



# Democracy Facing Global Challenges

V-DEM ANNUAL DEMOCRACY REPORT 2019





# V-Dem is a unique approach to measuring democracy – historical, multidimensional, nuanced, and disaggregated – employing state-of-the-art methodology.

**Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) produces the largest global dataset on democracy with some 27 million data points for 202 countries from 1789 to 2018. Involving over 3,000 scholars and other country experts,**

**V-Dem measures hundreds of different attributes of democracy. V-Dem enables new ways to study the nature, causes, and consequences of democracy embracing its multiple meanings.**

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We are very grateful for our funders' support over the years, which has made this venture possible. To learn more about our funders, please visit: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/v-dem-institute/funders>

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect an official position of the V-Dem Project or the V-Dem Steering Committee.

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# Table of Contents

V-DEM ANNUAL REPORT 2019

**INTRODUCTION**  
A WORD FROM THE TEAM

**04**

**MAIN FINDINGS**

**05**

**V-DEM IN A NUTSHELL**  
V-DEM IN NUMBERS, V-DEM

**06**

**V-DEM METHODOLOGY**  
AGGREGATING EXPERT ASSESSMENTS

**07**

**SECTION 1**  
STATE OF THE WORLD 2018

**10**

**V-FORECAST**  
PREDICTING ADVERSE REGIME  
TRANSITIONS

**27**

**SPOTLIGHT**  
PUBLISHED RESEARCH

**29**

**SECTION 2**  
THREATS TO DEMOCRACY IN  
THE DIGITAL AGE

**34**

**SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 16**  
TRACKING PROGRESS WITH V-DEM DATA

**38**

**SECTION 3**  
EXCLUSION: A CHALLENGE TO  
DEMOCRACY

**44**

**REFERENCES**

**50**

**APPENDIX**  
COUNTRY SCORES FOR 2018

**52**

# A Word from the Team

We are pleased to present our third Annual Democracy Report – “Democracy Facing Global Challenges.” It offers facts in a time of disinformation and a ray of hope about the state and future of democracy.

It is beyond doubt that democracy faces global challenges. The first section of the report shows that autocratization – the decline of democracy – affects more countries than ever before. Still, most democracies remain resilient despite global challenges such as the financial crisis, mass immigration to Europe, and fake news spreading effortlessly on social media, sparking fear. Section 2 builds on new data that we collected for the *Digital Society Project*, and provides further insights into how digitalization challenges democracy. In the third section we also tap into new and unique V-Dem Indicators and show how exclusion challenges democracy.

There is nothing inevitable about future outcomes. It is in this spirit that readers should interpret the results from the groundbreaking *V-Forecast* project (see page 27) presenting the top-10 countries at-risk of an adverse regime transition 2019-2020. Rather than suggesting that these countries are doomed, this is an invitation for action. History shows that if pro-democratic forces work together, autocratization can be prevented or reversed.

There are also several positive news stories to report from 2018. Central Asia recorded its first peaceful handover of power from one democratically elected leader to another in Kyrgyzstan. In

Malaysia, an autocrat surprisingly lost in the elections despite manipulating them – showing that even in autocratic settings, elections can be a force for change. Similar electoral surprises occurred in The Gambia in 2016 and Sri Lanka in 2015. Finally, pro-democratic movements have mobilized masses of people across the globe in 2018 and 2019, for instance in Algeria, Armenia, Slovakia and Sudan.

The data and research presented in this report is generated by the Varieties of Democracy project, which is headquartered at the V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, Gothenburg University. V-Dem is an international collaboration involving more than 3,000 scholars from all over the world. We are tremendously grateful for the support and contributions of our global network of Country Experts, Country Coordinators, and Regional Managers. Without all of you, V-Dem would not have been possible!

The newly released version of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset covers 202 countries from 1789 to 2018 and a brand new set of indicators measuring exclusion and social media, among other things. We encourage you to visit <https://www.v-dem.net> and try out our new and innovative graphing tools, which allow you to explore our data interactively online.

We hope that you will find the report instructive.

*The V-Dem Institute Team*



# Main Findings: Democracy Facing Global Challenges

- The trend of autocratization continues, but global democracy levels are not in free fall.
- 24 countries are now severely affected by what is established as a “third wave of autocratization.” Among them are populous countries such as Brazil, India and the United States, as well as several Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Serbia; p.15).
- Almost one-third of the world’s population lives in countries undergoing autocratization, surging from 415 million in 2016 to 2.3 billion in 2018 (p.15).
- 21 countries have made progress on democracy over the past ten years, among them Armenia, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tunisia (p.25). This testifies to the continued appeal of democratic values.
- Democracy still prevails in a majority of countries in the world (99 countries, 55 percent; p.15). The world is thus unmistakably more democratic compared to any point during the last century. However, the number of liberal democracies has declined from 44 in 2008 to 39 in 2018 (p.15).
- This report presents the first model for forecasting autocratization and identifies the top-10 most at-risk countries in the world (p.28). These findings serve as an invitation for action by the policy and practitioner communities.

## Challenge # 1: Government manipulation of media, civil society, rule of law, and elections

- ✔ Freedom of expression and the media are the areas under the most severe attack by governments around the world, followed by closing space for civil society, and an erosion of the rule of law (p.18).
- ✔ This report provides evidence that, for the first time, the freedom and fairness of elections has also started to decline in more countries than it is improving (p.18).

## Challenge # 2: Toxic polarization on the rise

- ✔ Toxic polarization in the public sphere – the division of society into distrustful, antagonistic camps - is an increasing threat to democracy (p.19).
- ✔ Political elites’ respect for opponents, factual reasoning, and engagement with society is declining in many more countries than it is improving (p.19).
- ✔ Political leaders are increasingly using hate speech in many countries (p.19).

## Challenge # 3: Digitalization enables the spread of disinformation

- ✔ New data document that many democracies are the target of foreign online disinformation campaigns - the most affected are Taiwan, the United States, Latvia, and many other countries of the former Soviet Bloc (p.34).
- ✔ Most autocratic regimes (70%) use the internet to manipulate the information environment in their countries (p.34).



# V-DEM IN NUMBERS

## Who is V-Dem?

V-Dem is an international effort comprised of:

- 5 Principal Investigators
- 16 Personnel at the V-Dem Institute
- 18 Project Managers
- 30 Regional Managers
- 170 Country Coordinators
- 3,000 Country Experts

All working together to produce:

# 26,855,974

Data points in the v9 dataset


## New Measures in the v9

### Dataset

63 new indicators on democracy adding to the 408 existing indicators.



New indicators come from 2 new thematic areas:



## Where is V-Dem Data Used?




The V-Dem dataset has been downloaded by users in 153 countries since 2015



1,082,180 graphs created using the online tools by users in 158 countries

While the majority of the dataset downloads in 2018 come from Europe and North America, users from all regions of the world have accessed the data and used the online tools since 2015.

### Dataset downloads (2015-18)



## V-Dem Publications and Presentations to Academic and Policy communities

- 605 presentations in 42 countries by V-Dem scholars since 2007
- 84 visiting scholars presented at the V-Dem Institute since 2014





# V-Dem Methodology: Aggregating Expert Assessments

Laura Maxwell, Kyle L. Marquardt and Anna Lührmann

**V-DEM HAS DEVELOPED** innovative methods for aggregating expert judgments in a way that produces valid and reliable estimates of difficult-to-observe concepts. This aspect of the project is critical because many key features of democracy are not directly observable. For example, it is easy to observe and code whether or not a legislature has the legal right to investigate the executive when it engages in corruption. However, assessing the extent to which the legislature actually does so requires the evaluation of experts with extensive conceptual and case knowledge.

In general, expert-coded data raise concerns regarding comparability across time and space. Rating complex concepts requires judgment, which may vary across experts and cases. Moreover, because even equally knowledgeable experts may disagree, it is imperative to report measurement error to the user. We address these issues using both cutting-edge theory and methods, resulting in valid estimates of concepts relating to democracy.

We have recruited over 3,000 country experts to provide their judgment on different concepts and cases. These experts come from almost every country in the world, which allows us to leverage the opinions of experts from a diverse set of backgrounds. We typically gather data from five experts for each observation, which enables us to statistically account for both uncertainty about estimates and potential biases that experts may evince, using a custom-built Bayesian measurement model.

We ask our experts very detailed questions about specific concepts. In addition to being of interest in their own right, experts are better suited to the task of coding specific concepts rather than broader concepts such as “democracy.” Box M.1 provides the V-Dem question on academic freedom as an example.

As Box 1 makes clear, we endeavor to both make our questions clear to experts and craft response categories that are not overly open to interpretation. However, we cannot ensure that two experts understand descriptions such as ‘somewhat respected’ in a uniform way (a response of “2” in Box M.1)—even when ‘somewhat’ is accompanied by a carefully formulated description. Put simply, one expert’s ‘somewhat’ may be another ex-

## Box M1. Question: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

### Responses:

- 0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.
- 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.
- 2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.
- 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.
- 4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

pert’s ‘weakly’ (a response of “1” in Box M.1), even if they perceive the same level of freedom of expression in a particular country. Of equal importance, all experts code more than one indicator over time, and their level of expertise may vary, making them more or less reliable in different cases.

Pemstein et al. (2018) have developed a Bayesian Item-Response Theory (IRT) estimation strategy that accounts for many of these concerns, while also providing estimates of remaining random measurement error. We use this strategy to convert the ordinal responses experts provide into continuous estimates of the concepts being measured. The basic logic behind these models is that an unobserved latent trait exists, but we are only able to see imperfect manifestations of this trait. By taking all of these manifest items (in our case, expert ratings) together, we are able to provide an estimate of the trait. In the dataset, we

present the user with a best estimate of the value for an observation (*the point estimate*), as well as an estimate of uncertainty (*the credible regions*, a Bayesian corollary of confidence intervals).

The IRT models we use allow for the possibility that experts have different thresholds for their ratings. These thresholds are estimated based on patterns in the data, and then incorporated into the final latent estimate. In this way, we are able to correct for the previously-discussed concern that one expert's "somewhat" may be another expert's "weakly" (a concept known as Differential Item Functioning). Apart from experts holding different thresholds for each category, we also allow for their reliability (in IRT terminology, their "discrimination parameter") to idiosyncratically vary in the IRT models, based on the degree to which they agree with other experts. Experts with higher reliability have a greater influence on concept estimation, accounting for the concern that not all experts are equally expert on all concepts and cases.

To facilitate cross-country comparability, we have encouraged country experts to code multiple countries using two techniques. We refer to the first as **bridge coding**, in which an expert codes the same set of questions for the same time period as the original country they coded. This form of coding is particularly useful when the two countries have divergent regime histories because experts are then more likely to code the full range of the ordinal question scale, providing us with more information as to where an expert's thresholds are. By extension, this information also provides us with a better sense of the thresholds of her colleagues who only coded one of the countries she coded. The second technique is **lateral coding**. This has the purpose of gaining a great deal of information regarding an individual expert's thresholds by asking her to code many different cases that utilize a wide variety of other experts. By comparing her codings to those of many other experts, we are able to gain a greater sense of how she systematically di-

### BOX M.2. KEY TERMS.

**Point Estimate:** A best estimate of a concept's value.

**Confidence Intervals:** Credible regions for which the upper and lower bounds represent a range of probable values for a point estimate. These bounds are based on the interval in which the measurement model places 68 percent of the probability mass for each score, which is generally approximately equivalent to the upper and lower bounds of one standard deviation from the median.

**Significant Differences or Changes:** When the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals for two point estimates do not overlap, we are confident that the difference between them is real and not a result of measurement error. We interpret changes or differences as substantially relevant when they are equal or larger than 0.05 (indices) or 0.5 (indicators).

verges from experts who code other cases; conversely, we also gain information on how those other experts diverge from her. Both of these techniques provide us with more precise and cross-nationally comparable concept estimates.

Finally, we employ **anchoring vignettes** to further improve the estimates of expert-level parameters and thus the concepts we measure. Anchoring vignettes are descriptions of hypothetical cases that provide all the necessary information to answer a given question. Since there is no contextual information in the vignettes, they provide a great deal of information about how individual experts understand the scale itself. Furthermore, since all experts can code the same set of vignettes, they pro-

**TABLE M.1: VERSIONS OF THE V-DEM INDICATORS.**

SUFFIX	SCALE	DESCRIPTION	RECOMMENDED USE
None	Interval	Original output of the V-Dem measurement model	Regression analysis
_osp	Interval	Linearized transformation of the measurement model output on the original scale	Substantive interpretation of graphs and data
_ord	Ordinal	Most likely ordinal value taking uncertainty estimates into account	Substantive interpretation of graphs and data
_codelow / _codehigh	Interval	One Standard deviation above (_codehigh) and below (_codelow) the point estimate	Evaluating differences over time within units
_sd	Interval	Standard deviation of the interval estimate	Creating confidence intervals based on user needs



vide insight into how experts systematically diverge from each other in their coding. Incorporating information from vignettes into the model thus provides us with further cross-national comparability in the concept estimates, as well as more precision in the estimates themselves. The output of the IRT models is an interval-level point estimate of the latent trait that typically varies from -5 to 5, along with the credible regions. These estimates are the best to use for statistical analysis. However, they are difficult for some users to interpret in substantive terms (what does -1.23 mean with regard to the original scale?). We therefore also provide interval-level point estimates that have been linearly transformed back to the original coding scale that experts use to code each case. These estimates typically run from 0 to 4, and users can refer to the V-Dem codebook to substantively interpret them. Finally, we also provide ordinal versions of each variable. Each of the latter two is also accompanied by credible regions.

## References

- Marquardt, Kyle L. and Daniel Pemstein. Forthcoming. "IRT Models for Expert-Coded Panel Data." *Political Analysis*.
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- Pemstein, Daniel, Eitan Tzelgov and Yi-ting Wang. 2015. "Evaluating and Improving Item Response Theory Models for Cross-National Expert Surveys." *University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 1*.

# Section 1: State of the World 2018

## – Liberal and Electoral Democracy

**T**his year's *Democracy Report* shows that the trend of a third wave autocratization – the decline of democratic regime traits – continues and now affects 24 countries. When we weight levels of democracy by population size – because democracy is rule by the people and it matters how many of them are concerned – it emerges that almost one-third of the world's population live in countries undergoing autocratization. Yet democracy still prevails in a majority of countries in the world (99 countries, 55 percent). This section analyses the state of democracy in the world in 2018 and developments since 1972, with an emphasis on the last 10 years. Our analysis builds on the 2019 release of the V-Dem dataset<sup>1</sup>.

Anna Lührmann, Sandra Grahn, Shreeya Pillai, and Staffan I. Lindberg


**WE ARE NOW UNDENIABLY** in a “third wave of autocratization”<sup>2</sup> and this year's *Democracy Report* shows that this trend continues across the world in 2018. Yet, levels of democracy are not going in to free fall. While “toxic polarization,” weakening rule of law, and attacks on free media and civil society are increasing in many countries, democracy keeps spreading to and strengthening in other nations. This is one of the important insights we gain from the 9th version of the *Varieties of Democracy* (V-Dem) dataset released in April 2019.<sup>3</sup>

Figure 1.1 illustrates the state of liberal democracy in 2018. The Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) captures the quality of electoral aspects, as well as freedom of expression and the media, civil so-

ciety, rule of law, and strength of checks on the executive.<sup>4</sup> Western Europe, North America, parts of Latin America, and Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan continue to be the strongest holds for democracy in the world. Venezuela, Nicaragua and parts of the Caribbean, along with large swaths of Africa, the Gulf and Central and East Asia, have the lowest levels.

Figure 1.2 shows every country's specific rating on the LDI in 2018 and the change over the last ten years. Country names highlighted in green indicate countries with significant democratization and red country names those with autocratization. Countries are divided into the top 10 to 50 percent and bottom 50 to 10 percent of the world in terms of LDI score.

**FIGURE 1.1: THE STATE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN 2018.**



You can create similar maps with other V-Dem Indices using the V-Dem Online Graphing Tool – “Interactive Maps.” Scan the QR code with your phone.

1. V-Dem Data Set V9; Pemstein et al. (2019).

2. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019).


3. V-Dem Data Set V9.


4. V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) consists of two main components. First, the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) that is the first systematic measure of the de facto existence of all elements of Robert Dahl's famous articulation of

“polyarchy.” Dahl (1971); Dahl (1989). For details about the EDI see Teorell et al. (2018). The second component is the Liberal Component Index (LCI), reflecting the liberal tradition arguing that electoral democracy must be supplemented with the rule of law, ensuring respect for civil liberties, and constraints on the executive by the judiciary and legislature. The two components are aggregated using a slightly curvilinear formula; see V-Dem Methodology Document V9.



**FIGURE 1.2: COUNTRIES BY SCORE ON V-DEM'S LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (LDI) 2018 COMPARED TO 2008.**







## Democracy Eroding but Not in Free Fall

Democracy levels kept falling in 2018 but they are not in free fall. However, it is of concern that the current wave of autocratization primarily affects the three regions with the highest average levels of democratization: Western Europe and North America, Latin America, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Figure 1.3 shows the average levels of liberal democracy in the world from 1972 to 2018. On the left-hand side, the thick black line shows the “standard-type” country-based average of liberal democracy in the world along with confidence intervals. The line portrays the well-known wave of democratization following the Carnation revolution in Portugal in 1974, which peaked around 2008.

The last ten years show a small but perceptible decline in the global average that is, however, well within acceptable confidence intervals.<sup>5</sup> Western Europe and North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia are the three regions where democracy levels have eroded the most in recent years.


## Many Large Countries Are Declining

Autocratization is much more dramatic when size of population is taken into account, and affects all regions, save Africa.

The lines depicting global and regional averages on the left-hand side of Figure 1.3 give equal weight to small and large countries. Seychelles, with less than 90,000 inhabitants, counts equal to India with 1.3 billion people. But democracy is rule by the people and it arguably matters how many live under democracy.

The right-hand side of Figure 1.3 uses population-weighted global and regional averages.<sup>6</sup> The global decline in democracy since around 2010 is significantly more pronounced when taking population size into account. By this measure, the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in the world has now been cast back to where we were around 1990 – almost 30 years ago.<sup>7</sup> The difference between the country averages and the population-weighted measures is because autocratization processes have taken hold in large, populous countries such as Brazil, India, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States.

**FIGURE 1.3: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL AVERAGES (RIGHT-HAND SIDE POPULATION WEIGHTED).**



5 For the aggregated indices the confidence intervals reflect one standard deviation. These indicate that we could still be at 2012 levels of democracy in the world but we could possibly already have reversed back to 1990 levels. While taking uncertainty seriously, we chose in the following to focus on point estimates for the sake of parsimony and to avoid making the text unnecessarily dense.

6. Population data is from The World Bank (2019).

7. The upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals say that this estimate could vary from around 1983 to around 1996, but we focus here on the point estimates displayed by the main lines.

Autocratization also affects *all* regions, except Africa, when we take population size into account. The declines are much steeper and of substantially greater magnitudes for Western Europe and North America and Latin America. Declines are conspicuous in Western Europe and North America, and by this indicator the region is back to the level of democracy for the average citizen 40 years ago, in 1978, the time shortly after Southern Europe came out of long periods of dictatorship. The regional average for Latin America is down to 0.51 in 2018, bringing the region back to about 1996-levels.

By 2018 Eastern Europe and Central Asia’s population-weighted LDI had declined by almost one third from its peak in 1994. By the population-measure, the decline in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is not only much more substantial, it also started much earlier than if we look only at country averages: around 1997 instead of around 2011. This is due to the influence of autocratization in Russia, which had already started in the 1990s and which is home to one third of the region’s population.

While these are worrisome facts, we also note that levels plateaued in all regions between 2017 and 2018. Democracy is not in free-fall around the world and on this account our findings correspond with this year’s report by the Economist Intelligence Unit.<sup>8</sup>


**Autocratization** means any substantial and significant worsening on the scale of liberal democracy. It is a matter of degree and a phenomenon that can occur both in democracies and autocracies. Thus “autocratization” is an umbrella term that covers both erosion in democratic countries (democratic backsliding), breakdown of democracy, as well as worsening of conditions in electoral authoritarian countries. Semantically, it signals the opposite of democratization, describing any move away from [full] democracy.

**Democratization** is also a matter of degree that can also occur at any level on the scale of liberal democracy and manifest itself in limited liberalization of autocracies, democratic transition, as well as in further improvements in the quality of democracies.

In this report we operationalize autocratization and democratization as a **substantial and significant change** of the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) over ten years. For each year, we take the difference of the score at time *t* and time *t*-10, thus capturing both rapid and gradual change. Changes are significant if the confidence intervals do not overlap, and we consider them substantial if the absolute value of the changes is larger than 0.05.<sup>9</sup>

**FIGURE 1.4: SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ON THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX**

*Left-hand: Number of countries; Right-hand: Share of world population*



8. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2018).

9. The second criterion is new compared to last year’s article by Lührmann et al. (2018a) and used in order to exclude cases where change is significant but not meaningful, e.g. Syria, where LDI declined from a low level (0.06) in 2008 to an even lower level in 2018 (0.04). This follows the conceptualization

in Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) but not the exact operationalization. In the present article we use changes on the liberal democracy index (LDI) to establish autocratization, since it draws on the Democracy Report 2019 from the V-Dem Institute where the LDI is in focus. In Lührmann and Lindberg (2019), changes on the electoral democracy index (EDI) are used.



For some analyses we need to make a crisp distinction between **regime types**. To this end, we use the four-fold Regimes of the World (RoW) typology, which classifies countries as electoral democracies if they hold *de-facto* free and fair, multiparty elections in a pluralistic media and associational environment. In addition to these requirements, in liberal democracies horizontal institutions and the rule of law constrain the executive. In the non-democratic regime spectrum, electoral autocracies hold *de-jure* multiparty elections and closed autocracies do not.<sup>10</sup>

### Autocratization Affects One-Third of the World's Population

**The world is now evidently in a “third wave of autocratization”<sup>11</sup> that has slowly gained momentum since the mid-1990s, even as some countries continue to democratize. The number of citizens affected by autocratization surged from 415 million in 2016 to 2.3 billion in 2018.**

Figure 1.4 provides another perspective on the current trend of autocratization. The left-hand pane shows the number of countries where the LDI either declined (black line) or improved (dashed line) at a substantially relevant and statistically significant level over the ten years prior.<sup>12</sup>

The number of autocratizing countries first increased noticeably towards the end of the 1990s, and then again around 2012. During the same periods, the number of democratizing states declined. In the last year for which we have data – 2018 – the autocratizing countries ( $N=24$ ) outnumber the advancing countries ( $N=21$ ) for the first time since 1978.

The right-hand pane of Figure 1.4 renders this trend by share of the world population living in democratizing or autocratizing states. Comparing the two panels reveals something of great consequence. While the *number* of autocratizing countries was similar between 2016 and 2018 ( $N=18$  and 24), three very populous countries (Brazil, India, and the United States) entered the group. In effect, the number of citizens affected by autocratization surged from 415 million in 2016 to 2.3 billion in 2018. At the end of 2018 almost one-third of the world's population lives in countries undergoing autocratization.

10. Lührmann et al. (2018b). While using V-Dem's data, this measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering Committee of V-Dem (only the main V-Dem democracy indices have such an endorsement).

11. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019).

12. For each year, we take the difference of the score at time  $t$  and time  $t-10$ , thus capturing both rapid and gradual change. Changes are significant if the

### Resilience in the Light of Global Challenges

**Democracy is still the most common type of regime. We count 99 democracies harboring 52 percent of the world's population and 80 autocracies in 2018. Yet, the number of liberal democracies has declined from 44 in 2014 to 39 in 2018, and with a count of 55 countries electoral autocracy has become the most common form of dictatorship in the world.**

Notwithstanding recent trends, the state of the world is unmistakably improved compared to 1972 when 76 percent ( $N=119$ ) of all states were autocracies (see left-hand pane of Figure 1.4) and the modal regime type was closed autocracy. Following dissolution of the Soviet Union, this type of dictatorship almost vanished, unleashing an unprecedented rise of democratically elected governments.

Figure 1.5 (left-hand) shows that despite recent setbacks, a majority, i.e. 55 percent of states ( $N=99$ ) qualify as electoral or liberal democracies in 2018. The right-hand side of Figure 1.5 displays that also 52 percent of the world population live in democracies.


Still, within the democratic regime spectrum there is a shift away from liberal democracy. The number of liberal democracies declined from 44 (25 percent) at its peak in 2014 to 39 (22 percent) in 2018. The share of the world population living in liberal democracies peaked in 1996 at 18 percent and declined to 13 percent by 2018 (Figure 1.5; right-hand). The share of *countries* that are liberal democracies is thus misleading in terms of how democratic the world is for its *citizens*.

At the same time, the number of countries classified as electoral democracies increased from ten percent (17) in 1972 to 34 percent (60) in 2018, and while a meager 18 percent of citizens were found in this type of democracy in 1972 that share had doubled (39 percent) by 2018.

Electoral autocracies are regimes that hold *de jure* multi-party elections but nevertheless tilt the playing field in the incumbent's favor, typically through restricting media freedom and the space for civil society, and repressing the opposition. As Figure 1.5 (left-hand) shows, 21 percent of countries (33) were electoral autocracies in 1972. By 2018, the share of electoral authoritarian regimes had increased to 31 (55 countries). This growth is

confidence intervals do not overlap, and we consider them substantial if the absolute value of the changes is larger than 0.05. The second criterion is new compared to last year's article by Lührmann et al. (2018a) and used in order to exclude cases where change is significant but not meaningful, e.g. Syria where LDI declined from a low level (0.06) in 2008 to an even lower level in 2018 (0.04). This decline of 0.02 is significant, but not substantially meaningful.

**FIGURE 1.5: GLOBAL SHARE OF REGIME TYPES (LEFT-HAND) AND SHARE OF POPULATION IN REGIME TYPES (RIGHT-HAND).**



also reflected in the share of the world population living under this type of regime, increasing from 11 percent in 1972 to 23 percent in 2018 (Figure 1.5: right-hand).

It is some solace that the proportion of (and hence number of) citizens subjected to electoral authoritarianism is smaller than the share of countries suggests. Nonetheless, the larger picture is that this form of authoritarian rule has expanded significantly and is now the most common form of dictatorship in the world.

The figure also shows that closed autocracies have almost vanished, making them only 14 percent ( $N=25$ ) of all countries while still accounting for 24 percent of the world population in 2018. The difference is primarily due to China. Nevertheless, the dramatic reduction of closed autocracies since 1972, with no noteworthy recent increase, is important to keep in mind when assessing the spread of the third wave of autocratization.

### Facing Up to the Challenges?

**Global challenges put pressure on democratic regimes, but the resilience of many established democracies shows that these forces do not necessarily lead to democratic erosion or breakdown.**

As the third wave of autocratization got under way around 1994<sup>13</sup> and gained momentum during the past few years (see Figure 1.4), a number of countries have shifted regime categories downwards.

Twelve countries that were *liberal democracies* have degenerated into electoral democracies: Greece, Hungary and Poland made full transitions to electoral democracy. Botswana, Cape Verde, Chile, Lithuania, Namibia, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea and Tunisia remain on the verge of meeting the criteria for inclusion in the group of liberal democracies again.

Among countries that were *electoral democracies* at some point since the start of the autocratization movement, 22 have been broken down to the level of electoral autocracies.<sup>14</sup>

Two countries that were *electoral democracies* (Libya and Thailand) along with four electoral autocracies (Palestine/West Bank, Syria, Vietnam, and Yemen) turned into closed autocracies.

Still, most democracies remain relatively resilient after serious global challenges such as the financial crisis, mass immigration to Europe, and fake news sparking fear spreading effortlessly on social media with the rise of digitalization.

13. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019, p.12-13).

14. Bangladesh, Belarus, Comoros, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Maldives, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine,

Venezuela and Zambia made a full transition to electoral autocracy. Armenia, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Madagascar and Somaliland also fell down but remain on the verge of meeting the criteria for electoral democracies. They are thus more ambiguous cases of democratic breakdown.



Many observers drew parallels to the 1929 Wall Street crash when the financial crisis hit in 2008.<sup>15</sup> The 1929 crash played an important role in paving the way for the rise of fascism in Europe and the Second World War. Ten years after Black Friday in 1929, six democracies had broken down – one quarter of the democracies that existed in 1929. Yet, ten years after the 2008 financial crisis most economies have recovered, and most democracies remain relatively robust.

Likewise, many saw a threat to democracy in the massive numbers of refugees arriving to Europe around 2015, and right-wing populists mobilized support by their anti-immigrant stance. However, populists are not equally successful everywhere and their vote share varies between zero and 40+ percent.<sup>16</sup>

Digitalization also poses challenges to democracy, but again, 15 years after the beginning of the global spread of social media, most democracies on the continent appear fairly resilient. Four European countries are affected by substantial and significant autocratization but only one –Serbia – has turned into an electoral autocracy, at least so far.

Thus, while global challenges put pressure on democratic regimes, they do not *necessarily* lead to democratic erosion or breakdown. This is important to bear in mind while analyzing the autocratization trend in more detail.


## Media and the Quality of Public Debate Are the Weakest Links

**Freedom of expression and the media, as well as the freedom of civil society, and to some extent the rule of law, are the areas under most severe attack by governments over the last ten years of the current third wave of autocratization. Yet, we also notice, for the first time, that the quality of elections is starting to derail.**

Given that erosion during the current third wave of autocratization moves conspicuously slowly and is typically accomplished by rulers via legal means,<sup>17</sup> it is imperative to detail which specific aspects of democracy are shifting.

There is a clear pattern. When countries autocratize, multiparty elections and their quality are not the primary targets, instead key aspects that make them meaningful are: freedom of expression, reasoned public deliberation, rule of law, and to a somewhat lesser extent, freedom of association.

This is shown in Figure 1.6 depicting for how many countries key V-Dem indices have substantially and significantly improved (vertical axis) or declined (horizontal axis) over the last ten years. For indices above the diagonal line more countries have improved than declined, and the other way around for indices placed below the horizontal line.



**FIGURE 1.6: KEY V-DEM INDICES: NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITH SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES, 2008-2018.**



You can create similar graphs with the help of 12 different V-Dem Online Graphing Tools. Scan the QR code with your phone.

- ▲ Electoral Democracy
- Participatory Component
- ◆ Egalitarian Component
- ▲ Liberal Component
- Deliberative Component

15. E.g. Anheier, Kaufmann, and Ziaja (2018).  
16. Rooduijn et al. (2019).

17. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019, p.10-11).

Egalitarian aspects have not changed much, while indices measuring the presence of elections, including participatory aspects captured by local and regional elections, have improved in more countries than they have declined. Key public officials are now subject to multiparty elections in twelve more countries than ten years ago.

Compared to 2008, 22 countries have also introduced local elections – such as Oman and the Nepal – or substantially expanded the influence of elected local officials by 2018. The picture is similar for regional elections.

At the same time, the quality of elections – captured by the Clean Elections Index –improved in 13 countries, but declined in almost as many (N=12).

Among the eight indicators (Figure 1.7) that go into the index of clean elections, the indicator for how free and fair the elections were declines the most: in 27 countries elections are now substantially and statistically significantly worse than in 2008. This is a new trend that we observe in this year's *Democracy Report*. In analyses for our previous reports, the quality of elections remained strong and was even improving. It seems that a number of autocratizing countries such as Hungary, Nicaragua, Turkey, and Zambia have come far enough in the process to also start derailing the core of democracy – the quality of elections.

Yet, the greatest deterioration registers in the institutions that make elections meaningful. The index for *freedom of expression*


and media declines substantially in 27 countries, while improving in only 15 over the past ten years (see Figure 1.6). Figure 1.7 shows that among the nine indicators that go into this index, government censorship of the media, bias in the media favoring the government, freedom of discussion for both men and women, and academic and cultural freedom of expression decline the most.

Figure 1.6 also shows that the index measuring *rule of law* deteriorates in 14 countries and improves in seven, and the index gauging *freedom of association* also declines in more countries (N=8) than in states advancing (N=5). With regards to freedom of association, it is mainly civil society that is a target of repression and not political parties (Figure 1.7).

Several indicators that go into the index for freedom of association are affected more severely. For example, the indicator measuring how harshly governments control the existence of civil society organizations deteriorates in a record number of 30 countries while improving in only ten. Repression of civil society organizations has similarly become significantly worse in 26 countries, while conditions have improved in only 17.

In conclusion, media and the freedom of civil society, and to some extent the rule of law, are the areas under most severe attack by governments over the last ten years of the current third wave of autocratization.

These developments are undoubtedly disconcerting. Recent



research has provided strong evidence that voters make poor choices if they lack accurate and independent information.<sup>18</sup> Thus, manipulation of the media reduces the effectiveness of elections and limits citizens in the exercise of their fundamental rights.

**Deliberative Aspects: Toxic Polarization on the Rise**  
**This year’s Democracy Report shows, for the first time, a spread of toxic polarization. This is arguably a dangerous course. Once political elites and their followers no longer believe that political opponents are legitimate and deserve equal respect, or are even acceptable as family and friends, they become less likely to adhere to democratic rules in the struggle for power.**


It is not only government-imposed restrictions on media and civic space that undermine the free, public-spirited debate necessary for democracy.<sup>19</sup> An increasing number of societies are polarized to the extent that they are split into “mutually distrustful ‘Us vs. Them’ camps.”<sup>20</sup> Such *toxic polarization* moves far beyond democracy’s nourishing wrangles about policy, and it cuts deep into the social fabric of society. For instance, opinion polls both in the USA and in Turkey show that citizens are increasingly reluctant to accept someone that supports another political party as a spouse, friend of their child, or even as a neighbor.<sup>21</sup> These are troubling signs. When political disagreements about policy translate into rejection of opponents as an acceptable companion, society is on a slippery slope.

To avoid such breakdown, it is vital that politicians and citizens alike show a basic level of respect for each other and for democratic institutions.<sup>22</sup> Figure 1.8 testifies that we are facing a far-reaching negative trend in this area.

In Figure 1.6 above, we showed that the index measuring deliberative democratic qualities declines in 20 countries while improving in only half as many. In Figure 1.8 we show that *all* of the indicators that constitute the deliberative index, as well as two new indicators measuring polarization and prevalence of hate speech, fall below the diagonal line, indicating that more countries regress than advance. Four out of the five indicators from the deliberative component make a turn for the worse in many more countries than they advance.

Deliberation refers to “mutual communication that involves weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters of common concern.”<sup>23</sup> Thus, the deliberative index and its indicators reflect to what extent the public de-

**FIGURE 1.8: INDICATORS OF TOXIC POLARIZATION: NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITH SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES 2008-2018.**



bate is respectful, builds on facts, and opponents are open to persuasion by reason.

The indicator for *reasoned justification* declines in 33 countries while advancing in only 14. This indicator reflects the extent to which politicians provide public and fact-based justifications for their policy choices and thus captures two important ideals of deliberative democracy. First, citizens should be enabled to understand the relevant pros and cons of important political decisions. Second, arguments, reason and facts should undergird public debate prior to decision-making and “[p]ost-truth politics is the antithesis of deliberative democracy.”<sup>24</sup> This measure declines precipitously in countries where disinformation and populism is on the rise, such as Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, India, Poland, and the United States of America.

Furthermore, the *respect for counter-arguments* declines in 31 countries. This indicator reflects the idea that mutual respect evolves through “authentic and non-coercive deliberation” and political elites should change their preferences.<sup>25</sup> With the rise of populism, societies are increasingly divided into antagonistic camps, impeding such a constructive approach to political debates.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, it is worrisome that both of these two indicators – *reasoned justification* and *respect for counter-arguments* – show a substantial and statistically significant decline also in one out

18. Hollyer et al. (2018).

19. Elster (1998); Habermas (1984).

20. McCoy and Somer (2019, p.234).

21. McCoy and Somer (2019, p.257-258).

22. Linz (1978).

23. Bächtiger et al. (2018, p.2).

24. Bächtiger et al. (2018, p.1).

25. Kuyper (2015, p.54).

26. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018).



of four *liberal* democracies (ten and eleven respectively, out of 39), such as in Brazil where the political climate has become increasingly polarized in the years leading up to the election of far-right populist Bolsonaro as president in October 2018.

Similarly, the indicators of the extent to which important policy decisions are discussed between the elites (*range of consultation*) or with citizens (*engaged society*) have both declined in 30 countries while improving in less than 20. The indicator capturing the extent to which political elites justify their positions in terms of *the common good* is the only deliberative aspect where the improvements (18) and declines (20) more or less even out.

This year V-Dem also collected new data on behalf of the Digital Society Project.<sup>27</sup> Two indicators are particularly relevant here: the indicator measuring the *degree of polarization* in society registers a substantial decline in 33 countries over the past ten years while improving in only five. Equally worrisome, in 30 countries major political parties increasingly use *hate speech* – “speech that is intended to insult, offend, or intimidate members of specific groups, defined by race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, disability, or similar trait.”<sup>28</sup>


This spread of toxic polarization is arguably a dangerous course. Once political elites and their followers no longer believe that political opponents are legitimate and deserve equal respect, or are even acceptable as family and friends, they become less likely to adhere to democratic rules in the struggle for power.

This can set in motion a vicious circle of mutual distrust and norm violation that is difficult to stop.<sup>29</sup> Donald Trump’s attempts to undermine the legitimacy of elections,<sup>30</sup> repeated calls that all media are the enemy of the people,<sup>31</sup> and vilification of political opponents in the United States, are telling examples of this.

### Democratizing and Autocratizing Countries: Patterns of Progress and Decay

**24 countries have declined in terms of liberal democracy between 2008 and 2018. In almost all autocratizing countries (17), a decline on the index measuring freedom of expression and the media is part and parcel of the deterioration of liberal democracy. Furthermore, in almost all of them (18), society is polarized and/or a populist held the office of Prime Minister or President by 2018. Thus, populism and toxic polarization go hand in hand with the current autocratization trend. However, 21 countries made progress on democracy,**

**FIGURE 1.9: CHANGES IN THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX, 2008-2018.**



**often after sustained pressure from citizens and opposition groups. This testifies to the unceasing attraction of democracy even as these processes remain incomplete, making such countries vulnerable to the risk of an adverse regime change.**

How do the changes in V-Dem indices and indicators reported in the previous section relate to change in political regimes? Typical for the third wave of autocratization, 2018 did not register any sudden breakdowns. Only two countries improved more than ten percent on the LDI from 2017 to 2018 (Ecuador from 0.37 to 0.47 and the Gambia from 0.28 to 0.44) and only one country’s decline was of the equivalent magnitude (Guatemala from 0.51 to 0.40).

However, over the last ten years, changes in almost 50 countries combine to be substantially relevant and statistically significant. In Figure 1.9 these countries have their country name spelled out, with the countries improving above the diagonal line and the countries declining below it. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide further insights on the patterns of change. Recall that the LDI is composed of eight main indices capturing clean elections, freedom of association, freedom of expression, rule of law, legislative and judicial constraints on the executive, as well as indices measuring suffrage and elected officials (see Table 1.1; last two indices are not shown). Substantial changes on these indices add up to indicate substantial autocratization or democratization processes.<sup>32</sup>

27. See Section 2 and <http://digitalsocietyproject.org>.

28. V-Dem Codebook V9, p.298.

29. Linz (1978); McCoy and Somer (2019).

30. See for instance an analysis by Chris Cillizza at CNN: <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/06/politics/donald-trump-2020-election-illegitimate/index.html>.

31. See for instance Emily Stewart’s report for Vox: <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/29/18037894/donald-trump-twitter-media-enemy-pittsburgh>.

32. See for instance Emily Stewart’s report for Vox: <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/29/18037894/donald-trump-twitter-media-enemy-pittsburgh>.

Changes on other V-Dem indices that are conceptually orthogonal to the LDI – for instance on polarization and the deliberative component – provide a basis for further analysis of current trends as shown in the discussion above. In the following, we discuss the most substantial autocratization or democratization processes depicted in Figure 1.9 and Tables 1.1 and 1.2.

### Autocratizing Countries: Gradual Erosion

24 countries have declined in terms of liberal democracy between 2008 and 2018. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the main countries.<sup>33</sup> The first six columns indicate which sub-indices of the LDI have declined. In almost all autocratizing countries (17), a decline in the index measuring freedom of expression and the media is part and parcel of the deterioration of liberal democracy. In eleven countries, the rule of law deteriorated and ten of

those are now autocracies. The index for clean elections drives decline in ten cases – mainly in countries that are now electoral autocracies. Furthermore, in almost all autocratizing countries (18), society is polarized and/or a populist holds the office of Prime Minister or President by 2018.<sup>34</sup> Thus, populism and toxic polarization go hand in hand with the current autocratization trend. We can group the autocratizing countries into four different types: (1) the erosion of liberal democracies and (2) the erosion of electoral democracies that nevertheless remain in the democratic regime spectrum; (3) the breakdown of democracies and (4) decline of already autocratic regimes (Figure 1.10).

### EROSION OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

The four processes of erosion that started in countries that were liberal democracies in 2008 are noteworthy. Liberal democra-

**TABLE 1.1: SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIES (2008-2018)**

		Clean Elections	Freedom of Association	Freedom of Expression	Equality before the Law	Judicial Constraints on the Executive	Legislative Constraints on the Executive	Egalitarian Components	Participatory Components	Deliberative Components	Polarization of Society	Populist in Power	Military Coup
Erosion of Liberal Democracies	Czech Republic												
	Hungary												
	Poland												
	USA												
Erosion of Electoral Democracies	Brazil												
	Bulgaria												
	India												
Democratic Breakdown	Comoros												
	Honduras												
	Mali												
	Nicaragua												
	Serbia												
	Turkey												
	Ukraine												
	Venezuela												
Zambia													
Declines in Autocracies	Bahrain												
	Burundi												
	Haiti												
	Mauritania												
	Thailand												
	Yemen												
Total, Decreasing Countries:		10	7	17	11	5	8	6	8	11	13	14	3
		V-Dem Liberal Democracy Indices						Other V-Dem Indices			Non-V-Dem Indicators		

No Substantial and Significant Decrease  
 Substantial and Significant Decrease

Note: All cells represent significant and substantially relevant decreases over 10 years, apart from the three more protracted cases of Nicaragua, Thailand, and Venezuela. Here we calculate the change by comparing 2018 to the year before the start of declines in liberal democracy, which was 2007 for Nicaragua, 2006 for Thailand, and 1999 for Venezuela. We have included all polities with substantial and significant declines of V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index between 2008 and 2018 apart from Zanzibar and Palestine (Gaza).


32. In rare cases the LDI changes at a substantial and significant level while none of its components do – for instance, in the case of the USA (Table 1). This is because in the aggregation the changes of the individual indices add up to be significant.

33. Here we focus on changes in larger countries and therefore do not discuss the adverse changes in Zanzibar and Palestine (Gaza). The N on Table 1.1 is therefore 22.

Sources: The V-Dem indices come from Coppedge et al. (2019). Data on populists in power on European countries is from The PopuList (2019) and populism data on Latin American countries from Ruth (2018). They rely on three core character components to identify populist leaders: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and an antagonistic relationship between the “virtuous people” and the “corrupt elite”. We used the same definition to characterize the rest of the cases, which we coded using various news sources. We have spotted military coups based on news sources as well.

34. Data on populists in power (as Prime Ministers or Presidents) in European countries is from Rooduijn et al. (2019) and populism data on Latin American countries from Ruth (2018). They rely on three core character components to identify populist leaders: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and an antagonistic relationship between the “virtuous people” and the “corrupt elite.” We used the same definition to characterize the rest of the cases, which we coded using various news sources.

FIGURE 1.10: TYPES OF AUTOCRATIZATION.



cies used to be thought of as well-nigh immune to adverse regime change,<sup>35</sup> and no liberal democracy has broken down in the past ten years. Yet, erosion is no illusion. The most dramatic changes occurred in **Hungary**, with a decline of almost 30 percent on the LDI scale (from 0.74 in 2008 to 0.44 in 2018), followed by Poland with 28 percent (from 0.83 to 0.55). Hungary's ruling party, Fidesz, changed laws and regulations, as well as informal proceedings, severely afflicting Hungarian democracy. Important checks and balances were removed before the 2014 election when regulatory changes increased media self-censorship. Changes to the legal framework before the elections also led to direct government control over the previously independent national election commission.<sup>36</sup> Since then the ruling party has increasingly restricted a broad swathe of democratic institutions, including freedom of the media, freedom of association, freedom of expression, academic freedom, and the rule of law.<sup>37</sup> Last year the major pro-government media outlets also formed a conglomerate, which observers fear will further undercut the already highly limited media pluralism.<sup>38</sup> An increasingly exclusionary politics is also reflected in declines on the Egalitarian and Participatory component indices. Hungary was classified as a liberal democracy in 2008 but was already downgraded to an electoral democracy in 2010, and by 2018 Hungary is balancing on the very verge of a breakdown to electoral autocracy. If it turns into an electoral autocracy Hungary will be the first former liberal democracy to suffer from such a breakdown in recent times.

In **Poland**, democratic erosion has mainly affected the media environment, the rule of law and judicial constraints on the executive. This country was also a liberal democracy in 2008 but was degraded to an electoral democracy in 2015. The ruling party, PiS, has made legislative changes to the judicial system, negatively affecting constitutional checks and balances. The PiS government then pushed through legislative changes increasing the role of political appointees in election-administration bodies, and authorities can now give preferences to favored groups and gatherings.<sup>39</sup>

Unlike Hungary and Poland, the **Czech Republic** remains in the liberal democratic regime spectrum, and the setbacks (14 percent on the LDI, from 0.85 to 0.70) have been more modest as of now. Yet, the election of populist oligarch Babiš as prime minister in 2017 and his close collaboration with the pro-Russian president Zeman, is putting Czech democracy to a stress test. Media pluralism has declined noticeably following Babiš' control of key outlets and deterioration in the quality of the public debate is indicated by substantial and significant decreases in the deliberative component and the polarization of society indicator. Nevertheless, a stable system of checks and balances and a vivid civil society seem to provide some protection from the further decline of Czech democracy – as of now at least.<sup>40</sup>

In the **United States**, president Trump constantly attacks his opposition as well as the media, and seems bent on curbing both

35. Mechkova, Lüthmann, and Lindberg (2017); Schedler (1998).

36. Kelemen (2017, p.222).

37. Kelemen (2017, p.222); European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (2018); Rupnik (2018, p.26); Than, Reuters (2018), see <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-courts/hungary-to-set-up-courts-overseen-directly-by-government-idUSKBN10B193>.

38. European Federation of Journalists (2018), see <https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2018/11/29/hungary-new-pro-government-media-conglomerate-threatens-pluralism/>.

39. Przybylski (2018, p.58-59); European Commission (2017), see [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5367\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm).

40. Pehe (2018).



civil liberties and oversight institutions, such as courts and the legislature. However, so far, American institutions appear to be withstanding these attempts to a significant degree.<sup>41</sup> In particular, the victory for the Democrats in the 2018 midterm elections strengthened the legislature's ability to provide constraints on the executive. Reflecting this, the Legislative constraints on the executive index bounced back in 2018 by 6 percent. While all components of the LDI show decline for the United States, the changes are not statistically significant, except for specific indicators such as those measuring harassment of journalists and media censorship. At the same time, the severe decline on indicators of polarization of society and disrespect in public deliberations are notable and provide evidence for what many observers suggest are the greatest threats to American democracy.

Several other liberal democracies are under pressure without yet registering substantial and significant decline on the LDI. For instance, after the right-wing populist party, FPÖ, joined the Austrian government in 2017, **Austria's** score on the Freedom of expression and alternative sources of information index declined significantly. This probably reflects incidents such as the interior minister threatening to launch criminal investigations against media that report negatively on the domestic intelligence agency; that newspapers were not allowed to cover government visits to a refugee center; as well as a party leader who demanded the resignation of a journalist who had made critical comments about his party.<sup>42</sup>

#### EROSION OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACIES

Democratic erosion affects three long-standing electoral democracies: Bulgaria, Brazil and India. In all three cases, attacks on media pluralism, academic and cultural freedom, and substantial polarization in society are the key properties worsening. In all three countries it has become more dangerous to be a journalist, indicated both by the V-Dem indicators and by Reporters without Borders' register of deadly attacks on journalists.<sup>43</sup> The concentration of media in the hands of actors loyal to the government also debilitates media pluralism in **Bulgaria**.<sup>44</sup> The Modi-led government in **India** uses laws on sedition, defamation, and counterterrorism to silence critics.<sup>45</sup> In **Brazil**, the political climate became increasingly polarized in the years leading up to the election of far-right populist Bolsonaro as president in October 2018.<sup>46</sup> In particular, the parliament's impeachment of then president Rousseff in 2016 and the arrest of former president Lula in 2017 on corruption charges, sparked fierce debates

and mass protests. These examples of deterioration of the political climate add up to significant erosion.

#### DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN

Of the nine democracies that have broken down during the last ten years, only one was the result of "sudden death" (Mali), while eight were a consequence of gradual erosion: Comoros, Honduras, Nicaragua, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela and Zambia.

**Nicaragua, Turkey and Venezuela** are the worst cases. After eleven, 15, and 19 years respectively of populist rule, autocratization has diminished almost all aspects of democracy. Despite the far-left appeal of the rulers of the two Latin American countries, even the V-Dem index measuring egalitarianism in the political sphere has declined substantially. Nicaragua became an electoral autocracy by 2012, and Venezuela had faced the same destiny a few years earlier. Turkey's LDI has plummeted by 35 percent during the last ten years alone and it was an electoral autocracy by 2013. Erdoğan's massive crackdown on media and civil society, as well as all but diminishing the rule of law and horizontal constraints on his rule are reflected in these changes.

In **Serbia**, autocratization under the current president and former prime minister, Vučić, started around 2012. Media freedom and electoral integrity were quickly eliminated and this country in the Balkans ceased qualifying as an electoral democracy in 2015. In **Zambia**, the election in 2016 was fraught with allegations of manipulation, but attacks on the institutions of horizontal accountability and media freedom had taken a significant toll in the years before and the country had already become an electoral autocracy by 2015. In **Ukraine**, then Prime Minister, Yanukovich, eroded key aspects of democracy, such as freedom of expression, association, and the rule of law from 2010 onwards, thus turning it into an electoral autocracy by 2012. While the Euromaidan revolution ousted him in 2014, the political situation in the Ukraine became increasingly polarized – including an armed conflict in the Donbass region – preventing the recovery of democratic institutions.

**Mali** is the only country in this group where an electoral democracy broke down suddenly, following a military coup in 2012. Even though this African country swiftly returned to civilian rule and was classified as an electoral democracy again by 2015, it continues to be marred by instability and violence and fidgets on the border between electoral autocracy and democracy.

41. Haggard and Kaufman (2018).

42. Mapping Media Freedom (2018), see <https://mappingmediafreedom.org/index.php/country-profiles/austria/>. 43. Reporters without borders (2019), see [https://rsf.org/en/barometer?year=2019&type\\_id=235#list-barometre](https://rsf.org/en/barometer?year=2019&type_id=235#list-barometre).

44. Ganev (2018).

45. Human Rights Watch (2019), see <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/india>.

46. Bolsonaro took office on 1 January 2019. Table 1.1 only includes developments until the end of 2018.

**TABLE 1.2: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF RECENTLY DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES (2008-2018)**

		Clean Elections	Freedom of Association	Freedom of Expression	Equality before the Law	Judicial Constraints on the Executive	Legislative Constraints on the Executive	Egalitarian Components	Participatory Components	Deliberative Components	Polarization of Society	Military Interference	State Fragility
<b>Deepening of Democracies</b>	Burkina Faso	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	El Salvador	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	Georgia	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	Sierra Leone	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
<b>Transitions to Democracy</b>	Bhutan	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	Fiji	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	Gambia	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	Ivory Coast	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	Kyrgyzstan	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	Nigeria	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	Sri Lanka	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	Tunisia	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
	<b>Liberalization of Autocracies</b>	Angola	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
Armenia		Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
CAR		Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
Guinea		Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
Libya		Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
Myanmar		Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
Zimbabwe		Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength	Strength
		V-Dem Liberal Democracy Indices					V-Dem Component Indices			V-Dem Indicators			

Strength  
 Fragile Improvement  
 Weakness

Note: Data is for 2018 and from Coppedge et al. (2019). For the V-Dem Liberal Democracy and Component Indices, which are all on a 0 (low) to 1 (high) scale, we consider a level below 0.5 a weakness, between 0.5 and 0.8 as a fragile improvement and a level above 0.75 a strength. The V-Dem indicators are each on different scales and therefore we apply individual cut-off points.

For the indicator on Polarization of Society we consider it a “strength” if V-Dem data indicates “no” or “limited” polarization; a “fragile improvement” if there is a “moderate” or “medium” clash of views and a “strength” if there are “serious differences in opinions in society on almost all key political issues”.

We measure Military Interference using the indicator on the extent to which political regimes depend on the military to maintain power. We consider a score below 0.2 as “strength”, a score between 0.2 and 0.75 as a “fragile improvement” and a score above 0.75 as a “weakness”.

State fragility is measured using the V-Dem indicator on the percentage of the territory the state has effective control over. We consider it a strength if states control more than 85% of the territory; a fragile improvement if it is between 85% and 75% and a weakness if it’s less than 70%.

### DECLINES IN AUTOCRACIES

During these past ten years, the situation has worsened substantially and statistically significantly in seven electoral autocratic regimes. Two countries turned into closed autocracies, after a military coup (**Thailand**) or the onset of armed conflict (**Yemen**), and two remained in the electoral autocratic regime spectrum throughout the ten-year period – **Burundi** and **Haiti**. In **Mauritania** a military coup turned the country briefly into a closed autocracy in 2008, but in the subsequent year the coup leader Abdel Aziz was elected president in multiparty elections.<sup>47</sup> It remains an electoral autocracy although the rule of law and equality has deteriorated again under Aziz’s presidency. In **Bahrain**, the government further closed down the already restricted space for media and civil society in response to mass protests in 2011. It remains among the worst of closed autocracies.

47. See BBC reporting: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13881985>.  
 48. Here we focus on changes in larger countries and therefore do not discuss the adverse changes in Palestine (West Bank) and Swaziland. The N on Table 1.2 is therefore 19.

### Democratizing Countries at Risk: Tender Flowers of Progress

Over the past ten years, 21 countries have made substantial and significant progress on democracy, often after sustained pressure from citizens and opposition groups. This testifies to the unceasing attraction of democracy even as these processes remain incomplete, making some of these countries vulnerable to the risk of an adverse regime change in the coming years. Table 1.2 offers an overview.<sup>48</sup>

In four fledgling democracies, various aspects deepened over the last ten years: **Burkina Faso**, **El Salvador**, **Georgia**, and **Sierra Leone**, even if the process reversed again in El Salvador in 2016. It remains to be seen if the populist President-elect Bukule will revitalize the democratization process there. Most of these countries face challenges, with horizontal constraints on the executive and levels of inequality putting them at some risk of reversal.

49. Cherif, Project Syndicate (2019), see <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/tunisian-democracy-in-crisis-by-youssef-cherif-2019-01?barrier=accesspaylog>.  
 50. Baledrokadroka (2015).

## DEEPENING OF DEMOCRACIES

**Burkina Faso** was a feeble democracy in 2008. A severe political crisis followed in 2014 when then president Compaoré sought to extend the presidential term limit, sparking mass protests around the country and a brief period of military rule. Democratic institutions then grew stronger than ever before with the 2015 electoral process. Challenges remain with respect to horizontal constraints on the executive, egalitarianism, and local participation. Instability – in particular terrorism – also continues to threaten democratic progress. **Sierra Leone's** electoral and liberal aspects of democracy have continued to improve during the last 10 years. Weaknesses remain, mainly in judicial oversight, but also – to a lesser extent – in legislative oversight and the quality of the electoral process.

In **Georgia**, a democratic reform process started after the Georgian Dream Party came to power in 2013. While the situation for the media, civil society, and rule of law has clearly improved, development in terms of clean elections and judicial oversight remains fragile. The process of democratic deepening in **El Salvador** has reversed. After advancing between 2009 and 2016, its scores on the LDI started to decline again in 2016. It remains to be seen if the populist President-elect Bukule – who assumes office on 1 June 2019 – will revitalize the democratization process or not. He faces the challenges of a continued strong presence of the military as a core regime support group and high levels of inequality.

## TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY

**Tunisia** is the star pupil of democratization of the past ten years. Transitioning to democracy in 2012 after mass protests ousted the dictatorial regime of Ben Ali, its score on the LDI rose steeply from 0.11 in 2008 to 0.68 in 2018. However, the data also suggest that the new government is not fully independent from the military and thus potentially vulnerable to interference (see Table 1). Ahead of the election in 2019, political parties are still relatively weak and young people – the driving force of the revolution – infrequently engage in formal political institutions.<sup>49</sup>

Second to Tunisia, **Bhutan** records the greatest improvements in liberal democratic institutions such as courts, parliament, and the rule of law, leading to improvements on the LDI. Some remaining restrictions on media freedom and freedom of association bind progress but military interference does not loom as a threat – contrary to the nascent democracies in Fiji and the Gambia.

**Fiji** held its first round of multi-party elections in 2014 after eight years of effective military control over government and transitioned to become an electoral democracy. Nevertheless,



V-Dem's country experts rate freedom of expression and alternative sources of information as weak, and indicate continued threats towards journalists. Ten military officers were elected to parliament in 2014, and the military continues to exert a significant influence in politics, putting the country at-risk of a reversal (see next section).<sup>50</sup> The **Gambia** transitioned to electoral democracy after 22 years of military rule and an election that then president Jammeh surprisingly lost in December 2016, but democratic institutions remain abridged. The weaknesses are similar to those in Fiji: government interference with the media, limited academic freedom, and suppression of opposition activities.<sup>51</sup>

A vibrant civil society and media landscape characterize the burgeoning electoral democracy in **Nigeria**, which commenced in 2011-2012. However, horizontal constraints on the executive and rule of law remain relatively weak. In early 2019, a poorly managed electoral process challenged democratic progress once again. In **Sri Lanka**, the transition to electoral democracy was sparked by the surprise electoral victory of Sirisena over veteran strongman Rajapaksa in January 2015, and many aspects of democracy improved. In particular, the judiciary has proven its independence and constrained Sirisena by denying his wish to call for snap elections in 2018.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, many other aspects remain frail, such as media freedom and egalitarian aspects.

**Kyrgyzstan** is the only one of the former Soviet Republics making substantial democratic progress over the past ten years. Substantial progress got underway in 2011 and by 2014 it was classified as an electoral democracy. The election of Jeyenbekov in 2018 marked Central Asia's first peaceful handover of power from one democratically elected leader to another.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, challenges in almost all aspects of democracy remain.

51. Maclean, Ruth, and Saikou Jammeh, *The Guardian* (2018), see <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/02/ismaila-cesay-university-of-the-gambia-protest>.

52. *The Economist* (2018), see: <https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/12/18/sri-lankas-prime-minister-regains-office-humiliating-the-president>.

53. *The Economist* (2018), see: <https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/01/20/repression-in-kyrgyzstan-is-eroding-central-asias-only-democracy>.





Photo: Lana H. Haroun. Public protest in Sudan (April 2019).

V-Dem's country experts rate political corruption and vote buying as areas of particular concern.

#### LIBERALIZATION OF AUTOCRACIES

Seven autocracies opened up substantially over the last ten years but fell short of transitioning to democracy. The rule of law remains severely limited in all liberalizing autocracies apart from **Armenia**. After the Velvet revolution in 2018, the country stands on the verge of meeting the standards for electoral democracy but fails in terms of the quality of the voter's registry, vote buying, and overall electoral freedom and fairness.

The openings in **Angola**, **Libya** and **Myanmar** during the last ten years have been limited. After decades of closed dictatorship, multi-party elections took place in all three and tremendous challenges remain. In Angola and Myanmar, the groups allied with the former regime – such as the military – continue to exert substantial influence. Some minority social groups – such as the Rohingya in Myanmar – are subjected to systematic repression. In **Libya**, the fall of Gadhafi during the Arab Spring in 2011 opened a brief period of hope. But after 42 years of severe oppression, civil society and political actors were too weak and fragmented to build new institutions. Civil war and state failure came to severely limit the newly won civil rights and political liberties of the Libyan people. Similarly, instability and conflict has impeded progress in the **Central African Republic** during the last ten years.

After a military coup on 23 December 2008 in **Guinea**, the military handed over power to an elected government in 2010. President Condé partly kept a promise to liberalize further. Freedom of association and expression expanded substantially until 2016 but media freedom has since eroded somewhat. According to Reporters without Borders, the government periodically harasses journalists such as the editor who was detained without legal grounds for two weeks in 2018.<sup>54</sup>

In **Zimbabwe** hopes were high for meaningful democratization after the resignation of long-time dictator Mugabe in Novem-

ber 2017. Instead, the LDI has improved by only 7% since 2008, reflecting the ruling party Zanu-PF's tight grip on power and its continued repression of political opponents and undermining of electoral integrity, rule of law, and judicial independence.

In conclusion, pro-democratic actors have managed to chart a successful strategy over the past ten years in several countries – for instance in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Tunisia. Still, substantial democratic weaknesses remain, even in the relatively successful cases, and these threaten the sustainability of the democratization process as the struggles for democratization continue, and sometimes bear fruit. 2019 has already ushered in major openings in Algeria and Sudan, even if in both countries the continued influence of old elites – such as the military – and state fragility put a meaningful democratic transition at risk.

#### Conclusions

The world is undoubtedly facing a global challenge: autocratization. Liberal democratic regime attributes have gradually eroded in 24 countries over the past ten years. In most of these countries ( $N=14$ ), populists enthuse their countries in a more autocratic direction by harassing journalists and other potential detractors. Toxic polarization – severe distrust between political opponents – is on the rise and limits the faculty of democratic forces to steady the institutions in many countries.

Nevertheless, it is not all gloom. 21 countries have democratized substantially over the past ten years. While many democratic weaknesses remain, these reformers signal that living in a democracy remains attractive to a large part of the world's population. The new pro-democratic mass protests in Sudan, Algeria, and on the Balkans, speak in a similar tongue.

There are now also evident cases of recovery from autocratization. To the surprise of many observers, President Moreno has broken from the trajectory set by his predecessor Correa in Ecuador. In South Korea, liberal democratic institutions have not only recovered but have grown stronger in coming out of the crisis sparked by then president Park Geun-hye, who served from 2013 until she was impeached in 2016.

In the United States, the advances of the Democrats in the congressional mid-term elections in 2018 put new checks on Trump's power, and it seems to have reversed the trajectory of an increasingly unconstrained executive.

The world may be at a tipping point today. The question is: are the pro-democratic forces going to be successful in regaining strength, or are we in for a long-term wave of autocratization?

54. Reporters Without Borders (2018), see <https://rsf.org/en/news/guinean-website-editor-held-illegally-defamation>.

# V-Forecast: Predicting Adverse Regime Transitions

**Richard K. Morgan, Andreas Beger, and Adam Glynn**

**A WIDE RANGE** of political forecasting projects focus on the onset of different forms of political violence – military coups and civil conflict, in particular. These projects provide a valuable resource for policy makers by identifying at-risk countries that may warrant additional monitoring. However, while political violence has received a great deal of attention, to our knowledge, we lack a comprehensive and transparent forecasting effort looking specifically at autocratization – the decline of democratic regime attributes. This is concerning given that 24 countries experienced some form of autocratization between 2008 and 2018, affecting one third of the world’s population.<sup>1</sup> While the impact associated with autocratization events is more diffuse and less intense than that of other political phenomena like civil conflict, adverse regime transitions tend to have a greater negative impact on more people worldwide and over a longer term.<sup>2</sup> As this democracy report makes clear, the erosion of democratic norms and institutions by sitting political elites represents a significant threat. Therefore, developing models that can help policy-makers and aid agencies identify countries at-risk of autocratization is of tremendous importance. The new V-Forecast project is V-Dem’s effort at developing such forecasting models.

In this initial year of the project, we focus on estimating each country’s risk of experiencing an *adverse regime transition* (ART) within a *two-year* window. We conceptualize ARTs as a shift in a country’s political regime in an autocratic direction. These declines can coincide with violent events such as coups and internal conflicts. The military coup in Thailand in 2014 is an example of an ART involving these more dramatic kinds of events. ARTs can also be the result of an incumbent regime’s repressive response to political protests, as was the case in Bangladesh in 2012, where the government used violence to suppress protests. Further, ARTs also capture the gradual erosion of democratic norms and institutions by elected political elites once

they lead to regime transition. The events that have unfolded in Hungary over the past few years – Prime Minister Orbán’s attacks on judicial independence and his curtailment of media freedoms – is an example of this type of ART.

As our starting point, we operationalize ARTs using the Regimes of the World (RoW) index, which classifies political regimes as closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral democracy, or liberal democracy.<sup>3</sup> To produce these classifications, the RoW index takes into account the quality of a country’s electoral institutions, its liberal characteristics, such as judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, as well as the regime’s record across various civil liberties indices. An adverse regime transition occurs when a country moves down this scale (going from an electoral democracy to an electoral autocracy, for example) from one year to the next. We forecast the risk of such an event occurring within a two-year window, i.e., a downward movement in at least one of the years. In the future, we will explore additional ways of operationalizing ARTs and other phenomena associated with autocratization.

To produce our estimated risk forecasts, we use an unweighted model average ensemble, which takes into account the output from three machine learning methods. These machine learning models have access to a data set of over 400 variables from a number of sources.<sup>4</sup> When we assess the resulting models by conducting a series of seven test forecasts from 2011 to 2017, which recreate the exact procedures we use to make our 2019-2020 forecast, we find that they do remarkably well given industry standards for similar rare events problems.<sup>5</sup>

The right panel of Figure Forecast-1 presents our initial predicted risk estimates for the top ten at risk countries in 2019-2020. The forecasts are probabilistic, and even a high risk score does

1. See Section 1 of this report.


2. Lüthmann and Lindberg (2019)

3. Lüthmann, Tannenber, Lindberg (2018).

4. V-Dem data V9 (Lindberg et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019); UN GDP and population data; ethnic power relations data (Vogt et al. 2015); coup event data (Powell and Thyne 2011), and armed conflict data (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Eck 2018).

5. For example, using a 2x7-fold cross-validation procedure, the ensemble model reports an Area Under the Curve-Precision/Recall (AUC-PR) score of 0.46. An AUC-PR score that is higher than the observed frequency of events in the data is a signal that the model is an improvement over random chance. With an observed frequency of ARTs at roughly 4 percent, the ensemble model therefore exceeds performance expectations. More details can be found in Morgan, Beger, and Glynn (2019) on the V-Dem website.

**FIGURE FORECAST-1: PANEL (A) PROVIDES THE TOP-TEN PREDICTED RISK FORECASTS USING PROCEDURES THAT MIMIC THE PROCESS USED TO GENERATE THE 2019-2020 ESTIMATES. PANEL (B) PRESENTS THE TOP-TEN ESTIMATED RISK FORECASTS FOR 2019-2020.**



not mean that an ART will occur with certainty in a particular country on this list. However, we can say with some confidence how many ARTs we expect to occur in general among these countries. In order to clarify this interpretation, the left panel of Figure Forecast-1 shows the risk estimates we would have made two years ago using this method. In this case, we see that five of the top ten at risk countries experienced an ART within the two-year window (2017-2018).<sup>6</sup> Using simulation, we would have expected three ARTs as the most likely outcome beforehand, with a 14 percent chance of five or more ARTs. The actual number was thus higher than expected. For 2019-2020, our simulations suggest that there is a 75 percent chance that at least two ARTs occur within the top-ten cases. Again, however, these are probabilities not certainties. Indeed, we hope local and international actors will work to reduce these risks, making our predictions wrong.

Providing accurate estimates of a country's risk of experiencing an ART is only the first step. The V-Forecast team is in the process of developing a series of estimated risk models for a number of different phenomena associated with autocratization. By developing these models and by making these risk assessments public and interpretable, this project hopes to provide useful tools for policy-makers and aid agencies. To this end, an interactive web application that allows users to see risk assessments for all countries is available on <https://v-dem.net/en/analysis>.

### Interactive web application

- <https://v-dem.net/en/analysis>.

6. One concern with our operationalization of ARTs as a decrease in the RoW index is that we may be identifying small real-world changes when the underlying components of the RoW variable start near the RoW thresholds. In future work, we will assess robustness with alternative operationalizations of ARTs, but with respect to the five ARTs among the top-ten at-risk countries for 2017-2018, as we note that most represented substantial adverse events or are part and parcel of a substantial erosion process. Take, for example, the events in Togo in 2016 that resulted in RoW downgrading the regime from an electoral democracy to an electoral autocracy. In the run-up to the elections, the government banned all forms of protest and imprisoned political opposition

leaders and supporters. Further, Amnesty International reports that a number of those detained were tortured, while others were put on trial without access to a lawyer. Conversely, the ART that we capture in Albania seems to be a function of a slight decrease in the Liberal Component index. It was a liberal democracy in 2016 but was downgraded to an electoral democracy in 2017 when its score on the Liberal Component index fell from 0.8 to 0.79, thus below the threshold of 0.8. This border case has the potential to bounce between liberal and electoral democracy in the coming years. With any hope, its liberal institutions will strengthen, placing this border case squarely in the liberal democracy camp.



## CAPTURING “DEMOCRACY”: TURNING A CONCEPT INTO DATA

### Measuring Polyarchy Across the Globe 1900-2017

2018 | *Studies in Comparative International Development*: 1-25

This paper presents a new measure of Dahl’s polyarchy for a global sample of 182 countries from 1900 to 2017. By measuring the five components of Elected Officials, Clean Elections, Associational Autonomy, Inclusive Citizenship, and Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information separately, this paper provides the rationale for how to aggregate them into an Electoral Democracy Index. The authors find strong correlations with other existing measures of electoral democracy, but also decisive differences where, they argue, the evidence supports the face validity of the polyarchy index.



**Svend-Erik Skaaning**



**Staffan I. Lindberg**



**Jan Teorell**



**Michael Coppedge**

### Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016

2019 | *Perspectives on Politics*, 17(1): 66-84

The authors integrate the literatures on authoritarian regime types and democratic forms of government by proposing a five-dimensional theoretical framework that can be applied in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Relying on data for 3,937 heads of state and 2,874 heads of government from 192 countries, from 1789 to the present, they present descriptive evidence, and gauge the extent to which the five dimensions can predict levels of repression, corruption, and executive survival. This leads to a set of original hypotheses that may serve as building blocks for explanatory theory.



**Jan Teorell**



**Staffan I. Lindberg**

### Measuring Subnational Democracy: Toward Improved Regime Typologies and Theories of Regime Change

2018 | *Democratization*, 25(1): 19-37

Social scientists have been limited in their work by the paucity of global time series data about subnational institutions and practices. This article addresses the lack of such data by introducing 22 subnational measures from the V-Dem dataset. Validity tests demonstrate that the measures’ strengths outweigh their weaknesses. The measures excel in covering all subnational levels for most countries, capturing different elements of subnational elections, and through the inclusion of a variety of dimensions of elections and civil liberties. The measures also offer unmatched global and temporal coverage.



**Kelly M. McMann**

## WHAT DEMOCRACY PROVIDES: EFFECTS AND OUTCOMES OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

### Corruption and Women in Cabinets: Informal Barriers to Recruitment in the Executive

2018 | *Governance*, 32(1): 83-102

Research on corruption and women in politics has mainly focused on legislatures. This article turns the spotlight on to the executive branch, and examines if corruption decreases the share of ministers who are women. Drawing on feminist institutionalist theories, the authors posit that in an environment of high political corruption, women will face obstacles. They test this reasoning empirically on a global sample of countries across time, and find that corruption tends to hinder women's presence in cabinets, albeit only in democracies and not autocracies.



Daniel Stockemer



Aksel Sundström

### Party Strength and Economic Growth

2018 | *World Politics*, 70(2): 275-320

This study argues that strong parties play a critical role in fostering economic development. The theory explores how parties ensure that politicians engage in activities that should enhance economic growth. By testing this hypothesis on data from over 150 countries, with time series extending from 1900 to 2012, the authors identify a sizeable and robust effect that operates in both democracies and autocracies, and provide suggestive evidence about causal mechanisms. This paper contributes to two large literatures, focusing on features of political parties and on institutional determinants of growth.



Fernando Bizzarro



John Gerring



Carl-Henrik Knutsen



Allen Hicken



Michael Bernhard



Svend-Erik Skaaning



Michael Coppedge



Staffan I. Lindberg

### Does Democracy Enhance Health? New Empirical Evidence 1900-2012

2018 | *Political Research Quarterly*: 1-16

This study tests the relationship between democracy and population health. Using a newly collected dataset covering 173 countries from 1900 to 2012, the analyses show that across models with various specifications, democratic elections have consistent effects on health outcomes even when other important factors, including good governance, are taken into account. The results also suggest that previous studies yielded mixed results, in part because the commonly used governance indicators limit the samples to not reflect the entire range of variation in measures of both democracy and governance.



Frida Andersson



Yi-Ting Wang



Valeriya Mechkova

## Fresh Pipes with Dirty Water: How Quality of Government Shapes the Provision of Public Goods in Democracies

2019 | *European Journal of Political Research*

Research suggests that democracy is beneficial for the provision of public goods. However, research also implies that democratic institutions are not sufficient to secure people's wellbeing. This study uses water quality as an example of a public good, and the results show that democracy is associated with higher water quality only in countries where quality of government is high. In contexts with low governmental quality, democracy seems to be associated with higher water pollution. In the second stage of the analysis, the mechanisms are examined using the case of Moldova.



Marina Povitkina



Ketevan Bolkvadze

## DEMOCRACY IN THE MAKING: DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

### State of the World 2017: Autocratization and Exclusion?

2018 | *Democratization*, 25(8): 1321-1340

The authors present evidence of a global trend of autocratization that mainly affects non-electoral aspects of democracy such as media freedom, freedom of expression, and the rule of law, yet these in turn threaten to undermine the meaningfulness of elections. Last year, democratic qualities were in decline in 24 countries across the world, many of which, such as India and the United States, are populous. Further, the authors show that political exclusion based on socio-economic status in particular is becoming increasingly severe.



Anna Lührmann



Valeriya Mechkova



Sirianne Dahlum



Laura Maxwell



Moa Olin



Constanza Sanhueza  
Petrarca



Rachel Sigman



Matthew C. Wilson



Staffan I. Lindberg

### United Nations' Electoral Assistance: More than a Fig Leaf?

2018 | *International Political Science Review*: 1-16

Between 2007 and 2014 the United Nations (UN) assisted more than one-third of all national elections worldwide. However, it remains doubtful as to under which conditions such assistance contributes to free and fair elections or has a positive long-term impact on democratization. This study assesses the impact of UN electoral assistance (UNEA) in Sudan, Nigeria and Libya, and finds that assistance contributed to election quality in the presence of regime elites prioritizing electoral credibility. However, if regime elites undermine electoral freedom and fairness such positive effects are unlikely.



Anna Lührmann

### Contested or Established? A Comparison of Legislative Powers Across Regimes

2019 | *Democratization*: 1-21

Repeated interactions between authoritarian leaders and their ruling coalitions can lead both to dictatorships in which institutions constrain the leader, and dictatorships in which the leader exercises near-complete control. To date, however, no one has examined how legislative powers vary across different settings and over time. Using data on legislative powers between 1900 and 2017, the authors conceptualize changes in the powers of the national congress to characterize regime development in either direction, and expound on the content of legislatures across regimes and the ways in which they change.



Matthew C. Wilson



Josef Woldense

### A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New About it?

2019 | *Democratization*: 1-19

Less than 30 years after Fukuyama and others declared liberal democracy's eternal dominance, a third wave of autocratization is manifest. This article provides the first comprehensive empirical overview of all autocratization episodes from 1900 to today, based on V-Dem data. The authors demonstrate that a third wave of autocratization is indeed unfolding and mainly affects democracies through gradual setbacks under a legal façade. While this is a cause for concern, panic is not warranted: the current declines are relatively mild and the global share of democratic countries remains historically high.



Anna Lührmann



Staffan I. Lindberg

## STUDYING COMPLEX TOPICS WITH RIGOR: NEW METHODS AND APPROACHES

### IRT Models for Expert-Coded Panel Data

2018 | *Political Analysis*, 26(4): 431-456

Data sets quantifying phenomena of social-scientific interest often use multiple experts to code latent concepts. While it remains standard practice to report the average score across experts, experts likely vary in both their expertise and their interpretation of question scales. As a result, the mean may be an inaccurate statistic. We investigate the utility of Item-response theory (IRT) models for aggregating expert-coded data and find that IRT approaches outperform simple averages when experts vary in reliability and exhibit differential item functioning.



Kyle L. Marquardt



Daniel Pemstein



### How to Make Causal Inferences with Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data under Selection on Observables

2018 | *American Political Science Review*, 112(4): 1067-1082

Repeated measurements of the same countries, people, or groups over time, sometimes called time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, allow researchers to estimate a broad set of causal quantities, including direct effects of lagged treatments. We use potential outcomes to define causal quantities of interest and clarify how standard TSCS models can produce biased estimates of these quantities due to post-treatment conditioning. We then describe two estimation strategies that avoid these post-treatment biases and show that they can outperform standard approaches in small sample settings.



Matthew Blackwell



Adam N. Glynn

### Investigating Sequences in Ordinal Data: A New Approach with Adapted Evolutionary Models

2018 | *Political Science Research and Methods*, 6(3): 449-466

This paper presents a new approach for studying temporal sequences across ordinal variables. It involves three complementary approaches (frequency tables, transitional graphs, and dependency tables), as well as an established adaptation based on Bayesian dynamical systems, inferring a general system of change. Frequency tables count pairs of values and transitional graphs show which variable tends to attain high values first. Dependency tables investigate which values of one variable are prerequisites for values in another. We illustrate these approaches by analyzing the V-Dem dataset, and changes in electoral democracy.



Patrik Lindenfors



Fredrik Jansson



Yi-ting Wang



Staffan I. Lindberg

### Sequential Requisites Analysis: A New Method for Analyzing Sequential Relationships in Ordinal Data

2019 | *Social Science Quarterly*: 1-19

We present a new method for analyzing longer sequences of requisites for the emergence of particular outcome variables across numerous combinations of ordinal variables using a sorting algorithm. With a large set of indicators measured over many years, the method makes it possible to identify and compare long, complex sequences across many variables to, for instance, disentangle the sequential requisites of failing and successful sequences in democratization, or to investigate in which order components of democracy occur and which components are the ideal targets for democracy promotion at different stages.



Patrik Lindenfors



Joshua Krusell



Staffan I. Lindberg

## Section 2: Threats to Democracy in the Digital Age

**C**itizens, civil society organizations, and governments are now using the internet daily in their activities. How does this affect democracy worldwide? In this section we explore some of the unique threats to democratic governance that arise as a result of the proliferation of online communication.

**Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson and Yi-ting Wang**

**ONE OF THE** key hazards of social media is the sheer volume of information, which, in turn, makes it challenging to distill true facts from false claims. False or misleading information on key political topics can quickly “go viral” online, and fact-checking and removing information online is tremendously difficult.

### **Governments Spreading False Information**

Figure 1 shows how often governments disseminate false or misleading information across regime types using the Regimes of the World (RoW) measure for 2018.<sup>1</sup> The horizontal line in the box plot indicates the median level for each type. Countries labelled above the box are over-performers for their regime type, while countries below the box are under-performers.

In general, governments in liberal democracies are better at sticking to the truth, although there are exceptions. Albania, Bhutan and Mauritius are liberal democracies with a particularly worrying standing in this regard. Austria, Benin, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and the United States are doing slightly better than the worst liberal democracies, with coders reporting that these governments spread misleading information “rarely” or “about half the time.”

Among electoral democracies there is more variation regarding the extent to which governments spread false information. Many countries score much higher or lower than the median on this indicator and are labelled in Figure 2.1. Notable cases include Guatemala and the Philippines, which have the lowest scores out of all electoral democracies. Chile and Lithuania have the highest scores, hovering close to the maximum rating for this variable (“Never, or almost never”).

Autocracies disseminate false information the most. Interestingly, there seems to be no significant difference between closed

The Digital Society Project (DSP) aims to answer some of the most important questions surrounding the interactions between the internet and politics. The DSP survey is part of the V-Dem data set, and consists of 35 indicators focusing on online censorship, polarization and politicization of social media, misinformation campaigns, coordinated information operations, and foreign influence in and monitoring of domestic politics.

For more information visit our webpage:

- <http://digitalsocietyproject.org>

and electoral autocracies. Countries like Azerbaijan, Cuba, Russia, Serbia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen use this tactic extremely often to influence all political issues. In the cases of Syria and Yemen, it may seem surprising that they manage to maintain the infrastructure required to spread false information to influence domestic affairs despite their ongoing civil conflicts.

### **False Information by Foreign Governments**


Another threat is false information spread by foreign governments. Here the pattern is very different (Figure 2.2). All countries, no matter the regime type, seem to be targets for the spread of false information by foreign governments. The two countries with the absolute worst scores are liberal democracies – Latvia and Taiwan. Notably, among the liberal democracies, the United States is third after Latvia and Taiwan. Russian information operations are well-documented, for example via trolls disseminating false information to influence the 2016 US presidential election.<sup>2</sup> Another interesting finding is that among the 30 countries with the worst scores on this indicator, eleven are from the former Soviet Bloc.

1. Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg (2018).

2. Nechepurenko, Ivan, and Michael Schwirtz. 2018. “What We Know About Russians Sanctioned by the United States.” *The New York Times*, February 17.

**FIGURE 2.1: GOVERNMENT DISSEMINATION OF FALSE INFORMATION, LEVELS ACROSS REGIME TYPES, 2018.**

Note: The scale for this indicator ranges from 0 to 4, where 0 corresponds to “Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues” and 4 corresponds to “Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.”



China is also actively spreading false and misleading information abroad, with Taiwan as one of its main targets. By circulating misleading information on social media and investing in Taiwanese media outlets, China seeks to interfere in Taiwan's domestic politics and to engineer a complete unification. Observers report many examples of Chinese disinformation campaigns.<sup>3</sup> For instance, China provides funds to media that adopt a more pro-Beijing line in their reports.<sup>4</sup> This is reflected in the

DSP online media fractionalization indicator, which indicates that major online media outlets in Taiwan provide very different presentations of the same events. Since Taiwanese people consume online media quite extensively – as reflected in the new indicator on online media existence – the Chinese disinformation strategy and resulting online information fractionalization is likely to have a detrimental impact on Taiwan's democracy.

3. E.g. Reporters Without Borders. 2019. "China's Pursuit of a New World Media Order." Reporters Without Borders (2019). <https://rsf.org/en/reports/rsf-report-chinas-pursuit-new-world-media-order>, p.18.

4. Ibid.

**FIGURE 2.2: LEVEL OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DISSEMINATION OF FALSE INFORMATION ACROSS REGIME TYPES, 2018.**

Note: The scale for this indicator ranges from 0 to 4, where 0 corresponds to “Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues” and 4 corresponds to “Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.”



### Citizens' Political Activities Online


What types of offline political action are citizens mobilizing on social media? The DSP also gathered information about this topic in the new survey using a multiple selection question in which we asked coders to select the most common offline political activities citizens organized online. The different activities include benevolent and legitimate democratic activities, where citizens organize themselves in opposition to government ac-

tions through such actions as protests, petitions, and strikes, as well as activities that constitute violent threats, such as terrorism, vigilante justice, rebellion, and ethnic cleansing. Using 2018 data, Figure 2.3 shows how common it is for citizens globally to use social media to organize each type of offline political activity. The scores range from 0 (not common) to 1 (common), where higher scores mean that more V-Dem coders have selected this type of activity as one of the most common in their country.



**FIGURE 2.3: TYPES OF CITIZEN MOBILIZATION ORGANIZED THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA, 2018.**

Note: The scores range from 0 (not common) to 1 (common), where higher scores mean that more V-Dem coders have selected this type of activity as one of the most common in their country.



The overall pattern is clear: the most common use of social media is to organize democratic actions such as protests, petitions, and to get people to turn out to vote in elections. Violent actions make up only a small fraction of activities mobilized on social media.

Street protest is the most usual activity organized through social media, with coders suggesting that this commonly occurs in 155 countries.<sup>5</sup> Among these are democratic countries such as Austria, France and Spain, but also countries endangered by democratic backsliding, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia, and Poland, as well as highly autocratic countries such as Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela. The high frequency of organizing street protests online demonstrates the potential to use social media for organizing citizens and making demands on governments.

The second and third most common activities organized through social media also relate to mobilizing peaceful, democratic political actions: signing petitions to support different causes and mobilizing voter turnout (Figure 2.3). Signing petitions is common in 140 countries and mobilizing voters in 133. The United Kingdom is the only country that receives the highest score on both categories. Strikes/labor actions are another form of political activity that our coders consider to be commonly mobilized online, with this activity commonly mobilized online in 77 countries. Burkina Faso, Greece, and Peru are some of the countries with the highest score in this category.

5. This is indicated by a score of 0.5 or higher on the respective indicator (v2smorgtypes).

However, the data also point to a less frequent, but still worrisome trend. V-Dem experts agree that online activity has been commonly used to mobilize ethnic cleansing in Iraq and South Sudan; and some coders report such attempts for additional countries such as India, Myanmar and Saudi Arabia. Equally concerning, in countries like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria and United Arab Emirates, coders suspect that terrorist activity is commonly organized online.

## Conclusion

The findings from the newly collected DSP dataset suggest that the primary threat to democracy perpetrated online comes from the dissemination of false information. Autocratic countries spread false information in their own country, which is a practice less common for democracies. However, both autocracies and democracies are targets for *foreign* governments spreading false information. Thus, a new threat to democracy lies in disinformation affecting citizens' attitudes and beliefs. In terms of the role of online activity in mobilizing offline actions, it is common for social media to be used to mobilize peaceful democratic actions such as protests, petitions, and voting. However, in some cases social media is used to mobilize violent, democracy-threatening activity, such as terrorism and ethnic cleansing. Such practices – even though less frequent – are worrisome.

# Sustainable Development Goal 16: Tracking Progress with V-Dem Data

**Lisa Gastaldi**

**IN SEPTEMBER 2015**, the UN General Assembly adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with the overall aim to “achieve a better and more sustainable future for all.” All 17 goals, together with their specific targets, are to be achieved by 2030.<sup>1</sup>

The SDGs address democratic governance in Goal 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions. It aims to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”<sup>2</sup>

The V-Dem Institute has taken part in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) virtual network of governance experts, development practitioners, statisticians, UN agencies, and civil society organizations summoned to provide input to the work of the United Nations Statistical Commission’s Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDG), and the Praia Group on Governance Statistics. This effort provided inspiration and guidance for the development of Goal 16 indicators at regional and national levels. The virtual network sought to develop a sound indicator framework for assessing the progress of this endeavor, and over 60 V-Dem indicators are listed as key indicators in the report “Goal 16 – The Indicators We Want.”<sup>3</sup>

Here, we illustrate how V-Dem Data can be used to monitor and evaluate SDG Targets 16.5 on corruption and 16.7 on gender equality. In 2017, the United Nations Statistical Commission agreed on an official framework for monitoring progress on these targets.<sup>4</sup> However – as we show – the official indicators only capture narrow aspects of the targets. V-Dem data can be used as supplementary indicators to address these shortcomings.

## **Target 16.5: Substantially Reduce Corruption and Bribery in all its Forms**

SDG Target 16.5 aims to “substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms.” The official indicators are derived from surveys in which individuals are asked about their personal experiences of corruption in everyday life.<sup>5</sup>



However, such survey responses are of limited use. We know that citizens have different understandings of what corruption means across countries, and that such questions are also susceptible to misreporting due to such things as social desirability bias. Furthermore, the official indicators do not distinguish between different types of public institutions. V-Dem’s measures deal with such issues of bias, and capture corruption with specific measures for various types of public institutions.

## **V-Dem Indicators for Target 16.5**

To allow for a more nuanced and differentiated analysis of corruption and bribery in Target 16.5, we recommend the **V-Dem’s Political Corruption Index** and its components.<sup>6</sup> The index aggregates the scores from two sub-indices: the **Executive Corruption Index** and the **Public Sector Corruption Index**, as well as ratings on two additional indicators: one measuring the extent to which judicial decisions are influenced by corrupt activities, and the other gauging how often members of the legislature engage in corrupt exchanges over legislation. These measures make it possible to both get a quick look at the overall level of corruption, and to drill down into specific institutions where things may be different.

1. UNDP (2017).

2. UN. 2015. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Available at: [https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A\\_RES\\_70\\_1\\_E.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf)

3. UNDP and Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. 2015. The Indicator We Want. Goal 16 – The Indicators We Want: Virtual Network Sourcebook on Measuring


Peace, Justice and Effective Institutions. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/the-indicators-we-want.html>.


4. UNSTATS (2017)

5. UNSTATS (2017)


6. See V-Dem Codebook V9.

**FIGURE SDG 1: COUNTRIES BY SCORE ON V-DEM'S POLITICAL CORRUPTION INDEX 2018 AND 2008.**









**Figure SDG 1** provides the country rankings for V-Dem’s **Political Corruption Index** in 2018 as well as the change in scores between 2008 and 2018, ranging from high levels of corruption to low. The Scandinavian countries are ranked as least corrupt, whilst Chad, DRC and Azerbaijan are classified as most corrupt. The table also highlights the countries where corruption has increased (red) or decreased (green) significantly and substantially during the last decade.

In many countries, an increase in political corruption seems to go hand in hand with the overall deterioration of the state of democracy – for instance in Bulgaria, Burundi, Brazil, Hungary, Thailand, Turkey and the United States. Turkish President Erdoğan and his family are allegedly involved in several corruption scandals.<sup>7</sup> In Brazil, the exposure of budgetary misconduct led to the congressional impeachment of President Rousseff in 2016.<sup>8</sup>

The development in Hungary is particularly noteworthy since the situation has deteriorated further while the country has been a member of the EU, where corruption, as such, is categorized in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, as a “particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension.”<sup>9</sup>

**Figure SDG 2** depicts the ratings for Hungary on V-Dem’s **Political Corruption Index**, as well as the institution-specific sub-indices and indicators, between 2008 and 2018. Lower scores indicate less corruption and higher scores more corruption. The overall score for political corruption in Hungary has increased, predominantly since Fidesz took power in 2010.

9. European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs. 2019. Corruption. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption>  
10. See for example Magyar (2016).

**FIGURE SDG 2: POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN HUNGARY (2008–2018).**

Note: The scale runs from 0 to 1. Lower scores indicate less corruption and higher scores more corruption. The indicators “Judicial corruption decision” and “Legislature corruption activities” have been standardized from 0 to 1 and then inverted to fit the same scale as the indices.



To learn more about Hungary and other countries, use the V-Dem Online Graphing Tool – “Country Graph.” Scan the QR code with your phone.

- Executive corruption index
- Judicial corruption decision
- Legislature corrupt activities
- Political corruption index
- Public sector corruption index

The graph also shows that the profile of political corruption has shifted since 2010. Corruption in the executive sector and the legislature is high and has *increased* substantially. Corruption-levels in the public-sector and the judiciary are much lower and have not increased. The ruling party Fidesz seems to have created a more centralized system of corruption.<sup>10</sup> Studies suggest that as much as 50-60% of the Hungarian market is dominated by companies favored by the government.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the ruling party seems to influence public procurement and has eroded the checks and balances and the rule of law needed to curb corruption.<sup>12</sup>

This example demonstrates how the disaggregated V-Dem data can be used to identify priority areas in the fight to reduce corruption and bribery and thus uncover a blind spot of the official indicators.

### **Target 16.7: Ensure Responsive, Inclusive, Participatory and Representative Decision-making at all Levels**


SDG Target 16.7 aims to “ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.” The official indicators for Target 16.7 focus on the share of positions in public institutions held by different groups (e.g. women), and how responsive and inclusive decision making is according to popular opinion surveys.<sup>13</sup>

To achieve Target 16.7, it is vital to ensure that women have the same rights and opportunities to participate as men. However, neither of the two official indicators capture *if* and *how* wom-

11. David-Barrett & Fazekas (2016).

12. David-Barrett & Fazekas (2016); Magyar (2016).

13. UNSTATS (2017).



**FIGURE SDG 3: WOMEN'S POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT INDEX (1946-2018)**

Note: The scale runs from 0-1. Scores increase with higher democratic quality.



To learn more about Women's Political Empowerment in your country, use the V-Dem Online Graphing Tool – "Variable Graph." Scan the QR code with your phone.

en can participate in decision-making processes as citizens. For example, the representation of women in parliament does not necessarily mean that women have full freedom to participate in society in ways that are empowering for women in general.

Rwanda has the world's highest representation of women in the legislature (61.3%), but the V-Dem ratings of civil liberties and civil society participation for women have *declined* during the last few years.<sup>14</sup> V-Dem data assess women's *de-facto* possibilities to participate both in public institutions and in society at large.

### V-Dem Indicators for Target 16.7

The following V-Dem indices measure the gender dimension of SDG Target 16.7 better and more comprehensively than the official indicators:

**Women's Political Empowerment Index:**<sup>15</sup> The political empowerment of women is defined as a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It incorporates the following three equally-weighted sub-indices:

- **Women's Civil Liberties Index:** includes indicators on freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice.
- **Women's Civil Society Participation Index:** includes indicators on open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists.
- **Women's Political Participation Index:** includes indicators on female legislatures and power distributed by gender,

which aims to illustrate to what extent women are descriptively represented in formal political positions.

The V-Dem data and the online tools on the website (<https://v-dem.net/analysis>) make it easy to compare how women's empowerment has changed between regions or in a specific country over time.

**Figure SDG 3** illustrates the development of regional averages of **V-Dem's Women's Political Empowerment Index** from 1946 to 2018. This graph depicts a gradual increase in women's political empowerment worldwide after the end of the Second World War until the end of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the MENA-region (purple line) scores lower in 2018 than Western Europe and North America did in 1946. Furthermore, it is important to note that this positive development, i.e. the world-wide gradual increase in women's political empowerment, has stagnated, and the values have remained almost unchanged for the rest of the world during the last decade.

If the level of change continues at the same pace as in the last decade, Target 16.7 will barely be closer to achievement in 2030 than it is now. This underlines the importance of introducing additional measures to comprehensively monitor potential developments and to implement suitable actions.

The official measures focus on formal representation and individual perceptions. V-Dem measures can help to monitor progress towards decision-making that is *de facto* responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative at all levels.

14. V-Dem Dataset V9.

15. V-Dem Codebook V9.







## Section 3:

# Exclusion: A Challenge to Democracy

**E**xclusion is a challenge to democracy in many ways. First, democracy includes a promise of equal participation and equal consideration. Thus, excluding parts of the population systematically challenges vital democratic principles. Second, prior research points to an inter-relationship between inequality that leads to exclusion, and liberal democracy. When democracy is strong, inequality tends to be reduced and vice-versa. Yet, our ability to advance knowledge about exclusion has been limited by ambiguous measurements. V-Dem now has newly developed measures of exclusion that maintain the highest possible standards of validity and reliability (see box below for further details).

**Staffan I. Lindberg\***

**A RECENT STUDY** focusing on Europe reports that countries with increasing inequalities leading to exclusion of certain groups also register shrinking democratic space over the past ten years or so. In Poland, for example, significant increases in inequalities leading to political exclusion are associated with a drop in the rating for democracy of over 20 percentage points since 1993. In Hungary, exclusion, in terms of lower socioeconomic groups' access to political power, has increased sharply since 1993. This was followed by Viktor Orbán's ascent to highest office in 2010 and the country is now on the verge of becoming an electoral autocracy, as discussed in the first section of this report.<sup>1</sup>

Regarding the legitimacy of democracy in particular, equal inclusion minimizes the resentments and frustrations of some groups with the political system.<sup>2</sup> As noted by the sociologist Seymour Lipset, if some groups are effectively prohibited from political and governing processes, the legitimacy of the system is likely to remain in question.<sup>3</sup> Exclusion can be informal, such as when suffrage is legally universal but some groups in society are denied the protections and resources necessary to participate. Other examples abound: intimidation of particular groups, unequal access to justice, social norms and culturally determined deprivation of resources that exclude certain groups. Exclusion leads to less economic security and lowering of incentives to produce and an increase in violent conflicts, while women's exclusion from power is associated with higher infant and maternal mortality.<sup>4</sup>

### Exclusion and Democratization

The new exclusion data collected by V-Dem this year makes it possible to show for the first time how different types of exclusion have changed over the past almost five decades, a period in which democracy has also expanded across the world. Figure 3.1 shows the average levels of exclusion in the world for four groups, while also plotting the level of liberal democracy as measured by the Liberal Democracy Index.

It is a striking picture. The levels of exclusion in the world have decreased substantially for all four groups, while democracy has expanded over this period. Exclusion by gender has shown the greatest decrease across the globe over this period. In 1972 it was the most widespread and severe form of exclusion but by 2018 it had become the least common. Exclusion of socio-economic groups or the poor generally, has suffered the opposite fate. Alongside exclusion of rural citizens, it was the least proliferated form of exclusion in the world in 1972. Reductions in exclusion of the poor in particular, have been much less pronounced since then, however, and it is globally now the most pervasive form of exclusion.

There is thus a clear correlation between substantial reductions of all types of exclusion and the spread of democracy in the world. It seems that when exclusion is reduced, democracy expands and vice versa.

\*. This text builds in part on the Concept Note on Exclusion coauthored by Rachel Sigman (lead), Staffan I. Lindberg, and Jan Teorell.

1. Lindberg (2019).

2. Dahl (1971, p.82); Dahl (1996).

3. Lipset (1959, p. 89).

4. Bollyky et al. (2019); De Soto (2000); Deininger and Feder (2009); Roessler (2016); Stolle and Hooghe (2005); Wang et al. (2018); World Bank WDR (2013).



## Methodology

The larger part of the work conceptualizing exclusion and producing measures for it was done by Rachel Sigman, Assistant Professor at the Post-Graduate Naval School and Research Associate at the V-Dem Institute. Jan Teorell and Staffan I. Lindberg have also contributed to this extension of V-Dem, with input also from, in particular, Edouard Al-Dahdah from the World Bank, but also participants in the workshop on 24th April 2018 held at the World Bank, as well as the V-Dem workshop on 31st May, 2018. V-Dem collected data on these new measures for the first time in 2019, and they are published with Version 9 of the dataset.

### WHAT IS EXCLUSION?

*We define exclusion as when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces, based on their identity or belonging to a particular group.*

“Governed spaces” indicate areas that are part of the public space and which government can regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations, except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere.

Second, exclusion does not happen by chance. Actors or institutions actively deny people access to services or participation in governed spaces. This distinguishes exclusion from similar phenomena, such as when an individual chooses to forego participation, or when insufficient resources or capacity of the state makes full participation impossible for the time being. Exclusion implies that basic principles of fairness and equity have been compromised. Thus, there is always a certain degree of intentionality when exclusion is present.

Third, exclusion does not only occur at the hand of states or formal actors but can also be the product of informal norms of behavior. Social attitudes towards particular groups such as women or homosexuals are often associated with exclusion of those groups, which underscores the importance of a holistic approach to conceptualizing and measuring exclusion.

### WHO IS EXCLUDED?

Exclusion, as defined above, is based on identity or belonging to a particular group. We have assembled meas-

ures of exclusion from five such salient groups based on socio-economic, social, geographical, gender and political characteristics. Importantly, individuals may experience exclusion based on their actual or perceived belonging to a particular group, without identifying themselves with that group.

*Socio-Economic groups* include those defined on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

*Social groups* include those based on ethnicity, language, religion, disability, migration status, sexuality, and caste. In many, but not all, cases these categories are defined by descent-based attributes, meaning those given at birth.

*Geographic group* can also form the basis for exclusion. Individuals may be subject to exclusion by virtue of their place of residence. More specifically, we distinguish between urban and rural groups. Urban areas are defined as an area in which population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer and with access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road (World Development Report, 2009: 54).


*Gender* is a very common form of group-based exclusion, and we measure the difference between men and women in this regard.

### EXCLUDED FROM WHAT?

We identify five spheres from which individuals or groups may be excluded in governed spaces where state institutions have authority to prevent exclusion. These are exclusion from equal access to civil liberties, political power and influence, public services, state jobs and state business opportunities.

Although each such sphere of exclusion is interesting in its own right, in this report we discuss mainly how exclusion of groups has changed across all five of them.<sup>7</sup> In other words, we concentrate on indices aggregating exclusion across these five areas for the four main groups presented above: socio-economic and social groups, by the urban-rural distinction, and by gender.

7. Correlations across spheres typically range from .7 or higher, which supports our simplifying strategy to collapse them.

**FIGURE 3.1: FOUR INDICES OF EXCLUSION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, 1972-2018.**

There is also an intriguing nuance to the relationship over time if we look closely at the differences between exclusion of various groups, and democracy over the past ten years or so. Two types of exclusion are growing again – socio-economic (orange line) and by social groups (green line) – over the same time period that liberal democracy (black line) has been receding in the world. Observers have written extensively about rising economic inequality, increasing levels of social group intolerance, as well as decreasing civic space, and erosion of liberal democracy (discussed also in the first section of this report). The trends in Figure 3.1, where democracy and these two forms of exclusion – that tap into the effects of such inequalities – move in opposite directions, seems to corroborate such fears.

### Regional Variation in Exclusion


As shown in Figure 3.2, however, there are important regional differences, both in terms of levels and with respect to changes over time. Sub-Saharan Africa (yellow line) has the highest levels of exclusion by socio-economic group and of rural residents in the world. Democratization in the 1990s and 2000s was also very partial and remains a largely unfinished business in this region. As shown in Section 1 of this report, the average level of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is the second lowest in the world.

Meanwhile, the exclusion of women and of minority social groups continues to be the highest in the MENA region (light blue line), where exclusion of social groups over the past ten years or so is even increasing. This coincides with the failure of democratization and the closing of democratic space after the Arab Spring.

Eastern Europe and Central Asia (red line) has, on the one hand, relatively lower levels of exclusion of rural residents and women, by world standards, but on the other hand there has been no progression whatsoever in these areas since the 1970s. Exclusion of poorer citizens increased dramatically with the end of communism in the early 1990s, and democratization in the 1990s is only associated with improving conditions regarding the exclusion of social groups.

The reduction of exclusion across all four groups is significant in Asia and the Pacific (purple dash line), as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean (green line) over the period, and follows the average developments in the world fairly closely. Notable is the more dramatic reduction in gender-based exclusion in Latin America, which now ranks third in the world in terms of the absence of gendered exclusion, tallying well with its status on democracy.

FIGURE 3.2: FOUR TYPES OF EXCLUSION: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1972-2018.



### But the Relationship Is Not Linear

Yet, even if the general relationship between lower levels of exclusion and democracy is clear, it is important to note that the relationship is not linear, or a given as a result of some mechanistic law. To illustrate the complexity and variation, Figure 3.3 plots levels of socio-economic exclusion by regime type using the Regimes of the World classification that distinguishes between closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies and liberal democracies.<sup>5</sup>

These boxplots show that the relationship between average level of exclusion by socio-economic group (the horizontal line inside each box) and regime type is not linear but instead somewhat  $\cap$ -shaped. For each regime-type, the box contains all cases from the 25th to the 75th percentiles. The average level of socio-economic exclusion is highest in electoral autocracies but lower in both closed autocracies and electoral democracies. While the average level of exclusion is by far the lowest in liberal democracies, there are several of them – Albania, Benin, Israel, New Zealand, and Vanuatu in particular – with a *higher* degree of exclusion than some of the closed and electoral autocracies.

This overlap is even wider if we compare the less demanding type of democracy – electoral democracies – with the two types of autocracies. The average is almost the same as for closed autocracies, and nine electoral democracies have socio-economic exclusion levels that are as high or higher than the average for the worst type of regime: electoral autocracies. Four Latin American countries stand out in particular – Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico – alongside Timor-Leste. They score around 0.75 or higher on the 0 to 1 scale, which is very high and comparable to the situation in electoral autocracies like Bangladesh, Chad, the DRC, and Mauritania.

While not displayed here, the  $\cap$ -shaped pattern is very similar for urban-rural exclusion, whereas the relationship between regime type and gender and social group exclusion is more linear, and decreasing.

Yet, all four types of exclusion share another pattern that is also very clear in Figure 3.4: all countries with a high level of liberal democracy have relatively little exclusion, as shown in the right-most plot, whereas levels of exclusion are more varying across lower levels of liberal democracy. Exclusion can be very high or very low in autocracies, but only relatively low in liberal democracies. Together with the country examples discussed above, this suggests that increasing exclusion of various groups is a challenge, possibly a threat, to liberal democracy – but also that liberal democracy is the only regime that protects against high levels of exclusion.


### Conclusions

Economic inequality has risen gradually but steadily since at least the mid-1980s in most parts of the world. There is growing awareness of the importance of exclusion for understanding a range of economic, political and social outcomes. Recognizing the negative consequences of exclusion,<sup>6</sup> efforts to minimize it are now increasingly common in development programs around the world. Success depends on broader changes to the way in which groups gain access to, or are excluded from, opportunities to participate in a wide range of economic and social arenas.

The recognition of exclusion as a critical issue must be extended to liberal democracies and, generally, developed nations. Exclusion poses a challenge to democracy everywhere. The new data provides tools to better study the relationship between exclusion and democracy, and these initial excursions suggest that this area should be prioritized for future research.



Photo: Kieran Lettrich. V-Dem event at the UN (4 September 2018).




Tim Green aka atoach CC BY 2.0

5. Lührmann et al. (2018b).

6. See for instance the World Development Report 2017.



**FIGURE 3.3: EXCLUSION BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP AND REGIME TYPE, 2018.**



▢ Closed Autocracy  
 ▢ Electoral Autocracy  
 ▢ Electoral Democracy  
 ▢ Liberal Democracy

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**Table A0: Regimes of the World 2008/2018.**

Country	2018	Change from 2008	Country	2018	Change from 2008	Country	2018	Change from 2008
Australia	LD		Croatia	ED		Egypt	EA	
Austria	LD		Dominican Republic	ED		Equatorial Guinea	EA	
Barbados	LD	↕	Ecuador	ED		Ethiopia	EA	
Belgium	LD		El Salvador	ED		Gabon	EA	
Canada	LD		Greece	ED	↘	Guinea	EA	
Costa Rica	LD		Guyana	ED		Haiti	EA	
Cyprus	LD		India	ED		Honduras	EA	↘
Denmark	LD		Indonesia	ED		Iran	EA	
Estonia	LD		Ivory Coast	ED	↕	Iraq	EA	↘
Finland	LD		Jamaica	ED		Kazakhstan	EA	
Germany	LD		Lesotho	ED		Kenya	EA	
Iceland	LD		Liberia	ED		Malaysia	EA	
Ireland	LD		Macedonia	ED		Maldives	EA	
Japan	LD		Malawi	ED	↕	Mauritania	EA	↕
Luxembourg	LD		Mexico	ED		Montenegro	EA	
Netherlands	LD		Mongolia	ED		Myanmar	EA	↕
New Zealand	LD		Nepal	ED	↕	Nicaragua	EA	
Norway	LD		Niger	ED		Pakistan	EA	
Portugal	LD		Nigeria	ED	↕	Papua New Guinea	EA	
Spain	LD		Paraguay	ED		Russia	EA	
Sweden	LD		Peru	ED		Rwanda	EA	
Switzerland	LD		Poland	ED	↘	Serbia	EA	↘
Taiwan	LD		Romania	ED		Singapore	EA	
Trinidad and Tobago	LD		Sierra Leone	ED		Sudan	EA	
USA	LD		Solomon Islands	ED		Tajikistan	EA	
United Kingdom	LD		Sri Lanka	ED	↕	Togo	EA	↘
Albania	LD -	↕	Timor-Leste	ED		Turkey	EA	↘
Benin	LD -	↕	BiH	ED -		Uganda	EA	
Bhutan	LD -	↕	Fiji	ED -	↕	Ukraine	EA	↘
Czech Republic	LD -		Gambia	ED -	↕	Venezuela	EA	
France	LD -		Guatemala	ED -		Zambia	EA	↘
Ghana	LD -		Hungary	ED -	↘	Zanzibar	EA	
Israel	LD -		Kosovo	ED -	↕	Zimbabwe	EA	
Italy	LD -		Kyrgyzstan	ED -	↕	Turkmenistan	EA -	
Latvia	LD -		Mali	ED -		Kuwait	CA +	
Mauritius	LD -		Moldova	ED -	↕	Vietnam	CA +	
Slovenia	LD -		Philippines	ED -	↕	Bahrain	CA	
Uruguay	LD -		Seychelles	ED -	↕	China	CA	
Vanuatu	LD -	↕	Tanzania	ED -		Cuba	CA	
Botswana	ED +	↘	Armenia	EA +		Eritrea	CA	
Cape Verde	ED +	↘	Guinea-Bissau	EA +		Hong Kong	CA	
Chile	ED +	↘	Lebanon	EA +		Jordan	CA	
Georgia	ED +		Madagascar	EA +		Laos	CA	
Lithuania	ED +	↘	Mozambique	EA +		Libya	CA	
Malta	ED +		Somaliland	EA +		Morocco	CA	
Namibia	ED +		Afghanistan	EA		North Korea	CA	
Panama	ED +		Algeria	EA		Oman	CA	
S.Tomé & P.	ED +		Angola	EA	↕	Palestine/Gaza	CA	
Senegal	ED +		Azerbaijan	EA		Palestine/West Bank	CA	
Slovakia	ED +	↘	Bangladesh	EA		Qatar	CA	
South Africa	ED +	↘	Belarus	EA		Saudi Arabia	CA	
South Korea	ED +	↘	Burundi	EA		Somalia	CA	
Suriname	ED +		CAR	EA		South Sudan	CA	
Tunisia	ED +	↕	Cambodia	EA		Swaziland	CA	
Argentina	ED		Cameroon	EA		Syria	CA	↘
Bolivia	ED		Chad	EA		Thailand	CA	↘
Brazil	ED		Comoros	EA	↘	UAE	CA	
Bulgaria	ED		Congo	EA		Uzbekistan	CA	
Burkina Faso	ED		DRC	EA		Yemen	CA	↘
Colombia	ED		Djibouti	EA				

Note: The countries are sorted by regime type in 2018, and after that in alphabetical order. They are classified based on the Regimes of the World measure, where **LD stands for Liberal Democracy; ED - Electoral Democracy; EA - Electoral Autocracy; and CA - Closed Autocracy.**


We incorporate V-Dem's confidence estimates in order to account for the uncertainty and potential measurement error due to the nature of the data but also to underline that some countries are placed in the grey zone between regime types.

The sign “-” indicates that taking uncertainty into account, the country could belong to the lower category, while “+” signifies that the country could also belong to the higher category. The countries that see a movement upwards or downwards from one level to another have an arrow next to them (↕ ↘ ↙).

This builds on the regime-classification by Lüthmann et al. (2018). While using V-Dem's data, this measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering Committee of V-Dem (only the main V-Dem democracy indices have such an endorsement).




## Appendix 1: Liberal Democracy Index



The V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) captures both liberal and electoral aspects of democracy based on the 71 indicators included in the Liberal Component Index (LCI) and the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). The EDI reflects a relatively ambitious idea of electoral democracy where a number of institutional features

guarantee free and fair elections such as freedom of association and freedom of expression (see Appendix 2). The LCI goes even further and captures the limits placed on governments in terms of two key aspects: The protection of individual liberties; and the checks and balances between institutions (see Appendix 3).

**FIGURE A1.2: EXPLANATION OF THE V-DEM LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX**



**Table A1: Country Scores for the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) and all Components Indices**

Country	Liberal Democracy Index (LDI)			Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)			Liberal Component Index (LCI)			Egalitarian Component Index (ECI)			Participatory Component Index (PCI)			Deliberative Component Index (DCI)		
	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-
Norway	1	0.867	0.037	1	0.913	0.027	6	0.958	0.027	1	0.966	0.027	26	0.649	0.020	1	0.989	0.651
Sweden	2	0.865	0.035	2	0.903	0.032	2	0.967	0.014	19	0.897	0.047	36	0.629	0.034	4	0.971	0.631
Denmark	3	0.846	0.037	5	0.888	0.039	4	0.966	0.023	2	0.957	0.034	10	0.720	0.015	3	0.972	0.648
Estonia	4	0.843	0.057	3	0.901	0.036	9	0.944	0.041	6	0.929	0.035	31	0.640	0.030	15	0.927	0.642
Switzerland	5	0.838	0.043	7	0.881	0.040	3	0.966	0.018	4	0.935	0.045	1	0.874	0.026	2	0.977	0.640
Costa Rica	6	0.832	0.031	4	0.896	0.030	14	0.930	0.028	32	0.847	0.060	19	0.675	0.030	10	0.950	0.635
Australia	7	0.824	0.040	15	0.864	0.039	1	0.969	0.015	31	0.850	0.071	18	0.681	0.019	13	0.937	0.642
Portugal	8	0.812	0.040	10	0.874	0.030	12	0.935	0.026	10	0.918	0.034	42	0.612	0.055	7	0.962	0.642
Netherlands	9	0.807	0.047	16	0.861	0.040	5	0.964	0.027	9	0.921	0.051	24	0.651	0.045	9	0.953	0.644
New Zealand	10	0.805	0.045	11	0.873	0.041	11	0.935	0.025	22	0.892	0.041	5	0.746	0.046	72	0.756	0.643
Finland	11	0.803	0.046	18	0.855	0.044	8	0.952	0.020	7	0.923	0.033	28	0.643	0.025	16	0.926	0.638
United Kingdom	12	0.800	0.043	8	0.875	0.032	15	0.925	0.040	30	0.852	0.052	16	0.690	0.017	32	0.880	0.636
South Korea	13	0.800	0.043	13	0.867	0.040	17	0.922	0.025	23	0.892	0.052	43	0.610	0.043	26	0.904	0.644
Belgium	14	0.796	0.046	14	0.866	0.039	16	0.923	0.023	12	0.913	0.033	34	0.634	0.028	18	0.922	0.639
Uruguay	15	0.783	0.051	6	0.884	0.039	30	0.892	0.054	37	0.827	0.064	3	0.809	0.024	12	0.943	0.637
Italy	16	0.783	0.057	12	0.873	0.043	27	0.902	0.035	26	0.882	0.041	17	0.684	0.058	41	0.863	0.648
Germany	17	0.774	0.049	25	0.838	0.047	10	0.941	0.028	3	0.940	0.046	30	0.643	0.035	6	0.965	0.633
Iceland	18	0.774	0.052	17	0.861	0.047	28	0.900	0.034	18	0.899	0.040	15	0.696	0.025	36	0.876	0.625
Slovenia	19	0.773	0.037	29	0.824	0.033	7	0.957	0.019	17	0.899	0.035	4	0.748	0.023	27	0.900	0.620
France	20	0.773	0.050	20	0.850	0.042	25	0.909	0.033	24	0.890	0.051	35	0.634	0.037	39	0.867	0.626
Chile	21	0.771	0.048	19	0.852	0.039	26	0.905	0.039	113	0.545	0.063	58	0.590	0.040	25	0.906	0.627
Luxembourg	22	0.765	0.036	9	0.874	0.037	38	0.862	0.046	5	0.934	0.033	117	0.443	0.078	5	0.969	0.643
Latvia	23	0.763	0.047	22	0.846	0.043	24	0.909	0.048	21	0.894	0.043	9	0.721	0.031	50	0.817	0.649
Ireland	24	0.760	0.046	24	0.846	0.044	23	0.910	0.042	15	0.904	0.042	38	0.622	0.070	17	0.923	0.631
Canada	25	0.759	0.042	21	0.850	0.038	29	0.899	0.035	13	0.909	0.051	21	0.661	0.010	14	0.934	0.608
Spain	26	0.742	0.054	33	0.819	0.048	19	0.918	0.031	27	0.871	0.044	39	0.616	0.047	28	0.898	0.629
USA	27	0.741	0.055	26	0.834	0.049	31	0.888	0.038	65	0.718	0.080	23	0.656	0.015	99	0.654	0.606
Cyprus	28	0.740	0.059	23	0.846	0.050	37	0.864	0.059	25	0.888	0.060	93	0.523	0.071	40	0.867	0.642
Lithuania	29	0.730	0.061	36	0.803	0.062	21	0.917	0.034	33	0.842	0.065	7	0.730	0.041	75	0.747	0.611
Japan	30	0.727	0.061	34	0.808	0.055	20	0.918	0.033	8	0.923	0.046	56	0.593	0.048	22	0.916	0.617
Mauritius	31	0.716	0.060	28	0.825	0.045	36	0.868	0.046	39	0.814	0.070	92	0.528	0.065	8	0.956	0.645
Austria	32	0.715	0.056	38	0.790	0.045	18	0.920	0.045	20	0.896	0.042	14	0.698	0.023	59	0.790	0.610
Slovakia	33	0.711	0.044	30	0.824	0.045	41	0.857	0.042	40	0.795	0.072	8	0.727	0.033	70	0.760	0.634
Greece	34	0.708	0.052	27	0.831	0.043	44	0.842	0.050	36	0.830	0.044	29	0.643	0.050	20	0.918	0.647
Jamaica	35	0.702	0.044	35	0.807	0.049	35	0.874	0.038	69	0.695	0.104	33	0.635	0.040	31	0.882	0.634
Czech Republic	36	0.702	0.040	31	0.822	0.038	45	0.840	0.065	14	0.908	0.045	90	0.536	0.060	54	0.802	0.617
Taiwan	37	0.700	0.055	37	0.801	0.050	33	0.882	0.041	16	0.903	0.046	2	0.845	0.035	38	0.870	0.624
Cape Verde	38	0.695	0.072	42	0.769	0.065	22	0.914	0.040	51	0.750	0.056	91	0.531	0.071	58	0.791	0.625
Trinidad & Tobago	39	0.681	0.045	40	0.786	0.045	39	0.861	0.039	38	0.823	0.047	88	0.543	0.053	24	0.914	0.628
Argentina	40	0.676	0.062	32	0.819	0.056	48	0.822	0.058	61	0.723	0.048	53	0.594	0.044	66	0.775	0.617
Tunisia	41	0.676	0.045	46	0.743	0.049	13	0.931	0.021	48	0.763	0.059	126	0.421	0.037	11	0.946	0.649
Barbados	42	0.675	0.061	43	0.768	0.051	32	0.884	0.050	28	0.864	0.045	148	0.278	0.039	34	0.879	0.634
Suriname	43	0.635	0.043	41	0.772	0.046	54	0.807	0.057	72	0.680	0.076	68	0.574	0.048	56	0.798	0.628
Vanuatu	44	0.630	0.079	51	0.724	0.074	34	0.881	0.061	49	0.761	0.066	110	0.479	0.083	21	0.916	0.643
Peru	45	0.621	0.057	45	0.753	0.048	53	0.810	0.060	111	0.557	0.064	6	0.738	0.032	93	0.683	0.634
Panama	46	0.608	0.050	39	0.788	0.053	68	0.741	0.053	104	0.593	0.098	70	0.573	0.056	46	0.833	0.617
Botswana	47	0.586	0.064	56	0.697	0.059	42	0.848	0.049	70	0.694	0.090	65	0.577	0.039	60	0.788	0.632
South Africa	48	0.575	0.045	53	0.717	0.048	60	0.775	0.057	108	0.569	0.061	57	0.591	0.035	37	0.875	0.636
Namibia	49	0.574	0.045	58	0.688	0.056	50	0.820	0.034	107	0.586	0.060	96	0.518	0.056	76	0.738	0.627
Croatia	50	0.573	0.058	57	0.689	0.055	46	0.822	0.045	46	0.765	0.119	12	0.709	0.057	81	0.720	0.629
Israel	51	0.568	0.069	55	0.698	0.074	56	0.802	0.055	53	0.747	0.099	79	0.556	0.057	77	0.738	0.625
Malta	52	0.568	0.052	47	0.743	0.055	67	0.743	0.076	11	0.914	0.063	27	0.646	0.065	43	0.854	0.636
Brazil	53	0.563	0.048	48	0.742	0.052	73	0.727	0.050	130	0.462	0.091	77	0.559	0.046	117	0.589	0.634
S.Tomé & P.	54	0.561	0.049	59	0.685	0.061	51	0.813	0.054	63	0.718	0.077	67	0.575	0.045	49	0.828	0.624
Senegal	55	0.558	0.066	50	0.733	0.064	63	0.754	0.065	50	0.754	0.075	123	0.426	0.054	48	0.830	0.625
Poland	56	0.548	0.053	54	0.708	0.051	62	0.754	0.054	29	0.859	0.048	51	0.596	0.052	109	0.629	0.628
Benin	57	0.535	0.050	64	0.654	0.044	47	0.822	0.057	55	0.736	0.081	45	0.606	0.038	61	0.786	0.622
Ghana	58	0.531	0.059	66	0.648	0.058	49	0.821	0.048	60	0.725	0.081	130	0.388	0.064	33	0.879	0.625
Georgia	59	0.530	0.060	60	0.676	0.065	64	0.750	0.059	43	0.791	0.087	105	0.501	0.069	47	0.830	0.645
Mexico	60	0.527	0.049	52	0.719	0.057	83	0.696	0.052	127	0.482	0.102	59	0.588	0.061	74	0.748	0.615
Bhutan	61	0.520	0.054	73	0.603	0.064	40	0.859	0.032	34	0.840	0.055	71	0.571	0.047	35	0.876	0.642
Timor-Leste	62	0.510	0.080	44	0.755	0.071	100	0.609	0.081	93	0.619	0.078	66	0.576	0.050	82	0.715	0.630
Indonesia	63	0.502	0.047	76	0.600	0.058	55	0.803	0.050	86	0.633	0.085	41	0.613	0.048	29	0.897	0.630
Burkina Faso	64	0.499	0.063	49	0.739	0.076	102	0.593	0.067	99	0.605	0.049	52	0.596	0.041	44	0.848	0.632
Bulgaria	65	0.499	0.049	78	0.593	0.050	43	0.842	0.051	45	0.777	0.068	11	0.714	0.048	71	0.756	0.621
Mongolia	66	0.484	0.060	70	0.624	0.060	71	0.733	0.063	64	0.718	0.088	101	0.509	0.052	45	0.838	0.616
Seychelles	67	0.475	0.066	82	0.578	0.086	58	0.798	0.042	59	0.729	0.080	151	0.257	0.061	57	0.796	0.624
Colombia	68	0.475	0.048	63	0.664	0.049	87	0.681	0.066	151	0.363	0.087	25	0.650	0.045	114	0.617	0.642
Ecuador	69	0.472	0.044	61	0.673	0.050	94	0.651	0.068	80	0.651	0.069	20	0.669	0.043	42	0.860	0.618
Sri Lanka	7																	

⬆ indicates that the country's score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  
 ⬇ indicates that the country's score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  
 SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.

Country	Liberal Democracy Index (LDI)			Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)			Liberal Component Index (LCI)			Egalitarian Component Index (ECI)			Participatory Component Index (PCI)			Deliberative Component Index (DCI)								
	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-						
Fiji	91	0.383	0.041	⬆	97	0.511	0.047	⬆	79	0.700	0.074	⬆	97	0.607	0.078	132	0.380	0.049	⬆	85	0.706	0.628	⬆	
Tanzania	92	0.382	0.038		99	0.504	0.041		77	0.718	0.051		62	0.723	0.076	111	0.477	0.078		83	0.711	0.636		
Kyrgyzstan	93	0.374	0.041	⬆	98	0.511	0.060	⬆	84	0.694	0.049	⬆	82	0.647	0.090	118	0.443	0.075	53	0.805	0.623	⬆		
BiH	94	0.369	0.045		92	0.538	0.062		97	0.626	0.050		89	0.627	0.094	100	0.510	0.053	120	0.574	0.628			
Macedonia	95	0.360	0.041		88	0.557	0.037		105	0.589	0.060	⬇	92	0.621	0.066	40	0.614	0.054	100	0.654	0.618			
Montenegro	97	0.349	0.034		107	0.456	0.046		82	0.699	0.049		58	0.731	0.077	46	0.605	0.042	98	0.663	0.611			
Kosovo	96	0.349	0.048		91	0.542	0.068		108	0.576	0.094		75	0.675	0.105	114	0.455	0.057	96	0.670	0.654			
Dominican Rep.	98	0.327	0.032		74	0.602	0.047		130	0.446	0.047		146	0.389	0.129	97	0.517	0.062	87	0.704	0.619			
Armenia	99	0.326	0.042	⬆	102	0.493	0.061	⬆	107	0.584	0.051	⬆	41	0.795	0.067	107	0.494	0.074	⬆	55	0.801	0.632	⬆	
Singapore	100	0.326	0.035		119	0.397	0.048		78	0.714	0.064		66	0.714	0.072	168	0.176	0.064	65	0.780	0.644			
Philippines	101	0.324	0.048		94	0.525	0.064		116	0.532	0.061	⬇	155	0.346	0.071	72	0.570	0.044	78	0.733	0.638			
Mozambique	102	0.322	0.042		106	0.477	0.056		101	0.597	0.077		100	0.604	0.102	62	0.582	0.048	106	0.634	0.603			
Papua New Guinea	103	0.321	0.033		109	0.444	0.037		93	0.652	0.065		141	0.414	0.064	95	0.519	0.050	134	0.445	0.618			
Mali	104	0.316	0.044	⬆	96	0.512	0.072		111	0.556	0.065		106	0.591	0.099	131	0.383	0.091	⬆	84	0.710	0.627		
Somaliland	105	0.303	0.036		105	0.480	0.052		112	0.555	0.046		142	0.409	0.083	73	0.569	0.061	131	0.475	0.642			
Kenya	106	0.297	0.034		108	0.447	0.060		103	0.592	0.044		124	0.502	0.107	94	0.523	0.071	118	0.579	0.648	⬇		
Hong Kong	107	0.295	0.019		131	0.338	0.027		65	0.746	0.055		44	0.787	0.067	153	0.254	0.033	101	0.640	0.625			
Madagascar	108	0.293	0.052		103	0.491	0.066		122	0.503	0.075		148	0.373	0.075	120	0.438	0.060	130	0.481	0.636			
Malaysia	109	0.292	0.038		124	0.372	0.051		86	0.682	0.059		56	0.733	0.080	⬆	81	0.556	0.054	103	0.640	0.628		
Lebanon	110	0.288	0.052		104	0.482	0.062		118	0.514	0.073		121	0.514	0.093	113	0.465	0.082	123	0.554	0.637			
Kuwait	111	0.287	0.027		134	0.321	0.028		66	0.746	0.055		67	0.710	0.123	158	0.235	0.073	73	0.750	0.632			
Guinea-Bissau	112	0.285	0.051		100	0.497	0.056		123	0.496	0.080		149	0.373	0.076	137	0.342	0.052	157	0.253	0.639			
Serbia	113	0.280	0.028	⬆	120	0.394	0.037	⬆	98	0.625	0.064	⬆	77	0.670	0.090	109	0.490	0.071	⬆	115	0.617	0.650		
Uganda	114	0.269	0.035		123	0.375	0.037		99	0.621	0.084		117	0.531	0.065	64	0.577	0.062	⬆	63	0.783	0.634		
Pakistan	115	0.259	0.032		114	0.415	0.048		115	0.532	0.069		175	0.215	0.079	50	0.598	0.049	52	0.806	0.628			
Morocco	116	0.255	0.022		137	0.299	0.017		89	0.668	0.066		102	0.599	0.077	83	0.552	0.092	⬆	51	0.808	0.635		
Jordan	117	0.251	0.022		145	0.271	0.026		80	0.700	0.059	⬆	83	0.646	0.084	⬆	145	0.289	0.064	108	0.629	0.625		
Iraq	118	0.251	0.046		112	0.422	0.061		119	0.510	0.084		132	0.456	0.082	63	0.579	0.051	90	0.698	0.637			
Iran	119	0.250	0.033	⬆	127	0.360	0.039	⬆	110	0.568	0.086	⬆	134	0.444	0.076	⬆	74	0.565	0.057	⬆	69	0.761	0.630	⬆
CAR	120	0.249	0.039	⬆	113	0.420	0.044	⬆	120	0.508	0.081		152	0.353	0.068	154	0.243	0.056		128	0.498	0.653		
Zambia	121	0.244	0.022	⬆	129	0.348	0.041	⬆	109	0.574	0.074	⬆	112	0.549	0.092	76	0.563	0.065	80	0.722	0.613			
Gabon	122	0.238	0.032		115	0.411	0.044		124	0.485	0.066		52	0.750	0.068	61	0.586	0.050	112	0.623	0.630			
Afghanistan	123	0.233	0.032		126	0.367	0.042		121	0.507	0.062		168	0.261	0.081	122	0.426	0.084	92	0.692	0.636			
Honduras	124	0.225	0.028	⬆	121	0.392	0.030	⬆	126	0.469	0.072		140	0.416	0.107	89	0.539	0.051	95	0.676	0.624			
Ukraine	125	0.223	0.045	⬆	117	0.408	0.059	⬆	132	0.425	0.090	⬆	128	0.470	0.089	49	0.600	0.043	67	0.774	0.628			
Comoros	126	0.222	0.036	⬆	101	0.495	0.056	⬆	141	0.340	0.046	⬆	81	0.651	0.099	69	0.574	0.057	113	0.621	0.654			
Zimbabwe	127	0.205	0.031	⬆	133	0.329	0.032	⬆	127	0.466	0.090		156	0.343	0.071	47	0.602	0.084	⬆	142	0.397	0.610		
Palestine/West B.	128	0.201	0.014	⬆	147	0.265	0.019	⬆	113	0.550	0.032	⬆	47	0.764	0.070	87	0.545	0.047	88	0.703	0.650			
Togo	129	0.199	0.034	⬆	110	0.441	0.049		140	0.340	0.052		95	0.611	0.114	163	0.211	0.051	91	0.692	0.620			
Angola	130	0.197	0.029	⬆	125	0.370	0.035	⬆	134	0.410	0.075		162	0.304	0.067	156	0.237	0.048	140	0.403	0.613			
Zanzibar	131	0.189	0.026	⬆	138	0.292	0.032	⬆	125	0.476	0.061		96	0.608	0.063	150	0.262	0.073	121	0.574	0.653			
Haiti	132	0.182	0.031	⬆	111	0.423	0.047		146	0.311	0.068	⬆	176	0.206	0.067	128	0.411	0.094	129	0.490	0.636			
Maldives	133	0.178	0.029		122	0.378	0.041		139	0.352	0.069		125	0.499	0.070	⬆	112	0.468	0.063	⬆	148	0.323	0.633	⬆
Guinea	134	0.176	0.030	⬆	116	0.410	0.031	⬆	147	0.306	0.076	⬆	143	0.398	0.077	138	0.331	0.065	132	0.454	0.664			
Libya	135	0.168	0.013	⬆	148	0.262	0.018	⬆	129	0.446	0.049	⬆	122	0.504	0.078	129	0.408	0.096	⬆	64	0.783	0.645	⬆	
Mauritania	136	0.165	0.033	⬆	118	0.406	0.063		151	0.276	0.062	⬆	169	0.248	0.072	⬆	152	0.254	0.084	105	0.637	0.634		
Rwanda	137	0.164	0.024		149	0.260	0.031		131	0.430	0.061		119	0.529	0.079	98	0.515	0.091	137	0.408	0.652			
Vietnam	138	0.161	0.023		154	0.224	0.017		128	0.461	0.073		91	0.622	0.084	99	0.513	0.066	107	0.629	0.627			
Swaziland	139	0.156	0.025	⬆	169	0.148	0.014	⬆	117	0.523	0.092	⬆	150	0.364	0.132	124	0.426	0.072	145	0.333	0.642			
Ethiopia	140	0.154	0.022		140	0.287	0.034		138	0.364	0.070		109	0.562	0.085	165	0.184	0.053	94	0.679	0.618	⬆		
Egypt	141	0.141	0.026		155	0.211	0.020		133	0.410	0.085		165	0.294	0.089	162	0.212	0.061	144	0.357	0.633			
Turkey	142	0.139	0.025	⬆	128	0.349	0.038	⬆	154	0.263	0.057	⬆	144	0.394	0.077	⬆	119	0.441	0.055	155	0.264	0.632	⬆	
Algeria	143	0.139	0.016		135	0.305	0.027		144	0.319	0.043		54	0.743	0.092	161	0.214	0.073	⬆	124	0.549	0.626		
Cameroon	144	0.131	0.018		132	0.334	0.031		155	0.254	0.048	⬆	116	0.532	0.068	157	0.236	0.066	149	0.322	0.634			
Bangladesh	145	0.131	0.023		130	0.341	0.043	⬆	157	0.235	0.075		166	0.290	0.080	106	0.497	0.076	147	0.327	0.626			
Iran	146	0.131	0.020		156	0.205	0.022		136	0.381	0.055		114	0.544	0.106	164	0.187	0.077	139	0.404	0.646			
Oman	147	0.128	0.017		159	0.188	0.017		135	0.387	0.061		101	0.599	0.095	135	0.354	0.061	167	0.186	0.633			
Russia	148	0.124	0.018		141	0.285	0.031	⬆	150	0.280	0.040		105	0.593	0.086	133	0.365	0.056	143	0.384	0.621			
Djibouti	149	0.123	0.021		146	0.267	0.044		153	0.271	0.052		98	0.606	0.125	115	0.454	0.077	135	0.428	0.630			
Belarus	150	0.122	0.013																					







## Appendix 2: The Electoral Democracy Index



For several decades, scholars and practitioners alike have depicted democracy in the world as though the extant measures really captured what is meant by the concept “electoral democracy”. Yet, we have all known that they did not.<sup>1</sup> V-Dem is the first systematic effort to measure the *de facto* existence of all the institutions in Robert Dahl’s famous articulation of “polyar-

chy” as electoral democracy. The V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) captures not only the extent to which regimes hold clean, free and fair elections, but also their actual freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, and association, as well as male and female suffrage and the degree to which government policy is vested in elected political officials (Figure 2.1).

**FIGURE A2.2: THE V-DEM ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY INDEX**



**Table A2: Country Scores for the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) and its Main Components**

Country	Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)			Freedom of Association Index			Clean Elections Index			Freedom of Expression Index		
	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-
Norway	1	0.913	0.027	6	0.914	0.620	13	0.956	0.634	5	0.964	0.604
Sweden	2	0.903	0.032	3	0.925	0.619	5	0.969	0.643	10	0.957	0.601
Estonia	3	0.901	0.036	15	0.902	0.626	3	0.971	0.651	3	0.969	0.599
Costa Rica	4	0.896	0.030	4	0.917	0.627	2	0.973	0.632	18	0.941	0.606
Denmark	5	0.888	0.039	2	0.927	0.610	16	0.951	0.649	2	0.971	0.610
Uruguay	6	0.884	0.039	37	0.884	0.621	4	0.969	0.623	4	0.964	0.609
Switzerland	7	0.881	0.040	5	0.914	0.618	19	0.948	0.645	1	0.975	0.616
United Kingdom	8	0.875	0.032	22	0.893	0.611	26	0.940	0.624	12	0.949	0.599
Luxembourg	9	0.874	0.037	33	0.886	0.626	12	0.962	0.637	11	0.957	0.601
Portugal	10	0.874	0.030	25	0.892	0.621	1	0.975	0.625	16	0.946	0.596
New Zealand	11	0.873	0.041	7	0.910	0.618	14	0.955	0.641	22	0.938	0.604
Italy	12	0.873	0.043	11	0.904	0.619	27	0.938	0.640	20	0.939	0.601
South Korea	13	0.867	0.040	44	0.870	0.606	15	0.954	0.634	13	0.949	0.603
Belgium	14	0.866	0.039	46	0.869	0.621	10	0.964	0.654	9	0.958	0.622
Australia	15	0.864	0.039	9	0.908	0.624	9	0.965	0.642	29	0.917	0.597
Iceland	16	0.861	0.047	21	0.894	0.634	24	0.944	0.639	14	0.949	0.606
Netherlands	17	0.861	0.040	32	0.886	0.626	8	0.966	0.657	21	0.939	0.601
Finland	18	0.855	0.044	49	0.867	0.633	6	0.968	0.636	8	0.959	0.602
Chile	19	0.852	0.039	20	0.895	0.609	11	0.963	0.644	36	0.892	0.599
France	20	0.850	0.042	52	0.863	0.637	20	0.948	0.644	7	0.960	0.609
Canada	21	0.850	0.038	31	0.888	0.623	23	0.944	0.623	19	0.939	0.592
Latvia	22	0.846	0.043	18	0.896	0.616	37	0.899	0.637	17	0.942	0.600
Cyprus	23	0.846	0.050	26	0.891	0.621	32	0.921	0.636	15	0.947	0.598
Ireland	24	0.846	0.044	40	0.879	0.624	35	0.913	0.639	6	0.961	0.611
Germany	25	0.838	0.047	53	0.862	0.613	17	0.951	0.638	23	0.936	0.599
USA	26	0.834	0.049	1	0.933	0.624	42	0.877	0.637	30	0.916	0.591
Greece	27	0.831	0.043	17	0.897	0.620	18	0.949	0.637	47	0.876	0.613
Mauritius	28	0.825	0.045	27	0.890	0.625	25	0.944	0.635	27	0.919	0.602
Slovakia	29	0.824	0.045	48	0.868	0.612	22	0.945	0.650	43	0.883	0.598
Slovenia	30	0.824	0.033	13	0.903	0.603	29	0.926	0.637	46	0.878	0.603
Czech Republic	31	0.822	0.038	43	0.872	0.618	31	0.923	0.633	31	0.913	0.591
Spain	32	0.819	0.048	24	0.892	0.635	7	0.966	0.626	24	0.935	0.600
Argentina	33	0.819	0.056	16	0.901	0.619	38	0.891	0.637	42	0.884	0.586
Japan	34	0.808	0.055	10	0.906	0.623	30	0.926	0.630	51	0.868	0.591
Jamaica	35	0.807	0.049	28	0.889	0.620	45	0.864	0.618	28	0.918	0.612
Lithuania	36	0.803	0.062	56	0.859	0.613	33	0.921	0.628	32	0.911	0.587
Taiwan	37	0.801	0.050	19	0.895	0.619	34	0.918	0.652	34	0.900	0.596
Austria	38	0.790	0.045	84	0.823	0.618	21	0.946	0.642	38	0.887	0.595
Panama	39	0.788	0.053	39	0.880	0.628	40	0.889	0.629	58	0.846	0.600
Trinidad & Tobago	40	0.786	0.045	23	0.893	0.609	51	0.833	0.640	40	0.885	0.615
Suriname	41	0.772	0.046	68	0.841	0.625	39	0.891	0.624	50	0.872	0.600
Cape Verde	42	0.769	0.065	36	0.884	0.627	43	0.876	0.638	54	0.859	0.600
Barbados	43	0.768	0.051	41	0.879	0.624	55	0.813	0.622	25	0.931	0.612
Timor-Leste	44	0.755	0.071	78	0.830	0.622	44	0.872	0.633	61	0.845	0.591
Peru	45	0.753	0.048	75	0.832	0.622	47	0.854	0.647	37	0.890	0.593
Malta	46	0.743	0.055	34	0.886	0.640	48	0.846	0.641	57	0.846	0.608
Tunisia	47	0.743	0.049	72	0.836	0.613	63	0.767	0.615	35	0.894	0.603
Brazil	48	0.742	0.052	30	0.888	0.618	41	0.880	0.644	70	0.815	0.598
Burkina Faso	49	0.739	0.076	82	0.825	0.612	57	0.795	0.622	39	0.886	0.615
Senegal	50	0.733	0.064	65	0.841	0.623	64	0.756	0.642	26	0.930	0.603
Vanuatu	51	0.724	0.074	42	0.874	0.636	56	0.801	0.642	33	0.904	0.606
Mexico	52	0.719	0.057	79	0.828	0.609	61	0.772	0.627	45	0.878	0.604
South Africa	53	0.717	0.048	47	0.868	0.637	60	0.786	0.630	67	0.829	0.594
Poland	54	0.708	0.051	86	0.820	0.631	28	0.928	0.622	104	0.708	0.589
Israel	55	0.698	0.074	100	0.765	0.620	46	0.860	0.614	64	0.840	0.603
Botswana	56	0.697	0.059	50	0.866	0.615	50	0.836	0.636	72	0.808	0.612
Croatia	57	0.689	0.055	64	0.841	0.629	36	0.904	0.634	97	0.724	0.591
Namibia	58	0.688	0.056	69	0.839	0.621	62	0.768	0.632	59	0.845	0.595
S.Tomé & P.	59	0.685	0.061	83	0.824	0.606	53	0.819	0.615	69	0.816	0.581
Georgia	60	0.676	0.065	8	0.910	0.633	73	0.717	0.621	41	0.885	0.595
Ecuador	61	0.673	0.050	74	0.835	0.631	76	0.704	0.617	49	0.873	0.607
El Salvador	62	0.672	0.077	35	0.885	0.614	79	0.691	0.628	68	0.826	0.604
Colombia	63	0.664	0.049	14	0.902	0.629	66	0.754	0.627	106	0.701	0.580
Benin	64	0.654	0.044	61	0.847	0.623	59	0.787	0.643	82	0.774	0.591
Ivory Coast	65	0.650	0.045	91	0.797	0.628	71	0.730	0.630	90	0.742	0.590
Ghana	66	0.648	0.058	38	0.882	0.636	77	0.697	0.621	48	0.875	0.600
Sri Lanka	67	0.644	0.065	54	0.862	0.609	67	0.752	0.653	75	0.799	0.598
Bolivia	68	0.641	0.070	90	0.800	0.608	78	0.697	0.606	76	0.799	0.584
Romania	69	0.628	0.052	101	0.763	0.620	49	0.846	0.625	95	0.727	0.590
Mongolia	70	0.624	0.060	51	0.865	0.612	82	0.668	0.610	55	0.854	0.587
Paraguay	71	0.617	0.056	63	0.845	0.629	81	0.674	0.620	78	0.784	0.606
Nepal	72	0.607	0.087	57	0.857	0.637	93	0.577	0.622	63	0.840	0.605
Bhutan	73	0.603	0.064	119	0.671	0.627	54	0.815	0.643	87	0.757	0.594
Dominican Republic	74	0.602	0.047	93	0.793	0.615	95	0.566	0.635	77	0.798	0.593
Indonesia	75	0.600	0.058	97	0.779	0.622	74	0.712	0.624	83	0.772	0.590
Guyana	76	0.600	0.067	12	0.903	0.633	70	0.741	0.634	66	0.833	0.608
Liberia	77	0.595	0.052	45	0.869	0.615	96	0.565	0.619	56	0.848	0.598
Bulgaria	78	0.593	0.050	71	0.837	0.625	72	0.723	0.625	101	0.715	0.606
Sierra Leone	79	0.586	0.052	89	0.803	0.625	89	0.618	0.634	60	0.845	0.604
Niger	80	0.583	0.051	77	0.831	0.605	111	0.460	0.632	62	0.845	0.599
Solomon Islands	81	0.578	0.078	29	0.888	0.628	113	0.450	0.620	53	0.862	0.606
Seychelles	82	0.578	0.086	96	0.781	0.630	83	0.662	0.633	98	0.721	0.598
Nigeria	83	0.577	0.054	88	0.807	0.634	94	0.567	0.639	44	0.880	0.613
Moldova	84	0.575	0.052	99	0.773	0.628	87	0.623	0.617	91	0.741	0.587
Lesotho	85	0.568	0.050	58	0.855	0.633	88	0.621	0.611	112	0.678	0.599
Gambia	86	0.566	0.057	70	0.838	0.613	102	0.521	0.629	65	0.834	0.593
Macedonia	87	0.557	0.037	73	0.835	0.634	85	0.627	0.605	94	0.727	0.578
India	88	0.557	0.066	114	0.703	0.618	69	0.742	0.629	115	0.675	0.601
Malawi	89	0.555	0.048	67	0.841	0.615	104	0.513	0.611	52	0.863	0.601
Guatemala	90	0.553	0.078	81	0.826	0.615	90	0.617	0.626	93	0.729	0.601

⬆ indicates that the country's score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  
 ⬇ indicates that the country's score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.  
 SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.


Country	Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)			Freedom of Association Index			Clean Elections Index			Freedom of Expression Index		
	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-
Kosovo	91	0.542	0.068	103	0.755	0.641	84	0.658	0.618	116	0.672	0.598
BiH	92	0.538	0.062	87	0.812	0.632	91	0.608	0.632	105	0.702	0.607
Hungary	93	0.536	0.061 ⬇	110	0.727	0.616	75	0.709	0.618 ⬇	128	0.619	0.581 ⬇
Philippines	94	0.525	0.064	104	0.751	0.622	105	0.497	0.620	86	0.768	0.588
Albania	95	0.519	0.057	76	0.832	0.629	98	0.540	0.611	120	0.648	0.608
Mali	96	0.512	0.072	92	0.795	0.632	114	0.442	0.631	88	0.751	0.610
Fiji	97	0.511	0.047 ⬆	106	0.748	0.615	80	0.685	0.618 ⬆	139	0.497	0.597 ⬆
Kyrgyzstan	98	0.511	0.060 ⬆	111	0.721	0.630	99	0.540	0.614 ⬆	81	0.777	0.604 ⬆
Tanzania	99	0.504	0.041	107	0.745	0.623	100	0.538	0.610	117	0.665	0.593
Guinea-Bissau	100	0.497	0.056	105	0.750	0.619	92	0.602	0.625	110	0.689	0.605
Comoros	101	0.495	0.056	98	0.778	0.624	119	0.392	0.636 ⬇	84	0.769	0.602
Armenia	102	0.493	0.061 ⬆	66	0.841	0.619	123	0.382	0.643 ⬇	85	0.768	0.584 ⬆
Madagascar	103	0.491	0.066	60	0.850	0.622	130	0.331	0.619	71	0.813	0.613
Lebanon	104	0.482	0.062	102	0.761	0.624	107	0.481	0.634	102	0.710	0.594
Somaliland	105	0.480	0.052	109	0.728	0.624	108	0.478	0.645	108	0.697	0.592
Mozambique	106	0.477	0.056	80	0.826	0.632	132	0.318	0.613	89	0.744	0.594
Montenegro	107	0.456	0.046	85	0.823	0.622	137	0.290	0.628	99	0.719	0.593
Kenya	108	0.447	0.060	116	0.690	0.618	135	0.296	0.616	79	0.780	0.596
Papua New Guinea	109	0.444	0.037	62	0.846	0.605	133	0.305	0.623	73	0.804	0.601
Togo	110	0.441	0.049	124	0.636	0.629	109	0.467	0.640	92	0.730	0.600
Haiti	111	0.423	0.047	55	0.861	0.621	144	0.251	0.632	111	0.688	0.605 ⬇
Iraq	112	0.422	0.061	127	0.632	0.616	121	0.389	0.627	103	0.709	0.612
CAR	113	0.420	0.044 ⬆	115	0.696	0.633	140	0.285	0.628	96	0.727	0.591
Pakistan	114	0.415	0.048	112	0.709	0.616	126	0.341	0.608	124	0.632	0.598 ⬇
Gabon	115	0.411	0.044	94	0.788	0.624	149	0.230	0.639	74	0.799	0.605
Guinea	116	0.410	0.031 ⬆	95	0.783	0.630 ⬆	134	0.297	0.622 ⬆	125	0.631	0.592
Ukraine	117	0.408	0.059 ⬇	129	0.613	0.612 ⬇	122	0.388	0.624	113	0.677	0.586 ⬇
Mauritania	118	0.406	0.063	141	0.489	0.627	120	0.390	0.628 ⬆	109	0.695	0.596
Singapore	119	0.397	0.048	133	0.550	0.616	58	0.792	0.639	146	0.347	0.601
Serbia	120	0.394	0.037 ⬇	108	0.743	0.616	116	0.419	0.607 ⬇	144	0.392	0.614 ⬇
Honduras	121	0.392	0.030 ⬇	59	0.852	0.625	153	0.204	0.627 ⬇	121	0.641	0.590 ⬇
Maldives	122	0.378	0.041	130	0.609	0.624	110	0.462	0.629	141	0.438	0.592 ⬇
Uganda	123	0.375	0.037	125	0.635	0.638	151	0.209	0.625	107	0.700	0.609
Malaysia	124	0.372	0.051	128	0.624	0.619	124	0.366	0.628	118	0.654	0.606 ⬆
Angola	125	0.370	0.035 ⬆	120	0.652	0.629	139	0.288	0.614	123	0.634	0.592 ⬆
Afghanistan	126	0.367	0.042	118	0.681	0.623	155	0.183	0.631	119	0.652	0.596
Myanmar	127	0.360	0.039 ⬆	135	0.543	0.608 ⬆	97	0.561	0.609 ⬆	134	0.568	0.591 ⬆
Turkey	128	0.349	0.038 ⬇	131	0.605	0.621	103	0.521	0.623 ⬇	158	0.239	0.596 ⬇
Zambia	129	0.348	0.041 ⬆	122	0.639	0.627	148	0.231	0.632 ⬇	127	0.621	0.600
Bangladesh	130	0.341	0.043 ⬆	126	0.634	0.617	141	0.279	0.635 ⬇	135	0.560	0.602
Hong Kong	131	0.338	0.027	117	0.683	0.607	68	0.749	0.638	80	0.780	0.600
Cameroon	132	0.334	0.031	138	0.529	0.619	150	0.227	0.615	131	0.582	0.599
Zimbabwe	133	0.329	0.032 ⬆	113	0.705	0.631	154	0.190	0.634	136	0.535	0.596 ⬆
Kuwait	134	0.321	0.028	165	0.124	0.616	52	0.824	0.621	122	0.640	0.590
Algeria	135	0.305	0.027	147	0.373	0.609	142	0.274	0.622	129	0.603	0.595
DRC	136	0.300	0.025 ⬇	143	0.454	0.607	156	0.171	0.622	126	0.626	0.601
Morocco	137	0.299	0.017	123	0.639	0.619	86	0.626	0.615	114	0.677	0.592
Zanzibar	138	0.292	0.032	136	0.542	0.628	160	0.136	0.638	140	0.495	0.601
Chad	139	0.290	0.022	134	0.549	0.631	164	0.083	0.648	137	0.520	0.594
Ethiopia	140	0.287	0.034	148	0.362	0.627	146	0.247	0.618	138	0.518	0.598 ⬆
Russia	141	0.285	0.031 ⬇	150	0.336	0.611	118	0.402	0.648	149	0.307	0.596
Sudan	142	0.281	0.044 ⬆	145	0.424	0.613	127	0.335	0.637 ⬆	147	0.332	0.610
Belarus	143	0.280	0.023	144	0.426	0.625	143	0.259	0.628	145	0.352	0.603
Congo	144	0.280	0.036	140	0.498	0.638	158	0.161	0.634	143	0.405	0.605
Jordan	145	0.271	0.026	132	0.556	0.618	101	0.537	0.616	132	0.575	0.594
Djibouti	146	0.267	0.044	142	0.458	0.615	152	0.206	0.628	142	0.416	0.597
Palestine/West Bank	147	0.265	0.019 ⬆	121	0.646	0.626	178	0.000	0.000	100	0.715	0.601 ⬆
Libya	148	0.262	0.018 ⬆	139	0.515	0.617 ⬆	176	0.000	0.000	130	0.590	0.608 ⬆
Rwanda	149	0.260	0.031	155	0.221	0.623	115	0.438	0.644	148	0.328	0.610
Cambodia	150	0.254	0.030 ⬇	151	0.289	0.621 ⬇	138	0.289	0.628	151	0.303	0.593 ⬇
Venezuela	151	0.241	0.024 ⬇	146	0.400	0.602 ⬇	161	0.130	0.625 ⬇	155	0.265	0.598 ⬇
Kazakhstan	152	0.239	0.027	159	0.200	0.617	136	0.292	0.626	150	0.307	0.601
Nicaragua	153	0.229	0.021 ⬇	158	0.204	0.634 ⬇	147	0.246	0.618 ⬇	153	0.290	0.603 ⬇
Vietnam	154	0.224	0.017 ⬆	175	0.052	0.614	112	0.458	0.637	160	0.221	0.612
Egypt	155	0.211	0.020	157	0.205	0.615	157	0.163	0.621	157	0.249	0.591 ⬇
Iran	156	0.205	0.022	164	0.135	0.612	117	0.405	0.648	154	0.276	0.611
Uzbekistan	157	0.204	0.024	163	0.139	0.609	131	0.323	0.620	164	0.169	0.596 ⬆
Azerbaijan	158	0.197	0.018	152	0.285	0.619	166	0.061	0.634	161	0.186	0.609
Oman	159	0.188	0.017	174	0.060	0.613	65	0.756	0.616	162	0.179	0.595
Cuba	160	0.182	0.017	177	0.040	0.629	129	0.331	0.636	172	0.103	0.621
Equatorial Guinea	161	0.182	0.012	160	0.189	0.615	165	0.067	0.638	165	0.160	0.608
Burundi	162	0.179	0.019 ⬇	154	0.232	0.630 ⬇	168	0.019	0.644 ⬇	163	0.172	0.601 ⬇
Somalia	163	0.179	0.023	137	0.532	0.618	171	0.000	0.000	133	0.569	0.597
Tajikistan	164	0.174	0.015	161	0.153	0.623	167	0.049	0.641	167	0.148	0.599 ⬇
Thailand	165	0.160	0.013 ⬇	162	0.143	0.617 ⬇	125	0.361	0.634	156	0.263	0.600 ⬇
Turkmenistan	166	0.160	0.012	172	0.068	0.607	163	0.115	0.643	176	0.060	0.604
South Sudan	167	0.160	0.013	156	0.206	0.625	177	0.000	0.000	170	0.119	0.600
Syria	168	0.152	0.008	167	0.104	0.606	173	0.000	0.000 ⬇	174	0.081	0.599
Swaziland	169	0.148	0.014	169	0.077	0.617	128	0.334	0.634	152	0.298	0.598
Palestine/Gaza	170	0.136	0.014	149	0.348	0.618	172	0.000	0.000	159	0.235	0.611
Bahrain	171	0.125	0.015 ⬇	166	0.115	0.607 ⬇	145	0.249	0.640	175	0.076	0.598 ⬇
Laos	172	0.120	0.010	173	0.066	0.627	162	0.122	0.658	177	0.029	0.620
Yemen	173	0.119	0.012 ⬇	153	0.262	0.604 ⬇	179	0.000	0.000 ⬇	168	0.147	0.608 ⬇
UAE	174	0.115	0.015	171	0.072	0.609	106	0.493	0.647	173	0.098	0.601
Qatar	175	0.094	0.009	168	0.080	0.627	175	0.000	0.000	166	0.154	0.591
North Korea	176	0.092	0.013	179	0.024	0.624	159	0.142	0.646	179	0.024	0.604
China	177	0.090	0.008	170	0.076	0.604	174	0.000	0.000	169	0.126	0.601 ⬇
Eritrea	178	0.086	0.006	178	0.033	0.626	170	0.000	0.000	178	0.029	0.613
Saudi Arabia	179	0.028	0.008	176	0.050	0.623	169	0.000	0.000	171	0.113	0.599







## Appendix 3: The Liberal Component Index



**FIGURE A3.1: THE V-DEM LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960 TO 2018.**

- World Average
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Asia-Pacific
- Eastern Europe and Central Asia
- MENA
- Western Europe and North America

In V-Dem’s conceptual scheme the liberal principle of democracy embodies the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against both the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. It also captures the “horizontal” methods of accountability between more or less equally standing institutions that ensure the effective checks and balances between institutions and in particular, limit the exercise of executive power. This is achieved by strong rule of law and constitutionally protected

civil liberties, independent judiciary and strong parliament that are able to hold the executive to account and limit its powers. The three indices that capture these dimensions are: the equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl\_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x\_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg\_legcon). Taken together they measure the V-Dem Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

**FIGURE A3.2: THE V-DEM LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX (LCI)**



**Table A3: Country Scores for the Liberal Component Index (LCI) and its Main Components**

Country	Liberal Component Index (LCI)			Equality before the law and individual liberty index			Legislative constrains on the executive index			Judicial constrains on the executive index		
	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-
Australia	1	0.969	0.015	17	0.964	0.606	10	0.951	0.656	1	0.983	0.659
Sweden	2	0.967	0.014	2	0.983	0.617	6	0.962	0.664	11	0.960	0.651
Denmark	3	0.966	0.023	3	0.982	0.627	2	0.966	0.664	7	0.969	0.665
Switzerland	4	0.966	0.018	7	0.976	0.615	17	0.938	0.650	2	0.978	0.663
Netherlands	5	0.964	0.027	12	0.969	0.629	1	0.967	0.652	9	0.963	0.656
Norway	6	0.958	0.027	1	0.984	0.620	3	0.964	0.673	4	0.972	0.648
Slovenia	7	0.957	0.019	13	0.968	0.627	16	0.941	0.660	12	0.957	0.654
Finland	8	0.952	0.020	5	0.978	0.612	5	0.962	0.671	13	0.950	0.655
Estonia	9	0.944	0.041	8	0.975	0.627	12	0.948	0.662	18	0.934	0.657
Germany	10	0.941	0.028	4	0.980	0.605	4	0.963	0.657	29	0.897	0.633
New Zealand	11	0.935	0.025	19	0.963	0.599	24	0.914	0.649	5	0.970	0.658
Portugal	12	0.935	0.026	9	0.975	0.620	23	0.920	0.643	10	0.963	0.649
Tunisia	13	0.931	0.021	55	0.882	0.607	14	0.947	0.663	22	0.920	0.642
Costa Rica	14	0.930	0.028	32	0.940	0.608	7	0.956	0.672	17	0.934	0.659
United Kingdom	15	0.925	0.040	25	0.953	0.599	9	0.951	0.668	34	0.881	0.652
Belgium	16	0.923	0.023	6	0.978	0.619	26	0.903	0.658	28	0.899	0.649
South Korea	17	0.922	0.025	20	0.961	0.611	21	0.925	0.649	24	0.913	0.645
Austria	18	0.920	0.045	21	0.960	0.620	27	0.896	0.662	25	0.908	0.663
Spain	19	0.918	0.031	11	0.972	0.624	39	0.845	0.635	8	0.966	0.677
Japan	20	0.918	0.033	15	0.966	0.617	13	0.948	0.654	35	0.877	0.641
Lithuania	21	0.917	0.034	30	0.947	0.617	33	0.869	0.658	15	0.947	0.649
Cape Verde	22	0.914	0.040	42	0.921	0.618	15	0.943	0.654	26	0.904	0.641
Ireland	23	0.910	0.042	26	0.952	0.636	43	0.841	0.644	3	0.973	0.657
France	24	0.909	0.033	23	0.954	0.606	45	0.837	0.654	33	0.883	0.653
Latvia	25	0.909	0.048	29	0.948	0.618	50	0.827	0.662	6	0.969	0.649
Chile	26	0.905	0.039	43	0.920	0.608	11	0.950	0.680	44	0.841	0.667
Italy	27	0.902	0.035	33	0.940	0.621	8	0.954	0.655	39	0.855	0.631
Iceland	28	0.900	0.034	14	0.967	0.612	36	0.859	0.664	20	0.928	0.669
Canada	29	0.899	0.035	16	0.965	0.616	42	0.843	0.652	27	0.904	0.666
Uruguay	30	0.892	0.054	28	0.948	0.611	37	0.853	0.661	21	0.925	0.642
USA	31	0.888	0.038	36	0.934	0.600	38	0.848	0.643	19	0.929	0.650
Barbados	32	0.884	0.050	31	0.941	0.603	68	0.768	0.653	16	0.946	0.663
Taiwan	33	0.882	0.041	18	0.964	0.614	41	0.843	0.642	41	0.852	0.629
Vanuatu	34	0.881	0.061	39	0.931	0.612	28	0.887	0.663	36	0.868	0.637
Jamaica	35	0.874	0.038	56	0.881	0.607	47	0.835	0.682	23	0.914	0.670
Mauritius	36	0.868	0.046	34	0.937	0.614	29	0.885	0.638	65	0.759	0.649
Cyprus	37	0.864	0.059	22	0.956	0.621	49	0.829	0.666	40	0.853	0.656
Luxembourg	38	0.862	0.046	10	0.974	0.597	20	0.926	0.638	63	0.763	0.667
Trinidad and Tobago	39	0.861	0.039	35	0.935	0.619	44	0.837	0.641	54	0.815	0.645
Bhutan	40	0.859	0.032	59	0.864	0.600	40	0.844	0.665	30	0.897	0.655
Slovakia	41	0.857	0.042	40	0.922	0.595	32	0.871	0.637	42	0.848	0.646
Botswana	42	0.848	0.049	46	0.917	0.612	54	0.816	0.643	46	0.838	0.647
Bulgaria	43	0.842	0.051	63	0.853	0.611	25	0.908	0.646	59	0.786	0.638
Greece	44	0.842	0.050	38	0.931	0.616	53	0.817	0.654	51	0.825	0.643
Czech Republic	45	0.840	0.065	24	0.954	0.617	52	0.820	0.638	45	0.840	0.657
Argentina	46	0.822	0.058	49	0.902	0.589	64	0.776	0.683	50	0.827	0.638
Croatia	47	0.822	0.045	50	0.900	0.599	69	0.763	0.656	58	0.790	0.642
Benin	48	0.822	0.057	27	0.949	0.613	70	0.755	0.643	52	0.825	0.665
Ghana	49	0.821	0.048	47	0.904	0.625	56	0.809	0.648	56	0.794	0.646
Namibia	50	0.820	0.034	51	0.899	0.611	82	0.700	0.639	38	0.867	0.634
Albania	51	0.813	0.060	44	0.918	0.611	35	0.860	0.655	68	0.747	0.679
S.Tomé & P.	52	0.813	0.054	41	0.921	0.607	31	0.876	0.644	81	0.672	0.645
Peru	53	0.810	0.060	86	0.779	0.609	22	0.924	0.648	71	0.741	0.657
Suriname	54	0.807	0.057	70	0.836	0.604	65	0.775	0.667	48	0.833	0.652
Indonesia	55	0.803	0.050	88	0.776	0.587	62	0.783	0.651	43	0.845	0.634
Malawi	56	0.802	0.055	74	0.817	0.606	18	0.932	0.659	75	0.722	0.636
Israel	57	0.802	0.055	62	0.855	0.597	19	0.929	0.672	85	0.659	0.655
Seychelles	58	0.798	0.042	61	0.859	0.621	78	0.714	0.648	32	0.885	0.646
Hungary	59	0.786	0.075	53	0.887	0.631	94	0.634	0.663	57	0.791	0.639
South Africa	60	0.775	0.057	80	0.800	0.602	48	0.829	0.644	53	0.816	0.645
Gambia	61	0.763	0.057	54	0.883	0.606	114	0.521	0.637	14	0.949	0.658
Senegal	62	0.754	0.065	48	0.903	0.598	60	0.784	0.664	89	0.654	0.653
Poland	63	0.754	0.054	58	0.870	0.602	66	0.774	0.641	88	0.657	0.632
Georgia	64	0.750	0.059	60	0.863	0.621	55	0.813	0.653	94	0.637	0.666
Hong Kong	65	0.746	0.055	45	0.917	0.608	127	0.440	0.660	47	0.837	0.664
Kuwait	66	0.746	0.055	106	0.684	0.600	58	0.799	0.651	69	0.742	0.647
Malta	67	0.743	0.076	37	0.931	0.619	124	0.469	0.665	49	0.828	0.671
Panama	68	0.741	0.053	66	0.841	0.615	72	0.735	0.668	105	0.547	0.667
Nepal	69	0.740	0.057	107	0.674	0.602	61	0.783	0.651	60	0.780	0.662
India	70	0.734	0.078	100	0.718	0.605	88	0.669	0.638	66	0.759	0.645
Mongolia	71	0.733	0.063	67	0.840	0.603	95	0.628	0.647	64	0.760	0.659
Brazil	72	0.727	0.050	81	0.795	0.601	92	0.654	0.643	55	0.813	0.625
Lesotho	73	0.727	0.106	104	0.686	0.609	76	0.718	0.641	80	0.689	0.650
Niger	74	0.724	0.062	71	0.834	0.604	63	0.778	0.647	109	0.530	0.645
Nigeria	75	0.723	0.063	90	0.772	0.609	59	0.792	0.653	104	0.552	0.649
Moldova	76	0.721	0.057	69	0.837	0.623	100	0.603	0.623	62	0.773	0.648
Tanzania	77	0.718	0.051	101	0.705	0.597	46	0.836	0.664	93	0.637	0.630
Singapore	78	0.714	0.064	52	0.898	0.630	93	0.653	0.654	97	0.632	0.632
Guatemala	79	0.700	0.050	108	0.665	0.618	90	0.658	0.640	70	0.741	0.654
Fiji	80	0.700	0.074	79	0.800	0.605	81	0.702	0.657	103	0.559	0.663
Jordan	81	0.700	0.059	97	0.749	0.592	75	0.720	0.633	77	0.716	0.645
Montenegro	82	0.699	0.049	78	0.804	0.606	111	0.527	0.639	67	0.751	0.651
Mexico	83	0.696	0.052	105	0.685	0.612	91	0.656	0.671	83	0.666	0.638
Kyrgyzstan	84	0.694	0.049	99	0.746	0.605	30	0.880	0.650	117	0.452	0.654
Sri Lanka	85	0.690	0.042	73	0.819	0.617	117	0.506	0.649	37	0.867	0.651
Malaysia	86	0.682	0.059	91	0.759	0.616	86	0.671	0.627	61	0.778	0.649
Colombia	87	0.681	0.066	124	0.582	0.599	73	0.721	0.643	86	0.658	0.647
Solomon Islands	88	0.678	0.055	94	0.755	0.601	99	0.605	0.641	72	0.737	0.625
Morocco	89	0.668	0.066	89	0.772	0.607	74	0.721	0.658	95	0.634	0.652
Liberia	90	0.663	0.071	65	0.843	0.600	109	0.546	0.674	84	0.665	0.662

⬆ indicates that the country's score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.

⬇ indicates that the country's score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.

SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.


Country	Liberal Component Index (LCI)			Equality before the law and individual liberty index			Legislative constrains on the executive index			Judicial constrains on the executive index		
	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-
Ivory Coast	91	0.658	0.060	96	0.752	0.612	107	0.559	0.655	91	0.646	0.663
Guyana	92	0.657	0.067	68	0.839	0.616	123	0.472	0.674	79	0.695	0.639
Papua New Guinea	93	0.652	0.065	115	0.632	0.611	105	0.574	0.652	78	0.709	0.677
Ecuador	94	0.651	0.068 ⬆	57	0.879	0.605	112	0.525	0.648	82	0.668	0.637 ⬆
El Salvador	95	0.647	0.068	112	0.652	0.613	98	0.612	0.637	73	0.726	0.658
Paraguay	96	0.641	0.078 ⬇	82	0.793	0.613	104	0.578	0.636	101	0.580	0.647
BiH	97	0.626	0.050	93	0.755	0.590 ⬆	118	0.504	0.657	99	0.595	0.636
Serbia	98	0.625	0.064 ⬆	84	0.790	0.600	96	0.618	0.642	114	0.477	0.644
Uganda	99	0.621	0.084	131	0.520	0.625	83	0.689	0.669	74	0.726	0.656
Timor-Leste	100	0.609	0.081 ⬆	92	0.759	0.607	97	0.615	0.646	100	0.593	0.654
Mozambique	101	0.597	0.077	109	0.665	0.606	121	0.478	0.650	76	0.721	0.630
Burkina Faso	102	0.593	0.067	87	0.779	0.601	110	0.533	0.652	98	0.596	0.671
Kenya	103	0.592	0.044	137	0.487	0.612	57	0.807	0.677	113	0.493	0.649
Sierra Leone	104	0.591	0.073	76	0.813	0.611	108	0.554	0.644	127	0.375	0.654
Macedonia	105	0.589	0.060 ⬆	85	0.782	0.612	85	0.682	0.631	125	0.393	0.658
Romania	106	0.588	0.041 ⬆	77	0.811	0.617	131	0.416	0.662	116	0.474	0.656
Armenia	107	0.584	0.051 ⬆	72	0.830	0.594	51	0.824	0.677 ⬆	135	0.307	0.638
Kosovo	108	0.576	0.094	110	0.662	0.598	106	0.565	0.657	106	0.542	0.692
Zambia	109	0.574	0.074 ⬆	103	0.689	0.604	122	0.474	0.658 ⬆	102	0.563	0.646
Myanmar	110	0.568	0.086 ⬆	139	0.462	0.593 ⬆	84	0.685	0.680	87	0.657	0.658 ⬆
Mali	111	0.556	0.065	119	0.604	0.594	102	0.598	0.688	115	0.476	0.660
Somaliland	112	0.555	0.046	116	0.627	0.603	71	0.749	0.652	133	0.340	0.656
Palestine/West Bank	113	0.550	0.032 ⬆	98	0.746	0.620	178			31	0.886	0.643 ⬆
Bolivia	114	0.536	0.052	75	0.817	0.616	132	0.401	0.645	124	0.400	0.635
Pakistan	115	0.532	0.069	152	0.322	0.618	89	0.662	0.658	96	0.633	0.642
Philippines	116	0.532	0.061 ⬆	121	0.592	0.606	128	0.436	0.634 ⬆	90	0.650	0.649
Swaziland	117	0.523	0.092 ⬆	125	0.577	0.628 ⬆	125	0.453	0.667	120	0.422	0.662
Lebanon	118	0.514	0.073	117	0.627	0.594	116	0.513	0.625	121	0.420	0.640
Iraq	119	0.510	0.084	146	0.366	0.604	79	0.707	0.662	112	0.494	0.640
CAR	120	0.508	0.081	154	0.309	0.612	67	0.773	0.677	122	0.420	0.652
Afghanistan	121	0.507	0.062	148	0.364	0.611	77	0.715	0.659	108	0.531	0.645
Madagascar	122	0.503	0.075	122	0.584	0.603	119	0.494	0.655	123	0.402	0.673
Guinea-Bissau	123	0.496	0.080	132	0.515	0.624	129	0.426	0.637	92	0.637	0.651
Gabon	124	0.485	0.066	64	0.845	0.619	138	0.264	0.683	137	0.303	0.672
Zanzibar	125	0.476	0.061	127	0.559	0.597	115	0.518	0.664	119	0.423	0.622
Honduras	126	0.469	0.072	95	0.755	0.613	136	0.286	0.662	128	0.372	0.673
Zimbabwe	127	0.466	0.090	144	0.377	0.608	87	0.670	0.648 ⬆	129	0.351	0.658
Vietnam	128	0.461	0.073	113	0.645	0.627	113	0.521	0.662	147	0.196	0.672
Libya	129	0.446	0.049 ⬆	168	0.161	0.608	34	0.867	0.651 ⬆	134	0.317	0.622 ⬆
Dominican Republic	130	0.446	0.047	83	0.790	0.608	149	0.189	0.649	132	0.341	0.640
Rwanda	131	0.430	0.061	102	0.696	0.623	135	0.303	0.669	144	0.220	0.638
Ukraine	132	0.425	0.090 ⬆	133	0.506	0.607 ⬆	103	0.593	0.656	140	0.242	0.635
Egypt	133	0.410	0.085	165	0.223	0.611	130	0.424	0.651	110	0.513	0.644
Angola	134	0.410	0.075	136	0.490	0.625	141	0.242	0.659	111	0.497	0.650
Oman	135	0.387	0.061	111	0.660	0.604	143	0.227	0.652	131	0.343	0.642
Iran	136	0.381	0.055	149	0.333	0.633	80	0.702	0.662	148	0.195	0.657
UAE	137	0.376	0.048	120	0.595	0.610	148	0.194	0.665	142	0.228	0.644
Ethiopia	138	0.364	0.070	123	0.584	0.606	134	0.329	0.636	153	0.174	0.668
Maldives	139	0.352	0.069	150	0.332	0.617	120	0.489	0.639	160	0.153	0.656
Togo	140	0.340	0.052	134	0.500	0.608	133	0.400	0.664	159	0.159	0.665
Comoros	141	0.340	0.046 ⬆	128	0.559	0.596	167	0.085	0.661 ⬆	130	0.345	0.657
Somalia	142	0.324	0.070	170	0.145	0.620	101	0.601	0.656	138	0.290	0.659
Algeria	143	0.319	0.043	118	0.607	0.604	152	0.167	0.659	162	0.147	0.648
Thailand	144	0.319	0.062 ⬆	158	0.281	0.606 ⬆	173	0.052	0.665 ⬆	107	0.536	0.659 ⬆
Qatar	145	0.311	0.064	138	0.472	0.609	176	0.041	0.679	126	0.377	0.647
Haiti	146	0.311	0.068 ⬆	155	0.297	0.608 ⬆	126	0.450	0.665	150	0.191	0.667
Guinea	147	0.306	0.076 ⬆	135	0.496	0.617	142	0.240	0.661	158	0.161	0.650
Kazakhstan	148	0.304	0.045	126	0.561	0.600	161	0.113	0.665	143	0.221	0.624
Belarus	149	0.281	0.038	114	0.643	0.608	165	0.090	0.654	168	0.089	0.650
Russia	150	0.280	0.040	130	0.521	0.597	157	0.120	0.666	164	0.121	0.631
Mauritania	151	0.276	0.062 ⬆	145	0.366	0.604 ⬆	158	0.120	0.666	136	0.306	0.663
Laos	152	0.271	0.058	167	0.184	0.608	147	0.194	0.654	118	0.451	0.656
Djibouti	153	0.271	0.052	129	0.547	0.605	160	0.113	0.654	145	0.206	0.623
Turkey	154	0.263	0.057 ⬆	161	0.262	0.592 ⬆	146	0.221	0.664 ⬆	139	0.283	0.638 ⬆
Cameroon	155	0.254	0.048 ⬆	142	0.389	0.609 ⬆	140	0.253	0.653	165	0.113	0.669
DRC	156	0.241	0.057	166	0.192	0.612	137	0.268	0.643	146	0.202	0.643
Bangladesh	157	0.235	0.075	143	0.378	0.613	155	0.127	0.641	141	0.230	0.639
Congo	158	0.229	0.052	156	0.293	0.618	150	0.179	0.672	151	0.183	0.655
Venezuela	159	0.218	0.063	157	0.289	0.621 ⬆	139	0.260	0.680 ⬆	174	0.039	0.670
Cuba	160	0.216	0.053	141	0.391	0.606	156	0.121	0.675	156	0.166	0.661
Uzbekistan	161	0.216	0.044 ⬆	140	0.415	0.587 ⬆	154	0.151	0.658	173	0.043	0.658
China	162	0.197	0.063	163	0.236	0.608	168	0.078	0.669	154	0.169	0.643
Chad	163	0.184	0.054	153	0.310	0.610	163	0.092	0.654	163	0.141	0.660
Tajikistan	164	0.172	0.041	160	0.275	0.612	166	0.087	0.638	161	0.151	0.641
Turkmenistan	165	0.170	0.050 ⬆	162	0.244	0.606	174	0.046	0.675	149	0.191	0.658 ⬆
Cambodia	166	0.163	0.036 ⬆	147	0.365	0.608	169	0.074	0.675	169	0.073	0.663
Sudan	167	0.163	0.053	173	0.114	0.591	151	0.173	0.678	155	0.168	0.658
Saudi Arabia	168	0.157	0.029	169	0.159	0.604	171	0.067	0.647	152	0.179	0.644
Azerbaijan	169	0.141	0.024	151	0.326	0.592	172	0.066	0.657	178	0.012	0.683
Palestine/Gaza	170	0.141	0.051 ⬆	159	0.276	0.612	179			157	0.163	0.650 ⬆
Yemen	171	0.139	0.042 ⬆	175	0.080	0.598 ⬆	145	0.222	0.666	166	0.111	0.684
South Sudan	172	0.133	0.046	176	0.074	0.603	144	0.226	0.660	170	0.060	0.624
Burundi	173	0.116	0.034 ⬆	172	0.120	0.601 ⬆	162	0.109	0.664 ⬆	172	0.055	0.646 ⬆
Nicaragua	174	0.116	0.035 ⬆	164	0.235	0.618 ⬆	164	0.092	0.669 ⬆	175	0.030	0.654
Equatorial Guinea	175	0.113	0.027	171	0.145	0.604	153	0.159	0.638	177	0.019	0.659
Syria	176	0.104	0.035 ⬆	177	0.066	0.597 ⬆	159	0.120	0.665	167	0.101	0.658
Bahrain	177	0.096	0.048 ⬆	174	0.111	0.610 ⬆	170	0.068	0.688	171	0.059	0.663
Eritrea	178	0.040	0.020	178	0.040	0.605	175	0.045	0.665	176	0.021	0.684
North Korea	179	0.027	0.015	179	0.008	0.607	177	0.037	0.662	179	0.011	0.662








## Appendix 4: The Egalitarian Component Index



The egalitarian principle of democracy measures to what extent all social groups enjoy equal capabilities to participate in the political arena. It relies on the idea that democracy is a system of rule “by the people” where citizens participate in various ways, such as making informed voting decisions, expressing opinions, demonstrating, running for office or influencing policy-making in other ways. The egalitarian principle of de-

mocracy is fundamentally related to political participation, as systematic inequalities in the rights and resources of citizens of specific social groups limit capabilities to participate in the political and governing processes. Therefore, a more equal distribution of resources across groups results in political equality and hence democracy.

**FIGURE A4.2: THE V-DEM EGALITARIAN COMPONENT INDEX**



**Table A4: Country Scores for the Egalitarian Component Index (ECI) and its Main Components**

Country	Egalitarian Component Index (ECI)			Equal protection index			Equal distribution of resources index			Equal access index		
	Rank	Score	SD +/-	Rank	Score	SD +/-	Rank	Score	SD +/-	Rank	Score	SD +/-
Norway	1	0.966	0.027	4	0.960	0.705	1	0.978	0.672	2	0.966	0.684
Denmark	2	0.957	0.034	3	0.964	0.724	8	0.949	0.649	1	0.984	0.709
Germany	3	0.940	0.046	7	0.953	0.723	23	0.920	0.666	3	0.962	0.717
Switzerland	4	0.935	0.045	21	0.922	0.706	6	0.956	0.675	9	0.935	0.719
Luxembourg	5	0.934	0.033	1	0.979	0.724	9	0.948	0.661	8	0.937	0.700
Estonia	6	0.929	0.035	13	0.942	0.735	5	0.958	0.666	13	0.908	0.665
Japan	7	0.923	0.046	6	0.954	0.691	2	0.970	0.675	22	0.881	0.679
Finland	8	0.923	0.033	8	0.951	0.733	30	0.903	0.661	5	0.952	0.671
Netherlands	9	0.921	0.051	12	0.943	0.703	11	0.948	0.650	15	0.905	0.677
Portugal	10	0.918	0.034	16	0.936	0.703	26	0.913	0.662	11	0.927	0.698
Malta	11	0.914	0.063	14	0.939	0.742	10	0.948	0.657	27	0.873	0.710
Belgium	12	0.913	0.033	25	0.909	0.701	21	0.933	0.670	7	0.939	0.680
Canada	13	0.909	0.051	26	0.909	0.703	22	0.929	0.648	34	0.859	0.710
Czech Republic	14	0.908	0.045	11	0.947	0.684	7	0.955	0.646	35	0.856	0.692
Ireland	15	0.904	0.042	9	0.950	0.685	42	0.881	0.641	24	0.876	0.695
Taiwan	16	0.903	0.046	23	0.913	0.673	12	0.948	0.652	39	0.848	0.673
Iceland	17	0.899	0.040	24	0.910	0.715	3	0.963	0.670	16	0.905	0.676
Slovenia	18	0.899	0.035	22	0.915	0.709	27	0.910	0.641	26	0.873	0.685
Sweden	19	0.897	0.047	2	0.966	0.716	47	0.858	0.647	10	0.935	0.690
Austria	20	0.896	0.042	5	0.956	0.713	15	0.940	0.658	40	0.847	0.687
Latvia	21	0.894	0.043	20	0.922	0.688	44	0.871	0.654	32	0.864	0.671
New Zealand	22	0.892	0.041	19	0.924	0.695	24	0.915	0.652	20	0.887	0.681
South Korea	23	0.892	0.052	31	0.872	0.683	4	0.958	0.652	28	0.871	0.680
France	24	0.890	0.051	34	0.860	0.709	13	0.945	0.652	18	0.900	0.708
Cyprus	25	0.888	0.060	27	0.896	0.695	17	0.937	0.668	25	0.875	0.717
Italy	26	0.882	0.041	17	0.934	0.686	31	0.897	0.643	12	0.913	0.699
Spain	27	0.871	0.044	10	0.949	0.699	28	0.908	0.633	36	0.855	0.689
Barbados	28	0.864	0.045	45	0.813	0.679	14	0.945	0.656	33	0.862	0.687
Poland	29	0.859	0.048	30	0.875	0.706	32	0.895	0.658	45	0.833	0.691
United Kingdom	30	0.852	0.052	39	0.839	0.680	43	0.876	0.636	31	0.865	0.690
Australia	31	0.850	0.071	29	0.889	0.672	51	0.843	0.636	42	0.835	0.713
Costa Rica	32	0.847	0.060	18	0.929	0.708	29	0.908	0.646	30	0.869	0.717
Lithuania	33	0.842	0.065	43	0.823	0.667	37	0.886	0.647	14	0.908	0.691
Bhutan	34	0.840	0.055	48	0.805	0.694	20	0.934	0.671	29	0.869	0.702
Belarus	35	0.833	0.045	65	0.755	0.678	33	0.893	0.631	19	0.893	0.682
Greece	36	0.830	0.044	68	0.744	0.698	25	0.914	0.626	4	0.953	0.692
Uruguay	37	0.827	0.064	28	0.892	0.718	49	0.854	0.667	48	0.826	0.679
Trinidad and Tobago	38	0.823	0.047	33	0.864	0.702	50	0.851	0.645	52	0.814	0.676
Mauritius	39	0.814	0.070	37	0.851	0.723	34	0.888	0.657	46	0.833	0.685
Slovakia	40	0.795	0.072	41	0.830	0.679	56	0.812	0.648	59	0.781	0.666
Armenia	41	0.795	0.067	38	0.843	0.679	53	0.829	0.641	67	0.759	0.676
Cuba	42	0.792	0.052	83	0.699	0.677	39	0.884	0.650	51	0.817	0.679
Georgia	43	0.791	0.087	36	0.856	0.715	38	0.886	0.631	93	0.665	0.703
Hong Kong	44	0.787	0.067	44	0.814	0.691	35	0.887	0.654	76	0.718	0.678
Bulgaria	45	0.777	0.068	54	0.790	0.702	59	0.789	0.644	54	0.806	0.663
Croatia	46	0.765	0.119	89	0.682	0.703	36	0.887	0.643	71	0.739	0.703
Palestine/West Bank	47	0.764	0.070	35	0.859	0.707	52	0.840	0.661	82	0.693	0.699
Tunisia	48	0.763	0.059	15	0.939	0.690	81	0.663	0.635	43	0.835	0.711
Vanuatu	49	0.761	0.066	32	0.865	0.684	104	0.553	0.626	17	0.900	0.692
Senegal	50	0.754	0.075	66	0.751	0.692	83	0.657	0.602	41	0.837	0.682
Cape Verde	51	0.750	0.056	46	0.807	0.702	54	0.821	0.654	37	0.852	0.702
Gabon	52	0.750	0.068	58	0.776	0.701	70	0.714	0.661	96	0.653	0.692
Israel	53	0.747	0.099	52	0.799	0.701	60	0.784	0.663	58	0.785	0.700
Algeria	54	0.743	0.092	91	0.671	0.684	62	0.759	0.642	90	0.674	0.699
Benin	55	0.736	0.081	51	0.804	0.697	73	0.703	0.639	38	0.851	0.694
Malaysia	56	0.733	0.080	85	0.693	0.679	46	0.860	0.658	87	0.686	0.705
Lesotho	57	0.731	0.068	60	0.764	0.681	57	0.797	0.645	61	0.776	0.674
Montenegro	58	0.731	0.077	55	0.783	0.709	48	0.856	0.650	115	0.569	0.673
Seychelles	59	0.729	0.080	56	0.783	0.704	41	0.882	0.677	119	0.545	0.673
Ghana	60	0.725	0.081	62	0.759	0.669	97	0.596	0.656	23	0.879	0.677
Argentina	61	0.723	0.048	69	0.742	0.687	74	0.695	0.640	47	0.831	0.673
Tanzania	62	0.723	0.076	67	0.746	0.685	87	0.638	0.645	53	0.808	0.688
Mongolia	63	0.718	0.088	74	0.734	0.655	61	0.762	0.622	78	0.714	0.715
USA	64	0.718	0.080	73	0.735	0.689	78	0.669	0.629	56	0.786	0.675
S.Tomé & P.	65	0.718	0.077	70	0.740	0.690	100	0.582	0.618	50	0.817	0.678
Singapore	66	0.714	0.072	49	0.804	0.716	19	0.935	0.660	118	0.547	0.692
Kuwait	67	0.710	0.123	110	0.611	0.712	16	0.937	0.666	129	0.483	0.693
Gambia	68	0.708	0.094	47	0.806	0.705	85	0.650	0.640	66	0.760	0.678
Jamaica	69	0.695	0.104	80	0.715	0.703	115	0.470	0.676	6	0.943	0.700
Botswana	70	0.694	0.090	72	0.737	0.696	66	0.741	0.643	106	0.613	0.720
Hungary	71	0.681	0.103	79	0.723	0.674	79	0.668	0.650	65	0.761	0.660
Suriname	72	0.680	0.076	77	0.725	0.689	71	0.711	0.645	77	0.714	0.681
Albania	73	0.679	0.080	94	0.667	0.688	77	0.675	0.644	92	0.667	0.660
Romania	74	0.679	0.073	75	0.730	0.682	103	0.564	0.650	70	0.747	0.680
Kosovo	75	0.675	0.105	113	0.593	0.705	75	0.695	0.632	84	0.688	0.684
Bolivia	76	0.674	0.061	40	0.832	0.700	127	0.390	0.636	57	0.785	0.693
Sri Lanka	77	0.670	0.108	102	0.623	0.718	82	0.659	0.630	100	0.636	0.681
Serbia	78	0.670	0.090	86	0.691	0.708	67	0.727	0.636	75	0.725	0.684
Guyana	79	0.665	0.070	106	0.621	0.705	86	0.643	0.630	81	0.694	0.696
Comoros	80	0.651	0.099	81	0.714	0.715	101	0.574	0.646	55	0.793	0.686
Ecuador	81	0.651	0.069	123	0.549	0.659	88	0.638	0.648	49	0.821	0.684
Kyrgyzstan	82	0.647	0.090	90	0.678	0.705	93	0.625	0.624	98	0.642	0.684
Jordan	83	0.646	0.084	50	0.804	0.689	68	0.721	0.629	133	0.474	0.682
Sierra Leone	84	0.638	0.073	105	0.622	0.668	112	0.480	0.647	63	0.765	0.681
Nepal	85	0.637	0.061	61	0.763	0.707	136	0.353	0.645	44	0.834	0.715
Indonesia	86	0.633	0.085	111	0.611	0.674	94	0.614	0.647	89	0.679	0.696
Moldova	87	0.632	0.091	92	0.671	0.673	84	0.653	0.643	116	0.566	0.689
Ivory Coast	88	0.631	0.072	59	0.770	0.686	118	0.449	0.627	73	0.736	0.698
BiH	89	0.627	0.094	93	0.667	0.702	72	0.710	0.646	85	0.688	0.697
Liberia	90	0.626	0.094	112	0.605	0.665	141	0.336	0.632	21	0.886	0.698

⬆ indicates that the country's score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.

⬇ indicates that the country's score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level.

SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.

Country	Egalitarian Component Index (ECI)			Equal protection index			Equal distribution of resources index			Equal access index		
	Rank	Score	SD +/-	Rank	Score	SD +/-	Rank	Score	SD +/-	Rank	Score	SD +/-
Vietnam	91	0.622	0.084	64	0.758	0.726	76	0.694	0.660	140	0.446	0.732
Macedonia	92	0.621	0.066	88	0.682	0.648	64	0.749	0.630	111	0.577	0.725
Timor-Leste	93	0.619	0.078	78	0.724	0.704	134	0.358	0.637	91	0.669	0.704
Niger	94	0.611	0.091	57	0.781	0.704	125	0.405	0.627	64	0.762	0.673
Togo	95	0.611	0.114	84	0.694	0.699	90	0.631	0.659	86	0.687	0.705
Zanzibar	96	0.608	0.063	132	0.442	0.703	98	0.592	0.664	69	0.754	0.673
Fiji	97	0.607	0.078	103	0.623	0.701	89	0.635	0.643	121	0.543	0.665
Djibouti	98	0.606	0.125	116	0.574	0.714	105	0.536	0.656	95	0.655	0.666
Burkina Faso	99	0.605	0.049	42	0.824	0.710	138	0.345	0.625	68	0.755	0.714
Mozambique	100	0.604	0.102	117	0.569	0.680	117	0.452	0.646	62	0.771	0.700
Oman	101	0.599	0.095	97	0.666	0.694	40	0.883	0.647	164	0.306	0.701
Morocco	102	0.599	0.077	76	0.725	0.692	113	0.476	0.639	113	0.571	0.682
Kazakhstan	103	0.598	0.078	122	0.551	0.694	63	0.755	0.649	132	0.479	0.661
Panama	104	0.593	0.098	82	0.709	0.709	91	0.630	0.648	110	0.589	0.700
Russia	105	0.593	0.086	134	0.436	0.702	69	0.716	0.639	109	0.596	0.670
Mali	106	0.591	0.099	87	0.688	0.710	121	0.432	0.664	74	0.728	0.680
Namibia	107	0.586	0.060	98	0.663	0.677	108	0.506	0.625	101	0.636	0.696
South Africa	108	0.569	0.061	107	0.617	0.652	161	0.184	0.643	79	0.701	0.674
Ethiopia	109	0.562	0.085	118	0.564	0.695	116	0.455	0.644	138	0.451	0.688
Palestine/Gaza	110	0.557	0.085	121	0.559	0.708	65	0.741	0.642	165	0.299	0.718
Peru	111	0.557	0.064	114	0.579	0.695	130	0.373	0.662	72	0.737	0.689
Zambia	112	0.549	0.092	63	0.759	0.687	143	0.329	0.627	99	0.637	0.682
Chile	113	0.545	0.063	53	0.798	0.679	124	0.412	0.663	126	0.499	0.690
Iran	114	0.544	0.106	126	0.519	0.683	80	0.664	0.663	114	0.570	0.698
Solomon Islands	115	0.539	0.085	96	0.667	0.695	150	0.278	0.649	104	0.615	0.720
Cameroon	116	0.532	0.068	95	0.667	0.685	111	0.492	0.642	127	0.488	0.699
Uganda	117	0.531	0.065	154	0.294	0.682	102	0.565	0.659	60	0.778	0.695
India	118	0.530	0.094	71	0.739	0.707	145	0.322	0.642	80	0.698	0.689
Rwanda	119	0.529	0.079	108	0.616	0.706	96	0.606	0.674	135	0.469	0.705
Nigeria	120	0.519	0.081	101	0.630	0.685	146	0.315	0.656	117	0.562	0.688
Lebanon	121	0.514	0.093	119	0.561	0.691	106	0.522	0.626	139	0.447	0.705
Libya	122	0.504	0.078	141	0.422	0.679	119	0.448	0.667	83	0.689	0.703
Malawi	123	0.503	0.094	124	0.548	0.716	140	0.337	0.654	88	0.685	0.681
Kenya	124	0.502	0.107	139	0.423	0.693	122	0.431	0.652	103	0.626	0.682
Maldives	125	0.499	0.070	99	0.643	0.695	126	0.401	0.630	128	0.486	0.670
Thailand	126	0.491	0.058	171	0.172	0.698	109	0.504	0.664	108	0.599	0.706
Mexico	127	0.482	0.102	129	0.497	0.707	128	0.376	0.627	112	0.572	0.700
Ukraine	128	0.470	0.089	147	0.357	0.705	95	0.610	0.618	142	0.437	0.690
Qatar	129	0.466	0.068	166	0.210	0.736	18	0.935	0.661	177	0.114	0.698
Brazil	130	0.462	0.091	130	0.486	0.683	149	0.288	0.656	102	0.628	0.683
UAE	131	0.461	0.079	151	0.322	0.672	45	0.870	0.654	169	0.209	0.684
Iraq	132	0.456	0.082	131	0.466	0.708	123	0.413	0.625	124	0.515	0.687
Venezuela	133	0.445	0.084	104	0.622	0.669	168	0.131	0.640	120	0.543	0.694
Myanmar	134	0.444	0.076	143	0.400	0.680	142	0.334	0.666	107	0.603	0.688
Eritrea	135	0.442	0.078	149	0.340	0.684	107	0.510	0.645	144	0.418	0.689
Laos	136	0.432	0.090	142	0.417	0.707	137	0.352	0.644	134	0.471	0.663
Uzbekistan	137	0.429	0.081	161	0.235	0.687	92	0.628	0.616	160	0.334	0.701
Burundi	138	0.426	0.070	109	0.615	0.711	177	0.084	0.669	153	0.379	0.683
Saudi Arabia	139	0.417	0.066	165	0.217	0.688	55	0.820	0.651	175	0.138	0.694
Honduras	140	0.416	0.107	138	0.428	0.695	153	0.240	0.640	130	0.483	0.684
Papua New Guinea	141	0.414	0.064	120	0.561	0.693	173	0.110	0.671	137	0.467	0.712
Somaliland	142	0.409	0.083	137	0.428	0.712	129	0.375	0.662	161	0.327	0.708
Guinea	143	0.398	0.077	115	0.579	0.705	164	0.156	0.663	150	0.389	0.684
Turkey	144	0.394	0.077	135	0.432	0.677	135	0.355	0.669	147	0.400	0.676
China	145	0.394	0.126	156	0.282	0.695	120	0.433	0.652	155	0.361	0.675
Dominican Republic	146	0.389	0.129	148	0.345	0.703	144	0.325	0.668	97	0.648	0.696
Nicaragua	147	0.375	0.080	152	0.313	0.705	114	0.475	0.660	157	0.349	0.681
Madagascar	148	0.373	0.075	150	0.334	0.720	170	0.124	0.661	105	0.615	0.712
Guinea-Bissau	149	0.373	0.076	100	0.632	0.696	172	0.114	0.661	143	0.428	0.686
Swaziland	150	0.364	0.132	133	0.442	0.729	132	0.369	0.655	154	0.361	0.711
Colombia	151	0.363	0.087	158	0.272	0.699	131	0.372	0.658	146	0.402	0.680
CAR	152	0.353	0.068	146	0.362	0.682	166	0.140	0.649	94	0.664	0.704
Equatorial Guinea	153	0.348	0.073	127	0.502	0.669	139	0.345	0.632	168	0.229	0.683
El Salvador	154	0.347	0.066	170	0.176	0.671	158	0.207	0.646	122	0.518	0.691
Philippines	155	0.346	0.071	140	0.422	0.714	148	0.291	0.629	145	0.409	0.682
Zimbabwe	156	0.343	0.071	136	0.431	0.698	154	0.221	0.646	162	0.322	0.714
Congo	157	0.339	0.088	174	0.127	0.723	147	0.302	0.683	123	0.517	0.694
North Korea	158	0.334	0.055	176	0.074	0.736	99	0.585	0.648	163	0.316	0.674
Turkmenistan	159	0.321	0.068	145	0.375	0.701	110	0.493	0.644	173	0.156	0.707
DRC	160	0.311	0.053	128	0.501	0.660	162	0.179	0.639	148	0.399	0.716
Bahrain	161	0.309	0.063	178	0.062	0.700	58	0.795	0.640	178	0.107	0.707
Angola	162	0.304	0.067	162	0.234	0.708	157	0.211	0.659	141	0.439	0.716
Guatemala	163	0.303	0.079	164	0.220	0.699	163	0.167	0.634	131	0.480	0.675
Paraguay	164	0.301	0.079	153	0.303	0.698	165	0.145	0.661	125	0.503	0.700
Egypt	165	0.294	0.089	160	0.244	0.690	176	0.091	0.670	136	0.467	0.680
Bangladesh	166	0.290	0.080	168	0.191	0.693	151	0.275	0.642	156	0.349	0.691
Azerbaijan	167	0.278	0.062	125	0.523	0.681	167	0.133	0.666	174	0.147	0.673
Afghanistan	168	0.261	0.081	167	0.202	0.719	152	0.254	0.634	152	0.380	0.694
Mauritania	169	0.248	0.072	163	0.226	0.739	159	0.205	0.668	166	0.278	0.688
Sudan	170	0.239	0.083	172	0.163	0.733	156	0.213	0.631	158	0.344	0.673
Chad	171	0.229	0.060	155	0.290	0.690	160	0.194	0.663	172	0.164	0.679
Syria	172	0.227	0.064	144	0.384	0.725	169	0.129	0.653	179	0.056	0.699
Somalia	173	0.226	0.077	157	0.281	0.712	174	0.102	0.661	151	0.386	0.703
Tajikistan	174	0.222	0.092	169	0.180	0.716	133	0.367	0.673	170	0.209	0.718
Pakistan	175	0.215	0.079	175	0.125	0.732	171	0.122	0.667	149	0.396	0.674
Haiti	176	0.206	0.067	159	0.252	0.700	175	0.101	0.680	159	0.337	0.691
Cambodia	177	0.187	0.082	173	0.131	0.712	155	0.214	0.642	167	0.230	0.706
Yemen	178	0.104	0.048	177	0.070	0.713	178	0.038	0.678	171	0.170	0.704
South Sudan	179	0.096	0.043	179	0.027	0.721	179	0.024	0.643	176	0.118	0.698



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


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
## Appendix 5: The Participatory Component Index



The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. This principle prefers direct rule by citizens as practicable. The V-Dem Participatory Component Index (PCI) takes into account four important aspects of citizen participa-

tion: civil society organizations, mechanisms of direct democracy, and participation and representation through local and regional governments (Figure 5.1). Four different V-Dem indices capture these aspects and are the basis for the PCI.

**FIGURE A5.2: THE V-DEM PARTICIPATORY COMPONENT INDEX (PCI)**



**Table A5: Country Scores for the Participatory Component Index (PCI) and its Main Components**

Country	Participatory Component Index (PCI)			Civil society participation index			Direct popular vote index			Local government index			Regional government index		
	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-
Switzerland	1	0.874	0.026	6	0.958	0.686	1	0.679	0	5	0.990	0.029	6	0.989	0.039
Taiwan	2	0.845	0.035	20	0.906	0.675	2	0.631	0	2	0.992	0.036	17	0.975	0.057
Uruguay	3	0.809	0.024	13	0.935	0.693	3	0.504	0	39	0.961	0.048	8	0.987	0.033
Slovenia	4	0.748	0.023	34	0.866	0.685	6	0.388	0	9	0.988	0.029	173	0.000	0.000
New Zealand	5	0.746	0.046	25	0.891	0.699	7	0.384	0	32	0.971	0.048	177	0.000	0.000
Peru	6	0.738	0.032	31	0.872	0.691	13	0.327	0	45	0.955	0.082	12	0.985	0.045
Lithuania	7	0.730	0.041	35	0.862	0.701	10	0.351	0	3	0.992	0.030	167	0.000	0.000
Slovakia	8	0.727	0.033	41	0.855	0.675	15	0.321	0	7	0.989	0.029	23	0.968	0.053
Latvia	9	0.721	0.031	43	0.851	0.711	14	0.322	0	26	0.980	0.041	149	0.000	0.000
Denmark	10	0.720	0.015	3	0.969	0.695	35	0.185	0	14	0.986	0.043	15	0.982	0.050
Bulgaria	11	0.714	0.048	54	0.827	0.698	8	0.383	0	38	0.962	0.054	117	0.052	0.054
Croatia	12	0.709	0.057	44	0.850	0.691	17	0.290	0	28	0.979	0.047	33	0.948	0.066
Bolivia	13	0.701	0.040	28	0.883	0.690	18	0.277	0	33	0.971	0.040	46	0.877	0.063
Austria	14	0.698	0.023	12	0.939	0.712	39	0.173	0	15	0.985	0.046	10	0.987	0.044
Iceland	15	0.696	0.025	7	0.956	0.713	51	0.145	0	18	0.984	0.047	171	0.000	0.000
United Kingdom	16	0.690	0.017	5	0.965	0.696	55	0.135	0	57	0.918	0.065	14	0.983	0.040
Italy	17	0.684	0.058	92	0.733	0.701	9	0.379	0	4	0.992	0.027	4	0.991	0.026
Australia	18	0.681	0.019	26	0.889	0.669	41	0.167	0	25	0.980	0.047	3	0.993	0.029
Costa Rica	19	0.675	0.030	18	0.928	0.721	46	0.163	0	27	0.979	0.052	162	0.000	0.000
Ecuador	20	0.669	0.043	103	0.707	0.651	12	0.328	0	17	0.985	0.046	36	0.937	0.084
Canada	21	0.661	0.010	4	0.967	0.685	129	0.015	0	36	0.963	0.048	2	0.994	0.027
Ivory Coast	22	0.657	0.049	56	0.821	0.701	21	0.232	0	99	0.739	0.104	38	0.933	0.075
USA	23	0.656	0.015	2	0.973	0.683	174	0.000	0	77	0.846	0.098	1	0.995	0.020
Netherlands	24	0.651	0.045	36	0.862	0.692	36	0.183	0	78	0.846	0.108	42	0.906	0.096
Colombia	25	0.650	0.045	59	0.816	0.675	27	0.212	0	6	0.990	0.029	13	0.984	0.035
Norway	26	0.649	0.020	1	0.973	0.720	128	0.015	0	40	0.961	0.077	30	0.960	0.056
Malta	27	0.646	0.065	83	0.748	0.695	4	0.424	0	85	0.816	0.143	138	0.000	0.000
Germany	28	0.643	0.035	14	0.934	0.704	147	0.011	0	23	0.982	0.043	9	0.987	0.046
Finland	28	0.643	0.025	10	0.945	0.709	132	0.015	0	8	0.989	0.042	85	0.238	0.137
Greece	30	0.643	0.050	39	0.857	0.693	30	0.200	0	84	0.821	0.128	50	0.844	0.124
Estonia	31	0.640	0.030	42	0.855	0.682	66	0.080	0	21	0.983	0.035	170	0.000	0.000
Sierra Leone	32	0.640	0.029	8	0.955	0.686	150	0.009	0	29	0.978	0.064	144	0.000	0.000
Jamaica	33	0.635	0.040	19	0.926	0.697	135	0.013	0	20	0.984	0.047	176	0.000	0.000
Belgium	34	0.634	0.028	22	0.903	0.694	124	0.017	0	30	0.977	0.037	18	0.975	0.048
France	35	0.634	0.037	38	0.858	0.709	95	0.033	0	24	0.980	0.040	24	0.965	0.052
Sweden	36	0.629	0.034	23	0.897	0.692	106	0.028	0	1	0.996	0.022	37	0.936	0.054
Nigeria	37	0.625	0.041	29	0.874	0.691	153	0.007	0	48	0.952	0.098	7	0.989	0.041
Ireland	38	0.622	0.070	11	0.942	0.711	28	0.208	0	100	0.723	0.167	147	0.000	0.000
Spain	39	0.616	0.047	61	0.803	0.672	65	0.082	0	12	0.987	0.028	157	0.000	0.000
Macedonia	40	0.614	0.054	121	0.641	0.671	16	0.294	0	35	0.964	0.064	137	0.000	0.000
Indonesia	41	0.613	0.048	32	0.870	0.696	171	0.000	0	55	0.928	0.072	21	0.971	0.052
Portugal	42	0.612	0.055	55	0.826	0.680	63	0.102	0	19	0.984	0.039	155	0.000	0.000
South Korea	43	0.610	0.043	48	0.841	0.687	98	0.031	0	41	0.960	0.053	11	0.986	0.038
Nepal	44	0.609	0.038	47	0.842	0.681	117	0.020	0	50	0.943	0.067	45	0.888	0.079
Benin	45	0.606	0.038	30	0.874	0.696	119	0.020	0	51	0.942	0.079	115	0.055	0.072
Montenegro	46	0.605	0.042	90	0.736	0.666	61	0.109	0	52	0.941	0.074	141	0.000	0.000
Zimbabwe	47	0.602	0.084	45	0.848	0.692	34	0.188	0	89	0.804	0.185	90	0.191	0.135
Romania	48	0.601	0.062	109	0.688	0.692	5	0.405	0	113	0.606	0.125	57	0.776	0.166
Ukraine	49	0.600	0.043	64	0.796	0.689	71	0.079	0	42	0.960	0.058	100	0.141	0.108
Pakistan	50	0.598	0.049	87	0.741	0.696	83	0.076	0	112	0.616	0.229	35	0.938	0.085
Burkina Faso	51	0.596	0.041	17	0.929	0.697	91	0.033	0	98	0.744	0.136	55	0.795	0.159
Poland	52	0.596	0.052	111	0.682	0.663	40	0.169	0	16	0.985	0.029	56	0.790	0.070
Argentina	53	0.594	0.044	40	0.856	0.705	126	0.015	0	66	0.894	0.058	19	0.975	0.038
Hungary	54	0.594	0.059	139	0.560	0.705	11	0.349	0	58	0.915	0.069	59	0.766	0.176
Japan	55	0.593	0.048	82	0.758	0.668	137	0.013	0	22	0.982	0.045	5	0.990	0.027
Malawi	56	0.593	0.034	63	0.797	0.695	140	0.013	0	56	0.927	0.070	172	0.000	0.000
South Africa	57	0.591	0.035	58	0.818	0.665	112	0.020	0	63	0.902	0.081	41	0.909	0.071
Chile	58	0.590	0.040	49	0.841	0.690	130	0.015	0	53	0.936	0.065	97	0.164	0.117
Mexico	59	0.588	0.061	97	0.721	0.681	85	0.055	0	11	0.987	0.036	16	0.976	0.044
Gabon	60	0.586	0.050	57	0.821	0.694	93	0.033	0	47	0.953	0.100	64	0.659	0.144
Paraguay	61	0.586	0.055	131	0.604	0.656	58	0.128	0	13	0.986	0.037	29	0.961	0.048
Mozambique	62	0.582	0.048	66	0.789	0.693	101	0.031	0	61	0.905	0.098	102	0.111	0.093
Iraq	63	0.579	0.051	95	0.728	0.691	79	0.060	0	119	0.482	0.044	39	0.926	0.076
Uganda	64	0.577	0.062	76	0.767	0.667	53	0.142	0	82	0.830	0.142	61	0.738	0.154
Botswana	65	0.577	0.039	24	0.896	0.697	102	0.029	0	91	0.796	0.085	89	0.206	0.119
Timor-Leste	66	0.576	0.050	102	0.708	0.668	123	0.018	0	10	0.987	0.050	123	0.041	0.070
S.Tomé & P.	67	0.575	0.045	94	0.728	0.670	109	0.020	0	43	0.957	0.064	20	0.973	0.060
Suriname	68	0.574	0.048	53	0.828	0.703	118	0.020	0	95	0.758	0.150	47	0.870	0.102
Comoros	69	0.574	0.057	130	0.608	0.682	56	0.131	0	83	0.826	0.134	32	0.949	0.078
Panama	70	0.573	0.056	122	0.641	0.681	74	0.068	0	34	0.965	0.060	80	0.381	0.073
Bhutan	71	0.571	0.047	89	0.737	0.722	110	0.020	0	67	0.889	0.102	58	0.772	0.119
Philippines	72	0.570	0.044	77	0.767	0.678	72	0.070	0	59	0.912	0.062	26	0.964	0.056
Somalia	73	0.569	0.061	86	0.743	0.720	94	0.033	0	37	0.962	0.091	77	0.408	0.110
Myanmar	74	0.565	0.057	108	0.689	0.713	78	0.060	0	128	0.358	0.131	34	0.940	0.072
Moldova	75	0.564	0.069	100	0.714	0.714	52	0.144	0	88	0.806	0.089	53	0.830	0.104
Zambia	76	0.563	0.065	80	0.761	0.719	60	0.121	0	90	0.798	0.110	74	0.453	0.059
Brazil	77	0.559	0.046	115	0.660	0.697	115	0.020	0	31	0.976	0.063	27	0.963	0.055
El Salvador	78	0.556	0.046	75	0.768	0.673	136	0.013	0	70	0.885	0.098	72	0.465	0.048
Congo	79	0.556	0.073	112	0.672	0.699	48	0.151	0	69	0.886	0.156	65	0.645	0.238
Israel	80	0.556	0.057	69	0.786	0.673	139	0.013	0	44	0.956	0.062	145	0.000	0.000
Malaysia	81	0.556	0.054	96	0.724	0.658	169	0.000	0	173			25	0.964	0.069
Lesotho	82	0.555	0.048	70	0.786	0.688	133	0.013	0	65	0.895	0.096	104	0.096	0.081
Morocco	83	0.552	0.092	71	0.785	0.689	37	0.177	0	114	0.600	0.258	63	0.723	0.150
India	84	0.551	0.073	114	0.668	0.701	156	0.000	0	105	0.686	0.101	28	0.963	0.046
Albania	85														


Country	Participatory Component Index (PCI)			Civil society participation index			Direct popular vote index			Local government index			Regional government index		
	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-
Cape Verde	91	0.531	0.071	85	0.746	0.700	76	0.063	0	75	0.853	0.106	166	0.000	0.000
Mauritius	92	0.528	0.065	88	0.739	0.693	151	0.009	0	49	0.948	0.097	150	0.000	0.000
Cyprus	93	0.523	0.071	33	0.869	0.680	175	0.000	0	92	0.784	0.146	169	0.000	0.000
Kenya	94	0.523	0.071	65	0.789	0.671	59	0.123	0	116	0.562	0.129	60	0.746	0.185 ↑
Papua New Guinea	95	0.519	0.050	118	0.651	0.684	141	0.013	0	71	0.884	0.112	49	0.862	0.103
Namibia	96	0.518	0.056	124	0.637	0.696	99	0.031	0	76	0.849	0.091	44	0.903	0.087
Dominican Republic	97	0.517	0.062	93	0.729	0.678	146	0.012	0	86	0.807	0.129	78	0.394	0.054
Rwanda	98	0.515	0.091	104	0.702	0.686	31	0.199	0	111	0.644	0.248	106	0.095	0.075
Vietnam	99	0.513	0.066	105	0.702	0.709	113	0.020	0	120	0.478	0.209	54	0.828	0.177
BiH	100	0.510	0.053	127	0.629	0.676	165	0.000	0	68	0.888	0.079	22	0.968	0.056
Mongolia	101	0.509	0.052	98	0.718	0.676	103	0.029	0	97	0.745	0.132	68	0.572	0.155
Guatemala	102	0.506	0.067	128	0.611	0.679	47	0.151	0	72	0.866	0.116	163	0.000	0.000
Guyana	103	0.504	0.049	125	0.631	0.666	138	0.013	0	81	0.838	0.132	51	0.842	0.139
Sri Lanka	104	0.504	0.055	78	0.766	0.675	100	0.031	0	101	0.723	0.122	67	0.592	0.139
Georgia	105	0.501	0.069	37	0.861	0.668	45	0.164	0	121	0.463	0.213 ↑	98	0.164	0.129
Bangladesh	106	0.497	0.076	132	0.598	0.676	172	0.000	0	60	0.907	0.088	142	0.000	0.000
Armenia	107	0.494	0.074 ↑	120	0.645	0.679	54	0.141	0	87	0.807	0.129 ↑	109	0.083	0.058
Niger	108	0.491	0.034 ↓	62	0.802	0.684	43	0.165	0	177			73	0.454	0.052
Serbia	109	0.490	0.071 ↓	156	0.377	0.730	50	0.148	0	74	0.859	0.080	48	0.862	0.094
Vanuatu	110	0.479	0.083	52	0.828	0.688	142	0.013	0	115	0.585	0.236	156	0.000	0.000
Tanzania	111	0.477	0.078	73	0.780	0.672	127	0.015	0	106	0.678	0.176	87	0.220	0.110
Maldives	112	0.468	0.063 ↑	159	0.338	0.692 ↓	57	0.129	0	54	0.930	0.075 ↑	91	0.179	0.142 ↑
Lebanon	113	0.465	0.082	81	0.758	0.703	173	0.000	0	108	0.668	0.156	140	0.000	0.000
Kosovo	114	0.455	0.057	110	0.686	0.688	131	0.015	0	104	0.687	0.123	160	0.000	0.000
Djibouti	115	0.454	0.077	137	0.582	0.692	89	0.040	0	96	0.754	0.153	101	0.115	0.067
DRC	116	0.453	0.066	143	0.528	0.682	67	0.080	0	136	0.223	0.067	52	0.836	0.090
Kyrgyzstan	117	0.443	0.075	113	0.668	0.673	32	0.195	0	118	0.496	0.181	118	0.050	0.050
Luxembourg	118	0.443	0.078	9	0.955	0.674	29	0.203	0	139	0.179	0.227	152	0.000	0.000
Turkey	119	0.441	0.055	165	0.295	0.691 ↓	20	0.247	0	73	0.861	0.088 ↑	111	0.069	0.105
Madagascar	120	0.438	0.060	106	0.694	0.704	42	0.165	0	129	0.355	0.131	119	0.050	0.054
Gambia	121	0.432	0.073	72	0.783	0.699	107	0.026	0	126	0.424	0.161	66	0.598	0.163
Senegal	122	0.426	0.054	51	0.835	0.683	49	0.151	0	133	0.237	0.154	99	0.156	0.108
Swaziland	123	0.426	0.072	138	0.569	0.665	144	0.013	0	102	0.718	0.117	136	0.005	0.026
Afghanistan	124	0.426	0.084	79	0.762	0.684	121	0.020	0	122	0.460	0.239 ↑	121	0.046	0.087
Venezuela	125	0.425	0.065 ↓	157	0.351	0.688	22	0.218	0	110	0.666	0.079 ↓	70	0.539	0.083 ↓
Tunisia	126	0.421	0.037 ↑	16	0.930	0.700 ↑	73	0.069	0	132	0.249	0.097	94	0.169	0.105
Nicaragua	127	0.416	0.067 ↓	154	0.400	0.675	69	0.080	0	94	0.777	0.098	158	0.000	0.000
Haiti	128	0.411	0.094	145	0.507	0.674	166	0.000	0	93	0.781	0.236	81	0.315	0.112
Libya	129	0.408	0.096 ↑	135	0.595	0.687 ↑	149	0.011	0	109	0.668	0.212 ↑	161	0.000	0.000
Ghana	130	0.388	0.064	15	0.933	0.707	108	0.024	0	134	0.235	0.163	131	0.014	0.035
Mali	131	0.383	0.091 ↓	60	0.812	0.674	96	0.033	0	130	0.338	0.267	105	0.095	0.072
Fiji	132	0.380	0.049 ↑	84	0.748	0.709	152	0.007	0	124	0.445	0.058 ↑	114	0.064	0.050
Russia	133	0.365	0.056	161	0.334	0.663	84	0.055	0	131	0.293	0.171	62	0.724	0.092 ↑
Somalia	134	0.364	0.063	129	0.611	0.712	92	0.033	0	135	0.226	0.131	76	0.414	0.070
Oman	135	0.354	0.061	153	0.414	0.692	162	0.000	0	107	0.671	0.123 ↑	146	0.000	0.000
Burundi	136	0.354	0.101	160	0.334	0.681	25	0.213	0	117	0.497	0.280	125	0.027	0.057 ↓
Guinea-Bissau	137	0.342	0.052	101	0.714	0.674	111	0.020	0	142	0.116	0.057	82	0.265	0.096
Guinea	138	0.331	0.065	50	0.840	0.672	82	0.057	0	150	0.069	0.144	113	0.067	0.071
Laos	139	0.320	0.063 ↑	167	0.256	0.692	157	0.000	0	103	0.706	0.159 ↑	92	0.175	0.110
Syria	140	0.314	0.065 ↑	176	0.105	0.691	38	0.176	0	123	0.446	0.244 ↑	69	0.539	0.150 ↑
Liberia	141	0.313	0.032 ↓	21	0.904	0.681	81	0.060	0	178			178	0.000	0.000
Belarus	142	0.307	0.081	146	0.504	0.709	64	0.091	0	146	0.088	0.120	93	0.169	0.128
Thailand	143	0.303	0.070	117	0.652	0.684	19	0.276	0	160	0.023	0.052 ↓	129	0.019	0.027
Chad	144	0.293	0.075	116	0.656	0.685	68	0.080	0	141	0.123	0.160	108	0.084	0.103
Jordan	145	0.289	0.064	119	0.648	0.665	168	0.000	0	138	0.197	0.130	110	0.081	0.093
Palestine/Gaza	146	0.284	0.069	148	0.474	0.684	179		0	125	0.445	0.144	143	0.000	0.000
Cambodia	147	0.281	0.077	151	0.428	0.690	155	0.000	0	127	0.374	0.178	84	0.249	0.156 ↑
South Sudan	148	0.278	0.093	163	0.303	0.685	116	0.020	0	179			71	0.529	0.226
Barbados	149	0.278	0.039	27	0.885	0.700	154	0.000	0	169	0.000	0.000	159	0.000	0.000
Zanzibar	150	0.262	0.073	126	0.630	0.684	178		0	144	0.111	0.175	168	0.000	0.000
Seychelles	151	0.257	0.061	67	0.788	0.687	145	0.012	0	158	0.025	0.057	153	0.000	0.000
Mauritania	152	0.254	0.084	141	0.544	0.698	26	0.213	0	152	0.043	0.098	107	0.090	0.122
Hong Kong	153	0.254	0.033	107	0.690	0.677	160	0.000	0	171	0.000	0.000	174	0.000	0.000
CAR	154	0.243	0.056	136	0.586	0.674	143	0.013	0	175			103	0.108	0.102
Yemen	155	0.240	0.052 ↓	169	0.245	0.694	104	0.029	0	162	0.009	0.030	75	0.439	0.054 ↓
Angola	156	0.237	0.048	140	0.555	0.669	122	0.018	0	176			124	0.037	0.046
Cameroon	157	0.236	0.066	134	0.597	0.684	120	0.020	0	153	0.043	0.083	127	0.022	0.036
Kuwait	158	0.235	0.073	144	0.510	0.683	163	0.000	0	137	0.198	0.128	154	0.000	0.000
Kazakhstan	159	0.233	0.067	147	0.489	0.666	90	0.037	0	154	0.040	0.132	112	0.067	0.097
Sudan	160	0.228	0.076	149	0.458	0.708	114	0.020	0	147	0.083	0.069	83	0.261	0.136
Algeria	161	0.214	0.073 ↓	152	0.416	0.686	62	0.105	0	149	0.070	0.078 ↓	122	0.043	0.071
Egypt	162	0.212	0.061	166	0.283	0.685	24	0.213	0	161	0.022	0.082 ↓	95	0.168	0.108
Togo	163	0.211	0.051	133	0.598	0.705	88	0.042	0	174			151	0.000	0.000
Iran	164	0.187	0.077	155	0.378	0.708	105	0.029	0	143	0.113	0.138	139	0.000	0.000
Ethiopia	165	0.184	0.053	158	0.339	0.676	134	0.013	0	140	0.138	0.126	86	0.232	0.108
Cuba	166	0.179	0.061	171	0.216	0.697	97	0.033	0	148	0.073	0.088	88	0.211	0.116
Azerbaijan	167	0.179	0.050	172	0.209	0.677	23	0.218	0	157	0.025	0.064 ↓	120	0.048	0.054
Singapore	168	0.176	0.064	142	0.532	0.690	148	0.011	0	168	0.000	0.000	179	0.000	0.000
UAE	169	0.168	0.072	150	0.456	0.717	164	0.000	0	166	0.007	0.043	133	0.009	0.029
China	170	0.147	0.042	162	0.312	0.667	159	0.000	0	145	0.099	0.054 ↑	128	0.022	0.028
Equatorial Guinea	171	0.143	0.058	170	0.238	0.701	44	0.164	0	155	0.032	0.061	135	0.008	0.029
Uzbekistan	172	0.140	0.055	164	0.302	0.686	77	0.062	0	159	0.024	0.053			








## Appendix 6: The Deliberative Component Index



The V-DEM Deliberative Component Index (DCI) captures to what extent the deliberative principle of democracy is achieved. It assesses the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning, focused on the common good, motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial

interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

**FIGURE A6.2: THE V-DEM DELIBERATIVE COMPONENT INDEX (DCI)**



**Table A6: Country Scores for the Deliberative Component Index (DCI) and its Components**

Country	Deliberative Component Index (DCI)			Resonated justification			Common good justification			Respect for counterarguments			Range of consultation			Engaged society		
	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-	Rank	Score	SD+/-
Norway	1	0.989	0.651	2	2.908	0.092	13	3.721	0.278	2	4.192	0.329	1	4.914	0.086	3	4.624	0.357
Switzerland	2	0.977	0.640	3	2.845	0.155	30	3.564	0.299	9	3.744	0.362	2	4.708	0.289	4	4.574	0.389
Denmark	3	0.972	0.648	12	2.677	0.313	21	3.628	0.315	5	3.891	0.385	4	4.653	0.321	2	4.670	0.324
Sweden	4	0.971	0.631	6	2.791	0.198	6	3.777	0.208	10	3.742	0.348	6	4.619	0.256	8	4.413	0.304
Luxembourg	5	0.969	0.643	1	2.918	0.082	3	3.794	0.206	1	4.667	0.284	8	4.537	0.385	58	3.401	0.434
Germany	6	0.965	0.633	5	2.802	0.198	56	3.282	0.265	43	3.064	0.270	7	4.604	0.290	13	4.267	0.329
Portugal	7	0.962	0.642	10	2.688	0.270	10	3.729	0.271	4	3.964	0.379	3	4.703	0.279	23	4.048	0.418
Mauritius	8	0.956	0.645	19	2.587	0.294	116	2.555	0.605	3	3.980	0.461	12	4.461	0.479	10	4.375	0.536
Netherlands	9	0.953	0.644	27	2.434	0.242	37	3.484	0.278	15	3.515	0.352	5	4.635	0.316	20	4.126	0.416
Costa Rica	10	0.950	0.635	8	2.739	0.254	2	3.852	0.148	16	3.478	0.458	16	4.197	0.415	27	3.937	0.407
Tunisia	11	0.946	0.649	47	2.217	0.293	8	3.758	0.234	18	3.464	0.409	10	4.476	0.421	5	4.521	0.385
Uruguay	12	0.943	0.637	20	2.586	0.354	36	3.501	0.453	20	3.413	0.485	43	3.649	0.612	1	4.672	0.326
Australia	13	0.937	0.642	36	2.308	0.252	17	3.669	0.293	35	3.227	0.375	13	4.461	0.396	22	4.103	0.357
Canada	14	0.934	0.608	25	2.515	0.311	23	3.623	0.346	46	3.046	0.410	14	4.408	0.323	28	3.921	0.351
Estonia	15	0.927	0.642	35	2.324	0.307	67	3.138	0.381	13	3.620	0.415	18	4.138	0.556	11	4.355	0.432
Finland	16	0.926	0.638	26	2.438	0.311	127	2.326	0.633	22	3.383	0.501	22	4.066	0.452	7	4.473	0.449
Ireland	17	0.923	0.631	4	2.814	0.185	110	2.606	0.547	40	3.114	0.398	11	4.475	0.499	43	3.640	0.659
Belgium	18	0.922	0.639	22	2.556	0.214	65	3.174	0.400	37	3.217	0.396	9	4.503	0.388	41	3.734	0.425
Niger	19	0.922	0.645	49	2.205	0.346	35	3.506	0.468	32	3.286	0.421	19	4.090	0.506	12	4.290	0.466
Greece	20	0.918	0.647	39	2.282	0.347	49	3.361	0.388	6	3.831	0.549	30	3.892	0.588	29	3.919	0.528
Vanuatu	21	0.916	0.643	28	2.434	0.346	47	3.394	0.511	7	3.782	0.521	25	3.991	0.587	31	3.841	0.511
Japan	22	0.916	0.617	13	2.672	0.263	46	3.396	0.320	11	3.682	0.326	39	3.708	0.369	45	3.609	0.386
Sierra Leone	23	0.915	0.643	23	2.553	0.297	51	3.355	0.636	19	3.438	0.457	21	4.069	0.599	21	4.107	0.489
Trinidad and Tobago	24	0.914	0.628	7	2.781	0.219	26	3.597	0.394	29	3.323	0.465	31	3.832	0.593	40	3.737	0.591
Chile	25	0.906	0.627	21	2.574	0.275	24	3.609	0.294	26	3.366	0.394	20	4.078	0.392	65	3.334	0.535
South Korea	26	0.904	0.644	48	2.207	0.355	39	3.473	0.432	17	3.473	0.500	33	3.816	0.465	15	4.245	0.448
Slovenia	27	0.900	0.620	15	2.630	0.236	29	3.568	0.296	30	3.319	0.295	26	3.950	0.302	55	3.451	0.277
Spain	28	0.898	0.629	40	2.275	0.280	5	3.787	0.213	70	2.616	0.352	37	3.748	0.434	19	4.145	0.395
Indonesia	29	0.897	0.630	60	1.989	0.214	42	3.426	0.429	24	3.373	0.384	32	3.821	0.458	14	4.250	0.434
Ivory Coast	30	0.886	0.639	80	1.767	0.367	25	3.603	0.349	42	3.065	0.516	17	4.159	0.438	18	4.176	0.509
Jamaica	31	0.882	0.634	43	2.254	0.286	44	3.406	0.542	47	2.948	0.648	62	3.165	0.542	16	4.228	0.546
United Kingdom	32	0.880	0.636	44	2.246	0.252	53	3.336	0.352	44	3.049	0.343	36	3.760	0.383	44	3.630	0.325
Barbados	33	0.879	0.634	72	1.849	0.203	20	3.634	0.360	62	2.676	0.414	23	4.051	0.473	32	3.827	0.442
Ghana	34	0.879	0.625	56	2.028	0.224	54	3.317	0.365	77	2.529	0.332	15	4.265	0.427	26	3.997	0.393
Iceland	35	0.876	0.625	17	2.598	0.333	40	3.448	0.530	54	2.769	0.352	41	3.669	0.454	59	3.399	0.378
Bhutan	36	0.876	0.642	51	2.152	0.248	15	3.688	0.310	14	3.570	0.506	27	3.941	0.535	78	3.095	0.437
South Africa	37	0.875	0.636	14	2.668	0.302	70	3.117	0.427	45	3.048	0.685	38	3.737	0.510	56	3.424	0.409
Taiwan	38	0.870	0.624	16	2.599	0.319	97	2.789	0.506	23	3.376	0.420	42	3.659	0.489	57	3.405	0.515
France	39	0.867	0.626	31	2.401	0.294	38	3.475	0.382	120	1.980	0.596	88	2.720	0.579	6	4.507	0.454
Cyprus	40	0.867	0.642	30	2.405	0.338	120	2.516	0.520	56	2.720	0.562	24	4.034	0.567	37	3.750	0.567
Italy	41	0.863	0.648	53	2.118	0.333	109	2.618	0.450	27	3.360	0.445	45	3.645	0.516	39	3.745	0.504
Ecuador	42	0.860	0.618	67	1.901	0.296	4	3.791	0.209	33	3.285	0.470	34	3.795	0.459	30	3.846	0.588
Malta	43	0.854	0.636	11	2.687	0.310	48	3.385	0.421	67	2.646	0.388	48	3.514	0.514	92	2.958	0.431
Burkina Faso	44	0.848	0.632	95	1.643	0.376	82	2.984	0.277	31	3.308	0.517	52	3.427	0.530	25	4.007	0.582
Mongolia	45	0.838	0.616	107	1.542	0.186	80	3.020	0.535	12	3.632	0.431	54	3.279	0.472	35	3.776	0.371
Panama	46	0.833	0.617	59	1.996	0.346	85	2.930	0.320	51	2.853	0.367	35	3.781	0.415	42	3.663	0.508
Senegal	47	0.830	0.625	42	2.257	0.253	32	3.561	0.418	36	3.220	0.600	74	2.944	0.522	66	3.309	0.425
Georgia	48	0.830	0.645	79	1.772	0.291	11	3.724	0.247	38	3.190	0.405	53	3.306	0.366	36	3.758	0.352
S.Tomé & P.	49	0.828	0.624	54	2.072	0.231	68	3.120	0.307	84	2.448	0.378	44	3.647	0.509	50	3.510	0.384
Latvia	50	0.817	0.649	45	2.235	0.275	111	2.596	0.411	68	2.639	0.370	56	3.260	0.455	48	3.535	0.475
Morocco	51	0.808	0.635	18	2.595	0.360	14	3.699	0.300	59	2.705	0.388	106	2.334	0.297	54	3.458	0.413
Pakistan	52	0.806	0.628	145	1.044	0.283	101	2.748	0.591	34	3.269	0.513	47	3.557	0.645	17	4.216	0.525
Kyrgyzstan	53	0.805	0.623	34	2.341	0.310	92	2.828	0.318	49	2.942	0.370	59	3.177	0.463	93	2.907	0.331
Czech Republic	54	0.802	0.617	76	1.790	0.182	34	3.527	0.386	63	2.657	0.412	50	3.476	0.361	61	3.376	0.402
Armenia	55	0.801	0.632	58	2.006	0.357	18	3.669	0.312	50	2.891	0.419	87	2.744	0.341	38	3.746	0.374
Suriname	56	0.798	0.628	104	1.590	0.271	22	3.628	0.372	82	2.489	0.312	60	3.176	0.388	24	4.007	0.522
Seychelles	57	0.796	0.624	62	1.942	0.231	63	3.190	0.364	25	3.369	0.457	65	3.111	0.495	96	2.866	0.462
Cape Verde	58	0.791	0.625	29	2.408	0.330	58	3.255	0.387	88	2.414	0.324	70	3.009	0.393	101	2.778	0.438
Austria	59	0.790	0.610	63	1.941	0.259	59	3.254	0.314	92	2.367	0.230	83	2.803	0.279	33	3.817	0.388
Botswana	60	0.788	0.632	77	1.787	0.234	55	3.312	0.415	41	3.100	0.497	46	3.620	0.624	77	3.122	0.420
Benin	61	0.786	0.622	9	2.695	0.291	62	3.210	0.358	135	1.671	0.443	148	1.422	0.420	9	4.410	0.485
Liberia	62	0.785	0.647	33	2.366	0.311	123	2.448	0.547	72	2.577	0.						



# Global Standards, Local Knowledge



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