

NEWSLETTER

JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

1100 Seventeenth St. N.W., Suite 401, Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 659-3800

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Message from the President

In October, members of JINSA had the opportunity to visit Israel and Lebanon with the cooperation of the Israel Defense Forces. Our visit with the IDF and government officials reconfirms and underscores one of the basic concepts for the founding and existence of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs.

From our meetings, discussions and visits to Lebanon, the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley and a number of defense industries, Israel's importance as our country's most reliable ally and strategic asset in the tumultuous Middle East, Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa and the eastern end of the Mediterranean became increasingly apparent.

The purpose of JINSA's mission to Israel was complex: to study, inform and educate ourselves relative to the military action and strategic implications of Operation Peace for Galilee; and to report on the lessons to be derived from the IDF operation and experiences in Lebanon.


Prior to our departure, several of us met with IDF officials at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, to discuss and lay the ground rules for our trip. Defining the rules was simple: no limitations were to be placed on the nature of any questions we wanted to ask or any information we might seek. Considerations of security did constrain some of the answers, but we found our Israeli hosts extremely responsive, with rarely a question or request left unanswered, evaded or unattended.

In our June/July 1982 *Newsletter*, we editorialized on the dirty work which Israel had done in Lebanon for the Western world at large by dealing a serious blow to Palestinian and other international terrorism. As Israel's contribution to the world, it was done at considerable cost to itself:

- over 300 lives lost and thousands wounded among its troops;
- high economic and social costs being borne by its citizens;
- heightened, yet unwarranted, opprobrium in many sections of the international community.

Any further assessment of Israel's significant, sometimes controversial role in Lebanon must take account of Israel as:

- an outstanding fighting force and highly professional Army, Air Force and Navy;
 - a citizen's army highly cognizant of its moral values;
 - a vital, democratic and westernized state; and
 - a highly technological country, unparalleled in the region.
- These argue persuasively for the continuance and enhancement of the



special relationship between Israel and the United States.

We will describe in greater detail in our *Newsletter* the results of our technical and tactical findings. JINSA will use the information and knowledge gained from Israel's experiences and sacrifices in Lebanon, and our observations and reports in those regards, to help strengthen and enhance Israel's military and other ties with our country.

We owe our sincere thanks to Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon; Professor Ezra Sadan of the Finance Ministry; Mr. Hanan Bar-On of the Foreign Ministry; Lt. General Rafael Eitan; Maj. Gen. Yehoshua Segui; Maj. Gen. Yisrael Tal; Maj. Gen. (Res.) Aharon Yariv; Brig. Gen. Yaakov Even; Brig. Gen. Amos Gilboa; Brig. Gen. Ben Naftali; Col. Tuvia Margalit; Mr. Moshe Ortasse; and Mr. David Hahn for the considerable time and effort expended on our behalf and for their candor. Our trip was greatly enhanced by the knowledge and friendship provided by Colonel Basil Herman, our IDF escort.

Our special thanks also to our friends in the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C. for their invitation, their invaluable coordination and support, and for their faith in JINSA's mission.

Saul I. Stern

Inside:

- Meeting with Ariel Sharon
- In Lebanon
- Reporting and Propaganda

The Role of Technology In the Long War

Francis P. Hoerber

Ed. Note. JINSA members visited Israel Aircraft Industries, Elta Electronics and the Merkava tank plant to help put the military operation into the context of Israel's technological capabilities.

Mr. Hoerber is a consultant in national security affairs and a Contributing Editor to our Newsletter.

Israeli technology prevailed over the Arab/Soviet weapons! The Western technological lead over the East has been proved once more!

These are popular slogans heard widely in this country since last June. They are worth examining, however, since many who accept them go on to infer that, with this technology, and emulating Israeli tactics (military as distinguished from weapons technology), NATO need not fear the Warsaw Pact. The argument is even likely to play a role in coming debates on the U.S. defense budget, with many in the newly-elected 98th Congress repeating old arguments about Department of Defense exaggeration of the threat and reinforcing comfortable beliefs about the Western technological edge offsetting Eastern numbers of men and armaments.


Others assert that Israeli training and morale were decisive. NATO cannot count on facing Soviet weapons manned by ill-trained and -motivated Arabs. Many Soviet weapons, it is added, are copied from the West, but simplified and performing better as weapons in the field.

There is probably some truth in all of these propositions. We tried to sort them out from our observations in Israel. But the returns are not all in. Much was avowedly kept secret by the Israelis, pending U.S. reply to Defense Minister Sharon's request to Secretary Weinberger that the United States send a team of experts to review the evidence, including intelligence, e.g., from captured Soviet weapons, now that the "raw data" are being processed by the Israelis. Moreover, when this is done, caution will still be in order, for conditions in the Peace for Galilee (peace in Lebanon?) campaign were sui generis and may not yield transferable lessons.

But let us report what we think we saw and learned.

The Anti-SAM, Anti-fighter War

The Israelis boast of full control of the air over Lebanon. Giulio Douhet might well have seen it as fulfillment of



Israel's mini-RPV, the Scout, provided real-time views of Syrian SAMs and real-time damage assessments.

his 1920s dream of "command of the air." This control was hard- and skilfully-won.

Example A was the "Scout," the Israeli remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), a high-tech "model airplane" We visited the modern plant where these RPVs are produced by Elta, a subsidiary of Israeli Aircraft Industries. In the nose of the mini-airplane is a television set (no LLL TV, or low-light-level, TV as yet) which gave real-time views of the Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, to be used by the E-2C (a U.S. Navy-developed airborne early warning and control aircraft somewhat smaller but similar to the AWACS, or E-3A, of the Air Force) and ground stations for coordination of artillery and air attack on the sites. The TV also gave real-time damage assessment, so that the attacks could avoid the waste of overkill and move on to additional sites.

The heart of the Scout is the impressively compact electronic unit that not only contains the communications for guidance of the plane and return of information but also generates false radar images (electronic countermeasures, or ECM) that caused the SAMs to turn on their radars, thus confirming their positions to the E-2Cs. This did not permit the Soviets successfully to attack the Scouts, which are

built almost entirely of composites, and have a small gasoline engine mounted on top of the craft, driving a pusher-type wooden propeller and therefore have a very low radar cross-section (RCS), or signature visible to the ground radars. In fact, the Israelis claim no Scouts were lost to enemy action, but only a few to operational problems, for example, "freezing of the fuel" at high altitude (in the neighborhood of 10,000 feet)—presumably freezing of moisture in the fuel lines. (The claim may be false, since the Syrians originally reported downing 23 Israeli aircraft, but that would merely mean the Scouts were cheap decoys.) The vehicles could be recovered, either using their very-simple tricycle landing gear or in nets, with the metal leaf-spring landing gear removed (further reducing the RCS). They could be reused essentially indefinitely. No jamming or other ECM was encountered in the benign environment of the attack on the 14 Soviet SA-6 SAM sites in the Bekka Valley, or even of the more advanced SA-8s and SA-9s brought up later and attacked by identical tactics. The sites had been photographed during the two-year preparation for the war and rehearsed over Israeli soil (with severe limitations of air space since the return of the

(Continued on page 7)

EDITORIALS

A Pattern for the Future?

The death of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev leaves US analysts unable to predict the future course of Soviet actions with any clarity until the power transition is complete. However, the Soviet leadership had already been making preparation for such a transition, and Brezhnev's last major addresses can be viewed as elements of regime stabilization, patterns that could be followed in the event of his death. In this context, the meeting in October between Brezhnev, senior Politburo members and the entire top echelon of the Soviet Defense Ministry should be assessed, fully recognizing that the patterns he tried to set in motion may be modified in light of future events. Brezhnev's address should be read as much between the lines as on the lines; what he didn't say may be as important for US policy as what he did.

Example: "The international situation makes it imperative for us to redouble or treble our efforts...for reducing the danger of nuclear war which is hanging over mankind...Practical preparations are underway in Europe for the deployment of American medium-range nuclear means in NATO countries."

Omission: Arms control. The Soviets have nearly completed their deployment of SS-20 missiles on the periphery of Europe. The planned deployment of Pershing IIs is designed as a specific countermeasure. President Reagan offered to halt plans for the deployment if the Soviets removed the SS-20s. The "Zero Option" speech was well received in Europe, but there was no positive response from the Soviets.

Example: "A great deal of work is being done in agriculture in order to eliminate in the future the need for grain purchases and fully meet the population's growing demands."

Omission: A grain embargo would hurt. Our European allies charge that they were asked to sacrifice jobs on the TransSiberian Pipeline while American farmers were being paid for grain sold to the Soviets. If the Administration is determined to hit the Soviets in a vulnerable spot, the President should be rethinking his campaign promise not to embargo grain.

Example: "It is necessary to be able to operate with due account of the latest achievements of science in the art of war."

Omission: The Soviets have historically been unable to match our technological capabilities, and have invested enormous amounts of time, effort and money buying and stealing from us. The importance of limiting the flow of technology to the east has been recognized by the Pentagon, but the educational and industrial communities have yet to fall in step. Moreover, America's allies have not done their share.

Example: "Israel's aggression in Lebanon should be regarded as a consequence of the political course taken by the Americans. It is clear that this is, in the final count, the doing of the USA."

Omission: The Israelis and the US are on the same wavelength concerning reducing or limiting Soviet control and influence in the region (which was surely one result of Operation Peace for Galilee). It is that congruence of definitions of interest which makes allies out of friendly countries. But the primary target of the PLO was Israel, and Israel's primary goal was to remove the threat to its citizens.

Example: "They (the US) have unfolded an unprecedented arms race, especially a nuclear arms race, and are trying to attain military superiority."

Omission: Actual and relative defense budgets had been shrinking in this country while the Soviets continued a massive arms buildup program. We are now in the process of strengthening areas of military and technological weakness. Giving priority to our defense needs, giving definition to our national interests, modernizing and increasing our capabilities are ways of maintaining our position as leader of the Free World. Allies, big ones and small ones, cannot be left to question our willingness and ability to defend our mutual interests. Our decline as a global military power has led to a decline in our political leverage. Balancing and strengthening both should be our course for the future.

As is generally the case in official statements by the Soviets, we

are painted as warmongers and they as defenders of the peace. Americans and our allies should examine Brezhnev's speech carefully and compare it with facts as we know them in Afghanistan, Poland, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam and other places, before we accept this premise and talk about slackening America's efforts in defense of our interests.

With a Scalpel or a Meat Ax?

JINSA has long upheld the principle of a strong national defense policy for this country and favors a defense budget adequate to do the job. When severe post-Vietnam constraints led to an actual and relative decline in defense spending, we pointed to the danger inherent in watching our capabilities erode while the Soviets pursued a massive buildup. We have been pleased by the intention of the Reagan Administration to rebuild our capacity to defend our interests.

However, the November election and continued tepid economic outlook forecast a change in defense spending patterns. Cuts are almost inevitable, and the question that needs to be posed is whether the cuts will be made with a scalpel or a meat ax. The answer depends on two forces that are already hard at work: one to save and one to cut.

The Administration must make a good, precise, fundamental case for sustaining the budget. The broad view—sending the required political signals to Moscow—is an appropriate first line of argument, and nearly all parties to the debate are agreed that is required. But specific programs and priorities must be examined and defended in detail. This is not an idle exercise. It will help pinpoint areas in which cuts can be sustained if need be, and will strengthen public and Congressional confidence in the essential soundness of our force modernization and readiness program (areas requiring immediate and sustained attention).

At the same time, defense-budget-cutters in Congress must also narrow and hone their argument. "Cutting defense to free money for jobs and saving social programs" is ill-defined. Aside from the fact that the defense industry produces jobs as well as armaments, hacking away at the numbers in the budget without a program would be a waste of much of the money and effort already expended on upgrading our capabilities. The budget-cutters must know as much about our defense programs and priorities as the budget sustainers.

Bipartisanship and Congressional-Executive Branch cooperation should be able to produce mutually agreeable broad goals first, and then specific programs with a budget to match. We believe the broad goals are clear: defining our national interest for ourselves, our allies and our adversaries; causing the Soviets to believe we have the capability and the will to defend those interests; and assuring our allies that we will lead our common effort and not simply make demands of them.

Items in the current defense budget should be weighed against the goals. By proceeding from agreed-upon premises, the cutters and sustainers will have an easier time identifying programs which advance the goals in a cost-effective manner, and those which may fall short. The defense budget is not sacrosanct, but insisting upon the scalpel approach to cuts will save us money in the long run, and allow the public to give defense spending the support it needs and deserves.

NEWSLETTER

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In Lebanon

Shoshana Bryen

Ed. Note: At Rosh Hanikra on the Lebanese border, we met our IDF escorts for the ride into Lebanon. We had coffee and sandwiches at the border post, and discussed with the commander the heavy Lebanese civilian traffic. The atmosphere was casual, but as our purple minibus crossed, an IDF jeep preceded us, another followed us, and an armed escort rode with us. Thus protected, we entered what, by the accounts of the Western press, should have looked like Dresden.)


The first thing the casual observer (if there is such a thing in southern Lebanon) notices is the building. Not simply repair of war damage, but new buildings in previously undeveloped areas. If investment in buildings is a sign of optimism, the southern Lebanese are optimistic this fall. Repair is also an optimistic venture. Rubble from the 1975-76 Civil War has lain rotting, perhaps in the belief that more destruction was coming, making repair a waste of time. Now there is repair and there are new buildings.

The second thing is the damage, and the third is its localization. We drove up the coastal road from Rosh Hanikra to Tyre and then to Sidon, along one axis of Israeli advance. Along the axis, nearly every building right into Tyre shows bullet wounds. The port, which the PLO had used to unload its supplies, had been severely damaged, but by the time we arrived, the Israeli government had paid for the repairs and the port was open. Only two large hulls of sunken boats remained in the water off the harbor. Once off the coastal road in the city, damage is more likely to have been caused by aerial bombing—but single buildings were hit while others around remained unscarred. Our IDF escort told us that Israeli intelligence had pinpointed headquarters of various Palestinian factions in those buildings; those were destroyed.

The same was true of Sidon. Buildings along the axis of advance showed considerable bullet and rocket damage, while isolated pockets of buildings in the center of the city were destroyed. On a major traffic circle in Sidon, a large building, almost totally destroyed, was pointed out. It looked familiar to some of us as the one which often appeared on the evening news in America, representing the destruction of Sidon. Journalists had neglected to mention, however, that the building had been blown up during the Civil War!

There it was useful to recall the rhetorical question of Major Yehuda Weinraub of the IDF Spokesman's Office. He had asked the group the day before why journalists had not gone up to the tower of Sidon to photograph the entire city, rather than isolating destruction (particularly old destruction) for the cameras. We had no answer then, and no good answers as we rode through the city, but bias and the desire to present the sensational, in context or not, rose to the top of the list for speculation. The city was not destroyed, the citizenry not ravaged, the shops not empty. Words like "blitzkrieg," "holocaust," "genocide," and "carpet bombing" are wildly misplaced in relation to the cities of Southern Lebanon.

We met with the Israeli director of civilian services in Sidon, who sees his job in terms of Lebanese civilians as nearly finished. "Most of the aid provided by Israel is no longer necessary.



Our job was to bring them back to work, to fill in the gaps. We gave the administration the ability to work; the roads, the airfields, etc."

Most of the city administration is now functioning, he said, with the exception of the police. Terrorized for seven years by the law of the PLO, the Sidon police are today unwilling to write parking tickets for fear of retribution. His description of conditions in Sidon were corroborated upon our return by Administration officials close to the scene, who said the medical emergency is over and the US may recommend cutting public food distribution, as there is ample food in the marketplace for the population.

The Israeli commander acknowledged that the Palestinians are a different story from Lebanese civilians, and they will continue to receive public assistance for the foreseeable future. The Lebanese do not consider Palestinian refugees an internal Lebanese problem, he said. They need Palestinian labor, and are willing to accept those who came in 1948, but not those who came in 1970 (i.e., the PLO). They point to friction between the two groups of refugees as adding to their problem. Whatever the position of the Lebanese government, the Palestinians are worse off as a group than the Lebanese following Operation Peace for Galilee.

The original Israeli plan had been to relocate the Palestinians outside the camps but the Lebanese Government refused the idea of scattering the refugees. They also refused to allow UNRWA to prepare sites inside the camps for rebuilding. Between August and early October Israel and UNRWA waited for a decision, as the rainy season approached. Major structural damage had been done in the refugee camps, and the Israelis estimate that 30,000 people lost their homes. Some have been squatting in abandoned buildings in the cities, others living in public buildings.

There are no refugees currently living without shelter according to US sources. After protracted negotiation with the Lebanese government, UNRWA began clearing sites for the erection of tents. Israeli contractors began putting up tents, but Palestinians tore them down, claiming they were a return to a 1948 standard they would not accept. Israel recommended prefabricated housing, but the Lebanese refused permanent structures. A compromise was reached when the Israelis laid the floors for the tents and supplied the Palestinians with cement, so that those who chose to build cement buildings could do so. Thus far, all sides find this acceptable, with the



At the top of the Beaufort, the rationale for Operation Peace for Galilee becomes immediately apparent.



Sidon. Words like "blitzkrieg," "holocaust," "genocide" and "carpet bombing" are misplaced in relation to the cities of Southern Lebanon.

Israelis providing a guarantee to the Palestinians that as long as Israeli forces remain in Lebanon, the cement structures will not be removed by the Lebanese government. It may be the ultimate irony of the war.

From Sidon we turned east and headed for the Beaufort Castle. Moving off the coast and into the countryside, we saw again the narrowness of the path of Israeli-created damage. There was little evidence of the war until we came to Beaufort.

Rising 500 meters, Beaufort is an enormous Crusader fortress. The PLO used its caverns and passageways for storage and hiding, and from the top they shelled Israeli settlements. We drove to the top, past the wreckage of intense fighting from the Israeli assault. At the top the rationale for Operation Peace for Galilee became immediately apparent. The castle is the highest point for miles in all directions. Whoever holds the Beaufort holds the key to all of southern Lebanon and part of northern Israel. Without binoculars, you can see into the Israeli city of Metulla; with binoculars, you can see people walking in the streets. With a gun on top of Beaufort, you don't have to be a crack-shot to do heavy damage in Israel. (Or, in Lebanon. Major Haddad's home city and headquarters at Marjayoun are even closer than Metulla.)

The tonnage and dollar value of PLO armaments, the volume of evidence of international terrorist training and the uncovering of a fully formed PLO ministate in southern Lebanon is staggering, but the physical realization of where the guns were and where the civilians are, surpasses all definitions of spine chilling. "Invasion of privacy"

sounds shallow, but in fact it was the ultimate invasion of privacy. There was no way for residents of the Galilee to shut out the hostile eyes and indiscriminate guns of the PLO. Whatever the political fallout, perhaps the most selfish justification of the incursion into Lebanon—silencing the guns firing on the Galilee—is the most easily understood from the vantage point of the Beaufort Castle. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon would later tell us, "We did it for ourselves. The rest of the Free World benefitted, but we did it for ourselves." And it was clearly necessary.

Descending, we drove south and left our IDF escorts at the Good Fence, where Lebanese civilians have been crossing into Israel for jobs and medical care since the Civil War. We spent the night in Metulla, and finally realized why our Israeli hosts had been so insistent that we stay there, rather than in a more plush hotel farther south in Tiberias. Having seen Metulla from the Beaufort, we would spend the night feeling the presence of the Beaufort from Metulla. But we, unlike the local residents, never felt the presence of the PLO, and we slept well.



Whoever controls the Beaufort, controls all of Southern Lebanon and much of Northern Israel.

Ariel Sharon

Ed. Note: We were scheduled to have a brief session with Israel's Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon. We were delighted to find Mr. Sharon willing and able to ignore the timetable and extend our meeting to 2 1/2 hours. Below is an edited transcript of our meeting.

We've got three circles of security problems. One is Palestinian terrorism, which is not something that sprouted recently or after the Six Day War or after the War of Independence. We have suffered thousands of casualties and I can go back 100 years.

The second circle is the Arab confrontation states. At the present time they have about 13,000 tanks, artillery and thousands of jets. Comparing the strengths—they were about 3 to 1 in favor of the Arabs, which was acceptable. We now have 4 to 1, and by the end of the decade it will be 5 to 1.

The third circle is Soviet strength; the Soviet expansion that started in this region in 1955. Since then it's extending all the time. The two first circles we have to take care of ourselves but when it comes to the third circle (and that is the Soviet strategy) it is not only an Israeli task, but it's a major threat to us. But we believe that we will come and go in spite of it.

Terrorism

About terrorism. I'd like to give you some figures in order to emphasize the point, particularly now, after the war in Lebanon, when we are being blamed so much for what we have done and what we haven't done. It's very interesting to see what Israel suffered by the PLO terrorists acting from Lebanon or instructed from Lebanon in the years 1965-82, before the war. We had 1392 killed, 6239 wounded, number of casualties—7631. But those activities did not start in 1965; in the 1950's Israel suffered over 1000 people killed by terrorists then coming from the boundaries of the area occupied by Jordan (from the West Bank) and the Gaza district occupied by Egypt. I'm not talking about casualties that we had in the War of Independence, because then we had 6050 dead. And not in the Sinai campaign in '56 either—I'm just mentioning people that were killed by terrorists in the '50's and this number exceeded 1200. As I said it didn't start then and it didn't start after the War of Independence. We suffered almost 1000 dead between the years 1936-1939, and I'll go backwards and say we had an enormous number of casualties in 1929, 1921 and 1920. Altogether I can take you back to the beginning of the century and even earlier than that. That's the problem that we have been facing for the last 100 years.

Confrontation

When we talk about terrorism we cannot expect anybody to take action against terrorism that hits us. And when we come to the confrontation states, we believe that that is purely our role to take care of it. But still I believe one should be very careful when it comes to supply of advanced sophisticated weapons to the Arabs. Weapons have become one of the most important ways of gaining influence and the US has the right, of course, to establish what the sophisticated weapons should be. But the Arabs are not going to fight the Soviets, and if somebody hopes that they will do it, it will never happen. We are the only ones who were holding and containing it here for years.

We are not participating in the arms

race any more because we cannot participate. We are not going to add during the coming ten years. We are not going to add one tank, one jet, one piece of artillery—we aren't going to add. We are going to replace with new items but are not to add.

That will of course bring us to the importance of keeping the quality edge in our favor. We must keep our retaliation capability, our deterrence capability and we have to be completely convinced that we will be able to take preemptive steps when something happens.

I emphasize the need for preemptive actions. For instance, Jordan by the end of the year will have 1000 tanks. Regular tanks—in regular units. Without revealing any secrets here, I can tell you that Jordan by itself will have twice as many tanks as Israel—"running tanks" or tanks that are in service. We have, of course, many more, but they are reserves. We have to mobilize them, we have to equip them, we have to move them to the front. I would say between 24-72 hours. We have another factor now. We have mobilized centers like Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa several times—we even did it during a war. Our reserves are beautifully organized; even from the management point of view it's very interesting. I don't think that anyone has a system like it. We learned it from the Swiss, but then had a problem so we, of course, developed it ourselves during the years. But we have never had the experience of mobilizing while our centers of population are under any kind of attack, and this would be a difficult story. So I said that Jordan itself has 1000 tanks. Syria has 3000 tanks. Iran has 4000 tanks. Israel

keeps about half of this number. If for instance they would come today—it's impossible—but by chance let's say that 1000 tanks were moved into Jordan. (I am not speaking about things that may happen, I am speaking about things that already happened.)

The world can find those which are called extreme, and those which are called moderate—but all of them are here, all of them have participated in the wars. Iraq participated in the War of Independence, in the Six Day War, the Yom Kippur War—all the wars. The possibility exists that Iraq would move 1000 tanks into Jordan and these tanks and troops would get into defensive positions. A war of attrition would start and we are going to find ourselves in a very different position. So what is our answer? Our answer is that these Iraqi troops must be met not on the River Jordan but on the boundary of Jordan and Iraq.

We don't have any problem now with Egypt. But for us one of the main problems is to keep a demilitarized strip of about 100 miles in Sinai—and it has been agreed to in a security arrangement that was part of the peace agreement. That gives us the necessary time and therefore change is something Israel cannot accept. But what if you get up one day and you find that instead of the 230 tanks the Egyptians are allowed to keep in Sinai, along the Suez Canal—they have 280. The question would be: Are we going to drag a nation to war because of 50 tanks? And what if it is 350, then 400? The other side will have created the dilemma for us by logistical operations. Exercising our rights may mean for us to go to war.

Israel can cope with the problem of confrontation with the Arab states. We can do without any help or any soldiers to defend us or pilots to give us an umbrella, or a navy to protect us. We can



Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon

do all this ourselves without any problem but we have other considerations. Every advanced, sophisticated weapon supplied to the Arabs and political pressures that keep us from taking necessary steps once a problem develops, may put us in a very difficult situation. But as I said we can manage these questions and problems ourselves.

Soviet Expansion

The Soviets are a general problem for all of us. The Soviets showed complete weakness during the Lebanese war (maybe they are struggling for leadership) but I don't think we really know why they did not show any initiative.

One cannot look at the map with optimism. You can see movement of the Soviets, a permanent movement forward which I think should worry every man in the Free World who can look forward and see how it may look in the coming years unless some steps are taken. And these steps are not military steps. For instance we offered the United States—on my visit there last year and on my visit there this year—cooperation with Africa. We spoke then about very moderate military support to those countries, but mainly about development, food production and so on. Just to fill up the bucket that stays there, that exists there. They were good proposals but nothing came of them.

We did not need the United States from the moral point of view because we have been working in developing areas for the last 30 years. You can find our experts in the driest desert in the world on the border between Peru and Chile, on the highest mountains in the poorest sectors of Europe, in southern Italy. We have trained more than 60,000 experts in the last 30 years. Half of them we brought here to Israel and half we trained abroad—7000 Israelis have been busy with this project for years. We have been working in more than 70 countries, many of which never had any political relations with us. So when we're discussing this we were not discussing our need because we have been doing those things in any case. We thought it best to work with the United States but we didn't have much success convincing them to cooperate in these areas.

Strategic Positions

The position of the United States has improved tremendously in the area. As a result of the peace agreement with Egypt, the United States has become the most influential factor there and this is important. But I'd like to emphasize something more on the military side of it. When Israel insisted having a multinational force in Sinai, it gave the United States three first-class air bases.

I would not say that the Egyptians would be very happy if those bases were used now, but in case of an emergency it would be different.

The war in Lebanon will drive out the Syrians who have been under complete Soviet influence since 1974. Almost two thirds of Lebanon have been under Syrian occupation since January 1976. By being under Syrian occupation, of course, the Soviets had another foothold here. Another area was the area of the PLO terrorist organization which, of course, was part of international terrorism backed by the Soviets.

I tried to convince our American friends for almost a year, talking about Lebanon and so on. I never saw any American, any French, Italian or British helicopters flying in, endangering their pilots in order to evacuate wounded or to bring help or supplies for seven years. But the United States is in now and holding the international airport at Beirut. That means that one year ago the Americans had no air bases in Lebanon or in Sinai and only Israel was ready to give her services in case of emergency. That situation has completely changed.

In the Middle East, or Near East, when we speak about what you call rapid deployment, it's not so much the number of troops that you need, nor their strength that is the main factor. The main factor is time. How to be there earlier and put the dilemma on the other side. There is a tremendous change in the position of the United States in the region in that regard as a result of the two actions taken by us.


That was not the reason for going into Lebanon. We went into Lebanon in order to destroy the terrorist infrastructure because, as I emphasized before, of the casualties. At the same time, the fact is that Lebanon had become the center of local, regional, international and syndicated terrorism. It never happened before that one country somewhere in the world had become such a military and political center of international terrorism as Lebanon, mostly in Beirut.

We went in because Israel decided years ago that one cannot compromise with terrorism. If I could have expected something from the Free World, it is to learn this lesson. That one should fight terrorism, take advantage of those things we achieved and not make any compromise in the future with terrorists. I believe that is the main lesson for the Free World.

Lebanon

Now, about the immediate problems; I would like first to refer to Lebanon. The Green Line is the famous line of the 25-50 kilometers which we have been talking of—not so much we ourselves, but the rest of the world. Now it has become one of the main issues for blaming Israel. There are places that we don't have 45 km. of the eastern side of Lebanon. There are places where we are 2 miles, 1 1/2 miles from this line. There is a place where we are 8 miles from this line. All this noise around the world is being made all the time, again and again and again, thousands of times—it is just a line. Why this line? We took this line because that was the range of the 180mm—old, but very good—Soviet guns. The terrorists had a range of 43 km. When it comes to the mountainous area (and the mountains here are about 6000 feet high) they have a range of 52 km. That is the line, the northern edge of the security line.

When we talk about the future phases in Lebanon, of course our object is to reach a peace agreement in Lebanon. I personally believe that we were relatively close. One report by the United States



and we would have signed a peace agreement with Lebanon, but that is not the tendency at the present time. To put it very moderately, it is not the tendency of the United States to bring the Lebanese to sign this agreement. Peace is not a gesture by one country to another. It is one of the components of security.

Security Arrangements

Now I'd like to speak about the security arrangements that we must achieve with Lebanon. The first problem is the external forces. There are several thousand terrorists in Tripoli, and to the east in the area of the Bekka Valley. They must leave the country. Then there are the Syrians who presently have about 1200 tanks occupying almost half of Lebanon. There are the Israeli forces; and we don't intend to stay. We don't want to keep one square inch of Lebanon. The second problem is the general security of Lebanon. Lebanon should be demilitarized when it comes to foreign forces. Of course the international forces are agreed upon. I am speaking about Syrians, Jordanians, Iraqis, Saudis, Egyptians, Moroccans or any others. They cannot be in Lebanon. And of course Lebanon must be clear of any terrorists in the future—terrorist units, individuals or political headquarters. It cannot be a base for terrorist activities. In the southern area, there can be no artillery or services for missiles. Inspection arrangements on other things must exist in that area as well.

When it comes to security arrangements with Lebanon, the Americans are welcome to participate, sign as witnesses, and give or add letters of guarantee to these arrangements. But the negotiations must be between the government of Israel and the government of Lebanon. The agreement should be signed by the two sides—the government of Lebanon and the government of Israel. Today the Marines are here and tomorrow they may be in some other place. We are grateful to our friend the United States for them, but they can be evacuated. We have to live with this problem, and so somebody should be responsible. The only ones that can be responsible for the security here are the Lebanese.

From the practical point of view, how to start the movement, we have two possibilities. One is for Israel to stay where we are now and negotiate everything from there. And there is another way—in two phases. The first phase is that the Syrians holding the mountains would withdraw from there, the ter-

rorists would leave, all the prisoners of war, the dead and the bodies kept by the Syrians and terrorists would be brought home. Then we would withdraw to the Green Line—the line of security—where we would halt until we finish the security arrangement. The two-phased plan will give a certain momentum to these activities so that people will see that something is moving. Given the situation, we hope that this plan will be adopted.

We discussed our plan with the Lebanese, and gave it to the Secretary of State of the US at the same time. The Lebanese reaction was entirely different from the reaction that we heard in the media by President Amin Jemeyel. The reaction that we got, without going into detail, was quite different. But that, of course, we aren't here to negotiate or discuss.

That is the situation now, the immediate problems and the general problems. If you have any questions, I will answer them.

QUESTION 1: Had the country drawn up a campaign plan and has it looked over the plan to see how the actual fighting went in accordance with the plan? What compromises or changes or modifications had to be made? Would you comment for us on how you see this now?

ANSWER: On the 5th of June, the government heard a resolution to advance to what we call the range—the range that threatens our local government and towns along the border. That is the Green Line. Before the 8th of June, the Parliament said that we would reach the line, the range of artillery. I believe that if the war had ended when we reached the line, we would have stayed there; but the war proceeded. Battles went on and we reached and blocked the road between Beirut and Damascus, which was the most important thing. I don't believe anything would have changed for Lebanon if we had not reached the highway. The Syrians and the terrorists would have remained in Beirut. But if the war had stopped, Israel would have stopped on the line.

We never had any intention of going into West Beirut. It's not that we didn't make plans, it's not that we didn't put pressure on. It's not that we didn't immobilize the terrorists. But it was combined with diplomatic efforts to put the kind of pressure that would bring the expulsion of the terrorists from Beirut. The situation we presented to them was such that they didn't have any choice,

and we managed to catch some 15,000 terrorists in their headquarters, some of whom were there to evacuate.

As I said, we wanted to avoid entering West Beirut. We had plans and ways to do it if the situation were presented, but we wanted to prevent it. This has been emphasized again and again. We had a problem in Beirut. The terrorists had violated the agreement with Philip Habib. That agreement belonged to us and to the Americans as well, and we discussed it together many times. The PLO left behind about 2500 terrorists in their headquarters. They did not hand over the heavy weapons to the Lebanese army as they were supposed to on the 22nd of August. We were waiting for Beshir (Jemeyel) to start his duty. When he was killed we faced a very difficult situation in which the problems could have arisen again and divided the country.

After midnight on the 14th of September we made the decision to go into West Beirut as fast as possible. It was a complicated operation because we had a very small number of troops. We had to fly men in from Israel to the Beirut airport, which was then in our hands. At 5:00 a.m. we started our move and that's what brought the Lebanese army into West Beirut, and enabled them to proceed with this mopping up operation.

That doesn't mean that we like exactly what they are doing now, but it's very interesting—no one has said a word about it, because it's under the multinational force. The Lebanese are destroying hundreds of buildings and thousands of people. Some of them were slaughtered in the streets; some were walked to the Syrian border; some are in prison; quite a number of them were just left in the field; and the number that simply disappeared is 1000 or more. It's happening every day—and no one says a word. No one is blamed. We are not there with them, but we are outside and watching the operation.

QUESTION 2: A very simple question. In your report you stated that one of the plusses that the Americans got was the three air bases in the Sinai. Weren't those destroyed?

ANSWER: No. When we left there we left the control towers and the runways, but we destroyed the underground shelters. The runways are first class, communication equipment is there and I'd say enough is there so they can be used within hours. The most important thing for the US strategically is the time factor. How to be in every key strategic

point within hours—not days or weeks, as it is now—but within hours.

QUESTION 3: I wonder if you would comment on the deployment of the Air Force. Is it unique to this operation? Specifically, would you comment on the deployment of the Israeli Air Force in Beirut?

ANSWER: About shooting down 100-102 MiGs, at least half of them were MiG 21s, but at least three are regarded to be the best the Soviets have now (MiG 25s).

The SA8 got very complicated because everything is contained in one vehicle. The SA9 is also a problem for low-flying aircraft. We managed not with secrets, but by using our minds. After the Yom Kippur War, the debates about missiles really gave us an answer to the missile systems which might have overcome our aircraft. We had many doubts, reservations and problems, but we managed. I sent a letter to Secretary Weinberger and I offered the United States an opportunity to discuss the lessons of the war. I know that the letter was very warmly received and I believe we will have an American mission to discuss and negotiate the use of this information. There are three different kinds of information: the first being intelligence; the second being Soviet hardware; and the third being lessons of the war.

As for Beirut today—one should go and see it. We only rarely attacked the city itself, only very specific targets. We had specific information about the headquarters of the PLO and we decided to investigate. To give you some figures: in West Beirut there are between 23,000 and 24,000 buildings—we destroyed 40. You can see in photographs that it is a normal city. We concentrated our efforts on what are called terrorist camps.

When people say "camp" they think it is something with a gate. One day I got a question (from the Kahan Commission). The question was about the gates closing. I brought photographs to show that these are not camps. (*Ed. Note: The photographs show Sabra, Shatilla and el-Fakahani as large neighborhoods with 1-12 story buildings contiguous to the main part of Beirut. More like the relationship of Harlem to Manhattan than POW camps to German cities during World War II.*) The terrorists had headquarters there and we concentrated our air strength on specific targets. We counted the number of buildings that were heavily damaged or destroyed and we found about 400 of them. I would like to emphasize again that the total number of buildings is almost 24,000.

We came into the area where the Syrians and the terrorists deployed their troops and headquarters, rockets, artillery and so on. We did not like the idea, but we had two options. One was to combine political steps with military pressure, and the other was to go into this built-up area and to fight hand-to-hand cleaning up the buildings. The number of casualties then—not only among our own soldiers, but in the civilian population—would have been without any doubt, far greater than the casualties suffered. I will add that when we attacked, much of the population had moved into the city of Beirut itself.

It was a problem, a complicated problem. But I will compare it to what was done in wars before and I would like to refer to Japan. The problems with the media now is that they announce these tragedies in every bedroom and every living room. They show what they want to show—and it never happened.

We found that the media has become

a major factor. Great Britain is a democracy yet during the war in the Falklands they didn't allow any photographs. In Israel that is impossible and I don't think that that would be possible in the United States. This problem affects the nature of democracy and must be taken into consideration. It is one of the factors that you must weigh with many others. It is also a lesson of the war.

QUESTION 4: More in the nature of an observation than a question, in view of the ability of the Lebanese government to protect the integrity of its territory before against PLO infiltration. Would this new set up that involves a treaty between the Lebanese government and Israel be subject to the same problem of infiltration? Would it be more of a truce than a real peace?

ANSWER: We would like to get the right to peace, but there is one thing that we are not going to give up; the security arrangement or treaty between Lebanon and ourselves. This must be signed. No one should expect us to give it up. We will stand firm on this because otherwise we are going to find ourselves within a short time—not in the same situation, but with problems nevertheless. Not to defeat all this infrastructure again. But in order to shell our civilian towns all you need is a single rocket launcher, which you can carry on the back of a donkey. It's a very simple thing. In order for the terrorists to make life hell, they don't have to use heavy artillery. They can use one missile per day and these missiles would put people in shelters for 24 hours. Therefore, Israel will not give up the necessary security arrangements. If somebody tries to pressure us on this—I think it would be a mistake.

The arrangement should be one that would increase stability and not bring us again to the circle of counter raids, retaliation, air raids and so on. We have to stop it. Therefore, I believe we must be able to control the situation. If you ask me how that can be done—knowing Lebanon so well now, I would say it would have to be more of a partitioned state than the Lebanese state of 1943. You must take into consideration that at least for now there's going to be a traditional Lebanese government. It will take some time to build a Lebanese army, but that is essential. If you ask me how one can build a Lebanese army, we trained Lebanese forces for years. There could have been a common effort by the United States and Israel and I believe that could have been very efficient. That won't happen so it should be an American mission to support them and American officers training them in courses. One must build an army.

The Lebanese army is based upon territorial units and you've got Moslems, you've got Beirut and you've got Christians. Every time if you have a commander who is Moslem you must have a deputy who is a Christian. It's not the way I would run an army. Something must be done now, but the problems can be solved and should be solved.

QUESTION 5: In describing the advance of the battle to the Green Line and when saying that it didn't stop there, you leave the object of curiosity among your listeners that the troops either proceeded without authority; or they proceeded to achieve better tactical positions so that they could stop; or that indeed they had some passive authority that was left out of the narrative. Could you elaborate a bit on which of those three, or some other, was the actual fact?

(Continued on page 7)



This is one of a series of aerial photographs of Beirut used to pinpoint targets for the Air Force. They were released to the international press in Israel and in the US, but were rarely, if ever, seen.

COMMUNICATIONS: Reporting & Propaganda

Shoshana Bryen

(Ed. Note: Hundreds of thousands of words have been written and spoken concerning Operation Peace for Galilee, and nearly as many about the role of the media in covering modern military conflict. This was the first war in history in which journalists had access to all sides coupled with simultaneous transmission of images to audiences around the world. Israel fared as poorly in the media war as it fared well on the battlefield. Our IDF hosts were eager to address the nature of the media and press coverage of Israel in Lebanon.)

IDF Spokesman, Brigadier General Yaakov Even, began with the premise that the world, including Israel, had little understanding of the nature of the PLO infrastructure in southern Lebanon. "We did not guess the magnitude and depth of PLO society. Everyone belonged to the PLO. They took over the Red Cross and UNRWA. They ran employment bureaus, social services and medical care. Teachers were PLO and the children received uniforms at age six." (Even himself recommended release of captured Palestinians under 16, only to find that they regrouped and fought again.)

Referring to the social service network, he said, "The PLO is not all black" and in fact, "the network resembles some experiences in Jewish history, although unique in its military aspect." They had to justify all of the money they got from the Saudis. If they didn't work, they didn't get paid.

And work they did, with severe penalties for non-cooperation. The IDF found orders for the execution of 12 residents of Sidon with the command "Report Back" attached. The enormous stores of ammunition and weapons found in the south and in Beirut attest to the seriousness with which "they were preparing for revolution," said Even. "Southern Lebanon was ready for a command to rise, to capture the south for the PLO. But Lebanon is not their promised land. This (Israel) is their promised land."

Added to this background of even IDF underestimation of the PLO infrastructure, there was a new "greyout" for the first six days of the operation (i.e., background briefings were given and information passed from unquotable, anonymous military sources, official information limited to bulletins, communiqués and background papers, and foreign and local press prohibited from entering the area of hostilities). Then the Red Crescent Society (independent of the International Red Cross and run by Yasser Arafat's brother) began issuing figures for Palestinians and Lebanese reported killed in the south. This despite the fact that there was no communication between Beirut and the south at the time. Rather than respond to the Red Crescent, the IDF invited the press into Lebanon on the sixth day. (Note: The IDF used a system of "conducting officers," assigning journalists to military sections. A British Parliamentary Committee study on government-press relations during a military conflict compared the Falklands, Vietnam and Israel. Its recommendation was to encourage use of the Israeli system.)

"There was enough input into the media," according to Even. "But nothing came out." Why? Major Yehuda Weinraub of the Spokesman's



Brig. Gen Yaakov Even

Office wrote in an official statement:

There are a number of understandable reasons which can explain the poor treatment Israel received. It is easier to identify with the weaker party, even if he is actually the aggressor. In all combat situations, pictures of destroyed houses and human suffering are more newsworthy since they arouse pathos, even if they are the exception.

He asked our group rhetorically why journalists didn't go to the tower of Sidon to take a picture of the whole city. Upon visiting the city the next day, we were inclined to ask the same question. His written statement continues:

Likewise the initial news greyout for security reasons facilitated the task for Arab media manipulators to establish images which can be erased only with difficulty.

Even went further, pointing to deliberate distortion, for which he placed the major responsibility on editors, rather than correspondents. "There is a chain of command in the army. Unfortunately, there is a chain of command in the media."

Even invited the 240 members of the foreign press corps to enter Beirut on Armored Personnel Carriers with the army on two conditions: 1) they stay at least four days to get a full picture; and 2) that the story be transmitted on TV and in the papers as it came from Beirut. The first condition was acceptable, he said, but journalists refused the second saying that they had no control over editorial decisions made at home.

On the subject of editorial control, Weinraub's article pointed to titles and captions designed to influence readers before they get to the text.

Preference is for Nazi symbolism and the Biblical law of an eye for an eye. Both "Time" and "Newsweek" ran covers with the identical caption of "Israel's Blitz." Variants of the term blitzkrieg appeared in the Boston Globe (9 and 16 June), the Christian Science Monitor (9 June), the Baltimore Sun, the International Herald Tribune (reproduction of 16 June NYT). "Newsweek" quoted a US military official who claimed Beirut would look like the Warsaw Ghetto (15 July).

One metaphor which recurs is the Christian conception of the Old Testament system of harsh, unmerciful justice. Hence the repeated reference to an eye for an eye. "With Old Testament Fury, the Wrath of Israel Spread Across Lebanon" begins a "Newsweek" report (21 June). In the same issue, a banner headline proclaims "A Terrible Swift Sword."

Aside from editorial bias and factual errors, which Even and Weinraub agree took on a life of their own, there was the frustrating problem of the tag "This article has been subjected to Israeli military censorship" on pieces from Israel. "Such a note immediately discredits the value of the article," according to Weinraub. He noted the much stricter censorship exercised by the Arab press and by the British in the Falklands, which received little, if any, criticism from members of the press or the audiences they served.

It became clear during our discussion with Even and Weinraub that the Office of the IDF Spokesman is not inclined to exercise stronger measures of censorship or turn to a "propaganda" campaign. Even mentioned plans to expand the "conducting officer" system to ensure that the press sees more, rather than less, of what is happening in the IDF. His view was echoed by others we met.

IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. General Raphael Eitan, told the group, "The Arabs have money to spend like the Nazis (on propaganda). They exploit death. It is not in our nature to adopt the methods of the Arabs."

He pointed with pride to the rigid orders issued to Israeli troops governing their conduct toward Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, and the warnings given to civilians to leave areas the IDF was approaching (which cost Israel the element of surprise, resulting in higher casualties). He noted that after the assassination of Beshir Jemeyel, the IDF forbade use of heavy artillery. "We can take the journalists and show them, but we cannot guarantee what they will print. Many were with the PLO for the whole time—they may have been influenced by propaganda."

Defense Minister Ariel Sharon said simply, "We failed to tell our case to the world. Maybe it is impossible."



Deputy Director General of the Foreign Ministry, Hanan Bar-On, called it a problem of perception. "That Israel is trying to force its will on everyone. Sometimes it looks like that. The United States also has a public relations problem. Because the US is the US, it can afford such a problem—Israel cannot. But we are proud of the double standard applied to us—we demand it of ourselves."

Still, the idea of an effort at public relations or propaganda seemed to hold as little appeal as the idea of censorship for the officials we spoke with. Manipulating or excluding the press was of less concern than doing the job as they saw it, and accepting adverse publicity as being one of the (minor) drawbacks of an open society. This may reflect tacit admission of their inability to deal with the press under adverse or untried circumstances, or the conviction that being right, or believing you are right, is sufficient. In the conclusion to his written statement, Weinraub placed responsibility for honest and accurate reporting on the conscience of the individual journalist:

Israeli society is open, pluralistic and democratic. Therefore, dissidence can be immediately picked up and rapidly diffused through Israel's excellent communications facilities. However, many journalists who consider themselves impartial should ask themselves whether initial prejudices, dislike for certain political or military leaders, personal frustration in news gathering and initial exposure to images beamed in from the other side did not influence their own choice of words and subject matter.

Beyond the problem of Israel's im-

Pictures You Never Saw in the Newspaper



Crates marked for the Red Crescent Society in Lebanon containing French mortar bombs. Hundreds of crates bearing innocuous labels contained arms, ammunition, and explosives.



Toy-shaped explosives found in Southern Lebanon. They were to have been carried over the border into Israel.

age, Bar-On expressed concern for the media's ability to damage the substance of a democratic government. "In an age of immediate communication, how restricted is a government in taking ac-

tion necessary for the country? We haven't really addressed the philosophical question. There is no real answer, but it is no problem for authoritarian states."

SHARON

(Continued from page 5)

ANSWER: You've brought three possibilities, first that the troops just moved without any approval from the government. Absolutely not. Everything was brought to the Cabinet. I don't remember any war here in this country—or a single war in the world—that was brought to the Cabinet, but our Cabinet was sitting every day to make decisions. Every step was brought to the Cabinet.

About the second possibility; that they were moving to find a better tactical position. What happened here was when we were on the Green Line they continued firing at us, but we did not advance. We stopped there. The Syrians stopped shooting on Friday, the 11th of June. The terrorists in the area of Beirut continued shooting. We took advantage of them because they were shooting. We blocked two roads, Damour to Alay and the main road to Beirut. We stopped again because there was a ceasefire. It was violated several times and we did gradually increase our pressure in the area of the outskirts of Beirut. It became more a question of using fire than moving. Every step was brought to the government. We had a general plan, but if they had stopped early on, I don't see that the Government would have allowed us to go any further.

If you ask me what would have happened then, I believe that the Syrians would still be in Beirut now and the terrorists would be attacking Beirut. We would have been facing a protracted war along those lines.

Conclusion

I would like to tell you that one of our problems is to tell our case to the world. Maybe it's impossible. Maybe we failed. I don't know. We need a lot of backing and support. What we have done is not only something that helps and supports us but I think it supported the Free World. We need backing and support mostly at this time as we are working on the problems of the future.

QUESTION 6: One last question, please. In your opinion what are the three most important messages you would like to have given out by us or anybody else in the United States?

ANSWER: That's a hard question. This is a country of 10,000 problems. I believe that terrorism should be stopped and one cannot compromise with terrorism.

The second thing is that what we have done was defensive. And though we went into this war in order to save ourselves from a very complicated problem that we have been subjected to for years and years, has contributed to the Free World and tremendously changed the position of the Free World in this region.

Third, is that Israel is a democracy. Therefore the criticism that one may hear here inside is something that doesn't make the country weaker, but stronger. Israel is a real democracy and there is a mistake in the assumption that Israel has become a different country than it was before—a country that relies more on power than on its moral values. That is the picture that the world is trying to paint of us. Israel has not been changed. Israel is a country with very high values, a democracy and has not changed. So, if I have to take three—I choose these three.

LONG WAR

(Continued from page 1)

Sinai). With the E-2C-relayed information, the SAMs were attacked by artillery fire (to divert and disperse the crews), air-launched chaff dispensers appropriate for the observed radar frequencies, and air-to-surface missiles, notably TOWs.

Meanwhile, Syrian jets were scrambled to meet the attacking aircraft (and to support the tank battle, discussed below). These Syrian aircraft were seen by the E-2Cs, generally as they rolled down the runways for takeoff. They were attacked by E-2C-directed aircraft when they passed an imaginary line, namely, the westernmost edge of the Syrian-based SAMs. The planes were MiG-21s and MiG-23s (MiG-25s appeared late in the game, were used for reconnaissance only, and two were shot down). Much was made by the Israelis of the superiority of the U.S. F-16s and F-15s, and of their Israeli pilots. But the greatest advantage appeared to this writer to be the Israeli capability to get off the first air-to-air missiles "beyond visual range" (BVR), under E-2C direction.


Incidentally, the JINSA team also inspected the IAI plant that makes the Kafir fighters. The plant is a depot that also repairs/modifies damaged aircraft—a bit messy, but good Kafirs came off the line. The Israelis gave no credit to the Kafir role in this war, however; they may be primarily for export.

How does one assess this technological/tactical tour de force? One can hardly quarrel with success, as measured by an 80:1 score (1 Israeli plane being lost to "ground fire"—with what weapon was not specified). But how much was superior Western technology and how much ingenious tactics, training, and morale against a slow-reacting, unimaginative enemy? (One cannot always choose rich parents or poor enemies.) The clear air of the Middle East, restricted airspace, benign electronic warfare environment, and Western initiative cannot be anticipated in the European theater. Nevertheless, RPVs are very likely to be valuable there. The Israelis say that you can't have too many and that manned aircraft platforms should be considered for them. Clearly, the United States should deeply study the Scout and its experience.

To this observer, however, the performance of the E-2C appeared to be the biggest single technological advantage (and concrete evidence of why the AWACS sale to the Saudis worried the Israelis). The greater-capacity AWACS should prove an asset in Europe. The Soviet Union cannot yet match it, although it has started with the Moss look-down aircraft and may be expected to catch up. Also, in Europe much AWACS energy will be spent in self-defense and in countering electronic jamming.

The Tank War

Equally one-sided was the Israeli-Syrian tank war: 400 to 10 tanks killed, and some of the small Israeli losses were self-inflicted. The latter point illustrates the greatest single deficiency of the Israelis cited. Namely, the lack of an adequate IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe). This is a long-term problem of modern warfare, not yet adequately solved by the United States either. The Israelis relied principally—or entirely—on visual identification (ID). They found silhouette ID from the air inadequate. Painted markings on Israeli tanks tended to be obscured by the omnipresent dust—and



The philosophy behind Israel's Merkava tank was that crew protection is paramount. The engine and transmission are in front of the crew and there is no ammunition carried above the turret ring.

tanks stir up a lot of it.

Much, perhaps most, of the victory in the tank war must be attributed to the Israeli control of the air, not only for air attack (the U.S. TOW anti-tank guided missile, launched from helicopters is credited with performing very well) but also for reconnaissance.

The Israelis also give credit to their Merkava, modestly referred to as "the best tank in the world." We visited the Merkava factory, again a depot half devoted to repair and modernization of damaged tanks. But new tanks keep coming off the line. There are numerous unique features of the Merkava, which the Israelis say was designed with the protection of the soldiers foremost in mind. The first innovation was to place the 900-horsepower diesel engine and its automatic transmission in the front of the vehicle. The frontal armor is layered, not as in the British-originated Chobham steel-plastic lamination, but with a ten- to twelve-inch space between the steel armor plates. This space, in the forepart of the vehicle, is filled with diesel fuel. Note that diesel oil does not explode or even burn easily, except under pressure. The most explosive liquid was found to be the hydraulic fluid in the transmission and controls, and a special non-explosive mixture was developed.

There is a four-man crew, and all are well protected, except the commander when he stands up through an open hatch, exposed, for better control of the battle. Ammunition is carried behind the crew but can be off-loaded to provide room for an infantry squad or for rescue litters and medics. There is a rear door, for protection of the dismounting of infantry or of loading of casualties on litters.

The Merkava is thus a multipurpose vehicle: tank, command vehicle, armored personnel carrier, or battlefield ambulance. It carries a 105mm rifled gun with a thermal shroud and five standard types of ammunition, a stabilized turret and gun (Cadillac-developed and Israeli-produced), a laser range-finder (Hughes-developed, Israeli

produced), night capability, a panoramic sight, an electronic ballistic computer, the lowest turret cross-section area of any contemporary main battle tank, and chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) protection, including filters and an air pump for positive internal pressure.

Despite 125mm guns on Soviet tanks (the Merkava will eventually carry a 120mm gun), the Israelis outgunned the Syrians. The Israelis called the Syrians poor gunners but credited them with not "breaking" under pressure, as the Egyptians do.

The principal opposition was the Soviet T-62. A few T-72s were brought into action on the last day, and the Israelis claim to have defeated them also with the Merkava, including penetrating the frontal "glasis" with 105s and TOWs, despite the reputed use of Chobham-type layered armor on the T-72. None were captured, the Israelis say, though one was inspected by a specially trained night raiding team. Findings are being withheld, however, pending arrival of the U.S. Defense Department team.

What, again, can one say, beyond praising the spectacular score? The Israelis say that the Soviet Gazelle gunship helicopters and Pogo and Sagger guided missiles performed poorly, the U.S. helicopters and TOW well. Israeli tanks and gunnery were superior. Battlefield coordination was superior, and there was control of the air. At this point one can only conclude that Western technology was very well used indeed. As to whether it is per se potentially decisive must still be answered with the Scotch verdict of "not proven."

The Prolonged Fighting

The history of the extension of the fighting beyond the 45-kilometer line in southern Lebanon is told elsewhere in this Newsletter. The most significant point for the evaluation of technology is that the motorized Israeli army did not prove well-adapted to fighting in "built-up areas" (what we would call "urban"

fighting), which must be done by infantry. New technology as well as tactics will be needed here. Since this is a major concern in NATO, teaching and learning may in this case go the other way.

Conclusions

As noted at the outset, the returns are not all in. Some technological edges were demonstrated. That a high technology military power, with superb training, tactics, morale, and initiative can prevail versus a lesser enemy has been demonstrated once more, even when the war was prolonged, not measured in days as in 1967 and 1973. The Israelis say they will rely for the next ten years on continued qualitative improvement but zero additional arms. Nevertheless, it takes nothing from the Israelis to say that whether Western technology has a broad based, reassuring advantage to comfort the United States and NATO remains to be proven.

News Briefs

PLO USED UN FACILITIES FOR MILITARY TRAINING: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) confirmed in an official report Israeli claims that the PLO used the facilities of a UN trade school in Lebanon for military courses for 781 students over a two-year period. The report said that armed PLO instructors lived at the Sibliin Training Center, stored weapons in a basement from which UN employees were barred, sent radio messages from the basement and conducted military classes for the students studying trades at the school. The courses included lectures, physical fitness classes, instruction on handling hand weapons and on the production of explosives. Diplomas were not awarded to the students until they completed a year of service with the PLO. Because of these activities, the Reagan Administration is holding up payment of \$15 million to the relief agency's section for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East at least until completion of the report. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act forbids payments to UNRWA unless it uses every possible means to ensure that no monies go to refugees receiving military training from the PLO or any other terrorist organization.

BONN WILL NOT INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING: The Defense Minister of West Germany, Manfred Woerner, has warned the Reagan Administration not to expect major increases in his country's military spending under the new conservative government. However, Woerner alluded to the possibility of a larger German contribu-

tion to NATO's infrastructure. The minister confirmed that preparations to receive new Pershing II nuclear missiles at the end of 1983 were progressing on schedule and he said that Bonn is still willing to deploy the missiles if U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks fall through, although he expects more serious protests against the missiles in West Germany in the next year.

U.S. TO UPGRADE TURKISH AIRFIELDS: The United States has agreed to pay for the modernization of 10 Turkish military airfields so that they can provide facilities for a variety of aircraft. The U.S. will pay for the improvements and for the installation of communications equipment; in return the airfields will be available in a military emergency to NATO forces.

DEADLINE FOR TALKS ON U.S. BASES IN GREECE: Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou has announced that he will set a deadline for talks on American bases in his country; if no agreement has been reached by that time, the bases will have to go. Part of Mr. Papandreou's campaign platform was a promise to his left-wing supporters to remove the four American bases from Greece. He claims that the bases have no strategic value to NATO or to Greek national security but are strictly American facilities that were established in the "neocolonialist" environment after the civil war which ended in 1949. No comment was made as to whether or how the Government will negotiate for the bases in terms of aid or security guarantees.

SOVIET SUB BASE IN KURILES: According to a Japanese newspaper, the Soviet Union has deployed conventional attack submarines at a new base on the Simushir Island in the Kuril chain. The Kuriles are located 250 miles northeast of Japan's northernmost island of Hokkaido, and were taken by the Soviets from Japan after World War II. This submarine base greatly increases Soviet naval capability in the northwest Pacific and Japanese and U.S. officials are concerned because they expect the Soviet Union to deploy nuclear-powered submarines at the base which already houses subs capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

ARMS SALES TO IRAN: Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arens reported that Israel, in coordination with the United States "at the highest levels" had supplied arms to Iran in its war effort against Iraq in an attempt to find some contact with the Iranian military in order to bring down the Khomeini regime. The arms transfers consisted mostly of spare parts for Iranian equipment produced in the United States.

SOVIET SPY PLANES INTERCEPTED: U.S. jet planes escorted two Soviet TU-95 Bear bombers, converted to espionage planes, out of the Air Defense Identification Zone near the east coast of the United States. The planes were spotted as they flew over the U.S. aircraft carrier Saratoga which was on sea trials after a major overhaul. It was the seventh time this year that Soviet planes have penetrated the zone.

INDIA TO BUY FRENCH JETS: The Indian government signed a contract to buy 40 French Mirage-2000 jets with Exocet missiles. The agreement was concluded on the same day that the Soviet Union announced its intention to modernize Indian weapons systems in its arms race with U.S.-supplied Pakistan.

BRITAIN INCREASES STRENGTH ON GIBRALTAR: The British Ministry of Defense has cancelled plans to replace the 500 1st Staffords Battalion troops in Gibraltar and in addition, sent in members of the 32nd Guided Weapons Regiment. Although the Ministry stated that the changes were due to scheduling conflicts and that the 1st Staffords will be replaced in January, the Times said that the government fears political instability in Spain will lead to a Falklands-style invasion of the British colony, which is claimed by the Spanish government to be Spanish territory.

CHINESE SUB LAUNCHED MISSILE: A Japanese newspaper reported that China had successfully launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile from a submarine in the East China Sea, becoming the fifth nation with the capability to fire missiles from submarines. Because the missile has a short range of only 740 miles, it does not have military significance, but it does have political and psychological effects on neighboring Japan. China launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile in 1980.

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

YEHUDA BLUM (Israel's ambassador to the UN, concerning the vote in the General Assembly to expel Israel): "Generally, I would say that there was an almost universal recognition that any attempt to tamper with Israel's credentials could have had disastrous consequences for the United Nations itself, and this brought together a wide variety and a wide spectrum of membership. I think it is significant that of the total membership of 157, only 9 supported the Iranian amendment. The remainder, 145 or so, one way or another distanced themselves from it: 75 voted against the Iranian amendment and another 70 either abstained or absented themselves from the vote, and this, in the UN context of course, is not without meaning. (27 Oct.)"

MENACHEM BEGIN: "If we have to decide whether all this incitement, all these false accusations, all the blood libels, all the vehement curses, all the insults, can stand in face of the fact that we gave the 200,000 residents of the Galilee security and peace, and we gave a chance to all the residents of Israel to live in the future, then we will accept anything that is hurled at us, all that was said against us, even the most horrible and negative things, knowing that the victory and the achievement will stand forever in the annals of Israel." (28 Oct.)

BRUNO KREISKY (Chancellor of Austria, in a joint communique with the Tunisian government): Expressed the belief that finding a just and comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict is commensurate with Israel's withdrawal from the occupied areas, including the eastern sector of Jerusalem, and recognition of the legitimate and unchanging rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to build their own independent state. They affirmed their support for the PLO—the sole representative of the Palestinian people. They recalled the need for it to take part in every action that can lead to finding a solution to the conflict. (11 Oct.)

YASSER ARAFAT (Chairman of the PLO, concerning President Reagan's peace initiative): "I have no connection with this plan. There is an Arab plan, which in my opinion we should uphold. However, this does not mean that we should not listen to all views. I must add here, that there is no such thing as a Reagan plan—merely a speech by the US president. There is, however, a French initiative put forward to the UN Security Council. There is also a Soviet plan, put forward by Chairman Leonid Brezhnev."

(Concerning possible US recognition of the PLO): "I am not optimistic about this. This is because the US Administration ignores the essence of the Middle East problem, which is the Palestine question and the just and established rights of the Palestine people, including their right to self-determination and the formation of their independent state on their national soil in accordance with UN resolutions and legitimacy. As is known, the US Administration ignores this fact and disregards international legitimacy." (14 Oct.)

'ISAM KHURI (Lebanese Defense Minister, concerning Lebanese Army raids into West Beirut): "If you do not work you do not make mistakes. Every positive step is usually accompanied by some drawbacks. The general objections may not all be based on facts. Some objections may be unfair. God forgive these people. We can understand it when people talk about public liberties, but what is the value of these liberties if there is no security and stability? If we really want to protect public liberties decisively then we must root out the elements of evil that obstruct public life. Just imagine an entire city sitting on top of stores and tunnels filled with all kinds of weapons. It is a very strange thing in a country seeking to regain its health, sovereignty and legality."

CAMILLE SHAM'UN (former President of Lebanon, concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon): "I have no reason to be pessimistic in this regard. I believe the Syrians will withdraw their forces together with all the Palestinian fighters. Of course, there is no question that Israel will also withdraw."

(Concerning the security arrangement demanded by Israel): "If the cost of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon is the signing of a security treaty with Israel, then I have no objection, provided that Israel will undertake not to carry out any aggression against Lebanon and to absolutely respect Lebanon's independence. In return, Lebanon must undertake not to allow the organizations that operated on its territory in the past years to resume their activities, if such activities constitute a threat to Israel's security. I would like to point out here that such undertakings are to a large extent incorporated in the 1949 armistice agreement." (29 Oct.)

BUTRUS GHALI (Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, concerning the recalling of the Egyptian ambassador to Israel): "The Israeli practices during the past months and following its invasion of Lebanese territory on 6 June have affirmed that Israel threatens peace. Egypt and the whole world condemned the invasion of Lebanese territory. The Israeli occupation of Beirut, which was opposed by all, was not conducive to peace, which we all want. After the invasion, we saw the savage massacres to which the Palestinian people were subjected in their camps in Lebanon and in the occupied Palestinian lands—these massacres were condemned by the whole world, including the United States and the Israelis themselves. For this reason, Egypt has recalled its ambassador in Israel until all Israelis withdraw from all Lebanese territory."

(Concerning the Arab eight-point peace plan): "First, I would like to clear up an important point. Egypt does not and will not claim hegemony of any plan for a peaceful settlement. Egypt will not stand against any settlement, but will support it if it achieves Arab and Palestinian interests...Egypt welcomes any plan on which all parties in the region agree." (Asked if this might occur at the expense of the Camp David accords, he replied) "Even at the expense of the Camp David accords, because the Arab and Palestinian interest is above all consideration. What is important from the Egyptian point of view is not the proposal of the plans as much as it is the execution of any of them." (23 Oct.)

JINSA
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
1100 Seventeenth St. N.W.
Suite 401
Washington, D.C. 20036

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