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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OPERATION IN CYPRUS

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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

INTRODUCTION

1. This report, which is being submitted after nearly six months of United Nations activity in Cyprus, seeks to present to the Security Council a picture, as accurate as possible, of the complex problems faced by the United Nations operation in Cyprus and of its efforts to cope with them. The report includes an account of the most important events relating to the United Nations operation in Cyprus since the period covered by my last report on the subject, i.e. 8 June until 8 September 1964. Earlier developments are also recalled whenever necessary in order to provide a clearer and more comprehensive picture of the situation.

I. MILITARY SITUATION

A. United Nations Peace-Keeping Force

(i) Composition and Deployment

2. The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is composed of military contingents placed at the disposal of the United Nations by Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The Force also includes a Civilian Police element (UNFICYP Civilian Police), the personnel of which are provided by Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden.

3. The strength of the Force which on 8 June 1964 amounted to 6,238 military personnel and 173 civilian police, comprised the following on 8 September 1964:

Military

Austria (medical unit)	47
Canada	1,132
Denmark	981
Finland	971
Ireland	1,032
Sweden	799
United Kingdom	1,025
TOTAL	<u>5,987</u>

Civilian Police

Australia	40
Austria	34
Denmark	40
New Zealand	20
Sweden	39
TOTAL	<u>173</u>
TOTAL UNFICYP	<u>6,160</u>

4. The following changes took place during the intervening period:

Arrivals

On 15 August the Canadian Contingent was reinforced by the arrival of the Anti-tank platoon of the First Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment with 29 all ranks.

The build-up of the Danish Contingent was completed when a further 312 men arrived on 11 and 12 June.

The Irish Contingent was strengthened by the arrival of the Third Infantry Group. An advance party of 76 all ranks arrived on 21 July and the main body of 323 all ranks on 4 and 5 August.

217 officers and men arrived from the United Kingdom during this period, to replace the Third Division personnel in the Force Headquarters.

No. 3 Flight Army Air Corps with 50 all ranks arrived from the United Kingdom on 11 August to replace the 19 Liaison Flight.

Departures

The 19 Liaison Flight returned to the United Kingdom on 11 August on being relieved.

The Regimental Headquarters and 'C' Squadron of the Life Guards from the United Kingdom with a total strength of 207 all ranks left UNFICYP Command on 8 August.

42 officers and 224 other ranks of the Third Division Headquarters and Signal Regiment, also from the United Kingdom, have returned home during this period.

700 officers and men from the Swedish Contingent have gone home on rotation during this period. The majority departed between 7 and 13 July. Not all /...

of these have been replaced, and the Swedish Contingent has consequently diminished in strength by 155 all ranks.

5. The Force is currently deployed as follows (see attached map I):^{1/}

Nicosia Zone

HQ UNFICYP (International)

HQ Nicosia Zone (Basic organization Canadian, with representative staff drawn from Contingents under command)

Austrian Field Hospital and Austrian Civilian Police

Canadian Contingent

Danish Contingent and Danish Civilian Police

Finnish Contingent

Paphos Zone

Swedish Contingent and Swedish Civilian Police

Famagusta District

40th Irish Battalion, Irish Contingent

Australian Civil Police (One Section)

Larnaca District

3 Infantry Group - Irish Contingent

Australian Civilian Police (One Section)

Limassol District

United Kingdom Contingent

New Zealand Civilian Police

(ii) Function and Guiding Principles

6. As indicated in the aide-mémoire contained in my report of 11 April 1964 (S/5653), the function of the United Nations Force in Cyprus is to implement the objectives defined in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, namely: In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. In carrying out its function the Force shall avoid any action designed to influence the political situation in Cyprus, except through contributing an improved climate in which political solutions may be sought.

^{1/} The map is being circulated separately as an addendum (S/5950/Add.1) to this report.

7. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Force is under the exclusive control and command of the United Nations at all times. The Commander of the Force is appointed by and responsible exclusively to the Secretary-General. The contingents comprising the Force are integral parts of it and take their orders exclusively from the Commander of the Force.

(b) The Force undertakes no functions which are not consistent with the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964. The troops of the Force carry arms which, however, are to be employed only for self-defence, should this become necessary in the discharge of its function, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, of seeking to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and contributing to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The personnel of the Force must act with restraint and with complete impartiality towards the members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

(c) As regards the principle of self-defence, it is explained that the expression "self-defence" includes the defence of United Nations posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack, as well as the support of other personnel of UNFICYP under armed attack. When acting in self-defence, the principle of minimum force shall always be applied and armed force will be used only when all peaceful means of persuasion have failed. The decision as to when force may be used under these circumstances rests with the Commander on the spot. Examples in which troops may be authorized to use force include attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they occupy under orders from their commanders, attempts by force to disarm them, and attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.

(d) In connexion with the performance of its function and responsibilities, UNFICYP shall maintain close contact with the appropriate officials in the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order and which has been asked by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus.

8. Deployed in sensitive areas throughout the country, the Force attempts to interpose itself between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot military positions, or if

that is not possible, to set up its own posts nearby so that its mere presence will constitute an effective deterrent to a recurrence of fighting. If, despite its precautionary measures, shooting incidents occur, the Force will immediately intervene and endeavour to end the fighting by persuasion and negotiation. In each case it will also carry out a thorough investigation of the incident. Frequent patrolling is organized whenever necessary to ensure the safety on roads and in towns and villages in sensitive areas. These actions will be described in greater detail later on in this report.

9. The Force is assisted by a Civilian Police unit which forms an integral part of UNFICYP. The main duties of these police elements are: to establish liaison with the Cypriot police; to accompany Cypriot police patrols which are to check vehicles for traffic and other offences; to man United Nations police posts established in sensitive areas; and to observe searches of vehicles by local police and road-blocks. The UNFICYP Civilian Police is also called upon to carry out investigation of incidents in which Greek or Turkish Cypriots are involved with the opposite community, and any special investigations as necessary, including the search for persons reported as missing.

10. But the daily tasks of UNFICYP go far beyond the normal duties set forth above. A wide range of problems, large and small, are brought to the attention of UNFICYP for its urgent action. In a Cyprus torn by internal strife the population of both communities lives in constant fear and looks to UNFICYP for protection. Escorts are organized to protect persons of one community who have to venture into the area occupied by the other. UNFICYP is frequently called upon to deal with such problems as food supply, relief and refugees. The UNFICYP field hospital, run by the Austrian medical unit, although primarily established for UNFICYP personnel, also provides assistance to the other patients on an emergency basis.

11. While the population constantly looks to UNFICYP for protection, the fighting elements on both sides are not always co-operative and often adopt hostile attitudes towards the members of UNFICYP whenever their presence impedes the achievement of their designs. In the performance of their duties members of UNFICYP have been threatened, abused and even fired on. Since the beginning of the operation, the Force has suffered six casualties, which occurred during the performance of duties, as follows: one killed in action, one in an accident which occurred while on duty, two missing and believed to have been killed, and two others wounded in action. Two other men have died of other causes.

12. I cannot conclude this section without paying a warm tribute to all members of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for the exemplary manner in which they have performed their difficult duties. It is not easy for armed soldiers under

conditions of great tension and danger to refrain from using their arms. Nor is it easy for them to remain always restrained and to persist in using persuasion rather than force when they are threatened. It requires great courage, a very special kind of courage, as well as an unusual amount of patience, understanding and compassion to work in the conditions imposed upon a United Nations Peace-keeping Force, but the officers and men of UNFICYP have measured up well in this regard.

(iii) Freedom of Movement

13. Freedom of movement is an essential condition for the proper functioning of the Force. The agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of Cyprus concerning the status of UNFICYP (S/5634) provides that the Force and its members together with its service vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout Cyprus.

14. But the Force has encountered many difficulties in this regard which have greatly hindered its work. In particular, during July and early August there were frequent cases of serious restriction of the movement of UNFICYP by the Cypriot police and the Cyprus National Guard.

15. The most serious case concerns the docks in Limassol. In the latter part of July, precisely at the time when it was believed that large shipments of military equipment were being unloaded from Greek ships, serious restrictions were imposed on the movement of UNFICYP personnel and vehicles at and near the Limassol docks. The attitude of the Cypriot security forces was so aggressive that it was feared that a clash might occur between them and UNFICYP. Therefore UNFICYP decided temporarily to withdraw its patrols from the areas in order to avoid incidents. Another serious restriction was imposed on UNFICYP movement during the Tylliria fighting, 5-10 August, when the battle area was sealed off and UNFICYP troops had great difficulty in gaining access to it.

16. The question of freedom of movement for UNFICYP has been the subject of long discussions and negotiations between the Force Commander and the Cypriot authorities. When the Force Commander encountered a firmly unco-operative attitude by those authorities after the Limassol incidents, I personally addressed a message to the Government of Cyprus on 22 July 1964 (S/5843). In this message, after drawing attention to the restrictions imposed upon the movement of UNFICYP in the exercise of their duties, I asked the Government urgently to take the necessary steps to bring an end to practices of that kind which hinder seriously the functioning of the Force. In its reply of 27 July 1964 (S/5842) the Government

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of Cyprus maintained that the entry by UNFICYP into docks and ports or other Government premises, or the stationing of units therein, was not included in the term "freedom of movement". As regards the claim of access by UNFICYP to specific sensitive areas, the Government desired to clarify that where requirements of absolute secrecy on matters of State defence and security were concerned, it was not possible to permit entry of UNFICYP patrols. The Government had, however, informed the Commander of UNFICYP of its readiness to make arrangements at his request to visit with the Minister of the Interior any area or place in Cyprus he might wish.

17. However, on 6 August 1964, the President of the Republic of Cyprus addressed to me a message (S/5855) in which he stated that irrespective of the legal views expressed in the communication of 27 July, it was his desire to assure me that the United Nations Force in Cyprus would enjoy full freedom of movement throughout the territory of the Republic. The only exception would be certain localities connected with the defence of the State, access to which might be arranged after consultation between the Government and the Commander of the United Nations Force. I replied to the President on 7 August 1964 (S/5869) expressing my appreciation for his personal interest and action on this matter and informed him that the Force Commander would be in touch with the appropriate authorities of his Government with regard to arrangements for access to the sensitive areas referred to in his message.

18. In further discussions and negotiations in Nicosia, the President assured my Special Representative and the Force Commander on 1 September that UNFICYP would enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout the territory of the Republic, although, for security reasons, certain sensitive areas could not be visited by ordinary UNFICYP patrols. However, during further discussions on 5 and 7 September, the President handed the Force Commander a map of the island with sensitive areas marked on it. This map showed 16 areas of special importance to the Cyprus Government which may not be visited by anyone in UNFICYP; 15 defence areas which may be visited only by the Force Commander having given due notice to the Cyprus military authorities; and 57 areas which may be visited only by senior UNFICYP officers having given due warning and even then only at predetermined days and hours. The President also stated that he could not permit UNFICYP to take air photographs of any of these areas. My Special Representative and the Force Commander considered the new position of the Cyprus Government to be contrary to

the assurances given to me by the President and informed him that they would immediately report the matter to me. It should also be mentioned (as an example of the deterioration which is taking place in the relationship between UNFICYP and the Cyprus authorities) that the Swedish Contingent in the Paphos Zone has been prevented from occupying an empty hotel in which they had intended to establish their headquarters. I am, of course, most concerned by this new trend and have requested the Government of Cyprus, in particular, to reconsider its position and comply fully with the undertaking given by the President in his message to me dated 6 August 1964. The Commander of the Force is prepared, in this regard, to discuss appropriate arrangements for the access by UNFICYP to certain sensitive areas, clearly limited in number and size, as otherwise the freedom of movement which is essential for the discharge by the Force of its responsibilities, would be seriously curtailed.

19. There have been also some cases of obstruction to the movement of UNFICYP by Turkish Cypriots in the areas controlled by them. These cases concern generally movement in the immediate vicinity of fortified posts and the local UNFICYP Commander has been able in each case to overcome the difficulty by negotiation.

B. Other Armed Forces in Cyprus

(i) Government Armed Forces

20. In my report of 15 June 1964 I made references to the establishment of compulsory conscription and the creation of a Cypriot National Guard as well as to the reorganization of the regular Police Force. The Police Force has remained at the same strength of about 5,000 since that time. But the strength of the National Guard has increased from about 15,000 to an estimated total of 24,000. Included in this figure is an estimated 5,000 men who arrived in Cyprus presumably from Greece during the month of July 1964 through the port of Limassol. Many of these new recruits are believed to be Greek Cypriots who have been students in Greece or have been serving in the Greek armed forces, but the information obtained by UNFICYP indicates that among the new recruits there were also Greek nationals including officers, instructors and technicians from the Greek Army. The National Guard has also been greatly strengthened with regard to weapons and equipment. The question of the military build-up will be dealt with in greater detail in a later part of the report.

21. General Georgios Karayannis who had assumed command of the National Guard at the time of its creation, resigned in mid-August 1964 and was succeeded by General George Grivas. The discipline of the National Guard is reported as having improved since its creation although cases of lack of discipline are still frequent at lower levels.

22. It should be mentioned that there are also a large number of Greek Cypriot civilians capable of taking up arms at very short notice to reinforce the National Guard.

(ii) Turkish Cypriot Fighting Elements

23. The core of the Turkish Cypriot fighting elements is made up by the original Turkish Cypriot members of the Cypriot Police Force and gendarmerie, and of the Cyprus army. They were joined by a considerable number of Turkish Cypriot armed civilians in the defence of certain areas of Turkish Cypriot population. The Turkish members of the Cypriot police, whose strength seemed to have been increased since the events of December 1963 by the addition of a number of recruits, continue to wear the same police uniforms but with Turkish badges.

24. It is not easy to make an estimation of the strength of the Turkish Cypriot fighting elements. The information available to UNFICYP puts their total strength at about 10,000, excluding 1,700 police and Turkish Cypriot elements of the Cyprus Army. It is believed that during last June and early July some 300 personnel, presumably from Turkey, landed on the beaches in the Kokkina/Mansoura area to reinforce the Turkish Cypriot fighting elements there and that an additional 300 might have infiltrated into other parts of the Island. UNFICYP has no information indicating that other reinforcements have reached the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot leadership seems to exercise only a tenuous control over some of the Turkish Cypriot fighting elements, in part, it is believed, because of the difficulties of communications. In particular the extremist Turkish Cypriot organization, TMT, operates quite independently of any control. In this connexion, it may be mentioned that on the Greek Cypriot side also, there are some extremist elements operating in the same way.

(iii) Greek and Turkish National Contingents

25. In order to complete the picture of the armed forces now stationed in Cyprus, excluding the British Sovereign Base areas, reference should be made to the Greek and Turkish National Contingents. Under the provision of the Treaty of Alliance signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960 Greece exercises the right to maintain an army contingent of 950 officers and men on the Island, and Turkey a contingent of 650. In April 1964, the President of Cyprus unilaterally abrogated the Treaty of Alliance and declared it therefore no longer binding on his Government. Both Greece and Turkey, however, have kept their contingents in Cyprus. The present strength of the Greek Contingent is 950 and that of Turkey 645.

26. The Greek contingent is in its barracks on the outskirts of Nicosia. The Turkish contingent, which had left its camp during the events of December 1963 and had deployed in the villages of Orta Keuy and Geunyeli astride the Kyrenia road north of Nicosia, are still deployed there. The Government of Cyprus contends that this is a breach of the Treaty which justifies its abrogation by Cyprus. Both contingents have shown obvious one-sided attitudes in favour of their respective communities. During the Tylliria fighting in August 1964, both contingents were observed to move out of their areas. But after the fighting the Greeks returned to their barracks and the Turks to the area they had been occupying before, but there was no indication that either of them took part in that fighting.

27. In this connexion it may be recalled that at the time of the establishment of UNFICYP, I suggested that both units be placed under the over-all command of the Force Commander. But, as indicated in my report of 15 June, the negotiations on the subject have led to no positive results. I have also suggested that it would be helpful to a solution of the Cyprus problem if the Turkish troops would be returned to their original barracks.

28. At the end of August, the intention of the Turkish Government to proceed with the normal rotation of one third of its contingent and the refusal of the Cyprus Government to allow it brought about the possibility of a new and dangerous crisis in Cyprus. This question was brought to the Security Council's attention in my report of 29 August (S/5920). In that report I informed the Council that

I had urged Turkey to consider postponing for a few weeks the scheduled rotation and also to reconsider my early suggestion concerning the return of the Turkish contingent to its original barracks. The Government of Turkey subsequently announced that it had decided to postpone the scheduled rotation for a short time.

C. Military Activities

(i) Positions occupied by the Government and Turkish Cypriot Forces

29. Following the events in December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot fighting elements gathered in areas inhabited by their community and fortified them against possible attacks. Map II in addendum 1 to the present report gives an indication of the areas now so occupied. The most important of them include a part of Nicosia city and its northern suburbs; a narrow area astride the Kyrenia Road extending from the northern suburbs of Nicosia up to the southern edge of the town of Kyrenia; the town of Louroujina; an enclave in the Lefka region and two beachheads at Kokkina and Limnitis.

30. In the defence of the areas they control, the Turkish Cypriots have set up roadblocks, trenches, fortified posts and sandbagged emplacements either on the ground or behind windows or on the roofs of buildings. Around those positions the Government forces have erected their own fortifications and roadblocks. The opposing military positions, manned by determined and well armed men, and sometimes separated by less than 50 yards, create a situation fraught with constant danger.

31. The measures taken by UNFICYP to prevent incidents follow different patterns, according to the areas concerned. In towns where the two communities living in adjoining areas have set up fortified positions very near each other, the two areas are separated by a demarcation line. One such line, referred to as the "Green Line", was established in Nicosia after the events of December 1963, and prior to the arrival of UNFICYP. UNFICYP keeps a close watch over this line through static posts and regular patrols. In sensitive rural areas where the opposing fortified positions are further apart, UNFICYP is permanently deployed in small detachments normally placed in an interposed position between the two sides. Whenever firing occurs it will immediately make contact with both sides to arrange a cessation of firing and if necessary re-deploy some of its forces to occupy disputed positions. Elsewhere throughout most of the Island UNFICYP makes its presence felt by organizing frequent patrols to survey roads and visits to villages.

(ii) Erection and removal of fortifications

32. Since its arrival in Cyprus UNFICYP has made determined efforts to achieve the withdrawal or elimination of the many fortifications erected by both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. As indicated in my report of 15 June 1964, proposals to that effect had been put forward by UNFICYP both to the Cyprus Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leaders, but unfortunately no agreement was reached. However, as a result of discussions and negotiations at the local level, some positive results had been achieved, notably in Ktima where it had been possible to remove the fortifications set up there.

33. The proposals mentioned above include a plan for the creation of a free zone in the city of Nicosia by pushing each side back by 100 yards. This free zone would be out of bounds for the fighting elements of either side and would be guarded and patrolled by UNFICYP. Negotiations for the creation of such a zone were continued by my Special Representative and the Force Commander with the Cyprus Government on the one hand and the Turkish Cypriot leadership on the other. By mid-July some definite headway had been made. The Cyprus Government agreed to withdraw its forces unilaterally and both sides agreed that the free zone to be created should be operated by UNFICYP forces alone. UNFICYP was working on the details of this plan when the tension began to rise with the Temblos incident in mid-July. No further progress has been made on the plan since then.

34. Since my last report, local UNFICYP commanders have continued their efforts towards the removal of fortifications. The negotiations involved are a continuous and wearying task. Even a minor incident provokes one side or the other to build posts in the fear that they might be attacked. Immediately, the other side retaliates by building similar ones. The removal of these new positions has then to be negotiated by UNFICYP, but no sooner is this achieved than fresh outcrops of fortifications would begin to appear.

35. The yardstick of success in this endless endeavour is not the number of fortifications removed, but the difference between those removed and those newly built. Here also the efforts of UNFICYP were positive until the Temblos incident in mid-July. The number of manned fortifications decreased during June and the first half of July throughout the Island. But tension mounted with the Temblos incident and reached its highest peak during the Tylliria fighting, and both sides began once again to re-fortify their positions.

36. In dealing with this problem, UNFICYP has always resorted to discussions and negotiations and attempted to achieve its objective by persuasion. Only in a few cases when the fortified posts were considered as a direct threat to its own position did UNFICYP proceed to dismantle them. This happened, for example, in Nicosia on 1 June when Government posts were removed from the Ledra Palace Hotel and on 20 August when three Turkish Cypriot positions directly threatening the Nicosia Zone Headquarters were removed. All these actions were taken after negotiations had failed to produce positive results.

(iii) Build-up of military personnel and equipment

37. The build-up of military personnel and equipment in Cyprus about which I expressed deep concern in my report of 15 June 1964, has continued on both sides since that report. The Cyprus Government has openly announced its intention to strengthen its armed forces. Its position is that so long as the threat of a Turkish invasion continues, it has the responsibility and the duty to build up its defences to protect the territorial integrity of the republic. That position, of course, was strengthened by the Turkish aerial attacks of early August.

38. My view, as expressed in my report of 15 June, continues to be that while there is no doubt that a sovereign government normally is entitled to import and/or manufacture arms, the questions as regards Cyprus is whether at the present time and in the present circumstances the importation and manufacture of arms by the Government of Cyprus is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Security Council resolution of 4 March. There is sharp division of opinion over that issue.

39. My Special Representative and the Force Commander have raised the question of the dangers of the arms build-up several times with the President of Cyprus who, while insisting on the duty and responsibility of his Government to build up its forces, assured them that the heavy weapons imported would be used only for the defence of the country against foreign invasions and not in the internal conflicts.

40. UNFICYP has kept a careful watch on all imports of arms and equipment and entry of military personnel, and has reported to me on the results of its observations. In carrying out its observations, it has encountered some difficulty in view of the restriction on its movement imposed upon it by Government authorities in the Limassol area as reported earlier.

41. The UNFICYP observations have established that during the month of July the Cyprus Government imported large amounts of arms and equipment which came in the main through Limassol Docks. In addition, an estimated 5,000 personnel entered the island in the same way presumably from Greece. It is believed that the imports of arms and military equipment were in excess of 3,000 tons of freight which left Limassol Docks in some 1,000 lorry-loads. UNFICYP has some estimates on the details of these imports, but it is not the purpose of this report to disseminate military intelligence.

42. The Turkish Cypriot community has also strengthened its fighting capacity since June by smuggling into the areas under its control military personnel and equipment. Under its mandate, UNFICYP endeavours to the fullest extent possible to check all smuggling of arms and personnel. There is evidence that arms and personnel have infiltrated, mostly under cover of darkness in areas controlled by members of the Turkish Cypriot community especially in the Kokkina/Mansoura area. As indicated earlier, at least 300 military personnel are reported to have been brought into the island to join the Turkish Cypriot fighting elements and an additional 300 also might have infiltrated. It is further believed that a limited quantity of arms and equipment, including bazookas and mortars have been smuggled in to the Turkish Cypriot community, but UNFICYP has no precise information in this regard.

43. On receiving the reports concerning the build-up of military personnel and equipment, I addressed on 16 July 1964, identical messages to the President of Cyprus, the Prime Minister of Greece and the Prime Minister of Turkey. After drawing attention to the reported built up, the danger it entailed and its adverse effect on the operation of UNFICYP and on the work of the Mediator, I expressed the view that the military build-up must be halted immediately. Having recalled the responsibilities of their respective Governments under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, I appealed strongly to them to ensure the full observation of both the letter and the spirit of that resolution. A similar message was addressed to the Vice-President of Cyprus on the same day in which I also referred to the Security Council's request to leaders of both communities in Cyprus to act with restraint.

44. In their replies, all four personalities fully shared my concern but maintained their previous positions. The President of Cyprus emphasized his Government's responsibility and duty to build up the defences of Cyprus to protect the territorial integrity of his country in the face of the Turkish invasion threat. This position was supported by the Prime Minister of Greece. The Vice-President of Cyprus, after observing that the attempt of the Cypriot authorities at strengthening their military position was aimed at dictating and imposing their own solution on the Turkish community in violation of the Security Council resolution, expressed the view that my message was mainly intended for Greeks and not for Turks. The Prime Minister of Turkey, after assuring me that his country had never sent to Cyprus military personnel and weapons other than those provided for in the Treaty of Alliance, charged that the Greek Cypriot leaders and the Greek Government had repeatedly embarked upon actions continuously increasing tension and that the Greek Government had sent military personnel and arms from Greece to Cyprus.

(iv) Shooting and other incidents

45. Before dealing with this question it may be useful to say a few words on the tension prevailing in Cyprus, which has remained at a high pitch ever since the events of December 1963, although its intensity follows an oscillating curve. This tension, which was extremely high in March 1964, lessened notably with the arrival of UNFICYP. From then on the atmosphere improved slowly but steadily due mainly to the peace-keeping efforts of UNFICYP until the incident of Famagusta on 11 May 1964, when two Greek National Army Contingent officers and a Cypriot police constable were killed in the Turkish Cypriot part of the city. Following this incident and the ensuing abduction of many Turkish Cypriot hostages, the tension once again rose to the acute level. Again UNFICYP attempted by patient efforts to bring about a relaxation of tension and the atmosphere slowly improved. But this trend was once again reversed by mid-July and the tension began to rise. The first incident of a major nature during this period took place in the Kyrenia area and was followed by another in Nicosia early in August, and finally the most dangerous crisis since the establishment of UNFICYP occurred with the fighting in the Tylliria area and the subsequent intervention of the Turkish aircraft.

46. But even at its lowest level, the tension prevailing in Cyprus is dangerously high. Between the two communities which make up the local population, there is

deep-rooted suspicion and mistrust. Each side is constantly in fear of being attacked by the other. The great quantities of arms which have been imported recently have gone into many hands. The local press on both sides, which regrettably has not so far shown a high sense of responsibility, frequently publishes inflammatory articles and stories and spreads false rumours. In this atmosphere, incidents can be easily set off by the smallest spark and, if no quick action is taken, may degenerate into a major crisis.

47. Hardly a day passes without one or several incidents. During the period from 9 June to 8 September 1964, there have been a total of 306 incidents. But, except for three series of incidents which will be dealt with separately later, they were of a minor nature in the sense that they did not lead to a marked increase in tension. The following table shows the number of incidents which have taken place during the period of 9 June to 8 September 1964, in the various zones and districts of Cyprus excluding the Tylliria fighting.

<u>Zone/District</u>	<u>Shooting incidents</u>	<u>Other incidents</u>
Nicosia Zone	191	31
Paphos Zone	53	9
Limassol District	5	2
Larnaca District	5	4
Famagusta District	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	259	47

48. The casualties incurred in those incidents were as follows:

	<u>Greek Cypriots</u>	<u>Turkish Cypriots</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Killed:</u>			
Shooting incidents	4	2	6
Murders	4	13	17
Total	<u>8</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>23</u>
<u>Wounded:</u>			
Shooting incidents	8	8	16
Murder attempts	6	6	12
Accidental discharge or explosion	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	20	14	34

The casualties resulting from the Tylliria fighting are referred to in the section on that subject below.

49. Most of these cases are shooting incidents. Two typical examples of such incidents are briefly described below.

50. During the night of 23/24 June a Greek Cypriot patrol of six men infiltrated onto a ridge normally manned by Turkish Cypriots east of the Turkish Cypriot village Ambelikou. At 0400 hours on 24 June, the Government forces opened fire on the village and also threw a hand grenade. The villagers stood-to and returned the fire. The Government forces then withdrew while the Turkish Cypriots continued to fire towards a Greek Cypriot position north of the village and at Karavostasi, a Greek Cypriot settlement north-east of Ambelikou. At 0600 hours United Nations troops arrived on the scene and succeeded in stopping the firing. By that time a total of about 700 shots had been exchanged, but there were no casualties.

51. On the morning of 30 June, about fifteen Turkish Cypriots from the Turkish Cypriot villages of Alevga and Selain t'Api moved forward from their normal positions north-west of Alevga to a ridge further to the west toward positions of the Government forces. The Government forces, seeing this movement, sent about fifteen Greek Cypriots forward to a ridge facing the Turkish Cypriots. Then firing broke out between Turkish Cypriots and Government forces and continued for about an hour, when about 125 rounds had been fired. United Nations troops moved into the area shortly after the shooting started and after approaching both sides persuaded them to move back to their original positions. There were no casualties.

52. The incidents other than shootings relate mainly to explosions of bombs and discoveries of unexploded bombs, abductions of persons and looting. In each case UNFICYP has intervened to help maintain law and order and take remedial action.

53. As stated above, there have been three series of incidents which are considered as of a major character. They are described in separate sections below.

(v) Incidents in the Kyrenia area

54. Early in July, the situation in the Kyrenia area began to deteriorate after the appointment of a new Cypriot police chief for the area. Soon after his arrival this police chief announced that in future the Turkish Cypriot village of Temblos would be patrolled by the Cypriot police. This announcement was deeply resented

by the local Turkish Cypriot population and in order to avoid disturbances UNFICYP immediately began negotiations with the police chief in an attempt to change his decision.

55. While negotiations were taking place the Turkish Cypriots reinforced the village and brought the number of fighters in it up to about eighty. In retaliation, the Cypriot authorities sent into the area a detachment of the National Guard of nearly 200 together with 25-pounder guns and armoured cars. On 17 July, they issued an ultimatum that they would attack the village unless all the Turkish Cypriot fighters evacuated it.

56. An UNFICYP detachment of company size was quickly deployed between the two opposing sides and succeeded in preventing fighting from taking place. Meanwhile, the Force Commander initiated negotiations with the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders in Nicosia and an agreement was reached whereby the Turkish Cypriots undertook to withdraw all their fighters from the village while the Government forces agreed not to send police patrols into it. Although agreement was reached at the top level, further efforts had to be made by the UNFICYP local commander, as is usually the case, to ensure that the agreement was actually implemented at the local level. But finally that also was achieved and the incident was closed.

57. Although there were no casualties, this incident was potentially dangerous as it could have led to a major crisis in view of the tension prevailing in the area. It was also the first time that the Cyprus National Guard made a real show of force with heavy weapons and armoured cars. This heavy armament was opposing no Turkish invasion at Temblos.

58. Another potentially dangerous incident occurred shortly thereafter near the St. Hilarion Castle, which is an important out-post of the Kyrenia area. In this particularly sensitive place, there had been frequent exchanges of shots between the positions of Government forces and the Turkish Cypriots and a number of UNFICYP posts had been interposed between them. On 1 August, heavy firing took place and some 6,000 shots were exchanged. UNFICYP immediately intervened and throughout the day sought to arrange a cessation of firing. Its efforts were ultimately successful in spite of the extreme reluctance on the part of both sides to stop shooting. The investigation undertaken by UNFICYP could not determine which side started the shooting or why exactly it was started, as each side accused the other of aggressive

intentions. This is one example of how mistrust and fear can breed serious incidents without any apparent reasons.

(vi) Incidents in Nicosia

59. Tension has remained very high in Nicosia throughout the period under review. New fortifications have been built and old ones reinforced by both sides almost every day. On each occasion UNFICYP has tried to remove these posts by negotiations and persuasion. Until the Security Council resolution of 9 August calling for an immediate cease-fire, shooting along the Green Line had been a common occurrence.

60. On 4 August, the Turkish Cypriots erected a new roadblock and reinforced one of their existing fortifications overlooking the Green Line. The Government forces immediately retaliated by reinforcing their own positions. In spite of the efforts of the UNFICYP local commander to reduce tension and secure the removal of the new installations, a heavy exchange of firing along the western half of the Green Line took place in the evening of 5 August, which resulted in one Greek Cypriot being killed and three wounded. Later that same evening UNFICYP succeeded in securing a cessation of firing which was followed by successful negotiations for the removal of the new fortifications on the next day.

61. A second shooting incident occurred in the western part of the Green Line area on 9 August when a series of exchange of fire between Greek and Turkish Cypriot positions took place during the afternoon and early evening. It is estimated that about 85 shots were fired by Government forces and about 35 by Turkish Cypriots. UNFICYP could not determine which side started the firing. The tension prevailing in the city, which had been further heightened at the news of the Tylliria fighting no doubt made both sides extremely nervous and likely to fire on the least provocation. This is well illustrated by the fact that a low pass made over Nicosia by a Greek Air Force aircraft shortly after 1900 hours was followed by a new outbreak of firing from both sides.

62. On 16 June after a quiet period of a few weeks, firing started between the villages of Ayios Theodoros and Piyenia. Sporadic firing took place for two days and was followed by a heavy exchange of fire between the villages of Mansoura and Mospilesi, in which mortars and rocket launchers were used by both sides. UNFICYP troops intervened and after strenuous efforts managed to stop the firing. Casualties were very light on both sides considering the amount of firing involved.

The official figures were three Greek Cypriots wounded and on the Turkish Cypriot side, one killed and two wounded. In order to prevent a recurrence of fighting the UNFICYP unit in the area was quickly reinforced. The Cypriot National Guard began to build up heavily in the area and following the fighting had more than ten infantry companies deployed between Xeros and Polis.

63. The situation remained tense despite the withdrawal of some of the National Guard units. Early in July, the Turkish Cypriots strengthened their positions in the hills around the villages within the Mansoura-Kokkina bridgehead. On 10 July General Karayannis, Commander of the National Guard, requested UNFICYP to remove the Turkish position on Hill 2188 (two miles south-east of Pakky Ammos). The Force Commander, after consulting with the UNFICYP commander of the Paphos Zone, assessed the position as purely defensive in character. Since, in their view, it did not constitute a threat to any Greek Cypriot village, he decided not to press for the evacuation of the position by the Turkish Cypriots nor to deploy UNFICYP troops in the contested area. Furthermore, the UNFICYP Commander, at the time, was pursuing with the Turkish Cypriot leaders a proposal agreed upon by the President of Cyprus to the effect that all armed men in this area should be confined to their villages. The Commander's assessment that the Turkish Cypriot position did not threaten any Greek Cypriot village, taken in conjunction with the desirability of securing agreement on the proposal of the President, led the Commander of UNFICYP to the firm opinion that no action to dislodge the Turkish Cypriots from this particular position was necessary. This was duly communicated to General Karayannis through the Ministry of the Interior by the Commander of UNFICYP. Another Turkish Cypriot position, however, which conceivably could have constituted a threat to the Pomos/Livadhi/Stavros road, was removed by UNFICYP on 17 July. In the exchange of correspondence that took place on this matter between 10 July and 1 August, UNFICYP was informed that action would be taken by the National Guard against this Turkish Cypriot height in the event that UNFICYP could not negotiate its dismantling and abandonment by Turkish Cypriots. General Thimayya pointed out that the UNFICYP zone commander had accompanied the President and General Karayannis when they visited Pakky Ammos and Kokkina. General Karayannis appeared to be satisfied that the situation around these villages was calm. Notwithstanding this, the UNFICYP zone commander offered to deploy troops on the ridge between Pakky Ammos and Kokkina. This deployment was carried out.

(vii) The Tylliria fighting

64. The Turkish Cypriot bridgehead around Kokkina and Mansoura was considered dangerous by the Cypriot Government. The Government claimed, with some justification, that the Turkish Cypriots had been smuggling arms and men into the bridgehead in order to strengthen their positions. Indeed, high Government authorities on more than one occasion had warned UNFICYP to stop this activity in this area or to stand aside and let the Government do it.

65. The situation before the fighting was that the Turkish Cypriots were occupying the villages of Kokkina, Mansoura, Alevga, Selain t'Api and Ayios Theodoros as well as having defensive positions on the surrounding hills. Until late in July the Government forces overlooking the bridgehead amounted to not more than two companies. They were deployed around the villages of Piyenia, Mosphileri, Kato Pyrgos and Pakhy Ammos in small posts.

66. UNFICYP had a company deployed in the area. Its headquarters were located just to the west of Kato Pyrgos and other posts varying in strength from three to thirty men between Pakhy Ammos, Ayios Yeoryios, Ayios Theodoros, Mansoura, Piyi and Piyenia, the whole area being linked by mobile patrols.

67. The Government build-up of troops and equipment in the area began during the last few days of July and continued up to 7 August. The first major increase took place on 3 August when 800 National Guard reinforced Piyenia and Kato Pyrgos. On 4 August the Government forces around the bridgehead totalled about 1,500. Roads and artillery positions were also under construction. On 7 August a large convoy including armoured cars and six 25-pounder guns moved into the Pomos area where the guns were positioned facing Kokkina. This convoy brought the total Government forces deployed in the area to an estimated 2,000 troops with six 25-pounder guns immediately able to bear on the bridgehead, two four-barrelled Oerlikon 20 mm guns, several mortars and a number of armoured cars. There were also a possible further twenty 25-pounder guns and ten more 20 mm Oerlikons in the Paphos forest area to the south.

68. The Turkish Cypriot strength was about 500 fighters in the bridgehead armed with small arms, and some mortars and bazookas.

69. At the beginning of August the Force Commander had become most anxious about the build-up and had expressed several times his fears to the Government. On

4 August, he received from the President the renewed assurance that the Government had no intention of attacking any Turkish Cypriot positions and that should the Government find it necessary to do so it would give due warning to the Force Commander.

70. On 3 August the Government forces began patrolling the sea with their newly-acquired armed patrol boats off Mansoura and Kokkina, about 800 yards off-shore. As one boat passed at close range off Mansoura fifteen shots were fired at it from the village and when it reached Kokkina it fired eight shots at small boats in the harbour. The boat continued patrolling the area on 4 August.

71. During the evening of 5 August, there was an exchange of about 500 shots, including a few rounds from mortar and recoilless rifles, in the Piyenia area. It is not known who started the firing, but a cessation of firing was arranged by an UNFICYP officer in the evening.

72. On 6 August Government forces mounted an attack supported by mortars from the Greek Cypriot village of Ayios Yeoryios against Turkish Cypriot positions to the north.

73. On 7 August they resumed the attack during the afternoon by opening heavy fire on the Turkish Cypriot village of Ayios Theodoros from the Greek Cypriot village of Piyenia. They also began to advance on Kokkina from the Greek Cypriot village of Pakhy-Amnos. The same evening a Government patrol boat shelled the villages of Mansoura and Kokkina with 40 mm guns. About seventy shells were fired in all.

74. At about the same time four Turkish F 100 aircraft flew over Polis in a demonstration of force and fired their weapons out to sea.

75. On 7 August the Force Commander sent a strong written protest to the Government in which he drew attention to the serious situation and asked that the operations be stopped.

76. Despite this request, the attack continued and by the early hours of 8 August both Mansoura and Ayios Theodoros had been evacuated by the Turkish Cypriots. The fighters in these villages retreated into Kokkina and all the women and children were evacuated with UNFICYP assistance to the Greek Cypriot village of Kato Pyrgos where a Swedish Company Headquarters was located. There, UNFICYP hastily set up a camp and provided food for the 200 refugees.

77. During 8 August the battle continued. The only remaining Turkish Cypriot position was Kokkina and the defenders were subjected to a heavy bombardment, including fire from 25-pounder guns.

78. During the same afternoon, Turkish F 100 aircraft, in an undetermined number, began attacking positions of the Government forces around Kokkina, Polis and Kato Pyrgos. A Government patrol boat was also attacked by the Turkish aircraft at Xeros and set on fire. It was finally beached, completely burned out. The casualties suffered by the patrol boat were reported to be five killed and thirteen wounded. It was during this Turkish air strike that one of the Turkish jet aircraft blew up in mid-air over Xeros. The pilot ejected himself from the plane and parachuted on Government controlled territory where he was taken prisoner. He was removed to a hospital in Nicosia where he later died. Through the good offices of UNFICYP, the pilot's body was returned to Turkey.

79. In the middle of the battle, UNFICYP attempted to secure a cease-fire in order to evacuate women and children from Kokkina, but this was refused by the National Guard Commander who was approached. Meanwhile the UNFICYP posts in Mansoura and on the ridge between Pakhy Ammos and Kokkina were coming under heavy mortar and small arms fire. Since it was apparent that they had no possibility of stopping the battle by staying there, it was decided that they should be withdrawn. A request for a temporary cessation of firing to achieve this was refused by the same National Guard commander. Eventually the posts were withdrawn under heavy fire, without casualties.

80. On 8 August, little fighting took place on land, but Turkish aircraft made new attacks on the villages of Pomos, Pakhy Ammos, Linni, Polis, Piyenia, Kato Pyrgos, Alevga, Selain t'Api, Mansoura and around Kokkina, where Government troops were thought to be located or passing through. The aircraft used machine guns, cannons, rockets, bombs and incendiaries.

81. Meanwhile the refugees in the camp at Kato Pyrgos had asked to be evacuated to the Turkish Cypriot town of Lefka and this was arranged with the Government. However, later in the day the Government postponed the move on the grounds that they could not be responsible for the safety of the refugees when they passed through the Greek Cypriot town of Xeros on the way to Lefka. This question was later brought to the attention of the President, who authorized the move, but after

the first forty refugees had been transported to Lefka in UNFICYP armoured personnel carriers, Government Security Forces on the spot would not allow the remainder to travel in that direction. Finally, because the refugees feared for their safety at Kato Pyrgos they were transported at their own request by UNFICYP to the Turkish Cypriot village of Kokkina where they still remain.

82. Throughout the entire battle, UNFICYP made strenuous attempts to secure a cease-fire, but was continually hindered by the Government forces. Its movement was impeded by the road blocks placed across roads and no Greek Cypriot commander was available with whom discussions could take place.

83. At 1350 hours on 9 August, President Makarios announced that unless the Turkish air attacks were called off by 1530 hours the same day he would order an attack on every Turkish Cypriot village in the island. The President later postponed this order, first until 1930 hours and then indefinitely.

84. Meanwhile, as set forth in the next section of this report, the Security Council in New York had adopted its resolution of 9 August calling for an immediate cease-fire. The Force Commander personally handed the Security Council's appeal to the President on the same day and he promptly notified his observance of it. The cease-fire became effective on the night of 9/10 August.

85. During that same night the Cyprus Government complained that two Turkish destroyers were anchored off Mansoura and were unloading men into small boats prior to their being ferried into Kokkina. The UNFICYP Commander immediately despatched the Commander of the Swedish Contingent to Kokkina to investigate. After a most hazardous drive, this officer arrived in Kokkina in the early hours of the morning. He found two Turkish motor torpedo boats in the harbour but could find no evidence that men had been offloaded, although he thought supplies had been. The boats left Kokkina before daylight.

86. The cease-fire was also breached by a machine-gun attack made by two Turkish aircraft on Polis in the morning of 10 August. Little actual damage was done, but ten civilians were wounded. This was discussed at a new meeting of the Security Council on 11 August, as set forth in the next section.

87. UNFICYP had no means of ascertaining the casualties caused by the Tylliria fighting and the Turkish air attacks. The Cyprus Government has estimated that the combined casualties of both actions on the Greek Cypriot side totalled 53 dead and 125 wounded, of which 28 dead and 56 wounded were civilians. No official figures are available as to the Turkish Cypriot casualties.

(viii) Security Council Resolution on the Cease-Fire

88. After the Tylliria fighting and the first intervention of the Turkish aircraft, the Security Council met on 8 and 9 August 1964, at the request of both the Governments of Cyprus and Turkey. On 9 August, it adopted a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire by all concerned. It also called upon all concerned to co-operate fully with the United Nations Commander in the restoration of peace and security and on all States to refrain from action that might exacerbate the situation or contribute to the broadening of hostilities.

89. The Security Council met again on 11 August to examine the implementation of the resolution. At the conclusion of this meeting the President of the Council, summing up the consensus of the views of the members of the Council, requested the parties to comply with its resolution of 9 August in its entirety, asked all Governments to stop all flights over the territory of Cyprus in violation of its sovereignty, and requested the Force Commander to supervise the cease-fire and to reinforce its units in the zones which were the sphere of the recent military operations, so as to ensure the safety of the inhabitants.

(ix) Observance of the Cease-Fire

90. Following the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 9 August, UNFICYP took immediate action to observe the implementation of the cease-fire to all extent possible. The Turkish Cypriots then occupied only two beachheads in Kokkina and Limnitis, around which the National Guard had established a number of fortified positions. Seventeen observation posts were set up by UNFICYP between the two sides: six around Kokkina, eight around Limnitis and three in depth along the likely axis of advance. Those posts are intended not only to observe breaches of the cease-fire, but also to give warning of any aggressive moves by either side in sufficient time for UNFICYP to take action to prevent a recurrence of fighting. New UNFICYP units have been brought into the area to reinforce those already stationed there.

91. UNFICYP was instructed to report to me immediately on all cases of breach of cease-fire. A note on the subject was submitted by me to the Security Council on 15 August (S/5898). It shows that from 13 to 15 August there had been ten cases of breach of cease-fire; five cases of firing by Government forces, three cases by Turkish Cypriots and two cases in which the origin of firing could not be determined.

All the cases were of a minor nature and there were no casualties. In addition, a Turkish patrol boat was reported to have landed supplies at Kokkina on the night of 12-13 August. Démarches about each of the above incidents were made to the appropriate authorities.

92. From 15 August to 8 September there have been twenty-six cases of breach of cease-fire. There are 11 cases of firing by Government forces, 4 cases by Turkish Cypriots and 11 cases of firing of undetermined origin. There have also been 23 cases of overflight, 4 cases by Turkish aircraft, 1 by Greek aircraft, and 18 by aircraft of undetermined origin.

D. Situation as of 8 September

93. Since the cease-fire the situation on the island has been generally quiet. On the whole, there have been no serious breaches of the cease-fire and only incidents of a minor nature. However, this situation is an unstable one and the tension remains very high.

94. In sensitive areas where the two sides face each other, both have been actively strengthening their positions since the cease-fire, despite UNFICYP efforts to remove fortifications. The military build up, while taking place on both sides, has strengthened the Government forces to a far larger degree than the Turkish Cypriots and now these forces have undoubtedly acquired the capability of overrunning the Turkish Cypriot strongholds rapidly when they so desire. This imbalance is considered a dangerous factor as it heightens the nervousness of the Turkish Cypriots and may create on the part of Greek Cypriots a feeling of over-confidence which may cause them to overlook the important deterrent factors that so far have prevented them from taking rash action since the cease-fire. The economic restrictions which the Government has imposed on Turkish Cypriot areas since July has, as will be explained later in the report, made the situation of large groups of Turkish Cypriots very difficult. This, of course, has caused tension further to rise.

95. Under these conditions any small incident can escalate into a major crisis. The tension which prevailed at the end of August over the rotation of the Turkish National Contingent, to which I referred in my report of 29 August (S/5920), illustrates the precarious character of the present lull.

96. There are, in the judgement of UNFICYP, four particularly sensitive areas at present. One of these areas is the bridgehead of Kokkina which is still held by Turkish Cypriots with about 500 well-armed fighting elements. The Government forces have been maintained in large numbers around the bridgehead and they have improved their fortifications there. The Turkish Cypriots besieged in the beachhead are known to be short of food.

97. The second area is the beachhead of Limnitis which is also still controlled by Turkish Cypriots. Although there seems to be only about 200 Turkish Cypriot fighters there, the Government has brought up a large number of troops into the area. They could no doubt over-run the beachhead quite easily if they decided to attack.

98. The third danger area is round the town of Lefka where there are about 8,000 Turkish Cypriots, including between 750 to 900 militant TMT. Lefka also would provide a good base from which it would be possible to link up with a sea landing around Xeros. The Cypriot forces have recently established posts close to the perimeter in the South and have been seen reconnoitring the area.

99. The fourth danger area is the city of Nicosia. Tension there has always been high and since the cease-fire both sides have greatly improved their fortifications in the area of the Green Line. The economic blockade has resulted in serious shortages of many essential products in the Turkish Cypriot sector.

100. UNFICYP is keeping a careful watch on the military situation while at the same time endeavouring to ease the economic restrictions for the Turkish Cypriot population. As in the past, it is taking all precautionary measures to ease tension and to prevent a recurrence of fighting.

II. ACTIVITIES REGARDING THE RETURN TO NORMALITY

101. In addition to the activities set forth in the preceding chapter, UNFICYP has exerted its best efforts, to ease tension and facilitate the return to normal conditions by seeking solutions to a number of urgent problems of a political, economic, social or judicial nature. In so doing, UNFICYP has constantly kept in mind its duty to promote a return to normality in the island and the implementation of the programme of action outlined in my report of 29 April 1964 (S/5671).

102. Since my last report on the operation of UNFICYP (S/5764), regular contacts have been maintained at all levels with Government authorities and leaders and other responsible persons from both communities. During those contacts, UNFICYP officials, civilian and military, have ascertained the positions of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, and have tirelessly endeavoured to reconcile the opposing viewpoints and reach workable solutions. An account of the most important problems to which UNFICYP has given attention is set forth below.

A. Restrictions on the movement of the population

103. As indicated earlier in the report, the Turkish Cypriots control a number of enclaves in the Island, access points to which are guarded by road-blocks and fortified positions. Around these enclaves the Government armed forces have set up their own fortifications. Access to the areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots as well as the use of the road leading from Nicosia to Kyrenia are being denied to Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, the freedom of movement of Turkish Cypriots in the areas under the control of the Government, has in practice been restricted in those areas by reason of excessive checks and searches and of many unnecessary obstructions put in their way by the Government police at check points, as well as by the feeling of insecurity and the fear of arrest or abduction.

104. The movement of Greek Cypriots into the Turkish Cypriot controlled sectors is restricted by the Turkish Cypriot forces. While this does not affect the Greek Cypriot population to a great extent, except for the working of certain Greek Cypriot industrial and commercial enterprises located in Turkish Cypriot controlled areas, the Government finds this restriction intolerable for practical reasons as well as for reasons of principle. The inability of the Government to

use its premises located in Turkish Cypriot sectors is an impediment to the proper functioning of its services, particularly in Nicosia where a number of Government premises, including the Courts of Justice building and the Chief Post Office building, are located in the sector controlled by Turkish Cypriots. The restriction placed by Turkish Cypriots on movement on the important Kyrenia road, astride of which is deployed the Turkish contingent, is also a source of major difficulty.

105. However, the bulk of the problem is the restriction of the movement of Turkish Cypriots outside their areas. As indicated in my report of 15 June 1964, UNFICYP has sought to alleviate the difficulties arising therefrom by taking a number of remedial measures at the local level. It has organized regular supervisions at roadblocks and check points manned by the Cypriot police in order to try prevent excesses and abuses. Frequent patrolling is carried out in sensitive areas in order to prevent abduction or interference with the free movement of Turkish Cypriots. In exceptional cases, generally for humanitarian reasons, UNFICYP has also organized escorts and provided transport facilities for the movement of food, essential merchandise and individuals. As indicated later in the report, UNFICYP has escorted Turkish Cypriot judges to courthouses located in Greek Cypriot areas. It has also ensured the protection of harvesters when they have had to work in the fields near or outside the boundary of their community. It has become a common practice for Turkish Cypriots who are compelled to travel outside their areas to call first the UNFICYP Civilian Police before setting out on their journey. On receiving such calls the UNFICYP Civilian Police have always endeavoured to keep a careful watch on the road to be taken by the traveller in order to ensure his safe passage. The movement of food and other supplies is dealt with in the chapter on economic restrictions below.

B. Normalization of the public services

106. The extensive breakdown in communication between Greek and Turkish Cypriots had as one of its most serious results the disruption of public services. In Nicosia, Government offices, archives and stores were to be found on both sides of the Green Line in locations which civil servants of one community or the other did not feel safe to visit. The head offices of all Ministries were in the

Greek Cypriot sector, whereas all Court records and all land ownership and mortgage records, for example, were in the Turkish Cypriot sector, and the principal Government stores in the area were near the Green Line patrolled by UNFICYP.

107. Because of the very real practical and psychological factors which keep Greek and Turkish Cypriot Government employees apart, pending a final settlement, UNFICYP could make only a modest contribution to normalizing the public services. In dealing with those problems, however, UNFICYP found in a number of instances, among career civil servants of long standing, feelings of professional solidarity, mutual respect and personal friendliness towards colleagues of the other community with whom they had been out of touch since December 1963. An account of some of the problems undertaken by UNFICYP is given below.

(i) Re-employment of Turkish Cypriot civil servants

108. UNFICYP authorities from the beginning of the mandate in Cyprus gave serious consideration to this question and on several occasions they raised it with the Cyprus Government. All negotiations on the possible re-employment of the Turkish Cypriot Government civil servants in Nicosia and their financial compensation from January 1964 have ended in a deadlock up to now, as it is considered by the Government to be a highly political matter linked closely with the final settlement of the Cyprus question. On the other side, the Turkish Cypriot political leaders preferred to deal with this matter on a global basis, unwilling to accept any sort of gradual solution which might accord with conditions in various Government Departments and Public Services.

109. It was observed during the negotiations on this matter that the Turkish Cypriot civil servants never in the past disclaimed the Cyprus Government as such. They felt that due to the prevailing conditions since December 1963 they were unable, for physical and security reasons, to attend their offices on the Greek Cypriot side of Nicosia. Therefore they stayed on the Turkish Cypriot side and affirmed that they were willing to co-ordinate their work with the Government departments' activities. In this connexion they expected their salaries to be paid from last January or at least to receive some compensation from the Government. They well understood that the problem of their formal re-employment was pending owing to

the delayed solution of the political problem. Up to the present the situation has remained unchanged. It is clear that a major step towards normal conditions could be made only when the position of Turkish civil servants and the matter of their salaries since December have been clarified.

(ii) Lands and surveys

110. The fact that the Director and the majority of the staff of the Department of Lands and Surveys were separated from the Turkish Cypriot staff members and from the entire collection of books recording titles, mortgages, attachments, tax payments, etc., of the Nicosia District, housed in a strong room in the Turkish Cypriot sector, has caused inconvenience and financial embarrassment to thousands of persons in both communities. Many property transactions were delayed. Others were carried out by declaration, as is usual in Cyprus, subject to their being declared void at a later date should impediments be found upon inspection of the books.

111. Beginning in July it proved possible for a small number of transactions to be carried out at UNFICYP Political Headquarters in Nicosia, the Turkish Cypriot leaders having agreed to produce the necessary books in answer to approaches from UNFICYP.

112. Because of the importance of property transactions, UNFICYP submitted on 29 July a draft plan for the establishment of a temporary District Lands Office to be established at UNFICYP Political Headquarters. Under this plan UNFICYP would provide office space for Greek and Turkish Cypriot staff members, escort the latter in one party to and from work, and assist in the transfer under escort of all Departmental records to a strong room at UNFICYP Political Headquarters. The plan was acceptable to the Government in several respects but the resumption of payment of salaries and the proposal that the books be returned to the strong room in the Turkish Cypriot sector after the departure of UNFICYP raised difficulties. Turkish Cypriot leaders found it unnecessary and inappropriate to transfer all the books from their sector. They maintained that all that was necessary was for the Government to confirm that the Turkish Cypriot staff members of the Department were civil servants in good standing and to send them material for entering in the books. No general agreement therefore was reached and the backlog of unprocessed

applications, enquiries or transactions had by 31 August risen to over 2,000. UNFICYP continues to try to arrange for isolated transactions to be carried out on its own premises.

(iii) Payment of arrears to Turkish Cypriots

113. As one step towards preparing for a return to normality, UNFICYP urged strongly that efforts be made to square accounts up to the end of 1963 and with this end in view made many approaches to Government officials and to senior Turkish Cypriot civil servants but, except for the provision of some information, the Government was unable to offer any co-operation in this sphere.

114. It should be stated in this connexion that early in 1964, before the arrival of UNFICYP, the Government had sent the Deputy Accountant-General, a Turkish Cypriot official, a sum of about £10,000 towards payment of the balance of salaries and wages owed to the Turkish Cypriots in respect of December 1963. Afterwards, however, much smaller claims for December salaries of exactly the same nature and claims for miscellaneous services and goods supplied by Turkish Cypriots to the Government in 1963 were not met, despite carefully detailed submissions by the Deputy Accountant-General and many approaches by UNFICYP.

115. Even in cases where cheques issued by the Ministry to Turkish Cypriots in 1963 had not reached them, were shown in the Government records as uncashed, and had in any case become invalid after six months, the Government declined to issue new cheques which could be delivered through UNFICYP, preferring to keep the question in suspense. The reason advanced in all such cases was that part of the funds might be taken from the payee for the purchase of arms.

116. It should also be mentioned that the salaries of Turkish Cypriot judicial personnel have been and continue to be paid, as well as the pensions of the retired Turkish Cypriot civil servants.

(iv) Payment of Social Insurance Benefits

117. As stated in my report of 15 June 1964, many Turkish Cypriots were not receiving old-age pensions, widows' pensions and other benefits to which they were entitled under the Social Insurance Law of 1956. There has been no basic improvement in this field since that report.

118. The President of Cyprus confirmed to UNFICYP on 9 May 1964 his agreement in principle that social insurance benefits to which Turkish Cypriots were entitled before the events of December 1963 should continue to be paid. However, reports from UNFICYP patrols visiting villages continued to include complaints that payments had not been received since December. Detailed claims from residents of the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia, also submitted by the Deputy Accountant-General both direct to the Accountant-General and later through UNFICYP, were not acted upon.

119. With the assistance of officials in both the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance and the Turkish Cypriot sector, UNFICYP made a close study of the workings of the Social Insurance Law in respect of both social insurance benefits and in the field of social welfare. It was clear that in many cases formalities such as the completion, twice a year, of life certificates or notification of changes of address could not be complied with in the country's unsettled state, unless special arrangements were made.

120. Practical suggestions were therefore discussed by UNFICYP with the responsible officials during June. Fresh life certificates had in any case to be completed in that month by all persons entitled to old-age or widows' pensions. It would not have been difficult for UNFICYP to arrange for these forms to be distributed, filled in and certified in any manner desired by the Ministry if an agreement could be reached with the Government. UNFICYP repeatedly urged the Government to discuss this matter with it and make practical arrangements together. However the Government has not responded so far.

121. Social Insurance benefits, however, continue to be paid to the relatively small number of Turkish Cypriots living in Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Kyrenia, provided they present themselves at the local Employment Exchanges where registration takes place.

122. It should be mentioned that the breakdown of communications between the Government's Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot officials has also disrupted the functioning of social welfare activities, such as public assistance to destitute persons, payments to families with whom children are boarded out and payments to children's homes and boys' hostels. The fact that many persons of

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very limited means have their purchasing power so seriously reduced through the non-receipt of old-age and widows' pensions to which they are entitled has caused great hardship.

C. The functioning of the Law Courts and the administration of justice

(i) The functioning of the courts

Nicosia

123. As explained in my report of 15 June 1964, one of the greatest impediments to the proper functioning of the Courts of Law and to a restoration of the normal administration of justice arose from the fact that the Courts of Justice building was situated within the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia. Throughout the period under review the Courts of Justice building has not been available to the Government. The High Court, the Ministry of Justice and the Department of the Attorney-General have, as a result, been handicapped by their inability to have recourse to the records and the library housed in the Law Courts building.

124. During the last few weeks, specific files or records relating to a few matters which have come up before the Supreme Court have been brought, through UNFICYP good offices, from the Law Courts building in the Turkish Cypriot sector to the building which the Law Courts are temporarily using in the Greek Cypriot sector. Individual Turkish Cypriot judges have, whenever it has been found necessary for them to do so, come and attended to their duties, through arrangements made by UNFICYP. For the rest, purely Turkish Cypriot cases have been instituted and disposed of in the Turkish Cypriot sector without any reference to the Commander of the Cypriot Police or the Department of the Attorney-General.

125. As indicated previously, the Government had proceeded with its decision to designate another building for use as the Law Courts building in order to facilitate a return to normality in the functioning of the Courts in Nicosia. This building adjoins the Headquarters of UNFICYP civilian personnel, close to the Green Line. It was selected by the Minister of Justice as giving the maximum personal security to Turkish Cypriot citizens attending court and as causing least inconvenience to UNFICYP in providing transport and escort if and when necessary.

126. The Minister of Justice has requested, and the Force Commander has agreed, to provide UNFICYP protection and escort for Turkish Cypriot judges, lawyers, Court staff and witnesses attending the new Law Courts building for the business of the Court, if and until such escorts are considered necessary. It is hoped that after the first few weeks of the functioning of the Courts in the new building the sense of personal insecurity of the Turkish Cypriot citizens concerned will progressively diminish until Turkish Cypriot judges, lawyers and witnesses are in a position to travel back and forth by themselves without any fear, as is now the case in some of the provincial towns, such as Limassol.

127. The question of the position of Turkish Cypriot police personnel, who refuse to acknowledge the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and still regard themselves as a "separate" Police Force, remains a serious obstacle to a smooth working of the above arrangements. This subject is more fully considered below.

The rest of the island

128. In the other towns there has been marked and discernible progress towards a return to the normal functioning of the Law Courts. The cases which required trial by Turkish Cypriot judges under the Constitution and which had been pending since the December 1963 events by reason of the failure of Turkish Cypriot judges to attend Courts situated in the Greek Cypriot sectors of the towns, are now being taken up. A majority of the summary trials have been concluded, and the preliminary enquiries into the more serious offences have also been finalized.

129. This improvement has been the direct result of the role played by UNFICYP. On the one hand, UNFICYP ensured to Turkish Cypriot judges who had refused to travel to Law Courts in Greek Cypriot sectors of the cities on the ground of fear for their personal security, complete safety by escorting them in UNFICYP vehicles. On the other, UNFICYP persuaded the Judges of the High Court and the Ministry of the Interior to take all necessary steps to prevent any harassment or humiliation of Turkish Cypriot judges by Cypriot police personnel at checkpoints on the main roads and thus remove one of the principal reasons given by Turkish Cypriot judges for their reluctance to travel.

130. It is heartening to report that co-operation between UNFICYP, the High Court and the Ministry of the Interior has produced a practical working scheme to ensure the complete freedom of movement of all judges throughout the island without let or hindrance. Each member of the Cyprus judiciary has been issued with an identification card and the Ministry of the Interior has given instructions to the Cypriot police that on production of these identification cards judges should not be questioned or delayed, nor their vehicles searched or checked.

131. As a result of this arrangement, which has been in operation since early August, most of the Turkish Cypriot District judges have been attending their Courts to perform their judicial functions. The District Courts have been functioning in Kyrenia, Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol and Ktima.

General observations

132. Although some positive results have been achieved with regard to the return of Turkish Cypriot judges to the Law Courts, difficulties are still encountered regarding service of summons on Turkish Cypriot accused and witnesses and their attendance in Courts situated outside their sectors.

133. A serious impediment to a complete return to the normal functioning of the Courts of Law is the anomalous position of the Turkish Cypriot police personnel. The question of whether or not they are members of the Police Force of the Republic has been one of the most vexing political disputes between the two communities. The Government has taken the position that no police officer or policeman can be regarded as a member of the Police Force of the Republic until and unless he acknowledges the authority of the Government by submitting to the control of the Ministry of the Interior and carrying out instructions issued by the Commander of the Police Force. Turkish Cypriot police personnel refusing to do so are therefore regarded as challenging the Government authority and thereby depriving themselves of the right to recognition by the Courts of Law of the Republic. The fact that Turkish Cypriot police personnel have been wearing on their cap badges the national symbol of Turkey is regarded by the Government as evidence of their loyalty to a foreign country, justifying treatment of them as "insurgents".

134. Quite apart from the legal question of the validity of any police functions now being performed by Turkish Cypriot police personnel, even the matter of their attending a Court of Law to give evidence relating to investigations or police

functions performed by them in cases which had occurred prior to the December 1963 events, (i.e. when they were members of the Police Force of the Republic) has raised difficult issues. There is, therefore, little prospect of the Courts, throughout the Island, being able to dispose of those cases pending at the time violence erupted last December, in which Turkish Cypriot police officers had been in charge of investigations.

135. The difficulty is that the question of the status of the Turkish Cypriot police personnel is one stemming from political considerations and relates to basic attitudes taken by both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders regarding their ultimate political objectives.

(11) Administration of Justice

136. It is gratifying to record that throughout the political crisis and inter-communal violence in the island the members of the country's judiciary, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, have to a large degree succeeded in maintaining, as far as is humanly possible, the objectivity and detachment that their high office demands. In the day-to-day administration of justice, judges have given a valuable example in addressing themselves exclusively to the matters before them and in endeavouring under trying conditions, to uphold the rule of law and to perform their judicial functions without fear or favour.

137. The administration of justice, meaning the enforcement of law under judicial direction and in accordance with the judicial process, has, of course, been faced with certain practical difficulties, particularly in "mixed cases" in which the parties belong to different communities. The satisfactory results of UNFICYP's efforts to facilitate the sitting of Courts with "mixed benches" has to some extent been rendered futile by the fact that mixed cases which had arisen prior to 21 December 1963, cannot still be taken up for hearing (except the minor cases such as traffic offences, where ex-parte proceedings are in order) by reason of the non-attendance in Courts of Turkish Cypriot police officers and witnesses. Witnesses have come to testify in Courts of Law in some of the towns with greater frequency during the recent months, under protection of the Cypriot Police of the area, and therefore constitute no serious problem. It is, as already observed above, the question of the Turkish Cypriot police personnel which has proved intractable.

138. There has sprung up recently a most unfortunate practice both on the part of the Cypriot Police and of the Turkish Cypriot police personnel. There have been a large number of cases where Turkish Cypriots have been arrested by the Cyprus Police on charges in one way or another connected with the present situation in the Island (for example, carrying fire arms without a licence, attempting or conspiring to overthrow the lawful Government of the Republic by use of violence, attempted smuggling of arms and ammunition from one Turkish Cypriot area to another, etc.).

139. In several cases where judges using their judicial discretion have either acquitted them or released them on bail pending trial, the Cypriot Police have immediately re-arrested them as they were leaving the precincts of the Court for other alleged offences. Such conduct by the police is open to the inference that it is motivated by non-legal considerations. UNFICYP has therefore invited the Government's attention to the need to ensure that the Police enforce the law properly and fairly.

140. Turkish Cypriot police personnel in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia have also during the recent past begun to follow this practice. There are at present seven persons in Turkish Cypriot police custody (5 Greek Cypriots and 2 Greeks) "arrested" by Turkish Cypriot police and held purportedly under cover of legal process, but in reality as hostages. The Turkish Cypriot leaders and police have treated with contempt the orders of release of these persons made by the Supreme Court after hearing appeals on their behalf. UNFICYP made every effort to persuade the Turkish Cypriot leaders to ensure compliance by the Turkish Cypriot police officers with the Supreme Court orders, but to no avail.

141. Apart from bringing the administration of justice into disrepute, this practice by both sides has led to vindictive action and encouraged a whole vicious circle of hostage-taking under the pretense of arrest and custody according to law. The above cases indicate that the administration of justice is still being perverted on both sides for reason of political retribution and for strengthening their respective bargaining positions. It would, therefore, appear that, however much the judiciary and those exclusively concerned with upholding the integrity of the Courts may try to protect the institutions of justice and of law, the determining factors are in the last resort the decisions of political leaders taken only with a view to political advantage. UNFICYP will, nevertheless, continue, wherever possible and whenever it considers its role capable of constructive results, to use its best efforts to help in a return to normal functioning of the Courts of Justice and to the restoration of the rule of law.

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D. Missing Persons

142. In my report of 15 June 1964, I indicated that as of 8 June, a total of 483 Turkish Cypriots and 52 Greek Cypriots were reported as missing. As a result of intensive searches effected since then, carried out with the assistance of UNFICYP and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 251 Turkish Cypriots and 9 Greek Cypriots have been found. It may be noted that among these persons a number had never been abducted, but had simply left their normal places of residence to live with relatives or friends elsewhere. Among those who remain missing are many persons who disappeared during the December 1963 events, and there seems little hope of finding them alive. The same may be said of all those who were abducted after the Famagusta incident of 11 May 1964.

143. The above figures coincide with the lists of missing persons recently given by the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders. According to the Government, there were as of 1 September 43 missing persons of whom 38 were Greek Cypriots, 4 British nationals and one German. The list established by the Turkish Cypriots puts the number of Turkish Cypriots still missing at 232. UNFICYP and the ICRC are continuing their efforts to trace these missing persons.

144. As regards the larger question of general security, UNFICYP has exerted its best efforts to improve the situation within the terms of its mandate, but little result has been achieved so far. The increase of tension which reached a new high with the Tylliria fighting, and the economic restrictions imposed by the Government on the Turkish Cypriots, have made more difficult the action of UNFICYP in this field. As indicated earlier in this report, UNFICYP continues to ensure the protection of persons to the extent of its means.

E. Postal Services

145. One calamitous result of the disturbances of December 1963 was the partial breakdown of postal services affecting, in the first place, Nicosia. With this can be linked the non-delivery of large numbers of parcels which on 21 December 1963 were either in the North Branch Post Office or in customs warehouses in the Turkish Cypriot Sector of Nicosia. The Chief Post Office building with the main national stocks of stamps, postal orders and stores also is located in that Sector.

146. Pending agreement on the full restoration of postal services, the Government has, since 25 April 1964, sent no international or domestic correspondence or parcels, except for one category, across to the Turkish Cypriot Sector of Nicosia. The exception is the monthly batch of postal warrants representing civil service retirement pensions of those who receive them in that form. Following representations by UNFICYP, when Turkish Cypriots raised this problem in May, the Department of Posts agreed without delay to separate these warrants for April and May from the rest of the detained mail and they have continued to be sent at the end of each month. As reported previously, correspondence continues to be brought daily by UNFICYP from the Post Office in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia to the new Chief Post Office in the Greek Cypriot sector for onward despatch.

147. Each side feels compelled to hold considerable amounts of property belonging to great numbers of individuals (correspondence on the one side and on the other an unknown number of parcels which may have escaped being looted during the disturbances or afterwards), until a plan to restore services is agreed upon. The personal anxieties, the extreme inconvenience to exporters and importers and the material loss resulting from this situation, need not be stressed here.

148. UNFICYP has engaged in long and intensive negotiations aimed at the full restoration of postal services. As indicated in my report of 15 June, a revised set of ten proposals was submitted by UNFICYP to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leaders on 25 May. A plan embodying a few modifications of these was received from the Government on 17 June and a not dissimilar set of proposals from the Turkish Cypriot leadership on 18 June.

149. After further discussions with all concerned, UNFICYP sent to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leaders on 30 June a new set of proposals which it believed to be the most realistic and reasonable. On 14 July, a reply was received from the Turkish Cypriot spokesman. With one or two minor changes and one of some substance it accepted all points of the UNFICYP plan, including arrangements for the disposal of correspondence and parcels. It also accepted the UNFICYP formula for solving the contentious question of salaries for Turkish Cypriot postal officials but included a proposal to retain certain funds in a suspense account until the whole problem of postal officials' salaries was settled.

The Government has not yet replied to the proposal despite UNFICYP representations.

150. Apart from the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia, the town of Lefka and a number of Turkish Cypriot villages near Nicosia and in the north-west, postal services to Turkish Cypriots, the Director of Posts assures, are functioning normally.

151. In light of the great impatience of both sides to settle this question and of the fact that their views on how this should be done are not far apart, it is hoped that a solution will be found soon, with the good offices of UNFICYP, to bring about the full restoration of these vital national services.

F. Government Properties

152. Most of the main Government stores are situated in or near the Omorphita area of Nicosia which was a no-man's land during the December 1963 disturbances. During that period and in several instances since then the buildings themselves suffered considerable damage. Their contents and equipment, such as machinery stored in the grounds, have apparently been much reduced by looting. Since these stores cover a good deal of ground and lie between fortified posts of the opposing sides, the risk of looting is still present.

153. As national assets of such value called for further protection, UNFICYP made in May 1964 a detailed survey of the following stores: Cyprus Telecommunications Authority, Seed Cleaning Plant, Grain Commission Store, Public Works Department, Water Development Department, Forest Department and District Administration Store. The first was found to be in good condition, structurally intact and its contents apparently undisturbed. The remainder had suffered more or less heavily from structural damage or looting, offices and records were in complete disorder and there were several considerable fire hazards.

154. A plan for making the second category of buildings and what was left of their contents more secure, which could have been done within an estimated two weeks, was prepared by UNFICYP and submitted to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leaders in early June. The latter stated they would accept it provided Turkish Cypriot workmen were employed. No reply has been received as yet from the Government.

155. UNFICYP has made particular efforts to have work resumed in the Seed Cleaning Plant because of its importance for both communities in the economic life of Cyprus. After inspection by the Government and by Turkish Cypriot representatives of the extent to which machinery was damaged, UNFICYP began in April 1964 negotiations with representatives of the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community. Since the plant is in a sensitive area where both parties wished their authority to prevail, political considerations prevented agreement on the employment of workers for repairs and maintenance. Because of this the negotiations have achieved no positive results. UNFICYP maintains permanent guard over the plant but no further steps have been taken from the Cypriot side towards restarting work.

G. Agricultural problems

156. The main problem to which UNFICYP has devoted its attention in the agricultural field concerns harvesting. In the present atmosphere of tension the farmers of one community, whether Greek or Turkish Cypriots, are reluctant to work their fields if these are located near or inside an area controlled by the other community, because of the feeling of insecurity and the fear of being shot or abducted. Suitable arrangements have to be made in each case to allow agricultural activities to continue. This was particularly important at the time of harvesting.

157. As indicated in my report of 15 June, UNFICYP, through appropriate arrangements, had been able to ensure the safety of harvesters where the fields of one community adjoin those of the other for the harvesting of wheat and barley, which are the main grain crops of the island. This harvesting was completed in the first part of July.

158. Arrangements were also made to enable farmers to have their crops harvested in areas outside their community which had been abandoned. However, in many cases these fields had been illegally harvested before the arrangements could be carried out and this resulted in substantial losses for the owners, mainly Turkish Cypriots, in abandoned areas. UNFICYP has continued to press for the payment to the owners for the grain or its return in the case of unauthorized harvesting. Lists by villages compiled by UNFICYP showing the extent of unauthorized harvesting and grazed crops were given to government authorities for

their action. However, in spite of UNFICYP's efforts, no progress has been made in this matter as the Government has not yet arrived at any decisions regarding compensation or economic assistance to farmers in abandoned or troubled areas.

159. During the month of August, UNFICYP devoted much effort to arrive at suitable arrangements for the harvesting, to take place in late August and September, of carobs, olives and grapes in adjoining, mixed or abandoned areas. In this connexion, UNFICYP attempted to arrange joint meetings between Greek and Turkish Cypriots to discuss arrangements for gathering these harvests. The Government, however, was opposed to this procedure and instead made its own arrangements for the harvesting of carobs and other crops.

160. These arrangements provided that any citizen of Cyprus was free to proceed with the harvesting of the crops he owned. The Government forces would assure, if necessary, the personal safety of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot farmers as well as the safety of their crops. It was also stressed that UNFICYP was free to take independent measures to ensure that no Turkish Cypriot, lawfully harvesting his own property, was harmed in any way.

161. The Turkish Communal Chamber doubted that Turkish Cypriot farmers could harvest their crops freely and safely under the Government arrangements and requested UNFICYP to ensure that Greek and Turkish Cypriot armed personnel would be removed from the harvesting arrangements. It also requested that protection be given only by UNFICYP and that farmers in both communities be properly compensated for any unlawful harvesting.

162. UNFICYP Zone Commanders made necessary arrangements at the district level for extending adequate protection to farmers during the carob harvests. These arrangements worked out smoothly thanks to the presence and action of UNFICYP, although some abandoned areas had been illegally harvested before the date set for the harvesting. UNFICYP negotiated local agreements, provided escorts and guards as required and generally used its good offices to iron out any difficulties that had arisen. On the whole, the harvest of carobs, an important export crop, provided a good example of the co-operation which could be obtained between communities having mutual interests through the help provided by UNFICYP. It is hoped that there will be no difficulties in connexion with the other two crops.

163. Another problem dealt with by UNFICYP was the maintenance of citrus orchards belonging to Greek or Turkish Cypriots who had left their villages or had difficulties in reaching their orchards. As described in my report of 15 June surveys were made by UNFICYP with the help of United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) experts stationed in Cyprus to determine the condition of trees and the irrigation equipment required. Arrangements were made by UNFICYP with the local authorities and representatives of citrus orchard owners regarding measures to provide for irrigation and minimum cultivation needed to save the orchards, including the use of mobile pumps, inspections and financing. These arrangements worked out fairly satisfactorily. The first irrigation of orchards was completed at the beginning of July in Lefka and in the Tylliria area.

164. One of the general difficulties was the collection and transfer of money for the payment of this work but, wherever feasible, UNFICYP patrols, particularly those in the Nicosia and Paphos zones were used, both in collecting money from the owners and transferring funds to the irrigators.

165. UNFICYP also made considerable efforts during the period to assist farmers in obtaining the authorization to purchase spare parts and fuel for the operation of agricultural equipment, particularly irrigation pumps in Turkish Cypriot areas. But only limited results were obtained regarding the purchase of fuel for communities in the north west of the Island and orchards suffered considerably. After the imposition of economic restrictions, it became practically impossible in certain areas to obtain fuel for this work and even the purchase of agricultural spare parts was often prohibited.

H. Local and export markets

166. Trade and marketing like other economic activities on the Island, have been adversely affected by the events of the past eight months and UNFICYP has endeavoured to help alleviate the difficulties that have arisen in this field.

167. As regards local marketing of agricultural products, while Greek Cypriot farmers have been able fully to dispose of their products, Turkish Cypriot farmers have encountered serious difficulties. In order to alleviate some of their difficulties, arrangements were made in May 1964, through UNFICYP's good

offices, for the delivery of the remaining stock of the 1963 wheat and barley crops. The implementation of these arrangements was delayed by certain technical difficulties such as lack of transport facilities and the restrictions on the movement on roads. However, with the assistance of UNFICYP, it was possible by the end of July to effect the delivery of all 1963 stocks to the Cyprus Grain Commission's stores in the various districts, especially from areas which were under Turkish Cypriot control.

168. Negotiations were also initiated concerning arrangements for the delivery of the 1964 crops but no agreement has as yet been reached. The Grain Commission was unwilling to appoint the Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Societies as its agent on the ground that under the present circumstances it was impossible to exercise any control over them. Furthermore, the Commission insisted that the Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Societies should clear their 1963 liability before arrangements for the 1964 crop delivery could be agreed upon. It proposed that the balance of liabilities should either be paid with the equivalent value in cash, or be settled by grain deliveries from the 1964 crops. When the question of financial guarantees arose, the Commission requested a joint undertaking by all Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Societies instead of a guarantee by the Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Bank as suggested by the Turkish Cypriot side. On the other hand, the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Bank and Societies insisted on the settlement of compensation for the grain illegally harvested by Greek Cypriot farmers in the Turkish Cypriot farmers' fields, before any further step for the 1964 crop delivery could be taken. In view of these opposing positions, no decision was reached and consequently no arrangements for the delivery of the 1964 crops from the Turkish Cypriot farmers to the Grain Commission on the basis of the subsidized price could be agreed upon. However, negotiations are going on and UNFICYP continues to lend its good offices in order to break the present deadlock.

169. Regarding the export of agricultural products, the total value of exports in 1963-1964 exceeded that of the previous year, but certain quantities of products from the Turkish Cypriot producing areas could not reach the foreign markets, owing mostly to technical difficulties such as restriction of movement on

roads. UNFICYP, in co-operation with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and with the Cypriot police, facilitated the arrangements for citrus and strawberry exports from the Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Societies in the Limnitis area. Recently, UNFICYP arranged meetings between the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Societies in which the Government policy for the marketing of agricultural products was fully discussed and practical arrangements made. There seemed to be a willingness to co-operate in marketing locally and exporting the forthcoming production of Turkish and Greek Cypriot farmers, such as citrus, carobs, almond olives, grapes and tobacco.

170. Finally, UNFICYP also negotiated and facilitated the removal from several large stores of essential and durable goods belonging to persons of either community to their respective sectors in Nicosia and elsewhere, as well as the removal of goods from stores and shops located near the Green Line. Unfortunately, there had been extensive looting and thefts by irresponsible persons from both communities in some of these premises before the goods were removed.

171. The progress made by UNFICYP in its efforts to restore business activities or to help remove stocks and goods from endangered areas was recently halted, as a consequence of the economic restrictions imposed by the Government on the Turkish Cypriot community in certain areas since last July.

I. Industry

172. One consequence of the disturbed situation in the island and of the restrictions imposed on the movement of persons and goods was that many plants owned by members of one community but located in the sector controlled by the other could no longer function. This not only caused hardship and financial loss to the owners but also adversely affected the economic activities of the country. Since its arrival, UNFICYP has been giving attention to this problem, mainly in the area of Nicosia.

173. As a result of negotiations undertaken by UNFICYP, the Greek Cypriot cold stores for the production of ice, which are located in the Turkish Cypriot sector, were reopened. Arrangements were made for the removal of some machinery from several Greek Cypriot plants in the Turkish Cypriot sector which were brought to

the Greek Cypriot sector. Arrangements were also made for the maintenance and repairs of some other such plants. Following discussions arranged by UNFICYP between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives, an agreement was reached whereby Greek Cypriot as well as Turkish Cypriot labourers were hired to work in Greek Cypriot plants in Turkish Cypriot sectors, and escort was provided by UNFICYP to bring the Greek Cypriot labourers back and forth.

174. Arrangements were made for machinery and materials from a number of Turkish Cypriot plants located outside the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia to be moved back into that sector. In the suburb of Omorphita the Government agreed, following representations by UNFICYP on this matter, that operations should be allowed to resume in the two Turkish Cypriot brick and tile plants. However, both plants have been almost completely looted. UNFICYP tried to help trace the missing machinery but was only partially successful in this endeavour. By agreement with the Greek Cypriot business community the owner of one of the plants for which no machinery could be traced was compensated and received credit from the Greek Cypriot merchants to buy new machinery abroad.

175. In addition, UNFICYP used its good offices in the negotiations and arrangements for the reopening of the Cyprus Mines Corporation, an important mining company. This company, which mines and exports copper and iron ores and concentrates in the north west of the island, employed before the December events a labour force of about 2,400, of whom approximately 1,400 were Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots. On 13 April 1964, the mines of Skouriotissa and Navrovouni were reopened and work was also resumed at its mining, maintenance and loading installations at Xeres. At the time of the reopening, there were approximately 2,000 workers, of whom 80 per cent were Greek Cypriots.

176. UNFICYP also lent its good offices in the negotiations for the reopening of two lime plants in the Kyrenia area but the negotiations did not lead to any positive result, mainly because of the tension prevailing in the area.

J. Welfare of displaced persons and rehabilitation of housing

177. As indicated in my report of 15 June 1964, the disturbances of December 1963 had resulted in the total or partial destruction of many dwellings, a high

proportion of them simple homes whose owners would be but slightly able to fend for themselves. This tended in many localities to create or to aggravate a refugee problem, as the owners of these houses and their families fled to safer areas where many of them lived in temporary camps in precarious conditions.

178. Serious efforts were made by UNFICYP to induce refugees from the Omorphita suburb of Nicosia to return from camps a few miles away to houses which could at least be partially occupied. About half of these refugees would have been ready to do this but feared for their personal safety.

179. In refugee camps near Nicosia many hundreds of children living in crowded temporary quarters and exposed during the great heat of the summer months to the risk of dehydration survived without serious illness partly because an UNFICYP architect and military engineers planned and, with local help, built provisional matting roofs to give shelter from the sun as well as open air showers.

180. UNFICYP carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout the island during the disturbances, including the Tylliria fighting. It shows that in 109 villages, most of them Turkish Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Omorphita suburb of Nicosia 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have been partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs.

181. The results of the survey are set forth in great detail in a report which was recently submitted by UNFICYP to both the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders. The report concludes that in the light of what has happened and of the desirability of improving the quality of housing, there is a clear necessity for preparing a general national housing plan which should be integrated with a social and economic development plan for Cyprus. The plan would aim at rebuilding the destroyed housing and public buildings and also at improving housing especially in rural areas where the situation is described as rather critical regarding water, sanitary services and the quality of roofs and floors. The report further suggests the desirability of formulating a national housing rehabilitation programme.

182. The problem of displaced persons has also another aspect which relates to medical assistance. In many Turkish Cypriot villages, crowded by the arrival of displaced persons, there is an acute shortage of medical facilities.

183. UNFICYP has given some medical assistance and relief to the Turkish Cypriot community in these villages, especially in the transportation of seriously ill persons. As the UNFICYP medical team is fully occupied with their normal duties, UNFICYP requested the ICRC to send some physicians in order to provide urgent medical assistance, especially to isolated Turkish Cypriot villages. Two International Red Cross doctors arrived in Cyprus in mid-July and UNFICYP is giving them all possible assistance, particularly in regard to transportation and medical supplies. It is expected that the International Red Cross medical team will work out, with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders, practical arrangements for allowing Turkish Cypriot doctors to be established in important Turkish Cypriot villages and to visit isolated villages.

K. Improvement of public facilities

(i) Ktima

184. As a consequence of the events of December 1963, the electricity and water supplies and the telephone service in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Ktima were interrupted early in 1964. An agreement concluded between the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders early in March, before the arrival of UNFICYP, provided for the restoration of these facilities, but it had not been implemented. The Turkish Cypriot sector was therefore deprived of electricity and telephone service and the water supply, while not completely stopped, was frequently interrupted.

185. Shortly after its arrival UNFICYP used its good offices in order to restore fully these facilities. This was achieved by mid-May, but the water supply was restored only on the understanding that the Turkish Cypriot community would settle its arrears in fees with the district office before 1 June.

186. Difficulties in this regard arose early in August because the Turkish Cypriots refused to pay the fees and consequently, despite UNFICYP efforts, the water supply to the Turkish Cypriot sector was cut off again on 5 August. UNFICYP took the matter up with the Cyprus Government and on 18 August agreement was reached to restore the water supply, on a humanitarian basis, after my Special Representative undertook the responsibility of finding a way for the settlement of the bills for future water consumption in Ktima. Consequently the water supply was restored the following day.

(ii) Nicosia

187. While there has been no difficulty concerning the electricity supply to the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia, the operation of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus in that sector has been paralysed since January 1964. As indicated in my report of 15 June, UNFICYP had arranged several meetings between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of the EAC Board of Directors, but no visible progress had been made. Since that report, further negotiations have taken place with the good offices of UNFICYP, but again without achieving positive results.

III. ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS

188. Among the problems to which UNFICYP has devoted its attention, the question of economic restrictions is of special importance both because of the hardship imposed on the Turkish Cypriot community and of the effect it may have on the maintenance of law and order on the Island.

A. Situation until mid-July 1964

189. Ever since the outbreak of violence on 21 December 1963, a variety of restrictions which were described in my report of 15 June have been imposed upon the Turkish Cypriots. The isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community, due to the restrictions placed on their movement on the roads, brought hardship on the members of the community as well as serious disruptions of their economic activities. As indicated earlier in this report, UNFICYP made determined efforts to alleviate those difficulties in various fields.

190. In addition to losses incurred in agriculture and in industry during the first part of the year, the Turkish community had lost other sources of its income including the salaries of over 4,000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government and by public and private concerns located in the Greek Cypriot zones. The trade of the Turkish community had considerably declined during the period, due to the existing situation, and unemployment reached a very high level as approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots had become refugees. Expenditure of the Turkish Communal Chamber on development and other projects, as well as other expenditure, had dropped considerably as a yearly subsidy formerly received from the Government had ceased to be granted in 1964. Furthermore, a large part of its remaining resources had to be used for unemployment relief and other forms of compensation as approximately half of the population came to be on relief. In accordance with figures published by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, the number of persons receiving some kind of assistance from the Red Crescent relief amounted to about 56,000, including 25,000 displaced persons, 23,500 unemployed and 7,500 dependents of missing persons, disabled and others.

B. New restrictions after mid-July

191. Around the middle of July, at the time of the Temblos incident, described earlier in this report, the Government took two steps which served to impose further hardship on the Turkish Cypriot community. On 17 July, UNFICYP was officially informed that some twenty-five articles were considered as strategic materials, the purchase of which by Turkish Cypriots was forbidden without special authorization from the Ministry of the Interior. These articles included building materials, cement, iron in bulk/iron rods, wire netting, electrical equipment, transistorized and other batteries, timber, large bags, automobile accessories and parts, tyres, sulphur and other chemicals, as well as fuel in large quantities. Secondly, it imposed restrictions on the importation of Red Crescent supplies for the relief of the population.

192. Since December 1963, six shipments of emergency and relief supplies had been sent from Turkey through the Red Crescent for distribution by the Turkish Communal Chamber. They consisted mostly of medical supplies, flour and other foodstuffs. The first five ships arrived before July 1964 and the supplies they brought in were unloaded and distributed without difficulty. But when the sixth one arrived on 15 July, obstructions were placed on its unloading by the Government.

X Only after a series of negotiations initiated by UNFICYP did the Government authorize the free importation of some of the supplies brought in, while duty had to be paid on others, and the remaining items were not allowed to enter the country at all, because they were considered as strategic materials, or were items produced in the country under subsidy. As the Turkish Cypriot community refused to pay duty on relief supplies, the only supplies unloaded were those which were exempt from duty. As a result, only 390 tons out of a cargo of 900 tons could be unloaded. The Government also insisted on control over the distribution of the relief supplies. Persistent representations made to the Government by UNFICYP and the International Committee of the Red Cross were unsuccessful. In spite of UNFICYP's effort to escort Red Crescent convoys carrying relief supplies throughout the country, obstructions were frequently placed on the movement of those convoys.

193. The Government's new policy, as explained by the Greek Cypriot authorities, was a two-pronged one. First, it sought to afford facilities and protection to law-abiding Turkish Cypriots acknowledging the rule of the State, and secondly it was designed to deny all benefits of Government services to "Turkish terrorists" and sympathizers who rejected Government authority. The Government explained that it had to forbid the importation of certain supplies as they might be used to meet the needs of Turkish Cypriot fighters.

194. Leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community considered the new directives as nothing but a determination of the Government to condemn them to starvation, and Dr. Kucuk, the Vice President of Cyprus, strongly protested against these policies.

195. Aware of the serious consequences that the Government measures could bring about, UNFICYP drew the Government's attention to the dangers which might result from the imposition of additional restrictions. At the same time, in close collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross, it worked out arrangements with the Government for the distribution of the already limited supplies. However, all its efforts came to naught as fighting broke out in Tylliria on 5-10 August and relief to the Turkish Cypriot community was stopped. The shortage of food and other essentials became particularly critical in this area and in the entire Paphos zone, and it was necessary for UNFICYP and the ICRC, on humanitarian grounds, to make renewed representations to the Government to allow emergency shipments of relief supplies to Lefka and Kokkina.

C. Situation after the Tylliria fighting

196. Immediately after the Tylliria fighting and the Turkish air strike, the Government announced that it would cut all movement of supplies into the areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia, Lefka, Kokkina and Limnitis. Following this announcement, convoys of food and other essential supplies were prevented from reaching their places of destination. If such severe measures had been maintained, the situation of the beleaguered Turkish Cypriots would have become untenable, and probably led them to resort to desperate and violent action.

197. In view of the foregoing, my Special Representative and the Force Commander expressed their serious misgivings to the Government and warned that any increase in economic restrictions would only lead to severe trouble. Urgent discussions

were held both with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in a further effort to find a solution of this vital problem. The Turkish Cypriots claimed that they were being starved and the Greek Cypriots contended that the Turkish Cypriots had enough food in store for many months to come, and that much of it was going to Turkish fighters. In view of the controversy, UNFICYP carried out on 16 August a preliminary survey of the situation concerning food and other essential supplies, covering 142 villages and five cities of the Turkish Cypriot population. The survey showed, at the time, that more than 40 per cent of the villages had no flour, that some had bread for only a few days, that about 25 per cent of the villages had flour for only one or two weeks, and that in any event the flour would only last up to a month in the best of circumstances. The survey also showed that the need for milk and dairy products, rice and salt, was acute, while kerosene was in extremely limited supply. Furthermore, medical attention in villages was notably low. In the cities, the survey showed that, although the situation was better than in the villages, it was deteriorating rapidly. One additional factor brought out by UNFICYP's survey was that the restrictions had brought about a shortage of currency and that this was causing unemployment and other hardships. UNFICYP also ascertained that the stock of relief supplies on hand was extremely limited. The restrictions imposed on Turkish Cypriots, therefore, would bring severe hardship to them despite the agricultural products they could obtain from the resources of their own areas.

198. With this information on hand, my Special Representative and the Force Commander appealed to the President for an immediate relaxation of the restrictions. In meetings with the President and members of his Cabinet on 18 and 20 August, an understanding was reached which would substantially lessen restrictions in Nicosia, Lefka and Kokkina, while in other Turkish Cypriot areas throughout the Island, including Limnitis, restrictions were to be lifted for all goods, with the exception of strategic materials already mentioned in Section B above. During the discussions, the Government had stated that they would have lifted all restrictions for Nicosia, Lefka and Kokkina if the Turkish Cypriots had agreed to open the roads they controlled in those areas, including the Kyrenia road. The detailed arrangements for the implementation of this understanding were to be worked out in further discussions between the Government and UNFICYP officials with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

199. During further discussion, a detailed plan of implementation of the understanding was prepared by the Government and UNFICYP, with the assistance of the ICRC. In short, a number of essential food items such as flour, milk, cooking oil, butter or margarine, pulses, potatoes, frozen or fresh meat, sugar, eggs and salt, as well as kerosene and other fuels, would be allowed into the restricted areas in determined quantities, whereas fresh vegetables and fruits and medical supplies, as well as alcoholic beverages and women's and children's clothing would have free entry. The quantity of restricted items was determined by the Government on a weekly per caput basis and the International Red Cross considered the caloric value of this quantity reasonable. Agreement was reached on the population estimates of the restricted areas except for Kokkina. UNFICYP would give all possible assistance for the implementation of the understanding in terms of escorts and transport facilities, etc. The implementation of the plan was to begin on 1 September.

200. Meanwhile, UNFICYP, on the basis of the assurance given by the Government regarding the lifting of restrictions concerning the Turkish Cypriot areas other than Nicosia, Lefka and Kokkina, took steps to facilitate the transport of essential goods to those areas. Unfortunately, obstructions were still encountered at the local level. On 27 August a Red Crescent convoy carrying thirty-nine tons of assorted foodstuffs from Famagusta to the non-restricted area of Ktima was held up by Cypriot military authorities. Part of it was allowed to proceed only after strong protests on the part of UNFICYP. Also a much-needed car-load of Red Crescent supplies was kept from moving into Lefka on the same date.

201. In discussions with my Special Representative, the Vice President, Dr. Kucuk, reported fifteen instances of obstructions to the arrangements made during the last week of August. He strongly questioned the Government's right to impose severe restrictions on an important sector of the population. He also pointed out that to make food supply conditional on the lifting by Turkish Cypriots of the restrictions on movement now existing in their areas was unacceptable to him, as it would prejudice issues that were an essential part of an ultimate political settlement.

202. My Special Representative protested to the Government about the obstructions still made by its officials in violation of the understanding reached. The Government

expressed its regret at any violation that might have taken place before all members of its security forces had been fully briefed. UNFICYP notified the Government that any breach of the understanding after 1 September would be fully reported.

203. During the first two days of September no serious cases of obstruction to the movement of food and other supplies to Turkish Cypriot areas were reported, but on 3 September a supply of fresh meat and cheese in authorized quantities was prevented by Cypriot forces from entering the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia, in violation of the understanding. Reports received on 4 September from UNFICYP local units indicated that the local Cypriot military authorities in certain areas were unwilling to implement the understanding, or interpreted it in an excessively restrictive manner. UNFICYP took this matter up urgently with the Government authorities in Nicosia. But far from easing the prevailing situation, the Government decided on 5 September to add the Turkish Cypriot sectors of Famagusta and Larnaca to the list of restricted areas. The Government further informed UNFICYP that it reserved the right to impose economic restrictions in other areas if circumstances made it necessary to do so for military, security or other reasons. This hardening of position was reflected on the local level at check-points where obstructions, harrassments and actual confiscations of foodstuffs took place after 2 September.

204. However, on 8 September President Makarios informed my Special Representative and the Commander of UNFICYP that in response to their appeal, the large Turkish sectors of the towns of Famagusta and Larnaca, would no longer be treated as restricted areas. On its part, UNFICYP has been observing in the last few days the movement of food supplies in the Island and has noted that the Government's decisions are being carried out and that in most cases the restricted areas are receiving the amounts of supplies allocated to them. As stated before, these amounts were established by the Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross has considered their caloric value as reasonable.

205. UNFICYP has welcomed the decision by the Government to eliminate the Turkish-Cypriot sectors of Famagusta and Larnaca from the restricted areas as well as the implementation of the Government's decisions concerning movement of supplies. These are important steps in the right direction and it is hoped that they will open the way to further easing of the economic restrictions still in force.

Although no cases of starvation have been noted in the Turkish-Cypriot areas, serious inconveniences have been caused to the people subjected to these restrictions and in some cases conditions have reached the hardship stage. However, it should be noted that some cases of shortage of food and other supplies may be attributed to inadequate organization in certain Turkish-Cypriot communities and their inability to arrange for the authorized amounts of supplies to reach them. UNFICYP will continue to exert its best efforts to achieve a further relaxation of the economic restrictions, not only for humanitarian reasons, but also with a view to lessen tension and to help preserve law and order.

206. As regards the situation in Kokkina, since the fighting ended on 9 August, two consignments of supplies were brought into the area between that date and 8 September. A third consignment arrived on 9 September which consisted of the following: 4,500 pounds of flour, 450 pounds of beans, 765 pounds of cooking oil (margarine in lieu of cooking oil), 120 pounds of sugar, 300 pounds of salt, 210 pounds of milk powder, 64 gallons of cooking kerosene. On 8 September the UNFICYP Senior Medical Officer visited Kokkina and reported that the health and general condition of the inhabitants, including children, was fairly satisfactory. He observed one ton of potatoes entering the village which was estimated to be over and above the consignment arrived on 8 September. The villagers informed the UNFICYP official that they had received a consignment of food some days before, which seems to indicate that in addition to foodstuffs and other goods coming in through regular channels, other supplies have also been entering the area. The over-all situation in Kokkina as regards supplies was not found to be one of great hardship and for the moment there was no question of the population facing starvation.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

Financing of UNFICYP

207. It will be recalled that the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) establishing the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus provided under operative paragraph 6 that all costs pertaining to the Force should be met in a manner to be agreed upon by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus, and that the Secretary-General was also authorized to accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.

208. Although I was able to obtain voluntary contributions approximately equal to the estimated costs of \$5,430,000 for the first period of three months during which the Force was operational, in my report to the Security Council on 15 June 1964 (S/5764), I pointed out that the costs involved in extending the Force for an additional three months would be \$7.3 million, and I informed the Council of my concern regarding the financial arrangements for the Force.

209. In subsequent reports to the Security Council, on 21 August 1964 (S/5910), and 27 August 1964 (S/5913), I reported that I had been able to obtain voluntary contributions equal to only about five-sixths of the amount of the estimated costs for maintaining the Force for the second three-month period ending 26 September 1964, and I stated that there was no assurance that any costs incurred after 27 August could be met within the terms of operative paragraph 6 of the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964.

210. While three pledges have subsequently been received, one in the amount of \$5,000, another of up to \$400,000 contingent on a two to one matching proviso, and a third one of \$25,000, they are insufficient to cover the deficit of more than \$2 million between the estimated costs and the total amount pledged for the second three-month period. In these circumstances, although I will continue my efforts to secure additional pledges of financial support for UNFICYP, I am obliged to repeat, with added emphasis, the statement in my 15 June report to the Council that "Should the Force be extended, it will remain to be determined whether this increased amount could be raised through voluntary contributions. I have no assurance of this at present".

211. If it is decided to extend the period during which the Force is stationed in Cyprus by an additional three months after 26 September, the additional costs are

estimated at \$7,050,000 on the assumptions that the strength of the Force will be approximately 6,400 officers and other ranks, that the United Nations will not be required to bear the costs of any rotations or repatriation of the contingents that may be required, and that the bases for claims for reimbursement of extra costs to Governments providing contingents will for the third period of three months be the same as for the second three-month period.

V. MEDIATION EFFORT

212. It is with deep regret and sorrow that I report to the Council that the Mediator on Cyprus, Mr. Sakari Tuomioja, died in Helsinki on 9 September as the result of the stroke which he suffered on 16 August. This is a severe blow to the mediation effort. Mr. Tuomioja had served as Mediator with great ability and dedication and now his life has been given in the effort.

213. Mr. Tuomioja had kept me informed of his activities, plans and thinking on the question, but had not submitted a formal report to me. At the time he was stricken he was about to depart from Geneva for a new round of mediation talks in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia.

214. Having consulted the four parties principally concerned, as defined in paragraph 7 of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, and having found that they all consider it important to designate a new Mediator without delay, I am taking the necessary steps toward this end and expect shortly to be in a position to inform the Security Council of that action.

VI. SUMMING-UP AND OBSERVATIONS

215. The resolution of the Security Council of 4 March 1964 (S/5575), in providing for the Force that was to be established in Cyprus, defined the function of that Force only in general terms, namely, "to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions". Given the political complexity of the Cyprus problem, it was manifestly impossible for the Council to do more than this at that time. I undertook, in these circumstances, to organize the Force and establish it in Cyprus while recognizing that it would be subject to some limitations. Thus, UNFICYP was given a very heavy responsibility without any precise definition of its general mandate to guide it so that it might know clearly just what it is entitled to do and how far it may go, particularly in the use of force. This inadequacy and lack of clarity in the mandate of the Force has been, obviously, a handicap to its operation. The Force, of course, has been subjected to much pressure from those, on the one hand, who would wish it to go much further than it has gone, particularly in the employment of armed force, and those on the other, who would feel that at times the Force tries to go too far on the territory of a sovereign State.

216. Despite these handicaps, and under most trying and dangerous circumstances in general, the Force in Cyprus has functioned extremely well. It has not, obviously, been able to achieve the full objectives defined in the general mandate of the Security Council. It has not, for example, been able to prevent altogether "a recurrence of fighting", for there have been two serious engagements - at St. Hilarion and in the Tylleria area - since the arrival of the Force in Cyprus. But the presence of the Force in Cyprus was a major factor in bringing the fighting in these two areas to a quick end and in preventing those episodes from escalating. Nor can there be any doubt that had the Force not been deployed in Cyprus over these six months, there would have been far more fighting on that island than there has been, with resultant heavy casualties and devastation. As to maintenance and restoration of law and order in Cyprus, there has been a considerable improvement in the security situation since the deployment of the Force and its police arm. To mention only one sphere, incidents involving the beating, shooting and kidnapping of civilians have been greatly reduced. As regards a return to normal conditions,

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there has also been vast improvement in the situation since the arrival of UNFICYP, although conditions in Cyprus today, without question, are still far from those prevailing in the island prior to the outbreak of communal fighting in December of last year. But there have been significant advances from the dire situation that existed when the Force arrived in Cyprus. This is reflected in such developments as much more freedom of movement on the roads and much less harassment on them; as the harvesting, with good results, thanks to the assistance of the Force; as in the lifting of the sieges of a number of Turkish communities; as in restoring the operation of public utility services; and as in the increased movement of essentials. Nevertheless, UNFICYP has found on innumerable occasions great resistance, and indeed sometimes adamant refusal from both the Government authorities and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, concerning proposals designed to promote a return to normal life, if such arrangements, in their view, seem in any way to prejudice their political objectives.

217. It must be said, however, that despite all efforts of the United Nations, at Headquarters and in the field, conditions in Cyprus today are far from good; indeed, they are very unsatisfactory when viewed from the perspective of the hopes for Cyprus which motivated the Security Council's resolution of 4 March. But if the United Nations Mission and Force had not been established in that island and had not been exerting ever since every possible effort on behalf of peace and reason, conditions in that tragic country would be immeasurably worse, with all of the implications which this would have for the peace of the region and of the world.

218. I think it is necessary to point out, with regard to the reference in the Security Council resolution to "a return to normal conditions", that there has been all along and continues to be what I consider to be a misunderstanding on the part of the Turkish community of Cyprus and of the Turkish Government as to the function and duty of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. The position of the Turkish side is that by a "return to normal conditions", the Security Council intended a complete restoration of the situation in Cyprus exactly as it was before the fighting broke out in December, including, of course, the restoration of the constitutional situation. Therefore, in their eyes, UNFICYP should have been employing force, wherever and whenever necessary, to restore, over the opposition of the Cypriot

Government, the constitutional situation relating to the privileges, rights and immunities of the Turkish community in Cyprus. Thus, in this view, UNFICYP should not regard the Cypriot Government or any acts taken by it as legal; the present Cypriot army, the National Guard, should be considered as illegal and should be treated as such by UNFICYP; the importation of arms by the Cypriot Government should be considered illegal under the Cypriot Constitution and should be stopped by UNFICYP in pursuance of the Security Council's resolutions.

219. I have not, of course, accepted these positions and have pointed out to those who hold them that the Security Council did not indicate such intentions in adopting its resolutions on this question.

220. On the other hand, UNFICYP was not established by the Security Council as an arm of the Government of Cyprus, and it has not been permitted to fall into such a course. It respects at all times the sovereignty and the independence of Cyprus and the authority of the Government, but it acts independently in the discharge of its mandate, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council.

221. The plain fact, therefore, is that the United Nations Force in Cyprus is in the most delicate position that any United Nations mission has ever experienced, for it is not only in the midst of a bitter civil war but it is dangerously interposed between the two sides of that war. In that situation, the United Nations operation has had to exert every effort to maintain objectivity, to serve fairness and justice, and to avoid taking sides while doing all possible to alleviate suffering. Thus, in recent weeks, UNFICYP has been devoting major effort toward eliminating or lessening the hardship experienced by many Turkish communities in Cyprus by the economic restrictions which have been imposed by the Government of Cyprus.

222. With regard to this policy, which has become quite vigorous since the fighting of early August was ended by the cease-fire called for by the Security Council, one can understand the evident concern of the Government of Cyprus for the security of the country in view of the recurrent threats emanating from Turkey about Turkish landings on the island, and particularly in view of the tragic experience of the island with the Turkish air raids of early August. But allowing for the security factor, the conclusion seems warranted that the economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, which in some instances

have been so severe as to amount to veritable siege, indicate that the Government of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action.

223. The policy of economic pressures has definitely caused much hardship in the Turkish population; it has nourished bitterness on the Turkish side; it has hardened the Turkish position; it has greatly increased tension and would no doubt lead to a new eruption of fighting if continued, particularly in the arbitrary and shifting from day to day manner in which it was being applied.

224. It is, therefore, a cause for no little encouragement that it has been learned, on the eve of this report, that the Government of Cyprus has substantially relaxed these economic restrictions and that supplies are now flowing into the Turkish Cypriot areas in accordance with accords thus far reached.

225. I feel compelled also to express the view that the aerial attacks on Cyprus communities by Turkish aircraft in early August, whatever their supposed tactical significance, were most unfortunate and have made the solution of the Cyprus problem far more difficult. These raids on defenseless people killed and maimed many innocent civilians, destroyed much property and inevitably led to a stiffening of the positions of the Cypriot Government, as might have been anticipated. I trust that they will not be repeated, for whatever reasons.

226. On not very convincing grounds of national security, the Government of Cyprus, despite the assurances given to me by the President of Cyprus in his message of 6 August 1964 (S/5855), has recently sought to impose restrictions on movements of the Force which, in effect, would go very far toward nullifying freedom of movement for UNFICYP. The projected restrictions would be to such an extent as to cripple the effectiveness of the Force and to make its continued presence in Cyprus virtually useless. I have, of course, vigorously protested these restrictions to the Government of Cyprus, and have demanded that they be lifted. But as of the date of the submission of this report, there has been no satisfactory response. The security needs of Cyprus will be fully respected by the Force, but it cannot fulfil the mandates of the Council from a virtually static posture. There is implicit in this problem a question of mutual trust and good faith.

227. A recent crisis, which at present is only in abeyance, relates to the intended rotation of a part of the Turkish contingent stationed in Cyprus. It will be recalled that in the early stage of the deployment of UNFICYP in Cyprus, I had proposed to the Governments of Greece and Turkey that their contingents stationed in the Island should be placed under United Nations Command in Cyprus, although not as contingents in the United Nations Force in Cyprus (S/5764, page 36, paragraph 116). This proposal was acceptable to Greece but was rejected by Turkey since in effect it would mean the return of the Turkish troops to their barracks. When, quite recently, an impasse developed between Cyprus and Turkey over the projected rotation of part of the Turkish contingent, I appealed to both Governments to employ moderation and restraint in this situation, and specifically urged the Government of Turkey to postpone for a few weeks the scheduled rotation of the Turkish troops (S/5920). The rotation has been deferred and the Turkish Government is due commendation for its helpfulness in this critical situation. Also at that time I sought the reaction of the Government of Turkey to my suggestion that there be an agreed arrangement for the rotation of Turkish troops in Cyprus whereby the relieving troops would not take up positions in proximity to the Kyrenia Road, with UNFICYP thereafter undertaking full and exclusive responsibility for the control of that road. The road under UNFICYP control would then be opened to all civilians but to no armed personnel of either side. Such an arrangement, of course, would be without prejudice to the claims of either party with regard to the status, presence and location of the Turkish contingent in Cyprus. I have now received a reply from the Government of Turkey to my suggestion. The Government of Turkey agrees to place its contingent in Cyprus under the over-all command authority of the Commander of UNFICYP, subject to several conditions. The Government of Turkey has also stated that they cannot agree to the withdrawal of the Turkish contingent from their present position astride the Kyrenia Road, but would have no objection to UNFICYP controlling the Nicosia-Kyrenia Road and keeping it open to unarmed persons, provided the United Nations guarantees that no Greek-Cypriot policeman or other armed personnel will be permitted to use the road and that any attempt on the part of Greek-Cypriots to gain control of the road in any manner whatever, would be prevented by UNFICYP by the use of arms. The Turkish reply also states that the Commander of UNFICYP,

before issuing orders to the Turkish contingent for any task or movement which would require a change in the present position of the contingent, must have the prior consent of the Turkish Government. The Turkish memorandum was submitted to me on 10 September 1964, and I have therefore not had the opportunity to make a thorough study of its substance. However, I am bound to say that the conditions set forth by the Turkish Government virtually nullify my suggestion. In particular, the requirement for the Commander of UNFICYP to obtain the prior consent of the Turkish Government on orders relating to the deployment of the Turkish contingent, is an unacceptable condition, as I had indicated at an early stage. However, it is my intention to continue exploring this matter with the Turkish Government with a view to finding a satisfactory solution.

228. In my report to the Council on 15 June 1964 (S/5764, Corr.1 and 2), I reported in paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 on the build-up of arms and ammunition in Cyprus on both sides, but particularly on the Government side. That build-up continued and contributed to the heightening of tension and led ultimately to the serious fighting that occurred in early August. UNFICYP has observed and reported this build-up but it has been in no position to do anything else about it, other than to warn both sides about the unwisdom and the danger of such actions, since it has no mandate from the Security Council to do more, particularly with regard to actions of the Government of a sovereign, independent State. Moreover, as a result of the build-up in arms and the reorganization of the Greek Cypriot armed forces into the National Guard, the United Nations Force in Cyprus today is not only outnumbered by the Greek Cypriot forces but it also commands considerably less fire power. This is a fact whose significance is limited by the other fact that UNFICYP carries arms in Cyprus only for use in self-defence.

229. From the foregoing it may be properly concluded that the United Nations Force in Cyprus is in an unhappy position. A civil war is the worst possible situation in which a United Nations peace-keeping force can find itself. Strong reasons other than financial can be adduced in support of the position against maintaining a United Nations force in Cyprus. But the overriding reason for extending UNFICYP beyond 26 September is the position of those directly concerned with the Cyprus problem, and many others, that, despite all handicaps, to withdraw UNFICYP at this time could lead to utter disaster in the Island. The four Governments which are to be consulted in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 4 March,

have all indicated, in response to my inquiry, that they wish the Force to be continued beyond 26 September. The Government of Turkey accompanied its assurance to this effect with some "observations" about the shortcomings of the Force and its inability, under its existing authority, to carry out the mandates of the Security Council, as these mandates are interpreted by the Government of Turkey.

230. In the event that the Security Council is inclined to extend the Force for another three-month period, I must call the attention of the Council once again to the difficulties that have been encountered in financing the operation for the first two three-month periods. Financial support of the Force under paragraph 6 of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) has been inadequate and has been received in such manner, both as regards pledges and payment of the pledges, as to make planning, efficiency and economical running of the Force almost impossible. I would call to the attention of the Council some notable absences on the list of States making voluntary contributions, some for the entire six months' existence of the Force and others for its second period, although the Security Council resolution was adopted unanimously.

231. I would consider it unrealistic for the Council to expect that UNFICYP can be maintained for still another three-month period on such a flimsy and uncertain financial basis. The Force, once established and deployed in Cyprus, must be supported, and this requires cash in hand. Therefore, I feel bound to advise the Council that if UNFICYP is extended for another three months beyond 26 September, I must insist that at least pledges in the total amount necessary to sustain the Force for its third three-month period be in hand by that date. Should this not eventuate, I wish to forewarn the Council that in carrying out its instructions to maintain the Force in Cyprus I will have no choice but to consider any expenses exceeding the total of the voluntary contributions received as a legitimate charge against United Nations revenues from whatever source derived. The bills will have to be paid.

232. Finally, may I advise the Council that, if UNFICYP is extended, there will be serious need for at least some clarification as to actions that the Force may take in the discharge of its mandate. Therefore, I intend to proceed on the certain assumptions and to instruct the Commander of the Force accordingly. The assumptions and related instructions would be along the following lines:

/...

(a) That in establishing the Force and defining its important function, the Security Council realized that the Force could not discharge that function unless it had complete freedom of movement in Cyprus, which could only mean such unrestricted freedom of movement as may be considered essential by the Force Commander to the implementation of the mandates of the Force.

(b) That the Force, in carrying out its mandate to prevent the recurrence of fighting, is reasonably entitled to remove positions and fortified installations where these endanger the peace, and to take all necessary measures in self-defence if attacked in the performance of this duty.

(c) That in seeking to prevent a recurrence of fighting, it may be demanded by the Commander that the opposing armed forces be separated to reasonable distances in order to create buffer zones in which armed forces would be prohibited.

233. Mr. Galo Plaza, my Special Representative in Cyprus, and the two Commanders of UNFICYP, Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani and his successor, General K.S. Thimayya, and those associated with them, have rendered distinguished service to the United Nations and to the cause of peace in Cyprus, and I wish to compliment them highly.
