More than one hundred years have passed since the death of George Canning and the destruction, in time of peace, of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets in the Bay of Navarin. That 'untoward event' was a landmark in the creation of modern Greece from small and precarious beginnings, and the five years which elapsed before a King was found and a boundary fixed for the new State have often been treated as a mere postscript to the story of the revolt. Such a treatment has a certain justification in the history of Greece. But Navarin was a landmark also in the decline of Turkey during the nineteenth century, and may be taken as the beginning of a different chapter.

From another point of view, the years 1828 to 1833 were a turning-point in the relations of England and Russia, and cannot be ignored if we are to understand the development of a temper which ultimately led to the Crimean War, persisted through the crisis of 1878 and came to the surface at frequent intervals until circumstances brought about a short-lived alliance from 1907 to 1917. It may safely be said that Englishmen, for two or three generations, were pro-Turkish because anti-Russian, and for no other reason. The 'conversion' of British diplomats and statesmen was almost completed between the Battle of Navarin in 1827 and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833. In the official world, a definite change can be traced during those five or six years in the views of Stratford Canning, Aberdeen and Palmerston, and in others a hardening of views already held. The 'conversion' of the British public followed; it was attempted, with only moderate success, during the thirties, and was achieved much more completely during the fifties, of the last century. Among those who influenced opinion by books and articles, it is enough to mention the names of David Urquhart and John McNeill.

This episode in the story of British policy in the Near East has . . .