

**IMPACT OF MEDIA POLITICAL INCITEMENT ON SOCIAL UNREST  
IN UGANDA: A CASE OF KAMPALA CENTRAL DIVISION**

**BY**

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## **DECLARATION**

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**APPROVAL**

This Dissertation has been written under my supervision and I hereby approve it for submission to the school of social sciences; Nkumba University.

Signature..... Date.....

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## **DEDICATION**

This research is especially dedicated to my parents Mr. Maitland Rukaari, my late mother Mrs. Evas Rukaari, my wife Phionah and Children, Rene, Rayner, Reanna, Roberta and Renata who are a source of joy and inspiration.

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## **ACRONYMS**

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

SNS Social Networking sites

## **ABSTRACT**

The role played by media in social unrest has been an issue of discussion all over the world. Although media influence has increased tremendously in the last decade, researchers are yet to agree on the impact of media political incitement on social unrest. The context of analysis of medial political incitement on social unrest in Kampala Central Division during the presidential and parliamentary campaigns between 2011 and 2016 revealed media can act as a double-edged sword. The study reviewed various literature on hate speeches & messages, political participation & violence, social protest movements and challenges facing media reporting. From the review the study adopted a conceptual framework developed from the libertarian theory and social responsibility theory of media reporting based on Aday Andersen (1974) & Buor (2004) with the propagation of social unrest as the dependent variable which relies on the media political incitement as the independent variable. In addition, people's response to conflict coverage is persuaded by their level of democratization, form of media, access to information and level of political maturity as intervening variables.

This study investigated the impact of media political incitement and social unrest in Kampala Central Division. The objectives of the study were to examine the nature of media political incitement in Kampala, document the different types of social unrest that have been caused by media political incitement in Kampala and establish the challenges facing media in reporting on political issues in Kampala.

The study used a cross sectional survey design, applied qualitative and quantitative approaches and collected data using interviews and questionnaires. Stratified random sampling technique was applied to the study population of 209,500 people from the Kampala Central Division from which the sample of 84 participants were selected.

The study found that media political incitement had an impact on social unrest in Kampala Central Division during the presidential and parliamentary campaigns between 2011 and 2016 and was escalated by vernacular (local) FM stations. In particular, 76.7% of the media in Kampala, publish content with hate speeches and 60.4% broadcast messages of hatred and intolerance through media platforms like Twitter, Facebook (69.4%) on a monthly basis. Most of the incitement makes most people uneasy (76.7%), resulting in social unrest (53.5%) aimed at influencing Government decisions. This was associated with the wave of murders, kidnapping as the residents (>50%) were expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership (53.5%). The media however faced harassment from the police and some of the public (58.9%) were uncomfortable talking to media on political issues.

The study concluded that media in Kampala Central Division politically incite people through hate messages, publishing content with hate messages, preaching hatred and intolerance which promotes social unrest. The political incitement is through platforms like Twitter, Facebook making most people uneasy and could result in social unrest associated with the wave of murders, kidnapping as the residents and aimed at influencing Government decisions. Residents expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership, were uncomfortable talking to media on political issues and asserted that media faced harassment from the police.

Therefore, to mitigate conflict reporting misrepresentation, specifically in weak democratic states, a common approach to conflict reporting should be designed and adhered to. Independence of the media should be guaranteed and media should be provided with adequate resources to enable it provide accurate and reliable news. Government should address the political concerns of its people. More importantly, there needs to be stringent regulations including legal action and control of vernacular (local) FM stations which are prone to manipulation by political elite. This should be coupled with training of journalists on conflict reporting and development of a standard conflict reporting procedure.



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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The world is in an era of globalization in which the flow of ideas has become a common feature of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Ralph, 2006). The writer (Ralph) narrated that the media has played an important role and function in facilitating this flow of ideas that the issues that were global have become localized and the reverse is also true. This work assesses the impact of media political incitement and social unrest with a particular bias on Kampala, Uganda. This chapter focuses on the background, statement of the problem, purpose, objectives, research questions, significance, scope and limitations of the study.

#### **1.1 Background to the study**

##### **1.1.1 Historical Background**

Throughout history, information is a key factor in beginning of conflicts around the World. The media plays an important role of a watchdog in the society; exposing to the public what is essential but hidden, however, it can also be used to mobilize for violence and or hatred. There is the mainstream media also known as traditional media and social media. Currently, Social media can act as a tool for widening the democratic space; however, it can also lead to destabilization of peace and spring of violence. Messages and information are instant; newsrooms, as places for editing news are being overtaken; raw information is sent by anybody to everybody unedited. Journalism has been stolen! Information, whether likely to generate hate or bring peace goes out uncensored! (Oliver, 2001).

The most controversial incident of media incitement to violence involved newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst and his calls for the assassination of William McKinley during the election of 1900 in US history. McKinley was running for a second term in office with a new vice president (Theodore Roosevelt). During the campaign, Hearst's New York Journal and other newspapers set up a drum-beat of extreme political criticism. At one point the Journal labeled McKinley "the most hated creature on the American continent" and said:

*"If bad institutions and bad men must be got rid of only by killing, then the killing must be done."*

The New York Times explained that a similar call for McKinley's assassination was seen in a doggerel poem written by a then-famous writer named Ambrose Bierce. So when McKinley actually was assassinated in September of 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt and his cabinet members personally blamed Hearst for McKinley's assassination. Speaking of the incident later, Senator Lewis Schwellenbach said the attacks were "the most cowardly in all the sordid career of journalism which that man (Hearst) has pursued."

There are many other incidents of strong media rhetoric or grossly misleading images that seemed to justify violence in media history. For example, the 1915 film "Birth of a Nation" falsely depicting African Americans during the Reconstruction era in the worst possible light. The film apparently triggered a wave of lynching. "Media-promulgated stereotypes of various and diverse groups of people cause harm in both direct and indirect ways by presenting oversimplified, mostly negative, and often deceptive depictions (Lester, 2006). The 1998 murder of a gay University of Wyoming student, Matthew Shepard, is often seen as one example of the impacts stereotypes can have.

In Germany, crimes against humanity were nearly always preceded by campaigns of hatred in the mass media in the 1930s, where some of the most infamous films and newspaper articles in history directly targeted Jewish people. One newspaper, *Der Stürmer*, specialized in crude, vivid and vicious anti-Semitism. “Jewish murder plan against Gentile humanity” was one particularly virulent headline. The only solution, *Der Stürmer* often said, was “the extermination of the people whose father is the devil.” The newspaper was published between 1922 and February, 1945, after which its editor, Julius Streicher, was sentenced to death for crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal in 1946. The Tribunal said his advocacy of murder and extermination “clearly constituted persecution on political and racial grounds ... a crime against humanity.”.

One article from May, 1939 stated: *"A punitive expedition must come against the Jews in Russia. A punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them that every murderer and criminal must expect. Death sentence and execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be exterminated root and branch"* while another article written personally by Streicher dated 25th December, 1941 stated: *"If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the Jewish blood is to finally come to an end, then there is only one way-the extermination of that people whose father is the devil"*.

In Africa, the newspaper *Kangura*, published in Rwanda in the early 1990s for example issue no 22, 23 of October 1991, Issue no 27,28 of December 1991, Issue 42 of May 1993 and Issue no 43 of June 1993, openly advocated genocide of Tutsi people and in 1994, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi were killed by Hutus at the urging of *Kangura* and Radio Rwanda. *Kangura's* editor, Hassan Ngeze, along with broadcast colleagues, was convicted of crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and sentenced to life

imprisonment, re-affirming the international legal principle that leaders of the mass media organizations can be held responsible for inciting genocide.

While the level of political rhetoric in the United States in recent decades has been heated, it has certainly not approached the *Der Stürmer* or *Kangura* level of incitement. Nevertheless, many people feel that the bright red line between political rhetoric and open incitement to violence has been smudged, if not crossed, by cross-hairs on political districts; by calls for “Second Amendment remedies” against liberals in Congress; by gun-toting extremists at political rallies; and by politicians who “take aim” against liberals in their televised campaign ads.

In Uganda, the government has since the 2000’s used the laws in partisan ways to create a minefield for media owners and reporters who speak or write about issues that the government deems politically sensitive or controversial. For example on the 10<sup>th</sup> September 2009, Uganda experienced two days of rioting when government troops responded to rioters throwing stones, blocking roads and lighting fire with excessive lethal force, resulting in the deaths of at least 40 people (source: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/10/uganda-investigate-2009-kampala-riot-killings>). The riots occurred when the NRM government instructed state agencies to block the visit of a cultural leader of Baganda, to Kayunga (an area that was historically part of Buganda kingdom) and Luganda-speaking radio stations voiced support for the Buganda cultural leader and encouraged listeners to show that support by traveling to the area during the planned visit.

There have been assertions in many spheres on what constitutes media political incitement. Developing countries especially in Africa have been hard hit with social unrest, violence and uprisings in the recent past to what could be blamed to such. However, what can be drawn and asserted to lead to advocacy of national, ethnicity, racial or and religious hatred that constitutes

incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, prohibited by Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) often precedes mass atrocities like genocide, civil wars, mass and forceful displacements of populations and war (ICCPR, 1966).

Some scholars argue that there should be more restraints imposed on media political messages and freedoms of media at particular social settings in order to prevent social unrest, such atrocities mentioned above and enhance peace and prosperity. To the contrary, other commentators argue that not all political media incitement reaches the level of prohibition and a clear edge must be developed (Ringera, 2010).

Incitement to violence or ethnic hatred, including by ordinary citizens or politicians, community leaders or journalists, has actually resulted in massive violence and mass killings in many countries across the continent. Rwanda presents the most extreme examples of how the relationship between a government, the media and politics can go horribly wrong. But throughout the continent, there are sporadic instances of alleged incitement resulting in massive violence, such as in Kenya, Ivory Coast, Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria, etc. In an age when ordinary people have to express extreme views to get media attention, there is a need to advocate more peaceful rhetoric.

### **1.1.2 Conceptual Background**

The term media refers to a plural of word-medium which refers to various means of communication e.g. Television, Radio and the Newspaper. The term is used as a collective noun for the press or news reporting agencies. In the computer world, media is also used as a collective term that refers to different types of data storage options. In communication, media are the storage and transmission channels or tools used to store or deliver information or data.

The media are by far the most important source of information about politics and conflicts for most-people, which grants them a considerable influence over citizens' perceptions, opinions and behavior. By reporting on some conflicts but not on others, and by representing conflicts they report on in particular ways, the media strongly influence the dynamics and outcomes of conflicts, and thus also shape the prospects of success of conflict parties. That is why participants in conflicts, including state officials, armed rebels and other warring sides, political parties, social movements, workers on strike and pro-democracy activists in authoritarian states aim to exploit the media to foster their goals by adapting their activities to the logic of media operation.

Media political incitement is defined as the continued and unrestrained expression of intolerant rhetoric disseminated through the media and in political discourse that is provocative of discrimination, hatred or violence.

Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") defines media political incitement as the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, which often precedes mass atrocities like genocide, mass displacements and war. This Media political incitement is as a result of disgruntlements among some sections of the populace who want their voices heard and can use any media to air out their feelings.

On the other hand, social unrest is defined as complex events that can be influenced and triggered by social causes as well as accidents and natural disasters characterized by high complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, easily triggering effects onto other sectors of society and capable of inducing a breakdown or collapse of the social or political system (Renn and Keil, 2008).



Drury & Olson (1998:6); Zhang *et al.*, (2005: 138) associate social unrest with protests in the form of peaceful as well as violent demonstrations, strikes and with acts of civil and political violence. Keidel (2005) on the other hand links social unrest with a protest that includes more than eight persons. The intensity of social unrest can be measured by the number of demonstrations, riots, armed infringements and strikes within a year (Keidel, 2005).

### **1.1.3 Theoretical Background**

The study was underpinned by a theory of social production functions posited by Bradburn, (1969); Campbell *et al.*, (1976); Diener, (1984); Omodei and Wearing, (1990); Watson, (1988) which emerges as an appropriate candidate for explaining dissatisfaction that results in unrest. The theory states two universal goals: physical well-being and social well-being. These are accomplished through five main instrumental goals (stimulation, comfort, status, behavioral confirmation and affection (Ormel *et al.*, 1999: 62). The assumption is that individuals strive for these goals. The means to reach these goals can be deduced from the theory of rational choice. When wellbeing is not met and frustration occurs, the media can be used as a tool to stimulate or incite people into voicing their concerns either peacefully or violently. If people decide in spite of high costs to go public they are much more inclined to organize themselves and mobilize other citizens than in a situation where there is no obstacle to expressing dissatisfaction.

The theory of rational action provides a concept of how people make decisions in the face of uncertainty. It does not explain why people may become dissatisfied with their environment.

### **1.1.4 Contextual Background**

In Uganda, the NRM-controlled regulatory body governing radio in Uganda, the Broadcasting Council, suspended the licenses of three Luganda-speaking stations (*Suubi FM, Radio Sapienta and Akaboozi*) and withdrew the license of another, Central Broadcasting Station (CBS), all without notice or a prior court order. On September 10 and 11, 2009, political discord between

the central government and the Buganda cultural institution sparked riots that left at least 40 people dead in Kampala. Baganda youth began rioting when police blocked a delegation representing the Buganda kingdom from visiting Kayunga district. Police and soldiers threatened journalists trying to photograph and report on the unfolding events. In the wake of the riots, the Broadcasting Council also pressured these and other stations to suspend specific journalists whom the Council deemed had “incited violence.” The Council officially banned any open-air broadcasting, a very popular forum for public debate in local communities, known as bimeeza in Luganda in the country on any topic. CBS remained off air for some time (closed on September 10, 2009 and opened on October 23, 2010) while the other three stations ((*Suubi FM, Radio Sapienta and Akaboozi*) informally negotiated with authorities to return to the airwaves. The government took swift action against the above local radio stations, allegedly for inciting the public to commit violence, and forcibly pulled them off air on the first day of the riots (*Source: Increased Threats to Freedom of Expression in Uganda | HRW May 2, 2010: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/05/.../increased-threats-freedom-expression-uganda>*).

The government-sanctioned media clampdown during and after the September riots and the criminal charges levied against numerous print journalists appear to have led local government officials and NRM party operatives to believe they should take similar action. Human Rights Watch Research (2015) found that journalists based in rural districts were increasingly subjected to intimidation, threats, charges, and, to a lesser extent, physical attacks while trying to report on local political matters.

Rural radio journalists, in particular, have been targets of serious and repeated threats to their lives and their jobs. The perpetrators are often pro-NRM government officials, especially Resident District Commissioners who represent the President’s office at the district level or police and intelligence officials who are retaliating against criticism or reports on official

misconduct, such as alleged corruption, mismanagement, or human rights violations. In many instances, when threatening reporters, local government officials specifically referred to what happened in Kampala during the riots as evidence of the power of the state to stop negative reporting. Because local government officials are perceived to be closely aligned with police, instances of threats and intimidation have gone largely unreported and without proper investigation or prosecution. When instances have been made public, no investigation has taken place.

The inconsistency of some of the national laws in Uganda like the Access to Information Act 2005, with its obligations under international law and its constitution has not made the situation any better. The government also takes advantage of the vagueness in national laws to suppress critical appraisals. It does so by charging journalists with crimes and granting media regulatory bodies' broad powers to restrain speech through the revocation of licenses. Ugandan laws criminalizing certain types of speech are overly vague and broad, which makes even innocuous public statements open to criminalization. For example, the crime of "promoting sectarianism," is defined as "any act which is likely to promote feelings of ill will or hostility among or against any ethnic group or body of persons on account of religion, tribe or ethnic or regional origin."

Ugandan government authorities use these laws not to safeguard national security, but rather to stifle speech. For example, a reporter in Gulu district was charged with criminal libel for writing an article on public allegations of corruption by a Deputy Resident District Commissioner, despite the fact that the reporter sought comment from the commissioner himself and then quoted him in the article (*source: <https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/gulu-journalists-drum-up-support-for-arrested-colleague>*). Another journalist was charged with sedition for commenting on radio that

President Museveni had a “poor quality upbringing.” (source: <https://www.observer.ug/component/content/article?id=5126:what-serumaga-said-on-wbs-tv>)

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Although social media is expected to contribute to development, reconciliation and peace by widening the democratic space, recent world events have shown that social media, just like traditional media, can act as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the media can act as a tool for widening democratic space, but on the other it can lead to destabilization (Varghese 2011, 10). Government opened up the political space to Multi Party in 2005. The media has been used to spread political incitement through hate speech and incite social unrest leading to violence.

Since the previous political campaigns in 2005, at least 40 criminal charges have been levied against the media (journalists and talk show panelists). Fears have been raised about increased presence of politically inciting information in the Ugandan Media space. On the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> September 2009, Uganda experienced two days of rioting when government troops responded to rioters throwing stones, blocking roads and lighting fire with excessive lethal force, resulting in the deaths of at least 40 people. Police and soldiers threatened journalists trying to photograph and reporting on the unfolding events and the Broadcasting Council suspended specific journalists deemed to have incited violence and four local FM stations CBS, Suubi FM, Radio Sapienta and Akaboozi were closed. As contrasted to mainstream media which involves self-regulation and strict adherence to journalistic codes, the inability to regulate politically inciting content on social media has made it a fertile ground for the spread of hate content (Malik, 2012) and this has resulted into mass protests, riots, and rebellion within Kampala City and mostly in the Central Division.

In the past, the government has used threats of judicial action to scare Ugandans to not post flammable messages online, however there is continued media political incitement causing

social unrest in Kampala Central Division. There is a challenge of drawing the line between freedom of expression, hate speech and the right not to be discriminated against. There is need to study the impact of medial political incitement on social unrest in Kampala Central Division during the presidential and parliamentary campaigns between 2011 and 2016.

### **1.3. General Objective**

The general objective for this study is to establish the impact media political incitement to social unrest in Uganda, with specific emphasis to Kampala Central Division.

#### **1.3.1 Research Objectives**

The study was guided by the following specific objectives:

1. To examine the nature of media political incitement in Kampala Central Division.
2. To document the different types of social unrest that have been caused by media political incitement in Kampala Central Division.
3. To establish the challenges facing media in reporting on political issues in Kampala Central Division.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

1. What is the nature /forms of media political incitement in Kampala Central Division?
2. What are the different types of social unrest that have been caused by media political incitement in Kampala Central Division?
3. What are the challenges facing media in reporting on political issues in Kampala Central Division?

#### **1.5 Scope of the study**

##### ***Geographical scope***

The study was carried out in Kampala Central Division located in Central Uganda. The division is one of the divisions of Kampala Capital City that has experienced the most number of social unrest. The division comprises the central business district of the largest city in Uganda and

includes the areas of Old Kampala, Nakasero and Kololo. These areas are the most upscale business and residential neighborhoods in the city. The division also incorporates low income neighborhoods including Kamwookya, Kisenyi and Kampala's Industrial Area. Kampala Central Division was chosen because most revolts, protests take place in the Central business district.

### ***Content scope***

This study looked at the different ways/platforms through which the media creates political incitement in Kampala Central Division; the different types of social unrest that have been caused by media political incitement especially during the election period; and the challenges facing media in reporting on political issues in Kampala.

### ***Time scope***

The study focused on the period between the 2011 and 2016 Presidential and Parliamentary elections. This time period is not only important because it falls within the five years deemed good for studying but will also be the times when media political incitement and social unrest usually happens.

### **1.6 Purpose of the study**

The purpose of the study was to examine the impact of media political incitement in the propagation of social unrest in Uganda, Kampala Central Division.

### **1.7 Significance of the study**

It is hoped that the study findings will help other researchers in similar area in developing their literature. The study will be of value to future researchers who would be interested in the same area of study or on the gaps of this study with the view of filling them.

The study may help the government of Uganda in putting in place appropriate strategies and policies to improve the media to publish or report balanced information that excludes incitement.

In addition, the results of the study may also help media houses in the management of publications or reporting so as to reduce the propagation of violence through media, Ministry of Information and National Guidance, the Police, political parties, human rights group, civil society and academics.

### **1.8 Justification for the study**

Freedom of expression was identified by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 as one of the freedoms and rights that individual human beings are entitled to. The Constitution of Uganda in 1995, as a way of fulfilling the International obligations but as also committing itself to protection of the same freedom included in the national document the right of the individual to express him or herself. In the modern period more so with the increase in the number of media houses, expression is often done through both print, electronic and social media. However, this expression has sometimes caused unnecessary unrest and also raised public tension. It is in this interest that this research is done so as to investigate whether media political incitement does indeed impact on social unrest.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviewed the literature related to the role of media political incitement in the propagation of social unrest. The primary aim of this chapter was to analyze and review what has been written and researched in the areas of media political incitement and propagation of social unrest in order to identify the research gaps. The chapter is arranged under the following sub-headings of theoretical review, literature review and research gap

#### 2.1 Theoretical Review

The study is underpinned by the theory of social production functions posited by Bradburn, (1969); Campbell et al., (1976); Diener, (1984); Omodei and Wearing, (1990); Watson, (1988) which emerges as an appropriate candidate for explaining dissatisfaction. The theory states two universal goals: physical well-being and social well-being. These are accomplished through five main instrumental goals (stimulation, comfort, status, behavioral confirmation and affection) (Ormel et al 1999: 62). The theory assumes that individuals strive for these goals. This means the attainment of these goals can be deduced from the theory of rational choice. Within this school of thought it is assumed that individuals choose the most effective and efficient means for reaching a pre-determined goal. The production functions illustrate the relationship between goal attainment and personal costs (in terms of resources such as money, time, effort etc.). Risks occur if either the degree of goal attainment and/or the extent of costs are uncertain. Often it depends on the actions and decisions of others if one's expectations become true. These contingencies express themselves as risks to the individual decision maker. In terms of rational action each individual has to calculate the impacts of each decision option and assess the probability that the expected impacts will or will not materialize.



Social mobilization theory claims that individuals express dissatisfaction in public arenas if the costs of going public are low and the expectation that somebody will respond to it high. In cultures where the expression of dissatisfaction is encouraged we will find more public manifestations of dissatisfaction than in those culture in which such behavior is politically or socially sanctioned. However, the likelihood of further escalation rises if people face high costs of expressing dissatisfaction. The reasons is obvious: If people decide in spite of high costs to go public they are much more inclined to organize themselves and mobilize other citizens than in a situation where there is no obstacle to expressing dissatisfaction.

The theory of rational action provides a concept of how people make decisions in the face of uncertainty. It does not explain why people may become dissatisfied with their environment. The literature contains endless theoretical concepts for explaining dissatisfaction. Often dissatisfaction is linked to the gap between personal expectation and perceived reality. In some cultures even the most deprived groups do not complain about their situation because they do not expect anything better. In other cultures even the well-off tend to express dissatisfaction because they expect to be entitled to even more privileges in the future. In general, one can assume that the expression of dissatisfaction is a function of experience of unfair treatment by others, an expectation that such treatment is not justified or legitimate and a context in which such dissatisfaction can be voiced in the public.

If one turns specifically to the experience of risk, we can be more specific. Psychometric research has demonstrated the properties of risks and risk-related situations that amplify or attenuate the feeling of being endangered or threatened. The main characteristics that shape risk perception include voluntariness, personal control, dread, impression of inequities, blame, familiarity and others. Risks that are perceived as dreadful, involuntarily or out of personal control trigger more stress and concern than risks that are taken voluntarily, have no or minute catastrophic potential and allow personal control. Accordingly we can expect

people sharing a perception of high risk to be more inclined to express dissatisfaction than those with low risk perception. This insight is useful when diagnosing the types of risks that could trigger the first steps of social unrest. If people face risks such as the global financial crisis they will probably associate a feeling of dread, involuntariness, lack of control and blame with this crisis, while other collective risks such as car accidents with a high death toll are attenuated due to the perception of voluntariness, personal control and lack of catastrophes.

## **2.2 Literature Review**

### **2.2.1 The Nature of media political incitement**

**Hate speeches:** Hate speech discourses on media in critical events are likely to lead to the demystification of sociopolitical actors, as well as to an overall uncertainty among citizens which might finally result in their political disengagement and social fabric determent. Moreover, in a public space where messages of hatred and intolerance are allowable, people might feel unease and intimidated to express their points of view. In other words, hate speech on a popular social media platform such as Twitter, and facebook can possibly obstruct the constructive process of deliberation, and threaten democracy and peace. Also, the fact that it is very hard, if not impossible- to control and regulate hate speech content on social media, intensifies the need to identify and make sense of the hate speech phenomenon in order to find the right solution for its diminution without challenging the right to free expression (Sevasti, 2014). This study sought to establish the presence of this hate content on social media in its varying degrees.

Whereas hate speech, most of the times takes cue, when there has to be uttered or spoken word (s), such words may also be written in a book, a newspaper, a pamphlet, a brochure, or expressed in a public performance. The spoken word must be capable of being understood by the audience as stirring hatred directed at a particular section of the population.

Publication may entail the actual printing of the material containing hate speech as well as physical handing out of the material to the public or sections of the population (NCIC, 2008). All media platforms being channels of communications expose people in varying degrees to hate speech.

**Hate messages:** The Social Networking sites (SNS) are providing cost-effective platforms to communicate with large populations with zero time difference. Noting that media is a powerful tool of communication, media literacy is an issue that cannot be ignored (Parekh, 2012). It is therefore pertinent to evaluate the potential impacts that media political incitement in propagating social unrest in Uganda.

Mostly, growing democracies and economies face various challenges; economic, social and political. Hate messages would be of different contexts in such a circumstance of a developing nation; economic, social or political wrangles are obvious (Matas, 2000). Political rivalry, social injustices and economic struggles may push populations to blaming others for their woes. This often may push for hatred. Most of the times the only option to vent is the readily available social media which goes uncensored. Further, hate messages that are communicated and spread via different media are in different forms. Some may be in form of pictures (cartoons), in coded languages, and others in outright and straight forward language. Bloggers and micro bloggers may have incidental posts of hate messages posted on their timelines (Jaishnkar, 2008). Others may decide to either share the message, like the messages, or comment on them. Either way, the hate messages have been spread.

### **2.2.2 The different types of social unrest**

So we can find an operational concept for social unrest based on historically documented nationwide social unrests caused by the unanimous underlying factors (Zhang 2005: 18) This study however, mostly concentrated in China. What many definitions of social

unrest have in common is that they assume some kind of numerical threshold which defines a demarcation line between protest or manifestation of dissatisfaction and the emergence of social unrest. We believe that such numerical threshold are arbitrary and not very useful since the impact as well as the potential damage of social unrest may not at all or only slightly correlate with the head count of participating individuals or the number of protest events.

### **Political participation**

Within the semantic area of activities that underlie social unrest protests, demonstrations and political violence are most frequently mentioned. These manifestations are also part of another social science tradition, i.e. the theory and concepts of political participation. That concept includes actions that are operated by citizens aiming at influencing collective decisions on several levels of the political system (Barnes et al 1979:160). Not only the active mobilization of citizens but also the political goals of influencing collective decisions constitute key elements of this tradition. Excluded here are economic or social goals for which people could get engaged. Also political violence is not mentioned as a means of political participation. In newer studies both aspects are sometimes mentioned as components of participation (van Deth 2009: 145.)

Kaase distinguishes between conventional and unconventional political participation. While conventional participation includes activities such as voting or writing letters to the editor, unconventional political participation includes activities such as signing petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins, rent and tax strikes, traffic blockades and wild strikes (Kaase 2002: 352). This listing of unconventional activities seems to be close to the list we found in the literature about social unrests. Activities associated with social unrest are often linked to unconventional political participation. Conventional political participations such as elections or the attendance of a political event are definitely not part of social unrest. Seen from a

theoretical perspective it can be concluded that activities that are designed to serve a specific function within a functional system (such as politics or economics) belong to the ordinary, expected and conventional form of serving this function, while unconventional or unexpected forms of expressing a desire for change or intervention can turn into social unrest. Even those unconventional forms may be functional if the corresponding system is in urgent need of a radical reform. So in view of this line of argument social unrest is not necessarily dysfunctional but its manifestations appear as unexpected, unplanned, often spontaneous as well as unconstrained or uncontrollable within the functional system in which they occur.

### **Political violence**

The subject of political violence constitutes a research field of its own. Generally there are at least three forms of political violence: The first form refers to forms of violence performed by the political system (e.g. administrative, judicative, executive). In some studies political violence performed by the political system also means violence against citizens in form of disparity, social exclusion or persistent poverty (just to name some). The second understanding of violence refers to violence that is performed by the citizens against the political system (Sanchezem 2006:179). In this field we can find the following definition: political violators break with their actions basic social norms. These injuries of norms are justified on a level above the individual in difference to criminal infringements. In extreme cases they challenge the complete normative system (Kepplinger 2009: 95). Kepplinger assumes that the description of delinquent behavior reflects the view of the political establishment or that part of society against which the violence is directed. For the peers and the supporter of the violator this behavior is regarded as legitimate and morally justified given the circumstances under which they believe to suffer (Kepplinger 2009:97).

These two perspectives are integrated in the following definition; Collective violence is personal injury by a group. Most is social control by which people define or respond to

behavior as deviant (Senchal de la Roche 1996:97). The author distinguishes four forms of violence: lynching, unrest, vigilantism and terrorism. These forms can be classified along two dimensions: The degree of accountability (it can be individual or collective) and the degree of organization. Lynching is an individual act with a high degree of organization; vigilantism is likewise individual but not well organized. Unrest and terrorism are collective forms of violence; terrorism is organized, while unrest is not (Senchal de la Roche 1996:102-105).

A different distinction is introduced in the text from Sanchezem (2006). In addition to violence executed by the political system called structural violence, he refers to radical violence that may lead to waves of protests, strikes, demonstrations and to regional endangerment of security and criminal violence that occurs in the form of criminal youth gangs, mafia type collaborations and drug cartels (Sanchezem 2006: 179).

In reference to social unrests, violence, as long as it is collective, can be counted as one extreme from among other forms of collective expressions of dissatisfaction. Violence that is executed from the political system is different from social unrest, but may be a trigger for social unrest as Sanchezem (2006: 179f) emphasizes. Often social unrest may not be directed towards changing collective decisions but could be spontaneous expressions of dissatisfaction, frustration or experienced inequity. In this sense social unrest is only one component of unconventional political participation but, at the same time, transgresses the concept of participation as it may include collective protests that may not have a clear political goal, let alone a message of what should be done to cope with the present situation or crisis.

### **Social protest movements**

In his classical definition Karl W. Deutsch defines social mobilization as the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior (Deutsch

1961: 494). To be successful protest activities need both organization and endurance. Organizational capacity is essential for coordinating activities, recruiting new members, sustaining motivation and building networks. Sociologists refer to the process of institutionalization as a necessary means for movements to develop momentum beyond single events and to generate collective identity.

Charles Tilly notes that social movements emerge as a synthesis of three elements. These are campaign (sustaining collective action aimed at influencing public decisions), a social movement repertoire (e.g. demonstrations and other actions similar to those mentioned in the section on political participation), and a public representation of the goals, unity and values as prerequisites for sustaining the coherence of a social movement (Tilly 2004:3/4).

We can conclude that unconventional activities of collective actors are part of both research traditions: social movement as well as political participation. The difference between the two concepts seems to be that, within the scope of social movement, the interest is more on the endurance of such activities, while political participation is more focused at the individual motivation for joining a protest group and its impacts on the political system. Political violence intersects with both the political participation as well as the social movement tradition.

It is interesting to note that over time some of the allegedly unconventional activities have become ordinary, conventional forms of expressing dissent. Strikes organized by labor unions, for example, are now seen as legitimate form of protest even by those who do not benefit from these activities. Other actions such as demonstrations or petitions are now labeled as conventional although when they were first introduced they started as unconventional forms of protest. Today most of the European citizens have at least once participated in such actions. They tend to belong to normal processes within the political system

The analytical division between conventional or unconventional is hence contingent

on time period, location and culture. What appears to be a common form of political expression in one country is seen as major deviant behavior in another country. Social unrest is hence not a term that can be defined irrespective of the context in which it is used. Any political system constructs a boundary between conventional and unconventional (often by legal prescriptions or by daily practice). That boundary is fluid, however. It changes over time and may manifest itself at very different thresholds in different political cultures. This is the basic reasons that all operational definitions of social unrest are bound to fail. It is justified to connect social unrest to unconventional activities performed by collective actors but the extent and intensity of what unconventional entails depend on time, culture and social context. Furthermore, even attributes such as violent behavior may in some contexts be seen as legitimate or conventional (for example resistance against a common aggressor). However, most cultures would classify politically motivated violence as a form of unconventional activity and hence social unrest. Yet even if we had an agreement among all scholars that violent behavior constitutes one example of social unrest there is a clear understanding that social unrest cannot be confined to violence alone and that other forms of unconventional activities such as a national boycott should be grouped under this category. Given these ambiguities, we conclude that social unrest is an expression of collective dissatisfaction with the political system and manifests itself in unconventional forms of protest behavior.

The exact definition of what is regarded as unconventional and the degree and extent of collective actions that constitute the demarcation line between protest and social unrest cannot be defined in advance but relates to the context in which social unrest is studied. Social unrest can be seen as an extreme expression of social mobilization with major impacts for society e.g. economy or politics, with the proviso that the extent of the term majorly is subject to wide cultural, social and individual interpretations.



This definition brings us back to the concept of risk. If we see social unrest as a source of risk, we can map the major impacts in terms of losses to what people value: loss of life, injuries, property damage, loss of wealth, etc. If social unrest is the result of risk we can look for triggers and drivers that lead people to actions that, in their respective context, are regarded as unconventional and extraordinary. Both perspectives assume a continuum between a mere expression of dissatisfaction and violent civil war at each end of the continuum.

### **2.2.3 Challenges facing media in reporting on political issues**

The functions of the media in a democracy and subsequently in an election process have elicited much interest from media practitioners and outsiders. Various scholars have attempted to bring out a simplistic explanation of the way the two institutions work alongside each other but it has proved difficult. While it is often assumed that these roles play themselves out on a symbiotic relationship. It is against these roles that we examine the theories of news production to show the routines that journalists undergo in news selection.

Schudson, 1989 opines that journalism is an important constitutive element of public life and media institutions like any other are governed by traditions and dynamics of their own. But in the broader public life, news institutions do not define politics any more than political structures fully determine the news; there is an ongoing interaction (cited in Curran et al, 2000). It is these interactions between the political players and media that one needs to engage with, to try and look at the boundaries both institutions have with each other as power instruments. Curran notes that at its best, the mediatization of politics is one in which journalism is capable of standing as spokesperson for civil society, challenging political arrogance and political roguery.

The African press for long has had constant relations with politics. Kasoma (2000:83)

refers to the African press as having been a political press and operating as a political tool from the onset. He notes that politicians particularly those in government, have necessarily, always been involved in and with the press, legally and extra legally. That their involvement was in ordering journalists to do this and do that, complaining about acts or omissions by journalists and the press, warning journalists and the press to report on what those in government are saying, even if it does not conform to what they are doing or not doing. Indeed, it is difficult to picture the African press without its hallmark of overemphasis on politics. Politicians have courted the press and when the reports seemed unfavorable to them, they turned against the same institution they need. Kasoma (2000) also notes that the press is shrouded in controversy arising out of its nature as a campaign press. The press has been used as a political campaign tool to mop up party support of either the ruling party or the opposition. This still remains the case especially where there is the distinction between government- owned press and the private press.

As Imanyara (1992) has noted, generally, the role of the press in democratization has been that of an independent forum and mouthpiece of crusaders of change. The openness of the alternative press to the public and its bold approach to sensitive and critical political issues has had the cumulative effect of inciting the general public to wake up to their democratic rights and demand change. Arising from this, is the need for the press to distance itself from political relationships where there would appear to be a conflict of interest. Often, it is advised that private or independent media will effectively fulfill their roles in a democratic polity.

Waldhal (2004) notes that an important task for the media under democratic rule is to monitor political life and to draw the attention of voters to how politicians are fulfilling their responsibilities to society. In the circumstances then, it is expected that journalists will seek to effectively carry out this task as their duty to the public. In the same manner,

politicians will seek to prolong their stay in power even when their terms come to an end. But as Atieno-Odhiambo (1997) avers, modern times expect that there will be open competition for leadership. This competition in return assumes a high premium will be placed in the value of plurality and debate. For this to happen, the media can only serve the masses and flourish when it is not confined to governments.

In the democratic sphere, the need for a balanced interpretation of the day's happenings is central to the process. Walter Lippmann (1965) observed that journalists point a flash rather than a mirror at the world. He argued further that the audience does not receive a complete image of the political scene; it gets a highly selective series of glimpses instead.

Lippmann(cited in Graber, 2001:38) was categorical in his argument that there is no such thing as objective standards in journalism; there are only conventions. Which is why he saw every newspaper as the result of a whole series of selections as to what items shall be printed, in what position, how much space each shall occupy and what emphasis each shall have. News is fundamentally shaped by organizational routines and the content is shaped by these practices. To help outline these routines, it is important to engage with the theory of news production.

### **2.3 Conceptual Framework**

The propagation of social unrest (dependent variable) relies on the way the media can incite the people politically (independent variable). However, the level of democratization, form of media, access to information and level of political maturity can act as intervening variables in either fueling or stimulating social unrest. The study based on the libertarian theory and social responsibility theory to develop the conceptual framework. The libertarian theory advocates for media to be self-regulating in observance of strict code of ethics and professionalism.

#### **Libertarian Theory**

This is just in contrast to the authoritarian approach to media. Here media enjoys an absolute freedom of expression. Its prominent features go like this. Competitive exposure of alternative viewpoints. Attacks on the government's policies are accepted and even encouraged: the media as a watchdog Journalists and media professionals ought to have full autonomy within the media organization. There is no explicit connection between the government and the media. The press is free from censorship. It is accountable to the law for any consequences of its activities that infringe other individuals' rights or the legitimate claims of the society.

The protection of dignity, reputation, property, privacy, moral development of individuals, groups, minorities, evens the security of the state no infringement accepted from media

Such an extensive freedom is also a problem as all people have the right to speak and receive information freely, but no one takes responsibility of the wrong doings. The ethics in multicultural or pluralistic societies vary from place to place; hence there is always complaint against the media of each other's society


#### **Social Responsibility Theory**

This theory keeps certain areas free for the Press but at the same time puts lot of responsibility on media. As discussed in the beginning that the media is not just seen as an enterprise like others in the business sector of any society, but due to its unique nature, society expects a particular role which media must play in getting rid of social evils, educating people, criticizing government policies and exposing other wrong doings in a society. The sense of responsibility has been emphasized more in this theory as compared to any other Media has certain obligations to society:

- It must show truth, accuracy, objectivity, and balance
- The media should be free but self-regulated (codes of conduct, and ethics)
- The media is pluralistic: diversity of society, various points of view, forum for ideas
- The media ownership is a public trust. The journalist is accountable to his audience / readers

**Independent Variable**

**Dependent Variable**



Source: Author's own construct based on Aday and Andersen (1974) and Buor (2004)

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the methodology that was used in the study. This includes the research design, area of study and target population as well as sample size, sampling procedure, data collection methods, instruments, quality control, administration procedure, ethical issues and data analysis. It also includes limitations and assumptions.

#### **3.1 Research Orientation**

This study used both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative aspect dealt with the different statistical data obtained in the study. The qualitative aspects was used to handle data expressed in words related to feelings, opinions, attitudes, perceptions and views of the key informants like the Media Houses, and Politicians and civil society actors in Kampala district.

#### **3.2 Research Design**

The study employed a cross sectional survey design. This design was chosen because it enables detailed investigation into the characteristics of a population as expressed at a particular point in time. It involves collection of data on attitudes, belief, opinions, practices and perceptions related to the issue of interest (Leedy, 1985) as cited in odiya (2009). This design is also found to be suitable for providing numeric descriptions of some of the selected participants. It also describes events as they are, as they were or as they will be (Oso & Onen, 2009).

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#### **3.4 Study Population/ Target Population**

Denscombe (2010:23) explained that study population doesn't mean everyone that lives in the country but rather all the items in the category of things that are being researched. Kumar validated Denscombe's submission that a study population is that from which information to

find answers to the research questions is obtained. The target population consisted of the entire population (209,500 according to the 2014 census) in Kampala Central Division. The target population was from Old Kampala, Nakasero , Kololo, Kamwookya, Kisenyi and Kampala's Industrial Area where media houses, NGOs an CSOs were targeted totaling to 8442 from which 1% (84) of the population was considered for the study. The target population was chosen because of the inability of the researcher to reach the whole population besides the constraint of time and resources available for the study.

### **3.5 Study Sample**

The study took a sample of 84 participants' determined using Krejcie Morgan (1970) table of sample size determination (see appendix).

### **3.6 Sampling Techniques**

This study employed stratified random sampling techniques. Since Kampala Central Division is already divided into smaller units, the division was considered as a non-overlapping group of homogenous characteristics called strata. Simple random sampling may result in the population being considerably below or over represented (Collis & Hussey, 2003). The advantage of stratified random sampling over simple random sampling is that “stratified random sampling overcomes the problems of under or over representation of sample as each identifiable strata of the population is taken in to account” (Collis & Hussey, 2003). According to Kovacs (1985), “stratification ensures that all the important aspects of the characteristics to be studied are represented in the sample” and this also improve the generalizability of the findings.

Simple random sampling was used to select respondents that were included in the study. Specific attention was paid to inclusion of both male and female respondents in the study sample. This technique ensured that each member of the target population had an equal and independent chance of being included in the sample. The process of simple random sampling (lottery method) used. One paper was picked at random without replacement. The name of a person from a media house on the picked paper will be included in the study.

The media officials was purposively selected to participate in the study because they are the ones who publish and report on issues

### **3.7 Data Collection Techniques**

Considering the nature of the data that was collected was perceptual and attitudinal, self-report techniques were more relevant than any other for collecting them. The main

techniques chosen for this study thus were questionnaires, interviews and documentary analysis.

*Questionnaire survey* was employed to collect data. The researcher used an interviewer based semi structured questionnaire to collect information from the respondents. The technique was appropriate because it handled a large sample size and saved time and money. Furthermore, the study targeted categories of respondents who are literate and were capable of responding to questionnaire items easily (Odiya, 2009).

*Interviews* were also used to obtain data from the respondents (Interviewees). The researcher conducted the interviews for the media officials, key politicians and key civil society leaders in the district. This technique allowed the researcher to obtain information that could not be directly observed, historical information and gain control over the line of questioning, and provided the opportunity to clarify items on the spot during the interview process (Odiya, 2009).

### **3.8 Data collection instruments**

The instruments that were used for data collection are questionnaires and interview guides. *Questionnaires* were used because the study was concerned with variables that could not be directly observed such as views, opinions, perceptions and feelings of the respondents. Such information is best collected through questionnaires (Oso & Onen, 2009).

*Interview guides* were used for interviewing the key informants as detailed above. This enabled the researcher to gather first-hand information from the respondents over their perceptions about the study variables. The two instruments were able to collect very essential and consistent data.

### **3.9 Quality Control**

Quality control involved adjusting / modification of the instruments following the pre-test study in order to improve the validity and reliability coefficient to at least 0.70. This is the least value of validity and reliability coefficient generally accepted for survey studies (Popham, (2000). Furthermore, quality was enhanced by controlling the effects of extraneous variables. This was done through randomization since it limits systematic bias and spreads the effects of extraneous variables evenly (Odiya, 2009). The method is good since it involves random sampling of participants and their random assignment to groups.

Validity of the instruments was determined by giving the instruments to three independent experts who evaluated the relevance of the instrument to the study objectives and



rated the items on the scale of relevant (R) and irrelevant (IR). Validity was determined by computing the Content Validity Index using the formulae below.

$$CVI = \frac{\text{Average Scores Rated Relevant}}{\text{Total Number of Items in the Questionnaire}}$$

Source: *Amin (2005)*

### *Reliability*

This is how consistently an instrument measures what it is meant to measure. It is the degree to which research findings can be replicated under similar circumstances or the extent to which the scores from the assessment are consistent across repeated administrations of the same tests to the same population. This study will use Cronbach's coefficient alpha to assess the internal consistency of the research instrument.

Cronbach's alpha is defined as:

$$\alpha = \frac{K}{K - 1} \left( 1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^k \sigma_{\gamma_i}^2}{\sigma_x^2} \right)$$

Where  $K$  is the number of components;  $\sigma_x^2$  is the variance of the observed total test scores, and  $\sigma_{\gamma_i}^2$  is the variance of component  $i$  for the current of persons.

### **Administrative procedures**

After approval of the research proposal at the department level, the researcher obtained an introductory letter from the office of the Dean of the school of Social Sciences of Nkumba University and payed a pre study visit to the Division. This pre-visit helped the researcher to identify respondents; seek their consent and make relevant appointments for eventual data collection. While in the field, the researcher delivered the questionnaires to the respondents. The answered questionnaires were collected immediately while those that remained were collected later by the researcher. The researcher interviewed media officials; Politicians and Key civil society leaders.

### **3.10 Ethical Considerations**

The major ethical issues considered in this study included privacy; confidentiality; anonymity and informed consent of the respondents which are required in all studies and researches using human participants (Uganda National Council of Science and Technology, (UNSCT) 2007). The researcher gave assurance to the respondents that data collected would

not be used for any purpose other than academics and that the identity of the respondents would be kept secret by the researcher through assigning codes.

### **3.11 Data analysis**

This involved analysis of quantitative and qualitative data by use of both descriptive and inferential statistical analyses. Descriptive statistical analysis employed frequency and percentage distributions and bars charts. Inferential Statistics included Chi square (Chi square is more effective for determining Levels (Onen & Oso, 2009) and relationships were analyzed by use of Pearson's Correlation Coefficient ( $r$ ) since it is one of the most appropriate coefficient of determination of relationship in research (Onen & Oso, 2009) . This was achieved using the SPSS software version 16.0.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

#### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the data obtained in the study to examine the role of media political incitement in the propagation of social unrest in Uganda.

In an attempt to analyze data, two types of data analysis were conducted.

- a). Statistical Data analysis: for Kampala Central Business District, Categorical and ordinal data collected from the questionnaire analysis including frequency distribution, percentages, measure of central tendencies and interpretation were done.
- b). Thematic and content data analysis: Descriptive data from the interview, questionnaires were collated, categorized into themes and checked for associations. In order to analyze this descriptive data, various techniques like finding locus of data, reading and annotating trends, categorizing data into themes, corroborating evidence and developing account. The services of a statistician were solicited in the analysis of the data collected from this study. Out of 84 questionnaires given, only 56 were representatively filed a response rate of 66.7% which were used for this study.

## 4.1 Socio-Demographic data

**Table 4. 1: Socio-Demographic data**

<b>Sex/gender</b>	<b>Frequency n=56</b>	<b>Percent 100%</b>
Male	36	64.3
Female	20	35.7
<b>Age bracket (years)</b>	<b>Frequency n=56</b>	<b>Percent 100%</b>
Below 18	0	0
18-29	17	30.4
30-39	24	42.9
40-49	10	17.9
50-59	5	8.9
60 and above	0	0
<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Frequency n=56</b>	<b>Percent 100%</b>
Divorced	17	30.4
Married	24	42.9
Single	10	17.9
Widowed/Separated	5	8.9
<b>Highest level of education attained</b>	<b>Frequency n=56</b>	<b>Percent 100%</b>
Ordinary level certificate	10	18
Advanced level certificate	8	14.4
Tertiary	15	26.5
University	23	41.1
<b>Length of stay in Kampala</b>	<b>Frequency n=56</b>	<b>Percent 100%</b>
1year back	7	12.5
2years back	28	50.0
3years back		28.6
Above 3years back		7.1

**Source: Field data, 2018**

The findings indicated in table 4.1, show that the majority of the respondents were male with a valid percentage of 64.3% as compared with 35.7% of the females. This was because the males were more eager to defend their positions in relation to nature, and these were assumed to be the most active in relation to demonstrations, strikes and the rest.

As can be observed in Table 4.1, the majority of the respondents were below the age of 50 years with an overwhelming cumulative percentage of 91.1% and only 8.9% were between the ages of 50-59 years. This also means that the majority of the respondents were in the age bracket which could be described as active in terms of employment mobility, in case they were not satisfied with their current job and this had a bearing on the study, in that way, employment affected social fabric of the society and therefore unrest could rise from being unemployed.

The findings as observed in Table 4.1 also indicate that the majority of the respondents 42.9% were married, 30.4% were cohabiting, 17.9% were single and 8.9% were widowed. The distribution of the marital status also had a bearing on the study in a way that, different statuses had different reasons as to why they would involve themselves in demonstrations and strikes and this had a bearing on the results of the study considering that others were married and others were not.

In table 4.1, it was revealed that the majority, 41.1% of the respondents were degree holders, 18% were Diploma holders, 14.4% were advanced level certificate holders as well as ordinary certificate holders, while 8.5% were Master's degree graduates and 3.6% were ordinary level certificate holders. On the whole, since the majority of the respondents had some level of education, their responses were deemed helpful to the study; they also expected some level of enlightenment accruing to their levels of education attained. On average, the respondents were adequately qualified persons academically in line with their job requirements especially for media practitioners.

The length of stay in terms of number of years in Kampala shows that 12.5% of the respondents had stayed in Kampala for one year back, 50.0% had stayed for two years, 28.6% had stayed in Kampala for the past 3 years, while 7.1% had stayed in Kampala for more than 3 year. This implies that most of the respondents had spent at least enough time to have knowledge of political incitement due to media publications and broadcasts as well as the resulting social unrest in Kampala.

#### 4.2 Objective 1. To examine the nature of media political incitement in Kampala.

**Table 4. 2: Showing responses on whether the media in Kampala publishes content that comprises hate speeches.**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Not Sure	3	5.4	5.4	5.4
Agree	10	17.9	17.9	
strongly agree	43	76.7	76.7	94.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Field data, 2018

As to whether the media in Kampala publishes content that comprises hate speeches, 76.7% of the respondents strongly agreed, while only 17.9% agreed and 5.4% were not sure. These statistics confirm that the media in Kampala publishes content that comprises hate speeches.

This shows that the media was a source of incitement because it published content that comprises hate speeches. This meant that the authorities had to understand what type of hate speeches that the media propagated in order to curb the resultant actions that might result in social unrest

**Table 4. 3: Showing responses on whether the media publishes/broadcasts messages of hatred and intolerance**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
Disagree	2	3.6	3.6	3.6
Disagree	4	7.2	7.2	7.2
Not Sure	16	28.8	28.8	39.6
Agree				
Strongly agree	34	60.4	60.4	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Field data, 2018

Table 4.3 shows the responses on whether the media publishes/broadcasts messages of hatred and intolerance, 60.4% of the respondents strongly agreed while 28.8% agreed. However, 7.2% were not sure and 3.6% disagreed. This confirmed that the media publishes/broadcasts messages of hatred and intolerance. For those that were not sure or disagreed, they may not have had knowledge on what hate messages or intolerance meant. These findings indicated that Kampala was one area where the media was in abundance and its regulation was found wanting because publishing /broadcasting messages of hatred and intolerance could result in social unrest. It was thus important that understanding media content is a contributing factor in understanding people's view and consequently social unrest.

**Table 4. 4: Showing responses on whether Media platforms such as Twitter, and facebook propagate issues of hate in Kampala**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
	Disagree	0	0	0	0
	Not Sure	7	12.6	12.6	12.6
	Agree	10	18	18	30.6
	Strongly agree	39	69.4	69.4	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Field data, 2018

Table 4.4 indicates the responses as to whether Media platforms such as Twitter, and facebook propagate issues of hate in Kampala, 69.4% of the respondents strongly agreed while 18% agreed. The finding simply indicated that in Kampala, Media platforms such as Twitter, and Facebook propagate issues of hate in Kampala and therefore knowledge of the contributions of Media platforms such as Twitter, and Facebook to political incitement was important.

**Table 4. 5: Showing responses on whether Social Networking Sites (SNS) communicate hate messages that are spread via different media are in different forms.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
	Disagree	0	0	0	0
	Not Sure	6	10.8	10.8	10.8
	Agree	20	35.7	35.7	46.5
	strongly agree	30	53.5	53.5	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Field data, 2018

As to whether Social Networking sites (SNS) communicate hate messages that are spread via different media and in different forms, 53.5% of the respondents strongly agreed while 35.7% agreed. However, 10.8% were not sure. It was concluded that Social Networking sites (SNS) communicate hate messages that are spread via different media and in different forms.

This was strengthened by some respondents who noted that the social networking sites were very much accessible to most people literate and illiterate alike and therefore tagging,

forwarding, creation and posting of hate messages therefore not easy to censor because some of the illiterate could not be stopped from posting hate messages.

**Table 4. 6: Showing responses on whether in the last one month, you shared, tagged someone, forwarded, or reposted any hate content on social media.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0
	Disagree	0	0	0
	Not Sure	7	12.6	12.6
	Agree	10	18	18
	Strongly agree	39	69.4	69.4
<b>Total</b>		<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Field data, 2018**

Table 4.6 indicates the responses as to whether in the last one month; you shared, tagged someone, forwarded, or reposted any hate content on social media, 69.4% of the respondents strongly agreed while 18% agreed. However, 12.6% were not sure.

The findings pointed out that hate messages are always shared on social media. This was justified by a respondent who stated that “*the recipients of these messages and forward them, share them sometimes unconscious of the repercussions*”.

**Table 4.7: Showing responses on whether in the last one month you received hate content messages on social media.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0
	Disagree	0	0	0
	Not Sure	0	0	0
	Agree	25	44.6	44.6
	Strongly agree	31	55.4	55.4
<b>Total</b>		<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Field data, 2018**

Table 4.7 indicates that 55.4% of the respondents strongly agreed that in the last one month they received hate content messages on social media, while 44.6% agreed. This implied that in the last one month people on social media received hate content messages. For example, the



current state of issues in the media about the reshuffle of IGP Kale Kayihura, the death of Andrew Felix Kaweesi and other killings that have been connected to internal wrangles in the police force.

**Table 4. 8: Showing responses on whether a big percentage of your friends on social media post hate content.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
	Disagree	2	3.6	3.6	3.6
	Not Sure	4	7.2	7.2	7.2
	Agree	16	28.8	28.8	39.6
	Strongly agree	34	60.4	60.4	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

**Source:** Field data, 2018

Table 4.8 shows the responses on whether a big percentage of friends on social media posted hate content, 60.4% of the respondents strongly agreed while 28.8% agreed. However, 7.2% were not sure and 3.6 disagreed. This confirms that hate messages were always posted on social media. This was further justified by a respondent who noted that “...when you have data and someone sends you a message, you sometimes take it as a joke and find yourself forwarding it to your friends or the public sometimes without comprehending the consequences of one’s actions”

Social media was thus considered as a gateway to political incitement which if not curbed would rise into social unrest.

**Table 4. 9: Showing responses on whether the media prints/ publishes content that makes people might feel uneasy and intimidated**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0
	Disagree	0	0	0
	Not Sure	3	5.4	5.4
	Agree	10	17.9	17.9
	strongly agree	43	76.7	76.7
<b>Total</b>		<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Field data, 2018

As to whether the media prints/ publishes content that makes people might feel uneasy and intimidated 76.7% of the respondents strongly agreed, while only 17.9% agreed and 5.4% were not sure. These findings confirm earlier findings that the media in Kampala publishes content that made people feel uneasy as well as intimidated. This shows that the media was a source of intimidation because it published content that made people circulate hate speeches. This meant that the authorities had to understand what type of hate speeches that the media propagated in order to curb the resultant actions that might result in social unrest.

#### **4.3 Objective 2: The different types of social unrest that have been caused by media political incitement in Kampala.**

The respondents were asked questions regarding the types of social unrest in Kampala caused by media political incitement. The findings were presented in the tables below:

**Table 4. 10: Showing responses on whether there has been demonstrations and political violence in Kampala as a result of media incitement**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
	Disagree	0	0	0	0
	Not Sure	22	39.3	39.3	39.3
	Agree	4	7.2	7.2	
	Strongly agree	30	53.5	53.5	60.7
<b>Total</b>		<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Field data, 2018

Table 4.9 indicates that 53.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that there has been demonstrations and political violence as a result of media incitement in Kampala, while 7.2% agreed with the statement. The findings indicated that media political incitement was one of the causes of social unrest and political violence in Kampala.

**Table 4. 11: Showing responses on whether demonstrations and political violence in Kampala have been aimed at influencing collective decisions by government**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Not Sure	17	30.4	30.4	
Agree				
Strongly agree	39	69.6	69.6	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Field data, 2018

The findings in table 4:11 shows responses to whether the demonstrations and political violence in Kampala have been aimed at influencing collective decisions by government, 69.6% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement while 30.4% agreed. It was concluded that demonstrations and political violence in Kampala have been aimed at influencing collective decisions by government.

**Table 4. 12: Showing responses on whether demonstrations activities have involved signing petitions, boycotts, traffic blockades and wild strikes**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Not Sure	0	0	0	0
Agree	22	39.3	39.3	
Strongly agree	34	60.7	60.7	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Field data, 2018

Table 4.12 indicates that 60.7% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that demonstration activities in Kampala have involved signing of petitions, boycotts, traffic blockades and wild strikes, while 39.3% agreed. In an interview with some of the respondents, when *there was a demonstration most roads would be blocked with tyres burnt in the middle of the road thereby disrupting normal business and traffic.*

It was concluded that demonstration activities in Kampala have involved signing of petitions, boycotts, traffic blockades and wild strikes.

**Table 4. 13: Showing responses on whether there have been incidences of lynching or waves of murders in Kampala**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	2	3.4	3.4	
Disagree	1	1.6	1.6	5.0
Not Sure	13	23.5	23.5	23.5
Agree	10	18	18	
Strongly agree	30	53.5	53.5	71.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

**Source: Field data, 2018**

Results in table 4.13 indicate responses on whether there have been incidences of lynching or waves of murders in Kampala. 53.5% strongly agreed while 18% agreed. It was concluded that there has been lynching and a wave of murders in Kampala..

The lynching and the murders arise from a variety of reasons. Some of the people felt a lot of helplessness and nursed the feeling that the law and order institutions were not doing enough to protect them and so they had to take the law into their own hands.

However, 23.5% of the respondents were not sure that in Kampala there have been incidents of lynching and a wave of murders.

**Table 4:14 Showing responses on whether Kampala has of late experienced regional endangerment of security and criminal violence in the form of criminal youth gangs**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
	Disagree	0	0	0	0
	Not Sure	0	0	0	0
	Agree	18	32.1	32.1	
	Strongly agree	38	67.9	67.9	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

**Source: Field data, 2018**

The findings in table 4.14 indicate that 67.9% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that Kampala has of late experienced regional endangerment of security and criminal violence in the form of criminal youth gangs; while 32.1% agreed. One of the reasons they gave was that the Police had gone to bed with some of these gangs and that is what was making them more rampant.

**Table 4. 15: Showing responses on whether there have been incidents of kidnapping of political leaders and demanding for ransom in Kampala**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly	0	0	0	
	Disagree	0	0	0	0
	Disagree	1	1.8	1.8	1.8
	Not Sure				
	Agree	18	32.1	32.1	
	Strongly agree	37	66.1	66.1	98.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

**Source: Field data, 2018**

Table 4.15 indicates that there have been incidences of kidnapping of political leaders and demanding for ransom in Kampala. This was represented by 66.1% of the respondents who strongly agreed while 32.1% agreed. Only 1.8% of the respondents were not sure. This showed

the level of concern people have over the security of their leaders, while the leaders themselves lived in fear.

**Table 4. 16: Showing responses on whether in Kampala we have spontaneous expressions of dissatisfaction, frustration of government leadership**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
d Disagree	0	0	0	0
Not Sure	4	7.2	7.2	7.2
Agree	22	39.3	39.3	
Strongly agree	30	53.5	53.5	92.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Field data, 2018

Table 4.16 indicates that 53.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that in Kampala there have been spontaneous expressions of dissatisfaction and frustration of government leadership, while 39.3% agreed with the statement. However, 7.2% were not sure. The foundations of a good government some intimated is satisfaction among the population. When the people feel dissatisfied, they are compelled to react negatively towards the leadership of government.

#### 4.4 Objective 3: Establish the challenges facing media in reporting on political issues in Kampala

The study aimed to find out the challenges facing media reporting on political issues in Kampala.

**Table 4. 17: Showing responses on whether journalists face personal safety and security risks in the course of their work in Kampala**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Not Sure	30	53.5	53.5	53.5
Agree	1	1.8	1.8	55.3
strongly agree	25	44.7	44.7	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

**Source: Field data, 2018**

The findings on whether journalists face personal safety and security risks in the course of their work in Kampala indicate that 44.7% of the respondents strongly agreed while 1.8% agreed.

However, the majority of the respondents 53.5 % indicated they were not sure whether journalists faced a lot of risks in their work and if this affected their reporting during political periods. The findings however, indicate that to some extent journalists face a lot of safety and security risks during their work in political periods. One interviewee noted that because of these risks journalists now prefer to write stories that favor groupings considered to be more powerful and aggressive in order to avoid being attacked.

**Table 4. 18: Showing whether Police harass journalists during political periods/ times**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Valid Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Not Sure	6	1.8	1.8	1.8
Agree	30	53.5	53.5	55.3
strongly agree	20	42.8	42.8	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

**Source: Field data, 2018**

The respondents were asked to indicate whether police harass journalists in Kampala during political periods and 42.8% of the respondents strongly agreed while 53.5% agreed. In an interview with some of the respondents, they indicated that they have seen many journalist being beaten and their equipment confiscated especially those from media houses considered hostile to government.

It was concluded that Police indeed harass journalists during political times in Kampala.

**Table 4. 19: Showing responses on whether the public is uncomfortable talking to journalists on political issues**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Not Sure	0	0	0	0
Agree	33	58.9	58.9	58.9
strongly agree	23	41.1	41.1	41.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Field data, 2018**

Table 4.21 indicates that 41.1% of the respondents strongly agreed that the public in Kampala fear to talk to journalists on political issues. While 58.9% agreed. It was concluded that journalists were thus finding it hard to find correct and accurate stories because the public feared sharing information on political issues with them. With no sources from the public, journalists are cut off from the gist of the issue at hand and thus have to either graft some stories or do not write about a particular political issue at all as they would not have information from the public.

**Table 4. 20: Showing responses on whether the media law in Uganda is rigid**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Not Sure	1	1.8	1.8	1.8
Agree	29	51.8	51.8	53.6
strongly agree	26	46.4	46.4	98.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Field data, 2018**

Table 4.22 shows that cumulatively, 98.2% of the respondents agreed with the statement that the media law in Uganda is rigid. While only 1.8% were not sure. This was a consistent factor explaining the relationship between the media and state functionaries like the police and other security agencies. The laws make it easy for the security agencies to harass the media and at times deny them coverage of certain political matters accusing them of being anti-government and enemies of the state.



**Table 4. 21: Showing responses on whether Journalists lack the necessary equipment**

		<b>Frequenc y</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Valid	Strongly Disagree	2	3.6	3.6	
	Disagree	0	0	0	3.6
	not sure	2	3.6	3.6	3.6
	Agree	24	42.6	42.6	46.2
	strongly agree	28	46.4	50.2	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

**Source: Field data, 2018**

Journalists lack the necessary equipment to do their work. This was indicated by 42.6% of the respondents who agreed while 50.2% strongly agreed. On the contrary, 3.6% disagreed and 3.6% were not sure. The conclusion on this was that journalists lack the necessary equipment to do their job. As a result, journalists find it hard to gather information and that they need to come up with a good story and a credible one at that.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the discussions, conclusions and recommendations. They were presented according to the objectives of the study.

#### Demographic data

According to table 4.1, the majority of the respondents were male with a valid percentage of 64.3% and this was because the males are more interested in Political issues than their female counterparts. Also the majority of the respondents were below the age of 50 years with an overwhelming cumulative percentage of 91.1% meaning that the majority of the respondents were in the age bracket which could be described as active politically, and thus were more likely to be engaged in political activities in the area. Marital status also affected political behavior in a way that different statuses had different reasons as to why they were either involved in political unrest in the area or not.

The majority i.e. 41.1% of the respondents were degree holders and their responses were deemed helpful to the study.

On the length of stay in terms of number of years in Kampala, the majority, over 50.0%, had stayed for two years and more implying that they had at least spent a long time in the division to have experienced some social unrest in Division.

#### 5.2 Discussion of findings

The study found that media political incitement had an impact on social unrest in Kampala Central Division during the presidential and parliamentary campaigns between 2011 and 2016 and was escalated by vernacular (local) FM stations and was double-edged. The media has been used to spread political incitement through hate speech and incite social unrest leading to violence. The media politically incited people through hate messages, publishing content with hate messages, preaching misleading information and intolerance through platforms like Twitter, Facebook which promotes social unrest associated with the wave of murders, kidnapping as the residents and aimed at influencing Government decisions.

### **5.2.1 To examine the nature of media political incitement in Kampala**

Media in Kampala publishes content that comprises hate speeches as shown by findings in table 4.2. This is in agreement with Jaishnkar, (2008) that hate messages that are communicated and spread via different media are in different forms. Some may be in form of pictures (cartoons), in coded languages, and others in outright and straight forward language. Bloggers and micro bloggers may have incidental posts of hate messages posted on their timelines. Others may decide to either share the message, like the messages, or comment on them. Either way, the hate messages have been spread.

Publications and broadcasts of messages of hatred and intolerance have also led to social unrests in Kampala as shown in Table 4.3. These findings are consistent with Matas (2000) who posits that most growing democracies and economies face various challenges; economic, social and political. Political rivalry, social injustices and economic struggles may push populations to blaming others for their woes. This often may push for hatred. Most of the times the only option to vent is the readily available social media which goes uncensored

Media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook propagate issues of hate in Kampala and therefore knowledge of the contributions of media platforms such as Twitter, and Facebook to political incitement was important as shown in Table 4:4. The findings are in line Parekh, (2012) who notes that the social networking sites (SNS) are providing cost-effective platforms to communicate with large populations with zero time difference. Noting that media is a powerful tool of communication, media literacy is an issue that cannot be ignored.

As to whether Social Networking sites (SNS) communicate hate messages that are spread via different media and in different forms. Results from Table 4.5 led to the conclusion that Social Networking sites (SNS) communicate hate messages that are spread via different media and in different forms. This finding agree with Sevasti, (2014) who adds also that, the fact that it is very hard, if not impossible- to control and regulate hate speech content on social media, intensifies the need to identify and make sense of the hate speech phenomenon in order to find the right solution for its diminution without challenging the right to free expression

The findings also pointed out that hate messages are always shared on social media. This was justified by a respondent who stated that “*the recipients of these messages and forward them, share them sometimes unconscious of the repercussions*”. This was shown in Table 4.6 accounting for 87.4% of the responses.

The results as indicated in Table 4.7 revealed that many people receive hate content messages on social media accounting for 100% of the responses, making it an important factor in political incitement and social unrest in Uganda. Hate Content spread on social media about one group can easily incite other sections against this particular group leading to political violence. This is in agreement with Jaishnkar, (2008) who avers that political rivalry, social injustices and economic struggles may push populations to blaming others for their woes. This often may push for hatred. Most of the times the only option to vent is the readily available social media which goes uncensored.

Posting of hate messages by friends led to political and media incitement as revealed in table Table 4.8 accounting for 89.2% of the responses. This confirmed that posting of hate messages by friends was one of the indicators of political conflict a conclusion that was further justified by a respondent who noted that “...when you have data and someone sends you a message, you sometimes take it as a joke and find yourself forwarding it to your friends or the public sometimes without comprehending the consequences of one’s actions”

That the media was awash with messages that create unease and intimidation was confirmed by responses of respondents in Table 4.9 accounting for 94.6%. These findings confirm earlier findings that the media in Kampala publishes content that made people feel uneasy as well as intimidated. This shows that the media was a source of intimidation because it published content that made people circulate hate speeches. This meant that the authorities had to understand what type of hate speeches that the media propagated in order to curb the resultant actions that might result in social unrest.

### **5.2.2 The different types of social unrest that have been caused by media political incitement in Kampala.**

The findings indicated that media political incitement was one of the causes of social unrest and political violence in Kampala accounting for 53.5% of the responses as shown in Table 4.10. These findings relate with Ortwin et al, 2011 who argue that from a more systemic or functionalist point of view social unrest can be conceptualized as risk (posing threats to society) but also as an opportunity for positive change or development. For example those who pursue social or political goals as a means to reshape society, may turn to stimulating social unrest as an instrument for facilitating changes. Even though social unrest may trigger positive changes in society, it is associated with the risk of experiencing damage to human lives and property. It

describes a complex web of triggers, immediate risks and probably remote benefits and threats which makes social unrest a typical representative of systemic risks.

The findings in table 4.11 revealed that the demonstrations and political violence in Kampala have been aimed at influencing collective decisions by government accounting for 69.6% of the respondents. It was concluded that demonstrations and political violence in Kampala have been aimed at influencing collective decisions by government. This conclusion resonates with the ideas of Ortwin et al, 2011 who claim the 2008 demonstrations and strikes in Greece were a response to the lack of job opportunities among young people and thus aimed at influencing government decisions. They add that the firm position of the government then may have ignited the protest movement but it also had reconfirming effects to those who always questioned the efficacy of governmental action. Now almost all Greeks are convinced that the government is serious about reducing the deficits and rejuvenating the economy.

Social unrest in Kampala involved signing of petitions, boycotts, traffic blockades and wild strikes. The findings Table 4.12 indicates that 60.7% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that demonstration activities in Kampala have involved signing of petitions, boycotts, traffic blockades and wild strikes,. In an interview with some of the respondents, when *there was a demonstration most roads would be blocked with tyres burnt in the middle of the road thereby disrupting normal business and traffic*. It was concluded that demonstration activities in Kampala have involved signing of petitions, boycotts, traffic blockades and wild strikes. Author Kaase distinguishes conventional and unconventional political participation. While conventional participation includes activities such as voting or writing letters to the editor, unconventional political participation includes activities such as signing petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins, rent and tax strikes, traffic blockades and wild strikes (Kaase 2002: 352).

Results from the study also indicates that there have been waves of murders and lynchings in Kampala.71.5% of the responses as seen in table 4.12 attest to that. These findings are in line with Senchal de la Roche (1996:97). The author distinguishes four forms of violence: lynching, unrest, vigilantism and terrorism. These forms can be classified along two dimensions: The degree of accountability (it can be individual or collective) and the degree of organization. Lynching is an individual act with a high degree of organization, vigilantism is likewise individual but not well organized. Unrest and terrorism are collective forms of violence, terrorism is organized, while unrest is not (Senchal de la Roche 1996:102-105).

Kampala has of late experienced regional endangerment of security and criminal violence in the form of criminal youth gangs. 100% of the respondents agreed attested to this claiming that this is mainly so because the Police had gone to bed with some of these gangs and that is what was making them more rampant. This position agrees with Sanchezem (2006) who says that In addition to violence executed by the political system (called structural violence), there is also radical violence that may lead to waves of protests, strikes, demonstrations and to regional endangerment of security and criminal violence that occurs in the form of criminal youth gangs, mafia type collaborations and drug cartels.

Kampala has experienced incidents of kidnappings of people and demands for ransom. Table 4.15 indicates that there have been incidences of kidnapping of political leaders and demanding for ransom in Kampala accounting for 98.2% of the responses. This was mainly due to unresolved political issues but also a feeling among some members that they were being overly alienated. These findings are in line with Misra (2008) assertion that many outbreaks of civil violence are also expressions of major unresolved geographic conflicts .In any case, a call to violent actions requires a major cause. Such causes may appear not very dramatic or as being highly exaggerated by an outside observer, what counts is that they are believed by those who are sympathetic to the cause (not only the activists). Furthermore, there must be a common conviction among the activists and their sympathizers that the conditions will only change if violence is used. Both conditions can transform a peaceful movement into a radical uprising that leads to numerous acts of violence.

The study also revealed that there have been spontaneous expressions of dissatisfaction and frustration of government leadership accounting for 98.8% of the responses as shown in Table 4:16. The foundations of a good government some intimated is satisfaction among the population. When the people feel dissatisfied, they are compelled to react negatively towards the leadership of government. This conclusion agree with Ortwin et al, 2011. Social unrest seems to be likely in cases in which people are extremely dissatisfied with their situation and probably fear for their health, lives or livelihood. Dissatisfaction is normally linked with the feeling of blame. Someone or some institution is being blamed for the negative situation. Dissatisfaction is also highly connected with the question of perceived inequity and justice. The mass media are important amplifiers or attenuators of social dissatisfaction and bring topics into the public discourse (agenda setting). Finally the fate of the protest movements

depend on the degree to which unsatisfied groups can organize themselves and translate their anger into collective action and the response of the public officials to this organized protest

### **5.2.3 The challenges facing media in reporting on political issues in Kampala**

Many people are not sure that journalists face a lot of risks in their work and if this affected their reporting during political periods. These survey results however, indicate that to some extent journalists face a lot of safety and security risks during their work in political periods. One interviewee noted that because of these risks journalists now prefer to write stories that favor groupings considered to be more powerful and aggressive in order to avoid being attacked. This position is re-echoed in Aidan White's (2003) words that the challenge of objectivity, impartiality and balance in journalism is faced daily by journalists, but there is no test of professionalism greater than that posed in the heat and pressure of a bitterly-fought political election

Police in Kampala harass journalists accounting for 96.3% of the responses. In an interview with some of the respondents, they indicated that they have seen many journalists being beaten and their equipment confiscated especially those from media houses considered hostile to government. Caro Rolando writing for IFEX in 2016 reported that Police brutality had escalated in the lead-up to Uganda's presidential elections. In less than two months - between October and November 2015 - there were three separate incidents of journalists shot by police - while they were covering political events.

Journalists are facing difficulties in finding correct and accurate stories because the public fears sharing information on political issues with them. Table 4.21 indicates that all the respondents accounting for 100% agreed to the fact that journalists cannot file accurate stories because they lack credible and reliable sources. Consequently with no sources from the public, journalists are cut off from the gist of the issue at hand and thus have to either graft some stories or do not write about a particular political issue at all as they would not have information from the public. Like the South East Asian Press Alliance noted while covering the elections in East Timor, most of the media outlets do not have enough means to cover all political parties. Some media houses have very few staff - especially online media outlets, which mostly have one or two journalists that cover everything (IFEX, 2017).

The media laws in Uganda are very rigid. This is illustrated by Table 4.22 which shows that cumulatively, 98.2% of the respondents agreed with the statement that the media law in Uganda

is rigid. This was a consistent factor explaining the relationship between the media and state functionaries like the police and other security agencies. The laws make it easy for the security agencies to harass the media and at times deny them coverage of certain political matters accusing them of being anti-government and enemies of the state. This situation resonates with the one in East Timor as reported by the South East Asian Press Alliance in 2017 that the Press Law already requires all media workers to have media ID cards issued by the Press Council. The process, which includes a condition for new media workers to take a six-to-18-month apprentice period before a competency test, only began mid-2016. In the absence of regular media ID cards, the National Elections Commission (CNE) proposed that media workers have to register with for the special IDs. Prior to the election period, journalists protested the idea of a "registration" for media organizations and journalists to be able to cover the upcoming polls. They were wary that the measure and process would go against the Press Law, which protects the rights of the media to cover stories without any restriction.

Journalists lack the necessary equipment to do their work. This was indicated by 92.8% of the respondents who agreed. The conclusion on this was that journalists lack the necessary equipment to do their job. As a result, journalists find it hard to gather information and that they need to come up with a good story and a credible one at that. In East Timor the South East Asian Press Association reported that media owners were keen to invest more in more profitable content than the quality of news content. Journalists are poorly-paid and not well-equipped, logistically and professionally, to provide good quality reporting (South East Press Alliance, 2017).

### **5.3 Conclusions**

The findings of the study were based on the research questions upon which the researcher drew the following conclusions.



### **5.3.1 The nature of media political incitement in Kampala**

The media in Kampala publishes content with hate messages and preach hatred and intolerance which has led on many occasions to social unrest. Social media platforms such as facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp also propagate issues of hate, while people continued to share these messages without even thinking about the content and the consequences of spreading such messages. The media itself is awash with hate messages thus inciting the people and promoting social unrest in Kampala.

### **5.3.2 The different types of social unrest that have been caused by media political incitement in Kampala.**

The social unrest in Kampala has been characterized by Demonstrations, Petitions, Traffic blockades and wild strikes for example. Demonstrators piled stones and set fire to block a road during a protest against the arrest of opposition leaders in Kireka suburb of the capital Kampala, April 18, 2011. In reaction Godfrey Mutabazi, executive director of the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) told Reuters that “I can assure you we’ll not hesitate to intervene and shut down these platforms,”

Kampala has also in the recent years experienced several murders and lynching. There have also been Kidnaps and demands for ransoms which were not known previously in the city. There have also been spontaneous riots in several parts of Kampala central.

In June 2015, police arrested social critic Robert Shaka, also an information systems engineer with a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programme, on allegations of being behind the pseudonym Tom Voltaire Okwalinga (TVO), responsible for leaking government secrets on Facebook. Shaka was arrested on charges under Section 25 of the Computer Misuse Act for using computers and other electronic devices to issue “offensive communication”. Section 25 of the Computer Misuse Act states, “Any person who willfully and repeatedly uses electronic communication to disturb or attempts to disturb the peace, quiet or right of privacy of any person with no purpose of legitimate communication whether or not a conversation ensues commits a misdemeanor.” A conviction attracts a fine not exceeding UGX 480,000 (US\$140), imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both (*Source: <https://acme-ug.org/2015/07/13/hunting-down-social-media-abusers-in-uganda-as-elections-near>*)

### **5.3.3 The challenges facing media in reporting on political issues in Kampala**

The media in Kampala central has faces the challenge of their personal safety and security, Police harassment, strict media laws which has affected the media environment and

lack of the necessary equipment and logistics to carry out their work. All these have made it difficult for the journalist to deliver good products to the public.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

The researcher recommends the media should be independent and try to give the public the correct information. However, they should avoid publishing hate messages and messages of intolerance which can lead not only to social unrest but also political instability and genocide. It is also recommended that the government addresses the political concerns of the people in Kampala so that the journalists cannot use those issues to incite the public into social unrest.

The public should use peaceful means of protests to avoid the chaos and unrest that results from violent protests and strikes.

Media houses in Kampala should provide their journalists with adequate resources for them to be able to provide accurate and reliable news to their consumers.

#### **5.5 Research for further studies**

The sources of social unrest may vary from one district to another and from one division to another. It is therefore, important that more studies be done in this area to establish whether there are varying causes in the different areas or if the causes are the same and what should be done to avoid future political and social unrests.

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## APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRES TO RESPONDENTS

Dear Sir/ Madam,

I am Robert Mwesigwa Rukarri., a student of Nkumba University pursuing a Master of Arts Degree in Security and Strategic Studies I am currently conducting a study on the role of media political incitement in the propagation of social unrest in Uganda: a case of Kampala Central Division. The study is purely for academic purposes and the information given will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

I therefore, humbly request you to spare some time and answer the following questions.

### SECTION A: Background information

Tick or write answers in full where applicable.

1. Gender

Male  b) Female

2. Age bracket (years)

18-25  b) 26-30  c) 31-45  d) 45 and above

3. Marital status:

Single  b) Married  c) Widow(er)  d) Divorced/Separat

4. Highest level of education attained

a) Ordinary Level  b) Advanced Level  c) Tertiary

d) University

5. For how long have you stayed in Kampala?

a) 1 year back  b) 2years back  c) 3 years back  d) Above 3years back

**SECTION B: To examine the nature of media political incitement in Kampala Central Division**

On a scale of 1-5, tick in the appropriate box on how you strongly agree or disagree with the statements given.

Scale	1	2	3	4	5
	Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
The media in Kampala Central Division publishes content that comprises hate speeches					
The media publishes/broadcasts messages of hatred and intolerance					
Media platforms such as Twitter, and facebook propagate issues of hate in Kampala Central Division					
Social Networking sites (SNS) communicate hate messages that are spread via different media are in different forms.					
In the last one month, you shared, tagged someone, forwarded, or reposted any hate content on social media					
In the last one month you received hate content messages on social media					
A big percentage of your friends on social media post hate content.					
The media prints/ publishes content that makes people might feel unease and intimidated					
You encounter hate messages on WhatsApp more often					
The content in most print media is usually full of discriminatory messages					
The media hands out material to the public or sections of the population containing hate speeches					
All media platforms expose people in varying degrees to hate speech in varying degrees					

15. Other comments on the nature of media political incitement in Kampala Central Division  
(Please specify)

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**SECTION C: Different types of social unrest that have been caused by media political incitement in Kampala Central Division**

<b>Statement</b>					
There have been demonstrations and political violence in Kampala Central Division as a result of media incitement					
Demonstrations and political violence in Kampala Central Division have been aimed at influencing collective decisions by government					
In Kampala, demonstrations activities have involved signing petitions, boycotts, traffic blockades and wild strikes					
In Kampala Central Division, there have incidences of lynching or waves of murders					
Kampala Central Division has of late experienced regional endangerment of security and criminal violence in the form of criminal youth gangs					
There have been incidences of ransoms and hijacking of political leaders in Kampala Central Division					
In Kampala Central Division, there have been spontaneous expressions of dissatisfaction, frustration of the government leadership.					

**Other comments on different types of social unrest that have been caused by media political incitement in Kampala Central Division**



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**SECTION D: Challenges facing media in reporting on political issues in Kampala Central Division**

On the scale of 1-5, tick in the appropriate box on how you strongly agree or disagree with the statement given.

Statement						
Journalists face personal safety and security risks in the course of their work						
Police harass reporters during political times						
Public is uncomfortable talking to Journalists during political times						
The media law in Uganda is rigid						
Journalists lack the necessary equipment						

**Other comments on the challenges the media faces in reporting political issues in Kampala Central Division (Please comment)**

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*Thank you for the co-operation*