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**Future Impact
of Dissident Elements within the Army
on the Enforcement of Discipline,
Law, and Order**

by R. William Rae
Stephen B. Forman
Howard C. Olson

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PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT

TECHNICAL PAPER RAC-TP-441

Published January 1972

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McLean, Virginia 22101



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FOREWORD

The degree to which dissidence may have an impact in the future on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order is of serious concern to Army planners. In this study, an attempt was made to determine the current level of dissidence in the Army and to examine the possible causes of dissident behavior as a basis for estimating what the trend may be in the next few years.

The findings should prove useful to the Army in general and to the Office of the Provost Marshal General in particular in their planning for military police requirements for the Modern Volunteer Army.

Paul W. Keve
Head, Public Safety Department

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to express their appreciation for the assistance provided by staff members of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, the Counterintelligence Analysis Detachment of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and the Adjutant General's Office. Dr. Earl E. Hall assisted by Mrs. C. C. Jackson (both formerly with RAC) contributed to much of the analysis during Phase I of the study. Miss Penelope S. Bonsall assisted by Mr. William B. Blakemore were responsible for the computer programming of the personnel survey analyses.

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

Generally to identify and assess the existing and potential impact of dissident elements within the Army on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order.

Specifically.

- (1) To determine the extent and nature of dissidence in the Army.
- (2) To determine the factors that contribute to the actions of dissident elements.
- (3) To estimate the trend in the various types of dissident activities for the next two to four years.
- (4) To determine the effect of dissident activities on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order.
- (5) To determine the adequacy of military police procedures for dealing with dissidence.
- (6) To determine Army-wide measures which could serve to reduce dissidence.

FACTS

This study was conducted under the sponsorship of the Office of the Provost Marshal General of the United States Army during the period September 1970 to August 1971. This report is one part of the Army priority study, "The American Soldier of the 70's."

The data used for this study were obtained from:

- (1) A written personnel survey designed and administered by RAC to 844 soldiers at Forts Bragg, Carson, Dix, Gordon, and Hood.

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(2) Personal interviews with 126 soldiers conducted by RAC at the above posts.

(3) A post commander mail survey distributed to the 17 largest posts in Continental United States (CONUS).

(4) Documentary data sources available in the Washington, D. C. area.

DISCUSSION

This brief discussion outlines the type of analyses performed during the study. The findings are tabulated and presented throughout the body of this report, and the conclusions are summarized at the end of this summary section.

The personnel survey addressed nine types of behavior related to dissidence:

- (1) On-post demonstrations
- (2) Off-post demonstrations
- (3) Contribution to underground newspapers
- (4) Distribution of protest materials
- (5) Attendance at protest meetings
- (6) Frequenting antimilitary coffee houses
- (7) Disobeying/refusing orders or showing disrespect to a superior
- (8) Drug use
- (9) Racial discrimination

To accomplish objective 1, the answers from the personnel survey were used to determine the percentage of those who had participated in the above behavior and the results were compared by grade and post, and within the NCO grades by years of active Army service.

The findings referring to dissident activities refer to the first six types of behavior listed above. Because a much larger number of soldiers have disobeyed/refused orders or shown disrespect than have participated in all of the first six types of activities combined, this type of dissident behavior was analyzed and reported on separately. Drug use and racial discrimination were also analyzed individually.

The personnel survey was used for objective 2 to identify those biographical and background factors that were characteristic of a large proportion of the dissidents, and a profile drawn of those most likely to commit dissident acts. In addition, those aspects of Army service that tend to create dissidence and racial unrest were identified.

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The reasons given on the personnel survey for not participating in dissident acts, together with an analysis of the change in the type of people who will enlist in the Modern Volunteer Army, were used to estimate future dissident trends for objective 3. Data from available documentary sources reporting dissidence over the past several years, and the results of the post commander survey, were also used for estimating future trends.

A subjective measure of the effect of dissidence was made from the answers to the personnel survey question that asked whether dissidence affects discipline, law, and order. The answers were analyzed by grade. A more objective measurement for objective 4 was made from the Army Judiciary data on Article 15 violations and courts-martial.

Very few soldiers answered on the personnel survey that they had ever observed the military police responding to dissident activities. Information obtained from the personnel interviews and the post commander survey did not suggest a need for recommending any significant changes in military police procedures for handling dissidence (objective 5).

As part of objective 6 the recommendations made on the personnel survey for reducing racial tensions and for allowing the use of marijuana were summarized by grade as well as the degree to which the various grades expressed a tolerance for dissident activities. And finally, those Army policies, practices, and procedures most often cited on the survey as the causes of dissidence were identified.

FINDINGS

Extent and Nature of Dissidence

Of the sample surveyed:

- (1) One out of six E1-E4s had participated in some dissident act more than once and one out of four E1-E4s had participated at least once.
- (2) Attendance at protest meetings and antimilitary coffee houses accounted for about half of all the dissident acts engaged in.
- (3) One out of four E1-E4s had disobeyed/refused orders or shown disrespect to a superior more than once.
- (4) Depending on the type of activity, between 8 and 21 percent of the E1-E4s had been asked to participate in a dissident act.
- (5) Over half of all soldiers had observed or personally encountered racial discrimination while in the Army.

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(6) A substantial majority of white soldiers noted the occurrence of discriminatory anti-white practices.

(7) Drug use was reported to be high in the lower grades, with 46 percent of the E1-E4s stating that they had used marijuana and 16 percent that they had used hard drugs more than once.

(8) Over half of the E1-E4 respondents (55 percent) stated that they had more than once participated in a dissident act, or disobeyed/refused orders, or shown disrespect to a superior, or taken drugs.

Factors that Contribute to Dissidence

(1) Those who participated in dissident acts tend to be well educated, from suburban homes, profess no practicing religion, have been active in protest activities and social service groups prior to induction, and use drugs.

(2) The dissidents tend to have been drafted or to have enlisted involuntarily to avoid being drafted, find their Army assignment unsuitable, have money and marital problems they attribute to the Army, have served in Vietnam, and have personally encountered racial discrimination.

(3) Over half (58 percent) of the dissident E1-E4s cited the Vietnam War as the major cause of their dissident activities, 38 percent cited the way the Army treats the individual, and only 4 percent cited poor living conditions.

(4) Almost one-third of the E1-E4 marijuana users and one-half of the E1-E4 hard drug users started taking drugs after entering the Army.

Trend of Dissident Activities for the Next Two to Four Years

(1) Dissident activities, particularly underground newspapers, antimilitary coffee houses, off-post protest meetings, disobedience/disrespect, racial incidents, violent protest and sabotage, grenade incidents, and conscientious objector applications have been increasing over the past several years.

(2) As many as 79 percent of the E1-E4s surveyed were not definitely opposed to participating in dissident acts in some future situation.

(3) The decline in the Vietnam War may be matched by a decline in politically motivated dissident activities by 58 percent.

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Effect of Dissident Activities on the Enforcement of Discipline, Law, and Order

(1) Only 14 percent of the E1-E4s stated that dissidence reduces discipline, law, and order, as compared with 57 percent of the field grade officers.

(2) There appears to be a rising trend in general courts-martial for disrespect and refusal to obey orders.

(3) Post commanders do not consider that the present level of dissidence significantly affects the enforcement of discipline, law, and order.

Army-Wide Measures for Reducing Dissidence

(1) Twenty percent of those surveyed felt that a more active program of racial discussions and sensitivity training is needed to help alleviate racial tensions.

(2) Harassment and lack of personal freedom and dignity are cited most often by the E1-E4s as the Army practices most responsible for dissidence.

(3) Many of the perceived causes of dissidence are attributable to a lack of effective leadership, and a reemphasis of leadership responsibilities and skills is needed.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Although there are continuing activities in types of dissent with possible political overtones, such as demonstrations, publishing of underground newspapers, and attendance at antimilitary coffee houses, these do not represent a serious problem for the Army at the present time in terms of enforcement of discipline, law, and order. Moreover, these are likely to become less of a problem as the Vietnam War winds down and the Modern Volunteer Army comes into effect.

(2) The major problems affecting discipline, law, and order in the Army appear to be:

- (a) Drug usage
- (b) Interracial friction
- (c) Disrespect to superiors and refusal of orders

Not only are these problems serious at the moment, but the trend appears to be towards an increase in frequency.

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(3) There is no evidence that the types of situations created by the problems listed in (2) above will create a need for military police procedures other than standard operating procedures. However, in view of the increasing trend in these incidents, current military police authorized strengths may not be sufficient to cope with the problem adequately over the next few years.

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**FUTURE IMPACT
OF DISSIDENT ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ARMY
ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF DISCIPLINE,
LAW, AND ORDER**

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test
AIT	advanced individual training
AWOL	absent without leave
CIAD	Counterintelligence Analysis Detachment
CO	conscientious objector
CONARC	Continental Army Command
CONUS	Continental United States
EM	enlisted men
MOS	military occupational specialty
MVA	Modern Volunteer Army
ODCSPER	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
OPMG	Office of the Provost Marshal General
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
SIR	Serious Incident Report
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
USAIC	United States Army Infantry Center
VOLAR	Volunteer Army

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INTRODUCTION

PROBLEM

"Army Seldom so Torn by Rebellion,"¹ "GI Attacks on Leaders Increase in Rear Area,"² "Race Rifts Follow the Flag,"³ "60 Pct. of Servicemen Try Pot, Panel Says."⁴ These newspaper headlines dramatize what some believe the situation to be, namely that "Not since the Civil War has the Army been so torn by rebellion."¹ That some dissidence exists is a fact, and this dissidence has manifested itself in demonstrations, stockade riots, dissemination of underground newspapers, refusals to obey orders, disrespect to superiors, protest meetings, establishment of antimilitary coffee houses, AWOLs and desertions, racial incidents, drug use, and even the killing and injuring of peers and superiors by use of fragmentation grenades (fragging).

An earlier study⁵ by the Research Analysis Corporation attempted to develop a theoretical framework for examining dissidence in the Army. This study is directed specifically at the current dissident situation, its probable causes, effects, and foreseeable trends over the next several years.

OBJECTIVES

The general study objective is to identify and assess the existing and potential impact of dissident elements within the Army on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order. The study's specific objectives are:

(1) To determine the extent and nature of dissidence in the Army. How widespread is the dissidence — is it of minimal proportions merely exaggerated by the news media, or are substantial numbers of soldiers participating in dissident activities?

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(2) To determine the factors that contribute to the actions of dissident elements. Is dissidence simply a product of the present climate of unrest and confusion in society as a whole, or are Army policies, practices, and procedures a cause of dissident eruptions?

(3) To estimate the trend in the various types of dissident activities for the next two to four years. Will dissidence recede as the Vietnam War winds down and the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) comes into being, or will it increase because of other widely perceived dissatisfactions?

(4) To determine the effect of dissident activities on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order. What is the impact of dissident activity on discipline, and the enforcement of law and order within the Army? To what degree must dissidence be suppressed to maintain a level of discipline commensurate with mission accomplishment?

(5) To determine the adequacy of military police procedures for dealing with dissidence. Is there an overuse of force or are procedures otherwise inadequate or inappropriate?

(6) To determine Army-wide measures which could serve to reduce dissidence. To reduce dissidence, should the Army focus more on humanistic needs such as personal worth and dignity of the individual or on institutional needs such as better food and more comfortable living conditions?

BACKGROUND

This study was conducted under the sponsorship of the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) of the United States Army during the period September 1970 to August 1971. It is closely related to two other RAC studies, one on the "Determination of Potential for Dissidence in the US Army,"⁵ a RAC Institutional Research Study completed in August 1970, and the other on the "Value Conflicts Between Civil Society and Military Institutions,"⁶ sponsored by the Army's Directorate of Military Personnel Policies, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and completed in August 1971.

This report is one part of the Army priority study, "The American Soldier of the 70's," and will be distributed as basic information to be used in other segments of that study.

APPROACH

The terms "dissent" (or dissenters) and "dissidence" (or dissidents) are often used interchangeably; in fact, the dictionary offers each as a synonym for the other. We have used dissidence rather than dissent throughout this study to convey better the intensity of the dissidents' anti-Army sentiment.

This study was conducted in two phases. During Phase I an attempt was made to accomplish the study objectives with data available in documentary sources in the Washington, D. C. area. Although the recent trends of some specific dissident activities were identified, the available data were too incomplete to measure the extent of dissidence adequately, and to determine causes or impact of dissidence.

To obtain additional relevant data, a survey instrument was developed in Phase II and administered to 844 Army personnel at five Army posts in CONUS. In addition to the personnel survey, data were also obtained from 126 personal interviews conducted at these same five Army posts, and from a mail questionnaire sent to the post commanders at the 17 largest posts in CONUS.

Table 1 shows which data sources were used to address each of the study objectives. Where supplementary sources of information were used (mostly of a background nature), they are referenced in this report.

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Table 1
RELATION OF DATA SOURCES TO STUDY OBJECTIVES

Objective	Data Source			
	Documentary Sources	Personnel Survey	Personal Interviews	Post Commander Survey
(1) Extent and Nature of Dissidence	x	x	x	x
(2) Contributing Factors		x	x	
(3) Trend in Dissidence	x	x	x	x
(4) Effect of Dissidence		x	x	x
(5) Adequacy of MP Procedures		x	x	
(6) Army-wide Measures		x	x	

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DATA COLLECTION

DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

The primary documentary sources of data were:

1. The Counter-Intelligence Analysis Division (CIAD) of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI) monthly reports on "Dissent/Racial Unrest in the Army."
2. The Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG), "Blue Bells" and "SIR" files.
3. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) Conscientious Objector (CO) files.
4. The US Army Judiciary Court-Martial files.

Table 2 indicates the types of data obtained from each of the documentary sources.

Table 2

DATA OBTAINED THROUGH DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

Source	Type of Data
CIAD Monthly Reports	No. of monthly dissident motivated incidents No. of known and suspected Army dissidents Publication of underground newspapers Appearance of anti-military coffee houses
OPMG "Blue Bells" and "SIRs"	Demonstrations, stockade riots, violent acts and sabotage, grenade incidents, desertions to a foreign country, racial incidents
ODCSPER CO Files	Conscientious Objector applications
Army Judiciary Files	Courts-martial

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The CIAD data must be viewed with caution. They are based on information submitted by post commanders and intelligence personnel and the criteria used for reporting dissident activity may be nonuniform. In addition, the percentage of the actual dissident activity represented by the reported activity is unknown.

The OFMS "Blus Bells" and "SIRs" contain reports of incidents that are considered to be of such a nature that they may result in damaging public confidence in the Army. This means that a good deal of judgment is involved in deciding whether to submit a report. Factors such as the likelihood that the incident will be publicized in a local newspaper may influence the decision to report it more than the nature of the incident itself. As with the CIAD data, the percentage of actual incidents represented by those reported is unknown.

PERSONNEL SURVEY

Survey Sample

The personnel survey was conducted during March and April at five CONUS installations — Forts Bragg, Carson, Dix, Gordon, and Hood — and was administered to a stratified random sample of 802 servicemen as shown in Table 3.

Table 3

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL SURVEYED

	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-O3 W1-W4	O4-O6	All Grades*
Post #1	84	36	31	23	174
Post #2	54	33	27	22	136
Post #3	86	29	29	28	172
Post #4	68	25	26	28	147
Post #5	74	47	27	25	173
Total	366	170	140	126	802

*Plus an additional 42 MPs from Ft. Hood.

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A greater number of E1-E4s was surveyed than any other grade grouping since it was expected that most dissidents would come from this group. One instance of a biased nonrandom selection was discovered at Ft. Hood where a group of 42 MPs showed up to take the survey. All but two of these MPs were in the E1-E4 grade category. This group of MPs was analyzed separately from the 802 randomly selected personnel.

In administering the survey it was emphasized that there was no provision for identifying the soldiers with their answers, and that anonymity was assured. At each base the survey was conducted in two sessions — one for enlisted men and one for officers — to further reduce any hesitations to giving truthful answers. It is believed that the overwhelming majority of soldiers did answer the survey in an honest manner. One basis for this belief is that the survey results are compatible with what we learned during the personal interviews. In fact, in the drug use area, which could be considered one of the most threatening by the individual, the extent of drug use reported in the survey was very close to the estimates made during the personal interviews.

As further indications of the survey's validity, there were several built-in checks. For example, one question asked for the soldier's highest education level and another question asked for his college course of study. The answers were consistent in that only the people who answered that their highest education level included at least some college indicated a college major. Similarly only those people who answered that they had used drugs also indicated in another question whether they had first started taking drugs in the Army or as a civilian. If people had answered the survey carelessly or randomly, there would not have been this consistency of answers between related questions.

Table 4 presents basic biographical statistics of the sample surveyed. The raw frequencies from which these percentages were calculated are given in App A.

Survey Format

Prior to administering the survey instrument, it was pretested at Ft. Belvoir, which resulted in an improved arrangement of the survey instrument. A copy of the survey instrument is included in App A.

Table 4
 BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION OF PERSONNEL SURVEYED

	Percent Within Each Grade					All Grades
	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-O3 W1-W4	O4-O6	All Grades	
Component						
Regular Army	58.4	92.8	23.0	68.0	61.0	
Army of the US	38.0	6.6	41.0	22.4	29.4	
National Guard	2.2	0.6	0.0	0.8	1.3	
Reserve	1.4	0.0	36.0	8.8	8.3	
Years of Active Army Service						
0-3	94.5	34.6	71.0	4.2	64.1	
4-6	4.6	18.8	18.9	3.3	9.9	
7-9	0.3	3.8	2.9	10.8	3.1	
Over 9	0.6	42.8	7.2	81.7	22.9	
Age						
17-21	61.3	14.5	2.2	2.4	32.0	
22-26	36.5	40.6	76.5	4.8	39.2	
27-31	1.9	9.7	13.2	12.0	7.1	
Over 31	0.3	35.2	8.1	80.8	21.7	
Highest Education						
Not a H.S. Graduate	19.4	10.6	0.7	0.8	11.4	
H.S. Graduate	38.8	53.5	5.0	0.8	30.0	
Some College	23.8	26.5	17.9	19.8	22.7	
College Graduate	18.0	9.4	76.4	78.6	35.9	
Race						
White	82.7	68.8	92.9	88.0	82.5	
Non-White	17.3	31.2	7.1	12.0	17.5	

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It consisted of 76 questions; most were multiple choice type, and the remainder were open-ended free-response type questions. During the data reduction and analysis phase, the open-ended free-response answers were evaluated and the answers were codified for computer input. The codification of these answers is presented in App A. The survey instrument contains questions in the following areas:

Background information - to determine what background characteristics may be related to the soldier's attitude toward, and inclination to, participating in dissident activities, and to construct a profile of the dissident soldier.

Conspicuousness of dissident activities - to measure the extent to which soldiers have observed other soldiers engaging in dissident activities.

Recruitment of dissidents - to determine the extent of dissident activist operations.

Participation in dissidence - to quantify the actual extent of current dissident activities and the reasons the dissidents give to justify their activities.

Soldiers' attitudes toward Army response to dissidence - to assess how soldiers feel the Army should treat dissident activities and why they feel as they do.

Extent and nature of racial discrimination and drug use - to quantify how widespread racial discrimination and drug use are, to evaluate whether these problems are inherited or aggravated by the Army, and to determine any correlation between these problems and dissidence.

Effect of dissidence on discipline, law, and order - to determine whether soldiers of various grades think dissidence affects discipline, law, and order.

Army factors contributing to dissidence - to identify Army policies, practices, and procedures that may contribute to dissidence, and to determine measures which could serve to reduce the dissidence.

The responses obtained to the survey questions in each of the above areas were applied toward accomplishing one or more of the study's six objectives.

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INTERVIEWS

Personnel Interviewed

Interviews were conducted in groups of three to six persons per group at each of the five posts where the personnel survey was administered, to explore the reasons for dissidence and ways to reduce it in greater depth than was possible through the written personnel survey.

Each of the posts was asked to select for the interviews a maximum of twenty EM considered to be dissident. It was apparent that some of the EM interviewed had complaints about the Army but would not be considered dissident. However a substantial number could truly be considered dissident, such as those at the Ft. Dix Personnel Control Facility and a group at Ft. Bragg who published the underground newspaper, Bragg Briefs.

Interviews were also conducted at each post with groups of squad leaders (NCOs), platoon leaders (junior officers), and MPs. Table 5 shows the number and type of personnel interviewed at each post. About three-quarters of those interviewed were white, and one-quarter was black.

Table 5

PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED

Group	Post					All Posts
	Fort Bragg	Fort Carson	Fort Dix	Fort Gordon	Fort Hood	
EM	19	7	19	7	12	64
Squad Leaders	4	3	4	3	3	17
Platoon Leaders	3	5	5	4	5	22
MPs	3	5	4	5	6	23
Total	29	20	32	19	2	126

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Interview Format

The only ones present during the interviews were the RAC interviewers and the interviewees; no representatives of the post were permitted to sit in. After a brief introduction of the purpose of the interviews, the following outline was followed in each of the interviews:

- (1) Dissident activities observed or participated in (demonstrations, contribution to or distribution of dissident literature, attendance at antimilitary coffee houses or meetings, disrespect, disobeying or refusing an order of a superior, AWOL)
- (2) Causes of dissident activities
- (3) Extent and nature of racial discrimination
- (4) Extent of drug use and its causes
- (5) Changes in level of dissidence over the past two years
- (6) Impact of dissidence on morale and discipline
- (7) Recommendations on how the Army could reduce dissidence

It is felt that little was held back during what turned out to be rather free-wheeling interviews. Although several of the interviewees were reluctant to speak at first, they became more talkative after the interviews got underway, and many thanked the RAC interviewer for the rare opportunity freely to get "a load off his chest." A synopsis and analysis of the interviews is presented in App B.

POST COMMANDER SURVEY

A questionnaire soliciting data on specific dissident activities during 1969-1970 and their effects on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order was sent to the post commander at each of the 17 largest posts in CONUS, namely: Forts Benning, Bliss, Bragg, Campbell, Carson, Dix, Gordon, Hood, Jackson, Knox, Leonard Wood, Lewis, Ord, Polk, Riley, Sam Houston, and Sill.

The format of the Post Commander Survey and a summary of the responses received are presented in App C.

FINDINGS

This section presents the findings for each of the study's six objectives. These findings are based on the available documentary data sources, the personal interviews, the post commander mail survey, and the personnel survey. The frequencies from which the percentages shown in this section were calculated, and the Chi-Square calculations for all tests of statistical significance referred to in this section, are shown in App A.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF DISSIDENCE (Objective 1)

Participation in Dissident Acts

The personnel survey addressed those activities that previous studies^{5,6} showed were the major ways soldiers manifested their dissident feelings. Specifically, the survey asked whether the soldier had never, once, or more than once:

- (1) Personally participated in an on-post demonstration involving ten or more soldiers.
- (2) Personally participated in an off-post demonstration involving ten or more soldiers.
- (3) Contributed to an underground newspaper.
- (4) Distributed an underground newspaper, protest leaflet, or petition on post.
- (5) Attended any protest group meetings.
- (6) Attended any coffee houses with antimilitary reputations.

Space was provided on the survey instrument for an entry if the soldiers had engaged in dissident activities other than these six, but no significant number was listed.

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By Grade. Table 6 indicates that in the random sample surveyed 16 percent or one out of every six E1-E4s had participated in at least one of the above six activities more than once.

Table 6
OVERALL PARTICIPATION IN DISSIDENT ACTS
(By Grade Level)

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06	MPs at Fort Hood
Number of respondents	(366)	(170)	(140)	(126)	(42)
<u>Percent who participated</u>					
More than once	16	8	3	0.8	12
Only once	9	9	7	1.6	17
Total	25	17	10	2.4	29

Similarly, 8 percent of the E5-E9s, 3 percent of the company grade, and less than 1 percent of the field grade officers had participated more than once.

An additional 9 percent of the E1-E4s, 9 percent of the E5-E9s, 7 percent of the company grade, and 1.6 percent of the field grade officers had participated in one of these activities only once. What portion of this one-time-only participation stemmed from curiosity and what part from conviction is unknown. However, when these are added to the more-than-once participants, 25 percent of the sample, or one out of four E1-E4s had at some time participated in at least one of the above dissident activities. Similarly, 17, 10, and 2.4 percent of the E5-E9s, company grade, and field grade officers respectively had participated at some time. Surprisingly, dissident participation among the 42 MPs at Ft. Hood was the highest of the groups surveyed, with 29 percent of the MPs having participated at some time in at least one of the six dissident activities.

More than any of the other grade groupings, the E5-E9s represent a variety of experience, with most of the E5s presumably having spent three years or less in the service and most of the E8s and E9s more than

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nine years. Not unexpectedly, most of the dissidence within this group is attributable to those with three years or less of active Army service. Table 7 indicates that 38 percent of the E5-E9s with less than three years of service, 23 percent of those with four to six years of service, and only 1.5 percent of those with over nine years of service had at some time participated in a dissident act. The 33 percent figure for those E5-E9s with seven to nine years of service is unreliable — the sample consisting of only six soldiers.

Table 7
PARTICIPATION IN DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES
(E5-E9)

	Years of Service			
	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Number of respondents	(55)	(30)	(6)	(68)
<u>Percent who participated</u>				
More than once	20	13	0	0
Only once	18	10	33	1.5
Total	38	23	33	1.5

The relationship between the years of service and the total dissidence shown in Table 7 is statistically significant (using a Chi-Square test) at the .005 level. This means that there is less than a .005 probability that chance accounts for the difference between the distribution of dissidence as shown in Table 7 and that which would be expected if it were proportionate to the number of soldiers surveyed in each group.

By Dissident Activity. Table 8 shows that attendance at protest meetings and antimilitary coffee houses accounts for the bulk of the participation in dissident activities, with 13 percent of the E1-E4s surveyed having at some time attended a protest meeting and 18 percent having attended an antimilitary coffee house.



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Table 8

**PARTICIPATION IN DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES
(E1-E4)**

	Demonstration		Underground Newspaper	Distribute Protest Materials	Attend Protest Meeting	Attend Antimilitary Coffee House
	On-Post	Off-Post				
Number of respondents	366 for all categories					
<u>Percent who participated</u>						
More than once	3	6	3	4	8	12
Only once	3	3	3	2	5	6
Total	6	9	6	6	13	18

In addition to the above six dissident activities, the survey instrument also elicited responses about a seventh category — whether the soldier had never, once, or more than once disobeyed/refused orders or shown disrespect to a superior. This category, which may be more a measure of discontent than of dissidence, cannot be rigorously defined since there are acts that some men consider to be disobedient or disrespectful that other men will not. Because of this, and because a much larger number of soldiers disobeyed/refused orders or showed disrespect than participated in all of the above six dissident activities combined, this category was analyzed separately. A substantial amount of disobedience and disrespect was found with 24 percent, or about one out of four E1-E4s having more than once disobeyed or refused orders or shown disrespect to a superior (Table 9). Seventeen percent, 6 percent, and 5 percent of the E5-E9s, company grade, and field grade officers respectively had disobeyed/refused orders or shown disrespect. Nineteen percent of the MPs at Ft. Hood had more than once disobeyed/refused orders or shown disrespect.

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Table 9

**DISOBEYING/REFUSING ORDERS OR SHOWING DISRESPECT TO A SUPERIOR
(By Grade)**

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06	MPs at Ft. Hood
Number of respondents	(366)	(170)	(140)	(126)	(42)
Percent who participated	24	17	6	5	19

As with the other dissident activities, most of the E5-E9s who had disobeyed/refused orders or shown disrespect had only a few years of active service and are most likely E5s (Table 10). The difference in degree of participation between those with less than three and those with over three years of service is significant at the .025 level.

Table 10

**DISOBEYING/REFUSING ORDERS OR SHOWING DISRESPECT TO A SUPERIOR
(E5-E9)**

	Years of Service			
	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Number of respondents	(55)	(30)	(6)	(67)
Percent who participated	31	13	0	9

Table 11 shows the percentage of soldiers who had participated in any dissident act or had disobeyed/refused orders, by grade. Thirty-two percent of the E1-E4s had participated in dissident or disobedient acts more than once and 47 percent had at some time so participated.

Table 12 presents a breakdown of combined dissidence/disobedience of the E5-E9s, by years of active service.

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Table 11

**DISSIDENCE/DISOBEDIENCE COMBINED
(By Grade)**

	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-03 W1-W4	O4-06	MPs at Ft. Hood
Number of respondents	(366)	(170)	(140)	(126)	(42)
Percent who participated					
More than once	32	21	9	4	36
Only once	15	19	11	6	14
Total	47	40	20	10	50

Table 12

**DISSIDENCE/DISOBEDIENCE COMBINED
(E5-E9)**

	Years of Service			
	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Number of respondents	(55)	(30)	(6)	(68)
Percent who participated				
More than once	38	23	50	9
Only once	22	30	50	10
Total	60	53	100	19

By Post. The results of an analysis of dissident participation by post is presented in Table 13. Dissident participation ranged from Post No. 3's low of 12 percent of E1-E4s who had participated at some time in one of the six dissident activities to Post No. 1's high of 37 percent, with the other three posts all showing about 25 percent.

The differences in the total dissidence between posts are significant at the .05 level. It must be emphasized that the survey asked whether the soldier had ever participated and his participation may have occurred at some previous post. Therefore, it may be that Table 13 does not accurately describe the actual distribution of dissident participation by post, although it is probably a good approximation.

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Table 13

**PARTICIPATION IN DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES
(E1-E4 — By Post)**

	Post #1	Post #2	Post #3	Post #4	Post #5
Number of respondents	(84)	(54)	(86)	(68)	(74)
Percent who participated					
More than once	23	11	9	16	18
Only once	14	15	3	9	5
Total	37	26	12	25	23

The most likely explanation for the low dissidence at Post No. 3 is that the E1-E4 sample from that post consisted largely of basic trainees whose short time in the service had not afforded them much opportunity to engage in dissident acts, even if so inclined. Post No. 1 with 37 percent dissident participation had been visited by well-known, nonmilitary, antiwar activists just prior to the survey which may have influenced the survey answers.

For the category disobeying/refusing orders or showing disrespect to a superior at the different posts, Table 14 shows that Post No. 3 again had the least participation, with only 14 percent of the E1-E4s saying they had disobeyed/refused orders or shown disrespect more than once. Post No. 1's 31 percent participation was again the highest among the posts, but the differences between the posts were not statistically significant at the .10 level.

Table 14

**DISOBEYING/REFUSING ORDERS OR SHOWING DISRESPECT TO A SUPERIOR
(E1-E4 — By Post)**

	Post #1	Post #2	Post #3	Post #4	Post #5
Number of respondents	(84)	(54)	(86)	(68)	(74)
Percent who participated	31	30	14	22	26

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Recruitment of Dissidents

In order to measure how active the dissidents are in recruiting others to participate in dissident acts, the survey instrument asked whether the soldier had never, once, or more than once been asked to participate in each of the six dissident activities. Table 15 shows that, depending on the type of activity, between 8 and 21 percent of the E1-E4s had at some time been asked to participate in a dissident act.

Table 15

RECRUITMENT FOR DISSIDENT ACTS
(E1-E4)

	Demonstration		Underground Newspaper	Distribute Protest Materials	Attend Protest Meeting	Attend Antimilitary Coffee House
	On-Post	Off-Post				
Number of respondents	366 for all categories					
<u>Percent asked to participate</u>						
More than once	5	11	8	5	8	10
Only once	7	10	6	3	10	7
Total	12	21	14	8	18	17

Approximately the same percentage of E1-E4s had at some time been asked to distribute protest materials or attend protest meetings or anti-military coffee houses (Table 15) as had actually participated in these activities (Table 8), whereas over twice as many had been asked to participate in demonstrations or contribute to underground newspapers as had actually done so.

Racial Discrimination

Racial discrimination may be considered a possible cause of other dissident acts as well as a manifestation of dissidence in itself. To measure the extent of the latter, the survey instrument asked whether the soldier had ever observed or personally encountered racial discrimination while in the Army and, if he had, to describe the circumstances.

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By Grade. It was found that racial discrimination is still widely encountered in the Army, with about 20 percent of the whites and more than 35 percent of the blacks having personally encountered discrimination, and substantially over 50 percent of both blacks and whites having either personally encountered or observed discrimination (Table 16).

The high percentage figures for blacks in the officer grades are not reliable, there being an insufficient sample; i.e., there were only eight black company grade and 12 black field grade officers surveyed.

Table 16

EXTENT OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

	E1-E4		E5-E9		O1-03/W1-W4		O4-06	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
No. of respondents	(46)	(296)	(49)	(116)	(8)	(130)	(12)	(110)
Percent who have personally encountered discrimination	35	19	45	22	62	22	83	20
Percent who observed discrimination	22	34	29	34	38	36	8	36
Total	57	53	74	56	100	58	91	56

A substantial majority of white soldiers, from a high of 83 percent of the E1-E4s, to 55 percent of the field grade officers, noted the occurrence of discriminatory anti-white practices, as shown in Table 17.

This discrimination was said to take one of three forms:

(1) Black NCOs giving the worst duties to whites and/or easiest duties to blacks.

(2) White NCOs, afraid of any appearance of prejudice, giving favored treatment to blacks.

(3) Black E1-E4s banding together in the barracks and at recreational facilities to harass and exclude whites. An example of this came out in one of the interviews at Ft. Dix, where the whites claimed that the blacks would not let any whites play on the ping-pong tables.

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Table 17

EXTENT OF ANTI-WHITE BACKLASH

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
Number of respondents	(78)	(33)	(49)	(31)
Percent of whites who have observed or encountered anti-white discrimination	83	70	59	55

By Post. Table 18 shows the extent of racial discrimination by post. The differences between posts are not statistically significant at the .10 level.

Table 18

**RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY POST
(E1-E4)**

	Post #1	Post #2	Post #3	Post #4	Post #5
Number of respondents	(84)	(54)	(86)	(68)	(74)
Percent who have personally encountered discrimination	24	15	12	25	29
Percent who have observed discrimination	40	35	26	38	25
Total	64	50	38	63	54

Drug Usage

Another aspect of dissidence that was analyzed was drug usage. The survey instrument asked whether the soldier had never, once, or more than once used marijuana or hard drugs.

By Grade. It was found that a substantial number of soldiers use drugs, especially marijuana (Table 19). The 46 percent figure for E1-E4 marijuana users may even be somewhat low because of soldiers who lied out of a fear that their units might be investigated if a high drug usage was revealed, although these figures generally agreed with those estimated during the interviews.

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Table 19

EXTENT OF DRUG USAGE

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06	MPs at Ft. Hood
Number of respondents	(366)	(170)	(140)	(126)	(42)
<u>Percent who, more than once, used:</u>					
Marijuana	46	24	18	3	40
Hard drugs	16	5	0.7	2	10

Of the 42 MPs at Ft. Hood, 40 percent had used marijuana more than once and 10 percent had used hard drugs more than once, indicating that with respect to drug usage the MPs most closely resembled the E1-E4 group. This is understandable since 40 of the 42 MPs were E1-E4s.

Table 20 gives a breakdown of drug usage by years of active Army service for the E5-E9 grades.

Table 20

**DRUG USAGE
(E5-E9)**

	Years of Service			
	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Number of respondents	(55)	(30)	(6)	(67)
<u>Percent who, more than once, used:</u>				
Marijuana	51	37	0	3
Hard drugs	13	3	0	2

Most of the E5-E9 drug users can be seen to have had three years or less of active service. The results for marijuana usage are statistically significant at the .005 level; the number of hard drug users is too small for a valid Chi-Square test.

By Post. Table 21 shows that E1-E4 marijuana usage ranged from a low of 38 percent at Post No. 3 to a high of 61 percent at Post No. 1. Hard drug usage ranged between 12 percent at Posts 3 and 5, to 22 percent at Posts 1 and 2.

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Table 21

**EXTENT OF DRUG USAGE
(E1-E4 — By Post)**

	Post #1	Post #2	Post #3	Post #4	Post #5
Number of respondents	(84)	(54)	(86)	(68)	(74)
<u>Percent who, more than once, used:</u>					
Marijuana	61	43	38	46	41
Hard drugs	22	22	12	15	12

Although the differences in drug use between posts was not significant at the .10 level, the same posts that exhibited low dissidence also experienced lower drug usage and those with high dissidence experienced higher drug usage. Additional data suggesting that many of the people who participated in dissident acts also used drugs are presented in the following section.

Table 22 shows the percentage of soldiers by grade who have more than once participated in a dissident act, or were disobedient/refused orders or showed disrespect, or took drugs. Over half of the E1-E4s, 55 percent, fell into this group.

Table 22

DISSIDENCE/DISOBEDIENCE/DRUGS COMBINED

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06	MPs at Ft. Hood
Number of Respondents	(366)	(170)	(140)	(126)	(42)
Percent who participated more than once	55	35	22	6	55

Summary of Objective 1 Findings

Of the sample surveyed:

- (1) One out of six E1-E4s had participated in some dissident act more than once, and one out of four E1-E4s had participated at least once.
- (2) Attendance at protest meetings and antimilitary coffee houses accounted for about half of all the dissident acts engaged in.

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(3) One out of four E1-E4s had disobeyed/refused orders or shown disrespect to a superior more than once.

(4) Depending on the type of activity, between 8 and 21 percent of the E1-E4s had been asked to participate in a dissident act.

(5) Over half of all soldiers had observed or personally encountered racial discrimination while in the Army

(6) A substantial majority of white soldiers noted the occurrence of discriminatory anti-white practices.

(7) Drug use was reported to be high in the lower grades, with 46 percent of the E1-E4s stating that they had used marijuana and 16 percent that they had used hard drugs more than once.

(8) Over half, 55 percent, of the E1-E4s have more than once participated in a dissident act, or were disobedient/refused orders or showed disrespect, or took drugs.

FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO DISSIDENCE (Objective 2)

Participation in Dissident Acts

Each of the 366 E1-E4s responded to whether he had participated never, once, or more than once in each of the six dissident activities. This means that there was a total of about 2,200 E1-E4 responses to the dissident activities participation questions. The first column of Table 23 shows the breakdown of responses by each group, i.e., 427 responses came from those who had never graduated from high school, 840 responses were from high school graduates, 522 from those who had some college, and 388 from college graduates. The second column shows the percentage of more than once responses within each group, i.e., 2 percent of the 427 responses from the non-high school graduates were more than once responses, 6 percent of the 840 responses from the high school graduates, etc. The table indicates that the dissidents (those giving "more than once" responses) tend to be well-educated, from suburban homes, profess no practicing religion, have been active in protest activities and social service groups prior to induction, and use drugs. The relationships are all statistically significant at the .005 level.

A very similar profile of the dissidents was shown in RAC's previous study on the "Determination of the Potential for Dissidence in the US Army."⁵

Table 23
 PROFILE OF EL-E4s WHO PARTICIPATED IN DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES

	No. of Responses in the Group	% of "More Than Once" Responses to Dissident Activities
Highest Education		
Not a H.S. Graduate	427	2
H.S. Graduate	840	6
Some College	522	6
College Graduate	388	8
Community Upbringing		
Rural	913	3
Urban	546	4
Suburban	712	11
Religion		
Practicing	1867	4
Non-practicing	304	15
Prior-to-Army Protest Participation		
Never	1603	2
Once	192	5
More than Once	364	22
Social Services Activities		
No	2015	5
Yes	162	14
Marijuana Use (More than Once)		
No	1177	1
Yes	988	11
Hard Drugs Use (More than Once)		
No	1823	3
Yes	354	19

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Since college educated youth have the highest proportion of dissidents, it may be worthwhile to briefly examine the basic causes of student protest. According to the President's Commission on Campus Unrest:

During the 1960's, in response to an accumulation of social changes, the traditional American youth culture developed rapidly in the direction of an oppositional stance toward the institutions and ways of the adult world . . . it rejected all institutional disciplines externally imposed upon the individual, and this set it at odds with much in American society There was the formation of a new youth culture that defines itself through a passionate attachment to principle and an equally passionate opposition to the larger society. At the center of this culture is a romantic celebration of human life, of the unencumbered individual, of the senses, and of nature. It rejects what it sees to be the operational ideals of American society: materialism, competition, rationalism, technology, consumerism, and militarism. This emerging culture is the deeper cause of student protest against war, racial injustice and the abuses of the multiversity.⁷

Antimilitary sentiment may be based in part on the antiauthority theme of the new youth culture. In addition to the antimilitary theme, another important basis for discontent of the college-educated soldier serving in the enlisted ranks may be his resentment at having to serve in a relatively low-status position on an equal basis or even subordinate to others from a lower level on the social and educational ladder. To quote Moskos, "It would appear, then, that the resentment toward military life of the college-educated enlisted man is based at least as much on personal occupancy of a subordinate position as it is with any principled disagreement with the hierarchical and authoritarian organization of the military."⁸

It should be noted that campus unrest is no longer a phenomenon associated with colleges only. "High schools are scenes of expanding racial strife and violence — a trend to which most observers see no early end Unrest spread in grade and high schools during 1969-70. A total of 530 racial incidents — 68 percent more than the previous year — made up the bulk of the disturbances."⁹

A somewhat different profile was obtained for those who disobey/refuse orders or show disrespect to a superior (Table 24). Although they also tend to profess no practicing religion, have been active in protest activities prior to induction, and use drugs, in addition they tend to have civilian criminal records, and unlike those who had participated in

Table 24
 PROFILE OF EI-E4s WHO DISOBEY/REFUSE ORDERS OR SHOW DISRESPECT TO A SUPERIOR

	Number of Respondents in the Group	% of "More than Once" Responses to Disobey/Refuse Orders or Show Disrespect
Religion	312 52	23 39
	Practicing Non-practicing	
Prior-to-Army Protest Participation	Never Once More than Once	20 28 39
Marijuana Use (More than Once)	No Yes	13 37
Hard Drugs Use (More than Once)	No Yes	18 54
Civilian Criminal Conviction	No Yes	21 40



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the other dissident activities, there was not a greater proportion of well-educated, suburban-reared people among this group. It may well be that the better educated do not engage in direct confrontations with individual superiors from whom they would presumably receive punishment, but they rather confine their dissidence to coffee house and protest meeting attendance, contributions to underground newspapers and other covert or nonpunishable activities. This supports what was learned through the interviews where the NCOs said it was not the college-types, but rather the ill-educated, undisciplined individual who caused them most of their troubles. The differences shown in Table 24 are statistically significant at the .025 level or below.

The general feelings of NCOs on the prevalence of disrespect were well summarized by one group of squad leaders during the interviews. They claimed it was getting to the point where men will do only what they feel like doing; that the present-day soldier is more knowledgeable and sophisticated than in the past, and will not accept orders unquestioningly — that NCO schools will have to teach how to deal with the current crop of young soldiers and that somehow discipline must be reestablished. They claimed that many company commanders were not as strict as they should be because they did not want their records to show that they issued too many Article 15's and, as a result, there is a breakdown in discipline when soldiers realize that nothing much will happen to them if they show disrespect. Many NCOs claimed that they would leave the Army because they no longer had any way of enforcing discipline.

It was found that certain aspects of Army service tended to create dissidence and discontent (Table 25). It was no surprise to find that the dissidents and discontents tend to have been drafted or have involuntarily enlisted to avoid being drafted, and find their Army assignment unsuitable. In addition, it was found that they tend to have money and marital problems they attribute to the Army, have served in Vietnam, and have personally encountered racial discrimination. Only the asterisked boxes in the table represent relationships that are statistically significant at the .10 level or below.

It should be noted that race does not appear in Table 23 as a factor affecting dissidence nor in Table 24 as a factor affecting disobedience/refusal/disrespect. In fact, nearly the same percentage of both races

Table 25
EFFECT OF ARMY SERVICE ON DISSIDENCE
(E1-E4)

	Committed Dissident Acts		Disobeyed/Refused Orders or Shown Disrespect	
	No. of Responses in the Group	% of More than Once Responses	No. of Responses in the Group	% of "More than Once" Responses
Voluntariness of Induction	Volunteered	3 *	94	18
	Forced Enlistment	6	115	24
	Drafted	8	137	29
Army Assignment	Suitable	3 *	182	17 *
	Not Suitable	8	177	30
Money Problems Caused by Army	No	4 *	221	21
	Yes	8	143	28
Marital Problems Caused by Army	No	5	232	20 *
	Yes	7	130	30
Vietnam Duty	No	5 *	273	22
	Yes	7	91	30
Personally Encountered Racial Discrimination	No	1 *	167	16 *
	Yes	11	75	35

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in the sample had committed dissident acts more than once (4 percent of the blacks and 6 percent of the whites) and exactly the same percentage (24 percent) of both races indicated that they had been disobedient, refused orders, or shown disrespect more than once. Yet Table 16 indicates that 35 percent of the blacks compared to 19 percent of the white E1-E4s had been personally discriminated against and Table 25 shows that a far greater percentage of those who had been personally discriminated against were dissident and disobedient. A possible explanation for this seeming inconsistency is that blacks are more inured to discrimination than are whites so that not as high a percentage of blacks who are discriminated against are likely to become dissident.

The factors listed in Table 25, unsuitable assignments, money and marital problems, Vietnam duty, and racial discrimination make individuals unhappy, make them ripe for participating in dissidence. But are they the driving force, the major cause of dissidence? The answer is no, if you believe what the dissidents say are the causes (Table 26). Over half (58 percent) of the E1-E4s responding to that question cited the Vietnam War as the major cause of their dissident activities, and close behind, 38 percent cited the way the Army treats the individual as the major cause. Only 4 percent cited poor living conditions, such as bad food, inadequate quarters, long work hours, etc, as the major cause of their dissidence.

Table 26

**REASONS GIVEN FOR DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES
(E1-E4)**

Reasons	Percent
Number of Respondents (50)	
Vietnam War or other Government policies	58
The way the Army treats the individual	38
Poor living conditions — food, quarters, work hours	4

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That the majority of dissidents cited the Vietnam War or other Government policies as the major cause of their dissidence is not surprising. The political climate in the United States over the past few years has been a turbulent one. Some of the manifestations of a deeper and more general unrest are civil disorders, increasing racial tension, widespread campus disturbances, and peace demonstrations. The anti-Vietnam War and antiestablishment sentiments expressed by a large part of the nation's youth, and by many older people, have to some extent crystallized into an antimilitary attitude, exacerbated by events such as the invasion of Cambodia, the Green Beret spy case, and the My Lai incident.

The withdrawal from Cambodia, the continued reduction in the draft and in Army strength, the reduction in casualties in late 1970 and early 1971, and the continued Vietnamization of the war have served to reduce some of the tension. Nevertheless, coupled with other causes of unrest in the American social fabric, the Vietnam War has left a residue of deeply antagonized and apparently ideologically revolutionary dissidents that does not seem likely to soon disappear. A measure of this residue of revolutionary or violent dissidence is the increase in the number of bombings at Government facilities. Between January and June 1969 and January and June 1970, there was a threefold increase in the bombings of military installations and ROTC offices, a fourfold increase in the bombings of selective service and recruiting offices, and a fivefold increase in the bombings of general Government buildings.¹⁰

Racial Unrest

The current intensification of racial feelings between black and white soldiers is a result of the present social environment within the U. S. which, among other things, is producing a better educated, more articulate and impatient young man. Much of the outspoken, young black soldiers' philosophy is directly identifiable with writings of such men as Eldridge Cleaver and Malcolm X. They basically desire to be identified with a new black pride for which they are constantly seeking historical evidence and visible symbolism. Many young black soldiers have been indoctrinated with the idea that to remain within the white man's social structure will mean they will be forever subservient to the white man Outward manifestations of black pride are afro hair-cuts, mustaches, soul music, and continued rhetoric against white man's imperialist and competitive society.¹¹

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Previous studies have shown that the specific causes of discontent mentioned by black soldiers most frequently are:

- (1) Unequal military justice both in court-martial conviction rates for selected offenses and in severity of punishment received.
- (2) Unequal opportunity for promotion.
- (3) Unequal assignment to combat arms.
- (4) Racial separatism off-the-job, mainly off post.
- (5) Degrading treatment by superiors.

Military Justice. Among the results and conclusions of the study reported in Ref 12 are:

- (1) Blacks received a higher percentage of nonjudicial punishment and courts-martial than their white counterparts in all four services.
- (2) For direct confrontation offenses involving disrespect, disobedience, insubordination, provoking gestures and speeches, and assault, enlisted blacks receive nonjudicial punishment and courts-martial convictions at a percentage double that of enlisted whites in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.
- (3) In every service treated, punishment is found to be equally dispensed to enlisted whites and enlisted blacks, both in nonjudicial punishment and courts-martial convictions.

It would appear from these results that there is indeed a marked difference in the rate at which enlisted blacks received nonjudicial punishment and courts-martial, as compared with their white counterparts, but that there is no significant difference in the type or amount of punishment received for similar offenses. The reasons for the differences in rates of nonjudicial punishment and courts-martial are not clear. It could be that the general heightened awareness of black pride and identification with it of young blacks throughout our society may cause young black soldiers to be oversensitive to perceived insults or slights, even when these may be unintentional, and to react in a militant or aggressive fashion. It could also be, as many black soldiers claim, that they are discriminated against by being charged with an offense, where a white soldier would not be so charged in a similar situation. Whatever the facts may be, black soldiers view the situation as evidence of racial discrimination.

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Assignment to Combat Arms. According to recent manpower figures⁸ for enlisted personnel in pay grade E4 with under four years of military service, 31.3 percent of black soldiers were assigned to combat arms as compared with 18.3 percent of white soldiers. The difference persists throughout all AFQT levels within the grade.

It is also pointed out that "the over-concentration of blacks in combat units is all too obviously shown in the casualty reports from Vietnam . . . during the 1961-1966 period, blacks constituted 10.6 percent of military personnel in Southeast Asia while accounting for 16.0 percent of those killed in action."⁸

Off-duty, Off-post Separatism. Although it sometimes appears that integration is working smoothly in a military setting with white and black soldiers working well together on-the-job, a high degree of racial separatism often exists during off-duty hours. This appears to be especially true for off-post recreational facilities to the extent that by tacit agreement some are patronized exclusively by black soldiers and some by white, not only in the United States but overseas as well. "The pattern of off-duty separatism is most pronounced in Japan and Germany and somewhat less so in Korea. Combat conditions in Vietnam make the issue of off-duty racial relations academic for those troops in the field. In the cities, however, racial separatism is readily apparent."⁸ "While integrated social entertainment was provided at Fort Bragg, it is tacitly understood that black and white soldiers don't socialize in Fayetteville. This de facto segregation by the bars and entertainment centers in Fayetteville is well known and it understandably stokes the fires of black racism."¹¹

The condition of de facto segregation during off-duty hours is difficult to avoid, since it is not practical to force any individuals to associate with one another during their leisure time. However, the inevitable result is the continued feeling of resentment in the black soldier at the thought that he is acceptable for military duty but not socially.

Degrading Treatment. A high proportion of enlisted men complain of harassment, the loss of their personal identity, and the way they are treated by their NCOs and officers. Unfortunately, the black soldier

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to a large extent, appears to view the harassment that the average enlisted man complains about as being directed at him personally because of his race. It was noted during the interracial seminars conducted at Fort Bragg that "one of the most poignant insights brought out in the discussions was the notion that white commanders and NCOs lack the proper understanding and sensitivity about the background and aspirations of black soldiers. It was pointed out that many white commanders felt that black literature was subversive and that finding black literature in wall lockers immediately meant labeling the soldier as a militant."¹¹

The available data on the causes stated by black soldiers to be sources of discontent indicate that these causes appear to have considerable validity. What is not clear is how much of the unequal treatment as perceived by black soldiers is a result of the nature of the selection and promotion system; how much is due to oversensitivity of black soldiers, leading them to see discriminatory treatment where none is intended and to react aggressively; and how much is due to actual lingering traces of racism.

Drug Usage

For factors affecting drug usage, the picture is not clear (Table 27). Only the correlations between community upbringing/marijuana use, community upbringing/hard drugs use, and Vietnam duty/hard drugs use (those asterisked in Table 27) are statistically significant at the .10 level or below. There were no statistically significant relationships between drug use and education or race.

It was found that almost one-third of the E1-E4 marijuana users and one-half of the hard drugs users started taking drugs after entering the Army, where "users" refers to the "more than once" group (Table 28).

Many of the same people who participated in dissident acts also used drugs, but except for the possible contribution of drug use to increased barracks thievery, it cannot be said that drug use causes dissidence.

Summary of Objective 2 Findings

(1) Those who participate in dissident acts (excluding disobeying/refusing orders or showing disrespect) tend to be well educated, from suburban homes, profess no practicing religion, have been active in protest activities and social service groups prior to induction, and use drugs.

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Table 27

**PROFILE OF THE DRUG USERS
(E1-E4)**

		Percent Who Have Used Marijuana More Than Once	Percent Who Have Used Hard Drugs More Than Once
Education	Not a H.S. graduate	38	18
	H.S. graduate	47	18
	Some college	54	16
	College graduate	41	11
Community	Rural	38*	9*
	Urban	42	18
	Suburban	58	23
Race	Black	52	24
	White	46	15
Duty in Vietnam	Yes	53	26*
	No	43	13

Table 28

**INITIAL CONTACT WITH DRUGS
(E1-E4)**

	Number of "more than once" Drug Users	Percent Who First Used Drugs While in the Army
Marijuana	166	29
Hard Drugs	59	51

(2) The dissidents tend to have been drafted or have voluntarily enlisted to avoid being drafted, find their Army assignment unsuitable, have money and marital problems they attribute to the Army, have served in Vietnam, and have personally encountered racial discrimination.

(3) Over half (58 percent) of the dissident E1-E4s cited the Vietnam War as the major cause of their dissident activities, 38 percent cited the way the Army treats the individual, and only 4 percent cited poor living conditions.

(4) Almost one-third of the E1-E4 marijuana users and one-half of the E1-E4 hard drug users started taking drugs after entering the Army.

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TREND OF DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES: THE NEXT TWO TO FOUR YEARS (Objective 3) Personnel Survey

One of the survey questions asked those who had not participated in any dissident acts why they had not. Table 29 shows that 19 percent of the E1-E4s said they had no opportunity to participate, 12 percent refrained from dissident acts mainly from fear of punishment, 48 percent said because protest wouldn't do any good and they just want to get out of the Army, 14 percent said they had no reason to protest and that complaints could be handled through the system, and 7 percent said protest is disloyal and unpatriotic. In fact, one man said that if people were allowed to protest, the next thing you know "you'll have the people running the country."

These results indicate a potential for dissidence. Many of the 19 percent who had no opportunity, and the 12 percent who said they refrained from dissident acts mainly from fear of punishment, might join the dissident ranks in some future situation. It is highly conjectural what segment of the 48 percent who felt that protest wouldn't do any good might become dissidents and under what circumstances, but it is interesting to note that only 21 percent of the E1-E4s surveyed would appear to be reasonably immune from any future dissident epidemic.

Table 29

REASONS FOR NOT PARTICIPATING IN DISSIDENT ACTS (E1-E4)

Reason	Percent
<hr/> Number of Respondents (255) <hr/>	
No opportunity	19
Afraid of punishment	12
Protest won't do any good, just want to get out	48
No reason to act — complaints can be handled through the system	14
Disloyal, unpatriotic	7

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The two events that will most likely have the largest impact on dissidence over the next several years are the winding down of the Vietnam War and the establishment of the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA).

Vietnam War. Table 26 indicates that 58 percent of the dissident enlisted men attributed their dissidence to the war, and therefore halting the war may substantially reduce the dissidence. The word "may" must be emphasized because it is quite possible that some other motivation for dissident activities could arise as the war winds down.

Modern Volunteer Army. The establishment of the MVA will probably have a great impact on reducing dissidence since in addition to removing a major cause of dissidence — the draft — it will also result in fewer of those types of people who participated in dissident acts joining the Army.

The survey asked whether the soldier had enlisted or had been drafted and, if he had enlisted, whether he would have enlisted if there had not been a draft, i.e., whether he was a voluntary or involuntary enlistee. It was found that the proportion of draftees and involuntary enlistees who were dissidents was more than twice as high as the proportion of voluntary enlistees who were dissidents (Table 30).

Table 30

**EFFECT OF VOLUNTARINESS OF INDUCTION ON DISSIDENCE
(E1-E4)**

	Number of Responses	Percent of "more than once" Responses to Dissident Activities
Voluntary enlistees	563	3
Draftees or involuntary enlistees	1510	7

The actions that are being taken by the Army in anticipation of achieving a volunteer Army in 1973 are largely aimed at improving the life style of the soldier. These actions will reduce or eliminate many sources of irritation that underlie the motivation for traditional Army griping. These improvements should result in a reduction in that portion of dissident activity based on systemic motivation though, according

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to the survey, this portion may account for only 4 percent of the total dissidence.

As a matter of interest to the MVA, the background characteristics of the total sample of soldiers surveyed was compared with those of the voluntary enlistees, i.e., those who would be in the service in a zero draft dituation. Table 31 indicates that with no draft there may be a decrease in the ratio of well-educated, suburban-reared, white enlisted men. There also may be a decrease in those who profess no practicing religion, have participated in protest activities prior to induction, and who use marijuana. The asterisked boxes in Table 31 indicate those comparisons whose relationships are statistically significant at the .10 level or below. A similar chart on the officers showed that there may be no change in the complexion of the officer ranks.

Although racial discrimination was not specifically cited in the survey returns as a cause of dissidence, Table 25 shows that the proportion of E1-E4 dissident responses from those who said they had personally encountered racial discrimination while in the Army was 11 times as high as the proportion from those who had not encountered discrimination. Whether the apparent increase in the proportion of black soldiers in the MVA indicated in Table 31 will result in an increase or decrease in racial confrontations and racially motivated dissident acts is unclear.

Also unclear is what effect the MVA will have on those who cite the way the Army treats the individual as the major cause of their dissidence. As will be more fully explained in a later section of this report, more effective leadership may be the primary factor in removing this major cause of dissidence.

Documentary Sources

Although the data found in available documentary sources do not accurately reflect the actual extent of dissidence, they may provide a basis for ascertaining whether certain forms of dissident activity are increasing or decreasing. The cut-off dates shown on the various data figures reflect the latest available source material at the time this study was made.

Table 31
CHANGE IN EM COMPLEXION WITH THE MVA

	E1-E4		E5-E9	
	% of Total Surveyed	% of Vol. Enlistees	% of Total Surveyed	% of Vol. Enlistees
Highest Education	Not a H.S. Graduate	38 *	19	12 *
	H.S. Graduate	44	39	65
	Some College	17	24	22
	College Graduate	1	18	9
Community Upbringing	Rural	44 *	42	48
	Urban	32	25	29
	Suburban	24	33	28
Race	Non-white	28 *	17	31
	White	72	83	69
Religion	Practicing	95 *	86	89
	Nonpracticing	5	14	11
Prior-to-Army Protest Participation (More than Once)	No	95 *	83	90
	Yes	5	17	10
Marijuana Use (More than Once)	No	61	54	76
	Yes	39	46	24

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CIAD Monthly Reports

Dissident Incidents. The monthly totals of dissident incidents as reported to CIAD are plotted in Fig. 1. It should be kept in mind that the incident data maintained by CIAD include only incidents of dissidence that have some political motivation. They do not include, except incidentally, data on types of dissidence that are motivated by systemic reasons (e.g., Army griping) or humanistic reasons (e.g., racial confrontations). It appears that the number of political incidents is decreasing as the Vietnam War winds down.

Army Dissidents. A plot of known and suspected dissidents in the Army on a monthly basis (taken from CIAD data) is shown in Fig. 2. The reporting system on dissidents has the same uncertainties associated with it as the incident data. It appears that the cumulative number is added to with each new identification of a dissident, and that a name is dropped from the list whenever a man has not been heard of in terms of dissidence for a year. This system may cause the numbers to be on the high side of actual dissent for a given month, while incomplete reporting may make the figure low.

The total number is made up of three categories: activists, participants, and suspects. The CIAD definitions for these categories are as follows.

Activists are those who have been involved in an act of organizing and planning a dissident activity, and who have communicated a dissident idea while on active duty in the US Army. Participants are those who participate in dissident activities without attempting to influence the activities of others. Suspects are those whose activities cannot be proven as dissident, but which do come to the attention of the commander or the various military or civilian intelligence agencies.

Depending on an increase in an individual's activity, he may be recategorized from a suspect to a participant, or from a participant to an activist. Similarly, a decrease in activity could result in an individual being downgraded in the dissident category or eliminated from the list entirely.

From Fig. 2 it appears that the number of known activists has been increasing steadily during 1969 and the first half of 1970, whereas the

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


Fig. 1—Trend of Monthly Incidents

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(RAC)




Fig. 2—Known and Suspected Dissidents in the Army

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number of participants increased gradually during 1969 but appears to be falling off in 1970. It is of interest to note that the curve of total activists and participants shows a pronounced rise during 1969 but appears to be remaining comparatively constant during 1970. (It is possible that some participants have become more active and have been recategorized as activists.)

Underground Newspapers. One of the prevalent forms of dissident activity is the publication of "underground" newspapers. Since "The Bond" and "Vietnam GI" first appeared in the spring of 1967, 99 newspapers have surfaced. Eighty-four of these are Army-oriented, 11 being of professional quality, but only 45 are currently considered active. The content of the newspapers is overwhelmingly focused on two issues: the Vietnam War and violation of soldiers' "rights" by the Army.


Apart from the professional papers, the underground press seems largely to be the product of the work of a few soldiers with some civilian connections and support; e.g., with organizations like the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Student Mobilization Committee (SMC), or the American Servicemen's Union (ASU). The papers are produced off post, often by use of mimeographs and during off-duty hours of the soldiers involved.

Fig. 3 shows the number of newspapers that first appeared in a given month in the period 1967-1970. It is seen that the appearance of new underground newspapers did not begin with any frequency until the latter half of 1968, increased substantially in 1969, and has remained at a comparatively high level during 1970.

As over half the newspapers that have appeared from time to time are no longer alive, the charts that show frequencies of emergence of newspapers cannot be used to determine cumulative totals existing at any time. Of the nine nonprofessional papers that surfaced in 1968, five are believed to be no longer published. In addition, 23 of 36 that surfaced in 1969 and 11 of 39 in 1970 are believed to be no longer published.

In view of the effort involved in publishing such papers, the financial strains that are apparent from the requests for contributions, and the relatively short life of most of them, it is not unreasonable

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PERIOD NEWSPAPER FIRST SURFACED

Fig. 3 —Underground Newspapers

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to view the emergence of at least some of them as semispontaneous responses to immediate political events in society as well as reflective of long-term currents of dissidence. An example of a spontaneous response could well be the high level of activity in May 1970 that corresponds to the period of widespread protest demonstrations following the invasion of Cambodia.

In any case, the picture for 1970 indicates that dissident activity as represented by the publication of underground newspapers does not appear to be diminishing. However, thus far in the study the data do not indicate that underground newspapers contribute to problems of discipline, law, and order over and above those directly related to suppressing the newspapers.

Coffee Houses. The appearance of antimilitary coffee houses, namely, off-post meeting places where dissident materials are distributed and dissident views are promoted, parallels that of the emergence of underground newspapers. Although some of these coffee houses have received a considerable amount of publicity, the numbers involved are actually quite small, namely, three were established in 1968, four in 1969, and six in 1970.

OPMG Blue Bells and SIRs. A major source of information on dissident incidents and breaches of law and order in the Army is represented by the OPMG files labeled "Blue Bell" and "SIR." Army Regulation 1-55, 4 November 1966, establishes the procedure for reporting all cases of suspected criminal conduct, wrong-doing, or mismanagement which may result in damaging public confidence in the Army. The reports are code named "Blue Bell." Continental Army Command (CONARC) Regulation 190-8 specifies the procedure for reporting serious incidents. These are referred to as SIRs.

It must be noted that Blue Bells are reported in instances that "may result in damaging public confidence in the Army." This means that a good deal of judgment is involved in deciding whether to submit a Blue Bell report on an incident. In some instances secondary factors, such as the likelihood that the event will be publicized in a local newspaper, may influence the decision to report an event more than the nature of the event itself.

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Table 32 summarizes the frequency of dissident acts reported via Blue Bells and SIRs during 1968, 1969, and through November 1970.

Table 32

FREQUENCY OF BLUE BELLS AND SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTS

	1968	1969	1970*
Soldiers act to create dissident propaganda	2	8	0
Soldiers protest infringement of rights	4	2	0
Soldiers in groups create disturbance on post	1	4	2
Soldiers create disturbance in stockade	1	9	4
Individual soldiers refusing combat orders	19	14	4
Deserters to a foreign country	199	36	9
Violent protest and sabotage	3	8	28
Grenade incidents ("fragging")	0	0	5
Racial incidents	4	5	12

*Through November 1970.

It is again emphasized that owing to the subjective criteria used for reporting these incidents, the above table probably does not represent the total number of occurrences of similar incidents. With this qualification, there appears to be a discernible trend in frequency of occurrence of incidents from 1968-1970 in several categories. The trend is sharply decreasing for the categories "Individual soldiers refusing combat orders" and "Deserters to a foreign country," whereas an increasing trend is apparent for "Violent protest and sabotage," "Grenade incidents," and "Racial incidents."

Refusing Combat Orders. In most of the incidents of this type, a conscientious objector (CO) to the war in Vietnam was involved and, in fact, many of the individuals had already filed for CO status when the event occurred. It will be shown in a later section of this report that in 1969 the number of soldiers applying for CO status increased sharply. Moreover, Army policy concerning CO applications changed in 1970 to permit approval of CO requests from active-duty soldiers on a much broader scale than previously. This simpler route for achieving CO status may

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have siphoned off most of the soldiers who might otherwise have refused combat orders.

Deserters to a Foreign Country. The Blue Bell reports on deserters to a foreign country do not constitute a complete file on such deserters, but include those men whose intentions were reasonably well known at the time they went AWOL and men who have been reported to military personnel as being in a foreign country either by friends or relatives or through their own letters.

The reports provide useful clues as to the motivation for many of these deserters. Of the 244 deserters reported in Blue Bells between 1 January 1968 and 31 December 1970, many had a history of personal troubles including marital difficulties and inability to manage personal finances; 102 (42 percent) are known to have had previous Army disciplinary problems; 39 (16 percent) were citizens of a foreign country serving in the US Army and deserted to their home country; 31 (13 percent) were on orders to Vietnam at the time of their desertion.

The marked drop in Blue Bell reported desertions to a foreign country may be accounted for in several ways.

(1) The possibility of applying for and obtaining a CO discharge or 1-A-0 noncombatant status has improved to the point where desertion no longer appears necessary as the only escape from a moral dilemma or from combat duty.

(2) Reports of life as a deserter in a foreign country (e.g., Sweden) may have made the option seem less attractive.

(3) Desertion to a foreign country may no longer be regarded by commanders as a sufficiently serious threat to the Army's public image to warrant being reported in Blue Bells.

(4) The relatively lowered level of recently published figures for casualties in Vietnam may make the fear of death in combat seem more remote.

Although desertions to a foreign country are decreasing, it should be noted that the AWOL rate appears to be increasing. During the personal interviews, one squad leader stated that about 5 percent of his unit was AWOL at any given time. It was interesting to note that the lower grades stated that most of those whom they knew to have gone AWOL had done so

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to take care of urgent personal problems, whereas the junior officers said that there was no reason for a man with a serious personal problem to go AWOL because he could get special leave from the commander to take care of it. It would appear then that either the lower ranks are unaware of channels that are available to them or that the channels are at times not as open as regulations might suggest. There is also the possibility that a soldier may be aware of the channels available to him but be unwilling to use them for psychological reasons.

Grenade Incidents. One of the more disturbing types of events first reported in Blue Bells and SIRs in 1970 is the killing and injuring of American soldiers by use of fragmentation grenades — often by persons unknown, but presumably by another American soldier. Five such events are reported in 1970 — all in Vietnam. The character of the events themselves and reports from soldiers who have served recently in Vietnam suggest that the causes lie in black antagonism toward whites, white antagonism toward blacks, and subordinates' resentment of superiors — i.e., ranking NCOs as well as officers.

Violent Protest and Sabotage. The incidents included in this category are largely arson, bombing, and sabotage or suspected sabotage. The increase in incidents in this category may reflect the increasing trend to violent dissent.

Racial Incidents. It is not always easy to make a clear distinction as to when an incident becomes a "racial" incident. However, it would seem that the deciding factor is whether the race of the individual(s) involved played a major part in instigating or exacerbating the incident.

The OPMG files on acts of violence, including both robbery and assault among Army personnel, suggest a great deal of black against white (and perhaps vice versa, though not identified as such) aggression. However, most of the incidents have the basic characteristics of street crimes (i.e., muggings, etc) with overtones of racial antagonism rather than characteristics of basic racial protest. Overtones are noted when, again and again, one sees in the reports that the muggers or armed robbers were black servicemen and the victims were white. Unfortunately, comparative data for black-black, white-black, and white-white Army-related street crimes are not available.

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More than half the 21 racial incidents reported in Blue Bells and SIRs during 1968-1970 occurred outside the continental United States; six occurred in Vietnam, two in Germany, one in Okinawa, one in Thailand, and one in the Canal Zone. Although racial incidents appear to be on the rise, there are presently no Army-wide procedures for gathering and recording the types of information required to analyze their extent and causation and, in fact, there appears to be a definite reluctance to record any information that would identify an incident as being racially motivated.

ODCSPER Conscientious Objector Files. Applying for conscientious objector discharge (1-0 classification) after induction may be considered to be an act of dissidence. Fig. 4 shows the number of applicants for CO status since 1965 and the number of applications approved per year. During the years before the major Vietnam buildup, the number of applicants was low, reaching 101 in 1965. During 1967, the number of applicants began to climb and in 1969 increased rapidly to 943. In 1970 the number continued to increase. By October, 903 applications had been filed and a simple extrapolation suggests that the number for the year would be about 1200.

It is quite possible that "draft counseling" movements and perhaps the underground newspapers, which carried articles on how to apply for CO status, had an effect on the 1969 and 1970 rates. It is interesting to note that applications are increasing even though the Army's strength is decreasing.

The increase in approval of CO applications may well have had an effect on the drop in the number of known or suspected dissident participants in 1970 (see Fig. 2). The procedure for dropping names from this dissident record has a built-in time delay such that the full effect of liberalized Army CO policy may not show up on the CIAD dissident plot until 1971. It would be well to continue to monitor and compare these frequencies (CO approvals and participant and suspected dissidents) for another year.

It is of interest to note that conscientious objector noncombatant (1-A-0) applications from servicemen totaled 355 in 1967, 711 in 1968, 924 in 1969, and 924 (estimate) in 1970. In 1967, 39 percent were approved, and in 1968, 74 percent were approved.




Fig. 4—Post Induction Conscientious Objector Applications and Approvals

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Pre-induction CO applications also represent a form of dissidence. There are a number of different stages at which this position can be taken by a potential draftee. Probably the most significant figure is the number of men who have been processed for induction, classified as conscientious objectors, and are being held on record in one or another form of CO status during their period of potential eligibility for induction. Between December 1968 and 31 October 1970, the number of men so classified rose from 13,300 to 25,737 — an almost 100 percent increase. It is not possible to distinguish between policy change effects and an increase in applications to account for this. It is clear that the number of men who might otherwise have been drafted into the Army, but who are excused because of CO sentiments, has approximately doubled within the last two years.

Recently the Selective Service Statistical Section has started compiling a monthly summary of the number of claims for Conscientious Objection filed during the month. From June to October 1970, the number of claimants has turned steadily downward (June, 14,440; August, 12,098; September, 9737; October, 8598).

With the exception of the Selective Service data on filings for CO status in latter 1970, the indications are that the rate of application for CO status is increasing and that the Army's inclination to accept such objection as a basis for exclusion or elimination from Army service is also growing.

Post Commander Survey

The situation in 1969 and 1970 for various types of dissident activity as reported in the post commander's survey is shown in Table 33. Some of the numbers reported by the posts were estimates only, but, nevertheless, there appears to be a significant increase in frequency of incidents from 1969 to 1970 in every category except on-post demonstrations and soldiers distributing protest literature. Also, in all categories except those two,* substantially more posts reported an increase in activity than a decrease.

*There was an increase in the frequency of soldiers distributing protest literature, and more posts reported an increase in this activity than a decrease, but the differences are not substantial.

Table 33

SUMMARY OF DISSIDENT ACTIVITY REPORTED IN POST COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRE
(17 Army Posts in CONUS)

Activity	Total Numbers		Change in Frequency from 1969 to 1970 (no. of posts)				Unknown
	1969	1970	Increase	Decrease	No Change	Not Reported	
On-post demonstrations involving 10 or more soldiers	12	11	3	5		9	
Printing of underground newspapers	87	110	10	4		3	
Soldiers known to have distributed protest literature	76	80	7	5	1	2	2
Off-post protest meetings attended by soldiers	99	135	7	2	3	4	1
Coffee houses in operation	8	13	6	1	5	5	
Incidents of violence where race was a factor in initiating the incident	66	97	9	1		4	3
Known instances of soldiers disobeying orders or showing disrespect to superior	338	533	8	2		1	6

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Some caution should be used, however, before concluding that the trend is actually increasing, since more attention is being given now to reporting these types of activities than before.

Summary of Objective 3 Findings

(1) Dissident activities, particularly underground newspapers, anti-military coffee houses, off-post protest meetings, disobedience/disrespect, racial incidents, violent protest and sabotage, grenade incidents, and conscientious objector applications have been increasing over the past several years.

(2) As many as 79 percent of the E1-E4s surveyed were not definitely opposed to participating in dissident acts in some future situation.

(3) The decline in the Vietnam War may be matched by a decline in politically motivated dissident activities by 58 percent.

(4) The establishment of the MVA may reduce dissident activities by more than 50 percent.

EFFECT OF DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF DISCIPLINE, LAW, AND ORDER (Objective 4)

The soldiers were asked on the personnel survey whether they felt the current level of protest activity in the Army significantly affects the enforcement of discipline, law, and order in the Army and why they thought that it did or did not. Only 14 percent of the E1-E4s stated that dissidence reduces discipline, law, and order, but over one-third of the E5-E9s and company grade officers and over half, 57 percent, of the field grade officers stated it does (Table 34). It is interesting that 11 percent of the E1-E4s thought that the dissidence was useful in that it forces the Army to make needed changes. The major reason given by those who said dissidence does not affect discipline, law, and order is the low level of dissident activity.

Disrespect to superiors and refusal of orders, interracial friction, and drug use were cited during the interviews as the major discipline, law, and order problems.

The post commanders, however, indicated that although there is continuing dissident activity such as demonstrations, publishing of underground newspapers, and attendance at antimilitary coffee houses, these do not represent a serious problem for the Army at the present time in

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Table 34

EFFECT OF DISSIDENCE ON DISCIPLINE, LAW, AND ORDER

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
Number of respondents	(356)	(168)	(139)	(123)
Percent who said:				
Dissidence reduces discipline, law, and order	14	35	37	57
Dissidence forces Army to make needed changes	11	3	4	0
Dissidence doesn't affect discipline, law, and order	24	14	39	31
They had no opinion	51	48	20	12

terms of enforcement of discipline, law, and order. It is, of course, possible that the post commanders may be reluctant to admit to any discipline problems on their posts.

These opinions on whether dissidence affects discipline, law, and order are subjective measurements. A more objective measurement is the trend in breaches of military law.

There are four different levels at which breaches of military law are treated in the Army: Article 15 violations (company punishment), summary court martial violations, special court martial violations, and general court martial violations. Some violations are specifically Article 15 violations, and some are reserved for general court martial attention. In most cases it is the severity of the breach of one of the punitive articles and not the article category itself that determines at what level trial and potential punishment will be undertaken. Most breaches of law in the Army are minor and are treated under Article 15.

The frequency per quarterly period of Article 15's and each type of court martial in the Army from 1966 to third quarter 1970 is shown in Fig. 5. Since the beginning of 1967, the trend for all types is upward, with the exception of special courts-martial which show a declining trend after mid-1969.

Court martial offenses include crimes such as burglary, robbery, and murder, and offenses such as refusal to obey orders. Within the punitive articles, Articles 88-92 deal specifically with disrespect and




Fig. 5 — Court Martial Trends

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refusal to obey orders. Any clear trend with regard to violations of these articles, particularly at the general court martial level, might be taken as reflecting the state of discipline, law, and order in the Army. Fig. 6 shows a plot of offenses tried by general courts martial per 1,000 soldiers per quarter, both for all articles and for Articles 88-92.

Changes in Army policy could have an effect on court martial data. For example, the 1969 Supreme Court ruled in O'Callahan v Parker (395 U.S. 258) that in order for the Army to have jurisdiction to try a soldier by court martial the offense must be militarily related. This ruling may account for the decrease in special courts martial since mid-1969. Overall, the picture presented by the data in Figs. 5 and 6 is one of a deteriorating trend in law and order in the Army since 1967. The rising trend in breaches of discipline as indicated by the data for general court martial offenses under Articles 88-92 is disturbing, although it is not clear whether this trend represents a shift in soldier attitude or a shift in the interpretation placed by commanders on the seriousness of a soldier's misbehavior.

The personnel survey asked whether the soldier had ever read an underground newspaper, had ever seen other soldiers demonstrating, distributing protest material, disobeying/refusing orders or showing disrespect to a superior, had ever been stationed at a base where there has been a nearby coffee house with an antimilitary reputation, or had ever known about nearby meetings of any protest group involving soldiers.

This series of questions permits a measurement of how visible the dissidents are to other soldiers. One might assume that discipline, law, and order problems increase as dissident visibility increases and vice versa.

Table 35 shows that the visibility ranged, depending on the activity, from 17 percent of the E1-E4s who had at some time observed on-post demonstrations to 80 percent who had at some time observed other soldiers disobeying/refusing orders or showing disrespect.




Fig. 6-General Court-Martial Offenses Trends

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Table 35

VISIBILITY OF DISSIDENT ACTIVITY (E1-E4)

Percent of Total Sample of 366 Who Had:						
Observed Demonstration On Post Off Post	Read Underground Newspaper	Observed Distribution of Protest Materials	Known of Nearby Protest Meetings	Known of Nearby Anti-Military Coffee Houses	Observed Disobedience/ Refusal of Orders or Disrespect	
17 32	44	33	38	28	80	

Summary of Objective 4 Findings

(1) Only 14 percent of the E1-E4s surveyed stated that dissidence reduces discipline, law, and order as compared with 57 percent of the field grade officers.

(2) There appears to be a rising trend in general courts martial for disrespect and refusal to obey orders.

(3) Post commanders do not consider that the present level of dissidence significantly affects the enforcement of discipline, law, and order.

ADEQUACY OF MILITARY POLICE PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH DISSIDENCE (Objective 5)

The personnel survey asked whether the soldier had ever observed the Military Police (MP) responding to protest activities, and if they had, what they thought about their action. Table 36 shows that little over 10 percent of the E1-E4s had observed the MPs responding to dissident activities. Of these about half thought the MP response appropriate and half inappropriate. Of those who found it inappropriate, half were dissidents. The main complaint was that the MPs used unnecessary force. However, the study results do not demonstrate a need for recommending any significant changes in MP procedures for handling dissidence.

The findings presented under Objective 1 indicate that the extent of dissidence within the MPs may be similar to that within the non-MP E1-E4 grades. The personal interviews with the MPs support this finding. Many of the MPs remarked that their fellow soldiers thought of all MPs

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Table 36

VISIBILITY OF MP RESPONSE TO DISSIDENCE

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
Number who had observed MPs responding to dissident activities	48	40	27	40
Percent of sample who had observed MPs responding to dissident activities	13	24	19	32
Number who thought MP response appropriate	18	20	21	37
Number who thought MP response inappropriate	22	10	6	1
No response	8	10	0	2

as bravado bullies who just were itching to smash skulls, when in fact most of the MPs were quite the opposite and were most unhappy about having to enforce certain regulations such as those pertaining to personal appearance standards.

The MPs at one post claimed that they had conducted an anonymous survey of their MP unit and found that 84 percent of the MPs had used marijuana. The MPs did note during the interviews that there is a shortage of personnel which results in long hours and extra duty for the MPs, and that soldiers are often assigned to the MPs with inadequate training.

ARMY-WIDE MEASURES FOR REDUCING DISSIDENCE (Objective 6)**Racial Unrest**

The personnel survey asked for any suggestions on how the Army can reduce racial tensions. Table 37 shows that many simply said that each soldier should be treated without regard to race. That the problem may be larger than the Army is evidenced by the large number who said that nothing can be done till society changes. That society has some way still to go is indicated by the 8-9 percent of the enlisted men whose contribution to improved race relations was the recommendation to eliminate the blacks from the Army, some suggesting Africa as the proper depository.

Often the black soldier tends to feel that the Army placement and promotion system is based on white educational standards that result in most black men being put into non-skill infantry MOSs. This perhaps

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Table 37

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING RACIAL TENSIONS

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
(Number of Respondents)	(184)	(100)	(98)	(101)
Suggestion on Reducing Racial Tensions (%)				
More racial seminars and discussions	13	17	24	25
Treat every soldier without regard to race	21	32	34	32
Weed out or punish troublemakers	10	6	12	4
Eliminate Blacks from the Army	8	9	0	0
Stop talking about race	3	7	8	10
Nothing can be done till society changes	34	22	14	19
Other	11	7	8	10

suggests a need to study the feasibility of either revising the qualification tests to make them more compatible with the educational level and experience of black inductees or of providing special preparatory training for black entrants whose prior education is not adequate to permit them to compete on an equal level with their white peers.

Although some changes in Army procedures can (and probably will) be made over the next few years that will help to bring black soldiers to an equal level of achievement with their peers, these will relieve only a part of the causes for black discontent. The major source of this dissatisfaction in the Army, as in society at large, appears to be an inadequate understanding of, sensitivity toward, and appreciation of needs and aspirations of the black man by the white community. Some steps that would undoubtedly help to ease the situation were recommended during the interracial seminars at Fort Bragg as follows (Ref 11):

- (a) Bringing problems into the open in a frank uninhibited manner through discussions.
- (b) Commanders taking more positive approach to talking to their men rather than relying on the passive open door policy.
- (c) Sensitivity training to provide white leaders with information as to exactly what the young black man wants and why he wants it.

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- (d) Continued program to provide the young black man with greater visibility of black accomplishments, i.e., classes in heritage, training films, etc.
- (e) Improving environmental factors such as too many post details and attempting to provide more job satisfaction.

The increasing anti-white backlash discussed in the section on Objective 1 findings poses a major threat to racial harmony. Open and uninhibited racial discussion, possibly in small groups, is vitally needed to clear the air and stem this increasing trend.

Drug Use

The survey asked what policy the Army should have with respect to marijuana. Table 38 shows that 34 percent of the E1-E4s felt the Army should allow marijuana use when off duty and 15 percent would allow it even while on duty as long as it did not interfere with performance on the job. To sum these two groups, 49 percent or about one of every two E1-E4s would not entirely prohibit marijuana. Similarly, one of four E5-E9s and company grade officers and one of ten field grade officers would not entirely prohibit its use.

Table 38

RECOMMENDATIONS ON MARIJUANA USAGE

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
Number of respondents	(366)	(170)	(140)	(126)
<u>Percent who said:</u>				
Allow marijuana use when off duty	34	19	22	6
Allow marijuana use on duty if it doesn't interfere	15	7	3	4
Present Regs should stay in effect	31	54	61	84
No opinion	20	20	14	6

Table 39 presents a breakdown of the E5-E9 marijuana use recommendations by years of active Army service. As the number of years of Army service increases, the percentage of those E5-E9s recommending some change in policy towards marijuana decreases. This relationship is statistically significant at the .005 level.

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Table 39

**RECOMMENDATIONS ON MARIJUANA USAGE
(E5-E9)**

	Years of Service			
	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Number of respondents	(55)	(29)	(6)	(67)
Percent who said:				
Allow marijuana use when off duty	33	28	17	6
Allow marijuana use on duty if it doesn't interfere	14	10	0	3
Present Regs should stay in effect	33	45	50	73
No opinion	20	17	33	18

The strongest advocates for allowing marijuana are those who have used it. Table 40 indicates that 78 percent of those E1-E4s who had used marijuana more than once said it should be allowed, whereas only 22 percent of the E1-E4 non-users would approve its use. This relationship between marijuana recommendations and marijuana users is statistically significant at the .005 level.

Table 40

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARIJUANA RECOMMENDATIONS AND MARIJUANA USE
(E1-E4)**

	Never Used Marijuana	Used Marijuana Once	Used Marijuana More than Once
Number of respondents	(163)	(32)	(164)
Percent who said:			
Marijuana should be allowed	22	34	78
Present Regs should stay in effect	48	47	10
No opinion	30	19	12

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Dissident Activities

To gain insight into the tolerance the various grades have for permitting dissident activities, the personnel survey asked whether the Army should prohibit such activities and discipline those who participate, or whether the Army should take no action as long as the activities did not substantially disrupt post operations. Table 41 shows that a majority of all grades said the Army should take no action towards soldiers who attend protest meetings and antimilitary coffee houses, who participate in off-post demonstrations when not in uniform, or who contribute to underground newspapers. A majority of all but the E1-E4s said the Army should not allow distribution of protest materials or demonstrations on post or off post when in uniform.

The high degree of tolerance of field grade officers towards the first four items indicates either concern that the Army has no right to interfere with what a soldier does off post in his own time even if it does reduce discipline, law, and order, or that an attempt to prohibit such activities would only increase the dissidence.

Table 41

TOLERANCE TOWARDS DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
Number of respondents	(366)	(170)	(140)	(126)
<u>Percent who say the Army should take no action towards:</u>				
Attendance at protest meetings	86	64	87	79
Attendance at antimilitary coffee houses	80	63	86	76
Off-post demonstration when not in uniform	80	61	80	67
Contributing to underground newspapers	71	53	78	66
Distribution of protest materials on post	65	35	44	31
On-post demonstrations	68	38	32	14
Off-post demonstrations when in uniform	43	16	13	8

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On the last page of the survey, the respondents were asked to list those Army policies, practices, and procedures that they felt contribute to increased protest. Over 30 such policies, practices, and procedures were listed ranging in scope from the physical training requirements to having a civilian — the President of the U.S. — in command of the Army.

Table 42 indicates that the item most often mentioned by the E1-E4s was the harassment of troops, mainly by the NCOs, and the lack of personal freedom and dignity. This supports what was learned during the personal interviews where we were told that there is immense resentment over the perceived harassment. Such statements as "the Army treats us as animals, or dogs, or children" were not uncommon.

The next most frequently cited item was unnecessary make-work duties and practices. Personal appearance standards, with hair regulations usually mentioned, was actually the third most frequently cited item. Fourth was the lack of communications between the lower EM and their superiors. Fifth on the list was the forced draft, sixth low pay, seventh was inequities of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), eighth was inefficiency and mismanagement of the Army, and ninth was incompetent and inadequate leadership.

In reality, although explicitly mentioned only ninth in frequency, inadequate leadership may well be a major contributing factor for most of the above complaints, except for low pay and the draft which Congress is now addressing.

One reason is the lack of consistency in the application of policies and procedures. For example, new haircut policies are followed by some leaders, liberalized further by others, and mostly ignored by still others. Article 15's and courts-martial are imposed in a far from even-handed manner. Open door policies differ markedly with the temperament of the commander.

There appears to be a lack of purpose, mission, and goals which progressively worsens as one goes down the echelon of command — or as the troops put it, everyone is just concerned with covering his own tail. Small wonder that inefficiency and mismanagement occur where many just pass the buck in order not to jolt the system. If there are legitimate reasons for what seem like outdated practices they haven't usually been adequately explained to the troops.

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Table 42

**ARMY POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES MOST OFTEN CITED
BY E1-E4s AS CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE**

	Number of Times Cited
1. Harassment of the troops and lack of personal freedom and dignity	151
2. Unnecessary make-work duties and practices	53
3. Personal appearance standards — hair regulations	41
4. Lack of communication between troops and superiors	37
5. Draft	31
6. Low pay	25
7. Inequities of the UCMJ	20
8. Inefficiency and mismanagement	18
9. Incompetent and inadequate leadership	16

And most important of all, there is in today's society a renewed concern for the dignity and worth of the individual. Loyalty and obedience to superiors are not given unquestioningly, but must be earned. They are not readily given by men who are forced to work at jobs that appear unworthwhile, demeaning, and unrewarding, or who are subjected to repression and harassment.

A re-emphasis upon leadership responsibilities and skills is called for. Perhaps this is not enough. There appears to be a clear dichotomy between the values of the men presently entering the service and those to whom they are responsible — the NCOs. It is open to question whether the Army can make both groups happy. Perhaps a new breed of NCOs is needed — more intelligent, better educated, and better trained in leadership skills. The new emphasis the Army is currently placing on leadership training and the new program that has just begun with the training of those who will train the leaders is a step in the right direction.

Summary of Objective 6 Findings

(1) Twenty percent of those surveyed thought that an increased active program of racial discussions and sensitivity training is needed to help alleviate racial tensions.

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(2) One of every two E1-E4s surveyed recommended that the Army not entirely prohibit the use of marijuana.

(3) Most of those who recommended allowing the use of marijuana had used marijuana.

(4) Harassment and lack of personal freedom and dignity were cited most often by the E1-E4s as the Army practices most responsible for dissidence.

(5) Many of the perceived causes of dissidence are attributable to a lack of effective leadership, and a re-emphasis of leadership responsibilities and skills is needed.

In brief, it was found that a substantial number of involuntarily serving young men, mostly well educated, are participating in dissident activities; activities perceived by a majority of at least the field grade officers to be detrimental to discipline, law, and order. The dissidents cited the Vietnam War and the Army's degrading treatment of them as the major causes of their dissidence.

It was also found that there is a far larger body of discontented, if not dissident soldiers. Discontented soldiers find socially acceptable issues to justify their dissident activities. It would be foolhardy to assume that after the Vietnam War another such issue will not emerge. The Army must address itself to today's causes of discontent to avoid tomorrow's dissidence. This study underlines the major cause of discontent — it is not low pay or poor living conditions although they are contributory — rather it is harassment and loss of personal dignity. The Modern Volunteer Army per se will not eliminate these. The success of the MVA and the control of dissidence will undoubtedly depend in large part on the leadership qualities of those who directly lead the troops.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Although there are continuing activities in types of dissent with possible political overtones, such as demonstrations, publishing of underground newspapers, and attendance at antimilitary coffee houses, these do not represent a serious problem for the Army at the present time in terms of enforcement of discipline, law, and order. Moreover, these are likely to become less of a problem as the Vietnam War winds down and the Modern Volunteer Army comes into effect.

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(2) The major problems affecting discipline, law, and order in the Army appear to be:

- (a) Drug usage
- (b) Interracial friction
- (c) Disrespect to superiors and refusal of orders.

Not only are these problems serious at the moment, but the trend appears to be towards an increase in frequency.

(3) There is no evidence that the types of situations created by the problems listed in (2) above will create a need for military police procedures other than standard operating procedures. However, in view of the increasing trend in these incidents, current military police authorized strengths may not be sufficient to cope with the problem adequately over the next few years.

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Appendix A

PERSONNEL SURVEY

The personnel survey consisted of 10 biographical items and 66 numbered questions, and is presented in Annex A1. The codification of the free response questions is given in Annex A2.

FREQUENCY OF RESPONSES

The percentages presented in the tables shown in the body of this report are based on the frequency of responses to the survey questions which are tabulated in Tables A1-A33.

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Table A1

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION OF PERSONNEL SURVEYED
(Frequency of Responses for Table 4)

Factor	Number of Respondents				
	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-O3 W1-W4	O4-O6	All Grades
Total Sample	366	170	140	126	802
<u>Component</u>					
Regular Army	211	155	32	85	483
Army of the US	137	11	57	28	233
National Guard	8	1	0	1	10
Reserve	5	0	50	11	66
No response	5	3	1	1	10
<u>Would you have entered the service if there had not been a draft?</u>					
Yes	98	103	72	100	373
No	268	65	68	25	426
No response	0	2	0	1	3
<u>Years of Active Army Service</u>					
0-3	341	55	98	5	499
4-6	17	30	26	4	77
7-9	1	6	4	13	24
Over 9	2	68	10	98	178
No response	5	11	2	6	24
<u>Age</u>					
17-21	222	24	3	3	252
22-26	132	67	104	6	309
27-31	7	16	18	15	56
Over 31	1	58	11	101	171
No response	4	5	4	1	14
<u>Highest Education Level</u>					
Not a H.S. graduate	71	18	1	1	91
H.S. graduate	142	91	7	1	241
Some college	87	45	25	25	182
College graduate	66	16	107	99	288
No response	0	0	0	0	0



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Table A1 (continued)

Factor	Number of Respondents				
	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-03 W1-W4	O4-06	All Grades
<u>College Course of Study</u>					
Humanities or social sciences	78	31	82	66	257
Technical or physical sciences	75	30	49	56	210
No college	204	102	7	2	315
No response	9	7	2	2	20
<u>Type of Community Where You Grew Up</u>					
Rural	153	74	31	53	311
Urban	93	49	41	35	218
Suburban	119	47	66	35	267
No response	1	0	2	3	6
<u>Race</u>					
Black	47	49	8	12	116
White	302	117	130	110	659
Other	16	4	2	3	25
No response	1	0	0	1	2
<u>Religion</u>					
Catholic	113	38	40	35	226
Protestant	171	102	77	76	426
Jewish	0	2	1	3	6
Other	29	8	4	3	44
Non-practicing	52	18	17	7	94
No response	1	2	1	2	6
<u>Prior-to-Army Protest Participation</u>					
Never	267	146	102	119	634
Once	32	5	8	6	51
More than once	62	17	29	1	109
No response	5	2	1	0	8
<u>Prior-to-Army Social Service Activities</u>					
Yes	27	7	11	4	49
No	337	162	129	122	750
No response	2	1	0	0	3

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Table A1 (continued)

Factor	Number of Respondents				
	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-O3 W1-W4	O4-O6	All Grades
<u>Is Present Army Assignment Suitable?</u>					
Yes	182	114	105	119	520
No	178	53	35	7	273
No response	6	3	0	0	9
<u>Ever Received Article 15?</u>					
Never	279	116	131	110	636
Once	46	38	4	14	102
More than once	39	14	5	2	60
No response	2	2	0	0	4
<u>Ever Been Court Martialed?</u>					
Never	340	149	139	122	750
Once	17	15	1	3	36
More than once	7	4	0	0	11
No response	2	2	0	1	5
<u>Ever Found Guilty of Civilian Criminal Charge?</u>					
Never	318	154	134	120	726
Once	31	10	6	5	52
More than once	14	3	0	1	18
No response	3	3	0	0	6
<u>Any Major Money Problems Caused By Being in the Army?</u>					
Yes	144	47	8	13	212
No	221	121	132	112	586
No response	1	2	0	1	4
<u>Any Major Marital Problems Caused By Being in the Army?</u>					
Yes	131	43	17	25	216
No	232	125	122	101	580
No response	3	2	1	0	6

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Table A1 (continued)

Factor	Number of Respondents				
	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-03 W1-W4	O4-06	All Grades
<u>Ever Volunteered for Duty In Vietnam?</u>					
Yes	88	74	51	66	279
No	276	93	89	60	518
No response	2	3	0	0	5
<u>Ever Been Stationed In Vietnam?</u>					
Yes	91	131	52	109	383
No	274	37	87	17	415
No response	1	2	1	0	4

Table A2

OVERALL PARTICIPATION IN DISSIDENT ACTS BY GRADE
(Frequency of Responses for Table 6)

Number Who Have Participated	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-03 W1-W4	O4-06	MPs at Ft. Hood
Never	276	139	127	123	30
Once	33	16	9	2	5
More than once	57	15	4	1	7
Total	366	170	140	126	42

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Table A3

E5-E9 DISSIDENT PARTICIPATION BY YEARS OF ACTIVE ARMY SERVICE
(Frequency of Responses for Table 7)

Number of E5-E9s Who Have Participated	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Never	34	23	4	67
Once	10	3	2	1
More than once	11	4	0	0
Total	55	30	6	68

Did not designate years of service — 11

Table A4

E1-E4 DISSIDENT PARTICIPATION BY ACTIVITY
(Frequency of Responses for Table 8)

Number of E1-E4s Who Have Participated	Demonstration		Underground Newspapers	Distribute Protest Materials	Attend Protest Meeting	Attend Anti-Military Coffee House
	On Post	Off Post				
Never	343	330	344	343	316	300
Once	10	12	11	8	17	21
More than once	10	21	9	13	30	43
No response	3	3	2	2	3	2
Total	366	366	366	366	366	366

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Table A5

**DISOBEYING/REFUSING ORDERS OR SHOWING DISRESPECT TO A SUPERIOR
BY GRADE**

(Frequency of Responses for Table 9)

Number Who Have Participated	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-03 W1-W4	O4-06	MPs at Ft. Hood
Never	239	116	121	115	29
Once	39	25	10	5	4
More than once	86	28	9	6	8
No response	2	1	0	0	1
Total	366	170	140	126	42

Table A6

**E5-E9 DISOBEYING/REFUSING ORDERS OR SHOWING DISRESPECT
TO A SUPERIOR BY YEARS OF ACTIVE ARMY SERVICE**

(Frequencies for Table 10)

Number of E5-E9s Who Have Participated	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Never	30	18	4	55
Once	8	8	2	6
More than once	17	4	0	6
Total	55	30	6	67

Did not designate years of service — 11; No response — 1

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Table A7

DISSIDENCE/DISOBEDIENCE COMBINED BY GRADE
(Frequency of Responses for Table 11)

Number Who Have Participated	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06	MPs at Ft. Hood
Never	195	102	112	114	21
Once	53	33	15	7	6
More than once	118	35	13	5	15
Total	366	170	140	126	42

Table A8

E5-E9 DISSIDENCE/DISOBEDIENCE
BY YEARS OF ACTIVE ARMY SERVICE
(Frequency of Responses for Table 12)

Number of E5-E9s Who Have Participated	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Never	22	14	3	55
Once	12	9	3	7
More than once	21	7	0	6
Total	55	30	6	68

Did not designate years of service — 11

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Table A9

DISSIDENT PARTICIPATION BY POST
(Frequencies for Table 13)

Number of E1-E4s Who Have Participated	Post #1	Post #2	Post #3	Post #4	Post #5
Never	53	40	75	51	57
Once	12	8	3	6	4
More than once	19	6	8	11	13
Total	84	54	86	68	74

Table A10

**DISOBEYING/REFUSING ORDERS OR SHOWING DISRESPECT
TO A SUPERIOR BY POST**
(Frequencies for Table 14)

Number of E1-E4s Who Have Participated	Post #1	Post #2	Post #3	Post #4	Post #5
Never	47	33	68	48	43
Once	10	5	7	5	12
More than once	25	16	11	15	19
No response	2	0	0	0	0
Total	84	54	86	68	74

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Table A11

RECRUITMENT FOR DISSIDENT ACTS

(Frequencies for Table 15)

Number of E1-E4s Who Have Participated	Demonstration		Underground Newspapers	Distribute Protest Materials	Attend Protest Meeting	Attend Anti-Military Coffee House
	On Post	Off Post				
Never	321	287	315	334	298	302
Once	25	37	21	12	37	24
More than once	17	39	28	18	29	38
No response	3	3	2	2	2	2
Total	366	366	366	366	366	366

Table A12

EXTENT OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

(Frequencies for Table 16)

Number Who Have Encountered Racial Discrimination	E1-E4		E5-E9		O1-O3, W1-W4		O4-O6	
	Black*	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
Never observed or encountered it	20	140	13	51	0	54	1	49
Observed it	10	101	14	39	3	47	1	39
Personally encountered it	16	55	22	26	5	29	10	22
No response	1	6	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total	47	302	49	117	8	130	12	110

*Those who answered race as "other" were not included as Black in Tables A12 or A13.

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Table A13

EXTENT OF ANTI-WHITE BACKLASH

(Frequencies for Table 17)

Number of Whites Who Have Observed:	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
Anti-Black discrimination	13	10	20	14
Anti-White discrimination	54	19	18	7
Mixed discrimination*	11	4	11	10
No response or not identifiable	224	84	81	79
Total	302	117	130	110

*The percentages in Table 17 for anti-white discrimination are based on the sum of "anti-white" and "mixed" responses.

Table A14

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY POST

(Frequencies for Table 18)

Number of E1-E4s Who Have Encountered Racial Discrimination	Post #1	Post #2	Post #3	Post #4	Post #5
Never observed or encountered it	30	26	53	25	33
Observed it	32	18	22	26	18
Personally encountered it	19	8	10	17	21
No response	3	2	1	0	2
Total	84	54	86	68	74

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Table A15

EXTENT OF DRUG USAGE
(Frequencies for Table 19)

	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
Number Who Used Marijuana				
Never	165	110	95	119
Once	32	18	19	3
More than once	166	41	25	4
No response	3	1	1	0
Total	366	170	140	126
Number Who Used Hard Drugs				
Never	287	159	135	124
Once	19	1	3	0
More than once	59	9	1	2
No response	1	1	1	0
Total	366	170	140	126

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Table A16

E5-E9 DRUG USAGE BY YEARS OF ACTIVE ARMY SERVICE
(Frequencies for Table 20)

	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Number of E5-E9s Who Used Marijuana				
Never	18	18	4	61
Once	9	1	2	4
More than once	28	11	0	2
Total	55	30	6	67
Number of E5-E9s Who Used Hard Drugs				
Never	48	28	6	66
Once	0	1	0	0
More than once	7	1	0	1
Total	55	30	6	67
Did not designate years of service — 11; no response — 1				

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Table A17

DRUG USAGE BY POST
(Frequencies for Table 21)

	Post #1	Post #2	Post #3	Post #4	Post #5
Number of E1-E4s Who Used Marijuana					
Never	24	26	47	32	36
Once	8	5	6	5	8
More than once	50	23	32	31	30
No response	2	0	1	0	0
Total	84	54	86	68	74
Number of E1-E4s Who Used Hard Drugs					
Never	58	40	72	56	61
Once	7	2	4	2	4
More than once	18	12	10	10	9
No response	1	0	0	0	0
Total	84	54	86	68	74

Table A18

DISSIDENCE/DISOBEDIENCE/DRUGS COMBINED
(Frequency of Responses for Table 22)

Number Who Have Participated	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06	MPs at Ft. Hood
Once or not at all	164	110	109	118	19
More than once	202	60	31	8	23
Total	366	170	140	126	42

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Table A19

PROFILE OF E1-E4s WHO PARTICIPATE IN DISSIDENT ACTS
(Frequency for Table 23)

Factor	Number of E1-E4 Responses			
	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total
<u>Years of Active Army Service</u>				
0-3	1844	74	115	2033
4-6	87	5	10	102
7-9	6	0	0	6
Over 9	12	0	0	12
<u>Highest Education Level</u>				
Not a H.S. graduate	403	15	9	427
H.S. graduate	758	29	53	840
Some college	471	20	31	522
College graduate	341	15	32	388
<u>College Course</u>				
Humanities or social sciences	383	24	53	460
Technical or physical sciences	426	13	11	450
<u>Community Upbringing</u>				
Rural	860	23	30	913
Urban	510	16	20	546
Suburban	597	40	75	712
<u>Race</u>				
Black	261	5	10	276
White	1620	70	111	1801
Other	86	4	4	94
<u>Religion</u>				
Catholic	615	20	32	667
Protestant	958	35	33	1026
Jewish	0	0	0	0
Other	152	7	15	174
Non-practicing	242	17	45	304
<u>Prior-to-Army Protest Participation</u>				
Never	1535	34	34	1603
Once	171	11	10	192
More than once	249	34	81	364

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Table A19 (continued)

Factor	Number of E1-E4 Responses			
	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total
<u>Prior to Army Social Service Activities</u>				
Yes	129	10	23	162
No	1844	69	102	2015
<u>Civilian Criminal Convictions</u>				
Never	1726	62	101	1889
Once	157	11	18	186
More than once	81	4	5	90
<u>Use of Marijuana</u>				
Never	961	12	12	985
Once	181	10	1	192
More than once	821	55	112	988
<u>Use of Hard Drugs</u>				
Never	1615	43	51	1709
Once	96	11	7	114
More than once	262	25	67	354

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Table A20

**PROFILE OF E1-E4s WHO DISOBEY/REFUSE ORDERS
OR SHOW DISRESPECT TO A SUPERIOR
(Frequencies for Table 24)**

Factor	Number of E1-E4 Respondents			
	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total
<u>Years of Active Army Service</u>				
0-3	221	37	81	339
4-6	10	2	5	17
7-9	1	0	0	1
Over 9	2	0	0	2
<u>Highest Education Level</u>				
Not a H.S. graduate	45	11	15	71
H.S. graduate	86	17	38	141
Some college	62	5	20	87
College graduate	46	6	13	65
<u>College Course</u>				
Humanities or social sciences	51	6	20	77
Technical or physical sciences	57	5	13	75
<u>Community Upbringing</u>				
Rural	103	15	34	152
Urban	62	9	21	92
Suburban	73	15	31	119
<u>Race</u>				
Black	28	7	11	46
White	199	29	73	301
Other	11	3	2	16
<u>Religion</u>				
Catholic	80	12	21	113
Protestant	115	17	38	170
Jewish	0	0	0	0
Other	19	3	7	29
Non-practicing	24	7	20	51
<u>Prior-to-Army Protest Participation</u>				
Never	189	26	52	267
Once	18	5	9	32
More than once	30	8	24	62

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Table A20 (continued)

Factor	Number of E1-E4 Respondents			
	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total
<u>Prior-to-Army Social Service Activities</u>				
Yes	18	2	7	27
No	221	37	79	337
<u>Civilian Criminal Convictions</u>				
Never	219	31	67	317
Once	15	3	13	31
More than once	5	4	5	14
<u>Use of Marijuana</u>				
Never	134	12	18	164
Once	20	5	7	32
More than once	83	22	61	166
<u>Use of Hard Drugs</u>				
Never	207	33	46	286
Once	10	1	8	19
More than once	22	5	32	59

Table A21
 EFFECT OF ARMY SERVICE ON DISSIDENCE
 (Frequency of Responses for Table 25)

Factor	Number of E1-E4 Responses							
	For the Six Dissident Activities				For Disobeying/Refusing Orders or Showing Disrespect			
	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total
<u>Voluntariness of Induction</u>								
Volunteered	526	20	17	563	66	11	17	94
Forced enlistment	616	28	44	688	76	11	28	115
Drafted	731	29	62	822	84	13	40	137
<u>Is Present Army Assignment Suitable?</u>								
Yes	1029	27	36	1092	133	18	31	182
No	916	52	87	1055	102	21	54	177
<u>Ever Received Article 15?</u>								
Never	1543	50	73	1666	199	27	53	279
Once	248	11	18	277	28	6	12	46
More than once	176	18	34	228	11	6	21	38
<u>Ever Been Court Martialed?</u>								
Never	1857	68	102	2027	228	36	75	339
Once	78	10	14	102	8	2	10	17
More than once	32	1	9	42	3	0	4	7



Table A21 (continued)

Factor	Number of E1-E4 Responses							
	For the Six Dissident Activities				For Disobeying/Refusing Orders or Showing Disrespect			
	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total
<u>Any Major Money Problems Caused By Being in the Army?</u>								
Yes	743	43	73	859	86	17	40	143
No	1230	36	52	1318	153	22	46	221
<u>Any Major Marital Problems Caused By Being in the Army?</u>								
Yes	697	31	53	781	80	11	39	130
No	1264	48	72	1384	157	28	47	232
<u>Ever Volunteered for Duty In Vietnam?</u>								
Yes	475	26	22	523	51	12	25	88
No	1495	53	100	1648	187	27	61	275
<u>Ever Been Stationed In Vietnam?</u>								
Yes	484	22	40	546	53	11	27	91
No	1489	57	85	1631	186	28	59	273
<u>Ever Observed or Personally Encountered Racial Discrimination?</u>								
No	953	25	24	1002	128	13	26	167
Observed it	600	29	56	685	66	15	34	115
Personally encountered it	385	20	43	448	39	10	26	75

Table A22

REASONS GIVEN FOR DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES
(Frequency of Responses for Table 26)

Reason Given	Number of E1-E4 Respondents
Vietnam war or other Government policy	29
The way the Army treats the individual	19
Poor living conditions — food, quarters, work hours, etc.	2
Total	50

Table A23
PROFILE OF THE DRUG USERS
 (Frequency of Responses for Table 27)

Factor	Number of E1-E4 Respondents								Total
	Marijuana				Hard Drugs				
	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total	
<u>Highest Education Level</u>									
Not a H.S. graduate	35	9	27	71	51	7	13	71	
H.S. graduate	64	11	67	142	110	7	25	142	
Some college	35	5	46	86	69	4	14	87	
College graduate	31	7	26	64	57	1	7	65	
<u>Community Upbringing</u>									
Rural	82	12	58	152	134	5	14	153	
Urban	41	12	39	92	69	6	17	92	
Suburban	42	8	68	118	84	8	27	119	
<u>Race</u>									
Black	21	1	24	46	32	3	11	46	
White	135	28	137	300	241	15	46	302	
Other	9	3	4	16	14	1	1	16	
<u>Ever Served in Vietnam?</u>									
Yes	38	5	48	91	60	7	24	91	
No	127	27	118	272	227	12	35	274	

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Table A24

INITIAL CONTACT WITH DRUGS
(Frequency of Responses for Table 28)

	Number of E1-E4 Respondents	
	Used It Once	Used It More Than Once
First Use of Marijuana		
In the Army	19	48
In civilian life	13	118
Total	32	166
First Use of Hard Drugs		
In the Army	12	30
In civilian life	6	29
Total	18	59

Table A25

REASONS FOR NOT PARTICIPATING IN DISSIDENT ACTS
(Frequency of Responses for Table 29)

Reason	Number of E1-E4 Respondents
No opportunity	48
Afraid of punishment	29
Protest won't do any good — just want to get out	124
No reason to act — complaints can be handled through the system	36
Disloyal, unpatriotic	18
Total	255

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Table A26

**EFFECT OF VOLUNTARINESS OF INDUCTION ON DISSIDENCE
(Frequency of Responses for Table 30)**

	Committed Dissident Acts (Number of E1-E4 Responses)			
	Never	Once	More Than Once	Total
Voluntary E1-E4 enlistees	526	20	17	563
Draftees or involuntary enlistees	1347	57	106	1510

Table A27
 CHANGE IN ARMY COMPLEXION WITH THE MVA
 (Frequency of Responses for Table 31)

Factor	Number of Respondents									
	E1-E4		E5-E9		O1-O3 W1-W4		O4-O6			
	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees
<u>Total Sample</u>	366	98	170	103	140	72	126	100		
<u>Years of Active Army Service</u>										
0-3	341	86	55	12	98	44	5	0		
4-6	17	7	30	22	26	15	4	4		
7-9	1	0	6	5	4	4	13	12		
Over 9	2	2	68	56	10	8	98	79		
No response	5	3	1	8	2	1	6	5		
<u>Highest Education Level</u>										
Not a H.S. graduate	71	37	18	12	1	1	1	0		
H.S. graduate	142	43	91	67	7	2	1	1		
Some college	87	17	45	23	25	16	25	19		
College graduate	66	1	16	1	107	53	99	80		
No response	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
<u>Community Upbringing</u>										
Rural	153	43	74	49	31	15	53	45		
Urban	93	31	49	31	41	22	35	25		
Suburban	119	23	47	23	66	34	35	28		
No response	1	1	0	0	2	1	3	2		



Table A27 (continued)

Factor	Number of Respondents															
	E1-E4				E5-E9				01-03 W1-W4				04-06			
	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees				
<u>Race</u>																
Black	47	20	49	32	8	5	12	10	302	71	117	69	130	67	110	87
White	17	7	4	2	2	0	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
Other																
No response	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0								0
<u>Religion</u>																
Catholic	113	32	38	16	40	17	35	26	171	55	102	75	77	45	76	65
Protestant	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
Jewish	29	5	8	4	4	4	3	2	29	5	8	4	4	1	3	2
Other	52	5	18	6	17	9	7	5	52	5	18	6	17	9	7	5
Non-practicing	1	1	2	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	2	1
No response																
<u>Prior-to-Army Protest Participation</u>																
Never	267	85	146	95	102	58	119	95	32	7	5	1	8	1	6	5
Once	62	5	17	6	29	13	1	0	62	5	17	6	29	13	1	0
More than once	5	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	5	1	2	1	1	0	0	0
No response																

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Table A27 (continued)

Factor	Number of Respondents												
	E1-E4		E5-E9		01-03 W1-W4		04-06						
	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees			
<u>Ever Received an Article 15?</u>													
Never	279	60	116	68	131	69	110	86					
Once	46	21	38	24	4	1	14	14					
More than once	39	16	14	9	5	2	2	0					
No response	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	0					
<u>Ever Been Court Martialed?</u>													
Never	340	85	149	89	139	71	122	96					
Once	17	8	15	10	1	1	3	3					
More than once	7	4	4	2	0	0	0	0					
No response	2	1	2	2	0	0	1	1					
<u>Ever Been Found Guilty of a Civilian Criminal Charge?</u>													
Never	318	83	154	95	134	68	120	96					
Once	31	10	10	4	6	4	5	3					
More than once	14	4	3	1	0	0	1	1					
No response	3	1	3	3	0	0	0	0					





Table A27 (continued)

Factor	Number of Respondents								
	E1-E4		E5-E9		01-03 W1-W4		04-06		
	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	Total Surveyed	Vol Enlistees	
<u>Ever Used Marijuana?</u>									
Never	165	49	110	78	95	58	119	96	
Once	32	11	18	10	19	9	3	2	
More than once	166	38	41	14	25	5	4	2	
No response	3	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	

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Table A28

EFFECT OF DISSIDENCE ON DISCIPLINE, LAW, AND ORDER
(Frequency of Responses for Table 34)

Effect*	Number of Respondents			
	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
Dissidence reduces discipline, law, and order	49	58	52	72
Dissidence forces Army to make needed changes	38	6	6	0
Dissidence doesn't affect discipline, law, and order	87	24	54	39
No opinion	182	80	27	12

*The "Doesn't affect discipline, law, and order" and "No opinion" frequencies were obtained directly from question 62 of the survey; the "Reduces discipline, law, and order" and the "Forces Army to make needed changes" frequencies were obtained by proportioning the "Yes" answers from question 62 as the ratio of "1" and "2" responses received from question 63 (refer to coding of question 63 in Annex A2).

Table A29

E1-E4 DISSIDENT VISIBILITY
(Frequency of Responses for Table 35)

	Number of E1-E4 Respondents						
	Observed Demonstration On Post	Off Post	Read Underground Newspaper	Observed Distribution of Protest Materials	Knew of Nearby Protest Meetings	Knew of Nearby Anti-Military Coffee Houses	Observed Disobedience/ Refusal of Orders or Disrespect
Never	301	247	205	242	222	260	72
Once	41	43	58	55	90	37	57
More than once	22	74	100	66	50	65	235
No response	2	2	3	3	4	4	2
Total	366	366	366	366	366	366	366

Table A30

VISIBILITY OF MP RESPONSE TO DISSIDENCE
(Frequency of Responses for Table 36)

	Number of Respondents			
	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
<u>Ever Observed MPs Responding to Protest Activities?</u>				
Yes	48	40	27	40
No	313	128	112	86
No response	5	2	1	0
Total	366	170	140	126
<u>If Yes, was MP Response Appropriate?</u>				
Yes	18	20	21	37
No	22	10	6	1
No response	8	10	0	2
Total	48	40	27	40

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Table A31

RECOMMENDATION FOR REDUCING RACIAL TENSIONS
(Frequency of Responses for Table 37)

	Number of Respondents				
	E1-E4	E5-E9	O1-03 W1-W4	O4-06	All Grades
Nothing can be done until society changes	63	22	14	19	118
More racial seminars and discussions	23	17	23	25	88
Treat every soldier without regard to race	39	32	33	32	136
Weed out those who* show prejudice	9	3	8	2	22
Eliminate Blacks from the Army	15	9	0	0	24
Stop talking about racial tensions	5	7	8	10	30
Leave Vietnam	2	1	0	0	3
Punish troublemakers	9	3	4	2	18
Other	19	6	8	11	44
No response	182	70	42	25	319
Total	366	170	140	126	802

*"Weed out" and "Punish troublemakers" responses were combined for calculating the percentages presented in Table 37.



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Table A32

RECOMMENDATIONS ON MARIJUANA USAGE
(Frequency of Responses for Table 38)

	Number of Respondents			
	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
Allow marijuana use when off duty	123	31	31	7
Allow marijuana use on duty if it doesn't interfere	53	13	4	5
Present regulations should stay in effect	110	90	83	104
No opinion	74	33	19	8
No response	6	3	3	2
Total	366	170	140	126

Table A33

E5-E9 RECOMMENDATIONS ON MARIJUANA USAGE
BY YEARS OF ACTIVE ARMY SERVICE
(Frequency of Responses for Table 39)

	Number of Respondents			
	0-3	4-6	7-9	Over 9
Allow marijuana use when off duty	18	8	1	4
Allow marijuana use on duty if it doesn't interfere	8	3	0	2
Present regulation should stay in effect	18	13	3	49
No opinion	11	5	2	12
Total	55	29	6	67

Did not designate years of service — 11; No response — 2

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Table A34

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARIJUANA RECOMMENDATIONS
AND MARIJUANA USE**

(Frequency of Responses for Table 40)

	Number of E1-E4 Respondents		
	Never Used Marijuana	Used Marijuana Once	Used Marijuana More Than Once
Allow marijuana use when off duty	21	8	94
Allow marijuana use on duty if it doesn't interfere	15	3	35
Present regulation should stay in effect	78	15	16
No opinion	49	6	19
Total	163	32	164



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Table A35

TOLERANCE TOWARD DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES
(Frequency of Responses for Table 41)

	Number of Respondents			
	E1-E4	E5-E9	01-03 W1-W4	04-06
<u>Attendance at Protest Meetings</u>				
Prohibit	51	61	18	26
Take no action	303	107	121	97
No response	12	2	1	3
<u>Attendance at Coffee Houses</u>				
Prohibit	70	63	19	30
Take no action	284	106	121	93
No response	12	1	0	3
<u>Off-Post Demonstration When Not In Uniform</u>				
Prohibit	71	64	27	40
Take no action	284	102	111	82
No response	11	4	2	4
<u>Contributing to Underground Newspapers</u>				
Prohibit	103	79	30	42
Take no action	250	88	109	81
No response	13	3	1	3
<u>Distribution of Protest Materials On Post</u>				
Prohibit	124	108	77	86
Allow	232	58	61	39
No response	10	4	2	1
<u>On-Post Demonstrations</u>				
Prohibit	114	105	93	107
Allow	240	63	44	18
No response	12	2	3	1
<u>Off-Post Demonstrations When In Uniform</u>				
Prohibit	201	140	119	115
Take no action	149	27	18	10
No response	16	3	3	1

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Table A36

**ARMY POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES MOST OFTEN CITED
BY E1-E4 AS CAUSES OF DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES
(Frequency of Responses for Table 42)**

	Number of Times Cited
Harassment of the troops and lack of personal freedom and dignity	151
Unnecessary make-work duties and practices	53
Personal appearance standards — hair regulations	41
Lack of communication between troops and superiors	37
Draft	31
Low pay	25
Inequities of the UCMJ	20
Inefficiency and mismanagement	18
Incompetent and inadequate leadership	16
Lack of discipline	15
On-post living conditions	11
Rank discrimination	10
Evaluation and promotion procedure	9
Working hours and conditions	8
Food	7
Family separation	7
MOS assignment	5
Discrimination	4
Mandatory training and P.T.	3
Military clothing	2

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TEST OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE (CHI-SQUARE)¹³

It was hypothesized that the percentage of the total number of responses of interest (e.g., the E1-E4s who said they had participated in some dissident act once or more) within each group of interest (e.g., at each post) would be proportional to the percentage of the total number of responding soldiers within each group (the null hypothesis).

For example, column 1 in Table A37 shows the number of E1-E4s in the sample at each post and the percentage of the number in the total sample of E1-E4s that this represents. Column 2 shows the expected number of dissidents at each post based on the hypothesis that the percentage of the total dissident E1-E4s at each post is equal to the percentage of the total number of E1-E4s in the sample at each post. Column 3 shows the actual number of surveyed E1-E4s at each post who had participated in some dissident act once or more. Are the deviations between the expected number of dissidents at each post and the number actually found (column 4) statistically significant, i.e., are the deviations between the expected and actual values due to something other than random sampling variations (rejection of null hypothesis)?

If the null hypothesis is rejected, this means that there is a relationship between post and dissidence. To determine if there is a significant enough deviation between the expected and actual values to reject the null hypothesis the statistic Chi-Square was calculated.

The Chi-Square test consists of squaring each deviation (column 5), dividing it by the expected number (to account for sample size since it is the relative size of the deviation that is important (column 6) and then summing these values, the sum being termed Chi-Square. A table of the theoretical distribution of Chi-Square is used to determine whether the value of Chi-Square obtained in the test is outside the range of chance probability. That probability is a function of the Chi-Square value itself and the opportunity for variation as determined by the number of degrees of freedom. For purposes of this study, groups are being compared on only a single dimension at a time, so the number of degrees of freedom is equal to the number of groups minus one. For the example, five posts minus one results in four degrees of freedom. The probability that a Chi-Square greater than 9.64 would occur with four degrees of freedom is found to be less than .05.

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This means that there is only a .05 probability of error in judging that the deviations between the expected and actual values are large enough to reject the null hypothesis and that there is a relationship between post and dissidence.

Table A38 indicates the Chi-Square values, degrees of freedom, and probability of there being a greater Chi-Square value (called the level of significance) for each of the relationships tested. If the level of significance was less than .10, the relationship was not considered statistically significant.

Table A37

CHI-SQUARE SAMPLE CALCULATION

Post	Column 1		Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6
	Number of E1-E4s in Post Sample	Percent of Total Sample of E1-E4s	Expected No. of Dissident E1-E4s	Actual No. of Dissident E1-E4s	Deviation (Actual Minus Expected)	Deviation Squared	Relative Squared Deviation (Col 5/Col 2)
1	84	(23%)	21	31	10	100	4.75
2	54	(15%)	13	14	1	1	0.08
3	86	(23%)	21	11	-10	100	4.75
4	68	(19%)	17	17	0	0	0.00
5	74	(20%)	18	17	-1	1	0.06
Total	366	(100%)	90	90			9.64

Chi-Square Value = 9.64

Degrees of Freedom = 4

Probability of occurrence of Chi-Square Value greater than 9.64, by chance = .05

Note: In calculation of Chi-Square, it sometimes is asserted that when expected frequencies in a category are smaller than 25, allowance should be made for the relatively greater effect of departure from the expected. No correction for small cell frequencies has been made in this study; a reader should interpret the significance test of such small cell values more cautiously.

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Table A38

CHI-SQUARE SUMMARY

Table # Referred to in Body of This Report	Item Tested	Chi-Square Value	Degrees of Freedom	Level of Statistical Significance (N.S. Indicates Not Significant at .10 Level)
7	Total number of E5-E9 dissident participants— by years of active Army service	21.3	3	.005
10	Number of E5-E9 disobey- ing/refusing orders or showing disrespect more than once—by years of active Army service	11.3	3	.025
13	Total number of E1-E4 dissident participants— by post	9.64	4	.05
14	Number of E1-E4s disobey- ing/refusing orders or showing disrespect more than once—by post	6.77	4	N.S.
18	Number of E1-E4s who have observed or personally encountered racial dis- crimination—by post	6.75	4	N.S.
20	Number of E5-E9s using marijuana more than once— by years of Army service	30.3	3	.005
21	Number of E1-E4s using marijuana more than once— by post	6.44	4	N.S.
	—using hard drugs more than once—by post	4.91	4	N.S.

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Table A38 (continued)

Table # Referred to in Body of This Report	Item Tested	Chi-Square Value	Degrees of Freedom	Level of Statistical Significance (N.S. Indicates Not Significant at .10 Level)
23	Profile of dissident E1-E4s by:			
	Highest education	15.3	3	.005
	Community upbringing	44.1	2	.005
	Religion	53.3	1	.005
	Prior-to-Army protest participation	208.5	2	.005
	Social service activities	23.3	1	.005
	Marijuana use	97.4	1	.005
	Hard drugs use	131.0	1	.005
24	Profile of E1-E4s who disobey/refuse orders or show disrespect by:			
	Religion	6.15	1	.025
	Prior-to-Army protest participation	7.89	2	.025
	Marijuana use	22.7	1	.005
	Hard drugs use	27.5	1	.005
	Civilian criminal conviction	5.12	1	.025
25	Effect of Army service on dissidence:			
	Voluntariness of induc- tion	11.4	2	.005
	Army assignment	23.6	1	.005
	Money problems	19.3	1	.005
	Marital problems	2.33	1	N.S.
	Vietnam duty	3.47	1	.10
	Racial discrimination	17.7	1	.005
25	Effect of Army service on those who disobey/refuse orders or show disrespect:			
	Voluntariness of induc- tion	2.63	2	N.S.
	Army assignment	6.77	1	.01
	Money problems	1.75	1	N.S.
	Marital problems	3.22	1	.10
	Vietnam duty	2.27	1	N.S.
	Racial discrimination	9.03	1	.005

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Table A38 (continued)

Table # Referred to in Body of This Report	Item Tested	Chi-Square Value	Degrees of Freedom	Level of Statistical Significance (N.S. Indicates Not Significant at .10 Level)
27	Profile of E1-E4 marijuana users:			
	Highest education	2.75	3	N.S.
	Community upbringing	5.59	2	.10
	Race	0.49	1	N.S.
	Vietnam duty	1.15	1	N.S.
27	Profile of E1-E4 hard drug users:			
	Highest education	1.99	3	N.S.
	Community upbringing	7.80	2	.025
	Race	1.30	1	N.S.
	Vietnam duty	7.23	1	.01
30	Effect of voluntariness of induction on dissidence	10.6	1	.005
31	Change in E1-E4 complexion with the MVA:			
	Highest education	35.22	3	.005
	Community upbringing	4.66	2	.10
	Race	7.10	1	.01
	Religion	6.78	1	.01
	Prior-to-Army protest participation	9.10	1	.005
	Marijuana use	2.01	1	N.S.
31	Change in E5-E9 complexion with the MVA:			
	Highest education	11.83	3	.01
	Community upbringing	2.14	2	N.S.
	Race	0.19	1	N.S.
	Religion	2.55	1	N.S.
	Prior-to-Army protest participation	1.77	1	N.S.
	Marijuana use	5.29	1	.025
39	E5-E9 recommendations on marijuana usage—by years of Army service:			
	Any change in policy	18.62	3	.005

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Table A38 (continued)

Table # Referred to in Body of This Report	Item Tested	Chi-Square Value	Degrees of Freedom	Level of Statistical Significance (N.S. Indicates Not Significant at .10 Level)
40	Relationship between marijuana recommendations and marijuana use	55.8	2	.005

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Annex A1

Post _____

ARMY PERSONNEL SURVEY — March, 1971

This survey is a part of a study of significant importance to the Army and to the country as a whole. Your answers are anonymous—there is no way to determine who filled out the questionnaire. Honest, seriously considered answers will substantially contribute to the value of the study's findings.

Please read each question carefully, take as much time as needed, and use the back of the page if more room is needed.

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Please answer the following questions (questions 1-30) as fully as you can. These questions pertain to your experience while in the Army. Do not consider experiences you have had before entering the service.

(Please circle appropriate answer.)

- 1. Have you seen an on-post protest demonstration involving 10 or more soldiers? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 2. Have you seen an off-post protest demonstration involving 10 or more soldiers? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 3. Have you read an "underground" G.I. newspaper? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 4. Have you seen an "underground" G.I. newspaper, protest leaflet, or petition distributed by soldiers on post? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 5. Have you seen a soldier purposefully disobeying or refusing orders, or showing disrespect to a superior? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 6. Have you been stationed at a base where there has been a nearby coffee house with an anti-military reputation? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 7. Have you known about nearby meetings of any protest group involving soldiers? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once

Please list below any other type of protest activity that you have seen soldiers participate in and circle how often you have seen each one.

- 8. _____ 1. Once 2. More than once
- 9. _____ 1. Once 2. More than once
- 10. _____ 1. Once 2. More than once



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(Please circle appropriate answer.)

- 11. Have you been asked to participate in an on-post protest demonstration?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 12. Have you been asked to participate in an off-post protest demonstration?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 13. Have you been asked to contribute to an "underground" G.I. newspaper?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 14. Have you been asked to distribute an "underground" G.I. newspaper, protest leaflet, or petition on post?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 15. Have you been asked to attend nearby meetings of any protest group?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 16. Have you been asked to attend a nearby coffee house with an anti-military reputation?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once

Please list below any other type of protest activity that you have been asked to participate in or contribute to and circle how often you have been asked for each one.

- 17. _____ 1. Once 2. More than once
- 18. _____ 1. Once 2. More than once
- 19. _____ 1. Once 2. More than once

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(Please circle appropriate answer.)

- 20. Have you personally participated in an on-post protest demonstration involving 10 or more soldiers? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 21. Have you personally participated in an off-post protest demonstration involving 10 or more soldiers? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 22. Have you contributed to an "underground" G.I. newspaper (for example submitted articles, worked on the editorial staff, etc.)? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 23. Have you distributed an "underground" G.I. newspaper, protest leaflet, or petition on post? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 24. Have you ever purposefully disobeyed or refused orders or shown disrespect to a superior? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 25. Have you attended any protest group meetings? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
- 26. Have you attended any coffee houses with anti-military reputations? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once

Please list below any other type of protest activity that you have personally participated in and circle how often you participated in each one.

- 27. _____ 1. Once 2. More than once
- 28. _____ 1. Once 2. More than once
- 29. _____ 1. Once 2. More than once

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30. If you answered that you have participated in any protest activity, please describe what you were protesting about and what the Army should do to correct the situation.

If you answered that you have never participated in any protest activity, please tell us why not.

Handwritten response area consisting of 25 horizontal lines.

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Please circle the answer that most closely describes what you think the Army should do about the following protest activities:

31. On-post protest demonstration by soldiers.
1. Prohibit it and discipline soldiers who participate
 2. Allow it as long as it does not substantially disrupt post operations.
32. Off-post protest demonstration by soldiers off duty and not in uniform.
1. Prohibit it and discipline soldiers who participate.
 2. Take no action.
33. Off-post protest demonstration by soldiers off duty and in uniform.
1. Prohibit it and discipline soldiers who participate.
 2. Take no action.
34. Contributing to off-post "underground" G.I. newspapers by soldiers who are off duty.
1. Prohibit it and discipline soldiers who contribute.
 2. Take no action.
35. Distributing "underground" G.I. newspapers, protest leaflets, or petitions by off-duty soldiers on post.
1. Prohibit it and discipline soldiers who distribute.
 2. Allow it as long as it does not disrupt post operations.

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(Please circle appropriate answer.)

36. Off-duty soldiers attending off-post protest group meetings.

1. Prohibit it and discipline soldiers who attend.

2. Take no action.

37. Off-duty soldiers visiting off-post coffee houses with anti-military reputations.

1. Prohibit it and discipline soldiers who go.

2. Take no action.

38. What are the reasons for your answers to questions 31 through 37?



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Some of the remaining questions pertain to your experience before entering the Army and some to your experience while in the Army. Please answer them as fully and carefully as possible.

(Please circle appropriate answer.)

39. Have you, prior to induction into the Army, ever participated in a protest demonstration, contributed to a protest type newspaper, distributed protest literature, attended a protest meeting, or organized or participated in any other type of protest activity? 1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once

40. If you have engaged in some protest activity prior to induction, please describe the types of activities and why you engaged in them.

41. Have you ever served in an organization like the Peace Corps, VISTA, or similar social service activities? 1. Yes 2. No

42. If yes: organization name _____

43. Do you consider that your present duty assignment fits your skills and abilities reasonably well to the Army's needs? 1. Yes 2. No

44. If no, please explain.



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(Please circle appropriate answer.)

45. Have you ever received non-judicial punishment (Article 15)?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
46. Have you ever been court-martialed?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
47. Have you ever been found guilty of a civilian criminal charge other than a traffic offense?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
48. Have you had any major money problems such as large debts, great difficulty in providing for your family, etc, that have been caused or substantially increased by your being in the Army?
1. Yes 2. No
49. Have you had any major marital or other family problems that have been caused or substantially increased by your being in the Army?
1. Yes 2. No
50. Have you ever volunteered for duty in Vietnam?
1. Yes 2. No
51. Have you ever been stationed in Vietnam?
1. Yes 2. No

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(Please circle appropriate answer.)

52. Have you observed or personally encountered racial discrimination while in the Army?

- 1. No
- 2. Yes, but I only observed it
- 3. Yes, I personally encountered it

53. If you have observed or personally encountered racial discrimination, describe the circumstances (what, when, and where).

54. Please write down any suggestions you have on how the Army can reduce racial tensions.



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(Please circle appropriate answer.)

55. How many times in your life have you used marijuana?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
56. Was your first use of marijuana in the Army or civilian life?
1. In the Army 2. In Civilian Life
3. Never used it
57. What policy do you think the Army should have with respect to marijuana. (Mark the one that comes closest to what you would recommend.)
1. Present regulations should stay in effect.
2. Men should be allowed to use marijuana freely when off duty, but never while on duty.
3. Men should be allowed to smoke marijuana almost any time they want, but should be punished if they are judged to be unfit for duty.
4. No opinion
58. How many times in your life have you used "hard drugs," e.g., heroin, LSD, etc?
1. Never 2. Once 3. More than once
59. Was your first use of "hard drugs" in the Army or civilian life?
1. In the Army 2. In Civilian Life
3. Never used any

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(Please circle appropriate answer.)

60. Have you ever observed the military police responding to protest activities?

1. Yes 2. No

61. If yes, please describe what the military police did and what you think about their action?

62. Do you feel that the current level of protest activity in the Army significantly affects the enforcement of discipline, law, and order in the Army?

1. Yes 2. No 3. No Opinion

63. Why yes, or why no?



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64. Please list below any Army policies, practices, or procedures that you feel contribute to increased protest activities by soldiers and why they so contribute.

65. Please describe anything you feel the Army should do to reduce the amount of protest activity in the Army.

66. Please note below any comments you would like to make about this questionnaire.

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Annex A2

CODIFICATION OF FREE RESPONSE QUESTIONS

The codification of the free response questions is given below. Each free response answer was read and the most appropriate code assigned to it. One analyst did all of the coding to ensure consistency.

Question 30

- 0 - No response.
- 1 - Yes. Because of the Vietnam War or other disagreement with government policies.
- 2 - Yes. Because of the way individual is treated in the Army.
- 3 - Yes. Because of poor conditions in the Army (food, quarters, work hours, etc).
- 4 - No. No opportunity.
- 5 - No. Don't believe in protest, just want to get out with no trouble, don't think it would do any good, etc.
- 6 - No. Afraid of punishment.
- 7 - No. Consider it wrong for soldier to protest (loyalty, patriotism, etc).
- 8 - No. Never had reason to protest, complaints can be handled through the system.
- 9 - Other.

Question 38

- 0 - No response.
- 1 - Soldier should be entitled to basic freedoms; what he does on his own time is none of Army's business if he doesn't break laws.
- 2 - No action if off post and not in uniform. Punish if on post or in uniform.
- 3 - Prohibit under all circumstances since these actions undercut discipline.
- 4 - Reasons relate to loyalty, patriotism or pride in service.
- 5 - No action because suppression only aggravates protest.
- 6 - Reasons relate to resentment over absolute authority of Army over the individual.

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Question 40

- 0 - No response.
- 1 - Political activities.
- 2 - Nonpolitical activities.

Question 44

- 0 - No response.
- 1 - Example given.

Question 53

- 0 - No response.
- 1 - White vs Black.
- 2 - Black vs White.
- 3 - Both Black vs White and White vs Black.
- 4 - Incidents not identified by race.

Question 54

- 0 - No response
- 1 - Nothing can be done until society improves.
- 2 - More racial seminars, education, discussions, etc, to promote mutual understanding.
- 3 - Treat every soldier like a man regardless of race.
- 4 - Weed out enlisted men and officers who display prejudice.
- 5 - Eliminate blacks from Army.
- 6 - Quit talking about racial tension.
- 7 - Leave Vietnam.
- 8 - Punish troublemakers.
- 9 - Other.

Question 61

- 0 - No response.
- 1 - Action proper and achieved desired results.
- 2 - Action inappropriate in some way.

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Question 63

- 0 - No response
- 1 - Yes. Bad influence because it reduces discipline.
- 2 - Yes. Good influence because Army needs to change with times.
- 3 - Yes. Because Army is reacting to it.
- 4 - No. Not enough dissent to worry about.
- 5 - No. But Army being made aware of problems.

Question 64

- 0 - No response.
- X - Number of examples given.

Question 65

- 0 - No response.
- X - Number of examples given.

Question 66

- 0 - No response.
- 1 - Pro.
- 2 - Con.
- 3 - Suggestions for modification.

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Appendix B

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

BACKGROUND

A total of 126 persons representing four categories of military personnel were interviewed: enlisted personnel who might be potential dissidents, noncommissioned officers (generally squad leaders), junior officers in field units, and officers and enlisted men assigned to military police units. The surveys were conducted in small groups (three to six persons) of like personnel by members of the study team at each of five installations during the months of March and April 1971. Interviews were conducted with no members of the home installation present, other than the persons being interviewed. The interviewees were assured that their responses would not be attached to them personally and that their names would not appear on the interview material, which helped assure candor in response. The interview was partially structured, asking questions of these seven general topics: (a) the extent and nature of dissident activity that the interviewees had observed or taken part in; (b) an estimate of the cause of current dissident activity; (c) racially motivated dissent on the post; (d) drug usage on the post; (e) changes in level of dissidence over the recent past; (f) the impact of dissidence on morale and discipline; and finally, (g) recommendations on how dissidence might be reduced.

Interview results are discussed from the standpoint of responses of each of the four groups, and then are contrasted to show variations in result and opinion as a function of grade difference and assignment.

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POTENTIAL DISSIDENTS

A total of 64 "potential dissidents" were interviewed. Some were indeed dissident, and some were soldiers who were simply discontented. At one post, a number were from the Personnel Control Facility, generally men being returned from AWOL to their parent units; these could be classed as having committed a dissident act. Others among the 64 were outspoken individuals who had been singled out by their company commanders or first sergeants, by the nature of their comments, as being potentially dissident. In other words, there was a wide range of dissidence among the personnel in this group; their comments range from dissatisfaction to corrective criticism to plain disenchantment and raillery against the military system.

Extent and Nature of Dissidence

Dissident activities said to be motivated by feelings of poor treatment and lack of identification with the military were common. Disrespect to a superior and refusing or responding slowly to orders given, failure to report for formations, improper appearance or uniform were mentioned frequently. The response of the military organization to these was company punishment or an Article 15. It was said that the company commander had promised to give an Article 15 to any soldier attending a coffee house.

There is some suggestion that this kind of dissent is expressed in terms of drug usage. It was mentioned frequently that soldiers use drugs in the service because they're bored or unhappy with their service situation. The extent of drug usage is discussed in another section.

Some interviewees reported accounts of self-inflicted injuries in Vietnam which can be termed a dissenting activity; this was said to be more common among married men in Vietnam — men who used such wounds as a way to return to the U.S.

Dissenting activity motivated by real or felt racial discrimination was also noted, but this too will be discussed in another section.

Many dissenting activities are concerned with opposition to the military system. There appeared to be few instances of distribution of dissident literature critical of the system, and of attendance at anti-military coffee houses. Going AWOL was said to be a personal response to dissatisfaction with the military system — a system which imposes many more restrictions upon the individual than he is accustomed to in

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civilian life, and a system which is intolerant of and not understanding of his personal problems. It was felt that the system reacted to the personal problems of an individual by attempting to thwart him and impose the system's rules upon him rather than in attempting to understand his problem. The consequence was that he reacted against the system by showing disrespect, by going AWOL.

It was said that rank and time in service have great influence on the severity of any punishment imposed. The complaint was made with respect to the enlisted ranks, but there would appear to be evidence in contrasting enlisted and officer ranks that similar punishments are not indeed awarded in an evenhanded style for the same offense.

There were frequent complaints about dissent motivated by inadequate living conditions for lower ranking enlisted men — lack of heat, noise, lack of privacy, not enough bunks to go around in the Personnel Control Facility. Such dissatisfactions are generally heard, regardless of the morale of a unit, and perhaps should not be given weight.

Activities that are politically motivated center around opposition to the Vietnam War; they include participation in rallies and demonstrations and attendance at coffee houses. While the Vietnam War was often cited as the cause for dissent, the extent of participation of soldiers in activities opposing the war is judged to be relatively slight. The very active dissidents (as, for example, officers of the coffee house at one installation, who organized and ran the coffee house and published the local underground newspaper) held that such dissident participation was very high; other potential dissidents who were not so involved reported, however, that participation was low. It is suspected that the latter is true. Some potential dissidents said that the individuals who attended the coffee houses were the "heads" and the "kooky" types, and they had little respect for them. Those who attended the coffee house on post were said to have "sold out" to the institution.

Causes of Dissident Activities

Dissident activities occur because the individuals who participate in them feel their needs are better satisfied through participating in the dissident activity than by not having done so. This, of course, makes the assumption that the dissident activity is freely engaged in and at the

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will of the individual. There may be rare instances when individuals are caught up in a fever of enthusiasm during a mass meeting and participate in an activity that they might not otherwise engage in, but this is not the case in the activities being described. The causes for dissident activities might be summarized in these ways:

Leadership is not respected. NCOs and sometimes officers, may not be respected as individuals, and their positions not recognized; if an order given is not on the surface a proper one, or one not considered reasonable or reasoned, the individual may choose to ignore it, to question it, to dawdle in performance of it, or to retreat from it. If the order or instruction seems to be unfair, he may do the same thing. NCOs are considered to lack in human relations skills, and to be operating on the basis of their status in the rank hierarchy; those who are in opposition to the system do not consider rank sufficient reason to cooperate, try to obstruct the system and refuse to obey the order. Many of the instances of dissent mentioned are related to the attitude of the soldier toward his immediate superiors, especially his NCOs. NCOs are regarded as not being as bright as the dissidents, it was said that in their leadership, they try deliberately to demean the soldier to show that he is a subordinate.

Those persons who express dissidence usually express opposition to the Vietnam War and feel that they are in the service against their will. They question US foreign policy, the kind of missions that the Army is given, and the integrity of the senior officers who pursue such missions. The concept of obedience in the military organization is foreign to the young men who feel that they have been brought into the organization unfairly. They do not recognize authority; they feel they have a right to disobey.

More personal freedom is expected in the military system. There is a refusal on the part of dissidents to appreciate or understand the rationale for regularity, order, and uniformity as a part of military organization, and a consequent increase in questioning of custom and tradition. It may be that there is not sufficient orientation given to the individuals when they come into the institution as to the customs, traditions, and characteristics of military life. On the other hand, there may be some

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aspects of military customs and traditions that are not necessary to an orderly system; for example, inspections in which an individual is expected to have his gear laid out in a precise uniform manner, the customs of the service respecting saluting and the manner of address to officers, requirements with respect to the personal appearance of individuals, restrictions on an individual's time when he is free from duty. There is increasing concern for individual freedoms in civilian life, and it is extending into military life.

The dissidents feel that the civilian population has a poor impression of the Army as do they. Yet they are resentful that civilians may sometimes take advantage of men in uniform and may not have high regard for servicemen. They suggest that the lack of regard for men in uniform by civilians may be coming about through increasing civilian dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Vietnam, with publicity accorded Army activities in Vietnam, with a poor conception of the Regular Army NCO, and with the recognition that lower ranking enlisted men are at a financial disadvantage in the military system and are somewhat at the mercy of the civilian community if the military base is not able to satisfy the day to day living needs of servicemen.

Complaints were voiced that men become disillusioned with Army life because of their feeling that promises made to them by recruiting personnel are not being kept once they get into the service. They feel that they were given an erroneous impression of military life. There also is a questioning of leadership in the Army with respect to promises made; for example, respecting the Modern Volunteer Army, promises have been made about changes on post that the soldiers had not yet seen. This may come about because publicity is accorded innovations before they are implemented and the lag time between reporting and implementation is so long that soldiers regard this as a promise not kept.

They resent lack of free time. Traditions of the service seem to demand that a soldier's time be occupied as much as possible, perhaps so that he will not have free time to go off post and get in trouble or perhaps because the business of the post with respect to the details of feeding, cleaning, guard duty tends to get exaggerated. There sometimes was questioning of whether or not guard duty was superficial, and was it

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really needed in many instances; one is demeaned by being required to take part in such a nonproductive activity. There also were complaints about the lack of regularity in duty hours, essentially taking time away from the personal life of the individual, and not allowing him to plan his personal life as he would like to.

They feel their living conditions are inadequate. There appears to be a great disparity in living conditions, and this kind of inequality is sometimes viewed as discrimination and favoritism. There were comments that attempts to individualize living conditions are met with frustration. An example was cited in which a granted freedom to put up curtains and make the quarters more attractive was frustrated by an interpretation that this was a fire hazard — resulting in the curtains coming down.

Vietnam returnees feel generally that their time is not put to good use. They feel they should either be given an early discharge or that their experience in Vietnam should be utilized in training new people.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice is regarded as something intended mostly to maintain the Army institution. This is probably a fair perception of a portion of the code, in that it does intend to do that. Another portion metes out punishment for behavior that would be unlawful regardless of whether it was in the military or civilian environment. The new soldier all too often does not recognize that there are disciplinary articles in the Uniform Code, nor does he recognize that the Uniform Code does indeed intend to force conformity in the military system.

Military trial procedure was said to be prejudiced toward the military system simply by the composition of the court. Trial by peers was suggested.

The military justice system is called unfair and is accused of inequality in the way in which punishments are administered. The use of Article 15 may lead to double punishment for the same offense; for example, the matter of prior jeopardy with respect to traffic offenses off post for which an individual had paid a fine to a civilian court and then could be reduced in grade or given extra duty for the offense when he came back to duty. (In talking with MP officers on post, there is some doubt as to how frequently such a thing occurs; it might be suspected that this is a kind of instance related by soldiers as having happened to "someone else," and the incidence of such events actually may be relatively low.)

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Evaluation and promotion procedures are felt to be unfair and discriminatory in that there is too much time in grade required for promotion of very able persons, and merit is not rewarded.

Many dissidents feel that they are improperly assigned, that the Army has not taken proper notice of their desires and skills in their assignment. Negro soldiers feel that the Army Classification Battery in itself is discriminatory, in that Negro soldiers on the average tend to get lower marks on the General Technical score especially. In other words, they feel the Army Classification Battery to be racially biased, perhaps not intentionally so, but still a fact.

Married soldiers should not have the same responsibilities in combat units as those not married. It was contended by a couple of interviewees that married soldiers refused orders in combat more than the unmarried ones because they had more responsibilities back home, and thus more to lose.

There is said to be a lack of legitimate means for protest and airing of problems in the Army. Soldiers do not wish to go to the IG because they fear recrimination within their company. Company personnel are often unsympathetic with complaints.

Inadequate pay for lower ranks is said to force men to go AWOL or to work extra hours off duty to supplement income. The Army is regarded as "not caring about you — so why should you care for it."

Extent and Nature of Racial Discrimination

It is reported that the proportion of whites and blacks in an outfit determines the kind of discrimination that one might expect. The number in the majority is the race that gets the breaks.

In general, whites do not see blacks as threatening to them unless the blacks gang up. Whites generally see no racial problem; blacks see the problem as quite severe. Puerto Ricans feel that they are discriminated against in the same ways the blacks do. Some whites suggested that the blacks are pushing too hard for their identity, and that activists come on post to stir up trouble.

It is said that there are more racial problems in rear areas in Vietnam than in most other places. It was also said that there was more racial dissent on training posts.

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One black reported, "We don't have any racial problems in my company. The company commander and NCOs are always joking about racial differences. So we joke about it all the time, and we don't seem to have any hangups." There may be a lesson here.

Extent of Drug Use and Its Causes

Estimates of drug usage ranged from 100 percent, on down to none — with drugs being defined as marijuana. It was not uncommon to hear it said that the use of alcohol was as much a problem as was marijuana. Marijuana is cheaper than alcohol in Vietnam.

Drug abuse was called a social sedative. Many take drugs to get away from the unhappiness and boredom of Army life, to socialize without worrying about a hangover the next day. There was said to be a higher proportion of Negro than white users.

It was said that a good company commander will tend to relieve tensions and consequently decrease drug usage; drug usage was said to be less in the companies that had good leadership.

A user is sometimes reluctant to go to the drug center, since he is then labeled by his unit as a user; his anonymity is not protected (but should it be?).

Many people learn to use drugs in the Army. The use of drugs in combat units may be critical. A story was told that a unit was led into an ambush when the point was high on marijuana; six men were lost.

The use of hard drugs in CONUS was said to be related to increased larceny in the barracks.

Changes in Level of Dissidence Over the Past Two Years

The sense of the interviews indicated a continuing relaxation of regulation and authority in the Army; discipline is becoming progressively more lax. This may be true in fact, or it may be that it appears to be the case because of increasing disrespect to superiors and challenging or disregarding legitimate orders. In addition, there appear to be more permissive regulations regarding the appearance of individuals. If pressing for individual freedom can be termed dissidence, the level of dissidence may be increasing; if it is simply termed freedom, the level may not be changing.

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From the comments received, it would appear that the extent of political complaint and protest is on the wane, as are the strident calls in the underground press.

The extent of drug usage, at least respecting marijuana and alcohol, would appear to be on the increase. Whether or not there is a consequent increase in hard-drug usage is not known.

Racial dissent appears to be increasing.

Impact of Dissidence on Morale and Discipline

Morale appears to be low among the potential dissidents, and discipline appears to be declining as well.

Recommendations on How the Army Can Reduce Dissidence

It should be recognized that measures to reduce dissidence may have a consequent effect in relaxing military discipline and perhaps in reducing the effectiveness of the Army in performing its missions. Any recommendations for reduction of dissidence should take this into account; the recommendations listed below are summarized from those suggested by the dissident group.

(a) Give the individual soldier greater identity, treat him like a man, and expect a man's performance from him.

(b) Permit greater freedom of speech, but demand responsibility and a high level of performance.

(c) Provide sufficient avenues for soldiers to air their "beefs" without fear of recrimination.

(d) Give special attention to Vietnam returnees, either by early discharge or use in special training — but in some way single them out so that they are distinctive.

(e) Allow for expression of individuality in the Army.

(f) Make a consistent effort to improve the living conditions of enlisted men.

(g) Make punishment fair, appropriate to the offense, and devise means so that the punishment authority is regarded as legitimate.

(h) Give an individual greater freedom of choice in his first term of enlistment by giving him more enlistment options.

(i) Have more civilians on post to deal with personal problems of soldiers; give personnel at company level special training in handling soldiers' problems.

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- (j) Establish greater regularity in a soldier's hours so that he can plan for his off-duty time.
- (k) Develop greater realism in training and allow the soldier to proceed at the soldier's own speed, with perhaps some relief of length of term of service if he is faster than the average.
 - (l) Reduce inspections to only those necessary.
 - (m) Any activity should have a rationale appropriate to it.
 - (n) Reduce details, such as unnecessary guard duty or other exercises and formations that might not be necessary.
 - (o) Provide adequate pay so that lower ranking enlisted men with families may subsist adequately.
 - (p) Insist upon fairness in all aspects of Army life, including promotions, assignments, and details.
 - (q) Improve leadership training so that leaders have the requisite personal relations skills to effectively recognize and deal with problems in their organizations, without exacerbating them.
 - (r) Make the IG more accessible to the enlisted soldier, as for example, having an enlisted IG (as is being tried at Fort Carson).
 - (s) Remove the possibility of double jeopardy with respect to civilian criminal offenses, which might also be charged as military offenses.
 - (t) Provide for enlisted men's councils and racial harmony councils at all installations to promote communication across grade levels.
 - (u) Reevaluate the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Perhaps reorganize articles in the Manual for Courts-Martial, so that disciplinary articles are grouped and more easily recognized as distinct from those dealing with civilian crime; then make sure that soldiers are informed about the disciplinary articles early in their career.
 - (v) Assure that Army Classification Battery tests or other placement tests do not discriminate against racial or ethnic groups.
 - (w) Develop consistency across the post with respect to interpretation and enforcement of permissive regulations.
 - (x) Reinstitute activities at the company level and higher that cut across all grade levels, so that officer and EM communication can be better established.

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(y) Evaluate the reenlistment bonus to see that it really is reenlisting persons who are desirable to the military institution.

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS

A total of 17 noncommissioned officers were interviewed. Generally they were squad leaders, but occasionally might be assigned to some other position.

Extent and Nature of Dissidence

The principal dissident activities observed by the NCOs (none claimed to be participating in dissident activity) were refusing orders, disrespect to superiors, and AWOLs. There was a general feeling among the NCOs that discipline in the Army was on the decline, and that somehow it must be reestablished if the military system is to remain viable. There were increasing reports of disrespect to NCOs and officers with the complaint that the individuals showing disrespect were getting away with it; that is, an NCO reported the infraction to the 1st sergeant and company commander, but no action was taken. It was said that the company commander does not want his record to show that he has issued too many Article 15's. A consequent breakdown in discipline results when the soldiers realize that nothing much is going to happen to them if they are insolent or disobedient.

There was mixed feeling on what policy the Army should have with respect to the distribution of dissident literature. Some felt that it should be allowed and the Army should make no recognition of it, while others believed it should be strictly prohibited.

AWOLs were thought to be on the increase because there was not sufficient punishment to a man going AWOL. It was estimated that AWOLs were at about a 5 percent level now.

It was reported at one post that there was a marked increase in muggings on post; this was supported by the post Provost Marshal.

Causes of Dissident Activities

It was judged by the NCOs that the principal cause of dissident activity was lack of discipline, and that there was a need to regain more firm leadership. NCOs claim that they will be or are leaving the Army because they no longer have any way of enforcing discipline.

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The quality of current troops was also felt to be a part of the problem. What was meant by quality was unclear, whether it was the motivation of the troops or the relaxing of selection standards. At any rate, training was thought to be poorly conducted, and the 18-year old too immature to be a good soldier. It was suggested too that there should be some way to get rid of those persons who do not wish to serve in the Army and who are no credit to the service — some way to get rid of them without a lot of paper work.

Another cause of dissenting activity was said to be the inability to properly utilize the experience and the skills of the men coming into service. A factor contributing to this is the need of the combat arms to be brought up to strength. Few people are said to wish to go into the combat arms; the result is that individuals are forced into combat arms assignments, and there is consequent unhappiness and low morale. The wives of men who are in the combat arms are unhappy because the husbands are away for long periods in field training.

NCOs feel strongly that they are losing their authority and their influence in the Army. They maintain that there is a need to maintain rank separation, that there should not be any social association of the NCOs with their men, or the NCOs with officers.

The NCO feels he is the "fall guy" in the company. He no longer has any prestige. For example, he is told that he cannot get his outfit up before six, but the area has to be policed by 0630, so the NCOs have to find some way to do it (which they do usually by waking men earlier!)

There is said to be uneven administration of military justice, especially at the company level. Article 15s are said to be administered arbitrarily and capriciously. The NCO also complains about administration of justice with respect to him and cites the same sort of complaint that potential dissidents did concerning the matter of double and prior jeopardy.

It was suggested that young men coming into the service are suffering from too little parental discipline. Once in the service, it is too easy for the parents to interfere, or for congressional inquiries to interfere with the management of the man in uniform.

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Leadership at the company level in the Army is said to be immature and inadequate. Company commanders have achieved their rank too fast and don't really know how to handle a company. They don't know how to communicate with their troops. Both company officers and the middle-ranking NCOs need leadership training in how to deal with their men. NCOs are pulling details because no one else will do them.

Cooks are hobos, and food handling is no good — no wonder soldiers complain, according to the NCOs.

Poor medical care is cited as a cause for dissent. There is a long wait for treatment when one goes himself or takes his dependents for care.

Basic training is too easy. It should be made more difficult; the new recruit once having accomplished a difficult stint of basic training will be more appreciative of military life.

There is an inconsistency in work habits and work requirements within and across units. Troops are not kept busy doing useful work. Boredom is detrimental to morale.

Blacks are said to be favored and do not receive their share of punishment or disciplinary measures (comment made by a white).

Extent and Nature of Racial Discrimination

In general, racial problems are not regarded as very serious by the NCOs. An increase in muggings which is attributed to race was cited. [It was commented (by the chief of staff at one post) that muggings and racial assaults, black-on-white, were motivated by prior white-on-black assaults.]

It was said by the NCOs that there were fewer racial problems in Vietnam, which is contrary to the impression gained from press accounts. It was also said the blacks are favored and do not receive their fair share of punishment and disciplinary measures — which was said not to be the case in Vietnam. It was also reported that Negro NCOs are harder on blacks than whites; this may be true, especially when the proportion of blacks in the company is less than whites.

Racial dissent was said to be increasing — "The more they get, the more they want."

Extent of Drug Use and its Causes

It was reported that more than half of the enlisted members of one organization smoked marijuana, and that there is an increase in crime

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on post, which is associated with the use of drugs. The use of marijuana was thought to be increasing.

Social drinking was said to be as serious as marijuana and quite prevalent; drinking during duty hours was not thought to be uncommon.

Changes in Level of Dissidence Over the Past Two Years

The NCOs feel that discipline problems are on the increase, and that the use of drugs is on the increase. There was some suggestion that racial problems might be increasing. Dissidence of a political nature was not frequently mentioned and can be presumed to be declining.

Impact of Dissidence on Morale and Discipline

Those dissident activities associated with a lack of discipline have a consequence of reducing morale and further reducing discipline. The NCOs feel the only way to deal with this is to again make military life more rigid and demanding.

Recommendations on How the Army May Reduce Dissidence

Most of the suggestions deal with the establishing of more order in the military system and with giving the NCOs more authority, backing them up in matters of discipline, and giving more meaning to the NCO's position.

(a) NCOs resent after-cycle reports by trainees, and feel that trainees' opinions are unfair. The NCOs feel that such reports should not be used in evaluating NCOs.

(b) The Army policy of up-or-out aimed at the NCO with 14 to 19 years of service is felt to be unfair. It is suggested that many good E5s and E6s will have to get out of service when they should continue to be used.

(c) Reestablish the Army policy of taking care of its own. It is felt this no longer is done.

(d) Do something special with Vietnam returnees, either discharge them or put them in a special unit.

(e) Close the post to outsiders.

(f) A company commander and NCOs should have training in interpersonal communications so they may deal more effectively with their subordinates. It was said a good NCO should first ask, not tell his subordinates what he wants them to do.

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(g) The NCOs resent civilians on post. They suggest that a good deal of the post local hire should be replaced by military personnel.

(h) Firm up the administration of military justice and develop a consistent policy for the administration of Article 15's within the company.

(i) Make greater use of the chaplain; more gets accomplished.

(j) Develop a consistent policy for application of standards, work, leadership, and punishment in the Army.

(k) Make basic training more difficult so that the individual who has come through basic has more confidence in himself. Make sure that everyone during his training is put into a position of leadership so that he has some knowledge of the difficulties in managing people.

(l) Raise the age requirements for the Army. Young men coming in at 18 are not mature enough.

(m) Form more racial harmony councils and enlisted men councils; they assist in communication, and are a vehicle for complaint. There should be more talk sessions of the men with the unit commander.

(n) Try to get troops more involved in civil and social domestic programs.

(o) Develop active training and work programs so that there is no idle time, but don't have troops doing make work.

LIEUTENANTS

A total of 22 junior officers were interviewed. As with the NCOs, few officers expressed any dissident activity of their own, but simply described what their concept of dissident activity was.

Extent and Nature of Dissident Activity

The principal dissidence observed has been disrespect and insubordination. Young men coming into the service are more knowledgeable and sophisticated than in the past. They are accustomed to having some voice in running their own affairs. They want to know why they are doing what they're doing. Many are in the Army against their will, and many have no concern for minor disciplinary punishment such as Article 15, so it is not an effective deterrent.

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The junior officers express little concern for what a man does in his free time; they feel that the Army should have no concern whether he is distributing literature, attending a coffee house, or whatever. It is the junior officers' feeling that the underground paper and coffee house have little effect. Many have never seen the underground paper published by the dissidents at their post.

Causes of Dissident Activities

The officers feel that permissiveness in the outside society is the major cause of expression of dissidence in the Army. It was generally agreed that those persons who were in the Army against their will were the dissidents. One officer said that half of his company are high school dropouts, so he has two factions in the company — the dull ones who don't care, and the smart ones who question why.

It is generally agreed also that lack of discipline in the Army contributes to the problem of dissidence. Along with this, inadequate training, the immaturity of young men entering the Army, the mediocre more than the apt entering the Army, and the bad press that the Army has been getting are all associated problems.

It was suggested that there is too much concern given to letters written to congressmen.

JAG officers and IGS are too lenient. Their influence lets a lot of men get out of court-martials and Article 15's.

There are too many civilians on post who take away the responsibility of the military and do not properly perform the duties themselves.

Enlisted men don't have job satisfaction. They must feel that their work is worthwhile.

There is no immediate discipline applied for wrongdoing. In going through the legal procedures required, the relation between infraction and punishment becomes weakened and lost.

Some officers feel that the blacks are favored with regard to disciplinary punishment. When they don't perform, they're not punished, simply to avoid the hassling that might result if they were.

Vietnam returnees are a source of discontent to the rest of the company. It is felt that they are not being properly used.

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There are inconsistent standards for behavior and conduct of military personnel, both within neighboring units and across the post. The standards for performance and punishment should be the same.

Both officers and enlisted personnel are aware of the waste and inefficiency in the Army and develop a feeling of "don't care." The inefficiency extends to make-work and poor use of soldiers' time.

Extent and Nature of Racial Discrimination

Racial incidents were claimed to be a minor problem. The majority of troublemakers are young blacks who are constant complainers, always late, and reluctant to accept orders, doing little irritating things that are not quite serious enough for an Article 15, but troublesome nevertheless.

An instance was cited concerning a group of 10 blacks who had set up an extortion ring requiring contributions, under threat of a beating if no contribution was made.

It is not good policy to have all blacks in one barracks room.

Extent of Drug Use and its Causes

The officers claim that many new troops pick up the use of drugs after entering the service, and that a high proportion do use marijuana. There was said to be a great deal of barracks larceny to support drug habits. In another post, however, the estimates were much lower and larceny was said to be lower.

It was suggested that imprisonment in the stockade often led to drug use. The same situation is said to be true in civilian prisons.

Changes in Level of Dissidence Over the Past Two Years

AWOL is said to increase just before going to the field. There is little excuse for AWOL since troops can get emergency leave if they have a pressing personal problem.

It was suggested generally that dissidence might be on the increase, but that it was less strident than it had been. Congressional inquiries appeared to be on the increase, however, and these were irritations.

Most of the young officers who were interviewed had been in service only a short while, so they really had no way to make judgment as to changes in level of dissent.

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Impact of Dissidence on Morale and Discipline

It was a general feeling that dissidence was reducing the Army effectiveness and was reducing morale and discipline, but the same comment made above, with respect to the time in service of the officers interviewed, should apply here.

Recommendations on How the Army Could Reduce Dissidence

The suggestions made center around improved discipline, getting out of Vietnam, and better utilization of personnel skills. Specific items suggested were:

- (a) Elimination of double jeopardy for civilian traffic offenses.
- (b) More pay for lower ranking soldiers.
- (c) Let Vietnam returnees out of service immediately.
- (d) More effective standards of conduct, and more effective and even punishment. Develop consistent policies across units and across the post with respect to requirements and disciplinary procedures.
- (e) Have meaningful work available for all members of the organization.
- (f) Develop community action projects, especially for those persons who are not oriented toward the military.
- (g) Crack down on civilian personnel on post. They are inefficient and an obstruction to good management.
- (h) Enlisted personnel at one post were a part of Project TRANSITION, working with post engineers, which appeared to be working out well: suggest this be applied elsewhere.
- (i) Spot insurgent leaders. Try to isolate them and then give them other responsibilities.
- (j) Make punishment and discipline immediate so as to be connected with the offense.
- (k) Give leadership training, including an approach as to how to get a job done. Ask instead of tell; develop means of communication across grade levels.
- (l) Improve relationships between junior officers and their superiors. Officers are sometimes intimidated by being told that they will have a poor Officer Efficiency Report if they describe a situation which is not in order. This leads an officer to feel that he should

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never tell a commander exactly what he thinks. He's always trying to cover himself.

(m) Develop personnel procedures which permit an officer to feel that he has some personal control over his career.

(n) Improve hospital and clinic facilities for dependents.

(o) Improve the effectiveness of the IG. At this point, the junior officers feel that the IG is effective only in solving the problems associated with pay records.

MILITARY POLICE

A total of 23 persons assigned to the Military Police Corps were interviewed. They ranged in grade from PFCs to 1st Lieutenants.

Generally speaking, the MPs interviewed were a bright, even-mannered, articulate group of individuals who appeared to be properly selected for their military police assignments.

Extent and Nature of Dissident Activity

MPs have had a greater exposure to dissident activities than have the other persons interviewed. For example, they have all seen literature that has been distributed on post, and have picked up copies of the material. They are all aware of coffee houses, and many have been on duty at demonstrations. The general feeling among those interviewed is that the Army should be unconcerned about literature and about coffee houses, inasmuch as there isn't much that can be done about it anyway. With respect to demonstrations, MPs are displeased with them mostly because it amounts to extra duty, taking away from their own free time.

The persons interviewed assert that they have not seen much disrespect toward authority. This probably means that they have not experienced much disrespect toward themselves, nor have they been called into cases where they are called to apprehend someone who had been disrespectful.

MPs sometimes feel that they are being asked to enforce rules relating to soldiers' behavior or appearance that should not be their obligation to enforce. In doing this, they are viewed as harassing and irritating the soldier; like the NCOs, they feel they're the fall guys.

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MPs say they feel they are accomplices in rank discrimination and express a sense of frustration in this regard. If an officer is given a ticket on post, say, it's likely that nothing will happen, that the charge will be forgiven. The same thing would not be true for an enlisted man.

With respect to coffee houses, some felt that coffee houses were probably worthwhile. There was said to be an insufficient number of places where personnel could vent their grievances with impunity, and coffee houses were thought to be useful for such purposes.

The MPs believe that there is a new awareness on the part of young men coming into the service; commonsense and keeping one's cool helps to relieve tension.

They express the feeling generally that young men coming into the service from the inner city are the principal source of dissent, insofar as MP personnel are concerned; they suggest they may need special training in dealing with such youth.

Causes of Dissident Activities

Men go AWOL because their company commander's open-door policy has failed. If a man has a personal problem, he should be able to see the CO and obtain special leave. MPs believe that complaints about food, hair, and details describe many of the causes for dissent. They also feel that the many NCOs and officers in field units who are staying in service have a basic inferiority. NCOs and junior officers alike often will not stand up to settle just grievances of their men because they're afraid bucking the Army system will hurt their career. Basically they're said not to have the integrity required for leaders of their rank.

It was said that only the brave and the foolish get involved in dissent.

At one post, more dissidents were seen in support activities than in field units. It was theorized that overhead personnel have more time off, freer attitudes, higher intelligence, and broader interests.

It was felt that there was too much publicity attendant to dissident activities, and this tended to fan the flames of dissent.

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Some awareness should be had of the sophistication and the backgrounds of the young men presently coming into the service to realize better how to deal with them.

Two divergent views on basic training appeared. One thought basic training was degrading and should be softened. Others thought that basic training should be hardened and that punishment in the Army should be severe and sometimes physical.

Lower ranking personnel do not have knowledge of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It was implied that if they did have knowledge of the code there wouldn't be as much dissent.

Extent and Nature of Racial Discrimination

Black MPs and white MPs do not care to work in mixed teams. They like to work with others of their own race.

It was suggested that much of the violent crime was a consequence of black and white encounters.

Black MPs feel increasing pressure to lay off blacks in the carrying out of their duties.

MPs feel strongly that there should be no racial bias or any other kind of bias among the MPs. Unfortunately the racial problems were felt to be on the increase.

Extent of Drug Usage and its Causes

A good many MPs use marijuana off duty, but not on duty. Drugs found on inspection are considered picked up in an illegal search and the case won't stand up. MPs are aware of considerable larceny associated with drug usage.

The use of marijuana seems to be increasing generally.

It was thought that the use of drugs in units was related to poor leadership in those units.

MP personnel related that those persons in the stockade learn drug traffic and become users.

Change in Level of Dissidence Over the Past Two Years

The MPs are aware that dissidence respecting matters of racial differences and drug usage is on the increase. No mention was made by the MPs of use of alcohol.

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Impact of Dissidence on Morale and Discipline

An increase in dissent increases the work for the military police and increases extra duty. From that standpoint, they feel that increasing dissent will reduce morale and have an adverse effect upon discipline, especially their own.

Recommendations on How the Army Could Reduce Dissidence

Political dissent associated with demonstrations and protests seems to have decreased over the past two years. MPs feel that the level of political dissent is not sufficient to have much impact on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order, and that no special MP actions, other than SOPs, are required to deal with it.

(a) MPs, like other categories of interviewers, feel that Vietnam returnees should be released upon return to duty in the United States if their remaining tour of duty is short enough.

(b) MP training should be more relevant and intense. There should be more on-the-job training for MPs. The MPs feel too that insofar as possible every MP should have had AIT before being assigned to duty as an MP. This is not the case in a good proportion of cases.

(c) The MPs should be relieved of the necessity for enforcing regulations dealing with the wearing of uniform.

(d) Reduce publicity attendant to dissent.

(e) Relax standards for personal appearance of soldiers.

(f) Form enlisted men's councils to improve communication both up and down the rank structure.

(g) Devise a program so that a man in service can keep his option open with respect to continued service. Don't trap him in the service.

(h) Have no restrictions on the distribution of literature, or on the operation of coffee houses.

(i) Change the age limit for troops coming into the Army.

(j) Make basic training rougher. This was felt to be a way of dealing with the hard-core, inner-city people who object to authority.

(k) Show more tact in carrying out MP functions; for example, in the approach or first contact with an individual, ask first, give orders later.

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(l) Take care in the assigning of new MPs who do not have much rank. They tend to react defensively and with undue severity in dealing with persons of superior rank.

(m) Get prisoners out of the stockade as rapidly as possible, as they learn bad habits in the stockade. Crack down on drug traffic and use in the stockade.

(n) Take care in the use of National Guard and Reserve MP personnel during unit training; they're often not trained to deal with prisoners.

(o) There is speculation among the MPs that the kinds of innovations dealt with in the VOLAR experiment will not be effective. There is need to concentrate on more basic values of the soldier.

CONTRAST AND COMMENT

The interview groups were intended to be quite disparate in their composition, so it might be expected that the responses of the interviewees would be quite different from each other as well. Members of each group tend to view dissidence differently. The potential dissidents, for example, see dissent as a way for them to express their disagreement and discontent with the military system. They view the system as a threat to their individuality and to a way of life which they do not care to give up.

The other three groups tend to accept the military system as it is (the junior officers perhaps less so than the NCOs and MPs), and thus view dissent as a threat to the system, and to them, as a part of the system. The NCO especially is concerned about what it does to him and his place in the system. The junior officers and the MPs seem less threatened by dissent and find it more a source of irritation than a threat.

In developing reasons and causes for dissent, the potential dissident is convinced that the military system is wrong, and perhaps that even the government behind it is wrong. He is bucking the system. He appears less interested in changing it than in getting away from it. The NCO, on the other hand, feels that the system may be going a little wrong — that training is not hard enough, that junior officers are inexperienced and do not support him — but mostly he believes that the dissidents in the system are the ones who are wrong. He attributes a part of their wrongness to the condition of the military system, but believes that it is capable of reshaping itself. The company grade officers and the military police see

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both sides of the situation. They see that the men coming into the system are different from those who have come in earlier, and that the military institution is trying to accommodate in various ways to these new members of military society who don't really care to be a part of it.

There is some consensus about the condition of the military system. It seems generally agreed by dissidents and the other three groups alike that discipline is declining, that the system equivocates, that its principles and objectives are less well defined than they have been. Except for the dissidents who proclaim that they have no use for the Army, the other three categories of respondents come to these agreements:

(a) The military system must be hardened again. The system has grown soft and lost its form. There is agreement that training needs to become more rigorous. Regulations need to be tightened. Codes and operations need to be unambiguously stated and properly observed by all who are subject to them. The institution needs to be renewed, to regain recognizable form.

(b) Soldiers must be given additional freedom. In modern society, if the Army is to attract persons who will stay with it, some additional freedoms need to be accorded them in the way of control over their living, individuality in their personal appearance, fair, understandable, and objective rules for discipline and for justice. Abilities and experience must be taken into account; Vietnam returnees, for example feel they are unique and apart from their fellows, a condition which needs to be recognized.

(c) The military system must develop a resiliency so as to be adaptable to modern-day society, while yet acquiring new structure and hardness. It cannot be so bound by regulations and rules that it cannot adapt to change.

Three other kinds of action appear necessary as the interviewee responses are reviewed: improve leadership, improve communication, and develop a new sense of trust and care for Army personnel.

That military leadership needs rejuvenation is abundantly clear when one hears the concerns of the discontent, the dissident, and the confused leader. There is lack of consistency in management policy and operation, inconsistency in standards required with respect to military performance,

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inconsistency in standards of appearance and discipline, inconsistency in the recourse that an individual has to get his complaints heard. This lack of consistency in policy and leadership means that leaders often act in what appears to be a capricious and arbitrary fashion in making judgments about matters within their concern.

Many leaders, at both officer and noncommissioned officer levels, have apparently lost the ability and means of communicating with their subordinates. Communication procedures — as for example, EM councils, racial harmony councils, and the commander's open-door policy — need to be examined to make certain that there is an exchange of information across and between grade levels.

Perhaps the greatest concern of all among all levels interviewed is that the Army doesn't care, that the Army is really not "taking care of its own," that it does not have the concern of the individual and his dependents at heart. The matter of individual trust and confidence in the institution is most important for a viable organization. Those in the organization must feel that the Army cares for them and is going to take care of them. This trust and confidence is being lost; rather, servicemen feel they are being used.

Certain discontented elements in the Army can be affected by these changes — the draftees who are discontented with their lot in the service, the Vietnam returnees who feel that they are being improperly used, those who have fallen back on drugs to relieve their boredom or to get the excitement which good leadership might have taken care of, racial discontents who feel there is a lack of appreciation of individual differences and identity and worth. All of these things will be affected by positive changes in leadership, communication, and an air of trust and care in the institution. Coupled with these changes, the system itself must establish its own new, firm, resilient identity.

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Appendix C

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POST COMMANDERS

INTRODUCTION

In order to supplement the data obtained through surveys and interviews, an attempt was made to obtain a broad overview of dissident activity in the Army and its effects on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order by means of a questionnaire sent to the commanders of the 17 largest posts in CONUS; namely, Ft. Benning, Ft. Bliss, Ft. Bragg, Ft. Campbell, Ft. Carson, Ft. Dix, Ft. Gordon, Ft. Hood, Ft. Jackson, Ft. Knox, Ft. Leonard Wood, Ft. Lewis, Ft. Ord, Ft. Polk, Ft. Riley, Ft. Sam Houston, and Ft. Sill. A copy of the questionnaire is given in Annex 1.

The responses to the questionnaires are summarized in the following sections. In order to preserve anonymity, the post numbers as used in this summary are not related to the order in which the posts are listed above.

REPORTED DATA

The frequency of incidents in 1969 and 1970 as reported by the various posts is given in Table C1. Estimated figures are shown in parentheses.

The posts were asked to comment on any change in frequency of activity from 1969 to 1970, what action had been taken against various types of activity, and how these activities affected the enforcement of discipline, law, and order. Their responses are summarized below.

Post 1

It is felt that the fluctuation in demonstrations on this reservation is not significant. There has been no change in procedures of responding to demonstration-type activities. The SOP established for this purpose has been adequate and is flexible enough to provide for effective coverage.

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**Table C1
DISSIDENT ACTIVITY REPORTED IN POST COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRES**

Activity	Year	Army Post																	Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	
On-post demonstrations involving 10 or more soldiers	1969	3	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	1	12
	1970	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	11
Printings of underground newspaper published by servicemen stationed at this post	1969	3	8	2	9	0	5	7	5	14	5	0	0	10	0	0	18	1	87
	1970	2	24	8	14	3	6	8	7	8	9	0	1	0	0	0	16	3	110
Soldiers known to have distributed protest literature	1969	30	4	11	unk	0	2	11	unk	0	7	1	0	5	0	0	3	2	76
	1970	30	7	4	unk	3	4	5	unk	0	(5)	0	6	3	1	0	4	8	80
Known off-post protest meetings frequented by soldiers stationed at this post	1969	5	8	0	unk	0	1	(26)	2	1	(12)	0	0	20	1	0	3	20	99
	1970	5	8	2	unk	0	4	(6)	11	1	(8)	0	0	35	4	0	6	45	135
Known off-post coffee houses with anti-military reputation that were in operation at some time during the year	1969	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	8
	1970	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	13
Incidents of violence where the race of any of the participants was a factor in mitigating or exacerbating the incident	1969	unk	0	0	unk	0	unk	0	54	0	0	(6)	6	0	0	0	0	0	66
	1970	unk	1	9	unk	0	unk	0	70	1	0	(7)	1	1	2	4	0	0	97
Known instances at this post of soldiers purposefully disobeying or refusing orders, or showing disrespect to a superior	1969	unk	unk	1	77	0	unk	unk	14	unk	(200)	0	0	unk	1	42	3	0	338
	1970	unk	unk	6	76	0	unk	unk	18	unk	(150)	4	3	unk	3	271	8	2	533
Other																			
Attempted demonstration on post	1969		0																
	1970	1																	
Bomb threats	1969						0												
	1970	1																	
Petition complaining of mess hall, laundry and morale	1969											0							
	1970											1							
Racial incidents with no violence	1969												0						
	1970												2						
On-post incidents involving civilian dissidents with military personnel taking part	1969																	1	
	1970																	2	
Attempts by civilian protest groups to organize military personnel	1969																	1	0
	1970																	3	3
Publication and distribution, or attempted distribution of dissident literature by civilian protest groups	1969																	95	15
	1970																	96	50



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One of the local underground newspapers last published in August 1970. Local coffee house now inoperative.

Post 2

Closing of local coffee house in August 1970 had a direct bearing on the decrease. The coffee house was the chief meeting place of dissidents in this vicinity. The ability of quick reaction by MPs and other units also had an effect by presenting an atmosphere of preparedness. Some of the main dissidents involved in the 1969 demonstrations had been barred from the post, which also accounted for the decrease. Military personnel involved in unauthorized demonstrations and distribution of underground newspapers on this installation, perpetrating criminal offenses and refusing to obey orders, etc, were handled through appropriate disciplinary actions. Civilians involved in unauthorized demonstrations were escorted from the post and barred from further entry. One attempted demonstration was prevented by alertness and rapid response by Military Police.

Increase of underground publications was associated with the peak activity at the local coffee house. With the increase in publications there was an increase in distributors.

Off-post protest meetings occurred at the height of the anti-war activities occurring around the country during the time the coffee house was operating. Local protest meetings declined toward the summer and stopped almost completely when the coffee house closed. No actions were taken by this command regarding off-post demonstrations.

One major incident on post involved a minority group against some white soldiers, but was not identified as a racial incident since indications were that the black group was out for personal gain.

Dissident activities declined noticeably during 1970, ending altogether by July, apparently due to action taken at the national level, i.e., troop withdrawal from Vietnam and by actions being taken in regard to the modern volunteer army.

Post 3

Local underground newspaper began publication in late 1969.

Increased amount of interest in foreign policy and military affairs, especially Vietnam, contributed to the increase in off-post demonstrations.

The apparent increase in soldiers disobeying orders indicates that post officials have begun to monitor and record all phases of dissident activity.

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Most racial incidents listed here are of a spontaneous nature. The apparent increase can be attributed to more accurate records being kept and effective reporting in this area.

There have been no changes in procedures or Military Police action as a result of dissident activity. This command is continuing to use ARs and appropriate USAIC regulations and the Manual for Court Martial to effectively deal with all phases of unauthorized activities.

Post 4

There have been no demonstrations, as such, on post. If any occur, the Military Police would utilize established police procedures to deal with them. In May, 1970, a large crowd entered the installation after a local peace rally. The majority of the individuals involved were civilian, but it is believed that many of those who participated were military personnel in civilian clothing. No apprehensions were made for violation of the military regulation prohibiting demonstrations. Civilians were apprehended for distributing leaflets and were subsequently issued letters barring them from the installation. Distribution of literature on post is unauthorized unless permission is granted by the Commanding General.

Meetings or gatherings on post are not allowed. Some have occurred, but no determination can be made as to the total numbers or purpose. Off-post activities are not within the Military Police jurisdiction.

Provost Marshal records do not reflect information on refusal of orders or disrespect to a superior since action is normally taken at the unit level, i.e., Article 15 or court martial. Military Police are not normally called in this type of offense since the military justice system differs from the civilian system in that the unit prepares the charges and a police complaint is not required.

It would be unrealistic to believe that racial tensions do not exist on the installation. There have been no known incidents of violence where race could be identified as a causative factor. Some harassment has taken place, generally in situations where many members of one race meet a few members of another race during off-duty hours in places near service clubs or civilian establishments where alcoholic beverages are served.

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In general, dissident type activity continued to decline since early 1969. Probable reasons are:

- (1) Lack of interest in the anti-war movement which reached its zenith in early 1969.
- (2) Liberalization of Army policies dealing with haircuts, relaxed pass policy, opening of more lower-rank enlisted facilities.
- (3) The lack of identifiable information concerning off-post activities of military personnel.
- (4) The realization, by would-be dissidents, that U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia is on a steady decline.

Post 5

This post has had very little protest activity during 1969 and 1970. Activity in the early months of 1971 has shown some increase. The biggest reason for the increase seems to be dissatisfaction of the public with the Vietnam war. This dissatisfaction is shared by all ages and therefore has become a part and parcel of the attitude of the younger soldier.

The increase in printing of underground newspapers is believed to be due to the constant publicity by the news agencies of the war and of demonstrations against the war.

In the main there has been no real change in the procedures or actions taken by the Military Police at this station. Because of the low level of protest activities, they have not affected the enforcement of discipline, law, and order.

Post 6

It is believed that the slight apparent increase in protest activities is due to the reaction brought about by public disclosure of the My Lai incident and racial trouble in nearby town. No changes in Military Police procedures have been required.

Post 7

An off-post coffee house served as a meeting place for known military dissidents during 1969 and until its closing by local civil authorities in January 1970. Loss of a central meeting place and a ready audience did much to quell the momentum of GI groups in this area.

Post 8

There has been an increase in frequency of soldiers attending off-post protest meetings because soldiers are becoming aware that they can

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participate in these groups in off-duty time. Little or no action has been taken against participants due to a lack of substantive proof that regulations have been violated.

The increase in refusal of orders and disrespect to superiors appears to be a result of an increase in reporting of incidents of this type to the military police. Units are becoming reluctant to handle incidents of this type internally. Increased emphasis has been applied to the investigation of these cases in an effort to assist the commander concerned in properly administering justice.

No action has been taken against the coffee house other than monitoring activities. This activity has not affected the enforcement of discipline, law, and order.

The increase in racial incidents appears to be a reflection of the current trend in the United States and cannot be attributed to any significant causative factor at this installation. Combination black and white military police patrols are used to the extent possible to investigate and handle incidents where race is a factor. Increased emphasis has been placed on the patrolling of areas where trouble of this type is frequent.

Post 9

Military police monitor group actions but do not become involved unless the group threatens or creates violence, disrupts traffic, or violates post rules or regulations. There has been no effect on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order by these activities.

One incident occurred in the summer of 1970 when a rumor circulated among Negro soldiers that a "brother" had been shot and killed on post. A few hours later, when military police attempted to apprehend a Negro soldier for a minor offense, a crowd gathered, the Military Police requested assistance, and an over-reaction on the part of all parties led to rock throwing.

Since this incident, extensive Military Police training to avoid over-reaction in controlling incidents has been stressed. Actions have also been taken to require officers and NCOs of units involved to control their troops rather than resort to Military Police control.

Post 10

Although the data indicate an increase in number of printings of underground newspapers from 1969-1970, subsequent events clearly indicate

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a decline. Lack of financial resources, loss of interest by known on-post dissidents and effective confiscation of issues have contributed to the demise of one newspaper. More recently, the appearance of a one-page poorly reproduced paper has alerted this command to a reactivation of dissident activities. Dissidents currently serving on active duty seem unwilling to risk punishment for distributing unauthorized literature. Distributions that have occurred on post are largely the work of dissidents from the civilian community.

Any demonstrations or distribution of literature on post would be handled by SOP. No documentation is available on the number of off-post protest meetings attended by active duty military personnel. No attempt is made to prevent soldiers from attending off-post protest meetings during non-duty hours.

The estimates of occurrence of refusal of orders and disrespect to a superior for 1969 and 1970 are thought to be reasonably accurate since they represent an extrapolation from 1971 information. Such incidents should not necessarily be attributed to anti-military, anti-war, or subversive attitudes. The vast majority of this type of activity at this installation stems from the AIT population. The decrease from 1969 to 1970 seems to be more a result of a reduction in the number of trainees than a decline in the level of "dissident" attitudes or behavior. No extraordinary measures have been implemented by this command to deal with this type of behavior. Incidents are subject to Article 92 of UCMJ and typically received disposition under that rule of military law.

Although incidents of violence have occurred among black and white active duty personnel, the motive for these altercations has always been attributed to a source of friction other than race. Drunkenness, personal disagreements, debts, etc, are the prime cause of such occurrences.

Post 11

The greatest reason for the slight increases shown in the data is improvement in reporting and recording of incidents.

A review of each incident of violence was instituted early in 1971 and is maintained on file. Previously the incidents were recorded and investigated, but further analysis was not made into possible or probable racial/dissident implications on a total case basis.

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Incidents of violence are largely a result of the mix of new soldiers (less than three months in service) from many diverse backgrounds (race, religion, and educational level) and communities learning to live, work, train, and cooperate together.

The lack of support for dissident or racially-oriented groups in the surrounding civilian communities makes it difficult, if not impossible, for trainees who are here only a short time to organize or present any cohesive effort.

Actions that have been taken to minimize the effects of dissident or racial incidents are:

- (1) A close alignment of Military Police patrols, interior guards, courtesy patrols and staff duty personnel has been achieved which affords early detection, notification, prevention, and apprehension of offenders.
- (2) Frequent analysis of all incidents involving violence is made to determine trends in racial tensions, racially oriented offenses, dissident implications, and association with outside supporting sources.
- (3) At post level, courses of instruction are presented in race relations and human relations which give opportunity to air opinions, complaints, or grievances in an atmosphere relatively free from the need to display violence. This safety valve aids in keeping racial problems at an absolute minimum.
- (4) Thorough investigation of all offenses to identify offenders but also to detect racial or dissident implications.
- (5) Complete coordination between commanders and staff on the identification, referral and counselling of possible dissident inclined individuals or those who stress racial violence.
- (6) Close liaison is maintained with civilian police agencies in the surrounding area to insure early awareness of any protest type gatherings or the initiation of dissident activities.
- (7) Regulations pertaining to petitions, distribution of literature, and meetings having protests as the basic purpose have been reviewed, clarified, and strengthened.
- (8) Stress has been placed on reporting incidents to the Military Police that involve violence, indicate dissent, or reflect racial overtones.
- (9) Command interest and review of all incidents where dissident or racial ramifications are indicated. This review is conducted with commanders and appropriate staff members and positive courses of action are decided for command supervision throughout the chain of command, Military Police prevention and enforcement efforts, and increased activities by other staff elements.
- (10) The operation of a community advisory council and the close liaison/cooperation with the military affairs committees of surrounding communities lends the civilian community support to maintaining law, order, and discipline on and off post.

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Post 12

The publication of a local underground newspaper met with little support. Prompt action was taken to determine who published and distributed the newspaper. Appropriate disciplinary action was administered to those responsible. Command action to remind personnel that distribution of literature without approval of the Commanding General is a violation of regulations, and a court martial offense caused an immediate cessation of the distribution.

Militancy of young black soldiers involved resulted in two instances of rendering Black Power salutes in a post theater. Members of the command were instructed on how to pay proper respect to the National Anthem and told future disrespect would not be tolerated because it is in violation of an Army regulation. No incidents have occurred since then.

Continued emphasis on educating all races to better understand each other has helped lessen tension and reduce disciplinary problems that might have arisen solely as a racial matter.

The caliber of soldiers, both draftees and volunteers, who have come into the Army during the past year appears to be different from that of their predecessors. Changes in public opinion have indicated an increased disaffection with the military as a whole and the Vietnam war. Consequently, more active participation by today's soldier in anti-war activities has resulted.

Post 13

During the period local dissident leadership diminished to a point where it was completely ineffective. The lack of leadership in turn failed to interest persons susceptible to dissident activity, both civilian and military, to the point that participation in dissident activities has diminished to a minimal state.

The publication of local underground newspapers suffered due to three primary problems:

(a) Individuals were not available for the continued publication of an underground newspaper.

(b) The editorial staff and contributing authors were for the most part unavailable and suffered from a lack of interest.

(c) Lastly, the distribution of underground newspapers was made

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exceptionally difficult and was suffering from the failure of appropriate articles targetted at the military population in the area.

The decrease in the number of soldiers distributing protest literature is attributed to the lack of a cause celebre which would stimulate soldier participation in distribution type activities.

The local coffee house was opened to the public more extensively than it was in 1969. However, it has suffered in its operation from a lack of effective leadership, a lack of substantial financial support, and a lack of civil and military interest. During 1970, soldier participation gradually diminished to a point where there was little interest.

The exact number of instances involving soldiers who disobeyed a lawful order or were disrespectful to a superior officer cannot be identified. There were no indications where such activity was identified as a significant factor in the exercise of discipline and mission accomplishment at this installation.

In July 1970, one incident took place which may be attributed to racial tensions. This incident resulted due to outside agitation concerning the death of a Negro educator at the hands of an off-duty white soldier who was working as a part-time attendant at a local gas station. Outside agitators took advantage of this event to incite racial hatred and to create a disturbance.

There are indications that the protracted use of narcotics may be a contributing factor to dissidence, racial tensions, and even violence at this installation. The individual soldier supporting a narcotic habit requires money in excess of what he earns as a soldier, and often has to turn to theft and violence to support the habit.

Actions that have been taken to minimize the impact of dissident activities are:

- (1) Action was initiated within the command to identify persons as trouble-makers, and subsequently to determine whether or not individuals so designated were suitable for retention. This effort resulted in an increase on the average of 30 soldiers a month being released by administrative actions.
- (2) An enlisted men's council was organized in late 1969 to enable the Division Commander to have a feel for what really bugged the soldiers. This effort by no means was an attempt to circumvent the chain of command, but was truly designed to attain a sense of responsiveness to soldier problems. As a result of command support for the council down to the lowest level, the effort has materially assisted the overall control of dissidence and racial tensions.

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(3) A Racial Harmony Committee was formed to better determine racial conditions at this post. Again there was no intent to circumvent the chain of command, but to give the Division Commander and his subordinate commanders a true evaluation of what factors are important in creating racial tensions and to identify the problems, either real or imagined, affecting minority groups. Significant improvement with regard to racial conditions has been realized from the efforts of this committee.

(4) Local criminal investigation, Military Police investigation, and Counterintelligence efforts have been used for the early identification of dissidence and violence. This effort is continuous around the clock. It has materially assisted, along with the Racial Harmony Committee and Enlisted Men's Council efforts, to control the environment.

(5) Project VOLAR, while in its initial stages and implemented in January 1971, had an impact in decreased racial tensions and dissidence during the period late 1970 through publicity and the promise of a better lot for soldiers.

(6) The implementation of a drug center to assist the user of narcotics with regard to his individual problem has had a favorable impact. There are no statistics available to substantiate the above statement in light of racial tensions and dissidence. The impact of commencing the drug center program has brought the drug problem the attention it so sorely deserved. Commanders are acutely aware of the impact of drugs on order, discipline, and mission accomplishment. This acute awareness has led to early identification of drug users and pushers. The Military Police criminal investigation and civil police authority have effectively used available information to curtail drug traffic. During the period January 1971 to March 1971, the director assigned overall responsibility of the administration of the drug center. Activity reports a significant drop in the use of heroin. This may be attributed to the increasing command awareness, assistance to the user of narcotics, and excellent results attained by the local police community.

(7) Under the sponsorship of the local Chaplaincy, an on-post coffee house activity was initiated in 1969. This activity was favorably accepted by soldiers and has provided an additional outlet for gripes, grievances, and the opportunity to express such grievances. Command representatives, to include the Division Commander, have made themselves available on a periodic basis for "rap" discussions concerning everyday life at this installation. This activity has helped to reduce dissidence and racial tensions, and may have led to the reduction of soldier interest in the off-post coffee house.

Post 14

Insubordination consistently causes concern at all levels of command. Most of the offenses listed involved minor cases of insubordination for which an administrative Article 15 was usually given. An Article 15 is placed on an individual's record for one year after which time it is taken off provided there are no further offenses. This explains the low number of known cases for 1969.

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Post 16

Preventive actions taken to preclude dissident and racial activities include:

- (1) Increased security through platoon sized quick reaction forces, keeping senior NCO in billets, and appointment of Field Officers of the Day for headquarters and major subordinate commands.
- (2) Better commander-troop communications through open door policy, command information program, NCO advisory councils, and appointment of Acting Inspector Generals and Equal Opportunity Officers at battalion and higher level.
- (3) Stockage of minority group cosmetics and soul food in Commissary and Post Exchange.
- (4) Increased intelligence reporting starting at lowest level.

A test case by the American Servicemen's Union to hold an unauthorized meeting on post is pending Federal court action. No other demonstrations have been attempted pending outcome of the court case. Civilian police attempt to provide coverage of any off-post demonstration. Military Police are not authorized off the installation.

There was a reduction in printing in 1970, but the type of newspaper is far superior to that of 1969, which indicates a degree of professionalism and dedication in both the military and civilian editors. Underground newspapers are published off post, away from military control. Distribution is normally accomplished by civilians.

Other than occasional muggings and individual fist fights, no incidents of racial violence have occurred. As a deterrent, courtesy patrols have been established with direct contact with the Military Police.

Incidents of dissident organizations encouraging military participation or attempting demonstrations on post clearly indicate that civilian dissidents are the a with military personnel for the most part merely hangers-on. For such activity on post, civilian personnel are detained and given letters of expulsion, and military personnel are turned over to their unit commanders for disciplinary action.

Post 17

The major cause of increased activity in 1970 can be attributed to an increase in support to the dissatisfied soldier by civilian directed anti-military and peace organizations. On a comparative basis, there has been very little on-post dissident activity. There has been, and still

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exists, a small but very dedicated group of civilian agitators in the surrounding communities. These people, joined from time to time by radical or leftist-oriented soldiers, are constantly attempting to organize soldier groups. The nature of the post, basic training, creates a constant and rapid turnover of personnel. Thus, the dissident organizers have not, as yet, been able to establish a following of significant strength.

Post regulations pertinent to soldier participation in political activities and the publication and distribution of printed matter have been rewritten or revised. The primary concern in this action was to clarify the regulation and to make it enforceable under current legal interpretations. The effect of such action has been negligible.

SUMMARY

Some general impressions to be gained from the above reports are:

(a) At none of the posts is dissidence considered to be a problem serious enough to have any effect on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order.

(b) The main cause of dissidence is seen to be U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war.

(c) The winding down of the Vietnam War and the introduction of Modern Volunteer Army improvements are seen as contributing to a reduction in the level of dissidence.

(d) A large part of the dissident activity stems from the efforts of civilian organizations to conduct demonstrations on Army posts and to recruit military personnel for their cause. These efforts have apparently had little success.

(e) No special Military Police procedures, over and above SOPs, have had to be developed to cope with the current level of dissident activity. However, there would appear to be some additional workload imposed on the MPs, since some posts mentioned an increase in patrol activity for deterrent purposes.

Although the level of overt dissidence appears to be low enough that it is not having any appreciable effect on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order, it may be seen that the printing of underground newspapers appears to be increasing. The degree to which these publications play a part in influencing soldier attitudes is not known, but it would

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be prudent to monitor their content since they could serve as a barometer of more serious activity in the future.

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Annex C1

POST COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRE FORMAT

Installation _____

Questionnaire completed by _____

Questionnaire for Post Commanders on RAC Study O11.180,
"Future Impact of Dissident Elements Within the Army on
the Enforcement of Discipline, Law, and Order," sponsored
by the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

The nature and extent of dissidence in the Army are matters of concern. In particular, the interest of the Government and the public in the maintenance of an effective and disciplined Army for the purpose of national defense justifies certain restraints on the activities of military personnel which need not be imposed on similar activities by civilians.

In January 1970, a survey was conducted at 17 installations in CONUS to obtain information related to a study "Determination of the Potential for Dissidence in the US Army." The attached questionnaire is in large measure based on the responses to that previous survey. Please respond to the questions as objectively and candidly as possible. Add sheets if more space is required.

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Please indicate in the table below the incidents that have occurred at your post during 1969 and 1970. Where data are not available, please provide estimates in parentheses.

Table 1

	1969	1970
1. Number of on-post demonstrations involving 10 or more soldiers.		
2. Number of printings of underground GI newspaper published by servicemen stationed at this post.		
3. Number of soldiers known to have distributed protest literature.		
4. Number of known off-post protest meetings frequented by soldiers stationed at this post.		
5. Number of known instances at this post of soldiers purposefully disobeying or refusing orders, or showing disrespect to a superior.		
6. Number of known off-post coffee houses with anti-military reputation that were in operation at some time during the year.		
7. Number of incidents of violence where the race of any of the participants was a factor in initiating or exacerbating the incident.		
Other protest activity. (Please list)		
8. _____		
9. _____		
10. _____		

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Please suggest an explanation for any increase or decrease from 1960-1970 in any of the activities listed in Table 1.

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.

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Please indicate what actions (MP actions, changes in procedures, etc) have been taken at your post in response to each type of activity listed in Table 1, and how these activities affect the enforcement of discipline, law, and order.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

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Distribution List
Not Filmed

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - RDD		
<small>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)</small>		
1. ORIGINATOR'S ACTIVITY (Corporate symbol)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Research Analysis Corporation McLean, Virginia 22101		FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
		2b. GROUP
3. REPORT TITLE		
Future Impact of Dissident Elements Within the Army on the Enforcement of Discipline, Law, and Order		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Technical Paper		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
R. William Rae Stephen B. Forman Howard C. Olson		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
January 1972	198 195	13
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8c. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
DAHC19-69-C-0017	RAC-TP-441	
a. PROJECT NO.	8d. OTHER REPORT NUM(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned to the report)	
011.180		
c.		
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
"Distribution limited to U. S. Gov't agencies only; Test and Evaluation. Other requests for this document must be referred to Office of the Provost Marshal General; Address: HQDA (DAFM), Washington, D. C. 20310."		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
		Office of the Provost Marshal General
13. ABSTRACT		
<p>The degree to which dissidence may have an impact in the future on the enforcement of discipline, law, and order is of serious concern to Army planners. In this study, an attempt was made to determine the current level of dissidence in the Army and to examine the possible causes of dissident behavior as a basis for estimating what the trend may be in the next few years.</p> <p>Conclusions of the study are as follows:</p> <p>(1) Although there are continuing activities in types of dissent with possible political overtones, such as demonstrations, publishing of underground newspapers, and attendance at antimilitary coffee houses, these do not represent a serious problem for the Army at the present time in terms of enforcement of discipline, law, and order. Moreover, these are likely to become less of a problem as the Vietnam War winds down and the Modern Volunteer Army comes into effect.</p> <p>(2) The major problems affecting discipline, law, and order in the Army appear to be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(a) Drug usage(b) Interracial friction(c) Disrespect to superiors and refusal of orders. <p>Not only are these problems serious at the moment, but the trend appears to be towards an increase in frequency.</p> <p>(3) There is no evidence that the types of situations created by the problems listed in (2) above will create a need for military police procedures other than standard operating procedures. However, in view of the increasing trend in these incidents, current military police authorized strengths may not be sufficient to cope with the problem adequately over the next few years.</p>		

DD Form 1473
1 NOV 66

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14 KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
attitude surveys						
discipline						
dissent						
dissidence						
drug abuse						
race relations						

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