

north, he purposes sending back superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar, and moving up Kakrez Valley, opening up fresh line of communication.

Telegram from General Primrose, Kandahar, to Quartermaster-General, Simla, — (dated 25th July, 1880).

Kandahar, 25th, July.—Information received this evening that Ayub's cavalry fell back last night to Helmand. Report received to the effect that one hundred and fifty cavalry crossed into the Argandab three days ago; believed to have been sent to take back Surteep's family hidden in village there. Efforts appear to be made by Hubbeboolla Khan, Barakzai, to raise people in Kakrez, without much success. There is much excitement throughout the country.

Cipher telegram from General Primrose, Kandahar, to Quartermaster-General, Simla, — (No. 430-K., dated 26th July, 1880).

Kandahar, 26th July.—Your telegram, 21st July. General Burrows states that should the enemy advance direct on Maiwand or on Khushk-i-Nakhud, he is prepared to attack him; should he attempt to reach Maiwand *via* Melmand, he would intercept him by Garmao Valley; should Ayub's force try to avoid him by taking road to Nish, *via* Melmand and Ghorak, he proposes to move by Maiwand into Kakrez. To do this he will reduce his baggage and send back some sick reported unfit, and I will assist him in every way to lighten his column and make it more moveable.

Telegram from General Primrose, Kandahar, to Quartermaster-General, Simla, — (dated 27th July, 1880).

Kandahar, 27th July.—General Burrows, under date evening 25th, reports situation unchanged. Two Sind horsemen shot when patrolling near Sungboor. At Kandahar I hear on best authority that Habeeboolla has been to Kakrez and has tried to raise the people without success. He was at Soznee on Sunday, and then proposed crossing into the Argandab. The second detachment, 11th Foot, left Sibi last night. Five men of first detachment struck down by sunstroke at Nari, are all doing well. Head-quarters 9th, and two mountain guns, left Quetta for Gulistan this morning.

Telegram from General Primrose, Kandahar, to Quartermaster-General, Simla, — (dated 28th July 1880).

Kandahar, 27th July.—General Burrows' force completely defeated; we take refuge in citadel; thirty sowars have escaped.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I., Commanding the Kandahar Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, — (dated Kandahar, 6th September, 1880).

IN forwarding the accompanying despatches from Generals Burrows and Nuttall, relative to the action of Maiwand, I have the honour to submit the following observations for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. On the 27th June the Political Resident reported to me that Ayub Khan had left Herat with infantry, cavalry, and 30 guns. He at the same time strongly urged that active support should be given to the Wali of Kandahar, then at Girishk. After considering the matter, I decided on recommending that a brigade of infantry, a cavalry regiment, and a battery of horse artillery should be sent to the Helmand,

To strengthen the garrison to be left here, the 4th Native Infantry were ordered to be concentrated at Quetta, and a wing of the 2nd Beluchis to march from Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Kandahar, with the concurrence of the Political Resident.

3. On the 1st July, the orders of Government were received through the Quartermaster-General, sanctioning an advance on Girishk, but that the Helmand was on no account to be crossed. The Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison and line of communications were not to be weakened, and troops from the reserve were to be pushed forward at once, as the Commander-in-Chief considered the force proposed to be left at Kandahar weak in all arms.

4. On the 2nd July, I received intelligence that Government intended Kandahar being reinforced by the 15th Foot, a battery of artillery, one Native cavalry, and two Native infantry regiments.

5. I was fully aware that immense difficulties would present themselves in pushing forward these corps, and that it would take some time before they could reach me; but as Ayub's advance would, I considered, have a disturbing effect on Kandahar and the country, I thought it advisable that the force approved of by Government should move to Girishk in accordance with their orders.

6. Accordingly, it marched on the 3rd July, and I was then left at Kandahar with the following garrison:—Squadron of Poona Horse, details of 3rd Light Cavalry, 3rd Sind Horse, four guns of C-2nd Royal Artillery, 5-11th Royal Artillery (Heavy Battery), 7th Fusiliers, and a wing of the 19th Regiment Native Infantry, — *vide* return attached. This of course was a very weak garrison; but the 4th Native Infantry, followed by the 28th Native Infantry, were moving up along the line, and I trusted to this becoming known, as also that other troops were coming, to prevent anything disturbing the ordinary state of affairs here.

7. On the 13th July the Head-quarters of the 4th Native Infantry arrived here, and between that date and the 28th July, the remainder of the regiment and the 28th Regiment Native Infantry joined at Kandahar.

8. It will thus be seen that I had no means of strengthening General Burrows except by sending him some details of the 1st Regiment N. I. and 30th N. I., left behind or joined at Kandahar from escort or other duties, and by 50 sabres of the 3rd Sind Horse under Lieutenant Monteith, who took out horses, &c., to equip the smooth-bore battery which had been rescued from the Wali's troops. On the 23rd July, however, by which time the 4th N. I. were nearly complete, and some of the 28th had arrived, I arranged to send 230 rank and file of the former regiment with a convoy of commissariat stores, and that some 130 of these should remain with General Burrows, the others returning as escort to a convoy of his sick.

9. Before this could be carried out, General Burrows had moved from Khushk-i-Nakhud, and the battle of Maiwand was fought.

10. I had, however, in the meantime, kept General Burrows fully informed of the instructions received from the Commander-in-Chief, — notably, the Quartermaster-General's telegram dated 15th July, to the effect that he must act according to his own judgment, and also the one dated 21st July, saying that Ayub should not be allowed to slip pass Kandahar towards Ghazni without being attacked.

11. Acting on this judgment, and on information which turned out to be inaccurate, he advanced from Khushk-i-Nakhud on Maiwand, and there found himself in contact with overwhelming numbers.