

ILONA SALOMAA

**RAFAEL KARSTEN (1879-1956) AS A FINNISH SCHOLAR OF RELIGION
THE LIFE AND CAREER OF A MAN OF SCIENCE**

*Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of the
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CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim and Background of the Study 5

1.2. Previous Studies 7

1.3. Framing the Problem 12

1.4. Methods of Investigation 15

1.4.1. Hermeneutic Understanding of Historical Religious Material 15

1.4.2. The Study of the Spiritual Growth of an Individual 24

1.5. Material of the Study 32

2. RAFAEL KARSTEN'S SPIRITUAL GROWTH IN TERMS OF HIS BIOGRAPHY

2.1. The Intellectual Heritage of Childhood Home 43

2.2. Rafael Karsten's Spiritual Growth and Life 52

2.3. Post Scriptum 95

3. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF RAFAEL KARSTEN'S COMPARATIVE RELIGION

3.1. The Profession 95

3.2. The System 104

3.3. Brief Abstract 174

4. RAFAEL KARSTEN'S THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION 1900-1910

4.1. Article 174

4.2. Doctoral thesis 185

4.3. The Polemic on the Doctrine and Institutions of Christianity 198

4.3.1. Society 198

4.3.2. Book 216

4.4. Brief Abstract 244

5. RAFAEL KARSTEN AND THE TESTING OF A THEORY 1911-1956

5.1. *Terra Incognita* and Amerindian Religions 245

5.1.1. Selecting the Site 245

5.1.2. An Ethnologist at Work 255

5.1.3. Testing a Theory 271

5.2. The Religion of the Samek 294

5.2.1. Background 294

5.2.2. Main Principles 297

5.3. Brief Abstract 307

6. CONCLUSION - The Meaning of Rafael Karsten's Conception of Religion for His Comparative Religion 308

SOURCES AND LITERATURE

APPENDICES

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim and Background of the Study

The purpose of this study is to comprehensively analyse Rafael Karsten (1879-1956) as a Finnish scholar of religion, an aspect which has gone almost unnoticed. I say “comprehensively” because of my Cartesian inclination to make my studies so inclusive that I can be sure that I have taken into account all that is essential and relevant (René Descartes in *Discours de la méthode*, 1637) (1). I believe in details, as did Rafael Karsten and Edward Westermarck one hundred years ago. I believe in the ultimate meaning of matter, as the Swedish scholar Christer Lindberg who urged me very early in my study to “dig up” everything necessary as thoroughly as possible. I believe that via the details I am on my way to profound understanding. To some people this may sound megalomaniac, for me it only means a precise and conscientious historical analysis. In the first place, Rafael Karsten has a widespread reputation as a researcher of South American indigenous cultures. Today, his contribution to our knowledge of South American Indians is considered wide-ranging and valuable. Although Rafael Karsten is known as a sociologist and a philosopher he is, in my opinion, best known as a scholar of religion as this depicts his scholarly career most accurately. Rafael Karsten and his theoretical constructs was relegated to an inferior position after World War II. Gradually, Karsten became a humanistic classic and a household name, but was in spite of that a truly forgotten figure. The fundamental reason for the neglect was the rapidly changing climate of the scholarly world. After World War II, modern Parsonian functionalism arrived in Finland. Then, the sociologists were interested in events and features inside industrializing society. After the war, crime statistics showed a worrying rise in violent crime. It was not only a job for the police, but also an obligation of social scientists to prevent crimes. The war meant an enormous change in Finnish society and its individual members since the hostilities not only created a general need but also re-wrote many individual stories which could be called personal tragedies. The war made many people change their philosophies of life while the fundamental questions were how to ensure permanent peace in the world, an efficient security policy, and economic primary protection. This tendency was also reflected in Finnish ethnology and comparative religion. Inevitably, the days of exotic travels were a thing of the past. As a result, sociologists and anthropologists turned their interest to the inner structures of Finnish society.

During the last two decades, in the 1980s and 1990s, the scholarly literature on Rafael Karsten has increased. This increase indicates a growing interest in Rafael Karsten’s lifework (and the Westermarckian school) among the older and the younger generation of contemporary scholars. This scholarly interest may be understood as a revival. Yet, although Rafael Karsten’s scholarly figure has undergone a subtle restoration, little attention has been paid to him as a scholar of religion. What is it in our time that has re-awakened the scholars’ interest

in the old Westermarckians? The answer probably lies in the intellectual and ideological transition which has taken place in Finland in the recent years. The fantasy and complexity of postmodernism has disconnected the scholars from their academic past. Gradually, the importance of knowing how one's subject area originated has gained popularity and the search for academic identity and roots has begun. However, the enormous work of restoring the academic work of the Westermarckian school is still in its infancy and the reputation of many of his disciples is still quite modest. Paradoxically, many modern authors, like anthropologists writing on marriage and morality, share the same research topic and even results with the old Westermarckians, but, consciously or unconsciously, deny this fact. They probably have not realized how much in common their studies in reality have with the works of the Westermarckian school. I believe that the lapse of memory and the prolonged unpopularity of the Westermarckian dogma among the academic public has been so deep-rooted that modern anthropologists and scholars of religion are still hesitant to admit their scholarly common ground with Westermarckian sociology. We must recall, however, that today the lectures and textbooks on learning the sciences of sociology, anthropology, and comparative religion tend to begin with Malinowski and Durkheim, ignoring all previous aspects. I believe there are three reasons for the ignorance towards Rafael Karsten and his lifework. Firstly, the general reluctance regarding the Westermarckian circle has not favoured Karsten's works. Secondly, Karsten's lifework was emphasized by the study of religion in the small-scale societies of South America. For many decades South America as a research interest was considered remote and uninspiring among the Finnish academic circles. As late as 1977, the desirable field research sites within the Finnish study of religions were India, the Middle East, Africa and the Arctic (2). Amazingly, Rafael Karsten, for almost one hundred years, was the only Finnish scholar of religion to conduct field investigations on South American indigenous cultures and collect valuable field material. Only a couple of years ago, the Finnish scholar of religion, Petri Salonperä, undertook a field expedition to Chile to study the cultural customs and religion of the Mapuche Indians. Thirdly, Rafael Karsten's controversial position in the Westermarckian school has caused scholars see him only as a "polemical" or "critical" person. I build here on the dogmas of personality psychology which suggests that epithets like "polemical" and "critical" have to be perceived in connection with their context, that is, a specific situation. Yet, a person's polemic behaviour in a certain situation does not prove that his dominant personality trait should only be argumentative. As is well known, an individual and his personality are always *unitas multiplex*, a polymorphous entity, making him neither a merely negative nor a positive being. Unfortunately, scholars have not understood Karsten's behaviour as a multiform entity in which changed emotions vary. This has led to an exaggeration of his temperament. In fact, one aim of my analysis is to show that Rafael Karsten behaved very differently in public than in private.

I have written my work so that every chapter of the study can be seen as a separate account - the individual scholarly story of Rafael Karsten. On the other hand, every chapter requires an understanding of the preceding one, that is, they constitute a continuity. In my opinion, the

historical study of a classical scholar makes it unavoidable to give voice also to the research object himself. This means using direct citations whenever reasonable; we are here interpreting what Rafael Karsten thought about comparative religion, not how I understand the Finnish study of religions. Since I plan to publish Rafael Karsten's biography in the near future, I have in this study excluded many scholars and private persons who, although being precious in Rafael Karsten's life, were not the most significant figures for the development of his study of religions.

1.2. Previous Studies

The aim of this section is to provide a comprehensive review of studies which have been written about Rafael Karsten after his death in 1956. Although Rafael Karsten was a versatile and charismatic scholar, the literature about him and his academic career is scarce. The few scholarly attempts to understand his life have been quite brief and restricted. This means that in many cases Rafael Karsten's life has been introduced by briefly presenting the most significant episodes of his life. A quick survey in fact indicated that the most common way to describe Rafael Karsten and his academic endeavours was to call him a "representative of Westernmarckian social anthropology" or an "explorer of South American Indians". This sort of standpoint is, however, like a valley hidden from view; it does not provide a profound viewpoint on the individual's life. Concerning my research interest, Rafael Karsten as a Finnish scholar of religion, there is only one previous study relating to this issue. Professor Emeritus of History of Religions, Åke Hultkrantz, studied Karsten in his article *Rafael Karsten as a Student of Religion* (Acta Americana 2/1993). In his article Hultkrantz claims that Karsten's theoretical structure regarding comparative religion was complete in his first publications. Thus, Professor Hultkrantz assumes that Karsten's methodological and theoretical notions on the study of religions developed only insignificantly during the years. Professor Hultkrantz's claim has been a challenging hypothesis and problem for my study.

There is only one biographical study of Rafael Karsten which chronicles his scholarly life in detail (Acta Americana / *Special Issue in English on Rafael Karsten* 1993). However, the study properly presents only one part of Rafael Karsten's life, his adulthood. But, if we consider biographical study a comprehensive survey of an individual's life, we have to conclude that there is no extensive biographical research on Rafael Karsten to exhaustively describe his life narrative from the cradle to the grave. Another dilemma in the study of Rafael Karsten's life is that he did not produce any autobiographical material, that is to say, he never wrote a personal account of his life. The reason for Karsten's blank diary is nevertheless intelligible. Firstly, Karsten's blank diary followed the tradition of early British evolutionary anthropology. For the early ethnologists "self-reflective" anthropology was not a natural fact but an unfamiliar framework for conducting fieldwork. This meant that Karsten and his colleagues went to the field as a *tabula rasa*, a scholar who wanted to be intellectually naked

in front of the “original” (a scholar had to forget his backdrops, “root metaphors”, when in the field). As a consequence, fieldworkers were avidly interested in the “Other” and forgot “Self”, that is, a fieldworker portrayed the narratives and customs of other people but never pondered his own implicit ontology (backdrops) in an interaction. It was only Bronislaw Malinowski who in the 1910s suggested that the ethnological method should not necessitate the concealment of personal feelings, but instead a certain self-analysis of the fieldworker was permitted, even required. However, since Rafael Karsten considered the analysis of alien institutions more important than pouring out his personal experiences, he kept no diary. Secondly, the absence of an autobiography is accounted for by his disillusionment with science in the 1950s. Rafael Karsten felt bitter and unhappy as a result of having learned the unpleasant truth about science, especially Finnish sociology. His former admiration for the sociological method changed to uncontrolled dejection when he began to feel that the representatives of modern Parsonian functionalism (which came to Finland in the 1940s) undervalued the work of ethnosociologists. In the 1950s Karsten resigned from the committees he considered to be excessively eager supporters of modern sociology. Presumably, Rafael Karsten’s disillusioned episode was not conducive to autobiographical accounts, that is, his misconception of his status within the academic world did not provide any reason for reminiscences. On the other hand, Karsten could have reminisced about his life partially as did his Finnish colleague Gunnar Landtman who produced his unofficial memoirs *Studenter under Finlands Kampår 1898-1909*, (“The Students Under Finland’s Period of Oppression 1898-1909”) in 1940. Seven years later, yet another member of the Westermarckian school, Leo Ehrnrooth, published his memoirs *Från ett skiftesrikt liv* (“About an Eventful Life”) (1947). Although Karsten’s self-portrayal was not recorded in a diary or autobiography, he made artful use of the press which desired to publish travel accounts of the wanderings in exotic and distant countries. In the Westermarckian context newspapers like *Nya Pressen*, *Hufvudstadsbladet* and *Svenska Dagbladet* were important forums where scholars could present their scientific achievements. Rafael Karsten was diligent in describing his undertakings in South America in various newspapers and his detailed travel accounts can be seen as some sort of autobiographical activity.

One difficulty concerning Rafael Karsten’s life is that there are no biographies (life stories or life histories) available. This means that there are no studies based on biographical interviews with Rafael Karsten. During his lifetime Karsten gave several interviews to the Finnish Broadcasting Company (*Yleisradio*) in which he described himself as a researcher of South American Indians. Only two of these audiotapes have been preserved and are stored at the audiotape archives of the Finnish Broadcasting Company. These interviews, however, were very fragmentary and do not fulfil the standards of life story material. Furthermore, there are no private tapes (nor notes on the tape recordings) extant in which Rafael Karsten is interviewed and encouraged to tell about his life. Neither is there any life historical material about Rafael Karsten. In biographical study life histories include information from other persons, in addition to the informant’s own story. Life histories may cover the entire life of an

individual or just some segments of his life. Life histories are always products of the interaction between the scholar and the informants. By interviewing the informants (research object and his reference group) and collecting data from mixed literary sources, the scholar develops a comprehensive synthesis of an individual's life span (the final output is his objective holistic narrative about the life of the research object). (1.) Unfortunately, Rafael Karsten's legend is only alive in the accounts of his relatives and friends and in the dog-eared pages of private letters and documents, whereas his own interactive memoirs are missing. Thus, according to the rules of the life historical method, we can conclude that there are no studies or material on Rafael Karsten drawing on oral and written information, produced by the research object and his reference group. In the following overview I examine the most important studies and articles written about Rafael Karsten over the years. Since the list has many items (new articles and studies are produced continuously) it reviews the present-day situation. The publications are presented in reverse order, from more recent studies to older ones.

Monographies (also academic theses). Emeritus Professor of Sociology, University of Helsinki, Erik Allardt, published his comprehensive study *The History of the Social Sciences in Finland 1828-1918* in 1997. In his research Allardt describes Karsten's life in a biographical and chronological manner and finally explains how Karsten and his scholarly working methods deviated from the scientific routine of his mentor Edward Westermarck. Erik Allardt sees Karsten's descriptive method as a valid working formula which "apparently gave a very reliable picture of life within the villages and tribes under scrutiny" (2). In 1994 Marianne Siitonen revised her Master's thesis *Rikkomuksen tunnustaminen muinaisen Perun Inka-kulttuurissa Rafael Karstenin mukaan* ("The Confession of an Offence in the Inca Culture of Ancient Peru - According to Rafael Karsten") at the University of Helsinki. Siitonen's study belonged to a branch of comparative religion and its aim was to analyse confession of an offence according to the laws of the ancient Inca, whereupon Rafael Karsten's Inca studies offered a framework for her investigations. In a wider context Siitonen's study is valuable, since it examines an area (Inca confession according to Rafael Karsten) which is fairly unknown and inadequately studied. In 1996 I revised my Master's thesis *Rafael Karsten suomalaisen vertailevan uskontotieteen edustajana* ("Rafael Karsten As a Scholar of Finnish Comparative Religion") at the University of Helsinki. Rafael Karsten and his research topics have regularly attracted more interest abroad than in Finland. In 1993, a group of Swedish scholars published *A Special Issue on Rafael Karsten* in the Journal of the Swedish Americanist Society, *Acta Americana*. The study was the first attempt to bring Rafael Karsten's life to a wide audience. Numerous prominent academic authors made an important contribution to the success of the book. The essays in the book reflected the diversity of the present interest in Rafael Karsten. The articles are not bound to a certain branch of science, but introduce Karsten's academic career in a multidisciplinary manner. The most significant quality of this book is that it serves as an excellent handbook for scholars interested in Karsten's career.

Articles. The articles written about Rafael Karsten and his scholarly career have a dual nature. First, there are articles which are written about other people, but touch sporadically on Karsten's professional life. There are numerous essays and writings which describe and analyse Karsten's academic endeavours, *en passant*, but, since the primary object aims to analyse other persons or phenomena, examination of Karsten has been brief and casual. I call these articles "minor mentions" as they only infrequently present Rafael Karsten's life career. Secondly, there are articles which are almost totally dedicated to the memory of Rafael Karsten. This includes articles which are fervently written about Karsten and his life career. Due to their comprehensive nature I call these articles "major mentions". Since the amount of "minor mentions" is considerably greater than the amount of "major mentions", I concentrate on presenting those "major mentions" which are dedicated solely to the life of Rafael Karsten. Furthermore, it would be impossible to name all the "minor mentions" written about Karsten. Although, sometimes "minor mentions" could even include more significant information than "major mentions", I only specify the names of the articles dedicated exclusively to Rafael Karsten and to cherishing his memory.

I have analysed Rafael Karsten in my article *Tohtori Karsten ja intiaanit* ("Dr. Karsten and the Indians") and *Tsantsa-festivaali* ("The Tsantsa Festival") in the Finnish Indian Magazine, *Kajo* (2/1999). Moreover, I have analysed Rafael Karsten's theoretical constructs in my article *Darwin oli varovainen pessimisti* ("Darwin Was a Cautious Pessimist") in the newspaper *Aamulehti* (26/11/2001). Ari Siiriäinen, Professor of Archaeology at the University of Helsinki, studied Rafael Karsten in his two articles *Tutkijoita Andeilla ja Amazoniassa* ("Explorers in the Andes and the Amazonas"), *Kahvi, Pahvi ja Tango* 1998 and *Rafael Karsten ja lähdekritiikin merkitys* ("Rafael Karsten and the Importance of Source Criticism"), *Suomen Antropologi* 2/1999. Especially, Siiriäinen's article on Rafael Karsten's source criticism examines and criticizes interestingly the way Karsten neglected the archaeological data available when interpreting the rapid expansion of the Inca state. Nevertheless, Siiriäinen's criticism shows understanding towards Karsten's procedure since he is aware that Karsten fundamentally had a negative attitude towards archaeology. According to Karsten, fieldwork amongst living people (in Swedish *levande människor*) was more exacting than the excavation of inanimate pots (3). The social anthropologist Jonas Nockert analyses Rafael Karsten in his article *Rafael Karsten and the "Ethno" in Ethnobotany* (*Acta Americana* 2/1995). Nockert's purpose is to try to re-establish the significance of Rafael Karsten's ethnobotanical studies. According to Nockert, the scholarly world has looked upon Karsten's ethnobotanical studies as being notable and valuable but outdated. Nockert emphasizes that Karsten's merit in ethnobotanical studies was that "he sought to reach beyond the observable aspects and did not merely acknowledge the close cultural and religious relationship between plants and "primitive" man, but also tried to study the plants accordingly" (4). Nockert's article is significant since it studies in depth Karsten's botanical and galenic pharmaceutics which has previously been little studied. I am not alone in the opinion that Karsten's ethnobotanical studies, which attempted at a valid index of Riobamba river plants and herbs,

are still valuable, especially in with regard to extinction of species, which means that primeval forests, for instance, lost many forms of plants and herbs and it takes millions of years for new species to make up for the loss. Thus, Karsten's collections of plants may already represent species that have become extinct or herbs at risk of becoming extinct. Interestingly, pharmacologists and toxicologists, Jan G. Bruhn, Bo Holmstedt and Jan-Erik Lindgren studied Karsten's ethno-pharmacology in their article *Natema, the Hallucinogenic Drink of the Jivaro Indians of Ecuador* (*Acta Americana* 2/1995). In his article *It Takes More than Fieldwork to Become a Culture Hero of Anthropology - The Story of Rafael Karsten* (*Anthropos* 90/1995) Christer Lindberg analyses Karsten's career as a researcher of South American Indians (especially as an explorer of the Jibaros). Another aim of Lindberg's review is to compare Karsten's anthropological career to Bronislaw Malinowski's endeavours in human sciences. Lindberg's deduction is straightforward: the unprecedented fame enjoyed by Malinowski has shadowed the careers of many celebrated scholars, whose studies have thus been sadly forgotten and undervalued. Rafael Karsten's daughter Maggie Karsten-Sveander analyses her father's life biographically in her issue *Rafael Karsten (1879-1956) - Från Kvevlax prästgård till Amazonas djungel* ("Rafael Karsten (1879-1956) - From Kvevlax Parsonage to the Jungles of the Amazonas"), *Antropologiska porträtt* 1993. The article is inspiring since it reveals some interesting details about Karsten's family life. Maggie Karsten-Sveander remembers her father as a distant figure who mostly lived in his own world (5.) Maggie Karsten-Sveander's article is significant since it gives an inkling of Rafael Karsten's personal life. The recollections of relatives are always noteworthy, since they allow an in-depth study of an individual. In his article *Rafael Karstenin intiaanit ja nykyaika* (1993) ("Rafael Karsten's Indians and the Present") the sociologist Jöns Carlson analyses Rafael Karsten's South American studies and considers how Karsten's research data could survive in a modern academic context, that is, how Karsten's research in South America could enrich present-day and future anthropological examinations. Erik Allardt and Jöns Carlson briefly introduce Rafael Karsten's scholarly career in the article *Koko maailmasta yhteen kylään: sosiaaliantropologit* (1989), ("From World to a Single Village: Social anthropologists"). The article appears in a larger work *Matka-arkku* (1989), which charts various Finnish explorers. The article presents Karsten's life by emphasizing his studies in South America. Jöns Carlson also writes about Karsten in his book *Suomalaisen sosiologian juuret* (1979), ("The Root of Finnish Sociology"). Dr. Arne Runeberg wrote about his academic muse in the article *Edward Westermarck och Rafael Karsten i 1970-talsperspektiv* (1977), ("Edward Westermarck and Rafael Karsten in the 1970s Perspective"). The aim of Runeberg's article is to initiate the renaissance of the Westermarckian tradition in the framework of the 1970s. Runeberg tries to justify the Westermarckian tradition by proving it also to be valid in the 1970s academic surroundings. Runeberg's endeavour evoked many kinds of opinions. At the University of Turku social scientists tried to evoke a new interest in historical approach, which indicated that the old Westermarckians were also back in favour (6). Another attempt to restore Rafael Karsten's scholarly fame is Ilmari Susiluoto's article *Rafael Karsten politiikan antropologina* (1976) ("Rafael Karsten as an Anthropologist of Politics"). Susiluoto aims to glorify Karsten's

academic status by praising his notable Inca studies. According to Susiluoto, Karsten's Inca studies are forgotten classics, which nevertheless deserve continuous public recognition. Ilmari Susiluoto analyses Karsten in another article *Kulttuurirelativismi maailmankatsomuksena ja tutkimusohjelmana* ("Cultural Relativism as an Ideology and Research Programme"), *Suomen Antropologi* 4/1978. Although the article presents elements from Karsten's scholarly career, it also examines sporadically Edward Westermarck's, Gunnar Landtman's and Arne Runeberg's academic paths. The speciality and perhaps peculiarity of the article is its method of combining an evolutionary anthropological thinking pattern with Marxism. An interesting and somewhat singular idea is Susiluoto's suggestion that the Westermarck Society should be a club of committed continuators of the Westermarckian research tradition. Susiluoto takes the view that modern sociologists are now the major components of the Westermarck Society when the situation should be vice versa. Susiluoto tries to legitimate his claim by asking how Rafael Karsten would have reacted if the Finnish theologians had founded "the Karsten Society" after his death. (7.) In December 1957 Ragnar Numelin addressed Rafael Karsten and his scholarly career in his commemorative presentation, *Rafael Karsten*, published later in the *Yearbook of Societas Scientiarum Fennica* (1959). However, this eulogy to a deceased colleague was not the only way for Numelin to remember his old colleague. He wrote several other papers about Karsten's life to various different scholarly journals published in Finland and Sweden. Because of their commemorative nature, Numelin's presentations did not analyse Karsten's academic career in depth, but on the contrary examined the culminations of his career in a celebratory manner. In his commemorative speech Numelin described Karsten as "the most independent of Westermarck's disciples" (8). Numelin's statement was apposite since Karsten's search for an individual existence was like a storm which blows asunder all personal bonds and obligations.

In sum, during the years various scholars representing different branches of science have written about Rafael Karsten. However, the amount of the published articles as well as the number of Karsten researches is still relatively small. The situation is even more exceptional if we examine articles and studies analysing Rafael Karsten as a scholar of religion. Apart from my own work, there is only one article, Professor Åke Hultkrantz's review, which takes a broader approach to Rafael Karsten as a scholar of religion.

1.3. Framing the Problem

The focus of my study is to analyse Rafael Karsten as a Finnish scholar of religion. In the course of the work, Karsten's scholarly career is examined in a comprehensive manner. This means that all significant facts and episodes which had an impact on Karsten's research career as a scholar of religion are accurately depicted. Since the boundaries of different established disciplines were breaking down at the beginning of the 20th century, Rafael Karsten's role as a scholar of religion coincided with those of a sociologist, ethnologist, and philosopher

(examined more closely later on). Although my study has a biographical emphasis, it is not merely an investigation of Rafael Karsten's personal history. Instead, the study attempts to define Rafael Karsten as a representative of Finnish comparative religion. This attempt to confine the research problem to comparative religion is reasonable, since a mere biographical study of Rafael Karsten would have been too extensive a project. Since the comprehensive study of Rafael Karsten's career necessitates that an author is closely acquainted with various subject areas within the humanities, social sciences, theological studies, and even natural sciences (sociology, cultural and social anthropology, social psychology, philosophy, comparative religion, archaeology, theology, biology, and geography) I realized that such a procedure would fragment my study into numerous parts, whereupon the wholeness and the aim of study might be lost from sight. Nevertheless, an individual's life is an entirety in which every part has its meaning, but wherein elements also interact with each other. Therefore, I comprehended very early that it was an unrealizable endeavour to try to intensively analyse Rafael Karsten as a scholar of religion without also taking into account other aspects of his life. One hundred years ago Finnish sociology, anthropology and comparative religion (branches of science in moral and social philosophy) were still only searching for their identity and academic basis. This scholarly astonishment of pioneers was also transmitted to scholars who simultaneously tried to create and promote the methods and premises of various subject areas (the study of religions, however, became institutionalized as an autonomous academic discipline in Finland as late as 1963). Due to the multidisciplinary customs of Karsten's time, my analysis will at times also describe him as an anthropologist, a sociologist and a philosopher. Although Karsten's career was inevitably multidimensional, I believe that his identity, role and position as a scholar of religion was also very clear and distinct. Thus, my ultimate goal is to make a thorough study of one aspect of Rafael Karsten's life by relating it to the whole (descriptive research problem). The other aspects of Karsten's life therefore remain open for the interest of future researchers.

The research scheme of my study is the following:

The Primary Problem: Rafael Karsten as a Finnish Scholar of Religion:
The Life and Career of a Man of Science

The Secondary - Explanatory Problems:

Rafael Karsten's Spiritual Growth in Terms of His Biography; *How does the analysis of Karsten's spiritual growth explain the birth of this vigorous ego and provide terms of reference for the late events of his life? Why is the analysis of Karsten's religious path meaningful? Why is the analysis of his biography necessary in order to understand his spiritual growth?*

The Terms of Reference of Rafael Karsten's Comparative Religion; *How was the Westermarck school born? How is it possible to define Rafael Karsten as a scholar of religion? What is it important to observe in this process? Is there something called "Westermarckian study of religions"?* Who were the most significant theoretical figures behind Karsten's reasoning? What was his theoretical system like?

Rafael Karsten's Theoretical Understanding of Comparative Religion 1900-1910; *How to describe and analyse Karsten's period of creating the theories and methodology of comparative religion? How intensely did Rafael Karsten approve theoretical and methodological solutions of empiricism, evolutionism and positivism and how explicitly did he apply them to his studies within comparative religion? What kind of foundation did Rafael Karsten's early research lay for his study of religions?*

Rafael Karsten and the Testing of a Theory 1911-1956; *What was the main inspiration underlying Karsten's enthusiasm for South American studies? How did he gather his data? How did Karsten's field investigations in South America testify to his previous theoretical premises? Why did Rafael Karsten travel to Petsamo? How did this early journey and a general interest in the religion of the Saami develop and verify his previous ideas of "primitive" religion (the essence of Rafael Karsten's study)?*

Conclusion - The Meaning of Rafael Karsten's Conception of Religion for His Comparative Religion; *What was the meaning of Karsten's conception of religion for his study of religions? What is our final impression of Rafael Karsten as a Finnish scholar of religion?*

Although my study examines Rafael Karsten more or less as an entity, it takes into account the whole external milieu in which the research subject has been active. I feel it is my categorical duty to explain how the research subject communicated and interacted with his environment, that is, how he influenced his milieu and how the surroundings acted on him. Thus, one essential part of my research problem is to show how the scholarly, political, cultural, and social atmosphere of Karsten's time influenced his studies. Rafael Karsten, like any other historical person, was a product of his own age, bound to the events around him. Thus, my analysis of his scholarly profile and its maturation is also inextricably linked with various milieus of his era. One basic function of my study is to emphasize the importance of perceiving accurately the historical setting of the research object, before ascertaining who he was and what he represented. This study is divided into six major sections. The first chapter, *Introduction*, deals with previous studies, the research problem, the research method, and research material (source criticism). The second chapter, *Rafael Karsten's Spiritual Growth in Terms of His Biography*, explains the birth of this vigorous ego and gives a term of reference for the later events of his life. The investigation of spiritual growth attempts to describe Karsten's experiences of becoming dissatisfied with his childhood religion as well as his later approval of ideas of agnosticism. The analysis of Rafael Karsten's religious path is significant

since it meaningfully portrays and recognizes his conscious choices within comparative religion. The third chapter, *The Terms of Reference of Rafael Karsten's Comparative Religion*, analyses the development of the Finnish study of religions at the beginning of the 20th century. Firstly, the aim of the chapter is to analyse in detail the study of religions in the Westermarckian terms of reference. Then, my aim is to ponder how the Westermarckian study of religions is defined. Is there an entity called "Westermarckian study of religions"? The chapter is also significant since it explains how Karsten's comparative religion acquired its theoretical identity. But it also locates Karsten and his studies in a larger context. Without knowing the historical and theoretical background of Karsten's reasoning it would be futile to try to understand him as a representative of Finnish comparative religion. The fourth chapter, *Rafael Karsten's Theoretical Understanding of Comparative Religion 1900 -1910*, analyses the way how Rafael Karsten's thinking on comparative religion was established and how it developed in the first decade of the 20th century. The years 1900-1910 were notable for Karsten's scholarly career, since during these politically confused years he presented and created his first premises and theories on comparative religion, that is, the hypotheses created during these years were the foundation for his later scholarly considerations. In the fifth chapter, *Rafael Karsten and the Testing of a Theory 1911-1956*, Rafael Karsten's scholarly career is analysed in the light of seven different fieldwork expeditions which he undertook in South America and Petsamo between the years 1911 and 1952. The purpose of the chapter is to ponder whether fieldwork investigations brought modifications to Karsten's theoretical constructs. The chapter also deals with Karsten's fieldwork practice. In the *Conclusion* chapter, the research outcome will be deliberated under the headline "the Meaning of Rafael Karsten's Conception of Religion for His Comparative Religion". The purpose of this deliberation is not to introduce new discussion but to summarize the suppositions and hypotheses of Karsten's study of religions and discuss once more in which direction Karsten's conception of religion led his study of religions, that is, what is our final impression of Rafael Karsten as a scholar of religion?

1.4 Methods of Investigation

1.4.1. Hermeneutic Understanding of Historical Religious Material

Re-creating and re-living the past is a perplexing and even mysterious scholarly phenomenon. Thus, the study of past events requires a method which brings cosmos out of chaos, that is, allows a reasonable interpretative understanding of historical facts. The method guided by the potentiality of "authentic" understanding and possibilities of interpretation has been considered *hermeneutica suo loco*, that is, a procedure which is appropriate for the study of historical occurrences which are among the historical consciousness of man. (1.) The epistemology of hermeneutics stems from a mythological narrative of Hermes. According to a myth of ancient Greece, Hermes was a harbinger of the gods who transmitted the messages of

the gods to the mortals. Hermes, *Psychopompos* with his *caduceus* (winged assistant(s)), acted as a guide to souls on their way to the underworld. Thus, the main role of Hermes was to *interpret* the behests of gods so that the transmigrating souls could understand them. The elaborate interpretative nature of Hermes stimulated the minds of scholars, who later on named their endeavour to construe historical situations (*historia*) hermeneutics (*hermeneia*). (2.)

Hermeneutics as a method of interpretation can be traced back to late antiquity, especially back to the ancient Greeks' study of literature. By interpreting textual passages, the Greeks were finally able to connect part and whole into an entirety, that is, to trace outputs of uncertain origin. During the Middle Ages, interpretation as a matter of understanding drifted into theological studies. Then, hermeneutics was used in non-literal interpretations of the Bible. However, hermeneutics as a special discipline emerged only after the Renaissance and the Reformation. At that time the most prominent biblical interpreter was Matthias Flacius Illyricus, whose work *Clavis Scripturae Sacrae* (1567) furthered and reshaped Protestant hermeneutics. In Flacius's opinion, the task of hermeneutic interpretation was to make the message of the Scriptures intelligible. Interestingly, Flacius emphasized that explication was not possible without hermeneutic training. The hermeneutic interpretation was not only popular amongst theologians in the Renaissance and the Reformation, but also philologists, scholars of jurisprudence, and philosophers made their own contributions to the development of the method. Philologists especially took an interest in the theories of interpretation and employed them in their philological criticism (*Ars Critica*). (3.) During the period of the Enlightenment, the status of *hermeneia* underwent modifications. Then, hermeneutics transformed into one general method or theory which was applicable for everyone interested in interpretation. Perhaps the most prominent pioneer of hermeneutics in the 18th century, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), endeavoured to connect philological focus on theological interpretation of exegesis and thus formulate one general hermeneutics. (4.) After Schleiermacher's approach, hermeneutics as a general "implication" was furthered by numerous theorists. The most significant representatives of universal hermeneutics after Schleiermacher were Droysen, Dilthey, Boeckh, Betti, Husserl, Ingarden, Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas, and Apel. Alongside universal hermeneutics, there have appeared numerous thought-structures of interpretation which have concentrated on specialities, like Mircea Eliade's hermeneutics of religion and religious phenomena within comparative religion. A remarkable feature in the history of the conceptual nature of hermeneutic method is the fact that since the beginning scholars have endeavoured to search for a general definition of hermeneutics. Above all, scholars have tried to establish an umbrella conception, which would impart a cohesive face to a multiplex method characterized by conflicting views. The most pertinent and perhaps the most applied definition has considered hermeneutics a theory or philosophy of the interpretation of meaning. Today, however, a formulation of a system of hermeneutic rules depends mostly on which strand a scholar represents. The most lucid and updated grouping of different hermeneutical strings has

been presented by Bleicher (1980): “it is possible to distinguish three clearly separable strands: hermeneutical theory, hermeneutical philosophy and critical hermeneutics” (5). All three hermeneutical strings offer a diverse standpoint for “translating” the past, but it is still open to various interpretations whether they actually represent three separate schools, since the logical variations inside every line are diverse. Therefore, it is typical of hermeneutics that every scholar, even within one tradition, individually formulates the idea of hermeneutics. But then again, scholars are also able to co-operate, like Habermas and Apel, within critical hermeneutics (6).

After defining the conceptual nature of hermeneutics the next phase is to observe how an interpreter clothes her endeavours in hermeneutical garb, that is, how it is possible to summarize a fundamental pattern of the hermeneutic procedure.

Figure 1. An idea of hermeneutics

An interpreter (individual reading of an individual work)



Understanding ⇒ Interpreting ⇒ Ultimate explanation ⇒ extant religious
 meaning meaning of meaning material, for instance

In order to ascertain the proper meaning, it is necessary that the interpreter herself understands the exposition of material before interpreting it to others. The whole idea of hermeneutics is thus primarily based upon understanding. Interpretation operates in the structure which we have already understood. In the language of hermeneutics it means that an interpreter makes the meaning explicit by asking particular questions: What does this text mean? How is its meaning transferred to us, to our present existence? Finally, an ultimate explanation refers to a situation in which an interpreter gives a final version of her material. That is to say, her *a priori* hermeneutic cognition establishes itself in a set form in her literary works. The hermeneutical method used in this study is part of hermeneutic theory, which focuses on the problematique of a general theory of interpretation. Hermeneutic theory has been employed by human sciences (or *Geisteswissenschaften*, which include the social sciences). The central importance hermeneutic theory gives to interpretation is revealed in its endeavour to clarify the original message and thought of an author by re-experiencing and re-thinking his/her life. This happens by interpretation, explanation (*Erklärung*) and understanding (*Verstand*). Deviating from hermeneutic philosophy, hermeneutic theory assumes that a process of interpretation is characterized by objectivity, that is, it is possible to reduce the implicit ontology of a scholar by several procedures during interpretation. In my study, the hermeneutic procedures of objectivity have been designed according to my independent interpretative approaches, which in turn are based on the models of Johann Gustav Droysen, a


representative of historical method within hermeneutic theory. Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884) was a German historian who, along with the Italian philosopher Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744), has been called the most prominent representative of historical hermeneutics. Droysen's historical method originated from discontent with Hegelian teleological history which appeared too speculative an approach for scholars interested in the profound intuition of historical time and space. Droysen's formula also drew a methodological distinction between positivist and historical approaches, whereupon historical method was not seen as a section of positivist influence, but as an historical discipline itself. Thus, Droysen's historical hermeneutics found its niche between the paradigms of Hegelianism and positivism, whereupon its obedience to these scientific laws remained unactual. (7.)

Droysen's assumptions presented here are unified by seven closely related themes. Firstly, the data for historical investigation is not the past as such, since it has disappeared, but the material (recollections) which has survived for posterity. Secondly, the way the past is reconstructed and divided chronologically and demographically (time and space) depends on a definer. Thirdly, it is possible to follow the traces of man, since the man as "flesh of our flesh" is intelligible to us, that is, a human understands a human. This reflects the duality between nature and history (mind). We can understand animals and plants only in part, since their inner nature does not completely speak to us and since they do not produce any visible historical data. Fourthly, historical method means *forschend zu verstehen*, understanding by means of investigation. This indicates that the re-creation of the past is based on criticism and interpretation. Criticism is concerned with the authenticity of sources, whereas interpretation refers to the examination of what sources have divulged in terms of historical explication. Fifthly, the process of understanding the past is all-inclusive, it is "as truly synthetic as analytic, as truly inductive as deductive"(8). Sixthly, the talent of understanding requires the power of knowing the past without a learned skill, that is, a person interpreting and understanding history utilizes intuition. Writing a truly objective history is impossible, since the past is irretrievably lost. However, a historian is touched by historical forces which have been preserved within the present and these remnants of the past animate her and her work. Seventhly, the task of interpretation is not to verify and support historical determinism (why things had to originate and had to be as they were), but to understand past phenomena relatively. This means that the task of historical hermeneutics is not to interpret directly particular historical events (for instance, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923) but through animated reading and analysing the existing materials interpret and reconstruct the past in a broad-minded manner. (9.) In this study Droysen's suggestions are presented in a reduced manner, avoiding philosophical modes of attitudes to which he was somewhat prone. Although Droysen was a historian and desired to establish the non-speculative rules of historical inquiry within hermeneutic theory, his reasoning intermittently slipped into philosophical romanticism, which in a speculative and idealistic manner defined the understanding between people, state, and religion. Thus, Droysen's contingent idealistic

philosophical movement fulfilled pre-eminently Schleiermacher's definition according to which "hermeneutics is as much art as it is science" (10).

The seven facts presented characterized Droysen's historical hermeneutics in general but in a strict sense Droysen emphasized that understanding should focus only on one mode of interpretation. According to Droysen, there were various forms of interpretation which could be categorized under hermeneutics. He mentioned six distinct forms of interpretation: pragmatic interpretation, the interpretation of the conditions, psychological interpretation, sociological interpretation, the critical interpretation of ideology, and the interpretation of ideas and morals. Pragmatic interpretation critically examined the causal nature of events, thus interpretation might be demonstrative, analogical or comparative in nature. The interpretation of conditions (economic interpretation) meant that the circumstances were primarily taken into account in interpretation since conditions made the events possible. Psychological interpretation understood the historical on a more personal level. This mode of interpretation saw the individual through her position, work and surroundings, that is, the individual was not interpreted merely as a person or through personality, but in connection with the whole context of her existence. Sociological interpretation saw social level as a standpoint of interpretation. The critical interpretation of ideology interpreted dogmas and convictions of society on a more intensive level than sociological interpretation. Finally, the interpretation of ideas observed ethical forces which outlined the life of an individual. This mode of interpretation took into account the deviating conditions of every age, how moral and ethical forces altered in the movement of history. (11.)

Figure 2. Illustration of the method used in this study



In the following analysis I will present an example of the application of Droysen's theory to the study of the life history of an individual. My examination analyses Rafael Karsten in a category of Droysenian psychological interpretation, when Karsten is interpreted through his work and personality, but in connection to the whole context of his existence, that is, his surroundings. However, Droysen's seven premises of the adequate nature of historical interpretation have provided an actual framework for my study, where the psychological mode of interpretation presents the general context of the study (see Figure four). The object of my

hermeneutic explication and critical examination is a historical person and the analysis of his scholarly activity. The data for my investigation is not the past as such, but the (religious) material of Rafael Karsten which has survived and which can be re-lived and re-experienced. As in every historical study, a scholar is unable to experience the events which produced the works and ideas of a research object. Thus, a scholar has to interpret residues which indicate of how, when and what occurred. Re-living and re-experiencing the material presupposes a flexible (interpretative and understanding) mind in a scholar which endeavours to re-live and sense a life and career in which religion and science are at issue. In general, it means that a scholar transposts herself into the conditions: she experiences, observes and sees things as they are/were in their historical context, following the *Zeitgeist* of the material. This occurs by obeying Droysen's method of understanding by means of investigation (*forschend zu verstehen*) and proportional analysis. During the study, I paid special attention to criticism of my source material, which indicates that all sources (documents, books, monuments, and records) used or quoted in this study have been secured by process of authentication. Similarly, I have estimated the real meaning and position of the sources of my study. The principal aim of relative analysis is to interpret Rafael Karsten's scholarly activity within comparative religion, not merely by studying one event in his life (the influence of his fieldwork trips on his study of religions) but by "animating" his work on a larger scale. The purpose of relative analysis is also to adhere to an agreement that the study gives room for further analyses, that is, my survey of Rafael Karsten does not aim at a final picture of him, instead, it raises many questions which should be re-examined in the future.


Moreover, I believe that written texts alone cannot invite the art of interpretation, therefore I have augmented my historical explication with audiovisual experiences (discussions, journeys, and radio programmes). The manner in which the past, *historia*, is reconstructed and represented as a tool of my study refers to the whole of reality in which Rafael Karsten was active. Thus, the past life is reconstructed through a historical era which begins from 1879 and follows the train of events to 1956. This chronological period of seventy-seven years characterizes Rafael Karsten's life, from birth to death. The reason for starting with his childhood lies in the fact that the activity of Karsten's childhood and adolescence must be synthetically combined with the actions of his scholarly career, and from this association the idea of Rafael Karsten's scientific career is contemplated. My analysis thus proceeds chronologically. An ideal rule of my hermeneutic analysis is the premise that it is possible to follow and understand the traces of Rafael Karsten in spite of the historical distinctions between him and us. By using the concepts of Descartes, the *imaginatio* and *intellectio* of a human are in the same fashion rationalities and absurdities to his fellow men as to himself. Although the lapse of time gives these meanings an archaic label, the core of understanding is preserved, that is, a human is able to understand a human through history. This symbolical communion with the past and the present has given power to my endeavour to understand Rafael Karsten as a Finnish scholar of religion by interpreting the "religious material" he produced (here religious material refers to Karsten's printed and unprinted sources which

influenced and furthered his career as a scholar of religion). Nevertheless, to adopt culturally alien categories, that is, to assume the world of a historical person with all its experiences, is a complex task. This means, hermeneutically speaking, the dual role of author and interpreter. According to the general laws of hermeneutics, a valid interpretation is formed by an authentic realization of the perspective of the author, without discarding the knowledge and experiences of the interpreter. Thus, every action of interpretation involves two parties: the author and the interpreter. If the interpreter adopts the perspective of the author completely there is a danger of biased explication. The subjectivity of the author is similar to the subjectivity of the interpreter. Both of them are “organic” selves whose subjectivity is self-evident but who aspire to a certain objectivity. In this study the dual role of author and interpreter is resolved by relying upon the idea of objective interpretation. Although Droysen never believed in objective history written by an understanding historian, I believe that an interpreter is able to suppress her subjectivity during the research process. My ideal of objectivity is not that of eliminating one’s cognitive beliefs but rather subordinating one’s cognitive presumptions to the process of interpretation, so that the research process itself testifies the mental complexity of a scholar. During the analysis I have interpreted and understood Rafael Karsten’s life in a context of objective explication, which means that I have kept my mind open to interpretation. An aspiration to objectivity has not, however, indicated that my mind served as *tabula rasa* in the context of the interpretation of Rafael Karsten’s religious material. On the contrary, my mind has certainly had preconceptions which have testified to my faculty for truthful interpretation. Nevertheless, I have explicitly exposed my cognitive assumptions and expectations to the process of interpretation whereupon the process itself has operated as a controller of my cognitive cosmos. I have also extended my notion of objectivity to cover the equality and neutrality of an author. The ultimate aim of my thesis is to present a neutral view of Rafael Karsten as a scholar of religion. In the context of objectivity it means that my investigation is a scholarly act of interpretation and understanding which proceeds without using justifications, excuses or accusations as principal research tools. I have not felt it my duty to speak in favour of Rafael Karsten or pass scholarly judgements on him, on the contrary, I have explicated him as a scholar of religion whose life I only reconstructed from extant materials. Interestingly, the ideal of objectivity in general has raised contradictory opinions amongst scholars of religion during the years. Helmer Ringgren and R.J. Zwi Werblowsky have suggested that (absolute) objectivity is impossible. However, Harald Biezais has presented divergent opinion according to which “to deny science’s objectivity is to totally deny science” (12). It is this proposal that my emphasis relies.

My process of historical interpretation differs from that of Droysen’s in that I regard the process of understanding as more “exclusive” than Droysen. Droysen considers understanding a total historical event, and his conception of understanding is thus all-inclusive, as truly inductive as deductive. My deviating mode of interpretation has been twofold: firstly, to divide Rafael Karsten’s life into sections and interpret him and his life and career one part at a time, and secondly, to form out of parts a single complete whole which understands Rafael

Karsten as a scholar of religion according to the context of synthesis. As the method points out, my interpretation derived from pieces to wholeness has been highly inductive in nature and has thus not been a concrete dilation of Droysen's extensive essence of understanding. However, according to contemporary views of hermeneutics, the process of interpretation is inevitably a circle. E.D. Hirsch has suggested (1976) that we must know the whole before we know a part, since the content of the part is guided by its purpose in the larger whole (13). Thus, Hirsch's horizon of interpretation is deductive in nature. The following diagram shows the differences between Hirsch's, Droysen's and my considerations.


Figure 3. The process of interpretation



Although Hirsch is convinced of interpretation through deductive understanding, I suggest that the possibility of understanding the whole before its parts is unreasonable, since how could an interpreter realize the whole before knowing the meaning of its parts. As an old mathematical lemma postulates, the whole is inevitably the sum of its parts. Thus, I believe my general view of Rafael Karsten is created by an understanding which becomes possible when first a separate and finally a synthetic understanding of the parts takes place. In this way, I also reduce the subjectivity of my study. Namely, *a priori* knowledge of the whole would later determine my understanding of the parts, that is, I would explicate the parts from the viewpoint of the whole. But, when I begin my understanding with parts, without an exact pre-knowledge of the whole, I am able to avoid certain individual determinism, which means that I understand parts as they occur to me and as they occurred to Rafael Karsten. It is my opinion that a procedure of cross-section has theoretically assisted me in understanding the foundational quality of Karsten's life. Had I established the hermeneutics of Karsten's life without inductive research design, I would have rejected the possibilities of in-depth and far-reaching understanding of his life. Challenging Droysen's opinion, I suggest that an all-inclusive interpretation as a scholarly notion is nonsensical, since it increases and perpetuates the reputation of hermeneutics as a highly poetic method. How could an interpretation be possible with procedures which scarcely rely upon the thinking patterns of *laissez faire*? The difficulty of hermeneutics is its reputation as a method of a sensitive poet who sits with his flute under a tree in blossom making artistic and happy-go-lucky interpretations of the surrounding world. Due to the stereotypes of hermeneutics, various scholars have considered the process of interpretation an effortless and uncomplicated method which allows heterogeneous argumentation. The danger lies, however, here: as free from strict methodological patterns and rigidity as it is, hermeneutics is a more complex and risky

method than any other procedure. It is clear that the imperfections apparent in applications of hermeneutic method are more general than the blemishes visible in applications of other methods. That is to say, if the method has a clear status and content its communicative competence emerges and that offers a cohesive setting for correct application. As a method under the pressure of continuous contradictory accusations, the field of hermeneutics has no definite position or content within science. Thus, whatever its use as an application in study, hermeneutic body primarily requires circumspection. However, I suggest that Droysen's model of hermeneutics on a general level offers a reasonable tool for obtaining valid and objective information of the historical research interest. Especially, Droysen's special sensitivity to the essence and existence of history and historical study of phenomena is remarkably ingenious. Before my application, at least Kurt Rudolph discussed the feasibility of employing Droysen's premises within comparative religion (14). The assumptions of my study can be summarized as follows:

Figure 4. Agents and gist of the study



As the figure above points out, my model of interpretation has been twofold; firstly, to follow the Droysenian premises in general, and secondly, to rely upon my own interpretation and application of Droysen's ideas. In my opinion, no hermeneutic model of interpretation is directly applicable to a certain event of understanding. Every event or person is unique and requires its own analytical treatment. Thus, the hermeneutics employed in this study was operationalised taking into account Rafael Karsten and his life and has derived as much from Droysen as from my individual deduction.

1.4.2. The Study of the Spiritual Growth of an Individual

The process of spiritual growth is not a principal tool in my study, but merely an explication which assists in understanding Rafael Karsten as a scholar of religion. However, during the study the analysis of Rafael Karsten's spiritual growth has proved to be a source of various, even contradictory interpretations. It has attracted my attention more than any other dilemma or paragraph in this study and I consider it a natural methodological item of my study. The idea of dealing with an individual's personal belief or spiritual development in general is not a novel one, but a fairly familiar topic in the psychology of religion. However, the conceptual and definitional core of the study of spirituality is heterogeneous and is composed of manifold formalizations and terminological categories. Furthermore, the study of spirituality has been promoted from two angles: firstly, from specifically psychological perspectives, and secondly, from sociological, theological and other perspectives. Interestingly, some psychologists studying religious phenomena have aspired to strengthen their solidarity by establishing committees with restricted membership (1). This, however, has been an exception rather than a rule. According to the Finnish psychologist of religion, Nils G. Holm, there is no radical distinction between psychological (psychologists) and psychological (others) study of religion (2).

The aim of this chapter is to explain how it is possible to describe an individual's spiritual growth in terms of the psychology of religion and in retrospective. Rafael Karsten never expressed his belief in detail. He was of the opinion that all individuals had their own special, sincere beliefs, and that it would be an endless process to attempt to modify other people's religious attitudes (3). In his case this meant that he had a dislike for people who reproached him for renouncing Christian theology and conviction. In spite of Rafael Karsten's marked scepticism towards the Lutheran church and its dogma, he was interested in religions on a universal level. In order to analyse Karsten's spiritual growth, a careful study of all his works is indispensable. Karsten's private correspondence, between him and his parents and siblings, forms an important nucleus. The dissection and understanding of Rafael Karsten's spiritual growth is all-important in order to be able to interpret him as a scholar of religion, that is, the explication of Karsten's spiritual growth explains his choices within comparative religion. The analysis of Karsten's spiritual growth is like a window which offers a large-scale but focused panorama on the understanding of an individual's life and career. In sum, the primary aim of this approach is to identify a religious (and) psychological context to explain how and when the particular individual spiritual development evolved, what its content and objective was, and how it determined the individual's existence (including his religious awareness). The religious psychological method of spiritual growth also assists in explicating how it is possible to outline and analyse the personal belief of a historical character, especially when he never expressed the content and development of his spirituality in explicit terms. In order to obtain a general view of Rafael Karsten's life, the researcher has to see that life as an animated historical continuum where numerous significant events live in a causal relationship with each

other. The correct overview, however, develops only if the researcher is able to separate the wheat from the chaff, in other words, if she is able to distinguish the significant elements of an individual's life from less meaningful episodes. This does not mean that the researcher intentionally gives an untrue account of a historical person or his words or actions. On the contrary, it means that she describes how much importance she attaches to particular historical events. As a whole, the personal historical research develops from a picture which the researcher creates from the subject. The task of the researcher is thus to re-invoke the atmosphere of past events. In sum, Rafael Karsten's spiritual growth has to be studied in such a way that the actual structure of events can be laid bare.

My scholarly endeavour to find an adequate approach to explain Rafael Karsten's spiritual growth has been stimulating but uneven. Fundamentally, the analysis of Karsten's spiritual growth was launched by Åke Hultkrantz, Emeritus Professor of History of Religion, who suggested to me that I should analyse Karsten's personal belief and scholarly conviction in my thesis. During the research process, Professor Hultkrantz's thinking has proved to be indispensable, since the whole thesis has taken shape according to the enhanced understanding of Rafael Karsten's spiritual growth. However, in the course of the study the concepts of personal belief and scholarly conviction, in spite of being challenging, have raised many questions. The most notable problem has been how to define "belief" and "conviction" on a conceptual level. The problems of theoretical definition surfaced. My first solution was to analyse personal belief and scientific conviction in the terms of reference of worldview research. Instead of using the terms "belief" and "conviction" I employed the words "personal world view" (*Weltanschauung*) and "scholarly worldview" (*Weltauffassung*). However, since within worldview research the definitions of the concepts "world view" and "worldview" take the form of a dialogue that results in a shambles of opinions, I abandoned the endeavour. This does not mean, however, that worldview research *per se* is of no value. Since worldview research was not the panacea for the problem of my study, finding a key tool for analysing Rafael Karsten's spiritual development, I ventured to seek an answer in psychology of religion. As worldview research, so also the psychological study of spirituality is complex, and thus the views of researchers on the comprehensive nature of existent concepts of spirituality have been contradictory and inadequately defined. In this area of knowledge I explored with many scholars and their methodological models. My main motive was to find an adequate matrix for the use of the concepts "belief" and "conviction". The general, universal idea amongst the psychologists of religion was that they saw belief as a valid and appropriate research concept. In fact, they agreed with each other that it was possible to use the term "belief" but disagreed on the content and research methods of this concept. Moreover, they evaded defining the meaning of "conviction" which has a very vague conceptual body within psychology of religion. (4.) Although there has been a significant increase in studies on belief in recent years, researchers have often approached this topic from rather narrow and constrained perspectives. Furthermore, communication across disciplines

has been scarce, resulting in a meagre supply of relevant research findings. Thus, psychologists of religion should meet to define not only the universal meaning and conceptual approach of “belief” but also of “conviction”. Perhaps this is unrealizable, but in a conference they could give their preference to several definitions which try to explain belief and conviction exhaustively. On the other hand, taking spirituality too seriously can suppress all interpretations and applications and expose them to the accusation of being totally inappropriate instruments for understanding spirituality. Thus, the attempt at conceptual unanimity has to pay attention to the danger of scholarly narrow-mindedness. The strength of psychology of religion lies in its ability to see belief as a valid research concept. This was novel information for me, since I had always thought that the concept of belief was such a strenuous and dangerous analytical concept that I should avoid it. Once when I attended a seminar and told the audience that I would study a person’s belief, one colleague remarked: “How can you study someone’s belief? How will you define it? How will you measure it? Didn’t you know that it is an impossible task?” This comment killed my enthusiasm for the problem of belief. Everything changed, however, when Professor Emeritus Åke Hultkrantz kindly advised me to continue my studies in the domain of spirituality. On a February afternoon, when I was sitting in his study, he suggested, as mentioned before, that I should analyse Rafael Karsten’s personal belief and scientific conviction in my work. It was an enlightening moment for me when I realized that it really was possible to discuss someone’s belief, without worrying about grass-root level conceptual spectres. The enthusiasm for the problem of belief was revived.

The psychological model which I finally adopted in order to study Karsten’s spiritual development was twofold: firstly, it was clearly characterized by the aims of my thesis, that is, it corresponds to Karsten’s changing phases of life, and secondly, it was flexibly based on the hermeneutic method of the Dutch theologian Ruand Reinder Ganzevoort. I gave some preference to the hermeneutic method of Ganzevoort because his psychological thinking pattern was the most transparent (Ganzevoort’s thinking is partly similar to the thinking formula of A.O. J. Cockshut, who in the early 1960s studied the conversion processes of English agnostics). Ganzevoort’s reasoning was novel, since he was one of the first researchers to perceive an individual’s spiritual development as an entity (from belief to unbelief via crisis, coping and conversion). I borrowed the “outer” structure of his thinking pattern, and created the “inner” content myself. In other words, I borrowed his five-level spiritual development schema, but made the inner reconstruction (concepts and definitions) of the approach myself. I also reduced the content, methodological breadth and a certain determinism of the method (I am referring to Ganzevoort’s partial dogmatic determinism that stems from his theological background). Such applied research was meaningful, since the hermeneutic nature of the method allowed free interpretation. This means that other researchers who adopt Ganzevoort’s reasoning will be able to make their own interpretations, explanations (*Erklärung*) and understandings (*Verstand*). With the help of Ganzevoort’s

reasoning, I first decided to describe Karsten's spiritual growth by using the concepts "belief" and "unbelief", that is, the former concepts "personal belief" and "scientific conviction" were replaced with the terms "belief" and "unbelief". At this stage, however, I rapidly realized that the use of the term "unbelief" gave rise to unwarranted conceptions amongst other scholars. The criticism voiced on my selection of concepts was labelled by comments which considered "unbelief" too strong an expression to describe Karsten's later spiritual phase. A general question of the critics was in what sense the rejection of the religion of the childhood home could be regarded as "unbelief" in Rafael Karsten's case. I could not proceed without changing my concept, although in my opinion the concept "unbelief" was not as powerful, mysterious or charged by theological connotations as the other scholars considered. I revised my notion and desired to return to discuss Rafael Karsten's "personal belief" and "scholarly conviction" which meant that I had reverted to the conceptual starting point. However, in this circle of reasoning I quickly learned that the concept "scholarly conviction" was too susceptible to various religious interpretations, that is, defining the concept "conviction" adequately was problematic in terms of comparative religion. Thereupon I took a fifth and perfectly distinct view. I replaced "conviction" with "agnosticism", which most lucidly reflected Karsten's view of life after rejecting the religious teachings of his childhood home. But how did I become convinced of Karsten's agnosticism? This problem I was able to deal with by asking the daughter of Rafael Karsten, Eva Karsten, for her advice. One spring evening while talking with Eva Karsten, I asked her whether she considered her father an agnostic. Eva Karsten, taking careful note, looked at me and inquired: what do you mean by agnosticism? I explained to her that in Rafael Karsten's case "agnosticism" implied a powerful and polemical personal state which does not comply with the conventional definition of the concept "agnosticism" (that neither in principle nor in fact is it possible to know God's nature or even whether He exists). I felt, however, that Rafael Karsten's views bore more likeness to "agnosticism" than "atheism" (the nature of Karsten's agnosticism is analysed more profoundly later). In my opinion, Karsten's "agnosticism" was the application of a scientific method to a study of all matters (I here adopted T. H. Huxley's view). After hearing my explanation, Eva Karsten stated that she was positive of her father being agnostic and that I actually had verified her former assumption. For a moment I felt a growing satisfaction about an analysis well done. Yet, the conceptual outlining continued. After replacing "conviction" with "agnosticism" I faced a problem. I realized that the term "agnosticism" was conceptually unbalanced compared to the word "belief". The term "agnosticism" simply contained more information on a conceptual level than the abstract word "belief". Consonant with this opinion, I realized that the word "agnosticism" explained the religious state of mind of an individual more explicitly than the term "belief" which does not necessarily address what kind of faith the individual is professing. The word "belief" describes an individual who believes in God or gods that control the world but does not define whether God is worshipped from the point of view of Christianity or Islam, for instance. In order to diminish the imbalance between the words "belief" and "agnosticism" I adopted a sixth and final approach. Then, I replaced "belief" with "Lutheran devoutness", which described the religious affiliation of

Rafael Karsten's childhood home. This meant the rejection of the word "belief", which had intellectually been so significant to me. However, I believe the word "belief" still becomes explicit through the term "Lutheran devoutness". In the following, I summarize the phases of my study:

Figure 5. *The phases of my "conceptual" analysis*

The first phase: "Personal belief and scholarly conviction"



The second phase: "Personal world view and scholarly worldview"



The third phase: "Belief and unbelief"



The fourth phase: "Personal belief and scholarly conviction"



The fifth phase: "Belief and agnosticism"



The sixth, final, phase: "Lutheran devoutness and agnosticism"

Now it is time to describe my approach in more explicit terms. The approach is conceptually constructed according to the purposes of my study. According to hermeneutic psychological study of spirituality, every individual has his own personal and solitary way of life, life story, different from any other ways of living. The personal life story is an individual's own story, which guides him/her through the various scenes of life. And since an individual's personal life story is sensitive to various incidents of life, it occasionally encounters intellectual clashes and challenges which expose the life story to modifications. At intellectual clashes a life story needs re-writing and re-interpretation. Individuals have to place themselves within their lives and tradition and re-evaluate their place and meaning in life. Since individuals are the aristocrats of their own lives, they are also the best interpreters of their lives. (5.) In theory, an individual's spiritual development is observed through five different levels. The model supposes that an individual has two possible religious states: belief in a religious context or belief in a context of rejection (which is more profane). An individual preserves his faith in something even in a context of rejection, since he cannot live without believing in something. Between these two spiritual alternatives stand three tools from psychology of religion which make a person vacillate between religious and non-religious attitudes (see figure six). (6.)

Figure 6. *Spiritual alternatives and tools of psychology of religion*

R.R.Ganzevoort's hermeneutic path of describing religious transition;

Belief ⇒ Crisis ⇒ Coping ⇒ Conversion ⇒ Unbelief

Adapted model of the present author

Lutheran ⇒ Intellectual change ⇒ Survival ⇒ Conversion ⇒ Agnosticism
devoutness process

After presenting the steps of spiritual growth, the most important phase is to define the concepts of Lutheran devoutness, intellectual change, survival process, conversion, and agnosticism.

I see *Lutheran devoutness* as a piety which is generated in response to accepting Martin Luther's teaching. Generally speaking, Lutheran theology (its doctrinal base is presented in the *Book of Concord* (1580)) is based on justification by grace alone. I do not wish to discuss "Lutheran devoutness" in any detail here since to define it briefly and unequivocally would be somewhat absurd. Nonetheless, I analyse "Lutheran devoutness" from the perceptions of Rafael Karsten's childhood home. In Rafael Karsten's childhood family "Lutheran devoutness" referred to Christocentric emphasis meaning that Jesus was seen as a saviour and a reconciliator ("A person who does not believe that Jesus is the son of God, is anti-Christ himself" and "Jesus is my life and death my victory", as Rafael Karsten's mother Emma Karsten used to say) (7). Obedience, love, ardent affection, and dedication to the Holy Trinity were the Lutheran themes of Karsten's childhood home. Generally, Rafael Karsten's parents believed that Jesus showed them the final and the only true path. Christian life was derived from reading the Bible and solemn supplications to God. Since the intellectual heritage of Rafael Karsten's childhood home is presented profoundly in Chapter Two I will not explain it more carefully here. All I want to state is that I see the Christian life of Rafael Karsten's childhood home as a piety/dedication due to its deeply devotional and obedient nature.

For me *intellectual change* is a reassessment of an individual's life. In this case the individual's life faces extraordinary problems and difficulties which are unprecedented and also strenuous for him. A change may either develop gradually or occur suddenly. A gradual change may be connected to certain episodes of life, whereupon a person progressively rejects, for instance, the piety of his childhood home. A sudden change arises when a person is rapidly

and radically forced into a reassessment of his past life, customs, convictions etc. I presume, and may be totally wrong, that a religious change developed through gradual “exigency” is more painful and strenuous for an individual than a sudden religious modification. A gradual religious change is most often a lifelong process, during which an individual can be sure about his convictions on an external level, but can still on an internal level be very uncertain about and even ambivalent about the solutions. Instead of using the term crisis, which sounds too strong with reference to Rafael Karsten, I employ the concept “intellectual change”, which, I believe, describes more aptly the spiritual turning point of an individual.

Survival process is a psychological tool which refers to the efficiency with which an individual can protect himself in a crisis. Surviving is like the hard shell of a nut which protects the seed inside. If the survival process is effective, the individual finds a satisfactory explanation and meaning for his belief, but if the process is ineffective it means that the individual fails to evince a satisfactory explanation for his belief, and religious commitment changes to unbelief. I prefer the term “survival process” or “surviving”, since the concept “coping” is in a psychological context quite worn-out. The term “coping” has become a cliché and is even today misused on many occasions. Even people outside the academic world have adopted this term and employ it quite indiscriminately. “Coping” as an exact scientific and conceptual indicator has lost its deepest core meaning. Thus, in my opinion the concept “surviving”, rather than the reduced term “coping” describes (on an emotional level) an individual’s struggle out of the net of intellectual conflict which has trapped him.

During the *conversion* process the individual changes his interpretation of religious issues according to the results of the survival process. In my opinion, conversion experience is like a junction where the individual meets all his needs and alternatives, and is able either to change his life circulation or to preserve the old conventional way of life. If the individual manages to preserve the old belief, the conversion experience is positive, but if he adapts to unbelief the conversion process is negative. This division partly reflects theoretical determinism, but still offers a consequential matrix to the complex questions of the conversion process. I do not see the conversion process as a homogeneous experience, I see it more as a heterogeneous state of mind, whereby a person lives under the crossfire of his own emotions and desires.

Conversion, as an experience, can be either a serious flesh wound or a joyful and liberating moment. However, the result of the conversion experience is, as mentioned earlier, largely dependent on the result of the survival process. In my mind, the conversion experience is merely the act of converting: changing one system or thinking pattern to another. It is not a mysterious process, an enigma, but a very personal moment, like the act of evading a previous intellectual life. It may occur now or tomorrow, take five minutes or five years.

In my opinion, *agnosticism* refers to a state in which the individual lives without religious piety but nevertheless preserves his faith in something (here religious piety refers to the state in which a person relies on life after death. In other words, a person feels he/she knows something about the afterlife, he/she has an absolute certainty about Heaven and Paradise. For instance, Islamic people can describe Paradise of afterlife quite exactly). The God-centred belief has turned into agnostic belief, which is not belief in a religious context but in a context of rejection. In agnosticism the individual gives absurd content to religion and religious commitment, and thus feels that belief in religious terms of reference is alien to his thinking pattern. However, an agnostic does not inevitably regard all religion as totally false. Many times, agnosticism has had a close relationship with the *Zeitgeist*. At the beginning of the 20th century it was in fashion amongst the Finnish intelligentsia to lose one's faith. Then, agnosticism was a part of the revolutionary spirit which attacked institutional Christianity, that is, the church and theology as a university subject. The target of agnosticism one hundred years ago was to point out that something was false and old-fashioned in order that the new and the fascinating could flourish. Rafael Karsten's agnosticism was developed in an atmosphere in which the Christian faith and the church were seen as institutions of illusory superiority. Karsten believed that Christian faith overestimated its quality in relation to other religions. Unexpectedly, the borderline nature of Karsten's agnosticism comes visible here. Although Karsten clearly rejected the religion of his childhood home and changed it to criticism of Christianity and the definite worship of scientific data, he never approved blasphemy, for instance (8). Furthermore, though he blamed the church for archaic behaviour, he visited the church on religious holidays. And finally, he never formally left the church. On the other hand, his work *Hedendom och kristendom* (1910) ("Paganism and Christianity") was an upsetting fierce attack on the dogma of Christianity. The reasons for Karsten's mercurial "agnosticism" are diverse and will be deliberated more profoundly in Chapter Two. Finally, I believe that an individual cannot live without believing in something. It is a physiological and psychological necessity and inevitability that an individual believe in something, be it God or the death of God. Without hope and belief (religious or otherwise) an individual would merely be an aimless and frustrated creature (naturally, this is open to debate).

As the following introduction of the method of the spiritual growth points out, the study and definition of spirituality (belief/unbelief, conviction, Lutheran devoutness, agnosticism) is particularly difficult. I am well aware that my definitions and concepts may irritate some scholars but placing my confidence in a certain definitional liberty of hermeneutics, I stand behind the concepts I have chosen. Interestingly, the Finnish psychologist of religion, Nils G. Holm, has stated that spiritual growth (from "belief" to "unbelief", roughly speaking) is quite a common experience amongst scholars (9). It seems that the more knowledge people acquire, the more scientifically based they realize life to be. On many occasions, this means that people become considerably less religious. In history there are numerous examples of scholars to whom becoming less religious has meant the acceptance of agnostic views. The most famous of them have been Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer. Nevertheless,

perceiving life less religiously does not inevitably mean adopting “agnostic” or “atheistic” views. In some cases, people who become less religious still preserve their spirituality. An American who felt he had lost the deepest meaning of his religiousness stated: “This does not in turn mean I lack spirituality. I am quite in touch with my spirit!”(10). The second phase of my hermeneutic approach is to present in practice how the transformation from Lutheran devoutness to agnosticism manifested itself in Rafael Karsten’s case. An application will be considered in Chapter Two.

1.5. Material of the Study

The former scholarly attention to Rafael Karsten and his career has mainly utilized the literary source material based on Karsten’s research and reports of other writers about him. This has meant that utilisation of Karsten’s personal files and other archive material has been haphazard and meagre. An underlying cause of this has been, however, that Karsten’s main archive (private correspondence, documents, reports, certificates, written agreements, personal notes, and photographs) has not been accessible to researchers until the early 1990s. Due to the neoteric *Zeitgeist* of the 1950s and 1960s, Karsten’s papers were buried under an avalanche of general uninterest. In the mid-1990s, when Karsten’s personal file was updated, it was like a revival of a buried treasure. Numerous dossiers were filled up with hundreds of significant historical documents about what had occurred in the academic world almost one hundred years ago. Today Karsten’s personal files are located in the Museum of Cultures in Helsinki and in the Helsinki University Library. The archive material of the Museum of Cultures is of crucial importance, since it embraces the majority of Karsten’s personal papers. Today, the idea and dream of organizing one leading Rafael Karsten archive at the Helsinki University Library persists, but still awaits its eventual realization. The source material used in this study can be divided into five categories. First, the private archives of Rafael Karsten (correspondence, notes, certifications etc.), secondly, the published works of Rafael Karsten (research, articles, conference presentations), thirdly, the private archives of Rafael Karsten’s colleagues (in Finland and abroad), fourthly, official documents (in Finland and abroad), and fifthly, supplementary material concerning Rafael Karsten and my whole study (research, journeys, Internet data). In sum, the primary sources utilized in this study are literary, since there is no oral material concerning Karsten except two radio interviews.

Figure 7. *Primary and secondary sources*

Primary Sources

Private archives of Rafael Karsten
Published works of Rafael Karsten

Secondary Sources

Private archives of Rafael Karsten’s colleagues
Official documents
Supplementary material

Rafael Karsten's private archives, along with his published works, are the most valuable sources utilised in this study. Karsten's private archives can be divided into five main sections:

The Museum of Cultures

In the early 1990s Rafael Karsten's family members, especially his son, Rolf Karsten Licentiate in Medicine (died in 1997), bestowed his father's personal correspondence and documents on the Museum of Cultures in Helsinki. The contribution was significant, since it comprised the major part of Rafael Karsten's scholarly work. Today, the donated estate is divided into two different categories: literary and visual material. The literary material consists of letters, draft manuscripts, certificates, book summaries, scrapbook, passport and other personal papers. The literary material is partly catalogued, but since the work is still in progress, the classification of material is based on every scholar's own evaluations. Rafael Karsten's private correspondence mainly consists of the letters he received from various scholars. Karsten did not duplicate the letters he wrote and thus it is hopeless to trace those letters which Karsten sent to his correspondents. There is only one preserved copy of a letter which Karsten sent to a colleague. The letter was written to Dr. Matthew W. Stirling in the Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C., and it evaluates critically Stirling's Jibaro Indian studies. Contrary to his habit, Karsten sent this particular letter to Stirling, but kept one version in his desk drawer. The letters stored in the Museum of Cultures merely describe Karsten's professional life, transilluminating his correspondence with different colleagues during the years 1904-1955. During these years Karsten corresponded with various Finnish and foreign scholars, Edward Westermarck, Ragnar Numelin, Gunnar Landtman, Arne Runeberg, Emerik Olsoni, Eric Alven, Alfred Cort Haddon, James Frazer, Karl von den Steinen, Theodor Koch-Grünberg, and Theodor Preuss, for instance. The most conscientious, industrious and perhaps also the most intimate writer of all Karsten's correspondents was Ragnar Numelin. As a diplomat, Numelin was continuously at the hub of international and domestic events and reported interesting news to Karsten in his numerous postcards and letters. Although Karsten in his later life had a faultfinding attitude towards Numelin (Numelin had misinterpreted Karsten's life-work in his book *Fältforskare och Kammarlärde*, 1947), their professional relationship lasted until Karsten's death in 1956. Karsten's professional correspondence stored in the Museum of Cultures has been the main source of my study. Without examining these letters closely, the reconstruction of Karsten's scholarly profile would have been unrealizable. At the beginning of reading the letters, the greatest impediment to the analysis was the old style of handwriting which required special attentiveness. The penmen with astonishingly ornate handwriting were the English ethnologist Alfred Cort Haddon, the Swedish ethnographer Erland Nordenskiöld and the Finnish sociologist Edward Westermarck. All of them could be upbraided for cacography, as their writing was so casual. In general, reading old letters is fraught with a danger: a researcher can interpret and understand material incorrectly, if she is not conscious of the systematics of

appearances in old handwriting. In other words, the informative and historical value of letters is in danger of disappearing because of the obscure style. Of course, this sounds a very pragmatic problem as a general rule, but in reality is a pervasive aspect of historical study. In the days of the Internet, it is easy to find WWW pages which teach you how to decipher old handwriting. The most important lesson these pages teach you is that in the olden days much of the orthography was “phonetic”. Unlike the letters, Karsten’s fieldwork notes, draft manuscripts (original manuscripts of Karsten’s published works) and other notes (like library studies) have mostly disappeared during the years. The disappearance of original fieldwork notes is naturally a great scientific loss: it is impossible to obtain any direct information about Karsten’s fieldwork techniques. This inevitably inhibits the researcher’s likelihood of portraying, defining and evaluating how exhaustive and accomplished an observer Karsten ultimately was in an ethnological sense. The value of draft manuscripts to my study has been minor since the manuscripts which survived represent the non-printed copies of Karsten’s published works. Thus the manuscripts’ contents are very similar to the dispositions of published books and therefore do not offer any notably new information. The most valuable pearl amongst the fragments of manuscripts is Karsten’s sporadic script to the work “Jordens folk” which was never published. Fragments of other notes, which represent Karsten’s library studies (Karsten made notes in the Biblioteca Nacional in Lima in Peru, for instance), have also survived. Their value lies in that reading and scanning them focuses attention on fixed points of Karsten’s scholarly interests. Otherwise, the fragmentary nature of Karsten’s library studies prevents the researcher from cogently interpreting and understanding their meaning.

Rafael Karsten’s visual material donated to the Museum of Cultures comprises approximately 254 photographs taken with camera format 9x12, metal Zeiss lens. When the original negatives arrived at the Museum of Cultures they showed signs of decay because of the lapse of time. Due to the expeditious salvaging process, negatives made of combustible cellulose-nitrate, were re-photographed. As a result of timely measures, the negatives were rescued and hundreds of black and white photographs became available to researchers. In addition to the rescued negatives, Karsten’s visual material also includes hundreds of black and white photographs (approximately 346 pictures) the negatives of which have disappeared. However, these small-sized photographs have preserved their value as a precious historical document. Taking into account my own research topic, I was primarily interested in photographs which described the spiritual life and religious customs of the Indians. Unfortunately, only ten per cent of all Karsten’s photographs include direct information of value to comparative religion. Karsten photographed religious rites only occasionally. The religious subjects of his pictures are: preparations of the Choroti Indians for the great drinking feast, the Choroti Indians assembled for a drinking feast, the curing rites of a Jibaro shaman, the tsantsa ceremony of the Jibaros, a Jibaro house with figures of spirits painted on the door, old sacred monuments of the ancient Inca Empire, and the Quechua Indians celebrating the commemoration of the deceased. One natural reason for the shortage of religious photographs was the fear that the Indians showed of the lens of the camera. The extract from Karsten’s research *The Head-*

Hunters of Western Amazonas (1935) describes his effort to photograph the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador as follows:

“Indian superstition puts many obstacles in the way of an ethnologist. My very attempts to photograph the Indians were at first looked upon with suspicion and fear, since they were convinced that with my camera I was taking their souls, from which again disease and death would ensue as a consequence. Only gradually could I overcome this particular superstition of the Indians”(1).

In the light of Karsten’s portrayal it seems very understandable that when a fieldworker endeavoured to photograph religious rites, which were the most sacred events in society, it was no ethnological wonder if the natives denied him access to the occasion. On many occasions the mere perception systems of a fieldworker were considered intrusive by the Indians. On the other hand, Karsten showed ingenuity when substituting photographs with drawings when he was prevented from taking photographs of the sacred ceremonies of the Indians. Karsten’s method was explicit: after returning from the field, artist Eric Wasström drew sketches of Indian ceremonies from Karsten’s descriptions. This is how many illustrative pictures were produced and published in Karsten’s works *Indian Tribes of the Argentine and Bolivian Chaco* (1932) and *The Head-Hunters of Western Amazonas* (1935). Of course, the ultimate value and authenticity of the sketches drawn at home is ethnologically more debatable than real photographs or drawings sketched in the field, since the main problem is how carefully Karsten was able to retrospectively describe the events to the artist and how profoundly the painter eventually understood them. Nevertheless, taking into account Karsten’s aspiration to achieve extreme precision and carefulness in ethnological recording, the sketches of his books should be considered reliable. Yet one peculiarity, given my interest in pictures with a religious dimension in Karsten’s visual representation, is that Karsten hardly used a camera at all when wandering amongst the Saami people (*the Skolt-Lapps*) in the Petsamo area in July 1927. During the trip, a formerly enthusiastic photographer suddenly contented himself with purchasing postcards of the scenery of Petsamo (Kolttaköngäs, Jäniskoski, and Tenojoki). Thus, the photographs with religious meaning presented in Karsten’s study *The Religion of the Samek* (1955) were borrowed from other scholars studying ancient Scandinavian and Finnish Saami (L. Hannikainen, S. Rheen and A. Poulsen). The principal reason for Karsten’s abstaining from visual recording in Petsamo had to be his assumption that the expedition was of only a preliminary nature.

Helsinki University Library - The National Collection, Private Archives, Sigfrid Rafael Karsten Collection (Number 514.1 and 514.2)

Rafael Karsten’s private archive, stored in the Manuscript Collection, Helsinki University Library, is composed of two separate collections. The first archive consists of Rafael Karsten’s manuscripts and the second document of “additional material”. Rafael Karsten’s

manuscript collection comprises a first copy of *The Religion of the South American Indians - East of the Andes*. Rafael Karsten's widow, Mrs. Margit Karsten donated the manuscript to the Helsinki University Library on 9 March 1965. The manuscript contains 210 pages and is identical with the published work. Rafael Karsten's manuscript collection also consists of a book of his student, Mikko Mensonen, whose sociological essay Karsten inspected. Rafael Karsten's second private archive, classified as "additional material", is composed of one sealed and ragged envelope which does not include a letter. The value of the Karsten material stored at the Helsinki University Library has been minor to my study due to the fact that the collections are modest.

Personal Collection of Eva Karsten

Many of Rafael Karsten's letters belonging solely to his personal correspondence are still preserved by his relatives, especially by his children. Eva Karsten, daughter of Rafael Karsten, in Lund, Sweden, allowed me to read family letters and postcards that have not been formerly studied. The letters and postcards were written during the years 1894-1954 and they amount to 37 postcards and 224 personal letters. For the purpose of my study I translated all the letters from old Swedish into English. I do not present the original Swedish versions of the letters in the text or in the references since this would have meant a literary quagmire (at the reader's expense). Nevertheless, I hope that the reader can rely on my translation of the letters. The great number of letters describes the relationship between Rafael Karsten and his family, mother, father, three sisters and two brothers. The letters written in the 1920s also shed light on the relationship between Rafael Karsten and his wife, Margit, née Boldt. Rafael Karsten's personal correspondence has been inspiring considering my aspiration to analyse Karsten's spiritual growth. Above all, the letters have divulged to me the initial nature of Rafael Karsten and have also assisted me in reconstructing the past, that is, in understanding the circumstances under which Rafael Karsten matured and lived. Eva Karsten's private collection also includes Rafael Karsten's manuscripts (probably unpublished) *Den sociala etiken såsom normativ vetenskap* ("Social Ethics As Normative Science", the exact time of writing is obscure) and *Ett arbete om moderna etnologer* ("A Study on Modern Ethnologists", 1947). The latter work is Karsten's polemic answer to Ragnar Numelin's study *Fältforskare och kammarlärde* ("Fieldworkers and Chamber Scholars", 1947). In his discourse Karsten accused Numelin of misunderstanding his role as a researcher of South American Indians. Karsten's effort to correct Numelin's statements has been of great use in my study, since Karsten's reply gives direct clues about the manner in which he defined himself as an ethnologist and a scholar of religion. Finally, Eva Karsten's private collection includes a scrapbook which comprises 181 separate newspaper articles published about Rafael Karsten during the years 1911-1946. The articles are divided into those which Karsten created himself, and those which the media produced about him. Since political, economic and social factors restricted the travelling of Finnish citizens in the 1910s and even in the 1920s, it was natural that journalists showed a keen interest in Karsten's journeys to distant countries.

Personal Collection of Maggie Karsten-Sveander

The personal collection of Mrs. Maggie Karsten-Sveander, daughter of Rafael Karsten, in Ekerö, Sweden, comprises Rafael Karsten's letter to *Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten* (The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters) and a number of Rafael Karsten's published articles. On 5 October 1954, Karsten resigned from the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters. The letter did not only tender Karsten's resignation from this particular society, but it also reflected his opinions of new modern sociology in a wider context. Karsten's letter of resignation (fourteen sheets) was a valuable document when I examined his past activities (1952-1956), that is, his illusionary impression of reality. Maggie Karsten-Sveander's collection is also indispensable since it includes many of Rafael Karsten's scholarly articles which are difficult to obtain elsewhere today. Those articles which were published in the international journals (*Archiv für Religionwissenschaft*, *Archiv für Anthropologie*, and *Folk-Lore*) seventy or eighty years ago are especially difficult, even impossible to obtain in Finland nowadays.

Rafael Karsten's Ethnographic Collections

In the past, when photography was not yet a fundamental element of anthropological collection, the collections of material artefacts of the indigenous cultures lived in a symbiotic relationship with the making of anthropology. The general history of collecting artefacts is, however, more complex than the historical portrayal of photography, since the gathering of artefacts has a timeless frame. In other words, the instinctive craving of humans to buy and collect objects as mementos of their trips has ancient origins. Since the era when hunter-gatherer tribes changed into agricultural societies, the material culture of humans has flourished. Permanent immobility meant that in order to survive an individual and his society needed various objects. At a later time, when man stabilized his subsistence and livelihood, he began to produce ornaments and other accessories. When the early explorers reached the distant cultures, they immediately showed an interest in artistic objects which they finally introduced to the audience at home. In fact, early explorers like the Venetian Marco Polo were the prototypes of a new pattern of thought according to which a traveller was obliged to collect evidence of the material culture of the people he visited. However, the early collecting of artefacts was more of an aspiration to achieve wealth than to produce a systematized catalogue of the heritage of the exotic cultures. In 1631 when the Royal Society of London was chartered, it began to promote scientific exploration (2). From this point on the aims and targets of ethnological expeditions became purposeful. The development of scientific expeditions and the emerging of the ethnological method gave rise to new discourses amongst explorers. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Swedish anthropologist and archaeologist, Erland Nordenskiöld, emphasized the importance of systematically recording the material culture of Bolivian and Argentinian Indians. Nordenskiöld was keen on various Indian artefacts and one of his ambitions was to make ethnographic collections for the Swedish museums. Although Rafael Karsten positioned himself as a researcher of intellectual culture

of the indigenous people in the evolutionary beginning-of-century British ethnological style, he also showed an interest in the material culture of the Indians. In fact, three separate facts stimulated Karsten to collect material evidence of the Indian cultures. Firstly, the promises of the museums to partly finance Karsten's expeditions if he would enrich their collections (museum-based-ethnography). Secondly, Karsten's holistic pattern of thought according to which material and spiritual culture had to be observed as one, that is, the analysis of spiritual culture required the understanding of the material aspect in order to be successful. Finally, Karsten was stimulated by his idea of collections as imperishable proof of vanishing cultures. During his first fieldwork trip amongst the Gran Chaco Indians in Bolivia and Argentina 1911-1913, Rafael Karsten collected proof of the Choroti Indians' material culture. His collection was especially inspired by Erland Nordenskiöld and his own holistic research design. However, Karsten brought only a small collection from the Choroti. The reason for the scanty evidence was that the unpropitious circumstances (Karsten's unsatisfactory command of the language of the locals and starvation of the natives during the dry season) prevented Karsten from gathering artefacts. Today, Karsten's small collection is preserved by the Ethnographical Museum of Buenos Aires. During his trip amongst the Jibaros of Eastern Ecuador 1916-1919, Rafael Karsten gathered material evidence on the Jibaro's concrete reality for the Gothenburg Ethnographical Museum. At the time, Rafael Karsten's attitude towards collecting artefacts in the field was ambivalent. On the one hand, he was economically compelled to collect material artefacts for the Gothenburg Ethnographical Museum, which provided the capital for his expedition. Karsten was angry at this obligation since it caused him much trouble in the field. Firstly, it proved to be an extremely difficult venture to send these valuable objects safely by ship, and secondly, the collection arrived at Gothenburg much later than had been agreed between Karsten and Erland Nordenskiöld, the Director of the Gothenburg Ethnographical Museum at that time. On the other hand, Karsten had an impatient desire to collect evidence of the material culture of the Jibaro Indians. Owing to his self-evident ethnological conviction that the expedition had to produce material results, he was full of enthusiasm about collecting. But in retrospect, Karsten was also interested in gathering since he had decided to devote one "curiosity-collection" (in Swedish *en kuriositets-samling*) to his own purposes. (3.) This personal "extra-collection" is nowadays stored by Rafael Karsten's children and grandchildren. In 1928 Rafael Karsten undertook his second expedition to Eastern Ecuador. The scholarly aim of the trip was to test previous research results and to bring the Jibaro Indian studies to a conclusion. Unlike in the preceding expedition, Karsten now brought a collection from the Jibaro culture to the Department of Exotica of the National Museum of Helsinki (nowadays the Museum of Cultures). Karsten first sought to sell his collection to the Gothenburg Ethnographical Museum but the Museum declined his offer. According to the Director of the Museum, Erland Nordenskiöld, the Museum no longer desired a collection from these areas (Eastern Ecuador) (4). Later on, Erland Nordenskiöld regretted his hasty refusal, but too late, since the National Museum of Helsinki had already received the Jibaro collection. Today, Karsten's collection is stored by the Museum of Cultures, Central Store of Orimattila. In spring 1999 when the Museum of

Cultures celebrated its grand opening, part of Karsten's collection was introduced to the public (predominantly the head ornaments, ear-staffs and necklaces of the Jibaro Indians). The meaning of Rafael Karsten's material collection to my study has been to consolidate my impression of Karsten's research. Especially, Karsten's collection in the Museum of Cultures has significantly visualized Indian culture for me and assisted me in trying to immerse myself in the analysis of Rafael Karsten as a researcher of South American Indians.

The second volume of source material significant to my study is formed by the published works of Rafael Karsten. This section comprises Karsten's scholarly monographs and journals published in international and domestic forums. During his active scholarly period (1900-1956) Rafael Karsten published approximately 21 studies (translations are not included) and 90 articles which mainly concerned South American Indians, but also the emerging and development of comparative religion and sociology in Finland. The published works of Rafael Karsten which have been especially invaluable to my study are presented in Chapter Three (3.1.). Since the main methodological tool of my research is the retrospective hermeneutic interpretation of religious material, reading and explaining Karsten's printed matter has formed an essential basis of my study.

The third source material used in my study includes the private archives of Rafael Karsten's colleagues. The content of the material is twofold: firstly, the letters which Rafael Karsten sent to his colleagues and opponents, and secondly, the correspondence between Karsten's colleagues which is only indirectly related to Karsten. The following three factors formed a primary impetus for the analysis of the archives of Karsten's colleagues. Firstly, the main task was to search for the letters which Rafael Karsten sent to his colleagues and opponents, since this was the most direct way to gain knowledge of the facts Karsten expressed to his colleagues. Another function of reading was to retrospectively outline the personality and life career of the individuals who played an important part in Karsten's life. Finally, the purpose of reading was to assist in generating a historical synthesis of the intercourse of the academic world of the first decades of the 20th century. The most noteworthy sources have been: the Edward Westermarck Collection in the Manuscript Department of Åbo Akademi University Library, and the Erland Nordenskiöld Collection in Gothenburg Ethnographical Museum and in Gothenburg University Library. However, there are also many other manuscript collections which have furthered my study (for more information, see the references).

The fourth category of source material comprises official documents. The official documents used in my study consist of diverse minutes, catalogues, and registers. The most significant documents have been: the minutes of the meetings of the Faculty of Philosophy (Arts) (1901 - 1906, 1906-1909), the minutes of the meetings of the Faculty of Divinity (1899-1903), the student registers of the University of Helsinki (1892-1901, 1902-1907), the minutes of the meetings of the Prometheus Society (1905-1913), the minutes, the anniversary minutes and the other documents of the meetings of the Theological Saturday Society (*Teologinen*

Lauantaiseura) (1896-1905, 1916-1919, 1926, 1936), and the collection of the MacMillan Company (British Library, London).

The fifth element of my study was established by supplementary material (published and unpublished works, radio programmes, empirical material, and Internet data) concerning Rafael Karsten, his profession and theoretical “system” (see Chapters 3.1. and 3.2.). This heterogeneous data comprises printed and unprinted studies, articles and papers written about Karsten (see “Previous studies) but also radio programmes of the Finnish Broadcasting Company (*Yleisradio*) and empirical sources such as discussions and personal trips. There are two preserved archive documents of the Finnish Broadcasting Company relating to Rafael Karsten. The first tape, *Intiaanien käsitys taiteesta* (“The Indians’ Conception of Art” (19.20 minutes)), was recorded on 31 January 1954 by Unto Miettinen. The tape includes an interview with Professor Karsten in his study discussing Indian art. The significance of this archive document for my research was the most illustrative since to listen to Karsten’s voice, quivering yet determined, made him very real to me. The second tape, *Etelä-Amerikan intiaanien tutkija Rafael Karsten* (“Rafael Karsten, A Researcher of South American Indians” (23.30 minutes)), was recorded on 22 February 1963 and was Veikko Huttunen’s radio play dedicated to Rafael Karsten as a researcher of South American Indians. The hermeneutical ideas of re-experiencing and re-living the past have guided my journeys to the regions and historical settings which played an important part in Rafael Karsten’s life. The journeys of re-living, as I call them, have also given an empirical emphasis to my study. In July 1998 I visited Rafael Karsten’s childhood parish Kvevlax (Koivulahti) in Ostrobothnia in Western Finland. The purpose of my trip was to consider myself taken back in time, in an old rural village, with the villagers listening attentively to the sermon of a clergyman. During my trip I realized that historical recarnation was totally dependent on the imagination of a scholar. The greatest effort was that Kvevlax today did not show any historical signs for contemporary eyes. The centre followed the typical architectural lines of modern Finnish shopping centres, cars were speeding by, and the villagers talked about *lotto* (the Finnish national lottery). Thus, it was no surprise that my first perception to be read in historical form, was generated by the Kvevlax church. When I sat in a pew of an exquisite church (which has preserved its old appearance) I could sense Rafael Karsten’s father preaching to large congregations. I sat in the church for an hour and went outside. It was raining heavily. Next to the church was Rafael Karsten’s birthplace, a yellow-painted parsonage. I stood in the garden of the parsonage for a short time but did not want to bother the present-day occupants. A black speedster interfered with my historical insight into the parsonage. After that I visited the grave of Edvin, Emma and Ellen Karsten (Rafael Karsten’s father, mother and oldest sister). The characteristic for that moment was that although these people had lived almost one hundred years ago I knew them almost perfectly by having read through the hundreds of letters they had sent to their son and brother Rafael. It was evident that I missed them. Subsequently, I jumped into the car and drove round Kvevlax in order to perceive the village structure more intensively. Afterwards, I realized that my experience was successful, although at first I was somewhat disappointed

with my inability to re-live the past. The material which I obtained (except for booklets of Kvevlax church) was not literary *per se*, but taxed me intellectually. Nevertheless, on some level I became convinced of the impossibility of successful re-experiencing of the past. As the philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) claimed, experience is either inner or outer. The outer nature of experience means our ability to sense sounds, smells and colours whereas inner experience refers to the psychological ability to understand and organize these external observations (5). However, not only Locke's empirical emphasis but also Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833-1911) notion of hermeneutic understanding of other persons and their life-expressions was my starting point when I planned my trip to South America. The planning of the whole journey stemmed from the opinions of several anthropologists who suggested that I should visit Ecuador and Peru in order to understand Karsten more profoundly. The general opinion of scholars was that writing about the jungle requires jungle experience. At first, I agreed with them. Everyone, I believed, should see the circumstances about which she is writing. However, in the course of the study I found it notably difficult to explain the purpose of my trip rationally. The basic question was not *whether* but *why* I should travel to Ecuador and Peru. For this part, I understood that the purpose of my trip could not be to conduct fieldwork since it is impossible to study Indian cultures as they were when Rafael Karsten visited them. Moreover, my research problem clearly reflected that I was studying an individual, Rafael Karsten, not South American Indians. But, why was I planning a journey to South America? To this I answer, in one word, to re-experience. According to Dilthey, re-experiencing indicates following the line of events whereupon the past passes through the consciousness of a researcher. Re-experiencing also means re-living and re-creating the past which culminates in empathetic and sympathetic understanding. Dilthey addresses the understanding of a historical event abroad. A historian can travel abroad and experience (*Erlebnis*) the environment in which historical action emerged. (6.) This technique of understanding was my personal target, that is, in my opinion, to gain knowledge of the external circumstances of rain forest, its sounds, smells, colours, and people, could have assisted me in constructing a correct awareness of Rafael Karsten as a researcher of South American Indians. The trouble stemmed, however, from the tendency to think that the principle "from my own experience" is an unequivocal approach and thus easy to reach. Let us claim, for the sake of argument, that it is difficult at least in historical research on an individual to separate the genuine scholarly experience of a historian from her subjective, personal perception, thinking, reasoning, doubting, believing, knowing and willing (here I refer to Locke's system of reflection) (7). Let me explain what I mean by this idea. A researcher who travels to the childhood village of her historical research object encounters a problem: how to experience historical milieu, especially when it has undergone dramatic changes. How to define the field? How to behave there? What to search for? With whom to discuss? I cannot but see that if there are no historical relics in the field (ruins, forts, monuments etc.) or certain persons with whom to discuss, the scholar easily remains totally beyond the range of any tangible experience, that is, re-experiencing and re-living the evaporated past is so inexplicable a task that the moment can easily result in a mere private and entertaining excursion. I say this since my planned journey

to Ecuador to acquaint myself with Rafael Karsten's research context encountered many obstacles. One problem was that my journey had no evident scholarly image. Paradoxically, I knew that I should travel to South America but fundamentally I did not know *why*. I intrinsically felt I had to make this trip, but finally I did not know what to do in the field. The trouble is that there are no scholarly guidelines or definitions to historical experience which are not based on direct observation of extant historical heritage (an individual studying ancient Egypt or Greece is still able to "experience" colossal remains). Of course, the approach of hermeneutic re-creating and re-living lays out principles of what might be relevant in understanding the human past, but it also raises many difficulties ("hermeneutics can be as much art as science"). People claim that one is not able to write about the jungle without jungle experience, but who fundamentally defines how one should behave in the midst of a rain forest when the original, ancient environment has disappeared? Moreover, how is it possible to sense the intellectual *historia* in a modern body of living? Of course, these are somewhat eternal questions but should raise more discussion. What is the so called "field-position" of a scholar of religion writing about figures or events of learning of history? How important is it to her to try to authentically re-experience the past of the research object? If I sit on the same stone as Karsten did one hundred years earlier, do I inevitably re-experience something? How am I able to ensure that my trip of re-experiencing has scholarly nature and does not turn out to be merely a vacation? Actually, how is my trip to differ from a personal vacation? The established ideals of fieldwork techniques are not useful here. And finally, how am I able to utilise and interpret my re-experience later in my thesis if we consider "experience" the subjective reflection of mind? The problem of (hermeneutic) re-experiencing of the past should therefore be the fundamental one even in the theories of the humanities of the 21st century. Unfortunately, I was never able to convince the academic sponsors of the utility of re-living the past. The most regrettable is, however, that Rafael Karsten's words, "[...] in order to be able to correctly appreciate the work of an explorer, it is important to know the circumstances [...]", still rings in my mind (8). However, Karsten's statement was mainly directed at the faultfinders of his works and is not today a prerequisite to understanding his work. The naked truth, *nuda veritas*, is that the circumstances of Rafael Karsten's expeditions no longer exist. Furthermore, Wilhelm Dilthey's claim that the ability to imagine is one of the most important qualities of an interpreter, saves my day (9). Finally, I believe that my inner empathy and imagination will allow me to "appreciate" the expeditions of my research object without travelling abroad.

I still want to mention the heterogeneous Internet material used in my study. As Patricia Burgoon and Peter Anderson (1996) have noted in "Internet World", today an increasing number of Internet pages are used as references (10). I have also cited several Web pages in my work. One of the problems with citing Web pages is that the address of the website may alter and it may become difficult to locate the page again. Moreover, the person who revisits a certain page again will, of course, generate new "hits". I have tried to minimize this problem

by giving, as accurately as possible, the Web citations used. Nevertheless, sometimes Web pages lack a title or a date (the date when the subject of the post was introduced in the server). In these cases, accurate information cannot be offered. The Web references used in my study are based on three sources: academic sources (universities, institutions, libraries, etc.), public sources (newspapers, travel prospectuses, etc.), and, finally news groups on the Internet.

2. RAFAEL KARSTEN'S SPIRITUAL GROWTH IN TERMS OF HIS BIOGRAPHY

*“Home district, home district, sunny and beautiful
be in my dreams at nights and in the daytime,
home district which between the plains of
fields and leas, glides to the sea as an eternal stream”(*)*.

This poem was first introduced by Bror Åkerblom in his extensive work on the local history and geography of Kvevlax (1962). With regard to my study the spirit of the poem is inviting and charming since it mercurially depicts the circumstances of Rafael Karsten's home district: the vast Ostrobothnian plains by the sea.

2.1. The Intellectual Heritage of Childhood Home

The red two-storey house with white corners was concealed behind a dense grove of green birches. It was late summer, and nature was fragrant with mature wheat. At the time, the vicarage of rural Kvevlax experienced a moment of delight and joy: a child was born. Sigfrid Rafael Karsten was born on Saturday 16 August 1879, at the vicarage of Kvevlax (in Finnish Koivulahti) in the province of Ostrobothnia in Western Finland. Finland was a grand duchy of Russia and the country therefore ruled by Tsar Alexander second. Historical evidence shows distinctly that at the time Rafael Karsten was born, the birth of a robust newborn was a much greater wonder than today. In Kvevlax area, as in the other parts of Finland, a woman gave birth to a baby alone or with the assistance of *jordegumma*, a woman who delivered babies (there were no qualified nurse midwives) (1). When Rafael Karsten was born, the national public health service was poorly organized. There was only one district physician in Kvevlax area, who lived 15 kilometres away in the town of Vaasa. A major difficulty with the distance, which from a modern perspective seems trivial, was the lack of transport services. For the inhabitants, this meant that a doctor's journey could take hours. Besides, Kvevlax received its first registered nurse, Hilda Nygård, only in 1923. (2.) Interestingly, Rafael Karsten was born about four months before the nationwide edict of public health service (on 22 December

1879). This official public order made by the government laid down the basic standards to Finnish health care system, which meant that the villagers were now better informed of epidemics, for instance. (3.) But, when Rafael Karsten was born, his mother had to cope with the problems of postpartum by reading booklets like *Råd för allmogen i afseende å de späda barnens uppfödande i norra Finland* (“Advice Relating to the Tending of a Weak Child in Northern Finland”, 1844) or Elias Lönnrot’s *Hvarföre dör en så stor mängd af barn under det första lefnadsåret* (“Why Do Many Children Die During the First Year of Their Life?”, 1845) (4). The titles of these booklets clearly reflected infant mortality in Finnish society, that is, a mother was primed to think that she would probably give birth to a weak child or lose the child completely. Due to the lack of professional obstetrics and neonatologists, the attitudes of mothers of newborn babies could not be very optimistic. According to estimations, no more than 60 or 70 per cent of children, born in a pre-industrial society, reached the age of 20. And if we focus on life expectancy, then we find that when Rafael Karsten was born, life expectancy for men was, at most, about 43 years in Finland. (5.) Although parturient Emma Karsten was *prostinna*, wife of a clergyman, it was not a position taken without diverse liability. The domestic burdens of the wife of a clergyman were more complex than is thought. She gave birth to many children, was responsible for their upbringing, trained the servants and planned the catering arrangements for the family (6). In other words, a family of clergyman was a large unit of *familjehushåll* (“family household”), which meant that family comprised not only nuclear family but also servants and other entourages (7). The *prostinna* was an executive figure in the daily life of the family and thus intensely committed to the family. When Rafael Karsten was born it was acceptable that a member of an estate, a clergy woman, nursed her baby. In Finland, a woman of estate was never prohibited from breast-feeding her newborn (8). However, many infants died. The experiences of Emma Karsten represented the desperation and misfortune of a mother in the 19th century. She gave birth to eight babies, two of which (Edvin Hedley and Ines Irene) she lost while still nursing. Typhoid fever, dysentery, and scarlet fever especially killed infants in Kvevlax. Mass funerals were not rare: on Sunday 4 May 1884, in Kvevlax eleven infants were buried due to the scarlet fever. (9.) In 1879, when Rafael Karsten was born, Kvevlax suffered a very difficult epidemic of pulmonary tuberculosis. In fact, bacillus tuberculosis was not identified until 1882. (10.) Infant mortality was not peculiar to a specific class but touched all existing structures and classes of society in Finland. In the light of the gloomy prophecies of the 19th century, the most fundamental question was how to survive in life. The destiny of this baby was to survive. He was baptized Sigfrid Rafael, since his mother had been given a free hand to name her child. Mother named her child “Sigfrid” since she found it a very beautiful name. But, she also desired to give her son another name “Rafael” since it was the appellation of an angel. (11.) Rafael Karsten was born to a family of one God, whose name was omnipotent and spoke in the voice of devout Lutheranism. His father, Klas Edvin Karsten (called Edvin), was vicar of the parish of Kvevlax. His mother Emma (Maria Augusta Emilia), née Cajanus, had a clerical background, too, as her father, Anders Cajanus, was vicar of Orivesi (the spouse of Anders Cajanus was Maria Lovisa Snellman-Cajanus). The first thing to observe about Edvin Karsten is that he

was an absolutely ambiguous person. Edvin Karsten was born in 1836 in the town of Rauma, in the province of Satakunta. His father Klas Adolf Karsten (1811- 1885) especially was a devout Lutheran, being an active preacher in Eurajoki and Honkilahti and vicar of the parish of Föglö. Klas Adolf Karsten was married to Augusta Elisabet Charlotta Reinholm on 22 February 1835. Interestingly, the genealogy of Karsten´s family suggests that it is possible to trace ancestry to Lübeck, Germany. The founder of Karsten´s family was Henrik Fredriksson Carstens who died at the turn of the year 1614-1615, being mayor of Helsinki. His son Henrik Carstenius (born in May 1612) was vicar of the parish of Porvoo (1639). Henrik Carstenius´s son Petrus (Per) Carstenius (1646-1710) defended his doctoral thesis at the University of Rostock on 22 March 1673. The topic of his thesis was: *De Forma Substantiali Corporis Naturalis contra Herebordum et Cartesianes*. Petrus Carstenius was married to Katarina Thauvonius, a daughter of the bishop of Viipuri, Abraham Thauvonius. There is only little information available on his son, Lieutenant Petter Carsteen who died in April 1711. But, we do know that Petter Carsteen was married to Kristina Elisabet Ruthenhjelm on 20 May 1706 and owned Ruotsila manor in Pälkäne. Petter Carsteen was the father of Corporal Petter Georg Carsten (1708-1765) who was married to Ulrika Svinhufvud af Qvalstad. Finally, Petter Georg Carsten was the father of Sergeant Petter Gustaf Carsten (1747 - 1819) who was married to Jakobina Johanna Cedersparre (1769-1840). Their son Klas Adolf was Rafael Karsten´s grandfather. (12.) As the genealogy suggests, the main career choice of the family was unquestionably the army or the church.

Rafael Karsten´s father Edvin Karsten, educated in Rauma (matriculation examination on 19 September 1855), and coming under the influence of people such as his father, felt called initially to pastoral work. After working as a popular teacher in an elementary school in Rauma (1857), as a headmaster in Nykarleby´s elementary school (1858), and the headmaster in Tampere´s elementary school (1867-1868), (Klas)Edvin Karsten was ordained on 24 May 1869. (13.) Edvin Karsten was eminently interested in the emphasis on pedagogical facts in schoolwork. However, on 1 May 1877 Tsar Alexander II appointed him to the post of vicar in the parish of Kvevlax. Given the ordinary custom of appointment, Karsten arrived in the parish through the back door, unexpectedly and without any official recommendations. (14.) Some researchers have suggested that when the biological energy of the ego is exercised in stimulating socio-cultural situations, it grows to its highest potential and strength (15). This occurred, most obviously, when Edvin Karsten arrived in the parish of Kvevlax. Quite apart from the views of the parishioners, he saw the parish of Kvevlax as backward and immoral. In many respects his biological and natural energy grew to a maximum potential when he decided that the parish needed a complete reform. As a result of Karsten´s vigorous and deterministic activity, Kvevlax experienced many reforms. In the first place Karsten emphasized active parish work with the task of seeking the legitimate meaning of a sacred text (exegesis). Secondly, he founded Sunday schools and choirs for young girls. However, his reforms functioned not only on a religious level, he also provided Kvevlax with a largely positive assessment of the impact of education, particularly after the establishment of village

schools and elementary schools. Along with schools he also organized the temperance movement in Kvevlax. In fact, Edvin Karsten was a supporter of total abstinence. It should now be clear that Karsten and his reforms were working on an extensive level. Edvin Karsten was a profound theologian and full of energy and enthusiasm. It is easy to see how from the perspective of the 1880s and 1890s a vicar single-handedly could arrange not only religious, but also socio-economic reforms in the parish. Looking at an old picture of Edvin Karsten it is difficult to imagine that this gentle faced theologian was the powerful figure he actually was. However, since the ego is partly conflict-born, Karsten could not manage without setbacks. Edvin Karsten failed to understand that the parishioners felt the reforms he was putting into effect were conflictive, that is, Karsten had an illusion of the acceptability of his reforms. Karsten's reforms were seen as damaging to the life of the parish. Karsten's decision to restrict the night life of young people especially aroused many protests. Young people demonstrated against the vicar by making a noise in his garden and throwing tar and mud at his windows (16). Another difficult issue, dividing the opinions of parishioners, was the decision of the local council (1887) to prohibit the shops from selling beer. In 1879, illicit distilling was a widespread problem in the Kvevlax area. In Kvevlax, the innkeeper Johan Öster från "Stranden" had many loyal customers visiting his illicit public house. Edvin Karsten quickly learned about Öster's dishonest business and went on to suggest that the so-called Sunday trading, which mainly meant the sale of spirits, should be banned. Furthermore, Karsten founded a temperance movement which, of course, first met with resistance and enmity amongst the villagers. At first people refused to attend the meetings, since they felt Karsten had penetrated into too private a sector of their life. (17.) Obviously, Karsten's reforms were of unusual quality since in the mid 19th century enthusiasm for temperance was extraordinary amongst the educated classes (18). However, the parishioners also misunderstood the fundamental basis of Karsten's reform. They failed to perceive that promoting temperance also meant promoting good morals, that is, the idea of temperance was an indirect way of raising decent children within society.

Although a man of determined character, Edvin Karsten felt depressed by the arguments of the parishioners. At the time his youngest child Rafael was born, he admitted in public that the era in Kvevlax had been "bitter experiences" for him. Ten years later he still described the whole 1880s as the "dark" decade. He confessed that he had misunderstood Kvevlax's reality and its intellectual interests. (19.) However, a human being would be too uncomplicated and monotonous a creature if it was only built of a conflict-born side which continuously develops personal illusions and misapprehensions. Since a human is a synthetic entity she inevitably also has a conflict-free zone, which in this context indicates a situation wherein biological energy is used in terms of benevolent purposes. Although the parishioners accused their vicar of a hot-tempered nature and irritability, they attended his services. In fact, the parishioners appreciated him because of his religious experience and his expertise in exegesis. Karsten's speech to the worshippers was colourful and lively, more than an ordinary service. Karsten spoke without proofs and the minds of the worshippers experienced the moments of fervent

divine passion. (20.) According to Edvin Karsten, the year 1887 was a turning point in Kvevlax's spiritual history. Then, many parishioners suddenly became interested in the message of salvation and desired to hear more about the great goodness of God. On a practical level this meant that the number of parishioners attending services increased considerably. (21.) The reason for the sudden increase in church-going resulted perhaps from the fact that Edvin Karsten had finally understood the needs of his parishioners, that is, he had a genuine feeling (not only from a master's point of view) for them. At first, Karsten's reforms increased tension in parish but gradually this tension carried the parishioners along, forward. In other words, tension and indignation turned into an exploring interest. However, Edvin Karsten's systematic conversion work which he established amongst the parishioners in 1889 was equally influential or momentous. This meant that every other week in each village a meeting was held which included the Bible study and devotions. Edvin Karsten ordered that meetings were to take place regularly. However, the interest that the parishioners showed in church-going declined again at the turn of the 20th century. As a result of the energetic march of new Christian denominations people lost interest in services. Furthermore, emigration to Pennsylvania, Minnesota and Montana (USA), bad weather conditions on the coast, and lack of heating in the church decreased the total number of attendees. (22.)

At the end of the 19th century many foreign Christian denominations established themselves in the province of Ostrobothnia. Problematically, in Ostrobothnia Baptists and Methodists were called *de frikyrkliga*, members of the free church. However, *friförsamlingen*, the Free Church, formed an independent denomination in Ostrobothnia after 1883. Baptism infiltrated Ostrobothnia in the 1860s via Jakobstad (Pietarsaari). In 1867, the Baptist Anna Heikel founded a Sunday school in Pedersöre. The years 1873- 82 were successful in founding new Baptist churches. Interestingly, new Baptist churches gained favour in villages where radical Pietism had been influential in the 18th century. In 1875 two villagers, Matts Barkar and Jonas Fjällström, preached *baptistlära* (doctrine of Baptism) in Vassor, near Kvevlax (23). In 1880 Karl Krokfors organized a trancelike religious movement (*den krokforska rörelse*) in Kvevlax area, which endeavoured to revive Christianity (24). Methodism reached Ostrobothnia through the sermons of the Swedish Karl Johan Lindborg and through the helmsman Gustaf Lervik, who in 1859 returned from North America. After his return, Lervik began to preach in the Vaasa district. As a result of Lervik's fervent sermons, many people converted to Methodism. By 1886 the number of Methodists had doubled. The message of the Free Church spread in Ostrobothnia in 1877 when Märten Granberg began to preach in Yttermark. The members of the Free Church refused to conform to the established rules and customs of the Lutheran church, that is, they proposed sweeping reforms in the folk church (*en friare församling* - a "parish with more freedom"). The religious barriers between various denominations were mercurial. Erik Jansson from Petalax, for instance, first took part in the meetings of the Free Church and later on visited Baptist meetings. A common target of the different religious groups was to criticize *vanekristendomen*, nominal Christianity. (25.) I turn now to the attitude of Edvin Karsten towards these religious movements. Being a vicar, Edvin Karsten was the

highest order in the parish. Since he was also a pacifist by nature, he adopted a tolerant attitude towards the new denominations. However, at the beginning of the 1880s his views on the new denominations were still disapproving. On 26 June 1887, he held a strict judgemental sermon in Vassor in which he warned people of the dangers of new Christian churches (Vassor was the place where many new religious movements first gained ground). Then, Karsten refused to accept teachers professing the Baptist faith in his Sunday schools. But this clear distinction between Lutherans and “others” suddenly disappeared in 1894 when Edvin Karsten spoke up for the Baptist teacher Anna Brita Vikstrand in front of the church council. After that, Karsten clearly became interested in the meetings of Baptists and Methodists and participated in the Baptist mission with great and lively interest. (26.) The fundamental reason for Karsten’s sudden change of mind remains unknown but, gradually, tolerant relations between Karsten and Baptists and Methodists ensured the new churches permission to attend Karsten’s services and other religious meetings. At that time, Karsten desired to intensify his parish of “true believers” by establishing a parish within a parish. This meant that a heterogeneous party of believers (Baptists and Methodists) visited Karsten’s home whereupon the vicar put his soul totally into the religious life of his house guests. (27.) Edvin Karsten’s liberal considerations raised, naturally, many objections amongst the parishioners. On the whole, Karsten’s ecumenical attitude was very exceptional in the Vaasa district. The vicar of the neighbouring parish (Maxmo), E. Bengs, for instance, used to call the police to put an end to the gatherings of Baptists and Methodists. Thus, *de frikyrkliga* were forced to hold their meetings in the woods at night. (28.) The most eager opponents of Karsten’s ideas complained about his liberal views to the ecclesiastical authorities. The adversaries reproached Karsten with being a sectarian Baptist minister. Opponents also claimed that Karsten had showed open respect to the members of the Free Church, Baptists, Methodists, and all kinds of vagabonds. Finally, the adversaries blamed Karsten for trying to set up a core group of believers inside the parish. The accusations of the villagers were ignored by the ecclesiastical authorities and Karsten retained his position. (29.) Again, the contradictory nature of Edvin Karsten becomes explicit. At the time that he was essentially opposed to new Christian denominations, he also allowed them to familiarize themselves with his services. The equivocal nature of the vicar became a *cliché* amongst the parishioners: *Prosten - han byggde upp och han rev ned!* (“Vicar - he built and pulled down!”) (30). Although Edvin Karsten’s unanticipated ecumenism could obviously be of greatest significance in the light of social and ecclesiastic explanations, I suggest that his liberal and paradoxical nature was a product of private notions (these personal characters also became visible later on in his youngest son Rafael). Edvin Karsten desired to know. He was a restless person who desired to be free from any obligations, but finally could not. His intrinsic solitude and instability was veiled in continuous energy and motion. In other words, his powerful pattern of behaviour covered his low self-esteem, which was much inclined to solitude. His ego was divided into outer and inner space where the inner was successfully hidden from others. Only the external structure of his ego became powerfully visible. His temperament was the channel through which the symptoms of solitude and longing were expressed. Hot-tempered behaviour confirmed the

ego, which was prone to chronic depression. Nevertheless, the spiritual delight and freedom of new Christian denominations allowed Karsten the possibility to reveal an inner aspect of his ego. What had formerly been conventional and stable in Karsten's life now turned into adventurous joy in the meetings of the free churches. At the time, his hot-tempered nature also mellowed. However, he still was a Lutheran vicar who wished to pursue justification by grace as the principal tenet. Parishioners also adopted an ambivalent attitude towards their vicar. In the 1890s, the parishioners continuously complained about Karsten's liberal attitudes to the ecclesiastical authorities. The love-hate relationship of parishioners towards their vicar offers a valid basis for defining Edvin Karsten as a father, as a parent.

Children always had a special place in Edvin Karsten's heart. In trying to develop children's ability to survive in society he founded various schools in the Kvevlax area. In spite of being interested in various denominations of Christianity, the aspiration for a strong internalization of Christian dogma aptly described Edvin Karsten's upbringing methods. The strict methods of religious upbringing finally caused him to incur the disapprobation of parents. Parents whose children participated in Karsten's confirmation class claimed that Karsten's standard required too much of the children. Parents could not accept Karsten's routine according to which children were obliged to learn the catechism and the Bible by rote. Besides, the entrance requirements for confirmation class were too high and many children were first obliged to study the Bible under the supervision of the *lukkari* ("verger"). But, in the crossfire of opinions, Karsten determinedly stated that learning about the Bible elevated the child. (31.) Edvin Karsten's determined piety also became visible at home. Examining the Bible was his favourite task. He was also an expert in Hebrew, and compiled a Swedish-Hebrew dictionary (he managed to finish 2/3 of the dictionary before his death). (32.) At home, Edvin Karsten used to sing psalms with his family. Music was so important in Karsten's family that Rafael Karsten continued to sing in a choir in 1938 (33). However, the requirements of his work repeatedly led Edvin Karsten outside the home. I here refer to an element of Christian philanthropy which was typical of the 19th century when charity was a duty of the church and private persons. The state established its status as a provider of welfare only in the 20th century. Thus, it was hardly surprising that Edvin Karsten's wife, Emma Karsten, was a prominent religious educator at home. The main reason for Emma Karsten's religious dominance was twofold: firstly, society of the 19th century brought out the nature of the mother as the teacher of her children (Snellmanian view of society)(34) and secondly, the professional duties of the husband prevented him from participating whole-heartedly in the upbringing of the children. It is noteworthy, however, that in the 19th century sisters also had an important role in adapting their siblings to a particular culture (socialization and enculturation). On a religious level this meant that by reading the Bible and teaching the prayers, the older sisters assimilated their siblings into a "true belief" (this was how Ellen and Signe Karsten "educated" their brother Rafael in religious matters).

As mentioned before, Emma Karsten (1837-1920) had a clerical background, too, as her father was vicar of Orivesi. There is little information available concerning Emma Karsten's childhood, but it is easy to imagine that her childhood, too, was coloured by the strict filial obedience expected by her parents. For Emma Karsten, the most powerful memory of her father was his last words: "God in Jesus will help me even in the deepest channels of death!" (35). The Latin *religio* refers to the fear of God or the gods. In Karsten's family children became conscious of themselves through fear of God, which was a prevailing force of everyday life. Emma Karsten's religiousness and concept of education were sincere. She looked upon religion as a means of salvation which would bring her children safely into society. She desired to separate the profane world from the true religious world and aspired to educate her children according to the teachings of Jesus. However, she also wanted her children to obey her. She insisted on reading the New Testament and psalms while she also emphasized that life became almost evil without saying prayers. Emma Karsten's need for a system became explicit in her habit of singing psalms at home, while her husband played the piano (36). Emma Karsten felt bound together with her children by God's will. She was an icon of a person who cherished a warm religious emotion between mother and child. I suppose that her religious devotion resembled "personal mystic experience" (*personlighetsmystiken*) in character. According to Nathan Söderblom's concept of mysticism, within "personal mystic experience" an individual encounters her personally shaped concept of God and enjoys love of the divine. A person becomes *en Gudsmänniska*, an individual bound tightly to God. (37.) I believe Emma Karsten's religious piety (and experience) was, at least, partly similar to Söderblom's definition, since, on many occasions, she lived in religious ecstasy which let her experience God's love and mercy. By combining Emma Karsten's utterances I have made a cross-section of her Lutheran devoutness. The aim of my brief analysis is to point out the authentic nature of her religious thinking and that she was *en Gudsmänniska*. The utterances have been assembled from the letters which Emma Karsten wrote to her children during 1898-1916.

"My Dear Children,

I have a continuous concern for the souls of my children. That all of them would be redeemed. It says in the Bible that God's words are eternal divine truth. Jesus took a child in his arms and uttered: "Except that a man become as a little child, he shall not enter the Kingdom of Heaven". Jesus is my life and death is my victory. Remember, God is your best friend and the counsellor of your soul [...] how much I would like to be with my children, so that I could say: "My Lord, here I am with the children You gave me!" God's patience is, however, very permanent and stable. God loves you! I will tell you a story of a sea captain and his crew. On a ship they had a spiritual discussion. Then, one young crew member with knowledge of the Bible opened the eyes of the old captain and the captain realized it was not too late to ask God's forgiveness [...] the angels of God only watch over people who stand in awe of God. In

my opinion, the most perilous evils which a Christian can encounter are: morality without religion, religion without the Holy Spirit, Christianity without Jesus, sin without penitence, and unbelief in salvation and rebirth in Heaven. God helps me continuously!

*May God be with You!
Your pious mother” (38)*

In my opinion, the cross-section of the old letters explicitly reveals Emma Karsten’s personal mystic abstraction, that is, God was not impersonal for her. In short, God was a total reflection of her identity. The messages of the environment were discussed in terms of God’s order. Furthermore, the letters represent Emma Karsten as a woman of sound religious judgment (I refer here to Original Sin of Christianity). After her husband’s death Emma Karsten became interested in Methodism and attended the services of the Methodist church. She wrote to her son Rafael as follows:

“There was a great festival in the Methodist church [...] I have attended their services almost every day. They are preaching so marvellously. I suggest that also you, my dear son, attend their services at Helsinki’s Methodist church” (39).

Emma Karsten’s interest in the preachings of Methodists most likely derived from the enthusiasm her husband showed towards Methodism at the end of the 19th century. What now becomes stimulating is the religious sentiment of Methodism which clothed Emma Karsten in ecstasy. Obviously, the Methodists’ style of preaching consolidated and intensified Emma Karsten’s “personal mystic experience”. As a whole, the Karsten family resembled *Agnus Dei*, the Lamb of God. Everything abominable to God they rejected. The two following utterances describe yet the intellectual heritage of Rafael Karsten’s childhood home. The first expression shows the last words of Edvin Karsten at the moment of death whereas the latter assertion represents, *de novo*, Emma Karsten’s devotional religiousness.

“I stand on a rock named Jesus, and nothing can separate me from him!” (40).

“So long as my heart beats and life embraces my body, I will pray to God for my children - the Prayer of Parents in the Book of Psalms. I will pray for the children who have moved out and I will never neglect the morning and evening prayers” (41).

Dixi et salvavi animam meam (“I have spoken and saved my soul”).

2.2. Rafael Karsten's Spiritual Growth and Life

We first meet Rafael Karsten on 11 November 1894 by pursuing a wide curriculum and doing geometry homework at night (1). Unfortunately, the limitations of the archives are very real: there is only one letter extant which Rafael Karsten wrote to his relatives during his adolescence. However, there is a wide collection of letters which Rafael Karsten's mother, father and sisters wrote to him 1901-1946. The utilization of these letters has offered me a personal contact with his early milieu. The content of the letters varies and many times the messages say nothing of important arrangements of every day life like attending school, social life or meeting relatives. These elements, of course, belong to the domain of external agents of family life but could also reveal multiple inner wisdom and glimpses of Lutheran devoutness. Interestingly, Rafael Karsten's sister Ellen Karsten wrote before her death as follows: "I think back to my childhood home and remember many little details of it" (2). Unfortunately, she never specified the "little details". Of course, historically this is very frustrating. A second type of historical vexation is the fact that Emma Karsten's personal notebook has been lost to posterity. Emma Karsten used to write very specific notes in a little book almost every day. (3.) Another paradox of my study is, as mentioned above, that when I analyse Rafael Karsten's childhood, I definitively meet a great problem: the children produced somewhat scant documentary evidence of their life. A lucid scholarly remedy for the absurdity of studying the history of childhood, is, according to historians, the method of analysing the relationship between parents and children. Then, an axiomatic question is: what sort of an attitude did the parents adopt towards their child? (4.) In my study, the articulated *internal* intensity of Karsten's family letters assisted me in analysing Rafael Karsten's childhood, adolescence and other phases of life. Let me take an example: Emma Karsten's cataphasia (frequent repetition) concerning religious issues makes it easy to deduce that she really was a very religious person. On the other hand, Emma Karsten's domineering tone of voice gives me a glimpse of the way she taught her children on religious issues. Therefore, an internal oppressiveness of the letters combined with several external facts of every day life have made possible my analysis of Rafael Karsten's spiritual growth. Fundamentally, reading the letters has revealed the attitudes of the parents towards their children. Moreover, the history of Kvevlax has offered informative views to the outer milieu of Karsten's family.

Rafael Karsten's first years were coloured by the piety of his home and by the strict filial obedience expected of him by his parents. In many respects, the world of an infant is comprehensive, that is, there is no visible contradiction between him and the world. It is at this time that a child experiences his parents' pedagogy as natural and does not question the events of his life. According to developmental psychologists, the separation-individualization process of a child begins at the age of nine. Then, a child is involved in the initial discussions of his existence whereupon questions like "Why am I here?" or "Who am I" become typical. A child awakes as an individual and determines to follow up several lines of internal and

personal inquiry as a result of this awakening. Fundamentally, he ponders whether he can make any use of the teachings of his parents. (5.) I believe that the actual separation-individualization process begins much later, that is, at the age of thirteen or fourteen. In referring to a famous theory of the psychologist Erik Erikson (6), I suggest that it is true that school represents the first genuine institution of reorientation in the life of a child, but it is to be noted, however, that an actual, reflective self-assertion only begins at puberty. In other words, my point is that school offers to a child individual resources to separate him/herself from childhood milieu, but that this separation does not become real until adolescence. A nine-year-old child has many doubts about the world but his/her scepticism is innocent and very impulsive in nature. The more “serious” part of existence comes later. This suggestion is strengthened by the research results of a report on atheism in the United States. According to the study, the most common age of adopting disbelief in the existence of God is between 15 and 24 (7). Also according to Starbuck (1911) and Karl C. Garrison (1956), the climax of conversion experiences takes place between ages of 15 and 16 (8). During adolescence, the complex environment poses many challenges, projects and events which require re-defining. The general mental orientation of an adolescent is no longer “absent-minded”, and this develops anxiety and disorientation in a young person (9). Peers also guide the choices of an adolescent to a large extent. As a result, an adolescent sees what friends wish him/her to see. The world and atmosphere around a juvenile is gradually changing. Finally, internal and external reorientations of life generate problems and crises that need to be solved. How a young person survives in a change depends on his/her individual choices but also on the background and organization of the situation which threatens to affect her solution (10). However, an intellectual change, coping and survival process are always caused by friction between old and new standpoints. I believe that in his childhood Rafael Karsten’s belief resembled unconscious belief, since he was trained for life in a Christian society (socialization and enculturation). He was born to a family of austere Lutherans and since the very beginning he had been raised as a Christian. Very typically for a child he did not question his parents’ religious teachings and piety, but accepted them as omnipotent sagacities. There were no questions about his religiousness, he professed Christianity as did the whole family. The peaceful and introspective atmosphere of Karsten’s childhood village, Kvevlax, increased people’s religiousness. The villagers were the guardians of each other’s belief and piety, whereas irreligious activity was immediately weeded from the garden of Eden (see the figure which analyses Karsten’s spiritual growth from one period of life to another).

Figure 1. *Rafael Karsten's spiritual growth from one period of life to another*

Childhood

Lutheran devoutness / unconscious belief - has been raised as a Christian, does not question the religious teachings of childhood home but considers them omnipotent maxims

Adolescence

Intellectual change / separation, re-estimation - need to express oneself
Survival/ search for the right balance in life - religion as a partner or anti-partner in a survival process
Conversion/ cognitive maturity to make decisions about one's faith feels external to Christian faith and rejects it (rejection of key belief systems)



Old Age

Agnosticism / free of theological explanations but no longer so critical of Christianity. The target of criticism has changed. The so-called feeling of marginality - does not feel "at home" anywhere.

Middle Age

Agnosticism/ the old belief was wrong and the new is a right and tempting one, an individual has a rational right to believe in whatever he likes. To be agnostic but not an enemy of religion. Life is possible without Christian dogma as the main motivator. Does not leave the church, however, and attends the church at Christmas.

(11.)

Since sound evidence is lacking, it is impossible to know the exact influence of elementary school on Rafael Karsten's life. In the first place the significant re-orientation of Karsten's life took place when he began his studies at Wasa Swedish Lyceum (secondary school) in 1894. Rafael Karsten described his new school as follows:

"I have got used to my new school. In the beginning I had difficulties with certain subjects but now, when everything is familiar, it is easy to go on. Even algebra proved to be easier than I expected. I have a very difficult exam in geometry within a short period of time and if I manage well I could receive a honourable degree in it. I await the holidays eagerly since I have had so much homework lately. I have to finish now and begin with my homework" (12).

The letter is the only proof of Rafael Karsten's attending school in Vaasa. There is no other evidence to explicitly reveal his day-to-day doings and thoughts as a schoolboy. However, historical registers and studies reveal that Wasa Swedish Lyceum (founded in 1641 in Nykarleby) was a school with inspiring teachers. The headmaster and religion teacher, V.T. (Vilhelm Teodor) Rosenqvist (1856-1925), was an authoritative teacher with excellent rhetoric. Rosenqvist enhanced the atmosphere of the school by consolidating the bonds between school and parents. But a more stimulating figure with an outlandish appearance was a teacher of Swedish language and literature, Eliel Vest (1863-1902), who had the ability to speak vividly of Swedish authors. Vest was a close friend of pupils but died unfortunately due to the excessive use of narcotics and alcohol. A classmate of Rafael Karsten was Väinö Tanner (1881-1948), at a later date professor of geography, who took his school-leaving examination in the same summer (1899) as Karsten. (13.) Rafael Karsten began secondary school in Vaasa at the age of 15. As a seaport, Vaasa was a gateway to international influences and tendencies. Probably this cosmopolitan, marine bustle made Karsten evaluate his religious world view against a more secular life course. However, Karsten still was influenced by his parents who visited Vaasa regularly, in fact, they had a little town house in Vaasa. And yet, Rafael was also economically bound to his parents. (14.) Nevertheless, it is probable that his school years, 1894-1899, in Vaasa's liberal atmosphere marked a watershed in Karsten's life. This suggestion is strengthened by the evidence of the record of the University of Helsinki. After finishing his studies at Wasa Swedish Lyceum on 15 June 1899 Rafael Karsten entered the Faculty of Philosophy (Historical-Philological Section, Ostrobothnian department) at the Alexander University on 16 June 1899 (15). Contrary to recommendations, Karsten did not enter the Faculty of Divinity until 23 March 1902 (16). What now becomes important is the question why Karsten entered the Faculty of Philosophy (Arts). It is a historical fact that often at least one of a clergyman's sons entered the Faculty of Divinity after his matriculation examination. The Finnish representative of Realism, Minna Canth (1844-1897), discussed this topic in her famous play *Papin perhe* ("The Family of A Clergyman") in 1891. In that play, Minna Canth rationally describes how a clergyman expects his son to choose theological studies. The son rejects his father's desire and the tense family drama develops. If the son of a clergyman was not interested in theological studies, other ideal professions for him were a commission in the army or the medical profession (at least in Edvin and Emma Karsten's family)(17). Faced with the absence of direct evidence of Rafael Karsten's career choices, I am forced to make two kinds of assumption. Firstly, there is definite evidence of Karsten's individual choices, and secondly, there are exclusively my own personal assumptions.

It is clear that during his school years in Vaasa, Karsten used to read the studies of the German scholar Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859). They described his expeditions in the regions of Orinoco in Brazil. In his later teens Karsten also read "Red-Indian story-books" which presented Indians as "fascinating individualities". (18.) Evidently various travel accounts made an impact on young Karsten and created an interest in foreign countries and nations. The books increased Karsten's mastery of the environment on a psychological level, however, the

books alone could not be the principal cause of Karsten's growing spiritual doubts. In retrospect, there had to be simultaneous physical reformers or agents which expanded Karsten's scope of individualism. Perhaps the ships carrying sailors and vagabonds ashore consolidated Karsten's daydreams about exotic countries. Possibly, a liberal circle of friends formulated Karsten's ideas. Therefore, the key contributor to Karsten's choices may have been his class mate, Väinö Tanner. Interestingly, Väinö Tanner entered the Faculty of Philosophy on the same day as Karsten. The concerns of the friends were with the radical and liberal ideas that the humanities of the turn of the 20th century addressed. Or perhaps, of all influential persons, the most important was a great humanist, the teacher Vest, who showed great qualities as a visionary. In reality, school was the ground for the demonstrative arguments and changing beliefs of students at the end of the 19th century. This was also recognized among the professors and lecturers of the Faculty of Divinity at the Alexander University, who in 1899 regretted that there was "an alien atmosphere towards religion" in the Finnish secondary schools (19). A member of the Faculty, *Civis Raunio*, declared on 15 November 1899 as follows:

"Why is the number of students declining in the Faculty of Divinity? The most significant reason for this is that the office of a clergyman is considered inferior. The spirit of the time is alien to all kinds of religiousness. When children leave their schools they do not have religious interests [...] there is hardly any real Christianity today (in Finnish tosi-kristillisyyss) at homes"(20). (the words in brackets are mine)

Interestingly, the following figure shows us the number of students enrolled in the Faculty of Divinity (today the Faculty of Theology) and in the Faculty of Philosophy (Historical-Philological Section) between 1899-1903 at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland (21):

Figure 2. *The students enrolled in the Faculty of Divinity and the Faculty of Philosophy (Historical-Philological Section) between 1899-1903*


Year	<u><i>Faculty of Divinity</i></u>	<u><i>Historical-Philological Section</i></u>
1899	23	76
1900	26	94
1903	38	200

As the figure shows, the number of students who entered the Faculty of Divinity increased more slowly than the number of students choosing humanistic studies. This development was perhaps the clearest sign of theological disaffection among the young generation. The heavy conventional and traditional curriculum of the Faculty of Divinity undoubtedly reduced the number of applicants. At the same time, it is clear that the failure of theologians to adapt the curriculum to the changing reality and their continuous desire to defend the old standards of

theological education discouraged many students. The quality of theological education in Finland was changing but very gradually (see Chapter 4.3.1.). One of the most important figures in this transition was the Finnish humanist and theologian Jaakko Gummerus (1870-1933), who after becoming acquainted with German theological tradition adopted a critical attitude towards the professors of the Faculty of Divinity at the Alexander University. Gummerus considered the Faculty's practice "long-drawn-out" and desired to humanize theological education by emphasising the importance of the relationship between student and supervisor. (22.) Another important figure was the theologian G.G. Rosenqvist, whose theological views were seen as current among the university students (see Chapter 4.3.1.) (23). Finally, my arguments regarding reasons for Karsten's entering the Faculty of Philosophy are only suggestions, but may give an indication as to what might have occurred. The conclusion to all this is that Karsten's humanistic view of life was born in Vaasa but became consolidated and discernible only when Karsten entered the Alexander University. This suggestion is supported by the evidence of family letters, that is, when Karsten entered the university his family still expected him to profess the Christian faith.

At the university it became Rafael Karsten's destiny to find contradiction between theological and humanistic approaches. A latent or awakening discontent with the religion of childhood home came out powerfully. Karsten began to see theological interpretations as conservative, inflexible and outdated. Practically, this meant that he began to see his childhood home's religious life as a negative experience. Why did Karsten finally reject the religion of his childhood home? It is possible to specify four separate factors since "religious" is never the personal destiny of human, but something which he deals with others and which is at least partly caused by others (I refer here to Karl Kerenyi's view). Rafael Karsten's rejection of the religion of his childhood home can be portrayed as follows:

Figure 3. *Main causes for Rafael Karsten's rejection of the religion of his childhood home*



Firstly, the revolutionary and liberal atmosphere of the University changed Karsten's pattern of thought. The end of the 19th century was a period of intellectual and academic change in

Finland. Charles Darwin's theory of evolution found its way to Finland in the early 1860s when various scholars were eager to accept Darwin's scientific ideas. Thereafter Charles Darwin's ideas of evolutionism spread rapidly in all academic directions. In the 1870s and 1880s scientists began to use Darwin's evolutionary assumptions as a weapon against the church and religion. At that time the scientific idea of evolution grew into a world view, and became thus a part of people's philosophy of life. In the wake of evolutionism the ideas of empiricism, liberalism, and socialism also arrived in Finland. With empirical sciences, the Finnish academic thinking pattern also assumed the ideal of positivism as a part of its theoretical terms of reference. The new intellectual tendencies adopted a non-affirmative attitude towards theology and Christianity. The radical ideals of positivism regarded theological study as an ancient relic. The revolutionary toleration of liberalism was based on individual decision-making and enterprise. The pessimism of naturalism and its demand for intellectual and social change created antagonism towards Christianity. According to the enlightened schools of naturalism, the church and its dogmas were antiquated and unsuitable for the progress of modern science. Similarly, socialism and its wide audience, the working classes, adopted a negative attitude towards Christianity. The Christian faith was a confederate of capitalism, and was thus a perilous dogma for the ideal of socialist revolution. (24.) The revolutionary tendencies among the students of the Alexander University offered Karsten a powerful experience of intellectual and physical reorientation which also raised a significant problem: he was not able to interpret new circumstances and winds of change on the basis of his contemporary belief.

Secondly, a pamphleteer for Karsten's intellectual anarchy was cosmopolitan Edward Westermarck, the doyen of Finnish sociologists, whose influence on the young student proved to be decisive. Karsten's first encounter with Westermarck took place in autumn 1899 or spring 1900, and his first impression was promising. From the first moment Karsten saw Westermarck, Westermarck became a symbol of intelligence, criticality, humanity, thoroughness, and open-mindedness for Karsten. Karsten felt he shared the same ideas, feelings, and academic doubts as Westermarck. (25.) Westermarck also belonged to the same Finnish Swedish intelligentsia (the group of Swedish-speaking scholars) as Karsten although Westermarck was born in the capital of the Grand Duchy of Finland, in Helsinki, being a member of the middle class, while Karsten was born in provincial Kvevlax, to a member of the clergy. Affected by Westermarck's liberal and agnostic outlook on life, Karsten became increasingly aware of the disparity between theological and humanist thinking. In contrast to Karsten's experience, Westermarck had grown up in a milieu in which a child was only occasionally taken to church. Westermarck's mother read a book of homilies on Sundays, but never discussed religion or religious issues with her children. As a student, Westermarck became an agnostic since he could not find any valid evidence of the existence of a personal god. However, for most of his life Westermarck experienced the existence of a great, enigmatic mystery which manifested itself in music. Westermarck also abstained from defining why man was on earth. According to him, it was pointless to discuss the purpose of

life since there was no definite answer. (26.) As an agnostic, Westermarck considered religion to be superstition, the source of immorality, and the origin of prejudiced thinking (Christianity alone, not the scholarly study of religions) (27). He was a member of the Raketen Club and of the Euterpe (Society) which were disappointed with the church's flattering line towards the government (28). If Lutheran devoutness or piety was not a particular virtue amongst the Westermarckians, why did then Karsten enter the Faculty of Divinity in 1902? I suggest that the reason for Karsten's theological studies was that the world was becoming receptive to radical explanations. The door was opened to scientific explanation based on forces and changes of the natural process. By following Westermarck's opinions, social actions and reference groups Karsten became involved in antireligious/clerical attitudes. I believe that Karsten entered the Faculty of Divinity to study the Old Testament exegesis and church history since he felt he needed theological knowledge in order to be able to show that Christianity fundamentally was a "religion amongst religions".

Thirdly, Rafael Karsten's independent nature evidently was a significant factor in his spiritual transition and in the emergence of his study on religion. At the same time that Karsten became involved with Westermarck and his teachings, he also launched his own independent style of research. Although Westermarck was a teacher of seminal importance, Karsten was continuously seeking intellectual freedom. Thus, I believe, Westermarck was ultimately like a window through which a wide scientific panorama came into view. It was this specific drive to free himself from all obligations that marked Karsten's career in comparative religion. Karsten had a hunger for obtaining information and going independently deeper into theory. Karsten has frequently been described (by Ragnar Numelin and Professor Hultkrantz) as the most independent of Westermarck's disciples. That is certainly true. The inviolable nature of Finnish comparative religion at the beginning of the 20th century was a challenge for Karsten's nature of pioneer. By steadily studying "religious belief" within the Westermarckian school, he aspired to go his own way. Karsten's variety of ideas could have entered ethics and moral philosophy, but it also could have made him more obliged to explicitly acknowledge his debt to Westermarck. And this had meant a certain reiteration of the views of Westermarck and the replacement of Karsten's doctrine of *nostro marte*, independently. It is almost as if the air was still resonant with the determined voice of Karsten: "You can believe in whatever you want, but I make my own way!" (29). Rafael Karsten's autonomy can be understood as a personal venture, as an inner attempt to solve scholarly problems, which set him apart from heterogeneous social intercourse. However, he was not asocial in the proper meaning of the word. He had not succeeded in *Walden*, a place where the American Henry David Thoreau lived in solitude in the woods. Karsten himself stated: "The human has never been isolated, but has always been a member of a certain social group" (30). The point of this comparison is to suggest that Karsten mainly created his study of religions independently, but never apart from other people. His individualism bore a likeness to the French-Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto who was described as "a cat who walked by himself" (31). On the whole, the solitary hours spent in the libraries were the most crucial to Karsten's intellectual development and to

the development of his study of religions. After all, the dynamism of Rafael Karsten's self-reliant and pioneering intellectual expression made him a prominent pioneer of Finnish comparative religion.

Finally, the liberal and radical climate of the university and the fervent figure of Westermark, as mentioned before, made Karsten gradually assess the faith of his childhood home. In an excited state of mind he began to see the strict religious nature of his mother as an irritating legacy. Interestingly, researchers have pointed out that those raised in religious settings frequently experience a conflict between religion and science in their adolescence. In these cases the parental figure with the most prevalent religious influence on the child has generally been the opposite parent. All in all, the notable reason for men's rejection of the faith of their childhood home has been the determined and abrupt religiousness of their mother. Thus, the faith of the childhood home is remembered with a sympathetic warmth only if the religious atmosphere of the home has been experienced as peaceful and modest (of course there are also antithetic cases). (32.) Therefore, I suggest that Emma Karsten's strict religious piety actually rejected her son's religiousness in a moment of heavily vacillating emotions. I believe Rafael Karsten partly adopted a negative attitude towards the religion of his childhood home since he felt his parents (especially his mother) were too persistent and narrow-minded in their religiousness. The strict religious nature of Rafael Karsten's mother became explicit in the way she tried to advocate the dogmas of Christianity, but unfortunately her tactics came closer to religious pressure rather than spiritual support. Emma Karsten's favourite words to her son Rafael were; "You say that you would give your life for science, but where will your soul go then?" (33) or "As a child you certainly would have entered heaven, but now it is doubtful!" (34). On the other hand, Edvin Karsten's attitude towards his son's anticlerical choices was ambivalent and neutral. Edvin Karsten used to say: "I wish you success in your studies!"(35) but sometimes he also tried to influence his son's opinions by saying: "Even the great atheists, like Fichte, read the Gospel according to St. John every day"(36). Over and over again, the letters indicate the ambiguous religious nature of Edvin Karsten (37). He accepted his son's choices in the domain of the humanities but still called him to the union of the Holy Trinity. Edvin Karsten was perhaps a vicar with a strong will, but I suspect that his religious nature never irritated Rafael to such an extent as his mother's religious fervour, that is, Edvin Karsten was more of a cosmopolitan person than his wife Emma. But, how would Emma Karsten characterize herself? Interestingly, Emma Karsten saw herself as "not a very austere mother"(38). She was convinced of her uprightness and affection as a parent. "You have always been my lovely boy!": she used to say to her son Rafael (39). But there seems to be a contradiction here. Emma Karsten failed to understand that as she was portraying herself as a kindly mother she also gave exacting commands to her children: "Please, obey me when I ask you to take your New Testament and read it and believe what God says!"(40). She also made attempts to influence the religious nature of her son by writing highly sentimental letters about staying up all night, and crying for Rafael's rejection of Christian faith. By comparison with Emma Karsten's letters, the correspondence between Edvin Karsten and his son Rafael was

surprisingly open and warm, that is, man-to-man conversation. Overall, Edvin Karsten encouraged his son in his attempts to become a scholar. When Rafael Karsten visited England his father wrote to him:

“If I were much younger I would also travel to London to see Westminster Abbey, the museums and St. Paul’s Cathedral, which interests me a lot. But I have to spend my time in boring and poor Kvevlax which does not offer me any highlights” (41).

But, as mentioned before, the sisters also trained their brother Rafael for a life in a religious society. Rafael Karsten’s oldest sister especially, the singing teacher Ellen Karsten (1863-1923), responded very vigorously to her brother’s endeavour to free himself from any religious attachments. Ellen Karsten considered that a humanist was destitute in comparison to a clergyman, who always had enough money to buy food, clothing and shelter. Furthermore, Ellen Karsten thought that it was devastating to spend two thirds of one’s life studying religions and cultures which finally did not offer a secure income. According to her utilitarian view, a humanist was doomed to be a pauper for the rest of his life. (42.) Although Rafael Karsten’s sister Signe Karsten (born 1876) was deeply religious, she adopted a positive attitude towards her brother’s choices in the academic world: “In every case it is your own right to decide what you want to do with your life. Your own interests guide you”(43). Rafael Karsten’s sister Helmi Karsten (born in 1867, married to the vicar of Kurikka, Yrjö Alanen) also encouraged her brother in his endeavours: “Ultimately, your plans belong to you personally!”(44). When we look at the influence of the women in Karsten’s family it is easy to come to the conclusion that the powerful intensity of Emma and Ellen Karsten’s viewpoints obscured the opinions of others. On 28 May 1903, Emma Karsten was pleased since her son Rafael had promised in a letter to continue his theological studies. Unfortunately, Emma Karsten misunderstood the aims of her son. Three years later Emma Karsten thoroughly realized her son’s rejection of Christianity and the family conflict took its toll. Emma Karsten became engaged in a continuous argument with her son. (45.) As a result of all this, Rafael Karsten drifted into a personal crisis (intellectual change). His personal life required re-writing, which meant that he had to re-assess and re-interpret the place of God in his life. Karsten’s psychological survival during the intellectual change was ineffective because he was not able to find a new interpretation for his Lutheran devoutness. Thus, his mother’s tactics resembled religious pressure rather than spiritual support and she unknowingly prompted her son to free himself from religious attachments rather than convincing him of the benefits of Christian piety. Finally, religion and belief were Karsten’s opponents in the survival process and also influenced his conversion process. In the conversion process Rafael Karsten met his previous way of life and the new tempting one at a juncture where he had to make a significant choice. He stood facing two signposts: one advised him to choose the old belief, and the other opted for a more liberal, evolutionary view of life. At the crossroads of conversion Rafael Karsten realized that he no longer recognized the meaning and content of his Christian faith and succumbed to the more inviting elements of Edward Westermarck’s

school. By accepting Westermarck's influence, Karsten replaced his belief with ideas of agnosticism and liberalism which criticized the foundations of Christianity. Karsten's conversion experience was thus negative, since his interpretations of belief were replaced by interpretations of agnosticism. Karsten's conversion experience was possible since he had reached cognitive maturity where he was able to make decisions about his faith. The result of this cognitive soul-searching was that Karsten now felt outside to Christian tradition, when he formerly had been a part of this religious tradition, that is, it meant the rejection of his key belief systems.

Rafael Karsten received his Master's degree (*filosofiekandidat*) on 8 March 1902 at the Imperial Alexander University. He received marks in philosophy (laudatur), Greek literature (laudatur), Roman literature (approbatur), Oriental literature (approbatur), and mathematics (approbatur) (46). The Professor of Greek Literature at the time was Ivar August Heikel (1861-1952) who lectured in reading rooms on Aristophanes. Professor Waldemar Ruin lectured on the great philosophical systems of the 19th century. (47.) Since the professorship in philosophy was open, Ruin was acting professor. On 26 May 1905, Arvi Grotenfelt was appointed professor of philosophy at the Alexander University. (48.) Then Edward Westermarck lost the appointment due to his unwillingness to take an examination in the Finnish language (49). The Professor of Latin Literature was Fridolf Vladimir Gustafsson (1853-1924), who lectured also on Latin grammar and stylistics. The Professor of Oriental Literature was Knut Leonard Tallqvist who taught Arabic, read Arabic texts and lectured on the history of Israel. (50.) At that time, professors held examinations in their homes. A student who had diligently studied the required literature rang the professor's doorbell and entered his study. Often, the anxiety of the test and the determined professor spoilt the examination in progress and the candidate was sent back home to study more. The overall grade of Karsten's certificate was *clarissimus* which was the lowest mark. (51.) Perhaps the rapid tempo of studies and the unstable political conditions of his learning environment influenced the young student's overall grade. One month before receiving his degree, Karsten described the conditions in Helsinki as follows:

"The anniversary of the February Manifesto was chaotic in Helsinki. The Finnish people showed grief over the tsar's despotism. People dressed in black while all shops covered their windows with black or dark cloth. The day was a day of national mourning. In the evening the Finnish crowd shouted slogans and threw stones at the Russian people. The police was called in to restore law and order, but in vain. People also became furious at the police"(52).

Rafael Karsten undertook his first research project at the British Museum at the beginning of May in 1903. Westermarck wrote Karsten a good letter of recommendation, and Karsten applied for a travel scholarship from the University Council, but in vain: his application was rejected and he was compelled to take a bank loan for his research journey. According to the

University Council committee, the reason for rejection was that Karsten did not have enough academic achievements for his scholarship. Even Karsten's other supervisor, the Professor of Greek language, Ivar A. Heikel, refused to accept Karsten's application, since he was not certain about Karsten's schemes. Finally, Karsten got 280 Finnish marks from the Alexander University and travelled to Great Britain. (53.) Rafael Karsten's intention was to work at the British Museum reading various studies which were difficult to obtain in Finland at that time. His plan was also to collect material for his doctoral thesis. However, the purpose of the journey was not purely scientific. Due to the tsar's oppressive politics, the political atmosphere of Helsinki was agitated. Rafael Karsten and especially his brother, the lawyer Julius Karsten had been active in underground movements. The members of underground movements were eager to express their anti-tsarist thoughts in wider forums, like market places. Rafael Karsten's marked scepticism towards the tsar and his reform policy was inherited from Edward Westermarck. (54.) Presumably, Westermarck's interest in morality and ethics had developed his interest in the tsar's inequitable policy. Seven years later Westermarck wrote in his new book, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, (edition "Moralens uppkomst och utveckling" used in this occasion): "Det har framhållits, att den överdrivna strängheten av en lag utgör ett hinder för dess tillämpning" (55). Based on the free interpretation of the researcher the comment could be expressed as follows: "Experience shows that the strictest laws are also the least obeyed ones". Westermarck had learned his hypothesis by Finnish experience, since Tsar Nicholas II's strong-arm policy had caused, not suppressed rebellions. On the other hand Westermarck was compelled to support anti-tsarist views as a visible representative of the Finnish intelligentsia. In 1899, over half a million (520 931) Finnish people signed their names on the anti-tsarist petition (56). Rafael Karsten's battle against the oppressive policy of tsar was inspired by Westermarck, but also by the general and inflammatory student unrest which had become a somewhat prevailing social phenomenon. The famous Finnish author and student at that time, Hella Wuolijoki, described in her book *Yliopistovuodet Helsingissä* ("Student Years in Helsinki") how by October 1905, due to the tsar's policy, life in Finland underwent a dramatic change and it became impossible for the ordinary student to continue her studies (57).

Another reason for Rafael Karsten's journey to Great Britain was the tsar's new conscription law. According to the law, young Finnish men were conscripted into the Russian army, and thereby also forced to fight on Russian fronts. This was a reason for many talented scholars to leave their home country. (58.) Rafael Karsten's sister, Ellen Karsten, told Rafael to ask Westermarck for his advice. Westermarck and the other scholars strongly urged Karsten to stay in London. Otherwise he would have been imprisoned or sent to Siberia. (59.) Rafael Karsten's first academic trip to Great Britain was significant, since Great Britain offered him the possibility to taste a cosmopolitan way of life. His proficiency in the English language was quite modest when he arrived in London. Rafael Karsten found it embarrassing to sit at dinner when he was not able to discuss with other people without sign language. However, the trip

was an excellent language course for Karsten. As he was able to learn languages easily, his linguistic development was quick. (60.) He enjoyed his stay in England, undertook excursions to Oxford, to Windsor castle and Southend (61). In July, Rafael Karsten finished his work at the British Museum. Nevertheless, his return home was an uncertain issue due to the conscription law. After careful consideration Karsten finally decided to travel to Finland. His brother, the philologist Torsten Karsten wrote to him:

“Since the family (mother, father and sisters) is no longer able to finance your trip you have to return from England. You have to avoid Helsinki since in landing you have to show your passport and that is the moment when the authorities can recognize you. Because of the warrant you have to be careful. The best solution is that you first travel by boat to Turku and further by train to Vaasa. In Vaasa you have to be extremely cautious since there are many detectives at the railway station. The detectives have searched for you in order to take you into questioning. After arrival at Vaasa, you immediately have to travel to the family’s summer cottage in Majniemi. One of us can ride by bicycle and meet you half-way. Do not take luggage with you. We can bring it later on. I want to mention to you that mother, Ellen, and I support your home-coming, whereas father, Julius, Ossian Lindholm and J. R. Aspelin oppose it. We cannot know what will happen since your case is the first one ever” (62).

Torsten Karsten’s instructions for Rafael’s home-coming resembled a thriller. Thanks to Vaasa’s new chief of police, and the people’s public resistance to the law, the case was settled. The Finnish conscripts went on strike in spring 1902. Then, they saw that refusing to serve in the Russian army was a great honour for Finnish people. (63.) Rafael Karsten undertook his second trip to Great Britain already in February 1904. At that time Westermarck was appointed teacher of sociology at the London School of Economics. Karsten prepared his doctoral thesis at the British Museum and met Westermarck frequently, meanwhile his brother Torsten Karsten took care of his brother’s applications for scholarships in Finland. Westermarck acted as a referee for scholarships. (64.) Karsten spent the summer in Finland and returned to the British Museum in September 1904 (65). His routine at the British Museum did not, however, only consist of intensive research periods. Rafael Karsten, Edward Westermarck and Gunnar Landtman were in the habit of having lunch in Lyons restaurants or in little A.B.C. cafés. In the afternoons, the three friends used to have a cup of tea in the Vienna Café. Dinner was enjoyed either at Malzy near Tottenham Court Road or at the Marguerite or in the Star and Garter near New Oxford Street. (66.) On Sundays, the friends spent time by studying books in London’s leafy parks (67). But then again, the restless and gloomy political and social atmosphere of Finland troubled the minds of Finnish scholars even in England. During the years 1903 and 1904, the Westermarckians could not but think pessimistically about events in their fatherland. At the time, the first period of oppression reached its climax in autonomous Finland. As is known, Edward Westermarck aspired to raise

the case of Finland by discussing it with the state secretary of Pope, Cardinal Rampolla. Westermarck was granted three audiences with the cardinal. Westermarck also endeavoured to speak of Finland's oppression in the United States. (68.) Interestingly, news travelled fast from Finland to England. When the Finnish official Eugen Schauman shot the Russian Governor-General Bobrikov and himself on 16 June 1904 at eleven a.m. in Helsinki, the news reached London already at four p.m. (it should be noted that Finland was 2 hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time) (69). The murder of Bobrikov was great news and was received with delight among the Westermarckians. Bobrikov's aspirations to Russianize Finland had ended in assassination and the Finnish students could not but be proud of Schauman's personal bravery (Eugen Schauman was Gunnar Landtman's classmate). Gunnar Landtman stated later that they had even wished that Bobrikov had not met with immediate death, but had suffered for what he had done to Finland (actually, Bobrikov died on an operating table at the Surgical Hospital in Helsinki). (70.) Obviously, Rafael Karsten shared the opinions of his colleagues, although he had reached Kevlax, Finland, when the assassination happened. However, despite the unstable political atmosphere, Rafael Karsten published his first scholarly article entitled *Den moderna religionsvetenskapen* ("Modern Comparative Religion") in a publication series of *Finsk Tidskrift* (for more information, see Chapter 4.1.).

On October 1905, Finland went on general strike. The students walked in the streets asking what Finland could do in the face of Russia's sanctions. The Alexander University was closed temporarily and the burghers of Helsinki were apprehensive about the future. In an attempt to influence national and social questions, the university students founded various associations. October 1905 saw the birth of such student societies as "Prometheus" and "Students' Social Democratic Society", to name a few. Nineteen days after the general strike, Rafael Karsten's doctoral thesis was presented in the hall of the Historical-Philological Section (on 25 November 1905 at 10 a.m.). (71.) Karsten had been given permission to defend his doctoral thesis six months earlier on 15 May 1905 (72). The title of his thesis was: *The Origin of Worship: A Study in Primitive Religion*. The focus of the study was the search for the origins of religion. Karsten's opponent (*ex officio*) was Edward Westermarck and the Professor of Philosophy Arvi Grotenfelt (1863-1941) presided over the occasion (73). Westermarck's statement on Karsten's dissertation was read at the meeting of the Historical-Philological Section on 5 December 1905. Four days earlier Westermarck had written as follows:

"Principally, I agree with the author, whereupon my remarks concern only some details[...] I wish the author could have chosen a more circumscribed problem [...] but it has to be mentioned that the thesis is uniformly lucid and that the defence of the thesis was gratifying" (74).

Rafael Karsten's doctoral thesis was the result of radical intellectualism of that time, where an evolutionary scheme was a valid term of reference of research. The doctoral thesis was for Karsten a landmark which guaranteed him the permanent favour and companionship of Westermarck. On the other hand, the doctoral thesis was also Karsten's final farewell to the piety and filial obedience of his childhood home. Karsten's thesis belonged to a branch of sociology, but was, regardless of that, a study on religion (I will discuss the nature and content of Westermarckian cultural evolutionism more in the next chapter). A month before his doctoral thesis was examined, Rafael Karsten became a member of the Prometheus Society. In October 1905, the members of the society elected Edward Westermarck chairman. The main objective of the Prometheus Society was to achieve full freedom of religion. The programme of the society was anticlerical, since the delegates of "aristocratic radicalism" were disappointed with the church's submissive approach to the government. (75.) Edward Westermarck and Rafael Karsten were not members of the most radical wing of the society, even if Karsten's anticlerical opinions were quite fanatical, that is, his analysis of Christianity was propagation rather than sedate discussion. Rafael Karsten's Prometheus activity was a great shock to his mother:

" I am worried about your belief and the lectures you have given in the Prometheus Society[...] Your lectures and the whole society are the enemies of Christianity [...] Please, open up your eyes to Jesus! (76).

And further:

"I wish you could leave the Prometheus Society and reaccept the belief of your childhood home. Please, leave Västermark (sic) who has only taught anti-Christian views to you. I wish you could be a Christian theologian some day. A great future awaits you if you return to the faith of your childhood home" (77).

Since the Prometheus Society was a child of the general strike (1905), its activity died out gradually in the late 1900s (last meeting in 1914). On taking his Ph.D degree on 11 December 1906, Rafael Karsten received marks in moral and social philosophy (laudatur), Greek literature (laudatur) and general history (approbatur) (78). In 1907, Karsten was appointed docent in comparative religion at the Alexander University (79). Then, Professors Arvi Grotenfelt and Ivar Heikel and Docent Zach Castrén gave their statements of Karsten's qualification. Professor Grotenfelt's report was emphatic and praised Karsten's doctoral thesis and his extensive booklet *Primitive Greek Religion* (1907). According to Grotenfelt, these studies had significantly influenced the subject area of comparative religion. Grotenfelt also stressed that Karsten had displayed an aptitude for independent scholarly work. The only peculiar aspect was, however, that Karsten so fervently and energetically desired to dedicate

himself to one subject area, comparative religion. Grotenfelt could not fully understand that in an era when it was fashionable to be interested in multiple academic examinations, a scholar would pertinaciously pay attention to one field of research. Docent Zach Castrén's report also praised Rafael Karsten's interest in comparative religion. According to Castrén, Karsten's ideas of comparative religion were worth mentioning. Both Grotenfelt and Castrén saw Karsten's studies on philosophy as loose, lifeless and unoriginal, but admired the intellectual ability and personal dynamism which he showed towards the study of religions. In his report, Professor Ivar A. Heikel concentrated on commenting Karsten's study "Primitive Greek Religion". (80.)

The late 1900s was for Rafael Karsten a period of academic striving. He carried on his studies in the course of the years 1906, 1907, 1909 and 1910 mainly in the British Museum in London. But he also studied philosophy of law in Berlin (1906, 1907, 1910) and in Cologne (1906) and moral and social philosophy in Paris (1906). (81.) The hours spent in the libraries were the most crucial to Karsten's intellectual development. Resolution encouraged hard work. One of the most important single factors in describing the Finnish intelligentsia of the turn of the 20th century is the trend known as interest in expeditions and scientific journeys. Ever since the Finnish physicist J.J. Nervander (1805-1848) and the orientalist Georg August Wallin (1811-1852) had undertaken their trips to Italy and Egypt in the middle of the 19th century, Finnish scholars aspired to study abroad. In spring 1908, Karsten applied for a travel scholarship from the University Council. The purpose of his application was to obtain a fieldwork research grant. His aim was to undertake an expedition to South America with his colleague Gunnar Landtman, in particular Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. (82.) However, their application was rejected and the whole project collapsed (for more information, see Chapter Five). Life went on. After all adversity Karsten decided to carry on his studies in the British Museum. On 15 March 1908, Edvin Karsten died after a lengthy and painful illness. Later at the funeral, on 22 March 1908, many people shared warm memories of their vicar at the parsonage (83). There are no letters to reveal to us how Rafael Karsten reacted to his father's death. Edvin Karsten wrote, however, his spiritual testament to his son Rafael one year before his death:

"I wish I could live so long that I could see you and Torsten at home. If I am going to die[...] I would like to express my thoughts about different matters to you. I am very glad that you were appointed to the position of university lecturer. Nothing else matters now[...] Once more, I hope you could believe in God's charity[...] The origin of Christianity can only be explained by systematic interpretation of the Gospels [...] It is a relief to be conscious of your belief at the moment of death. It would be horrendous to die without belief, without God's charity, without hope, peace, consolation, and delight. This is your father's last message" (84).

Since Rafael Karsten had become engaged in a sympathetic conversation with his father, it is likely that with Edvin Karsten's departure he lost one of the few men who fundamentally understood him. In summer 1908, Rafael Karsten hardened his heart against all criticism and returned from London in order to write a polemic pamphlet about the pagan origin of Christianity. At length, Karsten's analysis of Christian faith, *Hedendom och kristendom* ("Paganism and Christianity"), was published in 1910. In his study Karsten opened up new problems in the history of Christianity and shook its foundations. Karsten was a master of writing, his style of writing was quick-witted and thus it was easy for him to impress his readers. Karsten's book, however, received many contradictory comments and reviews. In general, theologians could not understand Karsten's suggestion that historical sources pointed out that there were obvious non-fictional connections between the ancient Middle East "pagan" religions and Christianity. On the other hand, Karsten's polemic discussion depicted the melancholy atmosphere of the intelligentsia. The second period of oppression had taken place in Finland in 1908 (for more information, see Chapter 4.3.). Emma Karsten's response to her son's book was shocked:

"We do not understand how you can place paganism before Christian faith, and deny that Jesus is the son of God. I will pray to God for your soul until I die!"(85).

In middle-aged Karsten still preserved his agnosticism. He felt that an individual had a right to believe in whatever he preferred. Karsten was agnostic but not an enemy to religion. In spring 1911 Rafael Karsten was anxious and dissatisfied with his life. He had decided to devote his life to the study of South American indigenous cultures but had no financial security for his fieldwork trip (for more information on the inspirers of Karsten's expeditions, see Chapter Five). Eventually, Nordenskiöld wrote Karsten a good letter of recommendation in order that the latter would obtain a travel scholarship from the Alexander Fund. After the rainy and windy summer spent at Henri Brummer's (friend of Karsten's childhood) home in Lapinlahti, eastern Finland (86), Karsten undertook his first expedition to South America, in particular to Argentina and Bolivia, in September 1911 (to Buenos Aires via Stockholm and London) (87). The financial problems still prevailed, but Karsten was too self-disciplined to give in. During the first trip, Rafael Karsten travelled with his young Finnish relative, the engineer Ossian Lindholm (88). However, Lindholm followed Karsten's expedition into the "interiors" only occasionally (during his trip Karsten studied the Toba, the Mataco-Noctenes, the Ashluslay, and the Choroti Indians of the Gran Chaco) (89). Karsten's main focus did not lie on the study of the material culture of the Indians but rather on the study of their religious customs. Jan-Åke Alvarsson has stated (1993) that Karsten's most significant contribution from the first expedition was that "he took the Amerindian religion as a serious object of study" (90). Emma Karsten's reaction to her son's expedition was pronounced:

“How do you think you can manage to travel to South America? How will you survive at the destination? There you will be surrounded by many dangers” (91).

And further:

“I know that God will help you, my boy, to meet the dangers in Bolivia. I am very worried about your trip [...] I know you plan a new trip in the future. You are never satisfied with your studies [...] you want more and more [...] I have had such great worry about you that now it is enough. I wish that God give you strength in your endeavours” (92).

During the years 1911- 1913, the prevailing atmosphere of Karsten’s family was that of ultimate anxiety. Emma Karsten could not sleep at nights and prayed for her son to believe in Jesus. She was pessimistic about everything and believed she would die before her son’s return from South America. (93.) From the moment of the Titanic disaster on 15 April 1912, Emma Karsten became nervous of her son’s long voyages (94). Every time Emma Karsten received a letter from South America, she shed tears of joy (95). She was horrified to think that her son could be dead and she would be unaware of it (96). Interestingly, one letter which Emma Karsten sent to the field described transparently her feelings of disappointment that her son had rejected his childhood home’s Lutheran devoutness:

“(at the beginning, Emma Karsten goes through the doctrine of Christianity) [...] as a child you believed in the teachings of Christianity, but in later age you abandoned your childhood faith [...] In my opinion, philosophy has destroyed your childhood faith. I emphasize that you can never be happy without belief in the salvation of Jesus Christ” (97).

When Rafael Karsten was in South America his brother, the lawyer Julius Karsten, was released from a five-year prison sentence on 12 August 1912 (he was probably sentenced to prison because of financial irregularities and some political agitation). After Julius Karsten was released from prison he moved to the United States and began to work in a railway company. Heavy drinking changed into pious belief in Jesus. Emma Karsten was proud of her son who had re-accepted Jesus as part of his life. At the same time, Emma Karsten had a victorious smile, since her son Rafael had foretold that Julius (“Julle”) would never revert to the faith of his childhood home after his imprisonment. Furthermore, when Julius Karsten asked his brother Rafael to follow the Christian life the latter’s prognosis of his brother’s future proved to be totally incorrect. Generally speaking, it is relatively certain that Julius Karsten’s re-acceptance of Lutheran devoutness markedly comforted Emma Karsten’s discouraged mind. (98.) Rafael Karsten returned from Bolivia at the beginning of July 1913.

The whole journey had been a great financial struggle although the Alexander Fund awarded a scholarship of FIM 5140 to Karsten in spring 1912 (99). When Rafael Karsten arrived in Finland, the political atmosphere of the grand duchy was agitated and tense due to the tightened control of Russia over Finland. A year later, in 1914, the Finnish people realized that Russian's main aim had been to Russianize the grand duchy when passive resistance turned into overt disobedience. (100.) Despite the increasing political, social, and economic uncertainty, Karsten gave lectures about *Indianska föreställningar* ("The Concepts of Indians") at the Alexander University and published several articles about Indian customs (Indian games, the custom of *couvade* (male childbed), and Indian dances) (101). Rafael Karsten undertook his second expedition to South America, Ecuador, at midsummer 1916. Edward Westermarck and his close friend, the Professor of Aesthetics Yrjö Hirn, wrote Karsten a good letter of recommendation and so the Faculty of Philosophy awarded him a scholarship of 8000 Finnish marks (per year) (102). Presumably, Karsten's intention was to travel earlier but the air of political excitement delayed his plans. Karsten desired to study the Jibaros of the Amazonas area which had preserved their cultural and political independence in spite of the Catholic missionaries (103). Again, Emma Karsten was worried about her son. Many letters which finally reached Finland were damaged by water. Before Rafael Karsten reached Ecuador his mother wrote to him: "If your journey comes true, try to search for God there!" (104). Rafael Karsten had difficulties in returning from Ecuador. He had to wait till the end of World War I, which was especially annoying because of his perpetual lack of money. The end of the journey was a real nightmare for him. Without Baron Nordenskiöld's and Karsten's family's financial aid and encouraging letters, the prospects of the young talented scholar would have been dim. Rafael Karsten wrote to Baron Nordenskiöld: "Everything has been so hard that I could even try to commit suicide" (105). The political instability, difficulties with loading the collections, and anxiety about his teaching duties at the university as well as homesickness, lack of money, the loss of his Russian passport, and the loss of letters sent by relatives and friends all contributed to Karsten's pessimistic frame of mind. These sad experiences developed Karsten's ethical thinking. He learned that the world was more hypocritical and insincere than he had thought, and that nations were not equals (because of the red rebellion in Finland, Finnish citizens were not allowed to enter Great Britain, as Great Britain was anxious about the spreading of Leninist Bolshevism). However, Karsten convinced the British officers of his (political) innocence and they issued him travel permit (to Finland via Liverpool). Rafael Karsten arrived safely in Finland in the autumn 1919. Meanwhile, Finland had gained independence (The Finnish declaration of independence was approved on 6 December 1917) (106.) During the 1920s and 1930s, Karsten concentrated on publishing the research findings of his expeditions. He had developed into a genuine Americanist who also participated in numerous congresses around the world (Gothenburg 1923, 1924, Hamburg 1930, Lund 1932 and London 1934). In the 1920s, Karsten turned his attention to German anthropologists and their fieldwork experiences in South America (von den Steinen, Preuss, Tessman and Koch-Grünberg). Karsten met Karl von den Steinen, who had done fieldwork among the Xingu Indians of Brazil, when he visited Berlin in 1914 (107).

Karsten also corresponded with Theodor Koch-Grünberg who worked in *Museum für Länder und Völkerkunde* in Stuttgart in studying the Taulipang and Arecuna Indians of British Guiana, South America (108). Karsten also visited the Americanist Günther Tessman who had done fieldwork among the Chama Indians in the Ucayali region, at least twice (109). However, the closest German friend for Karsten was Professor Theodor Preuss who assisted him when he felt himself scholarly the most neglected (110). Theodor Preuss' ethnological focus was on the Uitoto Indians of Rio Putumayo, North-West Brazil. In general, Karsten saw Preuss as “the leading Americanist of Germany” (111).

The bond between Karsten and childhood scenery loosened when Emma Karsten died on 15 September 1920 at the age of 83 (112). She preserved her strict religious nature all her life, but changed towards melancholy at the end of her days. She learnt to accept her children's choices, that none of them became a clergyman or an officer, and understood that scholarly work was what her son Rafael wished for his life. She uttered: “I will no longer warn you of dangers of adventures and expeditions, since it seems to me that your desire to wander is insatiable”(113). But, on the other hand, her sight still focused on her son's Rafael's agnosticism. Her attitudes were religiously coloured: “Please, read Psalm 324!” or “Why can you not give your heart to God? Why do you purposely forget His message?”(114). The old letters also reveal that Emma Karsten had a special secret which she aspired to tell to her son Rafael. Unfortunately, time ran out and the content of the secret remains unknown;

“I spent the happiest time of my life in Pedersöre where I was confirmed and married. There I lived with all my early illusions of life of which you do not know anything about! If we visit there together some day, I will reveal to you many things!”(115).

Evidently, the letter was meant to be an act of reconciliation, that is, Emma Karsten desired to tell her son that her early life, too, was affected by the idealism of youthfulness. Perhaps Emma Karsten tried to tell her son that on some abstract level she understood his questioning of man's place in nature. In every case, Rafael Karsten admired his mother: “I would have liked so eagerly to celebrate my mother's birthday [...] but I have to celebrate her only in my thoughts!”(116) but still preserved his agnostic ideas: “Dear Mother! Thank you for the [religious] clipping which, unfortunately, made no special impression on me” (the word in brackets is mine) (117). After Emma Karsten's death, Rafael Karsten and his brother Torsten Karsten were active in a local folklore association *Svenska Östbotningar* (“Swedish Ostrobothnians”) in Helsinki. They were also the editors of the publication *Bothnia*, which acted as an official organ of the society. (118.) Clearly, this indicated love, longing and veneration towards the old home district, that is, although Rafael Karsten rejected the religion of his childhood home he never turned his back on his home area. A year after Emma

Karsten's death, Rafael Karsten was married to Margit Boldt on 5 December 1921 in Helsinki. The courtship had began already in 1914. (119.) Margit Boldt, a daughter of the founder of the Finnish local folklore movement, Johan Georg Robert Boldt (1861 - 1923), was inevitably the woman of his life (120). Margit Boldt, born on 7 May 1892, was thirteen years younger than Rafael Karsten. She had entered the girls' school "Apollo" in 1903 and took her matriculation examination in 1911. She also studied music in the Music Institute of Helsinki. (121.) Later, Margit Boldt taught music to children. Like her father Robert Boldt, Margit Boldt had an insatiable interest in nature. During her life she wrote many articles about mussels and arranged various exhibitions. (122.) Interestingly, Robert Boldt's religious experiences were similar to Rafael Karsten's. At the age of 15, young Robert still believed in the Christian teachings of his childhood home, but rejected them soon afterwards when entering the Imperial Alexander University of Finland (he studied geography, zoology, and botany) (123). The intellectual vicissitudes of the era made Robert Boldt utter; "At this time, I do not know if I am a Christian any more, or what it fundamentally means"(124). Robert Boldt and Rafael Karsten had interesting conversations together in various coffee houses of Helsinki and in their relationship one senses an expression of keen understanding and sympathy. Both of them had an interest in expeditions (Boldt wrote an article about the Norwegian explorer Nansen), nature, and music (125). Moreover, both of them had grown up in a religious milieu which was later disturbed by the influences of the outer world. When Karsten published his study *Hedendom och kristendom* ("Paganism and Christianity", 1910), Robert Boldt showed great interest and admiration for it (126). Seen from this angle, it appears that Robert Boldt's encouragement and approval guided Karsten's studies in a particular direction, that is, when Karsten discussed with Boldt he became convinced of the significance and utility of his own intellectual undertaking. In brief, Robert Boldt was perhaps one of the most significant (late) supporters of Karsten's spiritual and intellectual anarchy. (127.) Rafael and Margit Karsten's first daughter, Eva Margareta Maria, was born on 3 October 1922 (in Helsinki) and the twins Rolf Robert and Margit Elisabet on 18 July 1924 (in Helsinki). According to the children, their mother sincerely appreciated and loved their father all her life. (128.) Ultimately, family life mellowed Rafael Karsten who, from the moment his daughter Eva was born, was constantly worried about the prosperity of his family. However, the children have reported that their father was a strict disciplinarian at home:

"We were brought up in an old-fashioned, almost Victorian way with a strict demand for obedience; for example we were not allowed to address our parents by the familiar form of address; du ("you", s.) When, after all, we sometimes revolted against our parents' authority we became subject to physical punishment of a traditional type. While we were growing up, my father did not have much time to be with us, except in the summertime at our country house. He lived in his own world, a world where things always happened and where interesting people were passing by" (129).

These memories show that Rafael Karsten lived for science which, at heart, entailed various scholarly engagements. The tension of family and professional life was a continuous mental factor in his life. I believe that although he fervently loved his family, he also needed his freedom, that is, his independent and somewhat solitary nature enjoyed the moments of adventure. A life devoted to science was his distinctive and lonely way of communing with himself. However, the family kept him in balance. While abroad he used to finish his letters by saying; *Alttså, many kisses till Eder all, och do not forget me* [sic]! (“So, many kisses to you all, and do not forget me!”) (130). The family remained loyal to their father. At school Rafael Karsten’s children were even proud of their adventurous father (131). The most difficult experiences for the family were the moments of their father’s departure. Then, the feelings were pronouncedly mixed. Rafael Karsten’s children have stated, however, that their mother never tried to prevent her husband from leaving for South America. On the contrary, she conscientiously aspired to take care of the numerous travel preparations. (132.) One of the most significant issues concerning Rafael Karsten’s scholarly career, occurred in January 1922, when he was appointed Professor of Moral and Social Philosophy at the University of Helsinki (former Alexander University). Edward Westermarck had been appointed professor of philosophy at the Åbo Akademi University in 1918 (133). The applicants for the professorship were Rafael Karsten, Docent in Comparative Religion and Gunnar Landtman, Docent in Sociology. At the request of the Historical-Philological Section, A. C. Haddon (Cambridge), Martin P. Nilsson (Lund) and Theodor Preuss (Berlin) submitted written reports on the applicants. The Section received the reports on 17 January 1921. The result was interesting but somewhat expected: Professor Haddon considered the applicants equal, whereas Nilsson supported Landtman and Preuss Docent Karsten. A while later, the Section asked Professors Yrjö Hirn, Kaarle Krohn, Arvi Grotenfelt and Waldemar Ruin to submit their reports on the applicants. Finally, a vote was taken. As a result, six members of the Section supported Karsten whereas seven members gave their vote to Landtman. At the election, held in the University Senate, the members cast 26 votes for Landtman whereas 13 voters supported Karsten. Soon afterwards, Gunnar Landtman was ranked first. Karsten was disappointed with the result. He complained about the voting results to the University Chancellor and finally to the Council of State. Surprisingly, the Council of State (Juho Heikki Vennola (1872-1938) was Prime Minister) and finally President Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg (1865-1952) appointed Karsten Professor of Philosophy at the Alexander University on 20 January 1922. (134.) Why was Karsten appointed to the professorial post? The reason was twofold: firstly, there was a language question which split the university, and secondly there was a question of scholarly talent and power. Both applicants were members of the *Svenska Folkpartiet* (“Swedish People’s Party”) (135). However, Rafael Karsten’s proficiency in the Finnish language was superior to Landtman’s knowledge of Finnish. Rafael Karsten had learned Finnish during his elementary school years in Vaasa, since his father supported the teaching of Finnish in schools (136). In 1905, the Finnish-speaking students began to claim the right to be taught in their mother tongue. During the academic year 1903-1904 only 28 teachers out of 97 lectured in Finnish (137). On 11 October 1905, the Historical-Philological

Section listed the teachers who lectured both in Finnish and Swedish. The index was very brief: only Professors Heikel, Tallqvist, Sederhjelm and Vasenius informed that they provided courses for Finnish and Swedish-speaking students. (138.) After Rafael Karsten's inaugural lecture ("Moral and Politics") on 15 February 1922, his sister Ellen Karsten wrote to him:

"Now we can calm down in this matter [...] despite the miserable writings which have emerged. How much worse everything would have been if Gunnar Landtman had been appointed Professor of Philosophy. Then, you had been compelled to wait yet another two years. Now you have to lecture in Finnish, but Finnish has never caused you any trouble. I understand, however, that it causes you some extra work but ponder how Gunnar Landtman has managed when his knowledge of Finnish is unsubstantial!" (139).

In my opinion, Ellen Karsten was correct. It is evident that during the era when language policy was a question of the highest order at the University of Helsinki, it was necessary to the Council of State to support an applicant who had a satisfactory command of the Finnish language. A different decision would perhaps have bolstered the language barriers within the university. However, it is important to note that the tsar's language statutes of 1900 and 1902 consolidated the position of the Finnish language. According to the historian Osmo Jussila (1979), the tsar aspired to banish Swedish by making Russian the official language of public administration and supporting the use of Finnish as a second official language (140). In 1926, a university society called *Akateeminen Karjala Seura* - "AKS" ("Academic Karelia Society") tried to foment the language dispute amongst the university students. "AKS" was a powerful organization which was in the majority in all Finnish student societies (141). The members of "AKS" were dissatisfied with bilingualism and stated that the Finnish speaking students could never completely understand the courses which were provided in Swedish. This increased the gap between students and lecturers. According to "AKS", making the university Finnish was a question of liberalism and toleration. (142.) In the language dispute Karsten supported the view according to which the university had to offer students the option of being taught in their mother tongue. This meant that Karsten at least partly accepted the opinion of "AKS" when he stated that "a Swedish university would only increase the differences" (143). In 1930, the Finnish parliament legislated that Finnish-speaking students should receive teaching in their own language (144). Regarding the scholarly talent and power of the applicants, it has been stated that Gunnar Landtman's zealous activity in a political party during the language dispute probably ruined his dream of a professorship (145). According to Ragnar Numelin (1965), Westermarck had regretted that "Landtman does so many other things than science" (146). As far as I can see, Westermarck's opinion was well-grounded. It is true that Gunnar Landtman was socially more active than Karsten. He was avidly interested in political issues (the question of the Finnish island of Åland) whereas Karsten contented himself with following events from the wings. Of course, Karsten was interested in politics and conversed with

people about world politics, but not current issues. While describing the rivalry for the professorship to Rolf Lagerborg in 1942, Karsten mentioned that he was probably elected because he was, *homo novus* (Karsten's term), a man without too many social and scholarly commitments. (147.) Moreover, Karsten considered President Ståhlberg a neutral decision-maker. I venture to make an interpretation which is based on the assumption that the attention Landtman paid towards politics and social concerns finally estranged him from ethnology, that is, even today his studies seem somewhat "generalized" and "abstracted" to the observer. However, I do admit that Gunnar Landtman was an able scholar. Because of his Americanist interfaces, Karsten's goal in the 1920s and 1930s was more to observe cosmopolitan issues than ponder Finnish "errands". It was also claimed that Karsten was appointed to the professorial post due to his independence as a researcher. (148.) Thus, the obstinacy inherited from his father Edvin Karsten had probably turned to be a valuable attribute in Rafael Karsten's life. All in all, the rivalry for the professorship of philosophy dissolved the relationship between Rafael Karsten and Gunnar Landtman. In his semi-autobiography (1940) Gunnar Landtman only mentions Karsten on one page when he describes his stay in London: "The third man in our company at that time was Rafael Karsten" (149). Evidently, the social intimacy of these two colleagues had lost its sharpest point in springtime 1922. At the same year, The Royal Academy of Sciences in Sweden awarded Rafael Karsten the Loubatian prize (4800 kronas) for *Blood Revenge, War and Victory Feast among the Jibaro Indians of Ecuador* and *Bland Indianer i Ecuadors urskogar I-II* (150).

Two years later, in August 1924, Karsten lectured about *The Preanimistic Theory in The Light of South American Beliefs* in the International Americanist Congress in Gothenburg (151). At that conference he met the Swedish Count Eric von Rosen (1879-1948). Eric von Rosen, the son of Count C.G. von Rosen and Ella Carlton Moore, was known for his various expeditions to Lapland (1900), to Gran Chaco of Bolivia and Argentina (1901-1902), and to Africa (1911-1912) (152). As a patron of science and a scholar who took a deep interest in the material culture of indigenous people, Eric von Rosen brought home, especially from Lapland, the Congo, Peru and Bolivia, a rich ethnographical collection which he donated to the Stockholm Ethnographical Museum. (153.) In 1924, Eric von Rosen became Rafael Karsten's personal friend and the Swedish Finnish culture co-operation began (in 1925 Karsten lectured in Stockholm and von Rosen in Helsinki). For historical reasons, we have to take a closer look at their relationship. As an ethnologist, Americanist and pro-Finnish savant, Count von Rosen was pleased with the Finnish Karsten, who was studying the spiritual culture of South American Indians. In 1925, Eric von Rosen, on behalf of the Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography, awarded Karsten the Andrée medal of silver for his scholarly contributions on South America (154). Rafael Karsten occasionally visited von Rosen's castle, which was situated in Southern Sweden. When Karsten visited von Rosen's castle in Rockelstad, he frequently met there prominent Swedish scholars like Erland Nordenskiöld and an authority of Central Asian studies, Sven Hedin. In Count von Rosen's home Hermann

Wilhelm Goering, Hitler's right hand man, visited (155.) Goering was then married to Carin von Kantzow (born von Fock) who was a sister of Eric von Rosen's wife, Mary Fock. After World War I, Goering had become a commercial pilot for *Svenska Lufttraffik* in Sweden. Through his work he met Carin von Kantzow. In 1923, Goering was severely wounded in the Beer-Hall *Putsch* in Munich. After a long recovery in Italy and Sweden he became addicted to morphine. It has been said that at the home of von Rosen he was so confused that he could not follow people's talk. The family of Carin von Kantzow was petrified by Goering's demeanour and refused to have anything to do with him. (156.) Moreover, Snyder (1976) has suggested that at that time Goering considered Hitler's propaganda an absurdity but loved the events and the parties which the Führer arranged (157). Thus, it would be historically tempting to claim that at von Rosen's home Goering was so confused that his utterances and opinions did not easily come up for discussion and that, then, Goering was probably enjoying life rather than promoting the ideology of the National Socialists. However, I do not have any definitive scholarly evidence of Goering's behaviour in von Rosen's seat and about his dealings with Rafael Karsten. Yet, I absolutely know that the arguments developed in Karsten's works are not in line with the ideas of Nazi Germany. Karsten's works are devoid of principles of eugenics (*Sonderbehandlung* - special treatment of the biologically inferior), anthropometric surveys, and theories of racial integrity, which, I think, were the most noticeable features of Nazi propaganda. Generally speaking, Karsten and his works are free from Nazi *Kultur*, a world view which was closely associated with racialism, a struggle between the Aryan and Jewish "races". Interestingly, one of Karsten's best friends in Finland was a Jewish scholar, Israel Schur, who was interested in Karsten's evolutionary anthropological views. In fact, Schur often visited Rafael Karsten's home. Later, Karsten's role was to comfort the discouraged Schur whose son disappeared during the hostilities with the Soviet Union (1941 - 1944) (158.) Eva Karsten (1993) describes her father's and Eric von Rosen's relationship as follows:

"Through his family ties, von Rosen stood close to the German cause and his sympathies remained with it well into the period of Nazi-Germany. Apparently Karsten was politically influenced by von Rosen, but he had no personal experiences of this era in German history [...] Karsten could not believe in rumors telling horrors of the holocaust"(159).

On the other hand, Christer Lindberg (1993) describes their relationship as follows:

"His (Karsten's) defence of the German cause was strengthened by his friendship with Eric von Rosen and Sven Hedin in Sweden, both intimately associated with the German Nazi regime in the thirties. That Karsten did not alter his pro-German stand during any of the events leading up to the outbreak of World War II, or even during the war, calls for two

possible interpretations. The first reflects the position of Finland [...] that only a strong Germany could save his country from the aggressions of Russia. The second [...] Karsten was totally deceived by the positive and romantic post-war propaganda, including all the assurances given by von Rosen, Hedin and their German friends” (160).

Inevitably, Lindberg’s argument is justified and legitimate. Taking into account Lindberg’s proposal, I suggest three explanations for Karsten’s pro-German views. Firstly, in the 1920s and 1930s Rafael Karsten had a very enthusiastic attitude towards Germany since many prominent Americanists were of German origin (his close friend Theodor Preuss, for instance). The German ethnologists Karsten knew were not affected by Nazi ideology (161). Secondly, Germany was not the foe of Finland until the Lapland War broke out in 1944. As is known, Finland engaged in military co-operation with Germany during the hostilities with the Soviet Union 1941-1944. Herman Goering’s adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Veltjens visited Finland in 1940. Then, he met high-ranking Finnish officials and soldiers, like Risto Ryti and Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. In December 1940, the Finnish General Talvela met Hermann Goering and Franz Halder in Berlin. (162.) Generally speaking, Finland’s relation to Nazi Germany was, although known, still secretive in parts. Thus, it was natural that Finnish people considered Germany and Hitler liberators who could perhaps save them from the offensive, detested Soviet Union. Thirdly, Karsten was positively disposed towards Germany since he was deluded by his naïve optimism into thinking that the German people were exploited by the English during World War I. In 1938 Rafael Karsten wrote;

“[...] if Germany in August 1914 had been aware of the plans of Great Britain to go to war, the whole war would have ended immediately [...] how people of a parliamentary country like Great Britain could accept the action of irresponsible politicians to throw the country into the adventure which questioned its entire existence [...] already before the war France acted in collusion with Russia, and their secret agreement was directed against Germany [...] in a country like Great Britain, war propaganda received its most complete form [...] Great Britain falsified its official documents by removing significant details which might have led it into a difficult position” (163).

Rafael Karsten’s opinion clearly reflects his vision of Germany as a deceived victim of war. Karsten disliked the Englishmen since he considered that the Allies treated Germany badly after the Peace of Versailles (1919). Karsten’s aversion towards the Englishmen stemmed also from the “unjust and cruel” Boer War (1899-1902) in which Great Britain fought against the Transvaal and Orange Free State. It may be said that it is more than amazing that a man who had formerly admired Britain and British education, suddenly turned his back on his intellectual inspirer. But, it seems that the patterns of mutual dependence between Karsten and

the British ethnologists, especially A. C. Haddon, had gradually become rusty (due to the fieldwork dissents) and Karsten had, thus, turned to German Americanists. He probably felt that German scholars were the most understanding. Besides, Germanism with its ideology of heroism had flourished in Finland from the 1910s onwards when Germany and its culture were glorified. Rafael Karsten's brother, Torsten Karsten, was Professor of German language at the Alexander University and belonged to the *Svenska Tysklandsvänner i Finland* ("Swedish Friends of Germany in Finland") and the *Indogermanische Gesellschaft* (member since 1914). Most likely, Torsten Karsten added to his brother's pro-German views. In 1945, Karsten was shocked by the news of the extensive Nazi concentration camps across Europe. (164.) Rafael Karsten had talked about the desolation which met Finnish people in Fjeld Karelia, when Stalin sent thousands of people to Siberia, but could never have anticipated what happened in Germany during the war. According to historians, there was no strong feeling of anti-semitism in Finland during the war years 1939-1945. It seems that when the great inhumanity of the Nazi concentration camps was revealed in Finland, it was a great surprise for Finnish people although some Finnish newspapers, like *Rintamamies* ("Veteran"), had reported on the Jewish issue in their columns. (165.) Karsten became gloomy and never made any public statement upon the holocaust (in 1951 he generally condemned the mass transportations of people in his article *Det Moraliska Framåtskridandets Problem* ("The Problem of Moral Development")). Universally, Karsten was disappointed with a human (being) who proved to be a "predator"(166). In my opinion, Rafael Karsten maintained pro-German views but in a very naïve and romantic manner. He admired the nation and its people but not the Nazi regime. Had he in advance understood and predicted the Nazi phenomenon, he certainly would have become its strongest opponent. My point is that it would be fundamentally erroneous to presume that Karsten's scholarly works include elements of Nazi ideology. There is no evidence of it. I believe that if Karsten had actually been influenced by the notions of the National Socialists, he would have promoted their methods and applied them in his own studies. This never happened. I would say that Goering's presence in von Rosen's castle was just an unfortunate and meaningless incident in Karsten's life.

Yet it is reasonable to discuss Rafael Karsten's relation to Edward Westermarck in the 1920s. At that time, Karsten visited Westermarck's farmhouse in England on several occasions. He enjoyed his stay since Westermarck was a very friendly host. In 1925, when Karsten visited Westermarck's home in Guildford, he wrote to his wife as follows:

"I have worked very studiously. My work will go to press after I have received the proof. Now my problem is what Westermarck will say about my polemics against him. He has promised to partly proof-read the study" (167).

The letter indicates that Westermarck's opinions were important to Karsten, and that Westermarck was still an esteemed authority to his friend. Nevertheless, the first significant intellectual clash between Karsten and Westermarck already took place in 1919 when Karsten expressed his disapproval of Westermarck's theory about the function of primeval art (for more information, see Chapter Five). Then, Westermarck felt that Karsten's criticism on his concept of art was unfair and groundless (see Chapter 5.1.3.) (168). There followed no apology from Karsten but the relationship between the colleagues survived. However, it was gradually reduced in strength. In 1925, Karsten's visit to Westermarck's house was successful in spite of Karsten's critique. Karsten admired Westermarck for the way he chatted with the chickens and goats when he needed a rest from academic routines (169). Karsten saw Westermarck as an excellent person who took care of his guests in "an ideal way" (170). Inability to agree on the function of primeval art finally destroyed their friendship. In 1924, Rafael Karsten knew he would publish an extensive study on South American Indians. Considering the immense admiration with which Westermarck's studies were regarded by scholars, Karsten decided to ask Westermarck to write a preface to his book. It would assist him a lot in his future development as a scholar. But there was one point in Westermarck's introductory note that irritated Karsten - namely that Westermarck still declared that the basic motives for self-decoration and even mutilation revolved around sex (" [...] for sexual impulse is even more primitive than superstitious beliefs") (171). Before Westermarck's preface was published in Karsten's ethnological research *The Civilization of the South American Indians* (1926), Karsten asked Westermarck why he was so attached to the means-of-attraction theory (the motif of primeval ornamentation was increasing interest in sexuality). On 11 December 1925 Karsten wrote to Westermarck as follows:

"In my studies and in my critique I have tried to adhere to scientific truth. In my opinion, you, who in your studies criticize other scholars [...] should also tolerate the critique which is paid to your studies. I think it would be regrettable if anthropologists had to believe that Indian dances are mainly erotic rejoicing [...]" (172).

Initially, Karsten felt that his criticism on Westermarck's theory was annoying, that is, he felt it was slightly unpleasant to denounce his tutor's views but did it "for the sake of science", as he himself expressed it (173). In the absence of good conversation, Karsten wrote to Westermarck several letters between 1924-1926 in which he explained his views. Westermarck did not yield since he knew that he had dealt with the magical aspects of art in his works (for more information, see Chapter 5.1.3). In 1927, Edward Westermarck published his autobiography *Minnen ur mitt liv* ("Memories of My Life", 1929). The autobiography is a real treasure, since it reveals the events of Westermarck's career chronologically and in detail. A peculiar point is that Rafael Karsten is almost totally forgotten in Westermarck's life history. Westermarck mentions Karsten once or twice in the context of the Prometheus

Society. What was the reason? Westermarck had known Karsten for 27 years, assisted him in his career, and played the role of a significant mentor and suddenly all was blank. Inevitably, an obstinate dispute about primeval art had taken its toll. Seventy years after the dispute it still remains unsolved who was right: Westermarck or Karsten. However, in this context we should ask whether Karsten intentionally continued the dispute. I state my conception differently: whether Karsten's criticism of Westermarck's theory was a complex way out of his mentor's dominance. It undoubtedly was. Westermarck's sociological star had begun to decline after the Finnish Civil War of 1918, when scholars insisted on studying Finnish society. The other reasons for Karsten's pessimism towards Westermarck and his influence could be Karsten's temperamental autonomy as a scientist, his established scholarly relations to Americanists around the world (Karsten was offered membership of the American Geographical Society in 1923 and the American Anthropological Association in 1926), his growing independence as a scholar in Finnish academic circles (professorship in 1922), a certain freshness of Karsten's perspectives in comparison to Westermarck's investigations, Westermarck's failure to answer to the demands of a new generation of sociologists, and the increasing differences of opinion (Westermarck's work *Ethical relativity* published in 1932 provoked controversy among readers). (174.) In the case of Westermarck and his disciples the Civil War was the first sign of the decline of Westermarckian enthusiasm in Finland. The Civil War changed the nature of Finnish social-scientific research. Young scholars, interested in the crisis of Finnish society, criticized the older generation of sociologists for failing to deal with the new social problems. The new generation of scholars blamed Westermarckians for lame reaction to the crisis in Finnish society. Young scholars developed a marked scepticism towards Westermarck's sociology since they felt that Westermarck and his followers only studied distant, exotic countries, without being concerned about the situation in Finland. (175.) The faultfinders never realized the significance of Westermarck's moral studies. The opponents were full of radicalism, as Westermarck and Karsten had once been, and thus forgot that with his moral studies Westermarck had developed Finnish research in social sciences. Westermarck's main aim was by chastity and ethics to explain his thoughts about ancient and modern societies, so that the modern human being could become conscious of his society by familiarizing himself with the development of general moral history and the moral philosophy of humanity. As Karsten had once sought to be free of any religious attachments, he now endeavoured to free himself from Westermarckian loyalty. However, although Westermarck's and Karsten's dispute still smoldered, they sat side by side at the banquet arranged by Rudolf Holsti, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in honour of Westermarck's scholarly merits in 1937. At the table were also Gunnar Landtman and Ragnar Numelin, the real core of Westermarckians. (176.) It seems that in spite of the differences of opinion, Westermarck's disciples never rejected their grand mentor.

During the exceptionally warm summer 1927, Rafael Karsten travelled to Petsamo. His aspiration was to study the so-called *Skolt-Lapps* (Saami). After finishing his lecture in

Jyvaskylä Summer University in July 1927, Karsten travelled to Petsamo. (177.) According to Maggie Karsten-Sveander, her father had for a long time been interested in the religion of the Fenno-Scandinavian Laplanders (178). As mentioned above, Karsten considered his trip an “orientation experience”, and planned to return to Petsamo later on. Nevertheless, the ethnological and personal loyalty to South American studies changed his plans. The reason for Karsten’s study on the religion of the Saami is somewhat obscure and will be deliberated more profoundly in Chapter Five. A year later, in September 1928, Karsten undertook his third expedition to South America. He travelled to Guayaquil (Ecuador) via Berlin, Hamburg and Antwerp. The trip was partly paid for by the Finnish state, partly by the University of Helsinki (179). Karsten travelled with colossal travel trunks which used to be stored in the hall of his house before the expedition started. During his sojourn in Berlin Karsten visited the German Americanist, a “43-year-old gentleman” Günther Tessman. (180.) Tessman owned a little farmhouse near Berlin and Karsten sat there for seven hours listening to Tessman’s experiences of the Chama Indians in the Ucayali region. Tessman was very surprised when Karsten told him that he aspired to return from Ecuador as early as in spring 1929. But Tessman did not hear Karsten’s ultimate thoughts; “I find it very difficult to travel when I have my family”(181). In the same year as Karsten visited Tessman, the latter published his research *Menschen ohne Gott*. The study was a great shock to Karsten. In his book Tessman “regarded the Indians as culturally far inferior to the negroes” (182). According to Tessman, the “Indians had no religion, no concept of soul and no belief in the afterlife: intellectually and morally they were at an almost animal stage”(183). Karsten could not accept Tessman’s criticism and generalizations. He had admired Tessman for the way he studied the material reality of Indians, and even observed Tessman’s fieldwork practice during his own expeditions. But Tessman’s limited outlook on the Indian race changed the relationship between the colleagues. Karsten questioned Tessman’s competence as an ethnologist, and suggested that Tessman’s work contained many errors (184). The anthropological relationship was ruined. In Berlin there also occurred an amusing incident. Rafael Karsten wrote to his wife about his trial as follows:

“It is quite boring having to spend so much time here in Berlin. However, I have been very busy all the time [...] Do you remember when I told you that someone recommended to me the Kaiser Hotel in Berlin. I went to that hotel and suddenly, before anything, pages rushed towards my luggage [...] I had not yet reserved a room [...] Then, I asked for a room, but they had only double rooms for 180 marks per night. They said that I could get a single room after a couple of days (80 marks per day). I took my luggage and left this hotel of millionaires as quickly as I could. Then, I went directly to the old familiar Hotel Stadt Cologne which costs 5 marks per night [...] The person who recommended to me the Kaiser Hotel spoke nonsense and I have my doubts whether he himself has ever resided in this hotel. (Do not tell this story to outsiders, they do not have to know where I live!)”(185).

The letter is delicious since it straightforwardly reveals Rafael Karsten's personal traits also as a scholar: determined ("I took my luggage"), somewhat modest but temperamental ("left this hotel of millionaires"), and introvert, pensive, and protective towards outsiders ("they do not have to know where I live!"). Rafael Karsten crossed the Atlantic by a ship called "Hamburg-Amerika-Linie". The ship was at sea one month. Karsten arrived at Guayaquil in the end of October 1928. Then, he described his plans to his wife Margit as follows;

"Tomorrow I will travel by train to Riobamba [...] I hope I can get horses from there so that I could travel to Macas without a terrible delay. The trip from Riobamba to Macas is not especially dangerous. In Macas I will meet my friends, maybe Feyes [...] at Christmas I will travel to Iquitos. My address in Iquitos is Dr. H. Bassler, Calle Putumayo 123, Iquitos, Peru. After that you can send your letters to Lima"(186).

According to Rafael Karsten, the trip was "necessary if he desired to finish and publish his study of the Jibaro Indians" (187). In practice this meant that Karsten wanted to verify *de novo* his earlier observations and notions and thus conclude his investigations on the Jibaro Indians and their culture. Margit Karsten was not the only one who worried about the explorer. After Emma (†1920) and Ellen Karsten's (†18.10.1923) deaths, Rafael Karsten's youngest sister Signe Karsten began to write more frequently to her brother Rafael. Signe also sent letters to South America. The letter dated on 3 January 1929 reveals how Signe Karsten had preserved Lutheran devoutness in Karsten's family;

"Christmas has gone [...] we have thought a lot about you [...] where are you and how are you? I spent my Christmas in Wasa with Julle's (Julius) family. Julle broke his knee and has to rest in bed for a while [...] I hope God will protect you during your expedition. How cheerful is the day when we shall hear about your arrival. We all await some news from you [...] I have missed you so much. You have always been such a great support for me. Let God guide you safely home!"(188).

Signe Karsten's letter implies her belief in a personal God. The word "God" here means religious guardianship and supervision, which Signe assigns to God. As in Emma Karsten's letters so also in Signe's letters God is not only a symbol that is present at a certain moment or culture but that is present everywhere and at all times. Rafael and Margit Karsten had a warm relationship with Signe Karsten. Nevertheless, the couple felt somewhat irritated when Signe visited them in Helsinki as the pious believer arranged religious "sessions" at their home. This was too much for the couple, who interpreted God in their own way. (189.) In spring 1929, Rafael Karsten stopped in Cuzco when returning from Iquitos and Lima. His ultimate

destination was Buenos Aires in Argentina from where the ship called “Finland South America line” departed. Karsten had become interested in the old Inca culture when studying the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador. In his studies Karsten had found that “the Jibaros are mentioned for the first time in history in connection with the war of conquest which the Inca Tupac Yupanqui made against the kingdom of Quito about 1450”(190). The historical relationship between the Jibaros and the Incas made Karsten interested in the latter. In February 1929, Karsten wrote to Erland Nordenskiöld: “[...] but I will [...] travel to Madrid in order to do some archive work since Inca culture is now something which stimulates my mind”(191). One month later, he planned: “Probably, I will take a boat which departs in mid-May [...] so as to conduct more fieldwork in the area of Cuzco”(192). In fact, Karsten originally intended to undertake an expedition to Peru in 1924, as the leader of the American expedition. Interestingly, the letter dated on 8 April 1929 in Buenos Aires does not reveal anything about his fieldwork in Cuzco: whether it was stimulating or not. Yet, it is important to take into account that Karsten never went into raptures at archaeological investigations and thus his most significant research work was done in the archives of Madrid and Copenhagen.

In the 1930s, Rafael Karsten’s academic career proceeded with giant leaps. He was very active on many scholarly fronts. He wrote articles on religious customs and the social life of South American Indians, published extensive monographs and studies (*Indian Tribes of the Argentine and Bolivian Chaco*, *The Head-Hunters of Western Amazonas*, *The Origin of Religions*, *Uskontotieteen perusteet*, *Inkariket och dess kultur i forna Peru*), participated in ethnological congresses around the world, was a member of many scientific societies, taught sociology and philosophy at Jyväskylän Summer University (1930, 1931), was a lecturer of Spanish at the Swedish School of Economics, led seminars at the workers’ institute of Viipuri (*Viipurin työväenopiston kerho*) (1929-1931), and undertook his fourth fieldwork trip to South America, Peru, to study the ancient Inca culture. During the period 1930-1932, Karsten was a member of *Sällskapet för Psykisk forskning* (“Society of Psychic Research”). In 1930, he lectured on subconscious soul action and mysticism and the appearance of spirits and prophetism in “primitive” cultures. (193.) Jouko Aho (1993) has suggested that Karsten and Landtman believed that telepathy had been proven experimentally (194). Karsten’s interest in parapsychological issues had two sources: firstly, Professor Arvi Grotenfelt’s (Karsten’s mentor and colleague) interest in parapsychological issues evidently influenced Karsten, and, secondly, spiritualism as a phenomenon had captivated the interest of British evolutionary anthropologists since Edward Burnett Tylor in 1866. Also, the naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace had given much attention to spiritual and psychological phenomena in his personal life (195.) On 5 July 1932, Rafael Karsten’s close associate Baron Erland Nordenskiöld died in Gothenburg, Sweden (196). Although, Erland Nordenskiöld’s role in assisting Karsten’s expeditions to Bolivia, Argentina and Ecuador was incontestable, relations between the two scholars were not harmonious. Both of them were men of a raging temper (197). The unbalanced nature of their friendship gradually became visible. First, Karsten reproached

Nordenskiöld for misunderstanding his interest in ethnography (“If you think that I do not have any interest in the material culture of Indians you are wrong!”) (198). Then, came the *huairu* game controversy when Karsten (and Preuss) opposed Nordenskiöld’s views of the function of the ancient Indian dice game and finally, in 1929, Karsten and Nordenskiöld argued over the academic qualifications of American scholars. Karsten saw the American scholar Paul Rivet as “a man of humbug” whereupon Nordenskiöld asked him to be more fair in his opinions (199). The polemics continued until the death of Nordenskiöld in 1932. In spite of the dispute, Karsten wrote an obituary for Nordenskiöld in the Finnish geographic paper *Terra*. Karsten’s column praised Nordenskiöld’s ethnographical merits but also gave a hint of Karsten’s disappointed attitude towards his mentor (“[...] it is strange that his research is not airtight [...]”) (200). In a wider context, it is also interesting to note Rafael Karsten’s relationship to Uno Harva. Their peculiar relationship became most visible when Karsten visited the University of Uppsala in 1935. At that time, the Finnish poet and author Martti Haavio told his wife Elsa Enäjärvi-Haavio in a letter that Rafael Karsten never greeted him or Uno Harva aboard ship when they were on their way to Uppsala (they met several times on deck) (201). Haavio’s letter reveals that Karsten’s and Harva’s relationship was not the best possible. Presumably, Karsten bore a grudge against Harva, who had earlier expressed his disapproval of the Westermarckian study of the exotic (at least this is how Karsten interpreted the situation). In November 1935, Elsa Enäjärvi-Haavio wrote to Martti Haavio that “Karsten becomes completely furious when he loses his temper with someone; he can never forgive a person who has been opposed to him” (202). In 1937, Rafael Karsten caught malaria in Peru. He had undertaken his fourth expedition to South America in spring 1937. In the same year he joined the editorial board of *the Handbook of Latin American Studies* which meant that he had gained a reputation for intriguing and extensive monographs in America, too. He worked at that time with Harvey Bassler and Lewis Hanke of the Handbook Committee as well as with Robert Lowie and Leslie Spier, the editors of *The American Anthropologist* (203). The purpose of Karsten’s fourth fieldwork trip was to collect ethnological data concerning the old Inca culture. Karsten described his trip as follows:

“I travel by boat to Buenos Aires and from there by train to La Paz in Bolivia. During this trip I will spend my time in the mountains where my main interest is in the half-civilized Aymara and Quechua Indians. These Indians have preserved many customs and beliefs which prevailed in the high Inca culture”(204).

As a result of the inadequate hygienic conditions of Peru and Bolivia Karsten contracted malaria (“[...] as is known, Peru is not the land of the Pasteur Institute”) (205). He had to leave the field two months earlier than planned. Karsten arrived home via Panama and New York in September 1937. The trip was not in vain. In 1938, Karsten published his first Inca study *Inkariket och dess kultur i det forna Peru* (“The Civilization of the Inca Empire in Ancient

Peru”). The book received instantaneous attention and the Society of Swedish Literature in Finland awarded Karsten the Mauritz Hallbergian Prize on 16 May 1940 (206). The “Head-Hunters” and Inca research are still the most famous of his monographs. Both books have been translated into several languages (French, Spanish) and reprinted several times. All in all, in the 1930s Rafael Karsten was an independent and versatile scholar, whose academic activity was free from any binding attachment. It is possible to argue that Karsten had found religious balance in his life, which meant that a life without Christian dogma as a main motivator was possible. In 1972, Karsten’s student Jaakko Haavio described the lectures of his teacher as follows:

“I was Karsten’s student for two semesters and I remember with great gratitude his cultivated personality. I knew all the time that he thought little of Christian faith and Lutheran theology but, contrary to what I expected, he never said anything insulting (regarding Christian faith)” (the words in brackets are mine) (207).

Jaakko Haavio’s words point out clearly how Rafael Karsten’s reputation for being a faultfinder with the Christian faith was widespread and that people expected him to comment harshly upon the church and the dogma of Christianity. However, Karsten’s critical pathos had become less strong after he had resigned from the anticlerical/ religious Prometheus Society. His academic emphasis lay now on the study of religion as a universal phenomenon. In 1930, Rafael Karsten developed the content of Finnish ethics (*elämäkatsomustaito*) with the National Board of General Education. He explained that teaching comparative religion (*religionshistorien*) made students independent of any religious dogma and gave them the opportunity later on, after receiving knowledge of “all” religions, to carefully elaborate their own world view. The comparative religion examined religions from a historical and objective point of view while no other distinction between religions but the “low” and “high” were made. Therefore, Christianity was not considered an “absolute” religion and gained no special position vis-a-vis other “higher” religions. Karsten proposed that moral philosophy should be seen as separate from any religious dogmas. (208.)

In his old age, Karsten’s attitude towards religion was mixed. His critical attitude towards the Christian faith had become milder, and he no longer published pamphlets against Christianity and its foundations. He preserved his independence from the austere Lutheranism of his childhood home but was no longer so critical about Christian dogma. In 1941, the theologian Jouko Leino in his commentary on Karsten’s work *Filosofinen etiikka* (“Philosophic Ethic”) stated as follows:

“The book stimulates the reader to a healthy self-examination. Generally speaking, the author’s relationship to Christianity is surprisingly positive”(209).

Jouko Leino’s argument reflects the fact that in the 1940s and 1950s the target of Karsten’s criticism changed. It was now the new modern sociology which arrived in Finland after World War II. Karsten felt that modern trends in social sciences had undervalued the work of old Westermarckian scholars. In the 1950s he resigned from the committees he considered to be excessively eager supporters of modern sociology (210). I call this period the “feeling of marginality” when Karsten thought that he was deceived by any group or society. On the eve of World War II (on 3 September 1939) the Westermarckians received sad news; the most influential Finnish social anthropologist of the early 1900s had died. Rafael Karsten recalled his mentor and colleague a few days later:

“As a scholar Westermarck had two characteristics which I respected: exceptional thoroughness, which his studies among the Arabs and Berbers proved, and a clear pattern of thought [...] Westermarck also influenced people by his humanity [...] his humane lifestyle and solicitude were explicit personal characteristics [...] it is thus sad to think that this open-minded seeker of truth and warm-hearted person is gone forever” (211).

Karsten’s words sound insincere considering his behaviour a year later when his associate Rolf Lagerborg asked his consent to become a member of Westermarck Society. Rolf Lagerborg wrote to Karsten as follows:

“Within a couple of days you will receive an invitation to the meeting of Humanisticum in Åbo. The meeting is held on 20 November which is Edward Westermarck’s birthday. The purpose of the meeting is to lay the foundation of the scientific society called the Westermarck Society or Societas Westermarckensis. In the meeting we will discuss the rules and publications of the society. The founders of the Society are going to be the following ten persons: K.R. Brotherus, Yrjö Hirn, Uno Harva, Rudolf Holsti, Albert Hämäläinen, Rafael Karsten, Rolf Lagerborg, Gabriel Nikander, Rolf Pipping, and Yrjö Ruutu. With this letter I would like to inquire in advance your opinion about the society”(212).

Rafael Karsten’s answer to Lagerborg’s inquiry was negative. According to Karsten, sociology had to look to the future, taking into account the circumstances and requirements of modern society. However, Karsten’s modern sociology was far less topical than the industrializing society required. After the war the nature of Finnish academic sociology changed. The trend of modern Parsonian functionalism took root in Finland. Modern sociologists were interested

in events and features inside the industrializing society. After the war, the crime statistics showed a worrying rise in violent crime. The days of exotic travels were history. Rafael Karsten had believed that he could develop Westermarck's sociology by modernizing its methodology and scholarly aims, but reality differed from Karsten's patterns. Besides, not only the topics of sociology but also the subjects of comparative religion were changing. Within comparative religion the diffusionistic ideas of the Vienna school gained a reputation and that irritated Karsten. Karsten also refused to accept the ideas of primeval monotheism (*Urmonotheism*) revived by the Swedish Geo Widengren. Consequently, Karsten's pattern of thought turned upside down once again. In spite of the late friction between Karsten and Westermarck, Karsten remained an immovable supporter of Westermarckian science all his life. Christer Lindberg (1996) has compared Karsten's gloomy attitudes to Westermarck's and Nordenskiöld's experiences. For Westermarck faultfinding was a reaction against the egoism of Western civilizations. For Nordenskiöld it meant a protest against inequity, while for Karsten personal disappointment originated in desires which were never attained. (213.) Knut Pipping (1984) has, however, pointed out that Westermarck "knew that scientific theories are provisional and rarely last for more than fifty years, and that certain of his contributions to sociology would become obsolete in due time" (214.) As mentioned before, Rafael Karsten's "cultural optimism" (as he himself called it) underwent a very substantial change after World War II, largely as a result of the horrors of war. During the Winter War (against Russia in 1939), *Valtion tiedotuskeskus* ("the Information Centre of Finland") sent Rafael Karsten to Sweden (with Sally Salminen and Ella Eronen) to publicise the national emergency in Finland. When the Winter War finally came to an end on 13 March 1940 Finland had to cede the areas of Karelia and Hanko to Russia. A few days later, Rafael Karsten described the situation in Finland as follows:

"[...] events have taken a catastrophic turn in Finland. The whole nation mourns the destiny of the country. The flags were at half-mast. Love of liberty and fatherland are characteristic traits in Finnish people's psychology and these traits gave our people energy to fight against the enemy"(215).

When the war between Finland and Russia broke out again, after the truce of 1941, Rafael Karsten's children Rolf and Eva Karsten were sent to the front. Eva Karsten was acting as *lotta*, a volunteer who performed communication services at the front whereas her brother, Rolf Karsten, fought in Äänislinna, Karelia. Rafael Karsten and the rest of his family were compelled, due to the heavy bombing, to leave their home in Kulosaari in Helsinki and move temporarily to their summer cottage in Lohja (Lojo). Life changed. There was a serious food shortage and food rationing. (216.) Karsten's family moreover had difficulties heating their summer cottage when there was twenty or more degrees of frost outside. The kitchen of the house was so cold that milk turned to ice during the night. Sometimes bombers even circled

above their house in Lohja (due to the heavy cement industry plants). If Karsten's family moved outside in winter, they had to camouflage themselves in a white sheet to avoid being seen by the bombers. (217.) Although Karsten had refused to join the Westermarck Society, he gave a presentation on Edward Westermarck in a radio series "The Thinkers of the New Era" in March 1943. Karsten also acted as a chairman of the Nordenskiöld Society (founded in memory of Adolf E. Nordenskiöld) and gave lectures on "The Marvellous World of the Amazon River" and "The Ancient Incas" at the meetings of the society. Due to the war, the scientific activity of the society had mainly concentrated on the study of the Finnish archipelago. Nevertheless, at the end of 1942, the society had over 700 members. This was probably due to the fact that the war destroyed the international connections of the Finnish scholars. The University of Helsinki was bombed heavily in February 1944. Eye-witnesses reported that professors and students were standing in front of the assembly hall which was on fire and shed tears for the university. In 1944, Eva Karsten became one of those young people who helped the Helsinki University Library day and night to rescue its valuable books and collections from the heavy bombing. The books were taken inland by bus and train. The University of Helsinki opened again at the beginning of November 1944. (218.) The war destroyed people's idealism and Rafael Karsten, too, saw the "pollyannaism" of his early life as a peculiar historical phenomenon (219). According to Karsten, World Wars I and II taught people that education or civilization as such did not humanize an individual or make her morally superior (220). Rafael Karsten's whole outlook changed into pessimistic pondering. During the Civil War of Finland in 1918, Rafael Karsten was absent from the country due to his expedition in Eastern Ecuador. When Rafael Karsten set foot on Finnish soil, after three years of absence, he could not anticipate what had happened in Finland. Finally, when he saw the declaration of independence, he regretted that "he had not been along to beat the Russians" (221). World War II was an experience of emotional and physical stress to Karsten and his family. The optimism of the turn of the 20th century had disappeared for ever and was covered by a disillusioned impression of reality. Besides, the war had severed Karsten's scholarly contacts abroad. After the war, life gradually found its course and people began to plan their future again. However, the situation in the University of Helsinki was chaotic. The crush of students, closeness of rooms, the general gloomy views of society, and hunger made life and study grim. As a result, cheating in tests increased noticeably. (222.) In 1945, Rafael Karsten described his customs at weekends in Kulosaari (Brändö) as follows:

"On Sundays, I shovel away the snow and heat the boiler room. Besides, on Sundays we always have many guests in our house. Naturally, it is very amusing. And, of course, I also work with my scholarly problems. I would like to go cross-country skiing but unfortunately it is not possible here. In general, I am the caretaker on Sundays" (223).

Clearly, Rafael Karsten's words disclose that he did not go to the church on Sundays. He rather adhered to his scholarly ideals and gathered guests in his house, like the Swedish theologian Nathan Söderblom who arranged meetings for a diverse group of scholars at his place on Monday evenings (Karsten was invited as a corresponding member of Nathan Söderblom Society in Sweden in 1943) (224). It can be supposed that in Karsten's residence, as in Söderblom's gatherings, the group discussed "nearly everything between heaven and earth" (225). But although the war destroyed Karsten's personal idealism, it did not re-consolidate the meaning of Christianity in his life. However, Karsten's attitude towards Christianity had become more lenient, since the target of his criticism had changed. Generally speaking, Rafael Karsten felt bitter as a result of the rapidly changing world and concentrated completely on defending his scholarly ideas against opposing views. In spring 1946, Rafael Karsten informed the papers about his prospective expedition in South America. He was now an honorary member of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (226). On 16 August 1946, he retired from his position as professor of moral and social philosophy at the University of Helsinki. At that time, his student Kauko Kuula recalled his teacher as follows:

"Even at the front your books have opened clear mountain views to the deepest human problems. Your life-work has given to us, the generation who returned from the war, an example of how implicitly the austere deities of science should be worshipped. As your recent student I wish to express, now when you are leaving the University of Helsinki, my gratitude for your rich teaching which has offered me much more than quasi-scientific theology could have done"(227).

A few days later, Rafael Karsten and his Finnish-Swedish expedition (*Expedicion Amazonica 1946-47*) voyaged from Oslo aboard m/s Martin Bakke to Guayaquil in Ecuador. Along with Rafael Karsten the other participants on the expedition were Eva Karsten, and the Swedish ethnographers Bengt Danielsson, Göran Wannberg, and Gunnar Harling. Karsten described the equipment of the expedition as excellent. Rafael Karsten's greatest ambition was to establish a *hacienda*, a house, in Ecuador which would gradually grow into a research station open for all Scandinavian explorers. The purpose was that from this base camp the team would undertake trips by motorboat along the Amazon river and conduct ethnographical, sociological, geological, and entomological studies. Rafael Karsten's dream never came true. The circumstances in Ecuador were too harsh to build a permanent research station. This was perhaps one of the greatest disappointments of his life. Besides, Finnish-Swedish co-operation experienced a setback when Göran Wannberg's attitude towards money irritated Rafael Karsten. In general, the money problems stemmed from the fact that the prices of goods and services had changed in Ecuador. The research findings of the expedition were not, however, fruitless. Rafael Karsten's ethnobotanical collections were rich in size and gave him new information concerning the Indians' use of medical plants (medical plants were used in religious ceremonies). (228.) After returning from Ecuador, Karsten began to work with his

study on the religion of the Saami (published in 1952). Maggie Karsten-Sveander has stated that at that time her father was “the fighting professor” which meant that he was hard on his scholarly opponents (229). Karsten himself called the era *humbug par excellence* (230). Gradually, Karsten became disillusioned with the whole world. The fact underlying Karsten’s academic disillusion was his personal conflict: he felt totally lonely, but at the same time considered himself an expert of well-nigh everything. Let me take a brief look at this problem. In the 1940s, Karsten complained that the University of Helsinki had abandoned him, without taking any interest in his knowledge (231). However, Rafael Karsten’s self-pity sounds ludicrous in the light of Professor Veli Verkko’s notion that Karsten’s book *Naturfolkens samhällsliv* (“The Social life of Primitive People”) was still on the curriculum in 1955 (232). One source of Karsten’s confusion was his inability to make the distinction between his own and others’ studies. Over the years, Karsten had accused the American ethnologist Paul Rivet of plagiarism in his Jibaro studies. One time, a young woman editor wrote an article about the Jibaro Indians to the newspaper called *Veckojournalen*. Karsten saw the article and accused the woman of taking his words from his book *Blodshämnd, krig och segerfester bland jibaroindianerna i östra Ecuador* (“Blood Vengeance, War and Victory Feasts among Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador”) (1920). The journalist told Karsten that she had received the information from her Canadian engineer friend while on holiday in Ecuador. Karsten could not believe the explanation of the journalist and grew angry. Finally, the woman promised to publish Karsten’s article on the Jibaros in her paper (233). Furthermore, Karsten believed he was absolutely right in his Jibaro studies. His letter to the Director of the Smithsonian Institution, Matthew Stirling, indicates his attitude:

“[...] I should think that these Indians, who after the appearance of my monograph are one of the best known of all South American tribes should now be left in peace [...] and still you consider yourself competent to correct my statements as to the significance of the head-trophy, as in so many other points. Neither you nor anybody else is able to correct me as regards the Jibaros, nor so I think, give some additional knowledge about them” (234).

Surprisingly, Rafael Karsten who had earlier stated that South America was large enough for numerous ethnologists, was now claiming that the Jibaros had been thoroughly studied and should be left in peace. Evidently, growing old had lowered Karsten’s tolerance of criticism. Rafael Karsten and his anthropological evolutionism would have managed better if it had sought a place in the updating of ethnology. If Karsten had not slammed the door shut so early, that is, if he had bothered to discuss with the representatives of modern sociology, the heritage of classic cultural evolutionists’ could have been preserved a longer time. Rafael Karsten’s tradition of polemics continued when in 1948 he criticized the doctoral theses of the young Finnish sociologists by considering them “vulgar, functionalist, and behaviorist” (235). Karsten even compared the nature of modern sociology to pornography: the more ribald the

text was, the more people bought it. In autumn 1949, he attacked on Thor Heyerdahl's Kon-Tiki Expedition. The controversy between the two scholars became most visible in the media. At the time, Karsten could not accept Heyerdahl's views that Polynesia was settled from Peru. Karsten believed that the Polynesian islands had been settled from Asia, from Japan, for instance. Karsten was not alone with his ideas. John H. Rowe of the Department of Anthropology at the University of California supported Karsten's views:

"Thank you for your letter. Yes, Heyerdahl has been attracting a good deal of popular attention in this country with his book [...] however, I have not yet had the feeling that anyone was taking the matter too seriously. The reviews of his book have praised it only as an adventure story and have suggested, as is indeed the case, that the anthropologists have little use for his theories. I have read the article in the Geographical Journal with some care. It seemed to me that the only thing Heyerdahl had established was that a raft made of balsa wood logs lashed together would not be broken or sunk in a long sea voyage as long as it was traveling before the wind [...] I personally feel that it is a great pity that we must devote our energies to this sort of controversy when there is so much important research that needs to be done. But sometimes it is necessary" (236).

Nevertheless, Rowe's words included a slight touch of irony towards Karsten's obdurance. Finally, Rafael Karsten met his antagonist personally. Maggie Karsten-Sveander described the controversy as follows:

"I remember my father walking up and down the floor like a tiger in its cage, while the family respectfully tiptoed around. One day Heyerdahl asked if he could come and see his antagonist in Helsinki. When he left my father said: "I cannot share your opinion but I will not attack you any more". Afterwards, he added to the family: "But he is really a nice man!" (237).

The incident proves that Karsten's emotions were stronger than his self-controlled powers of thought. The reflection only after the dramatic outburst had taken place. This form of behaviour ruined many of his friendships. On the other hand, Thor Heyerdahl was proved to be wrong. DNA evidence, that is, the study of ancient biomolecules, has shown that Heyerdahl's suggestion that the Pacific Islands were colonised from South America is unfeasible. In January 1998, Dr. Erika Hagelberg, of the Department of Genetics at Cambridge University, proved by using mitochondrial DNA that the Pacific Islands were populated from Asia. Professor Heyerdahl counter-claimed that "the real first settlers cremated their dead" which probably destroyed the potential evidence. Dr. Hagelberg has, however, disputed this by suggesting that she can look at the DNA in the bones. (238.) Our discussion has so far focused on the dubious changes which took place in the figure of

Karsten. But, as his father Edvin Karsten, so also Rafael Karsten was an ambivalent person. Having said this, I refer to some positive changes which occurred in him. I believe that Rafael Karsten and his wife Margit Karsten came closer in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1951, at the age of 72, Karsten undertook his last fieldwork trip to South America. A year before he had been a founder member of the *Sociedad Argentino-Finlandesa*. At that time, he was also invited to be a corresponding member of the Bolivian Society of Americanists. (239.) During his last fieldwork trip, Karsten visited the Shipibo Indians of eastern Peru with his wife Margit Karsten. For the first time, Margit Karsten followed her husband to South America and the trip became “the greatest adventure of her life”. Actually, Rafael Karsten flew to Lima (it took 2 ½ days) in advance due to the Americanist congress. After the conference, they met in the “unbearable swelter of Manaus”. From here, they travelled to Iquitos and finally by canoe to a village of Yarinacocha. The couple was on a scholarship awarded by the states of USA and Peru. (240.) Margit Karsten described their expedition in her grand leaflet *Bland Shipiboindianer i Peru* (“Among Shipibo Indians in Peru”) published in 1952. Margit Karsten’s descriptions of a man and a wife arranging family pictures inside the tent on Christmas Eve in the Amazonas gives the impression of a happy couple. When the couple was returning from their expedition, Rafael Karsten was knocked down by a police car in Buenos Aires. Karsten injured his leg and head and his pelvis was fractured. He had to spend one month in a hospital but survived. The battle mace of Indians of Yarinacocha became a symbol of Karsten’s recovery when, leaning on it, he gave an interview to the Finnish newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* at his home in Helsinki. (241.) Rafael Karsten travelled to South America for the last time in August 1954. He then with the Danish Kaj Birket-Smith participated in an anthropological conference in Sao Paulo in Brazil (242). The cultural anthropologist Birket-Smith was Karsten’s close friend who in his book *Kulturens Veje* (1951) (“The Ways of Culture”) accommodated himself partly to Karsten’s evolutionary views (it is significant to note that Birket-Smith’s evolutionary views were more complex than Karsten’s). Again, Rafael Karsten’s fighting spirit was demonstrated in a clash with *Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten* (“The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters”) in autumn 1954. The committee of the society had decided not to publish Karsten’s article *Some Critical Remarks on Ethnological Field-research in South America* due to its blatantly polemic and sacrilegious nature. Of course, Karsten did not regard the opinion of the society as a sign of geniality and respect. Responding to the committee’s decision, Karsten claimed that his article was meant to be his defence against the “accusations” of Matthew Stirling. Favourably to Karsten, not all shared the opinion of the committee. Ragnar Numelin, Alvar Palmgren and Mr. Nordman supported Karsten’s views and denied that the article was “coarse”. (243.) However, Karsten’s attitude that “in society all are against me” led to resignation from the Society on 5 October 1954. His article appeared the same year in the publication series of the Society (*Societas Scientiarum Fennica*). Yet, something has to be said about Karsten’s closest friends, Ragnar Numelin and Arne Runeberg, during his old age. Ragnar Numelin had the ability to understand Karsten’s fluctuating state of mind and thus succeeded in calming down his furious and upset colleague (244). Karsten never considered Numelin a proper ethnologist or a

scholar of religion although Numelin was a follower of Westermarck and published his study of learning of history of ethnology in 1949. In general, Numelin, who was continuously travelling around the world due to his profession as a diplomat, was a significant way for Karsten to get first-hand information on scholarly issues or events taking place in the world (Karsten's trusted friends abroad were also the ethnographer and university lecturer Gustaf Bolinder, who had studied the Indians of Colombia, along with Dr. Walter Kaudern and Professor Gerhard Lindblom). On many occasions, Numelin had time to oblige Karsten by distributing his books to scholars he met abroad. I believe that Numelin's and Karsten's pattern of thought and sense of humour were identical to each other. In 1953 Numelin expressed his devotion to Karsten as follows:

"As you know, I have always respected you as a thorough, critical and interesting scholar and thus I was sad to hear that modern social anthropology does not often refer to your works" (245).

The sociologist Arne Runeberg has been called the youngest member of the Westermarckian school. Rafael Karsten was his tutor and colleague. Emeritus Professor Åke Hultkrantz (1994) has aptly described them as the two opposite energies in Chinese thought: yin-yang. The yin-yang allegory expresses their interaction, which meant that each of the two contains the seed of the other and is about to produce the replication of its opposite in interaction. The halves balance each other. According to Hultkrantz, Karsten was the masculine, hard and active *yang*, while Runeberg represented the receptive and yielding *yin* (246). Since Rafael Karsten's archives are almost devoid of correspondence between him and Runeberg, it is hard to outline their connection. In May 1947, Runeberg asked Karsten to be the opponent of his doctoral thesis (247). In 1955, Arne Runeberg applied for the professorship in moral and social philosophy in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki. Professors of Philosophy Eino Kaila and Oiva Ketonen submitted written reports on the scholarly merits of the applicants (Sven Arne Runeberg, Sven Ilmari Krohn, and Kaarle Laurentius Sorainen). As a result, the Faculty declared all applicants to be unqualified for the post. A while later, the Faculty requested Rafael Karsten, Torgny Segerstedt and Erik Stenius to give their public report on the issue. Karsten submitted an extensive report to the Faculty in which he described Runeberg as an "intellectually rich and productive scholar" with special ability to conduct scholarly research. However, Karsten considered Runeberg more a sociologist than a philosopher and stated that Runeberg was unqualified for the post. Karsten's reports on Sorainen and Krohn were similarly pessimistic. Karsten took the view that Sorainen, who had studied Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, lacked "general scholarly vision" while Krohn presented the philosophy of Bertrand Russell "in a two-faced manner against logical empiricism". (248.) Krohn had presented his phenomenologic-hermeneutical interpretations of philosophy in his two volume doctoral thesis *Der logische Empirismus* (1949-1951). It seems that Karsten

supported Eino Kaila's school of analytical philosophy. Consequently, none of the applicants was appointed to the post. Sven Krohn was appointed to a professorial post of philosophy at the University of Turku in 1960 by inheriting the post from J.E. Salomaa. (249.) Arne Runeberg served as associate professor of sociology and social anthropology at the University of Helsinki 1971-1977. In 1974, Runeberg spoke up for the "old Westermarckians and their social anthropology" in the newspaper *Hufvudstadsbladet*. (250.)

Rafael Karsten died suddenly on 21 February 1956 while waiting to see a doctor for a routine physical examination. On walking into the examination room, the man of science died literally in his wife's arms. (251.) It had been Rafael Karsten's ultimate desire once more to visit his childhood locality, Kvevlax and Vaasa (252). Besides, there were three unfinished works in his study. Unfortunately, destiny cut short the life of an explorer. The cause of death was a heart attack (253). A year later Ragnar Numelin stated: "Rafael Karsten was a colourful, combatant, temperamental, and exact man of science. He was a university lecturer, scholar, and explorer" (254). We have to believe this is the truth.

Now, my conclusion is that in his childhood Rafael Karsten became personally committed to the belief system, it became an attitude, but events and circumstances at the beginning of the century caused a gradual rejection of that attitude system. At that time Karsten had a clear reference system of "unbelief" (here referring to agnosticism) which basically meant the rejection of the key belief systems of his childhood. In other words, the main reason for his abandoning the Lutheran faith was the change of reference groups and the increasing contacts with colleagues professing non-religious beliefs. On the other hand, one reason for Karsten's abandoning the church was the strict filial obedience expected by his parents, which later irritated him and stimulated the change of his thinking. Scholars have suggested that those brought up in religious settings frequently experience a conflict between religion and science in their adolescence. In these cases the parental figure with the most prevalent religious influence on the child has generally been the parent of the opposite sex. These hypotheses are verified in Rafael Karsten's case. Hostility towards Evangelical Lutheran dogma was a fashion amongst the Westermarckian school at the beginning of the century. Thus, to be non-religious was a precondition to being a scientist in the Westermarckian social anthropological circle. On the other hand, an anticlerical attitude, agnosticism, was for Karsten an opportunity to express himself differently from childhood patterns. As mentioned earlier, researchers have suggested that specific family experiences must be worked through in connection with the subject's adult life. A young person is always a seeker who is only rarely satisfied with the religious education of childhood home. Rafael Karsten was dissatisfied with the religious attitudes of his parents, but finally rejected only one variety of religion, Lutheran dogma, not religion in general. Karsten was agnostic, which meant that he believed that the ultimate cause

was unknowable, yet in spite of his agnosticism he was not an enemy of religion, rather an assiduous scholar of religion. “Life is a hard school”, as Klas Edvin Karsten used to say (255).

2.3. Post Scriptum

The aim of this chapter has been to analyse in terms of biography the spiritual growth of an individual. My first aim, on some level, was to compare Rafael Karsten’s spiritual growth with the intellectual development of his colleague, Uno Harva, since it would appear that their religious development was similar. I quickly learned, however, that Rafael Karsten’s spiritual growth was almost completely different from the experience Harva encountered in 1908 (1). Harva understood the contradiction between the profession of a clergyman and his fundamental aspirations quite late, whereas Karsten and Christianity drifted apart much earlier. Furthermore, Harva hesitated for a moment when rejecting the faith of his childhood home, while Karsten never concerned himself with the entreaties of his parents. If Harva became a scholarly convert only later, Karsten was that almost at once. However, the fathers of both friends were ultimately the persons who best understood the intellectual change in their sons. All in all, we have knowledge of Karsten’s and Harva’s intellectual change which guided them to comparative religion but something is still missing: we are unable to perceive the underlying cause of their rejection (2). All is based on the (objective) exposition and interpretation of a “biographer”.

3. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF RAFAEL KARSTEN’S COMPARATIVE RELIGION

In this chapter my aim is to analyse the birth, scope and nature of Rafael Karsten’s study of religions at the beginning of the 20th century. My task is twofold: firstly, to analyse the historiography of Finnish comparative religion by presenting the career of Rafael Karsten, and, secondly, to analyse the wide theoretical system which lay behind Karsten’s reasoning. Due to the pioneering studies of the Finnish scholars Lauri Honko, Juha Pentikäinen, Veikko Anttonen, Kirsti Suolinna and the Swedish scholar Åke Hultrantz, we are now in a better position to consider and understand the establishment and development of the Finnish study of religions. Thanks to these scholars, it seems to me quite clear that the *de facto* resources of the Finnish study of religions derived from two traditions: Finno-Ugric studies and Westernmarckian sociology. This claim presupposes that in Finnish theology the interest in the study of religions emerged at the end of the 19th century, but flourished only in the late 1910s and 1920s. In fact, theological circles (the discipline and the Evangelical Lutheran church)

awakened to the presentations of the study of religions observantly, after years of trenchant animadversion. However, we must bear in mind that researchers have expressed their thoughts more of Finno-Ugric studies as a resource of the Finnish study of religions than of other traditions. Thus, it is worth noting that the history of the Finnish study of religions has been presented only partially (or it would be more accurate to say that only one volume of this extensive task has been finished so far). All in all, my purpose is to analyse in detail the study of religions in Westermarckian terms of reference. This has been almost totally neglected in previous studies.


3.1. The Profession

In this chapter my dilemma is twofold. Firstly, my interest is focused on Karsten's scholarly orientation. The problem lies in the way Rafael Karsten is indiscriminately called a "philosopher", "sociologist", "ethnologist", "ethnosociologist", "social/cultural anthropologist", and "scholar of religion". My main purpose is to examine why we should consider Rafael Karsten a scholar of religion, not a philosopher, sociologist or ethnologist *per se*. Secondly, I aim to specify Karsten's works which were primarily studies on religion. This will assist in understanding his career as a scholar of religion.

Today, it is easier for a Finnish researcher to say "I am a scholar of religion" than one hundred years ago when "sociology", "ethnology" and "comparative religion" were nondescriptly overlapping. The vague definitional and positional boundaries between Finnish moral and social philosophy, sociology, ethnology and comparative religion caused uncertainty in the minds of scholars. Evidently, Karsten felt his scholarly status was somewhat misinterpreted when in his article *Modern nordisk religionsvetenskap* ("Modern Nordic Comparative Religion") (1947) he emphasized resolutely that he considered himself ultimately a scholar of religion. However, it was not until 1955, one year before his death, that he made a distinction between sociology, ethnology and comparative religion (although not in public):

"My book "Head-Hunters" is not an ethnographical work (as my daughter called it). Ethnography is what they do in Sweden. I call my research ethnology or ethnosociology, which, as comparative religion, is a part of sociology. It is surprising that in Sweden they do not consider comparative religion a part of sociology. I consider comparative religion a very important part of sociology"(1).

Inevitably, Rafael Karsten's definition appears to be fruitful in understanding the places of the various research fields in his mind. Following his definition, it is possible to outline the following figure:

Figure 1. *Rafael Karsten's scholarly position*

Undoubtedly, my diagram needs a commentary. In order to comprehend Karsten's scholarly orientation better, I have enlarged his definition to include moral and social philosophy as a discipline. To start with, at the beginning of the 20th century Finnish sociology, ethnology and comparative religion were subordinated to the discipline of moral and social philosophy. Since philosophy as an academic subject was more advanced than sociology, Finnish sociologists had a degree in philosophy. Edward Westermarck's enthusiasm for philosophy is a well-known topic amongst scholars, that is, although rejecting the philosophical tradition of the German theorists (Hegelian dogma) he never abandoned philosophy as a research interest. Erik Allardt (1997) regards Westermarck "as much a philosopher as a sociologist" since many of his books dealt with issues of moral philosophy and ethics (2). Rafael Karsten was not a philosopher in the free sense of the word. In February 1902 Rafael Karsten passed an examination in moral and social philosophy (laudatur level in Finnish), after three hours of oral examination (3). However, he was not satisfied with his performance. According to Karsten, philosophy was a significant subject but to receive a mark in it had no great value for him (4). Evidently, this was Karsten's first sign of pronounced interest in comparative religion. Although a professor of moral and social philosophy, Karsten's philosophical publications remained minor. His main work on philosophical ethics was not published until 1941. It has received a great deal of criticism. Most of Karsten's philosophical articles were written at the beginning of the 20th century (1906, 1907, and 1909). In his article on modern comparative religion (1904) Karsten revealed his disgust for philosophical speculation, especially the *a priori* principles of metaphysics. But is it meaningful to call Karsten a sociologist then? Referring to Karsten's utterance I consider him a sociologist only on a very comprehensive level. I suggest that he was a sociologist since the representatives of the Westermarckian school were called so. Erik Allardt (1997) considers Westermarck the founder of Finnish sociology "in a very concrete sense of the word" (5). By this Allardt probably indicates the fact that Westermarck was the first university lecturer in sociology at the Alexander University in 1890. On the other hand, Elina Haavio-Mannila and Frank Sweetser (1964) have seen Westermarck more as an anthropologist than a sociologist (6). Their view is supported by Professor Åke Hultkrantz, who considers Westermarck a "social anthropologist, for this is

what it was about” (7). However, Westermarck saw, at least, his work “The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas” (1906) “under the heading philosophy and psychology or ethics rather than anthropology” (8). In my opinion, one difference between Karsten and Westermarck is that Karsten was never a sociologist to the same degree as his mentor. Generally speaking, while Westermarck’s studies on marriage and family connected him to social issues, Karsten’s studies did not define clearly the purposes which the analyses of “primitive” religion served on a social level. Yet, Karsten considered sociology “the study of human social life among primitive people”. Karsten was neither a sociologist compared with his colleague Gunnar Landtman who already in 1903 became interested in the “origin of social classes” while Karsten zestfully continued the study of religious beliefs. Whether Karsten contributed to the ideological development of sociology is somewhat a matter of interpretation. (9.) As stated, after World War II Westermarckian sociology was regarded merely as a tradition which had offered “this and that and the other thing” to the rise of Finnish sociological orientation. In any event, Karsten’s reasoning received influences from early European sociological tradition and he wrote two introductions to sociology (published in 1928 and 1945).

Professor Åke Hultkrantz has suggested that the social anthropological study of the origin of religion was a part of the British empirical tradition. This was what Westermarck and Karsten took up. Regardless of this, I have made it clear that Rafael Karsten *felt* that he was a scholar of religion, not a social anthropologist *per se*. In December 1903, Karsten enthusiastically wrote to Westermarck that comparative religion had been introduced into the curriculum at the University of the Sorbonne. Apparently he planned to take courses in comparative religion in Paris. Seven months earlier he had told to Westermarck about his great interest in “history of religion”. (10.) We must also recall Professor Grotenfelt’s sincere wonder about young Karsten’s keen interest in the study of religions (Chapter 2.2.). As a twenty-five-year-old scholar, Karsten gave his first characterization of the “science of religion” (see Chapter 4.1.). Later, Karsten’s views on comparative religion as a part of sociology told merely about his desire to see the “science of religion” as a subject separate from theology. Karsten did not approve the Swedish model where the birth of the study of religions was closely connected to theology. The first Swedish professorial post in comparative religion (*religionshistoria*) was established in 1878 in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Uppsala (11). Above all, Karsten regarded comparative religion as an autonomous field of inquiry inside sociological knowledge. Thus, it would be unjust to call him merely a sociologist or a social anthropologist who has an interest in religious aspects of culture. What we have to do is, obviously, to try to observe how Karsten fits into the Westermarckian religious-scientific discussion (how Karsten’s study of religions is connected to his ethnology is deliberated later). Principally, I see the “Westermarckian study of religions” as a conceptual utopia. In my opinion, it is completely misleading to think that there is any coherence, “Westermarckian study of religions”, that could be analysed and defended. On the contrary, Westermarckian “sociology”

as a source of the Finnish study of religions was divided into various multidimensional and multidisciplinary goals. I demonstrate this as follows:

Figure 2. *The terms of reference of the Westermarckian religious-scientific discussion*

“Westermarckian study of religion(s)”



Edward Westermarck, introduced his subject as sociology, but considered it now and then more philosophy than anthropology. Westermarck was also interested in “religion and magic”.

Rafael Karsten, remained a Westermarckian evolutionist all his life, became interested in the “general study of religions which treats religions as equal”. Karsten defined the function and method of comparative religion.

Uno (Holmberg) Harva, started his scholarly activity as a Westermarckian evolutionist, subsequently became a Ratzelian diffusionist. According to Harva, the study of religions indicated “writing of objective history”.

Rolf Lagerborg, although Lagerborg conceptualized “sacred” in the Finnish study of religions, his interest in religion mainly developed through his studies on moral philosophy.

Gunnar Landtman, was more a sociologist and ethnologist than a scholar of religion. His studies on comparative religion are thus quite unsubstantial.

Karl (Kai) Donner, started as Westermarck’s disciple (studied modern fieldwork under Haddon’s tuition at Cambridge) but later became a Malinowskian functionalist rather than an evolutionist. However, Donner contributed to methodology of the Finnish study of religions.

Yrjö Hirn, K. Rob.V. Wikman, Ragnar Numelin, Rudolph Holsti, Ola Castrén, Leo Ehrnrooth, Hilma Granqvist and Ernst von Wendt were more or less engaged in aesthetic, sociological, social anthropological and social political aims. (12.)

(The purpose of this figure is solely informative and is not meant to undervalue anyone’s worthy career)

What I am claiming now is that Edward Westermarck, in spite of dealing with the religious beliefs of the Moors and Berbers, was more a philosopher and sociologist than a “purebred” scholar of religion. Although Westermarck stated in 1891 that he took a great interest in comparative religion, he was ignorant of a real establishment of scientific method of comparative religion (13). In other words, although Westermarck presented a view of religion (Latin *religio*) and gathered valuable information on the religious history of mankind, his

material relating to the religious beliefs of indigenous people offered him predominantly the basis for furthering sociological and philosophical problems. Having said this I do not want to undervalue Westermarck's valuable life-work, but to point out that the "true line of descent" within the Finnish study of religions derived from scholars who had not only gathered material relating to the religious beliefs of people, but who had also paid serious attention to the position and development of the study of religions. It turns out, then, that a scholar of religion is a person who has a certain indoctrinated aspiration to institutionalize the study of religions by not only investigating religions comparatively, generally, and objectively but also by paying attention to the position and appearance of comparative religion as an independent subject area. I must now address the real question of the father of the Finnish study of religions within the Westermarckian tradition. If Edward Westermarck cannot be considered the personification of Finnish comparative religion, he yet was a source of fresh ideas and inspiration. But whom did he influence?

As Figure Two points out, three of Westermarck's disciples, Uno Harva, Rafael Karsten, and Kai Donner spoke clearly of the study of religions. Broadly speaking, the other disciples, like Gunnar Landtman, associated comparative religion more with European ethnology. According to Åke Hultrantz (1994), Landtman's doctoral thesis "suffered from the lack of distinction between priests and medicine men, and his documentation of Kiwai Papuan religion had not much to say about higher spiritual beings" (14). While Uno Harva has frequently been called a driving force in the study of comparative religion, Rafael Karsten has been characterized as a social anthropologist to whom the study of religions was only of secondary interest (15). In my opinion, this is not the only undisputable truth. If we now regard Rafael Karsten more as a Westermarckian researcher than Uno Harva, who, I suggest, was perhaps most influenced by Professor of Finnish and Comparative Folklore, Kaarle Krohn, then, one important culmination of my work would be the following: we have to consider Rafael Karsten the father of Finnish comparative religion within the Westermarckian tradition. According to Veikko Anttonen (1997), Uno Harva started his scholarly activity as a Wundtian folkpsychologist, Westermarckian cultural evolutionist and geographico-historialist of Finnish school of folkloristics. In the 1920s, Uno Harva, however, became a Ratzelian diffusionist and a follower of the "Kulturkreise" approach. Regarding the Finnish scholar of religion, Kai Donner, he was initially influenced by Westermarck, but later became involved with Rivers's genealogical method and Radcliffe-Brown's and Malinowski's functionalism. Donner's detailed accounts of the ancestries and descents of the Siberian peoples were not typical for Westermarckian theoretical constructs. Rafael Karsten never traced ancestries in his monographies while his study on the social life of the Indians was descriptive rather than a systematic investigation of the descents of a particular "tribe". However, what comes to Uno Harva, Westermarck himself refused to perceive Harva's comparative religion in terms of the Westermarckian tradition. Westermarck saw that the appointment of Harva as a lecturer in comparative religion (1914) was unrealizable, since Harva was unwilling to utilize comparative analysis in his studies. (16.) Almost at the same time as Karsten undertook his

expeditions to South America, Uno Harva conducted field research among the Udmurts and the Maris in Russia, and among the Evenks and the Kets in Siberia (1911, 1913, 1917). Here we encounter the fact that Harva had a sensorious attitude towards non-European field studies. Rafael Karsten was never able to understand Harva's statement that "it was absolutely absurd that Finland sent researchers to study Indians, Papuans, Negroes, and other exotic people" (17). Veikko Anttonen points out that although Uno Harva was a disciple of Westermarck, his chances in promoting the study of religions along Westermarckian lines were "quite slight". This view is also confirmed by Professor Emeritus of Comparative Religion, Lauri Honko. Interestingly, Harva's doctoral thesis *Die Wassergottheiten der Finno-Ugrischen Völker* (1913) traced no "origins" in Westermarckian spirit (compare to Karsten's "The Origin of Worship" and Landtman's "The Origin of Priesthood"). All in all, Westermarck's statement and Harva's demeanour strengthen and preserve my principle of regarding Rafael Karsten as the real originator of comparative religion within the Westermarckian tradition. This does not, however, undermine Harva's (and Kai Donner's) meaning as a figure who also laid the foundation for the study of comparative religion in Finland. (18.)

How, then, did Karsten's ethnology characterize his study of religions and *vice versa*? Undoubtedly, a man whose outlook on life was directed by the wish to "study Indians who have never met white people" and who, then, undertook six different fieldwork trips to South America, can be called an ethnologist (19). Interestingly, Karsten emphasized that his studies in South America were not ethnographical but ethnological in nature. In Karsten's opinion, ethnography was concerned with the study of the material culture whereas ethnology investigated the spiritual culture of "primitive" people. You may also sense from Karsten's definition that he drew a parallel between "ethnology" and ethnosociology". This is a fascinating fact. During the years, the scholars have discussed "ethnosociology" or the "ethnohistorical" approach when referring to Westermarckian sociology. In Karsten's terms of reference, however, ethnosociology / ethnology forms an autonomous cognitive basis within the subject of sociology and thus cannot be regarded as the equivalent of sociology. That is to say, "ethnosociology" refers to Karsten's studies in South America not to his sociology *integra*. To speak of Karsten as a (social)anthropologist is fairly apt, since he himself discussed the anthropology of South American Indians (*Studies in South American Anthropology* (1920), for instance). This stemmed from Edward Westermarck's habit of considering his interest area anthropological: "In University College I hold ten extra lectures in anthropology [...]" (my emphasis) (20). According to the British anthropologist Alfred Cort Haddon, the term "anthropologist" derived from the past. The term "anthropology" was created by Aristotle, who used it in a disapproving manner, that is, Aristotle considered an esteemed Greek "not an anthropologist, not a gossip nor a talker about himself" (21). Later, the term "anthropology" (*anthropos*, "man"; *logos*, "study") appeared to be connected with notions of human biology. The situation changed, however, in 1881 when the British Edward Burnett Tylor published his work "Anthropology". Tylor's work changed the anthropological orientation by enlarging its content from absolute biology to the study of the relationship

between culture and the environment (22). However, almost fifty years earlier the word “ethnology” had become synonymous with “anthropology”. The word “ethnology” was coined by W. F. Edwards as the title for the *Société Ethnologique de Paris* in 1839. Then, Edwards pointed out that “ethnology” was synonymous with “anthropology” by “covering the whole field of the science of man”. Only four years later the British *Ethnological Society*, established in 1843, followed the French standard and endeavoured to clarify the use of the word “ethnology”. The task was far from easy since the opinions of scholars on the use of the word “ethnology” were mixed. As a result, Edward B. Tylor hesitated to discuss “ethnology” and preferred to use the word “rational ethnography”. The conceptual speculation took a new course in 1910 when Alfred Cort Haddon described “ethnology” as a subject “restricted to the comparative and genetic study of human culture and of man as a social animal (23). Nevertheless, Haddon was anxious about the vague nature of the word “ethnology”. It was not until the British anthropologist A.R. Radcliffe-Brown made a distinction between “ethnology” (the study of the past) and “social anthropology” (the study of the natural laws of a society). Today, the words “anthropology” (cultural and social) and “ethnology” are still employed synonymously while the expression “ethnography” is seen as an autonomous designation. (24.) Today, ethnography refers to the study of food production, social organization, religion, language, clothing and material culture, whereas ethnology refers to the comparative analysis of these ethnographic descriptions (generalizations, interrelationships, differentiation and so forth). Lévi-Strauss has suggested that ethnography “is interpreted in the same way” in all countries when it refers to “observation and description, field work”. The meaning of ethnology is to be a “first step toward synthesis” whereupon ethnology “includes ethnography as its first step”. One of the more meticulous attempts at defining the core of understanding our species is Milton Nunez’s distinction of “physical anthropology”, “cultural anthropology”, “ethnography”, “ethnology”, “social anthropology”, “archaeology” and “linguistics”. Nunez’s distinction is paralleled by many contemporary writers and thus tells us that “anthropology” today is seen more as a complex mosaic consisting of many subject areas than one immense conglomeration. (25.)

But let us return to the question of the relations between Karsten’s comparative religion and ethnology. To put it briefly, I suggest that Karsten was an ethnologist abroad and a scholar of religion at home. What does this mean? According to Karsten, comparative religion “had to explain the facts with which it was concerned” (26). To be able to explain these facts a scholar of religion had to visit the source of the matters concerned (“search of origin”). After the subversion of armchair anthropology, this occurred by conducting research in the field. Karsten went to the field as a trained ethnologist in order to collect ethnological data for his studies on comparative religion. Due to his aspiration to study indigenous cultures holistically, Karsten not only collected “religious” data but also emphasized the study of the material culture and social life of Indians (in study of the ancient Inca culture Karsten concentrated merely on investigation of religious ideas of the Incas). However, the fundamental aim of studying the material and social culture of Indians was to “throw much interesting light upon

their religion” (27). In Karsten’s opinion, this was called a “new treatment of the science of religion” (28). All in all, “new treatment” entailed empirical, universal, and comparative study of religion (and its origin) and religious phenomena. This is how ethnological monographs were born. But, the role of ethnology was not only to be a subsidiary discipline of comparative religion. Neither was ethnology an idea fund of comparative religion which formlessly fed information to a machine. According to Karsten, comparative religion also solved the problems of “general” ethnology, that is, studies on religion were of use in ethnology (29). Although Karsten endeavoured to make a certain distinction between “ethnology” and “comparative religion”, he at the same time emphasized the symbiotic, intimate, relationship between the disciplines. Were he here now, he would certainly be horrified by the academic development which has translated an interdisciplinary symbiosis into differentiation. I am fully aware that some scholars may disagree with the role I assign to Karsten. Someone may argue that Karsten’s role as an ethnologist was more explicit and far-reaching than I am willing to admit. In this connection, I ask the sceptics: Why did Karsten concentrate more on developing the methodology of the science of religion than ethnology / anthropology? In many cases, as in his monograph “The Head-Hunters of Western Amazonas” (1935), he even abstained from defining his fieldwork methods profoundly. I am well aware that it was typical of the Westermarckian school that they employed British anthropological field tools without radical new orientation. On the other hand, Rafael Karsten has won international popularity particularly as an ethnologist of South American Indians, not as a Finnish scholar of religion. So here we have what, in my view, could be called an annoying paradox. Perhaps the most successful definition of Karsten would be an “explorer of spirit”, a term which is advantageous both to anthropology and comparative religion (30).

The question of the character of Rafael Karsten’s comparative religion is anything but analytically unambiguous. The chief difficulty in outlining his comparative religion is taking into account a number of academic persons, tendencies and events which influenced him. Evidently, an analysis of Rafael Karsten as a scholar of religion requires a careful distinction between his studies. Firstly, there are works which directly and explicitly deal with problems and theoretical questions of comparative religion, and, secondly, there are monographs which only in a secondary manner address the inquiries of the study of religions. Karsten’s ideas, methods, and views that belong to a domain of comparative religion become fairly easily explicit. My criterion for making a distinction between Karsten’s studies was that I aspired to separate his ethnological studies from his works on religion. After re-thinking Karsten’s production I found ten studies and articles which immediately treat the methodology of the “modern science of comparative religion” (as Karsten put it). These works were: *Den moderna religionsvetenskapen* (“Modern Study of Religion”) (1904), *The Origin of Worship* (1905), *Till frågan om förhållandet mellan religion och moral* (“The Question of the Relationship between Religion and Moral”) (1906), *Hedendom och Kristendom* (“Paganism and Christianity”) (1910), *Inledning till religionsvetenskapen* (“Introduction to Comparative Religion”) (1928), *Luonnonkansojen uskonto* (“The Religion of Primitive People”) (1931),

The Origin of Religion (1935), *Modern nordisk religionsvetenskap* (“Modern Nordic Comparative Religion”) (1946), *Stridsfrågor inom den moderna sociologien och religionsvetenskapen* (“The Controversial Issues within Modern Sociology and Comparative Religion”) (1947), and *Utvecklingsläran och “Gudstron”* (“Evolutionism and “God-belief”) (1950). The work *Grunddragen av sociologiens historia* (“Arguments on the History of Sociology”) (1945) was also located in this category since it does not only analyze the history of sociology but scrutinizes simultaneously the past and origin of comparative religion. On the whole, “Grunddragen” is an invaluable work since it can be considered comprehensive survey of Karsten’s intellectual world. The studies and anthropological monographs like “Studies in Primitive Greek Religion”(1907), “The Civilization of the South-American Indians” (1926), “The Head-Hunters of Western Amazonas” (1935), “A Totalitarian State of the Past: The Civilization of the Inca Empire in Ancient Peru” (1949), “The Religion of the Samek” (1955), and posthumous publication “Studies in the Religion of the South-American Indians East of the Andes” (1964), are all impressive but abstain from directly dealing with problems of comparative religion. In general, these works explain ethnological observations and this way offer material and information to the study of religions (Karsten stated in his work “The Civilization” (1926) as follows: “ My chief task in this work has been to explain the customs and beliefs with which I am dealing”) (my emphasis) (31). The quality of Karsten’s monographs lies, thus, in the knowledge base they offer comparative religion. A more careful analysis of Karsten’s monographs is deliberated in Chapter Five.

3.2. The System

I now endeavour to leap from the definition of Karsten’s profession to the estimation and content analysis of his study of religions. In August 1973, at the Conference of the International Association for the History of Religions, the Professor of Religious Studies, Walter H. Capps, discussed broadly the problems of comparative religion. He was irritated and desolate since “the sources of comparative religion lay here and there” (1). By this he indicated that the main contributors to the study of religions have been disciplines of other fields. Interestingly, Walter Capps placed the works of early scholars of religions (Tylor, Frazer, Müller and Durkheim) “in the host of others” which made the study of religions “arbitrarily assembled” (2). But did Capps’s gloomy suggestion offer a correct view? In the present setting, many sorts of questions arise. Is it true that Tylor and Frazer can be placed “in the host of others”? Is it scholarly ignominy to admit that the science of religion is a collective in which various subjects meet? Is it rational to suggest that the study of religions should be the result of “immaculate conception”? What is our opinion of the fact that the rise of Western comparative religion was linked to the first Latin translations of Confucius and Daoist texts made by Jesuit missionaries. We must remember that it was the philosophers of the 19th century whose intellectual turbulence between “religion” and “science” made people’s attitudes towards the faith of others more tolerant in the Western world. Furthermore, who

were Tylor and Frazer to be considered only secondary scholars of religion? Or were they scholars of religion at all? Since Tylor and other representatives of the British evolutionary anthropological school were closely connected to the rise of Finnish comparative religion it is reasonable to ask whether Rafael Karsten was also guilty of putting the study of religions in disorder by supporting the views of Tylor and Frazer? Evidently, Professor Capps's suggestion compels us to an *ex post facto* analysis of comparative religion on national and international level. However, as Dr. Michael Pye has remarked, there is no definitive agreement on who should be considered the pioneers of comparative religion (3). In fact, every scholar of religion probably makes a list of her own. Thus, it is one single ray of light of interpretation which I am able to provide in this issue. In my opinion, the scholars of religion cannot form an exclusive group which rejects the presence of other disciplines and thus supposes the epistemology of the science of religion to arise automatically. The core of comparative religion dates from the early scholars who enthusiastically worked with the problem of religion and magic. My *ex post facto* analysis of Finnish comparative religion finds its culmination in the investigation of Rafael Karsten's scholarly background. It is possible to put the multiplicity of tendencies and individuals behind Karsten's work on comparative religion as follows:

Figure 3. *The scholarly range of visions of Rafael Karsten's comparative religion*

The scholarly view which Edward Westermarck offered to Rafael Karsten



Empiricism (experience) / Sophists > Aristotle > Oxford school > Bacon, Leonardo, Gilbert > Locke > Darwin, Wallace > Tylor > Haddon, Westermarck

Positivism (exactness) / Montesquieu, Rousseau > Condorcet, Cabanis > Saint-Simon > Comte, Mill > Herbert Spencer

Evolutionism (development) / Classical period (from Thales to Aristotle) > Late Classical period (from Marcus Aurelius to Abelard) > Medieval world (from Thomas Aquinas to d'Abano) > The Reformation and Renaissance (from Erasmus Rotterdam to Hobbes) > The Enlightenment (from Montesquieu to Erasmus Darwin) > Industrialization (from Lamarck to Tylor) > Converts to evolutionism (from Frazer to Westermarck)

(In the darkness of the libraries Karsten also acquainted himself with C. P. Tiele's and de la Saussure's phenomenology of religion (see Chapter 4.1.))

The purpose of the table was to get to the root of the problem of Karsten's logic on comparative religion. In other words, I have endeavoured to become closely acquainted with all significant intellectuals behind Rafael Karsten's framework. I call Karsten's complex

mixture of scholarly dependence and independence a *system*. The task of studying the “system” has been agonizing. The problem does not lie in the fact that now and then some of the matters are better expressed in the scholar’s mind than on paper, but in the way the motives behind Karsten’s ideas were developed into a complete system. Most people think of the past as an affair that has only desultory reconstructions on their minds. To most of them history is connected to personal memories which transform themselves into agreeable circumstances. However, being able to perceive the past in a formal and objective framework necessitates arrangements of matters in the mind, since “history” is always a statement of many points. In my opinion, it is a misapprehension to date the derivation of “social evolution” to the arguments of Spencer, for instance. The development of the Spencerian system has never been possible without the French tradition of de Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte. As Herbert Spencer put it: “My pronounced opposition to his views [Comte] led me to develop some of my own views” (4). On the other hand, Charles Darwin was not the first scholar to emphasize the idea of empiricism. He was only the scholar who completed the picture originally drawn by Aristotle. Thus, my figure does not merely present the close theoretical “elite” of Karsten’s reasoning, but also analyses the far-flung powers behind it (how “empiricism”, “positivism”, and “evolutionism” were born).

As a disciple of Edward Westermarck, Rafael Karsten looked through an evolutionary anthropological window, adopted and accepted its views, and finally arrived at his own interpretations and understandings of them. It is mysterious to imagine what Karsten would have become without encountering Westermarck, that is, if Westermarck had not served as Karsten’s teacher when Karsten was a new undergraduate. Perhaps Karsten’s world would have been built on Arvi Grotenfelt’s philosophical lectures, which captivated the audience. As a disciple of Grotenfelt, Karsten would have adhered to the German idealistic tradition and philosophical psychology (5). Nevertheless, more important than to ponder on the life Karsten would have spent without Westermarck is to recognize the proper meaning of Westermarck to Karsten. The reason why Westermarck as a teacher was more an intermediary than a real “pedagogue” is intricate. Firstly, Westermarck did not himself develop a lucid doctrine of his own, his role was to be a messenger and intermediary of the methodological solutions of others. Secondly, due to his pioneering fieldwork in Morocco Westermarck was frequently absent from the university. Thus he was prevented from guiding his Finnish disciples verbally, which meant that his students had to continue their studies at home and abroad independently. And thirdly, as a tutor Westermarck was not a distant *Gestalt*, he was rather an aged comrade, who made his disciples forget academic rank and age (6). Westermarck’s professional modesty showed in his way of treating his students and colleagues. He readily agreed to the scholarly ideas of colleagues using his liberality and tolerance. Instead of being unconcerned about the endeavours of his disciples, he encouraged them in their attempts to become talented scholars. Westermarck was one of the pathfinders whose influence on young students proved to be egalitarian but solicitous. After all, scholarly equality evidently made Westermarck’s disciples feel brave enough to establish their own careers. (7.) On the whole, Westermarck’s

ethical relativism which believed in the individual and his faculties was of much benefit to Rafael Karsten's autonomous nature. If Westermarck's tutelage had been similar to the American sociologist Pitrim A. Sorokin, who was famous for his merciless and critical nature as teacher, Karsten's programme of non-centralized academic research would probably have sunk into oblivion. On the other hand, Karsten suffered from the feeling of inferiority. The difficulties in obtaining travel scholarships especially made Karsten consider himself the least meritorious student of Westermarck. In my study, I use the term "Westermarckian school" to describe the fairly cohesive group Westermarck formed around him. In my opinion, the "Westermarckian school" entails the characteristics which Yash Nandan (1977) attaches to a group that is becoming a "school". Firstly, the group has to have a master. Secondly, the ideas of the master have to form a coherent body of principles. Thirdly, the followers have to accept the master's corpus of theories and give his/her doctrines an "aura of dogmatism". Fourthly, the group has to have its own organ or symbol, like a journal. Finally, the master of a group and his/her followers have to become the focus of attention among other scholars nationally and globally. (8.) In my opinion, these criteria are fulfilled in the case of Edward Westermarck and his disciples. Yet, Nandan's model does not take into account the most individual and independent figures of the group.

Recalling Edward Westermarck's state of mind in 1887 when he took his Master's degree in philosophy, he began to feel like a bird spreading his wings (9). This was visible in his overwhelming desire to study the history of marriage. The fact that Westermarck desired to acquaint himself more with the British pattern of thought on the origin of marriage made him long for advanced studies in Britain. When Westermarck realized that taking possession of part of Mrs. Hedvig Tamelin's inheritance spared him from economic troubles, he decided to travel to the Reading Rooms of the British Museum in England. Thus, in September 1887, Westermarck for the first time sat under the cupola of the "world's best library" in London. Evidently, the hours spent from early morning to late evening in the "temple" (as Westermarck called the British Museum) developed Westermarck's intellectual style into an encyclopaedic, intuitive and pattern-finding study. (10.) Everyday Westermarck had to compel himself to leave his intellectual sanctuary, and all he could think about in the evening in his lodgings were his books in the cloakroom of the Reading Room. In general, we could say that Westermarck's insatiable scholarly hunger for the problem of promiscuity and his utter boredom with Hegelian absolute idealism opened the world of British thought to Finnish philosophy and humanities. Later on, Westermarck's journeys also received a political aspect when in 1891 Finnish press legislation became tighter. In Britain he was safe from censorship which was fundamentally a menacing weapon of Russia's security policy (11). The censorship also ruined Finnish library resources effectually. *Enfin*, Great Britain and its scholarly tradition was such an internal part of Westermarck's pattern of behaviour that he inspired his students to dream about access to British education. Through Westermarck's theoretical adhesions, Rafael Karsten's study of religions was connected to the ideas of Baconian and Lockean empiricism of the 16th and 17th centuries and notions of positivism and evolutionism

of the 18th and 19th centuries. It should not be supposed, however, that these scholarly trends were developed in complete isolation. In point of fact, empiricism and positivism were historically and theoretically linked to each other. But though their intentions were parallel, these tendencies of the philosophy of science are worthy of individual analysis, that is, they have to be examined separately.

Empiricism. In my study empiricism largely refers to the tendency to emphasize “observation”, “documentation” and “experience” of actual occurrences, that is, I see empiricism first and foremost as an empirical praxis denying *a priori* thought. I do not consider empiricism here any particular philosophical model or doctrine, since its fundamental substance has varied from Aristotle to Locke (Aristotle was more interested in metaphysics than John Locke). My endeavour is mainly to emphasize scholars who developed their understanding of observation and the recording of data. During the years, the term “empiricism” has assumed a more extensive meaning, and now refers to any philosophical system that denies the possibility of spontaneous ideas and affirms that all knowledge is based on a *posteriori* thought. In his dissertation (1982) Timothy Stroup suggested that Westermarck’s methods “were those of the empiricism of his time, of which he was a pioneer” (12). Stroup’s suggestion is perceptive but it takes an attentive reader to realize that Westermarck was a pioneer of empiricism only when it was related to his pioneering anthropological fieldwork in Morocco. And yet, we have to understand that Westermarck’s empirical praxis was also based on models of the preceding generations. There were also other pioneers of fieldwork, like the Cambridge generation, who by observation and recording endeavoured to understand the indigenous mind. Before anything, empiricism, whether philosophical or not, needs to be scrutinized in terms of its historical context. The empiricism of Westermarck’s time was not developed all of a sudden, but as a result of the cogitations of various philosophers and theologians during the centuries. Although empiricism (empirical praxis) has many historical manifestations and culminations, it also has one classic coherence which is open, I believe, to closer examination. Interestingly, Karsten extended the origin of empirical praxis to the sophists and Aristotle. Thus, the following survey presents the scholars whom Rafael Karsten considered the most influential in developing the ideas of empiricism.

According to Karsten, the empirical spirit or enlightenment was originally developed amongst the Greek sophists who “ushered Greek thinking onto a new course” (13). Nevertheless, Karsten underlined that it was the Greek philosopher Aristotle (who completed his education at Plato’s Academy) who was the real pioneer of empirical research. Karsten’s interpretation saw Aristotle as a “realist” who was less bound to metaphysics than Plato. This meant that Plato’s idealism was not equivalent to reality. (14.) With regard to Rafael Karsten’s explication it seems to be at least partly correct. A writer of the history of Western philosophy, W. T. Jones, has suggested that the prevailing tendency before Aristotle had concentrated on the rationalistic analysis of logical consistency. The interest in facts grew gradually and Aristotle was one of the pioneers in emphasizing empirical observation. I believe that the time when

Aristotle departed from the Academy after Plato's death (347 BCE) was the most crucial to the elaboration of his empirical thinking. Aristotle spent the years 347-342 BCE travelling and presumably obtained direct evidence of various animals which earlier had been construed in his mind through the accounts of travellers and narrations of old innkeepers. In his work *Historia Animalium* Aristotle described faithfully the anatomy and behaviour of various animals. Aristotle's empirical method was quite neoteric since it was based on painstaking interview (farmers and fishermen), recording and observation. Observation and recording occurred in the "field" whereas interview took place at "home" when the Armies of Alexander the Great sent traders from around the country to visit Aristotle. Obviously, the experiment was alien to Aristotle's empirical practice and that is what separates it from modern science. However, in modern anthropology interview and observation are, of course, more advisable features than organized experimental laboratory conditions which has been popular with social psychologists (Stanley Milgram's experimental views, for instance). It should be clear from these comments that Aristotle was a scholar who essentially developed the methodological virtues of the fieldworker, that is, his inclination to acquire authentic and veracious information, instead of exclusive logical deduction, opened the doors of empirical activity to the minds of following generations of scholars. (15.) Aristotle was a genius who roused the empirical spirit and ventured curiously to encounter the world. Paradoxically, the next great scholar with aspiration to emphasize the importance of experience and observation, Francis Bacon, considered Aristotle unproductive. Francis Bacon's empiricism ("knowledge is power") was generated in the atmosphere of the Renaissance. The period of the Renaissance took shape first in Italy from which it spread to Western and Northern Europe. Renaissance man had a growing self-assurance. Theology was no longer "the queen of sciences" and the human was described in terms of reference of secular reasoning (emerging individualism; human thought she could herself satisfy her needs). (16.) The reasons for the decline of theology were many. Firstly, one significant force behind the general change was the Crusades, which enlarged the world scope of humans. Secondly, humans took a fresh interest in natural science which meant, for instance, that Aristotle's natural science was no longer shunned as it was in Paris in 1210. (17.) On a symbolic level the "out of sight" botany of cloisters entered a new scheme of perusal. Thirdly, the new interest in natural science also meant the rise of universities. The university as an institution desired to be free from pondering merely theological problems. (18.) In Italy the Renaissance meant that the bishops lost their autonomous role as disseminators of knowledge. Perhaps the first sign of the emancipation of Renaissance man became visible in art. The classical themes of Greek culture anchored in Italy when the Greeks escaped to Italy after the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in 1453 (19). The bishops also lost their authority over art. The painter Michelangelo Buonarroti constructed his marble sculpture David which symbolized the Renaissance longing for a lost art of Greek and Roman times (20). However, Michelangelo's (1475-1564) *Last Judgement* and Raffaello Santi's (1483-1520) *The Holy Family with a Lamb* also clearly signified that painters were worried about the world becoming too corrupt and heretical. Admiration for the classical ambitions of antiquity, however, increased in people's

minds. Philosophers of history have suggested that the spirit of the Renaissance generated two separate groups: the humanists and the empiricists. The difference between these two factions derived from their aberrant style to acknowledge the legacy of antiquity. The humanists paid tribute to classical antiquity whereas the empiricists took a personal interest in nature. However, since scholars of former ages, antiquity, had developed an interest in nature and its observation (as we saw in Aristotle's case) the humanists also shortly began to pay attention to the relationship between human and nature. Gradually, the strained barriers between the two groups disappeared, due to the fact that their aims and interests seemed to be parallel. On the other hand, empiricists, like Francis Bacon, never became inspired by antiquity and its representatives. In spite of practising his duty as Lord Chancellor of England, Baron Verulam, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), also dedicated his career to science. Francis Bacon was knighted on the accession of James I but was convicted in 1621 for taking bribes. He was then removed from office. (21.) In the scholarly world, Francis Bacon has been described as the "intellectually most daring thinker" who struck dumb Voltaire and the French Enlightenment in wonder and surprise (when Voltaire visited England he wrote about Bacon) (22). On the other hand, Bacon has been presented as a "prophet" or "visionary" who was not a prominent or "real" scholar in the proper meaning of word (23). Furthermore, Bacon has been seen as a "self-conscious utilitarian whose dominant motive was power" (24). In response to these characterizations and events, it has to be asserted that "the Baconian Ideal" which was based on detailed observation of nature and its phenomena is an avowed empirical axiom even today (Bacon presented his basic assumptions of knowledge and induction in his book *Novum Organum* (1621)). Bacon never travelled around the country observing nature as Aristotle did, but grounded his empiricism in experiments on natural phenomena:

"And in order to test how much expansion, as well as compression, air may tolerate, I devised the following. I took a glass egg, with a small hole in one end of it. By sucking hard, I extracted air through the hole, and at once stopped up the hole with my finger, immersed the egg in water, and then took my finger away. The air [...] drew in as much water as was necessary to enable the air to recover its old sphere or volume" (25).

The most notable aspect of Bacon's empiricism is its intricate nature. Bacon had a lot to say but his perspectives of "great instauration" and "mind's idols" failed to explain empirical method as explicitly as Aristotle's writings. Bacon's fervour over induction made him reject the hypothetic-deductive approach, that is, Bacon criticized the method which was based on hypotheses. For a long time after Bacon's death, the British evolutionary anthropological school gave credit to Baconian induction and emphasized that a fieldworker studying the details of a culture, should be a *tabula rasa*, free from preceding hypotheses and root metaphors in the field. Later on, Bronislaw Malinowski's diagnosis of evolutionary anthropological method was that concealing personal feelings in the field is a fallacious procedure and that a certain self-analysis on the part of the fieldworker was permitted, even required. The roles of the preceding hypotheses were, thus, to be universal tools for raising

questions and addressing the inner expectations of a fieldworker. All in all, the contribution of Bacon's science to empirical research lay in his emphasis upon the inductive method, which meant a new method for "a full experience of instances" (26). Rafael Karsten used to read Bacon's *Works* (1857-1874) but mentioned him only *en passant* in his work "Filosofisk Etik" (1941). It is clear that Rafael Karsten considered John Locke a more significant empiricist than Bacon since, according to him, Locke's influence on the French scholars (Montesquieu, Rousseau and Voltaire) had been greater than Bacon's discoveries (27). Whether this is so remains an open question. However, it is clear that without Bacon's criticism of medieval science ("not by argumentation but from particulars" - "not by hypothetic-deductive method but from induction") the Empirical Spirit would have gone onward more gradually and perhaps less passionately. Undeniably, Bacon was a visionary whose motivation and reasoning washed the face of the empirical method. The point to be made here is, however, that it is enthralling that Bacon's success was based on criticism of the medieval world which fundamentally had made his empirical pursuit possible. A researcher of the medieval world, Friedrich Heer, has asserted (1993) that the philosophers of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, like the Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grossteste, influenced Bacon's assumptions although Bacon himself remained unconscious of it. In fact, it is amazing that on many occasions academic trends are concerned only with the time in which they emerge without paying serious attention to theories of the past. If Francis Bacon and other empiricists, like Leonardo, William Gilbert, and Galileo, had relied more upon the past, they would probably have acknowledged more explicitly that their scholarly heritage was inherited from the inductive investigations of the Oxford school of Grossteste, for instance. A member of the Oxford school, William Merle, observed the weather and kept a meteorological diary in Oxford between 1337 and 1344, Richard of Wallingford (1292-1335) developed measuring instruments through trial and error. The most stimulating figure of medieval science was perhaps the Franciscan *Roger* Bacon, who took the first steps in creating ideals of scholarly fieldwork and expedition by proposing to the Pope that the whole world (from Spain to the Indies) had to be mapped and studied. (28.) Thus, medieval science was not only formed by pontifical ideals and rules but by innovative action, which formed the theoretical principles for Bacon, Descartes and Newton (29). Clearly, as mentioned before, Francis Bacon provided a more philosophical and humanistic foundation for empiricism than his predecessors in England and France. If many scholars of the medieval world had been interested in converting the world to Christianity, Francis Bacon's empiricism took an ambivalent attitude towards religion ("[...] give to faith only that which is faith's") (30). Bacon asserted that, on the one hand, there was knowledge conferred by God, but, on the other hand, the world was based on the knowledge of *raison*, pure intellect. Bacon also claimed that the natural world was created by God, since nobody had dared to claim the opposite. Yet knowledge (which was also a road to power) made the human's rebellion against God possible, and also gave her the ability to refute the words of the Bible. (31.) Altogether, Bacon asserted that natural (not merely divine) knowledge was possible and it could be understood by observation (Bacon's view was similar to that of the empiricist William Gilbert's notion).

Six years after Francis Bacon's death, in 1632, one of the most able philosophers in the world, John Locke, was born in Pensford, England. Like Bacon, Locke, too, has been considered a philosophical "visionary" (32). When Locke was creating his philosophical theses, the world was gradually moving on to the age of the Enlightenment (1700-1800) when thinkers taught that science and the use of reason would improve the human condition. However, the world had changed already before Locke's birth. Copernicus (1473-1543) had presented his heliocentric hypothesis with uncertainty of the Church's reaction to it, while Kepler (1571-1630) had contoured his theory of elliptical orbits of planets (33). At the time, many scholars searched for support for their assumptions from mathematics and physics (René Descartes's mathematical model for instance). Then, the academic world, as noted in Bacon's case, discussed "reason" and its possibilities and dimensions in human nature. Mathematical exactness attracted scholars like Descartes, who aspired to elevate human reason to the source of infallible knowledge. John Locke adopted a less bigoted attitude towards the problem of "reason". Locke endeavoured to study the nature and origin of ideas believing that it was not possible to achieve absolute information on phenomena. Generally speaking, it was characteristic of the age of the Enlightenment that science became interested in the study of human culture. The interest in humanistic values generated new subject areas like psychology, economic and social history, sociology and comparative religion. (34.) The Enlightenment was born in England but attained fulfilment in the French philosophies of Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau. The philosophers of the Enlightenment insisted on innovations in political, religious and educational doctrine. The history of ancient Greece and Rome was substituted by teaching of natural sciences. Obviously, Rousseau's *Emile* (1762) with its pedagogy comprised what was typical for the humanism of the Enlightenment. Rousseau (1712-1778) also put forward his ideas by saying: "man is by nature good but corrupted by society" (35). In these passions of the Enlightenment, my aim is not, however, to discuss the whole of Locke's philosophy. On the contrary, I try to analyse only that part of his study which deals with his empirical emphasis. Rafael Karsten considered John Locke "the most remarkable English thinker of modern time" (36). Westermarck also developed an early enthusiasm for the philosophy of Locke (37). Obviously, Karsten appreciated not only Locke's social theories but also his empiricism. Locke had adopted an empiricist point of view as a young scholar studying chemistry and medicine. Gradually, he became "the most typical representative of English empiricism" (38). After becoming a member of Lord Ashley's household in London, Locke supplemented his theoretical education in medicine with clinical experience (39). Locke believed that all the ideas we have originate from experience and observation (40). Moreover, Locke emphasized the experimental (empiricistic) verification of knowledge. He was "a slave to the truth" who had inherited his empirical emphasis partly from Bacon. Interestingly, Locke read Bacon's "Novum Organum" in April 1697 and his work *The Conduct of the Understanding* (1697) was influenced by Bacon's views (41). But, as Bacon had his own troubles with the ideas of empiricism, Locke's philosophy also bore singularities. Above all, Locke had been considered a non-consistent empiricist thus his concept of "experience" has been seen as too ambiguous to be understood properly (42). However, Karsten felt Locke's

ideas of empiricism were a house built on rock. I suggest that Locke had a clear empirical tendency when he pointed out the importance of the concrete and practical instead of speculative theory based on non-common sense. Let us investigate this further. In my opinion, John Locke contributed to the development of ideas of empirical praxis (fieldwork) by undertaking his own “fieldwork” as a doctor. Locke’s chemical experiments and medical observations pushed empirical standards forward. In fact, when as a doctor he examined a patient suffering from a vague pain, he could not know exactly what was wrong with the patient and what his finding would be. Then, the situation in Locke’s medicine was analogous to the experience of a fieldworker undertaking her research in a distant culture. Hundreds of years ago, a surgeon or ethnologist could not exactly know what he would find and how he should behave in the face of a new, unexpected “finding”. In order to become a good doctor a scientist had to venture to meet the “unknown”. The notion that one could be qualified without experiment and observation was obsolete. Locke’s notion of *tabula rasa* (to receive only few ideas before birth) later became the ideal state of mind for the ethnologist who rushed to the jungles at the end of the 19th century. Then, anthropologists wanted to be intellectually naked in front of the “original”. In summary, Locke’s standards (although weak) of experience gave a significant impetus to the rejection of armchair anthropology in the 19th century.

Seven years after Locke’s death, David Hume was born in Edinburgh in 1711. Hume reformulated Locke’s theory of ideas and gave preference to skeptic empiricism which tried to explain that producing any evidence of a world outside man was unfeasible (43). To cut a long story short, Hume never collected his anthropological evidence by himself but used the information gathered by non-professionals (travellers, missionaries etc.) (44). Interestingly, E.B.Tylor and Rafael Karsten considered David Hume a classic authority in comparative religion. Since they discussed Hume more in terms of his anthropomorphic theory (from polytheism to monotheism) I set Hume aside as for empiricism and analyse him more in the context of evolutionism. After the 1850s and 1860s, Europe drifted to a new worldview when the dynamic and disruptive ideas of Marx, Feuerbach, Darwin, Wallace, Renan, and Buckle gained significance in public forums. Equipped with an interest in observation and collection, Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882) embarked in 1831 (thanks to the Professor of Botany, John Henslow, Darwin became companion to Captain Fitzroy on the HMS Beagle expedition to the Southern hemisphere) and undertook his five year’s world tour (45). Darwin’s passion to observe natural phenomena and gather biological collections made him an empiricist who differed from former naturalists speaking of ideas of growth and change (Lamarck and Lyell). During his trip, Darwin studied not only the species of the Galapagos Islands and fossils of Patagonia but aspired also to make observations on man (due to his theory of sexual selection, Darwin was interested in comparing the phenomena of flora and fauna with appearances of mankind). In March 1864 he stated to Wallace as follows:

“I can show that the different races have a widely different standard of beauty. Among savages the most powerful men will have the pick of the women and they will generally leave the most descendants. I have [...] a few notes on man [...]” (46).

It was Darwin’s inclination and resourcefulness to pay attention to the world outside, not only books, which made him renowned. Darwin claimed that it was not enough to read Lyell but “a man must for years examine for himself great piles of superimposed strata, and watch the sea at work before he can hope to comprehend anything of the lapse of time” (47). In June 1858 the young scientist Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) sent his report on natural selection to Darwin. A keen interest in flora and fauna had compelled Wallace, surveyor and architect, to undertake expeditions to Brazil and Indonesia. In 1848 Wallace and Henry Walter Bates travelled to the river Amazon (southern and northern banks) in order to study the flora of the rain forest. Wallace returned to Europe in 1852 but Bates stayed there another seven years gathering a collection of 8000 formerly unknown insects. In 1854 Wallace undertook a trip to Indonesia and stayed eight years in the Malayan archipelago studying the distribution of animals. (48.) Eight years in the field has to be considered zoologically and ethnologically a long period and thus Wallace’s achievement can be considered outstanding in terms of the conditions of that time. As with Darwin, an inherent element of Wallace’s science was the attempt to study plants (orchids) and animals (pigeons, parrots, monkeys, butterflies) in the field. But Wallace also observed man when trying to adapt the theory of sexual selection to a human case:

“In the very lowest tribes there is rarely much polygamy and women are more or less a matter of purchase. There is also little difference of social condition and I think it rarely happens that any healthy and un-deformed men remain without wife and children” (49).

Edward Westermarck corresponded with Wallace (Wallace wrote 14 letters to Westermarck between 1890 and 1892) and they discussed sexual selection. Later, Westermarck stated that Wallace was not only a scientist but also a scholar who visited the “savage tribes” of the Malay Archipelago and South America and recorded their customs (50). One might say that Westermarck’s suggestion ties Wallace to the origin of empirical praxis. Rafael Karsten saw that Darwin’s studies on man had acted as a source of cultural evolutionary thinking and, thus, it was a delusion to think about Darwin merely as a biologist, that is, Karsten respected Darwin’s empirical contribution to sociology (read: ethnology and comparative religion) (51). However, another British “apostle of evolution” Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) never undertook expeditions abroad, he was connected to the tradition of empiricism by his experiments in which he took an interest in his youth. Spencer stated that:

“[...] in August, 1835, I went home. There was, however, an additional pursuit, namely Chemistry; my experiments which are named in letters to Hinton” (52).

Alfred Russel Wallace described Spencer's non-metaphysical praxis as follows:

"I remember being greatly impressed by his Linnean Paper "On Circulation and the Formation of Wood in Plants". It shows what a lot of experiments he made, how constantly he appealed to the experimental method and how admirably he reasoned on it. I think that if Spencer had been less of a thinker and more of a specializer he could have rivalled Darwin as an investigator" (53).

Contrary to Wallace, Charles Darwin's attitude towards Herbert Spencer's works was somewhat incredulous. Evidently, Spencer's lack of fieldwork experience vexed Darwin:

"I have now read the last number of Herbert Spencer [...] it is wonderful clever, and I daresay mostly true [...] if he had trained himself to observe more, he would have been a wonderful man" (54).

Evidently, Spencer's depressive disposition and old-fashioned style were not suitable for vigorous packing of bags (55). Darwin and Wallace gathered plants abroad, brought them home and studied them with care. At home their empirical data was turned into the scientific study of nature and its species. Wallace especially liked to send plants to Darwin as a gesture of respect and admiration (56). Consequently, it was Darwin and Wallace who brought the lines of empiricism to a focus from the 1830s on and who were the first to make any systematic attempt to show that observation, recording, and data gathering were essential tools in conducting research. If we think, then, about the moment when empirical praxis properly attached itself to comparative religion, we have to begin with Edward Burnett Tylor (1832 - 1917) although his studies had considered mainly products of armchair anthropology (57). As is well known, Max Müller (1823-1900), was also "an armchair philologist". However, comparative religion did not become a science only in the achievements of "sofa-scholars". Roughly speaking, one hundred years ago the study on religion gushed from three sources; firstly, the missionaries who worked with "heathen natives" reported on indigenous people and their religion, secondly, followers of a particular religion or religious tradition gave an account of their cultural systems, and, thirdly, prominent "armchair scholars", whether theologians or humanists, who read a lot were eager to explain their views. This division became most visible in The First General International Meeting on Religion held in Chicago in 1893. The attention of the conference was focused on the comparative (historical) study on religion although the participants were a heterogeneous collection of scholars (theologians, philosophers, poets and so forth). It may be fruitful at this stage to briefly examine the distribution of the presentations at the conference:

Figure 4. *The distribution of presentations in 1893*

9 presentations by missionaries (China, Japan)	27 presentations by followers of a particular religion (Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, Taoists)	61 presentations by “armchair” theologians and humanists (about Christianity, the world religions and the nature of comparative religion)
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As the figure points out, the first international meeting on religion was merely based on lectures held by scholars on spontaneous ideas. Interestingly, there were only four presentations which directly pondered the “comparative study of world religions” (by C.D.D Harlez, C. P. Tiele, Josef Cook, and Max Müller). The lecture of Mr. Chandradat Chudhadharn, the brother of King of Thailand, on *Buddhism As It Appears in Siam* presented the discourses of the followers of a particular religion, and the speech of Pastor, L. M. Gordon (missionary and teacher in Japan) on *Some Peculiarities Among Buddhism* exemplified the missionary ethnography. (58.) Although comparative religion came in for a good deal of positive commentary and effort by the participants of the conference, it was only Tylor who emphasized the need for a scientific empirical praxis in the study of religions. Tylor was a self-educated scholar whose correspondence with Edward Westermarck guided the latter to the methodology of British social anthropology. In ethnography Tylor was an academic prodigy, since, firstly, he was able to create a successful scientific career without an academic degree, and, secondly, he was able to maintain his academic position throughout his life, although he did not publish anything significant for almost forty years. Tylor’s self-educated background was not a peculiar phenomenon in relation to the position of ethnological study in the mid-19th century. On the contrary, Tylor’s lack of a degree was natural, since in the mid-19th century it was impossible to have a degree in anthropology in Britain. On the other hand, many early ethnologists, like the American Lewis Henry Morgan, had a previous academic degree in various subject areas, like philosophy and science of law. Much more peculiar than Tylor’s non-professional starting point, was his way to forsook academic writing already in 1881, when his last study *Anthropology* was published. The ulterior motive of Tylor’s behaviour is complex, but perhaps he wanted (and had to) to make room for the studies of a generation of “CAETS” (“Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits”) who furthered anthropology (and also comparative religion) by going into the field and becoming trained observers. Edward B. Tylor published his first ethnological outline *Anahuat; or Mexico and Mexicans: Ancient and Modern* in 1861 (59). As a consequence of health problems, Tylor travelled to Mexico at the age of twenty-four. In a bus in Havana, Tylor met a young archaeologist named Henry Christy who invited him to join his expedition to study the ancient graves of Perigord in Mexico (60). The trip stimulated Tylor’s mind and he became interested in the prehistory of humankind. In 1874 Tylor published *The Stone Age, Past and*

Present which traced “the Mexican connection down to Nicaragua, and perhaps even to the Isthmus of Panama” (61). Despite the fact that Tylor travelled in Mexico, developed comparative method in anthropology by making tabulations and classifications mainly based on *Notes and Queries* (circular of inquiry among officers, missionaries, travellers and others edited by Horatio Hale), and established a committee for investigating the physical characters, languages, and social condition of the North-western Tribes of the Dominion of Canada, he was not a scholar with an imperative urge to conduct field research. (62.) Tylor’s “armchair ethnography” presumably stemmed from the premature nature of his “rational ethnography” - that “in many branches the investigations are so recent that they can hardly be said to have a history, and in some cases their originators are still alive”, as A. C. Haddon put it in 1910 (63). Thus, it was fairly natural that the early experts sat on the sofa since their young subject areas were lacking the historical paragons to copy in thinking up field research. To them was left the task of creating the first general principles of doing ethnology. Thereupon, Tylor’s aspiration to improve anthropological study by emphasizing the importance of anthropological education at home was pioneering (64). Tylor considered that the acquaintance of the observer with a particular “tribe” had to be “intimate as well as kind” (65). Tylor admired the fieldwork of the American L.H. Morgan (1818-1881) who as a pioneer of American ethnological sociology was in fact ahead of his British colleagues. To be exact, Morgan published his work *League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nes, or Iroquois* (1851) ten years before Tylor’s “Anahuat”. Tylor also familiarized himself with American ethnological tradition by co-operating with the United State government’s Bureau of Ethnology (66). The father of Cambridge anthropology, Alfred Cort Haddon described Tylor’s significance as follows:

“Ethnologists were accused of basing their conclusions on the most fragile evidence, collected from most untrustworthy sources. To remove this reproach was the work of Professor Tylor. Tylor’s books are graced by such a charming literary style and quiet humour that they have become “classics”, and have profoundly influenced modern thought” (67).

Max Müller, although influenced by the German Romanticism of Goethe and Schiller, also esteemed Tylor:

“[...] it would be of much advantage and interest to the university (Oxford) that your views on anthropological subjects should be brought forward here by yourself in person” (68).

For Rafael Karsten, Tylor was a scholar of seminal importance although it can be seen that Karsten’s fieldwork training was grounded on Haddon’s (and Westermarck’s) supervision. Karsten realised that Tylor’s significance lay in his intelligence to emphasize the importance of empirical material in cultural studies. Karsten’s admiration for Tylor was so strong that he was not concerned about Tylor’s “armchair” orientation:

“That anthropology has to be grounded on empirical material was for Tylor a matter of course. He did not only undertake a trip to Mexico but also conducted comparative study of nationalities, based on topical ethnological literature [...] Tylor is a classic [...]” (69).

One of the most promising students and a follower of Tylor’s folklore studies, Alfred Cort Haddon (1855-1940), attached his mentor’s theories to the present and practice by undertaking the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits Islands in 1898 (with the psychologists W.H.R. Rivers, William McDougall, and Charles Myers, the amateur philologist Sidney Ray, trainee in field anthropology Anthony Wilkin, and medical pathologist Charles Seligman). Haddon had visited the Islands of the Torres Straits already in 1888 when his research interest was in marine zoology, especially in the formation of coral reefs. Haddon was a Darwinian zoologist whose early life was filled with the study of marine biology at the zoological station at Naples, for instance (70). Haddon travelled to the Torres Straits as a result of his own decision, which originated in his desire to escape the duties of a provincial professorship. Of course, the earlier visit of his friend Thomas Huxley to the islands on the H.M.S. *Rattlesnake* influenced the choice of fieldwork site. When in the island of Mabuag in 1888, Haddon became interested in ethnographical study when sitting around the campfire with missionized natives who answered Haddon’s questions in pidgin as to what life had been before the arrival of the white man. Stocking (1995) has suggested that at that time Haddon’s background in anthropology was “virtually nil” (71). In every case, when Haddon left Mabuag his zoological concern had already turned to anthropology. Furthermore, the results of his expedition were published in the prestigious “Journal of the Anthropological Institute”. Generally speaking, it was not until twenty years later that Haddon gave his resolute definition of anthropology as a “science on man which includes two different branches of science: *anthropos* or *homo* which studies human as such and *ethnos* or *socius* which studies human as a member of society”. (72.) By 1897, Haddon’s scope of study had broadened to include the psychology and sociology of “primitive” peoples (73). In 1898 Haddon defined the nature of the Cambridge expedition as follows:

“For the first time trained experimental psychologists (Rivers, McDougall, and Myers) investigated by means of an adequate laboratory equipment a people in a low stage of culture under their ordinary conditions of life” (74).

Due to his aspiration to make a comprehensive study of the customs of the Islanders, Haddon assembled a league of scientists representing various areas. The group began their historical endeavour with modern recording equipment in winter 1898. The work was began on Murray Island in the eastern straits. Later, Haddon, Ray, Wilkin, and Seligman travelled to Port Moresby, the Kiwai district, Mabuag, Saibai, Sarawak and Borneo. It has been suggested that Haddon received much of his information at second hand - by questioning the government officers living in the islands. At any rate, the statistical comparative method of Tylor had receded and the new era of the “field anthropologists” had begun. In conclusion, Haddon’s

“Expedition” was a turning point in the history of British social anthropology and thus its significance in the dawning history of comparative religion was vast. Of course, it could be stated that Walter Baldwin Spencer’s and Frank Gillen’s encounter in the central Australian desert meant a brand new phase in history of social anthropology, but whether we could call it a breakthrough to Karsten’s study of religions receiving empirical impulse is very doubtful. Actually, the ready answer to this is: if the front-runners are Baldwin Spencer and Alfred Haddon, the undoubted winner is Haddon and his “Cambridge School”. However, what makes this more complex is that we must recall that Edward Westermarck undertook his first fieldwork trip to Morocco at the same time that Haddon travelled to the Torres Straits in 1898. Thus, Westermarck has to be considered a pioneer of ethnological fieldwork (Haddon probably first introduced this term) on a domestic and international level. I believe that while Tylor had been a respected mentor for Westermarck, Haddon acted more as a comrade and colleague (Haddon assisted Westermarck in getting a research post in the London School of Economics). Unexpectedly, Westermarck abstained from mentioning Haddon or his work in his autobiography. Edward Westermarck’s trip to Morocco to study the rituals and beliefs of the Arabs and Berbers stemmed from the idea that experiences in the field were an essential qualification for an academic career. In his autobiography “Minnen ur mitt liv” (1927) Westermarck told about his love for nature and his longing for distant cultures. To illustrate, let us examine which events finally integrated Westermarck into the excellent group of pioneers of fieldwork. I have collected the feelings of his autobiography into one story (I have used the English translation of Westermarck’s autobiography although it is slightly dissimilar to the Swedish edition. For instance, Rafael Karsten is mentioned in the Swedish edition but is absent from the English translation. Here, I have added to the English translation some points, especially concerning Hjalmar Neiglick, which are mentioned in the Swedish version but are absent from the English edition):

“When, at the end of a month’s expedition, I passed a night at Helsingfors, and was awakened in the morning by the clatter outside in the streets, I felt a sudden despair that forced me to dash out of bed [...] it was a moment when my love of nature and a life in the open reacted like a flash of lightning against city and indoor studies [...] Even at this age I harboured an earnest wish to be able some day to travel to distant lands to study primitive tribes [...] on the other hand I felt much attracted by the empiricism of the English school of philosophy [...] I knew Neiglick from my childhood [...] in meetings of “Filosofiska föreningen”, he spoke up for empiricism against metaphysics. From autumn 1888 on, I met him quite often [...] at the end of October I went to England [...] when, however, I visited Tylor in Oxford he proposed my offering it (book) to MacMillan & Co [...] amongst all of whom we might have thought, there was no one whom I more admired than this great veteran of Darwinism (Wallace) [...] he was not only a naturalist, but had also stayed for long periods amongst savage races in the Malay Archipelago and South America [...] I had done with the proofs towards the middle of June. As a matter of habit I again turned my steps to my desk in the British Museum [...] I

took out a map and looked for the most out-of-the-way spot in the British Isles. My eyes fell on a little point in the Atlantic Ocean [...] the Shetland Islands. That was where I would spend my holidays! I had had enough of city life, and was longing to get back to nature [...] with the coming of spring I began to make plans for the summer, and my thoughts turned towards Iceland [...] when I mentioned the matter to my friend, James Sime, he expressed his astonishment that I had never turned southwards; why did I not go to Italy? Yes, why not? [...] in the middle of March I took the shortest route to Milan [...] Florence, Rome, Naples, Pompeii, Sorrento, and Capri [...] when summer came - this was in 1894 - I again went to London to continue my work; but in the middle of August I took three weeks' holiday and spent them in Switzerland [...] for Christmas 1897 I was invited by my old friends [...] but my Christmas journey turned out much more than a pleasant recreation for me, since it proved one of those occasions when pure chance exercises an important influence on one's life. I had thought of going in the spring to Tunis to get some personal experience of a Mohammedan people [...] when I chanced to mention my intention to Mrs. Goodison, she said that she had just had a letter of delight written under the shade of orange-trees at an hotel outside Tangier. Yes, Morocco was, of course, infinitely more interesting than Tunis [...] Mrs. Goodison added that amongst the officials at the British Museum there would surely be someone who could give me a letter of introduction to an Englishman in Morocco. And soon I found that she was right [...] I had originally only looked upon Morocco as one stage on my way, and intended afterwards to go on to Ceylon, the South Sea Islands, and Heaven knows where. But that journey was never to come off. I meant to return to Morocco, learn its language, and become as familiar as possible with its people. That was a big enough task for me; better much about little than a little about much [...]" (75).

Given these thoughts, Westermarck disclosed, in my opinion, not only the matters but also individuals who influenced his empirical praxis, that is, his Moroccan ethnological studies. Firstly, Westermarck was driven by his strong, even insatiable instinct for the open air, nature, and walking tours. I believe that this drive made him despise mere indoor studies. Secondly, he was inspired by the empirical underlinings of the Finnish philosopher Hjalmar Neiglick, and the British scholars E.B. Tylor and A.R. Wallace. Hjalmar Neiglick (1860 - 1889) was the first Finnish scholar whose doctoral thesis was based on psychophysical laboratory research. Although Neiglick's laboratory research, done in the German Wundt's laboratory, depicted the tradition of experiment within empiricism, his influence on Westermarck's study on history of cultural phenomena was explicit (76). Interestingly, Westermarck's encounter with Alfred Russel Wallace seems also to have been a strongly emotional moment:

"But one afternoon on my return from my work the servant announced that an old gentleman was sitting waiting for me. He introduced himself as Wallace, and as I stood there face to face with the great naturalist, I was overcome by such deep reverence that at first I could scarcely utter a single word" (77).

Thirdly, Westermarck's various journeys around Europe prepared him for more extensive adventures. And, finally, the courage of Mrs. Goodison's friend to visit Tanger, proved to be a moment of eureka in Westermarck's ethnological career. After 1904 Edward Westermarck was a lecturer in sociology at the London School of Economics. At the same time, Haddon and Rivers gave lectures to a new generation of academically trained anthropologists in Cambridge.

To conclude, the main inspiration underlying Karsten's enthusiasm for empirical praxis was the universal view, from Aristotle to Westermarck, that a thesis must be verified empirically. Moreover, theories put into practice in Morocco and the Torres Straits also intensified Karsten's longing for the field (yet it has to be taken into account that these elements were not unequivocally similar to the reasons why Karsten chose South-American studies). The story of Karsten's fieldwork and its techniques is deliberated in Chapter Five.

Positivism The aim of my analysis of the history of positivism is to deal with the rise of social sciences in France and in Britain in the 18th and 19th century. By knowing the intellectual endeavours of French and British positivists, it becomes possible to understand the wake of this philosophical system in Finnish academic circles at the end of the 19th century. The aftermaths of the French Revolution in Europe reached Finnish scholars quite late. In fact, it has been suggested that the students of the Academy of Turku were not affected at all by the revolution in Paris (the Academy of Turku was the precursor of the Alexander University; after the great fire of Turku the Academy was moved to Helsinki in 1828) (78). At that time, a small club called *Pro Natura Society* approvingly followed the events in France but never aspired to become a visible opinion leader (79). It is somewhat peculiar that the Finnish intelligentsia who shared anti-monarchist views (the War of Russia 1788-90) did not pay more attention to the anarchy of the French. Klinge (1967) has suggested that this mainly resulted from the fact that the students of Turku lacked a strong intellectual leader. Henrik Gabriel Porthan (1739-1804), who was a prominent opinion leader of the Academy of Turku, was a great friend of sound freedom but at the same time unwilling to accept the change which took place in the French Revolution when the Jacobin terror broke out. After Porthan's death, the students of the Academy of Turku received their influences mainly from German idealistic philosophy. (80.)

Positivism was a child of the Enlightenment but also the age of Industrialization. Positivism had taken only its first steps when the age of the Enlightenment changed into a complex of social and economic changes. Obviously, the rise of positivism (Montesquieu, Rousseau) correlated with the general nature of the Enlightenment. After that, the development of positivism can be viewed more or less as an outgrowth of somewhat independent social-scientific thought. However, the Enlightenment always lasted as the haunting inclination in the story of positivistic thought. In my opinion, the term positivism refers to two matters. Firstly, it describes the scholarly method which placed emphasis on methodological unity,

mathematic exactness, and causal explanation, whereupon the causal-mechanistic method was also applied to the humanistic branches (a system concerned with positive facts and phenomena). However, the ideals of positivism were not only synonymous with phenomenalism but regarded theology as an imperfect system of knowledge. Positive philosophy had also a certain correspondence to agnosticism. Positivists believed that it was meaningless either to affirm or deny the existence of God. However, I found it troublesome to specify whether French or British positivists were *de facto* agnostic. Firstly, the factual understanding of their spiritual life would have necessitated an exhaustive biographical analysis. Secondly, it is hard to define the nature of the Enlightenment and Industrialization and decide how to describe them? Who were the “real” positivists of the Enlightenment and Industrialization? Although people of the Enlightenment were on the threshold of the new and the modern, their world consisted of medieval elements which meant that the Church and Christian faith still dominated European intellectual life. However, the journeys of exploration and all kinds of geographical investigations of unknown regions gradually broadened the minds of people; for example, William Dampier’s studies in New Guinea in 1700. Moreover, it was in fashion to read works of travel writers as Rousseau did. (81.) During the Enlightenment, many scholars were deists who rejected supernatural revelation and believed in the existence of God on the evidence of reason and nature. Thus, by rationalizing religion, the deists tried to strike a balance between Christian and naturalistic views. At the same time that the deists built their rationalistic mental structure, there were scholars who totally denied the existence of a deity or of divine beings and could, thus, be characterized as atheists (Julien de la Mettrie and P. d’Holbach). (82.) Overall, the scholars of the Enlightenment aspired to grow in tolerance towards religion. In the following analysis I have not paid attention to the religious attitudes of the scholars of the Enlightenment but have instead examined the religious stands of scholars of industrialization, Comte, Mill, and Spencer, since they are regularly presented as agnostics or atheists. This also assists me in analysing whether Karsten’s agnosticism permeated through any of them. Overall, Comte, Mill, and Spencer were eye-witnesses to the industrialization and economic growth which flourished in Europe at the end of the 18th century. By the industrial and commercial advance there was plenty of educational progress which culminated in establishing new schools. By the end of the 19th century, European governments were developing preliminary schooling systems to decrease illiteracy. As a result, the increased literacy generated “mass receptivity” which meant that various ideologies were more easily spread among people. Furthermore, facilitating the access to education meant trouble for the Church, which was no longer the dominating opinion leader. Anti-clerical tendencies gained strength and this directly influenced the rise of the social sciences. Society was, perhaps, more explicitly than ever an “organization of movement and profit”. (83.) Nevertheless, the belief in advancement, whether universal or social, was not typical of all members of society. Interestingly, Comte and Spencer adopted a circumspect attitude towards advancement (to talk about progress in this context would be erroneous since Spencer drew an analogy between evolution and progress). In all, positivism had a different role in the salons of France than in the public houses and mansions of Britain. In France, the

philosophical system of positivism received more anti-religious implications than in Britain. The following analysis is mainly written from Rafael Karsten's point of view, that is, how Karsten understood the emergence of positivism. Of course, the analysis is also coloured by my historical interpretation.

As mentioned above, it is possible to position Rafael Karsten's study of religions in French and English positivism. Of course, humanist thought was also developed outside France and Great Britain, but it is reasonable to suggest that the episodes taking place in France since 1730 were essential qualifications for the rise of social theory universally. In general, modern theories of the state appeared in Germany later than in France and Great Britain (84). By leaning on Heilbron's (1995) outlook, it becomes evident that the rise of sociology and positivism in France was threefold. Firstly, with the emergence of the Enlightenment society moved towards insight which considered religion problematic. Then, the emphasis lay in the understanding of human nature. I call that period "reaching *société*" (1730-1775). The most prominent figures of "social theory" at that time were Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau. Secondly, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the social order was shaken by industrial mechanisation, the maturing of the autonomous nation-states of Europe, and the growth of a complex market economy (85). Scholars then began to contemplate the problems of social order from an explicitly scientific angle. This period can be considered as recognising new means of "conceptualizing social science" (1775-1814). The most prominent social scientists of this time were Condorcet and Cabanis. In the third period scholars like Saint-Simon and Comte were reaping the harvest of their precursors, and developed their sociological insight further. In practice, social science had turned from novice speculation into a brisk presentation of different approaches. I call that period "diversification of sociology" (1815-1850). In Great Britain, sociological positivism was connected to the tradition of empiricism but was also a legacy of Comte. The main figures of English positivism were John Stuart Mill (positivistic nominalism) and Herbert Spencer (positivist organicism). Mill's and Spencer's positivism shared a common podium. Both of them were sharp enough "to see clearly what was wrong with Comte's work in certain directions" (86). However, Spencer acquainted himself with Comte via Mill (87). Mill presented his ideas of positivism most clearly in his study *System of Logic* (1843) which in a Comtean manner outlined science according to "general laws" (88). Herbert Spencer's endeavour to connect the ideas of positivism to evolutionism generated a trend called "social Darwinism" (a conceptually contradictory term).

Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu's (1689-1755) status in the history of sociology is somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand his arguments of "state and law" made it easier for Saint-Simon and Comte to present their concepts of society. But, on the other hand, the fact that on a conceptual level he kept silent on modern social theory and reduced the meaning of society to merely "nation" or "country" does not inevitably grant him the status of a great social scientist (although Karsten considered Montesquieu an actual *sociologist* among the

early French philosophers of the Enlightenment) (89). However, there is no doubt that Montesquieu succeeded in integrating politico-legal theories with the insights of moral theories (90). This was the stimulus for the birth of the social theory of Condorcet and Cabanis. Furthermore, an expression of Montesquieu's ability to think in new ways was his suggestion, made in his work *L'esprit de lois* (1748), that laws, administration, and societies differed from each other according to different geographical and religious circumstances. Rafael Karsten believed that the geographical school of German Friedrich Ratzel was explicitly based on Montesquieu's views (the Finnish scholar of religion, Uno Harva, was connected to the "Ratzelian-Graebnerian-Schmidtian" tradition) (91). In the period of Montesquieu, rational enquiry with searching for reason became popular, while English reformation policy was supported by intellectuals tired of the absolute monarchy of *Le Roi Soleil* (92). In fact, Montesquieu was Locke's disciple. According to Heilbron (1995), the major theoretical problem of Montesquieu's period was "how to reconcile the diversity of the phenomena with the belief in universal principles" (93). Another disciple of Locke was the handsome and aristocratic French philosopher Francois de Voltaire (1694-1778) whose most significant ideas were, perhaps, generated during his three year's exile in England. Voltaire was the thinker who came to question the time of faith and order, that is, his law of tolerance and absence of prejudice represented the Reason of the Enlightenment which displaced theology and saw religion as an enemy to rational optimism. (94.) Although Voltaire detested the Catholic Church, which he considered the strongest opponent of the Enlightenment, he had a positive attitude towards "religion" in general (95). Voltaire's attitude towards "religion" guided later the attitudes of Herbert Spencer and Rafael Karsten: to denounce Christianity or its dogma did not mean to abandon interest in "religion" as such. According to Karsten, Voltaire was the hero of the age of the Enlightenment, having regard for social deprivation, which was seen as the worst opponent of intellectual freedom of an individual. Like the other scholars of the Enlightenment, Voltaire, too, had lost his faith in the French state. By advocating equality, Voltaire generated ideas of "modern" criminal law which ought to have been a death blow to the old barbaric system. Unmistakably, Voltaire was one of the founders of philosophy of law. (96.) Rafael Karsten devoted two articles to cherishing and generating Voltairean (and Montesquieuan) ideas of criminal law and the development of the idea of humanism (studies on the development of the idea of humanity (1906) and the ethics of the punishment (1909)).

Voltaire with his *philosophes* was a significant intellectual of the Age of Reason, but Rousseau (1712-1778) can also be claimed to have had an influence on eighteenth and nineteenth-century sociology. In general, Rousseau's perplexing philosophy has not been received with unqualified approval by scholars. I suggest that Rousseau more than anyone else kept his vision on emotion as a natural and autonomous part of a human's intellectual life. Perhaps Rousseau's philosophy was more the psychology of archaic emotions than anything else. One aspect of Rousseau's "psychology" was his aspiration to study the human's own self love (*amour-de-soi*), the natural goodness of man, and "originality" of man (what is natural in

man) (97.) Rafael Karsten criticized Rousseau's "natural mind" which "led him to romantically idealize the natural state" (98). Of course, Rousseau had his somewhat roseate ideal image "Emile" but what he, perhaps, most desired to elaborate in his works was the theme of the human, whether "primitive" or "civilized", as a "social man" whose emotions were natural innate passions (99). By leafing through Tylor's and Karsten's source material, it becomes obvious that Rousseau was not the most revolutionary force for the cultural evolutionistic school. Yet, it is clear enough that his ideas of "Natural" influenced Tylor, who saw primeval man as "a rational and scientific philosopher". Nevertheless, Karsten shouted Rousseau slogans more carefully, seeing "primitive" people as unfortunate:

"The romantic dream that mankind ought to be brought back to the state of nature as being the most happy one was due to a great error. Uncultured man is not happy at all" (100).

But then again, Gunnar Landtman's sociology took shape according to Rousseau themes just as soon as his monograph was published under the title *Kiwai Papuans of British New Guinea: A Nature-Born Instance of Rousseau's Ideal Community* (1927). To take briefly into consideration Rousseau's concept of society, we can state that his most significant thesis of the (ideal) state was presented in *The Social Contract* (1762) which formed a basis for his whole social theory. Rousseau's conceptions of the just legislator, supreme administration (*volonté générale*) and the Civil Religion evidently contributed to French social theory. His suggestions that "there is absolutely no original perversity in the human heart[...] society perverts men" was subtly parallel to John Locke's view of the newborn as a *tabula rasa* but deviated from it in its foundation (101). Rousseau assumed that a human was naturally, spontaneously good but it was the state that demoralized many of its members (whether a human was necessarily perverted, is in the Rousseau context laborious to analyse, and thus I ignore it here). What Rousseau then did in practice, was that he gave voice to French revolutionists who on the barricades borrowed their slogans from his "Contract" (102).

Twenty-three years after Rousseau had published his "Contract" and "Emile", Condorcet presented his synthesis of politics and history in *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* which was published posthumously in 1795 (103). Who was Condorcet anyway and what was his significance to the birth of social theory and positivism? In a very general sense, Condorcet was a mathematician who aspired to introduce probability calculation into moral sciences, that is, his endeavour was to mathematize the humanities. He was the first to integrate the natural sciences and social theory. Rafael Karsten saw that Condorcet's reasoning augured well for the rise of positivism. Condorcet's ideas would have been quite futile without the assistance of Turgot, who was Minister at that time. According to Heilbron (1995), Condorcet's and Turgot's friendship generated social theorizing by connecting mathematical ideas to the views of reform policies. Condorcet (and his colleagues) was the first to introduce the term "science sociale" (analogous to "moral science") in the year of French Revolution 1789. Later, the English term "social science" was derived from

Condorcet's works. (104.) According to Karsten, it was worthwhile to point out that Condorcet was the first to accentuate that "civilizations were subordinated to successive progress", that is, every period influences the eras that follow (105). After Condorcet, the physician Pierre Cabanis (1757-1808) dealt with the social science. A very important part of Cabanis's ideology was to make social science qualitative. He was shocked by Condorcet's quantitative approach which subordinated the human sciences to mathematics. As a physician, Cabanis could not completely deny the meaning of the natural sciences to the "life sciences". On the other hand, Cabanis believed that the natural sciences could "conveniently" be merged with theories of society. Since Rafael Karsten kept silent of Cabanis in his history of sociology, I do not analyse him further here.

According to Karsten, the actual founder of positivism was Count Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, le Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825). The life of Saint-Simon was flamboyant. During Saint-Simon's youth, his aristocrat parents became so convinced of his wildness that they prevented him from moving outside home. Later, Saint-Simon became an officer in the French army and participated in the battle of Yorktown in North America. During the French Revolution, he was incarcerated by Robespierre, who believed that Saint-Simon was a foreign agent. In the period of Napoleon I, he became a common nuisance due to his habit of begging money from everyone. And, finally, he went bankrupt. At the same time, he began to believe that the scientists were in a conspiracy against him. Saint-Simon's anxiety finally put him in a hospital for the mentally ill, *Charenton*. There, he tried to commit suicide. After the restoration of the French monarchy in 1815, Saint-Simon became a publicist. At that time, he gradually began to generate his ideas of society. (106.) As is known, Saint-Simon's merit was to introduce the concept "industrial society" to French and the whole European social theory (*Industrial System*, 1821) (107). In general, Saint-Simon has been considered "the radical prophet of a new industrial order" (108). The most legendary mottos of Saint-Simon were: "All men must work" and "Each according to his capacity" (109). All this implied a "socialist" attitude towards the state; the Saint-Simonians wished the state could cease to exist ("stateless state") (110). Saint-Simon believed in universal progress which did not only affect science. In his theory of society, the basic principles were prediction and verification. This meant that the integral part of his positivism was a standard of empirical observation, that is, facts were verified by observation. Karsten believed that one of the most significant parts of Saint-Simon's positivism was his historical sense which considered the past and its heritage positively. Edward B. Tylor's demand that the ethnographers and historians should co-operate in order to develop deduction within comparative religion was, probably, inherited from Saint-Simon. (111.) Interestingly, some scholars have regarded Saint-Simon as a utopian whose ideas were partly composed by Auguste Comte (1798-1857), his personal secretary, while others have seen him as a visionary to whom Comte owed "a considerable intellectual debt" (112). There is no commonly agreed explanation of this historical enigma. Thus, it is, perhaps, reasonable to regard both as gifted visionaries. However, the fact that Saint-Simon was a close friend and mentor of Comte for seven years, supports the view that Comte's ideas of society

were not totally detached from Saint-Simon's insights. It would be interesting to know how much Comte's "law of the three stages of knowledge" owed to Saint-Simon, since when Comte formulated his idea he was still working for Saint-Simon (113). Auguste Comte has been widely considered a theorist who drafted "sociology" (114). As a general principle, Comte's positive philosophy was the opposite of Condorcet's and Cabanis's positivism. While Condorcet and Cabanis emphasized the imitation of methods of natural sciences, Auguste Comte's positivism formulated a general theory of science which said farewell to metaphysics (115). Comte's work was accomplished mainly after the period of ascendancy of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821). Napoleon's reforms were not only administrative or legislative but were also related to the sciences. Napoleon, in spite of being a conqueror, had lost his heart to natural sciences and promoted its interests eagerly. It has been said that Napoleon was too busy for the social schemes of Saint-Simon (116). Evidently, Napoleon rejected the study of social sciences since it would have been ungraceful for the vanquisher to be interested in the differentiation or social circumstances of the vanquished. Auguste (former Isidore) Comte was a genius whose works, however, never caused ecstatic reactions in France (as did those of Condorcet and Montesquieu). Comte's life story is one of the most piteous in scholarly history. One of the best students at Napoleon's new *Ecole Polytechnique* never received a permanent academic position (117). Multifarious troubles of life caused him three serious nervous breakdowns and in 1827 he tried to commit suicide (118). All his life Comte suffered from low self-esteem and was sometimes desperately lonely and isolated although he believed that "an isolated individual was a mere abstraction" (119). Auguste Comte's parents were Catholics in a bourgeoisie spirit (the axiom of upbringing was: obedience, conformity, and certain parsimony) (120). However, Comte lost his Catholic faith at the same time as he met Saint-Simon. I am not sure about whether it is reasonable to call Comte an agnostic but at least his ideas of the "Religion of Humanity" were considered radical and shunned by Anglican Englishmen. Without a doubt, ebullient France treated Comte's ideas more indeterminately than conservative Great Britain. During his last years, Comte considered society a "Great Being" which in today's context could be equivalent to the swinging 1960s. At that time, Comte was a sort of messiah who preached universal love and harmony and believed that a human could be ennobled spiritually and that in the future women could give birth without sexual intercourse. (121.) Comte's anti-religious attitudes via J.S. Mill and Herbert Spencer influenced Rafael Karsten.

Let us examine Comte's work more profoundly. Comte's most significant ideas were not original as such. Firstly, his idea of positive philosophy was not thoroughly original since positivism as a concept had first emerged in France at the beginning of the 19th century. Furthermore, it is somewhat obscure whether we should at all discuss "positivism" in a Comtean context, that is, perhaps Comte's work was more related to the general theory of science. Heilbron (1995) has suggested that Comte was a positivist only "in the minimal definition of the word" since his "Cours de philosophie positive" was "not about the demarcation between science and metaphysics" but about "how developments in the various

sciences could be interpreted” (122). Secondly, Comte’s presentation of the three stages of progress (theological, metaphysical and positive) had originally appeared in the pamphlets of the French economist Jacques Turgot (123). Comte’s tripartite evolutionary theory also derived from Condorcet’s notion of successive social evolution and David Hume’s suggestion that “1700 years ago all mankind were polytheists” (124). First and foremost, Comte was an intellectual organizer who could give positivism a more cohesive appearance than his mentor Saint-Simon, whose works were prone to confused outlining (although Comte’s later writings are almost as badly written). It has been suggested that Comte borrowed the term, *science social*, from Charles Fourier (125). Perhaps, but he must have been also cognizant of Condorcet’s term *science sociale*. Rafael Karsten interpreted Comte’s positivism as follows:

“Comte asserts that the word “positive” had many meanings. It can indicate actual, when positive science is, above all, based on fact. It can mean productive in contrast to outdated and good-for-nothing. It can even indicate reliability [...]it also deals with exact assertiveness [...] and makes laws [...] furthermore, “positive” presents relative as opposite to absolute. In that light, Comte’s positivism and Fichte’s, Schelling’s, and Hegel’s metaphysics are opposites” (126). (my emphasis, in the original text the underlined words were italicized).

Rafael Karsten’s notion of the nature of Comte’s positivism is fairly plausible in taking into account that Comte’s sociology (read also: humanities) was based on biological notions which aspired to “microscopic” and “stethoscopic” accuracy in visual and auditory perceptions (127). Nevertheless, Heilbron (1995) has suggested that “by taking complexity rather than “certainty” or “exactness” as a criterion, Comte helped create a space for such new sciences as biology and sociology” (128). Furthermore, Karsten was right in claiming that positivism and metaphysics were opposites. As is known, Comte suggested that a general theory of science was generated only by working empirically, that is, the only logic was a general and empirical study of the sciences (refers to Comte’s seven sciences: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, physiology, sociology and morality) whereupon its results would be of importance to all sciences (129). In fact, Comte’s empiricism was not based on mere observation but real perception had also to be “interpreted by some theory”, that is, observed facts needed the guidance of a theory (this was materialized in Karsten’s work which combined “field knowledge” with cultural evolutionism) (130). Finally, Comte’s positive philosophy (does not refer to philosophy, since Comte was not interested in philosophy) was productive and pioneering in stressing that the task of sociology was not merely to imitate natural sciences but mathematicians and biologists could also learn from sociologists (131). As a result, the circulation of knowledge among sciences was the ideal state for Comte. Thus, it is reasonable to claim that Comte was never a reductionist to the degree of reducing sociological knowledge rigidly to the laws of the natural sciences (132). As a general rule, Comte set forth his ideas in the period of disciplinary specialization. In practice, this meant that scholars not only acted as researchers but also gave lectures on their research interests, that is, had

students. (133.) Although Auguste Comte was best in mathematics and conceivably biology was his vocation, his study of sociology (“Cours” 1830-42) can be considered an “early settler” of comparative religion (134). Preus (1996) has suggested that Comte treasured two theories of religion: firstly, he endeavoured to understand the emergence of religion in terms of historical analysis, and, secondly, he aspired to construct a new religion (135). It has been said that Comte’s ambition for a new religion was “proof of a certain madness” (136). Therefore, I suggest that what is more interesting for us is Comte’s idea of the tripartite history of mankind. Rafael Karsten analysed Comte’s “law of three stages” in his “History of Sociology” (1945) by paying special attention to theological stage which, he thought, characterized the way how “primitive” people perceived their world:

“A practical need compels primitive people to form a theory of nature, but their explanations are based on observations which are constricted by nature and thus fantasy plays the most important role in their definitions. The primitive people still live in a theological stage which Comte called fetishistic [...] a term which through Comte gained reputation among comparative religion. An important step onward occurs when people of lower cultures move from fetishism to polytheism. According to Comte, the transition to polytheism is the most significant line in a theological stage [...] in monotheism, which is the last phase of theological stage, there is a contradiction between the source from which explanation is obtained and the phenomenon which is explained [...] monotheism means transition to another great stage, metaphysical [...] in metaphysical stage explanation is not personal but bound to abstract ideas, principles, and forces. In positive stage [...] commitment to the fact is the only criterion” (137). (my emphasis, in the original text the underlined words were italicized).

As Karsten’s subtly cumbersome explanation tells us, the period of fetishism meant for Comte a stage when nature was discerned by the feelings of a human. In the period of polytheism a human began to sketch her world through a multitude of gods and spirits. Finally, in the period of monotheism, a human was connected to reality through her belief in the existence of one God (138). As Karsten hinted to us, Comte’s conception of a human living in a theological stage generated the tradition of searching for origins within comparative religion. Still, Comte was indebted to Hume and The President de Brosses in his assumptions. Before Comte, David Hume, with his logical, psychological or chronological “succession” (polytheism to monotheism), had orientated the world of the Enlightenment to search for early religion. Obviously, Hume’s proposal that human nature is historically universal caused him to draw the conclusion that religion was developed in accordance with general and omnipresent patterns. However, it was only Comte who updated the Humean search for origins in the social sciences (read: the study of religions). Secondly, Comte’s term “fetishism” originated in the considerations of de Brosses who in his work *Du Culte des dieux Fetiches* (1760) discussed “Fétichisme”. (139.) E.B. Tylor saw de Brosses as a “most original thinker of the last

century” (140). According to Tylor, Comte’s use of de Brosses’ term “denoted to a general theory of primitive religion” (141). Karsten believed, too, that with Comte’s theory, the term “Fétichisme” had become a natural part of the terminology of comparative religion. Owing to Comte, the scholarly atmosphere of the 19th and 20th centuries was thick with theories of the origins of religion (see Chapter 4.2.). Tylor appreciated the reasonings of de Brosses and Comte but felt it was “more convenient to use the word Animism” (142). Although Herbert Spencer criticized the views of Comte, he eagerly participated in the discussion of the origins of religion by proposing “manism” (the ancestor worship) to be the most primeval form of religion. Moreover, Tylor’s cultural evolutionary division or axis (“savage-barbarian-civilized”) directly reflected Comte’s (and also Morgan’s) model of a tripartite history of mankind. Rafael Karsten became a thorough-going Tylorian when he adopted animism as a prevalent explanation of the “origins”. However, Karsten was somewhat nonplussed by Comte’s tripartite division within theological stage. In 1935 Karsten stated that:

“Religious evolution has hardly any “stages” of religion which can be distinguished clearly one from another. It is still more impossible to draw a sharp line of demarcation between animism and polytheism” (143).

But, twelve years later he self-assuredly emphasized that “[...] evolutionists discussed the development from animism to polytheism and in a certain degree to monotheism” (144). The reasons for Karsten’s vacillating opinions are diverse. Obviously, Karsten initially rebutted Comte’s division after realizing in the field that animism and manism could be overlapping explanations. That made the “stages” of religion mercurial, that is, animism probably represented the most original form of religion but in a certain degree it had a co-existence with ancestor worship and pre-animism. Karsten changed his views, however, in the 1940s when he had to defend Tylorian ideas against Widengrenian (the Professor of Theology Geo Widengren) thoughts which discussed the development from pre-monotheism to pantheism or polytheism (145). Karsten was then compelled to revert, in order not to lose his theoretical credibility, to his most embryonic idea that the development was sliding simply from animism to monotheism. After all, Comte’s pre-Darwinistic “law of three stages” confused the minds of scholars of religion for decades and thus Comte was an ultimate precursor of a later scholarly attempt to find the origins of religion. It is important to see, however, that there was a difference between Comte’s and later scholars’ way of explaining the progress of religion: when the purpose of Comte’s “laws” was to “transitorily” understand how religion came into being, the other scholars, like Tylor and Karsten, attempted to fully establish the exploration of the origin within comparative religion by persistently hunting for historical sources of religion. I believe that although Comte was interested in “progress” and suggested that the entire past should be studied, he was not familiar with the real ideas of evolution and cannot, thus, be regarded as evolutionist (Darwin’s and Spencer’s works were not yet published). Auguste Comte’s co-operative intellectual purposes between natural scientists and humanists (I call it mutual knowledge interest), his views on social evolution, and his disbelief in real

observation without theory, made him the founder of “sociology” - the new science of society which later led to the formation of comparative religion.

John Stuart Mill (1807-1873) was a man with an ardent love of France. He had spent a year in France already at the age of 14. (146.) As is known, Mill knew and corresponded with Auguste Comte. Truly, Mill knew Comte’s work in detail and made his reasoning known in England (Mill gave laudatory comments on Comte in his *System of Logic* in 1843). In his *A Logical Critique of Sociology* Mill described Comte as “the only thinker who, with a competent knowledge of scientific methods in general, has attempted to characterise the Method of Sociology” (147.) But, Mill never accepted Comte’s views totally. In the 1860s Mill considered Comte’s psychological views “a big mistake” (148). But then again, Mill saw Comte’s historical method in the study of social phenomena as useful (149). Mill’s refusal to agree with Comte was due to their difference of opinion in discussion about logical criteria for argumentation (150). Roughly speaking, Comte’s philosophy of science was related to “method” (“Historical Method”) whereas Mill’s pondering lay not only in “method” but also in logical evidence (151). But what was Mill’s contribution to the elaboration of sociology and positivism? In a general sense, Mill’s conception of society dealt with the distribution of wealth, property, economic progress, the position of women, and the increase of the population. Rafael Karsten considered Mill first and foremost a “representative of the ethic of utilitarianism, who battled for individual freedom, the emancipation of women, and employment-related items” (152). Undoubtedly, these research interests were typical for Mill’s sociology. But, to discuss Mill’s influence on Karsten’s comparative religion is much more complex, since it is difficult to see which of Mill’s themes could be directly related to the study of religions. First of all, it is reasonable to suggest that Mill’s Victorian opposition to religion was inherited from Comte’s works. Nevertheless, it has been claimed that Mill was not totally or narrowly against Christianity but that he scrutinized all religions by not paying attention to Christianity alone. This is certainly true. Although Mill discussed liberal and secular education and wrote about atheism in his *Three Essays on Religion* (1875) he shared a sympathetic attitude towards the human’s religious quest. Furthermore, by reading his Christ-is-still-left comments, it could even be claimed that he was a religious man. Obviously, the conservative Anglican tradition of England influenced Mill who amicably presumed that “holding up in a Divine Person a standard of excellence and a model for imitation, is available even to the absolute unbeliever” (153). In my opinion, this sounds as if Mill had piously believed that even the remorseless “heretic” can find peace in Christ. But then again, many scholars have seen Mill as an obvious agnostic. For the most part, Mill’s conclusions on religion have to be seen as philosophy of religion which is distinct from the study of religions. But then again, his ideas of the “rational attitude of a thinking mind towards the supernatural” has to be considered invigorating. Mill believed that the attitude towards the supernatural, whether in natural or in revealed religion, was “that of scepticism as distinguished from belief on the one hand, and from atheism on the other” (154). Mill’s definition sounds somewhat vague taking into account that he did not explain “supernatural” further. To Karsten, the

notion of “supernatural” was far more problematic than to Mill, that is, Karsten stated that the notion of “supernatural” could not simultaneously be applied to both, “civilized” and “uncivilized” man, as Mill believed. In his dissertation “The Origin of Worship” (1905) Karsten stated as follows:

“It is a question much disputed whether savage peoples have, or have not, any notion of the “supernatural” [...] if by the word “supernatural” we mean only what is extraordinary and unforeseen to the savage mind [...] nothing, of course, prevents no one from using it with regard to savage notions [...] but if, on the contrary, we take this word in the sense which etymologically seems to be the most correct, one to signify something transcending or standing in opposition to the laws of nature, it cannot be applied to uncivilized man, for the idea of cosmic law is not grasped by him. I have, therefore [...] avoided using this expression” (155).

Thus, to Karsten, the supernatural was part of the “lowest religious ideas” only if it referred to “everything that seems strange and mysterious” (156). In addition, Mill’s division between the “thinking mind” and “the low stage” was a clear-cut inheritance from Comte’s history of mankind which later became explicit in Karsten’s belief that religion had been subjected to the law of evolution (157). On the whole, Mill analysed “religion” and “religious man” more comprehensively than Comte, who paid more attention to the position of theology. Interestingly, Rafael Karsten never explicitly discussed Mill’s influence on comparative religion and probably there was no reason for this since, due to his many-sidedness, Mill never even developed an encyclopaedic system of sociology. However, Mill’s main contribution to sociology and to the cultural evolutionistic school was that he not only emphasized the significance of psychology but also saw it in terms of the science of the laws of human nature. According to Mill, Comte denied “psychology the character of a science” and placed it “on a par with astrology” (158). Mill believed that “there exist uniformities of succession among states of mind, and that these can be ascertained by observation and experiment” (159). Mill’s “Science of Mind” offered a basis for Spencer’s and other social/cultural evolutionists’ psychological emphasis. Mill’s underlining of the study of mental phenomena in terms of evolution made Karsten in 1905 look at “religion from a natural history point of view” (160).

Certainly, a more significant figure for the rise of Karsten’s positivism within the study of religions was the British philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). In a very general sense, Spencer transferred biological evolution to a new stage: to a study of human society and its institutions as an organic whole, that is, Spencer endeavoured to make a scientific synthesis of the natural sciences and humanities. Since Spencer’s positivistic philosophy/sociology was a substantial part of his evolutionary thinking, it is laborious to analyse them separately. Hence, I discuss Spencer more in the next sub-chapter (“Evolution”). Yet, it is possible here to reflect Spencer’s concept of society and religion and his debt particularly to Comte. Herbert Spencer

was at the same time a fascinating and ambiguous scholar. Fundamentally, he was charming because of his scholarly self-effacement. Spencer despised worldly success and honours, and aspired to live for science. (161.) After 23 years in various boarding-houses in London, Spencer wanted to settle down at the age of sixty nine. Then, he moved to the house of two elderly sisters. The sisters recounted that Spencer refused to talk philosophy at home:

“Do they suppose I want to talk philosophy in my home? Such nonsense! Because I am a philosopher, am I not also a man? Fancy me marrying a philosophic woman! Why, that is the very last thing I should ever have done. Now what I like is clever nonsense” (162).

Frankishly, Spencer’s desire for inanity at home perhaps partly influenced his scholarly work and made it somewhat ambiguous. The truth is that already A.R. Wallace criticized Spencer for “obscure terminology” while Karsten described Spencer’s theories by saying “anything but convincing” (163). Today, many scholars have still regarded Spencer’s concept of society as “not very clear” (164). But then again, many of Spencer’s contemporaries considered his work “exceptionally noble” (165). Since Spencer’s “The Study of Sociology” and “First Principles” are very challenging to read, I have found it most useful to read him via commentaries by his contemporaries (Boutroux et al.). To try to comprehensively understand Spencer’s idea of society is puzzling. In his study on sociology, Spencer tried to establish “the possibility of Sociology”, as he himself put it. “The possibility of Sociology” formed the core of Spencer’s doctrine, namely, that there had to be a real conception of a social science and that attention had to be paid to the evolution of the organizations of societies (166). Furthermore, Spencer entertained an idea of “Science of Society” as a field which paid attention to “social growth, and the rise of structures and functions accompanying it” (167). That is why Spencer has been looked upon as one of the pioneers of sociological functionalism. However, Spencer had an irritating problem for years, namely, that the disciples of Comte connected him closely to the sociological heritage of their inspirer:

“The disciples of Mr. Comte think that I am much indebted to him; and so I am, but in a way widely unlike that which they mean. Save in the adoption of his word “altruism”, which I have defended, and in the adoption of his word “sociology”, because there was no other available word [...]” (168).

As Spencer put it, he was almost free of Comte. Interestingly, Spencer acknowledged having adopted the Comtean name “sociology” for lack of better definitions. Unfortunately, we shall never be able to know what Spencer’s choice would have been had there been other definitions available. On the other hand, it is surprising that a scholar who was independently able to generate the famous idea of the “survival of the fittest”, meekly approved the Comtean term. Furthermore, Spencer also stated in the Comtean spirit that “there can be no complete acceptance of sociology as a science, so long as the belief in a social order not conforming to natural law, survives” (169). As Spencer’s utterance points out, he explained sociology through

natural law. His principle of positivism appeared, perhaps, most manifestly in his analysis of the nature of social science:

“To [...] explain the nature of the Social Science, we must say that the morphology and physiology of Society [...] correspond [...] to morphology and physiology in general. Social organisms, like individual organisms, are to be arranged into classes and sub-classes [...] and just as Biology discovers certain general traits of development, structure and function, holding throughout all organisms [...] so Sociology has to recognize truths of social development, structure, and function, that are some of them universal, some of them general, some of them special” (170).

As a general rule, the core of Spencer’s positivism was to show the usefulness of the natural science (“Biology”) to social sciences (“Sociology”) (note Spencer’s capitals). Here, Spencer’s positivist impetus, evidently, sprang from Condorcet’s and Cabanis’s emphasis upon the imitation of laws of the natural science in social sciences. A precondition of Spencerian “Synthesis” was to base sociology and psychology upon a foundation of science, that is, Spencer found evolutionary perspective in psychology to be stimulating. As mentioned above, Mill’s “Science of Mind” was the impetus to Spencer’s psychological study. In 1864 Spencer wrote to A.R.Wallace:

“[...] I think that there are some purely physical modifications that may be shown result from the direct influence of civilization, yet I think it is quite clear, as you point out, that the small amount of physical differences that have arisen between the various human races are due to the way in which mental modifications have served in place of physical ones. I hope you will pursue the enquiry. It is one in which I have a direct interest” (171).

Later, Spencer also revealed that without Comte his study on principles of psychology would have remained unfinished. But, as mentioned above, it was Mill, not Comte, who entered the serious discussion of psychology within sociology, and, therefore, Spencer ultimately meant that his opposition to Comte’s views led him to work with the principles of psychology (172). Spencer also emphasized that his “Principles of Psychology” was published four years earlier than Darwin’s “The Origin of Species” and thus his ideas were conceived independent of Darwin (173). In the light of Spencer’s emphasis on his scholarly autonomy, it seems paradoxical that Karsten, when discussing Spencer as an English positivist in his “History of Sociology”, dedicated more space to Darwin as a pioneer of evolutionary sociology than to Spencer himself (174). Indeed, Darwin was interested in human affairs but it was Spencer who brought the law of development into a more universal focus, that is, Spencer’s analysis was more of the synthetic and Darwin’s of the analytical type (175). Typically for positivists, Spencer continued the tradition of empirical practice by conducting experiments (Spencer’s empiricism is set forth in sub-chapter “Empiricism”). What about Spencer’s concept of

religion then? As I understand it, Spencer's study on religion was a subdiscipline of his socio-psychology as a whole, that is, Spencer's concept of religion appeared through his concerns with human behaviour and society. I call Spencer's sociological and psychological study by one term "socio-psychology" since his concept of religion emerged through both of them (Spencer set forth his notion of the origin of religion in "Principles of Sociology" and his analysis of the ultimate religious ideas with indefinite vs. definite consciousness was launched in his discussion of psychology) (176). It has been said that theories of religion are not among the most important parts of Spencer's works. Furthermore, it is obvious that Spencer's writings on religion have not *in specie* influenced his reputation. I agree with the French scholar, Emile Boutroux, who in 1905 claimed that Spencer's work on religion "does not show any great originality" (177). This conception was also confirmed by Karsten who believed that Spencer's explanation of the origin of religion ("manism") plainly stemmed from the assumptions of the Greek philosopher Euhemeros (300 BCE) (178). Nevertheless, Spencer's "version of religion" is worthy of a brief analysis on this occasion (although I also discuss it in Chapter "Evolutionism").

Herbert Spencer's parents were devout Christians to whom religion was a matter of the highest importance. In spite of the piety of his childhood home, Spencer adopted an agnostic outlook on life. Spencer's agnosticism sounds complex when it maintains that the "Absolute" is "unthinkable" but we are not unable to affirm anything of it (179). The object of religion is "unthinkable" and "unknowable" which finds its form in our "indefinite consciousness". While science postulates the Absolute, religion ends in it. If science and religion endeavour to utter something definitive about the Absolute they enter "absurdity" (180). All his life Spencer vacillated between certain beliefs, professing, however, agnosticism as a main religious "conviction". Although Spencer rejected his childhood faith, he was interested in religions on a universal level. In his autobiography, he stated that he had a "genuine interest in religious subjects, and that this interest increased as years advanced" (181). In Spencer's case, it is, anyway, erroneous to discuss "unbelief" since he also considered agnosticism a religious attitude of mind. This indicated a certain theological determinism which had been ingrained in Spencer already as a member of family of preachers. Despite the fact that Spencer himself was quite uncertain about his ultimate religious attitudes, he emphasized the utilisation of a strictly objective method in the study of all sciences. Probably this pointed out that Spencer was anxious about the religious attitudes which could affect the way a scholar conducts scientific research. Rafael Karsten did not pay much attention to Spencer's concept of religion in his "History of Sociology" but discussed Spencer's notion of the origin of religion in his "Uskontotieteen perusteet" ("Introduction to Comparative Religion") (1931). In a general sense, Karsten's agnosticism reflected the same ideas as the views of Spencer. As mentioned in Chapter 2.2., Karsten was affected by the antitheological/religious views of positivists. Parallel to Spencer, Karsten's agnosticism was also quite relative in nature, that is, he rejected Christianity but not religion in general, and his enthusiasm for "religion" grew as the years passed. Moreover, Karsten also emphasized the use of objective method in the sociological

and ethnological study of human knowledge. Probably, Spencerian agnosticism was transmitted to Karsten via Westermarck (who greatly valued Spencer) and through his own intensive moments of reading in the British Museum (182). Although Karsten took over much of Tylor's pattern of thought, Tylor did not influence Karsten's spiritual transition as such. Tylor was a Quaker by religion who aspired to be related to the Lord without the intermediary function of priests and sacraments, that is, as a Quaker, Tylor was anti-Catholic and criticized the service of the Catholic Church which he saw as "unprofound". Tylor's religious attitude evidently mirrored English religious currents, since it was the Englishman George Fox who founded this sect in the 17th century. In general, it is important to refrain from fully embracing Spencer's idea of religion, namely, Spencer's study of religion is like a huge philosophical quagmire which swallows up excessively voracious scholars. In his "First Principles", Spencer was searching for the connecting link between science and religion since he desired to overturn the old belief that religion and science were enemies (183). Of course, it was a matter of honour for Spencer, as a positivist, to prove that religion and science were driven by the same forces, that is, they had the same origin. Spencer wrote as follows:

"What scientific truth can unite Science and Religion [...] we see good reason to conclude that the most abstract truth contained in Religion and the most abstract truth contained in Science must be the one in which the two coalesce" (184).

Spencer's ideas of religion as a whole were explained through evolution as a great natural principle of law which also touched upon the "social and cultural progress of civilization" (Spencer made Lamarckian "organic evolution" universal when applying it to the progress of human and society). According to Rafael Karsten, it was Spencer's social evolutionary search for the origins of religion which most eminently contributed to British comparative ethnology. Deviating from Comte, Spencer's "exploring of religion" was intentional, goal-oriented and *de facto* bound to theory (evolutionism) in sociology. In order to understand my argument, however, it is now time to see how evolutionism labelled (Karsten's) study of religions in the 19th and 20th century.

Evolutionism. The term "evolution" has an ambiguous nature which opens it to different theoretical standpoints (biological, genetic, mathematical, social, and economic), but, in general, "evolution" refers to the process of growth and development. The most famous evolution theory, admittedly, is Charles Darwin's biological theory that all existing organisms have developed from earlier forms by natural selection. Although at the beginning of the 19th century, evolutionism was more than ever a burning issue, Darwin was not the first to suggest that life was a *continuum*, an uninterrupted process. Yet, it has been said that Darwin "set the natural world in order" which, I believe, meant that Darwin's works established a certain standard for biological evolution (185). Still, Darwin never created the concept of "evolution" since Lyell and Sedgwick (1851) had already used that term when discussing development theory (186). Initially, the Latin term *evolūtiō* referred to the unrolling of a manuscript, that is,

to opening (*ēvolū-*). Interestingly, it was A.R. Wallace and his colleagues who later began to talk about “Darwinism” (187). But then again, Darwin (and Wallace) was almost a mere apostle of natural evolution. The man who applied the idea of evolution to sociology, Herbert Spencer, cannot be dismissed or completely overshadowed by Darwin. As plain as day, Spencer deserves his independent place in the history of evolutionary theory. Eric J. Sharpe (1975) has described evolutionary theory as the “watershed” for the emergence of comparative religion as a science 1859-1869. Sharpe suggests that comparative religion has existed from 1869 onwards. Rafael Karsten noted that comparative religion was born in 1855 but, unfortunately, did not substantiate his claim further. (188.) Whether Sharpe and Karsten are right in their claims is a matter of interpretation. However, it is meaningful to note that although comparative religion as a research interest became gradually influential in the leading universities of Europe in the middle of the 19th century, its first “struggle for existence” had already taken place in theories of Jean Bodin, Edward Herbert, Bernard Fontenelle, Giambattista Vico, David Hume, President de Brosses and Auguste Comte. Regarding Sharpe’s suggestion, it is possible, without great exertion, to see that the period from 1859 to 1869 was dominated by the scientific spirit of the “evolutionists”. The distinguished evolutionists of that period (1859-69) were, beyond dispute, Darwin, Wallace, Spencer and Tylor, who published their famous studies during those years. But is this to see the situation very much in black and white terms? Is it true that the history of evolutionary thought is much more complicated and extensive than the one we have become accustomed to perceive? Although it is palpable that Darwin and Spencer were “mature” apostles of evolution they never originated the principles of change and development. In present-day scholarly discussion, Preus (1996) has premiumly realized that Hume’s theoretical principles go “back to the Ionian philosopher Xenophanes” (189). Then, instead of merely analysing the noted evolutionists we should also see the figures behind (and beyond) them, that is, the history of evolutionism has to be charted more inclusively. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the history of evolutionism by chiefly paying attention to scholars who influenced Rafael Karsten’s cultural evolutionistic pattern of thought. But there can be no doubt about the practical value of knowing the history of evolutionism more widely, since a whole is more than the sum of its parts. My purpose is then also to examine the scholars who were the pioneers of the evolution theory but who never became its celebrated theorists. This I do because of a long needed clarity in charting the early history of evolutionary thought. As presented in Figure 3, it is possible to distinguish between six different generations of the development theory. The seventh generation of scholars (from Frazer to Westermarck and Karsten) were mainly converts to evolution who “improved” the evolutionary scheme of their precursors. Before analysing Darwin’s, Wallace’s, Spencer’s, Tylor’s, Frazer’s, Haddon’s and Westermarck’s evolutionary views, let me make an excursion to the history of evolutionism (from Rafael Karsten’s point of view). This facilitates our understanding of later evolutionists.

[I believe the inquiry on evolutionism should begin from pre-Socratic philosophy and from the name of Thales. Thales, a denizen of Miletus, believed water to be the cause of all things.

There is not much information on the views of Thales but it can be said that he, like other Milesians, was aware of the change where day follows night and seasons follow each other. It is supposed that Thales was able to comprehend that “in evaporation water becomes air, and in rain air becomes water” (190). However, Thales was never able to systematize his idea of change. The Ionian Greek philosopher Heraclitus (480 BCE) was, however, able to note in a more orderly manner that the world was in a continuous state of “flux and fire”, that is, Heraclitus realized that the world had never been stable, an “everlasting fire” (191). After the notions of Heraclitus, the Elean philosopher Parmenides (515-450 BCE) solved the problem of change. Parmenides was not interested in transformations which occurred in surroundings, but desired to analyse the concept of change itself (192). As a result, Parmenides saw “change” more as an illusion than an actual occurrence (193). Time went by. There were no philosophers to prove that Parmenides’s logic was transitory (194). Greek monism changed into pluralism. At that time, a citizen of Acragas, southern Sicily, Empedocles (first half of the fifth century BCE) presented his paradox: what is, is, but motion occurs (195). It has been suggested that Empedocles foresaw the rise of evolutionary theory with the emphasis on natural selection (196). The claim is somewhat surprising considering that Empedocles claimed that there was movement, but no transformation in material. After Empedocles, the Athenian Anaxagoras discussed the world in movement. Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras, too, viewed movement without a fundamental change or transition, that is, Anaxagoras believed that material was permanent but still in motion (197). However, Anaxagoras’s view that there was a single motion instead of two forces, marked an advance (198). A contemporary of Anaxagoras and Empedocles was Protagoras (500 BCE), a Sophist who travelled through ancient Greece teaching people for money. According to Protagoras, the world was in constant motion but the stream was twofold: outward (object of our perception) and inward (our sense organ). (199.) It is obvious that Protagoras, although sophisticatedly “enlightened”, was never able to decide whether the world was immovable or not, that is, his logic, which denied the possibility of an objective truth, and which relied upon common sense, led him, finally, too far from understanding motion. After Protagoras the later Pluralists (“Atomists”) like Lucretius endeavoured to show the uniformity of nature, claiming that this had made divine intervention in human affairs inane. However, Lucretius could not trace one explicit “uniformity” but discussed instead many “uniformities”. (200.) Overall, the Atomists considered nature a system of regular motions. The Atomists solved the problem of Thales by comprehending that water was not the element for all life and that motion was connected to change. It has been claimed that the ideas of the Atomists directly influenced the notions of modern culture from the seventeenth century onward (201). This is certainly true although the atomistic physics of Lucretius was yet far away from really solving the problem of change. The next philosopher to attempt to solve the problem of change was the most talented student of Socrates, Plato, who was born in Athens in 427 BCE (202). The analysis of Plato’s concern about change is guided by his theory of knowledge. As is known, Plato divided the world into two different sections: the world of physical objects (ostensible), and the world of ideas (real). By discussing a dual reality, Plato combined Heraclitian theory with Parmenidian notion. Jones (1970) has suggested that it would be erroneous to talk about Plato’s “theory of ideas” since his *ideai* basically meant “forms”. Let us accept Jones’s deduction. What follows is that the forms are not attained by sense perception but by thinking, that is, if you desire to perceive unity in disunity you have to think about the forms (203). What is the form then? The form is a dog called “Sammy” for instance, that is, the totality of the properties of the dog makes “Sammy” a dog. And what are those properties then? They are zoological and biological traits which tell the difference between a dog and other animals. But did Plato think that the world of forms was changing? Briefly, Plato saw the physical world as changing whereas the world of forms

appeared to be more or less constant and perpetual (“is what it is”) (204). Furthermore, Plato regarded the physical world as “lower” and the world of forms as “higher”, that is, Plato suggested that knowledge (*episteme*) was “higher” (eternal) to the act of supposing (*doxa*) which was seen as ignoble or lowly (changing) (*Luulo ei ole tiedon väärtti*- “Assumption is worth less than knowledge”, as the Finnish proverb says). To summarize Plato’s view of change is problematic due to his later statement that there was another reality, the world of souls, in addition to the world of forms. Did Plato then attain his views of change merely by integrating Heraclitian and Parmenidian views? Were his ideas simply silly or the most ingenious invention? Should we sympathize with the Arabian philosopher Avicenna who studied Plato’s theory of forms *circa* forty times without understanding anything of it (205). All in all, Plato’s theory of forms (theory of knowledge) was evidently a radiating construction but it bore fruit: Plato’s deduction was ennobled by Aristotle, who entered Plato’s Academy at the age of eighteen (206). Aristotle was born in Stagira in Thrace in 384 BCE (207). Although Aristotle remained in Plato’s Academy almost twenty years, he became an opponent to his tutor’s theory of knowledge. In general, Aristotle considered Plato’s deduction unfeasible since it doubled the world and abstained from explaining the phenomena of the world of physical objects (208). In Aristotle’s terminology, then, the “form” did not refer to Platonian real (209). Roughly speaking, Plato’s views were based on mathematics whereas Aristotle’s aspects were coloured by biological speculation. It has been said that a human is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian (210). Rafael Karsten was an Aristotelian scholar since to him Aristotle seemed a “realist” when Plato was an “idealistic utopist” (211). As said, Aristotle revised Plato’s theory of forms. He achieved this by seeing the world as a single realm of actual things. To Aristotle form was synonymous to an individual thing, a particular animal like “Sammy” the dog, where the “particular” integrated with the reality created “substance”. Thus, the world was constructed of private beings whereupon “universal” did not have any independent ontological position. (212.) However, scientific knowledge appeared only if the human shunned involvement in mere private beings. Aristotle also made a distinction between “form” and “matter”. Let us look at an example; A sweet is made of sugar. Then, sugar is the matter and the sweet is the form, that is, Aristotle saw that the matter is the “material” out of which something is made when the form is the shape that the object takes. But what about the problem of change in Aristotle’s theory? Due to consideration of space, I have to express Aristotle’s “change” quite briefly. By using my example of sweet and sugar, I illustrate Aristotle’s analysis of change which worked on the assumption that although the form (shape) of sweet changed in time, the ingredient remained the same since sugar was an essential element of the sweet. (213.) To Aristotle this was the most simple change from one shape to another. A more complicated change occurred when a larva developed into a butterfly, for instance. Then, instead of one clear substitution, there occurred many changes of shape. Aristotle saw this change as successive and systematic. I believe that here, as Jones (1970) has suggested, it is possible for the first time to draw a distinction between “change” and “development” in the history of evolutionism (214). The development considered in terms of Aristotelian deduction is regular, goal-oriented (teleology), eternal and successive.

After Aristotle’s death the Western world fell silent on the secrets of nature for a surprisingly long time (more than six centuries). Of course, there were philosophers who tried to solve the problems of existence, but it was only with the rise of Christianity that “Western” thinking received a new impetus. During the late classical period, Marcus Aurelius (121-180 CE) took an interest in nature. He adopted Heraclitus’s conception that “fluxes and changes perpetually renew the world” but also supported the Aristotelian view that change was regular and goal-oriented. (215.) In a very general sense, Aurelius’s religious fervor was a sign of the coming transition. In year 313 CE Constantine (“the Great”) issued the Edict of Milan, which

ensured equal treatment for Christianity among other existing religions and philosophies. Later, Theodosius I recognized Christianity as the religion of the Empire (379-95 CE). As a result, Christianity became the major religion of the Roman world (216). The first actual Christian philosopher, Augustine of Hippo, was born in 354 in Tagaste, North Africa. Although Augustine was a devout Christian (converted to Christianity in 386) and believed that God was creative and eternal, he could not escape from dealing with the questions of change and development. In fact, Augustine was a Neoplatonist who shared Plato's view of unchanging reality. However, Augustine (like Plato) realized that although reality was immobile, the sense world was changing and this put him before the great dilemma: in his writings Augustine was desperately asking "how God, did You make heaven and earth?" (217). Although Augustine's philosophy was made in deeply religious terms, it suggested that time was a perpetuity (218). During the medieval interval the Englishman Bartholomew discussed the Aristotelian terms of "form and matter". Unfortunately, Bartholomew's treatment of Aristotelian ideas of development was not ingenious and thus he was never able to take Aristotle's ideas of natural change further (219). The vigorous views of Peter Abelard (born in 1079) also abstained from directly benefiting a "paradox" of natural change although his notions of the nature and status of universals were distinguished. Nevertheless, Abelard's stern and unhistorical method was what the "scholastic" approach later became to be in the Middle Ages (220).

Between the 7th and 11th centuries the monasteries became the learning centres in Europe and by the 10th century the craftsmen began to build cathedrals and abbeys. In the medieval world, a new religious and philosophical orientation, different from the Greeks, was predominant. One of the leading thirteenth century theologians, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) turned to Abelard's systematic use of reason in search for the truth (221). Aquinas became a Doctor of Divinity in 1257. Previously he had joined the Dominican Order. (222.) When Aquinas was teaching in Paris (from 1252 to 1259) it was a city of intellectual warfare of the most audacious minds (223). In fact, Paris was the intellectual capital of Europe from the twelfth century onwards. Roughly speaking, the main "sin" of Aquinas was that he familiarized himself with Aristotle. The conservative university theologians and the Franciscans accused him of introducing Aristotelian ideas to the theology of the university and the Church (224). The cause of the attack of the Franciscans on Aquinas was their fear that via Aristotle, the Arabian philosophy of Averroes and Avicenna, and the neo-Judaism of Maimonides would spread ideas of non-Christian humanism to the Church (225). But, why pay attention to Aquinas when we know that he was a Christian thinker who believed that the world was created by God and that a human was a child of God. How did he apply Aristotelian views to his Christian philosophy? Was his reasoning basically of use to a theory of development? The key to Aquinas's inclination to employ Aristotle's conception is complicated. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish three different aspects which Aquinas apparently inherited from Aristotle. Firstly, owing to Aristotle's suspicion, Aquinas was aware of the limits of Augustinian Christian dualism. Like Aristotle, he rejected the conception of two realms in the universe (in Aquinas's case the disputed polarities were Heaven and Hell). Secondly, Aquinas believed that a man was simultaneously a child of God and a natural being, *homo res naturalis est*. Formerly, Aristotle had suggested that the human had natural ends. Thirdly, Aquinas's and Aristotle's conceptions of God bore some resemblances to each other. To both of them God was "the summit of the hierarchy of substances". (226.) Interestingly, Edward Westermarck pondered the moral conception of Aquinas in his writing on moral intuition. Then, Westermarck noticed that as a theologian Aquinas was unlike others, since he thought that moral distinctions preceded the divine word, that is, Aquinas was original by proposing that "good is not good since God will it, but that God will it since it is good" (227).

After Aquinas's death, there came a day when his suggestion that "man is a thing of nature" came to be an inspiration for the arguments of the men of the Enlightenment (Descartes and others) (228). Thinking about the rise of evolutionary theory in the 19th century, it seems that Aquinas's most remarkable work was to give voice to Aristotle (via his own interpretations) in a period when the Church and theology were suspicious of the ominous figures of classical philosophers. Thanks to Aquinas, the Aristotelian ideas of development survived when they were most strongly attacked from within the Church. A contemporary of Thomas Aquinas was Roger Bacon (born 1214) (mentioned earlier in the chapter on "Empiricism"), who had a fervent interest in nature. Bacon was an educated man (Oxford and Paris) with an extensive collection of occult books. As Heer (1993) has pointed out, in the medieval world the natural sciences were synonymous with magical and alchemical experiment and were thus shunned by the Church (229). However, the Church could be accused of double standards, considering that the Pope Sylvester II was initially a magician and a sorcerer (230). On the whole, the views of the Church were an antithesis of the notions of the natural scientists: the Church thought of the natural scientists as sorcerers and astrologers whereas the natural scientists regarded the clergymen as practitioners of "false magic". In the middle of the 14th century John of Rupescissa began to demand that there should be educated natural scientists not involved in alchemy and magic (231). Roger Bacon's role in the development of the natural sciences was that he urged people to experiment and discover (*Opus Majus*). He was never able to make great experiments of his own although he eagerly endeavoured to find an elixir of life and to establish a "universal science" (232). In general, Bacon has been considered one of the figures of the medieval world whose fresh ideas, after they had spread widely enough, brought the Middle Ages to an end (233). Thus, Bacon's significance lies more in his drive for detection than in theoretical speculation of change or development.

A follower of Bacon's conception was the Franciscan Arnold of Villanova (born circa 1238), who, after studying medicine, alchemy and astrology in Spain, Italy, and France, tried to find an elixir which would cure all ills. Although Arnold with the aid of alchemy tried to give a spiritual appearance to the elements of nature, his merit, evidently, was the general interest he paid to chemical elements. In the medieval world the development of medicine, anatomy, surgery, and astronomy influenced the natural sciences and prepared them for the later "revolution". Five hundred years later, Auguste Comte and David Hume expressed their famous notions according to which astronomy was a paragon or paradigm for the elaboration of science (astronomy as the great discovery which indicated the transition from common sense to science) (234). Interestingly, the dissection of pigs changed into a more efficient anatomy with the procedures of Mondino de Luzzi in the fourteenth century. The interest which Ibn Zuhr, the greatest of the Islamic physicians in Spain, also paid to all human (irrespective of religion) contributed to the development of the natural sciences. In 1269, Peter the Stranger conducted experiments on magnetism and at the same time Ramon Lull (1235-1315) endeavoured to develop an "automatic" machine which would unite knowledge and sciences into a "universal knowledge". (235.) Finally, the astrologer and physician Pietro d'Abano rejected all kinds of prophecy by claiming that nature was subject to its own unalterable laws which could be calculated by scientists (236).

At the end of the Middle Ages trade increased, and rich citizens were able to found manufactories with weavers, potters, and cobblers who made artefacts for the owners of the manufactories. With the new generations emerged new attitudes towards life. The attitudes of the intelligentsia coincided with the prevailing pre-capitalist development. In contrast to the medieval period, the intellectuals fashionably rejected the unwavering belief in the authority of the Church and gradually became interested in the "humane", which appeared as admiration for antiquity. (237.) Nevertheless, there were scholars, like Erasmus Rotterdam (c.

1466-1536) who tried to combine the erudition of the classical period with the doctrine of Christianity, that is, he sought a textual basis for faith combining linguistic competence from antiquity with knowledge of sacred writings in a widely varied church tradition. In the early 16th century, besides the crisis in Christendom (the Reformation), the natural sciences were promoted by the mineralogical studies of Georgius Agricola (1530) and anatomical pursuits of Padovian Andreas Vesalius who in 1537 gave the first comprehensive description of the human body. As mentioned earlier, in 1543 Copernicus wrote his *De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium* which introduced the heliocentric system of the world. Eight years later, Konrad Gesner published the first modern work of zoology (*Historia animalium*). The human was gaining new knowledge of herself and her environment but she was still under the strict surveillance of the Roman Catholic Church. Consequently, the Spanish physician Michael Servetus, who discovered pulmonary circulation, was burnt under the Spanish Inquisition as a heretic. Later, the Inquisition (a Roman Catholic tribunal for the suppression of heresy), compelled Andreas Vesalius to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land during which Vesalius disappeared.

In the 17th century it was not only the splendid Baroque Mirror Hall of Versailles which attracted the minds of people, the whole universe became a favorite subject, especially among scientists. Accordingly, the natural scientists (mathematicians, physicists, and astrologers) created a totally new conception of the world (238). The position of science in society changed. A minister of Louis XIV, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, founded the Science Academy of France in 1666 in Paris. Previously, the scholars of London had begun to come together (1645) and their activity created the base of what later became the "Royal Society". During the 17th century, it was not only René Descartes (*Discours de la Methode*) and Galileo Galilei (*Discorsi e dimostrazioni*) who presented their brilliant ideas of argumentation and experiment, but it was also Thomas Hobbes who suggested (*De Corpore* (1655)) that the universe was composed of bodies which were subject to mechanical laws (resembling the medieval ideas of Lull and d'Abano). The elaboration of the natural sciences was also indebted to the botany of the Englishman John Ray who in 1682 (*Historia generalis plantarum*) established the scientific principles for the classification of plants. In 1687 Isaac Newton published his work *Principia* which, due to its ingenious invention of three laws of motion (Newtonian mechanics), became perhaps the most significant piece of research in the history of science. To that was added Newton's law of universal gravitation. (239.) Newton's suggestion that the universe was harmonious but also guided by natural laws should be considered "breathtaking" in its historical context (240). However, equally significant for the elaboration of evolutionism was, perhaps, the revelation of the Italian physicist, Francesco Redi, that a maggot was not born spontaneously but as an issue of a laying fly. Before Redi, *generatio spontanea* had been taken for granted whereupon many scholars had claimed that frogs were generated from clay and bees from dead calves. (241.) But Redi was the first to emphasize that plants and animals originated and survived via real seed. However, Redi was not able to explain clearly whether all organisms, the smallest protozoa and bacteria, were developed spontaneously or not. (242.) At the end of the 17th century, the Italians particularly were tired of the pretentiousness of the Baroque. In due course, the poetic society "Academia dell' Arcadia", which emphasised chastity and simplicity instead of the decadence of the Baroque, was founded in Rome in 1690. Two years later, the English botanist Nehemiah Grew published *The Anatomy of Plants* (1692) which has been considered a very notable work. The emergence of the period of the Enlightenment dates back to the termination of the Spanish War of Succession in 1714 (243). The Enlightenment admired the deductions of Isaac Newton and Francis Bacon. Notably Newton was considered an ingenious reformer of the prevailing worldview. But why then did the Enlightenment have such a fervent interest in nature? Briefly, since they felt that

understanding nature consolidated the meaning of reason in the world. In a consideration of the changes that reshaped Europe in the 19th century the impact of scientific ideas of the 18th century seems to have been of considerable importance. In fact, many scholars of the 18th century were aware of the principle of the transformation of species.

In the year when smallpox vaccination was first invented (1721), Charles de Montesquieu suggested that mutations of species were possible. Moreover, the impact of the Swedish botanist and physician Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778) on botany and natural sciences was immediate in the 18th century. (244.) Edward B. Tylor described the background of Linnaeus as follows: “[...] and it was a great and sacred linden-tree with three stems, standing in the parish of Hvitaryd in South Sweden, which with curious fitness gave a name to the family of Linnaeus” (245). In 1732, Carolus Linnaeus undertook his first expedition to Lapland. Three years later Linnaeus published his work *Systema Naturae* (1735), which suggested that plants and animals should be arranged into classes, ordines, species, and genera. A great motivation behind the work of Linnaeus was his desire to see botany more methodically. In 1737 his work *Genera Plantarum* laid the foundation of modern botany by employing a two-piece system of taxonomic nomenclature. (246.) It is hard for those with no experience of the conditions of work 300 years ago to understand its difficulties. However, at that time, as today, novel information led to many interpretations. Actually, it seems that the Linnaean botanical system has generated polymorphous interpretations throughout history. The work of Carolus Linnaeus has been characterized by saying that he was not aware of the variability of species (247). On the other hand, it has been claimed that Linnaeus was doubtful of the immutability of species. After all, Linnaeus had ideas of the reproduction of species which influenced Charles Darwin’s analysis of natural increase: “Linnaeus has calculated that if an annual plant produced only two seeds - and their seedlings next year produced two, and so on, then in twenty years there would be a million plants” (248). Likewise, Herbert Spencer’s pattern of thought proceeded according to the Linnaean system when he discussed “individual organisms that had to be arranged into classes and sub-classes” and “the quantitative correlation of animals of each class” in his study on sociology and first principles (249). All in all, Linnaeus was proficient in botany, although he was evidently indebted to the classifications of the Englishman John Ray, but as a physician he seemed to be individual by asserting that infectious diseases were caused by acarids (mites and ticks) and worms (Pasteur’s virology appeared only in the 1860s) (250).

The interest in reproduction of animals also captivated the mind of the French Count Georges de Buffon (1707-1788). In 1749, Buffon published the first three volumes of his extensive work *Histoire naturelle*. Buffon was influenced by the English Jesuit John Turberville Needham, whose experiments had shown that some organic materials included vegetative virtue which produced Infusoria in an airtight container (251). In fact, Needham continued from where Francesco Redi had left off. In order to be able to better understand the reproduction of animals, Buffon made his friends pathologically examine the organs of mammals. While Buffon was observing, his friends (Louis Daubenton and T.F. Dalibard) killed a female dog that had just copulated and made an autopsy in order to find spermatozoa. According to Buffon, the most clear form of reproduction was generated when an infinite number of organic particles, similar to each other, was gathered together and the integrated body was built of them (252). By searching for “organic molecules” which could turn into bigger groups, like worms, Buffon tried to investigate how his own ideas supported the suggestions of Needham (Buffon discussed these issues with Needham)(253). An opponent of Buffon and Needham was the Italian priest Lazzaro Spallanzani, who became the most notable biological experimenter of his time. Spallanzani saw that if a vessel was boiled in hot water for an hour and if it was air-tight, regardless of the organic material used, no Infusoria

was generated (254). Thus, Spallanzani's thesis proved that even (the most) miniscule organisms had originated from something, and were not the result of spontaneous delivery. The experiments of Spallanzani were admired by Louis Pasteur, who established the law according to which fermentation was generated by microbes and not the other way around. Pasteur's experiments made with the famous curvy-necked bottles, showed to the world of sceptics that there was no impulsive development in any form. Did Spallanzani and Pasteur then believe that the species originated from the acts of God when they presented evidence against spontaneous generation? Indeed, by denying an *ad hoc* genesis they, apparently, made room for the Creation in their explanations. And that is why Pasteur's patrons later attacked the theories of Lamarck and Darwin.

Interestingly, in 1744, five years before Buffon published his first volumes, Johannes Palin took a doctoral degree at the Academy of Turku by defending a thesis *De Primis Scientiae naturalis initiis* (255). Palin's doctoral thesis demonstrates that the progress of the natural sciences was also followed in Finland. Like Redi and Buffon, who were also known respectively as a poet and philosopher, David Hume (1711-1776) was a (sceptical) philosopher who was opposed to the views of the Cartesians that the knowledge had a tried and true foundation. Generally speaking, Hume was a philosopher, a cosmopolitan Scotsman, a Newtonian naturalist, and a hysteric soul who did a lot of reading. As Preus (1996) has noted, Hume is too often either ignored or misinterpreted by historians of the study of religions (256). Most likely Hume is disregarded since his place in the history of comparative religion has been little studied and reconstructed. For us, David Hume with his scenes of the new science of mind has merely sounded like a true philosopher. Hume has not received an important place in the history of social sciences either. Forbes (1996) has suggested that Hume's friends Ferguson and Adam Smith "have attracted more attention as founding fathers of a truly sociological method and outlook" (257). Interestingly, Karsten never wrote about Hume in his analysis of history of sociology but instead investigated Adam Smith. The reason for Hume's decline is, I think, his old-fashioned and blurred terminology ("natural religion", "superstition") which makes it particularly difficult to thoroughly understand him. And it does not help us that the critical and acrimonious appearance of his social and political thought gives him a somewhat controversial status in the history of European thought. I believe it is fair to say that Hume is one of the most double-edged and cryptic philosophers. In the first place, I deal with Hume here since his naturalistic assumptions charmed the early scholars of religion, or, to put it another way, his "natural belief" suited the theoretic purposes of evolutionary anthropologists. It is not possible given the constraints of space to discuss Hume's notions on religion even partially (for Hume on religion, see Gaskin 1993). Hume had pre-Darwinistic views of religion, human and society. He took the natural sciences as a model and it seems that his ideas anticipated the principle of natural selection. Moreover, his discussion of the "blind force" in the universe possibly anticipated the theories of the big bang. (258.) Humean "force" was absorbed into the pondering of later evolutionists. In 1866 Alfred Russel Wallace talked about the "force" which would drastically change the nature of science (259). In his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40) Hume aspired to introduce the experimental (empirical) method to moral philosophy (260). Hume rejected the Platonic idea that the world had a double character and maintained that there was only one world. Hume's naturalistic ideas of religion became most visible in his works *Natural History of Religion* (1757) and *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1779). In these works Hume presented his two questions on religion: what was the foundation of religion in reason, and what were the causes of religion's natural origins in human nature (261). The former called for a psychological explanation, whereas the latter exacted a historical emphasis. This was the point which Karsten also took when he (like Tylor) presented Hume to the public as a man who was

the first to attempt to historically and psychologically solve the problem of the origin and development of religion (262). What does this mean? In terms of Karsten's reasoning, Hume's historicity referred to the supposition that the early human had lived in a state of brutality whereupon her ideas of gods had been low and childlike (263). However, Hume's deduction that polytheism was the most original form of religion had no value, in Karsten's opinion, to a present-day scholar of religion. Karsten claimed that Hume had conceived erroneous ideas since the historical material he employed was inadequate. Karsten said this only because he considered animism the most "prehistoric" explanation. All in all, historical orientation was an obvious part of Hume's experimental method. Nevertheless, Humean experiment did not, as such, refer to Newtonian physical experiments but served as an *ad hoc* way to acquire more reliable knowledge of human history. (264.) What about the psychological aspect then? Karsten believed that the psychological point of Hume's reasoning referred to his moral philosophy which "interestingly illustrated the nature of emotions and their meaning to mental life" (265). To put it simply, Hume's moral psychological emphasis on religion referred to the instincts which invest our systems of meaning in the generation of our beliefs (266). These instincts were basic elements like feelings of passion and pain. Moreover, passion was opposite to reason and thus Hume's moral philosophy, his ethics, was based on the triumph of emotion over rationalism and dogmatism. (267.) Hume's psychological emphasis especially captivated Edward Westermarck who took an early interest in Hume's moral philosophy. However, Westermarck did not *in toto* accept Hume's supposition but suggested the Humean analysis of moral emotions to be somewhat blunt and shallow (268). Stroup (1982) has stated that it is problematic to deduce to what extent Westermarck "himself recognized Hume's contribution to his thought" (269). This problem of debt to Hume can be avoided in Rafael Karsten's case. By leaning on Karsten's own statements it becomes obvious that Hume's historical search for the origins was a great catalyst for him (and for the entire Tylorian school). Karsten was influenced by Hume's psychological emphasis when examining the nature of moral evaluation (270). All in all, it was only natural and predictable that the historical description of Hume should stimulate Tylorian scholars interested in the origins of religion. To sum up Karsten's view: Hume contributed to modern comparative religion since he succeeded in presenting a general outlook on religion, that is, Hume's deduction that there had occurred natural development from lower to higher forms in the history of religion, was noteworthy (271).

At the end of the 18th century, Hume's fellow countryman, James Hutton (1725-1797), published his geological work *Theory of the Earth* (1788) an onslaught on traditional chronology based on the Bible, and suggested that the world was in a state of continuous motion. Hutton's argument that various stone types had been created from sediments because the temperature of the earth had changed them into crystal, was significant since it anticipated a deviation in structure from others of the same species (Darwinian laws of variation). Hutton had a definite influence on the theories of Darwin through Sir Charles Lyell. A contemporary of Hutton was Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), a versatile, free-thinking poet-scientist and physician, and also the grandfather of Charles Darwin. Erasmus Darwin presented his grounds for opinions of natural selection in *Zoonomia* published in 1794. Erasmus Darwin believed that improvements acquired during an organism's lifetime were inherited. Concurrently, Goethe and Geoffroy Saint Hilaire had outlined an equivalent conclusion of the mechanism of evolution (272). But how much did the grandson owe to his resourceful grandfather? In his letter to Baden Powell in 1860 Charles Darwin stated as follows: "The only novelty in my work is the attempt to explain how species became modified, and to a certain extent how the theory of descent explains certain large classes of facts: and in these respects I received no

assistance from my predecessors [...] Lamarck (by the way his erroneous views were curiously anticipated by my grandfather)” (273).

Charles Darwin’s letter makes two things explicit: firstly, he denies the possibility that his grandfather’s reasoning had assisted him, and, secondly, he considers the views of Erasmus to be fallacious. If Erasmus Darwin’s conception was “different” it arose from the fact that he examined the change of species without distinguishing between varieties and species. Further, Erasmus Darwin’s opinion of adaptation was too idealistic (“beautiful”) for his grandson’s thinking since it supported the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Although Erasmus Darwin discussed the ideas of biological inheritance, it is Lamarck whose name is now usually associated with that theory. (274.)

Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck is one of the most controversial figures in the history of development theory. His doctrine of descent has been variously disputed and it appears that scholars either embrace it or reject it. Unfortunately, Lamarck has been the name too often left on the book-shelves to gather dust. It can be stated that it would be erroneous to completely deny his influence on Darwinian and Spencerian evolutionary theory. According to Charles Darwin, “Lamarck was the first man whose conclusions on this subject excited much attention” (275). In fact, Lamarck is one of those natural scientists whose reasoning *de facto* influenced the ideas of later evolutionists (and the rise of comparative religion). However, Charles Darwin never took Lamarck as his model but became famous for his ability to criticize and extend the Lamarckian scope. For Herbert Spencer theoretical respect for Lamarck was part of his reasoning. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck was born in a little French village called Picardie on 1 August 1744. In his early life he studied under the tuition of the Jesuits of Amiens since his family wished him to become a priest. When the Jesuit school was closed in 1761 Lamarck joined the army at the age of only seventeen. After the war, Lamarck served as an officer in Monaco and Toulon. Here he also dedicated himself to the establishment of the botanical collection and definition of plants. Lamarck’s career in the armed forces was soon interrupted because of a chronic malady. After that, he moved to Paris and began to study medicine (never receiving a degree). During this period, he also studied botany with Bernard de Jussieu (1699-1776) and his nephew Antoine Laurent de Jussieu (1748-1836). He also came to know Rousseau and de Buffon, and the latter turned out to be a significant figure to Lamarck’s academic career. In 1779 Lamarck became a member of the botanical section of “Académie des Sciences” in Paris (de Buffon acted as referee). In 1782 Lamarck published the dictionary of botany *Dictionnaire de botanique* and became acquainted with the German and Austrian botanists Johann Gleditsch, Johann Murray, and Joseph Freiherr von Jaquin. But it was not until Lamarck published his extensive work *Tableau encyclopédique et méthodique des trois règnes de la nature* (1791-1823) that he gained wide reputation as a botanist (the work consists of a presentation of 2000 different plants with 1000 pictures). In 1788 Lamarck became a custodian at the *Jardin du Roi* (“Royal Garden”). After the French revolution, the name of “Jardin du Roi” was changed into *Jardin des Plantes* which sounded more republican. In 1793, it was given the name of *Museum National d’histoire Naturelle*. (276.) Lamarck acted as professor of botany and zoology at the “Museum”. In fact, his interest in zoology had developed gradually during the years (perhaps via Lacépède). Holding academic positions at the *Académie* and at the *Museum*, Lamarck had reached the highest possible scientific status in France at that time (277). In May 1800, during his opening speech at the *Museum*, Lamarck emphasized for the first time that all species were descended from other species, that is, he believed in the law of progressive development assuming that the species were variable (278). Lamarck’s ideas were not born overnight but as a result of long-term, exhaustive, and empiric research. In fact, Lamarck was not only a botanist and zoologist (paleontology) but also examined geology (*Hydrogeologie* (1802) and 11 *Meteorologic*

Yearbooks (1800-1810)). In 1809, Lamarck published his theoretical magnum opus *Philosophie Zoologique*. Seven years earlier he had been the first scholar to scientifically employ the term “biology” in his studies. Lamarck’s principal work was based on zoological systematization and definition. It could be characterized as a study of a long catalogue of various organisms. But Lamarck’s descriptive, taxonomic, and systematic style and his personal desire for knowledge satisfies the reader. In his study Lamarck studied fossil molluscs and shells and compared them with recent animals suggesting that the fauna was divided into vertebrate and invertebrate. Lamarckian progressive development meant that organisms developed according to natural laws step by step (theory of *Stufenleiter der Natur* - evolutionary gradualism). On a general level this indicated that development progressed towards higher complexity. Yet, Lamarck also accepted the spontaneous generation of new forms. Lamarck’s materialistic notion (spontaneous development) derived from his deistic outlook on life. As a deist Lamarck rejected the supernatural revelation (and the Creation) and maintained that the first organisms (Infusoria and worms) had developed by themselves, that is, automatically. (279.) At that time this kind of materialism as a pattern of thought was discarded in European academic circles. Thus, Lamarck was heavily criticized by Spallanzanian and Pasteurian scholars who maintained that breeding by itself was an unrealizable natural law (280). In his “Philosophie” Lamarck also aimed at accuracy in the natural sciences by making up tools that were universally applicable. According to Lamarck, the instruments for the natural sciences were systematic division (general or special), category, order, family, type or genre, and nomenclature (part or object) (281). Evidently, his goal to achieve “order” in the natural sciences was made in the Linnean spirit. Because Lamarck’s “instruments” were novel and a great expression of current natural sciences, it is likely that Charles Darwin was influenced by them when making the distinction between varieties, species and forms. To put it another way, although Darwin felt Lamarck was a somewhat delicate theorist, the former obviously always owed to the latter regarding classification. But Darwin was also indebted to Lamarck in another way. The most controversial issue of Lamarck’s conception has been his theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Lamarck suggested that individual organisms could pass on their properties to their offspring via manipulation and habit. The neck of the giraffe was proof of this for Lamarck; after the most original giraffe had stretched out its neck in order to be able to satisfy its hunger, all giraffes had inherited their lengthy neck as an acquired characteristic. It is a controversial issue among scholars whether Charles Darwin leant on Lamarck when stating as follows: “I think there can be little doubt that use in our domestic animals strengthens and enlarges certain parts, and disuse diminishes them: and that such modifications are inherited” (282). As has been pointed out, although Darwin reproached Lamarck with “the difficulty of distinguishing species and varieties” he also praised the Frenchman for doing “the eminent service of arousing attention to the probability of all change in the organic as well as in the inorganic world” (283). Owing to Lamarck’s idea of gradual (unilinear) development and to his refraining from applying his theory to the human, his doctrine of descent can perhaps best be described as a theory of transmutation, not as a theory of evolution as such (284). Whether “Philosophie Zoologique” marked the beginning of an entire new phase in evolutionary theory is not absolutely clear to me. As I have shown, there was intelligent action, debates and opinions before Lamarck. Otherwise Lamarck would have been born in a void. Nevertheless, Darwin claimed in his “The Origin of Species” (1859) that he was not familiar with writings “passing over authors from the classical period to that of Buffon” (285). In the light of Darwin’s expression, Lamarck was, then, the first “evolutionist” whose voice was really heard. The following quote from T.H. Huxley, Darwin’s supporter, affirms Lamarck’s importance: “I am not likely to take a low view of Darwin’s position in the history of science,

but I am disposed to think Buffon and Lamarck would run him hard in both genius and fertility. In breadth of view and in extent of knowledge these men were giants though we are apt to forget their services” (286).

“[...] I have often said to younger geologists that they did not know what a revolution Lyell had effected” (287). These words belong to Charles Darwin, whose teacher, Sir Charles Lyell, was. Also, Herbert Spencer had acquainted himself with Lyell at the age of 20. Further, E.B. Tylor referred to Lyell’s ideas in his “Primitive Culture”. But who was Lyell? Charles Lyell (1797-1875) was a Scottish geologist educated at Oxford. In 1832 he became the first professor of geology at the King’s College in London. The magnum opus of Lyell was *Principles of Geology* which was published in 12 volumes 1830-1833. In his work Lyell continued the work of Hutton by stating that geological processes operative in the remote past were no different from processes operative now (uniformitarianism). The gradualist theory of geological mutation and complexity offered a clear contrast to the Biblical explanation of earth-span of 6,000 years (288). In other words, Lyell challenged the catastrophist viewpoint which suggested that the earth had experienced a succession of creations of animal and plant life, and that each creation had been dissolved by a sudden calamity, such as upheaval or eruption. The supporters of the catastrophist viewpoint believed that the most recent catastrophe, the flood, destroyed all life except those animals and plants taken into Noah’s ark. The rest survived only in the form of fossils. In another principal work, *Elements of Geology* (1838), Lyell specified the epochs of the Tertiary Period from 25 million to 10 million years ago. However, attention should be paid to Lyell’s work *The Antiquity of Man* published in 1863. It can be easily seen that Lyell’s work was written after the publication of Darwin’s famous research. In “Antiquity” Lyell made himself known as a supporter of Darwin’s ideas whereas he objected to Lamarck’s theory. According to Lyell there were two great errors in Lamarck’s attempt to explain the origin of species: “first that he had failed to adduce a single instance of the initiation of a new organ in any species of animal or plant; and secondly, that variation had never yet gone so far as to produce two races sufficiently remote from each other in physiological constitution as to be sterile when intermarried” (289). Lyell’s accusations were similar to Darwin’s. Interestingly, Herbert Spencer became a partial supporter of Lamarck’s ideas by reading the arguments which Lyell evinced against Lamarckian ideas of animal development in his “Principles of Geology” (290). In “Antiquity” Lyell stressed his position as the first scholar who systematically aspired to outline the laws of the extinction of species. He suggested that “slow but ceaseless variations” and “migration” had an effect on the “occasional loss of some of them” (291). In a conceptual scene, his “extinction of species” acted on Darwin’s “natural selection” and Spencer’s “survival of the fittest”. In 1850 Professor Sedgwick rejected the mutations in historical development and proposed instead that species were “added” to nature until nature became what it is now. Sedgwick’s thesis was, however, overturned when Lyell and other geologists realized that the human had coexisted with the mammoth (this was not realized until the 1860s). In general, Lyell’s idea of progression was similar to Charles Darwin’s and Dr. J. Hooker’s assumptions (Dr. J. Hooker was Darwin’s long-time mentor and friend). Lyell considered progress “gradual elevation *from* the most simple to the most anthropomorphous mammalia, followed by the human race” (292). Lyell’s notion was superior to Lamarck’s, since his theory now reached the human. Still, Lyell’s evolution was almost as gradual as Lamarck’s. Similarly, Lyell also supported the idea of transmutation and wondered why Darwin was so cautious with it (293). Interestingly, Charles Lyell’s study of man’s antiquity also gave rise to a stimulating question of the notion of degeneration (here the process of degenerating refers to “cultural deterioration”) (294). Although Tylor pointed out that Lyell analysed the notion of degeneracy tongue in cheek, it seems that Lyell had expertise in this matter and succeeded in presenting

his ideas graphically (295). Lyell was not a supporter of the notion of degeneration but his mind was clearly tormented by the fact that early cultures had produced many master-pieces like “astronomical instruments and microscopes of more advanced construction than any known in Europe” and “from which the best engineers of our day might have gained invaluable hints” (296). Thus, our original progenitors were possibly superior to us and we were merely degenerate and “corrupt” descendants of them (297). The notion of degeneracy was later studied by Rafael Karsten in his analysis of the modern science of religion (see Chapter 4.1.). Although Karsten rejected the theory of degeneration, he was never able to entirely deny the existence of mental deterioration: “Theory of progression is not blind to religious degeneration; which has certainly occurred” (298). Lyell’s notions not only placed geology on an evolutionary basis but without him Darwin would have lost one of his theoretical backbones and Spencer would not have stayed with Lamarck. But Lyell and Lamarck never succeeded in making a general idea of progress into a coherent scientific theory. The establishment of evolution belonged to Darwin, Wallace, Spencer and Tylor.]

Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882) and Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) with their premonitions of natural selection and laws of variation continued the tradition of natural science as establishers of evolutionary theory. No doubt, Darwin’s and Wallace’s ideas developed an entirely new philosophical tendency. However, Darwin gained more reputation than Wallace. After reading the correspondence between Darwin and Wallace, I became convinced that this ought not to be the case. Even though Darwin was a clever and independent scholar, Wallace was continuously bolstering his ego:

“Dear Darwin, I am very sorry you are so unwell and that you allow criticism to worry you so. Remember the noble army of converts you have made: the host of the most talented men living who support you wholly” (299).

Wallace followed the new ideas in English drawing rooms and reported on them to Darwin (in this way Spencer’s term the “survival of the fittest” was presented to Darwin). The stories of Darwin and Wallace are known. Charles Robert Darwin was born in Shrewsbury, Shropshire, on 12 February 1809, as the fifth child of the wealthy and sophisticated English family of Susannah and Robert Darwin. He was sent to Edinburgh University to study medicine in 1825. Two years later, he began to study theology at Cambridge, in preparation for becoming a clergyman of the Church of England. But Darwin’s passion for natural history had emerged already in Edinburgh. In Cambridge, Darwin began to study plants and followed the Professor of Geology, Adam Sedgwick, to North Wales to study geological deposits. Then, he met the Professor of Botany, John Stevens Henslow, whose scientific research made a profound impact on young Darwin. Henslow not only helped build Darwin’s self-assurance but also taught his student to be a meticulous observer of natural phenomena. After graduating from Cambridge in 1831, Darwin was taken aboard the English survey ship HMS *Beagle* as an unpaid naturalist on a scientific expedition around the world. (300.) Alfred Russel Wallace was born in the county of Monmouth (now Gwent) in 1823. While studying the natural history of the Malay archipelago and the Amazonas, young Wallace arrived at the same conclusions on

the origin of species as Darwin. During his stay in the islands of Bali and Lombok, Wallace suggested that the narrow strait between the islands determined the distribution of animals: in the east animals were of Australian origin and in the west of Indian origin (301).

Enthusiastically, Wallace sent his paper to Darwin and asked him to forward it to Charles Lyell who could send it to the Linnean Society. On 1 July 1858, Darwin's and Wallace's papers were communicated to the Linnean Society (302). I think it is more than astonishing that Darwin and Wallace, although competitors, were able to keep their relationship balanced. In 1870 Darwin stated as follows:

"[...] a very few things in my life have been more satisfactory to me [...] we have never felt any jealousy towards each other, though in one sense rivals. I believe that I can say this of myself with truth and I am absolutely sure that it is true of you. You have been a good Christian [...]" (303).

Interestingly, Darwin's utterance communicates respect for Wallace's Christian life; it seems that Darwin, finally, considered Christian morality the best remedy against "any jealousy". In any case, Wallace's somewhat humble, modest, and kind nature kept him away from the list of the most celebrated scientists of the 19th century. In 1864 he wrote to Darwin as follows:

"As to the theory of "Natural Selection" itself, I shall always maintain it to be actually yours and yours only. You had worked it out in details I had never thought of, years before I had a ray of light on the subject, and my paper would never have convinced anybody or been noticed as more than an ingenious speculation, whereas your book has revolutionized the study of Natural History" (304).

But why then was Darwin such an overpowering figure? Before Darwin, the British Victorians Patrick Matthew (1790-1874) and Edward Blyth had independently understood the principle of natural selection and employed it as a mechanism to explain how species become modified. Matthew's views were published in *Naval Timber and Arboriculture* (1831), which was incomprehensibly dismissed by the readers. After publication of Darwin's "The Origin of Species", Matthew wrote in *Gardener's Chronicle* (on 7 April 1860) that he had arrived at the same conclusions thirty years earlier. (305.) Unfortunately, it was too late for Matthew's triumph although Darwin acknowledged that Matthew had understood the principle of natural selection "in the full force" (306). It is a peculiar fact that Darwin became a "steamroller" of evolutionism since he does not strike me as a particularly courageous and strong man. On the contrary, he was extremely ill and weak and suffered greatly from the criticism directed at his theories. I would describe him as an insecure pessimist. However, Darwin's power over the ordinary argumentation was apparent in his ability to realize the full potential of natural selection, that is, to understand that the evolution of all life was guided by the principle of natural selection. I believe the reason for Wallace's "defeat" was fourfold. Firstly, Wallace

probably lost the game since he was in the field when Darwin published his grand ideas. Secondly, Wallace constantly had difficulties with putting things together, that is, “writing anything like narrative” (307). Thirdly, Darwin was in a better position than Wallace since he never had to earn his living. And finally, Wallace too early assumed the role of an assistant although there was no need for it. The greatest difference between Wallace and Darwin was the attitude they shared towards Herbert Spencer. In 1864, Wallace became astonished by Spencer’s social statistic and considered it “amusing and clear”. At the same time he began to correspond with Spencer. Wallace thought Spencer’s “light literature” would be suitable for Darwin’s “special studies” (308). Wallace’s admiration for Spencer was so fervent that he even baptized his three month old son by the name of Herbert Spencer (309). Darwin’s answer was: “I heartily congratulate you on the birth of “Herbert Spencer” and may he deserve his name, but I hope he will copy his father’s style and not his namesake’s” (310). Darwin was never totally delighted and convinced by the Spencerian “synthesis”. Due to the fact that Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory has been examined in various studies (Ghiselin 1984, Desmond & Moore 1991, Mayr 1993, Jones 1994, and Amigoni & Wallace 1995) from various viewpoints, I feel it is futile to endeavour to afford one explanation more. Therefore, I have arrived at a decision to analyse only briefly his (and Wallace’s) evolutionary thought. As is known, Darwin’s and Wallace’s (like Spencer’s) observations on geographical distribution and geological succession led them to be doubtful of the invariability of species. Darwin’s evolution was criticized for forgetting history. Evidently, this meant that Darwin’s theory was opposite to the Creation. If Darwin’s “The Origin” was a shock to people who believed in the Biblical account of the Creation, an even greater jolt was his *The Descent of Man*, published in 1871, which seemed to insense the church conservatives even more. As is known, the book suggested that a human had a common ancestor with the animals. Then, Lyell’s notion of the co-existence of human and mammoth turned into a relationship of the two species (some fossil evidence was also known to Darwin). Wallace also correctly anticipated that Africa would be “the place to find the Early man” (311). The discovery in a South African Blombos cave has pointed out that human life began much earlier (100 000 - 70 000 years ago) than previously thought (312). By trying to squeeze Darwin’s and Wallace’s theory of evolution into one sentence it is possible to state that they described the transformation *from* earlier organisms to more complex ones (by inherited variation and mutation). In the Galápagos Islands, Darwin realized that each island supported its own form of tortoise, mockingbird, and finch, that is, the various forms were closely related but dissimilar in structure and eating habits from island to island. Darwin’s observation raised the question of possible links between distinct but similar species. The question of mutation appeared to be very complex to both Darwin and Wallace. Wallace could never decide why and how some birds had lost their ability to fly, that is, why “the birds do not want their wings” (313). The existence of individual variability was not the only solution to the question how species arise in nature. Evidently, the struggle for existence and natural selection as explanations had to be taken into account. Before Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace, Charles Lyell had discussed the competition between organic beings. (314.) According to Darwin, the struggle for existence referred to the

ability to act independently and the way this succeeded in producing offspring (315). In writing a paragraph on the struggle for existence Darwin drew on the doctrine of the British economist, Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), who stated that population increases faster than the means of subsistence unless disease or war intervene or actions are taken to limit population. In fact, Darwin applied Malthus's theory to "animal and vegetable kingdoms" (316). For Darwin, natural selection was a universal day-to-day phenomena when "every variation" endeavoured to take advantage of what is good and reject what is bad. The alteration in the conditions of life "caused or increased variability". (317.) Natural selection ("the Conditions of Existence") included unity of type which indicated basic structural coherence in organic beings (318). In a general sense, the development in nature was organized and gradual. Charles Darwin emphasized the old canon *natura non facit saltum*, nature does not make sudden bounds, to be "strictly true" (319). This maxim which describes natural selection was inherited from Linnaeus (*Philosophia botanica*) but also from the Aristotelian school. Thus, it appears that the ideas of classical minds were passed on to the later evolutionists (and this also justifies my lengthy analysis of the history of evolution). It appears that Wallace's ideas of natural selection were partly dissimilar to Darwin's when Darwin asked him to clarify his views:

"[...] but I cannot quite understand one point and I would be grateful for an explanation for I want fully to understand you. How can one female be selected and the intermediate forms die out without also the other extreme form also dying out from not having the advantages of the first selected form [...]" (320).

Interestingly, Darwin believed that "if the country were open on its borders, new forms would certainly immigrate and this also would seriously disturb the relations of some of the former inhabitants" (321). In 1866, Wallace took a conceptually opposing stand to Darwin's natural selection by suggesting that it was an ambiguous term which "to the few was as clear as daylight but to many a stumbling block" (322). Thereupon, he suggested that Darwin should use Spencer's term "survival of the fittest" which sounded more "plain" (323). Darwin answered that he fully agreed with all that Wallace said "on the advantages of Spencer's excellent expression" but he, however, doubted whether it was reasonable to abandon the term natural selection which was "so known internationally" (324). Further, Darwin claimed that any other term would correspondingly give reason for criticism (325). Ironically, today "survival of the fittest" is mainly known as Darwin's discovery. At length, Darwin did not share Spencer's belief in progress. In his *The Descent of Man* Darwin optimistically discussed strengthening the instincts and habits of future generations but thought afterwards gloomily about the future in which "the fittest did not survive" (326). In fact, Wallace stated that in one of his later conversations with Darwin "he expressed himself very gloomily on the future of humanity, on the ground that in our modern civilization natural selection had no play" (327). This indicates that for Darwin development was not strictly a progression from lower to

higher, but a complex phenomenon through preservation and accumulation from one mutation to another. Ihanus (1990) has stated that Darwin endeavoured to widen his evolutionary scope to mental and social processes (328). As mentioned before, Darwin had a few notes on man which he, in fact, did not plan to use. The main reason for his vacillation was that his outlines were “in a state of chaos” and probably were not “of any value” (329). On a very general level, Darwin’s ideas on why the different races have a widely different standard of beauty and why the most powerful men will generally produce the largest number of descendents (theory of “sexual selection”) can be seen in terms of psychological and social contemplation (330). However, I consider it somewhat peculiar that later scholars, like G. Spiller, have connected Darwinian ideas and sociology to eugenic views, of improving the human race (331). Undoubtedly, Darwin’s cousin, the geneticist and anthropologist Francis Galton (1822-1911), was developing the ideas of superman and super-civilization but it was not typical of Darwin. As stated, his conclusions on differences in races were supposed biological “inevabilities” not presented in a racist manner.

But is it possible to state the same about Herbert Spencer? In his boyhood Spencer’s father encouraged his son to undertake studies on natural history (332). During his youth Spencer also read Miss Martineau’s “Tales of Political Economy” (333). Inventiveness belonged to his early career as a railway engineer. At that time, Spencer produced various mechanical inventions for a living; he originally invented the early paper clip. (334.) Spencer’s career as a scholar was launched when he began to write scientific and political articles for various magazines (335). Spencer constructed a system of universal synthetic philosophy (biology, psychology, sociology, and morality) from empirical bases (336). I am not the first to wonder at his megalomania. In the 1960s, A.O.J. Cockshut said quite pertinently that “no one but a lunatic imagines that he understands the universe completely” (337). But it has also been stated that as an evolutionist Spencer stands “in an absolutely independent position” (338). Spencer was away from London in July 1858 when Darwin’s and Wallace’s papers were sent to the Linnean Society. For the most part, Spencer had independently come near to Darwin when outlining ideas of natural selection (“survival of the fittest”). Still Spencer, too, was tutored by Dr. Hooker, who read Spencer’s proof-sheets and pointed out errors in details (339). In 1881 Spencer described to A.R. Wallace how he had arrived at a conclusion on “survival of the fittest”:

“The whole process with all its horrors and tyrannies and slaveries and wars and abominations of all kind has been an inevitable me accompanying the survival and spread of the strongest, and the consolidation of small tribes into large societies [...]” (340).

Although Darwin formulated his ideas from the late 1830s onwards, and his ideas were privately known among the most prominent scholars, he remained unknown to Spencer, whose ideas mainly originated from Lamarckian (and Buffonian) sources- “the only and definite mechanism of development then known” (341). After all, Spencer and Darwin were

indebted to each other: Spencer was thoroughly Darwinian in accepting the selection and species question, and Darwin was equally Spencerian in admitting that there was an evolutionary principle where selection had not been shown to be appropriate (342). Probably Spencer's system had some advantages over Darwin's since it received greater attention than otherwise would have been accorded to it (343). Interestingly, Spencer considered the term "Darwinism" "the erroneous conception almost universally current" owing to the "qualification of its meaning" (344). Obviously, Spencer thought that "Darwinism" should, before being used, be defined and clarified properly so that it could be separated from other theories of evolution, that is, Spencer was probably worried that "Darwinism" would become a common term for all theories of evolution (including his own ideas). In 1887, M.J. Savage urged scholars to concede that Darwinism and evolution were not the same since Darwinism was concerned only with the development of organic life whereas evolution referred to the development of systems in a totality of the universe (345). In the light of this interpretation Herbert Spencer, not Charles Darwin, was a real evolutionist. True or not (there is no accounting for tastes), it is worth observing that both Spencer and Darwin were cautious about evolution. In his response to the "Congress of Evolutionists", held at Chicago on 28-30 September 1893, Spencer dealt with the conception of evolution very mindfully: "Evolution includes much more than "natural selection"" (346). Nevertheless, while Spencer prudently believed in the ennobling of organisms, Darwin was pessimistically of the opinion that the strongest and the most elevated would finally lose the game (Spencer's cautious optimism vs. Darwin's cautious pessimism). In my opinion we should be careful with the terms "Darwinism" and "social Darwinism". Firstly, "Darwinism" as a common concept is misleading since it does what it should avoid, that is, it obviously encompasses all notions of development although many of them have nothing to do with Darwin's ideas. We should probably discuss "Darwinism" only when referring to Darwin's idea of evolution. The term "social Darwinism" is merely a pathetic jawbreaker. It refers to the Darwinian notion of development but finally *means* Herbert Spencer's and William Graham Sumner's (1840-1910) ideas of social evolution. The term dismisses the fact that Spencer was almost independent of Darwin. Furthermore, social evolution in its ultimate form was created before Spencer and Darwin (347). And, as stated, Darwin's notion of social evolution always remained rough. For this reason "social Darwinism" is a false and deceptive mislabelling. On the whole, Spencer's evolution resembled Heraclitus's conception of the world in a continuous state of flux. In Spencer's reasoning the category of causality, not the category of substance, governed, that is, Spencer was interested in the changes which occurred in the processes of the world, not in the world's substance (348). Evolution was not mechanical but resulted from adaptation to the environment (349). The changes were universal and subordinate to a greater metamorphosis: "These various changes, organic or inorganic, are all changes going on in the same Cosmos, and forming parts of one vast transformation" (350). Then, the Spencerian evolution "is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation" (351). The transformation was

“vast” but also “varied”. The passage from an incoherent state to a coherent state had primarily occurred in our solar system. But Spencer was not satisfied with his conceptual pair “incoherent and coherent” and was compelled to ask the supplementary question “how does each whole come to divide itself into parts?”. Before long, Spencer realized that his question referred to the transformation which was “more remarkable than the passage of the whole from an incoherent to a coherent state”. In an evolutionary sense this had to mean that “uniform becomes multiform or that homogenous state becomes heterogeneous”. This, then, was the second aspect under which we have to study evolution. (352.)

For Spencer, evolution was progressive “as in the evolution of the Solar System there is progressive aggregation of the entire mass” (Spencer’s evolution at large - Inorganic, Organic, and Superorganic) (353). Basically, Spencer’s habit of perceiving society as one organism in the process of development made him a “social evolutionist”. Spencer’s evolution began with the “successive stages passed through by every embryo” and continued with the examples of the solar system, the earth and geological evolution, biological species, and the society (how language, science, and art had advanced). Society was like a biological organism which ascended from the lower creatures to the higher. However, the actions of individuals made society different from biological organisms. Yet, on a complex and organized level of society integration, harmony, and mutual dependence became the most elevated. (354.) However, society itself was also divided into stages. As mentioned before, Spencer’s ideas of the stages of development were inherited from writing up Comte. Still, Spencerian evolution progressed in a Lamarckian spirit *towards* higher forms of organism/ organization /complexity (compare to Lyell’s, Darwin’s, and Wallace’s transformation *from* an earlier organism). In his “Principles of Sociology”, Spencer arranged primitive, ancient, and modern societies in order. As society grew, its structure became more complex. The “primitive” societies were structureless and their regulative system took care of offence and defence. Ancient societies lived in a “sustaining system” in which people produced things for a living and finally, within modern societies living was assured by exchange and distribution which indicated trading and monetary affairs. (355.) Each society sustained various institutions. One institution was “religion” which emerged when “tribe” progressed, that is, when the chieftainship became “hereditary in one family”. Before the rise of “religion”, the early families, like “nomadic tribes”, professed “religious ideas” and thus there were no irreligious people however “primitive”. (356.) In fact, religious ideas formed the basis for “primitive” man’s social life. But tracing the ultimate religious ideas was not effortless for Spencer. In his “First Principles”, he discussed the “primitive ghost-theory” (“ghosts become causes for strange occurrences”), an ultimate religious idea (357). In his “Principles of Sociology”, he aimed at an intuitive pondering of dreams and ancestor worship, the keys to knowledge of the origin of religion. Rafael Karsten praised Spencer as “one of the first anthropologists to see in the culture of the present-day savage, an approximate correspondence to the state of culture represented by early or prehistoric man” (358). Karsten was satisfied with Spencer whose ideas showed to sceptics that *homo religiosus* had always been part of *homo sapiens*. Spencer’s

conception of the religion of “primitive” people was typical of social evolutionists who were opposed to the supporters of the theory of degeneration of culture (from higher forms to lower). But let us revisit Spencer’s “ultimate religious ideas”. When the religious ideas finally emerged they were almost universal and fundamentally true (359). Spencer emphasized that diverse forms of religious belief had their basis in some ultimate fact. In order to understand the birth of religious ideas it was necessary to ask “the origin and function” of religious sentiment which, after all, produced religious ideas:

“If we adopt a process of evolution, then we are met by the questions - “What are the circumstances to which the genesis of the religious feeling is due? And - What is its office? [...] We must conclude that the religious sentiment is either directly created or created by the slow action of natural causes: requires us to treat the religious sentiment with respect” (360).

Spencer’s definition seems at first sight empty. What is understandable is that the situation guides mental processes directly or indirectly. That is how religious sentiment is born. But does this sound too simple? What about the interaction of the human and her environment? It appears as if Spencer had “indispensably” adapted his theory of social evolution to religion, that is, religion was like a “race which has passed a certain stage of intellectual development”. As stated, religious ideas grew to “religion” when supreme power became hereditary. (361.) In Spencerian terms the development of “religion” is seen through the position of rulers. At first, rulers were considered “gods or demigods” whereupon kings were “superhuman in power” (in Fiji, for instance). In a “less barbarous” stage the monarch, instead of being literally considered a god, had divine authority”(in the East). Later, in the progress of civilization the divine origin was substituted by divine right whereupon the “king was God’s vice-gerent” (the Middle Ages). Today, the monarch has no rights beyond those originating in the “assent of the nation”. (362.) In general, it would be erroneous to consider Spencer’s notions futile, since he was paradigmatically significant to the degree that he solved the problems in ways from which later scholars of religion, like Karsten, benefited (363). During the years, Spencer’s naturalistic approach and his assumed racial tendency have cast a shadow over his works. Spencer believed that the instinct of self-preservation was typical of each institution and individual inside society (364). If the self-conservancy of an individual was impaired or invalidated, she became “unworthy”. Here Spencer sounds inhumane. However, very much like Lamarck, Spencer believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics, that is, criminals and the mentally ill produced “defective” offspring:

“For if the unworthy are helped to increase, by shielding them from that mortality which their unworthiness would naturally entail, the effect is to produce, generation after generation, a greater unworthiness” (365).

The “weak” or “the worst” persons were a risk to the other members of the population who, in spite of taking care of their family, had to care for the weakest ones whose self-conservation was non-existent. And since mental diseases, criminal nature, and disability were passed down, the children of “defective” persons were as well unable to take care of themselves. According to Spencer, it was cruel to allow the “worst” to multiply. (366.) Spencer’s struggle for existence was different from Darwin’s notions since it was now society which was seen as a biological organism or the one absolute factor in every sphere of life. From a modern viewpoint Spencer’s text, of course, is tough and it is easy to understand why the National Socialists copied so much from his population doctrine. Still, we would do Spencer an injustice if we merely label him as a supporter of a racial doctrine. Spencer was not the first to state that a criminal mother gave birth to a criminal son or that a certain feature anticipated villainy (the Italian scholar Lombroso suggested that a person’s proneness to wicked behaviour could be discerned from the feet) (367). What Spencer desired to say was that all living organisms adapted biologically to their environment and there was always a severe struggle for existence which ended in the survival of the fittest. In essence, the idea of evolution tended to cast off the rigid distinctions between one type of creature and another. Spencer’s ideas of “population elimination” were probably partly influenced by the gloomy future prognosis of Malthus, which cast a suspicious shadow over the progressively increasing population in Europe. Also a bias of that time, the European egoistic belief in progress and improvement refused to favour the position of the weak. Interestingly, Spencer was an eager supporter of individual freedom and the invisible dominance of the market and the government and thus his ideas of evolution were bound to his *laissez-faire* policy. He remained non-conservative in his opposition to militarism and imperialism. In the 1880s and 1890s Spencer publicly protested against British involvement abroad. All in all, it can be said that Spencer more than any other writer succeeded in changing the attitudes of British people towards the humanities. Owing to Spencer, the natural sciences became duly interested in philosophy and vice versa. (368.)

In his “Primitive Culture”, Edward B. Tylor stated that “the tendency of modern enquiry is more and more toward the conclusion that if law is anywhere, it is everywhere” (369). Tylor’s description evidently reflected the general atmosphere which Spencer’s synthetic philosophy had created. As a general rule, public opinion had changed people’s attitudes towards evolution to be more providential: “the English mind moves freely under the pressure of facts”, as Tylor said in 1878 (370). The works of Tylor (*Researches into the Early History of Mankind*) and Lubbock (*Prehistoric Times*) published in 1865 were epoch-making concerning the development of evolutionary anthropology and nothing can diminish their significance. Tylor’s study on the early history of mankind was his first major evolutionary anthropological work although he had published three works earlier (“Anahuac”(1861), “Remarks on Buschmann’s researches in North-American philology” (1862) and “Wild men and Beast-children” (1863)). However, Tylor’s discoveries of religion were not published until in *Primitive Culture* (1871). It is somewhat controversial how much influence Tylor absorbed

from Darwin and Spencer. According to Samuel J. Preus (1996), “on the whole, not very [much]” since the most Darwinian statement in Tylor’s study on primitive culture is that “in which Tylor almost echoes Herbert Spencer’s term “survival of the fittest” with reference to cultural forms” (371). Tylor respected Darwin and Spencer by saying that they “should not be left without formal recognition” (372). Tylor sent also his “Primitive Culture” to Darwin right after its publication (373). But the fact that Tylor was speaking highly of Darwin and Spencer is not equal to having proof that he actually pursued their notions. On the whole, the core of Tylor’s idea of development is the Aristotelian and Leibnitzian notion that nature never acts by leaps (“la nature n’agit jamais par saut”). As is known, this maxim was also strictly true for Darwin, who saw development as gradual and organized. For Tylor development (of civilization) was a “process of long and complex growth whereupon its various grades may be regarded as stages of development or evolution, each the outcome of previous history” (374). Then, Tylor, as Darwin and Spencer, believed in evolution which placed humankind within the created order, that is, organisms were not placed on the earth but generated out of the soil. Like Spencer, Tylor provided a theory of the various stages of development (savage-barbaric-semicivilized-civilized). And, like Spencer, Tylor adapted the idea of evolution to society, human, and culture. Interestingly, Tylor’s “Primitive Culture” was published six years prior to Spencer’s “Principles of Sociology” and thus the most pertinent question should be how much Spencer was ultimately influenced by Tylor. I consider Spencer more a naturalist than Tylor whose contribution to evolution lay in his discussion of anthropology and religion. One proof of Tylor’s non-naturalist nature is his clear aspiration to treat the development of culture from a “plain ethnographic basis” (375). But then again, the assignment of Tylor’s ethnographer was inherited from the duties of a thoroughbred natural scientist:

“The ethnographer’s business is to classify details with a view to making out their distribution in geography and history and the relations which exist among them. What this task is like, may be almost perfectly illustrated by comparing these details of culture with the species of plants and animals as studied by the naturalist. To the ethnographer, the bow and arrow is a species, the habit of flattening children’s skulls is a species, the practice of reckoning numbers by tens is a species. The geographical distribution of these things [...] has to be studied as the naturalist studies the geography of his botanical and zoological species. Just as certain plants and animals are peculiar to certain districts, so it is with such instruments as the Australian boomerang” (376).

Although giving ethnography certain “naturalistic” allusions, Tylor first and foremost allowed an unclouded historical scope to his studies (“history is a powerful agent in shaping men’s minds”). Tylor was impressed by Comte’s notion that “no conception can be understood except through its history”. In consequence, “the master-key to the investigation of man’s primeval condition was held by prehistoric archaeology”, that is, Tylor suggested that this key was “the evidence of the stone age, proving that men of remotely ancient ages were in the

savage state". On the whole, Tylor's "history" progressed in the Lamarckian and Spencerian spirit "towards perfection" which indicated that "no people will relapse into their original barbarism". Tylor's historical "perfection" was twofold: firstly, mankind developed materially (the use of stone tools replaced by easier processes), and, secondly, mankind matured intellectually (the improvement of mental and physical faculties - from naked mind and body to civilized mind). However, Tylor cannot be accused of being an excessively optimistic cultural evolutionist. On the contrary, he was fully aware of the various irregularities in the mental development of mankind which meant that a pattern of development was not viewed as uninterrupted (unilinear). Nonetheless, Tylor showed signs of theoretical blindness in insisting that progress was "slow in the beginning and increasing by degrees with redoubled velocity". (377.) The notion of degeneration was always strange to Tylor, who emphasized that there was no "single fact which seems to me to justify the theory that the ordinary condition of the savage is the result of degeneration from a far higher state" (378). For Tylor it was a methodological self-evident truth that an ethnographer, instead of stating the bare facts, formed the argument. "Rudimentary as the science of culture still was" Tylor lacked no material but instead he had to "select the most instructive ethnological facts from the vast mass on record" (Tylor's "science of culture" means anthropology) (379). The vast material to be used was produced by missionaries and explorers (from Captain Cook to Adolf Bastian). The literary works of Catlin ("North American Indians") and Prescott ("Mexico" and "Peru") also made the habits of "strange and ancient races" known (380). The problem was that nobody had brought this material into shape theoretically and methodologically (381). As is known, the comparative method and utilization of tabulation and classification of details were pronouncedly Tylorian methods. However, statistical investigation originally stemmed from the practices of the German Adolf Bastian and the English Francis Galton (382). By making comparisons and tabulations Tylor aspired to know why knowledge (or any particular skill) could be found in a certain place and how it had arrived there. In the first place ethnographical evidence (the facts collected) seemed to favour the view that the broad variations in the civilization are rather of degree than of kind (thus "the Gesture-Language is the same in principle, and similar in its details, all over the world"). Tylor offered three explanations for the supposed cultural similarities: independent invention, inheritance from ancestors, and transmission from one race to another. Although Tylor considered it almost impossible to say which of these explanations was of a higher grade he deduced that "sometimes, indeed, the first is evidently to be preferred" (383). Thus, the theory of independent invention made Edward Tylor believe that the human mind was similar all over the world. Tylor was fully aware that his ideas resembled the Italian proverb *tutto il mondo e paese* - "all the world is one country". (384.) But Tylor's notion mostly stemmed from Adolf Bastian's assumption of the mental unity of humankind (*Elementargedanken* and *Völkergedanken*) which aspired to explain the existence of the same ideas in different areas. However, it is important to note that Tylor never strictly denied the principles of transmission and inheritance. In fact, the famous Tylorian survivals in culture (a custom, an art or an opinion) kept their course from generation to generation and can thus be seen as some sort of inheritance from ancestors (385). Due to

his theoretical ambiguity, Tylor has sometimes been connected with the ideas of diffusionism, a counter-reaction to evolutionism within anthropology. Admittedly, on some occasions Tylor's notion of transmission resembled the ideas of diffusionism (that all or most distribution of cultural materials is due to their spreading from one locality or area to another, diffusion) but taking into account that Bastian's theory of mental unity was an antithesis to diffusionism, it would be erroneous to label Tylor diffusionist *in toto*. Interestingly, Tylor defined "culture" extensively only in his "Primitive Culture". Before, he had only concentrated on pondering the possible universality of the human mind. The Tylorian encyclopaedic definition of culture has become acknowledged: "Culture or Civilization was that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (386). Tylor saw the human as a member of society not an individual worker. Thus his notion was dissimilar to Spencer's idea of individual workers of society whose individual liberty was gradually increasing. In fact, the cognitive aspect of Edward B. Tylor's anthropology and study of religion becomes visible here: knowledge and belief, "capabilities and habits acquired", were learned as a member of society (387). It has been stated that as a rationalist Quaker, Tylor was not fascinated by the emotional, affective side of religion (this also was Karsten's view). But he discussed emotion with which religious belief was associated in his last chapter on animism. There his notion of "intense emotion with agonizing terror and rapt ecstasy" resembles, as Radin has suggested, Rudolf Otto's feeling of the mysterious, that is, "wholly other". While "religion" (as to its historical foundation) was not clearly one of the most important parts of Herbert Spencer's work, all the more significant it was to Tylor who gave "religion" a central role in his works. Yet, while Spencer (and Comte) were observing religion from a social and functional viewpoint, Tylor treated religion "culturally" by taking the view that religion as belief was a part of a vast complex called culture. It would be easy to think that Tylor's evolutionary thoughts of religion could be safely reduced to his notions of animism. Paul Radin was more than right in claiming that "Tylor's achievement in religion is much greater than that" (388). First and foremost, Edward Tylor gave us a "well-thought-out history of religions" (389). Tylor's ideas of the scientific study of religion do not transfer his scholarly position to mere anthropology as Walter Capp suggested in the 1970s. In short, we have to consider Tylor a significant father of comparative religion. Since it is not purposeful to give an exhaustive evaluation of Tylor's study on religion here, I emphasize only the most "evolutionary" fact of his comparative religion, that is, the theory of the origin of religion.

As a general rule, Tylor's theory of animism is an umbrella to his whole study of religions, including his famous "minimum definition of religion". According to Rafael Karsten, "among writers of the evolutionary school who have tried to explain the origin of religion there are two who ought to be mentioned above all others: Herbert Spencer and E. B. Tylor" (390). Tylor dedicated the second part of his "Primitive Culture" to the analysis of animism. His task to give a definition of religion compelled him to ponder whether there were "tribes so low as to have no religious conceptions" (391). Bearing a likeness to his notion of universal mind,

Tylor suggested that the question dealt with the universal nature of religion (compare to Max Weber's "belief in supernatural is universal"). But the analysis of the religions of "the lower races" required primarily a definition of religion. For Tylor religion was "belief in Spiritual Beings" (392). Evidently, Tylor's definition *in nuce* is very short and abandons a human's relation to these beings (compare to the definition of Robertson Smith that religion is "the manner in which a man is related to these beings"). In every case Tylor arrived at the conclusion that "non-religious tribes may not exist in our day" (again the Tylorian "element of uncertainty"). By adopting this opinion, Tylor came to emphasize two things: firstly, it was wrong to exaggerate the lowness of "savage" life and, secondly, "savage" religion is not ridiculous since beliefs and practises are logical. (393.) Originally, Tylor had realized that there was logic in "primitive" beliefs when comparing the magic of "lower level of civilization" to science and religion. Tylor claimed that although "occult science" was based on "pernicious delusion" it was an activity similar to science: it mixed up a belief in impersonal power and was based on real perception (religion was a belief in "exteriorized" spiritual beings). But, of course, the subjectivity and spontaneity of magic separated it from the objectivity and systematized experiments of science. Now the important point is that the similarities between magic and science showed to Tylor that the difference between "primitive" and "our" mental processes was not essential: "primitive man" could be considered a "rationalist philosopher". Hence, Tylor was angry with Max Müller who made the "religions of savage tribes" seem ridiculous compared to the great Asiatic system. But then again, Tylor also made his "savages" seem childlike and naïve by suggesting that "we may apply the often-repeated comparison of savages to children as fairly to their moral as to their intellectual condition" (for more information, see *Primitive Culture*, Volume I). (394.) For Tylor, it was possible to investigate the "doctrine of Spiritual Beings", religion, via "Animism" which "technically" was not a new term but stemmed from the classic theory of the German physician Georg Ernst Stahl, who coined the term in the 18th century in order to explain his idea of the soul as a vital principle responsible for organic development. (395). Tylor defined his task as follows:

"I have set myself to examine systematically among the lower races, the development of Animism; that is to say, the doctrine of souls and other spiritual beings in general" (396).

Thus, for Tylor, "animism" was a doctrine of souls and spirits. Tylor regarded "animism" as a philosophy where belief was the theory and worship was the practice. Although animism on the whole was the foundation for all religions, it developed into "philosophy of natural religion" among mankind. (397.) Tylor's "natural religion" was both general and particular. In general, Tylor saw religious doctrines and practices as the outcome of human reason not of supernatural intervention. Thus, religions were considered natural phenomena. Particularly, "natural religion" indicated a viewpoint free from "revelation". This meant that Tylor wanted to base his argument on pure reason in contrast to people who had evaluated "primitive religion" from the viewpoint of the Christian creed, for instance. But let us return to Tylor's animism. Tylor divided the theory of animism into two dogmas: first, individual souls which

continued their existence after the destruction of the body, and, second, other spirits and deities (398). In other words, Tylor made a distinction between universal spiritual beings (universal belief in the immortality of the soul) and other vaguer beings. The spiritual beings controlled the events of the material world and “received pleasure or displeasure from human actions”. The human’s belief in spiritual beings eventually led to veneration of the living. Tylor suggested that “primitive people” believed in spirits or souls (Tylor made no conceptual distinction) which were the cause of life in human beings, that is, they regarded spirits as phantoms who could transmigrate “from person to person, from the dead to the living, and from and into plants, animals, and lifeless objects”. Tylor’s idea of transmigration was influenced by Louis Figuier’s work *The Day after Death: Our Future Life according to Science* which attempted to revive the ancient belief that “body is the habitat of soul, which goes out when a man dies”. Figuier believed that the highest destiny of the transmigrating being is “the Sun: the pure spirits who form its mass of burning gases, pour cut germs and life to start the course of planetary existence”. In fact, the idea of transmigration was synonymous with the “great doctrine of metempsychosis” which not only suggested that “an animal may have a soul, but that this soul may have inhabited a human being, and thus the creature may be in fact their own ancestor or once familiar friend”. Does this mean that Tylor’s idea of transmigration was also roughly synonymous with rebirth or reincarnation? First of all, Tylor made a distinction between the theory of the “transmigration of souls” and the theory of the independent existence of the personal soul after the death of the body which, evidently, meant the idea of resurrection adopted by orthodox Judaism and Christianity (among Jews, the mystical Cabbalists adopted the idea of transmigration as part of their system of philosophy). It seems to me that for Tylor transmigration and reincarnation had a common meaning. Tylor believed that the idea of transmigration was either temporary or permanent thus the former meant passing “from human bodies down to morsels of wood” and the latter a transition, “new birth, or re-incarnation of human souls in other human bodies”. For Tylor, reincarnation was accomplished by the transmigration of the soul especially when “new birth was considered to take place by the soul of a deceased person animating the body of an infant”. (399.) Today, the ideas of transmigration, rebirth, and metempsychosis still conceptually overlap. Yet, we may suggest that the idea of transmigration describes the “*passing* of the soul at death” when reincarnation refers to “*rebirth*”. Further, in transmigration the soul can pass on to an animal, plant or human form even in a dream state which is not typical of the idea of reincarnation. This kind of conceptual examination, however, does not offer knowledge but opinions. The following figure shows the differences between various viewpoints:

Figure 5. *The ideas of transmigration, metempsychosis, rebirth, metamorphosis and resurrection*

Transmigration / Metempsychosis / Rebirth



The passing of the “soul or spirit” (consequence of a person) at death from one body to another or to a new form of being. Indicates a perpetuity from one life to the next, either of a self or soul, or if there is no “self” being reborn, as in Buddhism, only the process of causal change.

Metamorphosis



The transformation of a living being into another form of life (e.g. from a person into a plant)

Resurrection (Lat., *resurgo*, “I arise”)



The body rising back to life after death, that is, the departed souls will be restored and become immortal (especially in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam)

To conclude, we must consider transmigration, metempsychosis and rebirth overlapping explanations whereas metamorphosis and resurrection are antitheses. Nevertheless, the term “rebirth” is somewhat complex in taking into account the case of Buddhism, for instance, when the self as a dynamic coherence changes between lifetimes and refers, thus, more to rebirth than transmigration. Generally speaking, the idea of rebirth is common in Eastern religions. Today, the Tylorian search of the origin of religion is viewed as futile (see Radin 1958). But why? Robert Lowie has offered the most interesting explanation by stating that since there has not been “any rival theory to better it, the students of religion no longer engage in intellectual inquiries into the “origins” of religion” (400). In general, the search for the “origins” of early religious beliefs has been revived with the findings of archaeologists and palaeontologists. They know that 17 000 - 10 000 years ago the *Cave of Mas-d’Azil* served as a ceremonial centre in France. Today, the French rock-art specialist Jean Clottes, expert in Ice Age people who lived 14 000 years ago, tells us how people at that time believed in animal spirits living in the rocks. Clottes claims that many traditional people today, like the Inuits, think this way, that is, like the Magdalenian people of the Ice Age, the Inuit sculptors of today also believe that there is a seal (animal spirit) in the rock. Clottes’s arguments are stimulating since they verify two Tylorian notions: that there is a soul in an inanimate object (principle of animism) and that it is possible to treat mankind as homogeneous in nature “though placed in different grades of civilization” (401). Clottes’s notions are also remarkable since he does not only believe that there was a symbolic spiritual link between humans and animals but also since he tries to trace the details of the ceremonies of the Magdalenian people although it is evidently difficult. Thus, today archaeologists, rock-art specialists and palaeontologists who

venture deeper and deeper into the earth and find new caves, are presenting assumptions of the early beliefs and ceremonies of ancient people. For them it is most natural. (402.) Perhaps, in the future it will also be natural to scholars of religion. All in all, Tylor linked the notion of evolution to culture and religion by imaginatively employing history, not the natural sciences, as an explanatory instrument. He paid attention to the analysis of the development stages and did not consciously attempt to question the authority or value of rites and ceremonies. He became an ideal to Frazer, Haddon, Westermarck, and Karsten although he also found many opponents in different countries (Fritz Graebner, Wilhelm Schmidt, W.H.R. Rivers and Evans-Pritchard).

A few words have to also be said about James Frazer (1854-1941) who is regarded as one of the founders of anthropology and comparative religion. His masterpiece *The Golden Bough: A study in magic and religion*, which made an impact on Bronislaw Malinowski, appeared in twelve volumes between 1890 and 1915. The work was named after the golden bough in the sacred grove at Nemi, near Rome. In his work Frazer suggested that the human progressed from magic through religious belief to scientific thought. Frazer was educated at Larchfield Academy, Helensburgh, the University of Glasgow, and then at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he became a classics fellow from 1871 until his death. Frazer was professor of social anthropology at Cambridge from 1908 onwards. Frazer's translation and commentary on Pausanias, a Greek travel writer of the second century, was published in six volumes in 1898. In 1910 Frazer published his famous *Totemism and Exogamy*, which later excited Sigmund Freud, and between 1913-24 he wrote the captivating *The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead*. Frazer was knighted in 1914. Frazer converted conceptually and methodologically to Tylor's ethnography after reading "Primitive Culture" (403). Like Tylor, Frazer was an armchair scholar whose extensive all-round education stemmed from his library of over thirty thousand volumes (404). Tylor was not only a paragon for Frazer. Heretofore, Frazer had acquainted himself with the philosophical and psychological notions of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. His aspiration to see "the science of nature" as equivalent to "the science of mind" is a sign of the influence of Comtean / Millian/ Spencerian positivism. However, it was Sir Robertson Smith who became the personal mentor of Frazer's monumental "Golden Bough". (405.) Frazer's evolution progressed *towards* "highest forms" and it is thus meaningful to link it to the Lamarckian/ Spencerian/ Tylorian view of evolution. In his masterpiece Frazer declared that "our theme is the growth, not the decay" which meant a staunch belief in the evolution from uniformity to diversity of function. Frazer never emphasized unilinear evolution but admitted that "the course of development has varied greatly in different societies". Still, the social progress from uniformity (democracy) to specialization (despotism) was a general trend. (406.) But how then did magic change into scientific thought? According to Frazer, "in the evolution of society magicians appear to constitute the oldest artificial class" whereupon "among the lowest savages, such as the Australian aborigines, they are the only professional class that exist". For Frazer, magic was concerned with mechanical and coercive (effective) use of things believed to have

supernatural powers. As time went by, “the order of medicine-man” became specialized and was “itself subdivided into such classes as the healers of disease, the makers of rain, and so forth”. After “the most powerful member of the order wins for himself a position as chief and gradually develops into a sacred king his old magical functions decrease and change into priestly or even divine duties” when “magic is slowly ousted by religion” (an idea endorsed also by Spencer). Therewith, religion has control over magicians but cannot annihilate them totally. Religion, in Frazer’s scheme, was “a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man” which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life. Frazer was fully aware that his definition could not satisfy everyone. Nevertheless, it revealed two sides of religion: theoretical (belief in divine being) and practical (an attempt to please them). Belief without practice was not religion but merely a theology. The human was religious if she “acted from the love or fear of God”. As time goes by, magicians become wiser and notice the fallacy of magic in order to abandon sorcery for science. Finally, Frazerian future and the hope of progress is linked to “the fortunes of science” whose “golden key” would open many locks and “every obstacle placed in the way of scientific discovery” would be “a wrong to humanity”. All in all, religion with its belief in conscious agents differed from magic and science, which took it for granted that nature was established by invariable laws operating in a machinelike manner. (407.) Frazer’s preference that magic precedes religion has evoked diverse opinions. Especially his way of considering the Australian aboriginal “tribes” “the lowest” without a religion has aroused criticism. The sociologist G. Spiller stated already in 1914 that the Australian Aborigines cannot be said to be “in any assignable way lower than or different from the European branch of humanity” (408). Since then many anthropologists have shown that the Aborigines have complex religious systems (409). Rafael Karsten believed that James Frazer’s theory “cannot be upheld practically” since it is “extremely difficult to make a definite distinction between magic and religion even in the practices of primitive people” (410). Although it would be easy to criticize Frazer for presenting ethnologically abortive views, it would be historically shortsighted. In spite of disgrace offered by later scholarship, Frazer’s encyclopaedic study of magic and religion has had a vast influence on the emergence and development of comparative religion. It is also true that Frazer influenced the English poets and novelists David Herbert Lawrence (1885-1930) and Thomas Stearns Eliot (1888-1965). Lawrence’s tribute to the Aztec civilization in his *The Plumed Serpent* (1926) was indebted to Frazer’s universal mind. Likewise, without Frazer’s “The Golden Bough” T.S. Eliot would not have chosen the motifs he presents in *The Waste Land* (1922) (411).

Something has to also be said about Alfred Cort Haddon’s evolutionary approach although it is evident that his self-styled point of view deviated from Tylor’s cultural evolutionism and, thus, coincided only slightly with Rafael Karsten’s pattern of thought (412). Owing to his zoological background, Haddon adopted a biological viewpoint which was linked to the diffusionist tradition, that is, Haddon was interested in the forms of material and spiritual culture in one particular area:

“But when the group is studied in its area of characterisation, certain features stand prominently forward, and by a study of these the essential characteristics of the whole class can be determined” (413).

Haddon’s evolutionary approach first appeared in his *Evolution in Art* published in 1895. Yet, in 1909 Haddon lectured for a month on “The Evolution of Culture round the Pacific” in Seattle, United States of America (414). Haddon’s biological emphasis was also evident in his booklet *Anthropology: Its position and needs* (1903) in which he compared the biologist to the businessman: the biologist should follow the businessman who periodically checks the warehouse and sees that the company’s accounts are balanced in order to avoid unprofitable operation (415). Peculiarly, Haddon’s work *Magic and Fetishism* (1906) did not follow his idea of “single geographical area” but presented in a broad manner the magic customs of the world. Having decided on what grounds magic must be understood, Haddon provided a lengthy comparative analysis of the customs of contagious and homeopathic magic, as the sociocultural evolutionists of late nineteenth century had done before. Yet, one third of his examples of “mimetic magic” (homeopathic magic) were based on his own studies in the Torres Straits. (416.) The reader of Haddon’s work will also realize that Haddon was fascinated by the Tylorian search for the origin of religion. In his “Magic and Fetishism”, Haddon adopted fetishism as a basis “from which many other modes of religious thought have developed” (417). On the other hand, he concluded that “it is difficult to point out where fetishism ends and nature-worship, ancestor-worship, totemism, polytheism, and idolatry begin” (418). Haddon was sceptical of Tylor’s habit of classifying “fetishism as a subordinate department of animism” since “it is these imperceptible gradations which blur all the outlines of the rigid systematist” (419). Regarding Haddon’s anti-Tylorian notion, it is perhaps reasonable to conclude that Haddon’s search for the rudimentary roots of religion tell only about his interest in the general surveying of the development.

Now I have arrived at the last object of my analysis of evolution. He is Edward Westermarck, the “convert” to Hume’s, Darwin’s, Wallace’s, Spencer’s, Tylor’s, and Frazer’s evolution. Although Westermarck offered a synthesis of the others’ theories he also modified and improved them by developing new views based on defiant argumentation. The beginning of Edward Westermarck’s evolutionary thinking was linked to Herbert Spencer’s “First Principles” which he read in summer 1884 in Swedish translation (420). A few years later, he read parts of Herbert Spencer’s “System of Synthetic Philosophy” in German translation, and learnt more about Spencer via his psychologist friend James Sully, who knew Spencer very well (421). Although Westermarck inevitably admired Spencer all his life (“It is a quirk of fate that a Finnish scholar should be the first university lecturer in sociology in Spencer’s homeland”), it was Charles Darwin’s “The Origin of Species” which led him to the analysis of sexual modesty. The question of sexual shame also interested Wallace and Tylor, who offered suggestions for Westermarck’s consideration. The burning question appeared to be the concealment of the sexual organs by clothing, whereupon Wallace suggested that perfect

nudity was very singular among “savages” (Haddon claimed that “thirty years ago the natives were absolutely naked and unashamed” but suffered later, due to European influence, from “exaggerated prudishness”) (422). Wallace also declined to support Westermarck’s notion of “rudimentary dress of being wholly due to desire to excite the sexual passions” (423). Nevertheless, Westermarck’s notion of sexual selection on the whole seemed to come close to Wallace’s own approach (424). Tylor encouraged Westermarck to collect “an even larger body of evidence” regarding the “primitive purpose of dress” (425). In his study on the history of marriage Westermarck finally established his means-by-attraction-theory, which suggested that ornaments and other decorations were used as a sexual impetus in an offer of marriage. As mentioned on Chapter 2.2., this theory finally destroyed Westermarck’s and Karsten’s academic relationship. For Karsten the act of proposing was nothing else than the “criminal endeavour to seduce wife of another man” (426). Although Wallace tutored Westermarck in various letters, both of them were captivated by Darwin’s ideas. In 1891 Wallace wrote to E. B. Tylor that “ [...] no doubt Westermarck is a thorough Darwinian, so am I, but we both differ from Darwin on some points” (427). How Darwinian was Westermarck then and how did he differ from Darwin? Westermarck has told us that when he wrote the book about the history of human marriage he was completely enchanted by Darwinian ideas and that his views of sexual selection were more Darwinian than Darwin’s theories (428). After becoming interested in sexual modesty Westermarck, by reading more Darwin, soon learnt that many prominent scholars like Morgan, McLennan, Lubbock, Bastian, Post, Giraud-Teulon, Le Bon, Wilken, and Lippert believed promiscuous sexual behaviour to be the most original form of marriage. Yet, McLennan considered the matriarchal system of kinship a relic of early promiscuity (429). After a short period of sympathy towards the notions of these theorists, Westermarck rejected the theory of promiscuity in his doctoral thesis on “The History of Human Marriage” (1889) by declaring that Lubbock’s communal marriage (promiscuity) was not likely. Westermarck concluded that marriage did not belong exclusively to our own species but it was a virtually universal institution among birds (430). Thus, there were no human beings living *in toto* promiscuously without marriage (431). Edward Westermarck assumed that marriage is intimately connected to family and is probably the simplest although not the happiest social institution. In fact, “marriage was rooted in family” (432). The family which consisted of father, mother, and offspring was a universal institution which had formed “if not the society itself, at least the nucleus of it among our earliest human ancestors” (433). Edward Westermarck pointed out critically that “free sexual intercourse prior to marriage”, *Jus primae noctis* (the right of the first night), the courtesans as representatives of the communal wives, and the predominance of the female line did not presuppose or have to do with promiscuity (434). However, Westermarck never denied that among some peoples sexual intercourse may have been “on the whole promiscuous” but refused to accept that promiscuity had “formed a general stage in the social history of mankind” (435). With that argument, Westermarck became the reserved and critical evolutionist of human marriage but also famous in the world of scholarship and science (436). Darwin and Wallace had long felt that the Bachofen-Morgan-McLennan thesis of primitive promiscuity was untrue because of evident

jealousy between the sexes, but, while Wallace had not properly studied the question himself, Darwin felt that an almost promiscuous intercourse in ancient times was quite common throughout the world (437). Darwin believed that humans' gregarious way of living made promiscuity necessary. Westermarck denied that "primitive man" had spent as gregarious a life as Darwin had suggested since "gregariousness and sociability of man is a product of civilisation". On the other hand, Westermarck supported Darwin's idea that jealousy was a strong argument against ancient promiscuity. Westermarck was opposed to the opinions of Giraud-Teulon and Le Bon according to which jealousy was unknown among all "uncivilized" peoples. According to Westermarck, jealousy was a universal and powerful agent in the social life of people. (438.) Furthermore, Westermarck was employing Darwin's "natural selection" when claiming that it was not sexual instinct but the instinct of protecting offspring which was developed through the "natural selection" that kept male and female together (439). Paternal protection assisted the species in surviving in the struggle for existence. Thus, it was not only marriage but the father's help in protecting the family which had survival value for Westermarck. After Westermarck had exposed the fallacy of the promiscuity thesis, Wallace agreed with pleasure with his notion: "Your facts and your arguments seem to me quite conclusive [...]" (440). On the whole, Westermarck's search for the origin of marriage was biologically coloured, thus the beginning of his work contains accounts of the great sub-kingdom of the Invertebrata, reptiles laying their eggs, and many Latin terms (441). This sounds very Lamarckian. From that day on when Westermarck began to collect material for his doctoral thesis, it was self-evident for him that the relation between the sexes should be studied in terms of biological facts. For Westermarck, the search for the origin of marriage basically meant the problem of how to gather information about the early history of mankind from ethnographical facts. (442.) Westermarck's answer was that we had to "make / find out the psychological causes of the social phenomena" which meant that we had to pay attention to instincts as a "very important part at the origin of social institutions and rules" (443). In his "History of Human Marriage" Westermarck put great emphasis on Tylor's statistical method of investigation, which "throws light upon many mysterious points" regarding the development of social and cultural institutions (444). In fact, Tylor had stated in a letter to Westermarck that the tabulating method assisted in "putting anthropology on a more definite basis" (445).

Obviously, then, Westermarck's search for the causes of social phenomena derived from Tylor's tabulations and classification which pointed out the adhesions of coexistence of each custom by "showing which peoples have the same custom, and what other customs accompany it or lie apart from it". The number of adhesions finally showed the causal connection between the two customs. (446.) Westermarck compared various facts with each other in order to find out the causes "on which a social phenomenon is dependent" (Professor Emeritus Erik Allardt has suggested that Westermarck's comparative method should rather be called "global approach") (447). And the causes on which the social phenomena were dependent fell for Westermarck (as to Tylor, Bastian, and Waitz) within the domain of

psychology, which had been “overlooked” (on the whole Westermarck’s psychological view was wider including the influence of Hume, Wundt, Herbert Spencer, and Høffding, for instance) (448). Thus, for Westermarck, the search for the “origins” (origin of marriage, moral ideas, beliefs) was never first and foremost linked to a chronological and compulsive quest for the most rudimentary forms, instead, by Westermarck’s “origins” we should understand, as Professor Emeritus Erik Allardt has noted, the sociopsychological context in which they emerged (449). But as far as I understand Westermarck’s “origins” also in some sense referred to the historically original social phenomena although Westermarck himself stated that he was not studying, like McLennan, “races in their primitive condition” (450). Westermarck never presented lucid developmental patterns like Spencer and Tylor, and shunned, like Darwin, the employment of the terms “lower” and “higher” in order to avoid regarding something as “primitive” only because it “at the first glance appears so” (451). But in fact, Westermarck continuously discussed “man in his savage state if compared with civilized man” and talked about “barbarians”, “semi-civilized” and “genuine savages” (452). In this context he was a staunch social evolutionist who searched for historical “entitlement”, derived from Comte and Tylor, for his “origins” (453). It appears that Wallace’s contribution to Westermarck’s work on marriage was more thorough than Tylor’s, that is, by examining the chapters and reading the proofs of the whole book Wallace notably modified Westermarck’s great work:

“The book is such a vast accumulation of facts, that few but professed anthropological students will read it through [...] this (summary) will be the only popular part of the book [...]” (454). (the word in brackets is mine)

It appears that Tylor’s active role in a small Anthropological Dining Club had assured Westermarck the opportunity to meet new colleagues. The Club used to have dinner before the meeting at the Royal Societies Club in St. James’s Street and Tylor asked Westermarck to join the company (455). This was a very authoritative request since Tylor was a highly occupied Oxford scholar. Westermarck appreciated Tylor’s solidarity and encouragement in his autobiography. It is interesting that both Wallace and Tylor faltered whether some chapters of Westermarck’s “The History of Human Marriage” were “too sexual for even a special public” (456). Wallace suggested that Westermarck should use “marriage” in place of “sexual intercourse” in order to be “as reticent as possible” (457). Westermarck’s answer for Tylor’s and Wallace’s prudery was that “to keep something secret would be the same as to throw a cloth round a naked statue” (458). That Darwin had been very a important influence on Westermarck’s study was also apparent in Westermarck’s major work *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (1906-1908). When the work was published, Westermarck was a lecturer in sociology at the University of Helsinki, and an appointed teacher of sociology at the University of London (Martin White benefaction). In his great work, Westermarck analysed the evolution of moral consciousness. According to Westermarck, moral consciousness was born in society when the first moral judgments could be described as

certain mass phenomena not the private emotions of individuals (459). Moral concepts were based on moral emotions (Humean triumph of emotion) which could be described as “retributive”: based on either approval or disapproval (460). Referring transparently to Darwin’s concepts, Westermarck assumed that the “retributive” emotions had been obtained via natural selection in the struggle for existence, that is, moral emotions “promoted the interests of the individuals who feel them”. However, Westermarck never considered Darwin’s “natural selection” absolutely true. (461.) For Westermarck, altruistic sentiment was the main source from which moral emotions sprang (462). Although sympathy as a “disinterested retributive emotion” rivalled envy it could be found even among animal species which possessed the altruistic sentiment (463). Sympathy was then a universal phenomenon which had existed already in the dawn of humans. By discussing punishments and the death penalty, which tended to produce certain kinds of emotions, Westermarck returned to his theory of incest which had already appeared in his analysis of marriage and family. As a general rule, Westermarck suggested that many people had exogamic rules which meant that persons living or growing up closely together felt a “positive aversion to sexual intercourse” with each other (Westermarck’s suggestion is also known as “the Westermarck effect”) (464). The aversion to inbreeding was not only typical of the animal kingdom but also of humans. Westermarck pointed out that it was a widespread opinion among biologists that inbreeding was more or less damaging to species (465). But how were species then able to avoid the destructive power of inbreeding? By drawing on Darwin’s natural selection, Westermarck explained how nature, which eliminated the most destructive tendencies and maintained profitable variations, formed sexual drive after the cravings of species, that is, inherited and innate aversion to sexual intercourse and marriage between persons living together from youth was a result of “natural selection” (466). According to Westermarck, sexual intercourse “between a man and his foster-daughter was almost as great an abnormality as sexual love between a father and his daughter”. Westermarck even went so far as to propose that girls and boys educated in the same school do not have sexual interest in each other. (467.) This hypothesis is not unequivocal considering the many teenage romances born in the school and continuing even to marriage (in my own circle of acquaintances there are many). Westermarck rejected Durkheim’s explanation that aversion to intermarriage of persons living closely together had resulted from totemism. “How will we then explain the normal aversion to such unions”, Westermarck inquired (468). For Tylor, Westermarck’s notion of “inherent instinctive aversion to sexual intercourse with near relatives” was not self-evident. Conversely, Tylor claimed that he had never seen “proofs brought forward to satisfy my mind, though I am not prejudiced” (469). Tylor’s attitude towards Westermarck’s incest hypothesis was more qualified than Wallace’s. It is important to remember that when Tylor emphasized the intellectual, cognitive side of behaviour, Westermarck and his friend R.R. Marett stressed the affective or emotional side of conduct. Yet, Westermarck used Tylor’s data on the adhesions of exogamy in his analysis of the “horror of incest” (470).

During his preliminary analysis of the development of moral ideas, Westermarck found out that moral ideas of “uncivilized men” were more “affected by magic than by religion”. In order to understand this link better he had to acquaint himself with the folklore of non-European people, that is, he had to listen to the “savages”. (471.) This “force” was the one to lead him to Morocco. Although Westermarck described his major work on the origin and development of the moral ideas as philosophical and psychological rather than anthropological, anthropology was certainly of interest to him since his work on morality, in spite of everything, “dealt with problems of an anthropological character” (472). Since Wallace admitted that he read anthropology once in a great while (he made the mistake of claiming that Tylor was a supporter of promiscuity theory), Tylor’s methodological advance with statistical methods applied to the search for the causal relations between cultural and social facts offered Westermarck actual entry to ethnological speculation (473). Westermarck believed that Spencer’s and Tylor’s “admirable” works represented “a cultural history based on ethnographical grounds” (474). Westermarck visited Tylor at Oxford in October 1890 and in the same year they began to correspond with each other (475). In an era when the science of culture and society lived in a rudimentary stage, Euro-American orientation to society and culture also meant conceptualizing religion and anthropology. The American Lewis Henry Morgan was a founder of kinship studies and made a distinction between classificatory kinship terminology and descriptive kinship terminology based on the progressiveness of the society (from “Malayan and Turanian” polygamy to “Aryan, Semitic, and Uralian” monogamic families) (476). With early anthropologists the concepts “lineal female and male line”, “marriage”, “family”, “monogamy”, “polygamy”, “endogamy”, “exogamy”, “phratry”, “group”, “tribe”, “society”, and “institution” became common and were treated as a part of the anthropological discipline. At the same time the terms “religion”, “magic”, “soul”, “Spiritual Beings”, “worship”, “polytheism”, “monotheism”, “animism”, “animatism”, and “totemism” assumed their place in the study of religions. By 1916, Westermarck had undertaken sixteen journeys to Morocco’s Berber-speaking tribes. He was “anxious to study the customs and beliefs” of these people. In his booklet published in 1920 Westermarck made a conceptual separation of religion from magic (*magos*). From Tylor and Frazer onwards there was a compulsion among scholars to establish the difference between religion and magic. After the evolutionists, Emile Durkheim made his often-quoted distinction between unified-cohesive (religion) and non-unified/set apart systems (magic) when Bronislaw Malinowski separated “body of self-contained acts” (religion) from “a practical art which tries to get something” (magic) (477). Westermarck took the view that “religion” always included the relation to supernatural. However, “religion” was not only belief in something but also included a practical side, that is, a religious cult (a very Frazerian notion). Westermarck believed that because the gods of “uncivilized races” were mainly of a malevolent character, religion was born of fear (an old Roman notion also later adopted by Karsten). However, fear was not the only motive behind religion but it was also linked to hope. Thus, in a religious cult the human hoped that she would be able to repel the fury of the gods. (478.) What then separated religion from magic? According to Westermarck, “religion” meant human’s endeavour to naturally

and positively influence supernatural beings whereas magic referred to supernatural means or powers in trying to influence on the gods (479). Here is then *sine qua non* of Westermarck's concept of religion. Although Westermarck thought that exorcizing was not part of religion he stated that it was difficult to make definitive bounds between "religion" and "magic" in practice since even among the world's religions divine service often included magical elements (480). Westermarck concluded that "the moral ideas of uncivilised men are more affected by magic than by religion, and the religious influence has reached its greatest extension at certain stages of culture which, though comparatively advanced, do not include the highest stage" (close to Spencer's view) (481). With this Westermarck did not mean, however, that magic was definitively older than religion, as Frazer has suggested. Although he claimed in the Frazerian spirit that magic was concerned with the mechanical use of things, he shunned Frazer's idea of the erstwhile existence of magic. Westermarck believed that magic and religion had probably coexisted eternally and that the enemy of magic was not religion but science (482). Westermarck's notion anticipated Malinowski's idea that the natives without pondering the differences between "religion" and "magic" used both simultaneously in their rituals. Westermarck believed that religion and morality had developed in close connection although we could not be sure whether this development had been fundamental and had existed all the time. Nevertheless, "the gods had experienced a gradual change for the better", that is, they had become "ideals of moral perfection" whereas religion was now the protector of morality (Rafael Karsten's conception is very similar to Westermarck's notion) (483). In Westermarck's account the "gradual change for the better" does not constitute a homogeneous and unilinear idea of development. Like Tylor, Westermarck never strictly supported cultural evolutionary ideas but was ready to admit that other views, like Friedrich Ratzel's anthropogeographic school, also had a viable seed of truth. For the most part, Westermarck adopted the Lamarckian/ Spencerian/ Tylorian/ Frazerian notion of non-unilinear development which discussed the stages of evolution and progression towards higher forms of complexity. But, as mentioned before, Westermarck never outlined any explicit pattern of development and was thus somewhat critical of the Tylorian sequences of stages and survivals. According to Westermarck, the study of survivals would produce "arbitrary conclusions" if they were not investigated in their existing environment (484). Briefly, Westermarck's notion of development was more indirect than Tylor's. Yet Westermarck believed (like Tylor) that during the development there occurred improvement (marriage becomes durable and equality between the sexes increases). Westermarck was, in short, a development optimist when sustaining the idea that civilization increased the happiness of mankind. From a modern point of view Westermarck's endeavour to distinguish religion from magic may look like a ready-made Western category which was compulsively applied to the ethnography of "primitive people". Today, anthropologists and scholars of religion avoid terms made strongly in their own culture by speaking of the magical-religious, for instance. Although this application is not faultless it takes into account two sides of many rituals: the manipulative acts and submissive behaviour (485). Still, describing "religion" as something that exists in indigenous cultures is problematic. It is as if we were trying to solve the problem of which kind of

behaviour they have by calling it “religion” or “religious”. The great error of early European scholars of religion was evidently that they believed “primitive cultures” to have the same type of institutions and function as Christianity in their own culture. It is paradoxical that early ethnologists who were able to meet people of disappearing cultures were bound by Western categories and theoretical presuppositions which made them see “religion” and “magic” everywhere (Jan-Åke Alvarsson has called this “seeing but not believing” effect) (486). But how else should they have behaved when they were doing early research? One great mistake of the early scholars of religion was, evidently, that they could not realize that sometimes beliefs and practices found a home in another category than “religion”, as in myth or world view (although Karsten was aware of this). Today, some scholars of religion restrict the use of the term “religion” to Judaism and its descendants, Christianity, and Islam. This solution is not impeccable either, although religion in this context describes institutions which have much in common. One solution could be the re-classification (to create new ways of classifying) of beliefs and practices found in other cultures. However, this proposition never finds total agreement among scholars of religion but continues the tradition of the eternal question of which is the definition and quality of religion. I conclude my analysis of Edward Westermarck with Emerik Olsoni’s description of his conception of morality and its relation to evolutionism;

“The moral point of view which appears ubiquitously in Westermarck’s work [...] is underlined by liberality, tolerance, humanity, and belief in progress, i.e. by the characters which were part of balanced “enlightened moral awareness” of the evolutionists and liberalists of the 19th century” (487).

In spite of everything, the evolutionists’ elevated preference was to emphasize respect to other cultures. Since the purpose of this section has mainly been to present Darwin’s, Spencer’s, Tylor’s, Frazer’s and Westermarck’s evolutionary views on “primitive” religion, the following figure summarizes their views on development and “primitive” religion (it has to be taken into account that the figure works on an abstract level).

Figure 6. *Synthesis of the views on evolution and “primitive” religion*

Charles Darwin > Darwin described the transformation *from* earlier organisms to more complex ones, that is, one mutation to another. Darwin endeavoured to widen his scope to mental and social processes. Darwin had a few notes on man which he did not plan to use.

Herbert Spencer > According to Spencer, evolution progressed *towards* higher forms of organism/complexity. Spencer’s habit of perceiving society as one organism in the process of development made him a “social evolutionist”. Each society sustained various institutions. One institution was “religion” which emerged when “tribe” progressed. Spencer discussed the “primitive ghost-theory”, an ultimate religious idea.

Edward Burnett Tylor > Tylor's "history" progressed *towards* perfection. For Tylor, development was a process of long and complex growth. For Tylor, religion was "belief in Spiritual Beings". It was possible to investigate the "doctrine of Spiritual Beings" via Animism, a doctrine of souls and spirits.

James Frazer > Frazer's evolution progressed *towards* "highest forms". Frazer suggested that the human progressed from magic through religious belief to scientific thought.

Edward Westermarck > For the most part, Westermarck adopted the Lamarckian/ Spencerian/ Tylorian/ Frazerian notion of *non-unilinear* development. However, Westermarck never outlined any explicit pattern of development and was thus somewhat critical of the Tylorian sequences of stages and survivals. Briefly, Westermarck's notion of development was more indirect (spiral-like) than Tylor's. Westermarck made a conceptual separation of religion from magic. He took the view that "religion" always included the relation to supernatural.

I hope this brief synthesis facilitates the reader's understanding of the development of evolutionary thought.

3.3. Brief Abstract

In Chapter Three, I have presented the profession and the system of Rafael Karsten's comparative religion. Obviously, the analysis has been not brief but has included, in my opinion, the most essential entities and relations considering the proper understanding of Rafael Karsten's theoretical constructs. The aim of Chapter Three has been threefold. Firstly, to define Rafael Karsten's profession - why I claim that he is a thoroughly Finnish scholar of religion and why I consider him the only scholar of religion within the Westermarckian school (why I see the term "Westermarckian study of religions" as a conceptual utopia). My analysis has proven that Rafael Karsten was the only scholar within the Westermarckian school who not only elaborated the methodology of Finnish comparative religion but also paid attention to its status among sciences. The scope of other Westermarckians was more restricted: Edward Westermarck was mainly interested in "magic" and its relation to "religion", while Rolf Lagerborg developed the concept of "sacred" in Durkheimian and Machian spirit. Moreover, Gunnar Landtman should be considered more an ethnologist or a sociologist than a scholar of religion. Uno (Holmberg) Harva became quite early a Ratzelian diffusionist and an adherent of the "Kulturkreise" approach while Kai (Karl) Donner adopted Malinowskian functionalism and Rivers's genealogical method as his approach. Secondly, the purpose of Chapter Three has been to analyse the suggestion of Walter Capps that the main contributors of the study of religions have been disciplines of other fields. A closer look at this issue indicates that the works of early scholars of religion (Herbert Spencer, E. B. Tylor, James Frazer, Max Müller et.al.) cannot be unequivocally placed "in the host of others". In a very real sense classical

scholars should be considered significant theoretical contributors to the early comparative religion. Thus, the point is that their studies in no respect made the study of religions arbitrarily assembled. Thirdly, the purpose of Chapter Three has been to analyse the theoretical terms of reference of Rafael Karsten's comparative religion. Then, I have attempted to present the most important persons and factors which gave the impetus for Karsten's career as a scholar of religion. The proper understanding of Karsten's theoretical constructs has necessitated a close examination of the history of empiricism, positivism, and evolutionism. Although all traditions were closely connected to each other, they deserve to be observed separately. An examination of these traditions revealed that each of them can be characterized by different traits and figures of seminal importance. While empiricism, crystallized in the British "anthropological" empiricism of the late 19th century, denied the possibility of *a priori* thought, positivism was more connected to "reality" and "society". Furthermore, while the analysis of empiricism revealed the significance of Aristotle as a pioneer of observing exotic man (the desire to observe the lives of other people), the analysis of positivism showed the significance of Auguste Comte as a pioneer of the search for the origins of religion. However, positivism was also based on empirical knowledge of natural phenomena. Evolutionary views were connected with the former traditions when evolutionism endeavoured to demonstrate the facts of evolution and the place of flora, fauna, and humankind in it. In the minds of Herbert Spencer, Edward B. Tylor and Edward Westermarck the evolutionary ideas were closely linked to social and cultural phenomena. In Karsten's theory, these traditions were formed into one great network which reflected the rise of Finnish comparative religion. How this turned out will be deliberated in the next chapter.

4. RAFAEL KARSTEN'S THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION 1900 - 1910

The aim of this chapter is to analyse Rafael Karsten's comparative religion in the international debate of the day by concentrating on the emergence of his theoretical understanding of comparative religion. Since Karsten's theoretical background (the conceptions behind his formation of a theory) is presented in Chapter Three, I will here examine the most significant themes on which his comparative religion focused.

4.1. Article

Rafael Karsten's established mode of expression appeared for the first time in his short article "Den moderna religionsvetenskapen" in 1904. In general, the article tried to characterize comparative religion by distinguishing it from philology, mythology, philosophy of religion, and history of religions (close to Tylor's ideas). Karsten especially considered comparative

religion a “more general discipline than the history of religions” (similar to Uno Harva’s views) (1). This, however, did not subscribe to the notion that closely related subject areas were useless to the study of religions. Conversely, to say that they offered valuable scientific methods was not a meaningless fact. Before Karsten, E. B. Tylor had perceived the “scientific study of religions” as a subject in which “decision must not rest with a council in which the theologian, the metaphysician, the biologist, the physicist, exclusively take part” (2). This was far from the folklorist Andrew Lang’s opinion that it is “the common mistake to suppose that there is a science of religion” since “we have only collections of disputable facts, and a welter of conjectures” (3). Rafael Karsten’s article displays three apparent themes: firstly, the theoretical debt to the Professor of History of Religions, C.P.Tiele, secondly, the expression of disapproval of Max Müller’s theories, and thirdly, the psychological emphasis on the study of the religious state of the “primitive”. Karsten began his article with a definition of comparative religion:

“Comparative religion is not based on metaphysical speculation of religious epistemology but on the empirical study of objective reality. The task of comparative religion is to obtain information on the essence and phenomena of religion” (4).

The definition indicates that the young scholar had a clear aim to adequately understand comparative religion. Karsten’s definition makes it clear that he did not remain outside the world of empirical and positivistic thought and that his entry into this world was consolidated by an enormous distrust of vague speculation. Karsten, consequently, believed that the “empirical study of objective reality” should be recognized as *communis opinio* within comparative religion. Furthermore, Karsten’s definition also reflected his entry into the analysis of the real essence of religion, that is, phenomenology of religion. It has to be noted, however, that discussing “the essence of religion” may be a possible source of confusion if its context of utilization is not clearly explained. Namely, the analysis of the “essence of religion” has not only been a part of the works of phenomenologists but also the historical and social studies of Feuerbach, Marx, Mill, Nietzsche, Fustel de Coulanges, Herbert Spencer, Robertson Smith, Durkheim, Malinowski, Freud, Weber, Troeltsch, and Lévi-Strauss (5). At the turn of the 20th century, phenomenology of religion was replaced by cultural evolutionistic learning in the study of religions. However, as has been noted, the cultural evolutionists were interested in psychologically applying biological axioms to the study of socio-cultural phenomena. An analysis of socio-cultural phenomena also suggested a need for certain expressions of phenomenology. The phenomenology of religion was also equipped with global, universal comparisons. Granted, therefore, that a certain phenomenological aspect was needed if the researcher desired to testify the universal nature of the human psyche, Karsten elected Chantepie de la Saussaye as one of the most significant scholars of religion. The German scholar and the founder of phenomenology of religion, Chantepie de la Saussaye, published his masterpiece *Die Phänomenologie der Religion* at the end of the 19th century. Rafael Karsten was so impressed by Saussaye’s views that he even employed his definition of

the task of comparative religion (“ [...] to obtain information of the essence and phenomena of religion”). Karsten’s views were also indebted to Professor C. P. Tiele, the Dutch theologian of Leyden University, who was famous for his writings on the history of religions and comparative theology. Like Saussaye, Tiele tried to find the “knowledge of the essence of any religion” (6). Tiele believed that in its most reduced form the religious phenomenon reflected the “human’s belief in superhuman forces” (7). Tiele considered “religion” a set of doctrines which spread itself over a human’s life. He recognized a difference between comparative theology and comparative religion. In contrast to theology, comparative religion was not a “dogmatic system”. Although philosophical analysis of religious phenomena was not unfamiliar to comparative religion, it was a special subject area which did not belong to moral and social philosophy and was thus not a “philosophical doctrine”. (8.) Therefore, Tiele adopted a negative attitude towards “large-scale” philosophical speculation within the study of religions. He believed that comparative religion with its “solid facts” could establish the development of the most general laws and conditions which determined most religions (viz. Durkheim’s attempt to examine what it is that all religions have in common). By adopting the Saussayan / Tielean perspective, Karsten suggested that the question of the essence of religion (“what is religion”) had existed ever since the human had “opened her mind to the avenues of existence” (9). In this context, Karsten saw a fallacy in the philosophy of religion which had been too speculative and developed from “mere impulse” (10). If “empty and flabby speculation” was something to be eliminated, then “reflection over fact” would do very well as a scholarly truth (11). But if the human and her philosophical mind had vainly searched for the essence of religion, what could comparative religion do better? Karsten suggested that the aim of comparative religion was to find knowledge of the essence and phenomena of religion by using comparative method and by focusing on “the lowest forms of religion” (see also Chapter 3.1.). Thus, Karsten’s view of the aim of comparative religion is simultaneously inclusive and exclusive: it approves the same end as philosophy of religion (“what religion is”) but makes it a more specialized system which is shaped by the requirements of empiricism, positivism, phenomenology of religion, and evolutionary psychological theory of religion. Nevertheless, the speculative and philosophical angle of phenomenology was inevitably alien to Karsten (I here refer particularly to the phenomenology of religion of Dutch Geertz van der Leeuw) (12.) Tiele’s system had some advantages over Karsten’s among them the way it defined the nature (“aims and being”) of a scholar of religion. Tiele outlined a scholar of religion as follows:

“[...] scholar of religion studies doctrines, presentations, and customs of religions in order to understand that particular need in a human mind which has generated religious forms [...] we desire to understand and explain [...] we have to understand essences, origins and objects of religions [...] I am nothing if not critical [...] I am nothing if not historical” (13).

But how did a scholar of religion study “religions”? Firstly, C.P. Tiele submitted in a very practical manner that the scholar had to be protected from unpleasantness in her research work, that is, she had to feel that what she was doing was stimulating and “cosy” (14). Tiele’s “cosy” is still a prevalent precept and is explained most informatively by Ninian Smart’s “informed empathy”, which means that the researcher actively endeavours to become a member of the group she is studying, and that she tries to imagine how it feels to be a Muslim, for instance (15). Secondly, Tiele believed that a scholar of religion could never be totally satisfied with the information gained although she had to be true to her research results. Although Tiele emphasized the principles of pleasure and empathy, he urged scholars of religion to continuous *suspensio* of material. Further, his idea of being “true to results” indicated “honesty”, a general cultural norm which should be strong in scientific research. For Tiele, the multiple association of pleasure, congeniality, dissatisfaction and integrity meant, collectively, producing new high-quality research. But Tiele warned the scholar of being too “pedantic” and “bookish” since it made her look like a “superficial dilettante”. (16.) In his article Karsten spoke of E.B. Tylor and Andrew Lang as “fundamental” and “productive representatives of modern comparative religion”. Thus, like Tiele, Karsten considered effectiveness a virtue.

Karsten’s article also provided discussion on the question of the “natural development of religion”. Although it is clear that the evolutionary point of view of Karsten’s article mainly stemmed from Spencerian / Tylorian sources, we must recall that the concept of evolution was not unfamiliar to Tiele’s phenomenology. On the contrary, Tiele believed that the foremost task of comparative religion was to study the development of religion. Although Tiele expounded Tylor’s doctrine of “survivals” in his *Introduction to the Study of Religions* (1876), his concept of evolution was not, however, congruent with Tylor’s. Supported by the theory of the American Professor Le Conte, Tiele saw development as an “uninterrupted and proceeding transition with determinate laws and innate forces” (17). True to evolutionary paradigm, however, Tiele divided religions into three different developmental stages: the lowest natural religions, the highest natural religions, and the ethical religions (*revelare* religions) (18). In his article Rafael Karsten declared that a “theory which denies the natural development of religion will never find support” (19). True to his evolutionary thought, Karsten treated the question of the origin of religion as one of the most significant issues of comparative religion. As is known, the hunt for the “rudimentary” roots of religion had been established in the positivistic theories of de Brosses and Comte. In that sense, then, early British anthropology “drew its facts from the Empire but its theories from France” (20). In his article Karsten attacked Max Müller’s psychological theory of religion which culminated in the discussion of henotheism and degenerationism. In this, Karsten apparently followed in the footsteps of the folklorist Andrew Lang who was famous for his strong commentary on Max Müller’s theories. The fate of Max Müller’s insights warns us of how laborious the path to humanist understanding can be. Although Müller is elevated as the “father of comparative religion” and his *Introduction to the Science of Religion* (1873) is re-issued and re-read, his situation seemed very unpromising

throughout his life. Müller's destiny resembled Karl Marx's, whose ideas had to be polemically defended against all revisions and whose theory finally received an anachronistic nature (21). Max Müller, Professor of Comparative Philology at the University of Oxford, was an expert in Indian religions and considered India the original home of humanity. In fact, Müller's comparative study of religions was almost synonymous with his comparative study of mythology. For him, mythology was closely linked to nature thus mythology began when the human realized the uncontrollable strength of natural phenomena. Müller is known especially for his idea of the fundamental importance of solar mythology where the heroes and the gods are seen originally as solar metaphors. (22.) Max Müller's restricted impact on the thinkers of his day stemmed mainly from Tylor's relatively pronounced status among the British ethnologists. Thus it was Müller's fate to suffer from the dogmatic followers of Tylor, who chanted anti-Müllerian slogans. The man with a personable appearance and eloquent pen, Andrew Lang, was one to adopt the Tylorian view of religious evolution and to criticize Müllerian philology. At the same time, Lang even declared his views to be "orthodox Darwinian" (23). Lang (like Karsten) criticized Müller's notion of "savage man" as having an innate "faculty of apprehending the Infinite" (24). But this criticism had its fallacies. Lang's personal losses and his paranormal experiences changed his worldview. His grave hope to meet his dear friends and relatives in the hereafter made him interested in paranormal activity (a founding member of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882) (25). In 1894 he questioned Tylor's theory of animism in his book *Cock Lane and Common Sense* since views on religious evolution or progress no longer convinced him (26). Arguments over the direction of evolution did not, however, lead to a total split between Tylor and Lang since Lang wrote letters to Tylor even after their theoretical separation (27). In any case, the preternatural experiences had led Lang to the study of "identical and collective hallucinations", supernatural phenomena and beings, which set him apart from the Tylorian empirical study of *homo religiosus*, religious man (28). Later he even accepted the theory of degeneration but emphasized that his ideas of development from "high to low" were better than Müller's (29). It is clear that although Tylor's and Müller's theories differed from each other, they were also very much alike. Müller's theory of belief in divinity shared the same principle of universalism as Tylor's. In addition, Müller, like Tylor, supported a comparative approach to religion. Finally, Tylor's and Müller's texts were, now and then, prone to present "savages" or "the lowest religions" as childlike. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Müller admired Tylor whose "views on anthropological subjects" were of great interest (30). Yet, there were points of disagreement between Tylor and Müller, like Tylor's uncertainty of the correct interpretation of historical narratives which "to one side were sacred history, and to the other may seem mythic legend" (31). In Finland Müller's theories found support in the writings of Otto Donner (1835-1909), Professor of Comparative Philology and Sanskrit at the Alexander University. Donner employed the Müllerian emphasis already in his dissertation (1863) by drawing a comparison between ancient Finnish and Indian mythology. Then, Donner considered the primary source of mythology to be in ancient poetry. (32.) Rafael Karsten viewed Müller as a scholar who was evidently the pioneer of comparative religion but whose

theories, however, seemed to be “completely outdated” (33). According to Karsten, the only promising idea of Müller was his brilliant way of observing “religions”. In his *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* (1882) Müller suggested that if a scholar knew one religion she did not know any religion at all. This indicated that a scholar of religion had to profess all religions on one universal level, not only in one dogmatic horizon. Müller also emphasized that a scholar of religion should keep her own religious convictions in hand during the research process. (34.) Nowadays, the procedure is known as “bracketing” (going beyond - to restrain itself) within the phenomenology of religion (35). What, then, went theoretically wrong between Karsten and Müller? Let us first, for the sake of scholarly clarity, study the theories of the origins of religion more collectively.

Figure 1. *The most substantial theories of the origins of religion*

Fetishism: The term “fetishism” originated in considerations of The President de Brosses who in his work *Du Culte des dieux Fetiches* (1760) discussed “Fétichisme”. Afterwards, Auguste Comte suggested that human thought had passed through the level of fetishism within the theological stage. For Comte, the period of fetishism meant a stage when nature was discerned by the feelings of a human.

Polytheism: In his *Natural History of Religion* (1757) David Hume argued for the temporal priority of polytheism which was dependent on fear of unknown causes and developed towards rational theism. Unlike many scholars of the Enlightenment, Hume was not an atheist since he considered atheism going beyond the available evidence. The concept of rational theism is challenged in Hume’s works.

Religion as the unintelligible: The American Lewis Henry Morgan suggested that “religion deals so largely with the imaginative and emotional nature, and consequently with such uncertain elements of knowledge, that all primitive religions are grotesque and to some extent “unintelligible”. Morgan’s views on religion are not many and could be considered more anthropological than study on religion.

Animism: In his *Primitive Culture* (1871) Tylor defined animism as the general belief in spiritual beings and considered it “a minimum definition of religion”. Tylor believed that a human’s need to explain dreams, hallucinations, and death led her to make a distinction between body and soul. Tylor believed that all religions involve some form of animism and considered animism “primitive philosophy”.

Animatism or Preanimism: Robert R. Marett proposed that “primitive people” considered objects animate if these things had life. “Primitive man” did not make a distinction between the body of an object and a soul that could enter or leave it. Marett called this view “animatism” or “preanimism” and supposed it to antecede “animism”.

Henotheism; The German philologist Max Müller considered observation of the infinite to be the seed of religious thinking. The human's basic aspiration was to learn to know the "infinite". The first manifestation of this aspiration was henotheism (or kathenotheism) which indicated the worship of one God while allowing that other gods exist. All in all, religion was the "human capacity to perceive the infinite".

Dynamism; In 1891 R.H.Codrington introduced the concept of *mana* in his work *The Melanesians*. "Mana" is impersonal power, *par excellence*, which is part of all organic and inorganic. "Mana" confirms effectively the practical points of things and makes, thus, a house solid and land fertile, i.e. it is the "genuine effectiveness of things which corroborates their practical actions without annihilating them".

Urmonotheismus; In the 19th century the Scottish scholar Andrew Lang and the German Pater Wilhelm Schmidt noted the presence of "high god" in many myths. In his masterpiece *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee* Pater Schmidt suggested that the concept of supreme being and creator could also be found among less structured societies. Lang and Schmidt stated that this creator was a result of intellectual and metaphysical consideration.

Manism; Herbert Spencer suggested in his *First Principles* (1864) that the "primitive Ghost theory which assumes a human personality behind each unusual phenomenon" formed the basis of the earliest supernatural ideas. The Ghost theory referred to remote ancestors who became gods and were worshipped in rituals. According to Spencer, "ancestor worship is the root of every religion". The belief in the spirit of the dead can be called "manism" (Latin *manes*).

Totemism; The Scottish scholar W. Robertson-Smith suggested after his visit to the Bedouin Arabs of Sinai that the Semitic societies of ancient Arabia had assumed an animal as the emblem of their matrilineal clans and that their relationship to this distinctive animal was sacred, i.e. the animal was considered their sacred totem (Robertson-Smith's idea was developed by Durkheim).

Theory of magic; James Frazer, *Golden Bough* (1890-), considered magic to be more "primitive" than religion. When human realized that she was not able to control the world with magic, that there were forces stronger than her, she began to say prayers.

Theory of social integration; Emile Durkheim aspired to study religion in "its most primitive and simple form" in his *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915). Durkheim followed McLennan and Robertson-Smith in his suggestion that totemism was the most original form of religion. Durkheim saw the totem as a symbol which human had begun to worship as an idea of society. The theory emphasizes the meaning of cult society: a religious person is reliant upon the morality of society. (36.)

As a novice scholar, Karsten firmly adhered to Tylor's animism as an explanation. As the Tylorian tradition taught, animism should not be seen as a form of religion but as a world view, a "primitive" philosophy. Karsten fully accepted Tylor's premise. However, he was

dissatisfied with Tylor's definition of religion ("belief in Spiritual Beings") since it did not take into account the specific relationship between human and "mysterious" power (37). Karsten did not explain his rejection of Tylorian definition further. His adoption of Ira W. Howerth's definition of religion, however, supports the fact that he emphasized the relation between human and "mysterious" power. According to Howerth, "[...] religion is the effective desire to be in right relations to the power manifesting itself in the universe" (38). Karsten believed that the truth value of Howerth's definition was apparently greater than Tylor's (39). In his article Karsten did not analyse how religious emotion developed itself on the basis of an animistic world view. However, he was creating the main premises of his forthcoming doctoral thesis by suggesting that a human did not see deities of animism as "supernatural" or infinite but as mysterious beings who were often malevolent by nature. Thus, fear was an emotion which dominated "primitive cult". (40.) In the light of animistic explanation Max Müller's theory of the origin of "all religions" seemed rather "different". In general, Müller considered that observing the infinite was the seed of religious thinking. Actually, a human's aspiration was to learn to know the infinite. The first manifestation of this aspiration was henotheism (or kathenotheism) which indicated the worship of one God while allowing that other gods exist. Müller observed that the hymns in the Vedas were addressed to one God (the Supreme) but that the God was not the same from hymn to hymn. (41.) Rafael Karsten refused to accept Müller's theory and claimed that Müller's idea of the hymns of Rig-Veda as a representation of "primitive religion" was false (42). Karsten's objection to Müller was that the Vedic scriptures appeared to be "above the real primitive level" (43). Thus, Müller's henotheism was nothing but polytheism which presumed belief in individually perceived divine beings (44). Today, the Oxford Dictionary of World Religions (1997) still draws an analogy between henotheism and polytheism (45). In that sense, then, Karsten's faultfinding seemed to be justified. Karsten was leaning on Tylorian animation of spirits when he claimed that polytheism as the most original form of religion was nothing more than an unworkable hypothesis. In other words, polytheism as a belief was too complex for the mind of "primitive man", who was not able to differentiate between various characteristics of divine beings. (46.) Therefore, Müller's theory of devotion to one God while other gods exist was too composite an explanation to be plausible. This is something which was also related to "Urmonotheism" as a conceivable theory of the origin of religions. Karsten criticized monotheistic explanation by building on the suggestion of David Hume that primeval man without literary skills and scientific knowledge could not uphold theistic premises. As is known, theism means the doctrine of one personal God, that is, that there is one transcendent, self-existent, good, and all-knowing God. Christianity, for instance, is a theistic religion. (47.) Thus, theism and monotheism are synonymous terms since they emphasize that there is one and only one God. Tylor's and Karsten's animism never convinced the British anthropologist Robert R. Marett, who saw Tylorian animism as too lofty a standard for "primitive" thinking. Marett claimed that "primitive man" could not have been as intellectual as Tylor suggested. Later, Durkheim suggested sarcastically that Tylorian and Müllerian theories of religion were similar in that "both attempt to derive the idea of the sacred out of sensations aroused in us by

natural phenomena". (48.) So this is what we could call "dancing in a circle": scholars tend to continuously criticize each other without knowing who is right in the final analysis. But then is anything true? Obviously, scholars failed to see that there was no such thing as ultimate scholarly "truth" all by itself, but that these were always somebody's thoughts and interpretations.

Max Müller's theories also included a point of degenerationist persistency such that Müller considered fetishism "corruption of religion" or "parasitical growth" (49). Interestingly, Müller was satirized by H. Gaidoz who suggested that Müller himself had never existed but was a corrupt solar myth (50). Besides, the Langian / Schmidtian "Urmonotheism" as the most original conception of religion was linked to the theory of degeneration, which suggested the existence of a half-developed civilization from which civilized and "primitive" people have become differentiated. The people of less structured societies were thus the degenerate descendants of their forefathers who had lived in a quite high cultural stage wherein religious presentations had similar clarity. (51.) Karsten's analysis of the idea of degeneration was flavoured with confused deduction. On the other hand, he referred to "Urmonotheism" and henotheism as rejected explanations but then again he supported the idea of degeneration. Karsten regarded the English historian of religion, E. F. Jevons, as one of the most eager supporters of the theory of degeneration. Jevons's evolutionary view of religious phenomena was equipped with the idea of developmental regression. Jevons considered the God (Yahweh) of Judaism a unique phenomenon in the history of religions since the Jewish people were the first among whom the development had culminated in obedient monotheism. If the Jewish people, then, represented the ancient forefathers, the less structured societies probably received monotheistic belief from them during the transition from high to low. Thereby "Urmonotheism" as the most original form of religion became the most plausible. Karsten claimed that Jevon's suggestion was very close to Robertson-Smith's totemism. (52.) Unfortunately, Karsten had no time to explain his argumentation further. What is sure, however, is that he admitted the theory of degeneration to be possible to some extent. This was not consonant with Tylor's notion. Karsten suggested that the intellectual development of humanity had not been unilinear and uninterrupted but spiral-like (similar to Edward Westermarck's view of evolution). Karsten believed that degeneration in a religious sense had actually happened and described it as follows:

"History points out that the degeneration of people in a general cultural sense follows the religious degeneration whereupon "the barriers" which education indoctrinated to the lower forms of religion are torn down and folk belief with its superstition, miracles, ghosts, devils, animal symbols, and fetishes finds place again" (53).

Nevertheless, Karsten emphasized that degeneration was only an exception in a course of development and that the direction generally and normally pointed towards progress. Karsten's scheme of religious progression was clear: during evolution the number of gods

decreases until the development culminates in monotheism, when God is considered the omnipotent creator and ruler of the world. The old customs still prevailing in the “higher stages” should be considered Tylorian “survivals”. (54.) Karsten believed that certain conservatism was typical of all religions. He explained his notion as follows:

“The conception of divine world order embraces all interests of human life [...] an inner emotion which guides a human when he worships the god(s) derives from a human’s consciousness that his ultimate “good” (prosperity) is dependent on his relation to these beings who support the world’s order”(55).

Karsten’s definition reflects the late phase of religious evolution when religion has become a protector of morality and human acts according to the will of god(s). Karsten’s definition also explicitly emphasizes the role of emotion as the most primary aspect of religion (Humean / Westernmarckian importance). That is to say, Karsten considers emotion (not *ratio*) a psychological element which upholds and covers religious tradition. A human’s inner emotional dependence on her god(s) makes religions persist and flourish. Karsten suggested that a human’s emotional subjection to control became visible in a cult and thus it had to be seen, too, as a conservative element of religion (“[...] if we discuss religion then emotion is primary and presentation secondary) (56). As regards to Karsten, R.R. Marett’s thought that “primitive religion” had more emotional origin than Tylorian scholars claimed was, then, not totally correct. Besides, although Tylor’s evolutionary theorizing had more cognitive (“reason-based”) than emotional basis, Tylor also saw religious phenomena as “direct products of the human mind” (57). In Karsten’s reasoning, cult referred to a general ritual procedure which established a relationship of devoted reciprocity between an individual who sacrificed and prayed and the recipient (whether God or a spirit, depending on the stage of development) (58). Karsten suggested that the ultimate cause of cult was the human’s fear of malevolent spirits and his instinct to protect himself. Karsten’s definition sounds resolute in taking into account that it is almost impossible to state definite meanings of cults and rituals since the meanings are so many and varied. Today, the term “cult” refers mainly to many non-traditional religious movements and is also contrasted with sects (59). On the other hand, Professor Lauri Honko (1971) has seen “cult” merely as an act of worship whereas “rite” refers to a more complex traditional and religious act which includes various patterns of behaviour and verbal aspects (60). Nonetheless, Karsten was aware of the cult undergoing modifications. With religious progress, the expressions of cult (“prayer and sacrifice”) lived, too, through changes (61). As John Bowker (1997) has stated, “religions are open to change and have indeed changed much through the centuries” (62). Naturally, every religion has its own systems of change. But, even if the forms of expression change in every religion, the “ultimate concern” never disappears. Karsten finished his article by mentioning briefly “the great relation” of moral emotion (*etiska känsla*) to the “religious”. Karsten stated that although

religion and morality had developed in close connection to each other, morality emerged independently of religion. This theme Karsten came to refine in his doctoral thesis.

Professor Åke Hultkrantz has described Karsten's article as "beautifully written" (63). This is what its lucid argumentation evidently is. Nevertheless, the article suffers from a lack of coherent theme such that Karsten can be accused of a somewhat incoherent style. We must recall, however, that Karsten's ability to read E.B.Tylor and other British authors was still limited (64). Karsten's article reveals that Tylorian cultural evolutionism had become the guiding principle of his inquiry, that is, Karsten's article presents the rapturous evolutionary fervour of his early life coloured by a fusion of biological and socio-cultural aspects. But Karsten's early article also attempted to improve on Tylorian investigation by emphasizing "emotions". This psychological determination was intellectual homage paid to his mentor, Edward Westermarck. To conclude, in spite of the hurried and confused style of Karsten's article, it became one of the most significant works considering his future mode of expression within comparative religion.

4.2. Doctoral thesis

"The graduate student Rafael Karsten has in his dissertation "The Origin of Worship" dealt with the meaningful question of the origin of religions and especially of the general origin of cult. He suggests that a feeling of the strange and the mystical forms the essence of religions and that this feeling together with fear and desire led to the worship of objects or hypothetical beings. Uncultured man is prone to attribute mental life, similar to his own, to natural objects and to consider phenomena the result of the volition of personified beings. His observation is primarily directed at such phenomena which untypically become involved in his life. Thus, religions are products of fear - fear of the mystical and strange [...] the author does not presume to be the first to present such opinions. His dissertation only presents his own idea of the problem which today preoccupies comparative religion and opinion is highly divided. I mainly agree with the author and consider that he not only by drawing on relevant sources but also by his sound commentary on opposing theories is excellently motivated in his endeavour"(1).

This is a fragment of Westermarck's long statement on Rafael Karsten's doctoral thesis. As the text points out, Westermarck's general opinion of Karsten's dissertation was empathic. Westermarck stressed, however, that Karsten's arguments contained many of the ideas which were elaborated a few decades earlier in the first formal works on comparative religion. Still, there was no denying that Karsten was in an orthodox manner inspired by a significant question of the origin of religions and cult. Westermarck's positive opinion of Karsten's text was not a self-evident truth. In his statement on Gunnar Landtman's doctoral thesis *The Origin of Priesthood* (1905) Westermarck criticised Landtman for heavy, inaccurate, and

formally unmotivated opinions. James Frazer described Karsten's doctoral thesis as an examination which seemed to "show sound learning and sound judgment - a rare combination in this and perhaps in any subject". (2.)

In his doctoral thesis Rafael Karsten communicated the same enthusiasm for the research of the origin of religions and the religious life of man that he expressed in his early article. The aim of his doctoral thesis was "to trace the origin of religious worship as far as its chief acts, commonly distinguished as prayer and sacrifice, are concerned" (3). This referred to Karsten's dissatisfaction with Tylor's definition of religion, which failed to perceive significant communication between "man" and "invisible spiritual beings" (4). The idea of religion as a "practical concern" was necessary to Karsten's paradigm, that is, to "put himself in communication with the invisible spiritual beings" in order to "avert the evils or to obtain the benefits" (5). The conception derived from the notion of W. Robertson-Smith, who pointed out that "the most important thing in the history of religion was not the being or beings in whom man believed but the manner in which he was related to these beings" (6). Robertson-Smith suggested that a human attempted communion with the deity through the act of sacrifice (7). The emphasis of Robertson-Smith was linked to his theories of clan totemism and inherited from McLennan. Karsten was inspired by Robertson-Smith's work *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (1894), which he considered exceptional. Robertson-Smith's *commūniō religiōsus* included, then, more than mere Tylorian explanation of how belief in the existence of invisible powers in the universe came into being and how animism changed to monotheism. But Karsten noted also that his analysis took a course under the psychological analysis of emergence and development of "religious instincts". Karsten's notions of instincts were indebted to Westermarck, who had emphasized the role that "the mere instincts have played at the origin of social institutions" (8). Overall, a practical element of religion was that worship was subordinate to changes and transformations in the course of evolution (9). Karsten suggested that "man has by slow degrees been developed from a rude and brutal condition to higher and more complicated forms of life". Karsten's "slow degrees" were presumably equivalent to his "spiral-like" evolution presented in the early article. In any case, worship altered according to the "stages of human thought and feeling". Part of Karsten's evolutionary determinism was his belief that religion indispensably takes a higher tone with the advancing culture. The fact that the moral element was not a vital part of "savage worship" was not always understood by students. Consequently, the "savage peoples" had often been overestimated as regards their religious condition by perceiving their ideas to be far loftier than they in reality were. On the other hand, "theological students on religion" had observed "savage religions" merely "from the point of view of Christianity" and had "endowed them with religious and moral notions" which were foreign to them. (10.) The chief acts of worship were "prayer and sacrifice" which were closely related to each other in "savage cult" since "uncultured man" rarely addressed his/her gods in prayer without at the same time performing a sacrifice (11). Confusion might arise around Karsten's concepts "worship" and "cult" and therefore on what is "worship" and what is "cult" (for the definition

of “cult”, see Chapter 4.1.). Karsten considered worship “man’s endeavour by means of external acts, words, or mere thought to influence the will of the superhuman powers on whom he feels himself to depend, in order to avert some present or impending evil or to obtain benefits” (12). However, he never made any definite distinction between “worship” and “cult” (yet it is somewhat obscure whether this kind of categorizing is necessary at all). Today, the concepts of “worship”, “cult”, and “rite” are still relatively overlapping in the English language. Whereas “worship” refers to performing an act of worship in which love towards a deity is expressed, “cult” and “rite” also refer to a mode or system of religious worship of religious reverence. Of course, these concepts can be described as separate elements such that cult and rite are considered more formal means of expression than worship, which manifests personal and intimate love for a deity. (13.) We must also recall that one hundred years ago conceptualizing religion was still dubious. I mention this not to elicit the sympathy of the reader or to try to prevent criticism of Karsten, but on the contrary to encourage scholars to see that historical works are essentially dependent on past context and that does not, solely, grant the role of a critic to a modern reader. In any case, Karsten was certain that understanding the practical elements of worship exacted the knowledge of how “man arrived at the belief in unseen spiritual powers” (14). This meant the study of the “genesis of the animistic belief which forms a constitutive element of the lower religions throughout the world” (15). Although an immovable supporter of animistic theory all his life, Karsten admitted that to try to trace the most original form of religion was impossible since “even the rudest savage tribes” had a certain evolution behind them and could not, therefore, be assumed to represent the “primeval man” (16). Still, he believed that “there is a remarkable correspondence between the general primitive condition of early man and that of the lowest races in our own days” (17). This meant paving the way for his theory of animism, that is, the outward circumstances must obey hypothesis.

Karsten next focused his attention on animal and human. What followed was a Darwin-Westermarck-based analysis of the mental and moral faculties of animals and men. The question was whether “we can in animals find any rudiments of a sentiment which may be called religious” (18). The problem resembled Westermarck’s doctoral hypothesis that “marriage does not belong exclusively to our own species” (19). In general, Karsten’s assertion was evoked by a common evolution-psychological belief that human had originally been “rude and brutal” and thus quite animal-like. By leaning on Darwin’s former observation of the unlikely distinction between animals and men regarding religion, Karsten stated that “some physical features” of animals “may be regarded as rudiments of the animistic belief as it appears in savage man” (20). In order to prove his assumption, Karsten aimed at a psychical/mental study of animals. Here, “animal” as a general concept seems problematic since it is unclear to which living thing Karsten referred. On the other hand, Karsten vaguely discussed “animals of different kinds” but then again made a Darwinian distinction between “wild and domestic animals”. It is interesting how Edward Westermarck in his doctoral thesis analysed the species among which traces of marriage could be found by discussing the birds

as having an almost universal marriage and the mammals having a marriage “restricted to certain species only” (21). In this Westermarck did moderately better than Karsten regarding classification. For Karsten, a dog and a horse were the ideal models of animal psychology. Animal psychology became in fashion at the end of the 19th century. At that time, European researchers conducted experiments on dogs, rabbits, and other mammals. Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) began his famous experiments on dogs in 1889 and won the Nobel Prize for physiology in 1904. Sir Charles Scott Sherrington (1857-1952) studied the reflexes and nervous systems of higher mammals. Earlier, Claude Bernard (1813-1878) had made a series of important discoveries in physiology by experimenting on rabbits and other animals. These experiments on animals paved the way, above all, for physiologically orientated behaviourist theories of psychology. However, they evidently also influenced other subjects, like anthropology. In any case, Karsten claimed that “animal, like man, finds itself confronted with an external world which as its non-ego it distinguishes from its ego”. Further, the “practical motive” (to seek pleasure and avoid pain) drove an “animal to acquire a certain knowledge of the external world, to make itself at home in it and to enlarge its experience”. (22.) But behind the familiar-feeling sphere there was “an unknown world” of “uncommon phenomena of nature” which caused feelings of “wonder, awe, and terror” in animals. Karsten believed that to understand this “we have to consider an interesting feature in the psychical life of the animal: the tendency to vivify inanimate things”. Having determined the psychological trait of the animal, Karsten’s maxim came to be that “in all creatures there seems to be an innate disposition unconsciously to project their own internal life on the external world”. (23.) Karsten’s view was criticized by Westermarck in his statement on Karsten’s doctoral thesis:

“The author claims that animism originally depends on the “innate disposition” of a creature [...]”to project their own internal life on the external world”; I cannot accept this view since in my opinion it (animism) most analogically relies on external, not internal experience” (24).

Westermarck’s opinion declares that unusual and hideous phenomena of nature, external experiences, stimulated the inner life of a creature and made it vivify things. Karsten’s suggestion that external phenomena made a “strong impression” on animals never, however, denied Westermarck’s assumption. But here the similarities end. Karsten explained the theme differently by leaning on Darwin’s observation of his own dog:

“The animal was lying on the lawn on a windless day; at a little distance, however, a slight breeze occasionally stirred an open parasol which would have been wholly disregarded by the dog had anyone stood near it. As it was, every time the parasol slightly moved the dog growled fiercely and barked. He must, Darwin adds, have reasoned to himself in a rapid and unconscious manner that movement without any apparent cause indicated the presence of some strange living agent” (25).

Then, the inmost sense of the mysterious (“innate disposition”) made animals look at objects of nature as living agents. Here, Karsten’s assumptions also derived from the studies of the Italian psychologist Signor Vignoli (*Mito e Scienza*, 1879) and the animal psychologist G. J. Romanes (*Mental Evolution in Animals*, 1883). Romanes was a friend of the English psychologist James Sully whom Edward Westermarck had met in Norway during his hiking trip. Westermarck visited Romanes once. (26.) Thus, when Romanes and James Sully appeared in Karsten’s doctoral thesis, it was not only because they were prominent scholars but also because they were respected associates of his supervisor (*Hägerstrand’s neighbourhood effect*- information spreads through personal interaction) (27). Signor Vignoli’s idea of an animal as a conscious living subject with a will of its own stimulated Karsten greatly. Resting on the Vignolian hypothesis, Karsten argued that “every form, every object, every external phenomenon becomes vivified and animated by the intrinsic consciousness of the animal itself”. Karsten resented, however, Vignoli’s psychological necessity that an animal invariably animated the objects of the external world. Karsten considered the Vignolian premise a theoretical exaggeration which failed to see the often prevailing dream-like state of an animal when the animal did not “pay attention to the external world except when a practical motive impelled it”. (28.) We are still left with the question of how animals’ psychological emotion of the mysterious, which was the “very germ of the animistic belief and the religious sentiment”, accounts, then, for the human. Karsten offered an answer by stating that from the animal it was natural to “pass on to deal with man at the lowest stages of evolution” whose “rudimentary ideas” were “far more developed” than in animals (29). But it would have seemed theoretically preposterous if there had not been an obvious degree of similarity between “savage man” and “the higher animals”. This meant that the behaviour of “savage man” was explained by animal psychological premises. Like “higher animals”, “savage man” “projected her own internal consciousness on the objects surrounding her and transformed them into living deliberate subjects” (30). However, the English psychologist James Sully (*The Human Mind*, 1892) offered a more human (and differentiating) psychological point of view by stating that the human was directly conscious of her “own acts as causal agencies” (change, force, etc.), that is, the human was capable of understanding the causal relations of her own actions (31). According to Karsten, the “domain of causation” appeared when “primitive man” formed “a theory about the cause of the accident”, for instance. That is to say, a human’s “instinct of self-preservation” made her search for the causes of events in order to “overcome the evil and prevent it in the future”. Karsten gives an example of the “savage” who hurts herself over a stone: the accident is the stone’s fault since the stone is seen as a living agent. Furthermore, when “children and uneducated people” become furious at inanimate things and throw them, we can see a “survival from a primitive animistic belief” here. (32.) Although Karsten’s term “uneducated people” rests on his evolutionary scheme, it sounds somewhat naïve. Why should education determine the animation of things? So to speak, getting angry with lifeless things, like a stone, does not rely on education but more on personal traits, the activity level of that moment etc. Yet, when I shout at my things I have to consider them living agents since why else would I take my frustration out on them. Here we are also faced

with the interesting question of the differences between animism and anthropomorphism (the attribution of human characteristics to inhuman things or events). Be that as it may, Karsten believed that after a strange object was brought into the field of consciousness “in an undeveloped mind there easily arises the illusion of activity on the part of the thing perceived which consequently becomes vivified”. Karsten suggested that the strange was not only looked upon as a living object but also as “divine or supernatural” and if “considered to influence his destiny it becomes the object of religious worship”. (33.) What follows is Karsten’s comparative analysis between the world’s religious traditions. In the spirit of Tylorian universalism, Karsten stated that “the view that thunder, lightning, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions are caused by powerful spirits is almost universal among the uncivilized races of mankind”: not only “the Kafirs of South Africa or the natives of the province Tepeaca in Mexico but also the Laplanders, and the New Zealanders” saw lightning and thunder as a “living being who had his residence in the clouds” (34). Karsten’s deduction was in line with his former assumption that the strange and mysterious were considered living agents with “supernatural” powers among “primitive people”. As explained in Chapter Three, Karsten was aware of the problem with the term “supernatural”. Today, James Lett (1997) has suggested that “supernatural” still lacks a “common, unambiguous definition” (35). As stated, the feeling of the mysterious formed the core of Karsten’s animistic belief. By expanding his views, Karsten discussed “the deification of men and animals”, which gained a more coherent appearance through principles of animism. The deification basically meant that somebody was “more than a man and in possession of powers which we should call supernatural” (36). Karsten introduced two kinds of models of deification: firstly, “the mighty kings and skilled sorcerers” who had been honoured by their people, and, secondly, white men, like Captain Cook, who were regarded as divine beings due to their “external appearance”. The same goes for the deification of animals: the more strength and courage the animal had, the more certainly it was looked upon as a powerful deity. Furthermore, because certain animals had a peculiar appearance, provided men with food, and were “man’s most dangerous enemies in the struggle for existence”, they were treated as objects of worship. Karsten suggested that “primitive man” was psychologically inclined to deify strange objects, that is, deification was like an impromptu reflex. Nevertheless, not only “visible objects and phenomena” but also “incidents” seemed strange to “uncivilized man”. (37.) Earlier we considered the human’s innate property to try to find the causes of events (Sully’s / Karsten’s principle of causation). Karsten believed that “disease and death” or “any misfortune and unexpected disappointment” were incidents which “mostly appear to uncivilized man as mystic riddles”. However, death was unfathomable to the “savage mind” and the sentence “everybody must die” was like “everybody must be murdered” to her. Karsten believed that “only in malicious mischief does the Indian recognize the cause of death”. If a member of society died of a disease, the death resulted from an evil spirit. If, then, “evil is not known to have been caused by any visible agent, it must be inflicted by some invisible malevolent being” that has invaded the body of the sick man. To control the situation requires the knowledge of a sorcerer who gives his/her opinion of the cause of disease. Then, he/she “prescribes the means” by which the intruder is

driven out. (38.) Karsten gave a long list of examples of how people around the world feel about sudden disease. The material is derived from various sources: from the works of William Ellis (*History of Madagascar*, 1828-30), A.S. Thomson (*The Story of New Zealand*, 1859), William Yate (*An Account of New Zealand*, 1835), Lewis H. Morgan (*The League of the Iroquois*, 1851), Matti Waronen (*Wainajainpalvelus Suomalaisilla*, 1895), Yrjö Wichmann (*Votjaakkien mytologiasta*, 1892), and E.S. Jessen (*Afhandling om de Norske Finners og Lappers hedenske Religion*, 1767). The perusal of Karsten's comparative analysis reveals his "cut and paste" routine which largely ignores the author's own opinions and personal ethos. This applies also to Edward Westermarck. As Juhani Ihanus (1990) has suggested, it was typical of the Westermarckian tradition that textual unity was in constant danger of disappearing on account of boundless enthusiasm for comparison (39).

When Karsten in his article "Den Moderna religionsvetenskapen" (1904) had still considered Tylorian animism more philosophy than religion, he now adopted a different opinion. In his doctoral thesis Karsten rejected Tylor's notion that animism at an early stage was "philosophy of religion". Like R.R. Marett, Karsten claimed that "such a philosophy, indeed, seems to presuppose a far greater power of thought than the savage mind is capable of" (40). Karsten could not explain his claim further but suggested that animism resulted from gradual development when "at first only the most striking objects of nature became spiritualized" (41). Nevertheless, the principle of spiritualizing the most conspicuous objects was soon expanded and gave "rise to a universal animation of the world". The "universal animation" gave us a "well-known savage view" that all is peopled with mysterious spiritual beings, that is, it introduced and explained, once more, the theory of animism. (42.) Having attacked Tylor's notion of animism, Karsten next turned his attention to Herbert Spencer's "manes-worship". Karsten's relation to Spencer's idea of the worship of ancestral ghosts was, so to speak, eccentric. Professor Åke Hultkrantz (1994) has suggested that Karsten's interpretation of Spencer's theory was "somewhat confused" and can be "accused of some obscurity" (43). What, then, made Karsten's opinion seem confused? First of all, Karsten could not provide definitive arguments for why animism was superior to manism. He claimed Spencer to believe that religion had one origin only, worship of the dead. This kind of stubbornness was not typical of Spencer (we could rather accuse him of "beating about the bush"). Although Spencer claimed in his "First Principles" that the "Ghost theory" seemed a positive conclusion, he never totally denied the meaning of pantheism, theism, atheism, and fetishism as ultimate religious ideas. They were only "negative conclusions" (44). What Spencer believed was that the "mystery which all religions recognize is absolute" (45). Karsten's argument against Spencer's (and Mr. Grant Allen's) ancestral worship dated back to the statements of travellers (Colonel Ellis's and Miss Mary Kingsley's West African reports) which showed that the worship of the dead "is more or less in the background" in "savage societies" (46). Moreover, Karsten accused Spencer of seeing animism only as an "aberrant form of the original worship paid to ancestral ghosts" (47). According to Karsten, Spencer disputed the truth that "an inanimate object may by itself suggest life to a primitive mind and

thus become deified, no extra “aberrations” being necessary” (48). Karsten’s “aberrations” referred to Spencer’s theory which suggested that the “identification of the deceased ancestors with heavenly bodies” had originated when “savage children may have misunderstood the narrations of their parents about the stars” (49). Is Karsten pragmatically doing a volte face here? As far as I understand, an inanimate object which by itself suggests life to a human mind indicates external influence and impetus and in that case animism cannot be defined merely through “innate dispositions” of the human mind. This is an omnipresent perplexity of Karsten’s doctoral thesis which seemingly also irritated Westermarck. Yet, Karsten’s Darwin-based “innate disposition” is also reminiscent of Müller’s inborn comprehension of the “Indefinite” which Karsten rejected in his early article. Of course, we can also arrive at another interpretation of Karsten’s views. Karsten’s most vulnerable point was where opposition and approval coincided. By this I mean Karsten’s sudden statement that a manistic interpretation was “certainly one great and important branch of religion, and may even represent one of the earliest religious conceptions of mankind” (50). Why Karsten suddenly regarded a manistic interpretation as legitimate is something of a mystery. Although he claimed that there was “no logical necessity to assume a relation between animism and manism among the most backward peoples”, the last chapter of his doctoral thesis was dedicated to a somewhat random analysis of the origin of the worship of the dead (51). On that occasion Karsten admitted that ancestor worship was a universally dominant mode of worship. Professor Åke Hultkrantz (1994) has suggested that Karsten “interprets animism as mainly manism” and that “from Karsten onwards ancestor worship played a prominent role in Finnish evolutionary theory of religion” (52). In my opinion, Karsten needed manism to justify his notion of fear or self-preservation as an ultimate motive of “savage worship”, that is, the feelings of fear and awe which governed the cult of dead ancestors, had theoretical value for Karsten (53). The proof of this is that although Karsten saw manes worship as one great branch of religion he still endeavoured to show the untenability of the theory (54). Thus, manism was nothing but a psychological example of a phenomenon associated with the attributes of mystery, power, fear, and awe in “the deification of the departed human souls”(55). Karsten was also dissatisfied with Spencer’s opinion that animistic interpretation failed to explain “the conceived *shape* of a plant-spirit” (my italics) (56). Responding to Spencer’s suggestion, Karsten stated that “the anthropomorphic tendency manifests itself in every form of religious thought” and “it is, therefore, no wonder that uncivilized man should endow even a plant-spirit more or less with human consciousness” (57). This did not, however, mean that the animistic idea had originated “in the conception of a human soul” (58). In proof of this proposition, Karsten suggested that at first there was the idea of a “mysterious being” which before long was defined more narrowly. On that occasion, the “conception of human soul may have served as a type on which he framed his ideas of spiritual beings in general”. (59.) Today, the relation between animism and anthropomorphism still confuses the minds of scholars of religion. When I unconsciously or consciously (I do not wish to argue about this) attribute life to my things, do I simultaneously see human characteristics in them? A great problem has also been how to explain animism and anthropomorphism. The American scholar Stewart Elliott

Guthrie (1997, 2000) has seen anthropomorphism in the broader sense as “attributing human characteristics to nonhuman things and events at large” (60). Guthrie proposes that animism can be used in two senses: firstly, close to the Tylorian sense when animism is “any religion that credits a broad range of natural phenomena with spirits”, and, secondly, in a psychological sense when it indicates “attributing life to the lifeless”. In Guthrie’s opinion, animism and anthropomorphism are in relation since “as with the meanings of animism, the latter encompasses the former”. (61.) Whether animism and anthropomorphism are, then, in more than a hypothetical relation to each other is, in my opinion, obscure. What we need is direct evidence (comprehensive sample and investigation) of what kind of attitudes people adopt towards their things when giving them a piece of their mind, for instance. How many of them see things solely as inanimate and how many consider them living agents even with body and face? How much does people’s behaviour result from their cultural / religious background? This is only a rough proof of my idea. Without a doubt, we have to be able to first adequately understand and explain animism and anthropomorphism before making further analysis. Unfortunately, the ideas of animism and anthropomorphism still are, as Guthrie has pointed out, “little explained” and “poorly examined” within comparative religion (62).

Let us now scrutinise Karsten’s notion of fear more profoundly. Karsten’s suggestion that phenomena or objects which interfere with a savage’s welfare become gods reflected his main hypothesis that “religious worship had originated in the self-preservation or fear” (63). Since the “sense of the beauty of nature” was unknown to the “savages”, it was only “the sublimity of nature”, fear and awe, which captivated the attention of the “primitive man”. The “primitive man’s” restricted and childlike interest in the order of nature appeared, for instance, in fear which the Turanian tribes of Northern Asia showed towards their dead shamans who had become “a special class of spirits who are the most hurtful of all” (64). Karsten’s psychological manner of viewing “fear” suggests an emotional, not rational interpretation of the phenomena. However, Karsten was not the only scholar to consider fear an emotion which created religion or worship. In the 17th century, the Dutch philosopher Benedict Spinoza reasoned that “superstition is engendered, preserved, and fostered by fear”. A century later, David Hume suggested in his “Natural History of Religion” that the conception of fear of the unknown was key to the origin of belief in gods (“[...] the first idea of religion arose from [...] hopes and fears which actuate the human mind”). In the 19th century, the founder of scientific psychology, Wilhelm Max Wundt, saw magic as a product of fear and awe. In 1957, Paul Radin claimed that “at the dawn of civilization men lived in a situation of fear [...]”. Nine years earlier (1948) the Austrian-born American ethnographer Robert Harry Lowie, known for his studies of the Plains Indians, had suggested that “religion is a feeling of awe that has its source in the Supernatural, Extraordinary, Weird, Sacred, Holy, Divine”. (65.) Karsten’s almost blind trust in “fear” as an explanation did not, however, make him ignore the dualistic element of “most religions”. Yet, Karsten doubted whether “this dualism had existed


originally” since “at first only the destructive aspect attracted man’s attention” (66). Relying on the studies of the German Americanist Im Thurn, Karsten stated that the Indians had two kind of spirits: harmless and harmful, the former were very inactive, whereas the latter were very active (67). The dualistic interpretations also appeared in the works of the English historian of religion, F.B. Jevons, who suggested that “religion has originated in love” but also in “sense of the maleficent and fateful” (68). Although Tylor neglected the emotional aspect of religion in his “Primitive Culture”, he suggested that “in the life of the rudish savage, religious belief is associated with [...] awful reverence, with agonizing terror, with rapt ecstasy [...]” (69). In the wake of Tylor, the German philosopher and theologian, Rudolf Otto, presented in his work *Das Heilige* (1917) that the nonrational apprehension of the Holy had two aspects: fascination or awe. The dualistic emphasis was also part of the ideology of Count Goblet d’Alviella who in his Hibbert lectures stated that “nature had always presented herself to man with a twofold aspect, the one fruitful [...] the other [...] destructive”. (70.) Thus, Karsten was not the first to offer a view of a dualistic religious system. But he made a further observation that is of interest. He asked “how are we to regard the Supreme Divinities, recognized in different savage religions?” This was the question Karsten desired briefly to consider in connection to religious dualities. In June 1898, Lang suggested in a letter to Tylor that the “savage believed in [...] Supreme perhaps before he had any idea of “spirit”” and that this “turns anthropological theory in upset” (71). Rafael Karsten, rather predictably, was hostile to Andrew Lang’s theory that there appeared a “conception of a divine Creator” among “the rudest tribes” (72). Karsten believed that Mr. Lang’s mistakes were twofold: firstly, he assumed erroneously that “early man was by nature speculative”, and, secondly, his interpretation of ethnological material was somewhat inaccurate and distorted. Karsten expressed doubts about Lang’s perspective by noting that “the most trustworthy observers, students who have approached the matter critically, take up a very sceptical position with regard to these Supreme Beings”. (73.) Karsten’s reliable observers were mainly missionaries, army officers, geologists, artists, newspapermen, and travellers whose ethnological reports on African, Australian and North and South American indigenous cultures cannot be undisputably considered the most eminent. However, some studies, like the works of the American George Catlin (1796-1872) with hundreds of illustrations and scenes of religious rituals, games and villages, became early classics of their kind. Riku Hämäläinen (2001) has suggested, however, that George Catlin’s sceptical notion of the existence of Supreme Beings among North American Indians cannot be considered definitely authoritative due to Catlin’s inadequate source criticism typical of that time. Furthermore, Hämäläinen has pointed out that Garrick Mallery, whom Rafael Karsten considered one of his critical ethnological sources, and his work *Picture-Writing of the American Indians* (1893) was highly valued among scholars at the end of the 19th century and thus it is no surprise that Karsten so eagerly relied on Mallery’s study. (74.) In his work Karsten was convinced of the difficulty of the “savage mind” to “form a clear conception about the concrete and the typical”. While we perceive the world “as a complex whole”, the “savage mind” lacked “the power of abstraction” since he was incapable

of “deeper thought”. Thus, “the inability to form clear conceptions about things perceived” stimulated “superstitious fear”. Karsten admitted, however, that if there were ideas of the “Great Spirit” attached to religious thought it occurred only later or was “due to foreign influence”. Sometimes, the belief in a “Highest God” existed but was considered so remote that it was “useless to pray and sacrifice to a being who anyhow does not interfere with human affairs”. Karsten stressed the desire of the “savage” to worship only minor spirits which took too much interest in a human’s life. (75.) Karsten believed that acts of prayers and offerings were introduced gradually to the “primitive mind” since at first he probably tried to avoid the evil. In fact, Karsten assumed that worship was not part of the “lowest stages of religious evolution”. Karsten mentioned the Australian aborigines who “rank among the lowest savages known to us”. Although the Australian aborigines did not lack religious ideas and believed in many evil beings of Heaven and earth, they did not worship their demons in any way. (76.) Karsten’s illustration of the evolution of worship is interesting in two ways. Firstly, his notion that the Australian aborigines were the “rudest savages” represented an idea typical of the Frazerian generation of scholars (77). On the other hand, it sounds peculiar that Karsten considered the “aborigines” self-evidently the “lowest” since he had talked about the error of regarding the “lowest savage tribes” as representatives of primeval man in their general state of culture (78). In 1914, the British sociologist G. Spiller declared that there were no differences between the Australian aborigines and other “races” (79). In his lengthy analysis Spiller supplied evidence of this viewpoint by suggesting that there were no differences in the senses, temperament, variability, inhibition of impulses, concentration, originality, mental capacity, mental modifiability, instincts, brain and skull, talent and mediocrity between the races of mankind (80). An interest in the early species of mankind had arisen in the 17th century when the French traveller F. Bernier (1625-1688) distinguished four races: 1) the inhabitants of Europe, North Africa and a great part of Asia, 2) the Africans, 3) the Asiatics, and 4) the Lapps. In the 18th century, Blumenbach (1775) based his classification of population on skull form and identified a difference between the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Ethiopian, the American, and the Malayan (Australian, Papuan, and pure Malay) types. During the 19th century, Virey (1801) suggested that there are mainly whites and blacks while Pruner Bey (1863) and Bory de Saint Vincent (1827) claimed that a certain race could be identified on the basis of hair. In 1895, Keane discussed “ideal types differentiated by somatic characters and also by language, religion and temperament”. (81.) It seems that it was only the British sociologist G. Spiller who pointed out that physical differences appeared to be “minimal between races, for while [...] the average brain of European weighs 1.360, the average Negro’s weighs 1.316” (82). Further, Spiller stressed the “equality of the temperamental outfit in different races” (83). Secondly, Rafael Karsten’s notion of the Australian aborigines is interesting since it supposed “aboriginal tribes” to have religion, but no worship. That was not obvious. On the contrary, many scholars, like Frazer and Lord Avebury, had assumed the “Australian aboriginal tribes” to have no religion, only magic. Thus, Karsten’s suggestion that there is no people, however “low in the scale of human

development”, which is devoid of religion, represented a diversified opinion and became *sine qua non* of his comparative religion (84).

But let us return to Karsten’s suggestion that worship was a result of gradual development such that “primitive man” at first avoided “attracting the attention” of dangerous spiritual being (85). What followed was Karsten’s lengthy comparative analysis of worldwide religious habits. His evolutionary time travel proceeded by describing how the Indians avoided seeing the object dreaded by them to the “cult of the ancient Romans” which aimed at conjuring “an evil spirit by exorcism” (according to Karsten, the Romans generated the word “religio” which first appeared as *religere* (“read away” - “to conjure evil spirit”)) (86). Rafael Karsten saw that a weak point in his historical examination was the ancient Egyptians whose beliefs and practices “are too little known to be referred in a comparative study of religious phenomena” (87). Overall, Karsten’s comparative analysis was like an endless story without a decisive clue. Once again, he arrived at the conclusion that *primus in orbe deos fecit timor* (“fear of the gods”) has been the motive of religious worship (88). But what he offered as a new idea is the viewpoint of the relation between religion and the moral condition among “savages”. Although Karsten made his views on morality and religion the most explicit in his article *Till Frågan om förhållandet mellan religion och moral* (1906), I will here provide a survey of his concept of development of religion and morality in its entirety.

Figure 2. Rafael Karsten’s conception of the development of religion and morality



Karsten contended that although religion and morality had developed in close connection to each other, it was obscure whether this development had been fundamental. On the “low level of development” religion had no ethical nature since the gods of savage people had no ethical power or will to guarantee them a distribution of punishments and compensations. Ultimately, this stemmed from the fact that the emotional life of “savage people” was without ethical character. Feelings of sympathy and gratitude developed only later in the course of evolution. The thinking pattern of the “savage man” consisted simply of egoistic self-preservation. At first, religion meant a compulsion which was far from fervent religious activity or real innate respect towards spiritual beings. Then, the moral ideas of “the savage” originated in social life. Gradually, political society arose. Political society can be considered quite a late

phenomenon since ancient Greek and Roman anthropomorphical deities were still something other than ethical paragons. In a political society morality and religion came closer. The gods became the protectors of humans, whereupon the human showed her gratitude towards the gods by worshipping them (gratitude as the most dominant feeling towards the gods). Worshipping the gods prevented the appearance of evil spirits which tried to harm people. This kind of dualism had an ethical nature since the gods were now not only nature elements but moral or ethical masteries. Religion (or the gods) had become the protector of morality when a human behaved according to the will of the gods (e.g. God asked Abraham to kill his own son). Man improved morally during the advancement. (89.) W. Robertson-Smith had suggested in his study on the religion of the Semites that there was a close connection between morality and religion “even at the lowest stages of evolution” when “the gods whom man adores are the protectors of the social order and laws” (90). Karsten considered the observation of Robertson-Smith incorrect since “such notions are not found at the lowest stages” and since Lang “decidedly rejects the theory that religion was born of fear” (91). Karsten, however, felt it improper to investigate more the nature of Robertson-Smith’s tentative assumptions in his thesis. It is peculiar why Karsten did not analyse this question further when he nevertheless emphasized that the question was “much disputed and not yet definitely solved” (92). In any event, Karsten’s “proper” analysis of Robertson-Smith’s totemism was published only in his works “Inledning till religionsvetenskapen” (1928) and “The Origin of Religion” (1935). Karsten’s notion of religion and morality was similar to Westermarck’s suggestion that the origin of morality was not in religion. Westermarck rejected in his work *Early Beliefs and Their Social Influence* (1932) the views of the German philosophers Pfleiderer and Wundt that “all moral commands have their origin in religion” (93). In addition, Westermarck noted in his statement on Karsten’s doctoral thesis that he considered Andrew Lang’s hypothesis, which saw the gods as possessing moral characters, “inadequate” (94). Westermarck supported the idea that “supernatural powers seldom protect morals, and the powers which do so must be prevailed on to do so by sacrifices” (95). In other words, Westermarck’s view indicates that religion is not a moral code or form of virtue amongst the indigenous people, but a spiritual attribute which coexists with moral customs. Religion assumed a moral nature when deities became the guardians of morality during the flourishing of ancient religions. Westermarck suggested that the belief in immorality of “primitive people” was irrational and inconsistent with earlier statements on this subject. Westermarck pointed out, like Frazer and Haddon, that it was morality that formed the foundation for religion, rather than *vice versa* (96). The members of the Westermarckian school had no aspiration to make a difference between ethics and morality. For Westermarck ethics was a branch of science that explained morality by analysing it as a social phenomenon. However, there is a difference between ethics and morality. Modern philosophers have regarded ethics as a study of evil and bad, whereas the study of morality has been considered the investigation of customs (I admit that this is a very general view). According to Karsten, modern ethics had two moral roots: theonomy (morality is divine) and autonomy (morality is human). Autonomical morality concept was more scholarly and historically veracious than theonomical morality. Since Karsten’s socioethical

conception understood morality as a social phenomenon, his views on the separateness of religion and morality belonged to the subject area of sociological ethics, not philosophical ethics as such.

We can now close this section with a few remarks on the nature of Rafael Karsten's doctoral thesis. Karsten's doctoral thesis showed explicitly that Tylor's studies on the subject of animism were an important early contribution to the field of comparative religion. On the other hand, Karsten re-shaped Tylorian animism by refusing to see it as a "primitive philosophy". Karsten also rejected Tylor's definition of religion by emphasizing religion as a "practical concern" which culminated in worship. It is noteworthy that Karsten denied the existence of the Supreme Beings among "primitive religions" and saw Spencerian manism as one explanation for fear as a motive for "primitive worship". In addition, Karsten explained further his view of the relationship between morality and religion. Karsten's opinions were theoretically veiled in premises of animal psychology such that the mental and moral faculties of animals and men were compared to each other. Although Karsten presented some new perspectives in his thesis, the theoretical elements which distinguish his doctoral thesis from his early article are not many. It is clear that some necessary evolutionary themes, like the idea of animism and morality and religion, were articulated in his thesis. Evidently, then, the most notable theoretical tools of Karsten's research appeared in his first article. For Karsten, the doctoral thesis meant, hence, only elaborating the topics considered remarkable.

4.3. The Polemic on the Doctrine and Institutions of Christianity

4.3.1. Society

The purpose of this section is to analyse the emergence of the so-called Prometheus Society which became a forum for radical and liberal discussion especially among Finnish-Swedish university scholars from 1905 onwards. The activity of the Prometheus Society was closely linked to the ideological and social turning point prompted by ideas of evolutionism, positivism, empiricism, liberalism, and socialism. In general, the anti-clerical/religious activity of the Prometheus Society was one indicator of a growing secularization in society. It would be futile, however, to try to understand the activity of the Prometheus Society without paying attention to the dialogue between it and the so-called Theological Saturday Society, that is, it is imperative to note how theologians and clergymen responded to the accusations and demands presented by members of the Prometheus Society. Although Rafael Karsten's role in the Prometheus Society was prominent, he never became a member of the most radical wing of the association. In any case, Rafael Karsten's active part in the anti-clerical and anti-religious debates of his day prepared the way for his book *Hedendom och kristendom* ("Paganism and Christianity"). Rafael Karsten's activity in the Prometheus Society was one manifestation of his spiritual transition. Thus, the main indicators (see Chapter Two, Figure 2)

behind Karsten's spiritual transition also explain his participation in the activities of the Prometheus Society. How much, then, the activity in the Prometheus Society was personal punishment directed at his devout Lutheran mother, is a convoluted issue and outlined further in Chapter Two. Yet, it is certain that the growing secularization of the state and intelligentsia offered Karsten a splendid opportunity to set himself against the arduously felt religiousness of his childhood home and try the nerves of his mother. More than personal revenge, I see Rafael Karsten's Prometheus activity as a result of a general and all-powerful ideological change in society, Karsten's own personal affections, and the activity of Edward Westermarck who as a mentor set an influential example.

The secular humanism of the Prometheus Society which urged Finnish theology to seek for its direction was based on attitudes formerly raised in the discussions of the Finnish-Swedish societies *Raketen* and *Euterpe*. The *Raketen* Society was the precursor of the *Euterpe* Society and established in spring 1896 (a few months later than the Theological Saturday Society). Its members belonged to the student club *Nyländska Nation*. The *Raketen* drew its members from *Klicken*, an all male circle of friends inside *Nyländska Nation*. The opponent of *Klicken* was a group known as *Klunsen*, the assembly considered "democratic" and also open to women unlike *Klicken* which was closed to women. (1.) The members of *Klicken* discussed various topics but inside it flourished a strong philosophical interest which had been evoked by Edward Westermarck. The *Klicken* has been described as a group with a "patrician impression" in which the use of alcohol was relatively liberal. At the same time as the members of *Klicken* founded the *Raketen* society, the membership of *Klunsen* set up *N.K.K.* (*Nyländska kamratklubben*) (1892). Although the discussions and activities of the *Raketen* and the *N.K.K.* resembled each other, none of the members of the *N.K.K.* were active in the future *Euterpe* Society. Yet, women were prohibited from joining the *Raketen* while they were permitted access to the *N.K.K.* (2.) The *Raketen* became a discussion club and its meetings in the rococo room of Catani explored a combination of conservative, liberal, national, and cosmopolitan ideas. Yet, the *Raketen* was also a forum for aesthetics and literary issues (Mikael Lybeck as a favourite author). It was the destiny of the *Raketen* to be labelled a "separatist club" of insiders. (3.) By spring 1899 the activity of the *Raketen* had subsided and finally came to an end in autumn 1900. The most eager members of the *Raketen* Society founded the *Euterpe* Journal and the circle around it. The *Euterpe* Society was a more loosely united group than the *Raketen* and also opened the door to women (Greta von Frenckell was one of the first female members) (4.) The *Euterpe* Society inherited its secular humanism from the *Raketen*. Jan-Magnus Jansson (1990) has described Finnish-Swedish secular humanism as different from totalitarian, conservative or Christian humanism. Jansson has noted that secular humanism experienced a mental change at the beginning of the 20th century when the ideas of naturalism spread to Finland. In the period of Runeberg and Topelius, the great Finnish intellectuals of the 19th century, the attitudes of Finnish and Finnish-Swedish literati towards institutionalized Christianity were mild, whereas the mental compromise between progressive thought and religion still prevailed. (5.)

As time went on, the Finnish and Finnish-Swedish intelligentsia became more and more involved in new theoretical advances, evolutionary and comparative dimensions, which finally led to a great deal of criticism of the biblical texts (6). The chief intellectual stimulus among the Euterpe was received from abroad. The open-minded journeys to Europe (Copenhagen, Hamburg, Brussels, Paris, Cologne, Milan, Venice and Sils-Maria) were conditions for broadening the worldview. One member, Gunnar Castrén, who travelled with Harry Federley and Sigurd Frosterus became so inspired by Italy that he uttered: “One must not travel to Italy, or one cannot return from there” (7). Earlier, Paris had become a dream-place for the older generation of Finnish-Swedish scholars, like C.G. Estlander, Hjalmar Neiglick, Albert Edelfelt, and Werner Söderhjelm, who were in the habit of singing odes to the Seine and its magnificent atmosphere (8). Paradoxically, the eagerness of Finnish-Swedish scholars to experience the European atmosphere and European scholarship did not, however, lead to mass emigration, that is, Finnish academic youth did not leave the country very eagerly. Among the Euterpe emigration was constrained by the elementary personal feeling that abroad one easily felt like a “stranger”. The more oppressive the atmosphere in Helsinki became, the more the members of the Euterpe were ready to do battle for an “international, free, and intellectually rich planet”. (9.) To be exact, the Euterpe Journal was born before the appearance of the brotherhood and thus the magazine was the most significant channel for expressing views. The Euterpe Journal was born as a result of a noisy dispute when the members of the Raketen (G. Castrén, T. Söderhjelm, L. Ehrnrooth, and G. Cedercreutz) refused to have dinner in the same restaurant as the detested police commissioner of the town, W. Carlstedt, and his Russian speaking guests. After an incident in the Grand Hotel, Torsten Söderhjelm and Leo Ehrnrooth went to the restaurant Catani on the Northern Esplanade and decided to establish the official organ of the young academic generation, the Euterpe. (10.) To establish a review at that time was bound by many restrictions: to deal with the oppressive policy of Russia was strictly prohibited, for instance. One characteristic of the Russian oppressive policy was that the Russian authors were publicly able to accuse Finnish people of secrecy, resistance, and agitation in their pamphlets (11). The deterrent policy of Russia even assumed symbolic traits: “every now and then there is thunder in clear weather followed by a great flash of lightning when you least expect it”, declared the Russian Councillor of State N. N. Korevo in 1910 (12). The plan of Söderhjelm and Ehrnrooth to establish a new journal gained popularity among students and finally on 1 November 1901 the “first solemn consilium” was arranged in Ehrnrooth’s home. Before long, Yrjö Hirn and Werner Söderhjelm became part of the editorial staff. With a joint effort, the journal concentrated on literary, artistic and social issues. Foreign cultural trends were also discussed. It was noticed fairly soon, however, that there already were two Finnish-Swedish cultural journals, *Finsk Tidskrift* and *Ateneum*, which came out regularly and against which it was useless to compete. Since there was some doubt as to whether the Finnish-Swedish intelligentsia needed yet another culture magazine, the Euterpe Journal became a musical periodical which, also, dealt with literature, art and theatre. The review came out once a week on Saturdays. According to Gunnar Castrén, the Euterpe Journal was a “rescuing angel which saved the youth of Helsinki from indifference and

languor". (13.) However, the Euterpe Journal co-operated with Finsk Tidskrift. On 21 December 1902 Finsk Tidskrift organized a banquet for its devotees and Professor M.G. Schybergson, Edward Westermarck, the orientalist Knut Tallqvist, Gunnar Landtman, Georg Schauman, J. J. Tikkanen, Bernhard Estlander and other scholars were invited to the restaurant Nymark & Stavenows on the Northern Esplanade. The clamorous discussion concerned "socialism and franchise". Schybergson stated that they could not go against the demand of the social democrats for franchise reform considering that academic radicalism was indebted to workers who had been willing to sign a petition addressed to Tsar Nicholas II in 1899. (14.) Due to the fact that the Euterpe Society was loose in organisation, the agenda was weak and some members never wrote for the journal (owing mainly to their professional background, medicine, for instance). One of the most energetic writers was Rolf Lagerborg, a member of the Westermarckian school, who more than anyone else wrote to the Euterpe about social and religious issues. Leo Ehrnrooth considered Lagerborg a valuable co-operator (*en värdefull medarbetare*) whose discussions with Ehrnrooth in Helsinki's Boulevard street were very significant to the birth of the Euterpe. (15.) It seems that Rolf Lagerborg's pen was the most radical, since some of his articles were banned even by the members of the Euterpe themselves. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the protest of the Euterpe against Christianity and its institutions rested much on Lagerborg's polemic argumentation. However, Gunnar Castrén and Edward Westermarck also voiced skeptical reflections on the church as a buttress of tsarism. Mustelin (1963) has suggested that Castrén and Lagerborg meant different matters when they talked about religion, that is, Castrén's articles were clearer and more objective than Lagerborg's (16). At times, Lagerborg was criticized for unnecessary sharpness which alluded to his desire to render religion and the church lifeless (17). In his work *I egna ögon - och andras* ("With own eyes - and others'", 1942) Lagerborg discussed his "godfearing childhood" which still caused him religious restraints when he was a newly graduated Master of Arts at the Alexander University. According to Lagerborg he was never totally free from the "fight against religion" (18). Looking back upon his life, Lagerborg felt that his presentation of "unobstructed investigation in religious topics" (1897) meant for him a new insight, that of a freethinker (19). Mustelin (1963) has suggested that the Euterpe was antireligious and anticlerical but more anticlerical than antireligious (20). What does this mean? As far as I can judge, the anticlerical and antireligious attitudes of the Euterpe were linked to each other, thus they were children of positivistic, liberalistic, and evolutionary ideas. Nevertheless, it is possible to state that antireligious attitudes stemmed from the tradition of positivism (and evolutionism) through which agnosticism ("not knowing") had received a renewed existence in the 19th century. Because of the fervid adoption of scientific method to the study of all matters, the Westermarckian school particularly regarded theological study as an ancient relic which science had replaced (Comtean trichotomy). Rolf Lagerborg declared in 1897 that "science had no religion" (21). In general, the Euterpe Society (like the Prometheus Society) was tired of theologians' inclination to constantly underline the magnificence of Christianity. Yet, it was in fashion to be "agnostic" or "atheist" among youth societies. Interestingly, the only female Westermarckian, Hilma Granqvist (1890-1972), was

not agnostic but a professing Christian. Granqvist's theoretical terms of reference, however, was different from Westermarck's and she received her doctorate only in 1932 (22). Due to her later appearance as Westermarck's disciple she never came to the focal point of scholarly vicissitude (*fin de siècle*) of the beginning of the 20th century. The antireligious attitudes can also be considered opinions which "left religion behind" and which demanded the replacement of Christianity with something new, that is, it was not enough that Christianity received a new "outer garment" but it had to be changed for "new forms", as Gunnar Castrén put it (23). The antireligious attitudes within the Euterpe also originated in the views of particular theorists as in Voltaire's defence of the rationality of religion, Georg Brandes's "revolt of the human mind" and Friedrich Nietzsche's idea of the development of new individuality (24). The Danish critic and biographer Georg Morris Cohen Brandes (1842-1927) represented the naturalist movement in Scandinavian literature. He was influenced by the French critic Ernest Renan and by John Stuart Mill and introduced Nietzsche to Scandinavian readers. His writings and lectures reflected cosmopolitan radical realism and forthright atheism. Also, his influence on the scholars of the Euterpe was enormous (25). Voltaire was seen as an icon of humanity (26). Voltaire defended religious toleration (*La Henriade*, 1728) and attacked the political and ecclesiastical institutions of France (*Essay on General History and on the Customs and the Character of Nations*, 1756). But although Voltaire denounced the power of the clergy he made evident his own belief in the existence of God. In that sense, then, he could be considered more anticlerical than antireligious. The German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) and his provocative addresses of the independent and creative ideal *Übermensch* increased the certainty of one's own power to succeed among the scholars of the Euterpe. Nietzschean "will to power" meant not only power over others, but power over oneself. "Now youth is in power!", exclaimed Rolf Lagerborg in the Nietzschean spirit (27). Nietzsche's famous proclamation "God is dead" evidently affected most the Euterpe scholars with atheistic views. Let us now consider the anticlerical attitudes within the Euterpe (and the Prometheus Society). Although anticlerical attitudes were attached to international concepts of positivism, evolutionism, and liberalism, they were also pronouncedly "local", that is, they were flavoured by events of politically and socially arduous pathos of the time. The Euterpe supported the views of the Finnish Constitutionalists whose negative attitude towards the church stemmed from the political quarrel between them and the clergy (situation of moral aggravation). The Constitutionalists regarded the Finnish clergy as sycophants of the Grand Duke, since they had abandoned their ecclesiastic commitment to promoting Christian ideals in human life. (28.) In fact, many intellectual strands were bound together to form one opposition of opinions. One significant reason for the Euterpe expressing its disapproval of Finnish clergymen was the support which the clergy gave to the compliance politics of the party of the Old Finns, later the National Coalition Party. Here, "compliance politics" refers to the notion that Finland had to ensure its national existence by consenting to Russia's policies. Two members of the Theological Saturday Society, Arthur Hjelt (1868 - 1931) and Lauri Ingman (1868-1934), participated in the last Finnish diet (1905-06) as representatives of the clergy estate. Hjelt and Ingman were known for their moderate

conservatism, although Hjelt adopted quite a negative attitude towards Ritschlian “left wing” theology (29). Murtorinne (1978) has suggested that the reasons for the Finnish clergy expressing approval of the ideas of the Old Finns Party were varied. Firstly, the linguistic and social background of the Finnish clergy changed rapidly at the end of the 19th century. It was no accident that the party of the Old Finns with its nationalistic ideas was eager to support Finnish-speaking students of all ranks in their endeavours to get ahead. Gradually, the Finnish clergy began to consider the policy of the Old Finns a significant possibility to succeed in their clerical careers. Since Johan Wilhelm Snellman (1806-1881) (“forerunner of Finnish spirit”), the coexistence of religion and the state had been regarded as an essential social virtue since the survival of religion meant the survival of the state. Another Finnish figure with a largely conservative image was Yrjö-Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen (former Forsman) (1830-1903) who considered Christianity a natural part of the progress of human history. Yet, the older generation of the clergy was influenced by Finnish Pietism, which shunned general social activity and “be cautious” (*pysyä lestissään* in Finnish) describes its character as a conventional “observer” the most excellently. (30.) The Euterpe, thus, came to oppose the Snellmanian / Hegelian view which bolstered the ego of the clergy by considering God as the heart of all life. The Euterpe and the Constitutionals called the clergy opportunists, and stressed the need for a quick separation of the church and state. Furthermore, the Euterpe regarded the financial support of the state to the church as gratuitous. Rolf Lagerborg supported civil marriage (called the “Lagerborgian method”) and gained sympathy from the other members of the Euterpe, although many were still married in church. This ecclesiastical-political controversy also stimulated the labour movement to criticize the church. Leo Ehrnrooth saw the Euterpe Society and its activity in the club house *Rövarkulan* (“the Robber’s Cave”) as the richest memory of his early life. According to Ehrnrooth, the words “The young person’s new outlook on life has the same claim as every serious conviction” described the radicalism among the Euterpe and its co-operators most vividly. On the other hand, Ehrnrooth did not want to see the Euterpe merely as a society for atheists. (31.)

The Euterpe Society was still alive when the Prometheus Society was founded on 20 October 1905, eleven days before Finland joined in the general strike which began in Russia on 25 October 1905. Generally speaking, the Prometheus Society was founded by the youngest wing of the Euterpe. On 29 October 1905, Edward Westermarck announced that he would be keen to be chairman of the new society although he was travelling away in December (32). Edvard Järnström was elected vice-chairman, the university student Stefan Söderhjelm was secretary, Dr. Rolf Lagerborg recorder, and Hjalmar Eklund treasurer (33). In the first meeting Rolf Lagerborg read his polemic letter to the chapter and writer Nino Runeberg recited a poem (34). The number of participants in the meetings varied between 40 and 90. On 3 December 1905, the Prometheus Society decreed that every member was allowed to invite a maximum of two friends (old or new students) to the meetings (35). Perhaps this resulted from the wish of the society to set limits to the membership, which was relatively high and heterogeneous compared to the ten theologian members of the Theological Saturday Society. From the

beginning, the Prometheus Society was bilingual, and minutes were written both in Finnish and in Swedish. Murtorinne (1967) has suggested, however, that bilingualism was only a custom in principle and the Prometheus society was mainly an organ of the Swedish-speaking students (36). Regarding the Westermarckian school, the most active in the Prometheus Society were Yrjö Hirn, Rolf Lagerborg, Rafael Karsten, and Gunnar Landtman. Westermarck described the Prometheus as “the most lively” of all student movements (37). As stated, the emergence of the Prometheus Society was connected to the general strike, which caused farmers and city dwellers to protest loudly against the political situation. The extensive force of the strike is reflected in the historical fact that a few hours after the strike had begun, approximately 20 000 people had gathered around *Rautatientori* (the open area around the railway station). The furious crowd demanded that the parliament of estates should be dismantled and a new, unicameral parliament should be elected. (38.) The change in the nature of the intellectual atmosphere also brought a change in the possibility to attack ecclesiastical institutions. The open resistance and audacity dispelled the fear that anticlerical/religious opinions would inevitably lead to prison sentences. The radical movements advised their members to take advantage of the confused situation and express their anticlerical and antireligious attitudes courageously (39). The labour movement slogan “religion is a personal affair” also stimulated the minds of the non-socialist Finnish and Finnish-Swedish cultural radicals. It is peculiar, however, that the minutes of the Prometheus Society of that period are strangely mild, giving a picture of verve and rabidity typical of any youth club, but saying nothing about open intellectual fanaticism or chaos during the meetings, disregarding the resolute demands for abolishing religious instruction in the upper grades of school (40). The main objective of the Prometheus Society was to achieve full freedom of religion. The society also aimed at the separation of the church and the state (in co-operation with the Baptist church), civil marriage (Rolf Lagerborg’s project), removing obligatory religious instruction at least on the advanced level, and relieving of the legal obligation to swear oaths on the Bible (41.) The Finnish-Swedish journal *Studentbladet* presented the Prometheus as a society in which an agnostic worldview had a repulsion for any deeper world view and which did not aim at freedom of religion but freedom from religion (42). In fact, the aspiration to full freedom of religion had first appeared in 1887 when the lecturer Viktor Heikel and Mathilda Asp founded *Suomen uskonvapaus ja suvaitsevaisuusyhdistys* (“The Finnish Society for Religious Freedom and Tolerance”) (43). The society was instantaneously banned by the authorities. On 25 March 1906, the Prometheus Society decided to lay the foundation for a nationwide society for freedom of religion which would carry on Heikel’s and Asp’s discontinued activity (44). From the start, the Prometheus Society planned to establish an official organ of its anticlerical ideas. The only impediment to creating a new journal was the question of expenses and comprehensive circulation (only 250 subscribers when 400 were required) (45). As librarian of the Prometheus Society, Rolf Lagerborg subscribed to several foreign journals which were available at the reading room of Helsinki University Library (46). In 1907 the society began to publish the booklet “Prometheus”, which ran to only two issues: Edward Westermarck’s *Siveys ja kristinusko* (“Kristendom och moral” - “Christianity and

Morality”) and Rolf Lagerborg’s *Kristinuskon opetusta vaiko maallista siveyskasvatusta?* (“Teaching Christianity or Secular Ethics?”). Westermarck’s brief analysis of Christianity and morality got him involved in the historical examination of Christianity when Westermarck considered the morality of Christianity old-fashioned. Westermarck’s booklet was based on his lectures on morality and Christianity in the meetings of the Prometheus Society in December 1906 (47). Westermarck looked beyond the Christian concept of duty of charity which he saw as a primary character of Christian moral commandment. Westermarck treated Christian virtue of *agape* (refers here to love of God or Christ) as a phenomenon which was only associated with Christians, not all people. The history of Christianity had been pure bloodshed, whereby Christians had subjected the neighbouring tribes to their rule. Another interesting point is that Westermarck considered the acceptance of slavery to be the most immoral feature of Christianity. Westermarck criticized the Americans for failing to deal with the slavery problem. Westermarck pointed out that it was hard to believe that this horror had occurred only fifty years earlier. (48.) In 1906, Rafael Karsten analysed morality and Christianity in his booklet *Några drag af humanitetsidens utveckling* (“Some Traits of the Development of the Idea of Humanity”) and regarded Christians as immoral compared to “primitive people”. Karsten’s notion was somewhat paradoxical to his theoretical hypothesis that the idea of humanity had developed gradually in the course of human evolution. A member of the Theological Saturday Society, Zach Castrén, reproached Karsten for presenting a “combination of loose and outdated ideas” (49). Rolf Lagerborg’s Prometheus essay was written in a Nietzschean spirit and thus integrated into the intellectual atmosphere of the Prometheus Society. Lagerborg wrote in 1907 as follows (my abridgement):

“[...] the ideals of the church are inapplicable to a secular society [...] religion delays progress and thus morality gradually overcomes religion [...] the morality of the Old Testament is completely unsuited to our society [...] The Christian view that people are “depraved, fallen and sinful beings” has to be rejected since it does not aim at soundness and delight [...] but educates people to humbleness and insecurity [...] Christianity is dangerous [...] how many of those young people graduating from lyceums really go to church every Sunday and receive the Communion [...] the Communion during the confirmation is, thus, nothing else than a farewell ceremony when youth says farewell to religion [...] religious instruction compels youth to think differently from what they really desire [...] we must, however, avoid violence in our endeavours since the difference between us and believers concerns only the way of thinking in the opposed way structured and instructed brains [...] the members of the Prometheus Society have to respect Christians as individuals but not as convinced believers [...] you must not cause unnecessary wounds in your private life although you aim at honest scholarly debate in public” (50).

Rolf Lagerborg’s words of aspiration to individual tolerance captured the core of the thinking pattern of the Prometheus Society, although his phrases sound deceptively tranquil compared

to his later addresses like his eager advocacy of sexual radicalism (it is sometimes forgotten that youth ideal of free love was not born in the 1960s). The Prometheus Society failed, however, in founding a new review and thus its official organs appeared to be the Finnish *Nuori Suomi* (“Young Finland”, edited by *Ylioppilaiden Keskusteluseura*, “The Student Debating Society”) and the Finnish-Swedish radical *Framtid* (“Future”) (51). Besides, newspapers like *Helsingfors Posten* and *Nya Pressen* published columns by the members of the Prometheus Society and features of the society’s activity (52). Rafael Karsten’s activity in the Prometheus Society reached two points of culmination. On 17 October 1909, the Prometheus Society protested, in a large meeting of over 300 participants, signally against the so-called principle of “religious crime”. A few months earlier the editor of the magazine Finnish Socialist, Taavi Tainio, had been sentenced to two months in prison due to his high-spirited statements on religion (53). As mentioned before, the socialists and cultural radicals considered religion a personal affair while the state and church had to abstain from interfering in the religion of an individual. This demand was strongly opposed by theologians, who declared in a meeting of the Faculty of Divinity (1903) that religion was not only a personal affair but also a “matter of society, church, and humanity” (54). A theologian Kukkonen said that the question of religion as a personal affair served to mobilize atheistic views and was proof of “inordinate egoism” (55). At the Prometheus meeting itself (1909), the majority voted in favour of Rolf Lagerborg’s proposal that blasphemy should be seen as permitted expedient in objecting to superstition and religious activity. This was a radical expression of the members’ desire to see religion / religiousness as a topic which must be treated outside the table of public prosecutor. Rafael Karsten was not present at the meeting but rejected Lagerborg’s proposal in a newspaper article *Herr Rolf Lagerborg och häderiet* (“Mr. Rolf Lagerborg and Blasphemy”) (56). Karsten criticized Lagerborg for inconsistency and destroying the principles of tolerance and liberality of the Prometheus Society. As further justification, Karsten argued that comparative religion, not “sacrilege”, acted as an intellectual device for the intelligentsia. But who could have anticipated that the Finnish labour movement would also become interested in comparative studies on religion and translate parts of Max Müller’s “Natural Religion” into Finnish whereupon Müller’s text was efficiently spread among the working population (57). It is important, however, to understand that not all workers’ associations were captivated by the atheistic-materialistic views typical of the Social Democratic Party. There were also associations for Christian workers which were founded by clergymen (58). In 1942, Karsten looked back upon Lagerborg’s idea of blasphemy (as a weapon against the restriction of individual liberty) and declared, once more, that it was never analogous to his or Westermarck’s concept of tolerance (59). Ragnar Numelin, a member of the Prometheus Society since November 1912, described Lagerborg as a person who regardless of being a “diva” was a gentleman and always “correct towards his friends” (60). Rafael Karsten’s activity in the Prometheus Society reached, perhaps, its highest point in his book “Paganism and Christianity” published in 1910. A part of the anticlerical debate of society was to see Christianity, like any other historical religion, to be derived from the pagan religions. Edward Westermarck had previously declared in the *Euterpe Journal* that “religion

and magic” were a part of all religions (from animism to Christianity) (61). That is what Rafael Karsten’s phenomenological analysis of the relation between paganism and Christianity came to emulate. A more profound analysis of Karsten’s work is deliberated in the next section.

So far, we have only discussed the general orientation within the Prometheus Society, that is, its approaches to religion and the church. What about the dialogue between the Prometheus Society and the clergymen and theologians then? What was it like? The most significant adversary of the Prometheus Society was the Theological Saturday Society founded a few months earlier than the Euterpe Society. To begin with, it would be totally erroneous to state that Finnish academic theologians and clergymen were not prepared for the rise of new intellectual tendencies. I believe that the Protestant churches must have been prepared for the change since industrialization and changing of world-view did not occur overnight. Yet, it is certain that the omnipotent ideological power of evolutionary thought amazed the Protestant churches, that is, the Protestant churches refused to see that new ideologies would topple people’s faith in God (62). In Finland, the Protestant church believed that the old intellectual compromise between an idea of progress and Christianity would survive despite the fact that Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution had pronouncedly drifted to Finland in the early 1860s when the mineralogist N.G. Nordenskiöld, the palaeontologist A. von Nordman, the zoologist A.J. Malmgren, the chemist J.J. Chydenius, and the physicist K. Chydenius were eager to accept Darwin’s ideas (63). In 1872 the conferrer of Savo-Karelian nation, the naturalist J. H. Mela held his powerful lecture on Darwin’s observations in the nation’s annual festival (64). The reason why the Finnish clergy too readily trusted in the balance between natural and Christian views stemmed from the tendency of the natural scientists of the 18th century to go into the church, not only because of a better salary or a esteemed position but because they simply felt Christianity to be the foundation of their lives (65). Interestingly, the first Finnish work on natural sciences *Hyödyllinen opetus luomisen töistä* (“A Useful Lesson on The Works of Creation”) was published by the clergyman Juhana Frosterus in the 18th century (66). The Faculty of Divinity of the Alexander University likewise responded to the challenges facing the character of Christianity quite early although it is clear that the reforms they launched were more an attempt to support the position of the church than to establish a new role for theology. This is, at least, what the minutes of the Faculty of Divinity of that period reveal (67). But then again, looking at the doctoral theses examined in systematic theology, biblical exegetics, church history, and practical theology between 1828 and 1908, it appears that the theological studies hardly examined Christianity and secularization at all. K. A. Appelberg’s dissertation (on 2 May 1896) *Bidrag till belysning af sättet för prästtjänsternas besättande i Finland från reformationen till medlet af 17:de seklet* (“Analysis of Taking Clerical Office in Finland from the Reformation to the Middle of the 17th century”) is a somewhat prototypical example of how theological theses still turned to the past, being unprepared for exploring present-day conception of human and the world (68). On the other hand, the doctoral theses of the Faculty of Philosophy (Arts) of the Alexander University were yet dominated by “old-fashioned” *philosophiae Hegeliana* and it was only Dr. Mariupolsky

whose philosophical work on Herbert Spencer's evolutionary thought (May 1904) anticipated the arrival of new tendencies (69). Although the doctoral theses of the Faculty of Divinity ran into concrete problems quite late, the Faculty introduced the reform of theological syllabi with the new examination system facilitating the chances of the clergy to study abroad in 1886 (70). Some Finnish academic theologians studied in Germany when they assumed a cultural Protestant view of Christianity of the so-called Ritschlian school, a group of disciples around Albert Ritschl's (1822-1889) "immanent theology" (71). Ritschl, like other Protestant theologians of this school, Ernst Troeltsch, Adolf von Harnack, and Julius Kaftan, supported the idea that religion had an immanent nature and thus the duty of religion was to promote divine purposes in the world so that the relationship between man and God would become one of reliance and respect (72). Some disciples of the Ritschlian school aspired to historically analyse biblical issues when evolutionary theory was also applied to the Bible. In general, Ritschlian theology rejected the Schleiermacherian "metaphysical-speculative" ideas which did not put enough emphasis on the historical character of Jesus. While Schleiermacher employed *eine Methode der Hinüberdeutung* (interpreting Christianity in a particular schema), Ritschl preferred *die Methode der Deutung* (from the point of view of Christianity) (73). The Ritschlian empirical analysis of the history of the Bible met great resistance among many Protestant theologians. However, Ritschlian ideas represented a major current in Protestant theology up to the First World War, after which Karl Barth's dialectical theology or the theology of crisis began to achieve popularity (74). In 1886, the Faculty of Divinity was granted two new assistant professorships, one in the biblical languages and another in preliminary theological concepts (*teologisten prenotsionien virka* in Finnish) (75). The professorship of preliminary theological concepts attached importance to the study of non-Christian religions and was thus the first serious aspiration to integrate comparative religion into the subject area of theology. One incumbent of the assistant professorial post in preliminary theological concepts was Erkki Kaila (known until 1906 as Erik Johansson) (1867-1944), whose Beckian/Ritschlian (moderate) interpretation of Christianity assumed a fairly positive attitude towards the history of religions. (76.) In 1908, Kaila published his work *Uskonnonhistoriallisia luentoja* ("Lectures on the History of Religion"), which examined Christian origins and their implications, that is, the relationship between Christianity and the ancient religions of the Near East. Kaila showed theological valiancy in suggesting that Christianity had been influenced by oriental religions (Karsten called these "pagan religions"). For Kaila, Christianity was a doctrine of supernatural revelation which should not merely been seen as the "highest" religion. Kaila's attitude towards the doctrine of evolution was visible through his Ritschlian apologetics when he stated that "evolutionism and belief in God were not in conflict with each other" since "development to perfection does not appear haphazardly but as a result of the guidance of a greater power" (77). According to Kaila, evolutionary thought was a natural part of the doctrine of Christianity since "Christianity itself was waiting for a higher stage of religious development to emerge" (78). Above all, Kaila should be considered a skilled seer who anticipated the future problems of growing individualization when people's many activities lead them regularly outside the home. In 1932, Kaila warned

people of a “struggle for family” which would destroy family life if parents and children were not spending enough time together. (79.) As is known, this is what our contemporary social problems are very much about. If the University Senate of the Alexander University had not rejected the official proposal, Erkki Kaila would have been appointed a docent of comparative religion in the Faculty of Divinity. The University Senate saw comparative religion, however, as a subject area which belonged to the Faculty of Philosophy and its Historical-Philological Section (80). After Kaila, Antti J. Pietilä (1878-1932) took the post in preliminary theological concepts (basic theology) in 1911. Pietilä’s attitude towards the history of religions was positive and he published a religious philosophical study *Drei Versuchungsgeschichten, Zarathustra, Buddha, Christus* in 1910 (81). The study compared the temptation stories of Zoroaster, Buddha and Jesus and tried to trace a connection between them. Pietilä concluded that the temptation stories shared no similarities stemming from direct interdependent influence, that is, Pietilä desired to see Christianity as “absolute” which “fundamentally” differed from other religions of the time (compare to Kaila’s suggestion). (82.) One element of Pietilä’s theology, derived from the Laestadian form of piety and the Beckian biblical theology, was to see scientific knowledge and religious belief as essential entities which aimed at “praising God with their own expressions” (83). In 1889, the Finnish parliament passed the so-called “law of a different faith” (*eriuskoislaki* in Finnish) which increased the functional modes of the free churches, for instance. The Finnish theologians adopted a negative attitude towards the Anglo-American free church movement which in its pamphlets (*De frikyrkliges program* - “The Program of the Members of the Free Church Movement”) criticized Lutheran theology. Since 1888 the ecclesiastical tendency among Finnish theologians had expressed their views in journal *Vartija* demanding that the church should have “common confession and inner discipline” in order to be able to respond to the challenges of the time, that is, “Vartija” supported quick “mobilization of ecclesiastical forces”. (84.) On 19 August 1891, the ecclesiastical ideas found a new forum for discussion when the Finnish Society of Theological Literature was established in the town of Mikkeli. The chairman of the society was Gustaf Johansson (1844- 1930), who represented the second generation of Beckian theologians. Other members were K. Durchman, Johannes Schwartzberg, Jaakko Päivärinta, O.J. Cantell, Bruno Granit, K.R. Jauhainen and K. Malmberg (85). The society published literature dating from Finnish Pietism whereas non-Christian books were considered “frivolous and outrageous” (86). The activity of the society came to an end in January 1897, as a consequence of the “too quiet spiritual fervour” of the Savo area, until it was revived by members of the Theological Saturday Society in 1905 (87). The first meeting of the Finnish Theology Society (later the Theological Saturday Society) was held on 1 February 1896 at Erkki Kaila’s home at Kasarmikatu 14 in Helsinki. In fact, Erkki Kaila’s theological dissertation had been examined a few months earlier and he was the oldest (28 years old) and the most experienced participant at the first meeting. (88.) Other participants at the first meeting were Arthur Hjelt, Zachris Castren, Jaakko Gummerus, Martti Ruuth, Edvard Grönlund, Matti Pesonen, Taavi Puttila, Einar Candolin, Emil Ekman, Lauri Ingman, Lauri Pohjala ja Ludvig Sjöstedt (89). During the first meeting, the society translated

into Finnish some concepts of the German Berth Nitzsoh's dogmatics and Erkki Kaila quoted an expert in biblical exegetics, the German Professor Hermann Cremer, whose systematic-conservative work *Der Glaube und die Tatsachen* aroused lively conversation among participants (90). The German emphasis of the meeting came from the theological studies which Arthur Hjelt (Erlangen), Jaakko Gummerus (Leipzig), Lauri Ingman (Halle and Greifswald), Martti Ruuth (Halle and Greifswald), and Ludvig Sjöstedt (Halle and Greifswald) had undertaken in German universities (91). Erkki Kaila never studied theology under German tuition but familiarized himself with new theological tendencies by reading various works when acting as his father's assistant curate in a "remote parish of inner Finland" (Alajärvi) (92). During the first ten years the average number of people participating in theological meetings was ten, excluding the visitors. Erkki Kaila called the society a "*de facto* temperance society" whereas Lauri Ingman said it to be *Mumman maja* which referred to a secret society in Stockholm. (93). A member of the Theological Saturday Society, K.K. Aro, stated that the society aimed at "national theology" and so conversations were held in Finnish. An exception was made by the lecturer Albert Segerstråle, who always spoke Swedish. (94.) According to Erkki Kaila the tasks of the Theological Saturday Society were twofold. Firstly, it aspired to promote conversation by bringing theologians together. The society was a forum for free discussion, there being no topics that were regarded as inappropriate. Secondly, the society aspired to balance between religion and culture. Erkki Kaila was worried about the prevailing antithetical entities "cultureless religiousness" (the world was emptied of cultural meaning especially among Laestadian and Finnish Prayers) and "religionless culture" (the world was increasingly emptied of religious meaning among cultural radicalists and socialists). Kaila described Jaakko Gummerus (1870-1933), Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the University of Helsinki, as the most dexterous person in the attempt to obtain a balance between religion and culture (95.) Gummerus was famous for his resourcefulness, raising the level of the teaching of church history in the Faculty of Divinity by reforming instruction in methodology and introducing new academic seminars. Gummerus was influenced by the Ritschlian view of Christianity and supported critical historical research of church history. (96.)

By 1904, antireligious literature had gained hysteria-like prominence among cultural radical students and socialists. On 24 September 1904, the Theological Saturday Society for the first time discussed the re-establishment of the Finnish Society of Theological Literature. As the tempo of antireligious and anticlerical fighting rose, the society continued its discussion until on 4 March 1905 it decided on re-founding the Finnish Society of Theological Literature at Erkki Kaila's home. At that time, the Theological Saturday Society had received new members like Paavo Virkkunen (Snellman), Antti J. Pietilä, Antti Filemon Puukko and Yrjö Loimaranta (also Uno Harva, a pioneer of Finnish comparative religion, was a member of the society between 1915-1926). (97.) The task of the Finnish Society of Theological Literature was apologetic, that is, it aspired to respond the accusations of antireligious/clerical societies by showing the limits of the "brutal critique" of the church and religion. The apologetic task

also included an attempt to “easily and popularly explain the results of theology to the wider public” since especially the workers had “misunderstood theological questions and conceptions” (98). In 1906, a member of the Theological Saturday Society, Lauri Hendell, admitted that the Finnish Society of Theological Literature had very little voice in the clamour for public resistance to the church and clergy but regardless of that it would have been “inexcusable to neglect apologetics” (99). In practice, the Theological Saturday Society and the Finnish Society of Theological Literature were identical since the members of the former group were mainly also active in the latter. It turns out then that the apologetics of the Finnish Society of Theological Literature and the “theology” of the Theological Saturday Society were roughly synonymous (100). However, in the era of flaming radicalism when people disagreed on how to defend oneself against the attacks of the tsar, the meetings of the Theological Saturday Society were also habitually more coloured by political than theological issues (101). The disagreement between the Theological Saturday Society and the Prometheus Society originated in the demands of the Euterpe Society that the church and the state should be separated and that students of higher forms should be withdrawn from religious instruction. The demand for separation of the church and the state received its significant icon from France, where in 1906 the church was separated from the state. In general, the question of the separation of church and state dealt with dimensions of individual liberty and freedom of conscience. In 1906, the Finnish parliament established a committee to prepare a report for advancing freedom of religion. (102.) The issue of the separation of the church and state aroused a lot of discussion within the Theological Saturday Society. The Theologian Railo regretted that clergymen, in general, became involved in politics (103). Erkki Kaila and Jaakko Gummerus emphasized good-natured control over a subject to controversy. Lauri Ingman opposed separation since it would have required manifold re-arrangements and since people were unprepared for it. (104.) By this, Ingman denied the fact that in 1906 only fifty per cent of the Finnish people attended in divine services. On the other hand, Ingman was ready to allow the other side (the Prometheus Society) to have its way, that is, the law of a different faith and civil marriage. (105.) Within the Theological Saturday Society the debate on the question of the compulsory nature of religious instruction culminated in the personalities of Matti Pesonen and Paavo Virkkunen, since both of them acted as religion teachers in the Normal School of Helsinki. Ernst Lampén, a member of the Prometheus Society, especially argued this point with Pesonen and Virkkunen. Lampén concluded that religious instruction was “wretched humbug”. Pesonen remarked that inordinate secularization was counterbalanced by religious instruction. Furthermore, Pesonen took the view that religious instruction saved the individual from superstition, guided morality, and was a natural part of general education, that is, religion was the noblest side of the human mind. (106.) Generally speaking, anticlerical/antireligious tradition becoming accelerated by the general strike forced the Theological Saturday Society to search for a new orientation to theological issues, that is, to represent the real nature of *moderne positive Theologie*, as Jaakko Gummerus put it. Paavo Virkkunen’s proposal for new theology which did not only tolerate criticism but also pointed out the faults of expressions of belief also became one mode of speech within the Theological Saturday

Society. (107.) In response to the conflicts created by a secularizing nation, the Theological Saturday Society offered answers to the prevailing antireligious/anticlerical situation. Sigfrid Sirenius perceived a great difference between Finnish and Finnish-Swedish realism or naturalism. According to him, Finnish naturalism was realism against the church, not against the doctrine of Christianity, whereas Finnish-Swedish naturalism was mere “blasphemy” (108). N.A. Malin claimed that one reason for anticlerical attitudes was that the clergy was labelled uncivilized since their knowledge of Swedish was unsatisfactory (109). The Theologian Railo was convinced that the intellectual crisis which afflicted Finland after Romanticism was total astonishment to the clergy when the clergy became unable to oppose change and shepherded people to assume new ideas (110). Martti Ruuth considered that Juhana Mela’s lecture in Savo-Karelian nation contributed, more than anything else, to the spreading of refractory spirit among youth (111). The Finnish theologians considered it peculiar that Swedish naturalism with figures such as August Strindberg, Fröding and Ellen Key never received as powerful an image as its Finnish contemporary. Yet, we must recall that political conditions were different in Sweden and Finland. Paavo Virkkunen considered anticlerical attitudes a result of a long process and recalled that already in his childhood, in the 1880s, it was somewhat strange if people of the intelligentsia attended in divine service (112). Of course, there were also academic people with a positive attitude towards religion like the Finnish folklorists Julius and Kaarle Krohn (113). For the most part, the anticlerical/ antireligious tendencies of the Prometheus Society were associated with the figures of Edward Westermarck and Rolf Lagerborg. Erkki Kaila noted how the French ambassador to Finland had described the Finnish intelligentsia as completely pagan, which was, above all, the fault of Westermarck and Lagerborg (114). Yet in 1936, the Swedish bishop Torsten Bohlin lamented in *Stockholms Dagbladet* (a Swedish newspaper) that the Finnish intelligentsia was more anticlerical than its associates in the other Scandinavian countries. Bohlin considered Westermarck and his disciples guilty of spreading anticlerical/religious opinions (115).

It is peculiar that the Theological Saturday Society never paid much attention to the critique directed at the morality of Christianity. This, at least, is what the minutes of the Theological Saturday Society show us. The meetings of the Theological Saturday Society may be described as dogmatic, exegetical and pragmatic (116). The character of the apologetic activity of the society was to speak in defence of Christian atonement, the reconciliation of men and women to God through the death of Christ. On 13 February 1908, the famous debate took place between the Prometheus Society and the Theological Saturday Society when the societies disputed the Christian doctrine of the Atonement (117). The Prometheus Society had originally asked Arthur Hjelt to lecture on the Atonement but when Hjelt declined, Erkki Kaila decided to give a lecture since it would have been a great error and indication of diffidence if the church had rejected the proposal of the Prometheus Society. The dispute took place in the house of “Nyländska Nation” with Edward Westermarck acting as chairman. The dispute attracted a wide audience. In his speech Kaila made a distinction between “religious experience based on the lifework of Jesus” and the doctrinal aspiration to explain that

experience. (118.) When religious experience was a subjective and irrational change in the human, the doctrine of the Atonement was subordinate to rational argumentation, to verification or falsification. But Kaila was making a surprising statement when he denied that Christ had borne the penalty instead of us and that the conception of “credo” was not an intrinsic part of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement. Instead, Kaila desired to emphasize the lifework of Christ and his moral rectitude. (119.) Kaila’s presentation shocked many listeners. The members of the Prometheus Society had believed that Kaila would speak up for Anselm’s juridical theory of the Atonement, which stressed the penal suffering of Jesus. After general perplexity, the meeting concentrated, however, on pondering Anselm’s juridical theory of the Atonement. Some theologians, like Heimo Päätilä, saw Kaila’s opinions as heretical. Rafael Karsten wondered how the Christian doctrine of the Atonement could survive without the concepts of punishment and “credo”. Moreover, Georg Schauman wondered how a man with such antireligious ideas, as Kaila, could belong to the Lutheran church. Although many clergymen and theologians were shocked by Kaila’s words, the meeting turned to be a victory for the Theological Saturday Society and the Christian way of life since the Prometheus Society had not expected a theologian to be so flexible in his opinions. After the meeting itself, the cultural radicals saw Kaila as a scholar who had the courage to fight against professional theologians and who considered Christ only a man of distinguished valour, not God. (120.) Nevertheless, Kaila refused to accept any epithets attached to him. The controversy between the Prometheus Society and theologians continued when on 1 May 1908 Jaakko Gummerus lectured on *Kristinusko ja moraali* (“Christianity and Morality”) in the festival hall of the temperance society *Koitto*. In his lecture, Gummerus observed the way how Edward Westermarck, August Bebel, Paul Lafargue, and Väinö Jokinen criticized Christian ethics. Gummerus believed that the dilemma lay in the fact that Christianity was arbitrarily compared to other world religions thus the morality of non-Christian religions was, in an undue way, seen as superior to the morality of Christianity. In fact, Gummerus was convinced of the moral superiority of Christianity compared to non-Christian religions. Gummerus believed that Christian ethics was not a body of moral principles of one selected group but concerned all nations. (121.) Veikkola (1969) has stated that Gummerus’s lecture gained, after all, little influence compared to Edward Westermarck’s success with his work on the origin of the moral ideas, which was based on extensive material and expertise (122).

Regarding the relationship between the Prometheus Society and the Theological Saturday Society it appears that being a respondent is finally more advantageous than being a fervent-minded opponent. The activity of the Prometheus Society died out gradually after 1912 as a consequence of the changing political atmosphere and its members getting tired of the opinions of the most radical wing (read: Rolf Lagerborg). In fact, the endeavour of Finnish-Swedish radical youth to separate the church from the state became milder after 1908 when the unifying policy of Russia tightened and consequently brought Finnish people closer to each other. In that situation, the church was seen as an important keeper of national identity and

morality. (123.) Kirsti Kena (1979) has described how in the 1910s there occurred an intellectual re-orientation among Finnish-Swedish academic youth when pessimistic naturalism changed into individualistic, liberal, and non-dogmatic “religiousness of humanity” (*humaniteetti-uskonnollisuus* in Finnish). Then, the Finnish-Swedish academic youth aimed at the liberalization and humanization of the church by searching for a synthesis of religious and scientific worldviews. (124.) The legal position of the Protestant church remained immutable until 1917, when Finland became independent (125). Rolf Lagerborg’s personal wish came true when the law of civil marriage was passed in January 1918 (126). The general law of freedom of religion was passed in 1922. The first debate in Parliament on the government’s new Freedom of Religion Bill was initiated in 1909. A year before, the synod had approved the principle of unrestricted freedom of religion. However, the beginning of the second period of oppression (1908-1917) ruined further plans. (127.) The controversy over religious instruction at elementary schools terminated in the decision to preserve confessional religious instruction at schools when ethics, supported by Rafael Karsten and the head of the National Board of General Education, Mikael Soininen, became a school subject for children who were not members of the church (128). The traces of the activity of the Prometheus Society later appeared in Rolf Lagerborg’s somewhat fanatical intellectual self-reflection (his autobiography) in which he kindled the idea of re-starting the Prometheus Society. Lagerborg developed a vision of himself with a “holy mission” when he considered himself the “witness of truth, bringer of light, one of Lucifer’s *missi dominici*” (129). Rafael Karsten and Gunnar Landtman were later active in “Sällskapet för Psykisk Forskning” (“Society for Psychic Research”). It seems that Karsten’s interest in parapsychology, occultism and spiritualism continued his independent and antitheological way of thinking although many of his notions of “spirits” purely originated in his idea of animism. That is to say, Karsten’s interest in parapsychological phenomena mostly resulted from his general scholarly concern with the appearance of spirits and prophethood among “lower” cultures. Karsten, like Arvi Grotenfelt, searched for natural explanations for extraordinary phenomena and, thus, it is difficult to imagine that Karsten’s world would have been imbued with “personal spirits” or that he had used the assistance of spirits, as spiritualists used to do (the British spiritualist George S. Liekell described himself as having seven different spirits with separate earthly callings and sympathetic links) (130). Interestingly, the heritage of the Euterpe experienced a revival when Axel Cedercreutz arranged a meeting of the old Euterpe Journal in January 1932 (131). The activity of the Theological Saturday Society continued longer than that of the Prometheus Society and found its later appearance in the meetings of the Theological Monday Society (founded in 1916) which, however, suffered from “serious anaemia”, as Erkki Kaila put it (for more information on the Theological Monday Society, see references)(132). The following figure shows the most crucial differences between the Prometheus Society and the Theological Saturday Society:

Figure 3. *The most significant features of the Prometheus Society and the Theological Saturday Society*

Prometheus Society	vs.	Theological Saturday Society
Heterogeneous and large group		Homogeneous and small group
Radical / ardent / opponent		Moderate / cautious / respondent
Bilingual		Finnish -speaking
Extremist elements		No real extremist elements

The exploration of the features of these societies gives reason to argue that the heterogeneous, extensive, flaming, bilingual, and extremist nature of the Prometheus Society quite undoubtedly threw it into chaos. In general, much of the popularity of the Prometheus Society rested on the charisma and prominence of Edward Westermarck. But it is very dubious whether Westermarck even knew all the people who were present at the meetings. Besides, Westermarck was absent from many meetings as in the spring term 1906, when he was in London. Then, Rolf Lagerborg, for instance, acted as chairman. In contrast, the meetings of the Theological Saturday Society were based on definitive propinquity and can be described as a cosy group rendezvous. Interestingly, many members of the Theological Saturday Society entered the service of the state and attained high positions. Lauri Ingman acted as Prime Minister (1918-1919 and 1924-1925) and Minister of Education (1921-1922 and 1926-1929). Yrjö Loimaranta was Minister of Education 1922-1924 and Lauri Pohjala acted as Minister of Social Policy 1924-1925. Moreover, Erkki Kaila was elected to Parliament in 1917. Other members of the Theological Saturday Society who were elected to Parliament were K.K. Aro (1935-1942), J. H. Tunkelo (1935-1940), Jaakko Gummerus, Arthur Hjelt, A. F. Puukko, Antti J. Pietilä, Paavo Virkkunen (1913-1936, 1938-1945), B. H. Päivänsalo (1917-1918), and Zach Castrén (1909). (133.) Something should also be said about the bilingual nature of the Prometheus Society which, evidently, drove a fatal wedge between its Finnish and Finnish-Swedish scholars. One reason for this dissolution was, perhaps, the chairman's (Westermarck) non-existent proficiency in the Finnish language. It may be said that the internal harmony of the Theological Saturday Society owed much to the fact that its discussions were held in Finnish. Finally, the Prometheus Society had its extremist element, which the Theological Saturday Society was lacking, unless Erkki Kaila's view of the Atonement could be called "different". In the beginning, the antagonism fomented by Rolf Lagerborg fascinated many but later turned out to be nothing but trouble. The restiveness of the early period of the Prometheus Society was later considered a vexing inheritance when Rafael Karsten, especially, felt that some members exceeded their authority. To conclude, it turns out then, that the coherent and homogeneous nature of a society minimises the conflict inside it, that is, it secures the society against disharmony and gives it more continuity to operate. On the other hand, the name of the Prometheus Society never promised a victorious starting point: we must recall the wretched destiny of Prometheus when Zeus in revenge, after Prometheus stole fire

from Olympus, chained Prometheus to a rock where an eagle tore at his liver until he was finally released by Hercules. Besides, according to some variant of the myth, Prometheus finally achieved a reconciliation with Zeus (134).

4.3.2. The Book

The analysis presented in this section centres around Rafael Karsten's much disputed book "Paganism and Christianity". The reader will have realized that the purpose of the analysis of the Prometheus Society has been to assist us in understanding more profoundly the background of Karsten's work. I believe that Karsten's polemical words about Biblical Christianity resulted mainly from the social and political atmosphere of Finland (the periods of oppression, the general strike, and the emergence of the Prometheus Society). On the other hand, Karsten's expressions of the "egoism of Christians" and "religion of hate" can be seen as personal introspection when the experiences of childhood home became real. Nevertheless, it is difficult to consider Rafael Karsten's book a mere personal punishment meted out to his mother in return for the religious pressure she exerted on her son. To the best of my knowledge, Rafael Karsten was too weak and timid at this point and captivated by a child's perpetual love towards his mother. We must recall that Rafael Karsten never left the church because he knew it would have been too much for his parents. For Karsten Christianity existed, but its foundations needed shaking so that "all adverse attitudes towards the intellect would disappear" (1). Karsten's statement originated in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which considered faith irrational, and scientific knowledge rational. To repeat Karsten's opinion of his work let us recall, however, that the purpose of his study was not to support or reject any religious beliefs but to aim at an unprejudiced, scientific and phenomenological analysis of Christianity. Above all, Karsten saw himself as an "impartial estimator" (2).

Rafael Karsten's study was based on lectures held at the Alexander University during the term 1908-1909. In the preface to his work Karsten emphasized that his study aimed at investigation of the "worldview of Christianity from the viewpoint of history of religions". (3.) Karsten's work was divided into six main sections. The first chapter searched for the pagan elements in Christianity. The second chapter analysed revelation as understood by Christians, whereas the third chapter examined the authority of the Bible. The fourth section dealt with the Christian doctrine of the Atonement and the fifth chapter examined the Christian idea of God. Finally, the last chapter compared pagan morality with Christian ethical beliefs. Interestingly, the beginning of Karsten's study was almost a copy of his early article on the modern study of religions (1904). Basically, Karsten's theoretical determination witnessed in his book can be put concisely as follows. First of all, Karsten in the Tylorian spirit believed that the history of humanity was a part of natural history when ideas, emotions, and the will of the human followed the same laws which "guided the moves of the waves" (4). The solution for combining humanistic and naturalist viewpoints was provided by Comte's positivism which in England was linked to the Darwinian doctrine of evolution. However, Karsten's

positivistic/evolutionary scheme was not only veiled in biological analysis but also faced the question of the psychological possibilities of the human (evolution-psychological or socio-biological conception). At this point, Karsten emphasized Darwin's psychological views of human development. (5.) But to get a better grip on psychological explanation, it was necessary to point to David Hume, whose work on the natural history of religion was, according to Karsten, the "first serious effort to analyse the development of religion from a merely psychological point of view" (6). Karsten perceived that Hume's merits were threefold: firstly, Hume presented numerous well-founded viewpoints on religion, secondly, he reasonably rejected the concept of "supernatural revelation", and, thirdly, he endeavoured to show natural development from lower to higher stages within the history of religions (7). These characters made Hume the hero of those who put the idea of progress first. Another figure of importance to emerge from comparative religion was the "great philosopher of Darwinism", Herbert Spencer, whose deduction of religious development, although faulty, was based on extensive and pure religious historical material (8). For Karsten the extensive religious historical material available to researchers was the main point since it made the study of religions conceivable. With the support of the comparative method, a scholar of religion combined and classified the phenomena which she encountered among different people and as a result became aware of the characteristics of a particular religion. The aim was a systematic study of cultural evolution through comparing different nations and institutions with each other. Karsten pointed out that comparative religion did not make any distinction between religions, except the distinction between "lower and higher intellectual and ethical spiritual lives". Thus, the difference between Christianity and pagan religions rested only on degree not on kind. (9.) It may have been noticed that history of religions is a substantial *raison d'être* of Karsten's comparative religion. In his analysis of the modern study of religions, Karsten put forward a definition of the general tasks of comparative religion. He then emphasized psychology of religion as another significant field of research within comparative religion. The most significant difference between history of religions and psychology of religion was that while the former studied the "general expressions of religious life which appeared in dogma, myth and cult", the latter dealt with the "subjective, individual religious experiences which were typical of the higher stages of religious development" (10). In this context, Karsten also approached the question of the relationship between comparative religion and theology. The point was whether a clergyman / theologian could be an impartial scholar of religion? Karsten began with Nathan Söderblom's suggestion that it was not an impediment to the objectivity of a scholar of religion if she was "religious", for a "religious" scholar probably understood better the essence of religion and the "mysteries of faith". Söderblom took an example from the world of music: in order to be able to understand the theory of music one has to sense the vibration of notes. Karsten considered Söderblom's example arbitrary, since belonging to a certain school of music prevented one from understanding the essence of music objectively. In contrast, it was better if a listener did not belong to any school but listened to music without prejudices. By accommodating Karsten's example to a scholar of religion, it meant that a scholar of religion reached the most objective stage when she did not bind herself

to any religious confession, that is, a scholar who claimed Christianity to be the only absolute and true religion could not study religions unbiasedly. (11.) The fact that Karsten denied the school engagement to be of use is somewhat paradoxical, taking into account that he himself belonged to the Westermarckian school. This, then, must be one proof of Karsten's powerful internal aspiration to independence. Karsten never denied, however, that theologian was, *in toto*, unable to achieve valid research results within the history of religions despite the fact that her confession formed a clear obstacle to "free research". (12.) Karsten's treatment of the theologian reflects his love for the solution in which an ideal scholar of religion is seen as an intellectually intrepid and independent figure who recognizes, *inter alia*, that religions are influenced by each other (Karsten's method was partly diffusionistic - Christianity adopted elements of the surrounding ancient pagan religions) (13). Yet, we must recall that theologian Erkki Kaila's analysis of the relationship between Christianity and the ancient religions of the Near East (1908) was a study on history of religions which never allowed Christianity the status as the most elevated form of religion and which acknowledged that Christianity was influenced by oriental religions (14). But then again, Erkki Kaila's analysis of why people believe in God (1906) reflected the tension between Christianity and the modern scientific worldview and disapproved of people who made the mistake of thinking that "freedom was gained by leaving God". The result of all this was that people definitively met heavy disappointments. (15.) In his work Karsten responded to Kaila's conception by asking why Christianity had declined to support individual thinking, that is, whether the foundations of Christianity were so superficial that it was possible to overturn them just by thinking.

Having cleared the way through "mandatory" theoretical assumptions, Karsten next provided an analysis of the origins of religion. Karsten's analysis was a mixture of themes from his early articles and doctoral thesis. His examination did not find any new paths but faithfully repeated Tylorian ideas. Karsten saw that the problem of the ultimate origins of religions had always interested scholars of religion although opinions of the origin of the human race, as well, were merely hypothetical. In fact, arguments for the appearance of the first human were somewhat vague. Drawing attention to the 19th century, Karsten suggested that scholars of that time believed the Old Testament to be a source of knowledge on the origin of humanity. By resting on the Book of Genesis but also Romans (1-2) of the New Testament, scholars formed quasi-scientific theories of the origin of religion and humanity, saying that monotheism was the most original form of religion. (16.) Karsten described how the assyriologist Lenormant had pertinaciously and erroneously tried to prove that the old Babylonian religion was based on the existence of the Supreme being *Ilû*, the one and omnipotent god. Karsten also rejected Andrew Lang's suggestion of the presence of a "high god" in many myths. Overall, Karsten's notion that a scholar who "conducted research in earnest did not believe in the authority of the Bible in explaining the origin of humanity" was staunch and deterministic. (17.) As noted in Chapter Three, the positivists considered the basic clauses of God and transcendence absurd, not true or untrue (18). With his view, Karsten prepared the way for his conception of "archaic animism or fetishism as the most original form of religion among the first civilized people"

(Karsten supported the idea of fetishism as it originated in the views of de Brosses and Comte) (19). Then again, Karsten attacked Max Müller's suggestion that animism and fetishism resulted from religious degeneration (see more in Chapter 4.1.) (20). Karsten considered Müller's analysis of the origin of religion a child of the Romantic period when abstract philosophical speculation flourished (21). Loyal to his theoretical point of view, Karsten suggested Tylor to be the only scholar who had correctly recognized the "conception of spiritual beings among primitive people" thus Tylor's animism has had a paramount influence on comparative religion and mythology (22). For Karsten, the conception of a personal God was quite a late phenomenon since at first the divine was seen as a supernatural, impersonal force which manifested itself in nature objects and phenomena (*mana* of the Melanesian people, *wakan* of the Dacotah Indians, *kalou* of the Fijian people, and *andriaman'itra* of the Malagasies) (23). Karsten, then, proceeded to an analysis of the pagan elements of Christianity and explained his views as follows:

"If modern study of religions has received any new information about the relationship between Christianity and paganism, it has probably been that of being able to falsify an insular conception of Christianity as the highest and absolute religion, supernatural phenomenon of the world of which no empirical knowledge can be received [...] Christianity gained popularity since it borrowed many of its elements from pagan religions [...] today, the Bible cannot be explained by the Bible itself but through facts produced by religious historical material [...] that means advancement in scholarly research [...] for Christianity, Hellenism offered a significant stimulus [...] Logos as the name of Christ in early Christian theology was borrowed from Greek philosophy [...] to speak of the influence of Hellenism to Christianity would be, however, too extensive a project and thus we have to concentrate our analysis on the influence of old pagan religions, like Greek folk religion, on Christianity [...]" (24).

Today, theologians admit that *Logos* (Greek, "word" or "reason") as a description of Christ may have originated from the popular Stoic idea of a universal reason governing the world. On the other hand, the Bishop of Tampere, Juha Pihkala (1992), has suggested that the *Logos* of the Gospel of John (1. 1-18) and Colossians (1. 15-17) mainly derives from the Hebrew conception of God's word when it has an almost independent existence (25). It was only the early Christian apologist, St. Justin Martyr (c. 100 - c. 165), who combined the *Logos* of the Old and New Testament with Hellenistic interpretations (26). The role of St. Justin Martyr is interesting since on the other hand he admitted that traces of the truth could be found in pagan religions and thinkers, since "all share the generative word" (*logos spermatikos*), but then again he claimed that Christianity alone is rationally credible (27). Rafael Karsten's view of the influence of pagan syncretism on Christianity made him define the pagan elements of Christianity as follows:

Figure 4. *The pagan elements of Christianity*

**Jesus as the unique
incarnation of God**

**Mary conceived Jesus by
the Holy Spirit**

Resurrection of Christ

**Belief in the devil and the
worship of fetishes**

Belief in miracles

Sacrament of baptism

Karsten began with the traditional Christian belief that Jesus was the unique incarnation of God. Karsten believed that modern biblical theology had proved that sources for the thoughts of Jesus as the Son of God were almost entirely of Christian, not Jewish provenance. According to Karsten, the austere monotheism of Judaism (Yahweh who took over the powers and became “that which God is”) refused to acknowledge other godlike beings. (28.) In addition, Karsten emphasized that Jesus did not refer to himself as “God in human form” and was reluctant to accept the titles “omniscient” and “omnivirtuous” (29). Karsten suggested that the titles “messiah” and “Son of God”, which Jesus acknowledged were without a “godlike nature” (30). By acknowledging the title “messiah”, Jesus became part of Jewish national-political ideas although Jesus refused to use that expression of a symbol for establishing a temporal kingly Israeli regime. The title “messiah” indicated merely the coming of the kingdom of God and Jesus’s unique relationship to his “heavenly Father”. (31.) The idea that Jesus was the incarnation of God could be found only in the “New Testament sources of secondary importance”, that is, in the Gospel of John. Karsten took the view that the habit of the Gospel of John (1. 1-18) to identify the Logos with Jesus and God derived merely from Alexandrian philosophy (32). Thus, the philosophical speculation of the apologists which emphasized the duality of the Logos generated the idea of Jesus as the unique incarnation of God. For Karsten this was a sign of polytheism since all polytheistic religions were concerned with the idea that there were “gods which transformed into human form” and “humans who became God-like figures” (33). According to Karsten, a human might become a special figure after her death if she had been “supernaturally eminent” during her lifetime (34). It did not call for a miracle. Karsten explained his argument by introducing comparative analysis of the religious beliefs of North American Indians, the people of Tonga, the people of the Fiji Islands, and the ancient Indian and German peoples. Karsten showed that while North American Indians believed that “gods appeared in some figure among people”, the ancient German people saw “something god-related and miraculous in their women” (35). When Christianity appeared and gained strength, the prevailing Greco-Roman syncretism supported the views on “god-like people” (36). The Stoic philosophers strengthened this belief by discussing “godhood existing in all people”. That was why the people of Lystra elevated the apostle Paul (d. c.65 CE) and his companion on his missionary journey, St. Barnabas (Cypriot Jew), to the rank of gods when they cured a crippled man. Right after the healing, Barnabas was named “Jupiter” and apostle Paul “Mercurius” and steers and wreaths were taken to the

place in order to worship the “gods” appeared (37). According to Acts, it took a long time for Paul to make people believe that he and his companion were ordinary mortals (Acts 14. 11). The great admiration which people had for Paul in Lystra was also felt by Simon Magus, an opponent of St. Peter, who was known for his heresy arising from his endeavour to buy spiritual powers with money. As the name reveals, Simon Magus was also known as a skilful sorcerer who was worshipped as a god in Rome during the period of the Emperor Claudius. (38.) Karsten pointed out how Justin Martyr regretted that after the Resurrection of Christ, the devil gave birth to men who saw themselves as gods. Unfortunately, “pagans” did not persecute these devils but accepted them as god-like figures (Simon Magus became a founder of a gnostic sect of Simonians). Gradually, “worshipping of human” also gained popularity within Christendom when a self-proclaimed prophet Montanus (2nd cent. CE) posed as “the Trinity incarnate” who existed in three persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit (39). The Bishop of Caesarea in Palestine, Eusebius (c. 260-c.340), recounted how the pagans of Smyrna were worried that Christians would worship him as a God-related figure after the martyrdom of Polycarp (c. 69 - c.155) who was burnt to death after refusing to recant his faith during a pagan festival (40). Karsten aspired to prove that it was feasible to adequately explain the “phenomenon behind the idea of the divinity of Jesus” (41). Thus, an opponent of Christianity, Celsus (2nd century), was right in a sense that Christians who worshipped their “incarcerated and executed master” behaved similarly to many Greek “primitive groups”. Although Karsten’s analysis of the “divinity of Jesus” is inconsistent in many parts, the religious historical material it offers is notable. Yet, Karsten’s concepts “pagans” or “pagan religions” are too collective and homogeneous considering that each polytheistic religion has its own complex category of gods (42). Furthermore, Karsten’s criticism of his source material is deficient, disregarding his aim to see religions as equals in terms of comparative religion. We must recall that although Karsten’s work was a historical critical analysis of Christianity and pagan religions, that is, it re-interpreted Christian sources, it did not pay much attention to *how* the author used the sources. Methodological source criticism of historical material was not, however, unknown among Finnish scholars. The pioneers of modern historiography were the British historian Lord Acton (1834-1902) and the German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) whose doctrines spread to Finland at the end of the 19th century. The influence of Lord Acton on British historiography was substantial. He spoke of the historian as a judge whose research results represented a verdict. The historian had to study her material so that she understood its meaning. Although Ranke was influenced by his Protestant Christianity and his refusal to believe in the intellectual and moral development of humanity, his work *Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1535* (1824) was pioneering in historiography and brought principles of historical writing within reach (*wie es eigentlich gewesen* - how things have originally been). Above all, Ranke emphasized the study of original sources and accurate source criticism. (43.) In Finland, the theologian Jaakko Gummerus was influenced by Acton and Ranke and emphasized the meaning of source criticism in a study of church history whereupon he came to develop extrinsic and intrinsic source criticism of religious historical material. According to Gummerus, the task of the

extrinsic source criticism was twofold: firstly, to resolve the authenticity of the source, and, secondly, to establish where and when the source had been generated. The task of intrinsic source criticism was also twofold: firstly, to establish the significance of the source by paying attention to its internal elements, and, secondly, to compare sources against each other in order to define their final importance. (44.) By comparison with Karsten's unsubstantial source criticism, Gummerus's method seems highly systematic and co-ordinated. That is what A. F. Puukko meant, perhaps, when he claimed that Karsten's work contained "serious methodical and *contentus* imperfections" (45). Furthermore, Karsten's ideas of how Jesus thought of Himself in relation to God were complacently peculiar. Today, some theologians believe that Jesus was reluctant to acknowledge Himself as messiah and preferred the title "son of man"; a man who speaks with God-derived authority but is subject to death although vindicated by God at the moment of resurrection (46). Franz Pieper (1946) suggested, however, that this kind of conception was typical only of Harnackian, de Wetean, and Unitarian theologians. Pieper believed that the only explanation true to the Bible was: *eandem numero essentiam cum Patre habens* (one who has numerically one and the same being as Father). In addition, Latin idioms *unitas operationis* (unity of action) and *una et eadem potentia* (power common to Father and Son) described the divinity of Jesus (47). Pieper admitted that the doctrine of *De Persona Christi* was explained too abstrusely by Martin Luther and many other Lutheran dogmatists. On the other hand, the detailed analysis of the person of Christ was necessary for many "heterodox teachers" who have tried to deny this doctrine of the Bible (48). According to Pieper, the person of Christ with its *communicatio idiomatum* (community of attributes) was known since early Christianity and, thus, was not a result of the later crystallization of theological terms (49).

Rafael Karsten then passed to the question of pagan elements of the *Immaculata conceptio* of Christ. Karsten contended that the Christian doctrine of the Virgin Birth of Christ (that Jesus was conceived by the Virgin Mary by *causa efficiens* of the Holy Spirit and that Mary as a *materia* remained a virgin even in giving birth) shared more ancient pagan elements than the question of Jesus as a unique incarnation of God. Karsten claimed that the doctrine of the Virgin Birth of Christ was unknown to the earliest Christian tradition and came from non-Jewish "primitive" sources. (50.) By this Karsten meant that the concept of birth without sexual relations was a "late increment" proposed only in the New Testament. Yet, the Gospels of Matthew and Luke presented contradictory opinions of the virgin birth of Jesus: in Matthew (1.16), Joseph is paradoxically called the father of Jesus. Karsten also wondered why Matthew presented an extensive genealogy of Joseph when it was a generally accepted idea that Jesus was not a relative of Joseph but born by virginal conception. Furthermore, Karsten failed to understand why Mary said to the angel that her conception would be impossible for she had no husband. At that moment, Mary was, however, betrothed to Joseph. (51.) Karsten's conception is fallacious considering that Matthew (1-2) and Luke (1-2) state that Joseph became engaged to Mary only after Jesus was born. Rafael Karsten also asked why Mary, who better than anyone else knew the virginal and miraculous birth of her son, described Jesus as a

“lunatic who should be locked up” once when her son was crowded by people (Mark 3. 21) (52). Karsten’s example was exegetically overdone and it overlooked and misinterpreted that part of Mark (3. 22, 23, 31) which discusses the confused and menacing situation in which Jesus is accused of being an incarnation of Belsebul, that is, Karsten should have analysed Mary’s position at that situation more carefully, that she, probably, entered the situation by chance and was overwhelmed by astonishment. In general, Karsten believed that his illustrations showed clear *controversia* between the Gospels of the New Testament. Karsten considered it natural that within Christianity the idea of the Virgin Birth of Christ was linked to the question of *De Persona Christi* since the Son of God, God who entered the world, could not be conceived by Mary by natural breeding which was considered sinful and impure. Karsten thought that the idea of the Virgin Birth of Jesus also explained the supernatural wisdom and power he had received. Karsten was convinced that the idea of virginal conception and birth was characteristic of all “primitive people”. It was typical of “primitive people” that they had no idea of the connection between breeding and giving birth. Karsten leant on the work of the German scholar of religion W. von Foy (*Bericht über Australien*, 1905) who claimed that the “primitives” of Central Australia believed that some “higher being put the embryo into the mother’s womb”. (53.) But the old civilized nations, like the Greeks and the Romans, also believed that the “earth put the seeds into the mother’s womb” (54). Karsten also pleaded evidence of Zoroastrian texts and *Lalitavistara* that even the prophet Zarathustra and Gotama Buddha were conceived without sexual relations (55). It seems that Karsten perceived the most significant similarities between Babylonian-Assyrian and Christian stories regarding the doctrine of virginal conception and birth. Karsten noted that Sargon and Gilgames were, every now and then, presented as sons of immaculate virgins (56). Karsten, once more, referred to Justin Martyr, teacher of Tatian, who argued that the traces of the truth were to be found in pagan thinkers. The words of the German theologian R. Grützmacher that “natural birth never generated anything holy and divine but something humane and sinful and that was why Mary conceived Jesus while a virgin” irritated Karsten. According to Karsten, the view of Grützmacher was “vulgarly materialistic” and derived from the ideas of the Christian father and writer Tertullian (c. 160 - c. 225). (57.) All in all, Karsten believed that his many illustrations proved the Christian doctrine of the Virgin Birth of Christ to originate in “primitive” beliefs. This leads inevitably to the question of the credibility of Karsten’s examples. The answers given to this question are necessarily speculative and dependent on the targets and nature of the interpreter. A Finnish scholar of religion, Hannele Koivunen (1995), has stated that Christianity might need immaculate conception, according to which Mary was without the stain of original sin, in order to be able to separate itself from other religions of Asia Minor and the Middle East, that is, the “Blessed Virgin” made Christianity able to compete with other religions (58). Today, some liberal theologians have drawn attention to the general claim of virgin births in many religions (e.g. Mahāmāyā and the Buddha, Saoshyant and Zarathustra). Feminist theologians have also criticized the idea of virgin birth by pointing out that “Mary is not even accorded the participation of parthenogenesis if perpetual virginity is affirmed” (59). Regardless of all

controversy, the doctrine of *conceptio miraculosa* from the early days has been an essential part of Christianity whereupon Apostles' Creed says: *Conceptus est de Spiritu Sancto, natus ex Maria virgine* (60).

Rafael Karsten next turned his attention towards the doctrine of the Resurrection of Christ. Karsten began with personal astonishment at why the doctrine of the Resurrection of Christ was veiled in mystery. He noted that long before Christianity, the Semites and Hellenists maintained ideas of the death and resurrection of gods. (61.) The idea of the death and restoration of gods originated in the rotation of vegetation according to the seasons. Natural phenomena were seen as religious events since gods were associated with the plants and trees losing their vigour in the autumn and growing rapidly in the spring, that is, gods faced the destiny of death in the autumn and were restored in the spring. Karsten took an example from Greek mythology, Adonis, a youth who was slain by a wild boar, but brought back to life by Zeus and permitted to divide his time every year between Persephone and Aphrodite. Karsten noted that the worship of Adonis varied according to whether the Greeks were celebrating his rising from the dead (spring) or mourning his death. (62.) In close relation to the worship of Adonis were the ceremonies tributed to the celebration of god "Attis" in the Asia Minor and the god "Osiris" in Egypt. The people of Phrygia celebrated the restoration of Attis on 24 and 25 March while the birthday of the god was celebrated on 25 December. Karsten believed that the Christians took these dates from the people of Asia Minor and "intentionally adapted the birth and death of Jesus to Attis's days". (63.) Karsten mentioned that the doctors of the Church had been unable to explain this similarity when their general notion had been that presenting such an analogy was a "profanation caused by the devil" (64). Karsten, then, reproached the Gospels of the New Testament for representing differing accounts of the Resurrection of Christ. Karsten wondered why John mentions that only Mary Magdalene visited the tomb when Luke records that Mary Magdalene, the mother of Jacob (Mary), Johanna, and other women visited the tomb with sweet-smelling oils. In addition, the Gospel of Matthew mentions only Mary Magdalene and the mother of Jacob (65). Overall, Karsten was irritated because the gospels did not reveal what actually happened at the tomb after the first day of the Sabbath. The historical orientation of the study of the Bible acknowledges the contradictions between the gospels but emphasizes that sometimes Matthew and Luke used the sources of Mark, the earliest of the three Synoptic Gospels, whereas Matthew probably forgot one or then Luke added one too many to Mark's story about the people who visited Jesus's tomb (66). Yet, we must remember that the Gospel of John was clearly different (extensive and integrated speeches) from the three Synoptic Gospels (67). Karsten also claimed that the authors of the gospels had "more or less primitive worldview and conception of nature" since the conception of the immortality of the soul was, inevitably, animistic (68). On the other hand, Karsten suggested that the idea of the Resurrection of Christ may have stemmed from the fact that the death of Jesus was considered too inglorious by his disciples and that they felt it necessary to invent the idea of a continuing identity after death in order to dispel the recoil produced by the disgraceful death of their master. However, the purpose of

the story of the evangelists was also to give hope of the future return of Christ in glory (*Parousia*) (69). Whether Karsten's deductions sound impartial or partial depends on the reader. Obviously, Karsten's style is somewhat allegoric in the sense that it aims at his own favourite interpretations of the New Testament, totally ignoring the scholarly recognition of what the authors of gospels had originally meant by their accounts. On the other hand, his suggestion that the Resurrection of Christ was veiled in mystery in the New Testament, represented an existential view on the Bible which emphasizes radical re-interpretation of the parts of the New Testament (70). Interestingly, the Apostles' Creed says that human reason is not only doubtful about resurrection but also ridicules it (Apostles 17. 32). After all, it is not surprising that Karsten's opinions made his devout Lutheran mother call him antichrist, a man who abandoned Christianity (see Chapter 2).

Karsten claimed that the most evident pagan elements of Christianity, however, were the belief in the devil or Satan (in Christianity they are sometimes identical but also appear as separate figures) and the worship of the fetishes. The pagans who converted to the worship of "one true God", assimilated their folk religion of fetishes, devils, and sprites to Christianity and therefore the latter became a mixture of old and new religious elements. The pictures of God and Christ crucified and sacred objects associated with Christ or saints (relics) were direct evidence of pagan influence which was based on an anthropomorphical conception of god. Karsten stated that the "modern Catholic" kneeling before the picture of Virgin Mary and waiting for the miracle to come, behaved like a "pagan Laplander" who smeared blood on the picture of god in order to gain mundane fortune and glory. (71.) Karsten then repeated his universal theoretical axiom that during the progress, "religion" became more ethical by nature. Unfortunately, the idea of growing ethicality was not realized in Christianity, which continued the worship of fetishes although Judaism and Zoroastrianism denied all pictures of God as sacrilegious. In Christianity the pagan statues were changed for Christian purposes by merely adding the sign of *de cruce* to them. Karsten told about the head of Aphrodite with the sign of the cross carved on it that was found in Athens. Karsten believed that the only purpose of this kind of "ruining the beautiful head" was to change the statue of the ancient goddess of love to the Blessed Virgin Mary. Furthermore, the picture of "Madonna del Granato" in Southern Italy was, in fact, a statue of the ancient Greek goddess Hera, the wife and sister of Zeus. (72.) One significant phase when the monotheism of Christianity was sliding into pagan polytheism, was the appearance of the cult of saints. Karsten claimed that the cult of saints derived from Egyptian and Greco-Roman sources. Karsten referred to the accounts of the Greek traveller and geographer Pausanias (c. 175 CE) who said that almost every Greek city had its own saints whether then "once lived ruler or legendary figure from distant antiquity" (73). Karsten believed that Roman Catholic Church especially adopted the Greek cult of local saints, hence the canonization of the Pope, around the 13th century, attributed to the Pope the same status of advocate of God which was formerly attached to the Delphic Oracle (74). Karsten abstained from a more profound analysis of the cult of saints since it was not typical of "our church" (75). Instead, he moved on to analyse the belief in the devil which

was also typical of Protestant Christianity. The origin of belief in the devil lay in the practical need of the “primitive mind” to find an explanation for mysterious phenomena. The idea of benevolent gods or spirits appeared later and generated the conflict between good and evil (*dualis*) (here Karsten’s idea of fear as an ultimate explanation for early worship becomes, once more, explicit). Karsten suggested, however, that belief in the devil was a universal phenomenon which could be found among “primitive people” and “ancient civilized people”. (76.) This meant that Judaism and Christianity did not, *in toto*, take the belief in the devil from the surrounding pagan people although pagan beliefs evidently influenced Christian views of the evil. According to Karsten, the belief in the devil in Christianity derived from three sources: the Jewish folk religion, the Parsi tradition, and the Hellenic religion. Firstly, the influence of the Jewish folk religion on Christianity appeared most clearly in the way that the Old and New Testament saw the devil. During the period (586-538 BCE) when many Israelites were in exile in Babylon (Babylonian captivity), they were affected by the dualism of the Parsi tradition (Zoroastrians - Ahura Mazda, God, vs. Angra Mainyu, the evil). The teachings inherited from the Indo-Iranian tradition later became visible in the books on wisdom of the Bible (Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes). Karsten believed that Satan of the Old Testament was different from the devil of the New Testament, since the devil of the Old Testament lacked a clear task and character and could thus be described only as a “powerless instrument”. The devil of the New Testament was, however, a fully developed and pronounced figure, an independent prince of evil (Satan, Diabolus, Belsebul, the Great Dragon, The Old Snake and so forth). According to Karsten, the Synoptic Gospels were filled with accounts of the works of the devil. (77.) Secondly, the Greek philosophical systems derived from Platonism and Neoplatonism and stemming remotely from Plato, influenced the thinking of the Christians and the Jews. The Greek epic poet, Homer (9th century BCE), spoke about “Daimon” when he referred to the mythical abode of the Greek gods, Olympus. The Greek philosopher and statesman, Empedocles (c. 490- c. 430 BCE) and the Greek philosopher Xenocrates (c. 396-314 BCE) divided spiritual beings into the benevolent and malevolent. The founder of Neoplatonism, Plotinus (c. 205-70), developed this distinction further but it was only his pupil Porphyry (c.232- c.303 BCE) whose concept of the nature of evil came very near to the views of Christianity. (78.) Karsten never mentioned that Porphyry was known as an anti-Christian writer whose work *Against the Christians* was burnt in 448 CE. Overall, Karsten concluded that in Christianity pagan gods were reduced to evil spirits. However, the method of the Christian scholar Origen (c.185-c.254 CE) was to see pagan spirits as angels, invisible spirits to whom God left the supervision of natural objects, elements, and living beings. (79.) Karsten’s interpretation of Origen is possibly truthful considering that Origen was accused of purely allegorical reading and interpretation of the Bible (80).

The belief in miracles was the fifth pagan element of Christianity. Karsten argued that the belief in miracles was the most precious and essential part of any faith (81). For Karsten “miracle” was a miscellaneous term which had two explanations: natural and supernatural. In the “primitive” stage miracles were only considered supernatural due to the “ignorant nature

of the primitive mind". But the ability of the ancient civilized nations to understand nature was also so restricted that they claimed that miracles had occurred. According to Karsten, the belief in miracles was stronger in the New Testament than in the Old Testament arising from the strict monotheism of the Jewish-Israeli Yahweh. (82.) One proof of the belief in miracles in the New Testament was the description of the guardian angels who guided children especially. This view was not far from the belief in ghosts. (83.) Furthermore, the style of Mark and the other evangelists in describing Jesus as a "miracle worker" stemmed from the Near East traditions. Luke (8. 43-46) discusses a woman who has suffered from flux twelve years. When she touches the tassel of Jesus's cape she is suddenly cured. After realizing that something had happened, Jesus asked who had touched his cloak since he noticed the power going out of him (84). The conception that "sacredness" was not only a part of a particular person but also of his belongings was very typical, according to Karsten, of "primitive people". The Christian view of the soul escaping from the body at the moment of death was also based on Greek, Persian, and Indian tradition. The Cretan augur, Epimenides, was able to send his soul away whenever he desired. Karsten drew an analogy between the miracles of the Greek Apollonius of Tyna and Jesus since both of them cured sick people, exorcised evil spirits, and raised people from the dead. In addition, both of them experienced a miraculous birth and a mystic death. Karsten mentioned how the Bishop Eusebius refuted the story of Philostratus of Apollonius but not credibly enough. Finally, Karsten arrived at the conclusion that a historian of religions has to be sceptical of both stories (Apollonius's and Jesus's). (85.) All in all, Karsten's analysis of the Christian idea that there may be life after death was cumbrous and confused, veiled in quotes of numerous historical figures. He never explained more profoundly when the belief in the afterlife had developed in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, that is, when people realized that the "friendship with God might be continued by God through death"(86). Yet, Karsten's views on Greek influence are correct in the sense that for those people who received a Greek or Hellenistic education, like the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo, it was natural to discuss the immortality of the soul.

The last significant pagan element of Christianity was the sacrament of baptism. Karsten saw baptism as a "very general idea among the lowest cultures" (87). He suggested that originally sin was treated as internal (wicked ideas) and external state since everything filthy was abhorred by the gods. The complicated practices which are laid down for the purification of the people who enter the temples of gods are not merely for health reasons but involve the state of being ritually, religiously, acceptable. Ancient Indian people considered sin contagious, spreading from person to person and that it could be removed by water and fire. In ancient Greece an annual purification ritual was held in which all dirt clung to houses and temples during the year was burnt. The Hebrews of the Old Testament also knew many kinds of purification rituals which were based on the material conception of the nature of sin. The material notion of the nature of sin also came to prevail in Christianity. Karsten referred to the apostle Bartholomew who, when converting pagans to Christianity, said that as unbelievers lose their wicked beliefs the temples had to be cleansed of all filthy and evil spirits. Karsten

suggested that the declaration of Bartholomew established the sacrament of baptism. Then, the sacrament of baptism was a “simple sequence of incantations” and very similar to pagan rituals. (88.) Karsten divided the rite of admission into the Christian church into three sections: *Renuntiatio diaboli* (pagan abandons devil), *Exorcisme* (the actual driving out an evil spirit by the clergyman) and the act of *Baptism* (pouring water over the body) (89). Karsten proposed that the significant emphasis of the procedure in question was laid by the church father Cyril (*d.* 444), who stated that “without exorcism the soul cannot be purified” (90). The Bishop of Carthage, St. Cyprian (*d.* 258), emphasized in his letter to his son Magnus how significant a role the pouring of water over the body played in breaking the influence of the devil (91). Karsten stated that in early Christianity the candidates to be baptized were adults but before long infant baptism became the norm. The newborn was born into a state of original sin as a result of the fall of Adam. According to Karsten, the practice of baptizing even newborn babies with exorcism became prevalent in the 4th century. Then, the practice was twofold; firstly, the clergyman drove an evil spirit out (*exsufflatio*), and, secondly, he blew the Holy Spirit in (*insufflatio*) (92). The child who died before baptism went directly to hell since without purification she became a part of the first sin: “carnal breeding and birth”. Karsten believed, however, that the Christian practice of baptism included many brutish and fanatical elements which had been totally alien to pagan religions. Karsten declared that baptism was “unknown to Jesus” and that Paul considered it “somewhat trivial” (93). Karsten’s view of “Jesus and the rite of baptism” was peculiar considering that Jesus underwent the baptism of John the Baptist (Mark 1. 9). In addition, John the Evangelist (3. 22) tells us that Jesus baptized people in the region of Judea. Therefore, the practice of baptizing could not be totally unfamiliar to Jesus. However, Baptism never became a part of Jesus’s ministry (94). Karsten was irritated by the fact that the Christians had continually tried to deny the similarity between their practice and pagan practice of baptism. Karsten claimed that the Christians accused the devil of teaching the Christian tradition of baptism to the pagans. According to Karsten, a historian of religion was the only person able to offer a “less mystical explanation” in this question since she was able to see that religious conceptions among different nations developed sometimes independently in the same direction. On the other hand, the similarities could be explained by referring to the common spiritual atmosphere prevailing at a particular area in a particular time. (95.) Karsten here omitted any discussion of the Holy Communion, another “pagan-derived” doctrinal element of Christianity. In his conclusion Karsten proposed that Christianity made a systematic deal with pagan religions: if the pagan turned her life towards the goals of Christianity, Christianity was ready to accept or adopt some pagan beliefs and customs (96).

The second principal chapter of Karsten’s work focused on divine revelation and inspiration. Karsten stated that “revelation” and “inspiration” were terms typical of all religions (“primitive” and “historical”) since “religion”, overall, was the medium between the human and the divine world. The gods revealed themselves to human in many ways: at the “lowest level” the special phenomena of nature and mentally ill persons were seen as something

divine. “Idiotic persons” especially were promoted to the rank of miraculous prophets imbued by the divine spirits. Karsten emphasized, however, that the conception of a miraculous individual having contact with the gods was not only typical of “primitive people” but also a part of the worldview of the “civilized nations”. (97.) The Greeks and Romans had their oracles, the agencies by which inquiries were answered, while the Roman statesman and orator, Cicero (106-43 BCE), believed that the soul of human was able to prognosticate things only when it left the body (“wise men and sleepers”). The Israelite of the Old Testament adopted the ancient conceptions of divine revelation and inspiration. The God of Judaism, Yahweh, revealed himself in human form, thunder, or a burning bush. Moreover, a part of the ancient Israelite religion was the practice of using a priestly device, *Urim* and *Thummim*, for telling oracles (presumably “yes-or-no” answers). (98.) Karsten saw this kind of questioning God as factitious. Karsten suggested, however, that the ancient Israelite people considered many human outbursts of feeling as produced by God: Gideon was filled with God when he delivered the Israelites from the Midianites, and the spirit of God descended on Saul when he campaigned against the Ammonites. (99.) In the ancient texts of the Hebrews a prophet was a person of “inspired perspicacity” (100). Later, in the Jewish Bible, a prophet was exclusively considered a person who speaks on behalf of God, *nabi*. Karsten stated that the prophets gradually formed a trade in which different groups and opinions were represented. However, the desire to please the kings made the prophets compete against each other and as a result they often made “known the unknown” in a perplexing manner (diverse views on the nature of Yahweh). Thus, Karsten deduced, the prophets of the Old Testament were very similar to the inspired shamans of the “primitive people” (101). Only later, a prophet grew from a mere enraptured predictor to an ethical and religious functionary (Karsten probably referred to Samuel I 9. 9 which tells how a prophet in the early times was called a seer. Yet, the “great” prophets of the later times (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel etc.) also had a visible sign of God-possession which demonstrated itself in going into trances, for instance). In Karsten’s opinion, an unbiased study of the prophetic texts has proved their considerable untruthfulness and that some prophecies did not even call for special knowledge/ revelation. Karsten pointed out, however, that it was not only the Old Testament which included ideas of revelation and inspiration but also the New Testament shared more or less “primitive and developed” notions. (102.) Typically for the New Testament writings, inspiration was seen as caused by the devil. In Mark 1. 34 it is written that Jesus cured many people by driving out evil spirits but that Jesus never allowed spirits to talk to him because they “knew him”. In the early Christian church glossolalia, speaking in tongues, was common. Karsten believed that glossolalia with its ecstatic or trance state derived from “primitive” sources while prophecy could be seen as a more “intelligent” phenomenon. Karsten also pointed out that Paul was sceptical towards glossolalia and disapproved of it. The conception of people speaking on behalf of God or the devil contributed to the assumption that the writings they produced likewise came from God or the devil. In early Christianity this dogma of scripture or text inspiration became prevalent. According to Karsten, an example of text inspiration can be found in 2 Timothy 3. 16, where it is written that every writing inspired by God is useful considering learning, admonition, and

chastisement. In fact, it was the two letters to Timothy (Pastoral Epistles in the New Testament) which established the word “inspiration” since the Greek *theopneustos* was derived from *theopneustia*, which in Latin is *inspiratio*. (103.) Karsten stated that texts or scriptures considered sacred and collected into an accepted canon were common in “higher” or “positive” religions. The doctrine of scriptural inspiration was typical of the brahmans of Vedic society, who as intermediaries between humans and God endeavoured to establish the revealed and pre-historical nature of the hymns of Rig Veda. Moreover, Zoroastrians considered that their holy book Avesta was revealed to Zoroaster by Ahura Mazda while Muslims thought that the scripture of Islam, Qur’ān, was revealed to Muhammad by Allāh. (104.) Karsten, then, proceeded to discuss the scholasticism of Protestant Orthodoxy, which regarded the Bible as literally the Word of God. It is necessary here to critically revise Karsten’s views since in this part of his work we have a problem with the plot of the story. It is somewhat obscure why Karsten talked about Protestant orthodox biblical scholarship and then passed to the allegorical interpretation of Philo although Philo’s philosophy was established earlier than the notion of the Word of God. Failing to understand Karsten’s reasoning, I have made a chronological re-arrangement, that is, the ideas are Karsten’s, the chronology is mine. The Hellenistic Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria, introduced the allegorical interpretation of the Bible in his writing *Legum Allegoriae*, in which he dealt with the Pentateuch. Philo emphasized that the Jewish law had an absolute symbolic meaning. His allegorical biblical scholarship was furthered by many early Church Fathers like Ambrose, Origen, and Clement of Alexandria. Karsten was not altogether certain about the utility of Philo’s method (“ruinous inheritance from the Jewish church”) and stated that the Church Father Origen was misled when he assumed Philoan allegorical scholarship. (105.) After the Reformation (or reformations in the plural because of the diversity of protest among the Christian people in Western Europe), Lutheran biblical scholarship came to emphasize the nature of the Scriptures as the Word and the Truth of God. The view was based on Luther’s notion that scriptures alone is the source of doctrine and practice (106). The orthodox biblical scholarship mostly flourished in Protestant theological circles in the 17th century, when all passages of the Bible, even the characters, were regarded as divinely inspired. Karsten noted that Protestant fundamentalism still prevailed in Sweden, where it was supported by a “peculiar” journal *Facklan* (“Torch”) which with its “quasi-scientific evidence fought seriously against truth and objective research” (107). In the 18th century the Enlightenment directed its unfavourable judgment against scholasticism of Protestant Orthodoxy, and the so-called Enlightenment-theology came to emphasize the synthesis between reason and revelation. The miracles of the Bible and ecclesiastical dogmas were regarded as sensible and understandable. On German soil, the neology of Leibniz and Wolf (based on their philosophical views) came to represent the main trend of the Enlightenment theology. Then, neology aimed at a new understanding of the Bible which mostly entailed interpreting Christian dogma from a historical point of view, that is, the neologists emphasized the practical, not the theoretical, nature of Christianity. (108.) Karsten also referred to the significance of the German biblical critic, Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918), who deduced that

the Pentateuch was compiled from four separate sources. The views of Wellhausen, based on the Pentateuch commentary of the French physician Jean Astruc, were especially disfavoured by Orthodox Jews. (109.) As a whole, Karsten considered the historical-critical interpretation of the Bible unusable owing to its “radical and vague style of research” which prevented it from overthrowing Protestant fundamentalism (110). At the end of the chapter Karsten suddenly expressed his approval of Protestant biblical fundamentalism by suggesting that fundamentalism was a more “clear and consequential” biblical trend than historical interpretation. However, the trends were similar to each other in that they meticulously paid tribute to the writings of the Bible. Karsten wondered how many theologians and teachers of religious education finally had the courage to admit that the writings of the Old Testament of the Creation and the Fall were merely myths without intellectual value. Was it true that Genesis formed the so-called “required truth” for the Christians? Although Karsten refused to regard the Bible as “scholarly valid source material” he desired, at this juncture, to analyse the question of the authority of the Bible further. (111.)

In the course of his Bible analysis Karsten pondered whether there was one coherent conception of God in the Old Testament and whether this idea of God met the religious criteria of modern human. Karsten also wondered whether the morality of the Old Testament was suited to the needs of modern scholarly ethics. Karsten noted that the modern study of religions had proved the orthodox notion of Jews as the people chosen to receive God’s guidance, to be invalid. Although Judaism might give the impression of being the original religion, it was not in any way peculiar. On the contrary, many of the practices of Judaism were indebted to ancient Near Eastern, especially Semite, religions. (112.) Yet, the ethical monotheism of the classical prophets of Israel, which put minor emphasis on cult and foretelling and deserted tribal gods, was a unique phenomenon in the history of religions (113). Karsten’s view was somewhat parallel to modern Jewish thinkers who have suggested that the prophets were “thinkers who transformed Judaism from a tribal superstition to a universal system of ethical monotheism” (114). Karsten claimed that the backwardness of the concept of justice in the Old Testament originated in the merciless nature of God in Judaism. Karsten wondered why Yahweh, taking over the powers, revealed himself as such an austere figure, harshly demanding that “Israel should be holy as God is holy” (115). By examining the historical/personal nature of the God of Judaism, Karsten discovered that the most general attributes attached to Yahweh were intolerant, mercurial, ferocious, frightful, unpredictable, implacable, prejudiced, vindictive, punitive, and dire (116). Such characterizations were typical of the gods of “primitive people”. Karsten next took an example from Genesis (20, 26, I-II) and inquired why the King of Gerar, Abimelech, was punished by Yahweh although it was Abraham and Isaac who deceived Abimelech by presenting their wives as their sisters. Karsten deduced that in the Old Testament judgements on sin were passed arbitrarily without asking why some events had, in fact, taken place. An example of an immature concept of justice was also offered by the bloodguilt of Judaism, that “whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” (2 Samuel 3. 27), which Karsten saw as characteristic of all

“primitive” religions. (117.) Karsten pointed out that Jesus was opposed to the idea of the liability for punishment of those who have shed blood. Furthermore, it was clear that the right of the Israelite men to have many concubines and to divorce whenever they desired was a direct manifestation of “primitive” custom. Raija Sollamo (1992) has noted, however, that the Old Testament does not directly *order* wives to acquiesce to the authority of their husbands, that is, the husband has control over his wife but nobody explicitly demands that the wife should be obedient and acquiescent to her husband (118). Finally, Karsten claimed that the Jewish habit of displaying loyalty towards all Jews but punishing others (Moses killed an Egyptian whom he found beating a Jew) stemmed from the “primitive” tendency to think positively only about the people of the same community. (119.) Summing up the moral nature of the Old Testament, Karsten concluded that there was no integrated moral or ethical worldview in the sacred writings of the Old Testament. Thus, Karsten refused to believe that the Old Testament was divinely inspired. Or, then, the Jewish people had misinterpreted the intentions of God. Karsten pointed out that the Old Testament was faced with serious criticism during the centuries. The founder of a Christian movement rival to Catholic Christianity, Marcion (d. c.160), rejected the Old Testament and discussed its “wicked God”. (120.) Karsten reproached the theologians for overestimating the role of the Old Testament as a founder of moral code. It was somewhat gruesome how Luther rejected the theory of Nicolaus Copernicus, that the earth moves around the sun simply by appealing to the passage of the Book of Joshua in which Joshua tells the sun to stay in place. Karsten pointed out that as late as in the 19th century, the Faculty of Divinity of the University of Sorbonne asked Buffon to revoke his simple geological premises. And we should not forget the criticism Darwin faced when he introduced his famous doctrine of evolution. Then, the “church was detonated”. Ironically, the composure Darwin showed before the various accusations, made him the most elevated example of Christian magnanimity and toleration. (121.) Karsten noted that the fact that new scientific knowledge unceasingly troubled the minds of the clergy was realized by John Stuart Mill, who presented a three-step theory of the issue: firstly, clergymen declared new knowledge to be dangerous, secondly, they admitted that anything could be said about modern knowledge, and, finally, they accepted new information since it obviously was in harmony with the dogmas of Christianity (Genesis and the doctrine of evolution, for instance). Karsten desired to add yet one more point to his discussion about the authority of the Christian Bible: the fact that among Christians, the New Testament was considered an even more “authorized” and “infallible” collection of sacred writings than the Old Testament. But if the New Testament is examined from a modern point of view, Karsten noted, then it immediately appears that its ethical religious truths are veiled in subjective and incomplete conceptions which cannot serve as instructions for “all people of all times”. (122.) In fact, like the Old Testament, the New Testament did not include any integrated ethical or religious view of life. In Karsten’s opinion Jesus made God an agent performing actively in the world and taking care of people. This view was opposite to the remote nature of the God of Judaism. Karsten pointed out, however, that Jesus’s teaching of the present God was ruined by Paul, whose pessimistic views regarded God as a distant figure who forsook people, that is, a view very

similar to the Jewish tradition. As far as Karsten understood, the evangelist John also called the devil a prince of this world and claimed that nobody had ever seen God face to face (John 1. 18; John 4. 12). Thus, the New Testament did not include any coherent conception of God and His relation to the world. The sacred writings of the New Testament should, above all, be seen as humane-subjective conceptions, not as a result of divine inspiration. (123.) While it was Karsten's intention to also examine moral questions, he asked whether the morality of the New Testament was a suitable precept for the modern world. Karsten noted that the Russian novelist and advocate of reform, Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), and the French naturalist, Emile Zola (1840-1902), were critical of the morality of Jesus which, they contended, conflicted with modern social order. Karsten believed that Tolstoy was completely right in his assertion that modern social order had estranged itself from the moral goodness of Jesus. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus adopted a negative attitude towards certain social phenomena and institutions, like divorce without cause through adultery, taking of an oath, revenge, and violence. (124.) How then was the moral discourse of Jesus harmonized with the modern circumstances? According to Karsten, a Christian scholar of moral philosophy had two options: she could either deny the authority of Jesus or then preach, like Tolstoy, a gospel of love and good works, that is, become critical of the regulations of modern society. Karsten stated, however, that the Christian tendency to compulsively apply the words of Jesus given "on the mountain" to modern time was not acceptable. Furthermore, the Christian concept that the teachings of Jesus were somewhat impracticable in this time was not "valid". Yet, the aspiration to see modern society as a time of "distress", during which immoral actions were less reprehensible, was likewise invalid. In Karsten's opinion, the difficulty to adapt the sayings of Jesus to modern time derived from the fact that these discourses were not uttered "with an eye on modern circumstances". (125.) On the other hand, Jesus was merely interested in eternal life since the end was near (Luke 9. 27, Matthew 10. 23). That led us to an eschatological and ascetic side of the morality of Jesus. (126.) The word eschatology was first used in the 19th century in discussing the Bible, and the origins of Christian asceticism are to be found in the eschatological consciousness of the early Christians (127). That is why Karsten drew an analogy between eschatology (Greek, *eschatos*, "last") and the stress of strong self-control. Karsten mentioned that the Christian theologian and historian, Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930), refused to believe that Jesus had been elusive and ascetic since the Pharisees who set high moral standards for themselves described Jesus as an "eater and drinker". Karsten considered Jesus, however, a "person with the practice of self-denial like John the Baptist". That the Pharisees called Jesus "eater" stemmed only from the style of Jesus to adopt an unprejudiced attitude towards all kinds of feasts. Buddha acted similarly. Although the practice of asceticism marked the life of Buddha, he never accepted self-torment and was thus called an "eater" by his opponents (the opponents of Buddha said that he died of a surfeit of pork). Karsten pointed out that although Jesus never became the leading figure of ascetic movements, he told his disciples to forsake everything precious, children, spouse, profession, in this world (Luke 14. 26, 33). Unlike Buddha, Jesus encouraged people to self-mutilation (Matthew 19. 12). But, Jesus never urged people to develop their intellectual and physical

talents. (128.) Karsten also considered biased Paul's notion that woman should be silent in the congregation. Karsten claimed that the letters in Paul's name in the New Testament showed us that Paul never supported the abolition of slavery. Consequently, the social-ethical regulations of the writings of the New Testament derived from the humane and subjective views of their authors. Karsten emphasized, however, that the authors of the Christian Bible had not broken any law. In contrast, the church had rendered itself guilty of outrageous malpractices in the name of the Bible. (129.)

Part of Karsten's analysis of the authority of the Bible was the discussion about the Christian doctrine of the Atonement. Karsten's analysis was about the reconciliation of men and women to God through the death of Christ furthered by the New Testament. Karsten acknowledged that the need for such reconciliation appeared already in the Old Testament, even if the writings of the Old Testament originated in "primitive" sources. Hence the atonement of the New Testament was "essentially based on crude and primitive conceptions of the Old Testament". In general, Karsten suggested that atonement indicated either coalescence to "eternal" (pantheistic view) or repentance so that sins were at once forgiven by God (theist view). Furthermore, Karsten claimed that Christianity failed to offer an integrated view on the atonement. The information the gospels gave us about the last moments of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane and Mount Calvary (Hebrew, *Golgotha*) revealed that Jesus never spoke of the universal reconciliation with God through his death. The gospels of Matthew and Mark described, then, merely the natural pain and horror of a human caused by the awareness of imminent death and martyrdom. Karsten suggested that the complex idea of "propitiation" or "expiation" of the death of Christ elaborated by Paul was not in harmony with the words of Jesus who spoke only of the ever loving and forgiving Father. In fact, the views of Jesus on human nature were not as sombre and pessimistic as Paul claimed. Ultimately, Jesus saw that His death had a "representative and reconciling" meaning. For Paul, God had turned away from the world and forgave people their sins only because of the death of Christ (Rom. 8). (130.) According to Karsten, the reason why the disciples of Jesus adopted the idea of the atonement was that such an idea appeared a satisfactory explanation for the suffering and death of Christ since the death of Christ was seen as a "violation of devout faith" by the disciples. The prophetic book of Isaiah with its story of the suffering servant of Yahweh offered a good illustration to the disciples of Jesus. The book of Isaiah tells us that the servant of Yahweh does not suffer due to his own sins but because of the sins of other people whom he, through his own ordeal, saves from the punishment. That a righteous person suffers on behalf of a wicked one was, according to Karsten, a traditional Jewish conception. The Apostle Paul's words (Colossians I. 20) about the meaning of the blood of Christ's cross as a symbol of peace between God and mankind also stemmed from traditional Jewish sources (based on Semite, Greek, and Aryan traditions). Like the stories of the Old Testament, the writings of the New Testament were based on a materialistic view of sin. Karsten noted that the Old Testament stated that "blood is the soul of the body" (3 Moses 17. 14). But blood can be filthy and even pollute the whole society (the tendency to see menstruation especially as

polluting in societies which demand a strict separation between male and female roles). On that occasion, it became the most essential that the polluted person was purified through certain rituals. (131.) These purification rites of early Jewish societies were acts of reconciliation or expiation. Occasionally, the ancient Israelites made human offerings to the austere and threatening Yahweh when these sacrifices became the so-called propitiation offering of an angry deity (2 Moses 22. 29 speaks of offering the first-born to God). However, on the most “primitive” level sin was only conceptualized materially when the reconciliation was a mere outward act without ethical meaning. Karsten noted that according to later Jewish belief atonement was possible through proper repentance and the act of sacrifice. Then, the covenant relationship between God and people received an ethical nature. (132.) Karsten’s concepts “early and later Jewish societies” are somewhat vague and point to inaccurate historical moments. We must remember that the classical prophets (Jeremiah 4. 4) emphasized that the act of sacrifice was insufficient and that repentance must be accompanied by a change of heart (133). Thus, in the period of classical prophets atonement was seen in the context of personal repenting, not sacrificial ritual. That the act of sacrifice would lead to forgiveness was, then, prevalent among ancient Israelites and came to an end after the Temple was destroyed by the Romans in the 70 CE. (134). Karsten also refrained from discussing more profoundly the complex variety of sacrifices of the ancient Israelites, sacrifices which varied from sin-offerings and dedicatory offerings to meal offerings and free-will and peace offerings. Karsten was, however, aware of the dissatisfaction of the prophets with the act of sacrifice in propitiation for sin. To verify or annul Karsten’s assertion that the Old Testament discussed human sacrifices in ancient Israel would require critical understanding of the history of the ancient Near East, historical knowledge which is not open to me. Here I am only able to refer to the words of Thomas L. Thompson (2000) who in his illuminating work on *The Bible in History* writes as follows:

“In order to try to read and understand the Bible we need historical contexts [...] these will not tell us what the Bible is saying, and we will never have a right context that will prove finally that the Bible means one thing and not another. Rather, we have need for contexts that will help us understand the Bible in the same way that we understand any literature, whether ancient or modern” (135).

In my opinion, Thompson’s reasoning shows us that even a critical and historical reading of the Bible always produces relative results and has its roots in the personal understanding of a reader. That was also true in Rafael Karsten’s case. Perusing Karsten’s arguments shows us that his interpretations were not directly false or true but the products of personal interpretation when the ideas were ambitiously subjected to the aspiration to an objective study of history of religions. Yet, it is sometimes reasonable to call him “subjectively disapproving” when, for instance, he says that “inordinate repentance is a morbid phenomenon caused by hysteria and moral incompleteness of human” (136). It is also reasonable to criticize the general consistency and readability of his text. And we must recall

that Karsten's methods of exegetics were inadequate. Today, there are five major ideas of the doctrine of the Atonement which fall into two categories: objective and subjective theories. The objective theories suggest that "something factual had been done for us which has dealt with the reality of sin, and which we could not have done for ourselves" when the subjective or moral theories claim that the "extent of God's love revealed in Christ move us to repentance". (137.)

The fifth chapter of Karsten's work turns the discussion to the conception of God in different cultures and traditions. Karsten assumed that there was no "religion or religious world view" without an idea of God (in Swedish, *Gudsiden*). Loyal to his evolutionary views, Karsten presented a development curve of religions where animism represented the first stage. Then, on a "primitive" level God or the Divine being was not apart from humanly apprehended categories in time and space, that is, was a part of nature. Gradually, the idea of God was emancipated from immediate contact with worldly phenomena. When the human became aware of the natural laws, she began to see God or gods as more transcendent (period of polytheism). This led gradually and inevitably to theistic religions when the human could only say with confidence what God is not (*apophatic theology*). (138.) Although in theistic religions God was qualified out of worldly existence, the God of the New Testament had anthropomorphic characteristics, that is, God is a Father. Karsten suggested, however, that both early Christianity and medieval Christianity professed one-sided supernaturalism by seeing prodigiousness everywhere (139). Karsten considered René Descartes and his "Cartesian system of co-ordinates" a rescuing theory which by discarding the authoritarian systems of the scholastic philosophers ended the Christian speculation of an "outer force" (140). The ultimate triumph over God was attained, however, by Lamarck and Darwin, whose ideas of the natural intellectual faculties of human made people modify their idea of God (141). By focusing on the perplexing question of the relationship between the idea of God and the doctrine of evolution, philosophy of religion and its heterogeneous tendencies, Deism, Theism, Pantheism, Materialism, and Monism, tried to explain religion and belief in God in various ways. Karsten rejected both the Aristotelean notion of God as the source of all things and the ontological reflection that what truly exists in human mind is existent reality (if a human believes in the true reality of God, then God exists). Karsten called these views "transitory". Moreover, he refused to accept the notion that an inner religious experience of God gave information about the true existence of God. Karsten especially criticized new religious movements for regarding glossolalia as proof of divine power and revelation. (142.) Karsten considered modern psychology of religion a subject area which had successfully shown that "expressions of religious emotions" can be explained and examined "naturally". In this context, Karsten quoted extensively from William James's work on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). Karsten was not, however, satisfied with James's inclination to see the conversion experience in both psychological and supernatural terms. On the other hand, Karsten was impressed by James's notion of "experiences" or "senses" which were beyond consciousness but which were able to come to realization, that is, back to

consciousness. (143.) Karsten stressed that a Christian had to be ready to admit that a “pantheistic worldview with religious sentiment” was realizable. In fact, religious sense appeared more profound in pantheism than in theism since pantheism represented a higher religious notion than theism (a pantheist’s idea of God was never “superficial” and “spiritless”). A pantheist was certain that in the “predicament of existence something valuable was materialized and that in permanent and impermanent something divine appeared”. (144.)

The Theologian Erkki Kaila in the journal *Aika* (1911) criticized Karsten for one-sidedly rejecting the theistic concept of personal God and inclining to pantheistic conception (145). In my opinion, Karsten was not adopting a pantheistic view (compared to a panentheistic view) but took it merely as an example of a view which dealt with the relation between God and the world and thus should be considered one source of religious reflections and emotions. Yet, a pantheistic view of divine immanence and Spinoza’s *causa immanens* and *causa transiens*, which allowed the causality of God to be immanent in nature, agreed fairly upon Karsten’s agnostic view and offered him a theoretical instrument to fight against the theism’s emphasis on the total transcendence of God. Overall, Karsten underlined the ability of a psychologist of religion to explain a religious experience although she had never experienced it herself. (146.)

The psychological analysis of religious experiences led Karsten to examine the conception of a personal God. Karsten took a philosophical stand by asking how God should be described in relation to the world. This, however, he did only ostensibly. In truth, his target lay in showing that the integration of the biblical concept of God with the doctrine of the natural laws was preposterous. Karsten paid his main attention to the professorial dissertation of the Finnish Acting Professor of Dogmatic and Moral Theology, C.G.A. Rosenqvist (1855-1931). (147.)

Rosenqvist’s dissertation (1893) dealt with God’s relation to the world with a “particular reference to the Independence of the Creator and the Laws governing the Natural Order” (148). Rosenqvist emphasized that evolution or natural law was not an element restricting God or conflicting with Him but was a part of His persisting activity in the world (149). The laws of nature and the miracles in the Bible were “expressions of the same Spirit of God” (150). In general, Rosenqvist’s work should be called biblically defiant since it rejected the “traditional view of the verbal inspiration of the Bible” (151). Karsten responded to Rosenqvist’s historical views quickly. He claimed that Rosenqvist had adopted his ideas directly from the German philosopher and physician Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), who suggested that the human being (mind and body) is subject to the same natural laws as inanimate objects: these natural laws have the duty of enabling all things to attempt to achieve the values set by a supervising divine being. (152.)

However, Rosenqvist received many of his ideas through the Scottish naturalist and theologian Henry Drummond (153). Karsten denied the existence of true natural laws and suggested that natural axioms were mere general “influences” (154). Karsten stressed that the contradiction between natural sciences and theology was too extensive so that the “natural” and “religious” views could be synchronized, that is, their relation was not a causal *both-and* but a radical *either-or* relation (*e.g.* a scholar had to adopt either a theistic or a pantheistic view) (155). Karsten strongly disapproved of the endeavour of the theologians to harmonize biblical religion with Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Karsten also regarded

Rosenqvist's view of the miracles in the Bible as "stuff and nonsense" and suggested, instead, that the miracles merely derived from "defective knowledge of the natural laws". Karsten considered it completely absurd that a colleague of Rosenqvist, A. F. Granfelt, explained biblical miracles by claiming that geological studies had shown that inside the earth it was possible to find integral series of God's creation. (156.) By seeing Granfelt's notion as scholarly grotesque, Karsten stressed that the idea of God "supernaturally dealing with people" was an old-fashioned and vanishing notion. Rosenqvist's and Granfelt's dogmatic theism was far from making serious science. (157.) Instead, Immanuel Kant and his "overturning the supremacy of religious dogmatism" received high praise from Karsten. For the second time Karsten made known his disgust for theological-scientific compromises and stressed that theology should consider miracle, like medieval scholasticism, mere *supra et contra naturam*. (158.) All in all, Karsten deduced that whether somebody looked upon God as a personal or impersonal being depended, ultimately, on the course of her imagination. Naturally, the idea of God differed between nations and was highly dependent on different conceptions of the world and experiences of life. (159.) Commenting on Karsten's opinions above, it is reasonable to ask why his historical analysis merely provided a mercurial account of the contradiction between Christianity and natural sciences without pondering how the Christian conception of personal God ultimately manifested itself in a historical analysis, that is, where it came from. Karsten could have mentioned that "personal religion" and "personal God" (*ab ovo*) were familiar already to Mesopotamian religious literature (2000 BCE) (160). This was the logical method of treatment in the other chapters of Karsten's work. The last chapter of Karsten's work dealt with religion and morality. I have already examined Karsten's views on religion and morality in Chapter 4.2. and thus I will here stress only his themes which treated the differences between the morality of Christianity and pagan religions. We can outline Karsten's scheme as follows:

Figure 5. *Comparison between the morality of pagan religions and Christianity*

Pagan religions	Christianity
Moral development	Moral regression and immorality
Respect for worldly knowledge	Disrespect for worldly knowledge
Individual	Anti-individual
Tolerant	Fanatical and persecuting
Not gender related	Gender related - disrespect for women
Erotic love	Exaggerated erotic love

Needless to say, Karsten's dichotomies (development vs. regression, tolerant vs. fanatical etc.) call for further elaboration. In the beginning of the chapter, Karsten pondered whether Christianity had made human nature better and contributed to the development of humanity. His answer was entangled in the accusation that Christian theologians were guilty of exaggerating the superiority of Christian moral doctrine. Karsten was irritated by the Christian view that a person could not achieve goodness by means of intelligence but only with the help of God's grace. The mistake of Paul was to be opposed to "reason" whereas he emphasized that the scribes (*soferim*) were only intelligent men. According to Christian principles, then, the French Revolution with its fierce riots was nothing but an example of a phenomenon in which "humanity without divinity led to brutality". (161.) Karsten found this idea "unconfirmed" and claimed that it was "religion" which led to brutality. In this context Karsten mentioned the Crusades, military expeditions in the name of Christianity, which were proof of Christian "ferocity, bloodthirstiness and moral regression" ("moral regression" was not inevitably analogous to "religious degeneration" since although in Christianity they were intensively linked to each other they still had an independent nature). Karsten pointed to William James's analogy that "religion and fanaticism were identical". Karsten believed that the philosophers who elaborated secular ethical views (Hobbes to Nietzsche) were, ultimately, persons with the highest notions of humanity. Karsten then reproached Christian ethical belief for condoning slavery and the subordination of women. Karsten regretted that Jesus's saying "So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them" (Matthew 7. 12) had been forgotten by the apostle Paul and the Christian church. (162.) Commenting on Karsten's assertion, it is reasonable to remember that a part of Christian ethics, from the classical age on, was the principle of extension of moral citizenship to all, even to slaves (163). Besides, Karsten denied the fact that early Christianity was morally and religiously superior to the prevailing Greco-Roman syncretism. Karsten saw this as a historical embellishment and felt compassion for the destiny of the Roman emperor, Julian (332-63 CE), who by promoting paganism through education ("Against the Christians") came to be condemned by the doctors of the Church. Karsten then picked the first Christian Roman emperor, Constantine I (c. 288-337 CE), and expressed disapproval of his vulgar and contemptible nature which had been ignored by later Christians. (164.) Besides, the manner of Tertullian (c. 160 - c. 225 CE) to portray philosophical speculation as *haereticorum* was to Karsten totally ludicrous. Tertullian's mistake was to abolish the "open-minded enthusiasm for research" prevailing in the pagan religions. Karsten wondered why Tertullian prohibited the Christians from enjoying gladiatorial entertainment when he himself maintained questionable "showmanship" by describing how the Olympian gods were burnt in hell. Karsten also criticized St. Augustine for overemphasizing the meaning of God's mercy. In fact, the moral doctrine of St. Augustine, that pagan virtues were marvellous vices, was for Karsten biased and disastrous (Westermarck also discussed St. Augustine, although not as polemically as Karsten). (165.) According to Karsten, one awful proof of the baseness of Christian morality was offered by the murder of the Neoplatonist female philosopher, Hypatia, who was killed by the patriarch St. Cyril. Shocked by the "horrificing murder of Hypatia", Karsten deduced that the most cruel acts in

world history had been done in the name of Christianity. (166.) In my opinion, Karsten's notion of the ultra-cruelty of Christianity is excessive, taking into account the fact that for as long as people have been living together in groups, they have criticized other groups for making a custom of immoral regulations, that is, the behaviour of one's own group is seen almost without exception as superior to the standards of others. This arises from the fact that morality is made up of the subjective actions, intentions and experiences of individuals and lacks an objective unit, thus resulting under the heading *Omnem hominem fidelem judica tuum esse fratrem* - "Only a believing person is your brother" (the precept of the Catholic Church) (167). However, Karsten's opinion of the early Christians as an exceptional group which made allegations against each other and hated one another (Karsten's argument was based on the attitudes of Celsus) does not, as such, fit into my explanation. Although Karsten was well enough acquainted with the history of Christianity, he never explained why the golden rule of the Christian ethical belief was to love one's enemies (Matthew 5. 44) and to love one's neighbour as oneself (Leviticus 19. 18) if Christianity was nothing but a religion of detestation. At the end of his book Karsten declared Martin Luther (1483-1546) and the Christian reformer John Calvin (1509-1564) to be intolerant figures. Karsten blamed Luther for illogical thinking when he denied the infallibility of the church but claimed that the Bible was immune to fallacy or error. Karsten considered Calvin especially "inhuman like the worst Catholic inquisitor". He accused Calvin of the destiny of Miguel Serveto, who was convicted and burnt to death by the Protestants. As is known, the death of Serveto generated a wide dispute about the bounds of tolerance within Christianity. (168.) Karsten also adopted a negative attitude towards the various movements in Protestant Christianity. One of these was Pietism which, according to Karsten, included "many kinds of insanity" (in Pietism mysticism, religious ecstasy and sexual exaltation formed an "entity") (169). Sirkku Nyström (1996) has noted in her book *Mihin pappia tarvitaan?* ("Why do we need the clergymen?") that the condemnatory nature of Finnish Christianity stemmed, in fact, from the rigid confessional orthodoxy of Pietism (170). In the context of Pietism, Karsten became inspired by the examination of the relationship between sex and religion. A life of total debauchery was not only a part of the pagan religions but also appeared in Christianity although the lecherous feasts of the Christians seemed to be more grotesque than the pagan festivals (Karsten stated that this was also realized by apostle Paul, I Cor. 5. 1). An example of this was the early Christian "love feast", *Agape*, which included inglorious debauchery in various forms (note here two separate meanings of Christian "Agape"). Karsten believed that the statements of Tertullian revealed that in the third century pagans accused the Christians of immorality. Karsten also claimed that Tertullian had admitted that incest was not only common among pagans but also among the Christians. (171.) Here Karsten's ideas were contradictory to Westermarck's views. As explained in Chapter Three, Westermarck believed that the "horror of incest" was almost universal in human life, disregarding a few exceptions which represented abnormal cases. According to Westermarck, the aversion towards incest grew when a family changed from a large endogamic social unit to a small exogamic group. From the 1920s onwards, Westermarck called this aversion "innate". (172.) Karsten's opinion of

incest as a general phenomenon among pagans and Christians is totally different from Westermarck's view. By adapting Karsten's assertion to Westermarck's theoretical scheme, it seems that if incest was universal among the early Christians they, consequently, lived in endogamic social units or then they represented "abnormal" people. For Karsten the "tradition" of sex and religion in Christianity continued its existence in the customs of medieval society. Then, Christian "monks" were famous for practicing "aberrant sexual behaviour" when the "nuns" could be called "matrons of the brothels" (173). Karsten never defined "aberrant sexual behaviour" more explicitly but referred, probably, to homosexuality. His disapproval of the sexuality of "monks" makes us, then, ask about his attitude towards Westermarck's (supposed) homosexuality. It seems to me that Westermarck's homosexuality never affected their personal friendship in any way. Another thing is whether Karsten was ever entirely aware of it. At any rate, this kind of speculation does not deserve more space here. In general, Karsten suggested that the sexual over-excitement of the Christians derived from Paul's ascetic behest which gave the highest value to celibacy, chastity, and virginity (174). Westermarck, however, believed that Paul was more a theologian than a moralist whereupon "faith is the keystone of his teaching" (175). Karsten identified the love message of Christ with the Salvation Army the attempt of which to work closely with other denominations had been ridiculed by the Christians (176). Karsten concluded his speculation by stating that Christianity conflicted with modern religious and ethical views and that it was futile to try to deny this fact. If Christianity endeavoured to become a religion of humanity it should abandon many of its brutal dogmas (the doctrine of sinners going to hell after this life, the Original sin, the Atonement, and the salvation which comes by faith alone). The solution was not, however, convincing, for there was no reason to believe that Christianity would survive if its core doctrines were abolished. Then, Christianity would, according to Karsten, lose much of its originality. But Karsten's belief that the time of Christianity was running out, never vanished. For Karsten the "religion of the future" was based on the sayings and teachings of various religious "geniuses", Jesus being one of them (this reveals Karsten's admiration towards Jesus as a moralist, that is, the harbinger of love). (177.)

In retrospect Karsten's analysis encompassed several interrelated dimensions with Edward Westermarck's ideas: firstly, the disapproval of Christianity as the "prime mover" of moral development (as Westermarck put it), secondly, the dislike of the Christian ethical doctrine which was limited to the Christians only, thirdly, the accusation that Christianity had forsaken *Agape*, the love of God or Christ, fourthly, regarding the position of woman as "low and poor" in Christianity, and lastly, the disapproval of the Pauline elements of Christian doctrine. (178.) In the previous section (4.3.1.) I already discussed Westermarck's booklet "Christianity and Morality" (1907). But this was not his last analysis on this subject. In 1939, just before his death, Westermarck published the study *Christianity and Morals*, which, more polemically than his earlier work, treated Christian doctrines (asceticism, the sacraments, marriage, divorce, slavery). Timothy Stroup (1982) has suggested that Westermarck's work was divided into two parts: the analysis of morality and religion, and examination of the teachings of Jesus

and Paul (“While Jesus was a moralist, Paul was in the first place a theologian) (179). In fact, Westermarck’s analysis of the Christian doctrine had begun in March 1894 when he lectured about *Den moraliska innebörden af kristendomens lära om lifvet efter detta* (“The Moral Content of The Christian Doctrine of The Afterlife”) in a meeting of the Philosophical Society (180). As a whole, the conclusions Westermarck reached on Christian morality were negative - the “moral effect of religion has been on the whole bad” (181). But did Karsten take Westermarckian motives as given, that is, as the concrete basis of his analysis of the relationship between pagan and Christian morals? It should be apparent by now that the many similarities between their analyses reveal that Karsten, obviously, adopted this form of analysis from Westermarck but made it less philosophical and more polemic. Yet, Karsten’s knowledge of the Bible seemed to be of a higher grade than Westermarck’s since the verses of the Bible learnt in his childhood home were of use to Karsten in his analysis. We must keep in mind that the philosophical breakthrough of Westermarck opened the door for Karsten to individual thinking.

We can now close this chapter with a few remarks on the acceptance Karsten gained for his historical ideas. Here I will pay attention to the comments of the Finnish theologians Erkki Kaila and Antti Filemon Puukko. In 1911 Erkki Kaila gave a summary of Karsten’s book at theologian Linnove’s home (182). In the same year, Kaila gave a commentary on Karsten’s book in the journal *Aika* (183). Kaila criticized Karsten for lack of scholarly impartiality and open-mindedness in his work. Kaila claimed that Karsten should have made a more consistent difference between scientific and religious knowledge since “revelation” was merely a religious concept (184). Moreover, Kaila was anxious about Karsten’s mechanical views but admitted that Karsten’s “belief is like any other belief and is worthy of respect like any other sincere conviction” (185). A member of the Theological Saturday Society, A. F. Puukko, reviewed Karsten’s work in the journal *Vartija* in 1912. Puukko suggested that Karsten’s work was laudable considering the extensive religion historical material it presented. But here Puukko’s sympathy ends. Puukko stressed that some parts of Karsten’s work told not about objective making of science but an obvious “tendency criticism”. Furthermore, he questioned Karsten’s style to consider “clear and solved” the questions of the biblical history which still were seen as problematic by the “historical-religious” school. By this, Puukko referred to Karsten’s argument that Christianity had “organically developed from a certain cultural environment when the personalities of Jesus and the prophets remained of secondary importance”. (186.) Ironically, Puukko accused Karsten of nurturing old-fashioned and unhistorical views of the Bible. In my opinion, the attitudes of Finnish theologians towards Karsten’s work were surprisingly “spiritless”, taking into account how argumentatively Karsten, in places, dealt with Christianity. Perhaps this resulted from the fact that at that time Finnish theology itself was taking a new direction when a new emphasis in church history, systematic and practical theology aroused debate. This supports my belief that the emergence of Karsten’s book was strictly bound to a particular moment when Finnish academic atmosphere lay in an intellectual chaos. On the other side, the Finnish theologian Stadius

declared in March 1900 at the meeting of the Faculty of Divinity at the Alexander University as follows:

“The criticism of the Bible is entitled if it is done comprehensively without taking singular parts arbitrarily from it [...] The sincere critic carefully reads and surveys the whole text before uttering anything sure about it. The criticism of the Bible is, thus, justified if it occurs without dividing up the whole” (187).

It has to be admitted that Karsten’s manner of using comparative history of religions (the discipline of comparative religion) as a dominant context for the study of the Bible was a pioneering and somewhat ambitious and audacious scholarly procedure. However, his analysis never revealed why Christianity was pre-eminently of pagan origin. Moreover, Karsten’s notion of “paganism” was unclear. It would have been more systematic if it had more clearly searched for the predominant features of pagan religions instead of presenting the “gods” of different nations one by one. Rafael Karsten’s contemporaries Castrén, Lauha & Gulin (1949) noted in their book *Ihmiskunnan uskonnot* (“The Religions of Humanity”) that “all pagan religions shared common elements like the pursuit of fecundity, act of purification, and seeing gods as guardians” (188). But did Karsten’s “historical and impartial” study on the Bible change anything? The polemic against Christianity seemed to affect Erkki Kaila who in 1932 still stated that the “clouds above Christianity were gathering” (189). But then again, Kaila said that it was a mistake to lower oneself to despondency since the “reins were in God’s hands” (190). It seems then that Karsten’s polemic did not manage to agitate Finnish theologians of that period, who were reluctant to make any “biblical” concessions. As Kaila put it: “the position of Christianity has been difficult many times before and through the message of Christ we take heed of signs of the time” (191). But how do the theologians of today see the value of general and comparative historical analysis of the Bible? Let us look at the historian/ archaeologist Thomas L. Thompson’s present experiences which he discusses in his book *The Bible in History* (2000). In the beginning of his book Thompson discusses the reactions to his doctoral thesis in 1971. Thompson’s dissertation of the “historicity of the patriarchal narratives” was felt to be so polemic by European scholars that he found it “impossible to get his PhD in Europe”. As a result, he was excluded from university teaching and became a “full-time house-painter and handyman” in the United States, reading the Old Testament narrative and the Pentateuch only in the evenings and at weekends. The climate of biblical scholarship did not change until in 1985 when Thompson was appointed by the Catholic Biblical Association as annual professor to the Ecole Biblique in Jerusalem. Then, “the history of religions had come to compete with theology as a dominant context for the study of the Bible” when Thompson’s view of the patriarchal narratives was no longer considered argumentative, that is, his opinion had become “part of the mainstream of the field”. Yet, Thompson’s work on the historicity of the David stories created a scandal when it appeared in 1992. As a result, he lost his coming tenure at Marquette University. However, Thompson never lost his “considerable confidence that the Bible is not a history of anyone’s

past” and that “today we no longer have a history of Israel”. (192.) Who is right then - Karsten, Thompson or the theologians? This raises a difficult question of the relationship between comparative religion and theology. Who is who and how close should she be to another person anyway? I believe there is no Adam or Eve who could tell us objectively.

4.4. Brief Abstract

In Chapter Four, I have analysed Rafael Karsten’s theoretical understanding of comparative religion during the years 1900-1910. The purpose of Chapter Four has been to observe how Karsten’s theoretical terms of reference, presented in Chapter Three, became manifest in his writings. In this, I have paid particular attention to Karsten’s first publication “Den moderna religionsvetenskap” (1904) and his doctoral thesis “The Origin of Worship” (1905) which seemed to be the very basis for his evolutionary anthropological views on “primitive” religion. But since Karsten’s literary production on comparative religion was also connected to his personal intellectual development from the devout Protestantism of his childhood home to liberal agnosticism, I also devoted a paragraph to an analysis of his activity in the Finnish-Swedish Prometheus Society and his study on “Paganism and Christianity” (1910). The activity of the Prometheus Society was anticlerical (the criticism of the clergy) and antireligious (the criticism of theology and theologians), where the anticlerical tendency had a national emphasis while antireligious ideas were closely connected with cosmopolitan and liberal European circles. Rafael Karsten was never the most radical member of the society and his attitude towards Christianity softened after the death of the Prometheus Society in 1914. In Chapter Four, I have also analysed the dialogue between the Prometheus Society and the Theological Saturday Society. This has been important for the understanding of the anticlerical/religious attitudes of the Prometheus Society (the need for comprehending and observing the whole system). My analysis has pointed out that it would be totally erroneous to state that the Finnish academic theologians and clergymen were in no way prepared for the rise of new intellectual tendencies. I believe that the Protestant churches must have been prepared for the change since industrialization and changing of world-view did not occur overnight. Yet, it is certain that the omnipotent ideological power of evolutionary thought astounded the Protestant churches, that is, the Protestant churches refused to see that new ideologies would topple people’s faith in God. The reader will have realized that the purpose of the analysis of the Prometheus Society has been to assist us in understanding more profoundly the background of Karsten’s work “Paganism and Christianity”. I believe that Karsten’s polemical words about Biblical Christianity resulted mainly from the social and political atmosphere of Finland (the periods of oppression, the general strike, and the emergence of the Prometheus Society). On the other hand, Karsten’s expressions of the “egoism of Christians” and “religion of hate” can be seen as personal introspection when the experiences of childhood home became real. Nevertheless, it is difficult to consider Rafael Karsten’s book a mere personal punishment meted out to his mother in return for the religious

pressure she exerted on her son. To the best of my knowledge, Rafael Karsten was too weak and timid at this point and captivated by a child's perpetual love towards his mother. We must recall that Rafael Karsten never left the church because he knew it would have been too much for his parents. For Karsten Christianity existed, but its foundations needed shaking so that "all adverse attitudes towards the intellect would disappear".

5. RAFAEL KARSTEN AND THE TESTING OF A THEORY 1911 - 1956


The aim of this chapter is to analyse how Karsten's expeditions in South America and Petsamo tested his earlier theoretical premises. But the purpose of the research on Rafael Karsten's fieldwork is also one of a wider understanding: to comprehend why he undertook six different expeditions to South America and how he gathered his information, and thereby to explicate more profoundly how his expeditions moulded his theoretical terms of reference.

5.1. *Terra Incognita* and Amerindian Religions

5.1.1. Selecting the Site

The main controversy among scholars regarding Rafael Karsten's work has, perhaps, been the question of why he chose South-American studies. Probably no complete answer can be given, but it is possible to present a revisionist synthesis of the explanations that have been offered. Let us first look at the following figure which explicates this topic before we go into a further explanation.

Figure 1. *The design of Rafael Karsten's South American studies*



Professor Åke Hultkrantz suggests that Karsten's first expedition to South America was more an incident than an axiomatic event. Hultkrantz points out that Karsten first desired to travel to New Guinea, but changed his plans after realizing that his colleague Gunnar Landtman had reached the place earlier. According to the unwritten ethnological premises of the beginning

of the 20th century, two fieldworkers could not simultaneously gather material in the same area. (1.) Thus, Karsten had to select another field site. Professor Hultkrantz's suggestion is based on Ragnar Numelin's (1965) commemorative article on Gunnar Landtman in which Numelin described how Karsten in the summer of 1955 told him about his unsuccessful Melanesian plans:

"It is obvious that at the time when Landtman planned his expedition to New Guinea, Rafael Karsten was also preparing a trip to Melanesia. But Karsten had to change his plans when Landtman reached the field earlier. Karsten himself mentioned this matter to me in Lojo in the summer of 1955 accentuating that Landtman intensively co-operated with Westermarck and Haddon in order to receive a travel grant for New Guinea. But it was Landtman's right to do that, was it not? Nothing could have hindered Karsten from travelling to New Guinea if he had really wished to do so[...] in any case Melanesian studies attracted him more than South American studies. New Guinea is an extensive area [...] but Karsten stressed that he did not want to disturb Landtman's affairs."(2).

Now, in order to understand Karsten's disappointed flood of words, we have to interpret and observe this historical event exhaustively. Thanks to Edward Westermarck's international scholarly contacts, Karsten was able to study cultural anthropology and modern fieldwork under the guidance of A. C. Haddon in Cambridge (on Haddon, see Chapter 3.2.). Haddon's tuition in anthropology strengthened Karsten's Westermarckian precept that a thesis must be verified empirically. However, it can be said that the British tuition of Haddon put Karsten into a paradoxical situation. I believe that because of his early admiration for Alexander von Humboldt and other German Americanists, Karsten could not feel totally at ease under Haddon's "Torres Straits" mentoring. Baron Friedrich Heinrich Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) was famous for his extensive travels throughout the world but also for his first-hand observations in South America, particularly in the vast hinterland along the upper reaches of the Orinoco. Moreover, Humboldt's friend and travelling companion, M. Aimé Bonpland, identified no less than 6000 new species of plants. (3.) Emory S. Bogardus (1947) has described Humboldt as a "careful observer of the customs, manners, and standards of the various peoples with whom he came in contact" (4). Rafael Karsten referred to Humboldt's studies among the Indians of the Rio Negro in his doctoral thesis and in his extensive work on the civilization of the South American Indians (5). We must remember, however, that when taking Cambridge courses in anthropology, Karsten obviously also knew Alfred Russell Wallace's descriptions of life on the Amazon and Erland Nordenskiöld's ethnographies of the Gran Chaco. We also have to remember that Karsten arrived at Cambridge because of Westermarck's scholarly contacts and because the real and highly regarded core of fieldwork mentoring was, then, considered to be in Great Britain, not in Sweden or Germany. Why, then, did Karsten and Landtman, who studied in Cambridge and Oxford, suddenly begin to plan an expedition to South America? Was Haddon's Pacific preference too exasperating? One can

only guess what turned Karsten's and Landtman's minds so passionately towards South America. Perhaps Karsten's early interest in South America manipulated Gunnar Landtman whose ethnological determination was not as strong. At any event, in the spring of 1908 Karsten applied for a travel scholarship from the University Council together with Landtman. Their purpose was to travel to study "the social circumstances and religious concepts of the wild tribes of Brazil and Paraguay". (6.) Karsten and Landtman planned to travel to Buenos Aires in the beginning of March 1909 and from there along Rio Parana and Rio Paraguay to Asuncion, which was to be the chief location of their expedition. They first planned to study the Guarani Indians who lived in "a very primitive stage" but were, in spite of that, "easy to visit". But Karsten and Landtman also aspired to study some Chaco tribes living to the west of Paraguay. Karsten and Landtman were interested in these tribes because of their ethnological novelty, supposed primitive state, and remoteness from the interests of European superpower politics. (7.) On 23 July 1908, Landtman wrote to Karsten from Oxford that A.C. Haddon had written them separate recommendations in which he considered them "great friends and pupils" (8). Despite the apparent harmony of Haddon's statement, he seemed to be somewhat irritated by Karsten's and Landtman's project. Although Haddon did not want to destroy Karsten's and Landtman's plans for Brazil, because "anthropological research was needed everywhere", he nevertheless recommended them an expedition to the Pacific (9). It seems also that Haddon proposed to Karsten and Landtman the utilization of Rivers's genealogical method. Haddon probably commended Rivers's genealogical method since it was also suitable for the study of magic and religion - "the solution to almost every ethnographic problem" (10). But Landtman and Karsten did not discard their original plan. Looking into the several aspects of Landtman's feelings presented in his letter to Karsten, it seems that Landtman was greatly inspired by South America. Landtman re-sketches the expedition plan by making special notes of the Rio Parana and Rio Paraguay. He also suggested that they should "specialize" in two tribes: the Guarani Indians and the Chaco tribes. (11.) It was also Landtman who asked Haddon to write them new recommendations after they had re-outlined their locus of investigation. Finally, Haddon and Westermarck wrote good recommendations for Karsten and Landtman in order that they would obtain the Rosenberg travel scholarship. Westermarck fully supported Karsten's and Landtman's South American plans. (12.) Yet, it would be erroneous to believe that although Haddon somewhat mysteriously shunned South American studies he was opposed to cultures other than the Pacific. On the contrary, he followed, with keen interest, the studies on "the Maori race" and "Negro philosophy" (13). He also visited the Blackfoot Reservation in Montana and "sweated with the Indians in a sweat-lodge and danced with them in a medicine-pipe ceremony in a painted tepee" (14).

However, Haddon and Westermarck wrote their recommendations in vain: Karsten's and Landtman's application was rejected. The reasons for the rejection were various. First of all, Dr. Zach Castrén criticized Karsten and Landtman for neglecting the formulation of a clear research design, that is, why they were planning the trip and what the scholarly questions were that they aspired to find answers to. Castrén also wondered what happened to the early Finnish

ethnographic fieldwork which everybody now tended to ignore, that is, Castrén asked Karsten and Landtman to rethink how the experiences and research results of the early Finnish expeditions could be of use in their modern attempts. (15.) Professor Jooseppi Mikkola called for proficiency in the local language; he wondered how Karsten and Landtman were to study South American Indians without knowing their language. Interestingly, Mikkola saw that Landtman was undoubtedly a more qualified applicant than Karsten. Professor Carl Gabriel Bonsdorff was also skeptical towards the possibilities of Karsten's and Landtman's expedition. Docent Arvi Grotenfelt seems to have been their only supporter. Although Grotenfelt supported Dr. Gunnar Suolahti's application, he also believed in Karsten's and Landtman's idea because of its obvious great research results. (16.) Finally, the University Council found the scholarly merits of the applicants inadequate and the whole project collapsed. Rethinking this historical event now, it seems that Karsten's and Landtman's application obviously interfered with what was decided in advance: it was Dr. Gunnar Suolahti's turn to receive a travel grant. On the other hand, South America as a continent was geographically almost unknown and thus decidedly unpopular among Finnish scholars. And how could it have been otherwise when the American journalist Charles M. Pepper claimed in 1906 that even many people in the United States knew hardly anything of South America. Pepper believed that the reputation of South America had been violated by "earthquakes and revolutions" and that only Argentina was properly known of all South American countries due to its production of cereals, beef, mutton, and wool. (17.) But the governments of South America were working hard in order to speed up their development, both in population and in production. In 1906, the government of Ecuador signed a contract with an agency in Guayaquil in order to import immigrants to the lower and eastern regions of the republic. Then, it was hoped that the immigrants would be white and "preferably of the German or Dutch races". The only problem turned out to be that the territory was not "particularly healthy for Europeans". (18.) In the first Pan-American Conference in 1890, one delegate from Latin America declared that the "20th century would belong to South America" (19). But, this never resulted in an intellectual revolution of Latin America within the Finnish academic realm (until the 1970s and 1980s).

But let us return to Rafael Karsten's and Gunnar Landtman's application. It is quite obvious that Professor Mikkola's declaration of Landtman as a more qualified researcher than Karsten gave Landtman a primary status in the future granting of the travel stipends. Namely, Landtman received a travel grant from the Herman Rosenberg Fund in 1910, a year earlier than Karsten (20). In his recommendation, Westermarck had taken into account the previous professorial claims of sufficient language skill of a fieldworker and now pointed out that "language was only a medium for the study of native culture and not in itself the object of the study" (21). This utterance later came to be Karsten's precept in his Chaco studies (22). Surely, when Landtman received a travel scholarship, his and Karsten's plans for Brazil and Paraguay had been destroyed one way or another. Having received a grant, Landtman travelled to England to discuss with Haddon. A young scholar with travel plans up in the air was

obviously more than a dream come true to Haddon, who could now easily convince Landtman of the importance of New Guinea studies. In 1926 Haddon said that it was at his suggestion that Landtman undertook this particular expedition (23). Haddon suggested that Landtman should investigate what was “obscure in the ethnology of the Torres Straits [...] and thus form a link between the Islanders and the other inhabitants of New Guinea” (24). In general, this meant getting to know “exhaustively and with painstaking accuracy” the people and their customs (25). Landtman’s expedition to New Guinea began in 1910 and went via Suez, Colombo, Singapore, and Batavia to the Torres Straits. From the Torres Straits Landtman travelled to New Guinea where he lived in the mission station and made trips along the Fly river with some representatives of the Papuan Industries. Later, Landtman made expeditions to the outlying areas by himself. (26.) Landtman’s success with his fieldwork plans made Karsten anxious and dissatisfied with his life (27). If Karsten had dreamt about New Guinea after his South American plans failed, it was now rather hopeless since two fieldworkers operating in the same area was an anthropological predicament. On second thoughts, this idea does not fit with Karsten’s and Landtman’s former plan to do fieldwork together. In fact, the Haddonian ideal of anthropology was based on the co-operation between the field investigators so that the toil of ethnological inquiry was divided in the field; one conducting linguistic analysis, another psychological testing and so on. In other words, Haddon believed that there should always be several (two or three) proficient fieldworkers in the field. (28.) I believe that Karsten never lost his real longing for South American studies but that his fervour to do fieldwork in South America became strengthened after he realized that Landtman had gone “his way”. Interestingly, Edward Westermarck never told Karsten that primary data had to be collected in a certain area, that is, the practice of non-interference in the anthropological affairs of others, a so-called “*laissez-faire*” attitude, was typical of Westermarck who himself, when selecting the field site, planned to travel “heaven knows where” (29). Karsten’s and Westermarck’s early correspondence (1903-1911) consists of conventional discussion between student and mentor and does not mention the anthropological perspectives. It seems that Westermarck was satisfied with Karsten’s South American studies although in 1926 he felt somewhat frustrated that Karsten “by leaning only on South American material” tried to reject his means-of-attraction-theory (30). Westermarck’s opinion made Karsten point out that his “South American horizon” was more valid than Westermarck’s ambiguous concept “wild people” (in Swedish, *vilda folk*) employed in his study on marriage. Karsten also noted that his method of making South American Indians the primary source of evidence in his theories kept him surely within the “legitimate limits”. (31.)

After Gunnar Landtman had left to the field, Karsten found his deepest consolation in Erland Nordenskiöld with whom Karsten began correspondence in 1910, or perhaps somewhat earlier. As mentioned before, Rafael Karsten’s enthusiasm for South America had close ties with the studies of Erland Nordenskiöld. I am not sure if Nordenskiöld ever gained slavish followers but his emphasis on the urgent study of Indian religion provided a springboard for Karsten’s ideas. Nils Erland Herbert Nordenskiöld was two years older than Rafael Karsten.

In his early life he felt pressures of two kinds: firstly, he had a certain feeling of inferiority to his famous arctic explorer father, Baron Nils Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld (1832-1901), who led the first successful navigation of the Northeast Passage, and, secondly, he was driven by the success of his brother Gustaf who gained a reputation as an excellent photographer and surveyor in the Americanist Conference in Stockholm in 1894. (32.) From his father Nils Adolf Nordenskiöld, he inherited a keen interest in nature and collections (Baron Nils Adolf Nordenskiöld was an intendant in the Riksmuseet and took care of the mineralogical collection). But young Erland also inherited from his father the obstinacy and uprightness which once had driven the adventurous Adolf and his ship *Vega* through the Northeast Passage (July 1878 to April 1880). (33.) Christer Lindberg (1996) has, however, pointed out that not only Adolf Nordenskiöld but also his wife Anna inspired their children to probe the secrets of nature (34). Later, Erland Nordenskiöld studied mathematics, physics, and zoology at the University of Uppsala when he became inspired by the studies of Carl von Linné (35). The reasons for Erland Nordenskiöld's expeditions in South America are open to many avenues of interpretation. One reason was his insatiable and inherited hunger for adventure. Furthermore, he was obviously influenced by the nephew of his father, Nils Otto Gustaf Nordenskiöld (1869-1928), who undertook an expedition to Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego from 1895 to 1897 that produced significant new knowledge of glacial geology (36). In general, fieldwork soon became an "etiquette" for Nordenskiöld's activity (37). Here, it is most logical to pay attention to Nordenskiöld's expeditions undertaken before Rafael Karsten's fieldwork investigations since after four expeditions to Argentina, Bolivia and Peru, Nordenskiöld was regarded as the Scandinavian authority on the indigenous people in the area. Erland Nordenskiöld undertook his first expedition to South America in 1899, when he travelled to Ultima Esperanza in Northern Argentina and Southern Bolivia. The target of the expedition was zoological: Nordenskiöld studied molluscs and algae. Nordenskiöld undertook his second expedition in 1901-1902 to the area of the Chaco-Cordillera. The other participants of the expedition were Eric von Rosen, Robert Fries, Gustaf von Hofsten, the young Oscar Landberg and Dalecarlian Eric Boman. The trip was sponsored by Eric von Rosen and Adolf Nordenskiöld. During the trip Nordenskiöld made excavations, being interested in South American prehistory and ethnography. He also took an interest in Indian religion, but after finding the Mataco Indians too "shy" to talk about their religious practices, he relinquished the topic. From 1904 to 1905, Nordenskiöld led a Swedish expedition to the highlands and lowlands of northern Argentina, Bolivia, and southern Peru. The trip proved to be a turning point in Nordenskiöld's career. Although the area which Nordenskiöld investigated was zoologically, botanically, and archaeologically well-known, it was ethnographically quite poorly studied. (38.) According to Christer Lindberg (1996), the trip was significant for Nordenskiöld since for the first time he paid attention to the problems of the relationships of the highland and lowland cultures (39). From 1908 to 1909 Erland Nordenskiöld undertook his fourth expedition to South America, mainly to the lowlands of Bolivia. The trip was called the "Hernmarckian expedition" according to its Swedish financier Arvid Hernmarck. Nordenskiöld's obligation was to gather an ethnographical collection for the Museum of

Stockholm. (40.) In general, Nordenskiöld shared with Karsten one significant characteristic: they were not commissioned by colonial rulers to provide information on the subjects under study. On the other hand, they were almost slavish followers of the governments, being dependent on the financial resources of the museums. Along the way Erland Nordenskiöld's significance to Karsten seemed to be practical and theoretical, that is, general and specific. In a practical sense he gave Karsten the opportunity to use his well-stocked library of various Americanist studies, financed his expeditions in order to receive ethnographical collections for the Gothenburg Museum (although Karsten from time to time felt collecting more like an exasperating obligation than an appealing anthropological enterprise), and advised Karsten how to obtain travel equipment (tents, camera etc.) (41). At the beginning of the 20th century, it was quite impossible to obtain the works of foreign Americanists in Finland due to the strict Russian censorship. In that situation, Nordenskiöld's personal library was a valuable aid to Karsten's plans for scientific expeditions. Nordenskiöld's habit was to propose some supplementary reading for Karsten. Unfortunately, censorship prevented Karsten from finding these works in Finland. Thus, Nordenskiöld had to send the books to Karsten by mail, in spite of the great risk of losing them. (42.) In 1915 when Karsten was planning his second expedition to South America he asked Nordenskiöld to send him Koch-Grünberg's dissertation and Karl von den Steinen's monograph. When the delivery took two extra days, Karsten became anxious since he was sure that Koch-Grünberg's thesis had been seized by Russian censors. Finally, Karsten received his delivery in order and was able to design his expedition according to the personal experiences of other Americanists. (43.) In his posthumous work "The Studies in the Religion of the South-American Indians East of the Andes" (1964), Karsten confessed that he had learnt "more from the monographs of Karl von den Steinen and Koch-Grünberg concerning the customs of the Brazilian Indians than from any other work on South America" (44). In his work "The Civilization of South American Indians", Karsten expressed his gratitude to Dr. Nordenskiöld from whom he had received "a lot of valuable practical advice" with regard to his travels in South America and who had also been "kind enough to put his ethnological library, containing many rare books on South America", at his disposal: "My debt to him for his kind assistance is not easily measured" (45). Rafael Karsten was also in the habit of asking Erland Nordenskiöld advice on "practical tents, cots, and camp chairs" since travel equipment was cheaper in Sweden than in Finland (46). I have discussed Nordenskiöld's position as a financier of Karsten's expeditions already in Chapter One and thus I do not consider it necessary to elaborate this question here. In a specific sense, Nordenskiöld clarified Karsten's task in the field by stressing that Karsten's empirical research should concentrate on "the magic and religious concepts of the vanishing peoples" (47). Nordenskiöld was altogether sure that Karsten would "do valuable work in the field" and that a trained sociologist like Karsten was needed in South American studies, that is, Erland Nordenskiöld was tired of amateurs carrying out "most of the research in South America" (48). In 1910, Nordenskiöld wrote Karsten a good recommendation in order that the latter could obtain a travel scholarship from the Alexander Fund. Karsten formulated the objectives of his first fieldwork trip as follows:

“My own task was to complete Nordenskiöld’s general account of the material culture of the Chaco tribes with as detailed studies of their customs and intellectual culture as possible” (49).

In the travel report given in *Hufvudstadsbladet* (the Finnish-Swedish daily) in 1911, Karsten stressed that he studied the same areas of Argentina and Bolivia in which Nordenskiöld had previously made geographical and archaeological investigations (50). Karsten’s second fieldwork trip among the Jibaros of El Oriente del Ecuador was also supported by Nordenskiöld. Nordenskiöld did not only write Karsten a good recommendation in order that the latter could obtain the Rosenberg Scholarship but Nordenskiöld also granted Karsten financial support in exchange for ethnographical collections. Eva Karsten (1993) has said that the relationship between Karsten and Nordenskiöld continued “via home hospitality, correspondence and meetings at international conferences” in the 1920s (51). At the end of the 1920s, however, a break occurred in Karsten’s and Nordenskiöld’s friendship which made Karsten point out that Nordenskiöld “had no time, and no training, and probably very little interest” in “detailed methodical studies” of the Gran Chaco Indians’ social customs and religious beliefs (52). Karsten claimed that Nordenskiöld never visited the Tobas, although he actually did (53). Rejecting Nordenskiöld’s “history of culture elements”, Karsten came to emphasize Dr. Theodor Preuss’s status as the most proficient Americanist (54). Karsten’s embittered statements derived from the fact that since Nordenskiöld was one of the pioneers of South American studies, whose work had delineated the methodology of ethnography, Karsten suffered from an inferiority complex about his own career advancement in Gran Chaco. Karsten’s dejection was understandable: he was only two years younger than Nordenskiöld but ethnologically twelve years behind him (Nordenskiöld went to South America twelve years before Karsten) (55). Jan-Åke Alvarsson (1993) has pointed out that the fact that Nordenskiöld published his first research results in 1910, even before Karsten had undertaken any expeditions to South America, caused a life-long trauma for Karsten (56). Perhaps Karsten’s Inca studies were also a personal endeavour to show his superiority to Nordenskiöld. In the winter of 1913, Nordenskiöld found the forgotten ruins of an Inca fortress near Lagunillas of the Bolivian Andes. According to Pärssinen & Siiriäinen (1997), he drew an excellent map of the site and made preliminary excavations there (57). To bolster his ego, Karsten wrote to Nordenskiöld in 1916 that he had developed his own “special system of study” which meant that he wanted to be the first researcher ever to study a certain tribe (58). Having said this, Karsten shunned the Indian tribes previously investigated by some other researcher (e.g. Paul Rivet and the Colorados). At first, Karsten refused to study the Jibaro Indians because they were one of the most studied “tribes” in South America, but rapidly changed his opinion when he realized that the Jibaros of the Amazonas area had preserved their cultural and political independence in spite of the Catholic missionaries. But why was Karsten only attracted by an “unknown tribe”? I try to investigate this problem on four general levels. Firstly, Karsten desired to study an “unknown tribe” since to find an “unexplored tribe” was like a scoop for a journalist (level of individual achievement). Secondly, to encounter the

“unknown” undoubtedly meant insecurity and was thus linked to the bravery of an anthropologist (level of anthropological heroism). Thirdly, to be the first one in a particular area indicated the possibility to achieve and present unique documentation of high scientific value (level of scientific achievement). Finally, to encounter the “unexplored” meant new empirical perspectives on evolutionary problems (level of theoretical implications). (59.) To protect and promote his “special system of study”, Karsten “ranked” himself the first and the only researcher who had comprehensively studied the magical and religious concepts of the Jibaros and who had been able to observe their “tsantsa” festival from the beginning to the end. In any case, Karsten maintained that he was the first one to give a detailed account on Indian ceremonies. (60.) If some other researcher now desired to study Karsten’s “own tribe”, the Jibaros, his destiny was to get into an academic mess. This was experienced by the Director of Smithsonian Institution, Matthew Stirling, who “erred” by writing a small work on the Jibaros (*Historical and Ethnological Material on the Jibaro Indians*). Having read Stirling’s work, Karsten was “surprised” because the work was so “superficial”. Karsten asked Stirling to “leave the Jibaros in peace” since there were many other Indian tribes in this part of South America who needed investigation. (61.) During the 1920s and 1930s, Karsten disagreed with Nordenskiöld on various matters. By that time, Karsten had made friends with the German Theodor Koch-Grünberg, Karl von den Steinen, Günther Tessmann, and Karl Theodor Preuss. The German Americanists seemed to hold Karsten’s studies in high esteem since in 1930 he lectured about the Jibaros in the *Anthropologische Gesellschaft* in Berlin, and a little later, at Preuss’s request, in the prestigious *Ethnologische Kolloquium* (62). This was likely to have an effect on the re-bolstering of Karsten’s ego. As Eva Karsten (1993) has pointed out, one may evince a number of reasons for Nordenskiöld’s and Karsten’s polemics (63). The raging temper and eccentricity of both men led to arguments which continued until the death of Nordenskiöld in 1932. More than once, their intellectual controversy originated in the studies of the French ethnologist Paul Rivet. In December 1927 Karsten described Nordenskiöld’s article of the pictography of the Cuna Indians of Panama as “pure verification” to his theories of magical picture writing presented in his work “The Civilization of South American Indians” (64). In general, Karsten reduced the status of Nordenskiöld’s reports on Panama to mere “popular accounts” (65). Eight years later, Karsten claimed that Nordenskiöld’s accounts of the preparation of the arrow-poison in Panama were “far too summarising to be of much ethnological value” (66). In Karsten’s view, Nordenskiöld’s mistake was to assert, through the authority of Rivet, that “the Jibaros do not make their arrow-poison themselves, although the fullest ethnological record of arrow-poisons we have from South America is a record of the arrow-poison of the Jibaros” (67). Karsten felt that Nordenskiöld’s trust in Rivet made his writings on the “history of culture elements in South America” seem “airy and light” (68). Karsten pointed out that “of modern travellers in South America, *no one except myself* has paid any attention to the Indian arrow-poison which could amount to a real study” (the italics are Karsten’s own) (69). Another controversial issue between Karsten and Nordenskiöld stemmed, once more, from Karsten’s negative and denying attitude towards Paul Rivet and his notions of the ancient *huayru*-game. In May 1929

Karsten blamed Rivet for giving detailed descriptions of the Indian *huayru*-game (dice game) without referring to his studies. Karsten stated that Dr. Rivet had “lived for five years in the mountain regions of Ecuador”, but had obtained only “an *huayru*-die made of cow-bone” and that about the game itself Rivet knew “practically nothing”. (70.) According to Karsten, the real *huayru*-die was made of the leg-bone of a llama. Karsten declared Rivet “a man of humbug” and reminded that he himself had been the “first to describe” the ceremonial games of the South American Indians. (71.) Nordenskiöld never shared Karsten’s opinion of Rivet and considered Karsten’s estimation “unjust” and “unnecessary” (72). The reason for Karsten’s severe criticism of Nordenskiöld and Rivet derived from his desire to “protect his own work by discrediting those of others”, as Christer Lindberg’s (1993) telling remark puts it (73). Jan-Åke Alvarsson (1993) has discussed Karsten’s “off-stage” and “on-stage” discourses concerning Nordenskiöld. The “off-stage” attitude, which became explicit in Karsten’s private letters to Nordenskiöld, meant Karsten’s dependency upon and respect for Nordenskiöld. On stage, in public, Karsten saw Nordenskiöld merely as an unqualified traveller or an explorer. (74.) In my opinion, Karsten’s gloomy impressions stemmed from his often cited character: to take everything too personally. This was repeated in the late 1940s when the American publication “Handbook of South American Indians” (1946), edited by Julian H. Steward, Robert Lowie and Alfred Métraux, became to emphasize cultural ecological and cultural materialistic interpretations of South American cultures. The publication was first meant to be a European endeavour, edited by Erland Nordenskiöld, but turned out to be an American project because of the monetary problems and Nordenskiöld’s sudden death. Under the editorship of Steward, the publication neglected many Scandinavian, German and French sources and Karsten took this, once more, very personally. (75.) Karsten strongly criticized Lowie and Métraux for ignoring his fieldwork in the Gran Chaco, Ecuador and Peru and in emotional dissatisfaction gave a piece of his mind to Americanists Nordenskiöld, von Rosen, Rivet, Lehmann-Nitsche and Max Schmidt in order to bolster his own status as a meritorious Americanist. Karsten felt himself an orthodox martyr, left alone in a heretic world. He did not notice that in his *Social Organization* (1949) Robert Lowie did not mention Edward Westermarck at all, although dedicating a large chapter to the analysis of marriage. On the other hand, Lowie referred to Nordenskiöld but not Karsten while discussing “primitive” religion. (76.) Rafael Karsten’s closest friend, Dr. Ragnar Numelin, tried to soften his friend’s “on-stage” discourse by suggesting that Nordenskiöld’s ethnographical works were “significant sociological studies which opened themselves also to laymen” (77). After Nordenskiöld’s death, Numelin, who had a residence in Gothenburg, wondered how nobody in Sweden seemed to know South America: “Can we even call them social anthropologists?”, he wrote to Karsten (78). On the other hand, Numelin admitted that Robert Lowie had treated Karsten unfairly while Lowie’s study on social organization was a “real mosaic which surveyed the whole world, from primitive to modern, and should not be considered very scientific” (79).

Let me try to summarise the most significant themes of this chapter. In his youth, Karsten became interested in Alexander von Humboldt's works which still stimulated his mind when he was an experienced explorer. His keen interest in Humboldt was perpetually ardent. But more than Humboldt's studies, Karsten's South American studies were guided by the ethnological scenarios and studies of the Swedish Baron, Erland Nordenskiöld. Overall, Nordenskiöld gave meaning and purpose to Karsten's early fieldwork in the Gran Chaco. But we must not forget that it was the Tylorian / Haddonian/ Westermarckian empiricism which ultimately drove Karsten out of his chamber. In that situation the geographically distant field site, that is, the absolute opposite to home-study, was the only solution. Interestingly, the scene of the geographically most distant fieldwork site became an anthropological standard for a long time and turned out to be almost a joke in the end. Barbara Gallatin-Anderson has described the situation in the United States at the end of the 1950s as follows:

“Yet, in the late fifties there was no way of becoming a real anthropologist without foreign fieldwork, a hallowed rite of passage. Formal training in fieldwork was rare. You learned fieldwork by doing fieldwork. Fieldwork was presented as a difficult, demanding business. In one year our Peoples of Africa professor learned two unwritten languages, built his own hut, and maintained an uneasy peace between warlike tribes, all the while gathering data on a village whose kinship structure was unparalleled in anthropological reporting. Sites for fieldwork ideally were desolate, snake-infested, malaria-ridden communities a hundred miles from the nearest vestige of civilization. Our professors spoke with awesome familiarity about their villages, their mud-and-dung huts, their people, and their diseases. The legacy of tribal field sites was yet prevailing, although work in peasant villages of Latin America and Europe was achieving acceptance within anthropological departments in USA” (80).

Arjun Appadurai (1986) has also noted that “anthropological theory has always been based on the practice of going somewhere [...] somewhere geographically, morally, and socially distant from the [...] metropolis of the anthropologist” (81). But how did Karsten, then, act in the field? How did he gather his material? This will be deliberated more profoundly in the following section.

5.1.2. An Ethnologist at Work

In the 1880s, fieldwork became the growing front of the science (1). In 1879, the Bureau of American Ethnology as an offshoot of the U.S. Geological Survey was founded in the United States. But already in the mid-19th century museums had been eager to send collectors throughout the world and organise exhibitions of exotic artefacts. At the end of the 19th century, universities with museum staff developed professional training in anthropology (Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, Paris, Berlin and Utrecht) (2). The early significant contribution

of German scholars, mainly the so-called “geographic school”, to anthropology was that they gave a universal term “culture” within which all of human custom could be understood (3). The first modern department of anthropology was established in 1896 at Columbia University when the German-American ethnologist Franz Boas (1858–1942) was appointed a full-time teacher (4). The aim of this section is to briefly discuss Karsten’s fieldwork practice because knowing how he gathered his material assists us in understanding the results he obtained in the field. First of all, Karsten’s way of conducting anthropology has to be studied in its historical context. It would be a sign of historical short-sightedness to investigate Karsten’s fieldwork practice from a modern point of view since, as is well known, anthropology has changed greatly since Karsten’s expeditions. Here, however, we need modern anthropology to give us background to the historical shift and to expand our understanding. Since Haddon’s “Cambridge School”, fieldwork has been the key to orthodox anthropology. The American scholar, Paul Rabinow, known for his studies in Morocco, has described how, as a graduate student of anthropology at the University of Chicago, he learnt to know who was a real anthropologist, in spite of what they “knew about anthropological topics”:

“Professor Mircea Eliade, for example, was a man of great erudition in the field of comparative religion, and was respected for his encyclopedic learning, but it was repeatedly stressed that he was not an anthropologist: his intuition had not been altered by the alchemy of fieldwork” (5).

Apart from Uno Harva and Kai Donner, Rafael Karsten was the first Finnish scholar of religion whose intuition was definitively altered by the “alchemy of fieldwork”, by the various marches in the midst of the virgin forest. James Clifford (1990) has pointed out that today the process of field research is considered “potentially endless” which means that no anthropologist, whether a professor or a graduate student, can learn a language well enough and investigate all domains of indigenous life (6). In the light of Clifford’s perspective, Westermarckians’ aspiration to intimate detail and wholeness, which were central to their comparative method, seems megalomaniac. But we must recall their starting point, that is, the enticing situation when many indigenous cultures were yet “unmapped” and ethnological urgency was caused by fear of the disappearance of these cultures. But what do we mean by Rafael Karsten’s fieldwork practice? What was it? Linked to this, we have to first, however, look into Karsten’s “field”. What did he mean by the “field”? I will here discuss only Karsten’s spatial definition of the field (temporal definition is explicated later). For Rafael Karsten the field had various appearances: “the continent accompanied by difficulties owing to climate conditions and lack of roads”, “source of the studies of native customs”, “tropical wonderland”, “the region of the wild Jibaros” or “the land of *indios mansos* (tame Indians)” (7). The spatial dimension of the field changed depending on the places that Karsten visited. He called his fieldwork trips “great expeditions”, “excursions” or “visits” but avoided the term “travelling” due to its downplaying and unscientific connotations. Furthermore, Karsten shunned the term “adventure” since, although every expedition had its dangers, these

difficulties were exclusive to the ventures of every fieldworker. (8.) The problem of “where does the field begin and end”, launched e.g. by James Clifford (1990), was not the most significant topic of conversation among early anthropologists since it was spatially more effortless to recognise the boundaries of travel when “coming and going” was not as intense as today (9). The boat trip from Finland to Ecuador took between six and seven weeks, which easily guaranteed a fieldworker the possibility to serenely ponder where household chores came to an end and field life loomed. Viewing the letters Rafael Karsten sent to his wife from the voyage to Ecuador in 1928, it becomes obvious that the ship was a miniature world of its own: on the deck was a small swimming pool where Karsten swam every day whereas in the evening he socialised with German, English, Spanish and Swedish travellers. When the ship visited various ports, Karsten had the chance to familiarise himself with the people of the small villages, like Puesto Colombia, where he took two excursions with a 70-year-old trader, Mr. Wageman, to the interior. (10.) Although the voyage with evening gatherings may sound a tempting one, it was anything but enjoyment to Karsten. At the end of the trip, the heat was intense, the temperature rising over 37 degrees. However, Karsten was more irritated by the delay caused by the swell of the sea: “We cannot do anything [...] here you need only good patience and that is what I am without!” (11). George W. Stocking (1992) has suggested that “travelling weeks by ship” to the most distant reaches of the world was relatively harder than travelling by “transcontinental railways”, typical of American ethnologists who were thus able to pay easy and short visits to Indian reservations (12). All in all, taking the voyage as an anthropological tool which assists an ethnologist in the temporal definition of the field, we can suggest that the anthropologists of today have lost a significant privilege forever.

In March 1955, Rafael Karsten wrote in the Finnish newspaper *Hufvudstadsbladet* that “Edward Westermarck taught us the method of ethnological fieldwork and because of his valuable work our ethnology is now far ahead of the Swedish study of primitive people” (13). As stated in Chapter 3.2., Edward Westermarck, Alfred Haddon, and W.H.R. Rivers were the scholars whose opinions greatly contributed to training becoming a standard for anthropological fieldwork. What, then, was the Westermarckian method of ethnological fieldwork that Karsten cherished in his newspaper article. Nothing exceptional, we should say. As stated in Chapter 3.2., despite the fact that Westermarck’s fieldwork methods were British, they also were a combination of independent fieldwork techniques. Westermarck never analysed nor presented his techniques in detail, and because of the complexity of these techniques, arriving at the right conclusion is sometimes pure “guesswork”. Viewing the letters Westermarck sent to his colleague, Yrjö Hirn, it becomes clear that he emphasized the proficient language skills of a fieldworker (“[...] I learn Arabic quite slowly, but learn something new every day [...]”), carrying out research outside the veranda, that is, passing time in the village (“[...] the last two weeks I have travelled by foot [...] I just arrived from a very interesting trip [...] to Sheriff’s village and the other inland regions”), and witnessing events with “my own eyes” (“[...] I had a chance to witness a very interesting drama or rather a pantomime which takes place for one week every year”) (14). A conceptual cross section of

Westermarck's *The Moorish Conception of Holiness* (1916), reveals that Westermarck continuously repeated how he *saw* various matters: "I saw a cairn called Lälla Nfisa", "I saw a rock in the sea", "I saw a ruin with two vaults" (15). Sometimes he said that he had *heard* something or that something was *told* to him (16). He also tells that he was "camping close to the foot of the mountain" but never explicitly mentioned that he had gained his information by being present at a ceremony (17). In his letter to Karsten in December 1903, Westermarck emphasized the importance of the "independently conducted study of details" (18). I am not altogether sure whether Westermarck's fieldwork was done from an "emic" or "etic" perspective. In the light of certain letters, it seems that Westermarck had entered the village and observed "drama" from etic, an outsider's perspective without seeing the event from an insider's point of view (as Karsten did when he night and day participated in an Indian scalp-feast). In his letter, written during the fieldwork trip to Morocco in 1902, Westermarck described the circumstances in the field to Yrjö Hirn as follows:

"It is wonderful to work here. Early in the morning, sometimes before 7 o'clock, I carry my writing materials outside the tent into the large garden, where in the shadow of leafy fig, which almost reaches the tent, I work studiously the whole day. In this way I have now continued for almost three months"(19).

There are also other documents in which Westermarck discusses his decision to start to write a book on morality. In a letter to Yrjö Hirn on 19 December 1898, Westermarck describes how he was working with the most problematic chapter of his work, the moral predicate, but how it seemed that "everything would brighten up under the shining sun of Africa" (20). This is repeated in Westermarck's letter to the Finnish Orientalist, Knut Tallqvist in 1902 in Andjra: "[...] marvellous view to mountains and valleys and my greatest wish is to get my work ready [...]" (21). Turning to his writing materials, Westermarck was distant from the field, which raises the question of his real active time in the field, if, after all, there was a clearly defined field in his case. Surely Westermarck was in the field, in Morocco, but also in various undefined and rather mysterious routes in "the countryside, inland and mountains" (22). In general, Westermarck tended to be keener to explain his making of notes in the British Museum than to clarify his gathering of "detailed" material in the field (here I refer to Westermarck's letter to Yrjö Hirn on 28 October 1897 in which he faithfully explained how he made notes and copied text in the British Museum) (23). At all events, Westermarck was the *primus motor* of Karsten's fieldwork research. Compared to Westermarck, Erland Nordenskiöld's influence on Karsten's fieldwork practice was less obvious. Christer Lindberg (1996) has stated that for Karsten, fieldwork played a different role than for Nordenskiöld. Lindberg has suggested that Nordenskiöld was not able to completely remove his "cultural glasses" and thus had a tendency to observe matters in accordance with his personal interests rather than with his own eyes (he saw the activities of the medicine man as advanced humbug) (24). We must, however, recall that at that time modern theories of constant valuation and revaluation in the fieldwork (the obligation not to let our value predilections

dictate our research results), were not yet available or in fashion (25). Of course, Max Weber had discussed value neutrality in humanistic studies, but his theory was not applied to ethnological studies. However, Nordenskiöld's and Karsten's fieldwork practices were very much alike in two matters. Firstly, both of them were men of resolution and fervour in the field. A fit of anger when things went wrong was characteristic of them, "[...] having realized that my Indian companions had left me, I lost my patience", as Karsten put it in Rio Napo, Eastern Ecuador, in 1917 (26). Secondly, Nordenskiöld and Karsten shared the same "emic" perspective: the aspiration to see the culture in question from an insider's point of view. Karsten called this method *sätta sig in* (to position himself in the intellectual life of the people being studied") whereas Nordenskiöld discussed the practice of *tränga in* (inch your way into the customs and presentations of the people studied) (27). During the years, fieldwork developed both scholars towards a better understanding of indigenous cultures. Lindberg (1996) has pointed out that when Nordenskiöld studied the Cuna Indians of Panama in the 1920s, he was more mature than ever to understand their cosmology (28). This probably means that Nordenskiöld had learned to *redefine* the customs and institutions within the boundaries of a new culture (29). But let me now examine Karsten's fieldwork ideals more profoundly. In his works "Civilization of the South American Indians" (1926) and the posthumous "Studies in the Religion of the South-American Indians East of the Andes" (1964), Karsten asked what the universal rules were according to which we had to estimate the value of the ethnological material presented by a fieldworker. By building partly on the pronouncements of Dr. W. Crooke, Karsten suggested that every anthropologist should ask himself the following questions:

- 1) Does the investigator have the proper scientific training for fieldwork?
- 2) Did he stay for a long time among the tribe he is describing?
- 3) Does he know the language of the natives?
- 4) Did he witness the customs with his own eyes?
- 5) Was he a person able to earn the confidence of the natives?
- 6) Were his investigations entirely free from a particular "school"? (30.)

In full, Karsten's criteria originated in the Haddonian / Westermarckian locus of fieldwork practice. The standard of "intensive study of limited areas", established by Haddon but narrowed by Rivers, is absent from Karsten's list but can be located under his rule of staying among the tribe for a long time. Having assumed the ideals of British empiricism, Karsten adopted a negative attitude towards the "passing travellers and untrained observers" whose unscientific reports represented "ethnographical dilettantism" at its best (31). Karsten mentioned the young American explorer Up de Graff who studied the Jibaros without having any ethnological training, travelling mostly as a rubber gatherer and merchant. As a result, Up de Graff presented many "erroneous statements" about the Jibaros and thus his works were marked by "doubtful reliability". (32.) In general, Karsten believed that the travellers, commercial men, and adventurers were inaccurate from a scholarly point of view since they

desired to make large collections in a few days which also meant a short stay with each tribe and a superficial study of their customs. In this case, the study of the intellectual culture was of secondary importance. As a result, the accounts of travellers were highly conflictual, like R. Schomburgk's, a traveller in Guiana, outcome with the English traveller, Waterton, about the Macusi Indians in Guiana (33). Karsten suggested that the reason why ethnographical "dilettantism" flourished in South America was "the tremendous difficulties owing to climatic conditions, lack of roads, continuous rains, and the antisocial nature of the Indians" (34). Only training made an observer of the Indian customs able to encounter the difficulties.

Westermarck's three virtues, thoroughness, criticality, and patience, developed and practised under the Moroccan sun, were also typical of Karsten's fieldwork. Yet, it is reasonable to see composed courage as Karsten's significant virtue; too daring attitudes killed, as in the tragedies of Crevaux, Ibaretá and Boggiani (35). One part of the necessary training was also a dexterous utilisation of the instruments, especially the camera. When Karsten undertook his first expedition, the camera had become a significant instrument of a trained anthropologist. However, there were no defined sophisticated methods for anthropological photography, since visual anthropology as a special branch of science was yet unknown. More important than the defined angles or determined rules was that a fieldworker had photographic equipment with him. For early visual anthropologists the camera was a means of consolidating the experience gained in the field. One reason for enthusiastic photography was that gradually the camera became available to the amateur. But the development of anthropological method also advanced the employment of photographic equipment. Professional social anthropology interested in recording the details of cultures regarded photography as a natural addition to fieldwork. (36.) A.C. Haddon took a photographic kit (35 mm Newman and Guardia movie outfit) already to the Torres Strait expedition in 1898. In fact, Haddon did not merely take pictures of the natives, but also reproduced films and movies of Islander ceremonies and customs. In a letter to his colleague Sir Walter Baldwin Spencer, Haddon stated that "It (cinematograph) is an indispensable piece of anthropological apparatus" (37). Haddon's opinion clearly also influenced Karsten who took pictures of the Gran Chaco Indians already during his first fieldwork trip in Bolivia (1911-1913). The obstacles to free photography, however, were the high price of photographic equipment and the short supply of cameras in Finland at the beginning of the 20th century. Many times the Finnish ethnologist borrowed a camera through personal connections or bought one from Sweden. (38.) During the years, the old black and white pictures of early anthropologists have aroused many questions. The various discussions about the nature of "historical" photographs have intricately dealt with photographic interpretation and understanding. Firstly, humanists have pondered whether these old documentaries are too subjective perceptions, that is, records in which a fieldworker has from his own viewpoint chosen what he wants to photograph and after that arranged the photographic milieu and objects according to his own liking. Secondly, the scholars have discussed the racial and political ends and dimensions of old ethnological photographs. The most eager faultfinders of old Victorian photographs have stated that the composition of historical photographs evidently supported the antithetical division to "Western" and "Other".

This indicates that the visual style of early anthropologists has been either too racial or a direct manifestation of colonial desires. In the light of these claims it is significant to note that the old combination of photography and anthropology was a product of its time (the time axis has always to be taken into account), characteristic of novice anthropological research. The visual information that the anthropologists introduced to the Western audience was in many cases benevolent wondering at *man exotica*, not an intentional denigration of indigenous people. At least, in the Finnish context, Rafael Karsten's visual ethnology was not an advocate of expansion and maintenance of colonial power. For Karsten visual anthropology was not a promoter of colonialism, producing information on a colony for the motherland, but merely a device for photographing Indians in order to preserve something of their culture for posterity. Therefore, Karsten's photographs have even today merely an anthropological, not a colonial presence. The underlying reason for Karsten's anti-colonial views was that he was a subordinated person studying an inferior people (see Chapters 2.2. and 4.3.). This reflected the voluntary and independent nature of Karsten's ethnological expeditions. On the other hand, Karsten's photographs were on some level proofs of his theory formula, that is, evolutionary anthropological views. Karsten's assumption, behind the reality his camera recorded, was that the indigenous people lived in a lower stage of development than "civilized" people. First and foremost, Karsten's evolutionary views became visible in the way he photographed groups of Indians. The group pictures were an iconic and symbolic photographic paradigm for the supporters of British cultural evolutionism. The famous researcher of the Todas, C.G. Seligman, was in the habit of photographing large groups of Toda hunters and gatherers during his fieldwork in New Guinea in 1901 and 1907-1908. By taking group shots of the "Veddas" or the "Todas" a fieldworker endeavoured to underline the "wild" and "primitive" nature of the natives. (39.) Like his colleagues in the Pacific, Karsten, too, used the strategy of photographing large groups of Indians in the twilight of the rainforest. Very typically for Karsten, he put eleven or twelve Jibaro Indians into the same picture. Karsten was not ordinarily interested in portraits and profile pictures of an Indian male or female, that is, producing material which had especially interested anthropometric study. (40.) Karsten's evolutionary view was manifest in his photographs, also in the manner in which he photographed nature. Paradoxically, at first glance it seems that there was hardly an anthropological intent in Karsten's photographs. A great part of his photographs depicts the rivers flowing by and the forests swarming with life and thus apparently communicated only little with the aims of early British visual anthropology. But why did Karsten photograph nature so extensively? Did he photograph nature just for nature's sake, because he was ardently devoted to nature? Undoubtedly no, since it is reasonable to suggest that in reality Karsten's nature shots had a special stimulus, namely, his evolutionary theory. J.J. Gibson, who has studied the ecological approach to visual perception, has suggested that the ultimate concepts of evolutionary theory are twofold: firstly, the adaptation is relative to a particular milieu and, secondly, the natural selection operates comprehensively, influencing the whole organism and not only its parts. In other words, an organism is tightly connected to its environment and in order to understand the organism we have to observe the way the

organism interacts with its surroundings. (41.) For Karsten's photographs this means that by photographing nature Karsten presumably desired to observe the habitat which gave the whole matrix of existence to the organism, the Indians. Karsten realized that the correct interpretation and understanding of Indian culture also required the comprehension of nature, the environment, which co-operated *with* and *within* the Indians. With this explanation, hundreds of Karsten's photographs of nature can be seen in a different light and hopefully will not in the future be condemned merely as ethnologically trivial or peculiar. Collectively, Rafael Karsten's photographs had a threefold nature: firstly, they represented a new genre in anthropology (the *necessity* of photography), secondly, they acted as visible proof of theory, and thirdly, they exemplified personal mementos, that is, that a researcher had indeed undertaken expeditions in far-away places.

Rafael Karsten's second standard of fieldwork concerned the time spent in the field. Although the standard of a prolonged stay in the field originated in the Haddonian manual, the temporal aspect became distinctively to be Karsten's solitary "survival of the ethnologically fittest". For Karsten, a few days' or weeks' visit among the people studied was worthless and produced unreliable information. Karsten agreed with the Norwegian ethnologist A. Brock-Utne that if a modern ethnographer does not "satisfactorily tell how long his visit lasted, he is either wanting in scientific training or he has something to conceal" (42). But what was the "long time" Karsten suggested for a reliable fieldworker? In his posthumous study of the South American Indians, Karsten stated that a fieldworker had to stay in the field for years, at least two or more. Karsten criticized Erland Nordenskiöld for visiting only shortly many "tribes", which led to inadequate descriptions. (43.) Karsten's standards seemed to be somewhat irresolute, however, it is ironic that the Scottish missionary Barbrooke Grubb, who lived among the Lengua in Paraguay for 20 years, never won Karsten's confidence but, on the contrary, was reduced to an unscientific worker with studies of "popular appeal" (44). Moreover, Koch-Grünberg, who "through the force of circumstances" had to stay longer in the same place than he had originally planned, was not able to produce more than "scanty data on the social and religious life of the natives" (45). But how long did Karsten himself stay among the "tribes" he studied? Jan-Åke Alvarsson (1993) has stated that Karsten "overrated" the field periods of his first expedition by stating that he spent eight months among the Chorote when he "could not possibly have spent more than some three months among them" (46). Alvarsson has also wondered why Karsten claimed that he "studied the sociology and religion of the Indian tribes of the Rio Pilcomayo for nearly two years when he actually spent only five months in the field?" (47). During his expeditions among the Jibaro Indians, Karsten used the village of Macas as the main base from which he made "numerous expeditions to the tribes living in the south, in the east, and in the north" (48). To intensify the temporal aspect spent in the field, Karsten emphasized, however, that he stayed in Macas only every now and then:

"I have lived in Macas only during the short intervals between my excursions to the savage inhabitants of the tract [...] most of my studies, however, have been carried out during lengthy

journeys in the country of the Indians, when I usually stayed in each house for some days" (49).

Nevertheless, Karsten's descriptions of "lengthy journey" and "some days" make one guess how long he, *in toto*, spent in one village. Unfortunately, the Lévi-Straussian style of comprehensive outlining the houses was not typical of Karsten, who rather described the shape of the houses, and thus we are not able to estimate how many days he actually lived in one village, that is, by knowing how many houses approximately were in one Jibaro village we could multiply them by days (probably two or three) Karsten spent in each house and get the total time he spent in one village. In any case, Karsten stated that he "roamed the endless virgin forests between the Upano and the Morona for about two years" which makes us believe that if the "miserable condition of the ways and the almost continuous rains" took fifty percent of Karsten's time, another half of his expedition was surely spent in the Indian villages (50). Alvarsson (1993) has suggested that Karsten's obvious temporal exaggeration had to be "a reflection of the inferiority complex towards Nordenskiöld, Malinowski, and Westermarck" (51). The most important, however, is to see that in Karsten's era, the field was temporally defined within the *total time* spent in the field, that is, it was a generally approved part of an anthropological trip that a fieldworker described his expedition, e.g. "in Ecuador from 1916 to 1919", without analysing how many hours, days, weeks, months or years he spent in each place. This was more than obvious in Rafael Karsten's case. In his monographs Karsten was coming and going without more precisely describing how long he actually had lived among the people he studied, that is, he stated that he travelled seven days by foot and three days by canoe, from six o'clock in the morning to four or five o'clock in the evening, but never mentioned explicitly how long he stayed. All in all, Karsten was not alone with his individual "time exposure". After Gunnar Landtman had undertaken his expedition to New Guinea, Alfred Haddon praised him for being able in two years to get to know their customs "pretty thoroughly" and to gather a "surprising amount of information about their secret ceremonies" (52). Taking into account the vastness of Landtman's field area and how "unsocially", as Karsten put it, many indigenous people reacted towards a stranger who without a command of their language tried to record and photograph their sacred rites, it is highly suspicious that Landtman managed to do all this in two years. On the other hand, Clifford Geertz wrote his treasured work "*The Religion of Java*" (1960) after two year's stay in the field (53).

A command of the field language was an essential virtue, especially among Finnish ethnologists, although Gunnar Landtman, studying the Kiwai-Papuans, used pidgin Kiwai and felt it unnecessary to thoroughly go into the syntax (54). Landtman's attitude probably originated in Rivers's opinion (*The Todas*) that it was more acceptable to use a good interpreter or pidgin English rather than to try to use the field language unsatisfactorily (55). However, Rivers altered his opinion in the 1910s when he in *Notes and queries on anthropology* stressed with Haddon and Myers that language was needed for the "complete

understanding of the life and thought of a people” (56). It is, however, important to realize that in Rafael Karsten’s case, the command of the field language originated in Westermarck’s ideas and recommendations. As Juhani Ihanus (1990) has pointed out, the early British anthropologists did not, in practice, become oriented in “primitive” languages (57). Internationally, the practice was variable indeed: while Franz Boas never felt it significant to learn the field language properly, being reluctant to listen to the discussions of the Indians and using the pre-formulated questionnaires, Knud Rasmussen (1879-1933) emphasized the command of the Eskimo languages so that a researcher could properly internalise their thinking pattern (58). Only gradually was the precept of the command of the field language to become an integrated part of field research (59). The command of the language of the “savage people” became, thus, to be one of Karsten’s ethnological strategies. In his field research in the Gran Chaco, Karsten adopted the Westermarckian conception that language was a *medium* for the study, not the object of the study as such. Although Karsten desired to learn the language of the locals, he finally aimed at obtaining “a general idea of the character of the Choroti and Toba language” (60). This meant that Karsten aspired to get in contact with the “words most commonly used in daily life by the Indians” (61). In the Gran Chaco Karsten experienced particular difficulties when he realized that neither the Choroti nor the Tobas spoke Spanish, while interpreters were “impossible to obtain” (62). Thus, he had to “pick up both languages gradually” until at the end of his stay he met Indian interpreters and some Indians who were able to speak Spanish. As a result, Karsten claimed that he had learnt to speak the Toba language “tolerably well”. (63.) Jan-Åke Alvarsson (1993), who has conducted fieldwork among the Weenhayey (the Mataco-Noctenes) over six years has stated that the “endemic complexity of the Chaco Amerindian languages and their distance from Indo-European languages, added to the briefness of Karsten’s fieldwork reveals to us that Karsten must have reached a very limited working knowledge of the two” and that “tolerably well” is a most relative expression (64). Alvarsson is obviously correct but, on the other hand, it is peculiar that Karsten was able to produce apparently detailed vocabularies of the Choroti and Toba words and that he was able to present them phonetically, although he just aimed at a general description of the language of the locals. To me, his detailed analysis of the Choroti “sounds” seems highly linguistic, or how else should we react to his notions of Mr. Hunt who has “regularly mistaken the h-sound for the f-sound”? (65). During his expeditions in El Oriente, Karsten first studied the Jibaro language with an interpreter and later the Jibaro Indians as teachers (66). Then, he “compiled a vocabulary of more than a thousand words, which was carefully verified many times” (67). In conversations with the Jibaro Indians, Karsten aspired to pick up the most significant grammatical and syntactic rules by finally separating the sounds, the accent, and the parts of speech from each other (68). Above all, Karsten saw that “comprehending the strange words and writing them down correctly” demanded a phonetic ear (69). In Karsten’s opinion, many missionaries who had lived for years among the same people had lacked this special ability (70). Karsten also reproached Paul Rivet for publishing a grammar and a vocabulary of the Jibaros without having any knowledge of their language (71). While studying the civilization of the ancient Inca empire, Karsten

acquainted himself with the writings of the early Spanish chroniclers. The writings, which many times included reports only on the intellectual culture of *Tahuantinsuyu*, were often difficult to read and loaded with words and phrases of the Inca language (here I refer especially to Felipe Guaman Poma Ayalas's chronicle of 1613) (72). Nevertheless, Karsten's command of the Spanish language was excellent, he even taught Spanish in the Swedish School of Economics in Finland. Eva Karsten has told how she was ordered by her father to learn Spanish during the long voyage to Ecuador in 1945 (73). But Karsten gained his Inca material also by making relations with the present-day Quichua and Aimara Indians in Bolivia and Peru, who were direct descendants of the Inca civilization. In March 1937, Karsten stated that the Quichua language did not present any difficulties for him. Thanks to the Spanish monks of the 16th and 17th centuries, there were some Quichua grammars available. (74.)

The fourth point of Karsten's standards for an ethnologist was to observe religious customs with one's "own eyes". The accounts of travellers and missionaries represented lay forms of writing distant from an individual quality of thinking of the "primitive" people. As mentioned in Chapter 3.2., the "I saw, experienced and learned" attitude of early anthropologists originated in Aristotle, who was a prime mover of empiricism with his observations of people and animals. The standard of seeing the customs with one's own eyes led to the emphasis of "I" which, in a certain sense, made the informants look like the "Other". It was typical of Westermarck's, Landtman's and Karsten's works that they discussed what *they did* in the field. In November 1913 Gunnar Landtman gave an account of his fieldwork in the Prometheus Society and his presentation was "restricted to the events which *he himself* had seen and observed" in the field (75). The Westermarckian endeavour to present "primitives" as *they saw them* was a clear opposite to Malinowski's late aspiration to understand the "natives" as *they might see themselves*. Furthermore, Karsten aspired to be intellectually naked in front of the "original", forgetting his root metaphors, while Malinowski never supported the total concealing of the personal feelings of a fieldworker. But, although the dichotomy "my culture" and "your culture", i.e. "other men" and "primitive", was obviously present in Karsten's studies, mainly owing to his cultural evolutionary point of view, he never adopted an arrogant attitude towards his informants (76). On the contrary, we could accuse Karsten of cherishing excessively kindly attitudes towards the Indians, at the expense of objectivity. However, Karsten was not alone, Erland Nordenskiöld also felt deep empathy towards the Indians (77). On the other hand, Karsten considered the Christian Indians "the worst men you could co-operate with" and "the worst representatives of their race" (78). In this sense, then, Karsten's aspiration to forget his background in the field was unsuccessful. But Karsten also stressed that all kind of glorification of the Indian culture, that is, "building of wild fantasies", was not acceptable. In his work "The Origins of Religion" (1935) Karsten came to stress that "even the rudest savage tribe of today has a long history behind it" and thus the word "primitive" should be used with "great caution" (79). Karsten adopted a negative attitude towards the American explorer Fawcett, who believed that the Indians living in the rain forests of South America were culturally as high as the ancient Incas (80). Karsten saw Fawcett

as an exaggerator whose excessively high estimations became most visible in his claim that he had killed a boa snake 24 metres long when the boa could not, according to Karsten, grow longer than 10 metres (81). But let us return to Karsten's manner of emphasizing the importance of the "witnessing of feasts". Above all, this ethnological standard derived from Karsten's chance to observe the scalp-feast of the Jibaros in March 1916. As mentioned before, Karsten was probably the "first white man" to observe the tsantsa-feast, a mystery ceremony, as a whole. But how was Karsten able to observe a ceremony so significant that the preparations were begun some two years earlier? First of all, Karsten admitted that much happened by chance. While Karsten was staying in a village of Macas, he was told by an Indian that a great victory-feast was to be arranged at Chiguaza by an Indian named Shakaëma. Secondly, much depended on the fact that Karsten found a good Indian companion, an intermediary, who introduced him to the host of the feast. With the assistance of the Jibaro Indian Don Dionysio, Karsten finally arrived at the house where the feast was to be held. Don Dionysio introduced Karsten to Shakaëma and explained who Karsten was and what the object of his visit was. According to Karsten, the Indians were as hesitant to receive uninvited guests at their celebrations as were "civilized" people. (82.) Thirdly, access to the mystery ceremony was not only guaranteed by the eloquent escort but also by the presents Karsten gave to the host. At that time, the presents were an ethnological necessity and they were usually given to the "gate-keeper" of a culture and the other members of his/her family. In Karsten's case, the gate-keeper was a fifty-five or sixty-year-old professional warrior and sorcerer (83). The host Shakaëma was "quite pleased" with Karsten's presents: Shakaëma himself got a machete and each of his wives a collar of beads, needles, thread, and small round mirrors" (84). Karsten called this incident of giving presents an event when "the ice was broken and the friendship was established" (85). Evidently, an important fact was also that the host had seen "a party of strangers" arriving in his dream (86). All factors mentioned above also illuminate Karsten's fifth standard of "earning the confidence of the natives", which was necessary for making successful inquiries. In general, Karsten emphasized "possessing the tact" in the field (87). It is somewhat surprising that Karsten never had to make any concessions in order to be permitted to stay. In fact, Karsten's concessions were only twofold: the presents given to a gate-keeper and the use of an intermediary whose presence guaranteed that Karsten could enter the community. Karsten's concessions were dissimilar to the almost total transformation of the American ethnologist Frank Hamilton Cushing among the Zuni. In order to be allowed to stay, Cushing had to change his helmet into a black silken scarf, his shoes into moccasins and his old name into a new one. Furthermore, he was forced to eat Zuni food and sleep on the floor and it was even required that he should take a woman and pierce his ears. (88.) Yet, although Karsten's first encounter with the informants was certainly memorable, it was never particularly shocking. By this I refer to the experiences of Napoleon Chagnon whose pre-visions of his informants, the Yanomamo Indians of Venezuela, instantaneously faded in the field. Chagnon had imagined his informants in terms of Western cognizance when his first encounter with the "naked and filthy" Indians turned to be horrifying (the nauseating syndrome) (89). As stated in Chapter Three, Karsten was not an

adherent of the Rousseauian notion of “noble savage” and thus his pre-visions of the Indians were never overly idyllic, although surely more optimistic than Malinowski’s who was convinced that the descriptions of the natives were only in part identical with reality (90). After all, the early anthropological standard of “earning confidence” has survived up to this day. Georges & Jones (1980), who have studied the human element in fieldwork, have suggested that the fieldworker has to gain the confidence and cooperation of the people studied and maintain mutually satisfactory relationships (91). But let us return to the victory feast Karsten witnessed. The main feast, *Einsupani*, lasted for six days and nights (in another source Karsten said that it lasted for ten days) (92). Witnessing this ceremony was a “feat of strength and endurance” to Karsten. In his letter to the Finnish-Swedish newspaper *Hufvudstadsbladet* (December 1917), Karsten described his “eye-witnessing” as follows:

“Even in the wildest dreams of my youth I have not imagined that I once could participate in the Indian scalp dance [...] I stayed awake the first two nights since there was so much to observe [...] but the following nights I decided to sleep so I put cotton wool into my ears [...]” (93).

Having read Karsten’s description, one muses whether he should have stayed awake all the nights or at least more than two? Particularly when the feast was ethnologically almost undiscovered and unrecorded. Did Karsten now receive sufficiently detailed and reliable information? Well, Karsten was at least honest in trying not to mask his tiredness. In his study on the Jibaros (1935) Karsten mentioned that he “noted down” the first two nights since there were so many stimulating things to observe. But on the next page of his book he increased his “noting down” to two weeks, during which he more than ever filled the pages of his notebook. (94.) Unfortunately, we are not able to follow Karsten’s field notes since they have disappeared. Some of his notes, mainly on the Colorados, he lost in the shipwreck outside Bahia de Caraquez off the coast of Ecuador. Interestingly, Gunnar Landtman also lost his notes in a shipwreck but was able to hire a diver that managed to “salvage the trunk that contained them” (95). Since Karsten’s fieldnotes keep silent forever, it remains obscure what the fieldnotes as an individual corpus of information represented to Karsten. Travelling with a typewriter was not typical of Karsten. In fact, he never used the typewriter in the field. Thus, working with a typewriter, a Cliffordian physical change of state which for Malinowski happened already in the field hut, became actual for Karsten only at home. Then, Karsten’s monographs were created with a two-finger-system. To the anthropology of today, which in a very professional manner discusses “the *topos* of field notes”, “a corpus called *fieldnotes*”, “fieldnotes and other forms of ethnographic writing”, “the long-term writing”, “rewriting” or “metanotes”, it probably does not mean much if we say that “writing it down”, that is, making notes, was already a very essential part of the early anthropology. A part of Karsten’s method of eye-witnessing was also his tendency to claim that he *participated* in the victory feast:

“Having been allowed to be present at the feast, I had placed my fieldbed at one of the big pillars in the middle of the house. Since, as I found later on, the chief dance during the feast was performed every night round the central pillars of the house, I had to spend my nights in the middle of the dancing Indians and consequently could hardly think of sleeping” (96).

In my opinion, the extract points out that Karsten’s “participant observation” happened merely by chance and was not the most outstanding example of participant observation. Matthew Stirling criticized Karsten for making inaccurate observations among the Jibaros. Stirling claimed that he studied Karsten’s accounts when he himself was working among the Jibaros, and the Indians disagreed with all of Karsten’s ideas, arguing that they had never “heard of such a thing” (97). On the other hand, the researcher of Shuar (Jibaro) shamanism, Marie Perruchon (1993), has described Rafael Karsten as an accurate and skilful observer (98). All in all, although field research under Alfred Haddon’s (“the Leader and Dean of British Field Anthropology”) and Charles Seligman’s (part-time Professor of Ethnology at the London School of Economics since 1912) tuition developed into “what the blood of martyrs is to the Church”, fieldwork by participant observation was still in its infancy (99). It could be said that participant observation matured only with the studies of Ruth Benedict, who came to emphasize “actual participation in the life of community”, even though Benedict herself never learnt the language of the locals and engaged interpreters (100). We must remember that although Malinowski participated in village life by discussing and observing, he many times, paradoxically, stayed on the beach when the informants undertook a Kula expedition (101). Thus, although Malinowski aimed at systematic perception, his tools were in reality pragmatic and informal. At this point, it would also be appropriate to examine the informants whose life Karsten “eye-witnessed”. Who were they, in addition to being Indians? It seems that Karsten’s key informants varied according to the situation (only a few of them he mentioned by name, e.g. Shakaëma and Angoasha) (102). However, Karsten praised the older members of society for mastering the customs and rites. But there were customs which “only old men know about, and others which only old women can give information on” (103). An interesting aspect of Karsten’s notion is his female emphasis which considers women serious informants. It seems that Karsten was ahead of his time in an ethnological sense since female informants were not invariably considered important. Karsten described the prevailing ethnological practice as follows:

“When I started my first expedition to South America in 1911 one of the leading ethnologists of England gave me the advice never to have dealings with the women among the tribes I visit. “They know nothing”, he added [...] such advice may perhaps be justified in regard to, for instance, such natives as the Australians or Melanesians, although even this seems to me doubtful[...] I have in fact obtained some of my best information from women, who turned out to be equally as good informants on Indian customs as men, sometimes even better” (104).

Rafael Karsten's critical statement of the English ethnologist who ignored female informants probably refers to Alfred Haddon or W.H.H. Rivers. We must, however, remember that Karsten's success with female Jibaro informants was also highly dependent on the fact that women played the main part at important Jibaro ceremonies. This does not hold true in every culture. Here, I do not wish to take further an analysis of social or political organization, that is, clans and lineages or egalitarian and rank societies, but it seems that the Melanesian culture was more male centered than the Jibaro culture, while the Melanesian culture was based on the "man of importance", "centre man" or "generous rich man" whose power grew via various feasts held in the man's house (105).

The last hallmark of Karsten's fieldwork was his way of claiming that every anthropologist should be "entirely free from the ideology of a tendency or a particular school" (106). To make Karsten's remark understandable, we have to pay attention to two points: firstly, to the "Anthropos" school, that is, the Catholic cultural-historical school, led by Fathers Wilhelm Schmidt, Martin Gusinde, and Wilhelm Koppers, and, secondly, to Karsten's individual period of disillusionment. After the First World War, Father Schmidt's notions of the Fuegian culture were verified by the field studies of Gusinde (1919-1923) and Koppers (1922). In their studies, Fathers Gusinde and Koppers confirmed Father Schmidt's theory of *Urmensch*, *Urkultur*, and *Urmonotheismus* (107). The theory of *Urvolk* who lived in Central Africa (Pygmies), Ceylon (Weddahs), and Tierra del Fuego (the Fuegians) and who believed in one Supreme Being, gained reputation among scholars of religion and posed a grave threat to Karsten's notion of animism, and to Darwin's doctrine of evolution in general (see *Urmonotheismus* and animism, Chapter 4.1.). In order to diminish the scholarly charm and power of the Anthropos school, Karsten created a standard of anthropological reliability which was fulfilled only if an anthropologist was free from the ideas of the ethnological school to which he belonged (108). Karsten accused Fathers Schmidt, Gusinde, and Koppers of being merely the representatives of Catholic propaganda, with the Pope as the patron of their school, that is, belonging to a certain school produced only quasi-scientific results. Karsten believed that the only reliable and great authority of the Fuegians was the missionary T. Bridges, not the Anthropos school (109). Karsten's opinion of T. Bridges was a result of careful consideration: although Bridges had stayed forty years among the Fuegians, he had mainly been interested in philology and had left the rest of their culture, e.g. religion, almost unstudied. Thus, Bridges's studies posed no threat to Karsten's opinion of "primitive" religion. (110.) Although Karsten disliked "the Catholic study of religion" of the Anthropos school, he respected many older works of early missionaries (Gumilla, Lozano, Dobrizhoffer, Charlevoix, Sanchez Labrador). Karsten acknowledged that Catholic missionaries had done an "immense service to science by their minute descriptions of primitive Indian customs which they witnessed with their own eyes" and by their "thorough knowledge of native psychology" (111). But there is still another way to look at Karsten's attitude towards Catholic missionaries. In 1913, he criticized Catholic missionaries for keeping the Indians under strict guardianship, taking very young Indian wives, and selling spirits to the Indians. Karsten

described the Ava Indians (Chiriguano) of the Bolivian Chaco as “parrots” who were made to repeat the sacred tones of Christianity. The only real difference between a parrot and the Indian was that the parrot did not become a worse creature although repeating the words “Santa Maria” and “Madre Dios” (112). In 1935, Karsten’s dislike of Catholic missionaries had abated and thus he suggested that Protestant missionaries lacked the “experience and psychological eye of their Catholic colleagues” (113). As one can easily notice, Karsten had very diverse opinions of the missionaries and their activity. However, Karsten always believed that the Indians never voluntarily embraced any form of Christianity (114). In general, Karsten’s aversion to the Catholic or Protestant study of religions derived from Alfred Haddon, whose “poetic instinct” urged the fieldworker to open herself to the religious customs of “primitive” people in a humanistic manner, free from religious bonds (115). Haddon’s standard of the autonomous nature of an anthropologist later irritated Evans-Pritchard, who believed that the early anthropological study of religion had merely been a means of invalidating Christianity and its thousand-year-old teachings. Evidently, Evans-Pritchard made his claim since he was both a pious Catholic and a skilful anthropologist. (116.) It seems that Karsten never fully realized that the “stigmatizing” discourse of Catholic missionaries, which saw Christians as high and pagans low, and thus easy to abuse, was actually invariably supported and confirmed by the scholarly world with its evolutionary approach to the “primitive”, a “positivist form of a *comparison* between past and present”, as Nicholas Thomas has suggested (117). Finally, although Karsten’s standard of “freedom” was meant to invalidate the theories of the Anthropos school, it also stemmed from his own personal disappointment with the inability of Westermarckian ethnosociology to renew itself in the face of scholarly vicissitudes. As is known, in the 1920s Karsten felt Westermarck’s tutorship almost hard to bear. After two field expeditions, Karsten made a clear distinction between his and Westermarck’s theories claiming that his works on the civilization of the South American Indians did not bear much resemblance to Westermarck’s theories (118). In 1925, Karsten expressed his gratitude to Westermarck for giving him significant scholarly impulses, but, at the same breath stressed that as a scholar he (Karsten) desired to “go his own way” (119). As a result, Karsten warned the next generation of scholars not to belong to “a school” or “a tendency”. Here, “a tendency” seems to be synonymous with “a school” since Karsten did not warn young scholars not to adopt a particular theory, being himself a staunch animist all his life. (120). Yet, Karsten, in his study *Naturfolkens samhällsliv* (“The Social Life of Primitive People”) (1928), urged all scholars to “abandon all theories” (121). I, however, believe that by ethnological liberty Karsten meant mainly the avoiding of a personal commitment - that it was perilous to be too strongly the adherent of an individual since the idol could in one second become a falling star. As we now understand the most significant elements of Rafael Karsten’s fieldwork, it is time to observe how his fieldwork tested his early premises.

5.1.3. Testing a Theory

This section attempts to examine the problem relating to Rafael Karsten's early hypotheses and his later theories tested by fieldwork in South America. Usually, fieldwork means critical reflection and revises the former notions of a fieldworker since fieldwork experience "educates and deepens" (1). Formerly, Professor Åke Hultkrantz has concluded (1993) that there was no "development in Karsten's theoretical understanding of comparative religion from his first publications" and that the "modifications caused by his enormous fieldwork were negligible" (2). Understanding Professor Hultkrantz's suggestion calls for a closer examination of Rafael Karsten's theoretical constructs in comparative religion moulded by his fieldwork (for more information on Rafael Karsten's fieldwork routes, see Chapter 2.2.). First of all, Rafael Karsten's theoretical constructs tested by fieldwork can be presented as follows:

Figure 2. *Testing a theory*

Theories verified	Conflicting theories	New / further information
The "lowest" religion	The existence of high God, i.e. a Supreme Being	The importance of myths
Animism	The existence of benevolent spirits	Shamanistic practice
Worship as a product of fear of evil spirits		The religious significance of Indian ornamental art
Pessimism and cheerlessness		Intoxicating drinks and their significance in religion
Prayer and offering		
Ideas of disease and death - no concept of natural death		

It is noteworthy that this picture deals only with Rafael Karsten's theoretical constructs after his studies on South American religions. Due to the individual nature of his Saami studies, I will discuss his fieldwork among the Saami in the next chapter. The purpose of the picture is integrated; in my early study on Rafael Karsten (Master's thesis, 1996) I analysed Karsten's studies on the Chaco tribes, the Jibaros, and the Incas separately but here I aim at a

comprehensive picture of his theory - how his fieldwork in its entirety altered his early premises. The purpose of my investigation is to analyse Rafael Karsten's achievements as a field student of religion not as an Americanist as such. Thus, I do not here pay any particular attention to the indigenous people of South America and their cultures. Professor Åke Hultkrantz (1993) has previously pointed out that "nobody had studied South American religions *in situ* before the Second World War as much as Rafael Karsten" (3). This is certainly true. Although Walter E. Roth and Sir Everard F. Im Thurn carried out investigations in the folk-lore and animistic beliefs of the natives in British Guiana, and Theodor Preuss studied the pre-animistic views of the Uitoto of the Rio Putumayo, it was only Rafael Karsten who, in the 1920s and 1930s, became the great authority on South American religions (4). Although the Chaco culture, the Indian cultures of the Amazon territory, and the Inca culture had a character of their own and differed markedly from each other, Karsten was able to specify some common features among their material and spiritual culture, especially with the aid of the comparative sociological method. For Karsten, the comparative method referred to a small scale study of "savage" people in a certain part of the world, representing a certain stage of culture (5). Karsten emphasized that the comparative method did not deal with "thousands of facts collected from the most heterogeneous sources", but was limited to one geographical area, South America, and only rarely extended to Central or North America (6). In consequence, Karsten's comparative method became a more regular system than his early large scale approach, employed in his dissertation, which rather freely compared the "savage" peoples of different parts of the world to each other. Furthermore, Karsten emphasized that he desired to "explain the customs and beliefs" with which he was dealing without pondering the "wanderings of these culture-phenomena"; Karsten refused to accept the culture-relation theories of the so-called cultural-historical school of Graebner, Father Schmidt, and W.H.R. Rivers (Rivers' "conversion" from evolutionism to the "ethnological analysis of culture") (7). On this point, Karsten referred to Westermarck's statement that the culture-relation theory supplemented the theory of the "origins" but could not replace it (8):

"Even when the historical connection between the customs of different peoples has been well established, the real origin of the customs has not been explained thereby" (9).

Nevertheless, apart from Westermarck's statement, Karsten declared that:

"[...] we have no reason to lay too much stress on the method we follow in studying the culture of the lower peoples. Any method of investigation, after all, is good which conduces to our knowledge and helps us to understand the primitive customs and beliefs with which we are dealing" (10).

It must be said that Karsten's statement had a meaning only on a very abstract level. In fact, Karsten's theory proceeded with the passages through comparison and religious evolutionism. One characteristic of Karsten's aspiration to lay an evolutionary framework to his theories on

South American religions was his tendency to believe in the existence of the “low or lowest” religion, as can be seen in his dissertation. In fact, Karsten’s search for the “lowest” religion stemmed from his evolutionary goal to make a division between the Indian cultures studied. In this context, it becomes necessary to point out that the “racial” tendencies of evolutionary viewpoint were not synonymous to racist ideas. Thus, Karsten’s search for the “primitive”, the “lowest” or the “rudest” included only a developmental axis whereupon Karsten drew no analogy between “primitive”, “simple” or “loutish”. The following figure illustrates Rafael Karsten’s evolutionary division between the Indian cultures studied:

Figure 3. *The highest and the lowest cultures in Rafael Karsten’s theory*

“High”



The Incas = The mountain civilizations formed a sharp contrast with the primitive life in the rain forests east of the Andean cordilleras. The favourable geographical conditions created a grand scale agriculture; in consequence “higher” cultures (the Quichuas and the Aimas) developed. The Quichuas stood nearest to the white race and were the founders of the great Inca empire, a “state of real culture”. However, the Inca culture and religion had a “primitive” basis. There were probably a few peoples to whom religion had been of such essential importance as to the Incas. The theocratic idea - the Children of the Sun.

The Jibaros = The great Jibaro nation inhabited the large virgin forests in the eastern part of the Andes (mainly the Ecuadorian Andes). Their culture was one of the most important and interesting native cultures in the whole of South America. They were typical of a great and independent Indian tribe unaffected by Christian ideas. Interestingly, the Incas failed to subdue the Jibaros when Huayna Capac, the son of Tupac Yupanqui, tried to vanquish them.

The Pilcomayo tribes = The Chorote, the Mataco, the Ashluslay, and the Toba living on the Argentinean and Bolivian side of the Rio Pilcomayo represented the “lowest” tribes. Taken as a whole the Chaco culture was much poorer than the cultures in the tropical forests. Their mythology was very poor and their rites and ceremonies comparatively few. Among the Pilcomayo tribes the Tobas were the most advanced. (11.)



“Low”

As the figure points out, the Incas represented to Karsten a stage of real advancement although the religion of this totalitarian state of the past had a clear primeval emphasis. Whatever one thinks of Karsten’s approving Inca notions, one cannot help wondering about his explicit division of development stages between the Jibaros and the Chaco tribes. First of all, Karsten occasionally compared the Jibaros with the Chaco Indians, although the comparative method

was not appropriate for contrasting different stages of mental and cultural evolution (this is at least what Karsten himself suggested). Even though Karsten now and then described the Jibaros as “wild” and “hostile”, he frequently made the Chaco Indians look physically and mentally inferior to the “strongly built and muscular” Jibaro Indians (12). Jan-Åke Alvarsson (1993) has suggested that “it is no secret that Karsten’s favourite Indians were the Shuar (Jibaros) of Ecuador and not the Chaco Indians” (13). It seems that there is no other logical explanation for Karsten’s vertical developmental axis among South American Indians than his stern desire to prove the existence of “lowest” religion. Karsten’s observation that the mythology of the Chaco Indians was “very poor” offered him evidence of something inferior. Apart from the mythology of the Pilcomayo Indians, the myths of the Jibaros were very illustrative and of special importance concerning their “many customs and religious ideas” (14). Likewise, the Jibaros had “higher religious ideas”, like the myth of the great Earth-Mother *Nungüi*, which was absent from the religion of the Chaco Indians (15). Today, Karsten’s interpretations of the Chaco (Mataco and Chorote) lore are considered erroneous. Alvarsson (1993) has reported that during his fieldwork (1983-1985) he was able to record “over 300 different myths” of the Mataco (16). Besides, Johannes Wilbert and Karin Simoneau (1982) have edited numerous Mataco and Chorote lores (17). On the other hand it is obvious that Karsten’s division between the Jibaros and the Chaco Indians originated from his life-long inferiority complex towards Nordenskiöld; for Karsten the Jibaros represented the “most important and interesting native culture” since he did not associate them with the “rival”, Erland Nordenskiöld, that is, as a researcher of the Chaco Indians he felt an eternal runner-up (18). All in all, Karsten’s theoretical necessity (evolutionism) and feeling of inferiority made him consider the Pilcomayo Indians the “lowest” people while the Incas presented the highest stage of development. This also indicated that Karsten’s observations on the Pilcomayo Indians confirmed his early hypothesis of the existence of the “lowest” religion.

As indicated in Chapters Three and Four, Karsten was a convert to Tylor’s idea of animism. Animism as the “primitive” stage of religion was the slogan. Although Karsten rejected Tylor’s notion of animism as the philosophy of religion, he was thoroughly Tylorian in the sense that he dogmatically defended animistic explanation against pre-animistic, primeval monotheistic, and totemistic ideas. It can be argued, however, that fieldwork re-shaped Karsten’s opinion of Tylor and animism. In January 1937, Karsten criticized Tylor for disregarding the emotional side of religion and overlooking the close connection between animism and magic. Karsten’s first point was rather outdated since it was, by that time, a commonly accepted fact that Tylor overlooked the emotions although considering religious phenomena the products of the human mind. Nevertheless, Karsten’s emphasis on the close connection between animism and magic originally stemmed from his studies in “primitive” religion, which he was engaged in for some three decades, including the six years he spent in the field. (19.) In general, Karsten believed that the supernatural power which formed the essence of magic was closely tied with Indian animism, referring to animals, plants, and inanimate objects of nature (20). Karsten agreed with the German psychologist, Wilhelm

Wundt, who had shown that religion did not begin with a “belief in abstract impersonal powers” as the “savage” mind had a tendency to personify the objects around her (21). As a general rule, Karsten suggested that animism “must now be taken in a wider sense” (22). But how did Karsten arrive at the ideas he presented? What kind of observations of animism did he make? In the light of contemporary research, Karsten’s mistake was to start from “ready-made theories” and “preconceived opinions” of which he warned other researchers of “primitive” customs and ideas; when Karsten arrived in the field he dogmatically tried to find support for his theory of “primitive” religion (23). Thus he saw what he desired to see. On the other hand, Karsten acted like many scholars of religion of that day and, in my opinion, his obsession with animistic hypothesis did not invalidate the impressive material he collected. I agree with the reporter of “Nature” who in 1927 called Karsten’s ideas of South American religions “original” and “a contribution to the theory in social anthropology, whatever may be our ultimate judgment as to the validity of his conclusions” (24). In evolutionistically orientated work, evidence came before theory (inductive method) when the speculative systems of anthropology were both shunned and banned (25). Therefore, Karsten perceived that the most essential question was that of evidence; how the development from animism via polytheism to monotheism could be proved (in Swedish, *kan påvisas*) (26). Karsten’s fieldwork among the Chaco Indians was his first serious effort to give proof of animism among “uncivilized” people. Although a general belief in spiritual beings varied according to the “tribe”, Karsten suggested that the Indians’ belief in spirits compensated for “the lack of a notion of natural laws” (27). The spirit world of the Indians was plentiful: there were spirits inhabiting inanimate objects of nature, there were spirits embodied in animals and plants, and spirits with independent existence floating in the air or on the plains. The worst spirits were demons or evil spirits who caused diseases and death. (28.) In fact, Karsten’s monograph on the Indian tribes of the Chaco makes it fairly clear that the belief in spirits was almost pure demonology although the Indians also believed in the existence of benevolent spirits. In general, Karsten assumed that the religion of the Chaco Indians originated in the worship of human souls; the departed souls of young girls and boys and old men could re-appear as evil spirits in the shape of small boys (like Tylor, Karsten did not make a clear distinction between “soul” and “spirit”). These spirits had a significant role in the religion of the Chaco Indians and thus rebirth as a human was not a rare conception (compare to Hinduism where rebirth as a human is rare). Moreover, among the Tobas, the word for “soul” indicated “our (human) shadow” (compare to Tylor’s suggestion that “primitive” people pictured souls as phantoms resembling shadows which could pass from one body to another). (29.) Karsten believed that his hypothesis of the worship of human souls was confirmed by “animal-worship”; the belief in the passing of the soul or spirit of a departed person to animal. The beasts, like the jaguar, were believed to serve as the abode of evil spirits of human origin. (30.) Karsten’s notion of the “good spirits” in the religion of the Chaco Indians remained quite abstract since he was not able to define their transmigration (“Who had these good spirits been in their previous essence?”) more closely. He described benevolent spirits only as the guardian spirits of the medicine-men and the spirits animating plants. All in all, Karsten’s fieldwork in the Chaco

showed him, as W. Wundt had previously suggested, that the evolution of thought proceeded from concrete to abstract and not from abstract to concrete as Dr. Marett had suggested (31). Karsten's animistic premises were re-verified among the Jibaros. Once more, Karsten suggested that among the Jibaros, "as among other South American Indians", all spirits were "deified human souls" (32). The Jibaros recognized two words for a spirit: *wakáni* and *iguánchi*. The former meant "soul" or "shadow" – the human soul which "disembodied" temporarily in dreams or in the finality of death. But *wakáni* was not only in men but also in animals, plants, heavenly bodies, and in other objects of nature. According to Karsten, all *wakáni* evoked fearsome emotions in the Jibaros. The latter word, *iguánchi*, indicated the most evil and the most powerful spirit; all *iguánchi* were *wakáni*, but all *wakáni* were not necessarily *iguánchi*. (33.) Since *wakáni* appeared in different shapes and the human soul was believed to be able to reincarnate in the bear, deer or black monkey, the idea of the transmigration of the soul was not unknown to the Jibaros (34). As among the Chaco Indians and the Jibaros, animistic ideas also found soil in the religion of the Incas. In fact, Karsten suggested that the Inca religion was "fundamentally animistic": the orbs (sun and moon), the volcanoes, the mountains, and the caves were considered the "abodes of spirits", especially the ancestral spirits. Thus, ancestor worship formed a significant basis for the religion of the Incas. The plant spirits were also significant when many of the spirits were considered female like the quinoa, the coca, and the potato spirits. (35.) The Incas also believed in inanimate objects inhabited by good or bad spirits (the sacred places, *huaca*, as the locations of spiritual beings) (36). Here also appears Rafael Karsten's hypothesis that the material culture of "primitive" people was properly understood only in connection with their religious and magical beliefs (37). The animistic idea of transmigration was fulfilled in the notion of the Quichuas and the Aymara - the principal "tribes" in the Inca empire - that a sorcerer was able to change into a jaguar; the man-tiger (38). Karsten had concluded already in 1924 that it was a common belief in South America that a medicine-man was supposed to transmigrate to a jaguar or a snake after his death (39). Karsten also relied on the evidence of Koch-Grünberg, who suggested in his *Zwei Jahre unter den Indianern* (1908-1910) that if the medicine-man was very old and walked with difficulty, he went to the forest and turned into a tiger that killed men and animals (40). In any event, Karsten perceived that it was a mistake to believe that although the Inca religion had animistic elements it remained at an animistic stage. On the contrary, Inca religion was polytheistic, and thus on a higher level than the Indian cultures east of the Andes (41). The gods were seen as anthropomorphical or as having a human form. As a result, inanimate things, animals and human victims were offered to the gods (42). On the whole, Karsten's fieldwork confirmed his Tylorian notion that "primitive" rites and beliefs could not be explained without the idea of spirits or souls. The belief in metempsychosis or transmigration was deeply rooted in the Indian mind and thus animism formed the "essence of the Indian belief in the supernatural" (43). Interestingly, Edward Westermarck's observations in Morocco seem to point to the existence of animistic beliefs among the Moors. Westermarck mentioned in his study on the belief in spirits in Morocco (1920) that the Moors believed in *jnūn*, the spiritual beings which inhabited the nature and which sometimes attacked animals

and men (44). Unfortunately, Rafael Karsten's staunch "animism" drove him to various theoretical disputes. In 1927 the "Times Literary Supplement" called Karsten's study on the civilizations of South American Indians "controversial in its main intention - which is to demonstrate the shortcomings of various theories" (45). The truth is that in the 1920s Tylor's animism was seen as "antiquated theory", as the English "Daily News" put it in 1927 (46). In the Americanist Conference in Gothenburg in 1924 Karsten admitted that "the term animism had in a way fallen into discredit" (47). But once more he was too determined to give in. During the period 1924-1937 Karsten expended a lot of effort to make the theory of animism seem like a valid explanation in respect to R.R.Marett's animatism, Father Schmidt's "Urmonotheismus" and Robertson-Smith's totemism. He made various efforts to revoke Dr. Marett's views, suggested in his *The Threshold of Religion*, of impersonal magical power, mana (the Melanesian word for the supernatural). Karsten believed that Dr. Marett's pre-animistic explanation depended on a "misunderstanding of primitive "science"" (48). According to Karsten, "animatism" could not be proved to prevail "among a single people of our own days, and still less shown in regard to primeval man" (49). For Karsten the most irritating fact was, perhaps, that his close friend Dr. Preuss was a supporter of Marettian animatism when he claimed that "savage" religious customs had to be explained by the "magical power dwelling in man" (*Zauberkraft*), identical with "what the Iroquois called *orenda* (50). In Finland Karsten tried to explain his animism by leaning on the Finno-Ugrian studies of Uno Harva and K. F. Karjalainen. Karsten suggested that Harva's monograph on the religion of the Cheremiss (Mari) and Karjalainen's survey of the Jugra religion proved the existence of animism in Finno-Ugrian cultures, since Harva and Karjalainen discussed the spirits which inhabited heaven and heavenly bodies (51). Karsten's interpretation of Uno Harva's animism was peculiar since Harva was a supporter of the Marettian pre-animistic doctrine (52). Furthermore, to my knowledge, the Finnish linguist Henry Paasonen, who made a study of Mordvin religious ideas, was more charmed by animistic "soul" and "spirit" than his colleague K.F. Karjalainen (53). Karsten's staunch belief in animistic explanation also made him inimical to the theory of primeval monotheism (see also Chapter 5.1.2.). He rejected the notion of the cultural-historical school that there were *Urvölker* or *Urkultur*, since there were no longer "any really primitive people" and since science was not able to trace the first beginnings of religion but only to present mere hypotheses (54). In this context, Karsten attacked the Swedish Archbishop Nathan Söderblom, who proposed that the Supreme Beings (*Producers*) were of similar character among all "savage" peoples and thus it was valid to define them all on the same principle (I will discuss the Supreme Beings more profoundly later). The Norwegian ethnologist Albert Brock-Utne supported Karsten's opposing views of "Urmonotheism" and suggested that Karsten was "one of the very few Scandinavian scholars who have not knelt in front of Pater Schmidt, and remained faithful to the objectivity of science"(55). Rafael Karsten's fieldwork investigations also revised his notion of totemism. Karsten had previously claimed that among the Jibaros animals were not regarded as totems since totemism was "a religious or social system entirely unknown to the Jibaros" (56). In his study of the Incas Karsten, however, suggested that "a group of kindred persons who believe

they are descended from an animal, a plant, or a heavenly body, is an idea with which the American Indians are well acquainted; in the north and in the south of the continent” (57). Nevertheless, although Karsten’s notion of totemism as a *social* system was revised, he never accepted the idea that religion had sprung from totemism. Or then among the Indians totemistic beliefs were essentially founded on the doctrine of metempsychosis (58).

In his doctoral thesis (1905) Karsten suggested that the most significant thing in the history of religion was the manner in which the human was related to invisible, mysterious spiritual beings (Robertson-Smith’s notion). He also said that religious worship, which had no ethical character, had originated in the fear of or desire for self-preservation from malignant spirits (close to Westermarck’s notion that the unknown aroused a sentiment of fear and awe in “superstitious” minds). Finally, Karsten proposed that the main acts of worship were prayer and sacrifice. (59.) How did Karsten’s fieldwork then testify to his early premises? While studying the Indians of the Gran Chaco, Karsten noted that the Pilcomayo Indians believed in malignant spirits and thus fear of these evil spirits which only attacked humans at night was a visible part of their religious worship. The worship of these demons had a very practical aim: to expel them by conjury, dancing and prayers and thus to secure positive favours. However, the Pilcomayo Indians also worshipped benevolent spirits. This was fairly new information to Karsten, who in his doctoral thesis suggested that “primitive” religion was almost mere demonology. The worship of the good spirit aimed at transforming the vital spiritual power of the spirit to an Indian. As stated, the Indians believed that the good spirits animated certain plants. The forest tree *algaroba* was one of them. Thus, to ferment beer from the fruit of the algaroba was not only a sacred thing to the Indians but also gave them spiritual power through intoxication. (60.) Karsten’s notion of fear as the ultimate motive for “primitive” worship was also verified among the Jibaros. Karsten noted that among the Jibaros there was no visible division between good and evil spirits. Most of the *iguánchi* were considered malevolent, but sometimes the medicine-man was able to make friends with them. However, most of the religious practices of the Jibaros were aimed at expelling evil spirits. Thus, the fear of a demonic spirit was a motive underlying Jibaro worship. Karsten’s Inca studies re-confirmed his notion of fear as a motive of worship. The ancient Incas were afraid of anthropomorphic gods (the Creator-god, the Earth-mother) but also of lower spirits and demons that caused misfortune and sickness. The Incas worshipped the Creator, the Sun-god, and the god of Thunder and Lightning (61). The Creator-god Viracocha-Pachacamac not only personified the powers of nature, but also represented the destructive powers of nature, causing terrestrial catastrophies. He was, thus, greatly feared. The Incas also worshipped the Earth Mother Pachamama, who lived in the interior of the earth and whose power was benevolent (a giver of good gifts) and destructive (sickness and misfortune). In fact, Pachamama commanded the evil spirits, and the sickness that she sent led surely to death. (62.) Also, the “lower” spirits and demons played an “extraordinarily important role” in the religion of the Incas (63). These demons were called *supai* and they were, perhaps, spirits of dead Indians (64). They were regarded as terrifying and sources of ill fortune. The Inca Peruvians were in the habit of

organizing an annual rout of evil spirits, one of these events, called *coyaraymi*, was arranged in September, when the first rains brought sickness (65). What about the main acts of worship, then? In general, Karsten discussed two major forms of treating the spirits: conjuration and prayers. The conjurations played a “far more important part” since the prayers many times “escaped observation and were kept more secret than other religious ceremonies” (66). Among the Chaco Indians, conjurations were directed at the demons, mainly disease-demons, which were sent by a malicious sorcerer (67). The evils spirits were also expelled by ceremonial dances, which were exclusively for men. The dances also had a prohibitive, prophylactic, nature - to prevent illnesses (68). Nevertheless, the prayers played a significant role in the religion of the Tobas (69). The prayers were mainly dedicated to the guardian spirits, good spirits, and sometimes accompanied by offerings; the medicine-man summoned his guardian spirit to assist him in defeating the evil spirits (70). About the offerings Karsten did not have much to say since “real sacrifices” were unknown to the Chaco Indians. Only the votive offering when the Indian put gifts, a mantle, a waist-belt etc., in a bag and hung it up in a tree, could be considered an example of sacrifice among the Pilcomayo Indians (71). The religious practices of the Jibaros were so diverse that, according to Karsten, it was “almost impossible to bring them under any commonly recognized categories”, like sacrifice and prayers (72). Karsten believed that the aim of the worshipper could be to expel spirits or gain their favour. Besides, there were also religious practices which had “no reference to personal spirits at all”. (73.) But because many religious practices of the Jibaros were aimed at preventing evil spirits, rites like the great victory feast, the feast of children, the feast of young men, the feast of the women and the feast of the dogs were performed so that the evil influence was banished. This happened by shouting, dancing, beating drums and playing flutes. Facial and body-painting also protected the Jibaro Indians from the influence of evil. According to Karsten, the food offered to the dead and the words addressed to the Earth-Mother could be considered sacrifice and prayer. (74.) Among the Incas, the hymns and prayers were addressed to Viracocha, when they expressed a longing to “acquire an intimate knowledge of this mighty invisible god” (this prayer belongs to an old Inca who on his death-bed asked information on a “thing that causes fear”) (75). The Sun-worship indicated a homage paid to the Sun deity and the Inca ruler alike and represented conquest and becoming a great ruler (76). Incidentally, ancestor worship formed a very significant part of the Inca religion; the mummies of the Inca kings were objects of fervent worship and became the same kind of idols as the statues of the higher gods, the Creator, the Sun, and the God of Thunder and Lightning (77). Although the moon was of secondary importance among the Incas, it was worshipped especially in order to counteract the evil arising from the new moon (78). Karsten noted that “magical sacrifice” with “bloody and unbloody” offerings were frequent in the Inca religion (79). The bloody sacrifices meant the sacrifices of animals and human addressed to the highest gods (80). According to Karsten, the animal sacrifices were “natural” to the “civilized” Indians of the Andes because of the domestication of sheep, unknown to the “primitive tribes east of the Andes” (81). The Indians believed that there was a mysterious relationship between themselves and the animals they had domesticated - the llama was a sacred animal since the

soul of a dead person was believed to reincarnate in it (82). The human sacrifices also had a magical nature. The sacrifices of children meant a belief in a mysterious power which by way of sacrifice was transmitted not only to the Sun-god but also the Inca himself, whose vitality was thus protracted (83). However, the children were also sacrificed to the *huacas*, some kind of mysterious idols (84). The sacred places called *huaca* and *apachita* represented lower forms of worship. According to Karsten, the *huacas* were objects, like a stone fetish, inhabited by spirits or demons. In general, the concept *huaca* referred to frightening and awful phenomena when the Indians by shouting and wailing tried to expel evil spirits. (85.) The *apachitas* were sacred piles of stones inhabited by magical spirits and feared by the Indians of the Inca time. The rites performed at the *apachitas* were magical by nature but “far from being real acts of worship” (86). Although the plant spirits were not worshipped as intensely as a *huaca*, the Peruvians believed that the Maize-mother, the Coca-mother, the Quinoa-mother, and the Potato-mother were animated by a divine being. The worship of plant spirits also represented the “unbloody” sacrifices of the Incas. The ancient Peruvians believed that the plant spirits had magical powers and thus the worship directed at them was a kind of conjuration resembling the “mask-dances” (87). Moreover, the Peruvians made plant puppets (potato puppets, for instance) which they worshipped by dressing them in women’s clothes (88). The prayers and unbloody offerings (female clothes, for instance) was also directed at the Earth-mother Pachamama. Sometimes natural objects, like springs, were worshipped by offering clothes and sea-shells to the spirits inhabiting them (89). Moreover, magical offerings (amulets, like the teeth of wild animals) were made when new buildings were completed in order to strengthen them (90). In general, Karsten suggested that the Inca rituals “illustrated a materialistic conception of sin and the elementary union of religion and ethics” (91). This did not only indicate “washing away sins in a river” but also referred to the “ethical rules of religious sanction” - the confession institution of the Incas (92). What we have now seen in this section carries us evidently towards Karsten’s early suggestions. Karsten concluded in 1935 that “primitive” religious ritual or cult was an expression of human’s instinct of self-preservation and that having realized that her fate depended on the benevolence of invisible spiritual beings, she naturally aspired to enter into relation with them. This relation was manifest in sacrifice and prayer and was not ethical in nature. (93.) Karsten’s statement, based on his field investigations, points out that cult or sacrifice was not a mere gift offered to a supernatural being, but had also a magical, inhumane, side. Karsten also noted that the Indian sacrifice was different from the sacrifice of the Moors of Morocco, observed by Westermarck;

“While the 1-âr of the Moors is supposed to exercise a constraining influence on the saint to whom it is offered, the Indian sacrifice is believed to augment the power of the god himself” (94).

The comparison between Karsten’s early and late statements proves that nothing changed in his theoretical constructs in thirty years. The studies of Inca religion alone re-shaped his ideas

of "primitive" worship by bringing him a wellspring of religion and ethics; religious evolution concerning material and spiritual pollution (moral transgression) (95).

Karsten's early notion of "primitive" as unhappy was connected with his idea of fear; the fear of malevolent spirits made the Indian unconfident in the regular course of things since everything depended on the good-will of powerful evil beings. The uncertainty of what would happen next made the Indian unhappy and troubled. (96.) This unhappy nature of the Indian also affected her material and intellectual culture. Karsten believed that this was verified especially in the case of the Chaco culture which was "poor" and in which the world was viewed rather pessimistically (97). The troubled nature of the Chaco Indian also made him an unreliable servant and companion, that is, his moral quality was "low" when he could be characterized as "bad, ferocious, treacherous, and thievish" (98). Karsten realized, however, that the geographically demanding circumstances of the Gran Chaco (the poor quality of the soil) added to the Indian's pessimistic views (99). Although the religion of the Jibaros could not be called mere demonology, the fear of demons aroused "uncanny feelings" among the Jibaros and made them fearful and somewhat anxious about their life (100). As stated, Karsten's view of the Jibaros was more favourable than his view of the Chaco cultures. In fact, we could accuse Karsten of abandoning his early warnings of the Rousseau "state of nature" when in his monograph "Bland Indianer i Ekvadors urskogar" (1921) he created an obviously ideal society of the Indian societies of Eastern Ecuador: the moral standard among the Indians was very high, crimes like homicide were unknown, great generosity and social equality flourished, and children were brought up in a Spartan manner (101). In fact, the Indians were peace-loving and far from being as harsh as was generally believed. If a Jibaro Indian stole from others or left his white master during the expedition, this was because he was affected by Christian views. (102.) On the other hand, Karsten believed that the Jibaros easily fell into "apathy and fatalism" (103). The rich culture of the Incas formed no soil for unhappy feelings which prevailed among "the most primitive tribes" of South America; in the cultures in which the Indians walked naked and hated the white man (the Kashivos of Rio Ucayali and the Indians of El Gran Pajonal and Pampa). The Incas were a "dynasty of rulers" and Cuzco was for them what Mecca is for the Muslims and Benares for the Hindus. (104.) The Inca state, immense in extension and extraordinary in inner organization, and populated with people (the Quichuas) who "anthropologically stood nearest to the white race" could not be a place for troubled and frightful inhabitants. However, the Quichuas and Aimaros were the most "religious peoples in the world" and the belief in evil spirits predominated their religion. This, according to Karsten, made the Indians anxious about their lives. On the other hand, Karsten considered the Quichua Indians intelligent and strong in their social sentiment - a "race" endowed with talent. (105.) Another tribe of the ancient Inca empire, the Aimaros, showed instead "serious deficiencies" in their morality by revolting against their masters (106). But the strict obedience expected by the Inca rulers and the Spanish colonialists formed the character of these Indians, although not fundamentally (107). The hostile attitude of the

Spanish missionaries towards "pagan" beliefs forced the natives to conceal many of their religious rites and this also increased their pessimistic feelings (108).

Rafael Karsten's fieldwork also confirmed his early notion of death as an unnatural phenomenon in the "savage" mind; for "primitive man" there was hardly anything more mysterious than death (109). To such a mind, the idea that after death the soul continues its existence was the most natural. Karsten's view was influenced by Adolf Bastian, who suggested that the idea that human ceased to exist after death was typical only of "higher" intellectual development (110). According to Karsten, understanding the primitive idea of death required knowledge of Indian psychology (111). In fact, the Indian theory of death was closely connected with the ideas of reproduction and conception. Most South American Indians believed that the soul, a shadow-like image or the second-self of man, left the body at the moment of death. (112.) Death was caused by sorcery, magic or disease (spread by white men). The Tobas believed that the souls of dead people entered animals, such as deer, snakes, rabbits or birds (113). In fact, South American Indians believed that "all animals have once been men, or all men animals"; in every animal there was a spirit similar to that of the human (114). But the problem was caused by the question how the animal's own soul and the invading human soul were able to relate to one another - the problem of the animal becoming dual-souled. Karsten relied on the British ethnologist Whiffen, who had suggested that the Indians believed only in the temporary transmigration of the dead soul into the form of an animal, not a regular transmission. Yet, Karsten emphasized the illogical nature of savage thinking which had no interest in theoretical issues. (115.) Interestingly, Karsten was irritated by the disharmony between the theories of animism and totemism since James Frazer's theories of totemistic beliefs that totemic tribes derived their descent from particular animals and plants had questioned the idea of metempsychosis. Karsten suggested that Frazer's notion that many people identified themselves with particular animals and plants because their mothers had been impregnated by spirit animals or fruits and thus they themselves were nothing, but the certain animal or plant "stopped short where it should really begin" (116). Karsten asked what it was that made spirit animals or plants seek entry into women's bodies; why were they born into human form when one would expect them to be born as animals or plants and not as human beings? (117). To make the theories of animism and totemism cooperate, Karsten suggested that the "spirit" was an Indian ancestor who had been reborn in one of his descendants, via the impregnation of a woman, having meanwhile transmigrated to an animal or a plant (118). Thus, to the "primitive" mind birth and death were not expressions of the same radical event as to "civilized" man; they were temporal moments and indicated no absolute beginning or absolute end (119). At the moment of birth, one of the ancestors reappeared in the newborn, in the body of the descendant of the Indian man or woman whose body it had earlier animated (120). On the whole, birth meant the re-existence of a dead Indian man or a woman while death was merely the passing on into another existence; life was a circle (121). Karsten pointed out that the Indians certainly did not believe in the "immortality of the soul" - an expression "abused by Christian missionaries" - but rather in the continued

existence of the soul after death (122). But who was this particular ancestor that was reborn in the child and where did the physical germ of the newborn come from? According to Karsten, the Jibaros believed that the conception happened at the time of the new moon through natural sexual intercourse (not one single act of intercourse but several were necessary). According to Karsten, the Jibaro Indians understood that the germ of the child originated in the man and the new moon only assisted the development of the foetus. In other words, the Indian man was "the bearer of the eggs" and the newborn was consequently "the little father". (123.) This also explained the Indian custom of *couvade* in which a father was obliged to lie motionless in his bed fasting or remain inactive in the house after the birth of the newborn (124). Karsten noted that the problem how a new spirit associated itself with the physical foetus was not explained by the "primitive" Indian society - in this the Indians mainly believed in "supernatural" birth (125). Sometimes it was believed that a shaman brought a spirit to the woman or that jaguars made love to women (126). The ancient Peruvians had a fertility festival when men and women raced, quite naked, to a hillock and every man who caught a woman had sexual intercourse with her (127). It is noteworthy that Karsten's notion of the cult of the dead among the Jibaros and the Incas (the death-feasts) was not an attempt to legitimate Herbert Spencer's theory of manism or Kaarle Krohn's idea of ancestor worship as the most original form of religion (for more information on Krohn's idea of ancestor worship, see his work *Suomalaisten runojen uskonto*, 1915) (128). Karsten pointed out that the cult of the dead was unknown to the Indians of the Gran Chaco (129). In general, for Karsten, the cult of the dead was merely evidence of the fear of the supernatural power of the death-demon, especially those of family-fathers and medicine-men (130). Therefore, the Humean notion of fear as the first religious idea remained current.

We have so far mostly dealt with Karsten's theories verified in the field. However, Karsten's research on the Pilcomayo tribes showed him the existence of the concept of a Supreme Being in Toba mythology. Hence, Karsten's records conflicted with his early notion of the absence of high gods in "primitive" religion or mythology. In his early article Rafael Karsten criticized Andrew Lang for presenting incorrect ideas of a "high god" in many tribal societies. Karsten's scepticism towards Lang also coloured his later statements. Firstly, Karsten was irritated by the fact that Lang overestimated the notions of A.W. Howitt of the tribes of South-eastern Australia. Howitt was the missionary who suggested that the Australian aborigines had "high gods". Secondly, Karsten was worried about the strong dogmatic stimulus Lang gave to Father Wilhelm Schmidt's theory of the existence of primeval monotheism among the most "archaic people". (131.) Karsten stressed that A.C. Haddon's investigations in the Pacific area had proved that the people of this region had no idea of a Supreme Being, only beliefs in culture heroes (132). In his monograph on Indian tribes of the Argentinean and Bolivian Chaco (1932) Karsten admitted that the Tobas believed in two Supreme Beings, the evil *Kaloaralk* and the good *Perimalik*. Nevertheless, Karsten stressed that these figures played a role only in mythology, not in practical religion (133). Karsten's division sounds rather artificial; by referring to mythology Karsten avoided the theoretically irritating connection between religion

and Supreme Beings - that belief in higher gods was evident among the religion of South American Indians. Karsten explained the Supreme Being in mythic terms since he considered, like Tylor, myth an illogical and psychological delusion. By practical religion Karsten meant the spirits of a lower order which were either bad or good in nature. The presence of a "high god" in the religion of the Indians was an absurd idea since this kind of intellectual contemplation was not typical of "primitive" people. Nevertheless, it would be highly misleading to believe that Karsten underrated the role of the myth in Indian beliefs. In contrast, Karsten wrote accounts on Toba and Jibaro myths and his studies clearly indicated that the myths were of "special importance in throwing interesting light upon the numerous customs and religious ideas of the Indians" (134). Comparing Rafael Karsten to Uno Harva, it seems that Harva's study on Finno-Ugrian mythology lacked mythological texts, he analysed rituals, spirits, and gods, but not myths. Professor Åke Hultrantz (1994) interprets the reasons for this as follows: Firstly, Harva's pre-animistic views stressed the meaning of "supernatural power", not spirits, in religion. In this light, myth played a less significant role in study on the history of religions. (135.) In my opinion, Professor Hultrantz's suggestion should be interpreted as follows; Harva did not examine myths because the study of myths referred to "primitive" ontology - an explanation of the nature of spirits (close to Mircea Eliade's notion) (136). Secondly, Professor Hultrantz points out that Uno Harva did not emphasize "myths" because his mentor, Kaarle Krohn, drew an analogy between "mythology" and "religion" when Krohn's work on Scandinavian mythology was presented as a "review of the religion of the Viking time" (137). In my opinion, it would be mistaken to believe, however, that Marettian anthropology, *in toto*, rejected the study of myth. In contrast, R.R. Marett defined myth as an emotional response to the environment when the narrative myth formed the oral tradition of the communal rites. Marett also saw myth as a prerequisite to logical or rational thinking. (138.) But let us return to Karsten's notion of the Supreme Being in the Toba myths. Interestingly, Karsten explained the existence of the good Creator-god *Peritnalik* in the myths of the Tobas through Christian influence, since the older generation of the Tobas only knew an evil deity *Kaloaraik*, also active in the creation of the world (139). If the Chaco religion expressed itself in a different pattern than Karsten expected, the religious information he received among the Jibaros confirmed his negative idea of Supreme Beings. Karsten perceived that the two higher deities of the Jibaros, the Earth Mother *Nungüi* and her husband *Shakaëma* had very few similarities with the Supreme Beings as they were not considered the creators of the world or moral beings. (140.) It is peculiar that Karsten did not regard the Earth Mother as a moral being although she appeared in the cultural myths of the Jibaros as benevolent "donor of all good things" (141). In general, Karsten suggested that in their pagan state the Jibaros had no idea of a Supreme Being and if a notion of this kind appeared among some tribes it was due to the teaching of the Catholic missionaries (142). In his "A Totalitarian State of the Past" (1949), Karsten used myths to interpret the nature of *Viracocha*, the highest god of the Incas, and *Pachamama*, the Earth-mother. Karsten was not sure whether *Viracocha* and its additional epithets, *Con*, *Tici Viracocha*, or *Illac Tici Viracocha*, referred to one single "Supreme Being" or different Creator-gods. Unfortunately, the myths concerning *Viracocha*

did not give enough information on this issue. After all, Karsten's etymological analysis of the name of *Viracocha* suggested that *Viracocha* was a so-called Supreme Being. As a result, Karsten had to admit that since prehistoric time the Indians in the region of Lake Titicaca had worshipped a "high god". (143.) The Earth-mother *Pachamama* did not, however, represent a Supreme Being for the Incas. According to Karsten, the ancient Peruvian belief in the Earth-mother was very similar to the idea that the Jibaros had about the Earth-mother *Nungüi*. Rafael Karsten explained the similarity as a cultural borrowing or otherwise the belief in the Earth-mother had to be the common intellectual property of "all Indians in western South America" (144). It seems that by cultural borrowing Karsten meant a certain cultural influence the Jibaros had on other Indian tribes. This suggestion is based on Karsten's notion that the cult of the Earth-mother was much older than the Inca culture (145). The suggestion reveals something about Karsten's partly diffusionistic views that he derived from Erland Nordenskiöld (Karsten also searched for cultural similarities between the Canelos-Quichua and the Jibaros) (146). It can be stated that Karsten's notion of the existence of a Supreme Being in the Inca religion was not contradictory to his early ideas since the Incas were not "primitives" but lived in a higher state by being polytheists, almost monotheists. Thus, Karsten's former notions of the absence of Supreme Beings in a "primitive" religion became confirmed, excluding the Chaco culture. As a result, Karsten stated that the religious significance of Supreme Beings was greatly exaggerated when many Supreme Beings should only be seen as "mythical ancestors or the headmen of the clan" (147). Later, this opinion led him to a conflict with the Swedish scholar of religion, Geo Widengren. Interestingly, Peter Rivière (1987) has noted in "The Encyclopedia of Religion" that although suggestions have been made on the existence of monotheistic beliefs in the region of the tropical forest, there is "no evidence that any group worships a single divine being" and "where such claims do arise, the reference is, at best, to some otiose culture hero responsible for the creation of the universe" (148). Rivière suggests that we have to "look elsewhere for Indian religion" - and as a "rough guide we may take E.B. Tylor's definition of religion as animism" (149). Rivière's notion is legitimated by Ninian Smart's (1998) suggestion that many small-scale societies in the Amazon and Orinoco region have only "occasional belief in a High God or Supreme Being" (150). Nevertheless, Smart emphasizes that "such a belief is very widespread in the regions of the Pampas and Patagonia" (151). This is almost exactly what Rafael Karsten's observations in South America pointed out.

Now it is important to realize that although Karsten received some further or new information in the field, the information evidently worthwhile to his previous theoretical premises has been presented above. For an integral understanding of Rafael Karsten's comparative religion it is necessary, however, also to discuss his ideas of the Indian shamanism and the magical nature of "primitive" art (the issue which theoretically and personally divided Karsten from Westermarck). Deborah A. Poole (1987) has suggested that Rafael Karsten, like Henry Wassen and Erland Nordenskiöld, observed shamanism as a part of a more extensive comparative investigation of the material culture of South America (152). Poole's suggestion

evidently refers to Karsten's holistic view where material and social culture illustrated religious practices, the focus, nevertheless, being on religion. Otherwise, her interpretation is misleading. Nevertheless, it is very true that for Erland Nordenskiöld shamanism was a part of his investigation of material culture while he, for instance, presented the rattle-gourd, used by the medicine-man of the Chaco Indians, in his study on ethnogeographical analysis of material culture (1919) (153). However, Nordenskiöld never analysed the ceremonial context of the rattle-gourd more profoundly. During his expedition in the Gran Chaco Nordenskiöld was cured by a shaman and inspired by his experience he wrote an account of the curing ritual of a shaman (154). Nevertheless, it seems that this incident, dramatised later in a book, was not the most significant experience for Nordenskiöld since he never seemed to have a vocation for studying shamanistic practices more closely. However, the shamanistic practice in small-scale societies in South America came to inspire Rafael Karsten. Generally speaking, it can be said that the spectrum of supernatural spirits and their obvious relation to sickness and death led Karsten to the shamanistic practices of the "primitives". It is worthwhile to note that Karsten talked about the medicine-man (a sorcerer and a curer) rather than the shaman - a conceptual distinction he preferred in his monographs. The explanation for this is obvious; the word "shaman" is derived from the Tungus language terms *samon*, *saman* and *haman* and is thus more connected with Siberian ethnography than South-American studies (155). The reason for Karsten sometimes using the terms "shaman" and "shamanistic practices" is connected to the word "shaman" becoming central in anthropology and comparative religion between the two World Wars (1918-1939). At that time, the Danish scholars, for instance, produced information on the arctic shamanism of Greenland and Canada. (156.) The most significant work for the cognizance of the word "shamanism" in the Western hemisphere was perhaps Mircea Eliade's *Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l'ecstase* (1951). In any case, Karsten even occasionally called the medicine-man a "doctor" (157). Therefore, it is important to realize that for Karsten "medicine-man", "shaman", "sorcerer", "curer", and "doctor" had overlapping conceptual definitions. As an analyst of shamanism Karsten, like Uno Harva, was a pioneer. However, while Uno Harva concentrated on the morphological analysis of the mythic narratives of shamanic hunters, cattle breeding agriculturalists, and nomadic pastoralists, Rafael Karsten stuck to the "facts" being "chemically free from theoretical speculations" (158). Therefore, Karsten was astonished when Matthew Stirling accused him of "applying too much anthropological theory" in his monographs (159). Karsten's investigations on the shamanism of the Chaco Indians, the Jibaros, and the Incas pointed out many similarities and thus it is possible, on the basis of his monographs, to try to reconstruct one universal spectre of the South American shamanistic practice. Besides, Karsten himself stressed that an Inca shaman "proceeded much in the same way as the medicine-men among primitive tribes" (160). First of all, Karsten believed that a medicine-man occupied a central role in the religious tasks of a community (161). Karsten stressed that the medicine-man was, above all, a physician or a curer, not a priest. Priests or priestesses were unknown to the Chaco Indians and the Jibaros, disregarding the old Jibaro man or woman who conducted the ceremonies during the most important religious feasts (162). The

Inca state had its priests and its High Priest but a distinction was made between *ichuri*, priest or diviner, and *hambic*, a medicine-man (163). In general, the term "priest" belonged to "highly-developed cultures" (polytheistic or monotheistic religion) in which a person acted as "a mediator between the people and its god or gods" (164). Furthermore, there was a difference between a medicine-man and a sorcerer; a medicine-man was always a sorcerer practicing the magic art but a sorcerer or a wizard was not always a professional medicine-man (165). A sorcerer used only black magic (166). However, there was no essential difference between an Indian practicing black or white magic among the Pilcomayo tribes, especially among the Choroti (167). Moreover, the Jibaros had only one word for a medicine-man and a sorcerer; *wishinyu* (168). Karsten blamed Gunnar Landtman for using the terms "priest" and "sorcerer" indiscriminately, without closer examination, in his study on "The Origin of Priesthood" (1905) (169). Michael Harner (1990) has suggested in his study of the Jibaro shamanism that the Jibaros have good and bad shamans, specialized in curing and witchcraft (170). On the other hand, Harner does not mention whether the good shaman also has evil characteristics, as Karsten suggested. Moreover, Mircea Eliade (1989) has seen South American shamans as curers and wizards (171). Nevill Drury's (1989) suggestion supports Eliade's notion; Drury considers the shaman a healer and a transmitter of diseases (172). Father Martin Gusinde has also considered the Yahgan shaman of Tierra del Fuego a healer (curer) and a magician (173). According to Karsten, the shamanistic apprenticeship had some features that were common to all Indian cultures. It seems that Karsten had the opportunity to observe the apprenticeship of the would-be-shaman especially among the Jibaros. But let us first observe who was called to become a shaman according to Karsten's investigations. According to Karsten, the Toba medicine-man was a real artist who became a shaman by learning. No magical initiation took place, nor were any "particular mental-qualifications" necessary for becoming a shaman. (174.) However, a shaman always had to be "spiritually strong and possess a natural power of resistance against the evil spirits" (175). This characterization of the would-be-shaman was also related to the Jibaro medicine-man; the shaman's calling rose from individual ambition to learn shamanistic practice. The initiation of the Jibaro medicine-man, however, had magical aspects. The novice visited an old master who gave him magic "arrows" as well as the necessary tuition. The master put a small *chonta* thorn in his mouth and blew it into the mouth of the novice. The saliva with the *chonta* thorns indicated a mysterious "poison" which enabled the would-be-medicine-man to become a sorcerer. The "poison" ripened the body of the novice and enabled him to bewitch a person with his magical "arrows". The ripening lasted from six months to two years while the new medicine-man observed strict dietary prohibitions eating only boiled green plantains. (176.) The medicine-man of the Chaco Indians also had an "arrow" or a "splinter", mainly a cactus thorn or a piece of bone (177). Marie Perruchon's observation of shamanic initiation among the Jibaros supports Karsten's view of the importance and intimacy of the moment when the novice apprenticed him/herself to a master. Perruchon's shamanic initiation among the Jibaro Indians took place in November 1993 and she has described the rite as follows:

"We are sitting face to face. My tutor is looking right through my hazy eyeballs and into my body. It scares me a bit [...] he gives me the power through my chest, head, and finally through my mouth. It is difficult to keep from vomiting. He repeats the process three times and finally, I am allowed to rest" (178).

As far as one can see, Perruchon's notion of the shamanic power which is transformed by mouth supports Karsten's description although Karsten was never called to be a shaman. I have mentioned already that Karsten considered the shamanistic tasks to be curing and bewitching. Among the Jibaros, the shaman's task was not to control the weather since a "weather-doctor" could be any member of the community (179). By drawing on Karsten's monographs it is possible to trace some universal features concerning the medicine-man as a sorcerer. When the medicine-man desired to bewitch another Indian, that is, to throw the magic arrow, he first observed dietary prohibitions. The bewitching took place in the dark when the demons appeared. Then, the medicine-man took tobacco water, uttered a spell by mentioning the name of the Indian he wished to bewitch, whistled and moved his fingers in a peculiar manner (180). Finally, a sorcerer shot his invisible magical arrow to the chest or throat of the victim (181). The victim died within a few days unless another medicine-man was able to cure him. Karsten stated that sometimes a medicine-man disguised his "arrow" or his "demonical soul" in a jaguar. This proved the Jibaro sorcerer's ability to move outside his body. Karsten never pondered more profoundly why the medicine-man identified with the jaguar. Ninian Smart (1998) has suggested that a jaguar acts as a sorcerer's *alter ego*. According to Smart, this is mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the jaguar is able to swim and hunt in water and thus has access to the underworld. Secondly, a jaguar is able to ascend and, like the medicine-man, has access to upper regions, the heavenly world. Ninian Smart has also emphasized the numinous nature of the jaguar when it is seen as an animal "full of ambiguities". (182.) Sickness meant not only physiological weakness but also social disorder for the Indians. Thus, the medicine-man was best known as a curer. He prepared himself for curing by fasting. In the dark, the medicine-man went into the house of a sick person holding his magic bag containing magic leaves, like tobacco. His face was painted black or red. The treatment began with the conjuration or spell which was chanted in a low voice as the voice was supposed to have magic power. The medicine-man shook an instrument which had small bells. Among the Jibaros, a curer drank some tobacco water or *caapi* wine, *ayahuasca*, so that he became intoxicated (evidently an Inca shaman also consumed narcotic beverages in order to see the true cause of the sickness - according to Karsten, detailed information was lacking). After that, the curer came to the patient and put his closed hand on the part of the body that the evil had intruded. Then, the medicine-man, by shaking his rattle, spit and blew on the evil part of the body. Among the Jibaros, a medicine-man sometimes rubbed the sick spot with a white stone that was in his mouth. All this prepared the body for the extraction of the magic "arrow". Among the Jibaros, the medicine-man saw the ultimate origin of the sickness in a narcotic sleep. Having realized who the sender of the sickness was, the medicine-man tried to send the "arrow" back to its holder. Among the Tobas, the medicine-man invoked his good

guardian spirit through a chant, and it assisted him in banishing the intruder. The demon was finally eradicated from the body of the sick person by the medicine-man. The medicine-man showed the audience a small splinter which had caused the sickness. But that was not enough. In order to prevent the demon, usually the spirit of an ancestor, from returning to the body, a medicine-man negotiated with it by holding it in his hand. The medicine-man asked whether the demon wanted tobacco and also posed several other questions. The surrounding people answered these questions on behalf of the evil spirit. This ceremony was repeated every night until the sick person recovered. (183.) Referring to the narcotic state of the medicine-man, Karsten noted that *ayahuasca*, the caapi plant, was a very important part of the shamanic practices of the Jibaros. This plant, whose botanical name *Banisteria caapi*, was determined by the British botanist Richard Spruce, acted as a narcotic which produced hallucinogenic visions. In general, the medicine-man drank the narcotic *ayahuasca* and tried to find out who the sender of the sickness was, the author of the evil (184). Ninian Smart (1998) has suggested that the medicine-man's "capacity for vision" is "aided by hallucinogens" (185). Not only the medicine-man consumed *ayahuasca*, but also everybody who desired to "dream" (186). Both men and women drank *ayahuasca*, especially during a feast called *Natéma umártinyu* which was connected to the great victory-feast (187). Marie Perruchon has suggested that Karsten's account of *ayahuasca* use among the Jibaro Indians had two errors. Firstly, the Indians do not take *ayahuasca* in groups, as Karsten suggested, but individually (reported also by Michael Harner). Secondly, the Jibaros taking *ayahuasca* do not fall asleep but sit upright and seem to be very focussed. Sleeping would prevent them from seeing visions. (188.) According to Perruchon, only *maikua* produced visions during a sleep or coma-like trance (189). Interestingly, the photographs Karsten took of the Jibaro medicine-man curing a patient shows us the *shingi-shingu* rattle but not the drum. It seems that for the Jibaros, the drum was a collective instrument used in signalling, announcing a death and in important feasts, such as the great victory-feast. The drum beating could also signify an imitation of the great mysterious animal. (190.) Seemingly, while the shamans of Siberia were known for their drums, their counterparts in South America were famous for their rattles. Erland Nordenskiöld noted in his *An Ethno-Geographical Analysis of the Material Culture of two Indian Tribes in the Gran Chaco* (1919) that the rattle-gourd was a very old element of civilization in South America (191). All in all, Karsten's observations of the shamanic tasks of the South-American medicine-men reveal to us that shamanic episodes were usually public and veiled in heavy drama which aimed at a certain impression - to impress the audience by the mysterious power of the medicine-man. In other words, a shaman was a specialist in his community who played a very significant role if the community was in danger of slipping into social disorder. In the communities observed by Karsten, a medicine-man was not considered neurotic or psychotic but a man with potentially dangerous or vital power; the shaman possessed the cognitive ability by being a medium for the spirits and by being able to bewitch and cure people. The South-American medicine-man could be described as a man or a woman having a mysterious life of his/her own. The controversial issue among scholars has been how reliable Karsten's observations on Jibaro shamanism were. Michael Harner has considered Karsten's

observations prejudiced and deficient while Marie Perruchon and Michael Brown have proposed that Karsten managed to get close enough to the secrets of the Jibaro community and thus he should be considered a fairly reliable observer (192). According to Perruchon, Karsten's main fault was that he sometimes claimed that the Jibaro shaman spoke with souls when he in reality negotiated with the spirits (193). Professor Åke Hulkrantz (1993) has suggested that Karsten "apparently missed the shaman's cure of soul loss" (194).

Any evaluation of the results of Karsten's expeditions should pay attention to his idea of personal adornment and body decoration as a magical means to ward off the assaults of evil spirits - those "unseen beings with whom the very air is filled" (195). Karsten had first become interested in primeval art after reading Westermarck's chapter on "primitive means of attraction" in his epic about the history of marriage (196). In 1919, Karsten, however, evinced an opposite view to Westermarck's notion of self-decoration by presenting his own "magical" interpretation of primeval art. It can be seen that although Karsten's and Westermarck's ideas of the function of magic deviated from each other, their views of the distinction between magic and religion were very much alike. Like Westermarck, Karsten suggested that in religion a human was aspiring to a relationship with supernatural beings by natural means, by making offerings to them and by flattering them, while in magic he tried to influence them by supernatural means, by "using mechanical powers which they *cannot* resist" (italics are Karsten's) (197). But while Westermarck refused to see magic everywhere, Karsten stressed that magic was "a well-known fact" of "primitive" culture which did not disappear during (the) development (198). Magic played a significant part even in monotheistic religions "in which the ritual associated with demons is radically opposed to the cult proper" (199). Karsten's belief in "magical control" in every sphere of culture led to a long theoretical controversy between him and Westermarck although Westermarck emphasized that "in these questions there is considerably more agreement between his (Karsten's) and my own than he (Karsten) seems to be aware of" (200). By this Westermarck indicated that he had never totally denied the part superstition played in "primitive" means of attraction (201). Indeed, Westermarck was conscious of the magical content of primeval art, but perhaps his philosophical mind desired to give it a more aesthetic or practical value. In his study on "The Belief in Spirits in Morocco" (1920) Westermarck described how "the young man who wants to increase his own sexual capacity, writes the name of a *j?nn* (spiritual being) with Moorish ink on the palm of his right hand and then licks it up with his tongue" (202). Westermarck's observation proves that he was aware of the relationship between decoration and magic aspects. As a response to Karsten's accusation, Westermarck accentuated that he had discussed the magical content of primeval art (pictures and colours) already in *Finsk Tidskrift* in 1904 (203). His other articles with a magic perspective were "Popular Ritual of the Great Feast in Morocco", "Moorish Conception of Holiness", and "Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco" (204). But if Westermarck's theoretical constructs was as docile and many-sided as he himself suggested, why did Karsten become so irritated? We are on fairly firm ground here if we state that Westermarck's theoretical ability to give way was ostensible. Even though

Westermarck acknowledged the superstitious nature of self-decorative art, he declared that "however important the influence of superstition may have been, it should be remembered that the sexual impulse is even more primitive than the belief in mysterious or supernatural forces and agents" (205). The same point was made earlier in Darwin's research on the descent of man and upheld by such anthropologists as Dr. Joest (206). By emphasizing the "even more primitive sexual impulse", Westermarck's evidence slipped to the eternal paradox of "origins". Without a doubt, Westermarck's suggestion raised Karsten's objection since Karsten's theoretical constructs were now in danger of experiencing a serious set-back of being doomed by an eminent sociologist. Karsten had no option but to reject Westermarck's idea by suggesting that magical superstition was "as old as mankind" (207). Karsten admitted that his "general sociological view was certainly the same as that of Dr. Westermarck" but that "on many particular questions" he had "arrived at different results" (208). Karsten called this "radical disagreement" and emphasized that his polemic towards Westermarck had merely the character of self-defence since Westermarck's distrust towards his statements was very curious (209). Karsten stressed that his statement on the magical significance of the Choroti tattooing, a protection against disease, was based on "observed fact". Karsten refused to consider himself, however, an ethnological "master" (in Swedish, *herr*) (210). In his letter to Westermarck, Karsten stressed that self-decoration played no special role in the Indian marriage. Among the Choroti, the man who sent a woman the biggest draught got her as a wife - no sexual embellishments were needed (211). However, Karsten mentioned that his theories applied only to South American Indians and were thus conducted within "legitimate limits" (212). Interestingly, Karsten's habit of interpreting only South American material led Westermarck finally to cite the Americanist Whiffen in his works. Evidently, Westermarck was merely searching for support for his theory of sexual attraction from South American evidence. Karsten was discouraged by Westermarck's cross-cultural comparisons and stated that Whiffen was nothing but an amateur explorer and that presumably he (Karsten) knew the Indians better than Westermarck (213). When Westermarck then concluded that Karsten saw self-decoration as "a prophylactic activity against evil spirits", Karsten denied this by stating that Westermarck had "categorically" refused to see that he (Karsten) explored both magic and non-magic motives in his works (214). Karsten's argumentation culminated in his work on the civilization of South-American Indians, which turned out to be "an extended monograph on self-decorative practices"; Karsten devoted almost two hundred pages to the customs of body decoration (215). Interestingly, The Sunday Times praised Karsten for scientific fairness since in his work Karsten informed the reader right at the beginning that his theory had received only a partial acceptance from other sociologists (216). In reality, Westermarck had announced already in 1919 that;

"If I write you a recommendation in order that your work will be published [...] I hope you will treat me more fairly, and end the one-sided quoting of thirty year old work" (217).

Obviously, Karsten understood Westermarck's indirect claim. Although Karsten continued his argumentation against Westermarck's theory, he also wrote fairly good-humoured letters to Westermarck congratulating him on his new research results, for instance (218). Furthermore, Karsten continually apologised for criticizing the figure who had been such a significant impetus for his studies (219). Karsten knew very well that he needed Westermarck's contacts in order to be able to publish his works (220). As stated in Chapter 2.2., seventy years after the dispute, it still remains unresolved who was right: Westermarck or Karsten. On the other hand, I believe that Karsten started the dispute half-intentionally so that he could gain reputation as an Americanist but also a scholar who dared to argue with an eminent sociologist. But then again, Edward Westermarck, knowing the fervent and sensitive nature of Karsten, could also have abstained from applying the theme of sexuality and eroticism ubiquitously. I borrow the idea of the American anthropologist James Lett: "science being objective does not entail being fair to everyone involved; instead, being objective entails being fair to the truth" (221). After all, this is what Karsten's and Westermarck's dispute was about: both of them aspired, above all, to be rationally "fair to the truth". On an emotional level they also hoped to be loyal to each other.

A few words still need to be said about Rafael Karsten's interest in ethnobotany, which arose from his effort to construct a universal connection between Amerindian religious ideas and plants, that is, intoxicating drinks having religious meaning. Karsten's approach to ethnobotany and his emphasis on the cultural and religious aspects of psychoactive plants has previously been discussed by Jonas Nockert (1995) in his illustrative article "Rafael Karsten and the "Ethno" in Ethnobotany". According to Nockert, Karsten's approach to plants was, above all, that of an anthropologist. Nockert's suggestion coincides very well with Karsten's own statement that he approached the psychoactive plants and poisons merely as an ethnologist, the pharmacological and chemical problems falling outside his scope (222). Moreover, Karsten, although interested in the chemical composition of the Indian arrow-poison, for instance, studied it above all as an "ancient culture element" of the Ecuadorian Indians (223). Karsten's first detailed analysis on Amerindian psychotropic plants appeared in 1920 in his small treatise *Beiträge zur Sittengeschichte der Südamerikanischen Indianer*. Nockert has proposed that Karsten's interest in ethnobotany also stemmed from the studies of Alexander von Humboldt and Erland Nordenskiöld, who paid attention to the use and cultivation of plants by the Indians (224). This is evidently true. However, it is important to note that Karsten's attitude towards the information Nordenskiöld gave on the arrow-poison of the Choco Indians in Panama, the *pacurú* poison, was dismissive because Nordenskiöld could not identify the poison-producing tree botanically and because he never saw the poison used (225). Apparently, Karsten's claim of botanical knowledge is a proof of his pure pharmacological aspect which manifested itself in his ability to recognize the Latin terms of the plants and in his great interest in the chemical anatomy of the plants. Rafael Karsten was interested in the chemical analysis of the plants since he was tired of Nordenskiöld's and the Swedish pharmacologist C. G. Santesson's habit of drawing conclusions about Indian arrow-

poison without knowing the real effects of the poison studied (226). Due to the fact that even the effects of one and the same poison could vary greatly, it was useless to present generalizations of the poisons (227). In 1933, Karsten asked the Yugoslavian pharmacologist Dr. Wilhelm Mršić to study his samples of the liana which he had brought from Ecuador. Dr. Mršić showed great interest in Karsten's samples and said that he desired to compare the *Yagé* plant (*Haemadietyen amazonicum* (?), (Mršić's question mark)) of the Tumaco of Columbia with Karsten's samples of the liana (228). The results of Mršić's chemical analysis are unknown, but according to the recent experiments of the Swedish pharmacologists Bruhn, Holmstedt & Lindgren (1995), Karsten's samples of *Banisteria* or *Banisteriopsis caapi* were identical with Richard Spruce's original collections gathered in the Brazilian Amazon in 1852 (229). Thus, Karsten was probably able to identify the correct plant. Still, we have to see the ultimate motive behind Karsten's interest in pharmacology. I believe that by collecting the samples of the liana stem and the *ayahuasca* drink prepared from it, Karsten desired not only to study the chemical substances but also their effect on the human mind and their meaning for the religion of the Indians; the study of the degree of effectiveness of the Indian drugs and poisons moved Karsten closer to "primitive" animistic ideas - to be intoxicated by a drink was identical with being internally filled with a good or evil spirit which animated the plant and its fruit (230). In other words, knowing the interaction between chemical substances and living tissues made Karsten not only aware of the physiological pharmacodynamical effects but also of the mental acts and effects which culminated in religious ecstasy, that is, having "a good spirit in the brain", as the Toba Indians believed (231). Interestingly, Karsten never imbibed the Jibaro drinks himself because "living [...] alone among the Indians I have not taken the risk of consuming them in larger quantities for the purpose of stating their mental and physiological effects" (232). Jonas Nockert (1995) has correctly pointed out that in Karsten's time the synthesis of botany and ethnology was as yet poorly established and "quite difficult to achieve" (233). Evidently, the whole concept of ethnobotany was veiled in varying definitions and no serious efforts were made to define "narcotics", "toxicology", "chemical substances", etc. among ethnologists (compare to the vocabulary of pharmacology, which makes a distinction between "therapeutics" (beneficial chemicals) and "toxicology" (the study of harmful chemicals)) (234). Nevertheless, Karsten's ethnobotanical material and his observations and interpretations upon it have benefited many; pharmacologists, scholars of religion and anthropologists. Today, Karsten's ethnobotanical collection still offers invaluable material to scientists interested in psychotropic plants and their medical use. Interestingly, the filmmakers Sean Adair and Miguel A. Kavlin have produced an educational film on the shamanic use of *ayahuasca* and the visions it creates (235). But Karsten's collection also reveals something about the mysterious connection between the human and nature - that nature was the dominant form of religion in preliterate communities (I have here modified Maurice Godelier's notion that "religion is the dominant form of ideology in preliterate communities" (236).

We have so far analysed Rafael Karsten's theoretical constructs tested by his field investigations in South America. To complete this analysis we also have to pay attention to Karsten's short visit to Petsamo in 1927, which led him to write a monograph on the religion of the Saami. Only after this can we draw conclusions on Rafael Karsten's theoretical constructs tested by his field investigations.

5.2. The Religion of the Samek

5.2.1. Background

Amongst Rafael Karsten's voluminous South American studies, his small monograph on the religion of the Saami is like a utopia - the work which still seems to be significant and pioneering but, nonetheless, launched by a scholar who was anything but recognized as a researcher of the Finno-Ugrian peoples. The question still arises today: why did Karsten undertake a short trip to Petsamo in summer 1927? Why did he not return to Petsamo later? Why did he publish a monograph on the religion of the Saami only in 1952? First of all, I am not certain whether we should talk about an "expedition" to Petsamo, owing to the very limited time (weeks or one month) he spent there. Here, I use the word "trip" when referring to his visit to Petsamo area. Professor Åke Hultkrantz has suggested that Karsten travelled to Petsamo because the study of the Saami communities had become popular among Finnish ethnologists and folklorists in the early 1920s (1). On the other hand, Professor Juha Pentikäinen has proposed that Karsten's trip was arranged; somebody urged Karsten to travel to Petsamo to gather material on the Skolt-Lapps of the region (2). I believe that a combination of these two explanations is nearest to the truth; Karsten travelled to Petsamo because he was inspired by some ethnologist(s) active in Saami studies but also because the religion of the Saami had become a popular research topic among Finnish scholars; Rafael Karsten was attracted by the desire to search for "the wild which was not damaged by culture" (this seemed also to be one of the most significant motives for Samuli Paulaharju's travels) (see also Chapter 2.2.). (3). But on second thoughts it seems that one reason for Karsten's trip to Petsamo was perhaps his desire to show Uno Harva that he (Karsten) was also able to become an expert in Finno-Ugrian studies. Karsten's feeling of inferiority resulted from one incident: in 1935 K. Rob.V. Wikman compared Karsten to Gunnar Landtman and concluded that Landtman, more than Karsten, displayed considerable expertise in knowing the Nordic issues. It has been said that Karsten could never forgive Wikman and vowed revenge. On that occasion, Karsten said that Wikman would never receive his doctor's degree at the University of Helsinki. Similarly, Karsten had anathematized Uno Harva. I call this Karsten's "I will show you yet!" syndrome which was both over-confident and hesitant. (4.) But let us return to the study of Lapland among scholars. Lapland had fascinated scholars since the first half of the 17th century when zoologists and botanists travelled to this area to study its unequalled natural conditions. In 1732, Carl Linnaeus published his famous account *The Lapland*

Journey. Linnaeus's classification of the population of Sweden is famous; he made a distinction between Goths (tall, hair blond), Finns (with muscular body, hair long and flaxen), and Lapps (thin body, black hair) (5). In 1808, Knud Leem published his *An Account of the Laplanders of Finnmark* and in 1885 A.H. Keane searched for *The Lapps: Their Origin, Affinities, Habits, and Customs* in his Stanford monograph. Gradually, philologists and ethnologists became inspired by the Saami culture. In 1910, the Finnish philologist Eliel Lagercrantz undertook a trip to Northern Lapland and as a result published a book named *Laulava Lappi* ("Singing Lapland") (1950). Between the years 1920-1930, the Finnish ethnologist Samuli Paulaharju and his wife Jenny travelled around the area of Enontekiö making notes and taking photographs of the local way of life. Relating to the Finnish study of religion, his work *Seita stones and Seita worshipping* (1932) is an invaluable document on Saami religion. (6.) Presumably, the famous Finnish linguist T. I. Itkonen travelled to the region of Kolttaköngäs at the same time as Rafael Karsten (7). Itkonen also gathered data in other regions of Northern Lapland and the Kola Peninsula. One of his famous accounts on Saami culture and its history is the two volume *The Lapps of Finland until year 1945* (1948). The Finnish scholar of religion, Uno Harva, the naturalist K. M. Levander, and the student Kustaa Vilkuna also travelled to Kolttaköngäs at the same time as Rafael Karsten or soon afterwards. (8.) In 1915, Uno Harva published an account of the religion of the Lapps (*Lappalaisten uskonto*). In the 1930s, the Finnish librarian Erik Therman travelled to Northern Lapland and published later a work named *Among the Witches and the Nomads* (1940). But who finally urged Karsten to travel to Petsamo? In a letter to his wife on 11 July 1927, Rafael Karsten mentioned that he would travel to Petsamo as soon as his lectures at Jyväskylä Summer University were over. Furthermore, he wrote that the trip was going to be very interesting but also rather expensive, costing over two thousand Finnish marks. Indeed, the trip to Lapland was expensive. Samuli Paulaharju had to renounce his Lapland travels in 1928 since he did not have enough money to cover the expenses. (9.) However, Karsten never mentioned to his wife why he was so interested in the Petsamo area or who financed his trip. He insisted on travelling alone - a strong individual characteristic also visible on his South American expeditions. Karsten's inclination to travel alone was similar to Samuli Paulaharju's solitary habit of wandering alone (although Paulaharju's wife Jenny habitually travelled with him). This was a total opposite to the gregarious habit of the Finnish author Ilmari Kianto of wandering with a large group of people who also enjoyed the pleasures of travelling. (10.) The postcards Karsten bought in the field reveal that he travelled in the regions of Kolttaköngäs, Patsjoki (Jäniskoski), and perhaps Tenojoki (11). It seems that Karsten regarded the trip as preliminary in nature and that he desired to return to the area as soon as possible (12). The next year, however, he travelled to old Walamo, Tyrisevä and finally to Ecuador. In the preface to his study on the religion of the Saami, Karsten admitted that he had no expertise in "the Lapp culture" and therefore his work was not meant to be a handbook but a mere monograph on "the arctic religion of the Laplanders" (13). Karsten stated that his interest in "the religion of the Samek or the Lapps" had flourished for decades and was originally inspired by his religious-historical investigations. The long-span study on the religion of the Saami had

finally turned to be “so motivating” that Rafael Karsten decided to publish a monograph on this issue (14). In the preface to his work, Karsten mentioned two scholarly figures behind his enthusiasm towards the Saami people. Firstly, he commended the head of the Ethnographical Department of National Museum in Helsinki, T. I. Itkonen (1891-1968), for scholarly inspiration. Karsten considered Itkonen’s account on the religion of the Lapps a significant contribution to lappology (15). Professor Juha Pentikäinen (1995) has suggested that Itkonen’s works were “labelled by territorial thinking typical of Nordic lappology” (16). This indicated that the lappologists concentrated persistently on their *own* areas (17). But as is well known, this was not confined to Nordic lappologists but also Americanists internationally. After all, Professor Pentikäinen (1995) has considered Itkonen “a strong ethnological recorder who knew the people he studied” (18). Another figure to whom Karsten was grateful was the head of the Saami Department of the Nordic Museum, Dr. Ernst Manker (1893-1972), whose ethnological works had dealt with Lapp life and customs but also the magic drums of the Saami shaman (*Die lappische Zaubertrommel* Part I. and Part II., 1938 and 1950). Ernst Manker saw lappology as a field of research full of pitfalls perilous to a gullible scholar, that is, lappology was such a problematic research interest that a scholar had to think twice before becoming deeply involved in it. (19.) Karsten obviously understood Manker’s admonition when he emphasized in his monograph that the study of the Saami was more laborious than the investigation of any other Finno-Ugrian people. This derived mainly from the fact that the ethnic origin of the Saami was somewhat obscure. (20.) Karsten’s highest ambition was to present a general summary of the early religion of the Saami by using the methods of comparative religion. A part of Karsten’s comparative analysis was the search for similarities between the religions of the Saami and South American Indians. This Karsten preferred to do in the spirit of Tylor and Bastian by underlining the importance of psychology in explaining cultural history. First of all, Karsten considered the elements of human mental life universal. This led him to suggest that over the centuries people living in different parts of the world had assumed similar beliefs and customs independently of each other because the human mind was universal. Therefore, it was misguided to emphasize the determining power of the physical environment, as the German anthropogeographer Friedrich Ratzel did. But Karsten was aware of the fact that a comparative method could be a source of scientifically unqualified generalizations when a scholar easily adopted an uncritical attitude towards his sources. (21.) In order to minimize “methodological pitfalls”, Karsten suggested that a scholar had to employ his procedure correctly by building on psychological facts (22). On the other hand, Karsten emphasized that the religion and culture of the Saami deserved to be studied from its own point of view, not dogmatically subjected to a particular theory of comparative religion. In general, Karsten expressed his deep concern for the humiliation and cultural destruction which had met the Saami in Finland. Karsten blamed the churchmen for calling the religion of the Saami “the work of the devil”. Karsten also refused to understand why valuable evidence of the early Saami religion, the drums of the shamans, were brutally burnt. Karsten’s views were similar to those of the Finnish ethnologist Samuli Paulaharju, who suggested that “the cross broke and christening cast down” (in Finnish, *risti rikkoi ja papinkaste painoi*) the early

Saami religion (23). According to Samuli Paulaharju, Christianity condemned the Saami to the inferno after this life because sorcerers and sorceresses were not mete to inherit the kingdom of God (24). Karsten called the destiny of the Saami a tragedy and claimed that they had battled for their existence more than any other ethnic group (25). At the same time, Karsten fought for the position of South American Indians in his various articles and newspaper columns (*Indianernas rättsliga ställning i spanska Amerika* (“The Judicial Position of the Indians in Spanish America”, 1950). While he advocated the improvement of social, economic and legal position of the Indians, he also supported the preservation of the cultural-historical sites of the Saami, like ancient religious objects, *seita* or *sieidi* (26). In the 1930s Edward Westermarck also supported the preservation of the Saami community, *siidda*, in Suenjel (Suonikylä) region (27). Having given an overview of Karsten’s study of the Saami, I will next turn my attention to the main principles of his study on the religion of the Saami.

5.2.2. Main Principles

The purpose of this section is to analyse the main principles of Rafael Karsten’s study on the religion of the Saami. The question of how Saami studies testified to Karsten’s early premises is gratuitous in the sense that when his monograph was published, Karsten was an aged scholar out of favour for his theory, that is, in view of the fact that Karsten remained an unrelenting evolutionist and animist all his life, he was probably also one when giving an account on the traditional religion of the Saami. Thus, it would be more sensible to inquire, as Professor Åke Hultkrantz (1993) has suggested, how Karsten utilised his old paradigm to conceive the Saami religion (1). The following picture complies with the figure presented in Chapter 5.1.3. which analysed how Karsten’s South American studies testified to his early premises.

Figure 4. *Main principles of the Saami religion according to Rafael Karsten - how Rafael Karsten’s early premises of “primitive” religion were confirmed*

Theories verified	Conflicting theories	New / further information
The belief in spirits animism	The “high god”	The Nordic bear cult
The cult of the dead - fear as the main motive	The system of sacrifice	
Shamanistic practice		

First of all, it is important to notice that Rafael Karsten was the first researcher to systematically use the term “Samek” (or “Saami”) whereas the former scholars had talked about “Lapps” or “Laplanders”. Rafael Karsten separated six different elements in the Saami religion; the worship of *seita*, the worship of nature and personal gods, *noida* (shaman) and his activity, the system of sacrifice, the cult of the dead, and the Nordic bear cult. To some extent, Karsten’s division is related to his analysis of the Inca religion, especially to the worship of nature, the system of sacrifice, and the cult of the dead. Karsten, too, perceived similarities between the Saami stone *seitas* and the Peruvian stone *huacas* (2). Nevertheless, for Karsten the Saami culture represented an image of “primitive” or “low” community and was not directly comparable to the Inca culture.

In the first chapter of his book, Karsten discussed the worship of *seitas* which originated particularly in Scandinavian, not Lapp, religious beliefs. Karsten suggested that the old Nordic *seidr* indicated a “form of magic which was practiced by a female shaman, volvan” (3). In the area of Lapland, the term had received, however, a more specialized meaning. For Karsten the worship of *seitas* symbolized a form of primitive animism or fetishism which had two main features; firstly, inanimate objects of nature were inhabited by spiritual beings, and, secondly, these beings were believed to possess magical powers for which they were worshipped (4). The worshipping changed some *seitas* into real fetishes; stone (rocks) or wooden (staff, wooden figure, etc.) religious objects (5). The Finnish ethnologist M.A. Castrén had previously pointed out that the Ostyaks (Khanti), the Vogules, and the Samoyeds had fetishes identical to the Saami (6). The stone *seitas* of the Saami were often anthropomorphic in form; the spiritual beings which inhabited the underworld sometimes took a concrete *Gestalt* and emerged in stone or wooden *seita*. Uno Harva had also suggested in his *Lappalaisten uskonto* (“The Religion of the Lapps”, 1915) that the most precious *seitas* were made to resemble a human form. (7.) But whether these underworld beings lived in *saivo*-land (the land of the departed) or in *Jabmeaimo* (the actual abode of the dead), was not explicit in Karsten’s analysis (8). As can be seen, Karsten’s notion of *seita* worship was, once more, bound to the Tylorian context; impregnated by a form of Tylorian animistic idealism. Overall, his analysis of *seita* was highly individual. Karsten’s habit of citing many lappologists and comparing the Saami *seita* with the stone fetishes of the Incas and the African “negroes” did not facilitate the understanding of what he really proposed. Karsten never defined *seita* culture more closely - that *seita* culture was probably a family or clan institution maintained by the *siida*, a village or community system. Moreover, Karsten never made an explicit distinction between *seita* forms, that is, family *seitas*, community *seitas*, individual *seitas*, and so forth. The Finnish scholar of religion, Matti Aho (1994), has criticized scholars for presenting confused formalizations of *seita* in their studies on the Saami religion. According to Aho, scholars have produced different interpretations of *seita* probably because they have understood its meaning and form diversely and very individually. (9.) As far as I can see, Rafael Karsten’s definition is no exception here.

Rafael Karsten next turned his attention to the worship of personal nature gods among the Saami. Karsten emphasized that the Saami religion was the conjunction of two opposing entities, good and evil spirits, since the belief that the universe was governed only by good spirits was not typical of “primitive” people (10). Furthermore, Karsten made a distinction between the religious development of Finnish and other Scandinavian Saami people. While the religion of the Finnish Saami had many “primitive” and purely animistic elements, the religion of the Norwegian Saami represented “perfectly developed polytheism”; the more traditional religion moved to the West, the more it lost of its originality, arising from the Scandinavian influence. (11.) Nevertheless, Karsten’s analysis of the natural gods of the Saami was not particularly restricted to the Finnish Saami but also concerned the Saami of Norway, Sweden, and Russia (12). Karsten first pondered the Saami idea of the god of thunder (*Thorgalles*) and proposed it to be of genuine Lapp origin. If the idea of *Thora* or *Hora* emerged in old Scandinavian beliefs it came from autonomous development (*Völkergedanke*), not as a direct “loan” from outside as Kaarle Krohn, Axel Olrik and Uno Harva had suggested (13). The god of thunder was closely associated with the god of heaven but was also a “primitive and purely animistic conception” (14). Karsten built on the *Lexicon Laponicum* (1780) in which Lindahl and Öhrling had given an account of the god of thunder under the heading *Aija* (15);

“The ancient Lapps were convinced of the fact that thunder (*Aija*) was a living being who existed in the air[...] some Lapps even believed that thunder itself was a god [...]” (16).

Karsten also referred to Samuel Rheen, whose work *En kort relation om lapparnes lefverne och seder* (“The Brief Account of the Life and Customs of the Lapps”, 1897) described how the Swedish Lapps considered thunder a living being in heaven (17). Karsten mentioned that later more refined qualities were adhered to the “primitive” god of thunder when it became, perhaps due to the influence of Christianity, the god who determined people’s destiny and punished them according to their acts (18). Karsten, then, analysed the worship of the sun-god which was of Lapp origin. The sun-god, *Beive*, was considered one of the main gods of the Saami and often depicted in the drums. (19.) The reason why the sun was so miraculous a natural element for the Saami derived from the long period of darkness, *kaamos*, during the winter time. Karsten suggested that the Saami made no clear distinction between the sun as a material heavenly body and the sun as a divine being. Both presentations were mixed into one fantasy in their minds, as was typical of “primitive” people (20). Karsten, however, considered it peculiar that the sun had no anthropomorphic appearance in the drums of the Saami. The dazzling and warm quality of the sun obviously captivated the attention of the Saami and they understood it more as a material heavenly body without personifying it. Overall, the sun-god was considered a mother of all animals or living beings. (21.) Karsten next briefly discussed the worship of the moon, *Mano*, but was not altogether sure about whether there had ever existed a moon cult among the Saami. The idea was clearly “primitive”, but perhaps resulted from Scandinavian influence (22). Instead, an example of clear animistic belief was the belief

of the Saami of Utsjoki in wind demons which could attack humans. The real lord of the winds was, however, *Biegoalmai*, who also had a more general meaning as an inhabitant of fells and cold tundras (23). The worship of the god of hunting, *Leibolmai*, was also of Lapp origin. Karsten gave an account of the etymology of the word by noting that *leib* meant alder and *olmai* man. The alder was a sacred tree of the Saami and played a significant role in certain religious-magic rites, as in the trapping of a bear. The alder bark turned red when it was boiled and it was considered equal to human blood, which was sacred and loaded with magic power (24). The person whose face was painted with the red colour of alder was protected from evil spirits (compare to the Jibaro Indians' *Bixa orellana*). Women especially used the red paint as a prophylactic tool to protect themselves from the attack of the spirit of the dead bear (see the bear cult). (25.) If the cult of *Leibolmai* had local characteristics, the worship of the Saami goddesses, *Sarakka*, *Uksakka* and *Juksakka*, had more general prevalence which Karsten called "trinity" (26). These goddesses played an important role in women's lives. According to Karsten, *Maderakka* was the mother of these she-deities. Karsten's explication of this mother deity was brief and, like Uno Harva, he never mentioned that in some Saami shaman drums *Maderakka* found also her male equivalent *Madderatje*, the father (27). Karsten emphasized that *Sarakka* was the most important of the goddesses and had various functions; she was not only a goddess of childbirth but also a guardian deity of women's health (menstruation, for instance) (28). Rafael Karsten, like Uno Harva, explained the existence of *Sarakka* through etymology; her name derived from *saret* or *sarrat*, meaning cleave (in Swedish, *klyva*) (29). Karsten believed that the two daughters of *Sarakka*, *Uksakka* and *Juksakka*, played a secondary role in the religion of the (Norwegian) Saami. Karsten considered these two she-deities mainly a product of religious fantasy. Karsten regretted that the sources did not reveal the real functions of these two she-deities but proposed, however, that the task of *Juksakka* was probably to protect growing children from physical harm (30). It seems that Uno Harva was ready to assign *Juksakka* and *Uksakka* a more significant role in the Saami religion than Karsten. Harva believed that the task of *Juksakka* was to transform the female foetus into a male foetus in the uterus. Thus, the Lapps, who valued male children more than female children, due to the fishing and hunting culture, diligently made offerings to *Juksakka*. In contrast to Karsten, Harva perceived that it was the task of *Uksakka* to watch over the first steps of the child. (31.) But there was a more radical disagreement between Karsten and Harva regarding the worship of these goddesses; when Karsten declared that the worship of female goddesses was typical of all Nordic Saami people and thus of Saami origin, Harva concluded that especially *Uksakka* and *Maderakka* had Swedish and Finnish equivalents - the worship of goddesses was not of Lapp origin but originated in Scandinavian religious customs and beliefs (32). Karsten then went on to discuss *Varalden Olmai*, the "highest god" of the Saami religion (Kaarle Krohn has called it *Veralden-olmai*). It seems that *Varalden Olmai* was, as Kaarle Krohn suggested, above all "a man of the world", *Mailmen Radien* (33). Thus, Krohn in his *Skandinavisk mytologi* ("Scandinavian mythology", 1922) did not directly consider *Veralden-olmai* "the high god" (34). The fact that Karsten saw this divinity as the "high god" was probably due to his technique of interpreting historical sources.

In any case, Karsten was very sceptical of the existence of a true “high god” in “primitive” religions. Thus, in order to legitimate his theoretical viewpoint, Karsten accorded only a trivial meaning to *Varalden Olmai*, who should not be seen as a genuine Lapp divinity but as a god of Scandinavian-Christian origin. In fact, Karsten declared that *Varalden Olmai* was totally unknown among Finnish and Russian Saami people. (35.) Karsten, however, admitted that the cult of *Varalden Olmai* included original Saami features (36). Discussing the demoniac beings of the Saami religion, Karsten suggested that von Düben’s notion that the religion of the Lapps was void of evil spirits was totally incorrect. According to Karsten, the belief in evil spirits and trolls was common among all Nordic folk. Furthermore, the Saami people recognized demons which caused diseases (*Rutu* or *Rota*) and demons with human or animal figure. (37.) Karsten echoed T. I. Itkonen when suggesting that the Saami also believed in mystical beings who were the spirits of dead people or a spirit of shaman who had taken animal or natural form so that he could harm another person. In this context, Karsten mentioned *stallo*, which was a large and strong anthropomorphic figure living in forests and on fells. (38.) All in all, Karsten contended that there was no great distinction between the *seita* worship and the worship of personal nature gods, since both forms of adoration represented the same religious-historical stage of development - that from animism to polytheism (39).

Although the worship of personal nature gods like *Sarakka* formed an important part of the Saami religion, the shaman, *noiden*, and his activity was the most central idea of their early religion. Karsten’s focus, however, was in comparing the South American medicine-man to the shaman of the Saami and Siberian people rather than in discovering how the Saami shaman really acted. Karsten’s integration of shamanistic practices derived from his habit to see shamanism as a universal “primitive” factor (40). The Finnish scholar of religion, Heikki Pesonen (1993), has suggested that Karsten’s comparative method allowed him evidently to observe shamanistic practices which remained unfamiliar to other scholars of the Saami religion (41). Karsten suggested that shamanism indicated an invisible relation of *noiden* to the spirits (compare to Mircea Eliade’s notion that “the specific element of shamanism is not the incorporation of spirits by the shamans but the ecstasy provoked by the ascension to the sky or by the descent to hell”) (42). Karsten found five principal similarities between the activity of the South American medicine-man and the Saami shaman;

1) *Two separate worlds*. The visible physical world and the invisible spiritual world. The former was perceived through normal consciousness, while the latter was accessible only through special initiation, by acquiring knowledge. Only the shaman or an augur was able to “rise” to another world. The part of human which travelled between these two worlds was the “soul”. Today, it is a generally accepted idea that the shaman “rides”, “flies” or “dives” between three worlds (upper, central, and underworld). (43.)

- 2) *The conception of the soul.* The “primitive” people considered the “soul” a thin immaterial humane sight of body, identical with the mist or the shadow, which leaves the body when human’s earthly life comes to an end. After that, the “soul” continues its self-contained existence. The Saami believed, however, that the “soul” went to the underworld *Aimo* where the habitants of *Aimo* lived their life similarly to people on the earth. The soul of the medicine-man or shaman was able to make journeys out of the body, seeing and knowing what the ordinary people did not. (44.)
- 3) *The guardian spirits.* The “primitive” medicine-man or shaman had his/her guardian spirit with whom he/she co-operated in ecstasy or in a dream. The guardian spirits were either bad, *perkeleg-gadze* among the Saami, or good. The number of the guardian spirits determined the authority of the shaman or the medicine-man in a community; the more guardian spirits the shaman had, the more powerful he was. The Saami *noiden* could even discuss with his/her guardian spirit in a “normal” dream. It is noteworthy that Karsten talked about “dream” when pointing to the hypnotic state of the South American medicine-man since a medicine-man never went to a total state of cataleptic unconsciousness typical of shamans of the Arctic. Therefore, the Saami shaman acted in an ecstasy or in a trance which was achieved by magical drinks (made of lye among the Saami) and was a pinnacle of mystical exaltation. The dream of the medicine-man was, however, also a mystical experience. I do not see a fundamental conceptual difference between “dream”, “ecstasy” or “trance” since all of them indicate a state of abstraction, a hypnotic state which carries the person beyond logical thought and self-control. Professor Åke Hultkrantz (1991) has criticized Mircea Eliade for placing too much stress on “ecstasy” as a form of religious experience. (45.)
- 4) *Magical instruments.* A way to control the spirits and to be in contact with them; although the South American medicine-man used mainly rattles in conjuration, the medicine-man of the Patagonian Indians used the drum in a battle between his own vitality and the mystical evil power. The drum assisted the medicine-man in defeating the evil spirits. This was a function that the drum also played for the Saami shaman, whose drum called upon demons. Among the Finnish Saami, the drum was usually made of spruce, pine, or birch which had grown in an isolated, shady place. The drums were different in size and form. The drum was stored in the *posio*, the innermost part of the hut, *kota*. In the conjuration, the spirits went inside the drum or the rattle and through it discussed with the shaman or the medicine-man. Therefore, the drum or the rattle was a kind of an oracle. The pictures painted in the drum or the rattle were not absolutely necessary, but obviously increased the magical effectiveness of the instrument. The study on the pictures of the Saami drum or the pictures the Indians painted in their bodies required the knowledge of the psychology of “primitive” ornamentation, especially that of sympathetic magic (impersonating of a spiritual being assisted in trying to control it). The pictures of the Saami drum derived from their divine and spiritual world. The anthropomorphic figures of the Saami drums often

represented nature gods (e.g. *Biegolmai*, the deity of wind, and *Tiermes*, the deity of thunder) whereupon the animal figures represented the guardian spirits of the shaman or demons veiled in animal motives. Owing to Christian influence, the Saami drum also included Christian symbols which exemplified the Trinity; the Saami probably prayed to God for absolution and oblivion. I call this “genuine syncretism”. In general, *noiden* had to know the pictures of his/her drum very well since the drum was for him/her “the Bible of the archfiend” (in Swedish, *djävulens bibel*). (46.)

5) *Magical songs*. Originally, the Saami song, *joiku*, *jougam*, *vuolle* or *luohti* was similar to the Indian song that was sang in connection to the curing ceremony. The melodic system was based on a wordless, monotonous nasal tune which repeated the same simple motive. The power of the song was dependent on the power of the shaman him/herself. With the assistance of *jougam* the shaman called his/her guardian spirits. The magical songs had also a prophylactic nature. Under the influence of Christianity, Saami *jougam* became profane by losing its magic-religious nature. (47.)

It is difficult to make a definitive judgment on the similarities between South American and Saami shamans. Interestingly, Karsten presented only one factor which marked a great difference between American and Asian shamanism; while in the American shamanism a medicine-man him/herself acquired his/her guardian spirit (by his/her own choice), in the Asian form of shamanism god or spirit introduced itself to a shaman, that is, a shaman had to expend much effort to gain a guardian spirit (through individual striving) (48). In my opinion, shamanistic practices and beliefs were well documented in Karsten’s investigation; the real significance of some practices, however, is not so clear. The ritual equipment (other than a drum or a rattle; clothing, bag, and mask), the real process of falling into a trance and curing of soul loss, the essential features of a shamanism, were not part of Karsten’s profound analysis. We could also reprove Karsten for not giving any particular definition of shamanism. It seems that Uno Harva’s contribution in this issue was more significant. Harva suggested that the Saami *noiden* was either a seer (in Finnish *tietäjä*), a person endowed with spiritual insight, or a performer of the sacrifice (in Finnish *uhrintoimittaja*). Moreover, Harva referred to the clothing of the Saami shaman by suggesting that it was unsure whether the Saami shaman used the costume in the conjury ceremony as did the shamans in Siberia. The only traditional practice among the Finnish Lapps relating to the shaman’s clothing seemed to be the custom of covering the shaman’s head in sacred ceremonies. (49.) Today, the word “shamanism” is used rather ambiguously; the late Jim Morrison, the vocalist of *The Doors*, is even considered a “shaman” (50). Professor Åke Hultkrantz has blamed scholars for making the content and meaning of “shamanism” more than obscure (51). In my opinion, Karsten could also have studied shamanism more closely in connection to the environment and human mentality (52).

Rafael Karsten next turned his interest to the system of sacrifice among the Saami. According to Karsten, both bloody and unbloody sacrifices were typical of the rituals of the Saami religion. The unbloody sacrifices were directed especially towards the goddesses (*Maderakka*, *Sarakka*) by pouring firewater on the floor or to the soil (53). A more striking aspect of Karsten's analysis of the system of sacrifice concerned his notion of bloody offering among the Saami. Karsten explained how the Saami, in order to ensure good fortune in fishing and hunting, smeared the *seitas* with the blood of reindeer, fat of bear or fish oil. Furthermore, the Saami offered male reindeer to the "highest god" *Varalden Olmai*. Karsten's earlier observations among South American Indians had put forward the view that bloody sacrifice was unknown among "primitive" people. Thus, the blood of the reindeer smeared onto the *seita* and the reindeer offered to the "highest god" seemed to undermine Karsten's previous claim. All this Karsten explained, however, by declaring that the blood of the reindeer corresponded to the Indian habit of painting red colour on the skin in order to guarantee bodily power and ward off evil, that is, red colour was a sign of power and protection among "primitive" people. (54.) But considering the fact that sacrifice expressed degree(s) of dependency, the purpose of the blood sacrifice was also to ensure the power of the gods so that they could help the human in her struggle for existence (55). By emphasizing that all blood sacrifices among the Saami were not "magic" in nature, Karsten provided the badly needed support for his idea of only unbloody sacrifices among "primitive" people (56). Karsten considered it peculiar that the Saami sacrificed only the feet and horns of the animals to their gods but kept the meat themselves (at the Incas's Cuzco a red sheep, i.e. the animal dressed in a red shirt, was sacrificed to the Sun daily by burning the whole victim) (57). Karsten suggested that the Saami custom derived from a "primitive" view to regard limbs, hair, and nails as parts of the body which contained magical power (58). Rafael Karsten then extended his discussion to the worship of the dead. Previously, Kaarle Krohn and Uno Harva had suggested that the worship of the dead was the only original part of the Saami religion. As expected, Karsten saw Krohn's and Harva's view as theoretical exaggeration which denied the significance of the worship of heavenly bodies, for instance, by considering it merely a Scandinavian cultural debt. Karsten outlined that in the literature on the Saami religion two kingdoms of death were frequently mentioned; *Saivo* and *Jabmeaimo*. Karsten, however, considered it conceptually problematic to separate these kingdoms from each other. Among the Norwegian and Swedish Saami, *Saivo* signified a "holy mountain" while among the Finnish Saami it indicated "a holy lake or mystic spiritual beings who hung around mountains and lakes and who acted as the guardian spirits of a shaman" (59). But *Saivo* also connoted the soul of a dead shaman. Karsten declared that the view of the Jibaro Indians of spiritual beings which inhabited mountains and which were probably the spirits of dead medicine-men, who after death went to the mountains, was similar to the Saami beliefs. The Saami conception of "land inside the mountain" had gradually generated the notion of the underworld, *Saivo*, in which dead people spent their lives in very similar, but happier, conditions than the living. Such conception of the kingdom of death was, according to Karsten, very typical of "primitive" cultures. Nevertheless, the Saami notion of the kingdom of death had developed

independently of external influence. (60.) The difference between *Saivo* and *Jabmeaimo* was, then, that the former was situated closer to the earth's surface and the latter lay deep in the ground. Due to the deep and dark location of *Jabmeaimo* and the hard struggle the shaman had to go through when rescuing a stolen soul from there, *Jabmeaimo* was seen as a frightening place and that is why the Saami desired to enter *Saivo* after death (61). Karsten argued against Edgar Reuterskiöld who in his *De nordiska lapparnas religion* ("The Religion of the Nordic Lapps", 1912) claimed that death did not mean anything frightening or supernatural for the "primitives". Karsten rejoined that we know from earlier experience that the "primitives" were not afraid of death as a state but that they stood in awe of dead spirits, which caused illness and destruction. Thus, the bodies of the dead were treated with care and respect. The worship of the dead was also much inspired by fear. (62.) To sum up then, we find that Rafael Karsten's early premise that fear was the motive for the worship, became verified again.

The last paragraph of Karsten's study on the religion of the Saami dealt with the Nordic bear cult. At first glance it seems that the bear cult of the Saami was certainly the area where Karsten's theoretical constructs went furthest, considering the new data available. It soon appeared, however, that the Saami bear cult represented to Karsten only a way to compare "primitive" hunting customs and the belief which they aroused. Previously, Johannes Schefferus (1673), Edgar Reuterskiöld (1912), and Uno Harva (1915) had given accounts on the Saami bear cult in their monographs (63). Therefore, Karsten was somewhat unwilling to present a comprehensive analysis of this rite in his work but desired rather to specify the particulars of it ("details", an important prerequisite common to all Westermarckians). For Karsten the parts of the Saami bear cult were the killing of the bear, the burying of the bear, and the worship of the bear. As stated, his general aspiration was to compare "primitive" hunting customs with each other by using a religious-historical viewpoint. Karsten proposed, loyal to his animistic viewpoint, that a bear had a "soul" which was seen as dangerous after the hunter had killed his victim. Thus, certain ceremonies were needed before the meat of the bear could be safely eaten. The "pedantic and precise" rituals performed and repeated in the Saami dead bear cult were, according to Karsten, very typical of all "primitive" people (especially the Siberian people and the Ainu of Japan). (64.) Kaarle Krohn had earlier pointed out the close relationship between the bear cult and the worship of the dead; the Norwegian and Swedish Saami called the dead bear *saivo*, which also signified the soul of the dead. Samuli Paulaharju had noted that the Skolt-Lapps believed that the bear, *äijäseni*, was a human in animal form. Therefore, the Skolt-Lapps considered it "sinful" to eat bear meat. (65.) The body of the bear was loaded with magical power, when blood represented remarkable power similar to alder bark (see the paragraph on "personal nature gods"). The fat of the bear was an excellent remedy for gout, for instance (66). The cult dedicated to the dead bear was also loaded with impersonal magical power, real danger which especially hung over the hunter who had killed the bear. In fact, numerous precautionary measures took place right after killing the bear and in delivering it to the abode (the spirit of the dead bear was dangerous to

the “weak” members of the community like women and children). Karsten stated that the most of the rituals concerning the dead bear were, thus, prophylactic in nature. The Saami custom of beating the dead bear with a soft whip originated, according to Karsten, in a “primitive” custom to “beat the evil spirit away”, to neutralize magical power and to purify oneself. Rafael Karsten compared the Saami custom to the Arawaks of Guiana, South America, who in their *maricarri* ritual beat each other with a whip so that blood flowed - the function of the ritual was purificatory. (67.) When the bear was finally brought home, women put their best clothes on and veiled their heads. The mystical brass ring and the red alder sap sprinkled in the eye protected women especially. Karsten also mentioned that women were prohibited from participating in the cooking of the bear meat and were allowed to eat only certain organs of the bear. Unfortunately, Karsten never specified those organs. (68.) Karsten stated that the re-establishment of the desirable structures of life and society required making the power related to the bear, positive. Finally, a hunter took a trap chain which hung over the fire, began to sing the bear *joik*, and ran several times around the fire. After this he ran out of the door. Then, his wife took a pinch of ash which she threw several times after her husband. Now the husband was re-allowed to have sexual intercourse with his wife. (69.) All in all, establishing a rational opinion of Rafael Karsten’s analysis of the Saami bear cult is difficult without knowing the elements of this ritual more profoundly. I build on the suggestion of Professor Juha Pentikäinen (1995), that Karsten could have observed the role of the bear in Nordic environment more closely (70). Karsten himself believed that his analysis of the early Saami religion was fairly comprehensive (71). The relationship of the Saami to their “pantheon” was both disillusioned and illusioned and thus it was useless to search for any deeper religious emotion in their religion (72). The ultimate purpose of the god or *seita* was to help the Saami in the struggle for existence. This struggle had been the hardest (73).

Rafael Karsten’s study “Samefolkets religion” (1952) was translated into English in 1955 and published as “The Religion of the Samek”. The opinions of scholars regarding Karsten’s work were mixed: the ethnologist Ernst Manker considered the work “of great value” and the Norwegian ethnologist Gutorm Gjessing saw it as “a valuable survey” which, however, lacked “a deeper analysis as well as a critical discussion of the older sources used” (74). Whether Karsten’s study “The Religion of the Samek” was then a real success can be concluded on the basis of the sales; in two years (1955-1956) the book sold seventy seven copies (75). In any event, Karsten’s work paid attention to a significant question of Saami identity - that the Saami want to “develop but not as Norwegians, Swedes, or Finns” (76). A Norwegian Saami printer, Rolf Olsen, has said that the Saami have “the human right to be a group - otherwise we cannot survive” (77). This also concerns other indigenous peoples like the South and North American Indians.

In summary: At the end of Chapter 5.1.3., I promised to give a complete account on Rafael Karsten’s theoretical constructs tested by his field investigations. Did his enormous fieldwork change his theoretical understanding of comparative religion? As hypothetically presented in

Chapter 5.1.3., not very much. It now seems clear that this provisional theory is legitimate. The ultimate purpose of my analysis of Rafael Karsten as a field ethnologist has been to study his field material in order to discover his general pattern of thought within comparative religion testified by field investigations. This analysis has shown that Rafael Karsten's theoretical constructs changed only little during the years and was ready from his earliest publication "Den moderna religionsvetenskapen" (1904), that is, Karsten's religious-historical method moved in a predestined direction from his early works and Karsten never found it necessary to re-define his approach, the evolutionary study of the human past. Rafael Karsten's evolutionary method was fully outlined in his extensive studies on South American "primitive" cultures and in his study on the religion of the Saami. The religious-historical material Karsten's field investigations produced was threefold. Firstly, Karsten's early suggestions of the existence of the "lowest" religion, animism, fear as a motive for worship, death as an unnatural phenomenon, the nature of "primitive" prayer and offering, and general pessimism among "primitive" people were confirmed. Secondly, his observations on the Supreme Being among the Toba Indians and bloody sacrifice among the Saami conflicted with his early suggestions. Finally, Karsten's collection of data produced entirely new information concerning shamanism, ornamental art, and ethnobotany. Since it seems that Rafael Karsten's most significant early premises were verified by his field investigations, it is reasonable to believe that his theoretical framework changed only little from his early publications. Consequently, the theoretical constructions such as cultural evolution, primitive, civilized, animism, magic/religion/science trichotomy, and lower forms of worship really characterized Rafael Karsten's comparative religion.

5.3. Brief Abstract

Rafael Karsten's field investigations were based on the extension of armchair anthropology to the field. Because of the imperative function of "encountering the primitive", Rafael Karsten began to look for the opportunity to undertake an expedition overseas. Karsten's focus on "experiencing" arose from the conversations with Edward Westermarck and Alfred Cort Haddon. But Karsten still had a problem with the field site - where to do fieldwork? Although European anthropology was almost synonymous with Alfred Haddon's and W.H.R. Rivers' Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Straits, Rafael Karsten's field investigations took place in South America. This was due to many reasons, the most important of which were his early childhood interest in the studies of Alexander von Humboldt and the influence of the Swedish scholar Erland Nordenskiöld, who, at that time, was considered the Scandinavian authority on cultural anthropological studies. Rafael Karsten undertook six different field expeditions to South America (Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru) and one to the Petsamo area (the Saami studies). His expeditions among "primitive" people were far from the escapades of a foolhardy explorer. Quite the contrary, his expeditions had a serious scholarly nature, as suggested by Haddon, Westermarck and Nordenskiöld. The ultimate target of Karsten's

expeditions was to establish the universal nature of “primitive” religion when animism, entangled with a cultural evolutionary viewpoint, became most essential as an explanation. Karsten’s holistic viewpoint, which partly derived from Rivers, was also adapted to the study of social customs when the study of social customs illustrated “primitive” religion. The religious-historical material which Karsten’s field investigations produced was threefold. Firstly, Karsten’s early suggestions of the existence of “lowest” religion, animism, fear as a motive for worship, death as an unnatural phenomenon, the nature of “primitive” prayer and offering, and the general pessimism among “primitive” people, were confirmed. Secondly, his observations on the Supreme Being among the Toba Indians and bloody sacrifice among the Saami conflicted with his early suggestions. Finally, Karsten’s collection of data produced entirely new information concerning shamanism, ornamental art, and ethnobotany. Since it seems that Rafael Karsten’s most significant early premises were verified by his field investigations, it is reasonable to believe that his theoretical framework changed only little from his early publications. Consequently, for the rest of his life Rafael Karsten felt that he had found the rudimentary roots of “primitive” religion and argued continuously against disparate explanations of the origins of religion (R.R. Marett’s pre-animism, Andrew Lang’s and Pater Schmidt’s “Urmonotheism”, Herbert Spencer’s manism, and Robert H. Codrington’s dynamism).

6. Conclusion - The Meaning of Rafael Karsten’s Conception of Religion for His Comparative Religion

In the beginning I have to say that I earnestly hope this chapter will not be the readers’ digest of my work since the observations I make here cover only to some extent Rafael Karsten’s extensive career as a scholar of religion. Naturally, the purpose of the recapitulation is invariably to offer the reader the tools for comprehensive understanding of the topic analysed. The title of this chapter addresses Rafael Karsten’s conception of religion in his comparative religion, a topic very popular among scholars of religion even today. Here, the term “conception of religion” is fairly freely defined and points to the inner (spiritual growth) and outer (scholarly investigations, theories, and duties) elements of Rafael Karsten’s comparative religion. In my analysis, I have applied the hermeneutic theory of the German historian Johann Gustav Droysen to the study of the life history of an individual. My examination has analysed Rafael Karsten in the context of Droysenian psychological interpretation, where Karsten has been interpreted through his work and personality, but in connection to his whole existence and his surroundings. However, Droysen’s seven premises of the adequate nature of historical interpretation have given an actual framework to my study, where the psychological mode of interpretation presents the general frame of the study. The principal aim of my relative historical-hermeneutic analysis has been to interpret Rafael Karsten’s scholarly activity within comparative religion, not merely by studying one event in his life (the influence of his

fieldwork trips on his science of religion) but by examining his work on a larger scale. The purpose of relative analysis is also to adhere to the agreement that the study leave room for further analyses, that is, my survey of Rafael Karsten did not aim at a final, complete picture of him, instead it aspired to raise many questions which could be re-examined in the future. Moreover, I believe that written texts alone are insufficient for purposes of interpretation, therefore I have replenished my historical explication with audiovisual experiences (interviews, journeys and radio programmes). The manner in which the past, *historia*, was reconstructed and represented as a tool of my study refers to the whole of the reality in which Rafael Karsten was active. Thus, the past life was reconstructed for a historical era which began in 1879 and followed the train of events to 1956. This chronologic period of seventy - seven years characterized Rafael Karsten's life, from birth to death. The reason for starting with his childhood lies in the fact that Karsten's childhood and adolescence had to be synthesised with his scholarly career, and from this association the idea of Rafael Karsten's scientific career was deliberated. Therefore my analysis proceeded in chronological order. The ultimate rule of my hermeneutic analysis was the premise that it is possible to follow and understand the development of Rafael Karsten in spite of the temporal distance between him and us.

Another element in my study was the study of the spiritual growth of an individual. Understanding Rafael Karsten's spiritual growth was essential to interpreting him as a scholar of religion, that is, the understanding of Karsten's spiritual growth explained his choices in comparative religion. The analysis of Karsten's spiritual growth was like a window which offered a large-scale but focused panorama on the understanding of an individual's life and career. The primary aim of this approach was to identify a religious (and) psychological context to explain how and when the particular individual spiritual development evolved, what its content and objective was, and how it determined the individual's existence (including his religious consciousness). The psychological model which I finally adopted in order to study Karsten's spiritual development was twofold: firstly, it was clearly characterized by the aims of my thesis, that is, it corresponds to Karsten's changing phases of life, and secondly, it was flexibly based on the hermeneutic method of the Dutch theologian Ruand Reinder Ganzevoort. I gave some preference to the hermeneutic method of Ganzevoort because his psychological thinking pattern was the most transparent (Ganzevoort's thinking is partly similar to the thinking formula of A.O.J. Cockshut, who in the early 1960s studied the conversion processes of English agnostics). Ganzevoort's reasoning was novel, since he was one of the first researchers to observe an individual's spiritual development as an entity (from belief to unbelief via crisis, coping and conversion). I borrowed the "outer" structure of his thinking pattern, and created the "inner" content myself. In other words, I borrowed his five-level spiritual development schema, but made the inner reconstruction (concepts and definitions) of the method myself. I also reduced the content, methodological breadth and a certain determinism of the method (I am referring to Ganzevoort's partial dogmatic determinism that stems from his theological background). Such applied research was

meaningful, since the hermeneutic nature of the method allowed free interpretation. This means that other researchers who adopt Ganzevoort's reasoning will be able to make their own interpretations, explanations and understandings. With the help of Ganzevoort's reasoning and my own theoretical understanding of Karsten's life, I decided to analyse Karsten's spiritual growth by using the concepts "Lutheran devoutness", "intellectual change", "survival process", "conversion", and "agnosticism", the conceptual epithets which, in my opinion, describe Karsten's spiritual growth most truthfully.

In Chapter Two, the purpose of my analysis was to examine Rafael Karsten's spiritual growth in terms of his biography. Then, the analysis of the spiritual growth of an individual was applied to Rafael Karsten's life. My conclusion is that in his childhood Rafael Karsten became personally committed to the belief system, it became an attitude, but events and circumstances at the beginning of the century caused a gradual rejection of that attitude system. At that time Karsten had a clear reference system of "unbelief" (here referring to agnosticism) which basically meant the rejection of the key belief systems of his childhood. In other words, the main reason for his abandoning the Lutheran faith was the change of reference groups and the increasing contacts with colleagues professing non-religious beliefs. On the other hand, one reason for Karsten's abandoning the Church was the strict filial obedience expected by his parents, which later irritated him and stimulated the change of his thinking. Scholars have suggested that those brought up in religious settings frequently experience a conflict between religion and science in their adolescence. In these cases the parental figure with the most prevalent religious influence on the child has generally been the opposite parent. These hypotheses are verified in Rafael Karsten's case. Hostility towards the Evangelical Lutheran dogma was a fashion amongst the Westermarckians at the beginning of the century. Thus, being non-religious was a prerequisite for being a scientist in the Westermarckian circle. On the other hand, the anticlerical attitude, agnosticism, was for Karsten a way to express himself differently from childhood patterns. Researchers have suggested that specific family experiences must be worked through in connection with the subject's adult life. A young person is always a seeker who is only rarely satisfied with the religious education of the childhood home. Rafael Karsten was dissatisfied with the religious attitudes of his parents, but finally rejected only one variety of religion, Lutheran dogma, not religion in general. Karsten was agnostic, which meant that he believed that the ultimate cause was unknowable, but in spite of his agnosticism, he was not an enemy of religion, rather an assiduous scholar of religion. The conclusion of all this is that Karsten's humanistic view of life was born in Vaasa but consolidated and became outwardly discernible only when Karsten entered the Alexander University. This suggestion is strengthened by the evidence of family letters, that is, when Karsten entered the university his family still expected him to profess Christian faith. In middle age, Karsten still retained his agnosticism. He felt that an individual had a right to believe in whatever he preferred. In his old age, Karsten's attitude towards religion was mixed. His critical attitude towards Christian faith had become milder, and he no longer

published pamphlets against Christianity and its tenets. He preserved his independence from the austere Lutheranism of his childhood home, but was no longer so critical about Christian dogma. In the 1940s and 1950s, the target of Karsten's criticism changed, to focus on the new modern sociology which infiltrated Finland after World War II. Then, Karsten felt that modern trends in social science had undervalued the work of the old Westermarckian scholars.

The aim of Chapter Three was threefold. Firstly, to define Rafael Karsten's profession - to elaborate why I claim that he is a thoroughly Finnish scholar of religion and why I consider him the only scholar of religion within the Westermarckian school (why do I see the term "Westermarckian study of religions" as a conceptual utopia?). My analysis has proven that Rafael Karsten was the only scholar within the Westermarckian school who not only elaborated the methodology of Finnish comparative religion but also paid attention to its status among sciences. Rafael Karsten was not a philosopher in the free sense of the word. According to Karsten, philosophy was a significant subject but to receive a mark in it had no great value for him. Evidently, this was Karsten's first sign of pronounced interest in comparative religion. But was it meaningful to call Karsten a sociologist then? In my study I considered Karsten a sociologist only on a very comprehensive level. I suggested that he was a sociologist since the representatives of the Westermarckian school were called so. I also made it clear that Rafael Karsten *felt* that he was a scholar of religion, not a social anthropologist *per se*. Above all, Karsten regarded comparative religion as an autonomous field of inquiry inside sociological knowledge. Principally, I saw the "Westermarckian study of religions" as a conceptual utopia since Westermarckian "sociology" as a source of the Finnish study of religions was divided into various multidimensional and multidisciplinary goals. I suggested that Edward Westermarck, in spite of dealing with the religious beliefs of the Moors and Berbers, was more a philosopher and sociologist than a "purebred" scholar of religion. In other words, although Westermarck presented a view of religion (Latin *religio*) and gathered valuable information on the religious history of mankind, his material relating to the religious beliefs of indigenous people offered him predominantly the basis for furthering sociological and philosophical problems. Edward Westermarck was mainly interested in "magic" and its relation to "religion", while Rolf Lagerborg developed the concept of the "sacred" in the Durkheimian and Machian spirit. Moreover, Gunnar Landtman was more an ethnologist and a sociologist than a scholar of religion. One of the founding fathers of Finnish comparative religion, Uno Harva, started his scholarly activity as a Westermarckian scholar but later became a Ratzelian diffusionist. Kai Donner also started as a Westermarckian "evolutionist" but later became interested in Radcliffe-Brown's and Malinowski's functionalism. The purpose of my distinction, presented in Chapter Three (3.1.), was solely informative, considering the analysis of Rafael Karsten as a scholar of religion and should not be taken as an undervaluation of anyone's worthy career. Secondly, the purpose of Chapter Three was to analyse the suggestion of Walter Capps that the main contributors to the study of religions

have been disciplines of other fields. A closer look at this issue shows that the works of early scholars of religion (Herbert Spencer, Tylor, Frazer, Müller, etc.) cannot be unequivocally placed “in the host of others”. In a very real sense classical scholars should be considered significant theoretical contributors to early comparative religion. Thus, the point is that their studies in no way made the study of religion(s) arbitrarily assembled. Thirdly, the aim of Chapter Three was to analyse the theoretical terms of reference of Rafael Karsten’s comparative religion. I then attempted to present the most important persons and factors which gave the impetus for Karsten’s career as a scholar of religion. The proper understanding of Karsten’s theoretical constructs has necessitated a close examination of the history of empiricism (from Sophists to Edward Westermarck), positivism (from Montesquieu to Herbert Spencer), and evolutionism (from Thales to Edward Westermarck). Although all traditions were closely connected to each other, they deserve to be observed separately. An examination of these traditions revealed that each of them can be characterized by different traits and figures with seminal importance. While empiricism, crystallized in the British “anthropological” empiricism of the late 19th century, denied the possibility of *a priori* thought, positivism was more connected to “reality” and “society”. Furthermore, while the analysis of empiricism revealed the significance of Aristotle as a pioneer of observing man *exotica* (the desire to observe the life of other people), the analysis of positivism showed the significance of Auguste Comte as a pioneer of the search for the origins of religion. However, positivism was also based on empirical knowledge of natural phenomena. Evolutionary views or comprehensive “evolutionism” were connected with the former traditions when evolutionism endeavoured to demonstrate the facts of evolution and the place of flora, fauna, and humankind therein. In the minds of Herbert Spencer and Edward B. Tylor, evolutionary ideas were closely linked to social and cultural phenomena. In Karsten’s theory these traditions were formed into one great network which reflected the rise of Finnish comparative religion.

In Chapter Four I analysed Rafael Karsten’s theoretical understanding of comparative religion during the years 1900-1910. The purpose of the chapter was to observe how Karsten’s theoretical terms of reference, presented in Chapter Three, became visible in his writings. In this I paid particular attention to Karsten’s first publication “Den moderna religionsvetenskapen” (1904) and his doctoral thesis “The Origin of Worship” (1905), which formed the very basis of his evolutionary anthropological views on “primitive” religion (non-unilinear evolution, animism, fear as a motive for worship, the existence of the “lowest” religion, and the general pessimism among “primitive” people). Karsten’s early article revealed that Tylorian cultural evolutionism had become the guiding principle of his inquiry, that is, Karsten’s article presented the rapturous evolutionary fervour of his early life coloured by a fusion of biological and socio-cultural aspects. But Karsten’s early article also attempted to improve on Tylorian investigation by emphasizing “emotions”. This psychological determination was intellectual homage paid to his mentor, Edward Westermarck. In his doctoral thesis Rafael Karsten communicated the same enthusiasm for the research of the

origin of religions and the religious life of man that he expressed in his early article. The aim of his doctoral thesis was to trace the origin of religious worship as far as its chief acts, commonly distinguished as prayer and sacrifice, were concerned. Karsten's doctoral thesis showed explicitly that Tylor's studies on the subject of animism were an important early contribution to the field of comparative religion. On the other hand, Karsten re-shaped Tylorian animism by refusing to see it as a "primitive philosophy". Karsten also rejected Tylor's definition of religion by emphasizing religion as a "practical concern" which culminated in worship. Moreover, Karsten denied the existence of the Supreme Beings among "primitive religions" and saw Spencerian manism as one explanation for fear as a motive for "primitive worship". In addition, Karsten explained further his view of the relationship between morality and religion. Karsten's opinions were theoretically veiled in premises of animal psychology such that the mental and moral faculties of animals and men were compared to each other. Although Karsten presented some new perspectives in his thesis, the theoretical elements which distinguished his doctoral thesis from his early article were not many. Since Karsten's literary production on comparative religion was also connected to his personal intellectual development from the devout Protestantism of his childhood home to liberal agnosticism, I also devoted a section to an analysis of his activity in the Finnish-Swedish Prometheus Society and his study on "Paganism and Christianity" (1910). The activity of the Prometheus Society was anticlerical (criticism of the clergy) and antireligious (criticism of theology and theologians), where the anticlerical tendency had a national emphasis while antireligious ideas were closely connected with cosmopolitan and liberal European circles. Rafael Karsten was never the most radical member of the society and his attitude towards Christianity softened after the death of the Prometheus Society in 1914. In Chapter Four I also analysed the dialogue between the Prometheus Society and the Theological Saturday Society. This was important for the understanding of Rafael Karsten's anticlerical/religious attitudes. Rafael Karsten's membership of the Prometheus Society was not only significant to his spiritual growth (ability to show power of opinion over childhood home's religiousness) but also to Karsten as a scholar of religion (to fight against the "old-fashioned" opinions of the Finnish theologians). In general, my analysis also pointed out that it would be totally erroneous to state that the Finnish academic theologians and clergymen were in no way prepared for the rise of new intellectual tendencies. I believe that the Protestant churches must have been prepared for the change since industrialization and changing of world-view did not occur overnight. Yet, it is certain that the omnipotent ideological power of evolutionary thought amazed the Protestant churches, that is, the Protestant churches refused to see that new ideologies would topple people's faith in God. The meaning of Rafael Karsten's study on paganism and Christianity was threefold. Firstly, it was a watershed which the most ultimately separated him from the Lutheran devoutness of his childhood home. His mother Emma Karsten was shocked by the book and was overcome by feelings of ignominy. Secondly, the book was for Rafael Karsten a synthesis of the ideas he had presented in the Prometheus Society between the years 1905 and 1908. Thirdly, the book was his independent scholarly endeavour to prove the pagan origins of Christianity. This

meant original and independent analysis of the history of religions whereby Karsten wished to consolidate his position as a scholar of religion (Karsten was appointed a lecturer in comparative religion in 1907).

In the last chapter of my study, I aspired to analyse Rafael Karsten as a field-ethnologist by examining the field material he produced and to discover the general patterns of thought in his comparative religion after his six fieldwork expeditions to South America and one to the Petsamo area, Finland. The aim of Chapter Five was also a wider understanding: to comprehend why Rafael Karsten undertook six different expeditions to South America and how he gathered his information, and thereby to explain more profoundly how his expeditions moulded his theoretical terms of reference. In his youth, Karsten became interested in the works of Alexander von Humboldt, which stimulated his mind even when he was an experienced explorer. His keen interest in Humboldt was never left him. But more than Humboldt's studies, Karsten's South American studies were guided by the ethnological scenarios and studies of the Swedish Baron, Erland Nordenskiöld. Overall, Nordenskiöld gave meaning and purpose to Karsten's early fieldwork in the Gran Chaco of Argentina and Bolivia. However, we must not forget that it was the Tylorian / Haddonian / Westermarckian empiricism which ultimately drove Karsten out of his chamber. In that situation the geographically distant field site, that is, the absolute opposite to home-study, was the only solution. Apart from Uno Harva and Kai Donner, Rafael Karsten was the first Finnish scholar of religion whose intuition was definitively altered by the "alchemy of fieldwork". It is true that nobody had studied South American religions *in situ* before the Second World War as much as Rafael Karsten. In general, Edward Westermarck, Alfred Haddon, and W.H.R. Rivers were the scholars whose opinions largely contributed to training becoming a standard for anthropological fieldwork. According to Karsten, Edward Westermarck taught the method of ethnological fieldwork. What, then, was the Westermarckian method of ethnological fieldwork that Karsten praised in his studies. Nothing exceptional, we should say. Despite the fact that Westermarck's fieldwork methods were British, they also were a combination of independent fieldwork techniques. Westermarck never analysed or presented his techniques in detail. According to Karsten, the most significant standards for academic fieldwork were sixfold. Firstly, the investigator had to have the proper scientific training for fieldwork. Secondly, he had to stay among the "tribe" he was describing for a long time. Thirdly, he had to know the language of the natives. Fourthly, he had to witness the customs with his own eyes. Fifthly, he had to earn the confidence of the natives. Finally, his investigations had to be entirely free from any particular "school". Again, Karsten's criteria originated in the Haddonian / Westermarckian fieldwork practice. Considering Rafael Karsten's testing of a theory in the field, my analysis pointed out that Rafael Karsten's theoretical constructs changed only little during the years and retained their form from his earliest publication "Den moderna religionsvetenskapen" (1904), that is, Karsten's religious-historical method moved in a predestined direction from his early works and he never found it necessary to re-define his approach, the evolutionary study of the human past.

Rafael Karsten's evolutionary method was fully outlined in his extensive studies on South American "primitive" cultures. Although the Chaco culture, the Indian cultures of the Amazon territory, and the Inca culture had a character of their own and differed markedly from each other, Karsten was able to specify some common features among their material and spiritual culture, especially with the aid of the comparative sociological method. The religious-historical material Karsten's field investigations produced was threefold. Firstly, Karsten's early suggestions of the existence of the "lowest" religion, animism, fear as a motive for worship, death as an unnatural phenomenon, the nature of "primitive" prayer and offering, and general pessimism among "primitive" people were confirmed. Secondly, his observation on the Supreme Being among the Toba Indians conflicted with his early suggestion. Finally, Karsten's collection of data produced entirely new information concerning shamanism, ornamental art, and ethnobotany. Karsten's theoretical necessity (evolutionism) and feeling of inferiority (Nordenskiöld) made him consider the Pilcomayo Indians the "lowest" people while the Incas presented the highest stage of development. This also indicated that Karsten's observations on the Pilcomayo Indians confirmed his early hypothesis of the existence of the "lowest" religion. Moreover, my study showed that fieldwork re-shaped Karsten's opinion of Tylor and animism. Karsten believed that the supernatural power which formed the essence of magic was closely tied with Indian animism, referring to animals, plants, and inanimate objects of nature. As a general rule, Karsten suggested that animism must now be taken in a wider sense. While studying the Indians of the Gran Chaco, Karsten noted that the Pilcomayo Indians believed in malignant spirits and thus fear of these evil spirits which only attacked humans at night was a visible part of their religious worship. The worship of these demons had a very practical aim: to expel them by conjurations, dancing and prayers and thus to secure positive favours. However, the Pilcomayo Indians also worshipped benevolent spirits. This was fairly new information to Karsten since in his doctoral thesis he suggested that "primitive" religion was almost mere demonology. Karsten's notion of fear as the ultimate motive for "primitive" worship was also verified among the Jibaros. Karsten noted that among the Jibaros there was no visible division between good and evil spirits, that is, most of the religious practices of the Jibaros were aimed at expelling evil spirits. Thus, the fear of a demonic spirit was a motive underlying Jibaro worship. Karsten's Inca studies re-confirmed his notion of fear as a motive of worship. In general, Karsten discussed two major forms of treating the spirits: conjuration and prayers. The conjurations played a far more important part since the prayers many times escaped observation and were kept more secret than other religious ceremonies. Karsten concluded that "primitive" religious ritual or cult was an expression of human's instinct of self-preservation and that having realized that her fate depended on the benevolence of invisible spiritual beings, she naturally aspired to enter into relation with them. This relation was manifest in sacrifice and prayer and was not ethical in nature. Karsten's early notion of "primitive" as unhappy was connected with his idea of fear; the fear of malevolent spirits made the Indian unconfident in the regular course of things since everything depended on the good-will of powerful evil beings. This unhappy nature of the Indian also affected her material and intellectual culture. Karsten believed that this was

verified especially in the case of the Chaco culture which was "poor" and in which the world was viewed rather pessimistically. Karsten's fieldwork also confirmed his early notion of death as an unnatural phenomenon in the "savage" mind; for "primitive man" there was hardly anything more mysterious than death. According to Karsten, most South American Indians believed that the soul, a shadow-like image or the second-self of man, left the body at the moment of death. Karsten's research on the Pilcomayo tribes also showed him the existence of the concept of a Supreme Being in Toba mythology. Hence, Karsten's records conflicted with his early notion of the absence of high gods in "primitive" religion or mythology. In his monograph on Indian tribes of the Argentinean and Bolivian Chaco (1932), Karsten admitted that the Tobas believed in two Supreme Beings, the evil *Kaloaraik* and the good *Peritnalik*. Nevertheless, Karsten stressed that these figures played a role only in mythology, not in practical religion, that is, by referring to mythology Karsten avoided the theoretically irritating connection between religion and Supreme Beings - that belief in higher gods was evident among the religion of South American Indians. If the Chaco religion expressed itself in a different pattern than Karsten expected, the religious information he received among the Jibaros confirmed his negative idea of Supreme Beings. Karsten perceived that the two higher deities of the Jibaros, the Earth Mother *Nungüi* and her husband Shakaëma had very few similarities with the Supreme Beings as they were not considered the creators of the world or moral beings. In his "A Totalitarian State of the Past" (1949), Karsten used myths to interpret the nature of *Viracocha*, the highest god of the Incas, and *Pachamama*, the Earth-mother. Karsten was not sure whether *Viracocha* and its additional epithets, *Con*, *Tici Viracocha*, or *Illac Tici Viracocha*, referred to one single "Supreme Being" or different Creator-gods. Unfortunately, the myths concerning *Viracocha* did not give enough information on this issue. After all, Karsten's etymological analysis of the name of *Viracocha* suggested that *Viracocha* was a so-called Supreme Being. As a result, Karsten had to admit that since prehistoric time the Indians in the region of Lake Titicaca had worshipped a "high god". Although Karsten received some further or new information in the field, the information evidently worthwhile to his previous theoretical premises is presented above. For an integral understanding of Rafael Karsten's comparative religion it was necessary, however, also to discuss his ideas of the Indian shamanism and the magical nature of "primitive" art. It was worthwhile to note that Karsten talked about the medicine-man (a sorcerer and a curer) rather than the shaman - a conceptual distinction he preferred in his monographs. Karsten's investigations on the shamanism of the Chaco Indians, the Jibaros, and the Incas pointed out many similarities and thus it was possible, on the basis of his monographs, to reconstruct one universal spectre of the South American shamanistic practice. First of all, Karsten believed that a medicine-man occupied a central role in the religious tasks of a community. Karsten stressed that the medicine-man was, above all, a physician or a curer, not a priest. The Inca state had its priests and its High Priest but a distinction was made between *ichuri*, priest or diviner, and *hambic*, a medicine-man. Furthermore, there was a difference between a medicine-man and a sorcerer; a medicine-man was always a sorcerer practising the magic art but a sorcerer or a wizard was not always a professional medicine-man. Moreover, the shamanistic apprenticeship had some

features that were common to all Indian cultures. In general, Karsten considered the shamanistic tasks to be curing and bewitching. However, the medicine-man was best known as a curer. The South-American medicine-man could be described as a man or a woman having a mysterious life of his/her own. In 1919, Karsten evinced an opposite view to Westermarck's notion of self-decoration by presenting his own "magical" interpretation of primeval art. Karsten's belief in "magical control" in every sphere of culture led to a long theoretical controversy between him and Westermarck. Seventy years after the dispute, it still remains unresolved who was right: Westermarck or Karsten? In my study, I proposed that Karsten started the dispute half-intentionally so that he could gain reputation as an Americanist but also a scholar who dared to argue with an eminent sociologist. But then again, Edward Westermarck, knowing the fervent and sensitive nature of Karsten, also could have abstained from applying the theme of sexuality and eroticism ubiquitously. In my study I also showed that Karsten's claim of botanical knowledge was a proof of his pure pharmacological aspect which manifested itself in his ability to recognize the Latin terms of the plants and in his great interest in the chemical anatomy of the plants. Rafael Karsten was interested in the chemical analysis of the plants since he was tired of Nordenskiöld's and the Swedish pharmacologist C.G. Santensson's habit of drawing conclusions about Indian arrow-poison without knowing the real effects of the poison studied. However, Karsten desired not only to study the chemical substances but also their effect on the human mind and their meaning for the religion of the Indians; the study of the degree of effectiveness of the Indian drugs and poisons moved Karsten closer to "primitive" animistic ideas - to be intoxicated by a drink was identical with being internally filled with a good or evil spirit which animated the plant and its fruit.

Amongst Rafael Karsten's voluminous South American studies, his small monograph on the religion of the Saami was like a utopia - the work which still seemed to be significant and pioneering but, nonetheless, launched by a scholar who was anything but recognized as a researcher of the Finno-Ugrian peoples. I pointed out that we should not talk about an "expedition" to Petsamo, owing to the very limited time (weeks or one month) Karsten spent there. In my study I used the word "trip" when referring to Karsten's visit to the Petsamo area. I believe that Karsten travelled to Petsamo because he was inspired by some ethnologist(s) active in Saami studies but also because the religion of the Saami had become a popular research topic among Finnish scholars; Karsten was attracted by the desire to search for the wild which was not damaged by culture. But on second thoughts it seemed that one reason for Karsten's trip to Petsamo was also his desire to show Uno Harva that he (Karsten) was also able to become an expert in Finno-Ugrian studies. Rafael Karsten was the first researcher to systematically use the term "Samek" (or "Saami") whereas the former scholars had talked about "Lapps" or "Laplanders". In my study I showed that Rafael Karsten separated six different elements in the Saami religion; the worship of *seita*, the worship of nature and personal gods, *noida* (shaman) and his activity, the system of sacrifice, the cult of the dead, and the Nordic bear cult. My examination showed that Karsten's notion of *seita* worship was,

once more, bound to the Tylorian context; impregnated by a form of Tylorian animistic idealism. Overall, his analysis of *seita* was highly individual. Karsten never defined *seita* culture more closely or made an explicit distinction between *seita* forms. Rafael Karsten emphasized that the Saami religion was the conjunction of two opposing entities, good and evil spirits, since the belief that the universe was governed only by good spirits was not typical of “primitive” people. In order to legitimate his theoretical viewpoint, Karsten accorded only a trivial meaning to *Varalden Olmai*, the “high god”, who should not be seen as a genuine Lapp divinity but as a god of Scandinavian-Christian origin. Karsten contended that there was no great distinction between the *seita* worship and the worship of personal nature gods, since both forms of adoration represented the same religious-historical stage of development - that from animism to polytheism. Although the worship of personal nature gods like *Sarakka* formed an important part of the Saami religion, the shaman, *noiden*, and his activity was the most central idea of their early religion. Karsten’s focus, however, was in comparing the South American medicine-man to the shaman of the Saami and Siberian people rather than in discovering how the Saami shaman really acted. Karsten found five principal similarities (two separate worlds, the conception of the soul, the guardian spirits, magical instruments, and magical songs) between the activity of the South American medicine-man and the Saami shaman. The ritual equipment (other than a drum or a rattle; clothing, bag, and mask), the real process of falling into a trance and curing of soul loss, the essential features of a shamanism, were not part of Karsten’s profound analysis. Karsten’s earlier observations among South American Indians had put forward the view that bloody sacrifice was unknown among “primitive” people. Thus, the blood of the reindeer smeared onto the *seita* and the reindeer offered to the “highest god” seemed to undermine Karsten’s previous claim. All this Karsten explained, however, by declaring that the blood of the reindeer corresponded to the Indian habit of painting red colour on the skin in order to guarantee bodily power and ward off evil, that is, red colour was a sign of power and protection among “primitive” people. Rafael Karsten then extended his discussion to the worship of the dead. Karsten outlined that the Saami religion recognized two kingdoms of death; *Saivo* and *Jabmeaimo*. Karsten, however, considered it conceptually problematic to separate these kingdoms from each other. The difference between *Saivo* and *Jabmeaimo* was that the former was situated closer to the earth’s surface and the latter lay deep in the ground. Due to the deep and dark location of *Jabmeaimo* and the hard struggle the shaman had to go through when rescuing a stolen soul from there, *Jabmeaimo* was seen as a frightening place and that is why the Saami desired to enter *Saivo* after death. The worship of the dead was also much inspired by fear. To sum up then, we find that Rafael Karsten’s early premise that fear was the motive for the worship, became verified again. The last paragraph of Karsten’s study on the religion of the Saami dealt with the Nordic bear cult. At first glance it seemed that the bear cult of the Saami was certainly the area where Karsten’s theoretical constructs went furthest, considering the new data available. It soon appeared, however, that the Saami bear cult represented to Karsten only a way to compare “primitive” hunting customs and the belief which they aroused. The “pedantic and precise” rituals performed and repeated in the Saami dead bear cult were,

according to Karsten, very typical of all “primitive” people (especially the Siberian people and the Ainu of Japan). Since it seems that Rafael Karsten’s most significant early premises were verified by his field investigations, it is reasonable to believe that his theoretical constructs changed only little from his early publications. Consequently, the theoretical constructs such as cultural evolution, primitive, civilized, animism, and magic/religion/science trichotomy really characterized his comparative religion.

This in essence is what Rafael Karsten’s conception of religion is about. This is also its meaning for his comparative religion; the spiritual growth (from the cohesion of the society of his childhood days to the life according to the ideals of radical liberalism, and finally to the bitter disillusionment and ambivalence at an older age) which was combined with (or even resulted in) assiduous study of religions. In general, Rafael Karsten’s study of religions can be epitomized in one sentence - “unrelenting search for the very roots”. I end my thesis with the words of the Finnish author Mika Waltari on Rafael Karsten, his personal mentor in the 1930s:

“Giving up theological studies and the real need for clarity made me decide about comparative religion. The lecturer in comparative religion was Rafael Karsten, who lectured about the system of ethics [...] Karsten had studied the religion of the South American Indians and looked desiccated, as if the tropical forest had dried him up brown. He had a serious scientific career behind him and he had gathered extensive material concerning the religion of primitive people. When Professor Karsten got a chance to talk about his research topic, he lectured enthusiastically till the end of the lesson. Later, I have learnt to respect Rafael Karsten. Of my Swedish-speaking tutors, Rafael Karsten influenced me the most” ()*.

This is it. You learn to respect Rafael Karsten only later - after interpreting, understanding, and explaining his life and career. Fundamentally, this communication has taken place every day at almost every individual (and historical) level. My earnest hope is that my understanding will facilitate other people’s interpretations of him.

ABBREVIATIONS

- AFPP Antti Filemon Puukko Papers, Helsinki University Library
 AKSA Academic Karelia Society Archives, Helsinki University Library
 ARWP Alfred Russel Wallace Papers, British Library, London
 EKPC Eva Karsten's Personal Collection, Lund, Sweden
 ENC Erland Nordenskiöld Collection, Gothenburg Ethnographical Museum, Sweden
 ENP Erland Nordenskiöld Papers, Gothenburg University Library, Sweden
 EOP Emerik Olsoni Papers, Helsinki University Library
 ETP Edward Tylor Papers, British Library, London
 EWC Edward Westermarck Collection, Åbo Akademi Library, Åbo (Turku)
 FBCA Finnish Broadcasting Company Archives, Helsinki
 GLC Gunnar Landtman Collection, Åbo Akademi Library, Åbo (Turku)
 KTP Knut Tallqvist Papers, Helsinki University Library
 MMA MacMillan Company Archives, British Library, London
 MKSPC Maggie Karsten-Sveander's Personal Collection, Eckerö, Sweden
 MOMTSS The Minutes of the Meetings of the Theological Saturday Society, Helsinki University Library
 MOMHPS The Minutes of the Meetings of the Historical-Philological Section, Helsinki University Archives
 NP Northcliffe Papers, British Library, London
 PSA Prometheus Society Archives, Åbo Akademi Library, Åbo (Turku)
 RKC Rafael Karsten Collection, Museum of Cultures, Helsinki
 RLC Rolf Lagerborg Collection, Åbo Akademi Library, Åbo (Turku)
 SF MOMFD The Student Faculties. The Minutes of the Meetings of the Faculty of Divinity, Helsinki University
 Library
 SR The Student Registers. University of Helsinki. Helsinki University Archives
 YHP Yrjö Hirn Papers, Helsinki University Library

Hbl. "Hufvudstadsbladet"

REFERENCES

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim and Background of the Study

1. Niiniluoto 1980, 77
2. Pentikäinen 1977, 69

1.2 Previous Studies

1. See Suojanen 1982, 182, 185
2. Allardt 1997, 103
3. RKC. K.G. Izikowitz to Rafael Karsten 19.5.1954
4. Nockert 1995, 185
5. Karsten-Sveander 1993, 121
6. Haavio 1974, 54, 55
7. Susiluoto 1978, 166, 175
8. Numelin 1959, Memorial

1.4 Methods of Investigations

1.4.1. Hermeneutic Understanding of Historical Religious Material

1. Bleicher 1980, Introduction; Mueller- Vollmer 1997, 134
2. Bleicher 1980, Introduction; Mueller-Vollmer 1997, 1, 2
3. Mueller-Vollmer 1997, 2, 3, 4
4. Mueller-Vollmer 1997, 10, 11
5. Bleicher 1980, 1
6. Habermas and Apel developed the discourse ethics (what is a moral question and what is not)
7. Bleicher 1980, 16 - 19; Mueller-Vollmer 1997, 118
8. Mueller-Vollmer 1997, 122
9. Mueller-Vollmer 1997, 119 - 123
10. Bleicher 1980, 15
11. Mueller-Vollmer 1997, 129 -131
12. Barr 1979, 137 - 138; My suggestion is also inspired by Barnhart's premises of the scientific objectivity published in his *The Study of Religion and its Meaning* (1977, 16). Moreover, Diwald (1963, 76) has suggested that Dilthey believed that everything was depended on interpreter's *Willens zur Objektivität* (the interpreter's own desire to reach objective data). I see Dilthey's view as a natural theoretical item of my study. However, my idea of the scientific objectivity is not analogous to the Hegelian idea of "Absolute" which, in my opinion, almost blindly believes that the true judgments are invariably available (for more information, see Lonergan 1958, 384).
13. Hirsch 1974, 5, 27, 28
14. Rudolph 1979, 100

1.4.2. The Study of the Spiritual Growth of an Individual

1. Belzen 1997, 1.
2. Commentary by Nils G. Holm in the Methodological Seminar for Graduate Research Students of Comparative Religion on 22 May 2000 at the University of Helsinki
3. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Emma Karsten 3.2.1914
4. The words "belief" and "conviction" here refer to Finnish "usko" and "vakaumus". It goes without saying that these related meanings between English and Finnish concepts are problematic. Every language is based upon its particular form which is coloured by intellectual characteristics of its nation and culture (here I refer to Wilhelm von Humboldt's view of the nature of language). The difference between the English and Finnish language becomes explicit in the manner in which the words "religion" and "uskonto" are understood, for instance. According to some Finnish scholars, English "religion" is not synonymous with Finnish "uskonto", thus "uskonto" is considered more comprehensive than "religion" (since this is a highly complex issue I do not here pay more attention to the epistemological or morphological elements of these terms). However, the sad fact is that an in-depth consideration of the difference between "religion" and "uskonto" does not lead anywhere. At this point, I discuss the fact that it is impossible to express anything definite on "religion" or "uskonto" in the English or Finnish language. Since we are not able to know what the concepts "religion" and "uskonto" mean, how could we see that there is a difference between them in different languages? This is also related to the concepts of "belief" ("usko") and "conviction" ("vakaumus"). Thus, the words I employ are presented within the linguistic comprehension of the English language. Of course, the entire manner of understanding and analysing takes shape by taking into account the Finnish equivalents, that is, every time I

have adopted a new English term, I have also rendered it into the Finnish language (I believe that a scholar is not able to “escape” the influence of her mother tongue). Thus, when I have employed the word “conviction”, for instance, I have not been able to avoid pondering its Finnish equivalent. This proceeding has never been particularly difficult for me since I have not seen it as a task of my study to ponder how my English concepts deviate morphologically or epistemologically from Finnish terms. On the contrary, I have endeavoured to explain my English terms (Lutheran devoutness, intellectual change, survival process, conversion and agnosticism) as reasonably as possible.

5. Ganzevoort 1994, 21; In my study the concept “spirituality” refers to the spiritual growth of Rafael Karsten. Thus, it indicates Karsten’s transition from Lutheran devoutness to agnosticism. In other words, the concept “spirituality” is an umbrella term for the spiritual growth which becomes explicit in Lutheran devoutness and agnosticism.
6. Ganzevoort 1994, 21 - 25; Ganzevoort’s theological determinism becomes visible in his manner to define “unbelief” as a religious attitude. He states: “Both attitudes (belief and unbelief) address an ultimate concern and ultimate meaning of life, and thereby are fundamentally religious” (Ganzevoort 1994, 24, 25). My first applications of Ganzevoort’s theory were launched in presentations held at the Native American Conference, Lund, Sweden, and in the International Seminar of Comparative Religion, Helsinki, Finland (see Sources).
7. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten in November 1907 and 6.4.1909
8. I here refer to Karsten’s disapproval of Rolf Lagerborg’s writings which regarded blasphemy as entitled. (EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 5.11.1909.) For more information on Lagerborg’s Nietzschean ideas, see Jalava 2001, 390- 402.
9. Commentary by Nils G. Holm in the Methodological Seminar for Graduate Research Students of Comparative Religion on 22 May 2000 at the University of Helsinki
10. News group of Spiritual Growth in Internet. Commentary by “Rachelthe Runner” 2000, “Searching for Truth” at http://www.meritweb.com/_road/0000000f.htm

1.5. Material of the Study

1. Karsten 1935, 16
2. Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 1996, entry: ethnology, entry: expedition
3. ENP. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 21.12.1915
4. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 30.5.1929
5. Jones 1969, 245
6. Mueller- Vollmer 1997, 159, 160
7. Jones 1969, 246
8. EKPC. Rafael Karsten’s manuscript “Ett arbete om moderna etnologer”, page 2
9. Mueller-Vollmer 1997, 160
10. Burgoon, Patricia “What is the proper format for denoting a Web site or other Net address in a bibliography?” and Anderson Peter “What’s a “hit” on a Web page?”, Entry level, Internet World, February 1996

2. RAFAEL KARSTEN'S SPIRITUAL GROWTH IN TERMS OF HIS BIOGRAPHY

* Åkerblom 1962, 8; The original Swedish version of the poem is: "*Hembygd, hembygd, solig och fager står du i dagens och nattens dröm, där mellan slätternas åkrar och ängar glider mot havet en evig ström.*"

2.1. The Intellectual Heritage of Childhood Home

1. Åkerblom 1962, 415
2. *ibid.*, 415
3. *ibid.*, 412
4. *ibid.*, 411; The children of Edvin and Emma Karsten were: Ellen Emilia, Helmi Maria, Torsten Evert, Edvin Julius, Signe Vivia Augusta and Sigfrid Rafael
5. Teir 1981, 213; Pitkänen 1982, 16; Hietala 1982, 24
6. Klinge 1997, 101, 102
7. Räsänen 1991, 71; Interestingly, Kvevlax's church is located within sight distance of the vicarage, for more information, see Godenhjelm 1935, 224.
8. Klinge 1997, 102
9. Åkerblom 1962, 412. Edvin Karsten was the fourth vicar of Kvevlax. The first vicar of Kvevlax was Frans Oskar Durchman (1858 - 1869) (for more information, see Melin 1943, 82). The Huguenot temple of La Rochelle and Caen acted as an ideal for Kvevlax's church (for more information, see Harald 1992, 2).
10. Åkerblom 1962, 412, 413
11. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 12.2.1914
12. Wilskman 1933, 692, 700, 701, 721, 723 - 730
13. Åkerblom 1962, 336
14. *ibid.*, 336
15. Cumming & Cumming 1962, 15
16. Åkerblom 1962, 337. Although young people first disagreed over what should be done in Kvevlax, they at a later date, in 1919, showed their appreciation with hanging the picture of Edvin Karsten to the wall of the youth society (for more information, see Åkerblom 1962, 528, 529, 531).
17. *ibid.*, 282, 283, 311, 529; The Baptist K.O. Broady who lectured on "teetotalism" in Kvevlax in 1877 received a sympathy of Edvin Karsten. Broady described Edvin Karsten as a warm-hearted person (for more information, see Näsman 1962, 216, footnote, 263)
18. Åkerblom 1962, 337
19. *ibid.*, 336, 337
20. *ibid.*, 338
21. *ibid.*, 306, 307
22. *ibid.*, 306, 307, 312
23. *ibid.*, 321
24. *ibid.*, 321
25. Åkerblom 1962, 321; Näsman 1979, 84 - 93; Dahlbacka 1987, 133, 134. I also wish to point out that there was a difference between the foreign Christian denominations and the Christian revivalist movements which were born in the wild of Finland. While the Finnish revivalist movements, Prayer Sayers ("Bedjarna"), the so-called Renqvistianismen, Evangelic movement, and Laestadian movement, were based on pathos and ecstasy,

the foreign denominations, Methodism, Baptism, Adventism, and Free Church, were more schismatic in nature. Martti Ruutu calls foreign denominations separatist movements (for more information, see Ruutu 1967, 101, 102.)

26. Åkerblom 1962, 321, 322, 323. Edvin Karsten's motive for advocating Anna Brita Wikstrand was also pedagogical. If a teacher was diligent and distinguished, Karsten was ready to support her even if she was interested in separatist Protestant denominations. Wikstrand taught in junior school 1892-1899. (Åkerblom 1962, 365).
27. Åkerblom 1962, 323; Näsman 1962, 312
28. Åkerblom 1962, 324, 325
29. *ibid.*, 322, 323
30. *ibid.*, 338
31. *ibid.*, 309
32. *ibid.*, 338
33. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "M.M:s stora sångarjubileum", source unknown, 12.5.1938
34. Klinge 1997, 102
35. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 5.4.1911
36. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 28.11.1902. Klas Edvin Karsten was skilled in music. He knew the theory of music and conducted a choir. However, Karsten's strict mannerism of conducting the choir irritated the cantor-organist Hanelius, who declined to admit Karsten into the church during choir practice. According to Hanelius, Karsten was an outsider and thus not welcomed to the gallery of church (Åkerblom 1962, 312).
37. Holm 1979, 15, 16. Here, I do not consider mysticism an immediate attempt to realize the presence of the living God; on the contrary, I suppose that Emma Karsten's personal mysticism was an eternally established and persistent communion with God.
38. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 1.4.1898; 19.11.1907; November 1907; 16.5.1910; 5.4.1911; 12.8.1911; 14.6.1912; 30.1.1914; 8.2.1916
39. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 16.11.1909
40. EKPC. Newspaper article: Commentary on Klas Edvin Karsten's funeral, source unknown, 22.3.1908. Professor Matti Klinge has illustratively pointed out that up to 1914 the individuals of Finnish families lived in different phases of the modernization process. While some family members adopted a liberal attitude towards religion, the others preserved their old customs and beliefs. (Klinge 1997, 100.) It seems that at the turn of the 20th century Rafael Karsten and his parents lived in different phases of the modernization process.
41. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 6.4.1906; EKPC. Newspaper article: Commentary on Klas Edvin Karsten's funeral, source unknown, 22.3.1908.

2.2. Rafael Karsten's Spiritual Growth and Life

1. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Signe Karsten 11.11.1894
2. EKPC. Ellen Karsten to Rafael Karsten 15.9.1923
3. EKPC. Ellen Karsten to Rafael and Margit Karsten 18.7.1921
4. for more information, see Hietala 1982, 23
5. Dunderfelt 1992, 74, 75, 76; Cumming & Cumming 1962, 18 - 29
6. Erik Erikson, a famous developmental psychologist, believed that school as an external, physical institution increased a child's mastery of the environment and required reorientation on the part of the child. The physical stimulus of beginning school was combined with natural maturing which continuously created psychic reorientations. School was thus a "fundamental epigenetic phase" of the development of child. (for more

information, see Erikson 1950, "Childhood and Society", New York). In my study I have adopted a reduced version of Erikson's theory. However, I admire his clear vision of thought considering reorientation aspect in the development of child.

7. Sunden 1981, 77
8. for more information, see Starbuck, Edvin D. (1911) "The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Study of the Growth of Religious Consciousness", Garrison, Karl C. (1956) "Psychology of Adolescence", Gästrin, Jan (1936) "De växandes religiösa liv", and Kaila, Eino (1934) "Personallisuus". On the study of the dimensions of religiosity in Western Europe and in the U.S.A., see Grönblom 1984, 16- 27.
9. Cummings discuss "twelve-year-old as absent-minded, who cannot yet automatically locate himself in time by physical cues" (Cumming & Cumming 1962, 92). I extend their concept to cover also psychological cues.
10. The background and organization of situation here refers to reference groups like family, relatives, and friends who endeavour to affect the solutions of a young person.
11. My diagram is based on religion psychological studies of Christine Liu (1991), Eugene V. Gallagher (1993), Nils G. Holm (1993), Oser, Helmut and Bucher (1994), G.E.W. Scobie (1994) and Geraldo Jose de Paiva (1994).
12. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Signe Karsten 11.11.1894
13. Hoving 1956, 298, 299, 300
14. EKPC. The family letters from this period support my claim.
15. SR. The Student Registers, 1892 - 1901, 1902 - 1907, roll no 3, 2772 Sigfrid Rafael Karsten
16. RKC. Invitation to Rafael Karsten's inaugural lecture on 15 February 1922 at the Alexander University, page 14
17. EKPC. Helmi Alanen to Margit Karsten 30.4.1922 in Kurikka; Karsten-Sveander 1993, 3.
18. Discussion with Rolf Karsten on 11 May 1994; Karsten-Sveander 1993, 2. Reading various Ostrobothnian newspapers, like *Wasabladet* and *Wasa Tidning*, may have expanded Karsten's views, too. *Wasabladet* was a forum for vivid public argument (for more information, see Gran 1965, 183 and Hoving 1956, 430).
19. SF. MOMFD. 15.11.1899, § 4
20. SF. MOMFD. 15.11.1899, § 4
21. MOMHPS. Antti Sarvi's and J. A. Pärnänen's letter to the University Senate of the Alexander University on behalf of the Student Society in 1905.
22. Ijäs 1993, 69
23. Ijäs 1993, 72
24. Murtorinne 1967, 2 - 14; Klinge 1997, 85 - 90
25. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 28.5.1925
26. Westermarck 1927, 34, 36
27. Ihanus 1990, 48, 61; Westermarck 1927, 34, 35
28. see Mustelin (1963) of Euterpe
29. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Emma Karsten 3.2.1914
30. Karsten 1945, 10
31. Finer 1966, 11
32. De Paiva 1994, 143, 148; Niininen 1947, 20, 21
33. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 20.4.1911
34. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 5.4.1911

35. EKPC. Edvin Karsten to Rafael Karsten 20.2.1904
36. EKPC. Edvin Karsten to Rafael Karsten 7.6.1907
37. EKPC. Edvin Karsten to Rafael Karsten 7.6.1907
38. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 20.4.1903
39. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 5.4.1911
40. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 19.1.1916
41. EKPC. Edvin Karsten to Rafael Karsten 14.5.1903
42. EKPC. Ellen Karsten to Rafael Karsten 18.4.1903.
43. EKPC. Signe Karsten to Rafael Karsten 7.6.1907
44. EKPC. Helmi Alanen to Rafael Karsten 27.5.1911
45. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 28.5.1903
46. RKC. Rafael Karsten's Master's degree in the Faculty of Philosophy, the Historical-Philological Section, at the Alexander University, on 8 March 1902.
47. MOMHPS. The Catalogue of the Professors (1901)
48. Saarenheimo 1980, 24
49. Saarenheimo 1980, 22
50. MOMHPS. The Catalogue of the Professors (1901)
51. RKC. Rafael Karsten's Master's degree in the Faculty of Philosophy, the Historical-Philological Section, at the Alexander University, on 8 March 1902; Wuolijoki 1945, 74
52. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Signe Karsten 22.2.1902
53. EKPC. Torsten Karsten to Rafael Karsten 25.5.1903
54. EKPC. Signe Karsten to Rafael Karsten 23.4.1903; Ellen Karsten to Rafael Karsten 23.1.1903
55. Westermarck 1916, 198
56. Olkkonen 1986, 554; Tuomas-Kettunen 1994, 394
57. Wuolijoki 1945, 97
58. EKPC. Alfons Norrgård to Rafael Karsten 13.3.1901
59. EKPC. Ellen Karsten to Rafael Karsten 23.7.1903
60. EKPC. Signe Karsten to Rafael Karsten 15.5.1903
61. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Signe Karsten 12.7.1903
62. EKPC. Torsten Karsten to Rafael Karsten 26.7.1903
63. EKPC. Helmi Alanen to Rafael Karsten 23.7.1903. Edvin Karsten was also accused of provoking the young against the conscription law. The chief executive officer of the Vaasa county, Gyllenbögél, called Edvin Karsten the worst agitator in the area. Probably this resulted from the fact that the Finnish clergy was considered one of the most influential opponents of conscription. Edvin Karsten's role as a public educator made him look as if he had been a strong opponent of the new conscription law. Naturally, this impression was strengthened when his son Rafael was hiding in London. A person with the greatest influence on public opinion was, however, Johan Jakob Hulden who arranged public argument against conscription in Ostrobothnia. Edvin Karsten denied Gyllenbögél's accusations and went to see the governor of Vaasa. As a result, the governor ordered a new police investigation and Gyllenbögél was transferred to another post (he was sent to Russia to study the language) (EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 17.7.1903; Palmgren 1953, 99 - interleaf "Asevelvollisuusäissä oleville tovereille", page 4).
64. EKPC. Edvin Karsten to Rafael Karsten 20.2.1904
65. EKPC. Signe Karsten to Rafael Karsten 17.10.1904

66. Landtman 1940, 445
67. In his semi-autobiography Landtman describes how he was in the habit of studying books in London's leafy parks. Evidently, Rafael Karsten followed Landtman's custom.
68. Westermarck 1927, 191 - 193; Tuomas-Kettunen 1994, 396
69. Landtman 1940, 453
70. Landtman 1940, 453, 454; Tuomas-Kettunen 1994, 400
71. The cover of Rafael Karsten's doctoral thesis; Wuolijoki 1945, 97, 99, 101
72. MOMHPS. 15.5.1905, § 13
73. MOMHPS. 11.10.1905, § 5
74. MOMHPS. 5.12.1905, § 6
75. Lagerborg 1941, 95
76. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten November 1907
77. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 6.4.1909
78. RKC. Rafael Karsten's Doctor's degree/ Licentiates degree in the Faculty of Philosophy, the Historical-Philological Section, at the Alexander University on 11 December 1906
79. RKC. Invitation to Rafael Karsten's inaugural lecture on 15 February 1922 at the Alexander University, p. 14
80. MOMHPS. 24.5.1907, § 12
81. RKC. Rafael Karsten's various postcards from this period
82. RKC. Gunnar Landtman to Rafael Karsten 23.07.1908; Klinge 1997, 87
83. MOMHPS. Signum M. Mf/Ms 125; EKPC. Newspaper article, Commentary on Klas Edvin Karsten's funeral, source unknown, 22.3.1908; EKPC. Klas Edvin Karsten's obituary.
84. EKPC. Edvin Karsten to Rafael Karsten 7.6.1907 in Wasa.
85. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 20.4.1911
86. Henri Brummer was Rafael Karsten's childhood friend who became a medical doctor and worked in Savo (Savolax), in eastern Finland (RKC. Brummer to Karsten 7.12.1947).
87. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Bref från Gran Chaco" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 17.4.1913
88. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Bref från Gran Chaco", by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 17.4.1913
89. EKPC. Torsten Karsten to Rafael Karsten 20.12.1912
90. Alvarsson 1993, 70
91. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 2.5.1911
92. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 20.9.1912
93. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 14.6.1912 and 3.4.1912
94. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 20.6.1912
95. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 25.7.1912
96. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 5.11.1912
97. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 5.11.1912
98. EKPC. Torsten Karsten to Rafael Karsten 14.3.1912
99. EKPC. Torsten Karsten to Rafael Karsten 14.3.1912
100. Olkkonen 1987, 577
101. EKPC. Scrapbook 2, "Universitetets allmänfattliga föreläsningar", source unknown, 1931; Rönkkö 1991, 176; Pesonen 1991, 127

102. ENP. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 28.10.1915
103. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 19.1.1916
104. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 8.12.1916
105. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 4.8.1919; FBCA. "Etelä-Amerikan intiaanien tutkija Rafael Karsten", edited by Veikko Huttunen on 22 February 1963, archive tape N:o 1783.
106. Karsten Eva 1993, 26; Discussion with Eva Karsten May 1997
107. RKC. Karl von den Steinen to Rafael Karsten 20.6.1914
108. RKC. Koch-Grünberg to Rafael Karsten 20.8.1920. As the Americanist, Koch-Grünberg was highly interested in Karsten's expeditions. He desired to learn more about the photographs Karsten had taken in the field. Unfortunately, Theodor Koch-Grünberg died of malaria in Brazil in 1924 (see ENC. Koch-Grünberg's obituary).
109. Rafael Karsten met Günther Tessman in 1928 and 1930. The information is based on the following letters; RKC. Theodor Preuss to Rafael Karsten 24.5.1930 and EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 12.9.1928. Interestingly, Tessman lived with the young American man called "Pape" and Pape's very young sister did all the domestic work in their house. It seems that Rafael Karsten admired Tessman's and Pape's certain liberty although he had promised to his wife that "she did not have to cook all time" (EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 10.9.1920 and 12.9.1928).
110. Karsten Eva 1993, 28
111. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 1.12.1920
112. EKPC. Emma Karsten's obituary
113. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 5.4.1911
114. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 5.1.1915
115. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 21.4.1920
116. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Emma Karsten 1.1.1917
117. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Emma Karsten 3.2.1914
118. Bothnia II 1923, 45
119. Karsten-Sveander 1993, 13; Wilskman 1933, 726; see also Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 10.9.1920 and 17.6.1921. Their wedding feast was modest since Rafael Karsten's sisters Ellen, Helmi, and Signe were not present (EKPC. Helmi Alanen to Margit and Rafael Karsten 4.12.1921). Interestingly, Ellen Karsten stated in a letter sent to her brother Rafael one month before his wedding: "Let your marriage be lit by eternal sunshine!" (EKPC. Ellen Karsten to Margit and Rafael Karsten 20.11.1921). However, a year after marriage the young wife felt dispirited. Due to lack of money, her husband had to teach sociology and philosophy at the Jyväskylä Summer University. Moreover, he desired to spend a vacation in Naantali without his wife (EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 21.6.1922). Nevertheless, the longing for his fresh wife became so overwhelming that Rafael decided to invite her to Jyväskylä (EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 26.6.1922).
120. Karsten Eva 1994, 12, 13.
121. RKC. Margit Karsten's miscellaneous papers (school report)
122. Karsten Eva 1994, 12, 14; Margit Karsten had a fervent interest in nature. Her literary production is extensive. She wrote articles about the Finnish folklorist Elias Lönnrot, the town of Hanko, the Finnish Dean Gustaf Helsingius, Gustaf Storm the veteran of the War of Finland, the architect Pehr Granstedt, and gasteropods and bivalves. In the 1950s she wrote several articles about the South American Indians ("Bland Indianer vid Rio Ucayali", "Några glimtar från Lima", "IQUITOS, Amazonflodens pärla", and "Med Indiankanot på Amazonfloden") (for more information, see "Festskrift till Margit Karsten 7.5.1972").

123. Karsten Eva 1994, 13
124. *ibid.*, 18
125. *ibid.*, 18
126. *ibid.*, 18
127. *ibid.*, 40
128. Discussion with Rolf Karsten in May 1994; Discussion with Maggie Karsten-Sveander on 9 February 1995; Discussion with Eva Karsten in May 1997 and in April 1999; Wilskman 1933, 729
129. Karsten-Sveander 1993, 13
130. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 15.5.1925
131. Discussion with Maggie Karsten-Sveander on 9 February 1995
132. Discussion with Rolf Karsten on 11 May 1994
133. Allardt 1997, 95
134. RKC. Invitation to Rafael Karsten's inaugural lecture on 15 February 1922 at the Alexander University, pages 13, 14
135. Numelin 1965, 38, 39 (Landtman issue)
136. for more information on Klas Edvin Karsten's personal character, see Chapter 2.1.
137. MOMHPS. 11.10.1905, § 13
138. MOMHPS. 11.10.1905, § 13
139. EKPC. Ellen Karsten to Rafael Karsten 3.3.1922
140. Jussila 1979, 141
141. Klinge - Kolbe 1991, 114
142. AKSA. AKS, Suomalainen Valtionyliopisto 1926, WSOY, Porvoo; for more information on Rafael Karsten's attitude towards language dispute, see his article "Universitetet och språkfrågan" (1933) in which he emphasized the possibility of the student being taught in his/her mother tongue. The Language Act of the University of Helsinki was passed in 1936. The purpose of the Act was to end the language dispute between the Finnish and Swedish-speaking students. This, however, occurred only when the spirit of the Winter War reunited the Finnish people (see, Halmesvirta, Ojala (eds.) 1997, 99.)
143. RKC. Rafael Karsten's miscellaneous papers
144. Halmesvirta, Ojala (eds.) 1997, 99
145. Numelin 1965, 39
146. *ibid.*
147. RLC. Rafael Karsten to Rolf Lagerborg 29.11.1942; When Rafael Karsten undertook his third expedition to South America in 1928 he wrote to his wife as follows: "*Here (on ship) I have talked about science and politics with two older German men*" (EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 14.10.1928).
148. Numelin 1965, 39
149. Landtman 1940, 445
150. RKC. A cheque for Rafael Karsten for the Loubatian Prize, 6.4.1922.
151. EKPC. Newspaper article; "Amerikakongressen: andra dagen endast arbete på sektioner", Göteborgs Morgonpost, 26.2.1924
152. Nelson 1948, 44
153. Nelson 1948, 44. Count Eric von Rosen's most significant ethnographical, archaeological and

geographical works were: “The Chorotes Indians” (1904), “Archaeological Researches on the Frontier of Argentina and Bolivia in 1901-1902” (1904), “Från Kap till Alexandria” (1912), “Träskfolket” (1916), “En förgången värld” (1919), “Bland indianer” (1921), “Ethnographical Research Work” (1924) and “Did Prehistoric Egyptian Culture Spring from a Marsh-Dwelling People” (1929).

154. Discussion with Eva Karsten, May 1997

155. EKPC. Newspaper article; “Missförstådd lyckosymbol”, Hbl., 1.3.1973. The Swastika was Count Eric von Rosen’s personal cross, which he drew after his signature. Von Rosen’s swastika stood, however, in straight line whereas Nazi symbol *Hakenkreuz* leant to the left. It could be that von Rosen’s swastika captured Goering’s fancy and the latter introduced it later to Goebbels who popularized the swastika as the official Nazi emblem (see Snyder 1998, 135); EKPC. Newspaper article; “Vetenskapligt utbyte mellan Sverige och Finland”, Hbl., 9.9.1925; According to the Swedish scholar Christer Lindberg, the relatives of von Rosen have been unwilling to give the Count’s personal correspondence to the usage of scholars. Thus, the most significant information we have on Eric von Rosen and his opinions comes, perhaps, available through his studies. Rafael Karsten’s archives are almost void of correspondence between him and Eric von Rosen. The letters extant contain only brief and trivial notes (“I congratulate you on your award...”), nothing historically significant. In his article *Vår Tid och ungdomen* (“Our Time and The Young”, 1919) von Rosen wrote as follows: “*Opinions on what is the most advantageous to a country have to be disparate [...] there is no social class or party without the feeling of guilt [...] hate is an imposing and violent power and easier to bring alive than [...] love. The Swedish youth, your thoughts should be targeted at preserving rectitude[...] and trying to reach consensus and amity between the social classes and finally to the furthering the non-profit-making policy whether foreign or domestic*” (von Rosen 1919, 17, 18, 23).

Eric von Rosen believed that World War I broke out as a result of a power struggle of the trade blocs (*mammonister*). In my opinion, von Rosen’s text reveals that, at least in 1919, he supported the “multiculturalism” of views in making public decisions. Furthermore, his idea of hatred as a dangerous intellectual tool reflected more pacifist than racist pattern of thought. However, I could say, at a glance, that there are also ideas of fervid nationalism, which was characteristic of Nazi propaganda, in von Rosen’s quotation. Although, von Rosen battled against trade blocs he was not a socialist (see his article *En icke socialistisk tankar om strorstrejken* (1909), (“Non-Socialist Thoughts About General Strike”). In the 1930s, Eric von Rosen and Herman Goering co-operated politically. The Finnish Colonel and merchant Ragnar Nordström recalled as follows: “*Before the Winter War broke out, the attitude of Germany was clear. Goering’s brother-in-law, Count von Rosen, came to see Hackzell (Finnish MP) and me when we visited Stockholm. He told us what Goering had said concerning the relationship between Finland and Russia. Von Rosen advised us to make a memo for von Ribbentrop, and we did*” (Nordström 1996, 240). Nordström’s recollection sees von Rosen as a harbinger of Goering. But, taking into account Eric von Rosen’s unfaltering pro-Finnish views, his encounter with the Finnish officials seems understandable. By using Goering’s political knowledge, he probably aspired to help Finnish people. In his political and personal memorial, Colonel Nordström does not mention Rafael Karsten in any connection. Thus, it becomes obvious that although von Rosen was politically active, Rafael Karsten’s role in political enquiry and propaganda of the 1930s and 1940s was negligible, excluding his government tour in Sweden during the Winter War. Interestingly, Eric von Rosen visited Ragnar Numelin in 1926 with Colonel Nordström (see Ragnar Numelin’s visitors’ book in 1926).

156. Snyder 1998, 122

157. *ibid.*, 123

158. Schur 1935, 35, 36, 37; Discussion with Eva Karsten in April 1999 and May 2001

159. Karsten Eva 1993, 28
160. Lindberg 1993, 102, 103
161. The German Americanists knew by Karsten are not mentioned in Snyder's "Encyclopedia of the Third Reich" which, in my opinion, is one of the most comprehensive studies of the Nazi regime.
162. Laine 1987, 716
163. EKPC. Newspaper article: "Valhepropaganda militarismen palveluksessa maailmansodan aikana" by Rafael Karsten, Sosialidemokraatti, 16.1.1938.
164. Discussion with Eva Karsten in April 1999.
165. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Vi skola nog rida ut stormen ännu en gång. Imponerande Finlands-möte i Eksjö i går", Jönköpings Tidning, 15.3.1940; "Vaarallisinta on vaikeneminen" by Risto Rumpunen, Suomen Kuvalehti, 8.3.2002, nro 10, pages 66-67.
166. Karsten 1951, 5, 9
167. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 22.5.1925
168. RKC. Edward Westermarck to Rafael Karsten 3.12.1919. Dr. Kirsti Suolinna has suggested that the controversy between Karsten and Westermarck occurred much earlier, in the early 1910s. I consider her opinion a legitimate interpretation. (Discussion with Dr. Kirsti Suolinna on 20 November 1998.)
169. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 28.5.1925
170. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 28.5.1925
171. Karsten 1924, 15, 17, 21; 1935a, 490; Lagerborg 1951, 448
172. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 11.12.1925
173. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 11.12.1925
174. RKC. Rafael Karsten's brief biography (draft); see also Lindberg 1993, 101-103
175. Alapuro 1997, 83
176. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Minister Holstis lunch för Professor Westermarck", Hbl., 12.12.1937
177. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 11.7.1927
178. Discussion with Maggie Karsten-Sveander on 9 February 1995
179. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 19.9.1928; see also EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 23.- 24.6.1928
180. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 12.9.1928; EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Professor Karsten reser nästa vecka till Sydamerika" 31.8.1928, source unknown
181. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 12.9.1928
182. Karsten 1964, 21
183. *ibid.*
184. *ibid.*
185. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 12.9.1928
186. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 29.10.1928
187. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 15.9.1928
188. EKPC. Signe Karsten to Rafael Karsten 3.1.1929
189. Discussion with Maggie Karsten-Sveander on 9 February 1995
190. Karsten 1935a, 3
191. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 14.2.1929

192. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 18.3.1929
193. RKC. Rafael Karsten's miscellaneous papers
194. Aho 1993, 40; EKPC. Scrapbook 2. "Sällskapet för Psykisk forskning", 15.2.1930, source unknown
195. ARWP. Helena Blavatsky to Alfred Russell Wallace 7.11.1871;
Edward B. Tylor to Alfred Russell Wallace 26.11.1866
196. Karsten 1932a, 175
197. Karsten Eva 1993, 23
198. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 15.12.1920
199. ENC. Erland Nordenskiöld to Rafael Karsten 8.4.1929
200. EKPC. Scrapbook 2. "Internationella kongressen för antropologi och etnologi", 1934,
source unknown
201. Eskola 2000, 493; Rafael Karsten visited Uppsala frequently. In 1936, the Olaus Petri Foundation invited him to present four lectures on "primitive religion in South America" at the University of Uppsala (EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 17.3.1936).
202. Eskola 2000, 496
203. Karsten Eva 1993, 33
204. EKPC. Newspaper article; "Inkakultuuria tutkimaan", 1.5.1937, source unknown
205. EKPC. Newspaper article; "Malarian tvingade Rafael Karsten att lämna Peru", Hbl., 7.10.1937
206. RKC. Eirik Hornborg to Rafael Karsten 4.5.1940; Mauritz Hallberg was the Finnish industrialist and the Member of Parliament till 1910. (for more information, see Palmgren 1953, 113)
207. RKC. Haavio 1972, 208
208. EKPC. Newspaper article; "Religionshistoria och sedelära i folkskolan" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 11.2.1930
209. Leino 1941, 279
210. MKSPC. Rafael Karsten to "Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten" 5.10.1954
211. Lagerborg 1951, 374; Emerik Olsoni has described Westermarck's last days in his article "Edvard Westermarck - forskare och tänkare" (1952) (see EOP. "Edvard Westermarck - forskare och tänkare", Särtryck ur Samtid och Framtid Nr 4, 1952).
212. EKPC. Rolf Lagerborg to Rafael Karsten 8.2.1940
213. For more information, see Christer Lindberg's impressive study on "Erland Nordenskiöld - ett Indianlif" (1996)
214. Pipping 1984, 329
215. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Vi skola nog rida ut stormen ännu en gång. Imponerande Finlands-möte i Eksjö i går", Jönköpings Tidning, 15.3.1940; for more information, see also Drugge 1983, 73, 76; Zetterberg 1983, 214, 215; Zetterberg has re-examined Max Weber and discuss "the River of Time" in which "the World of the Chaotics" represents the current which is "shaped by growing legions of aimless drifters in big cities; the unemployed, the rootless, the homeless". These "lost individuals lead a life that is marked by rising crime rates". (Zetterberg 1983, 215.) In my opinion, the Finnish society lived in "the World of the Chaotics" after World War II. At that time, the Finnish sociologists used the concept "social control" to explain rising crime rates. The idea of "social control" was originally introduced by the so-called Chicago school in the 1920s (see Drugge 1983, 76).
216. Discussion with Eva Karsten in April 1999 and in May 2001; The Finnish word "*lotta*" is etymologically broad, including also medical services.
217. Discussion with Eva Karsten in April 1999 and in May 2001; Kolbe 1993, 19, 25; see also EKPC. Rafael

- Karsten to Signe Karsten 15.7.1942 (about a shortage of food)
218. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Nordenskiöld-samfundet i Finland", source unknown, 15.4.1942 and 7.4.1943, and "Högtalaren i dag", source unknown, 19.3.1943.
219. Karsten 1951, 5
220. *ibid.*
221. Karsten Eva 1993, 26
222. Kolbe 1993, 232, 233
223. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Snöskottning, kyrka, Catullus och skidor - Söndagsnöjen för helsingforsare", Hbl., Nro 68, 1945
224. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Lärt och populärt. Nathan Söderblom-sällskapet", Hbl., 15.9.1943; Sillen 1948, 40
225. Sillen 1948, 40
226. RKC. Rafael Karsten's miscellaneous papers
227. RKC. Kauko Kuula to Rafael Karsten 15.8.1946
228. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Unga svenska vetenskapsmän till Amazonflodens djungler", Morgontidningen, 8.3.1946; "Svensk-finsk forskarexpedition till Sydamerika startar i höst", Svenska Dagbladet, 8.3.1946; "Finsk professor startar expedition på ett år till Equadors indianer", source unknown, 1946; "Stor finsk-svensk forskningsfärd till Peru", Stockholms-Tidning, 8.3.1946; RKC. Newspaper articles: "Prof. Karsten perustaa pysyvän tutkimuslaitoksen Perussa", Helsingin Sanomat, 24.1., year unknown; "Prof. Karstenin päämaja Iquitoksessa", Helsingin Sanomat, 8.3.1947; "Rafael Karstens expedition", Hbl., 27.2.1947; Karsten 1947a; Discussion with Eva Karsten in April 1999; During the expedition, the Swedish scholar Bengt Danielsson met the Norwegian scholar Thor Heyerdahl in Lima. Danielsson later followed Heyerdahl's expedition to the Pacific. Danielsson became also engaged to Miss Edith Ayllon in Lima. All this was a disappointment to Rafael Karsten, who thought that the young members of the expedition should obey his rules (see RKC. Newspaper article: "Svensk forskare fann sin älskning i Peru", source unknown, 12.4.1947)
229. Karsten-Sveander 1993, 15
230. EKPC. Newspaper article; "Litterär humbug inom vetenskapen" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 27.11.1954.
231. EKPC. Newspaper article; "Gammal och ny sociologi" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 29.3.1955.
232. EKPC. Newspaper article; "Vår Sociologi-undervisning" by Veli Verkko, Hbl., 26.3.1955.
233. EKPC. Newspaper article; "Litterär humbug inom vetenskapen" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 27.11.1954.
234. RKC. Rafael Karsten to Matthew Stirling 20.10.1949
235. EKPC. Newspaper article: "Modern sociologi - några reflexioner med anledning av en avhandling" by Rafael Karsten, Nya Pressen, 4.9.1948.
236. RKC. John H. Rowe to Rafael Karsten 11.11.1950
237. Karsten-Sveander 1993, 16
238. Newspaper article: "DNA shows how Thor Heyerdahl got it wrong", Independent, 9/ Science, 8.1.1998
239. RKC. Rafael Karsten's brief biography
240. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Jarina Cochassa litistetään pienokaisten päät vieläkin", Helsingin Sanomat, date unknown; EKPC. Margit Karsten to Signe Karsten 5.11.1951; Karsten-Sveander 1993, 16

241. EKPC. Newspaper article; "Jarina Cochassa litistetään pienokaisten päät vieläkin", Helsingin Sanomat, date unknown; EKPC. Margit Karsten to Eva Karsten in February 1952 in Lima; FBCA. "Intiaanien käsitys taiteesta" by Rafael Karsten, edited by Unto Miettinen 31.1.1954, archive tape N:o 110.
242. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 22.8.1954
243. RKC. Ragnar Numelin to Rafael Karsten 5.10.1950; it is peculiar that although Karsten seemed to be Numelin's close friend, his name does not appear in the pages of Numelin's visitors' books. Perhaps, such formality was not part of their friendship. (for more information, see Numelin's visitors' books till 1926.)
244. RKC. Ragnar Numelin to Rafael Karsten 30.11.1946
245. RKC. Ragnar Numelin to Rafael Karsten 5.11.1953
246. Discussion with Åke Hultkrantz on 8 February 1995
247. EKPC. Arne Runeberg to Rafael Karsten 16.5.1947
248. RKC. Matti Leppo to Rafael Karsten 12.3.1955; "Valtiotieteelliselle tiedekunnalle", Rafael Karsten's statement in 1955; see also Salmela 1998, 384, 385
249. Niiniluoto, Ilkka 1999, "Kuolleet - Professori Sven Krohn", Helsingin Sanomat, Ajassa - on 3 July 1999 at <http://www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutisarkisto/19990703/ajas/990703aj00.html>
250. EKPC. "Sociologi och socialantropologi" by Arne Runeberg, Hbl., September, 1974; see also Salmela 1998, 97
251. Discussion with Eva Karsten in April 1999
252. Numelin 1956a, 60; 1956b, 234
253. Discussion with Eva Karsten in April 1999
254. Numelin 1957, 16; After Rafael Karsten's death, Ragnar Numelin proposed to Margit Karsten that Arne Runeberg could be the most appropriate person to complete Rafael's study on "The Indians East of the Andes" (RKC. Ragnar Numelin to Margit Karsten 23.2.1956).
255. EKPC. Klas Edvin Karsten to Rafael Karsten 16.5.1905

2.3. Post Scriptum

1. Anttonen 1987, 49. Uno Harva resigned from the post of the clergyman of Kuorevesi on 10 December 1908.
2. see Anttonen 1987, 48, 49. Anttonen suggests that Harva chose theological studies as a result of the religious orientation of his childhood home. Uno Harva entered the Faculty of Divinity at the Alexander University in 1902 at the request of his father. Uno Harva was thus more loyal to Lutheran devoutness of his childhood home than Rafael Karsten.

3. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF RAFAEL KARSTEN'S COMPARATIVE RELIGION

3.1. The Profession

1. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Eva Karsten in February 1955
2. Allardt 1997, 95
3. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Signe Karsten 22.2.1902
4. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Signe Karsten 22.2.1902
5. Allardt 1997, 94
6. Haavio-Mannila and Sweetser 1964, 92
7. Hultkrantz 1994, 102

8. MMA. Edward Westermarck to MacMillan 14.2.1906
9. Landtman 1940, 441; Karsten 1945, 159; for more information on Rafael Karsten's opinion of sociology, see Karsten 1947b, 7 - 11
10. Hultkrantz 1994, 102; EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 20.5.1903 and 2.12.1903
11. Pentikäinen 1977, 62
12. Karsten 1904, 247; Anttonen 1987, 131; Hultkrantz 1993, 43; Hultkrantz 1994, 102; Numelin 1918, 109 - 112; Olavi Louheranta's Master's thesis (1993) "Kai Donnerin tutkijakuva vuoteen 1914 asti"; Discussion with a historian Marja Jalava on 13 June 2001; Rolf Lagerborg was mainly interested in psychology (behavioristic reaction psychology) but studied also ethics (for more information, see Jalava 2001, 400, 401; Salmela 1998, 97). I am not altogether sure about Yrjö Hirn's position as Westermarck's disciple. Perhaps, he was more a comrade interested in the "origins", too. For more information on Lagerborg and Hirn, see Kirsti Suolinna's presentation in the International Symposium - Marriage, Morality and Emotions - Updating Edward Westermarck, Helsinki, Finland, November 19 - 22, 1998.
13. MMA. Edward Westermarck to MacMillan 3.2.1891 in Russel Square, London
14. Hultkrantz 1994, 102
15. Anttonen 1987, 11; Hultkrantz 1994, 103
16. Anttonen 1987, 80; Anttonen Veikko 1997. "The Study of Religion in Finland" at <http://www.abo.fi/comprel/history.html>
17. EKPC. Rafael Karsten's manuscript "Ett arbete om moderna etnologer", page 5; Karsten 1948a, 157
18. Karsten 1935b, 1, 3; Anttonen Veikko 1997. "The Study of Religion in Finland" at <http://www.abo.fi/comprel/history.html>
19. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 19.1.1916
20. Westermarck 1927, 259
21. Haddon 1934, 1; The term "anthropologist" was roughly synonymous with the word "barbarian" which in the Greek language meant "a mutterer", a person who uttered words indistinctly (for more information, see Mikkeli 2000, 55).
22. Anderson 1976, 30
23. Haddon 1910, 99
24. see Murphy 1989, Preface
25. Murphy 1989, 8 - 15; Lévi-Strauss 1963, 354, 355
26. Karsten 1931a, 20; Karsten 1935b, 7
27. Karsten 1935a, 18
28. Karsten 1935b, 8
29. Karsten 1935b, 8, 9; Karsten emphasized an intimate relationship between comparative religion and ethnology (for more information, see Karsten 1947b, 83). This kind of interdisciplinary attitude was also held by Edward Westermarck who, according to Knut Pipping, "believed that the several social sciences complemented each other in many useful ways" (Pipping 1984, 325).
30. This expression was probably part of Rolf Lagerborg's terminology. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate the original source.
31. Karsten 1926, 29

3.2. The System

1. Capps 1979 (Commentary), 179, 180
2. *ibid.*, 179, 180, 183
3. Dr. Michael Pye's Keynote Lecture "The Origins and Methods of the Study of Religions" in the Seminar in Comparative Religion, at the University of Helsinki on 28 September 2000. Interestingly, Dr. Pye reported that his students did not see Rudolf Otto as a scholar of religion since Otto had a theological background. However, there is no definitive understanding of who ultimately is or is not a scholar of religion. In this context, see also Professor Åke Hultkrantz's presentation "The Growth of Comparative Religion in Scandinavia" in the Jubilee Seminar in Comparative Religion, University of Helsinki, on 30 November 2000.
4. Spencer 1904a, 518
5. MOMHPS. The List of the Lecturers at the Alexander University; Wuolijoki 1945, 29; Aho 1989, 64, 73
6. Stroup 1982, 45
7. YHP. Edward Westermarck to Yrjö Hirn 19.12.1898, 24.9.1899, 23.4.1900, 5.12.1900 and 8.12.1928; MMA. Edward Westermarck to MacMillan 8.11.1907
8. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 3.6.1912 in San Pedro de Jujuy, Northern Argentina; Williams 1980, 100; Nandan 1977, xxvii, xxxviii, xxx; I analysed the scholarly relationship between Rafael Karsten and Edward Westermarck in my presentation held in the International Symposium - Marriage, Morality and Emotions, Updating Edward Westermarck, Helsinki, Finland, on 21 November 1998.
9. Westermarck 1927, 70
10. *ibid.*, 82, 83
11. Leino-Kaukiainen 1984, 78, 308
12. Stroup 1982, 183
13. Karsten 1945, 27
14. *ibid.*, 36
15. Jones 1970, 214, 215, 233, 234, 235
16. Jones 1969, 290
17. *ibid.*, 211
18. *ibid.*, 209; I am here discussing comparative religion and the science of religion since these concepts were set forth by Karsten in his studies on religion. However, I also consider it conceptually meaningful to discuss the study of religions. Furthermore, I have not systematically used the term "Victorian" in my study since I am not altogether sure about its content. I suggest that there is no single psychological or ideological unity called "Victorian" ethnology or study of religions (my suggestion is built on views of Herbert Tingsten 1966, 12).
19. National Geography "Maps", Disc 7, Historical Italy, The Renaissance (CD-ROM)
20. *ibid.*
21. Jones 1969, 74
22. Heilbron 1995, 49; Hobsbawm 1996, 219
23. Rosing 1988, 25
24. Jones 1969, 75
25. Bacon 1994, 244, 245
26. Jones 1969, 86
27. Karsten 1945, 75
28. Heer 1993, 243
29. *ibid.*, 241, 242

30. Bacon 1994, 72
31. Woolhouse 1988, 24, 27, 47
32. Wolterstorff 1994, 176
33. Jones 1969, 94
34. Swingewood 1985, 29
35. Dent 1988, 14
36. Karsten 1945, 72
37. Stroup 1982, 25
38. Karsten 1945, 72
39. Milton 1994, 9
40. Locke 1998, 50
41. Milton 1994, 23
42. Pringle-Pattison 1998, 49, 50
43. Jones 1969, 311
44. Preus 1996, 100
45. Wallace 1998, Introduction, VIII, IX
46. ARWP. Charles Darwin to Alfred Russel Wallace 28.3.1864
47. Wallace 1998, Introduction, XI
48. Inha 1926, 212, 579
49. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 29.5.1864
50. Westermarck 1927, 96
51. Karsten 1950a, 137
52. Spencer 1904a, 126
53. Meldola 1910, appendix, Alfred Russel Wallace to Meldola 23.6.1910
54. Meldola 1910, 29
55. Two 1910, 16
56. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 7.4.1862
57. Stocking 1995, 84
58. Barrows 1894, Parts I and II
59. Morris 1987, 98
60. Morris 1987, 98; Lowie 1937, 68, 69
61. Tylor 1874, 342, 343
62. Stocking 1992, 18; 1995, 84, 85
63. Haddon 1910, Preface
64. Stocking 1995, 84
65. Tylor 1958, 7
66. Stocking 1995, 84
67. Haddon 1910, 129
68. ETP. Max Müller to Edward B. Tylor November 1882
69. Karsten 1945, 161
70. Stocking 1992, 21; 1995, 99
71. Stocking 1992, 21; 1995, 100
72. Haddon 1911, 3

73. Stocking 1995, 107
74. Haddon 1910, 86
75. Westermarck 1929, 30, 43, 56, 88, 89, 92, 107, 109, 115, 119, 121, 129, 145, 146, 182; 1927, 42, 55, 90, 95, 96, 100, 120, 139, 140, 143, 155, 181
76. for more information, see Aho 1989, 42, 49
77. Westermarck 1929, 92
78. Klinge 1967, 300, 301
79. *ibid.*, 301
80. *ibid.*, 303
81. Wallis 1989, 56; Männikkö 1990, 550
82. Männikkö 1990, 552
83. Biddiss 1977, 22, 25
84. Heilbron 1995, 66
85. Fletcher 1971, 16
86. *ibid.*, 22
87. *ibid.*, 23
88. Swingewood 1985, 51, 53
89. Karsten 1945, 91; Heilbron 1995, 86, 87
90. Heilbron 1995, 80
91. Karsten 1945, 92
92. Heilbron 1995, 55
93. *ibid.*, 55
94. Collins-Makowsky 1972, 20, 21
95. Karsten 1945, 82
96. Karsten 1909, 17
97. Dent 1988, 14, 75, 88, 89
98. Karsten 1945, 85
99. Dent 1988, 59
100. Karsten 1905, 55
101. Dent 1988, 14
102. Karsten 1945, 90
103. *ibid.*, 96
104. Heilbron 1995, 110
105. Karsten 1945, 97
106. Karsten 1945, 98; Collins-Makowsky 1972, 22, 23, 24
107. Swingewood 1985, 36
108. Peel 1996, 120
109. Collins-Makowsky 1972, 25
110. *ibid.*, 25, 26
111. Tylor 1888b, 452; Karsten 1945, 98
112. Peel 1996, 120
113. Collins-Makowsky 1972, 27
114. Peel 1996, 120

115. Heilbron 1995, 199, 200
116. Collins-Makowsky 1972, 23
117. Swingewood 1985, 40
118. Heilbron 1995, 219, 232
119. Karsten 1945, 105
120. Heilbron 1995, 206
121. Collins-Makowsky 1972, 30, 31
122. Heilbron 1995, 203
123. *ibid.*, 227
124. Swingewood 1985, 41; Preus 1996, 96
125. Dahrendorf 1996, 801
126. Karsten 1945, 102
127. Karsten 1945, 105; Heilbron 1995, 247
128. Heilbron 1995, 254
129. *ibid.*, 222, 254
130. Swingewood 1985, 46
131. Heilbron 1995, 234
132. see Preus 1996, 109
133. Heilbron 1995, 236
134. *ibid.*, 246
135. Preus 1996, 109
136. *ibid.*, 109
137. Karsten 1945, 103, 104
138. Swingewood 1985, 43
139. Tylor 1888b, 144; Karsten 1931, 9; Heilbron 1995, 218; Preus 1996, 96
140. Tylor 1888b, 144
141. *ibid.*, 144
142. *ibid.*, 144
143. Karsten 1935b, 17; Whether Rafael Karsten represented a “hard and fast” positivism is a matter of interpretation. J. Giedymn (1975) has defined “strict” positivism as follows: firstly, knowledge is associated with science, secondly, the aim is at the utmost empiricism which abandons clauses of metaphysics, thirdly, philosophy is reduced to the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics, fourthly, the humanities have the same purposes and methods as natural sciences - methodological naturalism, fifthly, norms are seen through sociological relativism, and finally, the social value of the science and its practical results are considered essential (see Niiniluoto 1980, footnotes, p. 254). All these points can be related to Rafael Karsten’s ideas of positivism but some of them have to be noted carefully if associated with Karsten’s premises. First and foremost, it is difficult to see the philosophy of mathematics or the philosophy of science as strictly attached to Rafael Karsten’s scholarly constructs. His colleague Rolf Lagerborg was more interested in the philosophy of science, being a supporter of Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism (instrumentalism).
144. Karsten 1946a, 22
145. *ibid.*, 22
146. Fletcher 1971, 19
147. Mill 1971, 153

148. Heilbron 1995, 259
149. Mill 1971, 186; Heilbron 1995, 259
150. Heilbron 1995, 259
151. *ibid.*
152. Karsten 1945, 112
153. Mill 1971, 371
154. *ibid.*, 365
155. Karsten 1905, 14, 15
156. *ibid.*, 14
157. *ibid.*, 5
158. Mill 1971, 108
159. *ibid.*, 108, 109
160. Karsten 1905, 2
161. Boutroux 1905, 6
162. Two 1910, 48, 49
163. Karsten 1905, 34; Meldola 1910, appendix, Alfred Russel Wallace to Meldola 23.6.1910
164. for more information on social Darwinism, see van den Berghe
165. Boutroux 1905, 6
166. Spencer 1904b, 296
167. Spencer 1908, 386
168. Spencer 1904a, 517
169. Spencer 1908, 394
170. *ibid.*, 59
171. ARWP. Herbert Spencer to Alfred Russel Wallace 19.3.1864
172. Spencer 1904a, 518
173. see Spencer's "Preface" in "First Principles" (1896)
174. Karsten 1945, 117
175. Meldola 1910, 14, 26
176. Spencer 1896, 64, 65; Boutroux 1905, 15
177. Boutroux 1905, 6
178. Karsten 1931a, 32
179. Boutroux 1905, 13
180. *ibid.*, 12
181. Spencer 1904a, about the religion of the childhood
182. Ihanus 1990, 50
183. Boutroux 1905, 9
184. Spencer 1896, 23, 24
185. Collins-Makowsky 1972, 68
186. Lyell 1863, 394, 395
187. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 30.8.1868
188. Sharpe 1975, 26, 27; EKPC. Newspaper article: "Katolsk religionsvetenskapen och svensk" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl. 29.10.1955
189. Preus 1996, 99

190. Jones 1970, 9
191. Jones 1970,14; Wallace 1998, Introduction IX
192. Jones 1970, 21
193. *ibid.*, 21
194. *ibid.*, 25
195. *ibid.*, 25, 26
196. *ibid.*, 27
197. *ibid.*, 28, 29
198. *ibid.*, 30
199. *ibid.*, 67, 68
200. *ibid.*, 79
201. *ibid.*, 104, 105
202. *ibid.*, 108
203. Jones 1970, 124
204. Jones 1970, 126
205. Saarinen 1995, 24 - 49
206. Saarinen 1995, 50 - 61
207. Jones 1970, 214
208. Saarinen 1995, 50 - 61
209. Jones 1970, 217
210. *ibid.*, 218
211. Karsten 1945, 35
212. Jones 1970, 219; Saarinen 1995, 50 - 61
213. Jones 1970, 223
214. *ibid.*, 223
215. *ibid.*, 341
216. for more information, see Bowker 1997, 217
217. Jones 1969, 86
218. *ibid.*, 91
219. Jones 1970, 169
220. Jones 1969, 191
221. Heer 1993, 29, 84, 217
222. Jones 1969, 208
223. Heer 1993, 213
224. *ibid.*, 217
225. *ibid.*, 217, 218
226. Jones 1969, 215; Heer 1993, 218, 221
227. EKPC. Edward Westermarck "Den Moraliska intuitionen" (page 12), "Till Rafael Karsten med vänlig hälsning från författare", date unknown
228. Heer 1993, 219, 221
229. *ibid.*, 240
230. *ibid.*, 240
231. *ibid.*, 239

232. Jones 1969, 290, 291
233. *ibid.*, 327
234. Preus 1996, 110
235. Heer 1993, 249, 251
236. *ibid.*, 245
237. Laaksonen 1990, 303 - 308
238. Hiedanniemi 1990, 503
239. Thomson 1969, 45
240. Wallis 1989, 49
241. Leikola 1984, 124
242. *ibid.*, 128
243. Männikkö 1990, 509
244. Wallis 1989, 60
245. Tylor 1888b, 229
246. Wallis 1989, 63
247. Wells 1937, 305
248. Darwin 1998, 51
249. Spencer 1896, 210; Spencer 1908, 59
250. for more information, see Leikola 1984, 125 and Pirie 1968, 227
251. Leikola 1984, 128
252. *ibid.*, 128
253. *ibid.*, 128, 129
254. *ibid.*, 130
255. Vallinkoski 1966, 93
256. Preus 1996, 84
257. Forbes 1996, 388
258. Gaskin 1993, 328
259. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Thomas Huxley 1.12.1866
260. Heilbron 1995, 101
261. Preus 1996, 92; Gaskin 1993, 316
262. Karsten 1931a, 8
263. *ibid.*, 8
264. Heilbron 1995, 101, 102
265. Karsten 1941a, 51
266. for more information, see Penelhum 1993, 124
267. Karsten 1941a, 51; Stroup 1982, 135, 136
268. Stroup 1982, 138
269. *ibid.*, 134
270. see Karsten 1941a, 51
271. Karsten 1931a, 8
272. Darwin 1998, 371
273. Beer 1959, 52, 53
274. see Darwin 1998, 370

275. *ibid.*, 370
276. Schilling 1990, 12,13
277. *ibid.*, 17
278. for more information, see Darwin 1998, 370
279. Schilling 1990, 20
280. Leikola 1984, 133
281. Lamarck 1990, 65
282. Darwin 1998, 104
283. *ibid.*, 370
284. see Lyell 1863, 393
285. Darwin 1998, 370
286. Japp 1901, 10
287. ARWP. Charles Darwin to Alfred Russel Wallace 14.4.1869
288. see Wallace 1998, Introduction, XI
289. Lyell 1863, 392
290. Meldola 1910, 5
291. Lyell 1863, 393
292. *ibid.*, 405
293. *ibid.*, 405
294. Karsten 1931a, 28
295. Tylor 1888a, 57
296. Lyell 1863, 379
297. *ibid.*, 380
298. Karsten 1904, 256, 257
299. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 18.7.1871
300. Wallace 1998, Introduction, VIII
301. Inha 1926, 579
302. Meldola 1910, 6, 7
303. ARWP. Charles Darwin to Alfred Russel Wallace 20.4.1870
304. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 29.5.1864
305. Beer 1959, 39
306. Darwin 1998, 372
307. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 2.1.1864
308. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 2.1.1864
309. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 1.10.1867
310. ARWP. Charles Darwin to Alfred Russel Wallace 12.10.1867; Darwin was invited to the Royal Society in 1839 and the French Academy of Sciences in 1878
311. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 29.5.1864
312. National Geography, "People Like Us" by Gore, page 100, Vol. 198, No 1., July 2000
313. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 8.8.1862; At that time, some biologists criticized Darwin's concept of variation arguing that he could explain neither the origin of variations nor how they were passed to the succeeding generations.
314. Darwin 1998, 48, 49

315. *ibid.*, 50
316. *ibid.*, 51
317. *ibid.*, 64, 66
318. *ibid.*, 158
319. *ibid.*, 158
320. ARWP. Charles Darwin to Alfred Russel Wallace 22.1.1866
321. Darwin 1998, 64
322. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 2.7.1866
323. ARWP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin 2.7.1866
324. ARWP. Charles Darwin to Alfred Russel Wallace 5.7.1866
325. ARWP. Charles Darwin to Alfred Russel Wallace 5.7.1866
326. Japp 1901, 36
327. *ibid.*, 36
328. Ihanus 1990, 42.
329. ARWP. Charles Darwin to Alfred Russel Wallace 28.3.1864. I have examined Charles Darwin's pessimism in my writing "Darwin oli varovainen pessimisti" ("Darwin was a Cautious Pessimist"), Aamulehti, 26/11/2001
330. ARWP. Charles Darwin to Alfred Russel Wallace 28.3.1864
331. Spiller 1914, 233
332. Spencer 1904a, 80
333. Spencer 1904a, 125
334. Collins-Makowsky 1972, 68
335. Collins-Makowsky 1972, 68
336. Bager-Sjögren 1893, 63
337. Cockshut 1964, 81
338. Meldola 1910, 6
339. Watts 1875, 3
340. ARWP. Herbert Spencer to Alfred Russel Wallace 6.7.1881
341. Meldola 1910, 7, 14; Collins-Makowsky 1972, 68
342. Meldola 1910, 31
343. *ibid.*, 25
344. ARWP. Herbert Spencer to Alfred Russel Wallace 18.5.1889
345. Savage 1887, 5
346. Spencer 1897, 119
347. for more information, see Marvin Harris 1968, 122, 123
348. Bager-Sjögren 1893, 65
349. Boutroux 1907, 20
350. Spencer 1896, 276
351. *ibid.*, 396
352. *ibid.*, 305, 308, 330, 529
353. *ibid.*, 327
354. *ibid.*, 313, 319, 328

355. Spencer 1896, 343; Collins-Makowsky 1972, 70
356. Spencer 1896, 343
357. *ibid.*, 30
358. Karsten 1935b, 17, 18
359. Spencer 1896, 23
360. *ibid.*, 15, 16
361. *ibid.*, 343
362. *ibid.*, 5, 6
363. This has been originally suggested by Samuel J. Preus (1996, xi)
364. Spencer 1908, 19
365. *ibid.*, 344
366. *ibid.*, 344, 345
367. Elena de Tullio's presentation in the International Symposium - Marriage, Morality and Emotions - Updating Edward Westermarck, Helsinki, Finland, November 19 - 22, 1998
368. Meldola 1910, 33
369. Tylor 1888a, 24
370. Tylor 1888a, "Preface to the second edition"
371. Preus 1996, 137
372. Tylor 1888a, "Preface to the second edition"
373. ETP. Charles Darwin to Edward B. Tylor 30.4.1871
374. Tylor 1878, 2; Tylor 1888a, 1
375. Tylor 1888a, 27
376. *ibid.*, 8
377. Tylor 1878, 374; Tylor 1888a, 19, 33, 34, 58; Tylor 1958, 533
378. Tylor 1878, 375
379. Tylor 1888a, 18 and "Preface to the First Edition"
380. Tylor 1878, 2
381. Tylor 1888a, 25
382. Stocking 1995, 4
383. Tylor 1878, 376
384. Tylor 1878, 373; Tylor 1888a, 6
385. Tylor 1888a, 70, 71; Svein Bjerke (1979) has suggested that the "best general framework for a theory of the evolution of religion" does not stem from the considerations of the classical evolutionists but from the formulations of Sahlins and Service. Bjerke makes a distinction between four evolutionary levels: (1) Family level (hunters and gatherers), (2) Tribal level (horticulturists and pastoralists), (3) Chiefdom level (re-distributive economic system), and (4) State level (force used by political authorities) (see Bjerke 1979, 246).
386. Tylor 1888a, 1
387. Ihanus 1990, 52
388. Radin 1958, Introduction, ix
389. *ibid.*, ix
390. Karsten 1935b, 17
391. Tylor 1958, 1; Karsten's opinion of Tylor's animism, see Karsten 1947b, 115
392. *ibid.*, 8

393. Tylor 1878, 377; Tylor 1888a, 22, 33; Tylor 1958, 9
394. Tylor 1888a, 22, 31
395. Tylor 1958, 9; it is somewhat peculiar that Tylor did not mention “animism” in the “Circular of Inquiry” which he introduced for the purpose of studying the people of the Dominion of Canada (see Stocking 1992, 18)
396. Tylor 1888a, 23
397. Tylor 1958, 11, 194
398. Tylor 1958, 10
399. Tylor 1888a, 469; Tylor 1888b, 2, 3, 16, Encarta 1996, “Transmigration”; for more information on reincarnation, see Cranston and Williams 1993, 7- 10, 35, 37, 39 - 41.
400. Morris 1987, 101
401. Tylor 1888a, 7
402. National Geography, “People Like Us” by Gore, pages 114 - 116, Vol. 198, No. 1, July 2000
403. Morris 1987, 103; Stocking 1995, 131
404. Morris 1987, 103
405. for more information, see Stocking 1995, 130, 132
406. Frazer 1993, 106
407. Frazer 1993, 50, 51, 105, 106, 712
408. Spiller 1914, 234
409. Morris 1987, 105
410. Karsten 1935b, 237
411. About James Frazer at <http://www.kirjasto.sci.fi/jfrazier.htm>, 24.5.1999; James Frazer was also the mentor of Baldwin Spencer.
412. for more information, see Stocking 1995, 105
413. Haddon 1906, 71
414. MMA. Alfred Cort Haddon to MacMillan 11.2.1909
415. Haddon 1911, 25
416. Haddon 1906, 16, 17
417. *ibid.*, 91, 92
418. *ibid.*, 92
419. *ibid.*, 92
420. Westermarck 1927, 27, 33
421. *ibid.*, 78
422. Spiller 1914, 239
423. Wikman 1940, 17
424. *ibid.*, 17
425. *ibid.*, 7
426. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 17.1.1926
427. ETP. Alfred Russel Wallace to Edward B. Tylor 14.12.1891
428. Olsoni (date unknown), page 431
429. Westermarck 1889, 119

430. *ibid.*, 8, 27
431. *ibid.*, 71, 86
432. Westermarck 1889, 7, 8, 29; Westermarck 1936, 38
433. Westermarck 1889, 20, 53
434. *ibid.*, 86, 93, 98, 99, 137, 138
435. *ibid.*, 161
436. Erik Allardt's presentation "Edward Westermarck, A Sociologist Connecting Nature and Culture" in the International Symposium - Marriage, Morality and Emotions - Updating Edward Westermarck, Helsinki, Finland, November 19 - 22, 1998
437. Westermarck 1889, 142; Westermarck 1927, 69; Wikman 1940, 13
438. Westermarck 1889, 53, 63, 143, 146, 160; Westermarck 1936, 18
439. Westermarck 1889, 27
440. Wikman 1940, 14
441. Westermarck 1889, 13
442. Westermarck 1889, 4; Westermarck 1927, 69
443. Westermarck 1889, 4, 6
444. *ibid.*, 5
445. Wikman 1940, 6
446. Westermarck 1889, 5, 6
447. *ibid.*, 4
448. Westermarck 1889, 6; Ihanus 1990, 148, 151
449. Erik Allardt's presentation "Edward Westermarck, A Sociologist Connecting Nature and Culture" in the International Symposium - Marriage, Morality and Emotions - Updating Edward Westermarck, Helsinki, Finland, November 19 - 22, 1998
450. Westermarck 1889, 2
451. *ibid.*, 7
452. Westermarck 1906, 434-436
453. Westermarck 1889, 20
454. Wikman 1940, 19
455. EWC. Edward B. Tylor to Edward Westermarck 15.11.1899
456. Wikman 1940, 7
457. *ibid.*, 19, 20
458. Westermarck 1889, 8
459. Westermarck 1908, 740
460. Westermarck 1906, 1, 4; Westermarck 1908, 738
461. Westermarck 1908, 739; Ihanus 1990, 43. According to Westermarck, Darwinism referred to the theory of selection not to the doctrine of descent as such, that is, Darwinism was nothing but hypothesis of science. Westermarck took the view that Darwin and Wallace had offered new information by asking *why* did organisms ennobled (see Westermarck 1891, 219, 227).
462. Westermarck 1908, 665
463. *ibid.*, 739; for more information, see Mikko Salmela's study on this issue (Salmela 1998, 45-55)
464. Westermarck 1934, 114; Erik Allardt's presentation "Edward Westermarck, A Sociologist Connecting Nature and Culture" (page 6) in the International Symposium - Marriage, Morality

and Emotions - Updating Edward Westermarck, Helsinki, Finland, November 19 - 22, 1998

- 465. Westermarck 1934, 114
- 466. *ibid.*, 114
- 467. Westermarck 1908, 374, 375
- 468. Westermarck 1908, 377
- 469. Wikman 1940, 7, 8
- 470. Stocking 1995, 154
- 471. Westermarck 1908, 746; Olsoni (date unknown), page 438
- 472. MMA. Edward Westermarck to MacMillan 14.2.1906
- 473. Ihanus 1990, 54, 265
- 474. Westermarck 1889, 2
- 475. Wikman 1940, 4
- 476. Morgan 1964, 333, 408
- 477. Anderson 1976, 295
- 478. Westermarck 1908, 728; Westermarck 1920b, 9
- 479. Westermarck 1920b, 12
- 480. *ibid.*, 13
- 481. Westermarck 1908, 746
- 482. Westermarck 1920b, 16, 17
- 483. Westermarck 1908, 728
- 484. Stocking 1995, 152
- 485. Anderson 1976, 295
- 486. Alvarsson 1993, 59
- 487. Olsoni (date unknown), page 445

4. RAFAEL KARSTEN'S THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION 1900-1910

4.1. Article

- 1. Karsten 1904, 247. Uno Harva considered also history of religions a part of comparative religion (for more information, see Anttonen 1987, 78).
- 2. Tylor 1958, 538
- 3. Sharpe 1979 (Commentary), 212
- 4. Karsten 1904, 247, 250
- 5. for more information, see Birnbaum-Lenzer 1969, 87 - 212
- 6. Tiele 1894, 452
- 7. Tiele 1903, 3
- 8. *ibid.*, 11
- 9. Karsten 1904, 246
- 10. *ibid.*, 246
- 11. *ibid.*, 246
- 12. for more information on phenomenology of religion, see Karsten 1904, 247, 249; Waardenburg 1986, 102, 168; Anttonen 1987, 161
- 13. Tiele 1894, 452; Tiele 1903, 12, 13

14. Tiele 1894, 453
15. Gothóni 2000, 40
16. Tiele 1894, 453
17. Tiele 1903, 22
18. *ibid.*, 42, 63, 84, 86
19. Karsten 1904, 252
20. Kuper 1983, 168
21. for more information, see Collins-Makowsky 1972, 8; Morris 1987, 94
22. Bowker (ed.), 1997, 665
23. Stocking 1995, 56
24. *ibid.*, 55
25. *ibid.*, 56
26. *ibid.*, 56
27. ETP. Andrew Lang to Edward B. Tylor 15.6.1898
28. Stocking 1995, 57
29. *ibid.*, 56, 60
30. ETP. Max Müller to Edward B. Tylor, November 1882
31. Tylor 1958, 533
32. Anttonen 1987, 44; Korhonen 1989, 246
33. Karsten 1904, 249
34. for more information, see Müller 1882, see also Sjöblom 1997, 55, 56
35. Gothóni 2000, 40
36. Spencer 1876, 411; Spencer 1896, 43; Morgan 1964, 13; Morris 1987, 91- 140
37. Karsten 1904, 260
38. *ibid.*, 260
39. *ibid.*, 260
40. *ibid.*, 261
41. Bowker (ed.)1997, 665
42. Karsten 1904, 254
43. *ibid.*, 254
44. *ibid.*, 253
45. Bowker (ed.)1997, 653
46. Karsten 1904, 254
47. for more information, see Bowker (ed.) 1997, 968
48. Morris 1987, 116
49. Stocking 1995, 55
50. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 665
51. Karsten 1904, 255
52. *ibid.*, 255, 256
53. *ibid.*, 257
54. *ibid.*, 256, 258, 261
55. *ibid.*, 257
56. *ibid.*, 257

57. Tylor 1958, 537
58. Karsten 1904, 261, 262
59. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 247
60. Honko 1971, 23, 36, 45
61. Karsten 1904, 261
62. Bowker (ed.) 1997, xxiii
63. Hultkrantz 1994, 103
64. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 20.5.1903

4.2. Doctoral thesis

1. MOMHPS. 5.12.1905, § 6. Edward Westermarck's statement on Rafael Karsten's doctoral thesis (1.12.1905).
2. MOMHPS. 5.12.1905, § 6. Edward Westermarck's statement on Gunnar Landtman's doctoral thesis (1.12.1905); RKC. James Frazer to Rafael Karsten 25.6.1907. In 1920, Karsten sent his monographies to Frazer who congratulated Karsten "on the excellent results of your researches in South America" (RKC. James Frazer to Rafael Karsten 2.11.1920).
3. Karsten 1905, 3, 4
4. *ibid.*, 1, 2
5. *ibid.*, 1
6. *ibid.*, 1
7. Morris 1987, 113
8. Westermarck 1889, 6
9. Karsten 1905, 2
10. *ibid.*, 2, 3, 7
11. *ibid.*, 4
12. *ibid.*, 5
13. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English language. Third Edition. Copyright 1992 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Electronic version licensed from INSO Corporation.
14. Karsten 1905, 5
15. *ibid.*, 5
16. *ibid.*, 6
17. *ibid.*, 6
18. *ibid.*, 7
19. *ibid.*, 8, 27
20. *ibid.*, 7
21. Westermarck 1889, 27
22. Karsten 1905, 7
23. *ibid.*, 8
24. MOMHPS. 5.12.1905, § 6. Edward Westermarck's statement on Rafael Karsten's doctoral thesis (1.12.1905).
25. Karsten 1905, 8, 9
26. Westermarck 1927, 80
27. Valkonen 1969, 9
28. Karsten 1905, 10, 11

29. *ibid.*, 12
30. *ibid.*, 12
31. *ibid.*, 13
32. *ibid.*, 13, 14, 24
33. *ibid.*, 14, 15
34. *ibid.*, 18, 19
35. Lett 1997, 109
36. Karsten 1905, 21
37. *ibid.*, 21 - 24
38. *ibid.*, 25, 27
39. Ihanus 1990, 67
40. Karsten 1905, 32
41. *ibid.*, 32
42. *ibid.*, 32, 33
43. Hultkrantz 1994, 104
44. Spencer 1896, 43
45. *ibid.*, 43, 46
46. Karsten 1905, 37. Mary Henrietta Kingsley (1862 - 1900) was the British explorer of West and Central Africa who was the first European to visit parts of Gabon. Kingsley made her first visit to Africa in 1893. During her various trips in Cameroon and Gabon she studied the life and culture of the Fang people of the Great Forest region at Lambaréné. Her most famous works are *Travels in West Africa* (1897) and *West African Studies* (1899) (for more information, see Stocking 1995, 373).
47. Karsten 1905, 34
48. *ibid.*, 36
49. Spencer 1896, 34, 35
50. Karsten 1905, 40
51. *ibid.*, 38, 106
52. Hultkrantz 1994, 104
53. for more information, see Karsten 1905, 110
54. Karsten 1905, 106
55. *ibid.*, 106
56. *ibid.*, 36
57. *ibid.*, 36, 37
58. *ibid.*, 37
59. *ibid.*, 37
60. Guthrie 1997, 493
61. *ibid.*, 493
62. *ibid.*, 493
63. Karsten 1905, 33
64. *ibid.*, 44, 110
65. Morris 1987, 141, 142; Gaskin 1993, 319
66. Karsten 1905, 42

67. *ibid.*, 46
68. *ibid.*, 42
69. Tylor 1958, 8
70. Karsten 1905, 42; Encarta 96 Encyclopedia, entry: Rudolf Otto
71. ETP. Andrew Lang to Edward B. Tylor 15.6.1898
72. Karsten 1905, 50
73. *ibid.*, 50, 51
74. Correspondence to Riku Hämäläinen 2001; Hämäläinen 2000, 91
75. Karsten 1905, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58
76. *ibid.*, 59, 60
77. Morris 1987, 105
78. for more information, see Karsten 1935b, 14
79. Spiller 1914, 235
80. *ibid.*, 235 – 251
81. Haddon 1910, 88, 89, 90, 92, 95
82. Spiller 1914, 240
83. *ibid.*, 236, 237
84. for more information, see Karsten 1935b, 21
85. Karsten 1905, 60
86. *ibid.*, 83
87. *ibid.*, 74
88. *ibid.*, 85
89. Karsten 1905, 88, 94, 96, 97; Karsten 1906a, 3, 5, 7
90. Karsten 1905, 101
91. *ibid.*, 101, 102
92. *ibid.*, 102
93. Numelin 1941, 276
94. MOMHPS. 5.12.1905, § 6. Edward Westermarck's statement on Rafael Karsten's doctoral thesis (1.12.1905).
95. Numelin 1941, 276
96. *ibid.*, 276

4. 3. The Polemic on the Doctrine and Institutions of Christianity

4.3.1. Society

1. Mustelin 1963, 31
2. *ibid.*, 32
3. *ibid.*, 33, 34, 35, 36
4. *ibid.*, 40
5. Jansson 1990, 275, 276, 278, 282
6. Birnbaum & Lenzer 1969, 7
7. Mustelin 1963, 10, 11

8. *ibid.*, 9, 10
9. *ibid.*, 11, 13
10. Ehrnrooth 1947, 133, 134; Mustelin 1963, 14, 16
11. Korevo 1910, 20, 21
12. *ibid.*, 18, 19
13. Mustelin 1963, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22; The composer and pianist Karl Theodor Flodin (1858-1925) was the editor of the *Euterpe*. Flodin published the *Euterpe* until 1905 when the last number was issued. Flodin also promoted the career of the young Jean Sibelius. The one year's subscription to the *Euterpe* cost 10 marks in the Helsinki area. In other parts of Finland it cost 12 marks. The *Euterpe* came out 52 times a year. (Söderholm 1973, 301, 304, 305, 306.)
14. Landtman 1940, 407, 408
15. Ehrnrooth 1947, 136; Mustelin 1963, 57
16. Mustelin 1963, 277
17. *ibid.*, 277
18. Lagerborg 1942, 304. In 1899, Lagerborg published booklet "*Reform af etiken*" which was written in an idealistic and poetic manner ("Etiken har att uppbygga, väcka och värma.") ("Ethics elevates, awakes and warms") (see Lagerborg 1899, 15).
19. Lagerborg 1942, 305
20. Mustelin 1963, 287
21. Lagerborg 1897, 3
22. Allardt 1997, 105
23. Mustelin 1963, 277
24. Mustelin 1963, 215, 317; Lagerborg 1897, 7
25. Mustelin 1963, 214
26. Lagerborg 1897, 7
27. Mustelin 1963, 322
28. Murtorinne 1967, 11 - 13
29. Murtorinne 1988, 177, 226
30. Murtorinne 1978, 273, 274
31. Lagerborg 1942, 383; Mustelin 1963, 273; Ehrnrooth 1947, 138, 139; The original Swedish version is "Ungdomens nya syn på livet har anspråk på samma respekt, som tillkommer varje allvarlig övertygelse".
32. PSA. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society, 29.10.1905, § 3, (in Finnish)
33. PSA. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society, 29.10.1905, § 5, (in Finnish)
34. PSA. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society, 29.10.1905, § 10, (in Finnish)
35. PSA. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society, 3.12.1905, § 6, (in Finnish)
36. Murtorinne 1967, 39
37. Westermarck 1927, 275
38. Klinge 1978, 288
39. Veikkola 1969, 21
40. for more information, see PSA. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society, 25.3.1906, § 10 (in Finnish)
41. Lagerborg 1941, 95, 96
42. Westermarck 1927, 276, 277

43. PSA. The Minutes of the Meetings of the Prometheus Society, 3.12.1905, § 5; 25.3.1906, § 4, § 10 (in Finnish); Lagerborg 1941, 95; Rafael Karsten was the member of the Labour Committee of Prometheus Society 1909-1910 (see the Minutes of the Meetings of the Prometheus Society, 17.10.1909 and 27.10.1910).
44. PSA. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society, 25.3.1906, § 4 (in Finnish)
45. Lagerborg 1941, 101
46. *ibid.*, 102
47. PSA. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society, 3.12.1906, § 1, § 3 (in Finnish)
48. Westermarck 1913, 8, 17, 22, 29
49. MOMHPS. 24.5.1907, § 12. Docent Zach Castrén's statement on Rafael Karsten's docent application.
50. Lagerborg 1907, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8
51. Veikkola 1969, 25
52. *ibid.*, 25
53. Murtorinne 1967, 244
54. SF MOMFD. 7.10.1903, § 5
55. SF MOMFD. 7.10.1903, § 5
56. Lagerborg 1942, 346
57. Veikkola 1969, 61
58. Kena 1979, 22
59. RLC. Rafael Karsten to Rolf Lagerborg 29.11.1942 in Helsinki
60. RKC. Ragnar Numelin to Rafael Karsten 6.3.1949 in Brussels; PSA. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society, 21.11.1912, § 7 (in Swedish)
61. Veikkola 1969, 58, 59
62. for more information, see Murtorinne 1988, 166
63. Tervonen 1991, 205, 206
64. Alanen 1945, 114, 115
65. *ibid.*, 88
66. *ibid.*, 88
67. Murtorinne 1988, 170. The term "secularization" was introduced within theology in the Mission Conference of Jerusalem in 1928 (Kaila 1932, 7).
68. Hjelt 1909, 1- 7
69. *ibid.*, 14 – 16
70. Murtorinne 1988, 170
71. *ibid.*, 167
72. *ibid.*, 167
73. Aulen 1927, 285
74. Murtorinne 1988, 169; Murtorinne 1993, 10
75. Murtorinne 1988, 170
76. *ibid.*, 211, 212
77. Kaila 1906, 13
78. *ibid.*, 13
79. Kaila 1932, 14, 18

80. Anttonen 1980, 64, 65; Anttonen 1987, 39
81. Ruuth 1944, 47
82. Murtorinne 1988, 219
83. Alanen 1945, 148
84. Ruuth 1944, 10, 11
85. *ibid.*, 7
86. *ibid.*, 14, 18
87. *ibid.*, 19
88. MOMTSS. Booklet: The Theological Saturday Society. Manuscript (draft) by K.K.Aro
89. MOMTSS. Booklet: The Minutes of the Meetings of the Theological Saturday Society 1896-1905, The meeting on 1 February 1896, § 1, § 5.
90. MOMTSS. Booklet: The Minutes of the Meetings of the Theological Saturday Society 1896-1905, The meeting on 1 February 1896, § 1, § 3, § 5.
91. Ruuth 1944, 34
92. Ruuth 1944, 35; Murtorinne 1988, 211
93. MOMTSS. Booklet: (no name). The Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Theological Saturday Society; Booklet: The Theological Saturday Society. Manuscript (draft) by K. K. Aro.
94. MOMTSS. Booklet: The Theological Saturday Society. Manuscript (draft) by K. K. Aro.
95. MOMTSS. Booklet: Minutes of the Annual festivals. The Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Theological Saturday Society on 16 May 1936 in the Residence of the Archbishop of Turku, § 2
96. Ijäs 1993, 5
97. Ruuth 1944, 35; Anttonen 1987, 50; AFPP. Antti Filemon Puukko attended Edward Westermarck's lectures in 1896. Westermarck lectured on ontology (dualism, materialism, spiritualism, and parallelism) and the theory of selection (variation of organism, struggle for existence, and the survival of the fittest) (AFPP. Antti Filemon Puukko's notebook in 1896)
98. Veikkola 1969, 33, 35
99. *ibid.*, 30. The apologetic writings were published in the journals "Kotimaa", "Uusi Suometar", "Tähti", "Aika", "Valvoja" and "Nuori Suomi" (see Veikkola 1969, 37).
100. *ibid.*, 33
101. MOMTSS. Booklet: The National Circumstances in Finland at the End of the Second Period of Oppression and How Some Members of the Theological Saturday Society Got Involved in Politics.
102. Veikkola 1969, 134, 136, 137
103. MOMTSS. Booklet: Minutes of the Annual festivals. The Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Theological Saturday Society on 16 May 1936, § 2
104. Veikkola 1969, 138
105. *ibid.*, 136, 138
106. *ibid.*, 151, 153
107. *ibid.*, 35
108. MOMTSS. Booklet: Minutes of the Annual festivals. The Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Theological Saturday Society on 16 May 1936, § 2
109. MOMTSS. Booklet: Minutes of the Annual festivals. The Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Theological Saturday Society on 16 May 1936, § 2

110. *ibid.*, § 2
111. *ibid.*, § 2
112. *ibid.*, § 2
113. *ibid.*, § 2
114. *ibid.*, § 2
115. *ibid.*, § 2
116. Veikkola 1969, 95
117. MOMTSS. The Miscellaneous Papers of Gummerus and Ruuth. The Notes of Erkki Kaila; Erkki Kaila to Jaakko Gummerus on 18 February 1916 in Porvoo
118. Murtorinne 1988, 214, 215
119. Veikkola 1969, 84, 85
120. *ibid.*, 85, 86, 87. Kaila was later denounced by Heimo Pätiälä at the Conference of the Clergymen in Helsinki. Kaila took the view that the purpose of the meeting was to condemn him as a heretic. The meeting assumed, however, a very peculiar nature when Edward Stenij read A.F. Granfelt's essay "Några ord om försoningen". In his essay Granfelt, who was highly esteemed by other clergymen, was opposed to Anselm's juridical theory of the Atonement. Granfelt's views were felt surprising by other theologians and the atmosphere of the conference became confused (for more information, see Veikkola 1969, 89).
121. Ijäs 1993, 409
122. Veikkola 1969, 98
123. Kena 1979, 19
124. *ibid.*, 19
125. *ibid.*, 27
126. Lagerborg 1942, 383
127. Murtorinne 1967, 130, 131, 191, 255
128. Kena 1979, 348
129. Lagerborg 1942, 389
130. ARWP. Liekell to Alfred Russel Wallace 4.4.1876; Aho 1993, 35
131. Lagerborg 1942, 157
132. MOMTSS. Booklet: Minutes of the Annual festivals. The Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Theological Saturday Society on 16 May 1936, § 2. The Theological Monday Society was founded in 1916. The first members of the society were Alekski Lehtonen, Pauli Salokas, Elis Gulin, G.O. Rosenqvist, Rafael Gyllenberg and Verneri Louhivuori (also the member of the Theological Saturday Society) (see Kena 1979, 25).
133. MOMTSS. The Booklet: The Members of the Theological Saturday Society.
134. Tiirilä 1974, 94

4.3.2. Book

1. Karsten 1910, 228
2. Karsten 1911, 223
3. Karsten 1910, Förord (Preface)
4. *ibid.*, 3
5. *ibid.*, 2
6. *ibid.*, 5
7. *ibid.*, 5

8. *ibid.*, 7
9. *ibid.*, 8
10. *ibid.*, 11
11. *ibid.*, 15
12. *ibid.*, 13, 14
13. Karsten 1911, 232 - 237
14. Murtorinne 1988, 214
15. Kaila 1906, 16
16. Karsten 1910, 19
17. *ibid.*, 20
18. Pihkala 1992, 25
19. Karsten 1910, 21
20. *ibid.*, 21
21. *ibid.*, 22
22. *ibid.*, 28
23. *ibid.*, 34, 35
24. *ibid.*, 52, 53, 54
25. Pihkala 1992, 159
26. *ibid.*, 159
27. Bowker (ed.), 1997, 518
28. Karsten 1910, 54
29. *ibid.*, 55
30. *ibid.*, 55
31. *ibid.*, 55
32. *ibid.*, 55
33. *ibid.*, 56
34. *ibid.*, 56
35. *ibid.*, 56, 57
36. *ibid.*, 58
37. *ibid.*, 58
38. *ibid.*, 58
39. *ibid.*, 59
40. *ibid.*, 59
41. *ibid.*, 59
42. Pyysiäinen 1997, 213
43. Ijäs 1993, 295
44. *ibid.*, 295 - 297
45. Veikkola 1969, 77
46. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 497
47. Pieper 1995, 245
48. *ibid.*, 243, 244
49. *ibid.*, 244
50. Karsten 1910, 60

51. *ibid.*, 62, 63
52. *ibid.*, 61
53. *ibid.*, 62
54. *ibid.*, 63
55. *ibid.*, 65
56. *ibid.*, 65
57. *ibid.*, 69
58. Koivunen 1994, 137 - 143, 270 - 278
59. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 1026
60. Pieper 1995, 248
61. Karsten 1910, 70
62. *ibid.*, 71, 72
63. *ibid.*, 73
64. *ibid.*, 74
65. *ibid.*, 74
66. for more information, see Räsänen & Saarinen 1991, 129, 130, 178
67. *ibid.*, 137
68. Karsten 1910, 75
69. *ibid.*, 75, 76
70. Räsänen & Saarinen 1991, 185
71. Karsten 1910, 78
72. *ibid.*, 78
73. *ibid.*, 80
74. *ibid.*, 81
75. *ibid.*, 81
76. *ibid.*, 81, 82
77. *ibid.*, 85
78. *ibid.*, 88
79. *ibid.*, 89, 90
80. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 719
81. Karsten 1910, 92
82. *ibid.*, 92 - 95
83. *ibid.*, 96
84. *ibid.*, 96
85. *ibid.*, 104, 105
86. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 265
87. Karsten 1910, 105
88. *ibid.*, 107
89. *ibid.*, 107
90. *ibid.*, 107
91. *ibid.*, 107
92. *ibid.*, 111
93. *ibid.*, 112

94. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 125
95. Karsten 1910, 112
96. *ibid.*, 113
97. *ibid.*, 114, 114
98. *ibid.*, 115, Bowker (ed.) 1997, 1009
99. Karsten 1910, 116
100. *ibid.*, 117
101. *ibid.*, 118
102. *ibid.*, 119, 120
103. *ibid.*, 121
104. *ibid.*, 122
105. *ibid.*, 123 - 125
106. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 591
107. Karsten 1910, 130
108. Murtorinne 1988, 13, 14
109. Karsten 1910, 128, 129
110. *ibid.*, 130
111. *ibid.* 133- 136
112. *ibid.*, 138
113. *ibid.*, 143, 144, 145
114. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 771
115. *ibid.*, 512
116. Karsten 1910, 144- 147
117. Karsten 1910, 148 - 150; Bowker (ed.) 1997, 153
118. Sollamo 1992, 164
119. Karsten 1910, 150 - 158
120. *ibid.*, 162
121. *ibid.*, 164, 165
122. *ibid.*, 169
123. *ibid.*, 170 - 172
124. *ibid.*, 172 - 174
125. *ibid.*, 175 - 177
126. *ibid.*, 177
127. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 97
128. Karsten 1910, 179
129. *ibid.*, 180
130. *ibid.*, 180, 181
131. *ibid.*, 181 - 183
132. *ibid.*, 183 - 184
133. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 107
134. *ibid.*, 833
135. Thompson 2000, 231
136. Karsten 1911, 174, 175

137. Bowker (ed.) 1997, 107, 108
138. Karsten 1910, 218, 219; Bowker (ed.) 1997, 378
139. Karsten 1910, 221, 222
140. *ibid.*, 222
141. *ibid.*, 224
142. *ibid.*, 225- 227
143. *ibid.*, 228 - 232
144. *ibid.*, 257
145. Veikkola 1969, 76
146. Karsten 1910, 231 - 235
147. *ibid.*, 235, 236
148. Murtorinne 1988, 205
149. *ibid.*, 206
150. *ibid.*, 206
151. *ibid.*, 206
152. Karsten 1910, 237
153. Murtorinne 1988, 205
154. Karsten 1910, 237
155. *ibid.*, 238
156. *ibid.*, 243, 244
157. *ibid.*, 245
158. *ibid.*, 246, 248, 249
159. *ibid.*, 257, 258
160. Pritchard J. B. (ed.), 19
161. Karsten 1910, 259, 260
162. *ibid.*, 261- 263
163. Microsoft Home. Encarta 96 Encyclopedia, entry: "Christian ethics"
164. Karsten 1910, 264
165. Karsten 1910, 266, 272, 273; Westermarck 1913, 6, 7
166. Karsten 1910, 264, 265
167. Westermarck 1913, 5
168. Karsten 1910, 275, 276; Bowker (ed.) 1997, 876
169. Karsten 1910, 276, 277
170. Nyström 1996, 121
171. Karsten 1910, 278 - 280
172. Ihanus 1990, 164, 165
173. Karsten 1910, 281
174. *ibid.*, 278- 284
175. Westermarck 1939, 397
176. Karsten 1910, 286, 287
177. *ibid.*, 286 - 288
178. Westermarck 1913, 3, 5, 6; Stroup 1982, 124
179. Westermarck 1939, 397; Stroup 1982, 123

180. Stroup 1982, 121
181. *ibid.*, 124
182. MOMTSS. Booklet: The Meetings and Presentations of the Theological Saturday Society during 1.12.1896 - 2.12.1905.
183. Veikkola 1969, 76
184. *ibid.*, 76
185. *ibid.*, 76, 77
186. *ibid.*, 77, 78
187. SF MOMFD. 14.3.1900, § 5
188. Castren, Lauha & Gulin 1949, 122, 123, 126, 127
189. Kaila 1932, 7
190. *ibid.*, 7
191. *ibid.*, 7
192. Thompson 2000, xiii, xiv, xv

5. RAFAEL KARSTEN AND THE TESTING OF A THEORY 1911-1956

5.1. *Terra Incognita* and Amerindian Religions

5.1.1. Selecting the Site

1. Discussion with Professor Åke Hultkrantz on 8 February 1995; I discussed also this topic in my Master's thesis "Rafael Karsten suomalaisen vertailevan uskontotieteen edustajana" (1996) in which I emphasized Edward Westermarck's and A. C. Haddon's influence on Karsten.
2. Numelin 1965, 11
3. National Geography, "In Humboldt's Wake" by Ernest G. Holt, November 1931, pages 621 - 644, January 1930 - April 1933 (CD-ROM)
4. Bogardus 1947, 278
5. Karsten 1926, 371
6. MOMHPS. Zach Castren's statement on Rafael Karsten's and Gunnar Landtman's application on 19 August 1908 (The Minutes of the Meeting on 19 September 1908, § 3, signum b.)
7. *ibid.*
8. RKC. Gunnar Landtman to Rafael Karsten 23.7.1908
9. *ibid.*
10. RKC. Gunnar Landtman to Rafael Karsten 23.7.1908; see Stocking 1992, 35
11. RKC. Gunnar Landtman to Rafael Karsten 23.7.1908; When Landtman visited Haddon in Cambridge in June 1906, Haddon was not at home. Then, Mrs. Haddon introduced their magnificent garden to Landtman. Landtman wrote in a letter to Karsten that Haddon had a beautiful garden and an aquarium with lots of sticklebacks. Haddon also had a cat called "Sammy". Since Haddon himself was not at home, Mrs. Haddon wrote a letter to Mr. Frazer and asked if Landtman could visit him. When Landtman arrived at Frazer's house, Frazer was in Trinity College. Landtman had a short discussion with Mrs. Frazer, after which she took Landtman to see Frazer and they had a good conversation in Frazer's library. Landtman described Frazer as a genial and modest person. (RKC. Gunnar Landtman to Rafael Karsten 17.6.1906.)
12. RKC. Gunnar Landtman to Rafael Karsten 23.7.1908
13. MMA. Alfred Cort Haddon to MacMillan 27.3.1905, 30.1.1910
14. MMA. Alfred Cort Haddon to MacMillan 11.2.1909
15. MOMHPS. Zach Castren's statement on Rafael Karsten's and Gunnar Landtman's application on 19 August 1908 (The Minutes of the Meeting on 19 September 1908, § 3, signum b.)

16. MOMHPS. Jooseppi Mikkola's, C. G. Bonsdorff's and Arvi Grotenfelt's statements on 19 August 1908 (The Minutes of the Meeting on 19 September 1908, § 3, signum b.)
17. National Geography, "South America fifty years hence" by Charles M. Pepper, August 1906, page 429, May 1903 - August 1906 (CD-ROM); The knowledge of South America increased during the years. In 1919 the American correspondent of "The Times", Lilian Elliott, described the South Americans "extremely courteous" (NP. Miss Elliott to Viscount Northcliffe 16.12.1919 in Rio de Janeiro). Interestingly, the statistics show that in 1912 only 0.7% of reports published in the Swedish newspapers dealt with Latin America. In 1948, the percentage had risen to 1,1% (for more information, see Hadenius-Weibull 1985, 239).
18. National Geography, "South American Immigration" by W.H. Jackson October 1906, page 587, September 1906 - December 1909 (CD-ROM)
19. National Geography, "South America fifty years hence" by Charles M. Pepper, August 1906, page 427, May 1903 - August 1906 (CD-ROM)
20. Allardt 1997, 103; Gunnar Landtman became a lecturer in sociology in 1910
21. MOMHPS. Edward Westermarck's statement on 2 April 1909 (The Minutes of the Meeting on 3 April 1909, § 5)
22. for more information, see Karsten 1932b, 17
23. MMA. Alfred Cort Haddon to MacMillan May 1926
24. MMA. Alfred Cort Haddon to MacMillan 23.5.1926
25. MMA. Alfred Cort Haddon to MacMillan May 1926 and 23.5.1926
26. PSA. Gunnar Landtman's presentation "Två år på missionsstationer i Nya Guinea" in the meeting of the Prometheus Society on 13 November 1913 (The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society on 13 November 1913, "Diskussionsprotokoll"); Numelin 1965, 8, 9
27. EKPC. Emma Karsten to Rafael Karsten 5.4.1911
28. Stocking 1992, 22
29. Westermarck 1927, 139, 140; Stocking 1992, 22
30. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 17.1.1926
31. *ibid.*
32. Lindberg 1996, 21, 52
33. *ibid.*, 25, 50, 51
34. *ibid.*, 25
35. *ibid.*, 31
36. *ibid.*, 52
37. *ibid.*, 198
38. *ibid.*, 55, 56, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 90, 91
39. *ibid.*, 90
40. *ibid.*, 188, 192
41. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 19.1.1916; 11.2.1916; 8.3.1916; 3.4.1916; 31.12.1919. The beginning of Scandinavian social and cultural anthropology has usually been dated to a figure of Erland Nordenskiöld who in 1899 undertook his first fieldwork trip to South America. When Nordenskiöld undertook his first expedition, Scandinavian social and cultural anthropological studies were in an initiatory state. Nordenskiöld's systematic study of the material culture of the indigenous people established Scandinavian ethnography (for more information, see Christer Lindberg's work "Erland Nordenskiöld - ett Indianlif" (1996)). The preserved letters tell that the correspondence between Karsten and Nordenskiöld probably began in 1911. On the other hand, Nordenskiöld asked Gunnar Landtman in a letter in 1907 where

- Rafael Karsten was since he had not heard from him for long time (GLC. Erland Nordenskiöld to Gunnar Landtman 29.12.1907).
42. ENP. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 18.9.1915
 43. ENP. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 23.7.1915; 25.7.1915; 20.8.1915
 44. Karsten 1964, 24, 25; Karsten's and Koch-Grünberg's monographies have similarities in their appearance. Compare Karsten's "The Head-Hunters of Western Amazonas" (1935) to Koch-Grünberg's "Zwei Jahre unter den Indianern" (1909).
 45. Karsten 1926, Preface
 46. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 11.2.1916
 47. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Sydamerika är stort nog för alla etnografer", Nya Dagligt Allehanda, Stockholm 17.9.1925; Karsten Eva 1993, 22
 48. Karsten Eva 1993, 22
 49. Karsten 1932b, 17
 50. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Doktor Rafael Karstens forskningsfärd till Syd-Amerika", Hbl.,1911.
 51. Karsten Eva 1993, 22
 52. Karsten 1932b, 17
 53. Alvarsson 1993, 62
 54. KTP. Rafael Karsten to Knut Tallqvist 12.9.1920; EKPC. Rafael Karsten's manuscript "Ett arbete om moderna etnologer", page 2; Karsten 1933b, 8; Karsten 1934, 12
 55. for more information, see Alvarsson 1993, 60
 56. *ibid.*, 61
 57. Siiriäinen, Ari & Pärssinen, Martti 1997, "Eighty years after Erland Nordenskiöld", Revista Xaman, WWW-paper of Latin American Studies 4/97 at http://www.helsinki.fi/~romkl_ia/revista/kolumnit
 58. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 19.1.1916 and 8.8.1916; EKPC. The newspaper article: "Bland de vilda jibaros, I." by Rafael Karsten, Hbl.,16.12.1917
 59. Correspondence to Lecturer in Social Anthropology, Christer Lindberg 30.9.1998
 60. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 19.1.1916; Karsten 1935a, 13, 14
 61. EKPC. Matthew Stirling to Rafael Karsten 8.12.1949; RKC. Rafael Karsten to Matthew Stirling 20.10.1949
 62. RKC. Theodor Preuss to Rafael Karsten 24.5.1930; In 1933 Rafael Karsten lectured on "Begräbnis- und Frauergebräuche der Jivaro Indianer" in Berlin. Preuss had previously written to Karsten that the political circumstances did not hinder Karsten from lecturing on the Jivaros. (RKC. Theodor Preuss to Rafael Karsten 22.4.1933.)
 63. Karsten Eva 1993, 23
 64. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 8.12.1927
 65. Karsten 1933b, 3
 66. *ibid.*; Rafael Karsten's attitude on Eric von Rosen's works was full of remorse; in 1920 he praised Rosen's studies for "rich descriptions" but twelve years later considered them "superficial" (see Karsten 1920a, 82; 1932b, 16).
 67. Karsten 1933b, 8
 68. *ibid.*
 69. *ibid.*, 2
 70. Karsten 1930a, 5, 6
 71. *ibid.*, 3

72. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 14.2.1929 and 30.5.1929 in Helsinki; Erland Nordenskiöld to Rafael Karsten 8.4.1929
73. Lindberg 1993, 108
74. for more information, see Alvarsson 1993, 61, 62
75. for more information, see Lindberg 1993, 108
76. EKPC. Ragnar Numelin to Rafael Karsten 15.1.1950 in Bruxelles
77. Numelin 1919, 63
78. EKPC. Ragnar Numelin to Rafael Karsten 30.3.1946 in Gothenburg
79. EKPC. Ragnar Numelin to Rafael Karsten 15.1.1950
80. Gallatin -Anderson 1990, 1, 2, 3
81. Clifford 1990, 65

5.1.2. An Ethnologist at Work

1. Thompson & White 1964, 231
2. *ibid.*
3. *ibid.*, 230
4. *ibid.*, 231
5. Rabinow 1984, 3
6. Clifford 1990, 67
7. Karsten 1921, 392; 1932b, 15; 1964, 14, 15; The study of details was also insisted by W.H.R. Rivers. Nevertheless, Karsten and Westermarck criticized Rivers's method for being unilateral and extreme. Rivers influenced functionalism of Malinowski and structural functionalism of Radcliffe-Brown. (see Karsten 1946b, 368.)
8. EKPC. Newspaper article: "Professor Karsten om sina studier av indianernas religion", Stockholm Tidningen 19.9.1925.
9. for more information, see Clifford 1990, 67, 68
10. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 14.10.1928; 18.10.1928
11. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 14.10.1928
12. Stocking 1992, 354
13. EKPC. Newspaper article: "Sociologi - äldre och "modern"" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 25.3.1955
14. YHP. Edward Westermarck to Yrjö Hirn 19.12.1898 in Tetuan; 23.4.1900 in Tanger
15. Westermarck 1916, 27, 32, 56
16. *ibid.*, 9, 73
17. *ibid.*, 57
18. RKC. Edward Westermarck to Rafael Karsten 27.12.1903
19. YHP. Edward Westermarck to Yrjö Hirn 25.6.1902
20. YHP. Edward Westermarck to Yrjö Hirn 19.12.1898
21. KTP. Edward Westermarck to Knut Tallqvist 4.4.1902 in Andjra; In his letter to MacMillan in November 1905, Westermarck described how he "went to a little place on Moorish coast, and stayed there for mostly six months working hard at the second volume of my book [...]" (MMA. Edward Westermarck to MacMillan 12.11.1905). Dr. Kirsti Suolinna has furthered a discussion about fieldwork methods of the anthropologists of the 1910s and 1920s by specifying Malinowski's and Westermarck's techniques in her study: "*Hur Bronislaw Malinowski och Edward Westermarck bearbetade stress och isolering under sitt fältarbete*" (1996).

22. YHP. Edward Westermarck to Yrjö Hirn 23.4.1900; see also Stocking 1992, 23; Interestingly, šheriff Sīdi Abdsslam al-Baqqāli was for decades Westermarck's personal assistant, fellow traveller, and language teacher. In 1907 Westermarck and al-Baqqāli visited Finland. Then, al-Baqqāli met Westermarck's mother and sister (for more information, see Halén 1986, 124 - 127). Rafael Karsten never had personal assistant, excluding Ossian Lindholm. For more information on Karsten's expeditions in general, see my two articles in *Kajo* 2/1999.
23. YHP. Edward Westermarck to Yrjö Hirn 28.10.1897
24. Lindberg 1996, 192
25. Rabinow 1984, Robert Bellah's introductory words, p. xi
26. EKPC. Newspaper article "En resa i västra Amazonas, III." by Rafael Karsten, *Hbl.*, 21.8.1917
27. EKPC. Newspaper article: "Professor Karsten om sina studier av indianernas religion", *Stockholm Tidningen*, 19.9.1925; Lindberg 1996, 194
28. Lindberg 1996, 194
29. Microsoft Home, Encarta Encyclopedia 1996, entry: "fieldwork"
30. Karsten 1926, xxxvii; 1964, 14, 15; In Karsten's case the Baconian ideal of science free from presuppositions was not totally fulfilled. Today, it is commonly argued that theory formation always occurs in a particular intellectual environment in the presence of presuppositions which control the research (see Niiniluoto 1980, 245); One very interesting but regularly ignored question is how the early ethnologists survived in the field, especially in terms of nutrition. Karsten stated in his monograph on "The Head-Hunters and The Sun Worshippers" that he used to shoot turkeys from his canoe and his Indian companion fetched them. Karsten also hunted wild boar but no monkeys, which he desired to keep alive in their beautiful paradise. Besides, monkey meat did not taste very good. Karsten also fished for wels, which resembled salmon. (see Karsten 1929, 95 - 98.)
31. Karsten 1964, 12; Rivers' "general account of method" was corresponding to Alfred Haddon's "intensive study of limited areas" (see Stocking 1992, 218).
32. Karsten 1954, 13
33. *ibid.*, 20
34. *ibid.*, 1
35. Karsten 1932b, 6
36. Sekula 1989, 372
37. Long-Laughren 1999, 3
38. ENC. Rafael Karsten to Erland Nordenskiöld 11.2.1916 in Helsinki
39. Sekula 1989, 372
40. However, there are at least two profiles of an Indian male (warrior) in Karsten's collections. These photos were published in Finnish Indian Magazine "*Kajo*" 2 /1999. Whether Karsten's profile views reflect the interests and rules of the British anthropology rather than an immaculate photographic opportunity (usually the Indians were afraid of the camera) is a matter of interpretation. Interestingly, a photographer of the Museum of Cultures told me that Karsten was not as skilful a photographer as the Finnish Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim.
41. Wright 1992, 22, 23
42. Karsten 1964, 15
43. *ibid.*, 21
44. *ibid.*, 18
45. *ibid.*, 23, 24
46. Alvarsson 1993, 65

47. *ibid.*
48. Karsten 1935a, 48
49. *ibid.*, 56
50. *ibid.*, 30, 48
51. Alvarsson 1993, 65
52. MMA. Alfred Cort Haddon to MacMillan 23.5.1926 and May 1926
53. Morris 1987, 316 - 319
54. Landtman 1922, 53
55. Ihanus 1990, 97
56. *ibid.*
57. *ibid.*
58. Gooch 1993, 106; Lindberg 1993b, 57
59. Gallatin-Anderson 1990, 4
60. Karsten 1932b, 224
61. *ibid.*
62. *ibid.*, 21 - 23
63. *ibid.*
64. Alvarsson 1993, 68
65. Karsten 1932b, 224
66. Karsten 1935a, 541
67. *ibid.*
68. *ibid.*, 541, 544 - 559
69. *ibid.*, 540
70. *ibid.*
71. *ibid.*, 539
72. Karsten 1949, 35; Karsten considered Bernabé Cobos' four volume work *Historia del nuevo mundo* very significant (see Karsten 1925b, 37; 1938, 36, 37).
73. Discussion with Eva Karsten in May 1997
74. EKPC. Newspaper articles: "Mysteriet kring den gamla inkakulturen" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 14.12 (year unknown) and "Inkakulturens Gåta" by Rafael Karsten, Nya Dagligt Allehand, 4.1.1938; Karsten 1949, II, III
75. PSA. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Prometheus Society, 13.11.1913, "Diskussionsprotokoll"
76. see Rabinow 1977, 150, 151
77. Lindberg 1996, 191
78. EKPC. Newspaper article: "En resa i västra Amazonas IV" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 9.4.1917; about Karsten's attitude towards missionaries see Karsten 1920c, 6.
79. Karsten 1935b, 13; Karsten argued against Emil Hasselblatt who claimed that Karsten idealized "primitive" societies (see Karsten 1920b, 41).
80. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Professor Karsten reser nästa vecka till Sydamerika", source unknown, 31.8.1928.
81. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Professor Karsten reser nästa vecka till Sydamerika", source unknown, 31.8.1928; Rafael Karsten told in a radio interview that in Ecuador he shot an anaconda boa, "tiny poor thing", which was only two meters long (FBCA. "Etelä-Amerikan intiaanien tutkija Rafael Karsten", edited by Veikko Huttunen on 22 February 1963, archive tape N:o 1783).

82. Karsten 1935a, 59; see Karsten's study on the courtesy among the Indians (Karsten 1917, 79 - 89).
83. Karsten 1935a, 59
84. *ibid.*
85. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Amazonivirran päänmetsästäjien luona" by Rafael Karsten, *Iltalehti*, 6.5.1929
86. Karsten 1935a, 59
87. Karsten 1964, 14
88. Georges & Jones 1980, 14
89. *ibid.*, 45
90. see Malinowski's "Diary" (original edition in 1967, new edition in 1989)
91. Georges & Jones 1980, 2
92. EKPC. Newspaper article: "Bland de vilda jibaros I" by Rafael Karsten, *Hbl.*, 16.12.1917; Karsten 1935a, 61
93. EKPC. Newspaper article: "Bland de vilda jibaros - En indiansk skalpfest II" by Rafael Karsten, *Hbl.*, 30.12.1917
94. Karsten 1935a, 61, 62
95. Sanjek 1990, 36
96. Karsten 1935a, 61
97. Hultkrantz 1993, 48
98. Discussion with Marie Perruchon on 22 May 1997
99. Stocking 1995, 115, 274
100. Stocking 1992, 306
101. Stocking 1992, 43, 49, 246; Malinowski did not participate in Kula trading expedition because he refused to pay the £ 2 which the Mailu asked for the accompany of the expedition.
102. Karsten 1935a, 188
103. *ibid.*, 19
104. *ibid.*
105. see Anderson 1976, 242, 243; Anderson refers to Marshall Sahlin's study on political types in Melanesian and Polynesian communities.
106. Karsten 1964, 14
107. Hultkrantz 1993, 50; see also Karsten 1948b, 254, 255
108. Karsten 1964, 14, 16, 17
109. *ibid.*, 16
110. EKPC. Newspaper article: "Katolsk religionsvetenskap och svensk" by Rafael Karsten, *Hbl.*, 29.10.1955; Karsten 1947b, 82 - 84
111. Karsten 1964, 15
112. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "En resa bland kristna indianer" by Rafael Karsten, *Hbl.*, 3.9.1913
113. Karsten 1935a, 8
114. *ibid.*
115. Haddon 1911, 20 - 24
116. Morris 1987, 91, 92
117. Thomas 1994, 48, 64
118. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 17.1.1926
119. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 11.12.1925
120. Rabinow 1977, 150, 151

121. Karsten 1930b, 17

5.1.3. Testing a Theory

1. Rabinow 1977, xi
2. Hultkrantz 1993, 51
3. *ibid.*, 45
4. Karsten 1964, 22, 23; Everard Im Thurn participated in Tylor's lectures (see Stocking 1992, 18).
5. Karsten 1926, xxvi, xxvii
6. *ibid.*, xxvii
7. Karsten 1926, xxx; Stocking 1995, 179
8. Karsten 1926, xxxi
9. *ibid.*
10. *ibid.*, xxxii
11. Karsten 1920d, 11; 1932b, 17, 18, 110; 1935a, 3, 4, 371; 1949, 7, 9, 157; An interesting example of the usage of a "racial" term is offered by Frank Gillen who called the Aborigines of the Central Australia "niggers" and fieldwork "niggering". However, Gillen's attitude towards the Aborigines was genial and enthusiastic and it would be mistaken to consider him "a race hygienist" (see Stocking 1992, 25). Interestingly, Karsten misunderstood Levy-Brühl's notion of the pre-logical mentality. Karsten claimed that Levy-Brühl had stated in the Fifth International Congress of Religion in Helsinki that logical thinking was alien to the "primitive" mind. Christer Lindberg (1998) has, however, emphasized that Levy-Brühl "never said such things" and that it is perilous to follow Karsten's opinion without reading Levy-Brühl himself (see Lindberg 1998, 168-174; for more information on Rafael Karsten's opinion of "primitive" mind, see Karsten 1931b, 6-9). In general, Karsten suggested that the Darwinian survival of the fittest was a part of the everyday life of the "primitive" and civilized societies. But the struggle for existence was not less brutal in the civilized societies (see Karsten 1920d, 11).
12. Karsten 1929, 47; 1935a, 87; Interestingly, Rafael Karsten never explicitly talked about the colonists and their degree of "going native". In his "Intiaaniens parissa Ecuadorin aarniometsissä" ("Among the Indians of the Primeval Forests") (1920), Karsten emphasized repeatedly that the Indians were enslaved by white man (Karsten 1920f, 125 - 129). But was this the only truth? In 1920, American correspondent of "The Times", Lilian Elliott, described the circumstances in Argentina as follows: "The colonists, in settlements situated in rather isolated districts, have "gone native" to an astonishing degree. They are all of the third or fourth generation born in the country and appear to have lost pride and energy" (NP. Lilian Elliott to Lord Northcliffe 12.3.1920 in Buenos Aires).
13. Alvarsson 1993, 68
14. Karsten 1935a, 513
15. Karsten 1922, 2, 1935a, 513
16. Alvarsson 1993, 74
17. *ibid.*, 73
18. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "Inka-specialisten fick Hallbergs priset", source unknown, 16.5.1940; Karsten 1954, 8
19. EKPC. Newspaper article: "The Origin of Religion" by Rafael Karsten, *Man*, January 1937, Nos. 24-26. Correspondence 26.
20. EKPC. Newspaper article: "The Origin of Religion" by Rafael Karsten, *Man*, January 1937, Nos. 24-26. Correspondence 26; Karsten 1926, xxv. In 1937 the British anthropologist, E. J. James, of the University of Leeds, considered it unfortunate that he was not aware of the fact that Rafael Karsten had invented the

expression “magical manure” which he had recurrently used without knowing its real origin (RKC. E.J. James to Karsten 19.1.1937). First of all, I am not altogether convinced that the term “magical manure” was originally Karsten’s conceptual invention. James said that he had heard also other scholars use this term. Furthermore, we can argue against this term because we do not know its detailed nature. If we consider “manure” a term which refers to a substance, material, we could possibly connect it with homoeopathic and sympathetic magic which, according to Yrjö Hirn, had a material basis, i.e. the physical basis of homoeopathic and sympathetic magic was the material medium of some kind. Karsten suggested that this “material medium” was not Epicurean “thin membrane” or “effluvium” but “soul”, a human spirit. (see Karsten 1926, footnote, 202.)

21. EKPC. Newspaper article: “The Origin of Religion” by Rafael Karsten, Man, January 1937, Nos. 24-26. Correspondence 26.
22. EKPC. Newspaper article: “The Origin of Religion” by Rafael Karsten, Man, January 1937, Nos. 24-26. Correspondence 26; Karsten 1946a, 23
23. EKPC. Newspaper article: “The Origin of Religion” by Rafael Karsten, Man, January 1937, Nos. 24-26. Correspondence 26.
24. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: “The Civilization of the South American Indians with Special Reference to Magic and Religion by Rafael Karsten”, Nature, 25.6.1927
25. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: “Magical sacrifice - Dr. Karsten and the savages”, Daily News, 7.6.1927.
26. Karsten 1946a, 22
27. Karsten 1932b, 110
28. *ibid.*, 110, 111
29. *ibid.*, 118, 120
30. *ibid.*, 121; see also Karsten 1913, 202
31. Karsten 1935b, 47
32. Karsten 1922, 3
33. Karsten 1935a, 372, 373
34. Karsten 1922, 3, 1935a, 372
35. Karsten 1949, 204
36. *ibid.*, 177, 187, 189, 190
37. Karsten 1926, xxx
38. Karsten 1925c, 81; 1949, 186
39. Karsten 1925c, 81
40. Karsten 1926, 269
41. Karsten 1949, 206; about the social and political organization of the Incas, see Karsten 1931c.
42. Karsten 1949, 206
43. Karsten 1926, 498
44. Westermarck 1920, 6, 23, 35
45. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: “Animism in South America”, Times Literary Supplement, 3.2.1927.
46. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: “Magical sacrifice - Dr. Karsten and the savages”, Daily News, 7.6.1927; At the time when Rafael Karsten undertook his first expedition to South America, the evolutionary viewpoint had been brought into question in American anthropology (see Stocking 1992, 182).
47. Karsten 1925c, 80
48. Karsten 1926, 500; 1947b, 74, 81, 82
49. EKPC. Newspaper article: “The Origin of Religion” by Rafael Karsten, Man, January 1937, Nos. 24-26. Correspondence 26.

50. Karsten 1926, 155
51. Karsten 1946a, 29
52. Hultkrantz 1994, 99
53. *ibid.*, 107
54. EKPC. Newspaper article: "The Origin of Religion" by Rafael Karsten, *Man*, January 1937, Nos. 24-26. Correspondence 26.
55. EKPC. Newspaper article: "The Origin of Religion" by Rafael Karsten, *Man*, January 1937, Nos. 24-26. Correspondence 26; EKPC. Albert Brock-Utne to Rafael Karsten 16.12.1938
56. Karsten 1935a, 373
57. Karsten 1949, 174
58. Karsten 1926, 265
59. Karsten 1905, 1, 4, 33, 45, 96
60. Karsten 1923, 40; 1932b, 120, 125, 126
61. Karsten 1949, 177
62. *ibid.*, 196, 197, 212
63. *ibid.*, 231
64. *ibid.*
65. *ibid.*, 233
66. Karsten 1932b, 131
67. Karsten 1923, 50; 1932b, 131
68. Karsten 1923, 60, 66
69. Karsten 1923, 75; 1932b, 171
70. Karsten 1923, 76; 1932b, 171
71. Karsten 1932b, 173
72. Karsten 1935a, 423
73. *ibid.*
74. *ibid.*, 423, 427, 429
75. Karsten 1949, 165, 167
76. *ibid.*, 175, 176
77. *ibid.*, 246
78. *ibid.*, 176
79. *ibid.*, 206
80. *ibid.*, 215
81. *ibid.*, 215
82. *ibid.*, 216
83. *ibid.*, 223
84. *ibid.*, 222
85. *ibid.*, 188, 189
86. *ibid.*, 194
87. *ibid.*, 204
88. *ibid.*, 203, 212
89. *ibid.*, 211
90. *ibid.*, 214

91. *ibid.*, 235
92. *ibid.*, 235, 236
93. Karsten 1935b, 201
94. Karsten 1926, 377, 378; see also, Westermarck 1907, 361, 374 about *l-`âr*
95. Karsten 1949, 235
96. Karsten 1905, 55
97. Karsten 1932b, 208
98. *ibid.*, 29, 30
99. *ibid.*, 206
100. Karsten 1935a, 373
101. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: The Geographical Review. Review of Rafael Karsten's "Bland Indianer i Ekvadors Urskogar" (1921) by M. G. Wrigley, April 1923, American Geographical Society
102. EKPC. Newspaper article: "En Resa i västra Amazonas" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 9.4.1917
103. Karsten 1935a, 510
104. EKPC. Newspaper article: "Den Heliga Inkas" by Rafael Karsten, Hbl., 26.5.1929
105. Karsten 1949, 11
106. *ibid.*, 7 - 9
107. *ibid.*, 10
108. *ibid.*, 186
109. Karsten 1905, 106; 1964, 201
110. Karsten 1905, 107
111. Karsten 1964, 122
112. *ibid.*, 201
113. *ibid.*, 54
114. *ibid.*, 70, 71
115. *ibid.*, 71
116. *ibid.*, 123, 124
117. *ibid.*, 123
118. *ibid.*, 124
119. *ibid.*
120. *ibid.*
121. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "South American Indians", New York Times, 10.7.1927
122. Karsten 1932b, 189
123. Karsten 1964, 130, 131
124. Karsten 1927, 3; 1931d, 193, 194; 1932b, 73; 1964, 194; Karsten argued against Dr. M. Gaster who suggested in the March number of *Folk-Lore* (1930) that the couvade was a custom "for which so far no explanation has been given". Karsten informed Dr. Gaster that his chapter on the couvade in South America was published in his work "The Civilization of the South American Indians" (1926) and that this analysis should be seen as "a satisfactory explanation of all details connected with this peculiar primitive custom". (Karsten 1931d, 193.)
125. Karsten 1964, 133
126. *ibid.*, 135, 136
127. *ibid.*, 141
128. Karsten 1936, 7; 1949, 246, 247

129. Karsten 1932b, 194, 195
130. Karsten 1935a, 464
131. Karsten 1935b, 179, 180; Morris 1987, 102
132. Karsten 1935b, 183
133. Karsten 1932b, 110, 206
134. Karsten 1935a, 513
135. Hultkrantz 1994, 99, 100
136. Microsoft Home, Encarta Encyclopedia 1996, entry: "Myth and Knowledge"
137. Hultkrantz 1994, 100
138. Microsoft Home, Encarta Encyclopedia 1996, entry: "Myth and Knowledge"
139. Karsten 1932b, 206, 208
140. Karsten 1935a, 371, 372
141. *ibid.*, 371, 516
142. Karsten 1922, 2
143. Karsten 1949, 160, 163
144. Karsten 1941b, 32; 1949, 195
145. Karsten 1949, 194
146. Perruchon 1993, 89
147. Karsten 1935b, 179, 183
148. Riviere 1987, 473
149. *ibid.*
150. Smart 1998, 184
151. *ibid.*
152. Poole 1987, 509
153. Nordenskiöld 1919, 169, 170
154. for more information, see Alvarsson 1995, 130
155. Tshuner Taksami, "The Shamans of Siberia", presentation held in the International Symposium of Shamanism, on 16 January 1999, Tampere, Finland
156. Åke Hultkrantz "The Study of Shamanism and Its History", presentation held in the International Symposium of Shamanism, on 16 January 1999, Tampere, Finland.
157. Karsten 1932b, 134
158. RKC. Rafael Karsten to Matthew Stirling 20.10.1949; Anttonen Veikko 1997, "The Study of Religion in Finland" at <http://www.abo.fi/comprel/history.html>
159. RKC. Rafael Karsten to Matthew Stirling 20.10.1949
160. Karsten 1949, 233
161. Karsten 1923, 50; 1935a, 399; 1949, 232, 233
162. Karsten 1935a, 399; see also Karsten's study on "The Colorado Indians of Western Ecuador" (1924b, 148) about the practice of the medicine-man
163. Karsten 1949, 232, 236
164. Karsten 1935b, 206
165. Karsten 1922, 27; 1935a, 399
166. Karsten 1922, 27; 1935a, 400
167. Karsten 1932b, 133
168. Karsten 1922, 27; 1935a, 399, 400; 1955, 170, 171

169. Karsten 1935b, 205
170. Harner 1990, 35
171. Eliade 1989, 323, 324
172. Drury 1989, 8
173. Campbell 1983, 164, 165
174. Karsten 1923, 52
175. *ibid.*
176. Karsten 1935a, 400; 1955, 171
177. Karsten 1932b, 132
178. Perruchon 1995, 152
179. Karsten 1935a, 399
180. *ibid.*, 406
181. Karsten 1935a, 407; 1955, 172, 173
182. Smart 1998, 184
183. Karsten 1923, 53 - 58; 1935a, 413 - 420; 1949, 232, 233
184. Karsten 1964, 41, 95, 154
185. Smart 1998, 184
186. Karsten 1964, 161
187. *ibid.*
188. Discussion with Marie Perruchon on 22 May 1997; see also Perruchon 1995, 153, 154
189. Perruchon 1995, 154
190. Karsten 1935a, 109, 110, 355, 456
191. Nordenskiöld 1919, 173
192. Hultkrantz 1993, 48; Discussion with Marie Perruchon on 22 May 1997
193. Discussion with Marie Perruchon on 22 May 1997
194. Hultkrantz 1993, 45
195. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "The Mind of Savage", Literary Guide, March 1927; Karsten 1929, 62
196. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 29.10.1925
197. Karsten 1935b, 205; Karsten's conception of primeval art included an analysis of Indian petroglyphs. In 1924, Karsten published his only study on petroglyphs. He told that he had studied Indian petroglyphs in Rio Bobonaza in Ecuador and that his Indian companions were very afraid of those pictures, being unwilling to tell more about them (see Karsten 1924c, 19).
198. Karsten 1935b, 205
199. *ibid.*
200. Karsten 1926, Edward Westermarck's Introductory Note, page vi
201. *ibid.*
202. Westermarck 1920, 116
203. RKC. Edward Westermarck to Rafael Karsten 3.12.1919
204. *ibid.*
205. Karsten 1926, Edward Westermarck's Introductory Note, page vii
206. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "South American Indians", The Sunday Times, 16.1.1927
207. Karsten 1926, Preface, page vii
208. Karsten 1926, Preface, page xiii

209. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 8.11.1925; Karsten 1926, Preface, page xiv; FBCA. "Intiaaniien käsitys taiteesta" by Rafael Karsten, editor Unto Miettinen 31.1.1954, archive tape N:o 110.; Interestingly, Erland Nordenskiöld considered Karsten's opinion of the meaning of ornamentation one-sided (GLC. Erland Nordenskiöld to Gunnar Landtman 10.6.1914).
210. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 8.11.1925
211. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 17.1.1926
212. *ibid.*
213. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 11.12.1925
214. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 11.1.1926
215. Karsten 1926, Edward Westermarck's Introductory Note, p. vi; EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "South American Indians", The Sunday Times, 16.1.1927
216. EKPC. Scrapbook 2: "South American Indians", The Sunday Times, 16.1.1927
217. RKC. Edward Westermarck to Rafael Karsten 3.12.1919
218. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 13.10.1924
219. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 29.10.1925
220. EWC. Rafael Karsten to Edward Westermarck 13.2.1925; Although openly interested in questions of sexuality, Westermarck had his moments of embarrassment. Once in England Karsten and Westermarck participated in a lecture where an English-woman lectured on New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. Karsten described the lecture to his wife Margit as follows: "The woman lectured and showed some pictures. She talked about the way primitive women used to do exercises in the evenings in order to strengthen their muscles. Primitive people living in the Pacific Islands believed that exercised muscles increased romantic happiness in marriage. The lecturer also recommended wiry muscles to modern women. Westermarck met the lecturer later on and conversed with her. She told Westermarck stories about the sexual habits of primitive people. Westermarck considered these descriptions so embarrassing that he could not repeat them even among his closest friends" (EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 28.5.1925).
221. Lett 1999, 113
222. Karsten 1920e, 28 - 71; 1933, 2; Nockert 1995, 181, 182
223. Karsten 1920e, 3 - 72; 1933, 11
224. Nockert 1995, 182
225. Karsten 1933b, 3
226. *ibid.*, 11
227. *ibid.*, 12
228. RKC. Wilhelm Mrlic to Rafael Karsten 10.9.1933 in München
229. Bruhn, Holmstedt & Lindgren 1995, 171
230. Karsten 1933b, 11; 1964, 116, 117
231. Karsten 1964, 116
232. Karsten 1935a, footnote, 446
233. Nockert 1995, 183
234. Microsoft Home, Encarta Encyclopedia 1996, entry: "Pharmacology"
235. Timothy White "Shaman's Drum Review" at <http://www.sacharuna.com/drumreview.html>; White describes how the master of *ayahuasca*-ceremony don Agustin has taken *ayahuasca* over 1500 times and is thus living proof that *ayahuasca* is "a transformative medicine that is neither addictive nor destructive". Don Agustin Rivas-Vazques has become an international celebrity.

236. Morris 1987, 326

5.2. The Religion of the Samek

5.2.1. Background

1. Discussion with Åke Hultkrantz on 8 February 1995
2. Discussion with Juha Pentikäinen, September 1999, Lammi, Finland
3. Harju 1989, 261
4. Eskola 2000, 496
5. Haddon 1910, 90
6. Haddon 1910, 89; about *seitas* at <http://www.enontekio.fi/english/info/tutki.html> and Gustafsson, Philip, “The belief world of the northern peoples” at <http://www.internetix.fi/english/studies/senior/e-historyayhteiskunta/e-pohjoismaiden/about.htm>
7. Itkonen 1991, 253, 258
8. *ibid.*
9. EKPC. Rafael Karsten to Margit Karsten 11.7.1927; Harju 1989, 171
10. Harju 1989, 96
11. RKC. The postcards from Petsamo trip
12. Karsten 1952, 13
13. *ibid.*, Preface
14. *ibid.*, 5
15. *ibid.*, 12, 13
16. Pentikäinen 1995, 49
17. *ibid.*
18. *ibid.*
19. Karsten 1952, Preface; see also Öberg (1978), Ingemar Öberg used Karsten’s study as a source material in his study “Mission och Evangelisation i Gellivare-bygden ca 1740-1770” (Åbo, 1978).
20. Karsten 1952, 5, 7
21. *ibid.*, 14, 15
22. *ibid.*
23. Paulaharju 1977, 127; see also Öberg 1978, 8 - 10, 144, 145 (about christening)
24. *ibid.*
25. Karsten 1952, 140; compare to Karsten’s study on “ The Juridical Position of the Indians in Spanish America”. In his article, Karsten discussed the brutality of the Spanish conquistadors from the 16th century onwards (1950b, 3).
26. Karsten 1952, 8, 16, 140, 141
27. Nickul 1970, 200

5.2.2. Main Principles

1. Hultkrantz 1993, 51
2. Karsten 1952, 18 - 20, 28, 31
3. *ibid.*, 18
4. *ibid.*

5. *ibid.*, 19
6. *ibid.*, 29
7. *ibid.*, 31; Harva 1915, 29
8. *ibid.*, 22
9. Aho 1994, 18
10. Karsten 1952, 63
11. *ibid.*, 33
12. *ibid.*
13. *ibid.*, 34; Uno Harva proposed that the *lud*-worship of the Votyaks was probably inherited from their neighbourhood (see Harva 1914, 121).
14. Karsten 1952, 37
15. *ibid.*, 37, 38
16. *ibid.*, 38
17. *ibid.*
18. *ibid.*, 40
19. *ibid.*, 41
20. *ibid.*, 42
21. *ibid.*
22. *ibid.*, 45
23. *ibid.*, 45, 47
24. *ibid.*, 48
25. *ibid.*
26. *ibid.*, 49
27. Harva 1915, 167
28. Karsten 1952, 28
29. Harva 1915, 167; Karsten 1952, 50
30. Karsten 1952, 52, 55, 58
31. Harva 1915, 167
32. *ibid.*, 168
33. Krohn 1922, 67
34. *ibid.*
35. Karsten 1952, 58, 59
36. *ibid.*; it seems that Uno Harva's idea of the so-called "world pillar" (with it a god could support and hold the world) was rather unknown to Karsten. In any event, Harva's analysis of the connection between Saami and Germanic notions of world pillar and world tree was more profound than Karsten's (for more information, see Hultkrantz 1996, 32, 33)
37. Karsten 1952, 63
38. *ibid.*, 64
39. *ibid.*, 62
40. *ibid.*, 66, 67
41. Pesonen 1993, 141 (master's thesis)
42. Bowker 1997, 884
43. see Siikala 1992, 39; Pentikäinen 1998, 48
44. Karsten 1952, 121 - 127

45. Karsten 1952, 69, 70, 72, 79; Pentikäinen 1998, 9
46. Karsten 1952, 79 -97; on the shamanistic drum as a cognitive map, see Pentikäinen 1987. In his article Pentikäinen describes how the Saami drums were popular objects of export in the 17th and 18th centuries. Pentikäinen also considers the Saami drum “very sun-centred” (for more information, see pages 18, 25).
47. Karsten 1952, 98, 1935a, 502
48. Karsten 1952, 76, 77
49. Harva 1915, 110, 111
50. Pentikäinen 1996, 6; 1998, 25, Pentikäinen refers to the dissertation of the Finnish scholar Stig Söderholm *Liskokuninkaan mytologia* (“The Mythology of the Lizard King”) (1990)
51. Pentikäinen 1998, 25
52. for more information, see Pentikäinen 1998, 21
53. Karsten 1952, 118
54. *ibid.*, 108
55. *ibid.*, 105
56. *ibid.*, 110, 11
57. Karsten 1949, 222
58. Karsten 1952, 111
59. *ibid.*, 122
60. *ibid.*, 122, 123
61. *ibid.*, 123, 124
62. *ibid.*, 126
63. Karsten 1952, “Använd litteratur” (Literature used)
64. Karsten 1952, 129
65. *ibid.*, 130
66. *ibid.*, 131
67. *ibid.*, 134
68. *ibid.*, 136, 137
69. *ibid.*, 137
70. see Pentikäinen 1995, 95 - 97
71. Karsten 1952, 139
72. *ibid.*
73. *ibid.*, 141
74. Eva Karsten 1993, 35; Gutorm Gjessing reviewed Karsten’s work in journal “Man” in 1954 (RKC. Ragnar Numelin to Rafael Karsten 4.6.1954)
75. RKC. E. J. Brill Verlag und Buchhandlung to Margit Karsten 22.9.1956, 18.3.1957
76. National Geography “The Lapps” by Brimberg Sisse, February 1983, pages 194, 195, January 1980 - April 1983 (CD-ROM)
77. National Geography “The Lapps” by Brimberg Sisse, February 1983, pages 194, 195, January 1980 - April 1983 (CD-ROM)

6. Conclusion - The Meaning of Rafael Karsten’s Conception of Religion for His Comparative Religion

* Waltari 1935, 336; Haavikko 1982, 138, 139, 143

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APPENDICES

Appendix

The most significant phases of Rafael Karsten's life and career

- 1879 Born 16 August in Kvevlax (Koivulahti) in Ostrobothnia, Finland, to the vicar Klas Edvin Karsten (1836 - 1908) and his spouse Maria Augusta Emilia (Emma), née Cajanus, Karsten (1837 - 1920).
- 1899 Secondary school diploma (matriculation examination) at the Vasa Swedish Lyceum 15 June
- 1902 Master's degree at the Imperial Alexander University 8 March
- 1903 First journey to London and Oxford (library studies)
- 1904 Journey to London (library studies), journey to London (via Stockholm, Uppsala and Copenhagen)
- 1905 Defence of doctoral thesis "The Origin of Worship", founding member of Prometheus Society
- 1906 Licentiate's degree Imperial Alexander University 11 December, journey to London and Isle of Wight (via Cologne and Paris)
- 1907 Ph.D. degree Imperial Alexander University 30 May, Lecturer in Comparative Religion Imperial Alexander University
- 1908 Journey to Berlin
- 1909 Member of the Finnish Church History Society, journey to London
- 1910 "Hedendom och kristendom" published in Helsinki, Finland, journeys to Copenhagen, Salzburg, Dresden, Berlin, and Stockholm
- 1911 Journey to London (conference), summer at Henri Brummer's home, first expedition to South America, Argentina and Bolivia
- 1912 Argentina and Bolivia
- 1913 Home-coming via Buenos Aires (April)
- 1914 Journey to Berlin
- 1916-1919 Second expedition to South America, Ecuador
- 1920 Chairman of "Svenska Österbottenska Samfundet", journey to Cambridge (delivered a lecture), journey to Gothenburg (delivered a lecture), "Bland Indianer i Ekvadors urskogar, Vol. I" published in Helsinki, "Blodshämnd, krig, och segerfester bland jibaroinianerna i östra Ecuador" published in Helsinki
- 1921 Married Margit Boldt 5 December, corresponding member of "Academia Nacional de Historica Americana" in Ecuador, member of "Geografiska Sällskapet i Finland", "Bland Indianer i Ekvadors urskogar, Vol. II" published in Helsinki.
- 1922 Professor of Moral and Social Philosophy University of Helsinki 20 January, awarded 1922 Loubatian prize by The Royal Academy of Sciences in Sweden for "Blood Revenge, War and Victory Feast among the Jibaro Indians of Ecuador" and "Bland Indianer i Ecuadors urskogar I-II", journey to Gothenburg, lecturer at Jyväskylä Summer University. Rafael and Margit Karsten's first daughter, Eva Margareta Maria, born 3 October 1922 Helsinki.
- 1923 Corresponding member of "Sociedad Geografica Argentina", member of American Geographical Society, lecturer at the Jyväskylä Summer University, journey to Gothenburg (conference)
- 1924 Member of "Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten", journey to Gothenburg (conference). Twins Rolf Robert and Margit Elisabet born 18 July 1924 Helsinki.
- 1925 Awarded Andree medal of silver by Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography for scientific contributions, corresponding member of "Société des Americanistes de Paris" and "Instituto del Museo" (Universidad Nacional de la Plata), journey to Stockholm (delivered a lecture in "Geografiska Föreningen")
- 1926 "The Civilization of South American Indians" published in London, member

- of "American Anthropological Association", journeys to London, Berlin, Paris, and Stockholm
- 1927 Member of "Societas pro Fauna et Flora Fennica", journey to Petsamo, northern Finland (Kolttaköngäs, Jäniskoski)
- 1928 Lecturer at the Jyväskylä Summer University, journey to old Walamo and Tyrisevä, "Inledning till religionsvetenskapen" published in Helsinki, third expedition to Ecuador and Peru (1928-1929)
- 1929 "Huvudjägare och soldyrkare" published in Helsinki
- 1930 Journey to Hamburg (conference), journey to Berlin (delivered a lecture)
- 1931 Lecturer at the Jyväskylä Summer University
- 1932 "Indian tribes of the Argentine and Bolivian Chaco" published in Helsinki, journey to Lund (conference)
- 1933 Journey to Berlin
- 1934 Lecturer at the Jyväskylä Summer University, journey to London (conference)
- 1935 "The Head-hunters of Western Amazonas" published in Helsinki, "The Origin of Religions" published in London
- 1936 Member of "Gesellschaft Philosophia Jugoslavia", journey to Uppsala (delivered lectures on comparative religion)
- 1937 Fourth expedition to South America, Peru, corresponding member of "Die Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie, und Urgeschichte"
- 1938 "Inkariket och dess kultur i det forna Peru" published in Stockholm, member of "Sociedad Argentina de Antropologia"
- 1939 Member of "Nordenskiöld Samfundet i Finland", outbreak of Winter War - on behalf of the Council of State visited fifteen places in Sweden seeking voluntary support
- 1940 Hallbergian Prize from Society of Swedish Literature in Finland for his Inca studies
- 1941 "Filosofisk etik" published in Loviisa
- 1943 Corresponding member of "Nathan Söderblom Sällskapet", honorary member of Royal Anthropological Society, London
- 1945 "Grunddragen av sociologiens historia" published in Loviisa
- 1946 Retirement, fifth expedition to South America, Ecuador (1946-1947), honorary member of Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
- 1949 Corresponding member of "The Bolivian Society of Americanists"
- 1950 Founder member of "Sociedad Argentino-Finlandesa", deputy chairman of "Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten"
- 1951 Sixth expedition to South America, Peru, accompanied by Mrs. Margit Karsten (1951-1952)
- 1952 "Samefolkets religion" published in Helsinki
- 1954 Resignation from "Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten" (The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters), last trip to South America (conference)
- 1956 Died 21 February, Helsinki

Appendix II

The History of Finland in Terms of Rafael Karsten's life (1879-1956)

- 1863 Tsar Alexander II re-convenes the Diet
- 1870 The value of production per capita was less than 40 per cent of that in Great Britain at the time.
- 1899-1906 Russia's first period of oppression against autonomous Finland
- 1907 Finland elects its first Parliament through universal, equal suffrage
- 1906-1917 Russia's second period of oppression against Finland
- 1917 Finland gains independence on December 6

- 1918 The Civil War between the non-socialist White forces and the socialist Red forces. Finland did not take part in World War I.
- 1919 Finnish constitution ratified. Finland became a parliamentary republic with strong presidential powers.
- 1920 The peace treaty of Tartu with Soviet Russia.
- 1939 The Soviet Union attacks Finland, Winter War begins on 30 November
- 1940 The peace treaty of March 1940 with Soviet Union. Finland lost the Karelian area. More than 21,000 Finns died in the Winter War.
- 1941 Finland joins the war as co-belligerent of Germany
- 1944 Finland signs separate peace with Soviet Union. Finland ceded the areas it had lost in 1940 as well as the northern Petsamo area and its connection to the Arctic Sea. Moreover, Finland was obliged to lease the Porkkala peninsula area to the Soviet Union until 1956 and pay war reparations to the Soviet Union. Twelve per cent of the Finnish population lost their homes. Finland's role in World War II ended in April 1945 with the expulsion of German troops from the Lapland area of northern Finland.
- 1948 Finland and the Soviet Union sign Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). The Finnish pact recognized Finland's right to remain outside of the conflicts between the great powers.
- 1955 Finland joins the United Nations and the Nordic Council
- 1956 Juho Kusti Paasikivi's presidential term ends; Urho Kekkonen inaugurated in March 1956

(The source: Koivisto, Jukka 2001, "The Story of Finland". Economic Information Office, TAT Group, Finnfacts, Helsinki).

Appendix III

Rafael Karsten's Swedish-language lectures on comparative religion, held at the University of Helsinki

Den grekiska etikens historia
 Positivismen
 Zarathustra
 Buddhismen
 Uppkomsten av en prästklass
 Buddhas lära. Läran om lidandet
 Avesta och dess historia
 Avestas inledning
 Iranisk religion före Zarathustra
 Om österländska religioner
 Den praktiska religionen
 Dopceremonier
 Bön och offer i Amerika
 Livet efter döden, gravbruk och begravningsceremonier
 Indianska föreställningar
 Vedareligionen

Rafael Karsten's Finnish-language lectures on comparative religion, held at the University of Helsinki

Sosiologian metodi
 Jumalien ja sankarien aikakausi
 Alhaisemmat henkiolennot
 Vedan uskonto
 Surun järjestelmän luonteesta
 Saksalainen positivismi

Appendix IV



The expeditions of Rafael Karsten in Andean South America in 1916 – 1919 and 1928 – 1929. (Matka Arkku, 1990; Acta Americana Vol. 1, Nr 2; 1993)