

## *Preface*

FROM AL-QA'IDA'S 9/11 TERROR ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES to the ISIS "caliphate" and its reign of violence in the Middle East, Europe, and beyond, global jihad has captured headlines, impelled vast national policies, and seized the imagination of people around the world in recent years. This book is an interpretive study of the global jihad phenomenon, designed to assemble in a short, accessible volume an understanding of the global jihad movement in recent decades. To produce this history, I have drawn from both primary documents in their original Arabic and the best secondary works of scholarship on this phenomenon. I make two broad and novel arguments. First, and most important, I construct a typology that suggests global jihad is best understood as four quite distinct iterations, or waves, each stemming from a unique set of crises and each having significantly different ideological answers detailing the way ahead. The four chapters describe and analyze every wave in turn, from the 1980s to the present.

In the conclusion, I offer a second broad argument that situates global jihad among the universe of violent political movements of the past century. I argue that global jihad is not *sui generis*, or unique unto itself. Rather, and no doubt provocatively, I argue that global jihad can be more usefully understood as a variant form of a "movement of rage," as opposed to more typical revolutionary or anticolonial movements. While relatively rare, movements of rage across different cultures and continents share distinctive sociological and ideological features. Seeing global jihad in this light rebuts both those

who argue for its historical uniqueness (or even the exceptionalism of Islamist movements writ large) and those who argue that global jihad is just another form of revolutionary movement. Revolutionary movements—be they of the Left (e.g., Marxist), the Right (e.g., Fascist), or the broad Center (e.g., National Liberation)—are all based on Enlightenment ideals that their struggle will produce human progress, a better society that is more equal, freer, or more advanced. As with other movements of rage, the ideologues of global jihad do not make an Enlightenment case for their cause, as I show in my discussions of the four waves. Rather, global jihad is profoundly nihilistic (in the political, not philosophical, sense of the word) and apocalyptic in its ideology and behavior.

This book was written while I was on an abbreviated sabbatical at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand, and at the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore during the first five months of 2019. Both institutions proved to be wonderful hosts, and I would specifically like to thank Richard Jackson at Otago and Teo Michelle Agnes, Bilahari Kausikan, and Helen Lee at NUS for making those wonderful (if too short!) stays possible. The faculty and graduate students at both institutions proved to be terrific sounding boards for some of my ideas, and I hope I proved equally helpful in their research.

I offer my profound and humble gratitude to the many scholars who read through an earlier version of this manuscript and offered invaluable feedback: Martin van Bruinessen, F. Gregory Gause III, Mohammed M. Hafez, Thomas Hegghammer, Richard Jackson, Mehran Kamrava, Marc Lynch, William E. Shepard, Robert Springborg, David Waldner, Craig A. Whiteside, and the anonymous reviewers at Stanford University Press. Their inputs have made this book that much better, and none should be blamed for any mistakes or interpretations I have made. While all thought my typology of the four iterations of global jihad was an insightful addition to the literature, it is fair to say there was a decidedly split verdict on my argument about global jihad as a variant form of a movement of rage. I hope my more robust discussion, in response to some of their skepticism, will win over the remaining doubters, but I will leave it to the readers of this book to judge the final outcome.


A special debt of gratitude goes to Elizabeth K. Robinson, my copy editor of long standing, as well as my soul mate. She read through the whole manuscript twice, making the writing that much clearer and more accessible. She

also painstakingly constructed the bibliography while I made final edits to the manuscript.

I have utilized a common form of transliteration from the Arabic, which is a simplified version of the professional standard recommended by the Middle East Studies Association in its *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (IJMES). Most ‘ayns and hamzas (glottal stops) are represented with an apostrophe (’), and both long vowels and short vowels are kept to a simple *a*, *i*, or *u*. The exception is Arabic (or Farsi) words that have already made their way into the English language, in which case I adopt the common spelling. Hence, Usama Bin Laden, rather than ‘Usama bin Ladin, Khomeini not Khomayni, and Musab instead of Mus’ab. I have also adopted a common use rendering of the word “Shia” as both singular and plural noun as well as adjective to avoid switching between Shi’i, Shi’a, and Shi’i, respectively. Unless otherwise noted, I have done the translations myself. The one big exception to this rule is that in chapter 4, I have used Brynjar Lia’s excellent translation of the key parts of Abu Musab al-Suri’s book *Call for Global Islamic Resistance*. Although I have smoothed out the language in a few places, Lia did such a good job that I saw little reason to change it.

Last, but not least, I have dedicated this book to my daughters, Julia, Emily, and Abigail. In the more machismo strains of Arab popular culture, one man questions another’s manliness by hurling the epithet *abu’l-binat!*—“father of girls!” Given how proud I am of my daughters and all that they have achieved, I will gladly wear the term with honor.

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