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The 1987 National Election in Papua  
New Guinea

*Previous Studies of National Elections in Papua New Guinea*

- Bettison, D.G., Hughes, C.A., van der Veur, P.W. (eds.), 1965. *The Papua-New Guinea Elections 1964*. Canberra: Australian National University.
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**ELEKSIN**

**The 1987 National Election  
in Papua New Guinea**

Edited by

**Michael Oliver**

University of Papua New Guinea

Port Moresby

1989

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# Contents

Preface	vii
<b>Part I</b>	
1. Introduction <i>Michael Oliver</i>	1
2. Survey evidence on electoral behaviour in Papua New Guinea <i>Yaw Saffu</i>	15
3. Election law and the conduct of the elections <i>Bernard Wijeweera</i>	37
4. Regionalism <i>Ray Anere</i>	51
5. Gender, Age and Education of Candidates and Members <i>Mark Turner</i>	59
6. Hidden and Open Agendas: Social Policy Issues <i>Rosemary Preston</i>	69
7. Women candidates in the election <i>Eileen Wormald</i>	81
8. The trader's voice: PNG-born Chinese business and the election <i>Margaret Willson</i>	99
<b>Part 2</b>	
9. Angoram Open <i>R.J. May</i>	111
10. Papuan Prince(ss) and the Papuan hegemony: the election in Central Provincial <i>Wari Iamo</i>	123
11. Kerema Open <i>Michael Oliver</i>	151
12. The Manus vote <i>Alexander Wanek and Eileen Wormald</i>	189

13.	Faltering progress: Namatanai Open <i>Norman MacQueen</i>	209
14.	The Elections in North Solomons Province <i>James Griffin and Samuel Kawona</i>	225
15.	The Simbu election <i>Paula Brown</i>	245
16.	Tribal structure and rural ballot box counts in Hagen Open <i>John Burton</i>	253

## Appendices

1.	List of Electorates	285
2.	Population census 1971-1980	287
3.	PNG national elections: party-endorsed candidates	288
4.	PNG National election: returned and new members, by region and province	289
5.	PNG national elections 1977-87: number and percentage of votes cast	290

Index		291
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## Maps and Diagrams

Election proportion profile of five candidates (Central Provincial)	124
Angoram electorate	113
The Manus vote	192
Gulf Province Open electorate	185
Kerema Open electorate: census division	186
Kerema Open electorate: provincial constituencies	187
The Manus vote	192
North Solomons Province	227
Hagen Open: key to box counts and polling booths	254
Ballot box counts	260, 262, 265
Hagen Open electorate supplementary election, percentage counts, (individual candidates)	266-267, 269, 274-276
Isolines of voting percentages	278
Models of candidate support	280

# Preface

Producing a report on an election requires the collaboration of many people. The initial planning for these studies began in 1986 during meetings of the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG). The group involved rapidly grew beyond the department and included other social scientists at UPNG and several colleagues from other universities. Both before and after the elections, seminars were organized at which preliminary papers were presented by those who had indicated an interest in research on various aspects the election. Some participants were in the end unable to write the papers they had originally planned, but contributed nonetheless to the development of our ideas on what the election was all about.

Funds for the preparation and publication of this collection of studies came in major part from the Research and Publications Committee of UPNG. In addition, a particularly valuable grant was provided by the International Development Research Centre of Canada, earmarked for the participation of students in the gathering of data and especially in the administering of the interview schedules used in Yaw Saffu's survey, reported in Chapter 2. We are grateful to both bodies for their support.

Throughout the work on the election studies, innumerable demands were made on the Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea. We are grateful to Luke Lucas, the Commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo, the Deputy Commissioner, and to the staff of the Commission for their unfailing courtesy and helpfulness.

The final editing, and the preparation of photo-ready copy for printing, took place both at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at UPNG and at the Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies (RSPacS), the Australian National University (ANU), where the editor was a visiting fellow early in 1989. Both departments were hospitable to our research and generously provided space and materials. Typing at UPNG was done by Dimas Belik, and the coordination of pre-election research was done by Ume Suve. Lulu Turner in Canberra was responsible for typing, layout, editing, and preparing manuscripts for printing. Joan Oliver contributed many hours of editing. Adri Govers, head of UPNG's publications office saw the book through the printing stages. Thanks are due to all of them for their patience and dedication.

The maps and several of the tables used in the book were painstakingly produced by the Geography Department of UPNG and by the Cartography Unit of RSPacS at ANU, to whom we are grateful.

After the death of Iambakey Okuk, the great Highlands leader, one of the outstanding artists in Papua New Guinea, Kauage, produced a series of pictures depicting Okuk's life and political career. I approached him in the hope of getting his permission to use one of these, which depicted election campaigning, as a cover for our book. Kauage's response was marvellous. He immediately set about adapting one of his pictures and provided all the lettering for the cover as well. We are delighted to think of him as a valued collaborator in producing this book.

It is impossible to name each person who helped make this book possible, but I know I speak for all the contributors in thanking them very warmly.

Michael Oliver

Canberra, May 1989.



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# **Part 1**



## 1

**Introduction**

MICHAEL OLIVER

*STUDYING ELECTIONS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA*

In 1987, Papua New Guinea held its sixth national election; its third since Independence in 1975. Each one of the previous elections was the subject of a book, to which many students of Papua New Guinea contributed (Bettison, Hughes and van der Veur 1965; Epstein, Parker and Reay 1971; Stone 1976; Hegarty 1977; King forthcoming). They constitute a remarkable record and make it possible to trace the evolution of PNG politics in greater detail than in many developed countries. This study of the 1987 election owes a great deal to those that went before it, but a deliberate decision was taken not to try to replicate them. Had one wanted to do so, it would have been difficult, for each of the previous studies differed from all the others. Nevertheless, some constants can be found. Every study included one or more chapter on the overall significance of the election. In addition, each one included constituency studies, where the local level, the competition amongst candidates, was the focus. The present volume follows its predecessors to that extent.

This introduction will look at the interrelationships among parties, the election and government. There will follow a chapter that marks a 'first' in Papua New Guinea: an analysis of the results of a survey of attitudes and opinions based on a nation-wide sample, undertaken by Yaw Saffu and the students who worked with him. Bernard Wijeweera will then draw our attention to the rules of the election game and the logistical tasks which have to be performed if votes are to be successfully cast by scattered peoples, living in terrain which is extraordinarily difficult to penetrate.

Papua New Guinea is a state with nineteen provinces, grouped together in areas called Papua, the Highlands, the Islands and Mamose. (The name Mamose is a composite of the first two letters of the four North-West provinces of the former New Guinea coast, Madang, Morobe, (East and West) Sepik. It was formerly spelled Momase). Ray Anere looks at the regionalism which results and its effect on voting. Mark Turner shows us in his chapter that the education levels of candidates and members elected is still rising and that youth is no disadvantage in appealing for votes.

Papua New Guinea's elections are not noted for their focus on national issues and Rosemary Preston shows how little the situation had changed in 1987. Women had never played a large role in politics, and Eileen Wormald tries to discover why the 1987 national election failed to send even one woman to parliament. Finally, a special minority in PNG, the Chinese, is looked at in terms of its political attitudes and behaviour by Margaret Willson.

The chapters on constituencies follow, with a fair distribution having

been achieved among the country's four main regions. Papua is represented by Kerema Open (Oliver) and Central Provincial (Iamo); the Highlands by Simbu (Brown) and Hagen Open (Burton); the Islands by Namatanai Open (MacQueen), Manus Open and Provincial (Wanek and Wormald) and North Solomons (Griffin with Kawona); and Mamose by Angoram Open (May).

Throughout the book, the role of the political party is touched on in one way or another. An understanding of the place of political parties is a key to answering the question: what do Papua New Guinea's elections decide? Not all of the contributors will agree with the answers given to that question in the section that follows. The analysis and argument are those of the author, but discussions with all of the contributors and a careful reading of their work have been invaluable in arriving at the conclusions that have been reached.

### *Aftermath of the 1987 election*

Before trying to understand the election, an account of results and their aftermath must be presented. Other information will be found in the Appendices. A record number of 1515 candidates contested the 109 seats in the National Parliament in 1987 (Turner and Hegarty 1987). Five hundred and fifty-six candidates were endorsed by one (or more) of the fifteen parties in the field and the remaining 959 were Independents. Of the sitting members who contested the election, only 53.8 per cent were returned (Electoral Commission 1987a).

Citing returns by party is hazardous, for the process of switching from one party to another began before the results of three postponed elections came in. Between the end of polling and the time of voting for the Prime Minister on 5 August 1987, the picture changed radically due to Independents moving into one or another party's ranks, switches of party allegiance, the results of one of three postponed elections, and the death of an elected member (Electoral Commission 1987a and 1987b; Turner and Hegarty 1987), as shown in Table 1.

The prime ministership went to the leader of the People's Democratic Movement, Paias Wingti, who at the last moment put together a winning coalition of PDM, PPP, NP, PAP, PP, UP, and Independents. The opposition was led by Michael Somare, who was later replaced by a new leader of Pangu Pati and the present Prime Minister, Rabbie Namaliu.

<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Poll's End</i>	<i>5 Aug 87</i>
Pangu Pati	26	27
People's Democratic Movement (PDM)	17	26
National Party (NP)	12	10
Melanesian Alliance (MA)	7	7
People's Action Party (PAP)	6	14
People's Progress Party (PPP)	5	10
Morobe Independents Group (MIG)	4	4
League for National Advancement (LNA)	3	3
Papua Party (PP)	3	3
United Party (UP)	1	2
Independents	22	-

### WHAT DO PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S ELECTIONS DECIDE?

After an election in Britain, or New Zealand or Canada or Australia or the United States, it makes sense to ask: Which party won the election? Who will be the Prime Minister? Did the people throw the old government out or return it to power? What policies did the voters seem to favour?

After PNG elections are over, one is no closer to answering those questions than before the voting began. Yet they are the normal questions that people from outside ask. Indeed some observers, especially if they come from Australia or another Commonwealth country or the US, jump to the conclusion that there is something radically wrong with PNG politics if, after an election is over, these questions cannot be answered. For an observer from Italy, or someone who remembered the Third and Fourth republics of France, there would be nothing too strange about an inability to give answers, and indeed, such a person probably would have asked other questions.

But most of the people who pay occasional attention to PNG politics *do* come from Australia, or Britain or New Zealand or North America, and indeed it is people who come from these countries who write the books and articles about politics which are most accessible in Papua New Guinea. So there is sometimes an apologetic note that creeps into Papua New Guineans' voices when they explain that PNG elections do not tell which party won, or who will form their government, or whether people liked or disliked the last government, or even whether some policies were or were not popular. Worse than that, the desire to fit PNG elections into a more familiar pattern from abroad, like the Australian one perhaps, leads commentators to pretend, even when we know better, that the PNG elections really do provide the answers to those questions. Indeed, one can be critical of the title of the book that will soon appear on the 1982 national election in PNG: *Pangu Returns to Power*. It can be questioned whether the editor or any of the contributors to the volume got enough information from the voting results to predict what party or parties would form the government. Certainly the 1987 election results gave no sure clues, for up until the last few days before Parliament met, most people would have bet that Mr. Somare would head a Pangu-based government. And, as we have seen, he did not.

If the national elections of PNG do not give us answers to questions such as those posed thus far, what do they decide? The information we can pull from the election results is anything but simple and straightforward. Paradoxically, what the electors seem to be deciding and what the elections themselves decide are different. It is important to identify that difference and try to decide what effect it has on the quality of democracy in PNG.

### *Democracy*

The word democracy was just introduced, and attention must be paid to it before we go further, for elections have become an integral part of the representative brand of democracy. Almost every regime, no matter how repressive, has tried since World War II either to claim that it is a democracy or that it is setting the scene for democracy. The great legitimizing ritual of democracy has become the election, and particularly the election of members of the legislature, the law-making body. Even elections that seem spurious,

for they involve just saying 'yes' or 'no' to a single candidate, can be remarkably important as recent events in Chile, where people voted in a plebiscite to reject the single candidate General Pinochet, have shown.

It will get too complicated, however, if we try to look at Papua New Guinea's elections against the backdrop of every kind of election in every kind of state that claims it is a democracy. Instead, discussion will be limited to countries with government systems like that of PNG. These countries include those that follow what is often called the Westminster system and others that are most like them. One of the crucial things these governments have in common is that they are party governments. In each of them there are elections in which parties compete and which result in a party or parties winning control of government. Systems of government of this kind exist in almost all the countries of Western Europe except Switzerland (Katz 1987). They were the original basis of government in the ex-colonies of Britain and France, before military coups and the moves to single party systems took their toll, and they persist in some of them, including Papua New Guinea.

### *Party Government*

Richard Katz (1987), in a recent book entitled *Party Governments*, has provided an 'ideal type' description of party government and the myths that sustain it. 'Ideal type' definitions are not supposed to describe any existing entities. Rather, they lay out the characteristics towards which real entities are tending and which they would have if they were completely rational. Katz' description of party government sounds quite familiar, but it highlights some assumptions about this kind of democracy that are often made implicitly and are not examined at all carefully.

Two of the main assumptions of party government were just introduced: (a) that there are free elections in which competing parties contend, and (b) that the party or parties that win the election control the government. Here are a few more, often corollaries of the two basic assumptions. Party government assumes that the public service, the bureaucracy, either is under direct party domination or, more usually, that it is made up of bureaucrats who are neutral and act according to the direction of whatever party is in power. It assumes that only political parties exercise political power and therefore that all other organizations that want to advance their views and interests must seek to influence one or more parties. Finally, in party government, none of the competing claims to give legitimacy to the exercise of power count as much as electoral success. The bureaucrat's claim based on expertise, the aristocrat's claim based on birth and a tradition of public service, the priest's claim based on holiness, the soldier's claim based on knowing how to maintain law and order, the traditional chief's claim based on custom, the businessman's claim based on success in amassing wealth and on hardheaded management skills - all these are set aside and the party politician's claim, based on electoral success, is paramount.

It must be emphasized again that no existing regime will have all the characteristics of 'ideal type' party government. In most, bureaucrats' and businessmen's competing claims for legitimate, independent power are given some recognition. Parties do not have everything their own way. But, this said, it is hard to put Papua New Guinea in the party government category because its political parties seem so weak and incoherent in comparison with the parties of other states who practice the same kind of democracy and have the same sort of elections. Yet there is no doubt that the national elections of PNG eventually produce party government.

Indeed, one of the effects of using Katz's concept of party government as the category in which to slot PNG, rather than, say, 'the Westminster system', is to highlight PNG's differences from many other states that occupy places in the category. But before we go too far in isolating PNG as peculiar, let us look more closely at some of the other countries which enjoy party government and have greater similarity to PNG. Katz stated that the result of election competition in party government was that a party *or parties* won control of government. Coalition governments, made up of two or more parties, are indeed more common than single party governments in the 'party government' family. They occur frequently if not invariably in West Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, the Scandinavian countries, Spain and Portugal, India, Sri Lanka - and the list can be extended. It is certainly not the fact that PNG has coalition governments that marks it off from other countries with 'party government'.

In some of the countries listed, however, the composition of the coalition is known, roughly at least, in advance. Thus in West Germany, the dominant party in government will either be the Christian Democrats or the Social Democrats, even though neither may obtain sufficient seats to avoid a coalition. In France since the beginning of the 1980s, the groupings of parties on the right and parties on the left has become clear enough so that the voter knows in advance what effect his ballot is likely to have on the composition of government, even though he or she may vote for a minor party that on its own could not possibly constitute a government. In such countries, coalitions tend to be fairly stable. But more than that, they are countries where the electors' votes have a clear effect on, first, the composition of parliament and the relation of parties in terms of shares of power; secondly, the party composition of the coalition; and, thirdly, the individual who will be the head of government. This leads Katz to focus on whether a party system is 'bi-polar' (with a party or cluster of parties around opposing positions) or 'fragmented' (with parties occupying a variety of positions). This is, it can be argued, more useful than the old distinction between two-party and multi-party systems.

Italy is the leading example of the fragmented system of party government, and there coalitions are not easily predictable in advance and tend to be extremely unstable. Admittedly, the shuffles and reshuffles of ministers take place within a limited range - and exclude both the Communists on the far left and the neo-fascists on the far right. But, on the surface, Italy's version of party government seems to have real similarities to that of PNG. Certainly in Italy it is no easier to answer the four questions asked at the outset than it is in PNG. Italians who read election results know little more than Papua New Guineans which parties have won control of government, who will be the prime minister, whether the old government was approved of or rejected, or what set of policies have been favoured by the voters. And the Italian voter has even less knowledge than the Papua New Guinean about how long any government that does get formed will last in office.

It is generally agreed that the most successful forms of party government are those that tend towards a bi-polar form (eg. Britain, West Germany, Sweden). But it is also true that effective government has persisted for long periods in countries that have a fragmented party pattern. And if the only criticism one could reasonably make of PNG elections was that they resulted in unpredictable, multi-party coalitions, then Papua New Guineans could sit back in good company with Italians, Dutch, Belgians and quite a few others.

But to understand PNG's elections and the problems they give rise to one



has to go deeper. Papua New Guinea stands out, it is suggested, because of the discontinuity between what the elections themselves decide, which is not very different from what they decide in many other party government countries, and what the voters in the election are voting for and think they are deciding. In short, it is the thesis of this chapter that voters think they are choosing individuals who will bring them local development and the election in fact chooses which parties will have a chance to govern. The gap between these two, it may be suggested, is uncomfortable and potentially dangerous.

### *Parties in Papua New Guinea*

The role of the political party is the most important element in the discrepancy between what the electors believe they are doing and what the election in fact decides. Elections in Papua New Guinea on the face of it seem to produce party government and voters seem to be voting for members of political parties. The results of the election, as the ballots are counted, are reported in terms of a party losing a seat here and gaining a seat there. Admittedly, independent candidates are more numerous and successful than we would find in most countries with party government, but still in 1987, party candidates on average took three of the five top ranking places in each electorate. Success in the election is more closely correlated with party membership than education, religion, age or several other factors that could explain why some candidates do well and others not so well. Independents may have won 22 seats in 1987, but party candidates won 87 seats. So what is the difficulty? Why is it being suggested that there is a discrepancy between what the voters do and what the election produces?

The problem comes out when we look at two kinds of evidence. First, individual constituency studies and, secondly, the opinion survey data which Dr. Yaw Saffu (Chapter 2) is producing for the first time for Papua New Guinea.

Case studies of individual electorates have been done ever since the 1964 elections and they have filled a substantial part of the volumes of election studies that were put together for each subsequent election, in 1968, 1972, 1977, 1982 and now 1987. Several factors are cited in these studies as the best explanations of why some candidates won and others lost. Clan loyalties and obligations, local popularity, the impact of cargo cults, the wealth of the candidates, the energy and skill they put into campaigning - all these and others have been put forward as the crucial determinants of voting behaviour in a given electorate. Party affiliation is almost never cited as primarily responsible for either success or failure. Here is a brief quotation from David Hegarty's introductory chapter to the book on the 1977 national elections (Hegarty 1983:12):

Most of the studies in this volume show that parties had very little impact at all on the voter. Goode..., in his study of a "village view" of the election, shows that neither parties nor national issues were of concern to the voters. Goode suggests that villagers evaluate candidates in terms of the language group to which they belong; residential proximity; maturity; political and educational experience; kinship linkages; the place of origin of the candidate's wife or wives; and their perceived honesty or integrity....in general, elections remain very much local level contests.

As the constituency studies written on the 1987 election came in, the same

kind of pattern emerged. Party membership either does not seem to count at all, or it is inextricably mixed in with personal and local factors. Norrie MacQueen's study of Namatanai Open (Chapter 14), where Sir Julius Chan won again, does not report that the reason for his success is that he represents PPP, but does take into account the probability that his leadership of that party, and the cabinet roles and the general power position that that leadership opened up for him, affected peoples' votes. Jim Griffin and Samuel Kawona write on the North Solomons where the Melanesian Alliance and John Momis maintained a strength which is hard to factor into personal and organizational components. But instances like these, where a prominent party leader was a candidate were the exception in 1987 as in previous elections, and in most of the electorates of the country, like Kerema Open, party affiliation was indiscernible as a factor influencing how the people voted. Wari Iamo, writing on Central province constituencies (Chapter 10), gives party little weight; nor do Ron May on Angoram (Chapter 9), Alexander Wanek and Eileen Wormald on Manus (Chapter 13) and Paula Brown on Simbu (Chapter 16);

Yaw Saffu's survey of people's attitudes to voting brings a new kind of evidence to bear on the question of the role of political parties. The study he has done is path-breaking. Working with students (mostly from UPNG) Dr. Saffu obtained interviews from 1127 electors in seventeen of the 19 provinces and in the NCD. One of the crucial questions he asked was: 'What is it that you will look for in the candidate you will be voting for in 1987?' Only 3.4 percent gave party membership as their response, that is, thirty-two out of 941 respondents.

The conclusion one is forced to, both from the case study evidence and the survey evidence, is that party counts for almost nothing in voters' minds. The question immediately arises: If that is the case, how do you explain the much greater success of party candidates than candidates who have no party connection (independents)? Why does party affiliation correlate quite well with an appearance in the top group of candidates, listed in order of the votes cast for them?

The simple answer, which was first clearly stated by Peter King after the 1982 election (King forthcoming), seems to be this: candidates do not win because they are endorsed by parties; rather, parties endorse candidates who are going to win. The process of selecting candidates is a crucial one for the success of a party and a great deal of time and effort goes into it. Furthermore, strong candidates seek party endorsement not because they think that endorsement itself is a vote-catcher, but because endorsement brings with it some other advantages. First, parties provide money, posters, buttons, T-shirts, transportation - the material base for an active campaign. Secondly, sophisticated candidates know that the selection of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the other members of the National Executive Council (the cabinet) is made as a consequence of party manoeuvring and bargaining. A strong independent member is not without resources in this manoeuvring, but normally the chance of a cabinet post, or real influence on those in power, improves considerably as a consequence of party membership. Put in another way, the candidates most likely to succeed know that Papua New Guinea has a system of party government. They are aware of the key characteristics of party government that we pointed out earlier: only parties exercise legitimate power; elections determine which party or parties control government. There may be exceptions, and the chances of an independent may be better in PNG than elsewhere, but still *party matters*, and matters a great deal, and politicians know it.

Where are we then? People vote in PNG elections believing that party doesn't matter. Politicians, especially the ablest ones, know party does matter. Herein lies the special problem of party government in this country. For in this discrepancy there may lie a major weakness of PNG democracy. To find out a little more about the implications of the perception gap, we must do several things. First, decide how important the discrepancy in perception is. Secondly, if it does seem important, try to understand why it occurs. Thirdly, ask whether remedies are needed, and if they are, (a) whether we should try to give greater coherence to the party system and thus to party government, or (b) whether there are alternatives to party government that we should be examining carefully.

### *The Perception Gap*

Does it really matter that voters pay little attention to parties and politicians a good deal of attention? Perhaps the voters can get reasonable satisfaction from the way they cast their ballots even if, because they don't vote by party, they are not able consciously to influence the way government is formed and are not able to reward or punish governments by confirming them in office or throwing them out. One way of describing the process that actually goes on during and after an election is this:

The voters in each locality, as Dr. Saffu's survey suggests, vote for the person whom they think has the best leadership qualities and is best able to bring development. The candidates who put themselves forward will often find it convenient to get a political party to bear part of their election costs and serve as a base for negotiations for a minister's portfolio. But most of them accept the voters' thinking as to why they were elected and set about filling voters expectations as best they can. They therefore only calculate the extent to which party loyalty is to their own, and their constituents, advantage and are prepared to shift and change when the situation demands it. They join in the moves to pass or block votes of lack of confidence that will change or reinforce the ministers who have the closest access to state power, always hoping to increase their own and their constituents' advantage.

The logic of the election is that both voters and those elected accept that its purpose is to get access to the power and the resources that the state commands. In most developing countries, material advantage depends above all on success in obtaining access to the goods and services, the jobs and the benefits, the roads and the schools and the pensions, provided by the state. In more developed countries where the private sector is the chief source of people's incomes and the market is the chief provider of needed goods and services, politics can be less material, less local, less personal. Elections can be about foreign policy (though they rarely are) or trade policy or the extent of state regulation. But when jobs, subsidies, services and infrastructure must be sought not in the market but through the state, politics becomes something close and personal or at least local, and matters like parties or 'who will form the next government' seem to be distractions that are not allowed to intrude.

Now if this picture were the whole story, perhaps there would be little need to worry much about the future of democratic politics in PNG. But the trouble with it is that it puts an impossible burden on the individual MP. He (or too rarely she) gets chosen to bring development and gets rewarded or punished on the basis of whether development has been delivered. Yet the fundamental decisions about development are made by cabinet and by ministers who gain power through party coalitions. They are the ones that should be rewarded or punished in a democratic system that really makes

government accountable to the people. Yet when there is no party linkage, punishing an MP by not re-electing him does not punish the government in power. Thus the voter and the local MP, no matter how closely they may understand each other, are playing a largely irrelevant game. If the government closes down Ok Tedi mine, it makes little sense to punish Bob Bubec the local MP in North Fly Open. Only if punishing him were also a means of punishing the government of the day would voters be able to register their views effectively.

There is nothing irrational about the way PNG voters behave at the polls. But because they are involved in a process that leads to party government and they are not taking party into account in their voting, their influence on what they are trying to control - the flow of development to their locality and group - is partial and incomplete. This may not be too important if the country is growing and prospects for everyone getting a share of the growth seem reasonably good. The voter who lives in an area that is not yet prospering can argue that if he picks someone next election who has better leadership qualities and is more skilled at bringing development, he can remedy the situation, and the local share in the advantages of growth will be increased.

But should the day come when the country as a whole seems to be going down the wrong road or has come to a standstill, a serious form of frustration and disillusionment may set in. Voters may be convinced that the 'government' should be doing something quite different; but realize too late that simply trying to choose a better local representative will have no effect on the situation. A system of elections that makes only local MPs responsible and does not let electors call governments to account must eventually lose its credibility. If the peoples' decisions in elections are to give legitimacy to government, they must be seen by the people to have a more direct effect on government than do the elections of Papua New Guinea. Up to the present, PNG has a voting public that still believes in the process. Turnouts at elections are high and interest in politics is strong. Tolerance for the shenanigans of votes of confidence, and the incessant manoeuvring of members for advantage and power, seems high. Indeed, voters may take pride in the tactical skills of their representative as long as they think his search for greater personal advantage is also a search for more development for the electorate. But, tolerance can give way quickly to rejection, if things go wrong for the country as a whole and there is no way the citizen feels he can correct the situation through a voting system that is so narrowly focussed on the choice of local candidates.

Why is the voter's perception of the electoral process so narrow? This question is vast one, but it must be raised, for if we are eventually going to want to change the electoral process, it is important to try to understand why it is the way it is today. A tentative proposition, which others have raised, can be suggested. The people of Papua New Guinea have never been mobilized on a nation-wide question. In many developing countries, the creation of a strong political party was the outcome of a struggle for liberation from colonial rule. Africa gives many examples - Kwame Nkrumah's Convention Peoples' Party in Ghana, Nyerere's TANU in Tanzania and Kenyatta's KANU in Kenya come quickly to mind. In each case, the mobilization of a whole people around a liberation movement got transformed into an identification with a dominant party once independence had been achieved. In Papua New Guinea, the questions that attended the coming of independence were also the questions that brought political parties into existence in the country. But there was no prolonged struggle for liberation which demanded the mobilization of mass feelings and the creation of a mass

movement. Political parties were divided on the pace at which independence should come and the advantage that could be obtained in the process for various regions and groups. But they remained politicians' parties, not mass parties. In spite of Pangu Pati's attempt to go the mass party route, especially under the influence of Tony Voutas (Steven 1972), the parties of PNG remained typical examples of 'cadre' parties, to use the term of Maurice Duverger, the French political scientist who influenced thinking on parties so much in the 1950s (Duverger 1954). A cadre party was defined by Duverger in language which still rings remarkably true in PNG today, and might readily be applied to the founding of the Political Action Party under Ted Diro.

The cadre party [is a]...grouping of notabilities...Influential persons, in the first place, whose name, prestige, or connections can provide a backing for the candidate and secure him votes; experts, in the second place, who know how to handle the electors and how to organize a campaign; last of all financiers, who can bring the sinews of war...What the mass party secures by numbers, the cadre party achieves by selection.

Although these parties of politicians and notables originally differentiated themselves at least in part on the basis of issues, they very soon became organizations for gaining access to governmental power pure and simple. Because they had not had to mobilize the electorate as a whole around a vital cause, like liberation, they were able to adapt themselves to the political culture of the village, rather than becoming an agency for the change in that political culture. A political party could be quite successful if it just picked as candidates the people who most closely met the image of the successful leader that village political culture produced. It did not have to appeal to a national mass audience. It didn't have to identify national issues which would evoke enthusiastic response over the entire country. All the party had to do was pick the right man in the right place and give him enough backing to let him win. The governmental system which PNG had adopted was party government and required the existence of political parties, but it soon was clear that an accumulation of support for local candidates was quite enough for party success and that a competitive nation-wide appeal either on issues or on the merits of rival teams of leaders was quite unnecessary.

It should be stressed again how this differs from even the Italian kind of party government which involves unpredictable coalitions and a minimal direct control over government by the electorate. In Italy, parties are very important. People vote Communist, or Socialist or neo-fascist or Christian Democratic and not for the candidate and his personal qualities (Sartori 1976:88). It would of course be an exaggeration to say that in the other countries that enjoy party government voters always cast their ballots for a party rather than the individual, but it would be hard to find another example of party government where only 3.4 percent of the electors is likely to vote for the party. Papua New Guinea is remarkable, if not unique, in grafting village political perceptions onto a system of party government that seems inherently to demand a political culture that leads voters to choose on the basis of parties. To use Marxian language, PNG seems to be deep into a problem of articulating modes of production. A peasant mode creates a political consciousness, based on the understanding and values of subsistence-agriculture villages, that fits very uneasily with a system of party government that requires the political consciousness of a quite different mode of

production.

Two recent examples of new political formations in PNG bear out the case that party has significance only among politicians after elections and not with the voters during elections. Mr. Hugo Berghuser organized for the last election a 'Group of Independents' (Anere, Chapter 4). Each candidate presented himself to the voters as an independent, but because post-election manoeuvres for government formation and ministerial choice are better done from a group base, the temporary alliance was formed. At the right moment, Mr. Berghuser and others made their move and joined with Diro to form the Papuan Bloc. Utula Samana's Morobe Independents Group followed a similar strategy, although in this case Mr. Samana went the next step once cabinet manoeuvres were through and formed a political party with a potential nation-wide support base. In neither case did it seem necessary to present candidates to voters as party members. If the right candidates had been chosen, they would do just as well as independents, and post-election flexibility was maximized.

A strange picture emerges. Papua New Guinea's political parties in many ways behave just as parties do in other states with party government systems. Before and during national elections, party conventions or conferences are held; party platforms are issued and distributed; press conferences are given by party leaders; campaign tours are organized with great fanfare. The leaders of the opposition parties in the old parliament denounce those who were in the government. Newspaper articles are written as if a party contest was underway. Is it all a sham and a facade? Perhaps not all, but the attempt to isolate a party influence in the actual choice made by voters produces little that we can get our teeth into. For example, in the North Solomons, the Melanesian Alliance seems to have great strength. But do voters cast their ballots for the party? or is Father John Momis' personal following the reason why voters support those he endorses? or does the Melanesian Alliance just have enough prestige and astuteness to pick the right candidates, the ones who will win? The answers are not entirely clear, but the case for party influence is certainly unproved.

### *Promoting Party coherence*

Obviously a great many people share a concern about the weakness and incoherence of the political parties in Papua New Guinea and their lack of impact on the electorate. And where there are concerns, there will be attempts at remedy. One of these attempts was made by the Electoral Commissioner, Mr. Luke Lucas, for the 1987 election. The ballot paper included not only a picture of each candidate, but also a smaller photograph of the candidate's party leader. Voters simply couldn't ignore the fact that when voting for a candidate they were also voting for a party, unless of course they were supporting an Independent. No one, it seems, believes that the impact of this decision was significant; more than anything else, one suspects it raises the question of how far an Electoral Commissioner should go in attempting to influence the outcome of an election.

More drastic measures have been proposed to cope with instability, for instability is often cited as the worst feature of the party system in Papua New Guinea. The constitution gives some protection already from the frivolous use of the vote of lack of confidence to destabilize government. It cannot be proposed during the first six months after a government takes office, and if it is moved successfully during the final year of the life of Parliament, it results in dissolution and a new general election rather than a change in government.

The Namaliu government has indicated that it will bring in a constitutional amendment prolonging the initial period of grace enjoyed by a government, and just recently the premiers of the provinces have supported the idea of the first and the last twelve months of a government's life being free from threat of dismissal. Such a reform has a great deal to recommend it, but it shifts to the courts, the press, and the senior bureaucrats the onus of keeping the government within reasonable bounds in using its great powers. Stretching out the period of grace to twelve months seems safe enough. To prolong it much further raises the possibility of a government that is unable to get a majority in Parliament even to pass supply bills to provide the money to keep the government going, yet which cannot be forced out of office, short of Parliament dissolving itself and calling a new election under Section 105C of the constitution.

Another proposal that looks as if it will gather strong support is the reduction of the time between the end of the election and the formation of a new government. In 1987, the lengthy period between the final count (15 July) and the first meeting of Parliament (August 5) permitted a incredible display of seduction, bribing, and coercing of independents and small party groups as the two rival groups led by Mr. Somare and Mr. Wingti tried to assure themselves a majority of Parliamentary votes. Allowing less time for these manoeuvres is no major change, but it may at least decrease the indignity of the present procedure for government formation.

In the Report of the Electoral Commissioner (Electoral Commission 1987b) and in the papers presented at a seminar on elections held earlier this year a number of other possible changes were analyzed. They illustrate the difficulties of remedying deficiencies in a party system by changes in rules and procedures. One scheme, for example, sought to deter members from switching from one party to another by requiring them to face a by-election if they changed. Unfortunately, the likely consequence of such a rule would be to increase yet again the number of candidates who stood as independents in the next national election, thus making themselves immune from this penalty. In 1982, 60 percent of the candidates ran under party labels and they captured 79 percent of the vote. In 1987, only 37 percent of the candidates were endorsed by a party and they received only 59 percent of votes cast (Turner and Hegarty 1987), (nevertheless, they made up 79 per cent of those elected). Any measure that caused a further reduction in party-affiliated candidates would make Papua New Guinea a doubtful candidate for the party government category.

### *A deliberate move away from party government*

But perhaps that is the direction in which Papua New Guinea should go. Perhaps we should stop trying to find ways of changing the political culture of Papua New Guinean villages and of persuading the Papua New Guinean voter to pay attention to parties. Perhaps we should stop trying to show the mass of voters that only by voting along party lines can they exercise any direct influence on who is prime minister, who forms the government, and with what mandate. There are alternatives - and not just the dead ends of military rule, or a single party state, or the rule of 'experts' (technocrats/bureaucrats). One of the most interesting aspects of the analysis of party government in Richard Katz' book (1987) is the suggestion that the presidential/congressional system of the United States really falls outside the definition of party government.

Nowadays the Republican and the Democratic candidates for the

presidency are not really the nominees of their party organizations at all. Rival candidates for the right to represent the party organize their own primary election campaigns and by the time the party conventions come around, there is nothing left for the party delegates or the old party bosses in their smoke-filled rooms to decide. They are committed to follow the primary results. In the words of a well known analyst of American politics, Austin Ranney, "both parties have become little more than passive arenas within which the real political actors - groups committed to particular candidates and particular issue positions - contend for the nominations. The prizes are the two parties' labels, but the parties no longer control who wears them." (cited in Katz 1987)

Once someone has been elected President, whether he bears a Democratic or Republican label, he neither needs nor can count on the support of elected members of the legislature, Congress. He is slightly more likely to have his wishes respected by those in Congress who have the same party label, but he can be sure that normally they will be more interested in the views of their constituents, or those of the powerful interests groups within their states or districts, than in his own views. At any rate, he is sure of being in power for four years unless something perfectly awful, like Watergate, occurs.

In brief, parties remain the means of organizing American politics, but elections are much more a series of competitions among individual candidates, both at the presidential and the congressional levels, than between parties; parties show very little internal coherence; and it is not a political party that gains control of government after an election, but an individual president, along with a collection of highly individualistic congressmen and senators who pay little attention to party discipline.

Let us now try to think about the consequences of bringing such a system into Papua New Guinea. People have worried about government instability and the frequency of votes of no confidence. Perhaps these concerns have been somewhat overstated - five successful votes of no confidence in thirteen years does not have to strike terror in one's heart. But it may be sensible to worry about how long the country can tolerate governments that cannot be made accountable to the electors and which can engage in irresponsible power manoeuvres without an electoral penalty being applied.

In one stroke, a switch to the Presidential system would seem to solve these problems. Government would be stable for the full term of the directly elected president. And the Papua New Guinean elector's desire to choose as his representative to the legislature the person whose leadership qualities made him most likely to bring development to his electorate could be satisfied completely. Parties would still probably be formed to enable joint campaigns to be run - though they would not need to be any more rigid or durable than Mr. Berghuser's 'Group of Independents' - but they could be completely ignored by the voter who was assured of some influence directly on government by his vote for the presidential candidate of his choice. For that decision, the voter would soon learn that an effective vote required him to do more than favour a local favourite son and the notion of accountability, at least after every term of office, could take hold. Elections would still impart legitimacy, but to persons and not to parties.

Before one goes overboard in favour of this option, thought should be given to the experience of the Philippines and of some South American states who have tried this option, with results that chill any first enthusiasm. Nevertheless, it can be argued that a country that has not succeeded in taking parties seriously should be asking itself whether it should try to find ways of retaining democracy while making parties less important. The alternative of



tinkering with rules and incentives may not be a very promising one.

### *The Waiting Game?*

Is there another strategy? Perhaps the waiting game. PNG missed out on liberation as a mobilizing issue that would give people a sense of national consciousness. But there may be other dilemmas in the future that become the basis for organizing people around a single issue or cluster of issues. It might be the case for a high rate of resource development versus the preservation of environment and a PNG identity. Perhaps the development mania makes that a unlikely focus for bipolar politics, but a foreign threat, with options of ceding or resisting, might do the trick.

In sum, one may doubt the virtues of a sudden leap away from the idea of party government, even though it is not easy to think of ways of rooting it firmly in the people's consciousness. Democracies that are not party governments, as in the case of the US or Switzerland, tend to be better at limiting the role of government than at giving the state a popular mandate to act positively. It is doubtful that third world countries can prosper without a large role being played by the state, so one may have grave doubts about a move to the presidential system even if its worked out well.

Papua New Guinea has thus far shown a real capacity to find its own solutions to its problems. One can hope that this capacity to find a way will be used to relate parties, elections and governments more coherently.

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# Survey Evidence on Electoral Behaviour In Papua New Guinea

YAW SAFFU

So far, all Papua New Guinea (PNG) national elections have been studied. A substantial body of apparently empirical propositions on the determinants of electoral behaviour can be compiled from them. Among recurring themes are the overwhelming importance of local factors in candidate evaluation, the corresponding insignificance of party, and the virtual absence of issues in the decision calculus. Generalizations asserting or denying the meaningfulness of the voting act to the participants, and those insisting on or denying linkages between class and electoral choice, are also noticeable.

To provide a systematic collection of empirical evidence on such propositions, the study of the 1987 election, undertaken by the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, UPNG, incorporated a survey of electors. With the help of mostly UPNG students, a total of 1127 electors were interviewed in the National Capital District (NCD) and in all but two of the nineteen provinces. This chapter is a report of the survey evidence regarding propositions which have been quarried from earlier studies on PNG elections.

## *The Pattern of Localized Support*

The most widely observed feature of PNG elections is the phenomenon of localized support for candidates. Localized support is demonstrated by the ability of a candidate to attract virtually 100 per cent of the votes of a locality within the wider constituency, thereby denying his numerous competitors any electoral support within that particular locality. In terms of making a clean sweep of votes in an identifiable locality (or localities) while crashing ignominiously in other localities commandeered by one or the other of his/her rivals, the most successful candidate is often no different from the weakest.

A contributor to the studies on the very first national election highlighted the phenomenon: 'Only in two of the forty-two open electorates, Gumine and Milne Bay, did a candidate have a runaway win spread over the whole electorate...' (Hughes and van der Veur 1965:423). The 'Results' section of the various contributions to the Hegarty book on the 1977 election is replete with illustrations of extremely localized support for candidates. One contributor even offers an index with which to measure the phenomenon (Jackson 1983). In a study of the 1982 election in the Sohe constituency of Oro Province, I argued that to understand electoral behaviour in Oro, this pattern of voting had to be explained (Saffu 1982).

The phenomenon of localized support has come in for all sorts of formulations, as observers and commentators have struggled to identify just what aspects of the political economy and culture appear to lead so inexorably to it. While some formulations are non-committal, most harbour implicit hypotheses on the causes of the phenomenon. There are formulations which suggest that kinship factors, or linguistic solidarity, or the church, or social involvement, or hope of material benefits for the community may be at the basis of localized support. There have even been suggestions that class analysis explains the phenomenon (Donaldson and Good 1983; Stewart 1984).

A major aim of our survey was to try and explain the phenomenon of localized support. What attributes of a candidate account for it? What aspects of the candidate's relationship with a locality are important? To what extent do aspects of the cultural environment, rather than the personal attributes of the candidate (assuming the two are separable and are separated by electors) explain his or her runaway success in the locality? For instance, might the prevalent mode of decision-making over significant issues be a major cause? Might traditional alliance-making be a significant contributory factor?

### *Determinants of Voting Choice*

We asked two identical questions, one referring retrospectively to the 1982 election, the other prospectively to the forthcoming 1987 election. The retrospective question, asked of those who said they had voted in 1982, was: 'What was it that you liked about the candidate you voted for in 1982?' The forward-looking question about voting intentions was: 'What is it that you will look for in the candidate you will be voting for in 1987?'

A list of nine alternative responses, and a tenth omnibus, 'other', category, was offered, with accompanying directives to the interviewers, as follows:

(ALLOW THE RESPONDENT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION IN HIS OR HER OWN WAY. CHECK THE FIRST ANSWER AGAINST THE LIST OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES BELOW. WRITE '1' IN THE MOST APPROPRIATE BOX THEN ASK THE RESPONDENT IF HE OR SHE HAD ANY ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR THE WAY THEY VOTED. WRITE '2' IN THE BOX NEXT TO THE SECOND REASON GIVEN, '3' IN THE BOX NEXT TO THE THIRD REASON, AND SO ON UNTIL THE RESPONDENT RUNS OUT OF REASONS.)

- \_\_\_ 1. We belong to the same community, clan or language group.
- \_\_\_ 2. His/Her group are friends or allies of my group.
- \_\_\_ 3. We belong to the same church or were educated together.
- \_\_\_ 4. We have worked or done business together.
- \_\_\_ 5. He/she has good leadership qualities.

Table 1: Determinants of the Vote in Papua New Guinea

RESPONSE CATEGORIES																		
	No.	%	Rank	No.	%	Rank	No.	%	Rank	No.	%	Rank	No.	%	Rank	No.	%	Rank
1. Good leadership qualities	212	30.7	1	89	16.8	2	56	14.5	3	351	37.3	1	122	16.0	2	59	10.4	4
2. Ability to bring development	137	19.8	2	122	23.1	1	93	24.0	1	175	8.6	2	189	24.8	1	154	26.2	1
3. Primordial	83	12.0	3	16	3.0	7	14	3.6	7	89	9.4	3	21	2.8	7	20	3.4	6
4. Won't desert grassroots	51	7.4	4	85	16.1	3	75	19.4	2	81	8.6	4	119	15.6	3	118	20.1	2
5. High education	35	5.1	5	56	10.6	4	47	12.2	4	81	8.6	4	113	14.8	4	88	15.0	3
6. Party	33	4.8	6	55	10.4	5	35	9.0	5	32	3.4	6	87	11.4	5	57	9.7	5
7. Allies	31	4.5	7	35	6.6	6	13	3.4	8	21	2.2	7	32	4.2	6	14	2.4	8
8. Same school/ church	19	2.7	8	16	3.0	7	7	4.4	6	13	1.4	8	19	2.5	8	16	2.7	9
9. Worked	12	1.7	9	11	2.1	9	5	1.3	9	11	1.2	9	10	1.3	9	7	1.2	9
SUB TOTAL	613	88.7		485	91.7		355	91.8		854	90.7		712	93.5		533	90.7	
10. Other	78	11.3		43	8.1		32	8.3		87	9.2		50	6.6		54	9.2	
TOTAL	691	100		528	99.8		387	100.1		941	99.9		762	100.1		587	99.9	

- \_\_\_ 6. He/she is associated with some good leaders or party members.
- \_\_\_ 7. He/she is highly educated.
- \_\_\_ 8. He/she knows the way to bring business or development here.
- \_\_\_ 9. He/she will not desert us, but will come around and help us.
- \_\_\_ 10. Other (specify).

As the list shows, the categories went from primordial, kinship and linguistic considerations, through traditional socio-political factors, to aspects of secondary association solidarity, and to more personal attributes of the candidate. Table 1 summarizes responses to the two questions.

Table 2: Changing Weights of Determinants (Trends)

Response Categories	1982 Totals		1987 Totals	
	Endorsements		Endorsements	
	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>
1. Personal leadership attributes (Ref: Table 1 Categories 1 + 2 + 4 + 5)	1058	65.87	1650	72.05
2. Secondary solidarity (6 + 8 + 9)	203	12.64	256	11.18
3. Primordial (3 + 7)	192	11.95	197	8.60
4. Other	153	9.53	191	8.34
TOTAL	1606	99.99	2290	100.17

Of 691 respondents who said they had voted in 1982, and who also answered the question what they liked about their candidate, 212 (or 30.7 per cent) gave 'good leadership qualities' as their first answer. One hundred thirty seven respondents (or 19.8 per cent) gave business acumen or ability to bring development to the area as their first answer. The primordial category came only third, endorsed by 83 respondents (or 12.0 per cent) as their first answer. Party, other secondary associations, and traditional socio-political alliances evidently did not count for very much in the voting

calculus. Not one of the three was endorsed by more than 5 per cent of the respondents as a first answer.

The second and third answers, provided by fewer respondents, 528 and 387 respectively, confirmed good leadership and business acumen or ability to bring development to the area as the two most important determinants of the vote. The primordial category was endorsed seventh on both the second and third responses.

The responses with regard to voting intentions in 1987 were consistent with the 1982 ones. Of 941 respondents who said they would vote and who also indicated which factors would be most important for them, 351 (or 37.3 per cent) gave good leadership as their first answer, 175 (or 18.6 per cent) mentioned business acumen and ability to bring development to the area while, as before, the primordial response came third, with 89 (or 9.4 per cent) endorsing it. The endorsement for party, 32 (or 3.4 per cent), and for traditional socio-political concerns, 21 (or 2.2 per cent), were even lower than before.

These findings manifestly do not offer much help in disposing of the first two questions posed above, namely, what attributes of the candidates and what aspects of their relationship with the locality explain localized support. What they allow us to do is confirm propositions concerning the relative unimportance of party. We can also say that primordial factors are not as decisive as conventional wisdom appears to suggest. But the factors which appear to be important, such as perceived good leadership qualities of a candidate, and his or her ability to bring development to the area, are not, in themselves, capable of explaining localized support. Why should virtually all members of a locality, and only they but not others, be able to recognize the special abilities of their preferred candidate?

Might the answer to the puzzle perhaps lie in the way electoral decisions are made in PNG? Several writers have emphasized the importance voters attach to 'seeing the face' of the candidate. Paul Sillitoe, for instance, observed, in his study of the Nipa-Kutubu electorate of Southern Highlands: 'Seeing faces and forming opinions about character were important issues because there was little else on which people could base a rational choice in an electorate where all candidates stood on the same platform' (Sillitoe 1983:205). Sillitoe put forward both a structural and cultural explanation for the electors' evident insistence on judging candidates on the basis of personal knowledge:

People asked themselves, in the best selfish democratic tradition, who would help them most, and having no other yardstick plumped for the nearest man. In this they followed to some extent their traditional acephalous way of doing things where they judge others on the basis of personal knowledge.[Sillitoe 1983:211]

Townsend and Wamma's study of two constituencies in Morobe, at the opposite (eastern) end of the New Guinea 'mainland', also suggested that the kinds of 'judgement' electors make on the suitability or otherwise of candidates require close personal knowledge. They reported that such comments as the following featured on the positive side of candidate evaluation in Finschhafen and Kabwum: 'He does not drink beer; he has come and sat down to talk with us; he has strong family connections; he can speak out strongly.' (Townsend and Wamma 1983:234). The authors concluded: 'Candidates who did well ... all had long periods of presence in the past in the province'(Townsend and Wamma 1983:240). On the basis of

their study, the authors dispensed free advice to future hopefuls: 'maintain a presence in the electorate...'

The final example of the importance which observers and commentators have attached to candidates 'just showing their face' is furnished by Winnett and May, in their study of the Yangoru-Sausia constituency in East Sepik Province. Invoking the testimony of the legendary Tony Voutas, on how he turned Morobe into Pangu territory, Winnett and May pointed to the 'importance of getting around the electorate even if it is just to talk to people and listen to what they have to say' (Winnett and May 1983:270).

But side by side with these findings is the equally widely observed, very marked, reluctance of candidates in PNG to campaign throughout their constituency. The overwhelming proportion of candidates choose, deliberately, to confine their campaign to a particular area of the constituency or to a few clusters of small areas therein. Usually they concentrate their efforts on where they come from, or where their wives come from, or where they believe they have advantage over other candidates because they are known there, having lived or worked there over a period. I was struck by these self-imposed restrictions during my study of the 1982 election in Oro Province. Other observers (Ballard 1983:190; Westermarck 1983:162) have pointed to this self-denying ordinance on the part of election candidates in PNG.

The explanation for this tendency to concentrate attention and efforts on only a small section of the constituency was one of the objectives of a second survey (of candidates) which, unfortunately, had to be abandoned because of the reluctance of candidates to fill out the questionnaire and return. So, at this stage, a set of hypotheses is the best that can be offered. First, the depth and extensiveness of the principle of reciprocity in PNG cultures suggest that candidates believe it is a waste of time and, perhaps, culturally improper also, to try to intrude into the preserve of other candidates. Second, perhaps the lingering influence of the optional preference electoral system, used in the first three national elections, is also at work. Concentrating on one's own little corner and making deals with others for the second and subsequent preferences made sense. Third, parties have failed to implant themselves in the consciousness of electors, primarily because no source of social cleavage, such as class, ethnicity or religion, is deep and pervasive enough to serve as a base for effective party organization. The appearance (or perhaps reality) of a political vacuum created by this failure of parties encourages a *triam lak* mentality, a gambler's mind set, which is part of the explanation for the extremely large number of candidates. Finally, the difficulty of the terrain, the undeveloped nature of road networks, and the high cost of everything, including campaigning, are also part of the explanation.

But interesting as speculating on the causes of the phenomenon of self-imposed restrictive practices by candidates might be, the consequences interest us more. Perhaps the combination of spatial concentration of campaign activities by candidates and the legitimate desire of electors to know the candidate they vote for go far in explaining localized support for candidates? The response category that specifically tried to capture the combined effects of these two phenomena was: 'He/She will not desert us but will come around to help us'. In 1982, fifty-one people (or 7.4 per cent) gave this as their first response; eighty-five (or 16.1 per cent) gave it as their second; while seventy-five (or 19.4 per cent) gave it as their third answer. With respect to voting intentions in 1987, eighty-seven people out of 941 (or 9.2 per cent) gave this as their first response, while it was the second

response for 119 people out of 762 (or 15.1 per cent). One hundred-eighteen respondents out of 587 (or 20.1 per cent) gave this as their third response. The position of this response category was thus fourth on the first response, third on the second response, and second on the third response. In 1987, the respective positions were fourth, third and second, as Table 1 shows.

While such endorsements were not overwhelming, two observations are worth making. First, compared with the specifically primordial category, this response category was endorsed by far more people. Second, an even more important remark to make, I think, is that perceptions of good leadership, the single most important determinant of the vote in PNG, most probably incorporate this response category. A certain notion of social propinquity and non-desertion of grassroots almost certainly, on the evidence of another, unpublished survey, enters into the definition of a good leader in PNG. In many parts of the country, people with university degrees are still very rare. That a candidate's high level of education is not a stronger reason for voting for him or her is perhaps an indication of the importance that people attach to social propinquity and non-desertion of grassroots when evaluating leadership.

Another cultural dimension investigated by the survey was the prevalent mode of decision-making by electors. Implicitly challenging commentators who have claimed that for masses of electors in PNG voting entails no conscious decision-making, (Hughes and van der Veur 1965:401, 414-4; rather inconsistently, Sillitoe 1983) the following question was asked: 'When people around here are trying to decide which candidate they will vote for in a national election, how do they go about it?' We wanted to know what proportion of electors make up their own minds, and what proportion are told what to do by others. If people are told what to do, we wanted to know the source of the command, and whether it was primarily communal and authoritative or private and informal.

Seven hundred five respondents gave both a meaningful and relevant response. Of them, 348 (or 49.7 per cent) indicated that the voting decision was an individual act while 276 respondents (or 39.1 per cent) made it clear that voters are told whom to vote for. Two hundred twenty-one of these (or 31.3 per cent) identified the source of command as primarily communal/authoritative, in the shape of a formal community meeting (18.1 per cent), the clan head (7.5 per cent), the councillor (4.8 per cent), and the church (0.8 per cent). Identifying the source of command as private/informal were 55 respondents (or 7.8 per cent) who said the family head or educated *wantoks* tell people which candidate to vote for.

These figures, indicating the relative amounts of individual and group decision-making in electoral behaviour, do not tell the whole story. Aspects of the voting process in PNG need to be touched on briefly to show how, in rural polling stations, even those individuals who make up their own minds might be constrained to go along with the decision of others who have formal or personal authority over them. In the Highlands (where I observed the 1987 elections) the voting act is invested with a traditional significance which can be compelling. Often voters arrived at polling stations in groups, dressed up in *bilas*, and they would sing and dance around the polling station for some time before voting. While a candidate was not allowed to operate within seven metres of a polling station (admittedly not a very severe restriction) traditional groups representing him or her were quite at liberty to do so. The explanation for an intriguing phenomenon, voters actually shouting the name of their candidate as they dropped the ballot



paper in the box, also reflected the enormous social pressures on rural voters. I was told, when I enquired, that voters wanted their fellow villagers, or the scrutineer of the particular candidate to know they were voting correctly, that is, in accordance with an understood reciprocal obligation.

Even greater pressures on the voter to take the wishes of influential persons in the village into serious account appeared to be built into the voting procedures. First, the so-called village identification tribunal, a panel of village influentials who help the presiding officer to decide whether a person who wants to vote is indeed who he or she claims to be, is given a sort of semi-official status at the polling station. Second, illiterate voters are allowed by the Organic Law on Elections to be accompanied by an educated person of their choice to ensure that the presiding officer marks the appropriate name whispered by them. But what was happening in several polling stations I visited was that an influential educated person from a village would perform this role of witnessing for all the voters from the village. Thus, the vote was not secret. The physical lay-out of the polling stations emphasized this fact. There were no walls or effectively partitioned booths to offer privacy. Everything was done in the open. The scrutineers, and any observer for that matter, by standing at the right place, could see or lip read the choices made by voters. Of course, there are solid advantages in this, from the point of view of avoiding vote rigging. On the other hand, however, the pressures on a voter from a small face-to-face community to conform could be overwhelming in the circumstances.

#### *FURTHER SUPPORTING EVIDENCE*

We have to look further at our data to see what other evidence we need to accommodate. A question was asked to elicit views on what constitute crucial political resources in PNG elections. We asked respondents to account for their stated opinion on the re-election chances of the sitting MP. We asked: 'Do you think the sitting MP will win again or not?' Irrespective of the answer, the follow up question was: 'Why do you say that?' We could have sorted the respondents into 'will win' (320); 'won't win' (285) and 'don't know' (500), in order to find the reasons given by various categories in each group. We did not do so (although obviously that can still be done) because that would have proliferated subsets unduly. Instead, the reason cited as crucial, whether it was for winning, for losing, or for making it impossible for the respondent to predict, was coded the same. For instance, if money was given as the reason why the incumbent MP would win, or why his challenger would win, or why the respondent could not predict, the answer was coded as 'money'.

Poor performance was the single largest specific response category. Two hundred and twenty-nine respondents out of 696 (or 33 per cent) cited it, naturally, as a reason why the sitting MP would lose. If we add those who mentioned projects initiated by the MP ninety-seven or 14 per cent) and experience gained in office (twenty or 2.9 per cent) as reasons why the sitting member would win again, we find that 50 per cent of the respondents in our specific categories cited leadership as the crucial resource for winning elections. Answers referring to primordial factors came to only 68 (or 9.8 per cent). But it must also be said that ethnicity was mentioned indirectly. The major reason why 212 respondents (or 30.4 per cent) could not say whether the incumbent MP would win again or not was because the

large number of candidates was said to be making ethnic arithmetic difficult. The insignificant role of parties, and by extension of policy issues, was once again clear. Only thirty-seven respondents (or 5.3 per cent) mentioned the party or the support of party leaders in explaining their view. And if parties were insignificant for electors, it is a fair assumption that so were policy issues.

What came as a surprise, given the open role of money in PNG politics - the large sums of money that are reportedly spent by candidates, the obvious importance politicians attach to delivering government cheques personally to groups in their constituency, and the citing of bribery of electors in petitions to the Court of Disputed Returns - was the small number of respondents who mentioned money as a crucial resource. Only thirty (or 4.3 per cent) did. Surprising also was the absence of evidence of sympathetic support for the underdog or the new challenger. Such a reaction might have been expected, first, as a possible explanation for the high turnover rate among MPs at elections and, secondly, from the literature that implicitly posited a theory of circulation of elites to explain the acephalous syndrome (but not perhaps the equally ubiquitous 'big-man' syndrome) in traditional PNG (Sahlins 1963, Hogbin 1973, Berndt and Lawrence 1971).

Another question that was expected to elicit responses to throw further light on the determinants of electoral behaviour was the turnout question: the reasons non-voters give for their abstention. Of the 400 respondents who did not vote in 1982, 237 (or 59.2 per cent) gave age ineligibility as their reason, while fifty-six (or 14 per cent) said they had only recently moved into the area and thus either did not feel sufficiently involved in things or did not even know the candidates. Another fifty respondents (or 12.5 per cent) gave self-regarding reasons. The 1987 non-voters were even fewer: 119 respondents. Self-regarding reasons were given by forty-seven respondents (39.5 per cent) while eighteen (or 15.19 per cent) gave change in residency as their reason. Apart from the large underage category in 1982, the noteworthy difference in the response patterns by non-voters in 1982 compared with 1987 was the increase in cynicism in the latter year. Twenty-two respondents (or 18.5 per cent), compared with only nine (or 2.2 per cent) in 1982, gave reasons which suggested that they had lost faith in the system. Once more, the unimportance of parties in the decision calculus was made absolutely clear. Not a single person said they had abstained from voting in 1982 because their own party was either not fielding a candidate or was fielding a poor candidate. In 1987 only two respondents gave this reason.

### *How Meaningful Is The Vote?*

The significance of the act of voting derives from the wider system in which it occurs. In a liberal democracy, to ask about the meaning of elections is to ask, ultimately, about electors' ability to link voting to other concepts and institutions in the system, particularly the legislature, the executive, accountability, and the rule of law. The level of understanding of how the system is supposed to work and, even more important, how it actually works, would thus be a good measure of the meaningfulness of elections. A series of questions was intended to probe electors' level of understanding of the system and also to elicit some evaluation of the performance of representatives chosen through the electoral process.

The first question was: 'If you vote for someone and he/she wins this election and goes off to Moresby, what do you expect him/her to do when they get there?'. Only sixty-seven respondents (or 5.9 per cent) failed to answer that question or said they did not know what MPs are expected to do. Thus, over 94 per cent did have views on what MPs are expected to do. But of these, 833 (or 78.6 per cent) said MPs were expected to fulfil their campaign promises and bring development to the area, while another seventy-six (or 7.2 per cent) expected MPs to help them fix their personal problems. Only seventy-seven respondents (or 7.3 per cent) mentioned any of the following five items: attend parliament; participate in law-making; help to make and unmake governments; support party leaders; liaise with bureaucrats. Thus, there appears to be a very general understanding of the role of MPs as representatives who can bring development projects. But the indication is that not much is known about what MPs do specifically in order to bring these about.

The second question was an invitation to evaluate MPs' performance. Following the answer to the preceding question, we asked: 'Is this how other MPs generally behave?' That is, did respondents think that MPs live up to the expectations of their constituents? Only 355 respondents (or 31.5 per cent) thought so. The rest either did not think so (40.1 per cent), did not know (22.7 per cent) or did not answer (4.9 per cent). Thus, the high level of negative rating of MPs by electors, widely suspected because of the large turnover of MPs at elections, was confirmed. Those who said they did not think MPs live up to expectations were then asked to say what they think MPs actually do, instead of delivering on campaign promises. Of the 561 eligible respondents, 325 (or 57.9 per cent) said MPs look after themselves, 153 (or 27.3 per cent) were in the 'Other' category, while another forty-two respondents (or 7.5 per cent) admitted they did not know what MPs really do. Three specific response categories that would have indicated advanced understanding of the system - that MPs scheme to change governments, that they struggle to become ministers, and that they go on overseas travel sprees - were altogether endorsed by only fourteen respondents (or 2.5 per cent).

The last question on the questionnaire was an attempt to sum up respondents' position on most of the areas of enquiry. The question was: 'All candidates say that they will bring business or bring development to their areas if they are elected. How do you know who is telling the truth and who is lying?' We expected that answers could tell us something about the determinants of electoral choice, about which political resources are held to be crucial, about respondents' knowledge of the system, hence the meaningfulness or otherwise of elections, about electors' level of cynicism, and so on. No responses and inappropriate responses came to seventy-two while another 179 responses were in the omnibus, 'Other', category. Of the remaining 876 classified respondents, 215 (or 24.5 per cent) skeptically said it was impossible to know. At the other extreme, 104 (or 11.9 per cent) cynically said all candidates were lying. In between the two extremes were 282 respondents (or 32.2 per cent) who said they relied on their experience of human behaviour to detect who could be trusted, while another 245 (or 28 per cent) said they used candidates' past achievements as a guide. Thus, once more, we encounter the necessity for personal knowledge of the candidate.

Responses indicating that community or group sponsorship, party endorsement or religious affiliation of candidates would be adequate references all came to the small total of 30 (or 3.4 per cent). The relative irrelevance of party, church and even communal sponsorship, in the

evaluation of candidate reliability and integrity, was made clear. Direct, unmediated, personal assessment of the candidate, rather than cues offered by the company he or she keeps, is evidently what counts with electors.

### *The Social Bases of Electoral Behaviour*

In this section, we want to examine the social bases of electoral behaviour. We want to see the extent of regional variation. We also want to know how seriously class must be taken in the explanation of electoral behaviour in PNG. Are there significant variations in electoral choice and political assessments based on socio-economic status indicators? Is there a gap between elite and mass behaviour in electoral politics? Is there a gender gap? Finally, how significant is the generation gap? The chi-square statistic was used to evaluate the significance of differences observed within the independent variables: sex, age, region, religion, residence and indices of class. Tables 3 to 8 below summarize the findings displayed by some 110 chi-square contingency tables.

The differences observed between male and female responses on the 1982 and 1987 primordial categories, on what MPs really do instead of delivering 'development', and on how voting decisions are made, were not significant at either the 0.05 or 0.01 level. On two categories, secondary association solidarity in 1987 voting intentions and what MPs are expected to do, the difference was significant at 0.05 level, but not at the more conservative 0.01 level. On the remaining five items in the table, differences between male and female were significant. Thus, we might say that about half the time being male or female does make a difference. But there is no clear pattern regarding when, or over what issues, it does in electoral behaviour or opinion.

Table 3: Gender and Politics: Sex By:

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.05	Sig. at 0.01
1982 LEADERSHIP	29.43	1	YES	YES
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	11.65	1	YES	YES
82 PRIMORDIAL	0.05	1	NO	NO
1987 LEADERSHIP	12.87	1	YES	YES
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	4.35	1	YES	NO
87 PRIMORDIAL	0.52	1	NO	NO
RESOURCE	22.75	8	YES	YES
VOTING DECISION	14.64	9	NO	NO
MPS JOB	19.14	7	YES	NO
REAL JOB	5.68	7	NO	NO
SUM UP	18.78	7	YES	YES

Table 4: The Generation Gap: Age By:

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.05	Sig. at 0.01
1982 LEADERSHIP	206.18	4	YES	YES
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	24.85	4	YES	YES
82 PRIMORDIAL	32.56	4	YES	YES
1987 LEADERSHIP	47.50	4	YES	YES
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	4.97	4	NO	NO
87 PRIMORDIAL	5.41	4	NO	NO
RESOURCE	30.86	32	NO	NO
VOTE DECISION	39.99	32	NO	NO
MPS JOB	60.52	36	YES	YES
REAL JOB	27.56	28	NO	NO
SUM UP	40.02	28	NO	NO

According to Table 4, age matters on five counts, but not on six. The significant differences appear mostly in electoral behaviour but not so much in knowledge and evaluation of the system.

Differences between urban and rural residents are even less significant for politics than sex or age differences. Only three differences, two on 1987 voting intentions and one on overall evaluation of candidates, on leadership in the 1987 voting intentions, on opinions on political resources and decision-making in voting, were significant at both levels. A fourth difference, over what MPS are expected to do, was significant at 0.05 but not at 0.01.

Table 5: Residence and Politics: Urban/Village By:

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.05	Sig. at 0.01
1982 LEADERSHIP	0.93	2	NO	NO
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	0.42	2	NO	NO
82 PRIMORDIAL	4.31	2	NO	NO
1987 LEADERSHIP	9.90	2	YES	YES
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	1.23	2	NO	NO
87 PRIMORDIAL	13.31	2	YES	YES
RESOURCE	26.17	16	NO	NO
VOTE DECISION	14.02	16	NO	NO
MPS JOB	33.85	18	YES	NO
REAL JOB	11.44	12	NO	NO
SUM UP	41.19	14	YES	YES

Table 6: Regional Variation: Resident Region By:

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.05	Sig. at 0.01
1982 LEADERSHIP	15.57	5	YES	YES
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	6.74	5	NO	NO
82 PRIMORDIAL	45.83	5	YES	YES
1987 LEADERSHIP	28.73	5	YES	YES
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	10.14	5	NO	NO
87 PRIMORDIAL	41.47	5	YES	YES
RESOURCE	139.91	40	YES	YES
VOTING DECISION	119.15	40	YES	YES
MPS JOB	194.89	45	YES	YES
REAL JOB	50.16	35	YES	NO
SUM UP	131.13	35	YES	YES

Table 6A: Home Region By:

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.05	Sig. at 0.01
1982 LEADERSHIP	10.15	5	NO	NO
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	3.85	5	NO	NO
82 PRIMORDIAL	52.56	5	YES	YES
1987 LEADERSHIP	6.08	5	NO	NO
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	5.35	5	NO	NO
87 PRIMORDIAL	39.57	5	YES	YES
RESOURCE	99.33	40	YES	YES
VOTING DECISION	87.39	40	YES	YES
MPS JOB	187.08	45	YES	YES
REAL JOB	176.41	35	YES	YES
SUM UP	85.08	35	YES	YES

There were only two differences in the Resident Region Table which were not significant. Both had to do with the role of secondary association solidarity as a determinant of electoral choice. All the remaining nine differences were significant, although one of them, views on what MPs actually do, was significant only at the 0.05 level. The companion table on regional variation, Table 6A, was not as clear cut. Seven differences were significant, four were not. All four insignificant differences were in the area of electoral behaviour, while the significant differences were in the area of knowledge and evaluation of the system.

Table 7: Religion and Politics: Church By:

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.05	Sig. at 0.01
1982 LEADERSHIP	25.19	6	YES	YES
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	11.89	6	NO	NO
82 PRIMORDIAL	11.23	6	NO	NO
1987 LEADERSHIP	14.27	6	YES	NO
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	20.92	6	YES	YES
87 PRIMORDIAL	49.05	6	YES	YES
RESOURCE	79.54	48	YES	YES
VOTING DECISION	110.41	48	YES	YES
MPS JOB	69.04	54	NO	NO
REAL JOB	69.98	42	YES	YES
SUM UP	41.73	42	NO	NO

Table 7A: Religiousness

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.05	Sig. at 0.01
1982 LEADERSHIP	27.45	2	YES	YES
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	2.06	2	NO	NO
82 PRIMORDIAL	3.37	2	NO	NO
1987 LEADERSHIP	10.24	2	YES	YES
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	3.61	2	NO	NO
87 PRIMORDIAL	1.59	2	NO	NO
RESOURCE	10.42	16	NO	NO
VOTE DECISION	20.67	16	NO	NO
MPS JOB	18.89	18	NO	NO
REAL JOB	17.15	14	NO	NO
SUM UP	21.65	14	NO	NO

Religiousness, measured by how often respondents went to church, turned out to be the least discriminating causal variable. There were two significant differences, both to do with leadership as a determinant of electoral choice, while nine differences were insignificant. Religious affiliation was more predictive, with five of the eleven differences being significant.

Table 8: Class and Politics: Education By:

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.05	Sig. at 0.01
1982 LEADERSHIP	39.59	2	YES	YES
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	0.02	2	NO	NO
82 PRIMORDIAL	26.13	2	YES	YES
1987 LEADERSHIP	2.04	2	NO	NO
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	7.65	2	YES	YES
87 PRIMORDIAL	15.34	2	YES	YES
RESOURCE	26.20	16	NO	NO
VOTE DECISION	42.87	10	YES	YES
MPS JOB	41.69	18	YES	YES
REAL JOB	31.90	14	YES	YES
SUM UP	9.34	14	NO	NO

Table 8A: Occupation By:

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.05	Sig. at 0.01
1982 LEADERSHIP	54.25	8	YES	YES
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	25.93	8	YES	YES
82 PRIMORDIAL	24.51	8	YES	YES
1987 LEADERSHIP	13.32	8	NO	NO
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	14.30	8	NO	NO
87 PRIMORDIAL	14.67	8	NO	NO
RESOURCE	13.48	9	NO	NO
VOTE DECISION	9.95	6	NO	NO
MPS JOB	22.47	9	YES	YES
REAL JOB	12.31y	6	NO	NO
SUM UP	22.46	12	YES	NO



Table 8B: Income By:

Category	Value	Degree of Freedom	Sig. at 0.01	Sig. at 0.05
1982 LEADERSHIP	16.13	4	YES	YES
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY	22.09	4	YES	YES
82 PRIMORDIAL	13.96	4	YES	YES
1987 LEADERSHIP	2.25	4	NO	NO
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY	13.30	4	YES	YES
87 PRIMORDIAL	16.00	4	YES	YES
RESOURCE	41.98	32	NO	NO
VOTE DECISION	31.93	32	NO	NO
MPS JOB	59.55	36	YES	YES
REAL JOB	65.75	28	YES	YES
SUM UP	34.12	28	NO	NO

Finally, the socio-economic-status indicators show that class does not divide as clearly as class analysts of PNG electoral politics assume. Occupation makes the least difference, with only four differences out of eleven being significant. Both education and income differences are significant in seven out of eleven cases. Once more, it is difficult to see any pattern in the tables.

### CONCLUSIONS

Some conclusions emerge from our findings. First, monocausal explanations of the vote in PNG are definitely wrong, and none more so than those that put forward kinship or linguistic factors. Second, personal attributes of candidates, their perceived leadership qualities and ability to bring development to the area, both assessed personally at close quarters by electors, are the most significant explanatory variables. Third, as Table 2 makes clear, the explanatory capacity of personal attribute variables appears to be increasing at the expense of both primordial factors and secondary association variables.

If all the foregoing diverse bases of candidate evaluation result in patterns of localized support for candidates, then other factors must be at play. Political parties cannot account for it. They clearly do not count with electors. We have found some help in the prevalent mode of decision-making by electors and also in the spatially confined nature of election campaigns. The sorts of pressures operating on rural voters to conform to communal choices, if and when these are made, also need to be taken into account.

Finally, the social bases of PNG politics are presented in tables 3 to 8. Flux and fluidity are perhaps the only firm conclusions to emerge from the tables.

Opinions and behaviour are not settled and no clear patterns in the influence of the independent variables emerge. There is no elite - mass distinction to speak of. Class does not show up clearly in political opinion or behaviour. The urban-village dichotomy, difficult to demarcate in

practice in any case, leads to no discernible differences in politics. Neither does sex, age, religion or religiousness. Even the region of origin does not correspond very much to observed differences in politics. Only the region of residence appears to lead to significant political differences. Analysis of the direction of differences, to determine the rank of regions on opinions and behaviour, and a repeat of the survey, say two elections hence, may be worth doing for whatever further illumination they might throw on the insignificance of social cleavages for politics in PNG.

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The 1986 Scope and Methods of Political Science class pretested the questionnaire in the Bereina area of the Central Province in September. Between December 1986 and June 1987, UPNG students administered the questionnaires. In December 1986/January 1987, students who had been selected from among volunteers, administered the questionnaire in their home area. In April 1987, students on field work for the Decentralization course also administered questionnaires. In June, fourteen students were sent to provinces which had either not been adequately sampled or where a senior researcher/contributor of a chapter needed a student assistant. Alexander Wanek interviewed the Manus sample. Only Gulf and West New Britain escaped our determined efforts.

Great thanks go to the following students who administered questionnaires in the provinces indicated after their names. The asterisked students were with the project from start to finish.

- |                   |                      |
|-------------------|----------------------|
| * Daniel Aloï     | (NCD)                |
| Lundutta Betoma   | (Enga)               |
| Herman Burego     | (NCD)                |
| Kobule Dagaun     | (Milne Bay)          |
| Murphy Dagaun     | (Madang)             |
| Adam Delaney      | (East New Britain)   |
| Gedare Dorke      | (Western Province)   |
| * Terence Frawley | (Milne Bay and NCD)  |
| Dorothy Kaputin   | (NCD)                |
| Samuel Kawona     | (North Solomons)     |
| Anthony Kifan     | (West Sepik)         |
| John Kilkai       | (NCD)                |
| Cyprian Lasalo    | (Central)            |
| * Michael Lucas   | (East Sepik and NCD) |
| * Alphonse Malipu | (Enga and NCD)       |
| Alfred Mauyat     | (NCD)                |
| Michael Mission   | (NCD)                |
| Manuel Mungu      | (Morobe)             |
| Paulias Nukuve    | (NCD)                |

Henry Okole	(East New Britain)
Kome Pakau	Western Highlands)
Thomas Pupun	(Enga)
Yawi Rapi	(Southern Highlands)
Sam Rena	(Southern Highlands)
Chiki Samson	(Milne Bay and Northern)
Glen Tauliso	(Milne Bay)
Samson Tili	(Milne Bay and NCD)
Andrew Tumbu	(Southern Highlands)
Melchior Uma	(East Sepik)
* Felix Umari	(New Ireland and NCD)
Aso Alu Uvire	(Eastern Highlands)

Funds for travel and living expenses for students were contributed by the International Development Research Centre. This help is gratefully acknowledged.

The sampling strategy we followed is reproduced here as Appendix 1.

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## APPENDIX A

### ELECTION STUDY 1987

#### Survey of Electors

#### *Sampling Strategy*

*Please follow the following steps to select your sample.*

#### *A: In the Village*

1. Label all the houses in the village.  
A      B      C      D      etc., etc.
2. Write the labels on pieces of paper, cut out and crumple so that you can select the number of houses you want by the lottery method.
3. After shaking the pieces of paper in a suitable container (eg. a large envelope; a hat) pick out the number of houses you want in the village. The houses have been selected randomly.
4. The next step will be determined by how much time you have. If time is on your side, go to each of the selected houses, explain your mission and obtain the names of all adults who live there.
5. List all the adults on equal pieces of paper, crumple, shuffle, shake, as before, and draw out *one* name from the lot and then go back and interview the person selected.

6. If the person is not available after a couple of visits to interview him/her, or if he/she refuses to be interviewed, find out a few details about the person, eg. age, level of education, religion, and then try to find somebody else who seems to fit the description of the original sample member and then substitute this person for the original.
7. After step 3, if time is not on your side, then take the following steps, instead of steps 4-6.  

In the first house drawn from the container, ask for the oldest male inhabitant; in the second, the oldest female inhabitant; in the third house, the youngest (but above 18) male; in the fourth house, the youngest female, and so on.
8. As before, if you encounter non-response, substitute by drawing lots again, and follow the pattern. That is to say that if the non-response was encountered at house No.2, then in the substitute house, it is the oldest female inhabitant we will seek out.

*B. In Larger Towns*

1. First, draw a rough diagram of the town and divide the diagram into any number of sections, say 10, 20, 25, etc., and name them.
2. Cut up the diagram according to the number of sections you have, and crumple the pieces of paper so that once more you can select two or three sections from the container.
3. Depending on the number of people you want from the town, you may decide to select two or three from each section.
4. Before you set out to the sections of town to select your sample, settle on a number 3, 5, 6, 9, whatever, and say that you will start from the third house, or fifth house, or sixth house that you encounter in the particular section and then every third or fifth or sixth house after that.
5. To determine who to interview in each of the sampled houses, please follow the directions in step 7 above.
6. If a section selected happens to be an office/commercial area, follow 4 and 6, or 7, except that, instead of the oldest male, female etc, you will have to determine respondents by *position*. Thus, for example, in the first office, the third national in the office hierarchy, in the second, the most junior or the most recently hired national, provided he/she is above 18; in the third the top boss, etc. etc. Be consistent in following the pattern adopted.

*C. In General*

1. Please follow the instructions. If you have to substitute, do so either through a further random sampling or by closely matching the original sample member who failed to cooperate.
2. Avoid having more than 10 people sampled from one village or from one suburb of a town.

**APPENDIX B**  
**Characteristics of the Sample**  
**Total: 1127**

Variable	Categories	Frequency	Per cent
1. Sex	Male	753	66.8
	female	363	32.2
2. Age	Under 20	111	9.8
	20-29	439	38.9
	30-39	313	27.8
	40-49	169	27.8
	Over 50	86	7.6
3. Province of Interview	Papua	227	20.1
	Highlands	265	23.5
	Island	164	14.5
	Mamose	234	20.8
	NCD	235	20.8
4. Home province	Papua	376	33.4
	Highlands	314	27.9
	Island	179	15.9
	Mamose	246	21.8
	NCD	9	0.8
5. Reside	Urban	499	44.3
	Rural	476	42.2
	Equally	46	4.1
6. Education	0-6 years	608	53.9
	7-10	380	33.7
	Over 11	120	10.6

*(continued next page)*

Variable	Categories	Frequency	Per cent
7. Wage	Yes	484	42.9
	No	572	50.8
	Sometimes	47	4.2
8. Occupation	Top professional/ managerial	50	4.4
	Cash farmer	71	4.5
	Supervisory	51	4.5
	Artisan/clerical	303	26.9
	Manual/casual	203	18.0
	Subsistence	220	19.5
	Never worked	96	8.5
9. Income (per fortnight)	0-49 Kina	482	42.8
	50-99	154	13.7
	100-199	283	25.1
	200-299	60	5.3
	Over 300	58	5.1
10. Church	United	298	26.4
	Catholic	310	27.5
	Lutheran	172	15.3
	SDA	65	5.8
	Anglican	110	9.8
	None	24	2.1
	Other	140	12.4

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# **ELECTION LAW OF PNG AND THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION**

**BERNARD WIJEWEERA**

Elections to the National Parliament were ordered by the Governor-General through the issue of a statutory writ dated 27 March 1987, which fixed 15 July 1987 as the date for the return of the new members. Accordingly, nominations of candidates were entertained until 27 April 1987. Polling took place between 13 June and 4 July; in some urban electorates polling lasted only a few days whilst in remote inaccessible ones longer periods of polling were permitted. Counting of votes of all electorates commenced simultaneously in the evening of 4 July and proceeded continuously to a finish, with appropriate stoppages for the resting of counting staff, in what is believed to be the most protracted counting operation in a general election in PNG. By 14 July 1987, counting in all of the contested electorates had been completed. Finally, one hundred and six new members were returned to Parliament. In three open electorates (Mendi, Hagen and Kundiawa), polling had to be postponed and new dates fixed when a candidate in each of them died before the close of poll.

This chapter examines, firstly, the relevant law relating to the conduct of general elections for the National Parliament and, secondly, the various operational stages in the conduct of the election.

## ***THE ELECTION LAW***

### ***Constitutional Provisions***

The main constitutional provisions are those included in sections 12, 105, 125 and 126 of the Constitution of Papua New Guinea (CPNG). These sections have to be read along with section 50 of the CPNG which enshrines the right of a citizen to vote and stand for election. Collectively, these sections of the CPNG provide for elections to be conducted by an Electoral Commission in accordance with an Organic Law, in electorates pre-delineated by a Boundaries Commission. The composition, powers and functions of the two Commissions are to be prescribed by an Organic Law. In particular, an



Organic Law must regulate the electoral system and the procedures for the conduct of elections.

### *The Organic Law on National Elections (OLNE)*

This Organic Law, passed by Parliament in accordance with section 12 of the CPNG, sets up the electoral system for the conduct of elections to the National Parliament. It provides for the establishment of the Electoral Commission, with the 'prime function' of organizing and conducting all elections for the Parliament, and a Boundaries Commission for purposes of demarcating electorate boundaries. Specifically, the OLNE deals with administration, electorates, polling places, electoral rolls, qualifications and disqualifications for enrolment, nominations, ballot papers, voting, postal voting, counting of votes and a miscellany of procedural matters incidental and consequential to the conduct of elections.

### *Electoral Regulations*

Section 243 of the OLNE provides for the promulgation of Regulations by the Head of State, acting on the advice of the National Executive Council (Cabinet of Ministers), on all matters that by law are required to be prescribed. Principally, these relate to the various statutory forms and notices that are to be used in the course of the elections. Three such regulations were operative at the time of the elections: Electoral Regulation 1977, Electoral (Marking of Voters) Regulation 1982 and Electoral (Amendment) Regulation 1986.

## *THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE ELECTIONS*

### *The Preliminaries*

The demarcation of electoral boundaries and the compilation of the national roll of eligible voters constitute the important preliminaries that precede an election.

### *The Electoral Boundaries*

Section 125 of the CPNG stipulates that the number of open electorates and of provincial electorates and their boundaries shall be determined by Parliament in accordance with recommendations from the Boundaries Commission and that such determination shall be at intervals of not more than ten years. The first such exercise was done in preparation for the General Elections of 1977. Thereafter, in 1981, the Boundaries Commission did a delimitation exercise in preparation for the General Elections of 1982. The Commission's recommendations for delimitation were ultimately rejected by Parliament and, thus, the 1982 General Elections were based on the electoral boundaries demarcated in 1977. In so rejecting the Commission's recommendations, Parliament was acting in accordance with section 125(3) of the CPNG which conferred on Parliament the power either to accept or reject any recommendation of the Boundaries Commission; each such acceptance or rejection constituting a fresh determination by Parliament.

In anticipation of the 1987 General Elections, the Boundaries Commission prepared a review programme for the latter part of 1985. However, it was handicapped in its effort by the absence of two members that should have been nominated to the Commission by Parliament. It is to be noted that in terms of section 25 of the OLNE, the Commission is formed of three ex-officio members (Electoral Commissioner who shall serve as Chairman, Surveyor-General, Government Statistician) and two other persons appointed by a resolution of Parliament. In spite of these vacancies, and since three members formed a quorum, the Commission proceeded with its review of electoral boundaries during the period September-December 1985, visiting provinces and consulting interested parties. The final recommendations were held in abeyance, awaiting the eventual appointment of Parliament's nominees. Parliament finally made its appointments in March 1986 and, in early June 1986, the full Boundaries Commission met for the first time to take stock of what had transpired up to then. At this meeting the members decided to postpone all activities until after the 1987 General Elections. Certainly, a charged pre-election atmosphere was not the most conducive to Parliamentary debate on a delimitation of electoral boundaries.

The upshot of all this was that the 1987 General Elections too were based on the 1977 electoral boundaries. There were twenty provincial electorates mandated by section 33 of the OLNE and eighty nine open electorates determined by Parliament, bringing the total to one hundred and nine electorates. A list of these electorates is provided in Appendix 1.

The failure to revise the electoral boundaries, first demarcated in 1977, raises some important issues in relation to the principle of equality of representation which is enshrined as a guiding principle in sections 125(2) of the CPNG. Section 35 of the OLNE further modifies this principle by permitting a plus or minus twenty per cent deviation from the norm of strict equality. However, without a proper delimitation exercise it is difficult to say, today, whether the electorates conform to the equality principle even after allowing for the permissible limits. Demographic evidence tends to present a different view of the matter.

The electoral boundaries, demarcated in 1977, were based on the figures enumerated in the population census of 1971. The next population census was in 1980. Though the populations in all provinces, as shown in Appendix 2, increased in between the two censuses, the rate of increase was not uniform. The National Capital District and the provinces of North Solomons and West New Britain registered high increases (35 per cent or more) whereas provinces such as Western, Manus, Gulf and Simbu registered low increases (11 per cent or less). Thus, it should be clear that a demarcation of electoral boundaries that is based on the 1971 census is procedurally incorrect. Furthermore, this also means that provinces which have registered high rates of population increase since 1971 are under-represented in Parliament in comparison to those that have registered low rates of population increase.

One feature of the demarcation of electoral boundaries needs special comment. For political and administrative purposes the country is divided territorially into nineteen provinces and the district of the national capital. The CPNG (section 125) and section 33 of the OLNE prescribe that each such division as a whole shall constitute an electorate (called provincial electorate) for purposes of electing representatives to Parliament. In addition, each provincial electorate is to be carved up into smaller electorates (called open electorates) in such manner as may be reasonably practicable 'to ensure that all open electorates contain approximately the same population' [section 125(2)

of the CPNG]. Thus, as a mathematical proposition, it should be evident that this system of delimitation of electoral boundaries favours the less populous provinces, because irrespective of its population each province is entitled to one 'bonus' provincial seat. The distortion of the principle of equality of representation becomes marked when as shown below one compares the more populous provinces with those which are sparsely populated.

Province	Population Census '80	No. of Voters 1987 Roll	No. of Seats Parliament	Av. Pop /Seat	Vote /Seat
Morobe	305,356	152,323	10	30,536	15,232
Manus	25,859	14,039	02	12,930	7,020
Gulf	63,843	29,923	03	21,281	9,974
E.H'lands	274,608	182,181	09	30,512	20,242

Sources: *1980 Census Report*. National Statistical Office, 1983. *National Elections 1987* Electoral Commission, 1987.

The delimitation system becomes most anomalous in Manus province. Unlike the other provinces, it is not divided up into smaller electorates because its population is very small. Thus, the Manus Provincial electorate boundaries and those of the Manus Open electorate coincide, making the two electorates one territorial unit. And, the same set of voters through one ballot paper elect a provincial member and through another ballot paper an open member. Two members represent the same electorate in Parliament though they are separately identified as Manus Provincial and Manus Open; a situation that is not found elsewhere in the country.

Notwithstanding the distortion of the principle of equality of representation, it is worth considering whether the other provincial electorates (i.e. excluding Manus) serve a useful political purpose. It could be said that provincial electorates force candidates contesting them to transcend narrow, localized tribal and clan loyalties in reaching out for support in a larger territorial unit. It may be possible to win an Open electorate purely on the basis of clan support, but not so a Provincial electorate. In fact, a number of politicians who have gained national prominence have been elected in the past through provincial electorates. If this hypothesis is correct, then the provincial electorate may be a useful device for facilitating a national cohesion that rises above tribal and clan cleavages.

### *Registration of Eligible Voters*

Section 50 of the CPNG recognizes, subject to certain provisos, a fundamental right of every citizen who is of full capacity and has reached voting age to vote at elections. Section 56 on the OLN imposes an obligation on every citizen so entitled to have his name placed on the Electoral Roll by making a claim in the prescribed manner. The qualification for such a claim is continuous residence for a period of not less than six months in an electorate (section 54 of the OLN), with the right, and also an obligation, to seek a transfer of enrolment in the event of a change of residence. Failure to enrol in an electorate (or to seek a transfer of enrolment in the event of a change of residence) is an offence punishable, upon conviction, by a fine. Nobody, so far, has been taken to court on this ground.

The preparation of a reliable Electoral Roll is a matter that has eluded successive electoral officers working in the provinces; so much so that it has elicited an official admission that the roll used for the 1982 elections 'contained grossly inflated figures' (*Report on the 1987 National Election*, p.10). A few examples given below should bear out this statement.

Both the enrolment/population ratio and the actual votes cast at the 1982 elections indicate that the enrolment figures were unrealistic. It would be a freakish demographic pattern that would have 90 per cent of its population over the age of eighteen (voting age specified in section 126 of CPNG). The classic case, however, was Simbu Province where the numbers enrolled at the 1982 elections exceeded the total population enumerated at the 1980 Census.

Provincial Electorate	Enrolment 1982 (1000s)	Population '80 Census (1000s)	Enrolment/ Population Ratio	Votes Cast as % of Enrolment
Morobe	271	305	89%	35%
Gulf	60	64	94%	39%
N.Ireland	60	66	91%	42%

Sources: 1980 Population Census, National Statistical Office. 1982 *National Elections Voting Statistics*, Electoral Commission.

A concerted attempt was made in 1987 to update the common roll as accurately as possible. Wide publicity was given and citizens were exhorted to 'enrol now and be ready to vote'. Provincial electoral officers were enjoined to enumerate eligible voters by organizing mobile teams to visit individual villages. The task was completed on schedule, a minor hitch being that a few provinces reported a reluctance on the part of some voters to enrol. The reasons for this refusal are not very clear, though in one place lack of development in the area and false promises by candidates were offered as the reasons (*Minutes and Papers of Provincial Electoral Officers' Conference*, September 1986: 97,99,118,128). Nevertheless, the total enrolment figure of 1,872,823 for the 1987 elections compares favourably with the inflated figure of 2,319,287 arrived at during the 1982 elections. It also compares favourably with the estimated figure of 1,745,600, provided by the National Statistician as the citizen population over eighteen years of age in mid-1987.

There are, however, certain practical problems which make the enrolment exercise a difficult one. Though section 56 of the OLN makes enrolment compulsory and non-compliance an offence punishable by a fine, it is simply impracticable to bring thousands of offenders before the courts. Also, although the Law puts the onus on the voter to enrol, in practice the accuracy of rolls depends on enumeration exercises conducted by electoral officials. In remote inaccessible areas it is difficult to conduct such exercises with a high degree of accuracy. Moreover, an erroneous view has gained currency that it not necessary to enrol because, in any event, an eligible voter can exercise his right to vote at the election under the special provisions of section 141 of the OLN. The exact circumstances in which section 141 can be invoked will be discussed later, but for the present it must be emphasized that this view, though erroneous, has compounded the problem and together with the other difficulties has reduced compulsory enrolment to a provision without any teeth.

There would be a greater compulsion to register if only those enrolled were given the right to vote. In fact, in such an event, the prospective candidates and political parties would be galvanized into mobilizing their supporters to get their names on the roll. However, this is a step that has to be taken with extreme caution, because then the right to vote becomes a matter of implicit faith in the accuracy of the electoral roll. And, experience has demonstrated that such faith may be misplaced.

## *THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS*

### *The Nominations*

The elections proper began with the issue of a writ on 27 March 1987 under the hand of the Governor-General as provided for in section 105 of the CPNG and section 72 of the OLN. The writ fixed the polling period and the date by which the new members were to be returned. At the same time, under section 74 of the OLN, the date on which nominations were to close was also fixed. The relevant dates fixed for the 1987 elections were as follows:

Close of Nominations	27 April 1987
Start of Polling	13 June 1987
End of Polling	04 July 1987
Return of Writs	15 July 1987

According to sections 85 and 91 of the OLN nominations may be made at any time after the issue of the writ and before 12 noon of the date of closing of nominations. There are stringent qualifications that apply to candidates. No candidate can be nominated for more than one electorate (section 83 of OLN). A candidate should not be less than twenty-five years of age on the date of return of writs and must have been born in the electorate for which he intends to nominate or have resided in the electorate for a continuous period of two years immediately preceding the nomination or for a period of five years at any time before the nomination (section 103 of CPNG). A candidate has to deposit the prescribed fee and furnish a statutory declaration in terms of section 86 of the OLN to the effect that he is qualified to be elected as a Member of Parliament. No obligation is cast on the Returning Officer to inquire into the veracity of the declaration so furnished. That is a matter for courts to adjudicate upon an application.

A total of 1515 candidates nominated for the one hundred and nine electorates. This follows an increasing pattern that has been observed since elections to Parliament began in 1977.

Election Year	No. of Electorates	No. of Candidates
1977	109	879
1982	109	112
1987	109	1515

Source: Electoral Commission.

Of greater interest were the numbers of candidates (shown below) contesting the various seats.

No. of Candidates	No. of Electorates
01 - 05	08
06 - 10	30
11 - 20	56
21 - 30	12
31 - 40	02
41 - 50	01
Total	109

Sources: 1987 National Elections Voting Statistics, Electoral Commission.

About 50 per cent of the seats had candidate numbers ranging from eleven to twenty and 65 per cent of the seats were contested by more than ten candidates.

The political party line-up of the candidates was as follows:

Party	No. of Candidates
National Settlement Party	01
Leiba Party	02
Country Party	10
Morobe Independent Group	10
Papua Besena	10
Papua Party	17
Wantok Party	21
United Party	24
People's Action Party	34
Melanesian Alliance	43
League for National Advancement	52
National Party	55
People's Democratic Movement	73
People's Progress Party	88
Pangu Party	101
Independents	974
Total	1515

Source: 1987 National Elections Voting Statistics, Electoral Commission.

It will be observed that about two-thirds of the candidates were independents unaligned to any political party.

### *The Ballot Papers*

With such large numbers standing for elections, devising a suitable ballot paper was a matter that presented some difficulty. Hitherto, in general elections to Parliament, ballot papers prescribed in Form 18 of Electoral

Regulation, 1977 had been used. This provided for the name of the candidate and a box opposite each name for marking the vote. Obviously, this called for a high rate of literacy in the electorate and experience had shown that many voters needed assistance to mark their vote.

Another feature of Form 18 of Electoral Regulation, 1977 was the lack of party identification of candidates. All candidates, whether sponsored by political parties or standing as independents, were presented by name and a voter was hard put to ascertain the party affiliation of candidates. Naturally, political parties would have preferred a system in which the party attachments were made clear to the voter.

For these reasons, the format of the ballot paper was changed prior to the elections, by means of Electoral (Amendment) Regulation, 1986. This Regulation vested in the Electoral Commissioner the discretionary power to use photographs on ballot papers and, when so used, provided for the photographs of the candidate and the parliamentary leader of his/her political party to be shown on the ballot paper. In the case of independent candidates and those whose party affiliations were not clear, the cage provided for the party leader was to be left blank.

These changes to the ballot paper received the general support of the major political parties and wide publicity was given to them through the media. In the publicity campaign one item of controversy flared up. It centred around a short documentary video, prepared by a private advertising firm on behalf of the Electoral Commission, which explained the new format of the ballot paper and how to cast one's vote correctly. The documentary began with a short introduction by the incumbent Prime Minister and, as might have been expected, the opposition political parties took exception to this (and the background visual images of this introduction) as an act of political partisanship. Notwithstanding this objection, teams arranged by the Electoral Commission, with TV equipment and generators, toured the country showing the video in as many villages and towns as possible, all at state expense. Apart from this sour note, the publicity campaign was well managed and did serve the purpose of explaining an important innovation to the manner of voting.

One side effect of the new ballot paper needs some comment. The use of photographs on ballot papers was not a matter that was entirely new to elections in this country, though this was the first time this procedure was used in a general election to Parliament. Provision was there under Electoral Regulation, 1977 to have photographs of candidates only, and this provision had been used in some by-elections; but the provision was to be used only on occasions where the number of candidates did not exceed fifteen. Obviously, the size of the ballot paper was a major consideration in placing an upper limit on the number of candidates. With this restriction removed by Electoral (Amendment) Regulation, 1986 and the number of candidates in electorates being what it was, the ballot paper assumed immense proportions. Electorates that had a large number of candidates required a ballot paper that was about seventeen inches long each way and, in most electorates, both sides (front and reverse) of the ballot paper had to be used to save space. One of the original objectives in revising the format of the ballot paper, namely that of presenting an illiterate voter with a clear and simple choice, was lost in the resulting clumsiness of the ballot paper. The impact that the size of the ballot paper had on the process of counting of votes will be commented on later. For the moment, suffice it to say that a simple, uncomplicated and functional ballot paper is a matter of serious consideration for reform. The above comment should not detract from the efficient and thorough manner in which

the ballot papers were prepared, well in time. Only about six weeks were available for the preparation, collection of photographs of about one thousand five hundred candidates, printing and distribution of ballot papers to the respective Returning Officers. About five million ballot papers had to be made ready before polling commenced. It was a difficult feat which, duly accomplished, brought credit to the administrative capacity of the public service.

### *Polling and Voter Turnout*

By far, the most difficult operation in the election process is the provision of necessary facilities for polling. Such are the terrain and the difficulties of access to remote villages that providing the opportunity to every voter for exercising his right to vote is an extremely difficult task. To overcome some of these difficulties, the election procedure provides for extended days of voting and for mobile polling teams to visit selected locations on announced dates. Small villages were covered in one day whereas bigger villages were afforded more time. In urban centres, the polling teams were stationary and the voters were given sufficient time to come and cast their votes. In all, over eight thousand officials were engaged on polling duty, most of them public servants though a number had to be recruited for such purpose from outside the public service. All this required training, instruction and detailed preparation. Not the least in importance was the maintenance of adequate security, law and order. It has already been noted that about 1.8 million voters had been enrolled. Assuming that each voter will cast two votes, one for the provincial seat and another for an open seat, the total of votes cast for the provincial seats should indicate the voter turnout. The number of formal votes cast for the twenty provincial seats was 1,367,152 pointing to a voter turnout of about 73 per cent. This figure has to be qualified by the number of voters who cast ballot papers that were rejected (called informal ballot papers) and also by the number of voters who cast their vote without being enrolled.

A comparison with the voting figures of previous years demonstrates that, over the years, increasing numbers have been able to register their votes effectively.

Year	Estimated Pop. Over 18 Years	No. of Formal Votes in Provincial Electorates	Percentage
1977	1,400,900	980,131	70.0
1982	1,563,700	1,189,815	76.1
1987	1,745,600	1,367,152	78.3

Sources: National Statistical Office, *National Elections Voting Statistics*; 1977; 1982; 1987, Electoral Commission.

A negative feature was the increased number of informal votes cast at this election. An informal ballot paper is one that is rejected by the counting officer though the voter has used it to cast his/her vote. The grounds of rejection are precise and are laid down in section 154 of the OLNE. The three grounds are, (1) non-authentication by the Presiding Officer who issues the ballot paper to the voter, (2) no vote is indicated or the voter's intention in voting is devoid of certainty and (3) the voter has made a mark by which he could be identified. On these grounds alone can a ballot paper be rejected. It



could be said that in most instances ballot papers are rendered informal due to the inability of illiterate voters to understand how a vote should be marked. In the 1982 elections there were 43,165 informal ballot papers, whereas in the 1987 elections this number was 56,071, i.e. without counting those in thirteen electorates in which the records were destroyed by fire or vandalism. As percentages they reflect 1.8 per cent and 2.0 per cent of the total votes cast in the respective year. Though the situation in respect of informal votes has not deteriorated so sharply as to cause alarm, its significance lies in relation to a claim that was made on behalf of the amended ballot paper (i.e. with photographs on it) when it was first introduced to the public. At a 'briefing session' held on 8 October 1986 at the Islander Hotel to which representatives of political parties were invited, a pamphlet that was distributed by the Electoral Commission claimed, inter alia, that 'the new ballot papers are also so designed that informal voting is kept at a minimum'. It is now clear that the new ballot paper did not lead to a reduction in the incidence of informal votes.

### *The Voting*

No comment on voting patterns would be complete without a preliminary reference to what, in common parlance, is termed in PNG as 'sectional voting'. Sectional voting is of three types, though only two of them prove to be contentious. The OLN, in section 141, affords an opportunity to those whose names do not appear on the Roll for a particular electorate to vote on application and, in section 142, similarly affords an opportunity to a voter, whose vote has already been cast, to vote on application.

Section 141 of the OLN recognizes three reasons why a voter's name may not be on the roll: incorrect omission, incorrect striking-off and name cannot be traced on the list of voters. In all such cases the benefit of the doubt is given to the voter, upon his subscribing to a declaration (Form 21 of Electoral Regulation, 1977) to the effect that he is entitled to be enrolled for that electorate.

Section 142 of the OLN deals with those situations where a person's vote has already been cast, presumably fraudulently. In such an event, the voter has to furnish a declaration (Form 22 of Electoral Regulation, 1977) to the effect that he is the person whose name appears in the list of voters and that he has not already voted at the election.

Undoubtedly, these two provisions safeguard the interests of the genuine voter and his constitutional right to vote. Further more, they may have been prompted, at the time the election law was framed, by the lack of sophistication of the average citizen in ensuring that his name was duly placed on the electoral roll. Whatever may have been the reasons, the situation today is that these provisions tend to give a certain laxity to the voting procedure. Especially, the view appears to be prevalent among voters that it is not necessary to enrol because on polling day they will be able to make a declaration in terms of section 141 of the OLN and still vote. Judicial interpretation has made it clear that this is an erroneous view and that unless there is an incorrect omission made by enumeration officials or special personal circumstances apply, voters cannot rely on section 141 to enrol themselves (*Minutes and Papers of Provincial Electoral Officers' Conference*, September 1986: 15). The difficulty is that polling officials have no way of ascertaining which is an official lapse and which is an act of negligence on the part of the voter. They have to give a decision quickly on the material placed before them through a declaration. It would be only prudent to err on the side

of caution and allow the applicant to vote. The ill effects of these provisions have been mitigated somewhat by the use of indelible ink. The voter's finger is stained with indelible ink when he is issued his ballot paper. Though there are rumours of ingenious ways (unconfirmed) of removing such stains, this method certainly inhibits a voter from voting more than once.

Sectional voting could, of course, give rise to some degree of malpractice. In the case of votes cast under section 142 the malpractice is obvious, because more than one vote has been cast in the name of one voter. Even in the case of votes cast under section 141, it may well be that the claims are not genuine. For this reason, it is a provision whose implications should be examined very carefully. It should be noted that a voter has been conferred the privilege of exercising his vote at any polling place within the electorate (section 132 of OLNE). This means, in practice, that polling officials have to search for a given name in an electoral list which may even contain about twenty thousand names. On occasions, this could present some difficulty even though every attempt is made to prepare the voter lists according to villages, wards, census divisions, etc. When in difficulty, the polling official has now the discretion of issuing a ballot paper under the sectional voting provisions. Also, if the use of indelible ink proves to be an adequate safeguard, then, the opportunity for abuse of sectional voting is very much minimized.

### *Voting Patterns*

Voting patterns in general elections have been characterized by the scattering of votes among a large number of candidates. Up to the 1987 general election the record for the number of candidates in a given electorate was twenty nine, in the Kundiawa Open electorate during the 1982 elections. This record was broken in 1987 in as many as five electorates, the record this time being forty-five candidates for the Kerowagi Open seat.

The increasing number of candidates vying for electoral support coupled with the plurality (first-past-the post) system of choosing the winner has contributed to give the winners only the support of a small section of the voters in a given electorate; a tendency that will increase the appeal to clan and kinship loyalties. Only a few winners receive the backing of a majority of the voters in an electorate. The following table is very revealing in regard to this trend.

Percentage of Votes Received by Winner	No. of Electorates		
	1977	1982	1987
0 - <10%	-	04	01
10 - <20%	11	20	39
20 - <30%	37	33	42
30 - <40%	26	20	12
40 - <50%	16	14	05
>50%	19	18	07
Total	109	109	106

Source: *1987 National Elections*, Electoral Commission. *National Elections Voting Statistics*; 1977; 1982; 1987, Electoral Commission.

An examination of the above figures will demonstrate that about 80 per cent of the representatives sitting in the present Parliament command less than 30 per cent of the support of the voters in their respective electorates. If Parliament is taken as a collective body, then, its members received 778,620 votes of the total of 2,732,387 formal votes cast at the 1987 general election. In other words, Parliament has been elected on the basis of 28 per cent of the votes cast at the last election. A further deterioration, in line with the trend discussed above, cannot but devalue the representative nature of Parliament.

The new ballot paper and the use of photographs of party leaders on them was an obvious move to strengthen voting on party lines. However, as the voting figures given below indicate it cannot be said that the use of the new ballot paper strengthened the position of the party-backed candidate vis-a-vis the independent.

Twenty-two independent candidates were elected, forming the second largest group (if a group they can be called) in Parliament: Pangu Party with twenty-six candidates had the largest number. The independent candidates together polled the largest number of votes, exceeding the vote for the largest party (Pangu) by over two and a half times. Thus, the independent candidate is still a force to reckon with in PNG elections and political parties need further time to consolidate themselves.

Party	Total Formal Votes Cast
Pangu Party	408,082
People's Democratic Movement	298,712
People's Progress Party	168,280
Melanesian Alliance	153,611
National Party	135,761
League for National Advancement	132,001
People's Action Party	87,836
United Party	87,243
Morobe Independent Group	60,922
Papua Party	34,636
Papua Besena	17,122
Wantok Party	17,028
Country Party	10,743
Leiba Party	2,611
National Settlement Party	164
Sub-total	1,614,752
Independents	1,117,635
Total	2,732,387

Source: *1987 National Election Voting Statistics*, Electoral Commission.

### *Counting of Votes*

Elaborate arrangements preceded the counting of votes. Polling commenced on 13 June 1987 and went on, in some electorates, till 4 July 1987. In the meantime, preparations were set afoot to start counting in the evening of 4 July. A counting centre was arranged for each of the electorates, generally located within the electorate itself. Counting for the provincial electorates was

arranged in the respective provincial capitals. The exception was the Highlands Region where, for greater security, all counting had to be transferred to the respective provincial capitals.

The security of ballot boxes was one of the major goals of the counting arrangements. Ballot boxes were being transported from place to place, over a number of days. In view of this, once a ballot box was full, arrangements were made to deposit it in special security containers in police stations.

Periodic reports from the various counting centres on the progress of counting were collated at the National Tally Room which was specially constructed for the elections at the Sir Hubert Murray Stadium grounds in Port Moresby. The officials worked in shifts, round the clock, putting together for public view the information received from the various centres. Special accommodation was provided at the Tally Room for political party leaders and many of them and their supporters kept a constant vigil throughout the proceedings.

Counting commenced in all centres around 6 p.m. on 4 July and the first progress reports started coming into the Tally Room around 8 p.m. that night. There were high expectations of a quick completion when the first result was declared around 9 p.m. However, these hopes were premature and the counting process dragged on for days, the last result, that of the National Capital District Provincial electorate, being announced on 14 July 1987. The suspense of waiting for ten days to know the final results was a black mark on an otherwise well-conducted general election. The size and the format of the ballot paper also contributed to slowing down the counting procedure: it took some time to identify a vote which might be on either side of the ballot paper. Speeding up the counting process is a matter for urgent reform and will no doubt find sympathy among politicians, counting officials and the general public alike. A case in point is the recount in respect of Moresby South Open seat which was ordered, upon a petition, by the National Court. On the second occasion the count was completed in two working days, whereas the original count took five days of continuous counting. It is often pointed out that counting is delayed because candidates insist on repetitive recounts. Whatever the cause or causes, a speedier counting operation is a matter for serious attention.

### *The Return of Writs*

On 15 July 1987 one hundred and six members were returned to Parliament. As explained earlier, elections for three seats had to be postponed due to the demise of candidates during the polling period. In terms of section 124 of the CPNG the new members were summoned to meet on 5 August 1987, for the first time, to elect a Prime Minister. These summons set in motion a different political process on which much comment will be found in the other chapters.



# Regionalism in the 1987 Election

RAY ANERE

## *INTRODUCTION*

At the outset it will be useful to ask several key questions that may help to give perspective to the analysis of regionalism in the 1987 election. They are: What is regionalism? Is it evident in elections in Papua New Guinea? How does regionalism affect the behaviour of political parties, candidates and supporters of parties and candidates? Finally, how does regionalism affect politics at the national level?

### *What Is Regionalism?*

Some geographers define regions as natural systems created by topographical features; others see them in terms of social relationships and organizational principles. The possibility of extending regional analysis so that it could deal directly with social and cultural phenomena was not widely appreciated until Skinner used locational principles, developed by both Christaller and Losch to analyze, among other things, marketing systems and social relationships in China. Regional analysis was later extended to new questions of kinship, religion, ethnicity, politics and class, by examining questions of history and evolution, and by creating certain new principles of analysis (Kuper 1985: 693).

A region is a homogeneous area with physical and cultural characteristics distinct from those of neighbouring areas. As part of a national domain, a region may be sufficiently unified to have a consciousness of its customs and ideals and thus possess a sense of identity distinct from the rest of the country.... The term 'regionalism' properly represents the regional idea in action as an ideology, as a social movement, or as the theoretical basis for regional planning: it is also applied to the scientific task of delimiting and analyzing regions as entities lacking formal boundaries (Vance 1968: 377-78).

Two points in the preceding paragraphs seem especially relevant to our analysis. The first is that regionalism involves an idea in action; for instance, it may be a social movement or a theoretical basis for regional analysis. It may even be a basis for regional social and political consciousness. In this respect, the region is both a constituent part of a

wider social and political consciousness and may itself be made up of a complex of what Clifford Geertz calls 'primordial sentiments', based on traditional clan and village loyalties (Geertz 1963).

For the purpose of this study, I am interested in regionalism as an idea embedded in a course of action. The second point which seems to me to be relevant to the study of the 1987 general election is that regionalism as a concept can facilitate analysis in provinces and groups of provinces. In sum, regionalism can be seen as an idea transformed into a course of action, the basis of which is social and political consciousness which in turn permits analysis at the regional level.

### *Regionalism and Elections*

Is regionalism evident in elections in Papua New Guinea and does it affect the behaviour of candidates, political parties, and supporters of candidates and parties? It will be suggested that it is evident, and that it does affect behaviour at many levels. More specifically, this chapter will attempt to show that regionalism is a significant factor:

- (a) at the constituency level;
  - (i) through the action of the individual candidate who appeals to voters in a constituency on the basis of ethnic, linguistic, geographic and economic factors;
  - (ii) through the regional claims made on candidates and parties by voters in the constituency;
- (b) at the party level when the party is organized or campaigns on the basis of regionalism;
- (c) at the parliamentary and cabinet level.

These three levels will be discussed first by citing evidence from previous elections and then with evidence taken from the 1987 general election.

### *REGIONALISM IN PAST ELECTIONS*

Universal adult suffrage was introduced into Papua New Guinea in 1964. Since then studies of each of the general elections have been undertaken by scholars to see how political structures imposed by Australia were adapted to suit conditions in PNG. Premdas and Steeves (1978:i) pointed out that 'free elections are critical periods in a country's life history; they tend to bring to highlight the operational features of the political system as well as expose the underlying forces affirming or challenging their validity'.

Elections have been conducted in 1964, 1968, 1972, 1977 and 1982. Every election offers new insights into changes that are taking place in the country. For example, change in the educational levels of candidates is occurring as well as in the nature and level of their background experience.

Political parties did not exist in the 1964 election and even if they existed embryonically in 1968, they did not constitute a fully-fledged party system until the 1972 election.

The 1977 general election was particularly critical in that it involved discussions of both local and national issues: Papuans confronted New Guineans; old leaders were challenged by young and educated candidates; alternative programmes for social and political change were offered; party competition and electoral participation by citizens were intense; and the government's performance in promoting economic development was discussed.

### *Regionalism at the Constituency Level*

At the constituency level, regionalism was perhaps most important in the contest won by Josephine Abaijah in Port Moresby Regional electorate. Josephine Abaijah was the leader of the secessionist Papua Besena Party and she succeeded in defeating a key figure in Pangu Pati, Sir Albert Maori Kiki, by a decisive margin. Her vote was 57.8 per cent, an uncommonly strong showing in an election where most seats were won by less than 40 per cent (Premdas and Steeves 1978:130). To some extent Abaijah's vote was a personal one rather than simply an expression of regionalist sentiment. She successfully developed an image as a populist, regularly leading demonstrations to government buildings of those facing housing problems and unemployment. She kept in touch with the have-nots in Port Moresby and successfully criticized and challenged the government which many people had come to believe had lost touch with the people. Premdas and Steeves stated that Abaijah had mobilized most of the Papuan votes both in the planned settlements and in the squatters' housing settlements, leaving Kiki with nearly all the New Guineans (Premdas and Steeves 1978: 132). Her message was welfare, but Papuan welfare. She expected the votes of Papuans both for primordial reasons and for reasons of interest. She did not seek nor did she expect the votes of New Guineans. At that time, both the traditional villages of the National Capital District and its urban settlements were Papuan by a large majority.

Regionalist sentiment was employed by Abaijah's opponents as well, but the regional loyalties they hoped to command affected only a tiny fraction of the electorate. Thus, John Banomo, a Bougainvillean, could appeal to North Solomons residents and Tom Kimala, an Engan, to Highlands constituents, but neither stood a chance in an overwhelmingly Papuan city.

Regionalism was also evident at the constituency level in the 1982 election. Sir Iambakey Okuk appealed to his Chimbu electorate on the basis of greater development for the Highlands region. In his campaign he warned voters in the Highlands to be wary of coastal politicians and candidates, urging them to place trust and confidence in their fellow Highlanders. Josephine Abaijah, running again, repeated her message of Papuan regionalism and, in the New Ireland provincial seat contest, Noel Levi made it clear that in fighting for a fish cannery for Kavieng he was seeking to contribute to the economic development of the region as a whole. The candidate perceived himself as an agent of regional interests at the same time as he responded to pressing needs of one part of his constituency.



### *Regionalism at the Party Level*

In both 1977 and 1982, the party that stood most openly and unequivocally for regionalism was Papua Besena. It called for the secession of the Papuan region and its leader, Josephine Abaijah, never wavered in her mission to obtain a better deal for Papua. In an only slightly less overt fashion, the National Party was regarded as, and probably regarded itself as, primarily a Highlands party. In July 1982, when the leader of the National Party, Sir Iambakey Okuk, failed to be re-elected he gave his party leadership to Ted Diro, a Papuan coastal. Immediately there was an outcry from another Highland politician. John Nilkare said that the selling of National Party leadership to the coastals was a disgrace to the Highlanders. A man highly respected by Highlanders has now publicly traded us' (*Post-Courier*, 2 July 1982). In the same issue of the *Post-Courier*, Sir Pita Lus criticized Sir Iambakey's handling of the party leadership. It must be noted that both these public complaints came from Pangu Pati men, not from National Party supporters. The image of the National Party as a regional, Highlands party, seeking the promotion of Highland welfare, was nonetheless a familiar one.

### *Regionalism at the Parliamentary and Cabinet Level*

The direct consequence and indeed part of the purpose of an election is the formation of a government, involving the selection of a prime minister and the choice by him of the rest of the members of the National Executive Council (NEC) or cabinet. In 1982, Michael Somare was re-installed as prime minister as soon as parliament met, and in early August, he was faced with the task of deciding how to put together a governing team. He faced problems. According to the press, his own Pangu Pati members from the Highlands were pushing for as many as thirteen portfolios. Within the parliament as a whole there were twenty-four Highlanders, including members of the United and National parties, as well as Pangu, and independents. They were said to be demanding the portfolios of Transport and Civil Aviation, Works and Supply, and National Planning (*Post-Courier*, 5 August 1982). In addition, claims for cabinet posts were being made by members from Mamose, the Islands and Papua, and tradition demanded that each of these regions be represented. Some of the provinces might not get a cabinet portfolio for one of their representatives, but the regions could not be ignored. With cabinet size restricted by the constitution to twenty-seven, the problems Somare faced were real. Somare's approach to these problems represents an attempt at the same time to recognize and to limit the force of regionalism. He met with the Morobe branch of Pangu Pati over Morobe's demand for another portfolio. They wanted Labour and Employment for veteran Lae MP Tony Ila, who was at that time the president of the PNG Trades Union Congress. At the meeting, Somare said, 'I explained that other Pangu provinces like Western, New Ireland and Manus, were given a ministry each. This is to build up party strength in the province. The fact that Morobe had three ministers - Mr Bendumb (Transport and Civil Aviation), Mr Sali (Media) [*sic*], and Mr Awasa (Religion, Youth and Recreation) - gave the province a solid voice in cabinet to demand development for the province.' He went on to say that Morobe had a fair share and he urged leaders to work together for party solidarity (*Post-Courier*, 17 August 1982). This incident is particularly revealing for it shows what can be done for a region if the party's organization is solid.

Morobe at this time was a Pangu Pati stronghold and had an organization comparable only to that of East New Britain.

### *REGIONALISM IN THE 1987 ELECTION*

There can be little doubt that regionalism was at least as strong a factor in the 1987 election as in those of the past, and perhaps it was stronger. Certainly, regional feelings manifested themselves at all the levels and in all the forms that we have briefly observed for previous elections.

#### *Regionalism at the Constituency Level*

Most expressions of regionalism at the constituency level have to do with demands for more development for the region of which the constituency is a part. When the region and the constituency coincide, as in the case of the provincial electorate for North Solomons, the likelihood of regional economic and social development questions being in the forefront is strong. In 1987, Father John Momis' campaign for re-election in the Bougainville Provincial seat focussed on the problems of foreign investment in the province and the returns which the people of the North Solomons were receiving for the exploitation of the copper deposits which had attracted large amounts of foreign capital. In May 1987, Momis petitioned Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) to give 3 per cent of its yearly earnings to the provincial government to further compensate the people for the physical and social destruction which the mining operations entailed. This proposal became known as the Bougainville Initiative and Momis claimed that the people of the North Solomons were entirely behind it. The Melanesian Alliance Party which Momis led at the national level also dominated the provincial government of North Solomons, and it was not surprising that the acting premier of the province, Martin Bonai, threw his government's weight behind the initiative. He accused BCL of being a 'pig'. No similar pig would be permitted to dig in the soil of North Solomons in the future unless it made a greater, direct contribution to the provincial government and to the people (*Post-Courier*, 8 May 1987).

In another electorate, we find regional feeling expressed by the electors themselves, even though the leading candidate did not make explicit use of a regional argument. The electorate I am referring to is East Sepik constituency where Michael Somare was a candidate. There can be no doubt about Somare's personal popularity amongst the voters, but the magnitude of his victory (49,226 votes ahead of his nearest rival, Robert Passu) suggests that other factors may have been at work. East Sepik voters were hoping that Somare would not only be a regional leader but also the leader of a major party in parliament and, it was hoped, the prime minister. As it later turned out, Somare did not have the required number of MPs on his side to be elected prime minister. His strong individual showing in the election was, nevertheless, an index of the interest that the East Sepik people had in having one of their own as a leading contender for the top position in the national government.

In yet another electorate, regional claims were made with the same goal of assuring that party leadership would go to the region. During the election campaigns, Somare visited the Kokopo Open electorate to support the candidacy of Rabbie Namaliu. While there, he promised that if Namaliu

was re-elected he would become the next leader of Pangu Pati. A number of voters in Kokopo expressed the view that the party needed younger and more vigorous leadership and that Namaliu was the best candidate to take over the helm. By the late fall, the pressure from East New Britain to have one its own regional members take over the leadership of Pangu Pati became strong indeed. The East New Britain branch of Pangu took up the refrain initiated by the Kokopo electorate. Led by its president, Leo Tokaukau, the ENB branch resolved that Namaliu must resign altogether from Pangu since he still had not been made leader (*Post-Courier*, 12 November 1987). Namaliu himself admitted a day later that 'he would lose support if he remained in Pangu' (*Post-Courier*, 13 November 1987). Indeed, during the November session of parliament, Namaliu vacated his usual seat directly behind the chief in the opposition frontbenches and was sitting among opposition back benchers in one of the middle rows' (*Post-Courier*, 18 November 1987). This assertion of regionalism was resolved when Somare promised in mid-December 1987 to vacate the Pangu leadership in 1988, with Rabbie Namaliu as his automatic successor. The promise was kept in July 1988, when Namaliu became prime minister as well as leader of Pangu Pati. This incident is an example of regionalism expressed by the voters of an electorate largely after the election, but it had its origins in the electoral campaign.

### *Regionalism at the Party Level*

The chief party to embody regionalism in the 1977 and 1982 elections was Papua Besena. In 1987, Papua Besena still fought on, but it had to make room for another Papuan regional party, the Papua Party. Furthermore, a new quasi-party, the Morobe Independent Group (MIG), was founded under the leadership of Utula Samana, the former premier of Morobe province. The identification of other parties with regions was also strong. The People's Democratic Movement of the prime minister, Mr Paias Wingti, was perceived as having its stronghold in the Highlands, and it had to share this regional strength with the National Party, which continued to have a Highlands identity.

The split of the Papua Party from Papua Besena occurred finally in 1985, although tensions between Abaijah and other Papuan regionalists had been evident for some time. The Papua Party was led by Galeva Kwarara and it entered the 1987 election with high hopes of capitalizing on Papuan grievances and of support in voicing a demand for a greater Papuan voice in the affairs of the state. The party had no record of secessionism and although most of its members were former Papua Besena supporters, they had discarded independence as a political goal. Neither Papua Besena nor the Papua Party fielded candidates outside Papua but they named candidates in Fly River, Gulf, Central, Milne Bay and Oro.

The Morobe Independent Group ran candidates only in Morobe and concentrated on the regional problems of this most populous province in PNG. It was created only just before the 1987 election and was clearly based on the assumption that Utula Samana and those who stood with him would have the best chance of winning seats if they capitalized on their regional identity. The temporary, electoral character of the Morobe Independent Group was revealed when it changed its name in 1988 to the Melanesian United Front (MUF).

***Regionalism at the Parliamentary and Cabinet Level***

Once the election was over, the question of who would form the government dominated the news. For a long period, it seemed that Mr Somare would lead a coalition, and the struggle began for regional representation in the cabinet he would form. The coalition was to be based on Pangu, the National Party, the Melanesian Alliance, the Morobe Independent Group and the League for National Advancement. One of the difficulties with this combination was that it allowed little room for representation of the Papua region. Pangu had strength in Mamose and the Highlands, the National Party in the Highlands, the MIG in Mamose, the MA in the islands. The problem of finding strong prospective Papuan ministers from within this grouping was acute and it was not solved in time to prevent Somare losing out to Wingti and a PDM-led coalition when the vote in parliament came in August. Wingti faced regional problems of a comparable nature when he tried to put together his coalition and the cabinet which would be its expression. He was faced with the fact that the newly elected members of parliament had grouped themselves regionally in two powerful combinations. One of these was the Papuan Bloc. The other was, more predictably, the MIG.

The Papuan Bloc was made up of four main elements: the Papua Party, led by Galeva Kwarara who became the chairman of the bloc; a group of independents led by Hugo Berghuser; a Southern Highlands contingent led by Aruru Matiabe, and, most important of all, the People's Action Party (PAP), led by Ted Diro who immediately became the bloc leader as well. The PAP had not been created as a regional party and it fielded candidates in all regions. Its only successful candidates came from Papuan electorates, however, and it required little strain to turn the party into the lead element of a Papuan regional bloc. At the time of the formation of the Wingti cabinet, the Papuan Bloc counted twenty members and its bargaining power was such that it was assigned eleven ministries: five PAP members, five Independents and one Papua Party member. Wingti was spared the dilemma of deciding between Ted Diro and Sir Julius Chan for deputy prime minister by the interim report of the Commission of Enquiry into Forest Matters which was released after the election but before the formation of the new government. The interim report implicated Diro in possibly illegal activities. As a consequence, Wingti made him only a minister without portfolio, until he could be cleared (or convicted) of charges. Nevertheless, the key portfolio of Finance and Planning went to the bloc with Kwarara named to it.

The formation of the bloc and the cohesion which it attained so rapidly is testimony to the strength of Papuan regional feeling. There was a hope that one of their own could become deputy prime minister; there was a clear opportunity to bring major ministerial powers within the grasp of the region. An official statement of the bloc showed the value it put on regional unity:

Papuans have long sought solidarity and a Papuan image that enhances the dignity, self-reliance and strength of the Papuan people. We are a strength in our own right, one earned from a discerning electorate and to lose our dignity in a loose coalition of disparate views and policies would be a deception played on the people who elected us (*Post-Courier*, 20 July 1987).

Unfortunately, the bloc was dogged by bad luck and in addition to Diro's disappointing assignment, it had to put up with the dismissal of Aruru Matiabe, a Southern Highlands member, from his cabinet post as minister of Education while he faced charges of rape and carnal knowledge.

The Morobe Independent Group saw its fortunes rise when, in a cabinet reshuffle in December 1987, its leader, Utula Samana, became Public Service minister, a post left vacant by Dennis Young when he became speaker of the house. (*Post-Courier*, 4 December 1987). The MIG counts three other members of parliament all, of course, from Morobe constituencies: Steven Mambon (Markham Open), Ainde Wainzo (Menyama Open) and Ben Garry (Huon Gulf). At first it seemed that the MIG would retain its identity as a regional bloc, concerning itself primarily with the interests of the Morobe region. It is now clear that Samana has nation-wide ambitions and the creation of the MUF will enable him and his followers to transcend regional considerations.

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The study of the 1987 general election has shown that regionalism persists at three levels. It can be found at the constituency level where candidates make their appeals on the basis of regional solidarity and where voters exert pressure on candidates and on parties to pursue regional objectives. Regionalism is also evident in the ways that political parties organize their forces and plan their campaigns. Finally, it shows itself in the way groups form in the parliament and in the selection of ministers that is made by the prime minister when constructing the cabinet.

The evidence does not support a contention that regionalism is the dominant consideration in PNG elections, but it continues to play an important part in election campaigns and their aftermath.

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# Gender, Age and Education of Candidates and Members

MARK TURNER\*

## CANDIDATES

### *Gender*

Each parliamentary election in Papua New Guinea has involved increasing numbers of candidates contesting the 109 electorates. In 1987 there were a record 1515 candidates, an increase of 35 per cent from 1982. Despite the massive numbers seeking parliamentary office there were very few female candidates. There were only nineteen females, 1.3 per cent of candidates, contesting seventeen electorates. Seven of these candidates gained party endorsement. This was not unusual and conformed to the experience of previous elections (see Table 1).

Table 1: Female candidates in national elections and female MPs 1977-87

Year	Total Candidates	Female Candidates (Number)	Female Candidates %	Female MPs
1977	880	10	1.1	3
1982	1124	17	1.5	1
1987	1515	19	1.3	0

In 1977, ten candidates were females (1.1 per cent of total candidates) while 1982 saw seventeen (1.5 per cent) female candidates. Successive elections have witnessed negligible change in the meagre numbers and percentage of female candidates fighting for national elected office. Males

\* I am most grateful for the considerable assistance and co-operation of Luke Lucas, the Electoral Commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo, the Deputy Electoral Commissioner, and Andrew Trawen, the Senior Electoral Officer.

have maintained their dominance in national electoral politics despite an official commitment to greater social, economic and political participation by women. One of the Eight Aims which guide national development calls for an improvement in the position of women. Despite this call being in place for over a decade, it certainly has not been heeded in national electoral politics.

### *Age*

The majority of candidates fell into the 30-39 years category (see Table 2). In 1987 fifty-four per cent of candidates for whom the age was known were in this group. The 40-49 years category accounted for 24.9 per cent of candidates with the 209 candidates under 30 years (14.7 per cent) and the 92 over 50 years (6.5 per cent) making up the rest. These figures for candidates' ages were very similar to 1982 (see Table 2) and reconfirmed

Table 2: Age of candidates 1977-87

Year (Total Cands.)	Under 30 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	Over 60 years	Unknown
1977 (880)	200 32.4%	391 45.7%	196 22.9%	62 7.2%	7 0.8%	24 2.7%
1982 (1124)	193 17.6%	595 54.4%	243 22.2%	52 4.8%	11 1.0%	30 2.7%
1987 (1515)	209 14.7%	770 54.0%	354 24.9%	79 5.6%	13 0.9%	90 5.9%

*Note:* All columns except 'Unknown' show percentages of total number of candidates for whom age is known. The 'Unknown' column shows percentages of all candidates.

the changes between 1977 and 1982 in the age profile for candidates. There is a sharp reduction (23.4 per cent to 14.7 per cent in the percentage of candidates in the youngest category (under 30 years). The percentage of those over 50 years has also shrunk slightly (8.0 per cent to 6.5 per cent) since 1977. Thus there has been a consolidation of candidates in the age range of 30-49 years, especially in the 30-39 years group. Over three-quarters of candidates are now found in the twenty-year age band between 30 and 49 years.

There was some variation in candidates' ages among regions (see Table 3). The Highlands had larger numbers of candidates in the 30-39 years and under 30 age groups and much fewer than other regions in the over 40 years groups. By contrast the Islands had older candidates than the other regions. Only two candidates were under 30 years and the numerically largest category was the 40-49 years group with sixty-one (43.0 per cent)

candidates. Even the over 50 years groups were well represented with 14.8 per cent of candidates.

The age distribution of candidates was unlike that of the Papua New Guinea population at large. While 54.0 per cent of the candidates come from the 30-39 years age group only 31 per cent of the adult population (over the age of 25 years)

Table 3: Age of candidates by region, 1987

Region	Under 30 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	Over 60 years	Unknown
South Coast	29 8.6%	161 47.6%	115 34.0%	31 9.2%	2 0.6%	27 7.4%
Islands	2 1.4%	58 40.8%	61 43.0%	17 12.0%	4 2.8%	2 1.4%
North Coast	38 11.9%	172 53.9%	84 26.3%	22 6.9%	3 0.9%	6 1.8%
Highlands	140 20.6%	379 55.7%	94 13.8%	9 1.3%	4 0.6%	55 8.1%
TOTAL	209 14.7%	770 54.0%	354 24.9%	79 5.6%	13 0.9%	90 5.9%

*Note:* All columns except 'Unknown' show percentages of total number of candidates for whom age is known. The 'Unknown' column shows percentage of all candidates.

belonged to that group according to the 1980 national census. Those over 50 years comprised 27 per cent of the adult population but supplied only 6.5 per cent of the candidates. While wisdom may well be associated with age, it does not correlate with running for national office. That contest is left to younger men (but not too young) whose age, vigour, formal education and experience of the institutions of the urban world are seen as appropriate qualifications for entry into the realm of national politics. Rising life expectancy in Papua New Guinea has had no effect on this general pattern. Only in the Islands is there some deviation from it.

### *Education*

The formal educational levels of candidates have been rising with each parliamentary election. The 1987 election was no exception (see Table 4). At the lower end, those with no formal education shrank to a mere 2.6 per cent of candidates, thirty-seven of the 1515 standing. In 1977, 14 per cent



were without any education. Also contrasting were the percentages of candidates with primary education (grade 1-6) and with lower secondary education (grade 7-8) only. These two categories accounted for 42.2 per cent of candidates in 1977 but included only 24.8 per cent of candidates in 1987. By contrast the grade 9-10 group leapt from 29.8% of candidates to 40.7 per cent of candidates ten years later. But the most dramatic change has come in the grade 11-12 category which claimed only 13.9 per cent of candidates in 1977 but in 1987 boasted 31.9 per cent. Furthermore, almost 10 per cent of candidates in 1987 had university degrees.

Table 4: Educational level of candidates by highest grade achieved, 1977-87

Year/ Total No.of Cand.	Nil formal education	Grade 1-6	Grade 7-8	Grade 9-10	Grade 11-12	Unknown
1977 (880)	118 14.0%	245 29.1%	110 13.1%	251 29.8%	117 13.9%	39 4.4%
1982 (1124)	56 5.2%	224 20.7%	119 11.0%	455 42.0%	229 21.1%	41 3.6%
1987 (1515)	37 2.6%	234 16.4%	120 8.4%	580 40.7%	455 31.9%	89 9.9%

*Note:* All columns except 'Unknown' show percentages of total number of candidates for whom educational level is known. The 'Unknown' column shows percentages of all candidates.

There was some regional variation (see Table 5). The Highlands and North Coast regions had larger percentages of candidates in the lower two categories. Twenty-nine of the thirty-seven without formal education stood in Highlands electorates while 21.3 per cent of North Coast candidates had only received some degree of primary education. The South Coast and Islands regions possessed very high percentages of candidates with grade 11-12 levels of attainment - 38.5 per cent and 45.4 per cent respectively. Almost 80 per cent of candidates in both these regions had achieved at least grade 9. Overall, the message given by these figures is clear. Education is an important resource for individuals to utilize in competing for national political office. Achievement in formal education has become an unofficial but necessary qualification for those running for parliament. It is increasingly expected that candidates should have been educated to at least secondary school level. Candidates realize and even encourage this by proclaiming their educational prowess as a reason others should vote for them. And with each election the educational levels of the candidates have risen.

The educational levels of the candidates stand in sharp contrast to those of the adult population at large. The latter are characterized by low levels of literacy and incomplete primary education. An estimated two thirds of adult Papua New Guineans are illiterate. Twenty-eight per cent of children still do not even commence primary school and of those that do, 54 per cent do not finish. Eighty-four per cent of children do not attend provincial high school. Thus, candidates for the national elections are part of what is popularly referred to in Papua New Guinea as an 'educated elite', a group distinguished by relatively high levels of formal educational attainment. The lack of this unofficial qualification for being a candidate effectively prevents, or at very least, strongly discourages the vast majority of the adult population from ever contemplating standing for parliament. The large numbers of candidates contesting each national election tends to obscure this fact.

Table 5: Educational level of candidates by region and highest grade achieved, 1987

Region	Nil formal education	Grade 1-6	Grade 7-8	Grade 9-10	Grade 11-12	Degree	Unknown
South Coast %	1 0.3%	39 11.2%	30 8.6%	144 41.4%	134 38.5%	29 8.3%	17 4.7%
Islands %	3 2.1%	12 8.5%	15 10.6%	47 33.3%	64 45.4%	24 17.0%	3 2.1%
North Coast %	4 1.3%	68 21.3%	30 9.4%	133 41.7%	84 26.3%	28 8.8%	6 1.8%
Highlands %	29 4.7%	115 18.6%	45 7.3%	256 41.4%	173 28.0%	56 9.1%	63 9.9%
TOTAL %	37 2.6%	234 16.4%	120 8.4%	580 40.7%	455 31.9%	137 9.6%	8 9.9%

*Note:* All columns except 'Unknown' shows percentages of total number of candidates for whom educational level is known. The 'Unknown' column show percentages of all candidates. Figures in the 'Degree' column are also incorporated into the 'Grade 11-12' column.

## MEMBERS

*Gender*

For the first time in a national parliamentary election, no female member was returned (see Table 1). In 1977 there were three female MPs. In 1982 only one female was elected, and then only by one vote. Despite equality for women being one of the country's major developmental goals since independence, women have performed progressively worse in national elections since that time. In 1987 only one female candidate secured a second place in the polls and even then was a long way behind the winner. Fourteen of the nineteen female candidates finished below fifth position in the polls, gaining only very small percentages of the votes cast. Party endorsement seemed to provide little, if any, advantage. There was no regional or rural-urban variation in the female voting figures. Males were dominant everywhere resulting in a parliament where all 109 seats are occupied by males.

*Age*

The average age of members as 38.6 years, a slight increase over 1977 (35.6 years) and 1982 (37.9 years). While Papua New Guinea's national politicians are getting slightly older with each election, they are still on average fairly young. There is some regional variation with the Islands returning older members (average age 43.8 years) while the Highlands members are younger than average (35.8 years).

In common with previous years (see Table 6) the 30-39 years age group accounts for over half of the seats (57.0 per cent). The 40-49 year group has a further 29.9 per cent. Thus, the twenty-year band, 30-49, contains 86.9 per cent of members and leaves little room for the very young and the old.

Table 6: Members by age group 1977-1987

Year	Under 30 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	Over 60 years	Unknown
1977	19 17.8%	60 56.1%	24 22.4%	2 1.9%	2 1.9%	2 -
1982	12 11.0%	58 53.2%	35 32.1%	3 2.8%	1 0.9%	-
1987	6 5.6%	61 57.0%	32 29.9%	7 6.5%	1 0.9%	2 -

*Note:* Percentages are of total number of members for whom age is known.

The under 30s have only six members, a considerably reduced presence from the nineteen and twelve representatives in the previous two parliaments. Although the 50-59 years group more than doubled its numbers from previous years, it still claims only seven members. The over 60s made no headway and the only elected member from this group died shortly after he was declared. In general, the profile of the members' ages follows that for the candidates although members are even more heavily concentrated in the 30-49 years age group. But neither the young nor the old fare well in Papua New Guinea's parliamentary elections. They provide a minority of candidates, just over 20 per cent, and even less members, 13 per cent. Although politics is regarded as a young man's game it now appears that one can be too young to have a reasonable chance of success.

There was some regional variation (see Table 7). In the Highlands, a massive 79.5 per cent of members are in the 30-39 years group. Only one Highlands member lies outside the 30-49 years band. The Islands electors chose no member under thirty but focussed their favours on the 40-49 years group taking 58.8 per cent of their members from there. Even the over 50s fared well in the Islands, providing 17.7 per cent of the region's members.

Table 7: Age groups of members by region, 1987

Region	Under 30 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	Over 60 years	Unknown
South Coast	2 9.1%	12 54.5%	6 27.3%	2 9.1%	-	2
Islands	-	4 23.5%	10 58.8%	2 11.8%	1 5.9%	-
North Coast	3 10.3%	14 48.3%	9 31.0%	3 10.3%	-	-
Highlands	1 2.6%	31 79.5%	7 17.9%	-	-	-
TOTAL	6 5.6%	61 57.0%	32 29.9%	7 6.5%	1 0.9%	2

*Note:* All columns show percentages of total number of members for whom age is known.

The electorate have a tendency to dispense with older sitting members (see Table 8). Over 75 per cent of the sitting members who lost their seats were over the age of 40 years. Those retaining their seats had a younger profile, over half being under the age of 40 years. Even younger were the new members, three-quarters of whom were under the age of 40 years. While the electorate favour younger men, they prefer their members to be over 30 years. Thus, in every region the new members' ages were above 35 years. The high turnover of members, with the young replacing the old, militates against the establishment of a substantial body of highly experienced parliamentarians. Continuity in policy-making suffers while many members

have limited knowledge of parliamentary procedures and of parliamentary government in general.

### *Education*

As has been already noted, with successive elections the educational levels of candidates have increased. The process of improvement in educational achievement has similarly affected the elected members. They too have become more educated with each parliament. Furthermore, they have always maintained educational levels above those of the candidates in general. The results of the 1987 national elections have confirmed both of these trends (see Table 9). For the first time, more than half (54.1 per cent) of the members have attained at least grade 11. This is considerable and rapid progress from 1977 and 1982 when the figures were 26 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. It is also far superior to the candidates in 1987

Table 8: Returned, losing and new members by age groups, 1987

Type of Member	Under 30 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	Over 60 years	Unknown
Sitting Members Returned (56)	1 1.8%	29 51.8%	19 33.9%	6 10.7%	1 1.8%	-
Sitting Members Losing (48)	-	12 25.0%	29 60.0%	6 12.5%	1 2.8%	-
New Members <sup>2</sup> (53)	9.8%	5 64.7%	33 23.5%	12 1.9%	1	-

*Note:* Percentages are of total number of members for whom age is known.

of whom only 31.9 per cent fell into the grade 11-12 category (see Table 4). A massive 86.2 per cent now have at least grade 9 qualifications. Almost twenty years ago in the House of Assembly only 21.9 per cent of Papua New Guinean members had attained that level. As members' educational levels have improved, the lesser-educated members have obviously become a rarer species. In the last two parliaments there have been no members without formal education while only ten members elected in 1987 fit into the grade 1-6 category. Tertiary qualifications are now more prominent.

According to the Electoral Commission bio-data, well over half of the members have attended tertiary level courses. In the last parliament fifteen members possessed university degrees. After the 1987 election there are twenty-six degree-holders in parliament. Eleven of them have new degrees.

At least six others, including the former Prime Minister Wingti, have attended but not graduated from university. Thus, with 29 per cent of members having experience of universities, the role of these institutions, especially the University of Papua New Guinea, in socializing the national political elite is becoming increasingly important. It also emphasizes the point that the electorate consistently selects members who in general are more highly educated than the candidates at large.

There is some slight regional variation (see Table 10). In the South Coast and Highlands regions, over 90 percent of members have at least grade 9. This is quite remarkable for the Highlands, which, in 1968, elected only one person with that level of education; at that time eighteen of the twenty-five Papua New Guinean Highlands members had no formal

Table 9: Educational levels of members by highest grade achieved 1977-1978

Year	Nil formal education	Grade 1-6	Grade 7-8	Grade 9-10	Grade 11-12
1977	10 9.2%	26 23.9%	10 9.2%	35 32.1%	28 25.7%
1982	-	19 17.4%	7 6.4%	42 38.5%	41 37.6%
1987	-	10 9.2%	5 4.6%	35 32.1%	59 54.1%

Note: Members holding qualifications above Grade 12 are incorporated into the Grade 11-12 column.

education. Now, half of the degree-holders in parliament come from the Highlands. The Islands and especially the North Coast regions have higher representation in the lower categories. Most, but not all, of these men are long-serving politicians who have somehow succeeded in maintaining their popular support. One of them, Sir Pita Lus, was first elected in 1968.

It should not be thought that the possession of high educational qualifications will automatically secure election. For example, there were 111 disappointed degree-holders out of the 137 who stood for parliament in 1987. Also, 68.7 per cent of sitting members who lost their seats had at least grade 9 level education (see Table 11). Five of them had university degrees. Education is only one resource which candidates bring to the political arena. Voters take into account other factors such as performance, clan, residence, status and age when deciding whom to support. Nevertheless, losing members as a group do have a lower educational profile than the new members. Twenty-five per cent of losers had only primary education compared with 7.5 per cent of new members. Over half (28) of the latter were educated to grade 11-12 standard and sixteen of these

had degrees. Approximately one third of the ousted members had grade 11-12 qualifications. Finally, although the educational levels of the returned sitting members range from grade 3 to university degree, the educational profile of this group is higher than that of the losing members. While 68.7 per cent of the latter had at least grade 9, some 82.2 per cent of the returned sitting members had those qualifications. This pattern may well disappear or at least become less pronounced in the next elections. Approximately half of the members are ousted in each election. As most now have high educational qualifications, this means that the majority of losers may hold such qualifications.

Table 10: Educational levels of members by region and highest grade achieved, 1987.

Region	Nil formal education	Grade 1-6	Grade 7-8	Grade 9-10	Grade 11-12	Degree
South Coast	-	-	1 4.2%	8 33.3%	14 62.5%	4
Islands	-	2 11.8%	2 11.8%	4 23.5%	9 52.9%	3
North Coast	-	5 17.7%	2 6.9%	8 27.6%	14 48.3%	6
Highlands	-	3 7.7%	-	15 38.5%	21 53.8%	13

*Note:* Members appearing in the 'Degree' column are also incorporated into the numbers appearing in the Grade 11-12 column.

Table 11: Returning, losing and new members by highest grade achieved, 1987

Type of Member	Grade 1-6	Grade 7-8	Grade 9-10	Grade 11-12	Degree	
Sitting members returned (56)	10.7%	6 7.1%	4 26.8%	15 55.4%	31 17.9%	10
Sitting members losing (48)	25.0%	12 6.3%	3 33.3%	16 35.4%	17 10.4%	5
New Members (53)	7.5%	4 1.7%	1 37.7%	20 52.8%	28 30.2%	16

*Note:* Numbers of members appearing in the 'Degree' column are also incorporated in the 'Grade 11-12' column. The percentages appearing in the 'Grade 11-12' column incorporate those in the 'Degree' column.

# 6

## Hidden and Open Agendas: Social Policy Issues in the 1987 Election

ROSEMARY PRESTON

### *SUMMARY*

Party and candidate commitment to the development of national social policy as a vote-catching device was insignificant in the 1987 general election in Papua New Guinea. This conforms with patterns observed in other newly independent states and with electioneering since independence in PNG. In PNG, candidate status, political experience and motivation, the large numbers of candidates and the inevitability that a coalition government will be formed seem likely to have discouraged social policy statements in manifestos. The trend to cut social provisions in more developed countries as they seek to offset the effects of the recession and enforce monetarism is scarcely an incentive for less advantaged countries, equally squeezed for cash, to do the opposite. The implications of these trends in PNG for the fall of the multi-party state are not apparent, although some passing interest has been shown by the army in creating a military government.

### *Sources of Information*

The information on which this paper is based draws principally from issues of three national newspapers: *Post-Courier*, *Niugini Nius*, and the *Times of Papua New Guinea*, published over the three-month period prior to the election in June. It refers in addition to seminars presented at UPNG on themes relating to the election and to occasional national radio programmes. At best, the comments made should be treated as speculative, perhaps as the basis for more substantive research.

### *The nature of social policy*

There are many definitions of the term 'social'. This paper understands social policy to be policy oriented towards the promotion of well-being in society as a whole, or of communities within it. It is not concerned with



individual welfare, except insofar as society is the organized aggregate of all individuals in a given population.

Unfortunately, at such a level of generalization, it will be observed that all government policy is promoted on the grounds that it will serve the ultimate good of the society at which it is directed. While this would include policy concerning the development of law, government, science and technology, land, production and marketing, and education and health, it is only the last two of these that are conventionally described as areas of social policy. This is because a system of policy classification has evolved to identify different fields of government and policy development (political, social, scientific and legal, for example) for administrative and budgetary purposes.

One problem with such classificatory systems, however, is that the interdependence of the different areas and the primacy of economic policy may be overlooked. Initiatives to reduce the incidence of infringements of law and order are likely to include change in social or economic policy directed at providing greater opportunities for young people. They are less likely to affect legal policy. Changes in economic policy have immediate or long-term effects on social conditions which, in turn, require policy revisions. At the same time, social conditions are critical to the fulfilment of economic development policy, so that to ignore them can jeopardize its effectiveness.

It becomes, therefore, artificially restrictive to attempt a discussion on social policy in the general election in PNG, without acknowledging that the need for such policy and the form that it takes can only be understood in relation to the existing social and economic situation and to proposed changes in other fields of government. Thus, while this paper identifies social policy as that which concerned with the distribution of social rights, of access to food, housing, law, government and education (Conyers 1986), it is mindful of the need to consider these in wider contexts, and in particular, in relation to expenditure in designated sectors.

### *Elections and social change*

Finally, it has to be recognized that elections are mechanisms for popular legitimation of government and the policies that it introduces. In this they contribute to the process of social integration in national consolidation. In contrast, simultaneously, they legitimate the emergence of political elites in contexts, such as that of PNG, in which economic transition is accentuating social differentiation through the restructuring of the division of labour that is a prerequisite of an effective market economy.

## *POLITICS AND POLICY IN PNG AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*

### *PNG's Democratic Policy in Principle*

Since independence, PNG has been struggling to strengthen its internal organization so as to optimize its internal well-being and its position and at the periphery of global systems on which it is economically and culturally

dependent. To achieve this, the state has adopted the political, bureaucratic and military systems modelled on those of the former metropolitan power which demonstrably promoted that nation's economic prosperity and social integration. The political model adopted was the present electoral and party system derived from that of Westminster, England. In this, parties prepare manifestos for the policy that they would introduce in government and the electorate casts votes for the candidates representing parties which have the most appealing policy intentions. In theory, the right to formulate government policy is mandated to the party with the greatest number of elected candidates.

### *Political Practice Elsewhere*

When constitutions were being written for states achieving independence from colonialism, the extent to which their internal social organization and external relationships would impede the replication of classical democratic systems was not anticipated. In practice, in many new states, where the point of social reference is strongly local, rather than national, candidates are moved more by the prospect of personal gain than by the opportunity to enhance the well-being of the state and society as a whole (Cammack 1988). As a result, political party systems and, with them, party policy statements for national development are imperfectly established.

In many new nations, multi-party electoral systems emerge. Weaknesses in them become apparent when, after the count of votes in an election, no party has an absolute majority of members in the new parliament and fragile coalition governments are formed. Over time, the nascent party system may appear to atrophy, in what may be the first stage in a progression that leads to a single party state or dictatorship and later to military control (Premdas and Steeves 1983). These processes all serve to undermine the principal functions of political parties in elite-controlled, export-led states, elsewhere in the less developed world: integration, legitimization and policy formation and execution (Cammack 1988).

Referring to comparative analysis of studies from Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, the indications are that such party weaknesses can be explained by the extent of state control above that of ruling parties, in particular the personal power of the state president and the power of the bureaucracy; the limited political and administrative expertise of party personnel; the increasing sophistication of technology, in economic production. In some countries, lack of certainty about the locus of control or about political stability have been said to inhibit party development and involvement in policy formulation and implementation. It is claimed that

...it is inevitable that state resources will be used to shore up a regime and that the party will become a channel for patronage and the purchase of political support. Parties in the Third World tend to be agencies of the state rather than vehicles for the autonomous political mobilization of the citizenry behind clearly political programmes with strong ideological underpinning (Cammack 1988).

It can be argued that the intimate relationship between the state and the successful party explains above all else the paucity of party policy initiatives.

Caution should be used before assuming that elements of recent colonialism produce these imperfections in parliamentary systems. Most Latin American states achieved independence more than 150 years ago, but display similar symptoms. Many European states have, in the last forty years, formed coalition governments, after the failure of any one party to obtain a majority in parliament. The recent collapse of the centre and left of the political spectrum in Britain suggests weakness in the system that is likely to have sprung from recent economic change.

Similarly, questions about the locus of power in democratic states have preoccupied political theorists for centuries. Debates in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sought to establish the relative importance to government of the legislature, executive and crown (Hegel 1967). They continue as political scientists today argue over the roles of state, bureaucracy and party in national policy development (Middlemas 1983).

Observations on political and policy-making developments in PNG, during and since the post-independence general elections of 1977 and 1982 (Hegarty 1983, Pokawin 1982) suggest close conformity to the initial patterns set by African states after their independence in the 1950s and 1960s.

Echoing observations elsewhere and referred to above, the local rather than national orientation of candidates are seen to have dominated electoral campaigns:

The population, including the political leaders, have yet to identify with the political structures and institutions. They do not consider the institutions, laws and predominant values of the modern state as theirs (Pokawin 1982).

This implies that, as the new economic elites become, if they were not already, prominent politicians and vice versa, their management of government policy will be such as to enable them to further their own interests and those of the clans and ethnic groups on whom they depend for primary support. This may be to the extent that, in many instances, self-interest has been claimed to be more important than electoral obligations.

Pre-independence party formation in PNG aimed to prepare people for democratic government after independence from Australia. In elections since then, no majority government has been returned to parliament. The multiplicity of parties and the large numbers of candidates, party and non-party, contesting each seat has meant that post-independence governments have been formed from coalitions of elected parliamentarians, many of whom were not party members. They have constantly been subject to threats of votes of no-confidence which, in turn, have weakened government stability and courses of action.

The fragility of the coalition governments and their ability to influence policy is compounded by the high levels of turnover of members of parliament between one election and the next: 38 per cent of members resumed seats after the elections in 1977; 53.8 per cent in 1982. Not only is the proportion of members with expertise in government small (Hegarty 1988), their level of educational and professional experience is, in general, inferior to that of senior public servants. At independence, the locus of power was firmly within the established bureaucracy, rather than within the newly formed national parliament and cabinet. Since then, the greater stability, experience and professionalism of public servants have continued

to ensure that: '...by ministerial default bureaucrats are the real initiators and selectors of policy' (Saffu 1986).

This in turn explains the tendency for policy to:

...effect marginal changes to existing frameworks, monitoring the progress of implementation and triggering corrective measures maintaining fiscal stability....bureaucrats are not equipped by training or temperament to discover large social principles and embrace them as bases for operation...(Saffu 1986).

The continued need to employ expatriate expertise in government and business attests to the deficiency in human resources across the country and further enhances public service superiority in relation to governing parties. The growing use of information technology is undeniable. The extent to which this further weakens government power in PNG is as yet unclear. It is, however, likely to increase long-term dependency on imported commodities, which are used to control access to sensitive information of state, and on expatriate expertise for their operation.

Finally, contrary to frequent claims that political parties in PNG lack ideologies (Pokawin 1982, Oliver 1987), it seems to be without doubt that post-independence government and party policy in PNG has been a product of development ideology inspired by market capitalism which, as yet, no party manifesto has sought to challenge. On achieving independence, parties endorsed the Eight Point Improvement Plan (1972) and the National Goals and Directive Principles (1975) as the aims of government (King 1986). These policies give much importance to social development, but, if read carefully, it is always in the context of economic change leading to increased participation in a differentiated global economy. However, until the mid-1980s, the need to encourage the accumulation of wealth and status did not deter the adoption of policy to extend and diversify the provision of social services, from which there would be seemingly few direct returns to investment. Arguably, this unidirectional similarity between parties may be critical in explaining weakness in the party system.

In each of the above respects the emerging political system of PNG appears to be similar to the first stages of the model proposed by Cammack for understanding weaknesses in the democratic systems in less developed countries. Such weaknesses can only inhibit effective policy development.

### ***Social Policy in the 1987 General Election***

Descriptions of the conduct of the 1977 and 1982 elections appear to apply equally well to the 1987 campaign. However, the number of parties and the number of candidates had increased: in 1987 there were fourteen candidates aspiring to each seat in parliament and, of those returned, 53.8 per cent were new members. The educational and professional status of candidates had overall increased (Griffin 1988), but remain, on average, far below the levels of senior public servants. As before, in most cases, policy statements intended to muster votes emphasized local commitments, while those parties with manifestos stressed economic more than social policy development. After weeks of negotiation, a coalition was formed under the auspices of PDM, although it commanded no more than 17 per cent of the votes cast, a weak basis from which to assume authority to govern.

The treatment of social policy issues in the 1987 general election in PNG seems also to have changed little since 1977 and 1982. It has the same dominant characteristics: low salience, common underlying philosophies among candidates, a lack of planning specifications and the omission of a wide range of issues.

Along with a plethora of other modern institutions in the country, political parties should serve to integrate the population behind clearly defined policy objectives. In the 1987 election, only the national Party, and to a much lesser extent, the Melanesian Alliance, made this the core of their manifestos, through their condemnation of foreign ties and influence in the state. In the other parties, this integrative function of political campaigns seemed not to be in question and such social policy as they endorsed was to be through the expansion of the social welfare activities of government and non-government organizations.

Nevertheless, carefully planned campaign statements of policy to improve well-being across the country were not conspicuous. The most comprehensive were found in the manifestos of the principal parties, PANGU and PPP. Common themes were increased access to primary schooling, more extensive health services, strategies to reduce threats to civilian safety from street gangs and other criminal groups. Other issues included urban housing for public servants and the promotion of youth activities. ON the whole, proposed policy was in the form of reactive responses to existing situations, rather than proactive policy initiatives.

Random statements of intent for social policy could also be found in the speeches of party leaders: these tended not to be well-prepared policy statements, but combative modes of upstaging oppositional contenders or promises of assistance to specific groups, made in exchange for election support from interested parties. Examples would include:

- 1) Somare's plan to increase and improve teacher training as essential to maintaining the quality of education in all subjects and at all levels (*Post-Courier*, 8 May 1987) came as a direct challenge to the cuts imposed by Wingti to all sectors of the educational system, but above all to tertiary education, during 1986 and 1987.
- 2) Momis's intentions to increase the training capacity of the dental school at UPNG (*Niugini Nius*, 18 June 1987) seemed a blatant and unimplementable sop to supporters, as well as a challenge to Wingti, since the end-of-year closure of the dental school, on the ground of poor cost-effectiveness, was almost certain.

The low salience of statements of social policy in the campaign contrasts with the greater prominence given to proposed national economic development strategy. The latter, in both publications and speeches, appeared to be much more comprehensive. Wingti used it as justification for the low profile of social policy in the PDM policy programmed:

...our policy is not to have policy to improve social conditions....health, educations...without sorting out the economic base first from which to do it....(Wingti, May 1987).

In this he reveals an assumption that social development in PNG is irrelevant to the achievement of economic success. Seemingly, others shared his view.

### *Party identity*

The limited importance of social policy in the election campaign should be attributed only in part to the priority of economic growth. It is also related to the much-mentioned similarity of national policy proposals between contenders (Senge 1987, Oliver 1987a). There is little difference between party lines for national social policy and independent candidates did not emerge with either clear or innovative proposals. At times, party leaders themselves lost sight of the supposed differences between their policies. At a meeting held at UPNG in May 1987, less than one month before the election, leaders of PANGU, PPP and MA (the leader of the PDM had declined the invitation to participate), presented manifestos for national development. Their focus was economic policy, but in the course of debate, Somare, Chan and Momis were to foster the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) through technological change and the commercialization of production. Somare and Chan proposed doing this through capital investment and export-oriented production in primary industry. Momis stressed the importance of autochthonous enterprise that was not dependent on imported manufactures as the means of increasing output and growth.

At several points in the discussion that followed the presentations, all semblance of separate identities between the speakers evaporated. With the acquiescence of Chan and Momis, Somare orchestrated responses to questions from the floor, deciding which of the three speakers was best prepared to field specific topics. In making their responses, all three referred to their often shared experiences of government since independence and on their agreed need to stimulate economic growth. At times, they discussed an issue so as to put forward a consensual platform opinion. The idea that they were competing to promote the position of their own parties in the eyes of the electorate was lost as they conspired to create an image of themselves as a trinity of elder statesmen.

If it is remembered that national development aims are already enshrined in the Eight Point Plan and National Goals, such a display of common identity by the leaders of three of the more prominent parties may not be surprising. It is hardly calculated to stimulate differences in party policy recommendations. On the contrary, such blueprints for development endorse the impression of state supremacy in the formulation and execution of policy.

### *Sub-national commitments*

There is a fundamental inconsistency in democratic political systems which require the popular election of local area representatives to serve in national governments. Candidates for election have to convince local electorates that they will be more worthy than other candidates in diverting national resources to meet local needs. Many, to catch votes, portray this worthiness entirely in local and not in national terms, but know that, if elected, they will be obliged to act more in accordance with national than local policy.

Under such conditions, it would be unfair to infer that candidates' lack of vision for policy development at national levels implies a lack of interest in social welfare across the country. What it does suggest is that candidates, whether party members or independent, have to promote sub-national policy if they are to attract votes. In 1987 in PNG, some candidates were able to do this, indicating regional or provincial development strategy that they would pursue if elected. Others, lacking status or experience, or both, were

unable to project their contribution to change beyond their district or community.

While some political commentators maintain that trends towards regionalism in PNG are pointing the way to anarchy (Senge 1987), it is a prominent issue on any alternative political agenda. The emergence of parties with strong regional links may well be a further factor reducing the commitment to social policy at a national level.

### *Provincial orientations*

Experienced politicians were able to imply links between their achievements as provincial leaders and what they would do if elected to parliament (Oliver 1987a). Utula Samana capitalized on his achievements as premier of Morobe to win support, as did Alexis Sarei in North Solomons. Sitting members too endeavoured to manipulate their provincial electorates. Karl Stack, the sitting member, made considerable disbursements to provincial welfare in the immediate pre-election period as a means of increasing the number of votes in his favour in the West Sepik Provincial constituency; the member for Unggai-Bena used similar tactics (*Post-Courier*, 2 June). Rooney was able to exploit to the full her parliamentary achievements in Manus. Her campaign document is a report of what had been accomplished at provincial levels in Manus, over the past ten years, with some references to those of her national achievements that had contributed. It made few promises for the future (Rooney 1987). It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which a more nationally oriented position would have improved her performance in the polls, although it seems likely that her failure to win the seat had little to do with her manifesto and a great deal to do with internal politics in Manus.

### *Local development policy manifestos*

It would be misleading to suggest that candidates promoting policy for development in specific local communities were contending in predominantly rural constituencies. Harry Hoerler, an independent National Capital District (NCD) candidate, had a detailed set of policies for which he was seeking mandate, all of which would properly be within the domain of the NCD council, rather than of the national government. Social policy in his manifesto included the creation of mobile health clinics to be based at a general hospital in Gordon, the provision of all utilities and services to settlement populations, improved sporting facilities in the city and reduction of the incidence of breaches of law and order.

### *Idealistic visionaries*

Many candidates, perhaps the majority of outsiders, had no recognizable policy intentions to use as platforms in their campaigns. Examples would include both independents and party followers: Port Moresby independent candidates, Janet Regione and Ruth Iangalio, PAP's Alan Sako (Bulolo Open), National Party member Paiama Guambo (Kundiawa/Gembogl Open), LNA's Habia Baba (Tari Open) and PANGU's Dorothy Tekwie (West Sepik Provincial). All proclaimed their personal rectitude and commitment to ideals such as justice, equality and progress. None had specific policy strategies that they would introduce if elected. All were confronted with formidable opposition and, to some extent, the purpose of

their standing was to weaken the poll for favourites rather than to enter parliament.

What these candidates offered may, however, be a simplicity of discourse intended to be at the level of the average voter with limited understanding of modern politics, in a style that is closer to customary modes of status ascription than modern electioneering and razzmatazz. Unfortunately, given their generally low return rate, it would seem that such naïve campaigning was subverted at the outset by the prospect of material gain from more cannily manoeuvring competitors and an electorate with a slightly higher political acumen than might have been supposed.

### *Campaigning lacunae*

Along with the low commitment to social policy in the election campaign was a failure to consider the implications for planning the implementation of such policy as was being promoted, either in terms of new administrative systems that would be required or in terms of changing the orientation of the existing ones.

More significant were the social policy issues that were overlooked in the campaign. Few candidates, including women candidates, endorsed policy to promote women's rights and this has been interpreted as paying no more than lip-service to the cause of improving the situation of women in the country (Wormald 1988). In particular, commitment to reducing the incidence of violence against women and to facilitating women's access to law, was singularly lacking in spite of the recent campaign by the Law Reform Commission (Toft 1985). Statements about the future of West Irian refugees in West Sepik and Western provinces were not made. Positions on the future of expatriate contract officers and the dual salary structure were not convincing, any more than they were in respect of contractual social obligations to be imposed on mining companies or timber merchants.

### *Other Explanations of the Lack of Social Policy*

There is no doubt that the salience of policy statements in the campaign is affected by a candidate's performance in national, provincial and local arenas. Long-term politicians of principal parties have no problems talking about policy at national levels. First time aspirants, of whom there were hundreds in 1987, do not have the frames of reference which allow them to do this. To a lesser extent, policy positions are also affected by the party, if any, that the candidates endorse. In addition, there is a range of other factors which inhibit candidates from adopting rigid manifesto positions.

### *Candidate numbers*

The large number of candidates affects voting behaviour and reduces the number of votes required for any candidate to be elected. In constituencies with as many as forty candidates competing for a single seat, the support base of nearly all will be parochial or clannish. Indeed, many such candidates will have been unable to refuse nomination by clans, whose leaders, looking to material gain and status for themselves and for the clan, may have little understanding of the way in which wider issues have to be addressed.



*Coalition formation*

A second factor inhibiting policy commitment during the campaign is also related to the large number of candidates. In 1987, as in previous elections, it was certain that, with so many candidates, most of whom (63 per cent) were running as independents, the incoming government would not be composed of members of parliament from a single party. It would be formed by a coalition of members from different parties and non-aligned members who would agree to conditions, which could not be specified in advance, for co-operation in government.

The power base of members of a governing party or coalition is superior to that of parties and independent members in opposition. This leads to post-count negotiations to form a coalition with majority support being characterized by political agility, as members susceptible to persuasion shift their allegiance from one side to another, according to which appears likely to emerge to govern the country. Candidates who took rigid campaign policy positions might find themselves excluded from certain coalitions of which they might otherwise have been members. Strong commitment to manifesto policies may also prevent members from switching sides, if so doing appears to enhance their status in parliament.

The race to obtain majority parliamentary support, led by PANGU and PDM leaders after the June election, was overtly to elicit support from other members for their respective party policy proposals. The agreements made appeared to have little to do with policy and a lot to do with patronage, to the extent that members with well-known policy and party affiliations were prepared to forego a seat in the ruling coalition. Of these the most blatant was the member for Pomio who crossed the floor of the house on the morning parliament reconvened to ensure a majority for the Wingti coalition. His National party colleagues had aligned themselves with Somare. Rumour suggested that the prize for his defection would have a significant effect on the development of his constituency and probably on his position within it.

So far, then, in the 1987 election as in those before it, the limited reference to social policy derives from the dominance of personal and local interest, limited political experience of candidates and the inevitability of coalition formation. The first two positions of Cammack's model are thus confronted. In addition, the power of the bureaucracy over parliament and its ability to direct policy have to be recognized, if nowhere else, in the stability of the nation during the long pre-election closure of parliament. This too suggests the limited need for strong statements of social policy during the campaign.

*Issues of Doubt and the Need for Social Policy in the Campaign*

There is one element in the organization of the 1987 and earlier campaigns that, at first sight, makes the low salience of policy positions surprising. Behind the leaders of each of the principal parties, PANGU, PDM, PPP and MA, was a campaign manager and adviser. These advisers were all expatriate journalists contracted from overseas in the immediate pre-election period. Their brief was to prepare speeches and media presentations and to inform their principals on campaign activities each day. These *gurus* were unable to get their candidates to give priority to statements of policy intent, or saw no need for them to do so. This may

have mirrored the direction of social policy in recent elections in their own countries, where national contributions to social services are being reduced. Under these conditions, it is tempting to conclude that social policy statements are not a functional requirement for PNG elections.

Indeed, polling in PNG seems to be more about drama, an opportunity to ensure excitement in the one formal act of citizen participation in government. Popular acknowledgment of the solemnity of the act is shown in the wearing of *bilas* and body paint. It endows voting with an aura of ritual, reinforced by the indelible finger marking of those who had exercised their right of franchise. Bribery to vote in a particular way involves conspiracy, while the destruction of property during the campaign creates the illusion of combat against an enemy. Loser frustration vented against government and personal property becomes customarily legitimate, a symbolic retaliation after tribal defeat.

To some, elections are perceived to be no more than systems for choosing *bighmen* (and media hypes of election candidates in older democracies suggest that the same is increasingly true there): they encompass little space for policy or planning. Advice from bishops to voters (*Post-Courier*, 2 May) encouraged them to vote carefully, to find out about candidates, to avoid big spenders and beer men and party representatives who otherwise had poor reputations. This advice did not stress the need to assess policy promises and other manifesto items as the principle of vote-casting. This again implies the limited importance of such issues in the election process.

#### *The point at which campaign policy matters*

The point at which a government is formed is the point at which the campaign policy statements of the members of the coalition are adopted as policy for the cabinet. There may be some doubt about the extent to which such policy is legitimate, given that it will have been mandated by only a minority of the electorate. Since there has been no overt popular dissent to a given policy, acquiescence by default should be assumed. PDM commitment to economic development implies not a limited expansion of social welfare provision, but an absolute reduction in the services mode.

It is questionable how far such policy is economically imperative or how far it is aping strategy developed elsewhere in countries that are now dismantling once-famous social welfare systems through policies that unashamedly are bringing back the poverty, disease and homelessness of times gone by.

#### *Some Implications*

How far these observations point to the lack of future for the multi-party system of government in PNG, it is not possible to say. With the increasing numbers of candidates, the proportion campaigning under party umbrellas has declined, although the number of parties has increased. It would seem that the military had little scope for staging an insurrection against the government, until it was seized with flights of fancy following the transition of power in Fiji, early in the election year. What seems more likely is the continued government of PNG by successive coalitions, under the aegis of a benign bureaucracy which, in comparison with other Third World countries, is reasonably efficient. This does not question the relevance of Cammack's

hypothesis to the situation in PNG. It assumes that insufficient time has passed since independence for the hypothesis to be fully tested.

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## Women Candidates in the Election

EILEEN WORMALD

Since Papua New Guinea's independence, there have been three elections and three women members of parliament. Previously there had been one woman, Alice Wedega, appointed by the colonial government to the Legislative Council in 1961, but in the first two elections to the House of Assembly in 1964 and 1968, no woman contested. In 1972 four women stood and one of them, Josephine Abaijah, was elected. In 1977 she was one of the ten women candidates in the first post-independence election of whom two beside herself, Waliyato Clowes and Nahau Rooney, won seats. All three stood again in 1982 with another fourteen women but only Rooney was elected and that after an appeal to the Court of Disputed Returns. Rooney had been a government minister, a position she eventually regained and held until she lost her seat in 1987 when along with Abaijah she and all of the eighteen women candidates were defeated.

Altogether forty-one women have fought in the national elections held in Papua New Guinea. In doing so they were making a remarkable break with their traditional role. Clearly in such a diverse country, it is not possible to speak of one traditional culture but in terms of decision making, though not in some cases of lineage or economic status, the clans were and are male dominated with women excluded from power positions and from religious rituals (Strathern 1972). Nagari (1985) writes: 'In big village meetings [women] are often not allowed to speak. In the past male solidarity was emphasized by the men's house which women were forbidden to enter.' The subordinate position of women was reinforced during the period of colonization and Christianization by the superimposition of Western ideas of gender roles (Samana 1985), which are a powerful force in women's own self-perception.

It may therefore be surprising not that so few but that so many women have attempted to breach the male fortress of politics. Their right and indeed their duty to do so results from the 1975 constitution in which the equality of the sexes is firmly embedded: 'all citizens have the same rights, privileges, obligations and duties, irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed, religion or sex.' (*Constitution*, 55 [1]).

The constitution is frequently appealed to as the ideology of the new nation in which a fresh start can be made by all citizens, unhampered by time-honoured structural constraints which in older nations have impeded

women's access to economic and political structures. The reality has been a replication of the experience of women in other cultures, with the interaction of gender, culture and the ideology of a developing capitalist economy, together with Christian beliefs, reproducing the subordination of women in this transitional society. The gendered role of women is one of the most basic tenets of PNG's belief system despite the enlightened constitution. Women who wish to claim their promised equality have to do so in the face of considerable resistance, both by adopting male values and at the same time demonstrating their capacity as wives, and mothers, and homemakers.

### POLITICAL WOMEN

When one woman was elected in 1972 and three in 1977, it must have seemed as if progress was being made; but the defeat of Abaijah and Clowes in 1982 and Rooney in 1987 was a bitter blow to all who hoped for an increase, however gradual, in the political representation of women. Did these three women themselves contribute to their own defeat and the failure of others successfully to follow them?

Abaijah was the first elected member, a striking woman with a very clear platform based on the separation of Papua from New Guinea and embodied in the group she founded, 'Papua Besena'. Her bid for Papuan independence failed and she had never adopted a position as spokesperson for women in the House. She was reported as saying, 'I was elected by men as well as women. The men in the House don't just work for men. I'm not going to separate the sexes' (Woolford 1978). She has not changed this view. In an interview before the 1987 election when she had just declared her candidature for Central Province she said that of course she stood as a woman, 'you can't hide the fact, but when you are in a position where you don't just represent women ... you've got to make sure you play your role as a politician'. Women, she felt, find it difficult to decide on their political role and they need help in finding it which will give them strength to stand up against the network of men. The latter is a subject about which she knows a lot, since when she was first in politics she was laughed at and had to suffer sexist remarks from her male colleagues. It may be due to this that her performance in parliament was described as 'lacklustre' (*Post-Courier*, July 1982:2).

Clowes was a twenty-six year old school teacher when she won the Middle Fly seat against four male candidates in 1977. She stood as an Independent and won with 3,360 votes out of a poll of 10,638, with her nearest rival gaining 2,392 votes. She was married to an expatriate and said that her decision to stand depended on his agreement and that he encouraged her. Abaijah was her role model and she declared that it was seeing her at work that made her own people, the Gogodalas, ask her (Clowes) to contest the election. 'They have seen Josephine Abaijah at work, and they didn't see why I could not do the same for my people at home' (*Post-Courier*, 29 July 1977:22). She had a general platform based on helping local business and, in particular, improving shipping from her area to urban centres so that crops could be shipped for early sale. Unlike Abaijah, however, she stated: 'The other thing is that I am a great believer in women's rights. I cannot promise anything but I will do all I can to help the women of the country. A lot of men think we are rubbish and take no notice of us'. In parliament she

was a persistent questioner and she started a political party (Panal) to coordinate 'independent' Papuan members. It did not gather support and she was defeated in 1982 and disappeared from the political scene.

Rooney, the first woman to serve in the cabinet, was appointed minister for Correctional Services and Liquor Licensing in 1977. In 1978 she became minister for Justice and the conflict over the relationship of the executive and judiciary (Rooney 1985) led to the downfall of the Somare government. From Justice she moved to the ministry of Decentralization but was soon in opposition when the Somare government was defeated and Chan took over the leadership. She herself feels that her high profile as a minister made the right for a woman to lead an issue in the 1982 election. Though she insisted that there is no women's vote for women, and that there is no special role for women in the political field, the thrust of much of her argument is that women can play a unique part in decision making. Though it may be regarded as special pleading there is some element of truth in her contention that the decline in expenditure on women's projects out of the total National Public Expenditure Plan allocation from 11.5 per cent to 0.2 per cent between 1979 and 1982 (Nakikus 1985) was due to the lack of a women's voice and that this lack at the ultimate decision-making level could not be compensated for by efficient work by women bureaucrats. She saw herself as 'automatically the minister determined to do battle on behalf of women' because male counterparts were failing in areas of development such as social justice and social welfare (Rooney 1985).

Pokawin, himself a successful politician as premier of Manus and previously a member of the Political Studies department at UPNG, judged that in the 1982 election many of the Manus electorate wished to replace Rooney partly 'because of her success in the power game and even more, because she is a woman' (Pokawin 1987).

It is in fact remarkable that these three women overcame the prejudice against their sex as political leaders. This bias was succinctly described by a Grade 12 national high school student: 'PNG still has a tough tradition of men having higher status and able to convert and lead others' (Hayball 1987). Each, however, had the encouragement of an expatriate man who may have had a different conception of women's role from PNG men. Clowes and Rooney were married to men of Australian birth and Abaijah was the *protégée* of another (Woolford 1976).

This role of mentor for successful women politicians is not unique to Papua New Guinea (Wormald 1982) and in view of the recent entry of women into PNG politics, it is not surprising that their support should come from outside the culture. A number of women candidates in the current election commented on the difficulty of campaigning without spouse back-up whether this situation occurred because of his lack of interest or because they currently had no spouse. Divorcee Pilacapio's statement that politics was her husband for life (*Post-Courier*, 10 May 1987:36) might be true of any woman candidate who succeeds but not for one who is spending money at the same time as caring for home and family in an unsuccessful fight.

The wish of successful women politicians to discount their gender and to play the political game as men may be based on role models of successful women politicians outside Papua New Guinea but is probably particularly inappropriate in this culture. Women are constitutionally guaranteed equality with men - but as women, not as substitute men - and it would seem that politicized women may slowly be learning this important fact.

### *Candidates as Women's Representatives*

A sign of this transition appeared in Abajjah's views expressed in an interview before the 1987 election. She felt women in politics must work together and bury their 'petty jealousies, otherwise men will take advantage to say we don't really know what we are doing'. Asked if she felt women had a different political image from men she thought 'very much so - I work with village people, help with their projects, write their letters, look after them, and when I go to the village they look after me all the time not just at elections. If people vote for me it's because they know I will work for them'.

Rooney, hampered in her election campaigning by the necessity to continue her ministerial activities, nevertheless also cultivated the women and the village people. A newspaper report (*Post-Courier*, 19 May 1987:5) said:

The men are seated in Manus Open Member, Nahau Rooney's, village house, sipping their third cup of coffee in an equal number of hours. They are discussing the country's hottest topic - politics. Mrs. Rooney is sitting cross-legged on the verandah discussing the same issue with women and another group of men.

Other women candidates in 1987 pursued women's issues. Fide Bale, a seasoned campaigner, had always insisted that she 'wanted to get a woman's point of view represented in parliament' (Hegarty 1983). In this election her platform included the promise that she would 'represent Mothers, Wives, The Family, Yourself and the Grass Roots'.

Matilda Pilacapio, who had also stood for election twice before and who had been a provincial government member, felt confident of winning half the women's vote because women's views needed to be represented in parliament. 'Debates on women's issues have been shallow ... women's votes are being wasted if these men take the issues (of wife beating) as jokes'. (*Post-Courier*, 10 April 1987:36)

Whether or not this turning of women towards women was for these candidates a result of experience, other 'new' candidates campaigned on similar lines. Tamo Diro, former Women's Affairs Advisor to Mr Somare and Executive Officer to the National Council of Women, stood because she felt there should be more women in. She stood as an independent with the support of the Women in Politics group. Of all the women candidates, she perhaps came nearest to the idea of women having a special political agenda, saying that decisions made at the national level affecting the lives of women should have input from women.

Jogo included the need for equality of women with men in decision making in her campaign and Pai said that she was aiming at equal women's participation in all sectors of work.

Dorothy Tekwie, founding member of Women in Politics was, at the time of the election, warden of women students at UPNG where she had obtained a degree in Social Work. Soon after Women in Politics was founded, she said its purpose was to 'whip' men out of politics and almost immediately launched herself into the battle. She applied for and won nomination by Pangu Pati for West Sepik Provincial, a seat held by Karl Stack, resigned her post at UPNG and went to West Sepik to nurse the constituency. She travelled widely through the region and drew considerable interest and apparent support; she was, however, competing

against seven other candidates and a sitting member whose work for the region was widely acclaimed. This led to the latter's resounding victory when he won with 20,813 votes and a margin of 13,350 over his nearest rival. Tekwie came second from the bottom with 2,803 votes but did manage to save her deposit.

One interesting absentee from the list of women candidates was Lady Karina Okuk. There are many precedents in world politics for what has been called the 'Tiger principle' (Tiger 1970); women like Indira Gandhi, Cory Aquino, Isabel Peron, who came to power as daughters or widows of deceased politicians. It appeared at one point as if there would be a similar example in PNG, but this did not materialize. Lady Karina had first indicated that she might contest the seat of her late husband Sir Iambakey Okuk but when Ben Sabumei was nominated by Okuk's National Party for the by-election held in March 1987, she said that she would not stand at the general election if he won. When he did she honoured her word and he was again nominated and returned for Unggai-Bena in July of the same year. However, her interest in politics has not wavered and it seems likely that she will attempt to enter no later than 1992.

### *Religion and Politics*

Analyzing the 1968 elections to the House of Assembly, Wolfers wrote:

An examination of the members' backgrounds reveals a further trait that separated most candidates from their constituents. All but two of the indigenous members of the second house claim to be adherents of one of the territory's many Christian missions, a claim at which many missionaries would be astonished in individual cases. Could it be that Christianity is now one of the pre-requisites of political respectability in Papua New Guinea as in Australia, or do 'modernisers' simply tend to accept the white man's religion along with his schools, economic and political systems, as part of the process of 'development'? (Wolfers 1969)

Although much has changed in the two decades since that was written, the importance of Christian allegiance for many women candidates is still vital. It has already been suggested that Christianity has had an important influence on the position of women in PNG and its role in their politics may be equally important. The group founded in 1986 to encourage participation in politics - Women in Politics - is firmly based in religion and according to its constitution, all meetings have to start with a prescribed prayer. Of the eighteen women candidates in 1987, six made direct reference to religious allegiance or associated activities in their biodata (see Table 1). For others, it was an important strength or impetus to action; for example, Fide Bale, in her election literature, said she stood for strong, honest and Christian leadership (God-fearing). As Abaijah stated at an interview: 'It would not be possible [to be in politics] without a belief in certain things - God has given me everything. This is the strength which helps you'. Regione, a practising Catholic who goes regularly into retreat, said, 'It deepens my sense of purpose, gives a sense of direction, a sense of calm in a world of many trials and tribulations' and she wished to 'restore values and dignity in high places' (*Times of Papua New Guinea*, 11-17 June 1987:14). Debessa



relied on church youth to help her in her campaign. The problem posed, however, is that where a particular church allegiance is strong and either stated or known, this may alienate those of a different church, both women and men. The church allegiance where it involves work with a woman's fellowship seems to be a way of appealing to a particular group, not to men (nor to women outside the church), and is unlikely, therefore, to achieve a majority vote.

Table 1: Women with Declared Religious Allegiance

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Diane Debessa	-	describes herself as 'Christian Worker'.
Somere Jogo	-	had worked overseas for 9 years with Moral Rearmament.
Immaculata Kereku	-	President of Catholic Womens' Federation.
Jacinta Kodana	-	Church Worker for Catholic Church. President of Catholic Women's Association.
Martha Pai	-	Women's Fellowship Group Leader.
Hun Tagazu	-	Worked with Women's Fellowship.

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### *THE ELECTION*

In the event neither their faith nor their policies won any of the women sufficient support to be elected. Even Rooney was pushed into third place and although Abaijah came second, she was still nearly 5000 votes behind the winning candidate Ted Diro, whereas Rooney in third place was a bare hundred behind Pokasui who won. Tamo Diro, who was also third, was some 3,500 short of winning.

### *Candidatures and Votes*

There were eighteen women out of a total of 1,464 candidates, or 1.2 per cent (*1987 National Election Voting Statistics*). They received together 39,111 votes out of a total counted of 2,732,387 which is 1.4 per cent, not an unreasonable result in purely numerical terms.

Although only the three noted above came within striking distance of winning, a number of the other women polled a respectable number of votes. However, six - Debessa, Iangalio, Kodana, Pai, Lembo and Tagazu - failed to obtain 10 per cent of the winning candidate's votes and thereby lost their deposits.

Table 2: Women Candidates in 1987

Candidate	Electorate	Votes	Winner's Votes	Position in Poll	% of Total Votes
Abaijah	Central. Province	10126	14970	2nd out of of 11	18.78
Bale	Moresby Northeast	997	2495	7th out of 19	6.78
Debessa	Moresby Northwest	377	5395	15th out of 24	1.77
Diro	N.C.D	5458	8919	3rd out of 20	5.31
Iangalio	Moresby Northwest	232	5359	19th out of 24	1.08
Jogo	Western Province	2992	8245	6th out of 13	7.79
Kereku	Rabaul Open	796	2884	4th out of 8	8.46
Kodana	Goilala Open	64	2430	13th out of 13	0.68
Lembo	Tari Open	134	3324	13th out of 15	0.84
Pai	Tari Open	248	3324	12th out of 15	1.57
Pilacapio	Milne Bay Province	4070	13980	6th out of 9	8.28
Pokana	Morobe Province	6883	43655	4th out of 7	6.05
Regione	Moresby Southeast	850	1905	5th out of 28	5.33
Rooney	Manus Open	2208	2335	3rd out of 14	18.03
Tagazu	Nipa-Kutubu Open	26	3921	11th out of 11	0.13
Tekwie	West Sepik Province	2803	20813	7th out of 8	5.57
Tutumang	Finschaffan Open	434	3504	6th out of 10	3.32
Wild	Unggai-Bena	413	3960	8th out of 21	2.86

*Party Allegiance*

Eleven of the eighteen candidates stood as Independents while the other seven were spread among the six parties.

Table 3: Party Allegiance

IND	PDM	NP	PB	Papua P	Pangu P	PAP
Bale Debessa Diro Iangalio Kodana Lembo Pilacapio Pokana Regione Tagazu Wild	Rooney Tutumang	Kereku	Abaijah	Jogo	Tekwie	Pai

There is some evidence that party support was beneficial as a vote catcher. In terms of winning the highest percentage of total votes cast, four of the top five candidates were supported by parties:

Table 4: Votes and Parties

Name	%	Party
Abaijah	18.18	PB
Rooney	18.03	PDM
Kereku	8.46	NP
Pilacapio	8.28	Ind.
Jogo	7.79	PP

Only one party-supported candidate, Pai (PAP), lost her deposit and she was competing against another woman as well as thirteen men; the other five were all Independent.

Two of the candidates had previously been party supported (Bale by PPP, Pilacapio by United) but did not this time obtain party support. Bale was in the Morobe Independent Group which might be considered a party. The choice of constituency to fight was dictated by residence or place of origin but it may be thought foolhardy, despite the general insecurity of sitting members' seats, for Tekwie and Pilacapio to fight such well-entrenched figures as Stack and Young, and for Wild to contest a seat

against the man who had won it only four months earlier in the by-election caused by Sir Iambakey Okuk's death. However, Tekwie and others saw themselves as fighting to make women and men aware of women's right to be politically active rather than with any real hope of winning.

Perhaps the most surprising candidature was not related to place but to the decision to stand at all. Kodana in Goilala had been reported in August 1986 (*Niugini Nius*, 5 August 1986:2) as being worried by the formation of the Women in Politics Group saying that the women in Goilala 'felt threatened to follow the group' and had lost interest in obligations to their Church. It may be that she stood specifically as a church candidate to draw women away from WIP which she claimed consisted of businesswomen who talked politics to church women and caused confusion and conflicts.

### *Age, Marital Status and Education*

The ages of women candidates range from 26 to 46 with an average of 36, only one year lower than in 1982 when 37 was the average age of the fifteen out of seventeen candidates who declared. Only three gave their marital status: Pokana married with nine children, Regione divorced with three children and Wild, married.

Table 5: Age and Education

Name	Education	Age
Abaijah	Matriculation	37
Bale	Teachers College	45
Debessa	Grade 9	36
Diro	Grade 10, Queensland	45
Iangalio	Secretarial School	34
Jogo	Teachers Certificate	34
Kereku	Grade 9	32
Kodana	Standard 6	46
Lembo	Teachers Certificate	26
Pai	Grade 8	26
Pilacapio	Primary A	42
Pokana	Grade 7	43
Regione	BA, UPNG	37
Rooney	BA, UPNG	42
Tagazu	Grade 1	27
Tekwie	BA, UPNG	29
Tutumang	Teachers Certificate	No information
Wild	Standard 5	37

Though there are none without formal education, four (22 per cent) have attended only community school, five (28 per cent) have some

secondary schooling, two (11 per cent) completed secondary school (and one of those went on to further training but does not include this under education), four (22 per cent) have a teachers' certificate and three (17 per cent) have university degrees. This should be compared with the educational profile of all candidates. There is no clear relationship between age and education, older candidates (i.e. those over 40) being as likely to have reached secondary or tertiary education levels as younger.

There is a slight increase in the educational level of these candidates over those in the 1982 when three (18 per cent) had no formal education, three (18 per cent) had completed community school, seven (41 per cent) had some secondary schooling, two (12 per cent) had post-school training and one (6 per cent) was a graduate of UPNG (one not given).

### *Occupation*

The candidates' occupational claims are of some interest. Three (Pokana, Tagazu and Tutumang) describe their job as 'housewife' or 'home duties' but at least for Tutumang this seems to be an election necessity as her 'brief history' shows a career in teaching and more recently, for seven years, in computing. Six classify themselves as self-employed or business woman (Bale, Diro, Kereku, Pai, Pilacapio, Regione) but Abaijah who is often cited as a successful PNG businesswoman, gives her occupation now and for the past years as 'farmer'. A number of the candidates had been involved in community work. Debessa, for example, describing herself as 'Christian worker' had been involved with women's fellowship, prison fellowship and youth groups, while Jogo, saying she is a 'subsistence farmer' and 'active in community affairs', had worked overseas for nine years with Moral Rearmament and later had worked with the National Regional Provincial Women's Council as provincial women's co-ordinator. Kereku ('self-employed') had been a nurse for fifteen years (presumably all her working life until the election) but was also a village court magistrate and she had been president of the Catholic Women's Federation, an office presently held by Kodana ('subsistence farmer'). Pokana actually described herself as 'community leader' after early years as a community welfare officer and librarian while Tagazu ('housewife') had worked with the Women's Fellowship at Nipa.

Although a number had been trained as teachers, it appeared that only one (Lembo) was still in the profession although Pai ('business woman') had previously been a 'home economics trainer' after five years teaching in community schools. Of the three trained social workers (Regione, Rooney, Tekwie), only the latter was still pursuing that occupation as a student counsellor/warden at UPNG before she left to 'nurse' West Sepik on behalf of Pangu. There was also Iangalio, not trained as a social worker, but who had been executive director of the PNG Family Planning Association for ten years.

### *Experience in the Public Arena*

Although Abaijah and Rooney were the only two with experience as elected members in the national parliament, Diro and Regione, like Rooney at an earlier date, had acted as advisers to Somare when he was prime minister and Pilacapio and Pokana had served on provincial assemblies.

If we take into account the experience of the community leaders and the businesswomen described above, it is clear that in general these were women who would be sensitive to the position of women in PNG but also capable of participating actively in the decision-making process. If they had been able to sell themselves to the electorate, they could have made a powerful team in knowing how to use the appropriate channels for the benefit of women.

### *Post-election*

Though distressed by the results, the women accepted defeat gracefully. They felt they had fought honest campaigns; one said: 'I wouldn't buy votes though they were offered - if people voted for me it was because they thought I would represent them well in Parliament not because of any special promises of things I would get them'. Their attitude might have been summed up by Regione's election slogan 'No Rhetoric. Just Hard Work. No Promises. Only the Promise to do my best'. Rooney, the only one to lose a seat, contented herself with saying that she felt the people of Manus would regret their decision. Abaijah said that this was the end of her political career but she felt not only had she created an awareness of Papua but would continue to make Papuans aware of their identity and their rights. She regretted the absence of women from parliament, saying that an aggressive male parliament would not provide an alternative but set a bad example.

### *Women as a Special Electoral Group*

The lack of any elected woman made some think of alternative strategies for representation. Consideration was given to appealing to section 102 of the constitution to obtain at least one woman member. This section states that 'The Parliament may from time to time, by a two thirds absolute majority vote, appoint a person (other than a member) to be a nominated member of the Parliament'. This section had previously been invoked when it appeared in 1982 that there would be no woman MP, Rooney's appeal to the Court of Disputed Returns not yet having been heard. The National Party stated in July 1982 that it would press for such a nomination. By the time Stephen Tago, leader of National Party, put a bill to that effect to the House, Rooney was back in and indeed voted with the prime minister, Michael Somare, against the bill which was rejected by forty votes to twenty-seven. The opposition was led by the minister for Youth Recreation and Women, Tom Awasa, on the grounds that it would mean opening doors to all groups like churches, trade unions and the business community (*Post-Courier*, 6 May 1983:2).

Other attempts had been made to have women treated as a special political category. In May 1982 the Police minister, Warren Dutton, had proposed separate women's election booths to stop women being pressured by their husbands or harassed by unknown men, an idea said by the electoral commissioner to be a good one but proposed too late to be implemented and not raised again in 1987. A suggestion in 1985 that Enga province should have a separate women's electorate got a mixed reception from both women and men. Rooney supported this on the grounds that it would enable women to get to power, but once there they would have to

represent everybody not just speak for women (*Times of Papua New Guinea*, 9 October 1985:23).

Comparable demands were made in this election when first the Southern Highlands Provincial Council of Women and then the PPP regional secretary in the Mamose region demanded equal representation of women in running the election. Mr Yawasing of PPP claimed:

I believe strongly that women voters who are very old and cannot read or write, including non-formal educated ones, feel more confident in themselves when approaching their own sex sitting behind the polling table than men' (*Post-Courier*, 4 June 1987:10).

### WOMEN AND POLICY

The use of such affirmative action to ensure women's fuller participation in politics is an issue which will have to be addressed by the Women in Politics group. There is no doubt of the lip service given by the major political parties to the importance of women. When the PDM was founded in 1985 by Wingti, Rooney and Awasa with thirteen other members, Wingti as the leader pronounced 'the movement is totally committed to respect women as dynamic partners in nation building' and Rooney added that this part of their platform was 'her baby'. (*Times of Papua New Guinea*, 5 September 1985:5)

Equal lip service was paid to women's affairs in the PPP election literature which stated:

#### *Women*

#### THE PEOPLE'S PROGRESS PARTY WILL:-

- . promote women's legitimate right to contribute to national development. We will continue to consult women's groups to help combat law and order problems, improve education and health care policies, and foster economic development;
- . dismantle all barriers which prevent women from making a career in public life or participating in public affairs;
- . enact tougher laws to better protect the rights of women;
- . assist the National Council of Women to get viable projects off the ground, quickly and efficiently;
- . provide government-funded travel between provinces and regions, to enable women to learn from activities in other areas.

Julius Chan, the leader of PPP and deputy prime minister, employed Nellie Lawrence, formerly Secretary of the National Council of Women as his political assistant. But his party was not helped by this nor indeed by any other of its policies. Somare, speaking to the National Council of Women in 1984 when he was prime minister, called for women to enter politics and take up active roles in leadership. He added, significantly, that

the position of women seemed to have gone backward since independence. (*Post-Courier*, 21 March 1984:23).

In the current election, Pangu declared its policy:

*Women's Equality*

PANGU continues to support the goal of equality for women in all activities. Pangu will make sure:

- . girls have the same opportunity as boys to go to school
- . women are treated fairly by the law
- . women are treated equally in getting work.

Of the other major parties, United Party made no printed statement on women while the Melanesian Alliance in its own eight point plan said in its seventh point that it would work for:

- . Women as Equal Partners in Development
- . effective protection against domestic violence
- . re-direct agricultural extension to women
- . more women in top jobs.

There is nothing new in any of these statements and while vocal women might complain if they were absent they are hardly likely to be vote catchers. Nor can it be assumed that they will have influence on future policy in a parliament where a debate on domestic violence can produce a statement from the minister for Housing that 'I paid for my wife so she shouldn't overrule my decision because I am the head of the family' and another member said 'Previous speakers ... talk very strongly about husbands drinking and going home and bashing their wives ... I am one of those people'. (*Hansard* 1987). Nor can anything be read into the fact that both of those members lost their seats since the same happened not only to the member who said that 'I speak on behalf of the women in my electorate and the people of the nation. ... In the Melanesian way of life, we men claim to be boss of everything ... I think 99 per cent of the country's development is by women but yet we do not realise this fact' but also to the Minister for Justice who proposed that legislation to penalize 'wife-bashing' should be brought in to the next Parliament.

*ALTERNATIVE AVENUES TO POLITICAL POWER*

Somare's words of 1984, that the position of women seemed to have gone backward since independence, were bleakly prophetic in the light of the 1987 election results. That is, however, too pessimistic a view of women's position in PNG; a few women in this male-oriented society have broken through barriers in public service or business. In the political field in provincial governments, almost at the same time as women were losing their place in the national government Enny Moaitz was appointed the first woman provincial premier in Morobe. She had been minister for Finance and when the premier resigned to contest the national election, she was elected unopposed to take over.



It may indeed be at provincial level where women can make the major inroads into the power structures; certainly in some of the provinces there are strong women's groups which are not afraid to intervene in politics. In East New Britain the Council of Women threw their support in the national election behind three candidates in the province, two of whom were elected; while in the East Sepik women provided political education in which they stressed women's issues and the importance of women's contribution to economic development. However, the East New Britain action was equivocal since one of the candidates the women endorsed was standing against a woman candidate. In New Ireland where a woman candidate was defeated in the provincial government election, she was later appointed to the government. But this appointment created controversy among women's groups - a not unusual feature of political activity of women who have frequently been accused of not pulling together to ensure women act as a united group serving the interests of all women. As one ENB woman activist stated: 'women should stay united at all times to pursue their Council's interest without being politically manipulated' (*Times of Papua New Guinea*, 21-27 May 1987:4). Some women as well as men felt that council was being used when it gave support to three male candidates.

Experience of decision making at any level must be valuable for women who have only just obtained access to political structures and may be a pathway to national power. But the president of WIP has said: 'Women should work together to achieve one goal - to vote women into Parliament so that issues affecting women can be better catered for.' (*Post-Courier*, 17 July 1987:16). This is one of the many problems facing women - they have not as yet articulated what are the important issues on which they can and will unite and which will enable them to 'sell' themselves not only to women voters but to men also. What has to be decided by women is whether they wish to enter politics as surrogate men or as women with their own culture and political agenda.

### WOMEN AND POLITICS

The position of women in PNG has recently generated a considerable literature often focussing on the extent to which colonization and the development of a capitalist economy has increased the subordinate position of women (Preston and Wormald 1987). It has been suggested that in traditional societies, women as well as men had clearly defined and complementary roles but that today women have to compete in a man's world in order to achieve status (Mandie 1985).

This leads to a consideration of the idea of two cultures. It has often been suggested that for women to obtain position and power, they have to become surrogate men by taking on male characteristics. As an early theorist wrote: 'It is an old truth - but just for that reason important as the outcome of general experience that women are usually led by feelings men more by intellect. Men are more clever; [women] lack the necessary requirement of rational will' (Tonnie 1955). Whilst the specifics of this statement are now likely to be treated with derision, the idea that women and men display different characteristics and that the former are more suited to the 'private,' the latter to the 'public' sphere, would not.

Women themselves frequently state that their primary commitment is to their children and in both paid employment and politics the general tendency is for women to devote themselves to activities having a close relationship to their maternal role (Wormald 1982). In Papua New Guinea,

Bray (1985) writes: 'jobs such as typing and nursing have become known as women's work. ... At the same time they learn to think that to be a parliamentarian, doctor, airline pilot or (bus) driver is a man's job'. Yet however important their chosen role, it is undervalued in both status and material rewards: 'Women have a disproportionately onerous role in the maintenance of living standards in the Pacific and they receive only a relatively small share of the benefits' (Hughes 1985).

When women wish to break out of their traditional role by entering the public economy and political arena, they may find not only that they lack economic independence but also that they cannot succeed without adapting to the requirements of the dominant gender. Apan (1985) has shown that attempts by women to organize economic development in their own way in PNG met opposition from the cultural mediators, the male-dominated missions and government.

In politics, they have to fulfil their traditional familial role as well as selling themselves as able to compete successfully in the power struggle. When an aspiring woman politician said: 'Unless women are represented at all levels of decision-making there will be no real developments that affect women in society', she was careful to add: 'This is not to say that laborious household tasks are of lesser importance (*Times of Papua New Guinea*, 8-15 August 1986:9).

#### WOMEN IN POLITICS GROUP

The need to combine being wives and mothers with successful political action and a commitment to furthering the interests of women may seem a formidable task. It is, as we have seen, one which has been undertaken by the Women in Politics group which was founded in June 1986. During the foundation weekend, all the women present and some of the men recognized the need to encourage greater participation by women in politics but a few men articulated doubts about the advisability of action at the present stage of PNG's development or indeed at anytime (*Times of Papua New Guinea*, 8-15 August 1986:9). The women had no doubt that their knowledge and experience was needed by their country and that if women worked together, they could ensure that they were in a position to make decisions. The group did offer some support in the 1987 election by lending their name to fund-raising activities by women candidates and by giving advice about the mechanics of standing as a candidate, but lack of money and accommodation made anything more impossible. Women in Politics, through its interim President, Maria Kopkop, maintained a fairly high profile in the media. It is concentrated on no specific policies or appeals to women to vote for women, but rather took a stand on the 'constitutional and moral obligation to be involved in the government of our country' (*Post-Courier*, 29 April 1987:3).

#### CONCLUSION

Given the overt recognition by major political leaders and parties of the importance of women's equality and the impetus for electing women MPs provided by the formation of WIP, why did women not make progress in 1987 instead of taking a backward step? There are a number of structural reasons of which the most important may have been lack of funds. Rooney probably spent about K7,000 but others spent nothing approaching this sum and still ran into debt. Jogo had only K100 from the Papua Party for her

nomination fee and found that funding was her major problem since lack of money prevented her from visiting all the districts of her provincial constituency. Pai, on the other hand, supported by PAP, spent K6,000 although some of this amount was from *wantoks* and her own pocket. Tekwie estimates she used K7,000 of which K2,000 in cash, together with electioneering materials, came from Pangu. Abaijah, who after Rooney came the nearest to winning, said she had no funds for her campaign although she carried it out over a long period by visiting even the most remote and isolated villages in Central Province. It was an impressive campaign and she polled well but was defeated by Diro who, it was subsequently revealed, had massive campaign funds for his newly-founded People's Action Party. Lack of party endorsement was a factor related to lack of organizational support as well as to lack of funds; six women were 'screened' by PPP but none was endorsed and it is not known how many others were similarly unsuccessful with other parties. Although party support in itself, as an indication of a policy direction or an ideological stance, was not an important factor in this election, the money and other assistance provided through their agency almost certainly was.

It is unlikely however, that even without these constraints that women would have made great strides in this election although one or two might have been elected. Women have to overcome the twin difficulties of their position in Papua New Guinea culture and their own ambivalent attitude to their entry into political structures. Women aspiring to political activity in PNG face the pressures of traditional society on top of which has been laid an ideology of economic development which reinforces the subordinate role of the mass of women. However impressive their own emergence from this role, candidates, in order to win elections have to make other women and men vote for them. Pokawin (1987) sees this obstacle as almost insuperable because success in the power game by a woman is still not acceptable. Clearly an education and awareness campaign about the contribution which women can make, based on examples from other parts of the world in politics and from within PNG in business and the public service, must be started now in preparation for the 1992 election. In the meantime aspirant women politicians must clarify their own position; do they like Tekwie, wish to 'whip' men out of politics or do they believe like Abaijah that the time for gender antagonism is not ripe. 'Just at the moment we shouldn't isolate women's problems from men's and women's shouldn't take precedence when you are in government ... women and men still go hand in hand in development of our country' (Abaijah 1987).

But if women have been discriminated against in the process of economic development it seems unreasonable for them to expect that they will not suffer equally in the political field at the hands of well-entrenched men. Some men will support women's aspirations but in general women may find, as they have elsewhere, that they need to work as a group for their own advancement. Even working as a group will not resolve all women's difficulties. Within WIP there has been another divergence of opinion between those who think the main objective should be to work for the election of women at every level of government and those who feel its main purpose should be to form an electoral lobby which would monitor all parliamentary decisions which might affect women and make representations in their interests. To do the latter they need to decide on a platform of women's issues and in a heterogeneous religious and cultural group, this might not prove easy. The two aims are not necessarily incompatible but to achieve both, they need personnel and resources not yet

available to the WIP. There is also the possibility that acting as a women's lobby might conflict with the work of the National Council of Women or the Women's Affairs Section of the ministry of Youth and Home Affairs, producing further disunity among women. (*Niugini Nius*, 1 September 1987:8). Moreover, some feel that setting a 'women's agenda' is a mistake; 'We focus our attention on the specific needs and problems of women rather than the needs and problems of the community and the nation' (Rooney 1985). For individual women, access to power in itself may be the goal, with the implicit assumption that political decisions will be different if women are prominent among the decision makers. If women are to achieve such a position, however, concerted action is essential; a climate must be created in which not having equal representation of women in decision making is seen as reprehensible, in which women are seen as able to play the political game on equal terms with men while pursuing their own goals. Awareness, education and action are all necessary both at grassroots level, the start of which was seen in the East Sepik in 1987, and at the elite level of lobbying through parties to adopt equal numbers of women candidates, teaching women the skills of political campaigning, and ensuring that successful women help others to emulate them.

Only then may we hope to see 'equal participation by women citizens in all political, economic and social activity' (*Constitution 1975: National Goals 2, Directive Principle 5*).

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# The Trader's Voice: PNG-Born Chinese Business and the 1987 Elections

MARGARET WILLSON

## *THE PNG-BORN CHINESE COMMUNITY*

The elections of any country are determined by more factors than the political predilections of the voting public and this is certainly true for the 1987 election of Papua New Guinea (PNG). One influence worth considering in this election is the relationship between the PNG-born Chinese business community and government officials. Government officials, for the purpose of this paper, are defined as public servants and established contenders for the 1987 political seats. The PNG-Chinese business community is slightly more difficult to define. This business community is enveloped in a kind of mythology created by its apparent ability to acquire money. This mythology, like all myth, has maintained its power through mystery; few outsiders have economic knowledge of either the income of PNG-Chinese business people or their business methods. Before we can discuss the true role of PNG-Chinese business in national politics, we must unravel a bit of the mystery.

### *Business Management*

We shall begin with business management. The management of PNG-Chinese businesses, from trade store to corporation, is a family concern. This is because of a prevailing attitude among PNG-born Chinese that, in business, the only people one can trust are family. Family members are not considered inherently superior to outsiders, but internal family influence is a driving force in the PNG-born Chinese community and can be used to exert pressure on a family member who is making what the family considers to be unsound business decisions. This pressure also ensures a degree of honesty within the company. Such control is not possible over an outsider. The ideal PNG-Chinese business is one in which pressure and respect are in balance so as to create a strong and stable management team. Because of a belief in this ideal, PNG-Chinese businesses tend to use family members in top management positions when possible. Business knowledge is circulated among the members of such a management team, but seldom becomes general knowledge outside the family concern. It is unlike the knowledge in

the expatriate companies where hired managers move between corporations, turning specific business methods into a matter of general knowledge. PNG-Chinese businesses tend to remain discreet about internal business methods also in the hope that this will help them maintain, or gain, an advantage over their competitors. Concern for both discretion and stable management has made their business knowledge a private affair.

### *The Image of Success*

Without specific knowledge, outsiders speculate on PNG-Chinese business methods, allowing rumour to become accepted as fact. One such accepted fact is that the PNG-Chinese have an inherent ability to make any business venture a financial success. Nationals and expatriate business people in the Port Moresby area express conflicting opinions about whether the cause is genetic or environmental, but the ability itself is above doubt and is perceived as giving the PNG-Chinese firms unfair advantages over other firms. This stereotype is based partly on observable reality: most PNG-Chinese businesses are successful enough to allow their owners a comfortable middle-class life-style. Success is partly due to the intense concentration many PNG-Chinese families devote to their business. In many PNG-Chinese families, business concerns dominate conversation both during business hours and at home. This continual concentration is a dominant factor in the high degree of financial stability that is actually achieved.

Their *perceived* financial stability is influenced by 'face'. The Chinese concept of 'face' has no equivalent in standard English usage. It is a state of being. It is a condition that allows the individual to retain a position within the moral fabric of a community where respect is given a value above all else. In both traditional and modern China, high emphasis is placed on outward conformity to an ideal behaviour. Maintaining 'face' is the ability to live up to the standards of that code. A person who does not follow this code will be ostracised. 'Loss of face' is more than embarrassment or shame; it robs a person or family of a positive self-identity. It leads to extreme humiliation and in some cases suicide (Wilson 1979). For the PNG-Chinese business family, maintaining 'face', or the appearance of success, is vital and success will be upheld at almost any cost. For this reason, if business failure does occur, few outsiders will hear of it. The combination of all these factors - privacy relating to business methods, a high incidence of actual success, and the emphasis on 'face' even in times of financial difficulty - have worked to give the PNG-Chinese businessmen their legendary reputation for clever business judgment and an almost invincible ability to succeed at any business they enter. Such a reputation about the use of this power promotes questions about their role in national politics.

### *FUNDING REQUESTS*

A central issue relates to sources of funding for the candidates. The political parties of the 1987 elections presented individual platforms, but the policy differences between them were often subtle. The traditional dialectic of the Left and Right in party policy did not apply to the issues they addressed, nor was one party characterised as the specific party that catered

to business concerns. Because of this and other factors, a candidate's individual influence counted as much as party affiliation and encouraged the candidates to seek funds on personal merit. Candidates seeking such funds often come to PNG-born Chinese businessmen. The candidates realise, either from reputation or from individual dealings with a specific business, that these businessmen earn at least middle class incomes and in addition have a vested interest in the future of PNG. For these reasons, candidates look to PNG-born Chinese businessmen for sizeable contributions to their campaigns. It is implicitly suggested that any candidate who receives a contribution will, if he becomes a member of parliament, unravel bureaucratic tangles for a person who has helped him in the past, no matter whether he is Chinese, other expatriate, or National. This possibility of preferential status is also why the general attitude among the PNG-born Chinese is either to give small contributions to all of the candidates or to give nothing. In general, PNG-Chinese prefer to donate money in support of community sports or charities, investments more in keeping with their particular interests and daily lives.

### *Political Insecurity*

One reason for their attitude lies in political insecurity. During much of the colonial era, the PNG-Chinese had uncertain citizenship. The majority came in the early 1900s under German colonial rule and remained under the Australian Administration. During this period they remained nominally Chinese citizens, but as the years of continued separation from China passed, their alliances began to shift towards their adopted country. As non-British subjects and 'non-aboriginal natives' of the Mandated Territory, the PNG-Chinese were classed as aliens in PNG (Cahill 1973). During the Japanese invasion of the Second World War, the Australians adopted a confused policy towards the PNG-Chinese, unable to decide whether to treat them as expatriates and evacuate them or to treat them as locals and leave them behind. The Australians made a halfhearted attempt at evacuation in Lae, but in the Rabaul area, they treated the Chinese as locals and ignored them. Because of such confusion, the PNG-Chinese began to push for citizenship after the war ended. As the Australians were then the ruling elite in PNG, they sought Australian citizenship. Most did not at that time contemplate making Australia their home. In 1956, the Australian government awarded them Australian citizenship (Cahill 1973, Inglis 1975, Wu 1982). In the early 1970s, the PNG independence movements, particularly the Mataungan movement in East New Britain, carried exclusionist and nationalist overtones. This nationalism often took the form of anti-Chinese action. Other recent independence movements in Indonesia had resulted in massacre and expulsion of the Chinese (Mackie 1976). Faced with these examples, many Chinese became nervous about the safety of their families and left. Those who remained encountered little actual danger, but they retained a sense of insecurity about the stability of their political status in PNG.

When PNG became independent in 1975, the new government did not grant the PNG-born Chinese automatic citizenship, granting them only the options of becoming either naturalized or resident non-citizens. Under naturalized status they had restricted land rights and retained a status as outsiders. Since the proposal of dual citizenship had already been rejected by the new government as well as the Australians, the PNG-Chinese had to



make a choice between becoming naturalized PNG citizens and forfeiting their Australian citizenship, or keeping the Australian citizenship and living in PNG as resident non-citizens. The PNG-born Chinese had fought hard for Australian citizenship under the Australian Administration and, despite their feeling of loyalty to PNG, most opted for the political stability of retaining that citizenship. The PNG government's offer, they felt, accorded them only second class status. Either option - as naturalized PNG citizens or Australians living in PNG - placed them in a politically insecure position.

### *Political Impartiality*

PNG is a democratic state and its members of Parliament are elected every five years. The National government in PNG is trying to unite a country of hundreds of different languages and cultures. Because of the tensions among these groups, the elections are notoriously unpredictable. If a businessman backs a candidate who then loses his seat, that businessmen cannot count on political or financial impartiality from the winning opponent. As non-citizens, PNG-born Chinese living in PNG have little political recourse against a politician who might decide to turn against them. Most PNG-born Chinese have invested much of their future in PNG and they do not want to endanger this vision for themselves or their families. For this reason, most choose the middle road of political impartiality rather than risk making political enemies.

Another related reason for political impartiality is that most PNG-born Chinese prefer to remain unobtrusive both politically and socially. They tend to refrain from political involvement in an attempt to reduce the damaging side-effects of envy. They state that envious people will try to improve their own status by 'shooting at the head of the tallest poppy'. Envy is a danger both within and outside the Chinese community. All the PNG-born Chinese are related either by blood or marriage and this closeness gives the weapons of gossip and filial duty additional power. These binding kin ties, in a community where one household may contain members of two or more competing companies, create a political atmosphere where a delicate balance between public and private becomes vital even in the most intimate of relationships. In such an atmosphere, envy can create havoc inside a company as well as between companies. Likewise, if business people outside the PNG-Chinese community feel that certain PNG-Chinese are gaining too much advantage, they could try to damage that PNG-born Chinese person's status or company standing. The way to avoid becoming the object of such destructive envy is to keep one's own head low and blend in with the other businesses.

### *IDENTITY QUESTIONS*

The PNG-born Chinese have an uncertain identity. They are racially distinct from the native Papua New Guineans. They are ethnically Chinese but their culture is less easily categorized. For most, their first languages include Tok Pisin as well as Cantonese; they speak Cantonese that is dotted with nineteenth century terms no longer commonly used in modern Hong Kong or China and liberally interspersed with Cantonese swear words used in a way that reflects more a Melanesian and Australian life-style than Chinese. Most would not consider themselves fluent in Cantonese and if

their Cantonese vocabulary fails them, they quickly substitute a word in English or Tok Pisin. Few read or write Chinese or know much of classical Chinese philosophy. While they have retained much of the traditional Chinese style of cooking, their dishes have also incorporated Melanesian foods and cooking techniques. Their traditional medicine, which like many other overseas Chinese in Western influenced countries they use as a supplement to Western medicine, has become a blend of Melanesian and Chinese. The result is a culture that is neither Australian, Melanesian nor Chinese, but a culture unique in itself. Most PNG-born Chinese feel they could not live in China. As one young PNG-born Chinese woman said: 'We had a lovely holiday. We visited my grandfather's village. It was interesting, but so dirty and poor...I'd hate to live there.' (personal communication, anonymous, February 1987).

Most are Australian citizens, yet few of the PNG-born Chinese who were raised in PNG like living in Australia. Many of the older PNG-Chinese who left PNG at Independence regret the move and wish they could return. Those who travel south for business trips or to visit family, return refreshed from the change, but glad are to be 'home'. As some PNG-born Chinese people have said about Australia:

I enjoyed Brisbane, but it got boring. There's nothing to do. Most of my friends are here in Moresby. (personal communication, anonymous, April 1987).

People are different outside Rabaul. Rabaul people are friendly...In Australia, people just don't have time for you. In Rabaul we always have time. (personal communication, anonymous, December 1986).

or:

I tried living in Australia for a few months, but I didn't like it. This (Rabaul) is where I want to die (personal communication, anonymous, September 1986).

### *Friendship*

This combination of background and emotion makes the PNG-Chinese racial and legal outsiders in the country they consider home. Despite such commitment to PNG, PNG-Chinese realise that they are legally guests and they do not want to endanger their position. Before Independence, the PNG-Chinese had some involvement in elections. In 1964, a PNG-Chinese businessman acted as campaign manager for the Spanner-Tolimán team and in 1968, three PNG-Chinese stood as candidates in the New Guinea Islands. But even in 1964, the PNG-Chinese showed so little interest in politics that they were criticized both in the gossip column *Rabaul Talktalk* and at a pre-election meeting. At this meeting several people asked why no Chinese candidates were standing. As one student said:

It is very rare to hear Chinese talking about political matters. It would not matter if they were not naturalized yet. All their interest is based on the business sector of the economy (Bettison 1965:257; Epstein 1971:73).

In the years following Independence, the reluctance of the PNG-Chinese to involve themselves in politics has only increased. Now the PNG-

born Chinese do not want to become politically involved in PNG because they then run the risk of becoming a perceived threat to the nationalist aims of the PNG government. This they do not wish to do, so the choice of most PNG-born Chinese is to remain free of political involvement. This opinion seems consistent across the country. In Rabaul: 'We're traders, business is what we're good at...Politics is too unsure' (personal communication, anonymous, October 1986); or from Port Moresby: 'I'm not very interested in politics, except when it affects business. I'm just a businessman...getting messed up in politics only gets you trouble' (personal communication, anonymous, June 1987). And according to one government official:

The [PNG] Chinese are power brokers, but they stay out of the political scene. They are ... a commercial power. When they do back a person in an election, it is not so much for commercial gain but more from long connections and long-standing friendships. They aren't so much worried about what the candidate can do for them personally, but support them from long association (personal communication, Mr Wep Kanawi, May 1987).

This same long association makes the relationship between the PNG-Chinese and public servants somewhat different from their relationship with the elected politicians. The public servants are PNG's elite, often highly educated, and they remain in government over several administrations. Because of their long-term involvement with government, high-ranking public servants become politically powerful both in normal government affairs and in matters relating to an election. Many PNG-born Chinese are friends of these officials. Friendship is an ambiguous term that implies varied meanings for different cultures. In general Western usage, it means a person who has access to the domestic life of another person. The word was earlier incorporated into New Guinea Pidgin with the Western meaning. In contrast, the eighteenth-century European meaning of 'friend' implied a unity of elites that supported each other; for example, the King's Friends were those who supported his rule. The friendship between PNG-Chinese and elite Nationals encompasses both meanings. They have emotional commitment, but both are members of a PNG elite who benefit by supporting each other. This friendship does indeed smooth PNG-Chinese negotiations with the government, but that is not the purpose of the friendship nor its intent. Both the friendship and the elite status are partly grounded on the PNG educational system.

### *Schooling*

Before Independence, primary schools in PNG were segregated and the European children attended a separate school from the Chinese and Nationals. The two Chinese-funded primary schools established after the Second World War in Rabaul catered at first exclusively to Chinese students (largely because the classes were taught in Chinese). The Australian Administration also adopted a policy to provide separate Primary and Post-Primary Schools for Asians and Natives (Cahill 1973:192). Beginning in 1948 the Australian administered education system allowed the resident Chinese to attend secondary schools in Australia (Cahill 1973:193). In 1952, twenty-two 'Asian' children enrolled in Australian schools (Cahill

1973:196) and that same year, a secondary department was established at the Administrative Chinese School in Rabaul where students could prepare for the Junior Public Examination of the University of Queensland (Cahill 1973:198). Those who remained in Rabaul could attend the Administrative Chinese Secondary School for Chinese and mixed race students (Cahill 1973:199, citing Thompson 1951/1952:39).

Beginning in 1948, the nationals from either elite families or those who showed exceptional promise had a similar chance to continue their secondary schooling in Australia. When the opportunity came, many elite Nationals and Chinese attended the same schools mainly because these schools were recommended from one family to the next. These schools included the Marist Brothers' College (Ashgrove, Qld.), Scots College (Warwick, Qld.), Eagle Heights School (Mt. Tamborine, Qld.) University of Queensland, Oakhill College (N.S.W.), Blackheath College (Qld.), Slade School (Warwick, Qld.), Rockhampton Grammar School (Qld.) St. Brendon's College (Qld.), and others.

In Australia, both the PNG-born Chinese and the PNG nationals felt like strangers in an alien land. PNG-born Chinese recount their first experiences of riding a lift or an escalator or their nervousness at entering a large city. The nationals had many similar experiences. In an alien country, the PNG-born Chinese and the Nationals found they had more in common with each other than with many native-born Australians. Their shared background of a childhood in PNG and a shared language of Tok Pisin created more empathy between them. Also, racial prejudice in Australia against people with anything but European-coloured skin further tied them together. The result was that many nationals and PNG-born Chinese developed deep and lasting friendships. As these school children reached adulthood and returned to PNG, many of the PNG-born Chinese became entrepreneurs while the nationals became public servants, professionals, politicians, and entrepreneurs. Both groups form an elite segment of PNG society and, as friends, they influence each other. The reciprocal nature of this relationship should be stressed here. PNG-Chinese do influence the views of friends who are in government, but the public servants also influence the views of their PNG-Chinese friends. PNG is a rapidly changing country. Such reciprocal relations between people with a common ground in PNG culture and expertise learned overseas provide insights on how PNG can react to internal change and external pressures.

### *PUBLIC SERVANTS IN PNG POLITICS*

Of seventeen established politicians running in the 1987 election, selected on the basis of their national influence, fifteen had been employed in the public service before they ran for public office. Twelve of these public service-trained politicians attended schools in Australia. Of these, at least ten attended schools with PNG-Chinese. As one prominent public servant, who did not run for public office, said, 'I went to school with (PNG-born) Chinese...They're friends' (personal communication, Mr Wep Kanawi, May 1987). This special relationship, a Melanesian version of the 'old school tie,' makes some politicians the exception to the PNG-Chinese rule of impartiality. These school connections should not be underestimated. They are an integral part of political unity in PNG. One has only to note the influence of the 'Bully Beef Club', a discussion group from the

Administrative College in Waigani in the 1960s which formed the embryo for the Pangu Pati (Amarshi, Good, and Mortimer 1979:154).

In the rare cases during the 1987 elections when PNG-Chinese actively supported a friend who was running for office, or if they particularly favoured the politics of a certain party, they became involved mostly by making policy suggestions or giving political advice. Other PNG-Chinese muttered dire warnings against such involvement, but to no avail. In the 1987 elections, at least three of the parties had advice and personal involvement of PNG-Chinese businessmen.

### *Mutual Benefits*

Such relationships of long association provide a catalyst for the introduction of business connections between PNG-born Chinese and elite Nationals. A person will often prefer to conduct business with a friend because he knows the strengths and weaknesses of a friend. This is why many PNG-born Chinese who enter a business transaction, prefer to deal with someone they know. Sometimes this person will be a long-standing National friend. Some of these transactions are financially successful; some are not. However, over a longer period, both sides usually benefit. The PNG-born Chinese benefits through continuing ties with a National who has become influential. In addition such interaction continues to add to the PNG-born Chinese person's understanding of Melanesian culture. The National gains through the business knowledge and support he receives from the PNG-born Chinese businessmen. As with nearly all business transactions, both sides hope for financial gain. These are the usual business connections between most PNG-born Chinese and National government officials and the PNG-born Chinese are quite open about them.

The PNG-Chinese are traders; therefore most are not interested in large government contracts. Instead their business concerns are the sort of transactions where one person sells property to another or two persons start up a business together. Although this relationship can influence a politician's financial standing and indirectly influence the amount of cash he can pour into an election, his PNG-born Chinese business associate has little financial interest in the election's outcome; a person in political office can lose money as easily as a person in another vocation. The PNG-born Chinese are offering the elite Papua New Guineans the opportunity to learn about those same legendary business methods that have made them perceived as per capita the most successful entrepreneurs in PNG. In this way, the PNG-born Chinese are assisting the development of business in PNG in a way that foreign aid cannot. Theirs is a grassroots involvement. They are not giving anything and therefore are not insulting the PNG sense of self-pride. The Nationals are neither granting a favour that will increase their influence over the PNG-born Chinese, nor are they accepting a favour that would put them in debt. Rather they are working in a symbiotic relationship that is beneficial to both.

### *Selection of PNG-born Chinese Advisors*

These friendships also open channels where the national politicians and government officials feel they can ask select PNG-born Chinese for advice. This is different from an informal exchange of views in that specific advice

is sought on a specific issue or for a specific transaction. The advisor acts in an official capacity and is paid for services rendered. At least four prominent PNG-born Chinese business people offer consulting services to government bodies while many others give advice when they are asked for it. The PNG-born Chinese have lived in PNG longer than any other expatriate group. The exodus at Independence left about a thousand people, or a third of the original population. These remaining residents have experience, through their own lives and through those of their parents and grandparents, of the changes and problems of PNG over two colonial administrations and over more than ten years of independence. At present, most expatriates come to PNG on a contract basis for a period of two or three years. Some remain longer, perhaps even as long as ten years, but few stay long enough to call the country their homeland. Fewer still pass from childhood to adulthood in PNG and then work as qualified professionals. As a people who spent their early years in PNG and who place an emphasis on education, the PNG-born Chinese have qualities that other expatriates do not.

Their background gives the PNG-born Chinese the advantage of continuity when they give professional advice to the government. They have watched the ebb and flow of political trends; they have conducted business under various administrations and survived through them. Most of those who are in the position to advise the government are also connected to international trade networks and have extensive knowledge of international politics and finance. When National politicians and government officials want outside advice, they often turn to the PNG-born Chinese as the experts best able to serve them. In this sphere, PNG-Chinese have a positive influence on the policy of politicians. This in turn can affect a politician's election platform. In this way, PNG-Chinese can *indirectly* affect election results by directly affecting certain government policies that relate to business and finance.

A traditional Chinese cultural trait the PNG-Chinese have retained is the higher value of the family over the individual. They are watching the social and economic changes in PNG and are hoping for a development that will allow their children to remain in the country with jobs suited to their educational level. PNG-Chinese want their children to feel secure in investing both their capital and their professional expertise in PNG. These parents can work to ensure economic support for their children, but this is only one aspect of a family's needs. To maintain the economic stability the PNG-born Chinese desire, PNG as a whole must retain political and cultural stability. Their idea of good government is one that is stable and secure. They do not want radical change nor revolution; their ideal government is a conservative one that will allow them to make long-term plans and investments. They are not interested in short-term goals. When PNG-born Chinese work with the PNG government, these are the ends they are trying to achieve. Because of this, their advice to the government is likely to be given with the development of the country in mind.

Although a PNG-born Chinese would always work for the advancement of his family first, family stability depends upon a country-wide stability. This is not the case with contract workers. Contract workers, from Australia, Asia, Britain, or other countries, come to PNG generally for only a few reasons: they cannot find a job elsewhere; or they come for adventure; or they come for job advancement; or they come for money. Outside investors come for financial profit. Here lies a fundamental difference between the PNG-born Chinese and expatriate business people.

Outside investors can profit from a short term investment and pull out if they find the political, social, or economic climate unfavourable. Likewise, a contract worker will generally stay only as long as the contracting employer gives him the incentives he or she desires. In order to make a similar choice, PNG-Chinese must exile themselves from the country they consider a homeland. To avoid such an exile, PNG-Chinese walk a narrow path between involvement and detachment in PNG government affairs. Their direct effect on the 1987 elections was probably negligible, but as advisors and contributors to the economic development of an independent PNG, they are a rare asset to PNG political leaders.

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## **Part 2**





## Angoram Open: Twelve Candidates, One Party, Little Enthusiasm

R. J. MAY

### *THE ELECTORATE*

Angoram, one of the East Sepik's six open electorates, is geographically one of the largest electorates in the country, stretching some 135 km north to south from the coast to the border with Enga Province and 190 km east to west from the border with Madang Province to the Ambunti district boundary, an area of over 15,000 sq.km. Much of the electorate is thinly populated, however, the population being concentrated along the Sepik River and its major southern tributaries, the Keram, the Yuat and the Karawari. The electorate (whose boundaries coincide with Angoram District) contains a number of language groups divided between fourteen census divisions, but in terms of self-identification the bulk of the population can be roughly divided into three geographical zones: the middle Sepik, which includes a number of large river villages (mostly Iatmul speakers); the grass country south of the river, including the Keram and Yuat villages; and the lower Sepik, including the Murik Lakes and the scattered population between the river and the coast in the eastern corner of the province. Of a total district population of just under 39,000 in 1980, about 38 per cent were in the Grass, Yuat and Banaro census divisions and 22 per cent in the Middle Sepik and Korosameri census divisions. Angoram town, a minor administrative and commercial centre, had a population in 1980 of 1830, including a shifting population of people from up and down the river, and the Gavien Resettlement Scheme, a few kilometres outside Angoram, contained about the same number, drawn from various parts of the province. (Since 1980 there has been a significant increase in the number of people at Gavien.)

The Angoram District is one of the poorer districts of Papua New Guinea, being ranked 59th out of 87 districts in a 1985 study of district level inequalities (de Albuquerque and D'Sa, 1985). Two traditional mainstays of the cash economy, crocodile skins and artifacts, provide a small and irregular source of income, artifact sales specifically having been adversely affected by a decline in tourism (itself a minor source of income) and official discouragement of private - mostly foreign - artifact dealers. With the development of the Gavien Resettlement Scheme, cocoa, *Robusta* coffee and rubber production have become the major sources of income, along with small quantities of copra and vegetables. A Wewak-Angoram Land

Development Scheme, formulated by the provincial government, is undergoing a feasibility study. It is planned to cover some 90,000 ha in Angoram and Wewak districts and involves logging, plantation and smallholder production of coffee, cocoa and copra, and subsistence agriculture. In contrast to some other electorates in the country, there is little cash to lavish on election campaigns in Angoram and local business interests are not conspicuous, although the Pangu Pati president and former candidate, Joe Kenni, is a businessman of some standing and president of a small but influential group of local businessmen, Angoram Development Association, in Angoram town.


Although the construction, by the Somare government, of a road between Wewak and Angoram has considerably improved land communication, transportation in the electorate is still mainly by motorized canoe and is difficult and expensive.

Politically, Angoram, even more than the rest of East Sepik (excepting, perhaps, Peter Lus' Maprik), has been a longstanding Pangu stronghold. The lower Sepik is the home area of former Pangu leader and prime minister Michael Somare, and the Angoram branch of Pangu has had a continuity of membership and support unusual in Papua New Guinea politics.

Between 1972 and 1982 the Angoram seat was held for Pangu by Bill Eichorn, a mixed-race former teacher who has a crocodile farm and cattle smallholding on the Keram River. On the eve of the 1982 election, Eichorn looked vulnerable and though endorsed by Pangu he was opposed by seven candidates, including two strong pro-Pangu candidates, John Maiben and Philip Laki Yua. The last-minute candidacy of Laki, a local businessman (formerly a telephone operator) from Timbunke village in the middle Sepik who had been a member of the provincial assembly since 1979, was not universally popular: many middle Sepik villagers resented the fact that the man they had elected to represent them in the provincial assembly had resigned, without consulting them, to contest the national seat, and many Pangu Pati officials, who had seen Maiben as a likely successor to Eichorn, feared that a three-way split of the Pangu vote might let a rival candidate through. Laki was supported, however, by the Angoram Development Association, and in the event he won the contest by a clear margin over Maiben. Eichorn came third, the three Pangu candidates together collecting 73 per cent of the vote. The endorsed National Party candidate, Teddy Sane, came fourth with 12 per cent of the vote and the endorsed Melanesian Alliance (MA) candidate received less than 200 votes (May 1989).

### *PRELUDE TO THE CAMPAIGN*

In the lead-up to the 1987 election the customary preambles to nomination, preselection and campaigning, got under way slowly. In Port Moresby a Concerned Sepiks Group (whose membership seemed to contain a preponderance of MA supporters) held a meeting with a view to identifying 'good provincial candidates' for East Sepik, across party lines. There were suggestions (as there had been in 1982) that Somare might stand for Angoram, leaving MA national chairman Bernard Narokobi to contest the provincial seat, thereby avoiding a confrontation between Narokobi and the sitting Pangu member for Wewak, Tony Bais. But nothing came of the Group's suggestions.



Nationally, an electoral pact was negotiated between Pangu and the MA with a view to avoiding contests between Pangu and MA candidates. This pact was always suspect, since in Morobe Province the MA had a similar pact with the Morobe Independent Group, whose principal electoral platform was opposition to Pangu; also it was known that Narokobi intended to stand in East Sepik, in either the provincial seat or in Wewak. In the event the MA endorsed candidates in every East Sepik electorate except Angoram; Narokobi stood (successfully) against Bais and a MA candidate stood (to little effect) against Somare. This was a source of some bitterness amongst Pangu supporters.

Within East Sepik, as in some other provinces, there was discussion of whether the provincial government should give its endorsement to selected candidates. Since the provincial government was generally regarded as a Pangu government such a move might have been expected to favour Pangu candidates; however in 1985 there had been a falling out between the provincial government and the national MPs from the province which culminated in the national members calling for the suspension of the provincial government (May forthcoming). Although the rift had been largely closed, feelings between the provincial government and national Pangu members were still not overly cordial in 1987 and the provincial government (which itself appeared to be losing cohesion in 1987) played no role in the national election, though the deputy premier subsequently became a candidate in Angoram.

At the 'grassroots', talks with a variety of people in villages and in Wewak and Angoram in 1986 suggested a fairly widespread disenchantment with national politics. People expressed the view that, once elected, politicians were only interested in looking after themselves and showed no concern for those who voted them into office. Many electors said they would not vote in 1987. (Long-time student of the East Sepik, Bryant Allen, made similar observations in 1987 - personal communication). The government's voter education campaign may have done something to counteract this (although the returning officer at Angoram assessed its impact as 'limited'): for what the figures are worth, total votes cast in Angoram in 1987 represented 89 per cent of enrolled voters.

### *PARTIES*

In East Sepik generally, parties played a much less conspicuous role in 1987 than they had in 1982. Pangu was, of course, well represented, with all seven sitting members re-endorsed and the individual campaigns coordinated from the party's provincial headquarters behind the provincial assembly chamber in Wewak. Despite its pre-election pact with Pangu, the MA also endorsed candidates in all but one electorate. It maintained a small office in a local motor vehicle workshop, though MA activity largely revolved around the campaign of Narokobi in Wewak. The list of endorsed candidates of the People's Progress Party (PPP) included four in East Sepik, not including Angoram, but although the national party secretary visited the province briefly there was little evidence of an organized campaign. With Sane standing as an independent, there was no National Party (NP) organization in the province, although former Yangoru-Saussia member John Jaminan contested that seat, unsuccessfully, as a NP candidate. The People's Democratic Movement (PDM) and League for National Advancement (LNA) were conspicuous by

their absence, though PDM leaders had talked with candidates in the province. The relatively low visibility of parties was reinforced by the fact that the campaign budgets of the two major parties in the province were small, and by the decision of Pangu, in view of criticism of its 1982 campaign, to run a 'no noise' campaign.

In Angoram in 1982 there had been four party-endorsed candidates; moreover, in addition to the Pangu endorsed candidate there had been four pro-Pangu candidates, at least one of whom was alleged to have received some assistance from the party. The National Party, MA and PPP all endorsed candidates in 1982, though only the NP candidate (Sane) appears to have received much backing from his party, the MA national leadership even supporting Sane over the MA-endorsed candidate, who polled poorly. In 1987 Pangu policy ruled out pro-Pangu candidates and none of the parties which had endorsed candidates in 1982 - the NP, MA and PPP - endorsed candidates in Angoram in 1987 (though one candidate claimed affiliation with the PPP and another with the MA - see below).

The Angoram electorate was thus unusual - though not unique - in 1987 in that it had only one party-endorsed candidate, in a field of twelve. Pangu officials rationalized this by saying that since the electorate was 'Panguloyal', association with another party was an electoral liability, that it would be seen as 'disrespectful' to Michael Somare. There was almost certainly some truth in this, and it probably explains the reticence of candidates like Wimban, Unumba and Sane towards declaring party affiliations. But discussion with villagers over the twelve months or so before the election also suggested a pretty widespread cynicism, even hostility, towards parties in general; parties, they said, were more interested in playing the coalition 'numbers game' than in governing the country, and had done nothing for the people. In any case, since parties other than Pangu apparently had very little to offer candidates in Angoram, it made more sense to remain independent during the elections and keep options open if elected.

### ***THE CANDIDATES***

Laki served as an able if somewhat unspectacular member of the national parliament and, as the sitting member, he was reendorsed by Pangu in 1987. Eleven other contestants sought election.

Michael Kayus Nime, of Yaul village (Yuat CD), aged 42, educated to grade 6, a former policeman and church worker in Wewak, self-described in 1987 as a subsistence farmer, and president of the Biwat-Yaul Business Group. He had not stood previously and contested the election as an independent.

Sari Wimban, born in Mindimbit (Middle Sepik CD) but living on the Gavien settlement, 43, a diplomate in Health Administration from the College of Allied Health Science, Madang, having served for ten years as provincial health extension officer and stood for the national parliament unsuccessfully in 1977 as the endorsed UP candidate. In 1987 Wimban stood with the support of the Public Employees Association (the only East Sepik candidate with PEA endorsement). He did not declare any party attachment but was widely believed to be a PDM supporter, and admitted having 'had talks' with Wingti.

Teddy Sane, born at Koragopa (Grass CD) but living at Magiengo No.1, 38, educated to grade 10, a former naval cadet officer, merchant seaman and then stevedore instructor in Lae, had returned to the province in 1977 to contest the national election as a PPP candidate. Failing to get elected, Sane set himself up in Angoram, operating a trade store and dealing in crocodile skins. In 1981 he founded a local branch of the National Party and the following year stood as the endorsed NP candidate in Angoram, with support not only from Okuk but from the MA (see May, 1989). Following Okuk's death Sane lost interest in the NP, which he said was 'in a mess', and in 1987 he stood as '*independen kendidet i sapatim grass rut pipol long ples*', though he too appears to have had some contact with the PDM.

Victor Terenfop, of Akuram (Yuat CD), 38, educated to grade 9, employed for fourteen years as a community school teacher but self-described in 1987 as a subsistence farmer. Terenfop had not stood previously and had no party attachment.

Leo Unumba, from Biwat (Yuat CD) but resident in Angoram, 34, matriculated from UPNG and trained in Australia as a pilot before returning to work with a local construction company, Sepik Brothers, in Angoram. In 1977 Unumba contested the national elections, unsuccessfully, as an independent; two years later he was successful in the provincial elections, winning the Yuat seat and subsequently becoming deputy premier and treasurer. He was reelected to the provincial assembly in 1983 but resigned to contest the national election. Although standing as an independent, and having served in a predominantly Pangu provincial government, Unumba was said to have PPP links.

Benny Simbi, of Imbuando (Lower Sepik CD), 46, educated to grade 7, trained as a forestry officer at the Forestry College, Bulolo and served in East and West Sepik before retiring in 1979. Simbi, 'self-employed' in 1987, served as a councillor for a number of years. In 1982 Simbi stood as the endorsed PPP candidate. In 1987 he again claimed PPP affiliation but did not appear on the PPP's list of endorsed candidates and was officially described as independent.

Sami Januarius, also of Imbuando, 31, educated to grade 10, was employed by Wantok Nius and later as a provincial public servant before returning to his village. Described in 1987 as 'self-employed', Januarius had not previously contested an election, and stood as an independent.

Matthew Tamoane, of Darapap (Murik Lakes CD), 42, a former teacher and public servant with a BEd from UPNG, had returned to his village in 1984 to become involved in community and youth work. Tamoane, an independent, had not stood previously.

Jae Maika, of Moim village (Middle Sepik CD) but living in Angoram, 42, educated to grade 9, was employed as Angoram Council executive officer for eighteen years before leaving to become a coffee buyer for the Lus Corporation. Maika had unsuccessfully contested the 1977 and 1982 national elections and 1979 provincial election as a pro-Pangu candidate. In 1987 he stood as an independent

Elias Kainor, of Angoram (Middle Sepik CD), about 50, educated to grade 10, a former member of the army and subsequently a clerk in private enterprise in Madang and Wewak, was self-described in 1987 as a subsistence farmer. Elias, who had never stood before, claimed affiliation with the MA - and indeed his name had been written in to the list of MA candidates on the wall of the MA's small electoral office; the MA, however, denied having any association with him.

Torovi Dambui, of Angoram, 49, no formal education, a self-employed artifact carver who had returned to the Sepik after eighteen years in Rabaul and Lae and had not stood previously.

Of these twelve candidates, the general pre-election consensus seemed to be that only three or four had much chance. Most people with an opinion seemed to think that the likely winner was either Laki or Unumba. Both were well known and had firm bases in the populous - and therefore critical - grass country and middle Sepik areas. Reports from the Middle Sepik, however, suggested that a longstanding antipathy between the big Iatmul villages of Tambanum and Timbunke had resurfaced and that the Tambanum people were therefore likely to support Unumba against Laki (who is from Timbunke), splitting the middle Sepik vote and thereby giving an advantage, especially, to Wimban, who, himself a middle Sepik, was believed to have strong support in the grass country as well as in Angoram town and Gavien. There was also some suggestion that people in Yuat were angry with Unumba for abandoning his provincial seat to contest the election, but similar comments had been made about Laki in 1987, and it had done him no obvious harm. Opinions differed as to Sane's prospects. Sane himself was confident (as he had been in 1982), claiming strong support in the grass country and lower Sepik, but only a small number of the people with whom I spoke gave him much chance. Most of them counted against Sane the fact that he had stood for three different parties in three elections, and some complained that he was not a '*gras rut man*'.

### THE CAMPAIGN

In over a decade of election-watching in Papua New Guinea, I have never witnessed a campaign as quiet as that in Angoram in 1987. In contrast to 1982, when most people with whom I spoke could name most of the candidates and attach party labels to them, and had views about who might win, in 1987 few people seemed to have much knowledge about who was standing and little apparent interest in the outcome. Most expressed cynical views about parties and politicians.

Pangu, as usual, ran a well-organised but low-key campaign through its established *komiti* system. The Pangu team carried out fairly extensive patrols through the electorate - including the Keram, despite early threats by Eichorn that he would prevent Pangu teams entering his area. Laki was reported to have distributed NDF grants in several villages, including an amount of K5000 in Tambanum. Somare visited the electorate - making a special trip up the Keram - at a very early stage of the campaign but did not return until the final days before voting, and then only briefly. But there was little evidence of posters or party T-shirts and many *komiti* complained that they received scant support from party headquarters and had to provide canoes and pay for benzine personally. At village meetings party officials



emphasized Pangu's (and by implication, East Sepik's) early leadership of the nation and pointed to inefficiencies, disagreements and corruption in the Wingti government. They promised, if a Pangu government were returned, to promote economic development in the area (claiming as Pangu achievements the Wewak-Angoram road, the Gavien Scheme and the eradication of *Salvinia* from the river) and to tackle the growing *raskol* problem in the province. (The *raskol* issue was underlined by the closure of Angoram High School in June 1987 because of repeated attacks by *raskols*.) The Pangu teams were generally well received, though they ran into verbal abuse in a few villages where people felt that the sitting member had done nothing for them. A particular grievance in a few villages was the failure of the government (and indirectly of the local member) to assist in the sale of artifacts, and in Timbunke village people complained that, though he was a Timbunke man, Laki had done nothing to improve the road from Timbunke to the Sepik Highway.

Unumba, Sane and Wimban, and their campaign organizers, carried out limited patrols, concentrating on areas of expected support (Unumba in the grass country and middle Sepik; Sane mostly in the grass country and lower Sepik, and Wimban in the grass country and at Gavien) and around Angoram town. Both Unumba and Sane appeared to have well-organized informal *komiti* networks. At campaign meetings these candidates discussed much the same issues: the performance of the Wingti and Somare governments, economic development, and law and order.

None of the other candidates appears to have moved much beyond his own group of villages.

The returning officer in Angoram also reported a quiet and incident-free campaign and polling, though in the south of the electorate villagers from Enga came in to vote in East Sepik, in protest against the lack of regular government services in their own province (*Post-Courier* 31 July 1987).

### THE VOTE

The outcome of the election was a victory for Laki, who obtained 32 per cent of the vote, over Sane (21 per cent) and Unumba (13 per cent). Wimban (6 per cent) finished only fifth.

An analysis of ballot box figures helps throw some light on the pattern of voting (see tables 1, 2). Laki achieved the best spread of votes, being placed first in 13 of the 37 ballot box\* counts and second in another 9. Almost certainly he attracted votes as the sitting member and the endorsed Pangu candidate. Nevertheless Laki derived a quite high 31 per cent of his vote from only 4 of the 37 ballot boxes; moreover in 12 ballot boxes he scored less than 50 votes and in 5 boxes 10 votes or less. Surprisingly, Sane achieved a comparable spread: first in 11 ballot boxes, second in 7, with 32 per cent of his vote in 4 boxes but scoring less than 50 votes in 15 boxes and 10 or less in 8. Unumba recorded only 5 first placings and 11 seconds and his vote was more concentrated: 42 per cent from 4 boxes and 10 or fewer votes in 13 boxes. Other candidates' votes tended, as might be expected, to be more highly concentrated: Terenfop, who came fourth, received more than half his vote from two ballot boxes; Wimban received 40 per cent of his vote from two boxes, and the next ranked candidate, Tamoane, a high 74 per cent

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\* There were actually 38 ballot boxes but one contained only 14 votes (of which Sane and Laki together got 12).

from 2 (apparently defeating Laki on the lower Sepik) but receiving no votes at all in 19 boxes. Only three candidates - Wimban, Januarius and Dambui - failed to win a single ballot box (though Wimban scored 3 seconds).

It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from these figures. It is tempting to infer from the size and spread of his vote that Laki, as the endorsed Pangu candidate, received a party vote.

TABLE 1

Analysis of Ballot Box Results

Ballot box	Total votes	First and second ranked candidates in box	Candidate with most votes as percentage of total votes cast	Two candidates with most votes as percentage of total votes cast
1	578	Sane, Laki	51.7	94.1
2	660	Terenfop, Sane	53.8	85.1
3	605	Maika, Sane	47.3	70.1
4	490	Sane, Maika	59.2	84.5
5	264	Kainor, Unumba	22.7	42.8
6	292	Sane, Unumba	32.9	58.9
7	314	Unumba, Sane	52.2	72.0
8	193	Sane, Unumba	50.3	66.8
9	540	Unumba, Laki	78.0	96.5
10	556	Laki, Wimban	74.1	95.0
11	357	Laki, Wimban	51.3	97.2
12	349	Unumba, Laki	47.9	77.4
13	364	Laki, Kainor	40.4	55.8
14	874	Tamoane, Laki	48.2	77.3
15	1019	Tamoane, Laki	39.7	62.6
16	383	Laki, Sane	81.2	91.0
17	381	Unumba, Terenfop	60.6	81.4
18	538	Sane, Laki	36.8	62.6
19	198	Simbi, Unumba	50.5	69.7
20	664	Terenfop, Unumba	54.1	84.0
21	584	Laki, Unumba	61.5	82.4
22	481	Nime, Terenfop	43.5	67.6
23	467	Sane, Laki	40.0	75.6
24	534	Unumba, Laki	31.2	58.8
25	320	Sane, Unumba	93.8	97.2
26	372	Sane, Unumba	46.5	69.9
27	316	Laki, Terenfop	32.9	63.6
28	596	Laki, Maika	21.0	39.1
29	525	Sane, Laki	65.0	87.4
30	723	Sane, Nime	31.8	49.4
31	504	Laki, Sane	38.5	69.7
32	561	Laki, Sane	96.6	98.4
33	642	Laki, Wimban	49.1	95.8
34	736	Laki, Sane	61.3	81.3
35	379	Sane, Unumba	32.5	56.7
36	574	Laki, Unumba	71.1	92.2
37	431	Laki, Unumba	95.4	96.5

The uncomfortable facts are, however, that Laki received the same percentage of the vote in 1987, as Pangu-endorsed candidate and sitting member, as he did in 1982, as an unendorsed challenger, and that Sane, the endorsed NP candidate in 1982 supported by Okuk and the MA, as an independent in 1987 improved his share of the vote (from 12 to 21 per cent), and achieved a geographical spread comparable to that of Laki (as, to a lesser extent, did Unumba). Moreover, the concentrated vote for Tamoane in what has to have been lower Sepik, suggests that in the Pangu heartland itself local loyalties prevailed over party. On the basis of these observations, the most that can be said with any certainty is that energetic campaigning and 'being known' (both of which parties facilitate) gain votes, but that local support factors are still of great importance, especially for minor candidates.

### ***POSTSCRIPT***

In provincial assembly elections in October 1987 Unumba was returned in his former seat (Yuat) and Sane also gained election. In the formation of the provincial government, Pangu lost out to a coalition of independents and MA supporters. Unumba and Sane are ministers.

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**TABLE 2****Candidate Performance**

	Nime	Wimban	Sane	Terenfop	Unumba	Simbi	Januarius	Tamoane	Maika	Laki	Kainor	Dambui
Best 2 ballot box results as percentage of candidate's total vote	66.9	40.1	16.7	50.2	26.8	80.0	32.1	74.0	52.0	17.0	36.2	35.4
Best 4 ballot box results as percentage of candidate's total vote	87.8	56.0	32.0	65.5	41.8	84.0	44.3	90.2	75.8	31.0	54.9	55.1
Total vote	502	1157	3835	1423	2435	150	246	1116	788	5851	621	158
Placing	9	5	2	4	3	12	10	6	7	1	8	11



# Papuan Prince(ss) and Papuan Development: A Look at the Election in Central Provincial


WARI IAMO

In this paper, I look at the 1987 election in Central Provincial and focus on why the election slogans or rhetoric of 'Papuan Development' and 'Papuan Prince or Princess' have been the mainstay of Papuan leaders since post-independence. The twin political affinity 'Papuan Development-Papuan Prince or Princess' commences with the landmark political legacy from the one and only Josephine Abaijah, former MP for both Central Provincial and National Capital District, and the founder of the secessionist movement, Papua Besena. It continues with the brand of politics espoused today by Ted Diro, the incumbent for Central Provincial. I will argue that, in the electoral history of Papua New Guinea, Abaijah and Diro have provided an ideological framework that is a 'cementing metaphor' that unites the entire Papuan region as a people and holds together a political bloc in its quest for power and development. In doing so, I am building on Gramsci's metaphor of ideology as the 'cement' of society, and on proposition Poulantzas derives from it that 'ideology, which slides into every level of the social structure, has the particular function of cohesion' (Poulantzas 1975:207).

## *PAPUAN HEGEMONY*

Since the 1987 national elections, I have concluded that although Abaijah and Diro differ in some respects in their ideological framework, both have, through the use of the party system, created a concept I call 'Papuan hegemony'. This concept is more salient now in national politics than ever before and is also more pronounced among the people of Central. As I perceive it, Papuan hegemony describes not just the independent nature of political ideas and beliefs that, in addition, influence and mould fragmented social entities into unity; it is the conscious act of a coterie of conscious political engineers whose aim is to infiltrate a whole range of social structures for a purpose. The repercussions of this act are not perceived by the devotees.

As a military man and politician, Ted Diro, aided by a group of indigenous intellectuals, is consciously involved in creating a Papuan



hegemony. In using the word 'hegemony' I extend Antonio Gramsci's definition to fit my analysis of Papuan politics.

By hegemony Gramsci meant permeation throughout civil society - including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions, schools, the church, and the family - of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc., that is in one way or another supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate it...To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of "common sense". In short, hegemony worked in many ways to induce the oppressed to accept or "consent" to their own exploitation and daily misery (Boggs 1976:39).

### *ELECTORAL SETTING*

The Central Province (Map 1) is a narrow strip ranging from thirty to 100 kilometers in width, and stretching about 407 kilometers, from the border of Gulf Province to Milne Bay Province. It shares a common sea boundary with Australia and on land it shares land boundaries with Morobe, Oro, Gulf and Milne Bay provinces. A useful way of grasping the electoral extent of the region is by talking about each of the four open electorates, in spite of the fact that, in my view, they are quite arbitrary in nature and do not really represent each of the cultural groups in the region. They are the following: Abau, Rigo, Kairuku (including Hiri) and Goilala.

In 1964, the boundaries of what is now Central Province and the electorate of Moresby Open were coterminous. As a result voters from Goilala formed the largest block and, voting along ethnic lines, they elected Erico Rarupu, a Goilala man, who outdid the prominent Motuan favorite, Oala-Oala Rarua. Although Port Moresby and the Goilala sub-district were divided, Reverend Percy Chatterton, a strongly backed Motuan and coastal candidate, emerged the winner in the regional seat. From 1968 onwards Moresby Open Electorate remained a separate electorate, although minus a number of Motu-Koita villages which were included in Hiri Open. These villages were again included in Moresby when the District was created after independence. Today National Capital District and Central Province have separate electoral boundaries; the capital of both is within the confines of the District.

Central Province is divided into administrative districts of Abau, Rigo, Hiri, Bereina (or Kairuku), and Goilala. The entire population is, from the 1980 national census figures, 117,242. Of this total, 24,164 are from Abau; 24,172 from Rigo; 22,386 from Hiri; 22,716 from Kairuku, and Goilala provides 23,804. The 1987 national elections indicate that the voting population for the entire region is 56,775. Of these 12,084 come from Abau, 13,031 are from Rigo, 10,086 from Goilala and 21,574 from Kairuku-Hiri.

### *LANGUAGE AND TRADE*

The people of Central Province speak ten Austronesian languages and about twenty non-Austronesian languages (Pat 1988). While the majority of the



former language groups can be located in the coastal regions, the latter inhabit mostly the inland areas with pockets in coastal areas. It might be thought that language and feuding relationships, as well as geographical cleavages, were impediments to social interaction between ethnic groups. Yet authors as diverse as Seligman (1910), Malinowski (1915), Belshaw (1952, 1957), and more recently Leach and Leach (1983), provide evidence that the inhabitants of Central Province were neither isolated social entities nor untouched by neighbouring groups. The so-called Kula ring extended into Mailu-Aroma trade, and the latter into Hiri, thus pointing to the fact of economic interdependence among the diverse cultural groups. Indeed the need for each other's services and economic and cultural artifacts cross-linked all cultural groups into confederations, loosely amalgamated for trade purposes.

### *ECONOMIC FACTORS*

Economically, Central Province is one of the least developed regions. In this, it resembles the other Papuan provinces, and collectively the national politicians from the Papuan region, and most notable among them are such leaders as Abaijah and Diro, have successfully evoked resentment against this under-development to mobilize, appeal to, and influence the voters (Badu 1982; Daro 1974). The preponderant part of the population is rurally based and, according to the 1980 national census, of all the persons of all age groups involved in some kind of economic activity (80,741), the largest single group (26,363) is engaged in subsistence agriculture. About 13,068 are engaged in farming and fishing, 7,980 work for salary or wage; 1,982 own businesses; 11,690 are full-time students; 7,054 do housework; and the rest are too old to work or are looking for work.

Although of the total land mass of 34,457 square kilometers one third is coastal plain and two-thirds is foothills with mountain ranges, it is evident from rural peoples' agricultural activities that there is enormous potential for cash crop development. As shown in the 1980 national census, households in all districts of the region grow such cash crops as coffee, cocoa, rubber, spices, coconut, and food; or are involved in such economic ventures as raising pigs or cattle; selling artifacts, copra or fish; running a trade store or a PMV, and perhaps a canoe.

The economic history of the region shows that a plantation economy has been long established, but the plantations were owned by foreign firms like Steamships and Burns Philps which have other foreign businesses. The plantation economy has been basically coconut, in the coastal areas of Rigo and Bereina; and rubber in Sogeri Plateau and Cape Rodney regions. These industries have been revitalized and still generate income for the region, together with timber and other cash crops.

### *PAPUAN POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW*

It would take a thorough, major review of the literature on Papua New Guinea's political history, and on both its traditional and modern societies, to come up with a complete picture of 'Papuan Politics'. However, as an indigenous Papua New Guinean, from the Papuan region, who as a child and as an adult was socialized into the Western education system, I vividly remember the electoral politics of Central Province, first in 1964 and 1968

as a child, and in the successive years 1972, 1977 and 1982, as a mature, educated person. These personal but living experiences of a person, watching from the village the making of a polity of which he is a subject, are sufficient when supplemented with the accounts written by scholars (Bettison, D.G. *et al* 1965, Epstein, A.L. *et al* 1971, Hegarty, D., 1983, Premdas and Steeves 1983) to permit him to see Papuan politics through a special lens. The theme, Papuan Politics, is an overview of the political ideologies and characteristics of prominent Papuan politicians, nurtured in national politics. All these politicians, according to my opinion, developed political ideologies. First, Abaijah and more recently, Ted Diro, together with Sir (Dr) John Guise, Oala Oala Rarua, Sir Maori Kiki, Dr Reuben Taureka, Sir Ebia Olewale, have been the main originators of Papuan politics.

### *Brief Overview of Electoral Politics*

Electoral politics among indigenous Papua New Guineans only began with the House of Assembly elections in 1964 and 1968, which laid out the fundamental aspects of politics that were to appear in the succeeding elections. Indigenous political infrastructure was much more localized and integrated, and alien from the implanted one. However, it was this localized form of indigenous political structure that became integrated with the Western political forms at the village level. As indigenous people confronted higher levels of Western political structures, it was reported by the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory that in 1965, there was:

a deep feeling of inferiority arising from the lack of political education, ignorance of the outside world and ... in the case of certain more evolved elements of the population, who, on the contrary, are aware of the need for and advantages of political advancement, a certain timidity, physical or intellectual...(Visiting Mission 1965: para. 312, cited in Epstein *et al* 1971: 18).

But, neither were young expatriates very experienced and knowledgeable, although they were familiar with the political institutions. Yet they 'maintained a disproportionate influence over their less sophisticated members' (Epstein 1971:3). Like other introduced institutions, political education and infrastructure came much too late to Papua New Guinea, a subject of complaint in the United Nations and by Professor Ali Mazrui (Griffin 1975:247). Like their New Guinean counterparts, Papuans, in their pioneering ventures as politicians, experienced a considerable degree of ambivalence and timidity, all adding up to a sense of social inequality between the sophisticated and less-sophisticated and between the indigenes and the white Australians. These feelings of inferiority grew salient between the elected and official members, as expressed by Sir Tei Abal in the following words: 'We do not know much about what the official members think and feel. The Official members have so much of the power of discussion and debate that they seem to put the elected members down'. (Epstein 1971:26).

Such feelings were even more explicitly expressed as a problem between the indigenes and the white Australians by Lepani Watson: '...I see

the Papuan and New Guinean elected members being made into rubber stamps by some of the European elected members' (Epstein 1971:26).

Watson's claim that indigenous politicians were underestimated may be farfetched, since no statistics were used to verify this claim by Groves (1971:276) in his 1968 election study of Central Province Region. But the same claim is restated by Oram in his 1972 election study of Port Moresby electorate. The substance of his judgment is that

...By almost every relevant measure of modernization, the indigenous people of Port Moresby and its immediate hinterland are the most advanced in Papua New Guinea...this population has higher levels of educational attainments, a stronger commitment to urban life, a more complex differentiation of status and role, including greater occupational specialization, a more extreme dependence on wage labour at the expense of traditional means of subsistence...and a greater diversity of new institutions, ideas, and opportunities, than any other indigenous population in the Territory (Oram 1976:507)

These factors were reflected in the kind of candidates who stood not only for Central but most of the Papuan seats, both open and regional, as compared to other regions of the country. Groves (1971:291) showed that 'The Papuan candidates were almost all men with exceptional experience of the white man's world. None of them was either a hereditary leader of his lineage or a 'big man' who had achieved status at village level through gift exchanges, feasts, etc. They had all achieved their status through their success in manipulating modern institutions'. The disadvantages brought about by lack of formal education and lack of familiarity with English and with foreign political behaviours and institutions were more pronounced among Papua New Guineans than their white counterparts, and more so among the thirty-odd New Guinea Highlanders and Islanders and Coastals than their seven Papuan counterparts. In summation these social statistics were highlighted by Epstein and others to depict the Papuans and New Guineans in the following manner: 'While five of the latter (Papuans) had spent some years in European-type white-collar occupations, the great bulk of the indigenous members were subsistence farmers or traders' (1971:23).

### *Emerging Political Activism*

Political activism among Papuans or Papuan representatives, both indigenous and expatriates (some of whom were of mixed-race origin), was minimal both because self-confidence was low and because party politics was only beginning to emerge. This is confirmed in the words of the late Reverend Percy Chatterton: 'There were no parties and so promises could be no more than to do one's best. Most policy statements were the same; the candidates were barking up the same tree' (Bettison *et al* 1965:363).

Although candidates stood as individual persons, policies they espoused during campaign speeches or in their policy pamphlets highlighted issues of significance having to do with the political economy of the decade of the 1960s. Most salient were two: the threat of Indonesian take over of the island and the question of independence, although welfare and development problems sometimes figured just as importantly. In 1964 the question of

self-rule of some kind was on the one hand forced by the Indonesian's attempt to take over West Papua (or Irian Jaya) and on the other induced by the United Nations and the Afro-Asian bloc (see for example Grosart 1965:328, Hughes 1965:359).

Electoral politics were new to the Papuan candidates, yet their short-lived association with the Legislative Council in 1961, at least for a few, and long sustained association with the whiteman's life style gave them enough exposure to participate effectively in the 1964 elections. A snap preview of some, but not all, important Papuan candidates who laid the framework for Papuan politics will reflect the kind of policies espoused from the onset. It may be doing injustice to individual politicians who contributed enormously to development of their regions, however, a holistic treatment of certain themes is important to judge everyone together. On the issue of independence, almost every candidate talked about the idea of 'national unity', but it is not clear whether they meant national unity for Papua and New Guinea or for Papua as a Territory. There was a significant ambiguity among these candidates. Some were pro-nationalist (for United Papua and New Guinea) and others were regional nationalist, if we may assume this line of argument. For Oala Oala Rarua:

...independence will come only when people are ready. All over the world people say: "Independence for Papua New Guinea", but I don't see this now or next year...We are not ready for this. Australia is being forced to give independence....If I am elected, I will try and see a proper independence, not a false one, is given by Australia to Papua New Guinea (Hughes 1965:355).

Obviously Rarua was pro-nationalist as his pioneer campaign speech echoed a conservative independence move for Papua and New Guinea. John Guise's campaign slogan of unity and progress for Papua and New Guinea was similar to Rarua's. However, others struck a different note.

Lepani Watson's national unity policy was based on Christian principles. He stated that since there are many inherent social and cultural diversities within and among Papuans and among New Guineans, and between these two peoples, the Christian God who recognises none of these boundaries and cleavages must be the basis for national unity (Fink 1965:305). Yet these very Papuan politicians who sought national unity were alluding to their fellow men as Papuans on the one hand and New Guineans on the other, despite the similarity of their yearnings. In their advocacy of job opportunities, education and health, pay differentials, rural development, etc., all Papuan representatives, although benign in their attempt, were always speaking of two peoples: Papuans distinct from New Guineans.

Gradually the electoral process entered its third and fourth phases in 1968 and in 1972, and with higher levels of education and political participation, as well as work experiences, political activism increased among Papuans and New Guineans, and for the first time rising indigenous political parties played an active role in shaping policy issues for individual candidates. Nonetheless, many candidates were identified more by their personalities and charisma than by policies (Ogan 1971:132-161, Gostin *et al* 1971:91-131, Holzknicht 1976:216-237), by their personal loyalties and network (Oram 1976:504-528), and by their group and religious affiliation (Jawodimbari 1976:492-503, Allen 1976:133-159, Philsooph 1976:160:167).

Among the Papuan candidates, there were already seasoned politicians like Oala Oala Rarua, John Guise, Percy Chatterton, Gavera Rea, Lepani Watson, Paulus Arek, Albert Maori Kiki and Dr Reuben Taureka. In their own capacities and in their careers, these men and others not mentioned here either affiliated themselves with or actively took part in the formation of political parties. They were members and presidents of such pressure groups as urban worker's and waterside worker's unions, and makers and executives of such political parties as National Progress Party, People's Progress Party (PPP), Pangu Party, etc. While independence was an idea expressed by Pangu affiliates like Oala Oala Rarua, Gavera Rea and John Guise, most promises were of parochial interests.

## *SELF-GOVERNMENT AND POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS*

### *Abaijah's Legacy*

The style of Papuan politics changed from mere parochial interests and the welfare of the united territories to the movement of secessionists, as Papua and New Guinea were being prepared for self-government and independence, and as young educated Papuans entered the field of electoral politics. It was within the colonial context that the new brand of Papuan politics began. The political personality who began it all is Josephine Abaijah, who first was elected into the then House of Assembly for the Central Regional Seat in 1972.

Abaijah was a separatist, as some say, or secessionist; but Papua Besena (PB) expresses not only the name but also the philosophy (or ideology) of the movement. It was formed in 1973. Papua Besena is well documented and much of this discussion is drawn from Badu (1982), Daro (1975), Premdas (1977, 1983), Griffin (1975a, 1975b) and McKillop (1982). As Papua New Guinea (known as Papua 'and' New Guinea in 1972) prepared to enter the era of self-government, and eventually independence in 1975, Abaijah's Papua Besena in 1973 joined the existing Bougainville secessionist movement in a move to secede from the rest of the country. Abaijah's movement was premised on the philosophy of colonialism of two types, external and internal, both emanating from economic deprivation and economic insecurity. Australia, according to Abaijah, underdeveloped Papua. Directed by the United Nations to hasten the pace of development toward independence, it had done so by focussing investment in regions where economic gains could be maximized, and Papua was not among them. Another important dimension of Papua Besena's philosophy was derived from the region's unresolved legal status. At the outset it sought to become another state of Australia, but this stance was overshadowed by the issue of 'white' (external) and 'black' (internal) colonialism.

The course of action Papua Besena took in its formative stages changed when it won nearly all the Papuan seats in 1977 and controlled Port Moresby City Council. With the uprising of regional movements all over Papua and New Guinea, Papua Besena evolved into a regional pressure group rather than a secessionist movement. From 1973 onwards, the Somare-led coalition government had embarked on its decentralization policy which called for the setting up of provinces. Soon after, Bougainville and Central, the source of secessionist threats, came under provincial governments.

Abaijah and a new breed of Papuan politicians, well educated and more familiar with parliamentary democracy, like Galeva Kwarara, Gerega Pepena, Joseph Aoae, Goasa Damena, Sevese Morea and Roy Evara, still espoused rapid development for the underdeveloped Papua. The threat of Papua separating from New Guinea was the foundation of a political strategy developed by them to coerce decision-makers, a majority of whom they labelled 'New Guineans', to treat them more cautiously and favourably in their quest for power and money (or development). In 1978 Somare was toppled with the vote-of-no confidence moved by Sir Julius Chan and his People's Progress Party, aided largely by Papua Besena and the Papua Party, which had split off from PB, and the Melanesian Alliance (MA). Papuans, for the first time, held power in a big way. Members of Papua Besena like Joseph Aoae, Galeva, Damena and Pepena held ministerial portfolios. But its charismatic leader Abaijah, to her credit, refused any ministerial portfolios. In the 1982 elections only three of Papua Besena's adherents were returned by the voters and its leader, Abaijah, was among those who were not re-elected.

With the electoral demise of Abaijah and majority of her colleagues in the 1982 elections, did the ideological imprints she had branded in the minds of Papuan politicians wither away? It is hard to tell; but it appears that though her secessionist claim died, her political ideologies survived and were maintained by a few ardent Papuan politicians. This impression has become more pronounced than ever before and one may, with little doubt, state that Abaijah's legacy, in a more refined version, is continued by Ted Diro.

### *Ted Diro*

Ted Diro, the first Brigadier General of the PNGDF after independence, first entered parliamentary politics in the 1982 national elections. Like Abaijah, he was a well-known figure but as an army general, he enjoyed much more trust and respect among both Central people and Papuans. He portrayed himself with a regimental image and spread the idea that he would be the first Papuan to become the prime minister of the country. No doubt Diro, while in command of the army, had begun his campaign through civic activities in his electorate before he declared his intention to contest the seat. He was elected as an independent.

Being highly disciplined, he promoted himself effectively. But Papuans were not united. Papua Party (PP) and Papua Besena with limited numbers were on their own. When Okuk's electoral status was declared null by the Court of Disputed Returns in 1984, Diro, upon Okuk's invitation, became the head of the National Party - a Highlands Party - and leader of the Opposition. However, a year after when Okuk had been elected again, Diro relinquished his position to Okuk. Through this manoeuvre, Diro lost much of the trust and confidence of his fellow Papuan politicians and followers.

In mid-1985, the political current in Papua New Guinea changed with the defection of the former ardent supporter of Pangu and deputy to Prime Minister Somare, Paias Wingti. In the Opposition he quickly rose to the position of leader, and became the prime minister after the second vote-of-no-confidence, this time heading a party of his own, namely the People's Democratic Movement (PDM). The Papua Party, led by its staunch leader Galeva Kwarara, was with Wingti; so was Diro and a small group of followers.

Diro and Kwarara were strong believers in remaining in the corridors of power, where resources could be commanded and allocated to their electorate to reward loyalty and where Papuans could be assured of jobs in the echelons of power at all levels of the society. Getting into the government and occupying important portfolios were very significant. In 1987, Papuan politicians were not well organised. A regional party (PP) led by Galeva Kwarara existed; Ted Diro had his own, the People's Action Party (PAP); Roy Evara belonged to another (Wantok); veteran politician Mahuru belonged to PDM, Tago to the National Party, Lemeki to the Peoples Progress Party. Yet the sentiment for and loyalty to the slogan 'Papuan Development' and 'Papua for Papuans' are writ large and salient in their politics. The 1987 elections highlighted these slogans in a more popular way than any other elections.

### 1987 ELECTIONS

Papua New Guineans understand elections as a Western mode of selecting leaders of a nation. Many Papua New Guineans who compete for these public offices are men who have had experience in the manipulation of the these Western institutions and thus have gained the support and following of their people. All persons who nominated to contest Central Provincial, without exception, confirm this theory. The eleven candidates - J.M. Abaijah, Moses Anai, Ted Diro, Allan Efi, Theo Efi, Arere Hitolo, Francis Irere, Perai Manai, Mairi Mehtu, Philip Otio, and Reuben Taureka - are contemporary leaders in their own village communities and in modern institutional settings. They have been former national and provincial politicians; leaders of political parties, groups, trade unions and community organisations; former public and private servants; professionals and businessmen; army generals, medical doctors, bulldozer operators, agricultural officers, broadcast officers, pressmen, bank officers, and salesmen. Their educational levels range from grade school to high school to university; and professional qualifications were obtained from national as well as international institutions of learning, in the South Pacific region and other foreign countries.

Although one may philosophize that each candidate is of equal value and deserves mention in the literature of national electoral politics, for the purposes of this study I propose to concentrate on a few of the prominent candidates rather than all of them. I will only refer to the others where appropriate. I confine myself to Abaijah, Diro and Taureka, to expound my thesis, and in passing mention such personalities as Perai Manai and Mairi Mehtu because of the ethnic groups they represent and their party affiliations. The order in which each person is discussed does not represent their status nor significance; rather it speaks for the order of their political participation in the electoral history of Papua New Guinea. Each of the candidates will be discussed in this order: Taureka, Abaijah, Diro, and Manai.

### *Reuben Taureka*

Reuben Taureka's political history can be pieced together from studies done on electoral politics from 1964 (Bettison *et al*), 1972 (Stone, D.), 1977 (Hegarty) and to the subsequent election in 1982. Taureka, 59, is a native of

Maopa village, in Aroma, Central Province. Because schools in his early childhood days in 1940s and 1950s were maintained under the auspices of missions (churches) and indigenous Papua New Guineans under the colonial educational conditions received minimal education, adequate only for reading and writing, many indigenous people who had the potential to attain the equivalent of an Australian education were denied that right. Taureka, although a graduate at grade school level, was sent to Medical School in Suva, Fiji, in the late 1950s to obtain a medical diploma that gave him the right to be recognized as a medical doctor. Since then, and before and after his appointment to the Fifth Legislative Council in 1961, he served as a medical doctor and administrator in the Highlands, Mamose and Papua regions. He was the president of Port Moresby Worker's union in the 1960s, and later in 1961 was succeeded by Oala Oala Rarua. During his term in the Fifth Legislative Council and in comparison with other indigenous members, Taureka is described by Hughes (1965:23) in the following manner: 'Admittedly there were many more indigenous Members, but only one, John Guise, became a major figure in Council business...etc. From the first, Guise made extensive use of the power to ask questions, but of other indigenous Members, only Taureka made any real use of the opportunity.'

When the first House of Assembly was established in 1964 and also the first elected indigenous members sat in that House, Taureka was still a public servant. He served in his capacity as a medical doctor and administrator. However, in the 1972 elections, the year in which Papua New Guineans were still debating the question of political independence, Taureka nominated to contest the then Rigo-Abau seat held by Mr Euro, who was a businessmen and planter based in the hinterland of Aroma coast, the natal land of Taureka. Taureka easily won the seat because of his personal charisma, the vast experience gained from the Fifth Legislative Council, and his personal achievement and image as a medical doctor and administrator. Taureka entered parliamentary politics in the same year that Papua New Guinea was to gain self-government, and he and some prominent Papuan leaders like Maori Kiki, Gavera Rea, Oala Oala Rarua and Ebia Olewale were founding members of Pangu Pati. Under the then Chief Minister, Michael Somare, Taureka held such portfolios as Health, Education and Broadcasting and Information. At independence he was the Education minister. In the 1977 elections he lost to Gerega Pepena, a former Education superintendent for National Capital District, and an ardent Papua Besena candidate.

Taureka's loss in 1977 was not a mark of defeat in politics. Soon after the national elections he contested the Aroma coast seat in the Central provincial elections in 1979 and won. He served as the leader of the Opposition in the assembly and later in 1984 toppled the incumbent Kone Vanuawaru government in a vote-of-no-confidence. Taureka served as premier and then in the Opposition until Central provincial government was suspended by the Wingti-Chan government in May of 1987 for gross financial mismanagement. Being a career politician he decided to contest the 1987 elections, but not the seat he usually contested; this time he nominated for Central Provincial.

It is a mystery why Taureka decided to contest the Central Provincial seat, especially against such contemporary political personalities as Abaijah and Diro. But being a veteran politician, at both provincial and national level, Taureka is a big name in Papua and among his cohorts, both in and outside the national parliament. He decided against the idea of contesting



the Abau seat, perhaps because he had lost twice since his term from 1972-77. Since there were many candidates nominated from the Hiri-Kairuku and Goilala areas, he trusted that Abau voters might give him the edge to win Central Provincial.

Taureka stood as a Pangu candidate, as he always had. Yet his election policies were more in tune with the Papuan brand of politics. As a Pangu candidate, under the leadership of Michael Somare, Taureka stressed that if he won, he was likely to hold an important portfolio. This means, as Pangu has shown when it is in government, that goods and services will be delivered to the maximum satisfaction of all citizens and residents. Taureka's promise to the voters was to do the things he had done when a member from 1972 to 1977, and also when he served as premier and member in the Central provincial government. To appeal to his voters he rejected the idea of a government-sponsored road linking New Guinea and Papua, or Highlands and Papua. He accused his arch-rival Ted Diro of supporting this project.

Dr Reuben Taureka is regarded by Abau people as a member of the elite, who has personal ties and loyalties with old colleagues he met in his long-sustained political career. Being a Pangu founder (see Somare 1975:51) and a personal friend of Somare and a host of politicians like of Sir John Guise, Ebia Olewale, Sir Maori Kiki, Gavera Rea, Thomas Kavali, Paul Torato, the late Sir Iambakey Okuk, etc., Taureka's influence is far flung and he is perceived to have access to and the capacity to allocate resources and services.

Taureka fulfilled the expectations villagers have of all the educated elite who nominate to run for elections, in that he maintained a bi-local residence between the village and city; he maintained subsistence farming; and he engaged in village collective activities like church donations, celebrations, sports and cultural festivities. But the suspension of the Central provincial government just before the national elections made him suspect in the eyes of ordinary villagers. There were rumours that he was party to the financial mismanagement of the province. Especially in his natal region, Aroma, Taureka was accused by some tractor owners of misappropriating funds which the provincial government had allocated to help plough garden land for subsistence farmers.

Taureka's campaign was mostly confined to Abau, the region he once represented and the region he thought might restore his pride and dignity. Because elections are an expensive exercise, loss of money is a personal concern to many candidates. Nonetheless, Taureka's source of support came, first, from family members, second, from well-wishers, and lastly, from Pangu of course. On at least one occasion, Taureka and Diro used helicopters to visit parts of Abau. This, to voters in Aroma, was impressive. In Rigo and Abau and Hiri, Taureka made personal appearances; in Kairuku and Goilala regions, he did less travelling and counted more on his personal networks with his allies from the provincial government.

### *Josephine Abaijah*

Josephine Abaijah was only the woman candidate among ten men. Biographical details about Abaijah were pieced together from published sources Membrey (1974), Daro (1976), Badu (1982), etc. At the time of the elections Abaijah was 37, and listed herself as a farmer. Her natal place is

Milne Bay, her parents are domiciled in Oro Province. Her tertiary education culminated in London University after studies with the Papuan Medical School where she earned a diploma in Public Health. Before she first entered national politics in 1972, she held the position of the Principal of Papua New Guinea's Health Education Institute.

As we have seen, Abaijah made history in the electoral politics of Papua New Guinea at the time of the coming of self-government. She was the first elected woman member and had a clear platform based on the notion of the separation of Papua from New Guinea, because of internal political and economic colonialism brought about by Australians. She created an acephelous organisation, Papua Besena, to struggle for this ideology. Her separatist movement grew so powerful that at the dawn of self-government, Somare created the Village Task Force to bring development to underdeveloped areas such as Papua.

In 1982 Abaijah lost her National Capital seat to pro-Pangu candidate Phillip Bouraga. Her loss indicated the multi-cultural nature of the city population, and if the defeat was really related to her Besena ideologies, many voters were certainly anti-Besena. In 1987 she chose to challenge the incumbent, a political role-model to many Papuans, and the self-styled 'Papuan King', Ted Diro.

Although Abaijah revived the Papua Besena organization and fielded candidates in such electorates as Abau, Rigo, Kairuku-Hiri, Gulf, Kikori, Western, South Fly, Milne Bay, Samarai-Murua and Tari, she added another political dimension to her ideology. This time she became a member of a new political group, namely, Women In Politics (WIP) (see Wormald, Chapter 7). Other women candidates and supporters were Lady Okuk, Lady Olewale, Maria Kopkop (its president), Tamo Diro, Fide Bale, and Au Doko. The main objective of the organisation is to recruit women at all levels of the government to participate in making important policy decisions, and to provide moral, financial and technical aid to women candidates contesting for public office. Yet, the Besena ideology that Abaijah nurtured and propagated still provided her main slogans although they were now blended with issues affecting women. This mix of politics based on economic underdevelopment and the oppressed women is a new turn in politics. It meant Abaijah was appealing desperately to her female voters to return her.

Papua Besena as an organization has an independent source of funding from Abaijah's business. Abaijah had to have funds to hand out to a number of candidates in the Papua region. She received aid from well-wishers, friends, and family members. She travelled extensively throughout the Central Province, both to campaign for herself and also for the candidates she fielded in the four Open electorates: Abau, Rigo, Kairuku-Hiri, and Gailala. In her campaign Abaijah invoked memories of Papua versus New Guinea and propounded a clear-cut policy of 'Papua for Papuans' and 'Development for Papua'. Indeed, many Central people still uphold this legacy, because they see Port Moresby as the gateway to exploitation by outsiders, both New Guineans and expatriates.

### *Ted Diro*

Ted Diro, 43, is from Boku Village in Rigo. By virtue of his mother's natal place, Diro is not a typical mountain man from Rigo. His father is from Boku and mother from Moapa, located on the Aroma coast. Another of

Diro's political rivals, Taureka, comes from this coastal area. Diro spent part of his childhood in Aroma, and is fluent in Sinaugoro, Aroma, and Motu - all of which are mutually intelligible and are Austronesian languages.

The colonial government provided few opportunities for secondary education in the 1940s and 1950s. However, at Sogeri in the 1960s, Papua New Guineans were allowed to obtain secondary education. Some of the first Papua New Guineans to achieve this educational level became leaders of Papua New Guinea immediately thereafter. The class of 1962 at Sogeri, including Michael Somare, led the country to self-government and independence.

Ted Diro was a freshmen in 1962 and in the mid-1960s completed the Queensland Senior, an equivalent of grade 11 and 12, at Slade School, Warwick, Queensland. While at Sogeri, Diro was the commander of the Sogeri School Cadets, a para-military organization for secondary schools established throughout the then Territory. His thorough indoctrination as a dedicated cadet influenced his career pattern. He joined the Defence Force and was one of the first nationals to attend the most prestigious military school in Australia, the Defence Academy at Portsea, Canberra. After his successful completion of a diploma, he rose quickly through the military ranks and, in 1975, at independence, became the country's first commander. While in the Australian Defence Academy, Diro met the influential Indonesian Army commander, Colonel Murdani, who became a close friend and ally and from whom substantial 1987 election funds were received to aid Diro and his newly founded party, People's Action Party.

At independence in 1975, Diro inherited the colonial army legacy. In conformity with the traditional Western concept of a defence force, heavy emphasis was placed on the isolation of military and civilian roles. Papua New Guinea's educational programmes and civic activities were aimed at limiting any tendency for the armed forces to emerge in a political role. Civic activities, such as constructing roads and school buildings, aiding natural disaster victims in terms of shelter, food, and transport - these were once the responsibility of the army, but are now shared by the government and the army. Nonetheless, these civic projects created an image of Diro as a man of action, and moreover, gained him the confidence of the village people as a true army commander. In the minds of simple villagers, everything representing the army by way of green trucks, zippers, choppers, planes, uniforms, arms, manufactured goods and products, became a symbol of Ted Diro. Diro's biggest success in the Army was when he successfully put a rebellion down in 1982 in then dominion of New Hebrides, now Vanuatu.

The 1982 national elections were Ted Diro's first after his career as army commander. And his overwhelming victory was due largely, I believe, to the image built for him through civic activities and projects. However, this was when Diro entered as a freshman in electoral politics. His success in 1987 cannot be wholly attributed to the army. A term in the national parliament was enough for Diro to be adept in PNG politics. At the end of 1986, he emerged with at least two prominent Papuans, Vincent Eri and John Waiko, to announce the formation of a national party which they named the People's Action Party (PAP). Diro is its parliamentary leader and Aruru Matiabe was then the deputy leader. The executive is made up of

Waiko, Eri and a few others. Its controlling philosophy, governing all its policies, is 'People First'. The preamble to the party's programme quotes the words of Jefferson: 'the care for human life and happiness is the first and the only legitimate object of government'. Following on from this PAP recognizes the mood for national unity, and is committed to preserve the Westminster system of democratic government. All its campaign policies ranging from parliament, government and administration, education, economy, natural resources, localization, tourism, sport, law and order, foreign affairs, urban development, defence, police and CIS, youth, women and finance and investment are, in simple terms, 'honest' and 'trustworthy'. To illustrate this, under the heading 'Parliament, Government and Administration', the party stated categorically that it 'will fight...the abuse of power and is against corruption'.

Among the many candidates that contested the Central Provincial seat, Ted Diro was by far the most advantageously placed in terms of finance. He went into the election campaign as a Foreign Affairs minister, using his own resources enhanced by substantial money (K124,000) donated by the Indonesian Army commander, Colonel Murdani. In all, Diro's campaign, and those of the other PAP candidates who contested, cost him and his party well over K700,000. Diro's gigantic financial support and the support of well-wishers augmented his chances of emerging the winner over other candidates. In an informal gathering, Diro claimed he was financially independent and the contributions he received were only a third of his total expenditure.

As a freshman in electoral politics in 1982, Diro had formed a little independent group. During the election campaign he depended on his image as an army commander and on the civic projects he had created to portray himself as a 'man of action'. Successfully, he presented himself to the voters as potentially the first Papuan to hold the highest political office, the prime ministership. With substantial experience behind him, Diro, in the 1987 elections, entered the field as a political heavyweight. Behind him he had a political machine and plentiful resources. As an incumbent with these attributes, Diro was well ahead of other contestants. Structurally, in each Open electorate, Diro's PAP established the concept of *komiti*, a body composed of educated men, frequently retired army officers, to carry on an extensive campaign for Diro and others running under the banner of PAP. Some of these *komiti* men operated for money; others functioned on the assumption that a form of pecuniary reward would be forthcoming after voting was over. They also effectively served as scrutineers at polling and counting.

In each Open electorate all the *komiti* men were given a crash course on electoral rules by PAP specialists to foster the mood of independence and instil confidence through knowledge of the rules. This became extremely successful. In regions where Diro was well entrenched through his organizational structure, he appeared remote. Then the Foreign Affairs minister in the Wingti-Chan government, Diro spent substantial campaign time travelling, while his *komiti* men on the home ground did it all for him. However, he personally appeared in big rallies either by a ministerial 'limo', first class four-wheel-drive, or a chopper. At these rallies villagers were bombarded with the campaign tactic, that Diro will be the 'first' Papuan to be the prime minister. This self-aggrandizing was adequate to convince the simple voters to consider him over others.

### *Perai Manai*

Perai Manai, 34, from Tapini, was the only native of Goilala who stood for the 1987 elections. It is worth saying something about Manai in order to see how he could have swept Goilala so convincingly as an independent. Was there anything in his background and experience that could have endeared him so much to Goilala people, or was being one of them enough? Or was there any plan agreed to in Goilala to run only one candidate so as not to split the vote?

Manai completed grade 10 from Sogeri and after joining the public service in 1971, he completed the Public Service Higher Certificate at the Administrative College. At the University of Papua New Guinea, he was one of the first Papua New Guineans to enrol in the newly established journalism programme and graduated with a Diploma in Communication Studies. Manai served as a Press Secretary for the then Morobe premier, Utula Samana, for some time and in a similar capacity served Sir Julius Chan and the successive governments.

Manai is one of the first and best educated sons of the Goilala people during the post-independence era. There is, according to Manai, no secret about why only one candidate from that region was fielded. It was a common consensus among the villagers, leaders, and educated people that only one person from that populous region should be tried, as the chance of winning was higher, given the number of candidates that nominated from the coastal areas. Manai was, among many, the best choice for the Goilala voters. Being the only one, party affiliation did not matter. It was assumed that the preponderant factor in determining Goilala voting would be ethnicity. The results of the final count indicated that Manai in his natal region polled convincing with an overwhelming majority of 5,260 votes.

### *Voting*

Voting for the most part in the Central Province was quiet, although a few incidents were reported of between supporters of rival candidates, such as Taureka versus Diro in Abau and Kairuku, or Abaijah versus Diro and Manai in Goilala. Voting was supposed to be secret, done in a polling booth. This rule, however, was contravened in a number of ways: (a) where villagers agreed to 'block-vote', supporters would openly declare who they would vote for; (b) a small minority held up their ballot paper marking their 'Xs'; and (c) scrutineers of all candidates were within a seeing range and could figure out whom a voter chose. Secret voting then became open-voting and that had certain ramifications, setting off family and kinship conflicts, clan rivalries, and inter-village conflicts. Whether or not the tallies

kept by the scrutineers of each candidate were accurate, in many cases the expectations of the candidate and supporters were raised and conflicts and frustrations ensued.

### COUNTING

Table 1: Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidate From Open Electorates

	<i>Electorate:</i>				TOTAL
	Abau	Goilala	Kairuku-Hiri	Rigo	
<i>Candidates</i>					
J.M. Abaijah	1545	248	5467	2866	10126
P.A. Otto	1570	409	972	336	3287
M. Anna	1676	119	279	133	2207
A.I. Efi	133	439	1200	66	1838
T. Efi	294	993	1639	267	3193
T. Diro	2594	1760	4720	5896	14970
F.X. Irere	168	56	1477	90	1791
A. Hitolo	161	94	2826	107	3188
P. Manai	919	5260	515	100	5994
M. Mehuiu	194	560	370	2191	3315
R. Taureka	3008	48	1221	451	4728
Total allowed ballot papers	11462	9986	20686	12503	54637
Informal ballot papers	622	200	1888	528	2138
Grand total	12084	10086	21574	1303	56775

As shown in Table 1, the total electoral population for the Central Province in this election was about 56,775. Of this total, 12,084 voted in Abau, 10,084 in Goilala, 21,574 in Kairuku-Hiri and 13,031 in Rigo.

*Abau*

Table 2: Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidates in Abau Electorate

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Total votes</i>
J.M. Abaijah	1545
P.A. otto	1570
M. Anai	1676
A.I. Efi	133
T. Efi	294
T. Diro	2594
F.X. Irere	168
A. Hitolo	161
P. Manai	119
M. Mehuiu	194
R. Taureka	3008
Total allowed ballot papers	54637
Informal ballot papers	2138
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>12084</b>

It appeared that since Taureka and another candidate, M. Anai came from Abau, ideally 12,084 would be split between the two on kinship and personal loyalty ties. Yet, their biggest opposition came from Diro, whose mother is from Aroma, and also an unknown quantity, P. Otio. Although Taureka won by about 400 votes ahead of his nearest rival Diro, the votes were distributed along both ethnic and personal lines. Table 2 shows that Taureka polled 3,008; Diro 2,594; M. Anai polled 1676; and Otio polled 1,570. Non-natives of Abau polled less strongly: Abaijah 1,545; A. Efi 294; F. Irere 168; A. Hitolo 161; P. Manai 119; and Mehutu 194. Except for Abaijah, who still had a substantial following in Abau and who perhaps benefitted from the fact that Abau shares ethnic boundaries with her native Milne Bay, the rest who had no kin and ethnic loyalty polled poorly.

*Goilala*

Table 3: Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidates in Goilala

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Votes</i>
J.M. Abaijah	248
P.A. Otto	409
M. Anai	119
A.I. Efi	993
T. Efi	1760
F.X. Irere	56
A. Hitolo	94
P. manai	5260
M. Mehuiu	560
R. Taureka	48
Total allowed ballot papers	9986
Informal ballot papers	100
GRAND TOTAL	10086

The tussle in the Goilala region is very interesting. Here one would have assumed that claims to personal loyalties made by candidates like Diro and Abaijah throughout the Central Provincial electorate would have had a lot of impact on voters, especially since there was only one native candidate from the area who contested. In the final analysis, kin and ethnic loyalties again outweighed all other factors. Perai Manai's clear win of 5,260 as indicated in Table 3 proved this point. His nearest rival was Diro who polled a mere 1,760, the only candidate besides Manai to poll four figures. Abaijah, who in 1972 elections had the largest following here, performed miserably and could only master 248. Candidates who one might think had connections through the Central provincial government also did not perform well. These include Taureka (48) and Mehutu (560).



*Kairuku-Hiri*

Table 4: Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidates in Kairuku-Hiri

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Votes</i>
J.M. Abaijah	5467
P.A. Otto	972
M. Anai	279
A.I. Efi	1200
T. Efi	1639
T. Diro	4720
F.X. Irere	1477
A. Hitolo	2826
P. Manai	515
M Mehuiu	370
R. Taureka	1221
Total allowed ballot papers	20686
Informal ballot papers	1888
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>21574</b>

A. Hitolo was the only Motuan candidate from Hiri; others like Allan Efi, Theo Efi, and Francis Irere came from Kairuku region. It turned out that, as shown in Table 4, Hitolo (2,826), A. Efi (1,200), T. Efi (1,639), and F. Irere (1,477) polled almost evenly along ethnic and kinship lines, and outsiders polled better than they. These outsiders were political heavyweights like Abaijah (5,467), Diro (4,720), and Taureka (1,221), who performed extremely well because of their charismatic leadership, parochial handouts, and political loyalties through national and provincial politics. Both Abaijah and Diro still have a large following, especially Abaijah whose Papua Besena is still alive and well among these people.

*Rigo*

Table 5 shows that of the grand total of 13,031 voters, 12,503 were allowed and only 528 were invalid. Candidates who, by ethnic and cultural identity, would affiliate themselves to Rigo are Diro, Mehutu, and Taureka. It is quite evident that more than half of the voters polled their votes along ethnic lines: Diro polled 5,896, Mehutu 2,191, and Taureka 451. Abaijah, with 2,866 still has a very large following.

Table 5: Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidate in Rigo

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Votes</i>
J.M. Abaijah	2866
P.A. Otto	336
M. Anai	133
A.I. Efi	66
T. Efi	267
T. Diro	5896
F.X. Irere	90
A. Hitolo	107
P. Manai	100
M/ Mehuiui	2191
R. Taureka	451
Total allowed ballot papers	12503
Informal ballot papers	528
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>13031</b>

### *The Central Provincial Electorate as a Whole*

In the final analysis, Ted Diro emerged the clear winner, polling 14,970 ahead of Josephine Abaijah, who made 10,126. Trailing behind them were Manai (5,994), Taureka (4,728), and Mehutu (3,315). Although Diro won, his electoral performance compared to Abaijah, who was the first indigenous Papua New Guinean woman to represent the seat in 1972, was average. The results of the 1982 elections indicate that Diro won with an overwhelming majority (23,628), and his nearest rival could only master a third of his total votes. However, Diro's dramatic win in 1982 was due largely to his own credit as a military man and to the symbol the army constitutes. After four years in national politics some of Diro's weaknesses have become salient in his constituency. Some of these factors involved Diro's family life; others had to do with relinquishing the opposition

leadership, and some were about his electoral duties as an MP and the obligation of delivering goods and services; and also just being with the people.

### *PARTIES AND THEIR PERFORMANCE*

Party affiliations were interesting in Central Provincial electoral politics. Of the eleven candidates, five were endorsed by existing political parties. They are Abaijah by Papua Besena, Diro by People's Action Party, T. Efi by People's Progress Party, Taureka by Pangu and Mehtu by Papua Party. Among them Abaijah and Diro are party leaders. The remaining six, M. Anai, A. Efi, P. Otio, F. Irere, A. Hitolo, and P. Manai, stood on their own accord as independent candidates.

It is established, in the electoral history of Papua New Guinea, that kin and ethnic loyalty and parochial handouts are crucial variables that influence voters. The election results (1987 National Voting Statistics) indicated that, of the 106 MPs, a majority (84) were party affiliates and endorsees and the others (22) were independents. This, to me, suggests that political party consciousness on the part of voters in some electorates played a part in their choice of candidates. But party preference was combined with the candidates' performance (or prospective performance) in the deliverance of goods and services. This clearly is the case in the Central Provincial election, where out of the total 56,775 voters an overwhelming majority (36,322) voted for party candidates and just over half this figure (18,305) chose independent candidates. In the final analysis, a party candidate (PAP), Ted Diro, amassed a total of 14,970, about 4,846 votes ahead of his nearest rival, Abaijah, another party endorsee (PB), and 8,986 votes ahead of the independent candidate, Manai.

Party consciousness can be largely attributed to education, political participation and exposure of the Central people. Churches have enhanced this social process by neutralizing ethnic and kinship boundaries thus creating a cultural bond between ethnic groups under the name of a Christian God and concomitant ethical values and mores. And so the power of deciding on whom to select among the contestants becomes an individual choice free from kinship fetters. Trust is put in the guiding hands of the Christian God. From another point of view, the majority of Central people have had Western education longer than many parts of the country and adult voters write and read and can discourse on policy issues. Therefore there is a tendency for them to choose contestants on their party platforms and philosophies. But the party consciousness and political radicalism of many Central voters are largely attributable to Abaijah's Papua Besena from 1973 onwards. The increased party consciousness now means that party ideologies and policies are strengthening and the mechanics of operationalizing these philosophies are also becoming more sophisticated. Central voters, for instance, are told by the PAP supporters and canvassers that 'Party' means 'Power' and this in turn means access to political resources. Delivery of material goods by an individual who is affiliated with a party is a real possibility; while an individual with no party membership will be a loner and dependent on the whims of party members.

## DISCUSSION

The concept 'the Papuan hegemony' is the thesis of this paper. This is illustrated in the title 'Papuan Prince(ss) and Papuan Development'. It is the mainstay of both Josephine Abaijah and Ted Diro, during overt and covert election campaigns. It manifests itself through the use of party politics and through a much lesser use of kin and ethnic loyalty. Promoting the Papuan hegemony is the conscious and unconscious act of these two political personalities.

We can see from the preceding analysis of the historical overview of Papuan politics, that electoral politics before Abaijah's legacy, at the onset of 1964, were replete with kin loyalties and parochial interests. They were not party politics, owing largely to the alien nature of the institution. This trend was rapidly transformed with Abaijah's Papuan consciousness that culminated in a separatist movement, vying vigorously for Papuan Development (see Premdas 1977, Badu 1982, Mckillop 1982).

The Papuan consciousness became so salient that fear of and dislike for internal colonialism received more attention than external (neo-) colonialism. Structurally this consciousness permeated family, village or community, church, school, council, city and town, development and welfare association, civil service, as well as private sector, and bureaucrat as well as politician. These groups were aroused and mobilized by this consciousness on occasions of mass street demonstrations to vent their anger against the outsiders' mistreatment of their fellowmen, or in quest for equal allocation of resources and services. Great influence was brought to bear on the government of the day to take heed of the demands of the Papuans, predominantly residents in the capital city, Port Moresby, and outlying areas. A Village Task Force was specifically designed to counteract these social pressures (Somare 1975, Avei 1988). Nonetheless, the simple truth is that Papuan leaders, including their advisors and the bureaucrats, succumbed to the temptation of betraying Papua interests to enrich and enhance their social status at the expense of the ordinary, exploited villagers. The cultural activities and institutions that were built, the big corporations and food markets that cropped up, the fishing ventures as well as trucking businesses and many more that began, from the money collected from poverty-stricken villagers or through having access to resources, were all in the eyes of ordinary villagers smart ploys by their educated elite to enrich themselves more than aiding the common villagers to uplift their lives. The gulf between the villagers and the well-to-do Papuan grew.

This inevitable legacy, the Papuan hegemony, indeed is carried over and maintained by Diro. Many Papuans, at elections in 1982 and 1987, still associated him with the symbols of army. In most basic terms he was and is perceived as a man of action. He and his coterie of intellectuals and followers successfully portrayed him as a 'Papuan Prince,' and this usage was also seen as synonymous with 'Papuan Prime Minister'. He was strongly portrayed to his constituents as a potential Papua New Guinean prime minister, first to be from Papua.

Diro's People's Action Party (PAP) calls for a united Papua New Guinea, an ideal which was anathema to Papua Besena as a separatist

movement, and upholds a loyal commitment to Papua New Guinea and its people to derive maximum benefits from the natural resources of its soil. Yet it is quite clear to many Papua New Guineans that Diro's PAP is regionally based and biased towards Papuans and still upholds the legacies bequeathed by Papuan Besena.

There is only a slight difference between the Papua Besena and PAP. Josephine Abaijah, on the one hand, juxtaposed Papuan underdevelopment with Australia's one-sided economic favouritism of New Guinea, and preached against the resulting internal, New Guinea-dominated colonialism. PAP, on the other hand, perceives that its Papuan soil, mainly the NCD, is the gate-way to neo-colonialism and exploitation by New Guineans, but more saliently by enterprising New Guinea Highlanders than any other ethnic group. Therefore, PAP is strongly committed to the prevention of such a tendency developing fully; on the other hand, it is dedicated to the promotion of Papuans to work their own soil, master their own affairs, and to facilitate their economic independence and prosperity. It wants Papuans to hold top posts in the military, in the public service, and in business. At the national level, PAP and its Papuan Bloc faction is dedicated to the maintenance and security of the Papuan bureaucratic elite, in various public service departments and financial institutions. At the provincial level too, it is committed to the maintenance of those who are loyal to its leaders and their ideals in strategic positions of authority and command, in the provincial public service and its private sector. It seeks to assure that friends are prominent in the Department of Central Province, provincial/local governments, its electoral offices, its police force, its business-arm, and a whole range of government and non-governmental organisations.

PAP, its leaders, and their coterie of advisors may be benign and genuine in their endeavour to help Papuans protect themselves from all forms of outside exploitation, and most notably from the threat of the Highlanders in the NCD. The aftermath of the elections still indicate that while party-politics is being profoundly entrenched through a variety of institutional structures, its political and bureaucratic leaders coalesce with the metropolitan bourgeoisie to denude Papua of its natural resources, such as timber, much more to their own benefit than that of the ordinary villagers (see Barnett Reports, Times of PNG 1988). Nevertheless, this self-centred behaviour is prevalent in political as well as bureaucratic circles and not unique to PAP leaders.

Indeed 'United Papua New Guinea' is a catch-phrase for all major parties in Papua New Guinea national politics. PAP is no exception. At the outset, PAP tried to be a national party even though it always made use of the 'Papuan hegemony' theme in Papuan settings, from where it draws its impetus. Still, PAP supported Uma More in the Highlands, Alan Sako in Morobe, John Banono in North Bougainville Open and one may argue that these candidates did not campaign on the Papuan hegemony theme. The hidden agenda for Diro and PAP became very salient after the election, when it was found that PAP had elected only Papuan MPs. PAP became a more explicitly Papuan party. Even then, Diro, to his credit, kept the door open for PAP to reassert a national identity by making the Papuan Bloc, rather than PAP, the focus of Papua pressure group activity. The Papuan Bloc appear strong, however; there are political infighting and leadership animosities between Diro and Kwarara and between the Papuan Highlanders and Coastals.

Regional and cultural identities are still salient in national politics, although an outsider unaccustomed to this political tradition may wonder whether or not there is a *coup d'etat* around the corner. Like all parties, PAP claims it is a nationally-oriented party, and its membership can be drawn from all over the country. But its base has to be geographically defined. Thus, it has no alternative but to identify itself with the Papuan region, its headquarters based in the National Capital District (NCD). While it claims that its policies are nationalistic, its actions are contrary to this. Its dislike for capitalistic Highlanders is a case in point. As a preventive measure, it has attempted, in the NCD, to place Papuan bureaucrats in strategic positions of authority, such as National Capital District Interim Commission (NCDIC) management, land board, transport board, etc., to control and direct business interests towards maximum participation of Papuans. It appears that PAP's short-sightedness blinds it from a common enemy that all Papua New Guineans, regardless of ethnicity, have to compete with, the entrenched capitalists and the off-shore metropolitan bourgeoisie who coalesce with their counterparts, the national elites. Inevitably, economic development will create questions of belongingness and point to problems of regionalism, such as the one being faced by Papuans in the NCD now. On another note, however, Papua New Guineans in order to be one people, will have to tolerate each other and co-exist in many realms of life, despite locality. Often the elites realize that they have alienated themselves from their own people and that they are the cause of their own people's misery and poverty. Few people also are aware that their leaders cause some of their daily problems; yet what a 'man of action' such as Ted Diro can do for the simple people often amounts to their own exploitation.

### CONCLUSION

There is certainly a marked contrast between the electoral politics of people before and after the rise of Abaijah and Diro. Most salient perhaps were the changes in the variables that influenced voter behaviour. Only a few of the Papuans who stood in the early elections were highly educated and thoroughly assimilated in Western ways. They employed Western institutions and wealth to gain their *bigman* status and used it to gain leverage and become leaders in their communities and regions. Voting at that time was based much more along the lines of kin and ethnic loyalty and parochial handouts than along policy lines.

Commencing with Abaijah and proceeding onto Diro, electoral politics in Central Province marked the beginning of a new political history in Papua New Guinea. Because Papuans in Central Province were sensitized to the concept of Papuan consciousness by Abaijah's separatist movement, Papua Besena, voters tend to choose candidates along party and policy issues much more than on the basis of kin and ethnic loyalty. The 1987 race between Abaijah, the Papua Besena leader and candidate, and Diro, the PAP leader and candidate was not so much a choice between personalities as between representatives of parties and policy-goals. Despite the fact that Diro won the seat, the narrow victory margin indicates that both Papua Besena and PAP are popular in Central Province. Indeed, they stand for the same things. What makes both alike is their philosophy of Papuan consciousness, that acts as a 'cementing metaphor' for all Papuans against

New Guineans (now more pronounced against Highlanders). Papuan hegemony is the result of this social process.

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# Kerema Open Constituency

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## PREFACE

A study of one constituency in an election must answer a fundamental question: why did the winner win? To have any hope of providing an answer, one must decide in advance what evidence is likely to be most useful, what is 'important'. After a first visit to the Province of Gulf and discussions with both local people and those closer to political life in Kerema, I arrived at a tentative set of hypotheses.

First, I became convinced that local factors overwhelmed national or even provincial concerns in peoples' minds. 'Primordial sentiments' (Geertz 1963)

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\* Three personal factors, combined with an interest in the history of the area and especially its attempts at co-operative organization, influenced my decision to study Kerema Open constituency in the 1987 election. First, I knew Chris Haiveta, the Gulf Provincial Secretary, with whom I had spent a year at the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex. Secondly, one of the honours students in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies of the University of Papua New Guinea with whom I had previously worked on a research task, Orovu Vitaharo, came from the village of Hamuhamu on the East Coast of Gulf. Thirdly, a former student, Daniel Itu, was going to be a candidate in Kerema Open and generously offered to help steer me through some of the intricacies of 'applied' politics. I am enormously grateful to all of them. Chris Haiveta provided access to political leaders, public servants and provincial data, as well as hospitality in Kerema. Orovu Vitaharo arranged for Mrs. Oliver and myself to be put up in her family's home in Hamuhamu, introduced me to her father, Vitaharo Avosa, an invaluable guide and informant for the Toaripi area, and acted as a constant companion and translator for us in visits to nearby villages. Daniel Itu let me accompany him during his campaigning through several villages in the Kaintiba district (Hwabango, Kanabea, Kaintiba and Kamina) and also served as translator during individual and group interviews. Whatever insights I have been able to acquire are the result of their patience and helpfulness. All of them have been kind enough to read the manuscript for this study, but for the misinterpretations and errors that remain, I am solely responsible.

were often not as strong as in other parts of Papua New Guinea, for clan organization had faded out along the Eastern Coast. A strong sense of village solidarity and language group consciousness seemed to have grown up in its place. Common social and economic concerns - the need for 'development' - displaced or supplemented simpler kinship and 'wantok' loyalties.

Secondly, I was impressed by how little political party affiliation seemed to be affecting people's thoughts on how they should vote.

Thirdly, I heard a good deal about the interpenetration of provincial and national politics, and the hypothesis that provincial political connections would affect the 1987 national election outcome in Kerema Open seemed worth testing.

Equally important, this first visit convinced me that any attempt to interpret the voting in class terms would fail, but that the emergence of a political elite, from which the more successful candidates would be drawn, was probably going to be evident, continuing a national trend from the past elections. All of the members of this political elite would be better educated than most of their electors. They would also be better off economically and would sometimes be very wealthy. In these cases, wealth would often be a consequence of the interaction of political power, the power of public office, and business power. Perhaps their ability to lavish gifts and cash on their electorate would count heavily in their favour, but I had doubts that any such obvious connection between wealth and political power would emerge very clearly.

It also seemed to me that religion would only be of minor significance and would be almost impossible to separate from local and clan affiliations. One very alert informant insisted that religion would have an effect on the election, but the fact that he came from Moveave, with its exceptional religious rivalries, led me to discount his views as a general explanatory factor.

Gender was, it seemed, going to have no weight in voting or candidacy choices. No women looked about to nominate. The influence of women partisans of one candidate or other was likely to be very localized.

Finally, I received no impression that the 'personality' of any prospective candidate was likely to be of crucial importance. No one who seemed likely to run was going to have great dramatic appeal. Each would have to be assessed in terms of the skills, personal qualities and connections he possessed; and there might be differences in campaign style and tactics which would influence the outcome.

There remained the question of electoral 'issues' and their importance. It would be impossible to determine in advance whether clearcut questions of policy would arise. It was unlikely that they would be national questions, but perhaps local or even provincial questions would come up in the campaign which would divide the candidates on particular issues.

The description which follows of the province, its regions, the electorate of Kerema Open, the candidates who nominated and, subsequently, of the campaign itself, will reflect the attention I decided to pay to these factors: (a) local and regional identity and interests; (b) political party affiliations; (c) religious and non-traditional affiliations; (d) provincial government connections, (e) personal characteristics, including wealth, of candidates; (f) campaign styles and tactics; and (g) issues.

## **BACKGROUND**

Gulf Province is divided into six districts. From East to West, they are Malalaua, Kerema, Kaintiba, Ihu, Baimuru and Kikori. (Map 1) We will be concerned primarily with the first three, which are in turn divided into census divisions. Malalaua is made up of Moripi, Toaripi, Kaipi and Kovio. Kerema embraces Kerema census division, Kerema Bay and Kaberope. Kaintiba is composed of Hamdei and Uiabi on the East side of the Tauri River, and Hangoia and Ivore-Swanson on the West side (Map 2). Census districts and divisions are not the only units which must be kept in mind in studying Gulf politics. The province has been divided into electorates for provincial elections which have borders that always differs and bear names that sometimes differ from those of the census divisions. Map 3 shows the names and borders of these provincial electorates in the area covered by the national electorate of Kerema Open. The main differences are in Kaintiba district where the census division names of Wenta and Hamdei disappear and are replaced (roughly) by Middle Taure and Mienta respectively; in Malalaua where Mailovera is carved out of Toaripi; and in Kerema district where Kerema Bay is re-named Tairuma.

For elections to the National Parliament, there are three electorates: two Open electorates, Kerema and Kikori, and a Provincial electorate (Map 1). Only three of the other nineteen provinces, West New Britain, New Ireland and Oro, have just three members of the National Parliament. Only one province has fewer members: Manus, with two electorates.

Gulf's small population of 64,120 is sparsely distributed over wide areas of mangrove swamp, seacoast and river shore that can only be reached by water, and tightly folded mountains and valleys accessible only by air or footpath. Kerema Open constituency is made up of only about one-third of the land mass of the province, but its population is larger than that of Kikori constituency because of the comparative density of population in and around the capital of the province, Kerema; in the mountain valleys of Kaintiba district; and along the coast of Malalaua district. In the 1987 National Election, 14, 623 valid ballots were cast in Kerema as opposed to 10,517 for Kikori.

For the purpose of political analysis, a drastic simplification of Gulf Province groupings into three main regional\* groupings is possible. Basically, there are Eastern Coastals, who live in Malalaua district; Western Coastals, who live in Ihu, Baimuru and Kikori districts; and the Kamea who live primarily in Kaintiba, but with spillovers into Kovio and, even more strongly, Kaberope census divisions. The people of Kerema Bay are best, but still unreliably, linked with the Eastern Coastals

Since the focus of the study is Kerema Open electorate, detailed background information will only be supplied on Malalaua, Kerema and Kaintiba districts and the population groups that live in them, especially the Kamea and the Eastern Coastals. The boundaries of Kerema Open electorate reflect the basic artificiality of the boundaries of the province as a whole. A coastal population has been conjoined with a mountain population with which it has no affinity, and indeed a long tradition of enmity.

## *The Eastern Coastals*

### *Language and communication*

Although there is no single language that is spoken by all the coastal people of the Kerema Open electorate, there is quite easy communication through the Toaripi language, which was used by missionaries in the churches of the Malalaua and Kerema Bay coastal districts. It has become a *lingua franca*, but it would be misleading to suggest that linguistic distinctions are now unimportant. The labels given to Moripi, Toaripi and Kaipi census divisions are also the names of three of the main languages which are spoken along the coast. Language gives a sense of common identity to groups of villages and sets them off from villages where another language is spoken (Brown 1965, 1972, 1982; Franklin 1973). Nevertheless, historical connections among all areas along the coast are longstanding, and the entire region seems to have shared in the Hiri trade which for many generations covered the coast from the Purari River mouth down to the area that is now Port Moresby (Dutton 1982a and b; Rhoads 1982)).

### *Economic factors and eastern coastal unity*

Economically, the villages that make up the coastal region present no sharp contrasts. Sago is the subsistence economy staple and it is supplemented by fish, shellfish and coconut and by storegoods like rice and tinned meat and fish when cash is available. The first major departure from subsistence agriculture was copra production. It was undertaken both by villagers who gathered the coconuts from the palms in their locality and on plantations. Most plantations were run by big companies like Steamships; but in a few important instances, such as Koaru and Moru, they were founded by the London Missionary Society (LMS).

The copra cooperative societies that grew up along the coast during the late 1940s and the 1950s provide a vital key to understanding the political dynamics of the region. They have been described (Ryan 1963, 1969; Snowden 1981; Denoon 1982) in a fragmented way but their full story still remains to be written. Dawn Ryan's work, however, provides crucial insights into the reasons why the rise and fall of the copra cooperatives, and particularly of the Toaripi Association, had such a profound effect on eastern coastal villages. The bald facts about the Toaripi Association are simple to relate. Under the leadership of an ex-pastor named Posu, the seven villages of the Toaripi-speaking people established in 1946 a copra cooperative and by 1950 raised the sum of £6000 to buy a boat to transport copra to Port Moresby. The effort this demanded was enormous and could only be sustained by a constant high level of enthusiasm and commitment. Under colonial government pressure, the Toaripis were persuaded to extend their Association to include cooperative societies in the villages of other neighbouring language groups. For a while, the villages began to taste prosperity as the cooperative grew and flourished, but by the early sixties it collapsed.

The causes of failure were many. They included over-regulation by government, competition from private traders, disagreement among villages and especially among villages of different language groups, administrative inexperience and waning enthusiasm as the rewards seemed more remote and sparser than had been hoped for. But for a decade the people of the Eastern

coast had worked together, had shared a common purpose and had achieved something tangible and valuable. This period is now seen as the Golden Age of the East Coast. The cooperative's ship called in at most villages, taking copra to Moresby and bringing back a flow of manufactured goods and it was simple to communicate between settlements.

The Association was a symbol, however, as well as a practical achievement. Inevitably, it was perceived as an answer to the problem of how to tap the source of 'cargo' that had preoccupied the Gulf coast since the days of the 'Vailala Madness' (Williams 1976) in the 1920s and the later Tommy Kabu movement (Allen 1951; Maher 1958). The very practical steps which were being taken by village leaders to found an economic enterprise could also be seen as the rites that were necessary to get the ship that would bring cargo to the coast. 'Cargo cult' activity had stripped the East coast peoples of clan and sub-clan organization, of their men's houses and magical rites, and indeed of the whole set of interwoven rituals and symbols that had given coherence to their early social forms. The 'cargo cult' and the wholehearted adoption of Christianity were expressions of a rejection of the ways of the past and of a willingness to find 'modern' ways of achieving the incredible prosperity that attended the Australian-European way of life. The cooperative was capable of generating the same mix of mystical and material hopes that Ryan found to be induced by Christianity, with its promise of expatriate life-styles as well as the Second Coming (Ryan 1963).

The political significance of the cooperative movement's rise and fall remains strong. The cooperative proved that if coastal peoples could unite, they could prosper. It also showed how difficult the achievement of cooperation could be and how fragile it was once attained. Whatever the causes of the decline from the Golden Age, all efforts needed to be bent to its re-creation. Government help was desperately needed. Representatives who could both unify the East coast and bring the riches of the government to it were an urgent need. At the very least, the coast needed MPs who could see to restoring the ports, clearing the river and creek channels, and above all see to the completion of the Hiritano Highway which would provide access to Port Moresby.

### *Churches and schools*

First Christianity and then colonial officialdom had made an impact on the East coast since the 19th Century. The London Missionary Society (later the United Church) presence was particularly strong and in many cases the missions along the coast were founded by Polynesian pastors sponsored by the Society. The Roman Catholic Church has a strong presence in the province as well, and intense rivalry persists in centres where both churches are in close proximity, such as in Heavala, which with its twin village, Heatore, makes up the important centre of Moveave. More recently there has been some penetration by evangelical groups like the Seventh Day Adventists (SDAs). Coastal people, especially in and around Kerema, have had access to schools for several generations and in the post-World War Two period, leading up to self-government, independence and beyond, they have provided more than their proportionate share of Papua New Guinea's leadership in politics and the public service. Names like Sir Tore Lokoloko, Vincent Eri, and Mekere Morauta are known and respected well beyond the Province.

### *The Kamea*

Just north of the town of Kerema, the mountains come nearly down to the coast. They are the home of the Kamea, a people closely united by language and a common sense of identity in spite of the isolation of one village from another in the incredibly rugged terrain of the highlands. The Kamea of Kerema Open are part of a language and cultural group, 72,000-strong in all, that extends into the Southern Highlands, Morobe, Chimbu and the Eastern Highlands. They are quite different from the coastal peoples on almost every count. They look different - short and stocky as compared to the coastal tendency to be tall and slim. They grow kaukau in gardens through which they migrate in shifting cultivation. They are hunters. Above all, in the past they were raiders, and especially raiders of the coastal settlements. Their reputation for ferocity was unrivalled. The image of inhuman cruelty and untameable wildness that the coastal people held of the Kameas was passed on to the Europeans who first came to the area, and books were written about the terrible deeds of the savage Kukukuku, the coastal name for the Kamea. (Simpson 1953, Blackwood 1978). Contact with churches did not come to the Kamea until mid-20th century. The Roman Catholics were the first to penetrate, but more recently the SDAs have established themselves. Schools were almost unknown until the 1970s.

The government presence in Kaintiba was minimal. The ignorance and possibly the indifference of those who planned the new Province of Gulf is sharply revealed in the document prepared by J. Morola, with the help of a team of national and expatriate researchers, entitled: *Gulf Province Development Study* (Morola 1976). The final section of the study outlines eight key objectives: sea and river transport, road projects, hardware shops and service stations, postal services, commercial bank branches, agricultural development, commerce and trade, rural improvement and works. A Kamea reader would have difficulty finding a proposal that might affect Kaintiba. Perhaps she could discover the Murua-Kaintiba Road, squeezed in by some geographical distortion as a sub-heading under Murua-Kerema; perhaps she might consider that the bank branch recommendation could apply to some Kaintiba village; but she would hardly warm to the specifics of fish, crabs, prawns, crocodiles, a Kerema abbatoir, improved ports and a new large barge, sago sales and marketing of river-reed mats. Copra, rubber and fish get specific mention, but not coffee or cardamom or the other highland cash crops. Postal services are specified for every Gulf district except Kaintiba. In sum, the Kamea barely existed in government plans.

#### *Economic and social factors*

In comparison with the other provinces of Papua New Guinea, Gulf is neither rich nor well-endowed with the infrastructure and the amenities of modernization. Above all it lacks transportation facilities, and if there was a single theme that could be isolated in the 1987 election campaigning, it was the demand for roads, ports, channels and airstrips that would make the development and marketing of cash crops feasible and profitable. The Kamea are conscious of possibilities for future economic prosperity (Ilave 1981). Coffee small-holdings are multiplying, but unless the cost of shipping out the crop can be reduced, the extent of development is limited. In a similar way, the coastal people can go only so far in developing cattle raising and cocoa growing, expanding off-shore and deep-sea fisheries, and in rehabilitating the copra and rubber plantations unless roads and ports are built or improved.

*Coast/Kamea contrasts*

There is a general feeling in Gulf that development needs are urgent; but the stark contrast between the coastal region (Kerema and Malalaua districts) and the Kamea-populated highlands of Kaintiba is politically more important in Kerema Open. Kaintiba ranks 81st out of the 85 census districts of PNG according to a recent study of socio-economic indicators (Albuquerque and D'Sa 1986: 52) while Kerema ranks 9th and Malalaua 25th.

Neither the coastal people nor the Kamea believe they have done as well as they should have in terms of 'development' in PNG; but the intensity of the Kamea feeling that they are not getting their share of the good things of PNG life is stronger by far, and their resentment covers not only remote Islanders, Highlanders or Mamose people who are deemed to be getting more than their due, but the coastal people of Kerema Open itself.

*National Politics and Provincial Politics**National politics*

Men from Gulf Province were a constant feature of the national political scene and although a Prime Ministership (never held by a Papuan) might have been more impressive than the Governor-Generalship attained by Sir Tore Lokoloko, the accomplishments were not meagre. Very powerful ministers like Albert Maori Kiki had represented the province and in the period immediately before the election, from 1982 to 1987 two major portfolios went to members elected from Gulf. It must be stressed that both the recent national cabinet members, Roy Evara and Tony Farapo, were from the coast, as had been all their predecessors in national public posts, whether political or in the public service. The only Kamea to have been elected to the National Parliament, Aron Noaio, had been hopeful of a ministry after his first victory in the 1977 election and even more hopeful after his re-election in 1982. He had been passed over by each of the Prime Ministers of the period, Somare, Chan and Wingti.

*Provincial politics*

Gulf Provincial Government came into being in late 1977, but it was not until December 1979 that the first provincial election took place. The election provided new avenues to political power through 22 provincial seats and from the beginning they were hotly contested. The manoeuvring for control of, or even membership in, the Provincial Executive Council (PEC) was strenuous, and regional factors soon made themselves felt. It became clear that there would be fierce claims for PEC posts from each of the three geographic, cultural and linguistic groupings: West Coast, East Coast and Kamea. The Eastern coastals held the premiership in both the governments from 1980 to 1987: Sepoe Karava first, then Francis Malaisa. Since the December 1987 provincial general election, the pattern has not changed: Tom Koraea, another Eastern Coastal, came to power as premier with Francis Malaisa his deputy. Within the Provincial Executive Council, the balance of power among the regions has changed frequently, for though the premiership has been fairly stable, threatened votes of lack of confidence have produced frequent shifts in the personnel of the executive and in its regional composition. Since 1986



particularly, the Kamea group has been determined to increase its share of provincial portfolios and has set its sights on the premiership. By mid-1988, it had accomplished little and indeed had been completely excluded from the PEC, but the Kamea feeling of regional identity was as strong as ever.

Much of the political manoeuvring in the 1987 national election campaign reflected the power alignments of provincial government politics. Provincial members and ministers sought to use the prominence they had achieved in provincial government affairs as a spring board to national office; and regional groups, especially the Kamea politicians, linked their provincial and national strategies for acquiring power.

### *CANDIDATES*

Thirteen candidates entered the lists for Kerema Open. This number was somewhat fewer than in 1982, when sixteen nominated, but it still covered a wide range of aspirations and interests in the electorate. By the close of nominations on 27 April, it was apparent that neither the Eastern Coastals nor the Kamea had been able to consolidate their forces behind a major regional standard bearer.

#### *The coast: Malalaua*

For the eastern coastal people, the disunity that still dogged them in 1987 must have been galling, since many of them were quite conscious of the risk that was being run. The victory of a Kamea over the influential Tore Lokoloko in 1977 had shocked the coast, and to make sure there was no repetition of the event, a strong move had been made in 1982 to unite Kaipis, Toaripis and Moripis in support of a legendary figure from Moveave. Torea Erekofoa was a mystic as well as an organizer. He had run afoul of the Australian colonial administration which had a deep-rooted fear of cargo cults. This fear was acute in Gulf which had been the scene of the 'Vailala Madness' of the 1920s. The authorities had jailed Erekofoa in the 1970s for promoting a 'five-story-house' project in Moveave. The building plan might have been regarded as an expression of village pride, but the alternative interpretation that this was to be a cargo landing place won out. From then on, the colonial government kept a watchful eye on him, assisted it was rumoured by the Catholics of Moveave whose rivalry with the United Church, of which Torea was a somewhat independent and unorthodox member, was longstanding. But to pin down Torea Erekofoa as a cargo cultist is to miss the many-sided appeal of the man (Ryan 1963:12). He had built a United Church, rival to the official one; he had been the promoter of economic schemes; he was seen as a prophet by a large following. He gained wide support as a standard bearer for the Eastern Coastal people against the Kamea candidate, but, to his followers' great disappointment, it was not wide enough. The Moripis and the Kaipis and, indeed, other factions of the Toaripis could not resist putting up their own candidates. A split vote was inevitable. Still, Torea and his supporters were certain that they had consolidated enough votes to win. When the results were reported, and Aron Noaio, the leading Kamea candidate, was declared the victor again, there was angry disbelief throughout Malalaua. In the riots that ensued, Torea was jailed with a goodly band of his irate supporters including the candidate for

the Gulf Provincial seat, Clement Morasuru, who came from Torea's own Moveave village.

Given this well-remembered experience, Torea had redoubled his efforts in 1987 to achieve some measure of unity among the Eastern Coastals. He felt too old and unwell to run again himself, but he threw his support and prestige behind his son-in-law, Haro Meara Sarufa, and wrote to the Local Government Councillors of East Kerema and Mailovero enlisting their support. When the nominations were in, it was clear that his success in unifying the coast had once again been very limited. Local favourite sons abounded. Against Sarufa were lined up: a) Nelson Lari, a Moripi-speaking candidate from Iokea; b) Semese Ivaraoa, a Kaipi-speaking small businessman from Lelefiru; c) Hora Maera, another Kaipi-speaking businessman and former public servant; and d) Susuve Ila, a Toaripi-speaking salesman from Mirivase. The Malalaua vote was thus to be split five ways, and while no one seemed to give much chance either to Ivaraoa or Ila, Lari and Maera were much more formidable rivals.

### *The Kamea*

The situation in the North was not much different. Aron Noaio had put his head together with Daniel Itu; they had looked at the 1977 and 1982 returns and were convinced that Aron could win the Gulf Provincial seat just as handily as he had won Kerema Open in the past, particularly because there were bound to be enough coastal candidates to fragment the non-Kamea vote. They agreed that Itu would be candidate for Kerema Open and that both would take on the Peoples Action Party label and cooperate as fully as possible. The success of this strategy in Kerema Open depended on the Kamea vote remaining unfragmented and being cast in the direction that the combined weight of Noaio and Itu indicated. When the nominations were closed, the situation was far from solid. Itu had three rivals, and one of them seemed formidable. They were: (a) Sinkau Fugundo Didiman who was, as his name implied, a representative of Department of Primary Industries in charge of rural extension work in the north of the province. The big hurdle he had to leap was that he was not a Kamea and came originally from the Eastern Highlands. (b) John Dio Maso, a former member of the Gulf Provincial Assembly, who was a driver at the Kaintiba Mission. (c) Samuel Kamiaeto, the Deputy Speaker of the Gulf Assembly and a former provincial cabinet minister. Many informants whom I interviewed gave Kamiaeto a better chance of capturing the lion's share of the Kamea vote than a student fresh out of University like Daniel Itu.

### *Kerema district*

The resident population of Kerema district is small compared with either Malalaua or Kaintiba districts (Table 1). In and around the town of Kerema itself are squatter settlements often made up of Kamea-speaking men and women. The affinities of most Kerema Bay voters are closest with the Coastal language groups to the East, but loyalties and origins are mixed. Included in the census district is the census division of Kaberope. The population of the division is in large measure Kamea-speaking and, in the

reporting of voting results, Kaberope was grouped by the officers of the Electoral Commission with the Kaintiba votes. Four candidates came from Kerema district: Roseva Rovela, a former member of the provincial assembly and the owner of a popular Kerema bar; Mika Kerekere, a Kamea-speaking carpenter from Kaberope; Michael Sosori Oraka, a public servant; and Joe Karava, formerly with the Defence Force. None was seen as likely to affect the election outcome significantly.

### *The intensity of inter-area political rivalry*

The motives of the Kamea politicians in pressing for power for their region are reasonably clear. Apart from their personal ambition, they were intent on using political power to help their economically and socially disadvantaged region to achieve 'development'. They sought to rally supporters on these economic-catch-up grounds. The fierce resentment of the coastal people at their lack of success in Kerema Open ever since 1977 needs more complex explanation. It was based on both demography and culture.

#### *Demography*

**Table 1 Population by Census Districts within the Kerema Open Electorate**

District	Population	Absentees	%	Residents	%
Kaintiba (Kamea)	14,125	734	5.2	13,391	94.8
Malalaua (Eastern Coastal)	22,340	10,220	45.7	12,120	54.3
Kerema (Mixed)	6,535	1,538	24.3	4,949	75.7
Total	43,000			30,460	
Kaintiba:	percentage of total population of Kerema Open			32.8%	
	percentage of resident population			44.0%	
Malalaua:	percentage of total population of Kerema Open			52.0%	
	percentage of resident population			39.8%	

Source: National Statistics Office, *Rural Community Register*, Gulf Province, June 1982.

Census District has been so heavy that, although its total population constitutes a clear majority (52 percent) of the Kerema Open population, its resident population is only 40 percent. Kaintiba has only a small out-migration flow and its resident population is 94.8 percent of its total population. Kaintiba's resident population thus exceeds that of Malalaua, and constitutes 44 percent of the resident population of Kerema Open electorate.

The Eastern Coastal people thus believe that they are really the biggest group in the constituency and that only the accident of temporary population displacement (although it is now a displacement of two generations in many cases) puts them in a position of numerical and thus political subordination to the Kamea (Morauta and Ryan 1982; Morauta 1984).

The second explanation for the Malalauans' resentment of the Kamea's political success can best be described as a perception that the coastal people have of themselves as much more knowledgeable and sophisticated than the Kamea. The leadership candidates from the Coast included former senior public servants, diplomats and wealthy businessmen. Seven of the Coastal candidates in all three of the electorates of Gulf were university graduates. Among the Kamea candidates, a Grade 10 education was exceptionally high and only one of them, Daniel Itu, had a university degree. To the people of Malalaua, there seemed to be something 'wrong' with Kameas beating out coastals for the coveted seats in the National Parliament.

### *Sources of support for candidates*

#### *Political party affiliations*

Six of the thirteen Kerema Open candidates (Table 3) declared themselves as party candidates and seven were independents. The parties were Pangu (Hōra Meara), Papua Besena (Mika Kerekere), Papua Party (Haro Meara Sarufa), People's Action Party (Daniel Itu), People's Progress Party (Sinkau Fugundo), United Party (Samuel Kamiaeto), and Wantok Party (Nelson Lari). I interviewed three of the party-endorsed candidates and in two of the three cases, they had applied for a party's support only at the time of the announcement of the election and had had no previous ties with the party. The reasons these two candidates gave for seeking party affiliation were simple and straightforward: they needed the funding and other indirect supports, such as T-shirts, posters and the loan (or sharing) of vehicles that the party might supply. In Samuel Kamiaeto's case, he expected the party to supply K3000 and 5000 posters. He had sought a bank loan to cover the remaining K3000 which he expected to spend on the campaign. The second candidate, Sinkau Fugundo, had been promised K7000 from his party and planned to add K8000 of his own funds. The third party candidate for Kerema Open that I interviewed was Daniel Itu. His reasons for party affiliation with the People's Action Party (PAP) were quite different. He was one of four recent graduates from the Department of Political and Administrative Studies of the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) who had seen their best chance for entry into the political scene in the new party and had become founding members. The PAP was led by Ted Diro, who came from Central Province and had gained prominence both as a military commander and as a national cabinet minister; Vincent Eri from Gulf; and John Waiko from Oro. The party also received a great deal of practical organizational help from Colonel Ian Glanville, who was born in Australia and shared the military background of his leader.

Table 2 Gulf Provincial  
1987 National Election Candidates in Gulf Provincial Electorate in Order of Votes Polled

Rank	Name	Votes	%	Party	Age	Educn (yrs)	Residence Cens Dist	Occup'n	GPG	Other Information
1	Aron Noaio	4 758	18.99	PAP	35	10	Kaintiba	Teacher	N	MP-Kerema Open
2	Dorobe Ridler Kimave	2 852	11.38	Wantok	32	9	Kikori	(DPI)	N	Self-employed
3	Sepoe Karava	2 695	10.75	Pangu	36	15	Kerema	Community Dev	Y	(Premier)
4	Thomas Kekeao Hareo	2 627	10.48	PP	42	15	?	(Foreign Affs)	N	(Diplomat)
5	Api Namari	2 175	8.68	LNA	30	12	Baimuru	Farmer	N	(Teacher)
6	Lemek Kum	2 166	8.64	PPP	33	10	Kaintiba	MPA	Y	(Teacher)
7	Tony Haro Farapo	1 671	6.67	Ind	38	15	Malalaua	(Pub Ser)	N	MP-Gulf Prov
8	Tom Koraea	1 493	5.95	Ind	47	10	Kerema	MPA	Y	(Nat'l Minister)
9	Leo Kavaua	1 010	4.03	PB	39	15	Ihu	MPA-Speaker	Y	Soc. Worker
10	Ope Oeaka	834	3.32	Ind	46	6	Ihu	MPA	Y	(Interim Premier)
11	Anton Mark	823	3.28	Lab	56	6	Malalaua	Carpent.	N	Contractor
12	Maravila Turiai	810	3.23	Ind	40	10	Kerema	(Deputy Secr)	N	Public Servant
13	Francis Pao Maiu	694	2.77	Ind	52	9	Malalaua	Farmer	N	(PTC employee)
14	Morris Morehari	444	1.77	Ind	38	6	Malalaua	(Farmer)	N	Lives in P. Moresby
Total		10 517	99.94							
Average					40.3	10.6				

## Legend:

GPG Employed by or elected to Gulf Provincial Government: Y=Yes; N=No

(...) Brackets indicate an occupation or a position formerly practiced or held

MPA Member of the Provincial Assembly DPI Department of Primary Industry

Party Abbreviations: Lab=Labour; LNA=League for National Advancement; PAP=People's Action Party;

PB=Papua Besena; PP=Papua Party; PPP= People's Progress Party; Ind=Independent

Table 3 Kerema Open  
1987 National Election Candidates in Kerema Open Electorate in Order of Votes Polled

Rank	Name	Votes	%	Party	Age	Educ'n (yrs)	Residence Cens Dist	Occup'n	GPG	Other Information
1	Daniel Itu	2608	17.83	PAP	25	15	Kaintiba	Farmer	Y	(Gulf Public Serv.)
2	Haro Meara Sarufa	2477	16.93	PP	39	10	Malalaua	School Insp	N	Torea's son-in-law
3	Hora Meara	1859	12.71	Pangu	38	10	Kerema	Business	N	(Public Serv.)
4	Sinkau Fugundo	1680	11.48	PPP	32	10	Kaintiba	(DPI)	N	From E. Highlands
5	Samuel Kamiaeto	1628	11.13	United	30	10	Kaintiba	MPA	Y	Deputy Speaker
6	Nelson Lari	1500	10.25	Wantok	36	15	Malalaua	Self-emp	Y	(Prov. Planner)
7	Roseva Rovela	588	4.02	Ind	41	8	Kerema	Business	Y	(MPA)
8	Michael Sosori Oraka	560	3.82	Ind	53	9	Kerema	Public Serv.	N	
9	Mika Kerekere	522	3.61	PB	28	6	Kaintiba	Carpenter	N	
10	Joe Karava	409	2.79	Ind	?	10	Kerema	Farmer	N	(Defence Force)
11	Susuve Ila	279	1.91	Ind	31	6	Malalaua	Saleman	N	(Social Devel't)
12	Semesse Ivaraoa	267	1.82	Ind	52	7	Malalaua	Business	N	Tavern, Cattle
13	John Dio Maso	241	1.64	Ind	30	6	Kaintiba	Driver	Y	(MPA)
Total		14623	99.94							
Average					36.3	9.4				

Legend

GPG Employed by or elected to Gulf Provincial Government: Yes=Y; No=N

(...) Brackets indicate an occupation or a position formerly practiced or held

MPA Member of the Provincial Assembly

Party Abbreviations: PAP=People's Action Party; PB=Papua Besena; PP=Papua Party;

PPP=People's Progress Party; Ind=Independent

Table 4 Kikori Open  
1987 National Election Candidates in Kikori Open Electorate in Order of Votes Polled

Rank	Names	Votes	%	Party	Age	Educ'n (yrs)	Residence Cens Dist	Occupation	GFG	Other Information
1	Allen Ebu	2 522	23.98	NP	33	10	Kikori	Farmer	N	(Public Servant)
2	Roy Evara	2 001	19.02	Wantok	37	15	Baimuru	MP	N	Politician
3	Jacob Kairi	1 060	10.07	PAP	36	15	Baimuru	Publ Serv	N	Foreign Affairs
4	Joye Soloi Hareavila	808	7.68	Ind	32	15	Ihu	MPA	Y	Minister of Finance
5	Mark Ivi Maipakai	730	6.94	PPP	27	12	Baimuru	Fish Plant Mgr	N	(Bank Manager)
6	Vaii Kaipu	645	6.13	Pangu	34	10	Baimuru	Farmer	N	(Public Servant)
7	Peni Bori	628	5.97	Ind	45	3	Kikori	MPA	Y	(Local Gov. Council)
8	William Keare	574	5.45	Ind	45	9	Ihu	Council Pres	N	Medical Asst
9	Nao Kouoru	460	4.37	MA	33	12	?	Accts Clerk	N	Studying Economics
10	Mark Mauvake	444	4.22	Ind	45	10	Ihu	Business	N	(MP) (Publ Serv)
11	Kuberi Epi	414	3.93	Ind	42	10	?	Liaison Off	Y	Aide to Somare
12	Navu Gevina	76	0.72	Ind	33	10	?	Publ Serv	N	
13	Laura Ivia	70	0.66	Ind	61	4	Baimuru	Farmer	Y	District Adv Council
14	Nabira Ovi	52	0.49	Ind	50	5	Kerema	Farmer	N	Medical Orderly
15	Tau Kuma	33	0.31	Ind	34	9	Baimuru	MPA	Y	
	Total	10 517	99.94							
	Average				41.9	10.6				

#### Legend

GFG Employed by or elected to Gulf Provincial Government: Y=Yes; N=No

(...) Brackets indicate an occupation or a position formerly practiced or held

MPA Member of Provincial Assembly DPI Department of Primary Industry

Party Abbreviations: MA=Melanesian Alliance; NP=National Party; PAP=People's Action Party;

Ind=Independent

Itu's candidacy was one which from the outset showed promise. He had been active politically in Gulf affairs while still a student and a member of the Gulf Provincial Students Association at UPNG. For a year after his graduation he worked in the Provincial Secretariat first as a research officer and then as an executive officer. He had been deeply involved with the Kamea provincial members in planning for increased influence in provincial government through the toppling of the Karava government. He counted on spending K10,000 on his campaign, most of which would be supplied by the PAP.

Itu's deep party involvement was exceptional in that it was both recent and intense. Among four other party-endorsed candidates I interviewed (for the Gulf Provincial seat), this party commitment was matched only by Aron Noaio of the PAP. Sepoe Karava had been a Pangu Party member for fifteen years and remained loyal to it, but expected little support from it financially. The other two party candidates were recent converts. Lemek Kum, the Deputy Premier was frank in stating that he had been negotiating with two parties and intended to accept the endorsement of whichever provided the best material support for his campaign. This turned out to be the People's Progress Party (PPP). Ope Oeaka who had been a member of the PPP since 1969 was abandoned by his party and left to run as an Independent.

In not one of the interviews with party candidates was it claimed that the fact of party endorsement in itself increased the chances of winning the seat. Itu and Noaio both hoped that in the future the PAP could build an organization that stayed alive between elections and commanded people's loyalties. Sepoe Karava hoped that party affiliations, especially those of Pangu, would become stronger, but there was no hint that these *desiderata* had been attained in time for the 1987 election. All discussions of possible outcomes turned on local and personal factors and their impact on the voters.

No candidate interviewed suggested that the reason for his affiliation with a party was its programme. Daniel Itu came closest to giving this reason, but his comments are better interpreted as enthusiasm for a party that brought together new faces and dynamic personalities rather than agreement with specific policies.

#### *Provincial government connections*

Four of the candidates in Kerema Open in 1987 had existing or previous provincial government connections. We have already noted those of Daniel Itu. The person whom informants usually cited as his greatest rival was Samuel Kamiaeto, the current Deputy-Speaker of the Provincial Assembly and a former provincial cabinet minister. His connections with provincial politics were much more public and obvious than those of Itu, who was only briefly a public servant and a private rather than a public voice in Kamea political councils. Neither of the other two former provincial members who were running, John Dio Maso and Rosela Rovera, were mounting very considerable campaigns. If the hypothesis that provincial clout could be transferred to national campaigning was valid, it would most show in the vote received by Kamiaeto.

#### *Village affiliations*

Every candidate counted on village, and sometimes clan, affiliations for a core vote which could give him victory. Even Sinkau Fugundo, the outsider



from the Eastern Highlands who was running in Kerema Open, felt sure that because his wife was a Roman Catholic from Moveave he would receive support from an area where he was not personally as well known as in the mountains. For the rest, he was certain that his recent hard work among Kamea voters as a *didiman* (agriculture extension officer) would outweigh his status as an outsider, and he believed that some support would come from Malalaua people where he had earlier been President of the Public Employees Association (PEA) for five years.

Marriage connections were also regarded as significant by Daniel Itu. Itu's wife was from Miaru and she had relatives in Iokea, both Moripi-speaking areas of Malalaua. News that Samuel Kamiaeto, whom he perceived as his chief rival, had had a hostile reception when he visited Miaru early in the election campaign convinced Daniel Itu that his wife's family links were going to stand him in good stead.

### *Non-traditional Affiliations*

Church affiliations were those most often mentioned by informants as having some influence on voters' choice and candidates' acceptability. But, as noted in the preface, only one informant gave religion a prominent place among election determinants. Samuel Kamiaeto counted on the solid support from his Lutheran co-religionists; unfortunately they were too few to make a noticeable impact on election returns. Perhaps more important, he was convinced that no potential supporters would be turned against him because he was Lutheran. There was a precedent for this confidence. An SDA, Aron Noaio, had won Kerema Open in 1977 and 1982, yet his power base was the same as that of Kamiaeto, the predominantly Roman Catholic Kamea. United Church affiliation was important for the support that Haro Meara Sarufa hoped to gain along the East Coast, but it would be so intertwined with the appeal of his father-in-law, Torea Erekofoa (whose United Church orthodoxy was often in question), that it would be impossible to separate the two. Among candidates for the Gulf Provincial seat, the religious affiliation factor was deemed of some importance by Sepoe Karava who felt he would be helped by his extensive connections within the United Church. He had been Vice-Chairman of his local United Church circuit.

Non-traditional associations had grown up in Gulf as in the rest of PNG during the colonial years, but there was little evidence that they would play a significant role in the election. Many of Sinkau's PEA associates would, he hoped, support him. Samuel Kamiaeto had helped form the Wantoks, a sports club, and had been a patron of the New Gulf Club (another sports organization); he was also chairman of the Kamea Social Club that brought together Kamea public servants in Gulf. For the rest, membership or leadership in 'modernizing' associations seemed of little account and no candidate saw fit to mention such an affiliation in his brief biographic notes submitted to the Electoral Commission. Government experience was more significant, and no less than twelve of the thirteen candidates in Kerema Open had worked for a public body. It is a measure of Gulf province's lack of development that only four of the candidates had had private business experience or, at any rate, saw fit to mention it.

### CAMPAIGN STYLE AND TACTICS

Running a serious campaign in Kerema Open requires an immense expenditure of energy. Voters in the mountains are only reached by aeroplane, or by a motor cycle track from Kerema to Kaintiba, and then by punishing back-packing over mountain trails. Along the coast, candidates must beat their way through the waves in a dinghy from river mouth to river mouth, then follow winding creeks through the mangroves from one settlement to another. There are roads around Kerema itself and there is the highway to Malalaua, but that is the end of land transport possibilities. Travel is also expensive. Air fares are high, dinghies cost a lot to rent and more to operate. Petrol rates are set by small scale entrepreneurs in villages who charge what the traffic will bear, and boat traffic at election time is supposed to be able to bear a good deal. One consequence of boat and to a lesser extent road transport difficulties is to force candidates to work together. The most common combination is that of Open and Provincial candidate from the same party. But other *ad hoc* and locally appropriate sharing is common enough.

#### *Area access and vote-splitting*

Cooperative campaigning may be motivated by other considerations than sharing travel costs. Two other reasons are area access and vote splitting. Candidates for the Kerema Open seat frequently combined with candidates for the Gulf Provincial electorate because each wished to be introduced by a native son into an area where he was not well-known. Daniel Itu came from the west side of the Tauri River, thus even though he was campaigning among his own Kamea people, he found it useful to have Aron Noaio with him when he visited such East side villages as Hawabanga and Kaintiba (all the more so because Samuel Kamiaeto came from the east side). Similarly, Aron made use of Daniel's support when he was campaigning for the Gulf Provincial seat against Lemek Kum who, like Daniel, came from West of the Tauri. The partnership between the two PAP candidates, Itu and Noaio, was much less useful in other parts of the electorate. Daniel Itu frankly admitted that there were more valuable combinations when he was visiting the coastal settlements and that he ran a risk if he spoke out for a mountain candidate on the coast where at least the tolerance of the coastal candidates for the Provincial seat was essential. Tony Farapo might be Aron's rival for the Provincial seat, but Itu considered him an ally well worth having in Farapo's own Moripi country. The question of whether Farapo, an Independent, was really supporting Daniel Itu or Samuel Kamiaeto in Kerema Open was disputed. (The probable answer was: it depends what part of the electorate you are talking about!) There was similar ambiguity about Lemek Kum's support. Both Itu and Kamiaeto thought they had it; probably neither did.

Sometimes it was alleged by an informant that 'access' combinations were deliberately created. It was claimed that John Dio Maso was only running in Kerema Open as an Independent because Sepoe Karava, a candidate for Gulf Provincial, needed someone to take him through the Kamea areas where he had no strong and reliable connections. Sepoe might normally have turned to his fellow Pangu Pati candidate in Kerema Open, but this would have done him no good, for in that electorate Pangu had endorsed an eastern coastal. For the same reason, Leo Kavaua, the Speaker of the Provincial House of Assembly who was contesting the Provincial seat, was rumored to have put up Mika Kerekere, who came from Didimaua in Kamea

country, for Kerema Open. But at least in this case they were members of the same party, Papua Besena.

The line that divides putting up an 'access' candidate and putting up a vote splitter is a fine one. There was speculation on the part of one informant that Jacob Kairi had been put up by the PAP in Kikori Open as much to split the base vote of the incumbent Roy Evara who came from the same part of Baimuru as to win. But this kind of allegation is difficult to prove and Kairi in the end received far more votes from the electorate as a whole than a vote-splitter would be likely to get. Sepoe Karava, himself accused of putting up a candidate in Kerema Open to serve his personal needs, was suspicious that Maravila Turiai had nominated for Gulf Provincial just to reduce his (Sepoe's) vote in Kerema district.

### *Organization and tactics*

If an impact is to be made on voters who are scattered in dozens of little villages, a candidate requires local help. Each of the candidates I interviewed had set up some sort of network of local campaign agents in the villages. Usually these were village notables, perhaps a traditional leader, a Local Government Councillor or a church leader. Sometimes a candidate would, by contrast, seek an agent and most of his supporters from among the rising, non-traditional leadership, made up of the best educated who were often, especially in the Kamea villages, quite young. In larger centres and in areas of strong personal support, the single agent would be aided by a committee. (In Pidgin, the word *komiti* applies either to an individual or a group, so it is sometimes unclear how many organizers are involved.) Young people were usually recruited to do the chores of tacking up posters, passing messages and handing around notices. Supporters who had prestige in a broad area were asked to write letters to influential people they knew in other villages. The candidates' tours were scheduled to permit local committees to organize an impressive reception and a meeting. Party affiliation helped in these preparations. Trucks or boats could be borrowed; T-shirts or buttons, at least of the party leader, could be obtained. Sometimes the meeting was a feast, with beer and food for all. Sometimes it was simply a series of speeches, especially by the candidate himself with questions asked and answered.

In Kerema Open, Daniel Itu's and Haro Meara Sarufa's campaigns presented interesting contrasts. Neither had run before and they could not, therefore, run on their records or on the credit they might have picked up for the way they spent the K40,000 National Development Fund sums incumbents had at their disposal. But since Aron Noaio had moved to the Provincial electorate contest, none of their opponents had that advantage either.

Daniel Itu's campaign was heavily based on an appeal to voters to support a new kind of leadership: young, educated and politically sophisticated. He described his campaign as an exercise in political education. There was little razzmatazz. Itu's posters were black and white and they were sparsely distributed. His speeches owed more to the models of National High School teachers and his university lecturers than to high power evangelists. But he was indefatigable and succeeded in surrounding himself with young, dedicated followers. The energy and drive of Itu and his key supporters was directed not only to overcoming the domination of the coastals, but also to taking over from the traditional leadership in Gulf, especially in the Kamea-speaking region. Their aim was the substitution of a new generation for an

older one in the direction of provincial, and eventually national, affairs. Itu was confident that his understanding of politics and the ways of power was deeper than that of former leaders and would lead to greater effectiveness. In some parts of Papua New Guinea, like the Islands and much of Mamose, a young, educated leadership had taken over twenty years earlier and men like John Kaputin, Rabbi Namaliu and John Momis had enjoyed power for a generation. It had happened more recently in the Highlands, but Paias Wingti, Aruru Matiabe and John Nilkare were proof that it had occurred. Now it was time for the Kamea to field an effective, educated new team, and Daniel Itu was intent on giving it direction. Itu did not neglect the obeisances to traditional leaders in the mountains, but the men he relied on were young: leaders of youth groups, high school graduates, local teachers.

By contrast, the campaign of Haro Meara Sarufa embodied the frustrations of the coastals, and particularly of people who had felt that they were on the way to 'development' and had found that both economic power and, since 1977, political power was evading them. The malaise which had set in along the Eastern Coast after the failure of the copra cooperative was expressed in a series of related resentments. Resentment against self-seeking entrepreneurs who had made themselves a beginning in the comparative prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s, often by skimming off the profits of the cooperative. Resentment against political representatives who went to Port Moresby and forgot their villages. Resentment at the neglect of Gulf Province by the National Government and especially by the failure to keep ports open, clear the waterways and put the Hiritano Highway through from Port Moresby to Kerema. Resentment that a Papuan had never been chosen to be Prime Minister. And finally, resentment that the Eastern coast's problems, and Gulf's problems, and Papua's problems were a connected chain of discrimination and neglect. An initial solution to all these problems would be the election of a member for Kerema Open who represented the coast, and the traditional values of its villages and a had strong sense of Papuan identity. The right candidate had to be counted on to keep close touch with and be sensitive to the ideas and aims of the village councillors and the leaders of the United Church. The claim of the young and educated to provide leadership was greeted with suspicion by many coastal leaders who felt that they and their villages would be used as stepping stones to personal power and wealth. They looked for a local vision and powerful local connections. Torea Erekofo's son-in-law, Haro Sarufa, set out to meet these desires and hopes. He concentrated almost exclusively on the coast and Kerema. He used Erekofo's extensive network of friends and followers. He ran under the banner of the Papua Party whose leader, Galeva Kwarara, was a United Church minister. He set himself the task of unifying the coastals and convincing them that he represented the best in their traditions. His agents were the local notables. At 39, he was still a fairly young man himself, but much of his organization was more mature.

I did not follow Haro Sarufa's campaign in person, but I had visited the villages of Hamuhamu, Moveave, Uritai and Koaru in April 1987 when the election campaign was just beginning and before nominations had closed. My notes from that visit read:

Vitaharo Avosa and the village leaders in their fifties to whom he introduced me felt strongly that their best choice would be an experienced village leader, one of their own. And they were supported in their view, both in their presence and in their absence, by younger men. There was skepticism about the importance of

education and of a fluent command of English. The educated young, once elected, got enmired in Waigani intrigues and Port Moresby business deals that did little for their home areas. They were ignorant and uncaring about village people's cares and needs.

Sarufa was not to have the coastal vote to himself, but was the candidate who seemed to articulate the concerns of many coastals most clearly, and his electoral campaign reflected it.

### *THE ISSUES*

In personal interviews and in group discussions, held before the election in Kaipi and Toaripi villages and during the election in the mountains, I attempted to uncover the issues that electors felt were important in their decision on how to vote. What emerged was a set of concerns and of hopes. Whether they constituted 'issues' in the usual sense is another matter to which I will return.

Three themes were recurrent, indeed almost invariable: neglect of Papua, neglect of their region and locality, and the need for development.

#### *Neglect of Papua*

Resentment because Papua was getting a raw deal from the national government and because the interests of New Guinea and the highlands received far more than their just share of attention was expressed without any prompting in coastal villages and mentioned with only slightly less frequency and vigour in the mountains. The fact that no Papuan had ever been Prime Minister was often cited as proof of Papua's low standing in the national scene. The contrast between the Okuk Highway that linked the highlands internally and connected them with Lae and the failure to build either the Hiritano Highway or a road to join Kaintiba with the coast was strongly resented. Everywhere one looked, I was told, the story was the same: New Guinea dominated; Papua did not count.

#### *Regional and local neglect*

As might be expected, the charge that their region was not getting its fair share of public resources was most frequently heard in the mountains among the Kamea. Tony Farapo, the Gulf Provincial incumbent, was said to have paid no attention to them and provided them with no development. He did not visit them; he looked after his own interests and those of his *wantoks*. Aron Noaio was doing his best, but he had not been made a minister as had the two coastal men, Farapo and the incumbent MP for Kikori Open, Roy Evara. Along the eastern coast, the charge that some other region of Gulf was getting preferential treatment was rarely heard, but in its place came a litany of complaints about the neglect of almost every separate locality. Noaio was rarely the target of these charges; much more frequently they were levelled against Farapo, who was perceived as looking after only Moripi interests. The same attack on Farapo that was made in the mountains was echoed among the Kaipis and Toaripis: Farapo stayed in Moresby and never came to see them after he had been elected. Noaio was not spoken of with any gratitude or admiration in the meetings I had with village people along the

coast, but in two personal interviews, both with non-Kamea members of the provincial legislature, Noaio was judged to have been a Gulf representative, often present in the province and always attentive to its needs, rather than just a mountains' advocate. It was pointed out that he had even spent part of his national development fund money on the east coast. These facts might not be sufficient to exempt him from blame in each small locality for neglecting its interests, but it did mean that he was not a primary target.

### *Local development*

If neglect was an issue, so also was the other side of that coin, the demand for development. What development meant was almost invariably the satisfaction of very local needs. Even when illustrations were being given about the neglect of the whole of Papua, the examples cited were at most Gulf needs and usually regional or local needs. In village meetings, the list of what was needed for development was long, specific and very locally oriented. Transportation needs were the most prominent. In both the mountains and the coast, roads were crucial. In the mountains, new or improved airships for use by larger planes came next; on the coast it was navigable water channels, port facilities and regular visits by coastal ships. The Kamea complained that they were better connected by air with Wau in Morobe than with Kerema, and that they were marketing their coffee in Morobe and paying Morobe sales tax for goods they brought in from that province. Help in establishing cash crops and then in marketing the produce might stress coffee and cardamom in the mountains, and rice or fish along the coast, but the link between development and cash-cropping was universally perceived. The list of development needs usually continued with a demand for better, less costly schools, more available health centres, electrification, a sawmill so that better homes could be built, community centres that the women could run, and markets for handicrafts and agricultural and fishery produce.

What was *not* cited as a development need was investment in petroleum exploration or large-scale lumbering, or a national development plan, or even a full exploitation of the Lakekamu alluvial goldfields. Indeed, the Lakekamu gold fields seemed to raise a land compensation issue rather than a development issue.

### *Demands or issues?*

The link between local development needs and the election seemed clear enough in peoples' minds. The person they elected had as his or her primary responsibility the bringing of 'development' and there was a check list of local needs against which the representative's performance could be assessed. But there was no sense in which candidates would be distinguished one from another in terms of their *policies* for satisfying these needs. Every candidate was expected to know that his or her job was to bring development. Any candidate elected would at least have national development money to spend. The questions were: who would be most likely to act on the needs of a given locality? who would be able to get access to the largest pool of resources? who would be least likely to go to Moresby to make a fortune and to forget about the people who sent him there? The candidates were not expected to 'debate' the issues. No statement of priorities was expected from them. The

'issues' were a given for each locality and to some extent for each region. The problem of the election was to choose the person who would act on these local issues most effectively. Sometimes a candidate would attempt to show how he could remedy a neglect better than others, e.g., Daniel Itu's argument that only someone who belonged to a party with a Papuan party leader could hope to advance the cause of a Papuan Prime Minister. More usually, it was assumed that the personal qualities - the morals, the communication and negotiating skills, and above all the sense of loyalty - of the candidates were what would count in getting the issues acted on.

### THE POLLING

I watched the polling at Hawabanga in Hamdei census division in Kaintiba district. It is in the north-east of Gulf Province, close to the border of Morobe. The village is the home of Aron Noaio, Itu's PAP partner, and it lies on the East side of the Tauri River, the area of strength of the provincial deputy-speaker, Samuel Kamiaeto, whom Itu perceived as his chief rival. The total population of the Census division was 4721 in 1978. Hawabanga itself numbered only about 500 people, of whom less than one half would be of voting age, but electors would be coming in from surrounding villages as well.

About two hundred men, women and children were seated in tiers in a hillside bowl that formed a natural amphitheatre. Those from Hawabanga village itself tended to be dressed in jeans or shorts and tropical shirts or, in the case of the women, *laplaps* and *meri* blouses. But of those who had walked in from distant hill settlements, the men were dressed in *asgras* and woven aprons and the women in grass skirts and a cape of barkcloth. There were necklaces of kina shells and nose ivories of pig tusk. Men carried bows and a handful of arrows. The characteristic huge, often heavily loaded, Highland *bilums* were slung from the women's backs. I was allowed to sit and observe as the election officials called out names and, in ones, twos, threes or fours (depending on whether or not a man was married and if so, how many wives he had) peopled hurried from their places in the hollow to the cluster of buildings on the lip of the bowl where the poll was located.

The polling team consisted of a returning officer assisted by a man who had the voters list and called out names; another man who bellowed the names across the bowl; another who entered voters' names on a voters list; a policeman and two candidates' scrutineers. The men were called out by their own names, the women were simply '*meri bilong...*' If a *meri* arrived first at the poll entry, she was held back by a 'gatekeeper' (whose status was unclear to me) until her husband caught up and could precede her.

Only four of the thirty-odd persons I observed casting ballots marked their own ballot paper. The rest were escorted to a 'booth' (a tin, three-sided screen) by the returning officer, flanked by the scrutineers. The voter was then asked either to whisper a name or to point to a picture on the ballot. This process was repeated twice for each person, for each one could, of course, vote for both a Kerema Open and a Gulf Provincial candidate. Usually, voters opted for a whisper, sometimes after trying the other method and searching in vain through the big ballot, turning it frontwards then backwards looking for the face they wanted. An X was then inserted by the returning officer and checked by the scrutineers. The ballot was then folded by the returning officer and given to the voter to insert in the slot of the ballot box. Sometimes, I could hear the name 'whispered' from my station about five

yards away, and in this tiny sample the 'Aron' and 'Daniel' votes seemed to be out-numbering the 'Samuel' whispers, even though this was supposed to be one of Kamiaeto's areas of strength.

That evening I was introduced to the poll 'crier', who turned out to be the Local Government Councillor for the village, and his friend the self-appointed 'gate-keeper'. Both were unabashed supporters of Aron and Daniel and part of the local organization for those candidates.

On the way to the polling place, I had encountered on a narrow path an elderly lady quietly repeating the names Aron, Daniel, Aron, Daniel. I assumed that she had been reminded of them recently and wanted to make sure she remembered them. Perhaps because I had arrived with Daniel Itu and was staying with him in Aron's house I encountered no representatives of Kamiaeto or indeed any of the other candidates in Hawabanga.

There was no shouting, no scuffling, and little confusion. If this poll was typical, and there is no particular reason to believe it was not, Kerema Open was going to have a reasonably quiet election.

### *THE OUTCOME*

Daniel Itu won in Kerema Open and Aron Noaio won in Gulf Provincial. Allan Ebu who won Kikori Open was a National Party (NP) candidate but had also received the endorsement of the PAP. It looked like a clean sweep for the PAP, but whether that was a way of describing the result that would make much sense to most of Gulf's voters remains to be discussed.

### *The province as a whole:*

Before homing in on Kerema Open results, a word should be said on patterns of voting for the Province as a whole. Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide a base for some generalizations. The information in them is drawn largely from National Electoral Commission, *National Elections 1987 Report: Bio Data of Candidates*, Part 1, Port Moresby, 1987 and from the official election returns furnished by the Electoral Commission. The data has been supplemented occasionally by information obtained from Gulf informants.

#### *Party affiliation*

It was suggested in the Preface that party affiliation would not be an influential factor in determining how people would vote. On the face of it, the results seemed to belie this hypothesis. First, clearly-endorsed PAP candidates won both Gulf Provincial and Kerema Open, and a PAP-supported candidate won Kikori Open. Secondly, an inspection of Tables 2, 3, and 4 shows that the party-affiliated candidates tended to poll more strongly than Independents. Indeed, success (measured by rank in the polling) correlates strongly and significantly with being a party candidate rather than an independent ( $r = 0.71$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ). If these results do not indicate that electors in Gulf are voting along party lines, what do they mean?

My reluctance to interpret the returns as an indication of party preferences among voters stems from three sources. First, not one of my informants believed that anyone they knew cast their ballots for a candidate because of his party label. Similarly, no one to whom I asked the question: 'Whom do you think will win in Kerema Open (or Kikori Open or Gulf Provincial)?' replied: 'The Pangu (or the PAP, or the PP, or the PPP) candidate.'



Normally, they gave a name (Daniel, or Sepoe, or Tony). Occasionally, I was told: 'One of the Kamea candidates' or 'I think the coastal voters will be more united this time and will elect one of their people'.

Secondly, no one at any of the group or individual interviews I conducted said they were going to vote for a candidate because he belonged to a certain party. What I heard in local meetings and in interviews with village people was different. In the Toaripi villages of Hamuhamu, Uritai and Moveave, the Papua Party was spoken of favourably. A man in Hamuhamu said he liked the Papua Party because it had a United Church pastor, Galeva Kwarara, as its leader. Yet the feeling that the party was being picked by the candidate and his supporters, rather than the party picking the candidate, was strong. Particularly in Moveave, it was the fact that Torea Erekofoa had left Pangu to run with the Papua Party in 1982, and was now calling on people to support his son-in-law who was the Papuan Party candidate, that seemed to generate the support people expressed in the party. In the Kaipi village of Koaru, just as much a United Church stronghold as Uritai or Hamuhamu, there was no Papua Party support. Rather, the name of the local favourite son, Hora Meara, who was running as a Pangu candidate, was on everyone's lips. As a vehicle for the right man, the party might have significance; party support went little beyond that.

At Kamina, a group of about eighteen local people who were from the village (or in the village because it was Sunday) met with me and Daniel Itu. The latter's influence was possibly the cause of a comment that went as follows: 'We need a Papuan Prime Minister. It is not fair that all the Prime Ministers so far have come from New Guinea. If we vote for someone who has a party leader who is not a Papuan, we may lose the chance to help make a Papuan the next Prime Minister.' Such an intervention was exceptional and, especially in the Kamina case, can probably be explained as an echoing of the 'political education' that Daniel Itu had told me he was stressing in his campaign.

Thirdly, the attempt to carry over a sense of the importance of party into the provincial general election in Gulf in December 1987 was a complete failure, even though both Itu and Sepoe Karava, who were active in helping to plan the provincial election campaigning, were strong advocates of a party approach to politics. I have spoken to no one who explains the outcome of the provincial election as a consequence of party voting.

A more plausible explanation for party-endorsed candidates polling more strongly than independents is based on three points: a) parties only endorse candidates they think will have a reasonable chance of winning; b) strong candidates may seek some party's endorsement to be eligible for the party's financial support and support in kind (posters, buttons, transportation) but it often seems to matter little which party finally provides the wherewithal; c) sophisticated candidates know that the selection of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the other members of the National Executive Council is made as a consequence of *party* manoeuvring and bargaining. A strong independent member is not without resources in this manoeuvring, but normally the chance for a cabinet post, or real influence on those who become ministers, improves as a consequence of party affiliation. This third factor is not one that is perceived by most voters. Hence Daniel Itu's feeling that 'political education' was essential, especially in the importance of voting for candidates who belonged to parties with Papuan leaders if they wished to have a Papuan Prime Minister.

### *Provincial government connections*

Do the results suggest that provincial politics and national politics are becoming more closely inter-connected in Gulf? Certainly men who had made a name for themselves provincially or felt they had established their ability to 'deliver' development for their constituents, were coming forward as candidates in some numbers. A rough classification of candidates according to their provincial government connections or lack of them appears in Tables 2, 3, and 4 under the column headed GPG (Gulf provincial government connection). A correlation of 'rank' obtained in the poll (first, second, third, etc.) and 'Gulf provincial government connection' for the three Gulf electorates taken together shows no relationship ( $r = 0.06$ ). The picture does not change when each of the electorates is looked at separately.

Table 2 shows that of the five candidates for Gulf Provincial who had provincial connections, only two polled among the top seven candidates while three are found among the bottom seven. Lemek Kum, who just makes the top half of the poll, had been favoured as a very strong candidate by many informants in part because he was the Deputy Premier of Gulf. His final place in the standings must therefore be seen as a disappointment. The Speaker of the Provincial Assembly, Leo Kavaua, and two provincial ministers, Tom Koraea and Ope Oeaka, managed only to garner between 3 percent and 6 percent of the votes polled.

In Kerema Open (Table 3), the picture changes somewhat. Three of the five candidates with provincial connections appear in the top six of the constituency results. Two former members of the Provincial Assembly (MPAs) trailed badly with 4.0 percent and 1.6 percent. But one of those listed as provincially-connected is Daniel Itu whose employment by the provincial government was neither long (less than a year) nor well-known. He had occupied only an advisory and a research post and was hardly a public figure in the same sense as an MPA or a minister. It would be stretching interpretation a good deal to claim that his provincial government connections were a determining asset. Samuel Kamiaeto, the Deputy Speaker of the Gulf Provincial Assembly, came fifth in the Kerema Open poll, but this was a very disappointing result for a candidate whom many informants had thought would win. He fell 980 votes behind his fellow Kamea, Daniel Itu, and was beaten out by another mountain candidate who was not even a native of the province, Sinkau Fugundo.

In Kikori Open also (Table 4), provincial connections counted for little. A senior minister in the provincial government, Joye Soloi Hareavila, managed fourth place and an MPA, Peni Bori, came sixth. Three other provincially-connected candidates trailed.

The only conclusion to which one can come is that there was little positive transfer from provincial to national politics in Gulf. Was there a negative transfer? A hint of it came during an interview in Hawabanga where villagers asked why a person who already had a high position like Samuel Kamiaeto should try for a second one. But the evidence is slim and, as we have seen, has no statistical basis.

### *Age and Education*

Tables 2, 3, and 4 show that age and education, themselves closely associated ( $r = -0.41$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ), are assets in Gulf electorates. The correlation between rank and age is 0.46 ( $p < 0.01$ ) and that between rank and years of education is

-0.57 ( $p < 0.01$ ). If we look at the electorates separately we find the following:

*Age*

Gulf Provincial (Table 2)	6 of the top 7 candidates were under 40 5 of the bottom 7 candidates were over 40
Kerema Open (Table 3)	All of the top six candidates were under 40 3 of the bottom 6 candidates (about whom age is known) were over 40
Kikori Open (Table 4)	6 of the top 7 candidates were under 40 5 of the bottom 8 candidates were over 40

*Education:*

Gulf Provincial (Table 2)	6 of the top 7 candidates have Grade 10 or more 4 of the bottom 7 candidates have less than Grade 10
Kerema Open (Table 3)	All of the top 6 candidates have Grade 10 or more 6 of the bottom 7 candidates have less than Grade 10
Kikori Open (Table 4)	6 of the top 7 candidates have Grade 10 or more 4 of the bottom 8 candidates have less than Grade 10

*Wealth:*

Does the wealth of a candidate affect his chances of winning a national election in Gulf? The evidence is scanty. One simple fact can be stated: none of the three winning candidates was wealthy under any commonly accepted definition of the term. Daniel Itu was just out of university and was scraping funds from every source he could think of. Aron Noaio is a man of modest means, although his income as an MP puts him in the high income brackets of PNG. No informant suggested to me that Allen Ebu was a strong candidate because of his personal wealth. In 1982, the picture had been different. Both Tony Farapo, who won Gulf Provincial, and Roy Evara, who won Kikori Open, were regarded as very well-off. Perhaps the fact that Evara ran a good second to Allen Ebu in 1987 and that his Wantok Party running-mate in Gulf Provincial, Dorobe Ridler Kimave, came second also has something to do with Evara's capacity to raise funds. But the overall impact of the Wantok Party in the 1987 election was slight: a few votes were garnered; no one was elected. Gulf wealth does not yet seem determinant in Gulf elections. Perhaps the fact that the wealthy men who came originally from Gulf have not made their money in Gulf-based operations explains the lesser influence of wealth on electoral politics in Gulf than in some of the coffee-baron-dominated electorates of the Highlands. The importance of winning a seat in the National Parliament as a stepping stone to personal fortune may be as great in Gulf as elsewhere. But if one has already made one's money outside the province, *protecting* it through Gulf-based political power may seem less important than in the coffee-dominated provinces (MacWilliam 1984; Stewart 1984). If oil is discovered in Gulf, if the Highlands-to-Gulf highway is completed so as to give Kaintiba coffee a cheap outlet, or if timber development goes ahead at the pace it reached in 1988, the picture may

change. Already, Allan Ebu has been accused of incurring debts to hopeful logging firms who provided campaign transport by helicopter for him.

### *The results in Kerema Open*

Before any attempt is made to analyse the results obtained by candidates on a poll-by-poll basis, some interesting patterns emerge from a simple, preliminary examination of the overall figures.

There is a sharp break between the votes obtained by the first six candidates and those obtained by the rest. These were candidates who were seen as serious enough to be sponsored by political parties. Each one of them garnered 1500 votes or more and each received over 10 percent of the total votes cast. Together they account for 80 percent of the valid votes. The immediate impression is that the votes of the coastals in Malalaua and of the Kamea in Kaintiba were cast for regional candidates, but that no one of these candidates was identified as an especially valid regional spokesperson. Daniel Itu seems to stand out from the other two Kaintiba-based candidates more than Sarufa stands out from the other two Malalaua-based candidates and that slight difference may have meant the difference between victory and defeat. One other impression given by the figures for the first six candidates is that the coastal candidates gathered votes in proportion to the size of the language group they came from. Sarufa, the Toaripi-speaker (arguably a Moveave-speaker, but that distinction is a fine one) gained more votes than Hora Meara, a Kaipi-speaker. Hora Meara in turn out-pollled Lari, a Moripi-speaker. And the census figures show that Toaripis outnumber Kaipis and Kaipis outnumber Moripis. It may also be guessed that part of Daniel Itu's victory over Samuel Kamiaeto can be explained by the fact that the 1978 population on the West side of the Tauri River (Itu's side) outnumbers that of the East side by 2400 persons.

A more refined look at the election results (Table 5) bears out these quick impressions and provides other insights as well. The data is presented as it was made available by the Electoral Commission and can be interpreted only by comparison between Map No. 1 (Census divisions) and Map No. 2 (Provincial constituencies).

#### *Daniel Itu's Vote*

Daniel Itu received votes from just those areas that one might have predicted he would. His primary strength was in Kaintiba, the home of the Kamea. Table 5 shows that he received a larger vote than any of the other candidates who resided in Kaintiba. It also clearly indicates that the only non-Kamea candidate to make any sort of a showing in the region was the Eastern Highlander, Sinkau. No coastal candidate was able to pick up even 100 votes in Kaintiba. Itu's strength came in large measure from the western side of the Tauri, where he had been born and brought up. He received 1190 votes or 45.6 per cent of his total count from this homeground. The lion's share of it came from Hangoia-Middle Tauri and from Kaberope to the south. The support he had hoped for from Lemek Kum in remote Ivore-Swanson may not have been given or, if it was given, was unimportant, for Itu ran third there. On the eastern side of the Tauri, the positive impact of his running mate, Aron Noaio, seemed to count heavily for he narrowly out-voted Samuel Kamiaeto in Mienta, where Noaio's village of Hawabanga is located. In the

other east side area of Uiabi, his vote (7) was very low indeed. In Malalaua, Itu's only significant strength came from his wife's area, Moripi. There he outpolled all candidates except Nelson Lari, the native son, and left the two leading coastal candidates, Sarufa and Hora Meara, far behind. In Kerema itself, he did poorly, but managed to find 146 votes from the Kerema Bay/Kaipu Count #2. They probably came from the Kamea in the settlements around the provincial capital.

Itu was a well-informed politician able to assemble and assess political intelligence with some skill. I interviewed him on June 1, two weeks before the polling began. He believed that Kamiaeto and Sarufa would be his chief opponents, but he had spent more time evaluating his own strength than in attempting to quantify the opposing candidates' support. He did say that he expected to get half the votes in Mienta and that he expected Kamiaeto and Sinkau to get about a quarter each. He over-estimated Sinkau's strength, but as usual had a shrewd idea of what his own chances would be. Itu also made a guess as to how his support would be distributed. He began by estimating that he would get about 3000 votes. He then went through the major areas where he felt he knew how things were going for him, and gave a figure for each. This added up to nearly double the 3000 total he predicted, so he told me to reduce each of the figures proportionately to add up to three thousand. The result is shown in Table 6. The location names he used did not correspond exactly with the labels assigned to official counts, and both Itu's and the official count names are used when there is a discrepancy. His major weaknesses were in over-estimating Kaberope and Moripi, but for the most part the orders of magnitude are right.

Table 5

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Kerema Open Results by candidate, district, count and polling station

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<u>Name of Candidate</u> (in order of votes polled)	<u>Kerema District</u>		Total
	Kerema	Kerema Bay/ Kaipi	
	Count No. 1	No. 2	
Daniel Itu	58	146	204
Haro Meara Sarufa	61	151	212
Hora Meara	127	557	684
Sinkau Fugundo	62	155	217
Samuel Kamiaeto	93	95	188
Nelson Lari	170	134	304
Roseva Rovela	135	384	519
Michael Sosori Araka	50	72	122
Mika Kerekere	90	91	181
Joe Karava	78	188	65
Semese Ivaraoa	31	23	54
John Dio Maso	20	18	38
Total	999	2055	3054

Malalaua District

	Kovio Count	Kovio/ Uiabi No.3	No.4	Kaipi No.5	Toaripi No.6	Mailo- vera No.7	Moripi No.8	Total
Daniel Itu	50	27	37	18	41	365	538	
Haro Meara Sarufa	85	70	175	552	1180	135	2112	
Hora Meara	30	16	775	190	29	63	1093	
Sinkau Fugundo	46	8	33	21	56	38	297	
Samuel Kamiaeto	30	238	44	13	25	62	412	
Nelson Lari	7	18	41	212	68	804	1150	
Roseva Rovela	8	5	3	7	4	10	37	
Michael S. Araka	18	7	17	12	30	286	370	
Mika Kerekere	7	2	4	8	7	15	43	
Joe Karava	4	12	26	12	11	27	92	
Susuve Ila	5	13	26	80	10	43	177	
Semese Ivaraoa	2	7	132	11	29	20	201	
John Dio Maso	2	4	1	3	4	8	22	
Total	294	427	1314	1139	1494	1876	6544	

Kaintiba District

	Count	No.9	No.10	No.11	No.12	No.13	Total
	Mienta	Uiabi	Hangoia/ Mid.Tauri	Kabe- rope	Ivoro/ Swanson		
Daniel Itu	669	7	832	260	98	1866	
Haro Meara Sarufa	21	2	6	0	34	63	
Hora Meara	19	1	44	6	13	82	
Sinkau Fugundo	30	85	553	109	848	1625	
Samuel Kamiaeto	629	247	24	9	119	1028	
Nelson Lari	28	5	0	1	12	46	
Roseva Rovela	7	1	3	8	13	32	
Michael Sosori Araka	16	2	7	3	40	68	
Mika Kerekere	9	3	1	273	17	303	
Joe Karava	10	0	2	9	30	51	
Susuve Ila	18	4	5	4	6	37	
Semese Ivaraoa	2	1	3	1	5	12	
John Dio Maso	123	14	10	6	28	181	
Total	1581	372	1490	689	1262	5394	

Table 6

## Daniel Itu's estimates and the final result

<u>Itu's Estimate</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Official result</u>
500	Hangoia }	
500	Middle Taure }	832
500	Kaberope	260
200	Ivore/Swanson	98
500	Mienta	669
100	Tairuma/Ker. Bay/Kaip	146
25	Kaip	37
24	Kerema/Kerema Town	58
500	Moripi	365
50	Kovio	50
150	Other	93
<u>3000</u>	Total	2608

*Haro Meara Sarufa's vote*

Sarufa's only strength was in Malalaua and there he was clearly the candidate of the Toaripis and their close cousins the Moveaves from Mailovera. He garnered 32.3 percent of the Malalaua votes, yet of the 2112 district votes that went his way, 1732 or 82 percent came from Toaripi and Mailovera. The candidates that were responsible for his defeat in Kerema Open were Hora Meara who took the Kaip

*Hora Meard's vote*

A case could be made that Hora Meara had a wider base of support in Kerema Open than Sarufa, the other major coastal contender. He seemed to be able to win in Kerema Bay as well as Kaip, his home area. This impression may be misleading, however. The fact that the election officers put part of the Kaip votes in with those of Kerema Bay in Count #2 makes it impossible to know whether Meara's vote in this count is simply a reflection of language group loyalty among the Kaipis or of an appreciable support in Kerema Bay.

*Sinkau Fugundo's vote*

If any candidate could be deemed to be a 'modern' rather than a traditional candidate in Kerema Open it was Sinkau Fugundo. He had no 'primordial' support base, for he was an Eastern Highlander. Yet he was able to compete for Kamea support with native sons like Itu and Kamiaeto in every part of the Highlands accept Uiabi and Mienta, and show them his heels in Ivore/Swanson. He also to put together votes in Kerema in just about the same proportion as Itu, Sarufa and Kamiaeto. In Malalaua, his marriage links in Moveave (Mailovera) did little for him, but Sinkau probably polled as well among the coastals as did Kamiaeto. The figures are presented in a way that clouds this outcome, but we shall explain it when Kamiaeto's vote is examined. As a consequence, Sinkau came fourth overall, ahead of Kamiaeto. An interesting question is why Sinkau did so well in

Ivove/Swanson and for the first time an answer which stresses party ties may be tenable. Lemek Kum, who ran in Gulf Provincial, had opted, even if belatedly, for the PPP. His home base, from which he had been elected to the provincial assembly, was Ivove/Swanson and it was there Kum was counting on laying a firm base for his campaign in the national election. It is at least plausible that rather than choosing to back either of his fellow Kameas running in Kerema Open, Kamiaeto or Itu, both of whom were rivals for influence in provincial politics, he should decide to follow the dictates of party affiliation and throw his weight behind Sinkau, the PPP candidate in Kerema Open. Sinkau's extensive travels as a *didiman*, however, may be a sufficient explanation for his ability to gain votes in an area where neither of the two leading Kamea candidates had penetrated very far and were not well known.

#### *Samuel Kamiaeto's vote*

The way in which the electoral returns are reported makes it very difficult to sort out what happened to Kamiaeto's campaign. His home sub-district of Uiabi is divided in an unknown proportion between Count #4 (Kovio/Uiabi) and Count #11 (Uiabi). To make matters more complicated, ballots from #4 are lumped in with Malalaua and those from #11 are (properly) listed under Kaintiba. All one can say is that Kamiaeto's big polling in #4 probably represents a Kamea vote, and may represent in large measure a Uiabi vote. If one makes the not too heroic assumption that 200 of Kamiaeto's 238 Kovio/Uiabi votes are in fact attributable to Uiabi, then Kamiaeto's Kaintiba vote goes up from 1028 to 1228 (or 22.0 percent of the new total) and his Malalaua vote goes down to 212 (or 3.3 percent of the new total, just below the 297 (or recalculated 4.7 percent) gathered in by Sinkau. Intricate arithmetic aside, Kamiaeto's results showed little beyond local success and could provide no support for a hypothesis that provincial prestige could be transferred to a national election.

### CONCLUSIONS

It is time to tackle the question: why did Daniel Itu win in Kerema Open? Thus far I have largely looked at numbers and localities. Inter-regional rivalry was a dominant factor in the election, and Itu was able to gain the largest percentage of the votes in Kamea country, which is the most densely populated part of Kerema Open in terms of residents. He was also able to attract clusters of voters in other parts of the electorate, notably in Moripi, where his wife had been born. But the key question remains substantially unanswered: why Daniel Itu? Why not one of the other mountain candidates who put on an energetic campaign? Why not Samuel Kamiaeto, or Sinkau Fugundo? It has been shown that the election in Gulf as a whole gave no evidence that a provincial reputation in politics carried over positively to the national scene. But although that may tell us a little about why Kamiaeto was not more successful, it says nothing about what made Itu popular. Sinkau was not a native of Gulf, and that undoubtedly told against him. But why did he do so remarkably well, and again, why did Itu win?

In Kerema Open, the incumbent, Aron Noaio, did not try to take the seat a second time. Perhaps it would have been easier to explain Itu's win in terms of what the voters had found lacking in the person they had elected at the previous election, but that possibility did not exist. Nonetheless, the winner of the 1982 Kerema Open contest, Aron Noaio, contested and won



the Provincial Open seat in 1987 and defeated the incumbent, Tony Farapo, in the process. A closer look at what made Noaio the winner and Farapo the loser may shed some light on Kerema Open.

As already mentioned, I received frequent complaints about Tony Farapo during the visits I made and the individual and group interviews I conducted. He had not brought development; people hardly ever saw him for he spent his time in Port Moresby and rarely came back to see people and to talk to them. I asked: 'But doesn't the fact that he was a minister excuse some of his absences and don't you think the fact he was a minister was of benefit to you?' The reply was usually a non-committal shrug. Aron Noaio came in for very little of this kind of criticism. He had come back to many parts of the constituency. More often to Kaintiba and to Kerema than to Malalaua, but Malalauans had not been ignored. Especially in the north, people agreed that he had worked to get nationally funded development projects for the province and especially for the constituency.

Noaio satisfied two important tests: he remembered his electors once he was elected; he seemed to try hard to bring development to his electorate.

If we return to Kerema Open, we can suggest that although the results in each location show that people voted usually for one of their own, they nevertheless chose from among their local candidates the one whom they thought would best bring development and who would not work for himself alone. This conclusion is supported most vividly not by examining Itu's vote, but by looking carefully at Sinkau's support. Clearly, he was identified as a candidate of the Kaintiba district, even though he was not a Kamea. Within that district, his support was remarkably consistent and widespread. Except in Mienta, and in Ivore-Swanson where he won overwhelmingly, he came second in every count. In Uiabi, Samuel Kamiaeto's home territory, he gathered eighty-five votes as opposed to Itu's seven. In the Hangoia-Middle Taure stronghold of Itu, he took 553 votes as opposed to Kamiaeto's twenty-four. In Kaberope, he got less than half as many votes as Itu, but out-pollled Kamiaeto by 109 to nine. In the two Kerema District counts, he got slightly more than either of the leading Kamea candidates; and in Malalaua, if we remember to discount the Kovio-Uiabi count for Kamiaeto, we find that his 297 votes made him the only northerner except Itu to make a showing.

What did Sinkau have going for him? In education, he ranks with Kamiaeto in the second highest category, and behind Itu. He is young at thirty-two, but quite comparable to Kamiaeto's thirty and Itu's twenty-five. Like the other two leading northerners, he has party support. None of these factors make him stand out. Yet, even though a non-Kamea, he polled extraordinarily well. What seems to distinguish him from the others is a record of hard work as an agricultural extension officer helping small-holders and subsistence gardeners. He was known and seen frequently at the village level; he was there to help development. Even outside Kaintiba, he had been connected with public service as an officer of the PEA and as a Department of Primary Industry's official in Malalaua. He had established his concern for grass-roots development and his willingness to work effectively for it.

Sinkau lost out in Kaintiba to Daniel Itu, but it can be suggested Itu's success came from his ability to project the same leadership qualities possessed by Sinkau: concern with local development and the ability to deliver it, combined with the 'primordial sentiment' factor which Sinkau lacked. Daniel Itu stressed that he knew how politics worked; that he understood how the national government could be made to give more to the development of Gulf and especially the Kamea area of Kerema Open. He climbed the mountain trails indefatigably with a message about how


government worked in PNG and, simultaneously, how well he understood the mysteries of government. This combination of knowledgeable ability, energy and dedication marked both Sinkau and Daniel Itu and stood them in good stead even outside the mountains.

Kerema Open election results cannot begin to be understood except in terms of region and locality. Sinkau's results indicate that regional and local concerns are distinguishable from clan or even language group solidarity. To be perceived as dedicated to the region and its development seems to be indispensable and can, in part, be a substitute for primordial ties. In sum, I suggest that Itu won because he was from Kaintiba district, was a Kamea, promised leadership that would be attentive to regional and local needs and was perceived to have the knowledge and dedication to deliver development.

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
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
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# Manus: Provincial and Open Electorates

ALEXANDER WANEK AND EILEEN WORMALD

## INTRODUCTION

The results of the 1987 national elections in the two constituencies of Manus have an interest which goes beyond the normal concern about who will be selected to represent the people of the province in the National Parliament. They will be examined to try to see to what extent boycott threats from dissatisfied groups both regional and religious (whose dissatisfaction might be just as much with the provincial as with the national government) affected how many people voted and for whom, and to test the importance of political party allegiance in voting.

The chapter will first provide some background information on Manus province. Sources of community support for candidates will next be examined; and the candidates themselves. The discussion will then move to the political parties, Makasol, and other sources of voting strength; to election costs and to the platforms of the candidates. A discussion of the significance that can tentatively be attached to the polling results will conclude the chapter.

## BACKGROUND

Manus Province has the smallest land area of all the provinces of Papua New Guinea: 1943 square kilometres. It is made up of a group of islands, the Admiralty Islands, occupying almost 300,000 square kilometres. The largest island gives its name to the province as a whole. Manus Island is mountainous and about ninety kilometres long and thirty kilometres wide. Situated far off the mainland coast, Manus is probably the least visited of the provinces of PNG. Until the Second World War, it was known most widely from the writings of the anthropologist, Margaret Mead, whose 1930 book *Growing Up in New Guinea*, based on her time spent at Pere on the south of the island, had a world-wide impact. The population of Manus in 1987 was 26,038 (NSO 1987), of whom less than 200 were non-citizens. For the national election, 13,903 were enrolled, of whom 7,108 were men and 6,795 women (EC 1987(1)).

Since the 19th Century, the people of Manus have been divided, perhaps artificially, into four principal groups. The name Usiai has been adopted for the peoples of the inland of the main island; those of the coast and of most of the smaller surrounding islands are called the Mantakor. The Titan people form the third group. Traditionally, they lived in houses on stilts over the



shallow waters of lagoons to the south of the main island and over the waters adjacent to some of the southern islands. Now, they either lease state-owned land or they dwell as guests on the traditional lands of other groups. Titan legend holds that they originated on a prosperous island called Arop on the Castor Reef. When it disastrously submerged, the Titans took to the sea and to the shores of neighbouring people. In the late 1940s, they began to build ashore on Mantakor lands. They were invited to do so by Paliau Maloat, the prophetic leader of what is now the Makasol movement. A fourth distinct group of Manus people live on the remote Southwestern Islands of Wuvulu and Aua. They are probably of Micronesian origin, but today are intermixed with Sepik labourers who were brought in as plantation workers during the colonial period. Thirty-odd dialects and languages are spoken in the province.

The economy of Manus is still dominated by subsistence farming, supplemented by hunting, with fishing rivalling it in importance in the coastal villages and on the small islands. Cash income comes in part from the remittances of 4000 absent wage earners. The Usiai and Mantakor rely on cocoa as a cash crop, while those from the smaller islands, especially those in the west, depend heavily on copra, with supplemental income coming from shells and *bêche de mer*.

Recently there have been moves to improve the economic base of the islands. A detailed study between 1980-83 produced a K7.8 million development plan which has been approved by the provincial government led by Stephen Pokawin, a former University of Papua New Guinea lecturer. The programme is designed to increase rural development and private production while maintaining existing standards of social services. Timber, tuna, cocoa, copra and tourism are to be promoted as economic resources backed by improved road and wharf facilities.

What today is Manus Province was part of German New Guinea until the end of World War I when it came under Australian administration. During the Second World War, the area was first occupied by the Japanese and later re-conquered by allied, mainly American, forces. In the last two years of the war, a huge concentration of American naval and air forces brought a million US servicemen into the area who were juxtaposed with a contemporary local population of 13,000. This massive American presence had a profound effect on the physical environment and on the population. Its impact on one of the inhabitants, Paliau Moloat, was dramatic. The Paliau movement, later Makasol, was modelled on American military formations and set modernization and self government as its immediate goals. Over the years it went through many transformations, taking on sometimes the colouration of a 'cargo cult', sometimes of a political party, sometimes of religion. As Makasol, it entered into the matrix of political forces that influenced the election in complex ways, which we shall try to explain below.

### *SOURCES OF SUPPORT*

Even in a country that fields as many candidates for national elections as does Papua New Guinea, we must assume that most of the contenders have some notion of how they are going to garner enough support to be in real contention. Depending on the sources of support which they believe they can identify, they will map out a strategy to mobilize voting strength.

A number of writers have stated that political representation in Papua New Guinea tends to follow clan lines. Hegarty (1983:6) for example,

writing about the national elections in 1977, states that 'candidates and party organizers, particularly in the Highlands, calculated clan voting strengths ...' when planning for their election campaigns. Clans in Manus are relatively small patrilineal groups, including their children and, sometimes, their wives. Candidates and party organizers in the 1987 campaign in Manus tended to calculate voting strengths rather in terms of what some of them referred to as a candidate's 'extended family'. Extended families, according to this definition, consisted not only of a single line of men, their wives and children, but included the different clans of all the wives as well. They were thus large units of many clans.

Obviously, these 'extended families' were not clear-cut, indisputable units, mainly because of considerable overlapping. The actual size of an 'extended family' thus depended on a candidate's own ability to get his concept of 'relationship' across to as many of his 'relatives' as possible. According to personal (Wanek) information from several candidates, it should have been possible for any candidate with good standing in Manus to gain about 2,000 votes from 'extended family' members.


If 'extended family' support was crucial to victory, and if, as according to our information was actually the case, each candidate came from a different, even if slightly overlapping, extended family, then the nine men who contested Manus Provincial began with approximately equal chances to garner about 1500 votes each. Their problem was to garner more of the overlaps and those of ambiguous status than their competitors. The Manus Open seat does not lend itself easily to this kind of calculation, for some of the fourteen candidates came from almost exactly the same extended family as a rival. Indeed, it was rumored that vote-splitting candidates were nominated by competitors when it was feared that a candidate was having things too much his own way in an extended family.

To have good relations with their 'extended family' did not necessarily mean that candidates had to have spent all their time in their village. Usually it meant that they had been helpful over a long period on day-to-day problems of the extended family, whether they were physically present or not. Most important, however, among Titans and most Mantakors a candidate had to have a 'happy aunt', and among the Usiais, a 'happy uncle'.

Traditionally among Titans and most Mantakors, a child's paternal aunt shaped the life of a youngster by giving the spiritual power to achieve certain goals in life. A similar tradition existed among the Usiais, but there, usually, he father's brother held this power. If an aunt's or uncle's blessing meant that a youth had to leave home in order to make full use of the bestowed spiritual power, the youth was in no way expected to stay; but there was an obligation to show devotion and gratitude by satisfying every small wish of the paternal aunt/uncle. An 'unhappy aunt/uncle' even today in Manus is a very dangerous enemy, capable of execrating the remiss youth.

To supplement the extended family as a source of votes, candidates were led to find (or to establish) alternative groups who would support them. Among these alternative groups might, in some cases, be the political party; but in others instances to be identified with a religious group, or an occupational group or a racial group (Melanesian or European) might be more important. Such alternative groups shared the characteristic of being modern and non-traditional and of having cross-cutting memberships.

Before reviewing these alternative groups as pools of electoral support, it is necessary to introduce the candidates in the two constituencies of Manus Provincial and Manus Open.



## CANDIDATES

### *General Characteristics*

The nine candidates for the Manus Provincial seat came from five districts of the province with Loregau dominating with five candidates. In Manus Open, the fourteen candidates came from nine districts with none from Lorengau. Taking the two constituencies together, only the provincial electoral districts of Tulu-Panam, Kurti, Bupi-Chupen, Ere-Kele and South West Islands had no candidate in the field (see Map).

The Open and Provincial constituencies are coterminous so candidates have to decide which seat to contest. In part, the decision seems to rest on avoiding certain other candidates who seem to close competitors for the same set of voters. Most candidates try to nominate as late as possible so as to get the most information possible about the array of competitors in each contest. It also seems likely that those choosing the Provincial contest did so because they did not have a strong local base and they could afford to cover the province to draw support from all districts rather than obtaining a majority of the votes from their home village as some of the Open candidates felt they were able to do. Campbell, Chauka, Kellie, Marsipal and Pokayon lived in Lorengau and did not mention in their biodata another place of birth. Mundri from Kali and Polume from Loniu must during their education and training, as Doctor and Surveyor respectively, had spent long years away from their village. Only Pokana who stated he lived on Lau Island and Polaman living in Saban 2 village seemed as likely to have been Open as Provincial candidates though again, each had spent many years away from his village and in Pokana's case, with five years in Bougainville, away from Manus.

### *Manus Open*

The average age of the fourteen candidates who contested Manus Open constituency in 1987, was 42.7 ranging from Thompson to Maiah, a former provincial government premier, at 56. Pokasui was 36 and Rooney 42. Ten of the candidates gave their marital status, and the number of their children ranged from two (Pogat) to eleven (Maiah), with N'Drenaon reporting 'many children'. Rooney and Pokasui did not declare their marital status. Their education covered the whole spectrum from non-formal education (N'Drenaon) to postgraduate training (Kolowan and Thompson). There were four graduates plus two who had been to UPNG but not completed their degrees and two who had post-school training, Gai in teaching and Pogat in paramedical. Pokasui also stated that he had had 'post-grade 9' training, presumably in the army. In addition, one candidate had reached Grade 7, one Grade 9 and one Grade 10. Reflecting their relatively high level of education, these candidates had generally had well-paid jobs which some, like Pokasui, abandoned to pursue their campaigns. An occupational pattern for aspirant politicians found in many other parts of the world (Wormald 1983) was followed by four former teachers, a lecturer and two lawyers. Others were public servants, former politicians in local (N'Drenaon, Molean) or provincial (Maiah, who had also served a prison sentence for fraud while premier, and Senau) government. Pokasui had been for many years an army officer. Although the trend was towards educated candidates, Manus was not without its more traditional-style hopefuls. N'Drenaon who had served as a local

councillor stood because he wished to show that the old still had a part to play in governing and it seemed sad that having with difficulty scraped together his K100 deposit he did not poll sufficient votes to save himself from losing it.

Among the candidates was the sitting member, Nahau Rooney. In the first national election after independence, as one of seventeen women candidates, she won her seat by 680 votes, a clear victory, over her nearest rival James Sisosor. Though Sisosor was the official Pangu Pati candidate and Rooney had run as an independent (Rooney 1983), she was recognized as a Pangu sympathizer and was given a Ministry by the Pangu leader and Prime Minister, Michael Somare. She had a chequered career in that Parliament and in the 1982 election she was defeated on the first count by James Pokasui by one vote. Her appeal to the Court of Disputed Returns was successful and after a recount she was declared the winner by eleven votes.

In the 1987 fight, Rooney had both advantages and disadvantages. She fought the election on her record with the slogan 'Mama mas go bek', presented evidence of the improvements she had brought to the islands, and had the support of the provincial premier, Stephen Pokawin. Pokawin's endorsement in her election folder stated that "Nahau Rooney until now has effectively done her part in getting the necessary support from the National government for the programmes of the Manus Provincial Government. I find this very helpful...(Rooney 1987)" Her duties as a cabinet minister, however, made some voters believe she neglected them and her particular position under the Wingti government as Minister of Civil Aviation, Culture and Tourism led to criticism. The Island of Manus is well known as an 'exporter' of educated personnel to employment elsewhere so that air transport for them to leave, return to visit and be visited is of particular importance. Rooney's initiation of cheap fares just before the election was thought to be a vote-catcher (*Times*, 20 Feb - 4 Mar 1987) but this move could not compensate for the limited air service to Manus which had been curtailed in recent years. Rooney was also the victim of rather ruthless vote splitting tactics, as many of her thirteen opponents flatly admitted.

Among her opponents was James Pokasui, the man she had edged out in 1982, who had been permanently resident in Manus for a year prior to the election. After his defeat in 1982 and again in a provincial by-election in 1983 he had acted as an advisor to the Minister of Defence. He left this post in 1986 and returned to his village to cultivate his electorate as well as his garden. Being a former officer and having many personal friends among the officers at the naval base of Lombrum contributed to his good chances of winning the seat.

Martin Thompson was informally seen as the Makasol candidate. A lawyer with a private legal practice in Lorengau, Thompson had frequently represented Makasol in its numerous court cases against the provincial government and against other adversaries. An informal poll was taken by one of the authors (Wormald) in Lorengau a week before the election in which informants were asked to list candidates in the order in which they thought they would come in the election. In it, Martin Thompson was identified as the leading candidate.

Few of the other candidates were seen as having much prospect of winning. Micah Senau had a record of garnering electoral support for he had been the provincial member for the Sopomu Malai Bay constituency and was a former deputy premier in the Manus provincial government. Caleb Kolowan, a university lecturer and former Baptist minister, was hampered in what otherwise might have seemed a promising campaign by being

considered too involved with a local dispute involving his district of Los Negros.

### *Manus Provincial*

The average age of the candidates was almost identical to that in the Open electorate, 42.8, but the range (36-55) was smaller. Their education was also similar: two were university graduates (Mundri and Polume), one had been to university but not graduated, one had teacher training, three had reached Grade 10 or equivalent and two Grade 7. Only the winner, Marsipal, did not disclose his education. All proclaimed their marriage (and one divorce) and they all had children ranging from two to a claimed twenty (Chauka), Marsipal had been a carpenter and then a building contractor until his first election to Parliament in 1983. There was a former MP (Pondros) and a former provincial government member from 1983-85 (Kellie). A doctor, a surveyor, two businessmen, a teacher and a clerk made up the remainder of the candidates.

Arnold Marsipal, the sitting member, was a candidate for re-election. He had won a by-election in 1983 with a majority of 1197 votes after his predecessor, Michael Pondros, who had also been Minister of Public Utilities, had been dismissed from office when found guilty of misconduct in office by the Leadership Tribunal. Marsipal had the triple advantage of having a good record of ministerial performance from his short time in office as Minister for Correctional Services between August and November 1984 (when Somare's government fell after a vote of no confidence), of being a likely candidate for a ministry if Pangu formed the government, and of having had ample time to nurse his constituency while being in opposition.

Brian Campbell, who had run second to Marsipal in the by-election, stood for election again, and in his well-planned and extensive campaign he emphasized that he would attempt to bring rapid and large-scale development to the province, e.g. an international airport that would bring tourist traffic from Guam and elsewhere, with roads, hotels shops and other tourist attractions as its major economic spin offs. Campbell was considered to be a strong candidate, and many people in Manus wanted this naturalized citizen to be their representative in Port Moresby because, firstly, he would not be involved in 'wantokism' and, secondly, he would, as a European, be able to handle efficiently a government system brought to PNG by Europeans, with maximal benefits to the province.

Michael Pondros, in spite of his dismissal from office, presented himself for re-election and received some external support; Dr. Thomas Mundri, a physician at the Lorengau Hospital and medical officer of health for Manus until his resignation to stand as a candidate, was also perceived as a significant candidate.

Paliau Lukas Chauka was a strange and ambiguous contender. For many years he had been the Crown Prince of the Makasol movement under the elderly Paliau Maloat. He had fallen out with Paliau, however, and had left the movement after he and eighty-six other Makasol members had served time in prison for unlawful activities in the province. In contesting the seat he hoped to draw support from both Makasol and anti-Makasol factions. In those rural areas where he had strong Makasol ties (most of his family being Makasol members) he hoped to get Makasol support. In non-Makasol areas,

he hoped that his anger with the movement for the time he spent in gaol for his Makasol activities and his rupture with Makasol would gain him support.

### *POLITICAL PARTIES*

Five of the fourteen Open candidates and two of the nine Provincial candidates held party endorsement. But of these seven party candidates, only three or four made significant use of their party status in the campaigning. Sometimes, the party connection was deliberately played down for fear it would alienate rather than attract voters for whom the idea of party appeared to be a novelty. However, the financial support of parties was important particularly for hiring boats to take candidates round to the sixteen electoral districts including the Southwestern Islands, Wuvulu and Aua, which though they had always been in the Manus parliamentary constituency (Electoral District 16) were until 1986 under the administrative control of East Sepik. The 346 electors of these two small islands had been promised benefits from being taken over by Manus and some of the candidates felt they must visit to reassure them on this point. Certainly all available boats were in use in the election run-up and the state of the sea was a particular electoral hazard.

#### *Manus Provincial*

For Manus Provincial, the party picture was comparatively simple. Arnold Marsipal was unequivocally Pangu, used the party posters and cooperated with the Pangu candidate in the Open electorate, Micah Senau. Perhaps it was true that Manus was, as Nahau Rooney had once claimed (*P-C* 21/7/83), a strong Pangu area (although it did not prove to be for Senau, as we shall see). Still, Marsipal and Senau felt it necessary to explain the difference between party/feast and party/political organization to villagers throughout their campaigns. It is possible too that Pangu Pati had special significance to the numerous resident Sepik people who had been brought to Manus as labourers during the period of island plantations. They were told by Marsipal that because of the very concept of party, a vote for Marsipal actually meant a vote for Somare, their own wantok. Many Sepik people were visibly impressed by this argument, and the notion of party, operating on ethnic lines, was probably a good puller of Sepik votes for Pangu in Manus.

The only other candidate who ran on a party ticket in the Provincial contest was the candidate who came last in the polling, Denis Pokana of the National Party. Michael Pondros falls into a borderline zone. He was supported by the Group of Independents, led and funded by Hugo Berghuser and Robert Suckling, two Port Moresby entrepreneurs of German and Australian origins respectively. Pondros did not advertise this connection which would have done him no good in Makasol circles especially. But the Group of Independents was at most a quasi-party designed to give leverage in the post-electoral process of government formation.

#### *Manus Open*

In the Manus Open campaign, the part played by party and party affiliation is more difficult to discern and impossible to describe in general terms. Micah Senau, who ran his Pangu-endorsed campaign in much the same way as seemed to contribute to the great success of Arnold Marsipal in the Provincial seat, fared poorly in the final Manus Open tally. The winner was an Independent, James Pokasui. But Pokasui's success cannot be dissociated

completely from 'party'. He was quietly endorsed and funded by the Group of Independents. Moreover, he was known to have been a member of the National Party (NP) when he had run in 1983 (and come fourth) and it was noticeable that, this time around, the National Party had made no endorsement for Manus Open. After the election it was suggested not only that he had Pangu support but that he had received financial support from the United Party (UP).

Nahau Rooney's party connections are intriguing. We have seen that shortly after her first election she was embraced by Pangu and given a cabinet post. In 1983, she resigned from Pangu, declaring she had been a victim of the 'numbers game' when Tom Pais was made Civil Aviation Minister in July 1983. She was reported as saying: 'In politics we unfortunately allocate ministries to secure political numbers which means that the minority groups like women and the Manus people will never qualify. I am disappointed that Manus is not represented in the Cabinet - and so are women.(P-C 21/7/83)'' She became a founding member of the People's Democratic Movement (PDM) in November 1984 and when she was accused of switching parties to look for ministerial power she again stated: 'The issue is not that Nahau Rooney should become a minister but that Manus people must have a voice in the Cabinet ... there is a lot that a minister can do for her province'.

As a PDM candidate, Rooney may have lost support. Her own statements about political parties were equivocal. In her election pamphlet she wrote: "On the floor of Parliament parties are necessary in order for the system we have chosen to work, however Nahau will only ever be part of a party which moves to serve people and Nahau and the people of Manus have always emphasized the quality of the leader rather than the party name.'

Her own campaign relied little on her party connection. Wingti's picture appeared on the ballot paper and on her election poster, but she did not use the official PDM poster. To do so would have been difficult anyway since one of its two messages was 'Makim Wingti Man' and there was only one woman in the six photos surrounding Prime Minister despite the fact that the poster was authorized by 'Ms Nahau Rooney, Secretary'.

Martin Thompson began as an Independent then declared himself for the League for National Advancement (LNA) and, during the campaign, made selective use of his LNA endorsement. In non-Makasol areas, the LNA connection was useful to prove that he was not the Makasol candidate. In Makasol areas, LNA was not mentioned.

### *Province-wide*

The only party that seemed to have a province-wide strategy was Pangu and if it had any success, it may have had the odd effect of encouraging voters who lived in the Lele-Masi provincial constituency to vote for Pangu candidates. Pangu stressed that it wished to 'balance the power of the provincial premier in Manus' by means of its two endorsed candidates for the Provincial seat and the Open seat. Political power would be balanced if there was a premier from the Lele-Masi 'middle of the province'; Pangu's Arnold Marsipal as Provincial member from the Rapatona provincial constituency located in 'sun-up, the East of the province; and Pangu's Micah Senau as Open member from the Sopomu-Malai Bay area in 'sun-down', the West of the province.

Yet in spite of these strategic models, Pangu's position, especially in Manus Open, was far from clear. Rooney, despite her defection, was thought to retain some of her old Pangu supporters and there was some



question of Pokasui's alliance with that party. Despite its official endorsement of another candidate, Pangu in the aftermath of the election stated that

the Pangu Party branch in Manus has called on its Open member, James Pokasui, to withdraw from the P.M.'s camp. Party branch secretary, Titus Posakei, said Mr. Pokasui's supporters in the province were not happy that he had moved from the Pangu-led camp to Mr. Wingti's group. But Mr. Pokasui said he had consulted leaders from Manus before making his decisions: Manus had two members and at least one must be in government for people to benefit; Provincial member Arnold Marsipal was with Pangu, so he decided to join the other side in case they got in (*P-C* 3/8/87).

### *Independents*

Running as an Independent might simply mean that a candidate had failed in a bid for party endorsement. For example, Micah Senau, Roy Pogat, David N'drayew, Phillip Sapak, and, according to himself though not the local party, Martin Thompson had all applied for the Pangu endorsement in Manus Open which eventually was given to Senau. In other cases, the choice of Independent status seems to have been unconstrained. Independent candidates emphasized the importance of their individual qualities as leaders rather than their representing a party name and a prefabricated concept, thus appealing to traditional values of leadership in Manus. They usually also stressed the greater chance of independent candidates bringing development to the province by 'selling' themselves expensively to the faction in Parliament which was likely to form the government, thus gaining a ministry or at least project money for Manus. Some of the independent candidates tried to make use of their status of being 'independent' by stating unequivocally that the 'independent' country of Papua New Guinea was in need of 'independent' candidates, and 'independent' members in the National Parliament.

The evidence about the influence of parties and of independent candidatures in Manus is inconclusive. In the Open constituency, candidates for the LNA, PDM, MA, PPP and Pangu took five of the first six places, while an Independent won and Independents also monopolized the last eight places. Yet in the Provincial contest, the Pangu man won and the only other party candidate lost his deposit.

### *MAKASOL*

It has been contended thus far that the understanding of election results in Manus demands first of all a recognition of the existence of the 'extended family'. Then it becomes important to study the impact of other forms of identification and social categorization which crosscut both each other and the traditional 'extended family' grouping. We have seen how ambiguous the impact of party affiliation and endorsement seems to have been in Manus. It is time now to examine the political role of Makasol.

Makasol is a special case, a movement endemic to Manus. Although it may be best classified as a religion, and indeed has access to schools for the religious instruction of the children, it is many other things as well. The origins of Makasol in the Paliu movement led by Paliu Moloat have already been mentioned briefly. With a vision of the future influenced heavily, both

positively and negatively, by the American armed forces' stay in Manus, Paliau called on his followers to reject the state and all its emanations and to place their confidence on local, properly constituted institutions of their own. He rapidly ran afoul of the colonial authorities and spent several years in gaol. His influence remained enormous, and his first substantial success was the establishment of the Baluan Council as only the fourth local government council to be created in the whole of Papua New Guinea, following similar action in such relatively developed parts of PNG as Vunamami, Hanuabada and Reimber. The Baluan Council was created in 1950 while Paliau was still in prison. He became its president when he was released. In spite of his diatribes against government, he stood for and was elected to the House of Assembly in 1964 and was re-elected in 1968. He was defeated by Michael Pondros in 1973 and his influence seemed to wane. In 1979, however, he was elected to the new provincial government of Manus as member for Balopa and his movement gained momentum again.

In its contemporary form, Makasol is essentially a movement of cultural and political resistance to worldly government. The name Makasol was adopted by Paliau and his followers to stress their commitment to the customary council form of local government in Manus. It is an abbreviation of the Tok Pisin designation *Manus Kastom Kaunsol*, the customary council of Manus. Paliau believed the Manus Local Government Council set up in 1964, in which he had played a dominant role, was the only valid expression of the Manus community. This customary council was displaced by new government-sponsored local government organs. The Kaunsol meant 'government with a soul', in contrast to other forms of government. Currently, the Makasol movement is preparing for the arrival of Jesus who is said to be coming back to the world in a few years. Sitting on the throne of David (identified with the coronation stone in Westminster Abbey), He will govern the world in a new 'Commonwealth of Nations'. Those states which refuse to be governed by him will be destroyed. Specifically, the 'communist' system of community governments introduced by the provincial government is opposed and the re-introduction of the abolished system of local government is requested. Paliau's positions are not, however, constant and consistent. He may denounce the state as 'Lucifer' but he also stood for office, and accepted office, within the PNG state framework and has boasted of his role in introducing the national parliament.

Makasol organizes quite a significant number of people in Manus and different sources give different figures on the size of the movement. Makasol leaders sometimes state that their movement comprises up to 15,000 people, while adversaries of the movement which causes so much tribulation in Manus state that it has between 1000 and 1500 members. However low its membership may be (probably between 2000 and 3000), it is large enough to count in an election contest. To the extent that Paliau controls the Makasol vote, he becomes a force to be reckoned with.

The Makasol factor in the 1987 election might have affected the chances of victory of an individual candidate in any of five ways: (1) gaining of votes from Makasol support; (2) loss of votes from the alienation of non-Makasol voters who perceived a candidate to be too strongly supported by Makasol; (3) loss of votes from Makasol opposition; (4) loss of votes from a Makasol boycott; (5) gaining of votes (relatively if not absolutely) from a Makasol boycott when the Makasol vote would normally have gone to an opponent. Sorting out which of these five effects was in fact the operative one is no simple task.

The boycott effects have to be given very serious consideration because of Paliau Maloat's speech in Lorengau, the capital of Manus, on 24 April 1987. He ordered his followers not to enrol on the voters lists, not to nominate as candidates, and note to vote in the 1987 elections and told them that if they disobeyed, lightning would strike them. If Paliau's control over his followers is absolute, then only the boycott effects need be examined. But Makasol had attracted different kinds of people to it. Some highly sophisticated people, including several former senior civil servants, saw it as vehicle for political power in the province, yet may not have been as responsive to Paliau's general charisma and specific injunctions as his earlier disciples. For this and other reasons, the impact of Makasol, in spite of Paliau's espousal of a boycott, remained a question mark until the very end.

It is undoubtedly true that several candidates believed that Makasol support would be translated into votes. Michael Pondros lent his house in Lorengau to his uncle Paliau Moloat, who lived in it and also used it for Makasol's religious meetings. Pondros was aware of the fact that religious Makasol meetings also have tremendous political relevance for its members. Paliau Lukas Chauka, as we have seen, tried to benefit both from his former prominence in the movement and, with a different group of electors, for his having left the movement. It was said that he was offered and refused funds from Pondros, who was seeking to maximize his Makasol support.

The case of Martin Thompson is particularly difficult to assess. He came a close second to Pokasui. Did this mean that he was as strong as he was because of Makasol support or that he failed to win because the Makasol people who normally would have supported him were obedient to Paliau's boycott order? It seems that Thompson's team believed the latter, for his campaign manager is reported to have bashed up the head teacher of Makasol because Makasol had not supported Thompson enough. Yet his Makasol connections may have lost him support in the non-Makasol areas of the province in spite of the fact that he stressed when in these areas that some Manus leader had to be able to handle the conflict between Makasol and the government. Thompson claimed that Marsipal, Rooney and Pokawin had all ignored this very pertinent regional question.

Finally, it must be noted, if for no other reason than to underline the difficulty of pinning down the Makasol factor, that according to Makasol sources, Arnold Marsipal, Nahau Rooney, Francis Molean, Simaon Ndrenaon and Ngat Boruan Silip all had Makasol parents and varying personal relations with the movement.

### THE IMPACT OF TRADITION

Individual candidates ran into traditional barriers or were helped along by traditional beliefs in a variety of ways. One of those most affected was Nahau Rooney. The fact that she was a woman was in itself a defiance of tradition, for a *lapan* (leader) was always a man. It followed from this that she should not have been allowed to hold betel nuts when she spoke at the launching of her campaign, for this was a *lapan* privilege. The betel nuts were also a source of *lapan* power. If a *lapan* held a bunch of betel nuts when talking, he had to be obeyed unquestioningly. However, if a *lapan* dropped a betel nut during his speech, he would sit down quietly, for his power had temporarily at least been sapped. Nahau Rooney, it was claimed, had not only illicitly held the bunch of betel nuts, but had dropped one and still gone on with her speech. Moreover, her opponents accused, she had allowed *garamuts* (large drums) to be beaten at her own hotel, the Kohai

Lodge, at the outset of her campaign. This too was a grave impropriety for *garamuts* should only be beaten in triumph or in joy, and must never be beaten before a war. Rooney's beating of *garamuts* was called immodest and an outrage. Traditionalists also held against her the fact that she had a naturalized husband of Australian origin, a source of foreign ideas and values from which people in Manus should be trying to free themselves. The idea of a woman in power was itself a result of European influence.

Perhaps the candidate who, next to Rooney, suffered most from a traditional attack was Paliu Lukas Chauka, who was said to have been execrated by his aunt.

Part of the Manus tradition involves the use of metaphor, and the campaign speeches were enriched by several of them. Some of these metaphors built on traditional tales and some on passages from the Bible. Two examples may be cited.

First, several candidates who campaigned against the sitting Open member, Nahau Rooney, used her own slogan 'Mama mas go bek' and turned it against her by referring to the story of 'the mother turtle and the mother hen' (*mama torosel na mama kakaruk*). The turtle lays her eggs and abandons them (a metaphor for Rooney forgetting her electors in Manus while a minister in Port Moresby) while the hen sits on her eggs and constantly cares for her chickens (a metaphor for a good representative who cares for his electors).

Secondly, Pangu candidates employed a metaphor based on the biblical text about 'The Three Wise Men from the East'. The East of Manus is the provincial constituency of Rapatona. David Tasion, the Commissioner of Police for Papua New Guinea, who comes from Mokara on Pak Island, and Karol Kisakau, the Secretary of Environment and Conservation, who comes from Mouklen on Rambutso, were two Wise Men who already came from Rapatona, 'the East'. Arnold Marsipal, from Nauna Island, had to become the third Wise Man from Rapatona in order to fulfill the biblical text.

During their campaigns, most candidates were careful to meet for a private talk with the lapan of a clan or village. Lapan still are said to have the power to command the votes of villagers. Most nowadays claim only to make recommendation in favour of (or against) candidates, but candidates know that their views are not to be overlooked.

### CAMPAIGNING

The campaign on the whole was low key, and much of the work of candidates consisted in arriving quietly at a village, going to the house of the 'komiti' (the local community government representative) and asking him to gather villagers together. Public speeches tended to be short and informal, the most important part of the visit being the candidate's talk with the lapan. Still, name-calling did occur.

#### *Name-calling*

Nahau Rooney bore the brunt of personal attacks based on traditional factors. She also was criticized on non-traditional grounds. We will note the charges made against regarding funds and membership lists for her old party, Pangu, but she was also criticized for having joined the People's Democratic Movement which was perceived as the party of 'those Highlanders who help the coffee growers in the Highlands and forget about the copra growers on the islands'. Her opponents, however, did not escape accusations of

impropriety. A particularly complex charge was laid against Martin Thompson, which illustrated the bitterness between Makasol and non-Makasol groups in Manus.

In May 1987, Makasol had won a National Court case against the Government of Manus concerning the lawfulness of the system of community government introduced by the provincial government. The status of the Community Government Act was called into question in a case which involved members of Makasol attempting to retain possession of a large piece of land in Lorengau, which had been the property of the former organ of local government and which, Makasol claimed, should now belong to them. On May 21, the Premier of the province, Stephen Pokawin, had attempted to remedy this situation, over the fierce protests of three Makasol members, by passing an amendment to the Act 'for reasons of avoiding confusion and securing the stability of the province' (Lapan Assembly, 21 May 1987). Later that day, in a Radio Manus interview, a member of the Community Government of Sopumu-Malai Bay in South Manus accused Martin Thompson of consciously creating loopholes in the Community Government Act during 1982 when he had been Legal Officer for the provincial government. Now, as legal advisor to Makasol, Thompson was accused of helping the movement to use these loopholes against the provincial government. Thompson himself (personal communication, 22 May 1987) believed the local politician had been put up to planting this denunciation by someone from Rooney's team.

### *Ethnicity*

Ethnicity did not loom large in the campaign, except in the Pangu attempts to lure Sepik voters noted already. As the only naturalized-citizen candidate in the field, however, Brian Campbell had campaigned extensively and very efficiently and had toured the whole province even before many of the other candidates had begun their own campaigns. He had promised to bring tourists to Manus and used Fiji frequently as an example of an island state that had known how to achieve good development through tourism. When the military coup in Fiji became known in PNG, Campbell's adversaries quickly attempted to capitalize on the situation. They maintained that the Fijians had done the right thing when they had toppled their Indian-dominated government because it meant foreign government for Fiji. Papua New Guinea should be governed by Papua New Guineans and should not risk becoming 'another Fiji'.

### *Campaign costs*

Little is known about the costs of each candidates campaign. An estimate of K7000 for Rooney compares with a few hundred she spent in 1977 when she 'campaigning very little during the actual election period' (Rooney 1983). Pokasui's expenditure was probably rather more, but an accusation by the defeated United Party leader, Paul Torate, that he had been assisted to the tune of K34,000 was hastily withdrawn. The amended United Party statement claimed that 'the party did assist Mr. Pokasui in some form, however not in the magnitude of the figures published'.

The Group of Independents calculated a cost of about K150,000 for their thirty-seven endorsed candidates throughout the country (personal

communication, Robert Suckling). This would mean that Pondros and Pokasui would have been supported with about K4000 each.

The two Pangu candidates were said to be handicapped in their campaign by the act that Nahau Rooney, who had been secretary of Pangu's Manus branch until 1985, still held the Manus party's bank passbook and thus controlled an amount of about K2600 (membership fees and returns from a sold car). Rooney was also accused of holding Pangu's provincial membership register and of repeatedly refusing to hand it over (personal communication, Pangu Manus branch, 29 April 1987). The only support from the national office, according to the same source, was a 25 hp outboard motor which was too weak to be used for campaigning in the waters of Manus. When it came to Lorengau, the regional party attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell the motor for K1000.

Brian Campbell's campaign, according to his campaign manager, cost about K5000. This sum, however, did not include the cost of a large boat with outboard motor which was bought for the campaign, on the ground that it could be used for a longer period.

### *Platforms*

The two sitting members and the ultimate victor in the Open contest adopted different approaches in their electoral platforms.

Rooney stood on her record both as a minister and as a member for Manus. She claimed improvement in road and sea transport including a new workboat, M.V. Nahau, delivered immediately prior to the election to be used in the Western Islands. She mentioned her work with women and she was active in the celebrations held in May 1987 for the tenth anniversary of the Manus Council of Women, one of the more effective provincial women's councils, to which she contributed K5000 (*P-C* 13/5/87). Indeed on all counts her activities sounded credible. They were not, however, always greeted with acclaim by the electors. The proposal to move the wharf at Lombrum was featured in her election literature: 'The new overseas wharf at Lombrum will commence his year at a cost of K1.5 million which came after years of planning and struggling'. Nevertheless it was described by an elector as 'too big, too far' and it was wondered by another if it would mean moving the naval base from Lombrum, a source of 570 electors.

Other industrial projects such as a cannery at Lombrum had not materialized nor did a Japanese proposed timber development. Development of this type continue to be under discussion. Manus in 1987 could still be described as one of PNG's least developed provinces. It is not suggested that these disappointments were Rooney's fault, but they were set against her achievements by her electors. Unable to compete with Rooney on a record of input into the constituency, Pokasui took another line. As we have seen, he returned to his village early in 1987 after losing his position as a ministerial aide to Defence Minister Stephen Tago, then leader of the National Party. There he lived as a subsistence farmer and established himself firmly in Manus consciousness. In the light of his previous career, he made a special feature of work with ex-servicemen and war carriers. Marsipal, on the other hand, fought on a platform of 'Honesty, Humility, Hard Work' and the necessity to get Pangu into power. Since his ministerial experience had been brief, he was not able to claim he had secured as much from the national government for Manus as had Rooney, but he promised future benefits from his re-election.

*POLLING*

Polling was conducted by means of eight polling teams touring eight different 'sections' of the province over a period of two weeks, each section being composed of from one to three provincial constituencies (Tables 1 & 2). Each of the eight teams carried four to seven ballot boxes (Table 2) and these boxes were filled successively. This means that no data are available on the number of votes given by village, or island, or constituency, etc., for a given candidate.

*ANALYSIS OF RESULTS*

The results of the election were no great surprise. Marsipal had been a popular member during his short time in Parliament and though his nearest rival, Campbell, was a well known businessman, he had stood before without success. Rooney's slender margin in 1982 meant defeat by Pokasui was in the cards and it may be that the emergence of Thompson as the second in the race was the most notable feature of the results in terms of personal success or failure. It is nonetheless interesting to examine the returns to see whether they yield any insight into how Manus voters make up their minds in elections.

Perhaps the most evident pattern is the atypical behaviour of the voters from Wuvulu and Aua. People from the Islands of Wuvulu and Aua had repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the services they received from the provincial government in Lorengau. In a survey made in 1987 by Mr Bernard Narakobi (personal communication), a total of 628 from the two islands were asked whether they would prefer their islands to be administered by the Manus government or by the East Sepik government. The result was 497 to 131 against Manus. The citizens of Wuvulu and Aua had threatened to abstain from voting in the national elections of 1987 in protest against their undesired attachment to Manus Province. Table 3 shows that 47 per cent of the total population of Manus voted in the national election of 1987. However, it also shows that in Electoral Section 1 (Western Islands) only 30.1 per cent of the people voted for a Provincial, and 35.1 per cent for an Open, candidate. If the time factor in pre-election developments is looked at carefully, this discrepancy can plausibly be related to local feeling in Wuvulu and Aua about attachment to Manus Province.

The unpopular decision to keep Wuvulu and Aua within Manus was made in late April 1987. Enrollment for the election took place before that time, in 1986. In Sector 1, 49.1 per cent enrolled as compared to about 49 per cent for the province as a whole. Yet for the actual election, held after the attachment decision, only 61.3 per cent of those registered voted for the Provincial candidate and only 71.5 per cent for an Open candidate. These participation percentages are significantly lower than those for Manus as a whole: Provincial, 88.2 per cent and Open, 89.7 per cent. Something must have occurred between registering in 1986 and voting in 1987 to explain the fall off in participation in the Western Islands relative to the province as a whole. The probable cause is the decision that Lorengau, not Wewak, would administer the Islands and the call for a boycott of the election which this decision evoked.

Much less certainty attaches to the impact of Makasol on the election. As we have seen, it is impossible to assess the importance of a Makasol connection in explaining either the good showing of Martin Thompson in the Open seat (was it due to Makasol support?) or his failure to win the Open seat

(was it due to the Makasol boycott?). An examination of participation figures, however, does permit some tentative conclusions to be drawn about the effectiveness of Paliu's injunction to boycott.

Makasol is represented in Sectors 4-8, but since it forms a clear-cut majority in none of the rural Sectors (a fact which leads to tensions in many villages), it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of the boycott. In electoral section 5 (Los Negros and Lorengau town), however, where Paliu Moloat and many of his followers reside, participation in the election was very low: only 39.6 per cent in the Provincial vote and 39.5 in the Open. In Sector 5, furthermore, not only was the actual voting low, but voter registration was low as well; with only 39.6 per cent, it was the lowest in the province. It may be suggested that these figures can be explained at least in part by Paliu's call for a boycott of 'Lucifer'.

Finally, the results make possible no assessment of the significance of party endorsement as opposed to Independent status; nor do they suggest a Manus preference for a particular political party. An answer to the question of the importance party has in Manus elections is perhaps best sought in looking at contributions to campaign costs and the provision for candidates, at least in the case of Pangu, of a minimal organization.

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## TABLES

Table 1 Manus Provincial Constituencies

Section	Total Population		Enrolled Population
	EC	NSO	
1 North Western Islands	669	669	352
2 Kari Bipi	1209	1209	746
3 Soparibeu	1390	1612	746
4 Tulu-Ponam	1146	926	519
5 Kurti-Andra	1931	191	1042
6 Bupi-Chupeu	920	920	537
7 Lele-Masi	2207	2207	1252
8 Lorengau Town	3986	3986	1460
Lombrum base	1432	1432	570
9 Los Negros	1267	1267	617
10 Nali	1048	995	641
11 Pere-Mbunai	881	881	478
12 Ere-Kele	1310	1363	798
13 Sopomu-Malai Bay	2246	2246	1253
14 Balopa	1616	1616	888
15 Rapatona	2034	2034	1065
16 South Western Islands	753	753	346

Sources: National Statistical Office, 1987; Electoral Commission, 1987 *National Elections Voting Statistics*, 1987. The column EC gives numbers from the Electoral Commission; the column NSO gives those of the National Statistical Office. For constituencies 3,4,10 and 12, these figures differ.

Table 2 Composition of the eight provincial 'sections'

Section (Team #)	Provincial Constituency	Ballot Box #
1	Western Islands	01-01
2	Kali-Bipi/Soparibeu	05-09
3	Tulu-Ponam/Kurti-Andra	10-14
4	Bupi-Cupeu/Lele-Masi	15-19
5	Los Negros/Lorengau Town	20-26
6	Ere-Kele/Nali/Pere Mbunai	27-31
7	Sopomu-Malai Bay	32-36
8	Rapatona/Balopa	37-42
R/O	Postal Ballot Box	43

Table 3 Participation in polling, related to population

Sects	Pop'n		Voters		Percentage			
	EC	(NSO)	Prov'l EC	Open EC	Prov'l EC	(NSO)	Open EC	(NSO)
1	1422		428	499	30.1		35.1	
2	2599	(2821)	1466	1469	56.4	(52.0)	56.5	(52.0)
3	3077	(2857)	1340	1346	43.6	(46.9)	43.7	(47.1)
4	3127		1793	1799	57.3		57.5	
5	6676		2643	2638	39.6		39.5	
6	3239		1678	1690	51.8		52.2	
7	2246		1118	1121	49.8		49.9	
8	3650		1734	1734	47.5		7.5	
R/O	N/A		4	4				
Tot.	26036	(26038)	12204	12300	47.0	(46.8)	47.0	(47.6)

Table 4 Participation in polling, related to enrollment

Section	No	Enrolled		Voting		Percentage	
			%	Provincial	Open	Provincial	Open
1	698		49.1	428	499	61.3	71.5
2	1579		60.8	1466	1469	92.8	93.0
3	1561		50.7	1340	1346	85.8	86.2
4	1789		57.2	1793	1799	100.2	100.6
5	2647		39.6	2643	2638	99.8	99.7
6	1917		59.2	1678	1690	87.5	88.2
7	1253		55.8	1118	1121	89.2	89.5
8	1953		53.5	1734	1734	88.8	88.8
R/O				4	4		
Total	13397		53.2	12204	12300	88.2	89.7



## Faltering Progress: Namatanai Open, New Ireland

NORMAN MACQUEEN


### *TRENDS AND NUMBERS*

The fortunes of the People's Progress Party (PPP) took a sharp downturn in the 1987 national election.\* The party's leader Sir Julius Chan did, it is true, retain his position as Deputy Prime Minister in the new Wingti coalition but this was due more to an acknowledgement of his abilities and the unsuitability of his potential rivals for the post than to the voting strength at his disposal in the new parliament. That strength in fact fell from thirteen at dissolution to six after the election.

This decline in the PPP's popularity among voters was fairly evenly spread throughout the country but nowhere was it better illustrated than in Chan's home province of New Ireland. Three members of the National Parliament are returned from New Ireland - one from the provincial seat and one each from two Open seats: Kavieng covering the north-western portion of the island and Namatanai representing the south-eastern half. The PPP had represented all three constituencies in the old parliament but lost two of them in the 1987 election. Noel Levi, a senior figure in the party and a former Foreign Minister, was convincingly defeated by Pangu Pati's Michael Singan in the provincial seat. In Kavieng Open, Robert Cheong trailed fourth behind Gerard Sigulogo of Melanesian Alliance (MA) and

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\* A study of this nature obviously depends greatly on the good nature and patience of individual informants. I have been particularly fortunate in this respect. With very few exceptions the people I have sought information and guidance from have been both generous with their time and anxious to be as helpful as possible. A full list of these informants would be lengthy indeed but among the most prominent were: Ben Remessen, the District Manager of Konos and Returning Officer for the constituency; Tony Drett, the Namatanai District Manager and Assistant Returning Officer; John Koae of the Electoral Commission voter education team assigned to Namatanai; Father John of the Missionary Society of Jesus in Lihir; Esekia Tomon, the Pangu Pati candidate; Raphael Topik, campaign organizer for Sir Julius Chan; Ephraim Apelis of Susurunga and the Education Research Unit at the University of Papua New Guinea; Norlie Miskaram of the Geography Department at University of Papua New Guinea.



**NEW IRELAND SHOWING  
NAMATANAI CONSTITUENCY ELECTORAL DISTRICTS**

Table 1: New Ireland Province Election Results 1987

Candidate	Party	Vote	Per cent
<i>Namatanai Open</i>			
Sir Julius Chan	PPP	8246	48.28
Ezekia Tomon	Pangu	6277	36.74
Herman Saet	Independent	1922	11.25
Alfred Simele	Independent	636	3.72
<i>Kavieng Open</i>			
Gerard Sigulogo	MA	3614	26.17
Wala Gukguk	Independent	1620	11.73
Tokau Kamalo	Pangu	1482	10.73
Robert Cheong	PPP	1461	10.58
[Others		5628	40.79
<i>New Ireland Provincial</i>			
Michael Singan	Pangu	16156	52.78
Noel Levi	PPP	11577	37.82
Joe Tangus	Independent	2872	9.38

Source: Electoral Commissioner of PNG, Report on Papua New Guinea Election 1987.

indeed polled below a Pangu candidate whose intervention, PPP officials hoped, might have successfully split the vote against them.

In Sir Julius's own Namatanai Open seat alone did the People's Progress Party maintain a hold in New Ireland and then only with a considerably reduced margin. The threat to Chan's electoral position was neither sudden nor unexpected. The party's strength in New Ireland had been declining for some time and at the beginning of 1987 clear psephological evidence of this was provided by the defeat of the PPP-dominated provincial government of Robert Seeto by a Melanesian Alliance grouping led by Pedi Anis. This evident vulnerability of the PPP in New Ireland, combined with Chan's position as Deputy Prime Minister, made Namatanai a major target for the main opposition parties. The long-term arithmetic of Chan's position in Namatanai assumed considerable interest to friend and foe alike, suggesting to the latter a good prospect for his defeat and causing the former some concern.

In the first post-independence national election, Chan had taken 64.5 per cent of the votes in Namatanai, representing 8,751 of 13,557 votes cast. In the 1982 election, however, this had declined to 55.4 per cent (8,333 votes out of 15,029). If the trend was to continue in 1987, Chan would dip well below the 50 per cent mark. Moreover, if the established pattern of few candidates and limited support for independents in Namatanai elections persisted, Chan would be very vulnerable to a single, strong opposition party challenger. With this in mind, Pangu and Melanesian Alliance agreed to a joint campaign. Pangu would endorse the candidate who would then be

Table 2: Namatanai Open: Electoral Divisions and Populations

Division	Population
1. East Coast Central	5524
2. West Coast Central	2946
3. Tabar	2194
4. East Coast Namatanai	4701
5. West Coast Namatanai	2595
6. Susurunga	4002
7. Kandas	1785
8. Lak	1609
9. Lihir	5505
10. Tanga	3518
11. Anir	1302

\* Divisions 1-3 are in Konos Administrative District while 4-11 are in that of Namatanai.

\* Total includes 80 non-citizens.

Source: *Final Report of the 1980 National Census*

'officially supported' by MA. The risk of vote splitting of the type witnessed in the Kavieng campaign would thus be minimised.

The hopes of Pangu and MA were bolstered by the results of the provincial assembly election. In this the PPP had taken only 33 per cent of the votes in the eleven provincial electoral districts which corresponded to the Namatanai Open constituency. Between them, Pangu and MA had won 44 per cent with other non-PPP candidates taking a further 25 per cent (*Post-Courier*, 22 May 1987). To some in the PPP, the message of these two sets of figures was that Chan must now shift to the New Ireland Provincial seat (the easiest option open to him under the residency rules for candidates). Against this, however, was the fact that although PPP had lost the provincial assembly elections, it had not done so in Namatanai.

Although it had taken only a third of the vote there, it had still won nine of the eleven electoral areas. East and West Coast Central were won, respectively, by Melanesian Alliance and Pangu. The impetus for change in provincial government had come from the Kavieng 'end' of the island and, while the projections of national election figures might make the provincial seat look a safer option, the provincial election had shown PPP to be still dominant when the seats were distributed in Namatanai.

The result of the national election in Namatanai clearly vindicated the latter view. (Although of course the possibility remains that PPP might have held the provincial seat and lost Namatanai on the strength of Chan's personal appeal had he made the move.) The trend against Chan in Namatanai was neither deep nor rapid enough to unseat him in 1987. However his proportion of the vote did decline further and indeed *did* drop below 50 per cent (to 48.28 per cent). His majority too was drastically reduced. In 1982 he had won by 3,058 against his Pangu opponent Isikel Manning while in 1987 Ezekia Tomon had cut this to 1,969. The 1982

figures were: Sir Julius Chan (PPP) 8,333; Isikel Manring (Pangu) 5,275 and Sam Watnambar (Ind.) 949. Despite Chan's victory for PPP in Namatanai, by 1987 a move away from the party appeared to be a continuing process in New Ireland politics at both provincial and national levels.

### *The Candidates and their Bases of Support*

Atypically, in an election where double figure candidacies seemed to be the norm, the Namatanai constituency had only four contenders (one more in fact than in 1982). While the highest numbers of candidates were to be found in the Highlands seats, the rest of the country too was showing a growing *penchant* for lengthy ballot papers. Indeed the other Open seat in New Ireland, Kavieng, had fourteen candidates. However, both the provincial seat (with three candidates) and Namatanai Open held out against the trend.

The Namatanai contenders were firstly, of course, Sir Julius Chan. The main threat to his position came from the Pangu-endorsed and MA-supported challenger Ezekia Tomon. There were in addition two independents: Herman Saet and Alfred Simele.

Sir Julius Chan, sitting member, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Trade and Industry and leader of the People's Progress Party at the time of the election, was born on Tanga island in 1939 where his father owned plantations. The Chan family had been well-known as business people in both New Ireland and East New Britain for the past fifty years. Sir Julius's Chinese father and New Ireland mother lived in Huris village in the Susurunga district close to the geographic 'centre' of Namatanai constituency. Chan himself, however, built his large residence at Huris only in the late 1970s as local rumblings of discontent were beginning to be heard about his apparent preference for living across in Rabaul in East New Britain.

Chan's political career began in 1968 when he was elected to the pre-independence Legislative Assembly. From 1972 he was Minister of Finance, a post he retained after independence in 1975 in Michael Somare's government until 1977. Following his split with Somare after the election of that year, Chan proved himself an effective leader of the opposition. In 1980, after a carefully engineered vote of no confidence in Somare, he became Prime Minister. After the return of Somare and Pangu in the 1982 election, Chan returned to lead the opposition. His next taste of government came in 1985 when Somare was ousted by his own *protégé*, Paias Wingti, who secured the support of the thirteen PPP MPs. A major part of the price of this support was Chan's elevation to the deputy prime ministership and the ministry of Finance. At the time of dissolution in 1987, Chan remained Deputy Prime Minister but had moved the previous December to the ministry of Trade and Industry.

Both before and after independence, Chan had been regarded at home and abroad as one of Papua New Guinea's most able and accomplished politicians. He had also managed for most of his time in office to remain largely untouched by the increasingly frequent scandals surrounding the personal and financial affairs of many of the country's political leaders. Such evident integrity was simply enough explained, many felt, by the fact of the Chan family's considerable 'legitimate' business wealth. This relatively upright image was, however, damaged in the last months of 1986



as a result of the Placer shares issue and Sir Julius entered the election with his reputation for financial probity somewhat tarnished.

Placer Pacific, one of the major foreign companies involved in the country's incipient 'mineral boom', was lobbied by Chan's Department of Finance for a fourfold increase in the number of shares it had planned to float within Papua New Guinea itself. The intention - to offer 'ordinary Papua New Guineans' an increased stake in the exploitation of their country's wealth - was entirely laudable. It emerged, however, that through various manoeuvres the Chan family company and the People's Progress Party itself had bought up some 800,000 of the 11.5 million shares floated - which in the first few days of stock market trading had increased in value by about 150 per cent. Chan, with Prime Minister Wingti's support, brazened the issue out, with references to the spirit of 'popular capitalism'. Indeed, as Minister of Finance, Chan had expedited his financial coup by securing an extension of the period in which the shares were on offer and by relaxing PNG's foreign exchange regulations (See Saffu 1987:269-70).

Sir Julius's areas of support within the constituency could be roughly delimited in terms of census divisions/electoral districts. As might be expected, he was confident of considerable support in Tanga, his birthplace. The other offshore islands of Tabar and Anir also had been areas of some strength for PPP and, although less certain in 1987, the party's position on the 'gold' islands of the Lihir group (where the Chan family owned plantations) had been fairly strong in the past. On the mainland, his support was located in the relatively highly populated districts of East and West Coast Namatanai - the latter of which included Namatanai township itself and the home of PPP ex-provincial premier Robert Seeto. Rather more problematic in 1987 was the position of his residential district, Susurunga, which was the birthplace of his principal opponent, Ezekia Tomon.

Ethnicity did not appear to play a major part in voter's choice in Namatanai other than in the sense of a natural loyalty to the 'local man' where present. Consequently, cultural divisions were not the determinant of political commitment that they are in many other Papua New Guinea constituencies; nor could even the most Procrustean efforts of the ideologically motivated have found a class basis to political behaviour in Namatanai. The predominant cleavage appears to be based on what might be described as an 'age/education' nexus. Chan appeared to derive most support from the older age group which had been conscious of his ascending career since before independence. In those areas where the traditional village councils of elders were still influential in fashioning collective positions, support from more youthful voters could also be relied on. Even in villages where the council had become dominated by a younger age group, the political influence of the older men often remained greater than that of the organised representative body itself. This can be seen as at least a partial explanation of Chan's past strength on the offshore islands where customary generational deferences and authority patterns might be expected to persist more strongly than on the mainland with its greater exposure to outside influences. Chan's extensive business interests in the constituency and the resulting patronage network he controlled were also a significant feature of his support. In many ways, of course, the two aspects were interlinked with traditional deferences being both generational and socio-economic.

Ezekia Tomon, the Pangu candidate, was born in Hilalon Village in the Susurunga district in 1948. Educated locally and at high school in Rabaul, Tomon went on to study at the Administrative College in Port Moresby and

later took a Diploma in Development Administration at Birmingham University in the United Kingdom. In all Tomon had spent eighteen years in the public service roughly half at national level and half in New Ireland province. Before he resigned to contest the election, Tomon was Assistant Secretary in the Department of New Ireland. Like Chan, Tomon was clearly a 'local boy made good' but one of a different generation and political outlook. Committed to the public rather than the private sector and influenced by the pervasive radicalism of student life in Port Moresby in the 1970s, Tomon was an advocate of a 'bottom-up' development strategy and dismissive of Chan's *bisnis* network and the political clientelism that this involved (interview with Ezekia Tomon, Namatanai, 27 May 1987).

Tomon's area of support was in the relatively populous districts of East and West Coast Central. These were 'traditional' non-PPP areas. West Coast Central in particular had a reputation as a Pangu stronghold. This was in part due to the concentration of non-native New Irelanders working on plantations there. Many of these were from the Highlands and East Sepik provinces, both (though particularly the latter) established areas of Pangu support since independence. Additionally, Tomon hoped to wrest control of Susurunga division from Chan. Both men were residents of this district, (Chan from Huris village and Tomon from nearby Hilalon), but in Tomon's view, Susurunga as a whole was becoming disenchanted with the fixed pattern of PPP domination. In support of this contention, Tomon pointed to the recent defection from the PPP of the widely respected provincial assembly member, Edward Togimar, who became Deputy Premier in the Anis administration. Although Tomon devoted some campaign resources to the islands, apart from the politically uncertain Lihir group, he seemed doubtful of his support off the mainland.

As would be expected, in view both of the profile of likely PPP voters and of his own political tendencies, Tomon had targetted the younger, more educated section of the electorate which was less deferential to tradition. Convinced of the gradual disintegration of the authority of those village councils dominated by the older generation, Tomon saw the resulting vacuum in political influence being filled by the high school (and even tertiary level) educated 'returnees'. In essence, Tomon's hopes for the election were based on the assumption that this process (evidenced in his view by the previous national and provincial elections) had advanced to a critical point.

Another related section of the electorate that Tomon hoped to win over consisted of the local public servants. Tomon's own public service career and his consequent claims on both their professional solidarity and faith in his commitment to protect their interests would, he felt, guarantee their backing. Additionally, of course, they were members of that relatively highly educated and 'modernised' section of the electorate on which his more general hopes were pinned. (Tomon was in fact one of a group of candidates in the election officially endorsed by the Public Employees Association.)

The more serious of the two outsiders (both independents) in the election was Herman Saet. Saet came from Mahur island in the Lihir group and was forty-one years old. He had served for many years as a community school teacher in the province and, although contesting a national seat for the first time, he had fought and lost in the earlier provincial election. Saet was sponsored by a group of Lihir businessmen based in Port Moresby known as Pangpang. Their main objective in supporting the candidacy appeared to be to lay down a marker of their interest in future negotiations

with the national government and the companies involved in the gold workings.

Saet's support, therefore, could be assumed to come mainly from Lihir and his campaign was seen as an end in itself rather than as a serious attempt to win power. Nevertheless, his influence on a generation of school students and their families in various parts of the constituency was not underestimated by his opponents.

The final candidate was Albert Simele who at fifty-four was the oldest in the contest. Simele was from Konogogo Village in the West Coast Central district. A subsistence farmer, he was associated with the TFA cargo cult. It was from its adherents that his votes would come. TFA was a mainland offshoot of the TIA (*Tutukuval Isukal Asosieison* - United Farmer's Association) which began in the 1960s on the island of New Hanover and which is associated with President Lyndon Johnson. It first appeared on the mainland in the Kavieng area before spreading to Namatanai (Miskaram 1985). This restricted his appeal to only three villages in his home area with a possibility of more in Lihir where a connected cult, NIMAMAR, was active. NIMAMAR is an acronym of the names of the islands in the Lihir group - Niolam, Mali, Masahet and Mahur (Filer and Jackson 1986). Its support was, however, also being canvassed by Herman Saet on the basis of a local rather than theological appeal.

So much then for pre-election perceptions. How did the geographic pattern of support for each candidate hold up in reality? At time of publishing, the voting figures for each candidate in each electoral district were not available. The relative balance of support indicated here is based on the recollections of those officiating at the count. Unsurprisingly Chan remained dominant in the East and West Coast Namatanai divisions. Less expectedly, however, he did rather better than he might have hoped in the traditionally 'anti-PPP' districts of East and West Coast Central. These divisions appeared fairly evenly split between himself and the Pangu candidate, Ezekia Tomon. Tomon however picked up considerable support for Pangu in the remote southern mainland divisions of Lak and Kandas, winning the former outright and finishing neck-and-neck with Chan in the latter. Demography, however, made this more of a moral victory than a numerically significant one as the sparse population of this region meant little in terms of overall voters. In the crucial district of Susurunga in which both Chan and Tomon were resident for electoral purposes, PPP remained on top. *Within* the district, however, voters in the Hilalon/Huris 'home' area of both candidates appeared to favour Tomon.

The island districts showed a somewhat clearer (and less expected) trend away from Chan and the PPP. Only Tabar offered Sir Julius a large margin of victory. As might be expected, his birthplace Tanga provided him with a majority - but one considerably eroded since previous elections, Tomon collecting the disaffected votes. Anir too saw Chan winning but with Tomon reasonably closely behind. The one island division in which the Pangu candidate failed to mount a reasonable challenge to the sitting member was Lihir. Here, of course, the challenge to Sir Julius came from the independent Herman Saet who, despite early indications of a reasonably strong showing, eventually dropped behind the PPP total. Albert Simele did badly throughout the electoral districts, winning, as expected, only limited support in his home area of West Coast Central and failing to make the impact he had hoped for among his co-religionists in Lihir.

The reality of the geographical distribution of support for candidates therefore differed somewhat from their own pre-poll perceptions. Tomon

failed to extend Pangu's hold on East and West Coast Central and was finally unable to wrest control of Susurunga from Chan. Pangu did, however, achieve a greater success than it might have expected in the more remote mainland divisions and on the islands. In the event, the balance, although still slowly shifting, remained in the incumbent's favour. Neither the campaign nor the issues upon which it was fought provided the added impetus needed to complete the process of erosion of the PPP position.

### *The Campaign*

A visitor arriving in Namatanai from Port Moresby in the last weeks before the poll might well have wondered if an election campaign was actually in progress. In contrast to the National Capital District, the trees were unadorned with fly posters and one's ears unassailed by loud hailers. In part, of course, this was simply a consequence of the low candidate numbers and the dispersed geography of the constituency. But in part, too, it conforms to a distinctly relaxed 'Islands style' of campaigning.

The basic vehicle of campaigning was the village meeting at which candidates, or their representatives, by prior arrangement, would spend usually between one and two hours addressing the villagers and answering their questions. The meetings were invariably conducted in a decorous manner with prayers preceding politics and appropriate courtesies being shown to the village elders. Often the arrangement would be facilitated by a local committee of supporters. In such a dispersed constituency where communications could be extremely difficult, not only between the islands but on the mainland itself, blanket campaigning was clearly unrealistic. Consequently candidates tended to concentrate their efforts on consolidating known areas of support and attempting to win marginal ones. Inevitably some electoral districts were barely touched by the candidates. The southern divisions of Kandas and Lak, by reason both of their inaccessibility and sparse population, were largely ignored until the final stages of the campaign and then only canvassed in a fairly cursory manner. The disparity in the resources of the various candidates also determined much of their respective campaigning styles.

By virtue of his national responsibilities to both government and party, Chan himself was only occasionally in Namatanai. His campaign therefore was run by various local lieutenants. When the candidate himself did visit the constituency, his style - understandably - tended towards the regal with his presence enhanced by the attentions of numerous aides. The resources of Rabaul-based Pacific Helicopters in which the Chan family had an interest were obviously immensely useful in his campaign and gave him a mobility which compensated somewhat for the infrequency of his visits.

The PPP effort in Namatanai was, in theory, based on twelve campaign committees - one for each of the eleven electoral districts and one responsible for non-native New Ireland voters (mainly the Highland and Sepik plantation workers). It proved impossible to verify how far this model held up in reality but clearly Chan's personal and party wealth put his campaign organisation on a separate plane from that of his opponents.

Despite the opposition's targetting of Namatanai Open, the national effort in support of Ezekia Tomon, was far from lavish. Moreover, Tomon, although until his candidacy a senior public servant in a provincial administration hostile to Chan, did not have any obvious access to state resources in his campaign. His transport consisted of one elderly utility and

the limit of Pangu Pati support appeared to have been a certain quantity of petrol and the use of an outboard motor to aid access to the more remote parts of the constituency. Tomon had found it necessary to arrange personal loans against Pangu guarantees to finance his campaign. Although Melanesian Alliance was supporting his candidacy, there was no indication that this support would be financial in nature. His campaign did, however, benefit from visits by both his Pangu chief and Leader of the Opposition, Michael Somare, in the last phase of the campaign and somewhat earlier by Father John Momis the Melanesian Alliance leader.

Given his relatively limited resources, Tomon's campaign was inevitably somewhat selective. The Susurunga division was subject to a particular effort. Within Susurunga the Pangu campaign appeared to be based on local committees of supporters who prepared for - and subsequently attempted to build on - visits by the candidate. Beyond Susurunga, Tomon was concerned to 'nurse' the established non-PPP divisions of East and West Coast Central. The islands were, as already noted, seen as a less promising prospect, but the populous and politically unquantifiable Lihir group justified something of a special effort.

In terms of material resources, the campaign of the independent Herman Saet seemed only marginally less well-endowed than that of Pangu. With a small group of supporters, Saet's campaign (borne by a vehicle of the same marque and vintage as that of Pangu) appeared to concentrate on those areas adjacent to the township of Namatanai itself. The extra dimension to the Saet campaign was, of course, the effort being made in Lihir, the main source of his sponsorship.

There was no visible sign of any campaign being conducted on behalf of the other independent candidate, Albert Simele. With few resources and, in all realism, fewer prospects of success, it appeared that Simele was content to reap whatever support was forthcoming from his immediate home village area and such as could be garnered by his co-religionists in Lihir.

### *The Issues*

What were the issues in the Namatanai election? In terms of policy options capable of affecting voting behaviour, few 'issues' were clearly delineated. National-level considerations were virtually absent. Pangu's Ezekia Tomon did push the Placer share issue to a certain extent in his village meetings but it was unclear how much impact this actually had on his listeners. It is probably fair to say that any loss of prestige Chan may have suffered as a result was insignificant when compared to that which he enjoyed *ex officio* as Deputy Prime Minister and a former Prime Minister. His positive 'national' image more than outweighed his 'national' embarrassment over the shares issue.

At the local level, the issue of rural development (and past lack of it) was clearly important in the campaign. Ezekia Tomon, as already observed, saw the main division between his and Chan's approach to development as one between 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' strategies. Certainly, during Chan's period in office, Namatanai's economic base had remained predominantly in the larger-scale sectors. New projects tended to offer waged employment rather than village or community self-sufficiency.

The coconut plantations first established by the Germans at the turn of the century were, of course, no longer the valuable resource they once were. The sharp fall in copra prices in the 1970s almost halved New Ireland's

production between 1978 and 1981 (from 2,210 to 1,270 tonnes) and many plantations had fallen into decline. The response to this in Namatanai was not the subdivision and diversification of the plantations into smaller units producing a wider range of crops. Instead a process of renovation had been undertaken in which the plantations had been maintained as going concerns and planted with new hybrid strains of coconut (and, more recently, cocoa). The Karu project in East Coast Namatanai was typical, with renovation being financed by the Asian Development Bank.

Chan had a personal financial interest in this sector of the economy. His recently acquired Hilalon plantation in Susurunga became a source of conflict with the Melanesian Alliance-dominated provincial government which wished to see it pass into the hands of the local villagers to be either sub-divided or run cooperatively. This issue was emblematic of Chan's differences with Tomon and was given added significance, of course, by the fact that Hilalon was the latter's home village. Livestock development likewise had been based on relatively large-scale undertakings. The coastal grasslands of Huris, Chan's residential area in Susurunga, were given over to a cattle project funded jointly by the PNG Agriculture Bank and the European Community.

Interestingly, the Huris project was the only obvious example of ministerial patronage being dispensed in the home area. This evident failure on Chan's part to use his position in government to 'bring development' to the area in conformity with now expected political practice in the country was a source of some dissatisfaction in Susurunga. According to some informants, this disappointment played a part in the close fight between Chan and Tomon in this district.

The perceived shortcomings of Chan in sponsoring infrastructural development in the constituency might also offer an explanation for Tomon's relatively strong showing in the remote mainland districts of Lak and Kandas. This area had for long been neglected in the view of its inhabitants. Large parts of it were still accessible only by sea and considerable resentment had been felt at the failure of the government to extend the main arterial road in New Ireland (the German-built crushed coral Buliminski Highway dating from the early days of the century) southwards to the tip of the province.

Local discontent over Chan's track record did not, though, always mean a transfer of support to Tomon. The Pangu candidate too had a past record to defend in this respect - not as the incumbent candidate, of course, but as a leading provincial public servant. There was evidently some feeling that as Deputy Secretary of the province, he was not as effective as he might have been in encouraging the establishment of development projects and infrastructural improvements in the constituency.

Beyond the cash cropping of copra and cocoa and livestock development, the other two main revenue producing props of the local economy - gold and timber - were, by their capital-intensive nature, large-scale. They were, therefore, somewhat removed from the 'bottom up'/'top-down' dispute. Both, however, had considerable political significance in the constituency.

Lihir's gold deposits were being exploited jointly by an American company, Kennecott Explorations, which had an 80 per cent share, and the Australian-based group, Niugini Mining Ltd, with 20 per cent. Initial prospecting had brought progressively more optimistic estimates of the eventual yield once the mine began production, probably in 1990 (*Post-Courier*, 19 October 1987; *Times of Papua New Guinea*, 15-21 October

1987). This gold was Namatanai's most significant source of medium-term income. Consequently, Lihir became a focus of considerable attention from the candidates.

In anticipation of Lihir's future wealth, Chan had himself been instrumental in setting up the Lihir Development Association. This was intended to coordinate the use of royalty payments to the islanders in general development schemes and, crucially, to represent the islanders in negotiations both with the national government and the mining companies. Such a group would clearly have considerable economic and political influence. The implications of this were not lost on local business people, many of whom were less than enthusiastic about surrendering such a key area of influence to an 'outsider', for so Chan was represented by his opponents in Lihir. (Chan did have a long-standing association with the islands through family plantations and other business interests.) The election in Lihir therefore took on the character of what one informant described as a *maus struggle* (a conflict for who would be the voice - or 'mouth' - of Lihir). Against the PPP and the Lihir Development Association was ranged the Port Moresby-based Lihir business group Pangpang. Pangpang backed the candidacy of Herman Saet because, it was felt, he could be expected to put up a strong local challenge to Chan. While he obviously had little chance of broader electoral success in the constituency, his support in the district would, in the view of his backers, provide a clear signal to Chan of the strength of at least a section of local opinion.

The situation in Lihir was further complicated by the calculations of the other candidates. Tomon hoped that it would be he and not Saet who would be the ultimate beneficiary of the local suspicions of outside manipulation. The distrust of Chan was, in Tomon's estimation, more likely to express itself in support for a candidate capable of actually *defeating* him in the constituency rather than just giving him pause for thought in the Lihir district itself.

Lihir provided one of the clearest examples of Melanesian Alliance support for Tomon's Pangu candidacy. The MA leader Father John Momis made a campaigning trip to the district a few weeks before voting began. The visit by Father Momis, a Catholic priest, to an island group with an 80 per cent Catholic population was an astute move if not, ultimately, an especially successful one in terms of votes in the box.

Albert Simele, the other independent candidate, also had hopes of winning support on Lihir. His calculation, as suggested earlier, was based on the association between the NIMAMAR grouping in Lihir and his own DFA cult on the mainland. Inter-cult loyalty would, he hoped, turn this 'vote bank' over to him and deny it to Herman Saet.

In the event Chan held Lihir - though the first boxes counted apparently showed a strong swell of support for Saet. The respective hopes of Tomon and Simele proved illusory. Although Saet's share of the Lihir poll represented a movement of anti-Chan feeling, from the PPP point of view, he provided a very useful repository for such votes. If a significant part of the Lihir electorate was going to vote against Chan anyway, it was obviously preferable that it should do so in favour of a candidate incapable of using these votes to challenge the PPP at the level of the constituency as a whole. This circumstance raised a strong suspicion among Pangu supporters that PPP was in fact actively sponsoring Saet's candidacy as an effective means of splitting the anti-Chan vote (or at least diverting it away from Tomon and his overall constituency total). Hard evidence of this is

impossible to come by but conspiracy theorists recalled what they claim was a similar situation in the 1982 election when the 'Pangu' vote was split to the benefit of PPP. In 1982 Sam Watnambar, a 'Pangu-supporting' independent, took 949 votes thus reducing (according to Pangu activists) the vote of the official Pangu contender Isikel Manring. PPP was accused of engineering Watnambar's candidacy. In the event Chan's majority over Manring was more than three times the number of Watnambar's votes. The resentment of Tomon's supporters appeared to derive from the success of the 1987 vote-splitting manoeuvre (if such it was) rather than its immorality. Pangu itself, some of its strategists suggested, should put up a prominent local 'PPP-supporting' independent in Tanga in the next election in order to syphon off 'official' PPP votes in this marginal division.

Clearly, Lihir and its gold were destined to be important features of New Ireland politics for the foreseeable future. How the potential wealth of the islands would influence electoral choice remains to be seen. But it is apparent that the islanders were increasingly conscious of their special position in the constituency and the province as a whole and were already beginning to give political expression to this. The nature of this expression in Lihir - one of the most populous as well as the richest of districts - would inevitably have a considerable influence on the politics of the constituency as a whole.

As a campaign issue, the commercial exploitation of Namatanai's timber resources was, for the greater part of the contest, 'the dog which didn't bark in the night'. Although a major social, economic and environmental question, none of the candidates appeared anxious to raise it as a major *political* issue. Throughout 1987 the activities of the various foreign logging companies active in Papua New Guinea had attracted increasing public attention as a series of press revelations of their financial and environmental misbehaviour emerged. At the local level, however, the issue was far from clear-cut. Many Namatanai landowners and communities were in fact quite happy with the short-term benefits they appeared to be deriving from a resource not previously regarded as particularly valuable. Political interference in this would not necessarily have been a vote winner.

The timber industry in Namatanai had become closely associated with PPP. This was in part the natural consequence of the party's traditional domination of the politics of the area both in terms of national representation and provincial government. In part too, it was due to the PPP's image as a '*bisnis* party'. It was, however, only relatively late in the campaign that Tomon was willing to take a gamble on the timber question and raise it as an election issue.

New Ireland is one of the most heavily exploited logging areas in Papua New Guinea. It is also one of the least regulated. There were two legislative mechanisms covering logging operations in the country: the *Forestry Act* (1973 and 1975) and the *Forestry (Private Dealings) Act* (1972 and 1974). Under the first, the state acts essentially as an agent for local landowners and manages the financial side of their agreements with the logging companies. The *Forestry Act* also incorporates environmental and reforestation safeguards. *The Private Dealings Act*, however, involves the state merely in the designation of Local Forest Areas (LFAs) which the companies can then exploit on the basis of 'private' deals made directly with the local landowners (either individuals or communities). Most logging in Namatanai was carried out under this, increasingly controversial, legislation.



After some fifteen years of exploitation many LFAs had been clear-felled and the longer-term environmental and economic consequences were beginning to reveal themselves to the landowners. The Commission of Enquiry into the forest industry in Papua New Guinea which was set up by the national government under Mr Justice Barnett in response to mounting public concern was, by the later stages of the election campaign, having some influence on opinion in those provinces most involved in logging. The community as a whole was beginning to take a more critical view of timber exploitation and it began to suggest itself as a viable election issue in timber areas. In Namatanai the position of the Nakmai LFA was becoming sadly typical. Nakmai was logged by the Japanese company Gaisho (one of the most active in Namatanai) through a local joint venture company. Reporting evidence to the Barnett Enquiry, the *Times of Papua New Guinea* (15-21 October 1987) recorded:

...the Nakmai forest has disappeared, the people are split and the profits from the operation are unaccounted for. On top of that soil erosion is now rampant coupled with mud-slides, destruction of the reef and fishing grounds, blockage of waterways and pollution of the people's drinking water.

The effect of the timber issue on the 1987 election in Namatanai is difficult to assess. Tomon appeared to have benefitted from raising it in the southern part of Susurunga district which had recently attracted the attention of the loggers. In future elections, however, it was likely to play a much more prominent part in the campaign. As the local consequences of clear-fell logging become more and more evident and as national concern continues to be focussed on the timber industry and the misbehaviour of many of those involved in it, the voters in Namatanai are likely to respond. The particular form that response will take may well be determined by past perceptions of the positions of parties and individuals on the issue. In this event, the issue is likely to be fought out to the detriment of PPP.

### CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND PROSPECTS

The re-election of Sir Julius Chan disguised the fact that a distinct trend continued to run against the PPP in New Ireland. In Namatanai itself the party's percentage of the vote has progressively declined in the three elections since independence - from 64.5 in 1977 to 55.4 in 1982 and finally in 1987 to 48.3. If, as we have suggested, the motor of this trend is a changing age (and concomitant educational) profile on the part of the electorate, then the process looks set to continue. Certainly, no other social cleavages capable of cross-cutting this generational one seem likely to appear before the 1992 election.

It is possible that Sir Julius may attempt to mitigate the effects of the trend against his party by a more diligent 'nursing' of his constituency. He had, of course, shown himself to be sensitive to the dangers of erosion in his local position in the past - when, for example, he took the precaution of building his new residence in Huris. He might now take account of the prevailing feeling that he has not done enough in terms of local development at a grassroots level. It is far from clear, however, whether this would succeed in altering the perceptions of the younger part of the electorate. To a great extent, the Chan wagon is already seen as hitched to

the star of isolated 'big' project development. Opposition to such development has become, axiomatically, opposition to Sir Julius.

In terms of larger, specific issues too, the situation appears not to favour a resurgence of PPP's fortunes in Namatanai. It is probable that the whole question of timber exploitation will play a much more dominant part in the next election. The growing national awareness of this issue is likely to combine with increased local concern with the immediate consequences of logging in the constituency itself. Already Chan's Pangu and MA opponents are planning a much greater concentration on the issue in future. Unless PPP can distance itself from its past associations with the more negative aspects of the logging industry in Namatanai - no mean task given the longevity of local memories - it may well have a price to pay at the polls.

Another result of the electoral post-mortem carried out by the anti-Chan camp was the conviction that the next campaign must pay much more attention to the island districts. Given the absence of any particularly active campaigning there by Tomon, Pangu's performance was unexpectedly good. The assumption that the islands are in some way a PPP reserve seems no longer justified. The population of the islands amounts to about 35 per cent of that of the constituency as a whole, making them unquestionably a major electoral prize.

Ultimately, of course, these speculations depend on a future contest which would, essentially, replicate that of 1987 in terms of candidates and their affiliations. Such an assumption cannot safely be made. While social and demographic changes - and even likely issue areas - can be reasonably predicted, the number and nature of the contestants cannot. The 1987 contest involved what was basically a 'straight fight' between two sides distinguished by both local and national political features. There are many alternative scenarios, however. There is no certainty, for example, that the accommodation between Pangu and Melanesian Alliance will continue either at the national or the provincial level. A three-cornered election fought out among those two separately and the People's Progress Party would produce an entirely different type of contest. Similarly, the intervention of *other* established national parties would change the situation even further and would require an entirely new set of electoral calculations.

There is, moreover, a danger in transposing to future elections the somewhat artificial importance given to party identification by the peculiar circumstances of the 1987 contest. Inevitably, Chan as national leader of the PPP had a particularly strong 'party' association. By extension, his main opponent clearly represented the 'national' hopes of the Pangu-MA grouping and in consequence had a higher *party* profile than most other candidates. In short, the nature of the candidates affected the terms of the contest and focussed an 'unusual' attention on party identity. One of the most important determinants of the character of the next election in Namatanai will, therefore, be the presence or absence of Sir Julius Chan as a candidate. If he decides to run again in Namatanai, the People's Progress Party will obviously pull out all their campaigning stops against the trend of the past decade. Likewise, of course, Pangu and/or Melanesian Alliance will be making every effort to ensure that the trend continues. Both sides will attempt to capitalise on the 'lessons' of 1987 and this may very well involve, as we have suggested, a much more elaborate and ruthless set of tactics including perhaps the sponsorship of 'splitters' and 'siphons' by each side which would be capable of throwing even the most sophisticated psephological predictions into disarray. If, however, Chan decides that the

electoral trend in New Ireland is irreversible and chooses to run for another seat (perhaps in East New Britain), then Namatanai will have much less national significance and much less interest to the 1992 generation of electoral analysts.

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# The Elections in North Solomons Province

JAMES GRIFFIN WITH SAMUEL KAWONA\*

## INTRODUCTION

The North Solomons province (formerly Bougainville district) consists of a major island, Bougainville, 208 kilometres long by 32 to 64 kilometres wide, and a minor one, Buka, 56 kilometres by 14.5 kilometres. There are also five atolls: Nissan and Kilinailu are Melanesian-inhabited; Tauu, Nukumanu and Nuguria are regarded as Polynesian. Nukumanu, 400 kilometres east of Bougainville is the furthest of Papua New Guinea's outliers. The total area of the province is 8788 square kilometres; the atolls cover 192 square kilometres. Bougainville Island is mountainous and volcanic reaching to 2600 metres. The coastal plains are extremely fertile, there are exploitable forests and marine resources and a scatter of mineral anomalies of which only the copper, gold and silver of the Panguna area (central Bougainville) have so far been exploited. Rainfall averages over 2800 millimetres for the province with 2100 millimetres on the northern Selau peninsula, 3260 millimetres in Kieta (central east coast) and over 5600 millimetres in southwestern Siwai. The southernmost area, Buin, is some eight kilometres from the Shortland Island in the Republic of the Solomon Islands and there are marriages, trade and 'traditional movement' between them.

At the 1980 census the population was estimated to be 128,890. A growth rate of 3.2 per cent plus immigration may have brought this to


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160,000 or more in 1987. In 1980 more than 53 per cent of the rural population were under 18. The impact of the Panguna mine can be seen in the urban growth. In 1966 there were less than 900 people at the administrative centre in Buka Passage and only 750 at Kieta. Little more than 300 lived in Buin town. In 1980 a new town, Arawa erected on a resumed expatriate plantation, housed 12,623 people while at the minesite, Panguna, there were 3,487 and at the port, Loloho, 1,283. Kieta, some 10 kilometres from Arawa had 3,445. In this linked urban complex of 20,838 people, 35 per cent were born in the North Solomons, 51 per cent in other parts of Papua New Guinea and 14 per cent were non-citizens. Buka Passage had 1,517 with over 80 per cent North Solomonese and 49 non-citizens while Buin had 877 with 86 per cent North Solomonese and nine non-citizens. Town population would have increased since 1980 with non-North Solomonese squatters aggravating inter-ethnic friction. The highest concentrations of rural population are on Buka Island, on the eastern coast of Bougainville down to Toimanapu, some 60 kilometres south of Kieta, and on the Siwai-Buin plains. The large enclave plantations occupying 3 per cent of the land are on the east Bougainville and west Buka coasts; there are none in the Siwai-Buin area. There is a sealed road for 30 kilometres from Panguna to Arawa and then to Aropa airstrip, 20 kilometres south of Kieta. Unsealed roads run from Panguna south to Buin via the west and from Toimanapu to Buin, and north to Buka Passage, but some rivers are not yet bridged - a sore point in the electorate.

Fifty per cent of Papua New Guinea's cocoa is produced in the North Solomons, 60 per cent of it by smallholders while the province ranks second in copra production. Households on subsistence only comprise less than 15 per cent of the total. Logging occurs in the Buin area where, at Tonolei, there is a potential of 500 million square feet while lesser resources are being developed at Tinputz (north-east Bougainville), Wakunai (central) and Kieta. There are cattle and pig projects and a sizeable chicken hatchery. Small industries (bakeries, soft drink manufactures, laundry, workshops, garages) service the Panguna-Arawa-Kieta complex.

From its opening in 1972 to the end of 1983 Bougainville Copper Ltd (a subsidiary of Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia [CRA]) produced 2.1 million tonnes of copper, 223,222 kilogrammes of gold and 523,692 kilogrammes of silver with a value of K3.1 billion, of which gold revenue was roughly a third and silver some five per cent. This represented over 50 per cent of Papua New Guinea's export receipts during a period when overseas prices fluctuated markedly. Panguna ore grades are low and have declined with time but BCL has upgraded its technological efficiency and throughput to match deeper cuts, longer haulages and increasing costs. When, after self-government (1972), the original mining agreement was renegotiated (1974) in Papua New Guinea's favour, a moratorium was placed on further prospecting. As the Panguna lode is scheduled for virtual exhaustion c.2005 and a new mine requires some eight years from inception to production, the lifting of the moratorium is a pressing political issue. Without it provincial revenues, which have included mining royalties, and the general standard of living must drop. Popular opinion led by the paramount Melanesian Alliance (MA) party has been opposed to further mining (particularly by CRA/BCL) at least until problems of land resumption, direction of revenues and royalties and national-provincial equity can be resolved on terms more acceptable to North Solomonese. This became not only a major plank in the MA campaign of 1987 but, at the time of writing (April 1989), was part of the present resurgent movement for secession.



The province is divided into three districts which correspond to the three open electorates. Buka district (North Open) comprises not only the island itself but the southern side of the passage from the Selau peninsula south to include Tinputz and Teop speakers and west to Konua as well as the atolls (pop. 4893). Kieta district (Central Open) includes the Rotokas, Eivo, Torau and Nasioi (the last named by far the largest group). Buin district (South Open) includes Banoni, Nagovisi, Siwai and Buin speakers. If the 'Polynesian' outliers are said to speak one language, there are probably some 20 languages extant in the province of which the Buka district languages are mainly Austronesian, while the Nasioi, Nagovisi, Siwai and Buin are non-Austronesian. In 1964 the province comprised one electorate; in 1968 three (Regional, North, South); in 1972 the present four. (Sir) Paul Lapun, a Banoni speaker, won with especially strong support among the Nasioi in 1964 and in the South in 1968 and, although the Nasioi were excised to help form Central in 1972, again in 1972 (Ogan 1965, 1971; Anis *et al*, 1976), the last two times with an absolute majority. The North was won in 1968 and 1972 by Donatus Mola who joined the People's Progress Party (PPP). The Provincial or Regional seat in 1968 was won by Joseph Lue a Siwai Catholic supported by the Church and Lapun. He also joined PPP and, losing his support and becoming too closely associated with the Australian Administration, he was overwhelmingly defeated by Fr John Momis (18 to 82 per cent) in 1972.

No psephological study of the North Solomons has been published since the chapter in the symposium on the 1972 elections (Anis *et al*, 1976) although it is the nation's wealthiest province, has been dissident and centrifugal, and set a seemingly inexorable pace for the adoption of provincial government (Griffin *et al* 1979: 147-54, 209-17; Ballard, 1981: 95-132). It would be difficult to make this resumé of the 1987 election intelligible without trying, however sketchily, to cover this gap. In fact, the last sentence of the 1972 study entitled questioningly, 'Towards a new politics?', invites this sequel:

If the new House of Assembly cannot deal successfully with emergent Bougainville aspirations toward social, cultural, economic and political autonomy, MHAs Bele (Central Bougainville Open), Lapun and Momis may well be swept away by the same forces which elected them. (Anis *et al* 1976: 465).

Donatus Mola was omitted from this admonition. (Raphael Bele was elected to Central Bougainville Open.) This was not because Mola was a vanguardist of provincial autonomy but because, like Lue, he had been 'closely associated with the Australian Administration as well with other elements... (of the) "Establishment"' (Anis *et al* 1976). Obviously those 'same forces' which had elected Bele, Lapun and Momis had not, according to Anis *et al*, elected Mola, and Eugene Ogan, the senior member of that team, had held in his study of the 1968 elections that there was 'indeed ... a division of sociological significance' between the Buka district and the rest of the province (Ogan 1971: 159). In that Provincial election the North had voted heavily in favour of two European candidates, one from Buka Passage, the other from Teop-Tinputz, rather than for Melanesian Lue from the south. Anis *et al* implied that 'the traditional northern practice' of vesting 'long-term leadership ... in older men' may have been part of this sociological explanation although Mola's 'political acumen' and ebullient personality were undoubted factors in his success. As the North Bougainville electorate in

1987 deviated from the pattern of Central and South, this notion of 'a sociological division' should at least be kept in mind.

### ***DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH SOLOMONS 1972-7***

As, following the 1972 elections, all four Members of the House of Assembly (MHAs) were incorporated into Michael Somare's National Coalition, it was assumed by many observers that secessionism would wane. It had been openly articulated at the foundation of the Mungkas (Buin word = black) Society in September 1968 by 25 North Solomonese in Port Moresby with Lapun as leader. (Mungkas subsequently had corresponding branches in major towns and the home province.) The Mungkas declaration was occasioned by the Australian administration's intent to resume village land for mining facilities paying standard occupation fees of only 5 per cent per annum of unimproved capital value plus compensation for damage or inconvenience. It was accompanied by the formation of a Bougainville Landowners Association and in 1969 a secessionist association, Napidakoe Navitu (Griffin 1982). The subsequent defence of their land by the Rorovana (and, less dramatically, Arawa) villagers and the publicity given to it led to costly delays in the start-up of the mine as well as world-wide notoriety for both the multi-national company and the colonial government. By 1970 this issue appeared to have been settled amicably on much more favourable terms for villagers (Griffin, 1970). Napidakoe Navitu failed to spread province-wide and a referendum on secession organised by its expatriate secretary proved a fiasco. At the Bougainville Combined Local Government Council meetings, the two LGCs of Buka and Teop-Tinputz continued to withhold support for separatist motions. Lapun himself, then truly the charismatic leader of the south and central areas (Ogan 1974), had remained deputy leader of Pangu Pati and wavered towards some sort of federal solution [Griffin 1972: 276]), although very aware of the sentiments of his people. His appointment, ironically, as Minister for Mines by Somare locked him into a nationalist position where his deficiencies in education rendered him incapable of resisting the persuasions of colleagues and their advisers, finding a creative devolutionary position or playing an effective role in government. The symbolism of his knighthood in 1974 - the first conferred on a Papua New Guinean - was not lost on, or appreciated by, most North Solomonese. Lapun, contrary to expectations (Harries et al, 1973), rapidly lost home support.

Tertiary student members of Mungkas who were close to Momis kept the discussion of future options for the North Solomons open during 1972 (Griffin 1973) while Momis became deputy chairman (*de facto* chairman) of the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC). Momis asserted that the North Solomons had 'an absolute right to self-determination' (Griffin 1973) and continued his severe criticisms of the intrusion of the copper mine and its impact on local welfare (Momis and Ogan 1972). He hoped that entrenching provincial government in the Constitution would satisfy North Solomonese aspirations. An interlude of seemingly conciliatory talk, however, was shattered by the killing of two North Solomonese civil servants Rovin and Moini) in the Eastern Highlands on Christmas Eve 1972. Immediately the whole province rallied behind the separatist banner as resentment of mainlanders, especially Highlanders, boiled over. Aside from working on the enclave plantations in the province and often not returning home, they had migrated to benefit from the mine and its 'multiplier effects'.



The Rovin-Moini tragedy also brought Leo Hannett, a university graduate and former seminarian (Anis *et al* 1976: 446-8), back to his province from overseas study to mobilise for some effective form of autonomy (Mamak *et al* 1974). Hannett had been bitterly disappointed at failing to secure the endorsement of 'brokers' for the Provincial seat in 1972 in view of his record as a protagonist for his people since his seminary days. Intense rivalry developed with Momis from that time. To Hannett, Momis appeared to be exploiting his priestly network and influence to support a covert and inappropriate political ambition. Hannett's Bougainville Special Political Committee (Mamak *et al* 1976) demanded radical decentralisation, influencing the Combined Councils' Conference in November 1973 to threaten 'great trouble' if an interim provincial government were not immediately granted (Griffin 1977). Somare capitulated and the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government (BIPG) met in January 1974. (Sir) Alexis Holyweek Sarei, a former priest with a degree from a Roman university, who had married an American, became chairman. Sarei was from Buka, had been Somare's secretary, and was appointed by him District Commissioner of Bougainville in 1973 (Somare 1975: 115-20). In the early eighties, he became High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

In spite of this, a series of contretemps ensued (Ballard 1981: 112-20) as Port Moresby failed to provide funding which satisfied the BIPG. It came to be agreed that the full mining royalties would be granted to the province as well as its negotiated allocation. This was the more practicable as the mining agreement was renegotiated in 1974 much in favour of Papua New Guinea. Exasperation climaxed for the BIPS executive in May 1975 when it was denied the funding for which it had effectively budgetted. Hannett who had just previously denounced the idea of secession in an interview with an Australian newspaper, now declared it was the only option and was 'non-negotiable'. Over 80 per cent of the North Solomonese appear to have agreed. Subsequently the national Constituent Assembly threw out the section of the Constitution entrenching provincial government. Momis flew to the United Nations to put a fruitless case for secession - or what he thought to be 'self-determination'. On 1 September 1975, with Hannett giving an inspiring oration, the flag of 'the Republic of the North Solomons' was unilaterally raised, the name being chosen to connote a prior kinship with the rest of the Solomons archipelago. The three significant religious groups (Catholic, United Church and Seventh Day Adventists) were represented as was the cultic Hahalis Welfare Society which had isolated itself from Church and State in the early sixties (Ryan 1969: 286-337). Particularly conspicuous was the Catholic bishop, Gregory Singkai, himself a Nasioi, whose pastorate contained 75 per cent of the local people (Griffin *et al*, 1979). He said simply that a bishop ought to support his flock.

The stand-off was finally resolved (without loss of life) in August 1976 when provincial government was granted. Meanwhile plans had gone ahead to dismantle the colonial local government council system and replace it with 40 community governments. Sarei became premier without a contest; Hannett was provincial secretary. Writs had been issued for the Provincial and Central Open seats, but few bothered to vote. The new Provincial incumbent, Paulus Harepa, was to poll a mere 6.2 per cent against Momis in 1977 and 4.2 per cent in North Bougainville in 1982. His candidacy was regarded as an impertinence.

### THE PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE 1977-88

Momis (b.1942), Hannett (b.1941) and Sarei (b.1934) remained the outstanding personalities in North Solomons politics and eventually interpersonal conflict enveloped all three. In 1976 Hannett had progressed from provincial planner to provincial secretary but fell out with his colleagues and left the government prior to the 1977 elections. Although urged to stand for an Open seat to avoid what appeared to some as unseemly competition with his fellow hero of autonomy, Hannett contested the provincial seat and was defeated, 13,697 (51.4 per cent) to 8,046 (32.5), with two other candidates polling poorly. Momis won by over five to one in his home base, Buin district, but only narrowly in the North, for Hannett came from Nissan atoll. Hannett showed he could have won Central Open, where his activities had been most memorable, by leading Momis comfortably there. While Hannett campaigned widely and vigorously, Momis relied more on his church network and, in general, only replied to his opponent's vehement criticisms when they touched on the alleged incongruity of combining priesthood with politics. On this issue, which has continued to be hotly disputed, Bishop Singkai supported Momis although some members of the hierarchy in other parts of the nation doubted the propriety of Momis's position. Momis's apologia was entitled 'Priest in Politics for his Fellowmen in the World'. Citing documents from the Second Vatican Council he stated:

As a priest, an ordained minister of God, sharing in the universal priesthood of Christ, it is both my responsibility and privilege to take a plunge unreservedly into the abyss of human affairs and in fact into human history in order to shape my own personal destiny in the context of our personal destiny... Our strategy to promote such a development of man must be one of an intergral approach and must do away with the dualisms such as soul-body, heaven-earth, state-church ... As co-creators we must not be slaves to traditional practices and structures for the sake of conformity but rather be prepared to update them to suit the modern man (mimeo, 1977).

Time would show that the North Solomonese welcomed their MP's sacerdotal status rather than the contrary. Whatever supernatural associations clung to his priesthood, Momis's reputation for integrity and his rhetoric against foreign influence ('neo-colonialism'), big business, multi-nationals and the corruption of leadership matched the self-image of a people with an ingrained sense of moral superiority and of having been neglected and exploited by Port Moresby (Hannett, 1975). As a celibate he did not need to acquire wealth, as seemed imperative for politicians in many other parts of the nation. Voters seemed more satisfied with blessings than patronage. Momis was unreconciled to the intrusion of CRA/BCL and refused for years even to visit the mine. He was the father of a Constitution which had ultimately sanctioned provincial government. He was also critical of the paternalism of European clergy, while paying tribute to the proselytisation which had uprooted indigenous traditions more thoroughly than in most other parts of Papua New Guinea. All this made him *the* ethnonational leader in spite of his being mixed-race (having a Buin 'big man' father and a part-Chinese/New Ireland mother) and lacking the appearance of a *Mungkas tru*. Momis's prestige also elected S.Tulo (North), R.Bele (Central) and A.Anugu (South) and ensured their loyalty in Parliament.

Back at Waigani, Momis and his North Solomonese followers formed with John Kaputin (MP, Rabaul) an Alliance for Progress and Regional

Development, hoping to acquire some bargaining power in the formation of the new government. He was given the Decentralisation portfolio but eventually came to loggerheads with Somare over the latter's failure to bring down the Leadership Code. The last straw came when Somare reshuffled his Cabinet in late 1979 and took Decentralisation from Momis and Education from Kaputin. In March 1980 they helped to topple Somare and Momis regained his former portfolio, now called Provincial Affairs. His public altercations with the Deputy Prime Minister, (Sir) Iambakey Okuk, a fierce opponent of the Leadership Code and a scathing critic of Momis's principles, pointed up the Momis dilemma: was he a priest-in-politics or a politician who happened to be a priest? The rationale in 1972 for his entry into politics was that he would bring Catholic principles to bear on Constitution-making and ensure that the North Solomons gained substantial autonomy - both of which were achieved. However, his opponents were quick to note that where he had previously rejected Somare as 'corrupt', in 1980 he was a partner in a Chan-Okuk-led coalition that was even less tender to his principles. Indeed Okuk mocked them and on occasion publicly advised Momis to return to his presbytery.

None of this, however, worried the bulk of his constituents. They were content that their MPs had access to government and, just as Lapun's charismatic sense of mission had been trusted before, so it was with Momis. The formation of the 'radical' and censorious Melanesian Alliance party (MA) with Kaputin, while giving Momis nation-wide scope did not, because of its North Solomonese core, divest it of its special ethnolocal identity at home. Other parties as such, had not had, and were not to have, much attraction. Lapun's adherence to Pangu became significant (and fatal) only when he declined to support secession. Until then it was just a mysterious strategy the efficacy of which was best known to him. When, at a public meeting with Somare in late 1982, Hannett openly embraced Pangu (and national unity), of which he had been a member at university, it cost him future votes especially because Somare had expressed exasperation with provincial government and wanted its powers curtailed.

Hannett's success in defeating a lethargic Sarei (14,244 to 8,993 votes) for premier in 1980 spurred MA to more intensive organisation. Hannett had by then become a successful businessman in his own right and, as chairman of the directors of Bougainville Development Corporation (BDC), had espoused pragmatism, productivity and profit. On his initiative BDC had been founded in 1974-5 with the following objectives:

1. To enable Bougainvilleans to share in the profits being generated by the presence of Bougainville Copper on the Island (instead of their going to)...foreign-owned companies and being exported...
2. To enable people not living in the immediate vicinity of the mine, through a shareholding in BDC, to share in profits that were being generated in the vicinity of the mine and thus to spread the wealth and avoid the possibility of a wealthy elite developing in the immediate vicinity of the mine at the expense of the majority of the people on Bougainville.
3. To undertake certain other viable economic projects which would be of assistance to the people, although not necessarily undertaken to make profits, for example, Bougainville Air Services (Hannett, 1979).

Hannett went on to add that 'the long-term objective of the Corporation, once firmly established, was to move into the rural areas and undertake development and agricultural projects' for which 'positive plans were in hand' in 1979. However, the immediate aim was to acquire funds through penetrating service industries associated with BCL. By 1984, BDC was involved in airline operations, catering services, property rental, tavern and liquor sales operations, commercial laundries, welding and steel fabrication, hardware and timber supply, automotive repairs, polyurethane manufacture, paper products, limestone quarrying and investments in other companies. To fulfill its longer term objective, it moved into plantation acquisition in 1982. BDC was run on modern business lines; it had paid average dividends in excess of 20 per cent per annum; the total investment had been returned to shareholders; its senior management had been localised on performance not just on principle. In 1984 its net assets stood at K6 million and it was uniquely successful in Papua New Guinea (BDC, 1984). In 1987 BDC recorded a profit after taxation of K941,863 (*Times*, 11 June 1987). BDC's management took the 'capitalist' approach that its first duty was to its shareholders, among whom conspicuously were the Provincial Government and the local Catholic Church, and that it was up to government to use the benefits for social development. This 'trickle down effect' philosophy was anathema to MA which believed that BDC should concentrate on promoting 'grassroots' development and small-scale business activities. Almost from its inception clashes occurred between BDC and Provincial Government on the grounds of personalities as well as policies. (Hannett's resignation as provincial secretary resulted from such a clash.) Although notionally opposed to political interference in or even close government association with BDC, Hannett as premier in 1980-4 pressed the advantages of being chairman while Momis, Bele, Anugu and MA continued to oppose virtually any BDC initiative. While Hannett was regarded as an effective premier, he was widely depicted as 'a self-serving capitalist' hostile to the traditional egalitarian ethos and too supportive of a national integration which brought unwelcome immigrants to the province.

Sarei's defeat in 1980, so unexpected by Momis supporters, brought about a major shake-up in organisation. This proved effective in the 1982 national elections when some 75 per cent more voters turned out and all four incumbent MPs were triumphantly returned. Momis with 72 per cent of the votes defeated three opponents. Only the Pangu candidate, John Dumit, is of interest. Although he had been chairman of the Panguna Mungkas Association and a prominent supporter of secession in 1975-6, he polled only 14 per cent. Somare had visited Arawa in April 1981 as Leader of the Opposition to form links with Hannett and returned in 1982 during the campaign, to little avail. Following the elections he defeated Momis 66 to 40 for the prime ministership. All North Solomonese MPs were now out of government. This was one result of having an MA bloc and little satisfaction was felt when in November Somare declared in Arawa in the company of Premier Hannett that *he* personally represented North Solomonese interests. The need to have diverse representation was an argument heard in 1987.

An increase in the number of voters also occurred in the provincial elections of 1984 (roughly 38,000 against 23,000 in 1980), when Sarei (23,538 against 8,993), with MA backing, turned the tables on Hannett (13,345 against 14,244). In due course Somare appointed the latter Chairman of the Papua New Guinea Investment Corporation in Port Moresby. Fearing, among other reasons, that the MA-dominated Provincial Government, would take control, the BDC Board in February 1985 issued

700,000 new shares in a private placement at considerably lower than market valuation. When the Provincial Government did not immediately take up its option to purchase them, the Board, dominated by Hannett and its managing director, Paul Nerau, sold them precipitately with Hannett and Nerau purchasing substantial portions and, on paper, making a financial coup. The shareholding of the Provincial Government was reduced from 51 to 37 per cent; the Catholic Church and other shareholders had their assets at least temporarily diluted. The Board meeting was alleged to have been irregular and the whole issue at the time of writing is still subject to litigation. The electoral upshot was confirmation in the minds of MA supporters that Hannett and his associates were not only 'capitalist' but unscrupulous as well.

In 1988 Hannett returned to contest the premiership with the support of a new body, the Bougainville United Group (BUG), which attracted local business leaders and the support of the North Solomons-born Archbishop of Port Moresby, Peter Korongku, who turned up during Hannett's campaign. Hannett's only hope lay in the split in the MA vote between Anthony Anugu from the south - believed to be preferred by Momis - and Joseph Kabui, a Nasioi from the mine vicinity. Anugu (who is described below) had foregone contesting a third term in the National Parliament in the hope of winning the premiership. He had for years been especially strident in denouncing Hannett (whose wit often excoriated his opponents) but Anugu's turbulent personality seemed unlikely to attract substantial support other than in the south from which even the police had been ejected for a time during Hannett's premiership. With approximately the same turnout as in 1984 Kabui won with 40 per cent of the votes. Hannett gained (with less votes than previously) 28 per cent, Anugu 27 per cent, and one minor opponent, 4-5 per cent. Kabui won 65 per cent of votes in Central, losing only Arawa town to Hannett; Anugu won 54 per cent in the South; Hannett 45 per cent in the North where Kabui gained 34 per cent. Hannett was especially strong in the atolls and in Teop-Tinputz where his former deputy and the incumbent MP lived; Kabui prospered in the most dissident Central areas. While Hannett had not been able to compete with Sarei in the latter's home district in the North in 1984, he was able to defeat less distinguished candidates from other districts in 1988.

### ***NORTH SOLOMONS PROVINCIAL ELECTION 1987***

Elections in the North Solomons have not been flamboyant and expensive affairs and relatively little money appears to be spent on publicity although posters and T-shirts were in evidence around Kieta-Arawa. Only MA had a pyramidal organisation and a provincial co-ordinator, electorate co-ordinators and community government committees with ward committees to provide 'a follow-up campaign blitz', said the purportedly confidential 'Election Strategy 1987.' The ward committees were to be managed by people 'who know, feel (sic) and understand the people of that area'. Each village was to have a 'leg soldier' who would canvass votes 'on a person to person basis.... There can be more than one leg soldier in a village', said the Strategy, 'or a whole village population can be leg soldiers for that matter'. Advice was issued as to programming and punctuality, avoiding defamation, gaining endorsements from prominent leaders and opinion-makers, neutralising opposition and even setting up a 'spy network' to report on the opposition so that the campaign manager could prepare a 'counter-attack'. In the North Solomons, MA had

the Catholic Church network to supplement, or even pre-empt, party organisation.

MA campaigners had little need to labour the party's general principles and platform when there were available the specific issues of the BDC shares and the rise of 'Hannett's capitalist class' together with the long-standing grievances and claims associated with the mine. Now that the exhaustion of the Panguna mine was in sight, moves were being made to lift the moratorium on further exploration. Economic consultants in 1982 had prepared a scenario for the provincial government on what might be expected if there was no further mining (North Solomons Provincial Government [NSPG] 1982). However, while the prospect of reduced provincial revenues and lower living standards in an expanding population stimulated 'realism' among the business-oriented, it aggravated the distemper among those who felt that mining had despoiled them. The environmental degradation was glaring enough to the Nasioi, as was the presence of unwelcome and often disruptive and unproductive immigrants. But to this were added beliefs that dust from the mine was responsible for any run-down in crops and that it was causing illnesses in children. Momis was clearly tuned into this as yet subdued rage and, in response to it and his own long-standing antipathy to BCL ('the alien monster in our midst'), he produced his 'Bougainville Initiative'.

Under the heading 'THE WILD PIG CANNOT NOW HIDE FROM THE PEOPLE', Momis accused BCL of having 'rooted up the crops in the villagers' gardens' and demanded 'a fresh start... for self-reliance and dignity'. The 'Initiative' represented 'many years of careful thought' and offered Paul Quodling, the Managing Director of BCL, 'the gift of understanding' and 'the opportunity to crown your long career with the achievement of gaining the friendship of the people'. It offered 'a win for everyone, and loss for no-one'. BCL was asked to give directly to the Provincial Government three per cent of its gross income or four per cent of net sales revenue. This could easily be saved, he said, by more efficient production practices. Momis accused BCL of transfer pricing, of 'salting away K60 million a year (to) ... return to the smelters who buy our copper'. The agreement between the national government and BCL was to be 'outside the scope of this agreement' but it too needed renegotiation. Momis condemned BCL's 'philanthropic' arm, the Bougainville Copper Foundation, for deliberately fostering dependency, and placed 'moral blame' on BCL 'for the BDC scandal'. The 'Initiative' was seeking 'seed capital, to generate communal funds which are self-sustaining, and which instil pride in community development'. The letter to Quodling ended wishing him 'a happy retirement to cap off a successful career' and with the salutation, 'May God bless you'.

The reaction of most people unfamiliar with mining and government practice was obviously favourable and foreshadowed support for the direct action of the 'rebellion' of 1988-9. Those among the educated who saw the 'Initiative' as demagogic were apt to ask why Momis had not raised such issues in 1981 when the BCL agreement (1974) came up for its seven year review as he was at that time a senior minister. Even where they concurred with the Prime Minister, however, that 'it was incredibly irresponsible and politically sinful' and damaged the nation's 'standing' (*Times*, 28 May 1987), there was agreement that the province should receive greater returns. It was Momis's timing and grasp of procedures that were wrong, they felt.

Inevitably the issue of Momis's priesthood returned, with Sir Julius Chan, Deputy Prime Minister and also a Catholic, this time calling Momis a 'hypocrite' who ignored the Pope's directive for priests to keep out of politics

(*P-C*, 8 May 1987). Momis's critics even raised the question of why he had failed to take up the matter with the Pope or even greet him when the latter visited Papua New Guinea in 1984. Hannett wrote an 'Open Letter to the Bishops' asking why politics was not 'the laity's vocation per se' and accusing Momis of being 'partisan' and 'divisive' within the church (*Times*, 14 May 1987). The Bishops' Conference sidestepped the question by saying that Bishop Singkai had granted Momis 'an exemption...in exceptional circumstances' and the Conference would support that decision (*Times* 21 May 1987). Momis saw this as 'a vote of confidence' and denied there was any 'dichotomy' (*Times* 7 May 1987). He told the bishops his work was that of 'the visionary, for...prophecy is needed today'. He was known as 'the conscience of Papua New Guinea', the opponent of 'individualism', he said. He cited the role of Cardinal Sin in the recent Philippines crisis (Momis 1987). This led the chairman of PPP, Zibang Zurenuoc, to ask if the Catholic Church 'was behind Melanesian Alliance as a whole' and whether he should not recommend his Lutheran church to back PPP. Fr Momis's constitution 'defines quite clearly the separation of church and state', he argued. (*Times*, 7 May 1987)

Momis in 1987 faced two opponents, the more surprising being Sarei who resigned the premiership in 1987 ostensibly because of ill-health. For publicly unspecified reasons he had become disillusioned with MA and Momis. 'Momis has never run anything not even a parish', he said. It was clear to him that the province would need some new large-scale project in the future and Momis had not even taken an interest in repossessing the large plantations. Sarei was sacked from MA in April 1987 (*Times* 23 April 1987). Sarei was extraordinarily confident of winning and did not seem to realize that the reasons for his resignation as premier were being derided. The third candidate, Alois Banono (54), a former policeman officer from Buka, was endorsed by PPP. The result was a forgone conclusion with Momis gaining 70.8 per cent, Sarei 17.6 and Banono 11.6.

In spite of his continued success, one notable fact was the disrespect with which some of his critics now spoke of Fr Momis, where previously his integrity, if not his political judgement, was credited. Inexorably this led even to aspersions being levelled at his not being truly a 'Mungkas'. There were reports of his having been heckled at a few meetings, something unprecedented in the writer's experience.

### ***NORTH BOUGAINVILLE OPEN 1977-87***

The elections here were won in 1977 and 1982 by Sam Tulo (b. 1951) from Lemanmanu, a populous village in north Buka island. Tulo was listed as 'a trade store owner' but had been a superintendent of schools in the province. Having indicated his support for secession in 1975 he was posted to the Highlands whereupon he resigned. Although a member of the United Church, support from Momis overcame some of that handicap. His 1977 victory over Mola, however, was narrow: 3,178 votes or 30.3 per cent to 3,036 or 29.9 per cent. Mola was not granted a recount. Of the four other candidates, three were also Halia speakers: one was described as a 'wantok' of Mola's (423 votes); another, Michael Samo (854 votes), was actually a relative with whom Mola had had a land dispute. This was put forward as a reason for his standing. As the former commander of the riot squad in Arawa during the secession 'troubles' of late 1975, he stood little chance and might have known it. Mola could therefore be deemed unlucky. The Hahalis

Welfare Society did not put forward a candidate but probably gave a reduced vote to Joseph Hapisiria Nangoi (1,785 votes). Only one candidate came from the Teop-Tinputz area, Samson Purupuru of the United Church, who had had his life threatened when he opposed secession. Purupuru stood four times for Parliament with reducing support: 27 per cent in 1968, 12.1 in 1972, 11.1 in 1977 and 8.1 in 1982. His 1,160 votes in 1977 fell well short of what another sole candidate from his area might have achieved.

By 1982 Tulo, having been minister for Education under Chan, enjoyed increased prestige and an improved personal network as well as MA's improved organisation. He almost doubled his vote (42.4 per cent) while Mola was now regarded (with 20.4 per cent) as too old. Of the six other candidates only the two Teop-Tinputz candidates need further remarks: Purupuru (1,254) because he took votes from Carolus Ketsimur (1,635), a Catholic who had been educated in Australia and a programme director of the NBC seemingly groomed for chairmanship. Highly articulate, he nevertheless had a major strike against him being separated from his Catholic Australian wife. He has since lived with another Australian. Although it may be unimportant in places like the Highlands, 'divorce' disqualifies in the North Solomons. The two polled nearly 3,000 votes between them.

In 1987 Tulo withdrew, allegedly somewhat disillusioned with MA and Momis. He was also alleged to have reduced his chances of re-election by giving too much patronage to United Church villages. However, he was not interviewed and Buka was not visited by the writers. Tulo was said, however, to have ostensibly supported the MA candidate, James Togel. Togel (41) was born at Tahetahe, Buka Island, and educated there and at Catholic seminaries in Rabaul and Port Moresby. An Arts graduate of UPNG, he served as a teacher and then in provincial government, becoming Provincial Commissioner for Liquor and eventually Provincial Secretary. As such he enjoyed prestige but, living in Arawa, his campaign (it was said) was left in the hands of MA organizers, one of whom was said not to be in high repute. PPP again endorsed Mola while Thomas Anis (44, BA from UPNG), a former minister in Hannett's cabinet, was endorsed by Pangu. Surprisingly PAP had a local endorsee, John Banono (54), a former president of the Police Union who had been involved in the conflict with the rebellious Hahalis Welfare Society on Buka in 1962 (Ryan, 1969: 292). He had been most unsuccessful as a candidate in Central Bouganville in 1982. All the other eleven candidates - there were 14 in all - were independents. Aside from the eventual winner, the most interesting of them was Pasini Frankarena, originally from the Mortlock ('Polynesian') atoll, who held land on the Selau peninsula and was a prosperous farmer and logger. He was a patron of youth and women's groups and actively campaigned, using posters. He was expelled from MA with Sarei in April 1987 but must have taken some of its vote.

With so many candidates, mostly from Buka, there was the obvious danger of splitting Togel's vote there too. Political brokers in the Teop-Tinputz area were aware of this and, feeling that it was time the MP came from their area, dissuaded anyone from competing with Michael Ogio, Hannett's former deputy premier. They correctly calculated that, if the Teop-Tinputz vote could be delivered together with that of Hannett's home base of Nissan atoll and of the Kunua-Hahon west coast of Bougainville Island, Ogio could win. Resources were concentrated accordingly. Among his advisers were former candidates, Gayne Cooke (Ogan 1971: 150-1), Carolus Ketsimur (above), Samson Purupuru (above) and prominent local politicians. Ogio (b. 1942), who was a Catholic Church member, and was educated at Buin and



Keravat (Rabaul) high schools before attending Port Moresby Teachers' College. He passed through the primary and secondary teaching services, was recommended in 1970 for accelerated promotion, studied educational administration at ASPA, Sydney, and became a senior inspector in West New Britain before being appointed in 1974 to his home province. He was sympathetic to secession in 1975-6 and in 1980, after declining a transfer to the Southern Highlands, was elected to the provincial assembly. He accepted Hannett's view that the province should give priority to its economic base. From visits to both Catholic and United Church villagers it was evident he was acceptable to both. He was, however, cautious as to what his party affiliation might become. It appeared to be either pro-Pangu or pro-PPP for which there were already endorsees, perhaps fortunately for Ogio. He and his backers expressed concern that a solid MA bloc of MPs in the North Solomons meant exclusion for substantial periods from government, e.g. under Somare (August 1982 - March 1985) and under Wingti from November 1985. After supporting Somare for prime minister in 1987, Ogio was to accept a ministry from Wingti in 1988 not long before Namaliu, and Pangu, supported by MA, came to power.

The results for the six candidates mentioned above were:-

Michael Ogio (Ind)	3,379 votes	19.5 %
James Togel (MA)	2,828 "	16.3 "
Pasini Frank Marena (Ind)	1,774 "	10.2 "
Donatus Mola (PPP)	1,376 "	7.9 "
Thomas Anis (Pangu)	1,215 "	7.0 "
John Banono (PAP)	496 "	2.9 "

The other eight candidates polled between 7.5 and 1.7 per cent. A Tolai resident, Norman Ereman, scored 1.9 per cent.

### ***CENTRAL BOUGAINVILLE OPEN 1977-87***

Fewer voters (6,387 to 7,401) turned out in 1977 than in 1972 in Central Bougainville Open in spite of the turmoil of the preceding years. It is significant that the Nasioi, the dominant language group, had voted in the three previous elections for non-Nasioi : Lapun (Banoni) and Bele (Torau) (Ogan, 1965 and 1971; Anis et al, 1976). Ogan believes they have a prejudice against voting for one another (personal communication). In 1977 there were nine candidates, none at tertiary level and three at primary level only, in an electorate which had produced a number of North Solomonese graduates. Bele (then 29) had described himself in 1972 as a 'catechist' with five years schooling; in 1977 this appeared to have been upgraded to Form II. His claim on his electors rested with his leadership of the Rorovana people in the land resumption struggle in 1969, his treasurership in Napidakoe Navitu and his strong support for secession. He rarely spoke in Parliament and had resigned his seat in 1975. The main challenge to him in 1977 came from Raphael Niniku (49) who had replaced him in the 1976 by-election. Niniku came from Arawa village, was also involved in the land disputes, and had an ambivalent reputation in relation to the 'Establishment'. This and his membership of PPP explains his opportunism in taking Bele's seat. As a youth he had been a scout with the Australian forces against the Japanese, from 1946 an employee of the Health department, and during 1966-72 president of the less than popular Kieta LGC (Griffin, 1977). However, he

had also been among those protesting against the Australian administration to the United Nations in 1962 (Ogan 1971: 139) and had supported calls for a local referendum (Anis *et al* 1976: 458). Bele won with 26.2 per cent of the votes to Niniku 21.8. Their respective votes in 1972 had been 40.6 and 8.6. Lapun had then delivered the vote to Bele.

In 1982 voters increased by nearly 200 per cent to 17,338, no doubt owing to MA's better organisation, better campaigning by Bele and better educated candidates of whom three were tertiary educated. Although there were now eleven candidates, Bele procured 32.8 per cent of the vote with an endorsed Pangu rival, Patrick Nianko (35), gaining 18.1 compared to 8.7 per cent in 1977. Educated to standard six, Nianko had been President of the North Nasioi community government and, formerly in 1972-5, a committee member of the Bougainville Mining Workers Union. Some observers felt that Nianko would have done much better but for competition from other Nasioi such as Theodore Miriung (9.7 per cent) who came third in the poll. Miriung (in 1988 a justice of the Supreme Court) was a law graduate and provincial secretary. Refusing to accept early nomination, he finally did so only the day before they closed and did not campaign on principle. His support came mainly from his home base in the North Nasioi and the contiguous Eivo area. A cogent debater he spoke at a forum during Somare's pre-poll visit - he was Independent Pangu in effect - and was scornful of MA's 'empty idealism'. Miriung saw Momis as a 'dreamer' who would have been better equipped for politics as a family man with some experience in business. Three Highlanders stood and incurred local resentment for doing so. Together they polled 19.5 per cent - a surprisingly high total, suggesting that mainlanders had for once been carefully mobilised.

Of eight candidates in 1987, four had some post-secondary education. Nevertheless Bele (36.7 per cent) and Nianko (16.9) again led the poll. Bele was now clearly one of the least educated MPs in Papua New Guinea. Informants agreed that his parliamentary and electoral performance had not changed but that, with MA endorsement and his rapport with Napidokoe Navitu and cultic areas, he could not lose. Momis's 'Bougainville Initiative' spoke most directly to Central electors. Nianko was interviewed in the newsagency of Barry Middlemiss (Anis *et al*, 1976: 457-9; Griffin, 1982), an Australian who had been the first secretary of Napidakoe Navitu and polled second to Bele in 1972. Nianko had since become a contributor to Pangu funds. He praised Hannett's performance as premier; approved of BDC as 'a business arm not a political institution' which through its profits benefitted the people; preferred Momis to Sarei; thought 'redskins' created problems but that they could be overcome with 'proper settlement'; wanted a second mine if it 'operated in line with the people's aspirations'; saw the national government as doing little for the North Solomons and wanted a national high school in the province as well as additional primary and secondary schools. To Nianko BCL was 'a mixture of good and bad' which 'helps the whole country rather than local people'. Pangu's budget, he said, was only K1,300 with 2,000 posters and two dozen T-shirts only being despatched to each electorate in the province. Supplementary donations came from prominent people but he did not know the amount.

Two other parties were represented. PDM endorsed Joseph Monsen originally from the Sepik who became a farmer in Wakunai where he married a local woman. He had graduated in Education at UPNG and been a training officer with BCL. He was prominent in social welfare. He polled 16.4 per cent, apparently doing well in his home area, and finished third. Superficially more promising was the PPP endorsee, James Koibo (b. Kieta 1944), who

had been in administration for 18 years, and had been deputy provincial commissioner in Madang in the mid-seventies as well as president of Madang Mungkas, before becoming Administrative Secretary of the North Solomons 1978-85. He had not supported secession in 1975. He was currently personnel manager for Buin Earth Moving company. He saw PPP as a coherent well-led party which wanted to foster rural industries, thought the resolution of the Placer share issue should be left to the law not to politicians, approved of both Sir Julius Chan and the Leadership Code (but it was unfortunate, Koibo felt, that it was not implemented), saw the thrust of the 'Bougainville Initiative' as being proper but felt the timing and method were wrong. Koibo had helped to prepare a paper on revision of the Mining Agreement in 1981 but Momis had not pushed it, he said. His campaign manager, Aaron Marena, a prominent businessman in the timber industry, who had come fourth in 1982, praised Hannett against Sarei as premier and complained that the province's national MPs were poor at pushing for advantages for the North Solomons. He accepted the BDC explanation on the share issue and felt that the controversy surrounding BDC was 'more personal than ideological'. Koibo appeared to have a rational program, an electoral strategy and prestige. He polled only 9 per cent of the votes. He was unable to match even the United Church independent, Patrick Itta (14.4 per cent), from Guava minesite area, who as 'training services superintendent' with BCL may have drawn votes from the towns as well as his fellow churchgoers.

The three 'also-rans' were the former priest, Edmund Tsivara (50), from the dissident Kuka village near Kieta, who was currently secretary of Napidakoe Navitu. A lacklustre candidate who, to a large extent, would have been in competition with Bele; he polled only 3.7 per cent. Two independents from the Highlands, Elisa Tade (2.0 per cent) and Amgoi Dem (0.9), were ridiculed, the latter having no formal education and being listed as 'unemployed' and living in the 'Kieta settlement'. A general concern of all other candidates was migrant 'squatting' in the province.

### *SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE OPEN 1977-87*

Any lingering doubts about the overwhelming strength of secessionism in the parochial south were erased when Sir Paul Lapun could poll only 27.9 per cent in 1977 (cf. 1964-72 in Ogan, 1965 and 1971, and Anis *et al*, 1976). The victor, Anthony Anugu (31), from Siwai, had been a strident advocate of secessionism pre-1970. Educated to Form III at the Marist Brothers, Rigu, he had been secretary of the once promising but ultimately bankrupt cooperative, BUSIBA (Buin-Siwai-Banoni), and president of the Siwai Elcom. A reputation for turbulence did not deter Momis from endorsing him and with 47.2 per cent of the votes he defeated four opponents. Matthew Sipisong, a United Church village gospel preacher, was again (Anis *et al* 1976) a forlorn candidate (8.9 per cent). More interesting was the graduate, Ignatius Namake, from Siwai, who resigned as Assistant General Manager of the Papua New Guinea Electricity Commission but polled only 8.6.

In 1982 Anugu's percentage rose to 64 against four opponents with Lapun, by then a reluctant campaigner (rather than, as in the past, inactive), gaining 23.3. Sipisong and another United Church candidate, Obed Konki, polled 8.4 between them and an independent Pangu candidate from Buin, Thomas Lugabai, an associate of Hannett's, gained less than 5 per cent. Hannett's attempt as premier to restrain disorder in the south made him more unpopular. Anugu was reported to have published a broadsheet with the

heading: ENOUGH OF HANNETT'S COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT SLAVISHING FOLLOWING SIR JULIUS CHAN. Although in an agriculturally fertile area, Buin in 1982 was an underdeveloped, unkempt, unruly town - not an advertisement for self-reliance.

Anugu did not recontest in 1987 apparently because he aspired, with Momis's support, to become premier. His place was taken by his former campaign manager, Peter Kungka (39), from Buin. Billed as 'a subsistence farmer', he had a BA in missiology and diploma in broadcasting and had studied at a Rome university in 1982-4. From 1974-6 he had been manager of Buin Producers Cooperative and in 1979, and 1984-7, Communications Officer with the North Solomons Catholic diocese. Obviously he was a lynchpin in MA's upgraded strategy. Although the result seemed to be predictable, a few informants suggested that Michael Laimo, also from Buin, might split the Kungka's vote. Laimo, a provincial politician since 1980, had been a forceful political antagonist of Hannett and a prominent supporter of MA until expelled with Sarei in April. His personal life, however, was against him: he was a non-churchgoer and a 'divorcee' who had taken, while on a 'study course' in Japan, a wife from whom he was also separated. He gained 12.3 per cent against Kungka's 53.5. Ignatius Namake (Independent) improved his vote to 11.9 probably getting some of Anugu's Siwai vote.

Three other parties endorsed candidates. Thomas Lugabai did marginally better for Pangu with 6.5; Dominic Koroka 4.2 for PPP; Joseph Noro, an accountant and formerly a taxation officer for the provincial government, finished last of nine candidates for PDM with 2.3 per cent. Of the three other independents, Lembias Magasu Mangug from Siwai, who was a B.Sc and one of the first nationals to be employed on a university staff, polled 4.3 per cent. He had previously contested the 1984 premiership with no hope of success. Sipisong's support dwindled further to 3.2 and a former teacher from Siwai, Peter Mikuasi, gained 2.3 per cent. Four candidates had degrees and all others except Sipisong had completed grade 10 or its equivalent.

### CONCLUSION

With first-past-the-post voting, feeble party organisation and superfluous contestants, it is notorious in Papua New Guinea that the quality of a victor does not necessarily indicate the consensus of the constituents or, where he/she gains a low minority of votes, anything more than the roughest preference. A retrospect of the elections since 1964 in the North Solomons, however, points to several morals. While before independence party labels probably offered no advantage at all to Lapun, Mola and Lue, after 1975 all labels except MA appear a hindrance. The central issue in politics has not been just spoils for a particular electorate but the grievances, rights and identity of the province as a whole. These have been encapsulated within the 'philosophy' of MA which has been wrought from 'anti-colonial' rhetoric and Catholic distributist principles. It is arguable that this 'philosophy' has not, for the North Solomonese, implied fraternity with the rest of the nation so much as reinforced separatism. North Solomonese, but not Fr Momis, have seen MA as *their* ethnonational party. Fr Momis's nationalism is something 'offshore' and of the same significance as Lapun's membership of Pangu Pati. The ascendancy of Fr Momis and his ability to deliver votes even to undistinguished and non-performing or ill-prepared candidates may appear to have been dented by the victory of Michael Ogio in the North with its implication that some reduction of ethnonationalism occurs at the south

Tinupuz boundary. A look at Donatus Mola's victories in 1968 and 1972 may reinforce that idea. However, while the immediacy of the grievances associated with BCL decreases in the agriculturally prosperous north, it would be wise, before making that inference, to inquire more carefully as to the adequacy of the MA candidates and their campaigns in the North and the absence of effective strategy in MA's opponents in Central and South.

By late 1988 a grave resurgence of secessionism became evident. Optimism that integrative forces must prevail appeared misplaced. For one occasional observer at least, the seeds of optimism began to sprout during the eighties because no 'outbidder' (i.e. someone seeking mobilisation of more radical forces) had appeared to challenge the leadership of Momis, Hannett and Sarei. Whatever the differences among them, and in spite of their gestures in 1975, they were by preference nationalists with, however, an imperative commitment to local autonomy. Instead of competing with Momis for the support of dissidents, Hannett pursued economic policies and interests which were integrative. This has created space for a younger ethnonationalist leadership to emerge and it may require considerable flexibility for an MA with a nationalist programme to combat it. However accommodating the national government and BCL may be to current demands, population pressure in the North Solomons - numbers should double in less than fifteen years! - will continue to create dissatisfaction and scapegoats will come readily to hand. Anis *et al* in their 1972 study properly gave readers warning of what came to pass in 1975-7; it may be appropriate for this chapter to suggest that 'outbidding' will recur, though not necessarily through the formalities of national elections.

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## The Simbu Election

PAULA BROWN

My contribution will be limited to those aspects of the 1987 Simbu Provincial and Open elections that I could observe during the period I spent in Kundiawa, March to June 1987, and my knowledge of Simbu politics before, during and after this field period. Written in New York, the absence of direct experience of the last phases of the 1987 campaigns, voting and the post-election period in Simbu will be evident. The paper is, in large part, written before I received notice of the results, and these have been appended in revision.

Analytic and descriptive discussions of several previous elections observed by Bill Standish provide most valuable background information and orientation. My knowledge of candidates and events owes a good deal to his studies and the observations and comments of others (Criper 1965, Dage 1986, 1987. Griffin 1987). My own research in the area, which covers many facets of social, political and economic life, began in 1958. Fieldwork has been intermittent, and never concentrated upon the study of an election from early campaigning through voting and the establishment of government at local, provincial or national level.

While Simbu Province must conform to the requirements and procedures of the Papua New Guinea parliament and its elections, the Highlands, and Simbu, have certain special features and ways that the system has been adapted to local values and political process. It is indeed fascinating to see how highlanders manipulate the well-known *wantok* system to their political ends; how local rivalries become candidate nominations and electioneering; how party affiliation and endorsement provide some financial or practical assistance to candidates while party policy is ignored; how the gift and exchange system is adapted to election campaign food, beer and money distributions.

Simbu Province must represent an extreme case of dependency. Within the Highlands, it has as long a history of contact as the Eastern and Western Highlands provinces, more than Enga or Southern Highlands. Yet its high population density and lack of land available and suitable for agricultural development in coffee or other market products has resulted in less foreign investment and economic growth. It remains a land of smallholders, relatively unstratified. Since the first colonial period, finance and development have always depended upon government, and Simbu people have come to regard government as the major, or only, source of opportunity and finance. Having a friend in national government is seen as necessary for economic success. Election to office in the provincial assembly and parliament is keenly contested (Brown 1987).

Simbu, with nearly 180,000 people, is a populous and densely settled province. No large tracts of land have been alienated or are owned by the Simbu, and there are few non-Simbu residents or voters. People of the



Simbu (Chimbu) language and culture in North Simbu, and an increasing proportion of South Simbu, make up the population of the province. Many people can understand two or three Chimbu dialects. The other language groups are small and do not form separate electoral districts for parliamentary seats. However, Tok Pisin is the preferred language of political discussions and meetings among speakers of more than one dialect, and is commonly used by candidates for the provincial seat. In my observations of campaigning for the Open seats of Kundiawa-Gembogl and Kerowagi, I noted mainly use of the Kuman dialect. Local forms of Chimbu language are probably often used in the Open seat campaigns of other sub-provinces except, perhaps, in the Siane-speaking area of the eastern part of the province and at Karimui. This, I believe, intensifies the localization of interests. In recent elections, there have been no non-Simbu candidates, as are often found in other rural or urban constituencies. Every candidate looks to his own local support group.

April-June 1987, when the election preparations were most active in Papua New Guinea, was also the time that Australian and British national election campaigns were active. The contrast was striking, for party differences and national figures dominated these campaigns, while national political and economic issues were rarely discussed by voters or candidates in Papua New Guinea. As Hegarty observed of an earlier period, Papua New Guinea parties have not developed distinctive policies (Hegarty 1979:88). Only individual local candidates received attention in Simbu. The Papua New Guinea parliamentary election, with its emphasis upon individual candidates, in this respect resembles campaigns in the United States' primary elections without party considerations.

In the Open and the Provincial constituencies of Simbu, a total of 168 (167 men and one woman) nominated. The Provincial seat had the fewest candidates: seventeen, including nationally known figure Ignatius Kilage and two members of the 1982 parliament, John Nilkare and Peter Kuman, former allies in Pangu. Some of the candidates for the Provincial seat could not have expected success against these opponents, but I imagine that they chose to stand for the attention and exposure it offered. Perhaps the four men from the Chuave area regarded Brown Sinamoi, the parliamentary speaker and a National Party member, such a powerful opponent in the Chuave Open that they chose another contest. The Chuave Open electorate had twenty-one candidates. Forty-five candidates, the most in Papua New Guinea, were nominated for the Kerowagi Open. Kundiawa-Gembogl Open electorate nominated thirty-five. There were elder experienced politicians who had been member and ministers in earlier legislatures, young educated professionals, businessmen, government employees at all levels including teachers, policemen and ex-servicemen, and mission workers. Most of today's candidates are literate.

An Open electorate has a population of about 30,000-35,000. Over 17,000 voted in each of the several Simbu Open electorates. A tribe of 3,000 or more people is the largest recognized and named unit, divided into clans which may number 1,000 people and sub-clans of a few hundred. In many cases there were several members of the same clan, and sometimes subclan, competing for the votes of their fellow-clansmen. In the Kerowagi and Kundiawa-Gembogl areas, few of the Open candidates were well-known outside their tribe, and many did not attempt to win many votes beyond their tribe. Candidates frequently calculated the number of votes needed to win, on an optimistic expectation of votes from every man and woman in their local group, subclan and clan, and many in the tribe, with a

few friends in other parts for the electorate. Clearly, if votes are divided fairly equally among the candidates, in a field of forty candidates, the winner can be the one who receives just 3 per cent of the votes. Some candidates believed that they could win with votes of their clan and friends.

What accounts for the extraordinary hopefulness, rush of nominees, and rivalry for national elective office in Simbu? What level of qualifications is considered appropriate? How are candidates supported, votes decided and delivered?

It works something like this. By their own ambitions and the encouragement of members of their local men's house and subclan group, and some other friends, would-be candidates are identified months, even years, before the parliamentary election nominations. Some men seem to be perpetual candidates, nominated in every parliamentary and/or provincial election for a decade or more whether or not they have ever succeeded. This persistence is sometimes rewarded.

Since the first elections for local government council and house of assembly in the 1960s, Simbu have believed that a candidate should be educated and experienced in government service. In the 1960s, the most qualified was a man who could speak Tok Pisin and had some experience in working for Australians; now education beyond high school, fluency in English, experience in government employment, previous elective office or business achievement, are usual among candidates. For the most part, each candidate is independent: decision to nominate and supporters do not require party membership or a large support base. Since work experience is a qualification, many candidates who have been employed outside the province resign and return home to conduct a campaign. Some are rarely seen in the province until a few weeks before the voting begins. There are some tireless and some reluctant campaigners.

Nomination parades, demonstrations of supporters and some confrontations between them marked the period 27 March - 27 April in Simbu. Before this, the names of most of the candidates were widely known in their constituencies and among the politically interested men of the province. The perpetual candidates and many hopefuls announced themselves years before the nomination period, and only a few of the expected candidates failed to nominate. Thus it must have been known to all, well in advance, that competition among local hopefuls would be great, and indeed there were more candidates in 1987 than ever before.

Simbu believe that knowledge of the person, kinship, friendship and group membership are the basis of votes. The mode of campaigning, area covered, and expectation of results reflect this belief. A few seem to regard their local support base as secure, do not expect to win more votes, and do not make public addresses. A few moralists said that people know them and what they stand for, and vote accordingly. While the Open seat campaigns, where in 1987 there were many candidates, are often restricted to the tribe and neighbouring areas, campaigning for the provincial seat must be wider. Nevertheless, some of these candidates rarely ventured out of their subprovince and language area; I do not believe that they expected to receive many votes from other areas. Enmities between tribes and supporters of the many candidates make campaign visits hazardous. Some candidates reported hostility in their visits to other clans and tribes, and there were several fights among supporters of candidates during campaigning and canvassing visits.

During April and May the campaigns got under way with posters, signs along the highway, cars emblazoned with 'vote...' and slogans, loud hailers,

and roadside visits and speeches by candidates and supporters. I had little opportunity to observe the private visits by candidates to small localities, men's houses in their locality and other friendly areas, which several candidates said would be their method.

The action of campaigning is enjoyable, exciting, and prestige-building for candidates and their supporters. The male camaraderie of driving about in cars, using loud-hailers, playing tapes on loudspeakers, drinking parties, food distributions enliven Simbu life in the pre-election period. While women at roadsides, markets and localities see and hear some of this action, they do not share it. It is generally believed that women vote as their husbands direct them. Since most voting seems to be in local block, except where a woman has a close relative as candidate in the constituency, there would be little involvement for them.

Voters expect candidates to repay votes with cash and other distributions. If their candidate wins, a remote possibility in a field of forty, voters expect material benefits from their member of parliament. There is, indeed, some precedent for this, as Peter Kuman, the Kundiawa-Gembogl Open electorate MP and minister for Works, distributed a reputed K500,000 in the province for road construction and easily won the Provincial seat in 1987. Political sophisticates talk of vote-buying, vote-splitting, and other manipulations of the democratic process. It was claimed that local leaders publicly advertised that they had a block of votes for sale. Direct payment to local leaders and voters is said to be common.

I was also told that, to prevent a strong candidate from winning, a political party might put up a rival within his local group to 'destroy' his chances. It is general knowledge, then, that the candidate most likely to win is the one who has few rivals within his clan, tribe, or district. However, the pleasure of candidacy and of close ties with a candidate seem to prevail over a rational assessment of the probability of success.

There is also a concept, sometimes expressed, of 'leading candidate'; that is, a person who is expected to get votes beyond his local group, who has a reputation as a leader, vote-getter, and is thought to be well-qualified for office. Certainly all candidates are not considered equal: some are supported as a device for stopping a rival, and some are strongly supported by a party or are popular locally. Sitting members are formidable opponents too.

Candidates, their supporters, party officials and pundits all calculate the chances of candidates; their predictions are based upon informal polling, assessment of the local situation, and guesswork. Some claimed that a former leader had awarded his leadership to them upon retirement. The numbers calculation is based upon an estimate of the number of voters, and I think political magic: the belief that by saying a candidate has the numbers will make it so. Elections and the manoeuvres that accompany them are a most exciting Simbu sport.

The mysteries and intricacies of party endorsements and vote-splitting are embedded in old and new rivalries, enmities and allegiances. Old tribal wars, alliances, and conflicts, new school, work and rugby football team friendships and conviviality, kinship and affinity, may all be invoked to gain votes and disparage rivals. Two candidates, each of whom had wives from other provinces, expected all of the resident voters in Kundiawa town who were from their wives' home province to vote for them.

Every candidate questioned stated that his political programme, even if little enunciated in his public addresses, was to improve the life conditions of Simbu Province: roads, business, investment, educational and health facilities for the people. The 1987 catchword was 'grassroots'. Few mentioned national or international issues, and these rarely arose in public discussion. Problems of corruption, bribery, law and order in Simbu, curing the ills of former governments, were also raised. Some candidates manifest little knowledge of the powers and capacities of parliament to deal with local or national problems. Very few candidates stated any party allegiance in terms of political issues. However, party support in the form of funds and materials was received by some and expected by others. Many take the position that:

*I'm independent and stand on my personal popularity and character. The voters will choose me because I am well known, well liked, honest, trustworthy, and have a strong group of supporters in my clan and tribe. If I win I may join the winning party, hold a ministry and bring great benefits to my community, tribe, district and province.*

One Provincial candidate believed that if he won, he could control the six Simbu Open constituency members as a block to offer a party in exchange for a ministry.

National political parties did endorse candidates in Simbu, interestingly, in different ways. At the Provincial candidacy level, party affiliation and endorsement of a candidate likely to win are a significant commitment to his role in parliament. Thus Peter Kuman had People's Democratic Movement support, which also carried support of Open candidates in the province, and John Nilkare is a founder and leader of the League for National Advancement which endorsed only a few others. The National Party's interests in Simbu are more complex: they endorsed Ignatius Kilage, Yerr Komndi and others for the Provincial seat, and many candidates in the six Open constituencies. This might serve to split votes among Open candidates, it certainly must increase divisiveness while ensuring party loyalty if any of its endorsees should succeed. One or more candidates were endorsed by other parties, including Pangu which financed a helicopter tour with Somare, Peter Kumgi and Open candidates throughout the province.

Table 1: Results of election to the Provincial seat

<i>Chimbu Provincial</i>	<i>Votes</i>
Buckley Wan Iarume	6163
Peter Kumgi Kankuie	6339
Bongi Jeff Kobla	4121
Peter Kuman (Kakep)	22299
Kimin Poga	3181
Ignatius Kilage	14085
Yerr Komndi	2339
John Nulai	912
Sam Tokam Kundie	7732
Kiri Po Mala	2319
Roger Kaupa Ipaku	2723
John Mua Nilkare	13155
Peter Mondo	5115
John Komba B'nabe	1061
Wera Mori (Mori Wera)	11002
Nime Felix Table	5770
John Kultu	4882
TOTAL	113198

The combination of party connections and funds for distribution had interesting facets most visible among Simbu Provincial candidates in 1987. Simbu's leading political figure, a man who at one time controlled large funds for beer distribution, Iambakey Okuk, died in November 1986. His National Party organization had no local successor. Two members of parliament, John Nilkare of Gumine and Peter Kuman, were known for the money and gifts they had brought to Simbu. John Nilkare made gifts of cars, school supplies and equipment to the people of Simbu from his own resources, and Peter Kuman as Minister of Works had distributed large payments for roadwork in his home district of Kundiawa and North Simbu. Other well-known candidates, Ignatius Kilage for example, had no such resources and could not compete with such electoral methods. The support of the National Party evidently did not extend to large payments. Each of these, and some lesser known candidates, such as Wera Mori of Chuave, who is a United Party candidate, and Peter Kumgi of Kerowagi, had their greatest support in their home districts.

There is a discrepancy, then, between a Simbu ideal of independence and personal popularity and the national political party organization. Some candidates seem truly unaware of national issues and party politics; if so, they can have no genuine expectation of success.

There were strong and popular sitting members in four Simbu Open electorates, with party support. Brown Sinamoi (National Party) won the Chuave Open by receiving the largest number of votes in any Simbu Open constituency, 3,452; John Numi (National Party) polled 2,214 in SinaSina-

Yonggamugl, Bill Ginbogl Ninkama (PDM), 2,096 in Gumine, Paul Pawa Sisioka (PDM), 2,239 in Karimui-Nomane. In none of these cases did the winner poll more than 10 per cent of the votes cast.

The member for Kundiawa-Gembogl in 1982 was Peter Kuman, who succeeded in getting about 20 per cent of the votes for the Provincial electorate seat in 1987 against a strong field including John Nilkare, who won the seat from Iambakey Okuk in 1982. The Kundiawa-Gembogl seat, then, had no sitting member to contest. The death of a candidate delayed the voting here, and the final list of candidates differs slightly from the original nominees.

I examined the detailed results in Kundiawa-Gembogl, the area I know best, attempting to identify local support as indicated in ballot box figures. I find that favourite local sons seem to poll most of their votes in a small area, as represented by two or three ballot boxes which they often dominate. They may obtain a scatter of other votes in the electorate. However, the most successful candidates live up to the 'leading candidate' label: they receive most of the votes in their home area, usually a tribe, and some votes in nearly every area of the constituency. Votes for the winner of Kundiawa-Gembogl Open election, Wagi Meremba, were numerous in seventeen ballot boxes and scattered in many others, for a total of 2,952 out of 20,362 votes cast. When several men are nominated within a clan or local group, the votes are so divided that each may receive a hundred or fewer votes.

In Kerowagi, where candidates included four former members of parliament or the house of assembly, the sitting member David Tul polled second. He lost to Jim Yer, a teacher now engaged in building construction, who polled 1,889, about 8 per cent of the vote. Siwi Kurondo, a popular elder statesman, former member of the house of assembly, former minister and provincial premier, received only thirty-six votes in the field of forty-five candidates, one of whom received only a single vote! Kerowagi has been an area of recent warfare and tribal conflicts. Rival candidates abound to divide votes within the clan and tribe. No elected member has kept a following and been re-elected.

I believe this is the explanation of the large field of candidates and apparent hopelessness of the contest. The campaign is really two political competitions at the same time. For most of the candidates, candidacy itself is the goal. It demonstrates local popularity, makes a big man, shows how the candidate measures up against local rivals for clan and tribe leadership. In this competition, candidacy itself, having one's name on the ballot, posters, cars, supporters is an indication of being a local big man. Secondly, success is measured by obtaining votes of the subclan, clan and tribe. Electoral success, that is, achieving office, against thirty or forty rivals cannot be expected. In the local contest the one who receives the largest number of votes demonstrates that he has at least a local following.

Looking back to the 1960s, the first members elected to the legislative council and the house of assembly were less prepared than the present candidates, who have the first generation of national representatives as their models. Simbu voters, and many candidates, are guided by traditional values of local leadership and competition, and have adapted national political elections to their local rivalry. Yet Simbu has had some real national leaders: the first Highlands member of the house of assembly, Kondam Agaundo; Siwi Kurondo, an early minister; and Iambakey Okuk. In the 1980s there have been several prominent Simbu politicians. Simbu expect to lead their fellows and the nation; oratory and aggressive competition are highly developed in Simbu. Politics is their life.

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## Tribal Structure and Rural Ballot Box Counts in Hagen Open

JOHN BURTON

Hagen Open electorate was won by the National Party candidate, Paul Pora, with 37 per cent of the popular vote and 2,697 votes more than his nearest rival, an Independent. The People's Democratic Movement candidate came close behind in third place. The election was unusual for its small field of seven candidates, for being one of only three in 1987 where three candidates each polled over 20 per cent, and for the national/provincial dimensions of the struggle between the National Party and PDM candidates. It was also a Supplementary Election and highlighted an unintended consequence of the rule that after a candidate's death an election must be halted and new writs issued.

In this chapter I present a fine-scale analysis of voting in the rural parts of Hagen, based on ballot box counts and my knowledge of Hagen tribal structure.

### VOTER CATCHMENTS

In their analysis of Moresby North-East in 1977, Premdas and Steeves declared:


In analysing the results of practically all the electorates in PNG, clear patterns of voter preference reflecting a close association between the ethnicity of a candidate and the sources of his support is evident. *It is relatively easy to cross-check this observation* since the population is dispersed in rural areas and villages to which candidates can be easily traced. By examining the results in ballot boxes from different clusters of villages, one can show a pattern of voting that underlines the role of ethnic and regional factors in determining voter preference (Premdas and Steeves 1983:32; my emphasis).

In reality, it has proved exceedingly difficult to do this kind of analysis. Population figures have been wayward and hard to fit to the wards within electorates and ballot boxes have been taken 'on patrol' and have collected together votes from several villages. Worst of all, 'ethnic and regional' factors are not often known in close enough detail to make sense of the results. Thus, in previous election studies, only a few observers have tried to map ballot box counts to voter catchments. In 1968, Marie Reay (Colebatch *et al.* 1971) presented summary figures by tribe for three



- Koge NV1 Hagen Tech.
- Minib NV2 Highland Ag. Coll.
- Kik NV3 Baisu C.I.S.
- Ketika NV4 Kuk D.P.I.
- Pungamunga NV5 Ogelbeng Mission
- Kala NV6 Tibi Pltn.

- Togoba No. 1
- Kokmul
- Kilam
- Pit
- Koklamb
- Biap Rui
- Keltika
- Koipuka
- Palimb
- Tiling
- Kungaldi
- Kumunga
- Kilika
- Mulka
- Wimbka
- Kelua Community Sch.
- Teka
- Kelua No. 1
- Raklaimb
- Kunguma
- Ulka (Togoba No. 2)
- Kukl
- Kurramb
- Kagamuga
- Anga
- Tepokla
- Korabug
- Hagen Town
- Kagamuga Urban



KEY TO BOX COUNTS AND MAPS

- J3a • Rural polling booth
- J3b/c/d/e/f Voters in these areas bus to polling station



Figure 1

candidates in Wahgi Open. In 1972, Bryant Allen (1976) managed to get voter turnout figures for each village in Dreikikir Open, but was unable to pin ballot box counts to particular polling stations because election patrols carried boxes from village to village, filling them as they went. In 1977, Wes Rooney tried to match ballot counts to political and geographic divisions in Manus but had the same problem as Allen; some ballot boxes mixed votes from several areas. It 'proved difficult' (1983:277) to correlate these divisions with the ballot box counts. In the same year, B. Goode (1983) fitted the Obura-Wonenara Open returns to Wurm's language atlas, but he was only able to work at Census Division level (there were nine in the electorate).

### THE ELECTIONS IN HAGEN OPEN, 1987

The election was held over three days: Monday 10 August to Wednesday 12 August. The election was a 'Supplementary', that is, it was held some six weeks after the close of polling in the main election period (13 June-4 July). Paias Wingti, the sitting member, narrowly escaped a premature end to his career as Prime Minister when he abruptly - but predictably - switched seats to contest Western Highlands Provincial just before the close of nominations on 27 April 1987 (see Angwi Hriehwazi, 'Will Mr Wingti's gamble pay off?', *Post-Courier*, 30 April 1987). The Pangu candidate, Brass Wak, died on 22 May and the Electoral Commissioner was obliged, under the existing rules, to issue fresh writs. A side issue became the possibility of 'poison' as a cause of death (see Joe Koroma, 'The death of an heir', *Times of Papua New Guinea*, 11-17 June 1987). Wak apparently drowned when he fell into shallow water at his coffee garden during an epileptic fit and the coroner went to the unusual length of speaking at the funeral to explain the physical signs of epilepsy on Wak's body, such as bite marks around the tongue and mouth ('No poison, mourners told', *Post-Courier*, 29 May 1988). This was fully accepted, in my observation, during the election period.

The circumstances of the Supplementary Election altered the way in which the election was conducted in some important ways. These will be examined later in relation to the common roll.

The boundaries of Hagen Open are identical to those of both Hagen Census Division and Hagen Local Government Council. In 1987 there were thirty-three rural polling stations, two areas classified as 'urban' - Hagen town and Kagamuga (Hagen airport) and six other 'non-village' areas. Paias Wingti had allegedly received strong support from Engans living in Hagen in 1982 but, because of trouble between Engans and Wingti-supporting Hageners, was not expected to benefit from this 'external' support in 1987. In the event, and as will be seen in the analysis, the urban votes were not decisive to the result even though they amounted to 16 per cent of the total (3,702 out of 23,109). Table 1 shows the results.

Table 1: Results from Returning Officer's report (Masi 1987:Table 7)

	Ordinary votes	Section 141	Total
Paul Pora	7018	1576	8594
Michael Kunjil	4700	1197	5897
Terema Rumints	3664	968	4632
Michael Pundia	1689	581	2270
Peter Wap	921	173	1094
Rotep Wak	338	62	400
Tom Nidop	123	16	139
Informal			83
Total			23109
Tribes in Hagen Open			

### *TRIBES IN HAGEN OPEN*

Hagen social organisation is based on tribes, defined as politico-military alliances of territory-holding clans (cf. Brown 1960; Strathern 1971:Chap.2). Tribes have a segmentary structure and may, depending on size, be subdivided into several levels of sections, clans and subclans (cf. Strathern 1972); I have published a breakdown elsewhere (Burton 1988). The area is notable for the dominance of two very large tribes, the Jika and Mokei, with estimated populations in mid-1987 of around 10,500 and 9,150. With the exception of these two, each tribe in Hagen is paired off with another (this corresponds to the way the natural world is structured, with almost all plant and animal species being named in pairs). The the third most powerful grouping is the tribe-pair Kinjka-Yamka, with an estimated joint population of 4,300. Each of these three powerful groups put up strong candidates and, in each case, these men won their own tribes. However, the overall winner, Pora, was from the smallest of them, Kinjka-Yamka. Large tribes are prone to be factionally divided and they can be electorally overwhelmed because of this. The remaining tribe-pairs are as listed in Table 2, along with estimates of voter turnout, based on the most recent census figures and population growth set at 2.0 per cent a year, the rate adopted by the Electoral Commissioner in his first report (Lucas 1987:7). The total enrolment was 31,084, comprising 29,218 in the Principal and Supplementary Rolls (Lucas 1987:30) and 1866 in a Second

Supplementary Roll, so that whereas I put the turnout at well over 100 per cent, with the most politicized tribes having still higher figures, the official turnout was 74.1 per cent. \* The factors contributing to the excessive turnout figures will be discussed later.

Table 2: Tribes in Hagen: population data

	1980 residents counts <sup>1</sup>	1987 est. pops <sup>2</sup>	est voters <sup>3</sup>	votes cast	in- formal	turnout
Jika	8943	10508	5674	6257	7	110.4%
Mokei	7809	9241	4990	5910	23	118.9%
Yamka-Kinjka	3653	4642	2507	2635	3	105.2%
Elti-Penambi	2699	3562	1924	1437	10	75.2%
Kemi-Kukilka	2085	2015	1088	1515	5	139.7%
Kungunka-Palka	1621	1743	941	756	3	80.7%
Ruruka-Mimka	713	859	464	395	-	85.1%
Kopi	551	633	342	412	-	120.5%
Total	28074	33203	17930	19317	51	108.0%
Non-village votes				3702		
Informal				32		
Grand total				23102 <sup>4</sup>		

1 Data from Rural Community Register (NSO 1982a) and 1980 census (NSO 1982b). These figures are for people deemed to be 'residents'.

2 On basis of population growth at 2.0 per cent a year (cf. Lucas 1987:7).

3 Based on the RCR, where 54 per cent of the residents were aged 18 years or over.

4 There is a discrepancy of seven votes between my tabulation and the Returning Officer's, given in Table 1. Later the Electoral Commission in Mount Hagen checked the EC601 forms and found one more vote to make an official final total of 23,110 votes cast.

\* Setting population growth since 1980 at a higher rate than did Lucas does not alter this conclusion. At 2.3% a year - a nationally cited figure - the turnout falls from 108% to 106% in Hagen.

### THE CANDIDATES

Information on the seven candidates in Hagen Open comes from the Electoral Commission's *Bio data of candidates* (Lucas 1988a), supplemented by my own observations. I was busy interviewing local government councillors during the election period and only interviewed one candidate, Rotep Wak, about his intentions. The candidates were, in the order on the ballot paper, as follows:

- Michael Pundia, aged mid-30s. Pangu. A brother of the late Brass Wak, Pundia is a small businessman. Formerly an Ela Motors employee, he has recently started a branch of Paradise Motors in Mount Hagen, a company specialising in selling reconditioned Japanese cars (*Post-Courier* 26 August 1988). Village: Koklamb. Customary group: Jika Milakamb (Code J11).
- Michael Kunjil, aged 29. Independent. As a public servant, Kunjil was Principal research officer to the Lands minister in 1981 and was cabinet secretary for Department of Western Highlands in 1985-86. Education: MA in Political Science, University of Hawaii. Village: Keltika. Customary group: Mokei Kelingamb (Code M2).
- Paul Pora, aged 40. National Party. One of the most successful businessmen in Hagen, with interests in the haulage and coffee marketing industries, was seen as having the greatest personal campaign resources, as well as having the full weight of the NP party machinery behind him. He had been closely involved with the formation of the National Party in the early 1970s and lists a number of high national appointments in his bio data. Education: BEc, UPNG. Village: Teka. Customary group: Yamka Pepka (Code KY4).
- Terema Rumints, aged 39. People's Democratic Movement. A strong candidate who hoped to inherit sentimental support for Paias Wingti, the sitting member and Hagen's 'favourite son'. A complicating factor was that as a Kinjka (the pair tribe to Yamka) he could be expected to split the Yamka vote and weaken Paul Pora's chances. On the other hand, the PDM ticket could help him to win some sections of the numerous Jika, the prime minister's tribe. He had worked for 17 years as an airport fire officer with the Department of Civil Aviation. Education: Grade 9. Village: Teka. Customary group: Kinjka, Yamka resident (Codes J4 and KY2).
- Peter Wap, aged 27. People's Progress Party. The PPP ticket was unlikely to offer Wap more than token support in Western Highlands and Wap could be considered to be an Independent. He was a salesman at Ela Motors from 1974 to 1985. Education: Grade 10. Village: Kokmul. Customary group: Jika Opromb (Code J8).
- Tom Nidop, aged 36. Independent. A Sepik migrant, Nidop ran a taxi service for five years and was general manager of Kiluwa Trading for two years. He could have expected to find support among plantation workers and some urban *wantoks* as an alternative candidate. Education: Form 2. Residence: Hagen Town (Code U1).

Rotep Wak, aged about 45. Independent (pro-People's Democratic Movement). A pastor who has been more active in church activities than business and the councillor of the smallest and arguably most non-aligned tribe in Hagen, Wak could not expect much support beyond his own group and church-going friends. However, he stood as an alternative to the official PDM candidate. Customary group: Ruruka. Village assembly point: Kukl (Code RM).

### *DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VOTES*

Figure 1 is a key to the locations of the polling station catchments, with coded identifications matching my collations of the ballot box counts, which are given in Figures 2-10. The data were obtained from the EC 601 tally sheets and the totals shown in Figures 2-10 were obtained by adding up each day's votes at the polling stations. Thirty-three polling teams were employed in Hagen Open during the three days of polling using a total of 90 ballot boxes (some teams were not needed on the third day). All ballot boxes were sealed at the end of a day and new boxes were always started the next morning. Some boxes contained less than 100 ballot papers and should have been amalgamated with other boxes to protect the secrecy of the poll, but the practice in 1987 was for the counts for all boxes to be listed separately. It was also the case in other electorates; Box 131 for the East Sepik Provincial seat seems to be the record holder with only one vote, while several boxes in North Solomons Provincial had no ballot papers in them at all (Lucas 1988b).

Also shown in Figures 2-10 is the segmentation of the Hagen tribes, identifying thirty-three units - typically clans - that I was able to identify exclusively with each booth. There were five places where I had difficulty with this.

Kumunga, north of Hagen on the Baiyer road, is the polling station used by some clans of the Mokei Kuipi section, but some Penambi live in the area and also, I believe, vote there. I do not think that their votes have resulted in a mixed ballot at Kumunga as the results for Kelua No. 1, where Penambi's pair tribe, Elti, votes, are quite similar. The differences lie in a surprising 71 votes for the Sepik candidate, Tom Nidop, at Kelua No. 1 (the largest block of votes he received in the electorate) and fairly strong support for the Mokei candidate, Michael Kunjil, at Kumunga (Codes M7 and EP1).

Southeast of Hagen, Mokei Depi Komunka and the remainder of Mokei Kuipi share a territory, but had separate polling stations at Tiling and Kilika. This means that the results cannot be mapped separately. In the event, both groups evidently voted in a very similar way (Codes M5 and M8).

The Kungunka-Palka tribe-pair comprises some nine subclans whose land is scattered about the southern part of the electorate. Three live among the Jika Milakamb at Koklamb. Their votes cannot be mapped separately from the Milakamb, but again their preferences followed those of the Milakamb (Codes J11 and KP2).

The second Kungunka-Palka polling station was Kukl. This was the only booth at which the ballot box counts differed drastically on the different days that voting took place. Michael Kunjil won by a comfortable margin on the first day - and 120 of his 129 Kungunka-Palka supporters turned out on this day - whereas Terema Rumints won with 67 per cent of the vote on the second day. I did not ask a representative of these groups to identify the Kunjil (Independent) and Rumints (PDM) supporters among the

		Michael Pundia	Michael Kunjil	Paul Pora	Terema Rumints	Peter Wap	Tom Nidop	Rotep Wak			
Jika	Andapunts	Pangaka	155	62	133	237	81	3	4	675	
		Kuipngel	65	61	18	231	56	2	0		
	Mukaka	Kundka	79	39	224	297	40	1	7	687	
		Mukaka	34	105	126	405	5	1	10		
	Maipngel	Andakelkam	Nungapi	3	8	80	131	31	0	4	257
			Komb	0	270	49	13	3	0	0	
		Rukumb	Akelemb	69	183	118	305	160	0	42	857
			Roklamb	8	85	186	61	204	1	4.9%	
		Rukumb	Parklemb	6	85	186	61	204	1	4.9%	544
			Opromb	1.1%	15.6%	34.2%	11.2%	37.5%	0.2%	0.2%	
			Komapi	147	10	86	139	21	0	7	
			Mukimana	35.9	2.4%	21.0%	33.9%	5.1%	-	1.7%	
		Milakamb	Milakamb	198	64	28	17	1	0	0	308
			Milakamb	767	13	234	24	25	1	1	
		<b>1523</b>	<b>880</b>	<b>1282</b>	<b>1860</b>	<b>627</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>6257</b>		
		24.3%	14.1%	20.5%	29.7%	10.0%	0.1%	1.2%			

Figure 2 Jika polling booths

		Michael Pundia	Michael Kunjil	Paul Pora	Terema Rumints	Peter Wap	Tom Nidop	Rotep Wak		
Mokei	Depi	Kiminingka	1	618	34	2	2	1	0	658
		Koipka	0.2%	93.9%	5.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	-	
		Kelingamb	1	839	9	2	0	1	0	
	Nambka	Anda-akelemb	0.1%	98.5%	1.1%	0.2%	-	0.1%	-	852
		Engemb	24	335	172	27	45	0	2	
	Aling	Milimb	4.0%	55.4%	28.4%	4.5%	7.8%	-	0.3%	605
		Komunka	70	337	645	111	6	0	0	
		Akelka	6.0%	28.8%	55.2%	9.5%	0.5%	-	-	
		Akelka	28	77	551	105	4	0	2	
		Okupka	3.7%	10.0%	71.8%	13.7%	0.5%	-	0.3%	
	Kuipi	Kolka	45	113	459	25	12	0	26	680
		Akelka	6.6%	16.6%	67.5%	3.7%	1.8%	-	3.8%	
		Engaka	16	231	289	86	30	0	0	
		Kanjipka	2.5%	35.4%	44.3%	13.2%	4.6%	-	-	
Engaka		10	65	409	22	0	0	1		
Oklamunaka		1.9%	16.1%	77.6%	4.2%	-	-	0.2%		
Bunaka		195	2635	2568	380	99	2	31		
Kelambka		3.3%	44.6%	43.5%	6.4%	1.7%	0.0%	0.5%		
		<b>195</b>	<b>2635</b>	<b>2568</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>5910</b>	
		3.3%	44.6%	43.5%	6.4%	1.7%	0.0%	0.5%		

Figure 3 Mokei polling booths

Kungunka-Palka subclans so I am forced to label the two factions separately: they appear as Kukl A and Kukl B. Additionally, a substantial number of Kukl A voters supported Rotep Wak from the neighbouring Ruruka tribe - his only identifiable supporters away from his home booth. I did interview Wak and he said he was pro-PDM and was standing in order to oppose the endorsed PDM candidate, Rumints (Codes KP1 and RM).

Lastly, at Wak's own booth at the place called Ulka Angemb Pona, which is administratively called Togoba No. 2, the two tiny tribes Ruruka and Mimka put their votes into one box. Obviously there is no way to pick Ruruka intentions as distinct from Mimka's (Code RM).

With these qualifications, there is a very good correspondence between the sixty-nine rural ballot boxes and discrete local groups. Figure 10 gives the data for the two 'urban' catchments and the six 'rural non-village' catchments - Hagen Technical College, Highland Agricultural College, Baisu CIS, Kuk Agricultural Research Station, Ogelbeng Mission and Tibi Plantation - representing a further twenty-one boxes.

### PERFORMANCE AT HOME BOOTHS

According to the simplest expression of the idea that in predominantly rural areas 'primordial' factors - voting for fellow tribesmen - dominate election results, each candidate should start out by winning his 'home' polling booth by a huge margin. There is substance in this, as seen in Table 3.

Table 3: Percentage of votes won at home booth

Candidate	Home group	Place	Per cent	Runners-up (%)
Michael Kunjil	Mokei Kelingamb	Keltika	98.5%	-
Paul Pora	Yamka Pepka	Teka	86.1%	Rumints (11%)
Michael Pundia	Jika Milakamb	Kondila	72.0%	Pora (22%)
Terema Rumints	Jika Mukaka*	Ketika	59.0%	Pora (18%)
Peter Wap	Jika Opromb	Kokmul	37.5%	Pora (34%)
Rotep Wak	Ruruka	Togoba 2	44.6%	Kunjil (46%)
Tom Nidop	-	-	-	-

\* The PDM-supported Rumints is treated as a Jika Mukaka, Paias Wingti's clan, when really he is a Kinjka based at Teka. Pora won both Teka and Kinjka (62.1 per cent) by wide margins.

Of all candidates, Pundia could have been expected to make a clean sweep of his own booth, Kondila, on a sympathy vote, following the earlier death of Brass Wak. But in fact Kunjil was the only candidate with no serious rival at home; he scored an amazing 98.5 per cent of the valid votes. (In 1968, Kaibelt Diria took 100 per cent, less one vote, of his home booth in North Wahgi [Colebatch et al. 1971:253].) Pundia lost votes to Pora,






Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9

probably because of the latter's business activities in the booming industrial zone along the Highlands Highway partly in Pundia's territory. Pora lost votes to Rumints at Teka (KY4); Rumints (a) being based in the same place and (b) having the backing of a strong rival party. Rumints lost votes to Pora at Pias Wingti's home, Ketika (J4), probably due to straight rivalry between PDM and the National Party. Wap, the PPP candidate, lost votes to Pora at Kokmul (J8) because of the apparent hopelessness of campaigning without the support of a big party. We cannot fully understand Rotep Wak's narrow defeat by Kunjil at Togoba No. 2, because both Ruruka and Mimka cast their votes in the same ballot box (RM). It could be the case that Wak won Ruruka, his own tribe, but not Mimka. Nidop, the town candidate, received a surprising seventy-one votes (15 per cent) of the valid votes at Kelua No. 1 (EP1), but had virtually no support elsewhere.

### *PERFORMANCE IN HOME TRIBE*

The winner in the 'primordial' model of voting should be the candidate from the biggest tribe, but this did not happen in Hagen Open (Figs. 11-16). The three leading candidates - Pora, Kunjil and Rumints - won the tribes that endorsed them, they did so without unanimous support. I also have represented the relevant information in Figure 17 where isolines of voting percentages are mapped onto structural outlines of the Jika, Mokei and Yamka. What I have also tried to do here is to preserve the geographic relationships between the clans: Jika on the west, Mokei on the east and Yamka on the northeast of the electorate (cf. Figure 1). In Figures 11-16, the percentage support in each voter catchment area is displayed for each candidate.

#### *The Jika*

Among the Jika, Rumints (Figure 13) won quite easily from the other two Jika candidates, Pundia (Figure 14) and Wap (Figure 15), support for these two men being confined to one half of Maipngel section only. Rumints' Jika supporters came from a south-southwest/north-northeast axis along the western border of the electorate. As can be seen from Figure 17, Rumints was unchallenged in the western axis comprising the Andapunts and Mukaka sections, but the votes were split four ways in the Maipngel section. Here, Wap's support came from Opromb clan alone, while Pundia mobilised Milakamb, Muklmana, a very close ally to Milakamb, and Komapi. The Jika clan-pair Komb-Akelemb, in the same section as Wap and Pundia's clans, gave only three votes to Wap, and none to Pundia at all. An explanation may be found in that in 1986 and early 1987 Komb, supported by Akelemb, fought a vicious war (using guns) with Komapi, supported by Opromb, Muklmana and Milakamb. The end result was that Komb and Akelemb were routed and fled their territory to settle with the Mokei clan Kiminingka, with whom they had a boundary. Kiminingka live in the heartland of Kunjil country, so it is not surprising that the Komb-Akelemb, bitter at their defeat, put 81 per cent of their votes behind the Mokei candidate.

A remaining pair of clans that are structurally part of Maipngel section are Parklemb and Roklemb. They too gave few votes to the Maipngel candidates. The explanation is that they physically live in between the

Mukaka clans at Togoba - and speak their language (see below) - while the other Maipngel clans are located in the Ogelbeng-Hagen Tech. area in the centre of the electorate, some 10 km away. While there is firm evidence that these clans acquired the eastern Jika lands through conquest some decades before contact in the 1930s (Vicedom and Tischner 1983), I do not have ethnohistorical evidence for past schisms within Maipngel which would lend political meaning to the present-day geographical division. At any rate, the Roklamb-Parklamb are now more interested in the political scene around Togoba, with its national dimensions, than in the more distant and more parochial struggle going on near Hagen.

The real winner of the intra-tribal struggles of the Jika was Paul Pora. He averaged over 20 per cent of the Jika vote, a very useful addition to his tally because of the size of the tribe.

### *The Mokei*

Mokei has two structural sections: Depi, 'forest dwellers', whose clans occupy territories around and to the south of Hagen town, and Kuipi, 'grassland dwellers', whose original lands were north of the town on the Hagen plain. The smaller Kuipi section was troubled by warfare at around the time of contact in the 1930s and almost half its population resettled with the Komunka clan of the Depi Aling, or 'eastern', subsection between the Kum and Kukla Rivers east of the town. Further small pockets of Kuipi live in other places around Hagen: 20 km away on the fringes of the North Wahgi Swamp in the extreme northeast corner of electorate, at Kumndi High School in the Baiyer-Mul electorate, and at Kokma near Newtown.

Kunjil (Figure 12), the Mokei candidate, had a similar experience to Rumints in that he took only three of the eight Mokei polling booths. In structural terms, the split came in the middle of the Nambka subsection, half the Nambka going with him and half with Pora, and he only just scraped in to win Mokei overall from Pora by thirty-three votes. Pora's support among the Aling ('eastern') clans reached 70 per cent, and this was explained to me in terms of Pora's strong kin ties there through maternal relatives. While I understand this type of explanation, I am not fully satisfied by it, because candidates are evidently selective in choosing to exploit ties outside their own tribe. In fact, most of my analysis shows that candidates choose *not* to do so or are unsuccessful in doing so. Without going to a minute scale of analysis, I will generalise to say that 'propinquity' can be a factor strong enough to override some intra-tribal loyalties.

The situation of the Kuipi section may be compared with Jika Roklamb-Parklamb. The geographic separation of the two Kuipi polling stations could be thought responsible for a divergence of interests, but in fact all the Kuipi showed strong support for Pora. The stronger support was at Kilika (M7), close to Teka (KY4). The other group was, as discussed above, associated with pockets of Elti and Penambi, also Pora supporters, and their land is close to Pora's second area of activity in the Kelua area.

### *Kinjka-Yamka*

Pora (Figure 11) won this tribe-pair by a large margin because only a small part of Yamka Kimbka section supported his rival, Rumints. No other candidates were in serious contention. Kinjka were involved in tribal

	Michael Pundia	Michael Kunjil	Paul Pora	Terema Rumints	Peter Wap	Tom Nidop	Rotep Wak	
Town	170	799	798	499	56	22	23	U1
	7.2%	33.8%	33.7%	21.1%	2.4%	0.9%	1.0%	
Kagamuga	1	6	182	159	1	5	0	U2
	0.3%	1.7%	51.4%	44.9%	0.3%	1.4%	-	354
Hagen Tech.	25	117	77	48	28	1	0	NV1
	8.4%	39.5%	26.0%	16.2%	9.5%	0.3%	-	296
Highlands Ag. C.	6	38	75	82	10	1	0	NV2
	2.8%	17.9%	35.4%	38.7%	4.7%	0.5%	-	212
Baisu CIS	8	71	64	47	0	1	3	NV3
	4.1%	36.6%	33.0%	24.2%	-	0.5%	1.5%	194
Kuk DPI	2	9	55	27	6	6	0	NV4
	1.9%	8.6%	52.4%	25.7%	5.7%	5.7%	-	105
Ogelbeng	3	4	33	9	97	5	1	NV5
	2.0%	2.6%	21.7%	5.9%	63.8%	3.3%	0.7%	152
Tibi Plantation	0	15	0	1	3	2	1	NV6
	0.0%	68.2%	-	4.5%	13.6%	9.1%	4.5%	22
	215	1059	1284	872	201	43	28	
	5.8%	28.6%	34.7%	23.6%	5.4%	1.2%	0.8%	3702

Figure 10 Urban and non-village polling booths

Figure 11  
Hagen Open Electorate Supplementary Election 10th – 12th August 1987  
Paul Pora – National Party





Figure 12  
Michael Kunjil - Independent.



fighting with their neighbours a few years ago and there is still a good deal of enmity in their area. Their territory borders on that of Jika Mukaka and their strong vote for Pora may be read as an anti-PDM statement, reinforced by Kinjka's traditional links with Yamka. But it was Pora's only good showing in the western part of the electorate.

### *Elti-Penambi*

There were two factions in this tribe-pair. The Elti and the Penambi Kuipi and Depi sections live in the northern and western parts of the electorate (EP16 and EP2), adjacent to Pora's heartland. They lent their support to Pora, with a small group apparently of Elti at Kelua supporting (for unknown reasons) Tom Nidop, the Sepik candidate (Figure 16). The remaining section, Penambi Wia, live in the Kunguma-Korgua area (EP3) and their territory extends southwards into the Tambul-Nebilyer electorate. Fighting between Wia and the other Penambi had caused a severe split and Wia allied themselves with their Kunjil-supporting Mokei Kelingamb/Koipka neighbours. There was no support for Rumints or Pora here.

### *Ruruka-Mimka*

I discussed Rotep Wak's (Figure 16) small voter base in this tribe-pair above but, as is evident from the maps, their land abuts Kunjil's home territory and it was Kunjil who won the Ruruka-Mimka polling station, by four votes.

### *Kungunka-Palka*


I have also discussed the problems met with in plotting Kungunka-Palka allegiances. These people are strongly associated with various sections of the Jika, and Strathern (1971:230) describes them as a 'refugee group'. In several places, the land they occupy is enclosed by Jika land: at Nunga among the Jika Nungapi (KP16), at Togoba between the Roklamb and Parklamb (KP16), and at Koklamb (KP2) among the Milakamb. The main Jika-supported candidate, Rumints, won Kungunka-Palka and Michael Pundia was second. All the same, there was a split, as already discussed, and the first day of polling at Kukl (KP1a) saw a strong turnout for both Kunjil and Rotep Wak.

### *Kemi-Kukilka*

There was good support for all three major candidates from this tribe-pair; the only minor candidate to pick up a significant number of votes was Pundia, among Kukilka Ruklka section (KK3a) whose territory is surrounded by Pundia-supporting groups (Figure 14).

Kemi, who live at Kagamuga (KK1) polled strongly for Pora, but almost as well for Kunjil. There is a perceptible split among the Kukilka. The Kluika section live at Anga (KK2) along the western boundary of the electorate in the PDM heartland; they polled strongly for Rumints. Voting

Figure 13  
Terema Rumints—Peoples Democratic Movement.





among the Ruklka, some of whom live next to the Kemi near Kagamuga (KK36), followed the Kemi pattern.

### *Kopi*

The Kopi are paired with the small Nokpa tribe of Angalimp-South Wahgi electorate and are both part of the Pipilka phratry which controls the giant Gumanch Plantation in Dei electorate. The Angalimp-South Wahgi MP is Michael Mel, a Nokpa. Fifty-six per cent of Kopi votes went to Mel's National Party colleague, Pora. There was secondary support, in line with Kopi's geographic position adjacent to the western Mokei clans, for Kunjil.

### *Hagen Town and the Non-Village Areas*

Urban voters would have good reasons to support each of the two strongest candidates. The New Town area actually lies on land originally owned by the clans supporting Kunjil and some Mokei still live there. Kunjil's academic qualifications and public service background would make him attractive to other urban voters. Pora's high business profile in Hagen would be expected pull in many other voters. In the event Kunjil won the town from Pora, by one vote (Figure 10).

Elsewhere, Rumints had a special following at Kagamuga, having worked there for years, but he still lost out to Pora whose supporters swamped this area. Ogelbeng Lutheran Mission (NVS) is almost enclosed by the territory of Jika Opromb, Peter Wap's clan; Wap's local presence helped him to win easily at this minor polling booth (Figure 15).

Overall, the performances of each candidate in the non-village areas closely mirrored their showings at the rural polling booths, Pora winning by an adequate margin overall.

## *FACTORS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF CANDIDATES*

There are obviously serious weaknesses in the idea that 'the biggest tribe always wins'; if anything, the biggest tribes predictably lose because they are the least able to unite in support of one strong candidate. In reality the performance of candidates is affected by many factors.

### *Party*

Two of the three best-showing candidates were supported by the parties that have fought out provincial politics in Western Highlands in recent years: PDM and the National Party. The strong independent candidate, Michael Kunjil, was sometimes described as pro-United Party, but also as a 'Wingti man'. (The United Party was wiped out at the elections but was 'revived' by two Independents who joined the Wingti-led coalition on 5 August 1987 [Hegarty and Turner 1987:25]). The background to National-PDM rivalry in Hagen is as follows.

The National Party, led by Philip Kapal, came into power in the Western Highlands Provincial Government through a no-confidence motion in April 1985. Kapal's government was suspended by the PDM-dominated

national government in early 1987 and not reinstated until after the 1987 elections. As was widely tipped at the time, this cost PDM a great deal of support in Hagen and Wingti was wise to nominate for the Western Highlands Provincial seat.

As early as January 1987, Wahgi leaders were hoping to be able to vote for him in the provincial seat on the grounds that this would give them a chance to elect a prime minister, rather than 'wasting' their votes on a backbencher. Wingti polled strongly in most areas judging by preliminary data (official figures for this seat have not been published). His only rival was Andrew Tai, a Mokei Kuipi, who took 20 per cent. No other candidate got into double figures, not even the former member, Raphael Doa, who had National Party endorsement. Doa was in the national parliament until 1982 and once also led the United Party. He is a Mokei Nambka and his supporters may be identified with Kunjil's supporters in Hagen Open. There were two other Hagen candidates, Robert Enga, a Jika, and Daniel Rumint, a Yamka.

Party, then, is important in Hagen in the sense that sets of party-aligned interest groups are at work. It is a debatable point as to whether this constitutes 'party' as a psephological factor in some pure sense, but a glance overseas reveals that 'party' means different things in different electoral systems. More often than not, the strength of parties in stable two- and three-party systems has come to mean their degree of entrenchment in the electoral numbers game, rather than their close and faithful identification with recognised positions in the political spectrum. Perhaps the best resolution of this is to say that, in Hagen, 'parties' = 'interest groups' = 'a set of semi-permanently opposed political alliance groups'. I have given this definition in the plural to stress the vital ingredient of opposition between a *set* of groups and I use the term 'political' in its anthropological sense (as in 'political organisation').

Kunjil and Pora have constituencies encompassing Hagen town and the whole of the eastern half of the electorate. Principally this means the Mokei and Yamka tribes, but it also includes Kinjka, Ruruka-Mimka and Kopi. The Wingti/PDM-supporting block is made up of most of the Jika and Kungunka-Palka, and is located in the western half of the electorate.

The remaining tribes - Elti-Penambi and Kemi-Kukilka - put up no candidates and split their votes between the major candidates.

### *Language*

Hageners are slow to mention language as a factor dividing one area from another and many play down the existence of a well-defined boundary running across the electorate, roughly following the course of the River Walta. Melpa is the language of Hagen town and points east while Temboka is spoken at Togoba and southwards in the Nebilyer Valley. The languages are mutually intelligible and form the western end of the Central Family dialect chain which starts in Chimbu. Coincidentally the boundary marks the transition from mounded sweet potato, common in Southern Highlands and Enga (*maunten kaukau* in Tok Pisin) to the gridded beds common in the Wahgi Valley (*baret kaukau* in Tok Pisin).

As it happens, the Temboka area correlates very well with the PDM voting block and the Melpa area with Kunjil and Pora's supporters. This may be qualified by saying that the Jika Opromb, Komapi, Milakamb and Komb-Akelemb clans are Melpa speaking. But it is precisely these clans

who broke from the PDM-part of Jika, with two candidates for the Open seat and one - Robert Enga - for the Provincial seat. Elsewhere, Kinjka and most of Ruruka-Mimka speak Temboka, but neither strongly supported PDM; Kukilka is linguistically split, with the PDM-supporting Kluika speaking Temboka and the NP-supporting Ruklka speaking Melpa.

Language, then, highlights the line between the one western and two eastern voting blocks and correlates with at a rather odd agricultural difference.

### *Number of Candidates*

The big question of the 1987 elections as a whole was 'why were there so many candidates?' As is well known, Kerowagi Open was the recorder holder, with forty-five, and some of the other Chimbu seats were not far behind. The question in Hagen is 'why were there so few candidates?'

The answer certainly lies with the size of the major Hagen tribes and their partial alignment with the two big parties in the area. In this context it is important to underline the social forces that deter candidacy. The key part of campaigning is never seen in public, but takes the form of canvassing of support for candidacy long before the nomination period. In one area of Angalimp-South Wahgi, for example, I was told in January 1987 that all the men's house groups had *pasim vot pinis*. They had already decided which way they were going to vote - even though it would be months before nominations opened. How this works is that influential men pass from men's house to men's house listening to the talk and sounding out their allies. Possible nominees may be found in every village of Angalimp-South Wahgi or Hagen Open (in all probability a university graduate could be found in each one), so the important factors are those that *discourage* nomination. As time goes by, the strength of support for a particular nomination will become evident. Hagen clans, as constituents of large, well defined tribes, are clearly not all interested in putting up a candidate if they can decide on a strong candidate with party endorsement. A factor present in Hagen - but not in Kerowagi - is the cross-linkage between kinship networks created by traditional *moka* ties and the endorsement of candidates by big-men of regional influence; a Wahgi commentator, Ben Kugam, was quite sure this was sufficient to account for the difference. At all events, the case of Hagen Open contradicts the common conception that all highlands elections involve twenty or more candidates.

### *TOWARDS A MODEL OF CANDIDATE SUPPORT*

My analysis has taken the form of detailed discussions of voting in relation to tribal segmentation. As I have shown, voting intention is well-correlated to ethnicity when voters can trace some structural relationship to a candidate; however, this is not always possible. In the case of Southern Highlands Provincial in 1977, Sillitoe (1983:205) found that in other cases a 'vote-for-the-nearest-man' principle applied when voters had no candidates of their own and did not know the candidates from other districts. This hardly applies in the case of the geographically close-knit Hagen Open, but a principle of social propinquity, taking into account affinal and exchange system ties, clearly does operate when *lain* fails to guide voters in their choice, or has been disabled by hostilities with the structurally nearest

candidate's clan. Thus, the two Kukilka sections voted differently and with their neighbours, and the eastern Mokei voted with the Yamka, their neighbours.

When voters have several choices within the tribe, their choice is guided by that tribe's segmentation, coupled with the degree of warmth in the relations between individual clans. In Hagen Open, there is a very good case for saying that multiple same-tribe candidacies arise in those sections where the political atmosphere is most charged, so that the fact of there being a choice means that relations between nominating clans are, at the least, competitive. This was evidently so in 1987 within the fractious Jika Maipngel section.

Coupled with inter-clan competition is the virtual certainty that members of a clan will not all vote the same way, even if they have a home candidate to support. We do see a close correlation between the strength of support for each candidate and his relatedness (qualified by the above) to the voters at a particular polling booth, but the support is rarely exclusive. The exception in Hagen was Keltika, where 839 out of 852 valid votes were for one candidate. As Table 3 shows, candidates could more realistically expect between 40 per cent and 85 per cent of the vote in their own strongholds. I suggest that this scotches the occasionally aired notion that there are alternatives to the secret ballot that are more appropriate to PNG conditions, such as public declarations; Hageners, at least, do want the freedom of choice that the secret ballot offers.

In the final analysis, candidates owe their success (or lack of it) to the occurrence of rifts within their opponents' tribes and their ability to keep their own tribes united. The structural divisions of tribes do not determine when rifts will occur or how severe they will be, but - like geological faultlines - they do determine where the breaks will come.

The ultimate reasons for competition between tribes and for splits between the sections of tribes are often found in a history of warfare and alliance. Fighting is recorded between the sections of both Jika and Mokei (Strathern 1971:21) and even within them, as seen in 1987 in Jika Maipngel section. An example of warfare between tribes is the record of enmity between the Jika and Yamka; observers in Hagen in the early 1970s describe pitched battles between thousands of warriors from these tribes while the German missionary Georg Vicedom, who lived at Ogelbeng in the 1930s, recorded fighting between Yamka and both Jika and Kukilka in the early part of the century (Vicedom and Tischner 1983). After Pora's win, the Yamka took the opportunity to rub in their victory at the Hagen show with an impressive dance performance. Alas, with bitter irony, the caption to a photograph in the following issue of *Traveller's Times* was 'Jika clansmen strut their stuff'.

If candidates stand from the same tribe, or from the same section of a tribe, that tribe or section will predictably split down the middle along structural lines. In the present election, the three Jika-supported candidates drew votes in ever widening circles originating at their home polling booths, as can be seen in Figure 17. However, the candidates differed in their 'strength', as judged on independent grounds, and their circles of support varied greatly in size. A good way to judge this is to count the number of booths where a candidate scored 35 per cent of the vote. Obviously Rumints, with PDM backing, was much the 'strongest' contender; his circles swelled out to the extent that he took over 35 per cent of the vote at six Jika booths. Pundia's 35 per cent circle extended only to three booths, while Wap could only manage one booth.

Figure 14  
Michael Pundia - Pangu




Figure 15  
Pita Wap--Peoples Progress Party





Figure 16  
Tom Nidop-Independent



The concept of 'strength' is the key here. Surveys indicate that strength is a composite quality, made up of such things as personal leadership qualities, educational background, campaign resources and party backing (cf. Saffu, Chapter 2). I see few functional differences in the way Hageners, Australians, Americans or Britons assess a candidate's suitability for office. In each case the first phase is a form of preselection to screen out the candidates who are perceived to have a poor chance of winning. This can take place in the men's house, at party headquarters or more publicly as in the U.S. But in all the systems much weight is placed on a nominee's acceptability to as many as possible of the interest groups within the community. A comparison between the American system and PNG practice bears analysis. In the U.S., Democrat and Republican presidential candidates attempt to win vote guarantees through the system of primaries; in PNG electorates like Hagen, preselection is a matter of a candidate and his campaign team securing agreements with the other sections and clans of the tribe that they will back him and not nominate their own people. As in America, this is undoubtedly where personal leadership qualities must shine. In Hagen, Paul Pora had long held a high political profile, unsuccessfully standing for the 'Niugini National Party' in the 1972 elections (Pora 1973) and continuing a strong association with the National Party into the 1980s. His subsequent success in business and his experience in various local and national offices set him well ahead of less eminent and younger rivals, Rumints and Kunjil. This kind of 'strength' will also enable candidates to obtain similar assurances of support from at least sections of other tribes, as in Pora's case with the eastern Mokei.

Finally, at election time, this judgment is tested when the various combinations of block votes are distributed among the candidates, capped by often fewer than 10 per cent of non-aligned, swinging votes. In Hagen, there were three tribal blocks not obviously, or not necessarily, associated with a particular candidate - Elti-Penambi, Kemi-Kukilka and Kopi - and these may be considered to take the place of the 'swinging' voters in systems with well-defined parties. Their votes amounted to 15 per cent of the total and Pora won 37.6 per cent of their votes - an almost identical performance to his showing in the electorate as a whole.

All these considerations can lead to a general model of the expression of primordial factors in candidate support. The concept that 'biggest tribe wins' was easy to discredit here though, hypothetically, it might apply in electorates with weakly developed political groupings at a level higher than that of the clan (cf. Ryan 1959) and, again hypothetically, large numbers of nominations. In Figure 18a, we see three neighbouring tribes of different sizes, comprising say 1200, 1600 and 2000 voters, they are undifferentiated with respect to clans and subclans; each puts up one candidate,  $a$ ,  $b$  and  $\gamma$ , and all voters in a tribe vote for their own candidate. Candidate  $\gamma$  wins because his tribe, C, is the biggest.

A little more sophisticated is the model of pure 'segmentary enclavement' shown in Figure 18b. For the purposes of illustration there are seven intending candidates -  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_2$ ,  $\gamma_1$ ,  $\gamma_2$ ,  $\gamma_3$ , and  $\gamma_4$  - coming from the subsections indicated. Each receives the support of all the voters in that part of his tribe not claimed by another candidate. In this configuration, and if the lower level units in each tribe are of equal size,  $\alpha$  will win with his 1200 votes, to  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$ 's 800 each and  $\gamma_1$ ,  $\gamma_2$ ,  $\gamma_3$ , and  $\gamma_4$ 's 500 each. The message here is that the smallest tribe can win if its larger rivals are riven with internal dissent. As I have discussed, however, (a) candidates are not all equal with respect to leadership qualities and general credibility before






Figure 17

the electorate; (b) disputes arise between sections and nullify the ties of structural closeness; (c) not all electors vote for the home candidate; and (d) there are typically non-aligned tribes and non-village areas to consider.

Figure 18c shows a 'modified segmentary enclavement' model where the candidates are ranked in strength. For example,  $\beta_1$  is stronger than  $\beta_2$  and can win the B2a subsection from him within Tribe B, overriding  $\beta_2$ 's 'natural' claim to all of the B2 section. More than this,  $\beta_1$  can win subsection A2b in Tribe A, if, perhaps, its land abuts the land of candidate  $\beta_1$ 's subsection in Tribe B and the two groups of people are on friendly terms; he is relying on the propinquity of the A2a voters to his base overriding the natural claim that candidate  $\alpha$  has over them.


In Figure 18c a dispute has arisen within Tribe C; in fact subsection C1a has had a fight with C1b and has gone to reside with its neighbour, B2a. C1a had thought of nominating its own candidate,  $\gamma_1$ , but has now given up the idea and has decided to vote for  $\beta_2$ . After the election, uneven ballot counts for the remaining Tribe C candidates show that there was even a split within subsection C2b and one subsection has defected from  $\gamma_3$  to  $\gamma_2$ .

At this point, the candidates' scrutineers are looking to capture the following numbers of votes:  $\beta_1$ , 1500 votes;  $\gamma_3$ , 750 votes;  $\alpha$  and  $\beta_2$ , 900 votes each;  $\gamma_2$ , 500 votes; and  $\gamma_4$ , 250 votes. But the last factor has not been considered - that not all electors vote for their kinsmen - and it is likely that the strongest candidates will be able to 'poach' further votes from the weakest. Candidate  $\beta_1$ , therefore, seems likely to win by a larger margin than indicated.


In summary, this last model of voter behaviour best approximates to what is seen in Hagen; segmentary enclavement of support is evident, but it is modified by (a) a weighting attributable to 'leadership qualities'; (b) the effect of a factor I have called 'social propinquity' overriding structural closeness; (c) true floating voters; and (d) the shifting allegiances of non-aligned voter blocks.

## CONCLUSION


With the benefit of hindsight, this exercise in mapping electoral results onto the political geography of the electorate was more successful than I imagined it would be. I emphasize that I did *not* start the investigation by interviewing the candidates or their campaign supporters. I suspect I would have become bogged down in an investigation of whose campaign funds were the largest, or which candidate's promises were the most credible, if I had done so. Instead I paid attention only to what informants told me about the allegiances of groups in Hagen. Invariably men would have an elaborate historical reason why a certain group could or could not be relied upon to vote a certain way. My analysis here tries to replicate that information in an objective a way as possible and, by doing so, to arrive at a position where 'primordial' factors can be subtracted from the final equations. I believe this works to the extent that we are left with three equally well endorsed candidates, any of whom could have won from their voting bases. The winner triumphed because he consistently picked up more votes than his rivals at 'neutral' polling stations and poached more votes from their 'home' booths than they did at his. In other words, he won because of an electorate-wide perception that he was the best man for the job. The size of the primordial voter base was not a factor in his win.



(a) 'biggest tribe wins' model



(b) 'segmentary enclavement' model



(c) 'modified segmentary enclavement' model

- \*  $\beta_1$  wins A2b - propinquity of the two subsections
- +  $\gamma_1$  withdraws, takes voters to  $\beta_2$  (tribal fight within C)
- ¶  $\beta_1$  wins votes from all weaker candidates

Figure 18

Sadly, even with seven candidates and a relatively well-ordered social organisation in Hagen, the results are combinatoric and they do not easily lend themselves to an economy of presentation that would enable me to produce a magical 'answer'. If there is an answer, however, it is this: my representation of Hagen is a sketch compared to the volume of information collected in the heads of Hagen's traditional leaders as a matter of routine and which, through the interplay of many such heads, order daily political life in the electorate.

Finally, Hagen had a special place in the 1987 elections because of the dimensions of the National Party-PDM struggle on the national stage, and of the PDM split away from PANGU which also occurred here. As I have portrayed it, the party-aligned factions have their historical roots in a century or more of remembered warfare - not in the nationalist movements of the 1960s or 1970s. That the end result has the principal actors facing each other on the front benches in the National Parliament (Pora as Finance minister and Wingti as leader of the Opposition at the time of writing) is well worthy of attention in understanding the political dynamics of the modern state.

#### *ADDENDUM: SECTION 141 VOTING AND VOTER TURNOUT FIGURES*

The inflated turnout figures given in Table 2 are considerable cause for concern. Are they correct? How can voters cheat? Is double voting possible? The official position on this, stated publicly by the electoral commissioner in July 1988 at the Electoral Reform Seminar, is that the common roll is indeed in disarray but that double voting is impossible because the indelible ink used to mark the fingers of voters cannot be removed in time to cast a second vote. However, this is insufficient for the present analysis because (a) the statement does not get to grips with under-age voting, and (b) the Hagen Open election was not held during the main election period, meaning that more legal electors might well be available that 'should' have been. For example, many Hageners have multiple places of residence; if these happen to lie in different electorates - say, Tambul-Nebilyer and Hagen - a prospective voter could well be able to satisfy an electoral official that they are residentially qualified to vote in either electorate. In practice, voters make a choice at general elections of where to cast their single Open electorate vote. However, at by-elections and supplementaries this may not be the case and all those (dubiously) qualified to vote may do so.

Turning to Table 2, the acceptable turnout figures, ranging from 75 to 85 per cent, relate to tribes that did not nominate strong candidates. Three out of four of the unacceptable ones relate to the politicised tribes that did. These figures can be challenged because the precise number of eligible electors is unknown and has to be estimated. It is possible to reduce the apparent turnout by assuming a higher rate of growth in the electorate than 2.0 per cent a year since the last census. But calculations show that for the turnout to 'break even' at 100% an unprecedented rate of growth of around 3.5 per cent a year would have to have occurred. We know this is impossible because the youngest cohort of legal voters in 1987 were born in the period 1962-1969 when the birth rate was not high enough; even in 1980 Western Highlands had the fourth lowest crude birth rate in PNG (30 per 1000).

It is an obvious hypothesis that Section 141 voting was abused to produce high turnout figures at some booths. However, this is frankly

untestable. There was an *official* reduction in Section 141 votes from 32 two per cent of all votes in July (for the Provincial electorate seat) to 20 per cent in August (this election; Masi 1987:5). And even in July there was a poor correlation ( $r=0.22$ ) between the proportion of Section 141 votes at polling stations and the apparent turnout. The main reason was the use of the July Section 141 declarations to compile a Second Supplementary Roll for August. To say that this was a practice of dubious validity is an understatement and to carry the analysis further would be pointless. Suffice it to say that the initial 32 per cent rate of S141 voting (30 per cent at rural polling stations) is absurd in an electorate where the population is essentially static.

Examination of all three rolls used shows that they are very badly organised and that there are serious flaws in the manner of compilation:

- People appear more than once under different names.
- People appear more than once under the same name.
- People appear in both the principal and supplementary rolls.
- Husband and wife are given the same name.
- Mis-spellings have created non-existent people.
- No second name is given (e.g. a 'John' is listed under Hagen town).
- Expatriates are included at Kuk DPI station.
- At non-village rest houses the roll is alphabetised by Christian name, splitting husbands and wives; at rural rest houses it is arranged by family groups, but not in a special order.
- Common Christian names are mis-spelt (Geroge, Magret, Magaret, Mageret, Margart, Jerrery, Jenet, Jennet, Joccylin, Josphine, Thresia, Tresia, Thimothy, Vicent) placing them in the wrong places and casting doubt on the accuracy of customary names.
- An unlikely number of dependents follow the names of men; ages (estimated or otherwise) are not given so that wives cannot be distinguished from unmarried daughters nor unmarried adult sons from under-age sons. One man's name is followed by eighteen dependents, and only three marked 'F' appear to be wives.
- A column marked 'occupation' is useless, almost all rural men being labelled 'SF', subsistence farmer, and women 'HD', household duties, regardless of whether they are parents or children. (Many urban men are also listed as 'SF'.)
- Some 36 people labelled as 'STDT', i.e. students, are enrolled at Hagen High School. These people are likely to be under-age. I located one, the son of a councillor, at a rural rest house as well.

Elsewhere I have urged the establishment of a unified system of field operations to carry out census book revisions on behalf of both the National Statistical Office and the Electoral Commission (Burton n.d.). I repeat this call here and predict with confidence that if this does not come about, sectional voting will remain a serious problem in 1992. A consultant's report to the Electoral Commission comes to identical conclusions (Touche Ross 1987:17), but a proposal along these lines has yet to emerge from the Electoral Commission. Poor common rolls, it hardly needs stating, stand in the way of altering the constitution to allow snap elections.

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## APPENDIX 1

### LIST OF ELECTORATES

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*Provincial Electorate**Open Electorates*

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Bougainville	Central Bougainville South Bougainville	North Bougainville
Central	Abau Kairuku-Hiri	Goilala Rigo
Chimbu	Chuave Karimui-Nomane Kundiawa	Gumine Kerowagi Sinasina-Yongamugl
East New Britain	Gazelle Pomio	Kokopo Rabaul
East Sepik	Ambunti-Dreikikir Maprik Wosera-Gai	Angoram Wewak Yangoru-Saussia
Eastern Highlands	Daulo Henganofi Lufa Okapa	Goroka Kainantu Obura-Wonenara Unggai-Bena
Enga	Kandep Lagaip-Porgera Wapenamanda	Kompiam-Ambum Wabag
Gulf	Kerema	Kikori
Madang	Bogia Middle Ramu Sumkar	Madang Rai Coast Usino-Bundi
Manus	Manus	
Milne Bay	Alotau Kiriwina-Goodenough	Esaala Samarai-Murua
Morobe	Bulolo Huron Gulf Lae Menyamyua Tewae-Siassi	Finschhafen Kabwum Markham Nawae



National Capital District	Moresby North East Moresby South	Moresby North West
New Ireland	Kavieng	Namatanai
Northern	Ijivitari	Sohe
Southern Highlands	Ialibu-Pangia Kagua-Erave Koroba-Kopiago Nipa-Kutubu	Imbonggu Komo-Margarima Mendi Tari
West New Britain	Kandrian-Gloucestera	Talasea
West Sepik	Aitape-Lumi Telefomin	Nuku Vanimo-Green River
Western	Middle Fly South Fly	North Fly
Western Highlands	Angalimp-South Wahgi Dei Jimi Tambul-Nebilyer	Baiyer-Mul Hagen North Wahgi

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**APPENDIX 2**  
**POPULATION CENSUSES 1971-1980**

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Province	Citizen 1971	Population 1980	Increase %
North Solomons	90,382	125,506	39
Central	100,264*	116,361	16
Chimbu	159,729	178,013	11
East New Britain	108,238	130,730	21
East Sepik	180,149	220,827	23
Eastern Highlands	236,752	274,608	16
Enga	131,816	164,270	24
Gulf	58,273	63,843	10
Madang	168,212	209,656	24
Manus	24,356	25,859	6
Milne Bay	108,528	127,725	17
Morobe	240,930	305,356	27
National Capital District	82,492*	112,429	41
New Ireland	58,507	65,657	12
Northern	65,918	77,097	17
Southern Highlands	192,047	235,390	22
West New Britain	60,783	88,415	45
West Sepik	93,479	113,849	22
Western	70,339	78,337	11
Western Highlands	211,456	264,129	25

---

\* Estimates because Central Province and National Capital District were enumerated together in 1971.

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Source: 1980 National Population Census Pre-Release, National Statistical Office.

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**APPENDIX 3****Papua New Guinea national election 1987, party-endorsed candidates**

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Party	South Coast	Islands	North Coast	Highlands	Total
Country Party			4	10	14
Melanesian Alliance	7	13	20	5	45
Morobe Independent Group			10		10
National Party	12	9	10	25	56
Pangu Party	25	16	29	34	104
Papua Besena	10				10
Papua Party	17				17
People's Action Party	23		2	3	28
People's Democratic Movement	7	13	17	39	76
People's Progress Party	22	14	23	30	89
The League for National Advancement	8	2	17	26	53
United Party	8	5	6	7	26
Wantok Party	14		1	11	26
Leiba Party	1	1			2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>556</b>

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Source: Turner and Hegarty 1988: 9

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**APPENDIX 4****Papua New Guinea national election 1987, returned and new members by region and province**

---

Region/Province	Members returned number	New Members number
<b>SOUTH COAST</b>		
Central	4	1
Gulf	1	2
Western	2	2
Milne Bay	3	2
Northern	1	2
NCD	1	3
	12	12
<b>ISLANDS</b>		
Bougainville	2	2
East New Britain	4	1
West New Britain	2	1
Manus	1	1
New Ireland	1	2
	10	7
<b>NORTH COAST</b>		
Morobe	4	6
Madang	1	6
East Sepik	5	2
West Sepik	4	1
	14	15
<b>HIGHLANDS</b>		
Chimbu	5	2
E. Highlands	4	5
Enga	1	5
S. Highlands	5	4
W. Highlands	5	3
	20	19

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*Note:* Gulf and Western Highlands each include one member returned to a different seat than the one previously held.

Source: Turner and Hegarty 1988: 17

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## APPENDIX 5

### Papua New Guinea national elections 1977-87, number and percentage of votes cast

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Election	Estimated no. of eligible voters <sup>a</sup>	No. of votes cast	Percentage of eligible voters voting <sup>c</sup>
1977	1,380,000	970,172	70
1982	1,600,000	1,194,114	74
1987	1,800,000	1,355,477 <sup>b</sup>	75

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*Notes:* (a) These estimates were kindly provided by Dr Bryant Allen of the Department of Human Geography, Australian National University.

(b) The 1987 figure for 'number of votes cast' excludes three supplementary elections. The final figure will be slightly higher.

(c) The figures cited by the Electoral Commissioner differ slightly from these: 1977: 68.9 per cent, 1982: 66.3 per cent and 1987: 72.9 per cent (PNG, Electoral Commissioner 1987: 5)

Source: Turner and Hegarty 1988: 23

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## INDEX

Abaijah, Josephine 53, 54, 56, 82, 84, 86, 91, 123, 130-131, 134-135, 146

Bougainville Copper 55, 226, 232, 233, 235 (see also *North Solomons*)

Boundaries Commission 38, 39

Bureaucracy 72, 73, 78, 104, 105, 147

Campaigns (see also *Electoral issues*)

Angoram 112-114, 117-118

*Komiti* system 117-118,

Kerema Open 167-170

Namatanai Open 217-218

Manus 202-204

platform and policy issues 75-76, 203-204

strategy and tactics 74-77, 79, 168-172, 196-198

role of money 23, 117, 202-203

women 84-85

Candidates (see also *Electoral support, Tables*)

age 60, 89

attributes 59-63, 181-183, 193-196, 279 (see also *Voters' perception*)

clan/kinship affiliation 47, 116, 165, 247

education 61-64, 89, 175-176

gender 59, 81-89

number 2, 2-43, 77, 78

party-endorsement 115, 164-165, 196

religious affiliation 85-86, 166

selection 7, 115

voters' evaluation 19-20, 114, 117

women 86-97

independent 48, 198

Group of Independents 48, 196-197, 202-203

Morobe Independent Group 11, 56, 57, 58

Candidate profiles

Angoram 112, 115-117

Central Provincial 123-149

Gulf 158, 161

Hagen Open 258-259

Kerema Open 158-161

Kerema Open 158-161

Manus 193-200

Namatanai 213-217

North Solomons 236, 241

Simbu 258-259

Central Province 123, 124-126 (see also *Abaijah, Diro, Guise, Rarua, Tables*)

- electorates 125,
- language 125-126
- economy 126-127
- party affiliations 144
- politics, overview 127-128
- polling results 139-144
- voting 138-139

Chan, Julius 7, 57, 75, 92, 209, 211-214, 217, 218-219, 220, 222-223

Chinese community

- business methods 99-100
- culture and lifestyle 102-103
- education 104-105
- electoral support 101
- political impartiality 102, 103, 106
- PNG citizenship 101-102, 103
- relations with government 99-108

Coalitions (see *Government*)

Democracy (see also *Government*)

- in PNG 8
- quality of 3, 4
- systems 70-73

Development 8, 24, 53, 55

- Angoram 111-112
- Bougainville Development Corporation 232-234
- Central Province 126
- Eight Point Plan 73, 75
- Gulf 171-172
- Manus 190, 203
- NCD 76
- Lihir gold 219-221
- timber 221-222

Diro, Ted 11, 54, 57, 123, 131-132, 135-138, 143, 145-146, 161

East New Britain 56, 94, 101

- Kokopo Open 55-56

East Sepik 20, 55 (see also *Narokobi, Laki, Tables*)

- Angoram 111-120
- candidates 112, 115-117
- election outcome 118-119

Education system 104, 136

- Electoral behaviour (see also *Electoral support, Tables, Voters*) 6-8, 9, 22, 147  
 candidate evaluation 15, 18-20  
 clan/kinship affiliation 190-191, 198, 245, 247, 261-270, 273, 277-279  
 party affiliation 144-147, 152, 173, 270  
 religious affiliation 237  
 vote-switching 249  
 voting patterns (Kerema Open) 173-177, (Hagen Open) 259-279  
 voters turnout 23, 45, 281-283  
 non-voters 23E
- Electoral boundaries 38-40 (see also *Tables*)  
 population and representation 40-41
- Electoral Commission 11-12
- Electoral issues (see also *Campaigns, Parties*)  
 economic development 7,8, 53, 54, 55, 70, 74, 76, 79, 171, 218-220, 249  
 regionalism 53-58, 76, 170-171  
 social change 70, 74, 75
- Election law (Organic Law) 37-38, 39, 46
- Electoral process (see also *Electoral boundaries, Election law, Electoral Roll*) 12, 40-49  
 ballot papers 11, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49  
 candidate nominations 42  
 counting 48-49  
 formal and informal votes 45-46  
 polling 45-46, 79,  
 preliminaries 38  
 voters registration 40-42
- Electoral Roll 40-41, 46, 281-283
- Electoral support 47-48, 200 (see also *Electoral behaviour, Tables*),  
 and class 15, 29, 30  
 and development 8-9, 14, 112  
 determinants of choice 6-8, 16-22, 47-48, 144-147, 151-152, 161-166  
 socio-cultural factors 25-30, 31, 276-277, 176, 181-183  
 primordial factors 279-280  
 localised support 9, 15-16, 19-22, 72, 120, 151 246  
 party affiliation 144, 152, 276
- Electoralates (see *Electoral boundaries* and provincial entries, *Tables*)
- Ethnicity 23, 127, 214, 202, 245, 247, 253, 277-281
- Expatriates (see also *Chinese community*) 73, 78, 202



Government (see also *Party government*, *Provincial government*)

- accountability 13
- cabinet 57
- coalition 2, 5, 57, 70-79, 229
- legitimacy 9, 70
- reform, 12
- stability 11-12, 13
- systems 1, 5, 12-13, 70, 71, 72
- voters' perception of 23-24

Group of Independents 11, 13, 178, 196

Guise, John 129, 130, 133

Gulf Province (see also *Tables*)

- general description 153-159
- Kerema Open 152-187
  - election outcome 177-188
  - polling 172-174
- politics 157-158, 160

Hagen Open (see also *Nilkare*, *Tables*)

- candidates 258-259, 272
- election outcome 261-267, 279
- factors, 270-272
- language 271-272
- tribes 256-270
- voter catchments 253-255, 259-261
- voting patterns 259-279
- urban voters 270

Hannett, Leo 230-234, 242

Highlands provinces 62, 67 (see also *Hagen Open*, *Nilkare*, *Wingti*)

House of Assembly 229

Kiki, Albert Maori 53, 157

Kwarara, Galeva 56, 57, 131-132, 169

Laki, Philip 112, 115, 117, 118-119

Lapan, Sir Paul 228-232

Law and order 45

Manai, Perai 138

- Manus Province (see also *Pokasui, Rooney, Tables*)  
  candidates 193-196  
  economy 190, 203  
  electoral support, sources 190-192  
  electorates 193-197  
  general description 189-190  
  polling and results 204-205  
  Makasol (see *Political movements*)  
  Mola, Donatus 228, 236, 242
- Momis, John 11, 55, 74, 75, 220, 228, 230, 231, 235-236, 241
- Morobe Province 19, 20, 56, 93, 114 (see also *Samana*)
- Namaliu, Rabbie 2, 12, 55, 56
- Namatanai Open (see also *Chan, New Ireland, Tables*)  
  campaign 217-218  
  candidates and bases of support 213-217  
  issues 218-222, 223  
  polling 211-212  
  election outcome 222-223
- National Capital District 39, 49, 53, 76, 147
- Nationalism 101, 129, 241 (see also *Ethnicity, Secessionism, Political movements*),
- Narokobi, Bernard 112, 114
- New Ireland (see also *Chan, Levi, Namatanai Open, Tomon, Tables*)  
  candidates and electorates 209-213  
  election outcome 209-212  
  Lihir gold 219-221  
  provincial government 212  
  timber industry 221-2
- Nilkare, John 54
- North Solomons (see also *Bougainville Copper, Hannett, Mola, Momis, Sarei, Tulo*)  
  electorates 228  
    Central Bougainville 236-240  
    North Bougainville 236-238  
    South Bougainville 240-241  
  general description 225-226  
  politicians 228-237  
  politics 229-231, 236-241
- Okuk, Iambakey 53, 54, 85, 232, 250, 251

- Parliament, members of  
 age 64-66  
 education 66-68  
 gender 64
- Papuan politics 127-138 (see also *Abaijah, Diro, Central Province, Manai, Taureka*)  
 Papua Besena 53, 54, 56, 82, 123, 130, 135, 146, 161  
 Papuan bloc 11, 57-58  
 Papuan hegemony 123-127, 145-147  
 political activism 128-130  
 politicians 123, 127-138
- Party government 4-10, 12, 13, 78, 79
- Pokasui, James 83, 196, 197, 203
- Policymaking 72, 73, 74 (see also *Social policy*)
- Political movements  
 Mataungan movement 101  
 Makasol (Paliau) 195, 198-200, 202, 204-205  
 Mungkas Society 229  
 Papua Besena 123, 130, 135
- Political parties 6, 7, 10, 114-115, 130, 131, 161 (see also *Candidates, independent, Party government, Tables*)  
 and power 10, 71, 72, 144  
 and regionalism 54, 56, 147  
 and voting behaviour 2, 6-8. 23. 48. 145. 276  
*komiti* system 137  
 League for National Advancement 57, 114  
 Melanesian Alliance 11, 55, 56, 57, 74, 114, 115, 131, 211, 212, 220, 226, 232, 233, 234-235, 237  
 Melanesian United Front 56  
 National Party 54, 56, 57, 91, 114, 131, 275  
 Pangu Pati 10, 54, 55, 56, 57, 74, 93, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 133, 161, 196, 197, 203, 218, 232  
 Papua Besena 53, 54, 56, 82, 123, 130, 131, 135, 146, 147, 161  
 Papuan bloc 11, 57-58  
 Papua Party 56, 57, 131, 161  
 People's Action Party 10, 132, 136-137, 145-146, 147, 161, 165  
 People's Democratic Movement 2, 56, 57, 92, 114, 115, 131, 253  
 People's Progress Party 74, 92, 114, 115, 131, 209, 211, 217, 223  
 policy platforms 74-76, 92, 93, 128-129, 146  
 United Party 275  
 Wantok Party 132, 176

- Politics (see also *Political movements, Regionalism*)  
and gender 83-85  
and power 8, 9, 10, 78  
and patronage 78  
and religion 85-86  
interest groups 84, 92, 95-97, 112, 276  
national politics 157  
political activism 128-130  
political elite 70, 71, 152  
provincial politics 126, 157-158, 160
- Pokasui, James 83, 193, 194, 196, 197, 203
- Pora, Paul 253, 256
- Provincial government  
and national election candidates 165  
East Sepik 114, 120  
Morobe 93  
North Solomons 230-236  
Provincial Executive Council 157  
Western Highlands 270-271  
women in 93-94
- Regionalism (see also *Papuan politics*)  
and elections 52-58  
and parties 54, 56, 147  
constituency 53-54, 55  
definition 51  
in development 75, 76, 170  
parliament and cabinet 54-55, 57
- Rarua, Oala Oala 127, 129, 130, 133
- Rooney, Nahau 76, 81, 83, 84, 86, 91, 92, 194, 196, 197, 200-201, 203, 204
- Samana, Utula 11, 56, 58, 76
- Sarei, Alexis 70, 230, 231, 232, 233, 236
- Secessionism 123, 129, 130, 229, 233, 235, 236
- Simbu Province (see also *Okuk, Tables*)  
general description 245-246  
campaign 248  
candidates 258-259  
electorates 246-247  
politicians 246, 250, 251  
polling results 250-251  
voters' attitudes 249-251
- Social policy (see also *Policymaking*)  
in election campaigns 75-77  
nature of 69-70

Somare, Michael 23, 54, 55, 74, 75, 112, 115, 232, 233

Southern Highlands 19

Tables

Angoram]

analysis of ballot box results 119

candidate performance 121

Central Provincial

summary of votes 139, 140, 141, 142, 143

electoral behaviour

changing weights of determinants (voting trends) 18

class and politics 29

determinants of the vote in PNG 17

gender and politics 25

home region 27

occupation 29

generation gap [age] 26

income 30

regional variation 27

religion and politics 28

religiousness 28

residence and politics [urban/village] 26

age of candidates

1977-87] 60

by region [1987] 61

age of MPs

by age group 1977-87 64

by region, 1987 65

returned, losing and new MPs by age groups 66

educational level of candidates

by highest grade achieved 62

by region and highest grade achieved 63

educational levels of MPs

by highest grade achieved [1977-87] 67

region and highest grade achieved [1987] 68

returning, losing and new, by highest grade achieved [1987] 68

female candidates

age and education 89

declared religious allegiance 86

female candidates, female MPs [1977-87] 59;

female candidates [1987] 87

party allegiance 88

votes and parties 88

Gulf Province

candidates in order of votes posted 162, 163, 164

population census districts 160

Kerema Open: results 178

Kerema Open: Daniel Itu estimates and final result 180

Hagen Open

election results 257

percentage of votes won at home booth 262

tribes in Hagen, population data 258

Manus

composition of the eight provincial sections 206

- participation in polling by population 207
- participation in polling, by enrolment 207
- provincial electorates 206
  - New Ireland
    - election results 211
    - Namatani Open electoral divisions and population 212
  - Simbu
    - election results 250
- Tago, Stephen 203
- Taureka, Reuben 132-134
- Tulo, Sam 236-237
- Voters (see also *Tables*)
  - eligibility 40-42
  - political perception 8-10, 22, 23, 24, 79, 114, 117, 247, 248
  - turnout 45, 207, 281-283
- Watson, Lepani 127-128, 129, 130
- Western Highlands (see *Hagen Open, Nilkare, Wingti*)
- Wingti, Paias 2, 56, 57, 67, 92, 255, 281
- Women
  - candidates 81-98
    - age, marital status and education 89-90
    - occupation and experience 90-91
    - party affiliation 88-90
    - religion 85-86
    - votes 6-87
  - in development 203
  - in government 81-82, 91-92, 94, 96
  - National Council of Women 92
  - political issues 77, 82, 84, 92
  - status and tradition 93, 94-96
  - Women in Politics Group 84, 92, 95-97

New Ireland  
election results 211  
Namatanai Open electoral divisions and population 212  
Simbu  
election results 250

Tago, Stephen 203

Taureka, Reuben 132-134

Tulo, Sam 236-237

Voters (see also *Tables*)  
eligibility 40-42  
political perception 8-10, 22, 23, 24, 79, 114, 117, 247, 248  
turnout 45, 207, 281-283

Watson, Lepani 127-128, 129, 130

Western Highlands (see *Hagen Open, Nilkare, Wingti*)

Wingti, Paias 2, 56, 57, 67, 92, 255, 281

#### Women

candidates 81-98  
age, marital status and education 89-90  
occupation and experience 90-91  
party affiliation 88-90  
religion 85-86  
votes 6-87  
in development 203  
in government 81-82, 91-92, 94, 96  
National Council of Women 92  
political issues 77, 82, 84, 92  
status and tradition 93, 94-96  
Women in Politics Group 84, 92, 95-97

