

McLaren Independent AIBA Investigation



INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF

the AIBA Boxing Competitions Prior to and During the
Rio Olympic Games 2016

30 September 2021

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Chapter 1: Executive Summary | 1 |
| 1.1 Introduction | 1 |
| 1.2 Overall Outcomes of the Stage One Independent investigation | 3 |
| 1.3 Background on AIBA..... | 7 |
| 1.4 History of AIBA Investigations | 7 |
| 1.4.1 Special Investigation Committee..... | 7 |
| 1.4.2 IOC Report | 8 |
| 1.5 Creation of the Terms of Reference | 10 |
| 1.6 Methodology and Summary of Evidence Gathering Process | 12 |
| 1.7 Visit to AIBA’s Offices | 14 |
| 1.8 Witnesses..... | 14 |
| Chapter 2: AIBA Commissions’ Power Usurped..... | 16 |
| 2.1 Background on the Commissions..... | 16 |
| 2.1.1 AIBA Technical and Rules Commission | 19 |
| 2.1.2 AIBA Draw Commission | 19 |
| 2.1.3 AIBA R&J Commission | 20 |
| 2.2 The Executive Director’s Usurpation of Power from the Commissions | 20 |
| 2.2.1 Regular Amendments to R&J Rules | 23 |
| 2.2.2 London Games 2012 - How does an R&J get to the Olympics?..... | 23 |
| 2.2.3 Pre and post London Games - R&J Appointment Process..... | 27 |
| 2.2.4 The R&J Draw in Practice Ignored the Rules | 28 |
| Chapter 3: The Falling of the 5 Stars | 30 |
| 3.1 Introduction | 30 |
| 3.2 Priming the playing field: President Legitimises Corruption | 30 |
| 3.3 Top-Down Power over the R&Js | 33 |
| 3.4 5 Stars Inserted into a Culture of Corruption | 37 |
| 3.5 Field Manipulation Pops up and Evolves..... | 39 |
| 3.6 Bribery Attempt | 45 |
| Chapter 4: Run-up to Rio..... | 48 |
| 4.1 Introduction | 48 |
| 4.2 How to Win a Medal | 48 |
| 4.3 Corruption at London Games Qualifying Event and World Championships | 51 |
| 4.4 The Practice Ground for Rio – The Qualifiers | 53 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| 4.4.1 Stacking the Draw Commission | 53 |
| 4.4.2 Fulfilling London Promises..... | 59 |
| 4.4.3 The Executive Director Appoints Officials for Rio..... | 60 |
| 4.4.4 Weeding Out the Incorruptible | 61 |
| Chapter 5: Rio the Pinnacle and Anti-Climax | 68 |
| 5.1 Introduction | 68 |
| 5.2 Rio Appointments | 68 |
| 5.3 The Theory behind the Mechanics..... | 79 |
| 5.4 The Reality of the R&J Allocations | 84 |
| 5.7 Rotations though R&J positions..... | 93 |
| 5.8 Instructions to the R&Js | 95 |
| 5.9 The two big controversial Bouts – The public watershed moment | 96 |
| 5.10 Analysis of Bout and R&J Allocations at Rio | 98 |
| 5.10.1 Background..... | 100 |
| 5.10.2 Scoring System at Rio | 100 |
| 5.10.3 2:1 split bout results where the winner would have changed had all 5 judge scores counted..... | 101 |
| 5.10.4 How the MIIT Selected Bouts for Analysis..... | 104 |
| 5.10.5 Results Analysis | 104 |
| 5.11 Review of R&J allocation to suspicious bouts | 105 |
| 5.11.1 Evgeny Tishchenko (RUS) Bouts and associated R&Js | 107 |
| 5.11.2 Vladimir Nikitin (RUS) Bouts and associated R&Js..... | 109 |
| 5.11.3 Tony Yoka Bouts (FRA) - Including Hussein Ishaish (JOR) v Mihai Nistor (ROM) Bout and associated R&Js | 111 |
| 5.11.4 Bout linked to Yoka Ishaish v Nistor | 112 |
| 5.11.5 Sofiane Oumiha (FRA) - Bouts and associated R&Js..... | 114 |
| 5.12 R&Js of questionable skill appointed to Rio | 118 |
| 5.13 The 250,000 Bribery Attempt | 126 |
| Chapter 6: The AIBA Special Investigation Committee Report | 134 |
| 6.1 Introduction | 134 |
| 6.2 Formation of the SIC Commission..... | 134 |
| 6.3 The information available to the SIC..... | 135 |
| 6.3 The SIC Progress Report | 141 |
| 6.4 The SIC Final Report | 145 |

Chapter 1: Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

In 2021, the Olympic sport of amateur boxing finds itself in an unmapped territory of exceptional circumstances. The International Boxing Association (AIBA), the sport's governing International Federation ("IF"), was suspended from organising and participating in Tokyo 2020. This was caused by the 2018-2019 International Olympic Committee ("IOC") taskforce review of the sport's governance, ethical, financial management, and refereeing and judging. However, the IOC wished to ensure that boxing remained on the Olympic program and athletes who were preparing for the Tokyo Olympics had the opportunity to compete. The IOC, for the first time since the start of the modern Olympics, took over the delivery and organisation of qualification events and the Tokyo 2020 tournament itself. Until the AIBA addresses and rectifies the shortcoming identified in the IOC reports, the federation will continue to be suspended and boxing athletes will remain under the remit of the IOC. A warning has been issued that the place of boxing in the program of the Olympic Games Paris 2024 and future editions of the Olympic Games is in jeopardy.

On 21 April 2021 the AIBA Executive Board ("EB") decided to initiate a fully independent two-stage, later to become a three-stage process to investigate the above issues. McLaren Global Sport Solutions Inc. (MGSS), led by Professor Richard H. McLaren, O.C., was appointed by AIBA's

Executive Board (“EB”) on 11 June 2021 to act as the Investigation Group under defined terms of reference to conduct an investigation fully independent of the AIBA and the IOC.

The purpose of this chapter is to give a summary overview of the principal outcomes of Stage One of the investigation. The purpose of Stage One is to conduct a thorough investigation on (i) whether there has been corruption or manipulation of sporting results at the Rio Olympic Games 2016; and (ii) examine allegations of corruption of the AIBA senior staff and AIBA Referees & Judges (“R&Js”) during the Rio Olympic Games 2016. Background and detailed findings of the first stage of this investigation are provided in subsequent chapters of this Report. In order to comprehend the context of this Stage One Report it was necessary to include some comments on the other two stages. However, the full reports of the subsequent Stages will be provided in November 2021 and March 2022 in accordance with the terms of reference. The subsequent stages will involve a broad investigation to identify possible acts of corruption, mismanagement of funds, manipulation of results of elections or the like by AIBA in past and current administrations. The objective of all three stages is to enable AIBA to learn from its past. The purpose of the MGSS investigation is not only to investigate such actions and to identify the perpetrators, but also to issue recommendations going forward to have the proper mechanisms in place and implement the appropriate measures within AIBA to avoid that such misconducts could happen again.

This summary sets out first the key investigative findings with respect to Stage One of the investigation. These key points are followed by a discussion of the background and history of the

AIBA and the various reports that proceeded this Stage One Investigation Report. The background information is followed by a discussion of the formation of the McLaren Independent Investigation Team (“MIIT”) and its Terms of Reference after which can be found a summary of the investigative methodology used to develop this executive summary.

1.2 Overall Outcomes of the Stage One Independent investigation

AIBA has had a long history of match manipulation and corruption. The formal structure of the organisation is a reasonable and workable constitutional structure with apparent appropriate operational mechanisms activated through different permanent Commissions. The problems come from the fact that woven into that formal structure is an informal institutionalised structure that overrides constitutional checks and balances and serves the purpose of facilitating the manipulation and corruption that has grown up within the sport. The top-level officials extended their powers to include more than what was supported by the formal structure and its constitutional and governance processes.

The AIBA has struggled with allegations of corruption since well before the Athens Games in 2004 and the Summer Games that have followed thereafter. The same allegation has been raised consistently – outcomes of bouts have been manipulated because of the specific R&Js assigned to them. In response to the shackles of the legacy of corruption and manipulation, over the years AIBA has continually made changes to the rules governing appointments of R&Js, R&J evaluation system, and bout scoring. However, these reforms have done little to eliminate allegations of R&J

manipulation. To the outside observer, the rule changes functioned to demonstrate the federation's commitment to deter the possibility of corruption among R&Js and manipulation of bout results. However, despite these changes, manipulation and corruption have still been possible for several simple reasons. First and foremost, the problem is the personnel carrying out the duties of AIBA. The formal rules were not applied, and senior level personnel usurped powers to themselves. They used this institutionalised structure to manipulate poorly trained R&Js who wanted little more than the intangible benefits of being recognized in their own right as such and the accompanying tangible benefits of travel, status, and prestige they did not have with their regular day jobs. The fact that they were not well trained and frequently come from modest backgrounds enabled them to be preyed upon by those who had corrupt motives.

In order to understand what has been uncovered by the MIIT the culture in which paid and volunteer staff of R&Js and International Technical Officials ("ITOs") worked must be recognised and understood. The volunteers were frequently looking to be favoured at whatever the next event for AIBA would be. They were prepared to do anything even if it would violate internal rules or codes of ethics to ensure their being chosen by those with the power to make selections for the next upcoming event in the calendar. They were ripe for exploitation.

1.2.1 The Key Findings

1. A system for the manipulation of bouts by officials existed at Rio. The seeds of this were sown years before starting from at least the Olympic Games of the twenty-first century through the events around 2011 (to be discussed in next Stage) and London 2012.

2. The qualifying competitions along the route to participation in Rio in 2016 were the practise ground for the corruption and manipulation of bouts at Rio. At the Olympic qualifiers the manipulation methodology was fine-tuned in anticipation of use Rio.
3. The manipulation methodology relied upon corruption within the cadre of corrupted R&Js and the Draw Commission.
4. Key personnel took on powers they did not have on paper. For example, the Executive Director seized powers belonging to the permanent Commissions. The Commissions would let this happen as did the President. Once having acquired the power, he would oversee the appointment of R&Js that knew what was going on but would comply with the manipulation or who were incompetent but wanted to continue as an R&J so were willing to comply or turn a blind eye to what was going on. Thus, the R&Js were primed to be capable of manipulating the results of bouts to achieve their own personal goals, which were frequently the intangible rewards of recognition, inclusion and respect in their home countries.
5. With the usurp power the key personnel in turn selected persons to staff the various positions required to run boxing. In doing so, they were careful to appoint those overseeing the boxing bouts to ensure they would turn a blind eye to the allocation of incompetent or complicit R&Js.
6. Vital to the success of the corruption was the connivance, approval and complicit acknowledgement and support of these activities by the Executive Director and the President. The permanent paid staff worked in a command and obey environment where power was concentrated in the Executive Director and exercised on behalf of the President. Indeed, after the switch in June 2015 of Executive Directors the concentration of power was more acute and evident in the new Executive Director in charge for Rio who was prior to his elevation the Sports Director.
7. Bouts were manipulated for money, perceived benefit of AIBA, or to thank National Federations and their Olympic committees, and, on occasion, hosts of competitions for their financial support and political backing. The investigation to date has concluded that such manipulation involved significant six figure sums on occasion. The evidence the MIIT found is thought to be the tip of the iceberg.
8. The President CK Wu bears ultimate responsibility for the failures of officiating at Rio and the qualifying events. He was supported by his Executive Director at Rio who were key actors in organising the field of play to allow the manipulation to flourish.
9. The President's tenure dating back to 2006 means he must bear ultimate responsibility for tacitly approving corrupt activity in the behaviours of the officials before the 5 star group had been officially created. The 5 star R&J programme was a good concept ruined by the way in which the R&Js were selected for officiating duties. The consequence was

that the 5 star improvement would not achieve its intended goal of greater permeance and consistency in the officiating by the R&Js.

10. The evidence gathered by the investigation may result in decisions by AIBA to refer individuals for disciplinary consideration. Those persons who should be considered include the President at the time, Executive Director at Rio and selected 5 star & 3 star R&Js and ITO officials.
11. The identification of all those involved has been hampered by the reticence of some witnesses to make public statements preferring to speak with the MIIT in confidence, which we have respected. The MIIT wants to formally record its thanks to all of those who came forward to assist us in the investigation. The confidential nature of much of the interview information is crucial to understanding what took place.
12. A comprehensive study of the bouts at Rio indicates approximately nine bouts that were suspicious beyond the two raised in the media at the time. It may be necessary to further examine those bouts for which no definitive conclusion can be made at this time. The problem with completing that analysis is due to the delayed receipt of five score bout sheets. Therefore, there may also be other bouts which are suspicious. However, the time for analysis was too short to include in this Report. The on-going work of the MIIT will include further analysis.
13. The President in his reports to the IOC over the years avoided discussion of what he apparently knew was inappropriate conduct. The result was a masking of the corrupt activity to present a false impression of actions at the AIBA to the IOC. Problems were not identified and were suppressed or pushed aside rather than confronting them and dealing with them more robustly in the first place.
14. The MIIT investigation indicates that Rio was clearly a low point for AIBA. Significant steps have been taken to correct the process of officiating. Weaknesses still remain and there is no room for complacency in tackling these issues. The MIIT is of the view that progress is being made but the problem of personnel requires immediate up-front attention. The people are the problem.
15. The MIIT has made significant progress in the investigation of Stage One and this will be of benefit in the forthcoming Stages Two and Three.

1.3 Background on AIBA

The sport of boxing has a rich and ancient history, first being accepted as an Olympic sport in 688 BC at the 23rd Olympiad in Olympia, Greece. In modern times, it was officially included on the Olympic program at the St. Louis games in 1904 where it has remained to date. AIBA is the IF recognised by the IOC as the governing body for the sport of amateur boxing. The IF was founded in 1920 and previously known as the Federation International de Boxe Amateur. In 1946, the federation reorganised and became known as l'Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur. The AIBA is composed of 204 affiliated National Member Federations worldwide and five regional confederations.

1.4 History of AIBA Investigations

This independent investigation comes after a series of internal investigations and external IOC task force investigation into the allegations of corruption, bribery, and manipulation of sporting results. The findings of these investigations some of which have been made public have resulted in limited changes to AIBA's constitution, technical rules, and operations.

1.4.1 Special Investigation Committee

On 29 August 2016 President Dr. Ching-Kuo Wu ("CK Wu") established a Special Investigation Committee ("SIC") to investigate allegations made by various world media and AIBA members regarding alleged corruption among AIBA senior staff and AIBA R&Js. This was to focus on

allegations of cheating and manipulation specifically at the Rio Olympic Games. This was an internal investigation conducted by Mr. Tom Virgets, AIBA disciplinary Chair and R & J Evaluator; Mr. Terry Smith; Mr. Osvaldo Bisbal, AIBA Vice President; Mr. Ray Silvas, Special Advisory Committee Chair. The investigation was conducted over the course of approximately four months via interviews, statistical analysis of bouts, and email questionnaire. The original report was never made public. The MIIT has sight of a copy as well as the public report discussed below.

The public report of the SIC investigation found “no *credible evidence... of corruption among the 5 stars*”; The report noted that there was a “bad culture” within AIBA that was driven by “*power, fear and lack of transparency.*” It found that the Executive Director (“ED”) at the time, Karim Bouzidi, had all the mechanisms in place to control event outcomes, but “*found no credible evidence that the Executive Director... participated in such practices*”. However, the SIC did find that the ED had significant authority and influence over the Field of Play, including appointments of referees, judges and International Technical Officials (“ITO”), which he used alone to make changes to the referee and judge draws.

1.4.2 IOC Report

Following the Rio Games, the IOC Executive Board requested the AIBA perform specific steps to address serious concerns related to its governance and financial stability. The IOC requested a financial audit, an independent review, and the continuation of changes related to R&Js to be implemented. IOC’s review of AIBA’s progress report, submitted 31 January 2018, resulted in the

IOC enacting a series of measures which included opening an investigation into AIBA governance, suspending payments to AIBA, freezing all contact with AIBA until such time that an official inquiry was completed.

This inquiry produced a report in January 2019 (“IOC Report”). Among its findings, the IOC report found a continuous disregard of governance standards and processes, insufficient safeguards to ensure sustainable and fair management of refereeing and judging, and over-indebtedness. The IOC Report recommended the ongoing suspension of AIBA, which continues to the writing of this Report and for the IOC, on an exceptional basis, to develop a solution to allow the athletes of Olympic boxing to attend qualification events and the Tokyo Olympic Games just completed in August of 2021.

Since 2019, the IOC through its Special Monitoring Committee, with IOC Executive Board member Nenad Lalovic chairing the committee, has engaged in dialogue and monitoring of AIBA. The most recent report of Mr. Lalovic to the Executive Board occurred at a meeting on 7 September 2021. In letter correspondence to AIBA reporting on that meeting the IOC Director General Mr. Christophe De Kepper indicated there were three areas of concern: Governance, Finance and R&Js. Each of these topic areas will be the subject of comment in the various stages of the investigation. This Stage One Report has the focus on the R&Js conduct at Rio in accordance with the terms of reference.

1.5 Creation of the Terms of Reference

On 21 April 2021 the AIBA Executive Board (“EB”) decided to initiate a fully Independent Investigation “and to *“better understand the mistakes and misconducts of the past, obtaining information allowing to properly sanction the persons responsible for such misconducts (if applicable), and adopt / improve its policies to prevent such misconducts from occurring in the future”*”.

On 11 June 2021 the AIBA EB announced the appointment McLaren Global Sport Solutions Inc. led by CEO, Professor Richard H. McLaren, O.C., law professor at Western University, Canada; counsel to McKenzie Lake Lawyers, LLP and long-standing arbitrator at the Court of Arbitration of Sport (“CAS”), as the person responsible for establishing an Investigation Group to conduct the Independent Investigation under the Terms of Reference.

MGSS was *“solely responsible for the composition of the Investigation Group”* (“McLaren Independent Investigation Team or MIIT”). To that end, Professor Richard McLaren was supported by a multidisciplinary team with proven experience in complex investigations, doping violations, the interviewing of witnesses, forensic analysis, and financial and corruption investigations. The team was staffed by the Chief Investigator, Martin Dubbey and members of his staff from Harod Associates, including, Alex Miller, Howard Leather, Tracy Tobler and Greg Kitsell; accompanied by MGSS personnel Janie Soublrier, Robert Copeland, Matoula Charitsis and lawyer, Diana Tesic.

The Terms of Reference allow MGSS to “conduct the Independent Investigation in whatever manner it determines free from interference or direction by either the AIBA or the IOC” and mandated that the MIIT:

3.1 The mandate of the Independent Investigation shall be to:

- a. investigate the activity of all AIBA individuals, contractors and sponsors involved in the Rio Olympics to establish whether there has been corruption or manipulation of sporting results, identify where possible the responsible persons and recommend the appropriate courses of action (to be known as Stage 1);*
- b. investigate the activity of the individuals involved in the management and administration of the AIBA during the presidency of C.K. Wu and Gafur Rakhimov and after their presidencies, to establish notably whether there have been acts of corruption, violations of AIBA policies or lack thereof, manipulation of sporting results or of results of elections, mismanagement of AIBA funds, identify if possible the responsible persons and recommend the appropriate courses of action (to be known as Stage 2).*
- c. See below*

3.2 The Investigation Group shall not be bound by the conclusions of any previous investigations on the present matters. However, the Investigation Group shall inform AIBA if it concludes that further investigation is impossible.

3.3 The objectives of the Independent Investigation shall be:

- a. Investigate the activity of all AIBA individuals, contractors and sponsors involved in the Rio Olympics as per article 3.1 (a);*
- b. Identify and investigate past misconduct within AIBA as per article 3.1 (b);*
- c. Identify individuals who need to be disciplined and submit the material allowing for their case to be filed with either or both Ethics Committee and the Disciplinary Committee (if applicable);*
- d. From the paragraphs “a” and “b” of the above, collaborate with the persons in charge of AIBA’s reforms in order to assist in implementing the proper mechanisms that are fit for purpose to cure and prevent the flaws in governance structure that enabled the transgressors in paragraph “a” and “b” of the above.*

On 30 June 2021 the ToR were extended to include:

“3.1

c) investigate the activity of all AIBA individuals involved in the Refereeing and Judging at the 2021 ASBC Asian Boxing Championship in Dubai and other Competitions at the level of AIBA and Confederations to establish whether there has been corruption or manipulation of sporting results, identify where possible the responsible persons and recommend the appropriate courses of action (to be known as Stage 3).

...

3.3 The objectives of the Independent Investigation shall be:

a. Investigate the activity of all AIBA individuals, contractors and sponsors involved in the Rio Olympics as per article 3.1 (a), as well as the activity of all AIBA individuals involved in the Refereeing and Judging at the 2021 ASBC Asian Boxing Championship in Dubai and other Competitions at the level of AIBA and Confederations as per article 3.2 (c);”

This Stage One Report fulfills the terms of reference set out in 3.1.a. and the objectives of the investigation as set out in 3.3(a).

1.6 Methodology and Summary of Evidence Gathering Process

Professor McLaren and the MIIT have over the course of running a number of high-profile sports investigations developed a reputation of unbiased and independent examination of evidence. With each investigation the objective has always been to provide stakeholders confidence that an independent and careful assessment of facts would be undertaken. This investigation is no different. Throughout the course of the MIIT’s mandate, Professor McLaren personally reviewed all gathered evidence. This Report was prepared from the collective work of the MIIT investigative team. The investigation process is outlined below. The many significant elements

that were studied and analyzed ultimately provide the evidence and background for findings of fact.

The Terms of Reference provided the MIIT with complete autonomy and “the right to follow the evidence wherever it may lead them.” As such the MIIT created a map of enquiry or framework and laid out the allegations to be tested and lines of enquiry to be followed. The terms of reference also granted the MIIT the ability to approach law enforcement where it was appropriate or required based on the evidence.

In this first phase of the investigation the MIIT examined the previously completed investigations and their evidence where available; various investigations conducted by news organisations and their investigative journalists; and its own lines of enquiry, from which it created its framework. Typical in an investigation of this complexity, the framework is a living document and process which is updated as evidence is established, and lines of enquiry are either eliminated or added. This included a visit to the offices of the AIBA, over 40 key witness interviews, evidence collection, logging and processing.

Over the course of this first phase, the MIIT collected, developed, and reviewed almost two million documents, emails, video and audio recordings, interviewed past and present AIBA individuals and personnel. This Stage One Report is the analysis of all the intelligence gathered in that stage of the investigation.

Thus, this report contains information and evidence that Professor McLaren considers reliable and firmly established. While many of the MIIT's witnesses have remained confidential due to fear of reprisal and threats to their safety, the evidence provided by confidential witnesses has been carefully recited to protect their identity and the possibility of retaliation.

1.7 Visit to AIBA's Offices

Three members of the MIIT attended the offices of AIBA in Switzerland on 11 and 12 August 2021. During the course of that visit an attempt was made to retrieve the R/J original draw and bout sheets of the R&Js and ITO's who officiated at Rio. No such documents were found on the premises of AIBA. While the investigation team was there, a forensic image download of certain computers was taken and is in the course of being reviewed and analysed. Several staff were interviewed by the MIIT whilst there and the team is grateful for the cooperation received.

1.8 Witnesses


The Terms of Reference obligated *"anyone subject to the Regulations and Constitution of AIBA, the Confederations and the National Federations ... to fully cooperate with the Investigation Group and to comply promptly with any request made by the Investigation Group."* The MIIT had complete discretion to determine whether anyone, including any individual, any National Federation or any Confederation, failed to cooperate with the MIIT's requests, failing which it would refer the matter to the AIBA Disciplinary Committee where the individual could face a 10,000CHF fine or suspensions from boxing activities for up to two years.

The MIIT notes an unfortunate reality in the world of boxing. Many of the MIIT's witnesses refused to come forward publicly for fear of reprisal, threat to personal security, or loss of employment opportunities among other reasons. Surprisingly, even those who were no longer part of the organisation, either as staff or appointed, felt comfortable to share their evidence only in confidence. Many of these individuals possessed first-hand knowledge and documentary evidence related to the investigation. While the background forces, real or imagined, inhibiting most witnesses from coming forward, there was from all of them an overwhelming outpouring of love for the sport of boxing. Some of which have dedicated their entire working lives to the sport. The MIIT heard from these witnesses their overwhelming desire to save the sport.

Chapter 2: AIBA Commissions' Power Usurped

2.1 Background on the Commissions

The organisational governance structure of AIBA is recreated in the chart below.



There are 7 permanent AIBA Commissions. The AIBA Commissions are advisory bodies which may propose recommendations to the AIBA Executive Committee. They are also the implementation bodies of Executive Committee decisions. Generally, the purpose of these commissions within an international federation reaches beyond that of advisory and implementation functions. Apart from developing what amounts to subject matter expertise in specific technical, administrative, disciplinary and sporting areas, the commission structure theoretically increases accountability within the IF by preventing the concentration of power in a single individual. In the best case, the commissions function as a check and balance within the IF and ensure that no manager or department or executive board member has absolute control over decisions. It is an important practice of good governance in sporting federations, the lack of which ostensibly leads to concentration of power which can be the segue into corruption of individuals who are so minded to act corruptly.

The AIBA Bylaws in theory set out a structure that supported these checks and balances within the organisation. In practice however, the McLaren Independent Investigative Team (“MIIT”) finds that the rules were circumvented and decision-making power became more and more concentrated in the office of the Executive Director. The MIIT notes that it has only examined the role of the commissions and their relationship with the Executive Director insofar as it related to the in the field of play aspect of the sport, such as the R&J Commission, the Technical and Rules Commission and the Draw Commission. As such, it has no findings or comments on the structure, power dynamic or efficacy of AIBA’s other commissions which it leaves to the governance review happening in parallel to the MIIT’s investigation. The MIIT further notes these

examined commissions' area of expertise is ripe for corruption and manipulation and without clearly defined reporting and oversight authority exercising appropriate action is challenging.

The permanent commissions examined by the MIIT include the R&J Commission and the Technical and Rules Commission¹; each is composed of a Chairperson and other members, selected by the President² and ratified by the Executive Committee.³ Specific duties of the individual Commissions are stipulated in special regulations adopted by the Executive Committee.⁴

The Draw commission is a field of play commission instituted for the purpose of drawing Referees & Judges for each bout in any AIBA Open Boxing ("AOB") Competition, including the Olympics.⁵ Under the 2015 Competition Rules in force at the time of Rio, it consisted of a minimum of two persons who were certified AIBA International Technical Officials ("ITOs"). For all AOB Competitions, the Rules state that the Supervisor nominates the candidates and the AIBA President approves, appoints and dismisses the ITOs.

¹ Does not apply to the Athletes and Special Commissions.

² Art. 39.2 (E) of the AIBA Statutes.

³ Art. 38.1 (P) of the AIBA Statutes.

⁴ The MIIT has relied on the AIBA statutes in place at the time of the Rio Games, all reference to the rules will be those in effect during Rio, unless otherwise noted.

⁵ 2015 AOB Competition Rules.

2.1.1 AIBA Technical and Rules Commission

This permanent Commission is responsible for the development of AIBA Technical and Competition Rules and proposes new rules and/or amendments to existing rules. This Commission was also responsible for nominating the candidate for Supervisor, which is ultimately approved by the President.⁶

The Supervisor is a key role.⁷ This individual is responsible for all technical and competition related issues in AOB Competitions, defined as all AIBA owned and controlled competitions including: World Championships, Olympic Games, Continental Championships, Olympic Qualifying Competitions and Confederation Competitions. For all AOB Competitions, the Supervisor is responsible for nominating the candidates for the Draw Commission.⁸

2.1.2 AIBA Draw Commission

The Draw Commission members are ITOs nominated by the Supervisor and appointed by the AIBA President. According to the AOB Competition Rules in 2016, the Draw Commission was obligated to have at least two persons who will draw the R&Js for each bout in any AOB Competition.⁹ In all AOB Competitions, R&Js are drawn (i.e. selected) by the Draw Commission.

⁶ AIBA Bylaws, 2016.

⁷ Also referred to as Technical Delegate.

⁸ In APB and WSB Competitions, the referees would be nominated by the Supervisor.

⁹ AOB Competition Rules, 2015.

2.1.3 AIBA R&J Commission

The permanent R&J Commission is responsible for dealing with all issues related to R&Js. Primarily, it is responsible for *“ensuring that R&Js appointed to AIBA Competitions are suitably qualified and secures sufficient numbers of appropriately accredited R&Js for international, regional and national competitions.”*¹⁰ It is responsible for the development and implementation of the AIBA R&J Management System that caters to the development, education, certification and evaluation of R&Js.¹¹

2.2 The Executive Director’s Usurpation of Power from the Commissions

Based on the interview and documentary evidence reviewed, it is not evident to the MIIT when the erosion of the Commissions’ decision-making power began. It was however well underway for the period examined by the MIIT, which includes from London 2012 until post Rio 2016. Stage One of this Report under the Terms of Reference is focused primarily on manipulation of results at Rio and its related qualifiers; the MIIT narrowed its examination to the period from when the R&J star program was instituted by the then Executive Director, Ho Kim, until the end of the Olympic year 2016.

Ho Kim was the architect of the R&J accreditation program, the star program which allocated a 1-3 star rating to internal R&Js based on certain testing and qualifications. He also created the 5

¹⁰ (AIBA Bylaws, 2016).

¹¹ (AIBA Bylaws, 2020).

star program. He described to the MIIT that his goal with the 5 stars was to have a group of high calibre professional referees and judges, similar in scope to UEFA's class of professional referees, that were always available and free of conflicts, ready to be deployed at competitions when and where necessary. The concept was, in theory, a reasonable one. The Executive Committee agreed and signed off on the program.

Witnesses from the R&J Commission at that time described to the MIIT that according to the Rules, the R&J Commission should have had management over the program to a degree. However, it was well understood that they could not "overstep their boundaries" as the Executive Director maintained full control of the 5 star program. According to the technical rules in place at the time, the assignment of R&Js to AOB and WSB competitions must be completed by the R&J Commission. When the 5 star program started however, this authority had been stripped away in practice.

The R&J Commission would receive a list of officials from the Executive Director as the potential assignments and officials that should be assigned to a specific competition. The Commission would review the list and make recommendations of who should and should not be assigned and return it back to the Executive Director. What they found however, was that little by little their recommendations were not being observed. Inevitably, officials that the R&J Commission felt were inappropriate and who the Commission removed from the "list of possibilities" were nonetheless approved to officiate by the Executive Director. The role of the Commission

eventually became that of a mere rubber stamp, without the actual critical review of officials and appointment process required under the Rules.

The Commissions became more and more powerless with the appointment in 2015 of Karim Bouzidi (“Bouzidi”) as the Executive Director. The Rules dictated that R&J and ITO assignments were the responsibility of the R&J Commission and the Technical and Rules Commission, respectively. These assignments were supposed to have been overseen and approved by the President. However, Tom Virgets described that Bouzidi convinced the President that it should be his responsibility to choose the R&Js, and that he and the President should jointly determine the ITOs and Supervisor.

This usurpation of authority from the Technical and Rules Commission ultimately gave the Executive Director the ability to have full control of the appointment process for the key field of play positions at the Rio Games. He had the power to decide who would serve as the Supervisor, and Deputy Supervisors, on the Draw Commission, and ITOs, and ultimately could exert influence over all of the field of play positions. In parallel he had frozen out the R&J Commission from participating in any meaningful way in the selection criteria of R&Js for Rio, thus giving him the ability to have authority over the R&Js, which he could influence in real time. Therefore, the MIIT finds that the power to shape the competition landscape for the Rio Games rested in the hands of the Executive Director. It also finds that this was accomplished with the tacit approval and knowledge of the President.

2.2.1 Regular Amendments to R&J Rules

The AIBA has struggled with allegations of corruption since well before the Athens Games in 2004 and following each summer Games thereafter. The same allegation has been raised consistently – outcomes of bouts have been manipulated because of the specific R&Js assigned to them. In response to same, the AIBA has continually made changes to the rules governing appointments of R&Js, the R&J evaluation system, and bout scoring over the years. However, these reforms have done little to eliminate allegations of R&J manipulation. To the outside observer, the rule changes functioned to demonstrate the Federation’s commitment to deter the possibility of corruption among R&Js and manipulation of bout results. However, despite these changes, manipulation and corruption have still been possible for quite simple reasons – the Rules were not applied and the R&Js are not well trained and unprepared to resist temptation.

2.2.2 London Games 2012 - How does an R&J get to the Olympics?

Prior to the Beijing Games in 2008 National Boxing Federations (“NFs”) had the power to nominate R&Js for selection in international tournaments, including the Olympics. R&Js were accredited for international tournaments by first completing tournaments at the Continental level and then progressing to the International level. In this pre London system, the NFs would name their R&Js for specific international competitions. In other words, the NFs would tell AIBA “this is the referee we want.” It is obvious that there was significant opportunity for risk of not only corruption and manipulation but also coercion on the part of the NFs. Since the NFs would

have complete control and influence over an R&J's career, witnesses suggested that compliance with a National Federation's demands influenced not only the judge's future appointments to international tournaments but also bout results.¹²

The catalyst to move from the system of NF appointed R&Js to AIBA control over them came following the Beijing Games. Frequent allegations of manipulation together with media pressure and a strong request by the IOC prompted AIBA to reform their R&J structure. Its former Executive Director, Ho Kim, developed the star system where AIBA consolidated the power of accreditation and training of R&Js.

In essence, the star system functioned to indicate an R&J's experience and competence in officiating bouts. In order to get to international competitions an R&J would have to progress through three different levels – the 1 star R&Js could officiate smaller competitions with less than 12 countries, 2 star R&Js could officiate competitions with twelve or more countries and 3 star R&Js could officiate World Championships, Olympic Games, and other large international tournaments. With this change, National Federations had less influence over their R&Js. AIBA selected the R&Js for each tournament from a database it controlled and it was responsible to pay all their expenses. The star system was in place for the London Games.

¹² R&Js were anxious to please their appointee. Their day jobs often did not support the lifestyle of international business travel, luxury accommodation and the prestige of holding an appointment. They were vulnerable to corrupt approaches because they would do anything to maintain their position. They would say nothing and not report what they oversaw in order to better ensure future appointments.

According to the 2012 Technical and Competition Rules in effect for the London Games, the selection of R&Js for Olympic tournaments was the responsibility of AIBA's R&J Commission. The Commission would prepare a list of suitably qualified officials who were presented to the AIBA President for approval. However, the process by which and the criteria required for a R&J to be selected for the London Games is not clear and the MIIT was not able to identify any specific criteria other than the requirement that they be a 3 star.

Following the London Games, the Executive Director evolved the R&J star system to include a new level and introduced a class of "professional referees", the 5 star R&J. It is important to note that from a competency and experience standpoint, there was no significant difference between a 3 star or a 5 star R&J. There was no change in the accreditation system. In fact, five star R&Js were the anointed but, in reality, were merely accredited 3 star R&Js. The only difference was that 5 star R&Js would be full-time contractual appointments of AIBA, instead of being dependent upon selection. The purpose of the 5 star program was to develop as many full-time AIBA R&Js as possible to enhance the integrity of the sport. Seven appointments were made in total, and these individuals were managed by the Executive Director.

The thought at the time was that having full time AIBA R&Js would reduce scheduling conflicts and ensure there would always be 5 stars available to officiate. It was stipulated as a condition of engagement that they were to be available. Also, it was hoped they would be less influenced by their NF and home country, a problem that continues to hamper AIBA. Each of these 5 star R&Js officiated in both the Baku World Boxing Championships and London Games prior to being

appointed to 5 star status in October 2012. The 5 stars R&Js were selected by “*a panel of experts with the strict criteria of entry based on their previous qualifications, experience, and career records.*” A witness, who was a member of the R&J Commission, stated that they had very little control over 5 star R&Js. They became a clique accountable to themselves and the Executive Director.

The 5 star system was in place for the qualifiers and for the Rio Games. All of the 5 star R&Js were present in addition to 29 3 star R&Js. While all the 5 stars were appointed to officiate the Rio Games by virtue of their full-time contractual status at AIBA, there was no clear “roadmap” for how the remaining R&Js came to be selected for Rio. Similar to the AIBA Technical and Competition Rules in use during London, members of the R&J Commission were responsible to nominate a list of suitably qualified R&J officials for tournaments, which is to be approved by the President. However, this process was not followed in practice. (See Chapter 5)

While the Technical Rules indicated that the selection of suitably qualified R&Js falls under the authority of the R&J Commission, the minutes of the R&J Committee meeting in October 2016 following Rio reveal the reality:

“The Commission asked several times what the criteria were and were not involved at any point. [...] [I]n this selection process there was no prior discussion with the R&J commissions before selection and there was no opportunity for consensus. In every previous Games we had input, not here. [...] The Rio 2016 selection was not involved of the R&J Commission and that was wrong.”

Members of the R&J Commission describe asking the Executive Director Bouzidi, to start developing the selection criteria for R&Js a year in advance of the Games. However, their requests were ignored and in one instance were told that *“that is not your job.”* The witness recalled that Bouzidi specified that the R&J Commission was only responsible for training and educating R&Js and the selection and assignment of R&Js was his responsibility.

Prior to the pre-Olympic seminar, R&Js were subject to a gag order precluding them from sharing that they had been selected for Rio. Ironically the members of the R&J Commission who were supposed to have made the R&J assignments according to the Competition and Technical Rules in place, did not know which R&Js had been selected until the pre-Olympic seminar took place (AIBA122). While the 2018 minutes of the R&J Commission meeting indicate that all R&Js were selected by *“AIBA HQ Offices”*, parallel witnesses confirmed that ultimately the Executive Director had made all of the R&J selections for the Rio Games. It was not clear to the witness, nor to the MIIT, what criteria the R&Js needed to meet to be chosen to officiate at Rio.

2.2.3 Pre and post London Games - R&J Appointment Process

Following the Beijing Games, AIBA and the IOC came to an agreement that there needed to be more scrutiny and transparency on how the R&Js were assigned to bouts. An agreement was made to allow Price Waterhouse Coopers (*“PWC”*) to investigate and during their investigation AIBA realised no written R&J assignment process or procedures existed. PWC developed the written procedures for AIBA and the biggest reform was that assignments would be made using

a three person Draw Commission, where previously only the Chairman of the Draw Commission made the assignments. In practice, this was intended to remove any influence from the Chairman, Executive Director or President insofar as R&J assignments were concerned. However, these intentions did not eliminate this influence. A database was used to ensure that the R&Js were performing well. The database assisted in the assignments and the assignments were not to be changed without documentation.

2.2.4 The R&J Draw in Practice Ignored the Rules

The Draw Commission is responsible for examining the 5 judges on the draw and determine if there is sufficient neutrality and intended to safeguard the allocation process. For example, their duty is to consider geopolitical ties between countries, such as Russia and its former republics; or France and its international departments; or Britain and its former colonies, and prevent R&Js officiating bouts of boxers from “friendly” countries. Likewise the Draw Commission must adequately take into consideration countries with a history of geopolitical tensions. For example, if an Armenian is boxing and there is an Azerbaijan R&J, their historical tensions are unlikely to result in neutral officiating, or at least the perception of such.

At Rio 2016, the Draw Commission was composed of three individuals: Chair of the Draw Commission, Mohamed Moustahsane; member Stela Stoyanova; and member Ted Tanner. The 2015 AOB Competition Rules state that “*the names of the Referee and of the Judges for each Bout*

will be selected by a Computerized Software Program and/or by the Draw Commission.”¹³

However this rule was not applied and the Draw Commission on a daily basis manually allocated the R&Js to bouts. An in-depth analysis of the Draw Commission’s responsibilities is described in Chapter 5 of this Report. If the Draw Commission is unable to comply with the provisions in Rule 17 of the 2015 AOB Competition Rules, the Supervisor is to make the selection.

Two days before the end of the Rio Games, the Draw Commission was dismantled and 2 of its members replaced with other AIBA ITOs and the Supervisor was redeployed to another position. However, to the outside observer, up until that point, the Rules were being followed and neutrality was maintained for the most part; the manual draw by the Draw Commission was being reviewed and approved by the Supervisor. The reality was that the Rules didn’t stand a chance when the R&Js, the five stars, the Draw Commissioners and the Supervisor each had their part to play in manipulation as part of an orchestra being conducted by Karim Bouzidi.

¹³ Rule 17.1.1 AIBA AOB Competition Rules.

Chapter 3: The Falling of the 5 Stars

3.1 Introduction

In a very short period of time AIBA evolved their R&J system from National Federations (“NF”) nominating their own “friendly” judges, to the AIBA accredited 1-3 star system, and finally the addition of the seven independently contracted 5 star permanent R&Js. What started as a noble attempt to have a pool of the best 3 star R&Js permanently available to travel to all the international tournaments and reduce manipulation and corruption in their sport, resulted in the consolidation of influence and power in the hands of the Executive Director (“ED”) and these 5 star R&Js. However, it cannot be understated that the behaviours and practices that unfolded during the 4 years of the 5 star program were implicitly sanctioned by the President himself. The following chapter describes the rise and fall of the 5 stars and how their principles of ethics eroded under the requests and demands of the AIBA President, and ultimately primed them to accept bribes and manipulate results.

3.2 Priming the playing field: President Legitimises Corruption

The culture that existed at AIBA prior to the arrival of CK Wu was one of equal parts fear and obedience. The R&Js that were operating and cultivated during that time were likewise impacted by this culture. In that respect, AIBA’s notorious past president, Anwar Chowdhry, engendered a culture where R&Js would stop at nothing to please him in the hopes of achieving the pinnacle of their career - officiating at the Olympic Games. Indeed the IOC felt compelled to question the

selection of R&Js at times and put pressure on AIBA to promote fairness and transparency. It became common knowledge that the former President's favourite R&Js would be selected for Olympic Games and competitions. It was also understood that his favourite R&Js were those who would manipulate bouts in the way the President wished. This open secret was among the many reasons that CK Wu was put forward by the IOC to replace the former President and bring positive change to the organisation. However, this culture had thrived for more than 30 years. While there were significant changes made under his leadership, he also took advantage of the status quo at times for his own benefit. This sent signals to the R&Js that President Wu was legitimising corruption and that, like in the past, it was necessary to "please" the President in order to be appointed to competitions.

An example of this was described to the MIIT by former Executive Director, Ho Kim. During the European qualifiers for London 2012 held in Trabzon, Turkey in April 2012, CK Wu held meetings with the President of the Turkish Boxing Federation ("TBF") and members of the Turkish organising committee. Following these meetings the President called the ED to come to his room. The ED was instructed to ensure that Turkey would have some boxers qualified for the Games. The President's rationale was that the Turkish National Federation and organisers had spent millions to host the event. It would be humiliating to the TBF President if none of their boxers qualified. Ho Kim invited a member of the Competition Jury, the Draw Commission Chairman and technical delegate/ Supervisor, Luiz Boselli, and R&J Mik Basi to the President's room. He then proceeded to repeat to the gathered throng what was asked of him in front of the President. *"I repeated what CK Wu had just said to me word by word to make sure they knew this was*

coming from CK Wu.” He also stated to the MIIT that this particular example was not isolated and that during CK Wu’s tenure these types of requests happened regularly. The President wanted the Turkish boxers to benefit from qualification to the Games. He ought to have known this gesture of goodwill was corruption.

It is noted that Ho Kim made it clear in his interviews that although he did obey as requested, looking back, he is regretful that he did so and spoke to the MIIT wants to come forward on the record to correct some of the past wrongs. He would like to assist in saving the sport from expulsion from the Olympic program. If bouts could be manipulated, it would have to be done with the assistance of the individuals holding the following three positions being the most important ones with oversight. First, the Draw Commission had to ensure the right - or friendly - R&Js were selected; second, it had to be assured that the Supervisor who ultimately gives the final approval of the R&J assignments would not overturn the selections of the Draw Commission, and third that the selected R&Js knew that if there were any tight bouts that involved a Turkish boxer, it should go to Turkey. This communication primed these individuals, and especially Mik Basi, a future 5 star R&J, that corrupt practices would be considered acceptable under the Wu leadership. He was asking for bouts to be manipulated to do this. Unfortunately this was in the presence of a future 5 star Mik Basi, thus corrupting the system before it had even started.

Ho Kim stated to the MIIT interviewers that this request was clearly understood by all three individuals. Indeed, the Supervisor discussed with CK Wu what could be done while Ho Kim was present. While it was never explicitly requested to manipulate the bout scores, Ho Kim did ask

to approve R&Js that may be friendly to Turkey, so that they could protect the Turkish boxers. Mik Basi, the R&J called into the meeting, also understood what was being asked - if it was a tight bout, to give it to the Turkish boxer.¹⁴

Mik Basi was not only a skilled R&J, but also seen as someone who was a natural leader amongst the R&Js. On this occasion he was asked by implication to undertake an unethical action by the AIBA President directly. This incident provided legitimacy for his future actions and those of his then fellow 3 stars. No manipulation ever took place so the approach was not acted on as the six Turkish boxers apparently qualified on their own merits without the requirement for any manipulation from the selected R&Js.

3.3 Top-Down Power over the R&Js

The evolution to having an internal cadre of R&Js managed and trained solely by AIBA was a development that followed on the heels of the Boxing 16 Project and AIBA Professional Boxing where professional R&Js were used for officiating. This program was largely supported by the IOC and following discussions with the IOC Sports Director, it became clear to the Executive Director that the IOC was *“keen for AIBA to have its own professional working R&Js.”* The process by which the professional working R&Js, i.e. the 5 star program, came into existence followed by proper internal protocols as described below. Although some of the witnesses interviewed

¹⁴ By all accounts, the Turkish boxers performed well and they won all their bouts on their own merits.

challenged how the program came to be, the MIIT finds that the documentary evidence demonstrates that it was a transparent process that had the necessary approvals from the executive committee and various commissions. It was a classic example of management from the top down in accordance with the Rules.

Following meetings with the IOC, Ho Kim requested that the development of professional R&Js be put on the agenda of the R&J Commission meeting held in Bangkok 2012. At this meeting he presented the concept and rationale for the program and the Commission discussed the foreseeable steps forward such as target R&Js, target number of R&Js, selection criteria and timeframe for implementation. Subsequently, the Commission created a list of recommendations which included that AIBA should appoint 10-15 “professional” full-time R&Js and indicated that the new program was issued for the approval of the AIBA Executive Committee at its next meeting. Amendments to the AIBA Technical and Competition Rules were proposed by the Technical and Rules Commission and provided to the Executive Committee who approved the changes via mail in vote on 22 February 2012.

Prior to the London Games, a workshop had been held for all the R&Js selected to officiate at those Games. There was a total of 37 R&Js nominated by the R&J Commission and approved by the President. While the topic of the new program of professional R&Js was not included as part of the workshop, the discussions among the R&Js present lead to a number of R&Js sending their interest to become 5 star R&Js to the Executive Director, one of whom was Mik Basi (from England). In parallel to this workshop, Ho Kim developed the “Guidelines of AIBA 5 star R&J

System” and emailed them to the AIBA Sport Department. He requested the Guidelines be remitted to Franco Falcinelli, at the time ex-officio AIBA EC Member and Chairman of AIBA T&R Commission. The Guidelines were approved by the Technical and Rules Commission.

The requisite approvals having been received, the staffing of the 5 star judges could begin. The interviews and evaluations of potential candidates was conducted during the London Games by Christian Hoecht, the AIBA HR Director and David Francis, the AIBA Treasurer at the time. Christian Hoecht sent Ho Kim an email following their assessments. Seven R&Js were chosen, and the program was officially live and launched upon the signing of their independent contractor agreements on 28 October 2012. The seven chosen R&Js were:

1. Amrik Singh Basi (Mik Basi) (ENG)
2. Michael Gallagher (IRE)
3. Gerardo Poggi (ARG)
4. Rakhymzhan Rysbayev (KAZ)
5. Vladislav Malyshev (RUS)
6. Kheira Sidi Yakoub (ALG)
7. Mariusz Gorny (POL)

With the start of the 5 star program, a new position (the R&J Manager) was created by Ho Kim to interface with the day-to-day management of the 5 stars. The role was to essentially manage the schedules, competition appointments and performance of the 5 stars . The R&J Manager was also responsible for creating the first list of R&J appointments for competitions, including

the Olympics. Therefore, the R&J Manager worked with both the 5 star and other 3 star R&Js. This list would then be forwarded to the Sports Director and eventually to the ED and President for final approval.

Often the President in examining the list would ask the rationale for the selection of R&Js, and in some instances extended this to the specific reasons for their inclusion. In one instance the President insisted that a judge who had been suspended for cheating on the accreditation exam be included as a judge in competition. The ED and R&J Managers complied with this request having full knowledge of the R&Js suspension.

As described in Chapter 5, the R&J Commission was not involved in either the selection, implementation process, or management of the 5 star program. The R&J Commission, whose responsibility it was to ensure the proper training, qualification, accreditation and assignment of R&Js, was not involved in the oversight of the 5 star program since these were considered AIBA staff. Nonetheless, according to the Technical and Competition Rules, the Commission remained responsible for the 3 star judges and their assignments. However, over time the assignment process became centralized with the R&J Manager and Executive Director, eventually leading to the R&J Commission's role in R&J appointments being usurped, effectively becoming neutralized as an operating Commission backed by the rules.

The Executive Director would send the Commission a list of officials, and if the Commission made changes or recommendations to remove certain R&Js, those recommendations were followed

less and less. Eventually the Commission merely fulfilled the role of rubber-stamping the R&J selections made by the R&J Manager, Executive Director and the President rather than making the selection themselves. One witness recalled that:

“the balance of power was gradually shifting in favour of the Executive Director and the 5 stars as an autonomous unit. By the time we get to Rio selections, the R&J / T&R Commissions were virtually redundant, with all selections of officials being made by AIBA staff under the micromanagement of Executive Director and President Wu.”

The intentional lack of oversight from the R&J Commission and protection afforded to the 5 stars from the ED eventually gave birth to a shadow institutional organization within AIBA which executed the requests of either the Executive Director or the President.

3.4 5 Stars Inserted into a Culture of Corruption

The 5 Stars were, according to confidential witnesses, some of the best technical R&Js in AIBA. They may have had strong ethical values prior to their 5 star status. However, they progressed in their role as R&Js in an organisation steeped in a well-established culture of manipulation of boxing results and corruption. There was a knock-on effect from the institutional culture and environment. Ethical R&Js have seemingly always been swimming against the tide. If one desired to climb up the ranks to officiate at the highest levels of the sport, they would have to cross their ethical boundaries to ensure more time at the ring; it was the culture that provided the rationale that “everyone else does it, why shouldn’t I do so.” An example of this is at the 2015 Men’s’ Amateur Championships in Bangkok where Uzbek judge, Sherzod Akhmedov, gave multiple

bribes of 5,000 USD, concealed in toothpaste tubes or something similar to six other 3 star R&Js. This was reported and the money returned.

The 5 star R&Js present at the event were made aware of these approaches and reported it to Terry Smith (Positions) and Ray Silvas (R&J Commission). The Uzbek judge was sent home and technically suspended from AIBA following the referral to Terry Smith and Ray Silvas. However there is no documentary evidence of what actually happened following his departure from Bangkok. The AIBA database record states *“Dismissed during ASBC Championships Bangkok 2015 - Attempted to Bribe 6 other R&Js. Case is pending Suspension”*. According to recent correspondence from Anastasiya Bashlykova *“he was removed and suspended at the competition but after that there was no follow up on this matter”*, There does not appear to have been in this case an investigation and final decision taken by the Disciplinary Committee as it should normally have been. The flagrant bribery attempt demonstrates the systemic levels of corruption operating during the term of the 5 stars. Coupled with the President’s actions as described above, legitimising *“noble cause corruption”*¹⁵ and demanding the assignment of ethically compromised R&Js to competitions, the 5 stars were operating within a strong and legitimised culture of corruption.

¹⁵ A term commonly used to describe corruption where it is felt to be in the best interests of the organisation.

3.5 Field Manipulation Pops up and Evolves

The 5 stars were operating all over the world and, in addition to officiating, they were also training 1 and 2 star R&Js. The MIIT was unable to determine with any certainty the turning point at which the 5 stars started manipulating bouts as a team and influencing 3 and 2 star R&Js to manipulate the bouts as well. As described above, at least one 5 star, Mik Basi, was asked by the President prior to the existence of the 5 star program to manipulate a close bout in favour of certain boxers.

What is evident from several witness interviews is that eventually they were all involved in the manipulation of bouts. As a means to be able to communicate with one another in the ring and also to indicate to the 3 star R&Js how the bout was supposed to go, they developed a methodology of communication. One confidential witness described to the MIIT how they were first approached at Championship tournament in 2013 to be initiated into the sphere of the 5 stars. This was to be a first lesson in signalling. A colleague explained that accepting the signals was how it worked at this level and that you *“needed to decide what side to be on”* and learn to navigate it. The 5 stars were very careful about who they spoke to. This witness was sufficiently trusted by the 5 stars to have had the signalling explained by the 5 star Gerardo Poggi. He helped the witness understand why the scores were going in the wrong direction. The witness explained to the MIIT that although Poggi was not a fan of the signalling system, he felt obliged to comply because he was one of the paid judges.

The signalling process started off as something basic, using either agreed upon hand or eye signals between them, or leaning back or forward with their bodies, to inform others of the way they should judge a bout. One witness stated that the 5 stars *“had a tremendous influence on the other officials. So leading up to Rio they started at different competitions. They would be giving signals to each other at ringside.”* Different witnesses have different theories as to why the signalling started in the first place, but the unifying reason why an R&J acquiesced was fear – fear that their score would be out of synch with the others, fear that they would be the “one” on a 4-1 score, resulting in the worst possible consequence, not being selected for major tournaments and consequently loss of their perks

The 5 stars felt strongly that to be professional everyone should score the same way and provide a similar result. This “noble cause corruption” was to be the later catalyst of even greater corruption. One of the MIIT’s witnesses recounted that *“if you went with it, (signalling) you were a cheat. And if you didn’t go with it, you would have been marked down in your score and you would have maybe got no major tournaments. This was the fear that was put into the referees and judges. So you had the choice to make.”*

Eventually some of the more senior and uncorrupted members of the R&J and Technical and Rules Commissions picked up on this behaviour and challenged them, requiring the 5 stars covert communication to become more subtle and varied in order to prevent detection. Ray Silvas described that officials would inform the R&J Commission that the signals they were looking to catch were no longer in use. *“Now they’re using this new sign, but then they would change it*

again. And it was either touching of ears, looking down, looking for the left side, looking to the right side. It was always something, but we were always a step behind.” According to a confidential witness if an R&J refused to participate in the scheme, they would be removed.

While at the 2015 Doha Olympic Qualifiers, Pat Fiacco described a bout where he witnessed one of the R&Js, Canadian Tony Germain, making clear signals to the other judges. He recalls that Germain pointed with his eyes to the boxer in the blue corner for other officials at ringside to know who should win the bout. After the session, Fiacco confronted Germain with what he observed. As could be expected, Germain denied what Fiacco alleged. Following Germain’s denials, Fiacco reported his concerns to the Executive Director Karim Bouzidi and 5 star R&J Mik Basi. He later relayed these events to the President *“When I spoke to Karim about this, Karim told me that I need to be sure before I make these accusations. I know what I saw and that’s what I communicated to him. He told me to leave it with him and he will deal with it. I told him that President Wu needs to know this and he said he would deal with it.”* The ED subsequently took no action and this R&J was selected to officiate at the Rio Games.

The signalling that occurred at Doha happened on the specific instructions given to the R&Js. One R&J who had witnessed how these instructions were communicated was weary of discussing the events, stating that it was a fruitless exercise as historically it achieved nothing, and only created problems for those that came forward. He did however agree to disclose that *“at least in one instance, where it was said by the person who brought the information from higher up – that they were to give bouts if it was close, and I’m using their language, to certain countries and*

so on.” He added that specific R&Js were shown a list of certain bouts and how they should be scored. Hearsay evidence from Ho Kim corroborates the manipulation at Doha. He recalled that *“[a]fter Doha the World Championship in Doha I heard from a Korean R&J he told me how Mik manipulated the competition in the R&J room. He was forced to support certain R&Js. He was shown a list of boxers who he has to support.”* Thus, at Doha the manipulation of bouts was being orchestrated simultaneously through a method of pre- determining bouts together with hand signals for judges not privy to seeing the list.

While this confidential witness would not confirm who was giving instructions to specific R&Js and showing them the pre-determined outcome for bouts, he did confirm that he was an English 5 star R&J, and that *“it was said that information came down from higher up.”* The only English 5 star R&J is Mik Basi. This witness reported the incident. This confidential witness refused to participate in the SIC investigation as he felt at the time he would have *“been doing more harm”* to himself. He admitted that the only reason he spoke to the MIIT however was because he was asked to corroborate another confidential witness’ evidence.

At a World Series Boxing match in Havana, Cuba, Juan Milan Ponce, a member of the R&J Commission and technical official witnessed the 5 stars and some 3 stars discussing how the signals would work. He wrote an email to Ray Silvas to explain that:

“...about what we talked about Polish Gorny I tell you that that stop was on March 11, 2016 the members of the Group were as follows.

*Roland Rome Labbe CAN
Roberto Fernando Servide ARG*

John A Stefan Nordin SUE

Albino Foti ITA

Amrik Singh Basi GBR (MIIT Note: Mik Basi - 5 star)

Mariuez Jozef Gorny POL (MIIT Note: Mariusz Gorny – 5 star)

Where the latter (MIIT Note: Gorny) was commenting to the judges that he would give a sign for the corner that they wanted to win and could only happen in one bout and it was not possible and in the end, he was upset with the judges.”¹⁶

The 5 stars were not only corrupting the other R&Js, but also showing them in advance the signal that they needed to look out for which would determine the outcome of the bout. Following the Doha Qualifiers and the WSB match in Havana, the 5 stars needed to evolve their strategy. There was by now a lot of attention on whether they were using signals and how to decode them. Evidence suggests that they started to implement a new strategy while at Doha, one that did not depend on signals from within the field of play (“FOP”). The 5 stars were able to receive advanced information of the R&J selections for matches via the Draw Commission. The information on how to score a bout could be passed by the 5 stars to the relevant R&Js on the morning of each session, from within the more secure areas of the R&J lounge which was to a certain extent protected from prying eyes.

At the world championship in Kazakhstan, Ray Silvas described evidence he heard from two officials about incidents of bout manipulation by the 5 stars. *“[The 5 stars] are talking about getting together and fixing some, some matches. In other words, grouping themselves to, to either vote together or to, uh, in other words, help a particular country.”* Ray Silvas described

¹⁶ AIBA518f Email from Milan Ponce Cuba to Ray Silvas dated 11 March 2016 Translated from Spanish

how it would have been vital to ensure the correct R&Js were allocated for this manipulation to happen. He recalled that the daily R&J allocation was often changed on the orders of Bouzidi.

“If you were in a tournament and you saw the assignments for referee judges for a given day, um, all of a sudden they would change. And my question sometimes was what happened here? What, why is so and so refereeing the bout, and they would look at me in a very sheepish manner, kind of semi embarrassed them [...] They would just kind of point in one direction with their head and say it. And they would say Karim. So, he would change the assignments. Sometimes the head of the commission would get instructions on how to move some referee judges to referee more or specific bouts.”

The direct involvement of Karim Bouzidi, bypassing the responsibility of the Draw Commission and the authority of the Supervisor, was another way to remove any uncertainty in having a bout go a certain pre-determined way.

What emerged during the period between the London and Rio Games was a system that made it appear that the rules were being followed, with the best R&Js AIBA had to offer training and coaching the 3 stars and with the appropriate checks and balances in place for the Draw Commission to allocate R&Js for neutrality. However, the evidence demonstrates a much different evolution. What evolved was a system that operated independently of the Rules. Instead of training R&Js to be better officials, they were being trained to fear what would happen if they didn't accept to follow the signals, then later follow the list of pre-determined results. If the Draw Commission did not have a favourable draw for bouts, the Executive Director and the Supervisor could overrule it. Eventually an iteration of this shadow system of manipulation and corruption was put in place and executed at Rio.

3.6 Bribery Attempt

During the Doha WC in October 2015, a bribery attempt was made in relation to the semi-final bout between Yosbani Veitia (Cuba) and Jianguan Hu (China). According to records, the Chinese 3 star R&J Dexin Wang directly approached Alberto Puig De La Barca (president of the Cuban boxing federation and EC member) on behalf of a Chinese coach, offering him \$20,000 to allow the Chinese boxer to win and hence qualify. The Peruvian boxer having already qualified for Rio.

Puig shocked at the incident apparently recorded the conversation with Wang and having turned down the bribe attempt, immediately took it to Bouzidi and reported that an AIBA R&J tried to bribe an EC member. As Ognian Georgiev, a reporter from Bulgaria Today wrote in an expose of the matter, "*[n]ot only he was part of a bribery attempt, but he also broke the rules of the AIBA officials who are prohibit[ed] to make any contact with participants, coaches and national federation representatives during competitions.*" An investigation commission was apparently created and run by Osvaldo Bisbal. In an interview however, Bisbal denied any knowledge of this case.

In an interview William Louis Marie was asked about the Chinese bribery attempt. He confirmed that it was kept hushed up for more than a year. He thought that the incident was kept between Bouzidi and Fiacco (Supervisor at Doha) and did not think that CK Wu was aware of it until much later. When asked what punishment the Chinese received, WLM said "*China was not punished.*

To my understanding, China was not punished. Maybe [...] I don't know why he don't want to blame China. He thought it was an individual decision, not a national federation decision."

It is not clear in the evidence when this incident became more widely known within AIBA management. According to Georgiev's expose of the incident alleging a cover up "*Alberto Puig went with the voice record to AIBA Executive director Karim Bouzidi and AIBA President Ching-Kwo Wu.*" While the MIIT has not found evidence to confirm this meeting, it has uncovered in AIBA records, minutes of a meeting between CK Wu and Puig in November 2016, over a year after the incident occurred and after Bouzidi's suspension from AIBA and which are copied to Jomard, Tuccelli and Llauro, who also attended the meeting. In the minutes, Puig recounts the bribery attempt as follows:

"The topic was about a Cuban 52kg would box the Chinese boxer because the Cuban boxer had already qualified for the Olympics it wouldn't matter if he lost to the Chinese boxer. I explained that because of ethics I would not manipulate the bout. They then offered \$20,000, I said this conversation is over. I immediately spoke with Karim who created a commission run by Bisbal. Bisbal interviewed the coach. Bisbal listened to the recording and made the decision to separate the coach and R&J from the competition. I think the authority to speak with on this is Bisbal. I understand the Cuba/China relation, I'd rather preserve myself, any evidence needed, Bisbal has."¹⁷

The meeting minutes highlight two points. First, that Puig was a friend of Bouzidi and wanted to maintain good relations with China. The possibility therefore exists that Bouzidi agreed to cover it up, with or without the President's knowledge. It was known that the President would not want to upset China. Second, Puig told Wu that it was important that the R&Js were not able to

¹⁷ AIBA113b Minutes of meeting Puig and CK Wu 19 November 2016.

tarnish the sport. This may be the reason that there was no disciplinary action ever taken in relation to this incident. Tom Virgets, Chair of the Disciplinary Commission stated to the MIIT that AIBA never forwarded the issue to the Disciplinary Commission for investigation despite the fact that:

“It was well-known to the point that I even questioned it on one or two times, because as the disciplinary commissioner I can’t act solely on myself as the chair. I needed – I acted on complaint. That complaint never came forward to us for action during the realm of Karim, and that bothered me, because it should have. It should have been. And what was of concern on that is, one, Karim had a very strong relationship with Cuba.

The MIIT notes that Dexin Wang continued to officiate at the Olympic Qualifiers in both Vargas, Venezuela and Baku, Azerbaijan, although he did not attend Rio. There was no investigation and hence no disciplinary action was taken. The President however told Puig during the November 2016 meeting that Bouzidi , was responsible for the corruption and because of this he had been terminated. The President was actively trying to distance himself from the corruption and blamed Bouzidi while at the same time rationalised that the people responsible for it were effectively disciplined because they had been suspended.

Chapter 4: Run-up to Rio

4.1 Introduction

There has been a long history of mismanagement in AIBA. The catalyst for corruption stems back a long way. The qualifiers leading to the Olympic eligibility are fertile ground for corruption and part of that history. The year preceding an Olympic year is almost as important as the Olympics itself because it determines if a boxer will even participate at the Games. Therefore, there is significant opportunity and motivation to manipulate the matches at qualifying events. The groundwork for the corruption that took place at Rio was laid as far back as the qualification events for London 2012. The evidence examined by the McLaren Independent Investigation Team (“MIIT”) supports that the pattern established at the London qualifiers were reproduced during the Rio qualifications. Evidence collected by the MIIT demonstrates that several Rio qualification events were affected by manipulated bouts and appear to have been used to test out and evolve methods of manipulation eventually in place at Rio.

4.2 How to Win a Medal

There were two methods of trying to manipulate events to ensure the winning of Olympic medals. A national Olympic committee of a country may try and buy their way to an Olympic medal. Hosting a major qualifying or world competition is an alternate but more expensive way to achieve the same end.

Prior to describing the system in place for Rio it is important to look briefly at the historical conditions which encouraged national federations to consider buying their way to an Olympic medal. National Olympic Committees (“NOC”) fund the various national federations based on their medal success at the games. Thus medalling at the Games is critical for National Federations (“NFs”) to maintain and/or increase their NOC funding. As a result, witnesses described that NFs would attempt various strategies to try and exercise influence over the Executive Directors (“ED”), the Referees & Judges (“R&Js”) and technical officials to increase the possibility for a medal. For example, one R&J explained that during the Athens Games an Azeri official came to his room with a roll of 100 USD notes. While the particular R&J refused the bribe, historically this overt bribery happened with other R&Js as well. For national federations, having a guaranteed path to an Olympic medal was crucial for their continued support domestically.

Outside of an Olympic context, the hosting of a World Championship was another way a country could increase the potential for a medal. Hosting requires a significant investment on the part of the host country. In addition to some countries explicitly requesting favouritism from AIBA, Turkey for example, as described in Chapter 3 there also existed an unwritten understanding that on close bouts which included a host country boxer, the referee should score in favour of the host country boxer. At the 2011 Baku World Championships Executive Director, Ho Kim overheard the R&Js saying that *“if somebody gave big money and invested in AIBA, if that boxer was from the host country, and the bout is tight, support the host country.”*

There exists a culture of “favours”, particularly among the post-soviet countries which has also influenced AIBA in the past. In 2010 Azerbaijan gave AIBA a 10 million USD investment loan. This was the first time in the history of AIBA that it received a private loan in the millions. This was followed up by an additional 10-million-dollar loan from Kazakhstan. What followed was that the R&Js felt pressure to call bouts for either the Azeri or Kazak boxers. Azerbaijan specifically was explicit about its expectations subsequent to providing AIBA the loan at the 2010 Nanjing Youth Olympic Games. The ED recalls that the vice president of the Azerbaijan federation yelled at him that *“they were giving AIBA big money and most of our bouts are lost in the final and they were supposed to win.”* Their expectation was that the money ensured that bouts would be manipulated in their favour.

Manipulation stemming from the Azeri loan trickled into the London Games. Just prior to the games the BBC carried a story of medals for money. The allegation was that the Azeris had been promised Olympic medals as a condition of the 10 million USD loan referred to above. President CK Wu, always concerned about public perceptions, made an executive order to ensure Azerbaijan did not win any medals.¹⁸ *“[T]he first thing President told me was ‘Ho, because this is Azerbaijan promised 2 medals, now because BBC accused, if Azerbaijan boxers get any medal, it would justify [that] BBC is correct.’”* The fear for CK Wu was that if the Azeris had won it would have proved the documentary’s allegations of corruption correct.¹⁹ Therefore, a reverse manipulation had to take place to ensure they did not win any medals for public perception. The

¹⁸ Part 2 of this investigation will cover the background to this loan.

¹⁹ These allegations broke just as President CK Wu was going to be appointed to the IOC Executive Board.

President implicitly put pressure on the ITOs and R&Js not to score bouts in favour of the Azeris.

Ho Kim recalled that on:

“many occasions of meeting ITOs and also R&Js, he would continue to emphasize over and over again to the head of ITOs, to the head of R&Js that we could not let this happen. So what R&Js and ITOs were thinking about is that if they would let support or give score to Azerbaijan boxers to get a medal, they would be in trouble.”²⁰

These legitimised behaviours and structural conditions including: external funding; unfulfilled promises to Azerbaijan; external pressures from other countries on the President; and internal and external pressures on the Executive Director, resulted in the R&Js being effectively coerced into manipulating bouts. The same systemic issues applied to corrupted technical delegates. The impact of these events at London 2012 later came together in a perfect storm of manipulation at Rio.

4.3 Corruption at London Games Qualifying Event and World Championships

The European qualifiers for London 2012 were held in Trabon, Turkey. During the event the President instructed the then Executive Director (“ED”) to “*help Turkey*” because the organising committee had spent millions on the event and it would “*mean humiliation to the Turkish Boxing Federation president if no boxer would qualify.*” The ED understood that the President had implied to find a way to manipulate bouts in Turkey’s favour. He called several individuals including: Mr. Luiz Boselli, the Draw Commission Chairman; Mr. Jae Kyu Jung, captain of the R&Js

²⁰ During an informal hearing on AIBA finances in Albena Bulgaria in 2017, Ho Kim confirmed in front of the press that reverse manipulation actively denying Azerbaijan any medals occurred.

for the competitions; and Mr. Mik Basi to the room. The ED proceeded to repeat verbatim to those individuals, and in the presence of the AIBA President, what had the President had asked of the ED. Recall the culture of obedience and it could be inferred that it was understood that Turkey would need special assistance from those key people to have them qualify for the Games. While 6 Turkish boxers did eventually qualify, they apparently did so on their own merits. Nevertheless, the foregoing is a clear example of the methodology used to comply with the instructions of the President.

Another example of how the President instructed the ED occurred during the World Boxing Championships held in Baku Azerbaijan. The ED reported to the MIIT that the President instructed *“from now on, we need to make sure AZE boxers do not fall victim to a bad decision, and we need to protect them from any misjudgment situation”*. The ED, understanding his position within the command and obey culture at AIBA, once again inferred that the President was instructing him that special attention ought to be given to the performances of Azeri boxers at the World Championships. It became apparent the mindset towards Azerbaijan had changed since 2012.

The reason for this statement appears to stem from treatment of the Azeri’s during the London Games where the BBC accused AIBA of having promised two gold medals to Azerbaijan in exchange for the 10 million USD loan. The President is reported to have advised the officials at London 2012 that the Azeri loan investment should not mean that they will get gold. The MIIT interviewed several R&Js who were present at London and they stated that their perception of

the President's position related to the Azeris meant that he wanted to make sure the Azeri boxers would **not** win any gold medals, although he never explicitly instructed to do so. The Azeris filed an official protest following a close semi-final bout they believed they should have won; in addition, the Azeris threatened AIBA to go to the press without any basis to do so. When the officials were called into the review room to analyse whether the Azeri bout was improperly decided, the President exclaimed when the video started playing that *"the Azeri boxer got hit and look how the Italian boxer scored [...]."* Not only was the President overreaching his authority by commenting on the bout in front of the official review, given the culture of command and obey, the officials assumed the President did not want the decision to be overturned. The boxer lost and the Azeri representatives left the meeting furious.

4.4 The Practice Ground for Rio – The Qualifiers

4.4.1 Stacking the Draw Commission

There were several key qualifying events leading up to Rio. The MIIT has identified that at all the qualifiers, mechanisms of manipulation were being used and tested. These include the 2015 Doha Championships, the 2016 African Qualifiers and the Asia/Oceania Olympic Qualifiers. The former ED was fired in June 2015 by the President, and the Sports Director Karim Bouzidi became the new ED. He took up his role and exerted his authority with the new powers that had evolved to the ED position. One of those powers was to make the technical delegate selections for the tournaments; the Draw Commission positions being critical, as those individuals determine the R&J appointments to a bout. One of the requirements to manipulate matches was to ensure that

there was a corrupted draw commission thereby ensuring the “right” R&Js would be assigned to bouts where the outcomes were already decided in advance.

The MIIT has identified a pattern of suspicious appointments made to the draw commissions during several qualifying events. Luiz Boselli was appointed as a member to the draw commission at the Doha qualifiers.²¹ Prior to this tournament, Luiz Boselli had been removed by the President of the Brazilian Boxing Federation (“BBF”) and was no longer a member thereof. The BBF President Mauro Silva, had informed AIBA of his removal and requested that he not be appointed by AIBA for any events. However, the AIBA President kept him within the fold. The MIIT could not confirm when or why the BBF removed the accreditation of Boselli, but in 2017 Boselli’s unwavering loyalty to the AIBA President was encapsulated in an email he sent to him during the Executive Committee’s request that the President resign. This very loyal supporter wrote *“I want to express my solidarity to you. I have full confidence in you. 100%. I’m at your entire disposal for everything. You can count on me.”* Indeed, Boselli was prepared to assist Turkish boxers qualify for the London Games, at the implied request of the President.

Despite the BBF’s request to the contrary, Boselli was appointed as the technical delegate on the Draw Commission at Doha along with Yue Yan. Several witnesses interviewed by the MIIT also witnessed corrupt behaviour by Yue Yan. Ted Tanner, who was the third member on the Draw Commission at Rio witnessed Yue Yan complete the R&J allocation sheets for each day’s bouts in

²¹He was the technical delegate (supervisor) that was called in with Basi in front of the President and ED at the Turkish Olympic qualification manipulation attempt pre-London 2012 described above.

advance of the draw commission meeting. According to Ted Tanner, these allocation sheets should only be completed 10-15 minutes before each bout. He stated in his interview with the MIIT that:

“Yue Yan, would turn up in the morning and he’d have all the judging decisions for every bout already allocated. And I said to him after he’d tried this on a couple of times – I just said to him it was unacceptable and that it could be cheating. I knew in my mind what was happening is at some stage, either the night – probably that morning he’d gone along with Bouzidi and Bouzidi had given him his riding instructions. And he would fill in the – and then these were the referees for the bouts.”

Nonetheless, the competition rules allow the Supervisor to override the Draw Commission appointments.

The Supervisor at Doha was Pat Fiacco and he recounted to the MIIT that he had indeed made changes to the R&J appointments on the basis of the neutrality principle typically used to ensure national favouritism. However, he was often shocked that the R&Js he had removed from certain bouts nevertheless ended up officiating. Pat confronted Yue Yan and asked why the R&Js he signed off on were not officiating. He recalled that Yue Yan told him *“you got overruled.”* When Pat Fiacco asked if it was Karim Bouzidi who overruled him, Yue Yan said it was. This incident with Pat Fiacco and Yue Yan was witnessed by Ted Tanner who also heard Yue Yan tell Pat Fiacco that it was Karim who overturned the Supervisor’s changes.

At the Asia/Oceania Olympic Qualifier, Luiz Boselli was again appointed to the Draw Commission; this time together with Stela Stoyanova, who was later appointed to the Draw Commission at Rio. This was a particularly important qualifier due to the participation of countries such as

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan who in addition to having a strong boxing tradition are also alleged to have been offered money. Therefore, having commission members who would be ready to appoint corrupted R&Js to important bouts involving those countries was critical.

The MIIT notes that Stela Stoyanova's role as a technical delegate was maintained under similar circumstances to Luiz Boselli. During the interview of Emilia Grueva, Vice President of the Bulgarian Boxing Federation, she stated that Stoyanova was suspended from the Bulgarian Boxing Federation in December 2015. Svetoslav Sapundjiev (Bulgarian General Secretary) sent an email to AIBA advising of Stoyanova's suspension from the NF and asking for them not to use her as an accredited AIBA ITO in the future. Under the terms of AIBA Technical Rules para 2.1.1 (effective February 2015) membership of AIBA required *"2.1.1. All Boxers, Coaches, Officials, National Federation Office Holders must be members of or licensed and/or authorized by their National Federation, Confederation and AIBA to participate in national and international AIBA Competitions, unless AIBA otherwise consents."*

As a result of the Bulgarian Federation's request of AIBA to stop using Stoyanova, in December 2015 various administrators and senior managers in AIBA including legal counsel Clíodhna Guy, Sports Director Kristen Brynildsen and Executive Director Karim Bouzidi corresponded on the matter. The MIIT has reviewed the email traffic related to whether Stoyanova could continue to be appointed as an ITO. Ms. Guy advised that under rule 2.1.1 they could still use Stoyanova stating *"Who sent this? According to our technical rule 2.1.1 AIBA can make exceptions to the*

membership rule. Stella isn't supported by her NF but she is an eligible (and very good) ITO. Please do not delete anyone from the database unless Karim has given his consent."

In January 2016, Karim Bouzidi ended any speculation as to Stoyanova's future when he wrote that the *"President has decided to continue to appoint her as we are doing with Bosselli, therefore it is [his] decision and we will follow this."* A dramatic indication of the command and obey culture of AIBA at that time.

The evidence evaluated by the MIIT demonstrates that Stoyanova was crucial to the Draw manipulation at Rio and at the preceding qualifiers where she was appointed together with Mohamed Moustahsane. Therefore, it was vital to maintain her status as an ITO despite her national federation's requests to the contrary. Although Bouzidi says in the email that the decision was made by CK Wu, there is no documentary evidence available to support this.

According to Anastasiya Bashlykova (AIBA Head of Administration), in September 2016 following Stela Stoyanova's suspension during Rio, she was accepted for an AIBA Supervisor certification course (approved by Tuccelli) on the recommendation of Helmut Ranze. Stoyanova later withdrew from the course citing *"unforeseen circumstances."* Her appointment to the Youth World Championships in St. Petersburg in November 2016 was also later withdrawn with Tuccelli stating within an email correspondence that it *"looks like she will be buried soon."* This comment is likely to be in reference to the expected findings of the SIC which was ongoing at the time.

In November 2016 Tom Virgets sent an email to the President, voicing his concern at the fact that Stoyanova had been offered a place on the T&R Commission. He warned that Wu may not be aware of the *“degree of suspicion that she is under as a result of several individuals whom the committee has interviewed expressing concerns regarding her close relationships with Karim and some 5 stars. It is our belief that she should be seen in the same light as that of the 5 stars.”* In January 2017 during an email exchange with Ray Silvas about Stoyanova, Tuccelli stated it was not appropriate to continue using her as an ITO. Silvas agreed, citing the imminent release of the SIC report by Virgets, in which she was mentioned.

Finally, Boselli was also appointed as Deputy Supervisor at the 2016 African Qualifier with Mohamed Moustahsane. While the MIIT has not found any evidence that any bouts were manipulated at this event, it notes that Boselli was working here with Mohamed Moustahsane, another member of the Rio Draw Commission.

The MIIT notes that in the run-up to Rio, Stoyanova and Moustahsane were posted to the Draw Commission at the following Olympic Qualifying events:

- Men’s World Championships - Doha Oct 2015 (both appointed to Draw Commission)
- Euro Qualifier – Samsun, Turkey April 2016 (Moustahsane only on Draw Commission)
- Women’s World Championships – Astana, Kazakhstan, May 2016 (both on Draw Commission)
- AOB Olympic Qualifying Event – Baku Azerbaijan, June 2016 (Stoyanova on Draw Commission, Moustahsane as Supervisor)
- APB/WSB Olympic Qualifying Event July 2016 (both on Draw Commission)

Witnesses described to the MIIT that Moustahsane was close to Bouzidi. However, Karim Bouzidi ultimately had full control which he could have exerted on the Draw Commission. When asked if a single person on the Draw Commission could determine which R&J's get appointed, Pat Fiacco stated that *"it depends if Karim came down and said or sent the message, 'This is who I want'."* It was suspected by several witnesses that Karim, through Stela Stoyanova or Moustahsane, had the ability to control the R&J draw. If the Supervisor ever disagreed with any of the allocations, he could always be overruled by the Executive Director. As explained to the MIIT by Emilia Grueva, *"because all the ITOs, which includes the supervisor, are under the control of the CEO (Bouzidi), the CEO can say, 'Leave the draw commission to their job.'"* The implication being that since he had already instructed the Draw Commission, he did not want the Supervisor to overrule his decision.

4.4.2 Fulfilling London Promises

The Azeris felt betrayed at the end of London 2012. One witness whose testimony the MIIT is unable to corroborate stated that the reasons for the feeling of betrayal is because it was the President that approached them and offered them the medals. According to that witness, the President visited the President of the Azeri Boxing Federation, Kamaladdin Heydarov,²² prior to Rio. At this meeting it was stated that the President once again promised Azerbaijan the medals that he was unable to deliver in London. At this meeting was AIBA staff William Louis Marie. He informed the AIBA staff of what transpired at the meeting with the Azeris. According to the one

²² Also the Azerbaijan Government Minister of Emergency.

witness, these events were confirmed to him by Karim Bouzidi who disclosed to the witness that when CK Wu arrived in Rio he told Karim to make sure Azerbaijan win a gold medal.²³

4.4.3 The Executive Director Appoints Officials for Rio

There are three key positions which need to be corrupted in order for bouts to be manipulated. This is why it was critical for the Executive Director to appoint officials that he knew could either be manipulated, knew what was going on but compliant, didn't know what was going on but obedient, or were in the inner circle to these positions. In addition to the R&Js calling the bouts, the Draw Commission and the supervisor roles were needed to manipulate the bouts.

Ho Kim recalled that because of his ill health, he delegated the responsibility of organising the necessary appointments for Rio to his Sports Director at the time, Karim Bouzidi. Following Ho Kim's departure, Bouzidi's ascension to the role of Executive Director brought certain changes. He convinced the President that he should chose the R&Js and, together with the President, determine the ITOs and Supervisor. He also had charge of the field of play. Thus, in assuming full decision making authority, he could finalise the appointments for Rio at will.

According to Helmut Ranze, the Supervisor at the Rio Games, all the appointments for Rio were "*top secret*", even from him. This would have allowed the Executive Director to make his

²³ In fact Azerbaijan only won a silver and a bronze at Rio which didn't make the Azeri fed very happy. "*after the result the Vice President Slayman (sp) nearly threw a chair at CK. He is an EC member. Azerbaijan could have won but they gave it to Uzbekistan*".

selections as a ‘fait accompli’ without any opportunity for subsequent discussions and deliberations. The selections of R&Js and ITOs went on without the assistance of either the R&J Commission or the Technical and Rules committees. The Chairman of the R&J Commission, Osvaldo Bisbal, stated to the MIIT that normally he would be involved in the R&J appointment process, but he was excluded completely. Effectively, Karim consolidated control and had the ability to have influence over the supervisor and ITOs and have authority over the R&Js, which he could exert in real time. All of these selections were ultimately made with the approval of the President.

4.4.4 Weeding Out the Incorruptible

The Olympic qualification events were not only used as the training ground for the corrupted or easily turned R&Js, but also tested their obedience to the five stars and served to weed out the incorruptible. Those R&Js that refused to be bullied into crossing ethical and professional lines were simply removed from the potential Olympic roster. Those who complained about pressure being applied to score in a pre-determined way or follow hand signals or refused to “*get on board*”, were identified by the internal cadre as “*trouble makers*” and impediments in carrying out the mechanisms of manipulation. Several witnesses described their experiences with the five stars during the Olympic qualification events. As a result of the professional integrity of these witnesses they were typically not appointed to Rio, while other R&Js with performance issues and questionable ethics were.

One confidential 3 star R&J, refused to comply with the signalling instructions implemented by a group of corrupt 3 and 5 star R&Js. The witness explained that because the tournaments were part of the lead-up to Rio, it was overwhelming and aggressive. Since this witness was new, there was no way to benchmark what was and was not normal so *“I just figured I needed to try to make it through.”*

“So I was an official who had gone from not doing any international competitions to all of a sudden being international and doing these long, very impactful competitions and tournaments which were relating to the Olympic run.”

The approaches to corrupt this witness occurred over several tournaments and each time the corrupted R&Js would chastise, intimidate and pressure the witness to obey. One such incident occurred at the 2015 European Championship event in Samokov, Bulgaria. The witness’ refusal to obey eventually escalated to being intimidated. The first approach was done by a 3 star from Italy, who was understood to be the leader of the 3 stars. The Italian R&J pulled the witness aside early on in the tournament and questioned the scoring of a bout, *“[a]nd he told me, look, you know, I see that you're a great judge and you're judging really fairly, but it's obvious you're not getting the memo about how important it is that you follow what we're telling you to do.”* The witness ignored this request and continued to officiate in an ethical and fair manner.

Subsequent to this conversation, one evening while the witness was alone in the hotel room some of the corrupted R&Js, including 5 star Gerardo Poggi, entered the witness’ room late at night using a set of room keys obtained from the front desk and warned that as a result of the

way the bouts were being scored, it wouldn't bode well for the witness' future. The witness recalled that:

“So they had keys to my room and they came in and basically drunk told me that if I didn't start doing the job that I was hired to do that things wouldn't work out very well for me... So that, if I didn't do the decision, they wanted me to do, they would break into my room with bottles of alcohol, sit down in the middle of my, I mean, this is the mountains of Bulgaria, sit in my room and make sure that they talk, spoke to me about what it was that I wasn't doing... in that context I was scared shitless now because I've got people coming into my room, like busting into my room and telling me what I'm doing wrong.”

With the witness' personal safety at risk, the witness immediately called a member of the Executive Committee to inform him of the intimidation received from the group of R&Js. It appears from the evidence available that this complaint was not taken any further and no investigation nor disciplinary procedures were initiated by AIBA.

Following the World Championships in Bulgaria, the witness was appointed to officiate a Rio qualifier tournament in Vargas, Venezuela. The witness stated that *“Venezuela was essentially [...] the first time that I'd ever really experienced the intimidation to that extent.”* Mik Basi was one of the *“ringleaders”* at this tournament and he would hold secret meetings with officials that were complying with the corruption. The witness stated that *“Mik Basi was aggressive and very charming at the same time.”* However interactions with him during the tournament were essentially him sidelining the witness because of the witness' refusal to call bouts in the way he and the corrupted judges wanted. *“Everyone except for the five stars [were suspended from judging] for the most part. And a couple of three stars who I know were very deeply involved with*

executing what they wanted because they needed to have three stars on their side to be able to do and sway the judges' decisions and the direction that they wanted to be swayed."

A different confidential witness, an R&J from the Americas, was also at the Vargas qualifying event and described that the confidential R&J referred to above was visibly upset at Vargas and no one was offering any support. The confidential witness confirmed to the MIIT that this witness was being bullied for not falling into line: *"it was actual bullying and I think they saw [the confidential witness] as an easy target [...], I didn't want to go to the word 'harassment'. I said 'bullying'. I'm very careful with the word 'harassment', but, yes, to the point of having somebody crying. I think that's extreme."* One of the 3 star judges from Italy that was within the inner circle with the 5 stars was actively doing the bullying. The confidential witness eventually made a complaint about the behaviours he was observing which resulted in all the R&Js from the Americas being sidelined or suspended. When asked what he witnessed, he stated:

"the same thing [as Doha] – the five-stars taking over and it seems as though once you didn't go their way or whatever it is, they will side-line and so on. So I spoke up. I spoke up about it and so on and I thought it was grossly unfair that they had this amount of – this power when they were referees just like us. I did and then one of the five-stars came up to me and said, 'Look what you have done. You have made them suspend all the referees from the Americas'...."this is one was from Argentina". (MIIT Note: Gerardo Poggi)

Both confidential witnesses make reference to the "good" R&Js being sidelined at competitions if they did not fall in line to judge bouts in the way the core group of corrupted officials desired to achieve the required results, whatever they may have been for that particular tournament. This had a knock-on effect for the Rio R&J selection in which the MIIT has established that those

who complained about the 5 star behaviours or refused to bend to their will were left out of the selection, while those who were corrupt and/or would do as they were instructed attended Rio and the major qualifiers.

“a lot of us were really good officials and kept on going in a direction that we knew we should going, which is the correct decision [...] we get dressed up for the tournament and then we just sit in a room and don't do anything. So we were ready as officials, but we don't do anything. So that happened for about two or three days [...] if you're not going to score in the correct way, then they don't want you there effectively.”

The confidential witness went to the Rio test event in 2015, which in the witness' opinion, had no corruption. The R&Js in attendance were told that those who went to the test event would not go to Rio, nevertheless some R&Js who attended eventually were appointed to Rio; this confidential witness however was not. The witness believed this may have been due to not doing as the 5 stars demanded.

“So they only put the three stars at the competitions that really mattered. [...] And then after that (MIIT Note: Rio Test event) I can't remember my next event until [...] because I remember Rio happened. And basically, we just waited it out and then I think my next competition would have been sometime end of the year 2016. So I thought that, you know, for sure, because I hadn't listened to what I was supposed to do.”

The confidential witness is of the view that as a result of refusing to participate in the corruption, the witness began being overlooked for major events including Rio. This has been corroborated by other witnesses the MIIT has interviewed. Another confidential witness, a 3 star R&J, attended a tournament in Romania where he was approached by a number of mainly eastern European R&Js and some AIBA International officials telling him how he should vote in the last bout, *“four or five of them got round me and said, ‘Oh, last round, he wins. Winner. Blue wins.’ And I went,*

'No. Red or blue'. 'No, no, no, you don't understand'. And I went, 'No, I understand. Red or blue, okay?' A week following the completion of the event he got a phone call from Mik Basi asking him if he wanted to be part of the WSB R&J circuit. The confidential witness was keen to do this, but after having explained to Basi about the Romania incident he never heard anything more about the WSB appointment.

This confidential witness never had any other issues during his work as an R&J. He was never selected to officiate a Rio qualifier event, while another R&J having just returned to the sport after a long sabbatical from amateur boxing, did. He found this particularly surprising since his skill did not go unnoticed. He was awarded best R&J at the 2018 Asian games. When asked whether the stance he took in Romania had any bearing on his non-selection for Rio qualifiers or Games, he replied:

"you do question yourself, whether that had an impact or not [...] I was hoping to have got a qualifier [...] to be honest, it just pissed me off a little bit, because Alvin (Finch) had literally just come back in the sport, and he was given a flipping qualifier, and it really – again, it just peed me off a little bit, because I thought, 'Well, you've left us, as an amateur sport. Gone to pro. Didn't work out for you. Come back, and you're gifted a flipping qualifier. "

The MIIT has several other witnesses that have refused to be publicly identified for fear of their personal safety that either corroborate or have experienced their own "sidelining" for speaking up against corrupt practices or questioning the decisions of the 5 stars. In one instance a 3 star R&J received a mobile phone as a gift at a competition and declared it to the supervisor. Mik Basi upon learning this communicated to the R&J and threatened that declaring the phone may affect his future appointments, *"Oh, [confidential witness] that wasn't smart. You should have told a*

five-star. And as a consequence, it might go quiet for you now.” It indeed went silent for this R&J and he was not selected for any qualifiers or Rio. By all accounts this was a good quality R&J. The R&J asked for advice as to why this was happening to him and one colleague replied *“Yeah. In other words, you can’t be bought.”* And he said, *“You’re not what they want.”* Another incorruptible weeded out of the potential selection.

Having the R&Js that could be “bought” in place was the last piece of the puzzle that allowed for the execution of in-the-field bout manipulation. In order to assure the right outcome of a bout, it was vital that the corruptible R&Js were in place. Ray Silvas recounts in an interview how the daily selection was often changed on the orders of the ED.

“if you were in a tournament and you saw the assignments for referee judges for a given day, um, all of a sudden they would change. And my question sometimes was what happened here? What, why is so and so refereeing the bout, and they would look at me in a very sheepish manner, kind of semi embarrassed them [...] They would just kind of point in one direction with their head and say it. And they would say Karim. So, he would change the assignments. Sometimes the head of the (MIIT Note: Draw) Commission would get instructions on how to move some referee judges to referee more or specific bouts.”

Therefore even if the Draw Commission or the Supervisor made changes to the R&J assignments, the ED had the final authority to make changes as he saw fit.

Chapter 5: Rio the Pinnacle and Anti-Climax

5.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, the MIIT described the key roles necessary to facilitate manipulation and guarantee that certain boxers would win medals for their country at Rio. This chapter describes the subversion and usurpation of the rules by the Executive Director and the powerful influence of the naturally emerging leader of the 5 star R&Js to dictate the appointment of the key individuals to the trio of “in the field” positions - the Supervisor, the Draw Commission and the R&Js.

5.2 Rio Appointments

Helmut Ranze, the Supervisor at the Rio Games, reported that all the appointments for Rio were “*top secret*”, and kept even from him. This secrecy and gag order enabled the Executive Director (“ED”) to make his selections a ‘*fait accompli*’, without any opportunity for subsequent discussions and deliberations. The selection of R&Js and ITOs went on without the assistance of either the R&J Commission or the Technical and Rules Commissions. The Chairman of the R&J Commission, Osvaldo Bisbal, stated to the MIIT that normally he would be involved in the R&J appointment process, but the ED excluded him completely. The impact was a consolidation of control that enabled the influence over the supervisor and ITOs and authority over the R&Js; all of whom were the necessary ingredients to constitute what the MIIT have labelled the “trio in the field”.

All of these selections were ultimately made with the approval of President CK Wu.

The eligibility qualifiers for the Olympics were used by the ED to weed out the incorruptible R&Js. That vetting process left room only for those who were considered either: (i) poor quality but were corrupt; or (ii) corruptible and/or obedient to the will of the ED and the 5 stars to be selected for Rio. R&Js who complained, who could not be bought or manipulated, were left out. Following the 2016 Olympic Qualifier in Vargas, Venezuela, there was a pre-Olympic seminar for the R&Js that had been selected for Rio. There was a gag order in place and no one in AIBA had seen the list of R&Js that had been selected, not even the R&J Commission. The President and the ED were the only two individuals with final approval of the list. The normal process of approval had been circumvented and the Commissions were excluded. When the R&Js arrived for the seminar, Ray Silvas, a member of the R&J Commission, could not believe some of the selections:

“When I saw them.... I said, oh my God, what happened here? But there was nothing we could do at that point. It was too late. It was just a done deal. There was [sic] better referee judges that could work, the tournament [...] and some, you know, I had doubts regarding not just their performance, but their ethics.”

In that respect, Ted Tanner characterised the ethics of the R&Js selected:

“There were 36 referees and judges, and I really came to the opinion during the tournament that 18 of them were cheating and 9 of them were incompetent. But that was me being generous, otherwise I’d have to say 27 were cheating. And I thought 9 of them were honest and competent”.

It was a complete reversal of Santa Clause's myth of the naughty and the nice. The naughty were gifted an appointment at Rio because they were willing, or under pressure to support any request for manipulation, while the nice were left out. In an interview by the MIIT, William Louis Marie (Former Executive Director), was asked about the ED's influence over the R&J selection and he stated that *"[i]f you say, 'Does Karim influence the decision,' I'd like to say yes because Karim is – he likes to control everything and he was very close to Osvaldo Bisbal from Argentina and Ray Silvas. He had a say on the decision to appoint the referees and the judges, for sure."*

Another witness described to the MIIT a conversation between himself, the newly appointed ED, (following the dismissal of his predecessor), and the Chair of the R&J Commission. The witness stated that an open and transparent process of selecting R&Js for Rio was required. The ED said they would do it. However, according to Ray Silvas, who had a discussion with the ED, *"it never got done. When, 2016 came obviously it was too late."* Despite the technical rules in place, the ED believed it was his (AIBA HQ's) job to select the R&Js, and Silvas quoted him as saying *"your job is to prepare them, educate them. And then you turn them over to us. And we assign them."*

The R&J Commission, in its review meeting following Rio, on 3 October 2016, was in agreement that it had its authority and responsibility usurped by the ED and did nothing to prevent it from happening. The public scrutiny of the R&J selections that led to the knee jerk reaction of effectively sidelining all 36 of the judges at Rio, including the 5 stars, without any proper review or investigation, reverberated throughout the R&J Commission. Ray Silvas stated at the October meeting, as recorded in the minutes, that:

“We need to now make sure that it is understood that the selection of R&Js for Rio was not handled in the correct manner. The Commission asked several times what the criteria were and were not involved at any point [...] Shortly before the Venezuela finals, a new wave of R&Js was brought in, but there was also a gag order issued so that none of them were allowed to discuss their selection, creating an unnecessary and suspicious code of silence around what should be a very transparent process. The main issue in this selection process was there was no prior discussion with the R&J commissions before selection and there was no opportunity for consensus. In every previous Games we had input, not here.

During discussions at the meeting, commissioners noted that there was a marked departure from the selection process prior to the London Games where the R&J Commission was involved in the selections. There was a process for London and what happened for Rio “*was wrong.*”

The ED, however, did not act completely alone in the R&J appointments. By the time of the commencement of the Games, the 5 stars had, intentionally or unintentionally, assumed not only significant influence over the 3 stars but also acquired a quasi-administrative role hitherto not found within AIBA rules and regulations. The 5 stars expanded their responsibilities to include monitoring the performance of other R&Js, educating, admonishing, and even unofficially selecting R&Js to various competitions. Although documentation exists that demonstrates that the 3 stars were being regularly evaluated on a daily basis, the 5 stars were not. This is further confirmation of their special status within AIBA. This ultimately led to a situation where the 5 stars were acting without the required checks and balances which would have been provided by the R&J Commission. One witness was asked whether the 5 stars were involved in the selection process for Rio:

“Yeah. 110% yeah. I’ve no doubt. I have no doubt. You see the group for Rio was all a close-knit – they all could – the five-stars could manipulate them. They couldn’t do it to

me because I had spoke out. [...] Most of them referees that were at the Olympic games, we all – they were all there for a reason, because they kept quiet. There was a Scottish lad, [inaudible]. He was there. He knew that the signals... There was a guy from Hungary, there was a guy from Sweden. They all knew what was happening. They all knew that this was the system and they never spoke out, which I spoke out. And obviously then I got pushed to the side. So there was a fear amongst the referees and judges, especially when they brought the five-stars, right? Because they were given that much power that they were basically controlling everything. And this was all led by Karim and CK Wu.”

Another R&J with significant experience and praised by his colleagues as an ethical and experienced R&J, stated to the MIIT that he would have expected to go to Rio but there was never certainty with how the R&J selections were made at AIBA. He attended the pre-Olympic tournament prior to Rio, and he noticed that the 5 stars had amassed significant power enabling them to select “*their people*” to go to Rio. With the positioning of the trio of the Draw Commission, the Supervisor and the 5 star R&Js with the tacit approval of the President, everything was in place to enable manipulation.

As described in chapter 2, the position of Supervisor as part of the checks and balances, is to be selected by the Technical & Rules Commission. However, here again the ED subverted the rules and made the selection. The ED selected a supervisor who would not challenge him but do as instructed. Ray Silvas confirmed to the MIIT that the “*supervisor position again, the rule books said that the technical rules commission selected, uh, technical officials and supervisors, the executive director Karim Bouzidi overruled that rule and selected them.*” Another example is illustrated by Pat Fiacco’s experience as Supervisor at the Doha qualifying tournament. He explained that a practice developed where the ED would overrule the Supervisor’s changes to

the draw; according to Fiacco based on decisions that were decided and likely communicated to the Draw Commission in advance:

“What would happen is the draw commissioner would do his or her thing, bring it to me. I would look at it and I’d say, ‘No, this is wrong; this is wrong; this is wrong; scratch him out’. He would replace him, and then I’d sign off on it, and I’d look around the ring and I’d say, ‘Those aren’t the officials we agreed to’. So I went up to – Yue Yan was his name, and I said, ‘Yue, what’s going on?’ And he said, ‘You got overruled’. I go, ‘What? By Karim Bouzidi...?’ and he said, ‘Yeah’, and I thought, ‘Holy shit. Now they’re getting brave. Now they are getting really brave’.”

As a consequence, Pat Fiacco withdrew his appointment as Deputy Supervisor at Rio because he did not want to be a part of what he felt was going to happen. Ultimately, Fiacco lost trust in the individuals involved to run a clean Games.

The Supervisor has and can exert significant authority at the Games, including temporarily or permanently suspending an R&J where performance is unsatisfactory, and can even overrule a referee if their decision is contrary to proper officiating. However, Helmut Ranze did not exert any such authority even in the face of, at best, incompetence or, at worst, manipulation. He stated to the MIIT that he approved and accepted nearly every single draw made by the Commission. He also could not recall if he ever raised any objections to the draws. Within his sphere of authority, he was to confirm the application of neutrality, which he stated that perhaps he was *“not capable enough”* to do. His inaction had the effect of rubber stamping any changes, allocations, substitutions or decisions that were put to him, thereby aiding and abetting the manipulation process.

During his interview with MIIT investigators, Helmut Ranze made it clear that he avoided any involvement in anything contentious. Other witnesses interviewed by the MIIT contend that it is precisely because of his propensity to avoid confrontation and tendency look the other way that he was appointed to the position. A supervisor has the responsibility to assess the use of R&Js and ensure they are properly appointed, that their judging is of the required standard, and that one judge is not used excessively more than others. In this respect, there were obvious issues that Ranze had the authority to intervene in, but no action was taken.

Specifically in relation to the Tischenko v Levit Olympic heavyweight gold medal bout, Ted Tanner stated that it was important that the correct result be obtained for this fight. However, Stoyanova and Moustahsane overloaded the bout with 5 stars, thus reversing on the original plan to protect the 5 stars.

“I was guessing the bout was going to be rigged and then when they put these five stars in I knew it was going to be rigged. And so, I was holding it up because I wouldn’t agree to [the R&J Selection] and then in the end I thought, ‘If Ranze isn’t going to intervene, you may as well give up’. That’s what I thought.”

He was out voted by his co-commissioners and the Supervisor did nothing. Despite the fact that Ranze admitted to the MIIT that the bout was questionable, he did not scrutinize the Draw Commission’s allocation of 5 stars prior to the bout.

The Supervisor also failed in his responsibility to ensure that competent R&Js were used as widely as possible. In the case of R&J Vuong Trong Nghia (Vietnam), who refereed a total 87 bouts, the most of any R&J at the Games, Franco Falcinelli reported to CK Wu prior to the Games that

Vuong's capability was not up to Olympic standard. Considering that Vuong was involved in two high level contentious bouts a day apart, the Tischenko v Levit bout followed by Nikitin v Conlon, this was a vital assessment that Ranze knew or should have known. Falcinelli, the Deputy Supervisor at the Games, arguably held a responsibility to inform Ranze of his concerns related to his abilities, but evidently failed to do so. This knowledge about Vuong's abilities certainly was not acted upon and he went on to officiate the highest number of bouts at Rio.

In addition, the MIIT has performed a detailed analysis of the R&J appointments, which unequivocally demonstrates a failure in the Supervisor to carry out his responsibility in ensuring a fair spread of R&J appointments. The statistics are described below. The evidence therefore indicates that the role of the second branch of the "in the field" trio was essentially to do nothing but turn a blind eye and do as instructed by whomever.

The Chair of the Technical & Rules Commission, in consultation with other committee members, should have selected and appointed the ITOs. However, a member of the T&R Commission confidentially confided that he was never consulted regarding ITO selection. He stated that it was likely done by the ED in consultation with Mik Basi. This member also corroborates that the R&Js' appointments were influenced by same persons. The MIIT concludes from the evidence that the ED, assisted by Mik Basi, selected both the R&Js and the ITOs for Rio. That conclusion is corroborated by several of the MIIT's confidential witnesses.

To demonstrate the usurpation of the function of the Commissions, Helmut Ranze stated that he recommended two experienced and capable people for the positions of Draw Commission and R&J Evaluator. However, the ITO selection was kept “*Top Secret*” and, not surprisingly, neither of his choices were nominated. In the midst of all of this, the MIIT found evidence of an appointment directly influenced by Mik Basi. Following this conversation with Basi, he was sent his appointment shortly thereafter. This individual expressed to the MIIT that “*I have no doubt he was influential in selecting me to Rio [...] by then it was obvious that he had an immense amount of influence as a five-star.*” This is an example of the influence exerted by Mik Basi, the leader of the 5 stars over appointments, over which he should have had no involvement.

The final branch of the trio “in the field” were the ITOs appointed to the Draw Commission. The methods used to appoint the ITOs outside of the scrutiny of the Technical and Rules Commission adds further suspicion to the Draw Commission appointments. The appointment of Stela Stoyanova and Mohammad Moustahsane to the Draw Commission raises the possibility of being able to manipulate the R&J bout allocations. The Chairman of the Commission was Mohamed Moustahsane. The third person on the Draw Commission was Ted Tanner, who recalled that: “[I] was always a brake on the Commission, and they were always particularly led by Mohamed.”

With respect to Stoyanova, witnesses have explained that while she was efficient at allocating R&Js to bouts, there were several reasons why she is a likely cause of R&J draw manipulation. As discussed below, she was retained as an ITO despite her federation’s removal of membership

and later formal request to not have her nominated as an ITO. Some witnesses took the fact that her federation had essentially renounced her as evidence of her wrongdoing.

Additionally, the MIIT has interviewed several witnesses who have corroborated that Stela Stoyanova had a clandestine relationship with Mik Basi, the leader of the 5 stars. Prima facie, the existence of such a relationship does not necessarily lead to nefarious results; the MIIT notes that such a relationship is capable of assisting manipulation. Indeed, all three members on the Draw Commission agreed that it would be inappropriate if any such relationship existed. Several witnesses agreed that “[a]ll the ingredients were there for manipulation.” Both participants denied that there was any such relationship.

Despite the foregoing denial, Mik Basi agreed in his interview that if there was someone on the inside of the Draw Commission who could select a judge known to favour bout manipulation, it would be a breach of the integrity of the selection process. Basi commented that he did not think it possible that Stoyanova could have influence over the other two Draw Commission members anyway.

Lastly, Stela Stoyanova appears to have acted in breach of a commonly understood AIBA practice of eliminating close contact between ITOs and R&Js. Osvaldo Bisbal, upon witnessing Stela Stoyanova meeting with the 5 stars during Rio, requested the Supervisor remove her from the Draw Commission.

“I have watched her talking to R&Js in the R&Js room. She was in the middle of the group whilst the 5 stars were in the group. It was a routine [practice] not to allow ITOs to talk with the R&Js in the R&Js room.”

Several other witnesses corroborate Bisbal’s account. The inference drawn by this was that these were clandestine meetings where R&J selections were decided in advance of the following day’s bouts and communicated to the 5 stars without the interference of Tanner. He realised that there was possibility that the draws were being decided in advance by Moustahsane and Stoyanova, *“I don’t think Stella was much – that much involved with it. It would be Mohamed with Stella just being his chorus supporting him.”* Tanner was further concerned that Moustahsane received his prior instructions from the ED. This concern was echoed by Pat Fiacco.

When asked if any manipulation of the referee assignments could have occurred by the Draw Commission, Tom Virgets, who led the SIC investigation, stated that:

“The only person that Swiss Timing would have accepted [changes] from was the fact that Karim had the power and I’m going to put it to you this way: I can guarantee you – I don’t – you know, Stela probably, but I know Mohamed would have done anything that Karim told him to do. Anything that Karim told him to.”

If, as several witnesses stated, Stela could not act on her own to make changes to the R&J assignments, all that would be needed is another person on the committee to sway the decisions. Ted Tanner, the third person on the Draw Commission, described to the MIIT how decisions were made by the three of them and whether any of their joint decisions were overruled. He stated that:

“My concern was that Mohamed had got his riding instructions beforehand from Bouzidi. But it fell really over badly when it came to the 91kg final, where I just couldn’t agree what they’d done. Both Mohamed and with Stela’s support they suddenly overturned all our agreement about never using the five-stars where they could be seen to possibly have a conflict or whatever, and place them in a situation where they could be criticised. It was a Russian against a Kazakh. And the referee was the Argentinian. And he nursed the Russian through.”

Stoyanova and Moustahsane were in close contact outside of their Draw Commission duties.

William Louis Marie stated in an interview that he had seen Stela Stoyanova go into Moustahsane’s room on two occasions. Both denied that they were ever together in Moustahsane’s room. In the interview, Moustahsane stated that the night before he would prepare a spreadsheet of the next day’s bouts, with a list of available R&Js, but categorically denied allocating R&Js to bouts at this stage. He was asked about providing the MIIT with these spreadsheets and responded that he threw them away at the end of the Games, along with any original draw sheets.

5.3 The Theory behind the Mechanics

The investigative interviews of many individuals have crystallised a theory of how the manipulation occurred at Rio, which is described below.

The ED, often in consultation with the 5 stars and assisted by Sports Director Kristen Brynildsen, selected all of the R&Js. There are two possible avenues that have been identified for the decision to be communicated to the Draw Commission – either to Stoyanova via Mik Basi or Moustahsane via the ED.

Stoyanova and Moustahsane would influence the selection process, so that the “right” R&Js were in a position to officiate the bout as directed. In instances where Stoyanova and Moustahsane were unable to enforce influence on the draw, the ED went to Swiss Timing with a revised draw sheet, and his decision was final. Indeed, Tanner recalled that when the R&J draw sheet came out, it went to a “*certain person*” who looked at it, altered it and gave it back to Swiss Timing and said, “*This fellow will referee or this fellow will judge.*” That “*certain person*” being Karim Bouzidi. While there is wide agreement among the MIIT’s witnesses with how the manipulation was executed, the ED, due to illness, did not have the opportunity to be interviewed. The mechanism therefore relied on both the Draw Commission and the R&Js. One could not operate without the other for the manipulation to be successfully executed.

The mechanics of R&J allocation at the Rio Olympics was fine-tuned and practised at the various qualifying events. The following describes how the mechanics worked in practice. Initially, a “*master*” sheet (the format of which was believed first used by AIBA in 2008) to write the names of the allocated referee and judges’ positions for each bout in a boxing session is developed. See below:

| 20.06.2016 | Ring | A | B | A | B | A | B |
|------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | Bout | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| | Bout | 224 | 236 | 225 | 237 | 226 | 238 |
| SESSION 9 | Red | KOR | EGY | HUN | BUL | SVK | TKM |
| | Blue | MDA | GER | GUA | TTO | TUR | JPN |
| | Cat. | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 |
| | R | J | | | | | |
| 1 | *ALG 5 | | | | | | |
| 2 | MAR | | | | | | |
| 6 | CAN | | | | | | |
| 10 | USA | | | | | | |
| 9 | PUR | | | | | | |
| 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 |
| 7 | CUB | | | | | | |
| 8 | ECU | | | | | | |
| 3 | ARG 5 | | | | | | |
| 4 | ARG | | | | | | |
| 5 | *BRA | | | | | | |
| 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 |
| 14 | KOR | | | | | | |
| 11 | CHN | | | | | | |
| 12 | IRI | | | | | | |
| 15 | MGL | | | | | | |
| 13 | *KAZ | | | | | | |
| 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 |
| 28 | RUS 5 | | | | | | |
| 27 | RUS | | | | | | |
| 17 | BLR | | | | | | |
| 25 | LTU | | | | | | |
| 16 | AZE | | | | | | |
| 21 | HUN | | | | | | |
| 26 | POL 5 | | | | | | |
| 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 | 00:00:00 |
| 22 | GRE | | | | | | |
| 29 | TUR | | | | | | |
| 18 | FRA | | | | | | |
| 24 | ITA | | | | | | |
| 23 | IRL 5 | | | | | | |
| 19 | ENG | | | | | | |
| 20 | WAL | | | | | | |

Sample sheet from earlier AOB Olympic pre-qualifier event Baku

Across the top of the sheet are the bouts of the day, and along the left side of the sheet are all of the referees, by country, grouped together by continent and historical ties.²⁴ These general “groupings” were in existence when Tanner first officiated on a Draw Commission in 2011.

Approximately 30-40 minutes before each session, the Draw Commission members would discuss and allocate R&Js for up to the first 6 bouts of the session. As the day progressed, they would continue allocating R&Js so that they were always 3 to 4 bouts ahead of the bout being contested at that time. At times, the Draw Commission received instructions by the senior ITOs managing the tournament; they would have conveyed these instructions to Mohammed as the Chairman. The Draw Commission would allocate the specified persons to be referees of the sessions’ bouts after consideration of their: (i) ‘neutrality’ and (ii) physical size or gender in relation to the bouts’ boxers (i.e. not put a female or a small male person to referee a bout between male super heavyweights).

Where possible, the Draw Commission did not allocate R&Js to officiate in bouts involving a boxer from their continent or their allocated “grouping” but, if that was not possible, then they ensured a corresponding person from each “grouping” or continent was allocated to that bout.²⁵

²⁴ (i) ‘old’ Eastern Bloc countries, (ii) western European/North American/Australia countries, (iii) Latin American countries, (iv) Arab and ‘stan’ countries and (v) other Asian countries (apart from Arabs, usually there were not many African R&Js).

²⁵ If there was a West European boxer against an Asian boxer, if it could not be avoided that a West European judge was allocated to the bout then an Asian judge would also be allocated.

All of the allocations of officials for bouts were copied onto a “master” sheet so that a picture could be formed of the activity pattern of all R&Js. In theory, this was to ensure that an R&J was not being allocated too many bouts in succession, which could lead to deterioration in their performance through tiredness, and, also, that R&Js were rotated as much as possible into different judging positions around the ring for the bouts in which they officiated. However, a statistical analysis, conducted by the MIIT, discussed below, illustrates that the reality was different.

Additionally, the number of bouts each R&J was allocated to was kept tallied in an effort to ensure that the R&J in each of the advised “groupings” officiated as closely as possible in the same number of bouts as other members of that grouping. However, it was accepted that there could be wide disparity in the participation activity between members of the different groupings. Specifically, the Russian R&Js, because of the relative high number of Russian boxers and their placement in the Eastern Bloc grouping would not be allocated as many bouts in which to officiate compared with R&Js from other countries and groupings.

As the tournament progressed, as in other tournaments, daily instructions would be given to the Draw Commission by the lead group of ITOs at the tournament to not allocate certain R&Js to bouts for that day – these instructions would be conveyed to the Draw Commission by Mohamed Moustahsane. There were accepted legitimate reasons why this might occur, for example on the basis of poor performance the previous day by the persons stood down, or a rest day.

The allocation of R&J seating positions in a bout would be handwritten onto a formatted paper specifically for that bout. The Draw Commission would pass the document to the Supervisor and attempt to keep him advised of proposed R&J bout allocations at least 3 bouts in advance of the bout presently being conducted.

The Supervisor would scrutinise the allocations and approve them by signing the paper as approved, or could require a reallocation of persons as he so determined. When a bout allocation was approved by the Supervisor, copies of that document would be distributed to: (i) the Ring Supervisor, (ii) the R&J Evaluators, (iii) the R&J Co-Ordinators and (iv) the Ring Announcer.

5.4 The Reality of the R&J Allocations

If the theory was followed by all the officials at Rio, then there should have been a reasonable balance across the distribution of the R&Js, taking into consideration certain criteria as discussed. The MIIT undertook a statistical analysis of the R&J allocations, and its findings starkly oppose the planned requirement. This analysis shows that the key points as described in the requirement did not happen:

- Ensure parity across the allocations of R&Js;
- Avoid excess allocations of bouts; and
- Ensure rotation of R&Js through the different referee and judging positions.

With respect to the excess allocation of R&Js, when reviewing the list of R&Js who were selected by the Draw Commission to officiate on the most occasions during the tournament (Figure 1), four of those R&J were previously reported to CK Wu by Falcinelli and Fiacco for being of either poor quality or allegedly involved in corrupt behaviour; they were located in the top 25% of the list.

At the other end of the spectrum, the 5 star Russian R&J, Vladislav Malyshev, officiated the least, on only 16 occasions during the whole tournament, while four of the AIBA 5 stars were anchored in the lower third of the table. Only the 5 stars Kheira Sidi Yakoub (ALG) and Gerardo Poggi (ARG) completed anywhere near the number of bouts that would be expected of the most senior R&Js.

It would make sense that countries with a stronger boxing pedigree would bridge the medal rounds of the competition, thereby decreasing the opportunity to allocate R&Js from these country blocks to officiate in the latter rounds. This should not affect greatly the apportionment of R&Js by nationality during the earlier rounds. After all, it is the job of the Draw Commission, overseen by the Supervisor, to ensure a balanced selection process whilst maintaining neutrality. Similarly, as the competition progresses and the number of bouts reduces, there should be greater capacity amongst the 36 R&Js to spread the load more evenly. However, when the table of bout allocation by date is analysed, that does not appear to be the case.

Figure 1 - Allocation of R&Js to Bouts by Date/Nationality

| Judges / Referees | Nationality | 06/08 | 07/08 | 08/08 | 09/08 | 10/08 | 11/08 | 12/08 | 13/08 | 14/08 | 15/08 | 16/08 | 17/08 | 18/08 | 19/08 | 20/08 | 21/08 | TOTALS |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| VUONG Trong Nghia | Vietnam | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 10 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 87 |
| KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | Sri Lanka | 4 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 85 |
| MOUDRIKAH Hassan | Morocco | 5 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 77 |
| GERMAIN Tony | Canada | 3 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 4 | | 1 | 64 |
| CARBONELL ALVARADO Armando | Colombia | 2 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 63 |
| SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kennedy | Brazil | 2 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 62 |
| DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | Cuba | 2 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 4 | | 1 | 62 |
| CARRILLO Clemente | Ecuador | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 | | 1 | 56 |
| JUHASZ Roland | Hungary | 3 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 53 |
| NORDIN Stefan | Sweden | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 52 |
| SIDI YAKOUB Kheira [5*] | Algeria | | 6 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 4 | | | | | | 52 |
| BEDEMANN Claus | Denmark | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 51 |
| BONET Jose | Puerto Rico | 3 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | | 1 | 48 |
| BOUGIOUKAS Evangelos | Greece | 3 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | | 47 |
| MADFOUA Fathi | France | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 47 |
| POGGI Gerardo [5*] | Argentina | 3 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 6 | | | | | | | 46 |
| AYDIN Emre | Turkey | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 45 |
| LICINI Enrico | Italy | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | | 45 |
| TSOY Natalya | Kazakhstan | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 2 | | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 41 |
| McFARLANE Daniel | Great Britain | 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 39 |
| JUST Rene | Slovakia | 4 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | | | 1 | | 39 |
| PAULA SOUZA Marcela | Brazil | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 3 | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 38 |
| WANG Meng | China | 4 | 6 | 7 | 3 | 6 | | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 38 |
| ROOS Allan | Finland | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | | 4 | 3 | 1 | | 1 | | | 37 |
| KURBANOV Jasurbek | Uzbekistan | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 1 | | | | 1 | 36 |
| KHISHGEE Khas-Erdene | Mongolia | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 32 |
| RYSBAYEV Rakhymzhan [5*] | Kazakhstan | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 3 | | | | | | 32 |
| LIU Ming Li | Chinese Taipei | 2 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | | | | 32 |
| GORNY Mariusz [5*] | Poland | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | | | | | | 31 |
| KARAKULOV Mykola | Ukraine | 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 29 |
| GALLAGHER Michael [5*] | Ireland | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 1 | | | | | | 29 |
| BAGDANAVICIUS Kestutis | Lithuania | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | | | | | 27 |
| BASI Mik [5*] | Great Britain | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 1 | | | | | | 25 |
| HUSEYNOV Rovshan | Azerbaijan | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | 25 |
| MOROZOV Sergei | Russian Federation | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | | | | 1 | 1 | | 20 |
| MALYSHEV Vladislav [5*] | Russian Federation | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 16 |
| TOTALS | | 102 | 120 | 144 | 108 | 138 | 138 | 126 | 144 | 162 | 114 | 114 | 66 | 36 | 54 | 18 | 24 | 1608 |

The table above at Figure 1, shows the allocation of R&Js to bouts by date and nationality. The white spaces reflect days when a particular R&J did not receive an allocation. This clearly identifies the date of 17 August 2016 when the 5 star R&Js were stood down from the field of play, following the Nikitin v Conlon bout result and the ensuing allegations of corruption.

Analysis of this table shows that during a comparative period between 6 to 16 August 2016, there was a significant disparity across the bout allocations, with 3 star R&J Vuong Trong Nghia at the top of the table averaging 6.7 bouts per day, while the 5 star Vladislav Malyshev at the bottom of the table averaged 1.4 bouts per day.

In the early rounds, where neutrality should not be so much of an issue due to the significant number of competitors, Malyshev only achieved a maximum of 3 bouts per day on one occasion, and that was on day 8 of the competition. By this time, boxers from a number of weaker competitor nations would have been knocked out, leaving stronger boxing nations like Russia remaining. On neutrality grounds, this should have made it harder for him to be allocated to a bout in the later days, not easier.

Vuong Trong Nghia and Vladislav Malyshev are examples of the extreme ends of the spectrum; however, across the board of R&J allocations, it appears that certain individuals (especially the top 7 or 8 in the chart) are being appointed significantly more often than others across the whole date range, irrespective of nationality/neutrality considerations.

This supports to an extent the evidence gathered by the MIIT, which indicates that a core group of R&Js were involved in corruption, with selected 3 star R&Js being tasked by the 5 stars in certain important bouts to ensure the required results. There were insufficient numbers of 5 stars to guarantee the outcome of certain bouts. For that purpose, support from 3 star R&Js, who would do their bidding either willingly or under pressure, was needed to execute the

manipulation of the bout. The MIT interviewed numerous R&Js, both current and no longer officiating. All of those who were interviewed denied being involved in the manipulation. Many, however, were either witness to the manipulation or instructed to officiate a certain way.

Vuong, like many other R&Js, denied being present at times where manipulation of bouts was being discussed. However, later during the course of his interview with the MIIT, he eventually admitted that he was indeed present at morning meetings where the 5 stars would point at the daily bout list and indicate which corner (blue or red) should win. Not only did Vuong confirm that the 5 stars would have morning meetings amongst themselves prior to speaking with all of the Rio R&Js, he stated that all of the R&Js knew about the manipulation. The 5 stars would instruct **all** of them at the morning meeting which corner, red or blue, should be winning the specific bouts when it was a close contest and not obvious:

“MIIT Investigator: Okay, so what you’re saying to me is the 5 stars would tell everybody in the group who were going to win the bouts, but then –

Vuong Trong Nghia: Yeah, tell the whole – inside the room... Inside the R&J room. It’s not private to each other.

MIIT Investigator: Okay, so everybody knew what was going to happen later on, who was going to win.

Vuong Trong Nghia: Yes, yes, everybody

MIIT Investigator: I mean, finally we’ve got you to confirm that you were actually told to score in a certain way, along with all of the others.

Vuong Trong Nghia: Yes, confirm that, sir.”

On another occasion, Vuong reported to the MIIT that he was on the wrong end of a 4:1 decision where AZE lost to CUB. He went on to state that, from his perspective, the AZE boxer had won the bout, so he was surprised it went the opposite way. The AZE boxer protested afterwards. The MIIT reviewed the bout sheet for this particular bout and found that in fact the final result was 5-0 win on points to Cuba. It is clear that Vuong indeed voted with the other 4 R&Js and not as he had reported to the MIIT in his interview. This leads the MIIT to conclude that this particular bout was pre-determined since Vuong was adamant with the MIIT that he was on the right side of a corrupt bout.

Due to the reluctance of witnesses to come forward, it has not been possible to ascertain the number of corrupt R&Js, or their identities. Understandably, confidential witnesses with direct knowledge of what went on at Rio and the qualifiers were not willing to admit their own involvement in manipulation. However, these witnesses have stated that certain corrupt and/or corruptible 3 star R&Js were, for varying reasons, part of a cadre of R&Js, controlled and tasked by the 5 stars for the purpose of manipulating bout results.

In order to achieve this, those R&Js would need to be specifically selected for the relevant bouts, thus undermining the integrity and responsibility of the Draw Commission to show a more balanced apportionment of R&J selections. To ensure that the correct R&Js were selected, it would require the active collusion of the Draw Commission.

In interviews, both Mohamed Moustahsane and Stela Stoyanova, two of the Draw Commission members at Rio, denied any collusion. However, confidential witness testimony and the MIIT's statistical analysis support the position that both were involved in facilitating manipulation.

Ted Tanner, the third member of the Rio Draw Commission, has stated on the record that he had already seen the R&J draw being manipulated during the qualifiers. The MIIT found Ted Tanner a credible witness; however, it is noted that he did not come forward after Doha or during Rio. He concluded that it would make little difference since *"he couldn't beat the system."* As an example, he makes reference to a Draw Commission member Yue Yan, who, at the Doha 2015 Olympic qualifier *"would turn up in the morning and he'd have all the judging decisions for every bout already allocated"*.²⁶ While this incident does not directly relate to Rio, it demonstrates the methodology that was used during Rio and how the manipulation was undertaken to ensure the desired outcome with the necessary ITOs and R&Js in position.

²⁶ AIBA382b – Ted Tanner.

Figure 2 – Phases of the competition at which R&Js officiated

| Judges / Referees | Phases | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Grand Total | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------|----|----|----|----|---|-------|---------------|---|---|---|---|---|------------|---|---|---|---|---|--------|-------------|-------|---|---|---|---|---|----|-------|
| | Preliminaries | | | | | | | Quarterfinals | | | | | | Semifinals | | | | | | Finals | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | R | Total | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | R | Total | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | R | | Total | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | R | Total |
| VUONG Trong Nghia | 10 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 12 | 7 | 54 | | 3 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 19 | 2 | 3 | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 9 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 87 | |
| KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | 10 | 14 | 9 | 11 | 7 | 4 | 55 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 18 | | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 | | | 2 | | 4 | 85 | |
| MOUDRIKAH Hassan | 6 | 8 | 15 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 47 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 18 | | 3 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 7 | | | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 77 | |
| GERMAIN Tony | 3 | 13 | 10 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 45 | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 12 | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | | | | | 2 | 64 | |
| CARBONELL ALVARADO Armando | 4 | 8 | 9 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 40 | 7 | 2 | 1 | | | | 10 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9 | | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 4 | 63 | |
| SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kennedy | 6 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 37 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 14 | | 1 | | 1 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 3 | 62 | |
| DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | 7 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 39 | 2 | 4 | | 3 | 1 | 3 | 13 | 2 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 7 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 62 | |
| CARRILLO Clemente | 6 | 11 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 37 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | | | 10 | 2 | | 3 | 1 | | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 | 56 | |
| JUHASZ Roland | 5 | 4 | 3 | 10 | 6 | 2 | 30 | 4 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 5 | 12 | 2 | | | 2 | 3 | | 7 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 53 |
| NORDIN Stefan | 3 | 6 | 7 | | 6 | 5 | 27 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 2 | | 1 | | 1 | 4 | 52 | |
| SIDI YAKOUB Kheira [5*] | 10 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 2 | 8 | 39 | 1 | 5 | | 1 | | 2 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 3 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 52 | |
| BEDEMANN Claus | 3 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 29 | 2 | 2 | | 3 | 3 | 2 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 3 | | 7 | | 2 | | 1 | | 3 | 51 | |
| BONET Jose | 4 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 31 | | 1 | | 3 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 7 | | | 2 | | 1 | 3 | 48 | |
| MADFOUA Fathi | 8 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 28 | 4 | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 2 | | 1 | | | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 6 | 47 |
| BOUGIOUKAS Evangelos | 6 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 28 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | | | | 1 | | 1 | 47 | |
| POGGI Gerardo [5*] | 7 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 37 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 6 | 1 | | | | | 1 | 2 | | | | | 1 | 1 | 46 | |
| LICINI Enrico | 5 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 23 | | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 9 | | 3 | 4 | 1 | | 1 | 9 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 45 |
| AYDIN Emre | 4 | 9 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 28 | | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | | | 5 | | 2 | | | 1 | 3 | 45 | |
| TSOY Natalya | 5 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 32 | | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | | | | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | | 1 | | 1 | 2 | 41 | |
| McFARLANE Daniel | 3 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 23 | 5 | 1 | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | 3 | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 3 | 39 | |
| JUST Rene | 3 | | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 22 | 1 | | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 | 39 | |
| WANG Meng | 2 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 33 | | | 2 | | 1 | | 3 | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 2 | 38 | |
| PAULA SOUZA Marcela | 7 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 27 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 3 | 38 | |
| ROOS Allan | 1 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 26 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | 3 | 7 | 1 | 1 | | 2 | | 4 | | | | | | | | 37 | |
| KURBANOV Jasurbek | 3 | 3 | | 6 | 8 | 5 | 25 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 8 | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 36 | |
| KHISHGEE Khas-Erdene | 2 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 28 | 1 | | | | 1 | | 2 | | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | 32 | |
| LIU Ming Li | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 28 | | 1 | | | | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | | | 2 | | | | | | | | 32 | |
| RYSBAYEV Rakhymzhan [5*] | 6 | 5 | | 5 | 1 | 6 | 23 | | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | | | | | 1 | 1 | 32 | |
| GORNY Mariusz [5*] | 7 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 19 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 1 | | | | 1 | 2 | 4 | | | | | 1 | 1 | 31 | |
| GALLAGHER Michael [5*] | 10 | 1 | | | 4 | 6 | 21 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | | 2 | 6 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | | | | 1 | 29 | |
| KARAKULOV Mykola | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 19 | | 1 | 2 | 2 | | 2 | 7 | 1 | | | 1 | | | 2 | | | | 1 | | 1 | 29 | |
| BAGDANAVICIUS Kestutis | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 22 | 1 | 2 | | | 1 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 27 | |
| HUSEYNOV Rovshan | 4 | 2 | | 6 | 3 | 4 | 19 | | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | 4 | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | | 25 | |
| BASI Mik [5*] | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 19 | 3 | | | | | 1 | 4 | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | | 25 | |
| MOROZOV Sergei | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 15 | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 20 | |
| MALYSHEV Vladislav [5*] | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 13 | | | | 1 | 1 | | 2 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 16 | |

The table in Figure 2 shows the allocation of R&Js to bouts during various stages of the competition.

Ted Tanner reported that the 5 stars were being protected from involvement in excessive bouts due to media allegations of “cheating” at the qualifiers. Mohamed Moustahsane was the architect behind this and Tanner went along with the suggestion stating:

“We would have lists of these R&Js divided into their sections, different categories and then we’d have another list of who had had how many bouts. And we would try – within their categories try to even in it, but bearing in mind all the time was to – that we have to protect the five-star R&Js from [...] because people call them cheats and we’ve got to protect them, so that they don’t – so we shouldn’t put them in these important bouts.”²⁷

The MIIT’s statistical analysis shows that fewer R&Js are allocated to bouts as the competition progresses and competitors are knocked out. The use of the seven 5 stars across the phases also reduces slightly as the competition progresses, from 17.7% in the preliminaries to 12.8% in the quarter finals and 10% in the semi-finals. These numbers corroborate Ted Tanner’s account of their protected use and contradict Mohammed Moustahsane’s contention that there was no protection of the 5 stars. He was adamant that they were allocated equally across the board, stating that *“No, no, no, no. They have to work [...]. Why should they be protected? They are the best for us.”²⁸*

According to Tanner, the protection of the 5 stars only changed in the latter stages of the tournament when it became vital that certain boxers got through to the medals rounds and/or won gold. In relation to the Tishchenko (RUS) v Levit (KAZ) gold medal bout, where allegations of corruption and manipulation were widespread, three 5 stars were used for the one and only time in the whole competition. Tanner added *“I was guessing the bout was going to be rigged and then when they put these five stars in I just – I knew it was going to be rigged...the bout became so one-sided it was terrible when the decision came because it was so one-sided. And Poggi had done everything he could to protect the Russian.”*

²⁷ AIBA382b – Ted Tanner.

²⁸ AIBA397a - 1345959 Harod Associates Investigation Meeting 210804 Mohamed Moustahsane.

This is illustrative when considering that five of the 5 stars appear in the bottom 25% of the chart at Figure 1. When isolating for neutrality, the MIIT notes that the 5 stars cover a wide range of confederation blocks which would have allowed them to be used, certainly in the earlier stages of the competition, much more frequently than the Figures indicate. Indeed, Mik Basi an English 5 star R&J, would likely sit in the same European “neutrality” block as Stephen Nordin of Sweden, yet Basi only officiated 25 bouts as opposed to 52 by Nordin.

5.7 Rotations though R&J positions

It is well established that the referee position can have a significant influence in the manipulation of a bout. In addition, a judge sitting in position 1 can also have a significant influence by illicitly signalling the 4 remaining judges. Position 1 is differentiated from the other 4 as it has global view of the entire ring. In this respect, Ted Tanner informed the MIIT that he had suspicions at Asian/Oceania qualifiers that *“the judge 1 position was the lead judge they took their lead from.”*²⁹ The Draw Commission was responsible for allocating all the seating positions and selecting the referees.

An anomaly identified within Figure 1 is the number of times the 5 stars are allocated to judge position number 1 during the preliminaries. Gallagher is the extreme example. He was a judge 15 times during the preliminaries and, on 10 of these occasions, he was selected for position 1. All the 5 stars, with the exception of Poggi (who was allocated to position 2 on 8 occasions and

²⁹ AIBA382b – Ted Tanner Pg. 37.

position 1 on 7 occasion), were allocated position 1 more times than any of other 4 remaining judging positions. Similarly, there appeared to be a trend toward the 5 stars being selected for referee positions more frequently than one would expect based on the number of bouts in which each is involved.

When evaluating the percentage of occasions during the preliminary rounds that the 5 star judges occupied either the referee or judge 1 position, the results are as follows:

Percentage of times five stars are in position 1 or referee during preliminaries

1. Gallagher - 76.1%
2. Malyshev - 53.8%
3. Basi - 52.6%
4. Rysbayev - 52.1%
5. Gorny - 47.3%
6. Sidi Yakoub - 46.1%
7. Poggi - 40.5 %

What this analysis illustrates is that the 5 stars are put in these positions deliberately, otherwise there would have been a consistent allocation among all the 36 R&Js. This becomes even more pronounced in the quarter and semi-finals. In the quarter finals the 5 stars occupy the same 2 positions 44.5% of the time compared to those R&Js in the top 7 Figure 7 chart positions of 31.9%.

In the semi-finals the Figures show a wider margin, with the 5 stars occupying the position 1 or referee position 58% of the time as opposed to 33.6% by those R&Js in the top 7 table positions (Figure 1).

The MIIT notes that the allocation of Gallagher, for example, to either seat 1 or referee position on 20 of the 29 occasions in which he officiated during the entire tournament indicates that he was deliberately allocated to these positions in order to orchestrate a manipulation of results during certain important bouts. As detailed in Figure 12, from seat 1 (nearest a neutral corner) it is potentially easier to signal to the left and right than perhaps from other judging positions. Michael Gallagher, for example, occupied this position in the Tischenko/Levit bout.

5.8 Instructions to the R&Js

When Vuong did not score in the way he was instructed during the morning meetings, he stated that he knew the 5 stars were not happy with him. Meng-Li Lui, a 3 star R&J at Rio, noticed the same sort of reaction by the 5 stars when the scoring was not in line with the instructions given. *“From what I observed, the 5-star R&Js exerted pressure on 3-star R&Js by questioning them (3-star) why their judging was different from them (5-star).”* As a result, Ming-Li wrote to CK Wu following Rio to complain that she and Wang Meng, a fellow 3 star, were being marginalised by the 5 stars who were instructing other R&Js not to associate with either of them. Meanwhile Wang Meng was keen to avoid conflict and stay out of it. While he said that he never had any direct pressure from the 5 stars, mainly because of his lack of English, if any instructions came from Yue Yan he did not consider it as pressure.

5.9 The two big controversial Bouts – The public watershed moment

There were two bouts that caused the system to publicly collapse. There was a bantamweight quarter final, which saw the reigning World and European Champion at the time, Michael Conlon, come up against Vladimir Nikitin from Russia. The other was a gold medal heavyweight match between Russia's Evgeny Tischenko and Kazakhstan's Vasily Levit. Following the result of these two fights, the 5 star judges, the Executive Director, and Stela Stoyanova from the Draw Commission, were all stood down from their duties at Rio. The MIIT accepts that refereeing a bout is equal part art and science, wholly subjective and dependent on what angle in the ring each of the R&Js are viewing the bout. This is what makes them vulnerable to manipulation. However, the MIIT has not undertaken a review of these bouts and will not comment on the results. While some think the outcomes were fair, others disagree, and yet some reserve judgement and express relief that they were not selected to officiate them at all. It was very evident that whilst an R&J decision is very subjective when you look back with hindsight, judgement can be affected by opinion and agenda as to how you call a result.

However, it is evident from the many interviews of senior management conducted by the MIIT, that a general feeling of rallying around the AIBA camp was important during this time. Question not and accept instructions prima facie was the modus operandi for the majority of AIBA officials. A dramatic example of this was when Helmut Ranze asked no questions as to why the Draw Commission members and the 5 stars were removed and then, later, he was removed from his

position. His response was that he *“just got on with it.”* This “ask not” culture is maintained to this day.

It is apparent to the MIIT that the structure described above is what allowed these events to be manipulated. In effect, it allowed for bouts to be manipulated almost at will or whenever there was strong enough motivation to do so. Evidence demonstrates that AIBA officials were motivated by money and, in the case of CK Wu, personal motivation to maintain the good graces of the IOC. As described above, since judges reported to us that they were instructed at the start of the day which way bouts should be decided, providing it was close and a judgement call, we will never know the full extent of just how many bouts were manipulated at Rio. Patterns of behaviour and activity indicate that it was more widespread than initially thought and went far beyond these two bouts which most boxing experts have publicly pointed to as having been manipulated.

These two bouts were the catalyst for the house of cards to come crashing down. The first blow was Thomas Bach refusing to undertake the medal ceremony in the heavyweight gold medal match, despite having been scheduled to do so. This was a source of embarrassment for CK Wu, who responded by immediately suspending the 5 stars from officiating any further bouts. The second and knockout blow was the result of the Conlon fight and the public outcry that followed. Internally, a battle raged between those who preferred not to take action without prior investigation and the public relations side who persuaded CK Wu that it was better to throw out the ED, the 5 stars and ITOs to show he was being tough rather than ride out a media storm. This

was confirmed by Cliondha Guy who *“was told, in terms of – the issue was they were getting too much attention, and it’s drawing away from everything else, and it would be better to step them back. It was more around protecting the five-stars from the negative attention as opposed to anything else.”*

President Wu called a number of meetings to review the video footage of bouts to examine whether the bouts had been scored correctly. During this time, there was discussion regarding the 5star R&Js and allegations that they were favoring certain countries during the Olympics. To avoid further controversy, the 5 star R&Js were removed from the competition several days before the closing of the Games. However, they remained in their hotels at the Games, thereby continuing their overshadowing presence. President Wu also called a meeting with the witnesses (Ray Silvas AIBA122) and Tom Virgets (Disciplinary Commission Chairman) and indicated that the Executive Director, Karim Bouzidi, would be stood down from his position along with all the 5 Star R&Js and ITO Stoyanova due to pressure from the media.

5.10 Analysis of Bout and R&J Allocations at Rio

Detailed below is a summary of analytical findings relating to bouts and R&J allocation at the 2016 Rio Olympics. The purpose of this analysis was to review a sample of selected bouts to identify any potential patterns of R&J appointments that may substantiate or reject allegations of bout manipulation. The MIIT reviewed both oral and documentary evidence already made available to it as part of the Stage One of this investigation. Selected extracts of this material,

where relevant, have been used to assess whether the provided information is supported by the analysis.

The MIIT has only recently obtained³⁰ access to the electronic records which show the scores allocated to each bout by all 5 judges rather than the 3 scores randomly selected to identify the winner of each bout. As a result time constraints have prevented a complete analysis of the data and the MIIT is only able to release preliminary findings. If, upon further review, significant additional information considered relevant to this investigation is established through the MIIT'S ongoing analysis, it will be released as an addendum to this report at a later stage. To that end, given that the following analysis is not exhaustive, where names are mentioned within this section of the Report, no inference should be drawn that those mentioned were involved in corruption and bout manipulation unless otherwise stated.

Lastly, the MIIT will not comment on the scoring of particular bouts. It does not have the requisite professional boxing knowledge to make these assessments. It notes that R&Js require significant training, experience, and expertise in order to officiate at the Olympic Games.

³⁰The 5 scoring bout sheets were received on 22 September 2021 despite having been requested weeks earlier.

5.10.1 Background

A total of 273 bouts, of which 268 had a score, the others being either TKOs or withdrawals were held at Rio.³¹ These bouts were refereed and judged by a total of 36 AIBA accredited R&Js including seven 5 star and 29 3 star accredited R&Js.

5.10.2 Scoring System at Rio

AIBA operated a computerised scoring system at Rio. Upon the completion of the bout, each of the five judges would upload their score to the system. The automated computer system would subsequently select at random three out of the five scores. The three randomly selected scores would determine the winner of the bout.

According to the initial analysis of the bout sheets in which the scores for all 5 judges are listed, there were 65 split results. A split result occurs when all five judges are not unanimous. Of these 65 results, 11 bouts would have had a different winner had all 5 judges' scores been taken into consideration.³²

³¹ AIBA009 - Rio 2016 Boxing Results Book.

³² Bout Nos 42, 70, 71, 102, 166, 176, 178, 179, 183, 202 and 226.

5.10.3 2:1 split bout results where the winner would have changed had all 5 judge scores counted

The bout results detailed below have been obtained from the publicly available Rio Boxing Results Book. However, these only show the three scoring judges' results as selected by the automated system, not the total scores of all five judges. All of the bouts listed below when analysed against the bout sheets of all five judges, would have returned a different winner had all five scores had been considered.

Figure 3 – Publicly Available Split Bout Results

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------|---|-------------|--------------------------------|---------|
| 42 | 42 Preliminaries | Men's Light Fly (46-49kg) | RED BLUE | CARMONA HEREDIA Samuel BARNES Patrick | ESP IRL | RED WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: BRA | PAULA SOUZA Maroela | Judges: CHN | WANG Meng | 28:29 |
| | | | | | CAN | GERMAIN Tony | 29:28 |
| | | | | | KAZ | TSOY Natalya | -- |
| | | | | | ALG | SIDI YAKOUB Kheira | -- |
| | | | | | UZB | KURBANOV Jasurbek | 29:28 |
| 70 | 70 Preliminaries | Men's Middle (75kg) | RED BLUE | SEYI NTSENGUE Dieudonne Wilfred VIVAS Jorge Luis | CMR COL | RED WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: TUR | AYDIN Emre | Judges: KAZ | TSOY Natalya | 29:28 |
| | | | | | GBR | McFARLANE Daniel | 29:28 |
| | | | | | POL | GORNY Mariusz | -- |
| | | | | | FIN | ROOS Allan | -- |
| | | | | | RUS | MOROZOV Sergei | 27:30 |
| 71 | 71 Preliminaries | Men's Super Heavy (+91kg) | RED BLUE | CLAYTON Laurent Jr. PFEIFER Erik | ISV GER | RED WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: KAZ | RYSBAYEV Rakhymzhan | Judges: SRI | KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | 29:28 |
| | | | | | ALG | SIDI YAKOUB Kheira | 28:29 |
| | | | | | TPE | LIU Ming Li | -- |
| | | | | | UZB | KURBANOV Jasurbek | -- |
| | | | | | VIE | VUONG Trong Nghia | 30:27 |
| 102 | 102 Preliminaries | Men's Light Heavy (81kg) | RED BLUE | MINA Carlos Andres WARD Joseph | ECU IRL | RED WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: CHN | WANG Meng | Judges: GRE | BOUGIOUKAS Evangelos | 27:28 |
| | | | | | MAR | MOUDRIKAH Hassan | 28:27 |
| | | | | | CAN | GERMAIN Tony | -- |
| | | | | | TPE | LIU Ming Li | 28:27 |
| | | | | | UZB | KURBANOV Jasurbek | -- |
| 166 | 166 Preliminaries | Men's Fly (52kg) | RED BLUE | SERUGO Ronald ABGARYAN Narek | UGA ARM | BLUE WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: COL | CARBONELL ALVARADO Armando | Judges: SRI | KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | -- |
| | | | | | ARG | POGGI Gerardo | 29:28 |
| | | | | | CHN | WANG Meng | 28:29 |
| | | | | | BRA | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kennedy | 28:29 |
| | | | | | VIE | VUONG Trong Nghia | -- |
| 176 | 176 Preliminaries | Women's Middle (69-75kg) | RED BLUE | SHAKIMOVA Dariga FORTIN Ariane | KAZ CAN | RED WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: ITA | LICINI Enrico | Judges: MAR | MOUDRIKAH Hassan | 37:39 |
| | | | | | IRL | GALLAGHER Michael | -- |
| | | | | | DEN | BEDEMANN Claus | * 38:38 |
| | | | | | GRE | BOUGIOUKAS Evangelos | 39:37 |
| | | | | | TUR | AYDIN Emre | -- |
| 178 | 178 Preliminaries | Men's Bantam (56kg) | RED BLUE | BUTDEE Chatchai NIKITIN Vladimir | THA RUS | BLUE WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: COL | CARBONELL ALVARADO Armando | Judges: ARG | POGGI Gerardo | -- |
| | | | | | MAR | MOUDRIKAH Hassan | 28:29 |
| | | | | | CAN | GERMAIN Tony | 28:29 |
| | | | | | FRA | MADFOUA Fathi | -- |
| | | | | | VIE | VUONG Trong Nghia | 29:28 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------|---|-------------|------------------------------|----|---------|
| 179 | 179 Preliminaries | Men's Bantam (56kg) | RED BLUE | ASANAU Dzmitry ERDENEBAT Tsendbaatar | BLR MGL | BLUE | WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: BRA | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kennedy | Judges: CUB | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | | -- |
| | | | | | SRI | KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | | 29:28 |
| | | | | | ITA | LICINI Enrico | | 28:29 |
| | | | | | ALG | SIDI YAKOUB Kheira | | 28:29 |
| | | | | | ECU | CARRILLO Clemente | | -- |
| 183 | 183 Preliminaries | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | RED BLUE | BACHKOV Hovhannes HU Qianxun | ARM CHN | BLUE | WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: CUB | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | Judges: ALG | SIDI YAKOUB Kheira | | 29:28 |
| | | | | | ITA | LICINI Enrico | | 28:29 |
| | | | | | ARG | POGGI Gerardo | | -- |
| | | | | | ECU | CARRILLO Clemente | | 28:29 |
| | | | | | SRI | KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | | -- |
| 202 | 202 Quarterfinals | Women's Light (57-60kg) | RED BLUE | TAYLOR Katie POTKONEN Mira | IRL FIN | BLUE | WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: HUN | JUHASZ Roland | Judges: COL | CARBONELL ALVARADO Armando | | -- |
| | | | | | KAZ | RYSBAYEV Rakhymzhan | | -- |
| | | | | | UKR | KARAKULOV Mykola | | 39:37 |
| | | | | | ECU | CARRILLO Clemente | | 38:38 * |
| | | | | | VIE | VUONG Trong Nghia | | 37:39 |
| 226 | 226 Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | RED BLUE | GAIBNAZAROV Fazliddin RUSSELL Gary | UZB USA | RED | WP | 2:1 |
| | | | Referee: FRA | MADFOUA Fathi | Judges: HUN | JUHASZ Roland | | 29:28 |
| | | | | | LTU | BAGDANAVICIUS Kestutis | | 29:28 |
| | | | | | ITA | LICINI Enrico | | 28:29 |
| | | | | | SVK | JUST Rene | | -- |
| | | | | | SWE | NORDIN Stefan | | -- |

The MIIT has decided to reproduce the bout sheets for this split results below, mainly due to the fact that some have been widely reported in the press as subject to corruption amongst R&Js. While the possibility of corruption may exist, the MIIT found no evidence that the official automated scoring system was manipulated. The random selection of three out of the five scores ultimately decided the winner of these bouts.

Figure 4 – List of suspect bouts selected for review

| Bout | Date | Phase | Weight Category | Boxer RED corner | Nationality | Boxer BLUE corner | Nationality | Winner | No. | Official | Nationality | Result | Decision | Score 1 | Score 2 | Selected |
|------|------------|---------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|-----|-------------------------------|-------------|--------|----------|---------|---------|----------|
| 91 | 10/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | RUSSO Clemente | ITA | RED | R | BASI Mik [5*] | ITA | WP | 3:0 | | | |
| 91 | 10/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | RUSSO Clemente | ITA | RED | 1 | CARRILLO Clemente | ECU | | | 30 | 27 | X |
| 91 | 10/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | RUSSO Clemente | ITA | RED | 2 | KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | SRI | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 91 | 10/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | RUSSO Clemente | ITA | RED | 3 | BONET Jose | PUR | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 91 | 10/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | RUSSO Clemente | ITA | RED | 4 | VUONG Trong Nghia | VIE | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 91 | 10/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | RUSSO Clemente | ITA | RED | 5 | MOUDRIKAH Hassan | MAR | | | 30 | 27 | X |
| 160 | 13/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Super Heavy (+91kg) | ISHAISH Hussein | JOR | NISTOR Mihai | ROU | RED | R | POGGI Gerardo [5*] | ARG | WP | 2:1 | | | |
| 160 | 13/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Super Heavy (+91kg) | ISHAISH Hussein | JOR | NISTOR Mihai | ROU | RED | 1 | CARRILLO Clemente | ECU | | | 27 | 29 | |
| 160 | 13/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Super Heavy (+91kg) | ISHAISH Hussein | JOR | NISTOR Mihai | ROU | RED | 2 | LIU Ming Li | TPE | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 160 | 13/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Super Heavy (+91kg) | ISHAISH Hussein | JOR | NISTOR Mihai | ROU | RED | 3 | BONET Jose | PUR | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 160 | 13/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Super Heavy (+91kg) | ISHAISH Hussein | JOR | NISTOR Mihai | ROU | RED | 4 | MALYSHEV Vladislav [5*] | RUS | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 160 | 13/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Super Heavy (+91kg) | ISHAISH Hussein | JOR | NISTOR Mihai | ROU | RED | 5 | PAULA SOUZA Marcela | BRA | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 168 | 13/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Welter (69kg) | CISSOKHO Souleymane Diop | FRA | ARDEE Saylom | THA | RED | R | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | CUB | WP | 3:0 | | | |
| 168 | 13/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Welter (69kg) | CISSOKHO Souleymane Diop | FRA | ARDEE Saylom | THA | RED | 1 | CARBONELL ALVARADO Armand | COL | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 168 | 13/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Welter (69kg) | CISSOKHO Souleymane Diop | FRA | ARDEE Saylom | THA | RED | 2 | KURBANOV Jasurbek | UZB | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 168 | 13/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Welter (69kg) | CISSOKHO Souleymane Diop | FRA | ARDEE Saylom | THA | RED | 3 | CARRILLO Clemente | ECU | | | 30 | 27 | X |
| 168 | 13/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Welter (69kg) | CISSOKHO Souleymane Diop | FRA | ARDEE Saylom | THA | RED | 4 | JUST Rene | SVK | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 168 | 13/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Welter (69kg) | CISSOKHO Souleymane Diop | FRA | ARDEE Saylom | THA | RED | 5 | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kenned | BRA | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 176 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Women's Middle (69-75kg) | SHAKIMOVA Dariga | KAZ | FORTIN Ariane | CAN | RED | R | LICINI Enrico | ITA | WP | 2:1 | | | |
| 176 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Women's Middle (69-75kg) | SHAKIMOVA Dariga | KAZ | FORTIN Ariane | CAN | RED | 1 | MOUDRIKAH Hassan | MAR | | | 37 | 39 | X |
| 176 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Women's Middle (69-75kg) | SHAKIMOVA Dariga | KAZ | FORTIN Ariane | CAN | RED | 2 | GALLAGHER Michael [5*] | IRL | | | 37 | 39 | X |
| 176 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Women's Middle (69-75kg) | SHAKIMOVA Dariga | KAZ | FORTIN Ariane | CAN | RED | 3 | BEDEMANN Luce | DEN | | | 38 | 38 | X |
| 176 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Women's Middle (69-75kg) | SHAKIMOVA Dariga | KAZ | FORTIN Ariane | CAN | RED | 4 | BOUGIOUKAS Evangelos | GRE | | | 39 | 37 | X |
| 176 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Women's Middle (69-75kg) | SHAKIMOVA Dariga | KAZ | FORTIN Ariane | CAN | RED | 5 | AYDIN Emre | TUR | | | 37 | 39 | X |
| 178 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Bantam (56kg) | BUTDEE Chatchai | THA | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | R | CARBONELL ALVARADO Armand | COL | WP | 2:1 | | | |
| 178 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Bantam (56kg) | BUTDEE Chatchai | THA | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 1 | POGGI Gerardo [5*] | ARG | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 178 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Bantam (56kg) | BUTDEE Chatchai | THA | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 2 | MOUDRIKAH Hassan | MAR | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 178 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Bantam (56kg) | BUTDEE Chatchai | THA | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 3 | GERMAIN Tony | CAN | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 178 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Bantam (56kg) | BUTDEE Chatchai | THA | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 4 | MADFOUA Fathi | FRA | | | 30 | 27 | |
| 178 | 14/08/2016 | Preliminaries | Men's Bantam (56kg) | BUTDEE Chatchai | THA | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 5 | VUONG Trong Nghia | VIE | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | R | POGGI Gerardo [5*] | ARG | WP | 3:0 | | | |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 1 | CARRILLO Clemente | ECU | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 2 | VUONG Trong Nghia | VIE | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 3 | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | CUB | | | 28 | 29 | |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 4 | JUST Rene | SVK | | | 28 | 29 | |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 5 | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kenned | BRA | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 202 | 15/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Women's Light (57-60kg) | TAYLOR Katie | IRL | POTKONEN Mira | FIN | BLUE | R | JUHASZ Roland | HUN | WP | 2:1 | | | |
| 202 | 15/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Women's Light (57-60kg) | TAYLOR Katie | IRL | POTKONEN Mira | FIN | BLUE | 1 | CARBONELL ALVARADO Armand | COL | | | 39 | 37 | |
| 202 | 15/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Women's Light (57-60kg) | TAYLOR Katie | IRL | POTKONEN Mira | FIN | BLUE | 2 | RYSBAYEV Rakhymzhan [5*] | KAZ | | | 39 | 37 | |
| 202 | 15/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Women's Light (57-60kg) | TAYLOR Katie | IRL | POTKONEN Mira | FIN | BLUE | 3 | KARAKULOV Mykola | UKR | | | 39 | 37 | X |
| 202 | 15/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Women's Light (57-60kg) | TAYLOR Katie | IRL | POTKONEN Mira | FIN | BLUE | 4 | CARRILLO Clemente | ECU | | | 38 | 38 | X |
| 202 | 15/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Women's Light (57-60kg) | TAYLOR Katie | IRL | POTKONEN Mira | FIN | BLUE | 5 | VUONG Trong Nghia | VIE | | | 37 | 39 | X |
| 220 | 15/08/2016 | Final | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | LEVIT Vassily | KAZ | RED | R | POGGI Gerardo [5*] | ARG | WP | 3:0 | | | |
| 220 | 15/08/2016 | Final | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | LEVIT Vassily | KAZ | RED | 1 | GALLAGHER Michael [5*] | IRL | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 220 | 15/08/2016 | Final | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | LEVIT Vassily | KAZ | RED | 2 | CARBONELL ALVARADO Armand | COL | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 220 | 15/08/2016 | Final | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | LEVIT Vassily | KAZ | RED | 3 | SIDI YAKOUB Kheira [5*] | ALG | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 220 | 15/08/2016 | Final | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | LEVIT Vassily | KAZ | RED | 4 | VUONG Trong Nghia | VIE | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 220 | 15/08/2016 | Final | Men's Heavy (91kg) | TISHCHENKO Evgeny | RUS | LEVIT Vassily | KAZ | RED | 5 | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kenned | BRA | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 223 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Bantam (56kg) | CONLAN Michael John | IRL | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | R | SIDI YAKOUB Kheira [5*] | ALG | WP | 3:0 | | | |
| 223 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Bantam (56kg) | CONLAN Michael John | IRL | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 1 | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kenned | BRA | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 223 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Bantam (56kg) | CONLAN Michael John | IRL | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 2 | GERMAIN Tony | CAN | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 223 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Bantam (56kg) | CONLAN Michael John | IRL | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 3 | KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | SRI | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 223 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Bantam (56kg) | CONLAN Michael John | IRL | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 4 | VUONG Trong Nghia | VIE | | | 28 | 29 | |
| 223 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Bantam (56kg) | CONLAN Michael John | IRL | NIKITIN Vladimir | RUS | BLUE | 5 | GORNJ Mariusz [5*] | POL | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 226 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | GAIBNAZAROV Fazliddin | UZB | RUSSELL Gary | USA | RED | R | MADFOUA Fathi | FRA | WP | 2:1 | | | |
| 226 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | GAIBNAZAROV Fazliddin | UZB | RUSSELL Gary | USA | RED | 1 | JUHASZ Roland | HUN | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 226 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | GAIBNAZAROV Fazliddin | UZB | RUSSELL Gary | USA | RED | 2 | BAGDANAVICIUS Kestutis | LTU | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 226 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | GAIBNAZAROV Fazliddin | UZB | RUSSELL Gary | USA | RED | 3 | LICINI Enrico | ITA | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 226 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | GAIBNAZAROV Fazliddin | UZB | RUSSELL Gary | USA | RED | 4 | JUST Rene | SVK | | | 28 | 29 | |
| 226 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | GAIBNAZAROV Fazliddin | UZB | RUSSELL Gary | USA | RED | 5 | NORDIN Stefan | SWE | | | 28 | 29 | |
| 234 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | HARUTYUNYAN Artem | GER | GOZGEC Batuhan | TUR | RED | R | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | CUB | WP | 3:0 | | | |
| 234 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | HARUTYUNYAN Artem | GER | GOZGEC Batuhan | TUR | RED | 1 | CARBONELL ALVARADO Armand | COL | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 234 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | HARUTYUNYAN Artem | GER | GOZGEC Batuhan | TUR | RED | 2 | SIDI YAKOUB Kheira [5*] | ALG | | | 29 | 28 | |
| 234 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | HARUTYUNYAN Artem | GER | GOZGEC Batuhan | TUR | RED | 3 | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kenned | BRA | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 234 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | HARUTYUNYAN Artem | GER | GOZGEC Batuhan | TUR | RED | 4 | KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | SRI | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 234 | 16/08/2016 | Quarterfinals | Men's Light Welter (64kg) | HARUTYUNYAN Artem | GER | GOZGEC Batuhan | TUR | RED | 5 | VUONG Trong Nghia | VIE | | | 29 | 28 | X |
| 252 | 18/08/2016 | Semifinals | Women's Fly (48-51kg) | VALENCIA VICTORIA Ingrid Lorer | COL | OURAHMOUNE Sarah | FRA | BLUE | R | TSOY Natalya | KAZ | WP | 2:0 | | | |
| 252 | 18/08/2016 | Semifinals | Women's Fly (48-51kg) | VALENCIA VICTORIA Ingrid Lorer | COL | OURAHMOUNE Sarah | FRA | BLUE | 1 | VUONG Trong Nghia | VIE | | | 37 | 39 | |
| 252 | 18/08/2016 | Semifinals | Women's Fly (48-51kg) | VALENCIA VICTORIA Ingrid Lorer | COL | OURAHMOUNE Sarah | FRA | BLUE | 2 | LIU Ming Li | TPE | | | 39 | 37 | |
| 252 | 18/08/2016 | Semifinals | Women's Fly (48-51kg) | VALENCIA VICTORIA Ingrid Lorer | COL | OURAHMOUNE Sarah | FRA | BLUE | 3 | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | CUB | | | 38 | 38 | X |
| 252 | 18/08/2016 | Semifinals | Women's Fly (48-51kg) | VALENCIA VICTORIA Ingrid Lorer | COL | OURAHMOUNE Sarah | FRA | BLUE | 4 | JUHASZ Roland | HUN | | | 37 | 39 | X |
| 252 | 18/08/2016 | Semifinals | Women's Fly (48-51kg) | VALENCIA VICTORIA Ingrid Lorer | COL | OURAHMOUNE Sarah | FRA | BLUE | 5 | KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | SRI | | | 37 | 39 | X |
| 266 | 19/08/2016 | Final | Women's Light (57-60kg) | YIN Junhua | CHN | MOSSELY Estelle | FRA | BLUE | R | PAULA SOUZA Marcela | BRA | WP | 2:1 | | | |
| 266 | 19/08/2016 | Final | Women's Light (57-60kg) | YIN Junhua | CHN | MOSSELY Estelle | FRA | BLUE | 1 | GERMAIN Tony | CAN | | | 37 | 39 | |
| 266 | 19/08/2016 | Final | Women's Light (57-60kg) | YIN Junhua | CHN | MOSSELY Estelle | FRA | BLUE | 2 | CARRILLO Clemente | ECU | | | 39 | 37 | X |
| 266 | 19/08/2016 | Final | Women's Light (57-60kg) | YIN Junhua | CHN | MOSSELY Estelle | FRA | BLUE | 3 | BONET Jose | PUR | | | 38 | 38 | X |
| 266 | 19/08/2016 | Final | Women's Light (57-60kg) | YIN Junhua | CHN | MOSSELY Estelle | FRA | BLUE | 4 | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | CUB | | | 37 | 39 | |

5.10.4 How the MIIT Selected Bouts for Analysis

During the course of this investigation, the MIIT was advised by a wide array of individuals with knowledge of the sport what the potentially suspicious bout results at Rio were. These individuals have included senior AIBA associated personnel, as well as independent external sources (including investigative journalists), with no obvious allegiance to any particular country or boxer. The selected bouts detailed in Figure 6 is based on bouts identified by these sources.

It is an accepted fact that due to the subjective nature of officiating a bout, results will occasionally, and for a number of reasons, be the subject of criticism. The MIIT makes no assessment on the scoring of these bouts. It has however identified a small sample of bouts based on the advice of experts in the sport across which to conduct the analysis. The selection is not exhaustive and there are undoubtedly other suspicious bout results, about which the MIIT is unaware. Most of the bouts which received significant media attention towards the end of the Rio games are included within this list above.

5.10.5 Results Analysis

Out of the fifteen selected bouts the four highlighted in red in the final column were not considered for additional analysis. Although they had the potential to have been manipulated, given that the results of all five judges shows that the winner would have been different had all five scores been taken into account. The failure of these boxers to progress within the competition is therefore explained as a fault in the three out of five scoring system applied at Rio, rather than predetermined manipulation of the bout results.

The X in the far-right column of the spreadsheets above identifies the judges and the scores that counted towards the bout result. Those left blank are non-scoring judge results.

The boxes highlighted in yellow (also on the far right of the spreadsheet) identify bouts where two or more judges scored a 2 or more point range difference between the competitors over the course of the bout. This is potentially significant as it shows a disparity across the judging range and hence leads to accusations of a lack of professionalism and potential allegations of corruption within the ranks of the R&Js.

Confidential witnesses have stated that in the early years after the creation of the 5 star program, the 5 star R&Js directed 3 stars to score for a selected corner (i.e.. blue or red) using a signalling system in order to assure parity in the scoring, in what the MIIT has termed “noble cause corruption.” Under the three from five scoring, 4 judges would need to have been corrupted to ensure a desired outcome was achieved; however, in most cases, 3 would probably have sufficed under random selection, but this would still leave open the possibility that a favoured boxer may lose.

5.11 Review of R&J allocation to suspicious bouts


The aim of this review was to identify any obvious patterns of R&J appointment to these bouts, which would be considered outside the norm of what is expected. The MIIT in its was conscious of the total number of officials available and the requirement to maintain neutrality as the competition progressed. The selection of R&Js to bouts was the duty of the Draw Commission.

The MIIT accepts that the Draw Commission often has a difficult job in finding the right balance of R&J appointments to specific bouts. It is not an exact science and many factors are considered. The charts and subsequent analysis should therefore be considered as only an illustration of activity, and limited weight placed upon any findings.

The MIIT first selected a sample of the alleged suspicious bouts listed in Figure 6 for examination along with additional bouts associated with the controversial winner. The MIIT analysed bouts of the winner starting at the preliminary rounds until the particular boxer reached the end of his/her competition. For example in the case of Hussein Ishaish (JOR) v Mihai Nistor (ROU), this has been linked to the Tony Yoka bouts analysis, as allegations persist that this bout was fixed, in order to allow Yoka an easier passage through to the medal rounds. Subsequent to identifying these associated bouts, the MIIT examined the R&Js appointed to officiate in each thereof.

5.11.1 Evgeny Tishchenko (RUS) Bouts and associated R&Js

Figure 5 – Tishchenko Bouts i2 Chart



Key R&J appointment patterns

- A different 5 star was appointed as referee to each of the medal rounds in the Tishchenko bouts (quarter final, semi final, QF, SF and final).
- The quarter final had one 5 star R&J appointed [Basi (GBR) Referee (R)].
- The semi final had two 5 star R&Js appointed [Górny (POL) (R) and Sidi Yakoub (MAR)].
- The final had three 5 star R&Js appointed [Poggi (R), Sidi Yakoub (MAR) and Gallagher (IRE)]. This was the only bout during the whole tournament at which three 5 stars R&J were appointed to officiate.

- 3 star R&Js Kiridena (SRI) and Carrillo (ECU) were both appointed in the preliminary and quarter final rounds.
- 3 star R&Js Carbonell Alvarado (COL) and Silva Do Rosario (BRA) were each appointed in both the semi final and final rounds.
-


Analysis of 5 Judge Scoring Results

Analysis of the 5 judge scores across the range of bouts does not provide any obvious patterns of R&J appointments. Tishchenko won all of his four bouts by a 5:0 margin. The closest bout was the contentious final against Levit, where all five judges awarded the win to Tishchenko 29 to 28. During this bout, Gallagher and Carbonell Alvarado both awarded the first round to Levit, as did Vuong Trong and Silva Do Rosario in the third round. The second round was a unanimous 5:0 win for Tishchenko.

5.11.2 Vladimir Nikitin (RUS) Bouts and associated R&Js

Nikitin retired on medical grounds following his bout with Conlon and did not contest the semi-final.

Figure 6– Nikitin i2 Chart



Key R&J appointment patterns

- Despite the limited use of the senior R&Js, Poggi, a 5 star R&J, was appointed as a judge in both of the Nikitin preliminary rounds.
- Two 5 Star R&Js were appointed for the Conlon quarter final bout (Sidi Yakoub (R) and Gorny), with the later scoring in favour of Nikitin in his bout against Conlon.
- It has been stated that the 5 star referee (Sidi Yakoub) went out of her way to protect Nikitin from further injury during this bout, which would have forced the contest to be halted.
- Carbonell Alvarado (COL) was appointed as a judge/referee in both preliminary rounds and scored in favour of Nikitin as a judge in the first bout.

- Vuong Trong (VTN) was appointed as a judge in all three bouts that Nikitin contested, scoring in favour of the Russian on two occasions and against him once (versus Butdee).
- Germain (CAN) was appointed as a judge in both the second preliminary and the quarter final bouts and voted for a different boxer on each occasion (Conlon in the quarter final).
- Kiridena (SRI) and Silva Do Rosario (BRA) only officiated in the contentious Conlon bout, with both scoring in favour of Nikitin.

5 Judge scoring results


Nikitin, having comfortably negotiated his first preliminary round with a 5:0 points victory, had potentially his most difficult bout in the second preliminary against Chatchai Butdee, which he won 2:1 under the 3 from 5 judge system, but would have lost 3:2 if all 5 judges' scores had counted. Germain (CAN) and Moudrikah (MAR) were the only two judges that voted in his favour in this bout while Poggi (5 star), Vuong Trong (VIE) and Madfoua (FRA) voted for Butdee, with the latter giving all 3 rounds to the Thai.

Nikitin won the contentious bout against Conlon 3:0 on points but would have won 4:1 under a 5 judge scoring system. Only Germain (CAN) gave the bout to Conlon in what was a close match, with only 1 point separating the scores across the judging range.

As stated previously, 4 judges would be required to vote in favour of a particular boxer in order to ensure that he/she was the winner. This was the case in the Conlon fight, and may indicate that the result had been predetermined.

5.11.3 Tony Yoka Bouts (FRA) - Including Hussein Ishaish (JOR) v Mihai Nistor (ROM) Bout and associated R&Js

Figure 7 – Yoka i2 Chart



Key R&J appointment patterns

- No 5 star R&Js were appointed to any of the Yoka bouts, although it should be noted that they had already been stood down from their duties prior to the semi finals.
- A wide range of 3 star R&Js were used across Yoka's four bouts, with no significant patterns emerging.
- Del Puerto Trueba (CUB) officiated on 3 occasions (excluding the final), all of which he scored in favour of Yoka.
- Karakulov (UKR) also officiated as a judge on 3 occasions. In the quarter final and semi final bouts he scored in favour of Yoka, whilst in the final he gave the win to Joyce.
- Carbonell Alvarado (Col) was appointed as a judge in both the quarter final and semi final rounds and again scored in favour of Yoka.
- Bedemann (DEN) was appointed as a judge twice and scored in favour of a different boxer on each occasion.

5.11.4 Bout linked to Yoka Ishaish v Nistor

This bout, which has been linked to Yoka for allegedly providing him with an easy path to the medals, was a close fought bout according to the scoring. However, according to a number of commentators, this bout was more one sided than the score suggests, to the extent that the win should actually have gone to Nistor (the eventual loser) by a larger margin.

For a preliminary round it is interesting that two 5 star R&Js were appointed to this bout, one being Poggi (ARG) as referee and the other Malyshev (RUS), the latter scoring in favour of the alleged suspect winner Ishaish (JOR). Paula Souza (BRA) and Bonet (PUR) also scored in favour of Ishaish, whilst Liu (TPE) and Carrillo (ECU) scored for his opponent, Nistor. Carrillo gave the biggest margin in the bout in favour of the loser Nistor (27:29).

Only Bonet (PUR) and Carrillo (ECU) were appointed as R&Js to the Yoka bouts and the Ishaish v Nistor bout, with Bonet scoring on all three occasions in favour of Yoka and Ishaish (winners), whilst Carrillo scored for both Yoka and Nistor (loser).

5 Judge scoring results

Yoka made relatively straightforward progress to the semi-finals (winning 5:0 on both occasions), only dropping two points in the preliminary and quarter final rounds, the latter being against Hussein Ishaish, the victor in the contentious bout against Mihai Nistor. While there is no evidence to prove this, the ease in which Yoka overcame Ishaish, according to the scoring, may well support the allegations that the bout against Nistor was manipulated to ensure that Yoka had an easier passage through to the semi-final round.

Yoka won his semi-final against Hrgovic (CRO) 2:1 on points (4:1 with all 5 judges scores) with only Bedemann (DEN) scoring against him.


According to the bout sheets, the final against Joyce (GBR) was a much closer contest, with Yoka again winning 2:1 on points (but only 3:2 on points if all 5 judges' scores were counted). This means that the result would not have been assured in favour of Yoka, and could have been reversed, had different judges' scores have been picked under the random selection process. Emre Aydin (TUR), providing the biggest margin in favour of Yoka (30:27).

5.11.5 Sofiane Oumiha (FRA) - Bouts and associated R&Js

This boxer's bouts have been selected for analysis as a second representative sample of French bouts due to a number of concerns being raised that France achieved a disproportionate number of medals at Rio than would otherwise would have been expected. This has been alleged, at least in part, to the possible favouritism bestowed on the French team by Executive Director Karim Bouzidi, a French national.

This particular analysis also reviews the bout between Sofiane Oumiha and Otgondalai Dorjnyambuu (MGL), which is detailed in a separate section of this Chapter.

Figure 8 - Oumiha i2 Chart



Key R&J appointment patterns

- 5 star judges were appointed to officiate in 3 out of the 4 bouts contested by Oumiha.
- Malyshev was appointed as a judge in the first preliminary round, whilst Poggi and Gorny were judges in the quarter finals. On all occasions, the 5 stars scored in favour of Oumiha.
- Poggi was appointed as a judge in the semi-final against Otgondalai Dorjnyambuu (MGL), which has been reported earlier in relation to a \$250,000 bribery attempt to fix the bout.
- The only bout in which a 5 star was not appointed was the second preliminary bout against Amnat Ruenroeng (THA), which resulted in a TKO in round 3.

- Silva Do Rosario (BRA) officiated in 3 of the 4 bouts (including the semi-final bout against Dorjnyambuu), scoring in favour of Oumiha on all 3 occasions.
- Carrillo (ECU) also officiated as a judge in 3 out of 4 bouts, scoring in favour of Oumiha in 2 out of 3 occasions, including the semi-final bout against Dorjnyambuu.
- Vuong Trong (preliminary 1 and semi-final), Del Puerto Trueba (preliminary 2 and semi-final) and Meng Wang (preliminary 1 and quarter final) were all appointed twice to Oumiha bouts, and scored in his favour on all occasions.

5 Judge scoring results

Sofiane Oumiha had a straightforward passage to the final, winning all of his bouts 3:0 (5:0 when all judges' scores are taken into account), with the exception of the quarter final against Albert Selimov (AZE), which he won 4:1, when all 5 judges' scores are taken into account.

Oumiha was beaten 3:0 on points (5:0) in the final by Robson Conceicao, a boxer representing the host country Brazil.

The semi-final bout between and the Mongolian boxer Dorjnyambuu, which was the subject of the alleged bribery attempt, does stand out amongst the other scores in that all 5 judges produced a 28:29 win for Oumiha.

Figure 7 – Oumiha v Dorjnyambuu - 5 Judge scores spreadsheet

| Bout | Date | Phase | Weight Category | Boxer RED corner | Nationality | Boxer BLUE corner | Nationality | Winner | No. | Official | Nationality | Result | Decision | Score 1 | Score 2 | Selected |
|------|------------|------------|--------------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|-----|-------------------------------|-------------|--------|----------|---------|---------|----------|
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | R | POGGI Gerardo [5*] | ARG | WP | 3:0 | | | |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 1 | CARRILLO Clemente | ECU | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 2 | VUONG Trong Nghia | VIE | | | 28 | 29 | X |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 3 | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | CUB | | | 28 | 29 | |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 4 | JUST Rene | SVK | | | 28 | 29 | |
| 195 | 14/08/2016 | Semifinals | Men's Light (60kg) | DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai | MGL | OUMIHA Sofiane | FRA | BLUE | 5 | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kenned | BRA | | | 28 | 29 | X |

The other bouts which Oumiha contested have, as would be expected, a range of scores, while this one suggests that it may have been pre-determined, since all the scores across the three rounds being marked in exactly the same way by all five judges. The MIIT has been advised by its witnesses that consistent scores across all five judges is rare. It would not have taken much to reverse the scores on this close but decisive win for Oumiha, had the Mongolian Federation agreed to pay the requested bribe, detailed below.

Figure 9 – Bout 195 – Official bout sheet – 5 Judges

| | |
|---|--|
| Bout 195 | |
| <p><u>RED CORNER</u></p> <p>DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai (MGL)</p> | <p><u>BLUE CORNER</u></p> <p>OUMIHA Sofiane (FRA)</p> |

Winner: OUMIHA Sofiane (FRA) BLUE WP 3:0

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Referee: | Judges: | | | | |
| POGGI Gerardo (ARG) | CARRILLO Clemente (ECU) | VUONG Trong Nghia (VIE) | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose (CUB) | JUST Rene (SVK) | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kennedy (BRA) |

| | Judge 1 | Judge 2 | Judge 3 | Judge 4 | Judge 5 | W | KD |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---|----|
| ROUND 1 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | | |
| ROUND 2 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | | |
| ROUND 3 | 10:9 | 10:9 | 10:9 | 10:9 | 10:9 | | |
| TOTAL | 28:29 | 28:29 | 28:29 | 28:29 | 28:29 | | |

Further review of this bout may be warranted. There are several reasons why after getting through to the semi-final it was decided to sacrifice Oumiha. One reason explained to the MIIT could have been to allow the hosts country, Brazil, to win a gold medal.

It is clear to the MIIT that the bribery attempt, if successful, would have seen Oumiha lose in the semi-final, so his path to gold medal had clearly not been predetermined.

5.12 R&Js of questionable skill appointed to Rio

During the phase One investigation, it has come to the attention of the MIIT that concerns were raised over the ethics and ability of certain R&Js and ITOs that were still selected to attend Rio. Witnesses have alleged that these individuals were deliberately selected as they were either corrupt or malleable to the will of Bouzidi and the 5 stars, and who controlled the selection process.

The MIIT has conducted a review of the R&Js named and their allocation to bouts. This does not necessarily imply any allegation of wrongdoing. In addition to those examples detailed below, other individuals have been named by confidential witnesses as being involved in the bout manipulation process either willingly or under pressure. The MIIT notes that many witnesses were reluctant to provide formal evidence and, as a result, these have not been subjected to any specific analytical assessment.

1. Pat Fiacco report to CK Wu on Corruption at Doha and other incidents³³

In his email report to CK Wu after the Rio Olympics, Fiacco details his concerns raised at the Doha Olympic qualifier about “signalling” by Tony Germain (CAN). Despite these concerns being raised with Bouzidi, either no investigation was conducted, or no evidence was found to substantiate the accusation and Germain was appointed to Rio.

2. Franco Falcinelli report to CK Wu after Euro Qualifier in Samsun Turkey³⁴

Following the European Olympic qualifier held in Samsun, Turkey, in April 2016, Franco Falcinelli sent an email report to CK Wu voicing his concerns regarding the quality of some of the R&Js officiating at the tournament.

Those not up to Olympic Standard were listed by Falcinelli as:

- Aydin Emre (TUR)
- Carrillo Clemente (ECU)
- Jasurbek Kurbanov (UZB)
- Trong Vuong Nghia (VIE)

Those involved in the most 2:1 Split decisions (effectively assessed as not judging to standard) were:

- Cho Jung Sook, (KOR)
- Khas Erdene Khishgee, (MGL)

³³ AIBA 116b – Fiacco - post Rio email to CK Wu explaining Doha and other incidents concerning Bouzidi and corruption.

³⁴ AIBA149b – Falcinelli report to CK Wu.

- Udeni Tilak Pandara Kiridena, (SRI)
- Aydin Emre (TUR) – as above

Of those seven R&Js about whom Falcinelli raised his concerns, only Cho Jung Sook was not appointed for Rio; the remaining were selected. Their selection was all the more interesting due to the fact that the President in his email response to Falcinelli, had agreed with the concerns he raised and tasked Bouzidi to investigate and make immediate changes. This failure to act on the concerns raised by Falcinelli and Fiacco was due to the fact that selected R&Js who were either corrupt or would succumb to pressure, were needed at Rio in order to ensure that the outcome of predetermined bouts was achieved.

“Dear Karim, I receive a very good report from Franco regarding European qualify event. He made very good recommendation for changes, particularly R/J. I also strongly feel there exist group in R/J which needs our immediate action to change.”³⁵

Below is an assessment of a sample of 3 star R&Js mentioned above and how they were appointed to bouts which have been labelled as contentious.

3. Vuong Trong Nghia (Vietnam)

Nghia was identified by Franco Falcinelli as an R&J who was not up to Olympic officiating standards. Despite this, he officiated as an R&J on 87 occasions, more than any other R&J.

³⁵ AIBA149a – Wu email (string) to Bouzidi re Falcinelli’s report.

Having been appointed in 3 of the 4 Tishchenko bouts, including the final, which received widespread criticism amidst allegation of corruption, he was then appointed the following day to judge in the Nikitin v Conlon bout. This bout also achieved notoriety amidst allegations of corruption and caused the effective suspension of the 5 star R&Js, the Executive Director Karim Bouzidi, and Draw Commission member Stela Stoyanova.

Vuong Trong also officiated in 6 bouts relating to French boxers, the results of which some commentators, including the President, believed to be suspicious. One of these was the Otgondalai Dorjnyambuu (MGL) vs Sofiane Oumiha (FRA) semi-final bout which was the subject of the bribe attempt referred to at the end of this Chapter.

4. Kiridena Udeni Talik Bandara (SRI)

Kiridena, the R&J from Sri Lanka, was the second most used R&J in the tournament after Vuong Trong, officiating in 85 bouts. He was criticised by Falcinelli as being involved in some of the largest proportion of split bouts at the European Olympic qualifier, in effect stating that his judging was not up to the required standard to officiate at the Olympic Games.

Kiridena was involved in the following bouts where concerns have been raised as to the legitimacy of the results:

- Tishchenko (RUS) vs Russo (ITA) quarter final.
- Dorjnyambuu (MGL) vs Oumiha (FRA) - the semi-final bout which was the subject of the alleged bribery attempt.

- Yoka (FRA) vs Joyce (GBR) final.
- Ishaish (JOR) vs Nistor (ROU) preliminary. This bout is widely alleged as having manipulated to allow Tony Yoka and easier passage through to the medal rounds.

5. GermainTony (CAN)

Germain was the fourth most used R&J in the Rio competition, officiating at 64 bouts. He was reported by Pat Fiacco for “signalling” to other judges on how to score during the 2015 World Championships in Doha, Qatar.

Germain was involved in the following allegedly contentious bouts:

- Butdee (THA) vs Nikitin (RUS). Whilst victory in this bout would have gone to Butdee if all 5 judges’ scores had counted, many commentators believe that this was an easy win for Butdee and should not have gone to a split decision. Germain scored in favour of Nikitin during this bout.
- Conlon vs Nikitin. Germain was a judge in this bout, the result of which led to the ultimate demise of the 5 star cadre.

6.Carrillo Clemente (ECU)

Carrillo was another R&J reported by Falcinelli to Wu as being below Olympic officiating standard. He is eighth on the list of most appointed R&Js, being used on 56 occasions.

Like the others above, he has been involved in a number of bouts where the results have been called into question:

- Tishchenko (RUS) vs Russo (ITA) quarter final.
- Yoka (FRA) vs Joyce (GBR) final.
- Dorjnyambuu (MGL) vs Oumiha (FRA) semi-final.
- Ishaish (JOR) vs Nistor (ROU) preliminary.

Figure 11 - Analysis of R&J allocation across all bouts

| Official | | Total Bouts | | | Judge #1 | | Judge #2 | | Judge #3 | | Judge #4 | | Judge #5 | | Judge Results used | |
|--|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|------------|---------------|------------|---------------|------------|---------------|------------|---------------|------------|--------------------|------------|
| Name | Nationality | Referee | Judge | ALL | Position | Result | Position | Result | Position | Result | Position | Result | Position | Result | Selected | % |
| VUONG Trong Nghia | Vietnam | 12 | 75 | 87 | 12 | 7 | 16 | 9 | 12 | 10 | 14 | 10 | 21 | 12 | 48 | 64% |
| KIRIDENA Udeni Talik Bandara | Sri Lanka | 6 | 79 | 85 | 12 | 2 | 21 | 14 | 16 | 6 | 18 | 10 | 12 | 7 | 39 | 49% |
| MOUDRIKAH Hassan | Morocco | 11 | 66 | 77 | 7 | 3 | 16 | 13 | 22 | 16 | 11 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 43 | 65% |
| GERMAIN Tony | Canada | 12 | 52 | 64 | 5 | 3 | 14 | 9 | 14 | 10 | 9 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 32 | 62% |
| CARBONELL ALVARADO Armando | Colombia | 7 | 56 | 63 | 13 | 3 | 14 | 7 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 10 | 6 | 27 | 48% |
| SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kennedy | Brazil | 14 | 48 | 62 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 11 | 6 | 11 | 8 | 29 | 60% |
| DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose | Cuba | 12 | 50 | 62 | 11 | 4 | 9 | 6 | 12 | 8 | 11 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 28 | 56% |
| CARRILLO Clemente | Ecuador | 6 | 50 | 56 | 12 | 7 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 37 | 74% |
| JUHASZ Roland | Hungary | 8 | 45 | 53 | 11 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 13 | 8 | 11 | 6 | 28 | 62% |
| NORDIN Stefan | Sweden | 7 | 45 | 52 | 8 | 5 | 11 | 5 | 14 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 3 | 23 | 51% |
| SIDI YAKOUB Kheira [5*] | Algeria | 10 | 42 | 52 | 12 | 5 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 24 | 57% |
| BEDEMANN Claus | Denmark | 6 | 45 | 51 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 4 | 10 | 7 | 9 | 2 | 11 | 6 | 24 | 53% |
| BONET Jose | Puerto Rico | 4 | 44 | 48 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 12 | 10 | 25 | 57% |
| BOUGIOUKAS Evangelos | Greece | 6 | 41 | 47 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 22 | 54% |
| MADFOUA Fathi | France | 7 | 40 | 47 | 17 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 18 | 45% |
| POGGI Gerardo [5*] | Argentina | 11 | 35 | 46 | 10 | 6 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 21 | 60% |
| AYDIN Emre | Turkey | 5 | 40 | 45 | 5 | 2 | 13 | 9 | 10 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 24 | 60% |
| LICINI Enrico | Italy | 7 | 38 | 45 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 13 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 22 | 58% |
| TSOY Natalya | Kazakhstan | 10 | 31 | 41 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 17 | 55% |
| McFARLANE Daniel | Great Britain | 7 | 32 | 39 | 9 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 10 | 4 | 18 | 56% |
| JUST Rene | Slovakia | 7 | 32 | 39 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 11 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 22 | 69% |
| PAULA SOUZA Marcela | Brazil | 7 | 31 | 38 | 9 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 18 | 58% |
| WANG Meng | China | 5 | 33 | 38 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 9 | 5 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 24 | 73% |
| ROOS Allan | Finland | 6 | 31 | 37 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 20 | 65% |
| KURBANOV Jasurbek | Uzbekistan | 6 | 30 | 36 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 18 | 60% |
| KHISHGEE Khas-Erdene | Mongolia | 4 | 28 | 32 | 3 | | 5 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 17 | 61% |
| RYSBAYEV Rakhymzhan [5*] | Kazakhstan | 10 | 22 | 32 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 3 | | | 6 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 13 | 59% |
| LIU Ming Li | Chinese Taipei | 6 | 26 | 32 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 13 | 50% |
| GORNY Mariusz [5*] | Poland | 6 | 25 | 31 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 18 | 72% |
| KARAKULOV Mykola | Ukraine | 5 | 24 | 29 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 17 | 71% |
| GALLAGHER Michael [5*] | Ireland | 8 | 21 | 29 | 12 | 7 | 1 | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 12 | 57% |
| BAGDANAVICIUS Kestutis | Lithuania | 6 | 21 | 27 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 12 | 57% |
| BASI Mik [5*] | Great Britain | 7 | 18 | 25 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 50% |
| HUSEYNOV Rovshan | Azerbaijan | 5 | 20 | 25 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | | | 7 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 12 | 60% |
| MOROZOV Sergei | Russian Federation | 6 | 14 | 20 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 9 | 64% |
| MALYSHEV Vladislav [5*] | Russian Federation | 6 | 10 | 16 | 2 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 30% |
| TOTALS | | 268 | 1340 | 1608 | 268 | 142 | 268 | 167 | 268 | 158 | 268 | 158 | 268 | 161 | 786 | 59% |
| Percentage of results selected by | | | | | 52.99% | | 62.31% | | 58.96% | | 58.96% | | 60.07% | | | |

The analytical chart above (Figure 11) lists all 36 R&Js who attended the Rio 2016 Olympic Games, along with the total number of bouts they were involved in, either as a referee or judge. It also shows the number of occasions that each R&J occupied a certain judge position and how often (in number and overall percentage) a particular judge's score counted under the 3 from 5 judge scoring criteria.

The bottom row of the chart also identifies the percentage of times that a certain judge's position (1-5) was selected as a counting score by the automated system. It should be reiterated at this stage that there has been no information uncovered to suggest that any concerns exist regarding the automated selection process and its associated systems.

As can be seen on the bottom row of Figure 7, judge positions 2-5 have a similar percentage between 59% and 60%, whilst judge position 1 was randomly selected less often at only 53%. It is unclear why this anomaly occurred or whether it is relevant, as there is no comparable data available.

Figure 12 – Layout of Field of Play (FOP)³⁶

3.2. BOXING AREA AND OFFICIATING

3.2.1. Field of Play (FOP)

FOP Set Up – One Ring



³⁶ AIBA102 - AIBA R&J MANUAL_Draft 2015_Latest version-.

5.13 The 250,000 Bribery Attempt

Throughout this chapter the MIIT has described the systemic issues related to manipulation of bouts, those involved and the process by which it occurred at Rio. It became evident, however, that it was not the only way that bouts were being fixed. An external system also existed in parallel where direct approaches were made by or to the R&Js to manipulate bouts in exchange for money. While the MIIT was unable to determine with certainty who was responsible for incentivising the manipulation of bouts within the internal system, the following example of a direct bribery attempt is illustrative of money being used as an incentive to manipulate the results.

The bribery attempt was made in relation to the men's lightweight 60 kgs category semi-final bout held on 14 August 2016 between Otgondalai Dorjnyambuu (MGL) and Sofiane Oumiha (FRA). It involved an offer of money in exchange for ensuring a Mongolian victory. This would have secured the Mongolian a clear path to the gold medal bout and it appeared to involve significant sums of money, in the range of US\$100,000 - US\$250,000. Whilst the principal witnesses offer two contradicting versions of events related to who initiated the bribery attempt, i.e. the R&J or the national federation, the parties involved both agree to the fact that a bribe was offered to manipulate the bout and that it involved Rakhymzhan Rysbayev, the 5 star R&J from Kazakhstan. Based on the evidence available to the MIIT, including witness evidence and a voice recording of a conversation held between the Mongolian Boxing Federation's team

delegate and the 5 star R&J Rysbaev, the MIIT accepts the version of events as proposed by the witness.³⁷

The bribery approach generally unfolded as follows. At some point prior to the semi-final bout, a threat was made by the 5 star Rysbaev to the Mongolian Federation. According to Mongolian Federation's team delegate he understood that the R&J *"get[s] the money. If not, then your boxer loses. Before [the fight] they said that: Your boxer loses. If [you] don't give the money, then your boxer loses."* The bribe amount, to which the witnesses had differing recollections, which was somewhere in between US\$100,000 to US\$250,000, had to be paid in cash to Rysbayev prior to the start of the semi-final bout if they wanted their boxer to proceed to the next round. The witness from the Mongolian Federation went on to say that if they did not pay, then Rysbayev threatened to make sure that he, Khishgee (the Mongolian 3 star R&J) and the entire Mongolian boxing team would be sent back to Mongolia.

The Mongolian witness stated that even if they wanted to pay a bribe (as bringing back medals to the country would mean prestige for the Federation), they did not have any money to pay such a bribe. The day before the semi-final bout, the Mongolian witness passed Rysbayev's bribe "threat" to Bat Erdene, the President of the Mongolian Boxing Association, who refused to pay. *"He was a hugely rich man. He had a heart for boxing. But he also heard this sum and then he*

³⁷ Both 5 star Judges Rakhymzhan Rysbayev from Kazakhstan and Vladislav Malyshev from Russia were interviewed in relation to this incident. Both recounted a similar chronology of events. Primarily that the request was made by Khishgee (the 3 star R&J from Mongolia) on behalf of the Mongolian Federation and that Rysbayev rejected the bribe. They both stated that they spoke to Kishigee and because he was a "good chap", they would just leave it at that. Given the evidence assessed by the MIIT, it finds that their version of the incident not credible.

had shock, right? This is not possible. I cannot pay such a sum for my country, yes? For bribe or something. I cannot." Through Khishgee, the Mongolian Federation communicated to Rysbaev that they rejected the bribe offer.

Sometime after this, the recording of a telephone conversation between Rysbayev and the Mongolian witness, believed to be on 13 August 2016, was made available to the MIIT. On the call, Rysbaev was furious that the deal might fall through and the witness reiterated to gain confirmation "*[t]omorrow or tonight if we don't give [money] then tomorrow our boxer will lose this, yes?*" The Mongolian witness began recording the conversation part way through this call, as protection in case Rysbayev went through with the threat to send all of the Mongolian team home if the bribe was not forthcoming.

The MIIT is in possession of this recording. Whilst it was professionally enhanced and translated, it is in Russian and does not directly relate to the bribe itself; it does however support the confidential witness's version of events in relation to Rysbayev's threat to send home the Mongolian team if the bribe is not paid. Excerpts from the conversation, which show Rysbayev in a state of anger, are reproduced below.³⁸

Rysbayev: *It's not what we've agreed on.... You fucking explain to your ... (inaudible profanity), if he fucking drinks, let ... (inaudible) the fuck...(inaudible) ... we will fucking evict... (inaudible) him ... and ... you, everyone, Mongugli (likely plural derogative for Mongolians), and your judge-ster (either derogative or corrupt word for judge/referee) ... (inaudible).*

³⁸ AIBA120c1 Translation from Russian to English of the recorded conversation between the third party and Rysbayev.

Third Party: *“He is meeting Karimov tomorrow. He doesn’t believe us. What are we going to do, what?”*

Rysbayev: *“We, with this your... (inaudible), we negotiat[ed?] ... (inaudible) with him ... (inaudible). So don’t talk fucking shit, you ... (inaudible) - You don't ... (inaudible).”*

Third Party: *“He will meet with Karimov tomorrow. He himself, he does not believe us, because I told him he had to [give/put pressure]* today. It is necessary to [give/put pressure]* today I told him. He wants to meet with Karimov today, in the evening.”³⁹*

Rysbayev: *“He, if he talks to him on this subject, you ... (inaudible), I promise ... (inaudible), I will ... (inaudible)... he's flying home”**.⁴⁰*

Third Party: *“Who?”*

Rysbayev: *“We’ve sent him home ... We’ve sent him home** ... (inaudible) and the boxers will be fucking flying out next” **.*

Third Party: *“Who flies home?”*

Call Cuts off

The Mongolian witness explained to the MIIT that during this call he asked, *“This means he is bigger than IOC, yes? [...] I also said: Are you crazy? Are you/are you boss of the IOC? I also told him so. Are you the boss of the Olympic Committee or what? This is impossible.”*

³⁹ * Denotes non-existent word in Russian or a non-native speaker’s corrupted version of either ‘give something to someone’ or ‘to put pressure on’.

⁴⁰ ** ‘flying home’, ‘sent him home’ and ‘will be flying out’ may have underlying meanings: e.g. ‘sent packing’ and ‘get kicked out of/fail out of/get thrown out of’ respectively.

The bribe was ultimately not paid and, as a result, the Mongolian boxer, as threatened by Rysbayev, lost the semi-final bout 3:0 on the judges' scoring. Whilst the MIIT does not make any judgement on the validity of the result itself, it notes that the Mongolian witness was adamant that the Mongolian boxer had clearly won on his own merits. The bout sheet for this bout was reviewed by the MIIT and shows it was a close bout, but that the Frenchman had won 5-0. Of significance is that the scores of all the 5 judges are marked exactly the same across all three rounds. This is very unusual scoring, especially for such a close bout. This suggests a strong possibility that the bout result had in fact been fixed in advance and the R&Js told how they should score each round. A copy of the relevant bout sheet is attached below for illustration. Following the bout, as Rysbayev had threatened, the Mongolian was sent home.

Bout 195

RED CORNER
DORJNYAMBUU Otgondalai
(MGL)

BLUE CORNER
OUMIHA Sofiane
(FRA)

Winner: OUMIHA Sofiane (FRA) BLUE WP 3:0

| Referee: | Judges: | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|
| POGGI Gerardo (ARG) | CARRILLO Clemente (ECU) | VUONG Trong Nghia (VIE) | DEL PUERTO TRUEBA Jose (CUB) | JUST Rene (SVK) | SILVA DO ROSARIO Jones Kennedy (BRA) |

| | Judge 1 | Judge 2 | Judge 3 | Judge 4 | Judge 5 | W | KD |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---|----|
| ROUND 1 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | | |
| ROUND 2 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | 9:10 | | |
| ROUND 3 | 10:9 | 10:9 | 10:9 | 10:9 | 10:9 | | |
| TOTAL | 28:29 | 28:29 | 28:29 | 28:29 | 28:29 | | |

After the result, the Mongolians were very upset with the outcome and Dorjnyambuu, along with the spectators, started shouting at the R&Js. Kristin Brynildsen quickly came over from where the R&Js were sitting and stood amongst the gathered group of Mongolian delegates who were protesting to her about the result. *“We actually won in the ring. Why the referees (judges) gave the win to the other side?”* Brynildsen apparently told the delegates that *“you are not allowed to insult our referees (judges) [...] This is the referee (judge)’s matter. This is not my matter. But you are not allowed to do something like that. There was our president of Mongolian Olympic Committee and president of Mongolian Boxing Association. Both were there, yes? We were all mad, yes?”*.

The Mongolian delegates were angry and frustrated and immediately flew home. They did not make a formal complaint regarding the bribery/manipulation incident as, according to one delegate, *“There is no use.”* The Mongolian witness further stated that after his initial conversation with Rysbayev, he told Khishgee that if the 5 stars *“do something else again then/ do wrong, like us, then I hand this over to the International Olympic Committee/ I hand over this recording”*. Khishgee subsequently passed this information on to Rysbayev stating that the recording had been handed over to the IOC, but whether this was actually the case or not is not clear.

It was clear from the interview with the witness that it was his belief that the majority, if not all the 5 stars were party to, or at least aware of this bribery attempt. What is less clear is whether Karim Bouzidi had any knowledge of it, the witness stated *“I don’t know if Karim gave this task*

or did not give. That I don't know exactly... But this offer had Karim and the other five star/ they are all organized crime/ crime they made, yes".

If Bouzidi did not know about the planned manipulation, this may well explain Rysbayev's concern as displayed in the recorded conversation with the third party. If the meeting that had been scheduled with the Mongolian Federation's President regarding the bribery attempt, Rysbayev's concerns of retribution may have been further exacerbated if Bouzidi found out about it.

There is no further information as to whether the meeting between Bat Erdene and Bouzidi took place.

The MIIT have described the theory and the mechanics of how the manipulation worked at Rio, but this last section of the chapter illustrates how the R&Js can financially benefit from what they were doing. Whether the amount was \$100,000 or \$250,000, this shows a staggering confidence from 5 Star R&Js that they could ask for these sums. It demonstrates that this is not likely a one-off request. This wasn't a major showcase bout, but even so the amounts needed to fix the R&Js verdict was significant.

In any situation where illicit money is involved it is impossible to glean the full picture. In closing this Chapter, it becomes evident that the manipulation was worth financial reward. This might stick in the throat of any of the honest R&Js who were stood down as a result of the greed their

corrupt colleagues. However, the blame must not remain just at the feet of the corrupt R&Js but those officials leading the organisation, specifically the ED and President who had responsibility for ensuring a clean Games.

Chapter 6: The AIBA Special Investigation Committee Report

6.1 Introduction

Following the Rio fallout and under pressure from the IOC, it was inevitable that some form of enquiry had to take place into the corruption allegations and subsequent media backlash which led to the eventual suspension of the seven 5 star R&Js and the 3 star R&Js; subsequently followed by the Executive Director and a member of the Draw Commission. The President opted for an internal investigation into the matter. That investigation lacked the necessary independence and freedom to follow the evidence. The Final Report was heavily dependent on the President for final scrutiny and approval. The MIIT's review of the SIC's Minutes together with a comparison of the SIC Progress Report and the published Final SIC Report demonstrably reveal striking omissions of evidence. The summary contained in the paragraphs set out below supports the MIIT's conclusion.

6.2 Formation of the SIC Commission

On 29 August 2016, President CK Wu announced the formation of an AIBA Special Investigation Committee ("SIC") that was to be led by Tom Virgets, assisted by panel members Terry Smith, Ray Silvas and Osvaldo Bisbal. The main priority was to assess if there was corruption amongst the 5 star Referees and Judges and if so, to what extent it had impacted on the recently completed games and the reputation of AIBA. The MIIT's review of the SIC report investigation

is not intended as criticism against the SIC as they were working under extremely difficult circumstances without the proper resources.

On 3 October 2016, three AIBA SIC commission members [Smith (“TS”), Silvas (“RS”) and Bisbal (“OB”)] met as part of their role on the R&J Commission along with: Waldemar Mencil – AIBA R&J Commission Member, Rafael Vega Rodriguez - AIBA R&J Commission Member, Rajcoomar Godavarisingh - AIBA R&J Commission Member, David Llauro – AIBA Staff, Philippe Tuccelli (PT) – AIBA Staff, Nicolas Jomard – AIBA Staff and Doug Gray – AIBA Staff.

6.3 The information available to the SIC

According to the Minutes⁴¹ of the meeting, their knowledge of the corruption at Rio was greater than anything ever to be ultimately reported in either the AIBA SIC Progress report or the final version, released on 31 January 2017. In the opening remarks of the Commission’s meeting Bisbal stated that he had discussed Rio with Ray Silvas and the President and *“What has happened must never happen again.”* Given the importance of these comments and significant knowledge internally of what happened at Rio the MIIT has reproduced the detail of this meeting.

⁴¹ AIBA456 Minutes of R/J Commission 3/10/16.

“6. Rio Olympics

The Commission agreed to look at three bouts from Rio, but it was agreed that there was a longer history of corruption issues.

OB – We need to understand these issues didn’t just begin in Rio, the issues reach back over the last two years and the wider context is how did some of these boxers even get to qualify from the APB/WSB tournament in Venezuela for example, that is why we have been looking back over the last two years.

TS – Can we be privy to this wider context?

OB – That is the purpose of this meeting, to discuss where we are with our investigation. If we have seen a bout where the result is in question, we know there were other things happening behind the scenes. We want to talk to you in a transparent way to make sure that the decisions we make today are well informed and we will eradicate these problems. In Rio, the actions of a certain community of R&Js anchors our objectives for change. Bottom line is, and we will discuss it later today, the recommendation will be that certain R&Js no longer officiate for AIBA.

Three bouts from Rio were viewed.

Bout 1 Iashaish vs Nistor

TS – Before we start viewing, it is important that we put ourselves in the position of the R&J not how we personally would have assessed the bout.

RS – Even as we were reviewing the bout in Rio afterwards, there was still a clear outside influence upon us. They asked is it possible that the judges could have seen it the other way, we said it was possible, not necessarily that we agreed with that decision. The question ‘was this bout controversial’ or ‘could it have gone either way?’ We weren’t asked ‘who do you think won?’

TS – The root of the problem is the second round – by awarding it to Iashaish they were committed. They could have scored Nistor 10-8 in the last round which would have been fair, in order to reach a more just decision.

PT – For context, one theory behind the result was that it then provided an easier pathway for Tony Yoka – who the winner would face next – through to future rounds.”

This is a critically important comment by Tuccelli. The boxer Yoka went on to win Gold for France.

This comment implied there was a route for France to win medals. Unfortunately, Tuccelli declined the MIIT’s offer of interview.

“Bout 2 Tishchenko vs Levit

RS – I’m not sure if this bout happened before or after the previous Russian defeats, but at one point, the Russians were threatening to pull their sponsorship of the Youth competition in St. Petersburg – I don’t know if that led to over compensation here. The Russian did a little more in the 2nd round, but all three judges awarded it to Russia.

Nicolas Jomard – After the defeat of Khamukov, the 81kg boxer from St. Petersburg, a letter was sent from the St. Petersburg Federation to the President, there is that trail, stating what their qualms were.

RS – At the time there was controversy about the referee Poggi taking the Russian to the corner for a cut, did it give him precious recovery time, but that had to be done. The question posed to us at the time, during an inefficient review method with too many outside influences in the room, was ‘was this a corruptible or controversial decision?’. We said no. ‘Could the Russian have won?’ Yes.

TS– Once again, the scoring of that second round under the current system going to the Russian is the most debatable aspect. The judges were from Ireland, Colombia and Algeria, with two five star R&Js on it.

RS – When they’ve given two rounds to someone they often give one the other one to compensate, that should never happen.

TS – Nobody could give that last round to the Russian.”

The analysis by the MIIT reveals that in fact three judges did give the last round to Tishchenko contrary to Terry Smith and the Commission's view. The "current system" referred to did not matter as all 5 judges scored for Tishchenko in the 2nd round 10:9. They were split 3 to 2 in the other two rounds but both went to Tishchenko, hence he actually had a 5:0 win. No wonder the crowd were booing and IOC President Bach walked out.

"Bout 3 Conlan vs Nikitin

TS – It looked worse than it was because Nikitin was bleeding from a previous fight. The perception of mismanagement of the Conlan fight was in part because of the bloodied Russian. There are clear instructions about cleaning boxers when they are bloodied that weren't followed. Another factor was that Conlan's corner had told him he had lost the first round. Steps must be taken to ensure that results from previous rounds are not relayed to the ring.

RS then asked whether the scoring in between rounds is something that should be made public.

Nicolas Jomard – Again for context, it should be taken into account that Conlan said to media after that his coaches had told him two days before that the bout result was pre-determined.

TS – There is no need to watch more beyond these three bouts, we just need to learn the lessons from today and take action. I do want to underline that we will never eradicate the subjective element of judges' decision, it is an inherent part of boxing.

RS - We as a commission have seen the top bouts under discussion, do we agree they were balanced and could have gone either way? There was no controversy? We had different opinions, but they were within an acceptable realm.

OB – Despite these being the three bouts highlighted in the media, in our opinion they weren't the most debatable ones in Rio. For example, one bout involving a Thai boxer was, in my opinion, more controversial.

All: Agreed.

RS - Going back to OB point earlier regarding the wider context, we need to now make sure that it is understood that the selection of R&Js for Rio was not handled in the correct manner. The Commission asked several times what the criteria were and were not involved at any point. Shortly before the Venezuela finals, a new wave of R&Js was brought in, but there was also a gag order issued so that none of them were allowed to discuss their selection, creating an unnecessary and suspicious code of silence around what should be a very transparent process. The main issue in this selection process was there was no prior discussion with the R&J Commissions before selection and there was no opportunity for consensus. In every previous Games we had input, not here.

TS – In 2012 we were involved and there was a process but some R&Js still made it through without our knowledge via ED appointment. The Rio 2016 selection had no involvement of the R&J Commission and that was wrong.

RS – After the intense media scrutiny surrounding the debatable bouts, and in light of the previous stories regarding the five stars that resurfaced during the Games, it was decided by the AIBA authorities on site – President, VPs and EC members – stand down the five stars to protect both the institution and the five stars themselves whose credibility was no longer viable. I think we are at a stage now where the external audiences expect AIBA to not only study the behaviour of the five star judges but all the 36 R&Js present in Rio. That is why I recommend that we provisionally stand down all 36 judges and do not assign them to any AIBA competitions until the end of the investigation...

OB – In my two years of investigation, I have only noted seven R&Js are completely fair out of the 36. This is very negative, but there may be more. Many people don't want to speak officially but I understand now that it was occurring during the entire qualification process. Once again, we have seen these three bouts that caused the media crisis, and yes they were close bouts, but also many boxers that could have reached the medal stages were losing in the preliminaries. Their protests maybe weren't as visible as those of Levit, but I saw several bouts where I didn't understand the results. But we need to look at those results, because maybe the weaker rival was declared the winner, such as the Jordanian winner who went on to face Yoka, to give others an easier bout later on.

ITOs

RS – One of the problems we saw in Rio was with the Draw Commission, where there were some peculiar last-minute assignment changes. We are setting up interviews with all of the Draw Commission members to find out if they were influenced by others.

Nicolas Jomard – On that note the Draw Commission was also at the centre of the accusations appearing in FightNews prior to the Games, that was where the finger was being pointed, rightly or wrongly, at certain members.

OB – One example of the flawed system around the Draw Commission is that many R&Js knew beforehand what bouts they would be officiating because one evaluator was passing on that information to them. It is also worth noting that Recommendations: All 35 R&Js from Rio 2016 are stood down until the end of the investigation; the R&J at the FISU Championships be stood down with immediate effect; in AIBA communications, we use the word ‘debatable’ rather than ‘controversial’ regarding the bouts in question where two people in the Rio Draw Commission also officiated in the last 3 qualification tournaments. I had already noted flaws in the Draw system in Rio and at that time I proposed to Helmut Rantze [Technical Delegate/Supervisor] that the assignments for the R&Js from then on should not be done by the Draw Commission but by the relevant parties present on site and there were no objections. Unfortunately, the evaluators still provided feedback to the R&Js, I objected strongly, and proposed they be removed as a result of what the press were saying. The Rio Supervisor agreed.

RS – Ted Tanner and Jurgen Kvas, to my knowledge, were not really involved, but stood by while Stela Stoyanova and Mohamed Moustahsane initiated flawed decisions. Thus the recommendation I would like to make in the spirit of the decision made on the 36 R&Js from Rio is Mohamed and Stela not work until the end of the investigation. Beyond the four members of the Rio Draw Commission, I think it also important to include the evaluator Dorian Butan whom we also believe played a role.

6.3 The SIC Progress Report

On 15 November 2016, the SIC produced a Progress Report that detailed the steps taken and current state of the investigation⁴². An extract of the initial findings is detailed below:

“Summary of SIC’s Phase 1 & 2 Investigation Findings

To date, the investigation has failed to produce sufficient evidence that a culture of corruption exists within AIBA. While many of the persons interviewed by the SIC have expressed concerns that the AIBA 5 stars, some ITO’s and the AIBA Executive Director and the Competition Manager were in a position to, and may have manipulated the judging scores of a select number of National Federation boxers bouts, all persons interviewed to date, were not able to provide evidence that would merit a case be forwarded to the Disciplinary Commission for criminal court. Although the evidence to date does not warrant forwarding to the DC, the SIC is troubled by the sheer number of individuals who expressed concerns that the AIBA 5 stars yielded too much power over other officials, and that the AIBA Executive Director and the AIBA Sport Manager exercised too much power over the ITO’s and referees and judges.”

From this excerpt it is evident that this was not a case of “nothing to see,” but an early indication that all was not right at Rio. Nevertheless, this declaration of findings lacked the detail discussed amongst the R&J Commission on 3 October 2016 where key individuals were identified in specific roles which would have enabled them to manipulate the judging scores as part of a larger system. This is what certain members of the Commission believed had happened. It appears however that such allegations were met by the AIBA SIC generally with a wall of silence. In other words, this enquiry shows there was evidence and tacit acknowledgement by a number of Commission members and R&J witnesses that at qualifying events and at Rio bouts had been manipulated.

⁴² AIBA164B AIBA SIC Progress Report dated 15/11/16.

On 18 November 2016, the President wrote an email to Tom Virgets congratulating him on the progress work conducted by the SIC.⁴³ In his email, the President observed the following tacit acknowledgement that Karim Bouzidi and Kristen Brynildsen had influenced the 5 star R&Js to manipulate certain bouts in favour of certain National Federations:

“We now clearly understand that it is highly possible that the Executive Director, with cooperation from the Sports Director, influenced the 5 star R&Js’ decisions in bouts by favoring certain NFs. Therefore, it is important that we put more pressure on the 3 star R&Js to speak out and confirm this.”

The email continued with reference to France and Uzbekistan, presumably the ‘NFs’ being referred to. This was a spectacular Olympics for both of those countries in relation to boxing which had never before won so many medals at any previous Games.⁴⁴ The email continues:

“The bouts including France and Uzbekistan should be prioritized while proceeding with further investigations. Furthermore, the suspected R&Js’ scoring sheet records need to be reviewed in detail and analyzed to find any possible irregularities.”

Close scrutiny of the Progress Report makes no mention of France or Uzbekistan. This omission raises the possibility that high level discussion took place in relation to these two countries that were not included in the Report, which would ultimately go to the IOC. In addition, the Progress Report specifically states that *“to date the investigation has failed to produce evidence that a culture of corruption exists.”*⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the President stated in his email that there was a high possibility that it did exist in favouring certain ‘NFs’. This is an example of a crucial and fundamental issue discussed with the President and then not referred to in the Final Report.

⁴³ AIBA147N Email from CK Wu to Tom Virgets dated 18/11/16.

⁴⁴ One French Coach was quoted saying during the SIC report having appealed and been ruled to have lost a bout. “We used to have better luck when Karim Bouzidi was the Executive Director!”

⁴⁵ AIBA164B AIBA SIC Progress Report dated 15/11/16.

On 19 November 2016, as previously reported, the President CK Wu attended a meeting at the Youth World Championships in St. Petersburg with David Puig and Phillipe Nicholas. The Minutes of this meeting clearly record the President as stating *“Karim was the person manipulating, I sent him home, dismissed him, I cannot allow the Executive Director to damage AIBA, I hope my decision is very tough, Karim made a big mistake, there was no choice but to fire him.”*⁴⁶ The MIIT notes that there is no mention of this in the Progress or Final Reports. Furthermore, the President, who ought to have been a main witness was notably missing from both Reports. Moreover, this is not the first time that the President had arranged a dismissal of the Executive Director. Indeed, in 2015, Executive Director Ho Kim received the same treatment perhaps without as much justification as in Bouzidi’s circumstances. The matter will be examined in greater detail in the next stage of the MIIT’s report.

On 24 November 2016 Tom Virgets wrote to all SIC members and blind copied the President with an update of CK Wu’s view of the investigation:⁴⁷

“He requests that we offer 3 stars immunity from additional DC [Disciplinary Commission] action based upon their testimony. He agrees with us that many may have been influenced by the power of the 3 stars. He wants the investigation to focus on the top level being the ED. The 5 stars are retired, but the investigation needs to focus on the ED's influence over judging [...]. He wants better understanding of the issue. That occurred between China and Cuba, [...] Emphasis on ED's role, reaction. He wants more emphasis on issues involving ED's role in selection of Draw Commission and pressure by ED to influence European, 3 stars and ITOs.”

⁴⁶ AIBA164d Minutes of meeting held in St. Petersburg 19/11/16.

⁴⁷ AIBA164e Email Tom Virgets to SIC Team, bcc CK Wu.

On 28 November 2016, through his office the President produced the statement of a 3 star Judge from Rio, Ming Li Liu.⁴⁸ As a gesture of gratitude for the statement, CK Wu authorised her to continue judging for AIBA in return for her cooperation. She is the only judge of the 36 to have been allowed to do so. In her statement she complained of being marginalised and being told what to do by the 5 star judges without naming them. She also stated that Stela Stoyanova was “suspicious” and pointed out the names of fellow judging colleagues who knew more of the corruption.

On the same day the President also replied by email⁴⁹ to Pat Fiacco, a Board Member, concerning his allegations of corruption within AIBA and specifically actions undertaken by Karim Bouzidi to manipulate events and bouts. The President stated: *“Thank you for your integrity and courage by providing such detailed account. It is very helpful for our ongoing investigation. AIBA needs more people like you to uphold our sublime values of honesty and transparency.”*

Both the statement and the email response demonstrate the awareness of a corruption problem that the President later claimed to the IOC. Again, none of this information was referred to or made any mention of in either the Progress or Final Reports.

⁴⁸ AIBA164f statement of Ming Li Liu.

⁴⁹ AIBA 164g email CK Wu to Pat Fiacco.

6.4 The SIC Final Report

On 15 January 2017 the Final Report was submitted to the President.⁵⁰ It should be noted that no reference was made to France or Uzbekistan medal achievements, nor to the specific actions or influences of Karim Bouzidi as previously detailed by the President. These are keystone points because according to the SIC St. Petersburg meeting Minutes, Bouzidi was fired for manipulation and damaging AIBA, a point not clarified in the SIC Reports.

The Final SIC Public Report made the following points:

- *No evidence of corruption could be found.*
- *The SIC's recommendations for improvement to R&J structure for the Tokyo 2020 Cycle are already being put in place.*
- *AIBA defends the integrity of its expert R&Js who operate in difficult, subjective circumstances.*
- *Due to a lack of proper procedural norms, a concentration of decision-making power and the assigning of roles assumed by former Senior Management that had a detrimental impact on in-competition best practice. AIBA moved quickly to identify those involved and took the necessary steps to ensure its officials will no longer become scapegoats for close decisions which are an inherent aspect of the sport.*
- *An unwelcome axis of influence and sole decision-making had been created and used by former Senior Management that led to a lack of due process being carried out.*
- *The SIC have conducted a thorough investigation and many of their recommendations, including the disbanding of the 5 star R&J structure and placing control of the field of play back in the hands of the Tournament Supervisor, have already been put into place. This statement was made by President Wu but there was nothing mentioned about the SIC investigation itself.*
- *The SIC also found unprofessional relationships within AIBA had created an atmosphere of collusion between the Executive Director, his Sports Director and the 5 star R&Js that undermined the organisation and had a negative impact on its operating efficiency. There was no mention of corruption which was significantly, if not totally, played down.*

⁵⁰ AIBA063 SIC Final Report on Rio.

The MIIT questions why if there was no corruption identified by the SIC, were the 36 R&Js and ITO never used again, with the exception of Ming Li Liu. It is evident by the President's actions that there was a real concern about corruption they did not want to publicly report.

The President did not make himself available for an interview with the MIIT. He was not cited as a witness in the SIC Report and his evidence related to France, Uzbekistan and Karim Bouzidi was omitted. If anyone had first-hand knowledge and experience of what actually happened, it would be the President.

Tom Virgets did agree to be interviewed. The following excerpt from the recording of the MIIT interview relates to questions posed surrounding important omissions in the content of the SIC Report.

"Q: And should not that have been actually in the Report? If you have evidence of the fact that Karim Bouzidi was given compelling powers to run the show and, because of that, manipulate – would it not have been good to have brought that out really strongly?"

TV: What I would have said is: yes the Report probably would have never made it to the IOC desk had we made a statement in that Report that the President of AIBA, who commissioned this report for him, to determine whether it goes forward or not to the IOC was indeed remiss in having granted powers and authorities that were outside of the Constitution – outside of the Rules and Regulations. He was Executive Director.

Q: Okay so, because you were writing that report about Ho Kim, in effect, and Karim Bouzidi, because of what they had done and they handed over complete control to Bouzidi who looks like he ruined Rio for Boxing, so much so that you have to have the others – it's run not by AIBA now in Tokyo and everything else. Would it not have been beneficial for you to go and speak to the IOC privately and said to them, 'This is the report I've got to write to my president but I have massive, massive concerns here and these are my actual findings that I know would never get to you if I reported it through the president'?

TV: If you understand the IOC and how it circles around its own and the fact that CK Wu was one of them. I cannot tell you the attacks that came on me when I kicked out CK Wu by the IOC itself.

And it would be nice – in the real world you are – this is why these reports have to be done by an independent outside group. An internal investigation – I mean, the person who authorised this was CK Wu. CK Wu was also a guy who was, in his mind, above question. The IOC, if you tried to do anything that was disparaging to CK Wu's reputation, they immediately supported CK Wu and everyone [inaudible]. This is why there was an entire EC that almost was completely eliminated from AIBA because the IOC tried to protect him in the later, you know – a year later.

They protect their own and there is, quite frankly – it would not be possible for me to go to a meeting with the IOC on this investigation and have it without CK Wu in the room. And if I asked for that audience, they would have immediately informed him of the situation. We, as a committee, always were concerned about CK in this but – and I believe it was better that we go forward with what we could get into the Report on the others than to, one, we couldn't support what CK Wu wanted; but, two, we also knew that if we attacked CK Wu, the Report would die on delivery.

Q: Unfortunately, because of this, the Report didn't achieve what it set out to achieve, did it?

TV: Yes. No, not at all. Well, let me put it this way: on paper it achieved what needed to be done but in practice it completely fell apart and the only time that – well, let's put it this way: we put into place regulations but what I, on numerous occasions, in my conversations with the IOC and others – what everyone fails to understand is two things: one, fish rot from the top down. And until we change the culture of the Executive Board to one that doesn't have individuals who belong to National Federations making the decisions about competition; two, these ITOs or EC members who also represent their own countries – it's a conflict of interest from day one.

All these things have been put down to get rid of and for many years the recommendations that were going forward were recommendations made to clean this up from this type of corruption but by the time it got to the EC, it got watered down and by the time it got to the President it got further watered down because they don't want to give up the power. This is the key – they don't want to give up the power.

On 26 January 2017 the President wrote to the IOC President Mr. Thomas Bach with concluding details of the investigation into Rio.⁵¹ The letter is but another striking example of evidentiary omissions. The following is excerpted from this letter.

“Key findings showed a lack of procedural norms which resulted in a concentration of decision making power and assignment of roles by former senior management which had a detrimental effect to in-competition good governance. Actions were swiftly taken to identify those involved and measures put in place to hedge the risk of easily scapegoat closed decisions, specifically inherent in boxing as it is a subjective sport.

Moving forward, AIBA has made a concerted effort to broaden its education programs to remind boxers, coaches, officials and fans alike the vital importance of accepting bout results according to sportsmanship, respect and fair play values.”

The key findings make no mention of the corruption concerns that the President had spoken of earlier in the investigation, nor the concerns of the SIC team and the many investigative leads they had uncovered evidence of corruption within the organisation. Blaming the lack of procedural norms and concentration of decision-making power with former senior management seems an understatement compared with the irregularities found at qualifying events and the Olympics. However, passing on blame was a management style and pushing scandal away from implicating himself which enabled him to ignore his own culpability for what had ultimately taken place at Rio.

The ignoring of culpability and responsibility continues into the next paragraph, this time blaming coaches, boxers, officials and fans. The turn of phrase in suggesting that it was an enquiry into “sportsmanship and fair play” did not fool the IOC. The lack of an independent enquiry and the

⁵¹ AIBA112 Letter to IOC President Mr. Thomas Bach dated 26 January 2017.

editing role of CK Wu in the internal investigation resulted in an ongoing problem for AIBA and the wider boxing community and has now led to the MIIT being asked to examine the past.

Final word on this SIC Report goes to the highly respected Osvaldo Bisbal, former President of the American Federation and Chair of the AIBA R/J Commission. *"In my two years of investigation, I have only noted seven R&Js are completely fair out of the 36. This is very negative, but there may be more."*

The MIIT agrees that determining an exact number is difficult to establish with precision. In conclusion Osvaldo Bisbal highlights the findings in this independent enquiry report, yet conveniently omitted from the SIC Report in order to satisfy the President:

"Many people don't want to speak officially but I understand now that it was occurring during the entire qualification process. Once again, we have seen these three bouts that caused the media crisis, and yes they were close bouts, but also many boxers that could have reached the medal stages were losing in the preliminaries. Their protests maybe weren't as visible as those of Levit, but I saw several bouts where I didn't understand the results."⁵²

⁵² AIBA456 Minutes of R/J Commission 3/10/16.