

Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Fourth in a Series of Joint Urban Operations and Counterinsurgency Studies

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Preface

This report presents the fourth in an ongoing series of joint urban operations observations, insights, and recommendations drawn from contingencies worldwide with a predominant emphasis on Afghanistan and Iraq. Those preceding this effort are (1) *People Make the City: Joint Urban Operations Observations and Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq*,¹ (2) *A Tale of Three Cities: Analyzing Joint Urban Operations with a Focus on Fallujah, Al Amara, and Mosul*,² and (3) *Continuing Counterinsurgency Challenges: Third in a Series of Joint Urban Operations Observations and Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq*.³ In an effort to provide insights and propose valuable recommendations to those deployed or preparing to be deployed, this fourth study investigated two areas that previous studies and interviews identified as consistently challenging policymakers and practitioners during a counterinsurgency (COIN)—intelligence (intel) operations and measuring progress—while encompassing a number of subjects pertaining to COIN more generally. The appendixes provide the following:

- a consolidated listing of all major observations and recommendations from all four studies
- individual issue-discussion-recommendation (I-D-R) entries for each of the aforementioned areas (COIN, intel, and metrics) derived during the 2007 effort
- a consolidated compilation of all intel-related I-D-R from *People Make the City*, *A Tale of Three Cities*, and *Continuing Counterinsurgency Challenges*, for ease of reference for those particularly interested in that subject area.

As did its predecessors, this work benefited greatly from the insights and suggestions offered by the many interviewed in support of its underlying research.⁴ The resulting analysis and recommendations constitute a synthesis of their invaluable input from written sources,

¹ Glenn, Paul, and Helmus (2007).

² Glenn and Helmus (2007).

³ Glenn (2007c).

⁴ That the interviews represent some coalition members more than others is a reflection of author accessibility and resource constraints; it in no way indicates a judgment regarding the quality or importance of one country's participation compared to another.

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iv Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

previous work in the urban operations and COIN realms, and our firsthand experiences. It does not seek to be a comprehensive evaluation of the current state of affairs regarding intel, metrics, or COIN issues, but rather seeks to identify key insights regarding the three areas (each has merited volumes of works in its own right) and make recommendations based on interviewee inputs and the authors' previous research into related subjects. I-D-R entries include observations that we believe will assist in building the body of COIN knowledge. These entries may represent the views of one or multiple individuals. They include those that will require adaptation when applying them to situations other than their immediate circumstances and with which the authors may not always be in total accord. They are nonetheless included—after careful consideration—when we believed them to present perspectives worthy of readers' reflection. We posit that a reasonable observation should not be rejected outright simply because it comes from a single individual or is somewhat distant from currently accepted thought.

The document will be of interest to individuals whose responsibilities or interests include planning, policy, doctrine, training, and the conduct of COIN operations undertaken in or near urban areas in both the immediate future and the longer term.

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Contents

Preface	iii
Figures	ix
Tables	xi
Summary	xiii
Acknowledgments	xix
Abbreviations	xxi
CHAPTER ONE	
Introduction and Background	1
Background: Western Baghdad, Late Summer 2007	5
CHAPTER TWO	
Intelligence	11
Two Initial Observations Regarding COIN Intelligence Challenges	11
Meeting Expanded Intelligence Demands	13
The Need for More Intelligence Capability at Lower Echelons	16
Extending Tour Lengths for Intel Personnel	18
Databases: One Key to Unlocking the Door to Knowledge	19
Police Have Long Relied on Databases	20
Intel Organizations Tend Not to Share Well	22
Procedures Inhibit Sharing Beyond Military and Intel Organizations	23
Hardware and Software Incompatibilities Require Addressing	26
Intel Organizations and Procedures: A Third Hurdle Between the Present and More-Effective Operations	28
The Greatest Obstacle to Effective Intel Operations Is Mindset	30
Soldier or Marine as Sensor: Improving the Input	32
Concluding Thoughts on Intelligence	33
Intelligence Recommendations	35

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vi Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

CHAPTER THREE

Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in COIN Operations	37
Introduction	37
Metrics Should Assess Performance Against Objectives, Not Drive Objective Selection or Be Chosen Based on Ease of Collection	40
Understanding the Link Between Political Guidance and Metrics	40
Military Leaders Translate Desired Outcomes into Objectives Within LLOs	41
Measuring LLOs Directly Is Problematic.....	41
Metrics Can Measure Inputs, Outputs, or Effects.....	42
Metrics for COIN Operations Are Hard to Establish and Difficult to Measure.....	44
Further Metric Characteristics	48
Developing and Employing Metrics: Synthesis Observations from the Field.....	49
Metrics Must Be Aligned to Support Strategic Goals	50
Metrics Must Measure Progress Toward Meeting Objectives	52
Ideally, Metrics Reflect Causality, but This Ideal Will Seldom Be Achievable	56
Metrics Must Reflect Local Conditions.....	58
Compound Metrics Are Increasingly Being Used at All Levels.....	59
Metrics: An Additional Observation.....	60
Whoever Said Statistics Do Not Lie Does Not Understand Statistics	60
Metric Recommendations: Steps Toward Better Understanding.....	62
Provide Objectives from the Top and Input Measures from the Bottom with Effect-Based Metrics as the Common Link.....	63
Combine Qualitative and Quantitative Metrics to Form Compound Metrics When Necessary...	63
Routine Reassessment and Refinement of Metrics Are Absolutely Essential	64
Use a Red-Team Approach to Evaluate Existing Metrics	64
Present Metrics Using Simple, Easy-to-Understand Tools That Help Commanders Make Decisions.....	65
Incorporate Effect-Based Metric Training in All Staff and Commanders' Professional Military-Education Courses	65
Metric Recommendations.....	66

CHAPTER FOUR

General COIN Observations	67
A Campaign Without an Interagency Plan Is Like Football with No Playbook	67
Throwing Money from the Rooftop: The Need to Orchestrate Aid.....	68
Aid as Part of a Larger Whole: Taking an Overarching Perspective.....	70
COIN Shaping Operations Are a Matter of Holding Ground with Some Segments of the Population While Altering Attitudes in Others.....	72
Placing Coalition Installations Amid the Population Requires Careful Planning and Foresight...	73
Counterinsurgencies, No Less Than Conventional War, Can Have a Dehumanizing Effect on Friendly-Force Personnel	76

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Contents vii

Habitual Relationships Are as Important in Counterinsurgencies as in War..... 79
COIN Recommendations..... 80

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion, Recommendations, and Implications for the Future..... 81
A Look at the Current State of Affairs Regarding Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq..... 82
Future Implications 85

APPENDIXES

A. Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 87
B. Observations and Insights in I-D-R Form 109
C. Matrices..... 231

Bibliography..... 275

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Figures

1.1.	Baghdad Districts and Neighborhoods, 2007.....	7
1.2.	Approximate Route Used by Sunni Residents of Al Yarmuk Neighborhood to Reach Abu Ghraib Medical Facility in Autumn 2007.....	8
4.1.	Continuum of Relative Interests.....	73
4.2.	The Pins, Levers, and Springs Model.....	74

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Tables

C.1.	Complete List of Observations.....	232
C.2.	Observations: Doctrine.....	238
C.3.	Observations: Organization.....	242
C.4.	Observations: Training.....	243
C.5.	Observations: Materiel.....	247
C.6.	Observations: Leadership and Education.....	248
C.7.	Observations: Personnel (Soldiers).....	251
C.8.	Observations: Maneuver.....	251
C.9.	Observations: Command and Control.....	251
C.10.	Observations: Intelligence.....	254
C.11.	Observations: Fire Support.....	257
C.12.	Observations: Combat Service Support.....	257
C.13.	Observations: Special-Operations Forces.....	257
C.14.	Observations: Aviation.....	258
C.15.	Observations: Stability Operations.....	258
C.16.	Observations: Support Operations.....	262
C.17.	Observations: Force Protection.....	264
C.18.	Observations: Information Operations.....	265
C.19.	Observations: Multinational.....	266
C.20.	Observations: Interagency.....	267
C.21.	Observations: Governing.....	269
C.22.	Observations: Tactical.....	270

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Summary

The three previous publications in this series sought to identify, analyze, and develop recommendations regarding joint urban and COIN operations. They were characterized by (1) their focus being primarily the operational and strategic levels of war, (2) their coverage encompassing the full spectrum of conflict, and (3) the nations of Afghanistan and Iraq serving as the primary, though not exclusive, sources of material. The first in the earlier trio, *People Make the City: Joint Urban Operations Observations and Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq*,¹ was a broad-based, general study of the topics and theaters in question. The second, *A Tale of Three Cities*,² sought instead to investigate three urban operations in detail and draw material of interest to potential users by finding commonalities and comparing operations conducted in Iraq by the U.S. Army (in Mosul), U.S. Marine Corps (Fallujah), and British Army (Al Basrah and Al Amara). *Continuing Counterinsurgency Challenges*³ was the third such offering. It took a different approach, one similar to that used in this effort. *Continuing Counterinsurgency Challenges* focused on selected key issues identified during interviews and literature searches as being particularly difficult. The research underlying this report took on two additional areas that are notable both for the consistency of difficulties they present and the complexity of solutions related to those problems: intel operations (Chapter Two) and metrics (Chapter Three) are the stars in the pages to follow. A more general look at various COIN- and urban-related issues accompanies them in Chapter Four.

As did its predecessors, this work draws on the insights and suggestions offered by the many interviewed in support of its underlying research, in addition to material from applicable written sources and previous work in the urban operations and COIN realms. It does not seek to be a comprehensive evaluation of the current state of affairs regarding intel, metrics, or COIN issues, but rather seeks to identify key insights pertinent to the three areas and make recommendations based on interviewee inputs and the authors' previous research into these and other topics. Some of the material will be familiar to those knowledgeable about the subjects addressed; other insights will be new to many. The inclusion of what might seem to

¹ Glenn, Paul, and Helmus (2007).

² Glenn and Helmus (2007).

³ Glenn (2007c).

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xiv Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

some to be obvious or well-established discussion is deliberate. Anyone familiar with counter-insurgency, capacity building, or irregular conflict—all of which underlie the work here—knows that lessons are far more often relearned than newly discovered. As this report seeks to serve both those currently confronting the tasks associated with such undertakings and any in future years having to do so, we think it better to cover both the sometimes-known and original material. Additionally, a benefit of interviewing so many insightful individuals is the access the sessions offer to innovative thinking molded by one person's intellect in light of his or her experiences. We therefore seek to offer the reader these insights so that they might be adapted to meet the demands of challenges elsewhere in place and time when appropriate.

The following overarching question guided our work: What challenges and best practices pertaining to intel, metrics, and—on a by-exception basis—counterinsurgency are worthy of analysis, given the current state of field knowledge, the nature of ongoing operations, and likely future demands on U.S. and coalition partner organizations?

The results of this year's effort provide more than 150 individual I-D-R entries. (See the appendixes.) There are, in addition, 12 synthesis recommendations. These are briefly summarized below and, along with others of lesser scope or impact, receive considerably fuller discussion in their respective chapters.

Synthesis Observations and Insights

The civilian population is a key source of intel and may well be the friendly-force center of gravity. Protect it against attack by both the enemy and your own forces.

Despite wide acceptance of the population's importance to COIN success, too little attention is given to protecting members of the noncombatant community. Threats in this regard include insurgent, criminal, and other malevolent groups. Too often, the friendly force is also perceived as a threat, negatively influencing civilian willingness to cooperate with coalition intel collection and other initiatives.

Recognizing that treating civilians and detainees with respect can have great benefits is an inherent extension of this recommendation. Both cases will pose ongoing challenges, given deliberate insurgent efforts to inspire coalition-member hatred of local nationals and frustrations arising due to the indirect methods that threat forces use to inflict casualties on friendly forces.

Consider giving selected companies a 24-hour intel-analysis capability while investigating providing battalions a more robust intel section.

COIN operations, and, in particular, COIN operations in urban areas, rely on human intel (HUMINT). Much of the most valuable HUMINT comes from the lowest tactical echelons. The full value of these inputs can be lost when they are forwarded to higher echelons for analysis. Arguments for a company-level intel-collation and -analysis capability are common among those at the levels that would most benefit from timely intel.

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Summary xv

Lengthen tours for individuals in critical intel billets, particularly those involving analysis or contact with informants. Combine longer rotations with policies that (1) bring families in closer proximity to deployed personnel, (2) allow for more frequent breaks of equitable duration, and (3) result in staffing levels and leader selection allowing reasonable periods of daily and weekly rest.

Personnel turnover hinders intel operations in a number of ways. In addition to the inefficiencies associated with a recent arrival's learning curve, limited-duration tours mean that those in analysis and other critical billets have less time to familiarize themselves (1) with the theater and their areas of operation (AOs) in a general sense, and (2) more intimately, such that patterns become apparent, anomalies are readily detected, and they become completely familiar with databases. Additionally, members of the indigenous population form personal relationships, meaning that departure of coalition representatives severs or degrades the quality of coalition contacts with them.

Improve database development through better sharing and insistence on compatible technologies and software. Transition intel communities from their need-to-know default to a need-to-share mentality.

Creating and maintaining databases of key members of the population, infrastructure, threat, and other relevant elements have proven fundamental to successful law-enforcement and intel operations during past COIN operations. There is a call for better guidance regarding database development, improved theater (and broader) accessibility, and enhanced data-manipulation tools. As one observer noted,

the ability of market trackers to store and quickly recall historical data should be mimicked by the U.S. government so that commanders and diplomats possess relevant records that enable them to make decisions [that] take into account the economic, historical, cultural, political, anthropological, and environmental aspects of the region they are operating within.⁴

Properly programmed, such efficient data handlers could automatically cross-check the varied spellings of personal and place names so common to Arabic, thereby reducing confusion and allowing for uniformity on maps, documents, and other materials.⁵

Organizational structures and procedures are a part of current data-sharing shortfalls. In the immediate term, forces should find ways to improve sharing and eliminate intel stovepipes. Collocating intel sections, encouraging the presence of liaison personnel in intel-fusion centers, and taking the time to find ways to share rather than automatically restrict access can all be part of the process. In the longer term, they should improve sharing via removal of procedural,

⁴ Hsia (2007).

⁵ Employing some form of semantic-web concepts might be one way to approach the differences in name spellings. For a brief discussion of semantic-web developments, see Feigenbaum et al. (2007).

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xvi Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

technological, and structural barriers to timely exchange of relevant intel material, including those that limit distribution to agencies other than defense and intel agencies.

Develop source-identification and data-tagging procedures that permit collecting organizations to compare HUMINT sources while retaining the sources' anonymity.

More than 40 years have passed since the U.S. buildup in Vietnam. Yet the same problem of a single individual selling information to multiple indigenous and coalition intel agencies continues to plague analysis and corroboration of information. Employing retinal scans or other means of tagging intel from sources who need protection would allow comparison of sources without compromising them, given properly designed software. It would have the additional benefit of allowing agencies to (1) identify those selling identical or similar information to several organizations, thus precluding seemingly separate sources from acting to confirm each other and (2) curtail multiple agencies paying the same source for comparable input.

Consider the appointment of intel supremos both in theaters and at the strategic level to oversee, facilitate, and monitor more effective sharing of intel and general improvement in field effectiveness.

Such managers would have the authority to manage service and interservice communications and intel-system acquisitions. They would further be responsible for

- maintaining theater and strategic databases
- eliminating intel stovepipes
- facilitating intel exchange between nations, agencies, and other organizations
- generally enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of intel operations.

Introduce the creation, use, and employment of effect-based metrics into all echelons of leader and staff training. Training must include understanding of the link between causality or correlation and outcomes, the importance of incorporating local conditions in metric development and assessment, and the use of qualitative and quantitative metrics to form compound metrics for aggregation and interpretation at higher levels of command.

Forces should capture best metric-development practices from ongoing operations, in particular with respect to those that measure effects rather than effort or performance. They should improve understanding of the role of qualitative metrics, effective presentation of qualitative data, development of compound metrics, and essentiality of maintaining unbroken links between measures of progress and operational and strategic objectives. They should establish a set of nested metrics to facilitate translation to useful measures of progress at higher levels. However, realizing that some metrics may be unique to given locations and situations, forces should not discard them because they do not fit the nesting effort.

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Summary xvii

Conduct periodic, systematic reassessment and refinement of metrics. Review metric baselines to ensure that they remain relevant.

Operational conditions change, especially in the dynamic environments found in major urban areas. Metrics must maintain alignment with operations, meaning that measures have to undergo routine, systematic review for their applicability in light of changed situations and evolving objectives.

Establish a doctrinal metric framework that promotes objective definition from the top and identification of input measures from the bottom with effects as the common linkage.

There is an outstanding need for improved formal guidance regarding the roles, development, and application of metrics in operational environments. Measuring progress toward objectives or lack thereof is impossible unless those at higher echelons define the objectives sought. Leaders at lower echelons are most familiar with what metrics will best demonstrate whether there is movement toward these objectives. Definition of metrics must therefore be a cooperative undertaking, one that shares the common link of seeking to measure the effects of actions on realizing objectives rather than reporting only expenditure of effort.

Use a red-team approach to assist metric development and evolution.

The linkage of metrics with plan phases, operational effects, and mission objectives argues for their development and validation becoming a part of the order-development and planning processes. Testing and validating metric viability should be incorporated in war-gaming and similar processes seeking to refine proposed metrics and optimize the quality of decisions.

Portray metrics by using simple, easy-to-understand tools that facilitate commander decisions.

Challenges in presenting options and supporting data to commanders have increased in conjunction with a similar rise in the complexity of modern operations. Current data presentations often seek to present more information per unit space and time. Less attention is given to determining what information to present and what is less important. Development of training and command-and-control (C2) systems should give greater emphasis to information-selection techniques and processes.

Develop truly interagency campaign plans, and put the organizational structures in place to manage the campaign in accordance with plan guidance.

Overarching orchestration of activities in Afghanistan and Iraq still lacks a true interagency character. Aid expenditures overlap in some instances and undermine operational objectives in others. Personnel and organization rotations lack consistency as each leader attempts to put his or her mark on a tour in a theater. Lessons learned assist training and analysis as never before but remain constrained primarily to military issues. There is an urgent need for accelerated movement toward substantive interagency planning, management, and information and intel exchanges. Campaign plans should be maintained from rotation to rotation for

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xviii Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

continuity purposes, being updated as necessary to meet mission demands, not simply due to a desire for change. Military lessons-learned capabilities should assume the burden of identifying challenges and solutions regarding other-agency and interagency operations during COIN operations, occupations, and capacity-building campaigns pending development of a whole-of-government lessons-learned capacity.

Strive to retain habitual relationships during COIN deployments just as is done during conventional conflicts.

Unnecessarily breaking habitual relationships between units is little short of a cardinal sin in conventional operations. Yet brigade combat teams (BCTs) are routinely torn apart during deployments to COIN rotations. The costs in efficiency and leader-led relationships are no less severe than during regular-force action. There are further costs that are virtually invisible to observers of a theater of operation; though unit ties are operationally severed on the ground, family-support mechanisms and dependencies on the bases and in the communities from which these units come remain tightly interlocked. The result is increased difficulties in keeping rear parties and families informed, including during critical actions, such as casualty notification.

Concluding Remarks

In addition to chapters expanding on this material, the final chapter in this report selectively considers the current state of COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It concludes with thoughts on how these operations ought to influence training of leaders at all echelons in support of continued operations in those nations and other challenges worldwide both extant and future.

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Acknowledgments

In common with its predecessors, this work is a collective effort that owes much to the many who consented to spend time in lengthy interviews with us. Most of their names appear in the bibliography; a few do not, by request. We thank each of you—mentioned or not—for sharing your considerable experiences on behalf of the many who will benefit from your insights.

Several individuals went well beyond the norm in facilitating the conduct of these interview sessions. St. John (Singe) Coughlan once again showed his extraordinary perception in helping to identify British compatriots with the balance of experience, intellect, and forthrightness that makes interactions with them invaluable to these investigations. We regret only that dearth of time makes it impossible to contact all whom Singe recommends. Colonel J. B. Burton and the men and women of his 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, were truly exceptional in the support provided during the visit of our party to Iraq in late summer 2007. Brigadier General Joe DiSalvo and the leaders of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, provided invaluable insights into establishing and using meaningful metrics. Discussions with United Nations representatives in Baghdad would not have taken place but for the kind diligence of Jamison Jo Medby, former RAND colleague who now graces that international body with her services. Two longtime professional compadres granted us the opportunity to learn from those who have served with the Dutch Army in Afghanistan: many thanks to Lieutenant Colonels Henk Oerlemans and Johan Van Houten.

Gayle Stephenson provided another of her award-meriting performances in the role of administrative assistant. It would be unkind were we not to recognize the continued support of Duane Schattle, Scott Bamonte, and their colleagues in the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Urban Operations Office. A particular thanks in that regard is due to Jay Reist, who was so vital to the success of research conducted in Iraq. As always, thanks to Lisa Bernard for editing the document with exceptional speed and ability. Finally, Fred Wassenaar's commitment to excellence in creating the interactive CDs that accompanied two of the previous reports and would have similarly enhanced this study has been truly exceptional. Though decisions motivated by financial constraints precluded his work accompanying this report, we would be remiss not to thank him for his continued dedication and maintenance of only the highest standards.

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Abbreviations

ACF	anti-coalition force
ACT	analysis and control team
ADOCS	Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
AO	area of operation
Avn	aviation
BCS	battle-command system
BCT	brigade combat team
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
BDA	battle-damage assessment
BFT	blue-force tracking
BOS	battlefield operating system
BUA	battle-update analysis
C2	command and control
C2PC	Command and Control Personal Computer
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CEXC	Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell
CENTRIXS	Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC	civil-military coordination

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xxii Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

CITP	Counter-IED Targeting Program
COG	center of gravity
COIN	counterinsurgency
COIN CFE	Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence
COP	coalition outpost
CP	command post
CSS	combat service support
D	doctrine
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
F	facilities
FAC-A	forward air controller–airborne
FM	field manual
FOB	forward operating base
FP	force protection
FS	fire support
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
Govern	governing
GT	general technical
HTS	human-terrain system
HUMINT	human intelligence
HVT	high-value target
I	intelligence
IA	Iraqi Army
IAFIS	Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
IDF	Israel Defense Forces

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Abbreviations xxiii

I-D-R	issue-discussion-recommendation
IED	improvised explosive device
IGO	international governmental organization
IMINT	imagery intelligence
intel or INTEL	intelligence
Inter	interagency
IO	information operations
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR	intelligence requirement
IRD	International Relief and Development
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISF	Iraqi security forces
JAM	Jaish al Mahdi
JOR	joint operations room
JSS	joint security station
JTAC	joint terminal attack controller
KATUSA	Korean Augmentation to the United States Army
L	leadership and education
LLO	logical line of operation
LNO	liaison officer
M	materiel
Man	maneuver
MCO	major combat operations
MCS	Maneuver Control System
MiTT	military transition team
MOE	measure of effort
MOP	measure of performance

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xxiv Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

MOS	military occupational specialty
Multi	multinational
MVT	medium-value target
NAC	neighborhood advisory council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NOFORN	not releasable to foreign nationals
NTC	national training center
O	organization
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPSEC	operational security
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSINT	open-source intelligence
P	personnel
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
PSO	peace-support operation
PSYOP	psychological operations
QTB	quarterly training brief
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RC	regional command
RTF	reconstruction task force
S-2	staff intelligence officer
S-3	staff operations officer
SF	special forces
SIGINT	signal intelligence

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Abbreviations xxv

SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SOF	special-operations forces
SOR	special orders requests
Spt	support operations
Stab	stability operations
T	training
Tactical	tactical implications
TCG	tasking and coordination group
TCP	traffic-control point
TF	task force
THT	tactical human-intelligence team
TIC	troop in contact
TO&E	table of organization and equipment
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USR	unit status report
VC	Vietcong
WIT	Weapons Intelligence Team
XO	executive officer

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and Background

IRAQI OFFICIAL. I beg you to release all prisoners in time for Ramadan.

U.S. OFFICER. I won't release all prisoners.

IRAQI OFFICIAL. Not terrorists, murderers, or others who are truly bad.

U.S. OFFICER. I will not release any who has committed a crime [against] the coalition force or Iraqi citizens.

IRAQI OFFICIAL. I will give you names.

U.S. OFFICER. How many?

IRAQI OFFICIAL. One.

U.S. OFFICER. Does he work for you?

IRAQI OFFICIAL. As a matter of fact, he was my deputy.

U.S. OFFICER. So it's not about Ramadan. It's about you.

IRAQI OFFICIAL. Well, yes, but this thing is very important.

U.S. OFFICER. No.

—*Exchange between a coalition commander and an Iraqi official*¹

The demands on coalition military personnel serving in Afghanistan and Iraq are among the most difficult in the member nations' histories. Part diplomat, part mayor, part social worker, part municipal-services engineer, part politician, part mentor, and always soldier, sailor, marine, or airman, the challenges ask much of both the most senior and junior personnel. The most complex problems, unsurprisingly, tend to be products of urban environments; akin to a black

¹ Discussion related in Burton (2007).

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2 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

hole, difficulties there compress in time and space to present a dense mass of tribulations for any seeking peace and stability.

Whereas conventional warriors both figuratively and literally set their sights on the enemy, the person serving in a counterinsurgency (COIN) coalition can afford to grant the foe only limited attention. The adversary may be less the primary concern of each day's activities than a distraction that interferes with more-important tasks related to capacity building and establishing the foundation for long-term security. The causes that initially gave rise to insurgent and criminal activity would remain even if the threat disappeared overnight—corruption, sectarian prejudice and its related violence, incompetent administration, a crippled physical infrastructure, degraded essential services, and a hobbled economy often among them.

Yet the threat is far from disappearing in either Afghanistan or Iraq at the time of this writing. Quite the contrary. The many overlapping insurgent, terrorist, criminal, and other foes that together comprise the heterogeneous enemy in Iraq—and an only somewhat less varied one in Afghanistan—continue to feed on their damaged societies. What appear to be random bombings, kidnappings, and other atrocities sometimes constitute a well-conceived insurgent campaign of exhaustion. The coalition is rarely the primary focus of such actions. Coalition personnel present the various enemies an alleged justification for violence and a threat, but the international forces' strength means that they are best removed by eroding the soil from beneath them rather than via direct assault.

The pages that follow concentrate on two specific areas of consideration before delving into more general coverage of COIN issues that emerged as worthy of selection during our readings and the 92 interviews conducted in support of this effort. Chapter Two contemplates intelligence (intel) operations during counterinsurgency; Chapter Three ponders issues associated with the definition, development, and use of metrics in the same environment. Both were selected for attention because they were repeatedly evident in our previous years' work, in writings on ongoing U.S. deployments, and in many of the more than 300 interviews in support of this ongoing series of studies between October 2003 and September 2006. We did not limit our investigations during the 12 months following that three-year period to intel and metric issues alone. Chapter Four addresses additional issues: the aforementioned COIN topics not falling into either of the two previous categories yet deemed sufficiently important to merit their presentation for reader consideration. The fifth and final chapter summarizes the potential impact of recommendations made in earlier pages and considers them in light of tasks that our men and women in uniform will likely face during future deployments.

The resulting analysis makes no claim to being a comprehensive evaluation of the current state of affairs regarding intel, metrics, or COIN issues. Rather, it seeks to identify selected key insights regarding the three areas and make derivative recommendations of prospective value to those in the field. Some of the material will be familiar to individuals knowledgeable about the subjects addressed; other insights may be new. The sometimes inclusion of what might seem to some obvious or well established is deliberate. Anyone familiar with military history knows that lessons are more often relearned than newly discovered. The objective here is to selectively reconsider the known and present original material in our venture to serve both

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Introduction and Background 3

those currently confronting COIN challenges and others destined to do so in future years. When feasible, multiple sources support recommendations, original concepts, and other material. However, a benefit of interviewing so many insightful individuals is the access that the sessions offer to innovative thinking molded by one person's intellect in light of his or her experiences. We frequently offer the reader these innovative thoughts so that they might be sculpted to meet the demands of challenges elsewhere in place and time.

Given these objectives of identifying key issues and proposing solutions, we relied on the following overarching question and several supporting questions to guide our work:

- What challenges and best practices pertaining to intel, metrics, and—on a by-exception basis—COIN efforts are worthy of analysis, given the current state of field knowledge, the nature of ongoing operations, and likely future demands on U.S. and coalition partner organizations?

On intel issues:

- What are the greatest information-collection or intel challenges during an insurgency? Do these differ significantly from intel challenges in other environments?
- What approaches are particularly successful in meeting those challenges?
- What methods or capabilities merit development?

On metric issues:

- What means are effective for measuring progress—or lack thereof—toward operational objectives during COIN operations?
- What better ways of measuring progress merit consideration?

On other COIN issues:

- What guidance is appropriate to give a commander regarding the manner in which he or she should influence social change in an area of operation (AO), e.g., addressing social norms, such as providing education to females, revenge killings, and corruption?
- Arguably, one key to eventual success in the 1899–1902 Philippine War was the U.S. distribution of its forces in more than 500 small garrisons that sought both to support the local population and to deprive the insurgents of local support. Does a similar model of creating many points of traction apply to ongoing operations?
- How might interagency operations be better coordinated to provide unity of effort and of message?

The appendixes provide the reader more-detailed material of relevance to intel and metric concerns as well as to counterinsurgency and urban operations more generally. They include more than 150 individual issue-discussion-recommendation (I-D-R) entries. These I-D-R

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4 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

offerings appear under the primary headings of Intel, Metrics, Counterinsurgency, Governing, and General issues, though many are of a character that overlaps two or more of those categories. For ease of identifying specific items of interest, we label each entry by

- the elements comprising doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)
- battlefield operating system (BOS) components. No entries applied to air defense or to mobility or countermobility BOS issues; those that apply to survivability are accessible via the force protection (FP) entry.²
 - combat service support (CSS)
 - command and control (C2)
 - fire support (FS)
 - intelligence (I)
 - maneuver (Man)
- selected other miscellaneous factors
 - aviation (Avn)
 - FP
 - governing (Govern)
 - information operations (IO)³
 - interagency (Inter)
 - multinational (Multi)
 - special-operations forces (SOF)
 - stability operations (Stab)⁴
 - support operations (Spt)⁵
 - tactical implications (Tactical).

² *Force protection* includes

[a]ctions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (USJCS, 2001 [2004], p. 209)

³ *Information operations* are “[a]ctions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems” (USJCS, 2001 [2004], p. 256).

⁴ *Stability operations* encompasses

various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (USJCS, 2001 [2006], p. 506)

⁵ *Support operations* are those “that employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering” (U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps, 2004, p. 1-179).

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Introduction and Background 5

Additionally, I-D-R entries having particular relevance to the tactical level of war are so designated. (A substantial percentage of this year's entries have tactical application. That does not mean that they are not also relevant to the operational level, but rather that the issues and problems selected will also be of interest to those more interested in activities in the tactical realm.)

Background: Western Baghdad, Late Summer 2007

Briefings were all about “metrics,” which seemed to reflect a peculiarly American fixation with quantifying results in terms of, for instance, the number of schools refurbished, kilometers of roads re-surfaced, pipelines repaired, and the like. These were the figures [that] our governments like to publicise. But they conveyed nothing of the reality. It proved impossible to discover a rationale for the choice and prioritization of projects. I was always glad to hear that a particular town's generator had been repaired. But I also wanted to hear whether there were any plans to sort out the problems [of] another town; and if not why not.

—*Hilary Synnott, Bad Days in Basra*⁶

Western Baghdad in September 2007 provides us a window on how some insurgents ply a strategy of exhaustion at the tactical level, one that challenges coalition leaders in both the intel and metrics realms. Shi'a militia groups, often one or another form of Jaish al Mahdi (JAM), would find a Sunni mosque within or near a mixed Shi'a and Sunni neighborhood.⁷ JAM forces would attack the mosque to draw fire from Sunni defenders, thereafter making an anonymous report of the shooting to nearby Iraqi Army (IA) forces in conjunction with a request for action to subdue the alleged Sunni instigators. Army forces (comprised primarily of Shi'a personnel) would respond and declare the mosque troublesome. The imam would be removed and the mosque closed. Having eliminated a vital community resource for Sunni

⁶ Synnott (2008, p. 211).

⁷ JAM has several forms in the eyes of the local population or coalition representatives. These were described in several ways, most more or less agreeing with the following description provided by CPT Nicholas D. Kron (2007):

Loyal JAM: Representatives from the Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS). Loyal JAM members are also referred to as Sadrists or Golden JAM.

Real JAM: Makhtab al Khidamat (MAK), special groups that carry out the attacks for Sadr. They are “real” because they directly follow the orders of Moqtada al Sadr.

Criminal JAM: Effectively mafia.

Extremists not affiliated with al Sadr.

Note that members can overlap two or more groups, e.g., a Real JAM member may also participate in Criminal JAM activities for personal gain that have nothing to do with orders from Moqtada al Sadr. There are members of the Iraqi security forces in each of the four groups. Further, a Shi'ite who moves into a vacated Sunni house either under instructions to do so or because he or she simply seeks a place to live may be considered JAM by those under pressure to leave a neighborhood.

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6 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

worshippers, JAM members further encourage local Sunnis to leave, often employing one or more of the following tactics:

- denying the neighborhood public services
- threatening individuals, e.g., putting a bullet in someone's mailbox with a note that the receiving family will be killed if it does not depart within 24 hours
- moving Shi'a families into homes abandoned by Sunnis
- establishing local Shi'a prayer sites.⁸

Those familiar with efforts at ethnic cleansing or efforts to purge an area of an undesired group will find the tactics similar to those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Rwanda, and elsewhere.

Government officials may or may not be complicit in further pressuring the targeted segment of the community, e.g., via selective denial of public services.⁹ Colonel J. B. Burton's soldiers of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Infantry Division, noted that some Sunni neighborhoods in their AO received considerably less support in this regard than did adjoining Shi'a residential and commercial areas.¹⁰ In yet another instance, the BCT's soldiers determined that Sunni residents were so intimidated that they drove miles out of the way when medical attention was needed; residents in the Sunni community of Al Yarmuk (see Figure 1.1, location 67) perceived that the supposedly public hospital less than a mile distant was, de facto, off limits to them due to the dangers posed by JAM. Rather than risking murder in the Shi'a-dominated medical establishment, Sunnis drove south and west, skirting the boundaries of Baghdad International Airport (Figure 1.1, location 74) to avoid Shi'a-dominated neighborhoods in order to reach the far more distant medical facility in Abu Ghraib some 10 times farther away.¹¹ (See Figure 1.2.)

The scope and complexity of the undertakings in Afghanistan and Iraq begin to take on brutal clarity when we consider the many other problems confronting coalition members. The coherent Shi'a-insurgent approach to clearing Sunni areas just described demonstrates some degree of sophistication. (The greater JAM circumspection was necessary, of course, given the in-place presence of coalition forces.) The explicit and implicit demands inherent in an effective coalition response to such challenges are myriad. What is needed is a well-resourced, fully orchestrated, substantively interagency campaign plan backed by effective intel and truly diagnostic metrics to assist in measuring progress.¹² This is intel different from

⁸ Discussion related during Burton (2007).

⁹ Sunnis are by no means entirely cooperative in this regard. A task-force (TF) commander in an Iraqi Sunni urban neighborhood could not get working-age males living there to take jobs cleaning the streets. Used to their privileged status under the Hussein regime, they refused positions they considered below them (anonymous source 33).

¹⁰ Anonymous source 32.

¹¹ Nelson (2007).

¹² For simplicity's sake, such guidance is envisioned as a plan with a defined end state, a series of phases that would effectively move participants from present conditions to that end state, and a means of measuring whether progress toward that desired end state is taking place.

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Figure 1.1
Baghdad Districts and Neighborhoods, 2007



SOURCE: Humanitarian Information Centre for Iraq, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Used with permission. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


RAND TR605-1.1

intel that characterized the Cold War. Here, the threat is less homogeneous; its tactics more adaptive; its structures, relationships, and motivations more amorphous. Understanding the threat alone is far from sufficient. Information on public perceptions of the many authorities (the coalition and government of Iraq among them), behaviors and leanings of indigenous security forces within the 2nd BCT/1st Infantry Division AO, and the relationships between JAM (itself consisting of several loosely, if at all, interconnected entities) and security forces, Baghdad politicians, and the Shi'a population is but a drop in the bucket of what Colonel Burton and leaders like him required. Metrics presented a no less difficult challenge. The same measure might reflect completely different statuses over time, e.g., an absence of pleas for assistance from a traditionally Sunni neighborhood might mean that longtime residents did not feel threatened. It could also mean that most Sunnis had been forced to leave; what few remained might be so intimidated that contact with coalition representatives was a life-threatening risk. U.S. doctrine and training—and those of fellow coalition members—were and are only beginning to catch up with events in the field.

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8 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Figure 1.2
Approximate Route Used by Sunni Residents of Al Yarmuk Neighborhood to Reach Abu Ghraib
Medical Facility in Autumn 2007



SOURCE: CIA (2003). Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, University of Texas at Austin.

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Introduction and Background 9

Interviews and readings provided many examples that demonstrate the need for overarching guidance if intel and metrics are to serve coalition objectives effectively. Two will suffice to demonstrate here. Dutch Brig Gen Theo Vleugels recalled his 2006 command experience in southern Afghanistan, noting that the guidelines he received

from higher level were very broad. That did not allow me to see what my end state would be. We didn't have a campaign plan when we started, but we later got one from my higher headquarters that was close to ours, which is not surprising as they told us to do what we told them we would do.¹³

Colonel Burton similarly found himself frustrated by the lack of overarching coordination of capabilities that affected his Baghdad AO:

I was paying millions of dollars for sewerage, but where was the money going? I checked it out and made sure pipes were being repaired and the work was being done to remove sewage from our area, but the plant beyond there was broken and it was going directly into the Tigris for all I knew. . . . Our efforts were not synchronized with the greater system.¹⁴

The challenges due to lack of comprehensive management and guidance were exacerbated by responsibilities that the services are struggling to include in schoolhouse curricula: "We weren't trained for this. We were trained to cause behavioral change through the application of violence."¹⁵

It is easy to see how the experiences of General Vleugels and Colonel Burton relate to intel and metric demands. Vleugels having to create his own campaign plan provided his command great flexibility in meeting local needs. Colonel Burton's example demonstrates that, without the benefit of broader context, however, subordinate headquarters may optimize their actions only to find that the full potential at the macro level is squandered through no fault of their own. Colonel Burton's efforts to refurbish his area's sewage-treatment capabilities were undertaken in the (likely unavoidable) absence of knowledge about the overall condition of Baghdad's system (an intel shortfall) or how city engineers were planning to bring it online. The fine work done by his soldiers (recordable in a metric) had positive effect in western Baghdad but reduced broader impact due to the absence of coordination by higher echelons. Good subordinate leaders will define their own intel requirements (IRs) and design suitable metrics when they find themselves operating without effective overarching coordination and when operational success in their AOs calls for bold action. It should surprise no one that the result is less efficient than would have been the case had there been a master orchestration of resources to guide these lower echelons.

¹³ Vleugels (2007).

¹⁴ Discussion related during Burton (2007).

¹⁵ Discussion related during Burton (2007).

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10 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

The many responsibilities assumed by Vleugels, Burton, and thousands of other coalition leaders span the guidance provided by military doctrine and extend a good bit beyond. Theirs are not merely COIN missions. Coalition militaries—sometimes helped by other agencies, sometimes hindered in that regard—are building nations, training leaders, policing streets, molding security forces, protecting borders, providing succor to those in need, and, yes, fighting insurgents. Yet the issue is only partly whether progress is being made or whether the situation has improved since 2003. It is additionally one of how the coalition can be more efficient and effective now and how future undertakings can improve on those past. Effective intel and metrics will be fundamental to success, as will savvy with respect to counterinsurgency in general. How these areas affect the pursuit of this effectiveness and how coalition forces might improve their approaches to current operations in this regard is the focus of the remainder of this report. Not the typical report, the three chapters that follow are each stand-alone discussions of their respective topics. Rather than being linked by common themes (other than their relevance to counterinsurgency), each first seeks to identify issues of notable import as identified by interviewees and relevant authors, then proposes observations and recommendations where such are worthy of consideration. The chapters focus on intel, metrics, and general COIN matters in turn. Some reinforce recommendations made earlier in the series, e.g., that suggesting consideration of extending intel personnel's in-theater tours the better to achieve continuity and in-depth understanding. Others expand on actions already being taken in the field that might not be known to wider audiences; the provision of an intel capability at company level in some organizations to improve unit responsiveness and distribution of time-sensitive material to other organizations stands as an example in this case. Of a more revolutionary character, changing the basic intel-community operating presumption of releasing information only to those with a need to know to one dictating priority for the need to share also receives attention in Chapter Two. Observations and recommendations regarding metrics span a similar spectrum. The necessity to consider metrics in a dynamic context, one in which measures are frequently checked for their continued applicability, accompanies basic guidance regarding the initial design of such measures, e.g., the benefits of simplicity in that development and need to validate metrics during the war-gaming process when writing a plan. These and other aspects of our intel and metric analysis have two complements in Chapter Four. The first returns to the necessity for the elusive truly interagency campaign plan. The second reminds readers of a truth at once seemingly obvious yet too often overlooked in the field: the need to capitalize on habitual relationships no less during irregular conflicts than during conventional war.

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CHAPTER TWO

Intelligence

Intelligence has but one purpose, unchanged from the days when it became “the second-oldest profession”—namely, to reduce uncertainty in the mind of decision-makers.

—Robert Martyn, *“Beyond the Next Hill”*¹

Since intelligence about terrorists and their cross-border networks, their movement, and their plans is prerequisite of successful interdiction, intelligence-sharing should be expanded to the maximum level consistent with national security. This may require, when appropriate, the shedding of some longstanding reluctance to share information with foreign intelligence agencies.

—Andrew J. Pierre, *“Coalitions: Building and Maintenance”*²

There needs to be some intelligence applied to the intelligence.

—Captain Steve Anning, *1st Battalion, 22nd (Cheshire) Regiment*³

Two Initial Observations Regarding COIN Intelligence Challenges

If your logic tells you (and it should) that your operations must be intelligence-led, and [if] your intelligence relies (and it does) on members of the population providing you with information, then whatever else you do you must not allow that conduit of information to dry up. All prospective [operations] must be judged accordingly. So when someone proposes an operation, one of the most important tests is, “How will it impact . . . the likelihood of the population providing you with information in future?”

—Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, *British Army*⁴

¹ Martyn (2006, p. 22).

² Pierre (2002, p. 93).

³ Anning (2007).

⁴ Kiszely (2007).

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12 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Many have accepted, almost without question, that the population, popular will, or the people's support is the center of gravity (COG) during a COIN operation.⁵ Even the few questioning this assertion almost without exception agree that the population inevitably has a dramatic effect on ultimate success. As General Kiszely so eloquently stated, one of the reasons this is the case is that civilians are often vital sources of information. It is therefore striking that so little attention has been given to this crucial component in the planning and execution of friendly-force operations. Too often, operations include unfortunate episodes—e.g., a unit demonstrating too little fire discipline when traversing an urban area, soldiers failing to grant residents a demonstration of basic courtesies during home searches—that overlook the essentiality of giving priority to (1) preserving the people's good will and (2) convincing them that the coalition will persevere in its struggle with insurgents.

Doctrine tells us that “destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct path to victory” and that “commanders [not only] consider . . . the enemy COGs, but also identify and protect their own COGs.”⁶ Granted, it is impossible to deny a foe occasional success in attacking a COG so broad in character as a population, its will, or even the critical leadership thereof. Yet those interviewed in support of this research noted with no little frustration that coalition forces themselves too frequently neglect to treat local community members properly. Whether a COG or merely a vital component of friendly-force success, such neglect not only fails to protect this important operational factor; it works to increase the benefits that an adversary draws from it. Though certainly an oversimplification, there is value in considering popular support a zero-sum game: Any amount gained by one side deprives foes of an equal quantity of good will and intel. Conversely, an activity that turns community members away from the counterinsurgent cause benefits adversaries equal to those lost.

The importance of the noncombatant population potentially lends increased significance to nonmilitary organizations with a capacity to improve civilians' lot. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq bring renewed attention to organizations that at once enhance quality of life and benefit coalition operations to reduce popular grievances. Such entities include non-U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) representatives, other coalition member-nation militaries and government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international governmental organizations (IGOs), private security firms providing protection to U.S. and other officials, and other commercial-organization personnel. As these various groups stand to either directly or indirectly assist coalition efforts, it seems reasonable that they should, as appropriate, be granted access to U.S. and other nations' resources, intel among them. The degree of that support will vary significantly, of course, but to deny it completely can be self-defeating. Long-standing approaches to intel dissemination have recently proven inadequate for current demands. Two examples serve to introduce the nature of this challenge. (Others will appear in

⁵ *Center of gravity* is defined as “the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight” (USJCS, 2006a, p. IV-10) or “those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2001).

⁶ USJCS (2006a, p. IV-10).

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Intelligence 13

the following pages.) Colonel Kim Olson, Jay Garner's executive officer (XO) in 2003 (when Garner was director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, or ORHA, in Iraq), found that intel personnel refused to release information regarding local threats to those tasked with the personal safety of the coalition's senior civilian official in theater.

I told the [combined-headquarters intel officer] that he should brief [Garner's] protection team on the local threats from now on. Like others in the intelligence community, he refused to share intelligence briefs with the South African [personnel in the protection team] because they didn't have the appropriate security clearance.⁷

Similarly, it was only after repeatedly putting British soldiers at mortal risk that recent policy changes expanded Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) access to members of the United Kingdom's armed forces.⁸ Given the criticality of multinational partners and other organizations mentioned (as well as representatives of indigenous-government security forces), adjusting policies regarding strict prohibitions on sharing information, equipment, and procedures merits immediate reevaluation. The question is not one of whether to make needed changes but how to do so. This issue of sharing sensitive material receives attention later. First, however, it will be helpful to consider how the scope of what comprises *intelligence* has itself expanded.

Meeting Expanded Intelligence Demands

The best [intelligence] source is a platoon leader and his people on the ground.
—MAJ Timothy C. Hayden, *U.S. Army*⁹

Intelligence officers who were [dependent on] technological aspects were not that good. We had a police officer who was in the reserves. He [had worked with gangs], and he was able

⁷ Olson (2006, p. 107).

⁸ Le Fevre (2008). Derek S. Reveron (2006, p. 460) observed, as the Cold War threat gave way to military operations in the Balkans and Southwest Asia in the 1990s, the relationship between the UK and Australia expanded to provide both countries with access to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), the primary secret-level computer network.

A mid-2007 article reflected the potential for further expansion of access both to members of these nations and to others: "NSA [National Security Agency] and Defense plan to open a classified network known as the [Secret] Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), to a small pool of trusted allies, including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand" (Brewin, 2007).

⁹ Hayden (2007).

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to better put together the situation . . . based on his experiences in Vancouver than those trained in how to deal with the 3rd Shock Army.

—*LCol Shane B. Schreiber, Canadian Land Forces Command*¹⁰

Previous studies in this series have identified the need to consider far more than the enemy and terrain when conducting urban and COIN intel operations. Given the significant role of the population, determining what information is needed on civil societies should take on an importance at least on par with seeking intel on threats. The implications of this straightforward observation are dramatic. Previous U.S. experiences with COIN operations demonstrate how difficult it is to obtain information on even a single insurgent threat. Consider the situation confronted in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. In that case, a single, coherent entity dominated threat analysis from the macro perspective (though it might have several interacting components, e.g., the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong, or VC). In Iraq, the number of insurgent organizations alone makes intel collection and analysis several orders of magnitude more problematic. Add criminal, terrorist, supposedly legitimate political, rogue military and police, or other threats and the task is yet further quantum levels more difficult. And this addresses only the analysis of threats. Understanding who the key personalities are in the civilian population, what the interactions are between these notable influence nodes, and how they influence common folk introduces further challenges that increase the amount of material the intel analyst must access and assess. Groups traditionally of limited interest to military operators not only become part of the cast; they may take center stage. This means that much of the equipment and many of the techniques familiar to the intel community may be less applicable. Personnel, training, software, and technology demands above and beyond previous norms can quickly overwhelm table of organization and equipment (TO&E) allocations. Fortunately, some recently introduced TO&Es begin to address these expanded needs (the introduction of tactical human-intel teams, or THTs, in Stryker brigades, for example), but these tend to be tweaks to organizations not far removed from cold-war predecessors rather than purpose-built initiatives that truly address the character of current challenges.

The need for further adaptation (or from-scratch design) is evident in a number of recent events. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers MG Carl Strock was part of the above-mentioned Jay Garner's ORHA team dispatched to Iraq in the immediate aftermath of fighting in early 2003. When he

first joined Garner's team, he had been given an intelligence briefing on Iraq's electrical grid, but the intelligence focused on potential war damage to the system, not on the dilapidation of the power plants and generators—comprised of a hodgepodge of parts from Europe and Asia—that had suffered as a result of more than a decade of economic sanctions and inadequate investment.¹¹

¹⁰ Schreiber (2007).

¹¹ Gordon and Trainor (2006, pp. 467, 468).

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Intelligence 15

Wartime damage was relevant to Strock's duties, to be sure, but the challenges posed by years of neglect and decay confronted him with far more difficult problems. The misorientation of information provided him demonstrates the need for considering new perspectives when confronting occupation and COIN scenarios. Colonel Burton's observation (noted in Chapter One) regarding local sewerage and the failure to consider the system as a whole further illuminates the applicability of this truth regardless of the echelon. General Strock's was the strategic perspective; that of Colonel Burton addressed the operational and higher tactical levels. TF commander LTC James D. Nickolas' insight—"We fix the sewage pump and it sends the sewage to the next pump station up. But the next station up is broken, so it can't send it out and so our system can't work because that one doesn't"—reflects the pertinence of such information at lower tactical levels as well.¹² The message is clear: Collectors and analysts at every level must be capable of addressing the civilian spectrum of IRs in addition to the more traditional threat-centric.

Databases and the collection procedures that feed them likewise still have predominantly threat- and terrain-related foci. This means that units have a hard time both in fully preparing for deployments and in accessing needed information after arrival in a theater. Lieutenant Colonel Johan Van Houten observed that Dutch armed forces arriving in southern Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007 "knew almost nothing about the province. . . . Of course we could find a lot out about the terrain, but in COIN it is not about the terrain. It's about the people."¹³ U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) CWO Charles S. Heal deployed with his ANGLICO (air naval gunfire liaison company) team to support the British Army during 2003 operations in southern Iraq. He frustratedly observed,

we constantly were upsetting the locals by our inability to identify the real [community] leaders and ended up dealing with the de facto leaders, or those who simply presented themselves, often because they could speak English at least a little. One of my interpreters told me in An Nasiriyah that the people we were dealing with were in fact Ba'ath Party members and we were being seen as simply perpetuating their authority over the common people, exactly the opposite of what we were trying to do.¹⁴

Publicly accessible sources that provide basic material on Afghan provinces and their restricted-access counterparts, such as the Naval Postgraduate School's Program for Culture and Conflict Studies Web site,¹⁵ are encouraging initiatives that begin to address these shortfalls.

¹² Nickolas (2007).

¹³ Van Houten (2007).

¹⁴ Heal (2005).

¹⁵ NPS (undated).

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16 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

The Need for More Intelligence Capability at Lower Echelons

It is encouraging that commanders' priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and other guidelines for information collection also increasingly include the broader range of issues, such as those that troubled General Strock, Colonel Burton, Colonel Nickolas, and Chief Warrant Officer Heal. Leaders have similarly taken it upon themselves to unilaterally change the way they approach intel collection. "Every soldier a sensor" and "every marine an intelligence collector" have become old saws even in the few years since the country initiated operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many—commanders and subordinates alike—now seek to demonstrate coalition concern for the people amongst whom they serve, both for humanitarian and mission-related purposes. They understand that superficial contact is not enough in this regard; theirs must be substantive interactions.

Capitalizing on these opportunities can mark the difference between a dry hole and one rich in information. Checking for weapons might be the primary reason for soldiers or marines stopping vehicles at a traffic-control point (TCP). However, the location of TCPs should be influenced—if not driven—by a desire to collect information in situations that permit communication without exposing the talkers to insurgent retribution. Only imagination limits the ways to obtain information and improve the quality of contacts. USMC Maj. Brett Clark and his unit capitalized on the "every marine an intel collector . . . but what really helped was helping wounded kids who were hurt by IEDs [improvised explosive devices], [or] helping somebody whose car is broken down."¹⁶ Those deployed are recognizing what have long passed for good police practices. Chief Warrant Officer Heal was a marine reservist; in his civilian occupation, he served as an officer with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Heal recalled, "On rainy days I would pick up people off bus benches. I can't tell you how many tips I've gotten that way. People would call up and say, 'Hey, you remember you gave me a ride once. . . .'"¹⁷

Such innovators have also discovered that merely sending collected information forward for analysis at higher echelons sometimes fell short of mission needs. Intel is a dish best served hot. The timeliness and impact of what soldiers and marines gained on the streets was largely—if not entirely—lost by the time the raw material went up, was processed, and returned to originating or other units who could benefit. U.S. Army CPT Bobby Toon was among an increasing number of junior leaders who "finally realized that the onus on the IPB [intelligence preparation of the battlefield] was on me, because nobody has a better understanding of the AO than me."¹⁸ Material is still forwarded to higher headquarters as required. However, rather than seeing themselves as collectors alone, such men and women as Toon recognize that spot analysis and quick dissemination to relevant users is an important complement to "every soldier a sensor."

¹⁶ Clark (2006).

¹⁷ Heal (2006).

¹⁸ Toon (2006).

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Intelligence 17

Captain Toon's conclusion that his people were best qualified to conduct IPB when it came to local matters led quickly to his realization that "there is a need for [a] company S-2 [staff intel officer] to do analysis, not just compile information and pass it on to the company commander."¹⁹ Seeing the value provided by THTs at battalion level, MAJ Guy Wetzel similarly concluded, "We should really have THTs down to company."²⁰ MAJ Michael F. Trevett proposed a way of giving companies this greater intel horsepower:

There is no intelligence capability at company level, and that is absurd. . . . Intelligence in this type of counterinsurgency is not coming from above. . . . We [at corps] would have to go down to battalion level to get information on targets. We had about 150 people in the intel shop at corps. We could have taken half of them and pushed them down to every company in the country and increased the quality of information we got and helped them at the same time. . . . It would have greater impact and effect.²¹

Given that there are plans for the U.S. Army to increase the strength of its military-intel branch by more than 7,000 personnel by 2013, providing company-level analysis capability may be within the realm of the possible.²² Whether retaining that capability at company level is desirable during conventional operations would have to be part of the examination backing consideration of this restructuring. It may be that corps and other higher-level intel sections maintain shadow positions that, in times of conventional conflict, would be staffed by those assigned to companies during other contingencies.

Battalion commanders and staff have likewise found that the meager personnel levels allocated to their S-2 sections falls short of demand in Afghanistan and Iraq. Colonel Casey Haskins admired what a colleague did while commanding his TF during operations in 2005 Mosul. LTC Erik Kurilla

took about 20 of his guys with GT [general technical] scores above 120 and created an intel platoon. . . . He had less [manpower with which] to strike, but those guys he had to strike were much more effective. I've been telling everybody that you have to do it yourself. . . . We are top down and we need to be much more bottom up.²³

Kurilla himself noted that the number of personnel authorized in a battalion intel section was seven when he entered the service. It remained the same some two decades later as he commanded his battalion in Mosul, Iraq. As noted by Haskins, Kurilla took personnel from elsewhere in his unit and bolstered his intel capability to 23 men.²⁴

¹⁹ Toon (2006).

²⁰ Wetzel (2007).

²¹ Trevett (2007).

²² Kimmons (2006, p. 70).

²³ Haskins (2006). GT scores are taken as measures of intel and fitness for assignments in the U.S. military.

²⁴ Kurilla (2005).

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18 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Extending Tour Lengths for Intel Personnel

Relationships are everything in this fight.²⁵

—LTC Steven Miska, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, Baghdad, Iraq

Turnover remains a major limiting factor in our ability to build up knowledge. I would recommend dramatically increasing tour length for key personnel, but I would couple that with special incentives for those people: far better living conditions, significant bonus pay, and long leave periods.²⁶

Thus does Charles Barlow, former head of the Canadian Forces' Afghanistan Intelligence Response Team, summarize the impact of short unit rotations. His observations are consistent with comments made by many others during the several years of research backing this and previous analyses of ongoing operations. As any police officer, agent runner, or intel collector will likely agree, it takes time to establish the personal trust essential for providers to feel comfortable passing on information and for collectors to accept it. Transitioning between individuals departing and entering a theater is not simply a matter of introducing one's successor to an established information source. Lives are often at stake. Relationships are likely based on individual trust—not ideology, commitment to one side over another, or money alone. Additionally, accurately interpreting the information provided is a skill that grows with familiarity. Greater duration on station makes collectors and analysts more savvy, another argument for having some intel personnel remain in assignments longer.

There are many legitimate counterarguments. Individuals exhaust themselves working the long hours that active operations often demand. Family relationships suffer. Career progression can be undermined. Leaders must find a reasonable balance between retention of critical personnel in theater and unit cohesion. Yet these challenges are rarely insurmountable. Many are the result of flawed staffing procedures, less-than-optimal promotion systems, or leaders who are unable or unwilling to take the long-term perspective needed to better serve operational objectives and subordinates' welfare. Some police agencies have handled analogous issues effectively. Los Angeles County's antigang unit members maintain responsibility for the same gangs year after year, meaning that they are known to those groups' members, form beneficial relationships with them, and come to know details that can be critical to police successes. Law-enforcement operations in Northern Ireland during the Troubles suffered when personnel policies made frequent reassignment necessary to career progression, as explained by Bill Duff, formerly of the Royal Ulster Constabulary:

We started losing this local knowledge [that] has been built up over years. It was a combination of factors, one of which was that the modern career system said that . . . if you'd

²⁵ Miska (2007a).

²⁶ Barlow (undated).

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stayed in one position five years, then you must be some sort of failure, which is absolutely stupid. . . . It's a natural fact—you may not have had the energy at the end of five years that you had at the beginning of it, but you knew so much more. Your contribution has vastly increased. Where we did have continuity, interestingly, was in the special branch offices, because the special branch guys—not the inspectors, because the inspectors tended to be guys who still had another promotion or two in them—but the constables and the sergeants. Most of them stayed there for 5, 10, 12, 15 years. As a result, their local knowledge is encyclopedic. They knew not simply the guy's girlfriend, but all his previous girlfriends, and where their parents lived and where they lived and what they worked at. And the result was, you only had to get a snippet of some information fed back from some other region saying that [someone] was going to utilize [some location] to store a weapon, one of Colonel Qaddafi's AK-47s [a rifle] which he was getting the following day, and he was going to store it somewhere where there was a derelict car. That's all we knew and that's all the source could give us. Well, yeah, I know that; that'll be his girlfriend's father [who] owns a scrap yard . . . and that's where he's going to store the bloody thing. Let's get . . . out there now to have a look at that and see where [they could put a rifle]. Perhaps, if it firms up, then they'll be in a position to go put in an observation post. So get them out early to have a look at it before the weapon is there. Get all the photography done, the aerial photographs. Get the [right] people to look at how they might get in and get out of the place without attracting attention and so on. But you can . . . do that [only] if you have this local knowledge.²⁷

Counterinsurgencies are marathons, not sprints. They are measured in years if not decades in all but the most exceptional cases. Assignment and other personnel policies not designed to support the long run threaten mission success. Just as a campaign plan is vital to effective use of resources and staying on course, so too are wise personnel policies a requisite part of ensuring that intel processes sustain a high level of efficacy. The British assigned military personnel to Malaya for long stints during their post-World War II counterinsurgency in that colony. They provided for families to live in nearby Singapore and accompanied this with regular breaks from field duty. Similarly well-conceived adjustments for those personnel staffing key intel positions are within the realm of the feasible for today's coalitions. It would be wise to extend the tours of some and to lengthen overlaps when rotations do take place, thereby increasing the likelihood that informers will transfer their trust to incoming persons and analysts will have more time to learn nuances of import from their predecessors.

Databases: One Key to Unlocking the Door to Knowledge

A key piece is the whole cultural awareness piece: What to expect? What do they expect of you? What are the stories that Afghan children are raised on?

—Brig A. D. Mackay, *British Army*²⁸

²⁷ Duff (2007).

²⁸ Mackay (2007).

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20 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

I had spent hours and hours discussing the problems, discussions that always centered on the lack of information and the need for a databank.

—*Orrin DeForest*, *Slow Burn: The Rise and Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam*²⁹

In this type of environment, it's not how much you collect, but how well you collect as you can be overwhelmed. . . . Basically it's targeting your collections over time to what you need to know.

—*Col. Jay Bruder*, *USMC*³⁰

Counterinsurgency, and urban counterinsurgency in particular, challenges the intel collector and analyst because he or she must focus on the civilian population as well as more traditional aspects of the environment and enemy. We have noted that the analyst's challenge is notably keen in Iraq, where both population demographics and the threat are more varied than those in Vietnam, Chechnya, or Afghanistan. It is generally said that time favors the insurgents: They need not defeat the counterinsurgent, but rather simply outwait their foe. Yet intel is a case in which time holds benefits for the counterinsurgent as well: The greater the duration of a campaign, the longer the collector and analyst have to develop an understanding of the enemy and population. Several units have begun compilation of databases in Afghanistan and Iraq to take advantage of coalition commitment. This section considers best practices in this regard and aspects that draw our attention for other reasons.

Police Have Long Relied on Databases

If a cop in Anytown, USA pulls over a suspect, he checks the person's [identification] remotely from the squad car. He's linked to databases filled with Who's Who in the world of crime, killing and mayhem. In Iraq, there is nothing like that. When our troops and the Iraqi army enter a town, village, or street, what they know about the local bad guys is pretty much in their heads, at best. Solution: Give our troops what our cops have. . . . The troops now write down suspects' names and addresses. Some, like Marine Maj. Owen West in Anbar, have created their own spreadsheets and PowerPoint programs, or use digital cameras to input the details of suspected insurgents. But no Iraq-wide software architecture exists.

—*Daniel Henninger*, "*The Snake Eater*"³¹

Tactical information and intel of all types remains spread across myriad hard-copy and electronic sources today. Those desiring ready access to that of a given type must commit extensive time and energy to finding and culling what is available. Dealing with translations from languages with several phonetic interpretations (such as Arabic or Chinese) multiplies the chal-

²⁹ DeForest and Chanoff (1990, p. 77).

³⁰ Bruder (2007).

³¹ Henninger (2007).

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Intelligence 21

lenges as a single individual or place name can have a number of “correct” spellings when it is transliterated. Without consistency across databases, use of a particular spelling is “like misfiling a book in the Library of Congress. It’s nearly impossible to find.”³² The problem unsurprisingly extends to maps. Dutch units initially arriving in Afghanistan sometimes found that they had to rely on dated Russian maps. Operations were hindered because location names did not initially coincide with information received from other sources.³³ As one observer noted, the U.S. government should mimic market trackers’ ability

to store and quickly recall historical data . . . so that commanders and diplomats possess relevant records that enable them to make decisions [that] take into account the economic, historical, cultural, political, anthropological, and environmental aspects of the region [within which] they are operating. . . .³⁴

Properly programmed, such efficient data handlers could automatically cross-check the varied spellings of personal and place names so common to Arabic, thereby reducing confusion and allowing for uniformity on maps, documents, and other materials.³⁵ Such a capability would have a wide range of applications in supporting the rule of law and meeting evidentiary standards for dealing with insurgents, criminals, or other undesirables. Applications of value during day-to-day tactical operations would include improved identification of high-value targets (HVTs) (e.g., key Taliban or military leaders), consistency in location names used for navigation or FS, and reduced confusion in coordination operations involving multiple ground-force units (e.g., regular force and SOF).

Many units and other organizations more or less effectively compile such data for use in their geographical or functional areas of interest. There are also ongoing initiatives as various entities address continuing challenges associated with IEDs or other issues.³⁶ The example

³² Haskins (2006).

³³ Noordzij (2007).

³⁴ Hsia (2007).

³⁵ Employing some form of semantic-web concepts might be one way to approach the differences in name spellings. For a brief discussion of semantic-web developments, see Feigenbaum et al. (2007).

³⁶ Walter Perry provided the following comment during his review of a draft of this document:

The Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell (CEXC) records forensic data on IED emplacements and explosions, the Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT) reports provide similar data. The Counter-IED Targeting Program (CITP) is designed to provide data needed to create social networks that explain the relationships among various insurgents in a local area (identify insurgent cells). In addition to all this, considerable progress has been made in training the military to extract latent fingerprints that are of sufficiently good quality to be accepted by the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). The DoD has also developed its own data base called the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) collocated with IAFIS in Clarksburg WVA. The command in Iraq has recently developed a latent fingerprint database called Iraq Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS-I). The current status of these databases along with a description of the CEXC, WIT and CITP can be found in [Woodward et al., forthcoming]. In [that] report, the authors discuss successes to date and recommend near, mid- and long term actions to improve the compatibility among the databases.

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22 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

of sewage treatment in Baghdad tells us that these separate efforts, while commendable, are insufficient. Products are of limited utility beyond the bounds of creating organizations' given failures to address software compatibility, procedures, hardware, means of communication, guidelines for collection, standards for database inclusion, the need for a systematic approach, and other issues. There is still much room to increase the quantity and quality of information available on relevant operational factors other than those threat related. An incoming unit may find itself unable to fully partake of its predecessors' hard-earned knowledge because of such inconsistencies. It may find that much information of value still awaits compiling. There is call for a capability not only that can handle the magnitude this challenge offers but that does so with the requisite uniformity and compatibility to allow it to be accessed and employed across as many services, agencies, nations, and via as many means of storage and communication as possible.

Intel Organizations Tend Not to Share Well

In January 2006, for example, AMAN [Agaf HaModiin, Israel's intel section, or directorate of intelligence] [issued] a document titled "Hezbollah's War Conception." The 130-page report offered detailed information about the organization's ground deployment and the way it had camouflaged its underground facilities. . . . But since the document received the highest level of classification ("limited violet"), only a few outside AMAN's Research Department were granted access to its findings. Thus, the intelligence officer of the 91st Galilee Division—the main IDF [Israel Defense Forces] that faced Hezbollah—was allowed to read it but the Division commander, Brigadier General Gal Hirsh, was not. . . . AMAN ranked the distribution of high quality documents to a limited number of clients as a higher priority than in providing its actual clients with the relevant information they needed. . . . For similar reasons, AMAN refrained from distributing critical information to the combat forces before the war started. Instead, it was kept in locked metal boxes. The intelligence kits were supposed to be distributed to the combat units once war started but, at least in part due to bureaucratic competition, they were belatedly distributed two weeks after fighting commenced, and even then the intelligence was not used effectively. . . . The end result, as described by Major Ilan, the Intelligence Officer of the Golani Brigade, one of the IDF's best infantry forces, was that: "The classified material was not provided to use due to compartmentalization and we found out about it only post-factum. We had no knowledge about the deployment of Hezbollah and its order of battle. When we finally received the material, we had to read it, get used to it, and then draw the necessary lessons."

—Uri Bar-Joseph, *Israel's Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War*³⁷

Someone reading this quotation might be excused for concluding, "that could never happen here." And yet while perhaps not quite at this extreme, the following passages—the first from an anonymous interviewee, the second from a book—demonstrate that it would be unfortu-

³⁷ Bar-Joseph (2007).

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Intelligence 23

nate to assume that there is no room for improvement in the U.S. and allied intel communities as well:

Dutch F-16s would go out and fly missions [in Afghanistan], and after the missions they would ask for the BDA [battle-damage assessments], which were classified Secret U.S. They could fly the mission and drop the ordnance, but they couldn't get the battle-damage assessment.³⁸

Attempting to utilize intelligence within multinational PSOs [peace-support operations] has created ludicrous situations, such as when Indian Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar, commanding the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia was denied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intelligence being provided to his staff. The intelligence-sharing situation was not particularly improved when the Force Command was transferred to NATO's Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier from France, because his senior intelligence officer was Colonel Jan-Inge Svensson, from non-NATO Sweden.³⁹

It is unfortunate that efforts to improve intel sharing have hurdles beyond merely agreeing that change is called for. Procedures, technological and software incompatibilities, and organizational structures all present additional obstacles. Each is now addressed in turn.⁴⁰

Procedures Inhibit Sharing Beyond Military and Intel Organizations

One potential problem we overcame was the fusion between our Iraqi counterparts and us. . . . It pays huge tactical dividends. . . . We do run into classification issues a lot. When people send intelligence down, they don't put tear lines on it. They've pretty much gotten over slapping NOFORN [not releasable to foreign nationals] on everything.

—CPT Jon M. Brooks, U.S. Army⁴¹

I can date my experiential viewpoint to 1969 when I was an Infantry Second Lieutenant Platoon Leader. I and others—including my captain company commander—would watch as a helicopter flew into our fire support base—FSB “Danger” in the Mekong Delta. Out of the helicopter would come this very clean and neat first lieutenant with a briefcase—even his boots were clean—who would stroll over to the battalion CP [command post] where he would meet with the battalion commander . . . and the battalion XO—maybe the battalion S-3 [staff operations officer], and no one else. . . . Then the battalion commander and his

³⁸ Anonymous source 16.

³⁹ Martyn (2006, p. 23).

⁴⁰ For additional analysis regarding the sharing of information during operations, see Porche et al. (2008).

⁴¹ Brooks (2007).

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associates would . . . have the company commanders over to the CP for their briefing—without the aid of the papers or maps the First Lieutenant had in his case. . . . The company commanders would then give their rendition of what the “colonel” said the “first lieutenant” said about our upcoming mission—go to grid squares X, Y and Z, and search and destroy. We would ask—“What is it we are searching for?” The answer often was “Sorry, can’t tell you.” We never knew if that was the answer because the company commander really couldn’t tell us—or because the company commander really didn’t know because the battalion commander couldn’t tell him. Even worse, we were never sure what the first lieutenant couldn’t tell the battalion commander, who then would not tell the company commander, since he didn’t actually know—so that we lieutenants and sergeants had no clue about what the first lieutenant might or might not know. But . . . we had the mission, so we’d saddle up, put on our battle rattle, with a full load of ammo, and either helo [helicopter] in, go by boat insertion, or worst case hump in to the designated area where we had no idea if we were going to be ambushed by a battalion-sized VC unit or if we were looking for a U.S. POW [prisoner of war] or if we were searching for a headquarters or what the heck. Invariably we would be surprised in some way—and we would be stuck in a situation that we surmised could have been avoided if we had the benefit of the clean first lieutenant’s knowledge.

The worst part of it was—some very fine men had their feet and legs blown off from IEDs—yep, IEDs! We called them booby-traps but they were sure as heck “improvised explosive devices.” We had some very fine men lose their lives from ambushes and friendly fire incidents that could have been avoided. We had some very good attitudes forever affected by this dynamic. . . .

My approach was to strive to be the clean first lieutenant who knew everything and then to improve on that by telling everyone affected by what I knew what they should know when going in harm’s way, and to go in harm’s way with them whenever possible. That’s when I decided to branch transfer to military intelligence—to see if I couldn’t do a better job than the mess I found myself and my soldiers in down in the Mekong Delta. . . . We should insist now that full professional sharing and full technical interaction be the rule of the day—period!

—LTG Patrick M. Hughes, U.S. Army (retired),
former director, Defense Intelligence Agency⁴²

NATO, the ABCA (America, Britain, Canada, and Australia) Program, and other cooperative organizations have long-established agreements that are specific in defining what intel members can exchange and how. There is need for reevaluation even in these cases, however. British armed-forces representatives have been put at mortal risk during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq due to U.S. unwillingness or regulatory prohibitions against sharing, this despite pre-

⁴² Hughes (2007).

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Intelligence 25

vious changes in policy and guidance that expanded UK access to classified Web sites.⁴³ The preceding quotation regarding Dutch pilots reflects that much more remains to be done in terms of both the extent of information shared and the parties with whom that sharing should occur. Writing in early 2006 on the situation regarding intel exchanges, Derek Reveron correctly noted, “while ‘need to share’ has become the mantra since the 9/11 attacks, translating this slogan into a core function faces significant cultural and technological barriers.”⁴⁴ Reveron might in fact have been too optimistic. *Need to share* might be understood as policy by those within Washington’s beltway; much remains before it is similarly accepted in the broader intel community.

There are, of course, instances involving U.S. as well as allied nations’ personnel where there is legitimate need to assume risk to protect sources. However, too many cases of denying vital intel for what seem to be less critical reasons encourage a recommendation to (1) reconsider the nearly automatic default of classifying or otherwise restricting distribution of materials and (2) provide formal in-theater and lower-echelon authority to review external and higher-level handling guidance in light of the local intel authorities’ better understanding of operational and security conditions on the ground. Such granting of authority could require positive confirmation by the classifying headquarters prior to downgrading classifications or expanding distribution; however, timeliness of release should not be allowed to suffer unduly.

Sharing becomes more difficult when the prospective recipient is an NGO, IGO, or commercial enterprise. Members of a United Nations (UN) mission in 2007 Baghdad wanted to expand their operations via a field office on a coalition installation elsewhere in the country. It might have been expected that U.S. authorities would do whatever was possible to assist in this regard, given the legitimacy and other benefits accruing from UN association with coalition efforts to assist in rebuilding the troubled nation. Instead, requests from UN personnel regarding the number of indirect-fire attacks that struck the installation in question were denied, allegedly for security reasons.⁴⁵ There might have been concerns that releasing details about the number of successful rocket, artillery, or mortar attacks could have given an enemy information regarding the accuracy of its targeting. Yet had the rejecting officer thought in terms of need to share versus a need to know, he or she would likely have found it possible to both preserve OPSEC (operational security) and provide the information needed. For example,

⁴³ As noted in a previous footnote, both British and Australian access to SIPRNET was expanded in the aftermath of the Cold War. See Reveron (2006, p. 8). Reveron also quoted *The 9/11 Commission Report’s* observation that “current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive compartmentalization of information among agencies. Each agency’s incentive structure opposed sharing, with risks . . . but few rewards for sharing information” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 417). He likewise quoted former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone describing how such challenges impinge on sharing with international partners: “Incorrect use of the ‘NOFORN’ caveat on DoD information has impeded the sharing of classified national defense information with allies and coalition partners” (2005, p. 1). Cambone’s resulting guidance was that, for “intelligence under the purview of the DoD, originators shall use the ‘Releasable To’ (REL TO) marking, and any subsequently approved releasability marking, to the maximum extent possible” (2005, p. 1).

⁴⁴ Reveron (2006, p. 8).

⁴⁵ Anonymous source 34.

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26 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

reporting the number of attacks in the *vicinity* of the installation in question might well have met the needs of the UN without compromising OPSEC. Similar reticence also occurred for sharing selected technologies—e.g., those regarding counter-IED capabilities and radios—with UN personnel.⁴⁶

Hardware and Software Incompatibilities Require Addressing

I had a situation [in which] we had information that there was going to be a meeting between two guys in Latin America . . . and one of these guys was someone we were really looking for. The informant said, “They are going to be involved in a terrorist attack.” I passed it on to my source. . . . The informant came back and said, “Hey, this meeting is really going to happen.” . . . But [those I informed] said they didn’t have the resources to act on the intelligence. What they meant was that they didn’t have the SIGINT [signal intel] asset to tap telephones. . . . [We ended up not physically sending anyone information about where the two were meeting. The one that we wanted ended up getting arrested for a passport violation while he was at the meeting, but we did not know that, and he was set free.] It turns out that, for lack of a SIGINT asset, we lost this guy. He was arrested, and he was held for 48 hours. For lack of a SIGINT asset, we lost him when all we had to do was send somebody down and say, “Yeah, that’s the guy” and take him into custody.

—Lt. Col. Eduardo Jany, USMC⁴⁷

Technology-related issues further inhibit effective intel sharing, though there are initiatives to address some of those challenges. Such initiatives have a rich history of successful precedents, ones that can serve as examples for others yet to come. Deborah G. Barger’s *Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs* cited the memoirs of Richard Bissell, whom she called “the CIA’s driving force in reconnaissance systems in the 1950s,” as an example of previous intel technological innovation and long-sightedness:

Bissell wrote of the atmosphere of creativity and innovation driven by the need to address the Soviet threat, and of the speed with which such breakthroughs occurred. “The go-ahead for the U-2 project was given to Clarence ‘Kelly’ Johnson of Lockheed Aircraft by telephone on December 1, 1954,” according to Bissell. “The first overflight of the USSR took place on July 4, 1956. . . . Two months after the first overflight of the Soviet Union, Col. Jack Gibbs and I started defining a successor to the U-2. . . . In March 1955, . . . a general operational requirement for a photoreconnaissance satellite [was issued], thereby initiating a different technical approach to overhead reconnaissance.” Bissell notes that although there were scattered failures thereafter, there has never been a major lapse in the flow of intelligence from satellite reconnaissance since then. “It is no exaggeration to say that what was accomplished in this period of less than ten years was a revolution in intelligence collection. The desperate rivalry of the Cold War, of course, provided the major stimulus for our activities.” Bissell’s

⁴⁶ Anonymous source 34.

⁴⁷ Jany (2006).

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Intelligence 27

observation underscores the importance of a major impetus, or unmet challenge, to spur the kind of creative effort and action that leads to “breakthroughs.”⁴⁸

One might well argue that ongoing operations to combat worldwide terrorism and those confronting insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq should provide a stimulus akin to that posed by the Soviet Union in the era about which Bissell was writing. In many ways, the challenge is even more difficult. Not only are new technologies in demand, the abundance of in-use technological systems demands leaps forward in policy, procedures, and interorganizational cooperation no less revolutionary than the development of the U-2 or reconnaissance satellite. Barger was somewhat less optimistic with regard to U.S. capabilities to meet this expanded set of challenges, noting, “Today, new technology applications are developed in insular organizational ‘stovepipes’ and are not necessarily shared with others who could make use of them, or worse, are duplicated when duplication is unnecessary.”⁴⁹ Yet a forum exists for guiding disparate organizations’ initiatives and potentially linking them to coherent long-range capabilities:

Organizations like the Intelligence Technology Integration Center will play a very important role in the Revolution in Intelligence Affairs because they not only scan the horizon for new technological opportunities but also can provide a forum for technologists to interact with analysts, linguists, case officers, line managers, and others.⁵⁰

There is demonstrated progress at the operational and tactical levels as well. The Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has repeatedly demonstrated its utility both as a missile-launch platform and as a valuable intel system. Often piloted by personnel hundreds or thousands of miles distant, the airframe provided real-time video feeds to personnel at headquarters in theater both during conventional operations in early 2003 Iraq and COIN and counterterrorism actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both air and ground commanders at the tactical level repeatedly benefited from its capabilities to loiter over AOs, a prime example of support and supported personnel developing procedures for a new system in the interest of operational success.

Blue-force tracking (BFT) was similarly a success, largely due to its being commonly adopted by Army, Air Force, and (to a lesser extent) Marine forces.⁵¹ The system allowed commanders to monitor not only their own locations, but those of units in other services. BFT, in a sense, provided *intelligence by elimination* for air and ground targeting alike. Knowing what coalition units were in an area and whether those friendly forces had BFT systems, leaders could engage otherwise unidentified targets based on the absence of their own in the area in question.

⁴⁸ Barger (2005, pp. 89–90).

⁴⁹ Barger (2005, p. 117).

⁵⁰ Barger (2005, p. 117).

⁵¹ Lord (2005).

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28 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Yet there remains room for improvement. Two examples provide a sense of the hurdles yet to be overcome. First, though Predator has proven a successful system in supporting both air assets and ground units, passing information provided via live feed is currently practicable only in higher-level headquarters. Dissemination to brigade-level or lower Marine and Army organizations is feasible only via voice, email, or other indirect means of passage.⁵² Second, John Vines found his challenges in the many separate databases his unit had to access in order to extract needed information. Vines recalled his 18th Airborne Corps Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) tour, during which

we had more than 300 different databases tracking friendly and enemy event data across all the warfighter functions. . . . Much of the data available could not be shared, resulting in an incomplete picture of the battlespace and little shared situational awareness. . . . Most of the BCSs [battle-command systems] in Iraq were accredited for U.S. classified-data networks (i.e., [SIPRNET]) and not coalition networks. Thus, there were limited tools to support information processing in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. In many cases, the systems' complexity created high learning curves resulting in training shortfalls and rapid decay of user skills. . . . Although there were multiple programs of record for battle tracking (MCS [Maneuver Control System], C2PC [Command and Control Personal Computer], ADOCS [Automated Deep Operations Coordination System], FalconView [mapping software], GCCS [Global Command and Control System], etc.), none [was] able to create a combined view of enemy and friendly events on a map.⁵³

This shortfall, akin and related to similar problems with communication systems in general, is the result of many factors. Lack of a single, all-embracing, authoritative oversight mechanism for intel and communication-system acquisitions is part of the issue. Such an authority would ideally be responsible for reviewing and approving or disapproving service and combatant command programs with the idea of improving joint operational effectiveness. Such authority is a critical element. Previous joint dictates that services improve communication compatibility have, at times, been ignored. Control of purse strings and the power to cancel programs outright would assist such a manager in enforcing compatibility guidelines.

Intel Organizations and Procedures: A Third Hurdle Between the Present and More-Effective Operations

One of the biggest problems was sharing information. Every intel cell had its own database. They were collecting information their own way.

—R. G. W. (Rudy) Gouweleeuw, *Royal Netherlands Army analyst*⁵⁴

⁵² Darilek et al. (2006).

⁵³ Vines (2006, pp. 42, 44).

⁵⁴ During Gouweleeuw et al. (2007).

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Intelligence 29

The U.S. intelligence community is large and pervasive. Unfortunately, various agencies run their intelligence data and analysis in bureaucratic stove-pipes, which run straight from the tactical level to the highest strategic levels with little sharing along the way. . . . Raw data are seldom passed back—just agreed-on intelligence. Agreed-on intelligence is a homogenized product from which dissenting views and contradicting evidence has been removed or discounted so the community can have a common view. . . . If intelligence does come back down the stove-pipe, it often arrives too late.

—Lester W. Grau,

*“Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysts”*⁵⁵

Intelligence stovepipes have been cited as a problem so often that the term has become a cliché. Such operating in isolation is, in part, explained by issues described in the previous two sections: Internal organizational policies and incompatible technologies can all work against free exchange and timely sharing. Organizations’ objectives also differ. Some police, military, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) representatives in the 10-nation Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) initially found little reason to concern themselves with each others’ intel. The military concerned itself with the threat posed by the various militias. Police focused on day-to-day criminal activities and governmental corruption, while DFAT interest was primarily on broader national and international strategic issues.⁵⁶ Yet subordinates found much that complemented and clarified their own efforts when the leaders of these three major parties required their intel sections to collocate and cooperate.

RAMSI benefited from its limited size: The mission numbered no more than some 2,000 personnel at its early peak. It nevertheless offers a number of lessons worth noting. Collocation can be beneficial. Coalition forces in western Baghdad also benefited from the presence of U.S., Iraqi, and sometimes British security forces in a joint security station (JSS). It is practical for units to physically collocate intel assets when many are in proximity (as is often the case in urban areas). In other cases, however, dispersion of units may mean that collocation will have to be virtual, e.g., via cyberlinks. While face-to-face communication is preferable, the desired end of effective and timely intel sharing need not be dictated by the ability to physically come together in the same location.

Another benefit of better linking intel assets at lower echelons is a reduced vulnerability to scam artists. Canadian Charles Barlow could have been describing operations in Vietnam 40 years before with his recollection of operations in Afghanistan during which “sharing a source registry amongst HUMINT [human intel] agencies is another problem. In Kabul, there are ‘sources’ who sell the same junk info to everyone . . . knowing that there is no way anyone can check.”⁵⁷ Employing retinal scans or other means of tagging intel from sources that need protection would allow comparing sources without compromising them, given properly

⁵⁵ Grau (2006, p. 31).

⁵⁶ These descriptions are oversimplifications, but they address the general perspectives that delineated intel-concern differences.

⁵⁷ Barlow (undated).

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30 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

designed software. Such capabilities would have the additional benefit of allowing agencies to identify those selling the same information to several of them, thus precluding seemingly separate sources from acting to confirm each other and curtailing multiple organizations paying the same source for identical input.

Bringing intel assets together will present challenges along with benefits. Some allies or coalition members are more trustworthy than others. There will be NGOs, IGOs, and commercial interests that need to access only a very limited amount of intel. Segmentation, tear lines on documents, and other means of compartmentalizing information will be necessary just as current intel sections have their sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs). Information can be compartmentalized, though those establishing such facilities will have to resist emplacing such stringent access restrictions that they lose sight of the initial objective of facilitating sharing. USMC Col Kevin M. Trepa looked back on early operations in Iraq, remembering,

OIF 1 was interesting because we had a lot of Soviet-bloc countries that were in the coalition, [and therefore] a lot of security and intelligence issues. . . . We realized that not all coalition members are equal. We built three forms of CENTRIXS [Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System]. One that was for Arabs—Kuwaitis and Gulf States—one of former Soviet-bloc states, and one for more traditional [relationships].⁵⁸

The Greatest Obstacle to Effective Intel Operations Is Mindset

You will never completely get the intelligence wing of an agency, such as the army or the police, to relinquish its independence. . . . After a number of mistakes, we did get people to agree that we were all on the same side, and we therefore would share intelligence.

—Chris Albiston, formerly of Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch⁵⁹

One of our latest assistant chief counsels. . . . Things got real bad once and he said, “I’ll tell you what we’re going to do. When we get a piece of intelligence, instead of sitting down and saying, ‘Right, who needs to know this piece of intelligence?’ we will look at it and we will say, ‘OK, we’ll start from the position that everybody needs to know this intelligence, and then we’ll cross off those who don’t need to know it.’” . . . It led to a more efficient dissemination and a more efficient usage of that intelligence. There are a number of crimes you can commit in intelligence. . . . I believe the deliberate invention of intelligence is a heinous crime. The deliberate subjective interpretation of intelligence to suit your own predetermined ideas is another heinous crime. But sitting on intelligence and not telling those who

⁵⁸ Trepa (2007).

⁵⁹ Albiston (2007).

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Intelligence 31

need to know is also a heinous crime, because it leads to great inefficiencies and ultimately to the loss of objective.

—*Bill Duff, formerly of Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch*⁶⁰

You can't get intelligence from a source you don't even know exists.

—*Anonymous*⁶¹

The ubiquitous nature of multinational and interagency operations requires reassessment of intel-sharing policies. Unwillingness to share information under the auspices of OPSEC sometimes works against mission success and is the “easy way out” rather than the right decision. The time has come to transition from the traditional need-to-know approach to one of need-to-share during counterinsurgencies and selected other undertakings. This will require OPSEC and intel personnel to have a legitimate reason for denying information or intel to allies, coalition members, and others with legitimate concerns rather than relying on denial as the default mode. Establishing a standard of sharing will bring new requirements for designing and acquiring sufficient numbers of some equipment types (e.g., radios, counter-IED systems) such that coalition organizations can sell them to or share them with other organizations, albeit a sharing guided by policies to minimize the likelihood of OPSEC violations. There will similarly be a need to (1) establish intel-sharing agreements with these organizations prior to deployments when feasible, e.g., as part of interagency campaign planning and rehearsals, and (2) make future BCSs more conducive to information sharing in a coalition environment and easier to use and implement.⁶² The increase in the number and significance of civilian contractor responsibilities—to include provision of personal security for high-ranking U.S., coalition, and indigenous civilian officials—requires that particular attention be given to the provision of FP-related intel.

The United States is in a position to facilitate this move toward more-effective intel operations. The current preeminence of its technological capabilities in the field and the extent of other resources mean not only that the country will find itself in the position of guideline developer, but also that it should look at how it might better facilitate multinational and interagency cooperation. We noted that the first Dutch unit to deploy in support of operations in Afghanistan found it difficult to pass intel to that following, providing but one example. Issues interfering with more-extensive transfer included the obvious lack of lessons-learned infrastructure akin to that possessed both jointly and in the individual U.S. services. Less obviously, coalition partners may lack secure means of passing sensitive materials to deploying units in

⁶⁰ Duff (2007).

⁶¹ Anonymous source 23.

⁶² Vines (2006, p. 44).

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32 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

a form that facilitates effective use. These are all issues with which U.S. headquarters could provide assistance.⁶³

Superiority in technology should not be assumed to represent a similar U.S. dominance when matters come to HUMINT proficiency. U.S. armed forces have peers—in some aspects, even superiors—in this regard. Regardless of relative aptitude, there is a need for open-mindedness and willingness to learn from those with different perspectives. U.S. units and intel organizations should seek to draw on past and ongoing experiences of their British, Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, and Dutch counterparts in addition to those from other nations, NGOs, and other organizations.

British Army intel officer Colonel T. E. Stevens brought up the concept of an intel supremo during an interview. Such an individual would provide tertiary oversight and assist in improving the efficacy of coalition intel operations in a theater.⁶⁴ Similarly, subsupremos might serve to orchestrate intel efforts in smaller information-dense environments, e.g., major cities, such as Baghdad. Such managers could provide both the means and impetus for making many of these changes.

Finally, it is ever important to remember that the enemy always has a vote. Stovepipes by definition are separate entities. There are thus gaps, seams, and disconnects between organizations operating totally or in part in their own realms. U.S. Army 1LT Sean D. Henley was addressing unit AOs in Baghdad when he observed, “Just looking at the enemy patterns, it’s apparent from discussions [that] they know where our boundaries are. . . . They’ll be coming in and doing attacks in our area, and then run back across into that area because they know [that] no one is active over there.”⁶⁵ Failing to better cooperate creates bureaucratic intel borders that are no less open to exploitation. The former example of the clever information seller who peddles his product to multiple agencies, each ignorant of the other’s sources, is an example. It is one of the least damaging. Failure to improve intel sharing is an invitation to threat exploitation.

Soldier or Marine as Sensor: Improving the Input

During operations other than war (OOTW), commanders must task some units, other than intelligence, to perform detailed intelligence collection tasks. The units tasked often do not have the background or training to easily handle the [task]. As a result, reports sometimes lack detail and may leave gaps in the collection plan. The traditional intelligence collection plan does not fill the void. The brigade/battalion S2 must provide a detailed checklist, reporting journal or other graphic [aid] that leaves little doubt about what information is required and in what detail. These checklists need to be specific, but simple. In Somalia,

⁶³ Coenen (2007).

⁶⁴ Stevens (2007).

⁶⁵ Henley (2007).

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Intelligence 33

checklists were developed and used successfully for convoys, airfield security, patrols, road-blocks, and area assessments.

—*10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), U.S. Army, Somalia, after-action report*⁶⁶

The soldier-as-sensor concept is a brilliant one, but it comes with implications that can be costly if not recognized. The after-action report excerpt emphasizes the obvious need to link newly assigned intel responsibilities with the training essential to meeting them. Those at muddy-boots level must likewise be savvy with respect to both the specifics of what they are to find and the context for that detailed guidance. MAJ Guy Wetzel cited the value of linking a commander's PIRs to IRs to, in turn, special orders requests (SORs), the last dictating what the soldier or marine on the ground actually asks members of the population, e.g., "If you want to know where the gas is going, you ask, 'Who are you selling the gas to?'"⁶⁷ The key is to make every soldier sensor a smart one via training and keep each informed.

The training needs to alert those on the ground to the dangers they pose to members of the population if they do not consider the potentially negative effects of their actions. That a civilian's talking to a soldier can lead to retribution by the foe is well known. Yet there are other well-intentioned actions that can inadvertently lead to death or injury for those who seek to help a coalition. One unit assigned to 2003 Iraq prepared unit cards to hand out to members of the population interested in assisting. The unrecognized danger was that an insurgent searching someone or seeing the card in a home would assume that the possessor was a collaborator. Later in the conflict, a savvier officer handed out cards with nothing other than the number to dial, thus not directly affiliating the holder with U.S. armed forces. Even this might be insufficient depending on the level of threat. Dialed numbers remain on cell phones just as email addresses remain on computers. Various precautions are therefore necessary if insurgents check hardware or call the number on a card to see what response they receive from the other end. Sometimes, proven methods remain the best ones. Then

Captain Tony Jeapes recalled a simple and effective method used in Malaya, by which the police would surround a village during curfew and leave a piece of blank paper at every house; in the morning, they would let each villager drop his paper (unmarked except for the information itself) into a large box, which was later opened at police headquarters, with the anonymity of the informants thus fully protected.⁶⁸

Concluding Thoughts on Intelligence

The main lesson is the need for cooperation between all gatherers of information and all users of information. There is always a tendency toward proliferation of intelligence organi-

⁶⁶ 10th Mountain Division (1993, p. 30).

⁶⁷ Wetzel (2007).

⁶⁸ Hosmer and Crane (1963 [2006], p. 108).

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zations (there are said to be over 40 separate organizations operating in West Berlin today) and this must be firmly checked in any condition of insurgency.

—*“Isolating the Guerrilla”*⁶⁹

The intelligence on the military side was not tied in with the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and the CIA was not listened to. . . . I had my most depressing discussions with the intelligence people who could see what this was leading to, and could see what the population thought better than [then-director of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Iraq L. Paul] Bremer could. . . . Between Bremer and [then secretary of state Donald H.] Rumsfeld, it had to be all talked up, which is the American way. . . . The discussion with Bremer was always on the optimistic side, while on the intelligence side it was much less so. And I think the same was true to an extent of [GEN John Philip Abizaid]. You don't succeed within the U.S. system unless you [display a can-do attitude].

—*Anonymous*⁷⁰

Much has improved in the realm of intel since U.S. forces first deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. They and their fellow coalition members have honed HUMINT skills and returned to many smaller bases in lieu of residing in giant forward operating bases (FOBs), thereby improving contacts with the population. They have chosen to work with Iraqi units, understanding that local knowledge is critical to properly interpreting information. Yet, significant bureaucratic barriers remain to even more dramatic progress. The need to find ways to better share is among the most prominent. Providing analysis capabilities at the company level and enhancing those at battalion might be another. Ultimately, however, intel is an aid to decision-making rather than an end in itself. Those presenting intel products must do so frankly. They must do so clearly; unambiguousness in communicating intel is no less important than clarity when giving an order. Those receiving intel must, in turn, understand that not all the news will be good and that the messenger who delivers only positive news is more enemy than ally. How to present intel—positive, negative, or neutral—is an additional challenge. That is notably the case during a counterinsurgency, when means of measuring are often less intuitive than during conventional conflict. It is to this challenge that the next chapter turns after a presentation of several recommendations drawn from the foregoing discussion.

Let us conclude with the following offering from World War I lest we forget that even a topic as serious as intel merits an occasional touch of humor:

On one occasion, the General was going round the front line accompanied by the Intelligence Officer (who is the Officer [who] selected the password which is changed daily) and by the C.O. [commanding officer] of the unit in this sector. Staying out rather later than they had intended, it was dusk or dark when they approached one of the posts. The sentry challenged, “Halt—hands up.” Up went the General's hands in prompt compliance.

⁶⁹ HERO (1966, p. 25).

⁷⁰ Anonymous source 9.

“Advance on, and give the countersign,” continued the sentry. The General turned to the Intelligence Officer. “What is the countersign today?” said he. “Really I am afraid I have forgotten,” replied the Intelligence Officer, and both referred to the Colonel. “When I left my headquarters, it had not yet come through,” was his reply. The sentry remained obdurate. Then followed explanation, and, after some parley and identifications, the party were allowed to proceed. As they were leaving, the General hurried again to the sentry, saying, “Well, my man, you might just tell us now what the password is.” “I am sorry, sir,” was his reply, “but I haven’t the least idea.”

—*Henry Osmond Lock, With the British Army in the Holy Land*

Intelligence Recommendations

The following primary recommendations follow from the preceding discussion:

- The civilian population is a key source of intel and may well be the friendly-force COG. Protect it against attack by both the enemy and your own forces.
- Consider giving selected companies a 24-hour intel-analysis capability while similarly investigating providing battalions a more robust intel section.
- Lengthen tours for individuals in critical intel billets, particularly those involving analysis or contact with informants. Combine longer rotations with policies that (1) bring families closer to deployed personnel, (2) allow for more frequent breaks of equitable duration, and (3) result in staffing levels and leader selection resulting in reasonable periods of daily and weekly rest.
- Improve database development through better sharing and insistence on compatible technologies and software. Transition intel communities from their need-to-know default to a need-to-share mentality.
- Develop source-identification and data-tagging procedures that permit collecting organizations to compare HUMINT sources while retaining the anonymity of those sources.
- Consider the appointment of intel supremos both in theaters and at the strategic level to oversee, facilitate, and monitor more-effective sharing of intel and general improvement in field effectiveness.

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CHAPTER THREE

Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in COIN Operations

A rice farmer in Hiep Hoa [a district of Bac Giang province in Vietnam] could easily find himself sitting under a banner at midnight, participating in an antigovernment rally during which he might play the role of an outraged and exploited peasant, under the watchful eye of a Communist propaganda cadre. The following morning, the same farmer could send his children to the new, government-built school and then walk to the village office to vote in a local election—this time under the watchful eye of a government hamlet chief. The village Vietcong would boast in their report that . . . “90 percent of the villagers have actively thrown their support to the cause of the revolution.” At the same time the Hiep Hoa village chief would inform his superiors that “more than 95 percent of the villagers voted in the recent election, with anti-Communist candidates receiving the near unanimous support of the people.”

—*Stuart Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon*¹

Introduction

This measuring business is not easy.

—*Captain Jeffrey Schwerzel, Royal Netherlands Army*²

Metrics have been used in one form or another to measure progress or lack of progress toward achieving objectives throughout the history of armed conflict. However, metrics have never before received the attention seen today. With multiple blue-ribbon panels, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and, most notably, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and GEN David H. Petraeus’s Iraq progress reports all using their own internally developed performance metrics to evaluate progress, the selection and use of specific metrics have taken on exceptional significance. Add to this the role of such measurements in influencing the charting of future strategy, and that significance is further magnified. Increased data collection and the availability of the products to the media have also resulted in greater scrutiny and increased numbers of interpretations of available information. The ultimate choice of metrics can mean the difference

¹ Herrington (1982, p. 37).

² Schwerzel (undated).

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between publicly perceived success or failure. The choice of metrics has, in short, become one of national importance.³

Simply put, metrics are yardsticks for measuring progress toward achieving operational objectives or a desired end state.⁴ Some differences arise in how practitioners and researchers apply the concept of metrics. For the purposes of this report, we adopt a definition from recent RAND work. This concept starts by establishing a desired end state in operational terms. Three elements are necessary to measure progress against this end state:

1. indicators: observable quantitative or qualitative data inputs that are relevant for measuring progress toward the end state
2. a criterion of success: the method by which progress will be charted against the desired end state
3. data sources: where the data for the indicators will be collected in terms of both source and operational level.⁵

Despite its apparent simplicity, even this definition of metrics requires detailed planning, often complex application, and tremendous flexibility in order to maintain pertinence and stay ahead of the enemy in the action-reaction-counterreaction process prevalent during operations.

Commanders directed to plan and engage in combat operations do so with a sense of urgency that is tempered only by their desire to effectively translate guidance from civilian leaders into achievable military objectives. In traditional major combat operation (MCO) environments, the order to conduct combat operations is likely to be accompanied by a set of clearly defined objectives that drive planning. Commanders start with these objectives and use a process of backward planning that ideally includes developing metrics to enable both internal and external assessment of progress in achieving stated goals. This pattern is replicated down to the smallest units, with objectives and metrics at each echelon designed to support those at upper strata. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and, more recently, the first phase of OIF are examples of the military's ability to use clearly defined objectives to plan operations and employ predetermined metrics to assess achievement of these ends.

Despite the increased focus on metrics, selecting the right measures at each level of war has never been more difficult. The military must increasingly balance the desire to maintain simple, easily assessed, comprehensible metrics that provide adequate measures of effectiveness with the kitchen-sink approach, in which increased data collection and subsequent analysis attempt to satisfy all prospective users' requirements. The organization that chooses to use

³ That correctly defining and using metrics are of vital strategic importance is a given. Bernard Fall's classic works in this area are worthy of note (e.g., Fall, 1966). Thanks to Walter Perry for suggesting mention of this resource.

⁴ This definition of metrics was taken from previous RAND research as employed in multiple documents (e.g., Sullivan, Perry, and Jackson, 2005, p. 6).

⁵ This discussion of metrics was adapted from Larson et al. (forthcoming). Thanks to Thomas Szayna for suggesting this resource.

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 39

overly simple, easily assessed metrics risks not uncovering true indicators of progress, while the organization that collects and analyzes too much data risks insufficient focus on mission tasks and potentially falling prey to false indicators. The nature of counterinsurgency complicates matters in both the quantity of data and their correlation to sought-after objectives. Measuring progress during counterinsurgency is hampered by lack of specificity when it comes to determining the relationship between actions and outcomes. Francis Fukuyama describes the concept as follows:

Specificity refers to the ability to monitor a service output. The example . . . of a highly specific service is jet aircraft maintenance, a complex skill that is hard to fake. If a mechanic is incompetent, there will be immediate consequences. By contrast, high school guidance counseling is a service with very low specificity. The counselor may advise a student to change career directions; the advice may not be taken immediately, and, even if it is, its impact on the student's later life may not be known for years (if at all).⁶

The ability to collect and synthesize increasing amounts of data will tend to further expand the scope of metric applications in the future. Understanding how they are developed as part of the military planning process and how metrics are currently used to assess performance is a critical first step toward better integration of this assessment tool.

This chapter considers metrics by looking at (1) the link between political leader–desired outcomes and metrics, (2) a detailed analysis of how metrics are developed and linked to desired outcomes, and (3) the use of metrics in support of COIN operations. We first explore metrics by drawing from a base of literature that is burgeoning as a result of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The chapter begins by briefly exploring the link between political leader–desired outcomes, higher commanders' logical lines of operations (LLOs), subordinate commanders' specific objectives, and the selection of metrics that support mission success. After reviewing the links between objectives and metrics, a detailed analysis follows that looks at the types of metrics available to commanders, the difficulties in collecting data to support them, and their historical evolution. This second section closes with a list of desirable metric characteristics. The third section highlights five overarching observations concerning metrics in support of COIN operations as gleaned from interviews with veterans of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. These respondents ranged from junior soldiers and civilians to flag officers and diplomats. The closing section looks at metric imperatives—highlighting steps toward better understanding—and provides recommendations for going forward.

The following pages do not purport to represent a comprehensive discussion of a topic whose complexities fill volumes and constitute fields of study. We seek to familiarize readers with relevant challenges and some of the thinking that backs ongoing efforts to meet these difficulties. That done, we address insights and observations provided by those interviewed in support of this research or based on personal experiences in operational theaters.

⁶ Fukuyama (2004, p. 76).

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40 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Metrics Should Assess Performance Against Objectives, Not Drive Objective Selection or Be Chosen Based on Ease of Collection

It's a huge problem. They approach it as "What can we measure?" rather than "What do we want to illuminate?"

—*Stephanie Miley, U.S. Department of State*⁷

An obvious concern in this dynamic process is whether metrics are being developed that truly support the desired objectives or whether these metrics, sometimes selected by default because of their ease of measurement, may be inadvertently shaping commanders' objectives in unproductive ways. As an illustration, if a commander can easily measure the number of weapon caches found, he or she may decide that the number found is a proxy for the objective of increased security. Even less helpful are metrics that measure effort without linking it to results, e.g., reporting the number of leaflets dropped as a reflection of a psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign's success.⁸ The result could be prioritizing weapon searches at the expense of other, less quantifiable but more beneficial tasks. Selecting effective metrics—measures that accurately capture effects rather than inputs—is one of a commander's most complex and critical tasks. Poorly selected measures can lead to wasted effort and unnecessary risks. Better measures can increase the likelihood of mission success. Understanding how to develop effective metrics for COIN operations is notably challenging, given the many relevant parties and scope of tasks confronting a coalition.

Understanding the Link Between Political Guidance and Metrics

Civilian control of the military has been a cornerstone of the United States' democratic process since the country's inception. Ideally, the President of the United States, as the senior elected leader, provides a vision of the outcome the government hopes to achieve given a developing international situation. The chief executive and the executive staff then determine the appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military prescriptions to apply to most efficiently achieve desired objectives.

Developing and using metrics to assess performance in meeting objectives applies to all the elements of national power. This report, however, limits itself to a consideration of metric employment only in the context of the military.

⁷ Miley (2007). The views expressed in these statements are those of the individual and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government.

⁸ The authors thank reviewer Walt Perry for providing this example.

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 41

Military Leaders Translate Desired Outcomes into Objectives Within LLOs

The desired outcomes established by elected leaders become inputs to the military's planning process. Field manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*,⁹ provides a general framework for grouping these objectives into broad categories referred to as LLOs. LLOs help commanders and staffs to organize their planning and subsequently to execute operations. Examples include the following:¹⁰

- *Combat operations/civil-security operations*: Conduct activities to reduce violence and improve the perception of security.
- *Host-nation security forces*: Educate, train, and mentor indigenous security forces.
- *Essential services*: Restore or provide essential services, including sewer, water, electric, trash, education, and health services.
- *Governance*: Establish basic governance structures, support elections, reestablish the justice system, and foster local leader and organization development.
- *Economic development*: Support economic viability through financial infrastructure establishment, local economic development, and creation of supporting procedures.

Such LLOs allow commanders to focus efforts on designated priorities, such as establishing security (through combat operations and increased competence of indigenous security forces) and improving the quality of life for the indigenous population (through improvements in essential services, governance, and economic conditions).

Measuring LLOs Directly Is Problematic

[P]rogress is not something you measure with a stopwatch. It takes place over a much longer period of time. . . . When you pan back and look at it from the perspective of two or three years, [the number of significant insurgent events shows] a gently upward sloping line. In other words, nothing has changed. The enemy still has the initiative. You need to look at short-term, medium-term, and long-term measures.

—Anonymous¹¹

Ideally, commanders would directly measure the improvement in each one of the LLOs to assess their overall progress toward meeting their desired outcomes. Unfortunately, assessing improvements in broad categorical areas with any degree of accuracy is precisely the problem that is ultimately driving the use of more-complex metrics (as is the overlapping character and interactions between the LLOs). Commanders once determined to find the nonexistent silver-bullet metric that would promise success in reaching desired outcomes are defaulting to collecting data on as many inputs as possible in their efforts to find factors that correlate with

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps (2006).

¹⁰ U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps (2006, p. 5).

¹¹ Anonymous source 1.

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42 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

mission success. Measuring progress with respect to LLOs often requires a complex combination of qualitative and quantitative data rather than straightforward collection of quantitative data.

Metrics Can Measure Inputs, Outputs, or Effects

Organizations seek the set of metrics that best matches their data-collection capabilities and assessment needs. Commanders and staffs consider the number of data collectors and analysts and the amount of time the command can devote to this activity. There is no single set of “right” metrics that will perfectly assess performance. A commander can draw on at least three types of metrics, each with strengths and weaknesses. One or more will be of value depending on the circumstances in which an organization finds itself.¹²

The British and American governments have taken to publicising “Factsheets” and “metrics” listing: for example, kilometers of water pipes laid, completed electricity projects, schools [that] have been refurbished and even the planting of date palms. Such statistics indeed indicate activity but, without being presented in the context of the economy as a whole, they convey little meaning.

—*Hilary Synnott, Bad Days in Basra*¹³

Measures of Effort. Measures of effort (MOEs), for which no doctrinal definition exists, are used here as a measure of organization activities accomplished. COL Gregory Fontenot (U.S. Army, retired) used the term when describing the limited utility of reporting the number of mines neutralized in Bosnia and Herzegovina during his brigade command tour in 1995–1996 (discussed further later).¹⁴ Such data represent the most rudimentary approach that organizations use to assess their progress. Use of MOE relies on gauging organizational inputs, counting activities (such as the number of patrols conducted, IED caches captured, miles of electrical lines strung, or quantity of sewer-main breaks repaired) without regard for the circumstances or influence the activities have. Employing MOE requires the least amount of data collection, analysis effort, or expertise; simply relying on the numerical counts of event occurrences serves as the basis for inference. This method is often employed by lower-level units possessing less advanced data-collection and analysis networks and is a primary feeder of baseline data to higher organizations. General trends in these counts can help inform other metrics, but by themselves they do little to answer the question, “Are we moving closer to achieving our objectives?” and thus have limited intrinsic utility alone.

¹² The February 2008 edition of the U.S. Army’s FM 3-0, *Operations* (U.S. Department of the Army, 2008, p. D-4), replaces the previously employed *criteria of success* with the joint doctrinal terms *measure of performance* and *measure of effectiveness*, both of which are defined and described in this report.

¹³ Synnott (2008, p. 255).

¹⁴ Fontenot (2006, slide 12); Glenn (2007, p. 10).

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 43

Measures of Performance. Measures of performance (MOPs) are a measure of efficiency: “a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.”¹⁵ As noted in the February 2008 U.S. Army FM 3-0, “Measures of performance answer the question, ‘Was the task or action performed as the commander intended?’ A measure of performance confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed.”¹⁶ An example of this would be efficiencies gained by transitioning to a Web-based contracting process from a localized, face-to-face process. The Web-based process could better facilitate competitive bidding that results in reductions in average contract prices and increased quality, allowing additional reconstruction projects to be made available within the same fixed budget to support reconstruction operations, thereby meeting a stated objective of accomplishing or exceeding specific goals within stated resource constraints.

Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness are measures of outcomes or effects, “a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.”¹⁷ Again from FM 3-0:

Measures of effectiveness focus on the results or consequences of actions taken. They answer the question, “Is the force doing the right things, or are additional or alternative actions required?” A measure of effectiveness provides a benchmark against which the commander assesses progress toward accomplishing the mission.¹⁸

This metric is the most difficult to assess, since it often requires a subjective assessment by either the provider or consumer of these services. It often cannot be done directly using strictly quantifiable assessments. As an example, the outcome that we desire is not an increased or unlimited number of patrols as a measure of safety and security in an area, but rather outward demonstrations by the local population that indicate an increased confidence in their safety and security in the area. These could manifest themselves as an increased willingness to invest in local home-building or business start-ups, increased buying and selling of goods in local markets, more children playing in soccer games, the return of families who had fled the neighborhood, increased quality or quantity in intel tips, or even more thumbs-up gestures during a patrol on the streets. It is important to have metrics that reflect a lack of progress toward objective accomplishment as well. These might be measures that demonstrate stagnation or regression. Just as some signals indicate only progress, others might be a sign of its absence, or worse. Like measures showing progress, such metrics can be subtle. In an interesting example of a less (if at all) quantitative metric, British officials in post-World War I Ireland noted a decline in the public prestige of Royal Irish Constabulary officers. Recognition came not due to anything

¹⁵ USJCS (2007, p. 335).

¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army (2008, pp. 5-16–5-17).

¹⁷ USJCS (2007, p. 335).

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army (2008, p. 5-17).

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44 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

as overt as increased acts of violence against the officers, but rather because gardens around police posts were being vandalized.¹⁹

Simply counting the number of patrols conducted (a MOE) or the increased percentage of neighborhoods patrolled this week versus previous weeks (a MOP) would not provide an organization any indication of the movement toward achieving its ultimate objective of an increased perception of security by the local population. However, indirect or subjective metrics associated with assessing increased commerce on the streets, the ratio of positive hand gestures, and the nature of behavior at soccer matches may all be measures that, when combined, reflect on the outcome or effect sought: an increased perception of safety and security by the population. Any one of these metrics may show progress; however, more frequently, metrics are combined and distilled to make an assessment. Continuing with the soccer-match example, larger attendance figures, greater representation by minority groups previously persecuted, increased wearing of jewelry, and the presence of children together would represent mutually reinforcing signals of comfort regarding public safety. Improvements in some of these factors, combined with consistency or degradation of others, would instead provide ambiguous or negative feedback about movement toward sought-after goals. This report refers to the products of such combining as *compound metrics*.

The important distinction among the three types of metrics is that MOEs and MOPs are inward looking. They reflect a unit's own performance and efficiency at delivering a service or good. Measures of effectiveness get at the heart of the issue. They measure not what the providers provided, but rather whether the impact favorably influences sought-after objectives.

Metrics for COIN Operations Are Hard to Establish and Difficult to Measure

Progress here was marked by reports and reports and reports—how many teachers went to work yesterday, how long was the gas line in meters, and how many liters were sold. In this case it was how much business does the bank do. The reports were then passed on to what we imagined was a huge pile of unread papers that someone used as fuel for bonfires.

—*John Crawford, The Last True Story I'll Ever Tell*²⁰

Four considerations regarding metric applicability to counterinsurgency merit particular discussion.

COIN Operations Require Metrics Adapted to Specific Environmental Circumstances.

The Army is not a newcomer to using metrics to assess progress in meeting objectives. The unit status report (USR) is an example in which explicit metrics are used to assess a unit's personnel, equipment, maintenance, and training status on a monthly basis to determine readiness to perform its combat mission. Commanders similarly use the quarterly training brief (QTB) process to review the status of subordinate-unit weapon qualification, physical training, collec-

¹⁹ Mockaitis (1990, p. 70).

²⁰ Crawford (2006, pp. 78–79).

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 45

tive training qualification, and a host of other commander-deemed essential tasks for prioritizing unit training. What differentiates these objectives from those in support of COIN operations is the static versus dynamic nature of the two scenarios. The objectives in the USR and QTB processes are static. They rely on universal metrics applicable to every same-type unit in the U.S. Army without need for adaptation. What is different about metrics for Afghanistan and Iraq is that objectives and associated metrics in these contingency areas must be adapted to account for the specific location, people, and resources available—they cannot be one-size-fits-all universal metrics like those for the USR or QTB.

COIN Operations Necessitate That Metrics Ultimately Be Comparable Over Time and Across Geographic Locations. Special care must be taken to ensure consistency across objectives and their metrics at each echelon.

One of my frustrations when it came to metrics was with RC [regional command] South [in Afghanistan]. . . . [RC said,] “Provide me the number of enemy killed in action and give me the number of PRT [provincial reconstruction team] activities.” We asked them about defining a PRT activity. They never gave us an answer, so we gave them a definition, but all they wanted was a sheet with lots of big numbers. So the data coming [were] useless because no one was using the same definition for a PRT activity. Was it a medical event? [One country’s] RTFs [reconstruction task forces] were putting a new operation name to each time they went outside the gate. We didn’t do that, so it looked like [we were] lazy.

—*Anonymous*²¹

Each organization at every echelon must have objectives and supporting metrics that support those above it. Units may well suboptimize in the grander scheme without such consistency (i.e., their performance might be flawless from the perspective of their echelon but less effective or even harmful from others).

There is a second type of consistency essential for metrics to be effective. Consistency also means that metrics must share definitions, have common meaning in the minds of those using them, and be exploitable by higher headquarters. Metrics are the method by which organizations develop a common standard to assess their progress toward meeting objectives both longitudinally (compared with other organizations at that location) and intrateporally (within an organization over time). All organizations using a metric must therefore understand it to mean the same thing. Subordinate-organization metrics must also fit consolidated measurement processes at higher headquarters; in other words, the higher headquarters must be able to use lower-echelon metrics—either in raw or tailored form—to support those at the higher level.²²

²¹ Anonymous source 7.

²² This concept of adapting measurement processes at lower echelons to requirements at higher levels to ensure compatibility and consistency is an extension of the *nested LLOs* construct discussed in U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps (2006, p. 5-3). This same nested concept is also described in Larson et al. (forthcoming). The discussion in these references is restricted to nesting objectives; it does not address the point made in this text about ensuring compatibility of the metrics associated with the objectives.

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46 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Quantitative metrics allow for relatively uncomplicated comparisons. However, the inferences from these comparisons can be misleading if the metrics assess inputs alone (MOEs or MOPs). Because decisionmakers often give more credence to quantitative metrics than to qualitative ones, improperly selecting metrics can be more damaging than similarly misidentifying qualitative metrics.

Qualitative metrics are not easily compared in their raw form. Qualitative data often lack a common trait that allows for meaningful scalar comparison. A simple and generally informative aggregation can often be achieved by using stoplight charts.

It can be challenging to aggregate these qualitative and quantitative metrics from lower levels and draw inferences from the combined data at successively higher echelons. The development of the resulting compound metrics can, in turn, influence what is needed of data collectors. Leaders must strive to develop compound metrics that provide the measures needed at their and higher echelons without overburdening those on the ground who collect the data. Ideally, even the most complex compound metrics can rely on data that are simple to collect. As a very simple example of this, we can look at a situation that one of the authors faced in 2005 Sadr City. Considerable resources and effort had been expended to refurbish 15 sewer-pump stations in Sadr City to get the raw sewage off the streets. It was very easy to collect quantitative data on the hours the pump stations were operational, the number of operational spare generators and amount of fuel available to run them if the dedicated power went down, and the number of resulting sewage backups within the pump station's vicinity.²³ However, none of these quantitative measures alone provided any understanding of the effects of these initiatives on local citizens or associated outcomes. We could assume that individuals were better off with less sewage on the streets. However, there was no definitive understanding of how the improved service affected their willingness to favor coalition forces and reject insurgent influences in the service of improving security, thereby serving the ultimate goal of establishing a legitimate Iraqi government acceptable to the people. It was clear that a qualitative assessment of local "atmospherics," combined with a quantitative assessment of the progress in ridding the streets of sewage, was the metric desired. Data supporting this compound metric were relatively easily collected; forces needed to gauge the relative amount of sewage on the streets while determining the extent of public support for coalition and indigenous security forces, thereby allowing them to determine correlation (or lack thereof) between coalition actions and local population perceptions. (*Atmospherics* was a term that our unit used to describe a qualitative measure regarding a neighborhood or other area. It encompassed elements like the prevalence of waves and smiles from children and adults during a patrol in relation to the extent of rock throwing and negative gesturing, as well as other reflections of attitudes regarding coalition forces, Iraqi security personnel, and the general quality of life as expressed by local citizens during interactions.) While there were many factors other than the amount of sewage that

²³ All sewer-pump stations in Sadr City were provided dedicated 24-hour electrical-distribution lines that were *not* subject to the rolling blackouts of local citizens. Despite concerns that there might be some animosity about this, the local citizens were pleased and supportive, since it resulted in keeping most sewage off their streets.

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 47

would influence local attitudes (making establishment of causation impossible), determining the sought-after correlation was within the realm of the feasible.

This is a relatively simple example depicting qualitative and quantitative inputs that are rather easily collectible and combinable into compound metrics for use at higher echelons. There is a need to avoid defining metrics based on overly complex or difficult-to-collect data. It is to this challenge that we now turn.

COIN Operations Necessitate Ease of Measurement for Metric-Data Collection. Organizations should explore and develop the metrics that they think will best assess progress in achieving objectives. However, a metric should be adopted only if it can be reasonably measured using available assets. Often the best (and sometimes the only) sources of data are the individual soldiers and marines conducting patrols on the street. Their tasks are many and varied, with responsibilities that routinely put them in harm's way. This necessitates minimizing the difficulty of data collection so these men and women can quickly and accurately perform this task without unduly endangering themselves or impinging on other work. Simplicity also helps to ensure consistency in the quality of data collected. Increasing the complexity of collection requirements and the number of collectors greatly increases the potential for measurement error.

COL Gregory Fontenot recognized both the value of simplicity and the need to distinguish between MOEs and measures reflecting the beneficial effects of his 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) activities during its 1995–1996 deployment to Bosnia and Herzegovina. At one point, his unit had removed or otherwise neutralized 3,000 mines in its AO. The figure seemed impressive, until one realized that those 3,000 were but a tiny fraction of the estimated 180,000 mines within the brigade's boundaries. The MOE—the removal or destruction of 3,000 mines—was easy to gauge but not particularly helpful. Colonel Fontenot's MOE met both standards: The neutralization of those 3,000 mines opened 45 routes to traffic.²⁴ It had the additional benefit of providing a metric that would be of consistent value regardless of the echelon employing it.

COIN Operations Require the Use of Preplanned Metrics and Others Developed as Familiarity with the Theater of Operation Increases. The metrics that an organization uses to assess its progress are often derived in two very different ways. Some metrics are developed during the initial planning process. Specific quantitative or qualitative measures are matched against established tasks and missions to facilitate measuring progress. Later, units also develop metrics that rely on a more subjective assessment, taking into account prevailing conditions. These metrics associated with the operational environment tend to consist of many components, both qualitative and quantitative. As such, they are a prime example of compound metrics as described earlier. Colonel Fontenot's MOE provides a very simple example. Meeting the objective of improving military and civilian mobility within his brigade's AO was a consequence of two quantitative measures: (1) neutralizing 3,000 mines to (2) open 45 routes. Such compound metrics can themselves be components of other such measures—in the case

²⁴ Fontenot (2006).

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48 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

of Colonel Fontenot's brigade, how the mine-related compound metric reflected on economic improvements in the civilian sector.

Further Metric Characteristics

Soldiers always want quantitative data. . . . The fear or loathing of qualitative data is something that I think will hamper our efforts in the future, because in some cases that is the only data that we can give. . . . A . . . briefing with only qualitative data . . . is not yet accepted.

—Anonymous²⁵

Like every other process being employed in the COIN fight, the selection and use of metrics have adapted to changing environments. Initial summary reports of how many enemy were captured and killed, number of weapon caches found, number of health clinics constructed, and number of business permits approved are examples of the types of simple, quantifiable metrics that were initially used to reflect progress. These metrics generally measured levels of inputs (MOEs) or coalition efficiency (MOPs). As the insurgency continued, it became apparent that these input-based metrics were not necessarily moving in sync with desired outcomes. Gradually, a shift in focus from single, count-based objective measures to more complex, effect-based measures began. Organizations experimented with the use of compound metrics that combined quantitative and qualitative data to allow staffs to develop holistic assessments in hopes of better linking the measurements to desired outcomes. The shift to an effect-based approach relying on compound metrics significantly expanded both the data-collection and analysis burdens on units. No longer could a patrol just make a single count of some factor to satisfy its contribution to the metric puzzle. Instead, it was expected to record subjective assessments regarding an increasing number of measures, e.g., the number of progovernment posters remaining on walls, the demeanor of townspeople as the soldiers walked the streets, and the willingness of those approached to talk to interpreters. Those at battalion level and above realized a corresponding additional burden on the resources needed to compile and analyze the incoming data. Commanders continue to develop increasingly complex metrics in hopes that they will better measure progress toward objectives. Despite a pace that challenges the ability of doctrine developers and lessons-learned collectors, authoritative sources are beginning to expand beyond the simple count metrics and are offering observations regarding characteristics that they deem essential to successful metrics, as described later. The *Counterinsurgency* manual suggests that MOPs and measures of effectiveness be

1. measurable—ideally, a combination of quantitative and qualitative measures that are compared to an established standard
2. discrete—each measuring a specific task, condition, or standard

²⁵ Anonymous source 4.

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 49

3. relevant—a relevant link connecting the measures with the tasks, conditions, and outcomes
4. responsive—providing timely assessments of environmental and situational changes.²⁶

In his School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, MAJ Douglas D. Jones provided a more comprehensive look at required characteristics. He determined that metrics need to

1. be meaningful
2. be linked to the strategic end state
3. be observable
4. be quantifiable
5. be precise
6. demonstrate a strong relationship between cause and effect.²⁷

These lists are helpful, but it is in understanding their application from which real value is drawn. The remainder of this chapter seeks to provide that by drawing on the knowledge of individuals with extensive field experience applicable to the challenges inherent in defining and employing metrics.

Developing and Employing Metrics: Synthesis Observations from the Field

Unless we can get agreement on what we're trying to do, any measurement [is of little value]. For example, until you can settle on [what the role of civil-military coordination, or CIMIC, is], you can't measure progress because you don't know what progress is.

—Anonymous²⁸

This section provides five metric synthesis observations derived from the preceding discussion and links them to relevant comments, thoughts, and concerns of more than 30 interviewees with deployment experience in Afghanistan or Iraq. The observations are not prioritized but rather follow a sequence that reflects the general logic within the metric-establishment process:

- *Metrics must be aligned to support strategic goals.* Objectives and metrics that are not explicit and aligned between hierarchical organizations can lead to tactical successes that are operational or strategic failures.
- *Metrics must measure progress toward meeting objectives.* This requires measuring effects rather than inputs.

²⁶ U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps (2006a, p. 5-27).

²⁷ Jones (2006, p. 27).

²⁸ Anonymous source 1.

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50 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

- *Ideally, metrics reflect causality.* Causality is difficult to identify and even more difficult to verify due to the need to control for other influences in dynamic environments. However, establishing causality, correlation, or some lesser association suggests what actions commanders can take to influence desired outcomes.
- *Metrics must reflect local conditions.* Metrics are frequently situation-specific and generally cannot be assumed to be applicable throughout the operating environment.
- *Compound metrics are increasingly being used at all levels.* Compound metrics are becoming the norm at lower levels to develop meaningful metrics from combined qualitative and quantitative data and at higher levels to aggregate lower-level metrics and draw conclusions that reflect conditions of a broader segment of the population.

Metrics Must Be Aligned to Support Strategic Goals

Jeffrey Record, who was in Vietnam as a civilian, concluded that the body count became such an important metric for success that it corrupted much of the war effort: “[A]massing kills became the standard of career success for U.S. commanders, and therefore an often irresistible temptation to abuse in both the infliction and reporting of enemy casualties.”

Another metric that encouraged search and destroy over pacification was “battalion days in the field.” This metric made the number of days each battalion spent conducting combat operations a measure of performance. While time spent in search and destroy counted in this metric, pacification missions did not.

—*Austin Long, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence*²⁹

There were those who were saying, “You’re not that busy this week, because you weren’t doing that many patrols. You haven’t killed that many people,” and we’d say, “No, you don’t get it. Those are completely irrelevant.” . . . We would [say], “Tell us how you are perceiving it,” and that was better than these more formal measures.

—*LCol Shane B. Schreiber, Canadian Land Forces Command*³⁰

LLOs drive the establishment of unit goals that in turn influence the establishment of metrics to measure progress toward meeting those goals. This progression is doctrinally replicated within each unit, with each successive subordinate unit responsible for ensuring that its LLOs, goals, and metrics align with those of the next-higher organization. The *Counterinsurgency* manual summarizes the links as follows: “Lower echelon operations are nested within the higher echelon’s operational design and LLOs.”³¹ When the chain of logic is violated, or when a higher headquarters takes too long in developing its guidance, the result can be confusion,

²⁹ Long (2008, p. 14).

³⁰ Schreiber (2007).

³¹ U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps (2006, p. 5-3).

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 51

inefficiency, and reduced effectiveness. Moreover, able subordinates will seize the initiative, recognizing that waiting for higher headquarters begins a chain reaction of delays in getting plans to lower echelons. There is risk of disconnect between operational coherence and execution that could have strategic implications when LLOs and objectives originate from lower echelons in the absence of guidance from above rather than being developed and disseminated—or, at a minimum, informed by input—from the top.

COL (P) Joseph DiSalvo, commander of the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, highlighted how he linked guidance from higher with metrics: “The BCT staff would translate the division commander’s intent into effects we wanted to achieve, then identify metrics that could measure degrees of success or failure of the effects we wanted.”³² This paradigm reflects the logical nesting that FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, exhorts.

Getting it right initially does not mean that the process of metric definition is complete. Continuous review and refinement of objectives and related metrics are ongoing processes, ones that seeks to minimize unnecessary risk to soldiers while maximizing the value of resources expended in the service of strategic objectives. Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely of the British Army very clearly summarized the dangers inherent in suboptimizing at the tactical level:

All operations that are carried out should be evaluated as to whether they take you closer to, or further away from, your strategic goals. Thus, they should be gauged at the operational level [the level that links the tactical to the strategic]. Too often, this does not happen. Too often, people look at their operation just in terms of tactical success. For example, there were some operations taking place in Iraq where the success of the operation—say, a raid—was judged solely against whether tactical success had been achieved: tactical success in terms of attrition of enemy forces, numbers killed or captured, numbers of weapons seized, amounts of explosives captured, extent of area controlled. By these criteria—these metrics—a given operation would be judged a success, regardless of the fact that it had seriously alienated the local population, and the fact that, within a few months, other insurgents had re-infiltrated and regained control.

But gauged at the operational level, such an operation would have been judged a failure because, despite the tactical triumphs, it had seriously alienated the local population, thereby undermining the operational-level center of gravity, and taking us not closer to, but further away from our strategic goal. The operation had thus been actively counterproductive. In considering the operation beforehand, planners should have asked themselves not just “Will this operation be a tactical success?” but “Will this operation be a stepping stone on the path to achieving the operational level center of gravity—and thus on the path to our strategic goal?” If the answer to the latter was “No,” the operation should have been dropped like a hot stone.³³

³² DiSalvo (2007).

³³ Kiszely (2006a).

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52 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Although we would hope that this was the exception rather than the rule, leaders at every level must constantly reassess objectives and metrics of subordinate units to ensure that all are aligned within the hierarchical organization. It is the responsibility of senior commanders to ensure that a subordinate commander's choice of actions to optimize outcomes at his or her level is not detrimental for the higher organization. Absent assessment and feedback from senior headquarters, one can only expect subordinate commanders to seek maximum progress toward their local objectives.

Linking metrics to objectives does not mean that all such measures pertain directly to the end state. There will be metrics that apply only to some phases of a campaign plan. Metrics must be adapted as operations progress to ensure that they remain aligned with intermediate as well as ultimate objectives. Metrics therefore have to be nested not only from echelon to echelon to the extent possible, but also from phase to phase within a given echelon.

Metrics Must Measure Progress Toward Meeting Objectives

My team said something in a report that [differed from the report by] the brigade. A call came from Camp Victory asking, "Why are you differing? You shouldn't be differing." . . . And I said, "If you ask a local leader, 'Are the police trained?' he could truthfully answer, 'Yes.'" So they have all green lights up on the chart, but I might have a red light because yes, they are trained, but they are going around intimidating the people. In our rush to brevity, we sacrifice accuracy, and then the poor general thinks he is informed, but he is not.

—*Stephanie A. Miley, U.S. Department of State*³⁴

We have observed that metrics must adapt in part because objectives at various echelons change. David Sanger, in a *New York Times* article, supports this point by highlighting how President George W. Bush changed strategies four or five times in Iraq and that Bush's new gauge for measuring progress evolved from a focus on the maturation of the Iraqi government (which had been a key metric leading up to the surge testimony in September 2007) to one regarding U.S. alliances with tribes and local groups.³⁵

Junior leaders with daily interaction with local Iraqis seem to understand the importance of measuring effects in lieu of inputs. However, this understanding does not ensure that higher-level commanders will coordinate the establishment of metrics with lower-echelon leaders to better allow those most familiar with local conditions to match metrics to local personalities and conditions. When asked what he wanted to achieve in his area, CPT Jon Brooks, a troop commander in the South Ghazaliya area of Baghdad, stated, "I want security for the local population . . . markets opening and expanding and people [who] are not afraid . . . and people feeling safe walking the streets."³⁶ He clearly described his desired end state in terms

³⁴ Miley (2007). The views expressed in these statements are those of the individual and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government.

³⁵ Sanger (2007).

³⁶ Brooks (2007).

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 53

of effects: Iraqis feeling a sense of security while enjoying the benefits of economic development. Contrasting with the articulation of this objective is his concern regarding the metrics he was asked to report. “The metrics I use to measure it are something that might not even be meaningful: the number of people playing dominoes on the street [and] the hours of electricity every day. There used to be a big pile of garbage there and now there’s a little pile.”³⁷ His anxiety seems justified at first glance. The data he and his unit were collecting seemed little more than measures of inputs: simple counts of the number of individuals playing dominoes, hours of electricity available, and amount of trash. However, a closer look reflects that what appear to be input measures of little import are—at least in some cases—metrics reflective of effects. Increasing numbers of individuals playing dominoes could represent an increased perception of security. Increased hours of power might represent an improvement in conditions necessary for economic development, and a decrease in the amount of trash on the street could suggest increased security, quality of life, and improved potential for economic development. Any of these measures might be one of several components of compound metrics employed by higher echelons. Yet Captain Brooks is right to inquire whether the chosen measures in fact represent effects; his unease demonstrates the importance of explaining the purpose of the data being collected to those performing the task.

In other instances, quantitative measures are clearly more dubious as MOEs. An observer of operations in Afghanistan expressed frustration in finding that

operational commanders also continue to indulge in the fallacy of body counts, and a month in which more Taliban are killed than in the previous month is seen as progress. This is actually more likely [merely] to reflect the fact that there are more enemy on the battlefield than there were before.³⁸

Several officers voiced concerns that the focus during predeployment exercises, such as those conducted in conjunction with Fort Leavenworth’s Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), remains primarily on the collection and analysis of less-meaningful quantitative data while the current trend in theater is on capturing and assessing qualitative data. One, MAJ John Pirog, a battalion S-3 in Baghdad, summed up his frustration after having had to make adjustments following a false start in theater: “I wish someone had told us to [collect nonkinetic data] in the beginning. We were a young battalion.”³⁹ The unit’s predeployment training emphasized a deliberate model in which quantitative data were the means for measuring progress. The instruction had, in effect, made them resistant to using more qualitative metrics or more rapidly adapting their metrics to meet operational needs.

LTC Michael Johnson, squadron commander in the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, shared a similar concern about the quantity and rigidity of metrics and their ability to measure

³⁷ Brooks (2007).

³⁸ Anonymous source 36.

³⁹ Pirog (2007).

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progress. His comments lend further weight to Major Pirog's insights regarding metric training. Predeployment preparations need not only break away from a fixation with overreliance on quantification. Metrics present complex and—for many—new ground. Providing guidance on how to define them should undoubtedly be part of revised training. Instruction should also encompass war-gaming selected measures and otherwise validating objective-metric relationships, checking linkages between metrics at various echelons, and constantly reevaluating chosen measures to gauge whether revision or abandonment is called for. Leaders need to have an opportunity to determine the balance between too much measurement and the desired “good enough.” Addressing this issue, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson noted, “Metrics can consume a lower level unit. There is little time to get formal with metrics. Developing too many metrics and developing them too soon can cause a unit to unknowingly go in the wrong direction. All metrics must have a system to frequently adjust and determine [whether] they are useful and are measuring the right thing.”⁴⁰

The undertone here is that units can become so consumed with collecting the data needed to assess their progress that they are expending more energy on that collection than conducting operations that actually achieve the desired effects. Additionally, units can become so comfortable with assessment procedures that they lose sight of whether the metrics continue to accurately measure progress.

Others with experience in Afghanistan and Iraq also echoed the observation that measuring effects is considerably more challenging than simply gauging inputs. Effect metrics can make some people uncomfortable. When asked how he determined that security was improving in Afghanistan, Brigadier Theo Vleugels of the Royal Netherlands Army responded that that task

required us to make contact with the village mayor [and] the police chief. It was not the case that we asked the population whether we had achieved security . . . because they tell you what you want to hear. I agree it is not very effective in a sense, but it is the best we could do at the moment.⁴¹

LTC Kevin Farrell, commander of 1-64 Armor, 3rd Infantry Division, aptly articulated this evolution in metrics. Like General Vleugels, he realized that “just because something is measurable does not make it important and not all important information is quantifiable. I see this as the distinction between the art and science of war.”⁴² Ambassador Hilary Synnott drew on his lengthy career as a diplomat to similarly observe,

Much could be learned, or intuited, from the souks [markets]. The state of economic activity could be assessed from the selection of products on ale, their price and source of origin. The well-being of the population could be judged by the appearance of the shopkeepers

⁴⁰ M. Johnson (2007a).

⁴¹ Vleugels (2007).

⁴² Farrell (2007).

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 55

and their customers. Did they look healthy? Were they cheery or gloomy? How were they dressed? The quality of local government could be seen from the state of the streets and infrastructure.⁴³

One method of measuring effects rather than inputs that our interviewees commonly cited is to use some form of polling to capture the perceptions of the local population. The concern with polling, however, is that because of the often-dangerous environment, the polling organizations may not be able to ensure the rigor necessary to validate the randomness of respondent samples. General Vleugels' observation regarding Afghans' propensity to provide the answers they think coalition soldiers want to hear validates the need to use local pollsters, and even then to be cautious regarding use of results. Commanders in the field seem to be aware of these potential biases and use polls as references to gauge changes rather than absolute values. Colonel DiSalvo was one who concurred in this regard: "Polls are good as reference but [the] degree of bias [is] usually profound."⁴⁴ Wise to treat polling results as only one of several decision aids, leaders should nevertheless not overlook ways to improve the quality of those results. Charles Barlow, the former head of the Canadian Forces' Afghanistan Intelligence Response Team, opined,

Polling . . . generally showed a reasonably high level of popular support. But we overlooked the fact that we are not working in a democracy—whatever we may wish to call it—and that . . . the opinions of [only] a few people actually matter. Polling should be done that identifies what tribal leaders and religious leaders believe. Such polling should ask them what they want in return for their support and conversely what would cause them to withdraw that support. Surprisingly, they will tell us when we bother to ask.⁴⁵

The common viewpoint of those raised in a democracy is that polling leads to an understanding of popular opinion and hence can help leaders best match available resources to the wants and needs of the people. However, though General Vleugels recognized the desirability to accurately poll views of the population at large, he also realized that, in a country where the population is subservient to the desires of its leaders, soliciting the needs of the individuals at the apex of social hierarchies is helpful, despite not being optimal. Another key to enhancing the value of polling results, therefore, is to ensure that the social-node influencers are solicited for their input in order to understand the impacts of potential policy and resource changes on the attitudes of the influencers and hence the remainder of the population.

⁴³ Synnott (2008, p. 110).

⁴⁴ DiSalvo (2007).

⁴⁵ Barlow (2007).

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56 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Ideally, Metrics Reflect Causality, but This Ideal Will Seldom Be Achievable

As they say in research methods classes, “correlation does not necessarily imply causation.” Meaning, that just because two things happen at the same time, one does not necessarily cause the other. The classic example illustrating this principle is that you may eat carrots at dawn, and two hours later see more clearly, but it does not necessarily follow that the carrots cause improved eye sight. In the case of a reduced need for kinetic operations, . . . causes for that over the [past] year might have included bad weather, poor crops, good intelligence, bad intelligence, new commanders, a switch in Taliban strategy, switch in American strategy, etc. etc. The point being that just because the number of kinetic operations declined, it does not follow that it was caused by HTS [human-terrain system].

The odd thing is that in a pilot program such as HTS, a “natural experiment” is easy to develop. The question to ask is, did that number of “kinetic operations” decline any quicker in the area controlled by the brigade than it did in areas controlled by brigades [that] did not have HTS? This would presumably be easy to do in Afghanistan where not only are there more than one American brigades, but other countries also have a military presence. Such other sectors [act] as a “control” and then draw conclusions about HTS effectiveness. Such data [are] also open to the perils of interpretation, but using it is far better than relying on . . . vague feelings and anecdote.

—Tony Waters, “Message to HTS Anthropologists”⁴⁶

Finding a causal relationship between actions taken by a unit in a combat zone and the effects or outcomes observed in relation to the population is the ideal, albeit extremely unlikely, situation. To establish causality (essentially: action A occurs, resulting in outcome B) requires that very specific conditions be met. The unit would have to be able to control for (isolate) all variables that could be influencing the outcomes other than the one it believes causes the desired result. Commanders expressed significant concerns about the ability to both determine that these outcomes existed and identify causal relationships between them and a unit’s actions. LTC Jeff Peterson, commander of 2-14 Cavalry observed,

even if we can successfully measure an outcome, it’s extremely hard to know what caused the outcome. There are so many things happening at once that causal relationships are next to impossible to identify. There is a certain amount of guessing and operational art in measuring success.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Waters (2008).

⁴⁷ J. Peterson (2007).

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 57

LTC Michael Johnson, former commander of 3-7 Cavalry, 3rd Infantry Division, identified similar concerns:

Metrics are only really important or useful if you know that they are giving you the correct indicators. In a complicated environment this can be really hard. [A decrease in] violence [by] no means indicates necessarily that anything you are doing is causing it.⁴⁸

CPT Jon Brooks, company commander in TF 2-12 Cavalry in Iraq, was more succinct. He argued that higher headquarters “asking for metrics assumes a linear progression that doesn’t exist.”⁴⁹ Similarly, MAJ Dan Rouse, XO for 2-12 Cavalry, realized, “so much is inter-related that measuring one thing does not reflect the relationships.”⁵⁰ His comment highlights the interrelatedness of the factors that influence activities in an operational area. Urban areas are particularly dense with possible influencing factors, making establishment of causality even more difficult than elsewhere.

However, an experiment in the typical sense being impossible in combat does not mean that commanders should give up on attempting to establish what actions influence outcomes in their AOs.⁵¹ Field experiments, what are referred to as *natural experiments* in the quotation at the opening of this section—those with lesser standards than those one would accept in a laboratory where conditions can be controlled and variables completely isolated—may be both feasible and helpful (though the tempo of operations may require that the individuals conducting the experiment are from other-than-operational units). Understanding the difficulty of establishing causality, commanders may instead be able to establish the less demanding (though still problematic) state of correlation (i.e., when action A occurs, activity B also occurs). Because of the ever-evolving nature of COIN operations, correlation is probably the strongest possible relationship that the commander can hope to establish. Yet even this determination may well have limited utility. Operational environments are dynamic. Relationships between variables seldom remain the same for long. Other variables of no previous importance will assume a role, while others of previous significance may no longer affect relationships. While correlation certainly should help to guide leaders’ resource commitment at a given point in time, commanders will have to be ever mindful that yesterday’s truths may have little validity today. Like objectives and metrics, assumptions regarding relationships will have to be constantly monitored.

⁴⁸ M. Johnson (2007a).

⁴⁹ Brooks (2007).

⁵⁰ Rouse (2007).

⁵¹ Military commanders can and should use a combination of all three categories of experiments—true, quasi, and natural—to establish the less stringent correlation or broad patterns of association of results to help them determine desirable actions.

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58 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Metrics Must Reflect Local Conditions

Higher headquarters is using how much tip money is being spent as a metric, but in our area it doesn't work that way.

—LTC James D. Nickolas, U.S. Army⁵²

This observation is most easily accepted by reviewing the converse, which would absurdly imply that, once the LLOs and objectives had been established for the theater, metrics could be universally adopted that would apply to all units regardless of location or circumstances. Accepting this logic would result in assignment of metrics before entry into an AO, since specific factors there would be of no consequence. This approach would allow higher headquarters to define one set of metrics applicable to an entire theater, resulting in the convenient situation in which simply aggregating localized metrics would permit assessing overall progress, a situation akin to our heretofore discussed USR. The reality, of course, is much more complex. Any measures established or interpreted by higher headquarters that do not reflect local conditions are, at best, suspect and will almost inevitably precipitate inappropriate conclusions, resulting in inefficient or counterproductive actions.

LTC Gian Gentile was using the number of dead bodies found on his Iraqi AO's streets as a metric for the reduction in sectarian violence. While the measure might have been appropriate elsewhere, Colonel Gentile soon realized that such was not the case in his AO:

I increased the number of patrols in the area, gained the confidence of the local sheiks and imams, picked up garbage off of the streets to improve the lives of the locals and conducted more raids to capture insurgents whom we thought were taking part in sectarian killings. Early perceived results of my unit's efforts appeared encouraging: the number of dead bodies on the streets declined significantly. Initially, I thought my squadron's military actions had produced the decline. However, as I learned more about my area, I came to realize that the reduction of bodies on the streets was due not so much to my unit's military actions but to the simple fact that most of the minority Shia who had lived in Ameriyah had either been killed or fled the area. Fewer Shia bodies were showing up on the streets because there were fewer Shia for the local Sunnis to kill.⁵³

Colonel Gentile's initial misconception resulted in his reaching a conclusion that was counter to the reality on the ground. This may have resulted in a less effective allocation of resources than had he originally been aware that purging the community of Shi'a was the actual cause of fewer corpses therein.

A commander can take several steps to reduce the chances that his or her metrics will be misleading. The following are but a sample; good units are sure to develop others. First, specifically address what metrics the leaving unit is employing when a new unit is taking over

⁵² Nickolas (2007).

⁵³ Gentile (2007).

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 59

(in instances other than the arriving organization being the first into an AO). Determine the assumptions behind the establishment of those metrics and whether they have been validated, adapted, or otherwise challenged over time. Second, as once mentioned, war-game metrics just as one would any course of action. Assign staff members to play devil's advocate, their task being to identify shortfalls in proposed measures, thereby to mold proposals to better suit conditions or lead to rejection of unsuitable metrics altogether. Third, create PIRs and other information-collection and analysis tools in conjunction with metric definition. Identify the sources of information that will best support metric validation, adaptation, or replacement or disposal. Fourth, work in conjunction with adjacent and higher units, exchanging intel and feedback that will assist in capitalizing on commonalities across unit boundaries and between echelons. Fifth, encourage all unit members to challenge metrics or propose alternatives, perhaps rewarding those whose inputs prove the most insightful or valuable. Lastly, fully explain every metric in writing for use in both briefing unit members and informing higher headquarters that will receive these measures as reflections of conditions within the unit AO. This last step obviously implies a willingness to work with those at higher echelons to find metrics that reflect both local realities and a need to make them germane to objectives at all relevant levels.

Understanding the dynamics of a local area is not a nice-to-have proposition. It is a must-have essential to developing metrics that assist in allocating resources and, in turn, provide meaningful progress toward meeting desired objectives. Despite our commanders on the ground beginning to acknowledge this need for localized metrics that reflect the dynamics of their area, at times, higher commanders continue to believe that they can aggregate this data into compound metrics without recognizing local differences.

Compound Metrics Are Increasingly Being Used at All Levels

An increasing need for compound metrics is the result of the necessity to transition from a reliance on measuring inputs to measuring effects. The key to the success of these compound metrics is the ability to aggregate these lower-level metrics in such a way as to allow higher-level commanders the ability to draw inferences across larger portions of the population without compromising the metrics' ability to measure progress in each lower commander's AO.

Commanders interviewed alluded to this need for metrics that offered these characteristics but only peripherally addressed them. General Vleugels was an exception. He believes that "taking a lot of qualitative, subjective inputs [makes the analysis] more objective."⁵⁴

The need to meld metrics provided by subordinate organizations is a requirement that must be considered when designing those metrics. Aggregation to allow higher commanders to draw inferences will take place whether appropriate or not. An outstanding challenge is to determine how to find the appropriate balance between homogenization and the recognition of uniqueness when aggregating lower-echelon inputs. No one formula will work for every headquarters or theater, but more study of how to design metrics and improved training for

⁵⁴ Vleugels (2007).

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60 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

those defining, consolidating, and interpreting these measures will constitute a major—and necessary—step forward.

Metrics: An Additional Observation

Whoever Said Statistics Do Not Lie Does Not Understand Statistics

A quantifiable measure is not the same as assessing. . . . How do you measure originality?
—COL Casey Haskins, *U.S. Army*⁵⁵

[BG William] Westmoreland's optimism stemmed from several misleading indicators. At the time of his [late 1967] speech, large-scale PAVN [People's Army of Vietnam] and PLAF [People's Liberation Armed Forces] attacks had declined rather sharply for the preceding two months. Although a similar decline had been recorded for the final quarter in each year since 1965, Westmoreland placed this news in its most favorable light.

—Michael A. Hennessy, *Strategy in Vietnam*⁵⁶

The reference point for a given statistic can significantly influence the interpretation of that statistic. The interpreter of data must be very careful to capture the actual trends for decision-makers rather than opportunistically presenting a biased analysis supporting a preconceived hypothesis or unconsciously (or consciously) briefing material in ways likely to be misleading. MAJ Michael F. Trevett's experiences had exposed him to operations in multiple theaters. He was concerned in finding that "every BUA [battle update analysis] has daily attack statistics. They are a waste of time. Weekly statistics are a waste of time. One IED can jack up daily statistics. You have to look at monthly statistics."⁵⁷

In addition to interpretation problems due to the period over which data is considered, metrics also suffer if users do not consider the multiple possible explanations for given statistics, trends, or apparent relationships. Some may interpret falling casualty statistics as a sign of progress in bringing security to a neighborhood, while others might view them as reflecting fewer patrols venturing out because of increased attacks on friendly forces.⁵⁸

Several actions can promote correct use of statistics. One should first strive to ensure collection and analysis methods are rigorous and can withstand external scrutiny. The previously mentioned common definition and understanding of metrics and the statistics supporting them is likewise essential. Together, these are two steps toward promoting the unbiased use of

⁵⁵ Haskins (2006).

⁵⁶ Hennessy (1997, p. 130).

⁵⁷ Trevett (2007).

⁵⁸ Margolis (2007).

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 61

statistics to interpret metrics and accurately gauge the progress that is being made in achieving objectives.

It is also important to realize that how a question is asked can dictate the response. Those gathering information from a population must ensure their questions do not prejudice answers. Asking, “How much better are living conditions in your neighborhood now than when 1st Brigade was here?” is flawed from at least two perspectives. First, the questioner is inherently assuming that conditions have improved (“How much better . . . ?”). This may well be interpreted as not allowing a response that suggests otherwise. Second, many of those asked may be new to the community or otherwise not know when the 1st Brigade was responsible for the area. Question design must include consideration of the respondent’s perspective. Depending on the society involved, this can require considerable imagination. Anthropologist Marcus Griffin noted that it is critical to use (1) chronological reference points that respondents can readily grasp and (2) a measuring system that they can understand, one that will be consistent across all who take the survey or are being interviewed.

You have to know what counting system they use. . . . Knowing what the common usage is would be essential. Comparatively it has to be the same from one person to the next. For example, [use a time period as follows:] “How much confidence do you have in the government now compared to [what you had during] the last full moon?”⁵⁹

Griffin also identified the need to use a scoring scale that is readily understood. Telling a respondent, “Rank your confidence on a scale of one to five where five means very confident,” or asking him or her to use percentages might not be understood. It is crucial to figure out a way to introduce an comprehensible system that is uniformly understood across the sample of individuals. Griffin provided this alternative:

“If one rock means the government doesn’t provide you much help, three means they provide you support that is pretty good, and five rocks [means] they provide all the support you think they should, what level of support did they provide at the point of the last full moon? How about the level of support now?” This is similar to the way doctors ask people to gauge their level of pain, from 0 (doesn’t bother me at all) to 10 (unbearable).⁶⁰

Major Trevett’s observation regarding the time periods a metric should cover touches on a critical point. What span is appropriate will vary by what is being measured, the tempo of operations, the rate of environmental change (e.g., the speed with which an enemy or other entity is capable of responding to a friendly-force activity), and myriad other factors that will depend on mission-specific variables. A related issue is frequency of collecting data. Understanding the costs in doing so means that a balance between overly frequent collection (which can itself skew responses and the quality of data collected in some cases) and lag times so great

⁵⁹ Griffin (2007).

⁶⁰ Griffin (2007).

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62 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

that key changes go unnoticed. Deciding that a given datum need only be monitored over a 30-day period does not dictate that the information be collected only once a month. On the contrary, collection might be considerably more frequent, the data then being averaged, plotted, or otherwise used to reflect month-to-month, season-to-season, or other relevant trends. While determining what is most useful to a given situation will depend on operational needs, determining how to obtain such products can be assessed via referencing statistics texts or field experts.

Metric Recommendations: Steps Toward Better Understanding

This is a failure of how we train our general officers. When we go through BCTP, it's all quantitative. I shouldn't have to train [some high-level officer on how to use qualitative information].

—*Anonymous*⁶¹

People directing a counterinsurgency are often in need of indicators of progress—or danger signs—to guide their actions. I believe that the insurgencies in North Vietnam, Malaya, and South Vietnam have produced four such reliable indicators of progress against the Mao Tse-tung plan.

The first is the degree to which the local government is able to do an honest job and enforce the rule of law. . . .

Second is the size [of units] in which guerrilla units live and operate. . . .

Third is the flow of information from the people. . . .

The fourth [is] the rate of surrender of *genuine* guerrillas.

—*Brigadier Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long Long War*⁶²

It should be very clear at this point that metrics are rapidly becoming one of the focal points of COIN operations. The selection of specific metrics influences not only the actions and operations of those conducting operations, but also the standards by which their progress will be evaluated by commanders, political leaders, national and international media representatives, and subsequently the populations of the United States and world. This reinforces the urgency with which leaders must be trained to understand theory and practice regarding metrics.

In closing, we offer a few observations and recommendations that will hopefully help maintain the momentum toward better understanding of metric development and the creation

⁶¹ Anonymous source 11.

⁶² Clutterbuck (1966, p. 177).

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 63

of supporting processes. As with those for intel, these are not meant to be comprehensive. Rather, they are those derived from interviewee and writers' concerns about what continues to provide the paramount challenges in the field and those sources' thoughts on how to address these issues.

Provide Objectives from the Top and Input Measures from the Bottom with Effect-Based Metrics as the Common Link

Clear and concise operational and strategic objectives are invaluable in providing guidance to subordinate echelons. These objectives must be nested at each level so that all organizations understand their missions and commanders' intents from several layers of hierarchy above them. (The conventional-war wisdom of referring to the commander's intent two levels up during planning will often no longer be sufficient. Counterinsurgency and the strategic corporals⁶³ who conduct its operations require an understanding of national and coalition objectives even at the lowest tactical levels.) The critical link that bridges the gap between objectives coming from higher and metric measurements coming from lower is effects. Using effects in this way is like translating between different languages that are being used by the different levels of command. Effects are the common links that enable the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command to interface.

Units on the ground must be trusted to translate physical events and activities they see into effect-based metrics that are the vehicles for transferring information to higher levels. Higher levels of command must be able to take these effect-based metrics and aggregate them into groupings that allow them to measure progress in reaching designated objectives. These outcomes can then be used to inform political leaders and the public, thereby substantiating requests for the resources necessary to sustain operations or leave the fight. There are still significant growing pains, confusion, and misunderstanding about the development of effect-based metrics. Junior and senior leaders alike will struggle with developing and employing the complex effect-based metrics that are necessary to form the critical link to higher-level unit objectives until the training and inculcation of these skills are institutionalized.

Combine Qualitative and Quantitative Metrics to Form Compound Metrics When Necessary

A complete review of existing and proposed metrics must be undertaken when a unit enters a new COIN environment. The purpose of the review is twofold. Leaders must first ensure that the link between higher headquarters' objectives and subordinates' metrics maintains an effect focus. Second, they must review any existing measures to ensure that they are applicable to the new environment and its unique conditions. These dual demands will likely make it necessary to combine quantitative and qualitative measures to achieve the effect-based compound metrics desired. As an example, measuring the number of hours that a sewer-pump station in Sadr City operates on a daily basis is a quantitative MOE. Gauging pump station-operator

⁶³ *Strategic corporal* refers to the push of leadership in complex environments down the chain of command, ending with the corporal, the lowest-ranking noncommissioned officer (NCO). Gen. Charles Krulak (1999) popularized the term.

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64 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

diligence in maintaining and operating the station's equipment is a qualitative MOE. Individually, these items tell us very little about current or future effects in Sadr City. Combined, they provide a potentially informative measure regarding improvement in the quality of life and the level of confidence one should place in the provision of government services.

Routine Reassessment and Refinement of Metrics Are Absolutely Essential

Earlier, we discussed how metrics must be developed and adapted to take into account the specific locations, people, and periods in which a unit is conducting operations. All of these factors change over time based on myriad events, including economic, ethnic, tribal, and religious activities, among others. In addition, units conducting patrols and collecting metric data often develop routines that, in some ways, facilitate the collection of data but, in others, reduce the likelihood that they will collect additional and potentially revealing information. Avoiding such metric complacency is another reason to consistently review and, as necessary, revise both the character of the measures being taken and the means used to collect relevant data. Several unit commanders discussed the importance of conducting azimuth checks on their metrics.⁶⁴

Whether they are conducted weekly, biweekly, monthly, or otherwise, the time must be built into the battle rhythm to conduct a holistic review of existing and proposed metrics. These reviews serve several purposes. First, they provide an opportunity for staffs and commanders to assess how well the existing metrics are measuring progress against objectives from higher. Any shortfalls can be addressed, and metrics can be added, modified, or deleted to better address the needs of the higher organization. This streamlines the collection process and ensures that all efforts by collectors are necessary—minimizing exposure and risk to soldiers by collecting only that which adds value to the process. Second, reassessment provides the forum to similarly reassess baseline standards, a fundamental but too-often overlooked component of metric employment. A metric without a baseline is virtually meaningless. Finding that the murder rate in an AO is 1/5,000 members of the population tells commanders little unless previous (e.g., pre-fall of Saddam Hussein) rates are available. Yet knowledge of previous conditions is only part of establishing a baseline. That a community receives 12 hours of electricity a day is of limited utility in constructing a compound metric even if the previous average was four hours daily, when political announcements established expectations of constant power. Each metric requires establishment of a related baseline. As Colonel Gentile's example regarding the number of dead found in his AO suggests, these baselines also require revalidation or modification as conditions dictate.

Use a Red-Team Approach to Evaluate Existing Metrics

The development of metrics can generate champions who argue for the adaptation or retention of "their" measure, losing their objective perspective. This propensity is an acknowledged

⁶⁴ Several commanders mentioned reviews or azimuth checks during their interviews as a routine part of their assessment of progress in meeting objectives and their subsequent metric-refinement process, including LTC Michael Johnson and LTC Jeffrey Peterson.

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Metrics: The Way We Measure Success in Counterinsurgency Operations 65

aspect of orders and plan development; it is one of the reasons that military decisionmaking processes assign the S-2 the responsibility of assuming the enemy perspective during planning processes. There is the responsibility to look for weaknesses in the draft plan that an adversary could exploit. A similar war-gaming methodology should be extended to metric development. Devil's advocates would seek how proposed or existing metrics might not be measuring what is intended, how the metric might be misleading or misunderstood, how collection of supporting data might be unnecessarily risky, or how results could be deliberately misconstrued and used as a PSYOP weapon. The growing importance of metrics now demands that the metric-development process be elevated from that of a few people in a room to a formal process similar to the mission planning accomplished through the military decisionmaking process (of which, in reality, it should be a part).

Present Metrics Using Simple, Easy-to-Understand Tools That Help Commanders Make Decisions

Metrics must be simple enough to provide valuable input to the decisionmaking process and robust enough to maintain the integrity of the measure (requirements that should be part of the red-team analysis described in the preceding section). The value of stoplight charts as one means of synthesizing quantitative and qualitative compound metrics has been mentioned. Such presentation methods—simple, yet informative—should be the mark on the wall as staffs strive to ensure that commanders can use their results for the intended purpose of making well-informed decisions.

Incorporate Effect-Based Metric Training in All Staff and Commanders' Professional Military-Education Courses

Staffs and commanders are currently developing metrics the best they can based on the transfer of information during right-seat rides⁶⁵ and their experience from previous tours conducting COIN operations. Professional education needs to continue to evolve to teach all levels of commanders and staffs the fundamentals of developing effect-based metrics. These effect-based metric courses should provide current information on real locations and real situations to student staffs to allow them to develop metrics that they think would best measure progress at achieving the higher commanders' echeloned objectives. There is no better training than using real-world data to develop a product that a deploying commander could review to enhance his or her metric plan. These courses should also develop a student's understanding of the difference between causality and correlation to the extent that it will enable the students to determine the relative importance of specific inputs and the likelihood that they are affecting the desired outcome, and therefore the importance that should be placed on sustaining these actions in the face of the enemy's adaptations. Additionally, students must be trained to understand the importance of the local environment and customs in developing effect-based metrics. Metrics that are appropriate for one location may not be appropriate for any other—or

⁶⁵ Periods in which the outgoing and incoming leaders drive through the AO to familiarize the incoming leader with it.

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66 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

even the same—location in the future. Education received at a school on metrics provides the fundamental tools for a staff or commander to develop an effect-based metrics plan; however, the plan is just a shell until it is adapted to take into account the cultural and environmental factors of that area.

Metric Recommendations

The following primary recommendations follow from the preceding discussion:

- Provide objectives from the top and input measures from the bottom with effect-based metrics as the common link.
- Combine qualitative and quantitative metrics to form compound metrics when necessary.
- Routinely reassess and refine metrics.
- Use a red-team approach to evaluate existing metrics.
- Present metrics using simple, easy-to-understand tools that help commanders make decisions.
- Incorporate effect-based metric training in all staff and commanders' professional military-education courses.

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CHAPTER FOUR

General COIN Observations

If you're not taking the long-term view of this, don't do it.

—Brigadier A. D. Mackay, *British Army*¹

Which way will they jump? It's not which side has the moral high ground. It's not to the side they feel loyal to. It is the side they think they will prevail in the long run. . . . However good a job you're doing, if they don't see you or your proxy prevailing in the long run, they will go to the other side.²

—Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, *British Army*

[The commander] had a great tactical mind. He was great with the details, but he was so caught up in the details that he couldn't see the forest for the details. . . . He might have been a great Cold War commander, but maybe he wasn't for a counterinsurgency.

—Anonymous

This chapter provides analysis of several important factors identified in literature reviews or interviews that are pertinent to urban COIN (and COIN in general) operations but that do not appropriately fit in the preceding discussions of intel or metric issues.

A Campaign Without an Interagency Plan Is Like Football with No Playbook

Not only is there but one way of *doing* things rightly, but there is only one way of *seeing* them, and that is seeing the whole of them.

—John Ruskin³

¹ Mackay (2007).

² Kiszely (2007).

³ With thanks to the authors of *Tactics for Stabilizing Operations* (2005), from which the quote comes.

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68 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

The need for overarching guidance makes itself repeatedly apparent in the preceding pages. Without a plan, the many dedicated and capable participants in a COIN undertaking strive suboptimally. Some operate in virtual isolation, the product of geographic separation or frustration. Others coordinate with one or more others to establish mutually beneficial relationships. The total may be slightly greater than the sum of its parts, but whether it will lend itself to success is dubious. Like a football team whose players strive mightily in ones, pairs, or the occasional threesome, there may be the occasional score. Betting on victory is not advised.

The interagency character of a COIN campaign means that any such plan cannot be military alone—or, perhaps, even militarily dominant in some phases. There is no need to justify these statements. They are apparent to all familiar with counterinsurgency. The requirement has been emphasized in predecessors to this work. This section therefore assumes the need and addresses selected specifics that such a plan should entail.

Throwing Money from the Rooftop: The Need to Orchestrate Aid

Aid, short term or longer in aim, is a part of most COIN efforts. The value of being able to immediately affect a local population has been repeatedly touted in Afghanistan and Iraq. The work by the military, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. and coalition organizations, NGOs, and IGOs has deservedly received widespread praise. There is nonetheless much room for improvement. Some glitches are well known: projects resulting in schools where there are not enough children to merit the construction, hospitals refurbished without due thought given to whence doctors and other medical staff will come, or water-treatment plants constructed without ensuring adequate raw-water pumping-station capacity at a river's edge are but three. Such specifics are representative of a grander need to coordinate the literally millions upon millions of dollars worth of expenditures.

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds provide money at lower tactical echelons that permit a unit to have an immediate impact in addressing community needs. They have generally been used well in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but their distribution has sometimes been less effective than desired. In some instances, an immediate win later brought notable drawbacks, as when generators purchased to assist those without power in turn created a diesel-fuel shortage. In other cases, the resulting product—a well or refurbished community center—can prove a temporary respite, since no one in the receiving community has knowledge of how to maintain the end result or parts needed for repair are unavailable. Training in funding disbursement should emphasize the need to consider indigenous capabilities to maintain a project after completion—e.g., will other funds be necessary to retain functionality? Does the local population include anyone with the requisite skills to run and maintain the project? Is the education level in the community such that anyone is trainable in this regard? If so, is money forthcoming to train locals in upkeep and repair? The project likely should not be undertaken if the answers to such questions are unfavorable.

Similarly, it is desirable that the ultimate transition of a project from initiation to role in the community be identified before originating. While it is not always possible to make a firm determination, thought should be given to what part of the indigenous government will

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General Counterinsurgency Observations 69

assume control of the facility, organization, or wages incurred. A project that hires neighborhood youth only to end as soon as governing is handed back to local authorities because they cannot continue to fund it undermines the very government the coalition is attempting to legitimize. A more macro perspective would provide for continuity in funding, a transition from CERP support to one in which local leaders have money to perpetuate the scheme without interruption.

This longer-term view can obviously have strategic as well as tactical implications. For example, Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad have sometimes been denied services. On occasion, the cause is legitimate: Security was such that those serving the community were wise to avoid it. In other instances, the situation is otherwise. Shi'a-dominated governments have chosen to support those of similar belief while denying services to Sunnis. Application of CERP or other coalition funding in these instances is, at best, a short-term solution. Taking the longer perspective might include pressuring local and national politicians to meet their responsibilities were an overarching interagency campaign plan with related management structures in place—e.g., terminating projects or funding in the responsible local or national government until support to the deprived communities is restored.

The coordination necessary to apply such pressure when it serves coalition objectives is not as straightforward as it might seem. Organizations within the coalition sometimes have differing objectives. The example of a TF commander in a Baghdad neighborhood provides an example of the challenges involved. Confronted with a neighborhood that was intimidating members of a particular demographic group, he convinced his next-higher commander to cut off money to the perpetrators as part of efforts to coerce them to stop the unwanted behavior. However, the TF commander did not have the ability to influence nonmilitary funds. USAID provided \$8.2 million to the very group he sought to coerce and, from the viewpoint of the commander in question, “screwed up the whole plan” at least in part because “USAID doesn’t want to be seen working with the military.”⁴ Such a lack of cooperation can conceivably have direct and lethal implications for coalition forces. Asked what he did in this situation, the commander stated that he monitored

to see where the money [went]. If the money [is supposed to go] to businesses hiring young people, then you watch. . . . We didn’t see guys hiring [and there weren’t people working where they should have been if the money was actually being spent as reported]. When someone can get an individual to emplace an [IED] for \$5,000, you know where it’s going.⁵

Given centralized planning and the existence of a corresponding manager, USAID, International Relief and Development (IRD), and other agency funds would also have been cut off were the judgments of the TF commander deemed appropriate.⁶

⁴ Anonymous source 14.

⁵ Anonymous source 14.

⁶ Anonymous source 15.

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70 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

The Coalition Provisional Authority's creation of neighborhood advisory councils (NACs) reflects a further breakdown in synchronizing available capabilities. Apparently instituted to encourage democratic processes (members are elected) and provide a node for coalition coordination, they were, at times, very effective. In other cases, they became just another group with which local commanders had to negotiate; tribal or other local leaders retained the real authority. A broader conceptualization—or one more uniformly instituted—might better have empowered NAC leaders and enhanced the effectiveness of both NACs and the similar district advisory councils (DACs), granting them true and consistent influence across Iraq's urban areas. They could have been the centerpieces for local capacity building. As an insightful observer in Baghdad noted, "the NAC has no oversight or budgetary authority. . . . Sometimes it seems we are the only people dealing with the *beladiya* [community government]. I have a MiTT [military transition team] with the battalion. There is a [MiTT] with the brigade. There is no equivalent on the civilian side."⁷

Aid as Part of a Larger Whole: Taking an Overarching Perspective

I would say force is necessary, but I would certainly say it is not sufficient.

—Col. Jay Bruder, USMC⁸

Marines need to learn when to fight with weapons and when to fight with information, humanitarian aid, economic advice, and a boost towards good governance for the local people.

—USMC, Countering Irregular Threats⁹

Aid is, of course, only one part of this need for comprehensive guidance and management. Projects must be coordinated as a component of the totality that is the coalition effort. It is a concept with which U.S. military personnel are already intimately familiar. Recent views of what constitutes *maneuver* have expanded well beyond the traditional (and still formal doctrinal definition) that views it only in terms of "employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage [with] respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission."¹⁰ Savvier operators now realize that the full range of kinetic and nonkinetic military, other-agency, and commercial capabilities available can similarly be employed to influence situations in ways favorable to desired objectives. CIMIC should therefore be effectively integrated with security, government capacity building, and other aspects of an operation or campaign. Campaign plans should assist in establishing appropriate coordination mechanisms to minimize the chances of lethal fratricide and

⁷ Brooks (2007).

⁸ Bruder (2007).

⁹ USMC (2006, p. 5).

¹⁰ USJCS (2001 [2007], p. 331).

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General Counterinsurgency Observations 71

otherwise ensure that one organization's actions do not undermine those of another. Leaders of all coalition organizations would be provided direction on what actions to take in the face of rampant corruption and other social norms that not only interfere with but can outright prevent coalition success. Captain Ralph Coenen of the Royal Netherlands Army demonstrated considerable insight with his observation that

we dealt with training the police and then sent them out to the community. If they weren't paid, then they were extorting money at roadblocks. As the police are seen as coming out of our gates, eventually the extortion is going to reflect on us. The average Afghan citizen is not able to discern that it is Kabul that is at fault. . . . The Taliban is capitalizing on this very fact because it is a regression to the [way] it was back before 1994. Police extortion is one way the Taliban is winning over the population.¹¹

Given that a viable police force and army are notionally prerequisites to coalition departure, dealing with the corruption that denies them pay is essential, another of the many components that must work together if the coalition is to persevere.

Two final observations remain about the need for orchestration at the operational and strategic as well as tactical perspectives. Understanding the implications of such a massive undertaking requires an understanding of how the many parts fit together in what is the complete whole. This understanding, in turn, depends on analyzing ongoing activities. Lessons-learned processes will be vital; solutions found in one location should be quickly made known to those elsewhere so that the whole and its parts are always improving. Currently, the U.S. military has an excellent lessons-learned capability, as has already been mentioned. But it is primarily that: a military capability. An interagency campaign plan will need an interagency lessons-learned capacity. Though this may not be its responsibility formally, vital lessons will be lost—are already being lost—if the DoD lessons-learned organizations and their international counterparts do not step forward and assume the extra burdens implied: incorporating interagency lessons learned into current efforts.

Finally, campaign plans and the management oversight that would accompany them imply continuity. A plan should remain in effect once it is approved. Changes should be made only as needed to refine it as conditions require. Ego initiatives driven by new commanders wanting to put their stamp on the mission should be prohibited; senior commanders with oversight of incoming units should require that any substantial alternations receive their approval prior to implementation, given that procedures in place are producing positive results.

¹¹ Coenen (2007).

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72 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN Shaping Operations Are a Matter of Holding Ground with Some Segments of the Population While Altering Attitudes in Others

If you are able to win over the real loyalty of a small percentage of the population and create ambivalence in the large segment of population, then you are going to win.

—Maj Justin Featherstone, *British Army*¹²

British Army Lt Col Jim Suggit provided the author an interesting and potentially valuable expansion of a concept very similar to that previously introduced in the RAND publication *Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Areas*.¹³ The RAND work offered the continuum of relative interests, with which some readers might be familiar, as a means of considering populations in a conflict environment (see Figure 4.1).

Colonel Suggit's model relies on different stratification, but the more interesting aspect is his use of pins, levers, and springs as means of portraying shaping operations. The series of images in Figure 4.2 uses imaginary individuals in the habitually noncompliant sector and those to its right as an exemplary case. The model consists of

1. pins, to keep groups or individuals in place while influencing or moving one or more others
2. levers, to increase separation between selected groups as desired
3. springs to oust or eliminate those chosen for purging.¹⁴

The overarching objective is to move members of the population from right to left (toward increasing compliance) while neutralizing those unwilling to make such a change. Operations in the example provided, start with fixing (pinning) individuals in the rarely compliant group and those to their left in place (i.e., maintaining their levels of compliance and forestalling deterioration in attitude).¹⁵ A lever then increases the separation between the rarely compliant and habitually noncompliant groups to facilitate efforts to reduce the influence of the habitually noncompliant on individuals to their left. Efforts to improve compliance in the rarely compliant group are then undertaken, success being shown by the spread of color from those who are sometimes compliant. Further operations seek to purge the fanatical hostile group.

While the physical representation of the model is helpful, the real value is in the functions represented by the pins, levers, and springs. Realizing that all actions and messages influence multiple audiences, the conscious effort of fixing or pinning attitudes in place (e.g., via PSYOP messages, providing civil-affairs aid) is crucial, as is recognition that separating some groups from others improves chances of success (e.g., by demonizing the habitually

¹² Featherstone (2006).

¹³ Medby and Glenn (2002).

¹⁴ Suggit (2007a).

¹⁵ Suggit (2007c).

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Figure 4.1
Continuum of Relative Interests

Adversary-Obstacle-Neutral-Accomplice-Ally

Adversary: A population element with the capability, interest, and intent to exploit a friendly vulnerability.

Obstacle: A population element with an active capability to exploit a friendly vulnerability. Current interests may or may not be compatible with friendly-force goals, but there is no intention to interfere with friendly-force activities.

Neutral: A population element whose interests do not conflict with either the friendly or adversarial force. Capability to affect the friendly-force mission may exist, but it is currently inert.

Accomplice: A population element with the capability to capitalize on a friendly or adversary vulnerability and whose intentions are compatible with friendly-force objectives.

Ally: A population element whose interest and intent is to assist in accomplishing friendly-force objectives.

SOURCE: Medby and Glenn (2002).

RAND TR605-4.1

noncompliant group while demonstrating the benefits of increased compliance). The model also reflects understanding of an obvious but often-overlooked condition: Some individuals are simply incorrigible and must be eliminated. Resources expended to persuade them to become more compliant are wasted in all but the most exceptional of cases.

Placing Coalition Installations Amid the Population Requires Careful Planning and Foresight

People look at you as if you are the sheriff, especially when their own authorities aren't doing their jobs.


—*Staff Sergeant Alex Quandt, Royal Netherlands Army*¹⁶

You do need to focus on the impact of your actions on the population—the action of every single soldier, every time he or she goes out on patrol. There is a direct link between this and the intelligence on which your success depends. The person you influence favorably today may be the person who tells you not to go down that particular road tomorrow, and could

¹⁶ Quandt (2007).

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Figure 4.2
The Pins, Levers, and Springs Model



SOURCE: Adapted from Suggit (2007b).

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General Counterinsurgency Observations 75

become a valuable source of information for you the day after. The opposite is also true: the person you behave badly to (or thinks you've behaved badly to them) today could be telling your enemy not to go down a particular road tomorrow, and could become a valuable source of information for the insurgency the day after.

—Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, *British Army*¹⁷

You cannot commute to work during a counterinsurgency fight.

—LTC Steven Miska, *U.S. Army*¹⁸

The movement of soldiers and marines from large FOBs into smaller installations positioned in or adjacent to Afghan and Iraqi communities has paid off in terms of greater security for population members nearby and in the information provided to those staffing these outposts. Choosing their location requires a good understanding of current faction lines and other factors, to be sure, but a grasp of second- and higher-order effects of a friendly-force presence and some savvy in estimating what future situations are likely to develop are also necessary.

In short, locating a JSS, platoon house, outpost, or installation by any other name is both an operation in itself and—as can be drawn from Lt Gen Kiszely's comments—part of a larger conceptualization of how to achieve the desired end state. The situation will dictate which of the following are applicable as well as what other factors might be that are not listed here. These are offered as a sampling of issues that could influence the location of an installation and the size of the units staffing it. It is crucial to remember that these are not so much locations in which to reside as places from which to maintain positive contact with the local population. These are among the questions to consider:

- Does the local population need protection? Iraqi neighborhoods that are solidly Shi'a or Sunni are often less likely to see violence than those contested. Often, the contested areas are on fault or fracture lines between more-homogeneous neighborhoods.
- Does the area offer a location of sufficient size to establish a base without unduly disrupting community traffic, commerce, or other daily activities?
- Does the location permit reasonable access by resupply or quick-reaction force convoys?
- If attacked, will the location likely result in civilian casualties? Royal Netherlands Army platoon houses in Afghanistan were located to avoid drawing Taliban fire that might affect nearby civilian communities. They were sometimes adjacent to built-up areas but not actually in the village or town. In the Balkans, the Dutch once deliberately positioned their headquarters so that the Serbs would fire on it and not the nearby town.¹⁹
- Is the location close enough to desired communities that patrols can readily access them?

¹⁷ Kiszely (2007).

¹⁸ Miska (2007a).

¹⁹ Gouweleeuw and Oerlemans (2007).

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76 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

- Is it acceptable from the perspective of tactical security? For example, does other terrain dominate it? Provide observation of activities within? Is it easily isolated or accessed by vehicle-borne explosive devices? Does it give a foe underground access? Does it offer suitable fields of fire and observation? Do nearby buildings unduly block outgoing direct or indirect fire?
- Is there a nearby location to allow medevac by air or ground?
- Does the location share community problems (e.g., lack of electricity, lack of water)? While unpleasant, such sharing can give those living within the outpost increased legitimacy in the eyes of locals, whereas establishing a notably higher standard of living can have the opposite effect.
- Does the location serve larger objectives? Will it support a future police station or indigenous military outpost? Is it well positioned as part of an oil-spot expansion plan? Is it one of several mutually supporting JSSs?
- Does the installation promote coalition authority while undermining that of adversary groups?
- Is the site adequate from a communication perspective?
- Can quick-reaction forces within the outpost readily move along multiple routes to points within nearby neighborhoods? To reinforce other outposts?
- Are there aspects of the site that might inadvertently rouse ill will or be used by the foe in its PSYOP against the coalition? For example, is the site on sacred ground? Too near a religious or other sensitive site? Does the location have a history that might make local citizens hesitate to enter it or otherwise form views not supportive of coalition ends (e.g., did it previously house an unpopular regime's secret police)? (Taking control of such sites might have positive or negative consequences, depending on the specifics of the situation.)

Counterinsurgencies, No Less Than Conventional War, Can Have a Dehumanizing Effect on Friendly-Force Personnel

Perhaps I shouldn't say this—but from every tour I've come back from, I've come back hating the people I had to protect. . . . Somehow we allow ourselves to develop an antagonism towards them. And I think what's required is a regular reminding of all of us—especially the junior ranks—. . . why we're there, what we're trying to achieve, and the good things about the culture and history of the people that we're there to help and protect. Because sometimes in that environment, you can't help it, but your attitude will get worse and worse.

—*Anonymous*²⁰

²⁰ Anonymous source 35.

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General Counterinsurgency Observations 77

Everybody comes to Iraq looking for enemies, and you'll have no problem finding them. What you need to do is find some friends, and you should expend some effort finding them.

—*Attributed to LTC Paul Yingling*²¹

Armed conflict can dehumanize participants. The annals of warfare are rife with tales of ber-serking, soldiers absentmindedly eating rations amidst enemy corpses, and examples that demonstrate a feeling that the “they” are somehow less worthy than the “us.” This is not the appropriate place to investigate such matters in detail, but they are worthy of some consideration, since how the counterinsurgent treats members of the population affects the extent to which he or she ultimately succeeds. The first of the two preceding quotes demonstrates that there is a call for actively assisting soldiers of all ranks to avoid developing an antipathy toward an indigenous population. Taken a step further, demonstrating proper treatment of captured or surrendering enemy has likewise been shown repeatedly to have a positive effect on ending insurgencies.

Any solutions will have several facets. Observers in Afghanistan and Iraq note that unit type and mission can dramatically influence attitudes toward a local people. They find those assigned to PRTs or MiTTs tend to be less negative toward indigenous forces and personnel than personnel assigned to line combat units. Dutch leaders were concerned when some of their combat-unit soldiers demonstrated intolerance for Afghans in their AO. Recognizing the importance of maintaining positive relations with those able to provide critical intel, they introduced predeployment training that instills in their men and women the vital lesson of taking more than merely their own perspective. (The Royal Netherlands Army is now also considering in-theater reinforcement training in this regard.)

Our cultural awareness training is based on the premise that they need to understand the Afghan. They are taught to always consider how the Afghan considers them. . . . “Afghans stink.” . . . So we ask them, “What if you had no washing machine? What if you lived on a dirt floor? Afghan houses are as clean inside as they [be].”²²

While all can benefit from such education, the officer responsible for developing the training was notably concerned with line infantry. He found, “They were obsessed with TICs [troops in contact], how many they’ve had. . . . [Attitude toward civilians] very much depends on the soldier.”²³ Another experienced observer agreed: “People from CIMIC and PRTs have a different perception than those from the battle group. I think the battle group has a more negative attitude.”²⁴ A third was more succinct: “People from the battle group . . . see [only] people

²¹ Miska (2007a).

²² Anonymous source 4.

²³ Anonymous source 4.

²⁴ Anonymous source 5.

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78 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

shooting at them.”²⁵ The we-they approach to conflict can also blind even those at the highest echelons. One unit found that a high-ranking commander scorned subordinate efforts to negotiate with some in the enemy’s ranks. The subordinate unit’s leaders, apparently with a better understanding of Sun Tzu’s insights that “to capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them,” realized that the enemy was not a mass of uniformed automatons.²⁶ They sought to separate the less committed from the fanatical via means that reduced the risk of friendly-force casualties while increasing the likelihood of obtaining valuable intel. (The similarity to Colonel Suggit’s compliance model is obvious.) Counterinsurgency is many things. Simple and straightforward are not among them.

Viewing military operations that treated virtually all civilians alike, an insightful official noted that many members of a population are often related to one or more insurgents. Nevertheless, there is considerable difference between those actively supporting the foe’s cause and others who simply do not report on them. The official was concerned as he recalled the approach of some units:

You can’t treat everybody as if they are guilty. . . . I’ve never seen a group who are so much creatures of their nature. . . . When they are threatened, they want to smack back . . . and yet when the person on the other side acts [similarly,] there is no understanding that their reaction is exactly the same.²⁷

Restraint with respect to the enemy is likewise well advised. Unlike in conventional war, during which dehumanization of the enemy has often been desirable, counterinsurgency demands not only an understanding of the noncombatant, but also realization that compassion offered an insurgent can, at times, provide significant payoffs. Leaders in Malaya, Vietnam, and elsewhere have found that offering a captured enemy or recently surrendered soldier a hearty meal, an absence of physical abuse, and respect as a human being can bring dramatic benefits.

As Maj Justin Featherstone noted after his extensive work with the urban population in southeastern Iraq, “Humanity is what it’s about, a genuine desire to do good by the good people, which can sit side-by-side with killing the people [whom you’re there to kill].”²⁸

²⁵ Anonymous source 6.

²⁶ Sunzi (1982, p. 77).

²⁷ Anonymous source 31.

²⁸ Featherstone (2006).

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General Counterinsurgency Observations 79

Habitual Relationships Are as Important in Counterinsurgencies as in War

When you have a battalion working with a brigade [it's] never worked with before, and a brigade working with a division [it's] never worked with before . . . you're trying to figure out your counterpart while you're trying to figure out your mission on the ground. . . . And ratings figure in. . . . If you're the odd man out, the man who hasn't worked with the commander before, that's got to worry you a little bit.

—Gary Longhany, *Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence, Taji, Iraq*²⁹

Brigades with long-standing, habitual task-organization relationships are frequently broken apart when deployed to Iraq. The authors of this report found that, on more than one occasion, multiple TFs were taken from the brigades with which they trained only to be replaced by unfamiliar units of like size and capability. The primary reason for the disruption seems to have been deployment schedules rather than unit capabilities, reflecting that the decisions were made at the strategic and operational levels rather than being driven by tactical considerations.

Good commanders recognize that today's operational environment strains unit readiness in ways that preparing for conventional warfare never did. COL J. B. Burton, knowing that his 2nd BCT would soon deploy to Iraq, recognized that the men and women in his command had to be ready for what the streets of Baghdad had to offer, but

at the same time, your tankers have to operate a tank. Your gunners need to fire their guns. We went to [the U.S. Army garrison at] Grafenwöhr early. . . . I was not going to put people in a range tower. I [had] people moving around the range environment with their weapons uploaded in a red status so that they [were] aware of their environment. We clothed the targets in typical Arab garb. [We] equipped some with weapons, some with hidden weapons. We put them in buildings so that they would pop up in windows. Tank table VIII became something other than firing at plywood. They fired at snipers on rooftops. So for instance, we ran the entire Graf set as a battlefield. . . . Meanwhile, [my supply unit was] running supplies [as they would during operations in Iraq]. There were no ammo pads. . . . It's the exercise of the totality of the environment in Iraq.³⁰

The rotation at the Grafenwöhr training area was not the brigade's only opportunity to simultaneously prepare for counterinsurgency and conventional warfare while strengthening the whole as a team. The brigade intel officer, MAJ Guy Wetzel, recalled,

We realized that HUMINT was going to be a huge thing. . . . We gave up our THTs to our battalions early on so they could go through all the training we did while preparing for deployment. The downside was that we had three battalions assigned elsewhere and got three battalions that hadn't organized in that way.³¹

²⁹ Longhany (2007).

³⁰ Burton (2007).

³¹ Wetzel (2007).

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80 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Major Wetzel went on to note that corps fortunately provided them with the personnel assets to make up for losing the THTs that accompanied the TFs assigned elsewhere once they arrived in Iraq.

Breaking habitual relationships affects operations in garrison as well. Commanders establish rear detachments to assist families with pay, emergency leave, and many other problems that inevitably arise in a community of several thousand soldiers and their families. It is the casualty notification officer, usually from the same installation as the deceased, who assumes the unenviable task of informing spouses and their families when a unit suffers a death. The men and women of the unit's rear detachment and family-readiness group then circle the wagons to support their own by conducting memorial services and otherwise assisting grieving families and injured soldiers. Units may be scattered across Iraq; the families remain side by side at installations or in communities in Germany, the United States, and elsewhere. Spouses assume much of the burden of supporting and comforting next of kin. While good parent unit commanders establish procedures to ensure that contacts with their detached units remain intact, such tasks are complicated, and time is lost when habitual relationships are broken.

Even though the army prides itself on the ability to interchange units with minimal incompatibility, doing so sacrifices understanding of standing operating procedures (SOPs), command personalities, and the strengths and weaknesses of other personnel and units. Minimizing the disruption of habitual relationships should once again become a goal sought at all echelons.

COIN Recommendations

The following primary recommendations follow from the preceding discussion:

- Develop truly interagency campaign plans, and put the organizational structures in place to manage the campaign in accordance with plan guidance.
- Strive to retain habitual relationships during COIN deployments just as is done during conventional conflicts.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion, Recommendations, and Implications for the Future

We're no good at operating in a city. . . . Think of yourself as a gardener trying to get ivy to grow on a wall. You can force it to grow in a certain way, or you can let it grow and prune it when it goes where you don't want it to. We want to control it. . . . You've got to be a little bit more comfortable with the ambiguity than we are.

—COL Casey Haskins, U.S. Army¹

From the perspective of the two opposing forces, the attitude is “This is a battlefield.” It's not. It's a home. It's only a battlefield in the minds of the two antagonists.

—Anonymous²

The foregoing discussion precipitated 13 synthesis recommendations. Consolidating the lists that appear at the end of Chapters Two through Four results in that below. The separate entries again appear at the end of Appendix A as part of a comprehensive, single source in which the recommendations from the first three books in this series also appear with brief descriptions of each. We similarly present the following 13 recommendations from this report, with brief descriptions in the summary at the front of this document:

- The civilian population is a key source of intel and may well be the friendly-force COG. Protect it against attack from both the enemy and your own forces.
- Consider giving selected companies a 24-hour intel-analysis capability while similarly investigating providing battalions a more robust intel section.
- Lengthen tours for individuals in critical intel billets, particularly those involving analysis or contact with informants. Combine longer rotations with policies that (1) bring families closer to deployed personnel, (2) allow for more frequent breaks of equitable duration, and (3) result in staffing levels and leader selection resulting in reasonable periods of daily and weekly rest.

¹ Haskins (2006).

² Anonymous source 1.

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82 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

- Improve database development through better sharing and insistence on compatible technologies and software. Transition intel communities from their need-to-know default to a need-to-share mentality.
- Develop source-identification and data-tagging procedures that permit collecting organizations to compare HUMINT sources while retaining the anonymity of those sources.
- Consider the appointment of intel supremos both in theaters and at the strategic level to oversee, facilitate, and monitor better sharing of intel and general improvement in field effectiveness.
- Introduce the creation, use, and employment of effect-based metrics into all echelons of leader and staff training. Training must include understanding the link between causality or correlation and outcomes, the importance of incorporating local conditions in metric development and assessment, and the use of qualitative and quantitative metrics to form compound metrics for aggregation and interpretation at higher levels of command.
- Conduct periodic, systematic reassessment and refinement of metrics. Review metric baselines to ensure that they remain relevant.
- Establish a doctrinal metric framework that promotes objective definition from the top and identification of input measures from the bottom, with effects as the common link.
- Use a red-team approach to assist metric development and evolution.
- Portray metrics by using simple, easy-to-understand tools that facilitate commander decisions.
- Develop truly interagency campaign plans, and put the organizational structures in place to manage the campaign in accordance with plan guidance.
- Strive to retain habitual relationships during COIN deployments just as is done during conventional conflicts.

A Look at the Current State of Affairs Regarding Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

There is much reason to be encouraged by coalition performances in Afghanistan and Iraq. Though a sample of one, the author was struck by the positive changes in Iraq during a recent visit. Walking the streets of Iraq's most troublesome urban areas had become a high-risk enterprise since last done in February 2004. In September 2007, our party not only was permitted to go out into Baghdad, but was encouraged to do so repeatedly both during the day and at night. There was much that reminded one of the authors of his visit to Iraq in early 2004. Children thronged and begged to have photographs taken. Adults were more reticent. But there were also striking differences. Having learned much regarding counterinsurgency and the critical role of the population in intervening years, those leading the patrols did far more than demonstrate the presence of coalition forces. They sought to make interactions with city residents, sometimes brief and superficial in 2004, longer and more substantive. Adults were still hesitant to join in conversation at times, but leaders demonstrated patience in drawing

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Conclusion, Recommendations, and Implications for the Future 83

them out and actively encouraged discussion of issues of local concern. Patrol members entered stores and inquired as to the pace of business. Previously troublesome militia members were in uniform as directed by U.S. officers, meaning that community members would immediately recognize (and could report) any untoward behaviors by those representing the group in question. Granted, these are the observations of but one person. Yet the changes in conditions on the ground were also reflected by a far better understanding of counterinsurgency's nuances during the many interviews conducted in support of this study.

This understanding is evident in evolutions in the approaches taken by coalition personnel. The outpost, platoon house, and JSS are now the norm rather than units being restricted to huge FOBs. Vehicles are for moving to neighborhoods, thereafter to assume a backup role to the primary mode of patrolling: soldiers on foot. Noncommissioned and commissioned officers are providing vital assistance to communities, playing the part of mayor, city manager, police chief, and community-association head to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the willingness of local leaders to assume those roles. Local leaders are increasingly willing to do so.

Yet there remains considerable frustration after looking over the pages of research in the three books preceding this one. It is not that the authors expect every recommendation to be heralded as a paving stone for the road ahead, but several have been subsequently recognized in multiple forums as having value in promoting coalition success. Unfortunately, the gap between recognition and substantive action too often remains a considerable one. Short-term perspectives and political ambitions sometimes make one question whether the United States' political system is capable of sustaining support for an extended, major counterinsurgency. The question is a disturbing one, given that most 20th-century insurgencies had durations that exceeded a decade. On a more positive note, ongoing operations in the southern Philippines suggest that sustaining support may be possible if the number of Americans committed to a deployment and media visibility are limited.³ It appears that limelight withers support for counterinsurgencies.

Akin to this issue of maintaining domestic and political support, that of addressing interagency inconsistencies is only somewhat within the bounds of the U.S. military's influence. The inherent inertia that characterizes virtually any large bureaucracy surely accounts for the limited progress thus far made in managing the many agencies working together in Afghanistan and Iraq (much less those representing other nations, NGOs, and IGOs). Real improvement in this regard is likely many years distant. Yet delay need not mean that leaders continue to tolerate counterproductive episodes, such as the failure to agree on whether aid should be cut off to a recalcitrant Baghdad neighborhood. The development of comprehensive, truly interagency campaign plans accompanied by clear lines of authority and responsibility are both overdue and essential.⁴

³ For more on U.S. operations in the southern Philippines, see Glenn (2008).

⁴ For more discussion of issues directly and indirectly related to interagency operations and approaches to addressing current shortfalls, see the earlier books in this series.

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84 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Among the issues more within the purview of armed forces' influence are those pertaining to the two focal areas that open this report: intel and metrics. Both formal changes to organization structures (such as introducing THTs) and adaptations on the ground (e.g., creating more-robust TF intel sections) demonstrate the importance assigned to the intel realm by those most directly influenced by it: the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen at the tactical level. It is also at these levels that leaders show great initiative in developing procedures and informal agreements with other government agencies that overcome hurdles to sharing intel. These efforts represent real ground-truth calls for change that merit attention at higher echelons. Of particular note is the breadth of the call for a company-level intel capability accompanied by a complementary buildup at battalion TF echelon. Planned expansions of intel staffing in coming years provide opportunities to address such recently recognized requirements, ones perhaps not envisioned when those numbers were originally approved, and thus suggesting reconsideration is in order.

Perhaps the recommendation made herein that will be most challenging is that suggesting a reorientation of intel-community thinking from a need-to-know mentality to one basing release of material on a need-to-share basis. Its impact—were it to be adopted—would, to a considerable extent, turn current procedures on their heads. Access to classified or sensitive information is, at present, denied to anyone without a demonstrated necessity to see it. Introducing a need-to-share standard would mean that access is granted to individuals and groups unless there is a demonstrable reason not to provide that access. This would not imply release of information or other materials to those seeking to harm the United States or its allies. However, it would hopefully redress absurd situations, such as that of Dutch F-16 pilots being denied access to BDA for their missions.

Metrics are at once a quagmire and an area of considerable promise. The negative aspect has nothing to do with the considerable potential benefits that metrics offer the armed services and other agencies. It instead applies to the complexity of the topic; the more one investigates metrics, the deeper and murkier their waters seem. That the contingencies on which we focus here are, in considerable part, COIN ones helps to explain the challenge. Whereas conventional war lends itself to quantification of results, counterinsurgency is less amenable in that regard. Qualitative evaluations are at least as important to measuring the effects of organizations' actions as are those countable. Translating these "softer" metrics into something of value can be difficult. Doing so when they are reported to higher echelons and as part of but one of many units' submittals magnifies the difficulties several fold. In some cases, the uniqueness of conditions in a particular AO means that melding such inputs with others is simply impossible (or, worse, doing so would lead to misleading results). Occasionally, the familiar can help; stoplight charts are one way of visualizing qualitative data in some instances. But in general, there is need for more study of metrics and training of those whose responsibilities involve their development, collection, analysis, collation, presentation, or use in the support of decisionmaking.

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Conclusion, Recommendations, and Implications for the Future 85

Future Implications

It is hoped that the discussions and recommendations in the preceding pages will have value not only to ongoing contingencies but also to others yet to come. They are part of a growing literature seeking to assist future leaders in that regard. That such resources are available is heartening. Less inspiring is the persistence of mistakes in confronting insurgencies. The world's armed forces never solved all the riddles associated with the post-World War II occupations and counterinsurgencies in the Philippines, Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, and elsewhere, but those and other events offer many lessons with application to the 21st-century contingencies confronting coalitions today. Major mistakes, such as disbanding the IA, consolidating units on large FOBs in lieu of dispersing them amongst the population in smaller installations, and being insufficiently careful with aerial bombardment in Afghanistan, suggest that leaders at all echelons were less educated with respect to counterinsurgency than was warranted. That too many military curricula still involve exercises with Soviet-style formations raging across terrain more reminiscent of northwest Europe than Baghdad, Kandahar, or Helmand province is equally discouraging. COL J. B. Burton's imaginative training at Grafenwöhr suggests that the choice need not be between conventional-war preparedness and readiness to assume irregular-conflict responsibilities. Much of the time spent in the schoolhouse, on the range, or in the field can serve both. What is called for is greater commitment to taking advantage of these opportunities. Units and individuals will certainly need to brush up on certain skills as the mission changes, but assuming that being prepared for one or the other alternative is the only choice is an unaffordable luxury.

Pointing the finger at military training at installations alone is to miss a vital component of preparedness. That so many leaders at every level were less familiar with counterinsurgency than they should have been means that they failed to educate themselves. Far more of a military leader's time is spent out of schools than in. Even when on exercise or deployment, there are moments of respite. With the status of military professional comes the responsibility to have a particular expertise that others do not. Samuel Huntington described the military profession as one whose members are expert in the "management of violence."⁵ Like it or not, that description from the 1950s no longer suffices. Counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, stability operations, low-intensity conflict—the title applied to the undertaking is less important than the realization that today's military professional must be able to manage much more than violence if he or she is to meet the demands of today's deployments. Self-education is an essential part of building this new, broader, and far more demanding expertise.

The several sources of education cannot neglect the foregoing requirements. Basics, such as military theory, retain relevance. Some argue that Clausewitz and others no longer apply given the types of conflicts that characterize this millennium. Yet one need only look at the guidance suggested by Sun Tzu from the perspective of what our adversaries practice in Afghanistan and Iraq to verify that lessons from thousands of years past remain effective today.

⁵ Huntington (1957, p. 11).

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86 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

History likewise informs us that the military that fails to adapt properly is destined for failures. The foregoing pages reflect cause for both optimism and concern in that regard. There has already been much improvement. It is essential that we employ our improved knowledge and expanding expertise to meet challenges such as those identified in these pages.

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APPENDIX A

Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books

The following are the major synthesis observations and insights from the initial two RAND joint urban observations and insights studies. Those introduced in this document appear in the initial listing to consolidate all those presented to date. They first appear as a list with no explanatory material. The second part of this appendix presents those from the first two books again, each accompanied by a brief explanation.

Joint Urban Operations Synthesis Observations and Insights

This fourth phase in the ongoing series of studies considering joint urban-operations observations and insights adds 13 synthesis findings to the 51 from the first three phases of work. The complete set of 64 appears here for the reader's convenience. Those from the first two study phases (i.e., those combined into the single *People Make the City* report¹) are consolidated under the five doctrinal urban-operation phases (understand, shape, engage, consolidate, and transition) with three of those listed as separate, overarching entries. Others, from *A Tale of Three Cities*² and *Continuing Counterinsurgency Challenges*,³ are presented otherwise.

Brief discussions of the findings from the first three phases of RAND's joint urban-operations and insights work follow the initial listing of finding statements. Similarly expanded discussions for the recommendations coming from this study appear in the summary at the front of this document.

Three Overarching Synthesis Observations from "*People Make the City*"

- The three-block war is the reality during modern urban operations.⁴

¹ Glenn, Paul, and Helmus (2007); Glenn, Paul, Helmus, and Steinberg (2007).

² Glenn and Helmus (2007).

³ Glenn (2007c).

⁴ *Three-block war* refers to situations in which forces may face "the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks" (Krulak, 1999).

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88 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

- The importance of orchestrating urban military and civil activities in support of strategic objectives is fundamental to national and coalition success.
- Urban operations increasingly characterize U.S. and coalition undertakings.

Observations and Insights from “People Make the City”: Understand

- At a minimum, transition to civil authority, not actions on the objective, should be the point from which to initiate backward planning. It will often be necessary to look even deeper in time.
- It is essential to consider the second- and higher-order effects of actions taken during urban operations. Those effects can be counterintuitive.
- Studies of former urban operations, most notably Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF, demonstrate that there is a need to modify U.S. joint and service intel processes, acquisition, training, support procedures, and doctrine.
- Irregular warfare, like urban operations, is very much influenced by noncombatants. Lessons from the former can be of value in addressing the latter.
- Decentralization, and therefore good junior leadership, is essential to urban-operation mission accomplishment. However, decentralization can make it more difficult to gain compliance within one’s own force, especially in the normally highly heterogeneous urban environment.
- Urban combat operations confront commanders with a dilemma of force.

Observations and Insights from “People Make the City”: Shape

- Shaping noncombatant, enemy, and other urban perceptions should be designed, war gamed, and conducted as a campaign.
- Managing expectations is critical to successful shaping.
- Cultural understanding is key to every aspect of urban-operation success.
- The extent to which the military is to be a social-engineering tool should be determined prior to operations.
- There is a call for a way to measure shaping-effort effectiveness.
- The United States needs to better assess initial indigenous-population perceptions. Its forces should be prepared to react appropriately to changes in attitude.

Observations and Insights from “People Make the City”: Engage

- “Speak softly and carry a big stick” is sometimes good advice during urban operations, though the stick has to be applied with good judgment.
- Regular force–SOF fratricide in urban areas remains a significant threat.
- Contractors play a fundamental role in urban operations. Their status and roles require better definition.

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 89

- The effects of urban environments on vehicle design, aviation operations, and system acquisition in general have, for too long, received insufficient attention.

Observations and Insights from “*People Make the City*”: Consolidate

- The greatest obstacles to accomplishing strategic objectives may come after urban combat.
- The U.S. military could better capitalize on the expertise of coalition members.
- Money and its management are key to urban-operation success.
- The organization and alignment of military and civil reconstruction organizations should parallel their indigenous counterparts.
- Consolidation should begin with the initiation of an urban operation. This requirement and the prevalence of urban operations is cause to reconsider the traditional perceptions of command functions.

Observations and Insights from “*People Make the City*”: Transition

- Coalition members should be aware of possible “mutinies” by some indigenous elements as established departure dates or other critical events approach.
- Though it may not be feasible due to political constraints, urban stability operations should be driven by an end state, not an end date.
- Beware the insurgency-to-criminal evolution.
- Balance short- and long-term perspectives. The challenges of today may be veiling those of tomorrow.

The Eight Synthesis Observations and Insights from *A Tale of Three Cities*

- Patience, and the restraint that accompanies it, are keys to successful urban COIN operations.
- Pursue the impossible: Unify the message.
- A broader definition of *military intelligence* is essential to meeting the urban COIN challenge.
- Too many joint doctrinal definitions fundamental to understanding and conducting urban counterinsurgency retain a bipolar, cold-war character.
- The density inherent in urban operations requires the coordination of all effects, not just fires.
- The military’s ability to influence without killing is too limited.
- Unit versus individual rotation offers extraordinary training opportunities that are, as of yet, not being fully recognized.
- Tour-length policy would benefit from a comprehensive study.

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90 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Fifteen Observations and Insights from *Continuing Counterinsurgency Challenges*

- Leaders should seek to increase the number of interactions between military personnel and the public.
- Intimidation is a two-sided coin. Ensure that friendly forces are aware of the unintended intimidating effects of their actions, appearance, or language.
- In planning and execution, focus on the population, not the insurgent.
- Occupation planning should consider the long-term consequences of actions no less than does combat planning. This includes consideration of how best to endow a nation with a viable security force.
- Just as in other aspects of COIN operations, be patient when preparing indigenous security forces.
- Embedding works.
- Develop an understanding of urban patterns so as to be able to determine what constitutes the absence of the normal or presence of the abnormal.
- Provide a system (or system of systems) to provide constant overhead urban surveillance with both broad context and low-level detail monitoring capability. Ideally, such systems would also have a target engagement capacity.
- Improve forward air controller–airborne (FAC-A) and joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) support of urban operations by adapting FAC-A and JTAC responsibilities to current demands.
- Provide a coordination mechanism to orchestrate SOF–regular force activities during urban operations.
- Training should cover the culture of coalitions in addition to the culture of those living in the theater of operations.
- Review rotation policies. The short length of U.S. tours undermines coalition COIN success in Afghanistan and Iraq.
- Instill the same ethic of operating within the enemy’s decisionmaking cycle in public affairs and other IO decisionmakers as is done for maneuver arms.
- Consider offering advanced education for governing and related skills akin to that sponsored in medical and legal fields.
- Consider developing an initiative similar to the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program for other regions.

Thirteen Observations and Insights from This Report

- The civilian population is a key source of intel and may well be the friendly-force COG. Protect it against attack from both the enemy and your own forces.
- Consider giving selected companies a 24-hour intel-analysis capability while similarly investigating providing battalions a more robust intel section.

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 91

- Lengthen tours for individuals in critical intel billets, particularly those involving analysis or contact with informants. Combine longer rotations with policies that (1) bring families closer to deployed personnel, (2) allow for more frequent breaks of equitable duration, and (3) result in staffing levels and leader selection, allowing reasonable periods of daily and weekly rest.
- Improve database development through better sharing and insistence on compatible technologies and software. Transition intel communities from their need-to-know default to a need-to-share mentality.
- Develop source-identification and data-tagging procedures that permit collecting organizations to compare HUMINT sources while retaining the anonymity of those sources.
- Consider the appointment of intel supremos both in theaters and at the strategic level to oversee, facilitate, and monitor better sharing of intel and general improvement in field effectiveness.
- Introduce the creation, use, and employment of effect-based metrics into all echelons of leader and staff training. Training must include understanding the link between causality or correlation and outcomes, the importance of incorporating local conditions in metric development and assessment, and the use of qualitative and quantitative metrics to form compound metrics for aggregation and interpretation at higher levels of command.
- Conduct systematic reassessment and refinement of metrics at periodic intervals. Review metric baselines to ensure that they remain relevant.
- Establish a doctrinal metric framework that promotes objective definition from the top and identification of input measures from the bottom, with effects as the common link.
- Use a red-team approach to assist in metric development and evolution.
- Portray metrics by using simple, easy-to-understand tools that facilitate commander decisions.
- Develop truly interagency campaign plans, and put the organizational structures in place to manage the campaign in accordance with plan guidance.
- Strive to retain habitual relationships during COIN deployments just as is done during conventional conflicts.

Joint Urban Operations Observations and Insights from “*People Make the City*,” with Brief Summaries

Three Overarching Synthesis Observations

Three insights are particularly relevant in demonstrating the character or influence of joint urban undertakings.

The three-block war is the reality during modern urban operations. Former Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Charles Krulak once described urban operations in terms of what he called the *three-block war*. A unit operating in a built-up area could find itself providing support to the indigenous population (block 1), helping to restore or maintain stability

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92 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

(block 2), and fighting an armed foe in force-on-force combat (block 3). Further, these events could occur simultaneously and on contiguous blocks. The metaphor was found to be a valid one by those in the field. Marine and soldier, U.S. and UK service representatives alike recalled General Krulak's model and declared that it accurately depicted the scope of challenges a force finds itself confronting in villages, towns, and cities during combat operations. The difficulty is that military forces are not staffed or equipped to concurrently handle the myriad tasks encompassed by the three blocks. The three-block war therefore not only presents a planning challenge, but also constitutes a resource-allocation nightmare.

Orchestrating urban military and civil activities in support of strategic objectives is fundamental to national and coalition success. Given that these modern ground forces are allocated personnel and materiel sufficient only for combat or supporting forces conducting a fight, the activities of other agencies capable of bringing further elements of national power to bear should be well orchestrated with those in DoD. This was not the case during early operations in 2003 Iraq. The delineation of responsibilities and orchestration of capabilities between DoD and other federal, nongovernmental, or private volunteer organizations was unsatisfactory. Improvement on the part of all participants is called for.

Urban operations increasingly characterize U.S. and coalition undertakings. World urbanization (approximately half of the world's population now resides in urban areas) and the force-projection character of the U.S. armed forces increasingly means that virtually any military action will involve activities in built-up areas. Ports and airfields are fundamental to force projection. Urban operations are almost inevitable because these are often adjacent to or embedded in larger urban areas and, in fact, are inherently urban in character themselves. Further, the importance of cities as social, economic, diplomatic, cultural, transportation, and other types of hubs means that coalition objectives will generally require military forces to conduct operations in these areas. The complexity of such undertakings—dealing with heterogeneous demographic groups, maintaining infrastructure support, and coordinating media requirements, to name but three—is far greater in densely packed urban environs. This density of demands will therefore also come to be the norm for military and other leaders. There is good news amidst these challenges, however. Such density and complexity are rarely found in any other type of environment. Therefore, a force qualified to meet such demands is likely able to apply its expertise and accomplish its missions virtually anywhere. Further, the observations, insights, and related recommendations on these pages will similarly often have applicability to environments beyond those urban.

Observations and Insights from “People Make the City”: Understand

At a minimum, transition to civil authority, not actions on the objective, should be the point from which to initiate backward planning. It will often be necessary to look even deeper in time. Military forces of all services tend to define a desired end state as the starting point for planning and then work backward to the present to best determine the resources and timings of events necessary to achieve that desired end. Too often, the end state used is a purely military one chosen without sufficient attention to transition requirements and coalition

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 93

objectives beyond those military. The appropriate end state from which to plan is not the defeat of the enemy or actions on an objective; it is the hand-over of responsibility to an indigenous government or a transition governing body. To focus on the military end alone means that such targets as communication towers and power plants may be destroyed, given the benefits they offer the armed foe. However, a longer-term perspective reveals this: Such assets are crucial to the indigenous society recovering rapidly and successfully, which makes sparing such resources or finding alternatives that are less damaging (than total destruction), more attractive.

It is essential to consider the second- and higher-order effects of actions taken during urban operations. Those effects can be counterintuitive. Second- and higher-order effects often have more immediate and wider impact in urban areas than in other environments. Planners and commanders need to consider consequences of their decisions and actions beyond those of the first order to avoid negative repercussions that can undermine mission success.

Studies of former urban operations, most notably OEF and OIF, demonstrate that there is a need to modify U.S. joint and service intel processes, acquisition, training, support procedures, and doctrine. U.S. armed forces retain too much of their cold-war character in the way they do business. For example, those who determine weapon systems, armaments, and ammunition requirements too rarely incorporate urban considerations in their thinking despite the inevitability of urban operations. The lack of a readily available way for dismounted personnel to talk to crews in buttoned-up armored vehicles is but one of many examples. Similarly, the greater reliance on HUMINT that characterizes urban operations suggests that fundamental changes to intel-staffing and information-processing policies may be in order.

Irregular warfare, like urban operations, is very much influenced by noncombatants. Lessons from the former can be of value in addressing the latter. The urban insurgent requires the support of a “sea” (civilian population) just as did Mao’s guerrillas in China, VC in Vietnam, or irregulars elsewhere during the many uprisings and rebellions that took place in the latter half of the 20th century. That sea is, in fact, far denser when it is an urban one; there are more individuals to provide support to insurgents, but more are also likely to know of the activities of such groups. Depriving the urban foe of support or capitalizing on the greater density of potential intel collectors are but two ways of taking advantage of this density increase.⁵ Considered from the perspective of urban areas’ unique characteristics, the many studies of irregular warfare conducted a half-century ago offer similar lessons very pertinent today.

Decentralization, and therefore good junior leadership, are essential to urban-operation mission accomplishment. However, decentralization can make it more difficult to gain compliance within one’s own force, especially in the normally highly heterogeneous urban environment. The heterogeneity inherent in many urban environments means that subordinate commanders will often be better acquainted with local demands than leaders at higher echelons. Such local knowledge argues for decentralized decisionmaking. At the same time, junior leaders must be trained and disciplined such that they respond appropriately when

⁵ For a further discussion of removing support for irregular forces in urban areas, see Glenn (2002).

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94 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

centralized control is necessary or uniform standards must be enforced throughout an urban population.

Urban combat operations confront commanders with a dilemma of force. Today's military commanders, regardless of service, find that urban combat operations challenge them with an inherent tension between the need to (1) defeat their enemy while minimizing casualties in their own force and (2) keeping noncombatant casualties and infrastructure damage to a minimum. The dilemmas are many: the soldier or marine who hesitates to pull the trigger because the foe is using civilians as a shield, the pilot concerned about the hospital next to which the enemy has positioned air defense systems, and the commander forgoing a tactical advantage because the opposition is firing from a mosque. All require the exercise of extraordinary restraint. The actions are commendable. They serve the ends of achieving coalition strategic objectives and maintaining a degree of humanitarian compassion in keeping with civilized standards in the oft-uncivilized environment of combat.

War, however, is the realm of destruction. There will be instances in which these men and women will have to put innocents and their property at risk. In such cases, there may be no good outcome, no alternative that promises to benefit all desired ends, but rather one only less undesirable than its alternatives. A pilot might select the alternative of engaging only a few rooms instead of destroying an entire building, with the appropriate airframe and munitions being called on for the task. In lieu of devastating a town, a ground-force commander could find that a limited number of enemy concentrations provides the opportunity to wreak destruction over only a few blocks. There are times when minimizing unfortunate loss still demands considerable destruction; the difficult decisions in this regard will be influenced by the mission, strategic objectives, moral implications, and other factors that are situation-dependent. Leaders making the difficult decisions must find an appropriate balance between restraint and devastation and train their subordinates to do the same.

Observations and Insights from "People Make the City": Shape

Shaping of noncombatant, enemy, and other urban perceptions should be designed, war gamed, and conducted as a campaign. While progress has been made in coordinating PSYOP and civil-affairs activities in the support of military and civil objectives, too often other aspects of military operations are poorly synchronized with those efforts to win indigenous trust and confidence. There is a need to orchestrate *all* aspects of military operations to consistently address desired ends. This requires creating a shaping-campaign plan that establishes guidance for consistent shaping, seizing opportunities as they present themselves, and adapting to minimize the effects of negative events.

Managing expectations is critical to successful shaping. Many Iraqis heard Western leaders' claims that life in Iraq would be better after the removal of Saddam Hussein. They were therefore unbelieving when told that their infrastructure would take months or years to repair after the cessation of regular force-on-force hostilities. Ideally, messages with such shaping consequences would be consistent across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. That

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 95

will rarely if ever be possible, but a well-conceived shaping campaign can include elements to address the inevitable inconsistencies and thereby minimize their potentially adverse impact.

Cultural understanding is key to every aspect of urban operations' success. Understanding the norms of the many groups represented in urban areas, especially large cities, makes the obvious requirement for cultural awareness far more challenging than in most other environments. Developing effective means of recruiting, retaining, and protecting indigenous personnel and taking advantage of additional resources to better interpret information of intel or other value should be a priority.

The extent to which the military is to be a social-engineering tool should be determined prior to operations. Military commanders will find themselves responsible for urban civil governance for at least a limited period no matter how good the cooperation between military and other agencies. It is essential that civilian and upper-echelon military leaders consider and provide uniform guidance on matters that will have immediate and longer-term strategic effects. Such issues include establishing uniform wage levels and setting policies regarding the rights of social groups heretofore denied equality (e.g., women in many Islamic urban societies).

There is a call for an effective way of measuring shaping-effort effectiveness. Given that efforts to shape the urban environment are desirable, means of accurately gauging which methods are successful, which are less so, and what areas require greater or lesser focus are essential.

The United States needs to better assess initial indigenous-population perceptions. Its forces should be prepared to react appropriately to changes in attitude. The U.S. military and its interagency partners enter virtually any Muslim nation with the proverbial two strikes against them. Armed-forces members have no control over either. The first is the result of Arab and, to a lesser degree, other Muslim support for the Palestinian cause and the indigenous population's perception that the United States has lined up on the Israeli side of that dispute. Second and related to the first is the product of years of U.S. demonization by leaders and media in the region. Urban shaping campaigns thus start from a disadvantaged position that must be taken into account when designing such campaigns and the IO that support them.

It is therefore somewhat ironic that current coalition adversaries in Iraq's cities and, to a lesser extent, those in Afghanistan choose to perpetrate terrorist attacks that wound and kill members of the indigenous population. There is evidence that those publics, and their leaders, are coming to realize that the insurgents have nothing to offer beyond continued death and misery. This significant shift in civilian attitude away from support for or tolerance of the terrorist should not be left to its own progress. Coalition forces need to capitalize on the opportunity with IO and civil-affairs initiatives that substantiate their stated policies of supporting indigenous governments and the welfare of the nation's citizens.

Observations and Insights from "People Make the City": Engage

"Speak softly and carry a big stick" is sometimes good advice during urban operations, though the stick has to be applied with good judgment. The proper balance between force application and restraint needs to be maintained during periods of failed civil authority or

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96 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

replacement of a standing regime by a coalition force. Minimization of noncombatant loss of life and collateral damage is desirable, but there may be instances in which demonstrations or the actual application of force serve sought-after objectives. The choices can be difficult ones. The grace period available for making them may be very short. For example, a commander may very quickly have to decide whether to allocate personnel from combat duties to stability tasks if widespread looting will undermine the restoration of order and cause significant long-term infrastructure damage. The decision to do so early, when the troublemakers are few and perhaps limited to primarily criminal elements, could have fewer negative consequences than attempting to enforce such a policy later, when a lack of preventive action has de facto sanctioned looting by the population at large.

Regular force—SOF fratricide in urban areas remains a significant threat. Improvements in long-range sights and other means of acquiring targets mean that detections of friendly SOF once virtually undetectable are increasingly commonplace. Failure to inform other regular-force coalition members of the presence of special operators can pose a greater danger to the latter than the risk of operational compromise due to wider dissemination of SOF locations.

Contractors play a fundamental role in urban operations. Their status and roles require better definition. Phase 1 of this study discussed the need to address shortfalls in interagency cooperation at some length. Regardless of the steps taken to improve in this regard, there will always be a period in which military leaders are responsible for the security and governing of urban areas seized in combat. Early action during OIF demonstrated that these commanders simply did not have the personnel to both conduct combat operations and preclude looting or other actions that disrupt the return to a stable environment. A solution worthy of consideration is hiring civilian contractors to assume responsibility for such tasks. The implications of using civilians are many, for military and civilian organizations alike. The potential benefits in quickly smothering outbreaks of lawlessness and destruction serve objectives at all three levels of war.

The effects of urban environments on vehicle design, aviation operations, and system acquisition in general have, for too long, received insufficient attention. The damage done to rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft over Iraqi towns and cities is a reflection of the need to seriously contemplate and experiment with current aviation urban doctrine. The scramble to up-armor high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and other trucks likewise demonstrates that urban challenges have too long been ignored in service vehicle-acquisition programs. Recent history, ever-increasing world urbanization, and events during ongoing operations all suggest that immediate consideration be given to these topics. Rigorous studies that begin with recognition that the problems exist are overdue.

Observations and Insights from “People Make the City”: Consolidate

The greatest obstacles to accomplishing strategic objectives may come after urban combat. Operations in Iraqi urban areas demonstrate that resistance beyond regular force-on-

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 97

force combat can be no less challenging and even more costly than pre-phase 4 operations.⁶ This reality lends further credence to the necessity of looking beyond purely military end states during backward planning. It also argues for planning, rehearsing, and coordinating with other agencies far deeper in time than has been habitual in the past.

The U.S. military could better capitalize on the expertise of coalition members. Few would challenge the statement that Americans possess the most capable military force in the world. Unfortunately, the authors' analysis suggests that this supremacy precipitates, in some cases, a hubris that precludes learning from those with potentially valuable advice.

Money and its management are key to urban operations' success. Military leaders cannot be experts in every field. Success in war imposes requirements to manage economies, rebuild infrastructure, reestablish governing bodies, and many other tasks for which a commander needs educated guidance. Use of funds to abet success in these many areas requires skill beyond those taught in military institutions. Fiscal policies need to be developed before conflict initiation. They need to involve orchestration between short-, mid-, and long-term economic initiatives. Part of the solution may be to develop a reservoir of those skilled in designing and applying these and other initiatives. The U.S. military currently pays for medical personnel's education in return for later service in the armed forces. Considering a similar program for sending individuals to graduate school for such needed skills as financial management and infrastructure development should be considered.

The organization and alignment of military and civil reconstruction organizations should parallel their indigenous counterparts. Molding coalition stability and reconstruction organizations to parallel those in place within the indigenous urban government eases the passage of information and works to reduce avoidable friction.

Consolidation should begin with the initiation of an urban operation. This requirement and the prevalence of urban operations is cause to reconsider the traditional perceptions regarding command functions.

The ongoing confirmation of the three-block war as an accurate depiction of urban combat operations drives one to conclude that consolidation of success in villages, towns, and cities cannot wait for the cessation of major combat or recovery operations. Shaping programs, to include robust civil-affairs efforts, need to capitalize on the favorable circumstances that victory in combat often brings. Provision of necessities for those in need, demonstrations of an effort to restore urban areas to some semblance of normalcy, and intolerance of vendettas and criminal behavior are all parts of successful consolidation.

The difficulty is that commanders and their staffs are fully committed to the execution of combat operations. The multiplicity of responsibilities—offensive, defensive, stability, and support—prove beyond the resources available to many commands. Traditional approaches to support (e.g., leaving relevant tasks to civil-affairs units) have similarly fallen short in Iraq, primarily due to the dearth of such assets. Intel staffs were challenged not only to determine likely actions by the IA, but also to gauge insurgent capabilities and determine the critical

⁶ Phase 4 refers to that period after the completion of regular force-on-force hostilities.

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98 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

personalities in the noncombatant population who would influence mission success after the worst of combat ended. The density of challenges inherent during urban contingencies requires reevaluation of conventional methods of dealing with them. Current decisionmaking processes, intel structures, and allocations of responsibilities for civil affairs are among the areas worthy of review.

Observations and Insights from “People Make the City”: Transition

Coalition members should be aware of possible mutinies by some indigenous elements as established departure dates or other critical events approach. History reminds us that indigenous security forces may feel themselves caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place as transition to a new government takes place. Finding themselves perceived as lackeys of the departing coalition and thereby losing their influence in the replacement regime, representatives may take violent action to consolidate their position as an influential party in post-transition society.

Though it may not be feasible due to political constraints, urban stability operations should be driven by an end state, not an end date. It is difficult to determine how long it will take to attain national objectives during the consolidation and transition periods. It is therefore desirable to tie, when feasible, transition milestones to accomplishment of those (or supporting) objectives rather than points in time.

Beware the insurgent-to-criminal evolution. Given some evidence that Iraqi urban residents are tiring of insurgent violence, it is necessary to consider how the insurgent forces are likely to adapt to a possible reduced level of support (or tolerance) in the nation's cities. Among the possible responses is a movement toward criminal enterprise as a means of supporting continued violence. Colombia's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and elements once professing dedication to revolution in Northern Ireland have both completed this transition. Despite propaganda efforts that state otherwise, the groups have left the vestiges of insurgent fervor far behind to become full-fledged players among international organized-crime syndicates.

The situations in Afghanistan and Iraq are unclear in this regard as of this writing, in considerable part due to the heterogeneity and number of such groups, especially in Iraq. Former criminal elements are among the insurgent ranks, but some insurgent groups have punished criminal activities by other factions, such as kidnapping for ransom. On the other hand, in Afghanistan, a return to opium production has met little effective resistance. Differences are likely to continue, but a shift toward more groups focusing on outright criminal activity is a possible evolution that coalition elements should seek to interdict early.

Balance short- and long-term perspectives. The challenges of today may be veiling those of tomorrow. Phase 1 of this study suggested that leaders should define the end states in terms of transitioning governing responsibility to an indigenous government rather than the shorter-term goal of defeating the enemy. Early planning goals in OIF spurred that recommendation; U.S. leaders had arguably focused too greatly on the removal of the IA and insufficiently on those actions essential to strategic success that followed such immediate mili-

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 99

tary success. The recommendation still stands despite the change in the enemy's character. The potential for civil strife and other challenges heretofore veiled by concerns with defeating insurgents cannot be allowed to go unaddressed. The ultimate goal of a secure and stable Iraq requires maintenance of a focus on an end state well beyond one defined simply in terms of defeating urban insurgents.

Synthesis Observations and Insights from *A Tale of Three Cities*, with Brief Summaries

Patience, and the Restraint That Accompanies It, Are Keys to Successful Urban COIN Operations

A modern counterinsurgency is a marathon. Coalition commitment to a stable and secure Iraq has already kept participating nations' militaries in that country for nearly 10 times the combined durations of the 1991 and spring 2004 force-on-force contests against the IA. Similar dedication in Afghanistan has extended years beyond that. COIN history makes it clear that the parties to eventual success include many, including noncombatant groups from throughout Afghan and Iraqi societies. Gaining the support of these individuals requires patience and restraint on the part of military men and women at every echelon, from the rifleman who chooses to allow a gunman to escape rather than fire into the crowd used for cover to the commander who spends days in negotiations with community leaders. U.S. military training has a bias for action; patience and restraint are rarely emphasized. There is much to be learned from best practices of U.S. and coalition forces alike that should be introduced into U.S. unit preparation.

Pursue the Impossible: Unify the Message

At times, current coalition behaviors belie the words spoken by civilian and military leaders alike. The resident of Baghdad, Mosul, or al Basrah who, on one hand, reads of coalition dedication to a peaceful Iraq is at best confused when a round is fired at his car by a passing military vehicle or he is unceremoniously thrown against the wall when his house is searched for no apparent reason. And he finds the policies of the foreigners in his city last month much different than those of the new arrivals who recently replaced them.

Unity of message—consistency across organizations, within governments, and over time—will be virtually impossible to attain. However, unit commanders can do much to mitigate the inconsistencies that appear between politicians' statements and tactical actions on the street. Actions seen daily in keeping with soldiers' and marines' words demonstrate a commitment that is key to obtaining popular trust. Maintaining that consistency when units transition is possible given extended and close contact between commanders in theater and those scheduled to replace them. The more-effective units are demonstrating that the impossible can be approximated and that the benefits in improved indigenous support are substantial.

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100 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

A Broader Definition of *Military Intelligence* Is Essential to Meeting the Urban COIN Challenge

The concept of intel as a product only with relevance to force-on-force engagements is insufficient to the demands of urban counterinsurgency. The commander whose intel officer provides even perfect insights regarding the urban insurgent's capabilities and intentions still lacks the information needed to successfully assist city leaders in rebuilding their neighborhoods. Knowledge regarding physical and social infrastructure, power relationships, sources of economic health, and much else pertaining to a town or city and its relationship to the areas around it is as crucial to coalition objectives as is knowing the enemy. Much of this information is unclassified, yet to this point remains unmined. Some has been accumulated only to be put on classified Web sites, rendering it inaccessible to coalition partners. Data collection is, at times, awkwardly handled, needlessly endangering members of the local population by exposing them to insurgent retribution. Intel processes and procedures require modification if they are to meet the demands of the units striving to defeat urban insurgencies and assist in the recovery of the Iraqi and Afghan nations.

Too Many Joint Doctrinal Definitions Fundamental to Understanding and Conducting Urban Counterinsurgency Retain a Bipolar, Cold-War Character

Doctrinal definitions of such fundamental concepts as COG, maneuver, engagement, and IO are inadequate to the challenges of urban operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Still tied to their pre-1989 roots of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, they fail to account for scenarios in which the primary focus is a noncombatant one and the adversary is an obstacle rather than an part of an objective. Much doctrine needs updating; the definitions that are its bricks and mortar should be given attention immediately.

The Density Inherent in Urban Operations Requires the Coordination of All Effects, Not Just Fires

The density of cover and concealment that structures offer, related to the number of possible movement routes, means that friendly forces in different units are frequently closer during urban actions than they are in more open terrain. The danger of fratricide due to rounds traveling through walls or across boundaries has long been recognized. Less understood is the extent to which other effects can endanger nearby comrades or threaten mission accomplishment. There is a need to coordinate the use of illumination and other capabilities in addition to lethal fires in order to avoid unintended consequences of one organization's operations on another.

The Military's Ability to Influence Without Killing Is Too Limited

It is an interesting dichotomy that the United States has spent tens of millions of dollars to develop and field precision weapons, capabilities that save noncombatant lives in far greater numbers than those of the friendly force, yet junior leaders fighting in Al Amara and Fallujah could not get the nonlethal stun grenades they so desperately needed. The contrast reflects a deeper and broader shortfall: There are insufficient nonlethal capabilities to serve the needs of

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 101

tactical ground commanders. The benefits in providing the munitions, systems, and training called for have a domestic component, for such assets could be of notable value if federal military forces are called on to support future U.S. domestic contingencies.

Unit Versus Individual Rotation Offers Extraordinary Training Opportunities That Are as of Yet Not Being Fully Recognized

In contrast to Vietnam War policies, the U.S. military rotates units rather than individuals in meeting the obligations of continuing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. An advantage of so doing is the ability to train units for pending responsibilities before deployment. Establishing close ties between in-theater leaders and those designated to replace them enables the passage of vital information on an individual basis. Linking deployed units to their replacements has proven a tremendous boon to organizations readying to assume responsibility for the complex urban operations that characterize the challenges for so many units. Such links, unusual at present, should become the norm.

Tour-Length Policy Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Study

Unit tour lengths differ significantly between services and nations. Individuals in the U.S. military generally rotate with their unit regardless of whether their responsibilities are such that a longer period of overseas assignment might better serve coalition objectives. An initial polling of leaders serving or with recent tours in Iraq reveals that many favor a rotation of between six and nine months with those in some functional areas (e.g., intel) remaining on station longer.

Synthesis Observations and Insights from *Continuing Counterinsurgency Challenges*, with Brief Summaries

Winning the Competition for Popular Support

Leaders should seek to increase the number of interactions between military personnel and the public. Increasing the number of a military force's garrisons and outposts is like increasing surface area: The more surface area, the greater the number of contacts with the population. More surface area therefore provides more opportunity for the friction necessary to gaining traction. This gaining traction with the civilian occupants of a theater is vital for obtaining intel, convincing the population that ours is the side worthy of support, and denying that support to the enemy. Military leaders know that an inactive defense is an invitation to attack and disaster. The same applies no less to counterinsurgency. Contact with urban residents provides the opportunity to demonstrate coalition commitment to public security and stability.

Ensure that friendly forces are aware of the unintended intimidating effects of their actions, appearance, and language. Coalition forces can be just as intimidating as insurgents, even if the latter are more directly threatening in their use of force. The well-disciplined and trained soldier and marine on the ground is a coalition's most effective ambassador—or a most

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102 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

destructive element in assaulting friendly-force objectives if he or she wields force indiscriminately or overly aggressively. Force that affects the noncombatant population, whether used to intimidate or for other purposes, should be applied discriminately and with an understanding of its potential longer-term implications.

In planning and execution, focus on the population, not the insurgent. One of counter-insurgency's great challenges is what appears to be a fundamental dichotomy: Actions necessary to killing insurgents alienate the population the forces are trying to serve. This simple reality carries great influence when commanders overly focus on removing the enemy through the use of lethal force, for they can end up creating more foes than they had at the initiation of operations. Scrutinizing concepts, courses of action, and plans from the perspective of preserving noncombatant support and protecting civilian welfare would introduce a significantly different character to operations. Putting predominant priority on the same issues while patrolling city streets or when otherwise in the field would do likewise. The challenges are very significant, as are the risks inherent in relying on a lesser volume of firepower when receiving incoming fire.

Restraint in force application is not the only way in which such warfare differs from that traditional. Intel now has a broader focus. It must consider not only an enemy's capabilities and intentions, but also the motivations, means of influencing, and likely responses of individuals and groups in the noncombatant population to various events. Much of a force's success will depend on good intel telling it what buttons to push in order to appease, gain the support of, or not alienate the local population. The restraint and respect shown by friendly forces will abet obtaining that intel. Both will also help before that intel is forthcoming, for actions taken should tend to limit the population's antipathy felt for units that adopt the approach.

All three of the recommendations addressed in this section refer primarily to U.S. and other international coalition-member actions that will facilitate public support. The actions and policies of the indigenous government and its forces will ultimately determine lasting success or failure. The second key challenge addresses several aspects crucial in assisting the development of capabilities.

Make the Right Decisions Early to Prepare Indigenous Military and Police Capabilities

Occupation planning should consider long-term consequences and the future need for indigenous security. Establishing short-term security without considering the longer-term impact of the approach taken can have significant repercussions later. Whatever the method adopted, introducing and maintaining security requires a systematic approach—a system that includes the legal process, the military, police, investigative capabilities, and more—all working in support of creating and sustaining the eventual rule of law. It is no less important to recognize the vital role played by the population in this development of security and respect for legal process. Treat post-crisis activities as an organic part of campaign planning. So doing, rather than treating them in the form of a separate undertaking or sequel, should lead to better synchronization of actions during the crisis and those in its aftermath so that the two are mutually supporting rather than virtually independent of each other.

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 103

Be patient when preparing indigenous security forces. Unfortunately, neither politics nor military operations are known as realms in which patience is granted its due. The consequences of impatience can set back attainment of goals by years by having to undo mistakes made in haste, such as disbanding units improperly staffed and trained. Every step of preparing government capabilities demands patience, steps that include the following, among many:

- determining the right mix of leaders and other personnel in security units
- recruiting to meet goals and avoid getting the wrong types of individuals
- training leaders before giving them command responsibilities
- continuing to mentor those personnel after they assume the burdens of leadership
- conducting operations with indigenous units working alongside those from coalition militaries or police
- gradually providing opportunities to solo during operations while coalition forces stand by, ready to assist
- transitioning to full-fledged self-reliance.

Embedding works. Both U.S. and UK personnel interviewed in support of this study strongly believed that embedding Iraqi units with American, or vice versa, was highly recommended. Lessons otherwise ignored by Iraqi soldiers were taken to heart when units patrolled together, the Iraqis emulating their better-trained and more-experienced comrades in arms. Though opinion was overwhelmingly supportive of the approach, there was less agreement on the details of what would constitute the best way of designing a training program of which embedding is a part.

While embedding Iraqi soldiers and units in coalition military units has proven effective in instilling better performance habits, there seems to be little recognition that a similar procedure might be highly desirable with respect to police personnel. Implementing procedures in this regard would obviously necessitate deploying increased numbers of coalition law-enforcement personnel, including bringing many more civilian police trainers and mentors to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Sharpening Insights into Urban Patterns

Develop the understanding to be able to detect deviations from normal urban patterns. Understanding what “normal” is in an urban area inherently allows the soldier to detect what is otherwise. In the common phrase used by the British based on their extensive experience in Northern Ireland, they seek to determine what constitutes “the absence of the normal or presence of the abnormal.” Understanding urban patterns has value at the operational and strategic as well as tactical levels. Daily routines are only one aspect of understanding an urban area. Weekly, monthly, and annual patterns are also important. While the discussion about determining such patterns as presented in these pages focuses primarily on military concerns in that regard, pattern recognition and understanding is also vital in the service of less traditionally military or nonmilitary objectives.

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104 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Information regarding urban patterns ought to be passed on to replacement units. There would ideally be a common format and database in theater to minimize the problems new users have when preparing for and eventually assuming responsibility for an area.

Intel relating to urban patterns is a resource that should be accessible during as well as before and after patrols.

Addressing the Unique Challenges of Urban Air Operations

In addition to the significant issues and related recommendations regarding minimizing collateral damage and noncombatant casualties addressed in the previous studies in this series, the following received attention during this analysis:

Provide a constant overhead urban surveillance system that reveals both broad context and detailed information. The call for a constant overhead observation and engagement capability is a consistent one and helps to explain why soldiers and marines on the ground grant almost mythical powers to their AC-130 comrades in arms. Their recognition of the need for such capabilities should not go unnoticed, nor should the daylight vulnerability of the airframe when the foe has sophisticated anti-aircraft means or the venerable AC-130's age. It provides a capability that should be maintained in the short run and improved on in the near term without a break in the on-station observation and engagement resource.

Likewise, UAVs of various sizes, sustained flight capabilities, armaments, and fields of view drew favorable remarks despite various shortfalls. There is a call for both a wide field of view to provide overall context and the ability to focus on and track potential targets.

Adapt air-operation C2 to meet urban operation demands. The number of aircraft operating over an urban area during periods of intense activity presents an extraordinary control challenge. Coordinating multiple, piloted, fixed-, and rotary-wing aircraft is further complicated given the plenitude of UAV systems that support operations. In addition to these coordination issues, the presence of friendly forces, innocent civilians, and structures that are not to be hit with munitions—many of which are concealed behind or within structures—makes coordination a potential nightmare. Providing situational awareness for incoming aircraft is one area that continues to pose issues. A debate regarding how to attain and maintain this situational awareness revealed strong convictions in some of those interviewed. Aviators in all services would benefit from a review of current requirements and training regarding the capabilities of and proper relationship between airborne and ground-based air controllers.

Coordinating Regular-, Special-, and Indigenous-Force Operations in Urban Environments

Provide a means to coordinate SOF, regular-force, and indigenous-force activities. Orchestration of regular forces and SOF continue to be a concern in some areas. Increased fielding of Iraqi military and police units further complicates matters. The density of friendly forces per unit space is often considerably higher in urban areas than other environments. Complement that with limited line of sight, differing uniforms (or lack thereof), various vehicle and weapon types, and occasional limited-visibility operations, and the opportunity for confusion and fratricide is too high for leaders to be comfortable with. In truth, there are two

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 105

types of fratricide of concern: force casualties and information fratricide. Regular-force and SOF commanders have to realize that coordinating with another element conducting operations in their AO does not mean that they are aware of all ongoing activities. This is all the more true when indigenous military and police organizations have assumed responsibilities in a built-up area. There is unquestionably a need for a centralized coordination node that keeps all relevant organizations advised of ongoing and planned operations.

Improving Training, Organizational Issues, and Command and Control

Training should cover the culture of coalitions in addition to the culture of those living in the theater of operations. There are a considerable number of implications inherent in recognizing and choosing to do something about better accounting for coalition culture. Too often, a coalition representative stands before an audience and conducts that portion of the meeting as though he or she were speaking to compatriots. The result: partial understanding at best and many questions left unanswered because no time was left for individuals to develop and articulate them. Similarly, national differences regarding logistical-support expectations, payments for goods and services, differences in command arrangements, and the like can undermine cooperation and cause dangerous misunderstandings. Ideally, such issues would be worked out prior to the initiation of operations. At a minimum, coalition-leader representatives need to be aware of them early and prepare to find resolutions. Doctrine and training should address such matters as differences between coalition-member organizations, capabilities (including equipment capabilities and communication compatibility), command relationships, and the very real benefits that various members might bring to a multinational gathering (e.g., cultural commonalities with the indigenous population).

Consider offering advanced education in governance skills. Service and joint oversight should monitor the forcewide distribution of officer degree qualifications and programs to ensure a balance of talents across services and components that best meets operational needs, including providing assistance to other countries during nation building. Similarly, services or joint commands should consider offering incentives to officers and NCOs taking advanced degrees on their own time, encouraging them to focus their studies on topics that address the balance just described. Many graduate schools provide the opportunity to obtain second degrees while an officer is studying there. Here again, second degree choices should be monitored with officers either encouraged or directed to obtain any additional certifications in fields needing additional personnel.

Review rotation policies, considering how short tours of duty undermine coalition COIN success in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is evident that having longer tours might well have significant benefits for COIN operations. It is also readily apparent that determining the optimum tour length is no easy matter, nor is it clear that all units or individuals should remain in a given area for the same duration. Continued work in this area of research strongly reinforces previous observations that the topic deserves a comprehensive investigation.

Consider developing an initiative similar to KATUSA for other regions. KATUSA may be the most successful multinational exchange program in the history of the United States. A

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106 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

form of this proven capability could promote considerable progress toward addressing several of the language and cultural challenges that confront U.S. forces during deployments around the world today. The United States should consider a similar program that would offer U.S. military units soldiers with needed language and—to some extent—cultural knowledge during deployments to those parts of the world identified as likely to require such commitments. Unlike in the Korean case, these augmentees would probably not come from the armed forces of the country to which U.S. personnel were deployed. They would instead represent a regional nation with sufficiently close ties to the United States to participate in such an arrangement.

Understanding the role of public affairs and information in war-fighting, prepare decisionmakers to fight on this level as well. The metaphor of an IO battlefield is a popular one, but few consider the implications of the analogy beyond the cosmetic. Overcentralization, delay, and a failure to trust subordinates lose fights in which steel fragments rather than words are the bullets. They do so in the information fight as well. Yet too few commanders employ the tools that, in the former fight, allowed their forces to fight effectively, communicate intent, clear orders, and delegate among them. Winning in the information war means assuming risk, just as is the case in other types of operations. It is necessary to instill the same ethic of operating within the enemy's decision cycle that is demanded during combat operations. Public-affairs personnel, those staffing other shaping capabilities, and commanders and staffs in the headquarters that command them have to adjust accordingly. It is no less necessary to train, equip, organize, and provide doctrine to allow this seizure of the initiative and to adapt C2 procedures as necessary.

Synthesis Observations and Insights from *Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan*

- The civilian population is a key source of intel and may well be the friendly-force COG. Protect it against attack from both the enemy and your own forces.
- Consider giving selected companies a 24-hour intel-analysis capability while similarly investigating providing battalions a more robust intel section.
- Lengthen tours for individuals in critical intel billets, particularly those involving analysis or contact with informants. Combine longer rotations with policies that (1) bring families closer to deployed personnel, (2) allow for more frequent breaks of equitable duration, and (3) result in staffing levels and leader selection resulting in reasonable periods of daily and weekly rest.
- Improve database development through better sharing and insistence on compatible technologies and software. Transition intel communities from their need-to-know default to a need-to-share mentality.
- Develop source-identification and data-tagging procedures that permit collecting organizations to compare HUMINT sources while retaining the anonymity of those sources.

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A Compilation of Observations and Insights from This Report and the Three Previous Books 107

- Consider the appointment of intel supremos both in theaters and at the strategic level to oversee, facilitate, and monitor more-effective sharing of intel and general improvement in field effectiveness.
- Introduce the creation, use, and employment of effect-based metrics into all echelons of leader and staff training. Training must include understanding the link between causality or correlation and outcomes, the importance of incorporating local conditions in metric development and assessment, and the use of qualitative and quantitative metrics to form compound metrics for aggregation and interpretation at higher levels of command.
- Conduct systematic reassessment and refinement of metrics at periodic intervals. Review metric baselines to ensure that they remain relevant.
- Establish a doctrinal metric framework that promotes objective definition from the top and identification of input measures from the bottom, with effects as the common link.
- Use a red-team approach to assist in metric development and evolution.
- Portray metrics by using simple, easy-to-understand tools that facilitate commander decisions.
- Develop truly interagency campaign plans, and put the organizational structures in place to manage the campaign in accordance with plan guidance.
- Strive to retain habitual relationships during COIN deployments just as is done during conventional conflicts.

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APPENDIX B

Observations and Insights in I-D-R Form

This appendix provides our observations and insights in I-D-R form. See the opening of Appendix C for an explanation of the meaning and purpose of the coding at the beginning of each.

INTEL-1

T/O/C2/CSS/I/Stab/Spt/IO/Tactical

Issue

Providing aid and making other forms of contact can influence a population's willingness to provide information. Inefficiencies or negative consequences of contact may, in turn, adversely influence that willingness.

Discussion

Immediate impact. Maybe it's blankets, or generators, or cash. . . . The process took so long that blankets would come six months later in April when they don't need them.¹

My legitimacy dried up [as soon as my funds disappeared].²

Recommendations

Apparent from discussion.

¹ Crabtree (2006).

² Toon (2006).

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110 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-2

T/I/Tactical

Issue

Monitoring intel sources to avoid single-source confirmation of information continues to be a challenge.

Discussion

Sharing a source registry amongst HUMINT agencies is another problem. In Kabul, there are 'sources' who sell the same junk info to everyone (NATO, various national agencies, etc), knowing that there is no way anyone can check.³

The same difficulty existed during U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Recommendations

Employ retinal scans or other means of tagging intel, thereby allowing collectors to identify same-source materials. Develop source-identification and data-tagging procedures that permit collecting organizations to compare HUMINT sources while retaining the anonymity of those sources.

INTEL-3

O/P/C2/I

Issue

Having short tours inhibits effective intel processing.

Discussion

Turnover remains a major limiting factor in our ability to build up knowledge. I would recommend dramatically increasing tour length for key personnel, but I would couple that with special incentives for those people: far better living conditions, significant bonus pay, and long leave periods.⁴

³ Barlow (undated).

⁴ Barlow (undated).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 111

“We had only two weeks right seat–left seat ride. It would not have been a bad idea to have replacements stay for a year for continuity.”⁵ *Replacements* refers to those soldiers who join a unit after an organization deploys. They thus have less time in theater than most of their colleagues and will not complete a full tour if they redeploy with the unit to which they are initially assigned.

It became more common to rotate the police around to police stations [in Northern Ireland] every two to three years . . . and we started losing this local knowledge, which has been built up over years. It was a combination of factors, one of which was that the modern career system said that . . . if you’d stayed in one position five years, then you must be some sort of failure, which is absolutely stupid. . . . It’s a natural fact—you may not have had the energy at the end of five years that you had at the beginning of it, but you knew so much more. Your contribution has vastly increased. Where we did have continuity, interestingly, was in the special branch offices, because the special-branch guys—not the inspectors, because the inspectors tended to be guys who still had another promotion or two in them, but the constables and the sergeants, most of them, stayed there for 5, 10, 12, 15 years. As a result, their local knowledge is encyclopedic. They knew not simply the guy’s girlfriend, but all his previous girlfriends, and where their parents lived and where they lived and what they worked at. And the result was, you only had to get a snippet of some information fed back from some other region saying that [someone] was going to [use some location] to store a weapon—one of Colonel [Muammar Abu Minyar al-]Qadhafi’s AK-47s [automatic rifles], which he was getting the following day—and he was going to store it somewhere where there was a derelict car. That’s all we knew and that’s all the source could give us. “Well, yeah, I know that; that’ll be his girlfriend’s father [who] owns a scrap yard . . . and that’s where he’s going to store the bloody thing. Let’s get . . . out there now to have a look at that and see where [they could put a rifle].” Perhaps, if it firms up, then they’ll be in a position to go put in an observation post. So get them out early to have a look at it before the weapon is there. Get all the photography done, the aerial photographs. Get the [right] people to look at how they might get in and get out of the place without attracting attention and so on. But you can . . . do that [only if you have this local knowledge].⁶

Law-enforcement officers on the Los Angeles County antigang unit are responsible for the same gangs year after year for the same reason.

Recommendation

Consider revising tour-length policies to incorporate these elements, perhaps augmenting them with others, such as moving families to locations closer to theaters of operation (e.g., British soldiers operating in Malaya could deploy families to Singapore).

⁵ Crabtree (2006).

⁶ Duff (2007).

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112 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-4

O/C2/I/Multi

Issue

Some militaries have no intel corps. At least one U.S. officer proposes that those assigned as head of intel sections need not be intel-branch personnel.

Discussion

The Royal Netherlands Army is one that does not have a separate intel corps, just as the Israeli Army did not until some five years ago. Those armies thus handle intel processes and responsibilities differently than the U.S. military does.

That the Netherlands Army has no intel corps can be hard during operations because the U.S. military must constantly send people back to a school for intel training who have never had it:

We should have a dedicated intelligence corps. . . . Currently, we [officers in the Netherlands Army] are experiencing difficulties at this stage due to the lack of educated intelligence NCOs or officers. . . . Of course, intelligence officers in artillery, infantry, and other branches stay in intelligence, and they and engineers are rotating extremely [frequently] due to demand for their skills in Afghanistan. . . . Because we could not get boots on the ground for an extended time in a protected environment, [the lack of trained intel personnel] was . . . the major obstacle in collecting on populations in a town and understanding the insurgency.⁷

The Dutch Army has no intelligence branch. Those in intelligence have a specialized knowledge.⁸

Training the S-2 . . . should be qualification and personality driven, not [driven] by branch. . . . [Being an] S-2 is a people business.⁹

Recommendations

Identify those militaries and other agencies with which the U.S. armed forces are likely to operate that have intel structures and processes significantly different from those with which Americans are familiar. Ensure that U.S. command and staff personnel fully understand the differences and their implications prior to deployment into theaters involving such militaries. Equip and staff (e.g., with liaison officers, or LNOs) the U.S. units accordingly.

⁷ Coenen (2007).

⁸ Quandt (2007).

⁹ Anonymous source 17.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 113

Understanding that, during some contingencies, interpersonal skills, coup d'oeil, or other talents are at least as important as technical ones, assign the individual most qualified to oversee intel operations, whether or not that individual is from the military-intel branch.

INTEL-5

D/T/I/Stab/Spt

Issue

Measuring popular opinions or perspectives can lead to a false understanding of the environment.

Discussion

We overlooked the fact that we are not working in a democracy . . . and that . . . the opinions of [only] a few people actually matter. Polling should be done that identifies what tribal elders and religious leaders believe. Such polling should ask them what exactly they want in return for their support and conversely what would cause them to withdraw that support.¹⁰

Recommendations

Just as knowing who the key nodes are during shaping (influence) operations, intel-collection efforts must realize that the views of some are far more influential than others. Collect and analyze accordingly.

INTEL-6

D/L/C2/I

Issue

Intel is only one part of the decisionmaking process. Having perfect intel does not guarantee perfect decisions.

¹⁰ Barlow (undated).

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114 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Discussion

There is no question that the intelligence [delivered to decisionmakers in Iraq gives them what] they think they need and types of info they don't even know they need, but it does not seem to have resulted in a higher quality of decisionmaking.¹¹

Recommendations

Treat intel as part of a commander's decisionmaking process. Seek to maximize the effectiveness of the system as a whole rather than its components.

INTEL-7

D/L/O/I/Stab/Spt/Multi/Inter

Issue

The ubiquitous nature of multinational and interagency operations requires reassessment of intel-sharing policies. Unwillingness to share information under the auspices of OPSEC sometimes works against mission success and is the easy way out rather than the right decision.

Discussion

Attempting to utilize intelligence within multinational PSOs has created ludicrous situations, such as when Indian Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar, commanding the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia was denied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intelligence being provided to his staff. The intelligence-sharing situation was not particularly improved when the Force Command was transferred to NATO's Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier from France, because his senior intelligence officer was Colonel Jan-Inge Svensson, from non-NATO Sweden.¹²

What was very problematic was . . . the computers and [command, control, communications, computers, and intel] networks. They had three or four computer networks. They had [nonsecure Internet-protocol router network], SIPRNET, NATO Secret, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] Secret, and CENTRIX[S]. Not everybody had access to all the systems, so the information was compartmentalized. So, say a unit deployed to support the mission. Say they were Macedonians and they had a helicopter there and they wanted to include a flight route into the [air tasking order]. They couldn't go straight to the people who needed that via a network. There was [a gap in communication] somewhere.¹³

¹¹ Anonymous source 30.

¹² Martyn (2006, p. 23).

¹³ Hutson (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 115

In the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO), we had more than 300 different databases tracking friendly and enemy event data across all the warfighter functions. . . . [M]uch of the data available could not be shared, resulting in an incomplete picture of the battlespace and little shared situational awareness. . . . Most of the BCSs in Iraq were accredited for U.S. classified-data networks (i.e., the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network) and not coalition networks. Thus, there were limited tools to support information processing in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. In many cases, the systems' complexity created high learning curves resulting in training shortfalls and rapid decay of user skills. . . . Although there were multiple programs of record for battle tracking (MCS, C2PC, ADOCS, FalconView, GCCS, etc.), none [was] able to create a combined view of enemy and friendly events on a map.¹⁴

One of the biggest problems was sharing information. Every intel cell had its own database. They were collecting information their own way.¹⁵

The U.S. intelligence community is large and pervasive. Unfortunately, various agencies run their intelligence data and analysis in bureaucratic stove-pipes, which run straight from the tactical level to the highest strategic levels with little sharing along the way. . . . Raw data are seldom passed back—just agreed-on intelligence. Agreed-on intelligence is a homogenized product from which dissenting views and contradicting evidence has been removed or discounted so the community can have a common view. . . . If intelligence does come back down the stove-pipe, it often arrives too late.¹⁶

I told the [combined-headquarters intel officer] that he should brief [LTG Jay Garner's] protection team on the local threats from now on. Like others in the intelligence community, he refused to share intelligence [briefings] with the South African [personnel in the security detachment] because they didn't have the appropriate security clearance.¹⁷

One anonymous interviewee said the following regarding NOFORN information and sharing it with British allies during OIF:

In some cases, it was critical that our allies [be] aware of some of the intel, and some of us personally lobbied to have it released. Needless to say, there were some expressions of "mixed loyalties" and the like, because we became the de facto advocates of our allies in some of the staff meetings I attended.¹⁸

¹⁴ Vines (2006, pp. 42, 44).

¹⁵ Gouweleeuw during Gouweleeuw et al. (2007).

¹⁶ Grau (2006, p. 31).

¹⁷ Olson (2006, p. 107).

¹⁸ Anonymous source 8.

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116 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

There were occasions when we weren't told. But that was a matter of human judgment, and I think that judgment of some of our older-style people was flawed because they had been trained in a different way—they'd been trained to keep everything to themselves, and [I think that] that was almost as damaging as . . . telling more. . . . Things got real bad once, and [one of the latest assistant chief counsels] said, "I'll tell you what we're going to do. When we get a piece of intelligence, instead of sitting down and saying, 'Right, who needs to know this piece of intelligence?,' we will look at it and we will say, 'OK, we'll start from the position that everybody needs to know this intelligence, and then we'll cross off those who don't need to know it.'" . . . It led to a more efficient dissemination and a more efficient usage of that intelligence. There are a number of crimes you can commit in intelligence. . . . I believe [that] the deliberate invention of intelligence is a heinous crime. The deliberate subjective interpretation of intelligence to suit your own predetermined ideas is another heinous crime. But sitting on intelligence and not telling those who need to know is also a heinous crime, because it leads to great inefficiencies and ultimately to the loss of objective.¹⁹

U.S. hesitation to share vital intel has repeatedly put coalition-partner personnel at mortal risk in Afghanistan and Iraq. That some members of organizations frequently given access to sensitive information present a greater security risk than other individuals and organizations denied it further emphasizes the questionable wisdom of such situations as those described here.

Members of a UN mission wanted to locate a field office on or near a coalition installation. Inquiries about the number of indirect-fire attacks that struck the installation in question were denied, allegedly for OPSEC reasons.²⁰ While details of the number of successful rocket or other attacks might give the enemy information regarding the accuracy of its targeting (thus justifying the denial), had the rejecting officer thought in terms of a need to share versus a need to know, it would likely have been possible to both preserve OPSEC and provide the information needed, e.g., by reporting the number of attacks in the *vicinity* of the installation in question.

The same reticence applies to sharing some technologies, e.g., counter-IEDs and radios:

The difficulty is [with regard to] technical things, like [electronic countermeasures. A counter-IED capability is] a requirement if you're in this environment. . . . If you're not with [Multi-National Force–Iraq], you have to get that sorted out. You have to buy [what is lacking]. Your own radios are affected. . . . We have to think about whether they are compatible with yours.²¹

¹⁹ Duff (2007).

²⁰ Anonymous source 34.

²¹ Anonymous source 34.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 117

Failure to coordinate communication, counter-IED, and similar technologies with coalition members and others likely to operate in the same AO risks system interference (including overlapping use of frequencies) and other shortcomings.

Recommendations

During counterinsurgencies and selected other undertakings, transition from the traditional need-to-know mentality to one of need to share, thereby requiring OPSEC and intel personnel to have a legitimate reason for denying information or intel to allies, coalition members, and others with legitimate concerns, rather than relying on denial as the default mode.

Design and acquire a sufficient number of given equipment types (e.g., radios, counter-IED systems) such that coalition organizations can sell them to or share them with other organizations in such a manner that OPSEC is not sacrificed. Establish agreements with these organizations prior to deployments when feasible, e.g., as part of interagency campaign-plan preliminary preparations.

Make future BCSs more conducive to information sharing in a coalition environment and easier to use and implement.²²

Act on the observation that the U.S. government should mimic market trackers' ability

to store and quickly recall historical data . . . so that commanders and diplomats possess relevant records that enable them to make decisions [that] take into account the economic, historical, cultural, political, anthropological, and environmental aspects of the region [in which] they are operating . . .²³

Properly programmed, such efficient data handlers could automatically cross-check varied spellings to reduce confusion and allow for uniformity on maps, documents, and other materials.²⁴ Recognize the many applications of such databases, including supporting rule of law and evidentiary standards for dealing with insurgents, criminals, and other undesirables.

The increase in the number and significance of civilian-contractor responsibilities—including providing personal security for high-ranking U.S., coalition, and indigenous civilian officials—requires particular attention to providing FP-related intel.

²² Vines (2006, p. 44).

²³ Hsia (2007).

²⁴ Employing some form of semantic-web concepts might be one way to approach the differences in name spellings. For a brief discussion of semantic-web developments, see Feigenbaum et al. (2007).

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118 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-8

D/T/O/C2/I/Stab/Spt/Inter/Tactical

Issue

CIMIC personnel are often untrained in intelligence gathering and can lack the necessary 'situational awareness' of wider intelligence issues that would allow them to be of more than basic assistance.²⁵

Discussion

Individuals and units involved in capacity building, aid provision, or other interactions with a population have access to sources of information otherwise difficult (if not impossible) to attain.

Recommendations

Appropriately train CIMIC representatives and provide them guidance such as commanders' PIRs. Integrate them into intel collection, analysis, and dissemination procedures.

INTEL-9

D/T/O/I/Stab/Spt/Interagency/Tactical

Issue

In choosing not to pass on information [that] they acquire in the course of their work and interpreting the obligation to do so as spying for the intervention forces, NGOs are in danger of moral absolutism: of giving precedence to idealistic principles over other values, such as the safety of intervention forces. By refusing to commit the lesser evil they may open the way to a greater one.²⁶

Discussion

Many NGOs deliberately separate their operations and themselves from military activities for fear of being associated with armed forces' operations and agendas. The results include (1) NGO members putting themselves at unnecessary risk due to ignorance of existing threats, (2) interference with military operations when NGO operations gone bad result in armed

²⁵ Ankersen (2006a, p. 113).

²⁶ Gendron (2006, p. 173).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 119

forces having to support rescue or other undertakings, and (3) denial of important information to all coalition participants that could aid local population members (e.g., where relief of a given type is most needed).

Recommendation

Incorporate NGOs in predeployment planning and training to better establish working relationships that compromise between policies of self-defeating total military-NGO isolation and complete subordination of aid organizations to armed forces' leaders.

INTEL-10

D/T/O/C2/I/Tactical

Issue

There is a general need to alert all units and personnel to their intel-collection responsibilities, train them accordingly, and establish in-theater procedures for encompassing their input into intel processes.

Discussion

The major difference in the IPB process for [operations in 1992–1993 Somalia] was that historical patterns were not available and data bases for the enemy had to be developed after the force arrived in country since National and Strategic systems were unable to provide detailed initial tactical information prior to deployment, which would have facilitated anticipation of enemy actions/intentions. In order to satisfy PIRs, collection assets must be in theater from the beginning. Special [operations] forces had been providing security for [U.S. Air Force] and humanitarian agency food deliveries into Mogadishu as well as remote airfields since August 1992. Unfortunately these teams were not used to develop an in country assessment; something that we could definitely have used.²⁷

Recommendations

During operations other than war (OOTW), commanders must task some units, other than intelligence, to perform detailed intelligence collection tasks. The units tasked often do not have the background or training to easily handle the tasking. As a result, reports sometimes lack detail and may leave gaps in the collection plan. The traditional intelligence collection plan does not fill the void. The brigade/battalion S2 must provide a detailed checklist, reporting journal or other graphic aids that leaves little doubt about what information is required and in what detail. These checklists need to be specific, but simple.

²⁷ 10th Mountain Division (1993, p. 3).

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120 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

In Somalia, checklists were developed and used successfully for convoys, airfield security, patrols, roadblocks, and area assessments.²⁸

Task organize such units to support intel needs, e.g., include non-TO&E personnel as necessary.

INTEL-11

D/T/M/P/C2/I

Issue

Properly run, checkpoints (control points) can be excellent sources of information.

Discussion

Checkpoints can be a good source of information. Permanent vehicle checkpoints are not as effective as mobile vehicle checkpoints because people who cannot pass a checkpoint will normally avoid it. People are more accepting of a vehicle checkpoint than a pedestrian one. While the primary objective of the vehicle checkpoint is to interdict supplies, weapons, and likely enemies, the primary objective of the pedestrian checkpoint is to gain information. Professional behavior by checkpoint personnel is especially important. Tips for successful pedestrian checkpoints include the following:

- Interview pedestrians individually and privately. Covert [closed-circuit television] taping of the interview can be used to counter charges of inhumane treatment.
- Give each person approximately the same amount of time regardless of whether [he or she is] providing information or not. Have a system in place so individuals with lots of information can easily and confidentially contact the unit for a lengthy debriefing.
- Offer each individual coffee, tea, cigarettes, candy, or other comfort items as appropriate.
- Apologize for and explain the need for the interview or brief search.
- Organize and control the waiting area. Provide seating and place a polite, patient person in charge of it. Secure the area against attack.
- Maintain tight security but do not openly brandish weapons.
- Use a trained interrogator.

²⁸ 10th Mountain Division (1993, p. 30).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 121

- Do not try to control too large an area or stay in one place too long.
- Do not act immediately on information a pedestrian provides if that would compromise the pedestrian's safety or future cooperation.
- Have women present when interviewing women and have women search women.²⁹

Recommendations

Train TCP and intel-collection personnel accordingly, and integrate them into intel-collection procedures.

INTEL-12

D/T/M/C2/I/Tactical

Issue

Creation of theaterwide databases lags needs. Police operations and intel undertakings in Vietnam as well as Iraq and elsewhere validate the need for comprehensive databases as a foundation for understanding communities and the enemy.

Discussion

If a cop in Anytown, USA, pulls over a suspect, he checks the person's [identification] remotely from the squad car. He's linked to databases filled with Who's Who in the world of crime, killing and mayhem. In Iraq, there is nothing like that. When our troops and the Iraqi army enter a town, village, or street, what they know about the local bad guys is pretty much in their heads, at best. Solution: Give our troops what our cops have. . . . The troops now write down suspects' names and addresses. Some, like Marine Maj. Owen West in Anbar, have created their own spreadsheets and PowerPoint programs, or use digital cameras to input the details of suspected insurgents. But no Iraq-wide software architecture exists.³⁰

Even old and hearsay information is valuable in helping to build understanding.³¹

The value of creating databases during an insurgency is very effectively described in Deforest and Chanoff (1990) and, to a lesser extent, in Herrington (1982).

²⁹ Grau (2006, pp. 30–31).

³⁰ Henninger (2007).

³¹ Ostermann (2007).

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122 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Recommendation

Develop the necessary software, hardware, training, and doctrine to support such database creation and use.

INTEL-13

D/I/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Members of a population who are willing to provide information may have no safe way of doing so.

Discussion

The potential informer who has trouble finding a safe way of parting with his information, everyone agreed, is a common problem. Capt. [Tony] Jeapes recalled a simple and effective method used in Malaya, [in] which the police would surround a village during curfew and leave a piece of blank paper at every house; in the morning, they would let each villager drop his paper (unmarked except for the information itself) into a large box, which was later opened at police headquarters, with the anonymity of the informants thus fully protected.³²

Recommendation

Anonymous tip lines provide a similar way of passing on information, especially in societies in which cell-phone usage is common. The procedure is not without risk, however, as an insurgent can determine whether an individual has called the tip line recently by checking the phone's call log.

INTEL-14

T/L/C2/I/Tactical

Issue

Counterinsurgency and other forms of irregular warfare demand nontraditional thinking in terms of intel just as they do more generally.

³² Hosmer and Crane (1963 [2006], p. 108).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 123

Discussion

Col. [Frank] Kitson [believed that a commander who expected to have all intelligence provided from above should instead] have used whatever data the intelligence organization could furnish him as only a beginning, and then gone on to develop his own, more valuable intelligence from the mass of data fully known or accessible to him. For example, by reviewing past movements and actions of the gangs he was fighting, learning some of their tribal customs, etc., he could have established certain patterns of behavior and operations and, after checking his theories against simple tangible evidence (such as tracks in the forest), could have put his patrols out selectively, rather than send them out at random or have them scour huge forest areas.³³

Col. [Wendell] Fertig strongly agreed with Col. Kitson's last statements and cited his own difficulty in convincing military commanders that, in addition to top agents, you need bar girls, cab drivers, and the like to provide the background information. He felt that these methods had never really been accepted by the Americans, though their results were acknowledged.³⁴

Recommendations

Encourage and train for out-of-the-box thinking when it comes to intel training.

INTEL-15

D/T/L/C2/I/Stab/Spt/IO

Issue

The British in Malaya recognized the importance of employing those familiar with the indigenous culture in intel roles. That lesson is rarely employed in current coalitions.

Discussion

We brought an imam with us because we knew that religion played a much larger role in Afghanistan than it did back home. [He was a Muslim Canadian Land Forces Command chaplain, a man in a Canadian uniform.] Bring these guys in. Make them our intelligence officers. . . . We've got white kids from Edmonton trying to do our intelligence. That's crazy talk. That's a huge resource that we are underutilizing.³⁵

³³ Hosmer and Crane (1963 [2006], p. 127).

³⁴ Hosmer and Crane (1963 [2006], p. 127).

³⁵ Schreiber (2007).

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124 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Recommendations

Seek to employ those with greater local social and cultural awareness in intel roles. Adapt clearance and access policies accordingly. Identify potential personnel resources to support such initiatives now, prior to the emergence of active operations (e.g., individuals of Korean, Iranian, or other origins or with relevant experience in areas of concern).

INTEL-16

D/T/L/C2/I/Stab/Spt/FP/Tactical

Issue

Obtaining good intel takes patience and personal assumption of responsibility for assisting in its development.

Discussion

“If you jump at every tidbit of information [brought to you by members of the public] right away, you lose your legitimacy very quickly.”³⁶

If you look at Northern Ireland, it took 30 years to get the HUMINT set up. . . . As much as we try to blend in, they don't want us there. It's going to take time, and we've only been [in Iraq] three years.³⁷

The way that we made some money was that we made family connections. . . . Developing every marine [to be] an intel collector . . . but what really helped was bringing [in] wounded kids who were hurt by [IEDs or] helping somebody whose car is broken down.³⁸

I finally realized that the onus [of] the IPB was on me, because nobody has a better understanding of the AO than me.³⁹

Recommendations

Plan for the long run, including initiating databases and other assets that will serve your successors even if they do not provide similar value during your rotation. Higher-echelon commanders should establish procedures to perpetuate such rotation-to-rotation exchanges of intel-related materials.

³⁶ Thomas (2006).

³⁷ Strong (2006).

³⁸ Clark (2006).

³⁹ Toon (2006).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 125

INTEL-17

T/L/C2/I/FP/Tactical

Issue

Continuity files are good only if you look at them.

Discussion

I had a continuity file, but I didn't look at it until six months into the tour. . . . I lost soldiers at the same intersections [as my predecessors had].⁴⁰

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

INTEL-18

D/T/L/C2/I/Stab/Spt/FP/Tactical

Issue

Pattern analysis is fundamental to urban COIN operations.

Discussion

Our S-2 didn't know how to do pattern analysis.⁴¹

Recommendations

Train all relevant personnel (e.g., intel, infantry who will patrol, drivers in convoys, helicopter pilots, combat engineers) on pattern analysis at schools and national training centers (NTCs) as well as during unit preparation. Create databases and procedures to facilitate pattern recognition at every echelon.

⁴⁰ Anonymous source 2.

⁴¹ Thomas (2006).

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126 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-19

D/T/O/I/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Company-level intel personnel have proven valuable. There is a widespread call for an intel-analysis capability at the company level during urban COIN operations.

Discussion

We used something like that in Northern Ireland. [They stayed in country a long time.] You can't use untrained [UK territorial army personnel, akin to U.S. reserves or National Guard].⁴²

I think it's a great idea. Below [a specialist or lance corporal] would not be a good idea. Maybe [a staff sergeant] to a lieutenant. [The capability has to be able to operate 24 hours a day] to take patrol debriefs.⁴³

We had three members of the section, because they have to take patrol debriefs, and do the paperwork.⁴⁴

I never took advantage of what came into the [company operation center]. They didn't know how to or I didn't have the time to train them on how to do analysis. There is a need for [a] company S-2 to do analysis, not just compile information and pass it on to the company commander.⁴⁵

We should really have THTs down to company.⁴⁶

There is no intelligence capability at company level, and that is absurd. . . . Intelligence in this type of counterinsurgency is not coming from above. . . . We [at corps] would have to go down to battalion level to get information on targets. We had about 150 people in the intel shop at corps. We could have taken half of them and pushed them down to every

⁴² Strong (2006).

⁴³ Crabtree (2006).

⁴⁴ Strong (2006).

⁴⁵ Toon (2006).

⁴⁶ Wetzell (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 127

company in the country and increased the quality of information we got and helped them at the same time. . . . It would have greater impact and effect.⁴⁷

The best option is to put intel analysts at company level. Another option is to leave them at corps and assign them down as necessary. We asked one Army major whether the latter option was feasible, given the requirement to meet force-on-force corps needs for a conventional war: “Absolutely, as long as you have the skeletal structure at corps to build when you need it. . . . I think people would weep and gnash their teeth, but we did that in World War II.”⁴⁸

Recommendations

Consider putting an intel-analysis cell at the company level in maneuver and selected other units. Staff and equip the organization for 24-hour operations.

INTEL-20

D/T/L/C2/I/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

The U.S. military’s intel system remains too anchored in the Cold War, including overly concentrating intel assets at too high a level.

Discussion

My fundamental thought is that the entire intelligence structure is wrong and you can’t fix it at the margins. Some of the pieces work, but you have to deconstruct the entire thing. . . . The entire structure [is based on] a highly synchronized platform. . . . Subordinates are tasked to support higher headquarters. The whole system is designed to supply corps and above with what it needs. . . . [It’s not like that.] We’re not dealing with cities [appropriately]. No two battalions have the same situation in their neighborhoods. . . . We need to devote a significant portion of our corps-and-above intelligence assets . . . to tactical echelons. I want to say company. . . . The best units are creating their own intelligence staffs. . . . [Look at what] Erik Kurilla [did in Iraq]. He took about 20 of his guys with scores above 120 and created an intel platoon. . . . He had less [staff with which] to strike, but those guys he had to strike were much more effective. I’ve been telling everybody that you have to do it yourself. . . . We are top down and we need to be much more bottom up. . . .

If I was king of the world, I’d have a lieutenant and four soldiers [in a company intel section]. . . . I would not send them to army schools, because the army would turn them into

⁴⁷ Trevett (2007).

⁴⁸ Trevett (2007).

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128 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

automatons. [We want] flexible thinkers. . . . I would still make battalion the level at which the commander would define information requirements. That's the first thing. The second thing is that cities are [characterized] by people, not by tanks. . . . I think that we should vastly increase the effort that's devoted to HUMINT. I mean, everyone out there is talking to people. . . . It may seem that this doesn't require a retooling. It's about 10 percent of our effort now. . . . It's more than that in Iraq . . . but it has to be about 60 percent of [our intel capability. It requires retooling].

[Finally, databases have to be better designed. Currently,] you have to have the exact right spelling [to find information in a database on someone or someplace. If you get it wrong,] it's like misfiling a book in the Library of Congress. It's nearly impossible to find. . . . We have done nearly nothing to make headway on it.⁴⁹

Recommendations

Investigate revamping U.S. military-intel structures in light of likely future challenges. Include analysis of the value and feasibility of reconsidering battalion- and company-level intel structures and other alternatives that improve the responsiveness, accuracy, quality, and overall value of intel at all echelons.

INTEL-21

D/T/L/O/C2/I/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Some commanders believe that company personnel should have funds for buying information. Others disagree.

Discussion

It's not a brigade fight. A company commander in Iraq is doing the same things a brigade did in Vietnam. . . . [Commanders are] meeting with local leaders, conducting full-spectrum operations.⁵⁰

Yes, [company personnel] should have money, but only after they have had some training.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Haskins (2006).

⁵⁰ Toon (2006).

⁵¹ Clark (2006).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 129

Company commanders would not do direct payouts, because it would appear to be a bribe, and [members of the indigenous population] are going to create intelligence [just to get some].⁵²

Your patrol leaders could pay for intel. It gives them street credibility.⁵³

I don't like the idea. We suffered from Walter Mittys in the '70s doing it. It's got to be controlled at division [level] or above.⁵⁴

Recommendation

Given the size of some AOs and the extent of responsibility assigned to lower echelons during urban counterinsurgencies, providing policies and assets necessary for leaders at these levels to pay for information may be desirable in some situations. However, given the difficulty of vetting sources, avoiding one source selling information to multiple buyers, and the variation in junior-leader intel savvy, allocating such authority should be on a case-by-case basis. An alternative under some circumstances might be the use of other forms of compensation, e.g., providing aid to a village that proved particularly willing to provide high-quality information.

INTEL-22

M/C2/I/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Counterinsurgency and other forms of irregular warfare present intel challenges more difficult to meet than those presented by traditional contingencies.

Discussion

Despite knowing the deployment destination, a member of coalition operations in Afghanistan "knew almost nothing about the province. . . . Of course, we could find a lot out about the terrain, but, in COIN, it is not about the terrain. It's about the people."⁵⁵

Recommendations

Train and collect accordingly. Consider sending intel personnel to theater earlier than others to provide for a longer overlap with the unit being replaced.

⁵² Thomas (2006).

⁵³ Clark (2006).

⁵⁴ Strong (2006).

⁵⁵ Van Houten (2007).

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130 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-23

D/T/L/M/P/C2/I/Stab/Spt/FP/Tactical

Issue

Other armies are better than the United States is at making “every soldier a sensor” a reality.

Discussion

[The British] also took a lot of photos on patrols that [U.S. marines] later saw in briefings. I thought this was interesting because it was apparent that [intel, surveillance, and reconnaissance were] more all encompassing than in the American forces in that everyone apparently had some responsibility for it.⁵⁶

Recommendations

Train both leaders and led how to take advantage of every patrol, convoy, or other opportunity as a reconnaissance event. Equip them with digital cameras and other assets necessary to properly execute related tasks.

INTEL-24

D/T/I/Inter

Issue

Intel collection and analysis during urban operations and counterinsurgencies need to focus on issues beyond those related to the threat.

Discussion

When Major General Carl Strock first joined [LTG Jay] Garner’s team, he had been given an intelligence briefing on Iraq’s electrical grid, but the intelligence focused on potential war damage to the system, not on the dilapidation of the power plants and generators—comprised of a hodgepodge of parts from Europe and Asia—that had suffered as a result of more than a decade of economic sanctions and inadequate investment. . . . The absence of electricity further undermined an already burgeoning security program, encouraged crime, made it hard for Garner and [GEN David] McKiernan to communicate with the Iraqi public over television and radio. . . . Saddam had been brutal, but at least he had kept the capital supplied with electricity, even if it meant diverting power from the Shiite-dominated south.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Heal (2005).

⁵⁷ Gordon and Trainor (2006, pp. 467–468).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 131

We fix the sewage pump and it sends the sewage to the next pump station up. But the next station up is broken, so it can't send [the sewage] out and so our system can't work because that one doesn't.⁵⁸

Recommendation

Assisting in a country's recovery after conflict demands understanding of preevent conditions and those actions necessary to (1) determine desired end states and (2) know how to achieve those end states. Focusing on threat-related matters alone fails to provide the complete picture necessary to deploy needed personnel and materiel assets in a timely manner. Such failure can establish conditions for failed COIN efforts.

INTEL-25

D/T/I/Tactical

Issue

Compiling a database of military-age males provides a means of monitoring transients and identifying neighborhood demographic characteristics.

Discussion

Patrol leaders were tasked with collecting the names and 10 digit grids for every military aged male they encountered. They would utilize the "House Call" TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures] to gain access to the residence and then simply record the information. Later, after returning to the FOB, the information would be recorded in a Company spreadsheet, called the Company Names and Locations Database. This spreadsheet was then used to pinpoint locations of individuals named in [databases]. ([Databases] would often give the name, but no location, or a vague location). It also helped us to better understand the tribal layout, religious mix, link analysis and trend analysis of our AO.⁵⁹

Recommendation

Strongly encourage all units to conduct this TTP. This can . . . be done [only] through an aggressive dismounted patrolling effort, but it is well worth the time.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Nickolas (2007).

⁵⁹ Schmidt (2005, pp. 3–4).

⁶⁰ Schmidt (2005, p. 4).

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132 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-26

D/T/L/O/M/C2/I/Multi/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Hardware and software incompatibilities will hinder intel operations.

Discussion

Several databases . . . became available [only] in the last few weeks of our deployment. Upper-echelon headquarters had databases that we couldn't access. It wasn't easy for us to search, because we lacked the software—in some cases, even when we could access a system. Different servers would sometimes use different software, further complicating the problem. These problems were, by and large, solved after identification by users.⁶¹

Recommendations

To the extent possible, participate in agreements that allow other militaries and governmental organizations to share software and access compatible hardware, whether via purchase of identical hardware systems or deliberate designs for organizational compatibility.

Where such participation is infeasible, equip responsible headquarters with sufficient additional materiel and personnel resources to provide effective 24-hour liaison capability to coalition-member organizations.

INTEL-27

L/O/C2/I/Multi/Inter/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

The effectiveness of coalition intel structures is very much influenced by local leaders' willingness to share.

Discussion

Social networks and key players in the AO were unknown prior to our arrival. If we'd known in advance, we would have understood relationships and been able to explain events as they occurred. The PRT and battle group were two separate units. At our smaller base [Camp Hadrian] we combined intelligence sections for the two [so that intel section was combined for entire base, unlike that at the larger Camp Holland.]⁶²

⁶¹ Wijers (2007).

⁶² Quandt (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 133

I believe [that] we had 13 separate intelligence sections on Camp Holland: Dutch TF, Dutch SOF, Australian TF, U.S. SOF, United Arab Emirates TF, Air TF, and others. It would have been helpful [for us to have] combined them; then we would have known everything. . . . One section knew the location of an IED factory, and we drove by it for three months. There was no information push.⁶³

Dissimilar intel capabilities benefit from collocation and fusion. COIN examples in this regard include RAMSI from July 2003 and the Baghdad fusion cell in place by mid-2007. Malaya provides another:

The heart of each War Executive Committee was its Joint Operations Room (JOR), in which police, navy, air force, and army personnel coordinated emergency operations and received, analyzed, and disseminated raw intelligence. The Malayan Police's Special Branch supplies intelligence to the analysts in the JOR, and information from military patrols and interviews with private citizens supplemented that intelligence. The processing of intelligence was nonstop. At least one intelligence officer was on duty in the room 24 hours a day. . . . The JOR was a key vehicle for daily coordination between the military, the police, and the civil administration.⁶⁴

Recommendations

Militaries and armed forces need to share information prior to arrival in theater. Commanders should establish ways of facilitating exchanges to provide maximum predeployment familiarity with AOs. Collocate intel capabilities when feasible.

INTEL-28

L/O/C2/I/Multi/Inter/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Intel sharing should include map exchanges and agreement on place names.

Discussion

While it is impossible to completely eliminate potential confusion due to different spellings or local variances in place names, agreeing on common maps and photographs can mitigate any resulting problems.

Up-to-date maps were a big problem [due to the inconsistency of] place names. If you did an intel pull on a certain village, you would get the wrong intel, because it was locally

⁶³ Verhoef (2007).

⁶⁴ Ladwig (2007, p. 62).

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134 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

called something else entirely. So we started from the bottom with aerial photographs and the like.⁶⁵

Because of lack of exchange, we [the Royal Netherlands Army] went to the Australians and others, because we could not get intel from our own people. [On] old Russian maps, some place names were correct; some were not. Locales had different place names—say, for an area around a given mosque. It took two months to even detect the issue.⁶⁶

Recommendations

Include map exchanges and provision of overhead photography in intel-sharing understandings. Similarly ensure that updates—e.g., when a new place name is obtained from locals—are disseminated throughout the coalition.

INTEL-29

D/T/O/C2/I/Stab/Spt/IO/Tactical

Issue

Woman-to-woman exchanges are an underutilized source of potential intel.

Discussion

I always asked the male of the house [for] permission to inspect the female rooms [and we always took a female soldier along when we expected to conduct house searches]. We were told by women on the PRTs that they had many approaches by women who passed them valuable information.⁶⁷

Dutch women more easily contact Afghan women than Dutch men contact Afghan men. . . . We have problems mapping out the human relations, the tribal relations in a village. We had trouble mapping out the male hierarchy in a village, but there is also a female hierarchy in a village and [the Dutch women] could help with that.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Verhoef (2007).

⁶⁶ Noordzij (2007).

⁶⁷ Wijers (2007).

⁶⁸ Coenen (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 135

Recommendation

Seek to capitalize on demographic advantages (e.g., have officers of the same gender, age, race, and religion as the locals) when collecting intel.

INTEL-30

D/T/L/C2/I/Multi/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Few nations have lessons-learned capabilities as good as those of the United States. The result can be poor transfer of information between successive rotations in those non-U.S. militaries.

Discussion

At least one country participating in the Afghan coalition passed very little intel between its first unit to deploy and that following.

Recommendations

Coalition leaders should act to provide incoming units and other organizations with pertinent information, including those from other nations. Nonmilitary organizations should be part of this process to the extent feasible.

Such provision may require the lead nation to assist in compiling and transferring intel, since some participating nations will lack secure means to send material.⁶⁹

INTEL-31

M/C2/I/Tactical

Issue

The ability to access and sift information of value remains too limited.

Discussion

Information of all types remains spread across myriad hard-copy and electronic sources. Those desiring ready access to information or intel of a given type must commit extensive time and personnel to finding and culling what is available. One observer noted that systems capable of handling massive amounts of data, such as stock-market capabilities, are worthy of emulation.

⁶⁹ Coenen (2007).

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136 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Recommendation

The ability of market trackers to store and quickly recall historical data should be mimicked by the U.S. government so that commanders and diplomats possess relevant records that enable them to make decisions [that] take into account the economic, historical, cultural, political, anthropological, and environmental aspects of the region [within which] they are operating. . . .⁷⁰

INTEL-32

D/T/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Much, perhaps most, intel of value during COIN operations is generated at company level or below, then used by the generating unit.

Discussion

Probably 90 percent of the intelligence that we operated on was generated by the company.⁷¹

Recommendations

Train and develop doctrine to capitalize on the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intel *within* units at lower echelons, because this will be the norm during counterinsurgency in many instances.

INTEL-33

D/T/L/C2/I/SOF/Stab/Multi/Inter

Issue

Better intel cooperation could also lead to better sharing of related assets.

Discussion

The biggest thing we have to do is develop better procedures on HUMINT. We basically need to learn how to pay these guys [giving us the information] and use this intel-

⁷⁰ Hsia (2007).

⁷¹ Featherstone (2006).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 137

ligence. . . . We're very weak in this area. . . . I had a situation [in which] we had information that there was going to be a meeting between two guys in Latin America . . . and one of these guys was someone we were really looking for. The informant said, "They are going to be involved in a terrorist attack." I passed it on to my source. . . . The informant came back and said, "Hey, this meeting is really going to happen." . . . But [those I informed] said [that] they didn't have the resources to act on the intelligence. What they meant was that they didn't have the SIGINT asset to tap telephones. . . . We ended up not physically sending anyone to where the two were meeting. Well, the one [whom] we wanted ends up getting arrested while he's at the meeting for a passport violation, but we don't know that and he gets set free. It turns out that, for lack of a SIGINT asset, we lost this guy. He was arrested and he was held for 48 hours. For lack of a SIGINT asset, we lost him when all we had to do was send somebody down and say, "Yeah, that's the guy" and take him into custody.⁷²

Recommendations

Expand the concept of intel sharing to include operational cooperation beyond collection, analysis, and dissemination. Develop doctrine, plan, and train accordingly.

INTEL-34

T/I/Stab/IO/Tactical

Issue

Generational differences are another demographic fault line that may offer opportunities.

Discussion

The younger generation over there [in the Middle East] are so enamored with technology and U.S. culture that they are willing to be mercenary and go to us. . . . They have to have the newest cell phone. . . . I remember one guy who we got by giving him a RAZR phone. . . . You have to identify guys who are not deeply ensconced in the Islamic mindset. . . . You need to find those in the 18–30 age group [to whom] you can offer technologies [that] they would not be otherwise able to access.⁷³

Recommendations

Include identification of generational differences and related motivations in intel-collection requirements. Capitalize on younger segments' familiarity with and desire for commodities or

⁷² Jany (2006).

⁷³ Jany (2006). RAZR™ is a trademark of Motorola.

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138 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

services that may not appeal to other portions of society. Similarly seek to take advantage of other variations in demographic segmentation.

INTEL-35

D/T/I/Stab/Spt/IO/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Good intel on local populations is key to favorably shaping indigenous public opinion. Failures in this regard can have negative consequences with strategic impact.

Discussion

[Inconsistency in] handover procedures [is] another great point. We constantly were upsetting the locals by our inability to identify the real leaders and ended up dealing with the de facto leaders, or those who simply presented themselves, often because they could speak English at least a little. One of my interpreters told me in An Nasiriyah that the people we were dealing with were in fact Ba'ath Party members and we were being seen as simply perpetuating their authority over the common people, exactly the opposite of what we were trying to do.⁷⁴

Recommendation

Create PIRs and collect on key aspects of social infrastructures. As one of the Joint Publication 1-02 definitions for *intelligence* makes clear,⁷⁵ it is important to collect on more than the foe. Not understanding an urban area's social structure and the relationships within it can lead to mistakes more costly than losing a battle.

INTEL-36

L/I/Stab/Spt/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Intel should not be the realm of sycophants.

⁷⁴ Heal (2005).

⁷⁵ USJCS (2001 [2004]).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 139

Discussion

The intelligence on the military side was not tied in with the CIA, and the CIA was not listened to. . . . I had my most depressing discussions with the intelligence people who could see what this was leading to and could see what the population thought better than [then director of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance L. Paul] Bremer could. . . . Between Bremer and [then secretary of defense Donald] Rumsfeld, it had to be all talked up, which is the American way. . . . [Other countries instead aim to] underestimate the success . . . to make sure you have the resources before you commit to battle. [That method is] not very popular [in the United States]. Bremer wasn't able to do that. The discussion with Bremer was always on the optimistic side, while, on the intelligence side, it was much less so. And I think [that the] same was true, to an extent, of [then commander of the U.S. Central Command GEN John] Abizaid. You don't succeed [careerwise within the] U.S. system unless you [display a can-do attitude].⁷⁶

Recommendations

Select and promote intel personnel with the personal integrity necessary to deliver unpopular information. Ideally, those responsible for appointing top-level civilian and military leaders should select individuals capable of such frankness.

INTEL-37

D/T/L/I/Stab/Spt/IO/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Legitimacy is crucial to a counterinsurgency. Legitimacy is not a given; it must be established—even marketed—in a competitive environment in which others are vying for it just as much.

Discussion

Part of the problem was that [the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad] never spoke to the common Iraqi. They ignored all those people. And even in Baghdad, they ignored the common Iraqi. . . . When we left in June 2004, it was yet another group of hand-picked Iraqi exiles who were put in charge. . . . It you speak to people in Baghdad, the educated middle class says, "Why didn't anyone come to us? Why didn't anyone try to get us involved in the process?"⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Anonymous source 9.

⁷⁷ Anonymous source 10.

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140 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Recommendations

Train commanders, staff, and all intel personnel not only to understand missions, objectives, and commanders' intents two levels up, but also to maintain understanding of COIN fundamentals and political concerns. Determine which groups are fundamental to recognizing and granting the coalition legitimacy. Thereafter, ascertain how to convince key influencers in those groups that it is the coalition cause that is legitimate and not that of opposing entities and that it is in their best interests to support the coalition in both the immediate and longer terms.

INTEL-38

D/T/I/Stab/Spt/Inter

Issue

Intel takes many forms. Commanders are, at times, insufficiently open to that concept.

Discussion

One anonymous interviewee was providing a senior commander information about persons of interest from many meetings with Iraqis, but

because I couldn't tell him [exactly where and when] they would be there, he thought it was useless. . . . He said he wouldn't call that intelligence. . . . [On the other hand, a TF commander considered] me [equivalent in value to a] second battalion. . . . Nine of ten times, what I learned from my Iraqi contacts was better than anything that the CIA bought.⁷⁸

Recommendation

As many of the I-D-R entries herein make clear, intel of value during counterinsurgency takes nontraditional forms. Concerns with civilian influence nodes, understanding of social interactions, and determination of what media are granted the most attention by a population are but three examples. The discussion here suggests that leaders—both those in the intel field and otherwise—need to understand that sources of information may likewise vary from those with which they are most familiar.

⁷⁸ Anonymous source 10.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 141

INTEL-39

D/T/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Best COIN intel practices will be situation-dependent, but some factors apply almost universally.

Discussion

We asked interviewees what the greatest information-collection or intel challenges are when operating in urban areas during an insurgency:

HUMINT. THTs provide us with a networked information system in support of the task forces.⁷⁹

Linking the SIGINT network to the HUMINT network.⁸⁰

Operations that pull the special-groups guys away and leave the moderates, because the moderates are afraid of the special-groups guys. The only way to do it is to get out and live amongst them. HUMINT is based on relationships.⁸¹

“Having a BCT LNO in the Baghdad Fusion Cell full time.”⁸² The fusion cell was also a good way to obtain intel from or otherwise interact with SOF. COL J. B. Burton’s 2nd BCT, 1st Infantry Division, had a 24-hour liaison relationship with the Baghdad Fusion Cell, a captain at night and a 1LT or E5 during the day. (Most targeting was done at night.)

Another interviewee said that the greatest challenge was having everything fuse in the analysis and control team (ACT)—for example, counter-IED input from the 9th Engineers and all other units. “Our ACT is a bit different [from] others. It’s more like a brigade fusion cell.”⁸³ Local debriefs serve the ACT. The information sent up to BCT level is based on commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) (i.e., the local input is “fused based on CCIR”⁸⁴).

⁷⁹ Burton (2007).

⁸⁰ Burton (2007).

⁸¹ Burton (2007).

⁸² Wetzel (2007).

⁸³ Burton (2007).

⁸⁴ Burton (2007).

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142 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Another said it was discrimination. “There is a lot of that stuff you have to not pay attention to.”⁸⁵ Gunfire, for example, need not be a critical event.

That’s difficult to answer, and, in this insurgency, it depends on where you are and whether the area is Sunni or Shi’a. . . . I was in Sadr City last week, and they haven’t had one walk-in. Sadr City is 97 percent Shi’a. People are watched there. If you go into a mixed area, Sunni would report on Shi’a; Shi’a will report on Sunni.⁸⁶

Recommendation

Note the potential for playing groups off one another (in the last response).

INTEL-40

D/T/I/Tactical

Issue

Various types of intel have value in urban areas.

Discussion

We asked one Army major, looking back on his experiences, what specific types or sources of intel proved notably helpful in dealing with urban insurgencies and insurgencies in general:⁸⁷

HUMINT number 1, SIGINT number 2. . . . The vast majority of the better intel comes from HUMINT. SIGINT will give you specific information on location and only general information on time. . . . With HUMINT, you can . . . verify it with questioning or track record. And again with HUMINT, in an urban environment, somebody always knows what’s going on.

We then asked him which intel is more accurate: “[It] goes to the number of sources you have and your experience in dealing with them, and your training and experiences in their culture. . . . You can’t get body language and facial expressions from SIGINT.”

He continued,

The other two are OSINT [open-source intel] and IMINT [imagery intel]. IMINT is good for the tactical level or operational level. OSINT would be better for information we wouldn’t get from U.S. outlets, but it won’t help you at the tactical level much.

⁸⁵ Burton (2007).

⁸⁶ Trevett (2007).

⁸⁷ Trevett (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 143

Recommendations

Develop doctrine and training to better prepare analysts for the demands of urban and COIN environments, including developing means of more effectively orchestrating inputs from various types of intel. Enhance exploitation of OSINT.

INTEL-41

D/T/I/Tactical

Issue

SIGINT and HUMINT are often closely linked in a counterinsurgency.

Discussion

SIGINT keys HUMINT. SIGINT is great for triggers. . . . You need both sources.⁸⁸

Recommendation

Train accordingly.

INTEL-42

T/L/C2/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Leaders need to ensure that analysts maintain an understanding of conditions on the street.

Discussion

People want to stay in their offices. That's completely the wrong way to go about [analyzing intel] during a counterinsurgency. You have to get out there and live it. . . . From the classroom up, you need to get people out—everybody; you need to get analysts out—at least twice a week. . . . Intelligence officers need to get boots on the ground.⁸⁹

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

⁸⁸ Kron (2007).

⁸⁹ Kron (2007).

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144 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-43

I/Stab

Issue

Short assignments for intel personnel can severely reduce their effectiveness due to unfamiliarity with the theater or AO.

Discussion

I was . . . there [only] four months. I should have been there a lot longer to better understand what types of sources we needed, but I do know [that] it was getting better. . . . The perfect rotation length isn't knowable, or it depends on the person. The longer a person is there, the better their contacts and the better they understand the situation, but there's a trade-off on how long you can benefit from that and maintain your battle rhythm. You're never working less than 12 hours a day, sometimes 15, 16, 17, or 18 hours a day. You had people come for two months and work at a sprint, but they didn't really get to understand the situation.⁹⁰

Recommendation

Consider longer tours for intel personnel, including longer overlaps with units and personnel being replaced and those incoming.

INTEL-44

D/T/I/Tactical

Issue

Cultural understanding and, by extension, good intel analysis must encompass understanding local use of symbols.

Discussion

"Symbols mean different things in the Islamic faith [from what they might mean elsewhere or to non-Muslims]. Water means purity. A sword means you're a warrior." We asked where one finds these symbols: "Posters mainly. I have yet to see anything spray painted."⁹¹

⁹⁰ D. Wood (2007).

⁹¹ Kron (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 145

Recommendations

Seek input from the field on keys to understanding informal means of indigenous communication, including posters, billboards, graffiti, and handouts. Incorporate the results into training for intel personnel, those on patrol, and others as appropriate.

INTEL-45

D/T/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Effective use of detainees in detention facilities has proven very useful in Vietnam and Iraq, but that effectiveness seems to be due largely to individual leader initiatives and ad hoc procedures.

Discussion

HUMINT sources about why people were doing what they were doing when they were [taken prisoner] gave us the best information.⁹²

We're not exploiting the [opportunity to glean intel from detainees] as well as we might.⁹³

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

INTEL-46

T/L/O/C2/I/Stab/Multi/Tactical

Issue

There are many obstacles to multinational intel sharing between host-nation and coalition forces—some legitimate, some otherwise.

⁹² Donald Wood (2007).

⁹³ Miska (2007b).

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146 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Discussion

Information is power. . . . [Our Iraqi counterparts] keep all that stuff close to their vest. Sharing information is sketchy at best. . . . [We do a] lot of carrot-and-stick approach with the IA.⁹⁴

We share some information with [host-nation forces]. I think we're more open with our intel than they are [with theirs].⁹⁵

You really have to build a bond with the person before they start opening up. You have to have lunch every day with [your potential source] so he's likely to open up more.⁹⁶

After a while, we started talking about "terrorists" instead of Jaish al Mahdi. [JAM members] are Shi'a [as are the IA soldiers]. They look at Jaish al Mahdi as good guys. [JAM members] provide food and aid. When you started talking individuals, they were more willing to talk. . . . When you started talking on the Sunni side, they were much more willing to do something.⁹⁷

We do share intelligence, and we'll tell them if there is a report of a [vehicle-borne IED] coming into the area. . . . Sometimes we'll ask the IA to verify our information, or we'll use what we know to see what they're willing to share.⁹⁸

If [members of the population] have the opportunity to give you information without being seen, they will talk. You must make yourself available to them. . . . A guy came up to me and said, "I have some information that I want to tell you, but I don't speak English well enough to explain it to you." So I brought my interpreter up, but [the informant] was afraid of giving [the information] to anybody but me. So I said, "Why don't you email me in Arabic and I'll have my American interpreter translate it." And he said, "That's a great idea." So I'm waiting for him to email it to me.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Anonymous source 19.

⁹⁵ CPT Kevin T. Joyce during Joyce et al. (2007).

⁹⁶ Ostermann (2007).

⁹⁷ Nickolas (2007).

⁹⁸ Joyce during Joyce et al. (2007).

⁹⁹ Ostermann (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 147

We asked this lieutenant whether he has business cards: “I’ve got his phone number, but he said, ‘My phone is really bad.’”¹⁰⁰

Note that some coalition-member representatives hand out cards so that individuals in the community can provide information later. However, it is important that such cards do not reflect any affiliation with coalition forces, as soldiers in Baghdad sometimes found their contact cards on bodies dumped in their AOs.¹⁰¹ Some handed out cards with only a phone number. Even in this case, however, it would be wise to have those receiving calls at those numbers answer in a manner that would not compromise someone were the card found on them.

A number of further challenges and solutions regarding obtaining intel from an indigenous military, members of the population, or enemy is evident in Herrington (1982).

Recommendations

Identify your “people persons” and ensure that they have the maximum opportunity to make contact with the indigenous population, whether civilian, security force, or enemy. Focus on training these members of your command to help them improve the chances of successful interactions. Use those who have proven successful previously to train others.

INTEL-47

D/T/C2/I/Stab/Multi/Inter/Tactical

Issue

COIN environments create multiple multinational and interagency ties, many of which result in various organizations’ representatives being in a headquarters. Effective means of disseminating intel (e.g., tear lines) lags requirements.

Intel cells containing both coalition- and indigenous-force representatives will likely have a dual operational-training function.

Discussion

One potential problem we overcame was the fusion between our Iraqi counterparts and us. . . . [Overcoming this] pays huge tactical dividends. . . . We do run into classification issues a lot. When people send intelligence down, they don’t put tear lines on it. They’ve pretty much gotten over slapping NOFORN on everything. Major [James] Orr has two Brits on his MiTT, and I couldn’t show it to them.

We asked this Army captain whether he shares intel with the Guardians, the Sunni militia formed to fight al Qaeda after Sunni groups fell out with the terrorist organization: “So

¹⁰⁰ Ostermann (2007).

¹⁰¹ Rouse (2007).

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148 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

far, it's been names, descriptions. . . . They have an LNO in here, and he can see, but nothing regarding sources. . . . They are on the checkpoints, so nothing beyond what they need on the checkpoints."¹⁰²

With the Iraqi Army, the problem is that [its members] don't know how to develop a target. Most of their intelligence is HUMINT. Working their way from the little kid dropping the IED up the chain to the guys building it, [it] just doesn't compute. . . . We've had three intelligence classes. . . . We get a new battalion every 90 days. [Those who have completed those classes] come up here for 90 days and then go back down there [to al Basrah] and another one comes up. . . . We deal with a brigadier general who calls down and says, "Here are six guys. Go [attack them] now." . . . And now we're dealing with the [negative] effects. . . . We have 15 wives at the door asking where their husbands are, and we don't know.¹⁰³

[This] battalion commander has sources. . . . [The commanders] are working off intelligence from different sources . . . as are the company commander and platoon leaders at the checkpoints. They run their own sources also. . . . Everything is time sensitive for them. . . . If they took more time, they would be able to get more evidence or get the [entire insurgent] cell.¹⁰⁴

Recommendations

Prepare and distribute intel-process training packages to all units working with or responsible for training indigenous security forces, including police. Train coalition personnel in ways of dealing with indigenous counterparts the better to integrate their intel sources with those of the coalition, one aim being to minimize information fratricide.

INTEL-48

D/T/L/C2/I/SOF/Stab/Spt/Multi/Inter/Tactical

Issue

The number of participants in urban operations complicates intel sharing. Leaving it to personalities—the current solution in many, if not most, instances—is inadequate.

¹⁰² Brooks (2007).

¹⁰³ MAJ James C. Orr during Orr et al. (2007).

¹⁰⁴ Vores (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 149

Discussion

One Army captain told us that there are major problems with SOF causing problems taking down targets in his AO. He said that they did not come to his unit for information and did not provide intel that could help save soldiers' lives, calling this a cause of information fratricide.¹⁰⁵

The sewage pumps don't have enough fuel to operate 24 hours a day. I had to go out and find that myself.¹⁰⁶

A lieutenant colonel in the Army said that he was not getting information from his PRT. "You know who my most valuable sources of intelligence is on Iraqi elections? My interpreter."¹⁰⁷

The crosstalk is rapidly improving. I've been pulled over several times by the Iraqi S-2 to share intelligence. . . . I think that the MiTT living here [in the JSS with Americans and the Iraqis] makes a lot of difference.¹⁰⁸

The Army captain said that the MiTT commander, MAJ James Orr, deserves a lot of the credit for information sharing.¹⁰⁹

It's really easy to slap SECRET NOFORN on [intel]. . . . I spend a lot of time going around reminding people [to use the caveat that allows the information to be released to those in the joint security site who need to see the intel].¹¹⁰

The inability to share intel with the Iraqis, who the coalition hopes to have assumed security responsibilities, means that Iraqi commanders are expected to put their soldiers' lives at risk without being able to gauge the extent of that risk.

Recommendation

Increase awareness at nodes disseminating intel. A standard of making virtually everything classified or NOFORN reflects a lack of understanding of conditions at receiving nodes.

¹⁰⁵ Brooks (2007).

¹⁰⁶ Brooks (2007).

¹⁰⁷ Nickolas (2007).

¹⁰⁸ Obal (2007).

¹⁰⁹ Brooks (2007).

¹¹⁰ Vores (2007).

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150 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-49

T/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Lack of experienced analysts requires extra COIN precautions, because indigenous actors will attempt to use coalition forces for their own ends.

Discussion

Most of our analysts are inexperienced. . . . You don't have the intel warrant analyst who has 11 years experience working with the Iranians. . . . so we've had a lot of counterintelligence used against our intelligences analysts. . . . We've developed some work-arounds, but it's an area that still needs improvement, and we need to get more experience on those teams, especially on the HUMINT side.¹¹¹

Recommendations

Include COIN training and exercise vignettes for both analysts with intel-related military occupational specialties (MOSs) and others (including commanders) involved in intel-analysis processes. Be particularly cautious before taking actions based on indigenous tips when the result will have negative shaping effects or influence operational consequences.

INTEL-50

O/M/I/Stab/Spt/Multi/Inter/Govern

Issue

Solutions can be found to overcome information-sharing problems.

Discussion

OIF was interesting because we had a lot of Soviet-bloc countries that were in the coalition, a lot of security and intelligence issues. Like CENTRIXS [and] SIPRNET for coalitions. We realized that not all coalition members are equal. We built three forms of CENTRIXS: one that was for Arabs—Kuwaitis and Gulf Sates—one of former Soviet-bloc states, and one for more traditional.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Miska (2007b).

¹¹² Trepka (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 151

Recommendations

Continue initiatives that seek to find ways to share needed intel rather than opting for simple denial of information requests.

Seek greater refinement in such sharing capabilities, e.g., gradations within NATO or even by individuals or groups of individuals representing selected countries or organizations.

INTEL-51

T/L/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

COIN intel training requires imagination and initiative.

Discussion

We asked interviewees how they train individuals for an environment in which adaptation is constantly in demand. One Army colonel told us this:

Organize yourself and train yourself day-to-day as you plan to fight. You've got to do it. . . . In Schweinfurt, a small town in Germany, my [intel officer] would track the gangs every day and tell us where a soldier shouldn't go because that's where the Russian gangs hang out.¹¹³

And a major told us, "We conducted what we called *intelligence support to military-police training* by taking the blotter and determining trends and trouble spots from that, so that [our intel analysts] were training on other-than-enemy capabilities and intentions right off."¹¹⁴

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

INTEL-52

D/T/L/C2/I/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

There should be solid intel links between the information being collected on the street and the operational missions and IRs of higher headquarters.

¹¹³ Burton (2007).

¹¹⁴ Wetzell (2007).

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152 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Discussion

PIRs drive IRs. IRs drive SORs: “what the soldier asks on the ground, e.g., if you wanted to know where the gas was going, you ask, ‘Who are you selling the gas to?’”¹¹⁵

Recommendation

Employ this or a similar technique, linking it with shaping and influence-operations messages to be put out by those who will interact with the population.

INTEL-53

T/L/C2/O/I

Issue

Stove-piping and lack of coordination between intel capabilities seems to worsen as one goes up in echelon.

Discussion

We wanted to know who knows what we don't know and has what we need to know. . . . We had intelligence shops that were somewhat separate. I needed information and put a message out to find out who might know something, and then I found that someone in our own shop had information that would have been helpful. . . .

We also asked how one fixed such problems:

We were working so hard that we didn't have time to sharpen the saw. . . . It wasn't until I'd been there four months and was getting ready to leave that I got a briefing on parts of our organization that weren't located with us. . . . In the four months I was there, we . . . had that briefing [only] once. . . . It would have been nice if that part of our intel shop had even let us know of [its] existence. . . . There was a meeting on the organization, but there was never a detailed information exchange. You can't get intelligence from [a] source you don't even know exists.¹¹⁶

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

¹¹⁵ Wetzel (2007).

¹¹⁶ Anonymous source 23.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 153

INTEL-54

D/T/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

One of the at-times-overlooked challenges in Iraq is that the enemy is far from homogeneous.

Discussion

At my time in Iraq, we were frequently surprised by the enemy at the tactical level. We rarely had predictive intelligence. . . . It is such a complex, widespread, and complicated insurgency that we were never going to achieve that, but we did aspire to that. . . . I speak of the “enemy,” but that implies that it is this homogeneous enemy, which, of course, it isn’t.¹¹⁷

Urban operations, and urban counterinsurgency in particular, challenge the intel collector and analyst because he or she must focus on the civilian population as well as on more-traditional aspects of the environment and enemy. The challenge in Iraq in this regard is more complicated than that in Vietnam, Chechnya, or Afghanistan because the threats are so varied.

Recommendations

Adapt training, staffing, and procedures to address this notably unique set of challenges. Continue to pursue innovative approaches in this regard, including the use of police-type data collection and analysis, pushing intel assets to lower echelons, and having fusion cells with broad representation and liaison at multiple levels.

INTEL-55

D/T/I/Stab/Multi/Inter/Govern/Tactical

Issue

OPSEC cuts multiple ways and is a crucial challenge, particularly with respect to HUMINT.

Discussion

So that brings us to HUMINT. . . . Detainee interrogation? Was it effective? Yes. . . . [The British] have improved there. . . . It is in the area of agents [in which] improvement needs to lie. . . . Who was working this? At the higher level, you have the national agencies. [It’s]

¹¹⁷ Stevens (2007).

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154 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

[v]ery difficult to measure that . . . in terms [of] overall intent. I suspect it was not as effective as we would have liked it to have been. . . . It was very good in identifying the political entities linked to the insurgents. . . . Where I feel the intelligence wasn't helpful was in dealing with the people who were actually attacking the coalition. . . . There was certainly insufficient effort prosecuted at the tactical HUMINT level.¹¹⁸

There were insufficient [HUMINT] collectors employed, a situation shared by the British in the south, though we have greatly improved there. . . . Another area we must not forget is the Iraqi HUMINT effort. I always thought this was an area that we could have developed further. . . . The problem was always OPSEC and the level of trust you could invest in these people. . . . This is a long-term business. There was always pressure to have the information yesterday. . . . HUMINT is not a tap that you can just switch on and off. It has to be developed over time. . . . Case development is an area for further development. You may be able to develop [an] individual on the edge of an organization, and then grow them up and into the organization.¹¹⁹

Communication between handlers and agents was not a problem, but if members of the public had information that they wanted to provide to the coalition, doing so was difficult, especially early on:

I just wonder how easy it would have been [for members of the public] to make those calls early on in a secure way. . . . One of the problems was [the number of] interpreters you need to take all those calls.¹²⁰

Recommendations

Develop in-place intel procedures and capabilities for immediately determining tactical-level threats—for example, means of exploiting detainee information, procedures for willing members of the population to safely communicate with coalition forces, and means of assessing risk and compartmenting information to allow maximum effectiveness in coalition–indigenous force intel interactions. These are long-standing historical challenges that result in reinventing the wheel in later contingencies—for example, detainee-information exploitation and U.S.–Republic of Vietnam intel cooperation both were very slow to mature.

¹¹⁸ Anonymous.

¹¹⁹ Stevens (2007).

¹²⁰ Stevens (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 155

INTEL-56

D/L/T/O/C2/I/SOF/Stab/Multi/Inter/Govern

Issue

Intel oversight is critical. Intel systems require an in-theater overarching-synthesis capability.

Discussion

I think the intelligence system demanded a supremo. We definitely would have needed one should we have been up against a [conventional] adversary. [It should definitely be] an American, probably some senior CIA member.¹²¹

“We [the British] had seven intelligence people in Iraq. The CIA had 400. There was almost too much intelligence coming in from the intelligence system for CIA.” This anonymous interviewee said that the British tend to stand back and look at trends while the United States uses its technologies and tremendous amount of resources to analyze the details. The interviewee continued,

[The U.S.-British one] was a good relationship. [The United States] used [British] capacity to stand back and look at trends to give them perspective. It’s something the U.S. should have the resources to do itself now. . . . An American system is better if it has that slightly lateral, British approach alongside of it.¹²²

Another said, “It’s critical to have an intelligence coordinator. [One of the coordinator’s duties] was to make sure that funding was spent well. We have what I think is still the only intelligence system compatible between two major intelligence agencies.”¹²³

Another told us that, through a central handling or clearance organization, agencies had to get approval before recruiting an informant. Lack of approval of a prospective informant did not mean that the individual was already an agent; there might be a bug in the informant’s house, or the denial might have been for other reasons.¹²⁴

We asked this interviewee how this relates to the tasking and coordination groups (TCGs), and whether TCGs handles these aspects. He told us that TCGs were for running live operations. There was at least one member of the constabulary who might know whether one of those being arrested was a source, whose credibility might be enhanced after spending six months in prison. But if there was going to be shooting, they had to handle it differently.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Stevens (2007).

¹²² Anonymous source 13.

¹²³ Duff (2007).

¹²⁴ Albiston (2007).

¹²⁵ Albiston (2007).

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156 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

If the TCG did not know whether an agent was involved, the source unit (the unit that provided the intel to start the operation along with many of the police) would, and one of the first things the constabulary learned was collocation. The source unit would be located right next door. So everything they needed was nearby. “This made the regional head of special branch a very important person. . . . You had to be sure that he was reporting everything he should be reporting in a timely fashion.”¹²⁶

Recommendations

Consider creating an overarching intel organization in Iraq and other theaters in which it is justified. Iraq is a particularly appropriate candidate, given the heterogeneity of the threats, multiple international influences, and internal mobility of some factions that therefore frequently cross boundaries between units and between countries. Emphasize the benefits of collocation and cooperation in doctrine and practice. Establish such cooperation as a service, joint, multinational, and interagency standard.

INTEL-57

L/I/Govern

Issue

Intel-database creation should begin immediately during an occupation, even before formal recognition of an insurgency.

Discussion

We made a lot of effort to establish a database [entry] on every single individual. . . . I fought very hard to build a database that was biometrically based. . . . I think [that] if we had captured everybody in the police force in a biometrically based database, we could have stopped a lot of the police killings, as you could have linked it to the police pay database.¹²⁷

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

¹²⁶ Duff (2007).

¹²⁷ Anonymous source 27.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 157

INTEL-58

T/L/I/Tactical

Issue

There is an intel ethos that not all understand.

Discussion

What I thought was a very strong HUMINT capability in the U.S. Army has been relegated to those people in the [second string]. . . . I was surprised in the lack of resources—money and people—dedicated to HUMINT. I was surprised at the lack of resources put toward translators.

In Northern Ireland, every soldier was an intelligence collector, and then every patrol was debriefed for 20 to 30 minutes after its completion. . . . One is an organization that takes that approach that every single member of the unit is an intelligence gatherer . . . versus another theoretical model [in which] soldiers see themselves as combat soldiers [and] see themselves as extremely good at protecting themselves as shooters but who look at intelligence as a black art and not something [that interests them].¹²⁸

Recommendation

Instill in soldiers that the ethos of the warrior and intel collector are part of the same whole, not separate and competing entities.

INTEL-59

T/I/IO/Tactical

Issue

Protecting an intel source may take an extraordinary effort. The impact goes well beyond the survival of a single individual.

Discussion

We did a huge operation to mask our real intent [which was to protect a source who gave us the key intel].¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Anonymous source 28.

¹²⁹ White (2007).

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158 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Recommendation

Understand that protecting a source who assists the coalition is not merely preservation of an asset and a moral obligation. It also sends a signal to others considering cooperation with coalition representatives. Failure to protect those who step forward demonstrates an inability of the coalition to protect the population that favors it.

INTEL-60

D/L/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Those providing intel to the tactical level from higher echelons are too often out of touch with conditions and requirements at receiving organizations.

Discussion

A British Army captain in Northern Ireland told us that one has to protect sources while protecting one's own. The intel gets so diluted that, by the time it gets to the tactical, usable level, it means absolutely nothing. His solution is that intel have a very separate intake location, almost like a call center, operating entirely outside the chain of command. That way, forces can ask those people, who have a collective knowledge there, so they can protect the knowledge and, most importantly, protect the sources. At the same time, a tactical-level commander could contact that call center with a question, and, because the center operates outside the chain of command, it can answer that question fully and properly. There needs to be some intel applied to the intel. The people always miss out at the tactical level, and the people at the tactical level are the ones with the muddy boots who are actually doing business.¹³⁰

Recommendations

Take steps to ensure that intel of requisite timeliness and quality makes it to the user. Assigning those with recent line experience to organizations screening and classifying or marking intel (either in a liaison or more permanent capacity) is an immediate short-term fix.

¹³⁰ Anning (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 159

INTEL-61

D/T/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Neighborhood censuses have historically proven an effective means of monitoring movement of individuals and identifying possible insurgents and sympathizers.

Discussion

Marines are [monitoring and identifying people] better. . . . They do census. I don't know [whether the Army doesn't do a better job of it] because the army doesn't have enough people [to do it].¹³¹

Census is an opportunity to collect intelligence without compromising the source.¹³²

We've been here for four-plus years and have not done a census. . . . That would significantly help us determine what's going on. . . . I don't think that the Iraqis are going to do it [so we need to, but our] biometrics capability can't handle that magnitude. That's one that is a big issue that we have not addressed.¹³³

Recommendations

Consider taking neighborhood censuses during counterinsurgencies. Thereafter, use them to monitor new arrivals, visitors, and others whose presence might signal undesirable influences or a buildup in preparation for an insurgent offensive.

Determine what software and technologies are needed for proper conduct of such a census. Arrange for the purchase of needed tools and related training for appropriate agency representatives as necessary.

¹³¹ Kirkpatrick (2007).

¹³² Klapmeier (2007).

¹³³ Miska (2007b).

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160 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-62

T/L/C2/I/Stab

Issue

The insurgent takes advantage of that fact that his or her operations span multiple battlespaces, at both the tactical level and those above.

Discussion

I'll target everything I can as far up as I can. . . . The deeper you go into the insurgent network, [the further] it's out of my battle space. I need to feed somebody else. . . . I hope somebody is targeting financiers. It's spreading beyond my battle space.¹³⁴

Just looking at the enemy patterns, it's apparent from discussions [that] they know where our boundaries are. It's pretty hard getting in touch with them. They are . . . out [only] about four hours a day. . . . They'll be coming in and doing attacks in our area, and then run back across into that area because they know no one is active over there.¹³⁵

Recommendations

Seek to develop intel (and supporting kinetic and nonkinetic) operations that minimize the impact of both special and infrastructure boundaries. Eliminate or reduce the effect of stovepipes that further hinder already-difficult conditions in this regard.

INTEL-63

L/C2/I/Multi/Inter

Issue

Staggering cycle rotations (i.e., subordinate units assigned to a division rotating on a different schedule from that of the division headquarters) offer benefits of continuity. However, special care must be taken to track essential orders and other materials that incoming units need during preparation and while in theater.

¹³⁴ Brooks (2007).

¹³⁵ Henley (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 161

Discussion

I'll tell you about an intelligence problem. . . . A corps commander puts out an order in July. . . . When a unit later comes to the corps, [the unit hasn't] seen [the order] unless [its S-2] goes data mining for it. They never get it because some staff officer at corps writes it and hits the send button and says, "Action passed [to someone else] is an action completed."¹³⁶

Recommendation

Consciously establish (and periodically purge and update) continuity folders at higher echelons for distribution to subordinate units that arrive off cycle. Similarly, subordinate units should receive guidance and prepare briefing files for senior headquarters preparing to arrive in a theater.

INTEL-64

T/L/C2/I/Multi/Inter

Issue

At times, U.S. leaders fail to consider how a lack of resources will affect other coalition members' operations.

Discussion

One other area [in which] the Americans are in an absolutely different [league] is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, particularly SIGINT-area platforms. They have technologically moved into a different league, and what they can stack above their people now, in terms of SIGINT platforms [is tremendous]. They've also trained their army to work with this. So the company commanders are really comfortable with the stuff coming down back end. UK [and] Canada [are] not there yet, by a long way. And this was genuinely a little bit bewildering to the American divisional headquarters.¹³⁷

Recommendation

U.S. commanders and their staffs must recognize that coalition partners often lack the funds, equipment, and other support that would allow them to operate at the same tempo as do U.S. forces, then incorporate this understanding into planning cycles and management of operations.

¹³⁶ Longhany (2007).

¹³⁷ Anonymous source 29.

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162 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

INTEL-65

O/I

Issue

Trusted interpreters are difficult to find, and this rarity results in a bottleneck.

Discussion

A major problem was the lack of interpreters [whom] you . . . can trust and thus . . . can be used at the top echelons when sensitive information is being discussed. We ended up [relying heavily on] two of the interpreters in Iraq because they were the only ones we could trust. We used Fijian soldiers who spoke Arabic and used them to screen local interpreters.¹³⁸

There are a considerable number of Arabic speakers in Fiji.¹³⁹

Recommendations

Seek to establish an identification and vetting process for interpreters for areas of interest now. Have processes in place to expand the numbers of trustworthy interpreters in such cases. Similarly, have such vetting processes for potential theaters in which interpreters have not been previously vetted.

INTEL-66

D/I/Multi/Inter/Govern

Issue

Such initiatives as biometric identification and related creation of databases or issuing of ID cards have higher-order implications that need to be considered.

Discussion

Different agencies issued Iraqis different ID cards—some Iraqi agencies, some British, such as CIMIC teams. There was no centralized, single ID card, passport, or driver's license that would provide a single source of information or single spelling of a name.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Goodacre (2007).

¹³⁹ Reid (2007).

¹⁴⁰ Anning (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 163

Recommendations

Centralize such databases and processes as early as possible. Some such centralization could occur before the initiation of operations (e.g., that within a coalition).

INTEL-67

M/I/Tactical

Issue

Coalition soldiers have found considerable intel value in carrying digital cameras.

Discussion

Me and some of my blokes—and, I know, a number of other soldiers—would carry their own personal cameras on the ground because they were useful for suspicious vehicles and that sort of thing. But it wasn't something that we were issued.¹⁴¹

We asked other interviewees whether a digital camera should be an issue item, and we received a resounding yes: "One per team at the most, one per multiple [half platoon] at the least."¹⁴²

Recommendations

Continue the practice of buying digital cameras for small tactical units as several units have already initiated. Ensure that tactical-level communication devices have the capability to send digital images directly from the device.

INTEL-68

T/M/I/Tactical

Issue

A way of invisibly tagging vehicles would assist operations, especially in areas where vehicle registration is not practiced effectively.

¹⁴¹ Grubb (2007).

¹⁴² Anning (2007).

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164 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Discussion

Being able to paint numbers on vehicles or otherwise mark them with ultraviolet (or other suitable) paint would assist in tracking and later identifying vehicles of concern.¹⁴³

Recommendation

Develop means of semipermanently (and, ideally, surreptitiously) tagging vehicles, other equipment, and (perhaps) selected individuals.

INTEL-69

D/T/I/P/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

The following observations compiled during an April 5, 2006, meeting of individuals familiar with urban operations—intel challenges are offered for consideration.¹⁴⁴ There is some overlap with these observations and several of those in other sections. No discussion or recommendation entries accompany this list of issues.

Training

- *The soldier or marine as sensor:* There is a need to train all pertinent members of a coalition how to assume their role in the intel-collection, -analysis, and -dissemination processes—e.g., in a village, town, or city, “everyone is a collector. . . . It’s not just intelligence people or HUMINT people; it’s everybody.”¹⁴⁵
- Training on urban patrolling is key to obtaining quality intel.
- Urban training sessions are too short to allow participants to develop an understanding of noncombatant and enemy behavior patterns.

The other day, a CSS soldier sees a guy walking along with an M-16 . . . and he stops him . . . and it turns out that he’s a guy stealing an M-16. A lot of other soldiers would have let him walk by. . . . To be successful in this environment, you have to get them to pick on the anomalies and report it. . . . For example, a guy with a beard and a desert uniform . . . check their credentials. Don’t hesitate to check credentials [for] anything that looks out of place. . . . [Iraqi] kids have set up these [Coca-Cola] stands all over. And all of a sudden, your guy is driving, and he says, “Hey, where’s [the Iraqi kid] selling his Cokes today?” . . . When the pattern is broken, you need to report it. In the training of taking a civilian and making him a soldier, you need to train him to notice differences in patterns.

¹⁴³ Anning (2007).

¹⁴⁴ Members of the 2006 Joint Urban Warrior intel-discussion group included Linda Carter, Bob Calhoun, Chris Conlin, Russell W. Glenn, Michael Hall, Jay Reist, and Duane Schattle.

¹⁴⁵ Howcroft (2003).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 165

- This Army general said that the Army briefs its convoys to do that as part of a somewhat formal and regimented briefing and debriefing process for his convoys.¹⁴⁶
- Preparation for urban operations overlooks historical lessons. The looting and disorder following the defeat of the Iraqi regime was akin to similar events following the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama.
- Roadblock and patrol training need to include more guidance regarding how valuable these functions can be for intel gathering.
 - One Army major said that his unit had satellite images, but it was not until people at roadblocks started talking that they knew anything about the inside of the town. They told the Army patrol that fedayeen were offering to pay residents to recover weapons hidden near some date palms. Another individual asked to be arrested so that it would not be apparent from discussions that he was helping the patrol. So they handcuffed him and drove him off. They showed him a map, which he studied for a while, but, when he understood it, he pointed out the Ba'ath party headquarters.¹⁴⁷
 - The same major explained that, having occupied the building in which they were going to live, they stockpiled an information base and gave every patrol a name, an objective, and a mission—e.g., “Your mission for this patrol is to find this hospital, find out how many beds are in it, and find out how the people are getting paid. Find out where the bank is.” They used their soldiers to get information.¹⁴⁸

A British general told us,

Checkpoints were used to shape [the population. For example, we would tell people in automobiles,] “We’re here to take Basrah. We’re not going to leave. You need to help us eliminate the Ba’ath party. . . . The place is surrounded. You need to get rid of members of the Ba’ath party and you can see that we are working to do it too.”¹⁴⁹

- Training, planning, and IPB for urban operations requires great attention to detail. The fact that enemy combatants dress as noncombatants makes discriminating between combatants and civilians difficult, especially at range, which increases the risk to noncombatants and makes FP difficult.
- Reconnaissance is a much different mission under stability conditions from what it is under combat conditions. Training does not reflect that.
- Conventional infantry units lack sufficient training with human-exploitation teams and PSYOP units.
- The nature of intel that a unit receives when it first enters an AO and the manner in which it is presented will influence how its members view their environment.

¹⁴⁶ West (2004).

¹⁴⁷ Holt (2003).

¹⁴⁸ Holt (2003).

¹⁴⁹ Bailey (2006).

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166 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

- Investigational skills required to bring down an urban insurgent cell are similar to those skills used to investigate U.S. street gangs. Soldiers with police backgrounds and experience with street gangs can bring unique and valued skill sets to COIN work.

Doctrine, Procedures, and Processes

- Employing the broader Joint Publication 1-02 definition of *military intelligence* is essential to meeting the urban COIN challenge. Knowledge regarding physical and social infrastructure, power relationships, sources of economic health, and much else pertaining to a town or city and its relationship to the areas around it is as crucial to coalition objectives as is knowing the enemy.
- There is a need to speed incoming units' understanding of their urban AOs: Researchers at the USMC Warfighting Laboratory found from historical study and consultation with British Army personnel that gaining reasonable understanding of an unfamiliar urban area was likely to take several weeks of intense collection and study.
- The target identification-engagement lag is often too long, allowing adversaries to escape. Operations in 1993 Mogadishu and those in 2004 Iraqi urban areas demonstrate the difficulty of moving vehicles quickly through town and city streets or approaching an urban target from the right angle at the right time from the air. In short, the ability to engage a target in an urban area after detection falls short of operational needs. Whether achieved via a single system, such as a hunter-killer UAV or much improved responsiveness between acquisition and engagement capabilities, solutions are needed to address the fast pace of urban combat.
- HUMINT procedures are often less developed than those supporting other types of intel.
- Often, tactical units cannot obtain adequate imagery in a timely fashion. Maps at 1:50,000 are generally inadequate for urban operations at lower tactical echelons. Imagery that could compensate for the lack of larger-scale maps is too often unavailable when needed.
- Material of value to those readying for urban operations is too often put on classified systems, even though it is unclassified.
- Much of great value to those preparing for and executing urban operations is also available from unclassified sources that are, at times, overlooked.
- Basic strategic intel on urban centers was found to be, at times, grossly inaccurate:

There was time pressure to take Um Qasar. I thought it was a town of 4,500 and found [that] it was, in reality, 45,000. There was almost no HUMINT. In reality, most of the population was [guest workers] such as Pakistanis.¹⁵⁰

- Traditional IPB methods may be insufficient in preparing for operations against an adversary reliant on irregular tactics and formations.

¹⁵⁰ Howes (2003).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 167

- Better guidance is needed regarding the level at which UAVs should be controlled during urban operations. UAVs assigned to lower-echelon USMC command levels proved extremely helpful and provided responsive intel for delivering and adjusting fires and subsequent damage assessment.
- Too often, units go into urban areas virtually blind with respect to intel, having to start nearly from scratch. A lack of actionable intel results in operations that require increased aggressiveness. This increased aggressiveness may result in unnecessary collateral damage and thereby negative shaping of indigenous perceptions.
- Imagery quality is sometimes inadequate, especially for regular-force units.
- Too often, intel focuses on enemy capabilities and intentions to the neglect of social, criminal, welfare, and other information pertinent to urban operations.
- Indigenous contacts dislike having their contacts change when units rotate.
- There is a tendency to classify people within the indigenous population as friends, neutrals, and enemies, with more or less permanent membership within a given classification. The truth is, such membership categories are fluid, and overt categorization by coalition forces can blind friendly-force personnel to these changes. Further, use of these three “bins” to classify people is overly simplistic and overlooks the considerable nuances that exist in reality.¹⁵¹
- The lack of proper naming conventions for Iraqi detainees has made it difficult to determine detainee status and location of detention for concerned family members.

Command and Control

- Interaction with the population and FP are sometimes in tension. There is risk in having personnel patrolling and otherwise working amid the local population. However, the improved intel and personal contacts resulting from these interactions may result in fewer casualties to coalition personnel.
- Communication systems were sometimes incapable of transmitting intel to all coalition units, particularly those on the move or separated by great distances. Automated intel-analysis systems did not reduce the fog of war, they were not fully compatible within the Army BCS architecture, and the findings were not common, relevant, or current.
- Maps, imagery, grids, and overlay material available to other services and nations is sometimes different from those used by U.S. units on the ground. Security restrictions were a significant impediment in distributing much-needed overhead imagery to ground forces in Mogadishu in 1992–1993. Some progress has been made in lowering the bar in that regard to make more and better imagery available in a timely manner. Security filters that keep products out of the hands of those most in need of them should undergo stringent and frequent evaluation and reevaluation.

¹⁵¹ For an initial discussion of categories other than *friendly*, *enemy*, and *neutral*, see Medby and Glenn (2002, pp. 96–101).

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168 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

- Lack of coordination between military forces and intel agencies nearly resulted in fratricide.
- Interagency-cooperation intel issues need to be rectified before deployment. After MCO, officials from the Coalition Provisional Authority in al Basrah sought to find out from the U.S. Air Force the functional purpose of government buildings that were bombed during the war. The individual who sought this information remarked, “Don’t tell me that [the Air Force] came in and hit all these tactical buildings and then you don’t know what they are.” The Air Force responded that the original governmental purpose of these buildings was classified.¹⁵²
- Limited coordination between different U.S. military and interagency assets has resulted in multiple assets attempting to handle the same HUMINT source.
- Contractors can put themselves at risk and interfere with coalition operations when not informed of relevant intel concerns. Contractors are currently by and large responsible for their own protection, this despite their having, in many cases, jobs that require them to potentially put themselves in harm’s way on urban streets. They are frequently not privy to the intel available to the military units they support, nor are their actions integrated into armed forces’ rapid-reaction force plans. While military or other government officials might decry the lack of control and regulation to guide contractor actions, the contractors themselves have ample reason to demand greater assurances of protection for the risks that they run.
- Policymakers, planners, and operators would benefit from a better-orchestrated joint approach to intel that provides an integrated and accurate intel picture during stability, support, and phase 4 (post-regular force combat) urban operations.
- Urban areas require much in the way of nontraditional intel, e.g., the locations of embassies, cultural sites, and other sensitive sites.
- There is a need to improve intel sharing between SOF and conventional units.
- Continuity and maintenance of expertise may require longer tours for intel personnel than for those in most other functional areas.
- Indigenous intel sources are too often inadequately protected from insurgent retribution.
- At times, there is inadequate passage of vital information between units. The provision of packaged intel reports on IED threats, route trafficability, friendly-force locations, and others allows for improved coordination between a unit and its subordinating or adjacent units or units traveling through the AO.
- Restrictions that impede intel sharing regularly frustrate non-U.S. members of multinational coalitions involving the United States.

¹⁵² Alderson (2004).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 169

Force Structure

- The current TO&E often falls short of intel demands when units are committed to urban operations.
- Marines lacked adequate UAV coverage of Fallujah, which limited some of their maneuver options.

Environmental Factors

- There are too few translators: Lt Col D. P. Hankinson, commander of the British Army's 2nd Royal Tank Regiment during fighting in 2003 Iraq, recalled,

a lot of people wanted to give us information when we first came into town, and you need to get the initiative early on, and it is then [that] we got intelligence and started arresting people. And we could have done even better if we had more interpreters. . . . We had only one interpreter, a Kuwaiti. . . . A lot of people wanted to give us information and we had to turn them away.¹⁵³

- Reliable translators are yet more rare: The British Army 1st Parachute Battalion's 1st Lt Ross Kennedy used a local interpreter and had his regular Kuwaiti translator stand by and listen during an interview in a small city outside of al Basrah, Iraq. At a meeting of the area's reconstruction committee, Lieutenant Kennedy

asked the town engineer what I could do for them. What did they most need money for? The engineer told me, and the interpreter, who was a schoolteacher, said, "We need books. . . ." My Kuwaiti interpreter said "That's not what he said. He said he wants a water-pumping station." They all had their own agenda. . . . It was frustrating.¹⁵⁴

- During stability operations, failure to discriminate between friend and foe can lead to conditions in which coalition forces unknowingly work with insurgents. Townspeople see that this is the case, assume that the coalition knows the insurgent's identity, and consequently lose trust in coalition intentions and methods.
- Iraqi insurgents have sought to acquire and have acquired official vehicles used by indigenous security forces. These vehicles can then be used to disguise themselves and their potentially lethal payloads during anti-coalition force (ACF) operations.
- Security contractors increasingly drive in unmarked vehicles so as to not pose obvious targets for ACF. Unfortunately, the use of unmarked vehicles in urban areas has limited the ability of coalition forces to recognize security-contractor identities, and blue-on-blue incidents have subsequently increased.

¹⁵³ Hankinson (2003).

¹⁵⁴ Kennedy (2003).

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170 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Technologies

- The state of the USMC's tactical intel-collection capability is well behind the state of the art:

Maneuver units have limited ability to see over the next hill, around the next corner, or inside the next building. Supporting intelligence collectors ([Marine UAV squadron], [Antisurface Warfare Improvement Program aircraft], [Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System], theater and national level assets) were great for developing deep targets, subject to the prioritization of higher headquarters (division and higher.) Navigating the labyrinth of collection tasking processes proved too difficult in most cases to get reporting on division targets, and certainly for battalion-level collections. . . . The Marine Corps has a tremendous void in its intelligence collection capabilities at the echelon that needs it the most.¹⁵⁵

- Troops reported a need for better personnel-detection equipment in the urban environment.
- UAV video feeds did not always provide adequate discrimination between enemy and noncombatant personnel.
- UAV operating sounds make the craft difficult to employ covertly.
- Due to large amounts of friendly-force and civilian traffic in urban areas, aerial platforms have a difficult time identifying ground-based curfew violators.
- Imagery of urban areas provided to U.S. commanders is often outdated.

INTEL-70

T/O/I/C2/Avn/Tactical

Issue

Intel assets, like any other resource, will sometimes not be available when needed.

Discussion

As TF 2-2 fought across the chaotic urban landscape, the staff struggled to monitor the battlefield. In the TF 2-2 TOC [tactical operation center] east of the city, CPT Natalie Friel, the assistant S-2 tried desperately to acquire UAV coverage from the Marines. "The Marines," she observed, "covered their own forces with their Pioneer and Shadow UAVs approximately 80–90% of the time. Our battalion had a Raven UAV, but it was virtually ineffective in the city because it could not hover over a location. I constantly had to beg and plead with the Marines via email, phone and Microsoft chat to get their UAV over

¹⁵⁵ Cordesman (2003, p. 187).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 171

[to] our sector.” In the end, [they] reported, “Our UAV coverage became so minimal that I actually requested [that] the [3rd BCT 1st Infantry Division] from Baqubah send me one of [its] Shadow UAVs.” Since TF 2-2 was the supporting effort in the operation, they were clearly not the Marines’ top priority for UAV coverage. It would appear however, that the intensity of the fighting in the Marine sectors forced them to severely limit UAV coverage for TF 2-2.¹⁵⁶

METRICS-1

D/T/L/O/C2/Stab/Spt/Multi/Inter/Tactical

Issues

Metrics are, at times, selected because they are easy to acquire without due consideration of their relationship to objectives. A lack of common definitions further complicates the issue of metrics. Traditional metrics often do not apply to insurgencies.

Discussion

One of my frustrations when it came to metrics was with RC South [in Afghanistan. The people there said,] “Provide me the number of enemy killed in action and give me the number of PRT activities.” We asked them about defining a PRT activity. They never gave us an answer, so we gave them a definition, but all they wanted was a sheet with lots of big numbers. So the data coming was useless because no one was using the same definition for a PRT activity. Was it a medical event? Talking to a tribal leader? . . . [One country’s] RTFs were putting a new operation name to each time they went outside the gate. We didn’t do that, so it looked like [we were] lazy.¹⁵⁷

Early perceived results of my unit’s efforts appeared encouraging: the number of dead bodies on the streets declined significantly. Initially I thought my squadron’s military actions had produced the decline. However, as I learned more about the area, I came to realize that the reduction of bodies on the streets was due not so much to my unit’s military actions but to the simple fact that most of the minority Shia who had lived in Ameriyah had either been killed or had fled the area. . . . I was able to reduce the number of attacks against my soldiers. But I concluded that the result was more due to my squadron changing its tactical movement techniques and patterns than to the number of enemy I captured or killed. . . . The [U.S.] Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine told me to attack the root problems that allowed the insurgency to exist in my area. But some roots were impossible to get at. There were thousands of unemployed young men in Ameriyah. I had much commander’s

¹⁵⁶ Matthews (2006, p. 56).

¹⁵⁷ Anonymous source 7.

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172 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

emergency reconstruction money to spend on endeavors like trash removal and street repair to employ these young men. But they were the Sunni children of the former Ba'athist elite. Rather than picking up the garbage, they wanted to go to college and become computer engineers, college teachers, doctors or lawyers. They could not do this, however, out of fear of leaving Ameriyah and being kidnapped or killed at the checkpoints run by the Shiite militia and Iraqi security forces that surrounded their district. I would have needed the wisdom of Solomon and the power of Franklin D. Roosevelt to solve the economic and employment problems of Ameriyah.¹⁵⁸

Metrics can cloud the situation, and commanders are ill informed despite their best efforts. Measures tend to be these input measurements. For example, [staffing] levels, training, and equipping Iraqi police. . . . My team said something in a report that said something different than the brigade. A call came from Camp Victory asking, "Why are you differing? You shouldn't be differing." . . . And I said, "If you ask a local leader, 'Are the police trained?' he could truthfully answer, 'Yes.'" So they have all green lights up on the chart, but I might have a red light because yes, they are trained, but they are going around intimidating the people. In our rush to brevity, we sacrifice accuracy, and then the poor general thinks he is informed, but he is not.¹⁵⁹

There were those who were saying, "You're not that busy this week, because you weren't doing that many patrols. You haven't killed that many people," and we'd say, "No, you don't get it. Those are completely irrelevant." . . . We would ask [those in the field], "Tell us how you are perceiving it," and that was better than these more formal measures.¹⁶⁰

How do we measure insurgencies? . . . First is the firm assertion that there are no magic numbers—not troops deployed, not dollars spent, not total number of insurgent attacks. As one of West Point's "Irregular Warfare Messages of the Month" notes bluntly, "trying to reduce success or failure to one or two criteria is risky if not irresponsible." Instead, suggests Craig Cohen of the U.S. Institute of Peace, it is better "to devise an aggregate index of indicators." With measures, more may not always be better, but a handful will always be too few.

Second, analysts need a framework that attaches meaning to each metric. As James Clancy and Chuck Crossett explain in one of the Army's leading journals, different officials too often find different meaning in the same numbers because they have no common reference. To one, falling casualties may be good news. But, to another, it is a sign of decreasing

¹⁵⁸ Gentile (2007).

¹⁵⁹ Miley (2007). The views expressed in these statements are those of the individual and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government.

¹⁶⁰ Schreiber (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 173

patrols—a possible indicator of heightened instability. The Army’s Douglas Jones phrases it simply: “it is only through agreement of definitions and a common framework of insurgency that applying measures of effectiveness to counterinsurgency operations becomes useful.” Without a framework, a pile of statistics can be made to fit almost any position.

Third, measures must be important, not just convenient. Counting heads at a graduation parade is far easier than measuring public opinion in a war zone or tracking insurgent financing. But it is a poorer measure of effectiveness. As Frederick W. Kagan notes in the *Armed Forces Journal*, such tallies of casualties, attacks, and trained locals “are measures of convenience, reflecting the ease with which data can be collected and presented rather than its inherent importance.” Honest assessment begins with honest data, even if it is difficult or dangerous to collect.

Fourth, outputs are more important than inputs. Measuring inputs like total dollars spent or the number of bases constructed gauges effort, not effectiveness. As Craig Cohen notes, progress should not be “judged in large part on the basis of international resources expended or programs implemented rather than on the basis of actual results produced.” In some ways, this is related to the problem of convenience; analysts can track coalition actions much more readily than [they can track] their effects. But it is the effects—not efforts—that ultimately matter most.

Fifth—and perhaps most important—is the recognition that the strategy must determine the metrics. The two must be tied.¹⁶¹

Recommendations

Train personnel at all echelons on the development, use, and design of metric systems. Explain the need to nest measures between echelons, and link metrics to objectives at each echelon. Refine understanding of how qualitative and quantitative metrics can be better employed, blended, and presented. Establish a nested set of metrics to facilitate translation to useful measures at higher levels, when such translation is possible. Establish common definitions of metrics to ensure that measures taken across commands and at various echelons are comparable or, if they are not, that users are made aware of the incompatibility. Train to develop and employ metrics that accurately measure progress or effectiveness in addressing objectives. Measures that reflect simply the amount of effort expended will rarely, of themselves, provide this information. Understand that very few outcomes are influenced by only a single factor. Avoid wishful thinking: believing that coalition actions are responsible for results that may be only partially, if at all, attributable to those actions. Recognize that statistics might also have less-than-obvious explanations, e.g., those regarding the high unemployment rates in Colonel Gentile’s AO (as cited in the second quote in the preceding discussion).

¹⁶¹ Margolis (2007).

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174 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

METRICS-2

D/T/L/I/Stab/Spt

Issue

Intel, influence, and measures of effect are inextricably interwoven.

Discussion

You had to understand what was going on both openly and behind closed doors in the provincial council, because there were people who said they supported us and didn't, and vice versa. You had to know what was going on with the 16- to 30-year-olds, because they were your fighters. . . . It didn't take much. . . . Just by putting on basic literacy lessons at night . . . so they could read Koranic passages. . . . It was massive. Building six football pitches could convert 500 potential Mahdi Army to 500 who didn't particularly mind the British Army, which is about as good as you're going to get sometimes. . . . You had to listen to the local clerics, especially the militant ones. . . . Our ability to know what the media was saying, both local and national, was just too slow. We just had to get the locals to do it for us. You have to monitor the economy. . . . And building. Because when people were building you knew things were going well, because people didn't build houses when they didn't think things were going well. . . . A local library, never occurred to me. . . . Asking them which factory we ought to get started up again. . . . Talking to people. That's how we gauged things. . . . This is where the private soldier is important, because he is talking to people.¹⁶²

Recommendations

Eliminate stovepipes between as well as within functional areas. Attempt to link efforts to shape public perceptions to metrics. War-game the metrics to determine likely second- and higher-order effects that will reflect whether the shaping action is influencing the effects desired.

METRICS-3

D/T/C2/Stab/Spt

Issue

Failing to identify metrics during planning hampers operational effectiveness.

¹⁶² Featherstone (2006).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 175

Discussion

We thought about this too late after we opened JSS Casino. We started seeing markets opening. We saw a sign—"I fix generators"—and thought, "Hey, that wasn't here yesterday. That's good." But we realized too late that we hadn't identified what we wanted to measure. Where there were three shops before, now there were 10, but that's anecdotal.¹⁶³

Recommendations

Identify and war-game tentative metrics during the development of operation and campaign plans. Adapt them as necessary during execution.

METRICS-4

T/L/Stab/Spt

Issue

Senior leaders are, at times, uncomfortable or unfamiliar with qualitative ways of gauging progress.

Discussion

This is a failure of how we train our general officers. When we go through [the Battle Command Training Program], it's all quantitative. I shouldn't have to train [some high-level officer on how to use qualitative information].¹⁶⁴

I wish someone had told us to [collect nonkinetic data] in the beginning. We were a young battalion.¹⁶⁵

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

¹⁶³ Nickolas (2007).

¹⁶⁴ Anonymous source 11.

¹⁶⁵ Pirog (2007).

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176 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

METRICS-5

D/T/I/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

A “course critique” approach to collecting information from indigenous populations may be effective in some situations.

Discussion

An anthropologist and military consultant told us that, when providing ways for those to be interviewed or surveyed for measurement purposes, one should treat the situation as if the respondents are students providing course feedback at the end of a semester. They should be asked to evaluate the issue in question (e.g., feelings regarding the legitimacy of the government), using (1) chronological reference points they can readily grasp and (2) a measuring system that they can understand, one that will be consistent across all respondents: “You have to know what counting system they use. . . . Knowing what the common usage is would be essential. Comparatively, it has to be the same from one person to the next.” For example, a question like “How much confidence do you have in the government now compared to [what it was during] the last full moon?” may be more effective than scores (e.g., “Rank your confidence on a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 means very confident.”) or percentages, since respondents might not understand those measures. The forces will need to figure out a way to introduce an understandable system that has uniformity of understanding—perhaps “If one rock means the government doesn’t provide you much help, three means they provide you support that is pretty good, and five rocks means they provide all the support you think they should, what level of support did they provide at the point of the last full moon? How about the level of support now?” This is similar to the way doctors ask people to gauge their level of pain, from 0, which means that the symptoms do not bother the patient at all, to 10, which means that the symptoms are unbearable.¹⁶⁶

Recommendations

Consider these or similarly designed means of obtaining measures from survey audiences. Train soldiers, commanders, and other personnel in their use as appropriate.

¹⁶⁶ Griffin (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 177

METRICS-6

D/T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Linking metrics to objectives is fundamental. Linking them to the phases of a campaign plan is likewise—though too often, no truly interagency campaign plan exists. Its absence means that metrics may be only loosely related to operations and too loosely connected from effective means of measuring progress or lack thereof.

Discussion

The guidelines I received from higher level were very broad. That did not allow me to see what my end state would be. We didn't have a campaign plan when we started, but we later got one from my higher headquarters that was close to ours, which is not surprising, as they told us to do what we told them we would do.¹⁶⁷

There were lines of operations that were consistent between [ISAF, OEF, and RC South]. Each had three. . . . To those we added a fourth: credible task force. Based on those lines of operations, we developed 23 effects that we desired to achieve. We came up with a plan [of] what we would like to achieve every six weeks. . . . Then every week we got together at the lower level to make sure the activities were working toward the goals identified in the six-week plan. At this synchronization meeting, we looked at what the requirements were and what adjustments had to be made to get to those objectives. So you had plans for six months, six weeks, and each day. . . . And when four months was up [battle groups were rotating in and out, as their tours were four months in duration], we went back and let them look at how they wanted to achieve their objectives.

We asked this Dutch general whether he used operations orders:

Yes, we did, but we always linked them to the effects. . . . After about three months, the [government in The Hague] started asking, "Hey, how about results?" So we took a line [for each activity] and rated from 1 to 10 where we were for each effect, with 10 being that you were done and could go home. . . . For example, "Did you bring security to Village A?" And then you rated it for each of the 23 effects, though of course you weren't working all 23 effects at the same time [because you didn't have the assets to do so].

[Measuring whether security was better] required us to make contact with the village mayor, the police chief. . . . It was not the case that we asked the population whether we

¹⁶⁷ Vleugels (2007).

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178 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

had achieved security . . . because they tell you what they think you want to hear. . . . It is not very effective in a sense, but it is the best we could do at that moment.¹⁶⁸

Recommendations

Encourage development of truly interagency campaign plans. Include guidance for incorporating metrics in the plan development, execution, and modification processes.

METRICS-7

T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Synchronization of qualitative and quantitative metrics requires tolerance for ambiguity and a willingness to discuss how such metrics reflect information.

Discussion

How do you quantify the effectiveness of the surge? Every morning I put together the BUA, a 45-minute brief. . . . [There's a] huge qualitative element. There's a focus on relationships, on mentorship and training that exceeds traditional military roles and functions. . . . There are representatives in [the Ministry of Defence], [Ministry of Intelligence], and some other areas, like electricity and oil. Yes, there are some quantitative measures. But there are others: intertribal cooperation. . . .

We followed up with this Marine general, who said that he measures intertribal cooperation by reporting on relationships and cooperation. He said that it was like giving the staff some lead on the reins because their commander does not have all the answers.¹⁶⁹

Recommendations

Introduce the creation, use, and employment of qualitative metrics into leader training at all echelons of military-training schools. Capture best practices from ongoing operations.

¹⁶⁸ Vleugels (2007).

¹⁶⁹ Trepa (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 179

METRICS-8

D/T/C2/Stab/Spt

Issue

Metric design has an inherent time component that should be made apparent when using the measure.

Discussion

I look at monthly statistics. Every BUA has daily attack statistics. They are a waste of time. Weekly statistics are a waste of time. One IED can jack up daily statistics. You have to look at monthly statistics.¹⁷⁰

Recommendation

Develop design guidance for metrics that includes a time component, e.g., that solicits answers to questions like “From what time perspective should the metric be viewed? Daily? Only with inclusion of a week or month of events?” A sample of the types of elements such guidance would include

- To what objective is the metric related, i.e., the metric shows progress or a lack of progress toward accomplishing which goals?
- What other metrics are part of this measure (for compound metrics)?
- When reporting this metric, what period of time should it cover (hour, day, week, month, each event, other)?
- Which types of units or sources are best able to provide the measurements needed for this metric?
- How might the data to support this metric be collected?
- What metrics at the next-higher echelon will this measure support?

METRICS-9

D/L/C2/Stab

Issue

Consistency across a theater and over time may require creation of an upper-echelon metric cell.

¹⁷⁰ Trevett (2007).

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180 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Discussion

You need to have an embedded team to measure effects [and to ensure maintenance of standards].¹⁷¹

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

COIN-1

D/T/L/C2/I/Stab/Spt/Multi/Inter/Govern/Tactical

Issue

CIMIC is often not integrated with other aspects of an operation or campaign.

Discussion

If you're not tying your civil affairs into a larger campaign, then you are wasting your time. . . . [People were going to small villages without coordinating their efforts with others.] They would find [that] they were the third traveling road show [to show up there] in a week. It's great to have civil-affairs specialists, but if you're coordinating it only at the corps level, it's not doing much. Better to have an emergency civil-affairs kit in the back of the vehicle [like the British and Canadians do]. You need to integrate it; if it's run by the [civil-affairs] staff, it has no extended impact. [It] needs to be coordinated with all activities.¹⁷²

Recommendation

Develop true multinational and interagency campaign plans that encompass all relevant aspects of coalition activities.

COIN-2

D/T/L/I/Tactical

Issue

U.S. personnel sometimes allow personal ethics to inappropriately interfere with mission requirements. They also, at times, fail to step outside of their own mindsets.

¹⁷¹ Mackay (2007).

¹⁷² Anonymous source 1.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 181

Discussion

In Muslim countries the government carefully monitors *and controls* what goes on in the mosques because they understand their power. But we shy away from that because we believe in religious freedom.¹⁷³

This same Canadian intel director told us that his people do not understand the people whom they are facing, especially the role of the strongmen in those societies (usually tribal, religious, or regional). He said that intel agencies need to get cleared experts from the region to help them understand how and why things happen and to get away from thinking in terms of who is on which side and realize that they will help us or hurt us based on their interests. This is why, he said, it is impossible to provide enemy strength; only some of the people are full-time insurgents.¹⁷⁴

Recommendations

Avoid applying inappropriate moral, political, or other predispositions to situations. Employ indigenous personnel in intel analysis and other roles to assist in overcoming both avoidable and unavoidable cultural ignorance.

COIN-3

D/T/L/C2/SOF/Stab/IO/Multi/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Despite significant successes in some locations, SOF–regular force coordination remains too dependent on commander personalities. Too frequently, the friction is the result of SOF failure to properly appreciate regular-force responsibilities, capabilities, or perceptions.

Discussion

[A combined joint special-operations TF] snatched two brothers who were sons of a sheikh [with whom we have very good relations. They] did coordinate it, but did so poorly. They said, “We’re coming by to pick up this guy named whatever” and used a name that was so common the task force couldn’t know who it was. . . . He’s still in jail, and I’m trying to deal with their father, and I haven’t been able to find [the son]. . . . These guys go in and blow down doors . . . when all they need to do is knock and they’ll let them in. . . . They killed the son in a Christian family. . . . They said [that the son] was reaching for a gun.

¹⁷³ Barlow (undated).

¹⁷⁴ Barlow (undated).

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182 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Yeah, okay, he shouldn't have done that, but these guys blew down the door, blew through the wall, and came with all their toys.¹⁷⁵

The failure of SOF leaders to adequately coordinate with the regular-force commander responsible for an AO has long been a shortfall in U.S.-Afghan and -Iraqi operations. We were told of a very similar IO fratricide event in 2003–2004 Afghanistan.

If you then have an American major running around in your area of operations that treats the [Afghan] province governor like a platoon commander, then that is very strange. . . . What I tried to do [to overcome the damage being done] was develop a geographical separation. . . . He worked generally in the western side of the province. He cleared out the Taliban from a particular area and put in a checkpoint manned by Afghans, and two days later it was destroyed by the Taliban. And he said, "See, you can't do both security and development at the same time. You have to clear the town of Taliban first and then do development." And our approach was that you have to stay there. You can't just leave. So you have two different approaches to the same problem.¹⁷⁶

SOF are generally highly proficient and professional. All specialty areas have their sub-standard performers, however. SOF failures to clear operations in another unit's AO has been and continues to be a problem in Afghanistan and Iraq. Similarly, SOF direct action that leads to damaged homes or other affronts to a population that regular forces are attempting to win over—damage, at times, not reported to the owning unit—causes information fratricide that undermines attempts to favorably influence the population.

Regular-force OPSEC compromises after SOF notification of pending actions are rare.

Recommendations

Cease allowing unrealistic concerns regarding OPSEC to act as an excuse for inadequate coordination. If necessary, put SOF units in an appropriate command relationship subordinate to the conventional-unit commander responsible for a given AO. At a minimum, require notification and postevent debriefing that provide sufficient information to address incidents that potentially undermine coalition objectives.

¹⁷⁵ Nickolas (2007).

¹⁷⁶ Vleugels (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 183

COIN-4

D/T/C2/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Selecting installation or outpost locations near villages includes myriad factors, some of which are not readily apparent at times.

Discussion

The two most important items on the platoon house were [that] it had to be defensible, but it had to be [accessible] to the population . . . because what we want to achieve is to instill confidence in the population. . . . You have to be able to support the platoon house. . . . Put it out in a way that you can support it. . . . It has to be a concerted effort, so you have a PRT in there. You have military in there. . . . In one case [the platoon house, actually a small installation, was] built by Afghans. . . . Elsewhere, we had to build ourselves. . . . The platoon house is the first step in enlarging the ink spot. If you establish it, then you should turn it over to the [Afghan National Army], and then move on to another spot [once the area is secured and cleared of enemy].¹⁷⁷

One Dutch Army captain told us about a company commander who coordinated with village elders of Singola as well as with the platoon commander who would staff it. It was about 200 yards from the outer boundary of the village and 800 yards from the center of the village. It suited the army's needs because it wanted to be close to the village population without interrupting daily life patterns. Village society is very inward looking, and putting a platoon house smack in a village would be disruptive. Taliban could capitalize on it through little things like accusing the troops of staring at a woman too long. One has to find, he told us, that middle ground between a military position and one that the people would approach and interact with the troops. Frankly, he said, he thought that the army failed. It was too far away for contact with the villagers and had a river running between the platoon house and the village.¹⁷⁸

A group of Dutch officers named these as among the variables to consider in selecting platoon houses:

- number of routes to get there (due to concerns about IEDs)
- fields of fire and fields of view
- ease of resupply and reinforcement
- proximity to town: close enough to make contact with civilians and have them come to base without compromising themselves
- if in town, one risks being accused of using civilians as shields

¹⁷⁷ Vleugels (2007).

¹⁷⁸ Coenen (2007).

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184 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

- safety of civilians
- whether it is sacred ground
- proximity to enemy “rat lines” or other points of interest.¹⁷⁹

Platoon houses were located to avoid drawing Taliban fire on nearby civilians. Dutch outposts of this type sometimes hugged built-up areas but were not actually in the villages or towns. In the Balkans, the Dutch once deliberately positioned their headquarters so that the Serbs would fire on it and not the nearby town.¹⁸⁰

One of these officers said that, for “Kakrah [one of the two platoon houses in the Dutch 17 Mechanized Battalion area], we coordinated with the local very influential Sayed tribe for the location. We had no problems there as a result, despite it being on sacred ground.”¹⁸¹ Another added, “but the Taliban used it as propaganda against us.”¹⁸²

Recommendations

As for JSSs in Baghdad and outposts anywhere, a considerable number of factors influence the choice of location. Only some of these are security related. Collect on the factors used to make such decisions, and create guidance for urban and rural outpost, base camp, and larger installations in this regard.

COIN-5

D/T/Man/C2/I/FS/Stab/FP/IO/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Determining the appropriate location of coalition outposts (COPs), JSSs, platoon houses, bases, or other installations within an urban area is a complex issue with broad impact.

Discussion

I directed that we pick out a location for a company base, [and I looked at several locations that didn't work]. We went to the pink schoolhouse with 27 kids, and it had a big parking lot, and I say, “This is great!” So we go in, and the next day, we have 350 students because the Americans are there. So that won't work, because that's not going to read very well in the *New York Times*, that we threw kids out of school.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ Crumbach (2007a), Wijers (2007), Clayden (2007), Luijten (2007), Quandt (2007), Noordzij (2007), Verhoef (2007).

¹⁸⁰ Gouweleeuw and Oerlemans (2007).

¹⁸¹ Luijten (2007).

¹⁸² Noordzij (2007).

¹⁸³ Burton (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 185

A number of factors influenced Colonel Burton's site selection, and they differed depending on the neighborhood and other factors. Areas between Sunni and Shi'a communities were flashpoints for violence. It is there that he put his COPs.¹⁸⁴

In large cities, in contrast, locating small installations in the midst of troubled areas may be highly desirable, as they better allow coalition members to respond to local threats against residents and more frequently present opportunities for intel collection. Failure to maintain such a presence can result in surrendering a neighborhood to insurgent influence.

During a briefing, an Army colonel said, about the policy of moving units into "super FOBs,"

The immediate impact of putting in COP Casino was that stores opened and tip lines started to light up. Another benefit of living amongst the people is that, when they complain that the electricity is out or that there is no water, the soldiers can say "Hey, we're living out here with you. We don't like it either." It gives you increased credibility. . . . You cannot commute to work during a counterinsurgency fight.¹⁸⁵

The murder rate in west Baghdad went from about 275 a week to about half of that when we put that first JSS in.¹⁸⁶

A COP is coalition only, so you have only one source of support. A JSS includes ISF [Iraqi security forces], "so you're stupid to have a COP alone because you only have the one source of support. So you grab a squad from an ISF unit and put it in a COP and say, "You keep one platoon here all the time," and you have a JSS with two sources of support.¹⁸⁷

Recommendations

Treat the placement of any overt COP or other facility as an operation, giving it the same level of analysis and war-gaming as an operation plan or order. Lessons-learned capabilities should include a study analyzing the many factors influencing placement of such installations, accounting for environmental, threat, and cultural factors.

Create multinational coalition-indigenous force outposts and patrol bases when security and other operational conditions allow, thereby taking advantage of the indigenous unit's greater familiarity with the culture (and, potentially, the AO, if it is from the region or has served there for an extended period).

For several concise initial thoughts in this regard, see 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2006, pp. 15-1-15-6).

¹⁸⁴ Burton (2007).

¹⁸⁵ Miska (2007a).

¹⁸⁶ Miska (2007a).

¹⁸⁷ Nelson (2007).

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186 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN-6

D/T/L/M/C2/SOF/Stab/FP/Multi/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Despite repeated occurrences, failure to coordinate unit movements in urban areas continues to risk fratricide.

Discussion

I think the coordination should have been better in Uruzgan [in Afghanistan]. For example, when there was a U.S. PRT patrol or U.S. SF [special-forces] patrol, there was no coordination for timings or routes. I don't need to know details, but give me a couple of grid squares and the times it needs to be out of bounds.

We followed up by asking whether they had had any instances of fratricide: "Luckily, we didn't, but we did have reports from platoons asking 'Hey, who is that moving in our area?' We had the same problems with Dutch SF."¹⁸⁸

Recommendation

Consider formation of TCGs or similar organizations to better coordinate actions and avoid both physical and information fratricide.¹⁸⁹

COIN-7

T/L/C2/CSS/Stab/Spt/IO/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Some aid organizations act as magnets for others. Loss of these can precipitate loss of NGO support valuable to coalition operations.

Discussion

In Tirin Kota, there was a UNAMA [UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan] office, but it was closed down, and now we're trying to get it back. . . . When UNAMA is there, it attracts other aid organizations.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ Anonymous source 3.

¹⁸⁹ For more on TCGs and coordinating friendly-force activities, see Glenn (2007c, pp. 59–64).

¹⁹⁰ Gouweleeuw (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 187

Recommendations

Cultivate the support of key NGOs during planning, training, and other predeployment activities, and consciously act to maintain that support after in-theater arrival. Incorporate IGOs and NGOs into coalitions to the extent feasible.

COIN-8

O/Stab/Spt/Inter/Govern

Issue

Combatant command and joint TF structures are not optimal for unconventional conflict.

Discussion

Infrastructure manning—those responsible for planning infrastructure recovery—was only 650 strong out of 16,000 people at [U.S. Central Command].¹⁹¹

Recommendations

Review standing and transient joint and service organizational structures in light of likely future contingencies. Consider introducing increased flexibility in those organizations, e.g., including or removing components from other agencies and organizations as threat and other requirements change. The result may be a less fixed command, one with a greater variety of formal and informal command relationships encompassing a broader range of capabilities than they do now.

COIN-9

D/T/C2/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Assisting in developing small businesses has much in common with the attention to detail and commitment necessary to make one's own small business succeed.

Discussion

Maximum \$500 is what I would give [to start up a business]. Out of 109 businesses that started, 108 were left—only one failed. That's food on the table for 3,800 people. And I didn't choose who would get money. The local community representatives selected them.

¹⁹¹ Featherstone (2006).

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188 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Each quarter had 12 representatives, and they included everybody from an ex-thief, [to] a street urchin, to a local cleric. I recruited the help of a minor cleric . . . and he sent me one representative, and he found these people. . . . I said I wanted people without a voice, because they were the ones picking up weapons. And I included clerics as well, but not more than one cleric per group. . . .

[We called it] Operation Kick Start. . . . The community committee could put anyone forward as long as there was no one in their extended family in the business they were recommending. . . . And the other condition was that, when they started work, they had to hire a younger person from another family, so there were two families benefiting. . . . The committee would bring in half a dozen people every couple of weeks. And they would tell me what their business was . . . and if I decided the business was viable, then they had to sign a receipt for the \$500 and show me a receipt for what they bought within seven days, and had to let me inspect [the business] within 30 days. [The requirements of not allowing family members and having to include someone from another family meant that] self-interest was put to the back. I had people attacking the Mahdi Army [because they were interfering with the program]. My intelligence was better than the human exploitation team [that was at brigade]. And it's not because I was running an intelligence system. . . . It's because these people really believed they were part of something that was succeeding. . . .

Operation Kick Start was the microeconomic program. Operation South Sea was going on at the same time to build 14 community centers in the biggest Mahdi Army–recruiting areas in Al Amara, and we tried to get water and sewage improvements in these areas too, so they would have reasonable sewage, clean water, and a community center.¹⁹²

The money from Kick Start came from the brigade commander, Andrew Kennett. He sourced it from Army Civil-Military Cooperation underspend, because the civil servants in charge of the treasury money would not give it to them:

It was a classic case of treasury civil servants who had never visited our tactical area to see what we were doing. . . . We are . . . talking about [only] two people here. . . . It was this case of them thinking they knew better, and the general wanting the money spent this way. . . .

These things cost a fortune. There are three things that are [essential to] success. One is [that] there must be a total buy-in to the people by the local troops . . . and that means you must be amongst the people. The other two things are interrelated. Intelligence and . . . financial autonomy must be held at the local company level. . . . It's the ability to do things immediately that is the difference between . . . success and ultimate failure. . . . It was about leadership. You lead your soldiers. You lead the local policemen . . . but actually you have to lead the local people, and it's going to be bloody painful, but you're going to be with them every step of the way. . . . [That's] trust. I never carried out an arrest in the time of a cease-

¹⁹² Featherstone (2006).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 189

fire, because that would have been seen as wrong by the people. . . . They respected honesty, and people hadn't been straight with them, [saying] that Basra was going to be Kuwait City in two years, and that simply wasn't going to be the case.¹⁹³

Recommendations

Attention to clients (community members), the labor market, and commercial influences is important to successfully grooming indigenous economic health, just as are other environmental factors, such as maintaining security. Develop a comprehensive system approach to capacity building in the economic sector just as in any other sector.

Decentralize all critical aspects of decisionmaking, including those financial. Individuals more distant from conditions on the ground are less likely to have an understanding of local needs than those intimately involved. This is true regardless of the nature of the agency involved. The military recognizes that counterinsurgency is the realm of the strategic corporal and platoon operations. Leaders in other organizations need to do the same.

COIN-10

D/T/L/C2/SOF/Stab/FP/IO/Tactical

Issue

At times, the enemy shares interests with the coalition on which the latter can capitalize.

Discussion

Getting interpreters, local ones who you could get the local people to trust [was vital, as was] getting them a "get out of jail for free card" from the Mahdi Army because they would be recognized as a neutral party. I never asked my interpreters to collect intelligence.¹⁹⁴

Recommendation

Do not assume that history or conditions elsewhere dictate reality in an AO. Be willing to negotiate with the foe when it serves operational objectives. Many is the insurgent leader who later became a local or national leader; such negotiations are means both of obtaining immediate benefits and of potentially influencing the strategic situation in the longer run.

¹⁹³ Featherstone (2006).

¹⁹⁴ Featherstone (2006).

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190 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN-11

SOF/Stab/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Maintaining separation between police and military-type responsibilities is desirable.

Discussion

We don't want to be putting cops [into COIN situations. If we do,] some [police] units think they are getting good at kicking doors, and they say, "Let's go get some terrorists." You have to also remember that police have to have reasonable suspicion to act, and they have to apply reasonable force. [Military units don't have those guidelines.] This is one of the problems in Brazil. The military police are ostensibly the patrol unit down there. They tend to use lethal force in almost every situation. Ask how many have been in a situation involving lethal force and almost everybody in the room raises his hand. Eighty to 90 percent raise their hand. If you go to the U.S. and ask a [special weapons and tactics] team the same question, maybe 10 percent have ever used lethal force. Then go back down to Brazil and ask how many have ever been in a hand-to-hand situation [during an effort to] arrest somebody. Maybe one or two hands go up. They always rely on lethal force.¹⁹⁵

Recommendations

When developing security-force capabilities, delineate between traditional military and law-enforcement roles. Consider development of separate laws and judicial systems to deal with insurgent, terrorist, or other acts characteristic of irregular warfare and those that normally would fall into the realm belonging to the police and related judicial processes.

COIN-12

T/L/P/I/Stab/Spt/FP/IO/Tactical

Issue

U.S. forces are too often guilty of viewing situations only from their own perspective. This is an issue at virtually every rank.

Discussion

I felt [that] there was not rigor in the information we were getting. It was not collaborated. Some would come in and say, "The governor is corrupt," and then he would be considered corrupt. . . . What was not acceptable was that then [the local U.S. commander] would not

¹⁹⁵ Jany (2006).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 191

work with him. Well, I'd love to work with Gandhi or Mother Teresa too, but I can't. . . . These are elected officials. We have to work with them. . . . We were accused of having connections with insurgents. Of course we did. [Much of the population was related to one or more insurgents.] Now if they were supporting them, it was one thing, but if they simply weren't reporting on them, that was something else. . . . The military got to the point [at which] they were risk averse. They have to be because people's lives are on the line. . . . The system punishes them if they [take casualties,] but it doesn't punish them if they overreact. They are not rewarded for accuracy. They are rewarded for overreacting and punishing everybody. . . . You can't treat everybody as if they are guilty. . . . I've never seen a group who are so much creatures of their nature. . . . When they are threatened, they want to smack back . . . and yet when the person on the other side acts, there is no understanding that their reaction is exactly the same. . . . Yes, killing his brother was a mistake, but that doesn't mean he doesn't want to kill you.¹⁹⁶

In the military, . . . complex, divergent thinkers, either . . . bite their tongue or they get out. . . . Very, very rarely they get to be generals.¹⁹⁷

You could always tell when [an SF operational detachment alpha] was working with the Afghan Army. They always had a lot more contact with the people. They had a lot more contact with the enemy because they knew where they were. . . . You have to have courage to disperse because we are more vulnerable, and we lack that courage . . . but it's the only way we are going to win.¹⁹⁸

A conference considering 21st-century leadership challenges associated with irregular warfare included the following among 44 shortfalls requiring corrective action in the U.S. military:

Promotes and perpetuates leaders in one's own image instead of as needed for 21st-century complex operating environments

Favors protecting careers and organizations over daring to take legitimate risks

Punishes and restrains risk takers instead of encouraging them

Does not seek "positional advantage" in all dimensions of the complex environment

Does not think dynamically about the full range of "audiences" to be targeted

¹⁹⁶ Anonymous source 31.

¹⁹⁷ Anonymous source 12.

¹⁹⁸ Schreiber (2007).

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192 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Does not trust subordinates to use initiative

Does not grasp information operations well or at all

Is unfamiliar with other agencies, their cultures and resource capabilities

Is more inclined to compete with rather than cooperate with other agency cultures

Is rushed through a promotion system that does not allow adequate accumulation of experience

Is constrained by a career progression system based on post-World War II and Cold War imperatives, concepts, interests and threats. . . .¹⁹⁹

Recommendations

Train leaders to “walk around the table” and view situations from the perspectives of other parties. Cease rewarding the overly conservative, risk-averse leader who sacrifices mission effectiveness due to excessive FP concerns.

COIN-13

D/L/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

There is danger in believing that metrics are telling you what you want to see.

Discussion

The military would look and say, “It’s stable, so let’s go someplace else.” Well, maybe it’s stable because of the footprint we have there. . . . There is a rush to determine a snapshot of the security situation in order to reduce the footprint. . . . We’re seeing an increase in violence in [this city] because they continue to decrease the number of soldiers there. . . . [When we started pulling out] the Iraqis themselves said, “We are not ready yet.”²⁰⁰

Recommendations

Understand that accurately interpreting metrics is as important as identifying appropriate measures. Guard against undue optimism. View metrics from the perspective of all relevant parties.

¹⁹⁹ McCormick Foundation (2007).

²⁰⁰ Anonymous source 31.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 193

COIN-14

D/T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/IO/Multi/Inter/Govern/Tactical

Issue

CERP and other aid efforts are often not coordinated over time, undermining both coalition efforts and the building of the indigenous government's legitimacy.

Discussion

[We need] infrastructure integration. Projects would be funded with CERP, then, six months later, there would be no money to run the project. The people would go to the government and ask for money, and the government would say, "We know nothing about this." . . . We were marginalizing the same governments we were trying to turn over to. [We] shouldn't use CERP money [when it wasn't coordinated with the local government].

A lot of division commanders want immediate results. . . . Instead of just using the CERP funds, they should ask how are you going to sustain it. Medical facilities are the worst case. We build a facility but don't check [how] they [are] going to get doctors or nurses, maintain equipment, and the like. We don't do a very good job of sustaining [our initiatives].²⁰¹

Recommendations

There is value in permitting CERP expenditures, but those expenditures should be considered in terms of both their immediate and longer-term impacts, including the need to maintain the result of the expenditure. Training regarding CERP and other funding must emphasize the need to consider indigenous capabilities to maintain a project after completion, e.g., will other funds be necessary to retain functionality? Will they be forthcoming? Does the local population include anyone with the requisite skills to run and maintain the project? The project should likely not be undertaken if the answers to such questions are not favorable.

Higher-level and follow-on headquarters should receive descriptions of subordinate-unit projects with the notion of integrating efforts into overall capacity building.

²⁰¹ Longhany (2007).

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194 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN-15

L/C2/Stab/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Coalition leaders are sometimes too tolerant of indigenous-leader incompetence, corruption, or other shortfalls.

Discussion

No unit can overcome its commander. A good commander can overcome his unit's shortcomings. . . . When we've clearly identified that this guy won't cut it, we won't remove him, and they won't remove him.²⁰²

While applying the same standards of competence to developing nations' security-force and other leaders will, in general, be impractical, undue tolerance undermines progress toward an acceptable state while implying coalition tolerance of leader shortfalls.

Recommendation

Indigenous security and other leaders' acceptable and unacceptable behaviors should be identified in coalition operations' orders and plans. Remove those leaders who cannot or will not change.

COIN-16

D/T/I/Stab

Issue

Destroying insurgent leadership is sometimes key to prevailing. Often it is not.

Discussion

We also spent a lot of time, money, blood, and treasure on going after MVTs [medium-value targets] and HVTs . . . and I don't think it had a great deal of effect on the Taliban because they are not hierarchical. If we killed one guy, they just replaced him in about 10 minutes. . . . [In that regard,] they are not that different [from] us.²⁰³

²⁰² Haskins (2006).

²⁰³ Schreiber (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 195

What we always wanted to do was not kill the HVTs and MVTs, but to make them irrelevant. . . . We didn't want to kill the fish. We wanted to poison the water.²⁰⁴

Recommendations

Ensure that tactical objectives support operational and strategic objectives. Do not assume that conventional-warfare approaches have value during irregular contingencies.

COIN-17

T/Stab/IO/Tactical

Issue

Use of coalition-nation imams can have dramatic operational effect.

Discussion

We brought an imam with us because we knew that religion played a much larger role in Afghanistan than it did back home. [He was a Muslim Canadian Land Forces Command chaplain, a man in our uniform.] Most of the mullahs were spreading anticoalition propaganda, and [our] imam went into a mosque to pray, and because he was an imam instead of a mullah . . . everything that the locals had been told was turned on its head in a minute. It was like a bomb went off, and it spread like wildfire. . . . Everything they had been told for generations [was things like] "The pale faces are all adulterers," and suddenly here's a guy who understands their scriptures better than they do. . . . It blew them away.²⁰⁵

Recommendations

Understand social, religious, and other internal hierarchies relevant to your AO, and capitalize on them.

COIN-18

D/T/L/C2/I/Stab/FP/Multi/Inter/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Instances of the military using too much force are numerous, and improvement is needed. However, the balance between force and restraint will depend on the situation.

²⁰⁴ Schreiber (2007).

²⁰⁵ Schreiber (2007).

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196 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Discussion

One Army colonel told us that the means that were particularly effective in reducing support for insurgents included these:

First is presence. You have to be there, and you can't just show up and talk about a better life. . . . The second one is courage. . . . The third one is ruthlessness. The Afghans understand ruthlessness. They understand and respect that. We had about a thousand Taliban who had built a defensive complex outside of Kandahar. . . . It was a vineyard. We called it super bocage. . . . It cut off the key [routes]. . . . We wanted to attack, but we told the local governors that we were worried about destroying too many drying huts . . . and they said, "Don't worry about the collateral damage. You are being too cautious. We need to remove this virus. You are being too easy on them." . . . They needed to know that the coalition was tougher than the Taliban, was meaner than the Taliban. I think we are squeamish with being mean, and that is sometimes viewed as weakness in Afghanistan.

When we replaced the Americans, the Taliban told the locals . . . "The Americans are abandoning you and now you're going to have to deal with us. ISAF made a deliberate effort to street the rebuilding effort . . . but what the people heard was that ISAF wanted to avoid combat, and they started to support the Taliban. The Afghans see that we have the capability. They see the helicopters and all. . . . They question whether we have the will, and the only way to convince them that we have the will is to do it. You can't talk it. You've got to do it. Especially with the Afghans—they've had 200 years of empty promises, and especially the past few years, they've had their share of empty promises. . . . And the last one would be IO exploitation. . . . When we do something, we need to make sure the Afghans know we're doing it."²⁰⁶

Recommendations

Address the overuse of force, but do not overcompensate by restraining its use too greatly. Train leaders and their subordinates to understand when and what types of force or other coercion are appropriate and how to diagnose situations calling for such employment.

COIN-19

T/Stab/IO/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Sometimes it is better to address a threat by providing the population with a better alternative.

²⁰⁶ Schreiber (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 197

Discussion

We asked some interviewees what methods have proven effective in neutralizing anticoalition clerics or others promoting proinsurgency or anticoalition behavior in the population:

I will give you a negative example. You might want to look at what they tried to do in Hilla, where the [Coalition Provisional Authority] office empowered . . . a pro-coalition cleric.²⁰⁷

The militias wouldn't have been as powerful if we'd provided the security to create the public space for [leaders not promoting the use of violence]. . . People formed militias because they felt they needed a way to advance their interests and they saw no other way to do it, and they saw [that] we were not providing security. So they did it themselves.²⁰⁸

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

COIN-20

D/T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/IO/Tactical

Issue

Traditional police or civil control methods may have application during international contingencies.

Discussion

I would have [used] curfews.²⁰⁹

Recommendation

Consider employing beat patrolling, curfews, public announcements, and other typical public-management tools that may have application for a force attempting to maintain or restore control of civilian-population behaviors.

²⁰⁷ Phee (2006).

²⁰⁸ Phee (2006).

²⁰⁹ Phee (2006).

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198 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN-21

D/T/Stab/IO/Tactical

Issue

Some units have aid packets ready to go to speed repair of damage done during coalition operations.

Discussion

Units in TF 1-64 Armor had packets—with food, water, repair materials, or equipment necessary to restore order—prepared for operations in western Baghdad.²¹⁰

Recommendation

Prepare the administrative and logistics elements necessary to speed repairs, payments, or other compensation for damage done during coalition operations or to demonstrate coalition concern after devastation wrought by the enemy.

COIN-22

D/T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/IO/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Indigenous-force or indigenous-official behavior can undermine coalition legitimacy.

Discussion

We heard that, when we were doing joint census with the police, the police were going back once they had seen the inside of the house and were extorting them.²¹¹

Recommendations

Take precautions to prevent public perceptions that affiliate corruption or other negative behaviors by indigenous agents with coalition forces. Support and promote public distribution of disciplinary efforts taken to minimize the number of such events.

²¹⁰ Hayden (2007).

²¹¹ Nickolas (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 199

COIN-23

D/L/Stab/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Lack of an interagency campaign plan and related overarching authority continues to weaken coalition efforts.

Discussion

The people in [this unnamed community] know how to get money from the [local government]. They are Shi'a; the government is Shi'a. They've got projects going in all over the place. They knew how to run the system. . . . They are not cooperating with us.

This anonymous interviewee went on to tell us that the TF commander did not want to provide any support to the community in question; he said that he convinced his commander to cut off money, to coerce them to support the coalition, but the TF commander was frustrated because he could not cut off funds other than his own unit's. He added that USAID, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, IRD, and other funds should also be cut off to support tactical objectives.²¹²

An anonymous commander was having problems influencing a community that was intimidating residents of a given demographic group. He therefore cut off aid to pressure the community to cease supporting those using the violence. However, USAID came in with \$8.2 million and, as he put it, "screwed up the whole plan." The USAID representative did not coordinate with the military commander responsible for the area. Said the interviewee, from his perspective, "USAID doesn't want to be seen working with the military." Such a lack of cooperation can have direct and lethal implications for coalition forces. When asked what he did in situations such as that in which USAID money was going into the problem community, the commander stated that he monitored

to see where the money goes. If the money [is supposed to go] to businesses hiring young people, then you watch. . . . In [one location], we didn't see guys hiring [and there weren't people working where they should have been if the money was actually being spent as reported]. And when someone can get an individual to emplace an IED for \$5,000, you know where it's going.

Recommendation

Develop interagency campaign plans that include authorities for oversight of operations to avoid such counterproductive actions.

²¹² Anonymous source 15.

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200 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN-24

D/L/Stab/IO/Tactical

Issue

Opportunities for favorably shaping indigenous public opinion will present themselves.

Discussion

TF 2-12 Cavalry reacted effectively to enemy militia cutting off the water supply to the western Baghdad neighborhood of Shula:

Jaish al Mahdi claimed [that] the Americans had cut off the water. We took advantage of it. We sent two [heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks] with water, and they said “Why would the Americans cut off the water and then bring it to us?” They weren’t buying it.²¹³

Recommendations

Plan for and otherwise prepare for shaping coups that unexpectedly offer themselves. Include identification of such opportunities in PIRs or other intel guidelines.

COIN-25

T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Habitual relationships are important during counterinsurgencies.

Discussion

Brigades with long-standing, habitual task-organization relationships are frequently broken apart when deployed to Iraq. We found on more than one occasion that multiple TFs were taken from the brigades with which they trained and replaced by unfamiliar units. The primary reason for the division of habitual relationships seemed to have been deployment schedules rather than unit capabilities, reflecting that the shortfalls are at the strategic—and, likely to a lesser extent, the operational—level.

When you have a battalion working with a brigade [with which it has] never worked . . . before, and a brigade working with a division [with which it has] never worked . . . before . . . you’re trying to figure out your counterpart while you’re trying to figure out your mis-

²¹³ Nickolas (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 201

sion on the ground. . . . And ratings figure in. . . . If you're the odd man out, the man who hasn't worked with the commander before, that's got to worry you a little bit.²¹⁴

We realized that HUMINT was going to be a huge thing. . . . We gave up our THTs to our battalions early on so they could go through all the training we did while preparing for deployment. The downside was that we had three battalions assigned elsewhere and got three battalions that hadn't organized in that way, but luckily, corps gave us the people we needed and, while training them was tough, the [HUMINT officer] got done, and it worked out.²¹⁵

That good commanders and common doctrine generally compensate for unnecessary breaking of habitual relationships does not justify it. Inefficiencies and lesser effectiveness are inevitable.

Recommendation

Manage deployments and maintenance of unit habitual relationships better at all levels.

COIN-26

D/T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Basic C2 relationship standards seem to be overlooked during irregular-warfare contingencies.

Discussion

One of the things I think is lacking is that there is not a very robust coalition command-and-control structure. The Iraqis—we don't even refer to them as coalition partners. So there is no really integrated command-and-control structure. There is not a single Iraqi war fighter in my headquarters. I have no [Iraqi] army dudes or police sitting in my headquarters. If I could change something, that is one of the things I would change—to have a truly unified command. . . . There's not an Iraqi G3 [Army operations officer] sitting next to a U.S. G3 [as is the case with the U.S. Forces Korea or a NATO] model.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Longhany (2007).

²¹⁵ Wetzel (2007).

²¹⁶ Burton (2007).

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202 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Recommendation

Look to successful coalitions and historical alliance relationships, and apply best practices to counterinsurgency and other irregular operational environments.

COIN-27

T/L/I/Stab/Tactical

Issue

COIN training requires imagination and initiative.

Discussion

We asked a U.S. Army colonel how he trains individuals for an environment in which adaptation is constantly in demand:²¹⁷

Organize yourself and train yourself day-to-day as you plan to fight. You've got to do it. . . . In Schweinfurt, a small town in Germany, my [intel officer] would track the gangs every day and tell us where a soldier shouldn't go because that's where the Russian gangs hang out.

At the same time, your tankers have to operate a tank. Your gunners need to fire their guns. We went to Grafenwöhr early. . . . I told [the personnel there that] I was not going to put people in a range tower. I am going to have people moving around the range environment with their weapons uploaded in a red status so that they are aware of their environment. We clothed the targets in typical Arab garb. [We] equipped some with weapons, some with hidden weapons. We put them in buildings so that they would pop up in windows. Tank table VIII became something other than firing at plywood. They fired at snipers on rooftops. So for instance, we ran the entire Graf set as a battlefield.

Meanwhile, [my supply unit] is running supplies [as it would during operations in Iraq]. There were no ammo pads.

I had the advantage of having [aircraft] flying security, and then I could hand off the aircraft to platoon leaders who could then call on the aircraft and control the air support.

Meanwhile, you have to train your family-readiness groups on everything from the notification process and memorial services back home to hosting memorials out in the training environment.

²¹⁷ Discussion comments are from Burton (2007) unless otherwise noted.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 203

It's the exercise of the totality of the environment in Iraq. You have to study a tour. I could find no better [way of doing that] than squeezing the head of the company commanders and platoon leaders from OIF 2.

An Army major noted, "We conducted what we called 'intelligence support to military police training' by taking the blotter and determining trends and trouble spots from that, so that [our intel analysts] were training on other-than-enemy capabilities and intentions right off."²¹⁸

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

COIN-28

Stab/Spt/Inter

Issue

There is often little synchronization of military and other-agency training directed at enhancing indigenous capacity for self-government.

Discussion

The NAC has no oversight or budgetary authority. . . . Sometimes it seems [that] we are the only people dealing with the [community government]. I have a MiTT with the battalion. There is a [MiTT] with the brigade. There is no equivalent on the civilian side.²¹⁹

Recommendation

Create interagency transition teams that synchronize related subsystems, e.g., a justice transition team would encompass police, prison system, courts, and evidentiary processes among its areas of responsibility.

²¹⁸ Wetzel (2007).

²¹⁹ Brooks (2007).

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204 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN-29

T/L/C2/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Indigenous security units with families in or near the AO will rarely put mission before the safety of loved ones.

Discussion

Fortunately, the Peshmerga units have families well to the north and thus are insulated from retribution to a greater extent than those in other units. The unit from Basra . . . is particularly good. They and the units from Kurdistan have been extended for an additional 90 days beyond their initial 90 day tour.²²⁰

Indigenous soldiers abandoning their units to take care of family safety was a factor during U.S. operations with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, notably during the final operations in the war.

Recommendation

While difficult to influence and an issue when recruiting, consider assigning indigenous regular-force units to locations remote from where their families reside and—at least initially—recommend that families not be brought to AOs. Other solutions (e.g., providing housing and jobs on installations) may be necessary for police and other local security forces.

COIN-30

D/T/Stab/Govern/Tactical

Issue

The original concept of MiTTs alone completing the preparation of IA units was flawed.

Discussion

An anonymous interviewee told us that the initial strategy for training Iraqi security forces was to improve their training by having a U.S. unit work with Iraqis, then a MiTT would take over to get them to level 1. However, the interviewee noted, a MiTT of “10 people lacks the juice to get them to level 1, so we’ve maintained the relationship of U.S. units with their counterparts.”

²²⁰ Miska (2007a).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 205

This generally involves a one-echelon difference between the U.S. and Iraqi units, e.g., a U.S. company works with an Iraqi battalion.²²¹

Recommendation

Assign MiTTs to the commands initially training security-force units, thereby augmenting both the receiving unit and MiTT as they undertake the responsibility.

COIN-31

O/Stab/Inter/Tactical

Issue

U.S. units are more effective at kinetic than at nonkinetic targeting.

Discussion

We asked an Army colonel how the problem of not conducting effective nonkinetic targeting could be addressed: "Get the experience. There are FBI agents over here, but there aren't enough of them."²²²

We really need this ability at the company level, and we don't have that here.²²³

Recommendations

Enhance doctrine and training regarding nonkinetic targeting. Consider employing law-enforcement personnel or techniques in support of that training.

COIN-32

T/L/C2/Stab/Multi/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Despite talk of letting Iraqis take on responsibility, it appears that some in the coalition are too impatient or simply unaware of the need to allow them to do so. There is at times, however, reason for the impatience.

²²¹ Anonymous source 20.

²²² Miska (2007b).

²²³ Miska (2007b).

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206 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Discussion

We have a joke that sometimes we create crack babies [as they rely on us]. . . . We are a safety net beneath them. . . . They are not getting [to the level of responsibility that we wish they were]. The operational commanders in the field are saying, “We wanted to do something, but [Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq] did it for us [because we were too deliberate in preparing the plan].”²²⁴

One of the hardest things is getting them to tell us [what the metrics should be]. “*En shala*” [is the response]. We’ve had meetings in which we [coordinated] everything and said, “Right, it’s on for tomorrow, right?” And the response is “*en shala.*” . . . They don’t like to set timelines. They ask, “Why are you driving us to your timeline?”²²⁵

I think that, if we left themselves to themselves tomorrow, they’d muddle through. . . . The key is to be there behind them when they need help to muddle through. . . . They don’t want somebody there telling them what to do. They want somebody there helping them do what they want to do.²²⁶

The hardest part is matching MiTT skills to the challenge. The kid down there will say, “Well, back home, we do it this way,” and that’s not the way it’s done here. He doesn’t know that, so he wants the Iraqis to do it that way, and the young captain or sergeant doesn’t know any better. . . . The [MiTT]—17 guys for 750 men in a battalion—that’s not enough.²²⁷

We need to better align the skill sets on the [MiTTs] with those in the units. . . . The higher the level is, the more particular we need to be in who we select. . . . but we don’t even have enough [MiTTs] for the units that need them now.²²⁸

One U.S. Army colonel noted that the Army needs to reexamine the way it advises. It tries to replicate itself: “We try to set up their [Ministry of Defence] like our DoD. Because we say [that] the NCO corps is the key to our army, we try to replicate the same [in] their military, a concept entirely alien to them. . . . We do that everywhere. We did it in Nicaragua.”²²⁹

²²⁴ Anonymous source 21.

²²⁵ Anonymous source 21.

²²⁶ Anonymous source 24.

²²⁷ Anonymous source 24.

²²⁸ Anonymous source 21.

²²⁹ Smith (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 207

Recommendations

There is a call for patience more often than for unilateral action or assuming the reins when building indigenous capacity. The role of adviser is a delicate and difficult one, one for which many are unsuited. Screen advisers well. Allow the indigenous leader to fail when failure is tolerable, thereafter debriefing the failure just as one would during a U.S. operation.

Advisers must recognize that their primary role is one of training. Before making any decision, they should ask themselves, “Is the situation so important that my assuming control overrides my mission of training this leader?”

Attempt to better align indigenous-unit needs with the skills of MiTT personnel, e.g., matching logisticians with units that need their insights. Similarly, consider varying the number and types of MiTT personnel assigned to a unit based on (1) where in the training process the indigenous unit is, (2) its demonstrated potential and willingness to improve, and (3) its level of proficiency.

COIN-33

D/T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/Inter/Govern

Issue

The interworkings of counterinsurgency, capacity building, and other aspects inherent in undertakings like those in Afghanistan and Iraq are becoming evident as they have not been since the end of Japan’s and Germany’s occupations. Now is the time to learn and develop doctrine both for immediate and future applications.

Discussion

Key to [the] next phase is to translate this into [political] and economic progress. [It is] not yet clear how this is to happen. We have excellent macroeconomists and excellent PRTs—not sure what the connection ought to be between them, if any. You could argue that the PRTs operate in a macroeconomic framework and that nothing else is required.²³⁰

While there is much talk of better interagency cooperation, improvement is too slow to meet field requirements. Coherent compilation and analysis of lessons learned and best-practice identification in the other-than-military realm is virtually nonexistent.

Recommendation

Coalition lessons-learned capabilities should assume the burden of identifying challenges and solutions regarding other-agency and interagency operations during counterinsurgency, occupations, and capacity-building campaigns. Though this may not be their responsibility, vital

²³⁰ Rollo (2007).

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208 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

lessons will be lost—and are already being lost—if DoD and its international counterparts do not step forward.

COIN-34

L/C2/Stab/Multi/Inter/Govern

Issues

The lack of an overarching campaign plan of real interagency character inhibits development of effective organizational structures, including headquarters in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mere interagency representation is insufficient. It requires the personnel or someone with the appropriate talent, personality, and rank.

Discussion

Diplomats were being terrorized by colonels asking for decisions using PowerPoint slides. “That’s why we have to have ambassadors,” they say, “because if they aren’t ambassadors, they are terrorized by colonels with PowerPoint slides.” . . . I think this [Multi-National Force–Iraq] should be an interagency headquarters as well. . . . How often do you see an Iraqi officer in our headquarters? We have plenty in their headquarters. . . . We should have one campaign plan rather than two.²³¹

Recommendation

Create the structure necessary at the strategic and operational levels to oversee and enforce the creation of truly interagency campaign plans and influence formation and staffing of organizations when it is necessary to execute those campaign plans.

COIN-35

D/T/Stab/Tactical

Issue

A definition of *counterinsurgency* that limits the phenomenon to organizations seeking the overthrow of a government is insufficient.

²³¹ Anonymous source 22.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 209

Discussion

[Al Qaeda Iraq] has stated that [it knows that it] cannot overthrow the current government. . . . Number one, [it seeks] to oust the coalition from Iraq. Number two, [it seeks] to undermine the government of Iraq because it is the consequence of [the coalition] being there. . . . [JAM] doesn't want to oust the government. It's Shi'a. Why would [it]?²³²

Recommendation

Broaden the doctrinal definition of *insurgency*. For one suggestion in that regard, see *Counter-insurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI)*, which proposes that *insurgency* be defined as “an organized movement seeking to replace or undermine all or part of the sovereignty of one or more constituted governments through the protracted use of subversion and armed conflict.”²³³

COIN-36

D/L/C2/Stab/Multi/Inter/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Unit rotations too often disrupt progress and frustrate local leaders.

Discussion

Consistency in programs between rotations is a key to COIN success. Currently rotation-to-rotation changes in policy are disruptive and frustrating for local leaders, who see coalition support as a variable that changes with each new unit's arrival.

Recommendations

Create, disseminate, and enforce the mission, commander's intent, tasks, and other aspects of an interagency campaign plan. Require approval of significant changes of course in policy.

Select military and other-agency leaders capable of making the right choices in support of coalition objectives.

²³² Trevett (2007).

²³³ Glenn (2007c, p. 52).

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210 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN-37

L/FS/Stab/Govern

Issue

The dominance of U.S. (and some allied) military power is such that it should reconsider the extent to which it is used, given the country's likely postconflict responsibilities.

Discussion

Was our intelligence good enough to say [that] we were up against a force that relied on those power stations, in order for us to defeat them? Did we need to knock out the water-pumping station? Did we need to knock out two-thirds of the power station? Did we need to take down power lines? And I know there was a positive approach not to knock out infrastructure, but in the end, we dropped five out of six bridges across the Shatt al Arab around Basra. We strangled the city, basically, and did we need to? What was the payoff? And I don't know what the payoff was. By knocking those bridges out, did we stop a huge [number] of forces [from] moving northward? I don't know. Did they have the means to retreat northward, or were the majority of them foot bound? Again, those are questions [to which] I don't know the answers. I think we could have been a little bit gentler, a bit softer maybe.²³⁴

Recommendation

Backward-plan conventional operations from a point of coalition forces leaving the theater or turning over responsibility to the indigenous country's government. Doing so would mean that occupation responsibilities, recovery from combat, and other components of a deployment would receive appropriate consideration during campaign planning.

COIN-38

D/T/L/Stab/Tactical

Issue

The COIN balance between force and restraint requires greater attention from those training upper-echelon leaders, those receiving the training, and policymakers.

²³⁴ Anonymous source 25.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 211

Discussion

“We have to do with less force, I think. . . . I think that in itself produces a very different mind-set. If you don’t have the overwhelming force available,” then—UK ambassador to Iraq William Patey told us. Forces, he said, have to approach things differently. He expressed uncertainty about whether, if UK generals had overwhelming force, they would act similarly. “Hearts and minds is a much bigger armament in our armory than Black Hawks.”²³⁵

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

COIN-39

T/L/Stab

Issue

Many of the same challenges recognized in 2003 and during previous counterinsurgencies remain.

Discussion

As Ambassador Patey noted about fiscal management,

The problems with the PRTs are that we introduced them when we started running out of money. . . . I suspect that it was a bit late, in my judgment. The danger with the PRTs is that we raised expectations and we didn’t have the money to put into it.

He worried that the PRTs were another manifestation of coalition forces doing things for the Iraqis while under pressure from capitals to let the Iraqis do things themselves.²³⁶ About alienating the public, Patey said,

The number of people in detention was counterproductive. . . . You would get lots of people rounded up, and, by the time you processed them. . . . It took over two or three months for the system to deal with [someone], and by the time he went out, he went off rather pissed off, and with some interesting new contacts, I would think. . . . Intellectually, commanders agree that it is a problem, setting whole communities against them.²³⁷

And about failing to manage expectations, Patey explained that, after telling the indignant population that there was a payoff for groups joining the political process, Sunnis would

²³⁵ Patey (2007).

²³⁶ Patey (2007).

²³⁷ Patey (2007).

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212 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

join the government and then ask, “Where is the payoff?” It takes time, he noted, and he emphasized the importance of managing expectations.²³⁸

Recommendations

Develop training and identify those leaders early who will act to force necessary changes in policy in a timelier manner.

COIN-40

D/L/Stab/Govern

Issue

The “oil spot” approach might have application to capacity building as well as security.

Discussion

Rather than spreading your effort across all of your 20 police stations to get uniformity, you focus your resources on five ‘beacon’ police stations.²³⁹

Recommendation

Create models that demonstrate the feasibility of attaining sought-after goals.

COIN-41

D/L/C2/Stab/Spt/Inter

Issue

The same organization need not have the lead in all regions or functional areas.

Discussion

The military might be in charge in some provinces, the police or other agency elsewhere, and, if it isn’t working in some provinces, maybe it all falls under the military. Maybe in Afghanistan the overall man is a four-star general, but his top man in three provinces is a police commissioner.²⁴⁰

²³⁸ Patey (2007).

²³⁹ Mackay (2007).

²⁴⁰ Albiston (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 213

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

COIN-42

D/Stab/IO

Issue

Survival and a reasonable life, rather than ideology, are the primary motivators for most in a population.

Discussion

What means were particularly effective reducing support for insurgents? Eighty percent [of the population was] sitting on the fence. Ten percent were for the government of Afghanistan; 10 percent were Taliban supporters. What the 80 percent want is security, and they want it to be permanent.²⁴¹

Regarding British operations in 1960–1970s Dhofar, Oman, MG Tony Jeapes wrote,

The reactions of the Jebeli civilians were disappointing. Although they were sympathetic, they did not dare to help. “You say you will be here a long time,” one old man told [the soldier]. “But what is a long time, one week, two weeks? And the [JAM] have never stayed here during the monsoon. The Communists are here the whole time. As soon as you leave, they will come back and punish anyone who helped you.” . . . The theme of every broadcast and every leaflet was “permanence,” but as the Tawi Atair operation had shown, the civilians were not going to climb off the fence until they were sure which side would win.²⁴²

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

²⁴¹ Vernon (2007a).

²⁴² Jeapes (2005, pp. 96, 141).

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214 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN-43

L/O/Stab

Issue

Some believe that nonkinetic functional areas tend to attract, on average, a lesser quality of personnel.

Discussion

The crème-de la-crème go to the kinetic side. . . . It tends to be the B-level officers who go into the nonkinetic areas.²⁴³

Recommendation

If this is true, adapt staffing policies to redress deficiencies where needed. The importance of nonkinetic operations requires that key billets have the requisite quality soldier assigned.

COIN-44

T/L/P/C2/M/I/Stab/Spt/FP/IO/Tactical

Issues

There is a call for actively assisting soldiers (including officers) to avoid developing antipathy toward the indigenous population.

Unit type and mission can dramatically influence soldier and marine attitudes toward the indigenous population.

Discussion

People from CIMIC and PRTs have a different perception than from the battle group. I think the battle group has a more negative attitude.²⁴⁴

People from the battle group . . . see only people shooting at them.²⁴⁵

²⁴³ Anonymous.

²⁴⁴ Anonymous source 5.

²⁴⁵ Anonymous source 6.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 215

Our cultural-awareness training is based on the premise that [troops] need to understand the Afghan. They are taught to always consider how the Afghan considers them. . . . [They say things like,] “Afghans stink.” . . . So we ask them, “What if you had no washing machine? What if you lived on a dirt floor? Afghan houses are as clean inside as they can make them.” Most soldiers in the battle group never see the inside of an Afghan house. . . . The battle-group commander saw that some of the soldiers were feeling negatively about Muslim culture due to the controversial nature of the subject in the Netherlands, and that’s why he asked me to develop the cultural training. That’s why I added the mosque visit. . . . I am presently talking to the chaplain service to talk about this with [its] soldiers. I am also proposing repetition training for battle-group soldiers once they are in theater, and . . . immersion training for specific groups of soldiers such as the HUMINT and [operational mentor and liaison team], where they live with Afghans for three or four days, where they sleep . . . eat, and everything else with Afghans. . . . I recently made a trip [to Afghanistan] and made a point of talking to soldiers. I have 100 pages of notes. They were obsessed with TICs, how many they’ve had. . . . It very much depends on the soldier [and whether they are working with a PRT or battle group].”²⁴⁶

The big thing is how you keep a company together. You have to keep them human in an extreme environment like that. . . . [It is especially difficult] for the American army [which stays] for [12] months. . . . We were talking about extending tours, and I think that’s a bad idea. We tend to dehumanize killing to some extent, and you want to do that, but . . . in [counterinsurgency,] it is so important to maintain your humanity. . . . You can’t allow soldiers to go too far . . . to become too dehumanized [with respect to their attitudes toward civilians]. Inevitably, it’s your most junior soldier who will have to make the decision whether to engage a target or not. . . . There should never be any talk of body counts. You can’t measure success by body counts.²⁴⁷

I think [that] people can begin to get resentful. . . . I remember [that,] one day, my soldiers showed me a DVD of some [of our] camp workers who’d been captured and had their throats slit, and I shouldn’t have watched it, but I did. After that, we just wanted to go out and patrol and find any insurgents that we could. And we were angry and we were resentful of the locals. We couldn’t understand how people could do that to another person, and we kind of lumped everybody in as one, even though it was insurgents who were doing it. . . . I think what’s required is regular reminding of all of us—especially the junior ranks—of . . . why we’re there, what we’re trying to achieve, and the good things about the culture and history of the people that we’re there to help and protect. Because sometimes in that environment, you can’t help it, but your attitude will get worse and worse. . . . [It would be an educational] campaign that also involves bringing over Arabs—not necessarily from Iraq—to speak to the troops . . . so that they can identify with them as humans rather than

²⁴⁶ Anonymous source 4.

²⁴⁷ Featherstone (2006).

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216 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

patrolling in vehicles and being removed from that populace. . . . That [also] needs to be constantly going on whilst we're there in Iraq. The troops will need reminding at least once a month that we have a purpose to build a bridge for these people, and we're only going to lose the conflict if we are disrespectful and rude towards them or angry towards them. . . . We need constant reminding of that. . . . I had no idea [that] I would encounter that sort of barbarity.²⁴⁸

Recommendation

Develop predeployment, deployment, and postdeployment educational sessions to assist personnel who have significant contact with members of the population to retain an appropriate perspective on the indigenous population. Substantive predeployment contacts with members of the indigenous society can help in this regard, as might similar contacts at in-theater training facilities. Regardless of the procedure employed, leaders should take steps to humanize the indigenous public in the eyes of their personnel. Unlike in conventional war, during which dehumanization of the enemy has been a norm, counterinsurgency demands not only an understanding of the noncombatant, but also a realization that compassion offered the insurgent can, at times, provide significant payoffs. There are numerous historical examples of compassionate treatment being promised to insurgents who surrender and benefits being reaped by following through on those promises. Examples in Malaya, Dhofar (Oman), and elsewhere have complements from the U.S. experience in Vietnam.²⁴⁹

COIN-45

D/T/L/I/Stab/Spt/Govern

Issue

There is danger in giving in to the temptation to hold families responsible for acts of relatives who are terrorists, insurgents, or other perpetrators. There is, in fact, a reasonable argument for providing such people support on par with that provided other needy members of the indigenous population.

Discussion

The reality is that, if the government isn't providing normal social security for the families of the people who are locked in prison, there are plenty of other people who will step in and do so. And there are, in terrorist organizations, as in the Mafia gangs, elaborate welfare arrangements. Even the Kray brothers, who ruled the East End of London in the '60s, had a fairly sophisticated welfare system to look after the families of those who were serving

²⁴⁸ Grubb (2007).

²⁴⁹ See, e.g., Deforest and Chanoff (1990) and, to a lesser extent, Herrington (1982).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 217

prison sentences because of the activities that they'd carried out at the behest of the Kray brothers themselves. The Kray brothers are very famous in British criminal folklore.²⁵⁰

Recommendation

Hamas, Hizballah, and groups associated with Muqtada al-Sadr all use social aid to promote their causes. Government failure to do so—or the more extreme decision to punish those related to perpetrators—can play into the hands of opponents.

COIN-46

L/Stab/Govern

Issue

Imposing stiff prison sentences, accompanied by separation from family and colleagues, may be an effective tool in mitigating insurgent recruiting and undermining morale.

Discussion

One of the things that I think hurt the [Irish Republican Army] in particular . . . was the fact that, when people were caught on the mainland [in England], they would tend to get much heavier sentences than they'd get here in Northern Ireland. They would get 25-year and 30-year sentences, and they would be sentenced to serve in a variety of prisons in England. They would be moved every three years from somewhere up in the north to somewhere in the south. That had a big effect on the families because the families could . . . afford to come over and see them maybe [only] twice a year, and it was very heart-wrenching for the families and very heart-wrenching for the prisoners. Although some people would say, "Well, it didn't stop them bombing England," that's true, but I know it did on occasion make it much more difficult for them to get top-quality operatives to go to England. Because guys were saying, "Hang on, I have a wife and family here. I've got three young children. If I get caught and spend 25 years in jail, I'm not going to see my kids growing up." Whereas even here in Northern Ireland, they knew the maximum they were going to . . . serve [was] 10, 12 years maximum. . . . If I'm a life prisoner, I'll get [released] after 12.88 years. . . . You have to get it out of the [minds] of the entire family that terrorism is a sensible route to go down.²⁵¹

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

²⁵⁰ Albiston (2007).

²⁵¹ Duff (2007).

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218 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

COIN-47

D/T/L/C2/I/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

As has often been noted in previous books in this series, every action taken (and many not taken) and every decision made (some not made) can influence the attitudes of the enemy and noncombatant population toward a coalition.

Discussion

One guy who became a leading terrorist and killed a lot of people . . . was easily converted to being a trigger man, a man who pressed the button on a roadside bomb. It was the humiliation of his mother who was kept waiting 20 minutes in the rain by an army patrol outside her car while her car was searched and checked. But yet another guy came to us and worked for us because an army patrol pulled his mother's vehicle out of a ditch, cleaned the mud off, bent the fender out so she could drive, and got her home safely. One guy I know of—when asked why he agreed to work for us—said that, for many years, he'd been thinking that terrorism was wrong and killing people was wrong [but he believed what he had been taught about the British and Protestants and was working with the Irish Republican Army. One day he and some comrades] were approaching a vehicle checkpoint that the police were manning, and this guy said the other boys in the car were saying, "Look at these f-ing bastards." But when they got to the vehicle checkpoint, the constable was very fair, very firm. He said, "Good evening, gentlemen," [even though] he knew the guys were terrorists. He knew they wouldn't have anything on them unless they were incredibly stupid, but he said, "Good evening, guys. Would you mind getting out and opening your [trunk] while I do a quick search?" He was very civil. He satisfied himself they had nothing incriminating, and he let them go. As they drove off, one of the terrorists said, "They're bastards, aren't they?" and that guy said, "Well, that guy actually was very civil about the whole thing. He was very reasonable, just doing his job." And that was one of the three or four things that turned that guy—a simple bit of firm but fair policing. Throw that in with a bit of kindness here or there, and throw that in with a bit of money, maybe the opportunity to get a little bit of revenge on somebody, and suddenly you have the opportunity to talk to people. You're never going to get any of this unless you build it up from the base up.²⁵²

Recommendations

Train, lead, and act accordingly.

²⁵² Duff (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 219

GOVERN-1

D/T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/IO/Govern/Tactical

Issue

Coalition operations will inevitably influence indigenous social norms and behaviors. Failing to recognize this and not establishing policies about which norms to address and which to not deliberately address puts friendly forces at an operational disadvantage.

Discussion

I think that not interfering would be interfering with our mission. We dealt with training the police and then sent them out to the community. If they weren't paid, then they were extorting money at roadblocks. As the police are seen as coming out of our gates, eventually the extortion is going to reflect on us. The average Afghan citizen is not able to discern that it is Kabul that is at fault. . . . The Taliban is capitalizing on this very fact, because it is a regression to the situation like it was back before 1994. Police extortion is one way the Taliban is winning over the population.²⁵³

When I got there, U.S. forces had taken the son of the sheikh, and everyone understood [that] he was the wrong person. He just looked like someone else. And I asked, "Is this a problem?" and they kind of laughed and said, "It's a problem for the sheikh's son." And I said, "No, this is your problem. Saddam used to do this. His people used to come in the middle of the night and take people away." And I went to my rule-of-law guy and made this his priority. . . . My point was [that], if I were not able to (or at least be perceived as trying to) correct this injustice, we would not have any credibility when discussing rule-of-law issues.²⁵⁴

Recommendations

Avoiding making decisions about what to change in local society itself has consequences that reflect on the entity failing to address the challenge. Include identification of those behaviors targeted for change during the development of operational orders and campaign plans. War-game the consequences of addressing those behaviors, including second- and higher-order effects. Include war-gaming of behaviors not targeted, and likewise determine the likely impact of leaving them unaltered.

²⁵³ Coenen (2007).

²⁵⁴ Anonymous source 31.

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220 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

GOVERN-2

D/L/Stab/Spt/Inter/Tactical

Issue

Providing aid requires subtlety and an understanding that “putting an indigenous face” on an action may sometimes not be the right choice. It is also important for the local population to see that coalition members are helping to improve the people’s lot.

Discussion

In track 1 projects, the tie between Dutch money and a project was visible. In track 2 projects, it was below the radar—purposefully not visible. In the case of track 2 projects, there was deliberately no tie between the money coming from the Dutch and where it was going. There would be a project done, and it appeared to the people that it was entirely by the Afghans.²⁵⁵

Recommendation

Before project initiation, determine whether an aid project or other effort ought to include association with the coalition. Such decisions should be part of shaping and influence operations’ decisionmaking process.

GOVERN-3

D/T/O/C2/Stab/Inter/Govern

Issue

Progress in developing one echelon, region, or functional area in the government is no guarantee that the system as a whole is improving.

Discussion

People were not being tried for terrorism because there was no terrorism court in Salahaddin, and they believed [that,] if they sent them to Baghdad, they would just be killed, so they just let them go.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁵ Gouweleeuw (2007).

²⁵⁶ Miley (2007). The views expressed in these statements are those of the individual and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government.

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 221

Salahaddin doesn't exist as an island. . . . My metric was [that], at the end of the day, I want to have a functioning government in a Sunni heartland that can function effectively with a Shi'a-dominated government in Baghdad. . . . I felt that you could win Baghdad and still lose the rest of the country.²⁵⁷

Recommendations

Developing systems—not simply selected parts—is crucial to eventual success. An effective interagency campaign plan is a vital element in providing the guidance needed to achieve such overarching coordination of efforts, but such plans seldom exist. Plan and resource for success in this regard, ensuring that those responsible for oversight leave their offices to obtain understanding of conditions in the many outlying areas that their decisions affect.

GOVERN-4

D/L/C2/Stab/Spt/Multi/Inter/Govern

Issue

Overly short rotations hinder coalition-objective accomplishment.

Discussion

[A rotation of] 90 days is absurd almost to the point of being not useful. I'd say at least six months. . . . The Iraqis are tired of talking to us because they go to our people [who change all the time] with the same litany of complaints and they feel [that] no one is listening.²⁵⁸

Recommendations

As with any aspect of operations, view issues from all relevant perspectives. Tour lengths should not be determined simply by concern for one's own force; the viewpoints of those with whom coalition representatives interact are also vital. Consider separate tour-length policies for those with more interaction with key local personnel.

²⁵⁷ Miley (2007). The views expressed in these statements are those of the individual and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government.

²⁵⁸ Phee (2006).

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222 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

GOVERN-5

D/T/L/C2/Stab/Spt/Inter/Govern

Issue

Commands are recognizing the need to align boundaries along political or governmental divisions, rather than physical ones, during urban COIN operations.

Discussion

One of the fundamental tenets [for us] was “Realign along lines of governance.” None of the coalition boundaries overlapped the political boundaries before the BCT assumed responsibility, so [the 2nd BCT, 1st Infantry Division] aligned [its] boundaries with the district boundaries.²⁵⁹

Recommendation

Sustain the lesson.

GENERAL-1

D/T/C2/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Consistency of message and behavior with the civilian public is essential. However, not being predictable is likewise crucial when it comes to tactical actions potentially involving the enemy.

Discussion

Predictably unpredictable is the way we’ve got to be. We are establishing patterns ourselves with the way we conduct operations.²⁶⁰

“You can’t do anything covert because they have spotters everywhere. . . . Even if you have civilian clothes . . . covert is out of the question,” a Dutch colonel told us. He said that the army would flood an area so that Taliban could not determine where the army was going. The army would leave stay-behinds. The number of emplaced IEDs dropped to zero

²⁵⁹ Miska (2007a).

²⁶⁰ Clark (2006).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 223

because Taliban did not know where the army was watching and did not want to get killed when putting in IEDs.²⁶¹

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

GENERAL-2

D/T/L/Multi/Tactical

Issue

Training designed for indigenous personnel must take into account local conditions. The time necessary to achieve even the most basic standards may have to be measured in days or weeks rather than hours.

Discussion

A Dutch Army colonel told us that, when one looks at his or her students and 90 percent of them cannot read, what would take an hour to teach were there a common language and the students more sophisticated can take a day. It took forever.²⁶²

Recommendations

Design training and make decisions regarding indigenous assumption of responsibilities accordingly, whether for security, governing, or other functional areas.

GENERAL-3

D/T/L/O/C2/Stab/Spt/Multi/Inter/Govern

Issue

Coordinating military, other-agency, and NGO initiatives is critical to efficient use of available resources.

²⁶¹ Van Houten (2007).

²⁶² Van Houten (2007).

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224 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Discussion

The Afghans will try to get money from you, the NGOs, and IGOs. By [coordinating with all relevant agencies,] you can avoid that.²⁶³

[Here is] what happened during ISAF in 2003: The headquarters set up a CIMIC organization that posted all projects so that there wouldn't be such repetition. In Uruzgan, there was a mosque, and we noticed [that] it wasn't in very good shape, so we offered to have it painted. Then a couple of days later, [United Arab Emirates] representatives came in and saw the same mosque and said, "This isn't in very good shape. We can build you a new one."²⁶⁴

Recommendation

Develop a flexible campaign plan that permits varying degrees of involvement by participants. Some organizations may not want more than an absolute minimum of coordination, but the need to avoid redundant projects, unnecessary FP risks, fratricide, and other shortfalls requires at least minimal cooperation.

GENERAL-4

T/C2/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Female personnel are crucial to operational success involving societies prohibiting free interaction between genders.

Discussion

Women were very valuable and every PRT had at least one woman on it. There was one woman who was not trained as a medic, but she was taught how to do inoculations because . . . it was better than not treating woman and children at all.²⁶⁵

A serious deficiency was not having any women translators.²⁶⁶

²⁶³ Anonymous source 5.

²⁶⁴ Anonymous source 7.

²⁶⁵ Gouweleeuw (2007).

²⁶⁶ Wiersum (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 225

I don't know whether being female causes problems with interacting with Afghan men during business. There was a documentary on [television] about a PRT in Afghanistan. She worked with Afghan contractors and had no problems. I don't know [whether] it was because she was viewed as a soldier first before a woman . . . or because she had money.²⁶⁷

Recommendation

Ensure that sufficient numbers of qualified women deploy in both military and civilian positions when social conditions demand. This may require augmenting deploying organizations with individual augmentees.

GENERAL-5

D/T/M/FS/SOF/Avn/FP/IO

Issue

British tactics in al Basrah evolved toward light infantry patrolling in many instances. Though the response to the threat often resulted in minor damage to civilian homes, soldiers attempted to compensate noncombatants as soon as possible.

Discussion

They used to operate almost exclusively from the roofs. We were on foot. We had only four armored vehicles [Warriors] as a [quick-reaction force]. . . . The best thing to do anytime we had contact was to kick in the door and get to the roof ourselves. And once we started that, we started taking it to them because we were using their own tactics. Initially, the troops would call for the Warriors on any contact, but we adapted after several weeks and that changed the approach completely. They didn't rely on Warrior any more. And we also always went back and paid for what we damaged. We went back the next day. . . . Sometimes, it would be a week because the fighting wouldn't allow us to get back before then.²⁶⁸

Another interviewee noted that such tactics risk alienating members of the population, as those engaging from roofs often have no affiliation with those residing in the building. The efforts described here to compensate immediately are notable for this reason.

Recommendation

Adapt both maneuver tactics and the actions needed to address the impact that those tactics will have on the civilian population.

²⁶⁷ Anonymous sources 6 and 7.

²⁶⁸ Featherstone (2006).

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226 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

GENERAL-6

D/Multi/Inter

Issue

Improved multinational, interagency, and commercial cooperation can have less-than-obvious benefits.

Discussion

A lot of the drought in Africa can be attributed to where they have drilled for water in the past. Certain aquifers take 500 years to refill. . . . [Rear Admiral Richard W.] Hunt brought experts in to determine where future wells should be drilled. A lot of the seismic data used in finding oil [were] good for water too.²⁶⁹

Recommendation

Continue to seek improvement in interagency and multinational operations, including developing effective campaign plans with substantive participation by all relevant parties, including those commercial.

GENERAL-7

T/Stab/Tactical

Issue

When necessary given the status of the unit involved, combined training centers should conduct training rather than validate what are supposed to be in-place skills. This may include harsher feedback regarding performances.

Discussion

[The NTC] should be a training event and not a validation. . . . Guys are out there dying. Put my ego aside. . . . We're deploying into a combat zone. Train me until the last minute before I get onto the plane. It shouldn't be an evaluation. . . . The first time our brigade set up its [joint network node] was at the NTC.²⁷⁰

Recommendation

Apparent from discussion.

²⁶⁹ Johnson (2007).

²⁷⁰ Nickolas (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 227

GENERAL-8

D/L/C2/Stab/Tactical

Issue

MiTTs benefit from subordination to coalition units.

Discussion

“What we were asking the [MiTTs] to do was too much. I’m supporting the [MiTTs] with 4,700 soldiers. They were doing everything from training a battalion staff to running small-arms ranges.”²⁷¹

Recommendation

As appropriate, take advantage of the complementary aspects of having MiTT and TO&E units working together.

GENERAL-9

T/Stab/Tactical

Issue

Adviser training and its products vary considerably in quality.

Discussion

Transition teams . . . don’t have the experience they need to work with their Iraqi counterparts. . . . Their shortcomings are their advisory techniques. . . . What we see here is [that we] end up teaching [the Air Force and Navy] the basics rather than how to be an adviser. The Marine teams that come through here are pretty good. . . . A lot of [the Army people] are reserves. [These teams include] all kinds of MOSs. You see those [who] have to take their advisory teams [from their existing personnel allocation] the 82nd Airborne, the Stryker guys—they didn’t go through [Fort] Riley [training location for MiTT training] and the training [at the Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence (CFE) in Iraq], but they are doing better with their Iraqi counterparts than the guys who did.²⁷²

Recommendations

Reexamine adviser training, considering that feedback from interviews in Iraq consistently reflect that reserve and National Guard personnel are, on average, less effective in this role than

²⁷¹ Burton (2007).

²⁷² Anonymous sources 18.

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228 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

are active-duty personnel. The appropriate response is likely more-careful screening rather than elimination of reservists and Guard personnel from these duties. Consider that some assigned to adviser-training positions perceive such assignments as punishment. Draw on the units cited in the discussion to improve training at Fort Riley and COIN CFEs.

GENERAL-10

T/Stab/Spt/Tactical

Issue

Training in officer basic courses and elsewhere may need reorienting.

Discussion

Most of what we do is [on-the-job training]. . . . Kinetic stuff is great, and we need it. . . . We got cultural-awareness training, but until we got here and actually started talking to people . . . that was the best training we had. Putting boots on the ground and just talking to people [is the most helpful training of all].²⁷³

In the [field artillery] basic course, we had pretty much zero training about what we're doing now.²⁷⁴

I went to the armor career course. We're still teaching kinetic operations. . . . That was three and a half years ago.²⁷⁵

"Even in our little AO, dealing with guys in the north is different [from] dealing with guys in the south." This Army lieutenant added that police training would have been helpful before they came.²⁷⁶

Recommendations

Adapt curricula as necessary to prepare soldiers for ongoing contingencies as well as other assignments and traditional war-fighting skills. Extend course lengths if necessary.

²⁷³ Klapmeier (2007).

²⁷⁴ Ostermann (2007).

²⁷⁵ Joyce (2007).

²⁷⁶ Klapmeier (2007).

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Observations and Insights in Issue-Discussion-Recommendation Form 229

GENERAL-11

D/L/O/C2/Stab/Spt

Issue

Population resettlement is as much an information as a security operation.

Discussion

The British in Liberia used both carrot and stick in motivating resettlement by having NGOs do it to provide support, presenting incentives, such as food, water, or building materials, and offering job training. PSYOP is still sometimes an add-on to maneuver operations. Too often, the PSYOP capability is put in the joint operations staff section instead of the joint plans staff section.²⁷⁷

Recommendation

Consider the mission and type of operation. While it may well be appropriate to assign the PSYOP and deception cell to an operations section during conventional operations, it might well be wiser to assign them elsewhere when involved in other contingencies.

²⁷⁷ Suggit (2007a).

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APPENDIX C

Matrices

This appendix provides a series of matrices regarding the joint urban observations and insights taken from written, conference, and interview sources presented in Appendix B. These offerings are organized under the primary headings of intel, metrics, counterinsurgency, governing, and general. They can also be accessed by their relevance to the elements of DOTMLPF, BOSs, and selected additional miscellaneous categories as listed here. Finally, those having relevance to the tactical level of war are so designated. (It should be noted that a substantial percentage of this year's entries have tactical application. That does not mean that the operational level is not the primary focus but that the issues and problems selected will *also* be of interest to those more interested in activities at the tactical level.) Matrices appearing in this appendix code each entry according to those areas to which it particularly applies. For example, observation INTEL-4 (coded I/O/C2/Multi in Appendix B and in the appropriate matrices here) should be of value to anyone interested in intel issues as they affect urban counterinsurgency or counterinsurgency in general (this being evident in its being put in the INTEL category). From Table C.1, it is apparent that the particular observation INTEL-4 is also relevant to organization (O), C2, and multinational (Multi) issues. (There is redundancy in all observations under the general intel heading, given that intel was itself a primary focal area of study during the analysis supporting this report. Obviously, all entries listed under INTEL are also coded "I," which represents intel in the BOS.)

Code designations appear here for ease of reference. Note that each code entry has its own matrix. Thus a reader wanting to focus on multinational issues need not go through every entry in Table C.1 (Complete List of Observations). He or she can go directly to Table C.19 (Observations: Multinational), which consolidates all I-D-R offerings with relevance to multinational topics.

- DOTMLPF:
 - D (doctrine)
 - O (organization)
 - T (training)
 - M (materiel)
 - L (leadership and education)
 - P (personnel)

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- F (facilities)
- BOS
 - Man (maneuver)
 - C2
 - I (intel)
 - FS (fire support)
 - CSS
- Miscellaneous categories of interest
 - SOF
 - Avn (aviation)
 - Stab (stability operations)¹
 - Spt (support operations)²
 - FP³
 - IO⁴
 - Multi (multinational)
 - Inter (interagency)
 - Govern (governing)
 - Tactical (observations with tactical implications).

**Table C.1
Complete List of Observations**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-2	T	I		Tactical
INTEL-3	O, P	C2, I		
INTEL-4	O	C2, I	Multi	

¹ *Stability operations* is an “overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (USJCS, 2001 [2006b], p. 506).

² *Support operations* are “[o]perations that employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering” (U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps, 2004, p. 1-179).

³ *Force protection* refers to

[a]ctions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (USJCS, 2001 [2004], p. 209)

⁴ *Information operations* refers to “[a]ctions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems” (USJCS, 2001 [2004], p. 256).

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Table C.1—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	
INTEL-6	D, L	C2, I		
INTEL-7	D, L, O	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-9	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-10	D, T, O	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-11	D, T, M, P	C2, I		
INTEL-12	D, T, M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-13	D	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-14	T, L	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-15	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-17	T, L	C2, I	FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-19	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-20	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-22	M	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-24	D, T	I	Inter	
INTEL-25	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-30	D, T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-31	M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-32	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-34	T	I	Stab, IO,	Tactical

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234 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.1—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-35	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-36	L	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-38	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-39	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-40	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-41	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-42	T, L	C2, I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-43		I	Stab	
INTEL-44	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-45	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-46	T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Multi	Tactical
INTEL-47	D, T	C2, I	Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-49	T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-50	O, M	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-51	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-52	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-53	T, L, O	C2, I		
INTEL-54	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-55	D, T	I	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-57	L	I	Govern	
INTEL-58	T, L	I		Tactical
INTEL-59	T	I	IO	Tactical
INTEL-60	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-61	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-62	T, L	C2, I	Stab	

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Table C.1—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-63	L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-64	T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-65	O	I		
INTEL-66	D	I	Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-67	M	I		Tactical
INTEL-68	T, M	I		Tactical
INTEL-69	D, T, P	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-70	T, O	I, C2	Avn	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-2	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-3	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-4	T, L		Stab, Spt	
METRICS-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-6	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-7	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-8	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-9	D, L	C2	Stab	
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-2	D, T, L	I		Tactical
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-4	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical
COIN-8	O		Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-9	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-11			SOF, Stab, Inter	Tactical

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236 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.1—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-13	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-15	L	C2	Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-16	D, T	I	Stab	
COIN-17	T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-19	T		Stab, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-20	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-21	D, T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-23	D, L		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-24	D, L		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-25	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-26	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-27	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-28			Stab, Spt, Inter	
COIN-29	T, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
COIN-30	D, T		Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-31	O		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-32	T, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Govern	Tactical
COIN-33	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-34	L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
COIN-35	D, T		Stab	Tactical
COIN-36	D, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-37	L	FS	Stab, Govern	
COIN-38	D, T, L		Stab	Tactical

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Table C.1—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-39	T, L		Stab	
COIN-40	D, L		Stab, Govern	
COIN-41	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	
COIN-42	D		Stab, IO	
COIN-43	L, O		Stab	
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-45	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, Govern	
COIN-46	L		Stab, Govern	
COIN-47	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
GOVERN-2	D, L		Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
GOVERN-3	D, T, O	C2	Stab, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-4	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-5	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-1	D, T	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-2	D, T, L		Multi	Tactical
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-4	T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GENERAL-5	D, T, M	FS	SOF, Avn, FP, IO	
GENERAL-6	D		Multi, Inter	
GENERAL-7	T		Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-8	D, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-9	T		Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-10	T		Stab, Spt	Tactical
GENERAL-11	D, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt	

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238 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

**Table C.2
Observations: Doctrine**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	
INTEL-6	D, L	C2, I		
INTEL-7	D, L, O	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-9	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-10	D, T, O	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-11	D, T, M, P	C2, I		
INTEL-12	D, T, M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-13	D	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-15	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-19	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-20	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-24	D, T,	I	Inter	
INTEL-25	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-30	D, T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-32	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-35	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-38	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-39	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-40	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-41	D, T	I		Tactical

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Table C.2—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-44	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-45	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-47	D, T	C2, I	Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-52	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-54	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-55	D, T	I	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-60	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-61	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-66	D	I	Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-69	D, T, P	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-2	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-3	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-6	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-8	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-9	D, L	C2	Stab	
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-2	D, T, L	I		Tactical
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-4	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, F5	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-9	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical

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240 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.2—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-13	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-16	D, T	I	Stab	
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-20	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-21	D, T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-23	D, L		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-24	D, L		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-26	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-30	D, T		Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-33	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-35	D, T		Stab	Tactical
COIN-36	D, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-38	D, T, L		Stab	Tactical
COIN-40	D, L		Stab, Govern	
COIN-41	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	
COIN-42	D		Stab, IO	
COIN-45	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, Govern	
COIN-47	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
GOVERN-2	D, L		Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
GOVERN-3	D, T, O	C2	Stab, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-4	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-5	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-1	D, T	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-2	D, T, L		Multi	Tactical

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Table C.2—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-5	D, T, M	FS	SOF, Avn, FP, IO	
GENERAL-6	D		Multi, Inter	
GENERAL-8	D, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-11	D, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt	

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242 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

**Table C.3
Observations: Organization**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-3	O, P	C2, I		
INTEL-4	O	C2, I	Multi	
INTEL-7	D, L, O	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-9	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-10	D, T, O	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-19	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-46	T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Multi	Tactical
INTEL-50	O, M	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-53	T, L, O	C2, I		
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-65	O	I		
INTEL-70	T, O	I, C2	Avn	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-8	O		Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-31	O		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-43	L, O		Stab	
GOVERN-3	D, T, O	C2	Stab, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-11	D, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt	

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**Table C.4
Observations: Training**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-2	T	I		Tactical
INTEL-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-9	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-10	D, T, O	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-11	D, T, M, P	C2, I		
INTEL-12	D, T, M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-14	T, L	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-15	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-17	T, L	C2, I	FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-19	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-20	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-24	D, T	I	Inter	
INTEL-25	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-30	D, T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-32	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-34	T	I	Stab, IO	Tactical
INTEL-35	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-38	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-39	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical

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244 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.4—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-40	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-41	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-42	T, L	C2, I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-44	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-45	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-46	T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Multi	Tactical
INTEL-47	D, T	C2, I	Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-49	T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-51	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-52	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-53	T, L, O	C2, I		
INTEL-54	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-55	D, T	I	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-58	T, L	I		Tactical
INTEL-59	T	I	IO	Tactical
INTEL-61	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-62	T, L	C2, I	Stab	
INTEL-64	T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-68	T, M	I		Tactical
INTEL-69	D, T, P	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-70	T, O	I, C2	Avn	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-2	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-3	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-4	T, L		Stab, Spt	
METRICS-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical

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Table C.4—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
METRICS-6	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-7	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-8	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-2	D, T, L	I		Tactical
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-4	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical
COIN-9	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-16	D, T	I	Stab	
COIN-17	T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-19	T		Stab, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-20	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-21	D, T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-25	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-26	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-27	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-29	T, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
COIN-30	D, T		Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-32	T, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Govern	Tactical

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246 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.4—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-33	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-35	D, T		Stab	Tactical
COIN-38	D, T, L		Stab	Tactical
COIN-39	T, L		Stab	
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-45	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, Govern	
COIN-47	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
GOVERN-3	D, T, O	C2	Stab, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-5	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-1	D, T	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-2	D, T, L		Multi	Tactical
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-4	T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GENERAL-5	D, T, M	FS	SOF, Avn, FP, IO	
GENERAL-7	T		Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-9	T		Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-10	T		Stab, Spt	Tactical

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**Table C.5
Observations: Materiel**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-11	D, T, M, P	C2, I		
INTEL-12	D, T, M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-22	M	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-31	M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-50	O, M	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-67	M	I		Tactical
INTEL-68	T, M	I		Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
GENERAL-5	D, T, M	FS	SOF, Avn, FP, IO	

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248 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

**Table C.6
Observations: Leadership and Education**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-6	D, L	C2, I		
INTEL-7	D, L, O	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-14	T, L	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-15	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-17	T, L	C2, I	FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-20	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-30	D, T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-36	L	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-42	T, L	C2, I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-46	T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Multi	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-51	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-52	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-53	T, L, O	C2, I		
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-57	L	I	Govern	
INTEL-58	T, L	I		Tactical
INTEL-60	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-62	T, L	C2, I	Stab	

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Table C.6—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-63	L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-64	T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-2	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-4	T, L		Stab, Spt	
METRICS-6	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-7	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-9	D, L	C2	Stab	
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-2	D, T, L	I		Tactical
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-13	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-15	L	C2	Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-20	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-23	D, L		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-24	D, L		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-25	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-26	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-27	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-29	T, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
COIN-32	T, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Govern	Tactical

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250 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.6—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-33	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-34	L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
COIN-36	D, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-37	L	F5	Stab, Govern	
COIN-38	D, T, L		Stab	Tactical
COIN-39	T, L		Stab	
COIN-40	D, L		Stab, Govern	
COIN-41	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	
COIN-43	L, O		Stab	
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-45	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, Govern	
COIN-46	L		Stab, Govern	
COIN-47	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
GOVERN-2	D, L		Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
GOVERN-4	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-5	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-2	D, T, L		Multi	Tactical
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-8	D, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-11	D, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt	

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**Table C.7
Observations: Personnel (Soldiers)**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-3	O, P	C2, I		
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-69	D, T, P	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical

**Table C.8
Observations: Maneuver**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical

**Table C.9
Observations: Command and Control**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-3	O, P	C2, I		
INTEL-4	O	C2, I	Multi	
INTEL-6	D, L	C2, I		
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-10	D, T, O	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-11	D, T, M, P	C2, I		
INTEL-12	D, T, M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-14	T, L	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-15	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-17	T, L	C2, I	FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-20	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical

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252 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.9—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-22	M	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-30	D, T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-31	M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-42	T, L	C2, I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-46	T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Multi	Tactical
INTEL-47	D, T	C2, I	Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-52	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-53	T, L, O	C2, I		
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-62	T, L	C2, I	Stab	
INTEL-63	L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-64	T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-70	T, O	I, C2	Avn	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-3	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-6	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-7	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-8	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-9	D, L	C2	Stab	
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical

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Table C.9—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-4	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical
COIN-9	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-15	L	C2	Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-20	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-25	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-26	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-29	T, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
COIN-32	T, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Govern	Tactical
COIN-33	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-34	L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
COIN-36	D, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-41	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-47	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
GOVERN-2	D, L		Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
GOVERN-3	D, T, O	C2	Stab, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-4	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-5	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	

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254 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.9—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
GENERAL-1	D, T	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-4	T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GENERAL-8	D, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-11	D, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt	

**Table C.10
Observations: Intelligence**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-2	T	I		Tactical
INTEL-3	O, P	C2, I		
INTEL-4	O	C2, I	Multi	
INTEL-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	
INTEL-6	D, L	C2, I		
INTEL-7	D, L, O	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-9	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-10	D, T, O	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-11	D, T, M, P	C2, I		
INTEL-12	D, T, M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-13	D	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-14	T, L	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-15	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-17	T, L	C2, I	FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-19	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-20	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical

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Table C.10—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-22	M	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-24	D, T	I	Inter	
INTEL-25	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-30	D, T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-31	M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-32	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-34	T	I	Stab, IO	Tactical
INTEL-35	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-36	L	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-38	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-39	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-40	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-41	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-42	T, L	C2, I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-43		I	Stab	
INTEL-44	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-45	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-46	T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Multi	Tactical
INTEL-47	D, T	C2, I	Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-49	T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-50	O, M	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	

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256 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.10—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-51	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-52	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-53	T, L, O	C2, I		
INTEL-54	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-55	D, T	I	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-57	L	I	Govern	
INTEL-58	T, L	I		Tactical
INTEL-59	T	I	IO	Tactical
INTEL-60	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-61	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-62	T, L	C2, I	Stab	
INTEL-63	L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-64	T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-65	O	I		
INTEL-66	D	I	Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-67	M	I		Tactical
INTEL-68	T, M	I		Tactical
INTEL-69	D, T, P	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-70	T, O	I, C2	Avn	Tactical
METRICS-2	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-2	D, T, L	I		Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-13	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-16	D, T	I	Stab	

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Table C.10—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-27	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-45	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, Govern	
COIN-47	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical

**Table C.11
Observations: Fire Support**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-37	L	FS	Stab, Govern	
GENERAL-5	D, T, M	FS	SOF, Avn, FP, IO	

**Table C.12
Observations: Combat Service Support**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical

**Table C.13
Observations: Special-Operations Forces**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-11			SOF, Stab, Inter	Tactical
GENERAL-5	D, T, M	FS	SOF, Avn, FP, IO	

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258 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

**Table C.14
Observations: Aviation**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-70	T, O	I, C2	Avn	Tactical
GENERAL-5	D, T, M	FS	SOF, Avn, FP, IO	

**Table C.15
Observations: Stability Operations**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	
INTEL-7	D, L, O	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-9	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-13	D	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-15	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-19	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-20	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-22	M	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-32	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-34	T	I	Stab, IO	Tactical
INTEL-35	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-36	L	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-38	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical

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Table C.15—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-39	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-42	T, L	C2, I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-43		I	Stab	
INTEL-45	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-46	T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Multi	Tactical
INTEL-47	D, T	C2, I	Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-49	T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-50	O, M	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-51	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-52	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-54	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-55	D, T	I	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-60	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-61	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-62	T, L	C2, I	Stab	
INTEL-69	D, T, P	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-2	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-3	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-4	T, L		Stab, Spt	
METRICS-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-6	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-7	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-8	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-9	D, L	C2	Stab	

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260 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.15—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-4	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical
COIN-8	O		Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-9	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-11			SOF, Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-13	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-15	L	C2	Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-16	D, T	I	Stab	
COIN-17	T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-19	T		Stab, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-20	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-21	D, T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-23	D, L		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-24	D, L		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-25	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-26	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-27	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-28			Stab, Spt, Inter	

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Table C.15—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-29	T, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
COIN-30	D, T		Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-31	O		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-32	T, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Govern	Tactical
COIN-33	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-34	L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
COIN-35	D, T		Stab	Tactical
COIN-36	D, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-37	L	FS	Stab, Govern	
COIN-38	D, T, L		Stab	Tactical
COIN-39	T, L		Stab	
COIN-40	D, L		Stab, Govern	
COIN-41	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	
COIN-42	D		Stab, IO	
COIN-43	L, O		Stab	
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-45	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, Govern	
COIN-46	L		Stab, Govern	
COIN-47	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
GOVERN-2	D, L		Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
GOVERN-3	D, T, O	C2	Stab, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-4	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-5	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-1	D, T	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-4	T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical

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262 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.15—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
GENERAL-7	T		Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-8	D, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-9	T		Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-10	T		Stab, Spt	Tactical
GENERAL-11	D, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt	

**Table C.16
Observations: Support Operations**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	
INTEL-7	D, L, O	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-9	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-13	D	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-15	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-19	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-20	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-22	M	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-35	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-36	L	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-38	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical

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Table C.16—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-50	O, M	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-52	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-69	D, T, P	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-2	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-3	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
METRICS-4	T, L		Stab, Spt	
METRICS-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-6	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-7	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-8	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-4	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical
COIN-8	O		Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-9	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-20	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-25	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-26	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-28			Stab, Spt, Inter	
COIN-33	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-41	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical

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264 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.16—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-45	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, Govern	
COIN-47	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
GOVERN-2	D, L		Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
GOVERN-4	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-5	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-4	T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GENERAL-10	T		Stab, Spt	Tactical
GENERAL-11	D, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt	

**Table C.17
Observations: Force Protection**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-17	T, L	C2, I	FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
GENERAL-5	D, T, M	FS	SOF, Avn, FP, IO	

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**Table C.18
Observations: Information Operations**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-15	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-34	T	I	Stab, IO	Tactical
INTEL-35	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-59	T	I	IO	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-17	T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-19	T		Stab, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-20	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-21	D, T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-24	D, L		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-42	D		Stab, IO	
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
GENERAL-5	D, T, M	FS	SOF, Avn, FP, IO	

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266 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

**Table C.19
Observations: Multinational**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-4	O	C2, I	Multi	
INTEL-7	D, L, O	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-30	D, T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-46	T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Multi	Tactical
INTEL-47	D, T	C2, I	Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-50	O, M	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-55	D, T	I	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-63	L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-64	T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-66	D	I	Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-32	T, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Govern	Tactical
COIN-34	L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	

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Table C.19—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-36	D, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
GOVERN-4	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-2	D, T, L		Multi	Tactical
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-6	D		Multi, Inter	

**Table C.20
Observations: Interagency**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-7	D, L, O	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-9	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-24	D, T	I	Inter	
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-30	D, T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-33	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	
INTEL-36	L	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-38	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-47	D, T	C2, I	Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-50	O, M	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-55	D, T	I	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-63	L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	
INTEL-64	T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	

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268 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.20—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-66	D	I	Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-7	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical
COIN-8	O		Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-11			SOF, Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-23	D, L		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-28			Stab, Spt, Inter	
COIN-31	O		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-33	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-34	L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
COIN-36	D, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-41	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	
GOVERN-2	D, L		Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
GOVERN-3	D, T, O	C2	Stab, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-4	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-5	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-6	D		Multi, Inter	

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**Table C.21
Observations: Governing**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-50	O, M	I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-55	D, T	I	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-56	D, L, T, O	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
INTEL-57	L	I	Govern	
INTEL-66	D	I	Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-8	O		Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-15	L	C2	Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-19	T		Stab, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-30	D, T		Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-32	T, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Govern	Tactical
COIN-33	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
COIN-34	L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	
COIN-36	D, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-37	L	FS	Stab, Govern	
COIN-40	D, L		Stab, Govern	
COIN-45	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, Govern	
COIN-46	L		Stab, Govern	
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical

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270 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.21—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
GOVERN-3	D, T, O	C2	Stab, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-4	D, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	
GOVERN-5	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter, Govern	
GENERAL-3	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	

**Table C.22
Observations: Tactical**

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-1	T, O	C2, CSS, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
INTEL-2	T	I		Tactical
INTEL-8	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-9	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-10	D, T, O	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-12	D, T, M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-13	D	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-14	T, L	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-16	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-17	T, L	C2, I	FP	Tactical
INTEL-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-19	D, T, O	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-20	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-21	D, T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-22	M	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-23	D, T, L, M, P	C2, I	Stab, Spt, FP	Tactical
INTEL-25	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-26	D, T, L, O, M	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-27	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-28	L, O	C2, I	Multi, Inter, Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-29	D, T, O	C2, I	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical

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Table C.22—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-30	D, T, L	C2, I	Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-31	M	C2, I		Tactical
INTEL-32	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-34	T	I	Stab, IO,	Tactical
INTEL-35	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-36	L	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-37	D, T, L	I	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-38	D, T	I	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-39	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-40	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-41	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-42	T, L	C2, I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-44	D, T	I		Tactical
INTEL-45	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-46	T, L, O	C2, I	Stab, Multi	Tactical
INTEL-47	D, T	C2, I	Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-48	D, T, L	C2, I	SOF, Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
INTEL-49	T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-51	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-52	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-54	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-55	D, T	I	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-58	T, L	I		Tactical
INTEL-59	T	I	IO	Tactical
INTEL-60	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-61	D, T	I	Stab	Tactical
INTEL-66	D	I	Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
INTEL-67	M	I		Tactical
INTEL-68	T, M	I		Tactical

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272 Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan

Table C.22—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
INTEL-69	D, T, P	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
INTEL-70	T, O	I, C2	Avn	Tactical
METRICS-1	D, T, L, O	C2	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter	Tactical
METRICS-5	D, T	I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-6	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
METRICS-7	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
COIN-1	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-2	D, T, L	I		Tactical
COIN-3	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-4	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-5	D, T	Man, C2, I, FS	Stab, FP, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-6	D, T, L, M	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, Multi, Inter	Tactical
COIN-7	T, L	C2, CSS	Stab, Spt, IO, Inter	Tactical
COIN-9	D, T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-10	D, T, L	C2	SOF, Stab, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-11			SOF, Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-12	T, L, P	I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-13	D, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-14	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-15	L	C2	Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-17	T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-18	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, FP, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-19	T		Stab, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-20	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO	Tactical
COIN-21	D, T		Stab, IO	Tactical
COIN-22	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
COIN-23	D, L		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-24	D, L		Stab, IO	Tactical

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Table C.22—Continued

Lesson	DOTMLPF	BOS	Miscellaneous	Tactical
COIN-25	T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-26	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
COIN-27	T, L	I	Stab	Tactical
COIN-29	T, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
COIN-30	D, T		Stab, Govern	Tactical
COIN-31	O		Stab, Inter	Tactical
COIN-32	T, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Govern	Tactical
COIN-35	D, T		Stab	Tactical
COIN-36	D, L	C2	Stab, Multi, Inter, Govern	Tactical
COIN-38	D, T, L		Stab	Tactical
COIN-44	T, L, P	C2, Man, I	Stab, Spt, FP, IO	Tactical
COIN-47	D, T, L	C2, I	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GOVERN-1	D, T, L	C2	Stab, Spt, IO, Govern	Tactical
GOVERN-2	D, L		Stab, Spt, Inter	Tactical
GENERAL-1	D, T	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-2	D, T, L		Multi	Tactical
GENERAL-4	T	C2	Stab, Spt	Tactical
GENERAL-7	T		Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-8	D, L	C2	Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-9	T		Stab	Tactical
GENERAL-10	T		Stab, Spt	Tactical

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