

1 Comment on Flaxman et al. (2020, Nature, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2405-7>): The
2 illusory effects of non-pharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in Europe

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
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8 In a recent article, Flaxman et al.¹ allege that non-pharmaceutical interventions imposed by
9 11 European countries saved millions of lives. We show that their methods involve circular
10 reasoning. The purported effects are pure artefacts, which contradict the data. Moreover, we
11 demonstrate that the United Kingdom's lockdown was both superfluous and ineffective.

12 A key concept in epidemiology is the *effective reproduction number*, $R(t)$, where t
13 denotes time. This function represents the expected number of infections generated by one
14 infected individual. Ceteris paribus, the effective reproduction number starts at $R(0)$, referred to
15 as the *basic reproduction number*, and decreases monotonically. The monotonic decrease is due
16 to the fact that the number of individuals susceptible to the infection but not yet infected declines
17 as the virus spreads. Of course, the function $R(t)$ can be influenced by non-pharmaceutical
18 interventions (NPIs) as well as by voluntary behavioral changes. However, in case of a finite
19 population, the effective reproduction number falls automatically and necessarily over time since
20 the number of infections would otherwise diverge.

21 The model of Flaxman et al.¹ contradicts this elementary insight. They estimate $R(t)$ from
22 daily deaths associated with SARS-CoV-2 using as an *a priori* restriction that $R(t)$ may *only*
23 change at those dates where interventions become effective. Such an approach does not prove

24 that NPIs were effective but rather begs the result, i.e., involves circular logic. The true effective
 25 reproduction number declines continuously, and when its estimates are allowed to change only at
 26 intervention points, it is clear that profound discontinuities, which attribute strong effects to the
 27 interventions, will emerge. Flaxman et al. (p. 2) conclude that while most NPIs had
 28 unidentifiable effects, lockdowns reduced the reproduction numbers instantaneously by 82 %.
 29 Taking the United Kingdom as an example, Fig. 1 illustrates the ineffectiveness of social
 30 distancing etc. in the analysis of Flaxman et al. as well as the enormous effect of the lockdown
 31 from 23 March.

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
35 **Figure 1: Estimate of the effective reproduction number by Flaxman et al. (Fig. 1).** The
 36 authors assumed $R(t)$ constant before 14 March and after 23 March. Changes were allowed only
 37 on the four dates where NPIs became effective.

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39 Flaxman et al. (p. 2) infer their estimate of the basic reproduction number from the initial
 40 growth of reported daily deaths. Our Fig. 2 shows the actual growth of reported daily deaths.

41 Following the presumption of Flaxman et al. that deaths are more reliable than cases, we see
 42 growth of reported daily deaths as a good empirical proxy that mirrors the development of the
 43 effective reproduction rate. Of course, deaths follow infections after a long delay – a fact which
 44 is taken into account below.

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48 **Figure 2: Growth factor of daily deaths.** *Source:* https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/891710/2020-06-11_COVID-19_UK_deaths_time_series.csv. Moving averages, 7 days. Retrieved 14 June 2020. Given daily deaths d_t ,
 49 growth factors were computed as d_t/d_{t-1} . Note that if daily deaths show exponential growth, any
 50 moving average will also show exponential growth.

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54 Disregarding noise in the data, the growth in daily deaths associated with the coronavirus declined steadily during March and April. Moreover, reported daily deaths follow infections with

55 a median delay of 23 days, consisting of a 5 days incubation period² and a median delay of about
56 18 days from symptom onset to death³. Note that this delay also underlies the estimations by
57 Flaxman et al. (p. 22 of their supplementary information).

58 Considering a total delay of 23 days between infection and death, possible effects of the
59 23 March lockdown should only become visible in the data around April 15. However, the series
60 does not show the slightest break in mid-April. Hitherto, the growth factor had already declined
61 from 1.54 to 0.97, and thereafter it continued its slowdown. Contrary to the findings of Flaxman
62 et al., Fig. 2 strongly suggests that the UK lockdown was both superfluous (it did not prevent an
63 otherwise explosive behavior of the spread of the coronavirus) and ineffective (it did not slow
64 down the death growth rate visibly).

65 The argument of a delay of 23 days between infection and death can also be used in the
66 opposite direction. With the growth rate of daily corona deaths falling since mid March, the
67 underlying growth rate of daily infections must have started receding in the second half of
68 February, long before the problem was recognized and any measures were taken. The continuous
69 decrease in the growth factor shown in Fig. 2, even at dates before any NPI could have become
70 effective, corroborates the theoretical insight that $R(t)$ falls automatically over time. We have
71 checked that the growth factors in the remaining 10 countries considered by Flaxman et al. show
72 a similar pattern.

73 Our final remark regards Sweden, the only country in the dataset that refrained from
74 strong measures, but has lower corona deaths per capita than Belgium, Italy, Spain, or the United
75 Kingdom. In the absence of a lockdown, but with an effective reproduction number that declined
76 in the usual fashion, Flaxman et al. (Extended Data Fig. 1) attribute the sudden decline in
77 Sweden's $R(t)$ on March 27 almost entirely to banning of public events, i.e., to a NPI that they

78 found ineffective in all other countries. This inconsistency underlines our contention that the
79 results of Flaxman et al. are artefacts of an inappropriate model.

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