


AD-A202 758

COPY

1



AIR WAR COLLEGE


RESEARCH REPORT

UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES BASES AGREEMENTS:
PROSPECT FOR ITS RENEWAL

DTIC
ELECTE
S JAN 1 1 1989 D
BD

COLONEL SAMSON M. MAHIMER

1988



89 1 11 057
AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION
UNLIMITED

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

United States-Philippines Bases Agreement:
Prospect for its Renewal

by

Samson M. Mahimer

Colonel, Philippine Air Force

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty in Fulfillment
of the Research Requirement

Research Advisor: Col David Kimball, United States Air Force

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 1988

DISCLAIMER

This research report represents the views of the author and does not reflect the official opinion of the Philippine Government and the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but, is the property of the United States Government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without the permission of the Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Loan copies of this document may be obtained through the interlibrary loan desk of the Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 35112-55464 (telephone: (205) 293-7223 or AUTOVON 875-7223).

AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

**TITLE: United States-Philippines Bases Agreement:
Prospect for its Renewal**

AUTHOR: Samson M Mahimer, Colonel, Philippine Air Force

Remarks on the problems and issues related to the United States-Philippines Bases Agreement and prospect for its renewal. An analysis of the provisions of the new Philippine Constitution; ASEAN perspective on the bases; US policy on nuclear weapons and its interests and options; Philippine interests and priorities, including alternate plans to compensate for the possible withdrawal of the US from the Philippines; and then an assessment of the effects of these factors on the renewal of the Bases Agreement. There are difficulties and barriers to the renewal of the said Agreement posed by conflicting policies of both parties and also due to divergent views on priorities, constitutional processes of both countries, and time constraints for concluding an agreement. However there are options for the United States regarding the problem, depending upon the desired level of its presence in Asia/Pacific region and how central the Philippine bases are to US national security interests.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Samson M Mahimer, Philippine Air Force, General Staff Corps, (Bachelor of Arts, Guagua National Colleges, Philippines and M.A. Political Science, Auburn University, Alabama) has been interested in international relations since 1976 when he joined the Philippine Air Force Intelligence. He has travelled in China, ASEAN, Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and the United States. He served as an F-5 fighter pilot and an instructor pilot in the early part of his career. He served as an operations branch chief in the Headquarters Philippine Air Force, then became the Air Intelligence Operations Director in the seventies. He also served as the Senior Military Assistant to the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Philippines in 1981-1983. He is a 1979 graduate of Air Command and Staff College resident course. He has lectured in various colleges, universities and service schools in the Philippines. Col Mahimer is a member of Class 1988 of Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author expresses his gratitude to the following without whose help this study would not have been possible:

Col David Kimball, USAF, my adviser, whose professional expertise provided me with guidance and some materials in completing this study;

Brigadier General Isidro B Agunod, Armed Forces of the Philippines Retired, former Commandant, AFP, Command and General Staff College, Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, Philippines;

My wife, [REDACTED] with whom my discussions, increased my insights into the issues involved.



Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
Disclaimer.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Biographical Sketch.....	iv
Acknowledgement.....	v
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Purpose and Scope	1
B. Methods and Problems	3
C. Definitions	4
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	6
A. American Presence in Asia	6
B. United States-Philippines Alliance	9
C. The United States-Philippines Defense Treaty	13
D. Description of the Facilities	14
III. DISCUSSION	17
A. Problems and Issues	17
B. Provisions of the Philippine Constitution	41
C. ASEAN Perspective on the Bases in the Philippines	43
D. United States' Interests in the Philippines	49
E. Philippine Interests Regarding the Bases	53
F. Options of the United States	57
G. Options of the Philippines	67
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	72
A. Conclusion	72
B. Recommendation	77

APPENDIX	"Summary of Economic Support Funds Projects Since 1980"	77
BIBLIOGRAPHY		80

#

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose and Scope

"Realpolitik", by my definition, compels me to write the prospect for the renewal of the United States-Philippines Bases Agreement. To me this subject matter is important, because it is tied to the security of Southeast Asia in general, and the Philippines in particular.

The subject is complicated because it deals not only with security but also the political, economic and psychosocial aspects of the relationship between the United States and the Philippines dating back to 1898. The problem of basing rights of the US in the Philippines has touched sensitivities of both peoples. No one could exactly say whose view is right. These sensitivities arise out of differences of perceptions on the significance of the bases. The United States takes the view of internationalism (global security and democracy), while the Philippines sees the bases in terms of nationalism (sovereignty) and economic development as priorities over external security. In a region like ASEAN where population is growing more rapidly than anywhere else, member countries worry about economic and political stability and security. Without these in place, the survival of their democracies are imperiled. Unmet expectations of peoples become a destabilizing factor, which communist countries

could easily exploit. In this sense, Free World security and stability in the East Asia/Pacific region become the concern of the United States, the leader of the Free World. The United States-Philippines Bases Agreement, the subject matter of this study, is one of the means by which the United States projects power in the East Asia/Pacific region, and to the Indian Ocean and Middle East. The Bases Agreement is a major concern of Filipinos too, for reasons of nationalistic feelings, economic difficulties and internal security. External security is their last priority as of now.

For a start, we are aware that the countries in the Asia/Pacific region have divergent priorities. The United States and the Philippines are in such a state of divergence. They do, however, share a common interest in assuaging the causes of growing unrest in the region.

The purpose of this research is to provide United States and Philippine decision makers an awareness of the prospects that lie ahead for the renewal or termination of the Bases Agreement. The interests of both countries and the security of the region will be better served if issues and problems are solved ahead of time rather than postponing the discussion until rushed against time. Difficulties are foreseen in the coming Bases discussions simply because of differing perceptions on the issues. Dealing with perceptions is complex primarily because, right or wrong, people's perceptions are always colored by what they believe as true. Nevertheless, there is a reservoir of goodwill and cultural ties dating

back ninety years between the two peoples that may be useful to negotiators.

This research attempts to cover a discussion on the prospect for the renewal of the United States-Philippines Bases Agreement beyond 1991, the expiration of the current Agreement. Specifically, it shall discuss pros and cons of renewing the Agreement viewed from Filipino and American perspectives. It shall also examine effects of Philippine constitutional provisions on national interests, the nuclear ban, and the issues regarding US presence in the Philippines. The analysis will be straight forward on different views and policies. From the discussion, options for the US and RP will be defined. Security interests of other regional nations will also be discussed. The paper will conclude with recommendations that may be useful for future negotiators.

B. Methods and Problem.

This research utilized the historical and descriptive approach. Primary and secondary sources were identified in the library research. Survey results of the Ateneo Social Weather Stations in the Philippines provided the data on the Filipino attitudes towards the bases and also towards the present government. First hand experiences of the author provided added dimension to the issues. Detailed analysis of Filipino perceptions are presented due to the fact that decisions are heavily colored by what people think and feel. All assertions and conclusions are straight forward, but reflect the

author's perspective.

There are two mutually exclusive but interrelated questions which this research shall attempt to answer. These are:

1. Do the conflicts between the provisions of the new Philippine Constitution, and the United States' policy of not acknowledging the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in the bases, vessels or aircraft destined to or transiting the Philippines, make the renewal of the United States-Philippines Bases Agreement quite difficult, if not improbable?

2. Can the United States government alone or in conjunction with the governments of Japan and/or other nations take economic, political, or even extra-legal measures to overcome barriers and difficulties in renewing the US-RP Bases Agreement or finding an alternative arrangement that will guarantee US military presence and unhampered operations in the Philippines?

Today, these questions are critical topics for discussion in both the US and the Philippines. Additional questions may evolve in the discussions, but will be limited to those that have direct bearing on the subject.

C. Definitions.

AFF - Armed Forces of the Philippines.

ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It is an economic association of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand.

BA - Bases Agreement .

Balikbayan - Filipinos who lived long overseas and are coming back to the Philippines

BLA - Base Labor Agreement signed in 1968 between the US authorities and Philippine officials for the purpose of resolving problems and issues concerning the Filipino base workers.

de Novo - start anew on a clean slate

EEC - European Economic Community.

ESF - Economic Support Fund. That part of the US-Philippines Bases Agreement compensation package spent only for economic projects of the Philippines.

HUKBALAHAP - Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, HUKS for short, (Peoples' Army Against Japan). It was formed by Communist leaning Filipinos who temporarily allied with the Philippine guerrillas and the Allied Forces in the Philippines to fight the Japanese. They were highly organized and effective, equipped with US weapons. They stocked weapons and equipment during the war. After the war they simply used the same weapons to attack the newly formed Philippine government Armed Forces. They were defeated in 1953 with the help of the US in terms of funds and modern equipment used by the Philippine Armed Forces.

JUSMAG - Joint United States Military Advisory Group.

MBA - Military Bases Agreement.

MBAA - Military Bases Agreement Amendment

MDAA - Military Defense Assistance Agreement

MDT - Mutual Defense Treaty

Mendicant - beggar like behavior

NFA - New Peoples Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Its orientation is Maoist. It was formed by Jose Maria Sison in 1969.

POL - Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants

Power - the capacity to make others behave or act in ways they otherwise would not do.

RP - Republic of the Philippines

Realpolitik - hard realities of life in this political world. This definition has Machiavellian connotation. It goes beyond the modern meaning as defined by Webster as, "A diplomatic policy on the aggressive pursuit of national interests without regard for ethical or philosophical considerations." Politics here is treated by me more as a science than a philosophy. It is cold and unfeeling.

Sari-sari store - In the Philippines, a very small store usually connected to the main house which sells a wide range of household items.

TUCP - Trade Union Congress of the Philippines. It claims more than three million membership out of the labor force in the Philippines with ties abroad.

US - United States of America

ZOPFAN - Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. American Presence in Asia.

The rationale for American presence in Asia during the Age of Imperialism (1865-1914), can be tied to the protection of United States' commercial and trade interests in the Asia/Pacific region. These interests were shared by Britain, France, Russia and Japan, which were then perceived as competing for territorial and market expansions. By the time the US purchased Alaska from Russia for \$7.2 M in 1867, the decision to expand had already been made by US decision makers. (1:117-119) The sinking of Maine in Havana harbor, Cuba, on February 15, 1898 brought the United States to war against Spain. (2:164) On May 1, 1898, Commodore George Dewey of the US Navy attacked the Spanish Fleet at Manila Bay, Philippines. After the defeat of Spain the US annexed Guam and Hawaii. On December 10, 1898, the Philippines, without the knowledge of the Filipinos, was ceded to the US by Spain through the Treaty of Paris. This gave the United States strategically located naval bases in the Pacific to promote and protect its interests.

Before the United States came to the Philippines, the Filipinos had been waging a revolt against Spain for two years. Initially the Filipinos welcomed the Americans, believing that the Americans came to help them in their fight against Spain. "At the outbreak of hostilities between Spain

and the United States in 1898 the American Consul in Singapore assured General Emilio Aguinaldo of Philippine independence if he became an active ally. . . . One month before the first American troops arrived, Aguinaldo's forces held all provincial Luzon and laid seige of Manila." (3:917)

By the time Commodore Dewey, attacked the Spanish fleet at the Manila Bay, the only remaining Spanish forces that were not defeated or had not surrendered to the Filipinos were those garrisoned in Manila. General Emilio Aguinaldo's forces, the Katipuneros, surrounded Manila, and it would have been a matter of days before Spain was totally defeated. Formation of a Philippine Revolutionary Government was, however, preempted by the arrival of the United States Navy. On June 12, 1898, Aguinaldo declared Philippine independence from Spain. This was not, however, recognized by the United States because according to President Mckinley the Filipinos needed to be helped to establish a democratic government. The United States, therefore, should not leave the Philippines unprotected from the imperialistic designs of Great Britain, Japan, Russia and Germany. (2:167-179) These are evidences that the US decided to have naval bases in the Far East long before it entered the war against Spain.(1:117)

Eventually the Americans were viewed as the new colonizers. This suspicion finally exploded in the Filipino-American war. "Dewey estimated 5,000 US troops was (sic) enough to end the Filipino 'insurrection' but 56,000 US

troops landed due to strong Filipino resistance". (3:915) The bitter struggle left more than 300,000 Filipinos and 15,000 Americans dead. The war ended officially with the capture of President Emilio Aguinaldo on January 8, 1903, and the surrender of the last Filipino General, Simon Ola of Albay Province, on September 25, 1903. (2:177)

B. United States-Philippines Alliance.

The history of United States-Philippine alliance indicates opposition to the first attempts at establishing military bases in the Philippines. Filipino opposition to the bases was registered when the Philippine Independence Act of 1933, known as Hare-Hawes-Cutting (HHC) Law was passed by the US Congress over the veto of President Hoover. The Philippine Commonwealth Legislature and the Filipino people rejected the Act at the insistence of then Commonwealth Senate President Quezon, the recognized Filipino leader at the time. The main objection to the law was the provision which gave the president of the US the power to designate Philippine territories as permanent military bases to be retained by the US even after independence. Upon the initiative of Quezon, the US Congress passed in 1934 the Tydings-Mc Duffie Law to replace the HHC Law. This law merely provided authority for naval reservations and fueling stations in the Philippines, and gave the US President only the authority to negotiate with the Philippine government for that purpose. (4:20 and 5:234)

World War II broke out in the Pacific when Japan attacked the US Forces in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and in the Philippines. In 1944 the US Congress passed Joint Resolution Number 93 vesting the US President with the authority to determine military bases in the Philippines. Resolution 93 states:

"The President of the United States is hereby authorized to withhold or acquire and to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto, in addition to any provided by the Tydings-Mcduffie Law . . . for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and the United States." (5:235 and 9:5-6) Philippine Commonwealth President Quezon, sick with tuberculosis at that time, headed the Philippine Commonwealth in exile in the United States. This probably explains why there was no opposition to the said resolution, which Filipinos considered to be more unfair than the HHC Law. (4:20-21)

The United States-Philippines Bases Agreement, negotiated in 1946, was signed in 1947. It provided basing rights of the United States forces in the Philippines for 99 years. The Bases Agreement came not as a surprise. Although it was completed in 1947, the unilateral passage of US Congress Joint Resolution Number 93 in 1944 anticipated it. The intention of the US was clearly to expand its influence in the Philippines even after independence. In the 1900 debate over the retention of the Philippines as an American colony, US Senator Alfred U. Beveridge said, "The Philippines are ours forever. . . . This island empire is the last land left

in the oceans. . . . Our largest trade henceforth must be Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. More and more Europe will manufacture the most it needs, secure from its colonies the most it consumes. Where shall we turn for our consumers for our surplus? Geography answers the question. China is our natural customer. . . . The Philippines gives us a base at the door of all the East . . . lines of navigation from our ports to the orient and Australia; from the Isthman canal to Asia (are trade routes that) coverge at the oceans separated by the Philippines." (6:5)

Filipino nationalists opposed the presence of the US bases/facilities in the Philippines, claiming that they impinged on Philippine sovereignty. Among those who opposed the bases just after World War II was Senator Claro Recto, who was labelled as communist. Oppositions to the apparently inequitable provisions of the agreement continued to grow prompting the Philippine government to seek negotiation with the US. In 1959 the Philippines and the United States agreed to reduce the 99 year term to 25 years, and further, that the bases be declared as Philippine bases with US facilities in them. (5:235) This became a reality only in 1979 when formal turnover was effected and the Philippine flag was raised alone indicating full sovereignty over the bases.

This failed to satisfy the oppositionists. They wanted the US to either completely withdraw from the Philippines, or pay rent which should be more than the of \$900 million of aid for five years which it presently gives in exchange for the

use of the bases. They argued that the Philippines was in effect forced to agree to the terms and conditions of the 1947 agreement. The Agreement was negotiated when the Philippines had not yet recovered from the devastation of World War II, "second only to Warsaw". (3:915-917) The economy was destroyed. There were no political or administrative agencies properly operating. Most of the bright young men were either dead or maimed by the war. Those who survived the war were more concerned with satisfying hunger. And the people running the government were those who collaborated with the Japanese.

The impact in the Philippines of the devastation had a long term effect on its people and political institutions in terms of its ability to administer its internal affairs. Corruption became almost institutionalized, election to public office, in many instances, was a means of upward mobility and influence, identity as a people became muddled and dependence on US economy perpetuated. Many Filipinos today believe that the Philippines should not have been given back its independence in 1946 but much later, considering its prostrate situation at that time when society was practically in chaos. The condition of the Filipinos after regaining independence from the US in 1946 was much more difficult for self rule than in 1898 when Aguinaldo declared Philippine independence from Spain. The society was in state of anomie that easily laid the environment for corruption and crime. The Philippines should first have been helped by the US in

reestablishing order in society before independence. Instead, the oppositionists argue, the US practically forced onerous conditions on a nation so dissipated by war, not of its own making. (7:22-23) However, the US was true to its promise to give back independence to the Filipinos after twelve years reckoning from 1934. The original date of independence was supposed to be 1944, but the war intervened so the US had to wait until July 4, 1946.

After World War II, some Filipinos believed that the presence of the United States military in the Philippines was necessary to protect the country from another Japan. This belief was reinforced with the advent of a new enemy, the Communists HUKBALAHAPS or HUKS for short. Security of the Philippines could not have been assured without the help of the US.

The Bases Agreement has undergone many amendments since 1947, the latest of which is the 1983 amendment. But the latest amendment did not really correct those "onerous terms and conditions". In fact it even afforded the US the "unhampered operations", practically a license to operate at will in the Philippines.

C. The United States-Philippines Defense Treaty.

Philippine Air Force source shows that from 1946 to 1951 there was no mutual defense treaty between the US and the Philippines. (9:2-7) There was rather a binding US-RP Military Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA). The JUSMAG

Philippines, which was introduced as a consequence of the Military Assistance Agreement, apparently sufficed to meet the military relations requirements between the two countries.

On July 5, 1953, the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty replaced the MDAA. The Treaty states:

- Article IV "An armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its peace and safety and declares that it would meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

- Article V "An armed attack on either of the parties is deemed to include . . . the metropolitan territory of either parties or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific, or on its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific." (9:7)

The Korean conflict effectively changed the nature of the conflict in which the Philippines would be involved. To assist the US, the Philippines sent combat troops to another country. Officially, this action was in response to the United Nations mandate.

The MDT provided the authority for the Military Assistance Agreement. The Military Assistance Agreement subsequently became the basis for the Philippines to receive aid and grants from the United States.

D. Description of the Facilities.

Description of the current US facilities and the actual

sizes of real estate and capabilities vary according to sources cited. Even official Philippines and USAF/NAVY sources do not agree. This detail does not, however, significantly alter Filipino and American perceptions on the rationale of the bases. For the purpose of the present discussion the descriptions made by Grinter in a paper in 1980 on the Philippine bases, quoting from unclassified US briefings, will be used.

Subic Naval Base.

- "is a natural deep-water port which encompasses 26,000 acres of water and 36,000 acres of land;

- "has on an average day, from 8,000-10,000 US 7th Fleet personnel;

- "has a collocated naval air station at Cubi Point;

- "has a major ship repair facilities (does over 68 percent of all 7th Fleet repair work) and can handle 20-25 ships at one time;

- "incorporates largest naval supply depot in the world (handles over 2.5 million barrels of POL and one million tons of other supplies annually);

- "enjoys use of Filipino skilled laborers at wages 1/7 of stateside wage scales;

- "injects about \$145 M per year to the local Philippine economy;

- "employs 37,000 Filipinos in direct or indirect hire."

Clark Air Base

- "acquired in 1903; home of US 13th Air Force since 1946;
- "covers 130,000 acres of land in Central Luzon (larger than the District of Columbia);
- "directly employs a total of over 18,000 people of whom approximately 8,200 are US Military and civilian;
- "is the major military communications center (with an orbiting satellite) and transit hub west of Hawaii for all airborne activities in the western Pacific and from there into the Indian Ocean;
- "is the largest US air base in East Asia and third largest overseas, has all-weather runways that service about 12,000 traffic movements per month, can move 2,900 short tons and 3,500 passengers per day;
- "has the most sophisticated Air Force training facilities in Asia including missile firing ranges, gunnery practice fields, and an electronic warfare range;
- "constitutes about 90 percent USAF spending in the Philippines and pumps approximately \$60M annually into the local economy;
- "has major stockpiles of war reserves munitions and would back up Japanese and Korean bases in case of a new war on the Korean peninsula;
- "Serves as main US base support for Diego Garcia."

San Miguel Naval Communications Station.

- "serves as the center for all 7th Fleet naval communications."

John Hay Air Force Base.

- "facilities provide temperate rest and recreation;
- "serves as regional conference site and training facility for all US Air Force, Navy, and Marine elements in WESTPAC;
- "houses Voice of America (VOA) transmitter and facilities";

Wallace Air Station.

- "provides radar control for Philippines Air Defense System;
- "has a drone launch facility for PACAF intercept training." (8:65-66)

Presently, a parallel runway at Clark Air Base is being built. In Subic Naval Base, more buildings and other facilities are being constructed. These additions will increase the capability of the bases to support the missions of the Pacific Command, one of the operational units of the United States which has units in the Philippines.

CHAPTER III

DISCUSSION

A. Problems and Issues.

According to Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus, there are four major issues:

- "The effects of the constitutional prohibition on the presence of nuclear weapons in the bases;
- "The question of legal jurisdiction (or sovereignty) over the bases;
- "The question of US compensation for the use of the bases;
- "Problems of Filipinos working in the Military installations." (10:1)

The issues are broadly stated. But there are certain emotional problems and issues intermeshed with these issues that must be brought into fore. The main issues, as stated by Manglapus, remain the same but they have, since 1946, developed other contingent issues as perceived by Filipinos. These, I shall try to describe and discuss. The Philippine constitutional prohibition on the presence of nuclear weapons in the bases will be discussed later in this chapter.

Filipino Perception of Unequal Partnership: US Internationalism (Security) v.s. RP Nationalism (Sovereignty).

Perceptions on the United States-Philippine Bases Agree-

ment and treaties differ depending on to whom one talks. To the US, the Philippine bases are modest contribution of the Philippines to a guarantee of its security and the Asian region. For the Filipinos, while the bases are already called Philippine bases with American facilities in them under Filipino Commanders, yet in actual practice these Filipino Commanders do not have full control and supervision over the activities in the bases as written in the ammendment to the agreement. This is an indication, as far as they are concerned, that the US enjoys extra-territoriality in the bases. This perception bred the idea of unequal partnership that have grown to other emotionally based issues. The partnership, however, actualizes the historical, cultural, economic and security relationship between the two countries. The United States puts in funds, manpower and equipment to the partnership, while the Philippines is expected to contribute its territory for use by the US forces in service of "mutual interests". In the process the Philippines also benefits economically from the presence of US forces. Filipino workers are employed in the bases; and American servicemen spend on goods and services which helps the local economy. Military equipment, training in the US, conferences, exchanges, and joint exercises help to modernize the Philippine Armed Forces. The Economic Support Funds (ESF), a part of the bases compensation package, are spent on infrastructure and services needed by the Filipino people. (See Appendix, "Summary of Economic Support Funds Projects from 1980") Sig-

nificantly other countries see the US presence in the Philippines as a guarantee of security and are, therefore, more willing to pour investments into the country. The Philippines, along with the other countries in East Asia/Pacific region, is also assured of oil flowing from the Middle East. The Philippines is more than sixty percent (60%) dependent on the Middle Eastern oil which passes such choke points as the Malacca Strait. The Strait is critical to the noncommunist countries in the region because this is where the oil tankers pass from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Any instability in the region will threaten the flow of oil to the Philippines and other countries. The bases contribute to the security of the Philippines and other countries in the region, thus assuring free flow of oil - a task the US has to undertake since no other democratic country in Asia/Pacific region could perform. And since the United States has security and commercial interests in the region, the bases also serve the US. The Philippine bases are part of the US chain of defense systems running through Guam and the Hawaiian islands to the mainland. These forward deployed forces operationalize the concept that war should be fought away from the mainland.(11:25)

This security perspective is shared by most Filipinos as evidenced by the speech of President Corazon Aquino before the ASEAN Summit in Manila last December 1987. On the other hand, those opposed to the bases argue that Filipinos should assert their own self-determination of their destiny. They

believe that while security is important, nationalism and sovereignty are the most basic elements for the Filipinos' progress from a doleout economy to a place in the community of sovereign nations. Edward Taylor seemed to agree with this when he wrote in 1964, "Nationalism is the only force that can provide dynamism to make modern society in the Philippines and give to Philippine foreign policy the dignity and independence that compel the respect of others. It is the task of US policy to ally itself with Philippine nationalism and make it a positive force in the partnership between the two countries." (5:12)

The anti-bases groups argue, that in the first place the Filipinos did not invite the Americans to colonize them in 1898. The US came to the Philippines and stayed not for humanitarian reasons but to pursue its quest for imperialism and economic expansionism. Having successfully placed the Philippines under its domain, the US then tutored the Filipinos on democracy, but at the same time made them consumers of US goods. "Favors" come from the US to the Philippines with string attached. The Japanese attacked the Philippines in 1942 because the Philippine forces were considered a part of the US forces. The consequent Philippine involvement left millions of Filipinos dead. They further argue that the Philippines got its independence back from the US but at the heavy price of an imposed Parity Rights Agreement (Bell Trade Act of 1947) which allowed US citizens equal rights with Filipinos to exploit natural resources,

compete in business locally and the Bases Agreement that allowed US presence in the Philippine bases on terms and conditions that were considered a mockery to the Philippine sovereignty.

To the Filipinos, including those who are for retention of the bases, the "partnership" with the US is unequal, lopsided in favor of the United States. To them sovereignty can not be traded for money or any kind of US support, especially if these make the Filipinos vulnerable to US manipulations.

Security Concern: Convergence and Divergence of Views.

Opinions for or against the retention of the bases become more emotionally charged as the next review of the Bases Agreement approaches in mid 1988. Diversity of opinions between the US and the Philippines notwithstanding, they share a common concern for the hard realities about the security of the region. Their concern is the growing military presence of the Soviet Union in Asia. Most analysts agree that in the foreseeable future, conventional war is more likely to occur than nuclear war. To the superpowers, this is translated in their ability to project power. This will require the use of overseas bases or a very large naval force and floating logistics bases. (12:26-29 and 45:424) The US has many military bases/facilities abroad gained thru multilateral or bilateral treaties and agreements. However, some of these treaties and agreements are about to expire or

need to be revised. The big problem for the US today is the growing demands of host countries for revised commitments requiring more dollars from the American people at a time when their budget deficit is growing. One such agreement the US must deal with is the Bases Agreement with the Philippines, which will expire in 1991.

For the Filipinos, the immediate priority is internal security. They view the USSR "in-roads" in the region as a potential threat because of the probable USSR covert support to homegrown communist insurgents. They do not see any immediate external threat to the country. The Marcos legacy of poverty, unemployment, and a \$29 billion foreign debt exacerbate the probability of the communist insurgents gaining ground, and further relegates problem of external security to be last among their national priorities.

The Philippines Arm Twisted By the US in 1946.

The perception that the US arm twisted the Philippines in 1946 to agree on the terms and conditions of the Bases Agreement has been a lingering one. While this was touched in the earlier chapter, it is necessary to discuss it further to have a better understanding of the feeling which the Filipinos have harbored painstakingly since after World War II.

The Philippines regained its independence on July 4, 1946 barely ten months after the surrender of Japan. The Philippines lost three million lives due to the war not their own making. There was no existing economy; society was in anomie;

and politicians who could have ran the country were either those who collaborated with the Japanese or just returning from abroad. There were no effective political and administrative agencies to distribute whatever goods and services were made available from the United Nations. (13:9) The country was so devastated that the only buildings left standing were Malacanang Palace, the University of Sto. Tomas, and the Manila Cathedral. Hunger was widespread and survival related activities like robbery became the basis of factions and rise to power of the strong. Election into public office was a means to upward mobility and more power. These activities generated other forms of crime against persons and property which the young government could not arrest due to lack of funds and manpower. During this period corruption became almost institutionalized in the social milieu eroding the moral fiber of the people. Compounding these problems was the HUKBALAHAP (HUKS) movement, a communist inspired insurgency, threatening to overthrow the new government. Behind this backdrop, the Philippines negotiated with the US on basing rights including the US-Philippines Trade Act guaranteeing US citizens the right to own property, exploit natural resources and compete in business with Filipinos, who at this point were destitute and ill prepared to compete. The Trade Act, therefore, gave a good and profitable investment climate for Americans. (8:60-61) It was not surprising that while big businesses were owned by Americans, small cottage industries and corner "sari-sari" stores were owned by Filipinos. Many

Filipino historians now say that the Filipinos were nurtured by the Americans on democratic way of life, but at the same time were "tutored" to become consumers rather than entrepreneurs. Significantly, Filipino owned businesses were mostly service oriented, rather than manufacturing oriented. The Trade Act benefited a few landowner Filipino sugar planters and coconut landowners. The Act guaranteed preferential treatment of Philippine products in the US in the form of liberalized tariffs or outright tariff exemptions. The windfall, however, went to the exporters who were also owners of production means such as sugar mills, manufacturing and mining firms. These were actually in the hands of Americans. In short, many Filipinos believe that the United States arm twisted the Philippines to agree on the terms and conditions of the Bases Agreement.

The Enemy Given a Better Deal.

Filipinos saw the irony of their fate following World War II. After Japan capitulated, the US wrote its constitution then built up and sponsored its economy to grow into what it is today. The US also built up the economy of Korea and Taiwan, whose citizens fought the war under the Japanese flag. On the other hand, the Philippines had to make do with the aid from the US, which they considered tied to a string; good enough to keep them afloat, but not too small to let them sink. This act of the US infuriated the Filipinos, who felt that while many of their people died fighting the war of

America, they got less than the enemy. Further agravating this feeling is the fact that US aid is contingent on the "best effort" of the US President and can not even be spent the way Filipinos want. It can always be argued that legally, the US no longer had any obligations towards the independent Philippines except to honor its commitments under the treaty or agreement it signed. However, today Filipinos are more and more aware of the history of the bases and the special relationship with the US. So called onerous provisions of all the agreements/treaties signed with other nations, specifically the US, are the favorite topics of discussions in History and Political Science classes and teach-ins. In my case I was first exposed to the issues in 1958 in college. Since then I have tried to enlarge my knowledge on the relevant issues and problems. Admittedly many of the ideas held by some Filipinos are blatantly exaggerated or untrue. But since the 1960's the notion that "America is not all that good", is getting more acceptance. Whether or not this is true is not important as the fact that this continues to grow in the minds of Filipinos. And yet, there is still such a reservoir of positive feeling towards Americans as individuals, that given a choice a typical Filipino will still rather befriend an American than any other foreigner. To accommodate the apparent distortions of perceptions, most Filipinos view America this way: The individual American is sincere, good and kind, but the American government does not reflect these in its policies towards its

so called friends and allies.

Filipinos Doubt the United States Reliability as Ally.

During World War II the US had a plan to bypass the Philippines instead of liberating it from the Japanese. It was only at the insistence of MacArthur that the Allied Forces liberated the Philippines. The Filipinos now consider General Douglas MacArthur a Philippine hero, but they lamented the seeming reluctance of the US in coming to their support during the war.

Another controversial issue is the nonexistence of an automatic retaliation clause in the US-RP Mutual Defense Treaty in case of war or attack on the Philippines. The treaty simply states that constitutional processes will take effect in case of attack - a statement many Filipinos think does not guarantee adequate US response. I was a fighter pilot in 1968 deployed in Cebu, Philippines, when newspaper headlines said, "US Backs Malaysia" during the near confrontation of the Philippines and Malaysia over the ownership of Sabah, North Borneo. This hit the Filipinos hard. At the least they had expected that an ally would remain neutral, and at the most help the two countries iron out their differences. Although there is little similarity between the Philippines-Malaysia rift and a hypothetical attack of a communist country such as the USSR or China, which is the immediate object of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the impact of the US promptly siding Malaysia triggered overt

doubts about the reliability of the US as an ally of the Philippines. Immediately spare parts for fighter planes of the Philippine Air Force were either not arriving on time or not available. The reason given by JUSMAG was that the parts were shipped erroneously to Iran and Vietnam. Right or wrong this fueled the doubts of the people. The Sabah issue headlines evoked the very first mass protest in front of the US Embassy, and prompted the Philippine Congress to take closer scrutiny of US-Philippines relations. When the Philippine government started recalling its contingent of troops from Vietnam, speculation ran high that this was due partly to the 1968 incident. Right or wrong, Filipinos recall this incident as a pattern of how the US deal with its commitments in the Philippines. In the 1980 monograph of Lawrence Grinter, he said, "that the US should not agree to entering another treaty with the Philippines because it would be to the best interest of the US to keep the provisions hanging and uncommittal". (Underscoring supplied.) (8:60) The reason presented by Grinter was because the Philippines has territorial claims like Sabah and other islands in the Spratly group. Should it sign a treaty with the Philippines the US could become involved in an unwanted war with its other allies, if the treaty contains automatic retaliation provisions.

The Sabah claim was dropped by the Philippines in December 1987 ASEAN Summit, in a friendly gesture to Malaysia. The claim on the Spratly islands group, however, is still to be resolved among the countries claiming them: China, Taiwan,

Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. The recent ASEAN Manila Declaration says that all disputes and claims will be resolved peacefully among members and other countries with claims.

Many Filipinos suspected during the regime of Marcos that as long as the United States kept its facilities in the Philippines, the US kept its eyes closed to the corruption of Marcos and his cronies. They pointed out that it is impossible for the Marcoses and their cronies to have stashed away so many millions of dollars in the Swiss banks and in the US without anyone in the White House or the US State Department knowing or having an inkling of what was happening. The Marcos corruption and abuses has nothing to do with US response in case of attack on the Philippines. However, Filipinos believe that if the US was true to its ideals and a true friend of the Filipino people, the regime of Marcos which perpetuated their misery would have not stayed so long. They perceived that the US was more concerned with their "unhampered" use of the bases than the welfare of the Filipino people.

"Unhampered Operations" of US Forces Viewed with Suspicion by Filipinos.

In the 1979 amended agreement is the "unhampered operations" provisions which the Philippines was not able to block. This is considered unacceptable by many Filipinos because it actually gives license to the US forces to do

anything they want in the name of operations covered broadly by that provision. They argue that nothing will prevent the US from using the bases in launching war or covert operations against a third country, if it so decides. The Libya raid and the Grenada intervention are brought to mind. Nuclear threat to the Philippines becomes more imminent if the US uses the bases to launch an attack against an Asian power like the USSR in Vladivostok. My talks with some who participated in the drafting of the provision indicate that had Marcos not agreed with the "unhampered operations" clause the US would have engaged the necessary pressure to remove him from office.

Crime Jurisdiction.

The question of criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed by American servicemen still results in disagreements between the US and the Philippines. The Philippine officials points to extra-territorial rights "enjoyed" by Americans while on tour of duty in the Philippines. Edward Taylor said that the origin of such conflict was the original language of the 1947 Bases agreement which says, "The US have primary jurisdiction over all offenses committed within the bases except when the offender and the offended are both Filipinos, unless the offense is against the security of the US. The Philippines has primary jurisdiction over all offenses committed outside the bases, except in cases where both parties are members of the American armed forces, or the offense is committed by a

member of the American armed forces while engaged in the actual performance of duty. "(S:243) This problem was thought to have been corrected in 1965 when the US and the Philippines agreed to amend Article XIII of the 1947 Agreement on criminal jurisdiction by having an annex which clarified further on jurisdictional problems regarding crimes committed by servicemen, and civilian citizens of both countries. As per amendment the Philippines had since the "jurisdiction of crimes committed by US servicemen or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offenses committed within the Republic of the Philippines and punishable by law of the Republic of the Philippines."
(14:1091)

"The military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise within the Republic of the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the laws of the United States over all persons subject to military law;

"In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:

- "The authorities of the Republic of the Philippines shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction in all offenses except as enumerated;

- "The military of the United States shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all persons subject to the military law of the United States in relation to: offenses solely against the property or security of the

United States, or offenses solely against the person or property of a member of the United States armed forces or civilian component or of a dependent; offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty." (14:1091-1094) In the agreed official minutes regarding the said article, the term "official duty" is clarified. "The term 'official duty . . . is understood to be any duty or service required or authorized to be done by statute, regulation, the order of a superior or military usage. Official duty is not meant to include all acts by an individual during the period while he is on duty, but is meant to apply only to acts which are required or authorized to be done as a function of that duty which the individual is performing;

"Whenever it is necessary to determine whether an alleged offense arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by or on behalf of the commanding officer of the alleged offender or offenders, on advice of the Staff Legal Officer or Staff Judge Advocate, will be delivered promptly to the city or provincial fiscal (prosecuting attorney) concerned, and this certificate will be honored by the Philippine authorities.

"In those cases where the Secretary of Justice of the Republic of the Philippines considers that the discussion of a certificate of official duty is required in the circumstances, it shall be made the subject of review through discussions between appropriate officials of the Government

of the Republic of the Philippines and the diplomatic mission of the United States provided a request is received by the diplomatic mission within ten days from receipt of the certificate by the fiscal." (14:1095)

Some Filipinos are still not satisfied with the above amendments. They pointed out instances of "abuse of discretions" by base authorities in the issuance of "duty certificates" especially when the US Base Commander is not present, i.e. servicemen "even obviously" not doing an authorize duty are given certificates to evade criminal suits or "being transfered" before an official complaint could be handed down to the base authorities. They complain that the spirit of the 1965 amendment are still not properly observed by the Americans.

Labor Issues.

As far as Filipinos are concerned labor issues are still a reality in the bases. The Agreement of 1947 had no provisions for labor relations. It was only in 1968 that a labor agreement was signed with the base authorities. A reflection of perceptions of Filipinos on labor issues is summed up by Philippine Labor Undersecretary Carmelo Noriel when he gave a speech at the conference sponsored by the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) on December 2, 1987 on US-Philippines Military Bases and Labor Agreements. He accused the US base authorities of being "one-sided" in implementing the Base Labor Agreement (BLA) when he said,

"Philippine Laws on labor relations are being 'conveniently disregarded' by US authorities to the prejudice of Filipino base workers." The issue presented by him among others is that Filipino base workers can not negotiate for better compensation benefits under the BLA which was originally signed in 1968 and amended on September 5, 1985. Among the provisions of the the BLA Noriel discussed as he interpreted them to be are:

- "principle of preferential employment of Filipinos in the US Facilities;

- "on exceptions whereby management can hire foreigners;

- "on the manner of contracting out services that can be contracted to foreign workers to the prejudice of the security of tenure of Filipinos;

- "on the matter of arbitration wherein the joint committee as stipulated in the agreement should act not only in its advisory capacity but to render the final resolution on the issues;

- "on the matter of collective bargaining negotiations which should cover anything that has a 'cost' or compensation value." (15:12)

He observed that the biggest issue is the question of sovereignty and application of Philippine laws, wherein the interpretation lies solely on the US Commanders assigned in the bases. Noriel further noted that there is a need to clarify why the BLA is "silent" on several issues affecting labor-management relations such as, "equality of treatment,

the right to organize and bargain collectively, and respect for the sovereignty of the Philippines". (15:12)

The speech of Noriel seems more of an emotional concern for workers in the bases. For one thing the accuracy of the language used by Noriel on the BLA may be exaggerated.

To all the accusations of Noriel, the US believes that the base authorities have faithfully interpreted the spirit of the (BLA) which the Philippines had agreed in 1968. Furthermore, there is a continuing dialogue in the joint committee established to iron out problems like these.

The problem of equal pay for equal work relates to the above complaint of Noriel. There are many perceptions regarding this issue. The US argues that Americans have different lifestyles and the standard of living in the bases are much different from that outside. Pay scales are equally applied throughout the United States and its territories differing only on certain instances. Once the Philippines is treated differently from the other allies, the problem would become even more difficult to resolve. Furthermore, if Filipino base workers are paid much more than the workers under Philippine payroll, the latter would escalate their demands for wage increases. This might lead to industrial strife. This argument is valid considering that the Philippine businesses can not even afford slight increase of the minimum wage.

Racial discrimination is still aired by Filipinos against Americans. They complain that they are discriminated and not treated equally at work. However, there were more instances

of indiscriminate suits or complaints against Americans to harrass them for other considerations and or concessions.

Philippine officials would like to address these problems with US cooperation especially if the Bases Agreement is to be extended or a treaty effected.

Social Ills.

The military bases are seen by anti-bases groups as major sources of social ills and health problems such as prostitution, crime, drug abuse, abandoned or neglected children. They believe that the dreaded killer disease AIDS was spread thru the bases. It can not be discounted, however, that Balikbayans, other foreigners, like the Japanese, the Europeans and Australians, coming to the Philippines could have carried the disease considering that it is now worldwide.

These ills have become a national scandal and give the Filipino woman a very ugly image. During the last days of the Marcos administration the active "social life areas" were defended as tourist attractions and, therefore, good for the economy. Americans can not be entirely faulted on this issue. Admittedly, the government still has to exert tighter control on questionable places of entertainments.

Economic Views.

Oppositionists to the bases think that the present economic gain from the bases does not offset the loses from smuggling, blackmarketing of US PX goods, lost sovereignty,

and dependence of Filipinos on service oriented rather than entrepreneurial economy. The Philippines can not continue to be a dumping ground for US and foreign goods. If it wants to progress economically, it must develop industries for which it does have the needed expertise. The bases could be converted into an industrial complex and the rest of the real estate devoted to food production and agriculture. They insist that the vast commercial potential of the bases is sufficient to provide income to those deprived of livelihood in case the US withdraws. The economic returns will be much more than the economy the bases are now generating, in fact more than the mini-Marshall plan presently deliberated by some US politicians.

The US believes that the bases contribute more than four percent to the local economy. Ambassador Platt said that more than 68,000 Filipinos are employed by the bases which makes it second only to the Philippine government as an employer. Another advantage deriving from the US presence is the indirect economy which results from US servicemen's spendings. (16:5)

RP: Aid Connotes Manipulation; Rent Connotes Commitment.

Presently, the Philippines gets aid from the US on "the best effort" of the President of the US under the executive level Military Bases Agreement. The aid money, equipment for the AFP and other economic industries if totalled will add up to millions of dollars. (See Appendix, "Summary of Economic

Support Fund Projects Since 1980") But Filipinos think this is small amount compared to what is paid other countries. However, the controlling factor is still the US Congress which approves the budget of the US. In the past, the promised aid had been either cut or delivered late, depending on the situation in the US or the mood of the Executive Department, specially on the question of human rights. This led Filipinos to believe that they are getting uneven treatment. This experience now prompts Filipinos to insist that they be paid rent, not aid. If the Bases Agreement is renewed, rent is a commitment that can not be touched at will by either the US Congress or the President of the United States. Media talkshows and other such fora in the Philippines all point out that many Filipinos want rental, and at much higher levels than the present aid for continued presence of the US in the bases. But Secretary Shultz in his speech before the influential members of the Philippine Congress in July 1987 said, that the US was not going to pay any rent whatsoever for the use of the bases, and that "if the Filipino people want Americans to leave the Philippines, then we will leave". (12:26-30) The question of aid or rent is therefore settled by the statement of Secretary Shultz, unless the position of the State Department is altered or amended depending on how central is the US need of the Philippine bases. On military aid, many Filipinos think that the Philippines is only getting obsolete equipment like the "T-33's that can not even start, and the helicopters that are flying

coffins". (17:6) Of course, for those who understand aviation the quoted statement is rather rude and unkind, considering that it is not how old the equipment is, but how well maintained it is to do the job. The oppositionists' counter is that, if the Philippines is really important, then at least the equipment seen by the people should perform much better than 30 year old junk. The problem here is that, right or wrong, people relate these concrete examples to iniquities of the bases compensation package. Some observers think they are justified.

The United States, however, does not agree with this perception. Aid is given to allies through out the world. There is no precedence for the United States paying rental on the use of bases within the territories of allies. The United States has maintained a good record on complying with the "best efforts" of the US President in obtaining approval of foreign aid from the US Congress. The only times when the promised aid was delayed, reduced or stopped was when the US Congress was faced with necessary budgetary cuts due to various domestic agencies competing for funds that have become less and less available, security problems around the world required higher priority, or when foreign governments receiving aid have become hostile to the US. The US expects its allies, like the Philippines, would understand these actions.

Philippines: All Agreements Will Be in the Form of a Treaty. But Will the US Sign and Ratify a Treaty?

Today, the general consensus of the Filipinos is that never again shall any treaty or agreements with the US be written in ambiguous terms. That is why all the agreements and treaties pertaining to the bases should be embodied in a single treaty, ratified by the Philippine Senate and, if necessary, voted on by the Filipino people in a referendum. The treaty should also be ratified by the US Congress. But there are doubts if the US President will sign a treaty. If ever he does, such a treaty will be scrutinized thoroughly by the US Congress. In fact, with the budget cut backs in the US, the need for increase expenditures in services, and the seeming increase of isolationist attitudes of many US politicians, the same treaty may not even be ratified by the US Congress. There is a significant rationale for this. Why should the US pay such a large sum of money for use of the Philippine bases when their functions could be distributed to other Asian bases? The money could be used to develop alternative bases or build more naval ships and equipment to sustain power projection. (45:424) Air Force assets may be slowly reduced or Clark Air Force Base may be given up entirely, while Subic is kept until a suitable base is developed. The question of whether or not the US could afford to withdraw from the Philippines depends on how central the Philippine bases are to the US interests in Asia. The US Navy believes its response to war will be significantly

affected if the US shall withdraw. Admiral Long testified in the US Congress that the Philippine bases are vital to the interest of the US in the Asia/Pacific region. (18:16)

B. Provisions of the Philippine Constitution.

Upon assuming power in the Philippines after the 1986 peaceful revolution, President Corazon Aquino appointed a Constitutional Commission from among the various recommendees of all sectors of society to draft a new constitution of the Philippines. The Filipino people ratified the new constitution by a majority of seventy eight (78) percent of all the 26 million votes cast. The new constitution adopted most provisions of the Marcos constitution except those that gave too much power to the Presidency.

There are, however provisions in the new constitution which make the renewal of the US-RP Bases Agreement difficult, if not improbable. These are:

1. Section 8, Article II **Declaration of Principles And State Policies**, "The Philippines consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory";

2. Section 21, Article VII **Executive Department**, "No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate";

3. Section 25, Article XVIII **Transitory Provisions**, "After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the

Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State". (19:2-64)

Immediately after the constitution was ratified, Filipino nationalists, concerned citizens, and anti-nuclear groups filed separate bills in both houses of the Philippine Congress proposing to implement immediately the banning of nuclear weapons, both in whole and in part, from the Philippines. The two bills are now pending. Many believe that the Congress would vote for the ban. Analysts predict that the Philippine Senate is the key to the passage or non-passage of the bills.

Nuclear Policy of the Philippines and the United States on Collision Course.

The nuclear ban provision of the constitution collides directly with the United States' policy of not declaring the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in the bases, vessels or aircraft destined to or transiting the Philippines. This will make the renewal of the bases agreement difficult, if not improbable. Unless the Philippines expands interpretation of the national interest provisions of the constitu-

tion to accommodate US interest, it is very doubtful that the US will sign a treaty with the Philippines. The nuclear ban portion of the provision, makes the utility of the bases very limited for deterrence and power projection. It will of course be too ambitious for the Philippines to even consider that the US would revise its policy on nuclear weapons just to retain the bases. A case in point is the policy of New Zealand which adopted a hardline approach against US nuclear ships making "port call" visits to New Zealand. The US cut off aid to New Zealand and suspended ANZUS when New Zealand insisted that the US confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its ships. Prime Minister Lange of New Zealand said, "that NZ can not be defended by nuclear weapons and as such NZ adopts a policy of nuclear free zone." (20:135-155) This could easily happen to the Philippines if it follows the lead of New Zealand. Unless the Philippine government has an alternate plan, the repercussions of a US withdrawal to the Philippine economy may be disastrous.

C. ASEAN Perspective on the Bases in the Philippines.

The best gauge on the attitudes of ASEAN towards the bases in the Philippines is the Manila Declaration formulated at the Manila summit in December 1987. In essence it affirmed the member countries' desire for the Far East as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). They also adopted the attitude that the Asia/Pacific region should be a zone free of nuclear weapons. They, however, did not specify a date

when they would like this to happen. (21:1)

During the summit the question on the bases was not brought up, although the President of the Philippines voiced Philippine concern on regional security and the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Asia. She emphasized the presence of the United States in the Far East as a necessary counterbalance to the Soviets in Indochina.

The Philippines Seeks to Share with ASEAN the Responsibility for US Facilities in the Philippines.

Before the summit, Secretary Manglapus of the Philippines met with the heads of other ASEAN members to assess their consensus on whether the bases are necessary for the security of their country and that of the region. (22:9) Published reports indicate that Indonesia and Malaysia do not support the presence of the US in the Philippines. They would rather see Southeast Asia quickly become a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from nuclear weapons. Indonesia does not consider the USSR as much a threat as China. Malaysia is of the same idea and does not give credence to US warning of a Soviet threat to the region. Singapore openly endorses US presence in the Philippines to counter Soviet threat. (23:37) This is understandable because Singapore trains its Air Force at Clark Air Force Base. Singapore lacks the space for training its forces and only the Philippines has a modern facility for training in a realistic environment. More important still is the fact that Singapore is very dependent

on the US for trade of its products and as source of technology for joint ventures in industries. Further it is to be noted that Singapore's neighbors like Malaysia and Indonesia have been traditionally anti-Chinese and only the Philippines has accepted and integrated its Chinese Community. This pro bases view is shared by Thailand and Brunei because of the Soviet bases in Indochina. Thailand sees the USSR as a threat because of its expansionist surrogate, Vietnam which is practically knocking on its doors. Vietnam has occupied Kampuchea and there is no prospect that Vietnam will soon leave Kampuchea. But while the Indonesians and the Malaysians have stated their official stands on the bases, their unofficial support for the bases has been noted by foreign correspondents who interviewed their foreign officials. They see the US as providing the stabilizing factor in the region, while the Kampuchea problem has not been settled and the Soviets have not yet withdrawn from Vietnam. In effect the ASEAN members are in accord on the necessity of the US bases in the Philippines. (12:26-30) This could be one good basis for the Philippines to negotiate with the US on the retention of the bases in the Philippines. Having duly conferred with ASEAN members, the Philippines can not now be tagged by its neighbors as uncooperative on the establishment of ZOFFAN.

ASEAN Needs the United States.

ASEAN is aware that it would be to its interest if the US stays in Asia and that ASEAN must remain pro-west if it is to

grow economically. It can not emulate Marxist-Leninists countries as good examples of progress because their credibility is zero. Countries in the Far East are also aware that the USSR is trying to expand its influence in the region militarily and economically. (23:37) The Soviet Union, with its naval and airpower fully entrenched in Cam Ranh and Danang, have replaced the US in Vietnam. Strategically, the USSR has virtually cut short naval travel time to the Malacca Straits from two weeks to three days, posing a threat to the sea lines of communications of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and ASEAN. At the same time it encircles China from the South thru Vietnam and Kampuchea. (24:17)

The USSR Courts ASEAN Particularly the Philippines.

Although the USSR has a poor track record of influence in the area, the new leadership in the USSR has become more pragmatic and more diplomatic in wooing ASEAN away from the US sphere of influence. In fact there are reports that the USSR is offering a contract for the Philippines to build some infrastructure projects in Soviet Asia at an "attractive" price. There are also projects offered by the USSR as a joint venture such as:

- "deep sea fishing;
- "exploitation of non-ferrous metal deposits in the Philippines;
- "use of Cebu and Batangas shipyards for repairs on USSR commercial vessels for an annual fee of \$30M;

- "rehabilitation of Nonoc nickel mining in Surigao island with Soviet financing;
- "High voltage transmission lines for the Philippine National Oil Company in Isabela;
- "rehabilitation of the Philippine National Railways;
- "five year employment of 2,500 Filipino workers in the construction of a Ukraine steel plant; and
- "employment of 1,300 Filipino workers in the construction of an electronics plant in Moscow." (25:5)

The wages offered are comparable to those offered by the Arabs. Furthermore, the Soviets have offered to build a coal plant in Northern Luzon. (25:5) Other states in the region are being offered fishing contracts by the Soviets. While the cash benefits are considerable, the caveat is also obvious. The political savvy and style of USSR leadership has changed dramatically since Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok in July 1986 when he said that, "the USSR is also an Asian country". (26:51)

Soviet in-roads in Southeast Asia are in military, political, economic, social and cultural terms. At the bottom of these overt activities are covert activities to destroy the image, and the influence of the US. (27:24-25) The USSR, however, does not want direct confrontation with the US and vice versa. The most that may happen is for the two to fight their wars thru surrogates in the third world. The reason is obvious - the danger of escalation that could lead to nuclear exchange which would negate whatever interests they have any

part of the world.

Other Reasons Why ASEAN Needs the US.

There are other reasons why ASEAN sees the need for US involvement in the region. The US is a market for ASEAN products and the US with its economic influence can lead other western countries to trade with ASEAN. Increase trade for ASEAN products will mean more foreign revenues that could finance other needs. Thus it would mean providing more jobs to the population and meeting their expectations. To turn away from the US may be disastrous for ASEAN.

ASEAN is one of the most dynamic regional groupings in the world today. (28:1-6) Economically these nations have progressed ten-fold in twenty years. While ASEAN is not a military pact, there is a tacit and informal understanding among members to help one another when necessary. The Manila Declaration affirms the cooperation of the members in the areas of energy, technology transfer, tariff barriers, food, education, drug control, police and peace and order, transportation, and other economic necessities. In effect ASEAN is evolving to become another European Economic Community (EEC). The countries involved are of the consensus that they need the US as a source of funds and security equipment until such time that they can be self-sustaining. They see peace is now in the region, and they are uncomfortable with the idea of Japan becoming too strong militarily, China becoming too dominant, and the USSR intruding in the fringes of ASEAN.

Thus, it is only the presence of the US in the Asia/Pacific region that will check the potential problems of security posed by these nations. (29:1-2)

D. United States' Interests in the Philippines.

Mr. Gaston Sigur, US Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, US Department of State, stated the interests of the United States in the Philippines as follows:

- "Guarantee the external security of the Philippines thru the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty;
- "Support East Asian, Indian Ocean and even Persian Gulf commitments thru the bases;
- "Offset/counterveil USSR military presence and influence in the region;
- "Support the development of democratic institutions in the region." (29:1-2 and 30:1-2)

Grinter listed the United States' interests in the Philippines as the following in the order of priority:

- "Retaining the Philippines as a friend and an ally so, as to permit relatively unencumbered use of the local military facilities;
- "Maintaining United States investments and special economic privileges in the country, while expanding US and multilateral trade on mutually beneficial terms;
- "Encouraging the market economy of the Philippines to succeed, thereby reducing its emotional and mendicant aspects." (8:60-62)

Forward and Logistics Base.

The interests of the US in the Philippines center more on the second and third in the list of Sigur and the first in the list of Grinter. To be able to do all of these, the US needs the means to project power, such as offered by the continuance of the unhampered use of the bases. The Philippines is a part of the chain of US defense systems that runs from Japan to Australia. (11:25) The Philippine bases are the forward bases to support its commitments in East Asia, all the way to the Persian Gulf. Ideally suited for this role, these bases, specially Subic, can not be easily duplicated anywhere else. (12:26-30) They are geostrategically astride the China Sea and the Pacific Ocean and any power unfriendly to the US could threaten the sea lines of communication of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.

Support Philippine Development and Security Needs.

United States' interests in the Philippines include support of the country's development and security needs. Frank Carlucci, US Secretary of Defense said in his Annual Report to the Congress on the Amended FY 1988/FY 1989 Biennial Budget, "The US unequivocally supports the elected civilian government in the Philippines and our defense relationship rests on that government's success." (31:81) It is also evident from the same report that the US Executive Department has requested for FY 1988 the amount of \$110M in military grant aid and \$2.6M in military training grants, "designed to as-

sist the Philippine Armed Forces in meeting their alliance responsibilities by equipping and training them to protect the nation, and by enhancing their military professionalism. . . . Our current efforts are focussed on providing the equipment needed by the Philippine Armed Forces to combat the current communist insurgency that threatens the democratic gains of the February revolution." (31:85)

The statement of Carlucci is sweet to the ears of Filipinos. It is one evidence that the US will not abandon them in times of need. With the US supporting the Philippines not only in security but also developmental needs, the Filipinos look forward to a better future. Also the US stands to gain not only in prestige but also in influence if the democracy in the Philippines will survive. This is one good test of whether a third world nation wanting democracy can progress economically. After all, not a single country in the world today, including the USSR and China, that turned to communism have progressed. Today, the USSR have turned to the West for source of technology and improve its economy. China also radically revised its concepts of economy by allowing its citizens certain capitalistic ownership because it has realized that its economy and technology have not caught up with the West by sticking to hardline Marxist-Leninism.

Inspite of these unequivocal words of support there are still some Filipinos who doubt the real motives of the US. They wait to see these statements come to reality, then and only then, they say, will they be convinced.

Philippine Bases Not Irreplaceable.

But the facilities, while important, are not irreplaceable. There are suitable sites for future bases that could be developed in the US Trust Territories in the Pacific or the functions of the bases could be redistributed to existing bases in Asia and Australia. The US can also negotiate with Thailand for basing rights if it is necessary to get out of the Philippines. Another feasible site is Brunei, which has been sympathetic to US interests.

Political problems may, however, pose a problem on the Thailand and Brunei choice. For one thing Indonesia and Malaysia, which are the major proponents to ASEAN as Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality may object vigorously in public. The US Navy, too, believes that withdrawal from the Philippines will mean a delayed response to security challenges in the region. Furthermore, the Philippines is needed to provide support from the East Asia/Pacific to the Persian Gulf. Cost of relocating the bases will run to billions of dollars and deprive the US of the cheapest English speaking expert labor force in the world. More importantly, however will be the unacceptable idea of the US vacating its traditional presence in the Far East, leaving other powers such as the Soviet Union to fill the vacuum. The ASEAN can be seen as confident that the US will not withdraw from the Far East considering the potential problems its withdrawal would generate. ASEAN is also aware that the Asia/Pacific region is a growing future market for the US. If forced to get out of

the Philippines, the US may develop a very strong Navy to compensate for the absence of the forward bases. It may even engage in economic and political pressures on ASEAN, particularly the Philippines just to retain the bases.

E. Philippine Interests Regarding the Bases.

Plans for the Bases if the US Withdraws.

It is very probable that the US will cut off all aids to the Philippines if the US will no longer be allowed basing rights in the Philippines or if the Philippine authorities will insist on enforcing the nuclear ban policy.

However, anti-nuclear groups argue that the Philippines should not be coerced by the threat of cut off of aid. The bases, they say, can be converted into industrial and commercial concerns. Clark for instance can become an International Airport since the Manila International Airport is due for relocation. It will cost the Philippines more than \$2B to build another airport, not counting the other facilities and hangars. Other areas at Clark can be utilized for industrial complexes of varied technology. Subic can be converted into a commercial shipping, ship repair and maintenance center for the Asia/Pacific area. It can also be the center for marine related courses/training and ship manufacturing. Countries, which are having their ships repaired elsewhere, will be attracted to the Philippines because it offers much cheaper, and expert service from an English speaking population. The other facilities, like John Hay and Wallace Air Stations, can

be used for tourism and major conference sites. The San Miguel station can be the center for communications for the Philippines run either by the government or the private sector. Excess real estate can be converted into food production and agri-business concerns. The total revenues on these will be much bigger than the proposed amount of annual rental for the use of the bases. Besides, it will push up the prestige of the Philippines among ASEAN members. Then the country can be truly considered as sovereign. Furthermore, anti-nuclear groups argue, by adopting New Zealand's Prime Minister Lange's policy on nuclear arms, the Philippines will no longer be target of nuclear weapons. If it does not get rid of the bases and nuclear weapons, the Philippines will certainly be a target in case of nuclear war, then the United States will not even be there to cleanup the mess afterwards.

If the United States Withdraws, Filipinos Will Survive.

But there are those who believe that the Filipinos will survive if the US withdraws from the Philippines. The Filipinos have shown that they can band together to resist apparently insurmountable odds, like the peaceful revolution of 1986. In spite of the support of President Reagan to Marcos up to the last hour, the Filipinos succeeded in throwing out the dictator. (7:22-23) Recent revelations, however, by President Aquino showed that she was in contact all the time with Ambassador Bosworth, the US Ambassador to the Philippines, during the revolution; and that the US exerted efforts

to let Marcos get out of the country to avoid bloodshed. The efforts of the US culminated with Marcos being airlifted to Hawaii by the US Air Force against his choice, which contributed to the 1986 peaceful revolution.

The withdrawal of the US from the Philippines, the anti-bases argue, will not be any different in terms of human sufferings. In short, the Filipinos will survive. Past examples are many and among them are:

- The Filipinos fought Spain and endured for many years, later fought the Americans for over five years, when they substituted the Spaniards as colonizers;

- They fought the Japanese for four years, losing three million people in the process; and

- They endured more than 14 years of Marcos' and his cronies' abuses and corruption.

Oppositionists to the bases propose not to postpone the departure of the US from the Philippines after 1991. They argue that Americans are only pursuing their own interests and only heed the interests of others if these interests coincide with their own." (32:4)

Some also believe that once the US withdraws from the Philippines, ASEAN will become more cohesive and will not abandon the Philippines. This is based on the recent ASEAN Manila Declaration which states that members will share whatever things they have to help another.

Moderate Filipinos: Bases May Stay, But

The moderates, among them Senate President Jovito Salonga, and Senator Heherson Alvarez are more pragmatic. They recognize the economic difficulties the Philippines is in, although from the very beginning the Philippines had been against the bases. Due to circumstances beyond its control, the bases are a reality to its lifeblood. The bases in fact help in the flow of capital from abroad. Any grumblings on the unstable relations between the Philippines and the US are always connected to how much Washington is willing to give as aid to the Philippines. A press release from the White House, indicating political uncertainty in the Philippines is sufficient to initiate capital flight and cause investors to shy away until a definite trend of stability becomes evident. While the relationship of the two countries is cordial, with special concessions extended to the Philippines in the past, there are those who believe that this special relationship made the Philippines mendicant and vulnerable to manipulations. The US is, therefore, able to dictate where and how the Philippines is going. In effect the Philippines is not really independent and sovereign. To paraphrase Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Manglapus during his campaign speeches for senator, for the Philippines to be able to progress and have its identity, it must first reduce the father image of the US to that of a brother image. This will allow the Filipinos to chart their own destiny and be able to carve their own place in the international arena.

But this is wishful thinking, for to realize such a dream the Philippines must be at least self-reliant economically. Presently the Marcos legacy of poverty, massive unemployment, lack of food, lack of employment, \$29B foreign debts, the burgeoning population, dependence upon the United States, Japan and other nations for economic support, and a communist inspired insurgency make the dream of Manglapus a very distant future. The Philippines will need US military equipment and logistics to help fight the communists. By and large the Philippines may not be able to go it alone.

The moderates propose that the Philippines may allow the bases to stay provided the US agrees to pay rent instead of aid, and at significantly higher levels than the amount presently given as aid. Further, that the terms and conditions should be rewritten in the form of a treaty and its provisions should avoid the ambiguity of the existing agreement and treaty. The moderates believe that international realities dictate that the Philippines should make use of the funds from the bases for its economic recovery.

F. Options of the United States.

The probable options of the United States regarding the bases are very much dependent on what level the US wants its presence to be in Asia. It is also premised on the notion that there is not a single nation in the world that can force a superpower to do what it doesn't want to do, including leaving its commitments abroad. It is, therefore, assumed

that the United States will only leave the Philippines if it wants to, not because the Philippines wants it to. The question then is, the centrality of the Philippine bases to the interests of the United States. Indications show that the bases play an important role in the interests of the US in the Asia Pacific region. Will it want to limit its perimeter defense to the US Pacific Trust Territories and create a perception with the American people and its allies that the US is a diminishing Asian power? Judging from various authoritative readings as presented earlier, the answer to this question is also no. Will it insist on occupying the bases in the Philippines even if the Filipinos decide to terminate the agreement and thereby risk the probability of being trapped in a situation when an ultra-nationalist government rules the Philippines? Obviously, the answer is no. But if the US decides to stay, it has the "muscle" to do it especially if there is a clear danger that the USSR may exploit militarily its withdrawal from the Philippines. What is the purpose of the US constructing another runway in Clark Air Base and more buildings and facilities at Subic Naval Base that increase the capability of the bases to support deployed forces, if the US is not sure to stay in the Philippines beyond 1991? There are mix readings on these developments. To some Filipinos these are indications that the US will stay in the Philippines regardless of the outcome of the talks on the bases. Talking to Americans, however, indicates that these constructions have been programmed long time ago that should

no longer be postponed regardless whether the US should stay in the Philippines or not after 1991. What of the Filipinos' displeasure? Even the Cubans are not able to dislodge the Americans at Guantanamo. Will the US want to be an apparent hostage to the monetary desires of the Filipinos? Will this not become a precedent for other allies? What about world opinion? Can the US disregard the very basis of its credo of liberty, democracy and self-determination for all countries? These are difficult questions, and at this point I think the US authorities will only be the ones who can answer them categorically.

But the United States must have options to the bases. The following are proposed:

1. On or before the 1991 expiration of the Bases Agreement with the Philippines, completely withdraw from the Philippines; redistribute the functions of the bases to such other bases as Guam, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. At the same time develop Guam and other alternative bases in the US Pacific Trust Territories i.e. Palau, Saipan, and Marianas island groups;

2. To compensate for the loss of advantage, negotiate with Thailand or Brunei for basing rights and with Singapore for continued access to its facilities for US ships;

3. Negotiate with the Philippine government for continued US stay in the Philippine bases with offer of an economic package to help the Philippines in its economic recovery.

4. Pressure the Philippines by economic and political

means, alone or with the help of Japan and/or other nations, for continued stay of the US, unhampered, in the Philippines. The pressure may include even extra-legal measures such as assassinations, bribery, direct or indirect intervention, e.g. sponsoring a "strongman", who could be manipulated later once he is in "power".

First Option - Long Term Solution for a Basing Problem.

The first option is considered a long term solution to the problem of power projection of the United States. The US will have better control of the situation without being bothered or limited by bases domestic politics. Japan, may be expected to agree for as long as it reaps the benefits of the security umbrella provided by the US. The only problem with this option is that, quoting James Fallows, "None of the sites would be quite as good as Subic and Clark. Unlike any alternative, the Philippine bases are already there, and don't have to be built from the ground up. Furthermore, it would take \$5B or more to shift to Guam and Micronesia . . . and if the military wanted to make up for every minute of extra steaming time from more remote alternative bases, it would have to buy at least five to six more battle carrier groups at some \$10B a piece". (12:24) Add the cost of operations of these battle groups and the total cost will escalate further. The US will also deprive itself of labor which is highly skilled and very cheap labor compared to American, Japanese, Guamanian, Korean and Micronesian. Filipinos are

also fluent in English and have proven that they can easily be trained in specialized skills. But nonetheless, Fallows has viable reasons. To him, relocating the bases will be less costly in the long term for the US than taking the risk of fighting domestic communists or ultra-nationalists in the Philippines in some future date.

Second Option - Political Problems Might Be a Repeat of the Philippines.

The second option is also possible, considering that Thailand, Brunei and Singapore want the US presence in Asia. It is doubtful, however, if domestic politics and pressure from other ASEAN members, like Indonesia and Malaysia, will not be applied to these countries in the future, thus in effect simply repeating the Philippine experience. Also Singapore facilities are commercial, which presents security problems in shared use of dock facilities with ships from various nationalities, including the Soviet Union.

Third Option - May Be Attractive to Filipinos and US Influence Could Be Maintained.

The third option will be very attractive to the Philippines considering its economic problems. As of now, while the Philippines is aware of regional security problems posed by Soviet militarism and influence, its immediate concern is more economic than regional security. Philippine officials believe that a strong economy, which can provide needed jobs

for its increasing population, will solve the communist insurgency. A strong economy has a political dimension for stability and vice versa. (33:438-441 and 34:12) In fact even the problem of land reform could be solved by the people themselves once the economy moves from agricultural to semi-industrial. The landowners may opt to sell their lands and invest more in industries than in agriculture because they will be after higher profit yielding industries. It will be to the long term advantage of the US to support the Philippines in its quest for economic recovery. Sun Tzu said, "Generally the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this." (35:177) Although this statement is referring to war, yet it also applies to relationships. Rather than allow internal problems to ruin the Philippines, it would really be of greater value to rescue her intact. In this way, the Filipino people will be forever beholden to the rescuer, the US. This will play very well on the Filipino value of "utang na loob" or debt of gratitude. The economic package must, however, be attractive enough for Filipinos to opt for it than asking for an outright rental or payment for the use of the bases (36:13) But still the Philippines might insist on the nuclear ban to be complied with as a part of the deal. The US may find it difficult, if not impossible, to accommodate this demand, However, there are indications that, like the Japanese, the Philippines might close its eyes or may not even attempt to ask if there are nuclear weapons in the bases or aboard ships and aircraft transiting the

bases. (37:1)

Fourth Option - Cheapest But May Create a Strong Backlash Against Americans.

The fourth option is probably the cheapest for the US. However, it could create a strong backlash against Americans but it could be counteracted by the US if it so desires.

The Philippines faces extreme economic difficulties; therefore, the US alone or with other nations like Japan, could easily apply economic pressure on the Philippines to force an extension of the United States-Philippines Bases Agreement, including a provision giving "unhampered operations" to US military forces in the Philippines. This would effectively override the nuclear weapons-free provision of the Philippine Constitution, since the United States is not bound by that Constitution. Historically, this was done in 1946-1947, when the parity rights for US citizens and the MBA were forced upon the economically prostrate Philippines. (7:22-23) Presently Philippine debts now total \$29 billion and are still growing. Debt servicing of interest alone is already forty percent (40%) of its total export earnings. The base compensation package contributes about four percent to the total in-flow of revenues to the Philippines. The economic problem, massive unemployment plus the growing insurgencies will make the Philippines vulnerable to systematic US and Japanese protectionist measures against Philippine exports.

The US also can undertake extra-legal measures to override the possible barriers and difficulties of renewing the US-RP Bases Agreement. The assassination of Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, and President Allende of Chile are examples of physical elimination through US extra-legal means. These examples and others are confirmed by the following writers:

- Hartmann and Wendzel 1985 said, "CIA assisted coup against Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 (which paved the way for the restoration of the Shah) and the aid provided in 1954 in the overthrow of President Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala. (In each case, the CIA was acting under orders from higher authorities)". (38:173-174)

- The Great Decisions 1988 published by the Foreign Policy Association Inc., stated, "CIA also carries out covert action - political, economic and para-military operations designed to influence other governments. The CIA helped overturn governments deemed unfriendly, such as Iran(1953), Zaire (1960) and Chile (1973). It was implicated in unsuccessful plots to assassinate foreign leaders, such as Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. In 1961 the CIA masterminded the bungled invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs." (39:3)

- Also Cockburn 1987 said that, "the death of General Torrijos, Panama leader, had been engineered in 1981 by means of a bribe offered by the CIA". (40:114)

- Wypijewski 1987 wrote, "As former US Ambassador to the

Fiji, William Bodde Jr. said in 1982, 'A nuclear-free zone would be unacceptable to the United States given our strategic needs . . . The United States will do everything possible to counter this movement.'" (41:117-118)

- In the Philippines the Manila Chronicle Editorial of October 26, 1987, said after the failed coup, against the government of President Corazon Aquino, by renegade Colonel Gregorio Honasan last August 28, 1987, "The US Intervention No Longer Covert." referring to the alleged covert activities of General Singlaub in the Philippines; and the role of Major Victor Raphael, US Army, Assistant Army Attache to the Philippines, who was reported to have interfered by asking the assaulting forces against Honasan not to attack the latter. Raphael, the Godfather of the child of Honasan, was accused of aiding Honasan. Raphael was transferred out of the Philippines but the US Embassy in Manila declared that Raphael was acting on official capacity and that he did not interfere as charged. (42:4; 43:219-220; and 44:1-2) This interpretation of the incident reflects Filipino anxiety on what the US may do or allow "private rightist organizations", which are self-sustaining and self-reliant, pursuing privately foreign policies of the US.

- Woodward 1987 wrote that William Casey, former CIA Director, had collaborated with a Saudi Arabian Prince in bribing Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadallah in Lebanon for \$2M to stop his terrorist activities following unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Fadallah by a group paid \$3M by the Prince on

behalf of the CIA. Likewise the efforts of Casey included \$8M spent on thwarting Libya in Chad and \$2M on preventing Communists taking power in Italy. Casey was surprised at how "cheap it is for a one time cost to solve a gigantic problem". (46:30)

We may even go to recent Philippine history, to when the CIA supported anti-Soekarno insurgents in Indonesia. It was in the late fifties when fighters were launched from Clark Air Base, Philippines, making intermediate stops for refueling in southern Philippines for this purpose. Two aircraft (B-26 and P-51) were shot down over Manado, Indonesia, and one of the American pilots was captured. Indonesians selectively show to visitors these planes and now laugh at those days with Soekarno. I have talked to a few Filipino fighter pilots who participated in the anti-Soekarno operations under the payroll of the CIA. Up to now, most of them still boast of their cloak and dagger feats when among pilots during informal gatherings in the Philippines.

There are indeed many ways of undertaking covert operations to "set the stage" for a justification of overt or covert action in a country and achieve certain objectives that otherwise could not be done in a normal way. (47:24-32) Filipino anti-bases personages in the Philippines can be easily eliminated, or bribed into silence or cooperation with the US. Also sponsoring a "strong man" to take over the country is a possibility to insure cooperation for as long as the "new government" can be made to do what the US wants him to

do later. Surely, there will be a "Chi-hua-hua of a noise" against such an action if known. There will also be bottled up resentment about what a "muscled" nation can do to preserve its interests or attain its objectives. Worst still will be the rise of strong nationalism against the US, but that will be a different story.

G. Options of the Philippines.

The following are the options for the Philippines:

1. The United States' Facilities in the Philippines be allowed to stay, provided new terms and conditions will be negotiated with and agreed upon by the United States under a treaty which both countries must ratify through their own Constitutional processes.

2. Allow the United States-Philippines Bases Agreement to expire then negotiate "de novo" with the US a new basing rights.

3. Terminate the Bases Agreement before its expiration date in 1991.

First Option - Seemingly the Current Thinking in the Philippines

Today in the Philippines, current thinking seems to fit the first option. Philippine President Corazon Aquino had practically indicated the position of her government regarding the bases in her ASEAN Summit speech last December 1987, saying that the Philippine factor plays a vital role in coun-

terbalancing the Soviet presence in Vietnam. Many observers believe that the Philippine government favors the presence of the US Facilities in the Philippines not only for economic reasons but for security reasons as well. Although President Aquino had openly said before that she would keep her options open and would respect the Bases Agreement until 1991, present realities and economic difficulties will force her government to negotiate with the US for a new Agreement or a Treaty, but under new terms and conditions. The present Agreement is considered by the Philippines to be onerous, ambiguous and one-sided in favor of the United States. The terms and conditions could take many turns considering the kind of politics Philippine politicians are prone to play. Even social researchers are not much help in reporting preferences of the Filipinos because of their proclivity to say the things the researchers want to hear whether true or not.

Nevertheless, the first option presented would not be too far from what Filipinos want from the US. By allowing the United States to stay, the Philippines can look forward to better economic relationship with the United States. These include better treatment of Philippine exports, modernization of the Armed Forces, more benefits and better treatment for workers in the bases and more foreign investments to spur economic growth in the country. Once the economy is strengthened, political stability will follow and insurgencies wane. The majority of those who join the New Peoples Army and other insurgent groups/bands are not the ideologues

but the economically displaced. Even the land reform problem may be solved as the economy moves from agricultural to semi-industrial. Propertied people will voluntarily sell their vast landholdings as they invest in higher and more profitable technology.

A plus factor, therefore, for the retention of the bases is the pressing economic needs of the Philippines. Combining this with the concern for the Soviet expansionism fueling the communist insurgency and the long congenial cultural ties between the US and the Philippines favors a prediction for a new arrangement between the two countries regarding US basing rights in the Philippines.

Second Option - May Give the Philippines a New Base to Bargain But May Also Run the Risk of Losing a Friend.

The second option may provide the Philippines with the advantage of bargaining from a clean slate assuming that the US will wait that long. The US might decide to go somewhere else as Secretary Shultz has warned the members of the Philippine Congress in his speech of July 1987. In that case the Philippines might have no one to negotiate with, thus losing a good potential for economic recovery with the compensation from the use of the bases. The nationalists, the anti-bases groups and the USSR will probably have the biggest victory they have never imagined over the United States, if it decides to withdraw.

Third Option - Not Likely Due to Practical and Hard Realities Affecting the Philippines.

The third option while satisfying some Filipinos, is probably the most adventurous thing the Philippines might do. This adventure may satisfy the desire of those who advocate neutrality and freedom from perceive nuclear threat in case of nuclear war. The problem with this stance is that a total war chooses no limit. The Philippines may not be spared inspite of its being neutral because of its strategic position as a springboard for power projection or as a forward logistics base. Also, radioactive fallout alone from the nuclear bombs that may be dropped on Japan, Australia, South Korea, China, USSR (Asia and Europe), NATO countries and the US can not be prevented from spreading to the ASEAN region, thus negating its desire to stay out of the conflict. Radioactive fallout spread all the way to Australia and Antarctica from the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant accident in the USSR.

The Philippines must also not forget that the USSR has not abandoned its goal of global communism. Albert Weeks in 1986 said that all leaders of the USSR have always quoted Lenin in justifying their actions. "Leonid Brezhnev: 'In our times, the global confrontation between two worlds - capitalism and socialism - retains its full actuality as do Leninist principles on a class and internationalist approach to national problems In no way has Lenin's formulation become obsolete - namely, that to be an internationalist means to do the maximum in one country (the USSR) for developing,

supporting, and stirring up revolution in all countries'." (48:49) Weeks further quoted Stalin, "The victory of socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task. The revolution which has been victorious in one country must not regard itself as a self-sufficient entity but as an aid, a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries". (48:49) These statements guarantee the support of the USSR to communist insurgencies throughout the world. If there is no apparent significant Soviet support of the Philippine NFAs now, it is because the Soviets are just trying to woo the Philippines to turn away from the the US. A reality to consider is the immediate economic problems of the Philippines that must be solved. The economic difficulties have already assumed political dimensions that threaten the very reason of its survival as a democratic nation. Once the US pulled out of the Philippines, predator powers like the USSR might fully support the NFAs and establish itself in the Philippines just as it did in Vietnam and Eastern Europe. Others like Japan and China might decide to get their share of imperialism, however late it might be. Getting out of the graces of the US at this time is probably the worst decision the Philippines could take, second only to trusting the Americans when they landed at Manila Bay in 1898.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

A. Conclusion.

Provisions of the Philippine Constitution and the present policies of the United States on nuclear weapons will prevent or make extremely difficult the renewal of the United States-Philippines Bases Agreement. Even if Philippine officials broadly interpret the national interest provision of the Philippine Constitution to accommodate US interests, demands for payment or rental for use of the bases could pose difficult bargaining for the US President and may result in the US Congress disapproval of any treaty with the Philippines. Rent, rather than aid, would remove the power of the US Congress to amend the base compensation package as it sees fit. And, power is defined as the capacity to make others behave or act in ways they otherwise would not do. The US Congress will not let go of this power because of the ramifications to its other powers, unless a special arrangement could be made by the US Executive Department that will satisfy Congress. Further, a treaty like this might become a precedence among allies of the US so that more problems are generated rather than are solved.

Another problem that may come into the process is the time needed to complete the negotiation for basing rights. The remaining time might be too short to react and incorporate all the provisions that both countries may agree on into one treaty. This will affect the timely renewal of the

Agreement and the stay of the US in the Philippines. As a strategy, the Philippines may give notice to the US in 1990 that the Agreement will expire on a specific date in 1991, unless a new agreement has been completed. It will be up to the US to decide to leave. The Philippines knows that a superpower will only do things on its own not due to proddings of another country. Opposition to the bases will further grow before 1991 because of the massive campaign they are making not only in teach-ins, but also in almost all colleges and universities. The findings of the Ateneo Social Weather Bureau on the attitude of the Filipinos towards the bases is a definite plus for the bases retention today. (49:1-5) But it is believed that this attitude will start declining from hence on, particularly if economic conditions do not improve. (The anti-bases groups are saying that the US only talks too much of helping the Philippines, but in reality demonstrates that the help it is giving is only a palliative to be able to float, but not to sink. Although the present government of President Aquino enjoys an enormous popularity of more than seventy percent in the provinces and sixty five percent in Metropolitan Manila, many agree that the final arbiter of the Bases Agreement will be the Philippine Congress. What the President says about the bases will have very little effect on the actions of the Congress. Rightist groups will continue to berate the present leadership. However, this group is fading as a force in the Philippines since the people saw the clear intentions of the group of Col Gregorio Honasan -

"that of making themselves the dictatorial rulers of the country". (50:1-7) It is clear, therefore, that the Filipinos are wary of authoritarianism in whatever name it may come, i.e. benevolent dictatorship, "anti-communism", constitutional authoritarianism, etc. They have voiced their preference for a democratic government, even with its weaknesses and inefficiencies, when they voted for a Congress and their local officials. The benevolent dictator idea was popular during the early Marcos presidency. But the misuse of power and abuse of authority by Marcos, his wife and his cohorts, have once again confirmed that, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". Filipinos have already experienced losing their freedom and they know how important freedom is. I believe that one knows the value of freedom least who has not experienced losing it.

And another thing is certain, the United States will not be held hostage to pay rent on the use of the bases. It may agree to something like "funds for security cooperation" but never rent. It is also certain that the Philippines will not agree to the word "aid" as compensation for the use of the bases. It might agree to another term such as the term suggested above. Certain, too, is the recognition of the increased security problem in Asia/Pacific region, which ASEAN recognizes to include Japan, Australia and China, if the US withdraws from the Philippines.

On a people to people personal basis, there is a very large, strong and healthy reservoir of goodwill in both

peoples, the Americans and the Filipinos, which the US and RP decision makers can capitalize on to strike an agreement. In the Philippines, despite the many objections of some, it is almost certain that the Philippine government will offer to extend the agreement in the form of a treaty between both countries. The reason is more economic than a question of security. The Philippines is so much in need of money that the base compensation package is a major source of funds which the country could ill afford to lose. The Filipinos and the Americans will not throw away the strong cultural relationship which has developed over the last ninety years. Assessing the problem at hand, it might be that it is more of a problem of ironing out relationship than a problem of basing rights Philippines.

But it may be temptingly easy for the United States, acting alone, or in conjunction with Japan and/or other nations, to undertake economic, political and/or extra-legal measures to override the "nuclear weapons-free" provision of the Philippine Constitution and to insure the renewal of the US-RP Bases Agreement beyond 1991.

However, such measures would eventually be known and could trigger a Filipino backlash against the Americans in the future, and bring about a takeover of the Philippine Government by ultra-nationalists (like Iran) or by indigenous communists (like Vietnam), thereby bringing about a situation totally deleterious to the longer-ranged US Strategic interests in the Asia/Pacific region. But as the British Foreign

Minister, later to become Prime Minister, Lord Henry John Temple Palmerston, said in the mid-1800's: "There are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent national interests". Underscoring supplied. (51:95)

B. Recommendations.

For the United States option number three is recommended. It is the most tenable, and in the long term best assures continued strengthening of US-Philippines relations.

The crux of Philippine problem is economics. There is no foreseeable solution to the Philippine political and economic morass until a rational economic aid program is implemented. This option will provide just such a program.

A politically and economically strong Philippines functioning under a democratic framework is a more dependable ally than a dictatorship can ever be. The reservoir of goodwill the Philippines holds towards the US and vice versa will assure that the majority of Filipinos will always view Americans with less suspicion than they would any other nationals. The fact of their self sufficiency will, moreover, greatly minimize their resentment which is borne out of their feelings that they have been taken advantage of and neglected. With a stable economy and political stability in place, the US and the Philippines could then deal with each other as equals, but with respect and enthusiasm for each others needs.

Appendix "Summary of Economic Support Fund Projects Since 1980"

APPENDIX

Summary of Economic Fund Projects Since 1980

Region 1

Province	Number of Projects	Total
Ilocos Norte	45	\$15,104,910.74
Abra	32	7,214,252.00
Mountain Province	41	42,048,052.91
Pangasinan	30	6,739,591.12
Ilocos Sur	31	6,997,195.67
La Union	38	21,800,691.75
Benguet	77	45,209,456.10

Region 2

Batanes	19	6,330,000.00
Cagayan	59	36,341,237.00
Kalinga-Apayao	38	8,179,551.61
Ifugao	15	5,965,106.77
Isabela	52	9,507,056.44
Nueva Vizcaya	37	7,710,765.08
Quirino	22	6,321,400.00

Region 3

Nueva Ecija	85	87,464,419.16
Zambales	61	186,520,485.00
Tarlac	81	296,301,557.27

Bataan	43	151,595,616.43
Pampanga	124	243,019,233.95
Bulacan	69	57,822,904.01
Region 4A		
Metro Manila	218	65,927,976.00
Region 5		
Camarines Norte	19	5,230,306.66
Camarines Sur	74	15,439,284.11
Catanduanes	12	3,311,359.05
Albay	48	43,613,704.54
Sorsogon	42	7,973,278.99
Masbate	39	8,480,688.00
Region 6		
Aklan	44	7,883,799.74
Capiz	81	21,650,750.63
Antique	36	7,525,663.09
Iloilo	82	19,402,367.88
Negros Occ.	86	38,182,578.08
Region 7		
Cebu	112	24,543,984.45
Negros Or.	46	36,330,174.64
Bohol	68	17,482,282.50
Siquijor	7	1,133,326.60
Region 8		
Northern Samar	30	6,721,196.91
Western Samar	85	21,932,574.69
Eastern Samar	66	13,311,149.95

Leyte	181	36,581,134.05
Southern Leyte	44	10,335,260.76
Biliran	23	4,533,000.00
Region 9		
Zamboanga del Norte	28	8,306,003.00
Zamboanga del Sur	45	11,485,000.00
Sulu	27	4,635,000.00
Tawi-Tawi	13	3,779,000.00
Basilan	12	3,270,000.00
Region 10		
Surigao del Norte	78	19,573,671.26
Camiguin	9	1,940,000.00
Misamis Occ.	33	6,689,244.79
Misamis Or.	35	10,816,946.10
Agusan del Norte	27	6,701,228.85
Agusan del Sur	34	5,973,827.50
Bukidnon	32	8,470,000.00
Region 11		
Surigao del Sur	30	5,615,977.42
South Cotabato	27	8,991,071.27
Davao del Sur	34	10,018,518.50
Davao del Norte	39	7,200,334.18
Davao Or.	26	5,160,427.50
Region 12		
Lanao del Norte	57	7,157,500.00
Lanao del Sur	25	7,778,870.65
North Cotabato	31	6,760,020.00

Maguindanao	25	6,599,960.00
Sultan Kudarat	8	3,379,999.99
Region 13 (sic) (4)		
Quezon	56	9,224,116.50
Rizal	14	7,533,525.51
Cavite	40	8,210,727.45
Laguna	46	7,977,665.96
Batangas	54	40,335,032.68
Mindoro Occ.	49	7,905,839.50
Mindoro Or.	31	7,983,018.00
Marinduque	20	7,908,069.52
Romblon	40	7,491,973.50
Palawan	25	6,780,700.00
Aurora	35	7,692,455.00
Grand Totals	3,526	1,944,681,888.96

Source: Background on the Bases: Military Facilities in the Philippines, Second Edition, United States Information Service 1987 pp. 48-68

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Kinder, H. and Hilgermann, W., The Anchor Atlas of World History, Volume II, Anchor Books, Garden City, New York 1978.
2. Zaide, G., Philippine History updated edition, National Book Store Publishers Inc., Metro Manila, Philippines

1984.

3. The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition, Volume 21, Grolier Inc., Danbury, Connecticut 1987.

4. Fallows, J., "The Philippines: The Bases Dilemma", The Atlantic, The Atlantic Monthly Company, Volume 261 Number 2 Boston, Massachusetts February 1988.

5. Taylor, G., The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations, Praeger, New York 1964.

6. Almario, M., "No 'Utang na Loob' to Uncle Sam", Manila Times, January 26, 1987.

7. Conason, J., "Courting Disaster", The Nation, The Nation Company Inc., New York, July 4/11 1987.

8. Grinter, L., The Philippine Bases: Continuing Utility in a Changing Strategic Context, National Defense University Research Directorate, Washington, D.C. 1980.

9. Unclassified Briefing and Lecture Materials on the Military Bases Agreement, Headquarters Philippine Air Force, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City, Philippines.

10. Sison, M., et al, "4 Major Issues in the Bases Talks", Manila Chronicle, February 2, 1988.

11. Middleton, D., "Overseas Bases Critical to the US Military Posture", Air Force Times, December 7, 1987.

12. Gordon, B., "South East Asia: The Good News, The Bad News", Defense and Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C. September 1987.

13. Smith, R., The Philippines 1946-1954, AWC Readings,

MAFB, Alabama 1987.

14. United States Treaties and and Other International Agreements., Volume 16 Part 2 1965, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington: 1966

15. _____, "US Bases 'Disregard' Labor Laws-Noriel", Business World, Philippines, December 2, 1987.

16. Speech of US Ambassador to the Philippines, Nicholas Platt, before the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines on January 22, 1988, reprinted in the Manila Journal, January 31, 1988.

17. Fineman, M., "2 Copter Crashes Fuel Manila's Anti-US Mood", Los Angeles Times, November 20, 1987.

18. Richardson, M., "The ASEAN Scene: Regional Defense Links Under Stress", Pacific Defense Reporter, Trade media International Corp., Volume XIII Number 10 New York April 1987.

19. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, ratified on February 7, 1987., National Government Center, Quezon City Philippines.

20. Hanson, F., "The Trouble in the Family: The New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Policy", SAIS Review, The John's Hopkins University, Winter-Spring 1987 Volume 7 Number 1.

21. Marcelo, D., "ASEAN Leaders OK Manila Declaration", Manila Buletin Today, December 15, 1987.

22. Crossette, B., Manila Pushes for Common Policy on Bases", New York Times, November 10, 1987.

23. _____, "The Pacific Basin: Alliances, Trade, and

Bases", Great Decisions 1987, Foreign Policy Association, New York.

24. Ahmad, Z., "Asian-Pacific Security into the Twenty First Century: Political, Economic and Cultural Trends", Asian Defense Journal, August 1987.

25. Baltazar, G., "RP-Soviet Projects Planned", Manila Bulletin Today, October 8, 1987.

26. Hansen, J., "Moscow Looks East Part I", National Defense, Journal of the American Preparedness Association, Arlington, VA October 1987.

27. Hansen, J., "Moscow Looks East Part II", National Defense, Journal of the American Preparedness Association, Arlington, VA November 1987.

28. Address of Secretary George Shultz before the Wilson Center's Seminar on May 27, 1987., "ASEAN: A Model for Regional Cooperation", Current Policy No. 965, US Dept of State, Washington, D.C.

29. Address of Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, before the 1987 Mansfield Conference, Missoula, Montana, May 29. "The US, Japan, and Asian Pacific Security in Perspective.", Current Policy No. 974, US Dept of State, Washington, D.C.

30. Sigur, G. Jr., "US Security Interest in the Philippines", Current Policy No. 815, April 10, 1986, US Dept of State, Washington, D.C.

31. Carlucci, F., Annual Report to the US Congress on the Amended FY 1988/FY 1989 Biennial Budget, US Government Print-

ing Office, Washington, D.C.

32. Henares, H., "Make My Day: Repeatedly Raped, We Behave like Prostitutes", Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 9, 1987.

33. Bacho, P., "US Policy Options Toward the Philippines", Asian Survey, Volume XXVII, No. 4 April 1987 University of California Press Berkeley, California

34. Ottaway, D., "\$5 Billion Urged in Aid for Manila", Washington Post 29 November 87.

35. Griffith, S., Sun Tzu The Art of War, Oxford University Press, New York 1971.

36. Reeves, R., "US Military Bases Seen By Philippines as Real Estate Deal", Atlanta Constitution 25 November 1987.

37. Callo, K., "The Philippines Intends to Ban Nuclear Arms from the Bases", Washington Times 11 Nov 1987.

38. Hartmann, F. and Wendzel, R., To Preserve the Republic: United States Foreign Policy, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York 1985.

39. _____, "America in the World", Great Decisions 1988, Foreign Policy Issues Facing the Nation, ed by Hoffman, S. Foreign Policy Association Inc., New York

40. Cockburn, A., "Beat the Devil", The Nation, The Nation Company Inc., New York April 15/22 1987

41. Wypijewski, J., "The Fiji Coup: Was the US Behind It?", The Nation, The Nation Company Inc. New York August 15/22 1987.

42. "US Intervention No Longer Covert", Editorial of Ma-

nila Chronicle, Philippines Monday October 26, 1987.

43. _____, "Chiller in Manila", The Nation, The Nation Company Inc. New York, September 12, 1987.

44. _____, "The CIA in the Philippines", Foreign Report, Published by The Economist, London SWIA IHG 1962 April 2, 1987.

45. Friedman, Norman, "The Maritime Strategy and the Design of the US Fleet.", Comparative Strategy, An International Journal Vol 6 No. 4 1987, reprinted in the Current News, DOD Special Edition Mar 9, 1987.

46. _____, "CIA: Casey's Secret Service", Published by The Economist, London SWIA IHG 1962 October 3, 1987.

47. Emerson, S., "Secret Warriors", US News and World Report.

48. Weeks, A., "Intervention: When is it Just?", Global Affairs, Volume 1 Number 3, International Security Council, New York Summer 1986.

49. Public Opinion Reports Project (Pre-publication Survey Data Release October 1986 and March 1987), Social Weather Stations Inc., Quezon City, Philippines.

50. Letter of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, addressed to all Members of the AFP on September 14, 1987.

51. The New Encyclopedia Britanica, Vol 9 15th Edition, Encyclopedia Britanica Inc., Chicago, Illinois 1985.

#