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THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE APACHE
INDIANS, 1871-1876: A CASE STUDY
IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.F.A., Kutztown University, Kutztown, Pennsylvania, 1976

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
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ABSTRACT

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE APACHE INDIANS, 1871-1876: A CASE STUDY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY by MAJ Jacque J. Stewart, USA, 202 pages.

Many historians contend that the U.S. Government's first real experience in countering an insurgency came during the Philippine Insurrection of 1899; and they classify previous conflicts with the American Indians as limited "wars of conquest."

In fact, the long struggle between the government and the Apache Indians stemmed from complex social, political and economic factors, and bears all the earmarks of a traditional, or secessionist, insurgency. This study evaluates the methods used to suppress the Apache insurgency by applying the principles of modern counterinsurgency doctrine.

The strength of the government's approach was in its ability to conduct a short, decisive military campaign which defeated most of the hostile bands and induced others to surrender. The major weakness lay in the government's inability to develop a balanced national strategy for dealing with the insurgency. Lack of cooperation between civilian and military agencies led to failed attempts at pacification, an ineffective reservation system, and continued conflict.

The experience of the U.S. Government with the Apaches confirms the validity of much of our current doctrine, and offers lessons which can be applied to modern counterinsurgency operations.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

. . . historical examples are rarely, if ever, exact enough to allow unquestioning application to specific contemporary problems. By analyzing trends in tactics, strategy, and weapons, however, soldiers can grasp the evolution of warfare and learn something of the basis for doctrine -- or devise a rationale for questioning it.¹

Colonel Thomas E. Griess

The most prevalent form of armed conflict in the world today is the insurgency. This trend shows no signs of changing as we rapidly approach the next century. Most Western nations, the United States included, have relatively little experience with more conventional types of warfare since World War II. The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the superpower balance with the United States, but it also eliminated stability in many of the smaller countries formerly controlled by the Soviets. Religious and ethnic violence is increasing, particularly in Southwest Asia and eastern Europe. Governments are being weakened by economic problems and factionalism, and cannot meet the demands of their citizens for change.

Every nation experiences some level of internal or civil strife, especially when it is relatively young and in

the process of development. A government must be able to accommodate rapid growth and change, and strive to adequately provide for all of its people. In some cases, a government may be faced with the task of incorporating varied ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds into a functioning society. When a government fails to do these things, or when it cannot accede to the wishes and demands of a particular group of people, that group may claim discrimination or injustice. They may organize to seek political redress for their grievances; if that fails, they may resort to violence. This violence can take the form of riots and demonstrations, terrorism, or armed insurgency.

While these insurgencies will most likely be restricted to nations outside the United States, they could directly or indirectly interfere with U.S. national interests and goals. We could lose access to strategic sources of oil or other valuable natural resources, as well as access to key military bases and air and sea transportation routes. The stability of a nation allied with the U.S. can be threatened by an insurgency in that nation. For these reasons, we invested billions of dollars in economic and military aid for, and conducted military operations in support of, counterinsurgency operations in developing nations like the Republic of Korea, the Phillipines, the Dominican Republic, South Vietnam, Iran, Thailand, Grenada, El Salvador and

Panama. Yet, we have often failed to achieve our aims because our policymakers and military strategists were treating the symptoms of the insurgency, rather than its causes.²

If the U.S. hopes to be successful in countering future insurgencies, it is imperative that military planners have a full understanding of the nature of this type of conflict. Strategies for countering insurgencies require more than planning for the application of military power. Policy makers and military strategists must have a knowledge and understanding of the society involved, the political and economic factors bearing on the situation, and the goal of the insurgency. Without such knowledge and understanding, we cannot devise an effective counterinsurgency strategy.

As with any other aspect of warfare, there are valuable lessons to be learned from studying history. The efforts of the U.S. Government to subdue the Apache Indians provide an excellent example of counterinsurgency operations within our own nation. For more than twenty-five years, the Apache Indians waged guerrilla warfare against the U.S. Army and American settlers in the Southwest. The struggle between the U.S. Government and the Western and Chiricahua Apaches was not a revolutionary insurgency in the broad sense of the modern definition: "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of

subversion and armed conflict." Rather, these Apache tribes sought to prevent an unknown and alien power from taking their lands and destroying their way of life. Due to the nature of their society and tribal makeup, the Apaches were not inclined to organize as a people against the U.S. Government. Uprisings were generally limited to certain tribes, or bands within a tribe. It was unusual for Apache bands to join forces against the U.S. Army; indeed, it was the Army's employment of one band against another that finally led to the Apache defeat.

The Apache insurgency was not politically motivated. Very few Apaches understood the functionings of the white man's system of government or had a desire to influence that system. The primary aim of the Western and Chiricahua Apaches was to break the restrictions imposed on them by the whites, and to be allowed to continue their nomadic lifestyle. The Apaches reacted to attempts to place them on reservations with hostility and distrust; natural reactions considering their past dealings with the Americans. The inability of the government to develop a cohesive policy concerning the Apaches, and later attempts to concentrate all Apache tribes onto a single reservation, made the problem worse.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the United States was a young, developing nation expanding

rapidly westward under the auspices of Manifest Destiny. Progress and change were foremost in the minds of the American people, and they saw the Western Indians as a hostile, indigenous minority who threatened to oppose that progress. The Indians, on the other hand, did not recognize the legitimacy or authority of the U.S. Government. They saw the white man slowly and inexorably encroaching on their lands, and tried to resist. The U.S. Government at first tried to ignore the "Indian Problem," but as the public clamor for land and resources grew, the conflicts between Indians and whites became more frequent.

In July 1867, Congress authorized the formation of a Peace Commission, which was empowered to negotiate treaties with the Western tribes and to institute plans for civilizing them. The efforts of this commission formed the basis of the so-called "Peace Policy," a strategy which aimed at placing all tribes on reservations, by force if necessary. Once on the reservations, the Indians would be taught the ways of white civilization and gradually assimilated into society.⁴ The Peace Policy was the fundamental guide for Western Indian relations for the next three decades.

Realizing that the nomadic tribes would be unable to sustain themselves by hunting within the confines of the reservations, officials of the Indian Bureau urged the Indians to adopt an agricultural way of life and provided

them with seed, farming implements and instructions on how to use them. This was anathema to the Apaches, who for centuries had relied on two forms of survival -- hunting and raiding.

The Indian Bureau planned to sustain the Apaches until they could become self-sufficient by providing them with rations, clothing and supplies. The reservation system, however, was inefficient and plagued by corruption, and many of these good intentions were never realized. Faced with starvation, some tribes simply left the reservations to hunt elsewhere. Other tribes resorted to their time-honored practice of raiding. These transgressions brought swift retribution from the U.S. Army and were the principal cause of conflict with the Apaches.

Most Indian tribes were adept at irregular warfare, but the Apaches were masters of the art. Handfuls of hostile warriors moved virtually unrestricted throughout Arizona and New Mexico, killing and raiding, then disappearing into the rugged mountains or across the border into Mexico to avoid pursuit by the Army. They fought only when terrain or numbers gave them an advantage, usually attacking from ambush. The Apaches resisted the Army longer than any other Western Indian tribe; the Chiricahuas were not subdued until 1886. Their depredations against American citizens cost the

U.S. Government more in claims for reparations than any other Indian campaign during the period from 1812 to 1889.⁵

Most insurgencies start with guerrilla actions against a military force which is primarily trained for conventional warfare. In order to counter the irregular threat, military leaders have to adopt new tactics and techniques. Their success is measured, in a large degree, by how quickly they manage to do this. The U.S. Army of the nineteenth century was no exception. It did not have a doctrine for dealing with irregulars. Military operations aimed at putting down insurrections were governed largely by General Order 100 of April 24, 1863, which was written as the U.S. Army's code of warfare during the Civil War. This order did not recognize the need for a separate doctrine to deal with an unconventional enemy. It called for "the adoption of the rules of regular war toward rebels," and did not address Indian warfare at all.⁶

Many field commanders recognized the futility of trying to apply the rules of regular warfare against Indian guerrillas, and adopted methods and tactics which were uniquely suited to their own situations. One of these commanders was General George Crook. His operations against the Apaches were marked by radical departures in strategy and tactics, and were successful in ending large-scale Apache resistance.

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the nature of the Apache insurgency and the U.S. Government's strategy for dealing with that insurgency. The factors which influenced development of a national policy for Western Indian affairs were varied and complex, and a complete analysis of these factors is well beyond the scope of this thesis. These factors are examined only in the context of the immediate effects that they had on the formulation of a strategy for the Apache conflict.

This thesis further restricts itself to an analysis of the U.S. Government's attempts to subdue the Apaches between 1871 and 1876. The Army conducted operations against the Apaches for more than two decades prior to this period, with limited success. Several of these operations, however, resulted in incidents which had a disastrous effect on future relations between the Apaches and the Americans, specifically, the Bascom Affair in 1860 and the murder of Mangas Coloradas in 1863.⁷ These events are summarized in the analysis of the factors contributing to the insurgency. By 1876, the majority of Apaches were settled on reservations and conflict thereafter was limited to small bands of renegades who raided intermittently on both sides of the border.

This thesis answers the following questions: What was the nature of the Apache insurgency? What was the nature of

the U.S. Government's response in dealing with the insurgency? How effective was that response? What lessons may be applied to modern counterinsurgency operations?

The methodology used to answer these questions is the doctrinal guide for insurgency analysis found in Appendix C of Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, and the expanded version of this guide which is found in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Publication C520, Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. I have chosen to use only certain portions of this guide because it was designed for analyzing current insurgencies, and many of our modern terms and concepts obviously do not apply to events of the nineteenth century.

I have tried to rely on primary source material as much as possible. The events leading up to, and following, General Crook's military offensive are well documented, but material on the campaign itself is difficult to find. The best of the primary sources are John G. Bourke's diary and his book On the Border with Crook. As Crook's aide-de-camp during this entire period, Bourke was able to provide detailed accounts of the campaigns and remarkable insights into Crook's personality. The diary gives astonishingly complete descriptions of operations in the field, unit compositions and strengths, postings of officers, maps and terrain sketches, and the beginnings of an Apache

dictionary. Bourke developed a close friendship with Crook, and sometimes blurs or omits facts which might cast the General in a negative light. For that reason, his narratives must be balanced with other sources.

Crook's autobiography gives a good overview of his dealings with the Apaches, the territorial citizenry, and the Indian Bureau; although his intense dislike for the Indian Bureau and its policies is clearly evident. His annual departmental reports are another valuable source because they include summaries of skirmishes and Apache depredations, and status reports on the reservations under his jurisdiction.

From the perspective of the U.S. Government during this period, the two most valuable sources are Peace Commissioner Vincent Colyer's Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, 1871, and General Oliver O. Howard's book, My Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians. Colyer's report is an exhaustively complete record of his meetings with the Apache leaders, his efforts to establish the first permanent Apache reservations, and his relations with the military. Colyer includes copies of telegrams and correspondence which provide insight into the political situation in Washington during this turbulent period. During his visit to Arizona he investigated the Camp Grant Massacre, and the statements of many of the witnesses are also included in his report. General Howard's book contains many

inaccuracies, perhaps because it was written so many years after the fact, but it does give a good account of his peace negotiations with the Chiricahua chief, Cochise.

More difficult to obtain are first-hand accounts from the Apaches themselves. The best sources in this category are: I Fought with Geronimo by Jason Betzinez and the narratives of Apache scouts John Rope and David Longstreet in Grenville Goodwin's Western Apache Raiding and Warfare.

There is a wealth of secondary sources available. For an excellent overview of American involvement in the Apache wars, see Dan L. Thrapp's The Conquest of Apacheria. John Upton Terrell's book, Apache Chronicle, offers a detailed account of Spanish and Mexican relations with the Apaches, and valuable information on Apache social structure, customs and warfare. Grenville Goodwin's Western Apache Raiding and Warfare is the best source on the Apache Indians that I have seen; the personal narratives of Apache scouts and warriors are especially valuable. The literature on this topic also includes several articles which make comparisons between the Apache conflicts and modern irregular warfare. These articles tend to focus almost exclusively on guerrilla tactics, however, and ignore political, economic and social factors which influence counterinsurgency operations.

Occasionally, historical accounts of a particular incident conflict. For example, General Crook's evaluation

of the success of the Peace Commissioners differs drastically from what those individuals reported. Details concerning the conduct of the military offensive and the resulting casualty figures vary wildly. Where these differences occur, all viewpoints are presented in the interests of objectivity.

CHAPTER TWO

THE APACHE INSURGENCY

It must be remembered that he [Crook] had left to him a legacy of the hatred of three centuries between the peoples whom he had to pacify . . . that war and pillage had been bred into the Apaches¹

J.P. Dunn

When the U.S. Government inherited the Apache problem from the Mexican Government in 1848, the situation had already been developing for over two hundred years. By 1871, the Apache conflict had reached the proportions of a national crisis. The goals of the Apache insurgents were similar to those of many other Indian tribes on the frontier: to retain their lands, their freedom, and their way of life. But what were the specific causes of the Apache insurgency? What factors precipitated such levels of hatred and violence that the Apache uprisings stood apart from other Indian problems?

In order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to briefly look at the Apache people and their history, especially the Western and Chiricahua Apache tribes, who were the key players in the Apache insurgency after 1871. This chapter will examine some of the cultural, economic and military aspects of Apache society; how those

factors brought the Apaches into direct conflict with other cultures, and how they shaped the insurgency itself.

The Indian tribes who collectively came to be known as "Apaches" were originally descended from the Athapascan linguistic group.² Migrating south from Alaska and Canada, groups of these Athapascan peoples reached the American Southwest sometime between 1,000 and 1,500 A.D. By the middle of the sixteenth century, they occupied an area which encompassed Arizona, New Mexico, parts of Texas, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma and northern Mexico.³

This portion of the Southwest, or "Apacheria", is characterized by some of the most inhospitable terrain on earth. Vast desert plains sprawl across much of the region, punctuated by rugged mountain ranges and laced by shallow, intermittently-flowing rivers and streams. The climate is one of extremes: searing, dry heat in the summers and bitterly cold temperatures with snow at the higher elevations during winter.

Driven by the relentless search for food in this harsh environment, the Athapascan newcomers split into separate regional groups, or tribes. These tribes gradually became independent of each other, but maintained similar cultural and linguistic traits. Modern anthropologists classify the Apaches into six or seven major tribes.⁴ The Lipan Apaches and the Kiowa-Apaches roamed from western Texas northward

into Kansas. The Jicarilla Apaches inhabited northeastern New Mexico, while the Mescalero Apaches lived in the southeastern part of the state. The Western and Chiricahua Apache tribes occupied what is present-day Arizona, southern New Mexico and northern Mexico (see figure 1, Appendix B).

The Western Apache Indians were divided into five subtribal groups. The White Mountain, or Coyotero Apaches, lived in an area which extended from the Pinaleno Mountains in the south to the White Mountains in the north. The San Carlos Apaches, including the Aravaipas and Pinalenos, ranged from the foothills of the Santa Catalina Mountains to east of the San Pedro River. The Cibecue Apaches lived from north of the Salt River to above the Mogollon Rim, their territory was bordered on the west by the Mazatzal Mountains. The Southern Tonto Apaches claimed the Mazatzal Mountains as their home, while the Northern Tonto Apaches ranged as far north as the modern city of Flagstaff. These Tonto tribes included a mixture of Yavapai, Yuma and Maricopa Indians. In total, the Western Apaches occupied an area of some ninety thousand square miles. Anthropologist Grenville Goodwin estimated that in 1860, the Western Apaches totalled approximately four thousand people.⁵

The Chiricahua Apaches lived further south, and were divided into three subtribal groups. Those who inhabited southeastern Arizona were known as Chokonen. The Warm

Springs, or Ojo Caliente group, lived in southern New Mexico. The Ojo Calientes were sometimes referred to as the Mimbreno or the Bedonkohe Apaches. A third group, the Nednhis, occupied the Sierra Madre Mountains in northern Mexico. Altogether, the three Chiricahua groups numbered between one and two thousand people.⁶

Each of the subtribal groups of the Western and Chiricahua tribes was further broken into bands which averaged about three to four hundred members.⁷ Each band claimed its own territory for hunting and food-gathering, and rarely intruded on the territory of a neighboring band. These bands were slightly more unified than the larger subtribal groups, but did not normally join together for purposes of warfare or raiding. These bands were comprised of the most basic, and important, unit of Apache society: the local group. A local group could contain anywhere from thirty-five to two hundred people.⁸ These local groups were very close-knit because most of their members were related through blood or marriage. The Apaches encouraged marriages within the local group, but kinship was not a requirement for membership. Any person or family could attach themselves to the local group.

The local group was small and mobile enough to support itself off the land, yet not so small that it could not readily protect itself in times of trouble. The men of the

group concerned themselves with hunting and raiding, activities which required cooperation and training for the young men. Males were taught from birth to become inured to hunger, thirst and hardship. Courage and endurance were prized qualities in an Apache warrior, since raiding and warfare were to be his way of life. Since the women were chiefly preoccupied with food-gathering, it was also necessary for them to cooperate closely. Each family was independent for purposes of survival, but shared food and work responsibilities with other families in the local group.

Each local group had its own leader who directed the majority of the group's activities. These group leaders did not have a hereditary right to lead the group; rather they were men who dominated because of their natural abilities, especially in the areas of hunting, raiding, and warfare.⁹ The group voluntarily agreed to confer the rights of a chief upon such a man. While he wielded a great deal of influence within the group, he did not necessarily control all of its members. The members of the group made decisions by consensus and were not bound by the word of the chief. They tended to cooperate with the chief if it was in their best interests to do so. As long as the chief could maintain the respect of his people by leading them successfully in battle, or by obtaining large quantities of

loot from raiding, he could control the group. When he failed to do so, he was replaced.

Exceptionally brave and capable chiefs could win prestige for their groups and thereby induce young warriors from other groups to join them, until the group became large and powerful. These chiefs gradually developed influence among other Apaches groups and bands, as well. In times of crisis, their opinions were carefully weighed in council. Sometimes, they could persuade various groups and bands to unite against a common enemy. These coalitions were extremely rare, and short-lived when they did occur. When the initial danger passed, families and groups splintered away and returned to the everyday necessities of life. Rare was the chief who could hold a large group together for more than a brief period.¹⁰

Many Americans who dealt with the Apaches failed to understand this rather democratic process of tribal and group leadership. Military and government officials attempted to negotiate with an Apache leader, believing that they were dealing with a chief who had absolute authority over his people. Negotiations completed, these officials reported that a successful treaty had been established with a certain group of Apaches, only to discover a short time later that members of the group were committing depredations or violations of the treaty.

The Apache cultural structure supported an economy based on raiding and warfare. The Apaches did raise some crops for sustenance, but this was a very meager source of food for them. When they did plant crops it was usually corn, beans or squash. They relied heavily on hunting deer or small game, and the women spent most of their waking hours in gathering and preparing natural foods such as yucca stems, agave heads, cactus fruit, pinon nuts, berries, seeds or mesquite beans. Because they could not subsist on their crops, and because they had to move once they had depleted the natural foodstuffs in a particular area, they were a nomadic people.

The Apaches came to depend on another source of sustenance; that which they could steal by raiding other Indian tribes. With the establishment of Spanish settlements in the Southwest during the sixteenth century, they discovered a rich new source of plunder.

The Apaches made a very definite distinction between raiding and warfare.¹¹ Raids were not conducted to retaliate against an enemy, but to obtain food, clothing, weapons and other goods. Often they took women and children as captive slaves; if these unfortunate individuals survived their initial captivity they might be integrated into a family and accorded status as a member of the local group.¹²

Horses, mules, sheep and cattle were another target for Apache raids. At first, they used horses merely as a source of food, but by the early 1700s discovered that the horse offered them mobility. The Spaniards tried to prevent the Apaches from acquiring horses, but the situation was soon out of hand and the colonists were forced to concentrate on staying alive. Other items greatly prized by the Apaches were iron tools and modern firearms. They quickly learned to improve the efficiency of their lances and arrows by replacing stone tips with new ones made of iron. When they began to collect muskets, powder and shot from their victims, the Apaches became a truly formidable foe.

Raiding parties were usually comprised of warriors from a local group, and numbered between five and fifteen men. The group was intentionally kept small because the chances of being discovered increased in proportion to the size of the raiding party.¹³ The warriors moved slowly and stealthily toward their objective. They intended to surprise the inhabitants of the settlement and escape quickly with their loot, or better yet, to take what they wanted without being discovered. If they were caught in the act, or did not move quickly enough once discovered, they faced a numerically superior and better armed foe. Discovery usually meant pursuit, which might necessitate abandoning livestock in order to escape. It also alerted the surrounding countryside

to their presence, increasing the chances of interception on the way home.

The primary purpose of an Apache war party was to avenge the death of a fellow warrior. The chief of the local group to which the dead warrior had belonged sent messengers to other bands and groups, inviting them to participate. The warriors from the various groups met at a designated spot and conducted a ceremony called ikalsita (going to war), in which warriors danced and exhorted each other to "think of angriness, fighting, and death."¹⁴

War parties were made up of as many as two hundred men under the leadership of a single chief, usually the chief who initiated preparations for war. The war party also included at least one Diyin, or "shaman." The shaman was the mystic and spiritual advisor to the group, and the Apaches believed that he could control the supernatural powers of war to provide an advantage to the war party. These shamans were powerful men with a great deal of influence in the local group, and were occasionally selected to lead war parties.¹⁵

The tactics of the war party were simple. Scouts were sent out to locate or track the enemy. If the enemy was encamped, the warriors crept as close as possible to the camp under concealment of darkness, then attacked in the early hours of the morning. If the enemy was moving, the warriors

might follow the column for days, until the terrain proved suitable for an ambush. Battles were short and fiercely fought, the warriors killing as many of the enemy as possible. When the war party returned, family and group members celebrated the victory with another ritual ceremony. If the warriors returned with adult prisoners, especially male prisoners, they were turned over to the female relatives of the warrior whose death the war party had been sent to avenge. These prisoners were tortured and killed.

Conflict between the Spanish colonists and the Apaches was recorded as early as 1580 and continued for the next 250 years.¹⁶ At first, the Apaches made efforts to remain on friendly terms with the Spaniards, since it was easier to trade for goods than to risk death or injury by trying to steal them. This spirit of peaceful coexistence did not last very long. Motivated by greed, many Spanish officials saw the Apaches as an untapped source of slave labor. Spanish law dictated that only Indians captured in battle could be held as slaves, but it was a simple matter to provoke the Apaches into starting a war, then capture and enslave them. In doing so, the Spaniards exploited what they gradually perceived to be the weaknesses of the Apaches: "the independence so greatly valued by each tribe. . . their unwillingness to join together for the purpose of fighting a common foe, their inability to organize."¹⁷

As more and more of their people were forced into slavery, the Apaches retaliated, sometimes destroying entire villages. The Spanish attempted to defend their colonies, but their system of military administration was a haphazard affair. Military presidios, scattered thinly along the frontier, were generally garrisoned by poorly paid, untrained soldiers under the leadership of corrupt officials. The Apaches struck with impunity at weakly defended villages, knowing that the soldiers from the closest presidio would not be able to react in time.

In 1772, the Spanish government decided to build a series of fifteen new presidios, stretching from the Gulf of California to the Gulf of Mexico.¹⁸ Strong military forces positioned at these presidios launched offensive campaigns against the Apaches in their mountain homes. These operations achieved only limited success, and by 1786 the Spaniards realized that armed force alone would not be enough to subdue the Apaches. A new policy was instituted whereby the government sought to secure a peace with the Apaches by providing them with regular gifts of clothing, firearms, and alcoholic beverages. In this manner, some bands were persuaded to settle near a presidio or trading post where they could be closely watched by the military.¹⁹ This policy brought a temporary and very fragile peace in the Southwest.

The Mexican struggle for independence from Spain began in 1810 and dragged on until 1821. In the eleven-year interim, the country's political system remained in chaos. Most of the troops were recalled from the frontier, leaving the northern states virtually cut off from economic and military aid. Distribution of gifts to the Apaches halted. The Apaches soon realized how weak the frontier defenses were and resumed their raiding with a vengeance. Ranches and villages were deserted as their inhabitants fled to the safety of the few remaining presidios. Some stability returned after the war, but government shortages of money and military manpower made it nearly impossible to deal with the Apaches.

The governors of the northern states attempted to raise civilian militia forces to cope with the uprisings, but when this proved ineffective they decided on a brutal new strategy. In 1835, the State of Sonora began to offer one hundred pesos for the scalp of an Apache warrior, fifty pesos for a woman's scalp, and twenty-five for a child's. Within two years, the State of Chihuahua instituted a similar policy.²⁰

These programs were, in effect, the announcement of a policy of extermination. The Southwest quickly filled with marauding bands of scalp hunters: Mexicans, American mountain men and trappers, and other Indian tribes. The carnage they

left behind enraged the Apaches and incited them to new levels of violence. An unforeseen side effect of the scalp bounty law was that it was virtually impossible for payment officials to differentiate between an Apache and a Mexican scalp. As a result, hundreds of Mexican citizens lost their lives to the ruthless scalp hunters.

The policy of offering bounties on scalps, and the resulting slaughter of innocent Mexican citizens, added to the problems between the U.S. and Mexican governments. Boundary disputes and unsettled financial debts plagued relations between the two nations for years, but the real problem lay with the American desire to expand. The annexation of Texas in 1845 led to escalating threats and military actions on both sides until war was declared in May 1846.

One month later, General Stephen W. Kearney entered Santa Fe at the head of an American army and proclaimed that the Territory of New Mexico (which at that time included Arizona) was officially annexed to the United States. The Apaches watched these developments with great interest, seeing an opportunity to rid themselves of their hated enemies, the Mexicans.²¹ During the war, the Apaches remained friendly to the Americans, but continued their raids against the Mexicans. Since some of these Mexicans now fell under U.S. jurisdiction in the newly annexed Territory of New

Mexico, the U.S. Army was obligated to protect them. Because of this, the Apaches began to have encounters with the American soldiers.

In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the war with Mexico. New lands were ceded to the United States as part of the agreement, but along with them came new problems. Article Eleven of the treaty stipulated that the U.S. Government was now responsible for preventing the Apaches (or any other Indians) from raiding across the border. If raids could not be prevented, the U.S. was to seek out and punish the raiders. Article Eleven also forbade U.S. citizens to buy livestock or other goods stolen during raids into Mexico and required the U.S. Government to pay reparations for losses or damages incurred by the Mexicans.²²

With the war at an end, the Apaches found themselves in an untenable position. They would never establish peace with their traditional enemies in Mexico. It was becoming increasingly obvious to them that the American settlers and their Army had no intention of moving on, but were establishing new garrisons and punishing the Apaches for the raids they conducted. The future held little promise for the establishment of a treaty which would guarantee either their lands or their way of life.

Apache hostilities continued on both sides of the border. Hundreds of miners enroute to the California gold fields were slaughtered in 1849. The U.S. Boundary Commission expedition of 1851 clashed with the Mimbreno Apaches.²³ By 1853, the U.S. came to the realization that it could not enforce Article Eleven of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Two-thirds of the small U.S. Regular Army were now stationed along the border in a futile attempt to intercept the raiding bands. The Apaches used the political situation to their advantage, realizing that American troops could not pursue them across the border. The Mexican Government was too fragmented and disorganized to develop a policy for dealing with the Apaches. Requests from the U.S. Government to conduct cross-border operations were denied because the Mexicans were fearful of losing even more territory to the Americans.²⁴

Unscrupulous Mexican and American traders added to the problem by continuing to deal with the Apaches; providing them with liquor and substandard firearms in exchange for stolen livestock and slaves.

The Gadsden Purchase agreement of 1853 abrogated Article Eleven of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and extended the American border further south. Conflicts with the Jicarilla and Mescalero Apaches in eastern New Mexico flared up. All of the Western and Chiricahua Apache tribes

continued to raid into Mexico, and some of the northern groups, particularly the Tonto and San Carlos Apaches, continued their depredations against American settlers. In southern Arizona and western New Mexico, though, relations between the Apaches and the Americans began to stabilize.

This was due in large part to the efforts of two important Apache leaders. Mangas Coloradas was a chief of the Mimbreno Apaches; probably the greatest of all Apache war leaders. Born sometime between 1790 and 1795, he was a physically imposing man, standing well over six feet tall. It was Mangas who clashed with the U.S. Boundary Commission in 1851, and who had been terrorizing the miners and settlers in New Mexico.

On July 1, 1852, Mangas agreed to a peace treaty with the U.S. Army. During the proceedings, Major John Greiner asked him why he fought so fiercely against the Mexicans. Mangas then related a story of how his people had been invited to a feast in the Mexican frontier village of Ramos. They became intoxicated and were lying on the ground asleep, when the Mexicans crept among them and killed them as they slept.²⁵ This, and other similar incidents, had created in him an undying hatred for the Mexicans.

Mangas had united himself to another powerful Apache band by marrying his daughter to the great Chiricahua chief, Cochise.²⁶ Cochise, born about 1823 or 1824, had developed

a similar hatred of the Mexicans. Except for some minor thefts of livestock, however, Cochise and his Chiricahuas had not caused any significant problems for the Americans. They continued to reside near Apache Pass in the Chiricahua Mountains of Arizona.

This tentative peace between the Americans and the two great Apache chiefs lasted until 1861. On the eve of the American Civil War, an unfortunate incident occurred which influenced relations between the Apaches and the Americans for the next decade.

In October 1860, a band of Apaches raided an isolated ranch on the Sonoita River, some forty miles south of Tucson and about twelve miles from the nearest military post, Fort Buchanan. The owner of the ranch, John Ward, was not present when the Apaches struck. They stole his eleven-year old stepson and most of the livestock on the ranch.²⁷ When Ward returned and discovered what had happened, he notified the commander of the garrison at Fort Buchanan. A detachment immediately set off in pursuit of the Apaches, but returned with the news that the raiding party had split into three smaller groups and disappeared into the mountains.

For reasons which are unknown, nothing more was done to recover the boy until January 1861. By this time, the Army suspected that the Chiricahua Apaches had stolen the boy, although there does not seem to be any firm evidence to

support that suspicion.²⁸ Second Lieutenant George N. Bascom left Fort Buchanan in late January with 54 troopers, and proceeded toward Apache Pass. On February 4, they arrived at Apache Pass and camped near the Butterfield Overland Stage Company's relay station there. Cochise and his people lived less than a mile from the station, and had an agreement with the manager of the station to provide him with firewood in return for food and clothing. Bascom invited Cochise and some of his followers to a conference, which was held in a tent surrounded by the soldiers. Upon being informed of the purpose of Bascom's visit, Cochise denied taking the boy or the livestock, stating that the raid had been the work of Coyotero or Pinaleno Apaches. Cochise offered to locate the boy and try to obtain his release.

Bascom did not believe Cochise and told the chief that he would be held as a hostage until the boy was turned over to the Army. Enraged, Cochise slashed his way out of the tent with a knife and escaped. Six of his people were taken prisoner, however; among them members of Cochise's family.²⁹

The next day, Cochise approached the stage station in Apache Pass and asked the station keeper and two of his employees to come out and talk. When they did so, the Apaches attempted to seize them. Two of the men escaped but the third man, a stage driver named Wallace, was captured.

That night, Cochise attacked a small wagon train several miles west of the stage station, capturing more hostages.

The following morning, Cochise attempted to negotiate with Bascom for an exchange of hostages. Bascom refused, and affairs remained at a standoff until February 10, when a reinforcement column arrived from Fort Buchanan. The commander of this unit, Captain Bernard Irwin, had with him three Coyotero warriors he had caught stealing horses.

Cochise, apparently believing that the Army intended to attack and destroy him, and that further negotiations were useless, killed his hostages. On February 18, the soldiers discovered the mutilated bodies of the men Cochise had killed. In retaliation, Bascom and Irwin decided to hang the three Coyotero prisoners and the three male captives from Cochise's band. The six bodies were left hanging from trees near the entrance to Apache Pass.³⁰

The "Bascom Affair" triggered a wave of bloodshed and violence that continued for over ten years. Apaches under Cochise and Mangas Coloradas united against the Americans, killing over 150 people by April of 1861.³¹ When the Civil War began a few months later, American troops in the Southwest were called east. Many posts in Arizona and New Mexico were abandoned. The Apaches observed this exodus and believed that they had caused the soldiers to leave. They

stepped up their attacks against the settlers and miners, who were now completely unprotected.

The Southwest was a hotly contested area during the early months of the Civil War until Union militia forces moved in to fill the gap left by the departed regulars. The California Volunteer Column, commanded by General James H. Carleton, arrived in Tucson on May 20, 1862. Carleton's intent was to join the Union forces under Colonel Edward Canby, operating against the Confederates in eastern New Mexico and Texas.³²

An advance column of the California Volunteers, consisting of two companies of cavalry, a detachment of infantry, and a small battery of two field howitzers, left Tucson on July 10, 1862, enroute to Santa Fe. As the advance element of the column entered Apache Pass on July 15, it was attacked by over five hundred Chokonen and Mimbreno warriors under the combined leadership of Cochise and Mangas Coloradas.

The troopers were able to reach the deserted Butterfield Stage station in the pass, but the Apaches occupied the hills overlooking the only spring in the canyon. The soldiers had completed the day's march with very little water and were near exhaustion. They made several attempts to reach the spring, but were driven back by the Apaches each time. The commander, Captain Thomas L. Roberts,

finally ordered his howitzers brought forward and fired them into the Apache positions. The Apaches were terrified by the new weapon and fled the scene.³³

The Battle of Apache Pass, as the incident was called, was important for two reasons. First, it was one of the few times that substantial numbers of Apaches from different bands allied themselves against the Americans. Secondly, it was one of the even fewer times that the Apaches chose to stand and fight a "set battle" against the Army. They experienced the devastating effects of modern firepower for the first time, and the lesson was not lost on them.

Once the threat of a Confederate invasion of the Southwest passed, Carleton and his California Volunteers remained in New Mexico Territory as an occupation force. In early January, 1863, Carleton learned that Mangas Coloradas was encamped with his band near the mining town of Pinos Altos in New Mexico. Carleton was convinced that he could not pacify the territory as long as Mangas Coloradas was alive. On January 11, he ordered one of his subordinate commanders, Brigadier General Joseph R. West, to launch a campaign against Mangas and his Apaches.³⁴

Accounts of Mangas' capture and subsequent death are confusing and contradictory. It is not certain whether the Mimbreno chief was actually captured, or if he was deceived by a white flag into talking with the Americans and taken

hostage.³⁵ In any case, he was in military custody on January 18. During the night, he was shot and killed, reportedly while attempting to escape. Some witnesses later stated that the sentries guarding him had heated their bayonets in the fire and placed them on Mangas' feet. When he resisted, they shot him. The next morning, a trooper took the chief's scalp as a souvenir. An Army surgeon cut off Mangas' head and boiled it to obtain the skull, which he sent to a friend in New York.³⁶

The death of Mangas Coloradas brought renewed violence from the Mimbrenos and other Apache bands. Attacks on settlements and ranches occurred almost daily. Carleton's troops were constantly in the field in attempts to locate Apache villages. Most of the Indians escaped before the soldiers arrived, and they sustained few casualties. The soldiers burned the deserted villages and killed any livestock that the Apaches left behind.

In February 1863, President Lincoln signed a bill which officially separated Arizona from the Territory of New Mexico and accorded it status as a separate territory. By 1864, Apache depredations were so bad that workers constructing buildings in the new territorial capitol of Prescott had to post guards while they worked.³⁷ The territorial governor appealed to General Carleton for more troops to protect the settlements in southern Arizona.

Carleton, who was fighting the Navajos in the north, could not provide the troops. Instead, he encouraged the citizens of the territory to organize themselves and assist the Army in exterminating the Apaches. Carleton gave standing orders to his subordinate commanders to kill all male Apaches, and to capture and imprison all women and children.³⁸

When the California Volunteers departed the territory at the end of the Civil War in 1865, the Governor of Arizona authorized the formation of companies of volunteer Rangers. These volunteers achieved some success against the Apaches, but they were disbanded a year later when troops of the Regular Army returned to the Southwest. The small Regular Army, however, was stretched too thin to be of any real consequence in dealing with the Indians. As Apache raids continued, citizens in Arizona and New Mexico complained bitterly about the Army's inability to protect them.

The Army was also drawing increasing criticism from humanitarian groups in the East about its handling of Indian affairs on other parts of the frontier. These groups accused the Army of provoking unnecessary wars with the Indians, of failing to discriminate between friendly and hostile Indians, and of slaughtering innocent women and children. The Army claimed that most of the problems with the Indians were caused by incompetent and corrupt officials of the Indian Bureau, who tried to manage Indian affairs from Washington

with no first-hand experience of frontier conditions. Another bone of contention was that, during times of peace, the Indian Bureau was responsible for controlling the reservations, but when hostilities broke out this responsibility fell on the Army.

Army officials argued that the Indian Bureau should be transferred from the Department of the Interior back to the War Department, claiming that this would end confusion over responsibilities and jurisdiction for Indian affairs. Civilians responded by insisting that military commanders on the frontier should be subordinated to Indian agents.

In an attempt to solve the growing Indian problem, and to reconcile these conflicting viewpoints, Congress authorized President Andrew Johnson to appoint a Peace Commission on July 20, 1867. This commission was empowered to negotiate treaties with the western Indians; to establish permanent reservations for them; and to formulate plans for "civilizing" them. This was the beginning of the government's "Indian Peace Policy."

The northern Plain Indians were the first to experience the effects of this new policy. Treaties were made with the Sioux Indians which were confusing and contradictory. White settlers continued to occupy lands designated for reservations and were attacked by the Indians who had been told the land was theirs. The bickering

continued between the War and Interior Departments as to who had responsibility for the reservations.

The Army's leaders believed that when Ulysses S. Grant became President in 1869, he would support them. Grant surprised everyone, however, by deciding in favor of the humanitarian reformists. Shortly after he assumed office, Congress authorized the appointment of a new Board of Indian Commissioners to manage the Indian Bureau. This move strengthened the Peace Policy and seemed to give credence to Grant's claim that he wished to avoid a war of extermination with the Indians. The Indian Peace Policy soon became known as "Grant's Peace Policy."³⁹

The Peace Policy put an end to the old treaty system in which Indian tribes had been treated as "sovereign nations." All Indian tribes were now to be concentrated on reservations, by force if necessary. Once on the reservations, the Indians were to be educated, converted to Christianity, and taught to become agriculturally self-sufficient.⁴⁰ The Board of Indian Commissioners was responsible for implementing the policy.

Grant made a concession to the Army by stipulating that Army officers could also be temporarily assigned to the Indian Bureau as agents and supervisors. This would assure the Army of a role in managing Indian affairs and, it was hoped, solve the problem of conflicting jurisdiction. The

Indian Bureau now had exclusive jurisdiction over all Indians on reservations, while the Army was only responsible for Indians off the reservations. All Indians not on a reservation were to be treated as hostiles. Several issues were left unresolved; among them the question of how the policy applied to Indian tribes like the Apaches, who had no established reservations.

Before the Peace Policy could be fully implemented, an incident occurred which caused it to be modified. On January 23, 1870, cavalry troops commanded by Major Eugene Baker attacked and wiped out a village of Piegan Blackfeet Indians in Montana. The public outcry over this incident caused Congress to pass legislation which prohibited Army officers from serving in public posts.⁴¹

This negated Grant's attempt to place officers in key positions as Indian agents and supervisors. Frustrated, Grant directed that only officials nominated by religious denominations could fill the positions which had been vacated by Army officers. His intent was to ensure that incompetent bureaucrats from the Indian Bureau were kept out of these positions. Now that the churches were dominating the management of Indian affairs, however, the implementation of the Peace Policy became decidedly anti-military. Resentment between the Indian Bureau and the Army continued to simmer.

The effects of the Peace Policy were slow to reach the Western and Chiricahua Apaches. After the Civil War, the U.S. had been divided into five military divisions for administrative and operational purposes.⁴² These divisions were further divided into nineteen departments. New Mexico fell under the Department of Missouri of the Division of Mississippi. Arizona was originally part of the Department of California of the Division of the Pacific. On April 15, 1870, the War Department officially established Arizona as a separate department in the Division of the Pacific (see figure 2, Appendix B). This ensured that more emphasis would be placed on military actions against the hostiles in Arizona, but it left Apacheria split between separate military commands in Arizona and New Mexico. This led to duplication of effort and a lack of coordination between the departments, a problem that was not resolved for more than twenty years.

The first commander of the newly formed Department of Arizona was Brevet Major General George Stoneman. After a familiarization tour of the territory in July of 1870, Stoneman determined that the facilities at the existing posts in Arizona were not suitable for departmental headquarters. He obtained permission to temporarily establish his headquarters in Drum Barracks, on the Pacific coast.⁴³ This move effectively isolated him from his subordinate

commands, since the only means of communicating with the posts in Arizona was by mail, which took seven days.

Shortly after he assumed command, Stoneman received instructions from General J.M. Schofield, Commander of the Division of the Pacific, to reduce expenditures within his department. To comply with this order, Stoneman closed several posts and recommended that others be closed; he cut back on the number of civilian laborers employed on the various posts and replaced them with soldiers; and he cancelled several government contracts. These actions earned him the ire of many civilians in Prescott and Tucson who stood to lose a great deal because of these cutbacks. Because of this, and because they believed that the Army was not doing much to protect them from the Apaches, many citizens and politicians began to criticize Stoneman in the territorial newspapers.

Stoneman tried to adapt Grant's Peace Policy by establishing a single temporary reservation for all of the Apache tribes in Arizona, thus, the White Mountain Reservation was created in early 1871 near Camp Apache. The commander of the garrison at Camp Apache was given the responsibility for controlling and supervising all Indians on the reservation. Stoneman ordered his commanders to induce "all the branches of the Apache Tribe living in Arizona" to move onto the reservation, and to inform the Apaches that,

"should they not go and remain upon this reservation, they will be treated as hostile, and will be pursued and punished wherever found."⁴⁴

In spite of civilian claims that the Army was ineffective against the Apaches, Stoneman's troops maintained enough pressure on the Apaches to convince some of them to consider making peace. In February 1871, an Apache chieftan named Eskiminzin, who led a band of about 150 Aravaipa and Pinaleno Apaches, came into the post at Camp Grant to talk with the commander, First Lieutenant Royal Whitman. Eskiminzin indicated that he was willing to make a permanent peace if he and his people could reside at Camp Grant permanently. Whitman told the chief that while he had no authority to make a treaty with him, he would pass along Eskiminzin's request to General Stoneman, and that he would provide food to all Apaches who came peacefully to Camp Grant.⁴⁶ In March, other bands came in and there were over five hundred Apaches living near Camp Grant. Stoneman sent word to Lieutenant Whitman to continue feeding them.

Unfortunately, Apache depredations continued. Many citizens in Tucson believed that Eskiminzin's Apaches at Camp Grant were responsible for most of the raids, and accused the Army of giving sanctuary to the raiders while it left the civilian populace to fend for itself. Another faction in Tucson was just as vehemently opposed to the presence of the

Apaches at Camp Grant and the White Mountain Reservation, but for a different reason. These were the contractors who supplied the Army with feed, hay, beef and other supplies. In their eyes, if the Army was successful at persuading the Apaches to come into the reservations, it meant that active campaigning against the Apaches might soon end, and their livelihood along with it. This band of contractors and speculators, known as the "Tucson Ring", helped fuel the public clamor against the Apaches at Camp Grant.

A citizen's committee voiced their complaints to General Stoneman during an inspection tour he made in late March. William S. Oury, one of the members of this committee, later recalled their meeting:

The result of the conference with that august personage, General Stoneman, was that he had but few troops, and could give us no aid, and that Tucson had the largest population in the Territory, and gave us to understand that we must protect ourselves.⁴⁶

Frustrated at Stoneman's inability, or unwillingness, to protect the citizens of the Territory, Arizona Governor A.P.K. Safford decided to have Stoneman relieved. He traveled to Washington, D.C. on other business in late March; while there, he met with Secretary of War Belknap and President Grant to discuss the situation. After listening to Safford, Grant promised to replace Stoneman.⁴⁷ Safford left Washington in mid-April to return to Arizona with the

news. Unfortunately, the citizens of Tucson had taken matters into their own hands.

On April 28, 1871, an expedition consisting of six Anglo-Americans, forty-two Mexicans and ninety-two Papago Indians departed from Tucson and headed east toward Camp Grant. At dawn on April 30, they attacked the sleeping camp. Accounts vary on the number of Apaches killed, between 85 and 120, but most of the victims were women. Twenty-nine Apache children were taken captive and returned to Tucson, where many of them were sold into slavery.⁴⁰ Most of the warriors were absent from the camp when it was attacked, lending credence to the possibility that they may have been conducting raids from Camp Grant.

News of the Camp Grant Massacre quickly reached the east coast, where it created a furor. President Grant threatened to proclaim martial law in Arizona if the perpetrators were not immediately brought to justice. A trial was held under a federal judge, but the jury of Arizonans failed to convict any of the participants in the massacre. The incident did result in two significant changes within the Department of Arizona. First, efforts were made to speed up the establishment of reservations for the Apaches under the provisions of the Peace Policy. The second change was that General Stoneman was relieved of command of the

Department of Arizona and replaced with Lieutenant Colonel George Crook on June 4, 1871.⁴⁹

As far as the Apaches were concerned, the massacre only served to reinforce mistrust between them and the U.S. Government. Eskiminzin fled to the mountains with the remnants of his band, killing a white settler on the way. Other tribes who had been considering peace now retreated to the safety of the wilderness, determined to resist.

Having looked at the social organization and customs of the Apaches, and the history of their relations with governments on both sides of the border, how did these factors affect the Apache insurgency? In answering that question, I will refer to the U.S. Army's current doctrinal framework for analyzing insurgencies. This framework lists seven elements which are common to all insurgencies: objectives, ideology, leadership, organizational and operational patterns, environment and geography, external support, and phasing and timing.⁵⁰ I have added an eighth element to the list, that of government influence, because I feel that this was a major variable in determining both the development of the insurgency and its eventual outcome.

Objectives: Field Manual 100-20 defines the objective of an insurgency as "the insurgent's desired end state."⁵¹ Obviously, the desired end state of the Apaches was to

maintain their freedom and way of life. The insurgency was not politically motivated; very few Apaches understood the white man's system of government or had a desire to influence that system. By the same token, the Apaches did not recognize the authority of the U.S. Government to take their lands and freedom away.

Unfortunately, the Apache's desire to maintain their freedom and way of life was totally unacceptable to the U.S. Government and its citizens. The Apache economy and socio-political structure was based on raiding and warfare, a perfectly acceptable way of life to them, but not to the settlers who were the victims of Apache violence. The U.S. Government was unwilling to force its white citizens to leave Apache lands, and it could not accede to the Apache desire to maintain the status quo.

Ideology: The ideology, or "cause," of the insurgency was tied directly to its objectives, and was simple, inspiring and convincing to the Apaches: to prevent the white intruders from taking their lands and to keep from being exterminated as a people. It was a cause behind which most Apaches rallied, and one which Apache leaders could use to incite violence against the whites. Tribal unity, or nationalism, was not an integral part of the Apache cause. In fact, it proved to be an ideological conflict that the

Apaches could not resolve. Only a few leaders were able to overcome the unwillingness of small bands and tribes to unite against a common foe. This internal conflict was exploited by the Spanish, and later by the U.S. Army.

Leadership: The Apaches, because of tribal differences and geographic dispersion, were mistrustful of each other and therefore not inclined to join forces against the government. Several important leaders, such as Cochise and Mangas Coloradas, did appear prior to 1871, and others would surface later, but even these men were rarely able to maintain an alliance of tribes for any length of time. The insurgency did not have a strong central leader who could inspire a sense of nationalism among the Apache tribes. This lack of a nationalistic spirit, this failure of the Apaches to unite either politically or militarily, led to their downfall.

Many military and government officials did not understand the democratic nature of Apache tribal government, and were confused by the inability of Apache chiefs to control all of their warriors. Peace efforts were frequently undermined by the independent actions of small groups of undisciplined warriors who refused to be bound to a treaty made by the leader of another band or tribe.

Organizational and Operational Patterns: We have already established that the Apache insurgency had limited aims and was not fought for the purpose of subverting or overthrowing the U.S. Government. In attempting to fit this conflict into a modern doctrinal pattern, the Apache conflict can best be defined in terms of a "traditional," or "secessionist," insurgency:

The traditional insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances . . . It springs from tribal, racial, religious, linguistic, or other similarly identifiable groups. These insurgents perceive that the government has denied the rights and interests of their groups and work to establish or restore them. They frequently seek withdrawal from government control through autonomy or semiautonomy. . . They generally respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence can range from strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism or guerrilla warfare. These insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgent's demands.⁵²

The Apaches were masters of irregular, or guerrilla, warfare. War was a way of life for them. Every man was judged by his performance on the battlefield, and the more loot he could steal or the more enemies he could defeat, the greater his standing among his people. Boys were trained from infancy to become warriors and to endure hardships.

The favored tactics of the Apache guerrillas were the ambush, the raid, and the small-scale attack. They avoided decisive engagements unless strength, terrain and surprise were in their favor. It was common for a raiding party to track the movements of a wagon train for several days until

it approached a location which was suitable for an ambush. The Apaches were extremely mobile and did not have to be concerned with logistics. If their horses gave out, they simply killed and ate them, then stole fresh ones.

Terrorism was another tactic favored by the Apaches, who were noted for their ferocity and cruelty to captives. Every newspaper or official account of an Apache raid is filled with details concerning torture and ritual mutilation. It became common practice for soldiers and frontiersmen engaged in battle with the Apaches to save their last round of ammunition for themselves, rather than risk capture.

They also had a fairly sophisticated communications system. Signals were transmitted by means of smoke, sunlight reflected from glass or mirrors (years before the Army thought to adopt the heliograph as a means of communication), or by arranging piles of sticks and wood at a pre-designated location. Using these methods, the Apaches could warn other bands that a column of soldiers was operating in the vicinity, or pass along information concerning enemy strengths and locations.

Although the Apaches were experts at guerrilla warfare, they did not have the slightest concept of employing their irregular tactics as part of a master strategy. If they had possessed strong central leadership, and a sense of

unity as a people, the outcome of their struggle might have been different. Instead, the insurgency was limited to small bands of Apache guerrillas, under separate leaders, conducting sporadic and uncoordinated strikes and raids.

Environment and Geography: The terrain of Apacheria was ideally suited to the guerrilla tactics employed by the Apaches. The open desert prairies aided mobility but made it difficult to approach an Apache hideout without being observed. The rugged mountains hindered troop movements and provided the Apaches with nearly inaccessible bases. Reliable sources of water were hard to find; some locations were known only to the Apaches. It was an easy matter for them to contaminate a spring after they had used it, or to wait in ambush and attack troops who came for water.

The vast extent of the area of operations also aided the Apache guerrillas. Despite an influx of settlers after the Civil War, the Southwest was still sparsely settled. The white population was concentrated in a few towns or mining camps, and the Army posts were too widely scattered and poorly manned to pose a significant threat to the Apaches. They roamed virtually unrestricted over the entire region, raiding, killing and terrorizing. At the first sign of pursuit, they retreated to their mountain sanctuaries or into Mexico where the U.S. Army could not follow.

The transportation and communications network in the Southwest was very poor. A few mail and transportation routes crossed through the area, such as the Butterfield Overland Stage road, but railroads did not penetrate Arizona Territory until after 1878 and the first telegraph line was not installed until October, 1873.⁵³ The scarcity of transport routes served to isolate settlements and make them more vulnerable to attack. It also made it difficult for the Army to resupply its forces in the field. The lack of a telegraph network made it difficult to coordinate pursuit or interception operations. It is perhaps significant to note that even today, with the aid of aircraft, radar and satellite communications, the vast expanse and rugged terrain of the Southwest pose a challenge to U.S. Government attempts to interdict cross-border narcotics traffic.

External Support: The Apaches did not have the advantage of being able to hide among a friendly populace. Their supportive population consisted of their family, band and tribe members, who moved with them and provided a mobile base from which to hunt and raid. Their source of supplies was the land and whatever they could steal from the whites or other Indians. Many whites unwittingly supported the Apaches by leaving herds of horses and cattle unattended. The only external support the Apaches received was from unscrupulous

traders on both sides of the border, who provided them with firearms, clothing and liquor in exchange for stolen livestock or kidnapped women and children who could be sold as slaves. This type of activity thrived in spite of government bans and police actions by the military. These traders were motivated by greed, of course, not by any desire to support the Apache cause.

Phasing and Timing: The Apache insurgents never progressed beyond the stage of guerrilla warfare, nor did they see a reason to do so. They believed that if they could continue to terrorize the white citizens, and avoid fighting the Army unless the odds were decisively in their favor, that eventually they could achieve a stalemate and the government would be forced to accede to their wishes. This is an effective concept which is employed by many insurgent forces today. Robert Taber describes it using an analogy:

. . . the guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough . . . the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws.⁵⁴

Time was certainly on the side of the Apache insurgents. The last hostile band was not subdued until 1886, after more than twenty-five years of fighting and at a

cost of millions of dollars to the U.S. Government and countless lives on both sides. Simply buying time, however, was not enough. The Apaches did not consider the American determination to settle the whole continent, and they had no concept of the enormous resources that could be brought to bear against them. Even those Apache chiefs who visited large cities in the east were unable to convince their people of what they had seen. As a result, the Apaches deluded themselves into believing that minor tactical victories would defeat the government's will to fight, and that they would be left alone.

Government Influence: Mexican and American settlers saw the Apaches as a hostile indigenous minority, a ruthless and savage people who were an impediment to civilization in the Southwest. These settlers demanded that their governments either eliminate the Apache threat or protect them from it. As we have seen, early government responses were usually hastily contrived solutions which were designed to appease their constituents, and were almost always ineffective because they were not adequately resourced.

The settlers became frustrated at their government's inability to protect them, and organized themselves to hunt the Apaches, usually with the objective of exterminating them. Angered at government attempts to pacify the Apaches,

civilians interfered either directly or indirectly, resulting in incidents like the Camp Grant Massacre.

The Spanish and Mexican governments vacillated between unsuccessful policies of appeasement and extermination. The U.S. Government tried to take a humane approach, but it assigned a low national priority to Indian affairs. It also failed to control the actions of its citizens and soldiers on the frontier, many of whom were unwilling to support a peaceful solution. Treaties were made and broken; treachery and murder - the Bascom affair and the murder of Mangas Coloradas - inflamed tensions and added to the Apache's mistrust of the whites; and Apache raids and depredations reinforced white anger and prejudice.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL STRATEGY

We have had soldiers in Arizona, and we have had philanthropists, and the two seem to work and to argue from antagonistic positions, and so to neutralize each other.¹

The New York Times, March 3, 1872

The Camp Grant massacre brought the "Apache Problem" to national attention. While President Grant's Peace Policy had clearly stated objectives, there was no national strategy aimed at achieving these objectives as far as the Apaches were concerned. The Department of the Interior made no attempt to establish permanent reservations for the Apaches, primarily because no legislation had been enacted to provide funding. The only reservations in Arizona Territory were temporary ones, established and controlled by the Army in spite of the provision of the Peace Policy which stipulated that the military was not to involve itself with the management or administration of Indian reservations.

Galvanized into action by the violence at Camp Grant, the U.S. Government began to formulate a strategy for dealing with the problem. Unfortunately, no single government agency or department had the sole responsibility for coordinating and

implementing that strategy. The Department of the Interior, which included the Bureau of Indian Affairs, was technically responsible for developing national policy for Indians. The War Department was responsible for developing a national military strategy that would achieve the objectives of the policy, yet the Army believed that it should have a say in determining policy, as well. The War Department continued to insist that the Bureau of Indian Affairs be returned to its control, and was adamant in its claims that the Apache situation could only be solved by decisive military action. Army leaders were confident that George Crook would soon subdue the hostiles.

Officials of the Interior Department, however, continued to maintain that the Apaches could be induced to move onto permanent reservations peaceably. They argued that military force should only be used as a disciplinary measure, and under the direction of agents of the Indian Bureau.

The rivalry between these two departments prevented any meaningful exchange of ideas or recommendations concerning the Apaches. Because they could not agree on a solution, each department proceeded with its own plan. As a result of this failure to coordinate a strategy at the national level, the Government continued to deal with the Apaches on a haphazard basis. Military and civilian officials worked at cross-

purposes for the rest of 1871 and most of 1872, achieving little in the way of solving the problem in Arizona.

Lieutenant Colonel George Crook demonstrated his ability as a field commander against the Paiute Indians from 1866 to 1868.² His use of Indian scouts and his adoption of Indian tactics contributed largely to his success. He did not believe that hostile tribes could be peacefully persuaded to settle on reservations; instead he believed that the Army would have to forcibly subdue the hostiles in order to achieve a lasting peace.³ He had little tolerance for the Government's "peace commissioners", or for any officer under his command who openly supported the Indian Bureau. Yet he had a reputation for dealing fairly with the Indians once they had been defeated, doing everything in his power to see that they received just treatment. One warrior later said of Crook: "He was a hard fighter, a strong enemy when we were hostile. But he played fair with us afterwards and did what he could to protect the Indians."⁴

General Schofield, Commander of the Division of the Pacific, and Governor A.P.K. Safford of Arizona were familiar with Crook's reputation. These gentlemen specifically requested that Crook replace the previous departmental commander, General Stoneman. During his meeting with President Grant in March of that year, Safford asked the President to appoint Crook to the position, in spite of

opposition from the Secretary of War and General Sherman who did not want to see Crook take the job ahead of other, more senior officers.⁵

Grant overruled their objections and agreed to Safford's request. Crook was awarded the brevet rank of Major-General, and arrived in Tucson in June of 1871 to assume his duties as Commander of the Department of Arizona.

Crook accepted Governor Safford's offer to establish a temporary headquarters in his home in Tucson.⁶ He remained in Tucson until September 11, organizing for operations against the Apaches. Crook's first order of business was to direct all of his subordinate commanders to temporarily suspend operations and report to him in Tucson. Lieutenant John G. Bourke, chosen by Crook to serve as one of his aides, recalled that as each officer reported to Crook he was interrogated for information concerning terrain, the nature of the enemy, the condition of troops and pack mules, and "every other item of interest a commander could possibly want to have determined."⁷

Crook also listened to advice from Governor Safford and other prominent citizens of Tucson. Their version of the story of the Camp Grant Massacre undoubtedly influenced his attitude towards the affair. He did not condone their actions, but he must have felt that they had provocation, so he did not condemn them either. He later wrote, "many of

these people have lost their friends, relatives, and property by these Indians. They carry their lives constantly in their hands, not knowing what moment is to be their last."⁸

Crook also developed a strong dislike for Lieutenant Royal Whitman, who had publicly spoken out against the perpetrators of the massacre. Crook's attitude was no doubt influenced by his conversations with Safford and others in this regard. He may have believed that Whitman's support of the Peace Policy was not in keeping with the professional conduct of an officer required to fight the Apaches, but Whitman had also been accused by other Army officers and civilians of being a drunkard and a womanizer; it is more likely that Crook simply did not wish to have an officer of this character representing his command. In any case, Crook declared that Whitman "had deserted his colors and gone over to the 'Indian Ring' [meaning the Peace Commission] bag and baggage, and had behaved himself in such a manner that I had preferred charges against him."⁹

Crook's tolerance of the civilians who had participated in the massacre, and his attitude towards Whitman, quickly won him public favor in the territory. These civilians were very vocal in their support for Crook and the offensive he was planning against the Apaches. Most of this support and advice was no doubt sincere and well-intentioned, but some of it was probably aimed at prolonging armed conflict with the Apaches.

Many of the civilians who advocated military action stood to make a healthy profit from the Army, especially during war. They saw a peaceful solution to the Apache problem as an end to their livelihood.

Governor Safford and others advised Crook that the solution to the Apache problem was to use Mexican scouts. The Mexicans purportedly "knew the country, the habits and mode of Indian warfare . . . they could march over the roughest country . . . they could go inside an Apache and turn him wrong side out in no time at all."¹⁰ Crook had used Indian scouts in California and Oregon to great advantage.¹¹ Lieutenant Howard Cushing had already successfully used Apache scouts on a small scale in the territory, although Crook may not have been aware of this.¹²

Why Crook did not immediately enlist Apache scouts is unknown. Perhaps he was dissuaded from the idea by Safford and others who were averse to giving employment to Indians, especially Apaches. In any event, Crook decided to hire fifty Mexicans as scouts. He referred to them as his "Destroying Angels."¹³ It was a decision that he soon regretted.

During his stay in Tucson, Crook made plans for a personal reconnaissance of the central and southeastern portions of Arizona, this being the region with the greatest concentration of Apache tribes. His purpose in making the

march was not only to familiarize himself with the terrain, but to condition his troops and evaluate his officers.

On July 11, 1871 Crook departed Tucson with five companies of the Third Cavalry and his fifty "Destroying Angels." His route went first to Camp Bowie in the Chiricahua Mountains, then north through the Pinaleno and White Mountains to Camp Apache, then west along the Mogollon Rim to Camp Verde and the town of Prescott, a total of more than 675 miles. The first leg of the march to Camp Bowie was uneventful. They reached the post on the fourteenth of July and departed on the evening of the seventeenth, using darkness to conceal their movements. As they moved north during the next few days, they came across several raiding parties returning from Mexico with stolen livestock. The largest of these raiding parties consisted of some sixty warriors. Crook's troops were spotted as they tried to intercept his party and the hostiles fled, leaving the livestock behind.¹⁴

By the time the column reached Camp Apache on August 12, Crook realized that his Mexican scouts were worthless. Not only were they unable to track the Apache raiding parties, they seemed terrified at the prospect of fighting Apaches. Crook discharged them at Camp Apache.

Relying on his prior experience, Crook decided to pursue the idea of using Indian scouts. In the vicinity of Camp Apache were several friendly bands of Coyotero, or White

Mountain Apaches. Crook met with the chiefs of most of these bands, particularly Miguel, Pedro and Alchise, and explained his views and ideas to them.¹⁵ He told the chiefs that it would soon be impossible for the Apaches to make a living by roaming the land and hunting, because the white people would continue to come. Only by settling on the reservations and farming, or raising livestock, could the Apaches hope to survive. Crook promised them that if the Apaches adopted this new way of life, they could become self-sufficient and prosper. If the Apaches stopped raiding and cooperated with the authorities, they would receive full protection from the Army. If any band chose to remain at war, however, it would mean trouble for all Apaches since it was not easy to discriminate between friendly and hostile Apaches. Crook told the chiefs that he expected the peaceful Apaches to "aid him in running down the bad ones . . . He hoped that the Apaches would see that it was their duty to do [so]."¹⁶

After several such conferences, Crook persuaded Miguel and Pedro to enlist as scouts, along with many of their warriors. He organized these Apaches into a scout company, combined with regular soldiers, under the command of Captain Guy Henry, Third Cavalry.¹⁷ Crook then gave orders for three of the units under his command, including Captain Henry's newly formed company, to scout the area toward Camp McDowell on the west bank of the Verde River. This expedition

was successful. Captain Henry reported that the Apache scouts were invaluable; with their assistance he located and surprised a band of hostiles. During the brief skirmish that followed, Henry's troops killed seven warriors and captured eleven female prisoners.¹⁸ Crook did not know of this success until later. He had already departed Camp Apache with two companies of cavalry, bound for Camp Verde.

Crook's reduced force moved north to the Mogollon Plateau and then turned west towards Camp Verde, since he had been informed that there was a clearly defined trail in that direction. Crook soon discovered that there was no trail at all. For almost a week the column wound its way through the rugged terrain and dense pine forests, guided by compass. A small band of Tonto Apaches ambushed the column, which sustained no casualties. Crook personally shot and wounded one of the warriors, but the Apache managed to escape. Three days later, the command reached Camp Verde. The trail that they blazed between Apache and Verde became known as Crook's Trail, and within three years it had been improved and designated as a formal military supply route.

By now, Crook had developed a feel for the terrain in which he would have to operate, and an appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of his troops. He also gained enough knowledge about the Apaches to know that he could not rely on conventional tactics to fight them:

The Apaches only fight with regular soldiers when they choose and when the advantages are all on their side. If pursued to their rocky strongholds, they send their families to some other point beyond immediate reach of danger, while the bucks . . . swarm your column, avoid, or attack, as their interests dictate, dispute every foot of your advance, harass your rear and surround you on all sides. Under such conditions regular troops are as helpless as a whale attacked by a school of sword-fish.¹⁹

Crook decided not to rely on regular troops alone. When he learned of Captain Henry's success with the Apache scouts, he was convinced that he had the solution. The key, he believed, was to enlist large numbers of Apache scouts and to employ them with regular troops. He would use the scouts to locate the hostiles, while his regular troops would do most of the fighting. To this end, he set about organizing several more Apache scout companies at Camp Verde.

Crook had heard rumors that he would not be allowed to conduct offensive operations against the Apaches because of planned attempts by the government to achieve a peaceful solution.²⁰ These rumors were confirmed at Camp Verde when he read in a newspaper that the Board of Indian Commissioners had sent its secretary, Mr. Vincent Colyer, to New Mexico and Arizona for the purpose of making peace with the Apaches and establishing permanent reservations for them.²¹

In May 1871, the Commissioners, with the support of the Secretary of the Interior, persuaded Congress to appropriate \$70,000 for the purpose of establishing permanent Apache

reservations in New Mexico and Arizona.²² This money became available on July 1, 1871. The Secretary of the Interior, with President Grant's personal approval, then appointed Vincent Colyer to head up the delegation of peace commissioners which would travel to the Southwest and oversee the establishment of the reservations.

President Grant directed the War Department to provide full cooperation to Colyer. On July 18, the War Department issued an order which directed military commanders in New Mexico to provide support and protection to Colyer and any Indians who could be induced to come onto the reservation in New Mexico. This order was amended on July 31 to include any reservations established in Arizona.²³

Colyer had full powers to sign peace treaties with any and all Apache tribes, to establish sites for permanent reservations at any place in the Southwest he deemed necessary, and to direct the use of military force to protect the Indians on those reservations. These powers superseded the authority of any military official in New Mexico or Arizona. Crook apparently did not receive copies of these War Department orders until September 7, since Colyer states in his report that he provided Crook with copies on that date.²⁴

When Crook learned of Colyer's visit from the newspapers, however, he immediately suspended his plans for an

offensive. He did not believe that the peace mission would be successful, but he states:

. . . I was afraid if I continued my operations and he [Colyer] was to fail, I would be charged with interference. So I at once countermanded all my orders looking to active operations against the hostiles, and directed all persons under my control to furnish Mr. Colyer all assistance within their power in the carrying out of his peace policy.²⁵

Colyer arrived at Camp Apache in Arizona Territory on September 2. There he met with chiefs Pedro and Miguel. He was dismayed to learn that Crook had enlisted friendly Apaches, and that these scouts had already been responsible for the killing of hostiles while under Captain Henry's command. A dispatch from General Crook had already arrived at Camp Apache, however, countermanding his order to use Apache scouts.²⁶ Crook meant this to serve as a temporary suspension of hostilities, but Colyer must have construed it to mean that Crook was willing to support his plan for pacifying the Apaches:

This order of General Crook, abandoning the practice of taking peaceable Indians from the corn-fields and compelling them to go on the war-path against their brethren, speaks much for his humanity and good sense, and was a great relief to my mind.²⁷

Colyer's initial aim was to establish a single Apache reservation in Arizona, but he soon realized that this was not feasible because of tribal differences, the sheer numbers of

the Apaches, and the logistics involved in concentrating all tribes at one location. He decided to make the temporary reservation at Camp Apache a permanent one, and designated the commander of the post, Colonel John Green, to manage the reservation. Since civilian agents were not immediately available, Colyer decided to appoint Army officers as temporary agents.

Colyer left Camp Apache for Camp Grant, arriving there on September 13. He was met by Lieutenant Royal Whitman and Captain William Nelson, who now commanded the post. Here at Camp Grant, Colyer realized how deeply opposed the citizens of the territory were to the Peace Policy. From the moment they learned of his coming, the territorial newspapers began openly expressing their contempt for his mission. The Arizona Citizen of Tucson and the Arizona Miner of Prescott were printing articles daily which referred to Colyer as a "cold-blooded scoundrel" and a "red-handed assassin."²⁸

The public attack on Colyer became so vicious that Governor Safford published a proclamation in the Citizen which called upon the citizens to treat Colyer "kindly." Safford's back-handed attempt at mollifying the civilians concluded with the words, "If they [the peace commissioners] come among you entertaining erroneous opinions upon the Indian question and the condition of affairs in this Territory, then, . . . you

will be enabled to convince them of their errors."²⁹

Safford's proclamation had no effect on his constituents.

Shortly after arriving at Camp Grant, Colyer learned that a group of about 175-200 "armed white citizens from Tucson" were converging on the reservation. Two Mexican couriers who had arrived earlier from Tucson reported that the expedition had been "gotten up with a view to breaking up the reservation."³⁰ Whether this group intended to attack the camp, or whether they were simply a large prospecting party passing through (as they later claimed), is unknown.

Colyer panicked. He told Captain Nelson that if the group approached within ten miles of the post, he would direct Nelson to gather up the Apaches and provide them with a military escort to Camp Apache, where they could be better protected.³¹ Nelson decided that a more realistic course of action was to prevent the group from approaching within ten miles of the post. He sent a corporal and four troopers to relay this information to the leader of the expedition. The corporal reported back that he had met with the leaders of the group, and that they did not intend to stop.

Nelson then ordered Lieutenant Whitman to "ride out and meet the party and inform them that he was prepared to enforce his order, and had his guns in position, and would open fire on them . . ."³² Whitman complied, and the expedition grudgingly turned back. While the situation was defused

without bloodshed, it gave the territorial newspapers fresh incentive to denounce Colyer and Whitman. It also earned Captain Nelson a reprimand from General Crook. Crook wrote to Nelson that his "action in this matter was unwarrantable", and that he was not to "unnecessarily provoke the hostilities of the citizens toward the military."³³ Crook arranged to have Nelson transferred out of the territory a short time later.

Crook's actions are the ones that seem unwarranted, considering that Nelson used good judgement and was acting in accordance with his instructions to cooperate fully with Colyer. Crook was obviously frustrated at having to halt his operations. This frustration, coupled with his growing disdain for the peace mission and his dislike for those officers who he perceived as having "gone over", may have motivated him.

Before he left Camp Grant, Colyer designated the post as a formal reservation. He selected Lieutenant Whitman to serve as temporary agent, because Whitman had established a deep rapport with the Apaches there and they trusted him. This action must have also rankled Crook.

From Camp Grant, Colyer and his party traveled north, stopping at Camps McDowell and Verde, and reaching Crook's new headquarters at Fort Whipple on October 4. Colyer reported that he was cordially received by General Crook, and that while they "differed somewhat in opinion as to the best policy

to be pursued toward the Apaches," they were able to resolve their differences.³⁴

Crook offers a slightly different version of his meeting with Colyer, saying that when Colyer reached Fort Whipple he expressed pleasure that Crook agreed with him that a peaceful solution was the answer to the Apache problem. Crook replied that he "had no confidence" in Colyer's mission, but since he had been ordered to give assistance, he "proposed to do so conscientiously, so that in case [the] policy was a failure, none of it could be laid at my door."³⁵

Colyer believed that he had succeeded in laying the groundwork for a lasting peace with the Apaches. Events were soon to prove him wrong, but he did succeed in establishing the beginnings of a reservation system for the Apaches. He formed a reservation at Tularosa, New Mexico Territory, for the Warm Springs Apaches. He created three permanent reservations in Arizona Territory: Camp Apache for the Coyotero, or White Mountain Apaches; Camp Grant for the Aravaipa and Pinaleno Apaches; and Camp Verde for the Mohave Apaches. He also established temporary reservations, or "asylums", at Camps McDowell, Beale's Spring and Date Creek for the Tontos and Hualapais until they could be moved to one of the other reservations.³⁶

Colyer left Arizona and returned to Washington by way of San Francisco. While in California, he met with General

Schofield, the Commander of the Division of the Pacific, on October 19. Schofield had heard rumors of friction between Crook and Colyer, but he had received no official reports of a problem from Crook. He expressed his concern on this matter to Colyer, who reported that he had enjoyed a cordial relationship with Crook and other military officials in Arizona. The fact that Schofield did not have current information may have been caused by the inadequate communications system between his headquarters and Crook's. Crook had requested that telegraph lines be extended to Fort Whipple and several other posts in Arizona, but no progress had been made in that direction. The primary means of relaying information was still the overland mail. Also, Crook had a penchant for failing to keep his superiors informed of his actions in the field.³⁷

Colyer also informed Schofield that he had established the reservations in Arizona Territory and had left the post commanders at each location with full responsibility to supervise the reservations, and to "feed, partially clothe, protect, and otherwise care for" the Apaches on them. Colyer requested that Schofield provide two thousand blankets for distribution among these reservations prior to winter.³⁸

Before Colyer even left Arizona, however, reports of Apache depredations began to filter in to Crook at his headquarters. Most of these depredations could be attributed

to hostile Apache bands, but there was evidence that some of them had been committed with bands with which Colyer had supposedly made peace.³⁹ Reports of these fresh Apache outrages were printed in territorial and Pacific Coast newspapers. Colyer saw these reports while he was in San Francisco, but apparently he was not swayed from the conviction that he had been successful. When he arrived in Washington on October 27, he presented a glowing report to the Secretary of the Interior and President Grant.⁴⁰

Shortly after Colyer returned to Washington, an event in Arizona rocked the frontier and seriously undermined his credibility. On November 5, 1871 a stagecoach was attacked near the small town of Wickenburg. Six of the eight passengers were killed. The two remaining passengers were wounded but managed to escape. Among them were a War Department surveying party and an Army quartermaster officer who was transporting a payroll.⁴¹ At first, the attack was blamed on white or Mexican bandits. The Arizona newspapers were quick to shift the blame to the Apaches. Because of the uncertainty, Crook sent Captain Charles Meinhold from Camp Date Creek to investigate. Meinhold's report concluded that the attack had indeed been conducted by Apaches, probably by some of the Apaches being fed and protected on the temporary reservation at Date Creek.⁴²

Some citizens in the territory, however, continued to insist that the "Wickenburg Massacre" was the work of bandits, not Apaches, and that certain individuals had conspired to suppress evidence which proved that the Indians were not guilty. The purpose for suppressing evidence was to "check a humanitarian feeling toward Indians" and to "give Arizona more troops and a larger money expenditure for army purposes."⁴³

When word of the incident reached Washington, advocates of the Peace Policy issued press statements which accused the War Department of falsely blaming the Apaches for the atrocity. The War Department, in turn, accused the peace commissioners of interfering in Army business.⁴⁴

President Grant had serious doubts about whether Colyer was as successful as he claimed. On November 7, Grant called Colyer, Secretary of War Belknap and Interior Secretary Delano to the White House to hammer out a policy which would appease both the military and the civilian agencies.⁴⁵ As a result of the conference, it was decided that:

1. President Grant would issue an executive order which formally established the reservations in Arizona and New Mexico.

2. All "bands of roving Apaches" would be required to move onto the reservations immediately. If they complied, they would be protected accordingly. These Apache bands would not be "permitted to send their old men, women, and children

upon such reservations, and permit their young men and braves to go on the war-path."

3. The War Department would be instructed to notify the white citizens of Arizona and New Mexico of the "determination of the Government to preserve, if possible, peace between the whites and Indians, and that neither will be allowed to depredate or trespass upon the other . . ."

4. The Superintendent of Indian affairs for Arizona would co-locate his headquarters with General Crook.

5. The War Department would select "suitable and discreet" Army officers to serve as Indian agents on the reservations until such time as they could be replaced by civilian appointees.⁴⁶

On November 9, General Sherman sent a copy of this agreement to General Schofield, along with an indorsement which directed him to comply with all facets of the policy.⁴⁷ Sherman's indorsement concluded with the words:

After general notice to Indians and whites of this policy, General Crook may feel assured that whatever measures of severity he may adopt to reduce those Apaches to a peaceful and subordinate condition, will be approved by the War Department and the President.⁴⁸

Crook felt that he had been vindicated. He was delighted at Colyer's failure and later wrote, "By the time Colyer reached San Francisco, his confidence was considerably shaken, and by the time he reached Washington his head was chopped off."⁴⁹

Although the political restraints had been lifted, Crook could not take to the field immediately. His department was in the midst of unit reassignments. The Third Cavalry was rotating out to be replaced with the Fifth Cavalry Regiment, and the Twenty-First Infantry Regiment was being replaced with the Twenty-Third Infantry. Realizing that he would need several months to complete the transition, Crook sent word to the Apache bands that they must come onto the reservations by February 15, or be punished.⁵⁰ Small groups and bands of Apaches trickled into the reservations to receive clothing and rations. Many people, Crook included, believed that there were more than a few hostiles mixed with the friendly Apaches coming in. These hostiles took advantage of the Government's generosity to see them through the winter, caching food and ammunition until spring when they could resume raiding.⁵¹

On February 7, 1872, Crook announced that any Apaches still out after the fifteenth of the month would be considered hostile, and if captured they would be treated as prisoners of war.⁵² As the deadline approached, many strong Apache bands remained out, particularly the Chiricahuas and some of the Tonto and White Mountain bands. Crook received intelligence from his white scouts - Al Sieber, Jack Townsend, Gus Spear and others - as well as from friendly Apaches acting as spies, that the chiefs of these bands had no intention of surrendering. Now, ominously, some of the bands living on the

reservations suddenly fled to the mountains. The Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Arizona, Herman Bendell, reported that most of the eight hundred Tonto Apaches at Camp Verde had departed, leaving only a few old women and children.⁵³

The February 15 deadline came and went, but before Crook could begin his offensive he received a telegram from General Schofield. The telegram relayed instructions from the War Department to "prevent as far as possible collision between the troops and Indians in Arizona."⁵⁴ The reason for this order soon became clear to Crook. The peace commissioners had been given another chance.

President Grant realized that while Colyer was eager and well-intentioned, his antipathy to military involvement prevented him from reaching a workable solution with Crook. Grant believed that a man with previous military experience would be better suited as a peace emissary. Based on Grant's guidance, the Interior Department selected Brigadier General Oliver O. Howard to go to Arizona and work with Crook to find a solution. Howard was an officer with a good combat record in the Civil War. He was an expert in human relations and headed the Freedmen's Bureau after the Civil War.⁵⁵ He was also notorious as a religious fanatic and was referred to in the Army as "Bible-Quoting Howard."⁵⁶

Howard did not arrive in Arizona until April. Crook was forced to limit his operations to pursuit of raiding parties in the interim. The two men met at Camp McDowell. Howard had plenary powers even greater than those of Colyer, making Crook his subordinate. Howard reported that this first visit went smoothly, but Crook was scornful of Howard's religious naivety and irritated at what he saw as Howard's interference with his plans.⁵⁷

Howard visited several other posts, listening to Army officials and Apache leaders at each place. At Camp Grant, he learned that Lieutenant Whitman had been placed under arrest pending a court-martial. Whitman's removal from Camp Grant upset the Apaches there, and Howard was fearful that they would flee the reservation. He directed that Whitman be returned to his duties. Crook was infuriated by this action.

Howard finally decided to call a conference of all Apache chiefs at Camp Grant in May. Messengers were sent out to the various bands with orders for the chiefs to report on the appointed day. Crook rode down from his headquarters at Fort Whipple for the conference. Governor Safford and a U.S. District Attorney named McCaffrey also attended.⁵⁸

The most important Apache chief to attend the conference was Eskiminzin. He and his warriors had been on the warpath since the Camp Grant Massacre. In a recent skirmish with Crook's troops, he had been wounded and thirteen

of his warriors killed. He came into the conference under a white flag, with assurances from Lieutenant Whitman that he would be safe.⁵⁹ Eskiminzin was primarily concerned with whether General Howard would help him get back the children stolen from his people during the massacre. Many of these children had been adopted into Mexican families living in Tucson.

The conference was relatively inconclusive in terms of establishing a peace. After two days of negotiation, Howard promised to return the children. Crook, Safford, and District Attorney McCaffrey were strongly opposed, stating that it was wrong to take the children away from their adopted homes, and that they were better off where they were.⁶⁰ Crook may have taken this stance because he did not wish to lose civilian support, but it is surprising since he generally espoused the view that the Apaches must be treated honestly and fairly.

Eskiminzin left the conference without committing himself to a peace treaty. Several other Apache leaders complained that Camp Grant was too hot and barren to be a permanent reservation. Howard agreed with them and designated a huge new tract of land which adjoined the Camp Apache Reservation. The new reservation was to be called San Carlos. It was also decided that Camp Grant would be relocated onto the new reservation as soon as possible.

Howard returned to Washington in June, accompanied by ten Apache chieftans who had agreed to meet with government officials there. The peace commissioners touted this as proof that Howard's mission had been successful and that war with the Apaches would soon be a thing of the past.⁶¹ Although Howard knew otherwise, he apparently did little to discourage this optimistic attitude. However, reports and dispatches from the frontier soon brought news of fresh Apache depredations. The majority of these incidents were attributed to the Chiricahuas under Cochise.

After meeting with his advisors in July, President Grant decided that the Apache Peace Policy would never be successful unless the Chiricahuas agreed to it. General Howard was ordered to return to Arizona and negotiate a treaty with Cochise. In the meantime, Crook was still waiting for permission to begin his campaign.

Howard arrived at Camp Apache near the middle of August. After several futile attempts to arrange a meeting with Cochise, Howard learned of a white man, Thomas J. Jeffords, who was reported to be a good friend of the Chiricahua leader. The two men met in September, and Jeffords consented to take Howard to meet Cochise on the condition that he go alone, without troops. Howard agreed.⁶²

Jeffords led Howard to Cochise's stronghold in the Dragoon Mountains. Howard remained in Cochise's camp for

eleven days, during which time he negotiated a treaty with the chief. It is not clear whether this treaty was ever committed to paper. Cochise insisted that he would not settle on a reservation unless a new one was created which encompassed the traditional Chiricahua homelands in the Dragoon and Chiricahua Mountains. Cochise also stipulated that Jeffords must be the agent for the reservation. Howard agreed on both counts.⁶³

The completed treaty had a serious flaw. Cochise told Howard that he would stop his warriors from molesting American citizens, but he could not prevent them from raiding across the border into Mexico. Howard avoided the problem by stating that he did not have the authority to establish a peace treaty for the Mexicans, and the matter was left unresolved.⁶⁴

The treaty forced Crook to halt all hostilities against the Chiricahuas. He tried to obtain a copy of the treaty, but to no avail:

I never could get to see the treaty stipulations, although I made official applications for them . . . This treaty . . . had a bad effect on my Indians [scouts], as they thought I was afraid of Cochise, because I left him unmolested.⁶⁵

As General Howard returned to Washington, Jeffords acted quickly to establish the Chiricahua reservation. True to his word, Cochise ceased his attacks against the citizens of Arizona and New Mexico. On Howard's recommendation, the Board of Indian Commissioners abolished the temporary reservations which Colyer had created at Camps McDowell and

Date Creek. The Apaches at these locations were relocated to one of the permanent reservations. An executive order published on December 14, 1872, formally established the Chiricahua, San Carlos and White Mountain (formerly Camp Apache) Reservations.⁶⁶

By the end of September 1872, only a few hundred Western Apaches had come onto the permanent reservations. The majority of the hostile bands remained hidden in the wilderness and refused to submit to the government. These bands continued to raid and kill. There was also firm evidence to prove that Apaches were leaving the reservations to raid, as well. On September 30, Lieutenant Max Wesendorff, with a detachment from Company A, First Cavalry, tracked a band of raiders to the Verde Mountains and attacked them, killing seventeen warriors and capturing one woman. The Apaches had ration tickets in their possession, showing that they had drawn rations four days earlier at Camp Verde.⁶⁷

Crook submitted his annual report that month, listing over forty incidents of Apache depredations and atrocities.⁶⁸ He reiterated his belief that the only way to establish a lasting peace in the territory was to conduct a decisive campaign against the hostiles. General Schofield endorsed Crook's report, recommending that "General Crook be given ample resources and full authority to deal with this difficult problem."⁶⁹

This time, President Grant did not disagree. After seventeen months of bureaucratic in-fighting, indecision, and vacillation between policies of peace and war, Crook was finally given approval to conduct his offensive.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TONTO BASIN CAMPAIGN

In operating against [the Apaches] the only hope of success lies in using their own methods . . . a partial tribal disintegration must take place, and a portion of the tribe must be arrayed against the other.¹

Brevet Major-General George Crook

Crook was forced to curtail his operations while Colyer and Howard were in Arizona, but he kept his troops conditioned by conducting long marches and reconnaissance missions. He sent an expedition under Captain Julius Mason to track down a band of Apaches which he believed was responsible for the Wickenburg Massacre. This column consisted of Companies B, C and K of the Fifth Cavalry, and about eighty Hualpai scouts under guide Al Sieber. Mason tracked the hostiles into the Santa Maria Mountains and attacked them on October 25, 1872, killing forty warriors and taking a number of prisoners.²

Crook also paid particular attention to his pack trains. He knew from experience that campaigns against Indians could not hope to be successful if a column was encumbered by long trains of heavy wagons. These wagon trains were unable to follow troops over rugged terrain, they created a dust signature which could be spotted miles away, and they

were difficult to protect. Crook used mule pack trains to replace the wagons, and he took a special interest in developing and refining procedures for using them. Bourke says that Crook "made the study of pack-trains the great study of his life."³ Crook's pack trains became the best in the Army and set a standard that was used through World War II.⁴

When Crook was assigned to the Department of Arizona, he arranged to have three pack trains transferred with him from the Department of the Columbia.⁵ These formed the nucleus of his new transport system. Pack trains were already in use in Arizona, but they were in abysmal condition. The animals and equipment belonged to the Army, but were managed by civilian packers, whose services were contracted. These packers were primarily interested in making a profit, and did not spend much time caring for the animals or maintaining equipment. Many of the animals were too small to carry heavy loads, and were poorly fed and covered with sores.

Crook replaced the unreliable packers. He sold off most of the mules and replaced them with animals of the proper size, weight and build. The pack cushions provided by the Quartermaster Department were of poor quality and caused more injuries than they prevented. To keep the animals from developing sores, Crook insisted that each mule be fitted with a tailor-made cushion. He made sure that each mule was

properly cared for, spending "one to two hours in personal inspection of the workings of his trains" each day.⁶

As a result of these improvements, Crook found that his mules were able to carry an average load of 250 pounds, while Government regulations stated that the average load should not exceed 175 pounds.⁷ Despite the increased load, the pack trains proved that they could keep up with Crook's columns through some of the most rugged terrain in the world, averaging thirty miles a day on the plains and fifteen miles a day in the mountains.⁸ A typical pack train was comprised of fifty pack mules, ten to fourteen riding mules, ten packers, a blacksmith, cook and packmaster. The train was broken into "troops" of ten mules and two packers each. The mules lived entirely on grass, so it was not necessary to carry grain for them.⁹ These pack trains enabled Crook's commands to operate independently for long periods. No longer would a column have to give up pursuit of a hostile band because it had run out of supplies. The pack trains would be one of the keys to Crook's success in the upcoming campaign, second in importance only to his Apache scouts.

While Colyer was in Arizona, Crook temporarily shelved his plans to create new companies of Apache scouts. After January of 1872, however, he began to enlist friendly bands and had formed several more scout companies. A scout company usually contained twenty-five warriors. The unit was

commanded by a white officer, but all of the non-commissioned officers were Indians. The scouts received thirteen dollars a month, and their term of enlistment was for six months. The Army provided them with a rifle, cartridge belt, canteen and blanket, and uniforms if they chose to wear them.¹⁰

The scouts were not usually mounted, but travelled on foot ahead of the column to locate Apache rancherias, or villages. They remained in contact with the regulars behind them by means of messengers. The scouts also provided flank security, with five or six warriors travelling on either side of the column. Even on foot, the Apache scouts could cover forty to sixty miles a day. The regular troops on their big, grain-fed horses were pressed to keep up. The only supplies the scouts required were rations, ammunition, and materials to repair or replace their moccasins.¹¹

Crook did not want the scouts to become decisively engaged, since he did not believe they were trained, experienced, or motivated enough to be an effective fighting force by themselves. Companies of regular troops were required to do the decisive fighting.

Crook organized his commands so that they could conduct independent, sustained operations over a vast area against an elusive enemy. He knew that his units would have to pursue the hostiles relentlessly to keep them from scattering. They would have to cross paths frequently in order to shift forces

and exchange intelligence. In order to achieve this flexibility and economy of force, Crook ensured that every command contained the three elements that he saw as essential for success: Indian scouts, companies of regular troops, and pack trains. Because there was initially a shortage of Apache scouts, Crook recruited Paiute, Yuma, Pima and other Indians to meet his requirements.

Each command was tailored to perform a particular mission or objective. Units which were searching for Apache villages, or conducting reconnaissance for a larger force, were smaller and had more Apache scouts than a command which was sent to attack a known Apache position. The commands did not remain static throughout the campaign, either, but changed in size and composition as the mission dictated.

To lead these commands, Crook selected officers who he believed were motivated and resourceful enough to act independently, but within the framework of his operational intent. These officers had to be patient enough to adapt to having the undisciplined Apache scouts under their command; and they also had to be "of the best physique, in robust health . . . of undisputed courage" so that the Apaches would accept them as leaders.¹²

Crook intended to conduct a winter campaign. The Tonto Basin is a vast area, heavily forested and broken by canyons, rivers and steep ridges. It is a basin only in the sense that

it is slightly lower than the mountains which surround it, and winter snows are common throughout the entire region. By locating and destroying the hostile villages, or rancherias, Crook planned to force the Apaches into the high country. He knew that the snow and cold would limit the mobility of the hostiles, and make it difficult for them to obtain food. They would be forced to build shelters and keep fires burning, making it easier to detect them. The snow would also limit the mobility of his forces, but at the same time it would alleviate the shortage of water which plagued operations during the summer months.

Crook planned to use all of the regular troops at his disposal within the Department of Arizona: the Fifth Cavalry Regiment, the Twenty-Third Infantry Regiment, and elements of the First Cavalry and Twelfth Infantry Regiments.¹³ (see Appendix A for a complete listing of these units). The infantry companies were charged with maintaining security at posts and reservations throughout the territory, while the First and Fifth Cavalry conducted the bulk of the field operations. Crook assumed a risk by doing this since he would be leaving some posts and many civilian settlements virtually undefended. He reasoned that if his columns kept the hostiles constantly moving, they would be too busy to raid.

He intended to conduct the offensive in two phases. During the first phase, columns from Camps Hualpai, Verde and

Date Creek would sweep the region west of the Verde River and drive the hostiles out of their rancherias and into the Tonto Basin. This would enable him to burn the rancherias and any winter stores left behind. It would also prevent the hostiles from raiding the settlements west of the Verde River in order to replenish the supplies they had lost.

During the second phase, additional columns from Camps Apache, McDowell and Grant would take to the field. Together, they would gradually close the perimeter around the Tonto Basin, crossing the Basin on routes selected by Crook so that the columns could periodically cross paths to exchange intelligence and support each other as needed. The Apaches would be kept constantly on the move, fleeing from one column into the path of another.

Crook personally coordinated many aspects of the campaign, such as specifying areas of operations and routes of march for each of the separate commands. He also specified dates on which the columns were to return to Camps Verde and McDowell to replenish their supplies. He planned to travel between these posts by Army ambulance in order to receive reports and issue additional instructions. Crook issued mission-type orders which clearly stated his intent, but which also gave his subordinate commanders the freedom to conduct tactical operations as they saw fit:

The Indians should be induced to surrender in all cases where possible; where they preferred to fight, they were to get all the fighting they wanted, and in one good dose instead of a number of petty

engagements, but in either case were to be hunted down until the last one in hostility had been killed or captured. Every effort should be made to avoid the killing of women and children . . . When prisoners could be induced to enlist as scouts, they should be so enlisted . . . No excuse was to be accepted for leaving a trail; if horses played out, the enemy must be followed on foot, and no sacrifice should be left untried to make the campaign short, sharp, and decisive.¹⁴

Crook instructed his commanders to concentrate on destroying or neutralizing several especially violent and dangerous chieftans: Delshay, Chunz, Nanni-Chaddi, and Cochinyay. Crook believed that if he could eliminate the threat from these chieftans, other bands could be induced to surrender. Some of his Apache scouts knew where Delshay, Chunz, and Nanni-Chaddi had their rancherias, and were willing to guide Crook's troops there. Crook assigned these scouts to his two largest commands for the second phase of the campaign.¹⁵

Phase one of the operation began on November 16 when the first three columns departed from Camp Hualpai. These were: Company C, Fifth Cavalry, commanded by Captain Emil Adam; Company K, Fifth Cavalry, commanded by Captain Julius Mason; and Captain Robert Montgomery's Company B of the Fifth Cavalry. Each column also contained a detachment of thirty to forty Indian scouts.¹⁶ These columns had the mission of clearing the hostiles from the areas at the head of the Verde River, south of the San Francisco Mountains and in the Chino

Valley. Crook departed from Fort Whipple a few days later for Camps Apache and Grant, where he would complete preparations for the second phase of the campaign. He left Captain Azor Nickerson in charge at Fort Whipple, and gave him the responsibility for coordinating operations during phase one.

The three columns from Hualpai had varying degrees of success. Captain Adam's command, aided by their Paiute scouts, was able to surprise a band of hostiles in the east side of the Chino Valley, killing eleven warriors and capturing three women and a child. Montgomery's column burned several rancherias, but reported only two hostiles killed and three others captured. Captain Mason's column also burned several rancherias, but the hostiles were warned of their coming and managed to escape.¹⁷

All three columns returned to Camp Verde on November 30 for re-provisioning. The expected snows had not yet fallen, and the columns had suffered from a shortage of water, particularly the Indian scouts who were moving on foot ahead of the regular troops. Many of the scouts were ready to quit when they reached Verde, but a few days later the snow came and the situation improved. Captain Mason had been suffering from rheumatism and was forced to turn command of his column over to Lieutenant William Rice.

While the first three columns were out, Captain Nickerson finished organizing two others at Camp Verde. These

were Company I of the First Cavalry, commanded by Captain Clark Carr, and Company A of the Fifth Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Albert Woodson. Both of these columns had a small detachment of scouts, as well.¹⁸ In accordance with Crook's guidance, Nickerson directed all five columns to scout the Red Rock region and then sweep in a large semi-circle from northwest to southwest of Camp Verde, through the mountains south of Prescott. The columns moved out on December 3.

As soon as they left, Nickerson rushed to meet a sixth column which was coming from Camp Date Creek. This column was commanded by Captain George Price and consisted of Company E, Fifth Cavalry and about thirty-five Date Creek Indian scouts. Nickerson directed Price to continue scouting to the southeast, toward Camp McDowell. He was to make contact with the other columns enroute, and return with them to Camp Verde by mid-December to prepare for their part in phase two.¹⁹

In the meantime, Crook had already begun phase two of the offensive. On or about December 3, he directed Captain George M. Randall's command at Camp Apache to scout west along the Salt River and across the lower Tonto Basin to Camp McDowell. Randall's command included Companies L and M of the First Cavalry and a detachment of Apache scouts. Randall was ordered to locate Delshay's rancheria and destroy it, and to capture or kill the chief. Randall's Apache scouts took him to Delshay's rancheria on December 11. Delshay escaped during

the two-hour battle that ensued, but fourteen of his warriors were killed. Two days later, Randall was able to locate and attack another large rancheria, killing eleven warriors and capturing six women and children.²⁰ The column arrived at Camp McDowell about December 16 for refitting, and returned to the field after a few days.

At Camp Grant, Crook organized a strong column under brevet Major William Brown. This column included Company L of the Fifth Cavalry, commanded by Captain Alfred Taylor; Company M of the Fifth Cavalry, commanded by First Lieutenant Jacob Almy; and thirty-one Apache scouts.²¹ This column set out from Camp Grant on December 11 to scout the Pinaleno, Mescal, Superstition and Mazatzal Mountains, with a final destination of Camp McDowell. Brown's column was provisioned for thirty days in the field, and was to link up with another column in the Superstition Mountains. This other column was being organized at Camp McDowell. Commanded by Captain James Burns, it consisted of Company G, Fifth Cavalry and a large force of ninety-eight Pima Indian scouts.²² Once the columns had completed their linkup, they were to locate the rancherias of Chunz and Nanni-Chaddi.

On December 18, the five columns belonging to Woodson, Carr, Adam, Montgomery and Rice returned to Camp Verde to prepare for their part in phase two of the offensive. All of these columns reported contact with the hostiles, and the

destruction of rancherias and supplies.²³ Lieutenant Rice's column had been the most successful, killing thirteen warriors and capturing three women.²⁴ The sixth column, under Captain Price, was forced to halt northwest of Camp McDowell at a place named Townsend's Ranch. Price had overextended his column in an attempt to cover the large area between Camps Date Creek and McDowell, and needed to resupply. During a skirmish near Baby Canyon on December 13, he had captured nine women and an old man from a band that had been raiding along the Gila River.²⁵

Nickerson sent the five columns at Camp Verde out again on December 23. Carr, Rice and Woodson were to cross over the Verde River, separate and sweep through the northern half of the Tonto Basin along the base of the Mogollon Rim, then work their way back toward Camp Verde. Adam and Montgomery were to move south with their columns, link up with Price, then cross the Verde River just north of Camp McDowell. From there, they would turn north and scout the western portion of the Basin as far as the east Branch of the Verde River. Crook now had nine separate commands operating in the Tonto Basin. Figures 3 and 4, Appendix B, show an approximation of their initial routes.

On December 25, Major Brown's column completed its linkup with Captain Burns' command in the Superstition Mountains. Burns had left Camp McDowell on December 20, and

that same day his men destroyed a rancheria, killing six men and capturing a woman and child.²⁶

Both commands moved north, crossed the Salt River, and by December 27 were camped in a small canyon in the Mazatzal Mountains. Here they prepared for what would prove to be the first major engagement of the campaign. Brown held an officer's call and announced that one of their Apache scouts, Nantaje, who had been raised in the rancheria of chief Nanni-Chaddi, was now going to lead them to the rancheria. Brown ordered that the pack trains be left behind and guarded by a small force. The remainder of the command would attack under cover of darkness.

At 8:00 P.M. the command moved out on foot, with the Apache scouts in the lead. They marched west through the foothills of the Mazatzals and then south to the canyon of the Salt River. Just before dawn, the scouts spotted the fires of the Apache rancheria. The scouts, along with white guides Archie McIntosh and Joe Felmer, were sent ahead to investigate while the rest of the column remained hidden. They soon returned with the news that there was a small rancheria on the edge of the canyon. The rancheria was deserted except for a small herd of horses and mules that had been left to graze. From the appearance of these animals, it was obvious that they had just been stolen in a raid. The scouts reported that the

fires they had seen earlier were, in fact, below the rancheria and inside the canyon.

Brown ordered Lieutenant William Ross to take twelve or fifteen of the best marksmen among the soldiers, as well as Nantaje and some of the other Apaches, and move down the trail which led into the canyon. He ordered Captain Burns to take Company G and scout upstream along the rim of the canyon. A short time later, gunfire erupted from the canyon below them. Brown now ordered Lieutenant John Bourke to take an additional forty men to reinforce Lieutenant Ross while he consolidated the rest of the men and followed.

Ross had discovered that the main part of the rancheria actually lay on a natural shelf in the wall of the canyon, at the rear of which was a wide, shallow cave. The Apaches were feasting and celebrating the results of their raid, and the soldiers were able to get very close before they were discovered. When they opened fire, the Apaches retreated to the safety of the cave. The cave was actually just an overhang in the cliff wall, but it was protected in the front by large blocks of rock which "furnished a natural rampart" for the Apache defenders.²⁷

Brown quickly closed with the rest of the soldiers. He positioned the men in two skirmish lines to prevent the hostiles from escaping. Using his interpreters, he demanded that the hostiles surrender. He was answered by jeers and

gunshots from the Apaches inside the cave. Brown repeated the demand, with the same results. He then asked the Apaches to send out their women and children, but to no avail. Brown ordered his troops to fire into the cave, aiming at the rock walls and ceiling so that the bullets would be deflected down behind the stone rampart at the entrance. This was relatively successful, as the attackers could hear the cries of the wounded and the warriors were forced to expose themselves in order to return fire.

Brown ordered a cease-fire and made a final demand for surrender. Instead of surrendering, about twenty of the warriors jumped over the stone blocks and raced towards the skirmish lines in an attempt to break out. Six or seven were killed immediately by the withering fire, and the others were driven back into the cave. After a brief lull, Brown again ordered his command to mass their fires into the cave.

In the meantime, Captain Burns had returned with G Company. Burns stopped on the edge of the cliff, directly above the cave, and sized up the situation. He harnessed two of his men with suspenders so that they could lean out over the edge of the cliff and fire directly down behind the stone rampart in front of the cave. The rest of the troopers began to roll large rocks over the edge, which glanced off the cliff as they fell and shattered into hundreds of deadly fragments.

After several minutes, Brown gave orders to cease fire and signalled Burns to have his men stop their bombardment. When the dust cleared from the cave, the soldiers cautiously approached the entrance. Bourke reported that thirty-five of the Apaches were still alive but severely wounded. Of these, only eighteen women and children survived to be taken back to Camp McDowell. Bourke believed that they might have saved more of the wounded hostiles, but the column was "not provided with medical supplies, bandages, or anything else for the care of the sick and wounded."²⁸ A total of seventy-six Apache warriors, women and children were killed during the Battle of Salt River Cave.²⁹ Nanni-Chaddi's band had been virtually eliminated. Brown sustained only one casualty, a Pima Indian scout who was killed early in the fight.

On January 6, 1873, after little more than a week at Camp McDowell, Brown's command returned to the field, this time consisting of Companies B, C, G, H, L and M of the Fifth Cavalry.³⁰ Crook was determined to end resistance south of the Salt River, so this command began its operations in the Superstition Mountains. On 15 January, 1873, after an all-night march, Brown attacked a small rancheria near Pinto Creek. Three warriors were killed and thirteen prisoners were taken; among them was the old chief of the band.³¹

Three days later, the column was hailed by an eight-year old Apache boy who had been sent as an emissary to

request peace. Brown fed the boy, but told him that he would only negotiate with an adult male. The boy soon returned with an old woman, but Brown repeated his instructions and was finally able to talk with the chief himself. The chief told Brown that his people were too widely scattered to surrender immediately, but that he would meet Brown's column at the confluence of the Gila and San Pedro Rivers in a few days and go to Camp Grant with the soldiers.

Brown arrived at the designated meeting place and was met by the chief and several of his men. The chief wished to discuss terms but Brown told him that he would have to wait and talk to General Crook at Camp Grant. As the column headed toward Camp Grant the next day, it was quietly joined by the chief and 110 of his people. Crook accepted their surrender and persuaded twenty-six of the warriors to enlist as scouts.³²

Major Brown was prepared to continue operations in the basin, but Crook had other plans for him. Cochise had honored the treaty made with Howard the previous autumn, and his Chiricahuas were no longer raiding American settlements. The treaty did not prevent raiding into Mexico, however, and Governor Pesquiera of Sonora had lodged complaints with Crook and Governor Safford of Arizona.³³ Crook decided to send Major Brown to meet with Cochise and attempt to persuade him to stop the cross-border raids.

Brown headed south in late January, accompanied by the Chiricahua agent, Tom Jeffords, the civilian agent from the San Carlos Reservation, George Stevens; Lieutenants John Bourke and Charles Rockwell; and white scout Archie McIntosh.³⁴ The group met with Cochise in his stronghold in the Dragoon Mountains on February 3. Bourke states that Cochise reiterated his desire to remain at peace with the Americans, but made it clear that, under terms of the treaty, he would not tolerate the presence of soldiers or white settlers on the reservation. Cochise did not deny that his warriors were raiding into Mexico. He said that he himself was at peace with Mexico, but that he would not prevent his young men from raiding because the Mexicans had not asked him for peace, and because warriors from other reservations were doing the same thing. Cochise also claimed that small bands of the Nednhi Chiricahuas living in the Sierra Madre Mountains of Mexico were responsible for some of the raiding.³⁵

Brown returned to Camp Grant and reported this information to Crook, whose hands were tied. The Chiricahuas were residing within his department, but he could not take military action against them unless they threatened American citizens. Preoccupied with his campaign in the Tonto Basin, Crook had to content himself with keeping an eye on Cochise by means of spies and informants in the chief's camp. Major Brown took several days to reorganize his command at Camp

Grant, picking up Lieutenant Woodson's Company A, Fifth Cavalry for a total of seven companies. The column left Grant on February 15 and headed north.³⁶

Meanwhile, Crook's other commands remained busy in the Tonto Basin. They pursued the hostiles relentlessly through the canyons and over the snow-covered high country. The columns which departed Camp Verde on December 23 had since returned for refitting. Captain Price and Company E, Fifth Cavalry, had killed six warriors, captured three women and destroyed large amounts of supplies. Lieutenant Rice and a detachment from Company K, Fifth Cavalry, also reported six warriors killed. Captain Carr's Company I, First Cavalry, killed one warrior. A "party of Maricopa [Indian] Allies," who were tracking some stolen livestock, caught up with a band of Tonto Apaches in the Bradshaw Mountains on December 28 and killed thirty-six warriors. It is not clear whether these Maricopas were operating under Crook's guidance, or if this was an incident of tribal warfare which Crook promoted to his advantage.³⁷

Bourke notes that Crook came to rely more and more on the Apache scouts for reconnaissance and flank and advance security. Many of the less reliable Indian scouts, such as the Pimas and Maricopas, were discharged.³⁸

Operations were hampered now by the outbreak of an animal disease called the "epizootic", a sort of influenza

which was affecting the entire country. Hundreds of horses and mules in Arizona died from the disease, and many of the columns were forced to continue the campaign on foot.³⁹ Even so, they remained remarkably effective. The months of January and February 1873 were characterized by dozens of small skirmishes which resulted in the killing or capture of hostiles. Resistance was beginning to weaken, but there were still isolated instances of Apache depredations.

On March 11, a band of Apaches tortured and killed three civilian men near the town of Wickenburg. Crook immediately renewed his efforts and the list of Apache casualties grew. Major Brown's command was now operating in the Tonto Basin and reported fifteen warriors killed and eight women captured. A detachment of Company K, Fifth Cavalry, led by Second Lieutenant Frank Michler, killed five warriors and captured half a dozen prisoners in the Mazatzals on March 19. Captain Randall's command, which now included Company A of the Fifth Cavalry, left Camp McDowell on the trail of the Apaches who had committed the murders at Wickenburg.⁴⁰

By late March, Captain Randall had tracked the raiders to the east branch of the Verde River. Several of his pack mules strayed away and were recovered by the hostiles, who began to send smoke signals to each other as a warning that the soldiers were nearby.⁴¹ Randall's scouts read the signals and told him that the hostiles were not aware of their

exact location. Randall decided to stop and go under cover while his scouts did their work. One of the scouts was able to capture a female from the hostile band and brought her back to camp. Crook relates that the woman was "intimidated" into disclosing the location of her rancheria and forced to act as a guide.⁴²

After dark, Randall's command followed the woman north along the Verde and then west into the mountains. They soon approached a "circular mountain running up into a column, with but one mode of ingress"⁴³ The flat summit of this butte was the site of the hidden rancheria, and the "mode of ingress" was a deep notch in one of the cliff walls. Randall's men crawled on their hands and knees up the rocky slope; their feet covered with gunny sacks to muffle the noise of their movement. Shortly after midnight they moved into position around the rancheria and remained hidden for the rest of the night. At dawn on March 25, Randall gave the order to attack.

The Apaches were "so panic-stricken that numbers of the warriors jumped down the precipice and were dashed to death."⁴⁴ While the exact numbers are unknown, Crook wrote that all of the warriors were killed and most of the women and children were taken prisoner. Interrogation of the prisoners, as well as certain items found in the village, confirmed that

this was the same band which had conducted the raid near Wickenburg.⁴⁵

This Battle of Turret Mountain (the name was derived from the shape of the butte) was the second, and final, major engagement of the Tonto Basin Campaign. Although Crook did not know it yet, this battle was to have an immediate and far-reaching effect on the remaining hostile bands. Bourke later said:

This and the action in the cave in the Salt River Canon [sic] were the two affairs which broke the spirit of the Apache nation; they resembled each other in catching raiders just in from attacks . . . in surprising bands in strongholds which for generations had been invested with the attribute of impregnability, and in inflicting great loss with comparatively small waste of blood to ourselves.⁴⁶

Bands of Apaches now began to appear at the military posts around the Tonto Basin, offering to surrender. During the first week of April, warriors from several of the hostile bands came into Camp Verde to negotiate for peace. Crook sent them back, insisting that he would only talk with their chiefs. He gave orders to temporarily suspend hostilities until he could determine if the Apaches were serious about wanting peace.⁴⁷ The columns began to return to Camp Verde, exhausted and bedraggled from months in the field.

On April 6, 1873, the hostile chief Cha-lipun reported to Camp Verde with over three hundred of his people and offered his unconditional surrender to Crook. Cha-lipun spoke

as the representative for other bands as well; his offer of surrender included over 2,300 hostiles. Lieutenant Bourke, who witnessed the surrender, recalled Cha-lipun's words:

They [the Apaches] had never been afraid of the Americans alone, but now that their own people were fighting against them they did not know what to do; they could not go to sleep at night, because they feared to be surrounded by daybreak; they could not hunt - the noise of their guns would attract the troops; they could not cook mescal or anything else, because the flame and smoke would have drawn the soldiers; they had retreated to the mountain tops, thinking to hide in the snow . . . but the scouts found them out and the soldiers followed them. They wanted to make peace, and to be at terms of good-will with the whites.⁴⁸

Crook shook hands with Cha-lipun and then addressed all of the chiefs who were present. He told them that as long as the Apaches promised to live peacefully, they would be treated well. The Apaches must agree to make a lasting peace, not only with the Americans but with the Mexicans and other Indian tribes, as well. They must remain on the reservations and submit to a daily count. As long as there were hostiles remaining in the mountains, all Apaches on the reservations would be required to wear "tags attached to the neck, or in some other conspicuous place, upon which tags should be inscribed their number, letter of band, and other means of identification."⁴⁹

Crook told the Apaches that they would be expected to work. The crops they raised would be sold and the profits returned directly to them. The Apaches would have to halt

certain tribal practices, such as cutting off the noses of adulterous women and brewing their traditional drink "tiswin", which was a potent alcoholic brew made from corn. They would be expected to preserve order among themselves. Some of them would be enlisted as scouts and "made to do duty in keeping the peace." 50

Crook had obviously given a great deal of thought to how the reservations within his department would be managed, and to how he would implement programs designed to educate the Apaches and make them self-sufficient. It is also obvious that he expected the reservations to remain under military jurisdiction for some time, because he immediately issued a set of orders which formalized his plans.

General Orders Number 12, issued on April 7, directed that Apaches who remained upon the reservations and complied with Government regulations would be protected by the Army. It also stated that after "a sufficient time shall have elapsed to enable the friends of any renegade still at large to bring them in," the Army would take action. Hostiles would be "forced to surrender or be destroyed."⁵¹ When Cha-lipun and the other leaders surrendered on April 6, organized resistance from the hostiles was effectively broken. Several key hostile leaders still remained at large, however; among them was Delshay. Crook was not willing to take the chance that Delshay would turn himself in. Within a few days, Captain

Randall's command was in the Mazatzal Mountains in search of the chief and his followers.

On April 25, Randall located and surrounded Delshay's camp on the upper Canyon Creek. His men opened fire on the hostiles at dawn. After the first few shots, Delshay raised a white flag and asked to surrender. Randall accepted the surrender, and Delshay and 132 of his people followed the soldiers back to Camp Apache.⁵² Delshay soon decided that the reservation was not to his liking and fled to Camp Verde with his followers. He claimed that he had been abused at Camp Apache by other Indians and begged to be allowed to remain at Verde. Crook consented.⁵³

General Orders Number 13 were published on April 8. This was a memorandum of instruction in which Crook announced his policies concerning the reservations. The order directed that a small detachment of Apache scouts would be maintained at each reservation. These detachments were to be commanded by junior officers (personally selected by Crook), and would "constitute the police force of the reservations."

Commanding officers at each reservation would aid civilian agents in "instructing the Indians in, and establishing among them civil government in its simplest form," so that the Apaches would eventually be capable of self-government. Crook cautioned that the Apaches "should not be judged harshly for acts which in civil codes would

constitute minor offenses," but he also warned that the Apaches should not be allowed to deceive agents and officers "in matters of greater import, being careful to treat them as children in ignorance, not in innocence."

Crook must have had a premonition of the problems to come, because he concluded by saying, "Perfect harmony between the officers of the Indian and War Departments, on duty together, is absolutely necessary." If differences arose between military and civilian officials, they must not be aired in front of the Apaches, but referred to the departmental commander for resolution.⁵⁴

Crook's General Orders Number 14 were published on April 9, commending his forces for completion of a campaign which had earned them "a reputation second to none in the annals of Indian warfare."⁵⁵ General Schofield, Commander of the Division of the Pacific, added his congratulations in his General Orders Number 7:

To Brevet Major-General George Crook, commanding the Department of Arizona, and to his gallant troops, for the extraordinary service they have rendered in the late campaign against the Apache Indians, the Division Commander extends his thanks and congratulations upon their brilliant successes. They have merited the gratitude of the nation.⁵⁶

Territorial newspapers referred to Crook as "the Napoleon of successful Indian fighters."⁵⁷ News of the results of the campaign quickly reached the East Coast, as did copies of Crook's latest series of general orders. On April

22, the New York Times proclaimed, "Perfect harmony exists between the officers and the Indian and War Departments. . . there seems to be no doubt that the peace thus inaugurated will be permanent."⁵⁸

By May 1873, most of the First Cavalry Regiment was withdrawn from the Department of Arizona and reassigned to the Department of the Columbia to participate in operations against the Modocs. A requisition for fresh horses to replace the ones lost to the "epizootic" was cancelled. The Tucson Citizen announced that "it looks as though the Government had come to the conclusion that an era of peace had come over Arizona, and that by no possibility could she ever again be disturbed."⁵⁹

As a result of the Tonto Basin Campaign, Crook was promoted to the permanent rank of brigadier general on October 29, 1873.⁶⁰ The news of his promotion was transmitted over a newly completed military telegraph line which terminated in Prescott, the first line installed in the territory.

General Crook's Tonto Basin offensive would be called a strike campaign today. A strike campaign is defined as "a series of major combat operations targeted against insurgent tactical forces and bases in contested or insurgent-controlled zones . . . They serve to keep guerrilla forces moving and off balance."⁶¹ Strike operations are aimed at defeating the active military element of the insurgency movement, but are

only one component of the government's overall counterinsurgency strategy. Some of the crucial factors that must be considered when planning strike operations are: intelligence, tactical operations, logistics, psychological operations, and command and control.⁶²

Intelligence: Prior to starting the campaign, Crook made it his business to gather as much information as he could concerning terrain, the Apaches, the status and condition of his forces, and the current political situation in Arizona. He did this by questioning his experienced officers, by meeting with the territorial governor, by inspecting each of his posts, and by making a personal reconnaissance of the territory. After evaluating this information, Crook was thoroughly familiar with the situation facing him. Today we call this the intelligence estimate process.

Probably the biggest factor contributing to Crook's success, and the one which he considered to be the most important, was the use of Apache scouts. Crook and his commanders quickly realized the necessity of using the Apache's own methods against them; not only to locate and attack the hostiles, but to convince them that further resistance was useless. The scouts provided Crook with the foundation of an extremely effective intelligence system, enabling him to be proactive in his operations.

Crook supplemented the information he got from the scouts with what he collected from his small network of spies and informants.⁶³ He came to rely more and more upon the Apache scouts, not only for intelligence and reconnaissance, but for their increasing value as irregular troops. His initial fears that the scouts would refuse to fight their own people were dispelled when he began to receive reports that they were often engaging the enemy before the regular troops could close.

Crook also focused on identifying and neutralizing key hostile leaders. He knew in advance where many of these leaders and their rancherias were located. As prisoners were interrogated, Crook was able to add to his intelligence base. The manner in which Apache prisoners were interrogated is not well documented, but Crook's admission that the female prisoner who led Captain Randall's command to Turret Mountain was "intimidated" into doing so, and the fact that interrogations were usually conducted by Apache scouts, indicate that forceful methods were not uncommon.

Tactical Operations: According to modern doctrine, strike forces are organized as "self-sufficient task forces capable of operating in areas remote from logistical bases."⁶⁴ This description can certainly be applied to Crook's command. He realized that conventional columns, tied

to wagon trains or the nearest post for logistical support, were useless against the Apache guerrillas. He decided instead to form small mobile commands which operated on converging routes to penetrate and control the territory occupied by the hostiles.

Crook's forces totalled about 1,850 at the start of the campaign. Of these, only about nine hundred soldiers, or a brigade-sized element, were actually employed in the field at any given time (these figures do not include Indian scouts or civilian guides and packers).⁶⁵ The constant movement of these small columns enabled them to cover vast distances and prevented the Apaches from concentrating or establishing ambushes. By fleeing from one column, the hostiles often stumbled into the path of another. The routes of each column were carefully designated so that they would cross paths often, allowing commanders to concentrate their forces if the need arose.

Logistics: Another key to Crook's success was his logistics plan. The use of mule pack trains enabled his columns to conduct sustained, independent operations, and to move through terrain which was inaccessible to wagons. The pack trains were also much easier to conceal and defend than wagon trains.

Psychological Operations: Crook made extensive use of psychological operations, although he probably did not consider them as such. He decided to conduct a winter campaign in order to deprive the Apaches of food and shelter. His mobile columns kept the hostiles continually on the move, denying them sleep and keeping them in a constant state of fear. Crook planned to neutralize key leaders, knowing that it would have a demoralizing effect on the remaining hostiles. The use of their own people to track them down in the most remote, and supposedly secure, hiding places was the most discouraging factor of all for the Apaches.

Command and Control: Crook task organized each of his columns with combat troops, scouts and pack trains, making them each totally self-sufficient. To lead these columns, he chose daring and competent officers who could operate independently but within his intent. He issued broad, mission-type orders that clearly laid out his guidance, but which left room for his subordinates to exercise initiative and to be flexible in their choice of tactics. Although the lack of a telegraph network was a significant problem, Crook worked around it by relying heavily on mounted couriers and by positioning himself to meet each column as it came in for resupply. This allowed him to pass on updated intelligence reports and to issue new guidance as necessary.

In light of these factors, Crook's strike campaign must be judged a success. The campaign effectively ended large-scale Apache resistance in Arizona and forced most of the Western Apaches onto reservations. Estimates of the number of hostiles killed during the campaign vary wildly, ranging from two hundred and forty to six hundred.⁶⁶ Crook's forces suffered less than a dozen casualties, including soldiers, scouts, and civilian packers and guides.

By May 1873, 1,500 Apaches were settled on the Camp Apache, or White Mountain Reservation; 1,400 were at the San Carlos Reservation; 1,700 at Camp Verde; 600 at Camp Beale Springs; and 1,200 on the Chiricahua Reservation; for a total of 6,400.⁶⁷ The pronouncement of a permanent peace, however, was premature. Although most Apaches agreed to submit to Government policies and regulations, they remained fearful and resentful. Crook was still faced with the problem of the Chiricahuas. Cochise declared that he would leave the reservation and return to the mountains with his people rather than comply with Crook's demand for a daily head-count.⁶⁸ Now that the hostiles had been subdued, the Department of the Interior was maneuvering to regain complete control of the reservations, clashing with Army officials in the process. This discord between civil and military authorities, along with corruption and mismanagement within the Indian Bureau, soon led to further problems with the Apaches.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONFLICT CONTINUES

I mention the material prosperity which is apparent in the Territory as the direct result of peace with the Apaches. It is to be hoped that there may be no mistakes in their management that will disturb this condition, for an Indian war, deplorable at all times, is much more to be deplored when it is the result of violated faith on the part of the Government or its agents.¹

Brigadier General George Crook

In the spring of 1873, the Apache reservations were faced with many problems, but the most critical of these was the U.S. Government's failure to provide adequate financial support. Congress had appropriated only \$250,000 to pay for the subsistence of Apaches on all reservations in Arizona and New Mexico for the fiscal year ending in June 1873. This figure was based on an estimate of 7,500 Apaches on the reservations at \$33.33 per person, per year.²

There were an estimated 6,400 Apaches on Arizona reservations alone, with more coming in daily. The estimate of \$33.33 per person was a gross miscalculation, especially considering that appropriations for the Sioux Indians were based on a figure of \$48.66 per person and that it cost

considerably more to transport supplies to Arizona Territory than it did to the northern plains.

The initial appropriation of \$250,000 was nearly gone by January of 1873, and H.R. Clum, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, requested an additional appropriation of \$150,000 to meet the deficiency. The additional appropriation was approved, but even so, many Apaches lived on the verge of starvation that spring.

Plans to keep the Apaches gainfully employed were hampered by a lack of tools and supplies. At Camp Verde, the Indians were put to work digging an irrigation ditch. All available tools were collected from Verde, Fort Whipple and Camp Hualpai for this purpose, but they proved to be woefully inadequate. Many of the warriors resorted to digging with hammers, old cooking kettles or sharpened sticks, while the women hauled dirt away in wicker baskets. Because of the lack of proper tools, the Apaches were not able to complete the five-mile long ditch until June of the following year.³

Using the same tools, the Camp Verde Apaches also tilled and planted fifty-seven acres of ground with melons and other produce. They constructed a water wheel from old packing crates, the only materials available, to assist in bringing water to their fields. This work was done at an estimated cost of thirty-six dollars to the Government.⁴

The Indians at Camp Apache had only "a few grubbing hoes condemned by the Quartermaster Department and fixed by the post blacksmith, and . . . sticks hardened in the fire" to work with. In spite of this, they managed to cultivate enough land to yield a harvest of 500,000 pounds of corn and 30,000 pounds of beans that year.⁵

Agent Tom Jeffords was having even more difficulty in maintaining the Chiricahua Reservation. When General Howard gave Jeffords authority to establish the reservation in October of 1872, he also arranged to have the post commander at Camp Bowie feed the Chiricahuas for sixty days. This arrangement ended in mid-December and Jeffords tried unsuccessfully to get support from the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Arizona, Dr. Herman Bendell. Bendell refused to assist Jeffords, or allow him to hire agency personnel, because Jeffords was not a duly appointed agent of the Indian Bureau.⁶

Superintendent Bendell was having problems of his own. During his visits of the previous year, General Howard had authorized expenditures of over \$25,000 for the Apaches, either by signing vouchers or sending the bills to Bendell. Many of these purchases were questionable. \$442.88 was spent at Camp Apache for tobacco and matches and \$380.00 at the Chiricahua Reservation for coffee (the Chiricahuas did not drink coffee and sold it instead). The Indian Bureau refused

to make payment on the more dubious vouchers. Merchants who did not receive payment refused to deal with Bendell; others forced him to pay inflated prices.⁷

In desperation, Jeffords resorted to buying supplies on credit, issuing even more worthless vouchers against the government. On some occasions, he used his own money. When his creditors began to demand payment, he wrote to General Howard in Washington. Howard discussed the matter with his friend E.P. Smith, who had recently been appointed as the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs. On March 5, Dr. Bendell received a telegram from Commissioner Smith, directing him to provide supplies to the Chiricahua Reservation.⁸

The Chiricahua's situation improved after that, as regular shipments of beef, corn and flour were delivered to the agency. Jeffords still did not have enough money to pay for the operating expenses of the agency or the salary of his employees - he continued to absorb many of these costs himself.

The Chiricahua agency was located in the dry and barren Sulpher Springs Valley, and was unsuitable for agriculture. Jeffords selected a new site on the San Simon River, east of Camp Bowie, and applied to the Indian Bureau for permission to move the agency. The Bureau approved his request, but would not provide funds to construct new buildings or to buy seeds and farming implements. Jeffords and his staff, assisted by

the Chiricahuas, built the new agency headquarters from the materials at hand: adobe and stone. He was able to beg and borrow enough supplies from Camp Bowie to begin teaching the Apaches to farm.⁹

The U.S. Government's failure to provide adequate funding for the Apache reservations was exacerbated by another problem; that of mismanagement and corruption in the agency system. In December of 1872, Congress had decided that the reservations should be returned to civilian control as soon as possible. The Dutch Reformed Church, a religious denomination which had very few members in the Southwest, appointed most of the new civilian agents in Arizona.¹⁰ Other appointments were made within the Department of the Interior as political favors. Most of these agents arrived in Arizona with two things in common: they had no prior experience in managing Indian affairs, and they were essentially honest. Inexperience could be overcome, but there were a few unscrupulous agents as well, and these were the problem.

The new agents were authorized to purchase, or contract for, rations and supplies based on the number of Indians on their reservation. The agent submitted a headcount to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, usually on a monthly basis, and funds were disbursed accordingly. Dishonest agents were able to defraud the government by reporting an inflated headcount, and they cheated the Apaches by shortchanging them

on their ration allocations. These agents were often abetted by members of the "Indian Ring", or the "Tucson Ring" as it was sometimes called; local merchants and suppliers who held contracts with the agents. The Indian Bureau had five inspectors who were supposed to audit each agency at least twice a year, but it was relatively easy for the dishonest agents to juggle their books to keep from being caught.

Crook wrote that, after the Apaches surrendered and settled on the reservations, "the Indian agents, who had sought cover before, now came out as brave as sheep, and took charge of the agencies, and commenced their game of plundering."¹¹ Perhaps Crook's caustic comment exaggerates the extent of the corruption, but there is no doubt that it was present.

A new agent was assigned to the reservation at Camp Beale's Springs in January, 1873. The Apache and Hualpai Indians there soon began to complain that they were not getting enough to eat. Captain Byrne, the post commander, decided to investigate the complaints and watched the agent as he issued rations. Byrne had the Indians bring their rations to another scale, where he weighed them again. He quickly discovered that the agent was cheating the Indians by using falsely calibrated scales. In one instance, a family entitled to ninety-five pounds of beef received only fifteen pounds.¹²

Byrne informed the agent that he was taking charge of issuing rations at the post. This, of course, did not sit well with the agent, who notified Superintendent Bendell. Bendell accused Byrne of overstepping his authority and meddling in Bureau affairs. Accusations flew on both sides, until Byrne decided to ask for a military court of inquiry. The board did not convene until July 29, 1873, with the department Medical Director, Dr. E.I. Baily, serving as president. During the course of the investigation, the court verified that the agent had indeed tampered with his scales and was selling the "surplus" food to local miners for a hefty profit. The court determined that Byrne had not "exceeded his proper authority or interfered with the agents of the Indian Department," and that he was "fully vindicated and justified" in reporting the fraud.¹³

Contemporary accounts make no mention of what happened to the crooked agent at Camp Beale's Springs. Dr. Bendell had already resigned on March 26, 1873. Whether his resignation was motivated by frustration or from fear of implication is unknown. He was replaced for a short time by Dr. John A. Tonner, the agent for the Colorado River Reservation near Fort Yuma. Crook accused Bendell of having "carried off some \$50,000 for his share of the spoils" during his tenure in office, but agent Tonner examined Bendell's books and found no proof to substantiate this.¹⁴ Tonner served for only a

short time because the office of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Arizona was abolished in June of that year. After that, agents reported directly to the Indian Bureau, which increased the chances for abuse and mismanagement.

Crook was determined not to let the corrupt agents have absolute control over the reservations. He advised his post commanders to closely monitor the activities of the Indian agents. He also assigned additional officers to the major reservations, ostensibly for the purpose of "assisting" the civilian agents. Major Brown went to Camp Apache, Second Lieutenant Schuyler was sent to Camp Verde, and First Lieutenant Jacob Almy to Camp Grant.¹⁵ In spite of these additional precautions, Crook was not able to circumvent the trouble which was brewing at the San Carlos Reservation.

The Indian agent at San Carlos was George H. Stevens. An appointee of the Dutch Reformed Church, he was a competent and honest man. The Apaches at San Carlos trusted him and there were few complaints. Stevens ran afoul of the "Tucson Ring" by refusing to collaborate with them, and the members of this group formulated a scheme to have him replaced. This scheme took the form of a letter, addressed to the Indian Bureau in Washington and supposedly signed by Stevens, which slandered General Howard. The plot succeeded when Stevens was summarily relieved of his duties. It was not proven until later that the letter was, in fact, a forgery.¹⁶

The Indian Bureau appointed Charles Larrabee, a recently retired Army officer, to replace Stevens. Since it would take several weeks for Larrabee to close out his business affairs and travel to San Carlos, another agent, Dr. Reuben A. Wilbur, was directed to temporarily manage the reservation. Wilbur had been running the Papago Indian Reservation in Tucson, and purportedly had close ties with the "Tucson Ring."

At the same time, the Indian Bureau directed that the Apache bands living at Camp Grant be moved to the San Carlos Reservation.¹⁷ Crook provided troops to assist Dr. Wilbur in transferring approximately 1,500 Apaches. This consolidation quickly caused trouble. Many of the bands and tribes now forced to live in close proximity were jealous and distrustful of each other. The more powerful chiefs fought over leadership and two factions began to form. One was led by Eskiminzin and Chiquito, who had come from Camp Grant. The other, and more dangerous, faction was led by Chunz, Cochinay and Ba-Coon.¹⁸

There were outbreaks of violence between the two factions. One of Chunz's warriors molested Chiquito's favorite wife; another warrior killed a man from Eskiminzin's band. Dr. Wilbur did little to try to quell the violence or to help negotiate a peace between the factions.¹⁹

Agent Larrabee arrived at San Carlos in early March, and walked into the middle of a dangerous situation. Dr. Wilbur was angry at being relieved. His business dealings with the "Tucson Ring" were very profitable, and he was not ready to vacate such a lucrative post. He began to incite the Apaches by telling them that the new agent could not be trusted. Larrabee immediately realized what was happening. He tried to defuse the situation by meeting with the chiefs and assuring them that they would be treated honestly, but Wilbur continued to undermine his authority.

Major William Brown, the post commander at Camp Grant, paid a visit to the reservation on May 8 and was shocked at what he found. Larrabee appeared to have lost any semblance of control over the Apaches, who were openly feuding with each other. Brown wished to arrest Chunz for a murder that the chief had committed at Camp Grant, but he could not do so without Larrabee's permission, and the agent had already agreed to pardon Chunz.²⁰ Brown met with the chiefs and warned them that they must obey Larrabee or be punished by the Army. His warning did not seem to have much effect, so he decided to leave First Lieutenant Jacob Almy and a small detachment of soldiers at the agency to provide security.²¹

Dr. Wilbur continued to foment trouble. Later investigation revealed that he intended to have Larrabee replaced, or possibly even killed. By mid-May Wilbur had

enlisted the support of Chunz, Cochinay and Ba-Coon. Eskiminzin and Chiquito, however, sensed that trouble with the white soldiers was imminent. They quietly collected their people and moved into the remote, mountainous portions of the reservation.

On May 27, Larrabee was issuing rations to the Apaches, most of whom were armed. Chan-deisi, a sub-chief in Cochinay's band, insisted that Larrabee give him extra ration tickets. Larrabee refused. Chan-deisi persisted and the agent continued to deny him the extra tickets until Chan-deisi raised his lance and threatened to kill Larrabee. Ba-coon, who apparently had a change of heart toward Larrabee, intervened and saved the agent's life. Larrabee sent for Lieutenant Almy, who arrived shortly with seven soldiers. Larrabee asked Almy to help him arrest Chan-deisi, but the warrior had disappeared into the throng of Apaches who were milling around the agency headquarters.

Lieutenant Almy decided to talk with the Apaches and persuade them to give Chan-deisi up. As he approached the group, alone and unarmed, a shot rang out. Witnesses later claimed that the shot was fired by Chan-deisi. Clutching his side, Almy turned around and staggered back toward the soldiers. The Apaches fired a second shot which struck Almy in the head and killed him instantly. The soldiers began to fire wildly at the Apaches, and although there was a great

deal of noise and confusion, Almy remained the only casualty. Chunz, Cochiday and Chan-deisi fled with their people.²² A pursuit column was organized at Camp Grant within a few hours, but the Apaches had too much of a headstart.

When Crook learned of the incident, he was furious. He insisted that none of the Apaches who had left San Carlos would be allowed to surrender until Chunz, Cochiday and Chan-deisi were brought in - dead or alive. Several units were dispatched to hunt down the renegades.

Lieutenant J.B. Babcock, with thirty-two troopers from Company E, Fifth Cavalry, and eighteen Apache scouts, followed a trail for seven days until he overtook one of the renegade bands near Tonto Creek on June 16. Fourteen warriors were killed and five women and a child were captured. Babcock also found several other camps that day which had been hastily abandoned.²³

Captain Burns and G Company, Fifth Cavalry, found a trail on June 30 and followed it for seventy miles before they located and attacked the renegades, killing one warrior and wounding three others. On July 15, Burns overtook another band of fifty Apaches, who surrendered without a fight.²⁴ Chunz, Cochiday and Chan-deisi were not among the killed or captured.

In the meantime, Dr. Wilbur returned to Tucson where he inexplicably managed to continue serving as the Papago agent

until 1874. Agent Larrabee submitted his resignation on June 18.²⁵ The Indian Bureau ordered agent James E. Roberts at Camp Apache to manage both his own reservation and the one at San Carlos, but Crook absolutely refused to relinquish full control to him. Crook appointed Captain George Randall to manage the San Carlos agency, and stationed Company I, Fifth Cavalry there to preserve order.²⁶

Trouble also erupted at Camp Verde later that summer. Delshay, in spite of his promise to remain at peace, was instigating an uprising among the other Apache bands. In mid-September, Lieutenant Schuyler apprised Crook of the steadily worsening situation. Crook responded with instructions to arrest Delshay. Before Schuyler could carry out these orders, however, Delshay and his warriors attacked the agency headquarters. The attack was thwarted by the intervention of guide Al Sieber and some loyal Apache scouts.

That night, Delshay took about forty of his followers and left the reservation. The Apaches "went into the Verde River, and travelled down it for twenty miles, so as to leave no sign, until they came to a rocky point on which they could escape into the mountains."²⁷ This was a desperate measure, since the autumn of that year was marked by torrential rains and flooding. Creeks and rivers were swollen and nearly impassable. Horses and men mired in the mud, but pursuit of the hostiles continued. On October 29, Major Brown and

Companies L and M of the Fifth Cavalry found and attacked Delshay's rancheria in the Mazatzal Mountains. The soldiers killed twenty-nine warriors and captured nine prisoners; Delshay's brother was among the dead.²⁸

Autumn turned into winter and operations dragged on. Lieutenant William Rice left Camp Grant with a column on December 1. His command scouted through the Tonto Basin, where two feet of snow now covered the ground, and finished up at Fort Whipple on Christmas Day. He reported striking two rancherias, killing twenty-one Apaches and capturing two women and ten children.²⁹ Captain Burns reported in to Whipple on December 27, having completed another scout of over seven hundred miles in thirty-six days. His company had killed six Apaches and captured a chief of one of the smaller bands, Chimehuevi, who was brought back to the post in irons.³⁰

As 1873 drew to a close, four of the most dangerous Apache chiefs - Delshay, Chunz, Cochinay and Chan-deisi - along with several hundred renegade warriors, were still at large. On January 4, 1874 a fifth name was added to the list. Captain Randall had implemented severe disciplinary measures at San Carlos after he assumed control of the reservation. Many of the Apaches, especially Eskiminzin, resented the harsh treatment and threatened to leave the reservation. Captain Emil Adam was the commander of the military detachment at San Carlos, and on New Year's Day, Randall ordered him to arrest

Eskiminzin. Adam took Eskiminzin into custody, but three days later the chief escaped and headed north into the wilderness, followed by six bands of Apaches.³¹

The Indian Bureau added to Crook's problems in January by directing that the Hualpai Indians at Camp Beale's Springs be transferred to the Colorado River Reservation near Fort Yuma. The move was scheduled to take place on January 26, but the Indians refused to go. They left the reservation and headed for the mountains, declaring that "sooner than go they would fight to the death."³²

Crook prepared to send troops after them, and Captain Byrne arranged a meeting with their leaders. The Hualpais trusted Byrne because of the part he had played in exposing the cheating scheme at the agency. His persuasive arguments, and fear of reprisals from the troops, prompted the Hualpais to change their minds. They returned to the agency in March and agreed to go peaceably to the Colorado River Reservation. Crook was now able to focus his attention on the other problems in his department.

Numerous reports of Apache depredations came into the headquarters at Fort Whipple. Miners were attacked, settlers in the San Pedro Valley were slain and their livestock stolen, and a family of six was tortured and killed near Phoenix.³³ Under increasing pressure from the territorial government, Crook decided to mount another winter offensive.

Two columns, one from Fort Whipple and the other from Camp Verde, combed the Tonto Basin. A third column scouted the Superstition Mountains. A renegade Apache who had turned himself in provided Crook with the intelligence that Chunz, Cochiday and Chan-deisi had established a large rancharia in the Pinal Mountains. Crook dispatched another column from Camp Grant to find the rancharia and destroy it. This column was led by Captain Randall and contained elements of Companies B, F, H, I, L and M of the Fifth Cavalry, Apache scouts, and the renegade informant who had agreed to act as guide. Randall was able to approach the village undetected, and attacked at first light on March 8. About a dozen warriors were killed and twenty-five prisoners captured, but the three renegade chiefs escaped.³⁴

On April 2, First Lieutenant Alfred Bache and Companies F, L and M, Fifth Cavalry attacked a band of renegades near Pinal Creek. Thirty-one Apaches were killed and fifty captured in the fight. Two days later the chief of this band, Juan Clishe, surrendered with the rest of his people.³⁵

Lieutenant Walter Schuyler and Company K, Fifth Cavalry returned to Camp Verde a few weeks later. They had been in the field nearly three months and had fought three major skirmishes in the Superstition Mountains, killing fifty-six renegades and capturing thirty-two.³⁶ There was still no sign of Chunz, Cochiday or Chan-deisi.

The break that Crook was looking for finally came in late April. Eskiminzin meekly reported in to the agency at San Carlos with what remained of his band. Tired, cold and nearly starved, the Apaches offered to surrender. Crook was notified and he immediately set out for San Carlos.

He was becoming increasingly frustrated. His soldiers were able to track down most of the warriors, women and children of the renegade bands, but the chiefs eluded him at every turn. Also, he probably believed that even if the chiefs were brought in alive, it would only be a matter of time before they stirred up trouble again. This frustration may have led to his decision to take a new, and surprisingly brutal, approach to the problem. When he arrived at San Carlos, he confronted Eskiminzin and the other Apaches:

I refused to accept their surrender, but told them I could not harm them, as they had thrown themselves on my mercy, but I would drive them all back into the mountains, where I could kill them all, that they had lied to me once, and I didn't know but what they were lying to me now. They begged to be allowed to remain, making all kinds of promises for the future. I finally compromised by letting them stay, provided they would bring in the heads of certain of the chiefs who were ringleaders, which they agreed to.³⁷

Crook even offered a reward for Delshay's head.³⁸

The Apaches, faced with this ultimatum, had little choice but to comply. Crook offered a slightly milder explanation of his course of action in his annual report that year. He said that the Apaches agreed to hunt down the renegade chiefs because:

. . . in almost every case of attack by the troops . . . the leaders got away, until these followers began to see that they were the great sufferers, after which desertions to our side became numerous, and it was through these desertions that we were finally enabled to get the ringleaders.³⁹

Whether the Apaches were motivated by a fear of Crook, by offers of rewards, or by a desire to avenge themselves on the leaders who had put them in their predicament, is uncertain. Two things, however, are certain. The first is that word quickly spread to Apaches on other reservations that the renegade chiefs were to be killed. The second is the fact that, within a few months, all four of the chiefs were dead.

Cochinay was killed by Apache scouts near Tucson on May 26, and his head was brought in to San Carlos.⁴⁰ Chan-deisi was killed on or about June 12 by the Apaches; his head was delivered to Camp Apache.⁴¹ Apache scouts and volunteers from San Carlos, led by a Tonto warrior named Desalin, tracked down Chunz and six of his followers in the Santa Catalina Mountains near Tucson. On July 25 they returned to San Carlos with all seven heads, which were put on public display.⁴²

Only Delshay was left now. Three Tonto warriors departed from Camp Verde and returned at the end of July, bringing with them a scalp and an ear which they claimed belonged to Delshay. Desalin led a second party, which turned up at San Carlos with a head that the group swore was Delshay's. The head could not be positively identified,

however, and both groups demanded the reward. Crook was not one to split hairs. "Being satisfied that both parties were earnest in their beliefs," he wrote, "and the bringing in of an extra head was not amiss, I paid both parties."⁴³

With the last of the renegade chiefs accounted for, and remaining hostiles trickling in to the reservations to surrender, Crook ceased his field operations. He began to concentrate on administrative matters within his department. Several of the smaller posts were closed and the troops consolidated at the larger posts, and work began on an extension of the telegraph line from Fort Whipple to Camp Apache. In the autumn of 1874, the Eighth Infantry Regiment began to relieve the Twenty-Third Infantry. There were only a few Apache depredations during the rest of the year. This was good news for the citizens of the territory and it helped the Army by reducing the costs of buying and transporting supplies.⁴⁴

The prospect of a lasting peace with the Apaches seemed closer than ever before, but it was only an illusion. New problems loomed on the horizon.

The great Chiricahua chief, Cochise, died on June 8, 1874.⁴⁵ He was succeeded by his son Taza, a warrior who was friendly to the whites, but who did not have the influence over the Chiricahuas that his father had. Cochise had kept his young warriors in check, but many of these men were not

willing to listen to Taza. Older members of the tribe began to compete with him for leadership rights, and splinter groups formed. Renegades from other Apache tribes found refuge on the Chiricahua reservation and added to the growing unrest.

The frequency of Chiricahua raids into Mexico increased. Mexican authorities were forced to prevent their citizens from making counter-raids into U.S territory and demanded that the depredations halt. In his annual report for 1874, Crook warned that if "the raids attributed to the Apaches from the Chiricahuas continue to be made on Sonora, we should be prepared for complications of a serious nature."⁴⁶ And now, for the first time since Howard had made peace with Cochise, came accusations that the Chiricahuas were depredating north of the international border.

Only four months after their arrival at the Colorado River Reservation, the Hualpais were in desperate straits. Crook asked that the Indians be permitted to return to one of the mountain reservations. He reported that:

. . . their situation is deplorable; being mountain Indians, the heat of the place . . . with a want of proper diet, has produced an eruptive disease, which seems to have become almost epidemic. . . Many of their little children are nearly blind from an affection of the eyes . . . The horses they have purchased to breed from have nearly half of them perished from starvation.⁴⁷

Word of the plight of the Hualpais also reached the Apache reservations, and added to the fears of many that they

might suffer a similar fate. They were not far wrong. In Washington, congressional testimony was revealing widespread corruption and waste in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Commissioner Smith and his advisors decided that the best way to reduce costs and corruption was to eliminate reservations and consolidate as many Indians as possible on the remaining reservations. This reasoning completely ignored the needs and rights of the various Indian tribes, but it appealed to desk-bound bureaucrats who had no concept of what managing a reservation was about. As part of the new plan, proposals were made to close the agencies at Camps Verde and Apache, and to consolidate all Apaches in Arizona on the San Carlos Reservation.⁴⁸

Reaction to this "concentration policy" in Arizona was mixed. The military, who realized that it was a mistake to put such a conglomeration of tribes and bands in one place, was violently opposed. The members of the "Tucson Ring," who exerted considerable influence in Washington, saw it as an opportunity to expand their business holdings and perhaps to monopolize all contracts with the giant San Carlos Reservation. Several Indian agents in Arizona, who were aware of the problems that might arise and should have known better, gave their indorsement to the plan. The most notable of these was John P. Clum, who assumed duties as the new agent for San Carlos on August 8, 1874.⁴⁹

Clum was convinced that the Apaches could best be served by moving them onto one reservation, and he saw himself as the man to accomplish this. Almost from the moment he set foot in Arizona, he was at odds with the Army. He sent a barrage of letters to officials in Washington, demanding that the Army turn over complete control of San Carlos to him. He was successful, and this encouraged him to push for other concessions. Clum did initiate many valuable programs on the reservation, such as an Apache constabulary and an internal court system, but he seems to have been blinded to the problems he caused by antagonizing the military and forcing a concentration of tribes in an area which could not sustain them.

The concentration policy became a reality in 1875. The agent at the Camp Verde Reservation became mentally ill and was committed to an asylum. Claiming that it was not cost-effective to maintain the reservation any longer, the Indian Bureau refused to replace the agent. Using this and other reasons for justification, the Bureau ordered that the 1,500 Apaches at Verde be transferred to San Carlos. The move began on March 1, 1875.⁵⁰

That same week, General Crook received orders reassigning him to the Department of the Platte. He left Arizona on March 25, warning that the concentration of Apaches at San Carlos would only lead to disaster. His replacement,

General August V. Kautz, was also an opponent of the Indian Bureau, and he was soon butting heads with Clum.

Angered by what he saw as military interference at the Camp Apache agency, Clum journeyed to Washington in late June of 1875 to obtain approval to move all Apaches from that reservation to San Carlos. Commissioner Smith approved and on July 21, Clum returned to Camp Apache to begin the move.⁵¹

The concentration of all Apaches in Arizona was completed in June of 1876, when Clum found grounds to have agent Jeffords relieved of his duties at the Chiricahua Reservation. On June 12, Clum escorted 325 Chiricahuas to their new home at San Carlos. This number represented only a third of the Chiricahuas; the rest had fled to Mexico rather than move to the hated San Carlos Reservation. The Chiricahua Reservation was abolished and the land returned to public domain.⁵² Historian Francis Lockwood called the removal of the Chiricahuas from their reservation "the crowning folly of the Indian Bureau," and subsequent events would confirm this.⁵³ The stage was now set for the final phase of the conflict between the Apaches and the U.S. Government.

Victorio, a chief of the Mimbreno band of the Chiricahua tribe, had fought with Mangas Coloradas and had a reputation as a fierce and capable leader. He and his people were transferred to San Carlos from the Ojo Caliente Reservation in New Mexico. They hated San Carlos and Victorio

tried to persuade another Mimbreno chief, Loco, to leave with him. Loco decided that it was better to remain and live in peace with the whites. Finally, Victorio could no longer endure the lack of game and edible plants, the sickness and overcrowded conditions, and he left the reservation in September 1877 to go on a short raiding spree.

As the Army closed in on him, Victorio took his people back to the Ojo Caliente Reservation where they were allowed to remain. In late August of 1879, Victorio was informed that the reservation was scheduled to be closed and that he and his people would be moved to San Carlos again. On September 4, he left the Ojo Caliente Reservation with sixty warriors, intending never to yield to government control again.⁵⁴

The renegade band was joined by other Chiricahua and Mescalero Apaches until it exceeded three hundred people. For the next year, Victorio conducted war against the U.S. Government and its citizens, raiding and killing throughout Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, then fleeing into Mexico. On October 15, 1880, however, Mexico ceased to be a sanctuary for Victorio when a force of Mexican troops and their Indian allies trapped the Apache band in the Tres Castillos Mountains of Chihuahua. Victorio and seventy-seven of his people were killed.⁵⁵

Geronimo was a Chiricahua shaman, or holy man, who rose to prominence as a war leader after Cochise's death. He was

one of the warriors who fled to Mexico rather than move to San Carlos when the Chiricahua Reservation was abolished. In May 1877 he was captured near Ojo Caliente, New Mexico and brought to San Carlos in chains. He was eventually released from confinement under the condition that he remain on the reservation. Geronimo agreed, but he chafed under the restrictions which were imposed on the Apaches at San Carlos. He began to preach hatred of the whites to any Apache who was willing to listen, and tried to induce other chiefs to join him in a breakout. Many of the Apache leaders were influenced by Geronimo, but fear of reprisals from the Army prevented them from openly supporting him.

Another shaman, a White Mountain Apache named Noch-ay-del-klinne, had been spreading the word of a new religion to many of the Western Apache tribes. This religion was based on a mystic belief that the Apache dead would be resurrected and the white man driven away, and Noch-ay-del-klinne soon had a substantial following. Word of this shaman's preachings reached the departmental commander, General Orlando Willcox, who was afraid that this new religion might incite widespread trouble. He dispatched troops to arrest the shaman, who was camped with his followers on Cibique Creek, near Fort Apache. On August 30, 1881, as the troops attempted to take Noch-ay-del-klinne into custody, they

became engaged in a fight. The shaman was shot and killed, provoking the Apache scouts with the column to mutiny.⁵⁶

When word of this incident reached Willcox, he immediately ordered reinforcements to San Carlos in anticipation of violence there. Unfortunately, it was the presence of the extra soldiers, not the death of Noch-ay-del-klinne, that led to trouble. Geronimo was convinced that the soldiers had come after him. He left San Carlos and headed for Mexico, followed by seventy-four Apache men, women and children. Geronimo proved to be a very competent war leader. He and his warriors terrorized the Southwest over the course of the next year, and Willcox's efforts to stop him were futile. On April 18, 1882, Geronimo's band returned to San Carlos, killing the chief of reservation police and forcing Loco and several hundred Apaches to join him.

In September of 1882, George Crook was reassigned to the Department of Arizona and tasked with the mission of bringing Geronimo to bay. He immediately recruited five new companies of Apache scouts and began to organize his forces for a campaign. He travelled to Mexico and personally obtained permission from authorities there to cross the border as long as he was in "hot pursuit" of renegade Apaches. He had only to wait for an opportunity to present itself.

That opportunity came in March 1883, when Chato, a chief of the Nednhi Chiricahuas and an ally of Geronimo, swept

through Arizona and New Mexico on a lightning raid. Crook's troops were ready, and as Chato headed south into Mexico, he was pursued by a large column with Crook at its head. The column contained very few regular troops; Crook was convinced that Apache scouts under white officers and supported by mule pack trains would be more efficient. He was correct. Within a matter of weeks, Crook had penetrated deep into the Sierra Madre and had the Chiricahuas fleeing for their lives.

Geronimo was disheartened because his last refuge was no longer safe, his followers were tired and hungry, and his own people were tracking him. He surrendered to Crook on May 21.

Geronimo and his people were returned to San Carlos, but the peace was short-lived. Crook and his officers enforced stern disciplinary measures, and forbade the Apaches to brew their native drink, tiswin, or to beat their wives. In May 1885, Geronimo left the reservation again, this time in the company of two other chiefs, Nachez and Nana, and over 130 followers, to return to the Sierra Madre.⁵⁷

Crook was soon on their trail. Geronimo and his people went deep into the mountains, and it took the Army the better part of a year to find him the second time. Finally, the tireless Apache scouts tracked him down. Geronimo agreed to meet with Crook on March 25, 1886, in the Canyon de los Embudos. Crook told him that if he didn't surrender, he and his people would be hunted down until the last one was

killed. If he chose to give up, he and the other Chiricahuas would be sent to a military post in the east for two years, but would then be permitted to return to San Carlos. Geronimo took two days to decide, but he accepted Crook's terms for surrender. He told Crook that it would take several days to collect all of his people, but he promised to bring them in. This satisfied Crook, who returned to Fort Bowie to wait for them.

Crook notified his superiors that Geronimo had surrendered and was returning to the United States with his people, but the announcement was premature. As Geronimo and the Chiricahuas crossed the border into Arizona on March 29, they were met by a trader who provided them with whiskey. He also gave them the false information that territorial officials were waiting to take them into custody and that they were to be hanged. This was enough to convince Geronimo that he had made a mistake. That night he slipped back across the border with a handful of his most loyal followers.⁵⁸

Crook was forced to telegraph this news to General Sheridan, who responded by criticizing him for relying on Apache scouts to escort the Chiricahuas and for failing to disarm them at the time of the surrender. Frustrated and tired, Crook asked to be relieved. He was replaced with General Nelson Miles on April 28, 1886.

Miles made a great show of reducing the number of Apache scouts in his command. He insisted that regular troops could succeed in locating and bringing in Geronimo, but soon came to the realization that he would have to use Crook's tactics after all. He dispatched Lieutenant Charles Gatewood and a detachment of Apache scouts to find Geronimo and convince him to surrender.

Gatewood found the renegade leader and his people on August 24, 1886. Geronimo said that he would surrender if he could remain at San Carlos. Gatewood told him that he could not agree to that. All of the Chiricahuas who had surrendered had already been shipped off to Fort Marion, Florida, and there was no longer any guarantee that they could return to Arizona. Geronimo was stunned by this news, but finally saw that he had no choice. He made one final demand - that General Miles personally accept his surrender. Gatewood relayed this information to Miles, who agreed. On September 4, 1886, Geronimo surrendered for the third and final time, marking the end of Apache resistance.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

. . . in counterinsurgency the defeat of enemy armed forces does not automatically lead to the attainment of the political objective. Instead, the key is eradication of conditions conducive to violence and instability. In all cases, political, psychological, and economic methods must be fully integrated with military force.¹

Steven Metz

In this quotation from Dr. Metz's article Counterinsurgency Campaign Planning, he cuts to the heart of the problem that many governments have in dealing with insurgencies - they tend too often to treat the symptoms of the problem rather than the root causes. The treatment of choice is usually a massive dose of military force administered to defeat the insurgent's military capability. This approach often fails, because unless the conditions which breed violence and stability are corrected, more insurgents will surface to replace those killed or imprisoned by government security forces.

That is not to say that military force alone cannot sometimes be successful in defeating an insurgency, especially if the insurgent population is relatively small

and has a limited amount of support. This was the case with the Apache insurgency. After Geronimo's final surrender in September 1886, the U.S. Government declared that the Apache insurgency had been quelled; but only after a long, costly and bitter conflict. In the end, the overwhelming military power of the government proved to be too much for the Apaches. Further resistance became futile. But the important point to consider here is that the conflict could have been ended much earlier and with less bloodshed if the U.S. Government had pursued a truly balanced counterinsurgency strategy; one that worked at eliminating the causes of the Apache conflict rather than simply trying to crush it with military might.

Two issues need to be considered in an overall analysis of the U.S. response to the Apache insurgency. The first is to answer the question: what was the nature of the government's response to the insurgency? The second issue is to determine how effective that response was by assessing its strengths and weaknesses in the light of modern doctrine.

The U.S. Government's response to the Apache insurgency was shaped by the national policy for dealing with all Indian tribes, namely the Peace Policy. The Peace Policy was inaugurated during Andrew Johnson's administration, but President Grant adopted it as his own in 1869. It became the prime directive for Indian affairs after that.

Grant's decisions concerning Indian matters were not proactive, but seem to have been driven by political expediency. When he assumed the Presidency in 1869, he was strongly influenced by reformist and humanitarian elements to overhaul the corrupt Indian Bureau and to find a more humane method of subduing the Indians. He seized on the Peace Policy more as a means of placating these interest groups than as a way to implement reforms.² As part of this attempt to prove that he was sincere about change, he appointed a Seneca Indian, Ely S. Parker, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. He also permitted religious denominations, particularly the Quakers, to dominate the selection of agents within the Indian Bureau. Again, these were actions designed to placate the peace advocates.

Parker was forced to resign in 1871 under charges of corruption, raising doubts about the new policy. Grant came under renewed pressure from the War Department to allow them to solve the problem militarily, especially in the Southwest where conflict with the Apaches was escalating. At the same time, the Camp Grant Massacre created sentiment for the Apaches and gave peace advocates a lobbying platform.

Grant tried to appease both factions. He vacillated between plans for pacification proposed by the Department of the Interior and private humanitarian groups, and plans for military conquest by the War Department. He did not give

responsive guidance until decisions were forced on him, and he did not ensure that the agencies within his administration were cooperating to achieve a balanced solution to the Apache problem. Cabinet level discussions between the President, the Interior and War Departments, and other key advisors concerning Indian matters were a rarity.³

The objectives of the American counterinsurgency response were to establish permanent reservations for the Apaches; to move them onto the reservations, by force if necessary; to teach them the ways of white civilization; and to gradually assimilate them into American society. Unfortunately, because of internal conflict, lack of cooperation, and the absence of firm guidance from the President, the U.S. Government was unable to develop a single, coherent strategy for achieving these objectives.

Instead, the government response was characterized by a series of ill-considered compromise measures, variously aimed at pacifying the Apaches, subduing them by military force, and concentrating them on several large reservations. Each of these strategies was pursued independently, with little consideration given to integrating them into one comprehensive program designed to accomplish the government's stated goals.

Current U.S. doctrine recognizes that successful counterinsurgency operations must be based on five

imperatives, or principles. These are: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance.⁴ I will begin my assessment of the U.S. Government's response to the Apache insurgency by looking at it in terms of these imperatives.

Political Dominance: ". . . political objectives drive military decisions at every level."⁵

The Bureau of Indian Affairs was charged with managing Indian affairs and making policy recommendations concerning all Indian tribes, and was initially part of the War Department. The Army became heavily involved in the management of reservations, often by default, since civilian agents were sometimes not available. Senior officers in Washington exerted a great deal of influence over Indian affairs. In 1849, the Indian Bureau was transferred to the newly created Department of the Interior, but the War Department maintained control over removal programs which relocated Indians onto reservations.⁶ This separation of authority was mandated primarily because the administration felt that the peaceful goals of the Indian Bureau were not compatible with those of the Army, but also because it was a means of preventing extremists in either department from gaining absolute control over Indian affairs.

The War Department, however, still believed that it should have some say in formulating Indian policy. Army officers were openly critical of Interior Department and Indian Bureau officials, and insisted that the only way to end the widespread corruption and mismanagement within the Indian Bureau was to return it to control of the War Department. When it became evident that this was not going to happen, Army officers began to try and circumvent Interior Department policies and decisions. This attitude was evident at every level, from General Sherman in Washington to General Crook in Arizona.

Unity of Effort: "Unity of effort means coordinated action and centralized control at all levels."⁷

Both the War Department and the Interior Department had a part in formulating a strategy to deal with the Apache insurgency, but neither agency was assigned supervisory responsibility. Since a third and neutral agency was not appointed to coordinate the efforts of the other two, all guidance and decisions had to come from President Grant. Grant, as we have seen, tried to accommodate both factions, with the result that there was no unity of effort at the national level.

The split at the national level carried all the way to Arizona. Peace Commissioners Colyer and Howard worked almost

autonomously during their pacification missions. They received no support from a hostile civilian populace, and only grudging support from Crook. They went about the business of creating reservations and establishing policies, oblivious to the confusion they were creating for civil and military authorities in the territory.

Howard's establishment of a reservation for the Chiricahuas did halt hostilities between that tribe and the Americans, but it effectively prevented the Army from exercising any control over the Chiricahuas. The provisions of this treaty were actually in violation of Grant's policy, which stipulated that Indian tribes would no longer be negotiated with as separate and sovereign peoples. Also, Howard informed Chiricahua agent Jeffords that he was to report directly to the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Washington, bypassing the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Arizona.⁸ This decision only created more confusion and animosity.

Crook, perhaps because of his intense personal dislike for the Indian Bureau and its policies, seems to have removed himself from any involvement with the peace commissioners. He grudgingly provided support to Colyer and Howard; not with the intent of contributing to a balanced solution, but to hurry them on their way out of the territory so that he could continue with his own plans. Once the peace commissioners

left Arizona, Crook did his best to make sure that the Army had almost total control over counterinsurgency efforts in the territory.

He personally developed the campaign plan and closely monitored its execution. The few civilian law enforcement authorities that existed in the territory were restricted to major population centers, and had no impact on operations. Crook discouraged the use of civilian militia forces, probably because he wished to avoid another incident like the Camp Grant Massacre.

Dr. Bendell, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Arizona, and a handful of civilian agents were the only representatives of the Department of the Interior remaining in the territory when Crook commenced his offensive. Relations between Crook and these individuals were strained, to say the least. A few weeks prior to starting the campaign, Crook directed Major William Brown, who also served as the departmental inspector general, to initiate a daily count of the Apaches already on the reservations at Camps Apache and Grant. This angered the civilian agents, who complained to Bendell. Bendell accused Crook of exceeding his authority and reported him to the Secretary of the Interior, but Crook was determined to let nothing stand in his way:

. . . I had made up my mind to disobey any order I might receive looking to an interference of the plan which I had adopted, feeling sure if I was

successful my disobedience of orders would be forgiven . . . I also instructed [subordinate commanders] to obey no orders, even from the President of the United States, until I first saw it, fully intending to disobey it . . .'

This is an incredible assertion coming from a senior Army officer, yet it reflected the attitude shared by other officers and War Department officials who were determined to subvert the policies of the Indian Bureau. It is hardly surprising that the U.S. Government failed to achieve unity of effort in its counterinsurgency response when one considers that Crook's superiors not only condoned, but encouraged, his independent actions.

Adaptability: ". . . the skill and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to accomodate different situations. It requires careful mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence, and regional expertise."¹⁰

Military and civilian officials charged with implementing the government's counterinsurgency response in Arizona proved to be very adaptable, but with varying degrees of success. When Peace Commissioner Colyer arrived in Arizona, there were no permanent reservations for the Apaches. He quickly established three permanent and three additional temporary reservations, and the beginnings of a support infrastructure for the Western Apaches. General

Howard followed his example by creating a fourth permanent reservation for the Chiricahua Apaches.

These men were able to quickly create a support system where none had existed before, but it was a system plagued with problems. Neither Colyer or Howard were regional experts; they did not really understand the needs of the Indians they were trying to help, nor did they anticipate the problems that would result from consolidating large numbers of incompatible tribes and bands at one location. Their choice of reservation sites was also ill-considered; especially the hot, barren site selected for the San Carlos agency. The reservations were designated with no involvement from the territorial government and very little involvement on the part of the Army. In short, Colyer and Howard were well-intentioned and they adapted rapidly to meet a need, but their actions were not carefully thought out or coordinated.

Officials in the War Department were far removed from events on the frontier. They believed that the Army could defeat the Apache guerrillas using conventional organizations and tactics. Crook realized the futility of trying to apply conventional methods to the Apache problem. He knew that the situation called for new tactics, use of Apache scouts to find and defeat their own kinsmen, and a program of education and assistance which would enable the Apaches to become self-sufficient once they were on the reservations. Crook

adopted methods which were tailored to meet this unique situation, and was generally successful in applying them.

Legitimacy: ". . . the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern . . ."11

One of the fundamental problems with the Peace Policy was that it ignored, or failed to recognize, that the Indians had a fully developed culture of their own; a sense of history and purpose as a people. Many Americans saw the Apaches as violent, subhuman beings, and were not tolerant of a culture which had such diverse values and attitudes. The U.S. Government could not allow the Apaches to continue raiding and terrorizing its citizens, of course, but it never made any attempt to propose an alternate lifestyle that was acceptable to the Apaches.

Conversely, the Apaches did not recognize the right or authority of the government to take their lands, to move them onto reservations, or to force them to adopt an agrarian lifestyle which was repugnant to them. They had no desire to be "civilized" and assimilated into white society, and continued to resist until they no longer had a choice.

Much unnecessary violence could have been avoided if the U.S. Government had been willing to recognize that they were dealing with a proud and established culture. The Apache society was based on warfare, and the warrior ethic

influenced almost everything they did. Every soldier who fought the Apaches attested to their ability and courage in battle, yet no serious attempt was ever made to exploit their warlike nature. Crook enlisted Apache scouts and used them with great success, and agent John Clum formed an Apache constabulary at the San Carlos agency which served as a model for native police forces at other reservations; clear indications that training and leadership could mold the Apache into an extremely effective soldier. A program designed to enlist Apache men into the military on a large scale would have channeled the abilities of the Apache warriors to a purpose beneficial to the government, and certainly would have been more appealing than the agrarian lifestyle proposed by the Peace Policy.

Perseverance: ". . . the patient, resolute, persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them."¹²

The U.S. Army was persistent in tracking down and defeating the last of the hostile Apache bands, thus defeating the insurgency. But at what cost was this victory achieved? If more attention had been paid from the start to developing a single, cohesive strategy, the conflict might have been shortened by years, saving countless lives and millions of dollars. The long-term goal of the Peace Policy

was to civilize and acculturate the Apaches, yet this goal was not realized during the nineteenth century (and some may argue that it still has not been achieved).

Congress consistently failed to appropriate sufficient funds to feed the Apaches on the reservations, much less provide them with the education or tools necessary to adopt an agrarian way of life. A great deal of lip service was paid to the need to create reservations which had adequate facilities to support and train the Apaches, but no serious thought was given to establishing a long-term budget to support this initiative. Once the Apaches were safely ensconced on reservations and out of the public eye, national attention quickly turned to more pressing matters. Funds were diverted elsewhere, and the reservations were barely able to function.

The failure of the government to curb corruption and mismanagement within the Indian Bureau exacerbated the problems of overcrowding, sickness and starvation. It also reinforced the Apache viewpoint that white society was weak and dishonest, and therefore undesirable.

The so-called "concentration policy" was implemented as a means of reducing costs and corruption within the Indian Bureau, but it completely ignored the needs of the Apaches and negated much of the good work that had been accomplished on the reservations up to that point. The removal of the

Chiricahuas from their reservation, and their forced consolidation at San Carlos in 1876, was totally unnecessary and only served to spark an additional ten years of violence. The concentration policy certainly did nothing to help the U.S. Government achieve its long-term goal of acculturating the Apaches.

In addition to the five doctrinal imperatives just discussed, it is appropriate to examine the U.S. Government's response to the Apache insurgency in terms of several modern counterinsurgency planning factors, as well. I have selected two of these planning factors as being of particular importance: populace and resources control, and use of violence.¹³

Populace and Resources Control: ". . . measures [which] deny support and assistance to the insurgents by controlling the movement of people, information, and goods."¹⁴

As this quotation indicates, the primary purpose of population and resources control is to deny support to the insurgents. What the term also implies is the responsibility of the government to protect its people from the threat of insurgent violence. Unless the government can guarantee this protection, the populace will generally be unwilling to support government policies. In order to protect its people

and to deny support to the insurgency, the populace and the insurgents must be separated. One technique commonly used today to accomplish this separation is to isolate vulnerable segments of the population in villages or compounds where access is strictly controlled, and where security forces maintain a constant presence. In Vietnam, these villages were referred to as "strategic hamlets."

One of the basic precepts of the Peace Policy was to locate the Apaches (and all other Indian tribes) on reservations, where their movements could be controlled. In theory, once the Apaches were contained on reservations, the populace would be protected from raids and depredations, and the Apaches would be deprived of a vital source of supply, namely, whatever they had been stealing from the settlers. This policy of isolating the Apaches by placing them on reservations, or as Lieutenant Colonel Robert Strange calls it, "strategic hamletization in reverse," was achievable only because the government was dealing with a relatively small insurgent force.¹⁵

Like many theories, however, the idea of containing the Apaches on reservation suffered in practice. Poor relations between the Army and the Indian Bureau led to confusion and disagreements over jurisdiction on the reservations. In situations where reservations were run strictly by the Indian Bureau, the nearest military presence

might be miles away. Crook attempted to disarm the Apaches when they came on the reservations, but soon found it to be an exercise in futility. Knowing that their weapons would be confiscated if they attempted to carry them on the reservation, the Apaches simply cached them away in a hidden but readily accessible spot.

Crook did not have the additional manpower to search for the hidden weapons, nor did he wish to become entangled with the bureaucracy of the Indian Bureau by attempting to obtain permission to conduct a search in the first place. The fact that the Apaches had access to weapons, combined with the fact that some reservations did not have an overt military presence, made it extremely difficult to keep raiding parties from slipping off the reservation and attacking civilian settlements.

As a result, many citizens were convinced that the government was incapable of protecting them from Apache depredations. When evidence surfaced that some of these raids were perpetrated by Apaches from the reservations, it created the perception that the government was harboring the raiders. Crook implemented some measures which were partially successful in controlling Apache movements, such as daily headcounts and the mandatory wearing of identification tags. What was needed, though, was a civil-military plan which permitted the stationing of troops at each reservation,

and which could prevent the Apaches from gaining access to weapons. Such a plan would have required constant cooperation between the Army and the Indian Bureau; unfortunately that spirit of cooperation never existed.

Use of Violence: "The government should employ the minimum amount of violence necessary in any given situation . . ."16

Many Army officers who fought the Apaches were of the opinion that women and children who provided vital support and assistance to the warriors, and who sometimes fought alongside them, were combatants in the technical sense and therefore fair game. Apache acts of terror and brutality added to the anger and frustration of soldiers who were already physically exhausted by difficult campaigning, and sometimes led them to commit similar atrocities in retaliation. It is not my intent to examine the morals, values and attitudes of nineteenth century Americans concerning the Indians, but to point out that General Crook differed from many of his contemporaries in that he made a determined effort to limit his use of violence.

Crook recognized that the Apaches had to be forcefully shown that armed resistance was futile, but he also believed that the Apaches must be treated with honesty and respect once they laid down their arms. He directed his subordinate

commanders to fight short, sharp and decisive engagements, but he did not advocate a policy of extermination. Hostiles were persuaded to surrender whenever possible, and commanders were to avoid killing women and children. These instructions concerning the use of violence, or "rules of engagement" as they would be called today, were issued with the intent of inflicting only enough casualties to demoralize the hostiles and induce them to surrender.

Most engagements occurred, however, as troops approached and attacked hostile rancherias. Commanders in these situations had to make a choice between attacking without warning, or announcing their presence and allowing many of the warriors to escape. Because most commanders were not willing to endanger their own forces unnecessarily, they opted to maintain the element of surprise. Some non-combatant casualties inevitably occurred. Even in circumstances where the Apaches were trapped and given the opportunity to surrender or evacuate their non-combatants - the Battle of Salt River Cave, for example - they often refused to do so.

Having cited Crook for his judicious use of violence early in the conflict, I must also point out that he did have lapses. The history of insurgent warfare has shown that, as frustrations mount and violence escalates, even the most objective and humane military leaders sometimes resort to

harsh tactics. Frustrated by the inability of his troops to bring in Delshay and the other three renegade chiefs, Crook used threats and the promise of rewards to cause the Apaches to kill the outlaws and bring in their heads.

A study of military history should serve one major purpose - to provide commanders and staff planners with the opportunity to benefit from the mistakes of the past. Many will argue that the U.S. Government's conflict with the Apache Indians was a remote event, and that with the benefit of modern technology, increased social and political awareness, and a highly trained and professional military, we are unlikely to repeat mistakes made in the last century. Nothing could be further from the truth.

With the collapse of the balance of power between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., American military planners are shifting their focus away from large-scale, conventional warfare. The threat of the future lies in small, regional conflicts, a fact which can be verified simply by picking up a newspaper or turning on the television. Many governments have recently collapsed or are on the brink of collapse. The U.S. is pouring billions of dollars of economic aid into some of these nations in an attempt to help them maintain social and political order, and we can expect to be called upon to commit military forces, as well. Some of these regional conflicts are politically motivated, but others stem from

tribal, ethnic and religious differences and bear striking similarities to our own Apache insurgency. It is critical that we understand the nature of these types of conflict, and that we are prepared to deal with them.

The U.S. Government's experience with the Apache Indians confirms that the modern doctrinal imperatives of political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance are valid. Of course, the terms we use today were not recognized 120 years ago, but the principles remain the same.

A government must address the root causes of an insurgency. This requires an understanding of the values and attitudes of each segment of society and a willingness to recognize that a nation can accommodate diverse cultures and needs. Solutions can be reached which are acceptable to both sides and which do not require the government to forfeit its legitimacy.

A successful counterinsurgency strategy must balance the use of military force with programs which adequately address the social and economic needs of the people involved. The U.S. Government did not completely ignore the social and economic aspects of its struggle with the Apaches, but it attempted to resolve these problems with a series of uncoordinated and expedient solutions. When these solutions failed, the government turned the problem over to the Army.

Counterinsurgency planners must also recognize that political realities will necessitate changes in the best of strategies. Government policies may be altered based on internal political machinations or public opinion, appropriations may be cut, or the needs of a neighboring nation may have to be considered. Planners have to be flexible enough to adapt to these changes without losing sight of their long-term goals. As we have seen, the U.S. Government did not adapt successfully when faced with these same political realities during the Apache insurgency.

Isolating vulnerable segments of a populace from insurgents by placing them in controlled villages or compounds remains a valid concept. The U.S. Government's experience with the Apaches (and its experiences in Vietnam), however, point up the fact that this type of program can only be successful if there is close cooperation between civil and military authorities, and only if security forces maintain a constant presence to stop or control the movement of the insurgents.

Rules concerning the use of violence in irregular warfare continue to be a critical consideration today. Counterinsurgent forces must often adopt some of the tactics of their enemy, but they cannot adopt his rules. The insurgent is not bound by any code of conduct or law of land warfare, and uses terrorism, torture, or the indiscriminate

killing of innocent civilians to further his cause. The purpose of security force operations is to defeat the military capability of an insurgency, to restore or maintain order, and to protect people and property.

Commanders who resort to unacceptable forms of violence, or who allow their soldiers to do so, compromise both their own and their government's legitimacy. The stress and fatigue caused by a difficult and prolonged operation, and the frustration caused by a unit's inability to find or engage the enemy, can combine to influence soldiers at all levels to commit unlawful acts of violence. Commanders must be aware of this fact, and take measures to prevent it from happening.

Finally, the success of General Crook's Tonto Basin Campaign illustrates that the military power of an insurgency can only be defeated by sustained offensive operations. It is not enough to disperse forces at widely scattered outposts with the intent of preventing the insurgents from gaining access to vital facilities or population centers. Military forces must be able to mass enough combat power to penetrate insurgent-controlled areas, destroy their bases, and strike decisive blows. These strikes cannot be conducted in a piece-meal fashion, but must be part of a coordinated campaign which is based on centralized planning and decentralized execution of tactical operations. Campaign

planners must make maximum use of intelligence, and they must ensure that the campaign can be sustained logistically. The senior commander must provide his subordinate leaders with a clear intent and detailed operational guidance, yet permit them to exercise flexibility and initiative during the conduct of tactical operations.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

¹Thomas E. Griess, "A Perspective on Military History," A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History, Center of Military History (Washington D.C.: Government Printing office, 1982), p. 37.

²D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paridigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1988), p. 5.

³U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington D.C., 1990), p. Gloss-4.

⁴Richard N. Ellis, "President Grant's Peace Policy," The Western American Indian: Case Studies in Tribal History ed. Richard N. Ellis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), pp. 48-49.

⁵War Department, Report of the Secretary of War - Messages and Documents, 1890-1891 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1891), p. 725.

⁶Adjutant General's Office, "General Order No. 100," Index of General Orders, 1863 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), p. 25.

⁷Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), pp. 14-22.

CHAPTER TWO

¹J.P. Dunn, Massacres of the Mountains (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1886), p. 729. In spite of its unfortunate title, Dunn's book is a surprisingly complete and objective account of the Indian Wars.

²John Upton Terrell, Apache Chronicle (New York: World Publishing, 1972), pp. 19-22. Also see Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. vii. According to these and other sources,

the Apaches called themselves N'de, Dine, Tinde, or Inde: all of which mean "the People." "Apache" is not an Athapascan word, but is believed to have been derived from "Apachu", a word used by the Zuni Indians to refer to the Athapascan Tribes in northern Arizona with whom they were constantly at war, and which means "enemy." The Spanish colonists began to use the word "Apache" in official correspondence near the end of the 16th Century and it soon began to be applied to all of the Athapascan tribes in the region.

³Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 19.

⁴Grenville Goodwin, Western Apache Raiding and Warfare ed. Keith H. Basso (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971), pp. 12-13. Also see Terrell, Apache Chronicle, pp. 22-25.

⁵Goodwin, Western Apache, p. 12.

⁶Robert M. Utley, A Clash of Cultures: Fort Bowie and the Chiricahua Apaches (Washington D.C.: National Park Service, 1977), p. 9.

⁷Goodwin, Western Apache, p. 14.

⁸Ibid., p. 14.

⁹Francis C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New York: Macmillan, 1938), p. 6.

¹⁰Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), pp. 13-14. Thrapp describes the alliance between Mangas Coloradas and Cochise, two great Apache leaders who joined forces against the U.S. Army and American settlers between 1861 and 1863.

¹¹Goodwin, Western Apache, p. 16.

¹²Ibid., p. 286.

¹³Ibid., p. 17. Goodwin states that any man in the local group was eligible to participate in a raid, as long as he had completed his "novice complex", a training period where adolescent boys were taught the techniques and ritual practices for raiding.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁵One shaman who would later rise to prominence among the Chiricahua Apaches was Goyathlay (or Goyakla). He later became known by his Spanish name: Geronimo. For more

information, see E. Lisle Reedstrom, Apache Wars (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1990), p. 18.

¹⁶Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 81.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁸Lockwood, Apache Indians, p. 21.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 28. Also see Terrell, Apache Chronicle, P. 141.

²⁰Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, pp. 8-9. Also see Terrell, Apache Chronicle, pp. 160-162.

²¹Terrell, Apache Chronicle, pp. 178-180. Terrell describes a meeting between Mangas Coloradas and General Kearney in October 1846. Mangas, accompanied by several other lesser chiefs, proposed to Kearney that the Apaches join forces with the Americans to defeat the Mexicans. Mangas claimed that this would show the Americans that the Apaches were friendly; in return the Apaches wanted only to be left alone and in possession of their lands. Kearney rejected the offer. See also Lockwood, Apache Indians, p. 77.

²²Lockwood, Apache Indians, pp. 81-82.

²³Terrell, Apache Chronicle, pp. 186-196.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 202-203.

²⁵Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 13. For a more detailed account of this incident, see Jason Betzinez, I Fought with Geronimo with Wilbur S. Nye (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1959), pp. 2-4.

²⁶Mangas' other two daughters were reportedly married to important chieftans of the White Mountain bands, extending his influence there, as well. See Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 164 and Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 13.

²⁷Robert M. Utley, "The Bascom Affair: A Reconstruction," Arizona and the West, Vol. 3, No. 1, (1961), p. 61. See also Benjamin H. Sacks, "New Evidence on the Bascom Affair," Arizona and the West, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1962), p. 264.

²⁸John Ward blamed Cochise from the outset, probably because other recent Apache depredations in the Sonoita Valley had been blamed on Cochise's band, as well. It has never been proven which band took the Ward boy, but the fact

that the Chiricahuas were living so close made them easy targets for blame. John Ward never saw his son again. In later years, an Indian scout and interpreter named Mickey Free claimed that it was he who had been taken from the Ward ranch by San Carlos Apaches and raised as a member of the tribe. See Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 16 and 260. Also, Betzinez, I Fought With Geronimo, p. 41.

²⁹Utley, "The Bascom Affair," p. 62.

³⁰Bernard J.D. Irwin, "The Chiricahua Apache Indians: A Thrilling Incident in the Early History of Arizona Territory," 1887, The Infantry Journal, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (April, 1928), pp. 374-375. Bernard wrote that when he rode back through the pass more than six months later, the bodies were still hanging there.

³¹Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 222. See also Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 18.

³²James H. Carleton, "Correspondence to Brig. General E.R.S. Canby," The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. L, Part One (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897), pp. 95-98.

³³Thomas L. Roberts, "Official Reports," War of the Rebellion, pp. 128-132. See also _____, "General Orders No. 12," War of the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. L, Part Two, pp. 40-41. General Carleton realized that if he was to maintain the vital route through Apache Pass, he would have to establish a post there. On July 27, 1862 he issued General Orders No. 12, which established Fort Bowie. He garrisoned it with one hundred troops of the Fifth Infantry Regiment of the California Volunteers. This post enabled the Army to keep the pass open during the Civil War, and it would later play an important part as a base of operations against the Apaches.

³⁴Lockwood, Apache Indians, p. 143.

³⁵Terrell, Apache Chronicle, pp. 240-241. See also Joseph R. West, "Official Report," War of the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. L, Part Two, pp. 296-297. Terrell asserts that individuals who participated in the operation later reported that Mangas was taken by means of a ruse. A group of civilian prospectors, along with soldiers from General West's command, persuaded Mangas to enter the mining town of Pinos Altos by offering to discuss peace terms under a white flag. When Mangas approached the group, he was told that he was being taken captive and that if his warriors tried to

intervene, he would be killed. In General West's official report, he stated that Mangas "had voluntarily placed himself in my power," but gives no further details. He states that Mangas was shot and killed by his guards after he tried to escape three times.

³⁶Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 241.

³⁷Ibid., p. 243.

³⁸Ibid., p. 244.

³⁹Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West: 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), chapter 5, passim.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 132.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 133.

⁴²Constance W. Altshuler, Chains of Command: Arizona and the Army, 1856-1875 (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1981), p. 185. See also Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 53.

⁴³Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Orders No. 1 (Prescott, A.T., 12 January 1871), p. 1.

⁴⁴Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Field Orders No. 2 (Camp McDowell, Arizona, 17 April 1871), p. 1.

⁴⁵Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 82.

⁴⁶William S. Oury, "The Camp Grant Massacre," Florence Enterprise (1885), reprinted in The Arizona Story ed. Joseph Miller (New York: Hastings House, 1952), p. 33.

⁴⁷Altshuler, Chains of Command, p. 196.

⁴⁸Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, pp. 89-92. See also Utley, The Indian Frontier, p. 139.

⁴⁹Altshuler, Chains of Command, p. 196.

⁵⁰U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington D.C., 1990), pp. 2-1 to 2-7.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 2-3.

⁵²Ibid., p. 2-7.

³³Richard J. Hinton, The Hand-Book to Arizona (San Francisco: Payot, Upham and Co., 1878), p. 16. See also George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt, 1960 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 183n.

³⁴Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1965), pp. 27-28.

CHAPTER THREE

¹_____, "Gen. Howard and the Apaches," The New York Times, Vol XXI (March 3, 1872), p. 4.

²Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 178-180.

³Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 148.

⁴Jason Betzinez, I Fought With Geronimo, ed. Wilbur S. Nye (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1959), p. 121.

⁵George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt, 1960 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 160.

⁶John Upton Terrell, Apache Chronicle (New York: World Publishing, 1972), p. 282.

⁷John G. Bourke, On the Border With Crook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892), p. 109.

⁸Crook, Autobiography, p. 173.

⁹Ibid., p. 170. Crook brought Whitman up on charges of gambling and drunkenness on duty. Whitman was tried in December 1871 and the court dismissed the charges - see Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Orders No. 33 (Prescott, A.T., 15 December 1871), pp. 1-4. Whitman was placed under arrest again in March 1872 pending another court-martial for disobeying orders. He was eventually cleared of the charges. See Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, pp. 107-111.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 163.

- ¹¹Utley, Frontier Regulars, pp. 178-180.
- ¹²Bourke, On the Border, p. 31.
- ¹³Crook, Autobiography, p. 164.
- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 164.
- ¹⁵Ibid., p. 166. Crook refers to Miguel as "One-Eyed McGill" in his autobiography.
- ¹⁶Bourke, On the Border, p. 143.
- ¹⁷Crook, Autobiography, p. 166.
- ¹⁸George Crook, "Annual Report for the Department of Arizona, 1871," Report of the Secretary of War, 1871 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1871), p. 78.
- ¹⁹George Crook, "The Apache Problem," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, Vol. VII, No. XXVII (October 1886), p. 262.
- ²⁰Bourke, On the Border, p. 136. Bourke says that while the source of these rumors could not be identified, they were probably based on the fact that two noted chiefs of the Warm Springs Apache bands, Loco and Victorio, had been living peacefully with their people near Fort Craig, New Mexico, for over a year. These Apaches were awaiting word from Washington as to whether a permanent reservation would be established for them.
- ²¹Crook, Autobiography, p. 167.
- ²²U.S. House, 42d Congress, 2d Session. Vincent Colyer, "Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, 1871," Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1871, H.Exe.Doc.1, (Washington, 15 November 1871)(Serial Set 1505), p. 460.
- ²³Ibid., p. 461.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 476.
- ²⁵Crook, Autobiography, p. 168.
- ²⁶Colyer, "Annual Report," p. 465.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. 465.
- ²⁸Ibid., p. 483.

²⁹Ibid., p. 473.

³⁰Ibid., p. 468.

³¹Ibid., p. 468.

³²Ibid., p. 468.

³³Ibid., p. 507.

³⁴Ibid., p. 482.

³⁵Crook, Autobiography, p. 168.

³⁶Colyer, "Annual Report," p. 499. Colyer refers to the Mohaves and Hualapais as Apache Indians, as do many other writers of the time. The Mohaves were actually the Yavapai Indians. They, along with the Hualapais (or Walapais), ranged from the Grand Canyon south to the White Mountains. Early settlers mistook them for Apaches and the designation stuck.

³⁷Wooster, Indian Policy, p. 64.

³⁸Colyer, "Annual Report," p. 508.

³⁹Crook, Autobiography, p. 168. See also Bourke, On the Border, p. 160.

⁴⁰Colyer, "Annual Report," p. 484.

⁴¹Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. 105. See also _____, "The Wickenburg Massacre," Yuma Sentinel (1878), reprinted in The Arizona Story ed. Joseph Miller (New York: Hastings House, 1952), p. 41.

⁴²Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 105. See also _____, "The Wickenburg Massacre," The New York Times Vol. XXI (February 29, 1872), p. 4.

⁴³_____, "Wickenburg Massacre," Yuma Sentinel, reprinted in The Arizona Story, p. 41.

⁴⁴Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 288.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 289.

⁴⁶Colyer, "Annual Report," p. 508.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 509.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 509.

⁴⁹Crook, Autobiography, p. 168.

⁵⁰Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Orders No. 35 (Prescott, A.T., 27 December 1871), p. 1.

⁵¹George Crook, quoted in The New York Times Vol. XXI (March 8, 1872), p. 1.

⁵²Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Orders No. 9 (Prescott, A.T., 7 February 1872), p. 1.

⁵³H. Bendell, report reprinted in The New York Times Vol. XXI (March 22, 1872), p. 2.

⁵⁴Headquarters, Department of Arizona, Circular No. 1 (Prescott, A.T. 8 March 1872), p. 1. Crook published the telegram, dated February 21, as a circular for distribution to his subordinate commanders.

⁵⁵Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 107.

⁵⁶Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 294.

⁵⁷Oliver O. Howard, My Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians, 1972 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1907), p. 152. For Crook's viewpoint, refer to his Autobiography, p. 169-172. Crook accused Howard of "prostituting" his command. He states that Howard tried to induce Crook's officers to side with him, and that Howard offered reassignment in the East as incentive to any officer who would do so. One of the officers with whom Howard was particularly friendly was Lieutenant Whitman. This especially irritated Crook since Whitman was under court-martial charges at the time.

⁵⁸Crook, Autobiography, p. 169.

⁵⁹Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 294.

⁶⁰Crook, Autobiography, p. 173. Crook stated that the captive children "had correspondingly become weaned from their people, in fact, dreaded going back to the Indians almost as much as white children." For Howard's viewpoint of the conference, see Howard, My Life and Experiences, pp. 157-162.

⁶¹Howard, My Life and Experiences, p. 178.

⁶²Ibid., p. 188.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 219-221 passim. See also Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Orders No. 37 (Prescott, A.T., 13 November 1872), p. 1.

⁶⁴Harry G. Cramer, "Tom Jeffords - Indian Agent," The Journal of Arizona History Vol. 17 (1976), p. 277.

⁶⁵Crook, Autobiography, p. 177.

⁶⁶Cramer, "Tom Jeffords," p. 265. See also Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 111.

⁶⁷Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Orders No. 34 (Prescott, A.T., 3 October 1872), p. 1.

⁶⁸George Crook, "Annual Report for the Department of Arizona, 1872," Report of the Secretary of War, 1872 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872), pp. 79-80.

⁶⁹J.M. Schofield, endorsement to "Annual Report for the Department of Arizona, 1872," Report of the Secretary of War, 1872 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872), p. 72.

CHAPTER FOUR

¹George Crook, "The Apache Problem," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, Vol. VII, No. XXVII (October 1886), p. 263.

²John G. Bourke, On the Border With Crook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892), p. 170. See also George F. Price, Across the Continent With the Fifth Cavalry (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1883), p. 659.

³Bourke, On the Border, p. 150.

⁴Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. 106. Thrapp served as a pack officer during World War II. He states that pack trains were used in Burma, New Guinea, China and other places, and that Crook's standards were still being used. U.S. Army Special Forces units today are experimenting with the feasibility of using pack animals for operations in mountainous terrain.

⁵War Department, Pack Transportation (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1908), p. 13. This manual was written for the Army Quartermaster's Department by Henry W. Daly, who was Chief Packer for the Army at the time. Daly

gained his experience as a packer with Crook during the Tonto Basin Campaign and his later campaigns against the Apaches in the Sierra Madre. In the preface to the manual, Daly acknowledges Crook's contributions to the development of pack trains, adding that Crook "may well be called the 'father' of modern pack service" in the Army.

⁶Bourke, On the Border, p. 154.

⁷Ibid., p. 154. Bourke claims that the average load was 320 pounds. Daly, in Pack Transportation, p. 14, gives the more realistic figure of 250 pounds.

⁸War Department, Pack Transportation, p. 14.

⁹Ibid., pp. 142-143.

¹⁰Grenville Goodwin, Western Apache Raiding and Warfare ed. Keith H. Basso (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971), p. 305n.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 93-185 passim. This portion of Goodwin's book is the personal narrative of Apache scout John Rope. Rope became a scout in 1876 and served under Crook in the Sierra Madre. His account provides a detailed description of the employment and capabilities of the Apache scouts. Crook makes particular note of the awesome physical abilities of the Apache scouts in his article, "The Apache Problem," p. 264.

¹²Crook, "The Apache Problem," p. 263.

¹³War Department, "Report of the General of the Army," Report of the Secretary of War, 1872 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872), pp. 20-32.

¹⁴Bourke, On the Border, p. 182.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 184-188.

¹⁶Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 121. It is difficult to establish an "order of battle" for Crook's forces since the columns operating in the Tonto Basin were constantly changing their organization and leadership. Price's Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry has been especially useful in identifying specific actions of the 5th Cavalry Regiment during the campaign.

¹⁷Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 121.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 122.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 122.

²⁰Ibid., p. 124. See also Headquarters, First Cavalry Regiment, "Campaigns, Battles and Engagements in Which the First Regiment of Cavalry has Taken Part," Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments (Washington: National Archives, 1900), Microfilm series D000806, no. 744, p. 17.

²¹John G. Bourke, Diary of John Gregory Bourke, Vol. I, Combined Arms research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, microfilmed from original at U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, microfilm # D000826, p. 25.

²²Ibid., p. 65. See also _____, Army and Navy Journal Vol. X, 1 February 1873, p. 380.

²³Price, Across the Continent, p. 659. Company A (Lieutenant Woodson) reported contact on the west side of the Verde River on December 7. Company K (Lieutenant Rice) reported skirmishes near Sycamore Creek, December 8-9, and in the Red Rock region on December 14.

²⁴Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 123.

²⁵Ibid., p. 123. See also Price, Across the Continent, p. 659.

²⁶Bourke, On the Border, p. 188.

²⁷Ibid., p. 191.

²⁸Ibid., p. 201. Bourke also says that it was very difficult to get medical officers assigned to the Department of Arizona at that time, and he makes a similar statement on December 11 in his Diary, Vol I, p. 27. Records indicate that only one commissioned surgeon was assigned to the department, the remainder were contracted civilian doctors (see Appendix A). Apparently these contracted surgeons did not accompany the columns into the field at the outset of the campaign, but when Major Brown's battalion left Camp Grant on February 15 to return to the Tonto Basin, it included four surgeons (see Bourke, Diary, Vol. I, p. 118).

²⁹Ibid., pp. 199-201. I have relied heavily on Bourke's account of this battle. See also Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, pp. 129-130.

³⁰Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 131, says that Brown's battalion consisted of only five companies of the 5th Cavalry. Bourke, On the Border, p. 202, states that six companies took to the field. This is supported by Price,

Across the Continent, p. 659.

³¹Bourke, On the Border, p. 205.

³²Ibid., pp. 205-207.

³³Ibid., p. 236. See also _____, Army and Navy Journal Vol. X, 22 February 1873, p. 436.

³⁴Bourke, Diary, Vol. I, p. 183.

³⁵Bourke, On the Border, p. 236.

³⁶Bourke, Diary, Vol. I, p. 118.

³⁷_____, Army and Navy Journal, Vol. X, 1 February 1873, p. 380. This is the only reference I have seen to groups of Indian "allies" working independently of Crook's columns.

³⁸Ibid., p. 203.

³⁹Ibid., p. 208. See also George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt, 1960 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 178.

⁴⁰Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 135. See also Price, Across the Continent, p. 659.

⁴¹Crook, Autobiography, p. 177.

⁴²Ibid., p. 177.

⁴³Ibid., p. 178.

⁴⁴Bourke, On the Border, p. 209.

⁴⁵Crook, Autobiography, p. 178.

⁴⁶Bourke, On the Border, p. 209.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 211.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 213.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 213.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 213-214 passim. I have paraphrased Bourke at length here, since he captures the essence of Crook's attitude and policies toward the Apaches after their surrender.

⁵¹Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Orders No. 12 (Prescott, A.T., 7 April 1873), p. 1.

⁵²_____, Army and Navy Journal, Vol. X, 14 June 1873, p. 698.

⁵³Crook, Autobiography, p. 180.

⁵⁴Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Orders No. 13 (Prescott, A.T., 8 April 1873), p. 1.

⁵⁵Headquarters, Department of Arizona, General Orders No. 14 (Prescott, A.T., 9 April 1873), p. 1.

⁵⁶Bourke, On the Border, pp. 220-221.

⁵⁷Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 143, citing the Prescott Arizona Miner, 29 March 1873.

⁵⁸_____, "The Indians - Fruits of Gen. Crook's Campaign Against the Apaches - The Peace Policy," The New York Times Vol. XXII, (April 22, 1873), p. 1.

⁵⁹_____, Army and Navy Journal, Vol. X, 14 June 1873, p. 698.

⁶⁰Crook, Autobiography, p. 183n. Crook's promotion angered many other senior officers, who felt that Crook was undeserving of such an honor. Many of these officers carried a grudge against Crook until his death on 21 March, 1890. In the 1971 edition of Crook's Resume of Operations Against Apache Indians: 1882 to 1886 (Johnson-Taunton Military Press), pp. 27-28, editor Barry C. Johnson reproduces a petition which gives evidence of the extent of this animosity. The petition, dated March 29, 1882, and addressed to the President of the United States, requests that Crook not be considered for promotion to Major General because of "the imbecility he exhibited during his campaign against Sitting Bull." The petition was anonymously signed, "Eighty Six Officers of the Army." It was forwarded to the Secretary of War, who filed it without action.

⁶¹U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-8, Counterquerrilla Operations (Washington, D.C., 1986), pp. 3-10 to 3-11.

⁶²U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. E-11.

⁶³Bourke, On the Border, p. 184.

⁶⁴Department of the Army, Counterquerrilla Operations, p. 3-10.

⁶⁵War Department, "Report of the General of the Army," pp. 20-32. See also Bourke, Diary, Vol. I, passim.

⁶⁶Frank C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New York: Macmillan, 1938), p. 204, says "more than two hundred and forty Indians were killed." Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 144, cites Bourke's calculation of 500 hostiles killed by Major Brown's command alone. John U. Terrell, Apache Chronicle (New York: World Publishing, 1972), p. 303, says "in excess of five hundred hostiles, not excluding a large number of women unavoidably slain, had been killed" by the end of December, 1872. "Another hundred met death" in the first few months of 1873.

⁶⁷_____, Army and Navy Journal, Vol. X, 14 June 1873, p. 698.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 698.

CHAPTER FIVE

¹George Crook, "Annual Report for the Department of Arizona, 1874," Report of the Secretary of War, 1874 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874), p. 66.

²U.S. House, 42d Congress, 3rd Session. H.R. Clum, "Appropriation for Collecting and Subsisting Apaches in Arizona and New Mexico," H.Exe.Doc. 105 (Washington, 13 January 1873), pp. 1-2.

³Bourke, On the Border, p. 216. See also _____. Army and Navy Journal Vol. XI, 25 July 1874, p. 789.

⁴Bourke, On the Border, p. 216.

⁵Crook, Autobiography, p. 183.

⁶Harry G. Cramer, "Tom Jeffords - Indian Agent," The Journal of Arizona History Vol. 17, No. 3 (1976), pp. 266-267. Secretary of the Interior Delano formally commissioned Jeffords as a U.S. Indian Agent on June 19, 1873.

⁷Constance W. Altshuler, Chains of Command: Arizona and the Army, 1856-1875 (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1981), p. 222.

- ⁸Cramer, "Tom Jeffords," p. 270.
- ⁹Ibid., p. 274.
- ¹⁰John Upton Terrell, Apache Chronicle (New York: World Publishing, 1972), p. 305.
- ¹¹Crook, Autobiography, p. 184.
- ¹²Ibid., p. 185.
- ¹³_____. Army and Navy Journal Vol. XI, 13 September 1873, p. 70.
- ¹⁴Crook, Autobiography, p. 184-185. See also Altshuler, Chains of Command, p. 222.
- ¹⁵Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. 147.
- ¹⁶Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 306. See also Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 147.
- ¹⁷Altshuler, Chains of Command, p. 224.
- ¹⁸Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 148.
- ¹⁹Terrell, Apache Chronicle, p. 307.
- ²⁰Bourke, On the Border, p. 184. See also Altshuler, Chains of Command, p. 225. Chunz had killed a small Mexican boy at Camp Grant the year before by striking him in the head with an axe.
- ²¹George F. Price, Across the Continent With the Fifth Cavalry (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1883), pp. 521-522.
- ²²Ibid., pp. 521-522.
- ²³_____, Army and Navy Journal Vol. XI, 14 August 1873, p. 20.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 20.
- ²⁵Altshuler, Chains of Command, p. 204n. See also Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 154.
- ²⁶Ibid., p. 226.
- ²⁷Crook, Autobiography, p. 181.

²⁸ _____, Army and Navy Journal Vol. XI, 29 November 1873, p. 247.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 373.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 373.

³¹ Ibid., p. 645. On 28 March, 1874, Captain Emil Adam was tried by a court-martial on charges that he "did fail and neglect to take proper precautions for the safe keeping of said prisoner" [Eskiminzin], and that he "did utterly fail and neglect to make, or cause to be made any attempt toward the recapture, or arrest of said escaped prisoner." He was found guilty and sentenced to be suspended from rank and command for six months, and to forfeit \$100.00 of his monthly pay for six months. Crook stated that he was "unable to comprehend how the court . . . could have imposed a sentence so utterly inadequate to the gravity of his offense . . ."

³² Crook, "Annual Report for 1874," p. 64.

³³ Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 157.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 157-158. See also Price, Across the Continent, p. 661.

³⁵ _____, Army and Navy Journal Vol. XI, 23 May 1874, p. 645.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 725.

³⁷ Crook, Autobiography, p. 181.

³⁸ Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 161.

³⁹ Crook, "Annual Report for 1874," p. 62.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 62. In his official report, Crook makes no mention of the fact that the heads of the chiefs were brought in as proof of their deaths. He only provides the dates on which they were killed.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 62.

⁴² Ibid., p. 62. See also Bourke, On the Border, p. 220.

⁴³ Crook, Autobiography, p. 182.

⁴⁴ Crook, "Annual Report for 1874," p. 65.

⁴⁵ _____, Army and Navy Journal Vol. XI, 11 July 1874, p. 758. This article quotes a letter from a soldier at Camp Bowie, who claimed that Cochise died from "dyspepsia" after an illness of 6 weeks. Cramer, "Tom Jeffords," p. 282, offers the theory that the chief may have died of cancer.

⁴⁶Crook, "Annual Report for 1874," p. 65.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 64.

⁴⁸D.C. Cole, "Reorganization, Consolidation, and the Expropriation of the Chiricahua Apache Reservation," The Indian Historian Vol X, No. 2 (1977), p. 4.

⁴⁹Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 162.

⁵⁰Altshuler, Chains of Command, p. 232.

⁵¹Michael L. Tate, "John P. Clum and the Origins of an Apache Constabulary, 1874-1877," American Indian Quarterly Vol. III, No. 2 (1977), p. 105.

⁵²Ibid., p. 109.

⁵³Francis C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New York: Macmillan, 1938), pp. 217-218.

⁵⁴Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 181.

⁵⁵Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 197.

⁵⁶Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, pp. 222-226.

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 314-315.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 345-346. The trader was a man named Robert Tribolett, who apparently had a thriving business along the border selling liquor, weapons and other goods to the Apaches. Thrapp infers that he was in league with the "Tucson Ring," and that he purposefully instigated trouble with Geronimo in order to prolong the conflict.

CHAPTER SIX

¹Steven Metz, "Counterinsurgent Campaign Planning," Parameters, Vol. XIX, No. 3, September 1989, p. 61.

²Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the

American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 130.

³Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 39.

⁴U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C, 1990), p. 1-5.

⁵Ibid., p. 1-5.

⁶Wooster, Indian Policy, p. 11.

⁷U.S. Army and Air Force, Military Operations, p. 2-9.

⁸Harry G. Cramer, "Tom Jeffords - Indian Agent," Journal of Arizona History, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1976, p. 267.

⁹Crook, Autobiography, p. 175.

¹⁰U.S. Army and Air Force, Military Operations, p. 1-5.

¹¹Ibid., p. 1-6.

¹²Ibid., p. 1-6.

¹³Ibid., p. E-2 and E-11.

¹⁴Ibid., p. E-22.

¹⁵Robert A. Strange, conversation with author, 28 January 1993.

¹⁶U.S. Army and Air Force, Military Operations, P. E-2.

APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA
DURING THE TONTO BASIN CAMPAIGN

Department Headquarters

Commander - Bvt. MG George Crook
 Ass't Adjutant General - CPT Azor H. Nickerson
 Ass't Inspector General - CPT William H. Brown (Bvt. Major)
 Chief Quartermaster - MAJ James J. Dana
 Chief Commissary - CPT M.P. Small
 Medical Director - Dr. E.I. Baily
 Chief Paymaster - MAJ Charles J. Sprague
 Aides-de-Camp - 2LT John G. Bourke and 2LT William J. Ross

First Cavalry Regiment**

COMPANY	ENLISTED STRENGTH	STATION	OFFICERS
A	62	Fort Whipple	CPT Thomas McGregor (Co & Post Cdr) 1LT Max Wesendorff 2LT P.H. Hogan
D	73	Camp Lowell	CPT E.V. Sumner (detached duty) 1LT Charles Bendire (Co Cdr) 2LT Herbert E. Tutherly
I	65	Camp Verde	CPT Clark C. Carr (Co Cdr) 1LT A. Grant 2LT Otto L. Hein
L	62	Camp Apache	CPT Stephen G. Whipple (on leave) 1LT Frank K. Upham (Co Cdr) 2LT Peter S. Bonus
M	24	Camp Apache	CPT Moses Harris (detached duty) 1LT Thomas Garvey (Co Cdr) 2LT Alexander O. Brodie

TOTAL: 286 Enlisted

15 Officers

**Note: Regimental HQs located in Benicia Barracks,
 Companies B, C, E, F, G, H, K stationed in Oregon,
 Nevada and California.

Fifth Cavalry Regiment

COMPANY	ENLISTED STRENGTH	STATION	OFFICERS
HQs	29	Camp McDowell	MAJ Eugene A. Carr (Regt/Post Cdr) 1LT William C. Forbush 1LT Charles H. Rockwell
A	72	Camp Verde	CPT Robert P. Wilson (Co Cdr) 1LT Jacob A. Augan 2LT Adolphus W. Greely
B	75	Camp McDowell	CPT Robert H. Montgomery (Co Cdr) 1LT William J. Volkman 2LT Walter S. Schuyler
C	74	" "	CPT Emil Adam (Co Cdr) 1LT Alfred B. Bache 2LT E.L. Keyes
D	74	Camp Bowie	CPT Samuel S. Sumner (Co Cdr) 1LT C.P. Rodgers 2LT George B. Davis
E	74	Camp Date Creek	CPT George F. Price (Co Cdr) 1LT Albert Woodson 2LT Charles D. Parkhurst
F	48	Camp Crittenden	MAJ William H. Brown (Co Cdr) 1LT J.B. Babcock 2LT William P. Hall
G	72	Camp McDowell	CPT James Burns (Co Cdr) 1LT Earl D. Thomas
H	74	" "	CPT John M. Hamilton (Co Cdr) 1LT Edward W. Ward 2LT Phineas P. Barnard
I	68	Camp Grant	MAJ William B. Royal (Post Cdr) CPT Sanford C. Kellogg (Co Cdr) 1LT Bernard Redly
K	70	Camp Hualpai	MAJ Eugene Crittenden (Post Cdr) CPT Julius W. Mason (Co Cdr) 1LT Charles King 2LT Frank Michler

COMPANY	ENLISTED STRENGTH	STATION	OFFICERS
L	74	Camp Grant	CPT Alfred B. Taylor (Co Cdr) 1LT Edward M. Hayes
M	70	" "	CPT Edward H. Leib (detached duty) 1LT Jacob Almy (Co Cdr) 2LT Charles Watts
TOTAL: 874 Enlisted			38 Officers

Twelfth Infantry Regiment**

COMPANY	ENLISTED STRENGTH	STATION	OFFICERS
D	37	Fort Yuma, CA	CPT A.B. MacGowan (Co Cdr) 1LT John L. Viven 2LT J.J. Clague
F	52	Camp Beale's Springs	CPT Thomas Byrne (Post & Co Cdr) 1LT W.W. Fleming 2LT Joseph H. Hurst
I	31	Camp Mojave	CPT F.F. Thompson (Co Cdr) 1LT Palmer G. Wood
TOTAL: 120 Enlisted			8 Officers

**Note: Regimental HQs located on Angel Island,
Cal. Companies A, B, C, E, G, H, K stationed in
California, Idaho and Nevada.

Twenty-Third Infantry Regiment

COMPANY	ENLISTED STRENGTH	STATION	OFFICERS
HQs	13	Fort Whipple	Bvt. MG George Crook (Regt. Cdr) 1LT O.W. Pollock
A	41	Camp Verde	CPT John Coppinger (Co & Post Cdr) 1LT Lafayette Hammond 2LT G. B. McDermott
B	34	Camp Date Creek	CPT James Henton (Co & Post Cdr) 1LT John F. Trout

COMPANY	ENLISTED STRENGTH	STATION	OFFICERS
C	49	Camp McDowell	CPT John L. Smyth (Co Cdr) 1LT Charles Hay
D	53	Camp Crittenden	CPT T.M. Smith (Co & Post Cdr) 1LT Stephen O'Connor 2LT William J. Clarke
E	60	Camp Lowell	MAJ A.J. Dallas (Post Cdr) 2LT Richard H. Poillon
F	60	Camp Bowie	CPT Joseph T. Haskell (Co Cdr) 1LT Charles Bird
G	39	Camp Hualpai	CPT Charles Wheaton (Co Cdr) 1LT William F. Rice 2LT P.T. Brodrick
H	51	Camp Grant	CPT James Thompson (Co Cdr) 1LT George M. Taylor 2LT J.H. Pardee
I	45	Camp Verde	CPT George M. Randall (Co/Post Cdr) 1LT William C. Manning 2LT Frederick L. Dodge
K	40	Fort Whipple	CPT Azor H. Nickerson (Co Cdr) 1LT Greenleaf A. Goodale 2LT Orlando I. Wieting
TOTAL:		485 Enlisted	28 Officers

Acting Assistant Surgeons on
Duty in the Department**

NAME	STATION
Dr. E.I. Baily	Department Medical Director, Fort Whipple
Dr. H.H. Davis	Fort Whipple
Dr. V. Havard	Camp Grant
Dr. W.A. Tompkins	Camp Mojave
Dr. Samuel L. Orr	Camp Bowie
Dr. H.M. Mathews	Camp Verde (field duty)
Dr. W.O. Springer	Camp Beale's Springs
Dr. W.W. Bidlack	With Company D, 1st Cavalry, in the field near Tucson
Dr. S.A. Freeman	Camp Crittenden
Dr. H.R. Porter	With Companies B and C, 5th Cavalry, in the field near Camp Verde

Dr. C.W. Harper	Camp Hualpai
Dr. M. O'Brien	Camp McDowell
Dr. J.A. Callender	Camp Lowell
Dr. L.N. Clark	Camp Grant
Dr. Leavitt Sanderson	Camp Verde
Dr. W.H. Corbusier	Camp Date Creek
Dr. G.A. Benjamin	With a detachment of the 5th Cavalry, in the field near Camp Verde
Dr. W.E. Rust	Camp Apache

****Note:** Because of the shortage of commissioned surgeons and assistant surgeons, Army regulations allowed commanders to hire civilian doctors. These "contract" surgeons were officially designated as Acting Assistant Surgeons. The Medical Director, who was a commissioned surgeon, assigned the contract surgeons within the department.

Sources:

War Department, "Report of the General of the Army," Report of the Secretary of War, 1872 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872), pp. 20-32. Duty stations and enlisted troop strengths as of August 31, 1872.

John G. Bourke, Diary of John Gregory Bourke Vol. I, 20 November 1872 - 6 April 1873, passim. Bourke includes copies of regimental postings and assignments in his diary.

APPENDIX B

MAPS

FIGURE 1 Western and Chiricahua Apache Tribes

FIGURE 2 Military Department of Arizona - 1871

FIGURE 3 The Tonto Basin Campaign

FIGURE 4 Key to Movements during Tonto Basin Campaign

NOTE: All maps were drawn by the author based on information from various sources.




FIGURE 1: Western and Chiricahua Apache Tribes




FIGURE 2: Military Department of Arizona - 1871




FIGURE 3: The Tonto Basin Campaign

The Tonto Basin Campaign

KEY TO
INITIAL MOVEMENTS & MAJOR BATTLES

- ① Companies B,C and K, 5th Cav. 16-30 Nov 1872.
- ② Companies A,B,C and K, 5th Cav, and Company I, 1st Cav. 3-18 Dec 1872.
- ③ Company E, 5th Cav. 6-30 Dec 1872.
(dates approximate)
- ④ Companies L and M, 1st Cav. 3-16 Dec 1872.
- ⑤ Companies L and M, 5th Cav. 11-29 Dec 1872.
- ⑥ Company G, 5th Cav. 20-25 Dec 1872 (joined with Companies L and M on 25 Dec.)
- ⑦ Companies A and K, 5th Cav. Company I, 1st Cav. 23 Dec 1872 - ?
- ⑧ Companies B and C, 5th Cav. Joined by Company E. 23 Dec 1872 - ?
- ⑨ Battle of Salt River Cave, 28 Dec 1872.
- ⑩ Battle of Turret Mountain, 25 Mar 1873.

FIGURE 4: Key to Movements During the Tonto Basin Campaign

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