

NEWSLETTER

JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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Vol. III, No. 13

June-July 1982

NEWS BRIEFS

JOINT NAVAL EXERCISES?: During his visit to Israel in May, Admiral Thomas Hayward, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, attended Israeli naval exercises and inspected Israeli naval facilities. He later disclosed that Israeli and American sailors are participating in joint training programs aimed at joint US-Israeli surveillance of Syrian and Libyan activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. The State Department refused comment beyond saying it was "vaguely aware of it" (the visit).

UAE SEVERS TIES WITH COSTA RICA: Following the decision of the Costa Rican government to reestablish its Embassy in Jerusalem, the Cabinet of the United Arab Emirates issued a statement which reads in part, "In order to serve higher Arab interests, and out of its belief in the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to retain their land and establish their state on their national soil, the UAE regrets and deplors this decision and has decided to sever all diplomatic and economic relations with the Republic of Costa Rica as of today."

SYRIA DENIES KLARSFELD ENTRY: Nazi hunter Serge Klarsfeld arrived in Damascus to demand extradition of former SS Hauptsturmführer Alois Brunner, but was turned back at the airport. Brunner, living in Syria under the name of George Fischer, is wanted by West Germany, Austria, France, Greece and Israel. He served as one of Eichmann's deputies in Vienna, Berlin, Salonika and Paris, and has been on the Allies list of most wanted Nazi war criminals. A French military court sentenced him to death in absentia in 1954.

NO GERMAN TANKS TO SAUDI ARABIA: In a statement made during a visit to Israel, West German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said that under Bonn's existing arms sales guidelines, West Germany will not sell advanced Leopard II tanks to Saudi Arabia.

WHERE ARE THE SS-20s?: According to Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State designate for European Affairs, the Soviet Union has deployed new SS-20 intermediate range missiles west of the Ural mountains, a violation of their own announced freeze in March. The Soviets denied Burt's announcement, made at a NATO meeting in Brussels. "Mr. Burt knows he is lying

and this is also known by those circles in Washington and NATO that handed him for publication a deliberate and rude concocted falsehood," Tass said.

NO MILITARY TRIP TO ISRAEL: Concern about Arab reaction has led to the postponement of a US military team's trip to Israel to learn how its forces dealt with Soviet weapons in Lebanon. US military professionals are eager to obtain first-hand information about Israeli tactics and the performance of Soviet weapons that American forces may have to face some day. The Pentagon acknowledges that the US has no first hand information, which might be vital in possible adaptations of US weapons.

US BASES IN GREECE: The future of US military bases in Greece will be discussed in Washington before the end of July. President Andreas Papandreu had pledged to set a timetable for the removal of US bases, but has softened his stand somewhat over the past few months. The main American facilities in Greece are communications bases in Crete and near Athens, an Air Force support facility at Athens airport and naval and Air Force facilities in West Crete.

SOVIET GUNSHIP DOWNED: According to Western sources, Afghan rebels downed a Soviet helicopter gunship in fighting north of Kabu. Two days after the fighting, the bodies of 22 Afghan government soldiers were brought to a hospital in the capital.

BUYING THE "INVINCIBLE": Before the war in the Falklands, Britain had agreed to sell the aircraft carrier "Invincible" to Australia for \$315 million. After the war, the British apparently decided to substitute the older carrier "Hermes" in the deal, but Australian Defense Minister Ian Sinclair went to Britain to tell Defense Secretary John Nott that the "Hermes" is not acceptable. The "Hermes" is 30 years old, the "Invincible" went into service in 1980.

W. GERMAN DEFENSE SPENDING: West Germany's military spending for 1983 will fall short of a NATO target calling for 3% real annual growth. In current dollars, the budget will increase from \$17.9 billion to \$18.8 billion. However, after factoring for inflation, this represents a real growth of 0.6%.

OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE, A CONCISE SURVEY

Background

The overall aim of the operation "Peace for Galilee" is best defined in the words of the government spokesman of 6 June:

"...to put all settlements in Galilee out of reach of terrorist artillery...positioned in Lebanon."

Although on 24 July 1981, a cease-fire agreement between Israel and the PLO had been achieved, the terrorists not only used the respite thus gained for a massive rebuilding of their military strength, but also renewed their assaults upon Israel, the territory held by Major Haddad, and Israeli or Jewish targets abroad. Since the implementation of the 1981 cease-fire, 29 persons were killed and 271 were wounded due to 290 terror acts.

Matters came to a head when, following the attack by the Israel Air Force upon guerrilla establishments in the Beirut area (which came as a response to the shooting of the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov), the terrorists conducted a 24-hour bombardment of the Galilee and of Major Haddad's enclave. Over 30 barrages were directed at 23 settlements, including the towns of Nahariya and Kiryat Shemona. Besides massive shelling by artillery and tanks, over 500 Katyusha rockets were fired. Following these events, the Israeli cabinet decided to launch the operation "Peace for Galilee," on the morning of 6 June.

The terrain

The IDF military command had to plan the campaign under adverse and highly complicated conditions, both in terms of terrain and of enemy forces.

Lebanon has two alpine mountain ranges (the Lebanon, which reaches 2046 m south of Beirut, and the Anti-Lebanon, which reaches 2814 m at Mt. Hermon), which divide it into four parallel zones running from north to south:

- the coastal plain
- the Lebanon ridge
- the Beqaa valley
- the Anti-Lebanon ridge, the crest of which determine the borderline between Lebanon and Syria.

Consequently, military operations—especially along the coast and east of the Lebanon range—were difficult to coordinate.

Fighting in the mountains is characterized by a number of well-known features; in particular, excellent conditions for defense, difficulty in deploying troops, heavy equipment, and assault weapons, severe limitations on the mobility of armor and other tracked fighting vehicles.

The coast is easily blocked by flanking positions all along the western slopes of the mountains, which at certain points lie between a couple of kilometers and several hundred from the waterline, not to mention such narrow passages as the Ras el Bayada, where the cliffs approach the sea. Fur-

ED NOTE: Operation Peace for Galilee and its ramifications for the Middle East, the U.S. and the Soviet Union is a subject too broad and complex for analysis in one issue of our Newsletter. Therefore, this issue is devoted to tracing events leading up to 6 June 1982 and the military operation that followed, culminating in the surrounding of West Beirut by the Israel Defense Forces. Next month, we will address the strategic implications of the operation and expect to provide a more thorough analysis of captured Soviet equipment.

As a monthly publication, we have omitted a great many events covered in the daily media and have concentrated on information they may have overlooked.

thermore, towns and villages, such as Tyre, Sidon, and Damour constitute effective roadblocks in view of the fact that they lie between the sea and the foothills, and are thus difficult to circumvent.

The Beqaa valley can be effectively "covered" from the mountain slopes to the east and west, and the many hill settlements, agricultural terraces, and orchards afford cover and concealment, yielding excellent defensive positions.

An effective barrier to all advance north of the Tyre-Marjayoun line and further across the Beqaa, from east to west, is the Litani River, the crossing of which requires either bridges or river crossing equipment.

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Katyusha Rocket Launchers of the type that shelled the Galilee prior to 6 June. Each launcher can fire up to 40 shells at a time.

EDITORIALS

Israel Did The Dirty Work

Even before the dust settles in Lebanon, the world should breathe more easily. Not only has Palestinian terrorism suffered a blow, but so has terrorism organized and promoted by myriad other groups. Many countries have been victimized, but none have been willing to take the painful and dangerous steps necessary to eliminate terrorists or their bases. Israel has done the dirty work for those countries, using its soldiers and its blood to destroy elements that made Lebanon the center of international terrorism. Those countries that will benefit have not admitted the service performed, let alone thanked Israel for shouldering their burden.

In order to operate, terrorist organizations require arms, money, training and a place in which to train. The PLO and the absence of a central Lebanese authority provided these elements to terrorists of every persuasion. The final tallies aren't in yet, but official Israeli sources have already made mention of possible Red Brigade, Bader Meinhoff and Japanese Red Army Faction members among captured terrorists, as well as Koreans, Yemenis, Bangladeshis and various Latin Americans. Couple this with the enormous stores of arms and explosives found by the Israelis, and the prospect for international havoc is indeed terrorizing.

There are those who warn that destroying the terrorist infrastructure will cut "radical" terrorists loose from "moderate" ones, thereby increasing acts of violence around the world. Perhaps, but the absence of a safe haven in Lebanon and the cutoff of the world's center of illegal arms as well as major training bases should also increase the difficulty of carrying out such acts. In very few other countries does such total chaos rule at the center, leaving a country completely vulnerable to illegal entry, unable to locate people wanted for crimes in other places and unwilling and unable to control lawlessness in its own domain.

Captured documents show that core PLO cadres receiving training in Eastern Bloc countries, Vietnam and Korea. The PLO links to Latin American guerrilla groups and the Red Brigade have recently been established. *In toto* then, the open secret of Soviet ideological and practical support for international terrorism becomes clear and indisputable. President Reagan and others who have long stressed the Soviet role must find satisfaction in their vindication and further satisfaction in the setback the Soviets received in this respect.

In its determination to rid its own borders of violence against civilians, Israel has done a service for all those countries that would have been subject to terrorism against their citizens this month or next, this year or next.

Perhaps, as in the case of the Osirak reactor, public protestation against Israel masks private relief. If not, it should.

The Changing of the Guard


President Reagan has consistently and firmly defined US interests as limiting the Soviet sphere of influence and strengthening Western strategic posture and independence of action. The Secretary of State, as the Administration's chief architect of foreign policy, must share the President's essential philosophy, or risk losing the President's confidence and his own ability to act decisively. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig shared Reagan's approach as it applied to the Middle East, but differed on elements of European policy.

Strategic consensus for the Middle East and Persian Gulf was a Haig formulation based on the President's understanding of the Soviet role in that vital region. Israel, as a democratic, anticommunist, Western-oriented state, was important, if not central, to the consensus. With the backing of the President, Haig was willing to use the carrot instead of the stick with Israel. He resisted other Administration elements, including a cadre in the White House, who were determined to "punish" Israel for transgressions, real or perceived. Understanding and confidence-building, Haig believed, would keep Israel and the US on the same track, moving toward the same goal.

In the case of the Trans-Siberian pipeline, Haig was again prepared to use the carrot approach. However, the goals of the

Europeans vis-a-vis the pipeline and those of the President are fundamentally incompatible. The pipeline is designed to bring natural gas from the USSR to Europe. The Europeans are heavily committed to the project both politically and financially, particularly the West Germans, who would receive the largest share of the gas. While Haig stressed cooperation and understanding for our allies, the whole concept of mortgaging Europe's energy future to the Soviets was anathema to the President. Reagan rightly objects to the possibility of the Soviets holding back gas for purposes of

(Continued on page 3)



Rep. Kemp Urges Support of Israel

The Honorable Jack Kemp (R-NY), addressing a meeting of JINSA members and friends, made public the text of his telegram to President Reagan concerning the Israeli incursion into Lebanon. The telegram reads in part:

"Israel has given us the opportunity to set back Soviet/Syrian advances in the Middle East, to destroy international terrorism's most fertile base of operations, to restore the sovereign rights of the Lebanese and to reinvigorate the Camp David peace process. I would urge you to seize this opportunity by insisting that Israel's withdrawal be contingent upon a suitable arrangement to guarantee a secure border and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon."

The text, and a further statement appeared in a press release shortly after the JINSA meeting on 9 June. In his extended statement, Kemp said:

"The status quo ante in Lebanon was intolerable: intolerable for the standpoint of the Israelis who live in range of Palestinian artillery, intolerable for the Lebanese who have been denied their sovereign rights over vast areas of their country, and intolerable for the United States and the Western world who seek stability and freedom from terrorism and the curtailment of Soviet power and influence in the strategically vital Middle East.

"It is apparent that a mere restoration of a cease-fire is not enough to resolve the conflict in Lebanon. And forcing a precipitate withdrawal by Israel would be a tragic mistake. Absent a mechanism to guarantee a *condo sanitaire* along the frontier, an Israeli withdrawal would only leave a vacuum which Palestinian forces would fill—as demonstrated by the events of 1978. And so long as Syrian forces occupy Lebanese territory, Lebanese independence will be a sham."

American Lebanese League

From a resolution passed at the American Lebanese League Convention in Washington in June:

Whereas: the American Lebanese League expresses deep sorrow at the tragic loss of life, limb and property and laments the added thousands of Lebanese citizens made refugees in their homeland and;

Whereas: the Lebanese problem must be considered in a larger context, having suffered the degradation and dehumanization of over seven years of brutal Syrian and PLO military occupation;

Whereas: it is in the vital and strategic interests of the United States and Lebanon to have all foreign forces withdrawn. A tragic error would be made if Israeli forces were to withdraw leaving Syrian and PLO forces in place. This would

condemn Lebanon to its continued agony and suffering.

Whereas: the present situation offers an opportunity for the United States to solve the Lebanese problem and to neutralize its territory as a flashpoint for conflict by alien forces with impunity,

Whereas: it would be in the United States' national and strategic interests and those of Lebanon that the present policy of containment and passivism be reversed.

Therefore, be it resolved that the United States use all legitimate means to:

Assist in the creation of a strong central authority and army in Lebanon that assure a free, independent, pluralistic, sovereign state with territorial integrity.

NEWSLETTER

The Jewish Institute is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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EDITORIALS

political blackmail, and objects to the Soviets accruing large amounts of hard currency in the sale of gas.

The President objected, not so much to the carrot as to sacrificing a strong defense of our stated national interest. As Israel furthers US interests by its actions, it receives the support of the President. As the Europeans undermine our interests, they must not be encouraged or assisted. Haig's unwillingness to uphold firmly the tone of the Administration's European policy made his departure predictable, if not inevitable.

As George Schultz assumes the post, we wish him well. We presume he will remember that the President decides the direction of US foreign policy, and President Reagan is willing to assert his leadership in that area.

The Ultimate in Cowardice

Civilian casualties are the miserable byproduct by any war and are to be mourned. However, the PLO is brutally cynical about such things as it cries to the world about civilian deaths, while much of the media is fervently taking up its chant. Had the PLO cared half as much when those people were alive as they claim to when they are dead, it would have protected them rather than hiding behind them.

The Israelis have long maintained, and it is now indisputable, that the PLO made a practice of installing itself in the middle of civilian areas, hoping thereby to avoid Israeli attacks. For example, the *New York Times* reported on an artillery piece parked in the middle of an elementary school playground and an enormous cache of arms and explosives stored in the basement of the same building. Small children are clearly the most non-combatant element of any population. To deliberately place them in the position of shielding arms, ammunition and grown terrorists is despicable. And worse, *The Economist* reports that the PLO killed civilians as they tried to flee their position as hostages in Sidon, and killed Arab negotiators sent to secure safe passage for those civilians.

Media reports about the abuse inflicted on civilians by the PLO are few and far between. Even fewer are reports of the efforts by Israeli soldiers and commanders (stemming from official battle orders as well as individual consciences) to limit civilian casualties even at the cost of higher Israeli casualties. Little has been written about the extraordinary conduct of Israeli troops toward civilians in captured areas, or the leaflets in Arabic urging civilians of many coastal towns to move to the beach before the Israeli approach (thus giving up the element of surprise). A Pakistani doctor working in the area credits the Israeli leaflets with saving the vast majority of the civilian residents of Tyre.

The Israelis were clearly aware of the terrible precedent set by other nations, including the US, in conducting aerial bombings of civilian areas. The lessons of Dresden, Tokyo, London, Coventry and Hanoi were not lost on them, and they took extraordinary precautions to minimize civilian deaths. General Sharon described the commanders' meeting in which it was decided to take Sidon and Tyre in house-to-house fighting (raising Israeli casualties) rather than using an initial bombing:

I told them we encountered a very difficult problem and can solve it in an easy manner. The easy way is to bomb and totally destroy those areas we go through. The other difficult and bloody way is to purge the buildings. A discussion ensued. All of them. . . concluded that we must not (take the easy way). We said we knew our decision would carry a price and it did indeed.

Under the houses we came across concrete bunkers and basements from one to four floors, and. . . we are dealing with an enemy which held its own people hostage and killed children in front of their parents, as in Ein Al-Hilweh, in Sidon, in order to prevent us from purging the houses. . . Only when we reached the final stage, when it transpired that there was no other possibility, we used more massive artillery and air force sorties against civilian settlements. We did something that no army, no people in the world—be it the one pretending to be the most moral and civilized one—would have done. We did it. . . We made the proper decision.

The Israeli concern was well-placed, and their tactics successful. While much of the media accepted without question the Palestinian

figures of 10,000 killed and wounded, and 600,000 homeless, two American journalists found quite another picture. In a report printed in the *Washington Post* on 25 June, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote, "In the two cities of Tyre and Sidon, there is reason to take seriously the Israeli estimate of Lebanese casualties; a total of 250 killed and less than 1,000 wounded." Official Israeli estimates have been revised since the fighting in the south ended, and now read 400 in Sidon, 56 in Tyre, 10 in Nabatiyeh and 40 civilians and terrorists in the Ein Al-Hilweh refugee camp. Evidently, many journalists find it more "newsworthy" and much easier to show images of death and destruction than images of care taken to avoid killing civilians, or of armed people who made sitting ducks out of unarmed ones.

Who, then, is concerned about civilian casualties? The PLO who nested among them in the first place? The civilians, who could not or did not object until it was too late? The Lebanese authorities, who are only now trying to get a grip on the rampant lawlessness of foreign and domestic militias? The world's diplomats who ignored years of systematic terror and killing of Lebanese civilians by the PLO and Syrians? Or the Israelis, who removed the PLO, even at the cost of civilian lives and their own lives, and who now insist that terrorist elements be disarmed for all time?

Some commentators and politicians have suggested openly or obliquely that the Israelis deliberately exercised a bloody vengeance on non-combatants. Even some who consider themselves strong supporters of Israel said Israel had "overreacted against civilians." One should not be indifferent to death and human misery, but their outrage rings hollow in the face of the recent history of the Middle East and their own prior callousness. Consider: 1) In 1970, King Hussein of Jordan killed an estimated 10,000 Palestinians in his effort to drive them out of Jordan; 2) in 1975-76, 60,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were killed in the Civil War in which Israel had no part; 3) In April and May 1981, Syrians shelled Beirut, killing over 700 civilians as estimated by a Beirut daily newspaper; and 4) In May 1982, President Assad of Syria sent his troops to the Syrian city of Hama, killing an estimated 5,000 civilians who were his countrymen and razing the city (there are no accurate numbers there because no relief organization has been permitted in Hama, or in Aleppo, where there are reports of more deaths).

How many dead civilians are too many? The answer should have been one—Israeli, Lebanese or Palestinian—but that time is long past. All sides involved in the fighting and the diplomacy, past and present, carry the somber responsibility of the dead. To berate Israel for inflicting civilian casualties after the clear precautions they took, rather than condemning the PLO for setting up conditions proven to maximize those casualties, is a position that can be taken only by phoney intellectuals in safe harbors. Those who understand or have experienced the horror of terrorism and the lack of conscience of terrorists, must treat the Israeli incursion into Lebanon as a cure (albeit a painful one) for a deadly cancer. Indeed, many Lebanese of all religions have already done so.



ZSU-23 Quad IV Soviet anti-aircraft guns. The PLO stationed AA guns in civilian areas, including school yards.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

No aspect of Operation Peace in the Galilee has received more press attention than the civilian casualties. According to official Israeli reports, the numbers appearing in the press are an extreme exaggeration. Statistics are not yet complete, but the following have been verified to a large extent by the International Red Cross, local doctors and the Israeli Civilian Assistance Unit.

- Sidon—approximately 260 civilian deaths.
- Tyre—approximately 56
- Nabatiye—approximately 10

In addition, the Israeli Defense Forces are housing refugees temporarily in public buildings and seeing to their immediate needs. Their estimate is that no more than 20,000 persons remained homeless in all of southern Lebanon.

By way of comparison:

- The Lebanese Civil War (which has continued since 1975) caused the deaths of 98,854 and the wounding of 255,542 others (according to Beirut newspaper reports of October 1980).
- The Syrians shelled Zahle in the Beqaa Valley and East Beirut with artillery fire during April, May and June 1981, causing the deaths of approximately 400 persons and the wounding of 700-800 others.
- As a result of terrorist activity since 1975, approximately 180,000 residents of South Lebanon left the region.

IDF Precautions

The Israel Defense Forces took measures to avoid inflicting casualties on the civilian population:

- Every officer set out on his mission with a map indicating the location of terrorist next as well as villages which were free of terrorists. Officers received explicit instructions to attack predetermined terrorist positions and avoid unverified targets;
- Buildings were hit only when outgoing fire was detected from particular structures;
- IDF forces relinquished the element of surprise in Tyre and Sidon when Israeli soldiers called upon civilians to leave the area of the impending battle prior to hostilities.

On the other hand, the *New York Times* (21 June 1982) reported that a school in Tyre was used as a PLO anti-aircraft position while the children's shelter was used for storing shells, missiles and weapons. The PLO used civilian homes and institutions as military positions, according to American sources who have surveyed the area. During the 1978 Litani Operation, when the Israeli forces attempted to push the terrorists northward, they avoided entering the built-up, civilian coastal region including Sidon and Tyre. Following that operation, the PLO decided to exploit these towns more fully. A captured "Fatah" document reads in part: *The built up areas of Sidon and surrounding villages offer excellent cover. The trees offer total camouflage and cover vehicles and personnel. Deploy in buildings in Sidon, refugee camps and villages.*

ISRAEL, LEBANON AND THE UNITED STATES

by Francis P. Hoerber

Editor's Note: Mr. Hoerber is a consultant in National Security Affairs.

In the April issue, I suggested that there are deep psychological as well as diplomatic and military problems in the strenuous and sometimes tenuous strategic relationship between the United States and Israel. Certainly, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (not forecast in the April piece for obvious security reasons!) has amply and painfully demonstrated the difficulties in our relationship.

Some elements of the American Administration did not shown early support for Mr. Begin, to put it conservatively, and were prompt to call for immediate Israeli withdrawal, without any indication that they recognized the strategic realities which drove the Israelis and which should deeply concern the United States. Indeed, Mr. Begin's visit to the United States and the President during the truce (but not withdrawal) was widely called an "embarrassment" to the Administration. Also of embarrassment to the Administration has been the disunity of Mr. Reagan's advisors on how the U.S. should react to the crisis. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger called for a strong public rebuke of Israel while former Secretary of State Alexander Haig refrained from harsh criticism of Israel.

President Reagan himself showed an understanding of the scope of the problem. After the above-mentioned visit by Prime Minister Begin, while not endorsing the Israeli military action, he called for a Syrian and PLO, as well as Israeli, withdrawal from Lebanon. The U.S. refused to support a resolution from the UN Security Council calling for Israeli withdrawal stating that the resolution was "unbalanced." The President further said his goals include a secure border between Lebanon and Israel, and the establishment of a strong central Lebanese government.

What have been the realities of the situation? Let us try to list the most important factors, and then discuss them.

- 1) The PLO was ensconced en masse in southern Lebanon and had shelled Galilee therefrom;
- 2) The Syrians have been in Lebanon since 1976, but had massively reinforced their presence in recent months;
- 3) The Soviets have supported and armed both the PLO and the Syrians in Lebanon;
- 4) Lebanon, a country of many peoples and factions, has proved incapable of either forming a coherent government or of protecting its own sovereignty.

The PLO in Lebanon

Yassar Arafat is indeed a man without a country—and likely to remain so as long as he and the PLO demand that the Israelis be a people without a country. But when he and his forces were denied asylum in Jordan in September 1970, he moved into Lebanon and over the years built up his organization and forces there. The Syrians, who have no more desire than the Jordanians to see a Palestinian state, pushed the PLO southward in Lebanon, toward Israel, by massing forces to keep open the road from Damascus to Beirut on the western coast of central Lebanon. Contained on the north by the Syrians but unimpeded by the factionalized, virtually anarchic Lebanese,


the PLO controlled the countryside and built up its military forces for periodic raids and constant pressure on Galilee in northern Israel, as well as maintaining a base supporting terrorism against Israel and worldwide.

It has been said that the attempted murder of Israel's Ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, on June 3, provided the "excuse" for the Israeli invasion, preceded only by an Israeli bombardment of Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon (without waiting for the establishment of responsibility for the attack on Argov) and a PLO countermove of a barrage against Galilee. There may be some truth to this accusation, but as Henry Kissinger has observed, "No sovereign state can tolerate indefinitely the buildup on its borders of a military force dedicated to its destruction and implementing its objectives by periodical shellings and raids." Moreover, the Falklands had diverted U.S. and European attention to the South Atlantic (although some European leaders called for a conference to discuss economic sanctions against Israel), and the apparently imminent victory of Iran over Iraq turned Arab attention in that direction.

While the PLO as a political movement has undoubtedly not been destroyed, its military capabilities have been virtually eliminated for a considerable time to come. The Israelis profess to be astounded and—despite their superb intelligence apparatus they may well be—by the massive Soviet stocks of tanks, artillery, and ammunition that have been built up by the PLO and also by the number of foreign terrorists, notably from the Bader-Meinhof gang, among the captured Palestinians. The number of PLO captured may still be in some doubt—at time of writing it is supposed to be between six and seven thousand—but the crucial question is not how many, but how they will be disposed of. They cannot be exchanged for smaller numbers of captured Israelis, for this would represent an exchange of POWs, which implies an Israeli concession that it has been at war with the PLO. Wars occur between nations, and clearly the Israelis will not recognize the PLO, which has never recognized Israel. A long period of screening of the captured forces may be anticipated, conceivably with the indefinite internment or even trial of identified terrorists of Palestinian or other origins. Meanwhile, as Prime Minister Begin said on "Face the Nation" on June 20, it will take many trips by the largest trucks to gather up and take to Israel the tremendous stores of weapons found in PLO-controlled areas. Clearly, there will be no withdrawal until that task is finished.

The Israelis have also noted and are producing photographic evidence, that the PLO used schools and basements of many civilian buildings for storage of weapons and ammunition. This is their answer to the PLO—and worldwide—complaints of civilian casualties (which clearly have not disturbed the PLO in attacks on Galilee). The Israelis claim to have been as precise as possible in attacking known military targets. The Israeli military record and the evidence presented of the PLO's exploitation of the ancient tactic of using sanctuaries as shields tend to give strong credibility to the Israeli side of that argument.

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Survey

(Continued from page 1)

The southern Beqaa and its approaches from Israel are dominated by the Beaufort heights, which rise steeply to a height of 717 meters, and lie near the bend of the Litani River.

Terrorist Forces

On the eve of Operation Peace for Galilee, the "regular," permanent terrorist forces in Lebanon comprised some 15,000 fighters under the overall command of the "Supreme Military Council" in Beirut. Additional militiamen were recruited from among Palestinian refugees. They were organized into units of battalion strength in the following heavily defended areas:

- The western slopes of the Hermon Range ("Fatahland").
- The Nabatiye region
- The Achiye-Rihane region
- The Tyre region
- The Qana region
- Sidon
- The northern coast region

In organizing their defense, they had brought to an unprecedented state of perfection the deliberate placing of military positions, HQs, stores, weapon emplacements of every kind, indeed their entire military infrastructure, in the midst of urban and rural settlements. It suffices to note the example of inhabited Sidon apartment houses, the cellars of which were turned into storage areas for high explosives, ammunition and weapons. Space in many apartments was requisitioned for the construction of weapon emplacements,

command posts, and the like.

The Syrian Forces

Other complications existed. Large portions of the terrorist forces were deployed in areas under Syrian army control. In Beirut, the Syrians held a division-size force, including a tank brigade and two infantry brigades of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) made up of Palestinian refugees. A further tank brigade and support troops were deployed in the area between the Syrian border and Joub Jannine, in which batteries of SA 2, 3, and 6 were positioned. The troops there occupied positions in the northern part of Fatahland. A brigade-size composite force was deployed in the Beqaa both from sides of Lake Qaraoun to the line Kalukaba-Hasbaya, its deployment area overlapping with portions of the terrorist positions. Since it was Israel's intention to abstain from drawing Syria into the war, as declared officially in a statement read by the government spokesman, the IDF command had to plan for the elimination of the terrorists from among their midst without engaging the Syrians themselves beyond the scope of self-defense operations.

IDF Planning and Composition of Forces

The Israeli command formed three task forces of armor, mobile infantry, and supporting units.

- a. Task Force-West—to operate along the coastal area
- b. Task Force-Centre—to operate along the ridge and upper western slopes of the Leba-mountain range

c. Task Force-South—to operate in the Beqaa valley and along the slopes of the Hermon (the Anti-Lebanon).

To overcome terrorist opposition, with as few casualties as possible to both the attacking forces and the civilian population, the operation was planned as a swift advance in depth, bypassing pockets of resistance, which remained to be tackled later while the advancing columns aimed at cutting of all terrorist forces and bases from their Lebanese and Syrian rear.

In the western sector, the advance on land was to be coupled with the landing of troops from the sea, bypassing narrow mountain passes, towns, and other centers of resistance. Strategically, the success of the operation depended largely on the quick conquest of the Nabatiye-Arnoun heights, which are comparable to a huge turntable. From the Nabatiye area, one can strike out along the Jezzine-Ain Dara axis, thereby splitting the enemy through its middle, while creating a severe threat to the Syrian positions in the Beqaa from flank and rear, and finally threatening to cut the Syrian life line to Lebanon, the Beirut-Shtura-Damascus road.

At the same time, it is from the Nabatiye area that one can move to the right and attack the Beaufort from the most advantageous direction (the conquest of the Beaufort being a prerequisite for an advance in the Eastern Sector).

Third, it was from here that a force was compelled to move in any attempt

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Israel-Lebanon Relations An Overview

What caused Israel's "quiet" border to disintegrate? To understand Operation Peace for Galilee, one must understand the reasons behind the deterioration in relations between Israel and Lebanon.

1900-1948: Before Independence

When renewed Jewish settlement in this area began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Lebanese border region was barren, scrubby and partially covered with swamps. A few tenant farmers worked the land for the rich effendi land owners, who lived in the major cities of the ruling Turkish Empire. Beduins roamed the area. The effendis were delighted to find buyers for their parched, unproductive land as Jews coming from Russia, Rumania, Persia and Lebanon itself began to settle the area.

At the end of WWI, the French Mandate included all of present-day Lebanon and the Upper Galilee region, where there were three Jewish settlements: Metulla, K'far Giladi, and Tel Hai. When Tel Hai was attacked by Arab marauders in 1920, all three settlements were evacuated with the help and assistance of their Lebanese Methualite (Shiite Moslem) neighbors.

A few years later, with the region under British Mandate, the settlers returned and rehabilitated the abandoned villages. Peace and cooperation continued until the bloody Arab raids of 1936-39. Smugglers and marauding bands of Arabs freely infiltrated deep into the country's interior. The British tried to close off the border by erecting a barbed wire barrier called the Northern Fence. They built the Northern Road which was patrolled by border guards and erected a string of police forts with commanding views of the area.

Jewish settlement remained limited until 1939. With the short-lived cessation of the anti-Jewish riots in 1939, a series of "Tower and Stockade" settlements was established: Hanita and Eilon in the west and Dan, Dafna and Amir in the Galilee panhandle. Four additional settlements, Matzuva in the west and Manara, Ramot Naftali and Misgav Am along the Naftali Hills, were built between 1940 and 1945.

At the end of WWI, hundreds of "illegal Jewish immigrants," running the British Blockade, were smuggled into the British Mandate territory through Lebanon with the assistance of local Lebanese residents.

1948-1967: Independence to the Six Day War

Lebanon joined the Arab attack on the newly declared State of Israel in 1948. The Lebanese Army advanced along the coast and in the center with fighting continuing until Operation Hiram ended the war in the north. Named after Hiram, King of Tyre, who assisted King Solomon in the construction of the Temple, the 29-31 October 1948 operation freed the Galilee of the Arab "Army of Liberation" under the Syrian commander Fawzi Qawuqji. The Israeli counter-attack penetrated all the way to the Litani River and ten Lebanese villages were held until the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon was signed on 22 March 1949. A UN-sponsored Armistice Commission with Israeli and Lebanese representation functioned well until the Six Day War.

In the eighteen years after independence, the existing 12 settlements

were augmented by 23 more built along the Lebanese border as the long period of the "quiet" border continued.

1967-1973:

The Six Day War to the Yom Kippur War

Lebanon did not enter the Six Day War and the quiet along the border was respected by both sides until 1969.

Terrorist attacks and Israeli retaliation began and, in 1971 they accelerated with the PLO expulsion from Jordan. Terrorist concentrations in southern Lebanon sharply increased, but since warnings to the Lebanese government did not restrain their incursions into Israel, the Israel Defense Force retaliated. Characteristically, relations with local Lebanese farmers and villagers continued to be good with little disruption in their pattern of living.

1973-1978

The Yom Kippur War to Operation Litani

Lebanon officially stayed out of the Yom Kippur War, but the Lebanese government was powerless to prevent the PLO from shelling Israel's northern settlements. After the war, the shelling and infiltration increased as the killings of civilians in Maalot, Kiryat Shemona, Shamir and Nahariya attest. A period of terrorist attacks and IDF retaliation continued until the Lebanese Civil War, beginning in 1975, dramatically altered the situation. In mid-1976, Israel opened the Good Fence, offering residents of southern Lebanon humanitarian aid without regard for race or creed.

Concurrently, the PLO turned the area into a center for international terrorist activities. Here, terrorists from all over the world lived, trained and embarked on their missions while the PLO took control of food supplies, electricity, medical supplies, water, etc., and subjugated the local population. The three Christian enclaves in southern Lebanon suffered loss of life and property as pressure built. Only the aid provided through the Good Fence to Moslems and Christians, seems to have prevented annihilation of these enclaves.

On 11 March 1978, terrorist incursions reached a climax. A PLO raiding party captured a bus on the Tel Aviv-Haifa highway and killed 35 men, women and children, injuring 80 others in the "Coastal Road Massacre" which ended just miles from Israel's most heavily populated area.

Operation Litani began the night of 14-15 March and continued for seven days. The IDF removed the terrorists from southern Lebanon and ceased operation when they reached the Litani River. All of southern Lebanon, except for Tyre and the Rachidiye refugee camp, was in Israeli hands.

Israel agreed to withdraw in favor of UNIFIL, the United Nations peace-keeping force established under Security Council Resolution 425. Despite this force and the security corridor of 120 square kilometers controlled by Major Haddad's Christian Militia, the PLO returned to South Lebanon stronger than ever.

With the terrorist murder of a father and child in Nahariya in April 1979, the IDF once again initiated retaliatory actions. In August quiet was restored, only to be broken in April 1980 when the PLO attacked a children's nursery in Kibbutz Misgav Am, killing three people, including an infant, and wounding

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SYRIA IN LEBANON

The 1975-76 Lebanese Civil War enabled Syria to enter that divided country and gain control by playing one side off against the other. In mid-January 1976, Syria invaded Lebanon under the guise of the Palestine Liberation Army. "We decided to go in under the name of the PLA," Syrian President Assad later confessed. "We did not consult them (the Palestinians) nor did we consult the nationalist parties."

Syria's intervention shifted the tide in favor of the leftists (whom Syria supported at the time) but Syria did not let these pro-Iraqis reap the fruits of their victory (the Syrians being distinctly anti-Iraqi). They imposed a cease-fire and a "constitutional document" which was unacceptable to the leftists since it did not reflect their strengthened position.

Syria then decided to crush leftist opposition and sent in commandos (March) and an armored brigade (April). She installed a figurehead president in a special election held under the guns of Syrian troops present in the Chamber of Deputies at the time of the vote.

Syria used the excuse of an apparently "rigged" petition by two Lebanese villages on the Syrian border (31 May) to send in a full division which had long been waiting poised.

Only six days later did the Christians adopt a resolution approving the Syrian intervention and on 9 June and 4 October 1976 in Cairo and Riyadh the Arab League gave ex post facto recognition to the invasion by dubbing Syria a member of a multi-national Arab Deterrent Force. This force was a fiction at its creation and even moreso after the last non-Syrian contingent left in 1978.

Syria helped the Christians crush the Leftist coalition and then turned against her "Christian allies" whose Western orientation she feared. Syrian troops conquered the North and Northern Beqaa shelling civilian population centers in East Beirut and Bachri. They have since, along with PLO leftists and Faranjiyya proteges, been Masters of Lebanon. Only the Haddad Enclave, the Jounye-Jbail-Kasroun bulge, Eastern Beirut and some "islands" in the Southern Beqaa are non-Syrian.

During 1977, the Syrians established and consolidated their positions in Lebanon, while there was a stalemate in redressing the underlying issues of the

Lebanese crisis. Because of the Sadat initiative, the Syrians were unable to exert pressure on the Palestinians, who were previously their chief allies, and the situation began to deteriorate.

At the same time, the poor relationship that had always prevailed between the Syrians and the Christian community erupted into violent confrontation, beginning with an attempt to establish Syrian positions at the entrance to a Christian camp near Fayadiya. In April, local incidents in two quarters of Eastern Beirut resulted in a Syrian bombardment which killed a number of civilians.

In June, tensions caused by these confrontations caused a deep rift in Chris-

The Arab League gave ex-post facto recognition to the invasion by dubbing Syria a member of a multi-national Arab Deterrent Force. This force was a fiction...

tian solidarity. Suleiman Franjeh, leading the pro-Syrian feudal interests, was confronted by the Phalangists and the Camille Chamoun's supporters who were anti-Syrian. The struggle came to a head with the murder of Franjeh's son Toni on 13 June 1978. Tensions were exacerbated by the Christian-Syrian confrontations which grew in scope. In July, the Syrians bombarded Christian civilian population centers, particularly in Beirut, while strengthening their forces already in place.

Hostilities continued until 9 August when a cease fire was arranged. The Syrians realizing that public opinion had turned against them. Under heavy American pressure and plagued by Israeli overflights in a show of strength, they decided to turn their attention to the Christian areas north of the capital.

They began a systematic slaughter of anti-Syrian elements in the northern Christian villages, resulting in a devastating weakening of the Christian resistance. During this period, the elements which had given legitimacy to the pan-Arab concept of the Arab Deterrent Force began to disassociate themselves with the Syrian onslaught. In February, the Sudanese contingent withdrew. In March, it was the Saudis who left. In April the United Arab Emirates unit followed suit, leaving the force totally Syrian and perhaps "unmasking" the ultimate aim of the Syrians.

By October 1978, with the Christians desperately weakened, the Syrians again agreed to a cease fire. Numerous attempts to bring real quiet to the area failed, notably the Beit ed-Din Commission, whose recommendations in October 1978 remained on paper only.

In May 1979, Lebanese President Elias Sarkis met with Syrian President Hafez Assad. They agreed that 1) Syrian forces would remain in Lebanon; 2) more security assignments would be given to the Lebanese Army and that Syrian forces would be redeployed though not reduced; and 3) a new coalition government would be formed, which would try to reach a domestic political solution. Subsequently, three

governments have been formed, all of which have failed to bring about any semblance of domestic tranquility. The PLO continued to build their power base in the south and to move at will throughout the Moslem community disrupting any attempts at reconciliation. The Christians continued their internecine warfare with the Kataeb (the Social Democratic Kataeb Party or the Phalangist Party) eventually taking control of Chamoun's followers and becoming a cohesive anti-Syrian force.

In late December 1980, clashes between rival Christian elements in the city of Zahle resulted in the killing of five Syrian soldiers and brought Syria and the United Lebanese Forces of the Kataeb and Chamoun into direct confrontation.

Zahle is a Christian town of 200,000 located in the Bekaa Valley and on the main highway linking Beirut with Damascus. The citizens of Zahle had attempted to construct an alternative road to this highway which was controlled by Syrian roadblocks, thus freeing themselves of dependence on the Syrian Army. To stop this, the Syrians kidnapped the Lebanese Forces commander and began the shelling of Zahle.

Three Syrian battalions surrounded the town and held the bridge over the Beradouni River, which divides the town and controls the road to Damascus. Greatly reinforced Christian

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Soviet T-72 new main battle tank. In its first battlefield test, the T-72 was shown to be vulnerable to Western weaponry used by the Israelis. The Syrians lost approximately nine T-72 tanks.

Survey

(Continued from page 4)

to bypass the coast as far north as the mouth of the Zaharani River, in a deep detour so as to join columns moving along the coastal road.

In the east, there was no alternative to effecting a breakthrough in the Beqaa advancing along parallel roads leading to the Qaraoun-Rashaya area.

To achieve all of the above, sufficient superiority, especially in firepower, was created, and so was a closeknit system of air support for well-balanced armor and infantry teams. The assault helicopters, as well as those in command and control of logistic functions, need special mention.

It was hoped that the psychological effect of bypassing, encirclement, ample prior warning to the civilian population, and frequent calls for surrender would minimize the casualties of the civilian population. Israeli counterfire was restricted to the sources of terrorist and Syrian fire, with all possible care for noncombatant life and property. Troops withheld their fire under danger of their own lives until encountering actual resistance.

The Attack

The attack on the coastal sector commenced on Sunday the 6th, with a combined land and sea assault. While a mobile column struck out along the road in the direction of Tyre, a landing was effected near the mouth of the Litani River at Qasmiya, and the troops quickly moved down on Tyre from the north.

The terrorists were quickly alerted, and put up a spirited defense from their well-prepared positions, but by nightfall, Tyre was encircled. Strongholds and positions such as Qlaile, Ras el Ain, Rachidiye, Ein el Kantar, Bourghlike, were partly captured, partly bypassed. Consideration for the lives of the civilian population made the officer in command postpone the battle for the city of Tyre to the following day.

A further bridgehead was established further north at the mouth of the Aouali River; from here, troops could move down and join the fighting in the Tyre region, as well as advance upon Sidon.

The Central Sector

After securing their primary objective—the Aqiya bridge over the deep Litani gorge—central task force troops stormed the Arnoun heights and established themselves in the Nabatiye

sector. Immediately, one force moved east to conquer the Beaufort. The nearly inaccessible mountain was captured at midnight. In a parallel action, another unit turned west and pushed through Doveir and Kfour toward the Sidon area. At the time the Aqiya bridge was captured, another unit secured the Har-dale bridge, the only other passage over the Litani south of Lake Qaraoun, gained the Nabatiye bridge, bypassed the Aichiye positions, and commenced its advance against strong resistance along the mountain road, as far north as Arab Salim.

The crucial break through enemy positions had been achieved.

The Eastern Sector

Jumping off from Metulla, the eastern task force crossed the valley and pushed into Fatahland. East of Mar-jayoun, the passages between the steep hills became narrow gorges, yet mutually supporting armor and motorized troops advanced as far as the natural line of defense Hasbaya-Kaoukaba.

The Second Day

The Western Sector

In the south, Tyre was completely isolated and its inhabitants called upon to leave the town for the seashore prior to the assault. After the capture of the outskirts, a slow advance commenced, in which Israeli troops abstained from preventive fire prior to entering rooms and structures so as not to hurt noncombatants.

Further north, the Navy effected another landing while providing artillery fire for the advance on Sidon. By nightfall, the troops that moved along the coast and upon Sidon from the north and the south linked up with the force that had moved up the previous day from the Aqiya bridge and from the Arnoun heights through Doveir. Thus, a sufficient force was assembled for dealing with this major terrorist stronghold and for exploiting the success by moving further north.

The Central Sector

While the forces that had been engaged in fighting on the previous day consolidated their hold on the Arnoun heights (the Nabatiye area), another force pushed through this jumping-off position northward, to exploit the foothold on the mountain road and battle its way over 30 kms from the border to Jaba in the mountains, reaching the Syrian most forward positions in the Aichiye region. The first contact with



It will take several weeks to remove and catalogue the vast quantities of PLO armament captured in Southern Lebanon.

Syrian forces was made at Jezzine. Following orders, Israeli forces did not initiate fire, but returned it. Syrian armor and artillery commenced fighting that escalated and resulted in penetration of their position by the IDF.

The Eastern Sector

Fighting along the Hasbaya-Kaoukaba line continued.

The Third Day

The combined forces that had converged upon Sidon continued to advance up to two kilometers south of Damour. Naval support was effective in silencing targets along the line of advance as well as in rendering sundry logistic services. Sidon was besieged and mop-up operations in Tyre continued. The latter was slowed down by the fact that the terrorists were forcibly detaining civilians in their strongholds.

The Central Sector

While the Syrian armored brigade, strengthened with commando battalions and with a Palestine Liberation Army brigade, was engaged in the Jezzine area, with the active support of the air force and artillery (which used a variety of anti tank missiles and artillery ammunition), the mobile spearhead of the Central Task Force reached the heights over the Damour es Saffa River, which form the main southern and south-eastern chain of natural defense for Beirut and the Beirut-Damascus Highway. The outskirts of the Beit el Din and Ain Dara were reached.

This advance over 20 kms was beginning to threaten the Syrian hold over Beirut, as well as to endanger their positions in the Qaraoun area.

Under these pressures and that of the IDF forces which had captured the Arnoun heights turntable, the Syrians were ousted from Jezzine, and all of the Nabatiye area, which lay far behind the forward elements.

The Eastern Sector

Heavy fighting continued throughout all of that day.

The Fourth Day

This day was crucial for the complete success of the operation. Israel had thus far succeeded in restraining Syria from embarking on an all-out war.

The severe mauling of their occupation forces, as well as the danger of the complete loss of Lebanon, caused Assad to order the strengthening of the array of S.A. 2, 3, and 6 missile batteries to a total of 19. Previous experience had shown that this was a most effective weapon, and it was hoped that the threat of its use alone would constitute a strong deterrent for Israel. (The maximum effective range of the S.A. 6

surface-to-air missile at high altitude is about 60 kms, at low altitude possibly 30 kms. It is both command guided and self-homing. From their positions in the Zahle and just inside the Syrian border, all of the air space between Kiryat Shemona and Beirut was covered by the S.A. 2, 3, and 6 batteries.)

Israel viewed these Syrian moves as further flagrant breeches in the Syrian-Israeli cease-fire agreement, according to which even the existing missile batteries had no right to be there. It came as a further surprise, since at the same moment the American envoy Philip Habib had started talks in Damascus, on the basis of the mutual acceptance of the existing status quo in Lebanon. Accordingly, in the morning hours, the cabinet decided upon the elimination of the AA missiles at Zahle.

The mission was carried out at 14:00 hours by an IDF Air Force formation. Nineteen batteries were completely destroyed, four further severely damaged without the loss of a single Israeli aircraft. The impact on the Syrian morale was the more shattering since the Syrian aircraft launched to interfere were beaten back with the heavy loss of twenty MIG 21 and MIG 23 planes—again without any losses to the Israeli air force.

These spectacular achievements were due to—as of the writing of these pages—undisclosed sophisticated electronic devices and types of ammunition, the exact use of which had been carefully rehearsed by all concerned. Complete Israeli air supremacy was conclusively demonstrated, and so were the dangers of exposing the remaining Syrian forces in Lebanon to Israeli air strikes.

As these developments were taking place in the skies, matters on the ground proceeded as follows:

The Western Sector

While Tyre was being finally cleared and relief work was getting underway, the battle in Sidon continued. Further north, the third major population centre on the road to Beirut, Damour—with its accumulation of terrorist installations—fell after heavy battle. The entrance into the Ein Al-Hilweh refugee camp was postponed out of consideration for the great number of non-combatants who were in part forcibly held there by the terrorist fighters.

Central Sector

Heavy tank battles ensued with the Syrians during which the IDF established itself securely on the heights around Ain Dara in a position commanding the Damascus-Beirut highway from a distance of 3 kms.

Eastern Sector

After the Hasbaya-Kaoukaba line

was broken through, the eastern sector task force penetrated the area east of Lake Qaraoun in a running battle with the terrorists and the Syrian armored division.

The Fifth Day

Western Sector

With the close support of the Navy, the outskirts of Khalde were reached. The western sector task force was now at distance of about 10 kms from the heart of Beirut.

Advance elements were now directed in an outflanking movement towards the east, which at the same time aimed at cutting off Beirut and the terrorist forces in its western and southern outskirts from the east and the Damascus road.

Central Sector

During the previous day's fighting from Rachaiya north and eastward, the impetus was given to follow the mountain roads up to Kafr Quoia and Beqaa, each less than 5 kms (straight-line) from the Syrian border, in the rugged mountains at the rear of the Fatahland. This move succeeded in severing, under heavy resistance, this formerly de facto autonomous enclave from its Syrian hinterland as completely as the difficult topography permitted.

Further west, one mechanized Syrian brigade barely escaped being cut off during a fierce tank battle around lake Qaraoun, which ended with a Syrian withdrawal to the north towards the Damascus road, and the Israeli forces established themselves along the Beqaa-Joub Jannine line.

The Sixth Day

At 12:00 hours Israel ceased fire on all fronts against Syrian troops, on the basis of an agreement brought about through the endeavors of the United States. Israel did, however, explicitly exclude the terrorist organizations from this agreement and reiterated its right and intention to continue the operations necessary for the complete destruction of the PLO on Lebanese soil. Israeli forces took up positions in the northern Christian parts of Beirut. The remaining Syrian troops in Lebanon soil are concentrated mainly in the Zahle-Shtura area, and were reinforced (between 10 and 11 June) to a strength of about two divisions.

During the 5½ days of fighting, a territory of about 4,500 km² came under Israeli control. While pockets of resistance may take days and even weeks to eliminate, one may confidently view the defense system and the physical infrastructure of the terrorists as broken, and their weapon arsenal as destroyed or captured.



The Soviet 130mm field gun was used by the PLO for shelling northern Israeli settlements. The range of 2700 meters allowed the PLO to fire from behind UNIFIL positions in Lebanon and strike Israel.

Relations

(Continued from page 5)

16 others.

IDF actions were initiated against Lebanese-based PLO guerrillas and were aimed at neutralizing their infrastructure, keeping them off balance and preventing them from taking further offensive action. This policy remained in effect until deteriorating conditions in the rest of Lebanon created a new situation in the south.

1978-1982:

Camp David to Operation Peace for Galilee

Relative quiet prevailed along the Israel-Lebanon border following the IDF's series of preventive actions, except for a short flurry of guerrilla activity following the signing of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. The period until April 1981 saw relatively few terrorist incursions. The IDF maintained its policy of keeping the PLO on the run and undermining their confidence in their ability to protect themselves.

With the outbreak of the Syrian-Lebanese Christian fighting, culminating in the Battle of Zahle in April 1981, a greatly reinforced PLO once again began offensive actions against Israeli settlements. Now deeply entrenched in South Lebanon and with more sophisticated weaponry, the PLO incessantly shelled Major Haddad's enclaves and the 33 Israeli towns and settlements along the border. Life in the area came to a virtual standstill as most of the residents of the area were forced to live in bomb shelters on a semi-permanent basis. IDF retaliation against both the PLO and the Syrian Army eventuated the cease-fire negotiated by US Emissary, Philip Habib on 24 July 1981.

Although Israel and Syria observed the cease-fire, the same could not be said for the PLO. They were active in three different areas—attack, armament and infrastructure—during this period.

During the cease-fire, the PLO launched 290 terrorist actions against Israeli targets, including laying landmines, shelling and Katyusha rocket barrages, explosive charges in populated areas, attacks on tourists, and murder and attempted murder of Israeli diplomats. In May 1982 alone there were 26 strikes. At the same time, the PLO arsenals filled with new weaponry, mostly of Soviet manufacture. Supplied by Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya and South Yemen (See JINSA Newsletter, October 1981 for details), modern tanks and armored personnel carriers, BM 21 and BM 11 rocket launchers, artillery pieces with ranges up to 17.5 miles, anti-aircraft guns, SA 7 and SA 9 shoulder-fired missiles, and almost 20,000 tons of ammunition were stockpiled in strategically located arms depots.

PLO policy determined that the "safest" place to build their infrastructure would be in the midst of heavily populated civilian areas. Capitalizing on the known Israeli policy regarding minimizing civilian casualties at great risk to military personnel, the bunkers and command posts were built, impervious to air attack; ammunition was stockpiled, positions were heavily fortified, and artillery batteries were positioned close to civilian centers.

Such was the PLO situation in South Lebanon at the outset of Operation Peace for Galilee.



Although the preponderance of PLO armament captured in Lebanon was of Soviet origin, this display shows small arms manufactured in the US, France, Italy, Egypt, China and Germany.

United States

(Continued from page 4)

The Syrians in Lebanon

The Syrian forces in Lebanon included large numbers of Soviet-made tanks as well as air defenses. As the Israelis moved north, they say, the Syrians started south to engage them, presumably to keep them away from the defenses of the Damascus-Beirut Highway, and the Israelis continued north to counterattack. (A sovereign nation need not aid its tormentor by sticking to its announced war aims—25-mile penetration, as urged by many, regardless of developments during the war; it is even entitled to use deception in its strategy and tactics.) The Israelis apparently found significant chinks in the armor of the Soviet T-72 tank, heretofore asserted to be the best deployed tanks in the world (a title which must now go to the Israeli Merkava). (The T-72s may have been early models; we assume U.S. intelligence will eventually be shown some.) The Israelis also performed an impressive technological feat in using drones, or remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVs) in detecting the radio frequencies being used by the Soviet surface-to-air missiles, the SA-6s, and destroyed all or most of them with air attacks. They also destroyed considerable numbers of Syrian (Soviet) Mig-21s and Mig-23s in the course of the battle. For the Syrians, this represents a great loss of credibility as the peacekeepers of Lebanon as well as the containers of the PLO; for the Israelis, it represents the at least tem-

porary removal of a serious additional threat from the north.

Soviet Arms

Once more the widespread American and Western Tendency to explain away Soviet expansionism, particularly in the Middle East, has been refuted by Soviet actions. The Israeli photographs, and undoubtedly physical demonstrations to come, demonstrate clearly that most of the Syrian and PLO weapons in Lebanon were of Soviet origin. In short, the Soviets had two additional proxies in the Levant, useful at a minimum to guard the western flanks of their apparent gradual encirclement of the Persian Gulf region, emphasizing once more what should be the common U.S., Israeli, and NATO interest in defending that region.

Lebanese Anarchy

Although Lebanon, like Israel, is a tiny country, it is a nation of many tribes. Christians and Shiites, Druze (who have already declined to help form a new government) and many factions of these tribes, for example the Frangieh, Phalangist, and Haddad Christian militias. Though the Lebanese have been the shrewd traders of the Levant, they clearly have no present ability to form a coherent government. Only the Christian militia is a significant military force. The most sympathetic to the Israelis, this force nevertheless played no role in the recent hostilities, and is surely of marginal significance as an Israeli ally. A peacekeeping force is patently, and desperately, needed. The Israelis have in the past rejected a U.N.

Syria

(Continued from page 5)

units recaptured the bridge and the Syrians laid down a heavy artillery barrage throughout Zahle. The fighting soon spread to the Christian parts of Beirut. In a massive show of strength the Syrians brought in an additional 11 battalions as the destruction of Zahle commenced. Unable to regain control of the bridge or to force the city to surrender, the Syrians completely surrounded the town and started a siege which prevented reinforcements and supplies from reaching the beleaguered Christians. Heavy casualties and severe losses of materiel were suffered by both sides.

In 1980 in Tunis, many Arab foreign ministers questioned the Syrian mandate and in May 1981, they cut off funds to the Syrians who had been killing Christians in Zahle and Beirut.

Fearing that any sign of weakness could result in the Lebanese government publicly asking for their withdrawal and worrying about posing pan-Arab support for their intervention in Lebanon, the Syrians were determined to take decisive action in Zahle. Late in April 1981, the Syrians reached an understanding with the Lebanese government which placed Lebanese police in Zahle to separate the two forces. Immediately, the Syrians turned their attention to the Christian position on Mount Sanine, known as the "French Room." This position affords artillery control of Zahle and the port of Jounieh, through which the Christians received supplies. Encountering heavy resistance in their advance on the French Room and on Mount Lebanon, the Syrians launched aerial attacks by assault helicopters on 25-27 April 1981. For the first time in

four years of Syrian intervention in Lebanon, the clearly defined "red line" with Israel had been crossed.

Although Israel had stated publicly many times its desire not to be involved in the hostilities taking place in Central and Northern Lebanon, they refused to sit on the sidelines and watching the Lebanese Christian community face this onslaught without any protection from air attack.

On 28 April, the Israeli air force shot down two Russian-built Syrian MI-8 assault helicopters. The following day, Syria moved SAM-6 missile batteries into Lebanon. At the same time, SAM-2 and SAM-3 missile batteries were moved into the bulge in the Syrian-Lebanon border, which is in range of the Zahle area. In May and June, additional SAM-6 batteries were positioned in the valley. In all, 12 banks of SAM missile batteries were positioned in an area 20-25 km south of Zahle.

Designed to protect armored units from aerial attack, these batteries immobilized the IDF's ability to assist the Christian forces when they were under attack. For more than a year, Israel pursued a diplomatic solution to this untenable situation. Despite the efforts of U.S. Emissary Philip Habib and others, the missiles remained in place. Their effective range reached into Beirut and the port of Jounieh in the north, blanketed Zahle and the Christian villages of North Lebanon, and covered Major Haddad's enclave and the northern tip of Israel in the south.

With Syria's intervention into Operation Peace for Galilee, despite Israel's repeated calls for them not to interfere, the IDF air force eliminated the threat posed by this massive array of Soviet-made Syrian missile power on 9 June 1982.

peacekeeping force, and there is no reason to believe that such a force could be effective, given the antagonism to Israel in the U.N. itself. Mr. Begin said in his "Face the Nation" interview that Israel would accept a multinational force but "If the United States is willing to participate, we shall accept it willingly." If we are going to persist in the myth of the Rapid Deployment Force against the contingency of threats to the Persian Gulf, the establishment of a significant U.S. base in Lebanon may make belated amends for our failure to do so at Etzion and Etam upon the transfer of the Sinai to Egypt.

Conclusions

The United States should heed the Israeli plea to provide a peacekeeping force. It should also do its utmost to aid in the establishment of a stable Lebanese government.

The United States should steadfastly make Israeli withdrawal absolutely contingent upon Syrian withdrawal. Palestinians will remain in Lebanon, but the PLO militia and terrorists should be cut off as soon as they may once more raise their heads in the area. Indeed, an Israeli withdrawal is unlikely as long as the PLO is capable of military action in southern Lebanon or retains a base, with arms, in western Beirut.

The United States should not accept the view that events show its weakness in the area. On the contrary, we should miss no chance to support the argument that Western, primarily American, arms and technology proved superior to those of the Soviets, in Lebanon and the

Falkland Islands simultaneously. America must also give full credit to Israeli technology and must recognize openly what the Israelis have accomplished for the West. While the Soviets may well replenish Syrian, Argentine and even PLO stocks—and surely they cannot welcome that burden—they were in both areas conspicuous by their attitude of "let's you and him fight and we'll criticize." The dissatisfaction already expressed by the leaders of the PLO and Syria at the lack of Soviet support should be capitalized upon. On the other hand, euphoria over the demonstrated superiority of Western arms over often second-line Soviet equipment in Lebanon and the Falklands—and its exploitation by the "freeze" movement—should not blind us to the continuing Soviet quantitative and qualitative build up.

In short, the United States must—to repeat the theme of my earlier article—admit the two-sidedness of the U.S.-Israeli strategic relationship and stand ready to give more help and less criticism. We played an honest broker role between Egypt and Israel. There may be no more Sadats in the Middle East, but we must build up the confidence of King Hussein in Jordan and President Sarkis in Lebanon that we can be trusted to protect their interests; both want no PLO or Syrians in their homes or knocking on their doors.

The Israelis seek territorial protection, yes; empire, new lands to govern and defend, no.

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

RONALD REAGAN: "We have a situation in Lebanon in which there was a force, the PLO, literally a government within a government, and with its own army. And they had pursued aggression themselves across a border, by way of rocket firing and artillery barages.

"For the first time in seven years, the Lebanese seem to be trying to get together...to have control of their own country and to have a single Lebanese army. That is one of the goals we would like to see. The other goal would be the guaranteeing of the southern border with Israel; that there would be no longer a force in Lebanon that could, when it chose, create acts of terror across that border. And the third goal is to get all the foreign forces—Syrians, Israelis and the armed PLO—out of Lebanon."

(On the invasion of Beirut) "I think his (Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes) not having heard the original—the conversation between Prime Minister Begin and myself, that what he called a promise actually was in a discussion in which, to be more accurate, the Prime Minister had said to me that they didn't want to, and that they would not want to from the beginning." In response to the question "So it was not a promise?", Mr. Reagan said, "No."

(On the use of cluster bombs) "It concerns me very much...we have a review going now, as we must by law, on the use of weapons and whether American weapons sold there were used offensively and not defensively. And that situation is very ambiguous...you must recall

that prior to this attack, Soviet-built rockets and 130 mm cannon were shelling villages across the border in Israel and causing civilian casualties." (Press Conference, 30 June)

MENACHEM BEGIN: (Responding to President Reagan's 4 June letter) "For the last 72 hours, 23 of our town, townships and villages in Galilee have been under the constant shelling of Soviet-supplied heavy artillery and katyusha rockets by the PLO terrorists. Tens of thousands of men, women and children remain day and night in shelters. We have suffered casualties. The terrorists are aiming their guns exclusively at the civilian population. There are many military targets in the area; these are completely 'immune.' The purpose of the enemy is to kill—to kill Jews, men, women and children. Is there a nation in the world that would tolerate such a situation which, after the cessation of hostilities agreement, has repeated itself time and again?"

"We do not covet one inch of Lebanese territory. We wish to sign a peace agreement with a free, independent Lebanon...but it is our duty to make sure that our citizens and their families can live peacefully and carry on their daily lives without the lurking permanent threat of sudden death." (6 June)

ARIEL SHARON: (On civilian casualties) "Throughout the entire operation we made efforts not to hit civilians, efforts which, in my opinion, no other army in the world would have made. For this, too, we paid a price. But this is within the IDF's moral standards

and nature; it is within the nature of the Jewish people and of the State of Israel and that is why we behaved in this fashion. We hope the operation we carried out will lead to peace, quiet and tranquility. One should remember that terror does not only produce many victims, terror is perhaps the largest and most tangible danger to peace in our region.

"And I would like to emphasize that they (the PLO) never shelled any military installation, though there are so many of them in this area, and many of them were overlooked by the terrorists. They always choose to attack civilian populations—towns, villages along the border. And these people became hostages in the hands of the terrorist organizations." (11 June)

YITZHAK SHAMIR (Foreign Minister of Israel, commenting on Christian aid to Israel in the fighting): "Negative. The answer is a resolute no. No one helped us in this war, no one cooperated with us in this campaign and no one, apart from Israeli people, knew about the operation. Therefore, I can safely say—as we have told the United States and other friends—that no Lebanese element either knew or was partner to the Peace for Galilee Operation. I am not disappointed. We did not need it and we are not interested in all of Lebanon's internal wars. On the contrary, we believe some sort of uniformity of views and national unity around the need to establish an independent and sovereign Lebanon that would not be a game for foreign interests is slowly taking shape there. This is precisely our interest." (12 June)

ELIYAHU BEN-ELISAR (Chairman of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee): "In terms of realistic demands, this is truly the minimum of the minimum: that the northern settlements no longer be within the range of the cannons and the artillery. We should also insist that certain Lebanese aspirations be fulfilled, so that they can be freed of the yoke of the Syrians and Palestinians. But to what extent this...would be construed as intervention in the affairs of Lebanon, this of course I do not know; but I presume this is how it would be conceived. There is a great deal of hypocrisy here, because for years Lebanon was conquered by the Syrians and the Palestinians, yet no one said a word. The poor Lebanese were actually being brutalized and again no one said a word. But now that we are there, everybody is raising an outcry." (12 June)

YASIR ARAFAT: "First, I must stress that it (the incursion) is not an Israeli decision. It is an American decision. What the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples are presently suffering is aggression through the clear and obvious decision of the US administration.

There are now eight Israeli divisions in Lebanon. Crimes have been committed. There have been great losses among the civilian population, amounting to more than 30,000 dead and injured. In addition, 10,000 people are missing and more than 800,000 Lebanese and Palestinians have become refugees. This figure had risen to more than a million due to an exodus from Beirut in the past 48 hours. Despite this, no one can destroy the PLO. The PLO represents the Palestinian people and the will of the Arab popular masses. (29 June)

TERRORIST DEPLOYMENT

I. Western Sector/Along the Coast of Lebanon

Prior to 6 June 1982, the terrorists along the coast of Lebanon were deployed in the following manner:

- Tyre region approx. 1,500
- Coastal region (between the Litani and the Zaharani Rivers) approx. 700
- Sidon region (Between the Zaharani River and Damour) approx. 1,500
- Beirut-Damour region approx. 5-6,000

II. Eastern and Central Sectors

Throughout the rest of Southern Lebanon, terrorist deployments were as follows:

- Inside UNIFIL territory approx. 5-700
- Fatahland region approx. 1,500
- Nabatiye region approx. 1,000
- Achiye-Rihane region approx. 500

Note: Deployment inside the UNIFIL area is of particular interest. Approximately 5-700 terrorists were deployed in 25 positions—most lived in tents in the countryside, although some lived in buildings in area villages. These terrorists belong primarily to the "Fatah", the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (George Habash group), the Democratic Front (Hawatmeh Front), and "Saiqua". UNIFIL personnel were not permitted within 500 meters of those positions.

Terrorists in the coastal region were armed with a wide assortment of light weapons (Klatchnikov assault rifles and RPF7 anti-tank rockets) and heavy weapons including:

- 57mm and 85mm anti-tank guns which served as field artillery and 130mm artillery pieces which were used to shell Israeli settlements in the Western Galilee. The artillery pieces were positioned in fields and orchards and near refugee camps.
- 107mm and 122mm fixed and mobile rocket launchers (40 122mm katyusha rockets could be fired at one time).
- Machine guns and 12.7 mm-37mm anti-aircraft guns towed by or mounted on jeeps or trucks.
- S.A. 7 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles.

PLO naval bases were found all along the Lebanese coast from the Tripoli region in the north, through Beirut and Sidon to Tyre in the south. These naval bases were training centers, storage depots for naval supplies used during raids against Israel and as departure points for these raids. Tyre, Sidon and Beirut were also used as ports of entry for their military supplies.

In the central and eastern regions, the terrorists were equipped with a variety of artillery, tanks, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, including:

- T-34 tanks
- UR 416 Armoured Personnel Carriers
- 57mm and 85mm, 120mm, 130mm and 160mm artillery guns
- A variety of rocket launchers and "AA" guns, as well as vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft guns.

A system of fortifications including bunkers, trenches and firing positions to accommodate a unit of brigade strength was found in the Nabatiye area, as well as an improvised airfield.

From the July 1981 cease-fire until April 1982, there was an increase of 100% in the number of rocket launchers available to the terrorists; an increase of 150% in the anti-tank artillery; and an increase of 80% in the number of middle-sized cannons. Altogether, a total of 320 cannons and rocket launchers (as well as approximately 200 mortars of various types) were found by the IDF.

Breakdown of PLO Activity since the "ceasefire"

Since the 24 July 1981 "ceasefire" went into effect, the PLO perpetrated 290 attacks, attempted attacks, and firings along Israel's borders. within Israel proper, within Judea-Samaria, abroad, and against the population of Major Haddad's enclaves in Lebanon according to the following breakdown:

In Judea-Samaria and Gaza—110 terrorist acts	4 IDF soldiers
In the Lebanese sector—99 terrorist acts	1 border patrolman
In Israel—57 terrorist acts	1 Israeli citizen
In the Jordanian sector—4 terrorist acts	11 residents of Judea-Samaria and Gaza
Abroad—20 terrorist acts	2 Jews residing abroad
	4 non-Jews abroad
	3 tourists
	3 of Major Haddad's men
In the course of these acts, 29 persons died, according to the following breakdown:	As a result of terrorist activity, 271 persons were injured, as broken down below:
	16 IDF soldiers
	25 Israeli citizens
	25 tourists in Israel
	37 residents of Judea-Samaria, the Gaza strip, and East Jerusalem
	7 Jews residing abroad
	154 non-Jews abroad

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