MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN

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The members of the 332d Fighter Group and the 99th, 100th, 301st, and 302d Fighter Squadrons during World War II are remembered in part because they were the only African-American pilots who served in combat with the United States armed forces during World War II. Because they trained at Tuskegee Army Air Field before and during the war, they are sometimes called the Tuskegee Airmen. In the more than sixty years since World War II, several stories have grown up about the Tuskegee Airmen, some of them true and some of them false. This paper focuses on twenty-four misconceptions about the Tuskegee Airmen that, in light of the historical documentation available at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, and sources at the Air University Library, are not accurate. That documentation includes monthly histories of the 99th Fighter Squadron, the 332d Fighter Group and the 477th Bombardment Group, the 332d Fighter Group's daily narrative mission reports, orders issued by the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces, Fifteenth Air Force mission folders, and missing air crew reports.

I will address each of the following twenty-four misconceptions separately:

- 1. The Misconception of Inferiority
- 2. The Misconception of "Never Lost a Bomber"
- 3. The Misconception of the Deprived Ace
- 4. The Misconception of Being First to Shoot Down German Jets
- 5. The Misconception that the Tuskegee Airmen sank a German destroyer
- 6. The Misconception of the "Great Train Robbery"

- 7. The Misconception of Superiority
- 8. The Misconception that the Tuskegee Airmen units were all black
- The Misconception that all Tuskegee Airmen were fighter pilots who flew red-tailed
 P-51s to escort bombers
- 10. The Misconception that after a flight with a black pilot at Tuskegee, Eleanor Roosevelt persuaded the President to establish a black flying unit in the Army Air Corps
- 11. The Misconception that the Tuskegee Airmen earned 150 Distinguished Flying Crosses during World War II
- 12. The Misconception that the Tuskegee Airmen were the first to implement a "stick with the bombers" policy
- 13. The Misconception that the 332nd Fighter Group was the only one to escort Fifteenth Air Force bombers over Berlin
- 14. The Misconception that the 99th Fighter Squadron, unlike the white fighter squadrons with which it served, at first flew obsolete P-40 airplanes
- 15. The Misconception that the training of black pilots for combat was an experiment designed to fail.
- 16. The Misconception of the hidden trophy
- 17. The Misconception that the outstanding World War II record of the Tuskegee

 Airmen alone convinced President Truman to desegregate the armed forces of the United

 States.
- 18. The Misconception that 332nd Fighter Group members painted the tails of their fighter escort aircraft red without any direction from higher authority to do so.

- 19. The Misconception that all black military pilot training during World War II took place at Tuskegee Institute.
- 20. The Misconception that the Tuskegee Airmen were the only fighter pilots following the official policy of "sticking with the bombers."
- 21. The Misconception that the Tuskegee Airmen's 332nd Fighter Group flew more different kinds of aircraft in combat than any other Army Air Forces group during World War II.
- 22. The Misconception that the Tuskegee Airmen belonged to some of the most highly decorated units in U.S. military history.
- 23. The Misconception that the Tuskegee Airmen never got the recognition they deserved.
- 24. The Misconception that Tuskegee Airman Charles McGee flew more combat missions than any other pilot in the Air Force.

1. THE MISCONCEPTION OF INFERIORITY

The first misconception regarding the Tuskegee Airmen was that they were inferior. The myth was that black men were inferior to white men, and lacked the ability to perform certain tasks, such as flying a fighter effectively in combat.

The airplane was invented in 1903, and the military acquired its first airplanes and pilots in 1909, but black men were not allowed to be pilots in the American military until the 1940s. During World War I, there were no black pilots in the American military. In October, 1925, the War College of the U.S. Army issued a memorandum entitled, "The Use of Negro Manpower in War," which reflected the racial prejudice of white army

leaders of the time. It claimed that Negroes were inferior to whites and encouraged continued segregation within the Army.¹

In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed the War Department to begin training black pilots, which the Army Air Corps reluctantly began to do, but only on a segregated basis. The first class of black pilots in the U.S. military graduated in March 1942, and they were assigned to the 99th Fighter Squadron, the first black flying unit in American history. A little over a year later, the 99th Fighter Squadron finally was allowed to deploy overseas for combat, but only while attached to white fighter groups.

One of those white fighter groups was the 33rd. Its commander, Colonel William Momyer, did not want a black squadron attached to his group, and became convinced that it should be taken out of combat because of poor performance. In September 1943, Momyer sent his recommendation to Major General Edwin J. House, commander of the XII Air Support Command, who forwarded them to Major General John K. Cannon, Deputy Commander of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force.²

The so-called "House memorandum," went up the chain of command all the way to the headquarters of the Army Air Forces. In response the War Department conducted an official study to compare the performance of the 99th Fighter Squadron with that of other P-40 units in the Twelfth Air Force. The subsequent report, released on March 30, 1944, concluded that the 99th Fighter Squadron had performed as well as the white P-40 squadrons with which it flew in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. The 99th Fighter Squadron was allowed to stay in combat, although it was attached to another white fighter group.³

In the meantime, the 332nd Fighter Group, the first black flying group, and its three squadrons, the 100th, 301st, and 302nd Fighter Squadrons, deployed to Italy for combat duty. In the summer of 1944, the 332nd Fighter Group began a new mission of escorting heavy bombers for the Fifteenth Air Force, and the 99th Fighter Squadron was assigned to it. For the bomber escort mission, the Tuskegee Airmen began flying red-tailed P-51 Mustang airplanes, the best fighters in the Army Air Forces. Their range and speed allowed them to protect the bombers against enemy fighters.

During its combat with the Fifteenth Air Force, the 332nd Fighter Group was one of seven fighter escort groups, four that flew P-51s and three that flew P-38s. During the period from June 1944 to the end of April 1945, the 332nd Fighter Group shot down more enemy airplanes than two of the other groups, both of which flew P-38s. In other words, the Tuskegee Airmen shot down more enemy airplanes than two of the white fighter escort groups in the same period, but the fewest enemy airplanes compared to the other three P-51 units.⁴

It is possible that the Tuskegee Airmen shot down fewer enemy aircraft than the other P-51 fighter groups, and had no aces with five aerial victory credits, because they were staying closer to the bombers they were escorting. The total number of Fifteenth Air Force bombers shot down by enemy aircraft between June 1944 and May 1945, when the 332nd Fighter Group was assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force, was 303. The total number of 332nd Fighter Group-escorted bombers shot down by enemy aircraft was 27. Subtracting 27 bombers from the 303 total shot down by enemy aircraft leaves 276 bombers shot down by enemy aircraft while under the escort of one or more of the other six fighter groups in the Fifteenth Air Force. Dividing 276 by six, one finds that 46 is the

average number of bombers shot down by enemy aircraft when those bombers were under the escort of one of the other fighter groups. The Tuskegee Airmen lost only 27, significantly fewer bombers than the average number lost by the other fighter groups in the Fifteenth Air Force. In other words, the Tuskegee Airmen lost significantly fewer bombers to enemy airplanes than average of the other fighter groups.⁵ In terms of numbers of enemy aircraft shot down, the Tuskegee Airmen record was worse than that of the other P-51 groups in the same period, but in terms of the number of bombers that returned safely under their protection, the Tuskegee Airmen record was better.

TABLE I: FIGHTER GROUPS OF THE FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE IN WORLD WAR II

Organization	Total aerial victories June
	1944-April 1945
1 st Fighter Group	72
14 th Fighter Group	85
31 st Fighter Group	278
52d Fighter Group	224.5
82d Fighter Group	106
325 th Fighter Group	252
332d Fighter Group	94

Sources: USAF Historical Study No. 85, "USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II" (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978); Maurer Maurer, *Air Force Combat Units of World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983).

TABLE II: FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE HEAVY BOMBERS LOST, JUNE 1944-MAY 1945 (WHEN 332ND FIGHTER GROUP ASSIGNED TO FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE)

Month	Year	Number of Heavy Bombers Lost to Enemy Aircraft
June	1944	85
July	1944	94
August	1944	91
September	1944	7
October	1944	0
November	1944	1
December	1944	18

January	1945	0
February	1945	0
March	1945	7
April	1945	0
May	1945	0
TOTAL	June 1944-April	303
	1945	

Source: Army Air Forces Statistical Digest for World War II, 1946

(Washington, DC: Statistical Control Division, Office of Air Comptroller, June 1947) p.

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2. THE MISCONCEPTION OF "NEVER LOST A BOMBER"

Another misconception that developed during the last months of the war is the story that no bomber under escort by the Tuskegee Airmen was ever shot down by enemy aircraft. A version of this misconception appears in Alan Gropman's book, *The Air* Force Integrates (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1985), p. 14: "Their record on escort duty remained unparalleled. They never lost an American bomber to enemy aircraft." This misconception originated even before the end of World War II, in the press. A version of the statement first appeared in a March 10, 1945 issue of *Liberty* Magazine, in an article by Roi Ottley, who claimed that the black pilots had not lost a bomber they escorted to enemy aircraft in more than 100 missions. The 332d Fighter Group had by then flown more than 200 missions. Two weeks after the Ottley article, on March 24, 1945, another article appeared in the *Chicago Defender*, claiming that in more than 200 missions, the group had not lost a bomber they escorted to enemy aircraft. In reality, bombers under Tuskegee Airmen escort were shot down on seven different days: June 9, 1944; June 13, 1944; July 12, 1944; July 18, 1944; July 20, 1944; August 24, 1944; and March 24, 1945. Moreover, the Tuskegee Airmen flew 311 missions for the

Fifteenth Air Force between early June 1944 and late April 1945, and only 179 of those missions escorted bombers.

Alan Gropman interviewed General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., years after World War II, and specifically asked him if the "never lost a bomber" statement were true. General Davis replied that he questioned the statement, but that it had been repeated so many times people were coming to believe it (AFHRA call number K239.0512-1922). ⁷ Davis himself must have known the statement was not true, because his own citation for the Distinguished Flying Cross, contained in Fifteenth Air Force General Order 2972 dated 31 August 1944, noted that on June 9, 1944, "Colonel Davis so skillfully disposed his squadrons that in spite of the large number of enemy fighters, the bomber formation suffered only a few losses."

In order to determine whether or not bombers under the escort of the Tuskegee Airmen were ever shot down by enemy aircraft during World War II, I practiced the following method.

First, I determined which bombardment wing the Tuskegee Airmen were escorting on a given day, and when and where that escort took place. I found this information in the daily narrative mission reports of the 332d Fighter Group, which are filed with the group's monthly histories from World War II. The call number for these documents at the Air Force Historical Research Agency is GP-332-HI followed by the month and year.

Next, I determined which bombardment groups were in the bombardment wing that the Tuskegee Airmen were escorting on the day in question. I found this information in the daily mission folders of the Fifteenth Air Force. The Fifteenth Air Force daily

mission folders also contain narrative mission reports for all the groups that took part in missions on any given day, including reports of both the fighter and bombardment groups, as well as the wings to which they belonged. The call number for these documents at the Air Force Historical Research Agency is 670.332 followed by the date. The bombardment group daily mission reports show which days bombers of the group were shot down by enemy aircraft.

Next, I checked the index of the Missing Air Crew Reports, to see if the groups that the Tuskegee Airmen were escorting that day lost any aircraft. If any aircraft of those groups were lost that day, I recorded the missing air crew report numbers. This index of Missing Air Crew Reports is located in the archives branch of the Air Force Historical Research Agency. The Missing Air Crew Reports usually confirmed the bomber loss information contained in the bombardment group daily narrative mission reports.

Finally, I looked at the individual Missing Air Crew Reports of the Tuskegee Airmen-escorted groups that lost airplanes on that day to see when the airplanes were lost, where the airplanes were lost, and whether the airplanes were lost because of enemy aircraft fire, enemy antiaircraft fire, or some other cause. The Missing Air Crew Reports note that information for each aircraft lost, with the aircraft type and serial number, and usually also contain witness statements that describe the loss. For lost bombers, the witnesses were usually the crew members of other bombers in the same formation, or members of the crews of the lost bombers themselves, after they returned. The Missing Air Crew Reports are filed on microfiche in the archives branch of the Air Force Historical Research Agency.

Using this procedure, I determined conclusively that on at least seven days, bombers under the escort of the Tuskegee Airmen's 332d Fighter Group were shot down by enemy aircraft. Those days include June 9, 1944; June 13, 1944; July 12, 1944; July 18, 1944; July 20, 1944; August 24, 1944; and March 24, 1945.

TABLE III: BOMBERS SHOT DOWN BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT WHILE FLYING IN GROUPS THE 332D FIGHTER GROUP WAS ASSIGNED TO ESCORT

DATE	TIME	LOCATION	TYPE	SERIAL	W	GP	MACR
				NUMBER	G		
9 June 1944	0905	46 40 N, 12 40 E	B-24	42-78219	304	459	6317
9 June 1944	0907	46 00 N, 12 40 E	B-24	42-52318	304	459	6179
13 June	0900	Porogruardo,	B-24 42-9474		49	484	6097
1944		Italy					
12 July	1050	20 miles SE of	B-24	42-52723	49	461	6894
1944		Mirabeau,					
		France					
12 July	1051	10 miles E of	B-24	42-78202	49	461	6895
1944		Mirabeau,					
		France					
12 July	1105	43 43 N, 05 23 E	B-24	42-78291	49	461	7034
1944							
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17 42-107179		5	483	6856
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-107008	5	483	6953
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-102862	5	483	6954
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	44-6174	5	483	6975
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-97671	5	483	6976
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-102382	5	483	6977
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-107170	5	483	6978
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-102923	5	483	6979
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-102927	5	483	6980
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-97584	5	483	6981
1944		Memmingen					

18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-46267	5	483	7097
1944	4045 4400	Memmingen		40.400.400		40.0	- 000
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-102422	5	483	7098
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	44-6177	5	483	7099
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1045-1100	near	B-17	42-107172	5	483	7153
1944		Memmingen					
18 July	1104	47 54 N, 10 40 E	B-17	42-102943	5	301	7310
1944		ŕ					
20 Jul 1944	1000	45 38 N, 12 28 E	B-24	44-40886	55	485	6914
20 Jul 1944	0954	45 38 N, 12 28 E	B-24	42-78361	55	485	6919
24 Aug	1245-1247	49 28 N, 15 25 E	B-17	42-31645	5	97	7971
1944		ŕ					
24 Mar	1200	52 05 N, 13 10 E	B-17	44-6283	5	463	13278
1945		ŕ					
24 Mar	1208	51 00 N, 13 10 E	B-17	44-6761	5	463	13274
1945		Ź					
24 Mar	1227	Berlin target	B-17	44-8159	5	463	13375
1945		area					

Primary Sources: Daily mission reports of the 332d Fighter Group (Air Force Historical Research Agency call number GP-332-HI); Daily mission reports of the bombardment groups the 332d Fighter Group was assigned to escort per day, from the daily mission folders of the Fifteenth Air Force (Air Force Historical Research Agency call number 670.332); Microfiche of Missing Air Crew Reports (MACRs) at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, indexed by date and group.

3. THE MISCONCEPTION OF THE DEPRIVED ACE

Another popular misconception that circulated after World War II is that white officers were determined to prevent any black man in the Army Air Forces from becoming an ace, and therefore reduced the aerial victory credit total of Lee Archer from five to less than five to accomplish their aim. A version of this misconception appears in the Oliver North compilation, *War Stories III* ((Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2005), p. 152, in which Lee Archer is quoted as saying "I figure somebody up the line just wasn't ready for a black guy to be an ace." In the same source, Archer claimed that one of his five victories was reduced to a half, and no one knew who got the other

half.¹⁰ Another version of the story is contained in an interview of Lee Archer by Dr. Lisa Bratton conducted on 13 Mar 2001 in New York, NY. Archer claimed that he shot down five enemy airplanes, without specifying the dates, and that one of his victories was cut in half and given to another pilot named Freddie Hutchins, leaving him with 4.5. He also claimed, in the same interview, that the American Fighter Aces Association honored him, implying that the association had named him an ace at last.¹¹

In reality, according to the World War II records of the 332d Fighter Group and its squadrons, which were very carefully kept by members of the group, Lee Archer claimed a total of four aerial victories during World War II, and received credit for every claim. Moreover, there is no evidence that Lt. Freddie Hutchins earned any half credit, with the other half credit going to Archer. In fact, Hutchins earned a full credit for shooting down an enemy aircraft on July 26, 1944. The mission report for that day, which lists all the claims from the mission, does not list Archer. The order that awarded the credit to Hutchins on July 26 was issued on August 6, 1944, and it was the same order that awarded a credit to Archer for 18 July 1944.

The misconception that Lee Archer was an ace was perpetuated in part because of an excerpt in the book *The Tuskegee Airmen* (Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1955), by Charles E. Francis. In that book, Francis notes an aerial victory for July 20, 1944, but the history of the 332d Fighter Group for July 1944, the mission report of the 332d Fighter Group for July 20, 1944, and the aerial victory credit orders issued by the Fifteenth Air Force in 1944 do not support the claim.¹⁵

World War II documents, including monthly histories of the 332d Fighter Group and Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Force general orders awarding aerial victory credits show

that Lee Archer claimed and was awarded a total of four aerial victory credits during World War II, one on July 18, 1944, and three on October 12, 1944. There is no evidence among these documents that Lee Archer ever claimed any more than four enemy aircraft destroyed in the air during the war, and he was never awarded any more than four. A fifth was never taken away or downgraded to half. Moreover, there is no evidence, among the documents, that there was any effort to prevent any members of the 332d Fighter Group from becoming an ace. If someone had reduced one of his July credits to a half, or taken it away entirely, that person would have had no way of knowing that Archer would get credit for three more aircraft months later, in October, and approach ace status. When claims were made, they were recorded and evaluated by a victory credit board that decided, using witness statements and gun camera film, whether to award credits, which were confirmed by general orders of the Fifteenth Air Force. There is no evidence that the black claims were treated any differently than the white claims. If there had been such discrimination in the evaluation of claims, Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., the leader of the group would have most likely complained, and there is no evidence of any such complaint. To think that someone or some group was totaling the number of aerial victory credits of each of the members of the various squadrons of the 332d Fighter Group and intervening to deny credit to anyone who might become an ace is not consistent with the aerial victory credit procedures of the day.

TABLE IV. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF 332D FIGHTER GROUP AERIAL VICTORY CREDITS

Date	Name	Unit	Downed	GO#
2 Jul 1943	1 Lt Charles B. Hall	99 FS	1 FW-190	32 XII ASC 7 Sep 43
27 Jan 1944	2 Lt Clarence W. Allen	99 FS	0.5 FW-190	66 XII AF 24 May 44
	1 Lt Willie Ashley Jr.	99 FS	1 FW-190	122 XII AF 7 Aug 44
	2 Lt Charles P. Bailey	99 FS	1 FW-190	66 XII AF 24 May 44

	1 Lt Howard Baugh	99 FS	1 FW-190	122 XII AF 7 Aug 44
	1 Et 110 ward Baugh	7715	0.5 FW-190	66 XII AF 24 May 44
	Cpt Lemuel R. Custis	99 FS	1 FW-190	122 XII AF 7 Aug 44
	1 Lt Robert W. Deiz	99 FS	1 FW-190	66 XII AF 24 May 44
	2 Lt Wilson V. Eagleson	99 FS	1 FW-190	66 XII AF 24 May 44
	1 Lt Leon C. Roberts	99 FS	1 FW-190	122 XII AF 7 Aug 44
	2 Lt Lewis C. Smith	99 FS	1 FW-190	66 XII AF 24 May 44
	1 Lt Edward L. Toppins	99 FS	1 FW-190	81 XII AF 22 Jun 44
28 Jan 1944	1 Lt Robert W. Deiz	99 FS	1 FW-190	122 XII AF 7 Aug 44
20 Jan 1744	Cpt Charles B. Hall	99 FS	1 FW-190	64 XII AF 22 May 44
	Cpt Charles B. Han	7713	1 ME-109	04 All Al 22 May 44
5 Feb 1944	1 Lt Elwood T. Driver	99 FS	1 FW-190	66 XII AF 24 May 44
7 Feb 1944	2 Lt Wilson V. Eagleson	99 FS	1 FW-190	122 XII AF 7 Aug 44
7 1 00 1911	2 Lt Leonard M. Jackson	99 FS	1 FW-190	66 XII AF 24 May 44
	1 Lt Clinton B. Mills	99 FS	1 FW-190	66 XII AF 24 May 44
9 Jun 1944	1 Lt Charles M. Bussy	302 FS	1 ME-109	1473 XV AF 30 Jun 44
9 Juli 1944	2 Lt Frederick D.	301 FS	2 ME-109s	1473 XV AF 30 Jun 44
	Funderburg	30113	2 MIE-1098	14/3 A V AI 30 Juli 44
	1 Lt Melvin T. Jackson	302 FS	1 ME-109	1473 XV AF 30 Jun 44
	1 Lt Wendell O. Pruitt	302 FS	1 ME-109	1473 XV AF 30 Jun 44
12 Jul 1944	1 Lt Harold E. Sawyer	301 FS	1 FW-190	2032 XV AF 23 Jul 44
12 Jul 1744	1 Lt Joseph D. Elsberry	301 FS	3 FW-190	2466 XV AF Aug 44
16 Jul 1944	1 Lt Alfonza W. Davis	332 FG	1 MA-205	2030 XV AF 23 Jul 44
10 341 1744	2 Lt William W. Green Jr	302 FS	1 MA-202	2029 XV AF 23 Jul 44
17 Jul 1944	1 Lt Luther H. Smith Jr.	302 FS	1 ME-109	2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
17 301 17 11	2 Lt Robert H. Smith	302 FS	1 ME-109	2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
	1 Lt Laurence D. Wilkins	302 FS	1 ME-109	2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
18 Jul 1944	2 Lt Lee A. Archer	302 FS	1 ME-109	2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
10 341 1744	1 Lt Charles P. Bailey	99 FS	1 FW-190	2484 XV AF 11 Aug 44
	1 Lt Weldon K. Groves	302 FS	1 ME-109	2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
18 Jul 1944	1 Lt Jack D. Holsclaw	100 FS	2 ME-109s	2202 XV AF 31 Jul 44
10 Jul 1744	2 Lt Clarence D. Lester	100 FS	3 ME-109s	2202 XV AF 31 Jul 44
	2 Lt Walter J. A. Palmer	100 FS	1 ME-109	2202 XV AF 31 Jul 44
	2 Lt Watter J. A. Fairner 2 Lt Roger Romine	302 FS	1 ME-109	2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
	Cpt Edward L. Toppins	99 FS	1 FW-190	2484 XV AF 11 Aug 44*
	2 Lt Hugh S. Warner	302 FS	1 FW-190 1 ME-109	2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
20 Jul 1944	Cpt Joseph D. Elsberry	301 FS	1 ME-109	2284 XV AF 3 Aug 44
20 Jul 1944	1 Lt Langdon E. Johnson	100 FS	1 ME-109	2202 XV AF 31 Jul 44
	Cpt Armour G. McDaniel	301 FS	1 ME-109	2284 XV AF 3 Aug 44
	Cpt Edward L. Toppins	99 FS	1 ME-109	2484 XV AF 11 Aug 44
25 Jul 1944		1	1 ME-109 1 ME-109	
26 Jul 1944 26 Jul 1944	1 Lt Harold E. Sawyer	301 FS		2284 XV AF 3 Aug 44
20 Jul 1944	1 Lt Freddie E. Hutchins	302 FS	1 ME-109	2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
	1 Lt Leonard M. Jackson	99 FS	1 ME-109	2484 XV AF 11 Aug 44
	2 Lt Roger Romine	302 FS	1 ME-109	2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
	Cpt Edward L. Toppins	99 FS	1 ME-109	2484 XV AF 11 Aug 44

-190s 2284 XV AF 3 Aug 44
-190s 2284 XV AF 3 Aug 44
-109 2284 XV AF 3 Aug 44
-109 2485 XV AF 11 Aug 44
-109 2484 XV AF 11 Aug 44
-109 2350 XV AF 6 Aug 44
2001 2485 XV AF 11 Aug 44
-190 2831 XV AF 25 Aug 44
-109 3538 XV AF 21 Sep 44
-109 3153 XV AF 6 Sep 44
-190 3174 XV AF 7 Sep 44
-190 449 XV AF 31 Jan 45
-109s 4287 XV AF 1 Nov 44
-109 4287 XV AF 1 Nov 44
-111 4287 XV AF 1 Nov 44
-111 4287 XV AF 1 Nov 44
-109
-109 4287 XV AF 1 Nov 44
-111 4604 XV AF 21 Nov 44
-109s 4990 XV AF 13 Dec 44
-109 1734 XV AF 24 Mar 45
-262 2293 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-262 2293 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-262 2293 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-190 2293 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-190 2292 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-190 2293 XV AF 12 Apr 45
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-109s 2294 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-190 2294 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-190 2294 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-190 2294 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-190s 2294 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-109s 2294 XV AF 12 Apr 45
-109 3484 XV AF 29 May 45
-109s 3362 XV AF 23 May 45

1 Lt Jimmy Lanham	301 FS	1 ME-109	3362 XV AF 23 May 45
2 Lt Richard A. Simons	100 FS	1 ME-109	2990 XV AF 4 May 45

*order says credit was 16 Jul 1944, but history says 18 Jul 1944

During World War II, the only African-American pilots in the Army Air Forces who flew in combat served in the 99th, 100th, 301st, and 302nd Fighter Squadrons and the 332nd Fighter Group. None of these pilots earned more than four aerial victory credits. None of them became an ace, with at least five aerial victory credits. Were the Tuskegee Airmen who earned four aerial victory credits sent home in order to prevent a black pilot from becoming an ace?

That is very doubtful. 1st Lt. Lee Archer was deployed back to the United States the month after he scored his fourth aerial victory credit, and the same month he received his fourth aerial victory credit. Captain Edward Toppins was deployed back to the United States the second month after he scored his fourth aerial victory credit, and the month after he received credit for it. However, Captain Joseph Elsberry earned his fourth aerial victory credit in July 1944, and received credit for it early in August 1944. He did not redeploy to the United States until December 1944. If there was a policy of sending Tuskegee Airmen with four aerial victory credits home, in order to prevent a black man from becoming an ace, the case of Captain Joseph Elsberry contradicts it, because he was not sent home until four months after his fourth aerial victory credit was awarded, and five months after he scored it. It is more likely that the pilots who deployed back to the United States did so after having completed the number of missions they needed to finish their respective tours of duty.

TABLE V: TABLE OF TUSKEGEE AIRMEN WITH FOUR AERIAL VICTORIES

Name and	Fighter	Fighter	Date of	Date of award of	Month of
rank at time	Group	Squadron	fourth aerial	fourth aerial	redeployment to
of fourth			victory	victory credit	the United States
aerial					
victory					
credit					
1 st Lt Lee	332	302	12 October	1 Nov 1944	November 1944
Archer			1944		
Captain	332	301	20 July 1944	3 Aug 1944	December 1944
Joseph					
Elsberry					
Captain	332	99	26 July 1944	11 Aug 1944	September 1944
Edward					
Toppins					

Sources: Fifteenth Air Force general orders awarding aerial victory credits; monthly histories of the 332d Fighter Group for August, September, October, November, and December 1944.

Researcher: Daniel L. Haulman, Historian, Air Force Historical Research Agency

Finally, the American Fighter Aces Association did indeed invite Lee Archer as a guest to speak, but did not in fact name him an ace. The same association invited Charlton Heston to speak at the same event, and Heston was not named an ace. Frank Olynyk, a historian for the American Fighter Aces Association, confirmed that the association never recognized Lee Archer as having shot down five enemy aircraft, and the Olynyk's record agrees with that the Air Force Historical Research Agency: Lee Archer earned a total of four aerial victory credits.¹⁶

4. THE MISCONCEPTION OF BEING FIRST TO SHOOT DOWN GERMAN JETS

Sometimes one hears the claim that the Tuskegee Airmen were the first to shoot down German jets.¹⁷ Lee Archer, one of the most famous Tuskegee Airmen, repeated the claim in a 2001 interview. He claimed that "guys like Roscoe Brown and three other people shot down the first jets in our history, in combat." Three Tuskegee Airmen, 1st

Lt. Roscoe Brown, 1st Lt. Earl R. Lane, and 2nd Lt. Charles V. Brantley, each shot down a German Me-262 jet on March 24, 1945, during the longest Fifteenth Air Force mission, which went all the way to Berlin. However, American pilots shot down no less than sixty Me-262 aircraft before 24 March 1945. Most of these American pilots served in the Eighth Air Force. ²⁰

TABLE VI: ARMY AIR FORCES AERIAL VICTORIES OVER GERMAN ME-262 JETS

	NAME	CREDIT	FTR GP	FTR	Theater	Aircraft
DATE			(or Air	SQ		Flown
ddmmyyyy			Div)			
28081944	2 Lt Manford O. Croy Jr.	.50	78	82 FS	ETO	P-47
28081944	Maj Joseph Myers	.50	78	82 FS	ETO	P-47
07101944	Maj Richard E. Conner	1.00	78	82 FS	ETO	P-47
07101944	1 Lt Urban L. Drew	2.00	361	375 FS	ETO	P-47
15101944	2 Lt Huie H. Lamb Jr.	1.00	78	82 FS	ETO	P-47
01111944	1 Lt Walter R. Groce	.50	56	63 FS	ETO	P-47
01111944	2 Lt William T. Gerbe Jr.	.50	352	486 FS	ETO	P-47
06111944	Capt Charles E. Yeager	1.00	357	363 FS	ETO	P-51
06111944	1 Lt William J. Quinn	1.00	357	374 FS	ETO	P-47
08111944	1 Lt James W. Kenney	1.00	357	362 FS	ETO	P-51
08111944	2 Lt Anthony Maurice	1.00	361	375 FS	ETO	P-47
08111944	1 Lt Ernest C. Fiebelkorn Jr.	.50	20	77 FS	ETO	P-51
08111944	1 Lt Edward R. Haydon	.50	357	364 FS	ETO	P-51
08111944	1 Lt Richard W. Stevens	1.00	364	384 FS	ETO	P-51
18111944	2 Lt John M. Creamer	.50	4	335 FS	ETO	P-47
18111944	Capt John C. Fitch	.50	4	335 FS	ETO	P-47
09121944	2 Lt Harry L. Edwards	1.00	352	486 FS	ETO	P-51
22121944	1 Lt Eugene P. McGlauflin	.50	31	308 FS	MTO	P-51
22121944	2 Lt Roy L. Scales	.50	31	308 FS	MTO	P-51
13011945	1 Lt Walter J. Konantz	1.00	55	338 FS	ETO	P-51
14011945	1 Lt Billy J. Murray	1.00	353	351 FS	ETO	P-51
14011945	1 Lt James W. Rohrs	.50	353	351 FS	ETO	P-51
14011945	1 Lt George J. Rosen	.50	353	351 FS	ETO	P-51
15011945	1 Lt Robert P. Winks	1.00	357	364 FS	ETO	P-51
20011945	1 Lt Dale E. Karger	1.00	357	364 FS	ETO	P-51
20011945	2 Lt Roland R. Wright	1.00	357	364 FS	ETO	P-51
09021945	1 Lt Johnnie L. Carter	1.00	357	363 FS	ETO	P-51
09021945	Capt Donald H. Bochkay	1.00	357	363 FS	ETO	P-51
09021945	1 Lt Stephen C. Ananian	1.00	339	505 FS	ETO	P-51

15021945	2 Lt Dudley M. Amoss	1.00	55	38 FS	ETO	P-51
21021945	1 Lt Harold E. Whitmore	1.00	339	361 FS	ETO	P-51
22021945	Capt Gordon B. Compton	1.00	353	351 FS	ETO	P-51
22021945	2 Lt Charles D. Price	1.00	352	486 FS	ETO	P-51
22021945	Maj Wayne K. Blickenstaff	1.00	353	350 FS	ETO	P-51
22021945	1 Lt Oliven T. Cowan	1.00	365	388 FS	ETO	P-47
22021945	1 Lt David B. Fox	1.00	366	391 FS	ETO	P-47
25021945	Capt Donald M. Cummings	2.00	55	38 FS	ETO	P-51
25021945	2 Lt John F. O'Neil	1.00	55	38 FS	ETO	P-51
25021945	Capt Donald E. Penn	1.00	55	38 FS	ETO	P-51
25021945	1 Lt Milliard O. Anderson	1.00	55	38 FS	ETO	P-51
25021945	2 Lt Donald T. Menegay	1.00	55	38 FS	ETO	P-51
25021945	1 Lt Billy Clemmons	1.00	55	38 FS	ETO	P-51
25021945	1 Lt Carl G. Payne	1.00	4	334 FS	ETO	P-51
01031945	1 Lt Wendell W. Beaty	1.00	365	358 FS	ETO	P-51
01031945	1 Lt John K. Wilkins Jr.	1.00	2 AD		ETO	P-51
02031945	1 Lt Theodore W. Sedvert	1.00	354	353 FS	ETO	P-51
14031945	1 Lt Charles R. Rodebaugh	1.00	2 AD		ETO	P-51
19031945	Maj Niven K. Cranfill	1.00	359	368 FS	ETO	P-51
19031945	Capt Robert S. Fifield	1.00	357	363 FS	ЕТО	P-51
19031945	Maj Robert W. Foy	1.00	357		ETO	P-51
19031945	Capt Charles H. Spencer	1.00	355	354 FS	ETO	P-51
20031945	1 Lt Robert E. Irion	1.00	339	505 FS	ETO	P-51
20031945	1 Lt Vernon N. Barto	1.00	339	504 FS	ETO	P-51
21031945	Capt Edwin H. Miller	1.00	78	83 FS	ETO	P-51
21031945	1 Lt Richard D. Anderson	1.00	361	375 FS	ETO	P-51
21031945	2 Lt Harry M. Chapman	1.00	361	376 FS	ETO	P-51
21031945	1 Lt John A. Kirk III	1.00	78	83 FS	ETO	P-51
21031945	1 Lt Robert H. Anderson	1.00	78	82 FS	ETO	P-51
21031945	2 Lt Walter E. Bourque	1.00	78	82 FS	ETO	P-51
21031945	Capt Winfield H. Brown	.50	78	82 FS	ETO	P-51
21031945	1 Lt Allen A. Rosenblum	.50	78	82 FS	ETO	P-51
22031945	Capt William J. Dillard	1.00	31	308 FS	MTO	P-51
22031945	2 Lt John W. Cunnick III	1.00	55	38 FS	ETO	P-51
22031945	1 Lt Eugene L. Peel	.50	78	82 FS	ETO	P-51
22031945	2 Lt Milton B. Stutzman	.50	78	82 FS	ETO	P-51
22031945	Capt Harold T. Barnaby	1.00	78	83 FS	ETO	P-51
24031945	2 Lt Charles V. Brantley	1.00	332	100 FS	MTO	P-51
24031945	1 Lt Roscoe C. Brown	1.00	332	100 FS	MTO	P-51
24031945	1 Lt Earl R. Lane	1.00	332	100 FS	MTO	P-51
24031945	Col William A. Daniel	1.00	31	308 FS	MTO	P-51
24031945	1 Lt Forrest M. Keene Jr.	1.00	31	308 FS	MTO	P-51
24031945	1 Lt Raymond D. Leonard	1.00	31	308 FS	MTO	P-51
24031945	Capt Kenneth T. Smith	1.00	31	308 FS	MTO	P-51

24031945	2 Lt William M. Wilder	1.00	31	308 FS		P-51
21031713	2 Lt William W. White	1.00	31	30015	MTO	
25031945	1 Lt Eugene H. Wendt	1.00	479	434 FS	ETO	P-51
25031945	Maj George E. Bostick	1.00	56	63 FS	ETO	P-47
25031945	2 Lt Edwin M. Crosthwait Jr.	1.00	56	63 FS	ETO	P-47
25031945	Capt Raymond H. Littge	1.00	352	487 FS	ETO	P-51
30031945	1 Lt Patrick L. Moore	1.00	55	343 FS	ETO	P-51
30031945	1 Lt Carroll W. Bennett	1.00	339	504 FS	ЕТО	P-51
30031945	Capt Robert F. Sargent	1.00	339	504 FS	ETO	P-51
30031945	Lt Col John D. Landers	.50	78		ETO	P-51
30031945	2 Lt Thomas V. Thain Jr.	.50	78	84 FS	ETO	P-51
30031945	1 Lt Kenneth J. Scott Jr.	1.00	361	376 FS	ETO	P-51
30031945	1 Lt James C. Hurley	1.00	352	328 FS	ЕТО	P-51
30031945	2 Lt John B. Guy	1.00	364	383 FS	ETO	P-51
31031945	1 Lt Marvin H. Castleberry	1.00	2 AD		ETO	P-51
31031945	1 Lt Harrison B. Tordoff	1.00	354	353 FS	ETO	P-51
31031945	1 Lt Wayne L. Coleman	1.00	78	82 FS	ETO	P-51
31031945	Capt William T. Bales Jr.	1.00	371	-	ETO	P-47
04041945	1 Lt Robert C. Coker	.50	339	504 FS	ETO	P-51
04041945	Capt Kirke B. Everson Jr.	.50	339	504 FS	ETO	P-51
04041945	Capt Nile C. Greer	1.00	339	504 FS	ЕТО	P-51
04041945	2 Lt Robert C. Havighurst	1.00	339	504 FS	ЕТО	P-51
04041945	Lt Col George F. Ceuleers	1.00	364	383	ETO	P-51
04041945	1 Lt Michael J. Kennedy	.50	4	334 FS	ETO	P-51
04041945	1 Lt Harold H. Frederick	.50	4	336 FS	ETO	P-51
04041945	1 Lt Raymond A. Dyer	1.00	4	334 FS	ETO	P-51
04041945	Capt Harry R. Corey	1.00	339	505 FS	ETO	P-51
04041945	1 Lt John W. Haun	1.00	324	316 FS	ETO	P-47
04041945	1 Lt Andrew N. Kandis	1.00	324	316 FS	ETO	P-47
05041945	Capt John C. Fahringer	1.00	56	63 FS	ETO	P-47
07041945	1 Lt Hilton O. Thompson	1.00	479	434 FS	ETO	P-51
07041945	Capt Verne E. Hooker	1.00	479	435 FS	ETO	P-51
08041945	1 Lt John J. Usiatynski	1.00	358	367 FS	ETO	P-47
09041945	2 Lt James T. Sloan	1.00	361	374 FS	ETO	P-51
09041945	Maj Edward B. Giller	1.00	55	343 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	Capt Gordon B. Compton	1.00	353	351 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Harold Tenenbaum	1.00	359	369 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	2 Lt Walter J. Sharbo	1.00	56	62 FS	ETO	P-47
10041945	Capt John K. Hollins	1.00	20	79 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	Capt John K. Brown	1.00	20	55 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Willmer W. Collins	1.00	4	336	ETO	P-51
				FS		
10041945	2 Lt John W. Cudd Jr.	.50	15	77 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	F.O. Jerome Rosenblum	.50	15	77 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Keith R. McGinnis	1.00	55	38 FS	ETO	P-51

10041945	2 Lt Walter T. Drozd	1.00	15	77 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	2 Lt Walter 1. Drozd 2 Lt Albert B. North	1.00	15	77 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Robert J. Guggemus	1.00	359	369 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Charles C. Pattillo	1.00	352	487 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	Lt Col Earl D. Duncan	.50	352	328 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	Maj Richard G. McAuliffe	.50	352	328 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Kenneth A. Lashbrook	1.00	55	338 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	Capt Robert W. Abernathy	1.00	353	350 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Jack W. Clark	.50	353	350 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	2 Lt Bruce D. McMahan	.50	353	350 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Wayne C. Gatlin	1.00	356	360 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Joseph W. Prichard	.50	352	487 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	2 Lt Carlo A. Ricci	.50	352	487 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	Capt Douglas J. Pick	.50	364	384 FS	ETO	P-51
10041945	1 Lt Harry C. Schwartz	.50	364	384 FS	ETO	P-51
16041945	1 Lt Vernon O. Fein	1.00	368	397 FS	ETO	P-31 P-47
16041945		1.00	368	397 FS	ETO	P-47
	1 Lt Henry A. Yandel					
16041945	Maj Eugene E. Ryan	1.00	55	338 FS	ETO	P-51
17041945	1 Lt James Zweizig	1.00	371	404 FS	ETO	P-47
17041945	Capt Jack A. Warner	1.00	354	356 FS	ETO	P-51
17041945	Capt Roy W. Orndarff	1.00	364	383 FS	ETO	P-51
17041945	Capt Walter L. Goff	1.00	364	383 FS	ETO	P-51
17041945	F.O. James A. Steiger	1.00	357	364 FS	ETO	P-51
17041945	1 Lt John C. Campbell Jr.	1.00	339	503 FS	ETO	P-51
18041945	Maj Ralph F. Johnson	1.00	325	319 FS	MTO	P-51
18041945	Capt Charles E. Weaver	1.00	357	362 FS	ETO	P-51
18041945	Maj Donald H. Bochkay	1.00	357	363 FS	ETO	P-51
19041945	Lt Col Jack W. Hayes Jr.	1.00	357	363 FS	ETO	P-51
19041945	Capt Robert S. Fifield	1.00	357	363 FS	ETO	P-51
19041945	1 Lt Paul N. Bowles	1.00	357	363 FS	ETO	P-51
19041945	1 Lt Carroll W. Ofsthun	1.00	357	363 FS	ETO	P-51
19041945	Capt Ivan L. McGuire	.50	357	364 FS	ETO	P-51
19041945	1 Lt Gilmon L. Weber	.50	357	364 FS	ETO	P-51
19041945	1 Lt Robert DeLoach	1.00	55	338 FS	ETO	P-51
19041945	2 Lt James P. McMullen	1.00	357	364 FS	ETO	P-51
24041945	Capt Jerry G. Mast	.50	365	388 FS	ETO	P-47
24041945	2 Lt William H. Myers	.50	365	388 FS	ETO	P-47
25041945	1 Lt Richard D. Stevenson	.50	370	402 FS	ETO	P-51
25041945	1 Lt Robert W. Hoyle	.50	370	402 FS	ETO	P-51
26041945	Capt Robert W. Clark	1.00	50	10 FS	ETO	P-47
26041945	Capt Herbert A. Philo	1.00	27	522 FS	ETO	P-47

Sources:

USAAF (European Theater) Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft in Air-to-Air Combat, World War 2, Victory List No. 5, Frank J. Olynyk, May 1987.

USAAF (Mediterranean Theater) Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft in Air-to-Air Combat, World War 2, Victory List No. 6, Frank J. Olynyk, June 1987.
USAF Historical Study No. 85, USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II, Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, 1978.
Combat Squadrons of the Air Force, World War II, edited by Maurer Maurer, 1969.
Air Force Combat Units of World War II, edited by Maurer Maurer, 1983.
Compiled by:
Patsy Robertson, Historian
Organizational Histories Branch, USAFHRA

The Tuskegee Airmen were also not the first Fifteenth Air Force pilots to shoot down German jets, as is sometimes alleged. Two such pilots, 1st Lt. Eugene P.

McGlauflin and 2d Lt. Roy L. Scales, both of the Fifteenth Air Force's 31st Fighter Group and 308th Fighter Squadron, shared a victory over an Me-262 German jet on 22

December 1944, and Capt. William J. Dillard, also of the Fifteenth Air Force's 31st Fighter Group and 308th Fighter Squadron, shot down an Me-262 German jet on 22

March 1945. Moreover, on the day three Tuskegee Airmen shot down three German jets over Berlin on March 24, 1945, five other American pilots of the Fifteenth Air Force, on the same mission, with the 31st Fighter Group, also shot down German Me-262 jets.

They included Colonel William A. Daniel, 1st Lt. Forrest M. Keene, 1st Lt Raymond D. Leonard, Capt. Kenneth T. Smith, and 2nd Lt. William M. Wilder.

5. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN SANK A GERMAN DESTROYER.

In the movie *Red Tails* by George Lucas, a P-51 fighter pilot is depicted as strafing a German destroyer until it explodes, and group members are later shown watching gun camera film of the attack and the explosion, suggesting that a Tuskegee Airman in a red-tailed Mustang sank a destroyer by himself. The 332nd Fighter Group narrative mission report for June 25, 1944 notes that eight of the group's pilots flying P-47 aircraft strafed a German destroyer, on June 25, 1944, and two of them went around

for another pass to do more strafing. The group did not begin flying P-51s in combat until the next month.²³

The mission report also notes that the group sank the destroyer that day in the Adriatic Sea near Trieste. The pilots on the mission undoubtedly believed that they had sunk a German destroyer at that place and time. In a 2001 interview, Tuskegee Airman Lee Archer claimed "We sank a destroyer escort," and when others doubted, "we sent them the film," implying that gun camera film showed the ship sinking.²⁴

It is not likely that gun camera film, activated when the machine guns were fired, also showed the actual sinking of the ship, which would not have been immediate. Moreover, other records show that the only German ship that was attacked at the same place and time was the TA-22, the former World War I Italian destroyer *Giuseppe Missori*, which the Germans had converted into a very large torpedo vessel. The same records show that the ship did not sink on June 25, 1944, but was heavily damaged. The TA-22 was decommissioned on November 8, 1944, and scuttled at Trieste in 1945. It might as well have been sunk on June 25, 1944, because it never fought the Allies again.²⁵

The book, *The Tuskegee Airmen*, by Charles Francis notes that the Tuskegee Airmen attacked an enemy ship on June 25, 1944, , and that Gwynne W. Pierson and Wendell O. Pruitt each earned a Distinguished Flying Cross for the mission. The book also claims that Pierson was given credit for sinking the ship. The only Distinguished Flying Cross I found for Gwynne W. Pierson was for his action on August 14, 1944 (Fifteenth Air Force General Order 287 dated January 19, 1945), and the only

Distinguished Flying Cross I found for Wendell O. Pruitt was for his action on August 27, 1944 (Fifteenth Air Force General Order 3950 dated October 15, 1944.²⁶

Some sources suggest that the Tuskegee Airmen sank the German ship TA-27, which had been the Italian warship *Aurige*. The TA-27 was actually sunk on June 9, 1944 off the coast of Elba, west of the Italian peninsula, far from the Adriatic Sea, which is east of the Italian peninsula. The Tuskegee Airmen would not have sunk the TA-27, because the date and place do not match the group mission report.²⁷

6. THE MISCONCEPTION OF THE "GREAT TRAIN ROBBERY"

One of the popular stories about the Tuskegee Airmen is sometimes nicknamed the "Great Train Robbery." According to the story, personnel in charge of supplying the 332d Fighter Group robbed a train in order to obtain unusually large 110-gallon wing tanks the group needed to fly the unusually long Berlin mission of March 24, 1945. The story goes on to say that the fuel tanks acquired had been designed to fit the P-47s, not the P-51 airplanes of the 332nd Fighter Group, forcing the maintenance personnel to improvise the connections. According to the story, the maintainers were able to jury-rig the connections just in time for all the planes to be equipped to fly the Berlin mission. ²⁸

Another version of the story claims that only the 100th Fighter Squadron needed the larger tanks, and that at night Captain Omar Blair gathered a few enlisted men to seize the 110-gallon tanks from a train moving from Naples to deliver them to another group. As the story goes, the men "commandeered six flatbed trucks" and used one to block the tracks so that the train would have to stop. Using the submachine guns, they then forced "the shocked white staff sergeants operating the train" to give them the 110-

gallon fuel tanks they needed. Using the six trucks, Blair's group delivered the larger tanks just in time for the 332nd Fighter Group to fly the Berlin mission.²⁹

There are reasons to question the popular versions of the story. The larger 110-gallon fuel tanks were not new to the 332nd Fighter Group. In fact, they had been used on the longer missions of the group for weeks before March 1945.³⁰ The group would not have needed to modify the tanks to fit the P-51 aircraft, since the P-51s had carried such tanks before. James Sheppard was a crew chief in the 301st Fighter Squadron, and took part in preparing a P-51 of the 332d Fighter Group for the 24 March 1945 mission to Berlin during the night before the mission. As an experienced aircraft maintenance technician, he did not experience any difficulty in mounting larger fuel tanks to the wings of the P-51 he was maintaining so that they could carry out the mission.³¹

TABLE VII: 110-GALLON FUEL TANKS ON HAND, 332ND FIGHTER GROUP

Week Ending	Air	Fighter	Base	110-gallon fuel
1945	Service	Group		tanks on hand
	Squadron			
2 February	366	332	Ramitelli	563
9 February	366	332	Ramitelli	424
16 February	366	332	Ramitelli	295
23 February	366	332	Ramitelli	48
2 March	366	332	Ramitelli	Not given
9 March	366	332	Ramitelli	187
16 March	366	332	Ramitelli	0
23 March	366	332	Ramitelli	0
30 March	366	332	Ramitelli	64

Sources: February and March 1945 histories of the 38th Air Service Group

A version of the misconception includes the claim that the larger fuel tanks the 332nd Fighter Group obtained the night before the Berlin mission were made for P-47 airplanes, and had to be hastily adapted to fit the wings of P-51s.³² That is highly unlikely, because none of the fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force had flown P-47

airplanes since early July 1944.³³ Eight months had passed since P-47s were used by the fighter escorts in the Mediterranean Theater. The idea that 110-gallon fuel tanks for P-47s were being shipped to the Foggia area by train in March 1945 makes no sense, since P-47s had not been used by the fighter escorts in the theater for many months. Moreover, the P-47s the 332nd Fighter Group and other groups had used before July 1944 did not even carry 110-gallon fuel tanks.

TABLE VIII. TRANSITION OF FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE FIGHTER GROUPS FROM P-47s TO P-51s

Fighter Group	Last month flying P-47s	First month flying P-51s
325	May 1944	May 1944
332	June 1944	July 1944

Source: Maurer Maurer, Air Force Combat Units of World War II (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983.

The 332nd Fighter Group was not the only P-51 fighter escort group to fly the Berlin mission. There were three other P-51 groups that also flew the same mission, and they also used the larger fuel tanks to reach the target and get back. Two of the P-51 groups, the 31st and the 325^t Fighter Groups, had an ample supply of the 110-gallon fuel tanks in the latter half of March 1945. Two of the others, the 52nd and the 332nd Fighter Groups, ran out of the larger tanks in mid March, 1945, just before the mission.³⁴ Apparently they had to go to extraordinary lengths to get the fuel tanks they needed.

On March 23, 1945, the 55th Air Service Squadron of the 380th Air Service Group dispatched trucks from the depot at Foggia to the railhead at Chieuti for the larger fuel tanks. The squadron's diary entry for 24 March notes that it received "one trailer load of 110 gal auxiliary tanks for 366th Air Service Squadron." The 366th Air Service Squadron was based at Ramitelli, Italy, with the 332d Fighter Group, to service its P-51 aircraft. Another 55th Air Service Squadron diary entry in March 1945 notes that the squadron

also used trucks to deliver 110-gallon fuel tanks from Chieuti to the 52d Fighter Group, which, like the 332d Fighter Group, flew P-51s for the Fifteenth Air Force and which was based near Ramitelli.³⁵ The larger 110- gallon auxiliary fuel tanks were delivered to Ramitelli by truck, not from the depot at Foggia, where the smaller fuel tanks had been obtained, but from a railhead at Chieuti instead. At least some of the fuel tanks the 332nd Fighter Group used for the mission came from Chieuti, and from the 55th Air Service Squadron, which shared them with the 366th Air Service Squadron at Ramitelli. Those tanks were not stolen from a train, but were obtained from a railhead.

A version of the "great train robbery" legend notes that personnel of the 523rd Air Service Group scrounged up the 110 gallon tanks.³⁶ One of the problems with this account is that the 523rd Air Service Group was not active until April 4, 1945, almost two weeks after the Berlin mission.³⁷

According to Tuskegee Airman Lee Archer, who told a version of what he called "The Great Train Robbery" story in an interview with Dr. Lisa Bratton in March 2001 in New York, when larger fuel tanks for needed for the Berlin mission, which was farther than other missions, "our enlisted men, under a warrant officer, went to the depot and took 'em." This version contradicts other versions, which suggest that a train was actually stopped and robbed instead of a depot.³⁸

The day after the Berlin mission, Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, commander of the 332nd Fighter Group, commended Captain Omar Blair of the 366th Air Service Squadron for his part in obtaining the fuel tanks the 332nd Fighter Group needed for the Berlin mission. Captain Blair subsequently also commended Staff Sergeant George Watson of the squadron for leading a detail that traveled 60 miles to obtain the wing tanks needed

for the all-important Berlin mission. The letters of commendation noted that the efforts were undertaken the evening of March 23 and the pre-dawn hours of March 24, just in time for the mission to succeed. Captain Blair and SSgt. Watson were instrumental in the success of the 332nd Fighter Group's part in the longest Fifteenth Air Force air raid of the war, but the story that they had to rob a train, and that the 110-gallon fuel tanks had to be jury-rigged to fit the P-51s, is not consistent with the historical records.³⁹

7. THE MISCONCEPTION OF SUPERIORITY

A popular story circulating about the Tuskegee Airmen is that while many expected the "Tuskegee Airmen experiment" to prove that black pilots were inferior to white pilots, and that the black pilots would fail, the Tuskegee Airmen actually proved the opposite: that they were superior to the white pilots, and significantly outperformed them.⁴⁰ Whether the 332nd Fighter Group was better or worse than the other three P-51 groups in the Fifteenth Air Force is debatable.

The number of bombers under Tuskegee Airmen escort that were shot down by enemy aircraft was 27, but the average number of bombers under the escort of white fighter groups in the Fifteenth Air Force, in the same time period, was 46.⁴¹ The numbers suggest that the 332nd Fighter Group lost significantly fewer bombers than the white fighter groups, and therefore outperformed them. A related claim is that the 332nd Fighter Group developed such a reputation for superior escort performance that the bombardment groups requested to be escorted by the "Red Tails" rather than the other fighter escort groups.

A popular story is that the black pilots of the 332d Fighter Group were the only fighter escort pilots to stay with the bombers they were assigned to protect, and that the

white fighter pilots of the other groups invariably left the bombers to go after enemy fighters to shoot down, in order to build up their totals of aerial victory credits. One version of this story appears in Kai Wright's book *Soldiers of Freedom: An Illustrated History of African Americans in the Armed Forces* (New York: Black Dog and Leventhal Publishers, 2002), p. 181: "Throughout the war, it [the 332d Fighter Group] flew bomber escorts- duty rejected by white pilots because it didn't offer as much opportunity to earn kills, and thus praise and promotion- and earned a reputation as the air force's most reliable escort."

The practice of fighter escorts "sticking with the bombers" was not unique to the 332nd Fighter Group. The Eighth Air Force in England practiced the policy of staying with the bombers at least until early January 1944, when Lieutenant General Jimmy Doolittle succeeded Major General Ira Eaker as its commander. He ordered his Eighth Fighter Command leader, Major General William E. Kepner, to take down a sign saying the first duty of the fighter pilots was to bring back the bombers safely, and replace it with another sign saying that the first duty of the fighter pilots was to shoot down enemy airplanes. Doolittle authorized his fighter escorts to leave the bombers and go after the enemy fighters.⁴³

When Doolittle became commander of the Eighth Air Force, Lieutenant General Eaker moved to the Mediterranean Theater and became commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, which supervised the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces and British air forces in the Mediterranean theater. Eaker probably took his "stick with the bombers" policy with him, and it was the policy not only of the 332nd Fighter Group but also of the other fighter escort groups in the Fifteenth Air Force.

The history of the Fifteenth Air Force covering November 1943-May 1945, vol. I, notes that "Before the summer of 1944, the fighters always maintained close escort. The original policy of the Air Force, in fact, stipulated that the fighters were never to leave the bombers in order to make an attack unless enemy aircraft were obviously preparing to strike at the bomber formation. As enemy fighter opposition declined, however, one squadron, at the discretion of the group commander, was sometimes detached for a fighter sweep against the enemy. This was done on withdrawal only, and in no case before the bombers had reached the target."

Another interesting quote from the same document: "During the counter-air campaign early in 1944, a particularly high level of efficiency was reached by the escort fighters. On four consecutive days in February, heavy bomber penetrations into Germany were covered by an escort of P-38s and P-47s. Bomber pilots reported that the cover provided on these missions was the best ever furnished in the Air Force up to that time." It bears noting that the 332d Fighter Group had not started to escort Fifteenth Air Force bombers yet. The 332d Fighter Group started escorting bombers for the Fifteenth Air Force in June 1944. From this important document, it seems clear that the policy of the Fifteenth Air Force in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, unlike the policy of the Eighth Air Force in England after Lt. Gen. James Doolittle took charge of it, was to furnish close escort for the bombers, and not leave them to go after enemy fighters in the distance. Apparently the 332d Fighter Group was not the only fighter group providing close escort in the Fifteenth Air Force, and doing it well enough for the bomber crews to express appreciation. 45

None of the twenty-one heavy bomber groups in the Fifteenth Air Force was stationed at the same airfield as any of the seven fighter groups. 46 The assignments rotated, and one fighter group was not always assigned to escort the same bombardment wing or wings, or to provide the same kind of escort day after day. For example, sometimes a group would be assigned penetration escort, sometimes withdrawal escort, sometimes escort over the target, and sometimes a combination of them. The daily mission reports show that all the groups were flying the same kinds of missions, for the most part, and do not indicate that only one was escorting effectively. On many days, more than one fighter group was escorting many bomber groups heading for the same target. Because the assignments were made on a rotational basis by headquarters, apparently without discrimination, the idea that bombardment crews could request one fighter group over another for escort duty, and get it, is not likely. All of the bombardment groups were stationed at bases miles away from the 332d Fighter Group at Ramitelli Air Field in Italy, and their personnel had little or no interaction with the personnel of the fighter groups that escorted them. Most of them did not have the option of choosing one group over another.

TABLE IX: STATIONS OF FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE GROUPS, JUNE 1944-MAY 1945

Group	Wing	Airfield	Predominate
			aircraft type
2 Bombardment	5 Bombardment	Amendola, Italy	B-17
97 Bombardment	5 Bombardment	Amendola, Italy	B-17
99 Bombardment	5 Bombardment	Tortorella, Italy	B-17
301 Bombardment	5 Bombardment	Lucera, Italy	B-17
463 Bombardment	5 Bombardment	Celone, Italy	B-17
483 Bombardment	5 Bombardment	Sterparone, Italy	B-17
98 Bombardment	47 Bombardment	Lecce, Italy	B-24
376 Bombardment	47 Bombardment	San Pancrazio, Italy	B-24
449 Bombardment	47 Bombardment	Grottaglie, Italy	B-24

450 Bombardment	47 Bombardment	Manduria, Italy	B-24
451 Bombardment	49 Bombardment	Castelluccio, Italy	B-24
461 Bombardment	49 Bombardment	Torretto, Italy	B-24
484 Bombardment	49 Bombardment	Torretto, Italy	B-24
460 Bombardment	55 Bombardment	Spinazzola, Italy	B-24
464 Bombardment	55 Bombardment	Pantanella, Italy	B-24
465 Bombardment	55 Bombardment	Pantanella, Italy	B-24
485 Bombardment	55 Bombardment	Venosa, Italy	B-24
454 Bombardment	304 Bombardment	San Giovanni, Italy	B-24
455 Bombardment	304 Bombardment	San Giovanni, Italy	B-24
456 Bombardment	304 Bombardment	Stornara, Italy	B-24
459 Bombardment	304 Bombardment	Giulia, Italy	B-24
1 Fighter	305 Fighter	Salsola, then Vincenzo,	P-38
		then Salsolo, then Lesina,	
		Italy	
14 Fighter	305 Fighter	Triolo, Italy	P-38
82 Fighter	305 Fighter	Vincenzo, Italy	P-38
31 Fighter	306 Fighter	San Severo, then	P-51
		Mondolfo, Italy	
52 Fighter	306 Fighter	Madna, then Piagiolino,	P-51
		Italy	
325 Fighter	306 Fighter	Lesina, then Rimini, then	P-51
		Mondolfo, Italy	
332 Fighter	306 Fighter	Ramitelli, Italy	P-47 and P-51*

Source: Maurer Maurer, *Air Force Combat Units of World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983). *The 332nd Fighter Group obtained its P-51 airplanes during July 1944.

At least one of the bombardment groups had become acquainted with the 332d Fighter Group, and knew it consisted of black pilots flying bomber escort duty. On December 29, 1944, eighteen B-24 bombers were forced by bad weather to land at Ramitelli Air Field in Italy, the home base of the 332d Fighter Group, which was flying P-51s. Seventeen of those bombers came from the 485th Bombardment Group, and the other one came from the 455th Bombardment Group. Most of the white bomber crews spent five days with the Tuskegee Airmen, enjoying their hospitality at a very crowded base. The 332d Fighter Group left a note in each bomber noting that the 332d Fighter Group's red-tailed escort fighters were there to protect them on their bombing missions.

If any bomber crews requested that the 332d Fighter Group escort them, they probably belonged to the 485th or 455th Bombardment Groups, some of whose personnel had met members of the 332d Fighter Group and shared accommodations with them. The request would have been based on the bomber crews' experience at Ramitelli, and not because the 332d Fighter Group had demonstrated its obvious superiority to the other fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force.⁴⁷

At times, the bombardment crews would mistake one set of escorts for another. For example, World War II B-24 bomber pilot John Sonneborn remembered gratefully that his aircraft was saved by a red-tailed P-51 pilot when he was flying a mission to Ploesti, Rumania, on May 5, 1944. He assumed that he had been escorted by a Tuskegee Airman, since he learned after the war that they had flown red-tailed P-51s in his theater. What Mr. Sonneborn did not realize was that the 332d Fighter Group did not begin flying missions to escort heavy bombers such as B-24s until June 1944, and the 332d Fighter Group did not begin flying P-51 aircraft until July 1944. If Sonneborn were saved by a pilot in a red-tailed P-51, that fighter pilot must have belonged to the 31st Fighter Group, because the 31st Fighter Group escorted B-24s to Ploesti on May 5, 1944, and the tails of the 31st Fighter Group P-51s were painted with red stripes. After the war, bomber crews sometimes gave fighter escort credit to the wrong group.

Yet the statistics still suggest strongly that the Tuskegee Airmen lost significantly fewer bombers to enemy aircraft fire than the average number lost by the other fighter groups in the Fifteenth Air Force. Does that mean the Tuskegee Airmen were superior?

One measure of the quality of the fighter escort groups was not just the number of bombers they lost to enemy aircraft fire, but the number of enemy fighters they destroyed, because each of those enemy fighters was a potential bomber killer. Shooting down enemy fighters was also a way to protect the bombers. In November 1945, the War Department published a report called "Policy for Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army. Since the report had been prepared by a committee of generals headed by Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., it was sometimes called the "Gillem Report." Part of the report compared the four P-51 fighter escort groups of the Fifteenth Air Force, which included the all-black 332nd Fighter Group and the all-white 31st, 52nd, 325th, and 332nd Fighter Groups (the other three fighter escort groups of the Fifteenth Air Force, the 1st, 14th, and 82nd, flew P-38 aircraft). While the report praised the 332d Fighter Group for successfully escorting bombers, it also criticized the group for having fewer aerial victory credits than the other groups because it did not aggressively chase enemy fighters to shoot them down. The report also claimed that each of the three white P-51 fighter groups shot down more than twice as many aircraft as it lost in combat, but that the 332d Fighter Group lost more of its own aircraft in combat than it destroyed of the enemy.

TABLE X: COMPARISON OF FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE P-51 FIGHTER GROUPS

Fighter Group	Predominant race	Victories per aircraft lost in combat
31 st	White	2.49
52 nd	White	2.08
325 th	White	2.22
332 nd	Black	0.66

Source: "Policy for Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army," Report of War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower, November 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency call number 170.2111-1, November 1945), section on historical evaluation of the Negro's Military Service, subsection 9, evaluation of combat performance of the Negro in World War II, under g., "combat aviation," p. 15.

A comparison of the aerial victory credits of the seven fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force covering the period the 332nd Fighter Group flew for the Fifteenth Air Force, between early June 1944 and the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, reveals that each of the groups, except the 332nd Fighter Group, produced at least one ace. The three groups that flew P-38 aircraft each produced only one or two aces in the period considered, but each of the three P-51 groups, besides the 332nd Fighter Group, had at least ten. In other words, during the period June 1944 through the end of the war in Europe, each of the P-51 fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force, except the 332nd Fighter Group, had at least ten pilots who shot down at least five enemy aircraft. The 332nd Fighter Group had none. The 31st and 52nd Fighter Groups each had ten, and the 325th Fighter Group had eleven.

TABLE XI: FIGHTER ACES OF THE FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE BY GROUP, JUNE 1944-APRIL 1945

Fighter Group	Fighter Squadrons	Aircraft type flown	Number of aces
1	27, 71, 94	P-38	Two
14	37, 48, 49	P-38	One
82	95, 96, 97	P-38	Four
31	307, 308, 309	P-51	Ten
52	2, 4, 5	P-51	Ten
325	317, 318, 319	P-51	Eleven
332	99, 100, 301, 302	P-47 and P-51*	None

Sources: Maurer Maurer, *Air Force Combat Units of World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983) for squadrons of each group and aircraft flown by each group; USAF Historical Study No. 85, *USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978) for aerial victory credits for each squadron listed chronologically; Barrett Tillman e-mail to Daniel Haulman, 23 May 2012. *The 332nd Fighter Group obtained its P-51 aircraft during July 1944.

Why was the 332nd Fighter Group the only one of the Fifteenth Air Force P-51 groups that had no pilots to shoot down at least five enemy aircraft, when the other three

such groups each had at least ten such pilots? There are a number of possible explanations. The 332nd Fighter Group, of all the P-51 groups in the Fifteenth Air Force, shot down the least number of enemy aircraft, and the fewer the number of aircraft shot down, the less the chances for the pilots to become aces. Another possible reason is that the 332nd Fighter Group had more P-51 pilots on any given mission, since that group had four squadrons, and the other groups had only three. More pilots in the group meant less opportunity for each of the pilots to become an ace. The members of the 332nd Fighter Group might have performed more as a team, with no pilot attempting to become a superstar at the expense of the others, or of the bombers they were protecting. Another theory, already addressed in a previous Misconception regarding Lee Archer, is that there was a racial conspiracy to prevent a black man from becoming an ace. As already mentioned, there is no documentation to support that theory, and the documentation that does exist contradicts it. Another explanation is that Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., commander of the 332nd Fighter Group, would not allow his fighter pilots to leave the bombers in order to chase enemy fighters and build up their aerial victory credit claims and scores.

In comparing the 332nd Fighter Group with the other P-51 fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force between June 1944 and the end of April 1945, when they were all primarily escorting bombers, one should bear in mind two factors. The more enemy aircraft a group encountered, the greater the chance the group had to shoot down enemy airplanes, and the less chance the enemy had to shoot down escorted bombers. If the 332nd Fighter Group encountered fewer enemy aircraft than the other groups, it would have had less opportunity to shoot down enemy aircraft, and enemy aircraft would have

had less opportunity to shoot down escorted bombers. Another factor to consider is the fact that the 332nd Fighter Group was the last one to be assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force. Its pilots did not have as much experience as the pilots of the other groups in aerial combat associated with long-range escort missions, at least during June and July 1944. In addition to that, during June and July 1944, unlike the other groups, the 332nd Fighter Group and its squadrons were transitioning from P-39 to P-47 aircraft, and from P-40 and P-47 aircraft to P-51 aircraft. By the time the 332nd Fighter Group pilots were used to flying P-51s and engaging enemy aircraft challenging the bomber formations, the enemy aircraft opposition had declined considerably. By the latter half of 1944 and the first half of 1945, the German air force was a shadow of its former self, and the majority of the bomber escort missions encountered no enemy aircraft.

Members of the 332nd Fighter Group encountered enemy aircraft on only 35 of their 179 bomber escort missions for the Fifteenth Air Force (they flew a total of 311 missions for the Fifteenth Air Force between early June 1944 and late April 1945, but many of the missions did not escort bombers). They shot down enemy aircraft on only 21 of those missions. 332nd Fighter Group members lost escorted bombers to enemy aircraft on only 7 of their Fifteenth Air Force missions. The possible that the 332nd Fighter Group lost fewer bombers and shot down fewer enemy aircraft than the other P-51 groups in the Fifteenth Air Force because it encountered fewer enemy aircraft on its missions, and not because it was providing better escort protection by staying closer to the bombers. The more enemy aircraft a fighter escort group encountered, the more chance it had of both losing bombers and shooting down enemy aircraft. The fewer

enemy aircraft a fighter escort group encountered, the less chance it had of both losing bombers and shooting down enemy aircraft.

In the final analysis, whether the Tuskegee Airmen were superior or inferior to the other fighter escort groups with which they served depends on the criteria. The Tuskegee Airmen seemed to be superior because they lost significantly fewer escorted bombers to enemy aircraft than the average fighter group in the Fifteenth Air Force. On the other hand, the Tuskegee Airmen seemed to be inferior because they shot down fewer enemy fighters than any other P-51 fighter group in the Fifteenth Air Force. I prefer to conclude that the Tuskegee Airmen proved, by their exemplary combat performance, not that they were superior or inferior to the white fighter pilots, but that they were equal to them. The issue is not really superiority or inferiority, but equality. Furthermore, each pilot should really be measured as an individual, not part of some artificial class. There were unquestionably some individual black fighter pilots who had superior records than some individual white fighter pilots, and vice versa.

8. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN UNITS WERE ALL BLACK

All of the Tuskegee Airmen organizations in combat, including the 99th, 100th, 301st, and 302nd Fighter Squadrons and the 332nd Fighter Group, were virtually all black by the time they deployed overseas, and remained all black until the Air Force was integrated in 1949. However, the Tuskegee Airmen flying organizations were not originally all black, and it would be a mistake to imagine that white officers never belonged to them, or that white officers were invariably opposed to their success.

The most famous of the Tuskegee Airmen military organizations were the 99th Fighter Squadron, the first black flying unit in the American military; the 332d Fighter Group, the first black fighter group; and the 477th Bombardment Group, the first black bomber group. All of these Tuskegee Airmen military organizations began with both black and white members. The first three commanders of the 99th Fighter Squadron (originally called the 99th Pursuit Squadron) were white. They included Captain Harold R. Maddux, 2nd Lt. Clyde H. Bynum, and Captain Alonzo S. Ward. The first two commanders of the 332d Fighter Group were white. They included Lt. Col. Sam W. Westbrook and Col. Robert R. Selway. The first commander of the 477th Bombardment Group, after it was activated as a predominantly black group, was white. He was Col. Robert R. Selway (who had earlier commanded the 332nd Fighter Group). All of these military organizations eventually became virtually all-black, but they did not begin that way.⁵¹

Many of the flight instructors at Tuskegee were white. This was true at all three of the bases around Tuskegee, including Kennedy Field, where civilian pilot training took place; at Moton Field, where the primary flight training occurred; and at Tuskegee Army Air Field, where the basic, advanced, and transition training was completed. White officers retained leadership positions in the flying training organizations at Moton Field and Tuskegee Army Air Field throughout World War II. 52

For more than a year before the 99th Fighter Squadron was assigned to the 332d Fighter Group, it served in combat overseas while attached to various white fighter groups, as if it were one of the squadrons of those groups. In effect, those groups included both black and white personnel while the 99th Fighter Squadron was attached to

them. Some of the members of the 99th Fighter Squadron, which by then had become an all-black organization, resented being assigned to the 332nd Fighter Group, because they had become accustomed to serving in white groups, flying alongside white fighter squadrons, and did not relish being placed with the black fighter group simply because they were also black. In a sense, it was a step back toward more segregation. At any rate, many Tuskegee Airmen during World War II served in units that once included white personnel, although as the war progressed, their organizations became all black.⁵³

To be sure, some of the white officers who were in command of Tuskegee Airmen opposed equal opportunities for them. Colonel William Momyer of the 33rd Fighter Group opposed the continued combat role of the 99th Fighter Squadron when it was attached to his group, and Colonel Robert Selway, commander of the 477th Bombardment Group at Freeman Field, attempted to enforce segregated officers' clubs at that base, and had many of the Tuskegee Airmen arrested for opposing his policy.⁵⁴ But for every white officer who discouraged equal opportunity for the Tuskegee Airmen under their command, there were other white officers who sincerely worked for their success. They included Forrest Shelton, who instructed pilots in civilian and primary pilot training at Kennedy and Moton Fields near Tuskegee; Major William T. Smith, who supervised primary pilot training at Moton Field; Captain Robert M. Long, a flight instructor who taught the first Tuskegee Airmen pilots to graduate from advanced pilot training at Tuskegee Army Air Field; Colonel Noel Parrish, commander of the pilot training at Tuskegee Army Air Field; and Colonel Earl E. Bates, commander of the 79th Fighter Group for most of the time the 99th Fighter Squadron was attached to it (from October 1943 to April 1944.)⁵⁵

Even the black pilots of the Tuskegee Airmen units were not all black. Many of them descended not only from African Americans, but also from European Americans and native Americans. Some were a mixture of all three. Yet no matter how little African American blood they had, most of the members of the Tuskegee Airmen organizations were classified as "colored" in the World War II period. The skin color and hair texture and facial features of the Tuskegee Airmen varied as greatly as their height. Some of the Tuskegee Airman pilots looked more white than black. The racial diversity among the members of the Tuskegee Airmen organizations belied the foolish idea that men should be separated from each other on the basis of what they looked like. One Tuskegee Airman, Eugene Smith, was not black at all, but a mixture of European and American Indian ancestry. The doctor that delivered him wrote "colored" on his birth certificate. Because of that label, Smith could fly for the Army Air Forces only if he went to Tuskegee, and so he did. ⁵⁶

9. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT ALL TUSKEGEE AIRMEN WERE FIGHTER PILOTS WHO FLEW RED-TAILED P-51S TO ESCORT BOMBERS

Museum displays, World War II history books, magazine articles, pamphlets, newspaper articles, television programs, and even movies sometimes describe only one part of the Tuskegee Airmen story, misleading readers or observers into thinking that all the Tuskegee Airmen flew red-tailed P-51s on bomber escort missions deep into enemy territory. The Tuskegee Airmen story is much more complex than that. In fact, the Tuskegee Airmen flew four kinds of fighter aircraft in combat, and also bombers not in combat. Many of the Tuskegee Airmen who flew in combat during World War II and earned distinguished records never saw a red-tailed P-51. A good example is Charles Dryden, who returned from Italy months before any of the Tuskegee Airmen flew any P-

51s overseas, and months before they received the assignment to escort heavy bombers deep into enemy territory.⁵⁷

To be sure, the most famous Tuskegee Airmen flew red-tailed P-51 Mustangs to escort Fifteenth Air Force heavy bombers on raids deep into enemy territory, but not all of them did so. Before July 1944, the 99th Fighter Squadron flew P-40 fighters on patrol and air-to-ground attack missions against enemy targets on tactical missions for the Twelfth Air Force. Sometimes these missions involved escorting medium bombers, but more often they involved supporting Allied surface forces and defending them from attack by enemy aircraft in Italy. During June 1944, the 332d Fighter Group flew P-47 aircraft on bomber escort missions. Before then, the group and its three fighter squadrons flew P-39 aircraft on tactical missions for the Twelfth Air Force, supporting Allied ground forces in Italy. Neither the P-39s nor the P-40s had red tails. Only in July 1944 was the 99th Fighter Squadron assigned to the 332d Fighter Group, and only in that month did the group begin to fly red-tailed P-51s. The group painted the tails of the aircraft red because the Fifteenth Air Force had seven fighter escort groups, including three P-38 and four P-51 groups. All four of the P-51 groups had distinctively-painted tails. The 31st Fighter Group had red-striped tails; the 52nd Fighter Group had yellow tails; the 325th Fighter Group had black and yellow checkerboard-patterned tails. The tails of the 332d Fighter Group were painted solid red.⁵⁸ The assigned colors for each group helped distinguish it from other groups in large formations flying to, from, and over enemy targets. The various colored tails also helped bomber crews tell which groups were escorting them, and whether distant fighters were friend or foe.

Some of the African-American pilots who trained at Tuskegee Army Air Field during World War II never became fighter pilots at all. They became bomber pilots, and were assigned after their Tuskegee training to the 477th Bombardment Group, which flew twin-engined B-25s. That group never deployed overseas to take part in combat during the war.⁵⁹

10. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT AFTER A FLIGHT WITH A BLACK PILOT AT TUSKEGEE, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PERSUADED THE PRESIDENT TO ESTABLISH A BLACK FLYING UNIT IN THE ARMY AIR CORPS

Contrary to a persistent misconception, Eleanor Roosevelt's visit to Tuskegee

Institute at the end of March 1941 did not result in her convincing her husband, President

Franklin D. Roosevelt, to establish a black flying unit in the Army Air Corps. 60

In fact, the decision to establish a black flying unit in the Army Air Corps had been announced by the War Department on January 16, 1941, more than two months before Eleanor Roosevelt's visit to Tuskegee. The announcement included mention of plans to train support personnel for the unit at Chanute Field, Illinois, followed by pilot training at Tuskegee. On March 19, 1941, the War Department constituted the first black flying unit, the 99th Pursuit Squadron, and on March 22, the unit was activated at Chanute Field. A week after the 99th Pursuit Squadron was activated, Eleanor Roosevelt visited Tuskegee, and was given an airplane ride over Tuskegee. The date was March 29, 1941. The pilot was Charles Anderson, chief instructor who taught civilian pilot training at Tuskegee Institute. The President's wife visited Tuskegee, not to get a black flying squadron started, but because the black flying squadron had been started, and was scheduled to move from Chanute to Tuskegee after its support personnel had been trained.

Eleanor Roosevelt undoubtedly supported the efforts to establish black flying training at Tuskegee, and her visit to Tuskegee Institute encouraged contributions for the building of a primary flying base at Tuskegee (which later became Moton Field), but she did not convince her husband the President to establish the first black flying unit after her flight with Chief Anderson at Tuskegee, because the 99th Pursuit Squadron had already been announced in January, and constituted and activated before her Tuskegee visit.

11. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN EARNED 150 DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSSES DURING WORLD WAR II

For many years the Tuskegee Airmen were said to have earned 150 Distinguished Flying Crosses during World War II. According to Dr. Roscoe Brown, an original Tuskegee Airmen who earned his own Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC), 150 is the usual number one hears or reads for DFCs that were earned by Tuskegee Airmen. He said the number was based on the book, *The Tuskegee Airmen: The Men Who Changed a Nation*, by Charles Francis. Francis noted that there was evidence for 95 DFCs awarded to Tuskegee Airmen, but possibly there were as many as 150.⁶³

Craig Huntly of the Tuskegee Airmen Incorporated's Harry A. Sheppard historical research committee checked all the Fifteenth Air Force general orders that awarded DFCs to Tuskegee Airmen, and found 95 had been awarded. He knew that the Tuskegee Airmen units in combat had also served with the Twelfth Air Force, before joining the Fifteenth Air Force, and that Twelfth Air Force general orders would also probably note additional DFCs awarded to Tuskegee Airmen. However, Huntly found only one Twelfth Air Force general order that awarded a DFC to a Tuskegee Airman. It recognized the aerial victory credit of Charles B. Hall, the first black pilot in military service to shoot down an enemy airplane. He found no other Twelfth Air Force orders

that awarded DFCs to Tuskegee Airmen. Tuskegee Airmen who earned other aerial victory credits, while flying with the Twelfth Air Force, earned Air Medals instead of DFCs. The total number of DFCs awarded to Tuskegee Airmen was therefore 96: 95 of which were awarded by Fifteenth Air Force orders, and 1 awarded by a Twelfth Air Force order. Moreover, one Tuskegee Airman, Captain William A. Campbell, earned two DFCs. Therefore, 95 Tuskegee Airmen earned DFCs, but 96 DFCs were awarded to Tuskegee Airmen.

I searched through every one of the orders that Huntly listed, and found the dates of the events for which each of the Tuskegee Airmen DFCs were awarded. I placed the events in chronological order so that I could include them in my larger Tuskegee Airmen Chronology. The correct number of DFCs earned by the Tuskegee Airmen, for which there is documentation, is 96, not 150. The table below shows the numbers of all the Fifteenth and Twelfth Air Force general orders that awarded DFCs to Tuskegee Airmen.

TABLE XII: CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF TUSKEGEE AIRMEN DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS WINNERS, BY DATE OF THE ACTION FOR WHICH EACH DFC WAS AWARDED.

DATE	NAME	FIGHTER	GENERAL ORDER
		SQUADRON	NUMBER AND DATE
		OF 332D	OF ISSUE (all issued by
		FIGHTER	Fifteenth Air Force except
		GROUP	first one)
28 Jan 1944	Capt. Charles B. Hall	99	64, 22 May 1944 (12 AF)
12 May 1944	Capt. Howard L. Baugh	99	4041, 19 Oct 1944
21 May 1944	1 Lt. Charles W. Tate	99	449, 31 Jan 1945
27 May 1944	1 Lt. Clarence W. Dart	99	449, 31 Jan 1945
4 June 1944	Capt. Edward L. Toppins	99	4041, 19 Oct 1944
4 June 1944	Capt. Leonard M. Jackson	99	4876, 5 Dec 1944
5 June 1944	Capt. Elwood T. Driver	99	449, 31 Jan 1945
9 June 1944	Col. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.	(332 Fighter	2972, 31 Aug 1944
		Gp)	
12 July 1944	Capt. Joseph D. Elsberry	301	2466, 10 Aug 1944
16 July 1944	Capt. Alphonza W. Davis	(332 Fighter	3541, 22 Sep 1944

		Gp)	
16 July 1944	1 Lt. William W. Green	302	49, 3 Jan 1945
17 July 1944	1 Lt. Luther H. Smith	302	5068, 18 Dec 1944
17 July 1944	1 Lt. Laurence D. Wilkins	302	49, 3 Jan 1945
18 July 1944	2 Lt. Clarence D. Lester	100	3167, 6 Sep 1944
18 July 1944	1 Lt. Jack D. Holsclaw	100	3167, 6 Sep 1944
18 July 1944	Capt. Andrew D. Turner	100	4009, 17 Oct 1944
18 July 1944	1 Lt. Walter J. A. Palmer	100	654, 13 Feb 1945
18 July 1944	1 Lt. Charles P. Bailey	99	3484, 29 May 1945
20 July 1944	Capt. Henry B. Perry	99	4993, 14 Dec 1944
25 July 1944	Capt. Harold E. Sawyer	301	4876, 5 Dec 1944
27 July 1944	1 Lt. Edward C. Gleed	(332 Fighter	3106, 4 Sep 1944
		Gp)	
12 August 1944	Capt. Lee Rayford	301	5068, 18 Dec 1944
12 August 1944	Capt. Woodrow W. Crockett	100	49, 3 Jan 1945
12 August 1944	Capt. William T. Mattison	100	49, 3 Jan 1945
12 August 1944	1 Lt. Freddie E. Hutchins	302	49, 3 Jan 1945
12 August 1944	1 Lt. Lawrence B. Jefferson	301	49, 3 Jan 1945
12 August 1944	1 Lt. Lowell C. Steward	100	231, 15 Jan 1945
14 August 1944	Capt. Melvin T. Jackson	302	3689, 29 Sep 1944
14 August 1944	1 Lt. Gwynne W. Pierson	302	287, 19 Jan 1945
14 August 1944	Capt. Arnold W. Cisco	301	839, 21 Feb 1945
14 August 1944	Capt. Alton F. Ballard	301	1153, 5 Mar 1945
24 August 1944	1 Lt. John F. Briggs	100	49, 3 Jan 1945
24 August 1944	1 Lt. William H. Thomas	302	449, 31 Jan 1945
27 August 1944	Capt. Wendell O. Pruitt	302	3950, 15 Oct 1944
27 August 1944	Capt. Dudley M. Watson	302	4009, 17 Oct 1944
27 August 1944	1 Lt. Roger Romine	302	5068, 18 Dec 1944
30 August 1944	Capt. Clarence H. Bradford	301	1811, 27 Mar 1945
8 September 1944	Maj. George S. Roberts	(332 Fighter	137, 8 Jan 1945
		Gp)	
8 September 1944	1 Lt. Heber C. Houston	99	3484, 29 May 1945
4 October 1944	1 Lt. Samuel L. Curtis	100	158, 10 Jan 1945
4 October 1944	1 Lt. Dempsey Morgan	100	231, 15 Jan 1945
4 October 1944	Capt. Claude B. Govan	301	255, 16 Jan 1945
4 October 1944	1 Lt. Herman A. Lawson	99	449, 31 Jan 1945
4 October 1944	1 Lt. Willard L. Woods	100	449, 31 Jan 1945
6 October 1944	1 Lt. Alva N. Temple	99	231, 15 Jan 1945
6 October 1944	Capt. Lawrence E. Dickson	100	287, 19 Jan 1945
6 October 1944	1 Lt Edward M. Thomas	99	517, 6 Feb 1945
6 October 1944	1 Lt. Robert L. Martin	100	839, 21 Feb 1945
6 October 1944	Capt. Robert J. Friend	301	1811, 27 Mar 1945
11 October 1944	Capt. William A. Campbell	99	4215, 28 Oct 1944
11 October 1944	1 Lt. George E. Gray	99	4425, 10 Nov 1944
11 October 1944	1 Lt. Felix J. Kirkpatrick	302	4876, 5 Dec 1944

11 October 1944	1 Lt. Richard S. Harder	99	836, 21 Feb 1945
12 October 1944	1 Lt. Lee Archer	302	4876, 5 Dec 1944
12 October 1944	Capt. Milton R. Brooks	302	255, 16 Jan 1945
12 October 1944	1 Lt. Frank E. Roberts	100	287, 19 Jan 1945
12 October 1944	1 Lt. Spurgeon N. Ellington	100	449, 31 Jan 1945
12 October 1944	1 Lt. Leonard F. Turner	301	836, 21 Feb 1945
12 October 1944	Capt. Armour G. McDaniel	301	1430, 15 Mar 1945
12 October 1944	Capt. Stanley L. Harris	301	1811, 27 Mar 1945
12 October 1944	1 Lt. Marion R. Rodgers	99	1811, 27 Mar 1945
12 October 1944	1 Lt. Quitman C. Walker	99	3484, 29 May 1945
13 October 1944	1 Lt. Milton S. Hays	99	719, 16 Feb 1945
14 October 1944	1 Lt. George M. Rhodes, Jr.	100	49, 3 Jan 1945
21 October 1944	Capt. Vernon V. Haywood	302	5068, 18 Dec 1944
16 November	Capt. Luke J. Weathers	302	5228, 28 Dec 1944
1944	Cupt. Luke 3. Weathers	302	3220, 20 Dec 1744
19 November	Capt. Albert H. Manning	99	4876, 5 Dec 1944
1944			1070,5 200 15 11
19 November	Capt. John Daniels	99	5068, 18 Dec 1944
1944			2000, 10 200 15 11
19 November	1 Lt. William N. Alsbrook	99	836, 21 Feb 1945
1944	1 20 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11		35 3, 21 1 53 13 .5
19 November	1 Lt. Norman W. Scales	100	836, 21 Feb 1945
1944			
16 February 1945	Capt. Emile G. Clifton	99	3484, 29 May 1945
17 February 1945	Capt. Louis G. Purnell	301	2362, 14 Apr 1945
25 February 1945	1 Lt. Roscoe C. Brown	100	1430, 15 Mar 1945
25 February 1945	1 Lt. Reid E. Thompson	100	2270, 11 Apr 1945
12 March 1945	Capt. Walter M. Downs	301	3484, 29 May 1945
14 March 1945	1 Lt. Shelby F. Westbrook	99	2362, 14 Apr 1945
14 March 1945	1 Lt. Hannibal M. Cox	99	3031, 5 May 1945
14 March 1945	2 Lt. Vincent I. Mitchell	99	3031, 5 May 1945
14 March 1945	1 Lt. Thomas P. Braswell	99	3484, 29 May 1945
14 March 1945	2 Lt. John W. Davis	99	3484, 29 May 1945
16 March 1945	1 Lt Roland W. Moody	301	2834, 28 Apr 1945
16 March 1945	1 Lt. Henry R. Peoples	301	2834, 28 Apr 1945
16 March 1945	1 Lt. William S. Price III	301	2834, 28 Apr 1945
24 March 1945	1 Lt. Earl R. Lane	100	2834, 28 Apr 1945
24 March 1945	2 Lt. Charles V. Brantley	100	2834, 28 Apr 1945
31 March 1945	1 Lt. Robert W. Williams	100	3484, 29 May 1945
31 March 1945	1 Lt. Bertram W. Wilson Jr.	100	3484, 29 May 1945
1 April 1945	1 Lt. Charles L. White	301	2834, 28 Apr 1945
1 April 1945	1 Lt. John E. Edwards	301	3484, 29 May 1945
1 April 1945	1 Lt. Harry T. Stewart Jr.	301	3484, 29 May 1945
	1 Lt. Harry 1. Stewart 31.	501	3 10 1, 20 11 ay 10 13
1 April 1945	2 Lt. Carl E. Carey	301	3484, 29 May 1945
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15 April 1945	1 Lt. Gentry E. Barnes	99	3484, 29 May 1945
15 April 1945	Capt. William A. Campbell	99	3484, 29 May 1945
15 April 1945	1 Lt. Jimmy Lanham	301	3484, 29 May 1945
26 April 1945	1 Lt. Thomas W. Jefferson	301	3343, 22 May 1945

12. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN WERE THE FIRST TO IMPLEMENT A "STICK WITH THE BOMBERS" POLICY

In the RED TAILS movie by George Lucas, released in January 2012, the Tuskegee Airmen appear to be the first fighter group to implement a "stick with the bombers" policy of fighter escort. All of the other fighter groups appear to be chasing after enemy fighters, leaving the bombers unprotected from other enemy fighters. That is not true. The "stick with the bombers" policy had been instituted by Major General Ira Eaker when he was commander of the Eighth Air Force in England, long before the Tuskegee Airmen ever began heavy bomber escort. In January 1944, Eaker moved to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, where the Tuskegee Airmen were to fly, and took his "stick with the bombers" ideas with him for the Fifteenth Air Force, over which he served as commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. At the same time, Lieutenant General Jimmy Doolittle moved to England to take command of the Eighth Air Force. When he entered the office of the commander of the VIII Fighter Command, which managed the fighter escorts of the Eighth Air Force, he saw a sign that said, "The First Duty of the Eighth Air Force Fighters is to bring the bombers back alive." Doolittle ordered that the sign be taken down and declared that the first duty of the fighters is to destroy German fighters.⁶⁴

When the Tuskegee Airmen followed a "stick with the bombers" escort policy, they were not implementing a brand new policy, but following the old policy of General Eaker. The fighter escorts of the Fifteenth Air Force, under the Mediterranean Allied Air

Forces, refused to be lured away from the bombers they were protecting by enemy decoy fighters. That would have left the bombers more vulnerable to the other enemy fighters. The policy of going after the German fighters, instead of sticking with the bombers, was Doolittle's policy after he moved to England to take command of the Eighth Air Force early in 1944, but not the policy of the Fifteenth Air Force after General Eaker took command of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, under which the Fifteenth Air Force served.

13. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE 332ND FIGHTER GROUP WAS THE ONLY ONE TO ESCORT FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE BOMBERS OVER BERLIN

The RED TAILS movie by George Lucas depicts the Berlin mission as if only two fighter groups were assigned to protect the Fifteenth Air Force bombers: the 52nd and the 332nd. In the movie, the 52nd Fighter Group fails to show up, so the 332nd Fighter Group stays with the bombers all the way to the target, being the only fighter group to protect the bombers on that mission. Tuskegee Airman Lee Archer, in a 2001 interview, claimed that "the other group was supposed to relieve us got lost and didn't show up and our group decided that they would stay with the bombers." In reality, the Fifteenth Air Force bombers that raided Berlin that day were protected by no less than five fighter groups, including not only the 52nd and 332nd, but also three other groups. Four of the fighter groups flew P-51s, and one flew P-38s. All of the five fighter groups flew all the way to Berlin to protect the bombers that day. In fact, whereas the 332nd Fighter Group shot down 3 enemy jets that attacked the bombers near Berlin that day, the 31st Fighter Group shot down 5 in the same air battle. 66

14. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE 99TH FIGHTER SQUADRON, UNLIKE THE WHITE FIGHTER SQUADRONS WITH WHICH IT SERVED, AT FIRST FLEW OBSOLETE P-40 AIRPLANES

The Lucasfilm movie about the Tuskegee Airmen called RED TAILS suggests that the Tuskegee Airmen, when flying their P-40s, were flying obsolete hand-me-down airplanes that the white units no longer flew. The 99th Fighter Squadron was the Tuskegee Airmen unit that flew P-40s in combat. When the 99th Fighter Squadron entered combat from bases first in north Africa, and later Sicily and still later on the mainland of Italy in 1943, it was flying the same kinds of aircraft as the P-40 groups to which it was attached in turn, and the same kinds of aircraft as the P-40 squadrons that were assigned to those same groups. If the P-40 was an obsolete aircraft, then groups to which it was attached, and the fighter squadrons assigned to those groups with which the 99th Fighter Squadron flew, were also flying obsolete aircraft.

Most of the time the 99th Fighter Squadron was flying P-40s while attached to white P-40 groups, each of which had three other P-40 squadrons assigned, all the squadrons were flying the same kinds of missions. Those missions included attacking the enemy-held island of Pantelleria in the Mediterranean Sea, which surrendered without an invasion, and covering the Allied invasion of Sicily, to which the 99th Fighter Squadron moved with the group to which it was attached. In fact, both the group and the 99th Fighter Squadron earned a Distinguished Unit Citation for the missions against enemy-held Sicily. A Tuskegee Airman shot down an enemy aircraft exactly one month after the 99th Fighter Squadron flew its first combat mission. In truth, except for about a month in 1943, the 99th Fighter Squadron was not only flying the same kinds of aircraft, but also the same kinds of missions in the same areas, on the front lines facing the enemy.⁶⁷

There is one exception. When the 33rd Fighter Group and its three assigned P-40 squadrons moved from Sicily to the mainland of Italy on 13-14 September 1943, the 99th

Fighter Squadron, also flying P-40s, remained back at Sicily, and stayed there until more than a month later, when it also moved to the mainland of Italy. During that month, the 99th Fighter Squadron was stationed far behind the squadrons assigned to the group, and therefore had much less opportunity to shoot down enemy aircraft. On October 16, 1943, the 99th Fighter Squadron was detached from the 33rd Fighter Group and attached instead to the 79th Fighter Group. The next day, October 17, the 99th finally moved to the mainland of Italy.⁶⁸

The 99th Fighter Squadron earned two Distinguished Unit Citations before it was assigned to the 332nd Fighter Group. If one reads the orders that awarded those honors, he or she would find no reference at all to the 99th Fighter Squadron. The honors were awarded to the 324th Fighter Group, for operations over Sicily in June and July 1943, and for operations over Cassino on 12-14 May 1944. The only reason the 99th Fighter Squadron also received the two Distinguished Unit Citations is because the 99th Fighter Squadron was attached to the 324th Fighter Group in June and July 1943 and again in May 1944. The 99th Fighter Squadron was flying the same aircraft (P-40s) on the same missions as the 324th Fighter Group. It was not flying an inferior aircraft, and most of the time, except between mid-September and mid-October 1943, it was not flying many miles away from the enemy, without the opportunity to excel in combat.⁶⁹

15. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE TRAINING OF BLACK PILOTS FOR COMBAT WAS AN EXPERIMENT DESIGNED TO FAIL

Many publications about the Tuskegee Airmen claim that the program of training black pilots in the Army Air Forces was an experiment designed to fail, as if the Army Air Forces planned from the start to "wash out" all the pilot trainees before they had a chance to graduate, or that it planned from the start never to allow them to enter combat.

The documentation from World War II does not support the claim, although there were many within the service, including some of the leading officers, who resisted the policy of granting black pilots the same opportunities as white ones.

The World War II primary sources about the training of the black pilots at Moton Field and later at Tuskegee Army Air Field, and even at Selfridge Field, indicate that at least the local Army Air Forces officers by and large intended for the program to succeed. Studies by Robert "Jeff" Jakeman and J. Todd Moye prove that many Army Air Forces white personnel in the flying training program for black pilots, with a few exceptions, worked for the success of the black pilots. The foremost Army Air Forces officer in charge of the black pilot training was Colonel Noel Parrish. As commander of Tuskegee Army Air Field, where the pilots received their basic and advanced flying training, and where many of them also received their transition training, he had a vested interest in the success of the program. Many other white Army Air Forces officers took part in the training of black pilots, not only at Moton Field but also at Tuskegee Army Air Field. Among them were Major William T. Smith and Captain Robert M. Long. Forrest Shelton was a white pilot who taught black pilots to fly both in civilian pilot training at Kennedy Field and in primary training at Moton Field. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the commander in chief, had mandated the first black flying unit as early as 1940, and the War Department established and activated that unit in March 1941, even before any black pilots had been trained within the Army Air Forces. President Roosevelt, and the Army Air Forces officers at Moton and Tuskegee Army Air Fields, did not intend the program to fail.⁷⁰

16. THE MISCONCEPTION OF THE HIDDEN TROPHY

A popular story claims that when the Air Force held its first gunnery "Top Gun" meet in Las Vegas in 1949, the all-black 332nd Fighter Group defeated all the other groups, but because a black group won, the competition was discontinued and the trophy was hidden. Some sixty years later, the trophy was finally discovered, and the 332nd Fighter Group was recognized for this unique achievement.⁷¹

In reality, the Air Force's 1949 gunnery meet in Las Vegas was not called "Top Gun," and the 332nd Fighter Group was not the only fighter group to win. The 332nd won the conventional (propeller-driven) aircraft category, while the 4th Fighter Group won the jet aircraft category. In 1950, the Air Force held another gunnery meet in Las Vegas, but by then, the all-black 332nd Fighter Group had been inactivated. Two other organizations, the 3525th Aircraft Gunnery Squadron and the 27th Fighter Escort Group, won the 1950 gunnery meet, the first for the jet aircraft category, and the second for the conventional (propeller-driven) aircraft category. The trophy for the 1949 and 1950 gunnery meets included an engraved plate that named the four organizations that won the two meets in the two categories.⁷²

The story that the trophy was deliberately hidden by racists to cover up the achievement of the black pilots does not ring true. For one thing, the 332nd Fighter Group was only one of four organizations listed on the trophy, and three of them were white. Hiding the trophy would not only obscure black heroes, but white ones as well. Another factor to consider is that when the trophy was awarded for the last time, no institution called the Air Force Museum existed yet. In 1956, the Air Force Technical Museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base was renamed the Air Force Museum, which was open to the public, but the trophy was not yet a part of the museum's collection, but belonged to

the Smithsonian Institution, which could not display all of the thousands of artifacts in its inventory. In 1971, the Air Force Museum moved to its current site, but was still only a fraction of what it is today. Not until 1975 was the museum constituted as an official USAF organization rather than simply a named activity. The museum grew tremendously in size in the decades after 1975, and eventually had more room to exhibit artifacts. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. transferred some of its United States Air Force artifacts to the Air Force Museum. Among them was the trophy from the USAF gunnery meets in Las Vegas in 1949 and 1950. Years later, largely through the efforts of Zellie Orr, the trophy for the Air Force's gunnery meets in Las Vegas in 1949 and 1950 was put on display as part of an exhibit to commemorate the achievements of the Tuskegee Airmen, since the 332nd Fighter Group was its most famous organization, although the 332nd Fighter Group was not the only group to win the trophy.⁷³

The gunnery meets at Las Vegas were discontinued not because a black group had won, but because the Korean War broke out in 1950, and the Air Force needed to deploy its best fighter groups to the Far East to take part in the conflict, which did not end until 1953.

17: THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE OUTSTANDING WORLD WAR II RECORD OF THE TUSEKGEE AIRMEN ALONE CONVINCED PRESIDENT TRUMAN TO DESEGREGATE THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

The Tuskegee Airmen's 332nd Fighter Group completed its combat missions in Europe, and members of the 477th Bombardment Group took part in the "Freeman Field Mutiny," in the spring of 1945, but President Truman did not announce his famous Executive Order 9981 (EO 9981) until July 26, 1948, more than three years later.

Although the executive order did not mention segregation or desegregation or integration, President Truman noted that his intent was to end segregation in American military forces, which would help fulfill the equal opportunity the executive order overtly promised.

According to a chronology on the website of the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, there were several factors that led up to EO 9981. On October 29, 1947, the President's Committee on Civil Rights issued a report, "To Secure These Rights," which called for an end to racial segregation in the armed forces of the United States. On March 27, 1948, twenty African-American organizations meeting in New York issued a "Declaration of Negro Voters," which called for an end to racial segregation in the armed forces. On April 26, 1948, sixteen African-American leaders told Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal that the armed forces of the United States must be desegregated. On June 26, 1948, A. Philip Randolph announced formation of a "League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation", and three days later he told President Truman that unless he issued an executive order ending racial segregation in the armed forces, African-American youth would resist the draft. Most importantly, 1948 was a presidential election year, and President Truman hoped to appeal to black voters in his reelection campaign.

All of these factors must have influenced Truman's decision, but I believe the record of the Tuskegee Airmen and the many other black military organizations in World War II, such as the 92nd Infantry Division in Italy, black troops who volunteered for front line duty after the Battle of the Bulge, and the black drivers of the "Red Ball Express," must have also been a factor, not only in Truman's mind, but also in the minds of those

who urged him to desegregate the military. In recognizing the achievements of black military personnel in World War II, we should not give all the credit to just one or two of those organizations. The Tuskegee Airmen were probably the most famous of the black military organizations in World War II, but they alone were not responsible for the desegregation of the armed forces of the United States.

I believe the exemplary record of the Tuskegee Airmen's 332nd Fighter Group during World War II contributed to President Truman's decision to desegregate the United States armed forces, since it proved that black men could fly in combat as well as white men. I believe the efforts of members of the 477th Bombardment Group to desegregate facilities at Freeman Field in 1945 also contributed to the end of racial segregation on military bases, and, ultimately, to the end of racial segregation in the armed forces. However, there were certainly other factors that contributed to President Truman's military desegregation decision, including the role of other black military organizations during World War II.

Another factor to consider is that the Air Force, as a newly independent service, was already moving toward racial integration even before Truman's Executive Order 9981, and that the Air Force actually contributed to the decision. The first Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, supported the racial integration of the Air Force from the beginning of the Air Force as a military service independent from the Army in 1947, and he contributed to the drafting of the executive order. Symington was an old friend of Truman, and they both hailed from Missouri. Colonel Noel Parrish, who had commanded the flying school at Tuskegee Army Air Field, also supported the racial integration of the Air Force before the actual integration was implemented in 1949. It

should not be a surprise that the Air Force, of all the military services, was the first one to implement racial integration, because the ball had been rolling within the Air Force even before Truman issued his mandate to all the services.⁷⁵

In a letter dated April 5, 1948 to Lemuel E. Graves of the newspaper, *The* Pittsburgh Courier, General Carl Spaatz, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, wrote, "It is the feeling of this Headquarters that the ultimate Air Force objective must be to eliminate segregation among its personnel by the unrestricted use of Negro personnel in free competition for any duty within the Air Force for which they may qualify." On April 26, Spaatz announced that the Air Force would integrate. His views were consistent with those of the then Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington. Supporting the same view was Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, who thought that racial segregation of the Air Force degraded its effectiveness as a service. In the same month, April 1948, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert testified before the National Defense Conference on Negroes Affairs that the "Air Force accepts no doctrine of racial superiority or inferiority." Lt. Gen. Edwards also testified before the same conference, but was more specific, endorsing desegregation of the Air Force. The United States Air Force had not integrated before Truman's Executive Order 9981, but its leadership had already expressed its desire for racial integration. In the back of the minds of all the Air Force leaders who supported the racial integration of their service, before Truman's order, there must have been an awareness of what the only American black pilots in combat in World War II had achieved just a few years earlier, as members of the Army Air Forces.⁷⁶

18. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT 332ND FIGHTER GROUP MEMBERS PAINTED THE TAILS OF THEIR FIGHTER ESCORT AIRCRAFT RED WITHOUT ANY DIRECTION FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY TO DO SO.

A popular story about the Tuskegee Airmen is that one day someone in the 332nd Fighter Group impulsively decided to paint the tails of the group's escort fighters red so that others would "know who they were" and so that they would get credit for being the best of the fighter escort groups in the combat theater. The story suggests that aircraft of the other fighter escort groups were not painted in any distinctive color, and that the Tuskegee Airmen were the only ones to fly fighters with red tails.⁷⁷

In truth, each of the seven fighter escort groups in the Fifteenth Air Force had its own assigned color marking scheme. By the middle of July 1944, the 306th Fighter Wing had four P-51 groups, of which the 332nd Fighter Group was one, and three P-38s groups. The prescribed aircraft markings involved not only the tail but other parts of the aircraft as well, but the tails of the P-51s were the most distinctive. The 31st Fighter Group had striped red-tailed P-51s, while the 52nd Fighter Group had yellow-tailed Mustangs. The tails of the 325th Fighter Group P-51s were painted a black and yellow checkerboard pattern, and the 332nd Fighter Group, of course, had solid red tails. A Fifteenth Air Force document from 1944 shows the markings of the aircraft of each of the seven fighter groups, and a description of the markings. James T. Sheppard, a Tuskegee Airmen who maintained P-47 and P-51 aircraft at Ramitelli Air Field in Italy when the 332nd Fighter Group was flying combat missions from there, remembered that the 332nd Fighter Group members did not spontaneously determine the red-tailed markings of their aircraft, but that they were assigned by order of the commander of the Fifteenth Air Force, General Nathan B. Twining. Having received the color scheme order, the maintenance officer of

each of the four fighter squadrons of the 332nd Fighter Group gathered his crew chiefs and passed along the prescribed aircraft markings.⁷⁸

Once each of the fighter escort group aircraft was painted as assigned, each group could be identified more easily not only by the other fighter groups but also by the bombardment groups and wings whom they would escort. The colors helped the members of the large formations tell friend from foe, and, among friends, which group was which. This was especially important when there were several different bombardment groups and fighter escort groups on the same mission.

19. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT ALL BLACK MILITARY PILOT TRAINING DURING WORLD WAR II TOOK PLACE AT TUSKEGEE INSTITUTE.

Many articles about the Tuskegee Airmen imply or insinuate that all the black pilots in the American military during World War II received their flying training at Tuskegee Institute.⁷⁹ In actuality there were three main phases of military flying training: primary, basic, and advanced. Only the primary phase took place at Tuskegee Institute.

Along with other black institutions of higher learning, Tuskegee Institute operated a civilian pilot training program. This was accomplished at the institute's Kennedy Field, south of downtown Tuskegee. That, however, was to train civilian pilots, who were not yet members of the Army Air Corps or the Army Air Forces. There were other places all over the country where black pilots trained, as civilians.

Tuskegee Institute also operated, under contract with the Army Air Forces, a primary flying training school at Moton Field, another facility owned by Tuskegee Institute. The primary phase was for military pilots, but the although the cadets were in the military, many of the instructors were civilians. Military officers supervised the

overall training at Moton Field, and determined which of the pilots would move on to the basic and advanced phases of military pilot training.

The basic and advanced phases of military pilot training, for the Tuskegee
Airmen, took place not at Tuskegee Institute or any of its facilities, but at Tuskegee Army
Air Field, which was several miles northwest of Moton Field. Tuskegee Army Air Field
was much larger than Moton Field, and was wholly owned and operated by the Army Air
Forces. The flying school at Tuskegee Army Air Field was not part of Tuskegee
Institute.⁸⁰

20. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN WERE THE ONLY FIGHTER PILOTS FOLLOWING THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF "STICKING WITH THE BOMBERS."

When Lt. Gen. Ira Eaker commanded the Eighth Air Force in England, his policy for the fighter escorts of his bombers was to "stick with the bombers." That policy was reflected in a sign in the office of the commander of the VIII Fighter Command, Major General William Kepner. The sign read: "The first duty of the Eighth Air Force fighters is to bring the bombers back alive." Eaker did not invent the policy that fighter pilots escorting bombers would stay with the bombers and not leave them unprotected by going off chasing after enemy fighters. The policy was already defined in Army Air Forces Field Manual 1-15, "Tactics and Technique of Air Fighting," published on 10 April 1942. ⁸² It directed fighter escort pilots to "carry out their defensive role."

The policy apparently applied not only to the Eighth Air Force in England, but also to the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. At the beginning of 1944, General Eaker moved from England to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and became commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, under which the Fifteenth Air Force operated. Col.

Benjamin O. Davis Jr., in his autobiography, mentioned that General Eaker requested the 332nd Fighter Group be given the bomber escort mission and move to join the Fifteenth Air Force. In the same book, Davis insisted that the mission of his fighters was to "stick with the bombers" in order to prevent them from being shot down. ⁸³ From these sources, it appears that the policy of "sticking with the bombers" prevailed at the time the 332nd Fighter Group assumed and performed its bomber escort missions. One would therefore assume that if other fighter groups did not "stick with the bombers," but abandoned them to chase after enemy aircraft, that those other fighter groups were not following the policy they were assigned.

There is evidence that by the beginning of 1944, six months before the 332nd Fighter Group began escorting bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force, that the official policy had changed. As early as November 1943, General Henry "Hap" Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forces, sent a memorandum to General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, recommending that his fighters "seek out and destroy the German Air Force in the air and on the ground" and that "the defensive concept of our fighter commands and air defense units must be changed to the offensive." In a Christmas 1943 letter, General Arnold, in a similar letter to Major General James H. Doolittle, then commander of the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy, "my personal message to you – this is a MUST-is to destroy the enemy air force wherever you find them, in the air, on the ground, and in the factories." In January, 1944, Doolittle moved to England to take command of the Eighth Air Force. Meeting with the commander of the VIII Fighter Command, Maj. Gen. William Kepner, Doolittle told Kepner to take the sign down that said the first duty of the Eighth Air Force fighters was to bring the bombers back alive,

and replaced it with another sign that said the first duty of the Eighth Air Force was to destroy enemy aircraft.⁸⁶

One might imagine that Doolittle changed the fighter escort policy of the Eighth Air Force in England, and that the old policy of "sticking with the bombers" was preserved in other theaters, but there is evidence that the policy also changed for the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. Although the Fifteenth Air Force was technically under the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, which Eaker commanded, it was also under the operational control, like the Eighth Air Force, of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, under the command of General Carl Spaatz. Spaatz, who was the superior of both Doolittle and Eaker, issued an operational directive on January 11, 1944 that directed attacks on the German Air Force in the air and on the ground. Like his superior, General Arnold, Spaatz favored that the fighters go after the enemy aircraft. Even if Eaker desired to preserve the former policy of sticking with the bombers, his superiors directed that the fighters be turned loose against the German fighters as early as the end of 1943 and January 1944. This new policy was more practical in light of the increasing numbers and range of the Allied fighter escorts. Some of the fighters could be spared to go after the enemy aircraft, shooting them down so they could never threaten the bombers again. The 332nd Fighter Group did not begin escorting heavy bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force until June 1944, about six months after the policy began to change. Even when the 332nd Fighter Group did begin escorting heavy bombers, there were times when the group's own escort fighters were allowed to go in search of enemy fighters and airfields.

According to Richard Davis, in his biography of General Carl A. Spaatz (*Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe*, published by the Center for Air Force History in

Washington, D.C. in 1993, "Spaatz contributed greatly to the defeat of the Luftwaffe. He put his whole authority behind the decision to employ aggressive, loose-escort tactics, which freed the fighters to seek out the enemy but left the bombers more vulnerable." As commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, by the end of February 1944 (at least three months before the 332nd Fighter Group began flying bomber escort missions), General Spaatz provided operational control to both the Eighth Air Force in England under Doolittle, and the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy under Twining.⁸⁷

In conclusion, if the fighter escort groups of the Fifteenth Air Force, besides the 332nd Fighter Group, sometimes chased after enemy aircraft instead of only "sticking with the bombers," it appears that they were following rather than violating policy, and that the new policy emanated not from them but from the highest officers of the Army Air Forces. Contrary to a common misconception, the other fighter pilots were not simply seeking to raise their aerial victory credits total for personal glory, and abandoning the bombers they were supposed to protect in violation of their assigned mission.

21. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN'S 332ND FIGHTER GROUP FLEW MORE DIFFERENT KINDS OF AIRCRAFT IN COMBAT THAN ANY OTHER ARMY AIR FORCES GROUP DURING WORLD WAR II.

I am not certain of how this misconception originated, but it appeared at the Enlisted Heritage Hall, a museum at Gunter Annex of Maxwell Air Force Base. A display plaque claimed that the 332nd Fighter Group, the only Tuskegee Airmen group in combat, flew more different kinds of aircraft in combat in World War II than any other group in the Army Air Forces.⁸⁸

The 332nd Fighter Group flew a total of four different kinds of aircraft during World War II: P-39s, P-40s, P-47s, and P-51s.⁸⁹ There were other Army Air Forces groups that flew four or more aircraft in combat during the war. One of them was the 8th Fighter Group, that flew P-38s, P-39s, P-40s, and P-47s, according to the lineage and honors histories of the component squadrons. The 8th Fighter Group also flew P-400s, but that was another version of the P-39. It appears from this research that the 8th Fighter Group, like the 332nd Fighter Group, also flew four different kinds of aircraft in combat during World War II.⁹⁰

Research by Barry Spink of the Air Force Historical Research Agency indicates that the 1st Air Commando Group flew more than four kinds of aircraft during World War II, and might have flown as many as nine different types: B-25 bombers, P-51 fighters, L-1 and L-5 liaison airplanes, C-47 transports, CG-4 and TG-5 gliders, UC-64 utility airplanes, and even helicopters. It appears from preliminary research that it was the 1st Air Commando Group, not the 332nd Fighter Group of the Tuskegee Airmen, that flew more different kinds of aircraft in combat than any other Army Air Forces group during World War II.⁹¹

22. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN BELONGED TO SOME OF THE MOST HIGHLY DECORATED UNITS IN U.S. MILITARY HISTORY.

In various places, one finds articles that claim the Tuskegee Airmen belonged to units that were among the most highly decorated in U.S. history. For example, an article by Jessica York called "Tuskegee Airmen Recall Flying Unfriendly Skies," published in the *Oroville Mercury Register* of California and posted on February 20, 2007 claimed, about the Tuskegee Airmen, "To their great credit, many units rose far above the

expectations of their often racist commanders- some becoming among the most highly decorated units in U.S. military history." A similar claim appears in a 2013 online advertisement for the book, *The Tuskegee Airmen and Beyond*, by David G. Styles. It mentions that the Tuskegee Airmen belonged to one of the most highly decorated of the Army Air Forces organizations in World War II, at least in their theater.

The first black flying squadron in the American military was the 99th Fighter

Squadron, but it was far from the most highly decorated of the fighter squadrons in the

Air Force during World War II. The 99th Fighter Squadron earned a service streamer,
twelve campaign streamers, and three Distinguished Unit Citations during the war. The

94th Fighter Squadron earned sixteen campaign streamers and three Distinguished Unit
Citations during World War II. Even in its theater, the 99th Fighter Squadron was not the
most highly decorated. The 309th Fighter Squadron, an example of a non-Tuskegee
Airmen unit that was based in the same theater during World War II, earned a total of
fifteen campaign streamers, two with arrowheads, as well as two Distinguished Unit
Citations. There were other fighter squadrons in the theater, without Tuskegee Airmen
members, that had comparable numbers of honors.⁹²

The Tuskegee Airmen's 332nd Fighter Group, the only black flying group in combat during World War II, received 10 campaign streamers and one Distinguished Unit Citation during World War II. The 1st Fighter Group received 15 campaign streamers during the war, and three Distinguished Unit Citations. Even in comparison to other fighter groups in the same numbered air force and the same theater during World War II, the 332nd Fighter Group was hardly the most decorated. The white 31st Fighter Group, which also flew in the same combat theater during World War II, received fifteen

campaign streamers and two Distinguished Unit Citations. There were other fighter groups in the same theater that also earned comparable honors to the 31st. ⁹³

If the 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group suffered from racial discrimination by commanders over them during World War II, how could they have expected to have been among the most highly decorated organizations in the Army Air Forces? If they had been among the most highly decorated organizations, the claim of racism against them, by higher commanders, would be difficult to defend.

Individual pilots also earned awards, such as Distinguished Flying Crosses and Air Medals, during World War II, but the Tuskegee Airmen did not earn more individual awards than those who were members of other groups and squadrons in the same theater during World War II.

The idea that the Tuskegee Airmen were more highly decorated than the pilots of any other flying unit, even in their theater during World War II, is not supported by the evidence. The honors of the groups and squadrons show that the Tuskegee Airmen organizations, in fact, were less highly decorated than some of the other Army Air Forces flying organizations with which they served during World War II.

23. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN NEVER GOT THE RECOGNITION THEY DESERVED.

One often reads or hears that the Tuskegee Airmen never got the recognition they deserved. The claim was true at first, when in the first couple of decades after World War II, when most of the unit histories remained classified, overall histories of the war and the role of the Army Air Forces in the war tended to ignore the black units, and not mention the Tuskegee Airmen at all. But the claim is no longer true, and at times the 332nd Fighter Group and the 99th Fighter Squadron receive more publicity than many of

the other squadrons and groups that served with them in the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces.

As early as 1955, Charles Francis published a book about the black flying units in World War II which he called *The Tuskegee Airmen: The Men Who Changed a Nation*. In fact, Francis coined the term Tuskegee Airmen. Whoever read the book became aware that there were black combat pilots in combat with the American armed forces during World War II, but the book was not widely known at first.⁹⁵

A second event that further publicized the role of the black airmen in World War II was the formation of the Tuskegee Airmen Incorporated. Tuskegee Airmen veterans began gathering in 1972, and in 1975, they incorporated. In 1978, the leaders of the organization amended the articles of incorporation to make the Tuskegee Airmen Incorporated a charitable and education organization. The Tuskegee Airmen Incorporated has ever since educated the public about the contributions of the Tuskegee Airmen in World War II. 96

A third event made the Tuskegee Airmen famous around the nation and around the world. In 1995, the HBO cable television station produced and showed a movie called *The Tuskegee Airmen*, starring Lawrence Fishburne and Cuba Gooding, Jr. The movie was very popular, and not long after its showing the term "Tuskegee Airmen" became a common term. More and more Americans were aware of the black pilots who served in the Army Air Forces during World War II. In 1998, President Bill Clinton pinned a fourth star on the uniform of the most famous of the Tuskegee Airmen officers, General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., who had already become the first black general in the United States Air Force. By then, General Daniel "Chappie" James, another Tuskegee

Airman, had become the first black four-star general in any of the armed forces of the United States.⁹⁷ By this time, the Tuskegee Airmen were becoming more famous than many of the white airmen who served in other organizations flying some of the same kinds of missions in the same theater.

A fourth event made the Tuskegee Airmen even more famous nationwide. In March 2007, in an impressive ceremony in the rotunda of the United States Capitol in Washington, DC, President George W. Bush, on behalf of Congress, awarded the Congressional Gold Medal to the Tuskegee Airmen. The event was televised nationally. The Congressional Gold Medal is the highest civilian honor awarded by Congress, and it was presented to honor the Tuskegee Airmen collectively. Surviving Tuskegee Airmen from around the nation gathered for the ceremony. President Bush himself saluted the Tuskegee Airmen for their World War II service, and apologized, on behalf of the United States, for the mistreatment they suffered in the past.

A fifth event that further publicized the Tuskegee Airmen nationally and around the world was the 2012 release of a new theatrical movie about them called *Red Tails*, which George Lucas produced in 2012. While the movie had mixed reviews, it was widely popular. George Lucas, who was world famous for his Star Wars and Indiana Jones movie series, helped spread the fame of the Tuskegee Airmen far and wide, and the Tuskegee Airmen Incorporated, at their 2012 national convention in Las Vegas, recognized Lucas in an impressive ceremony.

Besides the Tuskegee Airmen book by Charles Francis, the formation of the Tuskegee Airmen Incorporated, the release of the HBO movie *The Tuskegee Airmen*, the 2007 Congressional Gold Medal Ceremony, and the release of the *Red Tails* movie, the

Tuskegee Airmen became famous in many other ways. They have been honored in countless other books, magazines and newspaper articles. Their story has also been celebrated in special museum exhibits, including the National Museum of the United States Air Force, the National Air and Space Museum, and the National World War II Museum. There is a Tuskegee Airmen National Historic Site at Tuskegee, run by the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior. There are even air shows in which a Red Tail Squadron of the Commemorative Air Force flies a red-tailed P-51. For all of these reasons, the claim that the Tuskegee Airmen never got the recognition they deserved is no longer true. People might not have heard about the Tuskegee Airmen for many years after World War II, but by the turn of the 21st century, they were among the most famous of the World War II pilots of the Army Air Forces.

24. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT TUSKEGEE AIRMAN CHARLES McGEE FLEW MORE COMBAT MISSIONS THAN ANY OTHER PILOT IN THE AIR FORCE.

Sometimes one hears or reads the claim that Tuskegee Airman Colonel Charles McGee, who flew combat missions as a fighter pilot not only in World War II, but also in Korea, and Vietnam, compiled a record of more combat missions than any other Air Force pilot. The claim appeared in an edition of *Rising Above*, a booklet published by the Commemorative Air Force's Red Tail Squadron to celebrate the achievements of the Tuskegee Airmen. That edition, circulating in 2012, claimed that Col. McGee's 409 combat missions is the U.S. Air Force record for most combat missions ever flown. ⁹⁸

The source of the claim was not Colonel McGee himself, or the Tuskegee

Airmen. The claim was contained in a speech by former Chief of Staff of the Air Force

General Ronald Fogleman, who noted that Colonel McGee had "the distinction of having

flown more fighter missions than any other pilot in the three-war history of the Air Force." General Fogleman's quote is contained in a biography of Colonel McGee by his daughter, Dr. Charlene McGee Smith. The same source notes that Charles McGee flew 409 combat missions. If you read the book carefully, you realize that the claim of more combat missions than any other Air Force pilot might be a misinterpretation of General Fogleman's meaning. He might have meant not that Colonel McGee compiled more combat missions than any other USAF pilot, but more than any other USAF pilot who also served in three wars. 99

There were several U.S. Air Force pilots who flew more than 409 combat missions, and therefore more than Colonel McGee. Alophus H. "Pat" Bledsoe, Jr., in an e-mail to the marketing director of the CAF Red Tail Squadron, noted that he personally had flown 422 combat missions in Vietnam, and was aware of several other Air Force pilots who flew more than 500 missions in during the Vietnam War. However, Bledsoe was a Forward Air Contoller (FAC) and not a fighter pilot, and he referred to other USAF pilots who were FACs, and not fighter pilots.

There were other Air Force pilots who flew fighters and who also flew more than 409 combat missions. One of them was Major Kenneth Raymond Hughey, who flew 564 combat missions in Vietnam before he was shot down and became a prisoner of war in North Vietnam. His number of combat fighter missions is 155 more than the 409 combat missions of Colonel McGee, but unlike McGee, he did not fly in three wars. ¹⁰⁰

The claim that Col. Charles McGee flew more combat missions, or more fighter missions, than any other USAF pilot in three wars is also false. Colonel Ralph S. Parr also flew in three wars, and his total number of combat missions is 641. He flew 12

missions in P-38s during World War II, 165 missions in F-80s and 37 missions in F-86s during the Korean War, and 427 missions in F-4s during two tours of duty during the Vietnam War. ¹⁰¹

Colonel Charles McGee should be honored for having flown 409 combat missions as a fighter pilot in the Air Force, and for having flown in three wars, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, but the claim that he flew more combat missions than any other USAF pilot, or any other USAF fighter pilot, is false. The claim that he flew more combat missions than any other USAF fighter pilot in three wars is also false.

CONCLUSION. Whoever dispenses with the misconceptions that have come to circulate around the Tuskegee Airmen in the many decades since World War II emerges with a greater appreciation for what they actually accomplished. If they did not demonstrate that they were far superior to the members of the six non-black fighter escort groups of the Fifteenth Air Force with which they served, they certainly demonstrated that they were not inferior to them, either. Moreover, they began at a line farther back, overcoming many more obstacles on the way to combat. The Tuskegee Airmen proved that they were equal to the other fighter pilots with whom they served heroically during World War II. Their exemplary performance contributed to the fact that of all the military services, the Air Force was the first to integrate, in 1949.

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NOTES

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¹ Alan L. Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1985), p. 2-3.

Air Force Combat Units of World War II, edited by Maurer Maurer, 1983. This information was compiled by Ms. Patsy Robertson, a historian at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.

² Alan L. Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 1945-1964 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1985), p. 12; Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), 157.

³ Air Force Historical Research Agency call number 134.65-496.

⁴ USAF Historical Study No. 85, "USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II" (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978); Maurer Maurer, Air Force Combat Units of World War II (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983).

⁵ Army Air Forces Statistical Digest for World War II, 1946 (Washington, DC: Statistical Control Division, Office of Air Comptroller, June 1947) p. 256 (Table 160)

⁶ Daniel L. Haulman, "Tuskegee Airmen-Escorted Bombers Lost to Enemy Aircraft," paper prepared at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. This paper is based on histories of the 332d Fighter Group, daily mission reports of the Fifteenth Air Force, and Missing Air Crew Reports that show the times, locations, and causes of aircraft losses.

Interview of General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., by Alan Gropman, AFHRA call number K239.0512-122.

⁸ Fifteenth Air Force General Order 2972 issued on 31 Aug 1944.

⁹ 332d Fighter Group histories, under call number GP-332-HI at the Air Force Historical Research Agency; Fifteenth Air Force daily mission folders, under call number 670.332 at the Air Force Historical Research Agency; Missing Air Crew Reports, indexed and filed on microfiche in the Archives Branch of the Air Force Historical Research Agency.

¹⁰ Oliver North, War Stories III (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2005), p. 152.

¹¹ Interview of Lee Archer by Dr. Lisa Bratton, conducted on 13 Mar 2001 in New York, NY, on file at the Air Force Historical Research Agency under call number K239.0512-2580, pp. 23-24.

Monthly histories of the 332nd Fighter Group, June 1944-April 1945; Fifteenth Air Force General Order

^{2350,} dated 6 Aug 1944; Fifteenth Air Force General Order 4287 dated 1 Nov 1944.

¹³ 332nd Fighter Group narrative mission report 37 dated 26 July 1944.

¹⁴ Fifteenth Air Force General Order 2350 dated 6 Aug 1944.

¹⁵ Charles E. Francis, *The Tuskegee Airmen* (Boston: Bruce Humpries, Inc., 1955), pp. 92 and 194; 332nd Fighter Group mission report number 30, for 20 July 1944.

¹⁶ Interview of Lee Archer, by Dr. Lisa Bratton, conducted on 13 Mar 2001 in New York, NY, on file at the Air Force Historical Research Agency under the call number K239.0512-2580, pp. 23-24; conversations of Daniel Haulman with Frank Olynyk during several fo the latter's research visits to the Air Force Historical Research Agency.

¹⁷ The author heard this statement repeated at one of the four Tuskegee Airmen Incorporated national conventions he attended in the successive years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. Dr. Roscoe Brown did not make the claim himself, but he was aware of it. The claim also was published in George Norfleet's book, A Pilot's Journey: Memoirs of a Tuskegee Airman, Curtis Christopher Robinson (Washington, DC: Robnor Publishing, 2006 and 2008), p. 217.

¹⁸ Interview of Lee Archer by Dr. Lisa Bratton, conducted on 13 Mar 2001 in New York, NY, on file at the Air Force Historical Research Agency under call number K239.0512-2580, pp. 19-20.

¹⁹ Fifteenth Air Force General Order 2293 dated 12 Apr 1945.

²⁰ USAAF (European Theater) Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft in Air-to-Air Combat, World War 2, Victory List No. 5, Frank J. Olynyk, May 1987; USAAF (Mediterranean Theater) Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft in Air-to-Air Combat, World War 2, Victory List No. 6, Frank J. Olynyk, June 1987; USAF Historical Study No. 85, USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II, Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, 1978; Combat Squadrons of the Air Force, World War II, edited by Maurer Maurer, 1969.

John B. Holway, *Red Tails, Black Wings* (Las Cruces, NM: Yucca Tree Press, 1997), p. 262.

²² Fifteenth Air Force General Orders 2525, dated 19 Apr 1945 and 2709 dated 24 Apr 1945.

²³ 332nd Fighter Group history for June 1944 and 332nd Fighter Group mission report for 25 June 1944. ²⁴ 332nd Fighter Group history for June 1944 and 332nd Fighter Group mission report for 25 June 1944; Interview of Lee Archer by Dr. Lisa Bratton, conducted on 13 Mar 2011, in New York, NY, on file at the Air Force Historical Research Agency under call number K239.0512-2580, p. 20.

²⁵ 332d Fighter Group history for June 1944; 332d Fighter Group mission report for 25 June 1944; David Brown, *Warship Losses of World War II* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990); "Fighting Ships of the World," website of Ivan Gogin (http://www.navypedia.org/ships/germany/ger_tb_ta22.htm); Aldo Fraccaroli, *Italian Warships of World War II* (London: Ian Allan, 1968). Jurgen Rohwer, *Chronology of the War at Sea* (London: Chatham Publishing, 2005), p. 338.

²⁶ Charles Francis, *The Tuskegee Airmen*, edited by Adolph Caso (Boston: Branden Books, 2008), pp. 113-114; Fifteenth Air Force General Order 287 dated 19 Jan 1945; Fifteenth Air Force General Order 3950 dated 15 Oct 1944.

²⁷ Myth contained in Wikipedia under Ariete Class Torpedo Boat; more correct information from H. P. Willmott's *The Last Century of Sea Power*, volume 2, *From Washington to Tokyo*, 1922-1945 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 207.

²⁸ J. Todd Moye, *Freedom Flyers: The Tuskegee Airmen of World War II* (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 121; John B. Holway, *Red Tails, Black Wings* (Las Cruces, NM: Yucca Tree Press, 1997), p. 260.
²⁹ Lawrence P. Scott and William M. Womack, Sr., *Double V: The Civil Rights Struggle of the Tuskegee*

²⁹ Lawrence P. Scott and William M. Womack, Sr., *Double V: The Civil Rights Struggle of the Tuskegee Airmen* (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1994), p. 225. The sources were interviews with Omar Blair, Woodrow Crockett, and George Watson.

³⁰ 55th Air Service Squadron histories for December 1944-March 1945, AFHRA call number SQ-SV-55-HI Jul 1942-May 1945.

³¹ E-mail from James Sheppard, an original Tuskegee Airmen, and a member of the Tuskegee Airmen Incororated, with whom the author has spoken and corresponded.

³² John Holway, *Red Tails, Black Wings* (Las Cruces, New Mexico: Yucca Tree Press, 1997), p. 260.

³³ Fifteenth Air Force daily mission reports, June and July 1944. AFHRA call number 670.332.

³⁴ Narrative Mission Reports of the 31st, 52nd, 82nd, 325th, and 332nd Fighter Groups, contained in the Fifteenth Air Force mission folder for 24 March 1945, AFHRA call number 670.332, 24 March 1945.

³⁵ 55th Air Service Squadron history for March 1945. The AFHRA call number is SQ-SV-55-HI Jul 1942-May 1945.

³⁶ Zellie Orr, *Heroes in War- Heroes at Home* (Marietta, GA: Communication Unlimited, 2008), pp. 2-3.

³⁷ Organization record cards of the 96th, 523rd, and 524th Air Service Groups, and organization record card of the 366th Air Service Squadron, on file at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.

³⁸ Intervier of Lee Archer by Dr. Lisa Bratton, in New York, NY, on 13 Mar 2001, on file at the Air Force Historical Research Agency under call number K239.0512-2580, p. 19.

³⁹ Documentation supplied by Craig Huntly, including a 25 March 1945 letter of commendation from Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. to the commander of the 366th Air Service Squadron, noting Captain O. D. Blair, and a 6 June 1945 letter of commendation from Captain Omar Blair to Staff Sergeant George Watson for his role in obtaining the fuel tanks for the Berlin mission.

⁴⁰ John Holway, *Red Tails and Black Wings* (Las Cruces, New Mexico: Yucca Tree Press, 1997), p. 249; Chris Bucholtz, *332*nd *Fighter Group – Tuskegee Airmen* (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2007), p. 116.

⁴¹ World War II statistical abstract; daily mission reports of the Fifteenth Air Force and the 332nd Fighter Group between June 1944 and the end of April 1945; missing air crew reports of bombers shot down in the Fifteenth Air Force organizations in the same time period.

⁴² Kai Wright, Soldiers of Freedom: An Illustrated History of African Americans in the Armed Forces (New York: Black Dog and Leventhal Publishers, 2002), p. 181.

⁴³ James H. Doolittle and Carroll V. Glines, *I Could Never Be So Lucky Again* (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1991), p. 380.

⁴⁴ History of the Fifteenth Air Force, November 1943-May 1945, vol. I (Air Force Historical Research Agency call number 670.01-1), pp. 277 and 286.

⁴⁵ History of the Fifteenth Air Force, November 1943-May 1945, vol. I (Air Force Historical Research Agency call number 670.01-1), pp. 286-287.

⁴⁶ Maurer Maurer, *Air Force Combat Units of World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), under each group designation.

⁴⁷ Fifteenth Air Force mission folder for 29 December 1944; 485th Bombardment Group history for January 1945.

⁴⁸ Ryan Orr, "Veteran's Life Saved by Tuskegee Airman," *Victorville Daily Press*, November 10, 2008; 332d Fighter Group histories for May, June, and July 1944; 31st Fighter Group history for May 1944;

Fifteenth Air Force Daily Mission Folder for May 5, 1955; E. A. Munday, *Fifteenth Air Force Combat Markings*, 1943-1945 (London, UK: Beaumont Publications), pp. 15-18.

- ⁴⁹ USAF Historical Study 85, *USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978); Maurer Maurer, *Air Force Combat Units of World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983); e-mail message from Barrett Tillman regarding Fifteenth Air Force aces.
- ⁵⁰ Narrative mission reports of the 332nd Fighter Group, filed with the monthly histories of the 332nd Fighter Group at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, for the period June 1944-April 1945. There are 311 such narrative mission reports filed, but only 179 of these were bomber escort missions.
- ⁵¹ Lineage and honors histories of the 99th Fighter Squadron, the 332rd Fighter Group, and the 477th Bombardment Group, and their monthly histories from World War II, stored at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
- ⁵² History of Tuskegee Army Flying School and AAF 66th FTD, book published by Wings of America and filed at the Air Force Historical Research Agency under call number 289.28-100.
- ⁵³ Conversations of the author with various original Tuskegee Airmen that took place during his attendance at five successive Tuskegee Airmen Incorporated national conventions, in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011.
- ⁵⁴ Alan L. Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History 1985), pp. 12-14 and 17-18.
- ⁵⁵ History of Tuskegee Army Flying School and AAF 66th FTD, book published by Wings of America and filed at the Air Force Historical Research Agency under call number 289.28-100; Robert J. Jakeman, *The Divided Skies* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992), pp. 264-265; Lineage and honors history of the 53rd Test and Evaluation Group (formerly the 79th Fighter Group) at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
- ⁵⁶ Author's personal conversations with Tuskegee Airmen George Hardy and William Holloman, and with journalist Ron Brewington; articles announcing the death of Eugene Smith as a Tuskegee Airman, November 2012, including WCPO news site, Cincinnati, Ohio, 26 Nov 2012, and Eagle Radio 99.3 FM website, Lawrenceburg, Indiana, 26 Nov 2012; Vevay Newspapers Online, 29 Nov 2012, "Eugene Smith, County Resident and Tuskegee Airman, Passes Away."
- ⁵⁷ Charles W. Dryden, *A-Train: Memoirs of a Tuskegee Airman* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997), pp. 144-147.
- ⁵⁸ Lineage and honors histories of the 99th Flying Training Squadron (formerly 99th Fighter Squadron) and 332nd Expeditionary Operations Group (formerly 332nd Fighter Group) at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, in addition to their monthly histories from 1943-1945.
- ⁵⁹ 477th Fighter Group (formerly 477th Bombardment Group) lineage and honors history, and monthly histories of the 477th Bombardment Group in 1944 and 1945, at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
- ⁶⁰ Conversations of the author with several of the original Tuskegee Airmen at a series of fiveTuskegee Airmen Incorporated national conventions between 2007 and 2011.
- ⁶¹ Robert J. Jakeman, *The Divided Skies* (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1992, p. 221; Maurer Maurer, *Combat Squadrons of the Air Force, World War II* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 329.
- ⁶² Information from Cheryl Ferguson of Tuskegee University archives, received on December 13, 2011.
- ⁶³ Information from Dr. Roscoe Brown, telephone conversation with Dr. Daniel Haulman on 13 December 2011.
- ⁶⁴ James H. Doolittle and Carol V. Glines, *I Could Never Be So Lucky Again* (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military Aviation History, 1991), p. 380.
- ⁶⁵ Interview of Lee Archer by Dr. Lisa Bratton, conduced on 13 Mar 2001 in New York, NY, on file at Air Force Historical Research Agency under call number K239.0512-2580, p. 19.
- ⁶⁶ Fifteenth Air Force mission folder for March 24, 1945, which includes all the fighter group narrative mission reports for the day, under call number 670.332 at the Air Force Historical Research Agency; Fifteenth Air Force Field Order 159 dated 23 March 1945, for the 24 March 1945 mission to Berlin. The order noted that the XV Fighter Command was to provide five groups for strong escort for the 5th Bombardment Wing (AFHRA call number 670.327, Mar-Apr 1945). The mission reports of the fighter groups confirm that five groups provided escort that day for the 5th Bombardment Wing that flew to Berlin.

⁶⁷ Maurer Maurer, *Combat Squadrons of the Air Force, World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1969), pp. 329-330. The 99th Fighter Squadron was attached to four different white P-40 groups in the Mediterranean Theater before it joined the 332nd Fighter Group, and flew the same kinds of aircraft they did on the same kinds of missions.

⁶⁸ Maurer Maurer, *Combat Squadrons of the Air Force, World War II* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1969), pp. 230, 233-235, 329-330; Charles E. Francis, *The Tuskegee Airmen: The Men Who Changed a Nation* (Wellesley, MA: Branden Books, 2008), p. p. 75.

⁶⁹ War Department General Order 23 dated 24 March 1944; War Department General Order 76 dated 8 September 1945.

⁷⁰ Robert J. Jakeman, *The Divided Skies* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1992); J. Todd Moye, *Freedom Flyers* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010); History of Tuskegee Army Flying School, call number 289.28-100 at the Air Force Historical Research Agency).

⁷¹ Corey Bridwell and Paige Osburn, "Tuskegee Airmen's Legacy Celebrated at Compton's Tomorrow's Aeronautical Museum," KPCC Radio page on internet, dated 19 Jan 2012; Robert Roten, "Laramie Movie Scope: Red Tails," (http://www.lariat.org/AT The Movies/new/redtails.html); Sundiata Cha-Jua, "Red Tails, A Historically Accurate Film?".

⁷² Author's visit to the National Museum of the United States Air Force in early 2012, where he viewed the trophy for the Las Vegas gunnery meets of 1949-1950 and the panel describing the trophy and the competition; copy of the names on the plate of the United States Air Force Gunnery Award, forwarded from Dr. Jeffery S. Underwood of the National Museum of the United States Air Force to Daniel L. Haulman as an attachment to a 7 May 2012 message.

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⁷⁴ Desegregation of the Armed Forces," Harry S. Truman Library and Museum website (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/desegregation/large/index.php)

⁷⁵ George Hardy, chairman of the Harry Sheppard historical research committee of the Tuskegee Airmen Incorporated; Alan L. Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1985), pp. 45-46, 55, 87-90.

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⁸³ Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., *Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), pp. 118 and 122-123.

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