

**UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND**

**THE KWAZULU-GOVERNMENT AND INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY'S  
RECORD ON CIVIL LIBERTIES IN SOUTH AFRICA,**

**1990-1994**

**DERICK NKOSINGIPHILE MYENI**

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**THE KWAZULU-GOVERNMENT AND INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY'S RECORD  
ON CIVIL LIBERTIES IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1990-1994.**

**BY**

**DERICK NKOSINGIPHILE MYENI**

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**SUPERVISOR: DR. M Z SHAMASE**

**EXTERNAL EXAMINER: PROF. ADUKARIR ADAM, AMUDU UNIVERSITY,**

**NIGERIA**

**EXTERNAL EXAMINER: PROF. MARY GOEDHALS, UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU**

**NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA**



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
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*The map of South Africa before 1994 that shows Natal with some spotted geographical areas that symbolise KwaZulu under the scourge of homeland that divided KwaZulu into small pieces of land. KwaZulu was the place where Inkatha under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi claimed to have a 100% political hegemony where many places were notoriously known for being no-go areas to those who were non-Inkatha members. .*



*The hounarable Umtwana of KwaPhindangene Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in his full traditional attire and is fully armed with the traditional weapons . He was Prime Minister of KwaZulu, the leader of Inkatha, the Minister of KwaZulu Police, the traditional leader of Buthelezi clan and leader of all Amakhosi (Chiefs) in KwaZulu. He selfishly dominated KwaZulu sicio-political affairs as from 1971-1994 and he is still the leader of Inkatha as from 1975.*



## **QUOTATIONS**

“When I looked back I saw my son being stuck with a huge knife. He was then thrown into the flames of our house they just torched it. He was screaming but there was nothing I could do. To this day I still hear the sizzling sound of flames as they ate into my son’s flesh”

### **-Victim of Natal violence**

Just as the Nazi in Germany killed people because they were Jews, in South Africa de Klerk, the National Party and Inkatha are killing people because they are black.

### **-Nelson Mandela**

“I pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave you only the cherished memory the loved and lost, and the solem pride that must be yours to have laid down so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom.”

### **-Benjan Franklin**

## **APPROVAL**

This dissertation has been read and approved in fulfilment of the academic requirement for the Degree of Masters of Arts in History, Department of History Faculty of Arts, University of Zululand, South Africa.

.....

**Date**.....

**Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase**

**SUPERVISOR**

## **DECLARATION**

I solemnly declare that this dissertation “**The KwaZulu-Government and Inkatha Freedom Party’s record on civil liberty, 1990-1994**” represents my academic embodiment of my laborious research that comprise a well work and academically acknowledged quotations, I therefore hope that it can be proudly used by the next generations as a reliable source of reference

**By**.....

**Student Name: Nkosingiphile Derick Myeni**

## **DEDICATIONS**

This dissertation is humbly and earnestly dedicated to all those people who died in the scourge of internecine violence, young and old while they were in pursuit of our freedom, therefore I say that their death was not for a minor cause but it laid an unshakable foundation for the freedom that we are currently enjoying and also to my beloved wife Thabisile C. Myeni , my children, my extended family members who are my mother Malta Myeni, my father Josiah Myeni, my sisters, Nikeziwe M. Nhleko, Nozipho G. Mngomezulu , Nomsa V.Gumede, Nombukiso S.Masondo and my late sister Nompumelelo C. Mngomezulu who I believe would be amongst my well wishes .

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-To my interviewees for their time also gut to share with me their grievous and horrendous past experience that that sometimes served to evoke pains and sorrows about their loved ones. I pass my special gratitude to Dr Nomzamo Luthuli although it was nearly impossible to work with her due to his vast knowledge in research ethics.

## **ABSTRACT**

*Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi the leader of KwaZulu government and Inkatha, was amongst other South African homeland leaders. In early 1970s he became the leader of Kwa-Zulu Self-Governing homeland. In 1975 he formed the pseudo-political party that became known as Inkatha Cultural Movement that worked congenially with KwaZulu Government for almost three decades. After the formation of Inkatha, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was soon possessed by a strong desire of insatiable power hunger that forced him to part ways with his old comrades of the African National Congress in 1979 after the aborted London Meeting between him and the Oliver Reginald Tambo the leader of the exiled African National Congress. This became a true political turning point that led to a political watershed that was marked by the untold hostility between Inkath/KwaZulu Government and the African National Congress. Buthelezi being well aware of this hostility, then tried all possible means to convince all those that were close to him including the apartheid government that the African National Congress was baying for his blood. This then led to establishment of the covert relationship between him and some of the senior members of both Defence and the Police Force.. He then embarked on making a watertight defence around him that would protect him against any possible attack from the African National Congress. In 1981 he established the KwaZulu Police (KZP) as part of his defence. The KwaZulu Police was said to be a police force that would do the maintenance of law and order but its main aim was to be a para-military force that would defend Inkatha members against its political opponents. As the eighties unfolded he consolidated his relationship with the apartheid government by accepting an offer of having some of 200 members of Inkatha to be taken for training in Namibia in a place known as Caprivi Strip. These people were trained under the guise of becoming the protectors of KwaZulu VIPs but in mere fact they had been trained to kill all anti-Inkatha. They were the referred to as the Caprivi Trainees since they were trained in Caprivi Strip in Namibia. These people had been trained in different ways of killing those who were anti-Inkatha in huge numbers. The likes of Romeo Mbambo, Israel Hlongwane, Gcina Mkhize and many more became Chief Buthelezi's private army that killed hundreds of the African Nation Congress ad COSATU members. These people made a harrowing admission in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In the TRC it was where all the violation of civil liberties were heard coming from these people and others. The Caprivi Trainees, KwaZulu Police, Vigilantes and the Warlords were the ones who turned KwaZulu into a political slaughter house in terms of violation of civil liberties of all non-Inkatha people while Inkatha and KwaZulu Government were cheering them up.*

## OPSOMING

*Hoof Mangosuth Buthelezi, die leier van KwaZulu regering en Inkatha was tessen die ander tuislande leiers in Suid Afrika. Vroeg in 1970s hy het die leier van KwaZulu Selfbestuurende Regering gepas. In 1975 hy het die sogenaamde-politiese party gevorm wat Inkatha Kultureel Party bekend word, wat baie geeswantskap met KwaZulu Regering gehad het vir baie jare. Na die bevorming van Inkath, Hoof Mangosuthu het dan deur die sterk onversadelik begeerte van maghongering beset word wat hom gedwing het om met sy komeraades afgeskei het, in 1979 na die onvoldrae London Vergadering tessen hom en die Oliver Reginald Tambo van die uitgeweke Afrikaans Nasional Kongres. Dit was die werklik 'n ploitiese keerpunt wat tot na politiese skeiding gelei het, wat deur die onberekebaar vyandigheid gemerk is tessen Inkatha/KwaZulu Government en die Afrikaans Nasional Kongres . As Buthelezi van die vyandigheid bewus was, het hy all die moontlik maniere pobreer om all die ' mense wat naby hom te oortuig met in begrip van die apartheid regering dit die Afrikaans Nasional Kongres hom wou doodmak. Dit het na die bekeerlinge verwantskap gelei het tessen hom en die hoof lede van die Suid Afrikaans Verdediging Mag en die Polisie Mag. Buthelezi het dan op die digte verdediging homself ingeskeep teen die moontkik aanval van die Afrikaans Nasional Kongres (ANK) afgekom het. In 1981hy het die KwaZulu Polisie geform as die deel van sy verdediging. Die KwaZuku Polisie dit gese word om die wet en order te handhaaf maar hulle groot doel was om die Inkatha lide te verdedig teen hulle viand. As die tagtiger jare begin oop te vouhy he sy verwantskap mwt die apartheid regiring baie vas demaak en hy het 'n die aanbod angevaar van Verdeding Mag afgekom het om ongeveer 'n 200 Inkatha lide te oplei in Namibia in die plek wat Capriv Strip bekend is. Hierdie mense het opgelei ander kleding om die beskermers van die hooggelaaste lide van albei Inkatha en KwaZulu Regering wees, maar in die eitlik feit hulle is opgelei om all die vyande van Inkatha dood te maak in groot nomers. Mense soos Romeo Mambo, Israel Hlongwane, Gcina Mkhize en anders het Hoof Mangosuthu Buthelezi se privaat militere gepas en hulle baie lide van COSATU en Afriaans Nasional Kongres doodgemaak. Hierdie mense het 'n baie treurig aanmeeming na die TRC gemaak dat hull baie mense doodgemaak het. Die Capriv Trainees, Kwa-Zulu Polisie, Vigilante, Krysheers was die mense wat KwaZulu 'n politiese slaghuis gemaak het vir all die vyande van Inkatha terwyl Inkatha en KwaZulu Regwring hulle bemoedig.*

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

**AFV.....*Afrikaner Volkfront***

**ANC .....African Nation Congress**

**APLA .....Azanian People**

**ABW .....*Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging***

**CODESA .....Convention for a Democratic South Africa**

**CASAG .....Concerned South African Group**

**COSAS .....Congress of South African Students**

**COSATU .....Congress of South African Trade Union**

**FOSATU .....Federation of South African Trade Union**

**HRS .....Human Rights Commission**

**ICU.....Industrial and Commercial Workers Union**

**KZP.....KwaZulu Police**

**KwaNacoci.....KwaZulu/Natal Chamber of Commercial Workers Union**

**LRC .....Legal Resources Centre**

**MAWU .....Metal and Allied Workers Union**

**MDM.....Maas Democratic Movement**

**MK.....Umkhonto Wesizwe**

**PAC.....Pan African Movement**

**NATU.....Natal Teachers Union**

**SAAF .....South African Air Force**



## **GLOSSARY**

*Amabutho* – Regiments

*Amakhosi* – Chiefs

*Askaris* - African National Congress's dissidents

*Coup d'etat* - seizure of power

*Impi* - war

*Izinduna* - Headmen

*Inter alia* - among other things

*Modus operandi* - Particular way in which a person performs task or work

*Per se* - Itself

*Persona non grata* - An unacceptable or unwelcome person

*Quid pro quo* - A thing given as a compensation or a return favour

*Sine qua non* - Indispensable condition or qualification

*Tuislande* - Homelands

*Ubuntu* - Humanity/ A state of being a human being

*Volkstate* - National State

## General Introduction

KwaZulu Government and Inkatha were two inseparable structures that operated congenially for 19 years under the leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. This made Chief Buthelezi to selfishly wield his enormous influence over these structures without the contestation of any kind.

*Refusal to allow political parties to operate within the Bantustan between 1970 and March 1975, and outlawing of political parties except Inkatha from 1975 onwards are strong indications that the leadership was bent on entrenching one party system<sup>1</sup>*

In this way he maintained a constant vigilance on all those who opted to start political parties that would compete with Inkatha. This very situation was the one that led to the Chief Mhlabunzima's sour blood within KwaZulu government in 1975 when he formed Inala Party that eventually led to his assassination. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi constantly labeled Chief Maphumulo with a sorts of names because he wanted people to view him otherwise. He claimed that the chief, who formed the opposition Inala Party in 1975, was a well-known agent of the National Intelligent Service.<sup>2</sup>

The political rift between Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo constantly widened to such an extent that it ended in the assassination of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo as aforementioned which is believed to be as the result of this political rift. This really shows the extent of KwaZulu Bantustan of exercising the political intolerance was higher than perceived. Inkatha had to be an only political party that had to operate without any contestation in the whole of KwaZulu something that at a later stage became a real cause of political killings more especially between 1990-1994. The fact that Chief Buthelezi was also the leader of Amakhossi (Chiefs) made him to have an overlapping influence between political affairs and traditional affairs. This therefore made him to be a centre of both power and influence in KwaZulu and he was of course a major decision maker. In this way he became a person that was

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<sup>1</sup> B Theron: *The Road to democracy in South Africa Volume2 [1970-1980]*, p . 827

<sup>2</sup> C.Copper etal : *Survey of race relations in South Afriva 1983*,p . 347

highly revered in time of peace and yet to be avoided in time of any conflict more within his political circle. Inkatha and KwaZulu Government were his corner stone of these above mentioned elements which were power and influence. Buthelezi undertook that no members of Inkatha would become involved in elections for the government's black community councils...<sup>3</sup> He had a right and the authority to say what was to be acceptable and not to be acceptable in KwaZulu which in short meant that he was the first and last men which implied immeasurable autocracy.

This was the very character that led to the political bloodshed in KwaZulu in the 80s when the Cosatu made inroads as an industrial union, 90s became worse when the ANC was unbanned. All political affairs in KwaZulu during his political hegemony were at his mercy something that became the cause of internecine violence in the whole of KwaZulu. All those who were non-Inkatha members were treated harshly to such an extent that they were brutally assassinated for their political beliefs and convictions. In 1990 when Nelson Mandela was released the political killing in KwaZulu took its toll since there was an open political contestation between Inkatha and the African National Congress. Inkatha in this fierce political situation remained victorious in many cases since it was fully backed by KwaZulu government. Buthelezi tried everything in his power to bolster and secure his political hegemony by activating Inkatha Youth Brigade.

*However, in order to secure his base in KwaZulu Buthelezi now strengthened Inkatha by developing the Inkatha Youth Brigade into a quasi-military wing of the movement.<sup>4</sup>*

It was during this period where Buthelezi activated all his killing machines in KwaZulu, such as the Caprivi Trainees, Vigilantes and Warlords in order to ruthlessly deal with all those who were against Inkatha especially the African National Congress members. This led to the killing of people while other were forced to leave their places for their safety.

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<sup>3</sup> W. De Kock: *Inkatha and the for a just South Africa- usuthu cry peace 10, p. 107*

<sup>4</sup> R.W. Johnson : *South Africa-first man the last nation ,p. 184*

The KwaZulu Police were also mentioned in a number of cases where unarmed and innocent people were brutally slaughtered. In true speaking Chief Buthelezi never thought of seeing himself losing the control of KwaZulu even in his wildest dream so he made all possible means to keep KwaZulu under his rigid control.

In 1993 Chief Buthelezi tried a political tactic by mobilising all the likeminded people including Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana and Afrikaans right wings parties to form something that was called Concerned South African Group (Cosag). Cosag was (loosely) united in opposition to the trend of the negotiations...<sup>5</sup> Structurally Cosag, was a heterogeneous formation that lacked commonality in approach which somehow became its major weakness. It therefore became a forged political homogeneous group that was formed in haste out of political frustration without a proper planning. Its demands were somehow very much naïve and unreasonable because it wanted to undo the core structures of the negotiations like CODESA which according ANC and the National Party was so inconceivable.

This attempt of Cosag therefore totally failed to yield the desired political results, but Buthelezi was not short of option since he the fully mobilised his forces, the Capriv Trainees, Vigilantes, Warlords and the KwaZulu Police to destabilise the pending changes. These people with the help of Inkatha and KwaZulu Government killed more people most of them were attacked and killed in their homes while they were sleeping. This act of Buthelezi being the leader of KwaZulu Government and Inkatha nearly derailed the negotiations for the new political dispensation in South Africa.

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<sup>5</sup> D Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 465







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## CHAPTER ONE:

### AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

*“The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with blood of patriots and tyrants”*

*-Thomas Jefferson*

#### 1.1 Introduction

This study seeks to give an exposition of the KwaZulu homeland government and the Inkatha Freedom Party’s record on civil liberties during the period of transition to majority rule in South Africa between 1990 and 1994. Civil liberties are civil rights and freedoms that provide individual specific rights. Though the scope of the term differs in various countries, in the context of South Africa and for purposes of this study, civil liberties include freedom from torture and death, the right to liberty and security, freedom of conscience, religion, expression, press, assembly and association, speech, the right to privacy, the right to equal treatment and due process and the right to a fair trial, as well as the right to life<sup>6</sup>.

Other civil liberties may also include the right to own property, the right to defend oneself, and the right to bodily integrity. This study justifiably uses the concept ‘civil liberties’, instead of ‘human rights.’ Civil liberties generally differ from human rights, which are universal rights to which all human beings are entitled regardless of where they live. One useful way of thinking about civil liberties is to think of them as rights that a government is contractually obligated to protect (usually by a constitutional bill of rights)<sup>7</sup>, whereas human rights are rights implied by one's status as a person, whether the

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<sup>6</sup> John Dugard et al: *The Last Years of Apartheid: Civil Liberties in South Africa, in a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State of Emergency*, pp. 5-12

<sup>7</sup> Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill: *Civil Rights*, pp. 92-110

government has agreed to protect them or not. KwaZulu was one of the ten "homelands," or "bantustans," set up by the South African government as part of the structure of "grand apartheid," the political program developed by the National Party government of South Africa and implemented over its years in power following its first election victory in 1948. It was scattered throughout the province of Natal, situated on the coast of South Africa's East Ocean (Indian Ocean), and became the homeland created for Zulu-speaking South Africans. Under apartheid, as originally conceived in 1951, all black South Africans would lose their South African citizenship and become instead citizens of theoretically independent states within South Africa's borders. Although all substantial ethnic groups of purely African origin in South Africa were eventually allocated to a particular homeland, the system was never entirely realized. Many Africans continued to live legally or illegally in areas officially designated for whites only; moreover, only four of the homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei; "the TBVC states")<sup>8</sup> ever became nominally independent.

The remaining six, including KwaZulu, were known as "self-governing territories" and did not have sovereign status within South African law, though they did have a large measure of legislative and executive autonomy. In practice, there was little difference for their inhabitants between the nominally independent TBVC states and the "self-governing territories," of which KwaZulu was one. Although the South African government repealed, in 1991, the major legislation implementing apartheid within South Africa outside the homelands, the statutes setting up the homelands remained in force.

The reincorporation of the homelands was one of the most contentious points at the multilateral negotiations for a transition to majority rule which began in 1990. The South African Government argued that the reincorporation of the "independent" homelands required the consent of the governments concerned, because it treated them as sovereign states. In the case of the self-governing territories, the South African government passed legislation in 1993 which made provision for the jurisdiction granted to the six "non-independent" homelands to be revoked<sup>9</sup>. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) was

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<sup>8</sup> Centre for Information Analysis, *South Africa: An inter-regional profile*, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand, 1991

<sup>9</sup> N. Cunningham-Brown: 'The Natal violence continues', *South Africa Foundation Review*, February 1990

established in 1972, replacing the Zululand Territorial Authority, which had been established two years earlier. In 1975, Inkosi (chief) Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi re-launched the Zulu cultural organisation, Inkatha-ka-Zulu, as Inkatha Yenkuleleko Yesizwe, known in English as the Inkatha Cultural Liberation Movement. The name changed to Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in 1990<sup>10</sup>. Buthelezi has been president of Inkatha since its revival in 1975, and was Chief Minister of the KwaZulu government for its entire existence.

e exerted substantial personal influence on both organisations. Inkatha dominated the KwaZulu Government (both its executive and its bureaucracy) to the extent that the government and Inkatha became interchangeable concepts. The organisation effectively ruled the KwaZulu government as a one-party state and used KwaZulu government resources and finances to fund the Inkatha's party-political activities and in the execution of civil liberties' programmes.

## **1.2 Problem statement**

Between 1990 and 1994 - the years between the unbanning of major anti-apartheid parties such as the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the SA Communist Party - a wave of violations of civil liberties swept the country. This took its heaviest toll in KwaZulu-Natal where the war between supporters of the ANC and the IFP, which had erupted in 1983 when the UDF began to "invade" IFP areas.

More South Africans – almost 14,000 – were killed in South Africa during the four and a half years following the release of Mandela in February 1990 and his inauguration as President of South Africa on 10 May 1994 than the number of those killed in the previous 42 years of the apartheid era. There was violence and counter-violence. There was even pre-emptive violence in the low intensity civil war that took place mainly between members of the ANC/UDF and members of the IFP. During this period, freedom to organize politically, freedom of expression, assembly, and association were routinely denied. Nevertheless, a bulk of literature exists on records of civil liberties and violations thereof of various political formations in South Africa. The problem, however,

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<sup>10</sup> 'Current Affairs', *South African Report*, 9 May 1991

has been an academic *cum scientific lacuna* in penetrating the ignorance, puzzlement and curiosity within the South African public mind about the record of civil liberties of the KwaZulu government and the IFP during the transition to majority rule in South Africa. A pragmatic shift and provision of scientific exegesis in the study of KwaZulu government and the IFP's record on civil liberties during the period in question became a necessity. It also became imperative to scientifically document the KwaZulu government and the IFP's record on civil liberties and its impact thereof, thereby throwing more light on the multi-faceted intricacies during the period under study. This justifies a study of the KwaZulu government and the IFP's record on civil liberties during the transition to a majority rule in South Africa, thereby helping to assess the role played by other players and the extent to which violations were committed.

### **1.3 Aims and objectives of the study**

The aim of the study was to give an exposition of the nature and extent of the KwaZulu-government and the IFP's record on civil liberties during the transition to a majority rule in South Africa. In pursuit of this aim, the main objectives of the study were:

- 1.4.1 To explore the nature and extent of the KwaZulu government and the IFP's record on civil liberties during transition era;
- 1.4.2 To establish whether the KwaZulu government and the IFP violated civil liberties during the transition period;
- 1.4.3 To analyse the role of the KwaZulu government and the IFP's subsidiary structures on civil liberties during the transition to a majority rule in South Africa, and
- 1.4.4 To evaluate the extent of the violation of civil liberties in South Africa during the transition to democracy.

#### 1.4 Literature review

In his detailed 2012 study, Anthony W. Marx argued that revolutionary movements depended for their success on both material and ideological appeals, and that leaders who wanted to mobilize the oppressed must search for the most effective strategies of combining these appeals. Based on a wealth of documentary sources and interviews, the study attempted to trace evolving ideological emphases on race, nation and class in black organizations and explored the interplay of these ideas with the concurrent records of civil liberties shaping their development.

The study sought to describe the theories developed by both the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to explain the nature of the political conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. It also outlined the evidence relied upon by each organisation to substantiate its perspective. In his 2005 study, Adrian Guelke, revisited the foundation of apartheid and its subsequent consequences in South Africa. As such, the author made a considerable assessment of the nature of civil liberties and violations thereof, while assessing the impact this had on the people of South Africa.

In doing so, the study took into consideration how the apartheid government managed to endure internal and external pressures up to the unbanning and thus the legalisation of the liberation movements in 1990. The contribution this made to this research is that it took into cognizance the role played by the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the ANC and other political formations during transition to democracy<sup>11</sup>. The only limitation it had was that it did not cover a detailed account of the KwaZulu-government and IFP's record of civil liberties, which this research undertook.

In his 1992 case studies, A. Minnaar contributed to this study by outlining the evidence relied upon mostly by the ANC to substantiate its perspective on the violation of civil liberties in South Africa, particularly in Natal. The ANC's perspective, in brief, was that violation of civil liberties in KwaZulu/Natal was perpetrated primarily by the IFP (and its predecessor, Inkatha). Violations stemmed from the collaboration of Mangosuthu

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<sup>11</sup>. A. Guelke: *Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. pp. 193-212.

Buthelezi, the IFP president, with the (former) South African government for a peaceful and non-violent transition to democracy. Both Pretoria and Ulundi were fearful of the increasing popularity and power of the ANC alliance, and hence both had an interest in attacking and destabilising the ANC and its ally, the United Democratic Front (UDF), as well as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

Contrary to Minnaar's version, this research study attempted to present the IFP's response on the ANC's perspective as set out above. The IFP rejected the ANC's perspective, and queried the assumptions which underpin the theory developed by the ANC alliance. In 1990, Mathew Kentridge revealed another harsh reality of war that he referred to as an 'unofficial war' that dominated many places in KwaZulu (Natal) such as Mooiriver, Pietermaritzburg and Hammersdale. These places according to him, really became undeclared 'war zones' where people that were against Inkatha were routinely and mercilessly slaughtered as a result of internecine violence that was perpetrated by Inkatha and its warlords. In this situation of 'unofficial war', Mathew Kentridge openly revealed the inhuman nature of Inkatha subsidiaries that were warlords and vigilantes that resulted in numerous deaths of people in these above mentioned areas:

*The Inkatha warlords are like mini-generals in command of small troops of bodyguards cum vigilantes, but in the main, armies are mobilised spontaneously to deal with discrete situations and disband automatically after the immediate battle is over.<sup>12</sup>*

This situation of the internecine violence went on unabatedly, since the people in charge were so reluctant to make meaningful interventions that would stop the violence but instead they kept on shifting the blame.

*Chief Buthelezi believes Inkatha to be the victim of unwarranted warlike aggression by other black groups intent on its destruction. In a composite interview reprinted in the first volume of the 1988 edition of Clarion Call, the official journal of Inkatha, Buthelezi pointed out that*

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<sup>12</sup> M. Kentridge: *An unofficial war- inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg*, p.14

*there will, of course, be little prospect of peace as long as certain individuals are and organisations are committed to annihilate Inkatha.*<sup>13</sup>

This kind of attitudinal approach of the powerful and influential people only served to bolster the structures of the so called the ‘unofficial-war.’ Mathew Ketrtridge further revealed that according Christopher Merrett, the detention rate grew alarmingly between 1987 and 1988 where comrades (anti-Inkatha) were constantly but baselessly detained. The detention for these people had no criminal reasons other than the fact that they were part of the revolutionary movements such as COSATU and UDF. The police who were responsible for these detentions proved to be very biased in favour of Inkatha elements such warlords and vigilantes.

*And furthermore the police attitude towards the warlords was particularly baffling. Despite the fact numerous allegations of murder and other crimes were being made against Inkatha officials, the police appeared uninterested in investigating the claims at all. Instead they channelled their energies into chasing and detaining township youths for reasons incomprehensible to the lay person, and which the police were not inclined to divulge.*<sup>14</sup>

Again, Antony Minnaar seems to be concurring with Mathew Ketrtridge about the general attitude of the police both KwaZulu Police (KZP) and South African Police (SAP) toward the non-Inkatha communities. Minnaar reveals that communities especially those that non-Inkatha were more than willing to co-operate with these police forces in so far as bringing evidence to light was concerned that would lead to the apprehension of the perpetrators of violence in areas where violence was rife but the police force was less interested in making use of the given evidence.

*Members of the community have frequently indicated their willingness to co-operate with SAP in combating violence in the area by offering themselves as witnesses and providing the police with valuable information regarding the perpetrators of violence. As a rule, there is no feedback to the community or their representatives regarding the assistance offered or information supplied. When information provided*

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<sup>13</sup> M. Ketrtridge: *An unofficial war- inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg*, p.16

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid*, pp, 71-72



*is apparently not acted upon, the community is justified in assuming that once again their security needs are not being taken seriously,*<sup>15</sup>

This really showed a true neglect of the communities especially in places like Mthunzini in KwaZulu by the police that was supposed to serve them for their security needs. Non-Inkatha communities were therefore left in a political abyss that seemed to increase their vulnerability to political violence; this of course led to many people being killed while others left their places against their will because they wanted to ensure their safety.

*There was no apparent SAP strategy to meet the security needs of the local population. The nearest police station is at Mutunzini, about 30 kilometres away. There was seldom SAP patrols in the area, and appeals for the establishment of police strong-point have been turned down.*<sup>16</sup>

## **1.5 Intended contribution to the body of knowledge**

The KwaZulu government and the IFP's record on civil liberties during the transition to a majority rule in South Africa have not been appropriately explored in the existing South African academic literature. Thus, this study sought to explore the nature and extent of the KwaZulu government and the IFP's record on civil liberties during the transition to a majority rule in South Africa during the period from 1990 to 1994. The study expected to bridge the academic lacuna on the existing literature on civil liberties in South Africa and violations thereof. The study would be of great benefit to researchers, students, and general public who are keen in knowing the record of the KwaZulu government, the IFP, South African government, and other formations on civil liberties in South Africa.

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<sup>15</sup> A. Minnaar: *Patterns of violence – case studies of conflict in Natal*, p.122

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 123

## 1.6 Theoretical framework

### The Biological Theory of Conflict

The nature of this research study suggests that the biological theory of conflict as presented by A. Ikelegbe<sup>17</sup> be employed for empirical analysis. The biological/behavioural theorists look at conflict from the point of view of the social behaviour of man. They state that the biological theory of conflict is made up of three main variables, namely: psychological, sociological and political. They view man (note that 'man' here is used in a plural form referring to both male and female) as a social animal. These theorists argue that man is naturally evil and he develops the tendency to react violently to/and against any form of unfavourable condition, be it social, economic or political. In other words, human beings are by nature masters of conflict rather than servants.<sup>18</sup> This shows that man is naturally created with destructive tendencies especially when his anger is pushed to the extreme.

Furthermore, biological theorists like Ted Robert, Gurr, John Dollard, Feierabend, Monga, Berkowitz and Yates state that conflict is a product of perpetual aggression and frustration which usually results in the outbreak of conflict. In addition to this, Mohammed observes that the greater the discrepancy within a particular social setting, the bigger the chances for violence to erupt.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the more individuals are denied access to their fundamental civil liberties and other basic necessities, the more the tendency for conflict to emanate. Other scholars approach the biological theory of conflict from physiological point of view. They are of opinion that the complexity of human behaviour which comprises basic necessities, degree of success or failure and level of stress or threat, are consciously or sub-consciously responsible for the outbreak of violence.

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<sup>17</sup>A. Ikelegbe: 'Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramification of Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle', *Journal of African Studies*, p. 24

<sup>18</sup> H. Mohammed: 'Basic Concepts and Theories of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution' Cited from H. Mohammed (Ed.) *Concepts and Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*, p. 13

<sup>19</sup> H. Mohammed: 'Basic Concepts and Theories of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution' Cited from H. Mohammed (Ed.) *Concepts and Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*, p. 13

## 1.7 Research methodology

This historical study places emphasis on the exploration of both primary and secondary sources while adopting a qualitative approach. This historical process involves the analysis and re-interpretation of the historical events and thus reconstructing the KwaZulu government and Inkatha Freedom Party's record on civil liberties during the transition to a majority rule in South Africa (1990 -1994). Qualitative research methods make the researcher dig deep into the subject or event under study. Accordingly, in this method, abundant forms of data or information were collected and thoroughly examined through a variety of perspectives. The data collected were interpreted to ascertain and enrich an extensively important perspective<sup>20</sup> This historical study placed more emphasis on the exploration of primary sources.

As such, it employed a comprehensive study and evaluation of archival materials - both inside and outside the Province of KwaZulu-Natal - coupled with other relevant primary documents. Thus, the study used confidential oral interviews with some relevant personalities that had knowledge of foreign policies and most importantly, those with the knowledge of the KwaZulu government and the IFP on civil liberties during the period in question .Interviews with retired politicians, officials and the present political office bearers and general leadership of the IFP and other role players, provided a balanced research analysis of the study.

The secondary data collection that used in this study involved print and electronic sources such as book, journals, pamphlets, dissertations, government publications, reviews, reports of various Commissions and Committees, official party-political statements and correspondence, diaries and other relevant manuscripts. In addition, materials from Legal Resources Centre (Durban), Human Rights Commission (Durban), Pietermaritzburg Association for Christian Social Awareness, Mary de Haas of the University of Natal and public libraries within the country were visited. Also, visits were made to the offices of the IFP in Durban, F.W de Klerk and Thabo Mbeki foundations for additional

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<sup>20</sup>R. Bobgan& S.K Biklen: Qualitative Research for Education, p32

consultations. Using qualitative approach and applying objective analysis, the information gathered from these sources was arranged, recorded and finally analysed.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE BACKGROUND TO KWAZULU GOVERNMENT AND INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

*“It seems to me that the more you know about the real world the better off you are.”*

*-Jim Haskins*

#### 2.1 Introduction

In 1970s, KwaZulu underwent a major socio-political change which was believed to be in line with the proposed Homeland system as it was the part of the South African government to keep all Africans ethnically divided. KwaZulu had to be in line with other nine Bantustans (Homelands) that were expected to form their pseudo-governments. Firstly, it was notable that the homelands system would have a destructive effect on the total development of traditional structures in the whole of South Africa; that is why it was strictly forced upon all Africans. The creation of homelands states added a new dimension to this disintegration of traditional structures.<sup>21</sup>

Homelands were one of major political designs that were preceded by a plethora of draconian laws such as the Mixed Marriage Act of 1949 and Registration Act of 1950 and also the Immorality Act of 1950. The implementation of these laws would play a significant role in the establishment of homelands. In other words, they would make homelands to function according to the expectation of the South African Government. These laws would form basic controlling measures of the implementation of the Homeland system and also the functioning thereof. Apartheid included rigid and increasingly sophisticated controls over the black Africans. The government tried to herd into the Homelands nearly all Africans.<sup>22</sup> This situation imperatively forced all

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<sup>21</sup> G. Moss and I. Obery: *South Africa - contemporary analysis*, p. 393

<sup>22</sup> L. Thompson: *A History of South Africa*, p. 193

Africans to set homelands structures that would reflect ethnic classification, so KwaZulu was no exception. KwaZulu responded to this call by forming all the necessary governmental institutions. In 1970, the Zulu Territorial Authority came into existence which became known as KwaZulu Government in 1971. KwaZulu soon had its functioning organ which became known as the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.

A year later in 1972, another major institution which was KwaZulu Constitutional Proclamation came into existence. This made KwaZulu a fully-fledged pseudo-government amongst other nine homelands as it was required by the South African regime. Interestingly KwaZulu opted for Self-Governing State instead of Independent State, the paradox was that these institutions shared the same platforms of being nominal 'states'. It meant at stage, that KwaZulu had met all the requirements of the pseudo-government as they were required by the then South African Government as part of criteria of the homeland.

In 1975, another notable structure came into being which was Inkatha Cultural Movement that became one and only quasi-political party in KwaZulu. Inkatha, therefore, became a major tool in shaping the ideological formation of KwaZulu people as a whole by means of taking responsibility of shaping children's minds at their formative stage. An Inkatha syllabus is taught in its schools, and teachers in particular are subject to very strong pressure to conform.<sup>23</sup> Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi became the Chief Minister of KwaZulu Government and the President of Inkatha as well. He held these two positions as from early nineteen seventies up until he parted ways with the KwaZulu Government in 1994 when he joined the Government of National Unity (GNU). He has however loyally remained the leader of Inkatha as from 1975 to date.

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<sup>23</sup> R. Davies, *et al*: *The Struggle for South Africa*, p. 390

## 2.2 KwaZulu Government The KwaZulu

The KwaZulu Government was founded in June 1970 on the foundation of the truncated KwaZulu Kingdom. KwaZulu therefore became the extension of colonial structures that had been laid by the Governor of the British Colony Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1891. On the 11<sup>th</sup> of June 1970 at KwaNongoma, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was elected as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of KwaZulu Territorial Authority (KTA) and Prince Clement Zulu became its Chairman with Chief Charles Hlengwa as Deputy Chairman. KwaZulu Territorial Authority became a forerunner of the KwaZulu Bantustan. Controversial places like Ingwavuma which are in the north of KwaZulu were also placed under KwaZulu homeland.

*In 1970, at the time of the establishment of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority, Ingwavuma was an expandable tract as far as white South Africa was concerned, and easily ceded to KwaZulu<sup>24</sup>*

KwaZulu Territorial Authority was therefore seen as the platform from which the chiefs (*amakhosi*) and *izinduna* (headmen) could express their collective views on socio-political matters. In 1971, Bantu Homelands Constitution Act came into being and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi became the Chief Minister of the proposed Bantustan. His election as the head of KwaZulu Bantustan administration provided him with a powerful political platform that he used to position himself into the strict leadership of conservative politics in KwaZulu, while at same time he strove to establish himself as a major role player on the national stage.

KwaZulu Territorial Authority (KTA) soon developed its functioning organ in 1971 which was the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA). The initial membership of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was taken from the Zulu Territorial Authority (TZA) which had been established in 1970. In 1972, the KwaZulu Proclamation came into existence which became an indispensable organ since it forged the representative structure of KwaZulu Government by means of the parliamentary system. This structure became the heart or the nucleus of KwaZulu Government. KwaZulu

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<sup>24</sup> B. Carton, et al: *Zulu identities being past and present*, p.385

Government superseded the Zulu Territorial Authority of 1970 which had been predominantly formed by the Chiefs and traditional Councils as representatives of the government. The KwaZulu Constitution Proclamation of 1972 removed Chiefs and Councils and replaced them with Parliamentary system with its members who were Members of Parliament (MPs) that fully adopted all the governmental duties from Chiefs and traditional Councils. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi therefore became a person who was in charge of Kwazulu socio-political affairs. It is noteworthy to say that although this might sound good but at a same time it served to create a deep rooted friction between KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) and KwaZulu Royal House.

Surprisingly, King Goodwill Zwelithini Zulu and his representative were not part of discussing matters before they were taken for discussion in KwaZulu Legislative Assembly but they were expected to attend the meetings. King Goodwill Zwelithini or his representative could attend the meetings of KLA and had to be furnished with the agenda ...<sup>25</sup> In 1975, there was another major development that developed within the newly formed KwaZulu Government which became known as Inkatha Cultural Movement. Inkatha was re-launched by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi as an attempt to revive the former Inkatha ka Zulu that was founded by his maternal uncle King Solomon in 1928.

*In the 1920s, prominent isiZulu-speaking intellectuals, businessmen and local leaders established an organisation called inkatha under the patronage of King Solomon kaDinuzulu.<sup>26</sup>*

What should also be said about KwaZulu Government under the leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, but without doing injustice to the given timeframe of my topic of my area of study, is that as early as the 1970s, KwaZulu Government became known for its violation of civil liberties. Inkatha and KwaZulu Government soon became tools that Chief Buthelezi used to alienate King Goodwill Zwelithini Zulu from power and the

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<sup>25</sup> B. Theron (Ed.)The road to democracy in South Africa Volume 2,[1970-1980],p.825

<sup>26</sup> B.Carton etal (Eds.): Zulu identity being Zulu, past and present, p. 353



king became an inconsequential figure in the land that he had rightfully inherited from his forefathers as part of his royal inheritance.

*Thus, King Goodwill Zwelithini's compliance with Inkatha's political goals was uncertain as Buthelezi advocated shunning bantustan independence. After much acrimonious debate, the KLA constitution in 1972 stripped King Goodwill Zwelithini of executive power and converted his throne into a grand symbolic, office<sup>27</sup>.*

It is again a need of imperative nature to say that KwaZulu Constitution Proclamation of also became another structure that served to downgraded the paramount King of KwaZulu King Goodwill to mere ceremonial status. In keeping with Buthelezi's wishes, the Zulu monarch had his status reduced to a ceremonial 'king personifying' the unity of the Zulu nation.<sup>28</sup> Chief Mangosuthu after having drastically reduced the status of King Goodwill Zwelithini, he then began oppose all those who wanted to form any political party in KwaZulu; as a result, those who dared to do that were either roundly rebuked or got suspended for a lengthy period of time from their services.

In 1973 a senior member of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Chief Charles Hlengwa formed a political party that became known as Umkhonto kaShaka (Shaka's spear). According to Charles Hlengwa, this party would represent the interest of the Zulu Royal House since Charles himself was close to KwaZulu Royal House especially with Prince Mcwayizeni. Hlengwa, because of this, was hauled before the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly being accused of plotting to topple Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi from his leadership and replace him with the Zulu King in politics. Jeffery Celani Mthethwa, then a close confidante of Buthelezi, moved a vote of no confidence against Hlengwa for allegedly trying to involve the Zulu King in politics.<sup>29</sup> Under these circumstances of being given a vote of no confidence after having been seriously and openly rebuked by the senior members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Hlengwa was forced to apologize and forsake the idea of continuing with the

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<sup>27</sup>B. Carton *etal* (Eds.): Zulu identity being Zulu, past and present, p. 357

<sup>28</sup> B. Theron (Ed.): *The road to democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, 1970-1980*, p. 825

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid* :p.1970-1980, p. 828.

party. This was the gross violation of civil liberties since people like Charles Hlegwa were denied to use their democratic right. In 1976, Chief Hlegwa's party, Mkhonto KaShaka (sic) (Shaka's spear) disintegrated after a head-on clash with Inkatha.<sup>30</sup> Notably, it did not end there because in December 1975, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, a popular chief in the Maphumulo area who was the Chairman of the Mpumalanga Region and a member of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, was suspended for two years without pay from his chieftaincy. His suspension came as a result of forming a political party that became known as Inala party. Inala was the name of the King Goodwill's first regimental enrolment age. Chief Mhlabunzima's suspension without pay was another violation of civil liberties since it was the cruelest way of preventing him from using his democratic right in a place like KwaZulu which he regarded as his birth place and a place that he grew to love like no other.

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi used rebuking and suspending people as his means of violating people's civil liberties as early as the 1970s to prove that his decisions reigned supreme and also his personality was above anyone else in the whole of KwaZulu. It therefore became even clearer that Chief Buthelezi was preparing KwaZulu to be a one-party 'state'. Inkatha had been in existence for eight months, formed in March 1975. Buthelezi's cruel efforts of stopping people from forming their political parties by violating their civil liberties helped Inkatha tremendously in becoming a party without opposition in the whole of KwaZulu, a place that by then had a population of more than 7 million people.

Chief Buthelezi's attitude of forcefully keeping KwaZulu a one-party 'state' became a reason in some years that followed for sanguinary factions over the political hegemony in KwaZulu more especially during the formation of United Democratic Front and COSATU during the years of 1980s since UDF in particular shared a common ideology with Inkatha's arch-rivalry the ANC. In practice the central canon of UDF policy is the Freedom Charter, of which the ANC was the major signatory; and

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<sup>30</sup> W. De Kock : *Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa-usuthu cry peace*, p.108

many senior office bearers of the UDF were important functionaries in the ANC...<sup>31</sup> Inkatha therefore developed a proclivity to brook no political competitors within its jurisdiction in KwaZulu.

### **2.2.1 Separate development and growth of the homelands**

Apartheid under the National Party was structured in such a way that it became a self - supportive mechanism that was being backed by the plethora of oppressive and segregating laws. These laws had one thing in common which was to keep all Africans ethnically divided and confined to their homelands away from white population except by virtue of being labourers. The government tried to herd into the Homelands nearly all Africans, except those whom white employers needed for labour.<sup>32</sup>

The white race under this apartheid political dispensation maintained an unchallenged supremacy that kept other races socio-politically marooned. At the heart of apartheid there were three major ideas that were regarded as the cornerstone for its existence which prevented the apartheid system from being challenged. The first idea was about the fact that the population of South Africa comprised four racial groups which were Whites, Coloureds, Indians and Africans. Each group had its own inherent culture that needed to be nurtured and promoted along its racial lines.

The second one was that, Whites' interests should prevail over other racial interests and the state (government) was not obliged to provide equal facilities and opportunities for the inferior races. Lastly, the White racial group formed a single nation with English and Afrikaans speaking groups treated as one entity while on the other hand Africans belonged to several separate nations which eventually gave white nation opportunity to be the largest group in South Africa. When looking at the structural formation of Whites, Whites were in a very strong position that made them to be unchallenged. On

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<sup>31</sup> M. Orkin: *The struggle and the future –what black South Africans really think*, p.48

<sup>32</sup> L. Thompson: *A History of South Africa*, p. 193

other hand, other racial groups were structurally weak and incoherent which failed them lending themselves to human solidarity of some sort. In other words, the political structure of Africans during apartheid remained extremely vulnerable and divided. In 1948, the National Party had a landslide victory in elections; this then gave it a long awaited opportunity to give effect to these ideas by means of applying the draconian laws that would ensure the racial and ethnical classification in South Africa.

*Since racial classification was to be the cornerstone, the NP rushed through the Population Registration Act of (1949), registering every citizen under a racial category – a remarkable enterprise in an already Creolised society.<sup>33</sup>*

In addition to this law, other laws of draconic magnitude were put in place, such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and the Immorality Act of 1950, which created legal boundaries amongst races by making marriages and sexual relations illegal across racial lines. The beginning of the fifties was marked by a number of laws that tended to discriminate against Africans some of which were aiming at making black South Africans foreigners in their land of birth.

*The cynically entitled Abolition of Passes and Consolidation of Documents Act of 1952 required all African to carry 'reference book' a pass by another name, which noted their employment history and residence rights.<sup>34</sup>*

It is however important to note that all these heavy handed laws were paving the way for a successful separation development and the growth of the homelands that started in the early 1960s. These laws totally laid a formidable foundation for racial separation particularly where Africans ended up being forcefully confined to the separating structures which were called “Homelands” or Bantustans as they were popularly known. Homeland is the Afrikaans interpreted word tuisland which was used in a pejorative fashion to describe the region that lacked real legitimacy and also consisted of unconnected enclaves. These homelands were structures that purported to exclude and push Africans to barren land and at the same time it served to encourage

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<sup>33</sup> R. W. Johnson: *South Africa - the first man, the last nation*, p. 141

<sup>34</sup> R. Ross: *A concise history of South Africa*, p. 129

internal divisions amongst Africans themselves whereby the collective term “Africans” had to be forcefully replaced by individual ethnic names such as Zulus, Xhosas, and Sotho as Venda etc. The success of the homelands largely depended on the well devised stratagem whereby the government transformed the administration of African population. In 1951, the government abolished the only official countrywide African institution, the Native Representative Council.

The National Party Government under apartheid, grouped the reserves into ten territories. Each territory became a “homeland” for potential African “nation” that was administered under white guardianship by a set of Bantu authorities consisting mainly of hereditary Chiefs. Homelands did not have the intention either to promote or to advance the socio-political well-being of the Africans, which is why they remained unconnected enclaves.

*These homelands were generally fragmented, particularly as consolidation plans put forward in the 1950s had been rejected under the pressure from the farmers who would have lost their land and in recognition of the primacy of white interests; all apartheid rhetoric notwithstanding that KwaZulu consisted of eleven separate patches of the territory and Bophuthatswana seven.<sup>35</sup>*

In these homeland structures, Africans had to develop itself along themselves ethnic lines, which was the divide and rule something that weakened the solidarity amongst Africans. Homelands Constitution Act of Properties gave spurious powers to all homelands governments of holding meaningless elections that was strictly overseen by South African government.

*Elections were held, but so arranged that even if those in opposition to the government in Pretoria won the votes, they would be outweighed in Parliament by appointed and thus compliant chiefs. Eventually, four Bantustans acquired independence, namely the Transkei under Kaiser Matanzima, Ciskei under Lennox*

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<sup>35</sup> R. Ross: *A concise history of South Africa*, p. p. 145

*Sebe, Bophuthatswana under Lucas Mangope, and Venda under Patrick Mphephu.*<sup>36</sup>

As it has been stated, all the above homelands consisted of several pieces of land separated by White-owned properties (farms); this system directly affected its economic viability and also the agricultural productivity of the homelands as a whole since all the arable and productive land was strictly reserved for white farmers and what became notable again was that, the highest percentage of land in homelands was non-arable. KwaZulu alone consisted of twenty-nine separate fragments of land most of which was agriculturally barren, what even worsened the situation in homelands in generally, was that more than one third of homelands' population was landless. This situation in homelands therefore forcefully led to inevitable economic downturn which became a direct cause for people to migrate in droves from homelands to cities in search of better work opportunities.

*Consequently, the economic incentives for Africans to leave the homelands, either as migrant or permanent labourers, grew more powerful than ever. African people relied on wage labour in the great industrial complexes of southern Transvaal and Durban, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town.*<sup>37</sup>

Transkei, as it has been mentioned, got nominal independence in 1976, Bophuthatswana followed in 1977, Venda in 1979 and Ciskei in 1981. These four homelands became known as TBVC states. It is imperative to note that the status of their independence was only parochially recognized in South Africa. This parochial recognition of these independent "states" made them to be totally rejected by the international community as spurious and non-existent states. Moreover, no foreign country recognized the sovereignty of the "independent" Homelands.<sup>38</sup> Citizens of these theoretical independent "states" were immediately deprived of their South African citizenship soon after getting their independence. Many citizens of these independent states lived legally as well as illegally in South Africa as their Homelands could not satisfy their

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<sup>36</sup> R. Ross: *A concise history of South Africa*, p. p. 145

<sup>37</sup> L. Thompson: *A history of South Africa*, pp.192-193

<sup>38</sup>Ibid :, p. 193

economic needs. Other six homelands became self-governing entities which were KwaZulu, KwaNdedele, KwaNgwane, Qwaqwa, Gazankulu and Lebowa. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of KwaZulu took an advantage of his Kwazulu royal connection by creating a powerful but dubious quasi-political organization which became known as Inkatha. The National Party Government created homelands to meet the ever growing labour needs that it believed would be satisfied by the promotion of these homelands. Homelands became a machinery to sideline Africans politically as well as economically from South Africa while as the same time they were intended to make Africans appear as foreigners in their land of birth.

*The second consequence deriving from affirmation that every African was to be thought of as a separate country within South Africa's borders was intended to be nurturing of the national consciousness among the various groups the government had identified.<sup>39</sup>*

It again had its objective that strictly relied on dividing Africans into 'haves and have-nots' since the corruption in homelands only benefited the high-ranking few individuals

*In general, though, the Bantustan administrations were vicious and corrupt, existing primarily for the enrichment of those who held office within them and as subalterns in the maintenance of order.<sup>40</sup>*

Homelands were also intended to create an impermeable social buffer between Blacks and Whites as it was supported by the abominable law of Group Areas Act of 1950. Homelands also became a tool to promote white supremacy by keeping them exclusively 'white race'; this idea was bolstered by the establishment of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act of 1950. Laws like this became a cornerstone for apartheid. The latter law was instituted to guard against mixed marriages between Blacks and Whites in South Africa since those who decided to go against this law had to immediately leave South Africa before they were caught. Economically, homelands

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<sup>39</sup> R. Ross: *A Concise history of South Africa*, p. 148

<sup>40</sup>*ibid*, p. 146

became a massive reserve for labour recruitment more especially for the mining sector and farms that predominantly employed young uneducated African women. At the same time, homelands became viable machinery which the South African government used to promote ethnic differences that would promote mutual mistrust within black people which eventually facilitated the black on black violence more especially in 1980s to 1990s.

This then meant that socially and politically, homelands became a dividing tool amongst Blacks. As a result, in homelands, all the high ranking people like homeland ministers and other officials lived luxurious life while the majority of the people were languishing in abject poverty. This became evident in 1990 when homelands had to be reincorporated to South Africa; homeland leaders fought tooth and nail trying to avoid this incorporation because they were protecting their ill-begotten luxuries. In 1992 in Ciskei, there was a disastrous case where twenty nine people were cold-bloodedly killed while attempting to forcefully incorporate Ciskei under Brigadier Oupa Gqozo back to South Africa.

The ballistic examination showed that most of these people were shot from behind. Another overwhelming resistance, although it was non-violent, was that of KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana where both leaders of these homelands joined hands with the Afrikaans right-wing parties. This happened despite the fact that people from Bophuthatswana were against Mangope's move. By March, the unrest had boiled over into a popular ANC-driven uprising that threatened to drive Mangope from power.<sup>41</sup>

## **2.2.2 The KwaZulu Constitution and the Legislative Assembly**

The truncation of the KwaZulu Kingdom after the battle of Ondini on 4 July 1879 came with changes that made KwaZulu nation to fall under the British administrative tutelage under the guardianship of Theophilus Shepstone. Theophilus came with a strange

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<sup>41</sup> O'malley: Shades of difference-Mac Maharaj and the struggle for South Africa ,p. 394



concept of Amakhosi which drastically and irreversibly lessened the power and the authority of the Paramount King of KwaZulu. His main intention was to totally annihilate the Kingdom of KwaZulu.

*The British sought to destroy the very fabric of the Zulu state. Not only was the monarchy oppressed altogether but the country was divided into thirteen chiefdoms, none of whose (sic) chiefs had any right to have an army or maintain the Zulu military system of age regiment.<sup>42</sup>*

This administration remained basically unchanged up until in 1960 where F.H. Verwoerd introduced the homeland system where Africans would have ten self-governing 'states' of which KwaZulu would be one of those states. In 1970 KwaZulu became one self-governing state at a preliminary level since it did not have any governmental institution. In 1971 KwaZulu became a self-governing state according to Self-Governing Territories Act of 1971. This then led to the promulgation of KwaZulu Constitutional Proclamation Act of 1972.

This Act provided the establishment of the parliamentary government that would be headed by the constitutional monarch. This constitutional monarch would take a model of the United Kingdom in its political formation although in practice it became somehow different since the paramount King did not have the authority that he deserved unlike the case of the United Kingdom. In a mere fact what happened in KwaZulu was the opposite of what was happening in Britain because in KwaZulu the king lost his power.

*Thus, King Goodwill Zwelithini's compliance with Inkatha's political goals was uncertain as Buthelezi advocated shunning Bantustan independence. After much acrimonious debate, the KLA constitution in 1972 stripped King Goodwill Zwelithini of executive power and converted his throne into grand, if symbolic, office.<sup>43</sup>*

It is however of great interest to note that democracy was only in theoretical sense since

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<sup>42</sup> R. W. Johnson: *South Africa - the first man, the last nation*, p. 78

<sup>43</sup> B. Carton etal (Ed.): *Zulu identities being Zulu, past and present* ,p. 357

KwaZulu was far from being a democratic entity. KwaZulu Constitutional Proclamation had fewer members chosen theoretically through open election. KwaZulu paramount King Goodwill Zwelithini automatically became a chosen member and he could then nominate a personal representative from the royal house but that could not hold a cabinet office.

Three members had to be nominated by the Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi. This constitution comprised seventy four MPs whose Chiefs were chosen from each of KwaZulu's twenty four regions. What became notable was that KwaZulu King Goodwill Zwelithini under this constitution would have no say since even his royal representative would not hold any cabinet office. In a mere fact this constitution only served to reduce both the power of all chiefs as well as that of the King (Goodwill Zulu) since it stipulated that the Chief Minister (Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi) would be a hereditary chief. The King became voiceless while on the other hand chiefs became insignificant individuals as Chief Buthelezi held an undisputable authority above them all.

*The KwaZulu constitution firmly entrenched the position of chiefs and stipulated that the chief minister should be a hereditary chief... Now they raise issues affecting the king, with people saying what pleases them because they know His Majesty cannot say a word in response<sup>44</sup>*

### **2.2.3 A System of Chiefs, Tribal and Regional Authorities**

This system of Chiefs and regional authorities more especially in KwaZulu were the institutions that were put in place by the British colonial government as early as 1891. This happened soon after the truncation of KwaZulu Kingdom as a result of its defeat in the sanguinary battle of Ondini on 4 July 1879.

*The British Government finally annexed Zululand in 1887 and ten years later handed the territory over to Natal. By the Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission of 1903-1904, Zululand was carved up into*

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<sup>44</sup> S. Theron (Ed.): *The road to democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, 1970-1980*, pp. 829-830

*areas for black and white settlement.*<sup>45</sup>

During these years the British Colonial Government had an upper hand in the administrating and controlling of KwaZulu political matters. All this was the result of the settlement of the Ondini battle of the 4<sup>th</sup> July 1879 and so the British Government had to forcefully modify the indigenous political system of KwaZulu to its favour. The KwaZulu Kingdom had lost its central power that was in the hands of the Paramount King for the decentralized power that would be in the hands of thirteen different chiefs (*amakhosi*) supported by headmen (*izinduna*). This then meant that the power and the authority of the Paramount King had been drastically reduced as a result of the British rule through Theophilus Shepstone who was by then a British Secretary for Native Affairs. He therefore used the authority that had been bestowed upon him to institute the structure of *Amakhosi* (Chiefs).

*After the defeat of Cetshwayo's armies in 1879, Zululand was divided into 13 separate chieftaincies and then, in 1887, annexed to British incorporated into the Colony of Natal in 1897.*<sup>46</sup>

Instituting the structure of Amakhosi (Chiefs) within KwaZulu Kingdom was the unfair strategy that was aiming at enervating the power and the authority of KwaZulu kingdom since it had proved to be among formidable Kingdoms in Africa. Of course, this system could not function without the support and guiding law. In 1891 Sir Theophilus put in place the law that became known as the Natal Code of 1891. During this time in the whole of KwaZulu, Theophilus Shepstone had the highest political control that nearly superseded that of the Paramount King on people's minds. African affairs in Natal were managed by Theophilus Shepstone, the Secretary for Native Affairs, often considered as the father of indirect rule and racial segregation.<sup>47</sup> This Natal Code stipulated that the Governor of the Colony as a Supreme Chief could appoint and also dismiss Chiefs (*Amakhosi*) when he deem fit.

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<sup>45</sup> T. Cameron and S.B. Spies (Eds.). : An illustrated history of South Africa, p.178

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p.178

<sup>47</sup> R. W. Johnson: *South Africa - The first man, the last nation*, p. 70

This alone clearly indicated that the newly formed structure of chiefdom was weak and ineffective since it was held strictly within the realms of the British influence and control. Chiefs were then decentralized throughout the whole region of KwaZulu and they would become in charge of their tribal issues but they were expected to act within the system that had been laid down by the Governor of the Colony. In 1910 when South Africa became a Union of South Africa, there was a paradigm shift concerning the institution of Amakhosi (Chiefs) which was about the policies for population control that was centrally formulated. In 1927, another Act was put in place which became known as Native Administration Act of 1927.

It is of important to note that this Act later changed to Black Administrative Act. This law together with Black Authority Act of 1951 modified the role of Amakhosi (Chiefs). The powers and the title of Amakhosi were inherited by Governor General in 1961. It was again inherited by the Prime Minister of South Africa (Dr Hendrik Verwoerd). This again meant the concealed strategy of disempowering the traditional structure of African leaders. Twenty nine years later in 1990, another major law in KwaZulu came into existence which became known as *Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa* Act of 1990. This act of 1990 was put in place by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi which became a tool for violation of civil liberties which led to any chief being either expelled from his position or even killed for non-compliance.

According to one of the clauses of this act a chief was not allowed to join any political party of his own choice; as a result, chiefs like Mhlabunzima Maphumulo and Alphas Molefe went on logger-heads with Chief Buthelezi after they had joined CONTRALESA. As a result of this, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo was killed in 1992 while Chief Molefe was dismissed by Chief Buthelezi from his position as a Chief of Nquthu. This Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's act of dismissing Chief Alphas Molefe from his position was according to one of clauses of Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990 that stipulated that the Chief Minister (Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi) 'shall' appoint and dismiss the chief when deemed it necessary. The treatment of these chiefs totally went against the Inkatha's aims and objectives about the

observance of human rights: To ensure observance of the fundamental freedom and human rights.<sup>48</sup> The case of Chief Molefe simply meant that his fundamental freedom and human rights were not observed which proved that Chief Buthelezi totally failed to live up to aims and objectives of Inkatha. In September 1989 the KwaZulu homeland removed Chief Elphas Molefe, whose ancestor was Hlubi Moefe from the position<sup>49</sup>

This, at same time, proved to be the violation of civil liberties. Again, Chief Buthelezi used another clause of this act that gave him a right to take decisions about people living in an area without consulting them. The case of instituting four tribes in Babanango without consulting the people concerned was also in accordance to the Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990 that gave Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi power to take decisions unilaterally.

This deprived the people of Babanango their rights over their land such as their arable land that they used for their substance farming and also their grazing land for their livestock. Babanango chiefs tried in vain to fight their case in court but the situation remained unchanged and those instituted tribes remained permanent residents of Babanango area. This went against the ‘statement of belief’ of Inkatha of ensuring politically stable society. We believe that respect for individuals and the value placed on cultural and large groups is synonymous with progress towards a politically stable society.<sup>50</sup>

It is important to note that this practice went against the aims and objectives of Inkatha as one of the aims and objectives of Inkatha was to ensure observance of the fundamental freedom and human rights. Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha failed in this regard to live up to one of Inkatha’s statements of belief that is about believing in individual equality before the law. The Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990 totally became the tool for the violation of civil liberties since it deprived chiefs an

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<sup>48</sup> S. Griffin (Ed.): *Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa, Clarion Call Special Edition*, 1987 p. 8

<sup>49</sup> B. Carton etal. (Ed.) *Zulu identities being Zulu, past and present*, p. 390

<sup>50</sup> S. Graffin(Ed.): *Inkatha the struggle for liberation in South Africa, Clarion Call edition*, 1987, p.6

authority over the land that they claimed to be theirs. One of the clauses of this act stipulated that: a chief should generally seek to promote the interests of his tribe and of the region and actively support, and himself initiate measures and the advancement of his people.<sup>51</sup> The question about the chiefs of Babanango is how they achieved this since their civil liberties were violated in terms of being deprived of the authority of what they believed was originally theirs.

This in short meant that the Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990 under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi violated civil liberties more than its predecessor which was the Natal Code of 1891. In June 1992, Chief Alphas Molefe was suspended and eventually dismissed from his duties as the Chief of Nquthu due to the fact that in August 1989 he had gone to Zambia with other CONTRALESA members. CONTRALESA, seemingly had become an ANC aligned organisation which gave it a sour taste to Inkatha. His dismissal proved that the Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990 was worse in violation of civil liberties since it gave Chief Buthelezi powers to appoint and dismiss chiefs when he deemed fit. This act reduced chiefs (*amakhosi*) to just ordinary civil servants employees that could be employed and dismissed at the discretion of the employer whereas chieftdom is not an ordinary employment but is something that is hereditary in nature that should be given the status that it deserves.

The fact that the reason for his dismissal was not given meant that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was using his own personal discretion that had been given to him by the Act of 1990 which was: “to appoint and dismiss chiefs when he deem fit.” Chief Alphas Molefe’s dismissal preceded a number of cases in the whole of Nquthu that were part of the violation of civil liberties as a result of the behavior of members who were so used to violation of civil liberties through violence.

On the night of November 8, 1992, several homesteads that were within the jurisdiction of Chief Molefe’s area were attacked by an armed group of men that left three people dead including Chief Molefe’s senior headman (*Induna*) and several huts were

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<sup>51</sup>G. Mare and G. Hamilton: *An appetite for power, Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the politics of loyal resistance*, p. 88

burnt. The police came there but they could not make any arrest due to the fact that police were also biased when dealing with Inkatha offences. On December 10, 1992, Meshack Motlaung who was Chief Molefe's oldest advisor was brutally assassinated and his case was also covered up by the KZP by telling lies about him that he was involved in cattle theft. Cases of this were often reported to the police without being given the attention they deserved. There were numerous reports where the KZP failed to protect or to take necessary steps to protect residents, particularly non-Inkatha persons...

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In the other instance there was a case of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo who was harassed and ended up being killed March 1992 due to his numerous offences that had been leveled against him by Inkatha, under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Chief Maphumulo was the President of CONTRALESA who had convened a meeting without informing Inkatha officials about it. In this meeting, Chief Maphumulo fully admitted that he was an Inkatha member, but at the same time he showed a high level of negativity against the discrimination against those who were non-Inkatha members, which of course was a strange concept to all Inkatha as he stated:

*I am an Inkatha man, but that does not mean that I have to discriminate. I have to accommodate every member of my tribe irrespective of their political allegiance, be it UDF, COSATU, Inkatha or Azapo. I will not tolerate people who go from house to house forcing others to join their organization.*<sup>53</sup>

In any normal society where civil liberties were held into high regard, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo's speech would have been tolerated since in any democratic society all people have a freedom of movement, speech and also freedom of choice. In case of KwaZulu, where civil liberties were being violated, Chief Maphumulo was roundly lambasted by Chief Buthelezi for holding the unknown meeting and also for the utterances that were said to be irresponsible. All these instances that were believed to have an involvement of Inkatha and its leader Chief Mangosuthu

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<sup>52</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p.51

<sup>53</sup> G. Moss and I. Obery(Ed.): *South Africa-contemporary and analysis*, p. 483

Buthelezi were seen and are still seen as the gross violators of civil liberties. Natal Code of 1891 surely would have been a better option if chiefs had to be given the opportunity to choose between the Act of 1990 and the Natal Code of 1891. What became notable about Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990 is that it was structured in such a way that it had to assist in creating new members of Inkatha by chiefs (*amakhosi*) since all chiefs were expected to be Inkatha members.

#### **2.2.4 The Proposal for a Federal State of KwaZulu Natal**

It is undeniably true that in South Africa, the 1990s came with changes of high political magnitude that changed South Africa irreversibly for the better. The unbanning of the anti-apartheid movements and also the release of Nelson Mandela added magnitude to the change. This change ushered in the multi-party negotiations that would include all political stakeholders in South Africa, even the black people that had never played any meaningful role in politics other than being reactionary or pressure groups such as United Democratic Front, Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), Inkatha and the unions such as COSATU and FOSATU.

What imperatively transpired in that new political dispensation was the principle of one-man-one-vote system that would be the guiding principle to the fulfillment of the newly proposed democratic order in South Africa? The proposed elections became a sign of hope to many people while on the other hand became a real nightmare for others especially people like Buthelezi whose future with KwaZulu was clouded by uncertainty as a result his party Inkatha resorted to eliminating its opponents.

The IFP had attacked and killed supporters of the ANC alliance as well as others who threatened to its interests.<sup>54</sup> On other hand the white community had fear for a black majority as a result of Blacks' numerical supremacy. The numerical supremacy for black South Africans had been a concern to white people for many decades back in time which remained a contentious and unresolved issue. Inkatha under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi also had a problem of being tactically sidelined since at the start of the preliminary

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<sup>54</sup> A. Jeffery: *The truth about Truth Commission*, p. 161



negotiation processes, there were two major dominating parties that tended to dominate the show, and these were the African National Congress and the National Party.

*In 1990 all emergency restrictions were lifted and in December a constituent assembly, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was set up to work out transitional constitution. Most of the mainstream parties attended but only two, the ANC and the NP, mattered most.<sup>55</sup>*

This was the source of Chief Buthelezi's discontentment that made him to seek for an alternative way that would defend and consolidate his political hegemony in KwaZulu that was under a black cloud. What should be borne in mind is that in South Africa as whole during this period, there was a contentious issue of incorporating Homelands back to South Africa which had remained a highly mooted point amongst the Homelands leaders especially Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of KwaZulu. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi brilliantly and opportunistically took an advantage of these situations which were that of unsatisfied white people about the one-man-one-vote and the issue of incorporation of homelands.

Obviously, this proposal of the Federal State of KwaZulu was really done with a hope of enjoying popular support more especially within the white people since the Federal State, would be a better option compared to one-man-one-vote as it was favoured by the ANC. Federalism therefore became one of many reasons that resulted in the upsurge of the mutual violence between the ANC and the IFP both in KwaZulu and Gauteng especially in the Reef. The Federal State would be the provision of the democratically elected legislative body that would govern the combined regions of KwaZulu and Natal. This proposed system would make KwaZulu/Natal to be part of South Africa but that would be independent of the central authority. In Chief Buthelezi's attempts to woo the white population in order to accept the idea of the Federal State, he employed different ways and means to make this possible such as public speeches that would convince people about his goal. His speeches, always bordered the Federal Government and its advantages so that all people including the white population could see Federal System as the viable

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<sup>55</sup> R.J. Johnson: *South Africa - the first man - the last nation*, p. 202

option of governance. In his speeches he categorically warned the South African population including Whites about the pending pitfalls in South African politics and at the same time giving those options that he thought were viable solutions in the forthcoming political settlement that was eagerly awaited by many people.

*We will see a great many different statements by political parties and organizations in the coming pre-negotiating period. It is not whether parties are saying the right things about what they ought to be negotiating about what is important...If white South Africans want to succeed in establishing something other than a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary state, there will have to be a lot more give and take than the National Parties now evidence of being prepared for. My guess is that we will end up with one or another form of a Federal system of government...*<sup>56</sup>

The whole idea for Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was to rope in the white population especially the white business community into a federal system. He therefore constantly made speeches about Inkatha's ideology that cut across the racial divides. Ideologically, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi believed in a process of power sharing that would have power devolving downwards and that of course was universally recognized and accepted.

*If the IFP and KwaZulu Government want the devolution of power downwards, we want a constitution in which it will be totally impossible for any political party ever to amass the kind of monolithic power which successive National Party Government built around itself. We want the people to have more control over political parties and over Government and we want to bring government closer to the people to make this possible. We also want all political power subjected to the constitution and supervision of the political process by courts.*<sup>57</sup>

Chief Mangosuthu quickly forwarded the constitution of his proposed Federal State trying to lure people from different backgrounds. Sadly, that constitution totally failed to convince people despite the fact that it was well drafted which forced him to resort to another strategy of collaboration with the homeland leaders such Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana and also the white right wing Afrikaans groups such as the Conservative Party and Afrikaans Volkunie to form something that became known as Concerned South

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<sup>56</sup> S. Vos (Ed.): *Clarion Call – South Africa, a new government plan of action*, pp. 7-8

<sup>57</sup> M.G. Buthelezi: *Fourth session of KwaZulu legislative assembly, policy speech*, March 1992, p6

African Group (COSAG). Unfortunately, all these attempts did not help since everything had been unalterably planned for the new political dispensation. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's political career was on the verge of its end, up until it was saved by the Kenyan, Professor Washington Okumu and Kissinger's team. Professor Washington Okumu and the Kissinger's team saved that pending unfortunate situation by persuading Chief Mangosuthu to convince all the IFP members to contest in the 1994 elections. It was in a charged atmosphere that a last-minute invention by Kenyan Professor Okumu, part of Kissinger's team, seemed finally to offer the prospect of a negotiated settlement with the IFP.<sup>58</sup>

### **2.2.5 King Solomon's Inkatha of 1920s**

Inkatha ka Zulu was found by King Solomon in 1928 who became the ruler of KwaZulu as from 1913 to 1933. In a mere fact preparation for inkatha kaZulu's formation started as early as 1924 as a result of a joint effort of kholwa landowners, chiefs and Zulu royal house. These joint efforts in forming of Inkatha signaled a wide spread dissatisfaction amongst these different socio-political groups of KwaZulu in particular as result of the promulgation of the plethora of anti-Blacks laws that became a political heat wave in South Africa that had started soon after the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 .

*The 1913 Natives Land Act, which put to an end to the purchase of land by black people outside their scheduled reserves, struck a heavy blow to the aspirations of the small group of kholwa landowners. The Native Administrative Bill of 1917, followed by the Native Administrative Act of 1920. Made clear to members of this class that their ability to pursue their economic and political aspirations outside the reserves was likely to be made more and more difficult...Many isiZulu-speaking people, both in the rural areas and in the cities, faced lives of increasingly hardship and uncertainty. Under these conditions many of them, particularly in Zululand, were becoming increasingly receptive to calls to unite as people and to give their allegiance to Zulu leaders whose*

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<sup>58</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's power – new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 467

*forebears had fought against domination.*<sup>59</sup>

The word Inkatha had both literal and figurative meanings. Generally, inkatha was made of an interwoven grass that was rolled into a ring shape that was used to balance and cushion the load. Customarily Inkatha was used as a symbol of unity that hung in the Zulu king's residence, representing the unity of the Zulu nation. a sacred coil containing substances of metaphysical significance, bound circularly in woven grass.<sup>60</sup>

Figuratively, Inkatha refers to unity and power of the nation that is aspiring for a common a goal or a purpose.

The purpose for Inkatha was clearly defined by Baleni where he said: “the purpose of the Inkatha had been to keep our nation firm. The binding round and round symbolises the binding together of the people so that they should not be scattered”<sup>61</sup> This in short real serves to signify that the Inkatha KaZulu was aiming at restoring the waning unity among the Zulu people. When King Solomon Zulu took over the Zulu kingdom, the kingdom was clouded by a number of socio-political issues that tended to interfere with the socio-cultural as well as the political life of the Zulu people in particular. In fact, when King Solomon's reign was at its infancy in 1913, a law of draconian nature was forcefully introduced which was the Land Act of 1913 which took about 87 percent of dependable land from the black people in South Africa.

Nationally, there was a massive outcry amongst the black people but little did they know that many oppressive laws were still to be instituted. This law preceded many more draconian laws that also remained a stumbling block to the socio-political development of Blacks in South Africa. Laws such as Native Affairs Administration Bill of 1917, Native Act of 1920 and the Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923 also impacted adversely since it aimed at keeping African political institutions situated in rural areas, something that took a form of homelands that were instituted in the 1960s. On the other hand, there was the emergency of the Zulu speaking middle-class which was gradually

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<sup>59</sup> B. Carton etal (Eds.) :*Zulu identities being Zulu, past and present*, p. 40

<sup>60</sup> N. Cope: *To bind the nation-Solomon kaDinizulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933* p. 108

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*,p., 1913-1933 p. 108

assuming the status of official party for Zulu royalists. Lastly, King Solomon's rule also experienced the emergency radicalized constituency of African workers through unions in urban area that was characterized by sporadic strikes. All these occurrences had a propensity to erode the allegiance of the Zulu monarchy which was a major concern for King Solomon within the Zulu Nation. Civilization forces like Christianity also impacted somehow adversely on the cultural trends of the Zulu nation since culture was a basic element that connected the nation to its king. The influence of the Zulu middle class, especially those who upheld Christian beliefs and convictions slowly but surely shifted the people of KwaZulu from their cultural roots because of some speeches that were delivered by the notable likes of John Dube:

*Upward! Into the highest places of civilization and Christianity-backward into the neither lump of darkness nor downward into the abyss of the antiquated tribal system. Our salvation is not there, but in preparing ourselves for an honoured place among nations.*<sup>62</sup>

Politically, the mid nineteen twenties was further characterized by the emergence of oppressive laws like Hertzog's political Native Bills which was aiming at keeping Africans out of parliament; on the other hand, the then South African legislation made an emphasis that the state was committed to its local policy for limited African self-government in rural areas. In 1925, there was a law that became known as Native Taxation and Development Act.

Among other things, this law stipulated that the Governor-General in consultation with the Native Affairs Commission and the Minister of Native Affairs had to be empowered to issue proclamations modifying the internal structure and operation of the local council, and limiting its powers. What became a cause for concern to King Solomon was that, in presenting these laws to parliament, Hertzog stated that it was particularly intended for conditions in Natal. All these conditions might have driven King Solomon to the formation of a socio-political party that came into existence in 1928 as Inkatha ka Zulu. King Solomon found it very imperative to have machinery that would assist in strengthening the cultural structures that would help in unifying the

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<sup>62</sup> N. Cope: *To bind the nation-Solomon kaDinizulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933* p. 97

whole Zulu nation. In 1928, King Solomon, with the help of people like John Dube, put in place a structure that became known as Inkatha Ka Zulu that was believed to be the restorer of the culture and unity of the Zulu nation:

*...it is necessary to have unity amongst the Zulu people now scattered throughout and outside the Union with a view to establish something tangible and worth the name of the once powerful ZULU NATION and also with the ideas of the obtaining a place under the sun and not infinitely to suffer to be [down] trodden and looked down upon by other nations.<sup>63</sup>*

One of the Inkatha's main aims was to encourage the unity amongst the people of KwaZulu which would help Zulu people maintain their waning identity. In 1920s, there was infiltration of foreign influence through unionism in the form of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) that nearly undermined the authority of King Solomon. In fact the newly formed union, seemed to overshadow King Solomon's authority by adopting responsibility for being a self-proclaimed mouth piece of KwaZulu people which of course was shifting people's hope and trust from the king to the union.

*...after Smith learned of gathering radical protest movements, comprise of KwaZulu workers and peasants seeking more land, better living conditions, and political rights-the ICU yase Natal (Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Natal ) operated openly in Zulu land.<sup>64</sup>*

This obviously showed that other than the king, the people of KwaZulu had someone else to rely upon for the issues that mattered the most which was a disturbing factor for King Solomon. Another aim of Inkatha was to encourage thrift amongst the Zulus and also to establish industries and trades. Inkatha also wanted to create agricultural co-operative for which the Umphini kaZulu fund had been established. Inkatha also aimed at buying or hiring farms, so as to cultivate sugar-cane and cotton together with a variety of fruit and vegetables that might prove funding to Inkatha ka Zulu. In order to ensure the viability of this agricultural project, all produce had to be grown for the open market rather than for subsistence purposes. Inkatha also had to

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<sup>63</sup> N. Cope: *To bind the nation-Solomon kaDinizulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933* p. p. 97

<sup>64</sup> B. Carton et al (Eds.): *Zulu identity being Zulu past and present*, p. 253

establish itself as a broker, buying and selling hides and livestock which was part of its economic boost. Inkatha further aimed at establishing educational and industrial schools for the Zulu people that would be modeled on the Dube's Ohlange Institution. It can therefore be said that Inkatha's main intention was to improve the socio-economic standing for the people of KwaZulu under King Solomon's reign although the constitution that guided Inkatha was so prescriptive that it tended limit these noble aims. Inkatha kaZulu's constitution was prescriptive because some of its clauses were against the expectations of the people that it was supposed to serve. In the first place, the constitution placed a great emphasis on Inkatha's foundation according to Western criteria, and it also put more emphasis on the loyalty to the South African government and British Crown more than expected.

Government officials were entitled to attend any gathering for Inkatha ka Zulu and any member giving evidence of a disloyalty to the throne or government was to be evicted. The constitution *per se* contributed immensely to the downgrading of King Solomon because according to it, King Solomon had to be called a Patron instead of a President which served to dilute the purpose of Inkatha.

It stated equally firmly that Solomon's relationship with Inkatha was that of being a 'Patron,' while the executive leader was to be called the elected president.<sup>65</sup> The only clause that was favourable to Inkatha was that a member of the Zulu royal family would automatically always be a treasurer to Inkatha but in practice that meant Solomon and his heirs. These prescriptive measures in this constitution made it to be very foreign to Inkatha's tribal elites and Inkatha therefore became ineffective. In short, this means that everything Inkatha could plan to do would be strictly under the perpetual surveillance of the South African government which could easily divert its operational objectives. It is imperative to note that within Inkatha, there were factors that led to its decline at a later stage.

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<sup>65</sup> <sup>65</sup> N. Cope: *To bind the nation-Solomon kaDinizulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933* p. 172

His decline of Inkatha kaZulu was neither foreseen nor contemplated; as a result, it was viewed by many people as a premature decline. What can be viewed as weakness of Inkatha as from the outset was the fact that although King Solomon was being driven by the political motives to form Inkatha but his approach was very evasive because his Inkatha only became a socio-economic organization without directly facing the disturbing political issues that were prevalent in 1920s.

*The earlier inkatha sought to advance a range of political concerns and economic ambitions that were suffering under assaults of legislated racial segregation and exclusions, beginning with the Act of Union in 1910.<sup>66</sup>*

Inkatha kaZulu completely failed to address the political side of things which made it to be a fictitious organization that was without a clear goal. This happened despite the fact that plethora of laws that were anti-Blacks with their exclusion by the Union Act of 1910 that was followed by the notorious Land Act of 1913 that took a big portion of land from the black people as some individuals had pointed out . Martin Legassik was the first to draw attention to the importance of segregation as a set of policies specifically designed to cope with strains of a society ...<sup>67</sup>.

Socially, the Zulu people especially men were not accustomed to programmed manual work that was designed for profit making which might be another cause of failure for Inkatha of 1920s. King Solomon and his partners, because of the prevailing political turbulences in South Africa, decided to shun the reality of dealing direct with political issues that remained a thorn in the flesh of the Africans of which the Zulus were no exception. The most deadly disturbance as mentioned above was that of the undue interference of Government officials in Inkatha meetings as it was prescribed by its constitution. Inkatha, under that state of affairs, could not be in a position to formulate a viable plan to deal with their plight since the members of Inkatha were always kept under strict and perpetual surveillance. The emergence of trade unionism such as Industrial and

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<sup>66</sup> B. Carton *et al* (Eds.): *Zulu identity being Zulu, past and present*, p.353

<sup>67</sup> S.Marks: *The ambiguities in South Africa-class, nationalism and the state in the twentieth Natal*, p. 38



Commercial Workers Union (ICU) might again have impacted negatively on the membership of Inkatha. Administratively, money was poorly administered because there was a slight difference between King Solomon's money and Inkatha's money that led to misuse of the organization's money. The 'confusion' that existed between Solomon's personal finances and those of Inkatha was, however, a problem for the future.<sup>68</sup>

This mal-administration of funds inevitably led to its bankruptcy which eventually led to its downfall. Inkatha ka Zulu's other reason for downfall was the fact that it was flanked by organizations such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) and South African Native National Congress (SANNC) with experienced and enlightened leaders such as J.T. Gumede, Pixly Seme and Kadalie for, so their reputation and experience in terms harnessing people's interest remained unsurpassed.

Seme and another prominent Zulu Congress leader J.T. Gumede, both of whom threw their considerable reputations behind the organisation.<sup>69</sup> Most of these leaders had international exposure that Inkatha leaders did not have and also financially, Inkatha's financial standing was less conducive for catering its every day's needs. The leaders of Inkatha kaZulu lacked ability and know-how that would help in marketing it around the country so that it could disseminate its influence, that would help in mobilising people for support. This parochial approach of Inkatha kaZulu really robbed it of the publicity that it deserved that of course would galvanise its existence.

*Further light thrown to the old Inkatha kaZulu of King Solomon by Oscar Dhomo according to whom the organizational included by definition Zulus from all over the country, although its main sphere of influence was in Natal and Zulu royal household in Nongoma. It was exclusive and did not have the organizational expertise and structure such as branches we have today.<sup>70</sup>*

Inkatha's dismal failure might have been *inter alia* caused by the lack of the financial backing and also the low level of its leaders' education that might have helped it to

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<sup>68</sup> N.Cope: *To bind the Nation-Solomon KaDinuzulu and Zulu nationalism 1913-1933*, p.113

<sup>69</sup> B. Carton et al : *Zulu identity being Zulu, past and present*, p.263-264

<sup>70</sup> W. De Kock: *Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa-usuthu cry peace*, p.85

successfully secure funds even from abroad rather than relying on meagre contribution coming from its members. Lastly, the premature death of King Solomon became the deadly blow for its demise since he was the only person who had real and clear vision for this fledgling organization.

## **2.2.6 Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement (1975) and the meaning of 'Inkatha'**

Inkatha was re-launched by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1975 some years after the collapse of the original Inkatha that was founded by King Solomon Zulu who was the maternal uncle to Chief Buthelezi. King Solomon's Inkatha was called Inkatha ka Zulu while Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha became known as Inkatha Ye Sizwe (Freedom of the Nation). During this time Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi showed his versatility of holding numerous positions including that of being the leader of Inkatha. For example, there is Chief Buthelezi Mangosuthu Buthelezi, premier of the KwaZulu homeland authority and the leader of Inkatha.<sup>71</sup> The political symbolism of Inkatha means power and unity especially of the nation. In other words, it is something that has a binding effect to the nation while culturally, Inkatha is an artifact made of the interwoven grass that is predominantly used by the Zulu women to cushion and balance the load which also eases the discomfort on the carrier's head.

*An Inkatha is "so powerfully woven together that it does not crumble and break, it does not slip and dislodge its burden. An 'inkatha' carries the weight of the nation, the treasures of the nation and the burden of the people."<sup>72</sup>*

It should therefore be noted that Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement originally became the movement that claimed to represent and also marshal political aspirations of the people of KwaZulu. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha therefore became a *sine qua non* pseudo political structure of cultural nationalism within the

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<sup>71</sup> M. Orkin: *The struggle and the future-what black South Africans really think*, p.1

<sup>72</sup> S. Johnson (Ed.): *South Africa no turning back*, p. 355

confines or peripheries of KwaZulu which also became an ethnically oriented organization as it was required by the South African government. South African history in mid-seventies took a different turn as a result of Soweto uprisings. This is said precisely because many South Africans became more political conscious, that at a later stage gave rise to consumer boycotts in the country.

Chief Mangosuthu therefore tried to capitalize on this by broadening his political base and aspiration of Inkatha that sought to better the political plight of the poor and under-privileged black South Africans in the whole of South Africa. What should then be borne in mind is that Chief Buthelezi had refused to declare KwaZulu as an independent 'state' like Transkei and Bophuthatswana; this then made him to regard himself as the champion of the black people in the whole of South Africa while regarding other Bantustan leaders as 'lackeys' of the Nationalist Government. This notion was however flatly and contemptuously rejected by people like Steve Biko the leader of the Black Consciousness Movement where he totally rejected Buthelezi's unfounded pretence by saying:

*Our attitude here is that you cannot in pursuing the aspiration of black people and achieve them from a platform which is meant for the oppression of black people. We see this entire so-called Bantustan platform as being deliberate creations by the nationalist movement to contain the political aspirations of the black people and to give them platforms to direct their attention to.<sup>73</sup>*

Other critics also confirmed that Inkatha was just a regional cultural nationalism that was only structured for naïve and parochial issues that had its confines in KwaZulu and it failed to influence things at national level.

*Chief M.G. Buthelezi's Zulu-based Inkatha movement, which has engaged in a vicious campaign to become a major contender in the political process of change, but at the same time such groups effectively define themselves as subnational by appealing only to minority of the population.<sup>74</sup>*

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<sup>73</sup> B. Theron: *The road to democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 [1970-1980]*, p. 835

<sup>74</sup> A.W. Marx: *Lessons of struggle - South African internal opposition, 1960-1990*, p. 7

This sought to reveal the infamy that Inkatha had in KwaZulu due to the fact that it steady but surely violated the civil liberties of other people for instance, Inkatha rigidly controlled public servants in KwaZulu since all people that had to be employed as public servants had to become Inkatha members which was part of violating the civil liberties of the civil servants. On the other side, student doctors, teachers and nurses in KwaZulu were required to take oath of allegiance to the KwaZulu government and to Chief Buthelezi before they could pursue their careers under KwaZulu government. This was the true violation of civil liberties since people were denied their rights to exercise their democratic right of affiliating to the political parties of their own. They were also denied their rights of remaining apolitical since there were people who had no political inclination at all.

It can be said that Inkatha by and large became a serious violator of the civil liberties since it left its power and authority unmonitored in the hands of few irresponsible individuals who turned all the Inkatha dominated places, into their own ungodly kingdoms. The case of Thomas Shabalala of Lindelani became a case in point since he turned Lindelani into a no-go area for non-Inkatha people. This resulted in the deaths of all the Inkatha's non-conformants in great numbers while others were forced to leave Lindelani to find safer places elsewhere. This infamy of Lindelani was further revealed in a letter that was written by the President of the United Democratic Front (Archie Gumede) to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1987 where he stated this:

*There are even instances where law-abiding people (and sometimes apolitical) citizens have been victimised when refusing to succumb to the pressure from Inkatha officials. Take the case of two residents of Lindelani who refused to pay the following dues to an Inkatha Central Committee member: R5 for an Inkatha subscription fee, R1.50 for Inkatha Women Brigade, R3 for United Workers Union of South Africa, R2 for Inkatha Building Fund. And R3 for Shabalala's bodyguard fund. Having successfully defended in court their right not to pay these monies, their house including their belongings was burnt down by Inkatha vigilantes. As a result of this action, these law-abiding citizens who belonged to no political organization, feared for their lives and have not returned to Lindelani.<sup>75</sup>*

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<sup>75</sup> M.G. Buthelezi: *Sixth session of the fourth Legislative Assembly, Policy Speech*, p. 43

This became one of the worst cases of violation of civil liberties in the history of Inkatha in Lindelani since there were people who were totally apolitical, and also very poor who could not afford to pay that money. Inkatha once tried to forcefully extend its ideology by attempting to enforce Inkatha syllabus to all schools that were within the peripheries of KwaZulu. This became another violation of civil liberties since children were inculcated with Inkatha ideology at tender ages before they were ready for any political ideologies. In other words, Inkatha had adopted the German approach during the Third Reich (1934-1945) where children had to be inculcated with Nazi ideology at a tender age which was against the universally human rights.

The draconian attempt of Inkatha in the course of 1980s, Inkatha to control all the communal segments by the vigilantes and warlords led to the killing of a number of school children, more especially in the Durban region such as KwaMashu during the school boycotts, which was also viewed as a gross violation of civil liberties of children because they had to exercise their democratic rights of not doing what was not good for them. As early as 1978, it had become a propensity for Inkatha to target places for high learning like the University of Zululand in particular, since there were students who were known to be anti-Inkatha.

These students were totally not tolerated since it became stock-in-trade for Inkatha to use *amabutho* (regiments) to victimize those students, and there is a memorable case in point for such a situation where Reggie Hadebe, who was a student in this institution was severely victimized by *amabutho* (regiments) in the presence of his parents because he was believed to be anti-Inkatha. Hadebe, who had conveyed the resolution and was graduating that day was attacked and knocked down unconscious in full view of his parents.<sup>76</sup> Another serious altercation between *amabutho* and students which was also viewed as the violation of civil liberties took place in August 1983 that extended to October which led to the tragic loss of lives for students. In the October clash, 4 students died while 115 were injured, 50 of them were in a critical state. In this sanguinary clash, what became a cause of confusion was that students were attacked while they were in

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<sup>76</sup> B. Theron (Ed.): *The road to democracy in South Africa Volume 2 (1970-1980)*, p. 841

their residential places as the *Sunday Tribune Newspaper* of the 4th September 1983 reported:

*Unaware of the pending terror, students said they were eating leisurely Saturday breakfasts, sleeping in or discussing the previous day's meeting when the stillness was shattered by the pounding of sticks and shields and the war cries as the 'impis' swept the campus. Most students ran into the closet hostels and barricaded themselves in bedroom. But the attackers surrounded the hostels, stoning windows, before storming inside to break down doors and attack the barricaded students.<sup>77</sup>*

It should be noted that this was the serious violation of civil liberties on unarmed students who were maimed and killed indiscriminately while they were sitting peacefully in their residences. The 1980s were the years that really took the violation of civil liberties to its greatest toll because there were two movements that were formed (COSATU and United Democratic) which were perceived to be anti-Inkatha and what made things to be even worse was that they were seen as the African National Congress 'surrogates' or ANC-aligned movements. Their existence shifted people's allegiances from Inkatha more especially the working class that joined COSATU in droves because of industrial oppression and exploitation that had remained unchallenged.

Inkatha therefore strengthened its subsidiary structures such as the warlords and the vigilantes that would guard against growing influence of the African National Congress and its surrogate structures within its geo-political sphere of influence. The vigilantes were highly active when it came to violation of civil liberties in most parts of KwaZulu under the banner of Inkatha. Further evidence of Inkatha linked vigilante action emerged in a statement revealing details of attacks against UDF and COSATU aligned organizations in the Durban township of Claremont.<sup>78</sup> Vigilantes grew to prominence in 1980s where it got seriously engaged in an internecine violence with COSATU and UDF because it was trying to curb the growing influence of these two organizations in KwaZulu. What should be noted above all, is

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<sup>77</sup> J. Wentzel: *The liberal slideaway*, p. 224

<sup>78</sup> S. Johnson (Ed.): *South Africa no turning back*, p. 195

that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was against the emergence of any organization that had the potential to test his hegemony in KwaZulu since KwaZulu was a one party 'state'. This then heightened the horrendous activities of the vigilantes that resulted in countless incidents where the opposition members were mercilessly killed within the peripheries of KwaZulu. The recruiting of these vigilantes was facilitated by the fact that they were amongst the poverty-stricken unemployed individuals who could easily be manipulated for financial gain or in kind.

In this way vigilantes steadfastly presented an insoluble problem to COSATU, UDF and other resistance organizations. They operated actively in townships in mid to late eighties in places like KwaMashu especially during the time of school boycotts where they killed and maimed many school children. It is important to note that in addition to the vigilantes, there were 'kitskonstabels' instant constables who were black recruits that were only given only three weeks training as policemen.

This group also added immensely to the violation of civil liberties under the banner of Inkatha in KwaZulu. It must be noted that due growing insecurity within the high ranks of Inkatha officials, Chief Buthelezi approached the SADF for a further fortified defence which resulted in further recruitment of 200 Inkatha members who went for a special training in Caprivi Strip in Namibia in former South West Africa. This training was conducted in a very surreptitious manner up until it was revealed by South African major newspapers that brought to light.

*The Weekly Mail's* revelations of secret military training and financial support for Inkatha members by SADF suggest a gigantic conspiracy...<sup>79</sup> This became a true revelation of how much was Inkatha under the leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was prepared to violate the civil liberties for the benefit of its narrow political ends. It also at the same time revealed Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's devious intention of building his political hegemony on the woes of the nation as it was again exposed by the *Weekly Mail*. *The Weekly Mail's* expose` had demonstrated yet again that Buthelezi was seeking to rise to government over the corpses of the people.<sup>80</sup> Inkatha and its leadership wanted to create a kingdom of reign

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<sup>79</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 303

<sup>80</sup> N. Cope: *To bind the nation-Solomon kaDinizulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933* p. 97

of terror where all people of KwaZulu would be forced to tergiversate what was originally theirs and forcefully accept what Inkatha and KwaZulu imposed on them. The clandestine connection with all these covert groups was a true testimony of Inkatha's unbounded ambition to political greatness. The vigilantes as from its inception became famous for the forced recruitment of the people to willy-nilly join Inkatha, which resulted in numerous cases of the violation of civil liberties to many of those who were against it. The addition of the Caprivi Trainees and *kitskonstabels* (instant constables) aggravated the internecine violence that dominated the whole of KwaZulu as early as mid-eighties to the beginning of 1990s.

Inkatha for these reasons remained as the main violator of the civil liberties in KwaZulu that left many people in a state of orphanhood and homelessness. The existence of these covert groups in KwaZulu were further encouraged by the political vacuum as a result of the unbanning of the anti-apartheid movements since KwaZulu became a highly contested terrain as a result of Inkatha's hegemonic control. It is important to state that Chief Buthelezi left no stone unturned trying to avert and undermine the changes that ended up denting his political image as the violator of civil liberties of all people who were non-inkatha.

In 1990, Inkatha made a change of name to Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) with the hope that, the change might consolidate his partnership with other political giants in South Africa such as the National Party. In fact, all these totally became a fiasco since the Nationalist Party more especially under Willem De Klerk singled out the ANC as the negotiating partner. It is noteworthy to say that all parties including Inkatha became less politically less favourable parties during the transitional years 1990-1994. This state of affair forced Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi resorted to strengthening his collaboration with the covert structures, that became the major reason for the internecine violence that nearly led to the civil war in KwaZulu between Inkatha and the ANC. During this time the ANC became the main role player in South African political affairs represented the interest of all black people .



### 2.2.7 Inkatha and the ANC

The relationship between Inkatha and the African National Congress can be traced as far back as 1928 during the first Inkatha of King Solomon since John Dube who was the former President of the ANC assisted King Solomon in forming Inkatha kaZulu. This was the first in a series of attempts made by Dube to involve Solomon directly in the 'kholwa' political world and the Congress-style political process.<sup>81</sup> It should also be noted that politically, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was groomed by the ANC at his tertiary level days in Fort Hare where he constantly rubbed shoulders with the ANC members such as Zakes Mathews and Robert Sobukwe who mentored him.

All the same, he had the connections with almost all the old ANC leaders. At least in the early days, his actions within KwaZulu Bantustan had a private support of the ANC in exile.<sup>82</sup> It is also important to note that Chief Buthelezi grew up as an ANC Youth League member during his school days in the University of Fort Hare; this relationship went a long way up until Chief Buthelezi formed his Inkatha in 1975, where he was morally supported by the ANC in exile with the hope that it would be an internal surrogate for the ANC that would sustain and disseminate the ideology of the exiled ANC.

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi maintained his connection with ANC even after his school days by keeping close ties with Chief Albert Luthuli until the ANC was banned in 1962. After the banning of the ANC, Chief Buthelezi maintained a tacit and yet tenuous relationship with the ANC and he finally parted ways in 1979 after the disagreement that they reached in London on armed struggle and economic sanctions. This therefore resulted in circulating rumours coming from the ANC about assassinating Chief Mangosuthu since he was labeled as a sell-out and a traitor. In fear for his life Chief Buthelezi quickly made an appeal to the South African government in order to guarantee his personal safety and that of other senior officials of Inkatha that might be part of that plot to assassinate Inkatha officials. The South African officials, especially the SADF

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<sup>81</sup> N. Worden: *The making of modern South Africa*, p. 153

<sup>82</sup> R. Ross: *A concise history of South Africa*, p. 149

department, were more than prepared to assist Buthelezi to strengthen and consolidate his safety by taking some Inkatha members and give them training in Caprivi Strip in Namibia. These trained Inkatha members became known as the Caprivi members. These Caprivi Trainees combined with the pro-government elements that became known as the 'Third Force' that specialized in killing the anti-apartheid activists; they also played a crucial role in fomenting violence between African National Congress and Inkatha. The success of 'Third Force' in helping Inkatha to deal with the anti-apartheid members relied on its secrete strategy of remaining unknown to the public.

*During the late 1980s and early 1990s, we spent considerable time and ernergy trying to establish who and what the Third Force was; the sinister, secretive force that continued to foment conflict between especially the main ethnic party in KwaZulu-Natal, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC and its internal sinister movement the United Democratic Front (UDF). More than 15000 people died in this conflict between 1985 and 1994.*<sup>83</sup>

The combination of the Caprivi Trainees and the Third Force became a political heat wave that was aiming at the total annihilation of the African National Congress and its surrogates such as COSATU and the UDF. This political scuffle between Inkatha and COSATU/UDF was fueled by the territorial contestation between them since Inkatha regarded itself as the sole owner of KwaZulu, and therefore could not brook anyone who claimed territorial and democratic rights within KwaZulu. This Inkatha attitude became inextricably connected with the presence of the Caprivi Trainees to extend and consolidate the course of violation of civil liberties in KwaZulu between 1990 and 1994.

The success of the Caprivi Trainees in this covert operation relied on advance training given to them by the South African Defence Force under the code known as 'Operation Marion'. The training took place in strict secrecy in the Caprivi strip in Namibia from April to October 1986, under the code name *Operation Marion*.<sup>84</sup> These trainees were integrated into the KwaZulu Police after completion of their training and they were mentioned in many cases of violence in KwaZulu Natal. The mid-eighties was characterized by growing violence

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<sup>83</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.) *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 108

<sup>84</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 154

between Inkatha and the United Democratic Front (UDF) that had become the new internal surrogate for the ANC. The United Democratic Front was formed as a result of the ever increasing government's anti-blacks laws in South Africa. The immediate spur to the founding of the UDF was the government's proposals in 1982 and 1983 for the reform of the influx...<sup>85</sup> The UDF soon duplicated the ANC in all its forms which made it arch-rival of Inkatha for the bigger part of the 1980s. Towards the end of the eighties, after the release of the first ANC political prisoners that included Harry Gwala was the 'firebrand' for the ANC, who brought hope to both ANC/UDF supporters in every speech he made such as one he made in Durban on 12 August 1989, where he promised his supporters that: we will take freedom to you by force if necessary.<sup>86</sup>

The arrival of Harry Gwala in the Midlands heightened and intensified the internecine violence between Inkatha and UDF/ANC. On the other side, Inkatha had David Ntombela as its firebrand that co-ordinated all violent activities for Inkatha in the same area. In this way, Pietermaritzburg and the surroundings became a highly contested terrain. Neither Inkatha nor UDF/ANC was prepared to surrender. As a result, the warring elements marshalled their respective areas of dominance. Inkatha had the warlords that played both defensive as well as offensive roles, while on the ANC side there was a group that became known as comrades some of whom were the members of Umkhonto Wesizwe.

### **2.2.8 The London Meeting (1979)**

The London Conference between Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the ANC took place as from 30 to 31 October 1979 after several abortive attempts. This conference was held in one of London's prestigious hotels known as Excelsior Hotel under the chairmanship of Bishop Alpheus Zulu. Unfortunately, the issues of interests between these two organizations were of different nature which became the reason for the failure of the London Conference. What seemed to shock the ANC was that Chief Buthelezi had completely forsaken all principles of the struggle as he had agreed to be internal ANC 'surrogate' when the ANC helped him in forming Inkatha in 1975.

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<sup>85</sup> T. Lodge and B. Nasson: *All, and now, black politics in South Africa in the 1980s*, p. 35

<sup>86</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 255

*He found the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in 1975 at instigation of the ANC in the hope that, as the Illustrated Readers Digest History of South Africa (1994) states Buthelezi would keep the flame alive in the region.*<sup>87</sup>

Due to changing circumstances, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi had to revise his ways of working with the ANC in exile which would be a non-violent means in dealing with South African government in order to avert the unnecessary loss of lives. This happened after Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi had tried several times but in vain to maintain a healthy relationship with the ANC in exile by trying to persuade the ANC to employ non-violent approach to South African solution.

*I sent emissaries abroad charging them to argue the merits of multi-strategy approach with them, and to offer them co-operation in those projects where Inkatha's aims and objectives coincided with the ANC Mission in Exile aims and objectives –and where tactics and strategies were not mutually hostile...In all my discussions with the ANC in Exile I was adamant that Inkatha should remain Inkatha and that it should remain committed to the black popular will which expressed itself in Inkatha's massive membership and was articulated through its democratic machinery*<sup>88</sup>

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi put forward the view that if the future had to be stable in South Africa, it was important that the central and dominating forces had to begin showing opposition to apartheid. He regarded Inkatha and ANC as the suitable mechanisms to achieve this view but in a peaceful manner that would not be regrettable after freedom had been achieved . Chief Buthelezi preferred a situation where both ANC and Inkatha would like to see the South African Government brought to the point of power sharing, that would produce unity of purpose among South Africans, the exiled African National Congress, Inkatha and the intransigent South African regime in a way that would avoid the loss of innocent lives unlike other countries in Africa that attained their freedom at the bitter cost of their people's lives and infrastructural

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<sup>87</sup> J. Lnnegar: *Every step of the way – the journey to freedom in South Africa*, p. 254

<sup>88</sup> S. Graffin (Ed.): *Clarion Call - Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa, Special edition 1987*, pp. 18-19

projects such as schools, industries and any other forms of development. The fact that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in his statements did not make any mention of economic sanctions and armed struggle clearly showed his opposition on these two African National Congress's proposals. The ANC steadfastly maintained that, there would be no meaningful negotiations in South Africa between them and the militarist regime of P.W. Botha and Magnus Malan without their policy of armed struggle being fully employed. The African National Congress through Oliver Tambo affirmed its adherence to strategic objective of pursuing the seizure of power from the South African regime in order to build a democratic, non-racial and peaceful South Africa had been visualized by the Freedom Charter of 1955. The African National Congress further confirmed that if the situation dictated, they would use all possible means and ways to achieve this objective.

This African National Congress stance was diametrically at variance with the *modus operandi* that Inkatha had suggested which of course served to widen the gap between Inkatha and the African National Congress. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi therefore showed an overwhelming surprise when he realized that the ANC was still the adherent of violent means of solving South African situation and he therefore strongly and openly forwarded his negativity towards the use of violence. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi therefore summed up things as follows:

*If you cannot bring about change through democracy, you will never have democracy after change... I have campaigned for non-violent solutions to South Africa's problems throughout my political life. I reject the use of violence for political purposes.*<sup>89</sup>

On the other hand, the ANC's demands were different. Although it was also about co-operation it put its emphasis on armed struggle, economic sanctions and also the people of war that were highly opposed by the Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his delegation. Inkatha through Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi rejected the armed struggle, the people of war and economic sanctions since it believed that, this ANC strategy was

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<sup>89</sup> S. Vos (Ed.): *Violence time to call halt, Clarion call*, Volume 1, 1990, pp. 6-15

only there to delay the economic progress and the political freedom of black people as it would serve to destroy peaceful means of achieving freedom. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was amongst those who believed in foreign investment that would free South Africa from its poverty.

*The first view encourages investment. The view says that help South Africa to grow, so that they should be encouraged to invest here freely. This view is supported by PW Botha and the Nationalist Government, businessmen like Harry Oppenheimer, Chief Mangosuthu Gasta Buthelezi and Inkatha, and other homeland leaders*<sup>90</sup>

This was the major reason that forced Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi , to adhere to peaceful means of dealing with apartheid in South Africa. Chief Buthelezi therefore persistently and tenaciously adhered to his peaceful stand point because he had a belief that he was strongly backed by his more than one million Inkatha card-carrying members. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi put it strictly and categorically that these members of Inkatha had repeatedly expressed in their meetings and conferences against acquisition of freedom through violent means.

He further stated that violence would only bring more anguish to his people that were already in dire poverty. This London Conference between representatives of Inkatha and the ANC totally failed to come with a common plan that would satisfy both concerned parties. This situation irreversibly further widened the already existing ideological rift between Inkatha and ANC. It therefore created the perennial animosity between them which in later years became the cause of the internecine violence in the whole of KwaZulu in the 1980s and 1990s.

It can be undoubtedly said that the disastrous outcome of the London Conference signaled political violence that nearly brought KwaZulu into a civil war as from the eighties to early nineties. As a result of this state of affairs, the then General Secretary (Alfred Nzo) of the African National Congress (ANC) openly labeled Chief Buthelezi

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<sup>90</sup> M. Orken : *The struggle and the future-what black South Africans really want*, p. 8

and his Inkatha members as politically bankrupt careerists and renegades who would be swept onto the rubbish heap of history. In the early of 1980s, ANC propaganda machine vigorously swung into action against Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi giving all negative labels such as calling him a puppet, stooge and collaborator. This showed that there was not even an inch of relationship left between the ANC and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha totally became *persona non grata* to all African National Congress members as John Nkadimeng, a member of the NEC, referred to Chief Buthelezi while on Radio Freedom Lusaka in the 80s:

*It is clear that the puppet Gatsha\* is being groomed by the West and the racist regime to become Savimbi in a future free South Africa. The onus is on the people of South Africa to neutralize the Gatsha snake, which is poisoning the people of South Africa. It needs to be hit over the head.<sup>91</sup>*

The ANC and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi had taken irreconcilably different ideological routes that left no hope for future political co-operation. The then President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo also voiced out his dismay on Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi 's attitudinal change since his organisation, Inkatha was given by the ANC a huge moral support during its formative years with a hope that it would become an internal 'surrogate' for the ANC in Exile.

*Unfortunately, we failed to mobilise our own people to take the task of resurrecting Inkatha as a kind of organisation that we wanted, owing to the understandable antipathy of many of our comrades towards what they considered as working within the Bantustan system. The task of reconstituting Inkatha therefore fell on Gatsha Buthelezi himself who then built Inkatha as a personal power base far from the kind of organisation we had visualised.<sup>92</sup>*

This therefore represented an eternal turning point in their relationship. The African National Congress therefore took it upon itself and other patriotic forces to raise the level of consciously organized political activity which would enable people to conquer this tyranny which was apartheid. As a result of this, the African National

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<sup>91</sup> P. O'Malley: *Shades of difference, Mac Maharaj and the struggle for South Africa*, p. 294

<sup>92</sup> J. Baskin: *Striking back – a history of Cosatu*, p.329

Congress more than any time before, in the early 1980s, wanted to protest vigorously against the brutalities that the racist regime was perpetrating against it and its supporters. Under these circumstances, the ANC said directly that however brave and heroic are mass actions like Soweto uprising they could not win them any liberation and so, the armed struggle and people's war would remain a key element in their struggle for liberation. The outcome of the London Conference between the ANC and Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi therefore became a disastrous one. It led to a total split between Inkatha Cultural Movement and the African National Congress (ANC).

Dr. Buthelezi held tenaciously to his principles of non-violence since he believed that politics and economy were inseparably intertwined, so one had to be careful of achieving one at the expense at the other. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi firmly believed that any political strategy that can be wrongly and mindlessly employed for the sake of acquiring freedom could destroy all the economic prospects of the country and would make that acquired freedom to be meaningless and insipid, since recovering from political disarray and economic downturn would be very costly and nearly impossible after the war no matter who wins. He therefore openly admitted that his political stance had irreparably strained his relationship with:

*The fundamental position I hold in my leadership has brought me into confrontation with revolutionaries and all those who want bring about downfall of South African government by making the country ungovernable through violence the revolutionaries in South Africa*<sup>93</sup>

This statement showed Inkatha and its leadership's negativity towards violent means of attaining freedom. This kind of stance that Inkatha and its leadership took had a far reaching consequence because in early 1980s the ANC had to align itself with other internal surrogates which were the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) which became sworn enemies with the Inkatha.

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<sup>93</sup> Z. Cele(Ed.) Opening of the L.A, umxoxi Volume 1, 1988,P.14



This situation served to irreversibly diversify black South African political history more than ever before.

### **2.2.9 The advent of Inkatha Freedom Party**

Inkatha Freedom Party is the modified name of the Inkatha National Cultural Movement that was re-launched by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1975. In 1990, Inkatha used the word 'freedom' for the first time ever in order to meet the pending political challenges of the coming home of the banned anti-apartheid movements such as the ANC, AZAPO, SACP and many more. The unbanning of the anti-apartheid movements gave Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi some sleepless nights thinking about the ways and means to deal with forthcoming challenges. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi then decided to re-align and strengthen Inkatha's subsidiary structures such as vigilantes, KwaZulu Police and he also revived his covert relationship with the South African Government.

It is important to state that at this time, the political dispute that led bloodshed between Inkatha and the ANC became inevitable. Inkatha in many if not all rural areas wanted to forcefully extend its political hegemony. This reluctance by Inkatha to allow other parties to operate remained a root cause for an internecine violence in the whole of KwaZulu. In part, the conflict in the areas stems from reluctance by Inkatha to extend even the most basic rights to its political opponents.<sup>94</sup> Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the leader of Inkatha, tried by all means to keep this a reality by entering into covert relationship with the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS) and also with South African Defence Force (SADF). This involvement of SADF and NIS in planning of killing people had serious repercussions in careers of some people involved.

*In any event, in December 1992, seven SADF senior officers were placed on compulsory leave and 16 others (including two generals and four brigadiers) placed on compulsory retirement, with substantial severance packages, for unauthorized activities linked to*

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<sup>94</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 108

*political violence which led to killings.*<sup>95</sup>

This obviously showed the weakness of the South African Government under F.W.de Klerk because these officers and brigadiers had to be given summary dismissals if the government was really serious about the justice that would eventually credit it as a good government to all people. KwaZulu Police were also engaged in killing anti-Inkatha people in their jurisdiction, be it in townships or in rural areas which became a gross violation of civil liberties by Inkatha and its subsidiary structures.

The KwaZulu Police almost acted like the military wing for Inkatha during this transitional period. KwaZulu, under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, swelled the ranks of KwaZulu Police with new recruits most of whom had been trained in Caprivi in Namibia which was formerly known as South West Africa. Most of these policemen were taught little about the nature and the duties of police but all what they were taught was to deal with the opposition especially the members of the ANC. The KwaZulu Police areas of operation were densely populated areas like townships and some rural areas where they killed people randomly and indiscriminately in big numbers.

“In KwaZulu-Natal, however, where Inkatha continued to try and assert hegemonic control, the violence continued, with KZP hit squads remaining active.”<sup>96</sup> What should be remembered is that in the early 1990s, South Africa had preliminary negotiations like the Pretoria minutes and the Groot Schuur minutes where Inkatha was given less political spotlight. These preliminary negotiations were dominated by the ANC and the National Party (NP) which made Inkatha to further strengthen its relationship with some of the state agents which had come to be known as the ‘third force’. Moreover, members of the government’s covert forces such as Eugene de Kock, the head of Vlakplaas began to work on behalf of Inkatha.<sup>97</sup> The direct involvement of the state gave Inkatha an upper hand over its opposition. At some instances, there were some prominent representatives of the then South African government, such as Colonel Louis Botha who surreptitiously subsidized Inkatha in order for it to execute its covert

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<sup>95</sup> D.R. Howarth and A.J. Norval (Eds.): *South Africa in transition*, p. 23-24

<sup>96</sup>*ibid.*, p. 24

<sup>97</sup> L. Nancy *et al.*: *South Africa - The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 104

activities. Colonel Louis Botha, once paid a staggering amount that resulted in a scandalous situation in July 1991 Horwarth and Narval state:

*State support for Inkatha was most firmly demonstrated by Inkathagate, when in July 1991 a number of SAP Security Branch documents were leaked to Weekly Mail, revealing that the police, through Colonel Louis Botha, paid over R25000.00 to help Inkatha.<sup>98</sup>*

This then proved beyond doubt that Inkatha's strategies to deal with the opposition were fast becoming complicated and diverse more especially after 1990. During this period there were two well-known individuals who were operating on their own by inciting Inkatha members, more especially in the rank and file level to fight all the ANC related structures and also to kill people if possible. These people who were actively involved in doing this were Themba Khoza and Thomas Shabalala.

Themba Khoza was from Eshowe but he spent most of his time in Gauteng where he brewed and fermented violent activities against the non-Inkatha members (ANC) more especially those who lived in the vicinity of the hostels. Politically, Themba Khoza came from rank and file level and he quickly made a meteoric rise to national level where he became an Inkatha Youth Brigade leader. Khoza actively criss-crossed both KwaZulu and Gauteng forcefully wielding Inkatha's influence to all non-Inkatha people.

He was therefore because of this, mentioned in many sanguinary attacks both in KwaZulu and Gauteng. His activities added immensely to the violation of civil liberties as a result he earned respect and popularity within Inkatha senior members. His political counterpart Thomas Shabalala, from Lindelani on the northern side of Durban became actively involved in serious violations of civil liberties. Shabalala was another Inkatha activist who was respected by his people and yet mostly feared by his opponents. Lindelani under Thomas Shabalala became a slaughterhouse since it became a no-go area for non-Inkatha people. As a result, many people fled from Lindelani to other safer places. In Lindelani, all non-Inkatha people were inhumanly treated and all Inkatha supporters and the police began to disregard all the structures that were put in

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<sup>98</sup> D.R. Howarth and A.J. Norval (Eds.): *South Africa in transition*, p. 20

place to keep peace. In this regard Minnaar states:

*At present Shabalala and his 'police' continue their intimidatory activities ...Even after the National Peace Accord was signed on the 14<sup>th</sup> September 1991, violation of this accord occurred in Lindelani where Shabalala's supporters were again involved in acts of intimidation involving Lindelani residents.<sup>99</sup>*

It was the very reason that made most people leave Lindelani for other places as refugees. People were also forced to pay illegal and endless dues that also became the reason for the violation of civil liberties because all those who failed to meet the demand were taken as anti-Inkatha and killed by Thomas Shabalala's surrogates. These dues that were willy-nilly paid by people made people to regard Lindelani as a political slaughterhouse because all the non-adherents were killed which increased the number of people killed as a result of the violation of civil liberties. Generally, the number of people who died in this four-year period 1990-1994 was statistically higher than those who died in the 42 years of National Party's rule that stretched from 1948-1994.

It is important to note that the increase in statistics of violence was aided by the clandestine operation of the 'Third Force' which was the state-sponsored element. Indeed, the death toll was extremely high throughout the transition, due to Inkatha's ruthlessness and apparent activity of some state-sponsored 'Third Force'. This made this four-year period to be worse years in the history of South Africa. The independent observer, Janet Cherry, had this to say about the death toll statistics:

*The figure of deaths due to political violence in South Africa between 1960 and 1994 is commonly given as between 20000 and 30000 but from February 1990 to April 1994...14000 to 15000 deaths occurred.<sup>100</sup>*

In the 1990s, Inkatha also heavily relied on its supporters and vigilantes to bolster and stabilize its influence in rural areas as well as in townships. Vigilantes played both

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<sup>99</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 80

<sup>100</sup> J.S. Saul and P. Bond: *South Africa-the present history*, p.133.

offensive as well as the defensive roles which made them to be a *sine qua non* structure for Inkatha's subsidiaries. Vigilantes were formed in mid-eighties and it enjoyed the support of Inkatha senior members such as Prince Gideon Zulu who was one of Chief Manogosuthu's right hand men.

Vigilantes inflicted deadly blows on all non-Inkatha members because of the backing they received from these senior Inkatha members. The vigilantes forcefully applied its inhumane approach to all people who were non-Inkatha members such as forceful recruitment and also forcing people to attend meetings and rallies for Inkatha both in rural areas and townships. The growing influence of urban radicals provoked local power struggles with conservative vigilante groups determined to assert their own supremacy over townships.<sup>101</sup>

In fact, these vigilantes, because of their unregulated authority, forcefully demanded support from township officials, teachers, local councilors, small township capitalists like shop keepers and church officials like Priests. Every member of the community had to have his or her allegiance clearly coded and that code had to be that of Inkatha membership. Archie Gumede the then President of the UDF stated to the letter that he once wrote to Chief Buthelezi about the plight of the Methodist Minister of KwaMashu, where the minister said: I was made to walk down the road in a broad daylight (by the vigilantes). Many of them were armed. I was forced to wave my fist in the air, and chant 'The UDF is the dog'.<sup>102</sup>

This symbolized that Inkatha supporters had been attuned not to respect or honour any person or structure that was not Inkatha. These vigilantes made a lethal combination with KwaZulu Police (KZP): as a result, some vigilantes ended up being recruited as KwaZulu Police constables. Vigilantes played an important but yet a devious role of escalating violence in the whole of KwaZulu and also in Gauteng.

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<sup>101</sup> A.S. Mackimmon: *The making of South Africa - culture and politics*, p. 260

<sup>102</sup> M.G Buthelezi: *Sixth session of the fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1988*, p. 44

*Inkatha members, supporters or vigilante elements were, according to the HRC, responsible for 34 of the 49 massacres reported over the two years since July 1990, with township residents and ANC supporters only responsible in six cases.*<sup>103</sup>

When one looks at this violence ratio between the ANC and Inkatha one can easily realize that the ratio somehow disproportionately placed Inkatha on the lead of violation of civil liberties. Inkatha, during 1990s, made a connection with some deadly gangs that were recruited as para-military elements. They were given training that specialized in killing people using all forms of brutality. Some of these gangs were the 'Black Cats' that operated in Wesselton who openly admitted that they were recruited by Inkatha in order to assist in violation civil liberties.

Gangs like these formed a very complicated network that made serious random attacks more especially in places like Johannesburg in Soweto that had become another operating zone for Inkatha other than KwaZulu. In 1990, this violence shifted from KwaZulu to Gauteng where it became the reason for numerous massacres. On the 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1990, there was an attack that was made in a Soweto-bound train in which 26 people were instantly killed. According to a reliable informant, the killers got to the train with pangas and AK 47s.

These killers had been strictly told not to speak while they were in a train because they might cause some suspicions to the nearby passengers since they were Namibians who had been brought for a special purpose of perpetrating violence. In this context, it is therefore appropriate to observe that Inkatha was doing what Renamo did in Mozambique between 1982 and 1988 where people were killed in trains, especially in congested trains. The random killing of people featured prominently in Inkatha's strategy that became known as classic destabilization tactics that Inkatha employed in 1990s when dealing with their political opposition. Howarth and Narval note:

*The point of randomness serves a political agenda: for tactically, the random choice of victims to camouflage the source and [b]y attacking individuals at random within community known to support*

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<sup>103</sup> D.R. Howarth and A. J. Narval (Eds.): *South Africa in Transition*, p.20

*a particular organization, a form of collective punishment is imposed and people are terrorized into avoiding any support or contact with that which brings them misery.*<sup>104</sup>

In the early 1990s, up to the election year in 1994, the vigilante elements grew enormously in such a way that it worked hand in glove with all the Inkatha related subsidiaries such as the KwaZulu Police, chiefs (*Amakhosi*) and the headmen (*Izinduna*). It should be noted that violence in the South Coast started when chiefs and *izinduna* (headmen) felt that the UDF and later the ANC intended replacing them with civic and village committees. The intensity of violence was felt in some places of KwaZulu-Natal even after the 1994 elections. Shobashobane which is 200 kilometres south of Durban was amongst those places that experienced violent attacks even after that the multi-racial elections, since its residents were attacked by Inkatha members on 25 December 1995. This cruel attack of the ANC members by Inkatha led to the massacre that left about 19 ANC supporters dead.

This KwaShobashobane massacre was master-minded by the tribal institutions in a form of chiefs who were Inkatha-aligned members, since their fear entirely laid on the uncertainty of their positions in a democratic South Africa. This uncertainty resulted in perpetual threats to many chiefs in KwaZulu and for this reason they made sure that there was no progress for and democratic move that might leave them in limbo. Another element of conflict is the increasing pressure on tribal institutions to give way to democratic practices.<sup>105</sup> What came to light here was the politically bigoted police who were former KwaZulu Police failed to come to the rescue of Shobashobane despite the fact that they had been warned timeously about the pending danger. This meant that the culture or the mentality of the violation of civil liberties was deeply rooted more especially among those who were the former KwaZulu Police (KZP). On the other hand, it showed the obstinacy within Inkatha to part ways with their violent nature. There was a noticeable tendency that Inkatha did in collaboration with the police both the SAP and KwaZulu Police. KwaNongoma in Northern KwaZulu was another place that really remained unchanged as even after 1994, internecine pockets of violence were found

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<sup>104</sup> D.R. Howarth and A. J. Narval (Eds.): *South Africa in Transition*, p. 20

<sup>105</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 109

in KwaNongoma. Inkatha in KwaNongoma did not have a political space for opponents as from its inception in 1970s. After 1994 the ANC members forcefully registered their presence with a hope that the no-go areas had been changed. In April 1999 the ANC for the first time ever launched a local branch and started recruiting preparing the forthcoming general election in June 1999.

Joseph 'J.B.' Sikhonde did much to oppose that move and enforced the hegemony of Inkatha in the area. Sikhonde made a tenacious grip on the taxi industry as well as other trading businesses in the town of KwaNongoma. For this reason the whole taxi industry was politicized since the Nongoma Taxi Association (NTA) split in two factions led by Mangisi Buthelezi and Mkhalka Zungu. Mangisi Buthelezi soon fell out of everybody's favour since he was suspected to be in league with the African National Congress; as a result, he was forced out of KwaNongoma. This was a totally undue political intolerance since South Africa by then was democratically ruled. This then added to the violation of civil liberties by Inkatha supporters more especially in KwaZulu.

### **2.2.10 Conclusion**

The violent incidents that came as a result of the violation of civil liberties in KwaZulu from 1990 to 1994 nearly brought South Africa especially KwaZulu to a full scale civil war as a result of black on black violence. The whole situation in this five-year period was a real portrayal of reality in reverse since the targeted stumbling block which was the apartheid regime that had for many years held black majority with the reigns of terror and oppression, remained unscathed. The intransigence of some black leaders more especially during the transitional era led to untold massacres such as the Boipatog and Bisho massacres that nearly halted the whole process of the negotiations. The magnitude and the intensity of these massacres forcefully drew the attention of the notable South African politicians as the results of this Nelson Mandela states:



*...Bisho will rank alongside Boipatong on that roll call of infamy that recounts the past two years of de Klerk's incumbency...The Bisho Massacre should alert all South Africans. De Klerk's continued emphasis on strong regional government, outside of the democratic process and within the context of the homelands, has given a signal to the repressive structures built up over the years by the apartheid regime that they can do what they like to retrench their authoritarian rule.<sup>106</sup>*

The significance of the transitional period culminated in the formation of relationships between unlikely partners who were Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the right wings Afrikaners such as the Conservative Party and Volkunie Party to form something that became known as Concerned South African Group (Cosag). Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's effort of trying to halt and nullify the multi-party negotiations was being pushed by the fact that ANC might get the hegemonic control of KwaZulu which he regarded as a place in which he had an inalienable right. I... will not be the one who lays himself down before the ANC's war machine to be mangled upon in the ANC's march forward to supremacy over all.<sup>107</sup> Chief Buthelezi was showed his non-compliance o allowing KwaZulu to become part of multi-party South Africa as it was proposed by the South African government and the African National Party.

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<sup>106</sup> N.L. Clark and W.H. Worger: *South Africa - The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 107

<sup>107</sup> D.Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid in South Africa*, p .400

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL OPERATIONS OF KWAZULU GOVERNMENT AND INKATHA.

*“The law of the Creator, which invests every human being with an inalienable title to freedom, cannot be repealed by any inferior law, which asserts that man is property.”*

*-Salmon P. Chase*

#### 3.1 Introduction

The KwaZulu government came into existence in the early 1970s, and in 1975 Inkatha Freedom Party was formed as the only political entity. Inkatha became an indispensable institution of KwaZulu since it was its quasi-political institution of KwaZulu government that would play a pivotal political role for KwaZulu government. Inkatha had a major task such as that of ensuring patriotism of KwaZulu to all people of KwaZulu. To inculcate and foster a vigorous consciousness of patriotism and strong sense of national unity based on a common and individual loyalty and devotion to our land.<sup>108</sup>

KwaZulu government and Inkatha worked congenially together for 29 years starting from 1975 to 2004. Inkatha became a dependable and reliable institutional vehicle for the entire socio-political activities of KwaZulu government, since it was taken as the political passport for KwaZulu government in so far as life necessities were concerned especially things like employment. In this way Inkatha had a herculean role of shaping and promoting the political allegiance for all KwaZulu government's civil servants in order for them to have an unbroken loyalty to the government of KwaZulu. Inkatha also ran the political affairs of KwaZulu as a whole; as a result, Inkatha became the heart of

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<sup>108</sup> W. De Kock: *Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa-usuthu cry peace*, p.174

KwaZulu government. In this way Inkatha and KwaZulu government fell under a vigorous and rigid leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi who selfishly led these institutions for almost three decades which resulted in him claiming that all Zulu speaking people were Inkatha members. During these years of co-existence between Inkatha and KwaZulu government Chief Buthelezi's prominence grew to such an extent that sometimes he even felt that his political representativeness of black people even went beyond the peripheries of KwaZulu to South Africa as a whole.

*...Buthelezi has established himself as a serious participant in shaping a future South Africa. He has done this through highly publicized meetings with the world leaders to whom he speaks on behalf of 'black South Africans.'*<sup>109</sup>

This then gave Chief Buthelezi a chance to interact freely with national leaders and continental leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia at one stage as well as some international leaders such as Margaret Thatcher of Britain. In this process of his representativeness he totally seemed to overshadow in all aspects King Goodwill Zulu who is a hereditary King of all Zulu speaking people. Regionally, Inkatha and KwaZulu government wielded a very strong influence to the people of KwaZulu ranging from ordinary people, civil servants and Chiefs. The civil servants, because of this unsweaving influence, had to swear a pledge of allegiance to the KwaZulu Government in order to secure their future with the KwaZulu Government.

### **3.2 Relations with the apartheid regime**

Both Inkatha and KwaZulu Government developed strong relations with the apartheid regime over the years of their existence. This relation lasted for almost three decades as it started from B. J. Vorster to F. W. de Klerk. The highest level of this relation took place during the presidency of P. W. Botha in the mid nineteen eighties as a result of the emergence of the United Democratic Movement in 1983 and also the union revolution in industries that led to the formation of COSATU in 1985. The mid 1980s in KwaZulu

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<sup>109</sup> G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.): *South Africa - contemporary analysis*, p. 481

were highly threatened by the emergence of the two organizations since they seemed to intervene negatively with the hegemony of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha. This state of affairs forced Chief Mangosuthu as the leader of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha to tighten the belts of relations with the apartheid regime even further. Under F.W. de Klerk when the anti-apartheid movements had been unbanned, the relations between Inkatha and apartheid regime grew even stronger moving from strength to strength which resulted in the emergence of something that became known as the 'third-force'. In a mere fact this was the continuation of what had started even before F.W. de Klerk in 1980s.

*Inkatha's adversarial relationship with the ANC heated up in 1980's and , amidst a conflict that killed thousands of people, Inkatha faced well-founded accusations of collusion with the apartheid state and its military arm, the South Africa Defence Force (SADF).<sup>110</sup>*

The third-force was private and hideous activities that were driven by the state agents such as some senior members of the police and also some senior members of the South African Defence Force (SADF). SADF as far back as 1986 was directly involved in giving the secret training to about 200 Inkatha members who became known as Hippo in Caprivi strip in Namibia. In addition to this, the SADF further gave training to Inkatha supporters in urban areas and guerrilla warfare at the base near Mkuze in the northern KwaZulu.

These Inkatha trainees were then constantly and repeatedly used in hit squads to assassinate anti-apartheid activists in KwaZulu-Natal. During this period, the Nationalist government injected a substantial amount of money that was used to fund Inkatha rallies that had one main purpose of counteracting and opposing the ANC which became a direct source of violation of civil liberties in provinces like KwaZulu and Gauteng ( former Transvaal). The implication was that the government funding had been used to fund a rally where exhortations of violence by Buthelezi and other IFP leaders had triggered some of the worse violence ever witnessed.<sup>111</sup>The third-force was

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<sup>110</sup> B. Carton etal: Zulu identities being Zulu, past and present,p.354

<sup>111</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 284

the injection of secret funds by the government agents to the IFP in order to promote black on black violence in order to destabilize peace initiatives amongst the black people. This covert collaboration between Inkatha and the apartheid regime had far reaching consequences since it nearly nullified the process of multi-party negotiations in the early nineties. The covert relations between Inkatha and the apartheid regime took place in numerous forms such 'Third Force' where some of the state employees personally took an active role in plotting the deaths of all those who were against Inkatha especially the ANC members.

The other form of this covert relation existed in the funding of Inkatha by the apartheid regime to establish its own paramilitary forces that had one purpose which was to annihilate all those who were against Inkatha. What also needs to be known is that the relation between Inkatha and apartheid regime took place either directly or indirectly. There were times when the apartheid regime agent personally and directly took part in killing people on behalf of Inkatha. The most commonly known and remembered incidents were those of Eugene de Kock the head of the Vlakplaas. There were numerous people who were killed in these covert operations that were strictly between Inkatha and the members of the apartheid regime.

*SAP covert unit, C10, under the command of Colonel Eugene de Kock and operating from Vlakplaas outside of Pretoria was engaged in propagating train and hostel violence and the manufacture of 'home made' weapons for the IFP.<sup>112</sup>*

This involvement of the apartheid regime in destabilizing the ANC through Inkatha further proved the existence of the covert relations that had dire consequences to the people of South Africa. On the other side of these relations, there was an indirect involvement of the apartheid regime agents where they injected a sizeable amount of money to Inkatha to fund its covert programs. There was a case where Colonel Louis Botha in July 1991 paid over R250000 to help Inkatha. This money of course helped Inkatha immensely to achieve its political ends against the ANC. This then shows the

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<sup>112</sup> D.R. Howarth and A.J Norval (Eds.): *South Africa in transition*, p. 20

massive involvement of the 'Third Force' in black on black violence that nearly halted the proposed political changes. The 'Third Force' was only discovered very late because of its nature since it was a subtle but yet highly sophisticated and ruthless scheme that could easily escape even the eyes of the vigilant observers. In most cases, when violence and the activities of the 'Third Force' is discussed it mindlessly and haphazardly confined between 1990 and 1994, but in fact, it went beyond this assumed timeframe.

Notably, the 'Third Force' that came into existence as a result of the covert collaboration between Inkatha Freedom Party and the apartheid regime, became a self-propelled machine even after 1994 since it continued to make its presence felt in places like Magoda near Richmond about 40 miles south of Pietermaritzburg. These were the remnants of the 'Third Force' activities more especially in KwaZulu-Natal where Inkatha once had its strong hold. People on the ground failed to understand the deaths of their loved ones since some of this violence happened when they thought that the country was by then free.

*Most blacks who had been victims of the violence instigated by the 'Third Force' believe that they were caught up in that vicious cycle killing because white extremists and their henchmen were behind destroying black rule.<sup>113</sup>*

This was the aftermath of the 'Third Force' activities that ended up being driven by the diehard individuals who believed in status quo of the apartheid. In Gauteng, hostel dwellers who were Inkatha members were given weapons by the state police. One policeman nicknamed 'Iron fist' or the 'A Team' became instrumental in fermenting violence between Inkatha and the African National Congress. 'Iron fist' seemed to be the one of those policemen who was a self-proclaimed state agent since he was supplying Inkatha members with weapons.

*Days before the violence erupted in Soweto, newspapers reported that a white policeman went into the Meadowlands Hostel and told*

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<sup>113</sup> G. Mwakigile: *South Africa-in contemporary times*, p.154

*that the ANC vowed to exterminate Zulu hostel dwellers.*<sup>114</sup>

This policeman literally urged the Inkatha supporters to strike before the ANC did. He also highlighted the ethnic difference between the Zulu and the Xhosa speaking people in order to intensify racial animosity that would fuel the ethnic violence. In August 1991, newspapers eventually revealed what became hard evidence of a link between the police and Inkatha. This revelation left F.W. de Klerk with no option but to dismiss the Minister of Defence Magnus Malan and the Minister of Police Adriaan Vlok from their posts, Magnus Malan was given a new post which was Minister of Water and Forest while Adriaan Vlok was made a Minister of Correctional Services. This was somehow seen as a tacit admission of guilt on F.W. de Klerk's side but at the same time he was also seen as the person who was conniving with the wrongdoers since he failed to come with a decisive decision of terminating their services. This of course would have given De Klerk a creditable position that would also exonerate him from any form of blame.

### **3.3 Zulu ethnic homogeneity**

Zulu ethnic homogeneity has grown quite extensively over the years from the time of King Shaka who was the founder of the Zulu nation. It has become the pride and honour of the isiZulu-speaking people. The word homogeneity means sameness of things or people of the same population group with common historical background and also lingua-cultural orientation. Zulu language over years has gained a lot of recognition even beyond the peripheries of KwaZulu as a result of its superior Zulu ethnic homogeneity as compared to other ethnic groups in South Africa. This has led to Zulu language to be taken as black lingua-franca that facilitated language problem in a racially mixed situation especially in gold mines in Witwatersrand that became known as isi*Fanaka lo* (Zulu pidgin language).

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<sup>114</sup> P. Bonner and L. Segal: *Soweto, a history based on the video documentary*, p. 154

*The cities and towns of the Witwatersrand, for example, housed large heterogeneous populations, including a great many isiZulu-speaking labour migrants from KwaZulu and Natal. While derivations of IsiZulu provided the foundation for a black lingua franca in and around the gold mines and some townships, other African languages became important in daily communication...Yet the omnipresent Zulu ethnic character rarely instigated inter-ethnic faction fighting. Indeed, Zulu identity, regional particularities and black nationalism were intermingled in careers of Durban-based isiZulu speaking notables such as John Dube, Selby Msimang, A.W George Champion, Albert Luthuli and Josiah and Archie Gumede, all of whom emerged as leaders in the early and middle decades of the twentieth century.* <sup>115</sup>

This justifies the magnitude of the Zulu ethnic homogeneity that dominates other ethnic homogeneity for other groups. It has therefore been monopolized and manipulated by some individuals in socio-political domains as their own creation whereas there have been many people who were involved in moulding and shaping it, some of whom very little is known about them.

*...the embryonic sense of Zulu ethnic identity and nationalism, enunciated by William Ngidi and other members of the Zulu intelligentsia in the mid and later nineteenth century, took hold and spread, increasingly cutting across and sharpening class divisions.* <sup>116</sup>

It should be however noted that, this Zulu ethnic homogeneity has stood firmly against the colonial inroads such as the sanguinary battle of Isandwane in 1879, Bhambatha rebellion in 1906 as well as against the scourge of apartheid that stretched from 1948-1994. The magnitude of Zulu ethnical homogeneity is underpinned by various factors such as numerical supremacy that is higher than other ethnic groups which has been the result of their superior military strength and prowess especially when compared to other African ethnic groups. Zulu people as the nation, manifested its prowess as early as during the time of King Shaka who earned his respect by conquering other ethnic groups to form one formidable Zulu nation in 1816-1828. King Shaka was never defeated until he was assassinated by his two half-brothers Dingane and Mhlangana on the 24<sup>th</sup> September 1828. This legacy of military prowess was cherished by the Zulu people and it became a reason for King Cetshwayo's army to conquer the indomitable British colonial

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<sup>115</sup> B. Carton *et al* (Eds): *Zulu identity being Zulu, past and present*, pp.607-608

<sup>116</sup> C. Hamilton *et al.*: *The Cambridge history of South Africa Volume 1. From early times to 1985*,



army in Isandlwane battle in January of 1879. Although the victory of the Zulu people over British army was short-lived but it left an indelible memory to the Zulu people as a result it boosted their pride of Zuluness. The Zuluness which is formed and shaped by various factors such as their language, history, culture, and their heroic deeds pushed the Zulu nation to the greatest heights; as a result, the Zulu nation became widely known nationally and continentally. ... Zulu ethnic nationalism is now a significant feature of the Southern African landscape... <sup>117</sup> These ethnical homogeneity factors have kept the Zulu tradition alive long after the Zulu kingdom was tragically truncated by the British forces soon after the battle of Ondini on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August 1879. It has been the gist and reason for the Zulu people to take pride in their culture through their traditional attire, music and their war cries.

Notably, as early as 1970s when KwaZulu Government came into existence, Chief Buthelezi took an advantage of the Zulu ethnic homogeneity to boost his socio-political status. He became an unscrupulous manipulator of the Zulu ethnic homogeneity when he formed the Inkatha in 1975, he did this by referring to all four and the half million Zulu speaking people as all Inkatha members irrespective of the fact that they were not all the affiliates of Inkatha. It can therefore be said that he deliberately capitalized on the ignorance of the masses to use the Zulu ethnic homogeneity to boost his personal image and that of Inkatha. He used incorrect and unfounded emphasis of the saying that Inkatha and the Zulu ethnic homogeneity were inextricably intertwined and therefore cannot be separated:

*In other words, all members of the Zulu nation are automatically members of Inkatha if they are Zulus. There may be people who are inactive members as no one escapes being a member as long as he or she is a member of the Zulu nation.* <sup>118</sup>

He therefore regarded Inkatha and Zulu ethnic homogeneity as an inextricable entity; in other words, they are two sides of the same coin. He then forcefully declared Inkatha as

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<sup>117</sup> S. Johnson (Ed.): South Africa no turning back, p. 1

<sup>118</sup> G. Mare and G. Hamilton: *An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of loyal resistance*, p. 57

the natural home for all Zulu people and for this reason his belief was that, ‘to oppose Inkatha was to oppose the Zulu nation’. In the first place, this notion made him and his people to brook no criticism on Inkatha no matter how trivial could it be. Secondly, this notion made him to be against the formation of any other political party within the peripheries of KwaZulu. It is important to note that this second notion of failing to tolerate the formation of other political parties within the periphery of KwaZulu at a later stage became a reason for internecine violence when UDF and COSATU were formed in early 1980s.

His resistance to see other parties being formed in his back yard became a major reason for the violation of civil liberties of those who did so like many UDF and COSATU followers who were executed because of this mentality of denying them a right of association as it was guaranteed by human rights. This kind of mentality undoubtedly became the reason for the upsurge of violence between Inkatha and COSATU/UDF followers. Zulu ethnic homogeneity became Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s source of strength from which he drew power and inspiration more especially when he was challenged. In 1985, when COSATU was launched in Durban, it soon went into logger-heads with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi due to the fact that COSATU called for economic sanctions which Buthelezi was against.

Chief Buthelezi used the Zulu ethnic homogeneity to ward off many challenges for instance he used it during the time when COSATU and other revolutionary elements were calling for economic sanctions. He pointed that: Seven million Zulus had not given him a mandate to call for sanctions.<sup>119</sup> This seven million was the total number of all the Zulu people by then ranging from small children to the aged people some of whom were totally apolitical not to mention the children who did not even know what politics was all about. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi because of the Zulu ethnic homogeneity that was embraced by all Zulu people therefore mistakenly believed that Inkatha and the Zulu ethnic homogeneity were synonymous. Politically, the number of seven million simply

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<sup>119</sup> G. Mare and G. Hamilton: *An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of loyal resistance*, p. 117

becomes an apocryphal figure because most of the working class had been absorbed by COSATU that was an African National Congress aligned movement. The very same situation of ‘doctoring’ figures of Inkatha supporters became the cause of the internecine violence in 1980s and 1990s when people proved to be otherwise.

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s misguided notion caused by the Zulu ethnic homogeneity had made him to regard all Zulu people as Inkatha which was factually incorrect. This ill-conceived notion had some dire consequences in intensifying violence since he regarded the whole of KwaZulu people as his political entities that had to be naturally his political tools to uphold and promote his political inspirations. He therefore expected all the Zulu speaking people to willy-nilly join Inkatha forgetting that Inkatha as the political structure had to be joined by choice not by the command of someone’s will.

It can be said that to a certain extent he was able to achieve his goal since his notion was quickly entertained by many people who began to believe that all Zulu speaking people were Inkatha members while all Xhosa speaking people were the African National Congress members. This whole concept was supported and spread by the high ranking officials of Inkatha. This therefore ranked among the primary causes of the violence as it was mentioned by the National Party MP Schutte.

*...while National Party MP Schutte explained the violence to the BBC as a glorified faction fight between ‘Zulu’ Inkatha and ‘Xhosa’ ANC/UDF.<sup>120</sup>*

The formation of the UDF was seen by many people as if it was formed within the parameters of Inkatha territory so it was therefore regarded as an undue intrusion of the outsiders to Inkatha’s own backyard. This was the very reason that escalated the violence since according to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi all the Zulu speaking people who had joined both ANC and UDF were like ‘rotten potatoes’ to be totally exterminated. In early 1990s, the highest number of people who were killed in KwaZulu was killed because they were believed to be anti-Zulu and pro-Xhosa. To everyone’s surprise, this political

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<sup>120</sup> G. Moss and I. Obery: *South Africa - contemporary analysis*, p. 477

misconception went on unchallenged by the then South African government since it served to perpetrate the black on black internecine violence. The extent of that damage caused by the manipulation of the Zulu ethnic homogeneity could therefore not be undermined since it was the cause of thousands of deaths both in KwaZulu and the Reef (Gauteng). Many Inkatha officials and even King Goodwill Zulu were amongst those who manipulated the Zulu ethnic homogeneity, for instance the king could use the Zulu history to boost and strengthen the nature of the Zulu nation's identity that would make it appear mightier than other ethnical groups in South Africa.

It was so unfortunate that in the process of manipulating this Zulu ethnic homogeneity, the whole situation ended up becoming tribalism while Inkatha members claimed to be the custodians of non-tribalism and non-racialism. In KwaZulu, all the professionals like lawyers who were either Sotho or Xhosa people were blackmailed as perpetrators of school boycotts in 1980s. The assassination of Griffiths Mxenge's wife Victoria in KwaZulu was said to be of political nature but in a mere fact her assassination also had an ethnic connotation since she was of Xhosa origin. The Zulu King Goodwill would sometimes use some irresponsible and inflammatory statements that were so tribal in nature that were as the result of Zulu ethnic homogeneity which stirred the Zuluness in people which could easily result in irresponsible behavior.

*Those who want to drive the Zuluness out of the souls of the people of Durban will be eradicated one by one. We are the people of warrior blood, forged as a people in war and peace.<sup>121</sup>*

These are the kind of irresponsible and inflammatory words that were used to manipulate the historical heroism of the Zulu nation. This clearly shows how much could the Zulu ethnic homogeneity be manipulated by people especially the notable ones like the King and others who were expected to be apolitical, to achieve their selfish and murky ends. Again, in 1982, the tribal nature of the Zulu people forced them to oppose the incorporation of Ingwavuma into Swaziland just because Zulu people would never be under the Swazi people who were somehow regarded as an inferior tribe and again on the

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<sup>121</sup> M.G. Buthelezi: Sixth session of the fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, policy speech, p45

side Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was afraid that he would lose the ethnic supremacy that had been his source of pride for years. Inkatha therefore constantly used tribal attacks on Indian leaders who were in United Democratic Movement. These are the reasons that perpetuated intolerance of the democratically built organizations such as the African National Congress, COSATU and UDF by Inkatha that claimed to be the representatives of the Zulu ethnic homogeneity. It therefore caused an exaggerated ethnical hostility that became a direct cause of the internecine violence amongst the people of KwaZulu and other black ethnic groups such as the Xhosa people who were in constant clash with the Zulu speaking people more especially in places of ethnical mixed residences such as hostels. This therefore led to the huge mistrust between the Zulu speaking and the Xhosa speaking people that eventually led to hostility.

This resulted in constant clashes between the Zulu and the Xhosa people; as a result, the Zulu people often failed to establish a healthy relationship with those people who were not of Zulu origin. This therefore served to encourage tribalism among Zulu people that made them not to be in harmony with other people. This was clearly demonstrated in a letter that was written by the President of UDF Archie Gumede to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in mid-eighties where he clearly stated that: In addition, you often couch political conflicts in ethnic terms. For example, you referred to the Anglican priest and UDF patron Mcebisi Xundu as Xhosa priest troublemaker.<sup>122</sup> This kind of abuse was deliberately encouraged by the senior Inkatha members who constantly led to disrespect of other people, this unfortunately perpetuated ethnic animosity which became a prime cause of ethnic violence.

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<sup>122</sup> M.G. Buthelezi: *Sixth session of the fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, policy speech, March, 1988*, p. 45

### 3.4 The Public Service and Party Political Activities.

The civil service of KwaZulu Government was very diverse and multi-departmental as from its inception in early seventies. The civil service comprised of Chiefs, traders, teachers, nurses and the legal department: the magistrates and attorneys with the Prime Minister Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi who wielded a very strong influence on these civil services. This class of civil servants became known as petty bourgeoisie stratum. Amongst these civil servants, Chiefs were given a preferential treatment within KwaZulu Government more particularly when it came to remuneration. ..Through the KwaZulu government's system of patronage which pays them and which has treated chiefs more sympathetically than civil servants with regard to salary increases.<sup>123</sup>

The reason for this preferential treatment is thought to be the fact that Chiefs were regarded as the 'fathers of the nation' at the grassroots level. The fact that the Chiefs were so close to the people at grassroots level in KwaZulu meant that they could interact with these people on a daily basis. That gave Chiefs an easy access to inculcate any influence to these grassroots people about any intended course or purpose that would strengthen their Inkatha support. For this reason Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi highly valued Chiefs as a result he once said,

*We will preserve the traditional system of Chieftainship in KwaZulu and re-affirm our constitutional relationship with the Paramount Chief and will build our future state with the regard to our cultural heritage and traditions adapted and fructified by the ideals of Western civilization and democracy and modern scientific principles."*

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This kind of affirmation that Chief Buthelezi made, showed his undiluted intention to preserve Chieftainship in KwaZulu since this was the structure that backboned him in his traditional structures. In 1990, when the political situation changed in South

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<sup>123</sup> M. Moss and I Obery: *South Africa- contemporary analysis*, p. 483

<sup>124</sup> G. Mare and G. Hamilton: *An appetite for power- Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of resistance*, p. 89

Africa, against being influenced and destroyed, he instituted the law that would safeguard this Chieftainship against being influenced and destroyed by the newly unbanned political ideologies. Chief Buthelezi instituted the act that became known as Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act of 1990 that replaced the Natal Code of 1891 that was instituted by the British under the tutelage of Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1891. In KwaZulu Government the most represented petty-bourgeois strata were the traders. Traders unlike Chiefs existed within capitalism and were economic orientated individuals. They therefore stood to gain more from Inkatha Freedom Party's control of the KwaZulu Legislature Assembly.

This stratum enjoyed access of business licenses, business sites and access to finances from KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation. This trader corporation did not go without conflict as a result of economic policy and also about the distribution of sorghum beer within KwaZulu. They then, in order to register their dissatisfaction, supported boycotts of white-owned shops. The conflicts within the traders intensified; as a result, there was a split from Inyanda which was the African Chamber of Commerce for the region. This split led to the formation of another body that became known as KwaZulu/Natal Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KwaNacoci). When further complications arose within Inyanda it led to the resignation of its Chairman Mr. P.G. Gumede which was followed by the resignations of another two main officials of the Nafcoc who were Reuben Shabalala and Roger Sishi. These events that took place in close succession drew the attention of the media, especially the newspapers:

*Inyanda's very survival depends on the strong membership and support it enjoys among the rural KwaZulu traders, most of whom are staunch royalists and would not dream of questioning Inkatha policies. The power of the numerically strong rural traders was used to bring the rebels into line.*<sup>125</sup>

This in short meant that Inkatha's over interference to businesses might have led to the instability of those businesses. Other unnecessary practices were forcefully placed on the civil servants especially the professionals such as teachers, nurses and doctors. It must be

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<sup>125</sup> G. Moss and I. Obery: *South Africa - contemporary analysis*, p. 484

noted that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was trying to increase his control over these civil servants but sadly, these pledges only served to bring a lot of tension and dissatisfaction among the petty bourgeoisie strata especially within doctors. These pledges even drew the attention from other quarters such as UDF as it was clearly stated in an open letter that Archie Gumede the President of UDF wrote to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in mid-eighties where he stated these words:

*Forcing medical practitioners and students to sign pledges also constitute in my mind an unreasonable infringement of fundamental people's rights. We believe that the enforcement of this loyalty pledge has caused clashes even in Ulundi where many Government employees have been unwilling to sign the pledge. The situation has reached a most unfortunate stage where allegations are made that your security officers are interviewing government employees to check on their 'trustworthiness to Inkatha.'*<sup>126</sup>

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi became within KwaZulu Government the symbol of authority and also the most revered person since he held two major positions; firstly, that of being the leader of KwaZulu Government and also the leader of Inkatha Freedom Party. He therefore demanded an ultimate and absolute respect from all KwaZulu petty bourgeoisie strata especially the teachers and doctors who were asked to solemnly declare not to vilify, denigrate and also to speak in contempt of Buthelezi and cabinet of KwaZulu Government. The issue of the 'pledge' became a very contentious issue since, some elements within KwaZulu government such as doctors who refused to sign the pledge of allegiance which of course infuriated some senior members of KwaZulu Government such as Dr. Frank Mdlalose who was the Minister of Health in KwaZulu Government.

All in all, what can be said about the relationship of KwaZulu Government and its civil servants is that it was always full of tension and uncertainty which resulted in unhealthy relationship between KwaZulu Government. This kind of political entitlement impacted negatively on Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's support and popularity. In early eighties, Chief Buthelezi's popularity showed a drastic drop when

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<sup>126</sup> M.G Buthelezi: *Sixth session of the fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly policy speech March 1988, p43*



compared to imprisoned Mandela because Chief Buthelezi had become *persona non grata* outside the peripheries of KwaZulu because of his parochial views that left no space for non-Zulu speakers.

*...Schlemmer's research showed that Buthelezi's support had declined to 32, 5 per cent, while Mandela's had risen to 34 per cent. Moreover, while Mandela's support was evenly spread across the country, Buthelezi's was restricted to Natal.*<sup>127</sup>

This erosion of Chief Buthelezi's support was as a result of Chief Buthelezi's conservative and parochial approach that he employed in marketing his personality and also the political standing of Inkatha. Inkatha in most cases was regionally and culturally bound which created a fertile ground for excluding the non-Zulu speakers. That is to say, Inkatha's attraction is weakest in the more populous regions, and its association with a Zulu cultural nationalism keeps non-Zulus out.<sup>128</sup>

### **3.5 Relations with the Trade Union movements**

Unions in KwaZulu were no strangers since they had been in operation as early as the seventies. The institution that became Trade Union Advisory and Co-ordinating Council (TUACC) was formed in Durban in 1973; its main aim was to offer courses in trade unionism under the guidance of unionists and academics. This institution had arisen out of need to coordinate activities of the first trade unions formed in 1973. The first two unions formed in Durban in April 1973 were Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) and Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). The TUACC soon developed a corporation with KwaZulu through Barney Dladla who was the Minister of Community Affairs.

Barney Dladla had shown support for strike movement which led in him being removed from his post. This was the first reaction of KwaZulu Government to the union activity. Barney Dladla ended gathering enough popularity than even threatened

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<sup>127</sup> S. Johnson (Ed.): *South Africa: no turning back*, p. 359

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*: .p. 359-360.

Buthelezi's leadership in KwaZulu. Barney Dladla soon stole a huge publicity amongst the distinguished individuals such as Halton Cheadle and Harriet Bolton who both gave him envious praises something that can be regarded as a reason that created a rift between him and Chief Buthelezi.

*The fairly brief formal relationship between the fledging union movement and the KwaZulu authorities was troubled mainly by Buthelezi's conflict with Dladla who was probably the strongest alternative leader within the constituency to which they both appealed.*<sup>129</sup>

Barney Dladla's popularity and fame grew from strength to strength as a result in March 1973 Dladla delegated to meet with the management and the workers of Alusaf in Richards's Bay during their strike for salary rise. In January 1974 Barney Dladla led a massive march of 5000 workers in New Germany industrial complex to the main mill of the notoriously exploitative Frame Group. What became remarkable here was the fact that while Dladla's popularity grew, Buthelezi's suspicion toward unionism also grew.

*During 1974 Buthelezi went so far as to condemn strikes, presumably taking into account the effect of strikes on business confidence and willingness to invest.*<sup>130</sup>

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi began to engage himself with other Bantustan leaders in a state-sponsored advertising campaign for investment which would mean more work in the country. This era of early seventies marked the beginning of negativity of KwaZulu Government toward the unions. In mid-nineteen eighties there was a massive development of unionism that led to the formation of the biggest union in the history of South Africa.

This union became known as COSATU that was formed in November 1985, which became a gigantic trade union within KwaZulu with neither their consent nor knowledge and what even made things to be worse for KwaZulu Government was that COSATU was formed in its backyard in Durban. This formation of KwaZulu

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<sup>129</sup> Mare and G. Hamilton: *An appetite for power Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of loyal resistance*, p. 121

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

Government was like ‘back stabbing’ to the whole of KwaZulu Government and Inkatha Freedom Party. COSATU became the archenemy of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha. On the trade union front, Buthelezi attacked COSATU, the new umbrella trade union federation launched in Durban 1985...<sup>131</sup> This was beginning of rivalry between Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi since COSATU proved as from the outset to be an African National Congress aligned organization; its leadership was dominated by the Xhosa speaking people and seemed to claim industrial hegemony for the employees of KwaZulu region and South Africa as a whole. For these reasons, many people who were Inkatha members were made to be anti-COSATU; as a result, one of the Inkatha members known as Cele who was also a former member of FOSATU once said:

*Things started changing when FOSATU changed to COSATU. This caused Inkatha to take part and said that COSATU was not good; they were accused of being the ANC. Inkatha said that all the Zulu people should not join and those that have joined COSATU should resign and join other the union which was formed by Zulu people and Zulu Government. They did not succeed because there were few people who joined them. I was also a member of Inkatha and we said that we must work together with ANC as we thought they were together, and that is how people started hating us.*<sup>132</sup>

When attaching meaning to the above said words one can easily be convinced that COSATU was taken as anti-Zulu organization that had to be ostracized by all Zulu speaking people. That therefore meant that any union that could be formed in KwaZulu would be an ethnically-oriented union where only Zulus would join. COSATU, on its launch day of in Durban showed a massive numerical supremacy which brought fear and uncertainty to KwaZulu Government and Inkatha.

This numerical supremacy even went against the notion that all Zulu speaking people were Inkatha members and they could not easily entertain any idea coming out either of Inkatha or KwaZulu Government. Secondly, COSATU’s growing influence was fast extending outside the work place which made both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha

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<sup>131</sup> M. Orken : The struggle and the future –what black South Africans think, p. 56

<sup>132</sup> A. Sitas: *The Mandela decade, 1990-2000*, p. 88

to be uneasy about the future of their political hegemony in their own area. This then forced Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi who was the leader of these two institutions, KwaZulu Government and Inkatha to form his own counter union in 1986 which was known as the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). UWUSA as from its outset became an Inkatha-aligned union that was ready to fight COSATU be it in companies, farms, factories or shops.

It should be noted that during its inauguration in Durban, UWUSA had about 60000 followers although many of them were just ordinary people who had been press-ganged to attend this gigantic launch of UWUSA thinking that gathering had to do with a Zulu cultural connection since many Zulu speaking people had been told to be in their cultural attires and they had to openly carry their traditional weapons. The whole situation became a portrayal of Zulu militant warriors that was ready for war than a labour union gathering which was a true manipulation of the Zulu people by Inkatha/KwaZulu Government in order to satisfy their political ends.

It was a display of raw power with thousands of militant *impis* (Zulu warriors) chanting traditional war cries and brandishing spears and knobkerries.<sup>133</sup> UWUSA in its inception seemed to enjoy a huge success although it was ephemeral; this was because of its immunity to the harsh imposition of the deterrent and restrictive governmental laws such as the State of Emergency of 1986. The State developed a proclivity to be more tolerant of UWUSA to things that the State could not tolerate when it was done by other unions such as COSATU. UWUSA probably proved to be a state-sponsored labour movement since it was exempted from any form of harassment. This therefore indicated a close relationship between UWUSA and the State.

*UWUSA was formed with the full sanction of the apartheid system and the fact that it had been taken advantage of by the state indicates their opportunism. We are convinced that their formation was a reactionary act taken by the state in collusion with some employers.*<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>133</sup>J .Naidoo: *Fighting for justice-a lifetime of political and social activism*, p. 113

<sup>134</sup>*Ibid.* p. p. 114

Therefore, its aim was to counteract COSATU which was fast gaining undue popularity within the labour force. UWUSA was the management-orientated and inexperienced union because it was formed by people who were all in management positions; as a result, they did not have any union experience. Unlike COSATU, UWUSA membership numbers who attended the first part of its launch did not reflect the real number because many people who had attended its launch day had been forced to do so. They were there partly because of the pressure of 'traditional' authority –Chiefs were instructed to fill buses (provided without charge) and to get the people to Kings Park.<sup>135</sup>

It seems that all circumstances that surrounded UWUSA were so unreal because the number of 70000 people who attended the launch of UWUSA was not a true reflection since most attendees had been forced by the traditional authorities as part of traditional allegiance to Inkatha and KwaZulu Government. UWUSA for this reason failed to live beyond its first decade of its existence.

The whole leadership of this trade union did not have any work experience other than the fact that they were high ranking managers such as General Secretary S.Z. Conco who was a KwaZulu businessman and its President P.S. Ndlovu who was just a Personnel Officer with the giant Tongaat-Hulett. They all did not have any experience to organize workers at grassroots level and they lacked the political experience that their counterparts in COSATU had. To say the least, UWUSA since its inception, did not have any record of fighting for labour affairs for its affiliates but it became a fierce opponent for COSATU members and all those who were anti-Inkatha. It therefore openly became an anti-strike union that dissuaded people from participating in strikes.

*In May, the UDF and COSATU called for a stay away to boycott the white-only election. It was very successful but Inkatha and their running dog, UWUSA, tried to get people to ignore it.*<sup>136</sup>

This kind of attitudinal stance further widened the rift between UWUSA and its original purpose of improving the socio-economic standard for its affiliates. It fully involved itself

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<sup>135</sup> G. Mare and G. Georgina: *An appetite for power and politics of loyal resistance*, p. 133

<sup>136</sup> M. Kentridge: *An unofficial war inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg*, p. 34

in sanguinary encounters between it and other unions ‘affiliates throughout KwaZulu that led to high level violation of civil liberties. While UWUSA has not much impact on conventional industrial relations, a horrifying wave of violence on the shop-floors and in the township of Natal followed its wake.

*The deaths of eleven Hlobane coal miners in May 1986 of Food and Allied Works Union (FAWU) shop steward at Jabula Foods on the East Rand June 1986, and two MAWU shop stewards at BRT Sarmol near Pietermaritzburg in December 1986, served as ugly testimony to this new trend.”* <sup>137</sup>

UWUSA was only mentioned in political-related issues; it therefore shows that it was more on political affairs than labour affairs. This kind of behavior was shown at its infancy since most of its violent encounters were registered in 1986 which was its formation year. It can therefore be undoubtedly declared as Inkatha subsidiary that had one undiluted purpose of killing all the opponents. This therefore meant that the dream of KwaZulu Government of having a strong union that would compete with COSATU became a fiasco.

UWUSA’s main aim was to block COSATU at every turn in order to discourage its development. On the other hand, UWUSA was assisted by the South African apartheid government by detaining members of COSATU to create space for UWUSA to grow in membership. The widespread detention of COSATU leaders in potential UWUSA growth areas prompted speculation that the state was actively attempting to create ‘space’ for Inkatha aligned union. <sup>138</sup> This was because UWUSA, was not that much involved in labour affairs but it was pro-free market unlike COSATU that was so involved dealing with labour affairs in a serious sense.

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<sup>137</sup> S. Johnson (Ed.) *South Africa no turning back*, p. 160

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, p.160

### 3.6 Policy and position on armed conflict

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi as the head of KwaZulu Government took a strictly negative stance on armed conflict as early as nineteen seventies. This is the very stance that forced him to part ways with African National Congress just after the London Conference in 1979 that was between him and the leadership of the exiled ANC. When Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi formed Inkatha in 1975 he stressed the policy of non-violence since he believed that any form of violence might hinder socio-economic development not only of KwaZulu but of South Africa as a whole. This is the very reason that forced him as early nineteen 80s to disseminate the idea of non-violence even outside the peripheries KwaZulu. In 1981 Chief Buthelezi spoke to the community of councilors in Sebokeng near Vereeniging in Gauteng Province where he told them that:

*Violence is a terrible fate and, apart from my moral objections to it, our people will lose much, much more than those supporting the government before victory is achieved. Brothers and sisters, our people can fight and if necessary they will fight. If fighting was that strategy that could bring change soon, we would be part of that action now. Our judgment, however, is that at this point it would to be a war which cannot be won.<sup>139</sup>*

Chief Mngosuthu Buthelezi's maintenance of non-violence was the strategy that any liberation movement could employ in the struggle for liberation. In his supporting argument he further stated that there was no single liberation movement in the history of South Africa that had ever adopted the strategy of violence while it was still operating within South Africa because even the African National Congress (ANC) which then encouraged violence as the instrument of change, operated in South Africa as a non-violent movement for 48 years from 1912-1960. Chief Buthelezi openly viewed the policy of the African National Congress of favouring the

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<sup>139</sup> J. Wentzel: *The liberal slideaway*, p. 219

armed struggle as the cheapest form to mislead the oppressed masses because ANC only adopted the armed conflict after it was banned in 1960 knowing for the fact that they were out of danger. The obvious fact that Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi stressed was that it was only after this period where the African National Congress opted for a purposive armed conflict in a form of Umkhonto Wesizwe. According to Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, armed conflict could not conveniently operate when people who are supporting it were living inside the country. He warned about the difficulty of dealing with the aftermath of violence after the battle of liberation had been won since violence could lead to irreparable damage in terms of economy as well as the human factor. His negativity was based on the fact that violence could not by any means to and ways lead healthy and democratic society and he also strictly warned about its outcome.

*I know of no society in the world where the kind of violence now employed by the ANC Mission Exile has produced an open democratic society. I have again and again said it bluntly that if the ANC Mission in Exile is allowed to continue much further along the road they have chosen to walk, white South Africa will adopt scorched earth policy and unleash the kind of state violence which we have not even begun to see.<sup>140</sup>*

In so far as the armed conflict was concerned, Chief Buthelezi had to agree with the fact that some former colonies in Africa like Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe were partly liberated by means of the armed struggle and he also stressed the fact that there were also other countries in the very continent that were liberated through non-violence means. In his denial for armed struggle, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi forwarded some valuable points to be considered like the fact that, South African political problems were fundamentally different from other countries such Angola, Guinea-Bissau before independence. According to his view, he stated that the oppressed people in these countries were faced with a group of oppressors that were numbering in hundreds of thousands and the majority of whom

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<sup>140</sup> S. Griffin (Ed.): *Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa, Clarrion Call, Special Edition*, 1987, p.



were settlers who could easily flee to their countries of birth after liberation struggle. Buthelezi maintained on the other side that, South Africa had a unique case because South Africa was faced with a determined oppressors numbering almost up to five million, who no longer had other place or home to flee to which meant that they were prepared to kill or to be killed in defence of the rights or privileges that they regarded as theirs. Chief Buthelezi argued against destroying the economy through economic sanctions that if it be mindlessly applied the whole strategy could destroy South African economy forever. The danger of the Exiled ANC's strategy was further highlighted by one of his cabinet member Oscar Dhlomo, who warned about those who talked about the struggle while they were not directly involved in it, that they could cause disastrous consequences for others while they themselves remained untouched.

*We must do everything now that can humanly be done to foster economic development wherever it can be fostered in South Africa. If we smash the South African economy now, we will smash the free enterprise system in South Africa for ever...The struggle cannot be waged by remote control in company board rooms in New York, London, Paris or Bonn. Those who wish to be our allies in this struggle must be physically involved in the front line which is South Africa.<sup>141</sup>*

For these reasons, Dr. Buthelezi and Inkatha were fully convinced there were other effective non-violent means that could be used to cripple South Africa. The whole policy of non-violent widened the ideological rift that made Mangosuthu Buthelezi to suffer vilification of all forms coming from the high ranking. ANC officials such as Alfred Nzo who openly referred to Dr. Buthelezi as a politically bankrupt careerist and renegade who would one day be swept in rubbish heap of history. His denial of the armed struggle not only surprised the African National Congress but also the Nationalist Government because since Chief Mangosuthu had diametrically rejected the independence of KwaZulu, the Nationalist Government viewed him as an African National Congress's ally. The stance that he took in 1979 of parting ways with African National Congress left the Nationalist Government with a difficult question of whether Chief Buthelezi was a 'foe or ally.'

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<sup>141</sup> S. Vos (Ed.): *Inhlabamkhosi, After the White election - what now for South Africa? Clarion Call Vol 2, 1988*, pp. 22-23

It soon became clear that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was a man of his own agenda who favoured neither the African Nationalist Congress nor Nationalist Government but his refusal of these fighting tactics for the African National Congress was to incubate and nurture his idea of 'multiracial federation' that would combine KwaZulu and Natal since by then these places were functioning as separate eco-political entities.

*In 1981, a commission he had appointed proposed the integration of the white-controlled province of Natal and the KwaZulu homeland, to be run by an assembly elected by proportional representational and a multiracial executive making decisions along power-sharing lines.*<sup>142</sup>

This was the real reason for Chief Mngosuthu Buthelezi's refusal of violent change that would come through armed struggle and economic sanction because his primary aim was that of maintaining his hegemonic control in a proposed combined KwaZulu and Natal, in a future Federal State of Natal/KwaZulu in this way he regarded violence, through armed struggle and economic sanction as an anathema. Buthelezi thought that armed struggle and sanctions were destroying the chance for peaceful change.<sup>143</sup>

### **3.7 Conclusion**

KwaZulu Government and Inkatha worked in unison in a form of controlling all the organizational structures in KwaZulu. Both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha wielded a very strong influence in the whole of KwaZulu; as a result, they brook no interference of any sort within the territorial jurisdiction of KwaZulu. The formation of United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) 1986 came as the result of opposing COSATU that had been formed a year earlier in 1985 in Durban. UWUSA soon became a sworn enemy of COSATU since COSATU had proved not to be in good terms with both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha. This distaste that UWUSA had for both COSATU and UDF was because of the fact that UWUSA openly shared an ideological platform with Inkatha. UWUSA was little more than a 'sweetheart' union in relation to

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<sup>142</sup> H. Giliomee and Bernard: *New history of South Africa*, p. 375

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*: p. 375

Inkatha: it imported the rivalry and Inkatha onto the shop-floor.<sup>144</sup> This then from the outset revealed that UWUSA was not for labour solidarity but was a political tool for Inkatha to deal with all its assumed enemies; this, at a later stage, increased the internecine violence in KwaZulu. The domineering character of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha forcefully spread to the civil servants more especially in higher grades such as teachers, nurses and even the doctors which ended up with the negative effects in some departments within KwaZulu Government.

Namda President, Diliza Mji blamed the shortage of doctors in KwaZulu largely on the pledge.<sup>145</sup> Many doctors and other medical practitioners had to leave KwaZulu for other provinces which totally led to the state of brain drain in KwaZulu medical department. These civil servants had to behave submissively and obsequiously since they had to sign or swear a pledge of allegiance which was against their will; as a result, they were forced to be Inkatha- minded ideologically.

This heavy-handed approach that was discharged, by the overlapping leadership between Inkatha and KwaZulu Government led both Inkatha and KwaZulu Government to be politically labeled as autocratic leaders. This view of autocratic leadership did not only affect the medical department in terms of labour shortage, other departments such as education were also affected since teachers were also not happy about the manner they were being treated by being politically harnessed which led many to be reluctant about being employed by KwaZulu Government.

The department of education in one way or another found itself operating under the heavy-handed situation since promotion had to be determined by a person's level of allegiance between that person and both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha which simply meant that teachers' promotion had become *quid pro quo*. The KwaZulu 'Legislative Assembly' decreed in 1978 that a civil servant's standing within Inkatha would be a key factor in decision about promotion.<sup>146</sup> This situation made KwaZulu Government to be less attractive in so far as employment was concerned. In all KwaZulu

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<sup>144</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 335

<sup>145</sup> G. Moss and I. Obery: *South Africa - Contemporary history analysis*, p. 486

<sup>146</sup> G. Mare and G. Hamilton : *An appetite for power, Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of loyal resistance*, p. 390

schools, Inkatha syllabus was forcefully introduced as non-examinable academic program and all teachers were willy-nilly expected to offer Inkatha-aligned school programs.

“Oscar Dlomo, KwaZulu’s Minister of Education, warned the reluctant teachers that they would be dealt with by the by Bantustan authorities.”<sup>147</sup> During this time KwaZulu adopted a character of a totalitarian ‘state’ just like Nazi Germany in early 1930s since it attempted to manipulate the intellectual moulding of children according to Inkatha principles. Teachers and other academic authorities were also expected to show an unrelenting allegiance to Inkatha’s propoganda that would guarantee a total conformity to Inkatha principles.

*In November 1978, the Inkatha aligned teachers union, the Natal African Teachers’ Union (NATU), had convened a meeting of about 1500 teachers, educationists, the inspectors Association and Inkatha-aligned academics to introduce the non-examinable Inkatha syllabus*  
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The whole of KwaZulu obviously became intolerable and this became the reason for the formation of Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in 1979. The Inkatha like-minded authorities tried to block COSAS at every turn by allowing Inkatha Youth Brigade to operate in all KwaZulu controlled schools. This was a true violation of civil liberties since those within the confines of KwaZulu were totally deprived of freedom of choice and were fully subjected to mental slavery that forced them to be Inkatha members.

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<sup>147</sup> B. Theron (Ed.): *The road to democracy in South Africa, Volume 2* , 1979-1980, p. 842

<sup>148</sup> Ibid B. Theron (Ed.): *The road to democracy in South Africa, Volume 2* , 1979-1980, p. 842

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.0 THE JUDICIAL ARM'S ROLE OF THE KWAZULU POLICE

*“The ballot is stronger than the bullet”*

*-Abraham Lincoln*

#### 4.1 Introduction

In early 1970s, KwaZulu became a self-governing state under the system of homelands (Bantustan). It had all the necessary institutions that qualify KwaZulu to meet all the requirement of a self-governing state. In 1975, the KwaZulu Government under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi re-launched Inkatha Cultural Movement for which he became an undisputable leader. Under this state of affairs Inkatha worked hand in hand with KwaZulu Government. Inkatha therefore became a quasi-political movement that totally presided on all the political affairs for KwaZulu Government. In South Africa as a whole there was no black political movements, so, this situation resulted in a political vacuum; as a result of the banning of all anti-apartheid movements in early 1960s. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi therefore found it necessary to fill the political void that had been left by the banning of the ANC as mentioned above.

The void needed filling, I thought, and the position seemed to offer a platform from which a black politician might with relative impunity articulate the grievances of his people.<sup>149</sup> It was upon this idea on which Inkatha was formed in 1975. What became remarkable as the years moved on was the fact that KwaZulu was still dependent on the South African Police (SAP) for the purpose of law enforcement. This reason made KwaZulu

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<sup>149</sup> A. Sparks: *The mind of South Africa*, p. 274

Government feel the need to have its own police department that would maintain law and order. After meeting all the necessary requirements , the KwaZulu Police (KZP) came into existence in 1981 the force modeled on the South African Police; and this police department was also headed by Chief Buthelezi as the Minister of Police which was the third position of Chief Buthelezi in the KwaZulu Government. It should be highlighted that the influence of South African Police was never completely done away with since it was still found here and there in KwaZulu.

KwaZulu Police worked in juxtaposition with the South African Police while at the same time KwaZulu Police fully maintained its autonomy. What became remarkable about KwaZulu Police was that it became one of the subsidiaries of both KwaZulu and Inkatha from its inception in 1981 to 1994. This therefore meant that the operation of the KwaZulu Police was not confined to the maintenance of law and order but it also extended to pure political matters as it constantly assisted Inkatha members when they faced their political rival such as UDF/ANC. Minnaar notes:

In almost all areas under the control of the KZP there were allegations of the KZP being involved in unlawful shootings, assaults, threats, arson, intimidation and harassment against persons perceived to be non-Inkatha.<sup>150</sup>

This kind of attitudinal approach of the KwaZulu Police made it to be seen as Inkatha-aligned police institution and it ended being viewed as Inkatha para-military structure.

## **4.2 The Policy of the KZP**

As from the outset, the policy of the KZP was that of being apolitical since all members of KwaZulu Police were strictly told that ‘may not belong to any political party’. This clearly meant that KwaZulu Police could not be active members of any political party including Inkatha. In 1990s, to everybody’s surprise the Commission

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<sup>150</sup> A. Minnaar: *Patterns of violence - case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 50

revealed that many members of the KZP were highly politicized, biased, and also a partial police force and most of its members openly supported Inkatha Freedom Party. This situation became even worse than the South African Police Force because the SAP were never expected to support the National Party once they had been employed as state police.

*In 1981, when KwaZulu Police was formed, it became one of the subsidiary structures of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha. This made it to be completely impossible for its employees to escape Inkatha ideology or influence as it was expected of all KwaZulu Government employees. This made KZP to work hand in glove with the other Inkatha subsidiary structures in dealing with those who were the rivals of Inkatha as it was tacitly expected. In "Natal, the attackers are KwaZulu policemen and Inkatha impis led by the so-called warlords.*

<sup>151</sup>

Since Inkatha became the symbolic influence and also an authoritative organ for the entire KwaZulu Bantustan, KwaZulu Police could of course be no exception, so, they could also be expected to be Inkatha aligned employees. KwaZulu Police were therefore tacitly expected to be pro-Inkatha and anti-apartheid movements such as UDF/ANC. ...in July 1991 Gen. J.H. Butcher, Commissioner of the KZP, conceded that 'to a certain extent' KZP members were biased towards the IFP...<sup>152</sup>. This biased attitude proved to be one of the most irreconcilable as in most cases they could attend matters that affected non-Inkatha members. In reported cases, complaints made to the police by non-Inkatha members have not been dealt with effectively by the KZP.<sup>153</sup>

This symbiotic existence between KZP and Inkatha showed that KwaZulu Police were always ready to dance to any tune played by Inkatha as part of their organizational allegiance. This policy of the KZP of aligning itself with Inkatha made the KZP to be inseparable with Inkatha; as a result, all KZP employees were being viewed as Inkatha since it became so easy for the high ranking KZP officials to wield a strong influence in Inkatha. The obvious fact was the leader of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha

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<sup>151</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for the people of South Africa*, p. 265

<sup>152</sup> A. Minnaar: *Patterns of violence - case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 52

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid*:p.51

Cultural Movement who was Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was also the head of KwaZulu Police which meant that what was for Inkatha was also for the KZP. This therefore meant that KZP and Inkatha were sharing the same ideological platform.

### 4.3 Police nature of conduct

It has been mentioned that KwaZulu Police were modeled on South African Police in all its formation. The only thing that tended to differ was the fact that KZP was alleged of both being incompetent and also politically biased; as a result, there were so many cases of being biased that were leveled against the KZP more especially in 1990s.

On 8 November 1992, there was a group of armed people who were believed to be Inkatha since Chief Alphas Molefe was at loggerheads with Inkatha leadership for joining CONTRALESA, they attacked several homesteads within the jurisdiction of Chief Molefe. The animosity between Chief Buthelezi and Chief Molefe stemmed from their ancestral grudges where the Sotho assisted the English army against King Cetshwayo in the battle of iSandlwana in 1879.

*This was a reference to a longstanding campaign to reinforce 'Zulu' rights over those of the Molefe chief Basotho residents, who were blamed by Inkatha for illegally settling on ground in much the same way as the voortrekkers who lagged in Nquthu and defeated Dingane's regiments on 16 December 1838.<sup>154</sup>*

In this incident three people were killed including Molefe's senior Induna (headman) and also several huts were burnt down. The call for assistance was made to the police but since the intention was clear that those armed men wanted to kill the non-Inkatha people as a result of the political misunderstanding between Chief Molefe and Buthelezi, the police did not timeously respond. This was a clear sign of KZP being politically biased toward Inkatha since they had a sluggish response and it somehow showed that

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<sup>154</sup> B. Carton etal: Zulu identities being Zulu, past and present, p. 391



they had fore knowledge of that attack. They were very late despite the fact that the nearest police station was timeously phoned and told about the attackers. They had shown clearly that their intention was to kill people. The late arrival of the police with not enough man power to deal with the situation really showed negligence and bias that the police had in dealing with issues of Inkatha violent attacks. It also became clear that their late arrival was intended since no reasonable attempts were made to track the intruders. To everybody's surprise, the station commander was heard instructing his officers not to take any action since the incident was a pure "political matter" and their intervention was not necessary.

It should also be noted that on 10 December 1992 in the same area, Meshack Motlaung one of the chief's advisors was cold-bloodedly assassinated and again the statement that was issued by the KwaZulu Police was also untrue and extremely biased since they said that the assassination was in connection with cattle theft and no arrest was made. The case that might implicate one of the KZP personnel was covered-up as a result no proper investigation was done. The KZP had developed a proclivity to side and cover-up anything that might implicate Inkatha since its (KZP) role was effectively controlled by Inkatha as the analysis of Anthony Minnaar revealed.

*[ One] has to question the role of the South African and KwaZulu Police . At the very least certain elements have been guilty of turning blind eye to the activities of Inkatha vigilantes, allowing them free rein to attack ANC areas and to drive out ANC activists . At worst they have colluded and assisted in a number of attacks, protected Inkatha cadres from counterattack, assisted in transporting arms to certain areas, and refrained from arresting Inkatha members openly guilty of leading attack* <sup>155</sup>

The kind of such conduct of the KwaZulu Police (KZP) was further witnessed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) when it reached a conclusion that was very much akin to Minnaar's analysis.

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<sup>155</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 341

*Both [vigilante groups and security force members] perceived the same enemy, and were perceived as same enemy. Security Force members who testified before the Commission spoke of the various ways in which the security forces had collaborated with Inkatha in attacks of UDF. This included the ANC supporters, arming Inkatha supporters, transporting Inkatha attackers and standing by while Inkatha supporters attacked people<sup>156</sup>*

In some instances, people who were severely injured more especially in the hands of Inkatha, their access to treatment would be deliberately delayed up until that person or people died in order to destroy evidence that might lead to arrest of the culprits. On the other hand, the KZP proved to have developed proclivity to favour Inkatha in a situation where they were supposed to make an impartial intervention more especially in cases where there was an Inkatha and ANC/UDF conflict.

*Although the police purport to be neutral, committed to ending the strife, there are innumerable allegations of police partisanship in favour of Inkatha...Over the past weeks, despite repeated requests to the police and local magistrate for protection from the threatening gangs, no help was forthcoming and the police continued their attacks on the residents.<sup>157</sup>*

This showed without a doubt that the KwaZulu Police was acting so unethical by undermining the rule of law by being biased. This biased attitude of the KZP became a trans-provincial matter which brought the suspicions that it was perpetuated by the 'state' since the occurrences of this nature mentioned above also frequently happened even in Gauteng in almost the same pattern as in KwaZulu where the intervention of the police was extremely biased and unfair as Howarth and Norvel state:

*Time after it emerges that the SAP, SADF and the KZP constantly 'intervened or failed to intervene on the selected basis.' In KwaZulu-*

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<sup>156</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p.342

<sup>157</sup> M. Kentridge: *An unofficial war - inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg*, pp. 198-199

*Natal and on the Reef, the security forces transported, escorted and joined Inkatha offences or remained inactive during Inkatha attacks - failing to disarm the protagonists, often with the excuse that Inkatha weapons were 'cultural' or that the security were 'waiting for orders'<sup>158</sup>.*

In KwaZulu-Natal, violence of the very same situation mentioned above went on unabated even after 1994 where people thought that they were free; the sinister occurrences were still found in some places such as the Christmas day of 1995 in a place known as Shobashobane which is 200km south of Durban. It was situated on the periphery of the former KwaZulu Government's sphere of influence; this is an area of long and well-established settlement.

This place had a serious massacre that left the 19 ANC supporters dead out of 250 targeted people. This massacre was a result of the perennial grudges between Inkatha supporters and the African National Congress supporters. Before 1994, many ANC supporters had decided to leave the area due to mounting political tension in the area. After 1994 when people thought that everything was by then normal and they decided to go to their places not knowing that the place was still unsafe. On Christmas Eve all chiefs of Shobashobane that were Inkatha-aligned called their followers and planned the attack tactic for the following day. On the morning of the Christmas day, the Inkatha supporters of 600 armed men with automatic rifles attacked ANC supporters and left 19 people dead. Sadly it was noted that among the deceased were six women and one child.

This thing became a thought provoking issue, because the nearest police station (Izingolweni) was only three kilometres away from the place of massacre but the police totally failed to come to victims' rescue. This meant that the massacre was well planned where the police had prior knowledge and were told not to intervene. Those that were on duty at the Izingolweni police station said they did not have enough resources

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<sup>158</sup> D.R. Howarth and A.J. Norvel (Eds.): South Africa in transition, pp21-22

that would make them to timeously respond to the attack. Inspector De Bruin who was in the police station premises at the time of attack said that during the attack, he had only four detectives with him, and he could not move into the area, as they were not enough to handle the situation. He maintained that it would have been extremely dangerous for them to move into the area since the attackers were very well-organized and aggressive. The whole situation bordered the old attitude of the (KZP) of being partial and biased since most police that were there, were former KwaZulu Police (KZP) who were still in favour of Inkatha.

This led to the conflict between the central and provincial government about the way in which KwaZulu-Natal was controlled. The investigation proved the involvement of the police beyond the shadow of doubt. What is more, allegations have also been made of direct police involvement in fighting in collusion with Inkatha.<sup>159</sup> There were eventually 96 warrants issued to arrest all those that were suspected of being involved in the massacre. This case of Shobashobane became a case in point of the KZP partiality when it came to intervention when Inkatha supporters were on the upper hand. In 1990s, the conduct of KZP was tarnished by high level of incompetence as a result of the fraudulently issued appointment certificates to Caprivi Trainees. The case of Caprivi trainees started in 1986 where the South African Government and KwaZulu Government sent some Inkatha members to Caprivi Strip for paramilitary training

*... the Weekly Mail, showed that in 1986 the South African Defence Force (SADF) had trained some 200 Inkatha members for this purpose on the Caprivi Strip in the then South West Africa.*<sup>160</sup>

When these trainees came back from Caprivi, they did not have any specific place for deployment, for this reason most of them had to swell the ranks of the KZP while others had to join the vigilantes whose work was to eliminate the opposition of Inkatha. Those who were taken to fill the ranks of the KZP were the ones who became known for

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<sup>159</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p.189

<sup>160</sup> D.R. and A.J. Norval (Eds.): *South Africa in transition*, p. 18

incompetence since they did not get proper and suitable training. KZP Major General Mathe was responsible for issuing fraudulent certificates. His misdeed was presented for prosecution to Natal Attorney- General, Tim MacNally . But despite Mathe's admission for issuing fraudulent appointment certificates, he was not prosecuted. On the last twelve separate occasions between 1988 and 1992, the Supreme Court in Natal issued urgent orders restraining members of the KZP from assaulting or carrying out other unlawful acts against township residents. In one case, SAP Detective Sergeant Joseph Kabanyane and others interdicted the KZP from assaulting and harassing not only the applicants themselves, but also other residents of KwaMakhutha Township.

Evidence submitted to the Court indicated that large numbers of KwaZulu police officers were travelling around KwaMakhutha Township in vehicles and on foot, shooting indiscriminately with heavy caliber weapons at any visible township resident. No investigation followed the granting of the court order, and his replying affidavit, the commissioner of the KZP merely denied that his members had been acting unlawfully. The case of KZP shooting indiscriminately really did not only tarnish the already ailing image of the KZP but also the image of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha and it also proved to be a horrendous act done by the very people that are supposed to protect others.

#### **4.4 Township Policing**

In KwaZulu townships, policing as from mid-eighties was very unfair and extremely biased. In 1980s when ANC was still in exile, the members of both United Democratic Front and COSATU members were constantly victimized by the members of the KZP to the extent that some people had to leave their places and seek refuge elsewhere. The situation became worse in the 90s after the unbanning of the African National Congress. The war intensified between the KZP and those who were non Inkatha members in the whole of KwaZulu. The deaths of the victims even drew the attention of the senior members of the ANC to come and attend their funerals. The

victims included, of course the people in the village of Magoda near Richmond, a town about 40 miles south of Pietermaritzburg in KwaZulu Province where Mandela attended the funerals.<sup>161</sup> In fact, the KZP force was the most manipulated institution since all police members had to prove their competence by the number of successful massacres that they had executed. As a result, this institution hired policemen that were trained specifically to kill all those people non-members of Inkatha Freedom Party including those who were suspected to be circumstantially out of Inkatha circle or ideology. It appeared that even within the KZP personnels, there were people who were seen to be out of Inkatha ideology like Sergeant Siphon Dlamini in 1993, who was popularly referred to as 'Mdonori. The killing of innocent people who were non-Inkatha members escalated at Esikhawini especially in J2 Section in these years of 1990s.

There was a case of Nokuthula Gabela whom I interviewed on 13 January 2016. Nokuthula worked for a pineapple factory at Empangeni Rail in 1992. The killing of people who were suspected to be anti-Inkatha became rife in Esikhawini more especially in J2 section that was dominated Inkatha members. There was a case in point of Nokuthula Gabela whom I interviewed on 13 January 2016, Nokuthula worked for a pineapple factory at Empangeni Rail in 1992. My main intention was to have a full account of her family's brutal assassination on 2 December 1992 at Esikhawini J2 Section house number 1716. On 13 January 2016 I met Nokuthula Gabela to get a full account of her family's tragic death.

*Yes it was on the 2nd December 1992, when my family members were brutally assassinated by the KwaZulu Police in their own residence. The paradox side of the story was that all those who were killed on that fateful night were unintended victims since the main target was me. In a mere fact this situation began with my union membership because I was COSATU union member.<sup>162</sup>*

I asked her what did the union membership have to do with her being targeted or harassed?

*In a mere fact COSATU was the only union that boldly identified itself*

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<sup>161</sup> G. Mwakikagile: *South Africa contemporary times*, p. 126

<sup>162</sup> *Interview with Nokuthula Gabela, Esikhawini Township, 13 January 2016.*

*with Exile African National Congress , the ANC was regarded as an enemy for both South African government and Inkatha. This then made any one who was a COSATU member to be an enemy of both Inkatha/KwaZulu government. Inkatha therefore in our area at Esikhawini had its deadly subsidiary structure that did hideous work of killing all those who were COSATU members these people were called the Caprivi Trainees that comprised dangerous recruits such as Romeo Mbambo, Israel Hlongwane, Gcina Mkhize and many more.<sup>163</sup>*

She explained the event of that night.

*It is not easy to say it all since I was not at home, because due to the fact home were rife. On the night of that day at about eleven o'clock at night I heard a terrible noise coming from my home direction which made me to be more suspicious that my home was being attacked. On the morning of the 3rd December 1992 very early in the morning I asked my friend to go with me to check my home's situation and when we were about few metres from home we heard a dreadful commotion from my home yard and I realised that the situation at home was not right. We met a police van just close to my house I stop it and told them to assist us but the driver said that I had to go police station to report what had happened. My finding at home was so terrible because my mother and my three siblings had been brutally assassinated and they all lying there in a blood-soaked house unattended. Those that had come before me told me that my father (Jameson) who was in his mid- fifties had been rushed to Ngwelezane hospital<sup>164</sup> that I was a prime target I had already left my home for my safety for the nearest hostel which was called Bhambatha hostel that was about a kilometre from my home. On 2<sup>rd</sup> December 1992 I went past my home from work and I spent only an hour and I went to my place at Bhambatha where I had almost a sleepless night because I had a premonition on that night because threats of the pending invasion of my*

I asked her what move did she take after hearing such dreadful news .

*I then went straight to Ngwelezane where I found my father in a critical condition since he could not even speak and he barely recognised me and sadly a day after that we were told that had died which added number of the fatalities from four people to five people. <sup>165</sup>*

How then did you cope with this calamity?

*Coping was not easy because we lost all what we had both materially*

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<sup>163</sup>Interview with Nokuthula Gabela, Esikhawini Townsio ,13 January, 2016

<sup>164</sup><sup>164</sup>Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid

*and immaterially because our house was burnt down to ashes on the day of the attack and we were completely left in a state of destitution since we had literary live on handouts from our sympathizers and I personally lost even more because my child (girl) who was at Eshowe Teachers' Collage had to drop from her studies because she became completely mentally disturbed when she got the these fateful news and what hurt me even the most was that because of our materially inadequacy my child ended up dying of hunger.<sup>166</sup>*

She explained the role of the TRC.

*This Commission helped us a lot in terms of coming with the truth about who really killed our family members because all what we had was just an inaccurate information basing on suspicions but during the TRC every piece of the truth came out that it was Romeo Mbambo and Gcina Mkhize together with the notorious Mbuyazi family who did this dreadful thing to us. Materially we got amount of R30000 which of course was not enough because we couldn't even build a house but it was better than nothing. The TRC further helped us in funding my brother's child her school's bursary (Nelisiwe Gabela) who is currently doing her final year at the University of KwaZuluin her teacher's degree. This of course made us to be so grateful to the TRC.<sup>167</sup>*

Finally she summed up the political implication and long term consequences .

*For me even today I am still trying to make sense with the whole issue of political violence because those people who were used to do all these in human things to other people especially KwaZulu Police were totally political naïve and ignorant since most of them were just 'Mickey Mouse' people who were unconsciously manipulated by their 'Masters' in order to fulfill their Masters' selfish ends and also to satisfy their insatiable and irrational appetite for power. I therefore place the total blame to their leaders such as Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and other memberof KwaZulu Government members such as Gedeon Zulu since his name was constantly mentioned in planning these atrocious violations of our rights because all these things were done to safeguard and promote their political interests at the expense of the innocent 's lives . Lastly what I must say is that although I am trying to reconcile with the past but what still nags me even the most is that my father is still not deregistered from the department of Home Affairs since all his identity documents got burnt when our house was burnt as a result he is still taken as a person who is still alive, so culturally and spiritually this situation stands to torment us as his the*

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<sup>166</sup> Interview with Nokuthula Gabela, Esikhawini Townsio ,13 January, 2016

<sup>167</sup>Ibid



family.<sup>168</sup>

In light of this interview it vividly appeared that both Inkatha and KwaZulu Government under the leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi had no respect at all for civil liberties for the people. It also showed the inhuman nature of Chief Buthelezi of trying to build his hegemony on the woes of the innocent people. The officials for KwaZulu Government such as the late Gedeon Zulu who was constantly mentioned in the TRC in planning and encouraging the violation of civil liberties proved to have no respect for a human value at all.

On 4 March 2016, I had another interview with Captain Zamokuhle Collin Mpanza who is a former KwaZulu Police and is currently a Captain for Empangeni Detective Branch (EDB). This interview with Captain was strictly based on the assassination of Sergeant Dlamini in June 1993 who was stationed at Esikhawini Police Station. My first question to the Captain was about the relationship between the KwaZulu Police and Inkatha in the late 80s to early 90s.

*Well it is not easy to say anything much about their relationship in 80s because I only started working for KwaZulu Police in 1992 but what I observed in my starting years was that the relationship between KwaZulu Police and Inkatha was very much close and the word 'Inkatha' was highly revered within the KwaZulu Police department to such an extent that one had to be cautious on how one used the word Inkatha more especially in the presence of 'some colleagues'.<sup>169</sup>*

Captain, what do you mean by 'some colleagues'?

*I am saying this precisely because by then, there was a clearly visible difference between the ordinary KwaZulu Policemen of which I was the one, and the so called 'Caprivi Trainees' since of course they were given a preferential treatment by both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha in terms of needs since they were given huge incentives that made them to drive fancy cars and they dressed smartly than most of us. If I can add on this I can say that their allegiance to both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha was somehow higher than the rest of us which made everyone to speak gingerly and cautiously about both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha in their presence.<sup>170</sup>*

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<sup>168</sup> Interview with Zamokuhle C. Mpanza (Capt.) Empangeni, 4<sup>th</sup> March 2016

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> ibid

Captain how did they generate these incentives, what targets were expected of them?

*In fact, by incentives I mean extra cash that was given to every member of the hit-squad as they were sometimes referred to, after having killed the most wanted person or persons like April Makhwenkwe Tarliwe who was assassinated on the 19<sup>th</sup> April 1992 and also Dr. Luthuli of J2 Section who was also assassinated for not faking the post mortem examination results of those people who had died in the hands of KwaZulu Police, the number of people killed within the specified time could also generate substantial incentives. It is important to say that even within those hit-squad members there were those who were better than others and most relied upon in terms of executing people like for instance Romeo Mbambo, seemingly Romeo lacked a sense of humanity (Ubuntu) and he was the most cruel person than all his counterparts, this can become the reason that he was tasked with a shocking responsibility of killing his colleague, Sergeant Dlamini. This gentleman therefore surpassed his colleagues in terms of favouritism and popularity within the circle of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha officials.<sup>171</sup>*

Captain can you please tell me about the *modus operandi* of Sergeant Dlamini's assassination as where and how did it take place?

*The only thing I know is that he was attacked and killed by Romeo at night in his girlfriend's residence that was in J2 Section Esikhawini since he had a girlfriend that lived in H2 Section in Esikhawini and surprisingly his wife was the member of KwaZulu Police.<sup>172</sup>*

Captain, did his assassination have anything to do with the ANC membership as it was surmised?

*Hi... not exactly as far as I know because we all had our political allegiances kept very secretly within ourselves but the only thing that I realised was that, he used to take everything for granted because he never thought that what was done by the Caprivi Trainees to other people out there could be done to him as well since these Caprivi Trainees were his colleagues. The other thing he used to do was that of speaking haphazardly about Inkatha and maybe for this reason he might have been thought to be a tacit member of the ANC, as I mentioned before that the*

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<sup>171</sup> Interview with Zamokuhle C. Mpanza (Capt.) Empangeni, 4<sup>th</sup> March 2016

<sup>172</sup> Ibid

*word Inkatha was highly revered.*<sup>173</sup>

Captain, what do think facilitated the success of the investigation of the death that led to the fact that he was killed by Romeo Mbambo who was of course his colleague?

*There was no investigation that was done because the lady that was with him saw Romeo Mbambo and his accomplice who was Gcina Mkhize. In a mere fact according to given evidence by the eye witness, Romeo shot the second bullet which was one that she thought killed him after Gcina had shot the first one, so in a situation like this there was no investigation needed since everything was axiomatically clear.*<sup>174</sup>

This interview reflects a weird human nature where people had to engage themselves in an act of committing such cruel and thuggish acts of killing their colleagues just for sake of material gains and reputation. It is a clear display of cruelty and selfishness where people like Romeo and Gcina had to put their petty gains far above people's lives.

This interview, despite being factually saturated but it remained one side of the coin since nothing was said by Sergeant Dlamini's family. On the 24<sup>th</sup> March 2016 I made another interview with Sergeant Dlamini's wife by the name of Busisiwe Dlamini to give the side of his family. Busisiwe Dlamini is Sergeant Dlamini's wife who was also a KZP member who worked in the same police station with her husband. Busisiwe, can you briefly tell me about your husband, Sergeant Dlamini? Sergeant Dlamini's name is, Dumisani who was my husband for more than twenty years, and when he died we had three girls although the first one I got her before meeting him.<sup>175</sup> Can you tell me about his tragic death?

*It is not easy to give everything that happened on that fateful day since he was out of home to his child's mother in J2 section. In fact, he left here in the afternoon to drop the child and he promised to come back soon which of course did not happen. At night of that day at about 23h00, I heard a knock on the door and when I opened the door I found that, it was one of my colleagues, Sergeant Masondo who told me these tragic news. Well, at first he said that he had got injured and he eventually told me that he had*

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<sup>173</sup> Interview with Zamokuhle C. Mpanza (Capt.) Empangeni, 4<sup>th</sup> March 2016

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Interview with Busisiwe Dlamini (Sergt.) Esikhawini Township, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2016

*died after I had asked whether he had happened. On my arrival I found him lying on the pool of blood in the passage of the rooms which me*<sup>176</sup>

Who were those attackers? “His attackers to my surprise were our colleagues, Romeo Mbambo and Gcina and Romeo Mbambo, Gcina shot him first but his shot was not lethal and Romeo had to give a second shot that killed him and they left him being motionless.”<sup>177</sup> Mrs Dlamini, at work, was there any signs of hostility between your husband and his killers?

*In fact, the situation between us as the ordinary policemen and the Caprivi Trainees was that of the cream and whey in the gourd because although we were in the same place our relationship was not healthy and my husband was an extroverted person talking about anything that other people were talking about it behind closed doors.*<sup>178</sup>

What do you mean, can you briefly explain?

*My husband once told me that he had asked them why they killed innocent people that they were supposed to be protecting. I think that was the reason for his death.*<sup>179</sup>

How then did other policemen including yourself view this, where your husband had to die in the hands of his colleagues?

*In fact I just have mentioned the situation of the ‘cream and whey’. None amongst us ever thought that that would go that far, because despite differences amongst us and them, we were all colleagues that had to protect one another.*<sup>180</sup>

What is your view on a situation like this where a colleague had to kill his colleague and also about violence at large especially in the period between 1990 and 1994?

*This whole situation was really a display of unbridled evil ambition that*

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<sup>176</sup> Interview with Busisiwe Dlamini (Sergt.) Esikhawini Township, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2016

<sup>177</sup> Ibid

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

*drove those young people to kill people indiscriminately trying to satisfy their bosses' insatiable desire because, although I did not attend the TRC but I heard that in their (Caprivi Trainees) TRC submission they agreed that they were acting according on the instructions of their employers such Prince Gideon Zulu who was one of KwaZulu Government's Legislative Assembly member. If I look at the violence of this given time frame, it was again a raw display of despondence of the leaders of both Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government of trying to maintain their ill-gotten hegemonic control of KwaZulu and so, they did this desperately by means of violating other people's civil liberties with the hope of reversing the looming political changes which of course was impossible as we all know.<sup>181</sup>*

Mrs Dlamini, was there any role played by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in your situation?

*I can say yes, although it was not enough because we were given a once off payment of R30000, but what puzzled me about the TRC was it failed to make a follow up on things that had been promised by some people, like Romeo since had promised to write a book about the atrocities they did to people more especially in the era of 1990-1994 and the money that would accrue from that publication would be given to the victims' children and the time is quite long but nothing is forthcoming which makes me to doubt the effectiveness of the TRC role.<sup>182</sup>*

What do you think the TRC could have done in order to live up to the expectation of the victims of which you are one of them?

*The TRC had to be formed and conducted by people, like shrewd politicians with capable economic people and also religious people, so for me this combination would have at least come up with something better than what was done. The religious aspect remained prominent for spiritual assuagement only and other aspects were like economic, political and legal were left unattended. Political aspect had to be prioritized since the whole issue of violence was politically based, and the economic people had to be involved in order to access the financial position for the victims so that they could be compensated accordingly. That is the kind of formation that I think could have done something that would have maybe met the expectations of the victims."<sup>183</sup>*

This interview confirms the fact that the Caprivi Trainees were not police was true, but

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<sup>181</sup> Interview with Busisiwe Dlamini (Sergt.) Esikhawini Township, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2016

<sup>182</sup> Ibid

<sup>183</sup> Ibid

they were uncompromising killers who could kill anyone even within the circle of their colleagues. The killing instinct that was imbued to them through training and also through their daily philosophy made them to be really inhuman in nature. On 29 March 2016, I again did another soul-touching interview with Mrs Zanele Tarliwa about another tragic death of her husband April Makhwenkwe Tarliwa who died in the hands of KwaZulu Police. April Tarliwa was the Ceppawu Shopsteward which was a COSATU affiliate Union in Mondi mill paper in Richards Bay. Mrs Tarliwa explains :

*Oh, it was on the night of the 19<sup>th</sup> April 1992 when he got a call from his father who was not well on that night his father lived about ten kilometres away from us. At about 24h00 in the midnight a man who was a KwaZulu Police came and told us that my husband was in the mortuary and he did not explain anything more. I did not sleep as from there and the following morning I went to the mortuary being confused since everything was so incredible but what even surprised me was that on our arrival in the mortuary we were denied an entry despite the fact that I had told them repeatedly that deceased was my husband which made me to suspect that there was a covert relationship between the mortuary and those people who had killed my husband.<sup>184</sup>*

How did this situation end?

Eventually they gave us entry permission and when entered I found husband being thrown in the corner like a piece of garbage.<sup>185</sup>

She explains how the tragedy began.

*In fact it was not suspicion but we had tangible cases where we narrowly escaped death. My had decided to pick me from school when we were nearly killed by someone who my husband described as Mr Vusi Masondo who was Inkatha member.<sup>186</sup>*

She explains the events of that day.

*We were on our way back home as I have just mentioned and my husband spotted a grey VW car that was for Mr Masondo whom he described as Inkatha member, he then immediately told me to duck my head down because he would definitely shoot us but luckily the bus just came between the car and it saved us from that fate that would have taken our lives.<sup>187</sup>*

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<sup>184</sup>Interview with Zanele Tarliwa Esikhawini Township on the 29 March 2016

<sup>185</sup> Ibid

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid

She gives the account of her husband's death.

*My husband was assassinated just about two kilometres out of Esikhawini while he was on his way to attend his father at Kwa-Dlangezwa as I have mentioned before. According to the confession by one of the KwaZulu Police, Israel Hlongwane in the TRC, they suspected his car while they were doing their routine patrol and they quickly followed him, they then shot him through the window while they were overtaking his car and he died there and then.<sup>188</sup>*

She explains the way in which her husband's post mortem was conducted,.

*Well, my heart is still bitter on that one because Dr. Nhlanhla who did the post mortem examination was more than bias but he even acted out of his professional ethics by telling lies as a Doctor. He said that the bullet that killed my husband had got stuck on the side of his head and he had taken it out and sent for a ballistic test but what the killer (Israel Hlongwane) said was totally contrary to what Dr. Nhlanhla said because, Israel Hlongwane said the bullet went through my husband's nose and it got stuck on the chest. This was a contrasting evidence that led to the exhumation of my husband's body and only to find that Dr. Nhlanhla was lying because the finding according to that exhumation Israel Hlongwane, was right because they found it in my husband's chest. Dr. Nhlanhla was doing some cover ups of some sort that I still fail to understand even now but I believe that he had been bribed to conceal evidence that would implicate KwaZulu Police as it was a normative practice in those days to do so.<sup>189</sup>*

Mrs Tarliwa some people are saying that the role of the TRC was less effective, can you please tell me your own view about the TRC?

*Materially I can agree because R30000 that was given almost to all violence victims might not be enough when compared to damage we suffered as violence victims but immaterially the TRC helped me a lot since it assuaged me emotionally and it made me to accept what had happened and now I am able to talk about it especially my husband's case without shedding tears as it was the case before it. On the other hand, the TRC helped to keep record straight that helped to solve all the mysteries like the case of unethical people like Dr. Nhlanhla who lied about my husband's death, so the TRC brought that to light, like in the case of my husband since he was exhumed to verify the conflicting evidence that was*

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<sup>188</sup> *ibid*

<sup>189</sup> Interview with Zanele Tarliwa Esikhawini Township on the 29<sup>th</sup> March 2016

given by Dr. Nhlanhla and Israel Hlongwane of the KZP.<sup>190</sup>

Lastly, your husband's death had disastrous impact in the family, can you please elaborate on that one.

*Yes that is correct because as I have mentioned before that on that fateful night my husband was out to attend his ailing father who was sick, the old man died soon after he had received the news of my husband's death which was of course another major disaster that befell the family as a result of my husband's death.*<sup>191</sup>

Interview of this nature shows that KwaZulu was not just a homeland, but it was a regime just like the Nazi German during the time of Adolf Hitler(1934-1945) since all those people who live in KwaZulu even the professional people like Dr. Nhlanhla had to be attuned to Inkatha's philosophy exactly as Nazi people did in Germany. Dr. Nhlanhla had to do an information cover-up about the nature of Makhwenkwe Tarliwa's death because he wanted to remain loyal to KwaZulu Government and inkatha.

On 24 April 2016 I interviewed the mysterious death of Dr Henry Vika Luthuli who was assassinated by the KZP at his home surgery at Esikhawini.

Dr. Luthuli, can you briefly tell me about your husband's tragic death?

*The tragic death of my husband took place on the 2nd August 1990 in our home round about 20h00. I was in the bathroom while I heard a deafening sound that I did not understand and while I was still confused what was going on, I immediately heard my ten year old daughter, Noluntu hysterically yelling on the top of her voice saying "why do you shoot my father . When I got out I found my husband lying unconsciously and he was profusely bleeding, I then tried to alert my neighbours and we phone the police station.*<sup>192</sup>

Dr. Luthuli can tell me about the response of the police?

*The police to everybody's surprise did not come at all, up until my*

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<sup>190</sup> Ibid

<sup>191</sup> Ibid

<sup>192</sup> Interview with Zolile Luthuli (Dr.) at Esikhawini Township 24<sup>th</sup> April 2016



*neighbour Mr Mathonsi took his car and went to report the matter in person. Again, when the police came they asked me some few questions that I cannot even remember because I was in dire pain and frustration. My husband was then taken to the mortuary after they had written a statement. What even surprised me even the most was that no follow up was done.*<sup>193</sup>

Dr Luthuli explained that the police cover-up had implications to her husband's death.

*We totally remained in the darkness for almost four years and what distressed me even the most was the fact that I was highly implicated by both family members and other people at large as the one who had orchestrated my husband's death up until I was exonerated by the TRC where the KZP admitted that they had killed my husband on that night.*<sup>194</sup>

She revealed her state of mind after discovering the truth.

*Truly, I was highly relieved because in the first place I knew the killers of my husband and I was totally exonerated from the baseless blame of having plotted the death of my husband.*<sup>195</sup>

She noted the importance of the TRC in exploring the activities of the KwaZulu Police

*The TRC for me was very helpful in terms of illuminating all the mysteries about what happened during that fateful period of 1990-1994, which could have remained unknown, it therefore served as the real fact finding mission that also helped to straighten our historical records. I can therefore undoubtedly say that TRC was the most prestigious mission that South Africa ever had in our life time especially to us as black people from whom the truth was always hidden.*<sup>196</sup>

The interview of Dr. Zolile Luthuli about her husband Dr. Vika Luthuli reflected a true professional ethics that Dr. Vika believed in. He was unlike Dr Nhlanhla who betrayed his professional ethics because he wanted to remain loyal to Inkatha and KwaZulu Government. Dr Vika was a professional who died for his work ethics by telling the truth about postmortem examination of those who were killed by Inkatha and its associates.

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> Interview with Zolile Luthuli (Dr.) at Esikhawini Township 24<sup>th</sup> April 2016

<sup>196</sup> Ibid

In Esikhawini there were very influential individuals such the notorious woman who worked in very close connection with the KZP especially the Caprivi trainees that woman was popularly known as MaMbuyazi who resided at J2 section. MaMbuyazi made J2 section to be a no-go area for all non-Inkatha members. She was the one used to host Inkatha members that were coming out of Esikhawini when coming for the rallies. The KZP connived with all the political misdeeds that MaMbuyazi and her accomplices did to those that were politically against her.

It should be noted that the KZP misconduct was not only confined at Esikhawini but it was also spread to other places such as Enseleni, the place that almost 15 km north of Richards Bay. In Enseleni, KZP showed an immeasurable bias when dealing with conflicts that were between ANC/COSATU and Inkatha. Inkatha members could burn houses for non-Inkatha members without the police intervention as one eyewitness who was operating on anonymity once said. School children and neighbours helped put out flames, while the police and soldiers in Hippo watched<sup>197</sup>

The same witness who reportedly described himself to be neutral or apolitical said that he was forced to accompany the men as they burned houses. Members of the security forces made no attempt to seize the weapons, which included guns, knives, pangas, clubs and the petrol bombs. According to the press report released by the Human Rights Council, the police repeatedly failed to respond to calls for help from residents and also refused to disarm and apprehend the attackers. This nature of the KZP tended to discredit them as an institution that purported to serve them competently and also impartially. The whole situation made it to be very infamous among the people at first had taken the as an institution of honour.

#### **4.5 Accountability**

The vast majority of the alleged crimes involving KZP were never fully investigated while many of those cases were not even reported. In some instances those cases that

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<sup>197</sup> J Wentzel: The liberal slideway,p.430

happened to reach the courts, attempts were made to cover them up. According to the nature of evidence that was assessed by the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), it was found that the use of cover up in cases where KZP were being investigated was the order of the day. In mid-eighties to early nineties the KZP became so infamous for changing from being apolitical to political since they began to work hand in hand with Inkatha Cultural Movement. During these years they were so reluctant to bring victims to medical care colleagues.

This was because of the fact that in most cases the members of the KZP were implicated in killing people who were non-Inkatha members. In strange cases, the KZP could deliberately delay the injured person to access medical treatment for various reasons that were only known by them as it was stated in one of deponent's case pertaining the death of his son: On that day, the deponent's son was brought to the hospital after being shot. He was still breathing and semi-conscious. He was taken to the Prince Mshiyeni Hospital at Umlazi, where the deponent visited him the following day.

*I knew, because I saw, that my son had a bullet wound on the upper left side of his body. My son's cousin told me that the shot had been fired by the police from inside a "private car."<sup>198</sup>*

What aspired the following day was that was transferred to another hospital where he was certified dead and on his death certificate it stated that he died of abnormal injury. The reason for the deliberate delay might the fact that the policemen were avoiding being implicated as one of their colleagues might be involved.

#### **4.6 Covert Activities**

Before and during the early 1990s, KwaZulu Police (KZP) had been constantly found in covert activities with the aim of showing support to both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha. The KwaZulu Police as one of the major Inkatha subsidiaries had constantly

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<sup>198</sup> J.Wentzel: *The liberal slideway*, p.430

shown unbroken loyalty to Inkatha as the Commissioner of KwaZulu Police Brigadier Jac Buchner once stated: We [the KwaZulu Police] support the lawful authorities, which is the KwaZulu Government. To the extent that Inkatha is part of the government, I suppose you could say we support Inkatha.<sup>199</sup> This relationship between the KwaZulu police as the security entity and the political party Inkatha as Brigadier Jac Buchner has stated, was the main motive behind the covert activities of the KwaZulu Police more especially in early 1990s. The covert activities for KZP became mostly as the result of the covert relationship surreptitiously existed between them and SAP/SADF. Both South African Police and South African Defence Force, due to the fact that they were both apparatus for apartheid, were always ready to give any assistance to KwaZulu Police whenever it was needed; as a result, they became like-minded in everything they did.

In the midst of violence in early 1990s, the KZP and the SAP/SADF were normally found conniving with Inkatha in violent deeds by means of taking no action against its violent and atrocious actions against those who were non-Inkatha. The police also participated in this sustained exercise of pretending nothing was wrong.<sup>200</sup> This situation bolstered the covert activities for the KZP they knew for the fact that whatever they did to non-Inkatha members there would be no SAP/SADF intervention. As a matter of fact, the KwaZulu Police covert activities were heightened by the presence of the Caprivi Trainees within KZP since these Caprivi Trainees were constantly implicated in covert activities where non- Inkatha people were killed.

In places that were regarded as the jurisdiction of the KwaZulu Police such as townships, the covert activities for the KZP as were rife since they were trying to silence those who were anti-Inkatha. In places like Esikhawini which is south of Richards Bay, violence where the KZP was directly implicated became order of the day. In fact, this place had male-hostels that were largely dominated by COSATU members that were of course part of the ANC, these hostels became prime targets of the Inkatha and the KZP. According to the Unrest Monitoring Action Group (UMAG), in the Inkatha rally that was held at

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<sup>199</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case study of conflict in Natal*, p. 110

<sup>200</sup> M. Kentridge: *An unofficial war- inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg* p. 136

Esikhawini in February 1992, there were about sixteen people killed, twenty houses were seriously damaged while properties were looted by Inkatha members in the full presence of the KwaZulu Police and the SAP/SADF. Innocent people from the H- Section and Alusaf hostel dwellers were attacked and killed while the KZP and SAP/SADF were leisurely looking at what was taking place and they did nothing at all to avert that situation. They did nothing to stop impi or to disarm it and in full view of SAP and SADF, together with the KZP proceeded to attack the Alusaf Hostel.<sup>201</sup> This was the classic example of the covert activities of the KwaZulu Police where they covertly collaborated with SAP/SADF to exacerbate violence by not giving timely intervention in order to save innocent lives. This kind of covert activities of the KZP began to make its impact felt even in rural areas around Empangeni, in place like Ntambanana that is about 35 km North West of Empangeni.

In this place KZP covertly joined hands with the vigilantes that were much involved in the violation of the civil liberties in KwaZulu. In this case the ANC Youth League had to hold meeting in one of the local schools called Mningi High School, in this proposed meeting the ANCYL was disrupted by the armed vigilantes that were believed to have been transported by the KZP to get there. In April 1991, a planned meeting of the ANC Youth League at the Miningi (sic) High School in Ntambanana was disrupted by the armed vigilantes allegedly transported by the KwaZulu Police.<sup>202</sup>

This was the clear sign of the ubiquity of the KZP covert activities where in all instances they covertly sided with Inkatha as part of its subsidiary responsibility. KwaZulu Police also had a covert establishment in the northern part of KwaZulu in the extreme rural place known as Mkhuze. KZP in this place chose a very secretive and less travelled piece of land and they established their covert camp that was code-named as Tshaneni Leadership and Development Institute. Places like the one that was at Ulundi that was known as *Matleng* camp were bases of covert activities of KwaZulu Police that operated under the full support of Inkatha and they only served for covert purposes as a result they

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<sup>201</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case studies of Natal*, p.118

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, p.118

constantly supplied Inkatha vigilantes with weapons that were used to kill non-Inkatha members.

*In other townships there is a widespread belief that warmongers in the security police are running guns from Ulundi through the KwaZulu Police.*<sup>203</sup>

Camps, like Mkhuze and Ulundi were where the Caprivi Trainees were temporarily kept before they were allocated for the covert operation; in other words these camps were used as a hiding place for all the culprits of the Caprivi Trainees. The dissidents claimed that after they returned to KwaZulu, some members of the unit were posted to secret bases run by KwaZulu Police officials and that one of these bases was at Mkhuze.<sup>204</sup> This covert camp was directly sponsored by the state which further proved the existence of the covert relationship between KZP and the state. Places like Mkhuze were among the well-chosen places for covert operations that immensely contributed to escalation of violence in KwaZulu more especially in 1990-1994.

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#### **4.7 Conclusion**

KwaZulu nearly witnessed a bloody civil war in the early 1990s due to the political violence between Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC). As from the inception of Kwazulu Government and Inkatha in early 1970s the political situation was dominated by Inkatha that worked hand in glove with the KwaZulu Government. It therefore implies that Inkatha being fully backed by the KwaZulu government enjoyed political hegemony in the whole of KwaZulu as the only political party.

The years of 1980s became a turning point for the political situation in for both Inkatha and KwaZulu Government, when in 1985 the trade unions such as COSATU

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<sup>203</sup> M. Kentridge: *An unofficial war inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg*, p. 53

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid*: p 53

and a revolutionary movement the United Democratic Front (UDF) came into being. The fact that these political movements claimed to champion the industrial and political affairs respectively within the realms of KwaZulu made Inkatha to raise eyebrows since these new organizations seemed to trespass on its terrain that Inkatha had selfishly dominated since its inception in 1975.

In 1981 when the KZP was formed, meant Inkatha had an ally to fight these antagonists; the power struggle amongst Inkatha and COSATU/UDF reached an unprecedented political equilibrium which intensified violence in the whole of KwaZulu. KZP played a pivotal role in destabilizing both UDF and COSATU which became a reason for internecine violence in KwaZulu. The TRC report said that hit-squad activities in KwaZulu/Natal were 'rife' especially in areas under the jurisdiction of the KZP.<sup>205</sup>

This undoubtedly led to bloody wars in KwaZulu where Inkatha was sometimes fully assisted by the KwaZulu Police and SADF. The conflict in Natal was viewed by many as the ethnic one between the Zulu and Xhosa people but the paradox was that all people in KwaZulu were Zulu speakers. Essentially, the struggle was for political hegemony between Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha and the joint forces of the UDF and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The violence might have been fueled by other factors such a criminal drive by those who wanted to capitalize on the confusion on both Inkatha and COSATU as a result of violence. The covert activities between the KZP and the SAP did the untold political harm by assisting Inkatha members to fight non-Inkatha members.

*In subsequent amnesty application to the TRC, De Kock and some of his Vlakplaas colleagues acknowledged that, in the period from 1990-1992, they had given Inkatha some 60 home-made shotguns...*<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war – new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 457

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.* p.456

This was the undeniable testimony of existence of the covert relationship between Inkatha and the South African Government. This covert relationship started during the time of P.W. Botha and it extended to the era of F.W. de Klerk where it left thousands of anti-Inkatha people dead due to the political hegemony that Inkatha wanted to have on KwaZulu. This covert relationship was the result of the growing influence of the African National Congress in the early eighties.

*The escalation levels of political consciousness among black South Africans in the early 1980s, coupled with the re-emergence of the ANC in internal black politics and the formation of the United Democratic Front, presented Inkatha with competitors in the struggle for national internal leader*<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> S. Johnson (Ed.): *South Africa - no turning back*, p. 359



## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 KWAZULU GOVERNMENT / IFP RELATIONS WITH THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

*“Justice reminds me of the man who murdered both his parents, and then, when sentence was about to be pronounced, pleaded for mercy on the grounds that he was an orphan.”*

*-Abraham Lincoln*

#### 5.1 Introduction

In early late 1970s after the failure of the London talks between Inkatha and the African National Congress, Inkatha took a negative stance against all anti-apartheid movements more especially the ANC because of its armed struggle and economic sanction policy. Inkatha as from its inception in 1975 became a custodian of non-violence. The ANC had very strong belief that as long as the white communities were living comfortably while blacks were killing one another, liberation would never be achieved. According to Oliver Tambo and the ANC as a whole, the armed struggle would be a better catalyst to draw white people to meaningful negotiations for non-racial dispensation for all people in South Africa as David Welsh states:

*We cannot and should not allow a situation of relative peace and tranquility to obtain in the white areas of our country while the blacks are in flames. We must take the struggle into the white areas of*

*South Africa and there attack the apartheid regime and its forces of oppression in these areas which it considers it rear.*<sup>208</sup>

On the other side, Inkatha believed that it was only a peaceful approach basing on non-violence that would be a preferred *modus operandi* of liberating South Africa. This ideological clash between the ANC and Inkatha led to a perennial hostility that became the reason for endless and internecine conflicts that stretched as from 1980s to 1990s as David Welsh states:

*The fierce rhetoric from the ANC, and comparable responses from Inkatha, raised the political temperature on the ground, predisposing rivals to regard the conflict in 'zero sum' terms, implying that only one winner could emerge.*<sup>209</sup>

The rivalry between Inkatha and the ANC nearly put South Africa especially KwaZulu on the verge of civil war since none was prepared to surrender. In this way, the violence that had accrued from this rivalry led to regrettable loss of lives on both warring sides.

## **5.2 Relations with the African National Congress (ANC)**

As from 1975, when Inkatha was re-founded by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Buthelezi, the leader of Inkatha, had a tacit and yet a tenuous relation with the African National Congress. Politically, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi never openly identified himself with the African National Congress after its banning other than that he kept on making a call for 'release Mandela' but he never shared an ideological view with the ANC in a real sense. Four years later in 1979, after the failure of London talks between the ANC and Inkatha, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi fully tergiversated with the ANC. The ideological rift between these two organizations grew to such an extent that it culminated in mutual animosity that in later years became the reason for the

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<sup>208</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 274

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, p.334

gratuitous loss of lives in places like KwaZulu and Gauteng. David Welsh summed up as follows:

*By early 1980s, the ANC strategy had crystalised into four interlocking components: mass mobilization, underground organization, armed propaganda and international isolation of the apartheid state.*<sup>210</sup>

These were the root causes of internecine conflict between the ANC and Inkatha as they were both vying for political hegemony in KwaZulu.

*As earlier noted, the ANC regarded itself as a national liberation movement dedicated to implementing a national democratic revolution. It therefore regarded political opposition as an unnecessary obstacle to the success of the NDR.*<sup>211</sup>

Chief Mangosuthu on the other hand, did everything to oppose all these ideas for the ANC since he believed that Inkatha had an inalienable right over KwaZulu and again it had been Buthelezi's main aim to be loyal to the Nationalist Party government. It can be undoubtedly said that Chief Buthelezi's attitude made the African National Congress fail to convince Inkatha about the employment of the armed struggle and economic sanctions as means of dismantling apartheid. Some members of the ANC such as John Nkadimeng and Alfred Nzo showed an unrelenting hostility to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi by calling him all sorts of names such as tribalist, a blood-soaked gangster, tyrant and also a forerunner in the service of P.W. Botha.

These bitter and demeaning words served to increase the hostility between ANC and Inkatha which made violence between them to be inevitable. The formation of both UDF and COSATU in the 1980s gave ANC an edge over Inkatha since these two new organisations were aligned to ANC. Inkatha in this way simply became dispensable since it was no longer needed to be an internal surrogate for the ANC since UDF/COSATU would play that role. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi tried all possible

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<sup>210</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 271

<sup>211</sup> A. Jeffrey: *Chasing the rainbow – South Africa's move from Mandela to Zuma*, p. 125

means to subvert the growing support and influence of the ANC by forming a counter union in 1986 that became UWUSA and he also tried to use Zulu ethnicity to win all the Zulu speaking people but his success was minimal. In his speeches to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1994, the Zulu ethnicity featured prominently. David Welsh summed up this as follows:

*We were defeated militarily but never crushed. We most certainly never relinquished our Zuluness and renounced our Zulu sovereignty. When we were dragged into the Act of the Union [1909] without even so much as a by-your-leave, we took with us our sense of who we were, where we came from and where we intended to be going. We also took with us our Zulu sovereignty.*<sup>212</sup>

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi constantly expressed these sentiments but in vain since the number of the Zulu speaking people who were joining the ANC grew alarmingly every year. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Inkatha tried all possible means to discourage this growth; as a result, all people who were non-Inkatha members were brutally killed and many places that were under Inkatha became no-go areas for the ANC supporters who wanted to recruit new members.

*The 'overwhelming majority' of people living in KwaZulu/Natal supported the ANC, and yet the organisation was not allowed to operate freely. Instead, it remained under constant attack, without any protection from the police or army.*<sup>213</sup>

This led to the spread of rumours to assassinate Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi by the ANC senior members. The ANC was under this notion because it viewed Inkatha as anti-revolutionary organisation such as UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique since it was proving to be against changes in South Africa. During the years of mid-eighties to 1994, Inkatha became a true anti-revolutionary organisation since it had forsaken the status of being an internal surrogate for the ANC. Internally, the ANC accommodated Inyanda National Movement (INM) that had been formed by Enos

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<sup>212</sup> D. Welsh: The rise and fall of apartheid, p. 338

<sup>213</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 368

Mabuza of KwaNgwane Province who took a clear position of being an anti-apartheid campaigner. The UDF, after its formation in 1980s, became an ANC aligned movement and for this reason together with COSATU became internal political targets for Inkatha. The mid-eighties were totally dominated by the internecine violence between ANC/UDF and Inkatha that came as a result of political and territorial hegemony in KwaZulu in places like KwaMakhutha, Pietermaritzburg, Lindelani and many more. The ANC then made sure that all its defensive and offensive structures were strengthened in order to defend its political hegemony more especially in places like Pietermaritzburg. According to the ANC, several Umkhonto commanders infiltrated the country from the middle of 1987 in order to begin a sustained military offensive.<sup>214</sup>

During this time, Inkatha relied more on warlords while the ANC relied on ‘comrades’ as their stalwarts for violence which played both the offensive and the defensive role in their respective areas. In reality, this whole situation resulted in the creation of no-go areas that were symbols of territorial dominance between the warring parties. These no-go areas were the reasons for many people’s deaths because failure to respect the no-go area’s rule for the opposite side would be an instant death to the trespasser. This kind of eye to eye violence in early 1990s went out of the peripheries of KwaZulu to Gauteng (former Transvaal Province) where it killed a lot of people. In Gauteng, it was interpreted as ethnic violence which was assumed to be between the Xhosa speaking people and Zulu people.

*Here the conflict was between the migrant hostel dwellers, mostly Zulu and Inkatha supporting, and people living in the townships adjacent to the hostels, invariably referred to by the Zulu migrants as Xhosa-speaking ANC.*<sup>215</sup>

This kind of speculation made many people believed that this internecine conflict was being orchestrated by the regime by covertly giving Inkatha training and also supplying Inkatha with weapons, in order for the violence to be seen as black on black violence.

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<sup>214</sup> A. Jeffery: *People’s war - New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p 172

<sup>215</sup> P. O’Malley: *Shades of difference - Mac Maharaj and the struggle for South Africa*, p. 292

The notion of black on black violence was supported by the white people's perception that black people were bloodthirsty and they were also incapable of settling disputes amongst themselves other than with violence. This perception of black on black violence was also supported and entertained by the government in order for it to go on unabatedly. The violence in Gauteng had many repercussions such as shooting outside the Shell House that did not only shake South Africa but the world at large.

On 28 March 1994, King Goodwill Zwelithini the person who was viewed to be apolitical was said to have given an inflammatory statement that really evoked all Zulu loyalists. We are here today to proclaim before the world, our freedom and sovereignty and our unwavering will to defend it at all costs.<sup>216</sup> These are very words that made Zulu loyalists to march to Shell House on 28 March 1994 which resulted in the deaths of eight people and injured 20. These inflammatory words did not come as a surprise when uttered by someone who was said to be apolitical like King Goodwill since Inkatha was so prone into using him for evoking up Zuluness from Zulu loyalists. In fact, it goes without saying that these words had been politically engineered by the top ranking people within Inkatha.

The findings for Judge Nugent proved that the ANC was offensive than defensive because some of the Inkatha supporters were shot even before they could reach the Shell House. Obviously, the Shell House incident will be one of those incidents that will remain indelibly on people's mind as one of the unnecessary bloodshed that could have been avoided. The incident that led to the Shell House shooting was in reality perpetrated by the Inkatha in order to scupper any chances of elections which was part of violation of civil liberties since it was one way of preventing people from exercising their democratic right of choosing who to govern them. This on the other hand showed that the ANC regarded Gauteng province as its stronghold that is why it did not give the Inkatha any chance to make any move especially when it came to rallies. Back in 1991, during the Thokoza massacre, Inkatha supporters were ambushed by the National African Congress's Self Defensive Unit (SDU). This happened on 8 September 1991

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<sup>216</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's War - New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 458

when the SDU called together its section leaders and they were advised to deploy its ambush parties. In this ambush Inkatha supporters were shot at a point blank range that led to death of sixteen hostel dwellers while thirteen were seriously injured. The second ambush at the entrance of the stadium where two more Inkatha supporters were killed instantly, that brought the death toll to eighteen people in total.

This then forced one of Inkatha official Themba Khoza to say that: When rockets are used against our members it shows the seriousness of the efforts to eliminate our supporters.<sup>217</sup> It can therefore undoubtedly be said that the turning point in Inkatha and ANC's relationship in the late 1970s became the reason for the hostility between them that led to the deaths of people in great numbers on both sides. This was because of the territorial and political hegemony that was being sought after and fought for by both parties.

### **5.3 The ANC's unplanned military operation**

In the course of the armed struggle, the ANC as from early 1960s relied more on its military wing known as Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK) for its military operation. The MK was trained to use its discretionary capacity when situation dictated since the former South African government was always militarily on guard for any attack that was believed to be part of terrorism.

*MK training always emphasized the need for personal initiative, and sought to develop the capacity of operatives to use their own discretion based on strict political considerations.*<sup>218</sup>

These kind of operational attacks became known as unplanned military operation since the determined targets were attacked out of the official policy guidelines. It cannot be denied that some of the ANC cadres misapplied this policy since their attacks could sometime involve the civilians who were protected by international military law since civilians are always taken as 'soft targets.' The attacks of the Magoo Bar and the

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<sup>217</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's War - New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 459

<sup>218</sup> E. Duxtander and P. Salazar: *Truth & reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p. 302

Durban esplanade by the MK cadres was the case in point for ‘soft targets’ attacks for which the ANC was blamed for a senseless terrorism that led to death of civilians in both of these attacks . At times, there were individuals who defected to the state and became informers or those who had become witnesses in political trials and ended up being Askaris like Joe Mamasela. Those people were labeled by the ANC as collaborators with the state. People like those posed a constant danger to the ANC since most of them were highly informed with the maneuvering strategies of the ANC.

They could therefore easily regard those as legitimate targets of planned or unplanned military strategies. An unplanned military strategy was at times very common in rural areas such as in places like Northern Transvaal that is currently known as Eastern Gauteng . The reason behind this was that the government had trained and equipped farmers to operate as an extension of military structures. These farmers therefore became targets for ANC’s unplanned military operation whereby individual farmers were killed in their farms. Notably, at times the ANC had to kill people who were regarded as soft targets such farm labourers and their children who were not their primary targets, ANC surprisingly had to condone those cold-blooded murders. With regard to those attacks on ‘soft targets’ for which MK were responsible, we do not seek to justify such attacks but insist that the context in which they occurred is relevant.<sup>219</sup>

The attacks of this nature became more prevalent after the Kwabe conference of June 1985. During this conference, the organisation came to a point where the distinction between the ‘hard’ targets (military forces) and the ‘soft’ targets (civilians) was disregarded. The MK cadres specialized in using land mines to their targets, these land mines killed people indiscriminately. Land mines were predominantly used haphazardly without determining the targets where it killed innocent civilians. One land mine explosion in the area in Durban 1985 killed six members of the Van Eck and Nysschem families who were travelling in a game farm...<sup>220</sup> The upsurge of these unplanned military operations took its toll in 1986 when a number of bomb attacks went up by

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<sup>219</sup>E. Doxtander and P. Salazar: *Truth & reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p.304

<sup>220</sup>A. Jeffery: *People’s War - New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 196



almost 96% since the ANC began to attack civilians even in hotels. As from 1985 to 1989 there was a huge upsurge again of such attacks that came as the individual efforts of Umkhonto Wesizwe cadres that targeted crowded places such as banks and stadiums. All these incidents proved to be indiscriminate in nature since it made no distinction between the 'soft' and the 'hard' targets.

What also remained distinguishable was that these attacks made no racial distinction. In October of 1987, there was a huge explosion in the shopping centre of Witbank, the Eastern Transvaal, that left two people killed and about 42 others wounded. Another major incident of such magnitude took place in Standard Bank branch of Roodeport (West Rand) which left four people killed and about 19 seriously injured. These incidents were mostly the results of solo efforts of individual cadres who used the discretion to kill people. Hein Grosskop a white Umkhonto commander once confessed openly that:

*I see the ANC's military operations as vital and effective means in the struggle to destroy apartheid...if I decide to kill you because you are an obstacle to peace, a danger to the community that is not as murder...I joined the ANC to help bring closer the day of liberation - the day when shooting and killing will stop.<sup>221</sup>*

These uncompromising words proved that the ANC cadres were not prepared to settle for anything else but liberation that had to come at all cost. 1990, due to the growing attacks of the ANC by those that later became known as the 'Third Force' seemed to heighten the struggle between the ANC and the Nationalist Party government's surrogates. After a mass funeral in Soweto in 1990, the ANC President Nelson Mandela publicly pledged the formation of the Self Defensive Unit (SDU) which would be the internal defensive wing for the ANC. SDU played a vital role in an unplanned operation attacks for the ANC. The SDU began to attack anyone who was related to the Inkatha irrespective of his or her political affiliation. The first person to die was a woman named Nomvula, whose sin was a romantic involvement with a Zulu hostel

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<sup>221</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's War - New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. p. 197

dweller.<sup>222</sup> The ANC leadership such as Ronnie Kasrils, Aboobaker Ismail, Riaz Saloojee and Robert McBride played a crucial role in the formation of the SDU. In 1991, there was an upsurge of violence on the Reef. The accusation for that upsurge was totally placed on the Third Force which made the SDU to activate its defensive position. The ANC through the SDUs started to deal fiercely with anything that it believed to be the source of violence. The defensive stance resulted in the killing of sixteen hostel dwellers that were ambushed by the ANC on Sunday 8 1991 while they were in their way to the meeting in Tokoza (East Rand).

On the same date, there was another ambush by the ANC that assailed the hostel marchers at the entrance of the stadium that left two people dead which brought the death toll to eighteen. According to the informants, these people were shot with AK-47 at point blank range. To everybody's surprise, when the news of the massacre began to spread, the ANC accused the police of having helped instigate the attack in order to thwart or undermine the peace process. This made the ANC escape the blame for the massacre up until it was later examined by the Goldstone commission which found no evidence of the police wrong doing. The commission found that the SDU was also involved in the planning and execution of the attack in Phola Park. These inhumane attacks continued unabatedly.

In July 1992, a taxi returning from Ulundi congress was stopped by a man who was wearing a camouflage uniform and carrying a torch which made him look like a member of the SADF. In that taxi, seven Zulus were identified and were taken to the nearby field close to Germiston premises where they were all shot in the back of the head. On Sunday the 25<sup>th</sup> July there was an aborted attempt to derail the train on which 2000 Zulus were expected to return from a rally at the FNB in Soweto. The tampered train line was timeously found by the police who saved the calamity by stopping the train before it derailed. These were part of the unplanned ANC's military operations which were aiming at counter attacking Inkatha in early 1990s

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<sup>222</sup>Interview with Busisiwe Dlamini (Sergt.) Esikhawini Township, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2016, p.143

#### 5.4 The ANC's planned military operations

In the course of 1992 there was an increasing attack of the Inkatha supporters that came from mysterious assailants that normally dressed in police or army uniforms. One of such events took place in mid-August 1992 in a place known as Folweni south of Durban . This attack was believed to be one of ANC's planned military operations.

*Without doubt, this is a planned strategy employed by MK and ordered by the ANC - and Nelson Mandela, as commander in-chief of MK, must take direct and full responsibility for the actions of his hit squads.* <sup>223</sup>

In this instance, Inkatha supporters were killed in an assault by ten gunmen dressed in security uniforms. In a space of only ten days, another similar attack took place in the area known as Patheni near Richmond. In this instance, a well-known *induna* (headman) Fana Nzimande, who was an Inkatha supporter, was visited by five unknown black men who were wearing army-type uniforms and balaclavas.

These men claimed to be police members who were looking for illegal guns. Nzimande with the respect of law handed over the guns that he had as a sign of being a law abiding citizen. After Nzimande was fully disarmed, he and all his family members including his wife were ordered by these attackers to line up against the wall of the kraal and they were brutally mown down by the attackers. In this brutal attack, only two of Nzimande's daughters survived but with serious injuries.

This attack was fully condemned by Inkatha as cold-blooded and barbaric murder. In the mid-September of 1992, another attack on Inkatha members occurred in Umgababa on the south coast of Durban that left about eight people dead. These attacks began to intensify since on 14 October 1992 a group of twenty men that dressed in security uniforms openly attacked the homestead for Mthiyonke Mvuno who was Inkatha 's vice-chairman in Felekisi south of Durban.

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<sup>223</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's War, New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 350

In this attack Mvono's wife was assassinated together with four family members including two children. These people were also said to have been killed by the gunmen dressed in police and army uniforms. This brought the death toll for Inkatha supporters killed in an operation of this nature to 32 people within a space of four weeks. These attacks had one thing in common they were executed by people who were using police and army uniforms and they were employing very brutal way to kill people and their killing strategy was that of leaving no one alive since they killed even women and young children. This was seen by some Inkatha members as a mini holocaust that was aiming at eliminating Inkatha leadership. This created a huge outcry amongst the Inkatha officials as Ben Ngubane once commented that:

*The attack bore all the hallmarks of MK .Trained assassins wearing security force uniforms are now perpetrating attacks on the IFP as part of a sinister new phase of covert ANC hit-squad operations.* <sup>224</sup>

This kind of political situation in Natal resulted in mutual internecine violence between the ANC and Inkatha. In this case what should be borne in mind is that on 17 June 1992, Inkatha of KwaMadala hostel dwellers had massacred the people of Boipatong which resulted in gruesome deaths for 39 people and numerous injured people. They also burnt quite a number of houses in this area, so this made everyone to understand that the ANC planned attacks for September 1992 for the Folweni residents was a retaliatory act.

What also needs to be remembered is that these brutal mutual attacks between the ANC and Inkatha were bolstered by the formation of Self Defensive Units (SDUs) and the Self Protective Units (SPUs) in 1990. The SDU was the internal para-military wing for the ANC that combined with Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK) to fight Inkatha. The formation of the SDUs intensified the violence more especially in the Gauteng region since they sometimes attacked indiscriminately; they even attacked people who were known to be ANC members.

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<sup>224</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's War - New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 350

*...Umkhonto, the SDUs, and township youths-could attack not only off-duty policemen (and their families) or IFP members (and their families) but also civilians who were likely to be ANC supporters or who were known to be ANC supporters.*<sup>225</sup>

The political situation between ANC and Inkatha ended up reaching an equilibrium, since the ANC Umkhonto and the SDUs as its military wings while Inkatha had its newly formed SPUs, covert hit-squad and the KwaZulu Police in KwaZulu. This situation remained unchanged as from 1990-1994 although toward election things intensified since Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi thought that he was being politically ostracized by both ANC and the government.

### **5.5 Conflict with collaborators**

As from 1975 when Inkatha was formed, it enjoyed a healthy relationship with the Nationalist Government as from BJ Vorster to FW de Klerk. This relationship was nurtured by the fact that the Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi the leader of Inkatha remained politically docile to South African Government more especially by the end of 1979 after he had tergiversated all the ANC's indoctrinations especially that of an armed struggle. It was after the London Conference of 1979 where Buthelezi openly rejected the armed struggle, people's army and also the economic sanctions and he soon enjoyed huge support from his followers.

His adherents overwhelmingly agree with his declare opposition to armed struggle and violence against the system.<sup>226</sup> His ad In the 1990s, after the unbanning of the anti-apartheid movements, the relationship between Inkatha and the Nationalist Government began to crumble gradually since FW de Klerk, unlike his predecessors, did not seem to be in the train anymore with Inkatha as was the case previously. In the early 1990s, the National Party through FW de Klerk became politically engaged with ANC in some political preliminary processes before multi-party negotiations such as Groot Skuur

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<sup>225</sup>. Jeffery: *People's War - New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 508

<sup>226</sup> M. Orkin : *The struggle and the future –what black South Africans really think*,p.55

Minutes, Pretoria Minutes, and Record of understanding, CODESA 1 and CODESA 2. In all these political processes, Buthelezi and Inkatha played a very trivial role in such a way that his political lustre began to wane drastically. The ANC, after its banning, was given a chance to be an active participant in shaping and designing the proposed future of South Africa that would change the age old political stalemate in South Africa as Saul and Bond explain:

*Yet the question as to how precisely the ANC could now be expected to position itself and to deal concretely with the new situation of apartheid 'stalemate' was a central one - bringing into focus a whole range of questions about the transition itself.<sup>227</sup>*

This means that the ANC was fast claiming its political recognition at the expense of other parties of which Inkatha was one. This then became the main reason for attrition of the political relationship between Inkatha and National Party. During early 1990s, there were some important and yet thorny political issues that were discussed as a matter of national interest, such as the proposal of the new Constitution for the new South Africa. The person who came to facilitate the constitutional draft was Francois Venter, a legal academic from Potchefstroom who was one of the government's advisors. What became an issue to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was the fact that the drafting of the new Constitution became the business for the National Party and the ANC while other parties like the IFP played little or no role at all.

This then increasingly created a huge political rift between Inkatha and the National Party. Before the Record of Understanding of 26 September 1992 between the National Party and the ANC, FW de Klerk and Roelf Meyer had a prior discussion with Buthelezi seeking to allay fear and suspicion that, a deal with the ANC was not about ostracizing him from what was going on. FW de Klerk put it clearly to Buthelezi that the objective of the bilateral talks with the ANC was about persuading the ANC to go back to the negotiation table since the ANC had abandoned negotiation after the Boipatong massacre of June 1992. During this time, Chief Buthelezi came with heavy demands that De Klerk could not easily accept. Among Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's

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<sup>227</sup> J. S. Saul and P. Bond: *South Africa - the present as history*, p. 124

demands was the paradoxical demand of seating of the Zulu King and KwaZulu Government in the negotiation table. Chief Buthelezi also told the government to desist from the perception of considering negotiations as the bilateral between the FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela. The paradox of Chief Buthelezi's demand about the Zulu King laid on the fact that when KwaZulu Government was still in good order, Chief Buthelezi ordered the Zulu King Goodwill to remain apolitical so that he could be above politics so that he could have nothing to do with the politics at all. Buthelezi, on the other hand, advanced the view that the King should remain above politics.<sup>228</sup>

Demand for the King's inclusion displayed Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's naive opportunism and also a dire political inconsistency which portrayed him as the person who had completely lost his political direction. The nature of the proposed Constitution remained highly mooted which became one of those things that increased Chief Buthelezi's suspicion as well as reluctance to accept it. The tricky question about it was whether the new Constitution would be unitary, as the ANC had demanded or it would be federal and the IFP and others including the National Party had expected it.

Chief Buthelezi was steady but surely, realizing that there were no concessions that would permanently block the way to real democracy. According to Chief Buthelezi's perception, there were so many things that were discussed by FW de Klerk and Mandela. In the Record of Understanding in which Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha did not play a role, there were proposals of diverse magnitude that were also proposed behind Chief Buthelezi's back such proposals for: the constitution-making body would act as an interim Parliament, and it would be used an interim GNU.

The other proposal was that the provision would be made for the national and regional government during the transition, as well as justifiable rights that almost stole the whole show that left the IFP which was believed to be the third biggest organization in South Africa without a chance to say whatever Buthelezi (Inkatha) wanted to say. That simply meant that there were only two bulls, the ANC and the NP that could share the

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<sup>228</sup>. B. Theron (Ed.): *The road to democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, 1970-1980*, p. 827

political arena in South Africa despite the fact there were other parties of which Inkatha was the one. This state of affairs became visibly clear that Inkatha was losing its political lustre to South African government as it has been mentioned above. This further strained the relationship between Inkatha and the National party which of course created a grievous cause of concern to the Inkatha which did not go unregistered as one of Inkatha officials told the Citizen Newspaper that everything has been arranged beforehand and that Codesa has been hijacked by the government and the ANC alliance<sup>229</sup>.

In the Record of Understanding, Buthelezi was so dismayed that FW de Klerk was convinced by the ANC's proposal to ban traditional weapons and also to fence the hostels while on the other hand the ANC supporters were regularly armed with highly sophisticated arms that were reason for the death of hundreds of Inkatha supporters. This then highly infuriated Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in such a way that he regarded FW de Klerk as a person who was openly conniving with the ANC.

*Buthelezi's anger marked the end of the road in his relationship with De Klerk; his earlier respect and trust had evaporated, despite De Klerk's effort to persuade him, the bilateral talks with the ANC were no more than an effort to start the negotiations.*<sup>230</sup>

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi realized that the only way to remedy the situation was to join hands with other homeland leaders such as Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatsoana and Oupa Gqozo of Ciskei so that they could resist the incorporation to South Africa. Chief Mangosuthu did all this despite the fact in his call for the 'release Mandela campaign' he once admitted that he was more that prepared to serve under Mandela as a black leader of South Africa. Chief Buthelezi further fortified his effort by inviting the Afrikaans right wing groups such as the Conservative Party and the Afrikaans Volksonie to join him and those homeland leaders which resulted in the formation of Concerned South African Group (Cosag). Over and above this, Buthelezi gave warnings of serious pending conflict if the ANC and the NP could ride roughshod over

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<sup>229</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's War - New light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 307

<sup>230</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 464



Inkatha's vital interests:

*If anyone looking to the future of South Africa expects Inkatha to vanish, they [had] better go and reread their Zulu history....I serve [notice] that Inkatha is a national political force and the KwaZulu Government is a historical reality which can only be ignored at the peril of the negotiation process.* <sup>231</sup>

These utterances fell among other intimidations that Chief Buthelezi used as his scare tactics but none of those scare tactics ever yielded fruit that would help him achieve his goal since nationally, everything went as planned. Lastly, Chief Buthelezi told FW De Klerk about the federal state proposal that was much akin to the defunct Natal/KwaZulu Indaba of 1986 with the hope that De Klerk might support him in that idea but De Klerk showed no interest at all. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was not deterred since he tried everything in his power to popularize his idea for a Federal State and he even tried to do so by drafting an alternative constitution but he did not win any support from other parties, it was only the Conservative Party that stood by him since the Conservative Party was also against the change that was being proposed.

In this way, the Conservative Party also became anti-change, just like Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, as its leader Andries Treurnitch had defied the preliminary negotiations as something that is akin to an ungodly marriage between the National Party and the African National Congress. CP leader Andries Treurnitch greeted the announcement of the bilateral agreement 'with utter contempt', calling it a *coup d'état* by the government and the ANC, in favour of the ANC. <sup>232</sup> This then became even clearer to the business community that, this Federal State Proposal was not the type of thing that they could opt for. This further diminished Chief Buthelezi's hopes of achieving it; as a result, this idea died at its infant stage. At this stage Zulu King Goodwill Zulu tried in vain to support Chief by making some scare tactics by promising the resistance of the Zulu people if they try to force KwaZulu into a unitary state since KwaZulu was a sovereign state.

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<sup>231</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p 464

<sup>232</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 375

*The Zulu monarch, King Goodwill, then also intervened by claiming 'exclusive and independent sovereignty' over all the territory which had been under Zulu dominion in 1834. He warned that attempts to force the Zulu nation to participate in a unitary state would fail on the account of the resistance of the Zulu people.*<sup>233</sup>

It however became clear that King Goodwill's scare tactic fell on deaf ears since the process of change that included KwaZulu went on undisturbed. The conflict between Inkatha and the National Party therefore went on unabatedly even if Chief Buthelezi promised to boycott the election of 1994. 1994 became the final year for collaboration between Inkatha and the National Party since the National Party lost power.

## **5.6 Political accountability**

Inkatha in the early years of its formation portrayed itself as the internal surrogate of the ANC since it adopted the legacy of the ANC such as the colours of the ANC and also the freedom songs of the ANC. It tried to duplicate the ANC by taking an advantage of the political vacuum of the black anti-apartheid movements that was the result of the banning of the ANC in early 1960s. It was in this decade of the silent 1960s, too, that Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi and his Inkatha Movement arose<sup>234</sup> In mid-seventies, Inkatha pretended as if it had lied low in order to achieve what were the real goals of the ANC. Towards the end of 1970s, Inkatha became the freedom obstructionist, since it proved to be against any liberation strategies that were believed to be quicker and effective such the armed struggle and economic sanctions. Inkatha remained the ANC's most formidable internal rival and a major obstacle to the success of the people's war.<sup>235</sup> In early eighties, Inkatha under the leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi formed the KwaZulu Police (KZP) that was also used

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<sup>233</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 439

<sup>234</sup> A. Sparks: *The mind of South Africa*, p. 274

<sup>235</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light in the struggle for South Africa*, p. 148

as the obstructionist element of liberation since it became the reason for the deaths of anti-apartheid people in huge numbers especially the members of the ANC and the UDF.

*The TRC next turned its attention to KwaZulu Police (KZP). Here it drew succor from Goldstone's forth interim report, for this had also warned of a probable hit squad at work within the KZP...The Weekly Mail & Guardian identified the former Caprivi trainees taken into custody as Gcina Mkhize, Raymond Mbambo, and Israel Hlongwane. All three had been linked to the killing in Esikhawini (Empangeni) in June 1993 of a KwaZulu police (a Sergeant Dlamini) and four other people.*<sup>236</sup>

On the other side, Chief Buthelezi adopted parochial views about the liberation struggle; as a result, in mid-eighties he came out with Natal KwaZulu Indaba which could not have contributed much to the liberation of South Africa as a whole even if he had been successfully implemented because of its parochialism. In 1992, when the Record of Understanding was formed, Chief Buthelezi did not feature prominently; the main role players were FW De Klerk and Nelson Mandela. This made Buthelezi to react by collaborating with some homeland leaders and the Afrikaans right wing parties such as the Conservative Party and Afrikaans Volkunie calling for Federalism.

They collaboratively formed something that became known as South African Concerned Group (COSAG) which failed to bear fruit due to irreconcilable differences amongst the partners. The formation of the group however, could not conceal major division of strategy and goals...<sup>237</sup> As early as 1986, Chief Buthelezi had formed a counter-union known as United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) which stood against COSATU which was a revolutionary organization.

This proved that Inkatha, under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi, truly became an anti-revolutionary organization in all respects. Inkatha, under Chief Buthelezi, really proved to be a revolutionary obstructionist which went on unabatedly even beyond

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<sup>236</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light in the struggle for South Africa*, pp. 432-433

<sup>237</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 465

1994. Lastly, Chief Buthelezi really proved to be the man of doubtful and double agenda who used his dubious personality to achieve his narrow political ends. For instance, when Mandela was still in jail, Chief Buthelezi constantly made a call for the release of Mandela and even showed willingness to serve under Mandela, but after Mandela's release, Chief Buthelezi did not live up to his words, instead, he regarded Mandela as his political arch-rival.

## 5.7 Conclusion

KwaZulu Government and Inkatha as from late 1970s parted ways with the ANC due to different opinion about the liberation struggle more especially when it came to armed struggle and economic sanctions. The relationship between KwaZulu Government, Inkatha and African National Congress got sour; as a result, it led to sanguinary wars as from mid-eighties to early 1990s. In early 1990s, the hostility between Inkatha and the African National Congress intensified more especially after the release of Nelson Mandela because Chief Buthelezi thought that the ruling party (NP) was pushing him aside for the newly released Mandela.

This became a cause of internecine violence that took its toll in the beginning of 1990 which resulted to the deaths of numerous innocent and apolitical people. The violence was so intense that all parties shared equal responsibility for the cause of violence as Nelson Mandela once pointed out: I am not going to blame the IFP and the government only. We must face the truth-our people are just as involved in violence.<sup>238</sup> Inkatha was clandestinely supported by the covert element that was directly sponsored by the Nationalist government more especially in the Reef in Gauteng where it wanted to establish its political hegemony. This situation made Nelson Mandela lose control and lambasted F.W. de Klerk in such a way that their relationship seemed to be irreparably damaged.

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<sup>238</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p 376

*He began by accusing the president of moral turpitude and duplicity, and went on to pile insult on insult, scornfully, abusively, venomously, and when it was over nobody could doubt that the relationship of trust which once existed between the two was utterly, irretrievably destroyed.*<sup>239</sup>

The extreme political violence such as Boipatong massacre did not detract the ANC's focus from the goal which was multi-party election that had to be democratically achieved. The main objective of the IFP was to derail the multi-party election seeing the ANC was gaining an alarming popularity amongst black people of South Africa more especially in KwaZulu where IFP was assumed to have a majority support.

The political stance adopted by the IFP especially when the election days were approaching highly stained an age old collaboration between the IFP and the government that nearly forced Chief Buthelezi to boycott the pending election of 1994. IFP and the KwaZulu Government became active participants in brewing violence with the hope of nullifying the progress for the multi-party talks. In fact, Inkatha and the KZG were the only major participants in the conflicts which had no control over a private army to be deployed for political purposes.<sup>240</sup> This state of affairs only served to diminish the support for Inkatha at the national level which tended to increase the support of the African National Congress both provincially as well as nationally.

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<sup>239</sup>A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p 305

<sup>240</sup>E. Doxtader and P. J. Salazar: *Truth and commission in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p. 340

## CHAPTER SIX

### 6.0 REPORTS OF COMMISSIONS AND COMMITTEES ON KWAZULU GOVERNMENT AND IFP'S RECORD ON CIVIL LIBERTIES

*“We have entered freedom with the laggage of unsettled accounts about our history.”*

*-Adam Michnik*

#### 6.1 Introduction

South African Government even before 1994 during the last days of the Nationalist Government began to work laboriously trying to streamline and accommodate and at the same the government had to try to eradicate all those obstacles that might impede those proposed political changes. This then resulted in the formation of plethora of Commissions and Committees such as Goldstone Commission, Advocate Malcom Wallis, Human Rights Commissins, Transitional Executive Council Group (TECG) etc. that would shoulder that massive responsibility.

The later played a crucial role in terms of removing all the obstacles that impeded the way to free elections. After the elections there after there was another major commission that was called Truth and Reconciliation Commission that had a reconciatory nature since dealt with the perpetrators and the victims. Perpetrators had to come to the fore and testify on the account of their participation in violation of other people's civil liberties. It should also be borne in mind that these Commissions and Committees' main aims were neither to condemn nor to condone any ill doings but it was to unearth all the truth that had remained unknown in order to forge a spirit of reconciliation within all the concerned parties. ... The TRC was meant to generate a new public culture of democratic

accountability and reconciliation.<sup>241</sup> Confessions had to be genuinely and truthfully made for the sake of true national reconciliation that would bring about emotional assuagement and spiritual healing to all those who were victims of internecine violence more especially during the transitional period and beyond.

On the positive side, the TRC performed an important therapeutic role, giving victims the opportunity to tell their story and have their sufferings acknowledged.<sup>242</sup> As stated, this was not about revenging but was more about assisting those who were victims of that violence to come to terms with their situation of losing their loved ones and their valued properties such as houses and businesses in that internecine violence. Amnesty would only be guaranteed to those who would unflinchingly and unreservedly state their cases, and again their cases had to prove to be of really political nature rather than thuggery or any other form of self-fulfillment motives such as grudges and jealousy.

This process could therefore be seen as the fact finding mission that was to be assisted by numerous mechanisms such Goldstone Commission, the advocate Malcolm Wallis, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Legal Resource Centre (LRC), the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the Transitional Executive Council's Task Group of 1994. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in particular had to touch on most sensitive issues of human rights abuses in depth. The commission started by hearing victims of human rights abuses telling their stories, which were more horrific than anyone had imagined...<sup>243</sup>

It should be noted that these mechanisms had manifold objectives since it would help solve many mysteries on the violation of civil liberties because some had remained partially uncovered while others had remained totally covered. Secondly, this process would determine if the culprits had to be given amnesty, and that amnesty had to be based on political justifiable violation of civil liberties and it was to be truthful since the truth would expedite the healing of wounds to those who mysteriously and

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<sup>241</sup> S. Jeppie (Ed.): *Toward new histories for South Africa - on the place of the past in our present*, p. 70

<sup>242</sup> H. Giliomee and B. Mbenga: *The new history of South Africa*, p. 414

<sup>243</sup> L. Thompson: *A history of South Africa-from the earliest known history human inhabitants to the present*, p. 275

painfully lost their loved ones. Moreover, the truth would help clarify and straighten the South African historical records on violation of civil liberties. It is at this stage where much attention would be drawn to the functioning and the significance of these commissions and committees.

## **6.2 The Legal Resources Centre (LRC) and the Human Rights Commission (HRC) 1992**

KwaZulu Police (KZP) together with other security forces such as South African Police (SAP) and South African Defence Force (SADF) as from mid-eighties to nineties became the greatest concern in many parts of KwaZulu both in townships as well as in rural areas. These three security elements joined hands in fermenting violence against the ANC and its subsidiaries such as UDF and COSATU in the whole of KwaZulu as well as outside the boundaries of KwaZulu such in Gauteng in places such as Boipatong, Soweto and also in hostels that were dedicated to male migrants from KwaZulu.

This kind of covert collaboration of these South African security forces with Inkatha was to protect and uphold the interests of Inkatha and other structures of apartheid directly led to deaths and displacements of people in great numbers more especially in KwaZulu. This situation did not go unobserved; as a result, many people especially in Gauteng areas made a huge outcry about the police who were inhumanly biased towards Inkatha.

*The police always jumped to Inkatha's aid and shoot teargas and bullets in our direction. They never do this to the Inkatha people when they burn and stone our houses.<sup>244</sup>*

Complaints of this nature became the order of the day as it has just been mentioned since the police force always stood on the side of Inkatha as a result of this devious

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<sup>244</sup> P. Bonner and L. Segal: *Soweto a history based on the video documentary*, p. 154



collaboration between KZP and South African Police. There were other numerous cases where SADF was directly implicated in aiding Inkatha, in its hideous activities of violating other people's civil liberties. Evidence for this covert collaboration between Inkatha and SADF kept on presenting itself in different ways. Tony Yengeni noted that R-4 or R-5 rifles (standard issue to the SADF) had been used in the attack, adding: "It is sinister that SADF-issued weapons were used."<sup>245</sup>

This was one of the evident proofs about the involvement of the SADF in destabilization of peace in South Africa that even forced F.W. de Klerk to reshuffle his cabinet where both Magnus Malan and Adrian Vlok were removed from their respective positions. On 29 July the State President announced that he was removing Malan from the defence portfolio and Vlok from the police one.<sup>246</sup> It important to say that people's opinions were at variance about this step because some said it was a good step while others said it had a lot to be desired since these people had to be given a summary dismissal. The Defence force as early as mid-eighties had a clandestine relationship with Inkatha that led to secret training of 200 Inkatha members in Caprivi in Namibia.

These 200 people were later integrated to KZP under a cloak of being the body guards of KwaZulu VIPs but it soon became evident they were to be a para-military squad that had to specialize in killing non-Inkatha members. In many KwaZulu townships, it soon became clear that KwaZulu Police force was directly involved in killing non-Inkatha members in droves. These kind of inhuman deeds began to draw attention from institutions such as the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) and the Human Rights Commission (HRC).

The LRC/HRC report cites cases where the KZP refused to accept complaints from people or demanded to know the political affiliation of the complainant.<sup>247</sup> There were numerous cases where people were not given proper legal protection within all jurisdictions of the KZP. Other findings made by LRC/HRC were that those victims were non-Inkatha members. Again these institutions all found that people who were

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<sup>245</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war-new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 402

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 285

<sup>247</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 51

found to be wearing T-shirts of other political parties other than those of Inkatha were to be ridden roughshod which was part of the violation of civil liberties as per KZP officials' instructions.

*Mathe of the KZP had told policemen that should they come across any person wearing ANC, AZAPO or SACP T-shirts within their area of jurisdiction [they] were to ensure that such persons were lost in the mist.* <sup>248</sup>

These hideous deeds that were linked to KZP such as abduction of ANC-aligned or non-Inkatha activists, failure to intervene in preventing attacks done by Inkatha members to non-Inkatha members in the presence of the KZP, maltreatment and torture of detainees, disruption of funerals, memorial services etc. As from the inception of the Bantustan system, Chief Buthelezi regarded KwaZulu as his political stronghold where his political hegemony had to be willy-nilly maintained.

The KZP therefore upheld the same mentality within KwaZulu; as a result, they began to assert that anyone who was not Inkatha was the enemy of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha. For this reason the KZP wanted to assassinate all those who were non-Inkatha members so that Chief Buthelezi's goal could be achieved. According to the findings of the Legal Resources Centre the KZP in KwaZulu was responsible for abducting and killing people who were non-Inkatha members.

It is said that KZP was clearly and systematically acting as Inkatha's private army in the conflict. <sup>249</sup>This finding revealed the reluctance of the KZP to intervene when Inkatha members were attacking non-Inkatha members. In 1992, in Nquthu, on night of 8 November the people who were believed to be non-Inkatha members were brutally attacked by armed Inkatha members that led to death of several people, the KZP were told but they did not intervene timeously and no arrest was made. "There are numerous cases where KZP failed to protect or to take necessary steps to protect residents, particularly non-Inkatha persons, from being attacked in their presence or in other

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<sup>248</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 53

<sup>249</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war – new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 247

circumstances.”<sup>250</sup> The KZP proved to be in league with Inkatha in various ways since they were also responsible in supplying Inkatha with all kinds of weapons including the home-made weapons to attack all those who were non-Inkatha members. In the early 1990s, the Human Rights Commission through its laborious investigation came up with shocking findings that the government was manipulating the black on black violence to suit its devious and murky political agenda. According to these findings, the government’s intention was to weaken the ANC since the ANC was its major competitor for future elections.

This was clearly proved that De Klerk’s government was chasing a twin strategy, which was that of talking about peace while at the same time fermenting the black on black violence. These institutions especially the HRC also played a tremendous role in keeping a straight statistical record of those who were killed by vigilantes which was one of infamous Inkatha’s subsidiaries.

*In a similar vein, the HRC stated in the new total strategy that there had been a horrific total of 2640 vigilante-related deaths over the past twelve months, and that these killings represented 83% of all politically related deaths in this period.<sup>251</sup>*

It can therefore be said that the role of these institutions was of tremendous importance in streamlining our historical records that otherwise would have gone into a state of inaccurate estimation.

### **6.3 The Goldstone Commission of 1992**

This committee sat in different places on different dates; it was in Cape Town on 7 February in 1992, and also in Pretoria where it started in February to September of the same year. This Commission was chaired by the Hon Mr Justice R J Goldstone who was assisted by two gentlemen who were Mr G Steyn and Mr S Moshidi. The main aim of this Commission was to delve into all forms of injustices that predominantly happened in the period of mid-eighties to early nineties and also find those who were responsible for those

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<sup>250</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 51

<sup>251</sup> A. Jeffery: *People’s war – new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 293

injustices. Goldstone's investigation was to play a major role in bringing to book some of the major practitioners of dirty tricks.<sup>252</sup> It is however important to say that although there were many culprits of the internecine violence of 1990-1994 transitional period, this commission placed its primary focus on the activities of the KZP. In almost all of the areas under the control of the KZP, conflict monitors and lawyers have received reports and evidence of the involvement of the KZP...<sup>253</sup> KwaZulu Police for a long time was taken by many people as the private army of Inkatha and KwaZulu Government but there was no tangible proof that would substantiate that kind of thinking .

This thinking was first substantiated by the Goldstone Commission of 1992. This commission began to delve into cover-up case practices that implicated the high-ranking KZP officials. There was a case in point of Captain Leonard Langeni who in 1988 concealed four special constables who were under his command in Mkhuze Camp in the northern part of KwaZulu. These four constables were involved in the Trust Feed Massacre, so, in order for them to escape the rule of law they were taken to Mkhuze Camp. Despite their inactiveness, they were given full salaries by Leonard Langeni. This kind of behavior was clear abuse of power by the KZP officials and it was the abuse of the taxpayers' money.

In 1990, those same constables were assisted in joining the KZP despite the fact that they were sought after by the South African Police in connection with the case in which they were concealed for in Mkhuze Camp. This was a travesty of justice since according to the employment ethics, for any police force, people with criminal cases were not supposed to be employed as policemen. The employment of such people became rife KwaZulu which made people to lose hope in the police in such a way that they could not rely on them as law and order maintainers. The community had little confidence in the police, while some organisations were alleged to have discouraged their followers from making statements to the police.<sup>254</sup> This was therefore a clear undermining of the rule of law by the people who were supposed to be protecting it. This Commission further revealed another mysterious

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<sup>252</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and the fall of apartheid*, p. 419

<sup>253</sup> A. Minnaar: *Patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, pp. 50-51

<sup>254</sup> A. Jeffry: *The truth about the truth commission*, p.155

case of the concealment of another KZP special constable by the name of Vela Mchunu, who was implicated in the murder case in December 1986, that was about the killing of three members of the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) from Mpophomeni. Cases of this nature kept on coming up again against Vela Mchunu where in 1990 he was again implicated in the murder trial of Samuel Jamile of Clemont in Durban who was an Inkatha Legislative Assembly member who was mentioned in numerous murder cases and Vela Mchunu was again taken to Mkhuze Camp for a refuge after completion of Jamile's case.

This Commission further revealed that in March 1991, Constable Vela Mchunu was appointed as one of KwaZulu policeman under a fictitious name of Alfred Masango, where he was assisted by a high-ranking official Leonard Langeni (KZP Captain) and Zakhele Khumalo (Personal Assistant for Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi). This of course was part of serious travesty of justice by people who were supposed to uphold it.

Mkhuze Camp really became a notorious place since this Commission further revealed that other culprits such as Daluxolo Luthuli was also hidden in Mkhuze Camp after he had been released on bail in connection with the possession of an AK-47 that had been used in an attack of a UDF stronghold in Mpumalanga (Hammersdale). There was another revelation of the Caprivi Trainee, Bhekisisa Alex Khumalo who was also taken to Mkhuze following his release on bail on a charge of attempted murder.

According to this Commission, another notorious KZP member by the name of Nyoni Israel Hlongwane who was very active in Esikhawini area, Israel was taken to Mkhuze as a refugee despite the fact that he was sought after by the South African Police in connection with serious cases of rape, murder and the attempted murder. Israel Hlongwane's case was a unique one since rape was a pure thuggish act that went far beyond his scope of duty; it therefore had to fall out of the ambit of amnesty. His thuggish nature became evident when he was denied amnesty by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission since rape was pure thuggery.

The South African Police tried in vain to co-operate with the KZP in order for Hlongwane to be brought under justice, its failure was orchestrated by these high-ranking KZP and Inkatha officials because of the power that was bestowed on them to undermine justice and the rule of law. This Goldstone Commission further made a groundbreaking discovery of the covert collaboration between Inkatha and the some of the state agents in the violation of civil liberties that resulted either in killing, maiming of also torturing non-Inkatha members in most of KwaZulu. The Seven Days War that took place in Endaleni outside Pietermaritzburg where Inkatha left more than one hundred people and also a high number of houses burned other kind of properties being irreparably damaged.

*In March 1990, Cosatu released a dossier detailing 29 incidents in which policemen and Inkatha warlords had collaborated in shooting at and harassing residents of Imbali (Pietermaritzburg) between November 1988 and January 1990...In April, the ANC issued a statement blaming the government for the Pietermaritzburg violence and demanding that it ensures that the 'police who had led, armed, and protected the numerous vigilante groups, ended their campaign of terror against the democratic movement and the people of Natal.'*<sup>255</sup>

This Commission further delved into another scourge of the hostel dwellers that acted as agents of the violation of civil liberties where they collaborated with South African Police (SAP) more especially in KwaZulu and Transvaal (Gauteng). In places like Thokoza, Sebokeng, Boipatong and Denver, there were several cases that were reported in connection with the assassination of non-Inkatha people. "At a wall that separated 2000 Zulu hostel-dwellers from jeering township youths, Inkatha supporters from the nearby Sebokeng hostel marched home under police escort."<sup>256</sup>

These hostel dwellers were predominantly Inkatha from KwaZulu who were Inkatha supporters that were prepared to hold an Inkatha flag even outside the peripheries of KwaZulu. They therefore brooked no resistance coming from non-Inkatha; as a result, they attacked and killed people in numbers in these above-mentioned places. The intensity of these activities of the hostel dwellers made the African National Congress to think that Inkatha through these hostel dwellers had an intention of derailing the peace

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<sup>255</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, pp. 241-242

<sup>256</sup> D. Reed: *Beloved country - South Africa silent wars*, pp. 33-34

process.

*The death toll on the Reef in the week after the Thokoza massacre soared to 150. The ANC said the violence was 'aimed a derailing the peace process' and appealed to its supporters not to allow ... wanton acts of provocation to result in even more bloodletting ...The hostel dwellers made preparations for attack . Some of the the men fetched weapons from their rooms. Others were given guns from a pile brought by an IFP leader.<sup>257</sup>*

These incidents had dire consequences in terms of the violation of civil liberties that nearly led to derailment of the peace process more especially between the National Party Government and the African National Congress as the supporters of the ANC openly pleaded for war after the Boipatong massacre. People in the ANC, long before the Goldstone Commission, delved into these incidents, such as the Boipatong Massacre had a clear understanding that although these incidents were perpetuated by Inkatha hostel dwellers, the Nationalist Government under De Klerk was surreptitiously sponsoring Inkatha which resulted in a huge outcry more especially from the upper echelons of the African National Congress and they reacted as follows.

*The National Party regime of F.W. Klerk has brought our country to the brink of disaster. Riddled with corruption and mismanagement, the regime is determined to block any advance of democracy. It pursues a strategy which embraces negotiations, together with systematic covert actions, including murder, involving its security forces and surrogates. The subversion of the political processes to destroy the democratic movement in South Africa, led by the ANC cannot be allowed to prevail any longer. We cannot tolerate a situation where the regime's control of power allows it the space to deny and cover up its role in fostering and fomenting violence. The Boipatong massacre is one of the most chilling consequences of the actions of the De Klerk regime. Before the people of South Africa and bar of international opinion, it cannot escape culpability<sup>258</sup>*

The Goldstone Commission of 1992 further revealed the conscription of Inkatha members into hit squads. The covert activities of the hit squads were prevalent in KwaZulu and

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<sup>257</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, pp. 288-328

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid* ,p.331

Natal since by then KwaZulu and Natal were taken as separate entities. Places like Esikhawini and Nseleni were badly affected by the activities of these hit squads; as a result, many people were killed and others were forcefully and permanently removed from their places while their properties were irreparably destroyed. According to this Commission, these hit squads had access to KwaZulu Government resources such as vehicles, arms and ammunitions which gave them all opportunities to violate civil liberties. They were tasked with the responsibility of eliminating all the ANC/SDU elements more especially in KwaZulu/Natal as Jeffery states:

*According to the commission, there was a high probability that a hit squad consisting of five policemen have been responsible for the murder of people not less than nine people , including the leaders and the members of the ANC.*<sup>259</sup>

According to this Commission, this therefore made Inkatha supporters to be implicated in numerous cases of the violation of civil liberties. These supporters were heavily engaged in the campaign of disrupting all the electoral process as it was coming nearer. They were constantly supplied with arms and ammunitions by the right-wing organisations and also from the security forces. During this period, Inkatha members were sent to para-military training projects where they were trained on weapon handling. The Goldstone Commission revealed that during this period, the violation of civil liberties by Inkatha members rose to the highest toll which was estimated at 3000 violation of civil liberties in KwaZulu /Natal from 1993-1994. In short, the significance of the violation of civil liberties lied on the fact that it paved and facilitated the process of Truth and Reconciliation Commission because most of the culprits had been identified by this Commission.

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<sup>259</sup> A Jeffery : *People's war –new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 432



#### 6.4 Advocate M. Wallis Committee of 1993

Advocate Malcom Wallis Committee was put in place in 1993 as a sub-committee for the Goldstone Commission. Its main aim was expedite the findings about the violation of civil liberties. It was therefore given a special responsibility to enquire into the role of the KwaZulu Police's political inequities such as disregarding the elementary procedures, a failure to bring Inkatha offenders to book and all other forms of incompetence that had been started by the Goldstone Commission a year earlier. This committee had to deal meticulously with all the political inequities of KwaZulu Police more especially during the transitional period.

Community members who were not members of Inkatha could not report any wrong doing by Inkatha members to the KwaZulu Police because that would mean more trouble for those who have reported. Often victims of attacks who are non-Inkatha members fear that if they report the matter to the KZP they would be further victimized.<sup>260</sup> During these years of early 1990s, the KZP was constantly ill-conceived due to the fact that it sided with Inkatha in most cases. For this reason, the KZP was mentioned in numerous cases such as failing to bring Inkatha perpetrators to book; the very reason that protracted the internecine violence more especially between the ANC and Inkatha. This was perpetrated by the fact that many if not all KwaZulu Policemen were so partial in dealing with issues that could implicate Inkatha members and its sub-structures like vigilantes and warlords.

According to Malcolm Wallis Committee, this kind of behavior only served to take the internecine violence to its highest toll since the very people who were supposed to be peace-keepers had become an obstacle to peace for the fact that they constantly connived with the perpetrators. The trends in the conduct of the KZP indicate that the KwaZulu Police may become one of the biggest obstacles to a lasting peace in this region.<sup>261</sup> KZP was mentioned in failing to properly and objectively investigate all the wrongful behavior

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<sup>260</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *The patterns of violence case studies of conflict in Natal*, p. 51

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid*, p. 55

of the Inkatha members. This committee worked very well with the Goldstone Commission; as a result, there were a lot of political inequities of the KZP that were brought light.

*In May 1995, Malan was one of 20 accused of killing 13 people in KwaMakhutha (KwaZulu-Natal) in 1987...In his evidence to the TRC, Malan apologized for having given orders that led to the death of innocent civilians caught in the cross-fire– ‘this is part of the ugly reality of war.’<sup>262</sup>*

This committee played a crucial role in uncovering the most clandestine information about the death of innocent people simply because they thought to be either the African National Congress (ANC) or United Democratic Front (UDF) members. It also revealed the involvement of the state in the covert network of assassinating political activists. It also delved into covert relationship between senior government officials who were found to be on their own when it came to killing other people since they succumbed to other people's requests in killing people as Malan revealed in his testimony.

*The state alleged that the killers were members of a hit squad trained by the SADF to eliminate UDF/ANC members during the 1980s... But he insisted that he had been ordered, or been approached for authorization by any member of the SADF, to kill political opponents of the government.<sup>263</sup>*

## **6.5 Truth and Reconciliation Commission**

Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the investigative institution that was chaired by Archbishop Bishop Desmond Tutu that became part of facts finding mission on all political injustices that took place before and during the transitional period in South Africa.

*The TRC's task, and in particular the investigation and documentation of gross violation of human rights, as well as the construction of a comprehensive new archive with its authoritative representation*

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<sup>262</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, pp. 409-410

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 409-410

*published in the official TRC report...*<sup>264</sup>

Its main aim was to bring the perpetrators and the victims alike to the fore in order to testify on what they did and also on what happened to them especially those that were victims, as from the years back to transitional period. It is of primary importance to note that this commission had to forge unity and reconciliation amongst the perpetrators and the victims. This therefore required all the perpetrators to come to the fore and testify on all the violation of civil liberties for other people and the victims were also expected to come to the fore and testify on what happened to them as a result of the violation of their civil liberties. The commission started by hearing victims of human abuses tell their stories, which were more horrific than anyone had imagined...<sup>265</sup>.

Political parties and individuals had to make their submissions that were expected to be truthful and also to be less biased. All the participants were supposed to unflinchingly and unreservedly state their cases whether they be perpetrators or victims. Inkatha Freedom Party was amongst those parties that were expected to testify on the violation of civil liberties, but what transpired was that it was only those who were used for the violation of civil liberties like members of the KZP especially those who were known as Caprivi Trainees who testified, and the senior members of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha like Mangosuthu Buthelezi had flatly refused to participate in testifying. It should be noted that despite of their refusal, most members of Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government were seriously implicated in the violation of other people's civil liberties. In most cases, Inkatha got implicated in the violation of civil liberties through the KZP which was its main subsidiary structure as it routinely collaborated with both SAP and SADF in the gross violation of civil liberties.

*“The TRC made certain findings relating to the KZP which suggested that on occasions they co-operated with the SAP in perpetrating gross human rights violations...In various findings made by the TRC against the IFP, it sought to create links between a variety of violent activities taking place within community dynamics and individual crimes on the one hand and Inkatha on the other hand.”*<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Shamil Jeppie: *Toward new histories for South Africa - on the place of the past in our present*, p. 68

<sup>265</sup> L. Thompson: *A history of South Africa - from the earliest known human inhabitation to the present*, p. 275

<sup>266</sup> E. Doxtader and P.J. Salazar: *Truth and Commission in South Africa - the fundamental document*, pp. 339-340

These were the serious implications that were directed to Inkatha's major subsidiary structures. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi took a stance of distancing himself with these covert activities of KZP by stating that KZP was controlled by the South African Government since KwaZulu was unlike the TBVC states; KwaZulu was dependent on South African Government. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi forwarded this statement despite the fact that he was the Prime Minister of KwaZulu and also the Minister of KZP.

*Prince Buthelezi served simultaneously as President of the IFP and the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Government and during the period of 1982-1994 was the Minister of Police in the KwaZulu Government.*<sup>267</sup>

This therefore clearly showed his intention to falsely exonerate himself at the expense of the Nationalist Government. Inkatha and KwaZulu Government of which Chief Mangosuthu was the leader of both did a lot of violation of civil liberties both before the transitional period, during transition period and also after transitional period like the case of Shobashobeni in the South Coast KwaZulu-Matal. Inkatha and KwaZulu Government used vigilantes and the warlords in making sure that all those who were anti-Inkatha were thoroughly dealt with. Vigilantes sometimes had to work hand in glove with the police in the process of violating of civil liberties.

*The third role of the police and other security forces is to sponsor and establish vigilante groups, to work on their behalf, particularly to attack the neighbourhood and street committees lawfully established by radical resistance organisation as an alternative local government.*<sup>268</sup>

This collaboration between the police and the Inkatha subsidiary structure was further worsened by other findings of the TRC about Inkatha's covert relationship with the organized township gangs in Ermelo which became known as the Black Cats which also grossly violated the civil liberties. The TRC sought even to connect Inkatha to the activities of the groups known as the 'Black Cats' and the 'Toasters Gang'.<sup>269</sup> These gangs did untold violation of civil liberties on all those who were non-Inkatha both in rural areas and in townships of Ermelo. It was soon discovered that despite these structured

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<sup>267</sup> E. Doxtader and P.J. Salazar: *Truth and Commission in South Africa - the fundamental document*, p.41

<sup>268</sup> S. Shaun (Ed.) *South Africa - no return back*, p. 273-274

<sup>269</sup> E. Doxtader and J.P. Salazar: *Truth and reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p. 341

violation of civil liberties by Inkatha and its accomplices, there was other unstructured violence that was executed by individuals that were neither known nor planned by Inkatha officials, which also did untold harm to people.

*The reality is that the overwhelming majority of violence by Inkatha members and supporters was produced by occasional activities of unstructured groups without any underlying plan.*<sup>270</sup>

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also implicated Inkatha on train violence that killed a number of people especially in Gauteng between 1990 and 1994.

*The TRC, on the other hand, found that the IFP were 'centrally involved' in the train violence which killed 572 people, concerting their activities with the security forces in an effort to prevent the ANC coming to power.*  
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The issue of people that were killed in trains during the period of early 90s had become one of the political mysteries since the Goldstone Commission could not solve it and it became a source of finger pointing between the ANC and Inkatha.

*The Goldstone Commission examined some 100 such cases in the 1991 to 1992 period and, while referred to the concurrent ANC-IFP violence, the commission could see no link between the violence and either the ANC or IFP or that it had served any political purpose.*<sup>272</sup>

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission made a major breakthrough by putting the issue of train incidents to rest since it had been a thought provoking situation as who was behind it. The ANC and some individuals that were operating in its name were also expected to make their own submissions to the TRC about the wrongs they did before and during the transitional era. The African National Congress took a stance of differentiating between the 'soft targets' (civilians) and 'hard targets' (military personals) in their military operation as from the formation of Umkhonto Wesizwe in 1961. This then gave the ANC a strict obligation to avoid the killing of the civilians be it white or black civilians, this had to be avoided in cases of military attacks.

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<sup>270</sup> Doxtader and J.P. Salazar: *Truth and reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p. 341

<sup>271</sup> R.W. Johnson: *South Africa's brave new world – the beloved country since the end of apartheid*, p. 290

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid*, p.290

In the submissions that the ANC made in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it stated that sometimes it became totally impossible to differentiate between the soft targets and the hard targets more especially with the white communities. In cases of farmers, it really became impossible to make a difference since most of them, especially those who were in border areas, were given arms by the government since they could come into contact with those who were entering the country with an aim of attacking the government as it was the stock-in-trade of all anti-apartheid movements members. It therefore went without saying that most farmers had to be taken as the hard targets that had to be dealt with without any regret or hesitation.

*...with white farmers integrated into the security system and provided with the tools of war including automatic weapons which were only legally possessed by members of the apartheid armed forces.* <sup>273</sup>

According to ANC's submission, most farms, especially those that were on the borders, were loosely taken as the war zones, which means attacking those farmers was condonable in terms of their military operation. The ANC in its submission further forwarded that on the 20<sup>th</sup> May 1983, it attacked the Head Quarters of South African Air Force (SAAF) by means of the car bomb where it left nineteen people dead and two hundred people injured of which eleven were army officers. Also, out of the two hundred that were injured seventy people were employees of the armed forces who of course were 'soft targets'.

This was the first major explosion that the African National Congress ever recorded in 1980s or since its inception in early 1960s. The ANC also took a stance to account for another blast that took place in Amanzimtoti on December 1985 where they left five people dead including an eight years child Corne Smit. This attack showed that the African National Congress was steadily becoming military unethical as it seemed to tergiversate its Geneva Convention agreement of 1977 of not jeopardizing the lives of innocent civilians. When the ANC became a signatory to the Geneva Convention on the conduct of war in 1977, it was the first liberation movement in the world to take this this

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<sup>273</sup> E. Doxtader and P.J. Salazar: *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p. 304

step.<sup>274</sup> It can therefore be said that the tergiversation of the ANC from the Geneva Convention's agreement was somehow morally justifiable since it was seen as retaliation for the attacks that the South African Defence Force had done on December 9, 1982 in Maseru (Lesotho) where South African Government was pursuing the MK cadres in this country. Oliver Tambo the then President of the ANC expressed his profound condolence about what befell LeSotho.

*This weekend has brought us together, the living and the departed. We are united by the brutal death of the nationals of this Kingdom and the children of the mothers of South Africa.*<sup>275</sup>

In this barbaric act the South African Army left more than 42 people dead most of whom were civilians; this of course was regarded by the ANC as a dastardly committed act by the South African Government which was contrary to the international code of conduct of the struggle which was fit to be condemned and also be retaliated if possible. The other dastardly committed act by the South African Government was that of the assassination of Ruth First who was Joe Slovo's wife in Maputo in 1982 with a letter bomb.

The introduction of the Tricameral Parliament in 1983 by the South African Government might have fueled the terrorist activities of the ANC since Blacks were excluded from that kind of political reforms although nothing that was specifically accounted for this to the TRC submissions of the ANC. This openly proved that the South African Government under the National Party was still far from forsaking its hideous laws of apartheid. Other than the above mentioned incidents, the ANC further undertook the submission of the operation of the Self Defence Units (SDUs) where they admitted that the SDUs sometimes became extremely difficult to control since they were divided into two groups.

There were those that had close link to African National Congress and those that operated outside the ANC realms. According to the African National Congress, the first SDUs phenomenon was the one that they could account for and they resisted to take the responsibility of the latter since the latter was acting outside the African National

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<sup>274</sup> Doxtader and P.J. Salazar: *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p p. 301

<sup>275</sup> T. Farber: *Through my lens Alfa Kumalo*, p. 59

Congress's control. Amongst the submissions that were brought to the TRC were those of the National Party represented by F.W. de Klerk who was the leader of the National Party and also the former President of South Africa. F.W. de Klerk, unlike other leaders of political parties like Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the PAC willfully and eagerly presented his submissions although he was somehow very much evasive and also very economical with the truth in his submission.

He clearly stated the three categories of the National Party starting from 1948-1960, from 1960-1978 and from 1978 -1994 of which he formed the part. In the first place he started by exonerating himself of all that happened during the first two eras of the National Party, at the same time, he failed to give all the political wickedness and the inequities during these first two eras. In the third era where he was partially and personally responsible, he again failed to live up to expectations of all those, whose family members suffered in the hands of the South African Government regime.

F.W. De Klerk in his submission evasively presented his facts by putting emphasis on the first era of the National Party which is 1948-1960. Of course it is undeniably true that those people of that political era, more especially Dr. D. F. Malan and H.F. Verwoed were seen as the designers and architectures of the apartheid system, basing it on hideous practices like the separate development of South Africans that led to establishment of the Homelands.

...the greatest legacy of Dr. Verwoerd was his vision of separate homelands...<sup>276</sup> Dr. H.F Verwoed was never involved in killing people at all, he only believed in long term imprisonment as he did to people like Nelson Mandela and others while Dr. D.F. Malan engineered most of the hideous laws like the Group Areas Act of 1950. His immediate predecessors, who were B.J. Vorster and P.W. Botha, were much involved in violation of civil liberties by assassinating people and it was under these people where the abominable places like Vlakplaas successfully tortured and brutally assassinated anti-apartheid activists which De Klerk was reluctant to account for. F.W. de Klerk denied that he had

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<sup>276</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 104



any knowledge of this hideous place in his submission despite the fact that it had immensely contributed to the violation of civil liberties where in most cases the commanders of that place clandestinely collaborated with Inkatha in the violation of civil liberties.

*Clandestine suppliers of the firearms, ammunition, and explosives from policemen or former policemen sympathetic to the IFP were on the increase as well, most notably from former Vlakplaas commander Colonel Eugene de Kock.<sup>277</sup>*

Vlakplaas, more especially during the era of P.W. Botha, became an ungodly kingdom for the violators of civil liberties. F.W. de Klerk did what was not expected of his submission by giving P.W. Botha a credit that he did not deserve, he mentioned Botha's name among those who brought about transformation in South Africa. For example, my administration and that of my predecessor belonged to the reform and transformation periods of the National Party.<sup>278</sup> In a mere fact that was a real fallacy and audacity since Botha's governance was so unforgivingly against Blacks; as a result, he deliberately excluded Blacks from the Tricameral Parliament of 1983. The Trilateral Parliament was the most spurious transformation because even those that it purported to serve were not happy about it since it was amongst reasons for the formation of the UDF for which Allan Boesak was the leader.

Botha again was responsible for the formation of the total strategy that was aimed at annihilating anti-apartheid members more especially those for the African National Congress as he was against negotiating with anti-apartheid movements. Botha, in his government, involved Magnus Malan in the Defence portfolio in order to make sure that his total strategy was properly executed which Malan executed with distinction.

*Botha appointed to his own old job of Minister of Defence, Magnus*

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<sup>277</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 444

<sup>278</sup> E. Doxtader and P.J. Salazar: *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p. 311

*Malan, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the proponent of the 'total strategy' against the liberation movements.* <sup>279</sup>

In his submission, De Klerk treated the security forces as an exclusive and separate entity from the South African Government whereas those people were in every respect, part and parcel of the South African Government since they were in the pay of the state. His denial of those people totally showed that he was prepared to be economical with the truth. So, it can be said that his submission left a lot to be desired because instead of giving information about what the National Party did, he constantly maintained a finger pointing at the ANC and the SACP.

He therefore totally connived with the existence of the ruthless 'total strategy' and its operations that were directed to all anti-apartheid activists. He fully backed the existence of the 'total strategy' as something that was so necessary. "The then government believed that it was being confronted by a 'total onslaught'. Its response was to develop its own 'total strategy.'" <sup>280</sup> His main aim was to exonerate the wrongs that his predecessors more especially P.W. Botha whom F.W. de Klerk referred to as one of the reformers whereas P.W. Botha's government was mentioned in numerous scandals that even made him to be reluctant to appear in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. F.W. de Klerk in his submission seemed to be more interested in leveling blames against the African National Congress about all the wrongs of the past than concentrating on his submission that had to be about the Nationalist Government.

*It heightened the atrocities committed by the ANC camps in Angola and elsewhere, and the persistent refusal of the ANC leadership over many years to face up and take responsibility for these terrible acts.*  
<sup>281</sup>

This really discredited F.W. de Klerk's submission since it made it to be less substantial and more biased. The whole situation made the National Party escape with valuable information that would give more light and knowledge about past. Despite F.W. de

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<sup>279</sup> R.W. Johnson: *South Africa - the first man, the last nation*, p. 178

<sup>280</sup> E. Doxtader and P.J. Salazar: *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p. 314

<sup>281</sup> J.W. Johnson: *South Africa's brave new world - the beloved country since the end of apartheid*, p. 150

Klerk's evasiveness, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission proved that De Klerk wanted to harbor all forms of the covert relationship and all forms of collaboration between Inkatha and the State Security Forces.

*Security Force members who testified before the Commission spoke of various ways in which the security forces had collaborated with Inkatha in attacks on the UDF. This included warning Inkatha members of impending attacks, disarming ANC supporters, arming Inkatha supporters, transporting Inkatha attackers and standing by while Inkatha supporters attacked people...KwaMadala hostel residents, together with the police, planned out an attack ...that the police colluded with the attackers and dropped them at Slovo Park .... White people with blackened faces participated in the attack.<sup>282</sup>*

This is the kind of submission that was expected of F.W. de Klerk so that it could suit the purpose of true reconciliation between the victims and the perpetrators. F.W. de Klerk in his initial submission mentioned that his government was totally not prepared in taking responsibility on all those violation of civil liberties that had been done by the security forces while it was under a direct control of the National Party Government. This then led to two security personnel's to come to the fore and testified on what they did in their capacities. In 1997 there was one of the major submissions given by Mr.

Harold Synman who was part of those security people who brutally killed Steven Biko in September 1977. Steve Biko was amongst those political activists that were brutality killed by the investigative police in Port Elizabeth. According to Synman's submission, there was a scuffle between Biko and one of the police who was Mr. Siebert. Siebert wanted Biko to be interrogated while he was standing; in other words, they did not want Biko to sit down while he was interrogated. This then became a bone of contention between Biko and the group of the security force. Steven Biko could not accept that kind of inhuman injunction; as a result, he disobeyed it by sitting down. During that situation Steven Biko was seriously manhandled by Mr. Siebert that resulted in the exchange of blows between Steven Biko and him. Siebert was then joined by other three policemen including Harold Synman in dealing with Biko who ended up being in the state of

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<sup>282</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, pp. 406-450

unconsciousness. Steven Biko was then cuffed on the bars of the door with his hands as well as his feet inextricably locked on the bars. He was kept there for the whole day up until he was unlocked by the night shift staff and let him lie on the mat for the whole night. The following morning he was medically examined by the District Surgeon who claimed to have found nothing wrong with Steven Biko despite the fact that Steven Biko was in a state of confusion as a result of the previous day's injury. Col Goosen who was the head of the staff in his report confirmed that there was nothing wrong with Steven Biko which made Steven Biko to be further medically ignored. During the TRC submission, Harold Synman clearly stated that he grew under a situation where he could do anything necessary to protect and promote the Afrikaans speaking people.

*"During my formative years, I became unconsciously a member or took part in the apartheid era and was convinced at the end of my schooling that apartheid was necessary for the continuing survival of Afrikaans speaking Whites."*<sup>283</sup>

He also mentioned the role played by his church (Dutch Reformed Church) in his upbringing. My personal convictions were supported by the fact that my church approved of and supported the policy and actions of the National Party Government.<sup>284</sup> This really showed that apartheid had so many corner stones and pillars since even the church, the very place that had to be for its spiritual uprightness had to give a tacit support to apartheid. In his submission it appeared that these police had to exercise their evil discretion on people that they were interrogating such as stripping their clothes and left them naked.

This was their special way of dehumanizing their detainees to such an extent that they lost their human status completely. Practices like these proved that apartheid were becoming naturally ingrained in many white people since they could do whatever wickedness in the name of apartheid without any instructions from their seniors. In this submission, although Synman was very much evasive and indirect in his answers, it came to light that Steven Biko's death was amongst the cruelest death that human beings had ever experienced, and

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<sup>283</sup> E. Doxteder and P.J. Salazar: *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p. 201

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid*: p. 201

it showed the extent to which apartheid could go on victimizing and dehumanizing black people which was all about the violation of their civil liberties. The other apartheid figure that brought his submission to the TRC was Eugene de Kock who was notoriously known for Vlakplaas operation. De Kock from the outset proved to be very much economical with the truth since he only submitted two cross-border cases whereas he was mentioned in numerous cases where he violated civil liberties for anti-apartheid insurgents.

*De Kock had been convicted in 1996 on six counts of murder and also confessed to the TRC about his role in the killing of dozens of people in the 1980s.*<sup>285</sup>

This then clearly demonstrates that what De Kock submitted to the TRC was just the tip of an iceberg as compared to what he really did. In his submission he only submitted two cases of the infiltration of the so called armed terrorists that had to cross the border from Swaziland to South. According to his submission, De Kock was informed by the Piet Retief security branch that there would be an infiltration of four ANC armed terrorists that would soon be crossing the border from Swaziland to South Africa but they were specifically targeting northern Natal. He therefore left Pretoria for Piet Retief to deal with the pending infiltration of those armed terrorists.

On his arrival to Piet Retief he organized transport that would pick those ANC terrorists from the border to their intended destination since they did not have any means of transportation. His plan was to ambush them as they entered South Africa as if they were traffic police during that process the occupants of the car would be brutally assassinated. De Kock fully agreed that he himself was involved in killing people and he was also well armed as he had been told that ANC terrorists were also armed. I was armed with an uzzi sub-machine gun of a 9mm calibre<sup>286</sup>. De Kock and his people made sure that all the car's occupants were instantly killed as per plan. In this brutal operation there was one woman who fell out of the car who was still alive but seriously injured. De Kock seeing that woman who was in dire pain struggling for her life ordered her to be killed by one of his men. In the first mission of killing those who were regarded as the terrorists, there was

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<sup>285</sup> A. Jeffery: *Chasing the rainbow - South Africa's move from Mandela to Zuma*, p. 122

<sup>286</sup> E. Doxtader and P. J. Salazar: *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents*, p. 213

an immeasurable level of brutality; as a result, they spared no life since one of those people was shot by Ras under the command of De Kock after she had shown some signs of life. This really shows how brutal people were assassinated under the command of De Kock. After those people had been so inhumanly assassinated, it was found that they did not carry any arms as it had been said.

According to De Kock, seeing that those people were not armed they then got some weapons and pretended as if those weapons were the deceased people's possessions so that they could justify the killing of the innocent and unarmed people. The brutality that was done to people by the security agents was far beyond the scope of any human experience. In the course of Eugene De Kock's submission, it soon appeared that there would be another terrorist infiltration that would take place for which his people had to perform the same task as they had done before.

In this case, the second group was bigger than the first group but the *modus operandi* was exactly the same. In this second operation the only thing strange that happened was the fact that Eugene De Kock killed even the driver Mr Manzini who had been sent to fetch the infiltrators. The reason might be the fact that Mr. Manzini had driven past the ambush spot by 80 metres which made De Kock suspicious about him and he therefore did not hesitate to gun him down instantly. He and I were practically a metre, maximum two metres from each other when I started firing at him.<sup>287</sup>

De Kock made sure that after gunning Manzini down, he concentrated on the main task of the operation where him and his people which was killing all the people that were in the minibus. According to his submission all people were killed in the same way as the first group, although with the second group, the fatality rate was so decisive since there was no one who showed signs of life after cease fire like in the case of the first one where one woman came out struggling for her life. He further revealed that after cease fire he inspected and he only found four unlike the report had said that people were above thirty in number. Both of these cross border operations were highly successful. Eugene De

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<sup>287</sup> E. Doxtader and P. J. Salazar: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa - the fundamental documents, 216

Kock at the end of his submission fully confessed that he did everything he did in his own capacity as police force in order to annihilate terrorism. This is how his submission ended by reservedly giving two cases out of so many that he was responsible for. Eugene De Kock at the end of his submission fully confessed that he did everything he did in his owned capacity as police force in order to annihilate terrorism. In this way Eugene De Kock fully exonerated all people that worked under him since they were all working under his command so that they could exterminate terrorism from the root. This is how his submission ended by reservedly giving two cases out of so many that he was responsible for. In this way his submission felt short in many respects such as that of hiding some crucial information of killing some *askaris* for minor and trivial reasons.

*Among them were Moses Ntlelang, killed in 1989 for losing his firearm during drinking spree, and Johannes Mabotha, shot twice in the heart by De Kock in 1989 for going AWOL...Also killed were Brian Ngqulunga, shot in 1990 and buried in Vlakplaas to stop him from exposing the police death squads, and Nerville Goodwill Sikhakhane, murdered in 1991 on suspicion that he was an ANC double agent.<sup>288</sup>*

These are things that *inter alia* served to discredit De Kock's submissions to the extent that he was denied amnesty since they were not submitted to the TRC. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission had another submission that was done by Robert MacBride who was the internal underground member of Umkhonto Wesizwe about the event of 1986 where he set a car bomb in one of the tavern in Durban by the name of 'Why Not'. According to him this bomb attack was retaliation for the raid that was done by the South African Government in Gaborone in Botswana in 1985 in its attempt to annihilate the ANC. What became noticeable in that barbaric attack of the regime was that it took no consideration of the soft targets as it had been agreed upon in the Geneva Convention of 1977 by the warring parties?

In this Gaborone raid, the South African Government left several people dead. He further mentioned the fatalities of black students in the Soweto uprising in June 1976 where the South African Government was responsible. In his submission, MacBride fully revealed

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<sup>288</sup> J. Dlamini: Askari-a story of collaboration and betrayal in the anti-apartheid struggle,p.48

that all what he did was for pure political reasons and it was also fully backed by the African National Congress. In this tavern attack his main targets were the security forces but it early became almost impossible to target them without the involvement of the soft targets (civilians).

Obviously, in his attack, he diverted from the Geneva Convention as he was backed by the terms of Bakwe Conference of 1985 that somehow became the amendment of the Geneva Convention of 1977. This submission revealed that there were three fatalities that were registered and sixty nine people that were critically injured. This bomb attack that took place on 12 April 1986 had a huge impact on South African politics since it is believed to amongst the contributory factors of the State of Emergency on the 14 April.

It therefore goes without saying that it in one way or another alerted the South African Government on the increase of political turbulence. The other major submissions that had been expected were from the PAC but it did not materialize due to the intransigence of its leadership. The little information that the TRC had about the political transgression of the PAC was the 21 year old Bessie Nzikizi Mkhumbuzi who did so because of the amnesty that he thought he might get. According to Bessie Mkhumbuzi and his compatriots, Mkoba, Nonxuba and Mlambisa attacked St.

James Church in 3<sup>rd</sup> Avenue Kenilworth in the District of Wynberg on Sunday of 25 July 1993. These three were the ones who orchestrated the whole massacre but Bessie only became a trivial member of the operation. This attack was well planned since each of them was assigned to do a special task. Mkhumbuzi was given a petrol bomb as his weapon. The attack almost went well since there were fatalities across the gender and age spectrum which real proved to be the work of the terrorists. This attack was somehow paradoxical since it took place while the transitional talks were underway which really meant that PAC was not for a peaceful change. This Massacre took place on 25 July while on the following day which was Monday the 26<sup>th</sup> the Negotiating Council would meet for further consultation about the interim constitution as it was part of transitional process. The day after the St James's Church Massacre, the Negotiating Council met again at



Kempton Park on 26 July to consider the first of the interim constitution.<sup>289</sup> This could easily portray PAC attackers as anti-liberation rather than anti-apartheid as they were perceived. This in short meant that APLA, under which these attackers of St James Church belonged, seemed to resemble its predecessor Poqo that was pure terrorist organization that was aiming at annihilating the Whites.

APLA's predecessor, Poqo, had fizzled out in the 1960s. It had been a genuinely terrorist organization, engaging in random acts of violence against whites.<sup>290</sup> The Truth and Reconciliation Commission came to an end leaving people with different views about its success. Some people, to a certain extent, said it was successful while others looked at it as a fiasco that failed to produce an intended goal of bringing all culprits to the fore especially those who were in high positions so that they could testify on their irresponsible behavior. The critics maintained that the TRC lacked the mechanism that would force some individuals to willy-nilly come to the fore with the required testimony about the violation of civil liberties.

The likes of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and P.W. Botha who was the former South African President flatly refused to heed the call for the TRC of giving testimony on behalf of their parties what they did which was viewed as part of the violation of civil liberties. "Buthelezi and P.W. Botha both successfully defied TRC invitation to appear, Botha treating it scornfully as a 'circus'."<sup>291</sup> It was under these circumstances that made the TRC to be viewed as ineffective and incompetent facts finding mechanism that failed to live up to the expectations of the South African people especially those who were victims of the internecine violence in a direct or indirect form. The other criticism against the TRC was its state of being too religious in nature as it was chaired by Bishop Desmond Tutu who was a layman on both legal and research capacities; it therefore lacked legal and proper research capacity that would have made an in-depth findings as it had been expected by many people.

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<sup>289</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 402

<sup>290</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 274

<sup>291</sup> R.W. Johnson: *South Africa - the first man the last nation*, p. 216

*It was moreover, weighed down with clerics who turned the hearings into a quasi-religious occasion and who were signally lacking in the historical, legal and research skills needed for the job.*<sup>292</sup>

This kind of the situation therefore made the TRC to a certain degree to fail in its attempts of being a fact finding mission since it failed to get people with relevant skills such a research and legal skills that would make an in-depth research that would meet the expectations of all the stakeholders. Lastly, some critics viewed it as a one-sided facts finding mission, because even though Inkatha was a major violator of civil liberties for many people, the TRC was supposed to give reasons as why Inkatha went into collaboration with the state security forces such as the SADF and the SAP as from mid-eighties since Inkatha members felt that Inkatha, was circumstantially bound to do so in order to defend its existence and that of its people.

*The TRC, whose membership included no one with the background affinity to Inkatha, largely ignored the impact on Buthelezi and Inkatha of the UDF's 'ungovernability' campaign, as well as the alleged threat posed by MK, which led, in turn, to the SADF in 1986 to train 200 Inkatha supporters for paramilitary purposes, including defence and a 'strike capacity.'*<sup>293</sup>

The inclusion of this piece of valuable information would have helped in straightening the historical record of South Africa without being biased.

## **6.6 The Transitional Executive Council's Task Group - 1994**

In early 1990s, South Africa underwent a historic political change that would result in democratic dispensation for all people who live in South Africa including black people that had been marginalised. This then had to be done in such a way that all kinds of political stumbling blocks were totally prevented from interfering with that enormous

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<sup>292</sup> R.W. Johnson: *South Africa - the first man the last nation*, p. 216

<sup>293</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 342

political task of changing South Africa. The South African Government and other stakeholders took a decision of putting in place some structures that would guarantee the smooth continuity of this democratic process. This effort of guaranteeing a trouble free transition led to the creation of the Transitional Executive Council Task Group that would ensure the peaceful transitional climate which at the same time would deal with any political incongruousness that might hiccup or retard that noble process.

*An important innovation that produced a draft bill by the MPNP and enacted into law by Parliament was the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), whose principal function was to facilitate the transition in the run-up to the election by promoting a climate for free political participation, and also to monitor governments and administrations to ensure that they could not derive electoral advantage from incumbency of office.<sup>294</sup>*

It is noteworthy that KwaZulu, under the joint leadership of both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha remained a thought provoking question because, the leadership of KwaZulu leadership was totally against the pending political changes. The Transitional Executive Council Group therefore had to face this mammoth task of weakening the KwaZulu Bantustan by means of mobilising all KwaZulu civil servants that were the pillars and the mainstays for both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha. The other main stratagem that had to be applied by Transitional Executive Council Group was that of isolating Chief Buthelezi in a way that would make him to lose his political constituency support that would facilitate its task in KwaZulu with less resistance.

*Successful and the long-term efforts by the people's movement to isolate Buthelezi and separate Inkatha from its constituency ...Emergency inability within KwaZulu as well as providing and increased public profile to acts of violence, particularly when directed to the ANC and its allies.<sup>295</sup>*

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<sup>294</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p.506

<sup>295</sup> A. Jeffry: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, pp. 453-454

This state of affairs would facilitate the intervention of the Transitional Executive Council Group in KwaZulu so that it could deal with the major stumbling blocks such as the KwaZulu Police and other forms of belligerent subsidiaries such as the vigilantes and the warlords. In fact, the Transitional Executive Council Task Group came in the wake of the African National Congress's eagerness of ensuring a strict control over the security forces ranging from all Bantustan police forces to South Africa Police force and South African Defence Force.

The African National Congress had envisaged the political turbulence that might occur as a result of these security forces' bias and negligent attitude that could mar this long awaited political change. The Nationalist Government also concurred with the ANC which resulted in the formation of the Transitional Executive Council Group. This Transitional Executive Task Group worked hand in gloves with other monitoring structures such Independent Electoral Commission and Independent Media Commission. The latter played the most crucial role in ensuring the proper and unbiased functioning of the broadcasting services; in other words, it created an amicable and impartial political climate for all political groups in South Africa.

*The latter's function was principally to ensure that public broadcasting services and the state-financed publications avoided bias and afforded parties the opportunity to participate in discussions, as well as to advertise, provided that all parties were afforded similar access.*<sup>296</sup>

This kind of political cordiality between the African National Congress and the National Party resulted in a huge uproar to those political parties who regarded themselves as attention-deprived parties such as the Inkatha Freedom Party, Conservative Party, AVF and Bophuthatswana. Their concern was that, this could give the African National Congress an advantage or an edge over them during the elections. This uproar resulted in a dire reaction from some of these so called attention-deprived parties. What notably became evident was that this uproar was accompanied by some threats. In fact, the whole

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<sup>296</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 506

situation was seen as a looming resistance that was directed to the government by both Inkatha and the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF) regarding the issue of the Transitional Executive Council Group since it seemed to be pro-African National Congress.

*Buthelezi also threatened military resistance to any potential TEC incursion into Inkatha turf...Viljoen announced that the acceptance of the Constitution was the beginning of a violent takeover by the communist-inspired ANC. He was reported as calling on AVF supporters to undergo military training and prepare to defend themselves.<sup>297</sup>*

On the other hand, another conservative figure, Hartzenberg, reiterated his demand for a *volkstaat* which would mean an exclusive independent Afrikaner state. All these resistant efforts became clear signs for anti-change but nevertheless the Transitional Executive Council Group carried on with its duties. KwaZulu, under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, had come under the spotlight since there were so many cases of the violation of civil liberties that had been reported against the KwaZulu Police. Some IFP leaders and other KwaZulu Government officials were also implicated in the violation of civil liberties. This also became a grievous concern for the Transitional Executive Council Group. According to the report given by the Transitional Executive Council Group, these officials were directly responsible for supplying all the resources that were used by the KwaZulu Police in the violation of civil liberties.

*In particular, 'resources or directions appeared to emanate from certain officials in Ulundi, allegedly located at the IFP Head Office and at the Department of the Chief Minister [Buthelezi]. These resources included vehicles, arms and ammunition, and in certain instances, AK-47s.<sup>298</sup>*

It therefore became axiomatically clear that both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha were the potential destabilisers of the transitional process. In the report, the Transitional Executive Council Group also revealed that the African National Congress's political campaigners were the main targets so that the whole process of political transition could become null and void. This in short revealed the devious intention of KwaZulu Government and Inkatha of trying to nullify the transitional process since it began to

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<sup>297</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 507

<sup>298</sup> A. Jeffry: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 457

eradicate even within KZP those who were thought to be African National Congress-aligned individuals. This resulted in singling out of some individuals within the KZP to be executed since they were viewed as disloyal to Inkatha. What needs to be borne in mind is that KZP was one of the Inkatha's subsidiaries which meant that that any disloyal within its circle could not be tolerated. This devious attempt of that both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha resulted in the assassination of Sergeant Dlamini who was commonly known as 'Mdonri' to the locals, stationed at Esikhawini Police Station. He was attacked and killed in his home in J2 Section Esikhawini by Romeo Mbambo who was one of the notorious Caprivi Trainees. This of course was the continuation of the violation of civil liberties by Inkatha which resulted in a huge outcry both locally and nationally. It is Important to say that despite the Transitional Executive Council Group's reports, Inkatha stood firm on blaming this report as unfounded and travesty of justice.

*Buthlezi dismissed the report's allegations of hit-squad activity in the KZP as 'hideous propaganda'...while spokeswoman Suzanne Vos added: We are not on the TEC. It is dominated by the ANC and its allies. This is deliberate propaganda attempt by the ANC. I would like to take a bet that none of these allegations would stand in a court of law. It is a deliberate attempt by the ANC to bad-mouth the IFP and to destabilise KwaZulu.*<sup>299</sup>

These reactionary responses from the Inkatha's President and its loyalist proved without doubt that they were not prepared to cooperate with the TEC Group in its attempt to eradicate all that was seen as stumbling blocks to a free and fair elections. The Transitional Executive Council Group went further with its task of intervention in KwaZulu by taking a major step of realigning of KwaZulu's civil servants so that all the potential problems could be solved before the elections. All KwaZulu civil servants had been inextricably entangled in web of KwaZulu Government/Inkatha's ideological influence as from the formation of Inkatha in 1975 to the period of the preparation for the elections in 1994.

This forced political bond between both KwaZulu Government/Inkatha and civil servant had to be broken in order to level the political ground in KwaZulu before elections. In

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<sup>299</sup> A. Jeffry: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, pp. 457-458

March 1994, the Transitional Executive Council Group wanted all KwaZulu civil servants to cooperate with it in its attempt to level this political situation for the pending elections. In the very same month of March the 28<sup>th</sup> of 1994, a special forum in KwaZulu from KwaZulu civil servants made an appeal to the Transitional Executive Council Group to intervene and replace Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi with an administrator which of course would be a better way of leveling a political ground for almost everyone.

This appeal for this special forum had been encouraged by the rolling mass action of about 50000 ANC campaigners in Durban on the 25<sup>th</sup> March which was seen by the ANC as the ‘mother of all rallies’ which had a major goal of liberating KwaZulu civil servants from the shackles of Inkatha once and for all. However, despite the number of attendees, Inkatha took an unexpected stance of undermining the attendance as a cross border attendance, for the Xhosa speaking people that had been bused from the Transkei to KwaZulu and it was therefore taken as not a proper representative of the Zulu speaking people.

*The IFP described the ANC demonstration as a ‘spectacular failure’, saying that the anticipated Zulu demonstrators had failed to arrive and instead the ANC had bused in Xhosas from Transkei and the Eastern Cape to bolster its support.*<sup>300</sup>

The success of the Transitional Executive Council Group in dealing with major issues in KwaZulu that might be the stumbling block to the forthcoming elections made people of KwaZulu to rely more on it. On 27 March, two days after the ‘mother of all rallies’ in Durban, there was another huge march of 10000 African National Congress supporters in Pietermaritzburg to deliver the memorandum to the Transitional Executive Council Group whereby they slated the De Klerk’s government for sponsoring the violence in Natal through the Senior Generals in the South African Police. In this march people also demanded the disbandment of the KwaZulu’s paramilitary training camps, such as those, that were in Mkuze and Ulundi in particular that had become a haven for warmongers and vigilantes which had played a pivotal role in violence.

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<sup>300</sup> A. Jeffrey: *People’s war - new light on the struggle for South Africa* p. 458

In the townships, there is a widespread belief that warmongers in the security police are running guns to vigilantes and the other guns come in from Ulundi through the KwaZulu Police.<sup>301</sup> These two marches really marked the end of the joint political hegemony of the KwaZulu Government and Inkatha in KwaZulu which undoubtedly became the success of the Transitional Executive Council Group in places that had been regarded as the political flash points such as KwaZulu and Gauteng. Lastly, the Pietermaritzburg march in particular really marked the end of Chief Buthelezi's political dominance over KwaZulu civil servants, as Joe Slovo stated:

*Addressing the marchers, Slovo reminded all KwaZulu civil servants that "Buthelezi would soon be merely a smell in history and their salaries and pensions would in future depend on an ANC..."<sup>302</sup>*

## **6.7 Conclusion**

The period between 1990 and 1994 was the period that preceded the massive task of multi-racial elections that would be for the first time ever in a racially divided South Africa. It is therefore necessary to say that this did not go without impediments and obstacles of various natures. Some of these obstacles were only envisaged without being experienced while others like violence were experienced in some areas which necessitated counteractive measures to be put in place that would deal with such pending situations. This led to emergency of plethora of commissions and committees that were of facts finding nature about what had happened especially as from mid-eighties to early nineties.

These commissions and committees comprised Legal Resource Centre/Human Rights Commission and Goldstone Commission/Advocate Malcolm Wallis Committee, which had one objective in common: to pacify and normalize the political situation in South Africa before the multi-party elections by means of bringing to light all the hideous

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<sup>301</sup> M. Kentridge: *Inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg*, p. 53

<sup>302</sup> A. Jeffrey: *People's war – new on the struggle for South Africa*, p. 458



activities of the past. Both Goldstone Commission and Advocate Malcolm Wallis Committee played such a crucial role in terms of being fact finding missions. Goldstone's investigations were to play a major role in bringing to book the major practitioners of dirty tricks.<sup>303</sup>

These fact finding missions delved in-depth into hideous activities of the KwaZulu Police of killing non-Inkatha people in places like Durban townships and also in the northern part of KwaZulu such as townships of Empangeni such as Esikhawini, Ngwelezane and Enseleni, this scourge of violence also made its presence felt in rural areas of Empangeni as well such Ntambanana. "The actions of the KwaZulu Police continued to be cause of concern in 1990, particularly in Umlazi and KwaMakhutha, where allegations of KZP attacks were not uncommon."<sup>304</sup> In 1993, just months before the elections, another major mechanism which became known as the Transitional Executive Council Group came into existence that had a major task of streamlining all the pre-election arrangements by eradicating all partiality and bias especially on the government side. In fact, it made its impact in 1994 just weeks before elections where it left no stone unturned in terms of counteracting all those things that were seen as pending hindrances more especially on the side of the government and other counter-revolutionary movements such as Inkatha and its subsidiaries.

*These were tentative thoughts, but they were the germ of the Transitional Executive Council which eventually came into existence in September 1993. The ANC's concern was that the NP Government could use the power of incumbency and its role as both 'player and referee' to the disadvantage of other parties.*<sup>305</sup>

This situation could really not be left unmonitored. Because of its magnitude it could therefore serve to mar the hard earned success of holding multi-racial-elections. So, the establishment of such body became one of the *sine qua non* majors in order to deal with those obstinate stumbling blocks such as Chief Buthelezi and his KwaZulu Government since Buthelezi had held the political freedom of all KwaZulu civil servants into ransom.

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<sup>303</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 419

<sup>304</sup> A. Minnaar (Ed.): *Patterns of violence-case study of conflict in Natal*, p. 29

<sup>305</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 430

South Africa, as the last country in Africa to get political independence, had to draw examples from countries like Mozambique and Angola in order avert bitter consequences such as the civil war that would make the country to be less governable. These noble attempts really helped in bringing a smooth transition in South Africa although there were some highly disturbing occurrences. During the transitional period, what became notable was that the covert agents of the Nationalist Government including the farmers tried all possible means of subverting the political changes by deploying thugs such as Cuna, the Mozambiquean illegal immigrant, to kill ANC activists and all ANC-related structures.

“The farmer said he was going to take me to Natal and I had to go and kill the ANC members. He asked if I could plant a bomb I said I would do the work for him.”<sup>306</sup> After that successful transition there was another daunting task of bringing those perpetrators and victims to the fore so that they could testify on what they did as perpetrators or on what happened to them as victims. This then led to the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that dealt with the afore-mentioned situation in terms shedding light on what really happened.

*According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in 1995, which provided graphic evidence of some of the methods used, over 2900 people reported 5002 instances of torture, most commonly beating, but including over 2000 cases of being forced into painful postures, electric shocks, suffocating or mental torture.*

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This whole situation became a key factor when it came to dealing with pre-election and post-election issues; as a result, it really resulted in a successful pre-election South Africa.

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<sup>306</sup> M. du Preez: Of tricksters, tyrants and turncoats – from unusual stories from South Africa’s past, p. 179

<sup>307</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 76

## General conclusion

In South Africa, the period between 1990 to 1994 was a remarkable period in the history of South Africa in many ways. Soon after the release of Dr. Nelson Mandela, the black South African masses especially the down-trodden ones were filled with the hope for a better life both politically and economically. This period of course represented an apex of political changes that had been long awaited. This then meant that the South African pillars of apartheid such as laws that favoured Whites at the expense of Blacks had to be shifted and replaced. In short, this meant that all political structures that were unilaterally put in place by the white minority government more especially after 1948 were also to be removed.

Obnoxious acts like the Group Areas Act of 1950 had to be completely removed since it was not only discriminating but it also promoted racial division amongst South Africans and it also promoted ethnic division amongst Blacks themselves since it led to the idea of Homelands that was realised in 1960s. where Blacks were ethnically divided according to their ethnic orientation. This whole idea of Homelands was to promote White Supremacy at the expense of Blacks since Blacks were regarded as non-deservers as Alan Paton once states:

*Another strand in the Group Areas rope was pure unadulterated anti-Indian hatred, and anger at the success of Indian shopkeepers, and contempt for their way of life. Another was greed, a desire to get hold of the property of Indian people, and particularly those Indian areas which were surrounded by the growing towns and cities, and so had become unbelievably valuable. This applied also to the property of coloured people, particularly in the Cape.<sup>308</sup>*

1990-1994 was a period that became known as the transitional period that had a daunting task of reversing all those unilaterally created structures. Homelands as institutions that had been put in place in order to exclude Blacks from South Africa also faced a bleak future during transitional era since Homelands had become a constant menace amongst

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<sup>308</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 55

the Blacks because Homelands, had served to deprive Africans of their South African citizenship and made them strangers in their land of birth.

*In addition, after 1960, the government began to restrict and even remove the minimum rights enjoyed by urban Africans, who were told they could enjoy political and civic rights only in 'homelands' like Transkei and Bophuthatswana... With the passing of the Bantu Homelands Citizen Act in 1970, the apartheid regime took a decisive step to strip urban South African citizenship.*<sup>309</sup>

The attempts to defend Whites' eco-political privileges and also the Homelands nearly halted the political changes since the white minority groups such as Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), Afrikaner Volksfront and the Conservative Party were all reluctant to loose hold of their privileges that they had clung to tenaciously for years while some black homelands leaders on the other hand vigorously fought against the removal of the homelands which of course had tremendous consequences such as Bisho Massacre, Boipatong Massacre, the formation of the Concerned South African Group (COSAG) and also numerous terrible incidents of violation of civil liberties that took place in places like KwaZulu and Gauteng.

Homelands leaders regarded themselves as the 'heirs' of these homelands and they regarded parting ways with Homelands as an impossible mission, so people like Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi tried by all means to defend his hegemonic control over KwaZulu. He then mobilized his subsidiary structures such the KwaZulu Police (KZP), and Vigilantes to fight against the envisaged political changes.

The subsidiary structures contributed immensely to the records of violation of civil liberties especially the KwaZulu Police, not in KwaZulu only but in South Africa at large where they covertly collaborated with the South African Police in assassinating anti-Inkatha people in many parts of KwaZulu and also in Gauteng. During this period the 'Third Force' worked tirelessly in assisting Inkatha by means of arming it so that Inkatha could assassinate all those who were non-Inkatha members. This 'Third Force' was also involved in planning the killing of people in trains more especially in Gauteng where

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<sup>309</sup> B. Theron (Ed.): *The road to democracy in South Africa*, pp. 321-322

Third Force activities were the killing on trains, arming of the Inkatha Freedom Party, dirty tricks campaigns and general destabilization of the political process.<sup>310</sup>

In fact, the reluctance that was shown by the leaders of the homelands when it came to real political changes proved the fact that although homelands were viewed by many Africans as political menace, homelands were their eco-political 'comfort zones' that they were prepared to defend at all cost. One of the attempts to defend these Homelands, culminated in the death of many people during Bisho massacre in 1992 which of course evoked both nationally and internationally condemnation.

*The German Government said it held Pretoria responsible for this behavior in a homeland whose purported independence has never been recognised by the international community. The South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) spoke of stepping up mass action in order to topple the homeland dictators in the Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and KwaZulu."*<sup>311</sup>

During this transitional period in KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi more than any time before showed a resistance of not losing his hold of power in KwaZulu as the leader of KwaZulu Government and Inkatha; he therefore opted for a Federal State so that KwaZulu could have its own political administration. He even tried to boycott elections with the hope that the majority of KwaZulu would join him in his boycott attempts so that KwaZulu could remain an isolated political entity. He did everything to counteract the political changes and was at the same backed by his subsidiaries such as KZP, warlords and the vigilantes which all played a huge role in the violation of civil liberties of all those who were anti-Inkatha. The KwaZulu Police (KZP) as an organized subsidiary structure for both KwaZulu Government and Inkatha surpassed other subsidiaries in terms violating civil liberties for the people especially by those who were known as Caprivi Trainees such as Romeo Mbambo, Israel Hlongwane, Gcina Mkhize, Madlanduna Luthuli and many more who killed many people from rank and file to powerful individuals.

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<sup>310</sup> M. du Preez: *Of tricksters tyrants and turncoats - more unusual stories from South Africa*, p. 192

<sup>311</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's war - new light on the struggle for South Africa*, pp. 344-345

This really showed the undying and unbroken nature of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi to counteract people's struggle that had been waged for many decades. Chief Mangosuthu's political intransigence could neither be tamed nor changed despite numerous attempts such as the Goldstone Commission and Advocate M. Wallis who gave in-depth information about the violation of civil liberties by Inkatha and KwaZulu Government which of course were Chief Mangosuthu's political domains.

*Buthelezi sustained serious political damage in March when the Goldstone Commission revealed evidence implicating senior police officers, including the Deputy Commissioner (the second most senior police officer in the country) in supplying guns, hand grenades and mortars to three senior members of the IFP, including Themba Khoza, chairman of the IFP's Transvaal Region.<sup>312</sup>*

Despite all these attempts, Buthelezi's political intransigence never diminished and these attempts became palliative rather than curative up until there was an introduction of the Transitional Executive Council Group of 1994. The Transitional Executive Council Group decisively dealt with those diehard issues like Buthelezi's intransigence, Buthelezi was forced to give up power for the democratic dispensation for all South Africans. Transitional Executive Council Group therefore played a pivotal role in bringing about politically free South Africa. This then had a tremendous impact on Chief Mangosuthu's hegemony since he began to steadily but surely lose his hold over KwaZulu including that of his subsidiary structures such as the KwaZulu Police (KZP) which was his corner stone for the violation of civil liberties of all those who were non-Inkatha. The allegiance of the KwaZulu Police made a paradigm shift toward a right direction which was the struggle of liberation which therefore meant that Chief Mangosuthu was becoming more and more politically vulnerable as Anthea Jeffery argues that:

*And even though the KZP have traditionally functioned as Buthelezi's private army, increasingly, members of the KZP, including command elements, side with the people's movements... The three SAP implicated in Third Force violence the deputy commissioner of police, Lieutenant*

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<sup>312</sup> D. Welsh: *The rise and fall of apartheid*, p. 511

*General Sebastiaan (Basie) Smit; the Head of the Department of Counter-intelligence, Major General Izak Johannes ('Krappies') Engelbretch (who was in charge of all investigation into political violence and subversion); and Lieutenant General Johan le Roux, Chief of Crime Prevention and Investigation. (A retired KwaZulu Police Commissioner, Brigadier Jac Buchner, a noted expert on people's war, who was also identified as a key player in the destabilisation strategy.) De Klerk called a press conference and announced that the three had been placed on immediate leave while an international task force had been appointed to probe the allegations.<sup>313</sup>*

This whole situation really signaled the fall of the apartheid regime with all its surrogates such as Inkatha and any other form of the Third Force elements where it structurally crumbled to the point of disappearance, which then forcefully paved the road to a democratic South Africa for all her citizens irrespective of race, colour, religion and creed.

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<sup>313</sup> A. Jeffery: *People's wars – new light on the struggle for South Africa*, pp. 454-455

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