

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the German strategy 1932 - 1939

Dr. Taysair Jadoow Alwosh

College of Education for Girls Al-Iraqi University, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Iraqi University

Abstract

After its establishment in 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was distinguished by an important position in the German strategy, due to the desire of its officials to obtain markets in the Arab Gulf region, and their awareness of the importance of that region in all different fields, especially in the economic fields. After coming to power in 1933, the Nazis put in their strategic calculations the need to seek markets and a foothold for Germany under the sun, seek to expand the world markets, and find outlets for their businesses in vital areas of the world, including the Arabian Gulf region. The Nazis found in Saudi Arabia a good market for the disposal of their products from industrial materials, dyes, weapons and other German industries, which would pave the way for them to enter other Gulf markets. The Germans desperately needed Saudi Arabia, in line with the economic policy adopted by the Nazis, based on limiting imports and encouraging exports abroad, to provide hard currency and employ it in other areas, particularly in the fields of military and military industrialization, which they placed in the utmost importance.

The objective of the research was to trace Saudi Arabia's position in German strategy, since its founding in 1932 and the arrival of Nazi to power in 1933, overcoming the difficult internal circumstances of Germany that followed the end of World War I, until the outbreak of World War II in 1939, and their attempts at that time to consolidate their influence and achieve their interests in all regions, particularly in areas that had consulates and economic relations with them, such as the Gulf Region, where Saudi Arabia is considered an important vital center.

The research was divided into an introduction, two themes, and a conclusion. The first theme focused on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the German strategy since the establishment of the Kingdom in 1932, until the end of 1935, while the second theme was devoted to studying Nazi Germany policy towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between (1936-

1939), the conclusion reached a set of conclusions that came out of the research.

First: Saudi Arabia in the German Strategy 1932-1935

The period before 1932 witnessed German direction towards the Arab Gulf region, but internal political instability in Germany and conflicts between political parties led to a decline in its economic role in that region, and that period saw only a trade treaty with the Kingdom of Hijaz in 1929, the importance of which lies It opened new horizons for German exports ⁽¹⁾.

German exports to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia increased after the announcement of its establishment in 1932 ⁽²⁾, and this became a necessity for Germany because of the economic recession that it suffered from, so the latter created a special department for foreign trade known as the (Political Management of Foreign Trade), and to stand by the German exporters , The German government created a government insurance company known as the Hermes Co. to guarantee their interests and to compensate them for the losses they might incur as a result of export operations⁽³⁾.

German commercial circles continued their interest in searching for broader opportunities for trade in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after the situation is stabilized. For example, (A. klinkel A. G. Hamburg) for maritime lines and transport began to consolidate German commercial interests in the Arabian Peninsula and working to increase it, as the Central Office for German Foreign Trade published a special edition of the Financial Markets Directory for Foreign Trade in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, and prepared a comprehensive reference to data and details that dealt with various aspects of Saudi economic life such as customs, exports, imports, fees and currency ⁽⁴⁾.

The Germans realized that the Saudi market is important to them, because the kingdom after its establishment needed modern technology and transportation routes connecting its remote areas, and a network of radio stations and other aspects of its infrastructure, especially after king Abdul Aziz bin Saud finished the stage of establishment he devoted to the stage of strengthening the political, economic and social construction of his new state, these aspects were present in the Germans due to the impact of industrial development that was witnessed at that time ⁽⁵⁾.

By the end of 1932, German companies such as (Junker), (Siemens), (Borsig Hall), (Zement verbande), (Riedel), (AG), (Faarben) for Dyeing,

(Zeiss), and other German companies to establish business relationships or conduct economic deals with Saudi Arabia, and because of that great commercial activity of German companies, we find that the importance of the Kingdom increased with the German departments in the (Weimar) government and German officials expected the importance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will increased more in the future in various fields ⁽⁶⁾.

German foreign directions towards new economic markets began to take on other dimensions with the arrival of the German National Socialist Party in 1933, with the founding of the New German Republic and the establishment of the Third Reich headed by Adolf Hitler ⁽⁷⁾. The leader of the party founded a special office for foreign affairs headed by Alfred Rosenberg in 1933, who was known for his broad ambitions, and his desire to find a place for Germany abroad, so his statement was consistent with those ambitions when he said “The original demands and unique aspirations of national socialism will be expressed within the region in which foreign policy operates” ⁽⁸⁾.

Germany tried to adopt a new method after the Nazis ⁽⁹⁾ came to power, which was to create an economic organization based on reducing imports and encouraging exports by reducing the value of cash, and trying to replace the deterioration of the German mark by focusing on obtaining hard currency by encouraging German companies to invest in areas characterized by a lack of competition for projects ⁽¹⁰⁾.

Farben Paints's Company was able to increase its sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1933 by the virtue of the Saudi demand to buy its industrial products from manufactured dyes and auxiliary chemicals, it opened a branch in the city of (Jeddah) to meet the increasing demands on its production, and was afraid of competition from other companies to produce it and in order to increase its sales, it decided to give (Besse) the rights to sell its dyes in Hijaz and in southern of Arabian peninsula, and as a result of this agreement increased the activity of (Farben) in terms of sales of dyes and chemicals that had a great demand ⁽¹¹⁾.

There was a problem facing German products exported to Saudi Arabia, was the existence of financial difficulties suffered by the latter, as it was unable to pay the debts it had to German companies, so Saudi Arabia raised customs and fees to the equivalent of 100% to increase its income, and

became able to pay its debts, as King Abdulaziz bin Saud tried to reassure German companies and make them continue their trade with his country by putting forward the idea of establishing a Saudi bank in the city of Jeddah, which pushed the company (Farben Fabrikken Auto) to make an offer to Saudi Arabia for Currency printing privilege of that bank, but the idea of its establishment was not realized at that time. In the same context, some German entrepreneurs in the Kingdom predicted that the economic situation of Saudi Arabia will gradually improve, and German companies must continue to work on the export of their products to it, and bear the delay in paying the debts of the Saudis for a period of time ⁽¹²⁾.

The advice of German businessmen to their national companies came out of their awareness that the suspension of trade between Germany and Saudi Arabia will push other subsidiaries of other countries to replace German companies which will lose the Saudi market that they desperately needed, Also, the failure of German companies to wait for Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's debts will lose them an important position among the Saudis, while waiting for them on their debts will make them favourable to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and will make the latter maintain that position and give them preference in importing products from them in the future ⁽¹³⁾. Germany, through its oil companies, tried to obtain an oil concession in Saudi Arabia, after King Abdulaziz bin Saud wished the Germans to participate in that field and expressed his willingness to grant it a privilege to invest oil in the region ⁽¹⁴⁾, and apparently the Saudi king wanted to manoeuvre foreign oil companies in order to obtain greater profits from foreign oil companies that were competing for the right to exploration in Saudi Arabia. German diplomats send forward the king's proposal to German Foreign Ministry, the latter presented it to Adolf Hitler, who rejected the proposal for two reasons, the first was that Germany was unable to protect its interests in Saudi Arabia in the event of war, and secondly that Germany at that time was unable to meet the financial demands ⁽¹⁵⁾ put by (King Abdulaziz bin Saud) as a condition for obtaining those privileges ⁽¹⁶⁾.

The Germans were afraid to engage in an economic adventure and intense competition over Saudi oil with other companies, because The American oil companies and their British counterparts were competing to win oil concessions within Saudi Arabia ⁽¹⁷⁾, and indeed the Americans were able through their oil company (Stander Oil of New Jersey) to win the privilege

of Saudi oil at the expense of the British, because King Abdulaziz Bin Saud would have preferred to bring American capital and American capitalists to his country, because of his reassurance to the government of the United States of America and his appreciation for the geological reports prepared by the American experts on the presence of oil in the lands of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in large quantities ⁽¹⁸⁾.

After 1933, Germany started to get rid of the effects of the economic crisis, due to the policy of the National Socialists who focused on the economic side to raise the standard of living for the peasants, improve the conditions of the middle class and strive to increase national income, the German banking system was reformed and the financial liquidity returned to accumulate in the funds of institutions and banks, and expanded the German government to restart the economic machine in order to absorb unemployment, Hitler stated in that regard, saying: “The important thing at this time is not the program and ideas, but the daily bread for five million unemployed people, and by giving them work to which we gain great authority” ⁽¹⁹⁾.

The economic program set by the German government required a search for areas and markets outside the borders of Germany, so Saudi Arabia was one of those global markets that German companies rushed to. In 1934, the German Ministry of Economy with the director of the Imperial Bank (Hilmar Schacht) start to encouraging German shareholders to invest in the (British Oil Development) Company as part of its orientation to make the German economy based on self-sufficiency, and trying to control its shares to increase their influence in the Arab world in general, and in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particularly ⁽²⁰⁾.

The problem that hindered the German commercial rush to the Arabian Peninsula lies in the difficult economic situation that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was experiencing as a result of the decrease in its financial resources, especially the number of pilgrims who performed the pilgrimage in 1934, which decreased to (13,000) pilgrims compared to 1931 when the number of pilgrims reached approximately (27,000) pilgrims. The end of the global economic crisis had a negative impact on Saudi Arabia, as the trade and exchange movement with it had shrunk by other countries, particularly Germany, so the customs fees decreased, and accordingly, the financial returns that the Saudi authorities obtained from the goods ⁽²¹⁾.

Moreover, the confrontation of King Abdul Aziz Bin Saud with some internal events, including the suppression of some tribes that raised problems and intended to shake stabilization, depleted the resources and financial liquidity, which led to keeping their debts in favour of German companies which reached In 1934 about ten thousand pounds sterling ⁽²²⁾.

Regional problems were one of the factors that made Abdulaziz Bin Saud in urgent need of funds to continuously enhance the military capabilities of his army, because the problem of drawing borders with Iraq, Yemen and others remained a problem that the Saudis were suffering from, and led to the depletion of huge sums of money to solve them, thus facing a number of local powers that were taking advantage of this to undermine the Saudi rule ⁽²³⁾. The king reached treaty with Iraq (friendship and good-neighbourliness) in 1934, and an arbitration protocol and extradition treaty were attached to it. As for his problems with Imam Yahya, Imam of Yemen, he signed the Taif Treaty on May 21, 1934, and each party admitted the independence of the each kingdom and ownership of them ⁽²⁴⁾, The threats he faced on the border, before dissolving it with some regional parties neighbouring his country ⁽²⁵⁾ forced him to demand that the Germans provide his army with weapons and equipment, who placed a large portion of it on its borders to protect his country from the hostile movements against it ⁽²⁶⁾.

The Germans could not keep quiet about their debts for long, because provide Bin Saud with the weapons needed was required him to pay some of their benefits in order to provide him with what he needed, For the purpose of reassuring the Germans of what his state owed them, in 1935 he issued an order to pay 10% of the value of each foreign debt. His issuance of this decision came after the Saudi government received twenty thousand pounds from the American oil company (Standard Oil of California) that was prospecting for oil in the Saudi Al-Ahsa region. This led to providing some financial liquidity with the Saudi government to pay some of its debts to the Germans and other foreign creditors ⁽²⁷⁾.

German commercial companies continued to deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the thirties of the twentieth century, especially after the improvement of their economic conditions, as the number of Muslim pilgrims to Saudi Arabia increased in 1935, and the Saudi government obtained sums of oil profits from American companies, thus it bought some

weapons from the Germans who were delivering it via Spain, but that did not prevent the emergence of other competitors in the Saudi economic arena such as France, Britain, Japan, Italy and even Egypt ⁽²⁸⁾, consequently, Germany needed to find representatives of its commercial companies who were commercially strong within the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and indeed (Abdullah Ali Ridha)⁽²⁹⁾ Company obtained the agency and represented some German industries inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, foremost of which was the representation of the Germans in the agency (Hanza Airlines) and (German Company for East African Airlines) by virtue of the financial position that was (Abdullah Ali Ridha) company enjoyed in 1935, its control over certain aspects of the Saudi market and the commercial confidence it enjoyed, especially in Jeddah, as well as the close relationship that the company had with the Saudi government due to the position he held as mayor of Jeddah before he devotes himself to managing the business of his commercial company of broad economic interests ⁽³⁰⁾.

Abdullah Ali Redha's company was Not only a representative of the economic interests of German companies, but Germany, because of Czechoslovakia's contact with it and its offer to market its products and represent its consulate in Jeddah, was forced to lure it and prevent it from accepting the Czech offer, When the German Foreign Ministry entrusted Abdullah Ali Ridha 's company with consular representation in Germany, which strengthened its position in Saudi Arabia, and prompted the president of the Saudi company to say: 'Our goal is to expand the spread of German goods in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia... We seek to import a lot of German goods, especially sugar in large quantities, building materials and others' ⁽³¹⁾.

The second theme: is Nazi Germany's policy towards Saudi Arabia 1936-1939

Although there was a commercial activity for the Germans in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it was not at the level that matches the Germans great ambitions, because the German economy was concentrated during the era of the Nazi government and advisor Hitler on internal economic recovery and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were interested in import and secure weapons during the years (1936-1938), due to the challenges they were facing in the southern Arabian Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf region,

accordingly Bin Saud initially sought contact with the British with whom he had close relations to secure his weapons needs, however, Britain initially hesitated to satisfying his armament demands, but their fear that he would go to other western countries to obtain weapons paid them to supply him with a small amount of weapons in 1937, the weapons were very expensive and of old type that Britain no longer needed ⁽³²⁾.

Despite the approval of King Abdulaziz bin Saud on the British deal, despite its defects and shortcomings, he realized that his English allies were not ready to meet his large armament demands, thus he had to think of heading towards a country other than Belgium and Netherlands whom British officials advised him to offer his armament demands to them instead of heading towards Germany. Bin Saud decided to present his needs to the latter, because he was aware of the quality of the good weapons that the Germans possessed and their appropriate prices, as well as, their willingness to be patient in paying their prices in comfortable instalments due to his country's economic conditions ⁽³³⁾.

King Bin Saud's was directed by the desire to strengthen his country's army and strengthen its capabilities therefore he headed towards the Germans, and he made every effort in that. He wanted to buy weapons at reasonable prices, and made the purchase in a form of a loan as possible, and to feel the pulse of Germany and its response to his desire to obtain weapons, sent in 1937 his own doctor, Dr. Medhat Sheikh Alard, came to Berlin to make some contacts with a number of officials of the Nazi party and with the relevant German factories and try to find out how well they responded to fulfil the wish of King Bin Saud ⁽³⁴⁾.

The Saudi king wanted to acquire German machine guns, to use them in the five new military sites that they set up on the northern border to secure their country from any possible aggression. This was the specialty of two German companies, (Varnarr Company) and the German company for ammunition (Germany Co.) ⁽³⁵⁾.

Although the German government found in King Ibn Saud's request for arms from its factories an opportunity to find markets for its overseas armaments industry, it was little hesitated, due to the large debts owed to its companies on the Saudi government which should have been paid and settled by the Saudi government. Moreover, satisfying the Saudi demand

due to the improvement of Germany's economic conditions in 1937 and its desire to rearm Germany and find external markets to spend and benefit from its money in support and promotion of the German economy to meet the internal economic requirements made it consider accepting the request⁽³⁶⁾. However, the Germans did not agree on the issue at first, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia tried to draw the attention of the German government to its desire to establish diplomatic relations with it, and its willingness to assign one of its official representatives in the countries neighboring Saudi Arabia to fulfill the duty of the German diplomatic official representative who is not resident in Jeddah, and is about to wait The German proposal in this regard, as the Saudi government decided to coincide with that proposal is to send Khaled Al-Qurqany known as Khaled Al-Hood to Berlin to buy weapons from Germany in instalments from the German company (Ferostal)⁽³⁷⁾.

The Germans were aware of the importance of the role that King Abdulaziz bin Saud and his kingdom contribute to the Middle East in general and Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula in particular, because of the presence of Islamic holy places in his country, and for his strong personality and dominance in an important region in the heart of the Arab world, as well as his country having large stocks of oil and gold, therefore, and as the Germans determined the importance of that, the kingdom would be a good market for European goods in the future, and the Saudi government would be the largest buyer which needed weapons, cars, and factories for the manufacture of light weapons, electrical installations, means of communication, water stations, Many other things⁽³⁸⁾.

Such factors encouraged the Germans during Hitler's era to establish economic and political relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, King Abdulaziz bin Saud, on November 5, 1937, sent his private secretary, Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, to meet Dr. Fritz Grobba⁽³⁹⁾, during the interview in Baghdad they discussed the German position regarding the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and King Ibn Saud welcome of the dispatch of Germany representatives to Jeddah, because the Palestinian issue showed that it is useful to have an opportunity for both governments to consult with each other on issues of concern to each of them⁽⁴⁰⁾.

The meeting that took place between Dr. Groppa and Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, the private secretary of Ibn Saud in 1937, opened a wide space for exchanging letters and memos in order to establish diplomatic relations between the Germans and Saudi Arabia. After less than three months, Sheikh Yusuf sent a non-printed letter written by hand through the Saudi charge d'affaires in Baghdad, Sheikh Muhammad Abdul-Raouf to Dr. Fritz Groppa, in which he focused on the fact that his government wanted to send Khaled Bey Al-Qurqani, known as Abu Al-Houd ⁽⁴¹⁾ to Germany to buy weapons and he asked Groppa to inform his government about this in order to provide him with the necessary assistance in order to buy German weapons in full. Suitable and moderate in exchange for installments and securing the balances on bank guarantee, and regarding the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Germany. Sheikh Yusuf Yassin stated that his government agreed to accredit a German representative in Jeddah to be based in another country, and made the German representative whose study of appointment is in Jeddah is accredited in one other country, and the Saudi sheikh continued in his message saying: "My government is pleased that the German representative accredited in another country will come to Jeddah to spend several months every winter." This was commented on by Sheikh Mohammed Abdul Raouf, the Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad, who said: 'King Ibn Saud was anxious to adopt the German representative as quickly as possible ⁽⁴²⁾.

Sheikh Yusuf Yassin spoke with (Heinrich de Haas), the former German honorary consul in Jeddah, so the latter confirmed that the Saudi Minister of Finance expressed his desire to settle the issue by paying half of what Duhas demanded (2000) pounds Sterling in gold that year, and to pay the other half in the year that follows, and in that way the process of 'establishing diplomatic relations with Germany' is facilitated by King Ibn Saud ⁽⁴³⁾.

Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Fouad Hamza ⁽⁴⁴⁾ used the opportunity to be in Berlin for treatment to hold talks with a number of German officials there, so he assured the head of the political department at the German Foreign Ministry (von Hentek) that Saudi policy is based on long-term considerations, asking about the policy that Germany will adopt towards the Arabian Peninsula, stressing that King Ibn Saud is compelled to

cooperate positively with Britain because of his special political circumstances and warned him about them, and the discussions also covered the possibility of the Germans cooperating with Saudi Arabia in the cultural field by sending numbers of Saudi students to Berlin, as is the case for Iraqis studying in Germany ⁽⁴⁵⁾, the idea was greatly welcomed by the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

Despite Fuad Hamza's attempt to prevent the fall of King Ibn Saud in the circle of British domination and his strong loyalty to them in order to get closer to the Germans to get weapons for the Saudi army according to offers and facilities suitable for Saudi Arabia, the British documents confirm the Saudi king's close relationship with Britain, and his belief that they are friendly to the Arabs, and that they control all matters of interest to the Arabs, and that they must expect less evil and more benefits from the British compared to others ⁽⁴⁷⁾. The events in the year before the World War II proved the extent of the close relationship between Ibn Saud and the British despite the hatred he had in his heart for them, but his country's need for them prompted him to rely on them in World War II.

Conclusion

The information received in the research indicated that Germany put Saudi Arabia in its strategy, due to the need for influential countries in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula to be its anchor in that region, to move towards gaining influence in other areas that needed in order to export its products and invest in it by its commercial companies.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's need lead it to opened its soil to German companies, and imported industrial products and weapons from them, to meet the internal and external challenges that they were facing, This represented broad prospects for the Nazi Germans to establish economic and weapons relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the reign of King Abdul Aziz Al Saud. Without the British opposition to Germany's entry into the Saudi market, and American oil companies competing with German companies, Germany would have gained more influential positions in the Saudi economy.

Because of Germany's need for Saudi markets, German companies were forced to sacrifice some of the benefits, such as not getting their financial dues directly from the Saudi government or paying them in advance, these

companies temporarily sacrificed their dues for some time, because the economic situation in Saudi Arabia was difficult, thus they waited for a certain period in the belief that the economic gains they would receive later are worth that sacrifice.

Margins

(1) For details on the treaty look:

G.W. Renadel, *German Relations with Hejaz and Yemen*, London, 1970, PP. 50-55

(2) On the twenty-third of September 1932, the founding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially announced and the end of the phase that Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud started with its unification. For details see: Fouad Hamza, *Saudi Arabia*, Riyadh, 1388 AH, pp. 114-120; H. Mejcher, *Saudi Arabia's Relationship with Germany king Abdelaziz*, 1406 H, pp. 12-15.

(3) F. Abdull al Samary, *Germany – Saudi Arabia Relations 1926 – 1939*, California, 1989, p.53.

(4) F. Abdull al Samary, *Op. Cit*, p. 66.

(5) Saud Ahmad Al-Shammari, *Political and Economic Structure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the Reign of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud*, Cyprus, 2011, pp. 63-64.

(6) Documents ON German Foreign Policy, No.186, From: F. Grobba, To: Berlin, 29/12/1932, p. 388.

(7) Adolf Hitler was born in 1889 in the city of (Bruno) in Austria, lived in 1909 in a homeless shelter, and volunteered in World War I as a soldier in the German army, and was rewarded with the Order of Iron Cross of the first category, belonged to the ranks of the German Socialist Workers Party (DAP) in 1920, After many years, he became one of the seven leaders in it. In 1933 he became an adviser to Germany, as he worked to lay the foundations of the Nazi regime ruled by a totalitarian dictatorship, he continued to rule Germany until his suicide in 1945 with his own pistol after his country was defeated by the allies and the Soviet forces entered Berlin. 2 ed., Beirut, 1995; Louis. to. Schneider, the man who practically wanted to occupy the world, translated by Tariq Al-Sayed Khater, Baghdad, 2008.

(8) John L. Heineman, *Hitler's First Foreign Minister*, Berkeley, 1979, p. 122.

(9) The word \"national socialist Nazi\" means in German, a political movement with a totalitarian and authoritarian ideology. William Shearer, *History of Hitler's Germany*, Translation: Khairi Hammad, Baghdad, 1962, p. 180-181 .

(10) Mohammed Kamel Al-Desouki, *History of Germany*, i2, Cairo, 1969, p. 67-68.

(11) D.G.F.P., No. 123, from: I.G Farben, To: A. Besse, 21/9/1933, p. 82.

(12) F. Abdull al Samary, *Op. Cit.*, p. 72.

(13) D.G.F.P., No.129, From: I.G. Farben, To: Berlin, 27/9/1933, p. 89

(14) Saud Ahmed al-Shammari, *Op. Cit*, p. 67.

(15) King Abdulaziz bin Saud set conditions for oil companies to obtain his country's oil, represented by granting the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a loan of (1,000,000) pounds in the form of credit amounts given to meet the needs of Saudi Arabia.

- N. Robertson, *The Origins of the Saudi Oil Empire*, New York, 1979, p. 80
- (16) F. Abdull Al Samary, *Op. Cit.*, p. 95.
- (17) For details on foreign competition over Saudi Arabia's oil, see: Talib Muhammad Wahim, *British-American Competition for Arab Gulf Oil*, Baghdad, 1982, pp. 179-185.
- (18) F. Abdull Al Samary, *Op. Cit.*, p. 99.
- (19) Quoted from: Wilhelm Reich, *Studies in Nazi Theory*, translated by Youssef Hanna, Beirut, 1974, p. 112.
- (20) F. Abdull Al Samary, *Op. Cit.*, p. 101.
- (21) W. Murray, *Saudi Arabia and the Germany*, London, 1966, P. 89.
- (22) I.O.R., L/p+ 6/12/207, From: Mr. Calvert, To: Sir John Simon, 10/10/1934, p. 268.
- (23) () Abdulaziz Ibn Saud fought many battles against opponents of his rule, such as Faisal Al-Duwaish, the leader of the Saudi (Mutair) clan, and (Ibn Hathleen) and (Jasser bin Lamy) and others who created him countless problems, and did not end until after their general death 1934, however, their clans (Mutair) and (Ajman) continued to cause problems for the Saudi regime. Ahmad Al-Tarbin, *Abdul Aziz Al Saud and his role in eliminating internal strife*, *Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies*, No. (7), year (2), July 1976, pp. 52-53.
- (24) For details see: Shaker Al-Khariti, *Al-Arab on Al-Ittihad Road*, Damascus, 1947, pp. 50-55.
- (25) Although Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud reached solutions with Iraq and Yemen, King Abdullah ibn Al-Sharif Hussein bin Ali continued to create problems for Ibn Saud by supporting some tribes and inciting them to the Saudi regime by virtue of the animosity between Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein and the personal problems between the two monarchs, Ahmed Tor Salmein, *Jordanian-Saudi relations 1932-1945*, Beirut, 2003, p. 93.
- (26) F. Abdull Al Samary, *Op.Cit*, p. 113.
- (27) I.O.R., L/p+S /12/2089, form: Mr. Calvert, To: John Simon, 11/9/1935, p. 211.
- (28) The prices of gas lamps from Egypt were cheaper and of lower prices than those from Germany, which affected the German companies that were producing them. For details see: S. Hayek, *Saudi Arabia 1932- 1965*, London, 1980, p. 87.
- (29) Hajj Abdullah Ali Ridha held the position of (Jeddah's mayor), and by virtue of his position he was able to obtain some ship agencies from some foreign companies. Muhammad Ali Mughrabi, *Features of social life in the Hijaz in the fourteenth century of migration*, 2nd floor, Jeddah, 1405 AH, p. 143.
- (30) Stefan Wild, *The Foreign policy of German*, New York, 1976, p. 112.
- (31) F. Abdull Al Samary, *Op. Cit.*, p. 125.
- (32) F.O., 371/21906, E. 1739/1267/25, From: R. Bullard, To: E. Eden, 8/4/1938, p.82.
- (33) H. Mejcher, *Op. Cit.*, p. 56.
- (34) Fritz Groppa, *Men and Powers in the Countries of the East*, translated by Farouk Hariri, Part 1, Baghdad, 1979, p. 175.
- (35) F.O., 371/2084, E. 4454/815/25, From: R. Bullard, To: E. Eden, 28/5/1937, p.91.
- (36) F. Abdull Al Samary, *Op.Cit.*, PP. 138-139.
- (37) Fritz Groppa, *Op. Cit.*, Part 1, pp. 178-179.

- (38) D. G.F.P., Series D, vol. V, from: Baghdad, To: the Secretary of State, Berlin, 18/2/1939, p.; 29.
- (39) From October 1932, Dr. Groppa held the position of German envoy in Baghdad, and held another position, in addition to his position in Baghdad in the period from the first of January to the third of September 1939, he is the German envoy in Saudi Arabia, and since the beginning of the Second World War until February 1943 German Special Commissioner for Arab Countries, responsible for supporting Rashid Ali Al-Kilani, Amin Al-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Palestine Sharif and Fawzi Al-Qawuqji, before and during the events of May 1941 in Iraq, and he was Chairman of the Arab Committee in the German Foreign Ministry. For details see: Fritz Groppa, previous source, Part 2, Baghdad, 1979.
- (40) D.G.F.P., Series D, Vol. V, from: Dr. Fritz Groppa, Baghdad, To : The Secretary of State, Berlin, 9/11/1937, p. 61.
- (41) He was working as an advisor to King Ibn Saud at that time. For details, see Michel Christian, *The Syrian Double Question*, Damascus, 1984, p. 57.
- (42) D.G.F.P., Series D, vol. V, From: Dr. Fritz Groppa, Baghdad, To: The Secretary of State, Berlin, 20/1/1938, p. 75.
- (43) D.G.F.P., Series D, vol. V, From: Dr. Fritz Groppa, Baghdad, To: The Secretary of State, Berlin, 20/1/1938, p. 75.
- (44) From Lebanese origin, he served as Deputy Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud from December 1930 until his appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary of Saudi Arabia in Paris during the Second World War. Looking: Extraordinary Smouhi, *Arab diplomacy in the field*, Beirut, 1996, pp. 37-38.
- (45) By the end thirties of the twentieth century, 30 Iraqi students were sent to study in Germany, and 300 Arab students in Iraq learned German under the supervision of four German teachers. look: F. Groppa, *Irk Berlin 1941*, Berlin, 1942, p. 25.
- (46) D.G.F.P., Series D, Vol. V, From: Hentiek, Berlin, To : The secretary of state, 27/8/1938, p. 91
- (47) F.O., 371/2706, Tel. 8, No. 315, From : F, To: Baghdad, 30/12/ 1940, p. 399.

List of Sources

First: Foreign documents:

A- Unpublished German documents:

Documents of German Foreign Policy :D.G.F.P.:

- D.G.F.P., No. 186, from, I.G., Groppa, To: Berlin, 29/12/1932.
- D.G.F.P., No. 123, from, I.G., Farben, To: A. Besse, 2/9/1933.
- D.G.F.P., No. 123, from, I.G., Farben, To: A. Besse, 21/9/1933.

- D.G.F.P., No. 129, from, I.G., Farben, To: To: Berlin, 27/9/1933.
- D.G.F.P., Series D, vol. V , from, Dr. Fritz Grobba, Baghdad, To: The Secretary of State, Berlin , 9/11/1937.
- D.G.F.P., Series D, vol. V , from, Dr. Fritz Grobba, To: The Secretary of State, 20/1/1938.
- D.G.F.P., Series D, vol. V , from, Hentiek , Berlin, To: The Secretary of State, 27/8/1938.
- D.G.F.P., Series D, vol. V , from, Baghdad, To: The Secretary of State, Berlin , 18/2/1939.

B- Ministry of India documents: I.O.R

- I.O.R, L/p+ 6/12/207, From: Mr. Calvert To: John Simon 10/10/1934.
- I.O.R., L/ps+/12/2084/, From Mr. calvert, To: John Simon 11/9/1935.

C- Unpublished British Foreign Office documents: F.O

- F.O., 371/21906, E. 1739/1207/25, From: R. Bullard, To: E.Eden, 8/4/1938.
- F.O., 37/ 2084, E. 4454/815/25, From: R. Bullard, To: E.Eden, 28/5/1937/
- F.O., 371/2706, Tel. 8, NO.315 from : Ibin Ibin- suid, To: Baghdad, 30/12/1940/

D-Unpublished Iraqi documents:

- D.K.O, Files of the Royal Court, Sequence 2647/311, book from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Presidency of the Royal Court No. Sh / 875 on July 14, 1940.
- D.K.O, Files of the Royal Court, Sequence 4338/311, a secret letter from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Cabinet Secretariat No. U / 2025/1205 on September 1, 1941.

- D.K.O, Files of the Royal Court, Sequence 771/311, book from the Iraqi Royal Commission in Yemen to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 2, 1941.

Second: Arabic books:

1. Ahmed Salem Tarabin, European Relations - Saudi Arabia 1932-1945, Beirut, 2003 .
2. Saud Ahmed al-Shammari, Political and Economic Construction in Saudi Arabia under Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, Cyprus, 2011 .
3. Smohi Extraordinary, Arab Diplomacy in the Field, Beirut, 1996 .
4. Shaker Al-Goouti, The Arabs in The Union Road, Damascus, 1947 .
5. Talib Mohammed And Heem, British-American Competition for Arabian Gulf Oil, 1982 .
6. Fritz Grobba, Men and Center of Power in the East, translated by: Farouk Hariri, C1, Baghdad, 1979.
7. Fouad Hamza, Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, D.T .
8. Louis . To. The man who practically wanted to occupy the world, translated by Tarek El Sayed Khater, Baghdad, 2008.
9. Muhammad Ali al-Maghribi, features of social life in Hijaz in the 14th century of Hijra, i2, Jeddah, 1405 Ah.
10. Mohammed Kamel Al-Desouki, History of Germany, I2, Cairo, 1969 .
11. Michel Christian, The Double Syrian Question, Damascus, 1984 .
12. William Shearer, History of Hitler's Germany, Translation: Khairi Hammad, Baghdad, 1962.
13. Wilhelm Reich, Studies in Nazi Theory, Translated by Youssef Hanna, Beirut, 1974.

Third: Foreign Books

1. F.Abdull alsamary, Germany- Saudi Arabia Relations 1926-1939, vnersity of culifonia Riverside, 1989.

2. G.W. Rendel. Germany Relations with Hejaz and yemen , London, 1970.
3. H.Meicheher, Saudi Arabia, Relat. Onship with Germany king Abdulzziz, 1406H.
4. John L.Heinman, Hitlers first forelgh Minister, Berkeley, 1979.
5. N.Robertson, origins of the Saudi oli. Empire , New York, 1979.
6. S.Hayek, Saudi Arabia 1932-1965, London, 1980.
7. Stefan wild, the foreign policy of Germen, New York, 1976.
8. W.Murray, Saudi Arabia and the Germany, London, 1966.

Fourth: Research and Articles:

1. Ahmed Tarabin, Abdul Aziz bin Saud and his role in eliminating internal strife, Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, Issue 7, Year 2, Kuwait, July 1976.