

Intelligence Information Report



[Redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

REPORT NO. [Redacted]

DATE DISTR. 14 MAR 1984

TRANSMITTAL OF PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE REPORT

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE -
HISTORICAL
COLLECTION
DIVISION DATE:
06-18-2012


1. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the source the attached Intelligence Information Report [Redacted] is being distributed only to the addressees listed below. The addressees are requested to limit circulation of this report to those officers who have a clearly evident need to know.
2. Further use of this intelligence information must not violate the controls which have been placed on it. [Redacted]
3. Addressees are asked to consult the Reports Clearance Office of the Directorate of Operations [Redacted] whenever use beyond that authorized by the dissemination controls is contemplated.

Distribution: The Director of Intelligence and Research
 Department of State
 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
 Director, National Security Agency
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
 Department of the Army
 Director of Naval Intelligence
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
 United States Air Force
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
 Deputy Director of Intelligence
 National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces
 Director, Office of European Analysis
 Director, Office of Soviet Analysis,
 Theater Forces Division
 Director, Office of Scientific and Weapons Research

~~SECRET~~



Intelligence Information Report



THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES



REPORT CLASS

~~SECRET~~



COUNTRY

Poland/USSR

SUBJECT

Concept of Operation for the Polish Front

DOI

Late 1981

SOURCE




SUMMARY

In a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact the Polish Front, commanded by Polish Army General Molczyk, would constitute one of three first echelon fronts under the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Grouping of Forces within the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD). The front is to be committed by the sixth hour of the third day of combat within the TVD in a zone from Luebeck to Wittenberge. The front will operate on diverging axes into Jutland and along the North Sea coast to Brussels and the French border. The offensive on the Jutland axis is to be conducted by the 1st Polish Army in conjunction with the 6th Airborne Division and the 7th Assault Landing Division. For the offensive on the coastal axis, the 2nd Polish Army will be the front first echelon initially with the 4th Polish Army to be committed from the second echelon when the 1st Army attains the front immediate objective. These offensives are to be completed about 10 to 12 days after they start. Senior Polish military leaders believe the front will be unable to accomplish the complex operational tasks simultaneously on the divergent axes.

- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1


~~SECRET~~

(classification)



~~SECRET~~

1. The planning for the operations of the Polish Front is conducted by Department II, (Operational Planning), Directorate I of the Polish General Staff in conjunction with the staff of the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) of the Warsaw Pact. The front commander is to be Army General ((Molczyk)). The present plan was prepared in the early 1970s, and only minor revisions have been made since then. The concept of operations and the detailed plans were prepared by the Polish General Staff based on guidance, in the form of axes and objectives, provided by the staff of the CAF. Polish officers took the completed plans to Moscow for review by V. G. ((Kulikov)), who was then Chief of the General Staff of the USSR. In 1980, the Soviets indicated that guidance for a revised plan was being prepared, but through late 1981 they had not provided a new outline. The Poles hoped to influence the content of the new directive as described below.

[ Comment: Source does not know how the plan dating from the early 1970s differed from that in effect previously or what caused the change. He also does not know why the Soviets were rethinking the plan in 1980 but notes that their intent to revise it predated the deterioration of Poland's internal situation and suspects that the ensuing crisis forced postponement or reconsideration of any changes.]


2. In a limited mobilization scenario, the front's zone is generally from Luebeck to Wittenberge. Within this zone, the Polish Front operates on two principal axes. The 1st Polish Army (Pomeranian Military District), augmented by the 6th Airborne Division and the 7th Assault Landing Division, operates on the Jutland axis. The 2nd Polish Army (Silesian MD) makes up the front first echelon on the coastal axis, the main axis of the front. The 4th Polish Army (Warsaw MD) is initially in the Front second echelon on the coastal axis. Two reserve mechanized divisions formed from Polish Internal Defense Regiments (WOW) comprise the Front commander's reserve. This 17 division force can be ready for commitment within eight days of mobilization. The plan requires the first echelon armies to be ready for commitment by the sixth hour of the third day, i.e., within 54 hours of the start of combat within the TVD.

[Source Comment: Prior to commitment of the Polish Front, East German forces, possibly Border Guards, and a Soviet division serve as a screening force. Elements of the Polish Front, including the command post, may be deployed forward within the TVD prior to the 3rd day of combat but are not


5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

committed to battle until about the 54th hour.] 
Comment: Subsequent references in this report to the number of days elapsed are based on the beginning of the Polish Front's offensive rather than the beginning of combat in the theater.]


3. On the Jutland axis, four divisions of the 1st Army (the 8th and 12th Mechanized Divisions and the 16th and 20th Armored Divisions) are responsible for seizing the Jutland Peninsula and Fyn Island. A joint airborne and amphibious operation against Zealand involves the 6th Airborne Division, 7th Assault Landing Division and the 15th Mechanized Division which, once on the ground, come under the command of the 1st Army. Elements of the Combined Baltic Fleet also may support the operations against Zealand and Fyn Island. The first echelon divisions of the 1st Army, i.e., the 8th and 12th Mechanized Divisions, are committed at a point near the inter-German border and attack on the Schwerin-Rendsburg-Fredrickshavn axis. [Source Comment: The precise line of commitment will depend on the relative positions of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces at the time.] When committed, the 8th Mechanized Division advances west on a line north of Hamburg to secure positions on the north bank of the Elbe River in order to block the river access to Hamburg. The 12th Mechanized Division attacks north through Schleswig-Holstein and into Denmark to the Bramminge-Vamdrup-Kolding line, the immediate objective on this axis, by about Day Five. On Day Six, the 16th and 20th Armored Divisions are committed from the army second echelon and continue the attack north to Frederickshavn, the subsequent objective. As the two armored divisions start the advance north on Day Six, the 12th Mechanized Division swings to the east to secure Fyn Island. [Source Comment: The 12th Mechanized Division probably will be augmented with additional river crossing equipment for the attack on Fyn Island, because it is anticipated that the existing bridges will have been destroyed. Some elements of the Combined Baltic Fleet also may support the operation against Fyn Island.]

4. The offensive against Zealand also begins on Day 6. The 6th Airborne Division conducts an airborne operation in the vicinity of Haslev early on Day Six. The 7th Assault Landing Division, after loading in the area of Mrzezyno and Swinoujscie and transiting the Baltic Sea under air cover provided by the East German Air Force, conducts amphibious assaults to establish beachheads in the Bays of Koge and Fakse. The Combined Baltic Fleet probably will provide some fire support against the more

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~

5
4
3
2
1



~~SECRET~~


heavily defended coastal regions. The 15th Mechanized Division, transported to Zealand on ships of the Polish Merchant Marine fleet earmarked for that purpose, lands by the end of Day Six. This division then advances north, bypassing Copenhagen, to Helsingor and secures positions on the north and northeastern coasts to protect the passage through the Danish Straits. Part of the airborne/amphibious force advances west to Korsor harbor and positions along the western coast to protect the sea passage between Zealand and Fyn Island. Reinforced battalion-sized forces will carry the offensive into Falster and Lolland Islands. Given strong resistance on Fyn and Zealand Islands, the operation would be expected to require four or five days, ending by Day 11.

5. The Polish Front's main attack follows an axis running from Neubrandenburg through Uelzen passing north of Osnabrueck to Enschede and then to Brussels and the French border. The 2nd Army's offensive on this axis begins with the 4th Mechanized Division on the right flank and 5th Armored Division on the left flank in the first echelon. These divisions conduct a passage of lines through the Soviet and East German screening force and cross the Elbe River between Wittenberge and the Elbe-Luebeck Canal. Shortly after these divisions cross the river, the 11th Armored Division moves forward to the first echelon between them. The army sector widens after the Elbe is crossed, and the 4th Mechanized Division attacks to the northwest to seize positions between Bremerhaven and the Cuxhaven area. [Source Comment: From these positions the 4th Mechanized Division can deny the enemy use of the major harbor facilities and, in conjunction with the 8th Mechanized Division on the northeast bank, control the Elbe River approach to Hamburg.] The 5th Armored Division on the left and the 11th Armored Division on the right continue the attack west across the Weser River reaching the army's immediate objective, a line running approximately from Bremen south to Minden, by the end of Day Three. At this time the 10th Armored Division and 2nd Mechanized Division are committed to battle from the army second echelon. The 10th Armored Division is committed between the 5th and 11th Armored Divisions. The 2nd Mechanized Division is committed to the northwest between the 11th Armored Division and the 4th Mechanized Division to seize positions along the North Sea coast between Wilhelmshaven and the Dutch border. The three armored divisions continue the offensive west reaching the Ems River, the front immediate objective on this axis, by Day Five/Six. One of the reserve mechanized divisions constitutes at least part of the army reserve during this offensive.

5
4
3
2
1

3
2
1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

6. After the immediate objective is attained, the 4th Army is committed to the battle on Day Six on the right flank of the 2nd Army for the final phase of the offensive. Prior to its commitment, the 4th Army takes control of the 2nd Mechanized Division from the 2nd Army, releasing the 1st Mechanized Division to that army in return. The 2nd Mechanized Division, now part of the 4th Army, consolidates its positions, while one of the two remaining mechanized divisions attacks to the northwest to secure positions on the North Sea coast between the Waddenzee and the left flank of the 2nd Mechanized Division. The other mechanized division attacks west to the Dutch coast between the Hague and the West Frisian Islands. The 4th Army subsequently may conduct operations on the Frisian Islands. One of the reserve mechanized divisions from the front reserve may be committed to support the 4th Army in establishing defensive positions along the North Sea Coast. The 2nd Army continues its offensive west toward Brussels with a Soviet tank army from the adjacent front, probably the GSFG-East German Front, on its left flank. This drive is to reach and cross the Rhine River by the end of Day Eight. [Source Comment: The Soviet tank army will have reached the Rhine a day or two earlier, thereby facilitating the Polish effort.] After crossing the Rhine, the 2nd Army, in conjunction with the Soviet tank army on its flank, continues the offensive through Brussels to the French border and the North Sea coast, completing the entire operation by Day 10-12.

7. The senior Polish military leaders realize that the operational objectives assigned to the Polish Front exceed the capability of the Polish forces and are particularly concerned about problems in command and control as well as air support. The Polish military leadership has requested a thorough analysis of the plan by the staff of the CAF in an attempt to obtain recognition and resolution of these problems. [Source Comment: A Soviet army would have to be added to the Polish Front in order for it to be able to accomplish its missions. A Soviet tank army from Belorussia has been portrayed as an operational maneuver group within the Polish Front in at least two exercises, but the plan has not been changed.] The Poles consider that the problems inherent in attempting to maintain effective command and control over extremely complex operations on widely diverging axes are insurmountable. Additionally, the Poles consider it impossible to provide effective air support simultaneously to ground operations on both axes. To support the Jutland axis the aircraft would have to be rebased into Schleswig-Holstein. From there they could not support operations on the coastal axis.

5
4
3
2
1


4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Conversely, if the aircraft were rebased to support the coastal axis, they would not be in position to support the Jutland axis. Experience from World War II, coupled with assessments of current NATO air capability, has led Polish military planners to expect strong NATO air operations on both axes, hence the concern. In an effort to resolve the operational problems, the Poles have proposed to the Soviets that the USSR assume responsibility for one of the axes, e.g., the Polish Front would have responsibility for the Jutland axis with Soviet or other forces assigned responsibility for the coastal axis. As of late 1981, only minor changes had been made to the plan, and the issues of primary concern to the Poles had not been addressed. [Source Comment: The stationing of US forces on the North German Plain and the possible employment of US Marines in Jutland significantly improve the forces that would oppose the Polish Front. Because the Soviets consider the operations to secure the Danish Straits and block the North Sea ports to be of vital importance, it is highly likely that Soviet plans will be altered to deal with the improved NATO capability. Over time, the Soviets probably will make some adjustments in force alignments to ensure that Soviet, not Polish, forces will oppose US units on the coastal axes.]



5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~

5
4
3
2
1