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Serving the National Interest:

Canada's Decision to Enter the OAS, 1989 – 1990

by

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M.A. Research Project

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On October 27-8, 1989, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, attended a meeting of hemispheric leaders in San José, Costa Rica. This multilateral summit celebrated a century of democratic rule in Costa Rica and, more substantively, focused upon the "six Ds" of contemporary hemispheric affairs: debt; drug trafficking; democracy; deforestation; disarmament; and development.[1] In the opening hours of the meeting, Mulroney announced that Canada's presence at the conference signaled a new departure in Canadian-Latin American relations. After decades of uneven attention, Ottawa recognized that Canada was increasingly engaged in the Americas. Emphasizing the importance of hemispheric interdependence in various functional fields, he added that promoting regional cooperation was integral to Canadian goals and that the Organization of American States (OAS) – despite its imperfections – was vital to the success of such cooperation.[2] The time had arrived for Canada "to occupy the vacant chair at the OAS that has been reserved ... all these years."[3]

Upon returning to Ottawa, the Prime Minister was questioned in the House of Commons about Canadian membership in the OAS, especially considering apparent

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[1] Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Costa Rica Gains Loan Agreement," *The New York Times*, 28 October 1989, 5; Globe and Mail, "Costa Rican Summit Celebrates Democracy," *The (Toronto) Globe and Mail*, 27 October 1989, A4; Hilary Mackenzie, Marc Clark and Mary Nemeth, "A Crash Course for Mulroney," *Maclean's*, 6 November 1989, 32-3, 36.

[2] Emerging from the Pan American Union, the Organization of American States was established in 1948. Peter McKenna suggests that it is "the principal political institution of the Inter-American system." James John Guy adds that the OAS is the "leading formal decision-making institution" in the inter-American system. McKenna, "How is Canada Doing in the OAS?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 1:2 (Spring 1993), 81; Guy, *People, Politics & Government – Political Science: A Canadian Perspective*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995), 471.

[3] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for An Address By the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders," San José, Costa Rica, 27 October 1989, 4-5. Regarding the *Canadian chair*, McKenna notes that in 1910 the U.S. Secretary of State, Elihu Root, offered symbolic support for Canada's membership in the nascent Pan American Union by instructing his "officials to place the Canadian coat of arms on the cornices of the inner court – with those of the other twenty-one republics – of the newly built headquarters of the Pan-American Union. In addition, the boardroom was to have a Canadian panel mounted and a chair with 'Canada' inscribed on the back for use at the Council table. This chair has, over the years, come to be ignominiously referred to as the so called 'empty chair'," *Canada and the OAS: From Dilettante to Full Partner* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 67.

American influence within that organization. Skirting the essence of this query, Mulroney reiterated simply that while previous Canadian governments had refused to join the OAS, his Government perceived that "the time was right, that the opportunities are there."[4]

In an attempt to conceptualize these perceived opportunities in the Western Hemisphere, G. Pope Atkins posits cautiously that the Mulroney Government's decision to join the OAS, as part of its 1989 *Latin American Strategy* and broader "regional activism," enhanced the geographic scope of Ottawa's foreign policy while reinforcing "other policy principles in place since World War II": highlighting John W. Holmes' 'middlepowermanship'; emphasizing multilateralism; being an honest broker; linking global and regional security to international law; and – at least rhetorically – championing international development.[5] Beyond concluding that "Canada has chosen to play a high-profile role in the hemisphere and has ... made long-term institutional commitments to do so," Atkins' brief analysis of Ottawa's official entry into the OAS suggests modest elements of change within general contours of continuity concerning contemporary Canadian foreign policy.[6]

While this work argues that entering the OAS reflected and reinforced a more substantive shift within Ottawa's external affairs, it also focuses implicitly upon themes of continuity and change. Indeed, at the time of the decision, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, reinforced these very themes, noting in 1988 that: "[w]e

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[4] House of Commons, *Debates*, 30 October 1989, 5291.
[5] G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, 3rd ed., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 104-5. Essentially, Atkins highlights common traits that often characterize contemporary Canadian foreign policy, as discussed by Akira Ichikawa, "The 'Helpful Fixer': Canada's Persistent International Image," *Behind the Headlines* XXXVII (March 1979). The reference to John W. Holmes' 'middlepowermanship' is from Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed., (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), 57.
[6] Atkins, *Latin America and the International Political System*, 105.

have indicated with some credibility that we intend not only to maintain but renew some of the best parts of the Canadian foreign policy tradition,"[7] including a special emphasis upon select multilateral forums.[8] More explicitly, on November 8, 1989, during a presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Clark explained that Ottawa's "decision to join the OAS and to expand our role in Latin America, represents continuity as much as it does change."[9]

Together, these official and academic comments provoke a number of questions regarding Ottawa's entry into the OAS. First, while Canada became a Permanent Observer to this inter-American forum in February 1972, which specific foreign policy priorities prompted Canada to join officially in 1989-90? Or, to draw from a speech Mulroney gave to the World Affairs Council in Los Angles just prior to visiting Costa Rica, which foreign policy goals were to be "upheld" through this initiative?[10] Second, rather than examining these objectives in isolation, how might this analysis be contextualized by Canada's national interest in, and beyond, the Western Hemisphere during the late 1980s? This question is central to the following analysis as, in 1992, Mulroney explained that when focusing upon international politics, "the question is simply and at all times: '[w]hat is in the national interest of Canada'?"[11] Third, while the Prime Minister considered the OAS decision "a significant foreign policy reversal," is

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[7] Joe Clark, "Canada's New Internationalism," *Canada and the New Internationalism*, ed., John Holmes and John Kirton (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988), 10-11.
[8] Clark, "Canada's New Internationalism," 4.
[9] House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 8 November 1989, 25:7.
[10] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, at the World Affairs Council," Los Angles, USA, 12 October 1989, 7.
[11] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University," Cambridge, Massachusetts, 10 December 1992, 4.

this an accurate conceptualization?[12] How might the significance of this decision be explained systematically, especially given Mitchell Sharp's concern – reaching back to the early 1970s – that the Canada-U.S. relationship "impinges on virtually every aspect of the Canadian national interest, and thus of domestic concerns."[13] Finally, to what extent do the decision making dynamics of this case help to illuminate broader themes of continuity and change – or what Andrew F. Cooper calls "the dual contours of old habits and new directions"[14] – in Ottawa's post-Cold war foreign policy?

Situated within the "process literature"[15] of the Canadian foreign policy canon, this paper addresses these questions by drawing upon Stephen Krasner's "statist image of foreign policy."[16] Attentive to James N. Rosenau's criticism of this theory and buttressed by elements of Charles F. Hermann's analytical typology of foreign policy change,[17] a slightly modified conception of Krasner's national interest – a set of transitively ordered preferences that persist [generally] over time and are related to general societal goals[18] – helps to shape a threefold argument regarding Ottawa's entry into the OAS.

First, in the midst of shifting international and domestic policy parameters, key Canadian officials purposefully developed a new "Long-Term Strategy for Latin

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[12] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Canadian Exporters' Association," Montreal, Quebec, 6 October 1992, 6.
[13] Mitchell Sharp, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," *International Perspectives* (Autumn 1972), 1.
[14] Andrew F. Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997), 28.
[15] Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 1:2 (Spring-Fall 1990), 78.
[16] Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1978), 5.
[17] James N. Rosenau, "The National Interest," in *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics*, rev. ed., (New York: Nichols Publishing, 1980) and Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 34:1 (March 1990).
[18] Krasner, *National Interest*, 55.

America" which shaped Ottawa's decision to enter the OAS in 1989.[19] While not dismissing other factors – the fading Cold War,[20] the rise of liberal internationalism,[21] converging relations between Conservative Canada and Republican Washington,[22] as well as heightened domestic awareness of, and sensitivity towards, the Americas[23] -- Ottawa's entry into the OAS was led primarily by a small coterie of Canadian officials, including the Prime Minister, who focused on the national interest and possessed a determination "to make history, not to shrink from it."[24]

Second, Ottawa's decision to join this inter-American forum was perceived by these governmental stakeholders as serving Canada's national interest in the Americas and beyond. If, as claimed by Edgar J. Dosman, the "fundamental objective" of Canada's Latin American strategy was to "restore balance to Canadian-Latin American relations," then Ottawa's OAS membership offered a familiar, multilateral mechanism to help refine and implement Ottawa's regional policy by focusing upon three core objectives.[25]

Membership was meant to help bolster Canadian security and cooperation in an increasingly interdependent hemisphere. According to Joe Clark, speaking about the pending OAS membership to colleagues on the Commons Standing Committee, "[s]ome of the global problems we have to address are particularly acute or have some particular implications in Latin America. Obviously, the narcotics problem is one of them, but so is

[19] Edgar J. Dosman, "Canada and Latin America: The New Look," *International Journal* XLVII (Summer 1992), 535.
[20] Robert W. Tucker, "1989 and All That," *Foreign Affairs* 69:4 (Fall 1990), 94.
[21] Anthony McGrew, "Liberal Internationalism: Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism," in *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance*, ed., David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 269.
[22] John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 3rd ed., (Montreal- Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 274.
[23] Brian J. R. Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America and the New Internationalism: A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968-1990* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 185.
[24] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, to the Americas Society," New York, New York, 28 March 1988, 8.
[25] Dosman, "The New Look," 537.

the environmental question."[26] To help address regional security challenges, like the drug trade and environmental degradation, Canada claimed its long-vacant seat at the inter-American table.

Next, membership in the OAS was meant to enhance regional economic stability and especially national trade opportunities – thereby contributing to increasing Canadian prosperity. To fellow parliamentarians, Clark emphasized "the debt question," adding that if the progress on debt reduction being made by Mexico, Costa Rica and other actors, "can bear fruit, there are going to be extraordinary trading opportunities for Canada in that region. There are some natural links that have been frustrated by the immense problems placed upon Latin American countries by the debt."[27] With hemispheric actors converging around the core tenets of "market democracy"[28] and the OAS on an apparent cusp of a "significant thrust"[29] toward regional economic and social development, Ottawa was positioning Canada to help stabilize, and prosper in, this transitional geo-economic environment.

Finally, Ottawa's entry into the OAS aimed to reinforce democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere, thereby reflecting a nascent ideological flavour in Canadian foreign policy as well as a desire to bolster the country's prestige in the emerging post-Cold War order.[30] Promoting democratic development in the region allowed Ottawa to

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[26] Clark's comment was in response to a query by a parliamentary colleague, Marie Gibeau M.P., "why the [OAS] decision ... and why now?" House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 8 November 1989, 25:19-20.
[27] Ibid., 25:20.
[28] Duncan Green, *Silent Revolution: The Rise of Market Economics in Latin* America (London: Cassell, 1995), 10.
[29] Christopher R. Thomas, *The OAS in Its 50th Year: Overview of a Regional Commitment* (Washington D.C.: OAS, 1998), 45.
[30] This goal was not unique to the Americas as the Mulroney government focused on a similar objective in South Africa. Linda Freeman, *The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 220.

emphasize Canadian values – what might be considered peace, order and good governance[31] – and their applicability for enhancing regional stability and prosperity. Perhaps foreshadowing elements of what would become the "soft power" agenda of later Liberal foreign policy,[32] Joe Clark explained, "Canada is a developed country with a unique standing among developing countries" and a desire to "make more of that standing."[33] Again, Clark reinforced to committee members that within Latin America, "[t]he democracy question is very important, it is extraordinary .... [I]t is important that countries like ours which talk about democracy be prepared to do something more about it, and our membership in the OAS will do that."[34] Drawing upon insights from Tom Keating and Nicolas Gammer, this multilateral membership afforded Canada a fresh forum to emphasize: the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights as well as the legitimacy of market-based economics.[35]

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[31] Paul Gecelovsky and Tom Keating, "Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative," *Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93*, ed., Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001), 194-207.

[32] Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future* (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2003), 74.

[33] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for A Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on Canadian Policy Towards Latin America," *Statements and Speeches* Calgary, Alberta 1 February 1990, 8.

[34] Joe Clark, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 8 November 1989, 25:20.

[35] While Keating and Gammer argue that these themes emerged within Canadian foreign policy in 1991, Gecelovsky and Keating suggest later that the Mulroney government embraced a "more ideological and interventionist approach to foreign policy in 1989." As discussed below, this paper posits that Ottawa's OAS decision reflects this earlier shift in Canada's approach to state sovereignty and that Mulroney's "understanding of and sympathy with" the American invasion of Panama in 1989 was not an anomaly, but an extension of this initial emphasis on democracy and human rights. Roots of this hemispheric position appear rooted, at least in part, in Canada's interests and actions regarding South Africa. Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, "The 'New Look' in Canada's Foreign Policy," *International Journal* XLVII (Autumn 1993), 724-5; Gevelovsky and Keating, "Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives," 195; Freeman, *The Ambiguous Champion.*

Third, accepting that Mulroney's OAS initiative arrived as a diplomatic surprise to many attentive state and societal stakeholders in Canada,[36] this paper posits that while this decision was a major "diplomatic departure ... [it did not mark a] fundamental change of foreign policy."[37] Instead it embodied what Charles Hermann conceptualizes as both a "program change" and a "problem / goal change"[38] in which post-war Canadian multilateralism was altered in substance and expanded in geographic scope to ensure that Ottawa was "at the table where issues of importance to Canada – and of the region – are discussed."[39] Essentially, Canadian membership in the OAS was perceived among key policy makers as both a symbol of the Mulroney government's "commitment to expanding ... relations" with various actors in the Americas, as well as a significant step – through multilateral "means" – to help secure Canada's evolving national interest in the Western Hemisphere.[40]

To facilitate the aforementioned argument, this work is organized into four substantive sections. First, a brief review is offered of core methodological assumptions which underpin this work. To help situate this statist argument within the relevant literature, the second section offers an overview of the principal explanations for Ottawa's official entry into the OAS. In sketching the main contours of this literature, the review focuses upon three questions. Which determinants encouraged Canada's entry

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[36] Stevenson suggests that "the decision to join the OAS came without warning and in the absence of any public debate," *Canada, Latin America and the New Internationalism,* 178.
[37] Gordon Mace, "Explaining Canada's Decision to Join the OAS: An Interpretation," *Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93*, ed., Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001), 143.
[38] Hermann, "Changing Course," 5.
[39] Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Notes for the Right Honourable Joe Clark, P.C., M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States," Washington [D.C.] 13 November 1989, 7.
[40] House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 8 November 1989, 25:7.

into the OAS? How is the decisional process characterized? And, what is the significance of this foreign policy decision? Third, Krasner's statist approach is outlined and augmented based upon criticism from Rosenau; helpful insights from Hermann are also incorporated into this section in order to analyze elements of foreign policy change. Finally, reinforcing Peter McKenna's claim that "a statist interpretation offers the best explanatory framework for understanding the dynamics of Canada's strategy for Latin America," this paper offers a fresh perspective and new evidence regarding Canada's official entry into the OAS in 1989-90.[41]

ADDRESSING ASSUMPTIONS: THE STATE, CASES & THE CANADIAN WAY

The argument presented in this paper rests upon three chief methodological assumptions: first, the applicability of the state level of analysis in explaining this foreign policy decision; second, the merit of the case study methodology; and finally, the relevance of an American-oriented theory to help explain Canadian foreign policy decisions and institutions.[42]

Not surprisingly, given Krasner's statist paradigm, the primary level of analysis of this work is the state, or the state-centric approach, to foreign policy analysis.[43] A general premise of this level of analysis is that "[t]he behaviour of states in the international arena may be best explained as the outcome of domestic political processes

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[41] Peter McKenna, "Canada's Policy Towards Latin America: A Statist Interpretation," *International Journal* XLIX (Autumn 1994), 953.

[42] Hermann suggests that foreign policy can be considered as: "a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed toward entities outside the policymakers' political jurisdiction. In other words, it is a program (plan) designed to address some problem or pursue some goal that entails action toward foreign entities. The program presumably specifies the conditions and instruments of statecraft." "Changing Course," 5.

[43] Krasner, *National Interest*, 6.

among groups or institutions within states."[44] Krasner refines this definition by distinguishing between societal and state actors, thereby emphasizing the importance of central decision making institutions and related roles embedded within, but also embodying, the state.[45] Or as he explains, "[a]t any given ... time state behavior can be viewed as actions of individuals occupying certain positions in the central government."[46] A brief review of five core assumptions of the statist school helps to reflect and reinforce the relevance of this level of analysis in the case of Canada's decision to enter the OAS;[47] these elements are drawn from Krasner's 1984 article, "Approaches to the State."[48]

First, political dynamics are perceived to be more "a problem of rule and control than one of allocations." Krasner suggests that greater emphasis is placed on preserving order "against internal and external threats" than on merely distributing political resources to select societal stakeholders. Beyond being intellectually compelling, this emphasis is particularly welcome regarding Mulroney's OAS decision as it allows for significant space to be established, and sustained, between the Prime Minister's foreign policy decision making and alleged "politics and patronage" in both Mulroney Governments.[49] Reinforcing this point, in 1988 Mulroney highlighted that "[w]ith foreign affairs, I believe politically that you gain very little by doing a good job. That's what Canadians expect – to conduct yourself with dignity and some class."[50]

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[44] Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 178.
[45] Krasner, *National Interest*, 12-13.
[46] Ibid., 33.
[47] John Erik Fossum, *Oil, the State, and Federalism: The Rise and Demise of Petro-Canada as a Statist Impulse* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 10.
[48] Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* (January 1984), 223-46, as quoted in Fossum, *Oil, the State and Federalism*, 11.
[49] Phrase borrowed from Claire Hoy, *Friends in High Places: Politics and Patronage in the Mulroney Government* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1987).
[50] Maclean's, "'A Commonality of Values'," Maclean's 20 June 1988, 23.

Second, the state is seen as "an actor in its own right"; quite simply, "the state cannot be understood as a reflection of societal characteristics or preferences"[51] but as "an autonomous actor pursuing goals associated with power and the general interests of society."[52] A 1991 Liberal party document focusing upon "Canada in the Western Hemisphere," helps to reinforce the relevance of state autonomy in this case by suggesting that "the government did not consult with the public or Parliament before embarking on a new policy direction" in the Americas;[53] that said, evidence suggests that various stakeholder consultations were undertaken during the development of this policy.[54] Third, Krasner emphasizes the force of informal and formal institutional constraints upon individual behaviour; "[a]ctors in the political system, whether individuals or groups, are bound within these structures, which limit, even determine, their conceptions of their own interest and their political resources." Fourth, statist approaches emphasize the importance of comprehending "how institutions reproduce themselves" and what historical factors facilitated their initial creation. In short, if institutions matter in foreign policy, so does history. Finally, statist arguments assume that political life is characterized by stress and struggle regarding "the rules of the game"; reinforcing an earlier insight that political dynamics encompass more than the mere

[51] Fossum, *Oil, the State and Federalism*, 11.
[52] Krasner, *The National Interest*, 33.
[53] Lloyd Axworthy and Roy MacLaren, "Part of the Americas: A Liberal Policy for Canada in the Western Hemisphere," 29 November 1991, 11.
[54] According to Dosman, "[t]he [Latin America] policy document received strong support from a multi-sector seminar of business, academic, government, media and NGO leaders which was organized by CALACS [Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies] at Carleton University in Ottawa on 4 and 5 May" 1989, "The New Look," 535. As well, see A.R.M. Ritter, *Conference Proceedings: Prospects for Latin America and the Caribbean to the Year 2000* (Ottawa: Institute for International Development and Cooperation, University of Ottawa & CALACS/ACELAC, 1990).

allocation of resources, these equations also include elements of *statecraft*.[55] These premises help to reinforce the relevance of the state level of analysis for explaining Ottawa's entry into the OAS.

Consistent with the traditional or "principal approach" for analyzing Canadian foreign policy, this work is a case study.[56] Beyond keeping with tradition, this perspective is utilized with three objectives in mind. First, it reflects and reinforces Krasner's efforts to focus upon key determinants that influence goals and shape decisional dynamics; essentially, cases help to illuminate not simply aspects of foreign policy decision making, but also the "historical context in which important international events take place."[57] According to External Affairs, important "economic and political transformations affecting the hemisphere" – including, economic recovery in the Americas, enhanced democratic development, and a relaxation of conventional security concerns in the post-Cold War era – presented Canada with new opportunities and challenges "in areas central to Canadian foreign policy interests." Full membership in the OAS was perceived as one measure, among many, to further "promote these interests."[58]

Second, case studies in Canadian foreign policy also allow for an analysis of "specificity and detail ... about both actions and antecedents," thereby helping to: connect causes with effects; compare competing explanations; and add insight to general theories of foreign policy behaviour.[59] Such a refined focus is apparent in Peter

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[55] Fossum, *Oil, the State and Federalism*, 11; Margaret Thatcher, *Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002).
[56] Don Munton and John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1992), v.
[57] Ibid., vi.
[58] Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Canada's First Year in the Organization of American States: Implementing the Strategy for Latin America," (Ottawa, 1991), 2-3.
[59] Munton and Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vi.

McKenna's 1992 work, "Canada Joins the OAS: Anatomy of a Decision."[60] Finally, by partially re-creating "the world of the decision maker," cases facilitate consideration of costs and benefits regarding alternative, existing and imagined policy options.[61]

A last, brief methodological concern focuses upon reconciling this U.S.-oriented, statist framework with Canada's parliamentary system of governance.[62] Reflecting upon the diffuse structure of executive authority in the U.S. system, Krasner notes optimistically that: "[i]f the efficacy of a statist paradigm can be demonstrated in explaining the raw materials policy of the United States, it should apply with even greater force to most other policy systems (at least those of developed countries) and to other policy issues."[63] Essentially, despite what David Thomas calls the "constraints on a president's powers," the statist framework still offers important explanatory insights regarding the development and implementation of American foreign policy – especially as driven by the White House and Department of State.

Based upon David E. Smith's seminal work regarding republicanism in Canada, because of party discipline and the parliamentary system, "in which cabinet monopolizes the prerogatives of constitutional monarchy," Canadian governance generally "produces greater independence of leadership than the American system provides."[64] From this insight and given that "power is centralized not diffused" within Canadian governmental structures, the core elements of Krasner's statist approach appear consistent with the

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[60] Peter McKenna, "Canada Joins the OAS: Anatomy of a Decision," in *America and the Americas*, ed., Jacques Zylberberg and François Demers (Saint Foy: Les Presses De L'Université Laval, 1992).
[61] Munton and Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vi.
[62] Peter McKenna, "A Statist Interpretation," 933.
[63] Krasner, *National Interest*, 7.
[64] David E. Smith, *The Republican Option in Canada, Past and Present* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 227.

contemporary parliamentary system of governance.[65] Indeed, if – as Donald J. Savoie suggests – "[t]he centre of government in Ottawa is at the apex of political power at the national level and it shapes policy, government decisions, government operations, and federal-provincial relations to a far greater extent than has been generally assumed," then statist analyses may be increasingly helpful to students of Canadian foreign policy.[66] Reinforcing this premise but also qualifying its implications, Kim Richard Nossal emphasizes the merit of a modified statist model by noting that: "the major histories" of Canadian external relations are "framed within an empirical paradigm for explaining state behaviour that falls between the stools of statism and liberalism."[67] This assumes that bureaucratic and elected officials have "their own conceptions of the national interest ... [or] definite ideas about what Canada's foreign policy should and should not be."[68] Though "the decision process is tightly controlled[,] access is restricted[,] secrecy is pervasive[, and] little input or participation by groups or individuals in civil society is welcomed," the state is still assumed to be "constrained or impelled by societal preferences." According to Nossal, the state is not perceived to be fully autonomous, but at the same time is only constrained minimally by societal preferences and traditions.[69] Regarding Canada's OAS decision, Peter McKenna reinforces that in the development of Canada's new policy framework for the Americas, "the application of a state-centric

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[65] David Thomas, *Canada and the United States: Differences that Count* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1993), 155-158.
[66] Donald J. Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), ix.
[67] Kim Richard Nossal, "Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal* XXXIX (Winter 1983-4), 16-18.
[68] Ibid., 17.
[69] Ibid., 18; in his work, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), Bruce Thordarson reinforces Nossal's emphasis on broad executive parameters regarding Canadian foreign policy by noting that, traditionally Parliament's "ability to influence such policies was never very great in the first place," 94.

model provides a clearer, more precise, understanding of Ottawa's political strategy towards Latin America."[70]

LITERATURE REVIEW: EXAMINING OTTAWA'S ENTRY INTO THE OAS

An insightful, if often inflated, anecdote about Canada's long-standing ambivalence about the OAS relates to what H. Basil Robinson calls "the Rostow Memo."[71] During a spring 1961 visit to Ottawa by President John F. Kennedy and his wife Jacqueline, a member of Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker's staff found a "Memorandum to the President" which had been left behind inadvertently after a meeting between Kennedy and Diefenbaker on May 17, 1961. While rumoured falsely to include the letters SOB,[72] the second item on the memo sought "[t]o push them [Canadians] towards a decision to join the OAS."[73] Needless to say, the incident reinforced Diefenbaker's gnawing unease at the Kennedy administration, while doing little to encourage Canadian membership in this inter-American forum.

While this vignette illustrates the "absolute nadir" of Canadian-American post-war relations, it also illuminates the relevance and richness of the inter-American genre within Canadian foreign policy literature.[74] Because this subject matter predates the Second World War, these works might be conceived as multigenerational in character: the first, analyzing Canadian hemispheric relations during the foundational years of both Canada and of the inter-American system (1867-1948); the second, focusing on Canadian hemispheric relations in the early post-war era (1948-68); the third, examining Canadian

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[70] McKenna, "A Statist Interpretation," 951.
[71] H. Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 206-7.
[72] Ibid, 207.
[73] Diefenbaker Archives, MG 01/X11/113, "Kennedy Memo – 16 May 1961," Volume 85, 1961.
[74] Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 263.

regional relations during the era of increasing interdependence and the close of the Cold War (1968-91); and the fourth, exploring Canada's role in the contemporary Americas (1991 to the present).

The following literature review focuses upon select works from the third generation which analyze and explain Canada's 1989-90 decision to enter the OAS.[75] The major themes of this specific foreign policy literature include: determinants affecting the decision making process in Ottawa; the character of this foreign policy decision; and its significance for Canada and other hemispheric actors.

In 1991, David MacKenzie published an early analysis of Mulroney's decision to enter the OAS in the *British Journal of Canadian Studies*. MacKenzie's focus is articulated as a query: does "the application of [OAS] membership reflect a significant shift in Canadian policy towards Latin America? Or with Canadian membership in the United Nations, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], NORAD [North American Air Defence Command], ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization], the G7 [annual summit meetings of leading industrial democracies, referred to as the G8 since 1998], the Commonwealth, *la francophonie*, and others, is Canada ... merely the 'world's greatest joiner'?"[76] As part of his argument, he suggests that this multilateral membership evolved out of Canada's increased attention to the civil wars – and

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[75] An example of a more exhaustive examination is provided by McKenna, *From Dilettante to Full Partner*, 113-27. For reasons of parsimony, a few works which situate Canada's decision to enter the OAS within broader foreign policy analyses have been excluded from the following review. While not examined in detail, these works are utilized throughout the text as they offer insight into this foreign policy decision. Three examples include: Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993), esp. 225, 239-40; Hillmer and Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire,* esp. 324-330; and Cooper, *Old Habits and New Directions*, esp. 261-274.

[76] David MacKenzie, "'The World's Greatest Joiner': Canada and the Organisation of American States," *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 6:1, 203. Offering an important clarification, K. J. Holsti suggests that Denmark actually "leads the world" in multilateral memberships; meaning that Canada is not the world's greatest joiner, see *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis,* 7th ed., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), 64.

concomitant peace processes – in Central America. Proposing incrementalism, he posits that:

> Canada had gradually become more involved in Latin America, not only with respect to trade and investment, but concerning issues such as peacekeeping, refugees, drug trafficking, foreign aid and development, human rights, and so on, and by ignoring the OAS, Canadians were missing a good opportunity to pursue these regional interests more effectively.[77]

MacKenzie also suggests that membership was consistent with Mulroney's efforts to improve relations with the U.S. and other actors in the Western Hemisphere: entry into the OAS "was an easy way to raise Canada's profile in Latin America and win approval in Washington."[78] He concludes that while official OAS membership removed "any lingering embarrassment caused by [Canada's] continued absence," it could not automatically "produce closer relations with nations of Latin America.... That goal will require more vigorous effort, attention and expense on the Canadian side."[79] According to MacKenzie, far from indicating a fundamental redirection of Canadian foreign policy, Ottawa's membership in the OAS simply offered a "new vantage point in hemispheric affairs."[80]

In his 1992 article, "Canada and Latin America: The New Look," Edgar J. Dosman argues that "[d]espite all the positive signs since 1989, Canada's relations with Latin America retain a certain fragility, as if the historic lack of a long-term political commitment still impedes an irreversible reorientation of Canada's relations with the

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[77] MacKenzie, "'The World's Greatest Joiner'," 215-6.
[78] Ibid., 214. In a later work, MacKenzie states that "[i]t was hoped that [OAS] membership would lead to a higher Canadian profile in Latin America and the Caribbean, improve inter-American relations, and introduce Canadians to the problems of the region without too much additional expense. It might even offset criticism for government cutbacks in other areas of hemispheric relations." "Canada in the Organization of American States: The First Five Years," *Behind the Headlines* (Autumn 1994), 13.
[79] MacKenzie, "'The World's Greatest Joiner'," 217.
[80] Ibid.

Americas."[81] Reinforcing this point, he notes that "[t]here have been 'blips' of Canadian interest in the past, but all failed to develop into anything more lasting."[82] Beyond elaborating upon this cautious change within uneven patterns of continuity, the significance of this work relates to its rare glimpse into the policy making process that guided Ottawa's entry into the OAS. By sketching converging bureaucratic and executive actions and interests that helped to shape *A Long Term Strategy for Latin America*, Dosman helpfully identifies key objectives of this initiative.[83] In an attempt to correct the lack of coherence in Canada's regional foreign policy in the late 1980s, "[t]he fundamental objective of the Latin American Strategy ... was to restore balance to Canadian-Latin American relations."[84] This process was meant to renew relations with Mexico and other major states in South America while refocusing departmental attention upon the Americas. Within External Affairs, this targeted transformation was modest; it was hoped that the Western Hemisphere would find a secure fit as a fourth pillar behind Canadian relations with the United States, Europe and Asia-Pacific.[85]

In 1993 Stephen J. Randall produced a chapter entitled, "Canada and Latin-America: The Evolution of Institutional Ties," in which he argues that despite decades of Ottawa's dithering over membership in the Pan-American Union (PAU) and then the OAS, Canada had "a substantial degree of political and economic involvement" in hemispheric affairs during the twentieth century. Beyond tracing the evolution of Canadian relations with key inter-American actors, this chapter reinforces elements of continuity embedded within Mulroney's OAS decision:

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[81] Dosman, "The New Look," 529.
[82] Ibid., 530.
[83] Ibid., 534-8.
[84] Ibid., 534, 537.
[85] Ibid., 537.

> [a]lthough that decision may have appeared to be a radical departure from previous policy and official attitudes, there was considerable foreshadowing of it in [Trudeau's] *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. There also existed a substantial foundation of Canadian involvement in bilateral and multilateral organizations that made the Canadian entry into the OAS both smooth and predictable.[86]

In his 1994 monograph, *Discovering the Americas*, James Rochlin offers a helpful interpretation of the "metamorphosis of Canada's position with respect to inter-American affairs."[87] Drawing upon insights from critical theory, he argues that "[c]hanging hegemonic structures may represent the most significant factor in the evolution of Canadian policy in Latin America."[88] To support this thesis, he examines three distinct phases of Canada's relations with Latin America. First, he "traces Canadian interest" in the region – including the PAU and the early OAS – from the early 1900s until "the Trudeau years."[89] The next section claims that the Trudeau era marked a "major watershed" in Canadian foreign policy regarding this region; a perceived decline in U.S. hegemony allowed for "deeper relations" to be established between Canada and other hemispheric actors, as illustrated by Ottawa's decision to become a Permanent Observer to the OAS in February 1972.[90] Finally, Rochlin argues that Canadian foreign policy was reoriented during the Mulroney years and that the decision to enter the OAS "symbolized a deeper political commitment to the rest of the Americas."[91] Similar to Dosman's *blips of interest*, Rochlin concurs that, historically, Canadian policy towards the region can be understood as "a scribble of peaks and valleys"; that said, he contends that this "new

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[86] Stephen J. Randall, "Canada and Latin America: The Evolution of Institutional Ties," *A Dynamic Partnership: Canada's Changing Role in the Americas*, ed., Jerry Haar and Edgar J. Dosman (University of Miami, 1993), 34.
[87] James Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1994), 6.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid., 4.
[90] Ibid., 5.
[91] Ibid., 6.

orientation" has lifted Canadian foreign policy in the Americas atop a permanent and "high plateau."[92]

That same year, Peter McKenna produced a statist interpretation of "Canada's Policy Towards Latin America." Combining insights from his earlier work, "Canada Joins the OAS: Anatomy of a Decision,"[93] with a "theoretical approach founded on statist assumptions," he investigates two inter-related issues: was Canada's long-term political strategy for Latin America "the result of state, society, or external forces?" And, having ignored much of that region during its first tenure, "why did the second Mulroney Government ...decide to focus its attention on the region?"[94] Or, "[w]hy did the Americas take on greater policy importance for the Mulroney government?"[95]

Prior to addressing these queries, McKenna highlights familiar assumptions underpinning key statist works: a preoccupation with the activity and paramountcy of the state; the notion of policy preferences being central to any discussion of the state; a foundational assumption distinguishing state from societal interests; and the applicability of statism within the realm of foreign policy making.[96] He then works to reconcile these tenets of a purely "state-centric framework" with the parameters of parliamentary government, including the "real influence of cabinet ministers and the political leadership."[97] Before turning to the contours of Canadian-Latin American relations, he reinforces that "with the possible exception of establishing some rather broad and general

[92] Ibid., 3.
[93] Peter McKenna, "Anatomy of a Decision."
[94] McKenna, "A Statist Interpretation," 929, 940.
[95] Ibid., 930.
[96] Ibid., 931-933.
[97] Ibid., 933.

limits on state behaviour, societal influences play only a minor role in determining the state's actions."[98]

Returning to questions regarding the primary determinants of Canada's strategy for Latin America, including Ottawa's entry into the OAS – and a broader rationale for Mulroney's interest in the Americas – McKenna focuses upon converging interests in three layers of government: a bureaucratic enclave of senior officials within External Affairs urging the Mulroney government to "undertake a full review of Canada's relations with Latin America in late 1988"; the office of the Secretary of State for External Affairs; and the Prime Minister's Office.[99] In summary, he states that "[t]he Mulroney government's formulation of a new political strategy for Latin America was essentially driven by domestic sources. But it is important to note that those sources were largely confined to the state – namely the highest levels of the government and senior officials."[100] Finally, these senior officials endorsed this strategy, and OAS membership, based on a consensus that "Canada should take on its responsibilities as an active nation of the Americas in order to participate effectively in advancing and promoting its own interests."[101] According to McKenna, these interests included: confronting challenges associated with increasing global and hemispheric interdependence, such as environmental degradation and debt; strengthening ties with the Americas, based on a dual perception that the world was subtly separating into regions and that Latin America

[98] Ibid., 934.
[99] Ibid., 935-6.
[100] Ibid., 942-3.
[101] Ibid., 947.

was going to have increasing pull within and beyond the inter-American system; and finally, enhancing Canada's influence and prestige in the region and beyond.[102]

Building upon many of these insights, McKenna's 1995 monograph, *Canada and the OAS: From Dilettante to Full Partner*, offers a twofold argument. First, that "the Mulroney government's reversal of Canada's previous position toward the OAS was not a significant redirection of Canadian foreign policy."[103] Instead this foreign policy decision was "less a fundamental shift" in Ottawa's external relations than a "change of 'means' of executing that policy."[104] And second, that this shift "represented the culmination of years of drawing closer to the inter-American system."[105] Essentially, Mulroney's decision to enter the OAS "was not so much a bold or dramatic initiative as it was the final piece in the evolving Canada-OAS puzzle."[106]

Although not as cogent as McKenna's works, another relevant piece from 1995 is Jean Daudelin's "The Politics of Oligarchy" 'Democracy' and Canada's Recent Conversion to Latin America."[107] Claiming that Canada's "old tension" between Europe and the Americas was resolved in favour of the Western Hemisphere, Daudelin offers an explanation of Canada's full membership in the OAS.[108]

To begin, he states that "[s]ince 1989, the Canadian government has taken a series of initiatives which, when viewed together, configure a genuine – if not necessarily

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[102] Ibid., 944-7.
[103] McKenna, *From Dilettante to Full Partner*, 3.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Jean Daudelin, "The Politics of Oligarchy: 'Democracy' and Canada's Recent Conversion to Latin America," in *Canada Among Nations 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy*, ed., Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 145-162.
[108] Ibid., 146.

definitive – 'conversion' to Latin America."[109] Beginning with Mulroney's OAS decision, Daudelin claims that "this hemispheric conversion undoubtedly represents our major reorientation since the end of the Second World War."[110]

Having categorized Ottawa's entry into the OAS as an important, if incremental, element of a fundamental redirection of contemporary Canadian foreign policy,[111] Daudelin analyzes "the mechanics of the conversion" by asking: to what extent has the process been democratic?[112] Curiously equating this notion of democratic governance with "extensive public debate" involving Parliament,[113] he suggests that "the series of decisions that led to Canada's deepening involvement in the Americas was not the result of a democratic process. Instead, the movement was led by a small coterie of influential politicians ..., high-level government officials, academics and businesspeople."[114] For Daudelin, Ottawa's decision to enter the OAS, like other elements of the Americas agenda, deviated from a simplistic model of Canadian governance: "Parliament [is to] make decisions which please the electorate."[115] Not surprisingly, to Daudelin, "[d]emocracy [has yet to fully] reach the foreign policy field" in Canada.[116]

Finally, he leaps a level of analysis to claim that Ottawa's hemispheric shift was "mainly dictated by external dynamics" and that "the Latin American option was imposed upon ... Canada"; or that the "context of the conversion was therefore largely responsible for the fact that, to the limited extent that they could exercise control, elites

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[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid., 149.
[112] Ibid., 146.
[113] Ibid., 152, 155.
[114] Ibid., 146.
[115] Ibid., 155.
[116] Ibid.

steered it."[117] Indeed, he suggests that while Canada's official entry into the OAS marked "a continuation of the 1980s agenda," it also apparently reflected and reinforced "the lack of control the government seems to have over its own growing agenda in the region."[118]

Building upon his earlier Ph.D. dissertation, in 2000 Brian J. R. Stevenson produced a comprehensive monograph, *Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism*. As he notes, [t]his book aims to understand the increased activity and effectiveness of both the state and civil society in Canada's foreign policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990."[119] Regarding Canada's foreign policy in the Americas, Stevenson argues that the late-1960s marked the beginning of an "unprecedented commitment" by Ottawa to contribute to inter-American affairs, thereby fostering closer state-society connections with the region.[120] By early 1990, this commitment culminated in official Canadian membership in the OAS.[121] Being attentive to structural changes within the international system – including the relative decline of the U.S., the rise of economic interdependence and the new institutionalized internationalism, along with the emergence of "citizen-centred foreign policy" – Stevenson adds that the puzzle of Canada's policy towards the Americas between 1968 and 1990 is that in some respects it seems independent and distinctly Canadian, while in others it appears to bow to U.S. pressures and values.[122]

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[117] Ibid., 146.
[118] Ibid., 149-50.
[119] Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism*, xii.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid., 10.

Attentive to elements of both continuity and change, Stevenson adds that while incremental in its inception, OAS membership "came as a surprise to most Canadians, even those who had a high degree of knowledge about and interest in Latin America."[123] Connecting Canada's gradual commitment to the Americas with Mulroney's "seemingly abrupt and sudden decision to join the OAS,"[124] Stevenson argues insightfully:

> [w]ith the renewal of Canada's internationalism during the 1980s, multilateral fora became increasingly important, both to promote Canadian interests and to cope with issues of transnational importance that bilateral relations could not deal with. Canadian multilateralism in the hemisphere grew steadily and incrementally, and in this sense, it did not represent a new direction, only the culmination of an old one. But in another sense, Canada's full entry into the OAS represented a qualitative change in its responsibilities in inter-American affairs. Once Canada had become a full member of the OAS, its multilateral policies would have to be more responsive to the hemisphere.[125]

Adding weight to his argument, Stevenson addresses a number of determinants that helped to shape Canada's evolving policy towards the OAS. First, while characterizing Ottawa's decision to enter the OAS as a "dramatic change [taken] within a short period of time,"[126] he argues that "Canada's entry into the inter-American system must be seen as a gradual development that began with the release of Pierre Trudeau's foreign policy review in 1970."[127] Essentially, the Trudeau-era review and the Liberal policy of enhancing bilateral linkages and later, fostering additional multilateral connections in the hemisphere, proved pivotal.[128] Ottawa's strategy in *Foreign Policy for Canadians* was "simple but powerful: in the short term, Canada was to consolidate and increase its bilateral relations with Latin American countries, and in the long term Canada

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[123] Ibid., 225.
[124] Ibid., 178.
[125] Ibid., 182.
[126] Ibid., 178.
[127] Ibid., 182.
[128] Ibid., 157.

was to nurture its multilateral relations through its observer status at the OAS, with a sight on eventual membership."[129]

Second, during the 1980s a variety of regional factors "brought Canada closer to Latin America."[130] Chief among these was the conflict in Central America which changed the "nature" of Canadian relations with key Latin American actors by fostering Canadian participation in "the emerging ad hoc multilateralism of the Contadora peace process, and later with the five Central American presidents in their efforts to seek a peace agreement."[131] According to Stevenson, the evolving relationship between Costa Rican president, Oscar Arias (awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for his Pearsonian efforts at containing this regional contagion) and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, allowed Ottawa "unprecedented multilateral diplomatic communication with the most powerful Latin American countries."[132] This bilateral relationship also reinforced Canada's "old internationalist ideals" within the evolving context of the new internationalism: "new institutions and regimes of an interdependent world"; the "institutionalization of summitry"; the proliferation of what John Kirton calls plurilateral institutions; and the "emergence of an embryonic global concert."[133]

Arguing that the crisis in Central America "was perhaps the principal catalyst for the decision to join the OAS," Stevenson suggests that a third factor in Ottawa's decision was the escalating debt crisis in the region throughout the 1980s. Perceiving that this

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[129] Ibid., 178-9.
[130] Ibid., 179.
[131] Ibid. To help contextualize Stevenson's comments, on February 14, 1989, the five Central American presidents signed the Tesoro Accord regarding verification procedures which were part of the broader Esquipulas peace process, an initiative started in June 1986. These resolutions were ratified in August 1989. See Andrés Pérez, "Nicaragua: History, Social Conflict and Missions for Peace," *Canada and Missions for Peace: Lessons from Nicaragua, Cambodia & Somalia,* ed., Greg Wirick and Robert Miller (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998), 36-40.
[132] Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America and the New Internationalism*, 100.
[133] Ibid.

deteriorating situation placed Canadian corporate and societal stakeholders – including banks – at increasing risk, Canada even emphasized challenges associated with international debt at the Toronto Summit of the G7 in 1988.[134] A fourth, and related, factor in Mulroney's decision focused upon issues of hemispheric drug trafficking and money-laundering, thereby reinforcing Canada's focus on finding meaningful mechanisms to encourage multilateral cooperation in this functional field.[135]

Fifth, Stevenson adds that modest reforms within the OAS community also "influenced the Canadian government in a positive way."[136] These incremental reforms flowed from: the ratification of the 1985 Protocol of Cartagena (a modest amendment to the OAS Charter, which took effect in 1988); calls for additional reforms by key hemispheric stakeholders; and indications that member states were beginning to address their respective institutional arrears.[137]

Finally, Stevenson concludes that "Canada joined the OAS when its role in Europe was diminishing" because of the end of the Cold War, the concomitant demise of the Soviet empire and the consolidation of the European community. After decades of relying upon a comfortable counterbalance in Europe, Ottawa's decision "only underscored Canada's search for new counterbalances with the United States. Whether it was conscious or not, joining the OAS was part of a visceral reflex to attain greater independence in foreign policy and to fully apply an internationalist ideology in a new region."[138]

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[134] Ibid., 179-80.
[135] This theme still resonates for Canada and other members of the OAS, see: Canadian Press, "Canada, OAS urged to stand fast against drugs," *The Globe and Mail*, 17 November 2003.
[136] Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America and the New Internationalism*, 180.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid., 180-81.

In his 2001 piece, "Explaining Canada's Decision to Join the OAS: An Interpretation," Gordon Mace states that "there remains the central question of why the federal government took this decision and at this precise moment in time."[139] His analysis suggests that "the change in Canadian policy on the OAS is explained by two clusters of factors: first, the changes taking place in the world and, particularly, in the world economy at that time, and second the particular dynamics in the Americas during the second half of the 1980s."[140] Regarding global dynamics, Mace identifies two additional factors that influenced Canada's hemispheric policy: the re-emergence of U.S. economic protectionism, which was a significant concern for Canadian officials because of increasing economic dependency on the U.S. and Ottawa's fear that "the world would be reorganized according to major economic blocs."[141]

Within the context of the Western Hemisphere, he suggests that the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement "must certainly be singled out as the most central element in the causal chain leading to the Canadian decision to join the OAS."[142] By the late 1980s, Ottawa – learning that Mexico's President, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, was seeking free trade with Washington – perceived OAS membership as a familiar multilateral check upon "the possibility of a hub-and-spoke type of arrangement for the management of North American relations and, eventually, hemispheric affairs."[143] According to Mace, in addition to becoming a reluctant participant in North American Free Trade Negotiations,

[139] Gordon Mace, "Explaining Canada's Decision to Join the OAS," 143.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid., 149.
[142] Ibid., 151.
[143] Ibid., 151, 153.

"Canada decided to join the OAS in the hope of reinforcing multilateral institutions and their role in the management of hemispheric affairs."[144]

To be sure, key Canadian officials were also attentive to "the dramatic transformation that had taken place throughout Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1980s."[145] Mace suggests that "the changes in the political and economic landscape in the Americas outside the United States were ... important because they gave ... some assurance that there would be no domestic opposition to stronger Canadian involvement in inter-American affairs."[146]

Finally, regarding the significance of this foreign policy decision, Mace claims that until the end of the 1980s, "Ottawa was notably absent from major inter-American discussions or negotiations," and that Canada's hemispheric relations were restricted to trade, investment and foreign assistance. He offers that "the decision to have Canada become a full member of the OAS has to be seen as a very significant diplomatic departure as well as a fundamental change of policy."[147]

CONCEPTUALIZING CONTINUITY & CHANGE: KRASNER'S APPROACH

Given the broad range of explanations on offer regarding Canada's decision to enter the OAS, a theoretical framework has been selected to help organize this analysis. The main theoretical foundation of this work stems from Stephen Krasner's 1978 work, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy.*[148] While focused upon American foreign policy, Krasner's emphasis on foreign policy goals has increasing resonance within some quarters of the Canadian foreign policy community.

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[144] Ibid., 154.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid., 155.
[147] Ibid., 143.
[148] Krasner, *Defending the National Interest.*

For instance, Denis Stairs suggests that "Canadians have grown alarmingly smug, complacent, and self-deluded in their approach to international affairs," especially given their concern with Canadian virtues and values rather than international objectives and effective diplomacy.[149] As well, a recent paper published by the Calgary-based Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute is entitled, *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World.*[150]

To facilitate this analysis, the section has three sub-sections. Premised on the distinction between state and society, Krasner's sees the state as an autonomous actor in which policy makers, ever mindful of international politics and the general well-being of domestic society, pursue a few core material – and occasionally ideological – foreign policy goals, which are conceived as *the national interest.* Based upon his criticism of national interest theory, James Rosenau subsequently challenges Krasner to account for change, or the evolution of these goals, as well as continuity. Finally, Charles Hermann's typology of foreign policy change helps to systematically conceptualize types of continuity and change within foreign policy analysis.

KRASNER'S STATISM: EMPHASIZING CONTINUITY

Defending the National Interest is a statist[151] interpretation of select foreign policy aims of Cold War America and the influence of these objectives, in combination with associated instruments, upon private U.S. natural resource corporations operating within

[149] Denis Stairs, "Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal* LVIII: 2 (Spring 2003), 239.

[150] Denis Stairs, et al., *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003).

[151] Krasner explains that a secondary if still "central analytical task of this study" is to defend the statist interpretation of foreign policy with reference to interest-group liberalism and Marxism, especially the structural variant. While recognized as an important goal of his work, neither liberalism nor Marxism receive substantive attention in the following analysis of Canada's 1989 decision to join the Organization of American States. *National Interest*, 6.

the international system.[152] Given the hegemonic position of post-war America,[153] and what is considered the enduring, anarchic nature of the international system,[154] this work also addresses broader U.S. influence upon "other actors in the international arena," and global order.[155] While Krasner focuses substantively upon state-society dynamics associated with the national interest, or what he suggests is the "ability of the state to overcome domestic resistance,"[156] Golam Mostafa reinforces the relevance of contextualizing such "local realities" within the nation-state system.[157]

As a pillar of international order, and of Krasner's analysis, the state is conceived as "an autonomous actor pursuing goals associated with power and the general interests of society."[158] It is an entity consisting of "a set of roles and institutions having peculiar drives, compulsions, and aims of ... [its] own that are separate and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group."[159] This perspective is summarized succinctly by Margaret Thatcher in her recent book, *Statecraft*: "[t]he state is something different from society."[160] By highlighting various cases relating to American raw materials

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[152] In the opening line of Chapter 1, "A Statist Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy," Krasner states that: *[t]his is a study of the aims of central decision-makers and their relationship with private corporations*. A foundational assumption within the following analysis is that the relationship under review is that existing between the state and private corporations rather than principal decision makers and these corporations. Helping to legitimate this assumption, Krasner notes that his work is "premised upon an intellectual vision that sees the state autonomously formulating goals that it then attempts to implement against resistance from international and domestic actors," 5, 10. The general contours of this inquiry are reinforced by Krasner's comment that corporations "have been critically dependent on political actors to create a general environment in which they [corporations] could operate effectively." Prior to World War I, Britain often assumed this role; after 1945, Washington increasingly assumed leadership in this realm and consolidated and sustained this position until the mid-1970s, *National Interest*, 93-4.
[153] Ibid., 15, 342 and 346-7.
[154] Ibid., 345.
[155] Ibid., 13.
[156] Ibid., 11.
[157] Golam Mostafa, *National Interest and Foreign Policy: Bangladesh's Relations with the Soviet Union and Its Successor States* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1995), 4-5.
[158] Krasner, *National Interest*, 33.
[159] Ibid., 10.
[160] Thatcher, *Statecraft*, xix.

policy during the twentieth century, Krasner draws upon a conception of *raison d'état*,[161] or the national interest, to help explain the influence of American foreign policy objectives, and associated instruments, upon large U.S. private corporations and relevant foreign governments.[162]

Working from this state level of analysis,[163] Krasner employs an innovative analytical instrument – the *empirical-inductive* approach – to help conceptualize the national interest.[164] Instead of assuming that states perceive and pursue an "objectively determined"[165] national interest, Krasner's argument is situated within what James N. Rosenau terms the subjectivist school.[166] This characterization rests upon the assertion that the national interest can best be discerned by analyzing "the statements and behavior" of principal foreign policy decision makers.[167] By emphasizing the preferences of senior officials,[168] Krasner's interpretation is consistent largely with what Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan, call an "elitist approach" in which "the national interest is what decision makers at the highest levels of government say it is."[169] Yet by adopting this approach, Krasner is aware of, and attentive to, important parameters.

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[161] Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D'État and Its Place in Modern History*, trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), ix. The term "reason of state" is equated to "the national interest" by Krasner, *National Interest*, 5.
[162] Krasner, *National Interest*, 7.
[163] Greg Cashman, *What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict* (New York: Lexington Books, 1993),13.
[164] Krasner, *National Interest*, 13, 35-6.
[165] James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, rev. ed., 285.
[166] Ibid., 289.
[167] Krasner, *National Interest*, 35.
[168] Ibid., 13.
[169] Griffiths and O'Callaghan, *International Relations*, 203-4.

On the one hand, while acknowledging the importance of key U.S. decision makers,[170] Krasner seeks to avoid the decision-making approach of international politics.[171] By emphasizing a basic analytical assumption[172] regarding the separation of state and society, he works diligently to anchor his empirical-inductive notion of the national interest within the statist image of foreign policy.[173] In essence, he draws upon a state-society framework – in which the state does not merely reflect particularistic societal interests,[174] but is conceived as an autonomous actor with its own needs and goals[175] – to help lift and sort empirical evidence from the realm of decision making, without "[o]pening up the black box."[176] To support this claim, he posits that the most important institutions for determining U.S. foreign policy, specifically the White House and the State Department, possess a "high degree of insulation from specific societal pressures and a set of formal and informal obligations that charge them with furthering the nation's general interests."[177]

While Krasner addresses challenges associated with executive decision making in the fragmented and decentralized, or *weak*, U.S. structure of governance, a sharper focus could have illuminated controversies surrounding congressional authority within the

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[170] Krasner notes that the "statements and preferences of central decision-makers can nevertheless be used to define the national interest" but only if specific criteria are considered when analyzing these preferences. *National Interest*, 43.
[171] Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, rev. ed., 286; Valarie M. Hudson explains that Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is a subfield of the International Relations field, "Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Touchstone for International Relations Theory in the Twenty-first Century," in Richard C. Snyder, et al., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 1.
[172] Krasner, *National Interest*, 5.
[173] Ibid., 5-6.
[174] Ibid., xi.
[175] Ibid., 333.
[176] Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed., 531.
[177] Krasner, *National Interest*, 11.

realm of foreign policy.[178] Although narrow "political needs" and the diffused power of Congress are addressed, additional attention might have be paid to the institutionalization of, what Glenn P. Hastedt calls, the "struggle" between White House and Congress regarding the direction of American foreign policy.[179] This appears relevant, and related, to the presumption of insulated U.S. executive offices. That said, within the contemporary Canadian context of "governing from the center,"[180] Krasner's emphasis on insulated executive offices appears consistent with Kim Richard Nossal's insights about the preeminence of prime ministers and a constellation of key ministers in shaping Canadian foreign policy.[181]

On the other hand, while equating the state-centric approach with the realist paradigm,[182] Krasner remains attentive to issues of foreign policy rather than

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[178] Krasner, "Policy-making in a Weak State," in *National Interest*, 55-90. The argument presented above acknowledges that Krasner touches upon ambiguities regarding congressional authority by noting that "jurisdictional boundaries are unclear" and "the American state often confronts dissident bureaus, a recalcitrant Congress and powerful private actors." Yet in his analysis of Congress and foreign policy, Krasner emphasizes the often "narrow constituency" interests of Congress and an "absence of cohesion and centralization" among federal legislators, (with an emphasis on pages 61-66). These elements account for obstacles presented by, what Glenn P. Hastedt terms, "Congress's internal structure and operating procedures," but, arguably, under states "the constitutional distribution of powers." This subject is important, as Krasner likely overstates the insulation of American executive offices within the realm of foreign policy. Hastedt, *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present , Future*, 5th ed., (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003), 201.

[179] Hastedt, *American Foreign Policy*, 180.

[180] Donald J. Savoie, "Primus: There Is No Longer Any Inter or Pares," *Governing from the Centre*, 71-108.

[181] Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed., 171, 219-233. Reinforcing this executive preeminence, Roy Rempel focuses on the marginal role of Parliament regarding Canadian foreign and defence policies; *The Chatter Box: An Insider's Account of the Irrelevance of Parliament in the Making Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2002).

[182] Krasner, *National Interest*, 12. Although there are alternative interpretations, in his chapter, "A Realist Theory of International Politics," Hans J. Morgenthau offers six principles of this paradigm: first, political action is governed by objective laws which are rooted in human nature; second, interest is defined in terms of power, which can be understood as the establishment and maintenance of the control of 'man over man'; third, specific types of interest and power depend upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is conceived and implemented; fourth, on issues of ethics, realism assumes that prudence – the weighing of consequences of alternative political actions – is a supreme virtue in politics; fifth, a refusal to equate a 'particular nationalism' and an associated foreign policy with the counsels of Providence; and sixth, an intellectual imperative to maintain the autonomy of the political sphere, thereby reinforcing that

international politics.[183] As he explains, this state-centric perspective is premised upon "the state autonomously formulating goals that it then attempts to implement against resistance from international and domestic actors."[184] Drawing upon a term employed by British military historian John Keegan, the state can be conceived as *purposefully* pursuing its national interest.[185] Essentially, instead of emphasizing the interaction of metaphoric billiard balls, or what Nossal terms singular units, or unitary actors,[186] Krasner emphasizes select elements of policy making processes – perhaps understood as choices and behavior,[187] or objectives and accomplishments[188] – of states regarding foreign policy.[189]

Upon identifying the level, and concomitant parameters, of his analysis, Krasner prudently suggests that only select state objectives can be comprehended as *the national interest*. By relying upon detailed empirical evidence – not surprisingly as most realists are "great lovers of history"[190] – he suggests that these particular foreign policy goals must be characterized by continuity and contextualized by relevant international and domestic determinants in order to be considered the national interest.[191] Initially, he suggests that three criteria help to distinguish between the ubiquitous presence of ephemeral policy objectives and the national interest, or the chief aims of leaders.[192] The

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interest defined as power. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 2nd ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954).

[183] Krasner, *National Interest*, 12-3.

[184] Ibid., 10-1.

[185] John Keegan, *War and Our World: The Reith Lectures, 1998* (London: Pimlico, 1999), 41.

[186] Kim Richard Nossal, "Opening Up the Black Box: The Decision-Making Approach to International Politics," *World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence*, ed., David Haglund and Michael Hawes (Toronto: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1990), 531.

[187] Krasner, *National Interest*, 14.

[188] Ibid., 13.

[189] Ibid., 13.

[190] Griffiths and O'Callaghan, *International Relations,* 262.

[191] Krasner, *National Interest*, 5-6.

[192] Ibid., 14.

national interest is described as officially endorsed, and implemented,[193] preferences that: relate to general societal goals; persist over time; and have a consistent ranking of importance.[194] Later, Krasner consolidates these into two pillars. First, the foreign policy preferences of decision makers which are aimed at the general interests of society rather than more narrow, sector specific initiatives. And second, that these interests maintain the "same transitive ordering over time."[195] After reviewing laws, studies, statements and broader historical contours,[196] Krasner argues that the post-war U.S. national interest regarding global raw materials consisted of three elements: "increasing competitive economic behavior, ensuring security of supply, and furthering broader foreign policy objectives."[197]

Having consolidated these criteria, and demonstrating his realist roots, he relies upon "the distribution of power among states,"[198] to help distinguish between two types of foreign policy objectives embedded within the national interest: general material objectives and ideological goals.[199] Regarding material objectives, these often routine foreign policy aims focus upon "some identifiable material benefit" for society as a whole; within the context of post-war natural resource sectors, the U.S. attempted generally to ensure both a competitive business environment and the secure supply of

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[193] According to Krasner, arranging foreign policy objectives according to their importance to the state is an analytical challenge which places an onus on researchers to move beyond public documents to examine the actual behavior of policy-makers. Within this context, and consistent with the statist interpretation of foreign policy, Krasner appears to equate such behavior with choices, decisions and related policy outputs within an anarchic international setting, *National Interest*, 14, 17.
[194] Ibid., 13.
[195] Ibid., 53.
[196] Ibid., 14.
[197] Ibid., 15-6.
[198] Ibid., 347.
[199] Ibid., 10.

various raw materials.[200] During a concluding discussion regarding distinctions between expansionist and imperialist foreign policy aims, he suggests that material objectives are also aimed at improving or sustaining "the social and physical quality of life" within a state.[201]

Ideological goals are of a normative nature, focusing upon visions of restructuring other societies or even the global order.[202] Such "politics of vision" are associated with broad beliefs or values and focus generally upon themes of "order, security and justice."[203] Importantly, these ideological aims are dependent upon, in the cases offered by Krasner, America's "global power position," or more generally, hegemony[204] and "the distribution of power in the international system."[205] Assuming that national norms are constant, Krasner posits that the influence – or lack thereof – of such beliefs upon that state's foreign policy is accounted for primarily by the distribution of power in the international system. Based on this premise, the argument follows that "[i]deological goals can be pursued only by the very powerful and perhaps also the very weak, by those who can make things happen and those who cannot change what happens."[206] Regarding the national interests of small and medium-sized states, Krasner claims that these actors "do not have the resources to change domestic regimes in other countries or create new international structures."[207] In a 1962 address focusing upon tensions in the Western Hemisphere, Lester Pearson hints at this point:

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[200] Ibid., 15.
[201] Ibid., 334.
[202] Ibid., 15.
[203] Ibid., 334.
[204] Ibid., 340.
[205] Ibid., 15.
[206] Ibid., 340.
[207] Ibid.

> [s]o, I beg you, my Latin American friends, be careful; but don't misjudge the Americans. They are a wonderful and generous people, the least imperialistically-minded people that ever had world power thrust on them. They have made lots of mistakes and will make lots more. So have we, the other countries of the hemisphere. If our mistakes are smaller ones, it is only because our countries are smaller.[208]

While Nossal asserts that Canada remains simply a "middle power in contemporary international politics,"[209] the Mulroney government perceived Ottawa's influence to be on the rise because of an enhanced relevance for Ottawa's multilateralist tradition[210] and increasingly aligned bilateral relations with the Washington.[211] On one side of the equation, Brian Stevenson argues that as interdependence and multilateralism helped to redefine the late-Cold War international system, Canada "became potentially, a more influential middle power than it had been in the immediate postwar era. In the western hemisphere, Canada had an opportunity to become an important and active player."[212] On the other side, increasingly close and institutionalized bilateral relations were evolving between Canada and the United States. According to Marc Lortie, serving as Mulroney's Press Secretary from 1987-1989 and remaining a senior mandarin in Canada's foreign affairs establishment, this unique bilateral relationship helped position Ottawa for new initiatives in the Americas:

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[208] Lester B. Pearson, "Tensions in the Western Hemisphere: 11 August 1962," *Words and Occasions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 188. While Pearson makes reference to size, it is assumed that he was speaking subtly about the relative distribution of regional power.

[209] Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed., 66. While Nossal emphasizes Ottawa's middle power position, others suggest a diminishing presence in Canadian foreign policy. For example, Denis Stairs' suggestion that Canada's contemporary international standing and status may be associated with "declining influence and growing incapacity," "Myths, Morals and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," 240. Even former Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, suggests that Canada's "middle-power role ... is losing much of its validity," from *Navigating A New World*, 6. Also see, Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2003).

[210] According to Tom Keating, "[t]he interest that middle powers have shown in international organizations is a reflection both of their interests and their capabilities." *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9.

[211] According to Hillmer and Granastein, Canada appeared to be casting "its lot wholly with the United States," *Empire to Umpire*, 330.

[212] Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America and the New Internationalism*, 226-7.

> [t]he historic Canada-USA Free Trade Agreement of 1987 opened the way for Canadians to look further south and seek new opportunities throughout the Americas. It is that treaty that gave Canada the final push to become a full-fledged participant in the Organization of American States (OAS), an essential decision on the path to playing a constructive role in the Americas. From there political leaders were convinced that the only way for Canada to compete in a world of growing globalization was to extend that treaty to Mexico to form the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).[213]

Based upon its rising multilateral, middle power status as well as its enhanced relations with Washington, by the end of the Cold War, Canadian foreign policy in the Americas, and elsewhere, reflected an increasingly confident character.[214] Focusing upon Krasner's argument regarding the importance of power in the scope, shape and substance of foreign policy, it follows that Ottawa's foreign policy objectives were shaped, however subtly, by nascent ideological goals regarding a desire to reinforce the fragile liberal democratic ethos emerging in other societies – reflecting a concomitant reduction in "regard for state sovereignty" – as manifest in Canada's "understanding of and sympathy with the American" intervention in Panama in December 1989.[215]

ROSENAU'S COUNTER-POINT: INQUIRING ABOUT CHANGE

While Krasner's work reinforces that the statist interpretation of foreign policy offers important explanations of, and insights into, the national interest, this conclusion is not shared universally; indeed, an enduring critic of this approach is James N. Rosenau. In his 1980 edition of *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, Rosenau argues that although *the national interest* is utilized by some policy analysts to help "describe, explain, or evaluate the sources of the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy," this tool has never

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[213] Marc R. Lortie, "Canada and Free Trade in the Americas: A Unique Experience," Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (August 1998), 2.

[214] Costas Melakopides suggests that almost from its inception, the Mulroney government sought to foster "a[n international] posture of confident idealism," *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), 140.

[215] Keating and Gammer, "The 'New Look'," 726, 723-4.

fulfilled its early promise because it remains rooted in values regarding what is best for a national society.[216] With some overstatement, he adds that there are "numerous" reasons why the national interest has proven "fruitless" as an analytical tool. Taking aim at both *objectivist* and *subjectivist* schools – with objectivists taking the heaviest volleys – it appears that his concern is actually threefold: the nature of nations; the (mis)identification of interests; and concern with select social science methodologies of inquiry.[217]

While warranting brief review, the initial criticisms focusing on nations and interests help largely to demonstrate the depth and detail of Krasner's work. Rosenau posits that nations are ambiguous by nature, with a myriad of interests that are difficult to both identify and aggregate.[218] As already noted, by equating national interest with *raison d'état*, Krasner capably offers an alternative which allows for the separation of state from society within the realm of foreign policy, thereby envisaging the state as an autonomous actor "pursuing goals associated with power and the general interests of the society"[219] rather than "a mirror reflecting particularistic societal interests."[220] Further, Krasner's brief discussion of Vilfredo Pareto's insights into the "utility of the community" and "utility for the community" provides a valuable insight overlooked apparently by Rosenau: "[t]he summation of individual utilities and the collective well-being of the society are not the same thing."[221]

That said, Rosenau's criticisms regarding social science methodology help to illuminate ambiguities between levels of analysis which are embedded within the

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[216] Rosenau, "The National Interest," 283, 287.
[217] Ibid., 287-292.
[218] Ibid., 287, 290.
[219] Krasner, *National Interest*, 33.
[220] Ibid., xi.
[221] Ibid., 12.

subjectivist school, thereby raising questions about the "evolution"[222] of the national interest or what Charles Hermann calls "change processes" in governmental decision making.[223] But not all of Rosenau's methodological concerns have such merit. Through extensive research, including a review of relevant legal documents, official reports, and general policy statements,[224] as well as "examining the choices that have been made in actual cases,"[225] Krasner challenges Rosenau's contention that there is an absence of "criteria for determining the existence of interests and for tracing their presence in substantive policies."[226] And Krasner is not alone. From an objectivist perspective, Barbara Tuchman contends that "[t]he march of folly" among states is "[a] phenomenon noticeable throughout history regardless of place or period."[227]

Yet Rosenau's insights, regarding an empirical overlap in levels of analysis, are helpful, especially given Krasner's innovative *empirical-inductive* formulation for determining the national interest. After acknowledging that subjectivists regularly "rely on the society's political processes" – which appears akin to, but more elastic than, Krasner's state-society distinction – to determine the national interest, Rosenau notes that some of these analysts "fall back" upon decision making, or what Greg Cashman calls the "small group,"[228] level of analysis.[229] This time, Rosenau is in good company. In a recent essay, Burton M. Sapin notes that one of the architects of decision making analysis, Richard C. Synder "proposed ... that we define state action as the behavior of

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[222] Rosenau, "National Interest," 29.
[223] Hermann, "Changing Course," 3.
[224] Krasner, *National Interest*, 53.
[225] Ibid., 54.
[226] Rosenau, "National Interest," 287.
[227] Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985), 4.
[228] Greg Cashman, *What Causes War?*, 13.
[229] Rosenau, "The National Interest," 291.

its official decision-makers."[230] While interested explicitly in select elements of foreign policy decision making, Krasner emphasizes continuity when characterizing the national interest; yet Rosenau's insights about the evolution of decisions, may help to explain foreign policy change as "most policies undergo a continuous process of evolution and revision as external conditions change and internal demands shift."[231] Essentially, Rosenau challenges Krasner to account for both continuity and change in the evolution of foreign policy objectives; in so doing, he also touches upon larger epistemological tensions within foreign policy analysis relating to limitations of levels of analysis.[232]

In responding to the narrow challenge of accounting for change, a slight modification to Krasner's framework appears prudent. As elaborated later, when conceiving the principal preferences of central decision makers as the national interest, in addition to accepting that these goals be "concerned with the general interests of the society," it is proposed that they also "maintain [similar] transitive ordering over time."[233] This slight shift in interpretation – from 'the same' to 'similar' – allows modest room for the incremental evolution of the national interest, a phenomenon which, as argued below, influenced Canada's decision to enter the OAS.

HERMANN'S CONTRIBUTION: A TYPOLOGY OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

Prior to focusing on the dynamic of Ottawa's OAS decision, Charles Hermann is called upon to help sort through, and make sense of, elements of continuity and change in this case study. Based upon his presidential address to the 30th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to

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[230] Burton M Sapin, foreword to *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, vii-viii.
[231] Rosenau, "National Interest," 291.
[232] Griffiths and O'Callaghan note that "the so call 'level-of-analysis problem' in the study of international relations remains a lively focus of theoretical debate and controversy," *International Relations*, 180.
[233] Krasner, *National Interest*, 53.

Redirect Foreign Policy," he offers insightful reflections upon causes and types of change within the realm of foreign policy decision making.[234] Specifically, Hermann outlines a continuum of foreign policy change – from minor adjustments, through program and goal changes, to fundamental reorientations – before turning to possible determinants of these changes, including: leaders; bureaucratic institutions; domestic constituencies; and external shocks.[235] Because Krasner's statist framework is premised upon select executive agents being able and authorized to envisage and act upon the national interest, the primary focus here remains with Hermann's "graduated levels of change."[236]

Before turning to the typology, three elements of Hermann's argument warrant brief review: acknowledging the ubiquitous nature of foreign policy change; addressing the relevance of foreign policy change; and conceptualizing foreign policy change. First, Hermann notes that while a state's foreign policy is constantly changing, "usually with minor adjustments or modifications in nuance," he remains attentive to significant redirections in foreign policy.[237] Second, regarding the relevance of constructing a continuum of foreign policy change, he notes that accounting for these types of shifts matters because:

> [c]hanges that mark a reversal or, at least, a profound redirection of a country's foreign policy are of special interest because of the demands that their adoption poses on the initiating government and its domestic constituencies and because of their potentially powerful consequences for other countries.[238]

[234] Hermann, "Changing Course," 3-21.
[235] Ibid., 3.
[236] Ibid., 5.
[237] Ibid., 5.
[238] Ibid., 4.

In essence, examining shifts in foreign policy affords students and practitioners an opportunity to analyze changing dynamics between states, the status of other external determinants as well as domestic factors.

Third, Hermann is especially interested in cases where "the same government that initiated a course in foreign policy recognizes that significant changes must be undertaken."[239] This emphasis is consistent with an important condition regarding Ottawa's entry into the OAS. Based on his November 8, 1989 statement to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, noted that: as the Mulroney Government was "returned with a substantial majority, ... work was begun under the guidance of Louise Fréchette to examine again our whole policy towards Latin America."[240] Essentially, Hermann seeks to look beyond assumptions that "regime change is virtually the on[l]y [*sic*] way to achieve profound shifts in a nation's foreign policy."[241] He is concerned with "self-correcting change – when the current actors change their course in foreign policy."[242]

Hermann's continuum of foreign policy change consists of four graduated categories: adjustment changes; program changes; problem or goal changes; and international orientation changes. He suggests that "major foreign policy redirection will be defined as the last three forms of change" of this continuum.[243] Quite simply, *adjustment change* emerges in areas associated with levels of effort and programming

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[239] Ibid.
[240] House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 8 November 1989, 25-13.
[241] Hermann, "Changing Course," 4.
[242] Ibid., 5.
[243] Ibid., 6.

scope. This type of change is often associated with quantitative tweaks to ongoing initiatves; "[w]hat is done, how it is done, and the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged."[244]

More significantly, *program changes* relate to the methods or means by which a goal or challenge is addressed. Essentially, Hermann's focus is upon "new instruments of statecraft"; therefore what is done and how it is done changes, but the purposes for which these steps are taken remain unchanged.[245] For McKenna, this category of change helps to conceptualize Ottawa's decision to enter the OAS as the "decision itself was less a fundamental shift in Canada's policy toward the hemisphere ... [and] more of a change in the 'means' of executing that policy."[246]

Hermann's *problem* or *goal change* suggests that an initial problem or goal that a foreign policy focuses upon is replaced or simply forfeited. In short, at least one of the purposes of a particular foreign policy are revisited and revised.[247] While Randall insightfully suggests that Trudeau-era policies in the Americas foreshadowed Mulroney's decision to enter the OAS,[248] Keating and Gammer highlight that a Trudeau-era policy of "non-intervention" was "undergoing a modification" just as Canada was entering the OAS.[249] As a middle power on the move in an increasingly interdependent, if uncertain, world order, democracy – what Michael Neumann calls "a clichéd ideology" – was subtly reshaping Canada's national interest in the Americas and beyond.[250]

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[244] Ibid., 5.
[245] Ibid.
[246] McKenna, *Canada and OAS*, 3.
[247] Hermann, "Changing Course," 5.
[248] Randall, "Canada and Latin America," 34.
[249] Keating and Gammer, "The 'New Look'," 722-724.
[250] William Raspberry, "Democracy, Not Off the Shelf," *Washington Post*, 8 December 2003, A25.

Finally, and of less concern, Hermann's *international orientation change* is the most extreme form of foreign policy change; it suggests a "redirection of an actor's entire orientation toward world affairs." No longer focusing upon a single issue area, or other individual actors, changes in orientation involve a systematic shift in a country's role and activities.[251] While Mace suggests that entering the OAS was a "fundamental change of policy,"[252] there is little to evidence to support this thesis. Indeed, it is worth recalling Dosman's interpretation that, within External Affairs, Canada's *Latin American Strategy* was seen as a policy piece that could help to secure Latin America a modest ranking of "fourth place, behind the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific."[253]

A STATIST IMPULSE: EXPLAINING OTTAWA'S ENTRY INTO THE OAS

According to Andrew Cohen, "[f]oreign policy has seldom been a decisive issue in Canadian elections, but the 1988 campaign was different. Free trade with the United States was *the* issue, and it helped stimulate a broader debate on Canada and the world."[254] The outcome of this debate, like the election – in which Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives secured a second majority – reinforced the government's confidence in fulfilling "the will of the people and serv[ing] the national interest," especially regarding "Canada's ability to compete with the best in the world."[255]

After reviewing external and domestic factors that established important parameters of Canada's 1989 hemispheric strategy, this section offers a threefold argument regarding this foreign policy decision. First, reinforcing the merit of Krasner's

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[251] Hermann, "Changing Course," 5-6.
[252] Mace, "Explaining Canada's Decision to Join the OAS,"143.
[253] Dosman, "The New Look," 537.
[254] Andrew Cohen, "Canada's Foreign Policy: The Outlook for the Second Mulroney Mandate," *Behind the Headlines* 46 : 4 (Summer 1989), 1.
[255] Office of the Prime Minister, "Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session, Thirty-fourth Parliament of Canada" 12 December 1989, 1.

statism, after the 1988 federal election which secured a second Progressive Conservative parliamentary majority, key Canadian officials set to work developing Ottawa's new strategy for Latin America, which recommended eventually – with executive approval rather than civil society consensus – that the time had come for Canada to enter the OAS.

Second, consistent with Krasner's claim that the statist approach must define "the goals sought by central decision-makers," the OAS decision was seen by these officials as serving the national interest.[256] More specifically, through Canada's "new realism," OAS membership was perceived as another multilateral mechanism to help stabilize the increasingly interdependent post-Cold War regional security environment.[257] As well, entry into the Organization was expected to contribute to Canadian and hemispheric prosperity.[258] Finally, membership in the OAS reflected a renewed confidence in Canadian foreign policy that encouraged Ottawa to promote a nascent democratic ethos emerging in the Western Hemisphere. By addressing these aims, essentially acting in the national interest, Canada intended to benefit from and contribute to what Michael

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[256] Krasner, *National Interest*, 35.

[257] During an address to the United Nations in September 1989, Joe Clark noted that "[i]n the past, it was the adherents of unilateralism who were known as realists and the advocates of co-operation who were labelled idealists. I submit that the reverse is now the case. Cooperation is now the new realism, and pragmaticism is the path to progress." Department of External Affairs Canada, "Speech by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Forty-Forth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statements and Speeches*, New York, United States, 26 September 1989, 3.

[258] In Costa Rica, during his announcement regarding Canada's entry into the OAS, Mulroney noted that "I believe that the single most important thing governments of the industrialized countries can do to help in this process [debt relief] is to put their own economic houses in order to reduce deficits and curb spending to ensure that their economies grow, that their markets stay open and that interest rates come down. Sound economic policies in creditor countries will bring interest rates down and help substantially to relieve the debt burden, particularly where they are matched by reforms in debtor countries and supported by debt rescheduling and innovative support by the World Bank and IMF [International Monetary Fund]. Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders," San Jose, Costa Rica, 27 October 1989, 2. This connection between the health of leading national economies and the state of the global economy offers potential insight into the depth of Mulroney's understanding of the evolving economic interdependence. See, Elizabeth Becker and Edmund L. Andrews, "I.M.F. Says U.S. Debts Threaten World Economy," *The New York Times*, 8 January 2004.

Mandelbaum calls a "virtuous chain reaction" of market economic reform, democracy, and the institutionalization of international affairs within the Americas.[259]

Third, contributing to the enduring debate about the significance of this shift in Canadian foreign policy, Hermann's framework is utilized to posit that, far from being a fundamental reorientation in Canadian foreign policy, Canada's entry into the OAS indicated both *program* and *goal* changes in Ottawa's hemispheric affairs. Entering the Organization offered more than a new means for promoting the national interest, it reflected and reinforced a new, ideologically-inspired, goal embedded within the national interest: promoting and consolidating democracy within and beyond the Americas. Finally, in an attempt to reconcile this conclusion with Krasner's static conception of the national interest, a brief rationale is offered regarding the potential refinement of Krasner's statism. As suggested by Rosenau, the national interest should accommodate both continuity and change in foreign policy.

SETTING THE STAGE: AN EVOLVING MILIEU

In their work, *Foreign Policy and Regionalism in the Americas*, Gordon Mace and Jean-Philippe Thérien inquire: "[w]hat combination of domestic and external influences explains the particular attitudes and behaviors of different governments throughout the Americas?"[260] By responding that Krasner's statist approach explains vital elements of the Canada's hemispheric strategy, especially Ottawa's decision to enter the OAS, this case study does not "entirely overlook" the influence of other determinants on Canadian

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[259] Quote borrowed from Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 234-5. As conceived, this chain reaction suggests that "[l]iberal economics begets liberal politics, which begets liberal security policies." Mandelbaum contextualizes this discussion by highlighting that "twenty-first-century liberal theory was both more complicated and more confident than its intellectual ancestors. Indeed, it raised to new heights the optimism about the course of history to which the Anglo-American world was periodically subject."

[260] Gordon Mace and Jean-Philippe Thérien, eds., *Foreign Policy & Regionalism in the Americas* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 7-8.

foreign policy in the Americas and elsewhere.[261] While brief, this contextual sketch has a twofold goal of illuminating key external and domestic parameters that influenced the development of Canada's hemispheric strategy in 1989 while, simultaneously, highlighting select Canadian decision makers' perceptions of these various factors.

With an already inefficient Soviet economy hemorrhaging from costs associated with the continuing Cold War and other public policy initiatives,[262] the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985 initiated the final phase of this 'dance of the dinosaurs'.[263] In 1989 – as Ottawa reviewed its foreign policy in the Americas – the European theatre of this bipolar contest closed with what Michael Howard calls "dramatic suddenness."[264] The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 foreshadowed the dissolution of the Soviet Union just two years later. Yet "1989 and all that,"[265] brought with it what Ian Clark identifies as a "mixed reaction."[266]

Liberal optimists perceived a "new opportunity for developing an improved world order" based upon principles of "peace, stability, justice, rights, and the rule of law"; for these policy practitioners and scholars prospects were bright "for international organization, collective security and [the] advancement of human rights."[267] As a chief proponent of this approach, Michael Mandelbaum, claims that the Cold War was not only a prolonged conflict but "an historical era" which left a distinct legacy: "the global

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[261] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 160.
[262] Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, (London: Abacus, 1995), 479.
[263] Donald J. Puchala, *Theory & History in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 94.
[264] Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 88.
[265] Robert W. Tucker, "1989 and All That," 93-114.
[266] Ian Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 19.
[267] Ibid.

dominance of liberal, Wilsonian institutions and practices."[268] Brian Orend adds that "[t]he end of the Cold War ... seemed to bring with it promises of greater international cooperation of the kind envisaged by [Immanuel] Kant."[269]

Conversely, pessimists – often realists – emphasized emerging dangers rather than apparent opportunities associated with the still nebulous new order. In cautionary tones, their arguments emerged. Among these, that the collapse of the bipolar order invited a "re-emergence of the traditional agenda of international politics that had been concealed by the distracting overlay of the Cold War," including "a new age of vicious national, ethnic, or civilizational conflict."[270] After writing that "[w]e may ... wake up one day lamenting the loss of order that the Cold War gave to the anarchy of international relations,"[271] John M. Mearsheimer focuses upon the "false promise of international institutions," positing that because these bodies "have minimal influence on state behavior," they are unlikely to promote stability in the post-Cold War world.[272]

For senior officials in Canada, the close of the Cold War in Europe evoked an aura of optimism, nudging open seemingly permanent foreign policy parameters. In a speech to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations on September 28, 1989, Joe Clark noted

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[268] Mandelbaum, *The Ideas the Conquered the World,* 45-6.
[269] Brian Orend, *War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000), 15.
[270] Clark, *Post-Cold War Order*, 19.
[271] John M. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments of Causes of War and Peace*, 2nd ed., ed., Richard K. Betts (New York: Longman Publishers, 2002), 17. First published in *The Atlantic* (1990).
[272] Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, ed., Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 334. First published in *International Security* (Winter 1994 / 95).

that "the world is in the midst of an extraordinary productive period in international affairs."[273] Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs explained:

> in Afghanistan, in Indochina, in the Gulf, in southern Africa, in Central America, in Lebanon, there is real movement on problems that, not so long ago, had seemed intractable. In Hungary, in Poland, in the Soviet Union itself, systems and assumptions are being turned on their head.[274]

Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War, coupled with this optimism, helped to transform the "traditional outlook [Ottawa possessed] towards Europe."[275] This process evolved quickly, beginning with Canada pushing[276] the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to emphasize "the Alliance's mandate for political and social dialogue," and shifting within a year – this time in the midst of "a full review of its policies towards Europe" – to Ottawa's conclusion that its "military contribution is bound to decline."[277] Importantly, the end of the Cold War did not end Canadian interest or involvement in European affairs. Indeed, Evan H. Potter argues that between 1989 and June 1997, "Eastern and Western Europe, in particular the European Union, again occupied a central place on the Canadian foreign policy agenda."[278]

As hinted at by Clark, Canada's Kantian-inspired optimism extended beyond the boundaries of Europe. Two days before his Council speech, in an address to the United

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[273] Department of External Affairs Canada, "Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at a luncheon hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations," *Statements and Speeches*, New York, United States, 28 September 1989, 1.
[274] Ibid.
[275] Marc R. Lortie, "Canada and Free Trade in the Americas," 16.
[276] The early Canadian endorsement of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty perhaps foreshadowed this initial post-Cold War response. See, Escott Reid, "Forming the North Atlantic Alliance, 1949," as published in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, 36-41.
[277] Department of External Affairs Canada, "Speech by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Forty-fouth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statements and Speeches*, New York, United States, 26 September 1989, 5; and Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, in the House of Commons during an Opposition Day Debate on 'Canada and the New Europe'," *Statement*, Ottawa, 31 May 1990, 2.
[278] Evan H. Potter, *Transatlantic Partners: Canadian Approaches to the European Union* (Ottawa / Montreal-Kingston: Carleton University Press / McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 1.

Nations General Assembly, the Secretary of State for External Affairs explained that "Canada welcomes the tide of democratization and the shift to the market place evident around the globe. On this trend rests the hope for social stability. And such stability is a firm foundation for international peace."[279] Later, when speaking to the Victoria Chamber of Commerce, Clark noted that the "revolution sweeping Europe" offers "lessons, opportunities and challenges to the Asia-Pacific region."[280] While focused on Asia, the tone of his talk revealed core elements of Canada's still emerging post-Cold War foreign policy.

One of the lessons he offered focused upon the inevitability of democracy sweeping China, despite recent events at Tiananmen Square. While Chinese authorities "brought the bloody halt to the march towards democracy in China..., [i]n time, that struggle will be won." Another lesson emphasized multilateralism, as "prosperity cannot long endure without a structure of international relationships and stable security, just as security is shortlived [sic] if it is not accompanied by economic strength and social justice." Because "*that security, that prosperity, that justice*," [the author's emphasis] require multilateral discussion and effort, the time had arrived "to develop institutions of dialogue in the Pacific to match the maturity and prosperity" of the region. Next, Canada "placed such great emphasis on success in the Uruguay Round to trade negotiations," in part, to prevent "the possibility – and danger – of trading blocs" emerging at this time of uncertainty. And finally, while not a superpower, Canada possessed unique advantages –

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[279] Department of External Affairs Canada, "Speech by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Forty-fouth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statements and Speeches*, New York, United States, 26 September 1989, 5.

[280] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada and Asia Pacific in the 1990s," Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, at a Luncheon hosted by the Victoria Chamber of Commerce, *Statement*, Victoria, British Columbia, 17 July 1990, 3, 5.

success in trade, social inclusion, peacekeeping, "one of the best aid programs in the region" – which gave it a reputation "as a stable, reliable and major player" in and beyond the region.[281]

Attentive to similar, if less certain, lessons and opportunities in the Western Hemisphere, Ottawa proclaimed that it was "pursuing an active, effective foreign policy" in "Latin America at large."[282] Like other international actors, Canada was aware of – and encouraged by – three historic shifts underway in the region. First, the regional consensus converging around core tenets of neoliberal economic reforms; based on work by John Williamson, this became known as the "Washington Consensus."[283] As Abraham F. Lowenthal writes, "[b]y the late 1980s most Latin American economic policy-makers came to share a diagnosis of the region's fundamental maladies and a set of prescriptions for restoring its health": confront the fiscal crisis of the state; bring inflation under control; abandon import substitution; create competitive exchange rates; end various subsidies; prune state-sponsored industrial and regulatory activities; privatize public enterprises; foster competitive markets; stimulate the private sector; and attract foreign investment.[284]

Second, there was a growing hemispheric accord regarding the value of democracy. Beginning in the mid-1970s, a "wide spectrum of Latin American opinion" – including military officials and former guerrillas, intellectual and religious leaders,

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[281] Ibid., 5, 6, 9.
[282] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, in the House of Commons during an Opposition Day Debate on 'Canada and the New Europe'," *Statement*, Ottawa 31 May 1990, 1.
[283] John Williamson, "What Should the Bank Think about the Washington Consensus," *Speeches, Testimony, Papers*, Institute for International Economics (July 1999), www.iie.com.
[284] Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Latin America: Ready for Partnership?" *Foreign Affairs* 72:1 (1993), 75-6.

corporate executives and labor organizers – began "to recognize the value of democratic governance."[285] An OAS official explains that:

> [t]his was particularly true in major South American nations such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. Even General Stroessner was on his way out in Paraguay. In Central America and the Caribbean, by early 1989 there were arguably democratic governments in every country but Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Panama. In 1990, when the OAS celebrated Paraguay's return to democracy by holding its annual General Assembly in Asuncion, only Cuba and Haiti (where conditions were ambiguous at mid-year) remained.[286]

Third, there was a "broad regional turn toward harmonious relations with the United States" as conventional confrontations with Washington proved unhelpful for several regional actors.[287] This nascent cooperation augured well for Ottawa. Just as Canada grew increasingly attentive to hemispheric affairs, this warming trend was transforming the character of the inter-American community. According to an official within the OAS, "[d]uring the 1970's and 1980's, outside observers sometimes likened the OAS to a dumbbell, with the U.S. at one extreme and most of the Latin American members at the other, while the OAS secretariat played a difficult balancing act trying to keep the dumbbell aloft."[288] By the end of the 1980s, "much had changed," thereby affording Canada a unique opportunity to enter the OAS "without having to 'choose sides' between warring groups."[289] According to Lowenthal, these transformations were accelerated by the end of the Cold War and the concomitant collapse of the Soviet threat

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[285] Ibid., 76.
[286] In a letter from an anonymous OAS official to the author dated April 14, 1995.
[287] Lowenthal, "Ready for Partnership?" 76-7.
[288] Letter from anonymous OAS official to the author dated April 14, 1995.
[289] Ibid.

– and later the Soviet Union itself – as well as the wide-spread validation of liberal markets and politics and the ongoing restructuring of the world economy.[290]

While heartened by these broad shifts in hemispheric affairs, in 1989 Canada was also encouraged by the uneven "progress" being made to resolve the contagion of violence that crippled much of Central America for most of the 1980s.[291] As reflected in Ottawa's approach to Central America, its overall optimism in the Western Hemisphere was tempered by the presence of ominous clouds on the hemispheric horizon: Latin America and the Caribbean were still plagued by international debt, the drug trade and widespread environmental challenges.

Importantly, Canada's cautious optimism regarding hemispheric affairs was shared with its foremost Cold War partner – the U.S. Accepting the emergence of global "interdependence," key officials in Washington perceived similar regional challenges and sought to encourage this general hemispheric transformation through a number of initiatives, including the 1989 Brady Plan aimed at reducing "the burden of debt in the Third World, especially in Latin America," and the 1990 Enterprise for the America Initiative (EAI).[292] According to U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, this latter initiative "included additional debt relief, the creation of a multilateral investment fund for Latin America, and a formal administration offer to negotiate free-trade and investment agreements with Latin American nations. The last was most significant."[293] While the hemisphere still confronted challenges, Canada and the U.S. were buoyed

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[290] Lowenthal, "Ready for Partnership?" 77.
[291] Department of External Affairs Canada, "Speech by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Forty-fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statements and Speeches*, New York, United States, 26 September 1989, 5-6.
[292] James A. Baker, III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: G.P Putnam's Sons, 1995), 604 – 607.
[293] Ibid., 606.

about the region because "pragmatism and moderation [are] increasingly evident in the region," as in much of the rest of the world."[294]

This alignment of U.S.-Canadian relations in the Americas, and elsewhere, reflected and reinforced what John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall describe as "a revolutionary shift toward ideological and political convergence and a remarkable accommodation on a wide range of divisive issue."[295] During the 1980s, bilateral relations in North America:

> moved from discomfort with one another to the conclusion of a free trade agreement and Canadian membership in the Organization of American States in 1989. There was a new military partnership. The Mulroney government endorsed the George H. Bush administration's invasion of Panama in December 1989, and Canada was America's enthusiastic junior partner in the U.S.-led alliance in the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991. The 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement among Canada, the United States, and Mexico would have been unthinkable in the Canadian political environment a decade earlier.[296]

While Marci MacDonald naively equates this convergence with an "Americanization of Canada,"[297] Kim Richard Nossal is more nuanced, noting that "[o]ver the nine years he was in power, Mulroney was, in practice, neither as pro-American nor anti-Soviet as his rhetoric as Opposition leader had suggested."[298] Indeed, with Canada's senior foreign policy positions "dominated by moderates," its diplomacy drew closer to the United States while still demonstrating "a distinctly traditional aspect."[299] Thompson and Randall attribute this dual focus to an ideological accommodation with Washington while, "'middle power' Canada continued to prefer multilateral solutions to international

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[294] House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 8 November 8, 1989, 25:8.
[295] Thompson and Randall, *Ambivalent Allies*, 3rd ed., 274.
[296] Ibid.
[297] Marci MacDonald, *Yankee Doodle Dandy: Brian Mulroney and the American Agenda* (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1995), xv.
[298] Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed., 182.
[299] Ibid., 188.

problems."[300] Glancing at the individual level of analysis, this weighted balance between continentalism and internationalism also illuminated characteristics of prime ministerial decision making.[301] Brian Mulroney – clearly committed to improving relations with Washington[302] – was seen by some as "a natural seeker of consensus in the middle," and was even perceived by one journalist as being "liberal" when compared to the "conservative" Liberal leader, John Turner.[303]

Within the domestic context, the debate over free trade "evoked... strong personal and political emotions" that challenged Canadians "to look deep into their national soul to decide where they would stand."[304] J.L. Granatstein suggests that Canadians "were offered two competing visions of their country: a separate Canada as independent as it could remain in an increasingly interdependent world versus a North American nation integrated into a continental economy directed from Washington."[305] This national debate, and the subsequent "historic decision at the polls"[306] – in which "[t]he Mulroney Conservatives earned only 43 percent of the popular vote, but the distortions inherent in a multiparty parliamentary system gave them 60 percent of the seats in the House of Commons" – helped to redefine traditional policy parameters in Canada-U.S. relations.[307] After the election, "the debate over free trade all but disappeared from the Canadian

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[300] Thompson and Randall, *Ambivalent Allies*, 3rd ed., 277.
[301] Cohen, "Canada's Foreign Policy," 3.
[302] J. M. Bumsted, *A History of the Canadian Peoples*, 2nd ed., (Don Mills: Oxford University Press Canada, 2003), 416.
[303] Allan Fotheringham, "One Fateful Roll of Fortune," *Last Page First* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1999), 117.
[304] Thompson and Randall, *Ambivalent Allies*, 282, 286.
[305] J. L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), 262.
[306] Ibid., 261.
[307] Thompson and Randall, *Ambivalent Allies*, 288.

political agenda" as many Canadians sensed simply that "nothing could be done."[308] Subsequently, Ottawa's entry into the OAS met with little public discussion,[309] and debate over the future North American Free Trade Agreement was modest as "[s]upport for this trilateral North American agreement within Canada was less vigorous than it had been for the Canada-U.S. FTA two years earlier, but opposition forces were correspondingly less apocalyptic in their resistance."[310]

If free trade prompted Canadians to reflect upon, and ultimately accept – evolving relations with Washington and the wider world, the enduring conflict in Central America provided some Canadians with new knowledge of, and interest in, this isthmus and other regional actors. As Jonathan Lemco notes, in the decade between the early 1980s and 1990s, "much attention" was paid by the Canadian press, interest groups and a small number of scholars to Central America and Canadian foreign policy in the area.[311] As Peter McFarlane reinforces, the governments of both Trudeau and Mulroney were also very attentive to the contours and consequences of this conflict.[312]

Canada's non-governmental constituency – with roots reaching back to protests against U.S. policies in Vietnam and Chile[313] – had an active and ambitious agenda: promoting human rights in Central America as well as the rights of war refugees; debating the location and scope of Canadian development and humanitarian assistance in the region; weighing opportunities for investment; pushing Canada to contribute to the enduring if evolving peace processes; and lobbying Ottawa to distinguish Canadian

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[308] Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?*, 276.
[309] McKenna, *Canada and the OAS*, 131.
[310] Thompson and Randall, *Ambivalent Allies*, 293.
[311] Jonathan Lemco, *Canada and the Crisis in Central America* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 11.
[312] Peter McFarlane, *Northern Shadows: Canadians and Central America* (Toronto: Between The Lines, 1989), 153-230.
[313] Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism*, 141.

foreign policy from American actions, thereby reinforcing Canada's reputation as a *helpful fixer*.[314] While drawing societal – and state – attention to hemispheric affairs, these domestic groups possessed a traditional ambivalence about Canadian membership in the OAS, as it was perceived frequently as an American-dominated body. This attitude appears to have changed substantively only after Canada entered the Organization.[315]

Finally, since the late 1960s, trends in Canadian immigration, investment, education, and travel bolstered societal and state interest in the Americas, thereby further altering the regional and domestic environment of Canada's hemispheric policy.[316] Migration to Canada from throughout the Americas helps to reinforce this complex shift. According to Alan B. Simmons, between 1966 and 1993, almost 200,000 Latin Americans moved to Canada; most arriving in waves caused by external shocks (including dictatorship, state terror, civil war, and violence), economic opportunity and social mobility.[317] After 1973 "new immigrants to Canada came chiefly from the non-European Third World," including countries like Jamaica and Trinidad.[318] Revisions to immigration legislation in the 1970s and 1980s only served to reinforce this trend. While Canada accepted thousands of Chilean refugees in the 1970s,[319] in the 1980s, tens of thousands of people came to Canada from the Caribbean, as well as Central and South America.[320] Within the context of these shifting external and domestic parameters, the

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[314] Lemco, *Canada and the Crisis in Central America*, 11.
[315] Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism*, 181.
[316] J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 266-276.
[317] Alan B. Simmons, "Latin American Migration to Canada: New Linkages in the Hemispheric Migration and Refuge Flow System," *International Journal* XLVIII (Spring 1993), 282.
[318] Bumsted, *Canadian Peoples*, 442-3.
[319] Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette*, 272.
[320] Bumsted, *Canadian Peoples*, 442-3.

Mulroney government opted for action-oriented analysis which facilitated official entry into the inter-American community.

THE DRAMA OF DECISION: ENTERING THE OAS

After the November 21, 1988 federal election, Mulroney and Clark "began to consider areas in which it would be sensible for Canada to take new initiatives."[321] Despite "elements of tension" between the Prime Minister's Office and the Department of External Affairs – lingering fallout from previous Tory leadership contests – an obvious consensus emerged: Latin America and the Caribbean were increasingly important to Canada.[322] This convergence regarding regional affairs arrived with little surprise. Months prior to the election, while speaking to the New York-based Americas Society, Mulroney explained that emerging hemispheric challenges – consolidating democracy, preserving the environment, opening trade channels, and dealing with debt – called for increasing "cooperation and leadership," adding that "building better and closer relations with its hemispheric neighbours ... [would be] an important facet of Canada's foreign policy."[323] For his part, in a later address to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Clark noted that, because democratic development and economic stability were inter-connected in the Western Hemisphere, "[t]he question of Latin America is urgent in our opinion."[324]

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[321] Joe Clark, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 8 November 1989, 25:13.
[322] Hillmer and Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire,* 324.
[323] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for An Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, to the Americas Society," New York, New York, 28 March 1988, 1, 10.
[324] Department of External Affairs Canada, "Canada in the World" Extracts of statements by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Statements and Speeches*, Ottawa, Ontario, 11 May 1989, 5.

In the weeks following the election, Clark – who was Canadian Prime Minister briefly during the 1979 Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua[325] and thereafter remained attentive to the uneven peace processes in Central America – met quietly with select officials from External Affairs in Jasper, Alberta.[326] Among others, this session included External's new assistant deputy minister for Latin America and the Caribbean, Louise Fréchette. Having started her career in External Affairs in 1971, Fréchette was quite familiar with, and supportive of, Canada's multilateral tradition within the United Nations system and beyond.[327] After serving at the UN, working on Ottawa's international trade files and helping to direct Canada's relations with Europe, in 1985 she was named Ambassador to Argentina, with accreditation to Uruguay and Paraguay. Upon her return to Canada, in October 1988 Fréchette was named the Department's new Assistant Deputy Minister for the Southern Hemisphere, thereby being recognized as one of Ottawa's top mandarins.[328] During her tenure as Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Fréchette "formed the conviction" that fundamental changes were taking place in Mexico, and "south of Central America," that were "going in a direction favourable to Canada."[329] Sensing that "these changes were sufficiently profound" and potentially permanent, upon returning to Ottawa she proposed "that we carry out a full, formal

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[325] Peter McFarlane, *Northern Shadows,* 155.
[326] Clark was the long-time Member of Parliament for Yellowhead, a northwestern Alberta constituency which includes "most of Jasper National Park." Monroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain-G. Gagnon and Patrick Smith, *The Almanac of Canadian Politics* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1991), 576-577.
[327] Fréchette was later appointed as Canada's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1992-1995, then after a stint in the Department of National Defence, as the first Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1998.
[328] Term borrowed from J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982).
[329] Louise Fréchette, interview by author, tape recording, Ottawa, Canada, 3 May 1995.

review that would go to Cabinet."[330] According to Fréchette, this idea was "in line with what the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs had in mind."[331]

Another official attending the Jasper meeting was Canada's roving representative for Latin America as well as Ambassador and Permanent Observer to the OAS, Richard Vessot Gorham. With extensive experience in Asia – having served as Canada's Ambassador to China in the mid 1980s – Gorham had also served as Assistant Under-Secretary for Latin America and the Caribbean in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During this earlier era, he remained "very skeptical about Canadian membership in the OAS," and consequently helped steer Ottawa away from OAS membership when the issue was reviewed by the Trudeau Government in 1983.[332] In his memoir, Mark MacGuigan speaks generally about this bureaucratic resistance, explaining that as his interest grew regarding entry into the OAS, "[o]fficials in the Department of External Affairs were ... strongly opposed" to joining this body.[333]

"[U]nder the guidance of ... Fréchette," Gorham and a small team began "to examine again our whole policy towards Latin America."[334] Recognizing the "lack of coherence" in Ottawa's approach to the Americas in late 1988, both Fréchette and Gorham perceived quickly that rebalancing regional relations would require leadership from External Affairs.[335] Yet, this bureaucratic consensus regarding the revitalization of Canada's hemispheric relations did not extend initially to possible Canadian membership

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[330] Ibid.
[331] Ibid.
[332] Letter from Richard Gorham to the author, 3 March 1995, 2.
[333] P. Whitney Lackenbauer, ed., *An Inside Look at External Affairs During the Trudeau Years: The Memoirs of Mark MacGuigan* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002), 138.
[334] House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 8 November 1989, 25:13.
[335] Dosman, "The New Look," 534-5.

in the OAS. For many months, Gorham remained skeptical of entering the OAS, while Fréchette appeared "much more in favour" of joining the organization.[336]

Mindful of their initial differences over entering the OAS,[337] on January 6, 1989 Fréchette and Gorham proposed drafting a policy document entitled *A Long-Term Strategy for Latin America.*[338] According to Gorham, this paper was essentially a "recommendation for [Ottawa to pay] more attention to Latin America."[339] As presented to Cabinet, the mandate of this review was: "[w]hether and how to give higher priority to Canada's relations with Latin America, including whether to join the OAS."[340] Joe Clark approved the production of this paper on February 1, 1989.[341] Over the next several months, Fréchette, Gorham and other members of their small working group – including Paul Durand, Ottawa's future Ambassador to the OAS[342] – "toiled in a windowless third-floor office of the Lester B. Pearson Building."[343]

While the paper "went through several drafts during spring and summer of 1989," the initiative was not shaped in isolation.[344] The review "involved a series of consultations and discussions" with officials from hemispheric governments, Canadian embassies, as well as provincial and federal officials. As well, the Fréchette-Gorham group also exchanged views with stakeholders from Canada's academic, corporate, non-

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[336] Letter to the author from Richard V. Gorham, 10 April 1995, 2.
[337] In a letter to the author dated 3 March 1995, Gorham states that "until the mid summer of 1989 the question of full membership was treated very cautiously as a 'let's wait and see how the OAS reform process is going'," 2.
[338] Dosman, "The New Look," 535.
[339] Letter to the author from Richard V. Gorham, 3 March 1995, 1.
[340] Dosman, "The New Look," 535.
[341] Dosman, "The New Look," 535.
[342] Conversation between Ambassador Paul Durand and the author, Washington, D.C., 23 January 2004.
[343] MacDonald, *Yankee Doodle Dandy,* 334.
[344] Letter from Richard V. Gorham to the author, 3 March 1995, 1.

governmental communities.[345] For instance, in early May 1989, select Canadian civil society stakeholders were engaged to help enrich and legitimate this policy making process. During a May 4-5 conference coordinated by the Canadian Association for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CALACS) at Carleton University in Ottawa, a distinct "consultative symposium" was held focusing upon "Canadian Relations with Latin America."[346] For Gorham:

> [t]he value of the seminar was that it enabled the Department to demonstrate to Joe Clark – and help him to demonstrate to his Cabinet colleagues – the overall importance to Canada of making a serious effort to enhance our relationship with Latin America and give that area a higher priority in Canada's foreign policy activities and objectives. It would also help, if he needed such help, to demonstrate that this idea of improved relations with the area was not some self-serving scheme of the bureaucrats, but had the support of the academic, business and banking sectors.[347]

According to Edgar Dosman, the nascent policy document was supported generally by these participants from academic, corporate, governmental, media and non-governmental organizations.[348] Apparently "a broad consensus [emerged] that Canada had to put the 1980s behind it and that External Affairs would have to signal a move forward by taking a more active leadership role."[349] A general statement was approved by these symposium stakeholders, highlighting that: "[a] changing policy environment has produced a foundation for cooperative action and agreement that Canada should accord Latin

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[345] Department of External Affairs Canada, "Canada's New Policy Initiatives in Latin America," Notes for Remarks by Ambassador R.V. Gorham to the Canada – Brazil Chamber of Commerce, Montreal, P.Q., 16 May 1990, 6.
[346] Ritter, ed., *CALACS / ACELAC Conference Proceedings*. A more complete title suggests that these governmental consultations were distinct from, if connected with, the broader conference agenda: "Proceedings of a Consultative Symposium on Canadian Relations with Latin America and a Conference on Latin America and the Caribbean to the Year 2000 organized by the Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 1989."
[347] Letter from Richard V. Gorham to the author, 10 April 1995, 3.
[348] Dosman, "The New Look," 535.
[349] Ibid.

America a higher priority in Canada's external relations."[350] Adding a critical caveat regarding OAS membership, Gorham reinforces that:

> [t]he multi-sector seminar at Carleton University resulted in a strong consensus that Canada should seize the 'window of opportunity' [based upon changes in the region, including neo-liberal economic reforms]... to enhance our relations with the countries of Latin America to our benefit while the opportunity was available. [Yet,] there was no clear consensus for or against the OAS membership; some proposed it, some opposed it."[351]

While encouraged by this conference and other consultative initiatives with governmental and provincial officials, timely nudges from Canada's political executive proved far more instrumental in easing open the parameters of the paper, thereby facilitating, and accelerating, an emerging bureaucratic consensus about Canada's entry into the OAS.[352] Gorham adds:

> [i]n respect of our primary objective to increase our contacts and enhance our interests with the countries of the region we became attracted to the concept that the time had come for Canada to recognize and accept that it was a 'nation of the Americas', not only geographically, but culturally, politically and economically as well – a concept and an approach which had never before been seriously considered. It became obvious that if we accepted and promoted that concept we could not at the same time refrain from becoming a member of the region's paramount organization.[353]

Resigned to being "backed into a buzzsaw called the OAS,"[354] Gorham notes the executive impulse behind this shift. External Affairs' evolving recommendation to seek official multilateral membership in the Americas was informed by "the fact that the Minister [Clark] and the Prime Minister would probably be receptive to the suggestion of OAS membership"; or even more explicitly, "if they were strongly opposed to

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[350] Ibid.
[351] Letter from Richard V. Gorham to the author, 10 April 1995, 2.
[352] Dosman, "The New Look," 535.
[353] Letter from Richard V. Gorham to the author, 3 March 1995, 2.
[354] McDonald, *Yankee Doodle Dandy,* 334.

membership we probably would not have recommended it as part of the overall package."[355] Fréchette confirms that, "it's only fair to say that there was no push from public opinion [for] Canada to join the OAS."[356] Reinforcing the statist nature of this decision, she adds:

> [y]ou know how these reviews are done. The bureaucracy does some of the leg-work. There is some contact with the political level. [It was] very clear that, in fact, this [was] very much along and according with the Prime Minister's own vision of what he thought ... the direction that we should be going and the same with the Foreign Minister.[357]

In an entertaining vignette, Peter McKenna reinforces that throughout 1989, Mulroney grew increasingly interested in this forum:

> [i]t was even hinted at the time that ... Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, while driving in the back seat of a limousine with Canada's ... Ambassador to the United States, Derek Burney, in Washington, was so impressed with the ornate architecture of the OAS building that he indicated to Ambassador Burney that Canada should perhaps give serious consideration to joining this organization.[358]

After a distinguished diplomatic career – and having served as Mulroney's chief from March 1987 to January 1989 – the Ambassador was likely already aware that such consideration was afoot for reasons beyond a simple prime ministerial penchant for Paul Philippe Cret's Beaux-Arts architecture. More likely, Mulroney was examining this inter-American architecture through an instrumental lens.

Recalling Stevenson's insight that, given the context of the working group's efforts, Ottawa's OAS initiative appeared a "seemingly abrupt and sudden decision,"[359] an OAS official elaborates that Canada's decision to actually enter the organization

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[355] Letter from Richard V. Gorham to the author, 10 April 1995, 2.
[356] Louise Fréchette, interview by author, tape recording, Ottawa, Canada, 3 May 1995.
[357] Ibid.
[358] Peter McKenna, "Canada-OAS Relations: More of the Same?" *Beyond Mexico: Changing Americas*, Vol. 1 ed., Jean Daudelin and Edgar J. Dosman (Ottawa: Carleton University Press and the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 1995), 153.
[359] Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism*, 178.

appears to have been "made quickly, at a high level."[360] Consequently, "the financial ramifications of Canada's membership had not been fully thought out,"[361] as unforeseen issues emerged in two areas: Canada's OAS membership quota assessment, igniting a broader debate on the issue within the Organization, and the level of Canadian support for specific 'voluntary funds' operated by select OAS agencies.

As a routine part of Ottawa's Latin American review, Canadian officials "asked the OAS Secretariat for a calculation of what [Canada's] membership quota would be, and were told that the calculation, done in accord with the traditional OAS formula, resulted in Canada's share being 7.15 percent, or about $US 4.3 million."[362] Yet, even armed with this knowledge, when the decision was taken, "External Affairs had to scramble around quite a bit to find this money, since ... the decision to join the OAS was made far after planning was completed for that year's budget."[363] While concentrating on securing its own immediate membership funds, "what the Canadian government did not realize was that Canada's membership reopened the entire issue of what assessments other members should pay."[364] While Washington, like several other capitals, was determined to use Ottawa's entry to lower its own membership assessment, other members sought "to impose a higher minimum payment on the tiny Caribbean states"; still others wanted to "treat Canada's assessment as 'over and above' (i.e., in addition to) all other quotas."[365] Finally, Brazil "insisted that Canada, as an industrialized, fully

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[360] Letter from anonymous OAS official to the author, April 14, 1995.
[361] Ibid.
[362] Ibid. This estimate is consistent with a Canadian estimate, "the price tag is certain: $[CDN]6 million," which appeared in a publication produced by External Affairs (likely penned by Edgar Dosman) entitled, "Mulroney's Discovery of the Americas," *International Perspectives: Canada and the World* XVIII:5 (November 1989).
[363] Letter from an anonymous OAS official and the author, April 14, 1995.
[364] Ibid.
[365] Ibid.

developed nation, must pay a larger share than any developing country OAS member."[366] The debate continued until June 1990:

> [w]hen the Asuncion General Assembly finally agreed on a new table of assessed quotas, and set Canada's at 12.36 percent – considerably above the 7.15 percent figure Canada had been led to believe would be its share. (This higher share, which then also applied to Canada's assessments in IICA [Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture], PAHO [Pan American Health Organization] and other inter-American organizations, was phased in gradually during 1991-94).[367]

A second indication that this decision was rushed relates to anticipated Canadian contributions to OAS technical assistance and cooperation programs.[368] Historically, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) budgeted for, and contributed to, specific OAS development initiatives. As a "developed-nation OAS member" other members expected Canada to be an immediate "net donor to the four 'voluntary funds' operated by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES) and the Council for Education, Science and Culture (CIEC)."[369] Essentially, various inter-American actors and agencies assumed that Canada – as an official member state – would become "a major new source of development assistance, in addition to continuing its support for the specific OAS projects for which CIDA had previously provided funds."[370] Unaware of these expectations, it seems that CIDA did not learn of these commitments until "after the Canadian [g]overnment had ... signed the OAS Charter."[371]

Helping to clarify the timing of Ottawa's OAS decision, David MacKenzie suggests that the final decision to enter the OAS was made "over the summer and fall of

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[366] Ibid.
[367] Letter from an anonymous OAS official and the author, April 14, 1995.
[368] Ibid.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.
[371] Ibid.

1989."[372] Gorham is even more specific, adding that "from mid summer onward therefore, the drafting and consultation process included among the various recommendations a specific recommendation that Canada seek membership in the OAS."[373]

Characterized by Dosman as "realistic and pragmatic, ... low key, inexpensive and practical,"[374] these other, equally important, recommendations were mutually reinforcing. In addition to entering the OAS, Canada intended to develop closer political relations with other Latin American countries. Next, Ottawa was to encourage greater cooperation with these countries "in areas of increasing mutual interest, such as external debt, narcotics control, environment, economic development, [and] cultural and academic exchanges." Third, the government was to push increasing trade and investment opportunities in the Americas. Fourth, Ottawa was to foster additional academic and institutional linkages throughout the hemisphere. And finally, the federal government was to encourage developing "greater knowledge and understanding among Canadians and Canadian institutions about Latin America and our shared interests in the region" – leading to the creation of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, FOCAL.[375]

With the OAS decision taken and the "Fréchette-Gorham initiative"[376] finalized, Prime Minister Mulroney assumed increasing ownership of Canada's pending membership in the Organization. Marci MacDonald notes that during the summer of 1989, "two months before Gorham and Fréchette's report went to cabinet recommending that Canada join the OAS, Mulroney confided to the Ottawa press corps that he was on

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[372] David MacKenzie, "'The World's Greatest Joiner'," 214.
[373] Letter from Richard V. Gorham and to the author, 3 March 1995, 2.
[374] Dosman, "New Look," 537.
[375] Letter from Richard V. Gorham to the author, 3 March 1995, 1.
[376] Dosman, "New Look," 537.

the verge of making that move."[377] This disclosure occurred during an August visit with President George H. Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine.[378] Consistent with his desire for a "diplomatic approach" to be utilized in addressing hemispheric issues – a theme articulated during Bush's February 1989 visit to Ottawa[379] – the President "welcomed and encouraged the idea of Canada joining" the hemispheric forum.[380] As Dosman notes, the summer saw other heads of government offer Mulroney similar encouragement.[381]

With Cabinet approval secured in early October,[382] Ottawa's official announcement regarding the OAS was made on October 27, 1989 at the aforementioned centenary celebration of Costa Rican democracy. According to an External Affairs publication, "[t]he San Jose meeting of Western Hemispheric heads of government ... was the ideal occasion: hosted by Nobel Prize winner Oscar Arias and marking the Prime Minister's first official visit to Latin America, the Conference offered the necessary pomp and ceremony for a Mulroney foreign policy announcement."[383] Upon thanking Arias for the invitation to attend, and offering "best wishes and congratulations" to his host, the Prime Minister highlighted the success of democracy in finally freeing "the

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[377] MacDonald, *Yankee Doodle Dandy*, 334.
[378] McKenna, "Anatomy of a Decision," 253.
[379] U.S. Department of State, "President's Visit to Canada," *Department of State Bulletin* 89: 2145 (April 1989), 28.
[380] David MacKenzie, "'The World's Greatest Joiner'," 214.
[381] Dosman, "The New Look," 536. Joe Clark adds that, "Latin American governments – without exception and with real enthusiasm – welcomed Canada's initiative to join the OAS." This said, this was not unexpected and therefore not a defining determinant regarding Ottawa's entry into the OAS. As Gorham explains, "political leaders of Mexico and other OAS countries, including the United States, have often expressed their governments' desire that Canada join the OAS." See: Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for a Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the University of Calgary, on Canadian Policy Towards Latin America," *Statements and Speeches*, 1 February 1990, 3; letter from R. V. Gorham to the author, 10 April 1995.
[382] Cabinet approval was obtained October 4, 1989, see Dosman, "The New Look,"537.
[383] Department of External Affairs Canada, "Mulroney's Discovery of the Americas."

genius of people the length and breadth of the Americas and round the world."[384] But the news was not all glowing. Noting key barriers to economic and social development throughout the region – including external debt, resistance to free trade, environmentally sustainable development, and the drug plague – Mulroney added that "interdependence is making us all partners in each other's burdens, participants in each other's prosperity, and architects of each others dreams."[385] Stating that the OAS – possessing weaknesses but also a promise of renewal – "is the one regional organization that can bring all the governments of the hemisphere together" to address these challenges, the Prime Minister offered that, "[o]n behalf of the Government of Canada, I am pleased to announce that I have instructed our Permanent Observer to the OAS formally to notify the Secretary General that Canada is prepared to sign and ratify the Charter of the Organization."[386]

Reassuring reporters that "[a]s a member of the OAS, Canada will not sign the organization's collective security agreement, the Rio Treaty, because 'it is inconsistent with our tradition and objectives',"[387] then addressing opposition questions concerning the resilience of "an independent Canadian policy" within the OAS,[388] Mulroney stepped aside as Clark and the other officials formalized the membership. On October 30, Gorham sent Canada's formal membership request to the Secretary General of the OAS, Joao Clemente Baena Soares. In the letter, Gorham noted that Ottawa wanted the matter of membership referred to the Permanent Council quickly, so "that it be included on the

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[384] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders," San Jose, Costa Rica, 27 October 1989, 1.
[385] Ibid., 4.
[386] Ibid., 4-5.
[387] *Globe and Mail*, 28 October 1989, A1-2. As well, the Rio Treaty, formally known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was created in 1947 as an early Cold War collective security instrument in the Western Hemisphere.
[388] House of Commons, *Debates*, 30 October 1989, 5291-5293.

agenda of the forthcoming 19th Regular Session of the General Assembly for consideration and decision so that membership can take effect on January 1, 1990."[389]

Later that day, the Secretary General forwarded this request to the Chairman of the OAS Permanent Council, Trinidad and Tobago's Ambassador, Angus Albert Khan.[390] On November 3, the Council recommended to the General Assembly "that it authorize the Secretary General ... to permit Canada to sign the Charter."[391] On November 13, during the second plenary session of the OAS General Assembly, Joe Clark signed the Charter."[392] While Ottawa's ratification of the Charter was finalized on January 8, 1990, Washington's December 20, 1989 invasion of Panama – and Canada's sympathetic understanding of "the America action" – muted any mood for celebration.[393]

THE FULCRUM OF DECISION: SERVING THE NATIONAL INTEREST

In addition to "examining the actual behavior of [this coterie of Canadian] policy-makers," Krasner's statist approach emphasizes that key foreign policy aims are "understood in terms of the national interest."[394] This emphasis is consistent with the Mulroney government's foreign policy commitment to serve Canada's national interest.[395] Regarding Ottawa's decision to enter the OAS, External Affairs' "*Long Term*

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[389] Letter from Ambassador, Permanent Observer of Canada to the OAS, R.V. Gorham, to OAS Secretary General, Joao Clemente Baena Soares, 30 October 1989.

[390] Letter from Secretary General, Joao Clemente Baena Soares, to Permanent Council Chairman, Ambassador Angus Albert Khan, October 30, 1989.

[391] CP / Res. 530 (795/89), "Request from Canada for Membership in the Organization of American States," November 3, 1989.

[392] Department of External Affairs Canada, "Notes for Remarks by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, P.C., M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States," Washington, 13 November 1989, 1.

[393] Department of External Affairs Canada, "U.S. Action in Panama," *News Release* 20 December 1989. Regarding the setting, Rochlin notes that, [a]ny hopeful euphoria that accompanied Canada's momentous decision to adopt a new role at the OAS was quickly dispelled during events surrounding the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989," *Discovering the Americas,* 193.

[394] Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, 12, 14.

[395] During his 1988 speech to the Americas Society, like several other speeches, Mulroney emphasized Canada's national interest. But during this address, while focusing upon the pending, yet incomplete, free trade agreement between Ottawa and Washington, the Prime Minister offered a clear distinction between

Strategy provided a framework for a range of selected measures" to promote three primary Canadian foreign policy aims in the Americas: "non-traditional security concerns" in the Western Hemisphere; economic recovery in Latin America and the Caribbean; and "the spread of democratic development and respect for human rights" in the Americas.[396]

THE OAS & CANADA'S EMPHASIS ON COOPERATIVE SECURITY

After signing the Charter on November 13, 1989, Joe Clark addressed the General Assembly of the OAS. Noting the broad hemispheric "turn to the market place" and the related "flowering of democracy," he then emphasized a "new realism which now defines international life."[397] This paradigm, "a fact of life and a guide to action," was premised upon twin tenets of liberal internationalism:[398] pragmatism, "as ideologies which do not work are discarded and practices that deliver tangible results are embraced"; and global interdependence, implying that it "is no longer possible for nations or institutions to operate in isolation."[399] Considering both forces, Clark suggested that "the new realism" was ushering in an era of reform and relevance, if not a renaissance, for some multilateral organizations like the United Nations and, with greater reserve, even the OAS.[400]

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what he considered "[t]he voices of special interests, sectional interests and vested interests" and "other, stronger voices, the voices of your national interest and ours, calling on their governments for the vision and courage to make history, not shrink from it." Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada to the Americas Society," New York, New York, 28 March 1988, 8.

[396] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's First Year in the Organization of American States: Implementing the Strategy for Latin America, January 1991, 2-3.

[397] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for Remarks by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, P.C., M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States," Washington D.C., 13 November 1989, 2.

[398] Griffiths and O'Callaghan, *International Relations*, 180-182.

[399] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for Remarks by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, P.C., M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States," Washington D.C., 13 November 1989, 2.

[400] Ibid., 6.

As part of this paradigm, Clark highlighted what Michael T. Clare calls "the changing parameters of global security" in the Americas and beyond.[401] With the close of the Cold War and the concomitant curtailment of conflict in Central America, supported by Ottawa and other regional actors within and beyond the OAS,[402] Clark focused upon a shifting notion of regional security: "this hemisphere carries its share of the global burden" regarding our "survival as societies – indeed as a species."[403] The emerging era was one of both potent change and immense opportunity. Clark identified three security concerns for Canada in the Americas: the interdependence of the ailing hemispheric ecosystem, the unhealed scars of the regional drug trade, and the heavy burden of debt in the Americas.[404]

During a later board meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Clark was more explicit about challenges characterizing the "new international security agenda" in the Americas, "sometimes poignantly and to a greater extent than elsewhere."[405] To his initial list of environmental degradation, the international drug trade, and the burden of global debt, Clark added "the plague of terrorism," the proliferation of regional conflicts and weapons of mass destruction that can "make those conflicts more lethal," and the "persistent crisis of under-development and over-

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[401] Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001), 14.
[402] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney," Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders, San Jose, Costa Rica, 27 October 1989, 1; Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism*, 5-6.
[403] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for Remarks by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, P.C., M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States," Washington D.C., 13 November 1989, 2.
[404] Ibid., 3.
[405] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for an Acceptance Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Governor for Canada on his Election to Chair the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank at the IDB Annual General Meeting," *Statement*, Montreal, Quebec, 2 April 1990, 2.

population."[406] He reinforced that unilateralism was neither an effective instrument nor an appropriate orientation for addressing key issues in hemisphere. These regional security challenges called not for Cold War collective security agreements or unilateral interventions, but instead for collective and cooperative action coordinated through reinvigorated inter-American institutions, including the OAS and the IDB.[407] As Brian J. R. Stevenson notes, within a year of entering the OAS, Canada became a champion of "cooperative security" within the inter-American system.[408]

To another audience in Alberta, Clark reiterated: "[i]f we are to assert our influence, secure our interests, and state our views, [then] silence is an odd instrument. So too is isolation. The problems of the hemisphere will not be solved through ... neglect. We can't have influence in Latin America by staying away."[409] As suggested by Mulroney in Costa Rica, it was not the Rio Treaty, but the broader inter-American architecture, centered upon the OAS, which offered an appropriate means to address Canada's security aims in the Americas. Indeed, Mulroney was even more explicit during a speech to hemispheric heads of government in March 1990. After explaining that "[p]erhaps the most important way to strengthen peace in the Western Hemisphere is to strengthen the role of its cooperative institutions," he added that his government's

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[406] Ibid., 1-2.
[407] Ibid., 2.
[408] Brian J. R. Stevenson, "Cooperative Security and Canada's Role in Inter-American Security Reform," *Natural Allies? Canadian and Mexican Perspectives on International Security,* ed., H. P. Klepak (Ottawa: Carleton University Press and the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 1996), 143.
[409] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for a Speech by The Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark to the University of Calgary on Canadian Policy Towards Latin America," *Statement*, Calgary, Alberta, 1 February 1990, 3.

decision to join the OAS "is a signal of our determination to contribute more directly to building structures of peace right here in our own back-yard."[410]

THE OAS & CANADIAN PROSPERITY

If these Canadian decision makers perceived Ottawa's membership in the OAS as a means to help ease existing regional conflicts and confront post-Cold War security challenges in the Americas, they also identified this forum as a mechanism to reinforce hopeful trends in the hemisphere, including "the widening acceptance of the free market," an euphemistic phrase aimed at promoting Canadian and regional prosperity.[411] As mentioned, Canada's goal of gaining from, and thereby contributing to, economic renewal in the Americas was a vital element of Ottawa's hemispheric strategy. This foreign policy aim also reinforced directly, and significantly, the statist impulse for membership in the OAS. In responding to the Washington Consensus – "the economic reform agenda that motivated policymakers in Latin America during the 1990s"[412] – there was a converging concern in Ottawa that "if Canada continued to have a limited relationship ... [in the region, it] would lose trading opportunities to the USA, Europe and Asia."[413] Ottawa's insight into changes sweeping the region, its experience in negotiating free trade with Washington and its commitment to institutional renewal reinforced the value of membership in the OAS.

While reviewing Ottawa's relations with hemispheric actors, Fréchette and Gorham picked up on an emerging and prescient paradox regarding the Washington

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[410] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada," Heads of Government Meeting, Barbados, 19 March 1990, 2-3.
[411] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for an Acceptance Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Governor for Canada on his Election to Chair the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank at the IDB Annual General Meeting," Montreal, Quebec, 2 April 1990, 2.
[412] Kenneth Maxwell, "Recent Books on International Relations," *Foreign Affairs* 82:6 (November / December 2003), 164.
[413] Letter from R.V. Gorham to the author, 10 April 1995, 2.

Consensus.[414] As Latin American and Caribbean governments welcomed more trade and investment, they increasingly cooled toward traditional tenets of "defensive nationalism," including import substitution, nationalization, bloated bureaucracies and inefficient public enterprises.[415] In so doing, these actors grew "more open to the rest of the world" and subsequently "much less willing to be subordinate to the USA," thereby creating a "window of opportunity for Canada."[416] If, as Joe Clark suggested, Canada for too long perceived the Western Hemisphere as merely a house, then the timing was propitious to make it a home.[417] Entering the OAS offered a significant and sustainable symbol of this commitment. Speaking to an audience in Montreal, Gorham later elaborated that "never again will Canadian businessmen [or bureaucrats] be faced with the embarrassing question of why does Canada not become a member of the OAS."[418]

If this insight was instrumental to Canada's decision to enter the OAS, so too was Canada's recent experience in free trade negotiations with Washington. According to Fréchette, the potential of participating in "theoretical" regional trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, did not influence significantly Ottawa's decision to enter the OAS.[419] Instead, a prompt arrived from the recent past. As noted, Marc Lortie claims that the Canada-US free trade deal "gave Canada the final push to

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[414] This insight continues to shape regional dynamics in the post-9/11 world; see Christopher Marquis, "Latin American Allies of U.S.: Docile and Reliable No Longer," *New York Times*, 9 January 2004, na.
[415] The term "defensive nationalism" is from Isaac Cohen, as quoted in Lawrence E. Harrison, *The Pan-American Dream: Do Latin America's Cultural Values Discourage True Partnership with the United States and Canada?* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 203; Harrison also offers insights into import substitution and nationalization. Mention of bloated bureaucracies and increasing skepticism toward public enterprises is from Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s*, rev ed., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 19.
[416] Letter from R.V. Gorham to the author, 10 April 1995, 2.
[417] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the University of Calgary of Canadian Policy Towards Latin America," *Statement*, 1 February 1990, 9.
[418] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for Remarks by Ambassador R. V. Gorham to the Canada-Brazil Chamber of Commerce," Montreal P.Q. 16 May 1990, 17.
[419] Louise Fréchette, interview by author, tape recording, Ottawa, Canada, 3 May 1995, 3.

become a full-fledged participant in the Organization of American States."[420] Given the eleventh hour political drama – led on the Canadian side by Mulroney and Burney, among others – surrounding the "decision at midnight" to secure free trade with Washington,[421] the Canadian coterie addressing the OAS membership foresaw the potential economic benefits of this new multilateral membership in the Americas. A number of close political relationships were likely to be created or reinforced by entering the OAS, affording Canada a unique, long-term competitive advantage in the nascent, neo-liberal post-Cold War "international economic order."[422] Gorham elaborated upon this theme during his speech to the Canada-Brazil Chamber of Commerce in Montreal. He explained that "while the [g]overnment's new [hemispheric] strategy is essentially to enhance our political relations with Latin American countries, that does not mean that trade promotion plays no part in it. Quite the contrary."[423] Fostering trade with hemispheric actors "is at the very core of our relations with Latin American countries. Enhanced political relations will create an improved atmosphere to increase our trade relations," which he urged Canadian corporations to "exploit to the fullest possible extent."[424]

Along with insight and experience, the promise of institutional renewal within the OAS also offered Canada new economic opportunities in the Americas. Noting that "[d]espite its debt crisis, Latin America constitutes an import market of some U.S. $73 billion," Gorham added that Canada possessed only 2.7 percent of this market share,

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[420] Marc R. Lortie, "Canada and Free Trade in the Americas," 2.
[421] Michael Hart, *Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free-Trade Negotiations* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), 330-334.
[422] Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4.
[423] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for Remarks by Ambassador R. V. Gorham to the Canada-Brazil Chamber of Commerce," Montreal P.Q. 16 May 1990, 16.
[424] Ibid., 17.

highlighting that half of these exports "were manufactured or semi-processes goods which created jobs for thousands of Canadians."[425] Foreshadowing a "significant thrust" soon underway in the OAS to foster economic and social development[426] in the Americas, he highlighted a specific inter-American element to Canada's economic strategy:

> The OAS is not a trade promoting organization but it does have a trade committee which up to now has concerned itself mostly with Latin American-USA trade. We intend to broaden its scope and create a mechanism to enhance Latin American awareness of our export capabilities.[427]

Borrowing from Robert Gilpin's state-centric analysis of the global economy, these Canadian officials drew upon both economic and political analyses to develop Ottawa's strategy in the Americas, and in particular Canada's decision to enter the OAS.[428] Based on insight, experience and expectation of institutional renewal, membership in the OAS was seen as a new means to bolster Canadian and regional prosperity, thereby promoting Ottawa's national interest.

CANADA, THE OAS, DEMOCRACY & INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE

In a recent commentary decrying Canada's declining influence in the Americas, Ken Frankel and John Graham suggest that, for more than a decade, Ottawa has "been one of the primary architects in developing and promoting" democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere.[429] In the late 1980s, as numerous nations in the Western Hemisphere began to substitute "unhappy traditions" of dictatorship and corruption for "democratic values and open markets," Canada's entry into the OAS aimed explicitly to

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[425] Ibid.
[426] Thomas, *The OAS in its 50th Year*, 45.
[427] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for Remarks by Ambassador R. V. Gorham to the Canada-Brazil Chamber of Commerce," Montreal P.Q. 16 May 1990, 19.
[428] Gilpin, *Global Political Economy*, 4.
[429] Ken Frankel and John Graham, "Monterrey Could Be Martin's Moment," *The Globe and Mail*, 9 January 2004, A13.

promote what Joe Clark called the "durable fabric of democracy" in the Americas.[430] Embodying what Krasner considers to be elements of an ideological foreign policy,[431] Ottawa's democratic impulse reinforced that membership in the OAS could help to promote democratic practices throughout the region, thereby securing regional stability and economic opportunity as well as push related innovations within the Organization and bolster Canada's prestige in the "new world order."

Before turning to these aims, its worth recalling that Krasner's statist framework assumes that ideologically-derived foreign policy goals[432] reflect the national interest, focus upon issues of order in other societies, and are determined by the global distribution of power.[433] Regarding the national interest, Fréchette confirms that Ottawa's hemispheric review – while attentive to views from regional specialists and sectoral stakeholders – "sifted through what our interests ... were in the hemisphere [and inquired] what objectives should we be pursuing?"[434]

Relating to the promotion of order in other societies, Fréchette is even more frank. Because Ottawa was heartened by the fundamental changes underway in the Western

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[430] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Building a New Partnership in the Americas," Speech to the Americas Society, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, de Montigny Marchand, New York, 15 November 1990, 3; Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for Remarks by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, P.C., M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States," Washington, D.C., 13 November 1989, 4.

[431] Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, 346-7.

[432] A more precise phrasing offered by Krasner is that "[a]n ideological foreign policy is best understood from a statist perspective for two reasons. First, the central characteristic of such a policy is that it does not offer benefits for any specific societal groups." He adds that "[t]he second aspect of an ideological foreign policy that suggests the power of the statist approach is that the ability to carry out such a policy is intimately related to a nation's place in the international system." While Canada's decision to enter the OAS was not dominated by the politics of ideology, the above argument emphasizes that ideology did influence this decision along with traditional material interests like promoting regional security and enhancing national prosperity. *Defending the National Interest*, 346-7.

[433] Ibid., 346.

[434] Louise Fréchette, interview by author, tape recording, Ottawa, Canada, 3 May 1995, 4.

Hemisphere, she explained, it was a "direction ... we wished to encourage."[435] Mulroney reinforced this point in the spring of 1990, noting that the extraordinary ferment in international affairs, and the advance of democracy, gives the international community opportunities to set the direction for change. In the Americas, there was "the opportunity ... to create new levels of cooperation politically and economically."[436]

Concerning the global distribution of power, Ottawa appeared confident that Canada was a middle power on the move,[437] or what journalist Mark Nichols termed "a middle power at the top."[438] This perceived ascent was fuelled by the fast-fading Cold War coupled with Ottawa's dual commitment to traditional multilateralism and attentive bilateralism towards the U.S., suddenly the sole superpower. Borrowing from John W. Holmes, the Mulroney government appeared untroubled by a traditional Canadian dilemma of "float[ing] freer in a world of shifting balances or in self-defence to cast our lot more closely with our overwhelming partner so that we can together be more ruthless to others."[439] As Kim Richard Nossal notes, Mulroney was convinced that "the post-Cold War order held out possibilities for Canadian diplomacy. For this reason, he consistently encouraged a more muscular and interventionist role for the United Nations."[440] Within the Americas, Daudelin and Dosman highlight that Canada was recognized as "part of a first circle of allies and partners, in both political and economic

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[435] Ibid.
[436] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada," Heads of Government Meeting, Barbados, 19 March 1990, 2-3.
[437] Krasner, *National Interest*, 346-347.
[438] Mark Nichols, " A Middle Power at the Top," *Maclean's* 20 June 1988, 32.
[439] John W. Holmes, *Life With Uncle: The Canadian – American Relationship* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 4.
[440] Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed., 183.

terms."[441] Known for hyperbole,[442] in his 1988 speech to the Americas Society, Mulroney even suggested that in the functional area of natural resources, "Canada is a superpower."[443]

Sensing a breeze in Canada's international sails, these key decision makers perceived that membership in the OAS would help to sustain the democratic impulse within the Americas, an impulse which was deemed integral to both regional security and national prosperity. As Clark explained to the OAS General Assembly, hemispheric "[s]tability depends on the consolidation of democracy in the region and the return to a sustained pattern of economic growth."[444] Just days earlier, he delivered a similar message to members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. "Our membership in the OAS and our strategy for Latin America are based upon a simple proposition – that the nations of the region are influential players on issues of importance to Canada and to the globe." He added that:

> [t]he ability of these countries to play a useful role in the resolution of these problems [specifically, drugs, the environment, human rights, debt, trade, and dialogue between developed and developing countries] depends on their stability, both political and economic stability. Only through that kind of stability will they be predictable and reliable partners. This stability is in turn dependent on the consolidation of democracy in the region and the return of these countries to a path of sustained economic growth.... In the absence of democracy and prosperity, we could see a return of violence and repression. We could see an expanding drug trade, an explosion in migratory pressures, greater losses for Canadian banks, and new tensions in the international financial system. On the other hand,

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[441] Jean Daudelin and Edgar J. Dosman, "Canada and Hemispheric Governance: The New Challenges," *Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership and Dialogue*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), 230.
[442] Geoffrey Stevens, *The Player: The Life & Times of Dalton Camp* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003), 14, 297.
[443] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney Prime Minister of Canada," Americas Society, New York, New York, 28 March 1988, 6.
[444] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for remarks by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, P.C., M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States," Washington D.C., 13 November 1989, 4.

> the successful resolution of the problems which grip this region would ease the international debt crisis, ensure the triumph of democracy, alleviate environmental problems and assist in the battle against the drug trade. It would also open up immense trade opportunities for Canada where we have exciting export possibilities particularly in the agriculture and high technology sectors.[445]

Summarizing this position, Canada's Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, de Montigny Marchand, explained to the Americas Society in November 1990 that within the Western Hemisphere "democracy requires development and development requires democracy."[446] With the close of the Cold War and the concomitant upbeat Anglo-American mood, Ottawa's liberal ideology reflected what Michael Mandelbaum regards as a Kantian-inspired innovation "not in wide currency until the end of the twentieth century: that political liberalism is the product of economic liberalism, that a market economy leads to democracy."[447] Canadian decision makers hinted that the relationship between markets and democracy would produce an enlightened and advantageous offspring: sustained liberal security policies, maturing ultimately into democratic and prosperous peace.[448]

For any hemispheric actors still uncertain about how to start this "virtuous chain reaction," Canada was not shy about sharing secrets of its own success.[449] As a new member in the OAS, with "real interests in play and real commitments backing them up," the Americas Society afforded the Under-Secretary of State an opportunity to emphasize

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[445] House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, November 8, 1989, 25:11.
[446] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Building a New Partnership in the Americas," Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, de Montigny Marchand, New York, 15 November 1990, 3.
[447] Mandelbaum, *The Ideas That Conquered the World*, 234-5.
[448] Ibid.
[449] Ibid., 235.

– and to universalize – the benefits of paying homage to this grand trinity.[450] Canadian exceptionalism "in avoiding civil war and revolution and in fashioning a voluntary association of many traditions and cultures" rested upon "only one code of conduct for Canada – cooperation and compromise."[451] Rooted in tolerance, Canada's model of compromise relied upon "balancing powers, balancing interests, and balancing views."[452] Even Ottawa's governing institutions reflected "all interests and perspectives in order to give the legitimacy that is crucial to stability."[453] Beyond promoting greater understanding of what Frederick Vaughan calls Canada's "republican" character,[454] Marchand's message was at once explicit and ideological:

> [m]y point is also that the situation and the forces that have worked upon Canada are increasingly working upon most countries and regions of the world. Canada's need to find a balance between interests and regions and cultures is increasingly an international need. Our experience – our Canadian code of compromise – may be among the contributions we can make to renewal in other areas, including the Americas.[455]

Apparently, the "discreet reserve," which characterized Canadian diplomacy during the early post-war order deliberations,[456] evolved to meet the early post-Cold War regional aims of "the stern daughter of the Voice of God."[457]

Yet by navigating their nation into the OAS, Canadian officials foresaw more than an additional opportunity to employ moral suasion. They recognized Canada's chair

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[450] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Building a New Partnership in the Americas," Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, de Montigny Marchand, New York, 15 November 1999, 1.
[451] Ibid., 5.
[452] Ibid.
[453] Ibid.
[454] Frederick Vaughan, *The Canadian Federalist Experiment: From Defiant Monarchy to Reluctant Republic* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 176.
[455] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 'Building a New Partnership in the Americas," Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, de Montigny Marchand, New York, 15 November 1990, 5.
[456] Munton and Kirton, *Selected Cases*, 14.
[457] U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, quoted by Hillmer and Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire,* 276.

as a means to help renew and reshape the Organization into an effective forum for "useful political dialogue... where disagreements might be resolved."[458] Within weeks of entering the OAS, Secretary of State Joe Clark presented a number of broad recommendations to alter institutional practices, thus promoting hemispheric democracy, dialogue and stability.

First, the Secretary General should have fresh resources to monitor and analyze situations in the region, thereby facilitating further discussion or co-operative action. Second, drawing upon untapped authority, the Secretary General should alert members to issues and actions that threaten regional security. Third, additional meetings were required at the Heads of Government level so that leaders could exchange views about revitalizing the inter-American architecture and related elements of hemispheric affairs. And fourth, the OAS should facilitate links between parliamentarians, reinforcing the emerging democratic ethos in the Americas.[459]

Clark also perceived areas for narrower, "functional co-operation" relating to democratic governance and human rights, including the establishment of "[a] permanent OAS 'Unit for Democratic Institutions' whose expertise could be called upon to co-operate in establishing and developing democratic institutions and in monitoring elections."[460] He then suggested a separate unit "which would conduct impartial investigations of irregularities in election or judicial processes if called upon by member states."[461]

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[458] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the University of Calgary on Canadian Policy Towards Latin America," *Statement*, Calgary, Alberta, 1 February 1990, 7-8. The following substantive recommendations are also from this speech.
[459] Ibid., 7.
[460] Ibid.
[461] Ibid.

As Gerald Schmitz notes, Clark and his colleagues did not dither on these recommendations: "Canada's first initiative after joining the OAS was the successful establishment ... of a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD)."[462] This Unit was chaired by a Canadian diplomat, John W. Graham.[463] Thereafter, prompted by Canada and its likeminded regional neighbours, the OAS engaged in election monitoring and related democratic development activities – another Canadian diplomat, Peter Boehm, went on to earn Ottawa's Outstanding Achievement Award for helping to "dislodge an undemocratic regime" in Peru[464] -- and the incremental if uneven renewal of human rights mechanisms within the inter-American system.[465]

K. J. Holsti notes that a perennial foreign policy objective focuses upon increasing "a state's prestige in the system;" not surprisingly, various diplomatic initiatives, including Canada's entry into the OAS, served this aim.[466] Based upon lessons learned in earlier multilateral efforts in South Africa, Ottawa anticipated that entering the OAS – with a promise of promoting a democracy – would raise Canada's profile in the Western Hemisphere, thereby enhancing Canada's image as a "good international citizen."[467]

As Ottawa's South Africa policy evolved from excessive caution to greater dynamism and creativity throughout the mid to late 1980s,[468] Canada's anti-Apartheid policy – especially Mulroney's repeated confrontations with British Prime Minister

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[462] Gerald Schmitz, "Hemispheric Affairs in Transition: Developing Canadian Roles," *Background Paper*, BP-451E, (Ottawa: Parliamentary Research Branch, Library of Parliament, September 1997), 12.
[463] Frankel and Graham, "Monterrey Could Be Martin's Moment."
[464] Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept,* 155.
[465] Schmitz, "Hemispheric Affairs in Transition," 12.
[466] K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 5th ed., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 127.
[467] David R. Black, "How Exceptional? Reassessing the Mulroney Government's Anti-Apartheid 'Crusade'," in *Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93,* ed., Michaud and Nossal (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001), 190.
[468] Clarence G. Redekop, "Sanctioning South Africa, 1980s" in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, ed., Munton and Kirton, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992), 344.

Margaret Thatcher in the Commonwealth and elsewhere – became associated with "exceptional leadership" on an issue associated with universal justice.[469] Clarence G. Redekop helps to capture this sentiment, noting that although more could have been done:

> [t]he Mulroney government's policy towards South Africa [sometimes referred to as 'constructive disengagement' which attempted to exercise influence through the curtailment of select interactions] placed it within the best traditions of postwar Canadian foreign policy. It was mediatory within the Commonwealth; the actions of Mulroney and his special emissary, Bernard Wood, were reminiscent of those of Trudeau and his emissary, Ivan Head, some fifteen years earlier. It was flexible and creative in its search for workable approaches to seemingly insoluble problems.[470]

Beyond the context of southern Africa, Mulroney's anti-Apartheid initiative was integrated into Ottawa's 1988 objective of securing a seat on the United Nations Security Council. According to Linda Freeman, the Prime Minister utilized a specific announcement at the United Nations in September 1988, offering modest security assistance to Mozambique for its fight against South African-backed rebels, to help "bolster Canada's international reputation" on the eve of Ottawa's election to the Security Council.[471]

In securing its seat as a non-permanent member of Security Council, Ottawa learned a vital lesson: Canada's shrewd, multilateral statecraft that promoted anti-Apartheid in South Africa also raised the country's regional reputation and global status.[472] In the post-Tiananmen Square environment, Ottawa's push for democratic

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[469] David R. Black, "How Exceptional?"189.
[470] Redekop, "Sanctioning South Africa," 347.
[471] Linda Freeman, *The Ambiguous Champion,* 219-21.
[472] In May 1989, Joe Clark confirmed the importance of multilateralism to Canada's efforts in South Africa by noting that "[t]he Commonwealth is probably the most effective instrument to keep the focus on South Africa over time ... The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers was designed to try to keep attention up." Department of External Affairs Canada, "Canada in the World: Extracts of Statements by

development in the Western Hemisphere could have a similar effect. According to a report produced by External Affairs a year after Canada entered the OAS, the democratic impulse which propelled Canada into the Organization and encouraged numerous institutional innovations had already helped to lift "Canada's reputation in the eyes of long-standing OAS members."[473]

This imperative was also emphasized to Canadian audiences. In his Latin American speech at the University of Calgary in 1990, Joe Clark explained that Ottawa's presence in international organizations had increased "to the point that we are among a small handful of nations upon whom the world counts to make multilateral organizations work."[474] Indeed, Canada's role in smaller dramas such as promoting "peaceful change" in South Africa proved decisive, much as it was in helping to "make democracy and prosperity not only the common rhetoric but also the common reality" in the Americas.[475]

A government backgrounder to the April 1998 Summit of the Americas offers a concise summary of Ottawa's foreign policy aims regarding its entry into the OAS. Essentially, in serving the national interest, the Mulroney government entered the OAS in January 1990 for three reasons. Membership in the Organization was intended to promote democracy and help to improve "prospects for strengthening human rights" in the Americas. Entry was also premised upon open societies fuelling economic reforms, thereby creating new opportunities for Canadian corporations in the Western

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the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade," *Statements and Speeches*, Ottawa, Ontario, 11 May 1989, 3.

[473] Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's First Year in the Organization of American States: Implementing the Strategy for Latin America," January 1991, 5.

[474] External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the University of Calgary on Canadian Policy Towards Latin America," *Statement*, Calgary, Alberta, 1 February 1990, 1,

[475] Ibid., 1, 5.

Hemisphere. And finally, emerging "non-traditional issues" relating to regional security, including drugs and environmental degradation, "meant that Canada could no longer afford to be excluded from the hemisphere's foremost political forum."[476]

A TYPOLOGY OF CHANGE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OTTAWA'S OAS DECISION

After his OAS announcement in Costa Rica, Prime Minister Mulroney spoke regularly about Ottawa's decision to enter the Organization. At the regional summit meeting in Barbados on March 19, 1990, he explained that "Canada's recent decision to join the Organization of American States is a signal of our determination to contribute more directly to building [regional] structures for peace."[477] On October 6, 1992, after describing Mexico as a "gateway" for Canadian exports in the Americas, Mulroney highlighted that the decision to join the Organization marked "a significant foreign policy reversal because we have suffered from a timid and sometimes inadequate role in hemispheric affairs."[478] The next day, at the trilateral signing ceremony of the North American Free Trade Agreement in San Antonio, Texas, he noted that the accord "provides us all with a pathway to prosperity. For Canada, this goes hand-in-hand with the decision of my government to join the Organization of American States and play a more active role in the affairs of this hemisphere."[479] Speaking at Harvard University in December 1992, he emphasized the national interest as a sole criterion for determining Canada's role in global politics, explaining that:

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[476] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Summit of the Americas, Santiago, Chile, April 18-19, 1998: Background Information," 31.
[477] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, Heads of Government Meeting," Barbados, 19 March 1990, 3.
[478] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Canadian Exporters' Association," Montreal, Quebec, 6 October 1992, 6.
[479] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Signing Ceremony of the North American Free Trade Agreement," San Antonio, Texas, 7 October 1992, 1.

> Canada and the United States have together shown leadership on the cornerstone issues of foreign policy. As founding members of the United Nations in San Francisco, we are strong believers in multilateralism and have sought to strengthen this indispensable instrument of world peace. That is also why Canada, under our government, joined the Organization of American States, because we believe we can only play a constructive role in the affairs of the hemisphere if we are at the table. In the OAS, far from being an echo of the United States, we are considered, as a G-7 industrialized nation, a welcome counterbalance to the preponderant weight of the Americans.[480]

Finally, in June 1993 – with mere days remaining as prime minister – Mulroney addressed the Americas Society, in Ottawa for the annual meeting of its International Advisory Council.[481] Encouraged by the growing "membership of the community of democratic American nations" and the abandonment of "the old models of economic growth" in the hemisphere, he explained that "[m]y government has taken a number of initiatives that also represent a change in Canada's attitudes to the region." Among the most important "was to join the Organization of American States." This decision reflected "an awareness that both the organization and the region were renewing themselves, and that hemispheric cooperation was integral to Canada's interests." Indeed, membership in the OAS provided the "foundation for changing the political dynamic of our relationship with the hemisphere."[482]

Essentially, these public reflections about Canada's entry into the OAS touched upon three themes. First, recognizing hemispheric and organizational transformations, the Mulroney government sought this inter-American membership to serve the national interest, aiming to: enhance regional peace and security; increase prosperity at home and

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[480] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney" Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University," Cambridge, Massachusetts, 10 December 1992, 4.
[481] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney," Americas Society, Ottawa, Canada 18 June 1993, 3. For additional details about the setting, see Marci MacDonald, *Yankee Doodle Dandy*, 347-8.
[482] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney," Americas Society, Ottawa, Canada 18 June 1993, 3.

beyond; and engage more consistently in hemispheric affairs, with a commitment to bolster "fledgling institutions that protect and enhance democratic traditions, values and respect for human rights."[483] Second, as a mature democracy increasingly tuned to the United States, yet still considered an elite multilateral joiner, Canada was an able and influential hemispheric actor.[484] Finally, OAS membership reflected a change in official Canadian attitudes towards the Americas and a significant shift in Canadian foreign policy. Given Mulroney's comments, and the diversity of opinion appearing in the aforementioned literature, this final point warrants additional analysis.

Both Gordon Mace and Jean Daudelin suggest that entering the OAS was equal to, or at least associated with, an essential reorientation in Canadian foreign policy.[485] For his part, Peter McKenna – in language consistent with Hermann's foreign policy framework – counters that "the Mulroney government's decision to enter the OAS did not signify a 'fundamental' shift in foreign policy."[486] While entering the OAS marked a "notable departure,"[487] in regional relations, "[o]ne should not lose sight of the fact that successive Canadian governments, albeit in an incremental fashion, were moving closer to full membership."[488]

Since the late 1960s, Ottawa not only paid increasing, if uneven, attention to Latin America and the Caribbean, it also advanced a modified version of the "multilateralist tradition in Canadian foreign policy," by becoming a permanent observer at the OAS in

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[483] Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Americas Society," Ottawa, Canada 18 June 1993, 2.
[484] Ibid.
[485] Mace, "Explaining Canada's Decision to Join the OAS," 143; Daudelin, "The Politics of Oligarchy," 146.
[486] McKenna, "Anatomy of a Decision," 254.
[487] Ibid.
[488] Ibid., 262.

1972.[489] This measured response allowed Ottawa make a symbolic gesture regarding its increasing interest in the Americas and its concurrent caution regarding relations with the America.[490] The recently released memoirs of Mark MacGuigan further reinforce McKenna's argument. Reflecting upon his time as Secretary of State for External Affairs in the early 1980s, MacGuigan, claims that "on what turned out to be my last day in office, I revealed at a press conference that I had in mind Canada's joining the OAS." He adds that "it was ... left to a later government to take the bold step of joining the OAS in 1990, by which time my own party had forgotten that it was originally our policy."[491]

If this foreign policy decision "did not signify a dramatic reorientation of Canada's overall policy approach toward the hemisphere," then, according to McKenna, as Ottawa's "policy objectives toward the hemisphere remained largely intact... the 'means' of helping to attain them was demonstrably altered."[492] To borrow from Hermann, in essence, McKenna conceives Canada's decision to enter the OAS as a "program change" in which modifications "are made in the methods or means by which the [foreign policy] goal or problem is addressed."[493] Undoubtedly, McKenna's analysis provides a partial explanation. Upon entering the OAS, Canada possessed a new vehicle with which to drive its foreign policy agenda in the Americas.

Yet Krasner's statist approach illuminates an additional, essential, element regarding the significance of this foreign policy decision: Ottawa entered the OAS, in part, because its hemispheric agenda – the government's regional policy objectives,

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[489] Keating, *The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed.
[490] John W. Holmes, "Canada, Latin America, and United States Foreign Policy," *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 244.
[491] Lackenbauer, ed., *The Memoirs of Mark MacGuigan*, 138.
[492] McKenna, "Anatomy of a Decision," 263.
[493] Hermann, "Changing Course," 5.

indeed Canada's national interest in and beyond the Americas – evolved, adopting an ideological imperative regarding democratic development. With key officials in Ottawa conceiving Canada as a reinvigorated middle power, the country sought to serve as an earnest midwife to the emerging liberal order. While far from a great power, Canada could still be a significant hemispheric actor in promoting democracy and human rights. Focusing on Canada's response to September 30, 1991 military coup in Haiti, Tom Keating argues that:

> [t]he Canadian government's reaction was immediate and unequivocal. Prime Minister Mulroney condemned the coup and implied that it should be overturned with force, if necessary. The idea of using force to support democratically elected regimes was a radical departure from past Canadian practice and reflected the extent to which attitudes had changed within the Canadian government towards the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty. It also demonstrates a new approach to security. Ethical priorities were shifting, and matters of good governance were now being privileged by political leaders such as Mulroney and his [new] foreign minister Barbara McDougall.[494]

Again, to borrow from Hermann, an "initial problem or goal" of Canadian foreign policy in the Americas was replaced; Ottawa's purposes were revised.[495] In 1970, Canada's "direct interest in the political affairs of the hemisphere" was real but "still somewhat limited."[496] The Trudeau government's vague hemispheric policy objectives included: acting independently; enhancing the quality of life in the region, specifically through modest scientific exchanges and mutual awareness initiatives; protecting the environment; fostering social justice; encouraging business; promoting peace and

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[494] Tom Keating, "Promoting Democracy in Haiti: Assessing the Practical and Ethical Implications," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001), 213.
[495] Hermann, "Changing Course," 5.
[496] Department of External Affairs Canada, *Foreign Policy for Canadians: Latin America*, vol. 4 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), 22.

security; while encouraging "people-to-people" relationships."[497] Reflecting both continuity and change, these priorities were transformed into the Mulroney government's "overall goal" of promoting stability, prosperity and democracy in the region.[498] While the Trudeau government encouraged, at least rhetorically, the emergence of "social justice" in the Western Hemisphere, the Mulroney government promoted actively the emergence, and viability, of democratic states, and therefore implicitly a notion of *just societies*, within and beyond the Americas. Gorham, in helping to steer Canada into the Americas, confirms that "I would describe our initiative as creating a new goal on Canada's foreign policy."[499]

Significantly, if Krasner's framework helps to reveal the emergence of a new ideological element within Canada's national interest, then it reveals concomitantly an internal tension within his work: while this statist approach emphasizes "a consistent set of goals,"[500] that converge as the national interest, as Rosenau suggests, it must also account for processes of "evolution and revision as external conditions change and internal demands shift."[501] To help resolve this tension, a modest modification is made to Krasner's framework.

In attempting to determine the U.S. national interest, or "the aims sought by American leaders," in the case of international raw materials markets, Krasner argues that it is "necessary to demonstrate that the ordering [of these aims] persisted over time."[502] Yet, during his discussion of ideology and foreign policy, Krasner emphasizes the

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[497] Ibid., 26.
[498] House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 8 November 1989, 25:11.
[499] Letter from Richard V. Gorham to the author, 10 April 1995, 3.
[500] Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, 6.
[501] James N. Rosenau, "The National Interest," 247.
[502] Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, 14.

"importance of the international distribution of power in explaining ... foreign policy."[503] He notes that while Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy goals foreshadowed the politics of ideology, it was only after 1945, as the U.S. "emerged from the war in an extraordinarily powerful position," that American leaders were able to impose their vision on the world.[504] More explicitly, "[f]or two and a half decades after the Second World War, Lockean liberalism was the key to American foreign policy; it was the desire to create a world order in America's image that led to the use of force."[505] Yet by the mid 1970s, with the international environment "changing dramatically"[506] and the U.S., in relative geo-political decline,[507] Washington was positioned poorly to stabilize this uncertain setting. In essence, while Krasner focuses upon consistent foreign policy aims during a specific period in contemporary American history, it is obvious that the U.S. national interest did shift slightly – reflecting and reinforcing shifts in power and prestige in the international system – beyond the parameters of his case study. While much work remains to be undertaken to examine more closely contested notions of the national interest, in the interim, we might consider simply that *the national interest* consists, generally, of persistent foreign policy goals, thereby allowing for elements of both continuity and change in foreign policy.

CONCLUSION: CONTINUITY & CHANGE IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

In his 1967 work, *Fate and Will in Foreign Policy*, James Eayrs suggests optimistically that "[f]oreign policy is the art of the possible," especially for small states with

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[503] Ibid., 347.
[504] Ibid., 344.
[505] Ibid., 347.
[506] Ibid., 349.
[507] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500-2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 514-535.

innovative agendas.[508] While the Mulroney government rejected small state status for Canada, preferring to act as an ascending middle power in an era of global transformation, Barbara McDougall – named Secretary of State for External Affairs as Joe Clark turned his attention to perennial Canadian constitutional questions – suggests that the Conservative approach to foreign policy was nonetheless innovative. She contends that from 1984 to 1993, Ottawa was both "interventionist and activist" in foreign policy, playing an especially "active role" in hemispheric affairs by promoting North American free trade and in entering the OAS.[509]

Weighing McDougall's claims, Denis Stairs inquires: to what extent was this foreign policy "a reflection of the political orientation of the Progressive Conservative party and the predilections of its leaders, and to what extent was it a product of insistent imperatives arising from circumstances ... at home and abroad?"[510] Or, rephrasing issues of fate and will in foreign policy, in what measure "were the Conservatives in office the 'architects' of their foreign policies, creating them (as it were) afresh, and in what measure [were they] ... 'engineers,' installing bridges of standard design over rivers that almost anyone in power would have had to cross?"[511]

If both of these factors, architectural engineering as it were, influenced the Mulroney government's 1989 hemispheric strategy, this paper has posited that their influence proved unequal. To be certain, Canada's decision to join the Organization of

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[508] James Eayrs, *Fate and Will in Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1967), 2, 85.
[509] Barbara J. McDougall, forward to *Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93*, ed., Michaud and Nossal (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001), viii, ix.
[510] Denis Stairs, "Architects or Engineers? The Conservatives and Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93,* ed., Michaud and Nossal (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001), 26.
[511] Ibid., 26-7.

American States – a key element of this regional strategy – was influenced by evolving international and regional post-Cold War systems, Ottawa's evolving, if uneven, interest in hemispheric affairs meshed with its multilateralist tradition and warming relations with Washington. Yet, by drawing upon Krasner's statist framework, modified modestly to accommodate Rosenau's concerns regarding continuity and change, the overarching argument of this work is that the impetus of this foreign policy decision rests upon specific choices and decisions taken by select Canadian foreign policy practitioners acting in the national interest. Essentially, within the context of what Brian Mulroney describes as "exhilarating... [and] challenging" times, a coterie of Canadian officials – led by Mulroney, Clark, Fréchette and Gorham – envisaged, and opted for, OAS membership based upon mutually-reinforcing, neo-liberal notions of the national interest: cooperative security; national and regional economic prosperity; and the institutionalization of democracy and human rights.[512]

As noted by Harold Hickman, a deputy director in Foreign Affairs familiar with Canada's inter-American agenda, the timing of this decision was "tremendous," as postponing this initiative would have led to missed opportunities within the Americas.[513] And the Mulroney government aimed to realize these international opportunities. While Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick suggest that this decision making dynamic comes as little surprise, as "[f]oreign policy choices are often made by a remarkably small number of individuals," situated around the head of government,[514] the

[512] Brian Mulroney, introduction to "Profiles in Transition: Ten Years of Russian – Canadian Cooperation," ed., David O'Brien, Vladimir Mikheev and Yuri Serieznov. University of Saskatchewan, 2003.
[513] Electronic note from Harold Hickman to the author, 6 February 2004.
[514] Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, eds., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 4th ed., (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 247.

specific outcome of this decision still caught some observers, and officials, off-guard in both Canada and the OAS.

Finally, to help recontextualize the enduring debate within the third generation of Canada-OAS literature, Hermann's typology of foreign policy change offers an analytical framework to consider the scope and significance of this decision. Drawing upon this framework, this paper goes on to suggest that entering the OAS represented a twofold shift in Canadian foreign policy. First, the emergence of, and commitment to, the ideological *goal* of promoting democratic governance in and beyond the Americas, thereby reflecting increasing confidence in Canada's geo-political position; as a middle power on the move, Ottawa was willing to help "remake the world" or at least nudge it toward the expanding neoliberal order.[515] And second, less significantly, after years of caution, Canada officially adopted this regional, multilateral mechanism – the OAS – as the primary vehicle through which to drive post-Cold War foreign policy in the Americas.

While both of these shifts in policy were significant, Canada's entry into the OAS did not mark a fundamental redirection of Ottawa's external affairs. After all, Canada's attention to the Americas, and the inter-American system, was not new. Since the late 1960s, Canada was increasingly, if unevenly, attentive to the Americas, entering the Inter-American Development Bank and becoming a permanent observer to the OAS in the early 1970s. Indeed, in 1964, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin Sr.,

[515] Phrase borrowed from David Fromkin, *A Peace to End all Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1989), 19.

foresaw that Canadian membership in the OAS would be "part of the ultimate destiny of Canada."[516]

Given Ottawa's multilateralist tradition, this decision to enter the OAS was hardly a fundamental shift in Canada's external relations. As Tom Keating explains, "over time and across different issues, Canadian policy makers have repeatedly relied on multilateralism in the pursuit of a diverse range of foreign policy objectives."[517] Arguing that Canada's multilateralist persona is neither inherently enlightened, nor representative of "an abnegation of national interests," Keating confirms that since the 1940s, Ottawa has conceived multilateralism "as the most effective strategy for pursuing national policy objectives," or what can be considered as Krasner's *national interest*.[518] While some authors focus upon the shifting geographic scope of this foreign policy decision, this paper has argued that the significance of this decision rests upon Ottawa's rationale for entering the OAS, especially the explicit ideological imperative regarding the promotion of democracy. In the end, Ottawa's decision to enter the OAS is indicative of what Andrew F. Cooper calls "old habits and new directions" in contemporary Canadian foreign policy.[519]

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[516] Paul Martin Sr., "Canada and Latin America" in *Paul Martin Speaks for Canada: A Selection of Speeches on Foreign Policy, 1964-67* (Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), 111.
[517] Keating, *The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., 2.
[518] Ibid.,5.
[519] Cooper, *Old Habits and New Directions*.

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ROUTING SLIP		FICHE DE TRANSMISSION
TO: A: **DSG**		
FROM: DE: **MB**		
Room No. – No de bureau **S-3862**	Extension – Poste **3-4005**	Date **17/08/2004**
FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

Madam, would you like me to draft an answer. Should we leave the door open for you to go to the University at some point?

No - no follow up.

COM.6 (2-78)



MM
(w. encl. + pp)

18 August – Back to central. No follow-up MB.

July 27, 2004

Ms. Louise Frechette,
Deputy Secretary-General
United Nations Secretariat
New York, New York
10017, USA

Dear Ms. Frechette:

My most sincere thanks for your patience and cooperation so long ago. Since arriving at your Finance Office in Ottawa in jeans almost a decade ago, there have been a few unexpected turns along the path of completing this paper, including a stint as a Legislative Assistant in the House of Commons focusing on international affairs.

We would be delighted to have you speak at the University of Saskatchewan one day. You continue to serve Canada -- and the international community -- with distinction and honour.

Sincerely,

Rob Norris
Coordinator, Global Relations

RN:nm

Encl:1



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