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From Yeke-juu league to Ordos municipality: settler colonialism and alter/native urbanization in Inner Mongolia[1]

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Prelude

Throughout the summer of 2001 people in the southwestern corner of Inner Mongolia, eagerly awaited a jubilee to mark the official change of the name Yikezhao Meng (Yeke-juu league) to E'erduosi Shi (Ordos municipality). Although approval of the name change came as early as April 2001, the local government decided to wait until August, the month of harvest, of plenty, to launch the change in a huge ceremony. The number 8, pronounced as *ba*, is a great number in the new Chinese astrological tradition in the age of economic boom, for its Cantonese pronunciation is phonetically approximate to the character *fa*, meaning to make a fortune. The number 8 has been associated with opening factories, companies, or restaurants throughout China since the 1980s, as though the supernatural sign of 8 or *fa* could ensure instant gratification and eternal prosperity. The irony is that this new money-making superstition masquerades as a sign of modernity, superimposing itself on the vanquishing of the non–money-making 'feudal' Yikezhao Meng. The only problem confronting the local leadership seemed to be whether to make just one fortune or two fortunes. So right up to the end of July, they were unable to settle on which date, August 18 or August 28, because 8-1-8 or *fa-yi-fa* makes one fortune, and 8-2-8 or *fa-liang-fa* makes fortune twice.

Unfortunately, as August 18 approached, the leadership was forced to postpone the celebration to September, because the ambitious reconstruction of the streets of Dongsheng city (*qu*), the new capital of the Ordos municipality, had

not been completed in time. Though disappointed at missing an auspicious date, the people there were determined to hold a mammoth ceremony as soon as the restructuring project was declared complete. Such enthusiasm was not without good reason. Originally a poor place with rugged terrain marked by vast and ever-expanding deserts, Yikezhao emerged towards the end of the twentieth century as the richest league in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, with three of the region's leading profit-making industries – cashmere sweaters, coal and chemicals. It is also home to the Chinggis Khan Mausoleum, perhaps Inner Mongolia's most popular tourist destination, attracting hundreds of thousands of tourists each year. Nothing could mark this hard-won progress better than dropping the feudal, backward-sounding name Yikezhao Meng and replacing it with E'erduosi Shi, conveying simultaneously a positively exotic indigenous image and a cosmopolitan ring, perhaps auguring humanity's future – E'erduosi is not only associated with the mighty Chinggis Khan, but is also China's best-known cashmere sweater brand name. Such a great transition must be celebrated not only with appropriate local ethnic Mongolian flavor but also on a most auspicious date.

Not everyone was overjoyed, however. Many Mongols decided to stay at home instead of joining the overwhelmingly Chinese revelers in the streets of the newly named Dongsheng Qu (Dongsheng city). Still, this muted protest was scarcely noticed. The name rectification was only one of the latest in a series of municipalizations or urbanizations in Inner Mongolia. Until 1976, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region had only two municipalities, Baotou and Hohhot. Now there are five additional municipalities: Wuhai established in 1976, Chifeng in 1983, Tongliao in 1999, Ordos in 2001, and Hulunbuir in 2002, outnumbering the prefecture-level leagues: Alashan, Bayannuur, Ulaanchab, Shilin-gol, and Hinggan. What is remarkable is that some of the original league names have been dropped, and in some cases replaced with Chinese names: whereas Yeke-juu was replaced by Ordos, a Mongol word, and Hulunbuir remained intact, Juu-Uda and Jerim were replaced by the Chinese names Chifeng and Tongliao.

This article examines this interesting 'urbanization' process cum rectification of names in Inner Mongolia. The changing map of Inner Mongolia presents a rapidly modernizing image of Inner Mongolia. What is unique about this transformation is that it differs from the classical urban development pattern whereby a relatively small town grew in size through gobbling up surrounding rural areas, as in the cases of Baotou, Wuhai and Huhhot. It invites comparison with rural-based industrialization whereby small towns expand in size through the development of (predominantly) non-state township enterprises or private enterprises. This latter form of urbanization appears to be a channel through which the surplus rural labor created after decollectivization, but which cannot be absorbed by large cities, can engage in small commodities production. It is also a product of a Chinese political decision to prevent rural to urban migration, for a variety of reasons that lie behind China's notorious urban–rural segregation system (*hukou*), and it is and remains a strategy to deny benefits afforded to urban residents to their rural cousins. In a more optimistic assessment, Arif Dirlik and

Zhang Xudong argue that 'the industrial penetration of the rural areas also gives rise to a post-urban, decentralized and place-based mode of development that promises to narrow rural–urban disparity and to rebuild rural communities in the market environment.'[2] A more comparable model can perhaps be found in the new phenomenon that localities all over China aspire to 'elevate themselves' by rectification of names, a phenomenon called *di-gai-shi* and *xian-gai-shi*. The magic of the term city, or any term that elevates one on the administrative scale, is sought by all and sundry. Chongqing's coup in 1997 to change from a prefecture-level city in Sichuan province to an independent provincial-level municipality is the most important example. At a modest level, Wugong *xiang* (township) in Hebei province, for instance, becomes Wugong *zhen* (town), thus elevating it above the other *xiang* (townships) in the county, and bringing access to money. Such an upgrading is not confined to the administrative and spatial continuum, but permeates the entire social and economic sphere. In the last decade there has been a rectification of names from *gongsi* (company) to *jituan* (group), *zongjingli* (general manager) to *zongcai* (CEO), etc., which is less of a substantial change than a face-lift. In other words, it reflects a kind of commodity aesthetics as Wolfgang Haug described in capitalist societies, which has more of an exchange value than a use value.[3] Such aestheticization is more appealing to the senses, but perhaps frustrating to sensuality.

I argue that, in the case of the four new municipalities noted above, it can best be comprehended in the context of Inner Mongolian ethnopolitics, that is, China's mode of administrating non-Chinese minorities, as well as China's Confucian practice of rectification of names, in the process of China's ever-changing political economy. It is in the social relations of production or economic development that we should find a more appropriate answer to comprehending this kind of urbanization and modernity in the northern frontier of China. In exploring this question, I will first analyze the Chinese administrative practices regarding non-Chinese minorities, cultural practices of naming with regard to minorities in China's history, and then expound on how the regional disparity rendered by Deng Xiaoping's development policy engendered a *new* passionate desire for development on the part of both frontier Chinese and Mongols. Such a modernity is what I will call alter/native modernity, that is, not just an alternative Chinese modernity, but one which hinges on altering the native Mongol cultural and political institutions and properties. Finally, municipalization through rectification of names will be analyzed as both a shortcut to modernity and a means to overcome ethnic autonomy, which is viewed by the Chinese leadership as incompatible with economic development, the national priority for the post-Mao developmental regime.

The politics of administrative division and multinationalism

Western theorists of ethnicity and nationalism have largely ignored administrative naming as an important component in maintaining ethnic relations. So too,

probably, have students of demography and urbanization. Nor have those who have examined China's ethnicity paid much attention to the administration of non-Chinese.[4] The conventional understanding of literati officials as China's quintessential bureaucrats has probably prevented inquiries into other forms of administrative systems, especially concerning those carried out in non-Chinese areas in China. It is often assumed that China's Confucian culture invariably assimilated the barbarians who resided within their political terrain. However, the fact remains that until 1884 when the Qing dynasty established 'Xinjiang province,' the 'Chinese' bureaucracy did not penetrate into 60 percent of today's non-Chinese inhabited territories. Here I submit that one of the most important mechanisms in maintaining the boundary between the Chinese and non-Chinese has been through separate administration, based on differences in language, economy, geography, or any other tangible factors. I also suggest that the municipalization of the Mongol league system, marking the elimination of leagues, reflects the tension between China's multinational reality and the Confucian-cum-nationalist Chinese state's desire for cultural and administrative homogeneity.

This is not the place to give a detailed study of the non-Chinese administrations in China; rather I limit myself to some brief comments, especially in relation to the Mongol conquest and rule of China in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries. Mongols exerted a far-reaching impact on the Chinese administrative system, particularly in terms of governing non-Chinese peoples. On the one hand, Mongols instituted the *xingsheng* or 'province' system,[5] which later came to be understood as a unique 'Chinese' local administrative institution. Mongol and their loyal non-Chinese officials, known as *darugachi*, were appointed by the Mongol emperors to serve in various localities.[6] On the other hand, during the Yuan non-Chinese peoples in today's southwest and northwest were granted wide autonomy, with their native chieftains (*tuguan*) permitted to rule their domains hereditarily.[7] Both were apparently innovations.[8] One may argue that such administrative separation was not so much Mongol altruism in building a multicultural empire, as a Mongol strategy to liberate the underdogs despised by the Chinese. During the Mongol Yuan many of the predecessors of today's non-Chinese minorities[9] were organized as legitimate components of the Mongol empire, and their leaders were made hereditary.

The establishment of the dual administrative system separating the Chinese from other peoples has profound implications as it informs the dynamics of later Mongolian and Chinese histories. Although the *tusi* system was further institutionalized during the Ming, it was also the Ming that started to dismantle it under the program called *gaitu guiliu*, that is, replacing hereditary native chiefs with centrally appointed civil service officials. This attempt prompted strong resistance from non-Chinese peoples who came under Chinese rule. The Qing dynasty, on the other hand, building on the Mongol system, instituted a more elaborate system that recognized native autonomy, although that recognition hinged on their support for the Manchu in ruling China. For instance, whereas the Chinese were administered in more than a dozen provinces controlled

directly by the Qing court, Mongols in different communities were allowed to keep their khanates (*aimag*) as in Outer Mongolia, or organized under a league (*chuulgan*) and banner (*hoshu*) system as in Inner Mongolia, wherein the hereditary Chinggisid and Hasarid[10] princes enjoyed great autonomy in administering their leagues or banners.

It is important to note that the Mongol-derived administrative system of home rule remained an important device for keeping non-Chinese loyal to the imperial center. The greatest source of dissatisfaction and rebellion by non-Chinese people came often when their relative autonomy was revoked and they were subjected to direct Chinese-style provincial administration. What is interesting is that, as Mongols attained a non-ruling minority status under the Qing, administered in the khanate, league and banner system, the provincial system which they had introduced during the Yuan became distinctly 'Chinese' and non-Mongol in their own eyes. Mongols saw the establishment of provinces in territories of Inner Mongolia in 1928 as an imposition of Chinese regular administration depriving Mongols of their autonomy. Defending leagues and banners, both in form and substance, became the very source and content of modern Mongolian nationalism in Inner Mongolia.

Let me elaborate this point further. Modern Inner Mongolian nationalism has been punctuated by a response to the loss of Inner Mongolia as an autonomous territorial administrative zone. Chinese nationalism, similarly, set the unification of all territories under a uniform provincial administration as its ultimate goal. By 1928, as soon as Jiang Jieshi conquered north China and set up Central Government rule under the Guomindang, the Chinese Nationalist Party, he placed all frontier territories under newly created provinces, such as Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ningxia, Qinghai, etc. – all except Outer Mongolia and central Tibet which were beyond Chinese control. This attempt to impose administrative unity was soon followed by revoking the solemn promise of the union of five nationalities, the foundational pact of a multinational Republic of China,[11] thereby rendering Manchu, Mongols, Tibetans and Muslims as branches of the Han-centered Chinese nation, and explicitly specified in Jiang's *China's Destiny*, his testament and a text that has sometimes been seen as a Chinese *Mein Kampf*.

The Chinese Communist Party, for its part, influenced by Leninist doctrine and perhaps obligated by the terms of the alliances it established with some minorities in order to oppose the Guomindang and the Japanese, as well as the sheer demand for autonomy on the part of some minorities, instituted what it called 'nationality regional autonomy' after 1949, modeled on the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government, the first autonomous region, established in 1947. In fact, in earlier decades, the CCP set up independent Soviet republics for themselves, and autonomies for non-Chinese minorities, thus incurring Chinese nationalist wrath, calling them bandits or traitors. This is an important topic in its own right, but here I only want to point out that because of Mongols' strong aversion to the very term *sheng* ('province'), the territory under the control of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government established in May

1947 came to be called 'Autonomous Region' (*zizhi qu*) rather than 'Autonomous Province' (*zizhi sheng*) after 1949.[12]

Within the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the local administrative divisions included league (prefecture, *aimag* in Mongolian, or *meng* in Chinese), banner (county, *hoshu* in Mongolian, or *qi* in Chinese), and *sum* (township, *sum* in Mongolian, or *sumu* in Chinese). *Aimag* is a revival of the indigenous Mongol term for confederation, replacing the Qing imposition of *chuulgan* (assembly, translated as *hui meng* in Chinese). *Hoshu* was an ancient Mongol administrative name kept by the Qing, so it was not abolished. *Sum* was also an ancient Mongol administrative term.

What is worth noting is that the Chinese translation of the terms reflects the distinct character of the Mongol administrative tradition. Interestingly, even the English translation preserves the Mongol characteristics of the terms rather than rendering them into prefecture, county or township. The situation of administrative names in other minority regions appears to be different. While the provincial-level autonomous units are all called *qu* or region, the lower administrations are named *zizhi zhou* (autonomous prefecture), *zizhi xian* (autonomous county), or *minzu xiang* (nationality township), all Chinese terms with no cultural or historical connotation in minority languages, although non-autonomous Chinese prefectures are called *diqu*, which is usually translated as 'prefecture' in English.

Although this pattern is almost uniform all over China, including Xinjiang and Tibet, no Chinese term was used to name administrations at the secondary level in Inner Mongolia, in deference to a Mongol desire to abolish all the Chinese provinces established in the territories of Inner Mongolia, and restore the territories of the former Inner Mongolian banners that had been annexed by neighboring provinces. At the tertiary level, however, within Inner Mongolia, we see a clear pattern of ethnic division: Mongol banners (*hoshu* or *qi*) coexist with Chinese counties (*xian*), which is not only a manifestation of a lost battle to restore Mongol administrative characteristics, but also a forced recognition of the reality that the Chinese constitute the overwhelming majority in the autonomous region overall and even in many rural areas. Nor should the banners be construed as purely Mongol in population. Banners are also studded with Chinese *xiang* (townships) along with Mongolian *sum* (arrow). Along with these administrative names embroiled in ethnic struggle there exist cities or municipalities (*hot* in Mongolian or *shi* in Chinese).

The rectification of names as linguistic nationalism?

To sum up briefly, naming the autonomous administrative territorial units for minorities is as important as their establishment *per se*, especially in Inner Mongolia. Naming is not a trivial issue, something simply decorative in nature. At issue is not just the symbolic importance of ethnic pride, but questions of autonomy and power relations between titular minorities and non-titular

Chinese. It is a common practice that subunits of an autonomous area do not wear the modifier '*zizhi*' (autonomous) unless they pertain to a separate minority nationality. For instance, only three banners in Inner Mongolia are 'autonomous,' belonging to three different nationalities: Orochon, Ewenki and Daur. Mongol leagues or banners do not wear the 'autonomous' label, because it is assumed that Mongols are the titular nationality of the entire autonomous region, and they do not need to be autonomous within it. However, China's Law of Nationality Regional Autonomy, either in the original 1984 version or the 2001 amendment, does not specify how to distinguish a Mongol administrative subunit from a Chinese subunit, given the existence of linguistic differentiation. Custom rules that Chinese in counties of Inner Mongolia are titular, and we may safely say that counties in Inner Mongolia are 'Chinese autonomous counties.'

Therefore, naming an administrative unit as banner or county infringes on extreme ethnic sensitivity, as it is a matter of ethnic autonomy and power relations. While no more 'counties' are likely to be formed in Inner Mongolia – because of its ethnic sensitivity and because 'counties' are falling out of fashion in other parts of China, too, thanks to the overall trend of urbanization in China as a form of modernity (see below) – the proliferation of cities or municipalities in Inner Mongolia is, among other things, also a reflection of this ethnic struggle, and a strategy of the Chinese to expand their territorial space. Cities are not supposed to be ethnic, or autonomous, as we can glean from the absence of 'city' in the definition of autonomous areas in China's Law of Nationality Regional Autonomy. I argue that although cities are also customarily associated with things 'Chinese,' this legal lacuna and the obvious benefits to locals, especially local officials, of being honored by the rise to city status checkmates ethnic sensitivity. Before we go on to discuss this matter, in relation to post-Mao economic development in the rest of China, let us examine briefly the tradition and practice of rectification of names as reflected in minority administrations.

As noted above, one of the important contentions in ethnic relations lies in naming administrations and localities. Naming, in traditional Chinese political culture, is an important device for keeping social order in harmony. As François Thierry has noted:

> The importance given in China to the harmony between the thing and its name is well known: every name must agree perfectly with the profound nature of what is named. Thus the graphic classification of the name of each type of Barbarian under a radical marking his animal nature is an ontological necessity. So one finds in the ideograms designating some Barbarians the root 'reptile' (the Mo, the Wei, the Liao, etc.), the root 'worm' (the Ruan, the Bie, the Dan, the Man, etc.), and above all the root 'dog' (the Di, the Yan, the Qiang, the Tong, etc.); some may be written equally with the root 'dog' or the root 'reptile' (the Wei, the Lao).[13]

We may extend this insight to discussing place names. Many place names in China still betray the origin of either *fait accompli* (or perhaps more properly *fate accompli*!) or desire to put down or 'tranquilize' the disturbances caused by

non-Chinese peoples. Some of those insulting place names have never been abolished. For instance, the capital of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region is Nanning – meaning bringing tranquility to the south; the capital of Qinghai is Xining, bringing tranquility to the west; Ningxia in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region means tranquilizing the Tangut kingdom or Xixia; and Liaoning province, bringing tranquility to the non-Chinese Liao dynasty. Along the Great Wall, immediately south of Ordos, are two border towns called Dingbian, which means stabilizing the border region, and Jingbian, pacifying the border region. It is remarkable that these terms continue to exist, although some more insulting terms have been removed. For instance, the former names given by the Ming dynasty to Urumqi and Hohhot were Dihua and Guihua, meaning to 'enlighten and civilize' barbarians, and to 'return to civilization and to pacify' barbarians, respectively, a far cry from the original Mongol meanings of Urumqi and Hohhot as 'fine pasture' and 'blue city.'

Some of these derogatory place names continue to exist inside Inner Mongolia. For instance, there is a county called Huade in Shilin-gol league. In the memoir of Prince Demchugdongrub there is an interesting description of his battle to change the name after the establishment of the Mongolian Military Government under the aegis of the Japanese Kwantung army in early 1936.

> In terms of 'internal administration', the first thing we did was to change Huade county to Dehua city. With regard to the establishment of Huade county, I once expressed my discontent, because the county seat was originally called Jabusu, and it just bordered my banner. Moreover, the Chinese transliteration of my name is De Mu Chu Ke Dong Lu Pu, and people call me De Wang, Prince De, using the first character De. If it is still called Huade, it means that I would be civilized [*hua*] to this place, but if it is changed to Dehua, it means that it would be civilized for me. During the period of Bailingmiao Mongolian Political Council, Bao Yueqing transmitted my discontent with the two characters Huade to Xiao Zhengying, a trusted aid of Song Zheyuan, governor of Chahar province. Xiao Zhengying immediately explained that the name came down in a series of names like Congli (following rite), Shangyi (upholding righteousness), it absolutely does not mean to convert or insult Prince De. If Prince De is not happy about it, I'll immediately advise governor Song Zheyuan to change it. Please explain to Prince De not to misunderstand. Indeed, soon I received a notice from the Guomindang Ministry of Internal Affairs notifying that Huade county was changed to 'Xingmin xian', New People county. However, despite the explicit order from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, since the East Chahar incident occurred before the name change of Huade took effect, the local people continued to call it Huade. Therefore, as soon as the Mongolian Military Government was founded, I decided to change Huade county to Dehua city.[14]

Prince Demchugdongrub, the foremost Inner Mongolian nationalist leader in the twentieth century, directly engaged in the struggle of 'rectification of name,' in order not to be politically eliminated or '*hua*' (civilized) by the Chinese.

Moreover, he changed it from county to city, diluting its 'Chinese' flavor, and appointing Mongols to become mayor and administrators of the city. Although it may sound as though it was a matter of Prince Demchugdongrub's royal pre-rogative or princely ego, the underlying tension was profoundly political as well as cultural. It is perhaps not so mysterious why the CCP altered it back to Huade county, regardless of Mongol discontent, after 1949. That they could continue to do so with impunity was due to the fact that Prince Demchugdongrub became an indicted war criminal after the war. Insulting a Mongol war criminal was a matter of revolutionary righteousness, but in doing so the CCP did not distin-guish revolutionary justice from ethnic discrimination.[15]

The naming history of Hohhot is no less interesting. Originally a fortified monastic center built in 1581 especially for the 3rd Dalai Lama when the Tumed Chief Altan Khan granted the title 'Dalai Lama' to the Tibetan Gelugpa Buddhist leader Sonam Gyatso in 1578, and called Hohhot, the blue city, after the color of the temple walls built with bluish bricks, it was named Guihua by the Ming dynasty, literally meaning 'return to civilization.' The Chinese name was retained by the Manchu. In 1735 the Manchu built a garrison town north-east of the city, and it was called Suiyuan cheng (Pacifying Afar City), also known as Xincheng (New City).[16] In the Republican period, with the Manchu garrison dismantled, the two cities were combined to become the capital of the newly established Suiyuan province, and it attained a new name, Guisui, meaning sub-mission and pacification. When Prince Demchugdongrub occupied the city in the late 1930s with the help of the Japanese army, he replaced the Chinese name with the Mongol original name Hohhot. But the Chinese rendering of Hohhot became Houhe Haote, which means 'favoring the peace (*houhe*) city (*haote*),' perhaps echoing the Chinese phrase *xiehe* (coordination or harmonization), which became popular in Japanese propaganda for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. That the character '*he*' is the same one for Japan made the choice particularly fascinating. However, the Chinese restored the Chinese name Guisui after August 1945, when Prince Demchugdongrub's army was defeated and the Chinese nationalist army under the former governor of Suiyuan province, Fu Zuoyi, retook the city. Only in 1954, four years after the founding of the People's Republic, when Suiyuan province was finally abolished and incorporated into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, was Guisui replaced by the original Mongol name Hohhot, the blue city. This was a rather late change, because as early as May 16, 1951, the State Council had already issued a directive ordering the removal of or a ban on ethnonyms, place names, stelae, or board inscriptions which were deemed discriminatory or insulting to minority nationalities.[17] But the two characters *Huhe* chosen for *Hoh* were interesting; they were partially different from Prince Demchugdongrub's *Houhe*. While the character '*he*' is the same, its meaning becomes contextually different when modified by a different character. The character *hu* means calling or crying out. In the new context of Chinese propaganda for 'national unity' (*minzu tuanjie*), harmony between Chinese and Mongols in this frontier has become particularly desirable. Hohhot thus becomes the 'calling for harmony city'!

This constant 'rectification of names' is of more than casual interest. Each change marked the brutal history of one nationality defeating the other, or a regime change. However, the restoration to Hohhot or Huhehaote should not be construed as the final victory. Chinese transliterations of Mongolian names are often deemed tongue twisting to Chinese. As noted above, Prince Demchug-dongrub's Chinese transliteration is rather long, consisting of seven characters: De Mu Chu Ke Dong Lu Pu. And the Chinese never called him by his full seven-character name, but always abbreviated to the first character De, followed by his title Wang, or Prince. Similarly, Huhehaote is seldom called in full, but often abridged to either Huhe, or Hushi, the Hu city. Almost all the Mongol league and banner names are abridged: for instance, Bayannuur league is called *Ba Meng* (Ba league), Otog banner is called *E Qi* (E banner, taking the first character of the Chinese transliteration *Etuoke*). Is it merely a Chinese linguistic propensity, a matter of technicality, or is something deeper at play?

While we may acknowledge that the Chinese language, made up of pictographic characters, is not particularly adept at transliterating non-Chinese polysyllabic languages, using fewer characters in names, preferably two, is actually a unique form of sinicization. In an interesting paper, Patricia Ebrey notes that many Chinese in south China are derived from non-Chinese peoples, but in Song, Ming and Qing times, few would acknowledge their non-Chinese descent: 'Rather than say they became Chinese the Confucian way, by adopting Chinese culture, they wanted to say they were Chinese by patrilineal descent.' She then asks a compelling question: 'If Chineseness was actually something one could acquire by learning, why were so few willing to admit that they had learned it?'[18] Much of the assimilation process can be found in the change of their names, especially surnames. In all the cases she has found, 'tribal names are transcribed as single characters, making them easy to assimilate to Chinese surnames.'[19] As it turned out, having more than one character in a surname denotes barbarian origin, and while conquerors would be happy to retain multi-character names as their distinction, 'once they were defeated or ousted, if they had become assimilated such distinctive names labeled them as alien, as non-Chinese, perhaps even hated non-Chinese.'[20] The strategy to assimilate, either as a preference or as a way to survive, was to drop their multi-character surnames, which were results of Chinese transcription from their polysyllabic languages, and to adopt single-character names, 'preferably one that looked like a Chinese surname.' As time went by, even completely Chinese two-character surnames like Sima, Situ, Gongsun and Shusun began to be associated with non-Chinese origin, and people who had those names had to drop one character![21]

Following this theory, we may argue that although Mongols managed to win victories by replacing Chinese discriminatory or insulting names with Mongol names – a victory perhaps facilitated by the CCP's initial pro-minority policies, given the fact that Chinese is the national language and Chinese constitute the majority in almost all minority autonomous areas – their hard-won victories have been compromised by the more subtle cultural process of sinicization.

In addition to the habit of sinicization through abridgement of transcribed

names, there is another process, namely translation. We have already noted that Mongol administrative names like *aimag* or *hoshu* are not transliterated as *Aimake* or *Haoshu*, but always as *Meng* or *Qi* (except *sum*, which would generally be transliterated as *sumu*, although in Qing times it was translated as '*jian*' or arrow). On Chinese maps, we find, for instance, that the former eight-banner Chahar Mongols have been divided between Shilin-gol league and Ulaanchab league, each having three banners, with the remaining two missing, presumably carved and divided up. Interestingly, the three Chahar banners in Ulaanchab are named Chaha'er Youyi Hou Qi, Chaha'er Youyi Zhong Qi, and Chaha'er Youyi Qian Qi, meaning Chahar Rightwing Rear, Middle and Front banners, in which, except for the characters Chaha'er, all are Chinese translations. Those three banners in Shilin-gol league are called Xianghuang Qi, Zhengxiangbai Qi, and Zhenglan Qi, all translations of Mongol names: Hövööt Shar Hoshu, Shuluun Hövööt Chagaan Hoshu, and Shuluun Höh Hoshu.

Although Hohhot is usually transliterated as Huhehaote, which is the official name, the Chinese not only abridge it as Huhe or Hushi, as noted, but also, more tellingly, translate it as Qingcheng, the Blue City. It is this translation, perhaps because of its clear meaning to the majority Chinese in the city, that has attained some poetic sense, as in the appellation of Saiwai Qingcheng – the Blue City Beyond the Great Wall. Baotou, the largest industrial city in Inner Mongolia, is often called Lucheng, Deer City, because Baotou is the transliteration of *bugut*, which means a place with deer. The character *lu* and the statues of deer are the usual decorative logos of this city which has long been devoid of deer in the wild. The association with the image of deer as expressed in the Chinese character *lu* is certainly more aesthetic than the lackluster and even obtuse-sounding two-character Chinese transliteration Baotou, which literally means 'wrapping head,' evoking the image of turbaned Shanxi peasants, the main stock of the local Chinese.

Let us proceed to discuss the characters used for Ulaanhad. Although this term is alive and well in Mongolian, the official Chinese name for the city has always been Chifeng, Red Peak, the Chinese translation of Ulaanhad. Hongshan, a less literal translation of Ulaanhad – Red Mountain – is used to denote an archeological site containing artifacts of the New Stone Age. Though largely filled with pastoral animal motifs, the so-called Hongshan culture has been appropriated to construct a glorious ancient Chinese civilization.

Chifeng was the capital of Juu-uda league until 1983 and is that of its successor Chifeng municipality. What is surprising is that instead of calling it Juu-uda municipality or Zhaowuda Shi, it was designated as Chifeng municipality. At one stroke, Juu-uda league, a Mongol league, was turned into a city with a Chinese name. This name change did not go unchallenged.

According to a senior Mongol official who participated in the meeting that discussed the choice of the name, the then Party secretary Zhou Hui, a Chinese appointed by the CCP Central Committee, insisted on choosing Chifeng as the official name for the new municipality. A participant in the meeting opposed it and suggested that even if the original Mongol name Juu-uda were not used, at

least the Mongol word Ulaanhad (Wulanhada, in Chinese) for Chifeng be chosen, if only to show a token deference to the Mongols' feeling in this region. According to my informant, Zhou Hui shouted angrily at the speaker for exhibiting Mongol nationalist sentiment. Ironically, the speaker turned out to be a Chinese, but Zhou mistook him for a Mongol, whose only mistake was to call for respecting the historical fact that Juu-uda league was a Mongol administrative unit.

This incident happened in a very tense period in Inner Mongolia in terms of ethnic relations after the Cultural Revolution. In 1981, for more than a month, Mongol students throughout Inner Mongolia went on strike, protesting Central Document No. 28, issued in response to Zhou's report to the central leadership on the Inner Mongolian situation. The document indicated that Inner Mongolia would receive more Chinese immigrants, an issue that was particularly sensitive to Mongols, especially young students who went through the Cultural Revolution, many of whose parents had been tortured to death by Chinese immigrants.[22] This student protest spread to a struggle between Mongol and Chinese leaders within the Party and government. Mongol leaders, recently rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution, and having experienced brutal ethnic suppression in the campaign against an alleged vast ring of underground Mongol nationalists, were especially sympathetic to the student demands. Their sympathy, however, cost them their political careers. More than 200 high-ranking Mongol officials were either demoted or sacked because of this incident, ushering in the first U-turn in the fragile post-Cultural Revolution pro-minority policies. Not surprisingly, Zhou Hui, a leader who had originally vowed to right the past wrongs done to Mongols, began to bridle at any criticism and any pro–Mongol remarks. Unfortunately, a Chinese Party secretary's personal mood aptitude could even deprive a Mongol league of its Mongol character.

The change of Jerim league to Tongliao municipality in October 1999 is a similar story. It was also a case of replacing the Mongol league name with the name of the capital city, except that Tongliao is a straightforward Chinese name meaning 'penetrating or opening up the Liao,' with its background in dealing with the Liao dynasty (AD 916–1125), a dynasty founded by non-Chinese Kitan people. Worth noting is the justification for the name rectification. As the Party Secretary and the Mayor of Tongliao municipality wrote in their glowing piece published in *People's Daily* on October 6, 1999:

'This is the result of deepening reform, expanding opening-up, and accelerating development undertaken by the people of Tongliao under the leadership of the Party. . . . By replacing league with municipality, history once again gives Tongliao people a development opportunity that comes only once in a thousand years.' They vowed, 'Replacing league with municipality opens a brand-new page for the development of Tongliao's economy. Our first term municipal party committee and the municipal government will, taking the replacement of league with municipality as the turning point, further emancipate the mind, grasp the opportunity, speed up the development, and carry a united, wealthy and civilized Tongliao into the twenty-first century.'[23]

One cannot but notice a forward outlook expressed in the above passage, as though the advancement of the people of Tongliao had been until 1999 hampered by the Mongol administrative unit called Jerim league, and the renaming had at long last emancipated them.

One of the first programs undertaken by the first term municipal party committee and government was dismantling three Mongolian colleges – Inner Mongolia Nationality Teachers' College, Inner Mongolia Mongolian Medical College, and Jerim League Animal Husbandry College – and amalgamating them into a newly created Tongliao University. This decision was promptly opposed by Mongol students from the three colleges, who issued a signed petition to China's State Council, State Nationality Affairs Commission, State Education Ministry, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Government, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Nationality Affairs Commission, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Education Commission, on November 30, 1999. They protested that the replacement of Juu-uda league with Chifeng league and Jerim league with Tongliao municipality had never been discussed with Mongols, and such acts violated Mongols' aspirations and interests. They argued that a name is an integral part of a thing, and it is a reflection of it. Changing the name of Jerim league deprived it of its Mongol substance. They insisted on adding the modifier '*minzu*' (nationality) in front of the word university, thereby denoting its 'Mongolness.'[24] It is not known what came of their petition.

In contrast to these dismal stories of 'rectification of names' at the cost of Mongol culture and autonomy, the change of Yeke-juu league to Ordos municipality (E'erduosi Shi) and the retention of Hulunbuir appears encouraging, even gratifying. In the case of Ordos, it is ostensibly the revival of the more authentic tribal name of the local Mongols, a name associated with the shrines of Chinggis Khan, replacing Yeke-juu, an administrative name imposed by the Qing dynasty and meaning Great Monastery. Transformed into a municipality, the Ordos appears to be both authentically Mongol and modern. Before going into the details that led to this interesting situation, let us first examine the urbanization process in Inner Mongolia and China at large.

Oedipus and urbanization: capitalism and reterritorialization

Despite a nomadic tradition, cities were not unknown on the Mongolian steppe.[25] As Mongols conquered more land and people, they either brought in craftsmen to build cities or moved out to conquered land and ruled from the cities there. Karakorum, once one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world, but now in ruins in the heart of Mongolia, was the capital of the Mongol empire. Beijing, a major city and capital of China, was largely established by the Mongols. However, as Mongols were driven out of China in the late fourteenth century and never regained their former strength, they swiftly reverted to the traditional nomadic lifestyle and inter-tribal war, far removed from urban life. Cities only survived in the Mongols' historical memories in the form of ruins,

known as *balgas*, reminding one of Dadu/Taitu (Beijing), known as Khanbalic, or Balac, as recorded in Marco Polo's travel book, a memory perhaps comparable to Samuel T. Coleridge's imagination of Xanadu, his Kubla Khan's 'stately pleasure dome.'

The Mongols' second and this time thorough conversion to Tibetan Buddhism in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries transformed them from world-conquerors to world-renouncers, and much of their interest and capital was devoted to monastery building in Mongolia and Tibet. Monasteries thus studded the otherwise sparsely populated Mongolian plateau, which then also served as market centers, where Chinese and Muslim merchants, allowed in by the Qing authorities, settled and built shops, creating a vast merchant empire exploiting Mongols. Over centuries, Kuriyen (Khuree) or Urga (today's Ulaanbaatar) in Outer Mongolia and Hohhot in Inner Mongolia developed into the two largest merchant cities in Mongolia.

With the influx of Chinese immigrants towards the end of the nineteenth century, settling in Mongol monastic centers, usually located in the best natural settings, as determined by Buddhist geomancy, there had been an increasing cultural inward-looking development on the part of Mongols, who believed that cities were necessary evils, necessary for obtaining commodities, but not suitable for Mongol residences. Cities thus became culturally Chinese, as trading became known as *hudaldaa*, 'cheating' in Mongolian, displacing the original term *ariljaa*, making trading something alien to the very ethic of 'Mongolness.'

Unlike some other minority regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang, which have their own urban tradition, it was not until 1949, after several centuries, that Mongols began to flow into cities in relatively large numbers as party, government and educational personnel. Cities, associated with industrialization, were attractive to Mongols, who were then also mesmerized by the notion of socialist modernity. But their cultural incapacity has never been resolved, for the Mongols have always maintained that their authentic Mongol culture is located in the grassland. This is reminiscent of Mao's suspicion of urban culture;[26] but while Mao's concern was ideological, Mongols' concerns are ethnic and cultural. Of course, the Chinese establishment of a formalized urban and rural divide policed by the institution called *hukou* – household registration – produced perhaps the largest inequality presided over by the Chinese Communist Party. With the peasantry discriminated against and locked into villages, urbanites, including industrial workers, have been protected as producers and vanguard forces in building the communist utopia. It would be an important topic to study how Mongol sense of rurality and urbanity in terms of ethnicity has been configured in the context of Chinese administrative separation, but here, suffice it to make a broad generalization that, in Inner Mongolia, the rural is divided in ethnicity: while Mongols are supposed to live in *muqu* (Chinese) or *maljih oron* (Mongolian) (pastoral regions), the Chinese live in *nongqu* (Chinese) or *tarialangiin oron* (Mongolian) (agricultural regions). Although at present more Mongols are peasants than herdsmen and they live in agricultural or semi-agricultural regions, instead of acknowledging this as a normal development, the

historical memory of a painful transformation invariably represents it as a result of colonization and sinicization.[27] Cities, on the other hand, though usually associated with the Chinese because of history and the sheer numbers of Chinese there, provide some hope for transcending this ethnicity as they represent modernity and the future of humanity. The result is the constant fear of losing their distinct Mongol culture and language in the Chinese-dominated cities, and their nostalgia for pastoral homeland notwithstanding, the overwhelming desire for modernity and the availability of modern amenities – products of China's ideological bent towards things urban – have driven a rapid Mongol flow into cities. An 'urban' Mongol category and an urban Mongol culture are on the rise, with every element hybridized with both Chinese and modern elements.

Cities have expanded and flourished in Inner Mongolia since the 1950s. While many have developed from monastic centers or market towns to administrative centers of leagues and banners, a few are newly developed industrial towns, with plants and workers transferred from coastal China. Such cities are usually self-contained places, with little relation to the local neighboring society. Fei Xiaotong, the eminent Chinese anthropologist, found in his study of Baotou in 1985 that most of the skilled workers who came in the 1950s and 1960s from inland China had aged, and many of their jobs had been inherited by their children, thus building a close kin society around the factories.[28] He urged that Baotou establish links with neighboring areas, exporting its skilled laborers, so as to both help develop the neighboring economies, and perhaps find relief for the ever-burgeoning population in a cramped city.

While Baotou is a municipality in Inner Mongolia, there are also a few enclaves built in recent decades and controlled directly by the central government in Beijing, to tap the natural resources. Xuejiawan in eastern Yeke-juu league is a case in point. Built in the 1980s exclusively for the purpose of extracting coal from the world's largest open-pit coalmine, Xuejiawan's relations with Yeke-juu league or Inner Mongolia were limited until recently when the seat of Jungar banner moved there from Shagedu. The labor is largely imported Chinese labor. The nature of such industrial towns or cities is reminiscent of cities built predominantly in minority regions by the central government in the late 1960s in its Third Front program.[29] The difference is that, while the earlier towns were justified for national defense purposes in the face of an ostensible threat of war with the Soviet Union, the post-Mao new towns are built for the explicit purpose of extracting natural resources.

All this points to a rapidly changing landscape in Inner Mongolia. Urbanization is a two-way process, generated both from within and without Inner Mongolia. I suggest that the change of four leagues to municipalities in the post-Mao period constitutes a new process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. David Harvey, following Deleuze and Guattari, argues that:

> the accumulation of capital is perpetually deconstructing . . . social power by reshaping its geographical basis. Put the other way round, any struggle to reconstitute power relations is a struggle to reorganize their spatial basis. It is

in this light that we can better understand 'why capitalism is continuously reterritorializing with one hand what it was deterritorializing with the other'.[30]

Harvey's point is important, pointing to the political and geographical dimensions of capitalist development. But can the urbanization or municipalization of leagues in Inner Mongolia be understood only as a result of capitalism? Harvey's Marxist analysis stresses the working-class resistance to capitalism. In so doing, however, he perhaps fails to appreciate why, in many cases in the Third World, the introduction of capital is actually initially welcomed by the local community as well as the national or capitalist elites. It is only when capitalist exploitation exceeds people's expectations, bringing more harm than benefit, that people begin to contemplate resistance. In other words, we must explain why, in Inner Mongolia, municipalization has not met with any serious open Mongol resistance, in contrast to the Chinese-initiated land reclamation of 1902, which prompted Mongols throughout Inner Mongolia to rebel violently, becoming the harbinger of modern Inner Mongolian nationalism.

Key to Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of capitalism in their majestic *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1977) is the psychoanalysis of social desire, which flows around the surface or body of the earth, driven by capital. Capitalism as a 'desiring machine' produces the 'subject,' which then takes the initiative or indeed is driven to pursue its desire, traversing vast space. Capitalism produces floating desires, and its prime aim is to engineer an encounter between the deterritorialized wealth of capital and the labor capacity of the deterritorialized worker. But deterritorialization is simultaneously reterritorialization, according to Deleuze and Guattari:

> There is the twofold movement of decoding or deterritorializing flows on the one hand, and their violent and artificial reterritorialization on the other. The more the capitalist machine deterritorializes, decoding and axiomatizing flows in order to extract surplus value from them, the more its ancillary apparatuses, such as government bureaucracies and the forces of law and order, do their utmost to territorialize, absorbing in the process a larger and larger share of surplus value.[31]

Much of this theory can be applied to the Chinese colonization of minority areas, and we may argue that the current municipalization or urbanization is a violent form of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. And this is induced by Chinese capitalism, which increases not only regional disparity but also the urban and rural disparity in post-Mao China.

Almost simultaneous with the rise of what David Harvey calls the post-Fordist 'flexible accumulation' in the 1980s to 1990s,[32] we saw a post-Cultural Revolution rebellion against revolution or the socialist work regime that emphasized equality and unselfish contribution, and a move toward a 'black-or-white-cat-which-catches-mice-is-a-good-cat' strategy of capitalist accumulation. But in a cautious way, the Party decided that capital should be accumulated in a few

coastal regions, hoping or claiming that the capital accumulated would then be transferred to other areas. In this regional development strategy, as in the Confucian and perhaps 'feudal' practice of 'exemplary' politics, the showcase developmental zones expanded, while the inland provinces and autonomous regions, especially the frontiers, remained starved of development. This engineering of regional disparity had the effect of making all the regions in China scramble for their own special benefits or special policies. Apparently the coastal advantage is caused as much by geographical location as by the state's differential taxation policies, providing preferential allowances to the cities, which can attract foreign investment. Regions not granted such policies are deprived of a vital opportunity to attract foreign capital.[33]

Thanks to the state's fiscal devolution policy in the 1990s, non-coastal regions could exercise their own authority to devise more attractive policies. As all development-crazed regions, including Inner Mongolia, vie for their own comparative and competitive advantages to attract outside capital, they compete to remove ever more legal or administrative hurdles.[34] Cities have emerged as the centers where industrial miracles and 'actions' occur, pointing towards a future utopia, departing from Mao's ideological ambivalence, and are represented in the media as an embodiment of modernity 'replete with much of the palette of global capitalist renderings of "modernity" and its radically persuasive imagery of the good life, progress and development.'[35] The city has attracted millions of rural peasants to seek temporary jobs while being denied basic benefits and almost permanently barred from settlement. The material prowess has been matched by its political advancement. Barry Naughton finds a good distinction between cities during the Maoist period and contemporary cities.[36] While the earlier cities enjoyed little autonomy, and indeed were subject to the twin policies of neglect and exploitation, the post-Mao period has seen the creation of 'conditions for a substantial expansion in the autonomy of cities and urban groups.'[37] They are now allowed to keep a larger share of their fiscal revenues than before.

Urbanization appears not to be a side effect of China's economic strategy, but rather its goal. The rate of urbanization has become the major index to measure the degree of a province's development. One of the schemes to accelerate urbanization is the conversion of counties and prefectures into cities, a scheme called in Chinese, *zhen gai shi* (town to city), *xian gai shi* (county to municipality), and *di gai shi* (prefecture to municipality). Cities and municipalities have proliferated as a result. Between 1979 and 1997, the number of cities increased from 193 to 668, of which 221 were prefecture-level municipalities.[38]

Some provinces, especially the coastal provinces, started municipalization in the 1980s. Jiangsu province, for instance, changed all of its thirteen prefectures to municipalities in the 1980s, and had changed half of its counties to cities as well by 2000.[39] On January 5, 2001, Shandong province proudly declared that it had completed the project of '*di gai shi*' (prefecture to municipality) and its rate of urbanization was 36.7 percent.[40] Worth noting is the cultural change in the process. In 2001, the prefecture-level Huaiyin municipality of Jiangxi province was changed to Huai'an municipality. It is not an upgrading, rather

an abandoning of an ill-omened name, Huaiyin. The character 'yin' in Huaiyin denotes either the southern side of a river/northern side of a hill, or the feminine or negative principle in nature, in opposition to yang, the masculine and positive, or indeed, it denotes the nether world, ghosts. Bolstered by prosperity, the leadership decided to embrace the bright new world with sunshine and enjoy the tranquility, hence the new name 'Huai'an,' 'an' denoting peace, tranquility.[41]

In April 2001 Xiao Jincheng, a researcher for China's State Development Planning Commission, proposed that urbanization should be the main road to development in the western region of China. In his survey of ten 'western' municipalities, provinces and autonomous regions, which include Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang, there are seven major cosmopolitan cities each with over one million people, and thirty-seven prefecture-level municipalities. But there are still twenty-two prefectures and autonomous prefectures which still do not have cities, sixteen of them being autonomous prefectures. Some of them simply have too few people to warrant municipalities. Ali prefecture in Tibet, for instance, has only 72,000 people. Still Xiao believes urbanization or municipalization is the answer to getting out of poverty. He argues:

> The fundamental significance of 'prefecture to municipality' lies in transforming the 'xu' (nominal) first-level government to a 'shi' (concrete) first-level government, increasing its capability to allocate resources. In the 1980s the state promoted the systems of 'prefecture to municipality' and 'municipality to administer county' throughout the country, in order to break down the administrative barriers separating cities from their surrounding counties, so as to propel a coordinated urban-rural economic development. This reform has clarified the jurisdictional relationship between cities and their surrounding counties, enabling cities to access more land and water supply, guaranteeing the supply to urban economic development. It has also allowed cities to open their gates to the countryside, making it possible for groups of people to go out of the villages into cities to engage in industrial work and commerce, thereby forming a new structure for an integrated development in urban-rural economy. Such a reform has basically been completed in the central provinces. However, in the western provinces and autonomous regions, due to the small size of cities and their weak functions, there are still thirty-nine prefectures which are yet to become municipalities.[42]

This was apparently a prelude to a comprehensive urbanization program the State Development Planning Commission launched on August 8, 2001 for the tenth five-year plan period (2001–2005). According to the blueprint document, the numbers of cities and towns increased respectively from 193 and 2,173 in 1978 to 663 and 20,312 in 2000. Meanwhile, the country's urban population increased from 170 million to 456 million, an increase from 17.9 percent to 36.1 percent of the total population. The government sets two different goals: it will restrict the number, but improve the quality of cities in the eastern region, and

the priority for the western region is to increase the number of cities or municipalities. Urbanization is promoted as the major way to bridge the gap between the eastern and western parts of China.[43]

Deng's regional and urban development policy has thus produced a strong contrast between coastal/urban and frontier/rural, as well as desires on the part of frontier Chinese, to 'open up' and 'catch up.' It also set forth new political dynamics that deterritorialize and reterritorialize frontier ethnic minority autonomous areas.

Post-Mao history is not all economy and finance, however. In the frontier minority regions, priority was initially given to restoring and expanding ethnic autonomy, giving more power to the ethnic minorities who had faced discrimination, or been subjected to harsh treatment as in the case of Inner Mongolia where a genocidal campaign against alleged Mongol underground nationalists cost tens of thousands of lives.[44] Numerous new laws and regulations have been passed to enhance autonomous rights among the titular minorities.[45] The most significant achievement, despite all its problems, was the Law of Regional Nationality Autonomy of 1984, drafted under the personal supervision of Ulanhu, the paramount Mongol (and nationality) leader in China from 1947 to 1966, and again in the 1980s.

Local autonomy in the realm of culture and politics could not, however, be directly translated into economic advantage. In fact, local autonomy frequently constituted rebellion against central state penetration, aiming particularly to halt the inexorable Chinese migration, which had brought havoc during the Cultural Revolution and throughout the long twentieth century had undermined the position of the nationalities in their homelands. The problem, of course, was that, from an economic development perspective, migration and the provision of state resources were critical to the development of productive power. Since capital inflow was often accompanied by Chinese migration, Mongols faced a problem: to oppose migration risked further impoverishment, falling behind economically during a period of rapid growth. In the event, decision–making power was never exclusively in the hands of Mongols. Indeed, attempts to block or slow, or even sentiments critical of Chinese migration, have always been denounced as manifestations of local nationalism or national splittism, which is susceptible to harsh suppression by the Chinese leadership, which never admits to its own nationalism, not to speak of racism.

As a result of the state's regional development policy that prioritized the coastal regions at the expense of the interior, and frontier ethnic resistance to the Chinese influx, minority regions, and Inner Mongolia in particular, lagged ever further behind, constituting a 'third world' within China. Of course, no one wants to be poor, especially when one's neighbor is gaining power through wealth. This juxtaposition of regional disparity and ethnic disparity characterizes the emerging condition in Inner Mongolia.

In the last decade or so, broadly speaking, there are three ways by which capital has flowed to the frontiers. We have already touched on the first, viz. the state's direct investment in the exploitation of natural resources in the frontier

regions. In this massive flow of capital, minorities benefit little, nor do frontier Chinese much more, the reason being that the central government monopolizes the profits, with no or little share to local government. Moreover, much of the labor came from outside, with few jobs especially for local minorities.[46]

The second is the Tibet and Xinjiang model. As a consequence of ethnic unrest and the specter of Tibetan and Uygur independence, the Chinese government has been transferring vast sums of money and large numbers of Han Chinese to settle and develop the local economy, hoping to achieve the twin aim not only of consolidating the region with Chinese settler population, but also of developing the economy, following the new reasoning in ethnic policy that an economically contented minority would not aspire to secede from China. The model is such that the more politically volatile Tibet and Xinjiang become, the more money is likely to flow from the center.[47] But the sum is small in comparison to the foreign capital the coastal region attracts, and the local minorities do not benefit as much as the old and new settler Chinese population does. This is not to say that foreign capital does not go to the frontiers; it does, but often not in contradiction of the regime's security interest.

Last but not least is the model pertaining to the southwestern minority and other less volatile regions, where, despite or because of continuing poverty, ethnic tourism is a burgeoning business.[48] Ethnic culture, as articulated by the former premier Zhao Ziyang's advisors Wang Xiaoqiang and Bai Nanfeng (1991) in *The Poverty of Plenty*, can be turned into capital. They argue that since the minorities lack technical skills that can be used to extract their region's abundant natural resources, they should get rich by selling their cultural differences through ethnic tourism.

In a fascinating paper on the impact of globalization on poverty-stricken Guizhou province and its large numbers of ethnic minorities, Tim Oakes writes perceptively about the Oedipus desire of the Guizhou provincial leaders for development:

> Faced with the inadequacy of central development funds designed to compensate for the adverse effects of fiscal decentralization on the minority and impoverished counties of China's interior, Guizhou has increasingly advocated the commercialization of the rural sector as the means by which the rural poor may escape poverty. In other words, *the province's answer to its simmering fiscal crisis is to 'sell Guizhou'*.[49]

'The most significant avenue for attracting investment,' Oakes writes, 'is the tourism industry. Touristic marketing of Guizhou as an attractive and exotic place has dominated the province's commercial development strategy, and in this regard, the region's significant population of ethnic minorities has played a crucial role.'[50]

Inner Mongolia is an interesting case, for it has the characteristics of all three models of capital flow. It is a frontier region with extremely rich natural resources, some degree of aspiration for more autonomy, and it is promoting Mongol culture for tourism. Although rich in natural resources, Beijing controls

most of them directly. What is interesting is that under such circumstances, envious of the prosperous coastal region and frustrated by their region's own sluggish development, some Chinese in Inner Mongolia vent their frustration at the Mongols, blaming them for being insufficiently rebellious in contrast to the Tibetans or the Uygurs. Had the Mongols made trouble, they imply, the center would have sent more money, some to the Mongols to appease them, and some to the local Chinese to award their struggle against ethnic secessionism. This case illustrates an interesting but typical mentality of settler colonialists in a poor region, one that simultaneously blames Beijing and the local ethnic population for their poor luck.

Unfortunately for Inner Mongolia, when China envisaged its 'Go West' plan in the late 1990s, Inner Mongolia was not included. To be not included in the bandwagon of development was a serious moral blow. The Oedipus complex of the Inner Mongolian leadership is reflected in an officially sponsored book entitled *Inner Mongolia in the Eyes of Famous People*.[51] In the often overblown, but perhaps also excessively polite, remarks contained in the book, the leadership hopes to encourage people to see the greatness of Inner Mongolia, past, present and future.

The change of leagues to municipalities may thus be seen as a unique product of this complex, which in turn has been generated by China's regional and urban economic development design. Although the change of Juu-uda league to Chifeng municipality in 1983, Jerim league to Tongliao municipality in 1999, Yeke-juu league to Ordos municipality in 2001, and Hulunbuir league to Hulunbuir municipality in 2002 are part of the national trend of municipalization, I argue that the Inner Mongolian cases reflect distinct local ethnopolitics. There appear to be many advantages in abandoning league administration in favor of a municipality. The primary aim of this change is, I argue, to overcome ethnic autonomous barriers, so as to allow for more leeway to pursue predatory economic development without concerns for social and environmental consequences. Ethnic autonomy, when it cannot generate economic prosperity, and when it is understood as a barrier to economic prosperity, has to be discredited. More to the point, since 'prefecture' is not a 'legitimate' administration sanctioned by the Chinese Constitution, changing the Mongol administration of prefectural-level leagues to municipalities became curiously a legal rectification! Below I discuss how ethnicity and capitalism have resulted in the reterritorialization and creation of an interesting post-modern 'entity' – Ordos municipality.

Ordos municipality: a corporate model for urbanizing Inner Mongolia?

I have noted above that Ordos municipality is distinguished from Chifeng and Tongliao in one important point: instead of using Chinese names as in Chifeng and Tongliao, Yeke-juu is replaced by a more authentic Mongol tribal name –

Ordos, rather than Dongsheng, the name of the capital city of the league.[52] In fact, there is nothing in Dongsheng that is less auspicious from a Chinese perspective than Chifeng and Tongliao. Dongsheng is a very old town, and was long an exclusively Chinese town, until the 1950s when it was chosen as the capital of the new Yeke-juu league. Once a small shabby outpost, with jurisdiction over Dongsheng county, the only Chinese county in Yeke-juu, Dongsheng was elevated to the status of a county-level municipality in 1982. In recent years, the city has become known for its improved sanitation, and in the 1990s, it hosted the All-China Small Town City Conference. Dongsheng is now one of the most important clusters in the newly emerging Golden Triangle of Hohhot, Baotou and Dongsheng. It had all the qualifications to be equal to or surpass Tongliao or Chifeng. But it failed.

Robert Young notes that an important feature of colonialism as distinguished from capitalism is that while capitalism may homogenize everything in its wake, colonialism does not. He takes issue with Deleuze and Guattari:

> The problem with the Anti–Oedipus as it stands for any form of historical analysis, apart from its sheer difficulty, is that the processes of decoding, recoding and overcoding imply a form of cultural appropriation that does not do justice to the complexities of the way in which cultures interact, degenerate and develop over time in relation to each other. Decoding and recoding implies too simplistic a grafting of one culture on to another. We need to modify the model to a form of palimpsestual inscription and reinscription, an historical paradigm that will acknowledge the extent to which cultures were not simply destroyed but rather layered on top of each other, giving rise to struggles that themselves only increased the imbrication of each with the other and their translation into increasingly uncertain patchwork identities. In addition, contrary to the implication of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, it was often the case that colonial powers such as Britain did not erase or destroy a culture, but rather attempted to graft on to it a colonial superstructure that would allow the convenience of indirect rule, freezing the original indigenous culture by turning it into an object of academic analysis, while imposing the mould of a new imperial culture.[53]

This theory has to be qualified in China. In different historical periods, different Chinese governments have instituted different policies, ranging from conserving the minority culture to destroying it. As noted above, ethnic tourism has been promoted as a means of developing the local ethnic economy. While this may also be true to some extent in Inner Mongolia, I argue that the adoption of Ordos is the result of a three-way process: Chinese promotion of Chinggis Khan as a *Chinese* national hero; Mongol ethnonationalist promotion of Chinggis Khan as a *Mongolian* hero and Ordos culture as representative Inner Mongolian culture; and Chinese appropriation of Ordos as a cashmere sweater brand, which has become the most famous Inner Mongolian brand name in China.

The territory of Yeke-juu league – surrounded by the Great Wall to the south, and encircled by the Yellow River on the west, north and east – is known as

Ordos internationally as well as within China. Archeologists may be familiar with the so-called Ordos bronze. This is the result of a backward reading of history, using the Ordos Mongol ethnonym to refer to their predecessors. The Ordos Mongols were relatively late-comers to the region. The association of the Ordos with the region was the product of a Mongol attempt to worship and safeguard Chinggis Khan's shrine. Toward this end, the Ordos tribe (formerly known as Ordos tumen – ten thousand households) settled in the region as recently as the sixteenth century. Nonetheless, the recoding has been taken as presuppositional. Thus, when some western scholars discuss the Han–Xiongnu conflict as early as two thousand years earlier, they refer to the territory as Ordos.[54]

The Manchu seemed not entirely sure of how to deal with the identity of the Ordos Mongols. While administered in Yeke-juu league – meaning Big Monastery, deriving from the largest Buddhist temple, Wangiin Juu, in the region – the banners within the league were however named after Ordos: all the banners were divided into two wings of Ordos, eastern and western, and each was called in accordance with its location, for instance, Ordos West Wing Front banner, etc. This is because the Manchus, while promoting Buddhism in order to better control the Mongols, also encouraged the cult of Chinggis Khan, claiming that their emperors were reincarnate successors of Chinggis. And Ordos is the plural form of *Ordon*, or eight special imperial ritual tents (*naiman chagaan ordon*) housing Chinggis Khan's shrine and those of his consorts and many Mongol historical figures.

With the collapse of the Qing, Ordos became a hotbed of contention as the Chinggis Khan shrine was critical to Mongol nationalism. As early as 1910, the Buryat nationalist intellectual Tseveen Zamtsarano, who was actively involved in Outer Mongolia's independence, paid homage to the Chinggis shrine in Ordos, and advised Mongolia's foreign minister to take Chinggis Khan's Black Standard as the national emblem.[55] In the subsequent Mongolian expedition to Inner Mongolia seeking unification in 1913, one column advanced in the direction of Ordos with the aim of taking the shrine. The new international signification of the Chinggis Khan shrine in Ordos apparently alarmed Chinese historians and archeologists, prompting them to investigate the real location of Chinggis' tomb. A series of debates between the renowned Chinese Mongolist Tu Qi and geographer Zhang Xiangwen was published between 1915 and 1917 in China's leading journal of geography, *Dixue Zazhi* (Journal of Geographical Science). Zhang, in a rather orientalist mood, claimed that he had 'discovered' Chinggis' tomb in Ordos during his tour, while Tu Qi, as a historian, insisted that Chinggis' tomb was actually in Outer Mongolia. Although ostensibly academic in nature, given the contemporary context of Mongolian nationalism and the rise of Chinggis Khan as a Mongolian national symbol, their spirited debate certainly helped draw Chinese attention to Chinggis' shrine in Ordos and elevate its profile in Chinese history.[56]

The symbolic importance of Ordos in association with Chinggis Khan was enhanced in the 1930s when the Chinggis Khan shrine became a major point of

contention among the mutually quarrelsome Japanese, Mongols and Chinese. The evacuation of the shrine from Ordos to Gansu in 1939, and the CCP and Guomindang worship of Chinggis, soliciting his martial spirit against the Japanese and their Mongol supporters, brought world focus on this mysterious land. After 1949, the CCP, in a major ploy to win over the Mongolian People's Republic, and of course at the demand of the Ordos Mongols to return their shrine, agreed to the repatriation of the shrine, and built a gigantic dome structure to collect all the Chinggis-related shrines in Ordos in one location for better control. Such promotion of a Chinggis Khan cult in a Communist era that emphasized 'people' rather than 'heroes' in making history was nothing but politically and nationalistically motivated. Perhaps this expedient promotion of a major 'feudal' hero was equally matched by the CCP's creation of a pantheon of 'people's' exemplars or models, such as Lei Feng and the two little sisters of the grassland,[57] and Mao's own personality cult. By contrast, the Soviet Union prohibited all manifestations of a Chinggis Khan cult in the Mongolian People's Republic.

It was, however, not until the post-Mao period, after the thorough destruction of the Chinggis Khan shrine during the Cultural Revolution, that Mongols in the region began to take the initiative to promote a local 'Ordos culture' in relation to Chinggis Khan. The Ordos songs, the Ordos wedding and Ordos women's dress, and others, have become the core of 'Inner Mongolian' culture, due not only to new folkloric aestheticization, but also to the general identification of the Mongols with Chinggis Khan. The conviviality of the Ordos songs, wedding and dresses makes them particularly suitable for representing Inner Mongolia at large. However, as ethnic tourism develops, Mongols are now feminized.[58] When tourists go to the grassland of Inner Mongolia, wherever it may be, they are greeted and entertained by lines of Ordos-dressed young girls, first with the famous Ordos drinking song, *Altan Hundag* (Gold Cup).

This feminized Ordos Mongol culture as representative of Inner Mongolian culture is particularly odd when accompanied by the promotion of the Chinggis Khan cult. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the so-called Chinggis Khan Mausoleum, a historic misnomer,[59] has been promoted not so much as representing a Mongol cultural tradition of ancestral worship, but as representing a Chinese hero, the greatest hero, 'the only Chinese who ever defeated the Europeans.' As such, the mausoleum has been renovated and expanded, now modeled after Sun Zhongshan's Mausoleum in Nanjing, attracting millions of Chinese tourists every year to experience the glory of China's racial victory over the Whites.

But these ethnocultural developments would never make a league into a municipality, for urbanization has to do with industrialization. Until the 1970s, the league had been a rather poor region, with a dual economy of pastoralism and agriculture. In the 1980s, however, the league began to develop three major industries: cashmere sweaters, coalmining and chemicals. They were so successful in the 1990s that they became the three most successful industries in the whole of Inner Mongolia. They were also the three earliest Inner Mongolian industries to be listed on the stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1994.

Between 1995 and 1997 the core companies of the Ordos Group Corporation, Yeke-juu League Chemical Industrial Group Corporation, and the Yeke-juu Coal Group Corporation made up one-third of all the stocks of Inner Mongolian companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, and they raised funds exceeding 2 billion yuan, constituting over 70 percent of all the capital in Inner Mongolia raised in the stock market.[60] Today, these three industrial groups have become cross-regional and transnational companies.

The Ordos Group Corporation is particularly interesting. Established in 1994, its core company, the Ordos cashmere factory, took its name 'Ordos' only in 1992. Its predecessor was Yeke-juu League Cashmere Factory, built in 1980 with Japanese investment and machinery. That the factory decided to take up 'Ordos' as its name in 1992 is not surprising, because by then the name Ordos had become famous through folkloric enhancement. We may also grant the possibility that the company, because of its export orientation, was particularly eager to find an eye-catching brand for its product, as is the business convention in the West. Nothing seemed to be better than the word Ordos. In the mid-1990s, the newly appointed Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia, Liu Mingzu, made it known that promoting top brands was his strategy for developing the Inner Mongolian economy. With this Party encouragement and the company president Wang Linxiang's astute management, the Ordos-brand cashmere sweaters have become a household brand throughout China. Seductive advertisements with a one-line poem – 'Ordos Cashmere Sweater Warms the Entire World' – beam across TV screens in China, and Ordos cashmere sweater billboard posters become major landscapes in many urban centers. The Ordos – or rather its misspelt, though official, rendition 'Erdos' – brand trade-mark was formally recognized as a 'Chinese famous trade-mark' by the state industrial and commercial administration bureau of China on January 5, 1999. The brand value of 'Erdos' topped 3.416 billion yuan in 2000, and it is the most famous brand in China's textile circle and also the most valuable brand in Inner Mongolia.[61]

The spectacular success of Ordos Group Corporation lent tremendous power to the debate about China's regional development strategy. As early as the 1980s, the Yeke-juu League Cashmere Factory, the predecessor of the Ordos Group Corporation, was a major model used by scholars and officials in the interior provinces and autonomous regions against the central government's diffusion model or the so-called 'ladder-step theory,' i.e. China's 'development was to proceed one step at a time from the coastal region to the interior regions.'[62] In the argument of what coalesced as the 'western school,' the ladder-step theory was detrimental to the development of the western region. They challenged the official assumption of the ladder-step theory that the backwardness of the western region was based on considerations of economic efficiency, arguing that the so-called industrial inefficiency of interior regions was 'calculated on the basis of state-fixed prices which depress those of extractive industries.'[63] 'Their favorite example,' writes Yang, 'is the Yi[kezhao] League Woolen Sweater Factory (and the wool) processing industry in general in Inner Mongolia. Imported from abroad in the early 1980s, this factory soon bested its coastal competitors by

becoming the most efficient and profitable enterprise in mainland China's wool processing industry.'[64] It may thus be argued that the factory played an important role in helping shift China's focus from the coastal region to the interior in the early 1990s, scoring tremendous symbolic, political and economic capital for the factory and its successor – Ordos Group Corporation.[65]

Promoting the 'Erdos' brand name thus became its strategy for success, capitalizing on the ethnopolitical significance of this region's tribal name associated with Chinggis Khan. Indeed, this industrially promoted, lyrically aestheticized brand name has accrued and is continuing to accrue tremendous value for the company. Unfortunately, the value-laden 'Erdos' brand has nothing to do with promoting Mongol culture, or helping Mongols.

Far from benefiting the local Mongols who have been encouraged to raise goats, which in turn has led to rapid desertification, the successful Ordos company deserted the local Mongols and cast its eyes elsewhere – on the Mongol herders in Mongolia. Their recent domination of the Mongolian cashmere market has aroused strong Mongolian nationalist feelings.[66]

Indeed, the company's predatory exploitation of cashmere resources has begun to undermine its own success. In a sober study of the cashmere industry in Inner Mongolia, Wang, Qin and Ding write that there have been at least two major wars for cashmere resources in Inner Mongolia: first in 1988 and second in 1993–1995. The first war pushed the raw cashmere price from 70 yuan per kilo to 130 yuan per kilo. And the second war blew the price up to 360 yuan per kilo, and 400–500 yuan per kilo at its peak. This was caused by the rapid increase in the cashmere processing industry dominated by the Ordos cashmere company. Since 1996, there has started another war, this time a war to slash the price of cashmere products. Since 1997, the cashmere sweater price has dropped by 20–30 percent, and some brands by even 50–60 percent. Because of this sluggish market, the raw cashmere price nose-dived to about 100 yuan per kilo in 1998, making herders lose money in raising goats. Apparently the processing capacity of China's cashmere industry has far exceeded both the material supply and the market demand for the finished products. In 1999, 95 percent of the more than 80 medium- and small-size cashmere processors in Linghe city near Baotou stopped production, and the Ordos cashmere group had 1.2 million cashmere sweaters piled in stock, worth 0.7 billion yuan, and the Luwang cashmere group in Baotou had 900,000 in stock, worth 0.5 billion yuan. There were 7 million cashmere sweaters in stock in Inner Mongolia in 1999, more than the entire sales volume in Chinese and international markets in that whole year.[67]

Nonetheless, this exploitation of cashmere resources, both locally and internationally, as well as the crisis it has created, has not stopped the Ordos group from appropriating local history and historical images. Nor does it prevent it from imposing a corporate model on the Yeke-juu league. In a hagiographical book promoting the Ordos Group Corporation and its two companions, the two Chinese authors, Cheng Li and Wang Xun, write as though the Ordos Group Corporation was the real force behind the Ordos renaissance:

Ordos is like a golden steed, soaring up, galloping in the front in the picture of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region's rapidly advancing economy. But the power that energized the internal impulse of this steed is the thickly deposited rich mineral resources under the thin layer of soil, upon which the traditional agricultural tilling production depends, which has nothing to do with traditional agricultural civilization. This is the raw material and spice for the industrial civilization.[68]

The following passage invoking Chinggis Khan is particularly pertinent:

The proud son of heaven Chinggis Khan once fixed his eagle-like eyes on this mysterious land, not only decreeing that he be buried here upon death, but leaving Ordos with the following masterpiece, composed in the 'refined' style which he was not good at:

[It is a place]
For stags to graze
For hoopoes to lay eggs
For a declined state to revive, and
For me to enjoy happiness.

However, he did not live long enough to see the 'revival' of the place in its true meaning; the army was pulled back, and the body died, the disparity between ideal and reality persisted so stubbornly in Ordos, which shaded off in the last moment of his memory.[69]

The arrogance of the above passage is reminiscent of Mao's 1936 poem 'Snow' in which he compared himself to all the ancient emperors, including Chinggis Khan, and was convinced that only he could make a greater hero:

This land so rich in beauty
Has made countless heroes bow in homage.
But alas! Qin Shihuang and Han Wudi
Were lacking in literary grace,
And Tang Taizong and Song Taizu
Had little poetry in their souls;
That proud son of Heaven,
Genghis Khan,
Knew only shooting eagles, bow outstretched.
All are past and gone!
For truly great men
Look to this age alone. (emphasis added)

And the truly great men, according to the pens of Cheng Li and Wang Xun, are Wang Linxiang, president of the Ordos Group Corporation, Li Wu, president of the Yeke-juu League Chemical Industry Group, and Zhang Shuangwang, president of the Yeke-juu League Coal Group. It is they who, according to them, have made Ordos a household name in China, and it is they who have made Ordos great beyond the expectation of Chinggis Khan. They deliberately mystify:

Someone made a joke: ten years ago, many outsiders did not know where Yeke-juu league is located. Spreading out a map of China, they looked for it carefully everywhere under a magnifier for a whole day, without any luck. They then burst into anger: why do you fool me with a false place name?'[70]

Ten years later, in contrast, 'The line of advertisement "The Ordos cashmere sweater warms the whole world" is known to everybody. In fact, many people remember Ordos only after first knowing this product of cashmere sweater. Only when they remember the name of this plateau do they start to follow with great interest the take off of Yeke-juu league.'[71]

With these bloated claims, it becomes natural that they should be the masters of this Ordosland which they claim to have made prosperous and famous. If the league assisted them to be successful, now the league must be transformed to fit the image they have built. The time is now ripe for a fundamental transformation or reterritorialization: the land they live in and the site of the profits it produces must now be made a municipality and called Ordos. Since the momentum has been built, the 'propensity' does not have to be enforced. A Chinggis-laden, postmodernist, globe-trotting and yet exotic, as well as perhaps a 'legal' Ordos municipality came naturally to replace feudal, backward and Mongol-flavored Yeke-juu league. And Yeke-juu, which means Great Monastery, with its celibate overtone is particularly inappropriate in this new age when libido drives humans towards lustful utopia.

Concluding remarks: urbanization and the future of Inner Mongolian 'autonomy'

It is too early to tell how and if Deleuze and Guattari's 'nomadism' or David Harvey's 'spaces of hope' as anti–capitalist resistance force[72] will strike back to challenge this reterritorialization of Inner Mongolia through urbanization, for indeed it is ironic that the history of modernity has been a process of settling down and urbanizing for the nomadic Mongols. Nor should we expect that the three industrial conglomerates will make Ordos, or, for that matter, the entire Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, any more prosperous. For after all, their industry lies in extracting the natural resources, and the resources come right from the land Mongol pastoralists live on. As the Chinese state discovers more natural resources, Mongols as well as disadvantaged Chinese have been thrown off their land. This process started long ago, and there is no sign of a stop even as people celebrate the birth of Ordos municipality adorned with ancient heroic images and modern high-tech wonders. The Ordosland and Inner Mongolia at large is a land of growing desertification, ever more Mongol pastures being swallowed up by rolling sand or being expropriated in various forms by both insiders and outsiders for industrial and agricultural purposes. Lester Brown, in a recent piece on the sandstorms emanating from north China, blamed both over-grazing and over-cultivation for causing the sandstorms. But the following passage indicates a unique process of Mongols losing their pasture to cropland at an astonishing speed:

In addition to local pressures on resources, a decision in Beijing in 1994 to require that all cropland used for construction be offset by land reclaimed elsewhere has helped create the ecological disaster that is now unfolding. In an article in *Land Use Policy*, Chinese geographers Hong Yang and Xiubein [*sic*] Li describe the environmental effects of this offset policy. The fast-growing coastal provinces, such as Guangdong, Shandong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu, which are losing cropland to urban expansion and industrial construction, are paying other provinces to plow new land to offset their losses. This provided an initial economic windfall for provinces in the northwest, *such as Inner Mongolia (which led the way with a 22-percent cropland expansion)*, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.[73] (emphasis added)

If Inner Mongolia suffers at the hands of the more industrialized coastal provinces, can the industrialization of Inner Mongolia do anything good for its own disadvantaged ethnicized, though titular, others? This question immediately points to the issue of ethnicity and, more importantly, the impact of municipalization on the question of 'autonomy.' I mean the impact on the remaining token degree of autonomy. What is the constitutional basis for such a change? And how does the non-existence of 'prefecture' in the Chinese Constitution figure in the debate and decision to abolish the Mongolian league system? These questions hinge on the assumption of the existence of a respectful constitution, which would provide at least a rule of thumb of how to behave.

In a recent policy recommendation, Luo Shujie and Xu Jieshun, two Chinese ethnologists from the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, allege that the autonomy law passed in 1984 has never been taken seriously as legally binding and thus it must be scrapped and a new law passed to reflect the new reality.[74] While there are good suggestions such as establishing authorities to interpret the law and a court to implement the law, there is one item that looks especially glaring in this context. They suggest that 'Autonomous Region' be changed to 'Autonomous Province,' so that people would not take autonomous regions (*qu*) for county-level regions (*qu*).[75] The authors' opinion may be right in their narrow sense, but they reflect the continuing impulses of Confucian 'rectification of names,' as they explicitly write: 'Therefore, changing "autonomous region" to "autonomous province" can serve the function of rectifying names, favorable not only to the consolidation of the status of the provincial-level autonomous areas, but also to the provincial-level autonomous areas' participation in international exchanges.'[76] Autonomy looks odd, and they must be made to conform to 'normalcy,' and the wider pattern. And this normalcy-seeking passion is precisely the source of power that eliminates any historically embedded 'differences,' the *raison d'être* for nationality autonomy.

Cities or municipalities are not autonomous areas, as they are not stipulated as autonomous in China's Law of Nationality Regional Autonomy. Autonomous areas include only 'autonomous region,' 'autonomous prefecture' and 'autonomous county.' In Inner Mongolia, leagues are not 'autonomous' constitutionally, but customarily. Now with more than half of the prefecture-level

administrative units having already become municipalities, and with other county-level municipalities, perhaps more than 70 percent of the population are already 'urbanites.' And given China's ambitious plan which sets urbanization as its form of modernity, and its form of urbanization by changing the name of counties and prefectures to municipalities, we may safely predict that the rest of the Inner Mongolian leagues are doomed to become municipalities. And prefectural municipalities are 'autonomous' of provinces or autonomous regions in terms of personnel appointment and other matters.

In a paper on the direction and characteristics of urbanization in Inner Mongolia, Shi Xiangshi writes that urbanization has three functions: (1) it is an effective means to accelerate the economic development of Inner Mongolia; (2) it will lead to improvement of the economic structures, not only creating more jobs but attracting more capital and skills; and (3) it will elevate people's education and scientific levels, and improve their 'quality.'[77] He writes that with industrialization of the countryside, the urban-rural structure has been altered, breaking down the isolation of cities, enabling cities to absorb large numbers of surplus rural laborers. But in Inner Mongolia, the government's fiscal power is limited, so there is little government money to be used for promoting urbanization. Instead, he argues that combining the market forces and the administrative power of the government in promoting urbanization is a unique Inner Mongolian characteristic of urbanization. He mentions that the change of Jerim league to Tongliao municipality and the change of the suburbs to towns in Hohhot are two examples of using government's 'external power' (*waibu liliang*) to create conditions for urbanization.[78]

In other words, the change of leagues to municipalities does not mean that these leagues have already been urbanized because of rural industrialization or urbanization of the countryside, as is happening in many parts of China (cf. Naughton 1995: 81–86); rather it is an intention or a 'desire' for urbanization! It is a desire for more jobs, more capital inflow, and of course more prosperity. And the old system, including the nationality form and content of autonomy, is considered a hindrance, something that must be eliminated using the government's 'external power.' After all, *shi* or municipality is to be hailed to exorcise the haunted failure of modernization in minority regions. Municipalization is therefore more of a narration of future than of past and present. Thus it is not quite a celebration of achievement, but a yearning for a utopian moment with an enthusiasm quite comparable to building 'People's Communes' (*renmin gongshe*) with drums beating, flags waving and people parading in the late 1950s to early 1960s. And don't we see provinces after provinces, autonomous regions after autonomous regions, declaring either that they have completely municipalized, thus modernized, or pointing to the imminent horizon?

The change of Yeke-juu league to Ordos municipality might be both to consolidate the gains of industrial development and to pave the way to facilitate further economic growth – failure to do so would suffocate the budding economy – hence the necessity to rectify the name 'in accordance with the truth of things.'[79] If that 'truth of things' in Confucian parlance is reincarnated as

'*kaifa*' (open up and develop) and remains so for a long time, and if Inner Mongolian autonomy is considered a hindrance to that truth of things, what could prevent the rectification of its name, so as to ensure that 'affairs' be carried on to success? The 'feminine' Huaiyin municipality has just changed to the 'masculine' Huai'an municipality, as noted.

The above conclusion sounds a bit alarmist, but not quite so if understood in a Chinese political culture perspective. In China, an important concept in comprehending historical transformation is *shi*, or tendency, propensity, which is embedded in the eternal concern with 'change.' 'Historical tendency,' writes François Jullien, 'bestows a necessary direction and a logical end upon all evolution. And this direction, this result, always stems anew from the play of factors making up the relations of force at a given moment.'[80] Individuals are deemed powerless to change the tendency, but they must 'appraise the moment in such a way as to detect its tendency and, consequently, seek to conform with its coherence,' according to the medieval Chinese philosopher Wang Fuzhi.[81] In this thought, people are denied subjectivity, and so are institutions, as Wang Fuzhi writes, 'the state of things evolves in accordance with the tendency, and institutions must be adapted accordingly.'[82]

In our context, urbanization is perhaps accepted as an 'irreversible' historical tendency, but the question remains whether institutions must be adapted accordingly or must work to harness urbanization to ends that would not only benefit all citizens but also respect the history of the land. To what extent is the relative lack of Mongol resistance the result of the state's high-handed policy, or the result of their acceptance of urbanization as an unstoppable historical tendency? Or have they been induced, as Pierre Bourdieu puts it, 'to collaborate in the destruction of their instruments of expression.'[83] The future of Inner Mongolia, whether or not it will remain a Mongol autonomous region, if only in name, will be largely determined by the answers to the above questions.

There are already ominous signs. Although the name Ordos is famous and the Chinese characters used convey some kind of aesthetic feeling, especially in Chinese calligraphy, we cannot predict that it will not be twisted for some purposes, such as abridging to keep only the first character, thus calling it Eshi, as in the case of Hushi for Hohhot. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the English rendering of Ordos was a mumbo jumbo Ertos, a Chinese imagination of how Mongols would pronounce E'erduosi in Mongolian without consulting Mongol intellectuals, who number not a few in Dongsheng. In the late 1990s, the spelling was improved, though still incorrect, and it became Erdos, which is proudly mounted on its sweaters as a logo, with E written in a curly form to denote cashmere hair. Remarkably, the Mongolian script spelling never appears.

What is more, Erdos and 鄂尔多斯 are private properties of the Erdos Group Corporation. As Wolfgang Fritz Haug writes perceptively on the privatization of brand names:

> Spending out 'many millions' of Deutchmarks on a brand-name campaign,
> which entails appropriating and privatizing a word in common usage and

consciousness and making it into a name exclusive to one's own commodity, is seen by the capitalists as a normal purchase, and what has thus been 'earned' is regarded self-evidently as a piece of private property. The words turned into brand-names by the campaign now become a part of the company's capital assets. (1986: 28–29)

Similarly, it would not be inconceivable that Erdos or 鄂尔多斯 would never be used by any other party or individual for commercial purposes.

But the issue is perhaps more subtle here. It would not be far-fetched to speculate on two related questions. First, would the name Ordos in its various linguistic forms be denied to the Mongols themselves? As countless legal cases of cultural appropriation by Euro-Americans of indigenous names, stories, and other cultural forms and substances show, this is a possibility.[84] The second question is concerned with the extension of Ordos to represent the whole of Inner Mongolia. Since more people know the brand name Ordos, and are attracted to it aesthetically and practically, what would prevent people from imagining Inner Mongolia as Ordos or rather Erdos? It does have a precedent. Tongliao municipality, for instance, substituted Jerim league, which is also known as Horchinland. The more generic and wider subethnic and territorial concept Horchin, however, has replaced a small city, Tongliao, the capital of Jerim league until 1999, so the city of Tongliao is now renamed Horchin Town! Just what does this swap of part for the whole entail for the future political legitimacy of Inner Mongolia as an autonomous region?

The story of the demise of Yeke-juu league and the birth of Ordos municipality is one example of alter/native modernity. While it shares certain characteristics of the national pattern, it is also unique in its entanglement of capitalism, colonialism and ethnicity. It is a story of settler-colonial corporate branding of a native region, distilling Ordos from its folkloric tradition to point to a lustful and exotic future. But such branding with a native symbol and name can only be understood in its most banal meaning as given by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2000): branding simultaneously connotes the corporate labeling of a thing and the permanent, physical, even violent transformation and commodification of both things and living beings.[85]

Notes

1   I would like to thank Mark Selden, Peng Wenbin, Li Narangoa, Pan Jiao and Wurlig Bao for their comments on an earlier version of this article.

2   Arif Dirlik and Zhang Xudong (eds), 'Introduction to *Postmodernism and China*,' special issue of *boundary 2*, 24, no. 3, 1997, p. 6.

3   Wolfgang Fritz Haug, *Critique of Commodity Aesthetics: Appearance, Sexuality and Advertising in Capitalist Society* (trans. Robert Bock), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

4   China has a long tradition of studying frontier geography and administration. In recent decades numerous publications have appeared in China, which usually extol the positive function of Chinese administrative incorporation for bringing out Chinese 'unity,' while mildly attack Chinese chauvinistic attitude in such practices.

5 Xingsheng is a short form of *Xing Zhongshu Sheng*, sometimes translated as regional secretariat. Cf. Elizabeth Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty*, Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, Harvard-Yenching Institute, distributed by Harvard University Press, 1989.
6 Cf. Endicott-West 1989. See Zhi'an Li, 'Yuandai xingshengzhi de tedian yu lishi zuoyong,' *Lishi Yanjiu*, no. 5, 1997, pp. 82–99.
7 Gao Shirong, *Xibei Tusi Zhidu Yanjiu* (Studies on the Northwestern Tusi System), Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1999; Bai Yaotian, 'Tusi zhidu queli yu Yuandai shuo,' *Guangxi Minzu Yanjiu*, no. 4, 1999, pp. 97–102.
8 In an important study propounding the establishment of the *tusi* (native administration) system during the Yuan, Bai Yaotian (1999) argues that the *tusi* system instituted by the Mongols differs fundamentally from the earlier Chinese system of treating non-Chinese people, i.e. the *jimi* or 'loose rein' system. The essence of the *jimi* system lies in treating the non-Chinese as animals, as is explained in Sima Qian's *Shi Ji* (The Records of the Grand Historian of China): '*Ji* is to bridle horse, while *mi* is to yoke an ox. To speak of controlling four kinds of barbarians is like bridling and yoking horses and oxen' (quoted in Bai 1999, p. 98). These words effectively describe the Chinese administrative praxis regarding non-Chinese peoples over the subsequent millennia until the Sung dynasty. The Mongols, on the other hand, according to Bai, treated them as '*wumin*,' meaning 'our people' (ibid., p. 98).
9 Mongols at the time were under the jurisdiction of Lingbei xing zhongshu sheng (xingsheng), although this province or regional secretariat was somewhat different from the Chinese xingsheng, subjected to looser form of administrative control from the Great Khan (cf. Endicott-West 1989, pp. 12–13).
10 Hasar was Chinggis Khan's brother. Most of the Horchin Mongols in eastern Inner Mongolia claim descent from him. During the Qing dynasty, Horchin nobles, thanks to their marital relations with the Qing royal family, enjoyed more privileges than Chinggisid nobles.
11 John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
12 The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was not a provincial-level administrative unit after all, rather a supra-provincial administration equivalent to the six other administrative regions of China, such as North China Administrative Region (*huabei xingzheng qu*), Northeast China Administrative Region (*dongbei xingzheng qu*), etc. It was only in 1954 when province was made the highest local administration that the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was downgraded to the provincial level, albeit without changing 'region' to 'province.' The downgrading cost the Mongols a great degree of autonomy, as the ministries (*bu*) had also to be changed to 'departments' (*ting, ju*).
   In the 1950s, there was confusion over the term '*zizhi qu*,' autonomous regions. Between 1949 and 1954, Yeke-juu league and Ulanchab league were named Yikezhao Zizhi Qu and Wulanchabu Zizhi Qu under Suiyuan province. They were prefectural-level autonomous regions. In Kueisui city (Hohhot), the local Muslims were organized under a Huizu Zizhi Qu (Hui Nationality Autonomous Region), which was no more than a borough. For an analysis of the situation on the southwestern frontiers, see George Moseley, *The Consolidation of the South China Frontier*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
13 François Thierry, 'Empire and minority in China,' in Gérard Chaliand (ed.), *Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States*, London: Pluto Press, 1989, p. 78.
14 Demchugdongrub, *Demuchukedonlupu Zishu*, vol. 13 of *Nei Menggu Wenshi Ziliao*, Huhehaote: Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Neimenggu Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui Wenshi Ziliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui, 1984, pp. 40–41.
15 This story remains a popular political joke that Mongols constantly make against the Chinese Communist-nationalist-cum-Confucian discrimination against Mongols.
16 The Manchu urban tradition is probably unique. In many parts of the Qing empire,

they built garrison towns or so-called 'Manchu cities' or 'new cities' (cf. Piper Rae Gaubatz, *Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996; Mark Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 89–132). James Millward notes that nineteenth- to twentieth-century Chinese historians often consciously or unconsciously referred to the Manchu cities in Xinjiang as 'Chinese cities' (Hancheng): 'The distinction between "Mancheng," or "Xincheng," on the one hand, and "Hancheng," on the other,' he argues, 'is not a trivial or pedantic one. Though these nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians may not even have been aware of the terminological shift they were executing, in doing so they have contributed to the historiographical erasure of the Manchu role in the creation of the empire and the conflation of "Qing" and "China" by turning Qing cities in Xinjiang into Chinese ones retroactively' (cf. James Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 150).

17   'Zhengwu Yuan Guanyu Chuli Daiyou Qishi huo Wuru Shashu Minzu Xingzhi de Chengwei, Diming, Beijie, Bianlian de Zhishi (1951 nian 5 yue 16 ri),' in *Minzu gongzuo shiyong fagui shouce*, Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 1958, pp. 187–189.

18   Patricia Ebrey, 'Surnames and Han Chinese identity,' p. 23, in Malissa J. Brown (ed.), *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan*, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996, pp. 11–36.

19   Ibid., p. 24.

20   Ibid.

21   Ibid.

22   See *Crackdown in Inner Mongolia*. An Asia Watch Report. United States: Human Rights Watch, 1991. Also, William R. Jankowiak, 'The last hurrah? Political protest in Inner Mongolia,' *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, nos. 19/20, 1988.

23   Zhu Guangkai and Zhao Shuanglian, 'Xushi erfa, zaichuang jiaji,' *Renmin Ribao*, October 6, 1999, p. 4.

24   'Nei Menggu Zhelimu Meng (xian gaiwei Tongliao shi) san da minzu yuanxiao xuesheng qingyuanshu (zhi er) 1999 nian 11 yue 30 ri' (Petition from the students of three nationality colleges in Jerim league (now changed to Tongliao municipality), Inner Mongolia (Part 2), November 30, 1999), posted on http://southernmongolia.hypermart. net/forum/ July 21, 2001.

25   Cf. Gaubatz 1996.

26   Mao's ambivalence to cities may have stemmed from Chinese nationalist and intel- lectual romanticization of peasantry and the rural. Li Dazhao, once Mao's tutor, for instance, wrote in 1919, comparing city life to the life of 'ghosts' and country life to that of the 'people': 'My young friends drifting about in the cities! You should know that the cities are full of crime, and that great contentment is to be found in the villages; that life in the city is more or less the life of a ghost, but that the work going on in the villages is the work of people; that the air in the city is foul and the air in the villages is pure. Why don't you just pack up your things, settle your travel expenses and go back to your home towns?' (quoted in Fitzgerald 1996, p. 136).

27   Almaz Khan, 'Who are the Mongols? State, ethnicity, and the politics of represen- tation in the PRC,' in Malissa J. Brown (ed.), *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan*, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996, pp. 125–159.

28   Fei Xiaotong, 'Baotou Pian' (An article on Baotou), in *Fei Xiaotong lun Xibu Kaifa yu quyu jingji*, Beijing: Qunyan Chubanshe, 2000 (1985), pp. 111–127.

29   Barry Naughton, 'The Third Front: defense industrialization in the Chinese interior,' *China Quarterly*, no. 115, 1988, pp. 351–386; Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.139–194; Zeqi Qiu, *Bianqu Qiye de Fazhan Licheng* (The Development Process of Enterprises in the Frontier Regions), Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1996.

30   David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, p. 238.

31   Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen Lane), New York: Viking, 1977, pp. 34–35.

32   Harvey 1989.

33   Cf. Dali L. Yang, 'Reforms, resources, and regional cleavages: the political economy of coast–interior relations in mainland China,' in Bih-jaw Lin and James T. Myers (eds), *Forces for Change in Contemporary China*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993, pp. 285–306.

34   Cf. Hans Hendrischke and Feng Chongyi (eds), *The Political Economy of China's Provinces: Comparative and Competitive Advantage*, London and New York: Routledge, 1999.

35   Tad Ballew, 'Xiaxiang for the '90s: The Shanghai TV rural channel and post-Mao urbanity amid global swirl,' p. 266, in Nancy N. Chen *et al.* (eds), *China Urban: Ethnographies of Contemporary Culture*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001, pp. 242–273.

36   Barry Naughton, 'Cities in the Chinese economic system: changing roles and conditions for autonomy,' in Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds), *Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao China*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995, pp. 61–89.

37   Naughton 1995, p. 88.

38   *Xinhua News*, December 5, 1998.

39   http://www.greattide.org.cn/one/shengzou01.htm

40   http://www.shandong-press.com/458htm/1b3.htm

41   Cheng Yan and Shi Aichun, 'Jiangsu sheng bufen shixian xingzheng quhua jinxing zhongda tiaozheng,' *Yangzi Wanbao*, February 7, 2001.

42   Xiao Jincheng, 'Fahui chengshi zai Xibu Da Kaifa zhong de daidong zuoyong' (Bring into play the exemplary function of cities in developing the Western Region), Lianhe Luntan (Union Forum) of China Economic Information Network, April 4, 2001. http://unionforum.cei.gov.cn/

43   See the full text, 'Shiwu Chengzhenhua Fazhan Zhongdian Zhuanxiang Guihua' (The key plan for urbanization during the tenth Five Year Plan period) at http://www.people.com.cn August 8, 2001.

44   Cf. Tumen and Zhu Dongli, *Kangsheng yu Neirendang Yuanan* (Kang Sheng and the Unjust Case of the Inner Mongolia People's Revolutionary Party), Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1995.

45   Cf. Katherine Palmer Kaup, *Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

46   The newly revised Law of Nationality Regional Autonomy (passed on February 28, 2001) aims to provide a legal framework to facilitate resource extraction and major infrastructure construction, which are now the main priorities for minority nationality areas. The revised law stipulates that the state will 'adopt measures' to give a 'certain level' of 'compensation' to minority nationality areas that supply natural resources (Article 65). Although not clear whether the 'certain level of compensation' is sufficient to benefit the local population, or indeed which local population, it nevertheless is a positive departure from the Chinese Constitution, which states: 'In exploiting natural resources [which according to Article 9 are owned by the state] and building enterprises in the national autonomous areas the state shall give due consideration to the interests of those areas' (Article 118).

47   For this kind of development, see Wang Lixiong's recent book *Tianzang: Xizang de Mingyun* (Sky Burial: The Fate of Tibet), Xianggang: Ming Jing, 1998. He however argues that because of the high altitude of Tibet, Chinese from the lowland will never be able to settle in Tibet permanently.

48   Cf. Louisa Schein, *Minority Rules: The Miao and the Feminine in China's Cultural Politics*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000.

49   Tim Oakes, 'Bathing in the far village: globalization, transnational capital, and the cultural politics of modernity in China,' *Positions*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1999, pp. 307–342, p. 319 (emphasis added). See also Oakes, 'Selling Guizhou: cultural development in an era of marketization,' in Hendrischke and Feng Chongyi 1999, pp. 31–72.
50   Oakes, 'Bathing in the far village,' 1999, p. 320.
51   Nei Menggu Zhengxie Biancuan Weiyuanhui, *Mingren Yan zhong de Nei Menggu*, Huhehaote: Nei Menggu Chubanshe, 1999.
52   Dongsheng city is now called Dongsheng Qu (borough). Interestingly, Tongliao city, the capital of Jerim league, is now called Ke'erqing Qu (Horchin borough), Horchin being the subethnonym of a Mongolian group, the most populous Mongol group in Inner Mongolia. This is perhaps a tradeoff between Mongols and Chinese. Chifeng city is still called Chifeng with three boroughs: Hongshan, Songshan and Yuanbaoshan.
53   Robert J.C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 173–174.
54   Cf. Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
55   Cf. Uradyn E. Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
56   For a collection of these texts, see Liu Yizheng, Shariledai and Ce. Alatengsongbuer (eds), *Chengjisi Han Ling Yanjiu Wenji (1912–1949)*, Dongsheng: Ykezhao Meng Chingjisi Han Yanjiusuo, 1988.
57   Uradyn E. Bulag, 'Models and moralities: the parable of the two little sisters from the Mongolian grassland,' *The China Journal*, no. 42, July, 1999.
58   For my critique of the thesis of feminization in Inner Mongolia, see chapter 3, 'Naturalizing national unity: political romance and the Chinese nation,' in Uradyn E. Bulag, *The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity*, Lanhem: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
59   Since Chinggis Khan's corpse is not in Ordos, it is a mistake to call the shrine in Ordos Chinggis Khan Mausoleum. This mistake was initiated by Ulanhu who in 1956 wrote the inscription '*Chengjisi Han Ling*' in Chinese, which is translated as *Chinggis Khanii Ongon* in Mongolian (Chinggis Khan tomb). The traditional Mongol name is *Naiman Chagaan Ordon* (Eight White Palaces).
60   Cheng Li and Wang Xun, *Zhongxibu de Shuguang: E'erduosi Xianxiang Touxi* (The Dawn of the Central and Western Regions: An In-depth Analysis of the Ordos Phenomenon), Huhehaote: Nei Menggu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1998, p. 173.
61   See the Corporation's website: http://www.chinaerdos.com/english/news/index.html
62   Yang 1993, p. 301.
63   Ibid., p. 303.
64   Ibid.
65   See also Cheng and Wang 1998, pp. 242–244.
66   Morris Rossabi, 'A new Mongolia in a new world,' pp. 72–74, *Proceedings of the Conference 'Mongolian Political and Economic Development During the Past Ten Years and Future Prospect*,' Taipei: Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 2000, pp. 42–85.
67   Wang Yan, Qin Zhihong and Ding Weidong, 'Nei Menggu yangrong chanye kaifa yanjiu' (A study on the development of the cashmere industry in Inner Mongolia), *Nei Menggu Daxue Xuebao*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2001, pp. 14–24, p. 16.
68   Cheng and Wang 1998, p. 210.
69   Ibid., p. 211.
70   Ibid, p. 156.
71   Ibid., p. 219.
72   David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000.
73   Lester R. Brown, 'Dust bowl threatening China's future,' Earth Policy Institute, May 23, 2001. http://www.earthpolicy.org/Alerts/Alert13.htm

74   Luo Shujie and Xu Jieshun, 'Shiji zhi jiao Zhongguo minzu zhengce tiaozheng de sikao' (Some ideas about adjusting China's policy towards nationalities at the turn of the century), *Guangxi Minzu Xueyuan Xuebao*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1999, pp. 2–12.
75   Ibid., p. 10.
76   Ibid.
77   Shi Xiangshi, 'Nei Menggu chengshihua de fazhan qushi he tedian,' *Nei Menggu Shehui Kexue*, vol. 118, no. 6, 1999, pp. 108–112, pp. 108–109.
78   Ibid., p. 112.
79   Cf. James R. Ware (trans.), *The Sayings of Confucius*, Taipei: Wenchi Ch'upanshe, 1980.
80   François Jullien, *The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China* (trans. Janet Lloyd), New York: Zone Books, 1995, pp. 208–209.
81   Quoted in Jullien, 1995, p. 209.
82   Quoted in ibid., p. 186.
83   Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 7.
84   Cf. Bruce Ziff and Pratima V. Rao (eds), *Borrowed Power: Essay on Cultural Appropriation*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997.
85   Cf. Miriam Greenberg, 'Branding cities: a social history of the urban lifestyle magazine,' *Urban Affairs Review*, vol. 36, no. 2, 2000, pp. 228–263, p. 229.

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