“The Dutch Experience and Memory of the Campaign of 1812: a Final Feat of
Arms of the Dutch Imperial Contingent, or: the Resurrection of an Independent
Dutch Armed Forces?*
By Mark Edward Hay
King’s College London
The history of the Dutch contingent of the Hussars and the 14th Regiment of Cuirassiers.4 The
Grande Armée starts on 9 July 1810. On this day, artillery was merged into the Seventh Regiment of
Napoleon decided to annex the untrustworthy Horse Artillery and the Ninth Regiment of Foot
Kingdom of Holland.1 Although the Netherlands Artillery. The bridging train became the 11th
would only remain inside the French Empire for Company of the First Battalion of Pontonniers.5
slightly over three years, the period had a Louis Bonaparte’s Royal Guard – “La gloire de la
significant impact on Dutch history, and not in the Hollande” according to Napoleon – became the
least on the history of the Dutch Armed Forces. For Third Regiment of Foot Grenadiers of the Imperial
the Dutch Armed Forces annexation meant two Guard and the Second Regiment of Lancers of the
things. First, per decree of 18 August 1810 the army Imperial Guard (commonly known as the Red
of the Kingdom of the Holland would be purged of Lancers).6 The second consequence of the
foreign nationals, and incorporated into the French- annexation of the Netherlands was that the Dutch
Imperial Army.2 The Dutch infantry was elements of the French-Imperial Army came under
renumbered the 123rd-126th and 131st Infantry French operational command, and as such the
Regiments of the Line, and the 33rd Regiment of Dutch units were ordered to participate in the
Light Infantry.3 The cavalry became the 11th Russian campaign of 1812. The Dutch contingent
did not participate in the campaign as an
1 H.T. Colenbrander, Inlijving en Opstand (Amsterdam, independent corps, but it was split up amongst the
1941), 1-5. army corps of the Grande Armée. The 33rd Light
2 J.W. Sypesteijn, Geschiedenis van het Regiment Infantry was assigned to the First Corps, and the
Nederlandse Rijdende Artillerie (Zaltbommel, 1852), 163. 123rd and 124th Infantry and 14th Cuirassiers were
For the purging of foreign nationals from Dutch units: placed in the Second Corps. The Third Corps of the
F.H.A. Sabron, Geschiedenis van het 124ste regiment Grande Armée had only one Dutch regiment: the
infanterie van linie onder keizer Napoleon I (Breda, 1910), 11th Hussars, whilst the Ninth Corps had two
124. Dutch regiments: the 125th and 126th Infantry. The
3 H. Ringoir, De Nederlandse Infanterie (Bussum: C.A.J.
van Dishoeck, 1968), 51-53; Marco van der Hoeven, Van
de Weser tot de Weichsel. Het leger van het Koninkrijk 4 J.W. Sypesteijn, Geschiedenis van het regiment Hollandsche
Holland en de Duitse veldtochten van Napoleon 1806, 1807 hussaren, vroeger regiment Hussaren van Van Heeckeren,
en 1809. (Amsterdam, 1994), 21; Sabron, Geschiedenis van vervolgens regiment Bataafsche hussaren en daar daarna 2de
het 124ste, 6-7; F.H.A. Sabron, Geschiedenis van het 33ste en 11de regiment Hussaren: een bijdrage voor de
Regiment Lichte Infanterie (Het Oud-Hollandsche 3de Nederlandsche krijgsgeschiedenis van het belangrijk tijdvak
Regiment Jagers) onder Keizer Napoleon I (Breda, 1910; C. van 1784-1814 (De Gebroeders van Cleef, 1849).
D. H. Schneider, Het 126ste [honderd zesentwintigste] 5 Sypesteijn, Nederlandse Rijdende Artillerie, 163; G.A.
Regiment Hollandsche Infanterie in Rusland in 1812 (P.N. Geerts, “De veldtocht naar Rusland in 1812 onder keizer
Van Kampen & Zoon, 1898). The 131st Infantry Regiment Napoleon 1,” Militaire Spectator, (1983), 52; J.P.C.M. van
of the Line was made up of a variety of units stationed Hooff, “George Diederich Benthien: een bruggenbouwer
on the islands of the province of Zeeland. The regiment pur sang,” Armamentaria, (1998-1999), 83.
was incorporated into the French army before 18 August 6 Initially the Guard Regiment became the 2 nd Régiment
1810. As consequence, this unit was not purged of des grenadiers à pied de la Garde Impériale, but on 11 May
foreign nationals, and had a less distinctive Dutch 1811 the regiment was “relegated” to the 3rd Régiment des
character. The 131st Regiment will therefore not be dealt grenadiers à pied de la Garde Impériale: Geerts, De veldtocht
with in this article. naar Rusland, 52.
former Dutch Imperial Guard regiments, of course, contingent of the Grande Armée remained
remained with the Imperial Guard Corps7. unaltered during these years – no new unites were
There is some confusion concerning the number raised, and no unites were disbanded. Therefore
of Dutch troops that participated in the Russian the number of 20,225 men, as a general figure,
campaign. Not in the least this is because seems accurate for the strength of the Dutch
astonishingly few historians have dared to put a contingent of the Grande Armée in 1812.
figure on the Dutch contingent of the Grande Dutch units were in the thick of all major
Armée. Those historians that have provided an engagements.11 Two feats of arms in particular, are
estimate often seem utterly misinformed. much quoted by Dutch military historians. The first
Colenbrander, for instance, estimates that 15,000 is the Battle of Krasnyi, which in fact was a series of
Dutch troops participated in the Russian campaign. skirmishes fought between 15 and 18 November
The number of 15,000 in fact refers to the numbers 1812.12 At this engagement, Dutch units put up a
of Dutch recruits that were levied prior to the stiff fight but were decimated. The Dutch Imperial
Russian campaign – the class of 1812.8 These Guard Regiment, for example, lost 460 out of 500
recruits were not the Dutch contingent itself, they men. The 33rd Light Regiment was down to 80 men,
were merely designated to reinforce the Dutch of whom only 25 were uninjured.13 The second
regiments of the Grande Armée. much quoted Dutch feat of arms involved the
Since the entire Dutch field army participated Bridging Company. During the retreat from
in the Russian campaign, a better manner, then, to Moscow, with temperatures of minus 26 degrees
gain insight into the strength of the Dutch Celsius, these troops laid two bridges across the
contingent of the Grande Armée, is to look at the River Berezina near Studianka. This allowed a large
strength of the Dutch army of 1810. Several days part of the Grande Armée to retreat to relative
prior to the incorporation of the Dutch army, the safety, but it came at a cost: of the 200 men, only
French did a full inventory of the Dutch Armed forty survived the icy water.14
Forces. According to this report, the Dutch Armed It is in part due to glorification and the
Forces numbered 28,262 men.9 However, this “mythification” of heroic feats such as these that, in
number includes home defences forces, and as Dutch historiography and national memory, it is
these did not participate in the Russian campaign, commonly accepted that the Dutch contingent of
these need to be deducted, giving a total of 21,866 the Grande Armée all but perished on the fields of
men for the Dutch field army. From this number a Russia. Over the years, two interpretations of the
further 1,641 men should be deducted. These destruction of the Dutch contingent of the Grande
troops were what remained form the Dutch Armée have emerged. The first is that the Dutch
contingent of the French army in the Peninsula.10 contingent was all but annihilated, and only a
The strength of the Dutch field army in 1810 lucky few survived to make their way back to the
therefore can be established at 20,225 men. Netherlands.15 The second interpretation differs
Obviously, in the years 1810-1812, the strength of only from the first in that the Dutch survivors of
the Dutch field army would change due to the the Russian campaign are believed to have been
influx of recruits, as well as desertion, decease and incorporated in the French army, instead of having
death. Nevertheless, the structure of the Dutch
11 1812 campaign in Russia: Wilkomir, 27 June 1812;
7 Sabron, Geschiedenis van het 124ste, 21 note 1. Polotsk, 18 August 1812; Borodino, 7 September 1812;
8 The number of recruits of the class of 1812 was in fact Moscow, 15 September 1812; Polotsk, 10 October 1812;
between 10,000 and 15,000 men: Van der Hoeven, Van de Chaznicki, 31 October 1812; Krasnoi, 17 November 1812;
Weser tot de Weichsel, 21. Borisov and Studianka, 28 November 1812: Ringoir, De
9 “Corps d’Observation de la Hollande, 15 July 1810”, Nederlandse Infanterie, 52.
Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, Vincennes, 12 Dominic Lieven, Russia against Napoleon: the Battle for
entry number C2 690. Europe, 1807 to 1814 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 267-268.
10 The primary Dutch work on the Dutch contingent in 13 Geerts, De veldtocht naar Rusland, 60.
the Peninsula is: J.A. De Moor and H.Ph. Vogel, Duizend 14 Van Hooff, George Diederich Benthien, 83-84.
Miljoen Maal Vervloekt Land. De Hollandse Brigade in 15 For example: Colenbrander, Inlijving en Opstand, 151-
Spanje, 1808-1813. (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1991). 152.
returned to the Netherlands.16 Of all historians research on the first line units. And it is true that –
researching the Dutch contingent of the Grande like the Grande Armée in general – the Dutch first
Armée only Sabron remarks that it may not be true line units suffered heavy casualties; these units
that the entire Dutch contingent perished in Russia. were practically destroyed during the campaign.
Due to his inability to disclose sufficient primary Still to say that these military units were destroyed
sources to prove otherwise, however, Sabron is not to say that all the troops perished on the
admits that he has little choice but to adhere to the fields of Russia. Many Dutch troops were in fact
opinion that the Dutch contingent was destroyed in taken captive by Allied armies. The remnants of the
Russia.17 126th Regiment, for instance, were taken captive at
Several accidental finds in the Dutch and Borisov on 27 August 1812. Approximately 100
French archives have convinced the author that this men of the 33rd Light were taken captive at the
– almost apologetic – comment by Sabron may be Battle of Krasnyi on 17 November 1812.19 And as
more in line with historical reality than the the Grande Armée retreated towards France, the
conclusion of other historians. Follow-up research number of engagements with the enemy increased,
has revealed that the current opinion as regards to and with it did the number of Dutch prisoners of
the fate of the Dutch contingent of the Grande war that fell into Allied hands. Significant numbers
Armée is most certainly not based on historical of Dutch troops were taken at Großbeeren (23
facts. The true aim of this article, then, is to rid August 1813), Katzbach (26 August), Dresden (27
Dutch historiography of this persistent falsehood. August), Kulm (30 August), and Dennewitz (6
So if the Dutch contingent of the Grande Armée September).20
did not perish in Russia, what then happened to The second line battalions of the Dutch
the Dutch regiments? In the first place, it is contingent had remained far from the fighting. This
important to realise that although all the changed when the French army retreated. Many of
aforementioned Dutch regiments participated in these units now became bottled up in the towns
the Russian campaign, the regiments did not and fortresses, which they garrisoned. The fortress
participate as coherent units. At this time, Dutch of Stettin contained the largest Dutch second line
infantry regiments consisted of four or five unit, approximately 1,400 men21 with battalions
battalions, ideally consisting of around 600-700 from the 123rd, 124th and 125th Regiments. Stettin fell
men. With the expectance of the Guards and the to the Allies on 5 December, and the Dutch
33rd Light Infantry, all infantry regiments were split garrison was taken captive.22 Wittenberg, which
up. The first two battalions of each regiment, and was stormed by the Allies in the night of 13-14
sometimes the third, were designated first line January 1814, contained a Dutch garrison of 1,162
units. These units participated in the invasion men.23 In addition, Danzig, Kolberg24, Löwenhain
proper; they were at the forefront of the fighting,
and marched to Moscow and back. The remaining 19 Ringoir, De Nederlandse Infanterie, 51-52.
battalions of the Dutch regiments served as second 20 “4 October 1813, London”, Nationaal Archief, The
line units. These units were held in reserve, acted Hague (NL-NA), entry number 2.21.008.01, Constant
as depot battalion, or performed second line duties Rebecque, Collectie 066 De Constant Rebecque, supplement 4,
such as the guarding and escorting of enemy inv.no. 24, Dagboek, deel 3, 1812 april 14 - 1813 oktober 9
prisoners of war, or the garrisoning of strategically [met reizen/campagnes Portugal, Spanje, Engeland].
located towns and fortresses.18 21 Sabron, Geschiedenis van het 124ste, 92-93. See also the
Historians of the Dutch contingent of the muster books of the Dutch Legion of Orange: First
French-Imperial Army have concentrated their Battalion: NL-NA, entry number 2.13.09, Stamboeken
Onderofficieren en Minderen na 1813, inv.no. 10 and 10A,
Bataljon Infanterie van Linie nr. 7; Second Battalion: NL-
16 To quote but the most obvious: Van der Hoeven, Van NA, 2.13.09, Oorlog / Stamboeken Onderofficieren, inv.no.
de Weser tot de Weichsel, 21 and 80; W.E.A. Wüpperman, 199, Bataljon Infanterie van Linie nr. 8; Third Battalion:
De vorming van het Nederlandsche leger na de omwenteling NL-NA, 2.13.09, Oorlog / Stamboeken Onderofficieren,
van 1813 en het aandeel van dat leger aan den veldtocht van inv.no. 227, Bataljon Infanterie van Linie nr. 9.
1815 (Breda: Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 1900), 1. 22 Colenbrander, Inlijving en Opstand, 256.
17 Sabron, Geschiedenis van het 33ste, 113. 23 Sabron, Geschiedenis van het 124ste, 95. Wilhelmina
18 Geerts, De veldtocht naar Rusland, 54-55. mentions a number of 565 men: “Dowager Princess to
and Hamburg contained significant Dutch V29, and his mother the Dowager Princess
garrisons, which were all marched into captivity Wilhelmina30, had taken up residence in Berlin.31
once the towns were taken.25 Partially this was due to necessity, as Napoleon
A last manner, which caused the numbers of had stripped the House of Orange of all its estates
the Dutch contingent to decline, of course, was save but a few private estates in Eastern Europe.32
desertion. It is difficult to establish the rate of Partially this was due to dynastic links: the
desertion amongst Dutch units, but that it was Prussian monarch, Frederick William III33, was the
significant can be concluded from the fact that on Prince of Orange’s brother-in-law.34
12 July 1812, at Minsk, the French Marshal Davout26 Emboldened by the apparent French defeat, the
ordered the Voltiguer and Grenadier companies of Prince of Orange and his mother had taken up the
the 33rd Light to parade with its muskets upside idea of raising a corps of troops consisting solely of
down, as punishment for the high levels of Dutch nationals. With this military unit it was
desertion.27 Some of the deserters made their way intended to invade the Netherlands, and liberate
home individually, many others were picked up by the country from French rule.35 The Dutch troops,
Allied armies, and joined their compatriots in of course, which the Prince of Orange had in mind,
prisoner of war camps. were those taken prisoner by the Allied Armies.
At this moment in time, the House of Orange Exiled, and without fortune or much
re-emerges onto the scene. In 1795 the House of supporters, the Prince of Orange was dependent on
Orange had fled the Netherlands before the Allied assistance, and a genuine diplomatic
advancing French Revolutionary armies. Since then offensive was started to gain their support. As early
the various members had either retreated to their as 15 March 1813, the Prince of Orange approached
private estates, or sought refuge at courts in Tsar Alexander36, and presented him with his
Europe. In 1812, the principal members of the plans. Alexander, hoping to take the fight to
House of Orange, that is: the Hereditary Prince of Napoleon, and eager to play the first violin in an
Orange28, the son of the late Stadtholder Willem anti-French coalition, was quick to lend his
support.37 Prussia and Sweden, the other members
Constant Rebecque, Berlin, 2 December 1813”, NL-NA, of the soon-to-be Sixth Coalition, dutifully followed
2.21.008.01, inv.no. 34, Brieven van de prinses douairière
van Oranje. 29 William V, Prince of Orange-Nassau (8 March 1748 – 9
24 Currently: Kołobrzeg in Poland. April 1806).
25 Hamburg: “Boreel to William I, Buxtehude, 25 January 30 Frederika Sophia Wilhelmina (7 August 1751 – 9 June
1814”, 2.21.008.01, entry number 2.02.01, Algemene 1820).
Staatssecretarie, inv. no. 6566, Ingekomen berichten bij de 31 Johanna W.A. Naber, Prinses Wilhelmina, Gemalin van
soevereine vorst van verschillende militaire autoriteiten, Willem V, Prins van Oranje. (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff,
January 1814, No. 35; “Benningsen to Willim I, 1908), 259, 273.
Pinneberg, 30 January 1814”, NL-NA, 2.02.01, 32 N. Japikse, De Geschiedenis van het Huis Oranje-Nassau,
Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6566, February 1814, No. 16; 2 vols. (The Hague: Zuid-Hollandsche Uitgevers
Jürgen Huck, Das ende der Franzosenzeit in Hamburg. Maatschappij, 1937-1938), II, 174-197.
Quellen und Studien zur Belagerung und Befreiung von 33 Frederick William III (3 August 1770 – 7 June 1840)
Hamburg 1813-1814 (Hamburg: Ernst Kabel, 1984), 12. 34 Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann, König in Preussens grosser
For Danzig, Kolberg and Löwenhain see the muster Zeit: Friedrich Wilhelm III. der Melancholiker auf dem Thron
books of the Dutch Legion of Orange at note 21. (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 165.
26 Louis-Nicolas d'Avout (10 May 1770 – 1 June 1823), 1st 35 “The Prince of Orange to Castlereagh, Breslau, 20
Duke of Auerstaedt, 1st Prince of Eckmühl February 1813”, H.T. Colenbrander (ed.), Gedenkstukken
27 Sabron, Geschiedenis van het 33ste, 42-45; Bruno Indekeu der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot
and Marco Bijl, “Van Vaandrig tot kolonel, vriend en 1840, 10 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1905-1922),
vijand van Frankrijk. Wijbrand Adriaan de Jongh (1776- VI, 1857-1858.
1821)”, Mars et Historia, 46 (2012), 10. 36 Alexander I of Russia (23 December 1777 – 1 December
28 William Frederick (24 August 1772 – 12 December 1825)
1843). In 1806, after the death of his father, William 37 “Princess Louise to Prince of Orange, 19 March 1813”,
became hereditary Prince of Orange. Later, after the Johanna W.A. Naber (ed.), Correspondentie van de
restoration of the House of Orange, William became Stadhouderlijke Familie, 1777-1820, 5 vols. (The Hague:
King William I. Martinus Nijhoff, 1931-1936), V, 194-195.
suit.38 At this time, when the Sixth Coalition was Austria, joined the coalition relatively late, and was
coming together, diplomacy demanded that the left no choice but to accept the acquis communautaire
Prince of Orange gain the support of another of regarding the raising of a Dutch corps.
Napoleon’s adversaries, namely Britain.39 This Having finally received the backing of all
proved more problematic. The reason for this was Allies, the Prince of Orange quickly set about
that British interests greatly differed from the organizing his Dutch corps, which would be
interests of the House of Orange, and many known as the Legion Hollandaise d’Orange, or the
political issues between Britain and the House of Dutch Legion of Orange. A recruitment centre,
Orange remained unresolved, such as the need to known as the Rassemblement or rallying point, was
have a friendly power occupy the North Sea Coast, set up in Schwedt on the River Oder.43 All Dutch
the return of Dutch colonies captured by Britain, prisoners of war were to be transported to this
and institutional issues, such as whether the a centre. In general this process proceeded smoothly.
Prince of Orange should return to the Netherlands Allied authorities were quick to transport the
as Stadtholder, or King.40 The hammering out of a Dutch prisoners of war to the Rassemblement.
compromise between Britain and the House of Admittedly, though, there were also difficulties.
Orange was complex and took several months, For example, approximately 1,200 Dutch prisoners
which severely delayed the formation of a Dutch of war had already been pressed into the second
corps. In September of 1813, finally, the Prince of battalion of the Russo-German Legion.44 The
Orange was informed that Britain, on several commanding officer blatantly refused to release
conditions, no longer had political objections to such a large part of his force whilst military
him raising a Dutch contingent from deserters of operations were still ongoing, which from his point
the Grande Armée. The most important of these of view is perhaps quite understandable.45
conditions were that the Prince of Orange would Despite such setbacks, more than enough
not command the unit, but stay in London and recruits poured into the Rassemblement. It remains
name a commanding officer in his stead, and that challenging to determine exactly how many Dutch
the force would be attached to the Russo-German deserters and prisoners of war were assembled at
Legion under the command of Wallmoden41, who the Rassemblement. Cator46, a Dutch exile in
was in British pay. Wallmoden’s corps, in turn, was Britain, who was intimately close to both the Prince
attached to the Army of the North under of Orange, and members of the British political
Bernadotte.42 The last of Napoleon’s adversaries, establishment mentions that 10,000 men saw their
38 Prussia: “Prince of Orange to Hardenberg, 19 March
1813”, Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken, VI, 1864; “Prince of
Orange to Wilhelmina, 19 March 1813”, Naber, 43 Naber, Prinses Wilhelmina, 280.
Correspondentie van de Stadhouderlijke Familie, V, 198-199; 44 Gabriele Venzky, Die Russisch-Deutsche Legion in den
Idem, V, 197-198, 277. Sweden: “Prince of Orange to Jahren 1811-1815 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966),
Wilhelmina, Stockholm, 8 April 1813”, Naber, 86; Naber, Prinses Wilhelmina, 280-281.
Correspondentie van de Stadhouderlijke Familie, V, 200. 45 Colenbrander, Inlijving en Opstand, 256; Venzky, Die
39 Colenbrander, Inlijving en Opstand, 247. Russisch-Deutsche Legion, 81. Eventually, these troops
40 G.J. Renier, Great Britain and the Establishment of the would be released towards the middle of 1814, when the
Kingdom of the Netherlands 1813-1815. A Study in British Russo-German Legion was incorporated into the
Foreign Policy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1930), 57-58, Prussian Army: Venzky, Die Russisch-Deutsche Legion,
65; “Aantekeningen van B.P. van Lelyveld 25 April – 30 110-113.
November 1813”, Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken, VI, 1874- 46 Thomas Cator was born in the Netherlands to English
1876. parents. In 1813 he fled to Britain with the intention of
41 Ludwig Georg Thedel, Count von Wallmoden (6 travelling to the West Indies. In November 1813, the
February 1769 - 22 March 1862). Prince of Orange offered his a position at the
42 “Prince of Orange to Wilhelmina, 27 September 1813”, Department of Foreign Affairs: J. Steur, “November
Naber, Correspondentie van de Stadhouderlijke Familie, V, 1813, een handschrift van mr. Hendrik baron Collot
221-222; “Prince of Orange to princess Louise, 12 March d’Escury, heer van Heinenoord”, Bijdragen en
1813”, Ibidem, V, 185; Colenbrander, Inlijving en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap, vol. 77
Opstand, 256. (1963), 208, note 5.
way to the Rassemblement.47 At first this figure unarmed and with barely the clothes on their
seems high, but when one adds up all the backs.50 These difficulties were expected. The
references in archives of numbers of Dutch House of Orange had taken out huge loan – known
prisoners transported to the rallying one comes to a as the hypothèque générale – and used this capital to
figure of 9,355 men.48 So, if one allows for a margin cloth and equip the recruits.51
of error, the number of 10,000 seems about right. Arming the troops remained a difficulty until
This, thus, means that out of the 20,225 Dutchmen the last for the simple reason that, at this point in
that participated in the 1812 Russian campaign, the campaign, many nations were raising military
10,000, or approximately half of the contingent, units, and there was a true lack of arms. This too
survived and were eventually organized into a had been anticipated. The staff of the Dutch Legion
Dutch corps. was well aware that the Dutch garrison of Stettin
So manpower was not a problem for the staff of carried a large quantity of arms in its baggage train,
the Dutch Legion of Orange. The real difficulty but before they could lay their hands on them, the
facing them was of a different kind. Firstly, the arms were confiscated by Prussia.52 Several
physical condition of many of the recruits was requests for arms were also directed to the British
poor, and, despite Frederick William’s generous government, but these were declined because the
offer of feeding the Dutch troops for as long as Britain gave priority to arming the Hanoverian
necessary, many remained hospitalized for long Army.53 Seeing no hope of receiving sufficient arms
periods.49 There were also considerable difficulties any time soon, it was decided to go ahead with the
in arming and equipping the troops. Like so many formation of the legion. In total three infantry
of the soldiers of the Grande Armée, the retreat battalions were formed, plus a detachment of
from Russia had taken its toll; the Dutch deserters artillery. Those troops who remained hospitalized
and prisoners of war arrived at the Rassemblement in the Rassemblement would be marched to the
Netherlands in groups of several hundreds.54
The First Battalion of the Dutch Legion of
47 “Cator to Van Hogendorp, Yarmouth, 2 December
Orange and the artillery detachment were the first
1813”, NL-NA, entry number 2.02.01, Algemene
Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6084, Brieven, memories enz.
ingekomen bij het Algemeen Bestuur der Verenigde 50 Naber, Prinses Wilhelmina, 281.
Nederlanden. 51 The House of Orange put up the family estates in
48 189 (3 a day for 4 October 1813 – 5 December 1813, Poland and Silesia, the family capital that had been
unknown thereafter) + 500 (received by Wilhelmina at invested in British loans, the family jewels, and all other
Berlin) + 1,200 (Russo-German Legion, released toward valuables as collateral for a loan that was provided by
he middle of 1814) + 1,400 (Stettin) + 1,162 (Wittenberg) + the banking houses Aarons, from Berlin, and Olden,
2,000 (Hamburg-Harburg area) + 1,000 (Benningsen on from Amsterdam: Naber, Prinses Wilhelmina, 281.
26 January). To this number, one should add a further 52 “Dowager Princess to Constant Rebecque, Berlin, 2
1,800 troops. These 1,800 troops had been assembled at December 1813”, NL-NA, Constant Rebecque, 2.21.008.01,
the Rassemblement, but were shipped, via Gothenburg, inv.no. 34
to Yarmouth where they were organized into a battalion 53 “Copy of a Dispatch form Charles Stewart to
under the Dutch exile, Colonel Panhuys: Panhuys’s Clancarty, 29 December 1813”, NL-NA, 2.02.01,
request to raise the Yarmouth Battalion: G.B. van Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6566; “Stewart to William I, Kiel,
Panhuys to Prince of Orange, Clifton Hotwells, 13 29 December 1813”, NL-NA, 2.02.01, Staatssecretarie,
November 1813”, NL-NA, entry number 2.20.01, inv.no. 6566, December 1813, No. 3.
Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6082, Correspondentie van de prins 54 “Koninklijk Besluit, 6 January 1814”, NL-NA, 2.02.01,
van Oranje tijdens zijn verblijf in Engeland met het 'Foreign Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6577, Kopieboeken van besluiten van
Office' enz., No. 13. Permission by the Prince of Orange: de soevereine vorst betreffende militaire zaken, met register;
“Prince of Orange to Panhuys, 16 Harley Street, 15 “Bovié to William I, s.l., 20 January 1814”, NL-NA,
November 1813”, NL-NA, 2.02.01, Staatssecretarie, 2.02.01, Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6566, January 1814, No.
inv.no. 6082. Transport of troops: “Cator to Van 32. Specifically in regards to prisoners of war in Russia:
Hogendorp, Yarmouth, 2 December 1813”, NL-NA, “Nota”, NL-NA 2.13.67 Inventaris van het archief van het
2.02.01, Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6084. Ministerie van Oorlog/Defensie. Geheim Verbaalarchief en
49 “28 October 1813, London”, Ibidem; “Schwartz to Gedeponeerde Archieven, inv.no. 1, Verzameling
William I, Schwedt, 2 January 1814”, NL-NA, 2.02.01, kabinetsorders van de Souvereine Vorst en nota's van kol. Van
Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6566, January 1814, No. 3. der Wijck, adjudant van Z.K.M., inv.no. 1., no. 7.
to set off to the Netherlands, where they arrived on Orange, a well-known Dutch historian
11 January 1814. Both units were directly moved to Colenbrander remarked that: “This whole initiative
the front line; the First Battalion of the Dutch of the Prince of Orange did not contribute to the
Legion of Orange and the artillery participated in provoking of the revolt [against France, MH].”57
the besieging of the fortress of Gorinchem, and This is quite true. The Dutch Legion of Orange was
later joined the advance into the Southern not raised in the Netherlands, but on the other side
Netherlands.55 The Second and the Third Battalions of Europe, in eastern Prussia. Still, provoking a
of the Dutch Legion of Orange, due to the revolution is but one side of the story. The securing
aforementioned difficulties, arrived in the of the gains of the revolution is another. And it is in
Netherlands considerably later, though still in time this last respect that I would argue that the Dutch
to participate in the siege of several key fortresses Legion of Orange did have an impact.
in the Netherlands.56 I suppose one could argue that the battalions of
The fall of the city of Delfzijl, in which the the Dutch Legion of Orange arrived in the
Third Battalion of the Dutch Legion of Orange Netherlands rather late, and after much of the hard
participated, marks the definitive end of French fighting had been done. On the other hand, little
rule in the Netherlands, and brings us to an hard fighting actually took place in the
assessment of the role of the Dutch Legion of Netherlands. The confrontation between French
Orange in the liberation of the Netherlands. Whilst and Allied forces in the Netherlands was more a
referring to the formation of the Dutch Legion of case of siege warfare. At this point in the campaign,
this style of warfare suited the French just fine. For
the Allies, who wished to march on Paris as quick
55 F.H.A. Sabron, De Vesting Gorinchem van November as possible, siege warfare meant detaching battle
1813 tot Maart 1814. (Breda: Koninklijke Militaire hardened first line troops from the main army to
Academie, 1902), 98-99, 102; Fall of Gorinchem: Sabron, lay siege to French occupied fortresses and towns.
De Vesting Gorinchem, 107; Battalion “in the field”:
When the Dutch Legion of Orange arrived in the
“Weekelijksche Sterkte Lijsten der Verschillende
Netherlands, it took over these second line duties
Corpsen der Staande Armée en der reeds
georganiseerde Battalions Landmilitie volgens from Prussian troops, thereby relieving Bülow58 of
ingekomene Rapporten der verscheidene strategic consumption and allowing the Prussian
Commandanten op den 28e February 1814”, NL-NA, general to concentrate his forces for a march on
2.02.01, Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6620, Staten van de sterkte Paris. The reason why, until now, the military
van het leger en het emplacement der troepen; Seventh contribution of the Dutch Legion of Orange is
Infantry Battalion of the Line attached to Dutch Brigade overlooked is quite simple. As soon as the
under Perponcher, and placed under General Graham: battalions of the Dutch Legion of Orange crossed
“William I to Bentinck tot Buckhorst, The Hague, 28 the Dutch frontier, they were merged into the new
February 1814”, NL-NA, 2.13.67, Ministerie van Oorlog,
Dutch army, and renumbered the Seventh, Eight
inv.no. 1.
56 The Second Battalion of the Dutch Legion of Orange
and Ninth Infantry Battalion of the Line.59 The
participated in the siege of Deventer: L.W. van Hoek,
“Deventer,” in Historische Gedenkboek der Herstelling van
Neêrlands Onafhankelijkheid in 1813 (Haarlem: De Erven F. 57 Colenbrander, Inlijving en Opstand, 256.
Bohn, 1912-1913), 36; “Generale Staat Zijner Koninklijke 58 Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von Bülow, Graf von
Hoogheids Troupen in de Verenigde Nederlanden op Dennewitz (February 16, 1755 – February 25, 1816)
den 29e April 1814”, NL-NA, 2.02.01, Staatssecretarie, 59 First Battalion of the Dutch Legion of Orange to the
inv.no. 6620; F.K. van Ommen Kloeke, “Overijssel en Seventh Battalion of Infantry of the Line: “Willhardt to
Zwolle,” in Historische Gedenkboek der Herstelling van William I, Coesfeld, 8 January 1814” NL-NA, 2.02.01,
Neêrlands Onafhankelijkheid in 1813 (Haarlem: De Erven F. Staatssecretarie, inv.no. 6566, January 1814, No. 15; “11
Bohn, 1912-1913), 605, and in the siege of Coevorden: January 1814, London”, NL-NA, 2.21.008.01, Constant
F.H.A. Sabron, In en Om Coevorden in 1813-'14. (Breda: Rebecque, inv.no. 25; Ringoir, De Nederlandse Infanterie,
Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 1913), 74. The Third 97; Naber, Prinses Wilhelmina, 288-289; “Nota”, NL-NA,
Battalion of the Dutch Legion of Orange participated in 2.21.008.66, Constant Rebecque, inv.no. 3; Second Battalion
the siege of Delfzijl: F.H.A. Sabron, De Blokkade van of the Dutch Legion of Orange to the Eighth Battalion of
Delfzijl in 1813-14. (Breda: Koninklijke Militaire Infantry of the Line: Ringoir, De Nederlandse Infanterie,
Academie, 1906.), 101-102, note 3. 107; Third Battalion of the Dutch Legion of Orange to
Dutch Legion of Orange also did much to restore
the credit of the House of Orange in the eyes of
Dutchmen. Whatever its inadequacies – such as a
lack of arms – the Dutch Legion of Orange came to
encapsulate the Dutch struggle against France, and
as such it became a true rallying point for
Dutchmen. The formation of the Dutch Legion of
Orange, finally, also helped to strengthen the
position of the House of Orange vis-à-vis the Allies
of the Sixth Coalition. Having militarily
contributed to the campaign allowed the House of
Orange to claim their position among the victors of
the War of the Sixth Coalition.
By means of final conclusion, then, the
misunderstanding in Dutch historiography
regarding the fate of the Dutch contingent of the
Grande Armée is the result of a misinterpretation
of the destruction of the Dutch contingent. That the
Dutch contingent was destroyed is not to say that
all troops perished on the fields of Russia. It simply
means that the contingent ceased to function as a
military unit. Accepting this fact may perhaps rid
Dutch historiography of a persistent falsehood. At
the same time, what then must we conclude if we
introduce this argument into the historiography of
the War of the Sixth Coalition? Did so many Dutch
troops survive because they were experts in
survival? Or was the Prince of Orange simply a
more cunning diplomat than other heads of state?
Or perhaps is it time to evaluate current
historiography as regards to the destruction of the
Grande Armée?
* In the first place I would like to thank the Institute of
World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the
Russian State University for the Humanities, the
Association Dialogue Franco-Russe, the International
Napoleonic Society, and the State Borodino War and
History Museum and Reserve for allowing me the
opportunity to present my research conclusions at the
conference: “Napoleon’s 1812 Russian Campaign in the
World History: A Retrospective View”. Also, I would
like to thank Michael Rowe, my doctoral supervisor, for
his valuable criticism and helpful comments on the
earlier draft of this paper.
the Ninth Battalion of Infantry of the Line: Ringoir, De
Nederlandse Infanterie, 110.
