

Divergent Interests: Franco-Pakistan Relations in 1950s

Abstract

The level of bilateral relations between sovereign states is based on their mutual interests in diplomacy, economy and cultural affinity. This bilateralism is sometimes influenced by external and internal factors. France and Pakistan are two states which have a gradual slow process of having cordial relationship. They had no clash of interest but at the same time they, also had no agreement of interest in 1950s which forced them to be close. So Pakistan and France could not establish cordial relations until 1960s. Their attitude towards each other was rather *indifferent* in early years.

The research for this article has been concluded in a way which explains the reader that due to three factors linked to the international and domestic constraints, France and Pakistan were showing *indifferent* attitude towards each other in 1950s. Cold war politics, weak domestic administration and some existential issue like decolonization for France and Kashmir for Pakistan absorbed their attention in a way that cordial relationship put asides for coming decade. The benefits of cordial relations which they enjoyed in later years indicate that if they had it, in early years, might influence the events happening in Asia and Europe. When Lord Palmerstone in 19th century announced “there is no permanent friend or foe in international relations”, he, in fact, had succinctly explained the stark reality of international politics that relationships among sovereign states based on those priorities which they set for their national interests. This approach signifies the Franco- Pakistan relations in round the years but here the focus is only the decade of 1950s.

Franco- Pakistan relations in 1950s

Apparent cordiality with indifference attitude with each other problems is the significant feature of Franco-Pakistan relations. Through the decades, some laps of time converge their interests and a warmth developed between them otherwise they moved towards same ends with indifferent to each other’s concerns. Question arises, why this indifference of attitude emerged time to time? The answer comes from their political, regional and strategic priorities.

Relations between the two nations started since the early months of Pakistan’s emergence as an independent state, first French ambassador Monsieur Léon Marchal, reached Karachi as early as December 1947 and Pakistan was initially represented by Samiullah Khan Dehlavi as charge d’ Affairs from 1948 until ambassador, Sardar Mohammad Nawaz Khan had not taken his responsibilities in 1950.

Pakistan’s early leadership had high opinion towards French glorious principles of liberty and democracy and its efforts towards the enlightenment of humanity. So

receiving French ambassador Monsieur Léon Marchal (1947-1949) on 9 April 1948, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah praised high for France, he said,

“The magnificent history of your great country and its achievements are well-known to the world. In Common with other nations, we in Pakistan have admired the high principles of democracy that form the basis of your great state ... the cry of liberty, fraternity and equality, which was raised during your great revolutions throughout the world, as, is known to every student of history. These ideals and these principles are still keeping up the hopes many downtrodden nations”.¹

At the fourth independence day of France, Pakistani leadership once again expressed its wish to work with France. On 14 July 1948, in a congratulatory message to French President Vincent Auriol (1947-1954), Quaid said, Pakistan and France “will unitedly play their part in re-establishing peace and prosperity in the present distracted world”.²

From 1947 to 1958, there is no major link developed between the Franco-Pakistani leadership. Chaudry Muhammad Ali during his transitory stay in Paris in 1956 – after attending the Commonwealth Meeting – had offered French leadership for mediation between them and Algerians, where a liberation movement was in full swing. Second time, Pakistan President Iskandar Mirza visited Paris in November 1957, unofficially when he was on his official trip to Spain and Portugal. He was guest of Prince Ali Khan, who later represented Pakistan in UN. In Paris, Pakistani President also spent a one-day shooting trip with the French President Rene Coty.³

The early goodwill messages, exchange of ambassadors and non-mentionable links could not symbolize convergence of interest or cordiality in the relations. Both states –in early decade of their relation –had occupied in some of their regional constraints and certain issues that linked to their survival. These strategically significant issues led both states to focus only those powers which helped them to solve them.

Issues absorbed the attention of France and Pakistan in 1950s

Decolonization of Southeast Asia and North Africa

Indo-China

With the end of WWII, the world had to two face two dilemmic situations, on one side a wave of nationalism accelerated among the colonial world, and on the other side, two super powers (United States of America, United Socialist states of Russia) representing two ideologies - communist and capitalist emerged on the global politics.

Among the ex colonial powers (Britain, France, Dutch, etc) France was reluctant to accept the reality of nationalism in colonial world. So it had to face a severe bloody conflict in Vietnam and Algeria in 1950s. Ironically, the liberation movement of both areas supported France in WWII, with the hope that they also succeeded to gain their independence after the war.⁴ But France needed those

colonies - to present itself as a global empire - for its standing in the world politics so it tried to curb their struggle for liberation with full strength.

The bloc politics of cold war, if become a blessing for those liberation movements of colonial world, at the same time it proved curse for France and its empire. So in spite of spending nearly 805 billion franc from 1945-1951, initially 25% and later 37% of the total defence budget for an ambiguous victory⁵ in Indo-China war, French government failed to keep it under its control. The half hearted American support for French and full communist support under soviet and chine's umbrella led France to the defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. it was catastrophic tragedy for France.⁶ The result of this defeat was a peace conference in July 1954 in Geneva, in which an honourable treaty was signed due to French Prime Minister, Pierre Mendes-France. Treaty was largely favourable to France. Under this treaty, Vietnam split into two, South Vietnam and North Vietnam and other two former protectorates Laos and Cambodia recognised as independent state.⁷ They already converted into democracies to keep French influence there.

Algeria

Martin Alexander and John Keiger summarized Algerian conflict rightly, "for both sides (French and Algerian) the conflict was always 'a mental, nervous and psychological war of attrition', and it was the French whose resolve ultimately cracked."⁸

French politician and military leaders were resolute to keep Algeria under their control because they believed "Algeria is France. It is not foreign country which we protect" (French Prime Minister Mendes-France).⁹ While the President of the French Republic, Vincent Auriol (1947-1954) declared, "Do not expect me to sacrifice a new Alsace-Lorraine on the other side of the Mediterranean".¹⁰ Besides politician, army was also not willing to face third consecutive defeat¹¹ within 15 years, so General Lorillot, the French commander in Algeria said, "they (politicians) made fool of us in Indo-China... they will never screw us in Algeria. I swear to you".¹² It was only Flex Gaillard, who analysed the situation realistically and admitted, "It is difficult to keep Algeria. It is more difficult to lose it. Finally, the most difficult is to give it away".¹³ All these resolute proved assumptions when in 1962; de Gaulle signed the Evian Agreement with Algerian and recognised it as an independent sovereign state.

Behind all these political and military determinations there are some geopolitical and economic motive¹⁴ were working because Algeria was not colony for French but a part of France.¹⁵ So it is considered that "if [Algeria] lost [it] was put France "on the slippery slope (on) which Spain and Portugal slid."¹⁶ (Raymond Aron)

The nationalism surge and bloc politics of 20th century forced France to liberate Algeria after eight years of gory war, in spite of all de Gaulle's efforts¹⁷ to keep all the conflicting parties united. Evian agreement (1962) proved to be a relief for France because no expensive army was needed now which gave a boom to the economy¹⁸ and it liberated De Gaulle to embark on an ambitious Foreign policy in third world, which considered to be unrealistic in certain extent but helped to place the France at the heart of European and global affairs.

First indo-china and then the Algerian crisis spread the process of decolonization in the rest of the French empire also. France had already granted concessions to satisfy the local nationalist sentiment during the 1950s in rest of African colonies. Paris granted all of them (Cameroon, Togo, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Mauritania, the Central African Republic, Congo, Chad, Gabon and Mauritius) independence without losing control over them. They all signed bilateral agreement with France.¹⁹ Through these agreements, French embarked a program of military support and economic aid to the former colonies in a way that it encouraged the emergence of a French-speaking bloc of nations in Africa, which gave greater resonance to French role in world affairs.²⁰

Pakistan and Kashmir: A Historical Perspective

“Problems come and go but the Kashmir dispute goes on forever”,²¹

The predictive words of New York Times’ editor written in 1951, even proved true after the first decade of 21st century.

According to British independence plan for India, princely states of India,²² were given the right of independence under three conditions, (a) join Indian state, (b) join Pakistani state, (c) remains independent, (literally third option was not allowed to implement). Some states like Hyderabad and Kashmir were interested to opt out the third option but unluckily their political, geographical and demographical situations were inappropriate.²³ Hyderabad’s feeling of independence was ‘crushed’ by Nehru (Indian Prime Minister, 1947-1964), successfully through a military action in 1949 under the pretext that its Hindu majority was not attuned with Muslim ruler’s decision. The story in Kashmir was vice versa from Hyderabad. Kashmir had a Hindu raja with 95% of Muslim population. Kashmir Raja signed a ‘standstill agreement’²⁴ with both governments (India and Pakistan) in 1947. His conspiratorial activities with Indian ruler had started a civil war in the valley. Under this pretext, two step were taken, a “frightened” ruler signed an *agreement of accession* with the Indian government and asked them for their help militarily against the ‘uncontrolled forces’ in the state and consequently, Indian army intervened in the valley.²⁵

Pakistan that was waiting the final decision of the Raja - did not inform the whole activity until the process was completed. Pakistan severe protest against this injustice with Kashmiri Muslim was proved to be a deaf ear. Now a clash with Indian army was inevitable so, after brief hostilities in April 1948, Pakistani troops liberated certain parts of Kashmir.²⁶ This Pakistani response against Indian ‘oppression’ in Kashmir forced India to take the issue into UN for the final decision.

This first Indo-Pakistan clash on Kashmir divided it into two parts, one is under Indian control and other is declared Azad Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani control. Kashmir issue is one of those issues, which are the symbol of UN’s failure to solve the global and regional issues, even if they become challenge to its basic principles of self-determination.

After more than sixty-five year of its life, Pakistan still ‘obsessed’ with the solution of Kashmir, many justifications were given for this obsession in the

last decades due to its ideological,²⁷ geographical²⁸, strategical²⁹ orientation for Pakistan. All these delaying Indian tactics cannot make Kashmir less significant of for Pakistan.

Pakistan's Attitude towards French Decolonization

Indian Muslims emotional bond to the sufferings of Muslims outside their region was symbolised through Khalafat Movement after the WWI, to save Usmani Khalafat in Turkey and Muslim league support for Palestine issue.³⁰ Muslim league's demand for the right for self-determination to the Muslims of North Africa from European – particularly French and Italian activities in Lebanon in 1943 indicated that these issues were also in their attention.

The suffering of Southeast Asian Muslim – in Burma and Indonesian especially, where Dutch were using brutal methods, to maintain their control - were condemned by the Muslim league.³¹ Even before the establishment of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam called Dutch action as “unfriendly act” and assured Pakistan support in “every way that is possible”.³² After independence, this approach to support for Muslim cause more vigorously adopted by Pakistan.³³

This vigorous and courageous support on the side of Pakistan to the Muslim cause in the world created complications between Franco-Pakistan relations – as both were apparently struggling for opposite objects. Pakistan wished for the independence of those states that were the part of French empire and struggling for their independence while French due to their own geo-political interests wished to maintain its hold on them.

France was confronting in Indo-China against Ho chi Minh, at the time of Pakistan's inception in 1947. Pakistan's indifferent attitude towards Southeast Asian issue was comparatively a source of satisfaction for the French government. According to Gilles Boquerat, it was due to the communist orientation of the movement and the non-existence of the feeling of Islamic solidarity.³⁴

Pakistan attitude towards Vietnam issue was indifferent but not rival because it did not object its participation in San Francisco conference in 1951 and supported Russian resolution, which objected the Korean and Vietnam application for UN candidature.³⁵

After 1950s, when Pakistan began to move close to the western camp, its actions became more favourable towards France, i.e. in 1952, Pakistan decided to facilitate French military planes – through a secret agreement. They allowed flying over Pakistani territory and refuelling in Karachi for their way towards Vietnam.³⁶ While in early days of its independence Dutch planes were refused to provide this facility (refuelling and landing right at Karachi, Pakistan) which was, in fact, an indirect help for the Indonesians liberation movement.³⁷ The hurdles in supply (due to Pakistan) and international pressure forced the Dutch to make a compromise with the liberation movement.

Contrary to Vietnam, Pakistan could not ignore what was going on, in North African Muslim, countries and surprisingly, French were well aware of it.

That was the reason; in 1951, French ambassador in Pakistan rejected the idea of a French warship stopover in Karachi because he was sure, there could be a popular reaction (against France) on the situations of North Africa and Middle East.³⁸

Pakistan provided all type of support to those liberation movements, in spite of its own financial and military weakness and welcomed all leaders of Maghrabain³⁹ liberation movements either he was from the Istiqlal party of Morocco or Mohammad Yazid of National liberation Movement of Algeria. They consecutively visited Pakistan and explained their respective cause, (sometimes on Pakistani passport).⁴⁰ Their branch offices in Karachi also worked for some time.⁴¹ The objective of these visits was – to get support for the Aid to Tunisian campaign and seek popular support for the liberation cause. Habib Bourguiba visited Pakistan during his second world tour and reached Karachi on 2 February 1951, he was welcomed with honour and warm feelings.⁴² Later, Ferhat Abbas, as a head of Algerian provisional government visited Pakistan in 1959.

Pakistan had to face a dilemmic situation after mid fifties regarding its relations with France due to its decolonization policy. Besides Tunis and Morocco, - French colonies- (liberated by France in 1956), Algerian issue was proved to be more touchy and emotional for Pakistani government. On one side, Pakistan, being a member of the Afro-Asian group in UN had become more vocal for liberation cause of colonies, and on the other side Pakistan joined western alliance system for its security – and had become an ally of France. Both were two diverse jobs to do. Many fold vested interests of Pakistan were at stake due to this diversity;

- Could it take the risk to antagonise a UNSC permanent member while its heart core issue Kashmir was still in UN?
- Could it ignore its ideological and constitutional responsibility towards self-determination and Muslim community?
- Should it evade its liabilities towards recently adopted western alliance?

Pakistani government adopted a flexible attitude after mid fifties towards Muslim community issues and its alliance requirements – to keep itself away from any decisional complication. It tried to create equilibrium between the two diverse objectives and not fully failed. Pakistan's pro-western stance lost its standing in the Muslim world but Arab countries' cold attitude did not influence Pakistan's support to the Muslim cause. This Pakistan's walk on double-edged sword recognised in the western world and in response, French ambassador in Pakistan suggested sending a pro-French representative from the Algerian Muslim brotherhood – that could help to mobilise the opinion in Pakistan.⁴³

If French were suggesting pacifying the public feeling, Pakistan was also proposing a helping hand to France for solving the Algerian Problem. In spite of playing a pro-active role in UN for the liberation movement, Pakistani Prime Minister Ch. Muhammad Ali (August 1955-September 1956) offered– for a mediating role to French government - between the warring parties in Algeria - during his stay in Paris.⁴⁴

Suez crisis was the most crucial time for Pakistan France relations, because France, in spite of being ally, was an aggressor against one of the Muslim

state (Egypt).⁴⁵ However, for Pakistani opposition and public protest, France was not the *target*. Their major focus was Britain and Pakistan's Commonwealth membership. So Pakistan's restrained (official) attitude during in comparison to Indian strong criticism was appreciated (in France).⁴⁶ Even it is reported in French archives that Iskandar Mirza and Feroz Khan Noon might have *regretted* at the failure of Anglo-French intervention in Suez.⁴⁷ This French observation based on the attitude of the Power hierarchy of Pakistan at that time. It was consisted of President (Iskandar Mirza), Prime Minister (Suhrawardhi), Foreign Minister (Feroz Khan Noon), and all of them "were seen as a moderating force able to keep in check a public opinion forcefully in favour of the Algerian fight for independence".⁴⁸

This French satisfaction continued until the presence of President Iskandar Mirza. After the imposition of Martial law in Pakistan on 7 October 1958, Iskandar Mirza decided not to accept the Algerian Provisional Government which was established on 19 September 1958. France was looking for this type of assurances throughout the world in international diplomatic war against the Algerian Liberation Movement. It was a significant satisfaction on the part of Pakistani government - that was initially a *blind supporter* of all liberation movement in the Muslim World.

French charge d' affairs in Karachi informed his government in a letter to French Foreign Minister that Pakistani government had decided not to recognize Algerian provisional government *immediately*.⁴⁹

French charge d'affaire in Pakistan in his letter of 9 October 1958, had already hoped that due to internal chaos that question of recognition would be postponed for the future. He also informed his government that the attitude of Indian union, commonwealth states, America, Turkey, and the states such as Japan, and Iran heavily influenced Pakistani opinion towards international issues.

This was *satisfactory* news for French government. This news countered the initial information in which one of the Pakistan high authority - while talking to Canadian high commissioner confirmed that they could not "isolate" the Muslim countries if they decided to "recognise" (PGAR) they also did it.⁵⁰

However, Iskandar Mirza had turned the table in French favour. It was a transitory period of satisfaction because Ayub Khan after sending Iskandar Mirza in exile (27 October 1958) when hold the power himself also changed the Algerian policy. French ambassador called his future attitude "cautious".⁵¹

His meeting with the Algerian leader Ferhat Abbas, as President of PGAR in April 1959 created a *wave of uneasiness* in French embassy in Karachi. With tough Pakistani stance on Algerian issue, French linked the presence of Kashmir issue in UN with Algerian support. France conveyed its concerns to Pakistani government reminding its responsibilities as SEATO ally, its economic requirements and diplomatic need for Kashmir issue. It also reminded Pakistan that it should be "considerate about Paris sensitivities".⁵² According to French ambassador, Pakistani government should first think about Kashmir rather than supporting the Algeria (freedom fighters).⁵³

It was Bhutto - who revitalized the Algerian independence case in UN General Assembly against French imperial policy in 1959 again. In the political committee of UNGA, he delivered a brief but strong speech in favour of Algerian freedom and against French occupation. It was his initiative that Pakistan recognised the Algerian Provisional Government on 3rd April 1961.⁵⁴ French objection on Pakistani decision rejected with the argument – while French government negotiated with the Algerian Provisional Government so they recognized its legal position themselves, they could not object on Pakistan.

Algerian issue took the Franco-Pakistan relations at the lowest ebb at the end of 1961, when Zafaraullah Khan, as Pakistani representative in UN, pleaded the case of those Algerians in the name of Afro-Asian group who were on hunger strike in Algerian jail. French reaction was more violent this time and considering it as an unfriendly act” it recalled its ambassador to Paris for consultation. It was decided when Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto visited Paris in December 1961, there was no meeting with French President and Prime Minister as a protest.

France showed its resentment on Algerian government’s recognition but did not break the relation off with Pakistan although Pakistan consulate was closed for some time.

Evian agreement in 1962, was end of an epoch of Franco-Pakistan relations, Pakistan Foreign Minister considered it the success of right of self-determination and liberation forces. He found in it a lesson for those forces which were suppressing those rights in the different regions; i.e., in Kashmir. Ayub Khan also sent a congratulatory letter to de Gaulle on the successful management of Algerian affair. He expected that now French moral and political influence in international affairs benefited for the Kashmir issue when it discussed in the UN.⁵⁵

France and Struggle in Kashmir

In 2001, Hubert Vedrine rejected – any- possibility of French mediation between Pakistan and India on Kashmir. His major insistence on viable dialogue between the responsible of India and Pakistan to find a solution to the problem that arose due to the nature of extremely sensitive territorial dispute.⁵⁶

This French observation was not new. They followed the same line of action since the Kashmir issue had begun except some occasions when their leadership supported Pakistani stance openly.

In 1955, French ambassador in India wrote to its government clearing some confusion related to the issue of Kashmir, he accused Nehru that after strengthening his position in Kashmir –he declined any international solution and only waiting –the worsening of political and economic situation in Pakistan that transformed his actions in Kashmir *a fait accompli*.

French ambassador further added that physical constitution of Kashmir, and majority Muslim population made it a part of northern region of Pakistan and Nehru had no illusion about it. Kashmir’s natural communication links exist with

Pakistan because its major river outlet crossed through Pakistani cities rather Indian area.⁵⁷

For French this mid 1950s realization of their ambassador in India was not new because their ambassador in Pakistan since 1948, informing them the importance of Kashmir issue in Pakistan's Foreign policy.⁵⁸

French ambassador's comment – concerning to Pakistani politics and importance of Kashmir region –in March 1950's was crucial and farsighted. He informed his government that the separation of East Bengal which population had a different culture from the western part of country was more easily acceptable than the partition of Kashmir.⁵⁹

Until 1951, French participation on Kashmir issue was under the Anglo-American influence, it was fashioned later on. In 1948, when Kashmir issue discussed in UNSC, after the long proceeding American were asking for an interim government and withdrawal of emegrie, while French representative Mr. Guy de la Tournelle proposed three conditions for the solution of the issue

- The withdrawal of Foreign troops from the s⁶⁰tate of Kashmir
- The return of the inhabitants, irrespective of their race Hindu or Muslim to their places of origin in the state
- The establishment of a free administration, which would not exert pressure on the population and would absolute guarantee of a free vote⁶¹

Later, Pakistan draft resolution in UNSC was a mixture of American and French proposals. Pakistan on one side suggested the impartial interim administration and on the other side the withdrawal of armed forces of Indian union and tribes men, the return of all resident to their regions, and holding plebiscite to ascertain the “free, fair, and unfettered will of people of the state.”⁶² However, nothing viable was happened as India had its own plans – UN was just a *tool* – to strengthen its position within valley through its puppet interim government under sheikh Abdullah. So India rejected every proposal and suggestion presented by UNSC which had no authority to force India to implement them. The unreasonableness of Indian attitude was felt by the members of UNSC and American representative, Austin commented, “...that the Security Council should take up a position which would amount to that of an ally in a war, and should pull off Pakistan and allow India to finish the job by force against the tribesmen. That is the very last position, which the Security Council ought to take.”⁶³

French attitude was near to Pakistan because in the 241st meeting of UNSC, its representative supported Pakistani point of view of plebiscite and said, “Plebiscite would not bring into question either the person or the sovereignty of the Maharajah”. He also suggested that prior to holding the plebiscite an interim authority composed of the chief of the national conference and of the Muslim conference should establish.⁶⁴ Because according to French approach, a satisfactory plebiscite could be held only where there was an authority and force to ensure it.⁶⁵

The early UNSC enthusiasm on the solution of Kashmir issue died down when India used heavy-handed diplomacy in Britain and threatened to leave the Commonwealth. As a result when the issue discussed again in April 1948, all the previous rules and regulations on which council emphasized were smoked. In spite of Pakistani representatives' protest, and Soviet Union and Ukraine's absence, a draft resolution was passed. In which there was not a single word of free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir.

The failure of international mediation caused war between Pakistan and India in 1948, which stopped after UN involvement. UNSC activated a commission for the demilitarisation of Kashmir.⁶⁶ Pakistan's believe on UN due to its own military, strategic weakness proved erroneous, and like the previous international organizations – it proved to be a tool for powers to play for their interest rather to support the weakened and rightful party.

In March 1951, during UN proceeding, France voted in favour of that resolution which supported Pakistani point of view and presented by Anglo-Americans because it believed that the draft resolution did not ask the parties to sacrifice either of their principles to their interest.⁶⁷ This French action was further strengthening by the old Indian C-in-C, Claude Auchinleck's observation in which he suggested that the states (Anglo-French) which had interest in Muslim world – France and Britain should try to prevent the situation from degeneration. This role would play a favourable impression and in response Pakistan, government could join western alliance.⁶⁸ This observation might be caused a change in French behaviour towards Pakistan and Kashmir issue and it had adapted from diplomatic to cordial policy. (Although it was doubtful due to French own multiple engagements) Anglo-American reservations and approach to keep the area in their sphere of influence lingered on Franco -Pakistan warmth for a decade more.⁶⁹

During 1957, Kashmir discussion in UNSC, French propped up Anglo-American resolution which supported the plebiscite. French ambassador of the opinion that issue should be solved otherwise both nations wore each other down in arms race and due to weak economic resilience, could become the pawns in the hands of major military powers of the times.⁷⁰ Later it proved to be true.

Franco-Pakistan Relations and Fight for Right of Self -Determination in UN

In early days, Pakistan's support for the right of self -determination was even beyond its resource and sans risk. Its representative in UN, Zafarullah Khan announced that Pakistan could not enjoy and appreciate its full freedom and sovereignty until the rest of (the Muslim) achieved it.⁷¹

On Kashmir issue where it was a party, its support was immense but it took step to accelerate the pace of independence in Italian and French colonies in Indonesia and North Africa. Pakistani practical support was also worth mentioning in spite of its insufficient capacity.

After Indonesian independence from Dutch, Second front was Italian African colonies where France and British were planning to receive the booty of their victory (divide them between them), providing a part of Tripolitania area of

Libya to Italy also. This proposal had met a severe resistant in the UNGA. Consequently, all colonies were put under UN control to *prepare* them how to run their own administration.⁷² It was the success of Afro-Asian community in UN in one aspect but the issue of French North African colonies was more complicated because France had more interest in stake and proved to be more resistant.⁷³

Pakistani support for independence movements had no regional, religious and ethnic limitations but it was particularly active for liberation movements of Muslim states. Practical and moral support was always there keeping alliance commitment in mind after 1954. The issue of Morocco and Tunis nearly solved when Pakistan and France joined SEATO as allies. However, Algerian issue lingered on until 1962 and – created further bitterness in the already unconcerned relations.

Tunis and Morocco were French protectorate while Algeria *considered* a part of Metropolitan France. After Libyan independence through UN, the movement of liberation accelerated in North African areas. French response was particular colonial, and its suppressive activities were become a talk of the town in media and in the UN corridors.

The issue of Morocco discussed in UN on 4 October 1951. Egypt requested that the question of French violation of the principle of the UN charter and of the declaration of the human rights in Morocco should discuss – but due to strong protest of French representative, a Canadian draft resolution was passed which asked the assembly to postpone the discussion “for the time being”. France, America and Britain supported the resolution while Arab state voted against it.⁷⁴

After Morocco, Tunisian government, in April 1952, wrote a letter to the UNSC and complained –to focus on the “grave situation” of Tunisia in which French were denied them – the right to develop friendly relations with other states.⁷⁵ Pakistan was President of the month in UNSC, but there was vigorous opposition to put the issue in the agenda. It was so strong that Chinese representative had to point out that in the history of UN, never found such an opposition to mere adoption of the agenda.⁷⁶

Pakistani representative mentioned the previous French argument; “to adopt the method of declining to place a question on the agenda involves serious disadvantages and risks”, when another issue was not accepted in the agenda.⁷⁷ It stated in 1946 when the issue was related to Ukraine’s complaint against Greece was presented but now France was the target. French argued with British support that, it was their domestic problem –so did not corresponds with the council’s jurisdiction. This argument could not impress upon the rest of the UN members.

After failure of UNSC to discuss the issue, Pakistani representative presented it in UNGA and – French delegation considered it better to withdraw from the assembly session during the discussion. Zafaraullah Khan criticised French *misuse* of Article 2(7)⁷⁸ and explained the original position of the treaty (between France and Morocco), which had given, France, the right to use authority in Tunis.⁷⁹ Issue was again included in UNGA session of 1953, Pakistan was among the signatory who referred the issue to first committee and France again used the UN Article, and refused to participate. This French attitude could not stop

the member to present a draft resolution in the favour of Tunisian right of sovereignty and independence and restoration of civil liberties. But effort was failed to get 2/3 majority in the assembly and could not be adopted. In 1954, when the dialogue was going on between France and Tunisian government, issue again discussed in assembly with long debate and expressed confidence on the success of negotiation. Moroccan question in UNSC and UNGA had to face the same response from French side and same enthusiasm from Pakistan and other Afro-Asian members.⁸⁰

In 1953, Pakistani Foreign Minister's tone while talking to Moroccan issue was comparatively (rather) *sympathetic* for France, he said, his objective was to look for

*“A satisfactory and rapid solution based on friendly cooperation between France on one hand and Tunisia and Morocco on the other It had never been his intention to create difficulties for France....” he also showed his regret that French who themselves considered, any sacrifice for their ideals was less, failed to understand, Pakistan's support for UN rules of independence and law.*⁸¹

The success of French prime minister, Pierre Mendes (1954-1955) solved some of French colonial difficulties at international level but with the independence of Tunis, Morocco and Vietnam in mid 1950s, Algerian liberation struggle has reached its full swing. The problem of French colony (Algeria), once again discussed in the UNGA, but French used the same articles of UN (domestic affair) to manipulate the discussion. This time UN acted more forcefully because contrary to Morocco and Tunis, which were French protectorate, Algeria was “considered” as an *integrated* part of French state since mid 19th century. UNGA decided to discuss the issue ignoring the General Committee's negative recommendation. French delegate protested and announced that they would not accept UN intervention in their *domestic affairs* and warned that it could also influence French relations with UN.⁸²

Algerian issue debated in the first committee of UN and Pakistan co-sponsored a resolution for the right of self-determination of Algerian people. This resolution asked France and Algerian to end hostilities and start dialogue for peaceful negotiation. This time French representative participated in the discussion to explain his country's point of view with the same old argument and challenged UNGA competence to discuss the issue, declaring that it had no recommending powers with regard to the right of self-determination.⁸³

Pakistani representative, once again assured France that its efforts linking to liberation movements were not *anti-western* rather they were in the support for the right of self-determination. She (Begum Ikramullah) further assured that territory (Algeria), should attach to the metropolitan with the “consent of the population concerned”.⁸⁴

UN tried to intervene in Algerian affairs seriously ignoring French argument of domestic affairs but de Gaulle, who took the control of French affairs in October 1958, stopped the French delegation to participate in UN deliberations. In 1959, he tried to pacify the situation through announcing the right of self-

determination for Algeria but France was continuously criticised and targeted for its colonial policies in UNGA.

Pakistani vigorous support for liberation movements for round the world in general and North African in particular created a fissure between Franco-Pakistan relations. It was not so much disturbing because both had their own sphere of problems, which were although divergent, but not collided.

Surprising element in the whole affair was that both (Pakistan and France) were avoiding to victimize each other for the relevant behaviour on their concerning problems. If France with Argentina in first political committee expressed the view that Pakistan like India was already a member of UN so there is no need for the new application in 1947.⁸⁵ Representative of Pakistan suggested in 1951 a resolution about Morocco, which should be worded “the question of the independence and sovereignty of Morocco”. According to him, such a modification would relive France of any sense of embarrassment or feeling of resentment regarding the wording.⁸⁶

References

* Dr. Humera Dar, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Queen Mary College, Lahore.

¹Rafique Afzal, *Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah 1911-34 and 1947-48* /, No.3. (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan,, 1966), 462.

²Samina Ahmed, “Franco-Pakistan Relation: 1, Political, Economic and Cultural Ties (1947-1977),” *Pakistan Horizon* 30, no. 3/4, (1977): 23.

³S. M. Ahmad, *A Lucky Pilot: Memoirs of Retired Wing Commander Lanky Ahmad* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 2001), ch.21, <http://www.concordiaexpeditions.com/luckypilot/>.

⁴The leaders of liberation movements of Indo-china and Algeria thought the era of German occupation (1940-1944) forced France to recognize the significance of nationalism for colonies but they did not identify the the importance of being a global empire for France. This misapprehension put the two parties into a brutal war nearly for more than 15 years 1945-1962.

⁵“United States Department of State / Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. East Asia and the Pacific (1950),” December 29, 1950, 961, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1950v06&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=961>.

⁶For the detail of French loss in Dien Bien Phu war see James Waite, *The End of the First Indochina War: A Global History* (Routledge, 2012), 48.

⁷Etats-Unis. Senate Committee on Foreign relations, *Background information relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam* (Washington, Etats-Unis: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), 50–62.

⁸Martin S. Alexander and John F. V. Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954-1962: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 14.

⁹ Alfred Grosser, *La IVe République et sa Politique Extérieure*, (Paris. 1949), [4] (Paris, A. Colin, 1961), 332. Michael Brett, "Anglo-Saxon Attitudes: The Algerian War of Independence in Retrospect," *The Journal of African History* 35, no. 2 (January 1, 1994): 220.

¹⁰ Grosser, *La IVe République et sa Politique Extérieure*, 48.

¹¹ The French generals were furious at Vietnam ending because within five years it was the second humiliated defeat for French army not from the superior army but this time from an inferior army of 'little yellow men'. Although this defeat was justified in these words, 'the loss of Indo-China was due to the incoherence of our politics under the fourth republic, to military errors resulting in part from the regime. But army was not in defeating mode again in Algeria. Nicholas Atkin, *The Fifth French Republic*, European history in perspective (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2005), 25. For Army reaction see Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (Pan Macmillan, 2012), chapter 8.

¹² Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, chapter 8.

¹³ B. Krishnamurthy, *Indo-French Relations: Prospects and Perspectives* (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2005), 43.

¹⁴ It was Saharan oil which was major incentive for French in Algeria in 20th century. 'The major stake, the French had in Algeria ... was their sense of national identity'. The idea of the existence of French oil beneath the Sahara is surely revealing of that sense of national identity. Tony Smith, *The French stake in Algeria : 1945-1962* (Ithaca: Cornell university press, 1978), 160. former French prime Minister Michal Debre, talked about Saharan oil as a "Une Oeuvre Purement Francaise," *L'Express*, November 30, 1979. This "oil" and other Algerian resources would definitely liberate France from the Anglo-Saxon dependency on the Middle East oil and other financial tutelage.

¹⁵ Algeria was invaded by France in 1830, and its occupation continued in 1834 to 1839, the same year resistance against Foreign occupation was started which was crushed by the French after a long and bloody struggle. In 1847, an Algerian Francais foundation was laid down. French and European settler had found the atmosphere favourable and settled in Algeria, in result their population in 1954 reached over a million and they represented the settlers of European origin and France's single most important market. Since 1871, it was officially designated as part of Metropolitan France, divided into three departments under the responsibility the Minister of the Interior. Strategically it was of vital importance to French position in the Mediterranean and the appeal of the Mediterranean as "un bassin Francais" was as potent as that of 'la plus grande France'. See Beigbeder, *Judging War Crimes and Torture*, 94-95. France while signing the NATO treaty included Algeria as part of French territory so that any future expected clash with the colonized could be transformed into a cold war struggle.

¹⁶ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, chapter 8. Atkin, *The Fifth French Republic*, 28.

¹⁷ After holding power in France, de Gaulle made quick five visits to Algeria in 1958 and concluded that the age of colonization had passed so Algeria had to liberate but when and how, it was the decision he needed to make. It was a delicate balance to "save the French Republic and keep Algeria in French union". He succeeded to do it, at first step, on 16 September 1959, and he offered three proposals as a solution of Algerian issue, (a), secession, means, full independence; (b), Francisation, option got favour of *pied noirs*; (c) Self-government for Algerian - with the help of French aid and close union with France.

Julian Jackson, *De Gaulle*, (Haus Publishing, 2003), 84–85; Atkin, *The Fifth French Republic*, 46. For French version of the whole speech see Charles de Gaulle and François Goguel, *Discours et Messages: Mai 1958-Juillet 1962* (Paris: Plon Club Français des bibliophiles, 1972), 142–45. He favoured the third option but hesitant to negotiate with *Front de Libération Nationale*, (FLN) as Algerian representative. A referendum was held in Algeria 1961 on the question of liberation in which 75% voted in favour of self-determination. After this referendum, Evian agreement signed in March 1962 means one year and three month further had passed.

¹⁸ Algeria proved to be a hell for French forces 17,456 soldiers killed, 64,985 troops injured while 1,000 listed as ‘missing in action’. Algerian casualties were in millions.

¹⁹ Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization?* (Berg, 2002), 180–84.

²⁰ Bruno Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 60–62.

²¹ “The New York Times,” February 13, 1951, cited in Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World* (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1993), 25.

²² India had two types of administrative bodies, one under the federal government and the other under the direct control of viceroy, called as princely states. These states were the remnants of old Indian structure which was maintained under the queen of England after the 1857 war of liberation. English crown had guaranteed the survival of their inheritance rule because the violation of this rule was the major cause of Indian resistance against East India Company, which ruled India before 1857.

²³ Hyderabad with Muslim rule and majority Indian population surrounded with Indian territory only from one side, while Kashmir with majority Muslim population under the rule of an Gorkha raja, surrounded by Pakistan territory expect a small area of Pathan kot which was given to India through Redcliff award.

²⁴ The term is mainly used in business dealing where a standstill agreement is occurred when the target corporation reaches a contractual agreement with the potential acquirer whereby the would-be acquirer agrees not to increase its holdings in the target during a particular time period. This has to be found legal under Delaware law. Patrick A. Gaughan, *Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings* (John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 213. But here in this case some Indian princely states signed agreement with indo-Pakistan governments to delay their expected merger with them.

²⁵ According to Indian version of the event, majority of the Muslim population inhabited in the northern part attached to Pakistan but after 1947, an *invasion* from tribal people which were added by the regular Pakistan army (it should be remembered that Pakistan had not a single unit at that time) raja of Kashmir sought Indian *help* which it provided after the signing of letter of accession and with the agreement of *undisputed* Kashmir leader Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. T. V. Paul, ed., *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8. For the critical discussion on Accession of agreement see Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (I.B.Tauris, 2003), 49–72.

²⁶ Sir Zafarullah Khan, *The Kashmir Dispute*, (Karachi: Pakistan institutie of international affairs, 1950), 17.

²⁷ For excellent western view how Kashmir is important for Pakistan see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

²⁸ Mujtaba Razvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan: A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Lahore: National Pub. House, 1971), 11.

²⁹ So Pakistani Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah Khan was right to say, Kashmir might not add anything in Indian security and economy but if Kashmir accedes to India, Pakistan "become a feudatory of India or cease to exist as independent sovereign state" UNSC meeting 464, 1950, Pakistani representative said, if Kashmir accede to India, India would be in a position to control the whole irrigation system of western Pakistan; and the defense of the western Pakistan, which was based on two main roads and railway systems running parallel to and within a few miles of Kashmir border.

³⁰ Dani Ahmad Hasan, *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah* (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1979), 335, 344.

³¹ G. (Gulam) Allana, *Pakistan movement: historical documents* (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1977), 211, <http://archive.org/details/bitterrootfores00leibgoog>.

³² Jinnah, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, 33.

³³ Pakistani support for Indonesian and Libyan independence, S.M. Pasha, *Islam in Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Global Media Publications, 2005), 24–27.

³⁴ Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations Through the Quai D' Orsay Archives" (presented at the Pakistan and France: Global Security Perspectives and Worldviews, Islamabad, 2006), 39.

³⁵ Mushtaq A mad, *The United Nations and Pakistan* (Karachi: the Times Press, 1955), 72.

³⁶ Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations Through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 39. India since 1947, refusing France for providing that facility, means fly over and refueling rights.

³⁷ Mehruhnisa Ali, "Pakistan-Indonesia: Ties of Amity," *Pakistan Horizon* XXXIV, no. 1 (1981): 95.

³⁸ "Dispatch from the Ambassador of France, Pierre Augé," (Série Asie 1944-1955, sous-série Pakistan, E 57 bis 6, vol. 38., December 19, 1951). Cited in Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations Through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 39.

³⁹ The residents of Northwest Africa, particularly, Morocco, Tunis, Algeria and Libya are called Maghrabain;

⁴⁰ *I.P.R.I. Factfile* (Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2006), 2.

⁴¹ K. Sarwar Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations* (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1960), 193.

⁴² Norma Salem, *Habib Bourguiba, Islam, and the Creation of Tunisia* (Taylor & Francis, 1984), 126.

⁴³ Dispatch from the ambassador of France in Pakistan, Bernard Dufournier, to the MFA, 3 May 1957, serie Asie 1956-1967, sous-series Pakistan, E.27-23-4, vol.1129, Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations Through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 40.

⁴⁴ New paper linked Pakistani offer with the last year Indian offer of mediation and commented being the biggest Muslim state it could not afford Indian involvement in this issue. "Le Pakistan Offrirait à La France Ses Bons Offices," *L'information*, July 12, 1956.

⁴⁵ Details,,,

⁴⁶ It should be remembered that after the Suez crisis, France asked India to represent it in Egypt when the relationship between France and Egypt were broken.

⁴⁷ Dispatch from the ambassador of France in Pakistan, Bernard Dufournier, to the MFA, 20 August 1957, serie Asie 1956-1967, sous-series Pakistan, E.27-23-4, vol.1130 Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations Through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 40.

⁴⁸ Dispatch from the ambassador of France in Pakistan, Bernard Dufournier, to the MFA, 20 August 1957, serie Asie 1956-1967, sous-series Pakistan, E.27-23-4, vol.1130 Ibid.

⁴⁹ Letter from french charge d'affaire Karachi to french foreign Minister couve de Murville, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. *Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1958. Tome II, 1er juillet - 31 décembre* (Paris, France: Imprimerie nationale, 1993), 561-61.

⁵⁰ Letter from french charge d'affaire Karachi to French Foreign Minister couve de Murville dated 4 Octobre 1958. For the original letter see ANNEXURE

⁵¹ Telegram from Bernard Dufournier, to MFA, 15 December 1959, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Maurice Vaïsse, and France. Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, *Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1959, Tome II* (Paris, France: Imprimerie nationale, 1995), 729. in Foreign ministry under the, series Asie 1956-1967, sous-series Pakistan, E.27-23-4, vol.1131, Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations Through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 41.

⁵² Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations Through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 40.

⁵³ Telegram from Bernard Dufournier, to MFA, 15 December 1959, Duroselle, Vaïsse, *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 729. in Foreign ministry under the, series Asie 1956-1967, sous-series Pakistan, E.27-23-4, vol.1131, Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations Through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 41.

⁵⁴ Pasha, *Islam in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 110. On December 1960, UN also accepted the right of liberation of Algerian people. Katja Wiesbrock, Martin Lailach, Dietrich Rauschnig, Katja Wiesbrock, and Martin Lailach, *Key Resolutions of the UN General Assembly, 1946-1996* (CUP Archive, 1997), 177-78. Mahmud Brelvi, *Islam in Africa: Foreword by M. M. Sharif* (Institute of Islamic Culture, 1964), 123.

⁵⁵ Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 42.

⁵⁶ Hubert Vedrine interview with Indian Radio: on 11 January 2001. http://www.un.int/france/documents_francais/011101_mae_vedrine_asie.htm

⁵⁷ Dispatch from the ambassador of France in India, Stanislas Ostorrog, to the MFA, 6 July 1955. NUOI, S 50-2-A-14, vol.239. Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 43.

⁵⁸ In May 1948, French ambassador wrote to its ministry; with the passage of time Kashmir issue have a "profound influence, even being a decisive factor, on the orientation of Pakistan Foreign policy".

⁵⁹ Telegram of the Ambassador of France in Pakistan, Pigeonneau, 31 March 1950, NUOI, S 50-2-A 14, vol.239. Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations Through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 42.

⁶⁰

⁶¹ UNSC meeting 236, 28 January 1948, Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations*, 123. Ibid.

⁶² Pakistani draft resolution on 20 January 1948 (S/P.V.236) suggested (a), the establishment of an impartial interim administration in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, (b), the withdrawal from the territories of the state of Jammu and Kashmir of the armed forces on the Indian union and the tribesmen, (c), the return of all residents of Jammu and Kashmir state who left or were compelled to leave the state, (d), the holding of a plebiscite to ascertain the free, fair and unfettered will of the people of the state as to whether the state should accede to Pakistan or to India. *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-1948* (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1947), 391.

⁶³ Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations*, 129.

⁶⁴ *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-1948*, 393.

⁶⁵ 269th meeting March 8, 1948, Ibid., 396.

⁶⁶ By 21 April 1948, UN adopted a mild resolution against indo-Pakistan affair on Kashmir and increased the number of united nations commission for India and Pakistan from 3 to 5. It also recommended to the governments of India and Pakistan for (1) the withdrawal of all tribesmen and Pakistanis, (2) the reduction of force levels by India on restoration of normalcy, (3) the appointment of a plebiscite administration by India and (4) the appointment of a plebiscite administrator by the UN Secretary General. For the original text "Resolution 47 (1948), S/RES/47 (1948)," April 21, 1948, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f23d10.html>. *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-1948*, 396-98.

⁶⁷ Resolution was adopted at the 593th meeting by 8 vote, 3 absentees (India, USSR, and Yugoslavia) Resolution 91 (1951), "India-Pakistan question: Document No. S/2017/Rev. 1," March 30, 1951. *Yearbook of the United Nations 1951* (New York, Etats-Unis: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1952), 343.

⁶⁸ Pierre Augé, "Telegram of the Ambassador of France in Pakistan, NUOI, Vol. 238.," August 9, 1951; Dr. Gilles Boquérat, "France-Pakistan Relations through the Quai D' Orsay Archives," 7.

⁶⁹ According to one of the American memorandum on south Asian affairs, American linked French efforts to be cordial with Pakistan as its wish to assert its position as a great power and to enhance its prestige in the Muslim world to show sympathy towards problems of

Pakistan. Memorandum further recommended, that it is better that rather adopted an independent approach French supported their (American) policies in UN.

⁷⁰“Resolution 122 (1957) 765th Meeting [S3779],” January 24, 1957, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/131/29/IMG/NR013129.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁷¹“General Assembly, Official Records 4th Session. 227th Plenary Meeting,” September 24, 1949, 59.

⁷² Italian occupation in of that part of ottoman empire (Libya) which was mostly under the pretext of prestige rather economic interest, proved to be disastrous for the region. After Italy’s defeat in WWII, France and Britain took control of the region like war booty but the struggle of Asian African in united nation created hurdles for them to maintain a four powers control on it like Berlin. For detail consult Dirk J. Vandewalle, *Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building* (Cornell University Press, 1998), Chapter 3.

⁷³ For the detail of Afro-Asian group efforts and resolution concerning to Libya see *Yearbook of the United Nations 1950* (New York, Etats-Unis: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1951), 345–62.

⁷⁴*Yearbook of the United Nations 1951*, 357–59.

⁷⁵Najma Heptulla, *Indo-West Asian Relations: The Nehru Era* (Allied Publishers, 1991), 121.

⁷⁶Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations*, 194.

⁷⁷“Statements on the Tunisian Question in the UN Security Council-,” April 10, 1952, <http://www.patrasbokhari.com/content/statements-tunisian-question-un-security-council-10-april-1952>. Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations*, 194.

⁷⁸ UN Article 2(7): “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. “Charter of the United Nations: Chapter I: Purposes and Principles,” accessed November 7, 2012, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>.

⁷⁹ For the detail argument see; UNGA seventh session , 1st committee, 537 meeting, 4 December 1952

⁸⁰ For the detail of Pakistan representative argument see Ahmed Mushtaq, *The United Nations and Pakistan* (Karachi: the Times Press, 1955), 114–115.

⁸¹ In that era, Pakistan was courting with America for alliance in Southeast Asia and France was also a part of it. General Assembly Official Record, 8th session, 1st committee, 637 meeting 15 October 1953. Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations*, 200.

⁸² French threatened to leave UN, Dorothy Maud Pickles, *The uneasy entente: French foreign policy and Franco-British misunderstandings* (London: Oxford U.P., 1966), 129–30.

⁸³ On 20 September 1957, issue was discussed in 14 meetings of first committee from 27 November 1957 to 6 December 1957. *Yearbook of the United Nations 1957* (New York, Etats-Unis: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1958), 68–69.

⁸⁴ General Assembly official record, 11th session, 1st committee, 830th meeting, 4 February 1957. Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations*, 204.

⁸⁵ *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-1948*, 39.

⁸⁶ *Yearbook of the United Nations 1951*, 358.