English Historical Review

0013-8266/88/1945/0040/$03.00

*Britain and the Ukrainian Question (1912–1920)**

BEFORE *The Times*, in 1912, opened its columns to a series of letters on eastern Galicia, neither the British reading public nor the British government had devoted much thought to Ukrainians. Had they done so, they would have discovered only that the 'Ukrainian question' was amorphous, that it was relatively insignificant even in eastern Europe, and that it was apparently devoid of ramifications which could threaten the West. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ukrainians lacked homogeneity. Apart from their number – after the Russians, they were the most numerous Slavonic people – they possessed few of the characteristics which might have led to a broadly based 'national awakening'. They extended from the Carpathians to the north-eastern shores of the Sea of Azov, and from the neck of the Crimea to a point only about a hundred and fifty miles south of Smolensk, but they were an amalgam of diverse local communities whose territory included significant non-Ukrainian minorities. The vast majority of their number lived in the Russian Empire, but a significant percentage (in eastern Galicia, the northern counties of Hungary, and the Bukovyna) were subject to the rather different political conditions which obtained in Austria-Hungary. Their language had not been codified, their literary traditions were underdeveloped, their elites tended not to be native-speaking, their predominantly agricultural occupations militated against concentration in cities, their religious loyalties were divided, and their past contained no clearcut 'golden age'. In the main, they did not refer to themselves as Ukrainians. Russians called them Little Russians, Austrians and Poles called them Ruthenes. The terms Ukraine and Ukrainian began to acquire all-embracing connotations at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but only in the writings of a handful of Ukrainian intellectuals. As late as 1918, a British official with first-hand experience wrote that 'the average peasant in the [Russian] Ukraine' would say of his nationality, first, 'that he is Greek Orthodox', second, 'that he is a peasant', and third, 'if one insisted on knowing what language he spoke . . . that he talked "the local tongue" . . . he simply does not think of nationality in the terms familiar to the *intelligentsia*'.[1]

Clearly, British observers of eastern Europe were going to need special reasons for taking note of these people. Whilst the British were

* This paper is to be presented to the X International Congress of Slavists, Sofia, September 1988. The author is grateful for financial assistance to the Small Grants Research Sub-Committee of the University of Newcastle upon Tyne.

1. London, Public Record Office, CAB 24/52/4638, fo. 117 (italics in the original).

perennially interested in the activities of Russians,[1] only Poles, of the other east European nationalities, caused them more than occasional concern; and even Poles rarely troubled their conscience before the November uprising of 1830 or after the January insurrection of 1863.[2] The brief vogue which Bulgarians enjoyed in 1876 had more to do with British antipathy to the Ottoman Empire and the domestic fate of Liberalism than with sympathy for a struggling east European minority. The British campaign of 1882 on behalf of oppressed Russian Jewry began slowly and ended abruptly.[3] Ukrainians were far less likely to attract British attention than any of these, for they were not persecuted as violently as Jews or Bulgarians and they were not as militant as the Poles.

Ukrainians did not appear frequently in Britain's voluminous travel literature. Although, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, three British travellers wrote a little about both Russian and Austrian Ukraine,[4] and although a German whose work was translated into English in 1842 went so far as to say that 'the aversion of the people of Little to those of Great Russia [is such] that it may fairly be described as a national hatred',[5] a Pole who published a book on the Cossacks in London in 1848 treated the Ukrainian territory which they inhabited as a Polish preserve, and declared that 'The political existence of the Ukraine seems to belong to the past; since, in legitimate accuracy, neither government nor province of the Ukraine at present exists'.[6] In a two-volume work which appeared in 1870 and was several times reprinted, William Hepworth Dixon devoted a chapter to Kiev which clearly conveyed its distinctiveness; but since the author deplored Pan-Slavism, and correctly depicted Kiev as embodying a mixture of Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian culture, the city did not come out altogether favourably in his account.[7] So far as Russian Ukraine was concerned, Dixon's picture seems to have been the last to appear in nineteenth-century Britain.[8] Austrian Ukraine fared little better, to judge by the remark of a young woman who visited the Ukrainian part of Galicia

1. See, for example, J. H. Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950).

2. N. Davies, '"The Languor of so remote an interest": British Attitudes to Poland, 1772–1832', *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, xvi (1983), 79–90; P. Brock, 'Joseph Cowen and the Polish Exiles', *Slavonic and East European Review*, xxxii (1953–4), 52–69; J. F. Kutolowski, 'Victorian Provincial Businessmen and Foreign Affairs: The Case of the Polish Insurrection, 1863–1864', *Northern History*, xxi (1985), 236–58; P. C. Latawski, 'Great Britain and the Rebirth of Poland 1914–1918: Official and Unofficial Influences on British Policy' (Indiana Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1985), pp. 13–62 (on 1863–1914).

3. J. Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 71–3, 108–9.

4. V. Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to XXth Century* (New York, 1953), pp. 181–95.

5. J. G. Kohl, *Russia* (London, 1842), p. 527.

6. H. Krasinski, *The Cossacks of the Ukraine* (London, 1848), p. 226.

7. W. H. Dixon, *Free Russia* (London, 1870), ii. 71–7.

8. See É. Borschak, *L'Ukraine dans la littérature de l'Europe occidentale* (n.p., 1935), pp. 147–73 ('Les voyageurs étrangers dans les pays ukrainiens').

in 1890. 'When I went there this summer,' wrote Miss Dowie, 'I knew nothing about Ruthenia, and I don't feel my ignorance calls for any apology, for, if I may venture to say so, I have never met anyone who did'.[1]

More scholarly British authors served Ukrainians only slightly better than the travellers. In 1841 an anonymous writer in the *Foreign Quarterly Review* devoted a lengthy essay to the work of Mykhailo Maksymovych, one of the first publishers of Ukrainian folksongs,[2] but by 1873 British scholars had forgotten Maksymovych's labours. In that year M. P. Drahomanov, the principal Ukrainian political thinker of the late nineteenth century, published an article in *The Athenaeum* pointing out that the contemporary British Slavist, W. R. Ralston, concentrated on Russian 'popular poetry and traditions' to the detriment of the substantial Ukrainian material. Drahomanov admitted that 'the publication of South-Russian popular poetry took place long ago', but drew attention to the forthcoming appearance of a new collection which he was editing in Kiev.[3] Ralston took a serious interest in the new publication, as did W. R. Morfill, the other leading British Slavist of the late nineteenth century. From 1874, the two of them published a number of reviews and essays which evinced considerable regard for Ukrainian literature and the Ukrainian language.[4] It was presumably because of their interest that Drahomanov, on being obliged to emigrate from the Russian Empire in 1876, toyed with the idea of moving to London.[5] But he chose Geneva, and later Sofia, and in the remaining years of his life did little to nurture the British interest in Ukrainian affairs which had shown signs of emerging. In the early 1890s he contributed a long essay, 'Russian Policy, Home and Foreign', to the London monthly *Free Russia*,[6] but *Free Russia*'s circulation was small, and its editors, Russian émigrés, were less certain than Drahomanov of the need to distinguish between the Slavonic peoples of the Russian Empire. In a footnote to another of his contributions to their journal they argued that 'the expression "Russian" may, in

1. M. M. Dowie, 'In Ruthenia', *Fortnightly Review*, xlviii (1890), 520; Dowie went on to publish *A Girl in the Karpathians* (London, 1891), which concentrated on Hutsuls, a sub-group of the Galician Ukrainians.

2. *Foreign Quarterly Review*, xxvi, no. lii (January 1841), 266–89.

3. *The Athenaeum*, 29 November 1873, pp. 695–6; see also R. Zorivchak, 'Anhliis'ka presa pro Ostapa Veresaia', *Vitchyzna* 1986, no. 5, pp. 179–80.

4. For the reviews, see *The Athenaeum*, 29 August 1874, pp. 270–1; *Saturday Review*, 5 June 1875, p. 731; *The Athenaeum*, 8 November 1879, pp. 592–3; *Westminster Review*, lviii (1880), esp. 84–91. The essays included W. R. Morfill, 'The Russian Language and its Dialects', *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1875–6, esp. pp. 526–32, and *idem*, *An Essay on the Importance of the Study of the Slavonic Languages* (London, 1890), esp. p. 30. See also É. Borshak, 'Early Relations between England and Ukraine', *Slavonic Review*, x (1931–2), 159–60.

5. N. M. Diuk, 'M. P. Drahomanov and the Evolution of Ukrainian Cultural and Political Theory' (Oxford Univ. D.Phil. thesis, 1986), p. 224.

6. *Free Russia*, January–March 1891, June 1892.

many cases, be fairly used for Oukrainians, Great Russians, and White Russians'.[1]

After Drahomanov's death in 1895 Ukrainian matters disappeared almost completely from British analyses of eastern Europe. The 1905 edition of Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace's *Russia* devoted a little space to the failure of the tsarist government's 'policy of Russifying . . . subject nationalities', but spoke in this connection only of Poles, Finns, Armenians, Georgians, and Jews.[2] Bernard Pares omitted the question of the Russian Empire's minorities from his lengthy *Russia and Reform* of 1907, and R. W. Seton-Watson referred only briefly to Ukrainians in his *Racial Problems in Hungary* of 1908.[3] Perhaps because he visited Ukraine for the first time in 1908,[4] Pares made something of the 'Ukrainian question' in his contributions to volume XII of the *Cambridge Modern History*, which appeared in 1910,[5] but neither he nor Seton-Watson, Britain's principal Slavonic experts in the first part of the twentieth century, took much interest in Ukrainians before they became a subject of international controversy. Nevill Forbes, Morfill's successor as Reader in Russian at Oxford, took a less enlightened view than his predecessor of the standing of the Ukrainian language. He found no grounds, in his inaugural lecture of 1910, for regarding Ukrainian 'as anything but a strongly-marked variation of Great Russian'.[6] By the time he spoke, the separate identity of Ukrainian had gained a measure of recognition from the imperial Russian authorities, but Oxford's expert was less flexible than they. As 1912 opened, the only commentator publishing in Britain who showed himself alive to the possible existence of a 'Ukrainian question' was the New Zealander Harold Williams, and even he expressed himself very guardedly. Writing on 'The Russian National Problem' in the first issue of Bernard Pares's *Russian Review*, Williams acknowledged that 'A national movement is developing among the Little Russians', but he was unable to predict its outcome. 'Under certain circumstances,' he wrote, the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire 'might be assimilated with their Great Russian kinsmen, but the possibility that they may preserve their national distinctiveness is by no means excluded'.[7]

Williams could have been more decisive if the title of his essay had allowed him to deal with the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary. Nevill

1. *Free Russia*, April 1891, p. 5.
2. D. Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia* (London, 1905), ii. 462–4.
3. B. Pares, *Russia and Reform* (London, 1907); Scotus Viator (R. W. Seton-Watson), *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London, 1908), esp. p. 12. There were only about 400,000 Ukrainians in Hungary; Seton-Watson concentrated on the two million Slovaks.
4. B. Pares, *My Russian Memoirs* (London, 1931), pp. 184–7.
5. *Cambridge Modern History*, xii, ed. A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, S. Leathes (Cambridge, 1910), p. 339.
6. N. Forbes, *The Position of the Slavonic Languages at the Present Day* (Oxford, 1910), p. 29.
7. H. Williams, 'The Russian National Problem', *Russian Review*, i, no. 1 (1912), 37.

Forbes had ended the Ukrainian section of his 1910 lecture by admitting, almost in parentheses: 'Whether the Little Russians of Austrian Galicia succeed in artificially elaborating a different language is another question'.[1] Forbes's understanding of the language question in the Ukrainian part of Galicia was extremely primitive,[2] but he sensed that developments in the region militated against the view that Ukrainians were of no account. In this he showed insight, for in 1912 Austrian Ukraine became internationally contentious and started to appear frequently in the British press. Between then and 1920, when the Paris Peace Conference ended and the Bolsheviks won the Russian Civil War, Ukrainians could never be wholly eliminated from the deliberations of west Europeans who took an interest in the fluid politics of the east. Although, at first, only Austrian Ukraine seemed to pose problems which involved outsiders, finding out about Galician Ukrainians entailed finding out about the entire ethnic group to which they belonged; and before they fell silent, Ukrainians under Russian tutelage had found their voice. Ukrainian communities either side of the pre-1914 frontier between Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire came to embody, between 1912 and 1920, issues which Britain could not afford to ignore.

In eastern Galicia, the preservation of a Ukrainian national identity was assured by the time Harold Williams alluded to Ukrainians in his essay on 'The Russian National Problem'. Poles dominated Galicia as a whole, but their numerical majority was concentrated in the western part of the province. Political conditions in the eastern part hardly favoured Ukrainians, but they were easier than those which obtained under the tsar, and Ukrainians exploited them to good purpose. Up to a point, Ukrainians benefited from the fact that they lived on both sides of the Austro-Russian frontier. Division seemed to weaken them, but the different paths of development which it necessitated ensured constant interplay and created a sense of political, social, and cultural movement. Whereas some minorities of the Habsburg lands were awoken to a sense of their separate identity by co-nationals outside the empire, in the Ukrainian case representatives of a group inside the empire provided leadership for a much larger group outside it. The doyen of Ukrainian historians, Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi (a citizen of the Russian Empire who worked as a professor in Galicia), emphasized the importance of Galicia's Ukrainians in an essay of 1906. 'In relation to the Ukrainian lands of Russia,' he said, Galicia 'plays the part of a cultural arsenal'. In direct allusion to the way in which Italy

1. Forbes, *Position of the Slavonic Languages*, p. 29.

2. For a modern analysis see P. R. Magocsi, 'The Language Question as a Factor in the National Movement in Eastern Galicia', in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ed. A. S. Markovits and F. E. Sysyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 220–38.

had been united in 1861, Hrushevs'kyi entitled his piece on Galicia 'The Ukrainian Piedmont'.[1]

Political figures in Russia understood the embryonic threat which Galicia posed to the unity of their empire. In the nineteenth century they took comfort from the 'Old Ruthenianism' or 'Russophilism' of many Galician Ukrainian leaders, but when, around 1900, these political orientations were overtaken by the alarming phenomenon of 'Ukrainophilism', St Petersburg responded in two ways: by moral and financial intervention in Galicia on behalf of the elements which were still sympathetic to the tsar, and by exerting diplomatic pressure on Austria.[2] To intensify the pressure, a Russian politician deliberately brought Galicia to the attention of the British. On 10 April 1912 *The Times* published a letter from Count Vladimir Bobrinskoi, a Nationalist member of the Russian Duma and the head of a St Petersburg body called the Galician-Russian Philanthropic Society. Bobrinskoi had been trying for some years to promote imperial Russian interests in the Ukrainian part of Galicia. Bernard Pares had met some of his friends in Lviv (Lwów, Lvov, Lemberg) in 1908, and 'did not think very much of them'.[3] Now, in 1912, Bobrinskoi attempted to enlist the sympathy of readers of *The Times* by foisting on them a highly misleading analysis of Austria's eastern province. He made out that his *bêtes noires* were the Poles. He claimed that in the fourteenth century they had conquered the 'Russian' (i.e. Ukrainian) population of Galicia, and that since then, whilst the 'Russians' had been 'firm in defence of their Russian nationality and Orthodox faith', the 'Polish conquerors' had done 'their utmost to Polonize and Romanize Carpato-Russia or Red Russia, as that part of ancient Russia is called'. Bobrinskoi maintained that the 'Russian' population of Galicia had been in particular difficulties since the Austrian defeat at Sadowa in 1866, after which 'Galicia came under the exclusive government of the Poles'. The 'Russian' minority had suffered badly enough in educational and electoral respects, but 'In matters religious their state is even worse'. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi was acting against the interests of his own people, 'and is doing all he can to Polonize and Romanize his Russian flock, of which he has proved himself to be not the shepherd but the wolf'. Having claimed that, for all its intensity, Sheptyts'kyi's 'persecution' was serving only to 'kindle the flame of ardent faith among the Russian peasantry of Galicia', and that 'the movement towards Orthodoxy is becoming wider and deeper every day', Bobrinskoi closed by appealing for an 'English writer' to 'come to Galicia and eastern Hungary, see for himself what is being done, and tell his mind and the

1. M. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), 'Ukrainskii P'emont', in *idem*, *Ukrainskii vopros: stat'i* (Moscow, 1917), pp. 61–6 (quotation from p. 62).

2. Magocsi, 'Language Question', pp. 225–6; *idem*, *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide* (Toronto/Buffalo/London, 1983), pp. 165–7.

3. Pares, *Memoirs*, p. 187.

mind of England to the persecutors through the medium of the British Press! So might their smiting hand perhaps be paralysed'.[1]

Bobrinskoi's misrepresentations were legion. Though justified in saying that Poles dominated the political process in Galicia and that the non-Polish minority resented them, he was wrong to call that minority Russian rather than Ukrainian. He was right to depict Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi as an energetic church leader, but wrong to call him an agent of Polish hegemony. Sheptyts'kyi was neither Roman Catholic nor Orthodox but Uniate, and stood for Ukrainians, not Poles or Russians. By refusing to acknowledge the existence of a Ukrainian identity, Bobrinskoi sought to confine the Galician problem to the sphere of Polish-Russian relations. He had in mind a day when the Ukrainian part of Galicia could be detached from Austria-Hungary, taken out of Polish hands, and incorporated into the Russian Empire.

The Ukrainian view of the matter, however, was not to go unheard. Volodymyr Stepankivs'kyi, a Ukrainian émigré from the Russian Empire, described his amazement at Bobrinskoi's *démarche*:

> Of what Russians does Count W. Bobrinsky speak? There are *no* Russians in Galicia. Of what persecution of Russian language does he complain? There is no Russian language spoken there. Count W. Bobrinsky exploits the similarity of words – "Roosyn" (a Ruthenian) and "Russian" – and tries to mislead the English public. How dare he speak of the historic Church of our people [the Uniate church] as of an intrigue of Jesuits? How does he not shrink from insulting publicly our Metropolitan, Count Sheptyski, . . .

Stepankivs'kyi seconded Bobrinskoi's call for an 'English writer' to visit Galicia, and promised that the visitor would realize 'that the Greek-Catholic Ruthenian people, whose "Uniate" religion is their historic religion, are valiantly struggling for the betterment of their lot, and that they do not deserve the enmity of the British Press, which Count W. Bobrinsky tries to invoke on them'.[2]

Russian and Ukrainian attitudes towards Galicia having found their spokesmen in *The Times*, Prince Pawel Sapieha spoke up for the Poles. Declaring his readiness 'to receive in Galicia any representative of the English Press who would care to judge of the state of things on the spot', he adopted a position midway between those of Bobrinskoi and Stepankivs'kyi. He agreed with the latter that Bobrinskoi must have 'intended to deceive the English public'. Insofar as any Ukrainians

1. *The Times*, 10 April 1912. For a fuller exposition of Bobrinskoi's views on Galician Ukrainians, see his book *Prazhskii s"ezd: Chekhiia i Prikarpatskaia Rus'* (St Petersburg, 1909); on his political outlook as a whole, see D. C. B. Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* (London/Basingstoke, 1983), pp. 128–9, and R. Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party 1907–1917* (New Brunswick, 1980), pp. 144, 192; on the pronunciation and correct form of his name (usually misspelt Bobrinskii), see B. O. Unbegaun, *Russian Surnames* (Oxford, 1972), p. 30.

2. *The Times*, 29 April 1912. On Stepankivs'kyi before 1912, see G. Y. Boshyk, 'The Rise of Ukrainian Political Parties in Russia, 1900–1907: with special reference to Social Democracy' (Oxford Univ. D.Phil. thesis, 1981), esp. pp. 421, 460–1.

in Galicia were Orthodox by religion (rather than Uniate), he believed that they had been attracted by Russian money, 'without realizing that it involves a change of religion and disloyalty to the State'. He accepted that about forty years previously the leading Ukrainian clergy in Galicia had been pro-Russian, but even then, in his view, the masses had not shared their opinion. On the other hand, Sapieha argued that questions of religion masked the true concerns of Galician Ukrainians, and that 'the Austrian Government may not and should not endure a propaganda [on the part of Ukrainians] which is much more anti-dynastic and detrimental to the State than religious'. In effect, Sapieha was making the case for maintaining Polish domination in Galicia at the expense both of Russians and of Ukrainians.[1]

The three-way debate between Bobrinskoi, Stepankivs'kyi, and Sapieha had the makings of a long-term correspondence. A few days after Sapieha's letter *The Times* published a 'protest on the part of the Poles of Galicia against Count Bobrinski's most untrue and unjust statements',[2] whilst in July it received a defence of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi from the 'Chrysostomus Society of Greek-Catholic Priests of Lemberg'.[3] Earlier in the year relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia had been improving, but in August *The Times*'s Vienna correspondent reported that the *Reichspost*, in that city, had taken the opportunity, in the context of Austro-Russian relations as a whole, 'to animadvert upon the alleged Russian Orthodox propaganda among the Ruthenes, or Little Russians, of Galicia'.[4] The dealings of Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians were beginning to have more than local significance.

At the end of 1912 the English Slavist W. J. Birkbeck attempted to lay the Galician question to rest. Having published *Russia and the English Church* in 1895, and having led a delegation of British bishops to Russia the previous winter, he was well qualified to assess the religious issues which played a large part in the matter. He went to Galicia, but managed, on his return, only to pour oil on the fire; for he came down wholly in favour of Bobrinskoi, and asserted that the Ukrainian population of eastern Galicia was Russian. 'Russian is the only Slavonic language that I can speak,' he declared in *The Times*, yet 'I must have had conversations with at least 300 peasants or townsfolk of the poorer classes', and had been understood by them; 'while in understanding them I met with not more difficulty than I have observed foreigners with a fair knowledge of English to find in conversing with my Norfolk gamekeepers and gardeners'. Birkbeck went on to assert that the Uniate

1. *The Times*, 29 May 1912.
2. *The Times*, 8 June 1912.
3. *The Times*, 30 July 1912.
4. *The Times*, 30 August 1912. For the improvement in relations early in 1912, see *The Times* of 6 and 14 February.

Church under Sheptyts'kyi was indeed an instrument of Polish hegemony, that 'Orthodox peasants [were] being heavily fined for attending and holding Orthodox services', and that Polish domination in Galicia was unjustifiable.[1] In a pamphlet entitled *Religious Persecution in Galicia* Birkbeck made his views even clearer, asserting that, '(*pace* Mr. Stepankowsky) "Ruthenian" is only Latin for "Russian"', and that 'In America, over 40,000 of the Galician emigrants have left the *Unia* [the Uniate Church] and joined the Orthodox community', which they could not have done as a result of the Russian bribery to which Prince Sapieha referred. So Birkbeck concluded in wholly pro-Russian vein, and averred that 'Count Bobrinsky's letter contained the truth, and, if not the whole, nor even half the truth of all that I saw, at least nothing *but* the truth'.[2]

Max Goldscheider, London correspondent of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, wrote to *The Times* to put Birkbeck right. Referring to 'leading German philologists' and to the Czech scholar Lubor Niederle, he claimed that academics unanimously accepted the view that the 'Little Russian' language and national identity were different from those of the Russians. He went on: 'The constant, and usually intentional, confusion of Little-Russian and Russian is one of the reasons why in latter years the little-Russian nationalists have begun to call themselves *Ukrainians*'. Goldscheider firmly denied the proposition that Sheptyts'kyi was an agent of the Poles. He pointed out that Sheptyts'kyi was 'constantly being denounced by the Polish nationalists for being an extreme *Ukrainian* nationalist'. He claimed that adherents of Orthodoxy in Galicia appeared to be growing in number only because 'there is an official department of the Holy Synod in St Petersburg for Orthodox missionary work' in the province. He agreed with Birkbeck only in one respect – in thinking that the issues at stake were important. 'This intricate little-Russian problem,' he said, 'is one of the two or three in Europe which after the liquidation of the Oriental question [i.e. at the end of the Balkan Wars] may turn out to be the very backbone of international politics in the near future'.[3]

Birkbeck attempted to refute Goldscheider,[4] but more important than their continuing disagreement was the fact that the whole 'Galician' correspondence was beginning to have an effect other than the one intended by its initiator. Vladimir Bobrinski had hoped to enlist unwitting British support for Russian attempts to claim Galician Ukrainians for the Russian Empire; but he had brought to light a larger 'Ukrainian question' of which British readers had been almost entirely unaware. And he had done so at a dangerous time. The Italian invasion of Tripoli

1. *The Times*, 3 December 1912.
2. *Birkbeck and the Russian Church*, ed. A. Riley (London/New York, 1917), pp. 308, 319, 321–2 (a reprint of the 1912 pamphlet).
3. *The Times*, 27 December 1912 (italics in the original).
4. *The Times*, 31 January 1913.

in 1911 and the outbreak of the first Balkan War in October 1912 (not to mention the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908) had made the decline of the Ottoman Empire, once again, a prime concern of diplomats. Although Galicia was far removed, geographically, from the changes which were taking place in the lands of the Porte, for some British commentators it belonged to the same spectrum of problems. Ottoman decline had always raised the prospect of an enlarged Russian sphere of influence, and if the tsarist regime were operating a forward policy in Galicia, it might also be doing so further south. As a link in the chain which extended from St Petersburg to the Balkans, Ukrainians were worth taking seriously.

So at least Bernard Pares seems to have thought, to judge by an article he included in the fourth issue of his *Russian Review*. Written by the Ukrainian Fedir Vovk, Curator of the Alexander III Museum in St Petersburg, it aimed to give a dispassionate view of 'the so-called Ukraine question, which has recently begun to attract more and more attention all over Europe'.[1] Vovk dealt with the history and contemporary standing of Ukrainians both in the Russian Empire and in Austria-Hungary. He accepted the centrality of eastern Galicia in Ukrainian affairs, and believed that it was only a matter of time before the area escaped Polish domination. He thought the Ukrainians of Bukovyna, south-east of Galicia, were 'practically in an equally satisfactory position; only the Ukraine population of Hungary, which has been forced to become Magyar, still awaits the moment for regeneration'.[2] Vovk closed his essay by listing seven steps 'which the champions of the Ukraine cause think necessary for the solution of the problem'.[3] He detailed political and cultural objections to these steps, and provided answers to the objections. His wide-ranging survey of Ukrainian affairs was undoubtedly the most judicious to appear in Britain before the First World War.[4]

A more impassioned supporter of the Ukrainian cause was by now addressing himself to the British public. George Raffalovich first seems to have written in any detail about Ukrainians in a letter to the *Saturday Review* of August 1912. Stepankivs'kyi had taken the magazine up on its discussion of Polish-Ukrainian enmity in Galicia,[5] and Raffalovich elaborated upon his letter. After asserting that, in the wake of

1. T. Volkov (F. Vovk), 'The Ukraine Question', *Russian Review*, i, no. 4 (1912), p. 106.

2. Volkov, 'Ukraine Question', p. 115.

3. Volkov, 'Ukraine Question', pp. 115–16. The steps included the use of Ukrainian in various educational and administrative contexts, the separation of east and west Galicia, and the foundation of a Ukrainian university at Lviv.

4. Vovk had been active in the Ukrainian interest since the 1870s; his judiciousness was further manifested by his co-editorship of *Ukrainskii narod v ego proshlom i nastoiashchem*, a substantial two-volume survey of Ukrainian culture which appeared in St Petersburg/Petrograd in 1914 and 1916.

5. *Saturday Review*, 27 July 1912, pp. 112–13.

The Times correspondence and other material in the daily papers, Britain was not so ignorant about Ukrainian affairs as Stepankivs'kyi suggested, Raffalovich conveyed Ukrainians' importance in three ways: by referring to their number; by acknowledging that some of them aspired to complete independence of existing states; and by pointing out that they posed problems both for the Russian Empire and for Austria-Hungary, not least by constituting a source of friction between the two. Claiming that 'The Ukraine was once the largest State in Europe' (presumably when Kievan Rus' was at its height), Raffalovich hinted that it 'may become so once more'. Superficially, he distanced himself from strident Ukrainian nationalism by attributing to 'some extremists' the view that a Ukrainian revival 'would draw the claws of the Russian eagle'; but the tenor of his letter implied that, if Russia were to be weakened by the loss of its Ukrainians, he would not object.[1]

Raffalovich's background and motivation are cloudy. He was not Ukrainian and had not yet visited any of the Ukrainian lands. According to a circular which he distributed in about 1914 in pursuit of lecture engagements, he had been born of an aristocratic French mother and a father who 'belonged to a well-known family of Odessa, in the Russian Ukraine'. He had served in the French army, become a naturalized British subject, and 'has since made a speciality of International Politics'.[2] The circular gave neither a date of birth nor the reason for Raffalovich's change of citizenship, but he seems to have been born in 1880 and to have come to Britain in 1906 or 1907.[3] The Raffalovich or Rafalovich family of Odessa were bankers, one of whose number settled in Paris in the second half of the nineteenth century. George appears to have been the grandson of this expatriate and the son of Artur Germanovich Rafalovich, an important intermediary in the negotiation of Russia's massive French loan of 1906.[4] The family name was Jewish, but George went to some lengths to deny his Jewishness. In 1915 he asserted that his branch of the family had become Christian three generations previously, and in 1919, in a private minute, he went so far as to say that 'Personally, I think that the Jews ... deserve all they get, by their exclusiveness, absurd nationalism within other

1. *Saturday Review*, 17 August 1912, p. 205.

2. A copy of the circular is to be found in London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, R. W. Seton-Watson papers, box 13.2, file 8, 'Correspondence regarding Ukraine' (hereafter Seton-Watson papers; not foliated).

3. The *National Union Catalog* gives Raffalovich's dates of birth and death as 1880 and 1958; the circular cited in the previous footnote gives few French publications after 1906 and no English publications before 1907.

4. On Raffalovich's probable grandfather see S. Iu. Vitte, *Vospominaniia*, i (Berlin, 1923), 213–14; on his probable father, *ibid.*, ii (Berlin, 1922), 192–219 (the chapter on the French loan). For references to other members of the family see S. J. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History, 1794–1881* (Stanford, 1985), pp. 66–8, 171–2.

countries, and by their "*middlemen* behaviour"'.[1] Undoubtedly Raffalovich spoke so vehemently because he had suffered on account of his Jewish background,[2] but he may also have been genuinely uncertain of his national identity, and anxious to find a people other than the Jews who would welcome his attentions. In view of his interest in international relations he had good concrete reasons for looking into the Ukrainian question, but beleaguered Ukrainians may have appealed to his heart as well as his head. He was not the only Jew to adopt a pro-Ukrainian stance at this time.[3]

In his first year in Britain Raffalovich published short stories and novels and collaborated with the notorious amateur of the occult, Aleister Crowley,[4] but from about 1910 he wrote chiefly on foreign affairs. In 1911, at the time of the Italian invasion of Tripoli, he travelled via Austria-Hungary and Romania to Constantinople, and on his return to the west wrote an article deploring the Italians' onslaught on the Ottoman Empire. He felt that it smacked of strength oppressing weakness, and that it might have the effect of driving Turkey into the arms of the Germans and undermining the European balance of power.[5] The same broad understanding of international relations provided the immediate inspiration for Raffalovich's adoption of the Ukrainian cause in 1912. His exchange with Stepankivs'kyi in the pages of the *Saturday Review* ranged far beyond the details of east Galician affairs.[6] By stressing, in two historical articles of early 1913, that 'In the seventeenth century the Ukraine was still an autonomous State, and the country and its people were of no small importance in the affairs of Europe', Raffalovich tried to support his view that 'the twentieth century may witness a return of the Ukraine to the rank of a European nation'.[7] In a number of other essays published in the same year, he addressed himself explicitly to the importance of Ukrainian matters in contemporary

1. *The New Age*, 11 March 1915, p. 517; Cambridge, Mass., Houghton Library, Harvard University, G. Raffalovich, 'Cuttings concerning Ukraine' (8 exercise books, 1917–20), vi (not paginated), handwritten comment on a cutting of June 1919.

2. The letter to *The New Age* cited in the previous footnote was written in response to an accusation that he was Jewish; incorrectly, R. W. Seton-Watson called Raffalovich 'by origin a Galician Jew' (Seton-Watson papers, letter to Van Wyck Brooks, copy, 5 February 1916).

3. Others included Lewis Namier and Arnol'd Margolin, on whom see below, pp. 59, 65–7. The most recent discussion of Raffalovich's career provides many details of his activities, but no clear explanation of his motives: R. Rakhmannyi, 'Ukrains'ke pytannia v Anhlii 50 rokiv tomu', *Suchasnist'* 1963, no. 3, pp. 117–20; Ie. Onats'kyi, 'Khto takyi Bedvin Sends?', *ibid.*, no. 7, p. 126; O. Kravcheniuk, 'Shche pro "Ukrains'ke pytannia v Anhlii 50 rokiv tomu"', *ibid.*, no. 9, pp. 113–17; and M. Dobrians'kyi, 'U vidpovid' na pytannia: "Khto takyi Bedvin Sends?"', *ibid.*, no. 10, pp. 124–6.

4. B. Sewell, *Footnote to the Nineties: A Memoir of John Gray and André Raffalovich* (London, 1968), pp. 21–2.

5. B. Sands (G. Raffalovich), 'The Vanity of International Politics', *Vanity Fair*, 25 October 1911, p. 523.

6. *Saturday Review*, 27 July, 17 and 24 August, 14 and 21 September 1912.

7. G. Raffalovich, 'Marlborough and a Crown', *The Commentator*, 12 and 19 February 1913 (quotations from pp. 171, 187).

European diplomacy.[1] Early in 1914 he concentrated on Russia's evident awareness that simple "russification" of its Ukrainian subjects was no longer a viable policy. The Russians were trying alternative methods and making certain concessions to Ukrainian aspirations. It was uncertain whether the trend would continue, but if it were reversed, a crisis would ensue; and if a crisis ensued, 'it will not be the Ukraine which suffers most from it'.[2]

In November 1913 Raffalovich brought his ideas together in a long pamphlet or short book entitled *The Ukraine*. 'It is necessary,' he felt, 'that the story of [Ukrainians'] struggle should be known in England; for it is to England that the Ukrainians will turn for sympathy when the need arises, as every nation struggling for its liberty ever does'.[3] He felt it to be 'an indubitable fact that the Ukrainian problem has passed out of the hands of the Russian and Austrian Governments', and claimed that Bobrinskoi tried to enlist British sympathy in 1912 only because he realized the fact.[4] He decried the views of W. J. Birkbeck and Nevill Forbes on the Ukrainian national identity and the Ukrainian language; he insisted that 'The Ukrainian national movement' was 'essentially an internal movement, the seeds of which were sown long before our time'; and he argued the case for a speedy resolution of the Ukrainian question on the grounds that 'so long as the Slav nations oppress each other and quarrel among themselves, they are affording aid to German expansion'.[5] Having gone far beyond the minutiae of the east Galician controversy of 1912, Raffalovich was by this time treating Ukrainians as a whole and setting them in a broad historical, geographical, and diplomatic context.

His efforts, moreover, appeared to be bearing fruit. By April 1914 the two thousand copies of the first edition of *The Ukraine* had nearly sold out, and Raffalovich was soliciting funds to support the publication of a 500-page multi-authored 'standard work' on the same subject. Support, he said, was 'readily forthcoming'.[6] *The Ukraine* had invited readers to contact Raffalovich and join a body which he called 'The Ukraine Committee', and although this has been said to be a one-man

1. G. Raffalovich, 'The Ukraine', *The New Age*, 10 April 1913, pp. 548–9; 'The Problem of the Ukraine', *The Outlook*, 31 May 1913, pp. 742–3; 'The Future of the Ukraine', *The New Age*, 23 October 1913, pp. 752–3.

2. G. Raffalovich, 'Le problème ukrainien en Russie', *La revue politique internationale*, i (1914), 284; see also B. S. (G. Raffalovich), 'The Ukrainian Question', *Darkest Russia*, 14 January 1914, p. 8.

3. B. Sands (G. Raffalovich), *The Ukraine: Reprint of a Lecture Delivered on Ukrainian history and Present-Day Political Problems* (London, 1914), p. 16. For the date of this work's composition, see p. 55; for one occasion on which it was delivered as a lecture, see *Newcastle Daily Journal*, 7 and 9 February 1914.

4. Sands, *Ukraine*, pp. 18–19.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 43, 37, 71.

6. Seton-Watson papers, Raffalovich to R. W. Seton-Watson, 23 April 1914 (enclosing a printed circular soliciting funds) and 28 April 1914 (thanking Seton-Watson for promising support).

affair,[1] it certainly attracted the membership of the noted Slavist R. W. Seton-Watson. Raffalovich's first letter to Seton-Watson makes it clear that, having read *The Ukraine*, Seton-Watson approached its author. Seton-Watson was looking for contributors to a proposed new journal, *European Review*, and Raffalovich both promised to write something of his own and affirmed that he could procure translations of works in Ukrainian. Subsequently, Raffalovich provided Seton-Watson with many contacts to assist the latter in his forthcoming visit to Galicia, and he may even have helped to prompt, or at least to confirm, Seton-Watson's plan to go there.[2]

At the time of his early exchanges with Seton-Watson, Raffalovich might have been justified in thinking that the eighteen months which he had spent on the Ukrainian cause had been spent to good purpose. He had published and lectured widely, attracted the attention of one of Britain's leading Slavists, disposed of nearly two thousand copies of a book and begun organizing a sequel. Apart from *The Ukraine*, other discussions of the Ukrainian issue were coming into print. It was true that one of them owed its appearance to Raffalovich himself and another met with his disapproval, but both of these fuelled the debate, and they were not alone.[3] Shortly, moreover, Raffalovich was to set out for Lviv and witness the festivities arranged to mark the hundredth anniversary of the birth of T. H. Shevchenko, the Ukrainian national poet. With first-hand experience of the Ukrainian territory which had appeared most frequently in British discussion of the Ukrainian issue, Raffalovich might have hoped to extend the scope of his activity.[4]

The war, however, dramatically altered both his own prospects and those of Ukrainians. Raffalovich was in Lviv when the news arrived of Franz Ferdinand's assassination. Three months later, after a difficult return to Britain, he described the Archduke as 'almost the only friend the Ukrainians had around the Emperor', and recalled the 'dread' which descended upon everyone at the jubilee. He realized that a war would give Russia the chance to achieve by force what Bobrinskoi, in 1912,

1. Dobrians'kyi, 'U vidpovid'', p. 124.

2. Seton-Watson papers, Raffalovich to Seton-Watson, 23 March, 20 and 23 April, 4 May 1914. For Seton-Watson's abortive *European Review* and his journey to Galicia see H. and C. Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London, 1981), pp. 98–100.

3. Raffalovich translated (from French) Y. Fedortchouk, *Memorandum on the Ukrainian Question in its National Aspect* (London, 1914). He disapproved of V. Stepankowsky (Stepankivs'kyi), *The Russian Plot to Seize Galicia (Austrian Ruthenia)* (London, 1914) (see Seton-Watson papers, Raffalovich to Seton-Watson, 23 April 1914). Other significant treatments of the Ukrainian question included the long essay 'Where Three Empires Meet', *Morning Post*, 19 and 21 June 1913, and H. Wickham Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (London, 1913), pp. 288–95.

4. Raffalovich's letters to Seton-Watson contain many details of his plans for the journey to eastern Galicia. One of his companions wrote a detailed but incomplete account of the visit in an Oxford undergraduate magazine: Raseur (H. Julian Fuller), 'Galicia in 1914', *The Varsity*, xiv (1914–15), nos 337–8, 340–3, 345, 347–51 (19 January–8 June 1915).

had been attempting to achieve by writing to *The Times*. In Raffalovich's view, the Shevchenko festivities in Lviv influenced the decisions taken by Russia in 1914. 'There was order, organisation, brains, behind this unexpected, large gathering, which I am convinced had a large bearing upon Russia's attitude before the war. It was time to act or lose her last chance of taking Galicia'.[1] Russia certainly acted swiftly, for by the time Raffalovich was writing, 'the tsarist armies [had] reached the San river and the well-defended walls of Przemyśl'.[2] Eastern Galicia, in other words, had fallen to them, and its Ukrainian movement was being firmly suppressed. The deportation of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi to the Russian interior was only the most signal indication of the Russians' attitude towards their new subjects. Raffalovich had to admit that the Ukrainian question had changed its shape. He had come to the issue as a writer on international relations, but he now acknowledged that 'from an international problem, the Ukraine question becomes a national one which concerns only Russia'. He indulged in the pious hope that 'a more liberal Russia' would carry out a pro-Ukrainian programme. He wanted Russia to engage in the deportation of Polish landlords and the dispersal of Jews throughout the empire; to promise an independent synod for the Ukrainian Orthodox and freedom of worship for Ukrainian Uniates; to introduce the use of Ukrainian in schools and to found Ukrainian universities. He called upon the British to offer 'a gentle but persistent hint to our Ally that perhaps she has misjudged in this instance [by attacking Ukrainians]'; and he felt that 'the Ukrainian reunion [i.e. the bringing together of Austrian and Russian Ukraine] will be of greater advantage if approached in the spirit of tolerance and remembrance of sacred promises'.[3]

What 'sacred promises' Raffalovich had in mind is unclear. In August 1914 Russia was prepared to make promises to the Poles, but all she offered Galician Ukrainians was annexation.[4] Disillusioned by events, in January 1915 Raffalovich decried the idea that the war had been undertaken on behalf of 'the sacred cause of smaller nationalities', and mordantly observed: 'What the Ukrainians need is a friendly statesman with two million bayonets behind him'.[5] He was justified in this

1. G. Raffalovich, 'The Conquest of Galicia', *The New Age*, 24 September 1914, p. 505. On Raffalovich's return from Galicia in wartime, see Seton-Watson papers, Seton-Watson to Van Wyck Brooks, copy, 5 February 1916; and *ibid.*, circular from Raffalovich to members of his 'Ukraine Committee', March 1916.

2. Magocsi, *Galicia*, p. 167.

3. G. Raffalovich, 'The Fate of Eastern Galicia', *The New Age*, 17 September 1914, p. 484.

4. P. S. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918* (Seattle/London, 1974), pp. 335–6. Bernard Pares was present in Lviv on 15 October 1914 when the newly appointed Russian Governor-General of Galicia declared to newspaper correspondents that 'Eastern Galicia should become part of Russia': B. Pares, *Day by Day with the Russian Army 1914–15* (London, 1915), p. 21.

5. G. Raffalovich, 'The Ukraine and the Small Nations', *The New Age*, 14 January 1915, p. 290.

view, but attracting the attention of statesmen was a tougher proposition than entertaining readers in the weekly press or finding subscribers to underwrite the publication of a book. As the Ukrainian question became a matter of iron and blood, Raffalovich lost heart. He continued his literary activity in 1915,[1] but before he left for the USA in November he had published, in Swiss obscurity, a somewhat negative appraisal of the British attitude towards his field of study.[2] In mid-October he declared that he had 'long since ceased to advocate the formation of an independent Ukraine' and that all he sought for Ukrainians was 'justice', which would 'be obtained when a body of opinion from England and France help the Russian people in wresting it from the Russian bureaucracy'.[3] Even if such a 'body of opinion' had come into being, it was naive to suppose that it could have been persuaded to challenge an ally in time of war. Raffalovich continued his Ukrainian work in the United States (where he tied himself in many knots), but after 1915 he rarely troubled his British readers. When, in February 1916, he claimed in *The Athenaeum* that Ukrainians ought not to be omitted 'from the list of the nations who have been encouraged by the Allies to persevere in efforts towards autonomy',[4] he provoked the anger of Professor Walter Alison Phillips of Dublin.[5] In May 1917 he unwisely informed readers of *The New Age* that, owing to the good offices of the newly formed Russian Provisional Government, 'the Ukrainian question is dead and buried'.[6] In reality, its complexities were still growing, but it had long since passed beyond the reach of journalists and into the hands of government officials.

When relations between Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians became a subject of discussion in *The Times* in 1912, the British Foreign Office had relatively good sources of information on the Ukrainian lands of eastern Europe. Its Consulate-General in Odessa had been collecting information on Russian Ukraine for decades, and its Embassy in Vienna had already noted the emergence of internecine strife in Galicia. No reports from these sources, however, had hinted that a Ukrainian

1. See *The New Age*, 25 February 1915, p. 466, 11 March 1915, p. 517, 8 April 1915, p. 622; M. Hrushevsky, *The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem*, trans. G. Raffalovich (London, 1915); and B. Sands (G. Raffalovich), 'The Future of the Ruthenians', *British Review*, xi, no. 1 (July 1915), pp. 26–38.

2. G. Raffalovich, 'Les Anglais et la question ukranienne', *La revue ukranienne*, i, no. 2 (August 1915), pp. 102–6. One of the few British authorities to meet with Raffalovich's approval in this essay was Arnold Toynbee, who considered the Ukrainian question both in *Nationality and the War* (London/Toronto, 1915), pp. 308–19, and in *The New Europe: Some Essays in Reconstruction* (London/Toronto, 1915), pp. 75–85.

3. *The New Age*, 14 October 1915, p. 581 (letter).

4. G. F. L. (G. Raffalovich), 'The Land of Mazeppa', *The Athenaeum*, February 1916, p. 61.

5. Whose book in the Home University Library, *Poland* (London, 1915), he had cited in support of his views. Phillips had included a bibliography of the Ukrainian issue (*Poland*, p. 253), but he protested that he was not of Raffalovich's opinion: *The Athenaeum*, March 1916, p. 142.

6. *The New Age*, 3 May 1917, p. 23 (letter).

identity was emerging. In the case of Russian Ukraine it might have been surprising if they had done so. Britain's officials in the southern part of the Russian Empire were probably justified in focusing their attention on economic matters. As the Odessa Consul-General put it in the turbulent month of September 1905, 'My Consular district is equal in area to France, and it embraces regions with widely different local circumstances. In one point, however, there would appear to be uniformity, and that is the general and growing poverty of the peasant class'.[1] In this letter the Consul-General was introducing a long enclosure from his subordinate in Mykolaiv (Nikolaev), who had recently completed a tour of the Ukrainain hinterland. The subordinate, V. H. Bosanquet, was well aware of the region's ethnic composition – indeed, he appended to his report a revolutionary proclamation translated from Ukrainian – but he held, probably with reason, that 'The [Ukrainian] peasant cares for no political question other than the improvement of his own condition, and the [local revolutionary] movement is therefore only political in so far as it has been exploited for political purposes'.[2] This appraisal showed good sense, but it was valid only for Russian Ukraine and was not equalled in insight by some of the material which London received from Vienna. When, in April 1908, a Ukrainian student murdered the Polish Governor-General of Galicia, Britain's Ambassador in Vienna correctly reported that 'Count Potocki has fallen victim to the ancient and inextinguishable hatred which exists between the Poles and the Ruthenians'. Then, however, he clouded the issue by claiming that 'The former . . . are Roman Catholics and speak Polish', whilst 'the latter . . . are Russian Orthodox and speak Russian'.[3] Since 'Ruthenians' were actually Uniate and spoke Ukrainian, the Ambassador was obfuscating the question of national relations in Galicia and hardly preparing London for Bobrinskoi's Galician machinations of 1912.

But in the event the British Foreign Office was spared the indignity of accepting Bobrinskoi's views at their face value. A new Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, provided better information than his predecessor. In June 1912 he quoted an article on Bobrinskoi's manoeuvre by Mykola Vasyl'ko, a Ukrainian from the Bukovyna who sat in the Austrian Reichsrat: 'why, [Vasyl'ko] asks, should the [Galician] Ruthenes have any sympathy for Russia, whose constant endeavours are aimed at the denationalization of the thirty million Ruthenes inhabiting her territory?'. On the basis of Vasyl'ko's article, Cartwright explained the background to Bobrinskoi's Galician ploy, and concluded by pointing out that 'the ensuing controversy is likely to have a most unfavourable effect on the relations between this country [Austria] and

1. FO 65/1712, fo. 288.
2. *Ibid.*, fo. 289.
3. FO 371/398, fo. 415.

Russia, which as it is leave much to be desired'.[1] Returning to the subject of Galicia in 1913, Cartwright detailed the latest disagreements between Poles and Ukrainians on the question of founding a Ukrainian university, but went on to remark that 'even Poles and Ruthenes forget their differences in their common hatred of Russia'. He drew attention to the fact that the Ukrainians of Galicia had been 'organizing various gymnastic societies, numbering in all some 120,000 men, with a view to their employment as an armed force in the event of an Austro-Russian war, which in Galicia is considered inevitable'.[2]

In the light of these reports, officials at the Foreign Office might have been sympathetic towards Volodymyr Stepankivs'kyi's *The Russian Plot to Seize Galicia*, a copy of which he sent them in April 1914. As its title implies, the work told them no more than Cartwright seemed to be telling them already. But in 1914 Britain had to keep on good terms with the Russian Empire. Although an official minuted that Stepankivs'kyi's account of Bobrinskoi's subversive activities in Galicia was 'in the main correct', he held that the work as a whole was 'hardly worth acknowledging ... It is a violent anti-Russian diatribe'.[3] In June 1914 Stepankivs'kyi tried again to attract the Foreign Office's attention, by sending it a leaflet embodying a call from five Ukrainian members of the Austrian Reichsrat for the establishment of a 'Ruthenian Committee' in London. Officials admitted that the leaflet looked 'as if it emanated from the "respectable" Ruthenian politicians in Austria-Hungary', but thought that 'It would be interesting to know whether the impulse to the formation of a Committee is Austrian or genuine Ruthenian, and whether it is going to carry on anti-Russian propaganda here'.[4] For some time to come, keeping on good terms with Russia was to be more important to British diplomats than evolving a policy towards Ukrainians.

Britain's tendency to defer to Russia's interests in Galicia became more pronounced after the outbreak of war. The disasters on the western front and in East Prussia made it unlikely that the Foreign Office would take exception to Russia's plans for south-eastern Europe, the one theatre of war in which the allies were initially successful. Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, quickly reported the Russian Commander-in-Chief's proclamation foreshadowing the incorporation of eastern Galicia into the Russian Empire,[5] and

1. FO 371/1298, fos. 172–6. On Vasyl'ko see T. B. Ciuciura, 'Ukrainian Deputies in the Old Austrian Parliament, 1861–1918', *Mitteilungen: Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der ukrainischen Wissenschaften* xiv (Munich, 1977), 49.

2. FO 371/1575 (not foliated), file 9807.

3. FO 371/1899, fo. 112.

4. Ibid., fos. 133–6. The five Ukrainian members of the Reichsrat included Vasyl'ko, mentioned above, and two important leaders of the Ukrainian movement during World War One, Kost' Levyts'kyi and Ievhen Petrushevych, on whom see Magocsi, *Galicia*, p. 168.

5. FO 371/2172, fos. 326–7.

subsequently provided details of the process of integration.[1] When, in February 1915, Joseph King asked in the House of Commons 'whether the Russian offer of autonomy to Poland is to be construed as involving an offer of autonomy to the Ukrainian population also', the Foreign Office disingenuously asserted that it was unable to answer his question.[2] When another MP asked repeatedly for information concerning the fate of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, the government again prevaricated, whilst asking the Petrograd Ambassador to supply details which would serve to justify Russia's treatment of the interned Metropolitan.[3]

Both the MPs who enquired about Ukrainian matters were probably associates of George Raffalovich.[4] Joseph King, who certainly knew him, frequently addressed himself to the Ukrainian question during the First World War. In September 1915, in conversation with Bonar Law, the Colonial Secretary, he raised the Ukrainian national cause 'and its relation to Canada' (where there was a large Ukrainian community).[5] In November he sent Bonar Law a copy of *Svoboda*, a Ukrainian-language newspaper published in the United States, claiming that it had a large circulation and displayed 'nothing disloyal ... to our cause'.[6] Pro-Ukrainianism served King's general purposes. He was a determined opponent of the war,[7] and took every opportunity to undermine the allied effort. Supporting Ukrainians enabled him to snipe at Russia, and so to question the morality of the Anglo-Russian alliance. The government became increasingly irritated by him. Bonar Law drew his attention to a virulently anti-Russian passage in *Svoboda*,[8] and in October 1916 the Cabinet decided to sanction his prosecution under the Defence of the Realm Act for corresponding with Raffalovich in New York.[9] In August 1916 King had written Raffalovich a letter in which he expressed himself 'very conscious of the huge mistakes and grave responsibilities at the doors of those who have prevented discussion [of the issues underlying the war]'. Almost in passing, he enquired whether Raffalovich had heard that a German aeroplane had recently 'attacked behind our lines [in France] and exploded £5,000,000 worth of shells which were stored in close proximity ... It is said

1. FO 371/2445, fos. 12–16.
2. *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, 5th series, lxix, c. 267, 8 February 1915; FO 371/2448, fos. 188–9.
3. *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, 5th series lxx, cc. 778, 1380–1, 3 and 10 March 1915; lxxii, c. 1919, 1 July 1915; lxxiii, c. 176, 6 July 1915; FO 371/2449 (not foliated), files 23352, 24534.
4. Sir Almeric Paget, MP for Cambridge, accompanied him to Galicia (Raseur, 'Galicia', 2 March 1915) and may have introduced him to other parliamentarians.
5. CO 42/992, fo. 447, King to Bonar Law, 4 November 1915, referring to the earlier conversation.
6. *Ibid.*
7. M. Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics During the First World War* (Oxford, 1971), p. 17.
8. CO 42/992, fos. 448–9.
9. CAB 41/37/34, H. H. Asquith to the King, copy, 6 October 1916.

to have been the biggest explosion the world has ever had'. After Raffalovich effected publication of King's letter in *The New York Times*,[1] the British Government realized that the MP had broken the law by disclosing military information. The Department of Public Prosecutions admitted that the censor ought to have spotted King's letter and that the event to which he alluded had been discussed in Parliament, but King was nevertheless fined £100 with 25 guineas costs.[2]

King's link with Raffalovich intensified a suspicion that advocates of the Ukrainian cause were hostile to the war or even sympathetic to the Central Powers. In two background articles on the trial, the *Evening Standard* openly accused King's correspondent of being a pawn of the Germans.[3] The accusation was mistaken in respect of Raffalovich, but contained a grain of truth when levelled at some of those who shared his objectives. Given the evidence of Russia's maltreatment of Ukrainians, it was hardly surprising that some of them inclined towards Austria-Hungary and Germany. They were not many,[4] but their behaviour exerted a disproportionate influence on the thinking of western diplomats. Indeed, most British officials came to believe that almost all Ukrainian political activity during the first three years of the war was pro-German. Even Lewis Namier, a native of eastern Galicia who later stood up for Ukrainians, argued in a Foreign Office paper of May 1915 that 'those who in America register themselves as Ruthenians can, I should think, practically all be considered adherents of the German side'.[5] In October 1915 A. J. Balfour's agent in the City of London despatched to a friend in the Admiralty a copy of Stepankivs'kyi's Lausanne-based newspaper *The Ukraine*, observing that 'it is evidently issued in favour of our enemies and is probably being paid for with German money'. The Admiralty official informed the Foreign Office, which in turn alerted the War Office and Scotland Yard. Although MI5 and the Special Branch at first thought there was 'not much harm in the paper', they found subsequent issues 'less harmless than the first'.[6] In November 1916 MI7d banned pro-Ukrainian literature in Britain, on the grounds that 'the Ukrainian agitation is favoured by the Austrian Government in order to embarrass Russia'.[7] The timing of the ban must have had something to do with the recent *Evening Standard* attacks on Raffalovich and the fact that the Home

1. *The New York Times*, 3 September 1916 (from which the quotations are taken).
2. *Evening Standard*, 20 October 1916; *The Times*, 21 October 1916.
3. *Evening Standard*, 23 and 25 October 1916.
4. O. Fedyshyn, 'The Germans and the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, 1914–1917', in *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution*, ed. T. Hunczak (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 305–22.
5. FO 371/2450, fo. 78.
6. FO 371/2448, fos. 285–92; FO 371/2747, fos. 81–8.
7. FO 395/144 (not foliated), file 136938, a document referring to the introduction of the ban at the point of its removal eight months later, on which see below, p. 62. I am indebted to Mr Christopher Seton-Watson for this reference.

Office had just discovered 'rather a surprising measure of evidence' of 'Austrian sentiments' among the relatively few Ukrainians who had found their way into Britain's internment camps.[1] Sir Horace Rumbold, who as British emissary in Berne kept a watching brief on Ukrainian activity in Lausanne, argued in February 1917 that the Ukrainian émigrés in Switzerland acted 'in the interests of Germany by fostering the dislike of the Poles and the Russians which unfortunately exists among the Ruthenians both in Eastern Galicia and beyond the Russian frontier'. Rumbold admitted that Ukrainians acted in this way 'perhaps unconsciously, perhaps sometimes unwittingly', and acknowledged that his information came from Polish sources, but it seems unlikely that these qualifications would have been taken particularly seriously in London.[2] Although Stepankivs'kyi, a prime mover among the Ukrainians in Lausanne, had not stopped writing to the British Foreign Office since his departure from England, the view which he expressed in a letter of July 1916, that Ukrainians 'firmly believe that their particular rights ... will be restored',[3] could hardly have derived much authority from the attitude which British officials had been inclined to adopt towards Ukrainians since 1914. Rumbold complied with Stepankivs'kyi's request of late February 1917 that he send London a memorandum entitled 'Ukrainian Claims', but the Foreign Office merely passed it on to the Russian Government, minuting that the claims it outlined were 'quite impractical'.[4]

After the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, Britain was slow to alter her view that the Ukrainian question should not be broached at home and could be left, on the ground, to the Russians. In April 1917 Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador in Petrograd, reported without comment an interview given to the press by P. N. Miliukov, the Foreign Minister in Russia's Provisional Government. Miliukov proclaimed his commitment to 'the national aspirations of the peoples now under the yoke of Austria-Hungary and Turkey', but remained an annexationist in respect of 'the junction of the Ukraine population of the Austrian provinces with the population of our [Russia's] Ukraine provinces'.[5] Britain did not seem concerned by Miliukov's proprietorial air. General Picton Bagge, British acting consul in Odessa, reported autonomist and federalist sentiment in Kiev at the end of April 1917, together with a concern for the use of the Ukrainian language in local schools,

1. HO 45/10836/330094, doc. 13, R. S. Nolan to L. Alma Tadema, 10 November 1916. This Home Office file contains cuttings of the *Evening Standard* articles on Raffalovich and may have been sent to Military Intelligence to persuade them of a Ukrainian danger. I have dealt with Ukrainians in the internment camps (and the King case) in 'Aliens in Britain and the Empire during the First World War', *Immigrants and Minorities*, iv (1985), 18–23; for a list of some 100 Ukrainians interned in Britain see V. Lutsyshyn, 'V anhliis'kii nevoli', *Svoboda*, 20 January 1916.

2. FO 371/3005, fo. 50.

3. FO 371/2750, fo. 258.

4. FO 371/3005, fos. 56–8.

5. FO 371/3010, fo. 63.

but two months later the new Foreign Minister in Petrograd, M. I. Tereshchenko, himself of Ukrainian origin, assured Buchanan that Ukrainian aspirations need not be dealt with until the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, and that 'Germans and Austrians had been working hard to bias them [Ukrainians] against their fellow countrymen [the Russians]'.[1] In a series of letters from Kiev which the Foreign Office received in early July, Bernard Pares tended to support Tereshchenko's opinion. He 'took for granted' that Ukrainians would achieve autonomy within a Russian-led federation, but claimed that this would be quite enough to satisfy them. He believed that those of their number who had looked to the Central Powers 'fell into complete impotence as an immediate effect of the Russian Revolution', and that Ukrainians were 'all for the continuance of the war in full union with the Alliance till peace is secured on the basis of frontiers of peoples'.[2] Pleased by this 'satisfactory information',[3] the Foreign Office did not seem to realize that, if circumstances changed only slightly, the idea of a peace based on the 'frontiers of peoples' could be interpreted more radically in Kiev.

Circumstances began to change at the very time Pares was writing. 'Taking for granted' that Ukrainians could achieve autonomy under Russia proved to be a rash attitude, for Petrograd's First Coalition Government collapsed in early July 1917 when some of its members alienated others by displaying autonomist sympathies in negotiating with the Ukrainian leaders in Kiev. If Ukrainians were to have difficulties extracting firm concessions from Russia, they were likely to look elsewhere for the solution of their problems. In late July and early August, the Foreign Office became aware that Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, who had been released from Russian internment soon after the outbreak of the revolution, was in contact with German and Austrian emissaries in Switzerland. The evidence indicated that he had been 'delegated by the Ukranian (*sic*) Government to conclude a separate peace [with the Central Powers] in the event of the armies of the Communist Party invading Ukrania'.[4] By the middle of August R. W. Seton-Watson was calling 'The Ukraine Problem' one of the 'five main political problems which lie at the root of the World War'.[5] A week later his associate Rex Leeper admitted that 'Whatever may be the cause, there is undoubtedly a strong feeling of Ukrainian nationality both in Eastern Galicia and Northern Hungary and in the Ukrainian

1. FO 371/3012, fos. 531–4, 536.
2. *Ibid.*, fos. 538–41.
3. *Ibid.*, fo. 542.
4. *Ibid.*, fos. 546, 548. On Sheptyts'kyi's release from internment see *The New Europe*, 19 April 1917, pp. 25–6.
5. Rubicon (R. W. Seton-Watson), 'The Ukraine Problem', *The New Europe*, 16 August 1917, p. 132. Seton-Watson reprinted this article in his *Europe in the Melting-Pot* (London, 1919), pp. 365–76.

provinces of Russia'. 'But for the oppression of the old Tsarist Government,' Leeper felt, Ukrainian problems would not have arisen, and 'but for the rivalry between Austria and Russia the Ukrainian movement might not have developed so rapidly'. These considerations, however, were 'no argument for refusing to look facts in the face as they are today'.[1]

Seton-Watson and Leeper were in official employment at the time of these declarations, but when they wrote for Seton-Watson's periodical *The New Europe* they worked under pseudonyms and were not expressing government policy. Their colleagues in the Foreign Office were slower than they to appreciate the growing urgency of the Ukrainian issue. At the instance of MI9c and the Director of Information, the Foreign Office sanctioned the removal of the ban on pro-Ukrainian literature in July 1917,[2] but when, in October, the unrepentant Joseph King put down a parliamentary question on the Government's attitude to the possibility of Ukrainian independence, a member of the Foreign Office staff treated it almost with disdain, holding that it was simply 'devised to cause us embarrassment', and adding: 'Incidentally we have never accepted the impossible principle' enunciated by King, which was 'that nationalities should decide their own sovereignty'.[3] Soon, however, the British Government had to think more deeply about the application of King's 'impossible principle' to Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Republic which was declared in Kiev on 20 November 1917 claimed that it did not have the intention of 'separating from the Russian Republic and destroying its unity',[4] but on 10 December Buchanan reported from Petrograd that N. V. Krylenko, a leading figure in the Bolshevik military hierarchy, regarded the Ukrainian government 'as openly hostile and a conflict as almost unavoidable'.[5] Three days previously, Buchanan had forwarded the report of a British officer who, after interviewing Symon Petliura, the Ukrainian Minister of War, had recommended that 'It might be worth the allies' while to throw their weight into the scale' on the side of the new republic.[6] London had marked the report 'Interesting', but it was becoming more than that. The possibility of armed conflict between Russians and Ukrainians had been a surprise to the British authorities, and in the next month they had to choose between various courses of action. Their primary

1. Rurik (R. Leeper), 'The Ukraine Problem since the Revolution', *The New Europe*, 23 August 1917, p. 175.

2. FO 395/144 (not foliated), file 136938. The removal of the ban made possible the appearance of the essays cited in the two previous footnotes.

3. FO 371/3012, fo. 550; *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, 5th series, xcviii, c. 803, 24 October 1917.

4. J. Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1918: Documents and Materials* (Stanford, 1934), p. 435.

5. FO 371/3012, fo. 566.

6. He had admitted, however, that 'it would be a big gamble', and had called Petliura 'A typical Russian (*sic*) of the lower bourgeosie (*sic*), dirty and idealistic': *ibid.*, fos. 583–8.

objective in eastern Europe was clear – keeping troops in the field to fight Germany; but whether Ukrainians were more likely to serve this purpose than Russians was a question which required careful investigation.

It was a measure of the Foreign Office's uncertainty in late 1917 that it suddenly took Volodymyr Stepankivs'kyi more seriously than it had done in the past. Sir George Clerk saw him on 27 December and concluded that, since he believed the Ukrainian Republic could be brought into the allied camp, 'his policy agrees with ours and I think that he might well be used to assist in carrying it out'.[1] Lord Robert Cecil doubted whether the new Ukrainian Republic was going to last very long, in which case cultivating its support would be pointless; but he agreed that 'things may change'.[2] The crucial question – whether to grant the Ukrainian Republic official recognition – remained a bone of contention in the Foreign Office until it became apparent that the Ukrainians had turned to the Germans. Major J. K. L. Fitzwilliams put the allies' dilemma perfectly in an incisive report from Kiev. If his masters recognized the Ukrainian Republic in the hope that it would serve the allied cause, they were 'backing a possible non-starter at long odds in the hope of getting a winner and thereby making a big coup'. He nevertheless advocated recognition as a matter of urgency, on the grounds that Ukrainian pro-Germanism was very much a thing of the past and that the Bolsheviks, not the Ukrainians, were subject to German influence.[3] On 21 December 1917 Britain agreed that the French should make allied decisions regarding the Ukrainian part of the old Russian Empire,[4] but early in January 1918 the Foreign Office advised the British Ambassador in Paris that Britain was 'not only prepared to recognise the Ukraine Government officially, if the French do so, but consider[s] that it would be desirable to take this step'.[5] Changes on the ground quickly altered Britain's view. In mid-January her representative in Kiev reported that the French, locally, found it 'inopportune' to recognize the Ukrainian Republic, 'in view of present Austrophil tendency of majority of Government which might in the near future materialize into a separate peace with Central Powers'.[6] The Ukrainian leaders, under strong military pressure from the Bolsheviks, did indeed make peace with Britain's

1. FO 371/3283, fo. 93. Only a few weeks previously, the Foreign Office had still been highly mistrustful of Stepankivs'kyi: FO 371/3020, fos. 229–36. In July 1917 he had been arrested at the Russian frontier and used by the Provisional Government as evidence of a link, at that time non-existent, between the Ukrainian leaders in Kiev and the Germans: W. Kosyk, *La Politique de la France à l'égard de l'Ukraine: Mars 1917–Février 1918* (Paris, 1981), p. 114.
2. FO 371/3283, fo. 93.
3. FO 371/3314, fos. 279–81, 17–18 December 1917.
4. FO 371/3062 (not foliated), file 246014.
5. FO 371/3283, fo. 32.
6. *Ibid.*, fo. 299.

enemies, with the result that Britain never again paid serious attention to the idea of recognizing an independent Ukrainian state.[1]

But Britain was not yet free of the Ukrainian question. As the *New Statesman* put it just after the Ukrainians made peace with Germany, 'The events of the next few months may decide for ages to come whether or not in the south of Russia a nationality will finally grow up entirely separate from the Great Russians'.[2] Britain was bound to keep abreast of developments, if only because Germany's ability to strike hard on the western front depended in part on the security of her position in the east. The Germans restored the leaders of the Ukrainian Republic to power in Kiev, but soon became dissatisfied with them.[3] In April 1918 they replaced them with a puppet regime under Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyi, whereupon Britain began to consider the possibility of inciting a Ukrainian peasant revolt.[4] Immediately prior to the November 1918 armistice, the *New Statesman* was predicting a peasant revolution 'of the fiercest character' in both Russian and Austrian Ukraine. 'A Ukrainian peasant revolt,' it said, 'stops short at nothing'.[5] Before a revolt could take place, however, both the Central Powers collapsed and yet more Ukrainian authorities came into being. In November 1918 a 'Western Ukrainian People's Republic' informed Britain (and the United States) that it had taken power in Galicia.[6] In the former Russian Empire, Skoropads'kyi fell in December and was succeeded by a Ukrainian 'Directory'. Neither of these bodies seemed likely to last long – the first was threatened by the Poles, the second by the Bolsheviks – but both involved Britain in further deliberations.

She proved more sympathetic to Galician Ukrainians than to those who had previously been under the tsar. Britain had taken a long time to decide on the need to partition Austria-Hungary,[7] but by the end of the war she had recognized that many of the Habsburg empire's nationalities were going to achieve statehood. In the February 1919 edition of his book *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, Henry Wickham Steed, the Editor of *The Times*, asserted that 'The true cause of the collapse

1. This account of the diplomatic activity of December 1917 and early 1918 has been great abridged. For more details of British behaviour see FO 371/3283, *passim*; for French policy see Kosyk, *La Politique*, esp. pp. 181–214; for Ukrainian embitterment see V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii* (3 vols, Kiev-Vienna, 1920), esp. ii, 231, 243.

2. *New Statesman*, 16 February 1918, p. 464.

3. For a translated German intelligence report of March 1918 see K. Ross, 'Doklad nachal'niku operatsionnogo otdeleniia germanskogo vostochnogo fronta o polozhenii del na Ukraine v marte 1918 goda', *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*, i (1922), 288–94.

4. CAB 24/52/4628, fos. 92–6, and CAB 24/52/4638, fos. 117–9, two papers of May 1918 from the Foreign Office to the Cabinet.

5. *New Statesman*, 19 October 1918, p. 46.

6. FO 371/3301, fos. 420–31.

7. See W. Fest, *Peace or Partition: The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy 1914–1918* (New York, 1978), and W. R. Callcott, 'The Last War Aim: British Opinion and the Decision for Czechoslovak Independence, 1914–1919', *Historical Journal*, xxvii (1984), 979–89.

of Hapsburg rule is to be found in its ... persistent effort to treat European peoples ... as though they had been the tribes of an Asiatic sultanate'.[1] Reflecting this opinion, the British authorities sought justice for the Habsburg peoples. So far as eastern Galicia was concerned, they worked hard to protect Ukrainians from the Poles who now threatened to subdue them. In the Foreign Office, Lewis Namier fulminated against Polish inroads throughout 1919.[2] By the middle of the year, however, Polish arms were prevailing over Britain's advocacy of adherence to the principle of nationality, and although, throughout the peacemaking process, Britain attempted to stand up for Galicia's Ukrainians,[3] her power was not equal to her idealism.

Britain's postwar policy towards the former Russian Empire differed from that which she adopted towards the Habsburg lands. She could not afford to advocate the Russian Empire's fragmentation if by doing so she made it easier for the Bolsheviks to pick up the fragments. Theoretically, she could have worked for the unity of all Ukrainians in an entity capable of resisting both Poles in the west and Bolsheviks in the north; but as a leading British student of Poland put it in 1919, 'the independence of the Ukraine from both Russia and Poland ... seems almost impracticable'.[4] The only substantial pro-western military authority on Ukrainian soil in 1919 was the White Russian General A. I. Denikin; and Denikin was unlikely ever to countenance the notion of Ukrainian autonomy, let alone Ukrainian independence.[5] C. E. Bechhofer, an unofficial British observer of the southern front in the Russian Civil War, argued that 'the [Ukrainian] separatist venture is not likely to survive the re-establishment of Russia, whenever this takes place'.[6] He had been prejudiced against Ukrainians for some time,[7] but his prejudice now harmonized well with the political and military realities.

Paradoxically, the Ukrainians of the former Russian Empire came closest to finding an effective advocate with the British at the very time the tide was running strongest against them. Their lack of impressive spokesmen had always been a major difficulty. Had they possessed a Tomáš Masaryk, they might have fared better. As a Home Office official put it in October 1916, 'apparently there are few, if any, educated

1. Quoted in *The Times*, 26 February 1919 (p. 9).

2. See the extensive quotations from his memoranda in T. Hunczak, 'Sir Lewis Namier and the Struggle for Eastern Galicia, 1918–1920', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, i (1977), 198–210.

3. H. J. Elcock, 'Britain and the Russo-Polish Frontier, 1919–1921', *Historical Journal*, xii (1969), 137–54.

4. A. B. Boswell, *Poland and the Poles* (London, 1919), p. 165.

5. P. Kenez, 'The Ideology of the White Movement', *Soviet Studies*, xxxii (1980), esp. 76.

6. C. E. Bechhofer, *In Denikin's Russia and the Caucasus 1919–1920* (London, 1921), p. 175, n. 1.

7. C. E. Bechhofer, *Russia at the Cross-Roads* (London, 1916), pp. 24–7; *The New Age*, 7 October 1915, p. 546.

Ruthenes in this country'.[1] In May 1919 one appeared. Arnol'd Margolin was actually Jewish, but he had thrown in his lot with the Ukrainian movement and came to the west as a representative of the Ukrainian Directory. Despatched to London by the Directory's delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, he contacted Walford Selby of the Foreign Office. Predictably, Selby told him 'that the British government was sympathetic to Denikin's army . . . and that the best way for a successful struggle against Bolshevism would be the cooperation between, or even an entire blending of, the Denikin and Ukrainian armies'.[2] Nevertheless, Selby suggested that Margolin present himself to the British delegation in Paris, and there he made a mark. J. Y. Simpson, despatched to Paris by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, differed from his superiors in respect of the best way to solve the problems posed by the demise of the Russian Empire. He was not a believer in its re-unification. 'It seems to me,' he wrote from the Peace Conference in June 1919, 'that the Federation is the great thing to go for'. He had come to believe, moreover, 'that the Ukrainians . . . are inclined to take the lead in having a discussion amongst all the representatives of the non-Great Russian Governments on the question of a Russian Federation of States'.[3] Simpson's main interest in Paris was in the non-Slavonic minorities of the former Russian Empire – he wrote the section on the Baltic states in Britain's official history of the Peace Conference[4] – but throughout his extensive despatches to London in June and July 1919 he gave due weight to the views of Ukrainians.[5] He was appalled, in general, by 'the extraordinary intensity of bitterness of feeling on the part of Great Russians towards some of these border peoples',[6] and worked doggedly to redress the balance.

Simpson was unable, however, to change the views of his masters. Ukrainians and other minorities impressed him, but he did not succeed in convincing London of the validity of their outlook. The Directory established a Ukrainian Delegation in London which said in the first number of its weekly bulletin that its objects were 'the obtaining from the British Government [of] the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic as an independent and sovereign State; the asking for moral and material help; and the establishment of commercial relations between the two

1. HO 45/10836/330094, doc. 12.

2. A. D. Margolin, *From a Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine, and America 1905–1945* (New York, 1946), p. 46; *idem*, *Ukraina i politika Antanty (Zapiski evreia i grazhdanina)* (Berlin, n. d. [1922]), p. 155.

3. FO 371/4380, fos. 109–110. Margolin spoke of Simpson in his memoirs, and included in the appendix the proposals he submitted to him: *Political Diary*, pp. 47, 195–7; *Ukraina*, pp. 157–9, 385–9.

4. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, ed. H. W. V. Temperley (6 vols., London, 1920–4), vi. 284–310.

5. FO 371/4380, fos. 163–5, 288, 347–9.

6. *Ibid.*, fo. 303.

countries'.[1] It failed on all counts. As R. H. Ullman has pointed out, 'during 1919 the Cabinet never once addressed itself directly to the question of whether British policy should work towards a united or a dismembered Russia'.[2] In December 1919 the Foreign Office produced a handbook on the Ukrainian question which gave very little credence to the idea that Ukrainians should decide their own fate. Though for the most part sober and judicious in manner, it did not fail to point out that 'The *Ukrainian territory* claimed by the propagandist literature, i.e. from San to Don, never formed a political unit, either independently or under the sway of any empire'.[3] When Margolin became head of the Directory's London Delegation early in 1920, the Home Office informed the Metropolitan Police that he was not to be accorded diplomatic privileges and had to register as an alien.[4] The Foreign Office refused to enter into dealings with Ukrainian co-operatives, and would deal only with a Soviet body entitled the All-Russian Central Union of Co-operative Societies.[5] One member of the Foreign Office staff was reluctant even to allow a Ukrainian choir to visit Britain, because it would 'advertise the fact that a few bandits, who call themselves the "Ukrainian Government", exist in South Russia'.[6] When, in April 1920, the Directory's anti-Bolshevik alliance with Piłsudski's Poland became public knowledge, Ukrainians lost what little chance they had of attracting the sympathy of the British labour movement.[7] Early in December 1920 an official at the Foreign Office drily noted: 'The League of Nations has now refused the request of the Ukrainian Government [for recognition]. The present series of documents [concerning the Ukrainian application] may be useful for reference'.[8]

With this, Britain filed the Ukrainian question away. Given that she had barely heard of it eight years previously, and that its complexities were many, her journalists and officials had made worthy attempts to grasp its protean character. They had rarely seen it as a single question, but neither did most Ukrainians. They had made mistakes – especially in exaggerating the extent of Ukrainians' wartime pro-Germanism – but they had probably grasped the essentials. In the first part of the twentieth century Ukrainians showed few signs of being able to found and defend a state of their own. They could not expect foreign countries to intervene on their behalf until they achieved a greater

1. *The Ukraine* (London), 5 July 1919, pp. 1–2 (not to be confused with the periodical of the same name published during the war by Stepankivs'kyi in Lausanne).
2. R. H. Ullman, *Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917–1921* (3 vols., Princeton, 1961–72), ii. 220.
3. Historical Section of the Foreign Office, *The Ukraine* (London, December 1919), p. 55 (italics in the original). This volume was No. 60 in the lengthy series of Foreign Office Peace Handbooks.
4. MEPO 2/2211.
5. FO 371/4044, fo. 599; see also *The Ukraine* (London), 28 February 1920, p. 2.
6. FO 371/4044, fo. 550 (but permission was in fact granted).
7. Margolin, *Political Diary*, pp. 57–8; *idem*, *Ukraina*, pp. 214–16.
8. FO 371/5437, fo. 132.

degree of homogeneity and produced spokesmen as weighty as those who spoke for the Poles, the Czechs, and the Serbs. Their political views were probably bound to be diverse whilst they inhabited two very different states. International boundaries more or less ceased to divide them from one another after the Second World War, but by then Britain's ability to make a mark on eastern Europe was very small. British interest in the Ukrainian question was unlikely to return to the level it attained between 1912 and 1920.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne DAVID SAUNDERS