

## Politico-military groups and armed factions

<b>1. Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC)</b>	
Date of creation	November 2014, in Birao*
Main leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gontran Djono Ahaba (Gula ethnic group)</li> <li>• Zakaria Damane (Gula ethnic group)</li> </ul>
Military stronghold	Bria <sup>†</sup>
Participation in political processes/dialogues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bangui Forum (2015): Yes</li> <li>• Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes</li> <li>• Sant'Egidio mediation:<sup>‡</sup> Yes</li> </ul>
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Ex-liberators” (2002-2003)<sup>§</sup></li> <li>• Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR: 2006-2012)**</li> <li>• Séléka Coalition (2012-2013)</li> <li>• Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC, until November 2014)</li> </ul>
Ideology and grievances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RPRC leaders maintain a climate of permanent crisis and intercommunal tension to justify their existence by the need to protect civilians from the insecurity. Leaders say that they act in self-defense against the central leadership’s authoritarian and predatory governance. RPRC leaders also denounce a policy that marginalizes the northeastern regions of the country. “Ex-liberators” seek the compensation they were promised for their participation in the March 2003 coup that brought Bozizé to power.<sup>4</sup></li> <li>• Despite these grievances, the leaders have never intended to change the system, as the predatory Séléka regime demonstrated in 2013.<sup>5</sup></li> <li>• In October 2016, the RPRC formed a coalition with the FPRC and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing. These coalition members have systematically attacked the UPC positions and the Peuhl/Fulani communities,<sup>6</sup> arguing that UPC and Peuhl/Fulani people are foreigners.</li> <li>• This evolving ideology remains instrumental in the process of RPRC leaders seeking to legitimize their presence and have their interests and grievances recognized by the international community.</li> </ul>
Military alliances	<p>Known as part of “the Coalition,” the RPRC operates in partnership with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The FPRC (since October 2016)</li> <li>• The anti-Balaka/Mokom wing associated with François Bozizé (since October 2016) and anti-Balaka groups in Haute Kotto province (in central CAR), particularly the Banda ethnic group</li> <li>• The Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC, since October 2016)</li> </ul>
Military strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The military strength of the RPRC has increased since the group joined the FPRC-MPC-anti-Balaka/Mokom wing Coalition since October 2016, giving the group better access to military equipment.</li> <li>• For more information on the military strategy of “the Coalition” that has left hundreds of people killed and hundreds of thousands newly displaced since October 2016 see part II, “‘The Coalition’ [FPRC, RPRC, MPC, anti-Balaka/Mokom].”</li> </ul>

\* Birao is the capital of Vakaga province, in the far northeast of CAR, on the border with Chad and Sudan.

<sup>†</sup> Bria is the capital of Haute-Kotto province, in central-eastern CAR.

<sup>‡</sup> For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

<sup>§</sup> For more information on the “ex-liberators” see Appendix, section A.

\*\* For more information on the UFDR see Appendix, section E.

Main political agenda	<p>Leaders of the RPRC had been perceived as a moderate ex-Séléka faction that has been involved in all political and dialogue processes. However, since October 2016, the RPRC has responded to FPRC leader Nourredine Adam’s call to form a coalition of ex-Séléka factions. The RPRC now shares the FPRC’s strategy, ideology, and grievances—while remaining its own distinct entity. Since the end of 2016, the RPRC’s main objective has been to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overthrow the central government based in Bangui and reestablish a Séléka regime; or,</li> <li>• If they fail to regain power, to have official partition of the country (with Bambari as the new capital of the Dar El Kuti or Logone state).<sup>7</sup></li> </ul> <p>In all scenarios, the RPRC leaders seek to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Obtain general amnesty for the leaders and the combatants, with the lifting of all multilateral and bilateral targeted sanctions imposed on individuals;</li> <li>• Maintain the <i>de facto</i> partition of the country and allow for the exploitation of the country’s resources; and</li> <li>• Obtain political and military positions in the government.</li> </ul>
International sanctions imposed (travel bans, asset freezes)	None