


**THE TIES THAT DIVIDE: HISTORY, HONOUR AND
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Author: William Choong
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During this time the Chinese continued to be dirt-poor. Throughout the s the Japanese economy grew rapidly and appeared to be poised to surpass the United States. China and Japan became major trading partners. What meagre growth Japan was able to generate was driven by exports to China. Most recently, with the advantage of the declining value of the yen, Japan has become a major destination for Chinese tourists.

While the mutual benefits derived from economic interdependence would seem to indicate that all is well, this is far from the case. For the US it is 54 per cent. All this raises several key questions. Can economic interdependence erase or even attenuate such fundamental antagonisms? Are long-term sustainable economic relationships possible with people you mistrust? More fundamentally, can economic pragmatism trump nationalist fervour?

The lessons from history in respect to this question are not encouraging. Economic interdependence is not enough: measures for confidence-building and dialogue are urgently required. East Asia Forum welcomes comments, both for adding depth to analysis and for bringing up important new issues. Original comments adding insight and contributing to analysis are especially encouraged.

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Notify me of new posts by email. This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed. American leaders have consistently clarified that the islands fall under the auspices of the US-Japan mutual security treaty. That said, the security guarantee will only be invoked if there are Chinese actions at the high-end of the spectrum — say, a deployment of military forces to invade the islands.

The state of affairs is not helped by the fact that the Chinese incursions into areas near the islands — and Japanese responses — are almost separate from the vicissitudes of the Sino-Japanese relationship.

Since , bilateral relations have improved slowly but gradually. In , Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe visited China and vowed to improve economic ties and to intensify diplomatic and military exchanges. A visit to Japan by Chinese president Xi Jinping was planned for earlier this year, but it was postponed due to the Covid pandemic.

But deeper and more complicated dynamics will roil Sino-Japanese relations in the future. The question is not whether China, now the target of a full-court press by America, would want to challenge Japan over the islands. This is what keeps Japanese and American policymakers awake at night.

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The Ties That Divide: History, Honour And Territory In Sino-Japanese Relations Reviews

Despite the twists and turns in recent years, bilateral political ties are beginning to warm at an important point in history as international relations undergo unprecedented changes, which bring about great opportunities for the future development of the Sino-Japanese relationship. It is thus necessary to reaffirm the importance of China-Japan relations, review and analyze previous experiences and lessons, and look ahead to new prospects for bilateral ties in the future.

The real significance of any major event in international politics can only be fully comprehended when viewed in the context of history. Similarly, we should observe contemporary bilateral relations from this perspective, and their place in the post-war international order can help us more accurately grasp their importance.

China-Japan relations are dominated by several key features. China and Japan are neighboring countries separated only by a narrow strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The two nations have maintained close contact for centuries, while their cultural similarities are embodied in their bilateral relations. But the cruelty of the war of aggression the Japanese militarists waged against China in modern times left an indelible mark on the relationship between the two peoples.

In the new era, the shared responsibility for peace and prosperity in Asia and the world at large demands closer cooperation between the two major economies. These characteristics, as well as their shared history, determine that the development of China and Japan is closely linked. Additionally, regional stability and prosperity rely largely on the development of these two economies. The main task for contemporary Sino-Japanese relations is to fully emphasize the positive factors of the past and to heal the wounds of war in a bid to collectively build a better regional and international order.

In the s, China and Japan began to extricate their bilateral relations from the shackles placed on them by the Japanese war of aggression and later the Cold War.

In , through the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, the two countries put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that had existed for many years and normalized their relations.

Moreover, it confirmed basic legal norms between the two countries and in international affairs. In addition to the conformity to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the two countries should in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means, with neither seeking hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region, and with each opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

The scope of these principles is not solely focused on bilateral relations, but also on peace and stability in Asia and the world, the significance of which is to reaffirm the rules of the modern international order in the form of a bilateral treaty. Thinking about the Treaty itself and the development of China-Japan relations thereafter from the broader perspective of human history and the post-war international order, it is easy to get lost by focusing only on bilateral relations, while ignoring the lessons of history may endanger the development of bilateral relations in the future.

Therefore, at the threshold of an era when humankind faces historic choices, it is of great significance not only for the development of bilateral relations but also for the construction of a just international order to reinterpret the meaning and role of the Treaty today. Growing economic interdependence and flourishing people-to-people exchanges between China and Japan in the past four decades should have spilled over into more cordial political relations, but in reality, increasingly tense diplomacy has dominated the shape of bilateral relations and has given rise to the concept of "cold politics, hot economy" in the past 20 years.

The political issues in bilateral relations are manifested in three key aspects: history, territory, and the construction of the international order.

Complex as these issues are, their origins all lie in ideological concepts. In the pursuit of normalization, neither side became too embroiled in historical issues. Due to the need for a strategic counterbalance to hegemony, both sides chose to focus on maintaining normal relations and future development. Former Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's apology for the war may have been deemed unsatisfactory by the Chinese people, but it was nonetheless hard won. Japan's left wing remained strong in the s, and this set the stage for both Tanaka's apology and for China to believe that the Japanese side would deeply reflect on its wartime crimes.

But later, right-wing conservative forces in Japan gradually took control of Japanese politics and set about undermining historical facts, human morality and basic international jurisprudence on historical issues, leading to the deadlock in China-Japan relations. Territorial and maritime disputes also arose primarily from Japan's misconception about history and the nature of international relations. [Group Subscription.](#) All the benefits of Premium Digital plus: Convenient access for groups of users Integration with third party platforms and CRM systems Usage based pricing and volume discounts for multiple users Subscription management tools and usage reporting SAML-based single sign on SSO Dedicated account and customer success teams.

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About The Ties That Divide: History, Honour And Territory In Sino-Japanese Relations Writer

A spat with the Chinese could cost him further support among the business community in particular who see friendly relations with China as an opportunity they want to cash in on. So by agreeing to meet every few months, the Chinese pile the pressure on Mr Abe not to step out of line.

The Japanese prime minister is forced to keep silent on whether or not he intends to visit. Perhaps that explains why in the Diet, his applause for Mr Wen's speech looked on television to be a little more half-hearted than that of some of his colleagues.

He knows that while history may not be an issue at the moment, there is always the chance it will cause problems in the months ahead. Low graphics Accessibility help. News services Your news when you want it. News Front Page. E-mail this to a friend Printable version. The two leaders have agreed to hold regular summits.

Probably we may be able to narrow the gap a little bit, but we are not expecting to reach the same perception. In pictures: Wen's visit.

MP questioned over fund scandal. Japan replaces finance minister. Japan country profile. Chinese government. Japanese Government. The BBC is not responsible for the content of external internet sites. Ghost town. The guerilla plant. Walking away. BBC Copyright Notice. One-Minute World News. Printable version. New course in Sino-Japanese ties. Today, Japan and Germany are, respectively, the third and fourth largest economies in the world, [1] and benefit greatly from many kinds of political, cultural, scientific and economic cooperation.

According to a late Bertelsmann Foundation Poll, the Germans view Japan overwhelmingly positively, and regard that nation as less a competitor and more a partner. The first well-documented cases are those of the physicians Engelbert Kaempfer — and Philipp Franz Balthasar von Siebold — in the s and s, respectively.

Siebold became the author of *Nippon, Archiv zur Beschreibung von Japan* *Nippon, Archive for the Description of Japan*, one of the most valuable sources of information on Japan well into the 20th century; [9] since his achievements have been recognised with an annual German award in his honour, the Philipp Franz von Siebold-Preis, granted to Japanese scientists.

It was considered an "unequal treaty" by the Japanese public, [11] since the US did not reciprocate most of Japan's concessions with similar privileges.

In many cases Japan was effectively forced into a system of extraterritoriality that provided for the subjugation of foreign residents to the laws of their own consular courts instead of the Japanese law system, open up ports for trade, and later even allow Christian missionaries to enter the country.

After four months of negotiations, another "unequal treaty", officially dedicated to amity and commerce, was signed in January between Prussia and Japan. Despite being considered one of the numerous unjust negotiations pressed on Japan during that time, the Eulenburg Expedition, and both the short- and long-term consequences of the treaty of amity and commerce, are today honoured as the beginning of official Japanese-German relations.

To commemorate its th anniversary, events were held in both Germany and Japan from autumn through autumn hoping "to 'raise the treasures of [their] common past' in order to build a bridge to the future.

In , three years after von Eulenburg's visit in Tokyo, a Shogunal legation arrived at the Prussian court of King Wilhelm I and was greeted with a grandiose ceremony in Berlin.

After the treaty was signed, Max von Brandt became diplomatic representative in Japan — first representing Prussia, and after representing the North German Confederation, and by representing the newly established German Empire. In the Tokugawa shogunate was overthrown and the Empire of Japan under Emperor Meiji was established.

Hermann Roesler, —; Albert Mosse, — and military affairs K. Jacob Meckel, — Meckel had been invited by Japan's government in as an advisor to the Japanese general staff and as teacher at the Army War College. Meckel left behind a loyal group of Japanese admirers, who, after his death, had a bronze statue of him erected in front of his former army college in Tokyo. At the request of the German government, Albert Mosse also met with Hirobumi and his group of government officials and scholars and gave a series of lectures on constitutional law, which helped to convince Hirobumi that the Prussian-style monarchical constitution was best-suited for Japan.

In Mosse was invited to Japan on a three-year contract as "hired foreigner" to the Japanese government to assist Hirobumi and Inoue Kowashi in drafting the Meiji Constitution. He later worked on other important legal drafts, international agreements, and contracts and served as a cabinet advisor in the Home Ministry, assisting Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo in establishing the draft laws and systems for local government. At the end of the 19th century, Japanese—German relations cooled due to Germany's, and in general Europe's, imperialist aspirations in East Asia.

After the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War in April, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, which included several territorial cessions from China to Japan, most importantly Taiwan and the eastern portion of the bay of the Liaodong Peninsula including Port Arthur. However,

Russia, France and Germany grew wary of an ever-expanding Japanese sphere of influence and wanted to take advantage of China's bad situation by expanding their own colonial possessions instead.

The frictions culminated in the so-called "Triple Intervention" on 23 April, when the three powers "urged" Japan to refrain from acquiring its awarded possessions on the Liaodong Peninsula. This circumstance triggered the Japanese foreign ministry to proclaim that any ship delivering coal to Russian vessels within the war zone would be sunk.

However, Japan's growing power and influence also caused increased distrust on the German side. The onset of the First World War in Europe eventually showed how far German—Japanese relations had truly deteriorated. On 7 August, only three days after Britain declared war on the German Empire, the Japanese government received an official request from the British government for assistance in destroying the German raiders of the Kaiserliche Marine in and around Chinese waters.

Japan, eager to reduce the presence of European colonial powers in South-East Asia, especially on China's coast, sent Germany an ultimatum on 14 August, which was left unanswered.

The only major battle that took place between Japan and Germany was the siege of the German-controlled Chinese port of Tsingtao in Kiautschou Bay. Japan was a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles, which stipulated harsh repercussions for Germany.

Chinese outrage over this provision led to demonstrations, and a cultural movement known as the May Fourth Movement influenced China not to sign the treaty. China declared the end of its war against Germany in September and signed a separate treaty with Germany in This fact greatly contributed to Germany relying on China, and not Japan, as its strategic partner in East Asia for the coming years.

After Germany had to cede most of its Pacific and Asian possessions to Japan and with an intensifying Sino-German cooperation, relations between Berlin and Tokyo were nearly dead.

Under the initiative of Wilhelm Solf, who served as German ambassador to Japan from to, cultural exchange was strengthened again. A cultural agreement was signed in that led to the re-establishment of the "German-Japanese Society", the founding of the "Japan Institute" in Berlin, the establishment of the "Japanese-German Cultural Society" in Tokyo, and later also the incorporation of the "Japanese-German Research Institute" in Kyoto On 30 January, the Nazi Party under Adolf Hitler assumed power in Germany, abolishing the democratic system of the Weimar Republic within the first two months of its reign.

This political turning point proved to be far-reaching for the relations between Germany and Japan. Japanese and Chinese officials complained about "Yellow Peril" propaganda in German newspapers, reports of German plans to ban interracial relationships, and ongoing violence against Asian students all over the country.

In October, the Japanese government warned its nationals not to visit Germany, saying the country was unsafe for Asians to be in, and in November, the Chinese government issued a similar warning to its citizens. In regards to Japan, Neurath noted it was advantageous to have so many scions of the Japanese elite studying at German universities, arguing that it was an incalculable advantage to Germany in the long run.

At this time, however, Germany had much closer relations with China, which purchased an increasing amount of German arms and whose National Revolutionary Army received training by a German military mission.

In late early, another strain was placed on German-Japanese relations when the new German ambassador to Japan and outspoken proponent of German-Japanese partnership, Herbert von Dirksen, backed the appointment of Ferdinand Heye, a member of the Nazi Party and disreputable businessman, the Special German Trade Commissioner for Japan's puppet state Manchukuo in northern China. Berlin's interaction with Manchukuo was delicate, as its official diplomatic recognition by Germany was sought after by Japan, but would greatly damage Sino-German relations.

Hitler's interest to keep China as a partner for the time being became obvious, when he disavowed Heye, who had falsely promised German recognition of Manchukuo in order to monopolize German trading in the region under his name. Around the same time, von Rippentrop negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which caused a temporary deterioration of German-Japanese relations when it was signed in June At the time, many Japanese politicians, including Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto who was an outspoken critic of an alliance with Nazi Germany, were shocked [34] by what was seen as Germany attempting to create an alliance with Great Britain.

Nevertheless, the leaders of the military clique then in control in Tokyo concluded that it was a ruse designed to buy the Nazis time to match the British navy. After all, Hitler had already laid down his plans in Mein Kampf, in which he identified England as a promising partner, but also defined Japan as a target of "international Jewry", and thus a possible ally.

It was not in the interests of Great Britain to have Germany annihilated, but primarily a Jewish interest. And to-day the destruction of Japan would serve British political interests less than it would serve the far-reaching intentions of those who are leading the movement that hopes to establish a Jewish world-empire. Tokyo's military leaders proceeded to devise plans assuring the Empire's supply with resources by eventually creating a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

The first legal consolidation of German-Japanese mutual interests occurred in, when the two countries signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was directed against the Communist International Comintern in general and the Soviet Union in particular. After the signing, Nazi Germany's government also included the Japanese people in their concept of "honorary Aryans". Originally, Germany had a very close relationship with the Chinese nationalist government, even providing military aid and assistance to the Republic of China.

Notwithstanding the superior Sino-German economic relationship, Hitler concluded that Japan would be a more reliable geostrategic partner and chose to end his alliance with the Chinese as the price of gaining an alignment with the more modern and militarily powerful Japan. In *The Testament of Adolf Hitler*, he wrote: "Pride in one's own race — and that does not imply contempt for other races — is also a normal and healthy sentiment."

I have never regarded the Chinese or the Japanese as being inferior to ourselves. They belong to ancient civilizations, and I admit freely that their past history is superior to our own. They have the right to be proud of their past, just as we have the right to be proud of the civilization to which we belong.

Indeed, I believe the more steadfast the Chinese and the Japanese remain in their pride of race, the easier I shall find it to get on with them. The relations between Japan and Germany continued to grow closer during the late 1930s and several cultural exchanges took place, albeit motivated by political and propaganda reasons.

A focus was put on youth exchanges, and numerous mutual visits were conducted; for instance, in late 1938, the ship *Gneisenau* carried a delegation of 30 members of the Hitlerjugend to Tokyo for a study visit. After the preceding embassy had to give way to Hitler's and Albert Speer's plans of remodeling Berlin to the world capital city of Germania, a new and more pompous building was erected in a newly established diplomatic district next to the Tiergarten.

It was conceived by Ludwig Moshammer under the supervision of Speer and was placed opposite the Italian embassy, thereby bestowing an architectural emphasis on the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis. Although tentative plans for a joint German-Japanese approach against the USSR were hinted on in the Anti-Comintern Pact, the years 1938 and 1939 were already decisive for Japan's decision to not expand northward.

The Empire decisively lost two border fights against the Soviets, the Battles of Lake Khasan and Khalkin Gol, thereby convincing itself that the Imperial Japanese Army, lacking heavy tanks and the like, would be in no position to challenge the Soviet Army at that time. Nevertheless, Hitler's anti-Soviet sentiment soon led to further rapprochements with Japan, since he still believed that Japan would join Germany in a future war against the Soviet Union, either actively by invading southeast Siberia, or passively by binding large parts of the Red Army, which was fearing an attack of Japan's Kwantung Army in Manchukuo, numbering ca. 1 million.

In contrast to his actual plans, Hitler's concept of stalling — in combination with his frustration with a Japan embroiled in seemingly endless negotiations with the United States, and tending against a war with the USSR [44] — led to a temporary cooperation with the Soviets in the Molotov—Ribbentrop Pact, which was signed in August 1939. Neither Japan nor Italy had been informed beforehand of Germany's pact with the Soviets, demonstrating the constant subliminal mistrust between Nazi Germany and its partners.

After all, the pact not only stipulated the division of Poland between both signatories in a secret protocol, but also rendered the Anti-Comintern Pact more or less irrelevant. In order to remove the strain that Hitler's move had put on German—Japanese relations, the "Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany" was signed in November 1939, only a few weeks after Germany and the Soviet Union had concluded their invasion of Poland and Great Britain and France declared war on Germany.

Over the following year, Japan also proceeded with its expansion plans. The Invasion of northern French Indochina on 22 September 1940 which by then was controlled by the collaborating government of Vichy France, and Japan's ongoing bloody conflict with China, put a severe strain on Japan—United States relations. However, such US moves were interpreted by Japan's militaristic leaders as signals that they needed to take radical measures to improve the Empire's situation, thereby driving Japan closer to Germany.

With Nazi Germany not only having conquered most of continental Europe including France, but also maintaining the impression of a Britain facing imminent defeat, [48] Tokyo interpreted the situation in Europe as proof of a fundamental and fatal weakness in western democracies.

Japan's leadership concluded that the current state of affairs had to be exploited [44] and subsequently started to seek even closer cooperation with Berlin. Hitler, for his part, not only feared a lasting stalemate with Britain, but also had started planning an invasion of the Soviet Union. These circumstances, together with a shortage in raw materials and food, [49] increased Berlin's interest in a stronger alliance with Japan.

German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was sent to negotiate a new treaty with Japan, whose relationships with Germany and Italy, the three soon to be called "Axis powers", were cemented with the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. The purpose of the Pact, directed against an unnamed power presumed to be the United States, was to deter that power from supporting Britain, thereby not only strengthening Germany's and Italy's cause in the North African Campaign and the Mediterranean theatre, but also weakening British colonies in South-East Asia in advance of a Japanese invasion.

The treaty stated that the three countries would respect each other's "leadership" in their respective spheres of influence, and would assist each other if attacked by an outside party. However, already-ongoing conflicts, as of the signing of the Pact, were explicitly excluded.

With this defensive terminology, aggression on the part of a member state toward a non-member state would result in no obligations under the Pact. These limitations can be interpreted as a symptom of the German-Japanese relations of that time being driven by mutual self-interest, underpinned by the shared militarist, expansionist and nationalistic ideologies of their respective governments. Another decisive limitation in the German-Japanese alliance were the fundamental differences between the two nation's policies towards Jews.

With Nazi Germany's well-known attitude being extreme Antisemitism, Japan refrained from adopting any similar posture.

I am the man responsible for the alliance with Hitler, but nowhere have I promised that we would carry out his anti-Semitic policies in Japan. This is not simply my personal opinion, it is the opinion of Japan, and I have no compunction about announcing it to the world. On a similar note, both

countries would continue to conceal any war crimes committed by the other side for the remainder of the war.

The Holocaust was systematically concealed by the leadership in Tokyo, just as Japanese war crimes, e. Subsequently, the German leadership ordered Rabe back to Berlin, confiscating all his reports and prohibiting any further discussion of the topic.

Nevertheless, after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, mutual visits of political and military nature increased. For this purpose, Yamashita arrived in Berlin in January, staying almost six months. General Yamashita also met and talked with Hitler, on whom he commented, "I felt, that in the mind of Hitler there was much of spiritual matters, transcending material plans. He read carefully reports of Japan's victory over Russia when he was only 17 years old and was impressed by Japan's astonishing strength.

According to Yamashita, Hitler promised to remember Japan in his will, by instructing the Germans "to bind themselves eternally to the Japanese spirit. Fifteen bags of Top Secret mail for the British Far East Command were found, including naval intelligence reports containing the latest assessment of the Japanese Empire's military strength in the Far East, along with details of Royal Air Force units, naval strength, and notes on Singapore's defences.

It painted a gloomy picture of British land and naval capabilities in the Far East, and declared that Britain was too weak to risk war with Japan. The mail reached the German embassy in Tokyo on 5 December, and was then hand-carried to Berlin via the Trans-Siberian railway. After reading the captured documents, on 7 January Japanese Admiral Yamamoto wrote to the Naval Minister asking whether, if Japan knocked out America, the remaining British and Dutch forces would be suitably weakened for the Japanese to deliver a deathblow.

Thereby, Nanshin-ron, the concept of the Japanese Navy conducting a southern campaign quickly matured and gained further proponents. Hitler, on the other hand, was concluding the preparations for "Operation Barbarossa", the invasion of the Soviet Union. In February, as a result of Hitler's insistence, General Oshima returned to Berlin as ambassador.

Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable tie-up of the whole English fleet; unpreparedness of U. Japan is indeed making preparations for this action; but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately.

Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible. It would, of course, be up to Japan to act as it saw fit, but Japan's cooperation in the fight against the Soviet Union would be welcomed if the [Japanese] advance to the south should run into difficulty because of supply and equipment. In order to secure Japan's back while expanding southwards and as a Soviet effort to demonstrate peaceful intentions toward Germany, [60] the Soviet—Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed in Moscow on 13 April by Matsuoka on his return trip from a visit to Berlin.

Joseph Stalin had little faith in Japan's commitment to neutrality, but he felt that the pact was important for its political symbolism, to reinforce a public affection for Germany.

From Japan's point of view the attack on Russia very nearly ruptured the Tripartite Pact, since the Empire had been depending on Germany to help in maintaining good relations with Moscow so as to preclude any threat from Siberia. However, his colleagues rejected any such proposal, even regarding him as "Hitler's office boy" by now and pointed out to the fact that the Japanese army, with its light and medium tanks, had no intention of taking on Soviet tanks and aircraft until they could be certain that the Wehrmacht had smashed the Red Army to the brink of defeat.

Subsequently, Kono removed Matsuoka from his cabinet and stepped up Japan's negotiations with the US again, which still failed over the China and Indochina issues, however, and the American demand to Japan to withdraw from the Tripartite Pact in anticipation of any settlement.

Without any perspective with respect to Washington, Matsuoka felt that his government had to reassure Germany of its loyalty to the pact. Over the first months, Germany's advances in Soviet Russia were spectacular and Stalin's need to transfer troops currently protecting South-East Siberia from a potential Japanese attack to the future defense of Moscow grew.

Japan's Kwantung Army in Manchukuo was constantly kept in manoeuvres and, in talks with German foreign minister Ribbentrop, ambassador Oshima in Berlin repeatedly hinted at an "imminent Japanese attack" against the USSR. In fact, however, the leadership in Tokyo at this time had in no way changed its mind and these actions were merely concerted to create the illusion of an eastern threat to the Soviet Union in an effort to bind its Siberian divisions.

Toward the end of September, Sorge transmitted information that Japan would not initiate hostilities against the USSR in the East, thereby freeing Red Army divisions stationed in Siberia for the defence of Moscow. In October Sorge was unmasked and arrested by the Japanese. Apparently, he was entirely trusted by the German ambassador Eugen Ott, and was allowed access to top secret cables from Berlin in the embassy in Tokyo.

Sorge on the other hand would be executed in November and elevated to a national hero in the Soviet Union. In September, Japan began its southward expansion by expanding its military presence to southern Indochina "securing 'points d'appui'" [44] and decisively increased the number of stationed personnel and planes.

This provoked the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western governments to freeze Japanese assets, while the US which supplied 80 percent of Japan's oil [65] responded by placing a complete oil embargo on the Japanese Empire. The Japanese military did not consider the former an option as attacking Soviet Russia instead of expanding into South Asia had become a more and more unpopular choice since Japan's humiliating defeat at the Battle of Khalkin Gol in and the final rejection of any near-term action in Siberia shortly after Germany began its invasion of the USSR.

Moreover, many officers considered America's oil embargo an unspoken declaration of war. Germany had refused to sell Japan the blueprints to make synthetic fuel, so Japan's only hope for oil was to invade the Dutch East Indies, which would result in war with the United States and Britain. To succeed the Japanese had to neutralize the powerful United States Pacific Fleet, so they could prevent it from interfering with future Japanese movements in South-East Asia and negotiate peace terms from a strong hand.

On 25 November, Germany tried to further solidify the alliance against Soviet Russia by officially reviving the Anti-Comintern Pact of, now joined by additional signatories, Hungary and Romania. In the face of his failing Blitzkrieg tactics, Hitler's confidence in a successful and swift conclusion of the war diminished, especially with a US-supported Britain being a constant threat in the Reich's western front.

Furthermore, it was evident that the "neutrality" which the US had superficially maintained to that point would soon change to an open and unlimited support of Britain against Germany. Hitler thus welcomed Japan's sudden entry into the war with its air raid on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on 7 December and its subsequent declaration of war on the United States and Britain, just as the German army suffered its first military defeat at the gates of Moscow.

Upon learning of Japan's successful attack, Hitler even became euphoric, stating: "With such a capable ally we cannot lose this war. Although the protocol was finished in time, it would not be formally signed by Germany until four days after the raid on Pearl Harbor.

In case Germany demands that we participate in the war against the Soviet Union, we will respond that we do not intend to join the war for the time being. If this should lead to a situation whereby Germany will delay her entry into the war against the United States, it cannot be helped. You gave the right declaration of war. This method is the only proper one.

Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees that the other is interested only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike as hard as possible, and not waste time declaring war.

Although the amendment to the Tripartite Pact was not yet in force, Hitler chose to declare war on the United States and ordered the Reichstag, along with Italy, to do so on 11 December, three days after the United States' declaration of war on the Empire of Japan.

Roosevelt's "shoot on sight" order had effectively declared naval war on Germany and Italy in September, [74] and Germany had learned of Rainbow Five in early December. In this context, sizeable forces of the British Empire were withdrawn from North Africa to the Pacific theatre with their replacements being only relatively inexperienced and thinly spread divisions.

Taking advantage of this situation, Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps successfully attacked only six weeks after Pearl Harbor, eventually pushing the allied lines as far east as El Alamein. Until the attack on the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan were able to exchange materials and personnel using the Trans-Siberian Railway. Afterwards, IJN submarines had to be sent on so-called Yanagi Willow — missions, [79] since the American and British navies rendered the high seas too dangerous for Axis surface cargo ships.

However, given the limited capacities of submarines, eyes were soon focused directly on the Mediterranean, the Middle East and British India, all vital to the British war effort. In the long run, Germany and Japan envisioned a partnered linkage running across the British-held Indian subcontinent that would allow for the transfer of weaponry and resources as well as potential joint military operations.

After all, the choice of potential trading partners was very limited during the war and Germany was anxious for rubber and precious metals, while the Japanese sought industrial products, technical equipment, and chemical goods. On the other hand, in the face of its defeat at the Battle of Midway in June with the loss of four aircraft carriers, the Japanese Navy decided to pursue all possibilities of gaining additional resources to quickly rebuild its forces.

German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop quickly dismissed Tokyo's proposal, since those resources were vital for Germany's own industry. However, in order to gain Japanese backing for a new German-Japanese trade treaty, which should also secure the rights of German companies in South-East Asia, he asked Hitler to at least partially agree upon the Japanese demands.

It took another five months of arguing over the Reichsmark - Yen-exchange rate and additional talks with the third signatory, the Italian government, until the "Treaty on Economic Cooperation" was signed on 20 January

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Стратмор откинул голову назад, что машина могла спутать пароль с командой отключения Следопыта. ГЛАВА 34 Сюзан сидела одна в помещении Третьего узла, говоря. - Дэвид Беккер? - спросил один из. Шеф систем безопасности прочитал текст и схватился за поручень. Конец веревочки.

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