

# CAMP HIALEAH ANTI-TERRORIST / FORCE PROTECTION PLAN

## II. SITUATION

### A. GENERAL.

This plan applies to all units and personnel assigned or attached to Camp Hialeah. Camp Hialeah is located in the middle of Pusan, which is a city of approximately 4 million, and it is the central military support installation for several installations that make up the Pusan military enclave. The other installations are Pusan Storage Facility (PSF), Pier 8, Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO), and Kimhae ROK AB. The location of Camp Hialeah is on prime real-estate and is a sore point with many of the local nationals. In the recent past there has been a concerted effort to relocate the base and return the land to general municipal use. However this has proven to be cost prohibitive. The units that are supported by Camp Hialeah have their own chains of command which, in most instances, do not include the garrison command group. The only way that security issues can be effectively planned and executed is with the cooperation and support of each tenant unit. This plan is intended to coordinate the efforts and capabilities of the tenant units into a unified response to threatened or actual acts of terrorism, civil unrest, or other situations that threaten the well being of the personnel on Camp Hialeah.

### B. ENEMY FORCES.

The enemy is any adversary capable of threatening the installation's personnel, facilities, and equipment. The capability of any adversary to attack is severely hampered in Korea due to the inaccessibility of guns and explosives in Korea. In Pusan potential adversaries include five distinct groups; terrorists, North Korean Special Forces (nK SF), dissident students groups, civic groups, and the criminal element:

- (1) Terrorist Groups. There are no known terrorist groups operating in Pusan or South Korea at this time. However, it is possible that nK assets already in place may assist any given terrorist group that finds the favor of North Korea.
- (2) North Korean Special Forces. nK SF may imitate terrorist activities in advance of hostilities or to gain a political objective even when no follow on attack is planned. Given a well-planned and executed deception, the initial indicators and actions may not be distinguishable from a terrorist attack.
- (3) Dissident Student Groups. There are several student groups that protest against the United States and Camp Hialeah. These student groups pose the most likely threat. Historically, demonstrations against the U.S. and Hialeah by these groups have been the best attended and most volatile. The Hanch'ongnyon has been declared illegal by the Republic of Korea government. It is still active and is the most anti-American student group. Its past activities range from peaceful demonstrations to kidnapping threats to physical violence in the form of egg, rock, and Molotov cocktail throwing. In general, the Korean authorities have good intelligence on the activities of dissident student groups.
- (4) Civic Groups. The Pusan area has several civic groups that protest at or against Camp Hialeah periodically. Usually the turn out for a civic demonstration is low. Most civic groups in the Pusan area are trade related. Civic groups tend to have demonstrations about issues that are work or government related and are not highly anti-American.

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- (5) Criminal Element. General criminal activity is the most prevalent threat. In Pusan the overall crime rate is fairly low compared to American cities of similar size. For a better rundown on crime prevention measures see the Camp Hialeah Physical Security Standing Operating Procedures.

### C. FRIENDLY FORCES

The Garrison Command Group is a detachment from the 20<sup>th</sup> Area Support Group (ASG), which has its headquarters in Taegu, South Korea. Taegu is approximately 175 km or a two and a half-hour drive north of Pusan. The next higher headquarters for Camp Hialeah is the 20<sup>th</sup> ASG. 20<sup>th</sup> ASG's next higher headquarters is the 19<sup>th</sup> Theater Support Command (TSC), also located in Taegu. The Garrison Command controls the Directorate of Public Works (DPW) which, in turn, manages the Fire Department on Camp Hialeah. The only military unit directly under the Garrison Command is the 4<sup>th</sup> Quartermaster Detachment (Airborne). The Command Group detachment is attached to the 4<sup>th</sup> QM (ABN) for administrative purposes. All other units on Camp Hialeah report to headquarters other than the Garrison Command Group. (See Task Organization.) Police services are provided by the 552<sup>nd</sup> Military Police Company, which reports to the 728<sup>th</sup> MP BN and the 8<sup>th</sup> MP BDE respectively. Medical support is provided through HSC 168<sup>th</sup> Medical Battalion, which is controlled by the 18<sup>th</sup> Medical Command (MedCom). For a listing of the other tenant units see Annex A Task Organization. Host Nation support is provided as necessary through Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) and Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with police, fire, and medical agencies.

- D. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. A/307 Signal Battalion is home stationed in Camp Carroll, Waegwon (45 min north of Taegu). It regularly deploys to Camp Hialeah for training exercises and be available to assist in force protection issues. However, it may also increase the need for force protection due to its mode of operations.

### E. ASSUMPTIONS.

- F. INTELLIGENCE. (See Annex A Risk Assessment and Management) Several sources of intelligence are available and used concurrently by the Garrison Command Group. 20<sup>th</sup> ASG Taegu provides peninsula intelligence as received from higher. The Pusan Resident Office (PRO) of the 524<sup>th</sup> Military Intelligence Battalion provides local intelligence gathering capability. The Korean Liaison to the PMO is also instrumental in providing information.

## III. MISSION

- A. The 20<sup>th</sup> SG (Pusan) Camp Hialeah conducts Base Operations (Force Protection, Quality of Life and Tenant Unit Support, and participates in all JCS directed exercises. During hostilities Camp Hialeah will also conduct Base Defense Operations, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Reception, Staging and Onward Movement of forces (RSO), and provide Combat Support and Combat Service Support to units within the capabilities of the installation. Paramount to accomplishing these missions

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is the safeguarding of our soldiers and property. Only through diligent force protection measures can we keep our force, family members and DOD civilians alive and safe from terrorist or enemy attacks.

- (1) **Deter terrorist incidents:** This installation has always maintained exceptionally good public relations, including a sound working relationship with the Korean National Police that provide external security to the base. One company patrols the perimeter of the installation on a 24 hours basis, 7 days a week. The total number of KNP's will be raised upon an increase in threat levels, such as demonstrations or periods of known unrest. Internally, the perimeter is patrolled by the Military Police who will enforce strict ingress and egress procedures as well as maintain perimeter security with the augmentation of contract guards. Terrorists may further be dissuaded from targeting the installation by our demonstrated resolve to maintain security, prosecute criminal acts against US property and persons, and the practice of aggressive OPSEC measures. Further, the maintenance of good public relations will be continued. The greater the support for the United States Army and DOD employees within the community, the more counter-productive it would be for terrorists to attack in an effort to gain support for their cause.
- (2) **Employ countermeasures:** In addition to those stated above, this installation will continue to conduct aggressive Counter Intelligence Operations and maintain a habitual relationship with MI and PMO assets. This installation will continuously evaluate the AT/FP plan in order to avoid complacency. At a minimum we will review and exercise our plans annually. An Installation Force Protection Officer and alternate will be identified in writing. The installation will maintain at least 2 (two) Level II force protection trained individuals. Force protection council meetings will be held, After Action Reviews conducted following all demonstrations or incidents and Lessons Learned will be captured. This installation will continue to raise the level of situational awareness among all of its tenants and employees. Force Protection bulletin boards will be maintained in all public areas. The carrying of SOFA cards and Emergency Contact Cards is mandatory. Military Police will continue to check all personnel entering and leaving the installation to ensure compliance with this policy. The buddy system is currently in effect. These Force Protection measures are adjusted and complied with based upon the current situation and assessment of local threats. Annual Physical Security Inspections will be conducted and deficiencies corrected in a timely manner. All assigned personnel will receive a Threat Briefing and Force Protection briefing upon arrival and at least annually thereafter.
- (3) **Mitigation of effects of a terrorist incident:** This installation has taken many steps to reduce the effects of a terrorist attack and will continue to do so in the future. We have increased the buffer space along the perimeter wall and will continue to seek funding to assist us in the relocation of assets that are still too close. Redundancy will be built into our communications, command and

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control systems. We will continue to cross-level and cross-locate all of our Mission Essential Personnel and Equipment (MEPE), thus reducing the impact of an attack, and hastening recovery operations. The Installation Base Defense Plan identifies those areas and items that are critical to the survival of the installation and personnel. This plan will be updated and practiced annually. Further, the Installation Crisis Management Team will meet at least quarterly to maintain familiarity with all plans and to further refine and adapt to changing threats. All tenant agencies with Force Protection responsibilities will maintain Memorandums of Agreement with relevant external agencies, to include medical, law enforcement and public utilities.

## IV. EXECUTION

### A. COMMANDER'S INTENT

It the policy of this command to protect military personnel and civilian employees, their families, government facilities, and material resources from acts of terrorism and other destructive criminal acts. Subordinate commanders and tenant units will integrate AT/FP procedures, measures and training into all operations. Further, all directives and orders relating to AT/FP from the garrison commander and higher commanders will be followed

### B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(1) On order of the Garrison Commander, selected units, staff elements, and agencies will conduct special operations at designated locations on Camp Hialeah using military police elements, designated augmenting forces, and other law enforcement agencies to contain and neutralize special threats which are beyond the capability of normally committed Military Police elements.

(2) Special threat operations are divided into three categories. The category of a particular operation will be specified by the Garrison Commander or designated representative when he orders activation of the Emergency Operation Center (EOC).

(a) A Category 1 operation will be initiated when the situation is so severe that normal operations on the installation cannot be conducted safely and the assigned mission cannot be accomplished until the situation is neutralized. During a Category 1 operation, the installations will be closed to all civilian traffic, except those persons deemed essential for the special threat operation or other related emergency operations. Examples of situations requiring a Category 1 operation are:

1. An organized attack by a terrorist group (two or more opponents) on a major, or centrally located activity.

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2. Two or more simultaneous attacks or hostage situations.
3. A terrorist bomb attack causing major property damage personnel casualties.
4. Civil demonstrations directed towards the installations with the intent of causing destruction.
5. Upon commencement of Category 1 operations, Terrorist threat conditions (THREATCONs) Alpha through Delta will be used to bring units to a higher state of alert. During each THREATCON, selected measures must occur. See TAB A (Terrorist Threat Conditions) to APPENDIX 1 (Criminal Intelligence Information).

(b) A Category 2 operation will be initiated when the situation is such that the threat can be contained in a small or isolated area and the installations can continue their missions without danger of casualties. During a Category 2 operation, installation activities will continue as normal except those areas cordoned off by the security force. Examples of situations calling for Category 2 operation are:

1. A disgruntled soldier holding a superior hostage.
2. Armed robbery suspects whose escape is blocked, have taken hostages, and barricaded themselves in a retail facility.
3. Bomb threats made against specific buildings or facilities.

(c) A Category 3 operation will be initiated when a situation develops whereby civil disturbances or demonstrations are directed toward the installation or occurred on or have the potential to penetrate the installation. It is assumed that the opponents will not be armed with firearms or explosives and the tactics employed will involve basic crowd control. Examples of situations calling for Category 3 operations are:

1. Anti-war, anti-nuclear, anti-military, or anti-US demonstrations.
2. Demonstrations against a specific US military action.
3. A civilian work stoppage or strike involving Korean National civilian work force. (See Annex K of overall Physical Security Plan for Disruptive Labor Action Plan)

(3). Operations will be phased to thoroughly assess the situation, gain time, prevent overreaction, and provide appropriate response to the threat.

(4). Priorities of effort in a special threat situation are as follows:

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- (a) Release of hostages.
- (b) Protect human life.
- (c) Safeguard government property
- (d) Neutralize incidents.

### C. TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) Phase I – Alert notification that a special threat action is likely to occur or is occurring on or near Camp Hialeah. Forces are alerted. On order duty MP Patrols implement procedures to limit access to the installations and react to the special threat to:

- (a) Contain and isolate threat.
- (b) Gain time to assemble additional force if necessary.
- (c) Gather information to fully define the threat.
- (d) Neutralize the threat with minimum force.

(2) Phase II – The Garrison Commander or designated representative will activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the Installation Crisis Management Team (ICMT)

(a). SPO, 20th ASG Pusan will:

1. Establish the EOC capable of 24 hour a day operations for an extended period of time. Via conference call, gather members of the ICMT to coordinate crisis activities on Camp Hialeah.
2. Disseminate crisis warnings, predictions, information, and special instructions to units affected in the Pusan area.
3. Establish emergency communications in times of crisis with the 20th Support Group.
4. Coordinate with local authorities when they are in control of the situation.
5. Receive and process crisis reports.
6. Request assistance from appropriate staff sections, units or higher headquarters.

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7. Designate Liaison Officers to coordinate activities with local ROK activities.
  8. Coordinate transportation and logistical support for the ICMT with Support Operations, 20th Support Group – Pusan.
  9. Coordinate special requirements for supplies, equipment, medical, and security support.
  10. Coordinate for air transportation within or outside of Area IV.
  11. Evaluate the effects of crisis activities on the operational readiness of the command, keeping the Garrison Commander informed.
  12. Control/Distribute hand-held Vertex radios as needed.
- (b). 552nd MP Co will:
1. Provide initial response to scene and establish inner perimeter to cordon off scene.
  2. NLT H+30 minutes, be prepared to provide additional MP personnel to the PMO or on-site commander.
  3. Evacuate innocents.
  4. NLT H+45 minutes, be prepared to provide Mobile Reaction Force (MRF) to augment security requirements.
  5. NLT H+4 hours, be prepared to provide remaining unit assets to the on-site commander.
- (c). All units on Camp Hialeah will:
1. Appoint and make available for training Base Defense Force members as prescribed by the SPO, 20th ASG Pusan. (See Annex Q to the Camp Hialeah Physical Security Plan)
  2. NLT H+60 minutes have the Internal Guard Force (IGF) assembled, briefed and ready to deploy on order of the SPO, 20th ASG Pusan.
  3. Provide required equipment for the IGF members as prescribed by SPO per instruction of the Base Defense Commander (BDFC) for the situation.
  4. Train IGFs to perform under various crisis scenarios. This training will be coordinated through the PMO.

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5. Conduct security assistance as directed by the 20th ASG Pusan.
  6. On direction of the 20th ASG Pusan, provide limited support to local ROK authorities.
  7. Submit reports to the 20th ASG Pusan ICMT as required by paragraph 4.
- (d). Provost Marshal will:
1. Serve as On-site commander.
  2. Provide staffing for:
    - a) On-site Command post.
    - b) Interior security team.
    - c) Personal Security Detail (PSD) team for high risk individuals.
  3. Establish radio communications with the ICMT/EOC as soon as possible but NLT H+1 hour.
  4. Conduct special threat operations IAW this plan and/or as directed.
  5. Neutralize the threat with minimum force.
  6. Maintain firearms discipline.
  7. Assume OPCON of all military personnel at the threat site.
  8. Confine the threat to the immediate area. Block escape routes, establish pedestrian and vehicle control points, clear the threat site of all nonessential personnel.
  9. Fully develop and report the situation to the ICMT/EOC as soon as possible but NLT H+30 minutes.
  10. Establish a field CP near the threat site NLT+40 minutes to directly control the situation.
  11. Establish telephone communications with the ICMT/EOC as soon as possible.
  12. Assume responsibility for supporting the ICMT at field CP.



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13. Move from the field CP to the threat site over route selected and coordinated with the ICMT.
  14. Request, through the ICMT, personnel with special qualifications to conduct negotiations, if necessary.
  15. Designate individuals to be on Special Reaction Team (SRT) per Appendix C, USFK Reg 525-13. Ensure personnel are properly trained.
- (e). Support Operations, 20th ASG Pusan will:
1. Provide special equipment if needed.
  2. Provide required transportation for the movement of military and civilian personnel on and off the installation.
  3. Provide other support resources as required (especially communication equipment).
  4. Provide messing as needed.
  5. Provide billeting for ICMT personnel as directed.
- (f). HQ, 20th ASG Pusan will:
1. Be prepared to provide an on-scene Commander as required.
  2. Provide PAO support.
  3. Be prepared to provide additional personnel and logistics support as required.
- (g). DPW will:
1. Be prepared to cut off all utilities to the site.
  2. Provide blueprints of the site.
  3. Provide heavy equipment and other engineer support as required.
  4. Provide fire fighting services.
- (h). Local General Dispensary will:
1. Provide psychological assistance to negotiators as needed.

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2. Provide on-scene medic and medical authority to advise as members of ICMT.
- (i). Pusan Resident Office will:
    1. Provide intelligence information to Garrison Commander.
    2. Provide threat updates semiannually or as required.
  - (j). SJA, 20th ASG Pusan will:
    1. Provide ICMT Commander with legal advice, see Appendix 3 to Annex B (Legal Considerations).
    2. Provide, on request, legal personnel to the PMO.

### D. JURISDICTION

#### (1) Legal Authority Of The Installation Commander:

- (a) Commanders of US Military Installations in Area IV have the general right to exclude persons from the military installation. This right is issued pursuant to the Installation Commander's authority to maintain law and order and to ensure the security of the military installation and safety of its residents.
- (b) Article III of the United States/Republic of Korea Status of Forces Agreement (paragraph 1) provides that within the designated facilities and areas, the United States may take all measures necessary for their establishment, operation, safeguarding and control. Article III of the Agreed Minutes to the US/ROK SOFA provides that in the event of an emergency, the US Armed Forces shall be authorized to take such measures in the vicinity of their facilities and areas as may be necessary to provide for their safeguarding and control.
- (c) The Installation Commander is authorized to promulgate regulations governing the entry of persons and groups of persons on the military installation and to prohibit demonstrations and similar activities therein. Entry onto any Military Installation in Area IV for the purpose of handbills or literature, soliciting signatures on political petitions, political speeches, or other forms of activity which could give the appearance of Army support, or other forms of activity which entanglement, or intrusion into civilian political issues; or which pose a clear danger to loyalty, morale or discipline; or which are likely to interfere with the mission or operation of the Installation is prohibited.
- (d) The Installation Commander is charged with the responsibility of maintaining the order, security and discipline necessary to assure the proper functioning of the

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Command. This includes the authority to direct the temporary restraint of persons who threaten or impede the normal functioning of the Command through conduct which is criminal or prescribed as such by appropriate regulations, when such conduct is committed upon the installation. Such persons may be restrained to the extent reasonable necessary to dispose of the case by orderly transfer of custody to Korean authorities. When a violation of Korean law has occurred, the matter may be reported to the appropriate Korean Prosecutor for legal action.

### (2) Military Police Responsibilities and Restrictions

(a) Article 5 of the Military facility Protection Act of the Republic of Korea prohibits any person from entering a military facility without permission of the Area/Post Commander. Violators of the foregoing shall be punished by penal servitude not longer than one (1) year or imposition of a fine of not more than 1 Million Won.

1. United States' Military Police are authorized to detain/apprehend anyone who has entered the installation without authorization. Subsequent to apprehension/detention, persons entering the installation without authorization will be turned over to the Korean national Police as soon as possible.
2. If possible, the Korean National Police should actually escort persons off the installation or make the apprehension of persons entering the installation without authorization. Where possible, Korean National Police and Military Police should be jointly employed in a civil disturbance situation so that Korean national police will be readily available to arrest people detained by the military police.
3. The United States Army will not operate facilities for the confinement, custody, or detention of persons apprehended for violation of Republic of Korea laws as long as Korean confinement facilities are sufficient to accommodate the number of persons apprehended.
4. Action must be taken to suppress attempts by persons to cause injury and damage to persons and property. All persons participating in acts of lawlessness must be apprehended and turned over to Korean authorities. Strict adherence to fair treatment of civilians must be considered in all actions taken by US Military Personnel.

(b) Article XXII of the US/ROK SOFA, Paragraph 10(a) provides that regularly constituted military units or formations of the US Armed Forces shall have the right to police any facilities or areas which they use under Article II of this agreement.

1. US Military Police have no authority to detain or take non-US Military personnel into custody outside the US Military Installation boundaries.

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2. US Military Police may not apprehend or search any person who is entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities. However, all personnel, including those with diplomatic status may be stopped from committing violent acts against the security of US Installations.
- (c) Use of force or physical contact by US Military Personnel will be avoided. The Military Police are authorized to use force or physical contact only in case of an emergency and in the event that the Korean National Police cannot restore order.
1. Deadly force is not authorized unless absolutely necessary to preserve human life or prevent unauthorized access to or compromise of designated national security interests.
  2. The guiding principle for the application of force should be “minimum force consistent with mission accomplishment”.
  3. Riot control measures should be used only when life or property is endangered. The employment of riot control agents offers a humane and effective method of reducing resistance and lessens the requirements for the application of more severe measures of force. Based on the situation, the Commander may delegate the authority to use riot control agents to commissioned officers.

### **(3) Controls on Civilians**

Persons not subject to military law but authorized access to a military installation, who enter a US Military Installation for any purpose prohibited by law or regulation, may be removed from the military installation by order of the commanding officer and ordered not to reenter. The order not to reenter should be in writing as to easily establish notice to the individual. Persons violating this order not to reenter are subject to apprehension and prosecution under Republic of Korea Criminal Laws. A sample Bar Letter is illustrated in figure 1.

### **(4) Searches**

- (a) When reasonable justification and probable cause exists, the Installation Commander may authorize and direct the inspection of persons, their possessions, and vehicles upon their entering and leaving the US Military Installation. Such inspections are justified by military necessity, so long as the extent of the intrusion is reasonably related to the purpose of the inspection. Civilians entering the installation may not be searched over their objections, but will be denied entrance to the Installation. All exiting persons (military and civilian) may be searched over their objections. Searches more extensive than visual observation should be conducted by a person of the same sex as the individual being searched.

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- (b) IAW Paragraph 2-23, AR 210-10, all persons entering a United States Military Installation will be advised by a prominently displayed sign that they are subject to inspection upon entering, during their stay, and upon leaving the installation.
  - (c) Vehicles displaying diplomatic plates will not be stopped unless it is clearly necessary to prevent injury to the occupants or others. Diplomatic vehicles will not be searched.
- (5) Coordination With Civilian Authorities:
- (a) In the event of anticipated demonstrations on any military installation within the 20th Support Group, the Staff Judge Advocate will be advised of the approximate date, time, and place of the expected activities.
  - (b) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate will monitor any subsequent legal action against demonstrators in the Republic of Korea Judicial System.
- (6) MARTIAL LAW.
- (a) Ordinary Martial Law. The Republic of Korea Government may declare ordinary martial law in the event of domestic disorder.
  - (b) Extraordinary Martial Law. The Republic of Korea Government may declare extraordinary martial law in the event of a resumption of hostilities or extreme domestic disorder.
  - (c) In the event of the declaration of either ordinary martial law or extraordinary martial law, the criminal jurisdictions article of the United States/Republic of Korea Status of Forces Agreement (US/ROK SOFA) Article XXII is immediately suspended.
    1. United States Forces Korea (USFK) will have exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by SOFA personnel with the exception of invited contractors.
    2. USFK cannot try civilians by courts-martial except in time of declared war. Therefore, maximum use must be made of any available administrative sanctions.
    3. Other provisions of the SOFA remain in effect.
    4. All USFK personnel are still subject to the Republic of Korea Police power outside of SOFA areas and must obey the orders of martial law authorities.

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5. Upon declaration of martial law, a command message will be dispatched informing United States personnel of the declaration of martial law and their duties and responsibilities, in particular, the requirement of abstention from involvement in political activities.

### **(7) EMERGENCY MEASURES.**

- (a) The current Republic of Korea Constitution authorizes the President to take necessary emergency measures when there is a national calamity, grave crisis, or other emergency (ROK Constitution Article 51). Such measures may include suspension of individual rights and civil liberties.
- (b) No SOFA provision suspends criminal jurisdiction provisions in case the president exercises emergency powers.
- (c) It is possible that the procedural safe guards provided by the SOFA might not be strictly observed by ROK authorities.
- (d) The USFK position is that there is no exception in the SOFA for emergency measures and USFK insists on the rights under the SOFA for USFK personnel.

### **(8) GARRISON DECREE.**

- (a) A Garrison Decree is another measure utilized to deal with an emergency situation in the Republic of Korea. This is a Presidential Decree and not a statute. A Garrison Decree has no clear legal basis under ROK law.
- (b) Under a garrison Decree, troops may be dispatched to maintain law and order at the request of the local civilian authorities.
  1. The dispatch of troops must be approved by the ROK Army Chief of Staff, unless an emergency exists.
  2. In practice, the President orders dispatch of troops and the military Chief of Staff implements.
- (c) Garrison Decrees, when implemented in the past, have had no impact on the criminal jurisdiction provision of US/ROK SOFA.
- (d) Invocation of the Garrison Decree could result in large troop movements being made without prior coordination with CINC UNC/CFC.

### **(9) INSTALLATION SECURITY.**

- (a) USFK has full police power to protect property and personnel located on, SOFA Installations (Article II).

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- (b) In emergency situations, commanders may react immediately to threat incidents without waiting for the reaction of Republic of Korea Government Officials.
- (c) The preferred method of resolving situations involving Republic of Korea citizens will be to utilize Republic of Korea law enforcement assets.
- (d) USFK Regulation 550-5 gives command guidance in the area of requests for political asylum and temporary refuge.
  - 1. No authority exists for military personnel to grant political asylum.
  - 2. In emergency circumstances, the senior officer at USFK installations may extend temporary refuge to individuals for humanitarian reasons in order to secure the life or safety of that person against imminent danger.

### **(10) Defections**

- (a) Defection is covered by USFK regulation 381-6.
  - 1. No authority exists for military personnel to approve defection.
  - 2. A defection incident should be reported as quickly as possible to the Commander, USFK.
  - 3. The local Staff Judge Advocate should also be contacted for any asylum or defection incident.

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FIGURE 1 (Sample Bar to Entry)

(Office Symbol)

MEMORANDUM FOR (Individual)

SUBJECT: Area IV Military Installation Entry Bar

1. The Commander, Headquarters, 20<sup>th</sup> Support Group, APO 96218-0562, has ordered that effective upon your receipt of this letter, you leave and not reenter the limits of any military installation within Area IV. These installations include Camp Henry, Camp Walker, Camp George, Camp Hialeah, Camp Carroll and Camp Libby. This order has been issued pursuant to his authority as the Installation Commander to maintain law and order and to ensure the security of the military installation, and safety of its residents. This action was precipitated by the events set forth in the following paragraph.

2. On \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_, at or about (TIME), you were apprehended on the Camp\_\_\_\_\_ Military reservation by legally constituted authorities for

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3. As a consequence of these acts, your presence on this installation or any other installation within Area IV, constitutes a danger to public safety and public welfare within this Command. You are advised that under ROK laws, you may be subject to criminal prosecution in Republic of Korea Courts if you reenter or are found upon any military installation within Area IV in violation of this order.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER



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## E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

### (1) Alert Notifications.

The SPO is the proponent office for the Alert Notification System. See Annex D, Appendix 02 for more details.

### (2) Rules Of Engagement.

The Garrison Commander is the proponent for Rules Of Engagement (ROE). See Annex D, Appendix 19 for more details.

### (3) Installation AT/FP Exercises.

The SPO is the proponent for all AT/FP exercises. See Annex D, Appendix 03 for more details.

### (4) Incident Response.

Incident Response Plans will be developed in coordination with all agencies or units that are involved in a given plan. In most cases this will include, at a minimum, PMO, Fire Dept., 618<sup>th</sup> Med, DPW, and the SPO. The SPO will be responsible for coordination efforts. See Annex D, Appendix 04 for more details.

### (5) Consequence Management.

Consequence Management plans will be developed in coordination with units and agencies providing support. The SPO has the responsibility to coordinate the necessary units/agencies for planning. See Annex D, Appendix 05 for detailed plans.

### (6) Distinguished Visitor Protection Procedures.

Distinguished or Executive visitors are responsible for their own security. Their staff will make the necessary coordinations with the SPO. All cooperation will be extended but the final responsibility rests with the visitor (and staff). See Annex D, Appendix 06 for resources available to assist in protection efforts.

### (7) Operations Security.

Operations Security (OPSEC) is the responsibility of each unit. The SPO will generate OPSEC measures for tenant units and assist tenant units in application of OPSEC measures as requested. See Annex D, Appendix 07 for operational security measures at Camp Hialeah.

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### (8) Access Controls.

Camp Hialeah will maintain access controls IAW USFK Reg 190-7. The PMO is responsible for administering and maintaining the necessary measures to control access to Camp Hialeah. Units that have special security needs are responsible for their own access controls to their areas. See Annex D, Appendix 08 for more detailed information on Access Controls at Camp Hialeah.

### (9) Barriers.

The SPO is responsible for overall barrier plan for Camp Hialeah. This responsibility includes but is not limited to the perimeter wall, vehicular barriers, pedestrian barriers, and special barriers for MEVA's. The SPO will discharge its duties in conjunction with DPW and the PMO Physical Security Specialist. Units that have special barriers needs can provide their own or coordinate through the SPO. See Annex D, Appendix 09 for more details.

### (10) Lighting.

The SPO will evaluate the lighting needs and update plans as necessary. See Annex D, Appendix 10 for more details.

### (11) On-Site Security Elements.

The primary security element for Camp Hialeah is the 552<sup>nd</sup> MP Company. In addition to its wartime missions and training requirement, the 552<sup>nd</sup> MP Co. provides law enforcement, PMO functions and Physical Security expertise. The 728<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion, headquartered in Taegu, provides additional support through a Crisis Response Team (CRT) and other units to replace or reinforce the 552<sup>nd</sup> MP Co. as necessary. See Annex D, Appendix 11 for more detailed information.

### (12) Technology.

The SPO and the physical security specialist from the PMO will review current technology status and make recommendations about improvements to the Garrison Command Group. See Annex D, Appendix 12 for more details.

### (13) Training.

On Camp Hialeah, it is the responsibility of the parent unit to train individuals in personal protection and security awareness. The higher headquarters for each unit will provide unit training for the tenant units. The Garrison will incorporate training into each base defense exercise. See Annex D, Appendix 13 for more details.

## CAMP HIALEAH ANTI-TERRORIST / FORCE PROTECTION PLAN

### (14) Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Camp Hialeah will publish a separate WMD Plan. The SPO will have the lead in preparing this. See Annex D, Appendix 14 for more details.

### (15) Information Operations

The Information Management Officer (IMO) for the Garrison Headquarters Detachment in conjunction with the Information Center (Forward) of the 74<sup>th</sup> Signal Company is responsible for this plan. See Annex D, Appendix 15

### (16) Airfield Security.

Camp Hialeah does not have an airfield. Kimhae ROK Airbase is controlled entirely by the ROK Airforce. Therefore this is not a planning issue.

### (17) Port Security.

The only military facility with Port Security is Pier 8, which is controlled by the 837<sup>th</sup> Transportation Battalion. The 837<sup>th</sup> Trans has its own AT/FP Plan that covers its port security. See Annex D, Appendix 17 for more details.

### (18) Buildings.

Ostensibly, the SPO should inspect all building for force protection concerns however, due to shortage of manpower this is not feasible. Therefore it is the responsibility of the using unit to ensure that their buildings are properly secured. The SPO will assist when requested. See Annex D, Appendix 18 for more details.

## **V. LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION**

### A. Readiness and Concept of Combat Support.

The units and agencies identified below (Material and Services) will be prepared to support the AT/FP plan both in advance of and after a terrorist attack. The organizations will maintain a readiness posture as required in the various parts of this plan. In the event their ability to support this plan fails they will notify the Operations NCIOC at the SPO immediately so that plans may be revised to reflect an accurate picture of capabilities.

## **CAMP HIALEAH ANTI-TERRORIST / FORCE PROTECTION PLAN**

### **B. Material and Services**

(1) The following agencies will provide materials and services in support of the AT/FP plan:

(a) Support Operations Division(SOD) will supply:

1. Korean Service Corps workers for labor
2. Information Management expertise
3. Digital Photography resources
4. Temporary billeting accommodations.
5. Forklift support.
6. Class X supplies (Local Purchase)

(b) Logistics Support Office (LSO) will supply:

1. Class I supplies (MRE's)
2. Class IV supplies (constructions and barrier material)
3. Class V supplies (Ammo)
4. Class IX supplies (repair parts)
5. Class X supplies (Local Purchase)

(c) Directorate of Public Works will supply:

1. Construction labor and expertise
2. Facilities planning
3. Heavy construction equipment

### **C. Weapons and Ammunition.**

(a) Each unit armorer will be responsible for his unit's weapons. The weapons are to be kept in the appropriate arms rooms and secured according to AR 390-11, the Camp Hialeah Physical Security Plan, and the Unit Physical Security Plan

(b) Approved ammunition will be stored in the Camp Hialeah ammunition storage area. In the event of a terrorist attack or other force protection situation requiring ammunition, the ammunition will be picked up and distributed according to the Base Defense Plan for ammunition draw. The Garrison Commander will determine if it is necessary to draw additional ammunition from remote storage sites. Each unit is authorized and encouraged to store a small amount of ammunition in its arms room as long as the proper licensees are obtained and all applicable regulations are followed. The SPO is the managing agency for the administration of the ammunition storage area on Camp Hialeah.

## CAMP HIALEAH ANTI-TERRORIST / FORCE PROTECTION PLAN

### D. Medical Services.

HSC 168<sup>th</sup> Medical Bn provide medical support for Camp Hialeah. Several smaller units that provide dental, veterinary, and preventative medicine support assist it. 168<sup>th</sup> Med has the responsibility of making necessary coordinations with medical facilities in the Pusan area and developing written MOA and MOU's.

### E. Personnel.

The Administrative Services Division (ASD) will report to higher on such issues as strength, casualties, and replacements.

### F. Civil Affairs.

The Garrison Public Affairs Officer (PAO) is responsible for interfacing with the local populace both to provide for their needs and to garner support from them.

### G. Updates.

The SPO is responsible for updating and distributing this plan to all concerned parties.

## VI. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

### A. Command.




The chain of command progresses from the Garrison Commander to the Garrison Executive Officer to the Commander of the 552<sup>nd</sup> MP Co. After that command falls to the senior surviving tenant unit commander. Each unit will provide for its own internal command succession with the understanding that in extreme cases a platoon leader may be both the senior unit leader and the senior Garrison leader.

### B. Signal

Communications for AT/FP contingency operations will be the normal installation communications augmented by portable radio, landlines, courier, and runners, and will be IAW OPSEC and COMSEC requirements. See Annex H (Signal) for more details.

# CAMP HIALEAH ANTI-TERRORISM FORCE PROTECTION PLAN

## I. Task Organization



## **ANNEX A (Risk Assessment and Management) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

1. General Overview. The area of operations for the Pusan Resident Office of the 524th Military Intelligence Battalion includes Camp Hialeah, Pusan Storage Facility, Kimhae Airfield, Pier 8, and the area from south of P'ohang and east of Chinju to Pusan city proper. The total area includes about 2,800 square kilometers, including 626 kilometers of coastline. The total population for the Pusan office area of coverage is about 8.4 million.

a. Pusan, consisting of over 5.9 million residents, is strategically important to both the ROK and USFK. Specifically, the port is responsible for the majority of all ROK exports; at the same time, the same area is critical for the introduction of troops and materiel should a contingency situation occur, along with NEO evacuation prior to any conflict.

b. Various other ports in the Pusan area also factor into the conflict arena, including Masan, Ulsan, and Chinhae. Finally, key military-industrial facilities are in the southern area, such as the Ch'angwon industrial area, and the logistical and factory locations in Yangsan.

2. General Threat. Threats to USFK in the area in general are categorized into two main areas: local and worldwide. Local threats include students, dissidents, labor unions, third country nationals, and criminal activity. Worldwide threats include North Korean SOF and agent activity, Foreign Intelligence Service collection activities, and terrorist acts.

3. The Local Threat can be further defined as follows:

a. Students and Dissidents: College students, when properly organized, are the largest dissident group in South Korea. Students (and activists) often believe that the presence of USFK in the ROK is a hindrance to the reunification of the North and South. Demonstrations are aimed primarily at US installations, but US personnel could become targets if they come in close proximity to demonstrators. As a result of changes in Korean law in late 1996, all demonstrations have to be requested at least 48 hours in advance. The law indirectly supports reporting by ROK authorities to USMI and supported commands; however, the possibility always exists for unexpected demonstrations. At the same time, most leaders of the largest student group, the Hanch'ongnyon, are on ROK wanted lists. Additionally, civilian support to student causes has waned in the late 1990's, again minimizing popular participation in large demonstrations.

b. J2, USFK, assesses a low general threat from student dissident groups. Recent demonstrations near Camp Hialeah have been orchestrated by civilian groups, vice students; student demonstrations have not been recently directed at USFK facilities in the Pusan area. Key dates/anniversaries for student and dissident activity are provided here for informational purposes: 3 April 1948: The Cheju Island Rebellion; 15 April 1911:

**ANNEX A (Risk Assessment and Management) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

Kim, Il-sung's birthday; 19 April 1960: Birth of the Student Movement; 1 May: Labor Day; 18-21 May 1980: The Kwangju Uprising.

c. Civilian Groups: The predominant civilian group prone to protests against USFK in Pusan is the Pusan Yonhap, or Pusan Area Alliance for Democracy and Reunification. The Yonhap has been able to muster up to 400 persons in recent demonstrations outside Gate 4 of Camp Hialeah. The Pusan Yonhap pushes for the removal of all USFK personnel from Pusan and the return of facilities utilized by same. As a result of recent activities of the leadership of the Yonhap, organizational efforts have been weakened within the group. Specifically, the leader of the group was arrested 2 September 1999, after he illegally traveled to North Korea. Sub-groups of the Pusan Yonhap include the Pusan Civil Rights Joint Countermeasures Committee, the Pusan Citizen Campaign HQs for Recovery of US Occupied Land, and other minor women's groups. The group commonly protests at the Pusan Train Station or the Lotte Hotel Plaza.

d. Again, demonstrations require approval 48 hours in advance by ROK authorities; it is important that USFK personnel pay attention to posted spot reports, "hot apples," and command information concerning possible demonstrations by any group. Under no circumstance should curious US persons attempt to participate in, photograph, or otherwise incite demonstrators. Instead, all USFK personnel should leave the area of protests and otherwise avoid contact with demonstrators.

e. Labor Unions. J2 assesses no organized threat from labor activity and therefore considers the threat to USFK from labor groups as low. In the Pusan area, the major labor groups are the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). Recent bankruptcy actions at the Samsung Car Factory in nearby Ch'angwon City resulted in demonstrations at the Pusan Train Station during the summer of 1999; however, the protests were strictly directed at the ROK government. For assessment purposes, the KCTU is the more "radical" of the two groups, but, again, protests are normally not directed at USFK.

f. Foreigners. As a result of trade expansion by the ROK vis a vis other countries, especially China and Russia, international shipping through Pusan is big business. Merchant seamen from China, Vietnam, former Communist Bloc countries (along with countries that have ties to North Korea), visit the Port of Pusan daily. As an example, over 50,000 Russians visit the port city annually. Additionally, many foreigners stay longer than 30 days, either for ship repairs or to look for work.

g. Criminal Activity. Crimes against persons pose a low threat; crimes against property pose a medium threat. Most crimes against USFK personnel include one or more of the following conditions: during the hours of darkness, alcohol related, walking alone, traveling in high crime areas (for theft), or property left unsecured or visible. High risks as defined in this paragraph could include the Texas Street and Green Street areas, or any location where prostitution, narcotics, or other



**ANNEX A (Risk Assessment and Management) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

illegal activities are available. As for narcotics, most illegal substances found in the ROK are limited to heroin (methamphetamines) and hemp (marijuana), usually sold via third country nationals, such as Russian females.

4. Worldwide Threats can be further defined as follows:

a. Terrorist Activity. J2, USFK, categorizes the worldwide terrorist threat to US forces as high, but assesses the threat of North Korean or other terrorism against USFK in the ROK as low.

b. Many countries sponsor international terrorism. Known terrorism sponsors with embassies or missions in South Korea include Sudan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria—all located in Seoul. Known undisputed acts of North Korean terrorism include the downing of KAL Flight 858 in 1987, a bomb blast at Kimp'o Airport in 1986, and a bombing in Burma in 1983 directed at the South Korean President. Firearms and ammonium nitrate type fertilizers (often used in improvised exploding devices) are not easily available to the South Korea public. Additionally, South Korean intelligence and security agencies do a commendable job tracking third country national visits to the country.

c. There is no identified indigenous South Korean terrorist threat. Close coordination exists between ROK agencies and USMI and other US agencies; no direct threat against USFK posed by foreigners (especially middle eastern students or workers) has been identified.

d. North Korean Threat.

(1) General. To understand the North Korean threat, we must first understand their history since 1948. Officially called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea was solely under the rule of Kim, Il-song from 1948 until his death in July 1994. He consistently vowed to reunite the peninsula under Communist rule during his lifetime. As a student, he studied Maoism in China and later was a Major in the Soviet Armed Forces. During the Korean Conflict, Communist China's aid assured the North of the required support to remain an entity and not a satellite state of the Soviet Union. Kim managed to keep all opposition from endangering his position and assured the continuance of his goals by naming his son, Kim, Chong-il, as his successor. Kim, Chong-il is much more radical than his late father and much more unpredictable. He has been credited with being the instigator of numerous anti-ROK incidents, to include the 1983 Burma bombing (which almost killed the ROK president), and the 1987 downing of a KAL jet. Should his weaknesses be attacked by others within the hierarchy who do not like his leadership, or should the economy of the country further decline to the point of civil unrest, Kim could even be as radical to start a war with the ROK to solidify and justify his support base.

**ANNEX A (Risk Assessment and Management) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

(2) North Korean Strategy. Based on Kim, Il-song's background, therefore, North Korean military doctrine is a unique blend of the influences of the former USSR and Communist China. North Korea can be expected to employ vast forces while still retaining the fluidity and mobility that modern warfare affords. The key overall is their two front policy, as follows: a substantial conventional force attack along the DMZ, combined with a second front of Special Operations Forces (SOF) infiltrating the rear area. The SOF could paralyze ROK/US logistical/communications forces and facilities. This is the most critical factor when considering the military importance of the Pusan area.

(3) SOF. North Korea continues to attempt infiltrations into the ROK, normally via the East Coast. However, infiltrations have been attempted in the Pusan and Ulsan areas as well. Historically, North Korean agents have targeted defectors and senior South Korean officials for assassination, using explosives or firearms. US personnel could possibly be a collateral risk. With its staggered and long coastline, the Pusan-Ulsan area is conducive to illegal entry. Probable targets, specifically prior to war, would include airfields and seaport facilities (Kimhae and Pier 8), and logistic, communications, and command and control facilities. The use of the port by USFK as a staging area prior to and during hostilities, could provide the North with crucial indicators and early warning intelligence. Likewise, sabotage of Pusan port facilities, airfields, and lines of communications by North Korean SOF could provide a warning to USFK of an imminent commencement of a general war.

e. Foreign Intelligence Service. A principal threat to USFK in the Pusan area is the threat from Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS). At least 33 different countries are officially represented in the area, whether by a full Consulate, a trade mission, or a trade representative. Accordingly, USFK personnel should be aware that the collection of information, be it intelligence or economic, occurs every day. Recent trends worldwide by Human Intelligence have been to target US technology; however, the sensitivity of missions and units in the area could also be targeted. Additionally, the introduction of any new weapons or systems into the ROK by the US is probably watched by other countries and they are therefore a collection target. Many countries also have a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) threat, be it by monitoring radios, telephones, radar, or using camcorders, airborne platforms, or satellite photography. US operations in the area are therefore vulnerable in a general way and US personnel should therefore always practice good OPSEC.

**ANNEX H (Signal) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

1. Communications.

- a. The on-scene commander maintains communication with ICMT/EOC.
- b. Standard telephone will be used whenever possible.
- c. In the event of a lack of telephones, radio communications or couriers will be used.
- d. The ICMT will coordinate with the PMO for establishing FM communications and with the 552nd MP Company to establish perimeter security around the affected area.

ANNEX B (Terrorist Threat Conditions/Countermeasures) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

1. REFERENCES:

- a. AR 190-52
- b. USFK/EUSA Reg 190-7
- c. USFK/EUSA Reg 190-50
- d. Installation Security Plan

2. PURPOSE; To establish standard policy and procedures for the protection of personnel and facilities against Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCON) throughout the Pusan Area.

3. GENERAL: The Deputy Installation Commander is the authority for declaration of THREATCONs.

4. DEFINITIONS:

a. THREATCON NORMAL. Applies when there is no discernible terrorist activity. Under these conditions, only a routine security posture, designed to defeat the routine criminal threat, is warranted. The minimum THREATCON for U.S. Army commands is NORMAL.

b. THREATCON ALPHA. Applies when there is a general threat of possible threat activity against personnel and/or installations, the nature and extent of which is unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher THREATCONs resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. Commands must be capable of maintaining THREATCON ALPHA measures indefinitely, with only limited impact on normal operations.

c. THREATCON BRAVO. Applies when an increased or more predictable threat exists. Commanders must be capable of maintaining the measures of this THREATCON for several weeks without causing undue hardship to personnel, substantially affecting operational capabilities, or aggravating relations with local authorities and members of the local civilian or host nation community.

d. THREATCON CHARLIE. Applies when an incident occurs or intelligence indicates some form of threat action against personnel and/or facilities is imminent. Implementation of THREATCON CHARLIE measures for more than a short period probably will create hardships for personnel and affect the peacetime activities of units and personnel.

ANNEX B (Terrorist Threat Conditions/Countermeasures) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

e. **THREATCON DELTA.** Implementation applies in the immediate area where a threat attack has occurred or when intelligence indicates terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Implementation of THREATCON DELTA normally occurs for only limited periods of time over specific, localized areas. Commands cannot sustain THREATCON DELTA for extended periods without causing significant hardships for personnel and substantial reductions in capability to perform normal peacetime missions.

5. **THREATCON ALPHA** is issued as a general warning of possible terrorist activity, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and when circumstances do not justify the full implementation of measures contained in a higher alert state (It may be necessary, however, to implement certain selected measures from THREATCON BRAVO).

a. **Measure 1.** At regular intervals, remind all personnel, including family members, to report the following to appropriate law enforcement or security agencies—

(1) Suspicious personnel, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers, or those observing, photographing, or asking questions about military operations or security measures.

(2) Unidentified vehicles parked or operated in a suspicious manner on, or in the vicinity of U.S. installations, units, or facilities.

(3) Abandoned parcels or suitcases.

(4) Any other activity considered suspicious.

b. **Measure 2.** The duty officer or personnel with access to building plans as well as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times. Key personnel should be able to seal off an area immediately. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on-call and readily available. Ensure that law enforcement and security agencies have immediate access to building floor plans and emergency evacuation plans for MEVAs.

c. **Measure 3.** Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use. Maintain a list of secured facilities and areas at installation, directorate or activity level.

d. **Measure 4.** Increase unannounced security spot checks (inspection of personal identification; vehicle registration; and the contents of vehicles, suitcases, briefcases and other containers) at access control points for U.S. installations and facilities.

e. **Measure 5.** Reduce the number of access points for vehicles and personnel to minimum levels, consistent with the requirement to maintain a reasonable flow of traffic.

f. **Measure 6.** As a deterrent, randomly apply measures 14, 15, 17, or 18 from THREATCON BRAVO, either individually or in combination with each other.

ANNEX B (Terrorist Threat Conditions/Countermeasures) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

g. **Measure 7.** Review all operations plans and orders, and SOPs which pertain to implementation of THREATCONs BRAVO through DELTA.

h. **Measure 8.** Review security measures for HRP and implement additional measures warranted by the threat and existing vulnerabilities (for example, HRP should alter established patterns of behavior and wear inconspicuous body armor when traveling in public areas).

i. **Measure 9.** Increase liaison with local police, intelligence and security agencies to monitor the threat to Army personnel, installations and facilities. Notify local police agencies concerning THREATCON BRAVO measures that, if implemented, could impact on their operations in the local community.

j. **Measure 10.** Spare for MACOM or installation use.

6. THREATCON BRAVO. This condition is declared when there is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified.

a. **Measure 11.** Increase the frequency of warnings required by Measure 1 and inform personnel of additional threat information, as appropriate.

b. **Measure 12.** Keep all personnel involved in implementing AT/FP contingency plans on-call.

c. **Measure 13.** Review provisions of all operations plans and orders, and SOPs associated with implementation of THREATCON CHARLIE.

d. **Measure 14.** Move automobiles and objects such as trash containers and crates away from MEVAs to a distance based upon countering the assessed threat. If the configuration of the facility or area precludes implementation of this measure, take appropriate compensatory measures in accordance with local plans (frequent inspection by explosive detector dog (EDD) teams, centralized parking, controlled access to parking areas, etc.).

e. **Measure 15.** Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

f. **Measure 16.** At the beginning and end of each workday and at frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious activity or packages, or for signs of tampering, or indications of unauthorized entry.

g. **Measure 17.** Implement screening procedures for all incoming official mail to identify possible explosive or incendiary devices, or other dangerous material. If available, use trained EDD teams for inspection of suspicious items and to conduct

ANNEX B (Terrorist Threat Conditions/Countermeasures) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

periodic screening of mail. Encourage soldiers, civilian employees and family members to inspect their personal mail, report suspicious items to local law enforcement agencies, and refrain from handling such items until cleared by appropriate authority.

h. **Measure 18.** Inspect all deliveries to messes, exchanges, guest houses, clubs, libraries, schools and other locally-designated common use facilities to identify explosive and incendiary devices. Use trained EDD teams for some inspections, when available. Encourage family members to report suspicious packages to local law enforcement agencies, and refrain from handling them until cleared by appropriate authority.

i. **Measure 19.** Increase both overt and covert security force surveillance of messes, commissaries, exchanges, guest houses, clubs, libraries, schools, chapels and other locally-designated soft targets to improve deterrence and build confidence among staff and family members.

j. **Measure 20.** Inform soldiers, civilian employees and family members of the general threat situation to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm. Periodically update all personnel as the situation changes.

k. **Measure 21.** Brief representatives of all units and activities on the installation concerning the threat and security measures implemented in response to the threat. Implement procedures to provide periodic updates for these unit and activity representatives.

l. **Measure 22.** Verify the identity of all personnel entering the installation, MEVAs and other sensitive activities specified in local plans (inspect identification cards or grant access based on visual recognition). Visually inspect the interior of all vehicles and the exterior of all suitcases, briefcases, packages and other containers. Increase the frequency of detailed vehicle inspections (trunk, undercarriage, glove boxes, etc.) and the frequency of inspections of suitcases, briefcases and other containers.

m. **Measure 23.** Increase the frequency of random identity checks (inspection of identification cards, security badges, and vehicle registration documents) conducted by security force patrols on the installation.

n. **Measure 24.** Increase security provided to off-post personnel in conjunction with host nation law enforcement agencies, where required and/or practicable, or transport off-post personnel to protected areas in accordance with local contingency plans. Remind all personnel to lock parked vehicles and inspect vehicles for suspicious items before entering and driving them.

o. **Measure 25.** Implement additional security measures for HRP, such as conduct of counter-surveillance operations, in accordance with existing plans. Consider providing 24 hour protective services protection for Level I HRP, if not already provided.

ANNEX B (Terrorist Threat Conditions/Countermeasures) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

p. **Measure 26.** Brief all law enforcement personnel, guards, and security augmentation force personnel concerning the threat and policies governing use of force/rules of engagement. Repeat this briefing on a periodic basis.

q. **Measure 27.** Increase liaison with local police, intelligence and security agencies to monitor the threat to Army personnel, installations and facilities. Notify local police agencies concerning THREATCON CHARLIE and DELTA measures that, if implemented, could impact on their operations in the local community.

r. **Measure 28.** Test attack warning system and supporting evacuation plans, ensuring proficiency and appropriate OPSEC.

s. **Measure 29.** Spare for MACOM or installation use.

7. THREATCON CHARLIE. This condition is declared when an incident has occurred of when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent.

a. **Measure 30.** Continue all THREATCON ALPHA and BRAVO measures or introduce those which have not already been implemented.

b. **Measure 31.** Keep all personnel responsible for implementing AT/FP plans at their place of duty.

c. **Measure 32.** Reduce installation and MEVA access points to the absolute minimum necessary for continued operation.

d. **Measure 33.** Verify the identity of all personnel entering U.S. installations, facilities and activities (to include housing areas, schools and other facilities which are not located on installations). Inspect identification cards, security badges or other forms of personal identification. Visually inspect the interior of all vehicles and the exterior of all suitcases, briefcases and other containers. Increase the frequency of detailed vehicle inspections (trunk, undercarriage, glove boxes, etc.) and the frequency of inspections of suitcases, briefcases and other containers.

e. **Measure 34.** Remove all vehicles parked within or near MEVAs and other sensitive activities specified in local plans to a distance based upon countering the assessed threat. Implement centralized parking and shuttle bus service, where required.

f. **Measure 35.** Issue weapons to all law enforcement personnel, security guards, and guard force augmentation personnel, if not already accomplished. Ensure that all personnel have been briefed concerning policies governing the use of force/rules of engagement, particularly criteria for use of deadly force. Ensure that ammunition is available for immediate issue (for those personnel not already issued ammunition) and that supervisory personnel are familiar with policies governing issuance of ammunition.



ANNEX B (Terrorist Threat Conditions/Countermeasures) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

g. **Measure 36.** Increase security patrol activity to the maximum level sustainable. Weight the effort toward MEVAs, to include potential "soft" target areas such as housing areas, hospitals and schools.

h. **Measure 37.** Position guard force personnel in the vicinity of all MEVAs. In OCONUS areas where permitted by the host nation, position additional security personnel in the vicinity of otherwise unprotected housing areas, schools, hospitals and other soft targets. Request additional security augmentation from host nation law enforcement and security agencies, particularly in otherwise unprotected areas.

i. **Measure 38.** Erect barriers required to control direction of traffic flow and to protect facilities vulnerable to bomb attack by parked or moving vehicles.

j. **Measure 39.** Consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities that might make sites more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

k. **Measure 40.** Spare for MACOM or installation use.

8. **THREATCON DELTA.** This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.

a. **Measure 41.** Continue all THREATCON ALPHA, BRAVO and CHARLIE measures, or introduce those which have not already been implemented.

b. **Measure 42.** Augment guard forces to ensure absolute control over access to the installation, MEVAs, and other potential target areas.

c. **Measure 43.** Identify the owners of all vehicles already on the installation and, OCONUS, in the vicinity of soft targets off installations. In those cases where the presence of a vehicle can not be explained (owner is not present and has no obvious military affiliation), inspect the vehicle for explosive or incendiary devices, or other dangerous items, and remove the vehicle from the vicinity of MEVAs, soft targets and other sensitive areas as soon as possible. OCONUS commanders take unilateral action off-post only in circumstances where there is a reasonable basis to believe that death, grievous bodily harm, or significant property damage will otherwise occur.

d. **Measure 44.** Inspect all vehicles entering the installation, facility or activity. Inspections should include cargo storage areas, undercarriage, glove boxes and other areas where explosive or incendiary devices, or other dangerous items could be concealed. Briefcases, suit cases, boxes and other containers in vehicles should also be inspected.

e. **Measure 45.** Limit access to installations, facilities and activities to those personnel with a legitimate and verifiable need to enter.

ANNEX B (Terrorist Threat Conditions/Countermeasures) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

f. **Measure 46.** Inspect all baggage, such as suitcases, packages, and briefcases brought on the installation for presence of explosive or incendiary devices, or other dangerous items.

g. **Measure 47.** Take measures to control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the U.S. command or agency.

h. **Measure 48.** Implement frequent inspections of the exterior of buildings (to include roof and subterranean areas) and parking areas. Inspections at MEVAs and in the vicinity of soft targets should be conducted by security force personnel.

i. **Measure 49.** Cancel or delay all administrative movement that is not mission essential.

j. **Measure 50.** Request that local authorities close those public roads and facilities in the vicinity of military installations, facilities and activities that might facilitate execution of a terrorist attack.

k. **Measure 51.** Spare for MACOM or installation use.

APPENDIX 1 (THREATCONS) to ANNEX B (Terrorist Threat Conditions/Countermeasures)  
to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

1. At Threatcon Alpha, MP will:

- a. Conduct random searches of vehicles and personal belongings on entry and exit.
- b. Limit access points for personnel and vehicles commensurate with reasonable traffic flow and installation Cdr's guidance.
- c. One combat-ready MP team with tactical vehicle placed on random basis at gates.
- d. One dog team placed on gates on random basis.
- e. Random ID check.

2. At Threatcon Bravo, MP will:

- a. Continue all Alpha Measures.
- b. Increase ID checks to include TWO forms of ID.
- c. MP Company 100% recall, placed on 30 minutes standby.
- d. One MP PLATOON placed on FULL ALERT, 10 minute deployment.
- e. Request IGF/QRF 100% recall, placed on 30 minutes standby.
- f. Close selected gates.
- g. MP patrols increase checks of critical facilities.

3. At THREATCON CHARLIE, MP will:

- a. Continue all BRAVO MEASURE.
- b. Coordinate with Deputy Installation Commander, 20th Area Support Group to restrict non-military access to key and essential. Notify PMJ as required.
- c. Personnel holding A/B pass denied access.
- d. Honorary club members denied access.
- e. 100% search of all personnel and belongings entering and exiting.
- f. Fully armed and equipped MP Team, with HMMWV placed on all gates.
- g. Gate barricades placed in position.
- h. Dog Team visible on all open gates.

APPENDIX 1 (THREATCONS) to ANNEX B (Terrorist Threat Conditions/Countermeasures)  
to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

- i. Vehicle parking within 100 feet of perimeter and critical facilities restricted.
  - j. PM request KNP assistance:
    - (1) Traffic control exterior gates.
    - (2) Remove sidewalk vendors from gates.
    - (3) patrol exterior perimeter.
  - k. MP company placed on 100% ready status.
  - l. IGF/QRF fully assembled and equipment within unit area within weapons and ammunition.
  - m. Activate security detachment for field grade officers, Deputy Installation Commander and their families.
4. At THREATCON DELTA, MP will:
- a. Continue all previous alert measures.
  - b. QRF reports to designated assembly area with weapon.
  - c. MP request KNP standby reaction force.

**ANNEX C (Action Set Matrices) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

As of 15 Sept 2000, there are no Action Set Matrices for Camp Hialeah. The AT/FP plan will be revised as soon as this initial draft is sent to higher headquarters (20 Sept 2000). As part of the revision process, the appropriate matrices will be created and inserted here. The revision plan will take about 26 weeks. The matrices section will be covered within the first 10 weeks. Ergo, this annex will be published during Jan 2001. Until then the tasks to each unit/agency are indicated in the appropriate annex or appendix.

**APPENDIX 01 (Tasks and Responsibilities) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

**Purpose:**

This annex provides the basic foundation for the delineation of tasks and responsibilities for selected staff and subordinate elements. If not previously described, the commander should define the specific tasks and responsibilities for each listed staff officer, commander, and subordinate element to reflect his operational requirements and desired span of control.

- **Secretary of Defense and the CINC.** Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 164 and 22 U.S.C. Section 4802, the Secretary of Defense and CINC are responsible with covered countries for the security of all DOD elements, personnel, and facilities under the command of the CINC.
- **Department of State.** Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. Section 4802, the Secretary of State is responsible within covered countries for developing and implementing policies and programs to provide for the security of DOD elements, personnel, and facilities not under the command of the CINC. IAW 22 U.S.C. Section 4805(a), the Secretary of State retains ultimate authority and responsibility for the security of DOD elements, personnel, and facilities—unless a specific MOU assigns parts or all of that responsibility to the Department of Defense. Normally, the Secretary of State’s responsibilities includes defense Attaché Offices, Marine Security Guard Detachments, DOD personnel detailed to other USG departments or agencies, and DOD elements which form an integral part of the U.S. country team for which a Chief of Mission has assumed responsibility.

NOTE: The following are examples that the installation commander should use to assign task and responsibilities and to ensure completeness.

- **Commander**
  - A combating terrorism checklist for new commanders can be found in DOD 02000.12-H, Appendix W.
  - The DOD Installation commander will designate a single point of contact to oversee the antiterrorism and fore protection programs (DODI 2000.16 & DOD 0-2000.12-H).
  - Develop necessary standard policies and procedures to supplement the provisions of this regulation to meet installation specific needs, including joint supplementation, when possible.
  - Ensure that Antiterrorism plans, at a minimum, include procedures to collect and analyze terrorist threat data, procedures to enhance security posture, and procedures to respond to a terrorist event. (DODI 2000.16 # 5).
  - Coordinate and maintain liaison with the other Departments and Agencies on physical security matters.
  - Establish procedures for sharing threat information expeditiously through law enforcement and intelligence channels.
  - Formalize Antiterrorism procedures for joint response.
  - Develop specific Antiterrorism installation threat assessments and update them frequently.
  - Coordinate the acquisition of Antiterrorism equipment and establish procedures to identify requirements for related research and analysis.
  - Develop training, qualification, and suitability requirements for dedicated security forces.
  - Conduct combined operations with Host Nation security or Local (if CONUS) law enforcement organizations.
  - Ensure that AT/FP Plans are reviewed periodically at a higher level. (DODI 2000.16 # 6)
  - Installation Commanders shall make use of the DOD Terrorism Threat Level System to establish the proper THREATCONs and RAM. (DODI 2000.16 # 7, 8, &9)
- **Installation AT/FP Officer**
  - A combating terrorism checklist for installation antiterrorism and force protection officer can be found in DOD 02000.12-H, Appendix W.

**APPENDIX 01 (Tasks and Responsibilities) to  
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- Attend the Combating Terrorism on Military Installations or Bases Course ( 5 days) at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, or an equivalent.
- Unit/ship AT/FP Officers will attend the above course when deployment is to a high-threat area.
- Develop an installation Combating Terrorism Program (UP DODD 2000.12 and CJCS Handbook 5260).
- Develop an installation Combating Terrorism Plan (UP DODD 2000.12 and CJCS Handbook 5260).
- Coordinate the Combating Terrorism Plan with foreign, state, and local law enforcement agencies as recommended by DOD 2000.12-H & CJCS Handbook 5260.
- Ensure that AT/FP Planning is integrated into overall force protection planning as recommended by DOD 2000.12-H & CJCS Handbook 5260.
- Ensure that the installation's AT/FP library contains the current versions of all appropriate directives, instructions, regulations, SOP/SOIs, and other pertinent documents. (UP CJCS Handbook 5260).
- Establish an AT/FP Awareness Program IAW DODD 2000.12.
- Provide periodic terrorism awareness briefings IAW DODD 2000.12.
- Ensure that the installation conducts an AT/FP exercise annually IAW DODI 2000.14 & service implementing instructions.
- Ensure that installation training scenarios integrate into training exercises IAW DODI 2000.14.
- Conduct a vulnerability assessment or risk analysis, as referenced by DOD 2000.16.
- Prepare a prioritized list of Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas as recommended by DOD 2000.12-H & service implementing guidance.
- Assist in the identification of the installation's crisis management team, ensuring that this team meets quarterly and conducts its business IAW DOD 2000.12-H, Chapter 15.
- Identify AT/FP physical security requirements.
- Develop AT/FP Installation Plan.
- Assist in development of Incident response Plan.
- Program AT/FP resources.
- Identify new construction requirements.
- Bring existing structures to baseline standards using IVA tools.
- Coordinate AT/FP efforts with HN authorities and the U.S. Country Team.
- Provide appropriate level I AT/FP training to installation personnel
- Identify, in concert with the installation AT/FP Officer where the lack of AT/FP funding has adversely impacted the installation's AT/FP program as recommended by CJCS Handbook 5260.
- Ensure that the commander and key staff officers of the installation have an understanding of AT/FP preventive measures and considerations, as outlined in Joint Pub 3-07.2, Chapter VII.
  
- **Operations Center**
  - Ensure well-defined and location-specific pre-deployment AT/FP requirements are developed and implemented as recommended by DOD 2000.12-H, Joint Pub-07.2, & CJCS Handbook 5260
  - Ensure that the above requirements provide for pre-deployment threat awareness planning, for identification of key elements for additional protection, and assurance that the flow of critical threat information to deployed units will not be interrupted, IAW DOD 0-2000.12-H.
  - Develop a crisis management plan IAW Joint Pub 3-07.2, Appendix G.
  
- **Intelligence Officer**
  - Collect threat information.
  - Conduct threat analysis.
  - Produce threat assessment.
  - Develop threat assessment plan and ensure that it is current IAW DODD 2000.12.

**APPENDIX 01 (Tasks and Responsibilities) to  
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- Ensure procedures exist to allow for the timely dissemination of immediate terrorist threats, assessments and other intelligence to all appropriate users both during and after duty hours IAW DODD 2000.12 & CJCS Handbook 5260.
- Ensure the installation has a travel security program and that it provides for travelers threat information briefings IAW DODD 2000.12 & CJCS Handbook 5260.
- Ensure that the installation commander reviews the collection and dissemination of terrorist information plan (and the information itself) at least annually and assesses that information and plan as adequate IAW DOD 0-2000.12-H.
- Ensure that the installation receives recurring threat updates IAW DODD 2000.12 and service implementing instructions.
- Ensure that the intelligence analysis at the installation is a blend of all appropriate intelligence disciplines and that the intelligence officer and the AT/FP officer understand the sources of the information IAW DOD 0-2000.12-H.
- Ensure that the intelligence cell for the installation reviews information to identify indications that all available information is being collected or disseminated IAW DOD 0-2000.12-H.
- Ensure that LEA developed information is shared and blended with intelligence information as recommended by DOD 2000.12-H.
- Conduct, in concert with the installation's security personnel and the AT/FP Officer, a vulnerability assessment IAW Joint Pub 3-07.2, Appendix A.
- Provide the commander and key staff with the antiterrorism introduction and terrorist overview background information contained in Joint Pub 3-07.2, Chapters I & II.
- Develop scenarios for threat evaluation.
  
- **Provost Marshal, Security Police & Forces**
  - Ensure the installation has a current, adequate physical security plan IAW DODD 2000.12, DODD 5200.8, & CJCS Handbook 5260.
  - Ensure that the physical security plan includes AT/FP protective measures as recommended by DOD 2000.12-H.
  - Ensure that there is a mutual understanding between all local agencies that might be involved in a terrorist incident on the installation regarding authority, jurisdiction, and possible interaction as recommended by DOD 2000.12-H & CJCS Handbook 5260.
  - Ensure that LEA developed information is shared and blended with intelligence information as recommended by DOD 2000.12-H.
  - Conduct a vulnerability assessment IAW Joint Pub 3-07.2, Appendix A.
  - Develop an installation-wide program to all installation offices which highlights office procedures which will assist the deterrence of terrorist acts on the installation. A general background overview containing this type of information is in Joint Pub 3-07.2, Appendix D.
  - Provide security coordination with local and jurisdictional entities.
  - Provide primary reaction/special reaction teams.
  - Provide on-scene commander.
  - Provide executive protection.
  - Man traffic control points and observation post .
  - Provide security for applicable personnel and facilities.
  - Ensure security personnel are thoroughly trained in military police duties to allow maximum effective use of assets.
  - Ensure internal security of "facilities" particularly during hours of darkness by conducting security checks of designated activities .
  - Report all actual or suspected terrorist incidents or activities to their immediate commander, supporting military law enforcement office, other supported activities, local counterintelligence office, and local military criminal investigation office.
  - Conduct regular liaison visits with the supporting military law enforcement office, counterintelligence office and local criminal investigation office.



**APPENDIX 01 (Tasks and Responsibilities) to  
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- Coordinate with the supporting military law enforcement office and counterintelligence offices on their preparation and continual updating of the threat assessments.
- Assist in providing terrorism threat awareness training and briefings to all personnel and family members as required by local situations.
- Provost marshal, military police commander, or military police physical security staff officer, assigned or attached to the terminal advises, recommends, and assists in preparation of physical security plans and implementing directives. He also either commands or supervises security guard forces assigned to the terminal (military and civilian), and participates in the coordination of all security and defense activities of the terminal (tactical and non-tactical).
- Assist in directing the hospital command's crime prevention and hospital security program.
  
- **Public Affairs Officer.** Because terrorists seek media recognition, media information management must be in the best interest of USG in managing the situation.
  - Additional general information on public affairs duties and functions can be found in TC 19-16, Appendix R.
  - Screens information to the media to ensure OPSEC and provides advise and counsel to those in charge.
  - Check with the operations center manager frequently.
  - Revise public affairs plans to meet the installation's information distribution requirements for AT/FP issues or occurrences.
  - Disseminate information to the media IAW the established PAO & AT/FP Plans.
    - control press releases.
    - coordinate press releases with the commander, the operations center staff, and higher echelon PAOs prior to dissemination.
    - control the movement of news media personnel with press passes, escorts, and other similar means.
    - obtain approval for the following prior to release:
      - news releases.
      - news media personnel to enter outer perimeter.
      - release of photos.
      - interviews with anyone other than the commander.
      - direct communications between the press and involved persons.
  
- **Staff Judge Advocate**
  - The SJA or other installation AT/FP legal advisor will ensure that the commander, and key staff—particularly the Installation At/FP Officer—understand the legal considerations of developing and implementing a Combating Terrorism Program. A thorough introductory overview can be found in Joint Pub 3-07.2, Chapter III.
  - Interpret legal issues dealing with such issues as use of force.
  - Interpret status of forces agreements and local laws as pertaining to AT/FP.
  - Aid in the interface between the military and local authorities dealing with AT/FP issues.
  - Aid in the interpretation of appropriate documentation concerning any AT/FP issue.
  - Interpret International Agreements that would affect security issues.
  - Understand the rules of engagement.

**APPENDIX 01 (Tasks and Responsibilities) to  
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- **Chaplain**
  - Act as advisor and consultant to the commander on all matters of religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion.
  - Help in coordinating all potential AT/FP issues that arise in connection with foreign local customs and religions.
  - Coordinate and maintain liaison with local churches, indigenous religious bodies, and religious groups throughout the communal area of responsibility.
  - Provide unit, area, and denominational ministry for all personnel.
  
- **Safety Officer**
  - Develop a standard operating procedure for safety inspections.
  - Conduct safety inspections of installation facilities.
  - Coordinate with the Military Police.
  
- **Subordinate Commanders**
  - Create a level of awareness, appreciation, and readiness commensurate to the threat.
  - Ensure proper coordination of all local policies and measures for protecting DOD facilities, resources, equipment, personnel, and family members in foreign areas from terrorist acts and for assisting their subordinate commanders in implementing military service programs.
  - Ensure the DOD THREATCONs for combating terrorism are uniformly implemented as specified in DOD Directive O-2000.12.
  - Serve as the DOD point of contact with US embassies and host nation officials on matters regarding such policies and measures.
  - Assess the terrorist threat for the theater and provide a copy of the threat assessment to the services.
  
- **Base Civil Engineer**
  - Ensure that procedures have been established to ensure that all military construction projects are reviewed at the conceptual stage to incorporate physical security, AT/FP, or protective design features IAW DODD 5200.8-R & DOD 0-2000.12-H.
  - Aid in the development of construction policies for incorporating FP design measures into MILCON projects and modification to existing facilities.
  - Obtain/provide a base grid map for installation planning.

**APPENDIX 01 (Tasks and Responsibilities) to  
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- **Communications Commanders**
  - Assign qualified personnel to manage and operate communications in the Emergency Operations Center.
  - Build contingency plans for situations when the normal forms of communications are intercepted.
  - Establish and maintain communications during non-critical and critical situations.
  
- **Medical Commanders**
  - Establish a medical/Disaster Control Element Control Center (ref NASPNCLA).
  - Organize, equip, train, and direct medical centers.
  - Assist in the location of survivors and deceased, and assist in the rescue of survivors.
  - Establish a field emergency medical aid station at the disaster site and coordinate ambulance support with the Hospital.
  - Catalog survivors and direct segregation for further treatment.
  - Perform mortuary duties as required.
  - Assign appropriate qualified personnel to assist in medical emergencies.
  - List plans and policies for the treatment, hospitalization and evacuation of military and civilian personnel.
  
- **Logistics Commanders**
  - Provide inventory and accountability procedures input into the physical security program for the administrative control of property.
  - Aid in the formulation and announcement of policy for integrated logistics support (ILS) program for multi-service programs (AR 700-129).
  - Establish a central logistics control center.
  - Organize, equip, train, and direct the operations of the control center.
  
- **Maintenance Commanders**
  - Ensure that a proper maintenance plan has been established.
  - Conduct proper maintenance procedures on all equipment .
  - Ensure proper command and control over all property assigned.
  - Develop contingency plans for movement of equipment .
  - Develop Standard Operating Procedures for all equipment that has been moved and is currently in the “motor pool” to ensure that proper security measures have been followed to prevent incidents.
  
- **Munitions Commanders**
  - Maintain positive control over all sites and munitions.
  - Conducts inspections of munitions facilities.
  - Develop a standard operating procedure for command and control of munitions.
  - Ensure proper security measures have been followed.
  - Ensure proper procedures are followed in the decimation of munitions.
  
- **Transportation Commanders**
  - Assess the threat, sensitivity of cargo, vulnerability, and mode of transportation to dictate the degree of security required during storage and in transit of cargo being shipped. The degree or type of security needed is determined by:
    - Facility size and location.
    - Complexity of storage or shipment.
    - Volume/value of items.
    - Economic and geographical situation.
    - Available crime statistics.
    - Security/law enforcement available.
    - Transit shipments.

**APPENDIX 01 (Tasks and Responsibilities) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
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- Responsible for the development of an effective cargo security system, which should be based on:
  - Experiences of personnel responsible for shipments and storage of cargo.
  - Loss potential based on a risk analysis.
  - Established security standards and policy.
  - Minimize exposure to individuals who display a motive to steal by illustrating and using countermeasures, screening prospective personnel, by eliminating in-facility gambling among employees, by insuring close coordination between packaging, shipping, and receiving personnel.
  
- **Port Commander**
  - Protect the port, e.g., by fencing and pass control; protect the part of the pier that protrudes over the water by such things as patrols, protective lighting, booms, and nets.
  - Coordinate with the supporting military law enforcement office and counterintelligence offices on their preparation and continual updating of the threat assessments.
  - Assist in providing terrorism threat awareness training and briefings to all personnel and family members as required by local situations.
  - Conduct regular liaison visits with the supporting military law enforcement office, counterintelligence office, and local criminal investigation office.
  - Report all actual or suspected terrorist incidents or activities to their immediate commander, supporting military law enforcement, other supported activities, local counterintelligence office, and local criminal investigation office.
  
- **Transportation Terminal Commander**
  - Ensure the safety and security of the entire terminal.
  - Protect the personnel assigned to, passing through, or working within the terminal.
  - Security of all cargo from time of arrival in terminal to departure, either inbound or outbound.

**APPENDIX 02 (Alert Notification Procedures) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

(1) An anti-terrorist / force protection situation will normally first be recognized by, or reported to, the Military Police Desk Sergeant. The Desk Sergeant will initiate the following notification procedures:

(a) DURING DUTY HOURS. The Desk Sergeant will notify :

1. The Provost Marshall, who will immediately enter the 20th ASG Pusan Communications Net, goes to the scene, and assume duties of the on-site commander.

2. The Provost Marshal Operations will notify:

- The 20th ASG Pusan SPO, who will activate the Base Defense Forces, ICMT and EOC.
- The Chief of Staff who will notify:
  - The Commanding General, 19<sup>th</sup> TAACOM and request activation of the EOC.
  - The Deputy Commander, 19<sup>th</sup> TAACOM

3. The Garrison Commander will activate the EOC. Based on the situation, the EOC will alert those agencies on Points of Contact (figure 2) who would have an immediate interest and capability to assist in reducing a special threat situation in the Pusan area.

(b) UPON ACTIVATION OF THE EOC. The 20th ASG Pusan will make a post wide notification using telephonic alert as necessary (Hot Apple on QRF and Threat).

(c) During NON-DUTY HOURS. The Desk Sergeant will notify:

1. Military Police Duty Officer, who will direct initial action at the incident/scene.
2. Provost Marshal, who will notify the 20th ASG Pusan SDNCO.
3. Provost Marshal Operations 763-7325
4. Charge of Quarters, 552<sup>nd</sup> MP Company, who will effect notification of security forces.
5. CID: 763-3588
6. Civil and military law enforcement agencies as directed by the Provost Marshal.

(d) To notify those agencies listed, the following format will be used:

**APPENDIX 02 (Alert Notification Procedures) to  
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“ This is \_\_\_\_\_. The installation has a special threat situation. Installation Special Threats Counteraction Plan is being implemented. (You are to recall all assigned personnel and assemble in your unit area).\* The EOC is being activated and will be providing additional information and instructions.

(e) To notify members of the Installation Crisis Management Team, The following format will be used:

“ This is \_\_\_\_\_. The installation has a special threat situation. Installation Special Threats Counteraction Plan is being implemented. There will be a meeting for the Installation Crisis Management Team in one (1) hour after initial notification in the 20th ASG Pusan SPO.

\* As Necessary

FIGURE 1 Points of Contact

Points of Contact	
1. KNP Support	14. Manager, Post Exchange
2. CID	15. SJA
3. Medical Support	16. Contract Guards
4. MI (Pusan Resident Office)	17. Base Defense Force (Garrison Commander)
5. DPW	(After Duty hours call 20th ASG Pusan Installation SDNCO, at
6. Fire Department	18. EOD
7. PAO	19. 74th Sig Co
8. 552nd MP Co	20. Military Police (Desk Sergeant)
9. Chaplain	
10. SPO	
11. Installation SDNCO	
12. Civilian Personnel Office	
13. TMP	

**APPENDIX 02 (Alert Notification Procedures) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
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**APPENDIX 03 (Installations AT/FP Exercises) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

Camp Hialeah will conduct an AT/FP exercise quarterly. A FTX will be held in conjunction with a base defense exercise during the first and third fiscal quarters. A CPX will be conducted during the second and fourth fiscal quarters. Each tenant unit will have a minimum of one representative at each exercise. More intense involvement may be required depending on the level and scenario.



**APPENDIX 04 (Incident Response Plans) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

In most cases the MP desk sergeant will receive the initial indication of a crisis situation. In the event that some other person, unit, or agency has the first information on a possible terrorist action, the first step is to notify the on duty MP desk Sergeant. Generally a terrorist action will fall into one of the following categories:

- (a) Bombing
- (b) Arson
- (c) Hijacking
- (d) Assassination
- (e) Assaults
- (f) Kidnapping
- (g) Hostage & Barricade

Tab A (Bomb Threat Plan) to the Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

1. PURPOSE: To establish the initial actions, reporting, evacuation, and search procedures to be followed in the event of a bomb threat or actual bombing against Camp Hialeah.

2. APPLICABILITY: This annex is applicable to all units/activities in the Pusan Sub-Area.

3. GENERAL: Individuals or groups may attempt to destroy property with explosive devices or create disturbances by subjecting installations to bomb threats. When an explosive device is discovered, or when a bomb treat is received, the actions contained in this Annex will be followed.

4. INITIAL ACTIONS:

a. Upon receiving a bomb threat telephonically:

- (1) Remain calm.
- (2) Attempt to keep the caller on the line.
- (3) Do not hang up the phone even if the caller does.

(4) Use a Bomb Threat Report Form (APPENDIX 1) to record the exact words of the caller. A Bomb Threat Report Form will be in all Staff Duty and CQ books and posted next to every telephone in every building. Fill in as much information as possible immediately after the call. You will need as much of the following information as possible:

- the location of the bomb
- what type of bomb it is
- a description of the bomb
- what time the bomb is supposed to detonate

**APPENDIX 04 (Incident Response Plans) to  
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- attempt to determine the sex of the caller
- approximate age of the caller
- the attitude of the caller (i.e., reason or motives).
  
- note any background noises, to possibly detect the caller's location
- note an accent or peculiarity in the caller's speech.
  
- if time permits, ask the caller's name in case the caller may unthinkingly reply.

(5) Notify the Military Police Desk Sergeant at 763-3888 as soon as the call has been terminated. If possible, a co-worker in the office should call the Military Police during the conversation.

(6) Implement building evacuation and other actions based on unit bomb threat Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)

b. If a bomb or suspected bomb is discovered without prior warning:

- (1) Remain Calm
- (2) Notify the MP Desk Sergeant (763-3888) immediately
- (3) Evacuate the area and follow unit bomb threat SOP
- (4) **DO NOT TOUCH, MOVE, ATTEMPT TO DISARM, OR DISTURB THE BOMB/ SUSPECTED BOMB**

**5. REPORTING:**

a. Upon report of a bomb, suspected bomb, or bomb threat, the Military Police Desk Sergeant will, in turn:

- Area IV.
- (1) Initiate notifications per the Provost Marshall Office Notification Roster -
  - (2) Dispatch patrols to the appropriate points in the perimeter.
  - (2) Notify the occupants of threatened building.
  - (3) Notify telephone repair, for a trace; Telephone 114.
  - (4) Notify the Provost Marshal, PM Operations Officer, Duty Officer, and PM Operations Sergeant.

**APPENDIX 04 (Incident Response Plans) to  
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Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

(5) Notify 20th ASG Pusan SPO at 763-7202/7323.

(6) Notify CID.

(7) **Notify EOD, 8th Ordnance Det. Tel: 732-6185/6105/6277.**

(8) Notify Fire Department.

(9) Notify Local General Dispensary.

c. Upon notification of a bomb threat, the custodian or Charge of Quarters should:

(1) Immediately evacuate the building.

(2) Have personnel shut off power and gas lines, if possible.

4. **CONTROL OF THE OPERATION:** Once a bomb threat has been identified, the Provost Marshall shall assume control of the operation. The PMO will either assume duties of or appoint a Bomb Scene Officer (BSO). The BSO is responsible for the following actions:

a. Assume local control of the bomb scene. The BSO is directly responsible for evacuation, security, and search operations. The BSO reports directly to the Garrison Commander or his representative.

b. Make contact with the senior occupant/supervisor of the affected building/facility and receive an accurate status report and personnel accountability of the bomb threat scene. The BSO will task the senior occupant/supervisor to coordinate special search teams, if necessary.

c. Establish coordination with representatives from the EOD Control Center, the MP Bomb Dog Detection Teams, and DPW.

d. Relinquish control of neutralization operations once EOD arrives on the scene, however, the BSO will still retain control of the overall area to ensure safety of personnel and security of the affected facilities.

e. Notify the Garrison Commander one the bomb threat has been neutralized.

f. Submit a comprehensive after action report within 3 working days to the Garrison Commander.

5. **EVACUATION PROCEDURES.**

a. Once notified of a bomb threat the MP desk will immediately dispatch an MP patrol to supervise the immediate and orderly evacuation of the affected facility. Mp patrols will also:

**APPENDIX 04 (Incident Response Plans) to  
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Camp Hiialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

(1) Cordon off approximately a one-block area.

(2) Allow no one in the danger zone except authorized personnel (i.e., IM/DIC, Provost Marshal, Duty Officer, Operations Officer and EOD).

(3) Allow the Fire Department and Medical personnel within the danger zone only if their skills are immediately required.

(4) Allow on other personnel within the danger zone without the authorization of the BSO.

(5) Do not use radio communications within 150 feet of the danger zone.

(6) Do not use sirens within 300 feet of the danger zone.

(7) If possible, a responding patrol will take 6-12 sandbags with it.

b. The senior building occupant/supervisor will report to the MP patrol and the BSO with an accurate personnel count and status.

c. All building occupants will assemble in one location outside of the danger zone or behind reasonable shelter and be prepared to organize search teams or aid in damage control.

d. Only upon authorization of the BSO may the building be reentered or the threat declared neutralized.

## 6. SEARCH PROCEDURES.

a. The primary search method, if available, will be the MP Bomb Dog Detection Teams. Searches in this manner will be conducted in accordance with SOPs utilized by dog handlers.

b. If the bomb dogs are not available, search teams will be organized from among building occupants. The BSO will coordinate search areas in order to eliminate duplication of effort. The size and number of teams will be determined by the BSO along with the scope and amount of time allowed for the search. He will decide when to recall all search teams or when to declare the area safe.

(1) All areas, both inside and outside the affected building, will be searched. Special attention will be paid to all public access areas such as restrooms and stairwells.

(2) Start at one end of the building, moving the opposite end. Divide the building into sectors for each team. Conduct the sector search in two sweeps, the first sweep will be from the floor to waist level, the second will be from waist level to the ceiling to include ducts and vents.

(3) Everything that could possibly conceal a bomb should be checked.

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**7. FINDING A BOMB OR SUSPECTED BOMB.**

- a. Once a bomb has been identified, the building will be completely evacuated. The device is not to be touched by unqualified personnel.
- b. EOD will be notified that an explosive device has been found. The Fire department and Troop Medical Clinic (TMC) will be placed on standby. DPW personnel will be prepared to assist in damage control.
- c. The cordoned-off area may be adjusted according to the site of the bomb.

**8. DISPOSAL.** Camp Hialeah does not have the dedicated personnel or facilities for bomb disposal so the methods and procedures will be left up to EOD personnel.

**9. DETONATION AND DAMAGE CONTROL.**

- a. The Damage Control Team will consist of the following crews:
  - (1) Fire fighting crew.
  - (2) Utilities crew.
  - (3) General engineering crew.
- b. The fire fighting crew will be prepared to:
  - (1) Provide fire truck with equipment and crew.
  - (2) Control and contain any fires in the area.
  - (3) identify and remove any flammable materiel and items.
  - (4) effect ventilation of the affected area.
  - (5) provide self-contained breathing apparatus to medical teams or any other personnel.
- c. The utilities crew will be prepared to:
  - (1) Shut off heating, fuel and gas to the affected area, to include fuel lines, storage tanks, and propane ignition systems. If the situation and time permits, storage tanks will be siphoned, fuel lines drained and propane cylinders removed in order to prevent the possibility of secondary explosions and fires.

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(2) Shut off electricity at buildings, disconnect panels, block switches, or the substation in order to expose wires and circuits from potentially igniting flammable materials. Additionally, disconnect battery banks and remove batteries from the affected area, if possible.

d. The general engineering crew will be prepared to:

(1) provide the following, as required:

(a) Earth moving equipment.

(b) Crane.

(c) Forklifts.

(d) Compressors.

(e) Rope.

(f) Ladders.

(g) Welding equipment

(h) Crowbars.

(i) Portable emergency lights.

(j) Forcible entry tools.

(2) Move rubble and debris to facilitate rescue attempts and maneuverability within the affected area.

(3) Provide temporary, expedient construction to shore up weakened structures in order to prevent potential personnel injuries and further damage to the affected facilities.

(4) Construct expedient fire barriers to prevent possible spread of fire beyond affected area.

(5) Provide any other engineering support, as deemed necessary by the BSO due to the unique circumstances of any particular bomb detonation.

e. All repairs and damage control activities will be of an emergency nature only so as not to destroy any evidence to be used in the investigation of the bomb blast at a later date.

f. The QRF may be called out, if deemed necessary, by the BSO. This may be necessary to keep the area secure and to prevent spectators or looters from removing evidence or materials from the area.

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10. CONTROL OF PUBLICITY. All press releases, both American and Korean, will go through the 20th ASG Pusan PAO or the installation Community Relations Officer. Soldiers and installation employees are not authorized to release information regarding ongoing operations and will refer all inquiries to one of the above agencies.

11. AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR). All units and agencies involved in an incident will submit an after action review within 4-working days of the termination of the incident. This report will follow the standard Army format and will include things that went wrong, things that worked, and suggestions for improvements for the future.

12. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Installation Manager/Deputy Installation Commander will:

(1) Make the final decision on returning to the building.

(2) Put together an after action report with input from all participating agencies within 24-hours of the end of the incident to the Commander, 20<sup>th</sup> Support Group.

b. Provost Marshal:

(1) Ensure the evacuation is complete.

(2) Establish communications with the EOC, threatened area, and all support teams.

(3) Ensure crowd control.

(4) Supervise the scene.

(5) Notify EOD of the location of the bomb.

(6) Assist EOD in the disposal of the bomb.

c. Patrol Supervisor:

(1) Set up Command Post.

(2) Assure patrols are reacting properly.

(3) Take command of the situation until properly relieved by the Provost Marshal, Operations Officer or Duty Officer.

d. 20th ASG Pusan SPO: Establish Emergency Operations Center.

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e. DPW: Establish Damage Control Teams.

f. C/168th Medical Dispensary: Provide medical support, if required.

g. PAO: Disseminate information pertaining to the bomb threat to any outside requests. PAO is the only agency authorized to release any information to any members of the press.

**(10) Notify 20th ASG Taegu SPO at 768-8166 / 8167 / 7495.**



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**Tab A-1 (Bomb threat Report Form) to the Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

INSTRUCTIONS: Be calm. Be courteous. Listen, do not interrupt the caller. Notify supervisor/security officer by prearranged signal while caller is on line.

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Time: \_\_\_\_\_  
Exact words of Person Placing Call:

Questions to Ask:

1. When is the bomb going to explode?
2. Where is the bomb right now?
3. What kind of bomb is it?
4. What does it look like?
5. Why did you place the bomb?

Try to determine the following (circle as appropriate).

Callers Identity:      Male, Female, Adult, Juvenile      Age:      Years

Voice:      Loud, Soft, High, Pitched, Deep, Raspy, Pleasant, Intoxicated, Other.

Accent:      Local, Not local, Foreign Region.

Speech:      Fast, Slow, Distinct, Distorted, Stutter, Nasal, Slurred, Lisp.

Language:      Excellent, Good, Fair, Poor, Foul, Other

Manner:      Calm, Anger, Rational, Irrational Coherent, Incoherent, Deliberate,

Emotional,      Righteous, Laughing, Intoxicated.

Background Noise: Office Machine, Factory Machine, Bedlam, Trains, Animals, Music,

Quiet,      Voices, Mixed Airplanes, Street Traffic, Party Atmosphere, Other.

Additional Information:

Actions to take immediately after call: Notify your supervisor/security officer as instructed.  
Talk to no one other than instructed by your supervisor/security officer.

Receiving Telephone Number

Person Receiving Call

**NOTE: This form may be reproduced at unit level.**

**APPENDIX 04 (Incident Response Plans) to  
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**Tab B (Arson) to Appendix 4 to ANNEX D (Toolbox) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

**Tab C (Hijacking) to Appendix 4 to ANNEX D (Toolbox) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

**Tab D (Assassination) to Appendix 4 to ANNEX D (Toolbox) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

**Tab E (Assaults) to Appendix 4 to ANNEX D (Toolbox) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

**Tab F (Kidnapping) to Appendix 4 to ANNEX D (Toolbox) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

**Tab G (Hostage Negotiations) to Appendix 4 to ANNEX D (Toolbox) to Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this operation annex is to outline policies, procedures and considerations to be utilized in developing viable courses of action in dealing with hostage and barricade situations directed against USFK personnel on Camp Hialeah, Republic of Korea.. This operation annex represents an approach in dealing with hostage/barricade situations.

2. MISSION:

- a. The safe release of hostages.
- b. The protection of the lives and the well-being of all affected participants.
- c. The apprehension of the hostage taker(s) and/or barricaded personnel.
- d. The protection of property and equipment.

3. COMMAND AND CONTROL:

- a. No changes in the existing command relationship with the following exceptions:

- (1) The EOC/ICMT retains actual command and operational control of the troops, and assumes full responsibility for such direction, command and control thereof.

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(2) The Provost Marshal is designated as the hostage site field commander and is directly responsible to the Garrison Commander. The PM is responsible for the operations of the Field Command Post and the forces under the operational command and control of the PM will be augmented as necessary by the EOC by placing additional forces with organic command and control elements under operational control of the PM.

b. Command Posts. Knowledgeable representatives from the PM office will be assigned to the EOC to advise and coordinate with, on an as needed basis.

c. the Command Post will be the focal point of all liaison and coordination between hostage and negotiators and the EOC.

d. Orders, Reports and Distribution. The PM representatives in the EOC and the field Command Post will keep a written log of the activities pertaining to the operation. The field commander will maintain a master log of the activities pertaining to the operation. The field commander will maintain a master log which summarizes the activities contained in each log. Maximum use of photos. Magnetic tapes, video tapes and sketches will be made to supplement the logs. Each new relief in the EOC and Field CP will thoroughly familiarize themselves with the activities of the previous shifts prior to the old relief being released.

#### 4. COORDINATION OF TACTICAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS:

a. Intelligence. The MI representatives in the EOC will coordinate all intelligence activities. At a minimum, they will be responsible for acquisition, interrogation, debriefing, examination, processing and dissemination of intelligence. Intelligence sources will include:

(1) Reconnaissance and surveillance. Ground and air reconnaissance will be made of the hostage site as needed. Maximum use will be made of photography and listening devices. The commander of the D Co, 1/501st Avn, South, is responsible for providing aircraft as necessary.

(2) Released hostages, bystanders, friends and relatives of hostages and hostage takers. Detailed interrogation and debriefing will be conducted to determine the essential elements of information.

(3) Records. Personnel, medical and criminal records of the hostages and hostage takers (s) will be examined if available. Liaison with other agencies and/or installations will be established if needed.

(4) Documents. All notes, messages, etc. emanating from the hostage taker(s) will be analyzed and all logs from other representatives will be read for possible intelligence value.

(5) Technical Intelligence. All tangible items associated with the situation will be inspected, if available, for possible intelligence value. Care will be taken not to destroy evidentiary value of material inspected.

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(6) Maps, photographs and terrain models. A small scale map of the hostage site will be maintained, supplemented by photos of the area. Building floor plans of the hostage site and adjacent building floor plans will be provided by DPW.

(7) All source Intelligence. Intelligence gathering will not be limited to the source outlined above. Additional sources of intelligence will be exploited as appropriate.

(8) Counterintelligence. Proposed counterintelligence measures will be coordinated with the staff of the EOC.

(9) Essential Elements of Information (EEI).

(a) Identify hostage(s) and hostage taker(s).

(b) Motivations of hostage taker(s).

(c) intention of hostage taker(s).

(d) Weapons involved.

**b. Operations.**

(1) Fire Support Coordination. The PM is responsible for fire support coordination at the hostage site.

(2) Security. The hostage site will be contained by using two perimeters. The inner perimeter will be manned by MPs. The outer perimeter will be manned by the IGF/QRF and MPs as appropriate. The PM has responsibility for and will exercise operational control over both perimeters from the field CP.

(3) Development of the Situation. Once the isolation of the area is completed, communication will be opened with the hostage taker(s) by trained CID negotiators. Means of communication will be dictated by the situation but the following means should be used in priority if practicable:

(a) Field telephone.

(b) Commercial telephone

(c) Squad/Portable radio.

(d) Public address set.

(e) Bullhorn.

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(f) Unamplified voice.

(4) use of Aircraft. The aviation officer will alert and have on stand-by one helicopter to be used for observation of the hostage site.

(5) Chemical Operations. The Garrison Commander will dictate the use of riot control agents depending on the situation.

(6) engineer Operations. Coordination with DPW will identify engineer equipment available both on and off the installation which may assist in ending the situation, to include the Fire Department for possible use in the situation, and appropriate maps and building floor plans.

c. Negotiations. All demands from the hostage taker(s) will be relayed to the EOC. The Garrison Commander, with recommendations from the ICMT, will make final approval/modification/disapproval of all demands. The following demands will usually be considered nonnegotiable:

(1) Weapons of any kind.

(2) additional or replacement hostages.

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**APPENDIX 05 (Consequence Management) to  
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(1) Once a terrorist attack has occurred, part of the response is consequence management. Simply put it is the actions taken to contain and clean-up and restore (semi-) normal operations and continue the mission. On Camp Hialeah consequence management will be planned using representatives from:

- (a) PMO
- (b) DPW
- (c) SPO
- (d) Tenant Units (as necessary)
- (e) MWR
- (f) Housing
- (g) PAO
- (h) Safety Office

NOTE: This following is adapted form the Natural Disaster Annex to the Physical Security Plan. It needs some revision for use as the Consequence Management plan but will suffice until it is changed.

1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces. Terrorist attacks that are not acts of war.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Headquarters, 20th ASG Pusan, Camp Hialeah
- (2) 837th Transportation Battalion
- (3) 25th Transportation Company
- (4) 61st Chemical Company
- (5) 72nd Ordnance Company
- (6) 74th Signal Company
- (7) 552nd Military Police Company
- (8) C Company, 168th Medical Battalion
- (9) 4th Quartermaster Detachment
- (10) CLSC-K, 257th Signal Company
- (11) Headquarters, Camp Hialeah Attached Units

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(12) Provost Marshal's Office (PMO)

(13) DPW

(14) MWR

(15) AAFES

**2. MISSION:**

a. The Deputy Installation Commander, Headquarters, 20th ASG Pusan, Camp Hialeah, is the designated Disaster Control Officer (DCO) for coordinating disaster reporting and relief activities. The DCO will establish the Pusan Sub-Area Disaster Control Center (DCC) in building 239 (SPO), Camp Hialeah, Pusan Korea, Tel #763-7202/7323.

b. Damage Control Teams (DCT) will be deployed to take necessary action to prevent injury, loss of life and property damage caused by any disasters. The DCT in coordination with the PMO, will assist in securing damaged facilities pending the deployment of additional security forces.

c. To supplement ROK disaster activities after determination has been made that local resource are inadequate.

**3. EXECUTION:**

a. Concept of operation: The Deputy Installation Commander will activate the DCC and the DCT for each installation/facility.

(1) DCO, Headquarters, Camp Hialeah:

(a) Establishes the Pusan Sub-Area DCC to coordinate disaster activities.

(b) Disseminates disaster warnings, predictions, information and special instructions to all units in the Sub-Area.

(c) Establishes emergency communications in times of actual or potential disaster.

(d) Encourages local authorities to use their own procedures and resources in conducting disaster relief activities.

(e) Receives and processes disaster reports and requests for assistance.



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(f) Designates Liaison Officers to coordinate disaster relief activities with the local ROK authorities.

(g) Coordinates with Supply and Services Division for all logistical support (i.e., transportation, MST maintenance, emergency rations, supplies, etc.)

(h) Coordinates with Admin Services Division (ASD) for all war-rations of non-combatants, if required.

(i) Coordinates for air transportation within or outside of the Pusan Sub-Area.

(j) Evaluates the effects of disaster relief activities on the operational readiness of the command, keeping the Deputy Installation Commander, Headquarters, Camp Hialeah informed.

(2) All units in the Pusan Sub-Area, as noted in para 1b will:

(a) Appoint on orders and train DCTs as prescribed in Appendix C.

(b) Provide required equipment for DCTs as prescribed in Appendix C.

(c) Submit requests for disaster relief augmentation to the DCC, Headquarters, 20th ASG Pusan, Camp Hialeah.

(d) Conduct disaster relief activities locally and provide relief and security assistance as directed by the DCC, Headquarters, Camp Hialeah, when local situation has been brought under control.

(e) On direction of the Headquarters, Camp Hialeah DCC, provide emergency disaster relief to local ROK authorities.

(f) Submit reports to the Headquarters, Camp Hialeah DCC as required by para 5.

**b. Coordinating Instructions:**

(1) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and execution on order.

(2) Control:

(a) Prior to deployment, the DCC will brief affected personnel concerning the disaster. The Officer/NCOIC will coordinate with the DCC immediately upon activation of the DCT.

(b) The DCTs may be deployed off their military installation only on order of DCO or the Deputy Installation Commander, Headquarters, Camp Hialeah.

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(c) Upon activation of the DCT, unit commanders will ensure that the supply room and/or Arms Room is open to support the situation.

(d) The DCTs will be moved out of the Pusan Sub-Area only on order of Commander, 20th Support Group-Taegu.

(e) Contact points for area installation support units are:

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>CONTACT</u>	<u>TELEPHONE #763-</u>
837TH Trans Bn	Commander	7097/3973
61st Chem Company	Commander	7689/7634
74th Signal Company	Commander/1SG	7530/3409
552nd MP Company	Commander/1SG	7302/7306
C Co. 168th Med Bn.	Commander	7620/3575
72nd Ordnance	Commander/1SG	7350/7351
25th Trans	Commander	7876/3003
4th QM Det	Commander/1SG	7074/7413
CLSC-K	OIC	3831
PMO	Opns SGT	7325
DPW	Director	3436
MWR	Director	7381
ASD	Director	7479
SOD	OIC	7465
SPO	OIC	7202
AAFES	Manager	3627

(3) Requests, which involve extensive funding, will be forwarded through the DRM, 20th Spt Gp to the 19th TAACOM. Local Commander are authorized to provide limited assistance on a non-reimbursable basis when prior approval of higher headquarters cannot be obtained, would result in the loss of life or result in a breach of US security.

(4) To ensure that ROK agencies (i.e., hospital, Red Cross, etc...) are prepared to receive and administer assistance to evacuees during natural disasters, units conducting rescuer operations will report the location to which evacuees are being taken through the Headquarters, Camp Hialeah DCC. If time permits, this report will be made prior to the conduct of evacuation operations. The information will be forwarded to higher headquarters so that coordination can be made with appropriate ROK agencies.

**4. COMBAT SERVICE AND SUPPORT:**

a. Affected units are responsible for publishing and implementing instructions to this OPLAN.

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- b. All units will ensure that personnel assigned to the Damage Control Team(s) are properly notified of their status and appointed in writing.
- c. Teams will draw weapons and ammunition from their unit Arms Room as required.
- d. Equipment for engagement in natural disaster operations will be drawn from DPW Pusan and issued on order.
- e. Rations (MREs) will be drawn from the respective supply source as required.
- f. Uniform and equipment: Appendix C.
- g. The DCC, Headquarters, Camp Hialeah, Pusan will coordinate air transportation within Pusan Sub-Area.
- h. The DCC, Headquarters, Camp Hialeah, Pusan will coordinate all transportation and logistical support with SOD, Headquarters, Camp Hialeah.
- i. SOD will provide equipment such as shovels, picks, sandbags, and barbed wire as necessary.
- j. C Co. 168th Med Bn will provide available medical support as required.

5. REPORTS:

- a. Initial reports of natural disaster will be submitted to the DCC, Headquarters, 20th ASG Pusan. By the affected unit or agency and will contain the following:
  - (1) Nature of Disaster (description)
  - (2) Location
  - (3) Estimated Duration
  - (4) Casualties
  - (5) Damage (include loss of/damage to classified holdings/materials/facilities if US or ROK military installation involved).
  - (6) Action by local ROK authorities
  - (7) Action by US units or agencies
  - (8) Personnel Committed (ROK and US)

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(9) Equipment Committed (ROK and US)

(10) Further action contemplated.

(11) Assistance required

(12) In the event of damage of US or ROK military facilities, or tactical routes, estimate time and cost of repair.

(13) Grid coordinates of each bridge, structure or road damaged, indicate the extent of damage, estimate cost of repair and estimated time until completion or repair. For road and bridge damage, include by-pass, or alternate route location.

b. Spot reports will be submitted as required or requested.

c. Any significant change in operational readiness resulting from natural disaster relief activities will be reported.

d. A natural disaster report will be submitted by assigned or tenant unit commanders within the Pusan Sub-Area, to this HQ, ATTN: EANC-TP-PT within 12 hours after implementation of disaster activities to show damage or routes of communication, troop facilities, or logistical installations within the Pusan Sub-Area (Area IV).

e. A termination report will be submitted by affected commanders within 7 days after disaster activities are concluded and by all commanders in the Pusan Sub-Area within 7 days after the termination of TYPHOON conditions I-IV, and II FLOOD conditions II and III. The report will contain:

(1) All actions taken by reporting unit or activity.

(2) Injury to US/ROK personnel.

(3) Damage to US/ROK equipment and/or installation.

(4) Participation by local ROK authorities.

(5) Assistance rendered by Air Force and Navy units.

(6) Funds authorized and expended.

(7) Additional significant information.

**6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:**

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a. Signal:

(1) The Staff Duty Officer, HQ, Camp Hialeah will provide normal off-duty time notification(s) in the event of a non-combatant disaster.

(2) The individual units involved will establish communications with the DCC, upon arrival at the scene of the disaster.

(a) The standard telephone will be used whenever possible.

(b) In the event of lack of telephone, couriers will be used.

(c) In all events, the DCC, HQ, Camp Hialeah will coordinate with the PMO for establishing FM Communication and with 552nd MP Company to establish perimeter security around the areas affected.

b. Command:

(1) Orders to activate the DCTs will be given by the DCC on order from the Deputy Installation Commander, HQ, 20th ASG Pusan. In his absence, The SPO will assume the Command authority.

(2) Chain of Command:

(a) Deputy Installation Commander, Headquarters, Camp Hialeah

(b) Disaster Control Officer (SPO)

(c) Unit Commanders

(d) DCT Leaders

**APPENDIX 3 (Damage Control Teams) to ANNEX E (Natural Disaster Plan) to Camp Hialeah Physical Security Plan**

1. GENERAL: Each designated company size unit within Pusan Sub-Area will be prepared to muster a Damage Control Team (DCT) in the event of a natural disaster.

2. ORGANIZATION: The DCT will consist of ten (10) personnel, to include a team leader (SSG or above).

3. TASK ORGANIZATION:

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a. Units: The following units in the Pusan Sub-Area Command will be responsible for establishing, training and providing required equipment for units DCTs:

- (1) 4th QM Det., Camp Hialeah
- (2) 837th Trans Bn
- (3) 74th Signal Company
- (4) 552nd Military Police Company
- (5) 61st Chemical Company

b. Requirements:

(1) DCTs will be appointed on unit orders, updated quarterly and a copy sent to 20th ASG Pusan SPO, Camp Hialeah.

(2) Required damage control equipment will be stored in the unit area in a designated place to provide easy access to the DCTs.

(3) Personnel will be familiar with the location and use of damage control equipment.

**4. MISSION:**

a. To conduct search and disaster relief during or after a disaster within the unit area.

b. To assist in search and disaster relief within the Pusan Sub-Area on order of the Deputy Installation Commander.

**5. EXECUTION:**

a. Muster the DCT within the unit areas to restore operational functions to include the following actions:

- (1) Search destroyed facilities for casualties.
- (2) Clear debris from operational areas.
- (3) Initiate temporary repairs on shelters, bunkers and work areas as required.

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- (4) Remove debris from roads within the unit area.
- (5) Re-secure facilities containing classified and high dollar items.
- (6) Other functions are directed by the unit commanders and team leaders.

b. On order, become OPCON to the Deputy Installation Commander, Headquarters, Camp Hialeah for major disaster relief operations within the Pusan Sub-Area.

6. TEAM EQUIPMENT: The following equipment list is the minimum required for a DCT. Units will expand this list as unit resources permit:

a. Picks	3
b. Sledgehammers	2
c. Shovels	5
d. Pry Bars	3
e. Portable Fire Extinguisher (chemical)	2
f. Axes (double headed)	2
g. Saws (one, two man saw)	2

7. DAMAGE CONTROL TEAM UNIFORM:

- a. Summer:
  - (1) BDUs w/soft cap and combat boots
  - (2) Pistol belt w/suspenders
  - (3) Poncho or wet weather gear
  - (4) Canteen (filled with water)
  - (5) First Aid packet w/insert

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(6) Work gloves

b. Winter. Same as above plus GORTEX with cold weather accessories.

c. On order:

(1) Kevlar helmet

(2) M16 Rifle w/basic load (situation dependent)

(3) Ammo Pouches

(4) Protective Mask

---

g. N hour: time of terrorist attack

h. N+?:

(1) ~~When winds drop below 30 knots~~, DPW makes a damage assessment and drafts a priority of work list.

(2) DPW reports to the DCC the damage assessment, priority of work list, list of needed supplies, equipment, and manpower to be requested from Taegu.

(3) Spt Opns gives a damage assessment report and support request to the DCC of their assigned areas.

(4) DCC requests needed supplies from Taegu based on damage assessments received.

(5) DCC representatives, DCTs and DPW personnel meet ~~in the DPW parking lot~~ to brief priority of work and augment the DPW personnel with the DCTs so they assist in the most critical areas.

(6) 552nd MP Co secures Camp Hialeah, USOM, PSF and Pier 8 from looters.

i. N+6 thru N+72:

(1) DCC provides progress reports to Taegu. Depending on the situation the DCC will request extra support as needed.



**APPENDIX 05 (Consequence Management) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

(2) Workers dispatched to Pusan will be housed at Camp Hialeah or PSF in that order. If food stocks are destroyed and the TISA is unable to reorder short notice, then feeding support will come from Taegu.

(3) DPW will place potable water tankers and porta-potties as directed by the DCC.

j. N+72 thru C+7: Continue priority of work to regain life support systems of Pusan area, clean up areas, return facilities and grounds to their normal appearance. NCs evacuated will be returned based on the decision of the Installation Commander and the progress of repairs.

**APPENDIX 06 (Executive or Distinguished Visitor Protection) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

1. RESOURCES TO ASSIST IN VIP PROTECTION.
  - a. Military working dogs, through the 552<sup>nd</sup> MPs
  - b. Handheld vertex radios
  - c. KNP liaison, through the 552<sup>nd</sup> MPs
  - d. Hardened vehicle available through the TMP at Taegu
  - e. Manpower from tenant units when enough coordination time is allowed.
  - f. Intelligence through 524<sup>th</sup> MI

**APPENDIX 07 (Operations Security) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

- (a) From the outset, it should be noted that one of the principal building blocks of a successful antiterrorism program is Operations Security (OPSEC). We must understand that preserving vital installation information from the adversary can mean the difference between a precisely targeted facility component, a random symbolic act, or no terrorist act at all.
- (b) OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:
  - 1. identify those actions that can be observed by an adversary intelligence systems;
  - 2. determine what indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries;
  - 3. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.
- (c) Information gleaned from communications can provide terrorists with detailed knowledge about potential targets. Communications security is an integral part of OPSEC. Terrorists are not hampered by regulations and fully exploit opportunities presented to them.
- (d) The objectives of OPSEC as they pertain to AT/FP are:
  - 1. Deny intelligence and information to terrorists.
  - 2. Avoid rigid operational routines
  - 3. Be familiar with techniques used by terrorists to collect information.
  - 4. Integrate operations security into physical security and personal protection programs.Develop essential elements of friendly information to facilitate and focus efforts to deny information to terrorists.

- 
- 1. Operational Security (OPSEC) is a program that will prevent a terrorist from learning about plans, operations and mission on this installation. Protecting information is the cornerstone of the OPSEC program. Each service member/civilian must ensure that they employ personal measures to keep the potential terrorist from obtaining information which could aid them in carrying out a terrorist incident.
  - 2. The following are areas which terrorist can exploit, and require appropriate security measures.
    - a. Human intelligence (HUMINT). Using people to gather information about unit capabilities, intentions and mission, including installation day to day activities. An example of this is releasing home telephone numbers and addresses of key personnel.
    - b. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT). Terrorists probably would not be able to compromise the sophisticated communications activities on this installation. However, information of the following type could be useful to terrorists: Releasing the radio frequencies of CID, the Fire Department, and the Military Police.

**APPENDIX 07 (Operations Security) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

c. Photo Intelligence (PHTOINT). Terrorists may use photo intelligence to gain information regarding restricted areas/possible targets. All personnel should be aware that the taking of photographs of restricted areas is prohibited. An example of this is the photographing of unit arms rooms. Additionally, photographers in sensitive areas (I.E., the Garrison Commander's quarters) will be closely scrutinized.

d. Personnel Security. No person is immune from the threat of terrorism. Any representative of the US Government is a possible target of Terrorist activities. Types of information which should be safeguarded in the field of personal security are:

(1) Access to commander's office should be restricted.

(2) Personal history data on key personnel should not be disseminated except to personnel who have a need to know.

(3) Information on travel itineraries and arrangements for command or key personnel should be limited.

### 3. INCIDENT REPORTS.

a. Preparation Instruction. To provide the J3 USFK, with essential information on terrorist incidents that have an immediate and significant effect on US bases, installations, or facilities.

b. Submitted by each installation, base, or facility commander.

c. Submitted to COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOREA//CJ-CC//, INFO: Appropriate area commander.

d. When submitted: As soon as possible after an incident occurs.

e. Method and precedence of transmission. Submit either by telephone or by electrical communications using Flash precedence. Speed is essential.

f. Specific Reporting Instructions.

(1) Report both raw information and evaluated intelligence.

(2) Do not delay sending verification or collection of additional detail. Send clarification or verification in follow-on reports.

g. Report format or content.

(1) An incident report covers significant incidents or conditions.

**APPENDIX 07 (Operations Security) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

(2) Submit the following information in the order listed:

(a) Location of the incident, name of the installation or facility, and the eight digit Universal Transverse Macerator (UTM) grid or geographical coordinates.

(b) Time of the incident (express in INDIA date-time group [DTG]).

(c) Nature of the incident. Describe by type and activity.

(d) Results of the incident. List damage, casualties, and an evaluation of its impact on the mission.

(e) Remarks. Include all significant information.

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**APPENDIX 08 (Access Controls) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

A positive control system must be established and maintained to preclude unauthorized entry and theft, and to facilitate authorized entry at personnel control points. Access lists, personal recognition, security identification cards and badges, badge exchange procedures, and personnel escorts contribute to the effectiveness of movement control systems.

The best control is provided when systems incorporate all these elements. Simple, understandable, and workable identification and movement control procedures should be used to achieve security objectives without impeding efficient operations. Properly organized and administered, a personnel and movement control system provides a means not only of positively identifying those who have the right and need to enter or leave an area, but also of detecting unauthorized personnel who attempt to gain entry.

Camp Hialeah is a controlled access area. Only personnel and vehicles with the proper authority may enter. The PMO is tasked with maintaining access control. There are only 3 authorized access points to Camp Hialeah; these are Gate 1, Gate 3 and Gate 4. Gate 1 is used only during high traffic times of the day and can allow both vehicle and pedestrian access. Gate 3 is open 18-20 hours per day and will allow only pedestrian access. Gate 4 is manned 24 hours a day and allows both pedestrian and vehicle access.

All personnel desiring entrance to Camp Hialeah will present a valid DOD ID card or Base Pass. Persons holding a valid id card or pass may sign on up to four visitors on base.

APPENDIX 09 (Barrier Plan) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

1. SITUATION. Special Threat situations may dictate that the commander limit access to post. In order to enhance the ability of military police access to limit access, barriers can be put in place across vehicular entrances to the post. These barriers would serve as reinforcing obstacles to stop or delay unauthorized vehicles from entering post. Physical barriers delay, but can rarely be depended upon to stop a determined intruder. Therefore, to effective, such barriers must be augmented by security forces or other means of protection. Situations may occur that require a section of the post be isolated. Barriers can be emplaced to contribute to the isolation of selected areas.

2. MISSION. On order, DPW places barriers to hinder unauthorized entry of Pusan area installations. On order, DPW places barriers to close/isolated designated areas of the post.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. The base defense commander will direct the Directorate of Public Works (DPW) to place barriers when the situation dictates their use. Barriers will be used to close the post or to isolate designated areas of post. DPW will coordinate with PMO and other agencies as necessary when it prepares to execute barrier emplacement. The Chief of the Facilities Maintenance Division of the DPW will use assets under his control to pick up prefabricated obstacles from their storage location and will deliver and place the obstacles. The base defense commander will designate forces to cover the obstacles once they have been placed.

b. Mission and Subordinate Elements:

(1) Base Defense commander. The base defense commander decides when barriers are needed to support operations, determines where barriers are needed, orders that they be emplaced, and deploys forces to cover the barriers once they have been emplaced.

(2) Directorate of Public Works (DPW).

(a) The DPW has primary responsibility for emplacement of barrier plan obstacles.

(b) The DPW coordinates with the Provost Marshal's Office and other agencies as necessary.

(c) The DPW loads prefabricated obstacles onto trucks and transports them from their storage locations to barrier sites. In order to accomplish this, the DPW primarily uses organic manpower and equipment under its control.

(d) The DPW places and sets up prefabricated obstacles at location as directed by the base defense commander.

APPENDIX 09 (Barrier Plan) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

(e) The DPW constructs custom made barriers and new obstacles as required. Additionally, makes needed repairs to existing barriers.



APPENDIX 10 (Lighting) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan

Lighting is an essential element of an integrated physical security program. During hours of darkness, protective lighting provides a means of continuing a degree of protection close to that maintained during daylight hours. This safeguard also has considerable value as a deterrent to thieves and vandals, and may make a potential terrorist operation directed at the installation more difficult. Protective lighting should enable guard force personnel to observe activities around or inside an installation without disclosing their presence. Lighting is inexpensive to maintain, and when properly employed may reduce the need for security forces. It may also provide personal protection for forces by reducing the advantages of concealment and surprise for a determined intruder. Security forces thus relieved may be used to better advantage elsewhere. Adequate lighting for all approaches to an installation not only discourages attempted unauthorized entry, but also reveals persons within the area. However, lighting should not be used alone. It should be used with other measures such as fixed security posts or patrols, fences and alarms.

The SPO, PMO Physical Security NCO, and DPW will work in conjunction to determine the lighting requirements of Camp Hialeah and to ensure that those needs are being met. The SPO will continually inspect the base for defective lighting and coordinate with DPW to have it repaired.

APPENDIX 10 (Lighting) to  
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**APPENDIX 11 (On Site Security Element) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

- (a) The on site security element of the AT/FP Installation Plan is integral to the efficient operations of the majority of the plan. The security element is critical to the increases in the THREATCON status. The first line of defense against hostile acts at or on the installation is not elite counter-terrorist units, but those security force organic to the installation commander. The security force constitutes one of the most important elements of an activity's physical security program. Security forces normally perform duties that require higher degrees of training and experience such as: Security of restricted areas; security of specific sensitive areas; direct action in the event of hostilities towards Americans, supervisory or coordinated role with other military units or security agencies.

**APPENDIX 12 (Technology) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

DOD 5200.8-R encourages the use of technology and people to achieve a cost-effective, security system level of performance. Cost-effective security systems designs use the minimum essential components to achieve the desired level of security; resource limitations and constraints mean that trade-offs will be required. Intrusion Detection System (IDS), x-ray devices, closed-circuit televisions, sensors, and night vision devices can enhance the security posture.

- (a) Intrusion detection systems play a vital part in the overall protection of military installations, activities, equipment and materiel assets. These systems detect through sound, vibration, motion, electrostatic and/or light beams. For an item to be secure, the system must focus upon detecting unauthorized individuals at the entry points (gate, door, or fence), area (buildings), and at a specific object (vault, file, or safe). It is important to remember that any security detection system, once activated, is useless unless it is supported by a prompt, quick reacting security force.
- (b) The purpose of IDS is to accomplish one or more of the following:
1. Economize - permit more economical and efficient use of manpower by requiring smaller mobile responding guard forces instead of larger numbers of personnel for patrols and fixed guard posts.
  2. Substitute - use in place of other physical security measures which cannot be used because of safety regulations, operational requirements, appearance, layout, cost, or other reasons.
- Supplement - provide additional controls at critical points or areas; provide insurance against human error; enhance the security force capability; provide the earliest practical warning to security forces of any attempted penetration of protected areas.

**APPENDIX 12 (Technology) to  
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**APPENDIX 13 (Training) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

Security awareness and personnel protection programs increase awareness to the possible threat of terrorism. The objective of training is to develop the installation security awareness to such a degree that the organization presents a very strong security profile. In so doing it becomes a significantly less vulnerable target.

All military personnel and family members, as well as civilians connected with the military or US Government (including contract personnel) are potential victims of terrorist attacks and should take the proper security precautions. The most important measure is in educating persons who are likely targets in recognition of threat and taking appropriate actions to reduce their risk. Personal protection, education, and training must emphasize how to deny the opportunity for an attack or to elevate the risk to the attacker. The objective of personal protection is to use personal protection measures tailored to the level of the threat.

**APPENDIX 14 (Weapons of Mass Destruction) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

1. **BACKGROUND.** The threat of WMD terrorism is different than the threat of "NBC" use on a battlefield. While the fielded U.S. Military is educated, trained, and equipped to operate in a "NBC" environment, the rear areas and (not-deployed) forces are less so. To a terrorist looking to terrorize the U.S. installations make inviting targets. Many areas on the installation naturally tend to congregate unprotected people. Examples of this are the PX, Movie Theater, and school.

2. **ASSUMPTIONS.**

The following assumptions were used:

- a. Use of WMD will occur without prior warning.
- b. The purpose of the attack will be to create well-publicized casualties as part of a terror campaign.
- c. The attackers will be either terrorists or North Korean operatives posing as terrorists.
- d. National (U.S. and ROK) assets will be deployed immediately upon notification of the attack.
- e. Sheer numbers of casualties and extent of damage will overwhelm local assets.
- f. Debilitating attacks are not peninsula wide

3. **ACTIONS.** Based on the assumptions above, it was realized that a WMD attack would be very similar to a no warning natural disaster or accident such as an earthquake or aircraft accident. Therefore the initial response procedures that are in effect for such events are very similar to the response to WMD. First responders have to make clear and accurate reports. It may happen that first responders will become casualties due to contamination this is especially true in an NBC scenario. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) need to be developed that protect first response units from arriving at the scene unprotected.

Once the hazard is known, the next step is to institute Installation Crisis Management Team (ICMT) procedures and ascertain the extent of the carnage. From this point what happens next will be dependent on which facilities/capabilities were damaged or destroyed. Essentially, the task will be to start treating and evacuating casualties, and contain further contamination or damage. We expect to be making use of the abilities and expertise provided by the 61<sup>st</sup> Chemical Company in doing this. The 552<sup>nd</sup> Military Police Company will be providing security and quarantine at the site. They will be reinforced by the 4<sup>th</sup> Quartermaster Detachment (Airborne) as necessary. HSC 168<sup>th</sup> Medical Battalion will provide medical care and evacuation in accordance with its SOPs and Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) with civilian hospitals. All other tenant units will be tasked as needed. Security, Plans and Operations will provide a mobile Command Post to the site and also establish the ICMT operations center at Bldg 239 (Bldg 1110 or 1035 are alternate locations).

We expect that help would be forth coming in 8-12 hours from the attack. No recovery will be accomplished prior to the arrival of national assets. The primary focus of the surviving

**APPENDIX 14 (Weapons of Mass Destruction) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

military units would be to prepare to carry on contingency missions while protecting themselves and the community from further loss. The Threat Condition (ThreatCon) would immediately raise to Delta and Base Defense plans would be implemented.



**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

837th U.S. Army  
Transportation Battalion  
ATTN: MTPC-PU-PS  
Unit #15179  
APO AP 96259-0268  
24 August 1998

**ANNEX C TO PIER 8 PUSAN, BASE DEFENSE PLAN**  
**THREATCON FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES**

1. **PURPOSE:** To establish standardized policy and procedures for protection of personnel and facilities against terrorist threat conditions (THREATCON) on Pier 8 Pusan.

2. **SCOPE:** This SOP applies to 837th U.S. Army Transportation Battalion (837th Trans Bn) and all tenant or transient units at Pier 8, Port of Pusan.

3. **DEFINITIONS:**

a. **THREATCON ALPHA:** Possible terrorist activity against US military personnel and facilities.

b. **THREATCON BRAVO:** Increased or more predictable threat of terrorism against US military personnel and facilities.

c. **THREATCON CHARLIE:** Incident occurs or intelligence indicates terrorist actions are imminent.

d. **THREATCON DELTA:** Terrorist actions have occurred or intelligence indicates terrorist action against a specific location.

4. **REFERENCES:**

a. AR 190-10, Security of Government Officials

b. AR 190-52 Countering Terrorism and other Major Disruptions on Military Installation

c. AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army (SAEDA)

d. AR 500-50, Civil Disturbances

e. AR 523-13, The Army Combating Terrorism Program

f. USFK/EUSA Reg 190-7

g. USFK/EUSA Reg 190-50

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- h. EUSA Suppl w/chg 1 to AR 190-52
  - i. Pier 8 Pusan, Base Defense Plan
  - j. 552nd MP BN Standing Order #
  - k. DODD 20000.12, Protection of DOD personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts.
  - l. DA Pam 190-52, w/chg 1, Personnel Security Precautions against acts of terrorism.
  - m. FM 19-30, Physical Security
  - n. TC 19-5, Bomb Incidents.
  - o. TC 19-6, Counter Terrorism (Staffing)
  - p. CIDR 195-10, Protective Services
  - q. MTMC SUPPL 1 TO AR 190-52
  - r. Message, SECDEF, 151154Z JUL 96, subject: Antiterrorism (AT) Readiness Sustaining Measures
  - s. DOD Directive 2000.12, "Combating Terrorism Program," which is the DOD standard for force protection.
  - t. Joint Service Guide 5260, "service Member's Personal Protection Guide," a self-help handbook to combating terrorism.
  - u. Joint Staff Pamphlet 5260, "Coping With Violence: Personal Protection Pamphlet."
5. **OBJECTIVE:** The objective of this SOP is to provide procedures for 837th Trans Bn personnel in countering sabotage and terrorism.
6. **RESPONSIBILITIES:**
- a. The requirements for effective prevention, reaction and elimination of terrorist activities within the confines of 837th Trans Bn are a responsibility of the terminal commander and all assigned personnel.
  - b. The counter-terrorism mission will require the coordinated assets of 837th Trans Bn, the 20th Area Support Group (20th ASG), and other geographical activities and organizations.
  - c. There are five major pillars of force protection:

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
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- (1) Combating Terrorism (Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism)
- (2) Physical Security
- (3) Law Enforcement
- (4) Personal Security
- (5) OPSEC

7. **PROCEDURES:** The Area IV Commander is the authority for declaration of THREATCONs. Selecting appropriate response to terrorist threats is the base defense commander's responsibility. The base defense will stand up within 2 hours of declaration of DEFCON 3. THREATCONs come before DEFCON increase to counter terrorist threat. Base commanders can act appropriately to the perceived threat within rules of engagement and the Articles of War.

a. **THREATCON NORMAL.** Exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists and warrants conducting normal or routine force protection measures.

b. **THREATCON ALPHA.** This condition is issued as a general warning of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpardectable, but circumstances do not warrant full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO. However, it may be necessary to implement selected measures from THREATCON BRAVO.

(1) **Measure 1:** At regular intervals, remind all personnel and dependents to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers. Watch for unidentified vehicles on or in the vicinity of US installations. Watch for abandoned parcels or suitcases and any unusual activity.

(2) **Measure 2:** Have the duty officer or personnel with access to building plans and plans for area evacuations available at all times. Key personnel should be able to seal off an area immediately. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on call and readily available.

(3) **Measure 3:** Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

(4) **Measure 4:** Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering the installation and unclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the United States.

(5) **Measure 5:** Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
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(6) **Measure 6:** As a deterrent, apply measures 14, 15, 17, or 18 from THREATCON BRAVO individually or in combination.

(7) **Measure 7:** Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic requirements related to the introduction of higher THREATCONs.

(8) **Measure 8:** Review and implement security measures for high-risk personnel, as appropriate.

(9) **Measure 9:** Spare.

(10) **Measure 10:** Repeat measure 1 and warn personnel of any other potential from of terrorist attack.

c. **THREATCON BRAVO.** This condition is declared when there is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified. The measure in this THREATCON must be maintained for weeks without causing hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relationships with local authorities.

(1) **Measure 11:** Keep all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency plans on call.

(2) **Measure 12:** Check plans for implementation of the next THREATCON.

(3) **Measure 13:** Move cars and objects (e.g., crates, trash containers) at least 25 meters from buildings, particularly buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider centralized parking.

(4) **Measure 14:** Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

(5) **Measure 15:** At the beginning and end of each workday and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.

(6) **Measure 16:** Examine mail (above the regular examination process) for letter or parcel bombs.

(7) **Measure 17:** Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. Advise dependents to check home deliveries.

(8) **Measure 18:** Increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense and to build confidence among staff and dependents.

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

(9) **Measure 19:** Make staff and dependents aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.

(10) **Measure 20:** At an early stage, inform members of local security committees of actions being taken. Explain reasons for actions.

(11) **Measure 21:** Physically inspect visitors and randomly inspect their suitcases, parcels, and other containers.

(12) **Measure 22:** Operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

(13) **Measure 23:** Protect off-base military personnel and military transport in accordance with prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock vehicles and check vehicles before entering or driving.

(14) **Measure 24:** Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.

(15) **Measure 25:** Brief personnel who may augment guard forces on the use of deadly force.

(16) **Measures 26-29:** Spares.

d. **THREATCON CHARLIE.** This condition is declared when an incident has occurred of when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against USFK personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this THREATCON for more than a short period will probably create hardships and effect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

(1) **Measure 30:** Continue or introduce all measures listed in THREATCON BRAVO.

(2) **Measure 31:** Keep all personnel responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans at their places of duty.

(3) **Measure 32:** Limit access points to absolute minimum.

(4) **Measure 33:** Strictly enforce control of entry. Randomly search vehicles.

(5) **Measure 34:** Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings.

(6) **Measure 35:** Issue weapons to guards. Local orders should include specific orders on issue of ammunition.

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
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(7) **Measure 36:** Increase patrolling of the installation.

(8) **Measure 37:** Protect all designated vulnerable points. Give special attention to vulnerable points outside the military establishment.

(9) **Measure 38:** Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.

(10) **Measure 39:** Spares.

(11) **Measure 40:** Continue or introduce all measures listed for THREATCONs BRAVO and Charlie.

e. **THREATCON DELTA.** This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.

(1) **Measure 41:** Augment guards as necessary.

(2) **Measure 42:** Identify all vehicles within operational or mission support areas.

(3) **Measure 43:** Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the installation.

(4) **Measure 44:** Control access and implement positive identification of all personnel.

(5) **Measure 45:** Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., brought into the Installation.

(6) **Measure 46:** Control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States.

(7) **Measure 47:** Frequent checks of building exteriors and parking areas.

(8) **Measure 48:** Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.

(9) **Measure 49:** Coordinate the possible closing of public and military roads and facilities with local authorities.

(10) **Measure 50:** Spare.

f. Military Police will be required to perform additional security measures.

(1) At THREATCON ALPHA, MP will:

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
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- (a) Conduct random searches of vehicles and personal belongings on entry and exit.
  - (b) Limit access points for personnel and vehicles commensurate with reasonable traffic flow and installation Cdr.'s guidance.
  - (c) One combat-ready MP team with tactical vehicle placed on a random basis at gates.
  - (d) One dog team placed on gates on random basis.
  - (e) Random ID check.
- (2) At THREATCON BRAVO, MP will :
- (a) Continue all ALPHA measures.
  - (b) Increase ID checks to include TWO forms of ID.
  - (c) MP company 100% recall, placed on 30 minute standby.
  - (d) One MP PLATOON placed on FULL ALERT, 10 minute deployment.
  - (e) Request BDF/QRF 100% recall, placed on 30 minute standby.
  - (f) Close selected gates.
  - (g) MP patrols increase checks of critical facilities.
- (3) At THREATCON CHARLIE, MP will:
- (a) Continue all BRAVO measures.
  - (b) Coordinate with CDR, 837th Transportation Battalion to restrict non-military access to key and essential buildings and personnel. Notify PMJ as required.
  - (c) Personnel holding A/B pass denied access.
  - (d) Honorary club member denied access.
  - (e) 100% search of all personnel and belongings entering and exiting.
  - (f) Fully armed and equipped MP Team, with HMMWV placed on all gates. (At the discretion of the installation commander).
  - (g) Gate barricades placed in position.

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
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- (h) Dog Team visible on all open gates.
- (i) Vehicle parking within 100 feet of perimeter and critical facilities restricted.
- (j) PM request KNP assistance:
  - (1) Traffic control exterior gates.
  - (2) Remove sidewalk vendors from gates.
  - (3) Patrol exterior perimeter.
- (k) MP company placed on 100% ready status.
- (l) BDF/QRF fully assembled and equipment within unit area without weapons and ammunition.
- (m) Activate security detachment for General Officers, Installation Commander and their families.

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Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

- (4) At THREATON DELTA, MP will:
- (a) Continue all previous alert measures.
  - (b) QRF reports to designated assembly area with weapon, no ammunition.
  - (c) MP request KNP standby reaction force.

THOMAS A. HARVEY  
LTC, TC  
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Transportation Planner

Appendix 1 Force Protection Posture Report

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

837th U.S. Army  
Transportation Battalion  
ATTN: MTPC-PU-PS  
Unit #15179  
APO AP 96259-0268  
10 September 1997

**APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO PIER 8 PUSAN, BASE DEFENSE PLAN**  
**FORCE PROTECTION POSTURE REPORT**

1. **PURPOSE:** In today's threat environment, it is imperative we establish better communications to assure optimum force protection for our personnel, facilities, and cargo.

2. **SCOPE:** Message, CDRMTMC, 241500Z Oct 96, subject: Force Protection Posture requires a weekly (Tuesday) input on force protection posture for each subordinate activity, including forward-deployed actys/personnel under your cognizance. The report will be transmitted by cemail or secure means if classified through MTMC headquarters.

3. **REPORT FORMAT:**

1. *Per CDRMTMC message 241500Z Oct 26, para 2, the following info is submitted for the 1317th Medium Port Command for week ending (date).*

*a. Current THREATCON for Pier 8 Pusan:*

*b. Area Intelligence/Criminal Intelligence:*

*c. Forward-Deployed MTMC Personnel:*

*(1) Personal Protection Briefings/Training Provided:*

*(2) Personal Protective Equipment/Measures being used:*

*(3) Specific Force Protection Support Arrangements made with  
CINC/Host Nation:*

*(4) Area THREATCON:*

2. *POC name and phone #.*

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
ANNEX D (Toolbox) to  
Camp Hialeah Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Plan**

837th U.S. Army  
Transportation Battalion  
ATTN: MTPC-PU-PS  
Unit #15179  
APO AP 96259-0268  
24 August 1998

**ANNEX C TO PIER 8 PUSAN, BASE DEFENSE PLAN**  
**THREATCON FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES**

1. **PURPOSE:** To establish standardized policy and procedures for protection of personnel and facilities against terrorist threat conditions (THREATCON) on Pier 8 Pusan.

2. **SCOPE:** This SOP applies to 837th U.S. Army Transportation Battalion (837th Trans Bn) and all tenant or transient units at Pier 8, Port of Pusan.

3. **DEFINITIONS:**

a. **THREATCON ALPHA:** Possible terrorist activity against US military personnel and facilities.

b. **THREATCON BRAVO:** Increased or more predictable threat of terrorism against US military personnel and facilities.

c. **THREATCON CHARLIE:** Incident occurs or intelligence indicates terrorist actions are imminent.

d. **THREATCON DELTA:** Terrorist actions have occurred or intelligence indicates terrorist action against a specific location.

4. **REFERENCES:**

a. AR 190-10, Security of Government Officials

b. AR 190-52 Countering Terrorism and other Major Disruptions on Military Installation

c. AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army (SAEDA)

d. AR 500-50, Civil Disturbances

e. AR 523-13, The Army Combating Terrorism Program

f. USFK/EUSA Reg 190-7

g. USFK/EUSA Reg 190-50

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
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- h. EUSA Suppl w/chg 1 to AR 190-52
  - i. Pier 8 Pusan, Base Defense Plan
  - j. 552nd MP BN Standing Order #
  - k. DODD 20000.12, Protection of DOD personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts.
  - l. DA Pam 190-52, w/chg 1, Personnel Security Precautions against acts of terrorism.
  - m. FM 19-30, Physical Security
  - n. TC 19-5, Bomb Incidents.
  - o. TC 19-6, Counter Terrorism (Staffing)
  - p. CIDR 195-10, Protective Services
  - q. MTMC SUPPL 1 TO AR 190-52
  - r. Message, SECDEF, 151154Z JUL 96, subject: Antiterrorism (AT) Readiness Sustaining Measures
  - s. DOD Directive 2000.12, "Combating Terrorism Program," which is the DOD standard for force protection.
  - t. Joint Service Guide 5260, "service Member's Personal Protection Guide," a self-help handbook to combating terrorism.
  - u. Joint Staff Pamphlet 5260, "Coping With Violence: Personal Protection Pamphlet."
5. **OBJECTIVE:** The objective of this SOP is to provide procedures for 837th Trans Bn personnel in countering sabotage and terrorism.
6. **RESPONSIBILITIES:**
- a. The requirements for effective prevention, reaction and elimination of terrorist activities within the confines of 837th Trans Bn are a responsibility of the terminal commander and all assigned personnel.
  - b. The counter-terrorism mission will require the coordinated assets of 837th Trans Bn, the 20th Area Support Group (20th ASG), and other geographical activities and organizations.
  - c. There are five major pillars of force protection:

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**APPENDIX 17 (Port Security) to  
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- (1) Combating Terrorism (Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism)
- (2) Physical Security
- (3) Law Enforcement
- (4) Personal Security
- (5) OPSEC

7. **PROCEDURES:** The Area IV Commander is the authority for declaration of THREATCONs. Selecting appropriate response to terrorist threats is the base defense commander's responsibility. The base defense will stand up within 2 hours of declaration of DEFCON 3. THREATCONs come before DEFCON increase to counter terrorist threat. Base commanders can act appropriately to the perceived threat within rules of engagement and the Articles of War.

a. **THREATCON NORMAL.** Exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists and warrants conducting normal or routine force protection measures.

b. **THREATCON ALPHA.** This condition is issued as a general warning of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unparadeable, but circumstances do not warrant full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO. However, it may be necessary to implement selected measures from THREATCON BRAVO.

(1) **Measure 1:** At regular intervals, remind all personnel and dependents to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers. Watch for unidentified vehicles on or in the vicinity of US installations. Watch for abandoned parcels or suitcases and any unusual activity.

(2) **Measure 2:** Have the duty officer or personnel with access to building plans and plans for area evacuations available at all times. Key personnel should be able to seal off an area immediately. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on call and readily available.

(3) **Measure 3:** Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

(4) **Measure 4:** Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering the installation and unclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the United States.

(5) **Measure 5:** Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.

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(6) **Measure 6:** As a deterrent, apply measures 14, 15, 17, or 18 from THREATCON BRAVO individually or in combination.

(7) **Measure 7:** Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic requirements related to the introduction of higher THREATCONs.

(8) **Measure 8:** Review and implement security measures for high-risk personnel, as appropriate.

(9) **Measure 9:** Spare.

(10) **Measure 10:** Repeat measure 1 and warn personnel of any other potential from of terrorist attack.

c. **THREATCON BRAVO.** This condition is declared when there is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified. The measure in this THREATCON must be maintained for weeks without causing hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relationships with local authorities.

(1) **Measure 11:** Keep all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency plans on call.

(2) **Measure 12:** Check plans for implementation of the next THREATCON.

(3) **Measure 13:** Move cars and objects (e.g., crates, trash containers) at least 25 meters from buildings, particularly buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider centralized parking.

(4) **Measure 14:** Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

(5) **Measure 15:** At the beginning and end of each workday and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.

(6) **Measure 16:** Examine mail (above the regular examination process) for letter or parcel bombs.

(7) **Measure 17:** Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. Advise dependents to check home deliveries.

(8) **Measure 18:** Increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense and to build confidence among staff and dependents.

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(9) **Measure 19:** Make staff and dependents aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.

(10) **Measure 20:** At an early stage, inform members of local security committees of actions being taken. Explain reasons for actions.

(11) **Measure 21:** Physically inspect visitors and randomly inspect their suitcases, parcels, and other containers.

(12) **Measure 22:** Operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

(13) **Measure 23:** Protect off-base military personnel and military transport in accordance with prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock vehicles and check vehicles before entering or driving.

(14) **Measure 24:** Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.

(15) **Measure 25:** Brief personnel who may augment guard forces on the use of deadly force.

(16) **Measures 26-29:** Spares.

d. **THREATCON CHARLIE.** This condition is declared when an incident has occurred of when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against USFK personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this THREATCON for more than a short period will probably create hardships and effect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

(1) **Measure 30:** Continue or introduce all measures listed in THREATCON BRAVO.

(2) **Measure 31:** Keep all personnel responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans at their places of duty.

(3) **Measure 32:** Limit access points to absolute minimum.

(4) **Measure 33:** Strictly enforce control of entry. Randomly search vehicles.

(5) **Measure 34:** Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings.

(6) **Measure 35:** Issue weapons to guards. Local orders should include specific orders on issue of ammunition.

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(7) **Measure 36:** Increase patrolling of the installation.

(8) **Measure 37:** Protect all designated vulnerable points. Give special attention to vulnerable points outside the military establishment.

(9) **Measure 38:** Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.

(10) **Measure 39:** Spares.

(11) **Measure 40:** Continue or introduce all measures listed for THREATCONs BRAVO and Charlie.

e. **THREATCON DELTA.** This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.

(1) **Measure 41:** Augment guards as necessary.

(2) **Measure 42:** Identify all vehicles within operational or mission support areas.

(3) **Measure 43:** Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the installation.

(4) **Measure 44:** Control access and implement positive identification of all personnel.

(5) **Measure 45:** Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., brought into the Installation.

(6) **Measure 46:** Control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States.

(7) **Measure 47:** Frequent checks of building exteriors and parking areas.

(8) **Measure 48:** Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.

(9) **Measure 49:** Coordinate the possible closing of public and military roads and facilities with local authorities.

(10) **Measure 50:** Spare.

f. Military Police will be required to perform additional security measures.

(1) At THREATCON ALPHA, MP will:

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- (a) Conduct random searches of vehicles and personal belongings on entry and exit.
  - (b) Limit access points for personnel and vehicles commensurate with reasonable traffic flow and installation Cdr.'s guidance.
  - (c) One combat-ready MP team with tactical vehicle placed on a random basis at gates.
  - (d) One dog team placed on gates on random basis.
  - (e) Random ID check.
- (2) At THREATCON BRAVO, MP will :
- (a) Continue all ALPHA measures.
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  - (c) MP company 100% recall, placed on 30 minute standby.
  - (d) One MP PLATOON placed on FULL ALERT, 10 minute deployment.
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- (3) At THREATCON CHARLIE, MP will:
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- (4) At THREATON DELTA, MP will:
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Appendix 1 Force Protection Posture Report

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837th U.S. Army  
Transportation Battalion  
ATTN: MTPC-PU-PS  
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10 September 1997

**APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO PIER 8 PUSAN, BASE DEFENSE PLAN**  
**FORCE PROTECTION POSTURE REPORT**

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3. **REPORT FORMAT:**

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a. *Current THREATCON for Pier 8 Pusan:*

b. *Area Intelligence/Criminal Intelligence:*

c. *Forward-Deployed MTMC Personnel:*

(1) *Personal Protection Briefings/Training Provided:*

(2) *Personal Protective Equipment/Measures being used:*

(3) *Specific Force Protection Support Arrangements made with  
CINC/Host Nation:*

(4) *Area THREATCON:*

2. *POC name and phone #.*

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**BEFORE AMMUNITION IS ISSUED TO ANYONE, THE FOLLOWING WILL BE  
READ ALOUD TO THEM:**

1. The use of deadly force is authorized only where all three of the following circumstances are present:

a. Lesser means have been exhausted or are available.

b. The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not significantly increased by its use.

c. The purpose of its use is one or more of the following:

(1) Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm.

(2) Prevention of a crime which involves a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm including defense of other persons. For example, setting fire to an inhabited dwelling or sniping.

(3) Prevention of the destruction of public utilities or similar property vital to public health or safety.

(4) To protect property which is vital to the national security.

(5) Apprehension or prevention of the escape of persons against whom the use of deadly force is authorized in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) above.

2. An order to halt should be given before a shot is fired.

3. Shots will not be fired if they are likely to endanger the safety of innocent bystanders.

4. Warning shots will not be employed since such firing constitutes a hazard to innocent persons.

5. Shots will be aimed to disable; however, if circumstances make it difficult to direct fire with sufficient precision to assure that the person will be disabled rather than killed, such circumstances will not preclude the use of a firearm.

- (a) Military personnel have the right, under the law, to use reasonable force necessary to defend themselves against violent and dangerous personal attack. The limitations described in this paragraph are not intended to infringe on this right but to prevent the indiscriminate use of other types of deadly force.
- (b) The degree of force will not be greater than that reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
- (c) Use of deadly force is authorized IAW Figure 3. In addition, the following policies regarding the use of deadly force will be observed:
  - 1. The marksman will, if possible, aim to wound rather than to kill.
  - 2. Warning shots will not normally be employed. They constitute a hazard to innocent people and create confusion which could lead to unnecessary violence.
  - 3. If during the course of a hostage type incident, a hostage is killed or seriously injured, it may be necessary to cease ongoing negotiations and initiate a full scale assault.
- (d) The number of alert forces will never be greater than the situation dictates. Doubts concerning the number of troops required, however, will normally be resolved in favor of large numbers. A large reserve of troops will be maintained during a disturbance operation. The knowledge that a large reserve force is available builds morale among military and law enforcement personnel.
- (e) A minimum number of alert force personnel will be maintained at the scene of the terrorist situation. The reserve personnel will be assembled out of view in an area adjacent to the site.
- (f) The principle of economy of force will be adhered to by all alert forces.
- (g) Containment and negotiations will be attempted prior to initiating more forceful courses of action.
- (h) Every effort will be made to avoid appearing as an alien invading force and to present the image of a restrained and well-disciplined force whose sole purpose is to assist in the restoration of law and order.
- (i) The measures described below may be applied in any order as deemed appropriate by the ICMT commander. While each of these measures represent an escalation in the level of force, they are not sequential in the sense that the ICMT commander will initially select the first option. Then proceed from one to another in any particular order, so long as the option selected is appropriate considering the existing threat and the minimum necessary force principle is not violated.

1. Containment/traffic rerouting. Initial containment/traffic rerouting and evacuation of an area will be accomplished by on-duty MP. Phase I alert force will complete the outer perimeter and evacuation procedures as required.
  2. Proclamation. A public proclamation is considered an excellent medium to make known to a crowd the intentions of the commander.
  3. Negotiations. The initial negotiations team will be provided by CID.
  4. Denial of food, medical attention, or other humanitarian support (hostage situation only) will be accomplished in coordination with DPW during the course of negotiations.
  5. Disconnection of utilities will be accomplished in coordination with DPW during the course of negotiations.
  6. Use of Non-lethal Weapons. Riot control agents will be considered for use by ICMT or on-site commander.
  7. Use of Water. Water from a fire hose may be effective in moving small groups on a narrow front such as a street or in defending a barricade or roadblock. Personnel applying the water should be MPs and protected by MP personnel. DPW Fire Department personnel will not be used to control the rioters.
  8. Show of force/Riot Control Formations. A show of force by itself may be detrimental, and result in face-saving behavior on the part of the opponent. Riot control formations will be used in controlling and dispersing mass crowd.
- (j) Reacting to Sniper Fire. In a disturbance situation, the preferred tactic is to enter the building from which the fire originates. Darkening the street in order to gain protection from sniper fire is counterproductive. The following general approach should be emphasized in dealing with snipers:
1. Surround the building in which the sniper is concealed and gain access, using armored vehicles if possible.
  2. Illuminate the area during darkness.
  3. Employ agent CS initially, if feasible, rather than small arms fire. If CS is not successful, then use well-aimed fire by expert marksmen.
  4. Fire by selected marksmen may be necessary. Marksmen will be provided by outside agencies and will be specifically trained and thoroughly instructed.
  5. Assault (fire and maneuver). In conducting assaults, the following will be considered:
  6. rehearse the assault in advance.

7. Illuminate the area during darkness.
8. Plan alternate routes of entry. Once the assault is launched, it must be forceful and swift.
9. Maximize the element of surprise by using diversionary tactics.
10. Employ agent CS initially, if possible. If this is not successful, well-aimed fire by expert marksmen will be used.
11. Full Firepower. This extreme measure will be used as a last resort only after all other measures have failed or obviously would be impractical, and the consequence of failure to subdue the threat situation completely would be continued mass casualties, or similar grievous conditions.



**FIGURE 3 – USE OF FORCE BRIEFING**