

Models of international organization in perpetual peace projects*

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Perpetual peace projects constitute a largely undervalued intellectual tradition that has attracted many polemical arrows. One of the most frequent criticisms levelled at the projects is that their authors too often abandon themselves to utopianism. Yet this tradition has proved to be much more influential than is generally recognized: contemporary international organizations, from the League of Nations to the United Nations, from the European Parliament to the International Court of Justice, were sketched out, if only in embryonic form, in these perpetual peace projects. Yet it is rare to find their authors numbered among the founders of internationalist theory.

The purpose of this paper is not solely to acknowledge the role played by these philosophers in paving the way for institutions in today's international community. The projects for perpetual peace also have a continuing relevance for the current debate on the transformation of international institutions. Concepts such as 'limited sovereignty', 'interference in the internal affairs of a state' and 'the violation of international agreements on human rights', which crop up regularly in popular debate on foreign policy, have been reflected upon in the past by the authors of perpetual peace projects. Three key problems are raised by the authors of these projects:

- (1) Will the formation of an international community, founded on the recognition of the sovereignty of its member states, limit the powers of governments?
- (2) Will the formulation of an international organization facilitate or obstruct the development of democracy in its member states?
- (3) What is the connection between the rights of individuals within a national community and their rights as inhabitants of the planet?

Although these projects differ in many ways—as I shall endeavour to demonstrate—they are all part of the specifically juridical¹ strand in pacifist thought. I have not, therefore, analysed these projects chronologically, as is done in the majority of the literature devoted to them.² Instead, I have linked them to one of three separate

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¹ Max Scheler, 'The Idea of Peace and Pacifism', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 7 (1976), pp. 154–66, and 8 (1977), pp. 36–50, and Norberto Bobbio, *Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace* (Bologna, 1984) have presented actual taxonomies of pacifism, in which they distinguish between the finalistic, instrumental, juridical, etc. Projects for perpetual peace obviously belong to the latter category.

² For a description and analysis of projects for peace, see J. ter Meulen, *Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung*, 3 vols. (The Hague, 1912, 1929, 1940); C. Lange and A. Schou, *Histoire de l'internationalisme*, 3 vols. (Oslo, 1919, 1944, 1954); S. J. Hemleben, *Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries* (Chicago, 1943); K. von Raumer (ed.), *Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance* (Munich, 1953); F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge, 1963); D. Archibugi and F. Voltaggio (eds.), *Filosofi per la pace* (Rome, 1991).

models of international organization. These models, identified as (a) pyramidal, (b) diffused, and (c) cosmopolitan models, are considered in the following three sections. A final section will explain the relevance of these models for an understanding of contemporary international relations.

The pyramidal model

The pyramidal model of international organization emerged during the Thirty Years War and was first explicitly presented in the *New Cyneas* of Emeric Crucé. It was taken up by many other thinkers, including the Duc de Sully, the abbé de Saint-Pierre, William Ladd and William Jay, and later provided inspiration for such international bodies as the United Nations Organization and its forerunner, the League of Nations.




Figure 1 Pyramidal model.

Basic characteristics of the model:

1. Disputes between sovereigns are settled through arbitration by the International Union;
2. The members of the International Union are the sovereigns and not the subjects;
3. The electoral criterion of the Union is 'one State, one vote';
4. Sovereigns are empowered to determine the constitutional relations within their States;
5. If the Union has a joint force at its disposal, this may be used to suppress possible rebellions within member States;
6. Characteristic authors—'strong' version: Crucé, Saint-Pierre; 'weak' version: Ladd, Jay;
7. Historical examples—'strong' version: the Holy Alliance; 'weak version': the League of Nations, the General Assembly of the United Nations.

This model, whose salient features are schematically illustrated in figure 1, traces the origins of war to the absence of a supranational authority to which states might appeal. Thus the elimination of war requires the reproduction at the international level of what happens when states are formed: the creation of a Union composed of the sovereigns of individual states with the right to use force delegated to it. Supporters of the pyramidal model never intended that this Union should be created by recourse to war—the very thing they have sought to abolish—but by voluntary participation on the part of states.

The creation of this Union does not automatically ensure the disappearance of friction between states, but it would make it possible to regulate conflict in its capacity as a supranational executive institution with powers of arbitration. As supporters of the pyramidal model point out, there is no reason why institutions which have proved to be effective in ruling domestic politics should not be effective on the broader scale represented by a group of countries or even an entire planet.

The creation of any such Union requires that potential members accept some essential preconditions. First and most important, is formal acceptance of the status quo, so all political, territorial and commercial claims against fellow members would have to be waived. Second, candidates must delegate their own sovereignty in international relations to the Union and hence abide by its decisions. In the words of the abbé de Saint-Pierre:

The grand Allies have renounced, and renounce for ever, for themselves and for their successors, resort to arms in order to terminate their differences present and future, and agree henceforth always to adopt the method of conciliation by mediation of the rest of the grand Allies in the place of general assembly, or, in case this mediation should not be successful, they agree to abide by the judgement which shall be rendered by the Plenipotentiaries of the other Allies permanently assembled.³

A 'strong' version put forward by such thinkers as Crucé and Saint-Pierre envisages the Union with coercive powers provided by an international army made up of forces supplied by individual member states. Such powers would discourage disobedience among members of the Union. Again, in Saint-Pierre's words:

If any one among the Allies refuse to execute the judgements or the great alliance, negotiate treaties contrary thereto, [or] make preparations for war, the grand alliance will arm, and will provide against him until he shall execute the said judgements or rules, or gives security to make good the harm caused by his hostilities, and to repay the cost of the war according to the estimate of the Commissioners of the grand alliance.⁴

A weaker version advocated by writers such as Ladd and Jay is much closer to a confederation and provides the inspiration for the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations. Here, the Union lacks powers of coercion and its role is limited to directing, or censuring, the actions of its members.⁵ Its executive can only call upon public opinion—optimistically baptized by Ladd as 'the Queen of the world'—for support.

The pyramidal model has two complementary features:

³ C.-I. Castel abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Abrégé du Projet de Paix Perpétuelle en Europe*, (1729, English translation: London, 1927), 3^e fundamental article.

⁴ *Ibid.* 4^e fundamental article.

⁵ William Ladd, *An Essay on a Congress of Nations* (London, 1840); William Jay, *War and Peace* (New York, 1842).

- (1) Great attention is paid to the way in which relations are established *between* states, with special care being taken to avoid sovereignty being diminished by the international community.
 - (2) Complete autonomy in the use of power by governments *within* their own state.
- Let us consider these points in turn.

Relations between states are organized so that each member of the Union has the same juridical weight regardless of military and economic strength, geographical size, or population. The Union's international assembly is based effectively on the principle of 'one state, one vote'.

To take one example, the plan put forward by Crucé in the early seventeenth century had already gone so far beyond the religious and cultural prejudices of the age as to deny the European nations any privileged role. He advocated an assembly of ambassadors in which all nations—Christian or otherwise—would be on an equal footing since each ambassador has the right to cast a vote. Crucé thus provides what is probably the first affirmation in the history of ideas of the principle that all states are endowed with equal dignity as members of the international community. In Saint-Pierre's project, relations between states are regulated in much the same way, differing from Crucé in restricting the proposed Union to the single continent of Europe and the sole religion of Christianity.

The principle of 'one state, one vote' is taken over almost verbatim into the Charter of the United Nations. As article 2 states: 'The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members'. Although some states are 'more equal than others', since some are permanent members of the Security Council, all states at least formally, are recognized as having the same rights. However, in practical terms, its Charter accords equal dignity to the *representatives* of the member states of the international community. The way in which sovereignty is *established* and *administered* within states is, in fact, almost completely ignored in the pyramidal model. Sovereigns are entitled to exercise their powers within their own communities as they see fit and are in no way required to make their conduct conform to international standards. Supporters of the pyramidal model often fall back on comparisons between their Union and a council of heads of families, each free to exercise their powers as they please within their own family but unable to undertake hostile action against other families without the agreement of the council itself.

Advocates of this model sought to persuade sovereigns of the desirability of forming a Union by pointing out that power over their own subjects would be reinforced. As Crucé put it: 'And what greater mark of sovereignty could be desired, than to command absolutely, dispose of everything according to one's pleasure, even of the lives of subjects, give Kingdoms, and not be accountable to any one?'⁶ And again: 'By which means peace being generally established between all Princes, there would remain nothing except to maintain it particularly in each monarchy: to which end all the sovereigns would work for their part, and would not have much difficulty in making themselves obeyed by their people and in holding them in check'.⁷

⁶ Emeric Crucé, *The New Cyneas* (1623; English translation: Philadelphia, 1909), p. 110.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 122. Saint-Pierre similarly maintained that sovereigns' powers would remain intact: 'Most Members of the Union are absolute Kings or Princes who are totally bent on retaining absolute and completely independent sway over their Subjects', *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, (1713–17; reprinted: Paris, 1986), p. 234.

The Union would also act as a sort of mutual guarantee against the risk of domestic insurrection. Crucé maintained that:

For what constrains monarchs to bear with their subjects, is the fear that these associate themselves with strangers, or that these latter should profit by the divisions and quarrels between the subjects and the Prince. Now this fear would then be superfluous, because by means of peace, each one would be content with his lordship, and would not think of anything else but how to govern his people. He would be adored by the good, the bad would tremble at his appearance. He would not need to fear rebellions and insurrections, which he would overcome with the assistance of other sovereigns, who would lend him prompt succor, as having all an interest in the punishment of the rebels.⁸

Once again, Saint-Pierre takes up views expressed by Crucé without altering their substances:

The Union will use all its power and take every care during the Regencies, Infancies, and weak Reigns of each State to protect the person of the Sovereign, and his rights, from harm by his Subjects or Foreigners: in case of Sedition, Revolt, Conspiracy, suspicion of poisoning or other violence against the Prince, or against the Sovereign House, the Union, as its tutor and born Protectress, shall send to the State special Commissioners by whom it shall be informed of the facts, together with troops to punish the Guilty with all the force of the Law.⁹

Further consideration of the model thus enables us to state that in such an international organization the only way to obtain improved political relations within states is by waiting for unilateral concessions from the monarchy. Moreover, individuals form no part of the international community except as the subjects of their sovereign. Therefore, if they are not—or do not feel themselves to be represented by their sovereigns, they are excluded from the international community.

This characteristic of the pyramidal model is even more distinctive given that those who proposed it were highly sensitive to the claims of civil society, and especially the emerging bourgeois and mercantile classes. For example, Crucé and Saint-Pierre point to the advantages which civil society would reap from the abolition of armed conflict. While for Hobbes the prerequisite for the progress of civil society is peace *within* the state, for them it is peace *between* states. Nevertheless, the only channel through which civil society is juridically represented in the international community is constituted by the sovereign.

It is also necessary to recognize the progressive elements present in the model alongside the conservative ones. Authors like Crucé and Saint-Pierre were in no way opposed to reform within states, but claimed that progress was regularly blocked by the outbreak of conflict. The international pact of peace was seen to make continuous reform possible. The whole of Saint-Pierre's political writings illustrate this argument. As well as being the author of numerous drafts of his project for perpetual peace, he also provided many plans for reform, currently hindered, according to Saint-Pierre, by the perennial state of tension between nations.

Although supporters of the pyramidal model deny the legitimacy of any armed action outside the rules laid down by the Union of States, they are far from accepting the need for pluralism between the state. They propose to achieve peace at the expense of democracy.

⁸ Crucé, *The New Cyneas*, p. 124.

⁹ Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, p. 166.

The concept of equilibrium in the pyramidal model

A few years after Crucé's book was published, the problem of forming a peaceful international organization was tackled by a former minister of Henry IV: the Duc de Sully. In his memoirs, published in 1638, Sully claims that Henry IV had worked out a secret 'Grand dessin' for the purpose of establishing lasting peace among the nations of Europe.¹⁰

The plan presented by Sully envisaged the complete geopolitical reorganization of Europe, which was to be divided into fifteen sovereign states—three republics, three elective monarchies, and nine hereditary monarchies. According to Sully, this reorganization would create a set of states of similar strength or, in any case, predisposed to form alliances that would establish equilibrium among the various nations. The implementation of the 'Grand dessin' would thus make the outbreak of international conflict contrary to the interests of each state, and hence undesirable. But what means did Sully think suitable for the implementation of the 'Grand dessin'? Once again, use was to be made of war—the very thing to be abolished.

It is clear that this plan has very different roots to those of the perpetual peace projects tradition since peace is the result of war. For juridical pacifists, by contrast, no equilibrium can be reached as the result of a new conflict. As Kant points out: 'For a permanent universal peace by means of a so-called *European balance of power* is a pure illusion, like Swift's story of the house which the builder had constructed in such perfect harmony with all the laws of equilibrium that it collapsed as soon as a sparrow alighted on it'.¹¹

It may therefore be wondered why juridical pacifist thinkers, and Saint-Pierre in particular, quote Sully's 'Grand dessin' and the authority of Henry IV in support of their projects when there is such an evident and marked divergence between the two conceptions of international peace. The reasons are not hard to see. The pyramidal model delegates the task of achieving a pacific international community to sovereigns, and nothing can lend the project more credibility than the claim that sovereigns are in favour and regard it as both useful and feasible.

*The critics of the pyramidal model**The scrutiny of the Enlightenment*

The pyramidal model was widely debated during the Enlightenment, largely thanks to Saint-Pierre's untiring efforts to popularize his own writings.¹² The idea of perpetual peace reached a vast audience, including thinkers such as Leibniz and D'Alembert. The most significant criticism of Saint-Pierre's project came, however, from the two greatest exponents of French Enlightenment, Voltaire and Rousseau.

¹⁰ Although Sully attributes the 'Grand dessin' wholly to Henry IV, it is uncertain to what extent it was actually thought up by the king, and to what extent it should be attributed to Sully's imagination alone. See André Puharré, *Les Projets d'organisation européenne d'après le Grand Dessin de Henri IV et de Sully* (Paris, 1954).

¹¹ Immanuel Kant, *On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'* (1793), in Hans Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings* (Cambridge, 1970), p. 92.

¹² See E. V. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France* (New York, 1941).

Voltaire's frequent attacks on war are common knowledge. His polemics were especially directed against the powerful, whom he viewed as waging war in the same spirit as they went hunting, with no thought for the sufferings the people would undergo. A project like Saint-Pierre's could not fail to arouse Voltaire's sarcasm. It was seen to delegate to sovereigns the task of abolishing wars which they themselves brought about. He regarded the creation of a pacific international organization as impracticable: 'The peace imagined by a Frenchman by the name of Abbé de Saint-Pierre is a chimera which cannot exist among Princes any more than it does among elephants and rhinoceroses, or between wolves and dogs'.¹³ Voltaire's sense of tolerance was also offended by the fact that Saint-Pierre only considered European and Christian sovereigns. The only feasible alternative for Voltaire was a thorough-going implementation of the Enlightenment's own cultural and political programme.

Saint-Pierre's project was rejected not only as unrealistic but also because it failed to censure the arbitrary exercise of power. For Voltaire, peace has little meaning when divorced from tolerance. His observations stress the need to combine peace and democracy, but ignore the need to prepare suitable tools to achieve peace in concrete terms.

Rousseau's analysis of Saint-Pierre's work is more carefully thought out. Unlike Voltaire, Rousseau was more inclined towards the formation of a Union of European States. However, he made a number of modifications to Saint-Pierre's original project. Firstly, he points out that a federation of solely European states finds its justification not in opposition to other powers or regions but rather in the fact that the states of the old continent share a common historical tradition and inherited from Christianity such shared cultural and religious values as the ideals of fraternity and concord.

Although political and cultural affinity make it both possible and desirable to create a European union, the formation of a European republic cannot be achieved through the mere summation of individual states. It requires profound changes in each state's internal political organization which are aimed at obtaining the full respect of the rights of individuals and peoples and at the pursuit of the common good. The policy of peace and security thus becomes the *result* of, rather than the premise for, the internal organization of individual states.

These premises led Rousseau to a radical criticism of Saint-Pierre's original project. The creation of a European organization aimed at ensuring peace would not only restrict the powers of sovereigns in international relations—as supporters of the pyramidal model naively promised—but would necessarily lead to changes in the internal constitutions of states. States with more highly developed constitutions would inevitably influence those with more backward political regimes: 'With the European Diet the Government of each State is determined no less than its frontiers'.¹⁴

But this is precisely the reason which causes Rousseau to be sceptical as to the feasibility of the project:

¹³ Voltaire, *De la paix perpétuelle, par le Docteur Goodheart* (London, 1769). § 1. On Saint-Pierre and Voltaire, see M. L. Perkins, 'Voltaire and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre on World Peace', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, 18 (1961), pp. 9–34.

¹⁴ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Jugement sur le projet de paix perpétuelle' (1758), translated in *The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Oxford, 1962), p. 389.

It is not said that if his system [Saint-Pierre's] has not been adopted it is because it was not a good one; what should be said is that it was too good to be adopted. For evil and abuses in which so many people indulge are introduced by themselves; but what is useful for public can only be imposed by force since particular interests are almost always opposed to it. [. . .] One never sees federal leagues established except by revolutions: and, according to this principle, who among us would dare say whether this European league is desirable or to be feared?¹⁵

In the new Europe, sovereigns would lose one of their principal means of maintaining power over their subjects: the existence—real or supposed—of external enemies. As Erasmus before him, Rousseau clearly denounced one of the causes of conflict, the need to keep subjects in a state of subjugation: 'I wonder whether there is a single sovereign in the world who, thus limited for ever in his most cherished projects, would bear without indignation the mere idea of being forced to be just, not only with foreigners, but even with his own subjects'.¹⁶

The author of the *Social Contract* could certainly have no wish for a European Union envisaged as a tool for putting down rebellion and countering democracy. As he clearly stated: 'It is not possible to protect princes against rebellion by their subjects without at the same time guaranteeing the subjects against the tyranny of the princes; otherwise the institution could not survive'.¹⁷

It was thanks to Rousseau that the pyramidal model thus overcame the contradiction between peace and the development of democracy. However, not even Rousseau was able to propose an international organization founded on a constitution fully respecting the rights of individuals and of peoples. And this theoretical lack was soon to be reflected in the politics of the French Revolution.

The Great Revolution

The French Revolution, dominated by the philosophy of Rousseau, made the pacifist views of the Enlightenment its own. Its Constitution contains an article expressly forbidding interference in the government of other nations, a norm of international law that was to be repeated almost word for word one and a half centuries later in the Charter of the United Nations. Also relevant was its repudiation of war as a tool of oppression and conquest. In the words of the Constitution of 1791: 'The French Nation forgoes the undertaking of any war of conquest, and shall never use force against the freedom of any people'.¹⁸ This article would appear to reconcile in political practice what Rousseau had reconciled in theory, i.e. the divergent destinies of peace and democracy.

However, closer study of revolutionary theory and practice in subsequent years suggests a different evaluation. There were a good few Jacobins who—strong in their possession of Europe's most powerful army after the Revolution—intended to exploit the situation in order to extend the conquests of the Republic and democracy internationally. The most significant exponent of this school was a singular German thinker, Anacharsis Cloots, who proudly defined himself as a 'baron in Prussia and citizen in the French Republic'. He had settled in Paris and even been elected deputy to the National Convention. A contemptuous critic of the Union proposed by Saint-Pierre—'a bizarre and ridiculous congress'—Cloots proposed a universal

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 396.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 389.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ *French Revolution Documents* (Oxford, 1966).

republic to be achieved through the uprising of the peoples of Europe but, if necessary, also through the advance of French troops.

The democracy achieved in France would be a small victory if confined to its own borders. It was necessary to extend it geographically as far as possible, by means of war: 'One vainly tells them that perpetual peace will be the price of universal law . . . war is necessary from time to time because mankind needs to be bled like any human body'.¹⁹ Cloots interprets the French constitution in the sense that France has no intention of using war to limit the freedom of other peoples, but *promotes* war in order to bestow upon them the liberties it has achieved itself. As the French troops gradually 'liberate' neighbouring peoples, they are to be annexed to the 'Single Nation', whose citizens will be called 'Germans' since all men are brothers. All means are legitimate to establish the Universal Republic, and so in the conflict between freedom and peace Cloots espouses the former even at the expense of the latter.

There was certainly no need of a more explicit theory to justify the advance of the French army beyond the Rhine. It is true that there was some opposition in France to Cloot's ideas. Robespierre in particular took a dim view of his muddled universalism, which he feared would lead to the denial of any specific Reason of State for the French Republic, and showed common sense in warning against 'the mania for wishing to make other nations free and happy against their will'. It is also true that Cloots ended up on the scaffold before his antagonist Robespierre.

Despite his unfortunate end, it was Cloot's ideas rather than Robespierre's that inspired France's subsequent foreign policy. The foundations had by now been laid for attempting to establish French hegemony over the continent, partly on the basis of lofty ideas of freedom and democracy and partly on the rebirth of the old Bourbon imperialism. Democracy marched side by side with the French armies and it mattered precious little to the last offspring of the century of Enlightenment that moral precepts had to be trampled in order to attain the supreme good. The dichotomy between peace and democracy already implicit in the earliest projects for perpetual peace finally came into the open. Peace could be denied and war promoted in the name of democracy.

The diffused model

Advocates of the model

The diffused model is distinguished from the pyramidal in that the supranational organization is no longer envisaged as a union of sovereign rulers of states but rather as an institution involving individuals belonging to the various states.²⁰ This difference is also reflected in the project for an international assembly, composed not of the sovereigns' ambassadors but of delegates who, in some way or another, represented also the citizens. The basic features of the diffused model are presented in figure 2.

¹⁹ A. Cloots, *La République universelle ou Adresse aux tyrannicides* (Paris, 1793), reprinted in *Œuvres*, (Paris, 1980), p. 9.

²⁰ In this regard, the diffused model ends up as a version of federalism. However, I will try to show that this is an *unintended* result, and not the starting point, of the authors I consider under this heading.




Figure 2 Diffused model.

Basic characteristics of the model:

1. Disputes between States are resolved through arbitration by international Federation, taking into account the will of the citizens;
2. The members of the Federation are the citizens and not the governments of the States;
3. The electoral criteria within the Federation is 'one citizen, one vote'.
4. The constitutional form of the member States is influenced by that of the State of the most advanced constitution;
5. Characteristic authors: Penn, Bellers, Saint-Simon, Bentham,
6. Historical examples—'strong' version: Federalist States such as United States of America: Dutch Union, Swiss Confederation: 'weak' version: The European Community

Various writers on this model—such as William Penn, John Bellers and Claude-Henri Saint-Simon—propose alternative criteria for the formation of the international assembly, but all reject the 'one state, one vote' concept which is the key criterion of the pyramidal model.

William Penn

The Quaker William Penn originated the diffused model when he proposed the creation of a 'universal diet' with tasks similar to those assigned by Crucé and Saint-Pierre to their Union, i.e. to settle disputes between states by arbitration. Penn also envisaged the members of the Diet as being appointed by sovereigns, but with the significant difference that each sovereign was to appoint a number of delegates proportional to the size of his country: 'for if it be possible to have an estimate of the yearly value of the several sovereign countries . . . the determination of the number of persons or votes in the states for every sovereignty will not be impracticable'.²¹

²¹ W. Penn, *An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (1693, reprinted: London, 1950), § VII.

Penn proposes that the number of each state's delegates should depend not on the 'revenue of the prince' but on the 'value of the territory' (a criterion reminiscent of the modern concept of gross domestic product) precisely because the delegates represent their country and not their sovereign. He suggests the following hypothetical composition for the assembly:

I suppose the Empire of Germany to send twelve; France, ten; Spain, ten; Italy, which comes to France, eight; England, six; Portugal, three; Sweedland, four; Denmark, three; Poland, four; Venice, three; the seven provinces, four; the thirteen cantons and little neighbouring sovereignties, two; dukedoms of Holstein and Courland, one; and if the Turks and Muscovites are taken in, as seems but fit and just, they will make ten apiece more. The whole makes ninety. A great presence when they represent the fourth, and now the best and wealthiest part of the known world.²²

This passage will remind the modern reader of the structure of the present European Parliament, whose characteristic of granting smaller countries a greater number of delegates than strict application of proportional representation would allow Penn anticipates. Although this assembly is less advantageous to small states than the pyramidal model's of 'one state, one vote', they are to be safeguarded by adjustment of the proportional system. However, what most distinguishes Penn from advocates of the pyramidal model is the fact that in his project delegates are not bound by the will of the sovereigns who have appointed them. Penn goes so far as to suggest the formation of groups made up of delegates from different states: 'If the whole number be cast in tens, each choosing one, they may preside by turns'.²³

It is no coincidence that Penn sees the delegates' right to vote as necessarily unbounded by the interests and policies not only of the sovereigns nominating them but also of their own states. Delegates must act solely upon their own convictions, and the means to ensure this is the secret ballot:

The question for a vote, which, in my opinion, should be by the ballot after the prudent and commendable method of the Venetians: which, in a great degree, prevents the ill effects of corruption; because if any of the delegates of that high and mighty Estates could be so vile, false and dishonourable as to be influenced by money, they have the advantage of taking their money that will give it them and of voting undiscovered to the interest of their principles and their own inclinations; as they that do understand the balloting box do very well know.²⁴

Delegates from the same country and appointed by the same sovereign could thus come to cast contrary votes on specific issues.

John Bellers

The idea of a European federal union was put forward again a few years later by another Quaker, John Bellers, who differed from Penn precisely with regard to the criteria for assigning delegates. His proposal was to divide Europe into cantons or provinces (he suggested 100), each of which would be represented at the European parliament: 'The Members of the Senate should be in Proportion to the Strength of a Country which they represent'.²⁵ Bellers followed Penn in implicitly assuming that

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid. § VIII.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ J. Bellers, 'Some Reasons for An European State' (1710), reprinted in G. Clarke (ed.), *John Bellers, His Life Times and Writings* (London, 1987), p. 141.

delegates to the international assembly would not be answerable to their sovereigns but to the provinces they represented. But what criteria should there be for creating provinces? Beller's proposal lends itself to two different interpretations. The provinces could be understood as mere subdivisions of nation states. In this way, the smaller states would be counted as single provinces and be entitled to a single delegate, while the larger ones would be subdivided into a number of provinces and have a corresponding number of delegates. If this is the sense of the proposal, then Beller differs little from Penn. The second interpretation is more radical. The provinces into which Europe was to be subdivided would not necessarily be created from single nation states. A number of small states could form a single constituency, and certain constituencies could be formed of territories and subjects belonging to more than one state. In other words, individuals would be represented in the international community on the basis of a constituency not necessarily coinciding with the state whose citizens they were. The creation of a supranational institution thus leads to a re-examination of the structure of states.

Claude-Henri Saint-Simon

The third and most significant formulation of the diffused model was put forward in an essay written by Claude-Henri Saint-Simon and his pupil, A. Thierry. The year in which the essay was published—1814—largely explains its content. Napoleon's defeat had definitively brought to an end Cloots's dreams of establishing a sort of universal republic in continental Europe, and for the first time since Saint-Pierre had published his project, the sovereigns of old Europe were gathered in Vienna. The pyramidal model could and did become political reality. It is thus no coincidence that Saint-Simon was careful to dissociate himself from Saint-Pierre's project:

The first result of the constitution of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (assuming that it were possible at all), would be to perpetuate the *status quo* in Europe at the moment of it was set up. Thenceforward the remnants of feudalism still in existence would become indestructible. Moreover, it would encourage the abuse of power by making the power of sovereigns more dangerous to their peoples, and depriving them of any resource against tyranny. In a word, this sham organization would be nothing but a mutual guarantee of princes to preserve their arbitrary power.²⁶

Saint-Simon thus takes over the criticisms made by democratic thought, and by Rousseau in particular, of the absolutism implicit in the pyramidal model. He did not, however, give up his aim of suggesting a supranational organization with alternative features. The European parliament he proposed was based on the idea that each state should adopt the most advanced political constitution then existing.

In his view, this constitution was found in Great Britain. France had also adopted a constitutional monarchy after the defeat of Napoleon, and he regarded the existence of analogous political constitutions in at least two different states as making it possible to create a supranational parliament and government as the first step towards a broader European unity: 'The French have adopted the English consti-

²⁶ C.-H. Saint-Simon, 'The Reorganization of the European Community' (1814), translated in F. Markam (ed.), *Social Organization, the Science of Man and Other Writings of Henri de Saint-Simon* (New York and Evanston, 1964), p. 38.

tution, and all the peoples of Europe will adopt it gradually, as they become sufficiently enlightened to appreciate its advantages'.²⁷

Saint-Simon had been convinced by the experience of the United States which suggested that the chief, if not the sole, obstacle to international integration was to be sought in the different constitutional structures existing within states. But the process of integration in no way hinders political progress. On the contrary, it provides a spur for the development of democracy. The most thorough formulation of the decentralized model thus overturns what was implicit in the pyramidal model: international organization is no longer seen as an obstacle to the development of democracy but rather as an incentive.

For the first time while theorizing on international unions Saint-Simon put forward the electoral principle of 'one man, one vote'. But what powers were to be attributed to the European Parliament? Saint-Simon envisaged this institution as concentrating powers great enough to undermine the very existence of nation states. It was even to decide upon the territorial integrity of its member states:

If a particular part of the European population, under a particular government, wishes to form a separate nation, or to come under another government, it is for the European parliament to decide the issue. It will decide, not in the interest of the governments, but of the peoples, bearing in mind always the best possible organization of the European Confederation.²⁸

Saint-Simon appears to have envisaged not a confederative union, but a *federal* and hence a *single* state, repeating in Europe what had happened on the American continent. He had lost sight of the distinction between founding a federal state and a confederative union, which Immanuel Kant had pointed out: 'A *congress* merely signifies a voluntary gathering of various states which can be *dissolved* at any time, not an association which, like that of the American States, is based on a political constitution and is therefore indissoluble.'²⁹

It is therefore surprising that Saint-Simon regarded the extension of parliamentary political regimes as being sufficient in itself to achieve this union: 'Now the time when all the European peoples are governed by national parliaments will unquestionably be the time when a common parliament can be established without difficulties'.³⁰ What he proposes is a political union that would come to negate the very reason which had led to the formation of nation states—i.e. territorial defence—and would effectively bring about the *disintegration* of individual states and their substitution with a federal state. It therefore seems hardly likely that mere persuasion would suffice to induce states to agree to such a union.

Jeremy Bentham

Bentham too worked on a project for universal and perpetual peace which, albeit unfinished, contains significant indications that it would neatly fit into the diffused model. He does not tackle the problem of supranational institutions, but analyses the relationship existing between foreign policy and citizens within a state. He takes as his

²⁷ Ibid. p. 50.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 48.

²⁹ Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), in Reiss, *Kant's Political Writings*, p. 171.

³⁰ Saint-Simon, 'The Reorganization of the European Community', p. 50.

starting point the benefits that individual states stand to gain from the establishment of perpetual peace. Bentham's assertion that neither Britain nor any other country has any interest in undertaking a war does not mean that war would offer no advantages of any kind—such as territorial expansion or wealth—but that it is not *in the interests of the individuals* making up the national community. And if foreign policy is, like domestic policy, to be understood as a service performed on behalf of citizens, then the actions of those responsible must be subjected to rules and control. It is, in short, necessary to go beyond the idea that governments alone may decide on the type of relations to be established with other states.

But how does Bentham expect to achieve the affirmation of the interests of individuals in the sphere of international politics? Through a simple norm requiring the *publicizing* of actions carried out by foreign ministers:

[The Foreign Department] is the Department of all others in which the strongest checks are needful. At the same time, thanks to the rules of secrecy of all the Departments, this is the only one in which there are no checks at all. I say, then, the conclusion is demonstrated. The principle which throws a veil of secrecy over the proceedings of the Foreign Department of the Cabinet is pernicious in the highest degree, pregnant with mischiefs superior to everything to which the most perfect absence of all concealment could possibly give rise.³¹

The major exponent of British utilitarianism thus seeks the participation of individuals in the international community, not as electors, but as citizens of a state which is the expression of the interests of individuals, i.e. a democratic state.

The legacy of the diffused model

The diffused model proposes the creation of an international organization which bridges the gap between peace and democracy that exists in the pyramidal model. The former thus succeeds in incorporating the criticisms put forward by democratic thought, and by Rousseau in particular, within the project for an international organization. However, peace and democracy are reunited at the cost of sacrificing the specific nature of nation states, i.e. to the substitution of individual states with a sort of world federal state.

Is there any difference between the diffused model and the more familiar federalist model, as expressed, for example, in *The Federalist*? Although they reach the same conclusions concerning the juridical constitution, there are significant differences. The latter proposes the creation of a super-state in order to reach a higher centralization and favours rearmament, the former uses the federation to achieve international peace and disarmament.

The conclusion reached by the diffused model raises two questions:

- (1) To what extent does this theoretical advance involve moving further away from the possibility of actually putting the model into practice? Is it *feasible*?
- (2) To what extent is the creation of a world super-state, albeit based on the 'most advanced constitution' in the world, able to meet the needs of widely differing communities? Is it *desirable*?

³¹ Jeremy Bentham, *Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace* (1786–89; reprinted London, 1927), p. 35.

As regards the first point, it may be said that more than one modern state has been set up in accordance with the provisions of the diffused model. It has proved effective in cases where various nation states have united to become a federal state. The historical examples of the Dutch United Provinces, which Penn considered, and the United States, that Saint-Simon studies, come under this heading. However, the main reason leading to the creation of these federal states is not the avoidance of internal conflict among member states but protection against the threats of other nation states. But for the wars waged by France and Britain, the Dutch state would not have been created, just as the United States of America would not have come into being without the War of Independence. The creation of these federal states resembles a Hobbesian situation more closely than the consensual union envisaged by Penn, Bellers and Saint-Simon: they were formed out of the need to concentrate energies and means into a monopoly of force capable of holding its own against existing nation states.

There is, of course, the highly significant historical exception of today's European Community, which does in fact constitute a supranational body mediating between states of similar characteristics but having different constitutions. Advocates of the diffused model are fully entitled to be regarded as the pioneers of today's European Community, but we must not forget the essential limitation this body shares with the United Nations: the lack of autonomous strength.

Historical experience does not entirely deny the feasibility of the diffused model. However, its advocates had something more ambitious in mind: a capacity to absorb new members to the point of including the whole world. The process of the gradual expansion of the diffused model has proved far more complicated than originally foreseen. In comparison, the pyramidal model (at least in the 'weak' version devoid of coercive powers) has been able to expand with far greater facility. While almost all states in the world are today members of the United Nations, there is no likelihood of their all becoming members of the European Community, or still less of the United States. It is not hard to see why the diffused model is more difficult to extend than the pyramidal: the former requires uniformity of political and economic systems, which inevitably hinders the acquisition of new members.

This raises the question of the extent to which the diffused model may be an effective means to ensure peace. It has unquestionably made it more difficult—and frequently impossible—for conflict to arise among the members of the same federation, just as the creation of nation states made it impossible for conflict to arise between different provinces of the same state. But as long as *more than one* federation exists on the planet, the risk of war cannot be eliminated. On the contrary, the creation of two opposing super-federations cannot but make any conflict even more dangerous, as the history of the Cold War demonstrates. Saint-Simon himself described something very similar to what took place after the Yalta agreement:

The Treaty of Westphalia established a new order by a political device called the balance of power. Europe was divided into two confederations which were artificially kept in equilibrium, thus giving rise to war and legalizing it; for two leagues of equal power are necessarily rival, and rivalry cannot persist without war.³²

³² Saint-Simon, 'The Reorganization of the European Community', pp. 30–31.

The cosmopolitan model

Kant and the birth of the cosmopolitan model

The cosmopolitan and diffused models have much in common. The former cannot, however, be regarded as juridically realized, but it may be interpreted as an attempt to combine elements present in both the pyramidal and the diffused models while positing as a unifying criterion a different conception of politics and law. While the pyramidal and diffused models are the outcome of the work of a number of writers, the cosmopolitan model is historically identified above all with the thought of Immanuel Kant. Kant's fundamental contribution to the theory of international relations consists of his short work *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project*, the most celebrated and significant work of juridical pacifism. The ideas it contains are not, however, the fruit of isolated reflection as Kant also tackles the same issues in other works.³³

In the first part of the project, Kant takes up Saint-Pierre's device of presenting his ideas in the form of actual articles of a hypothetical international treaty. The articles are divided into two sections, the first containing the *preliminary* and the second the *definitive*. The former are, at least in part, connected with the existing perpetual peace projects and are presented as laws forbidding certain actions of the state:

- I. No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made with a secret reservation of the material for a future war.
- II. No independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift.
- III. Standing armies will gradually be abolished altogether.
- IV. No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state.
- V. No state shall forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of another state.
- VI. No state when at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace.³⁴

This first part of the work resembles the pyramidal model in that it contemplates prohibitions on the international conduct of states without questioning their internal constitutions. The second article is, however, a clear criticism of the conduct of European monarchies and their view of territory as the property of the sovereign.

The fifth article is strongly reminiscent of provisions laid down by the French Constitution a few years earlier. Kant appears to have taken it upon himself to remind the French revolutionaries—and especially those who shared Clotus's ideas—of their promise to regard each state as endowed with equal rights. At the time when France was laying claim to political, cultural and military hegemony over the entire continent, the German philosopher pointed out the contradiction between the revolutionaries' progressive principles and their drive for power.

In the third article Kant points to the very existence of professional armies as a cause of war. This was by no means an attitude to be taken for granted. In the United States, for example, federalist writers had fought for the creation of a standing army

³³ For a recent analysis of Kant's writings on international relations, see A. Hurrell, 'Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 16 (1990), pp. 183–205.

³⁴ Kant, *Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Project*, in Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings*, pp. 93–7.

in opposition to provisions laid down in the constitutions of states with strong pacifist feelings such as Pennsylvania and North Carolina, both of which stated: 'As standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up'.³⁵ Instead of a standing army, Kant proposed the intrinsically non-offensive voluntary participation of citizens in defence of their territories.

While the preliminary articles did not break radically with the previous tradition, they appear both as a criticism of the more unjust practices of the old monarchies and as an appeal to the authentic values of the century's two most important revolutions, the American and the French. The three definitive articles constitute proposals for the international order envisaged by Kant and are the basis of a model of international organization radically different from that put forward by his predecessors:

- I. The civic constitution of every state shall be republican.
- II. The law of nations shall be based on a federation of free states.
- III. Cosmopolitan law shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.³⁶

The first article sounds a whole note above the pentagram of the perpetual peace projects tradition. For the first time it is maintained that if international peace is to be 'perpetual', it must imply a homogeneity of the political constitutions of individual states, the model for which is to be sought in the republic. Like Saint-Simon, Kant holds it neither possible nor desirable for a permanent international organization to exist without respect for the individual being in force within its member states. Since republican government involves the direct participation of citizens in the management of public affairs, it will necessarily be peaceful: 'If, as is inevitably the case under this constitution, the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise, for this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war'.³⁷

Have we thus arrived with Kant at the full reuniting of pacifism and democracy? Not quite, unfortunately. After adopting this radical stance, Kant then limits the consequences of his assertions by distinguishing between forms of sovereignty and forms of government. In his view, the republican constitution is a form of government capable of coexisting even with a form of sovereignty based on a monarchy, provided that the latter is exercised on the basis of a constitutional code. Kant is even careful to contrast the republican constitution with the democratic and to opt decidedly for the former. It is, in fact, precisely in his *Perpetual Peace* that the democratic constitution is criticized as a form of despotism. Kant thus appears to deny what was shown by the historical experience of the American and French Revolutions, i.e. the simultaneous birth of a republican regime and democracy.

Kant's aim was, in fact, to distinguish between two forms of government today defined as representative and direct democracy. His decided preference for the former appears to stem from his radical scepticism towards sovereignty as a direct emanation from the people, a scepticism which underlies this work's denial—contrary to the position adopted by his disciples—of the people's right to revolution and the direct exercising of sovereignty. Kant thus expresses, both here and elsewhere, his criticism

³⁵ Cited in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison, *The Federalist* (1788, reprinted: Chicago, 1952), p. 87.

³⁶ Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, pp. 98–105.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 100.

of some results of the Jacobin revolution, and would appear to opt for more moderate policies, such as those of the Girondins, or a form of constitutional monarchy similar to the British. While the gulf between peace and democracy is significantly narrowed by Kant's work, it still cannot be regarded as bridged.³⁸

The second article seems again to answer Cloots in that it underlines the difference between a confederation of states and a single state of all peoples. A universal confederation is not in itself a mistaken positive ideal, but it is decidedly mistaken to pursue it using means extraneous to international law, i.e. war. Kant thus opts for the negative surrogate represented by a 'permanent league for peace' with the goal of avoiding the outbreak of conflict. The difference with the diffused model relies upon Kant's support for the existence of both autonomous states and a voluntary confederation of states.

However, the truly significant article is the last, in which Kant decidedly broadens the theoretical perspectives of juridical pacifism. While his project's first article was concerned with constitutional, and the second with international, law, the third was aimed at founding a new branch: cosmopolitan law. All the citizens of the planet are recognized as being endowed with rights and duties going far beyond their formal status as subjects and citizens of one particular state.³⁹

The meaning of the Kantian notion of cosmopolitan law has for long been controversial.⁴⁰ In the light of the tradition of perpetual peace projects, cosmopolitan law seems to be the juridical innovation which allows resolution of the contradictions besetting projects for perpetual peace. States continue to enjoy full sovereignty and are invited to voluntarily join an international confederation, as expected in the pyramidal model. However, they must respect precise rules with regard to their internal constitutions, as stated in the diffused model. The task of 'controlling' is not assigned to other states, since this would lead to a contradiction between each state's claim to sovereignty and acceptance of the 'guardianship' of other states. The function of 'guardian' in both international relations and the internal affairs of states is thus to be performed by cosmopolitan law. Each inhabitant of the planet is elevated to the position of international 'magistrate'. Philosophers—today we would say intellectuals—are, without hypocrisy, assigned the privileged role of watching over and directing governmental action. As depositaries of the idea of reason, they are to be the privileged magistrates of cosmopolitan law.⁴¹

Kant also follows other pacifist writers in giving far less attention to the means for setting up an international organization than to the ends it should pursue. Like

³⁸ From J. G. Fichte, 'Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf von Immanuel Kant' (1796), reprinted in Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 1962), to Galvano della Volpe, *Rousseau and Marx* (London, 1974), democratic criticism of Kant's pacifist ideas has stressed this point.

³⁹ According to some interpreters of Kant, cosmopolitan law is to be understood as 'the relations of a state with the subjects of another state'; see N. Bobbio, *Diritto e Stato in Emanuele Kant* (Turin, 1969). In fact, within the idea of cosmopolitan law, Kant includes the right of citizens to hospitality in foreign countries and opposition to colonialism. However, he also adds something far more interesting and fruitful for the purposes of transforming international relations, i.e. the separation of the law of nations from the law of individuals as citizens of the world.

⁴⁰ For opposite interpretations of Kant's ideas as 'statist' or 'cosmopolitan', see Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, and Martin Wight, 'An Anatomy of International Thought', *Review of International Studies*, 13 (1987), pp. 221–7.

⁴¹ For a more detailed analysis of Kant's theory of international relations, and its relationship with the *jus gentium* tradition on the one hand, and the declarations of the rights of citizens of the French and the American revolutions on the other, see D. Archibugi, 'Immanuel Kant e il diritto cosmopolitico', forthcoming in *Giano. Ricerche per la pace*.




Figure 3 Cosmopolitan model.

Basic characteristics of the model:

1. The Assembly of States is based on the criterion 'one State, one vote': The Cosmopolitan Assembly is based on the criterion 'one citizen, one vote';
2. The members of the international community are both individuals and States;
3. Disputes between States are settled within the Assembly of States; the Cosmopolitan Assembly expresses its opinions on disarmament and international relations;
4. Characteristic author: Kant;
5. Historical examples: the European Parliament, Agencies of the United Nations.

Bentham before him, Kant proposes the abolition of secrecy in international, no less than in public, law. This would make it possible to oblige the political action of governments to conform to morality, since the maxims capable of achieving their purpose through publicity must necessarily 'conform to the general end of the people'.

Kant thus had the merit of founding a law independent of both the juridical relations within individual states and those existing between one state and another. As he courageously stated: 'the idea of a cosmopolitan law is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a

perpetual peace'.⁴² However, he failed to indicate the means whereby cosmopolitan law was to be enforced.⁴³

The cosmopolitan model today

Kant's suggestions enable us to put forward a third model of international relations shown in figure 3. This model combines the criterion of equal representation for each state found in the pyramidal model and censures violent interference in the internal affairs of another state. However, it is not taken for granted that the *status quo* must reign within states. On the contrary, the international community is assigned the task of fostering, through peaceful means, the progress of political relations within states—i.e. the establishment of democracy—as postulated by the diffused model.

What are the implications of this model for the international community? Today we have at our disposal international bodies such as the United Nations which, although with very limited means of coercion of their own, are at least capable of censuring the conduct of states in international relations. However, there as yet exists no recognized international organization called upon to control and report on the way political relations are handled within states. The ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, and of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference constitute the first significant 'intrusions' of international law into the sphere of public law. However, these moves are insufficient and, in part, contradictory.

Firstly, the role of censuring the constitutions and political practice of states—albeit solely with the aim of informing public opinion—has been mainly performed by non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International rather than by a supranational organization with some claim to being the expression of the inhabitants of the planet.

Secondly, there is a significant disparity between the attention devoted by such organizations to the subject of human rights and their concern with the constitutions in force in each country. The reason may be guessed at: while it is now fairly easy juridically to denounce abuses against the dignity of the person, it is far more difficult to identify an 'ideal' constitution. In fact, while states held responsible for crimes against the dignity of the person (such as torture) generally *deny* having committed them, states which do not recognize such political principles as free elections, the freedom of the press or the right to work maintain that they are not universally valid.

Thirdly, the lack of appropriate channels of the international community to 'interfere' in the internal affairs of each state has often induced governments to interfere into the actions of foreign governments. The consequence is that these problems are treated as marginal issues or even used as pretexts in inter-state relations.

⁴² Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 108.

⁴³ Among the applications of Kant's idea of cosmopolitan law, see Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton, 1979), for economic rights, Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (London, 1982), for individual obligations, R. J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge, 1986) with regard to the universality of some human rights, and D. Held 'Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System', in Held (ed.), *Political Theory Today* (Cambridge, 1991), with regard to the implications for national democracy.

This means that in the sphere of international relations the aspirations towards peace and democracy held by individual members of the civil society run up against obstacles implicit in its very structure. While there may exist great pressure for the establishment of a cosmopolitan model of international relations (suffice it to mention the activities of numerous United Nations agencies), this can in no way be regarded as something achieved.

In fact, some audacious proposals have already been made to reform international organizations.⁴⁴ After our review of the projects for perpetual peace, they appear much less visionary than generally believed. The full establishment of the cosmopolitan model requires the founding of a body within the international community to represent the peoples as citizens of the world. In practical terms, this would mean an organization parallel and complementary to the United Nations, which is primarily an inter-governmental organization. This organization would be the direct expression of individuals who, although citizens of individual states, are to be represented in the assembly independently of their countries of origin. Even though devoid of coercive powers, the task of this organization would be to *establish* and *uphold* cosmopolitan law.

Proposals such as those made by the International Network for a United Nations 2nd Assembly (INFUSA), by the World Citizens Assembly, and more generally in the Conferences for A More Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN) are related to the Kantian model of international relations, and they have much to gain from careful examinations of the perpetual peace projects tradition. More particularly, their proposals would benefit from a clear split between the law of nations and cosmopolitan law.

The first objection to such proposals is that individuals would be doubly represented in the international community, precisely as in the federative and diffused models: in the first instance by their governments, in the second by their direct representatives. While possibly effective in countries whose citizens do not identify themselves with their governments, this double representation would have no sense in countries governed by democratic systems. The real solution to the problem would thus be to achieve democracy in the authoritarian states. These objections go to the root of the problem, but are based on the assumption that the government of a state can represent the interests of that state and those of the individuals of the planet at one and the same time. Unfortunately, this is anything but certain. In the absence of linkages among civil societies independent of the state to whom they belong, all nations, including democratic ones, are entirely justified in acting on the basis of the Reason of State.

The double representation of individuals both as citizens of a state and inhabitants of the planet thus becomes necessary. It is possible to point to the historical experience of the European Community as a partial realization of the cosmopolitan model. While some of its organs, such as the Council of Ministers and the European Council, are composed of ministers of the member states and the single governments dispose of force, the European Parliament is a direct expression of the inhabitants of these states which is almost void of power. The European Community is, of course, a particular case in that it is composed of states with political and economic affinities.

⁴⁴ An overview of the current proposals to reform international organizations is provided in Frank Barnaby (ed.), *Building a More Democratic United Nations* (London, 1991).

However, at least conceptually, the experience of the European Community demonstrates the possibility of achieving a voluntary confederation founded on two parallel organizations—one formed by states and the other by individuals.

Nor would it be senseless to introduce into this supranational body some criterion of representation for individuals independent of their status as citizens of particular states. In today's world this view, which was once advocated by John Bellers, might mean the delegates to this hypothetical cosmopolitan assembly were elected jointly by the inhabitants of the two Koreas or of Israel and the West Bank.

This is not the place to describe the functions this body should perform. Suffice it to say that it would be called upon to co-ordinate many of the activities currently carried out on a sporadic and voluntary basis, such as information on arms, on human rights, and on forms of political organization in force within states. The creation of an authentically universal organization to embody cosmopolitan law is not, perhaps, an unattainable utopia. Although it remains, for now, an idea developed to give juridical and political cohesion to the international community, we cannot rule out of its potential aid in averting the global threats of our age.

Conclusions

This paper has analysed the tradition of projects for perpetual peace. I have endeavoured to show that, while such projects all belong to juridical pacifism, their internal differences are so significant as to suggest their division under the three distinct headings of the pyramidal, diffused and cosmopolitan models. I have further tried to demonstrate that the fundamental reason why the pyramidal model has run aground is its incompatibility with the development of democracy. The diffused model, on the other hand, does not clash with democracy, but is instead identified with the creation of a worldwide super-state—a goal not only hard to achieve without new conflict, but perhaps not even desirable.

Finally, I have pointed out the existence of a third model, developed by Immanuel Kant, which is, to some degree at least, capable of resolving the contradictions found in its predecessors. This model is still far from finished in either theoretical or practical terms. However, it is similar to some contemporary proposals for the reform of international organizations. The aim of the model is to create an international community which, while recognizing the full sovereignty of states, also allows for the participation of individuals through their direct delegates thus avoiding an undesirable centralization of power. This seems to be the means of arriving at the creation of an international community which would foster peace and facilitate the development of democracy.

Our travels through the world of projects for perpetual peace raise the unavoidable question as to whether they may be utopias. In my view, the *projects* were certainly not utopian. The institutions they proposed may not have existed at the time, but became real within a couple of centuries. The *authors* were, however, utopian in their belief that the creation of such institutions would suffice to solve the problem of war. Although the constitutional perfection of such institutions as the United Nations or the European Parliament far surpasses the dreams of the visionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the problem of war on the planet is still by no

means settled. Today's international organizations are undoubtedly a necessary condition, but certainly not a sufficient one, to guarantee peace. From this point of view, it can even be claimed that the authors of peace projects were not utopian *enough*, and that in order to achieve peace it may be necessary to imagine something even more audacious.

The history of the twentieth century has taught us that it is far easier to create international organizations than it appeared to the thinkers of the past. This must not, however, lead us into facile optimism: most of today's international organizations are still devoid of independent power. The international community's real problem is therefore not the sanctioning of law, but its enforcement without coercive means. Unfortunately, progress in this field is measured on the geological rather than the human time scale. Juridical pacifism cannot promise to make war disappear, but only to find ways of making it less probable.

It is no coincidence that there is a considerable disparity between the attention dedicated by juridical pacifists to the *ends* of their international organizations, and that dedicated to the *means* of achieving them. More attention is focused on the *way* in which peace can be obtained than on the *reasons* for war. They could not fail to be branded as politically naive. Comparison of Erasmus and Machiavelli, Crucé and Hobbes, Saint-Pierre and Voltaire, Kant and Hegel, Saint-Simon and Engels makes it clear that realist philosophers provide a far more profound and penetrating image of the causes of war; so much so that they conclude nothing can be done about it. However, the contemporary international community demonstrates that realism has led us up a blind alley. It is therefore necessary to seek other and intentionally more ingenuous approaches in tackling our planet's most important problem, survival.