

Служба Внешней Разведки 1991–2020

Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service 1991–2020

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Preface

This report on Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) forms the basis of a forthcoming book on Russia's active measures¹, disinformation and deception campaigns. Its publication at this point, before the book is finished, relates both to the SVR centenary, celebrated on 20 December 2020, and to several requests for information about this agency, which is largely unknown in Sweden.

There has been much publicity in the past few years on the various activities engaged in by the Russian intelligence services, both in Russia and in the West. Most studies have focused on the activities carried out by Russia's military intelligence service (GRU) and Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). One reason for this, is that the SVR has acted more professionally and managed to avoid the interest of media, politicians and researchers. At the same time, this makes this agency all the more dangerous. While it is certainly true that any organisation operating within the realm of intelligence and counter-intelligence would normally seek to avoid any publicity over which they lack control, it is equally true that such restraint may sometimes amount to sheer hubris.

Ever since Vladimir Putin gained control over Russia, we have witnessed the development of an increasingly aggressive and closed Russia, where much effort has been put into active measures, disinformation and hybrid warfare. We have heard about many incidents, statements, hacker attacks, electoral interventions, aggressive military exercises and so on. Yet, there has been very little information on the organisations and individuals behind these actions. Not having access to the full picture makes it difficult to understand what is going on. On the other hand, with information more readily available on these actors – where they are, who they are and how they operate – we are in a far better position to discover more of their activities and to reveal what is really happening. Uncovering Russia's actions is important both for Sweden and for the people living here.

With this in mind, I want to launch this part of my book project already at this point. Collaboration, aimed at expanding and deepening our knowledge of Russia's activities, is important not only in terms of increasing our understanding of Moscow's actions taken against us but also to better protect and defend ourselves. In this context, several truly admirable projects undertaken by journalists, such as the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP)² are worth mentioning as a similar approach, aimed at increasing our knowledge about how dictatorial regimes use and operate their intelligence services, would be highly appreciated.

Readers who want to dive deeper into the 100-year history of Moscow's intelligence apparatus to gain a better understanding of current events are most welcome to download my compendium *Grundkurs Sovjetisk Underrättelsetjänst*.³

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Introduction

It will come as no surprise that Russia, in different ways, poses a threat to Sweden and other Western countries. In recent years, Sweden has invested billions in strengthening its military capabilities, developed its civil defence with considerable emergency stockpiles, and the implementation of a brand-new psychological defence is around the corner. For several years, the West has faced an avalanche of fake news, disinformation, deception campaigns and other subversive activities, known in Russian as 'active measures' [Активные мероприятия]. Combined with the espionage that Russia is also involved in against our country, and Sweden's strategic location and proximity to Russia, the security threat currently facing our country has never been greater.

In the early 1990s, when the dictatorship of the Soviet empire had collapsed, the outlook both in Russia and in the world at large seemed bright. Unfortunately, this situation lasted only a few years until reactionary elements in the KGB and in what remained of the Soviet Army began to turn back the clock. At this time, the KGB had already been dissolved and replaced by half a dozen independent agencies. Thousands of KGB officers had left the agency and turned to the free market. Vladimir Putin, together with some 20 close associates, had participated in the plundering of the St Petersburg City Administration. However, when the then mayor of St Petersburg Anatoly Sobchak was not re-elected in 1996, Putin and his accomplices relocated to Moscow. Following a couple of years of swift career moves, first to become head of the Federal Security Service FSB and later to become Russia's prime minister, Vladimir Putin also persuaded the heavy drinker Boris Yeltsin to appoint him as president. This effectively put an end to the democratic experiment in Russia.

The KGB reinstated!

Vladimir Putin reinstated the KGB already in 2003. All of the security agencies that had been established since the beginning of the 1990s (except for the foreign espionage carried out by the SVR) were incorporated into the Federal Security Service FSB, which thereby regained its former power and glory. As duty called, many experienced officers gave up their employment in various companies and returned to the security and intelligence community. The foreign intelligence service, SVR, which had already been relocated to Yasenevo on the outskirts of Moscow, was left to continue its operations, which were rather different from those of the remaining Cheka in the FSB, which focused specifically on fighting the Russian population and destroying the country's budding human rights.

Free elections in Russia were now nothing but a memory; newspapers, radio and television have fallen into the hands of the regime and companies such as Gazprom; truncheons and stun guns are used by the police and the special forces against demonstrators; the freedom of association has been severely curtailed; the freedom of travelling abroad has become more limited; Russia's internet and mobile telephone networks are intercepted around the clock by the FSB; the legal system has become both corrupt and politicised; political undesirables are sentenced to very long prison terms for invented crimes; the Interpol is being used by Russia to hunt down political activists – to a large extent today's Russia has become a worse dictatorship than that of yesterday's Soviet Union.

Russia's intelligence officers prepare for war

The threat posed by Russia is problematic not only for Sweden. The SVR and its military counterpart the GRU are tasked with providing Russia's politicians and top military staff with information to be used in their decision-making in connection with a possible looming war. The two agencies also work more 'hands-on' with updating and broadening Russia's sabotage plans. It goes without saying that repeated losses of classified and confidential information, stolen by Russia's intelligence services, is a very serious problem indeed. However, the impact by these services on the lives of ordinary people is an even greater problem. Hundreds of Swedish citizens are approached by the Russian intelligence services every year. While the main actors in this context are the SVR and the GRU, it is evident that Russia's Federal Security Service FSB has also been involved in intelligence activities outside Russia in recent years. The main goal of all three services is to recruit new agents to be used as sources, in other words to make them betray their own country.

Russia crushes its own agents

In many different ways, people with access to valuable information are either forced, bribed, conned or pressurised into becoming agents. For these individuals, such a move may come at a very high price – often involving broken marriages, ruined personal finances, substance abuse problems and mental health issues. Being a traitor is not a picnic in the park, quite the opposite. If you are found out, and if you flee to Moscow, things will only get worse. Although today's Russia is certainly a lot different, the accounts of both Kim Philby and Stig Bergling make it quite clear that traitors are despised by both sides.

Today's growing efforts by the SVR to recruit so-called compatriots in the West – i.e. people of Russian descent with an interest in Russia's culture, history and language – run the risk of increasing the alleged 'russophobia', potentially resulting in further suspicions being directed against all Russians living in the West. In similarity with Western information carriers who fall victim to Russia's recruitment efforts, this is not doing Russians living abroad any favours.

One hundred years of oppression and violence

Shortly after the Bolshevik coup d'état in Moscow in 1917, Lenin founded the so-called Cheka which by violent means was to protect the new socialist state of workers and peasants. The 'red terror' began only a year later. Three years later, the Cheka's Foreign Department (INO) was established, tasked with foreign espionage and foreign influence operations. In 1921, the Cheka embarked on extensive research into the use of various poisons. Long before Germany, the Cheka built concentration camps, where individuals who voiced their opposition were forced to work themselves to death to enrich their prison guards. The organisation was also largely responsible for the death of millions of Ukrainians during the intentional famine in Ukraine, known as the Holodomor, in 1932–1933. Further to this, the Cheka was also heavily involved in the great many executions that followed the Moscow Trials in 1936–1938. In this context, tens of thousands of Red Army officers were executed, the result of which was not difficult to see in 1941.

When the SVR celebrated its centenary on 20 December 2020 (the FSB and the GRU celebrated their centenaries in 2017 and 2018, respectively), the agency embraced all of its history,

including its legacy of oppression and murder, for which the history of both the Soviet Union and Russia is infamous (except for a few years in the beginning of the 1990s). This is something that the agency's employees may ponder, when they look out of the windows at the Yasenevo headquarters from which, on either side, they can see the monuments erected at the NKVD's execution sites in Butovo and Kommunarka. Nearby was also the NKVD special prison, headed by Lavrenty Beria, in which prominent NKVD colleagues and others were detained before they were executed. The headquarters in Yasenevo was undoubtedly built on historic foundations.

When celebrations and hubris go hand in hand

Both private persons and legal entities, such as government agencies, companies and associations, often find it important to celebrate anniversaries in a variety of different ways. Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union have had a certain fondness for celebrating anniversaries (5, 10, 15 years etc.) by producing medals and pins to be worn on uniforms and suits. Since the early days of the Russian Federation, military units in particular have taken these celebrations a bit further and today several commercial companies offer comrades' and veterans' associations packs of medals, decorations, unit flags, t-shirts, CDs with military and political campaign songs, jubilee books, websites, concerts, meals and much more – all intended to make the anniversaries as memorable as possible.

Large diamonds

Apart from a number of articles published in newspapers and journals, as well as a few books, the SVR has never been much for exposing itself or its employees. This is exemplified, for instance, by its annual celebration of the Cheka Day, highlighting the foundation of the Cheka's Foreign Department (ION) on 20 December 1920, which has been an entirely internal event involving only its employees and President Putin.

However, about three years ago, the SVR allowed one of Russia's largest diamond mines to name three large raw diamonds after four of its illegals: **Aleksey Botyan**, the couple **Goar and Gevork Vartanyan**, and **Aleksey Kozlov**. This move must have made at least some old veterans gasp for air. The Vartanyans were both born in Armenia and had worked as illegals (and in other capacities) in Iran – as had Gevork's father Andrey for a period of 23 years. Kozlov was the most experienced of all Soviet illegals. He began his career in Denmark in 1962 and is alleged to have visited 86 countries. The penultimate country being South Africa, where he was arrested in 1980. In 1982, he was exchanged for about a dozen individuals that the West wanted back. However, Kozlov continued to work for the KGB and subsequently for the SVR until at least 2009. During this period, he worked as an illegal in one or more unknown countries between 1986 and 1997. He is known to have remained within the SVR until he was at least 74 years old.

At the time, Aleksey Botyan was the oldest illegal employed by the SVR who was still alive. The Vartanyans, on the other hand, was probably the most well-known illegals couple that could be shown to the world. While Gevork Vartanyan had died already in 2012, Goar Vartanyan was still going strong (she passed away in 2019).



Diamanten Gevork och Goar Vartanjan



Diamanten Aleksej Botjan



Diamanten Aleksej Kozlov

It was of course a bit unfair that the Vartanyans' diamond weighed 'only' a little over 25 carats, while Kozlov's stone was more than twice as heavy, at almost 58 carats. The most senior person of the group, Aleksey Botyan, was presented with a 100-carat diamond in 2017, to mark his 100th birthday.⁴

Diamonds in the sky

In 2020, yet another diamond was named, this time to mark the centenary of the SVR. This diamond was a proper giant, weighing in at 116.91 carats. A considerable number of large diamonds had been sifted through before a suitable candidate was selected and given the rather prosaic name '100 years of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service'. The reason why the SVR management selected this particular diamond relates to the fact that the original decision to establish the Cheka's Foreign Department on 20 December 1920 carries the number 169 – all three digits being reflected in the weight of the diamond.

It may be added that all four of the above-mentioned diamonds will be exhibited at the 'Moscow Kremlin Diamond Fund' in Moscow.

SVR – the worst agency of them all

People generally understand intelligence and security agencies to be extremely careful with classified documents, cover names, secret agents, covers and so on. Hence, there was a time in Sweden when the Swedish Security Service was not openly listed in the telephone directory but hid behind the more prosaic 'Swedish National Police Board, Department D'. This situation is said to have prevented the cleaning lady, employed by the Swedish spy Stig Wennerström, from contacting the Security Service at an early stage to report her observations. In popular speech, employees at the Swedish Security Service were known as 'felt slippers'. For many years, secret activities depended on secret organisations. Today, the situation is somewhat different.

It has been possible to map out some parts of the structure of the SVR – described on their own website as highly confidential – by using a wide range of data published online and not least on various auction sites, which publish photos and information associated with a considerable number of directorates and departments within the SVR. There is more information about certain parts of the organisation, while information on other structures is scarcer and at times limited to barely an abbreviation and nothing more. It remains something of a mystery how such widespread publication, which has been going on for many years, has been allowed to


continue while at the same time the SVR leadership consistently refers to the very same information as classified. Another mystery is the large number of SVR employees who are selling these desirable decorations. Russia is clearly a country where laws and regulations say one thing, but its citizens do something completely different.

Recently, the SVR and its head Sergey Naryshkin seem to have been affected by hubris to an extent never seen before in the world of intelligence. It appears that the celebration of the agency's centenary to some extent compensated for the fact that Russia, as a nation, is merely 30 years old. Indeed, all of 2020 was booked up with one magnificent SVR event after the other. What emerged was an agency that has largely lost the grip on reality! Finding that at least two-thirds of its celebrations focused on Soviet illegals only underlined this even more vigorously.

75 years after the victory

The centenary of the SVR coincided with the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the defeat of Nazism. These celebrations contained much disinformation, focusing specifically on demonising the West. The most blatant lie being the notion of the 'Great Patriotic War', fought between 1941 and 1945. The fact that Stalin signed a pact with Hitler, that they together occupied Poland, that the Soviet Union attacked and occupied Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and other parts of Eastern Europe, and that the Soviet Union also under false pretences invaded Finland, remain issues that are simply magicked away.

As the SVR was deeply involved also in the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, it was no coincidence that the agency emphasised its own role in bringing about its happy end. Another institution that was also heavily involved in this anniversary was the now revived non-profit organisation Russia's Historical Association (RIO), which lay dormant throughout the Soviet era. This association was founded already in 1866 but was not reactivated until 2012, now with Sergey Naryshkin as its chairman and primus motor (Naryshkin was appointed director of the SVR in 2016). Another key actor in this anniversary was the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), which houses tens of thousands of documents released by the SVR, some of which are alleged to be forgeries showing for instance how Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland conspired to initiate the war in 1939, and how these countries also in other ways sided with Nazi Germany. Via the MGIMO, disinformation originating from the Soviet Union and its intelligence apparatus will continue to be disseminated for a long time by future Russian diplomats.



Kim Philby – the master spy

Other documents have also been dusted off, including documents in which the former British master spy Kim Philby is once again made to serve his Soviet employers by posthumously telling about his espionage efforts. Philby's achievements are further emphasised by his 'Russian' handlers Arnold Deutsch and Teodor Maly (originally from Austria and Hungary, respectively), photos of Philby in the Soviet Union taken by the KGB, and photos of classified documents originating from the British Foreign Office, which Philby had apparently stolen and handed over to Moscow. These documents were marked "Top Secret – To be kept under lock and key – Never to be removed from the office". In 2020, a steady flow of previously classified documents was released from the SVR archives to the rest of the world, all carefully selected and probably, to some extent, recently manufactured.

Russian news media overflowing with propaganda

Today, Russia's news media has largely returned to its old Soviet role of acting as megaphones for the Kremlin. In 2020, some began publishing extended series of articles celebrating the SVR and Soviet espionage. In the beginning of June, Rossiyskaya Gazeta began publishing a long series of articles about the SVR and its most prominent heroes. Some months later, the Lenta.ru website began to publish a series of articles called *Spies who changed history*. At the same time, and as an explicit contribution to the SVR centenary, Rossiyskaya Gazeta launched an essay competition called *History of Intelligence – History of the Country*.

Books are also part of the propaganda. At least a dozen of books about Russia's many spies were published in early 2020, some of which were republications of old books that had been out of print for some time. Despite a considerable interest among Russians, even highly interesting titles may have a first edition of only 500 or 1 000 copies. However, in the past few years, the number of printed copies has started to slowly rise even if there is still some way to go before reaching the monster editions of the Soviet era, when books were often easily printed in 100 000 copies.

New books

The best new books are two titles written by Colonel **Aleksandr Bondarenko**, who since the early 2000s has written around 20 books. The books published in 2020 are about the two legends **Aleksey Botyan** and **Yuri Drozdov**. Botyan, who died in February 2020 at the age of 103, belonged to Directorate S. He served abroad for many years, where he was tasked specifically with sabotage planning. In connection with the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Botyan and other KGB officers set up a secret weapons stash in Czechoslovakia, containing American and European weapons, which was used to demonstrate that the West was behind the Czech aspirations for change and independence from Moscow. Drozdov also began

his career as an illegal before he became head of the KGB spetsnaz unit in connection with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Drozdov was later appointed head of Directorate S, before initiating the establishment of the KGB spetsnaz unit Vympel in 1981. Having learnt much from the war in Afghanistan, Drozdov wanted a unit staffed by well-educated officers who were fluent in several foreign languages and who, just before the beginning of a war, could operate behind enemy lines and carry out assassinations and sabotage. A considerable problem with both of Bondarenko's books is that the Moscow-based publishing house Molodaya Gvardiya (lit. Young Guards) still today uses the same poor layout as they have done for the past 40 years. In effect, both books look like something produced in the 1920s Soviet Union.

A selection of films

The SVR website contains a selection of around 20 films and tv programmes that were broadcast in 2020. Unsurprisingly, half of them deal with the much beloved SVR illegals. It is also evident that a large proportion of these films and tv programmes was produced by the media companies TV Zvezda and VGTRK. Anyone familiar with the SVR's activities in Russia will be aware that these two companies, along with a dozen or so other media outlets, always paint a positive picture of the agency.

Recently, the SVR has also become a film producer. The film *Without the Right to Glory*, highlighting the achievements of the former head of Soviet espionage, Pavel Fitin, was made specifically for the centenary.

There was also a film from the exhibition *Golden Pages of Intelligence*, shown at the Uzlov Museum of Art and Local Lore, which drew attention to the SVR centenary. The film is made in the form of a tour of the paintings in the exhibition, showing many portraits of eminent Chekists, among them one of the Cheka's most successful female intelligence officers, Zoja Rybkina, who during her career was posted as deputy resident, initially in Helsinki and later in Stockholm. Interestingly, the NKVD's activities during the Second World War not only in Sweden but to a large extent also in Finland, Norway, Denmark and Germany were operated from Stockholm.

Other exhibitions

The above-mentioned art exhibition was not the only one that the SVR was involved in organising in 2020. In February 2020, the agency organised an exhibition called the *Golden Pages of Intelligence History*, where the agency's centenary was combined with another significant theme celebrated in Russia in 2020, namely *Our Memory – 75 Years of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War*. This exhibition, held at the Moscow Pedagogic State University, was inaugurated by the head of the SVR Museum, Colonel **Yelena Barabanova**, the head of the SVR Veterans' Council, **Mikhail Pogudin**, and the 93-year-old SVR veteran **Vitaly Korotkov**.

Почта России

The Russian Post also helped the SVR with some festive atmosphere in 2020. Again, this is not a surprise but merely another piece in the jigsaw of the Chekists' extensive celebrations. At least five new stamps were issued in 2020. In contrast to the stamps issued in previous years, there was only men depicted on the new stamps in 2020: **Aleksey Kozlov**, **Aleksey Botyan** and **Gevork Vartanyan**, who were all illegals, and **Aleksandr Feklisov** and **Vladimir Barkovsky**, who belonged to Line X at the legal residences. They were both posted to the UK and the US, where they were involved in Operation Enormoz, the Russian plot to steal the Western Allies' atomic secrets.



Early February

The slightly more unusual programme items linked to the centenary were not scheduled until February. When passage No. 5063 at the SVR headquarters in Yasenevo was named after the head of Soviet intelligence during the Second World War, **Pavel Fitin**, this was nothing extraordinary. However, when the Russian government on the very same day announced that it would name a mountain with a height of 4 076 meters located on the Sudor ridge in North Ossetia after Pavel Fitin, this may have appeared somewhat exaggerated. Fitin is currently becoming increasingly well-known. Three memory plaques commemorating his achievements have been put up in different locations across Russia, as has a magnificent statue at the SVR Bureau of Public Relations and Media in Ostozhenka ulitsa. The reason for Fitin's high repute relates to the fact that he warned Stalin on several occasions. That said, there are also many other individuals who have never been forgotten.

Later in the spring of 2020, the Bank of Russia issued two jubilee coins, one in silver and one in gold, worth 3 rubles and 50 rubles, respectively.



Mountaineering

In the summer of 2020, a small group of SVR officers from Directorate S (the illegals directorate) travelled to northern Caucasus to climb the highest mountain in Europe, Mount Elbrus. The mountain, which rises 5 642 metres above sea level, has two summits surrounded by two very deep faults. During the expedition, a large banner from the SVR, with photos of four of its most well-known illegals – Rudolf Abel, Gevork Vartanyan, **Konon Molody** and Aleksey Kozlov – was placed near one of the summits.



New monuments



In 2020, Moscow also saw the unveiling of several statues and monuments contributing to the celebrations of the Cheka. The legendary illegals couple **Iskhak Akhmerov** and **Helen Lowry** was honoured with a beautiful monument, showing the silhouettes of the cities in which they had operated. Akhmerov was a Tatar, born in Baku, who had begun his career in 1921 as a student at the Comintern's university KUTV. He later worked in e.g. Turkey and China. His greatest achievements came during his time in New York and Baltimore, where he worked together with the American citizen Helen Lowry (another illegal), who was the niece of the leader of the US Communist Party, Earl Browder.⁵

In the autumn of 2020, one of the SVR's illegals was also represented on the MGIMO's recently unveiled monument *Defenders of the Fatherland*, which pays tribute to those who fought during the war and had been students at the MGIMO. As the university was not founded until October 1944, there cannot have been many young MGIMO students who lost their lives in the war.

The largest spy monument in the world?

Among the more spectacular events during the centenary was likely the unveiling of a gigantic new monument at the SVR headquarters in Yasenevo on 2 September. The SVR and its director Sergey Naryshkin had invited a large number of people, mainly well-known illegals and some other veterans, to participate.



This large monument is made of three parts. The main part is approximately six or seven meters high and consist of two pillars connected with a crossbar placed about five meters from the ground. The crossbar is decorated with the SVR emblem. The second part of the monument is its base, which is made from carved stone covered with thick bronze panels, decorated mainly with the faces of several (nowadays) well-known illegals and equally well-known illegals agents from the West run by illegals, such as the Cambridge Five.⁶

Finally, the third part of the monument shows a man and a woman cast in bronze, who are between two and two and a half meters high, embracing each other, and apparently approaching the arch formed by the two pillars in front of them. The man and the woman represent the new illegals, on their way from the SVR and Russia, probably bursting with all the propaganda for the SVR illegals that has flooded Russian society in the past few years through media, books, television, films, etc. Meanwhile, there has been no mentioning whatsoever in recent years of the GRU illegals. It appears that the GRU and the SVR have chosen quite different approaches when it comes to how they deal with their illegals and how their operations should best be handled. It will be very interesting to follow how the Russian military will act in this regard in the next few years.

Further propaganda

Each year since the year 2000, the SVR has awarded a beautiful medal and a large sum of money to writers deemed to have written the best books with a bearing on the agency and its activities. When examining the annual publication of spy books in Russia, it becomes evident that the same writers often turn up again and again. One reason for this could be the often quite small editions, which do not generate much of an income for the writers. Being awarded a prize from the SVR is probably most welcome. Since 2019, this prize is named after the SVR's first director, Yevgeny Primakov.

The awarding of the 2020 prize took place on 10 December. The choice of winners was not particularly imaginative. The first prize was awarded to the former SVR officer **Vladimir Antonov**, who had passed away in the spring of 2020. He was a worthy winner, awarded for in all six 'spy books': *Ejtingon* (2017), *Konon Molody* (2018), *Pavel Sudoplatov* (2018), *The Cambridge Five* (2018), *Sakharovsky* (2020) and *Jacob Serebryansky* (2020). All six titles were published by the old and well-known Moscow-based publishing house Molodaya Gvardiya (lit. Young Guards).

In addition to Antonov, prizes were also awarded to **Aleksandr Bondarenko** for his book about the old illegal Aleksey Botyan, and to **Nikolay Dolgoplov** for his book *Legendary Scouts-3*.

Another prize was awarded to the Veche Publishing House for having dedicated many years to publishing books benefitting the activities of the SVR. A prize was also awarded to a 13-year-old film-maker for a film about a young partisan and intelligence agent called Lena Golikov, who was active during the Second World War. The young film-maker had dedicated the film to the SVR centenary.

Finally, it was quite surprising to find the following information on the SVR awards webpage, stating that “due to the present regulatory legal framework, information on several Russian recipients of the SVR awards cannot be published at this time.”

New museums on 20 December?

The SVR intended to conclude its centenary in a grandiose manner by opening no less than three intelligence museums on the Cheka Day, 20 December 2020. The most important of these museums was to open its doors in Moscow, only a few steps away from the SVR’s Bureau of Public Relations and Media in Ostozhenka ulitsa.

Similar plans were also under way in Shatrovo. To properly announce the location of this new museum a memorial stone was unveiled, bearing the name of the former head of intelligence Pavel Fitin. This museum, which was initiated by the Regional Fund for Social and Legal Support of Veterans and Special Services Employees Blagovest, will be named after Pavel Fitin.

The city of Chelyabinsk also planned to open a new SVR museum called *The Shield and the Sword of the Fatherland*. The SVR Bureau of Public Relations and Media together with the Veterans’ Council in the Ural Federal District were reported to have successfully managed to involve local authorities, including the governor, as well as their FSB friends in the region, in this project.

The plan was for all three museums to open on Sunday 20 December 2020.

Did the SVR’s grand museum plans fall through?

The above-mentioned museums appear to have been little more than Russian Potemkin villages. Since the turn of the year 2020/2021, not a single word has been said about the three museums on the SVR’s websites. Russian media remains equally quiet. The question now is whether the grand museum plans fell through, or if the SVR managed to show off so many other successful events that the three museums were simply forgotten. Only the future will tell what really happened.

The great expansion of the SVR

Unsurprisingly, the SVR has expanded a great deal during the Putin era and finding evidence for this expansion is not difficult at all. As a former Chekist and as someone embracing much of what was integral parts of the old Soviet society, Vladimir Putin has always had a good eye to Russia's intelligence community and he is known to have given the agencies advantages in a number of areas. In addition to his general fondness of the intelligence agencies, there are several reasons why Russia's president actively supports the SVR and its two main competitors, the FSB and the GRU. Putin's recurring visits to all three agencies, especially on their anniversaries and on other special occasions, are well documented on e.g. the president's website.

Even if the overall trend is clear, there is little in the way of concrete numbers to indicate that the budget, the number of employees and so on have increased over the years. However, one indication of such growth, and one which is also highly visible, is the expansion of the SVR headquarters in Yasenevo, south of Moscow's first ring road, MKAD. Numerous photographs, including satellite images, of the SVR headquarters can easily be found online. These images are clear evidence that the number of buildings in Yasenevo has increased considerably over the years.

Initially, the plan was for a relatively limited area in Yasenevo to be used by the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). When this plan fell through, the Yasenevo area was handed over to the KGB as a 'gift' in 1972, at which point the organisation began using the existing buildings. It has been suggested that the reason why nothing came of the original plan was that the CPSU's International Department found the new complex too far away from central Moscow and that commuting there would be very time-consuming. Moscow's spies were obviously used to somewhat 'tougher' working conditions.

Contributions by Vasili Mitrokhin

Incidentally, the relocation of the KGB's First Main Directorate (Foreign Operations) from the Lubyanka building to the new KGB headquarters at Yasenevo gave Western intelligence organisations, principally the British MI6, access to the largest amount of information about the KGB that had so far been available to them.

To avoid that vast quantities of outdated documents that were no longer of any relevance to the KGB were moved to Yasenevo, one of the KGB's most experienced archivists was instructed to cull all documents assessed to be obsolete and of no interest to the agency's current and future activities. Considering the capacity of the KGB bureaucracy to produce vast amounts of documents, this was by no means a small undertaking and the culling of outdated documents continued for several years. The archivist assigned this task was **Vasili Nikitich Mitrokhin**.

Mitrokhin's career at the KGB had not been particularly successful. He was also disillusioned with the Soviet society in general and with the KGB in particular. He now saw his chance to damage the organisation that in his view had harmed the society in which he lived, and which had not previously provided him with any opportunity to pass on all the information he had

gathered over the years. The new developments undoubtedly presented him with some new opportunities.


Contributions by American researchers

If the Lubyanka Building in central Moscow, which has been the headquarters of both the KGB and the FSB, comes across as a very conservative and immobile square colossus, the opposite could be said of the SVR headquarters in Yasenevo. Throughout Putin's presidency, the SVR has expanded its headquarters and new buildings seem to have been added to the complex each year.

FAS expressing concern over the development in Russia

The Federation of American Scientists, FAS, has expressed concern over the nuclear arsenals maintained by the superpowers and, in particular, how Russia and the US continue to increase their capabilities to blow each other into oblivion. There seems to be no end or no limit whatsoever when it comes to the vast resources these and other nuclear powers are willing to invest in the development and testing of new weapons and components.

The FAS is not concerned solely with 'the great atomic bomb' but takes a keen interest also in other key matters, such as various structures within the nuclear powers, including the structures of their intelligence agencies. As far as can be assessed, the FAS is opinion-neutral as regards the nuclear powers and its data is deemed trustworthy.



Report on the expanding Yasenevo headquarters

In 2016, the FAS published a report on the Yasenevo headquarters, which was followed by an updated report in 2018. By drawing on numerous satellite images of the area, the FAS has been able to monitor the extensive construction work taking place on site. The data shows an increasing number of buildings across the area as well as extensions made to buildings that have been in use for many years. Comparing the Yasenevo headquarters in the early 2000s to the situation today, there is little doubt that the cost of the premises must have multiplied in this short period of time. However, it does not end here.

In the past ten years, if not longer, the SVR has planned to double or even triple the size of its headquarters, which currently measures 2.46 km² (the area marked in red). The sprawling bureaucracy within the realm of intelligence appears not to fall far behind the thriving bureaucracy elsewhere in society.

Yasenevo – not only the home of the SVR

A growing number of old Chekists have chosen to settle in the area between the two NKVD execution sites Kommunarka and Butovo. For several decades, leading figures – initially of the First Main Directorate of the KGB and subsequently of the SVR – have built their luxury dachas within walking distance of their workplace. Today, there are at least half a dozen dacha villages, boasting elegant villas, where many SVR generals and other ‘big wigs’ with close links to the SVR live.



SVR Medal of Merit

Overview of the organisational structure of the SVR

It has been suggested for several years that the SVR has approximately 12 000 employees. However, considering the vast expansion of its Yasenevo headquarters, the intensification of its activities abroad and other factors, there is reason to believe that the SVR could now have as many as 20 000 employees.

Introduction

Following a period of more than 70 years, during which the communist Cheka was tasked with protecting the Kremlin leadership from both external and internal enemies, it is evident that a more professional organisation has emerged since 1991. This new organisation does not use the same 'red filter' to analyse the world as did its predecessor. The so-called Cheka was first established on 20 December 1917, at which time it was under the leadership of the Polish aristocrat Felix Dzerzhinsky. It may seem peculiar that a Polish national was bestowed this honour. However, the 'Russian' revolutionaries, led by Lenin, were of many nationalities. While Lenin himself was certainly Russian, the Bolshevik leadership consisted of many individuals of other nationalities and ethnicities. The Soviet Union, like the Czardom, was made up of many ethnic groups, some of which were small in numbers while others were large national groups, such as the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Kazakhs. In addition, thousands of foreign revolutionaries had joined Lenin during the roughly two decades when he lived abroad, and in the early 1920s many of them were as much part of the communist movement as were Russians and other domestic ethnic groups.⁷ However, this was something that would change when Joseph Stalin came into power. His main focus was on building socialism in one country, i.e. the Soviet Union, and thoughts of a world revolution were put on hold.

At the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the banning of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Committee for State Security (KGB) was also dissolved. The emerging democratic Russia could not accommodate an agency such as the KGB and the country's new leadership wanted, as far as possible, to curb attempts by reactionary forces to reinstate an authoritarian order in Russia.

In 1991, the KGB was therefore dissolved and replaced by about half a dozen independent organisations, including the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information (FAPSI), the Federal Border Service of Russia (FPS). During the early 1990s, the anti-democratic forces were reasonably held in check. However, under the surface they had begun plotting to bring about change, and in the second half of the 1990s democratic Russia was pushed back. In 1996, **Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin** relocated to Moscow and in the same year many of his close associates at the Committee for External Relations (KVS) in St Petersburg left their posts when the mayor of St Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak, was not re-elected.⁸

In 1998, Putin was appointed director of the FSB. In 1999, he was appointed Russia's prime minister, which was soon followed by his entirely undemocratic appointment in 2000 as Russia's president by Boris Yeltsin, whose drinking problems at this time were becoming increasingly severe. The latter appointment came about after Putin had promised to grant Boris Yeltsin and his family immunity from prosecution for any crimes they might have committed.

The remit of the SVR

The main task of the SVR, which it shares with the FSB and the GRU, is to collect valuable and significant information to be used by President Putin and his 'siloviki' to run the country over which they have gained power. As KGB veterans, the Russian leadership more than many other Russians requires that even open source information (OSI) is assessed and confirmed by the intelligence agencies. The SVR is also involved in counter-intelligence within their own agency, whereas the extensive hunting down of political dissidents and individuals wanting to leave the country is handled entirely by the FSB and other agencies and non-governmental entities. Judging by information divulged by individuals who have served in the KGB, it can be assumed that this 'refinement' of the different fields of activity (and the organisational structure) is appreciated.



The SVR (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki) is tasked with protecting Russia by collecting and analysing information, which is passed on to the country's president and other leading figures in the Kremlin. The SVR mainly relies on human sources, who in different ways are made to contribute valuable information to the agency's intelligence officers. The intelligence gathering methods used by the KGB and the SVR have never been far apart. The most significant differences relate to the new opportunities presented by IT and the internet.

The director of the SVR is appointed directly by the president, who can also dismiss the director at his own discretion. The activities of the SVR are strategically regulated by the *Federal Law No. 5-FZ On Foreign Intelligence*, passed by the State Duma on 10 January 1996, and its subsequent amendments. Under this law, the president is granted a key role in several important strategic decisions. Several heads of the SVR have expressed their satisfaction at having a president who instinctively knows what they are talking about.

Twentieth century intelligence history

The SVR derives from the Cheka's Foreign Department INO (Innostranny otdel), which was established on 20 December 1920, exactly three years on the day after the founding of the Cheka itself. Initially, the SVR had only 70 staff members but the agency grew rapidly. Although there was some collaboration between the INO and Razvedupr (the name of the GRU before 1942), most of its close collaboration was with the Comintern's International Liaison Department OMS, which until 1943⁹ was the third intelligence agency in the Soviet Union alongside the Cheka and the GRU.

Foreign communists were recruited to work for the communist parties in their respective countries. Promising recruits were selected to attend the Higher Party School in Moscow, with top students subsequently being recruited by the OMS, where they were used as couriers and taught radio and telegraphy, document forgery, how to use invisible ink and so on. If Moscow was satisfied with their achievements, OMS agents could later be recruited by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the GRU. **Leopold Trepper**, leader of the GRU

'Red Chapel' network in Western Europe, began his career in the OMS. This was also the case of the legendary spy **Richard Sorge**, who operated in Japan, and the British top agent **Kim Philby**, who was recruited by two female Comintern agents in Austria.¹⁰ However, while Trepper and Sorge both worked for the GRU, Philby settled for the NKVD.¹¹ Many of the most well-known agent handlers and recruiters also had a background in the Comintern and had worked in several communist parties across Europe. If nothing else, this made life easier for the passport forgers at the GRU and the NKVD as many Comintern agents could use either their own identity documents or the identity documents of their party comrades. At that time, many countries did not have photographs in their passports and it was still a world in which an individual was believed to be whom he or she said they were.

At the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, the democratic Russia sought to dissolve the Cheka in an attempt to prevent its ongoing destructive activities across the country. Also at this time, the largest and most important directorates of the KGB were transformed into independent agencies¹², and foreign espionage – which had hitherto been carried out by the First Main Directorate – re-emerged as a much slimmed down version of itself, now referred to as the Foreign Intelligence Service, SVR (Служба внешней разведки, СВР).

Staff numbers dropped by at least 50 per cent. The number of students attending the KGB 101 School also dropped, from some 300 students to just 50, and many residencies in countries that Russia was not particularly interested in at the time were closed. According to available information, a majority of these residencies were located in countries in Africa and Latin America. With declining morale, and with bleak prospects for the future, most activities in the early 1990s lay fallow. Proactive and high-achieving intelligence officers left the SVR while those with less chances elsewhere remained. However, towards the mid-1990s this trend changed and several Chekists returned to the warmth. They may have picked up on signals of forthcoming change, or they may have discovered that the grass is not always greener on the other side of the fence.

Top levels of the SVR

The central organisation of the SVR is divided according to five organisational principles:

Collecting Departments [Добывающего аппарата],
 Analytical Departments [Аналитического аппарата],
 Operational and Technical Departments [Оперативно-технических служб],
 Support services [Вспомогательных служб] and
 Education and training [Обучение, Подготовкой]

The SVR website provides a very general overview of the agency, including an organisation chart outlining its highest management structure.¹³ According to the chart, the agency consists of a director, a state secretary and a first deputy director. In addition, there are four deputy directors, each with their own area of responsibility, and several support services for the agency's highest management. The website also provides information on six directorates [Управление], the two SVR functions; the Management of Operators, and Service and Support

[Служба эксплуатации и обеспечения] as well as the SVR Academy of Foreign Intelligence (formerly the KGB 101 School).

Given the areas for which the four deputy directors are responsible, and given the six directorates mentioned on the website, it is possible to say at least something about the types of activities carried out by the SVR. The areas for which the four deputy directors are responsible are listed as personnel, science and education, operations, and operational techniques and logistics. The six directorates listed on the website are responsible for *Analysis and information*, *External counter-intelligence*, *Economic intelligence*, *Science and technology*, *Operational technology*, and *Informatics, IT and the internet*.

A secret organisation?

According to the SVR, current legislation prevents the agency from publishing information on other organisational structures, or further details on already known directorates, departments and other divisions, or information on its employees. However, other parts of the agency have already been known for some time and knowledge about these structures would hardly be detrimental for the activities of the SVR – quite the opposite. One such example is the Spetsnaz unit Zaslou, established in 1993, which has been involved in numerous operations in many countries over the past 25 years. Other parts of the SVR, such as Directorate S, have been mentioned in recent interviews with Cheka veterans who certainly would have known better had the SVR really wanted to keep their organisational structures secret to the outside world. As these interviews concerned the expulsion from the US of ten Russian illegals in 2010, it is evident that the interviewees referred to Directorate S of the SVR, and not to the former KGB directorate with the same name. Several representatives from this SVR directorate have also appeared in Russian media, especially in the past five years. Since 2016, when **Sergey Naryshkin** became director of the SVR, it appears that the illegals' activities are those that the agency is most proud of and boasts most about.

Directorate ER, Economic Intelligence [Управление экономической разведки] was revealed in 2013–2014, when three of its officers were caught in the US. Two of them were declared *persona non grata*¹⁴ whereas the third officer, **Yevgeny Buryakov**, lacked diplomatic immunity and was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison and was fined \$10 000. Acknowledging the existence of this directorate would presumably strengthen the Russian general public's view of the SVR.

Further information that has been very useful relates to knowledge about the KGB's foreign intelligence organisation in the 1980s. It is evident that the SVR has subsequently engaged in similar activities, which when further examined appear almost identical to those of the KGB both in terms of modus operandi, scope and even names. While there have been some changes to parts of the organisation, and some parts have seen more than one change – including renaming of directorates to confuse outsiders – it is clear that none of these decisions have been taken lightly. Thus, it would appear that the old cliché “if it ain't broke, don't fix it” is familiar also to Moscow.

In the present study, information on other structural divisions of the SVR, including information on directorates, departments and sections, has been obtained from a wide range of open sources associated with manufacturers of medal, decorations, pennants and uniform patches; memoirs; Russian online auctions; online chat forums in the West and in Russia; and other data retrieved online. Based on this information, some 80–90 structural divisions of the SVR have now probably been correctly identified.

Information control weaknesses

Considering the SVR's unwillingness to make information about its organisation public, it is something of a paradox to find quite a lot of information about the SVR, in Russian, readily available across Russian society. This undoubtedly begs the question if the SVR has no interest in preventing the dissemination of this information, or if its capability to do so is somehow lacking. It appears that the SVR and other organisations in Russia are either not aware of what information is being spread online, in spite of their infamous hacking organisations and IT skills, or their interest in protecting this type of information is minimal and thus in stark contrast to what is being communicated on the SVR's website. A third theoretical possibility could be that the sole purpose of manufacturing medals and other decorations is to mislead anyone using open source information. However, it is very likely that details of such a scheme would leak in Russia, and Russian collectors, manufacturers, veterans' associations and others with an interest in this area would probably cause bad publicity to such an extent that this approach would not be viable. Whatever the reason, no open and direct measures seem to have been taken against individuals publishing information on the more 'secret' structural divisions of the SVR.

Furthermore, it is evident that it is only in the past few years that the Russian Armed Forces have addressed the vast problems associated with the flow of information in social media in general, and more specifically from Ukraine and Syria, where military conscripts, contract soldiers and sometimes officers have posted large quantities of images and information relating to their activities – often revealing information that should never have been documented privately in the first place, let alone posted online. In summary, it appears that President Putin and his closest associates as well as legislative politicians and senior officials at Russia's most critical agencies largely lack a more grounded understanding of IT, the internet and social media.

Lay-out of the study

This study is broadly divided into four themes, the first of which addresses the central structural divisions of the SVR, i.e. the parts of the agency close to the director and that are also openly accounted for by the SVR, for instance on its website. This theme is followed by a description of the structural divisions of the SVR that can probably be classified as directorates or departments [Управление]. Comparing the large number of such structural divisions within the SVR to the entities of the former KGB, one may assume that 'Управление' possibly carries a somewhat broader meaning today. The third theme concerns a number of structural divisions that operate centrally but on a level below that of the directorates. The fourth and final theme lists a number of structural divisions that most likely belong to the SVR but whose functions and/or organisational affiliations remain unclear. Considering how much information I have nevertheless been able to find on these structural divisions of the agency, the possibility of finding even more details should not be overlooked. This account is followed by a description

of the local residencies of the KGB and the SVR, including a both historical and up-to-date description of the different 'lines' (sub-departments) linked to the residencies.



Key functions of the SVR

According to the SVR, its key functions are:

The Director of the SVR – Директор СВР

The Office of the Director – Аппарат Директора

The Protocol Department – Протокольный отдел

The Group of Consultants – Группа консультантов

The Collegium – Коллегия

The State Secretary – Статс-секретарь

The Academy of Foreign Intelligence, AVR – Академия внешней разведки, AVR

The First Deputy Director of the SVR – Первый заместитель Директора СВР

The Bureau of Public Relations and Media – Бюро по связям с общественностью и СМИ

Deputy Director for Personnel – Заместитель Директора по кадрам

Deputy Director for Science – Заместитель Директора по науке

Deputy Director for Operations – Заместитель Директора по операциям

Deputy Director for Logistics – Заместитель Директора по материально-техническому обеспечению

Directorate for Information and Analysis, IAU (SVR INFO) (existed also during the KGB era) – Управление анализа и информации, ИАУ. Established in 1943.

Office of External Counter-intelligence, VKR (existed also during the KGB era) – Управление Внешней Контрразведки, ВКР. Established in 1963.

Department of Economic Intelligence, ER – Управление Экономической Разведки, ЭР. Established in 1994.

Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, NTR (existed also during the KGB era) – Управление Научно-технической разведки, НТР. Established in 1925.

Directorate for Operational Technology – Управление оперативной техники, опертехники. Established in 1937.

Department of Informatics – Управление информатики

Operational Departments¹⁵ – Оперативные отделы

Service and Support – Служба эксплуатации и обеспечения

The SVR headquarters in Yasenevo [Ясенево]

In addition to the above, the SVR headquarters in Yasenevo has expanded considerably during Putin's presidency. The headquarters was originally built for the International Department of



the CPSU. However, as its staff considered the location of the new headquarters to be much too distant from central Moscow, the KGB's First Main Directorate (not including Directorate S) relocated to the new complex in 1972. Yasenevo would later become the headquarters of the SVR.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has produced a detailed assessment based on satellite photographs taken between 2007 and 2018, entitled *Expansion of Russian Foreign Intelligence Service HQ* (<https://fas.org/irp/eprint/svr-expansion.pdf>). It is demonstrated in this assessment that the number and size of the buildings have at least doubled since the year 2000. The geographical area of the headquarters has also expanded, and stronger physical protection has been put in place to prevent unauthorised access. For further details, see Appendix 1, *The SVR's headquarters, 68 buildings and areas*, p. 85.

In addition to the central organisation of the SVR, its **Data Processing Centre**, TsOD (Центр обработки данных, ЦОД) and possibly the **Sports Club Alfa-Beta** (Спортивный клуб Альфа-Битца) are also located at the Yasenevo headquarters. Although the sports club and others engaged in sport may have some connection or other to the SVR, this has not prevented them from participating in decade-long protests against the agency's ongoing appropriation of land previously used for training. The headquarters also houses a wide range of everyday amenities, including a supermarket, a doctor's surgery, a petrol station, a vehicle service station and a recycling centre. Among registered companies are a dental practice and a pre-school facility. The SVR also prides itself of its very own fire brigade. The significance of having a doctor's surgery and a fire brigade close by became evident, for instance, in the autumn of 2019 when a young boy drowned after he had become trapped in the agency's swimming pool.

It is also worth mentioning that the SVR is not generally a well-liked neighbour. There has been a number of serious conflicts both with neighbours protesting against the new constructions built by the SVR and by athletes whose skiing tracks and other training facilities have become impossible to use due to the new fencing put in place by the agency. These conflicts go back more than ten years. Several of the constructions both inside and outside Yasenevo are known to have been carried out by the SVR Capital Construction Directorate, UKS. Other buildings have been constructed by external companies.

The financing of this vast construction project is not entirely clear. While the SVR's budget mainly emanates from the state, information on its actual size is kept secret. That said, there is information that Russia's Ministry of Economic Development has poured money into the SVR for many years, amounting to hundreds of millions of rubles annually.

SVR directorates

The SVR appears to consist of around 40 directorates – structural divisions referred to in Russian as 'Управление'. The KGB was made up of roughly the same number of directorates, with the notable difference that the KGB covered all fields of activity that are currently carried out by the SVR and the FSB, respectively. A quick comparison between the SVR and the FSB indicates that the two agencies have several structural divisions with identical names and

functions, such as counter-intelligence, personnel, informatics, IT, information, training and other directorates that presumably exist within both agencies.

Directorate ER, Economic Intelligence – Управление экономической разведки. Although the directorate was set up in 1994, intelligence activities focusing on economic circumstances go further back in history. Line ER has been known in connection with the KGB residencies since at least 1990. It is further known that SVR employees, or individuals probably affiliated with the Active Reserve, have held leading posts in at least 30 Russian banks.



In 2015, the FBI identified three members of this directorate in New York, where they had operated on and off between 2010 and 2015. Two of them had diplomatic immunity and were expelled from the country. The third individual, who was employed by the Russian Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank, VEB), was sentenced in 2016 to two-and-a-half years in prison and issued a fine of \$10 000.¹⁶ Finding the VEB in this context is no mere coincidence. The bank was founded already in 1924 by the Swedish citizen **Olof Aschberg**, known as the Red Banker.¹⁷ The bank has always played a key role for the

Cheka and continues to do so still today. Between 2004 and 2016, **Vladimir Dimitriev** was the bank's director. Prior to that, it appears that Dimitriev did a very good job in Sweden (1979–1986 and 1987–1993, the final years as the SVR Resident).

Directorate ETU, Operational Technology – Управление ЭТУ, Эксплуатационно-техническое управление. Established at least 25 years ago. One of few SVR directorates with its own emblem. The directorate, which was most likely established in 1991, consists of at least three departments (otdel).



Its emblem consists of a three-fourth stylised cogwheel, incapsulating a stylised globe (similar to that of the SVR emblem), which together form the Cyrillic letter Э followed by the Cyrillic letters T and У, i.e. ЭТУ (ETU).



Finance Directorate – Финансовое управление. Handles the finances of the SVR.



Directorate I, Information – Управление И, Информации (existed also during the KGB era). Established in 1969. Represented at KGB residencies by occasional officers from Line I or Line AIS [Лини И, Информации; Лини АИС, Аутоматизированный Информационный Системы]. Involved in IT operations around the world.



In 2003, **Sergey Petrovich Panasenko**, one of the directorate's employees, completed a thesis on cryptographic algorithms entitled *Development and analysis of interfacing systems for key cryptographic algorithms and standard software packages*.

Some years ago, Directorate I was involved in public procurement of software to be used in three interesting projects known by their cover names Storm-12, Monitor-3, Dispute [Шторм-12, Монитор-3, Диспут]. All three projects concern some kind of surveillance of the internet and social networks. However, to date not much more is known about either of these projects.

In all likelihood, Directorate I is responsible for the notorious SVR hacker group 'Cozy Bear', which has been active since at least 2008, probably longer. The group, which has around ten members, was subject to close examination by the Dutch intelligence service between 2014 and 2017. The Dutch service had continuous access to the group's computers for a little more than three years. By sharing this data with among others American partner agencies, it was possible to make valuable advances in the investigations into for instance the Russian interference in the United States 2016 elections.¹⁸ 'Cozy Bear' is known to have coded at least ten trojan horses and hacker programs that have been used by the group as part of its hacking activities (Hammertoss, TDiscover, UpLoader, uqu, SeaDuke, Cozyduke, Miniduke).

IATs, Information and Analytical Center – ИАЦ, Информационно-аналитический Центр. The centre has existed for at least ten years.



Directorate IAU, Information and Analysis – Информационно Аналитическое управление. Established in 1943.



Directorate for Informatics – Управление информатики. Reports directly to the deputy director for science and technology.

Directorate K, Personnel – Управление кадров (existed also during the KGB era). Established in the 1920s. Reports directly to the deputy director for personnel. During the KGB era, Directorate K had approximately 10 departments.



Directorate KI, unknown activities.



Directorate KN Disarmament and Non-proliferation – Управление КН (existed also during the KGB era). This directorate, which has existed for at least 25 years, seems to be previously unknown. It is very doubtful if the KGB was ever involved to any larger extent in disarmament issues. In my understanding, such matters used to belong exclusively to the GRU.



The KGB veteran **Gennady Evstafiev** (1938–2013), who was the front figure of the SVR for many years, headed this directorate until 2003. Evstafiev had a history of having been posted to Pakistan, India and Japan. He was also a resident at the United Nations' headquarters in New York and served as Russia's permanent representative to NATO in 2000-2003. Following his retirement, Evstafiev was active in one of the SVR's more important front organisations, the PIR Center, which devotes much of its extensive efforts to non-

proliferation and research into nuclear weapons. The PIR Centre was founded in 1994 and one of its functions is to deploy staff to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and several research institutes in e.g. the US.

Directorate M, Information and Analysis – Управление М (existed also during the KGB era). This directorate has existed for at least 40 years, and probably for at least ten years longer. The directorate publishes a journal called *Bulletin R* [Бюллетень Р], which has existed for at least fifty years, suggesting that the directorate is at least as old as its journal.





Directorate MS, Support measures, Active measures, Disinformation – Управление МС, Меры Содействия (existed also during the KGB era).

This directorate has existed for at least 90 years. Already in 1922, the deputy head of the Cheka, Jozef Unszlicht, and the head of the GRU, Oskar Stigga, made concerted efforts in the area of disinformation, which also involved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and the Comintern. In 1923, this initiative became known as the Special Disinformation Office. These efforts, in different forms, continued within the Cheka until the end of the 1950s, for instance within the MID and the Information Committee

(KI). In 1959, Department D (Disinformation) was established in the KGB's PGU, resulting in a new start in this area. Department D was later renamed Department A (Active measures). In 1961, the main office of the Novosti Press Agency (APN) was incorporated into Department A. Until 1991, activities in this area were largely carried out under the auspices of the International Department of the CPSU, which in turn was a continuation of the control exerted by the Soviet leadership over the Comintern. In more recent years, the party's International Information Department was also involved in managing its activities.

Directorate MS – organisational structure in the 1970s and 1980s:

- Management (chief, deputy chiefs, party committee) [Руководство (начальник, заместители начальника, партком)]
- Direction Political [Направление политическое]
- Direction Operational [Направление оперативное]
- Direction Economic [Направление экономическое]
- Direction Military-political [Направление военно-политическое]
- Direction KR Counter-intelligence [Направление КР контрразведка]

Today's Directorate MS for Support Measures appears to be one of the most important SVR directorates, due not least to its very extensive activities targeting the West, but also targeting Russia's own population. In the 1990s, several leading SVR representatives claimed that the agency's 'active measures' had been discontinued and were not going to be resumed, a claim that was evidently sheer disinformation. Today, several hundred government agencies and government-operated non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) are involved in Moscow's disinformation and influencing campaigns, as are several hundred propagandists, journalists, writers and so on. Most of these activities are carried out from Moscow, but the resources allocated for these activities outside Russia are also enormous. It is worth pointing out, however, that only a relatively small proportion of Russia's total efforts in this area are carried out clandestinely and today's SVR probably engages in less activities abroad compared to the situation during the Soviet era. Much of Russia's activities are carried out overtly. Finally, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that Directorate MS has a Department A,

which has existed for 90 years. There is no available information on its current activities, size, leadership, etc.

Directorate MVK – Управление МК. MVK is likely an abbreviation for 'Interagency Commission' [Межведомственная комиссия]. This directorate is at least ten years old and is a structural division that exists within both the SVR and the FSB (sic!). The more precise nature of the cooperation between the two agencies has not been fully clarified but probably concerns their collaboration with other government agencies, companies, schools, etc. It appears that both the SVR and the GRU are encouraging studious and intelligent youth to apply to the FSB Academy and its Institute of Cryptography, Telecommunications and Computer Science, IKSI.



The highly acclaimed FSB Academy attracts many young students with advanced IT skills.

All three intelligence agencies evidently want to see higher numbers of students apply to the Academy and they are keen to add new talents to 'Cozy Bear' and 'Fancy Bear' in the future. The well-known virus expert **Yevgeny Kaspersky** was a student at the IKSI between 1982 and 1987 (when the school was run by the KGB). When this information appeared in media, both Kaspersky and his company denied these allegations, claiming that he had not studied at the institute until the 1990s. Yet, as can be seen in this photograph, this is not true as Kaspersky is clearly wearing one of the KGB's cadet uniforms (the letter K can be seen on one of Kaspersky's shoulders). Such uniforms have not used after 1991.



Considering the ongoing worldwide debates about China's involvement in the development of 5G networks, one may ask whether in fact not all Chinese and Russian companies should be prevented from providing software to the West.

Directorate NN – Управление НН (existed also during the KGB era). Unknown activities. Established in 1956.



OA, SVR's Operational Archive – ОА, Оперативный Архив (existed also during the KGB era). The archive was established in 1920, in direct connection to the establishment of the Cheka's Foreign Department (INO) on 20 December 1920. Information held in this archive is presumably used on a regular basis.



Directorate OS – Управление ОС (existed also during the KGB era). Unknown activities. The directorate has existed for at least 80 years.

Directorate OT, Operational and Technical Support – Управление Оперативно-технического оснащения, ОТ.

Directorate OTU, Operational Technology – Управление ОТУ, Оперативно-техническое управление.¹⁹ (Directorates OT and OTU both existed during the KGB era albeit at different times). Established in 1937, re-organised on 2 July 1959. Reports directly to the SVR's deputy director for science and technology. It is likely that Directorates OT and OTU are one and the same directorate, either having used the two names at different times, or having used the two names interchangeably, possibly as a result of when people began to work at the directorate, or when they worked at or near the directorate.



A continuation of this old KGB directorate can also be found in the FSB. Several research institutes established in the 1950s and 1960s were closely linked to the activities of this directorate, including TsNIIST, NIIAI and TsNIISI.

Directorate OTU – earlier organisational structure:

1st Department (security detail)

2nd Department (eavesdropping of telephones and rooms)

3rd Department (production of cryptography, documents for operational purposes, examination of documents and handwriting)

4th Department (radio reconnaissance)

5th Department (manufacturing of optical equipment)

6th Department (postal control)

Directorate R, Operational Planning and Analysis – Управление Р, Оперативное планирование и анализ (existed also during the KGB era). Established in 1975. In the early 1980s, the directorate had 30–40 employees, some ten of whom were consultants. The directorate’s main task is to assess and evaluate the SVR’s operations abroad.

Directorate R used to be organised into three departments:

- “• 1st Department (analysis, compilation of comprehensive plans for the information work of the PGU, links with other units of the KGB and the International Department of the CPSU, the Ministry of Foreign Trade)
- 2nd Department (analysis and planning of recruitment activities, generalisation of experience, preparation of instructions, analysis of conducted operations)
- 3rd Department (integrated planning, control, management, organisational issues of the PGU)”²⁰

Directorate RER, Radio-Electronic Reconnaissance – Управления РЭР, Радиоэлектронная разведка. Directorate for signals intelligence. Russia uses several terms for this type of surveillance. It is also worth mentioning that signals intelligence is not an activity engaged in solely by the SVR. The FSB, the FSO and the GRU are also active in this area, and the agencies partly supplement and partly compete with each other.



The activities in this area appear to be divided into six separate areas:

Радиоэлектронная борьба, РЭБ – Radio-electronic warfare

Радиоэлектронная разведка, РЭР – Radio-electronic intelligence

Радиоэлектронное подавление, РЭП – Radio-electronic suppression

Радиоэлектронное противодействие, РЭП – Radio-electronic countermeasures

Радиоэлектронная защита, РЭЗ – Radio-electronic protection

Радиоэлектронные средства, РЭС – Radio-electronic means

Without seeking to define these areas, it appears that the different agencies operate according to partly different boundaries and, more specifically, different priorities. However, a more detailed assessment of these differences falls outside the scope of the present study.

Directorate RI, Intelligence Analysis – Управления РИ, Анализ разведывательной информации (existed also during the KGB era). Established in 1984. This directorate not only collects intelligence from all SVR residencies but also collaborates with the FSB, the GRU, the MID, Russia’s Academy of Sciences, several scientific institutes, and selected media with intelligence rapporteurs.

Directorate RP, Signals intelligence and Interception – Управление РП, Электронная разведка (existed also during the KGB era). Established in 1971. The difference between Directorate RER and Directorate RP, unless it is in fact the same directorate with different names, currently remains unknown. During the KGB era, there existed two directorates with activities bordering on each other that were later incorporated into FAPSI. When FAPSI was dissolved in 2003, its different parts were transferred to both the SVR and the FSB.



Directorate RT, Intelligence operations in Russia – Управление РТ, Разведка с территории (existed also during the KGB era). This directorate has existed for at least 30 years.



Directorate RT consists of at least three departments (otdel), the third of which is said to be (or to have been) focusing on the three Baltic States. It is currently unclear whether the directorate covers all former Soviet republics or only some of them, or whether all of the territories have been transferred to some other part of the agency.

One indication can be gained by examining a department within the Presidential Administration known as The Presidential Administration for Interregional and Cultural

Relations with Foreign Countries, which has a partly similar remit. The SVR intelligence officers working in this department are tasked with building relationships with all 14 countries that used to be Soviet republics.

The significance of these efforts, at least in the past, is well illustrated in a KGB school book entitled *Political Intelligence in the Territory of the USSR*, published in 1989. This 108-page book was used by the KGB 101 School's 1st Faculty.



Many of the activities in which Directorate RT is involved concern foreigners who recurrently come to Russia for various reasons, including as businessmen, students, researchers and journalists. These are all categories of individuals that the SVR has excellent opportunities to monitor, and its intelligence officers may even familiarise themselves with those individuals who are assessed to be of particular interest. As a result of the proximity to potential targets, the officers may collect information on a day-to-day basis, and it is also possible to use several officers and agents to monitor different aspects of

the life of a particular individual. Hence, the recruitment period can be significantly shorter while at the same time the targeted individuals are also much more exposed than what they would have been in their home environment. They may, for instance, have no colleagues or Swedish authorities to turn to for advice, and the interception and photo documentation may go on virtually around the clock. While this gives the SVR numerous advantages, it also often makes the targeted individual feel totally exposed.

Directorate S, Illegal Intelligence – Управление С, Нелегальная разведка (existed also during the KGB era). Established in 1922. (For further information, see pages 42 and 74.)

Directorate SI – Управление СИ (existed also during the KGB era). This directorate has existed for at least 50 years.



Directorate ShS, Cipher Department – Управление ШС, Шифровальная Служба (existed also during the KGB era). Possibly the oldest SVR directorate, established on 12 July 1921. Likely involved in breaking encryption as well as producing codes and ciphers for the SVR.

Directorate SR – Управления СР (existed also during the KGB era). Unknown activities. Established in 1972. Both badges carry images of icebergs with the image to the right also showing its underwater mass:



Security Directorate – Управления охраны. One of several SVR directorates dedicated to security management. At present, there is not sufficient information available to fully piece together the SVR's security organisation.

Directorate UKS, Capital Construction Directorate – Управление УКС, Управление капитального строительства. This directorate has existed for at least 20 years.



The activities of Directorate UKS are most likely complimented by other parts of the SVR as well as by at least one construction company owned by the SVR.

Yasen / Yasen Soshi [Ясень, Ясень Сочинский филиал] are construction companies owned and operated by the SVR. The names are obviously linked to the location of the agency's headquarters in Yasenevo. The company has existed for more than 25 years and has 50–100 employees. Its Sochi branch was set up in 2002 and has the same address as that of the agency's Pravda Sanatorium. It has emerged that the companies are also involved in a wide range of commercial activities that fall outside of their regular construction work.

Directorate USB, Internal Security – Управление УСБ, Управление собственной безопасности. This directorate has at least eight departments, the 8th of which is at least ten years old. In addition to Directorate USB, the SVR also has a Center for Internal Security, TsSB [Центр собственной безопасности, ЦСБ] and a Security Department [Отдел охраны]. Unfortunately, their relationship to Directorate USB has not yet been fully clarified. As



Directorate USB houses an 8th Department it may well be the case that the Security Department is a specialised security unit within this directorate. There is information to suggest that this department has number 1 among the numbered departments. Correct or not, it is known to have existed for at least 45 years.

Further to Directorate USB, there are also security departments in some of the other directorates, even if their precise number remains unknown. The SVR has made significant investments in security, especially when it comes to the Illegals Directorate, which has both its own internal security department and its own department for counter-intelligence.

Directorate USS, Directorate for Special Communication – Управление УСС, Управление специальной связи (existed also during the KGB era). This directorate is at least 80 years old and is known to have had a cipher department for at least 25 years. Directorate USS most likely handles radio and data communication between Yasenevo and the SVR residencies abroad.




Directorate USS has several facilities across Russia as radio still plays a key role in the SVR's general communications, but it also serves as a back-up should other means of communication, for instance via the internet, fail.



The directorate's main facility is reportedly the radio centre in Podolsk, a short distance south of Moscow. This facility consists of approximately 15 buildings, half of which are protected by double fencing. For security reasons, cars are not allowed to park inside the high security area.

The facility also has numerous antennas that are used for both receiving and transmitting encrypted radio traffic 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. The radio traffic mainly consists of messages sent between the headquarters in Yasenevo and the communication centres at the residencies.

Integral [Интеграл] is an unknown part of the SVR. Considering the design of this SVR badge, displaying a satellite antenna, one hypothesis could be that Integral is involved in some kind of special communication. Otherwise, the only available information on Integral is that it has existed for at least 20 years.



Directorate VKR, External Counter-Intelligence – Управление ВКР, Внешняя Контрразведка (existed also during the KGB era). Formerly known as Directorate K – Управление К, Контрразведка. Established in January 1963, at least in its present form. The



director initially had seven departments, which by 1990 had expanded into 10 different departments. Operated mainly abroad. The directorate was tasked with protecting the activities of the SVR and the overall Russian representation as well as penetrating the intelligence and security agencies of their antagonists. At present, it has not been possible to determine whether there are any organisational or operational differences between Directorate K and Directorate VKR. Throughout the 1970s, the well-known KGB general Oleg Kalugin was involved in leading the directorate, as its deputy head in 1971–1973 and as head of the organisation in 1973–1979. At local residencies abroad, this directorate has been represented by Line KR.

Directorate VKR – organisational structure in the late 1980s:

The directorate's management, with head, deputy heads and other staff

| | |
|----------------|---|
| 1st Department | The American continent |
| 2nd Department | The European countries |
| 3rd Department | The countries of the Third World |
| 4th Department | Emigrants from the Soviet Union, ideological opponents, international terrorism |
| 5th Department | Internal security at the First Main Directorate and at the legal residencies |
| 6th Department | Counter-intelligence at merchant ships abroad and aircrews |
| 7th Department | Information and analysis |
| 8th Department | Protection for trade representations and companies abroad |

The directorate's special department is tasked with attempting to foist false defectors on foreign intelligence agencies. While this may seem like a golden opportunity to trick their antagonists, the most significant problem for the Kremlin has always been their reluctance to give away enough correct and reliable information to help build the trustworthiness of the defector. For one thing, the Kremlin would have to take the risk of revealing a number of secrets hitherto unbeknownst to their antagonists. However, this is not only a risk to which they do not want to expose themselves, but it would also be nearly impossible to be granted permission to do so either by someone higher up in the hierarchy or by the country's president.

In the final years, before the break-up of the Soviet Union, this directorate had just over 200 employees in Moscow. At the same time, Line KR had at least 500 staff members posted at embassies and consulates in other countries.²¹ Today, just like during the KGB era, the main activities of Directorate VKR are probably focused on the intelligence and security agencies of other countries. The directorate likely also takes an interest in other countries' police authorities

and other government agencies involved in immigration matters. Another large responsibility assigned this directorate concerns organisations described as 'anti-Russian' as well as anyone seen as belonging to the group referred to as 'Russian compatriots'. The latter category may of course feel more or less enthusiastic about helping Rodina. Unfortunately, however, this has also resulted in many people in the West regarding Russians in the same way today as they did in the 1920s and 1930s, when all Russians were seen as unreliable and thought to have dual loyalties should it come to a conflict between the East and the West. If such suspicions become widely spread across the West, it would only benefit the Russian intelligence apparatus and possibly make even more Russians support the Moscow leadership.

Directorate VMU, Mobilisation – Управление ВМУ, Военно-Мобилизационное Управление. Probably established already in the 1920s. At present, there is no further information on this directorate.



Directorate VS, External relations, Foreign contacts – Управление ВС, Управление Внешних Связей. Established at least 25 years ago. The directorate probably did not exist during the KGB era when needs and requirements were quite different.



Between 1993 and 1998, the notorious Chekist and colonel general **Grigory Rapota** was deputy director of the SVR with special responsibility for Directorate VS, and more specifically the US and Scandinavia. Anyone with a good memory may recall that Rapota was expelled from Sweden on the Cheka Day, 20 December 1983, having been identified as belonging to Line PR.²² Another individual affiliated with Directorate VS, also known because of his time in Sweden, was the former Line N officer **Boris Grigoriev**, who had also been posted to East Germany, Iceland, Denmark and Norway. Grigoriev probably worked for Directorate S in all of these countries. During his time in Directorate VS, Grigoriev was responsible for Western Europe. **Leonid Reshetnikov** headed this directorate until 2009.

Other key functions of the SVR

Below are some other key functions that are important to incorporate into this report.

SVR's Scientific Council – СВР Ученом Совете (existed also during the KGB era). This function has existed since the 1940s, if not longer. Among its responsibilities is to decide who should receive certain SVR awards within the area of scientific research.

SVR's Foreign Intelligence Hall – Зал истории внешней разведки (existed also during the KGB era). Established more than four decades ago, during the KGB era, when the then head of the KGB, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, wanted to honour the centenary of the birth of the first head of the Cheka, Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky, born on 11 September 1877, by founding a museum in what was at that time the premises of the PGU.



Today, the museum is run in close collaboration with the SVR's Veterans' Council. There is also some collaboration with various veterans' associations affiliated with the SVR and the KGB, the extent of which however remains unknown.

Prior to the centenary in 2020, the SVR announced that it would open at least three new SVR museums across the country. According to an announcement made by the Russian Historical Society (chaired by the SVR director Sergey Naryshkin), one of the new museums is to be located next to the SVR's Bureau of Public Relations and Media in Ostozhenka ulitsa. Another museum will open in Shatrovo, named after Pavel Fitin, former head of intelligence. This museum has been initiated by the Regional Fund for Social and Legal Support of Veterans and Special Services Employees Blagovest. A third museum will open in Chelyabinsk, called *The Shield and the Sword of the Fatherland*. Here, volunteers have been involved through the Coordination Bureau of the Councils of Veterans of Security Agencies in the Urals Federal District, alongside the mayor and the governor, and the SVR and the FSB. The plan was for both of these museums to open on the Cheka Day, 20 December 2020.

SVR's Cabinet of Foreign Intelligence History [Кабинет истории внешней разведки]. Established in the same year as the Foreign Intelligence Hall, the two institutions are likely closely related. Vladimir Sergeyevich Antonov was a KGB veteran who had worked for the agency for many years before he was appointed head of the cabinet. He had a solid background, including cover positions as a correspondent for the news agencies TASS and Izvestia in both Switzerland and Belgium before his promotion to the SVR Bureau of Public Relations and Media. In 2002, Antonov was awarded the SVR literary price. He has written more than 30 books on various aspects of the Russian foreign intelligence service.



Judging by its activities, the department is heavily involved not only in the SVR's publishing of books, but it also works with the SVR's Veterans' Council to acquire artefacts for the museums and it also engages in other heritage-related activities, such as erecting new monuments and statues to commemorate well-known Chekists. Most of these Chekists have been well-known illegals, and in the past six years there have been at least four elaborate monuments created in honour of Ischak Achmerov, Artur Artuzov, Mikhail Mukasey and Gevork Vartanyan. Interestingly, and as by a twist of fate, none of them were Russian.

SVR's Training Centre, UTs – СВР Учебный Центр. This function, having existed for at least 25 years, is located in Firsanovka, Moscow oblast.



The Far East Department – СВР Органы Разведки Дальнего Востока (existed also during the KGB era). Established in 1922, this is one of the Cheka's oldest departments. Considering that this is now an SVR department, it would seem reasonable that its main interest is China, Korea, Japan and south-east Asia. However, it is worth bearing in mind that 'the Far East' is often also applied to Siberia and Mongolia.



SVR's Special Training Center, SUTs – СВР Специальный учебный центр, СУЦ (existed also during the KGB era). Established in 1977. The centre has several faculties (Кафедра, Факультет), e.g. the Faculty for Countering Terrorism, ВТ [Кафедра Борьбы с Терроризмом] and the Faculty for Operational Combat Training, ОВР [Факультет Оперативно-Боевой Подготовки].



The fact that the centre has more than one string to its bow became evident at the turn of the year 2010-2011, when a number of documents were found by an American journalist in Iraq. Searching through the headquarters of the Iraqi regime's security service, Mukhabarat, this journalist came across documents from the training centre, indicating that several Iraqi intelligence officers had attended a training course in 'acoustic surveillance methods'. Its implications were clear as the documents were found in one of Mukhabarat's offices responsible for interception operations.

Since at least the Second World War, both the Soviet Union and Russia have invited guests from a large number of friendly countries to attend courses in the Soviet Union, or Russia. The friendly countries, on their part, have provided the hosts with a significant number of individuals deemed suitable for recruitment alongside friendly visits to their respective countries providing a broad range of intelligence experience.

SVR's Service for Operational Support

This is a support function that falls directly under one of the deputy directors of the SVR. Apart from its name, not much is currently known about it.

A different type of activity, to say the least, and one that is probably not very closely tied the activities of the SVR, are the service's 'Competition for confectioners' [Соревнование кондитеров] and its 'Cooking competition' [Соревнование кулинаров] (sic!). If these awards are linked to the agency's staff welfare, or if they do in fact reflect actual operational training cannot be determined at this point.



The illegals programme

One important directorate that most definitely seems to have changed its name is the former Directorate S, now known as Directorate N [Управление Н Нелегальная разведка]. However, the directorate is still responsible for the SVR illegals. Since its renaming, the directorate would seem to share the letter N with Line N.

In spite of this directorate being responsible for some of the SVR's most clandestine activities, it has not managed to prevent information about its existence from being published. A number of badges, manufactured either by or for the SVR, can also be found on Russian auction sites. It appears that at least 25 different badges have been manufactured for Directorate N and its sub-departments N1, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6, N8 and N10, as well as for its Departments for Communication and Cryptography, Counter-intelligence, and Internal Security.



In addition, there is a veterans' association of unclear legal status: Клуб ветеранов Легенда, and a support fund for veterans from Directorate S [фонд ветеранов управления С].

It is possible that sub-departments N7 and N9 also exist, just as there could be sub-departments with higher numbers. The various department are, in turn, divided into sections. It is not known how many these sections are or what their main focus areas are. Examples include Department N2's section TsD and Department N10's section OD.



Direktorat S, möjligtvis Direktorat N [Незаконная разведка]. Avdelningarna N1, N1, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6, N8, N10 - sektion OD, samt "Intern säkerhet" och "Kommunikation o Krypto"

Established on 28 June 1922, Directorate S is one of the oldest structures of the Cheka. Even though the essence of this directorate has remained throughout this period, its activities and scope have shifted over time. The known setbacks to the illegals programme during the SVR era seem to be of a much more serious nature than anything that affected this directorate during the 71 years when it was run by the PGU, until 1991. The most serious blow was of course the disclosure in the US of two complete illegals networks in 2010. It is questionable whether anything like this could have happened during the KGB era, with its very different infrastructure and different working methods. However, for the time being, a more comprehensive analysis of this must be left aside. The arrests made after 1991 in e.g. Finland, Estonia, Germany and Canada should also be mentioned here. Considering that Russia would seem to be investing more resources than before in its illegals programme, these arrests must have been very

disruptive for its activities, quite irrespective of why the arrests happened or what the SVR knows about them.

Directorate S following the 1976 reorganisation:

- “1st Department (illegal immigrants of the centre)
- 2nd Department (the documentation and legends on regional questions)
- 3rd Department (selection and preparation of illegal immigrants)
- 4th Department (North and South America)
- 5th Department (Western Europe)
- 6th Department (Far East)
- 7th Department (North Africa, Middle East, Hindustan)
- 8th Department (direct actions) established in 1976 (e.g. spetsnaz in Afghanistan)
- 9th Department (security)
- 10th Department (work in the Soviet territory)”²³

Department P (Department F) – Financial intelligence, the use of the Chamber of Commerce (Отдел Ф – финансовая разведка, использование Торгово-промышленной палаты) was for many years headed by general Yevgeny Pitovranov. Sometimes, this department has been referred to as 'Department P' in honour of Pitovranov, who was the youngest KGB general ever at the time of his promotion.²⁴ At the age of 30, he was personally given the title by Stalin.²⁵

Vympel – the KGB’s Spetnaz infiltrators

The sub-departments of Directorate S seem largely to correspond to its previous organisational structure. During the KGB era, its 8th Department consisted of among other functions the Spetsnaz unit Vympel [Вымпел]. Established on 19 August 1981, Vympel played a key role in Afghanistan. Those joining the unit were all experienced with solid backgrounds.²⁶ In addition to the training received within the KGB, they were also trained by the Airborne Forces (VDV) and the Border Forces, as well as by pilots, seamen and tanker crews.



However, the staff involved in setting up Vympel was active already during the reconnaissance of Afghanistan, at least six months before the attack, and remained active until Vympel was formally established. Vympel consisted of four operational combat departments [оперативно-боевой отдел, ОБО] responsible for operations in Europe, Asia, Africa and America. More than 90 per cent of Vympel’s staff spoke foreign languages, with a majority speaking at least two or three languages apart from their native Russian. In the 1980s, Vympel is known to have operated in more than 20 countries around the world.²⁷ Vympel was subsequently transferred to the FSB.

The SVR equivalent to Vypel is **Zaslon** [Заслон], which was established in 1998 (other sources suggest it was established in either 1996 or 1997 – and according to this memorial badge it was established already in 1993!) The Spetsnaz unit was allegedly linked to the 7th Department of the SVR's Center for Internal Security [Центр собственной безопасности]. It is uncertain whether this information is correct, considering what is known about Zaslon's missions in several countries in the Middle East. It is impossible to know for sure whether these incorrect details are part of deliberate smoke screening as no other SVR unit is surrounded by as much false information and rumours.



Interestingly, the two Spetsnaz units set up by the KGB in the 1970s and 1980s were assigned vastly different missions. Both units were staffed almost entirely by officers. While Vypel focused on other countries, **Alfa** dealt with domestic security – countering domestic terrorism in particular. Alfa was established by Yury Andropov on 29 July 1974 and belonged to the KGB's 7th Department. Initially, the unit had 30 employees. In 1991, when the unit was transferred to what was to become the FSB, it had 500 employees. At that time, it consisted of ten departments located in Alma-Ata, Khabarovsk, Yekaterinburg, Kiev, Krasnodar, Minsk, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Sochi and Sverdlovsk, with approximately 50 employees per department.

SVR's technology espionage

There appears to have been a name change in regard to the SVR's industrial espionage. In the 1930s, the abbreviation NTR [НТР] was used for Scientific-technical intelligence [Научно-техническая разведка]. Later, the central directorate was referred to as Directorate T, while the local organisation at embassies and consulates around the world was referred to as Line X. During the SVR era, it seems that the old name, NTR, has been brought back in use. This was exemplified, for instance, in connection with the directorate's 85th anniversary when a table medal was minted displaying both variants ('T' and 'NTR').



The Academy of Foreign Intelligence, AVR

The Academy of Foreign Intelligence [Академия внешней разведки] dates back to the early days of foreign intelligence (INO, PGU) in 1920. However, it was several decades before any teaching was more firmly established. Over the years, the Cheka has had a vast number of schools, and the separation between them has not always been very well thought through. The standard procedure would seem to have been that when a department wanted to train its employees or wanted to run a specific programme with a view to recruiting new staff, the department itself would take this initiative and only later obtain approval from headquarters.

There have been both central and regional schools dedicated to only one or a few subjects, schools linked to different directorates, and specialised schools providing either theoretical or practical training.



Schools that in various ways correspond to the AVR were first established in 1922, when the GPU organised ‘higher courses’ for some of its key staff members. In 1929, the NKVD began to organise refresher courses that were six to twelve months long and could lead to further training to work for the INO. It was not until 1938 that special intelligence training was introduced, which was later to become the KGB 101 School and subsequently the AVR. Already at this time, much of the training took place in Balashikha [Балашиха] (today, much of the training of the FSB and SVR spetsnaz units takes place here).

It may be added that the special schools were responsible for the training of the border forces in these years. There was also specific training in driving, shooting, languages, etc. After the war, a sizeable organisation was set up with a large number of numbered schools.²⁸

The KGB ‘spy school’ was formally opened on 3 October 1938 as a ‘Special Purpose School’ [Школа особого назначения], the responsibility for which rested with the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) – a function within the NKVD. The GUGB existed between 1934 and 1938. Some years later, it was transformed into the NKGB.²⁹ Many name changes later, the school was finally renamed the Yuri Andropov Red Banner Institute.³⁰

The bulk of the school’s resources was used for longer programmes aimed at individuals who would become KGB officers. Depending on their prior education and if they had attended any previous courses, they would study for anything between one and five years. In the late 1940s, the total time spent in education was two-and-a-half years. By the 1980s, the total length of education had expanded to five years. Vladimir Putin was a student at the KGB 101 School for just over one year, partly because he had studied at the KGB 401 School in Leningrad in 1975–1976.

The 101 School also offered shorter specialist training and refresher courses. In the 1980s, there seem to have been at least 16 faculties. The students would learn about international politics, military history, law, administration etc., and they would also study topics directly linked to intelligence activities, such as radio technology, cryptography, foreign languages, counter-espionage techniques, etc.

In similarity with the SVR as a whole, relatively little is known about the Academy of Foreign Intelligence. It is assumed that the academy has fewer faculties than the 101 School. Exact numbers are not known but the school reportedly has at least four active faculties. However, thanks to the issuing of jubilee awards etc., further details about the school have gradually emerged. It has been established that the following faculties or institutes are also active: the

‘FPK’, which was established in 1981 and remained active until at least 2011; the ‘RT-1’ and the ‘RT-2’ (dates unknown); and ‘Kompleks VILLA’ established in 1959 and still active in 2009. The Academy of Foreign Intelligence is currently headed by Aleksandr Stushnov, who was a resident in Sweden between 2010 and 2016.

Research institutes serving the SVR

In its day, the KGB had several dozens of research institutes working in a variety of different fields. Some of these institutes were closed in connection with the break-up of the Soviet Union while others were divided between the FSB, the FSO, FAPSI and the SVR. Most of them were transferred to the FSB, which found itself in charge of some 20 different institutes.

Some of the institutes that can be linked to the SVR are largely unknown to me. There are several abbreviations that, in all likelihood, are linked to the SVR but whose activities remain unknown, including NIRIO, RIO, NKO, OPB, PFI, PFL TsP PPFi and RKI.

Scientific Research Center. Operated out of several Moscow locations. In Porechye, where the SVR now has a beautiful sanatorium, it was given three areas of land, measuring more than 8 100 m², as well as the estate itself, which had previously belonged to the Uvarov family. The centre was also given among other things a fabric factory, a mill, three or four other buildings, and barracks. Most of this has now be taken over by the sanatorium.



An unknown number of contracts have been signed with the FSB unit UMTO, which is responsible for materials technology and logistics. Information published on a website monitoring waste and crime within the state apparatus indicates that “every day, thousands of tons of cargo are transported by UMTO trains, planes and trucks to the FSB addresses.”³¹

The Scientific Research Center is located in a building constructed by Directorate UKS, at Tarusskaya ulitsa nr 22. In 2011, the centre figured in a wide tangle of economic crime, orchestrated by a high-flier at the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

Another institute is the **NIIRP** [НИИРП], which is more or less notorious for having attracted much attention in both Russian and international media. This institute was set up under the KGB’s First Main Directorate in the summer of 1979, when it was known as the Scientific Research Institute for Intelligence Problems [Научно-исследовательского института разведывательных проблем] and mainly processed open source information. In its early days, the institute had around 2 000 employees, who were principally tasked with wading through newspapers from around the world and to cut out and translate anything that could be of interest.³²

Further to the above-mentioned institutes, there are other institutes and companies acting as 'fronts' for the intelligence apparatus. These have either been set up on initiative by the KGB or the SVR, been provided with money, key staff etc., or they have been set up as private companies that for various reasons have turned to the SVR, or they have been linked to the SVR on initiative by the Cheka. For various reasons, they do not want to be too closely linked to the SVR, in the same way that the NIIRP also kept a certain distance. This applies still today.

The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, RISI [Российского института стратегических исследований, РИСИ] is a relatively new institute, established in 1992, which has become one of Putin's most important tools for exerting influence. There is no doubt that this institute is in the laps of the SVR. First of all, it remains on the same address in spite of its new scope and new formal head. Secondly, and most importantly, are the former and present heads of the institute. In 2009–2017, RISI was headed by Leonid Petrovich Reshetnikov, who was succeeded by Mikhail Yefimovich Fradkov. It is not difficult to see where RISI belongs.



Other key components of the SVR

The SVR's allegations that the remaining parts of its central organisation are classified to the extent that no information about them can be revealed would seem at least in part to be absolute nonsense or indicate that the agency is not taking its security work seriously. The fact that the SVR has a Veterans' Council [Совет ветеранов СВР] and a Council for Intelligence History [Кабинет истории внешней разведки] can hardly be the type of information that the agency cannot include among the structural divisions presented in the overview of its organisation. As regards the Illegals Programme, this is a function that obviously needs protecting with all means available. However, its existence and activities are hardly unknown, nor is this something that the agency for decades has kept silent about. On the contrary, this is something that the SVR is very proud of and also have every reason to be so. Hence, Russian intelligence history is full of book, stamps and much more showing the great extent to which official Russia wants to honour these activities as well as disseminate information about them. In this context, it is most peculiar to see how the SVR keeps ignoring its existence, thereby indicating that the agency is not quite clear on what it wants to achieve with its information policy and what should (and should not) be considered classified information.

Other SVR functions

Investigations into other parts of the SVR's organisation has, for instance, drawn upon research into the 'identities' of legal persons that can be linked to the SVR. In this context, I have mainly looked for numbers linked to military units [в/ч], tax numbers [ИНН], addresses, telephone numbers, leading figures and other information what can be linked to specific units within an agency or another organisation, or indeed independent legal persons.

Clubs

Several clubs seem to be allowed to use the SVR emblem. First, there is the old and well-known sports club Dynamo Sport, founded by the Cheka in 1923, and which has always been open for officers in the KGB and the MVD (i.e. the former NKVD). Dynamo now has one million members but at present the criteria for ordinary members remains unknown. The club is now divided in such a way that the club or section Dynamo-21 organises members from the SVR, while Dynamo-19 organises members from the FSO, and Dynamo-24 organises members from the FSB. At competitions, patronyms are sometimes used to hide the actual names of the participants from the SVR and other security organs. The Central Council of Dynamo has 208 members, four of which are from the SVR (a total of 44 members represent various organisations under cover names). One of the four SVR representatives is Dimitry Leonidovich Fadeyev, who is the SVR's first deputy director and secretary of state. Yet, in the list of members, his name is spelt Faddeyev!



The agency also has clubs for hunting and fishing [Клуб Рыболовов Охотников], for the arts [Клуб художников] and for other specialities such as 'Klub Pegas' [Клуб Пегас] as well as a dedicated tennis club [СВР Спортивный Теннисный клуб].

In Moscow, for instance, there is at least one general club for SVR officers, possibly two. One of the clubs, established in 1970, is open to members from both the FSB and the SVR, while the other club, which was probably established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is open only to SVR officers.

Delta, Scientific and Production Center (Дельта, Федеральное казенное предприятие) is a security company owned by the SVR.

Sanatoriums, etc.

There are at least two establishments in this category that have been officially attributed to the SVR: the Pravda Sanatorium in Sochi and the Porechye Sanatorium in Moscow oblast. Both establishments have belonged to the SVR since 1991. The Pravda Sanatorium, which has existed for at least 50 years, appears to consist of about fifteen buildings and has around 50 employees.

The SVR also has a rest home for seniors, Dom-Internat, registered in 1997, as well as a dental practice *Stomatologicheskaya poliklinika* and a nursery *Kindergarten No. 1461*, the latter two located at the Yasenevo headquarters.



Veterans' associations

Officers in the Russian Armed Forces and in the KGB, the SVR, the FSB, the FSO, the MVD and other agencies within the Russian security apparatus usually retire at the age of 55. Even though the average life expectancy among Russian men is at least 15 years lower than that of Swedish men, many of these retired members of staff are not prepared to retire and still want to contribute to their country. There are numerous active veterans' associations for retired employees from the Armed Forces and the security agencies, some of which are nation-wide while others are local. Some of the nation-wide associations have members and local branches in many of the CIS countries, and some of them also have active members in e.g. Germany and the US.

The number of members in the veterans' associations is not known, and more specifically it is not known how many members they have in relation to the number of retired employees, or how many of the veterans' associations are linked to the SVR. It is evident, however, that they play an active and important role in Russian society. To a large extent, the associations indulge in Soviet nostalgia and have an old-fashioned view on foreign and security policy according to which Nazi-Germany is understood to have executed the Polish officers in the Katyn massacres, Finland fired the first shot in the Winter War, and the CIA was behind the unrest in Eastern Europe in 1956, 1968 and 1980. They actively disseminate their views in connection with weapons exercises and as part of the patriotic schooling they pursue in schools and at summer camps. The associations also publish a fair amount of historical material on their websites and are actively involved in the writing and dissemination of historical and biographical books communicating a positive view of the intelligence agencies, the special units and the active foreign policy represented by the Soviet Union.

Symbols used by the SVR

This is the official SVR emblem:



In many contexts, the SVR makes use of one or several attributes found on its official emblem. At other times, the agency uses entirely different attributes, for instance for its different directorates.

This well-known and classical emblem, known as the shield and the sword, was originally used by the KGB. It is still often seen in many contexts and is used on a variety of different levels. It is somewhat problematic that this emblem is also frequently used by the FSB in particular but also by the FSO. However, it should be noted that SVR badges usually differ in that they tend to display less frequently used SVR attributes alongside the classical shield and sword symbol.

As will be shown on the following pages, one commonly used attribute is that of a stylised globe, crossed by a few lines of longitude and latitude. Another commonly used attribute is that of a radiant five-pointed star. Both attributes are also centrally placed on the official SVR emblem.

This badge indicates someone's affiliation with the SVR's Porechye Sanatorium:

On a background consisting of the shield and the sword is the radiant five-pointed SVR star, on top of which is the blue stylised globe with its lines of longitude and latitude.

Among the most frequently used attributes are the radiant five-pointed star and the stylised globe with lines of longitude and latitude, often forming a graphic pattern. Another frequently used attribute is that of a globe with the countries that, for instance, the directorate in question either works with or in.



A rare but characteristic attribute used by the SVR is that of an owl (cf. the GRU bat). Overall, the SVR does not seem to use any standardised typography, colour scheme, design and so on. Instead, the agency seems to endorse an 'anything goes' philosophy and clearly takes no interest whatsoever in matters of this kind.



Awards

To a large extent, the above badges represent the organisational structure of the SVR, thereby also describing some of their activities. There are also several medals and badges awarded by the agency to individual employees for their extraordinary achievements and, for instance, for their long and faithful service.

As part of its PR efforts, and as part also of its nation-wide propaganda efforts, the SVR introduced an annual cultural prize on 15 January 2000, which is awarded to well-deserved writers and artists. The first prize was awarded on the Cheka Day, 20 December 2000. By 2018, more than 60 individuals had received the prize, which also comes with a sum of money – 100 000 rubles to the first prize winner, 50 000 rubles to the second prize winner and 25 000 rubles to the third prize winner.³³



Unresolved questions

I have found several badges that are evidently produced by the SVR but where repeated investigations have not as yet yielded any further information.

TIS. This badge with the inscription 'ТИС 1973-2003 СБП' comes in at least three variants. Its connection with the SVR is strengthened by the fact that I was personally given this and two other SVR badges by an active SVR officer, who has also worked for the KGB in Sweden. In addition to the abbreviation SVR, this badge, in similarity with many other SVR badges, also displays the radiant five-pointed star.



T9. Another organisational structure, 'T9', was established in 1993 and remained active until at least 2008. Its current activities are unknown.



Unknown SVR units

Unit в/ч 12626. Unknown structure, unknown activities. Active at least between 2002 and 2017.

Unit в/ч 21247. Active at least between 2003 and 2019, located at 117602, Moscow, ulitsa Academician Anokhin, 6-5. Postal address: 101000, Moscow, General Post Office, PO Box 49.

Unit в/ч 49766. Address: 117465, Москва г, ул. Тёплый Стан, д. 3, к.1. Postal address 101000, г. Москва, а/я 611. This unit is co-located with units в/ч 18454 and в/ч 34016. Among its activities are deliveries of generator radio tubes to the Balashikha District.³⁴

Finally, the following units with military registration numbers are also part of the organisational structure of the SVR. Although they remain to be further investigated, their ties to the SVR are undisputed: **в/ч 18454, в/ч 25967, в/ч 34016 and в/ч 61360.**

Comparing the SVR and the KGB's PGU

In 1991, when Russia's democratic forces broke up the KGB into several independent agencies, virtually 100 per cent of the PGU (the KGB Directorate for Foreign Operations) was transferred to the new agency SVR. It is very unlikely that the SVR, at least in its early days in 1991, made any major changes to its organisation. Evidently, a considerable number of functions were added, which had previously been part of the KGB's central organisation, alongside some other important directorates, the activities of which were no longer directly available. This applied to administrative functions managing personnel, payrolls, health care and so on, and it probably also applied to operative functions such as surveillance, interception, photo labs, etc.

The administrative side of the SVR consists of directorates that also existed within the KGB, and which today can be found with identical or near identical names within both the SVR and the FSB.

Much of the operational activities are also carried out in ways similar to how things were done in the past. Numerous former KGB directorates remain with similar names or similar functions. Other activities have changed and/or have had their names changed. The most interesting example in this regard is the KGB's Service A, responsible for 'active measures', which the SVR leadership claimed had been discontinued at an official meeting with the CIA in Moscow. It was alleged by the SVR that these activities were no longer carried out due to the improved international situation in general and the improved relationship between Russia and the US in particular. This was nothing but sheer disinformation. The activities were never discontinued, it was only the directorate that changed its name.

Cooperation with the FSB, the GRU and other Russian intelligence organisations

Overall, it would appear that cooperation between the intelligence agencies – the SVR, the FSB and the GRU – is considerably much better today compared to what the situation was like during the Soviet era. The evidence for this is not set in stone but based on various indications that should be taken seriously. At the same time, it appears that critical information about their competitors have sometimes been deliberately leaked, including lists of personal data that have been published online.

The FSB is responsible for the physical surveillance of foreign embassies in Russia. However, as many foreign diplomats, due to their previous postings to other countries, are already known to the SVR, or will come to the attention of the SVR in the future when they are posted to other countries, the two agencies share a fair amount of information. There is also reason to believe

that the two agencies engage in some more hands-on cooperation, whereby they can learn from each other. In 2017, for instance, the Russians managed to trick the US into a contract for physical surveillance pertaining to the US Embassy in Moscow. At that time, the US had had to cut down its number of employees posted to the Russian capital and the hiring of a private company to carry out the physical surveillance of the embassy was considered a viable option. Hence, a contract was signed with Elite Security Holding, headed since 1997 by **Viktor Budanov**, a retired general from the SVR.³⁵ For several decades during the KGB era, he had worked in counter-intelligence and ended his long career as head of Directorate K, the KGB's counter-intelligence.

Since at least 2002, and for an unknown number of years after that, the FSB's **Management of coordination of the operative information**, [Управление координации оперативной информации], UKOI, has had SVR staff placed within its own agency. The same arrangement is known to have been in place at the FSB's Service for Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning (SAPSP). Directorate MVK, which is part of the organisation of both the SVR and the FSB, is another example of such cooperation. Seeing that the SVR has a directorate operating inside Russia, and that the FSB has the mandate to operate abroad, suggests that their cooperation is well-functioning.



Kompas [Компас] is an SVR department operated jointly with the GRU. Its activities are currently unknown. All available evidence suggests that it was established after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the KGB.



National Anti-Terrorism Committee, NAK, [Национальный антитеррористический комитет] appears to be an inter-departmental committee made up of all Russian agencies tasked with countering terrorism: the FSB, the SVR, the Armed Forces and the MVD. The committee was founded in 2006.



The SVR as part of Russia's administrative decision-making apparatus

In principle, all of Russia's intelligence agencies are represented as board members or council members in virtually every Russian authority involved in the country's foreign policy or security. This is true not only for the SVR but applies also to the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Russian Armed Forces (often the GRU), the Federal Protective Service (FSO), and others. Not only has the politics of appointment to such authorities provided the SVR with an opportunity to continuously collect information on what is going on within all sectors of Russia's administrative decision-making apparatus, but it has also given the agency an opportunity to communicate its own requests, requirements and instructions to all the authorities – including ministries, committees, institutes, etc. – that the SVR wants to influence and exercise control over. In total, several hundred board seats are filled by prominent representatives from the SVR.

This opens for the SVR, as well as for the FSB and the Armed Forces with the GRU, to govern all intelligence and security activities in Russian society, including its active measures and disinformation as well as initiating and managing deception campaigns. As regards the latter, the SVR has the main responsibility for ensuring that this area of operation proceeds and remains in line with the political goals set by Putin, the Presidential Administration and the agency itself. The allocation of responsibility largely resembles that of the KGB's relationship with the Politburo during the time of the Soviet empire. The SVR's representation in numerous boards linked to the administrative decision-making apparatus may also entail issues regarding personnel, including for instance cover positions, as well as providing the agency with an opportunity to both govern matters such as the recruitment of Russian citizens to the SVR (this also applies to the FSB and the GRU) and to ensure contact points for the many foreigners who visit Russia. For this reason, it has always been common practice that the international departments and foreign sections of authorities, companies, universities, large international corporations and so on have (and have had) a considerable number of Chekists employed as case officers within their respective organisations.

Considering the large number of authorities and organisations, there is every reason to believe that many of the SVR's representatives are brought in from the agency's **Active Reserve**³⁶ whose staff is concealed at other workplaces. Should this be the case, it is worth bearing in mind that this, under Russian law, is perfectly legitimate.

This is a mere fraction of the very many Russian authorities housing SVR representatives:

Russia's Security Council

Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Moscow State Institute of International Relations, MGIMO

State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots

Federation Council Committee for International Affairs

Presidential Administration for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

The Presidential Committee to Counter Attempts to Falsify History

Russian Direct Investment Fund

Russian Agency for State Reserves, Rosrezerv
 Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation
 International Institute for Energy Policy and Diplomacy, MIEP
 Center for Asia Pacific Studies, TsATI
 Russian State Commission for Radio Frequency, GKRCh

In addition to these state functions, the SVR is also represented in thousands of Russian companies, research institutes and bodies known as 'non-profit associations' in spite of the fact that such bodies have often been founded at the request of, and with the financial support from, the SVR. Such associations are sometimes also referred to as GONGOs.³⁷ However, it should be recognised that this is not some kind of illegal infiltration – the representation by the SVR in a wide range of governing and decision-making bodies as well as the agency's deployment of its own staff to work within these bodies is fully in accordance with Russian legislation. However, it is worth pointing out that the latter is not communicated to the Russian population.

According to provisions in Russia's *Federal Law No. 5-FZ On Foreign Intelligence*, dating back to January 1996, the SVR may place its staff within other authorities so as to fulfil its own remit. This staff often comes from the agency's Active Reserve. At other times, active officer cadets, fitting the qualifications of the workplace in question, are used to this end.

The MID and the MGIMO

The most important covert tools for the SVR's activities in the area of foreign policy is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and its university, the MGIMO, where many of Russia's intelligence officers are both educated and recruited. The university also produces vast amounts of SVR-inspired educational and research material, organise many events serving the interest of the intelligence service, and provides the SVR with thousands of cover positions mainly abroad but also in central Moscow. On top of this, the MID and the MGIMO function as gigantic 'influencing machines' for active measures and disinformation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID)

The close and intimate relationship between the Cheka and the foreign affairs services in Moscow began in the early 1920s and continues to this day. The Soviet Union was still in its infancy when representatives from the Cheka, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the GRU (known at the time as Razvedupr) and the Comintern met to discuss the ways in which they could best cooperate to reach their revolutionary goals.³⁸ There have always been close ties between Moscow's most important foreign policy actors. In contrast to the situation in Western democracies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has never been the main player in this team. In first place was the Soviet Communist Party, and in second place was the Cheka. Only after that came the minister of foreign affairs and his staff. This led to quite a few problems in Moscow as only a limited number of diplomats, journalists and politicians from the West knew how to handle the system. Being regarded time and again as number one, without being able to act in this position, undoubtedly caused a lot of tension. On the other hand, most diplomats are probably used to argue in favour of standpoints that are not their own, and to sign agreements even when they are not satisfied with the outcome.

It is important to understand that, at the end of the day, a country's foreign affairs services is also an intelligence organisation albeit not involved in espionage. Such activities are entrusted to the intelligence agencies, e.g. the SVR and the CIA. Yet, all foreign ministries collect and analyse information, which is exactly what any intelligence agency also does. What tends to distinguish them from one another is their use of different working methods. An intelligence agency may very well be involved in recruiting agents, bugging and burglaries, while a country's foreign affairs services – with its diplomatic status³⁹ – will only engage in legal and usually open information collection.

Stalin was always very interested in intelligence activities even if he never quite understood many of the basic operations carried out by the different functions, or the critical differences between them. In similarity with many other influential leaders around the world, he was also naïve and believed that his own analyses were superior to those produced by the agencies' very best intelligence professionals. The result of his delusion became evident to the world when Nazi-Germany attacked the Soviet Union on 20 June 1941, at which time the Russians found themselves completely paralysed despite hundreds of intelligence reports spelling out what was on the horizon.

In the late 1940s, Stalin believed that the previous intelligence failures by the Soviet Union could be avoided if all activities in this field were to be carried out by one agency alone! It never occurred to him that such an arrangement would make no difference at all unless the reports were taken seriously.

The Information Committee

It was in this context, in the beginning of the summer of 1947, that the MID founded the Information Committee, KI [Комитета информации при МИД СССР]. Stalin was convinced that he would be able to set up a homogenous foreign intelligence agency by merging the collection and analysis functions that existed within the MID, the MGB⁴⁰ and the GRU, and transform these separate parts into one cohesive organisation. As it turned out, this was easier said than done.

It was not long before all of the GRU's military staff retracted and left the KI. By 1949, not one of its officers remained. After this, the dismantling continued and after another two years the experiment had practically reached its end. On 2 November 1951, all intelligence functions within the KI were transferred to the 1st Main Directorate of the MGB and order was, by and large, restored. Formally, the Information Committee continued to exist until 1958 when its remaining Department for Disinformation was taken over by the KGB.⁴¹

Descriptions and analyses of the views and opinions held by the Soviet foreign policy elite have mainly been produced after the collapse of the Soviet empire and the opening up of the archives in the early 1990s, even if the archives of the Cheka and the Armed Forces have retained most of their secrets. However, in the past decades, it has become evident that the Soviet and Russian foreign affairs' services have been used as covers for intelligence activities. As their intelligence activities have been agent-based since 1917, Western powers have had ample opportunities to

monitor Moscow's intelligence activities, at least in broad terms. Successfully recruiting and running agents require skilled recruiters, who know how to identify the kind of information carriers requested by Moscow. In most cases, recruiters need several years during which they can devote their full attention to their 'embryos' before achieving the desired result. Distinguishing an agent recruiter from an actual diplomat, foreign correspondent or consulate official is usually not impossible, especially not for a skilled professional working with counter-intelligence in the West.⁴²

Examining how diplomatic covers were used by the Soviet espionage between 1971 and 1991 is certainly no minor task. Attempting an approximate estimation, on the other hand, is more feasible.

One examination of Soviet ambassadors indicates that at least 69 of them were in actual fact working for the Cheka. However, it is important to know that intelligence officers who became ambassadors were usually no longer active within the NKVD, the MGB or the KGB. This, in itself, is an indication that they, until they were appointed ambassadors, were active spies and agent recruiters, and they all posed a political risk should their backgrounds become known to the media in the country in which they were posted. However, there is one small exception. Between 1947 and 1958, when Stalin's Information Committee (KI) was operational, active officers from both the KGB and the GRU could be posted as ambassadors. One such example dates to 1950, when an officer from the Soviet Navy, Konstantin Rodionov, was appointed ambassador to Sweden. The fact that he was an active GRU officer⁴³ would probably have come as a surprise to most people in the Swedish capital at that time.

However, active intelligence officers are found when examining the posts of counsellor and minister-counsellor. In most cases, their diplomatic covers served to conceal the fact that they were posted as residents or heads of the different lines of the KGB's local residencies.⁴⁴ More than 210 named Soviet counsellors are known to have worked for the KGB during their postings abroad. In addition, at least 23 of the Soviet Union's deputy ministers for foreign affairs had a background in the KGB. Hence, it is completely impossible for most people who come into contact with any of Moscow's embassies to know whether they are meeting an actual diplomat or if the person in front of them is an intelligence officer operating under diplomatic cover. As a result, it also becomes completely impossible to distinguish between the politics advocated by the two different authorities, if indeed there is any differences in their political agendas at all.

In recent years, it has been established that the SVR, like its predecessor the KGB, uses Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a surprising great extent, which could be detrimental to the credibility of the MID in political and diplomatic contexts. Yet, the potential damage caused by intelligence officers – in other words spies! – who repeatedly act as diplomats does not seem to give any cause for concern.

In 1991, **Yevgeny Primakov**, former Pravda correspondent and head of the two research institutes Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies and the IMEMO, was appointed director of the KGB's 1st Main Directorate (Foreign Operations). In the same year, and once a sovereign Russia had been created, Primakov was appointed director of the SVR, a post he held between

1991 and 1996. As soon as he left the SVR, he stepped into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he took over as foreign minister. Interestingly, he was far from the only high-flier with a background in the SVR!



Primakov's successor as head of the SVR was **Vyacheslav Trubnikov**, who held this post between 1996 and 2000. He had previously worked mainly in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal, initially under journalistic cover as a correspondent for the APN and later as a diplomat. After his time as head of the SVR, he followed in the footsteps of Primakov to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he was appointed deputy foreign minister, first deputy foreign minister and later Russia's ambassador to India in 2004–2009. The deputy director of the SVR, **Jury Zubakov**, left the agency at the same time as Primakov in 1996 and he also went straight to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he became deputy foreign minister. He was later appointed ambassador, first to Lithuania and later to Moldavia. **Sergey Lebedev**, who had worked in East Germany during the same period as Vladimir Putin, succeeded Trubnikov as director of the SVR. After a total of 34 years in the KGB and the SVR, Lebedev was appointed executive secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 2007, at least until 2022 with the title of ambassador.

MGIMO

The MID university MGIMO was founded at the end of the Second World War. During its more than 75 years of activity, it has educated thousands of Soviet and Russian diplomats. Interestingly, many Chinese diplomats have also received their education at the MGIMO, as have several other nationalities. More than 6 000 students from other countries are known to have studied at the MGIMO. The period of studies is normally five years and some 30–40 disciplines are taught. Future diplomats can choose between 53 different languages.


Both during the Cold War and during the Putin era, the KGB and the SVR have had considerable opportunities to recruit thousands of the very best students from the MGIMO to become intelligence officers. Several experts on Scandinavia, who have worked as diplomats in Sweden, have belonged to the KGB and the SVR. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly appointed director of the SVR **Yevgeny Primakov**⁴⁵ is known to have held a recruitment speech at the MGIMO in which he outlined the possibilities offered to those working at the SVR. After this, the agency has provided several special courses at the MGIMO aimed at making the students more familiar with the SVR, its scope and working methods. Posters advertising SVR recruitment events are displayed in the corridors of the MGIMO. It goes without saying that Russia's intelligence agencies are also represented at the MGIMO's 'International Career Day'.

Today, there are at least eight high-ranking SVR officers at the MGIMO: at least four of whom are generals and many colonels, all of whom have also worked for the KGB for several years. Professor **Yury Kobaladze** left his post as major general after e.g. having served for eight years as head of the SVR's Bureau of Public Relations and Media. During the KGB era, he worked in e.g. the KGB's 3rd Geographic Department, responsible for Great Britain, other countries in the British Commonwealth and the Scandinavian countries. **Nikolay Gribin** advanced to the rank of lieutenant general after his ten years as head of the SVR's Academy of Foreign Intelligence (AVR), formerly known as the KGB 101 School. He is now the director of the MGIMO's Centre for European Studies. **Igor Morozov** stepped down as colonel in the SVR and has been acting professor at the MGIMO since 2018. Another acting professor is **Andrey Bezrukov** (cover name Donald Heathfield), with the rank of colonel, who is one of the ten very well-known and often photographed illegals⁴⁶ who were arrested in the US by the FBI in 2010 and later exchanged for four imprisoned Russians (one of them Sergey Skripal, who was later the victim of a bestial attempted assassination by Russia). In the summer of 2020, Bezrukov appeared on national Russian television, where he demanded that Russia should sue everyone in the US who had accused Russia of backing the riots in the US. Bezrukov works at the MGIMO's

Department of Applied Analysis of International Problems, where he among other things runs courses in intelligence for future Russian diplomats. Another very well-known former KGB officer is the lieutenant general and professor **Nikolay Leonov**, now at the Department of Diplomacy. He is probably one of Russia's most distinguished

experts on Latin

America. For several decades he was a personal friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro, and Che Guevara. Since 2017, **Vladislav Gasumyanov** is the head of the MGIMO's Department for Business Security. Gasumyanov, a former major general, not only worked for the KGB and the SVR but also spent some time working for the FSB. Deputy head at the same department is **Viktor Belousov**, formerly working for the KGB, who has also taught at the FSB Academy. Another individual with experiences from the FSB, as well as from the KGB and the FSO, is **Vladimir Svinarev** who for the past couple of years has worked at the Department of Regional Governance and National Policy. In addition, there is also an old acquaintance of Vladimir Putin's at the MGIMO by the name of **Nikolay Tokarev**. He served as major general in both the KGB and the FSB. In the 1980s, he was posted to Dresden in East Germany together with Putin⁴⁷ and several other 'siloviki'.⁴⁸ The above Chekists are only those who have been revealed via open source information. The actual number of intelligence officers at the MGIMO is



MGIMO
УНИВЕРСИТЕТ

ABOUT MGIMO STUDY THE SCIENCE Search on site

Gasumyanov Vladislav Ivanovich
head of department | Basic Department of PJSC "MMC" Norilsk Nickel " Corporate Security "
Doctor of Economics

Member of the Management Board of PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel.

Was born in 1959 in Baku.

In 1983 he graduated from the Kiev Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers, in 1985 - the Higher Courses of the KGB of the USSR, in 2002 - the North-West Academy of Civil Service.

Doctor of Economics, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Major General.

In 1982-2001 served in the KGB-SVR-FSB.

In 2002-2009 worked as Secretary of State and Acting Head of the Federal Agency for State Reserves.

In 2009-2012 - Deputy Head of the Department of the President of the Russian Federation for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

2012 to present in. - Vice President - Head of the Corporate Security Unit of PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel.

He was awarded the Orders of Honor, Friendship, other state and departmental awards, including the Certificate of Honor of the President of the Russian Federation and the Certificate of Honor of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation.

significantly higher. In most cases, they are younger intelligence staff whose covers have not yet been exposed.

In the past decade, yet more SVR employees have contributed in different ways to the activities of the MGIMO. One such example relates to the university's 'career days', at which SVR employees are known to have given lectures at which they have presented the worst examples of Russian historical disinformation in a very long time. **Lev Sotnikov**, major general in the SVR, has both given lectures and been involved in selecting a large number of documents containing disinformation, which has been uploaded on the MGIMO website and on the blog of the MGIMO's Alumni Association. This disinformation has been published not only in journals linked to the MGIMO but also in some international journals. Among Sotnikov's earlier postings was a stint at the Soviet Embassy in Sweden, where he had many contacts with people linked to media and politics. For many years, he was also first deputy director of the KGB's Disinformation Department. During Putin's years in power, Sotnikov has specialised in disinformation with a bearing on nearby countries and has disseminated vast quantities of documents containing lies about e.g. the Baltic States and Poland. His work for the SVR has greatly damaged Russia's international relations and had the MID and the MGIMO been normal institutions of society they would have kept Sotnikov at arm's length.

Today, however, the possibilities for any improvement are virtually non-existent. The MGIMO is and has been run by a large number of board members from the Cheka, guarding the interests of Putin and the SVR to ensure that no abrupt changes are made. In the past ten years, Chekists such as **Andrey Akimov**, **Vladimir Dimitriev**, **Viktor Cherkesov**, **Vladimir Yakunin**, **Vladimir Gruzdev** and **Sergey Chemezov** have all been board members of the MGIMO. While they are all Chekists, Cherkesov, Gruzdev and Chemezov have also worked for the SVR. The banker **Vasili Titov**, who for several years was on the board of the MGIMO, has now been the chairman of the FSB's Public Council for a few years.

The MGIMO has also been involved in a number of activities initiated by the SVR, which was likely one of the reasons behind the prominent and official congratulations expressed by the director of the SVR, **Sergey Naryshkin**, in connection with the MGIMO's 75th anniversary. There is a reason for everything! Another such reason is the gigantic publication project called *Great Victory*, launched in 2015 by Naryshkin and **Anatoly Torkunov**, headmaster at the MGIMO and a member of the FSB's Public Council. The project aims to publish in all 14 volumes online about the Second World War, which is still referred to as 'the Great Patriotic War' (thereby untruthfully eliminating the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Finnish Winter War, the occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the attack on Poland and much more that remains embarrassing as it reveals many of Moscow's lies). Unabashedly, the project in its entirety is called *For an Honest History*. In total, more than 150 writers are involved in the project, which will result in more than 300 articles, written specifically for the project, and more than 2 500 previously classified documents that have now been released by the SVR.

Collaboration as such is nothing new. Already in 2009, the MGIMO published large quantities of historical documents that had been released by the SVR and made available to the MGIMO. Hundreds of pages previously classified as 'top secret' [Совершенно Секретно] have been published on the MGIMO website and in a special issue of the *MGIMO University Bulletin* [Вестник МГИМО-Университета].

In many ways, the MGIMO is one of the organisations in Russian society that is most closely affiliated with the country's intelligence and security agencies. Few other organisations have as many SVR employees among their staff and its activities are clearly governed by these agencies. Consequently, the MGIMO should most definitely be seen as a daughter organisation of the SVR.

Recruiting Russian agents

Russia's intelligence work typically relies on a large number of Russian employees (intelligence officers) who in different ways recruit individuals abroad (agents, also known as spies) who hand over (often classified and secret) information from their workplaces to the intelligence officer who in turn ensures that this information reaches the headquarters in Moscow. In addition to the intelligence officers, who are usually well-educated and work full time, there are several other categories of individuals assisting, in this case, the SVR.

In this context, there are generally two different categories: cooptees and agents. Individuals belonging to the former category are also referred to as 'co-opted workers' and enjoy very high status. One such example was Georgy Arbatov, director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies and a member of the Palme Commission. As an individual, Arbatov was patriotic, extremely knowledgeable with a vast network of contacts, and for decades lent his assistance to the KGB. Individuals belonging to the latter category are Russians who have been recruited to operate as agents. In similarity with recruited foreigners, the Russians also enjoy a relatively low status. They may be willing or less willing to carry out assignments, they may contribute information to which they have access at their workplace, they may recommend other individuals suitable for recruitment, or they may provide other types of assistance.

Russian agents and foreign agents are largely recruited in the same way. The one difference being that the recruiting agents can often be a bit more open and direct when approaching Russian citizens. In a worst-case scenario, individuals may even be pressurised, but such agents usually do not deliver very well. The best results are yielded from individuals who are more or less willing to cooperate and who can also see various benefits associated with doing so. For this reason, the SVR and its sister agencies often emphasise the benefits associated with this particular 'duty of honour' and they also give money to their agents, albeit rarely any large sums. Bringing small gifts is also important, both as a means of 'greasing the wheels' of the relationship and to provide some improvement to the everyday life of the agent. Finally, it is worth mentioning that agents are often put into different 'boxes'. Not everyone contributes information. Many are so-called support agents, who are very useful for any intelligence agency as they, for instance, may be willing to lend apartments, cars or mobile phones or provide valuable assistance in other ways.

President Putin's very own diplomats

In similarity with many other autocrats, Vladimir Putin surrounds himself with individuals whom he trusts and who allow him to call the shots and pull the strings without anyone objecting or interfering with his intentions. Indeed, parts of the Presidential Administration have been specifically designed to meet these requirements.

In 2005, it was decided that a new structure tasked with handling all contacts with the former Soviet republics (including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) should be set up. This new structure was named rather pompously The Presidential Administration for Interregional Relations and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries. In principle, its scope is identical to that of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would now seem to have some new competition to look out for. However, as we shall see, this department has a rather specific role, which is partly different to that of both the MID and the SVR.

As it turned out, those appointed to manage the new department were a group of highly qualified individuals. No others were even considered. During the first two years, the journalist **Modest Kolerov** was in charge of its activities. There is no information on his precise background but since he has been prevented from entering Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Georgia, this does give some indications. Kolerov was succeeded by another 'journalist', **Nikolai Tsvetkov**, who had worked in Japan for *Komsomolskaya Pravda* but in actual fact belonged to the KGB. In 2008, **Sergey Vinokurov** became head of the department, where he remained for four years until he was appointed first deputy director of the SVR at the Yasenevo headquarters.

The current head of the department, **Vladimir Chernov**, assumed this post in 2012. Chernov has a long track record within the KGB's 3rd Geographic Department, which was responsible mainly for Great Britain and Scandinavia. One of his last assignments was as a personal assistant to general Vladimir Grushko, who among other things had previously been a KGB resident in Norway. Chernov was expelled from London in January 1983 but still managed to be posted to Finland in 1987–1993.

Not only the heads of this department but also other officials have a background within Russia's intelligence apparatus. One such example is **Vladislav Gasumyanov**, who was the deputy head of this department between 2009 and 2012. Today, he is head of department at the MGIMO.

The achievements of this department since 2005 have been described as having “created a deeply conspiratorial network of pro-Kremlin agents of influence in the neighboring countries.”⁴⁹ The difference between the contacts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the spies of the SVR is sometimes very subtle, but their purpose is presumably to secretly influence politicians and high-ranking political officials in Russia's neighbouring countries, i.e. the former Soviet republics. Hence, their purpose is not to steal classified information as the SVR would do, or to meet for open discussions as diplomats usually do. Instead, what is being organised from Putin's Presidential Administration is to a large extent the very basis for how active measures can be carried out. Seeing that all heads of the directorate seem to have links to the SVR, it may be assumed that the SVR has been in a position to use the Presidential Administration so as to make it easier for the agency's representatives to meet with their confidential contacts and agents recruited in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Baltic States without causing any immediate suspicions.

Russian historical documents and the SVR

One of the SVR's most powerful measure in the 2000s, which is also one of its most important active measures, has been the disclosure of thousands of previously classified documents from its secret archives. For several years, some of the Cheka's most skilled veterans examined the old documents, which were mainly from the 1930s and the years of the Second World War. The veterans seem to have focused specifically on documents with a bearing on Poland and Finland as well as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Initially, the SVR selected a number of important areas in which the agency wanted to reach tangible results benefitting Russia's present-day foreign and security policies. After this, a number of important documents were selected that were either correct or partly or entirely false. In all likelihood, leading experts on old Soviet documents, papers, inks, stamps, etc., later attempted to change or 'improve' documents that in many cases had been found in the archives and, in a few cases, complete forgeries were manufactured.

As approximately 95 per cent of the documents are entirely accurate, it is extremely difficult for historians and security experts to assess every aspect of the disclosed documents. If, on top of this, they are not allowed to examine the disclosed documents by using various invasive investigation methods, it becomes virtually impossible to establish whether they are genuine or not. Considering the role that forgeries and lies have played throughout much of the history of the Soviet Union and Russia since 1917, any analysis must assume that parts of the disclosed collections of documents are either partly or entirely false. At the end of the day, this truly represents 'fake news'.

The individual mainly responsible for the SVR's choice of documents and the compilations of various collections of documents that have been handed over to e.g. the MGIMO, or that have been compiled into a number of books, is Lev Sotskov who is known since his time in Sweden in the 1960s. Sotskov was posted to Sweden in 1962–1967 under diplomatic cover as third secretary and first secretary while in actual fact he belonged to the KGB's Line PR. He is also known to have socialised with several well-known Swedish journalists and politicians at the time.⁵⁰

The MGIMO, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, Russia's Historical Association – channels for disinformation

The SVR has taken several measures with a view to increase the credibility of the agency's released historical documents. In this context, it has received considerable assistance from a number of government agencies, several important GONGOs and a large number of media outlets in Russia. In this way, the SVR has surrounded itself with actors that often have a better reputation than the agency itself or has a better reputation among certain particularly important groups of society. As a direct consequence of this, it will appear as if these actors endorse the SVR's own assessment of the documents even though they cannot in any way determine whether these are entirely genuine, or if they have in fact been 'improved'.

Further to the extensive release of documents, the SVR has also released previously classified information on quite a large number of intelligence officers belonging to the Cheka, all of whom

have been well-known for several decades. Many of these men and women, who may now step forward, whether they are still alive or not, have been illegals working under cover in the countries which the Soviet Union regarded as its future enemies in the coming war against the imperialist and capitalist countries in the West, and especially those that during the Cold War belonged to the NATO defence alliance. Those hundreds of individuals largely represented the cream of the crop of the youth in Soviet society. Well-educated, trained in languages and highly motivated they ended up wasting 30 or 40 years of their lives waiting for a war that never happened. From what we have seen from the past 25 years of disclosures in Finland, Estonia, Germany, Portugal, Canada and the US, the SVR and its military counterpart the GRU continue to covertly dispatch their spies in locations where many of them will be waiting for orders to carry out their assignments, which could involve sabotage, assassinations or espionage.

Meanwhile, the SVR and its companions continue to disseminate partly faked narratives. In order for disinformation to be effective, it must never consist of only 'fake news'. On the contrary, most of the published information disseminated by the SVR must be completely true. This is also why the veterans scouring the SVR archives have had to be very knowledgeable not only about the history of the world and the history of the Soviet Union, but also about the history of their own organisation and its political goals. Without detailed knowledge in these areas, it would be impossible to put together a narrative that will blend in among the other documents. This is also one of the reasons why so much disinformation is revealed – the invented narratives simply do not match the reality we are all familiar with, and when this happens the jigsaw puzzle falls apart.

The documents were only a first start

Selecting and producing forged documents is a first, and certainly very important, step. Once this phase is completed, the information held in these documents must be put to use.

To the extent that historical documents are handed over to organisations such as the MGIMO, the SVR quite possibly expects these documents to result in reports, dissertations, articles published in scientific journals and on its website. This way of disseminating information is often seen as a first step, and it is hoped that other researchers, journalists and others will continue to disseminate the information to the general public and also, preferably, to other countries.

The SVR has been extremely skilled in disseminating information not only to writers and the book industry but also to film-makers and other culture professionals. Since the early to mid-1990s, hundreds of books have been published, many of which have formed the basis of both non-fiction and thrilling fiction. Evidently, spies are seen as both sexy and exciting. In this context, both the former KGB and present-day SVR have put much effort into spreading non-fiction to the general public, mainly in Russia but also in the West. As most researchers specialised in the Soviet Union and Russia speak Russian, they have bought large quantities of interesting books that by Western standards cost next to nothing.

Once Russia had become independent and relatively democratic, several serious research institutes in the West tried to gain access to many of Russia's historical archives. While it was

understood that the security and intelligence agencies were 'off limits', it was hoped that organisations such as the Comintern, which had ceased to exist a long time ago, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which had been banned, would have been made available. Unfortunately, however, there turned out to be horrendous practical obstacles preventing researchers from accessing the archives that had been made available.

Visiting Russia at this time was both a bit difficult and expensive, but the worst problem was that very few people spoke any English. Nor were there any copy machines, thus making it impossible to copy any material found to be of interest. This problem was later solved when complete copies of several archives were sold to the West. The costs associated with this were borne by Western universities and institutes.

At this point, some of the SVR's more open-minded and driven intelligence officers came up with a brilliant idea, namely to bring together equal-sized groups from the SVR and the CIA and to let them write books together. Some access to certain parts of the SVR's archives would be provided to the participating Russian intelligence officers.

Propagandists and spies in perfect harmony

From its very beginning in 1917, one of the most important tasks of the Cheka has concerned active measures, disinformation, deception campaigns and the dissemination of propaganda. It certainly has not been easy to establish whether this propaganda was disseminated in Soviet or Russian media and, if this was the case, whether it emanated from the media outlet itself or originated from the KGB or the GRU. Such analyses would have required excellent insight into who was who at Pravda, Novosti and TASS. Analyses of this kind are even more difficult to carry out in today's media landscape.

When the Soviet Union still existed, it was relatively easy to recognise which Soviet citizens abroad belonged to the KGB or the GRU. My compendium *Att identifiera en sovjetisk underrättelseofficer – en kort handledning*⁵¹ contains numerous details aimed at better understanding who was who in the local Soviet colony.

Spy nests

The proportion of Soviet intelligence officers was particularly high among Soviet diplomats and Soviet foreign correspondents. Diplomats, enjoying full diplomatic immunity in the countries to which they were posted, could neither be arrested, prosecuted, interrogated, or subjected to numerous other forms of intervention by local police authorities. Journalists have always had the advantage of being able to ask questions about anything at any time without having to give any specific explanation for doing so. In addition, the arrest of a journalist often results in a cascade of aggressive questions from many of their upset colleagues – or at least this is what local law enforcement tends to expect. In the US, the essential role of journalists has resulted in the CIA not being allowed to provide their intelligence officers with journalistic covers.

Normally, one third of the official Soviet representation in any country consisted of intelligence officers from the KGB and the GRU. Among the diplomats, some 50–75 per cent were spies and among Soviet journalists this number was about 50–60 per cent. In the 1980s, the Soviet representation in Sweden amounted to 210 male individuals, posted mainly to Stockholm and Gothenburg.⁵² Out of the 22 correspondents who worked in Sweden, 18 were identified as belonging either the Cheka or to the GRU.

Post-war mobilisation

After the Second World War, the Kremlin saw further possibilities to deploy journalists around the world. In the 1920s and 1930s, approximately two thirds of all foreign correspondents had worked for TASS and only a few had been sent out by the news agencies Rosta (in the 1920s) and Izvestia (in the 1930s). There was only a small number of countries to which more than one correspondent from TASS could be sent without losing their credibility. By pretending that there existed open competition between Soviet media, and that the different agencies were free to send their own staff, it was possible to send as many as half a dozen intelligence officers under journalistic cover. The journalists could move around much more freely than the Soviet diplomats and this approach also increased the number of intelligence officers who worked out of various addresses in any city. At the same time, this strategy made the counter-intelligence efforts undertaken by the target country all the more difficult to carry out.

For the sole purpose of providing the KGB with additional staff abroad, it was decided that an entirely new news agency would be set up and that it would have a large international department. In 1961, the Novosti Press Agency (also known as APN) [Агентство печати Новости, АПН] saw the light of day. Its main editorial office had in all eight international regions with many journalists posted to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, the Socialist countries, Asia, the Pacific region, North America and Latin America.

One editorial office was particularly important and of considerable interest, namely the Main Editorial Office for Political Publications, which was run directly by the KGB's Department D ('D' for Disinformation) [Отдела Дезинформации]), later known as Department A ('A' for Active measures) [Службы Активных мероприятий]). The founding of this department coincided with the establishment of the APN.

Today's media situation

Developments since 1991 have largely benefitted the SVR. However, during the 1990s much of its activities lay fallow due to considerable financial cuts and due also to the fact that many leading figures were close to Yeltsin and the democratic opposition. Following the advancement of the reactionary forces, the SVR's room to manoeuvre increased. Throughout the Putin era, the SVR has also been able to considerably strengthen its position as a result of most Russian media outlets now being either owned or controlled by Putin. In fact, only half a dozen independent media outlets remain in today's Russia.

When assessing which media outlets frequently publish news about the SVR, and do so in a very positive manner, and also publish recurring interviews with its present director, Sergey Naryshkin, it becomes evident that their staff and management consists of many active and

retired KGB and SVR officers. What also emerges from this, is an unambiguous list of media outlets, widely known across Russian society as supporting the SVR. These are some of the most obvious examples:

Interfaks

Izvestia

Lenta.ru

Regnum

RIA Novosti Press Agency (former APN)

Rossiyskaya Gazeta

RT (former Russia Today)

Sputnik


Trud

Tsargrad TV

TV Zvezda

VGTRK

It is usually possible to determine that a number of individuals within the media companies' management and on their editorial boards either belong to or have belonged to the SVR. These media companies also publish numerous features on the SVR and interviews with its director, Sergey Naryshkin.



Lenta.ru is one of the media outlets that published several series of articles celebrating the SVR during its centenary.

Russian compatriots in the West

All Russian compatriots living in the West are exposed to exhaustive and intrusive attention by the Russian society (i.e. the Russian government). These activities, which cost many billions of rubles (and cost billions even in dollars), currently involve 51 government agencies, organisations and associations.⁵³ The number of employees amounts to several thousands with at least one thousand being posted abroad, specifically in European countries.

There are several purposes for this large-scale activity:

- a) Russians abroad should, as naturally as possible, feel that Rodina is there for them.
- b) Travelling home should be easy, cheap and unbureaucratic.
- c) The Russian language should be kept alive for everyone, including children born in other countries.
- d) The Russian Orthodox Church should be the compatriots' obvious religious choice.
- e) Russia's embassies, consulates and the 'Russian centres' should be natural points of support.
- f) Russians should stay faithful to their country and its representatives, and they should be prepared to carry out any assignment given to them.

When examining Russia's influencing activities – consisting of active measures, disinformation and deception campaigns – it is relatively easy to identify some main characteristics that form the ideological basis of these activities. The Kremlin wants the SVR to focus specifically on certain important areas such as the Russian nation, the Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian culture and Russian compatriots living outside the Russian Federation. Having a solid base of people with whom it is possible to communicate directly and without any major inhibitions is essential to Putin and his allies. These compatriots frequently depend on having good contacts with the state apparatus as their parents or other close relatives often still live in Russia.

Already in the 1920s, the pro-Czar White Russian opposition was a very important group with which the Cheka remained in close contact for as long as it existed. Despite the very sharp political dividing lines, language, culture and much more kept the opposition linked to its beloved Rodina. When some leading White Russian generals were kidnapped in Paris and brought to Moscow, the success of these operations owed much to a number of recruited agents within the White Russian diaspora.

One hundred years of refugee espionage

Ever since the Bolshevik coup d'état in 1917 and the founding of the Cheka later that year, the Russian security apparatus has taken an exceptional interest in anyone who has left the Soviet Union and Russia. Part of this interest can be explained as a natural interest by Moscow. For instance, the Russian leaders of today are very concerned about the extensive brain-drain suffered by the country during the Putin era.

The men in the Kremlin have always bragged about their country's education, especially in the area of natural sciences, and have done so partly for a fair reason. Tens of thousands of engineers have graduated. At the same time, many serious flaws have come to light in the past three decades. There is a lack of IT skills and the existing knowledge in this field is too theoretical. There is also a low proficiency in foreign languages – especially English – and international academic contacts are fraught with problems. As a result, both travels and digital contacts have been hampered. It is perhaps no wonder that almost no Westerners go to Russia for teaching or research. Indeed, how many Nobel Prize winners from Russia have there been since the death of Stalin?

Cheka residencies in the West

Throughout the Cheka's existence, the local residencies have been staffed by individuals specialised in handling exile groups and defectors. In the early days, this function was known internally as 'the White Line' and was later referred to as Line SK (Sovetskie Kolonii - Советские Колонии) before it became a designated part of Line KR (Kontrazvedka - Контрразведка). After the Second World War, there was also a Line EM (Emigrasiya - Эмиграция), which targeted individuals in various exile groups but used completely different methods compared to those used by Line KR!

Line EM was mainly represented in Western countries, which had large exile groups that had fled from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia during and after the war. In the late 1980s, there were almost 210 Soviet representatives in Sweden, one third of them professional intelligence officers, and since the mid-1950s there had always been two Estonian and one Latvian KGB officer at the residency. KGB representatives from the different Soviet republics were found depending on which exile groups lived in which Western country. Line EM is known to have been represented in e.g. West Germany, France, Canada, the US and Australia. It was not difficult, by using a diplomatic list, to figure out which nationalities around the world that the KGB was taking a specific interest in. Understandably, KGB officers with an ethnic Russian background were rarely very successful among e.g. Estonians and Latvians. In order to be successful, agent recruiters would clearly have to come from within these groups.

The KGB's fondness of sports and culture

On special occasions, when large cultural or sports events were arranged in the West, which would prompt large exile groups to participate, the KGB would put together specially designed groups of officers and well-known and loyal individuals representing their respective areas of expertise.

For many years, the Soviet Union ran what was known as the Soviet Committee on Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad. Other committees existed for cultural contacts with Westerners. However, what these committees had in common was that they were managed by the KGB. In this area, there has been no major changes over the years other than the names of the organisations, hence what once was the responsibility of the KGB is now the responsibility of the SVR.

Why compatriots are particularly important to the Kremlin

One may think that cultural contacts, an interest in the Russian Orthodox Church, or wanting to learn the Russian language is something quite innocent and something that most countries are involved in. However, the activities engaged in by the Swedish Institute, the German Goethe Institute or the French Pompidou Centre are diametrically different from 'cultural' purposes pursued by Moscow. When the Kremlin opened up for the SVR, the GRU and the FSB to use dozens of institutes and government agencies to support Russian compatriots, its reason for doing so was also to secretly support much more sinister activities. This, in turn, has resulted in Russian compatriots finding themselves caught between a rock and a hard place – not that Putin and his allies could care less.

Critical examination of the staff

A closer examination of the individuals who in various ways are tied to the Russian bodies for compatriots reveals numerous links to the SVR. Seven years ago, a man was expelled from the US when it emerged that he was the head of Russia's Cultural Center in Washington, D.C., i.e. he was employed by Rossotrudnichestvo. In 2020, two young diplomats were arrested in the Czech Republic and sent back to Russia. They were both representatives of Rossotrudnichestvo and one of them reportedly carried the toxic substance ricin upon entering the Czech Republic.

An officer in the US Special Forces

In August 2020, a middle-aged officer in the US Special Forces was charged with unlawful intelligence activities carried out on behalf of Russia. The officer, born in the US, had a Russian mother who had given him much love and also instilled in him warm feelings for Russia. In 1994, when he was only 19 years old, he visited his mother's homeland, Rodina, for the first time.

A young Estonian

Something similar happened to a young Estonian, who also had relatives in Russia. His mother was Russian, his father had belonged to the KGB Border Troops, and the young man himself worked for the Estonian Defence Forces. In the 1980s, he changed from his mother's Estonian surname to his father's Russian surname. However, when Estonia became independent, he changed back to his mother's Estonian surname. Such behaviour is quite symptomatic for many Russians living abroad, and possibly also for immigrants in many other countries.

When the young man later travelled to Smolensk in Russia to visit his relatives, he also met a beautiful young woman. They made love one the evening and the following day two 'police officers' turned up, claiming that the woman was accusing him of rape. This was the beginning of numerous meetings in Russia, where the young man was pressurised into revealing a great deal of information about the Estonian Defence Forces. It did not take long before he was also made to hand over documents that he had stolen at work. He was subsequently sentenced to fifteen-and-a-half years' imprisonment.

Compatriots abroad

Over the years, none of the basic characteristics of the methods used for handling compatriots abroad have changed even if the agencies have gradually learnt from their previous mistakes and added modern technologies to their toolkit, such as the internet, social media, Facebook and so on. Many people have asked why Moscow continues to use the same old-fashioned methods and strategies that presumably must be well-known to its antagonists. The answer is, first of all, that it works. Do not mend what is not broken. Secondly, employees at Western intelligence agencies keep changing as senior officials leave and new staff members are trained in their new professional capacities. In this process, it is inevitable that some knowledge about the old working methods is lost, creating gaps in the knowledge banks of Russia's antagonists. Most organisations also tend to have poor institutional memory, both with regard to their own organisation but perhaps even more so when it comes to their antagonists, competitors and so forth.

When Rossotrudnichestvo (founded in 2008), Russkiy Mir (founded in 2011), the Foundations for the Support and Protections of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (also founded in 2011) and dozens of other organisations were established, they could rely on many years of experience in a country that is perhaps most renowned for its love of history and for having intelligence agencies that celebrate their centenaries while Russia itself is only 30 years old. The SVR is hardly an intelligence agency that throws away any historical information.


For instance, in the line organisation of the KGB residencies, there was a relatively unknown structure called Line 19, described as being responsible for all work carried out within the Soviet Committee on Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad, i.e. an identical but Soviet organisation compared to that of today. The KGB engaged in these efforts since at least the mid-1960s. Before the Second World War, there was a 'White Line' in at least those countries where large groups of Russians lived in exile, for instance in France and the US. When it comes to Russian compatriots, there really does not seem to be very much that sets the KGB's longstanding involvement apart from what we can see today, carried out by the SVR.

Many individuals in the West who are of Russian descent – having perhaps a Russian parent or a Russian grand-parent – have a natural interest in their own background. In effect, many of them are attracted by Moscow's initiatives abroad in the areas of Russian culture, Russian history, the Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church and so on. These people do not feel any reason to be particularly vigilant. The wide-spread vigilance of the Cold War is long gone. As a result, Russia's cynical recruitment efforts have a large potential to succeed, not least when compared to the possibilities of successfully recruiting Western information carriers.

There is a risk that the alleged Western 'russophobia', about which the Kremlin has talked so much for so long, will gradually increase and also become a reality among broad segments of the population. At the same time, there is an equally high risk that many individuals of Russian descent will face closer scrutiny when they apply for jobs deemed to be of interest to Russia's intelligence agencies. The arguments used by the Russian agencies when approaching their targets are always the same – and our own society must help protect anyone who is subjected to the intrusive monitoring and hostile recruitment attempts carried out by the SVR, the GRU and the FSB. This is not a battle anyone should have to fight on their own.

Investing in illegals

Since the uncovering by the FBI of eleven Russian illegals in 2010, it appears that the SVR has partly changed its approach to its most skilled spies operating abroad. In addition to wanting to brag about its very best intelligence officers – who are both men and women – the SVR also appears to be furthering its recruitment of young, intelligent and language talented individuals suitable for training to become illegal intelligence officers. There is also a need to find new methods to be used by the illegals. In an era of personal databases, biometric methods and other modern inventions, the traditional working methods are becoming increasingly more difficult to use.



Richard Murphy and Christopher Metsos met in secret at Queens in New York. Metsos was arrested in Cyprus but despite false ID documents, he was allowed to fly home to Moscow.

The FBI's exposure was probably the most significant setback for the SVR to date and resulted in some attempts by the FSB to take over the SVR's internal security work. There were even those who suggested an amalgamation of the two agencies. Others claimed that the use of illegals was something that belonged to the past.⁵⁴

The term 'illegal' has always been used by the Russian intelligence apparatus and serves to distinguish between the intelligence officers who are legally posted to embassies and consulates abroad, and those who are operating illegally in those countries. Illegals are typically smuggled into the countries in which they will operate, and they use forged passports and other forged identity documents as well as invented legends and numerous objects such as old postcards that they are alleged to have received, coins from countries in which they are alleged to have lived and other memorabilia and other objects intended to support their fake and invented legends. The changing and increasingly more demanding character of their assignments has prompted

the SVR to increase its recruitment of new illegals. To meet these demands, the SVR has had to increase the number of candidates suitable to take on the difficult assignments. Another factor making it more difficult for the agency is that it no longer has ready access to suitable candidates from Georgia, Armenia, the Baltic States and other parts of the former Soviet Union. If possible, the SVR seeks to avoid using individuals with typical Russian features.

Today's flow of information, with its abundant international ramifications, causes problems for the SVR and the GRU. Open source information is used both by counter-intelligence agencies around the world and by nosy journalists, who could be based anywhere, seeking to identify Russian intelligence officers. In the wake of Russia's attempted assassinations of Sergey Skripal and his daughter Yulia, several journalists in the UK and other Western countries successfully identified the involved GRU officers' real names, dates of birth and a fair amount of information on their backgrounds, although initially having only had access to a few photographs. Not even a closed and secretive country such as Russia managed to block all its important information channels. Publicists like British *Bellingcat*, Ukrainian *InformNapalm*, Riga's site *Meduza*, Russian *The Insider* and several others are living proof that open source information can be a very powerful tool indeed.⁵⁵

New methods used by the SVR

Another often overlooked problem is how technology has changed over time. For one thing, shortwave radio as a means of communication has become almost obsolete and has to some extent been replaced by the internet and mobile telephones. The FBI made some extremely exciting discoveries in connection with their assessment of the illegals and the information made available to the US by agents and defectors from the KGB's and the SVR's Directorate S – the illegals directorate.

As a new alternative to shortwave radio, the SVR has used manipulated and encrypted files that are uploaded to selected parts of the internet. By using a technology known as steganography it is possible to hide information in regular computer files. Image and audio files are among those most frequently used as these may hide (and encrypt) vast quantities of data without compromising the quality of either the image or the audio material.⁵⁶

Today, when crossing borders, photographs are increasingly complemented by fingerprints and other biometric markers, making it much more difficult for present-day illegals compared to what the situation was like for their predecessors. All border crossings made by an individual are also registered, making it possible for the relevant agencies to piece together anyone's movements. Inventing false backgrounds, better known as legends, is also becoming more difficult due to improved databases in which birth certificates are increasingly complemented by information on deaths, thus preventing the use by Moscow of stolen birth certificates as the basis for new passports and other identity documents. The fight against global terrorism has caused a lot of trouble for Russia's illegals.

Wireless transmissions

In order to send instructions across short distances, the Russians used WLAN technology⁵⁷. One example being an illegal sitting in a café, who at a given time would initiate an encrypted

transmission that could easily be recorded by an SVR officer from Line N passing by the café in the street. The two spies never had to see each other, and the transmission never revealed the content. In addition, this WLAN transmission could not be distinguished from all other WLAN traffic in the neighbourhood.

Already in connection with the expulsion of the illegals from the US in 2010, it was possible to note significant changes in how Moscow organised its illegals and which individuals were selected for this difficult task. One may assume that the difficulties listed above must have had a substantial impact already in the 1980s considering how different the backgrounds of the illegals in 2010 turned out to be.

Looking at the ten illegals arrested in the US (the eleventh illegal was arrested in Cyprus), it is evident that some of them had backgrounds typical for illegals, including cover names, legends and forged identity documents, including forged passports.

Anna Chapman

While some of the illegals had false names and invented backgrounds, others used their real names and backgrounds. One such example is that of Anna Chapman, who came to the UK under her real name, Anya Kushchenko. She subsequently married a British man and changed her surname to Chapman before moving to the US. Anna Chapman was considered particularly reliable as her father, Vasili Kushchenko, was a high-ranking KGB officer. She had studied at the well-known Lumumba University in Moscow, possibly as a result of her father's postings to Zimbabwe and Kenya. Interestingly, she was only 28 years old when she was arrested. This would seem to suggest that she could hardly have undergone the formal training usually provided to illegals in the 1990s.

The uncovering of yet more illegals

The FBI's major catch in the US is not the only blow suffered by the SVR's Directorate S. Compared to the illegals and the illegals' activities during the Soviet era, it is evident that the drawbacks suffered by Russia have been much more serious. Illegals have been uncovered on several occasions in both Finland and Canada. More occasional exposures are known from Japan, Iran, Israel, Germany and the US.

Other than a few examples from Finland, not very much is known about illegals in the Nordic countries. There is information that the illegal Rudolf Abel, who was arrested in the US in 1957 and swapped for the U2 pilot Francis Powell in 1962, had lived and worked in Norway in 1931–1935. Prior to that, he is known to have been active in Denmark for some time. Not much is known about Abel's time in Norway other than his alleged marriage to a Norwegian woman.

In the mid-1960s, there was an illegal operating in Sweden known as Karl-Olof Svanson. He arrived via China and assumed the role of a Swedish man who had been missing in the Soviet Union for many years. Most Swedish relatives accepted his story, but not everyone. These suspicions seem to have grown, resulting in Svanson also becoming an increasingly more suspicious person until his paranoia was in full bloom. In 1967, the KGB decided to bring him

home for medical care and sent one of its ‘travelling illegals’ to Sweden to arrange for his return to the Soviet Union. This story only became known because the Russian who was sent to Stockholm was the defector Oleg Gordievsky’s brother, Vasili Antonovich Gordievsky.⁵⁸

A succession of illegals

In the past decade the SVR and its new director, Sergey Naryshkin, have allowed the veterans among the agency’s illegals to appear in media and at various gatherings. The fact that most of them continue to keep quiet about the countries in which they have operated saves Russia from having to face negative publicity in the target countries. On the other hand, the backgrounds of the legal officers are often known and should the SVR admit that they have been active intelligence officers there is always a risk that they will be revealed by media. In fact, the SVR is often so careful that it will not even acknowledge those officers whose expulsions from Western countries have been publicly reported.⁵⁹

On 28 June 2017, the SVR celebrated its Directorate S publicly for the first time. At the same time, the agency also honoured its illegal veteran Aleksey Botyan⁶⁰, who turned 100 years old that year. In January 2020, the SVR most surprisingly revealed the names of seven of its successful illegals. The only individual among them who was already known was Mikhail Vasenkov, who was one of the illegals arrested by the FBI in 2010 and exchanged for four jailed Russians, including the well-known GRU officer Sergey Skripal who later became the victim of an attempted assassination in the UK. It should be recognised that the four individuals who were released at that time had been pardoned by the Russian president prior to their release.

Large number of monuments

In the summer of 2020, a gigantic new monument was inaugurated at the Yasenevo headquarters, celebrating all Cheka illegals. The monument, in the form of an arch, is 7–8 meters high and made from stone with bronze details. A free-standing part of the monument consists of a young couple, cast in bronze, measuring approximately 2.5 meters in height. The couple is supposedly approaching the arch on their way out into the world on their secret mission. The young couple apparently symbolises all young illegals who are posted around the world each year by the Kremlin.



The SVR Veterans' Council has commissioned several grand monuments that now embellish the graves of several well-known intelligence officers. Each year, on its Day of Remembrance, members of the Veterans' Council pay honour to a well-known Chekist by gathering at their grave to unveil a new memorial. In 2013, the Veterans' Council honoured the illegal Mikhail Mukasey who operated in Israel, and two years later a new monument was put in place to commemorate Ischak Achmerov, who was an illegal in the US. In 2018, Swiss-born Artuz Artuzov was awarded a monument, and another new monument is now about to be erected for the well-known Gevork Vartanyan⁶¹ who with his wife Goar worked as an illegal for more than 30 years. This monument will be placed in Kommunarka, not far from one of the NKVD's old mass graves. Interestingly, none of the above individuals were Russian, pointing to one of the great problems that the SVR's illegals programme is facing still today.

A new museum

The SVR has decided to open a new museum some distance from its headquarters in Yasenevo (which houses the agency's internal museum). The new Hall of History, which will be located in Ostozhenka ulitsa⁶², will have an exhibition on the Cheka illegals. Although their activities have usually always been kept secret, times have changed and it has become more necessary today than it used to be in the past to provide the people of Russia with more information about the intelligence agencies in general and the SVR in particular. The SVR considers itself and its activities the spearhead of Russian society. The museum will not display anything about illegals born after 1965. The agency is extremely cautious that both the museum and the publicity about its illegals that has been authorised do not reveal any details that could be linked to present-day illegals operating in the West.

Plenty of new knowledge

When combining the information on the 2010 arrest of ten illegals, released by the FBI, with other disclosures made in the West, including several books on this topic as well as all the propaganda cases released by the SVR itself, it becomes evident that there are considerable amounts of information on the illegals' activities carried out by both the Soviet Union and Russia. It is of course extremely difficult to know what implications this will have in the future. However, considering facial recognition technology and other biometric methods, as well as AI-driven data processing, it would seem quite possible that the number of exposed illegals will increase in the coming years. Russia may possibly be seeking to further its recruitment in this area so as to maintain the required number of illegals in many important countries in spite of the recent disclosures.

New types of illegals

New types of illegals will also be used. In connection with the invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979, Moscow used what was known as 'travelling illegals', who by circuitous means entered the two countries to carry out brief missions. One of their most common tasks appears to have been to play the role of Westerners, who allegedly could either act as couriers to smuggle important material to friends in other countries or provide support in the form of money or weapons with the ulterior motive of casting suspicion on local opposition groups.

'True name illegals' is a concept emanating from the FBI, used for describing one of the new types of illegals introduced towards the end of the Soviet era. Anna Chapman, who was arrested in 2010, is a typical true name illegal. She did not have to use any forged identity documents or memorise any legends – her real name was indeed Anna Chapman even if her surname was new and the result of her having been married to a British man for several years. Hence, she could act as herself and did not have to undergo several years of training to learn vast amounts of invented information, or one or several languages, to build a spy identity. One major disadvantage of using true name illegals, which is also reflected in relation to other activities in which the SVR uses Russian citizens living abroad, is that all Russians come under suspicion and Westerners in general tend to regard all Russians with considerable suspicion.

The SVR's activities abroad

The most important activities of the SVR are carried out abroad, which is also where most agents are recruited, hand over information and provide answers to questions that are put to them. Ever since 1917 and the establishment of the Cheka and the GRU, Moscow-run intelligence activities have focused on human sources, and more specifically recruited agents. It goes without saying that signals intelligence, bugging, open sources, satellites and many other methods of collecting information are also very important, but nothing is quite as important as agents handing over classified documents and answering questions about what other important information carriers think and believe and, in particular, what plans they have for the future. In this context, no other types of sources can usually even begin to compete.

With this emphasis on agent-based information collection, it follows that the key task of any agent network is to gather information on new suitable recruits. Having to thoroughly investigate your own circle of friends and acquaintances and having to hand over detailed information about them to recruiting SVR officers, is probably something over which a majority of agents agonise the most and which many times causes them to contact the counter-espionage of their own country. Treason against your own side feels even worse when forced to disclose information about people you care very much about.

Legal and illegal intelligence officers

To a large extent, human-based intelligence operations carried out both by the Soviet Union and Russia have always relied on two separate parts: one being the use of illegal intelligence officers, and the other being the use of their legal counterparts. The terms legal and illegal refer to the intelligence officers' relationship to the country in which they are posted, i.e. the illegals lack a 'legal cover', whereas officers posted to embassies, consulates, trade representations and other official institutions have a cover position that is 'legal' in so far as they are known to be in the target country. These officers carry Russian passports and act openly as someone born in the Soviet Union or Russia. That said, both categories are in many ways engaged in downright unlawful activities. It is, after all, espionage we are talking about.


The local organisation set up by the Cheka in a target country is known as a 'residency', as is also the local organisation set up by the GRU. Most countries only have one legal SVR residency. However, some large countries, such as India and the US, where the SVR operates

in several cities, have several residencies with one chief residence. The same often applies to the number of illegal residencies. If there are several illegal residencies this may relate to completely different factors, unrelated for instance to the size of the target country but depend instead on the perceived political or military significance of the country in question.

As regards the number of illegal residencies, this also depends on how successful the illegals are when it comes to establishing themselves in a country and indeed how fortunate they are. Even well-educated and skilled operatives are sometimes extremely unfortunate, through no fault of their own. Moscow of course tries to send more than one illegal to the same country in the hope that at least one of them will successfully establish themselves. Should they all be successful, this is certainly not a problem and the resources deployed will be put to use.

The local organisation

The residency has a straightforward, pyramid-shaped structure with the resident as its head and a few deputy residents. Operative activities are handled by SVR departments known as 'lines', each with their own specialty. The number of lines has differed both over time and in relation to the circumstances in the target country.



Today, eight lines are usually represented at a local residency:

Line PR – Political intelligence

Line VKR – Counter-intelligence

Line X – Industrial espionage and high-tech smuggling

Line N – Support to illegals

Line ER – Economic and commercial intelligence

Line OT – Operational technology

Line RP – Signals intelligence

Line EM – Emigration

Frequently, one may also come across other lines and working groups, depending on local circumstances. There have also been numerous changes over time. Line GP ('Glavny protivnik' meaning 'the main enemy') focused on recruiting American citizens working abroad. Line K focused on Chinese citizens, and Line SK ('Sovetskaya Kolonya') focused on Soviet citizens living abroad and their contacts.

Support functions at SVR residencies

The residencies carry out interception operations in two areas, one of which is directed from Moscow and linked to the SVR's other surveillance operations around the world, and one which involves operations against the police and counter-intelligence in their target country and aim to, if possible, detect which of the agency's intelligence officers are being monitored and therefore should not meet with their contacts and agents. There is also one or a couple of operative chauffeurs tasked with transporting intelligence officers to meetings, and who are also trained in detecting any surveillance activities. Moreover, there was a cipher clerk tasked with handling the traffic to and from Moscow.

A few comments on the situation in Sweden

In the 1980s, there were approximately 210 Soviet citizens posted to Sweden on official duty. According to information published in 1984 in the Swedish book *Industrispionage* [*Industrial espionage*, published only in Swedish], approximately one third of these individuals were professional intelligence officers, with some 50 of them belonging to the KGB and another 20 belonging to the GRU. Due to the cut-backs in 1991, when all Soviet republics became independent states, combined with Russia's failing economy and many other upheavals at the time, Russia's representation and the number of intelligence officers posted to Sweden dropped by half. However, despite the considerable drop in numbers, one third of Russia's official representation in Sweden still consists of officers from mainly the SVR and the GRU.

Some 30–40 years ago, anyone with an interest in Soviet espionage could often find useful information on such matters in Swedish media. Whether you were a politician, a company representative or a member of the general public, you could find out about how Moscow's agents operated in Sweden, which targets were of particular interest to them and so on.

In the past few years, there have been several instances when the intelligence activities of the SVR have been revealed, a number of which have been reported in newspapers and on radio and television. One such example concerned a visiting scholar from Russia, working at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in Uppsala, who was arrested in 2006. One of his assignments was to seek information on individuals who, in turn, could be suitable targets for

the SVR's recruitment operations. Another example from the early 2000s concerned the telecommunications company Ericsson. There have also been other instances when SVR officers have been forced to leave Sweden, albeit not at all to the same extent as during the 1980s.

In 2019, a Swedish engineer and the SVR officer Yevgeny Umerenko were arrested when they were having dinner together at a Stockholm restaurant. Umerenko had previously worked in Turkey, Switzerland and Germany and was now posted to Sweden under diplomatic cover, as counsellor. However, in reality, he was the head of the SVR X Line, i.e. the agency's industrial espionage in Sweden. According to Swedish media, prosecution against the Swedish agent, who at the time used to work in the Swedish high-tech industry was initiated in early 2021

It is most welcome that media publish information on these and similar matters, thereby also reminding people of the threat posed by Russia's intelligence agencies – the SVR, the GRU and the FSB. However, only rarely do we get to read about why such hostile activities are carried out, what their consequences are and what happens to those individuals who have been used and abused by Russia as part of these activities.

Biographies

Brief information on some leading SVR officers

During the past century, communist parties have exerted power by posting their own representatives in leading positions at important governments agencies, organisations, and so on. This applies to all countries that have had organised communist parties. It is quite clear that this working method has remained in use by the Russian intelligence apparatus. This is also something that interested members of the public can identify quite easily when reading about an important organisation and finding that three or four leading figures belong to one or several Russian intelligence agencies. Both the individuals and the published personal data have been carefully selected to demonstrate how the SVR and the other Russian agencies operate to exert political influence.

The following are some brief descriptions of a few individuals employed by the SVR, today or in the past, which will hopefully give the reader a better understanding of the SVR and its activities. These individuals have been selected partly because of their positions but even more so because of the activities in which they have been involved, also outside the SVR.



Vladimir Sergeevich Antonov, born in 1943. Antonov completed his military service in the mid-1960s, initially at the KGB's Higher Border Command School in Alma-Ata, and subsequently at the Kremlin Regiment in Moscow. He then became a student at the KGB 101 School in Moscow.

After completing his studies, Antonov acted as a journalist. His journalistic covers included for instance that of a TASS correspondent in Switzerland (1974–1980), and that of an Izvestia correspondent in Belgium (1984–1990). Of course, he also had a membership card for the Soviet Union of Journalists. If Antonov was ever known as a KGB officer at this time remains unknown but his later employments clearly indicate where he belonged.

In 1992, Antonov began to work at the SVR's Bureau of Public Relations and Media, which at that time was headed by major general **Yuri Kobaladze**. A large proportion of Antonov's work consisted of writing numerous articles for newspapers and journals about the KGB and the SVR, and leading representatives of both agencies. He was also very productive when it came to his own writing. Over the years, he wrote at least fifty books about the Cheka from a wide range of perspectives. He wrote fourteen of these books together with his SVR colleague **Vladimir Karpov** (who died in 2007, only 60 years old).

Antonov was also involved in the SVR's largest and most important book project, *Essays in the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence*, which resulted in six volumes published in at least four editions between 1995 and 2004. A total of 60 writers were involved in this project, which covers the entire history of the intelligence apparatus from 1920 until the years immediately before its publication and consists of just over 5 000 pages of history. Antonov's own writing

awarded him the SVR's cultural prize in 2003. He was awarded the same prize in 2020, this time posthumously. The 2020 prize was awarded by the director of the SVR, Sergey Naryshkin, and could possibly be related to the fact that Antonov and Naryshkin were colleagues for four years when they were both posted to Belgium.

It has also been confirmed that Antonov, either in the 1990s or in the early 2000s, worked as a personal adviser to the director of the SVR. Shortly after this, he headed the Foreign Intelligence History Cabinet. Several of Antonov's books address the history of the agency in general, and some of them deal with the awards and medals issued by the KGB and the SVR. Due to his detailed knowledge about the activities of the services, he was officially regarded for many years as the leading historical expert within his own department and was often made to explain historical processes and events to journalists and others posing intricate questions to the SVR.

Vladimir Antonov died in the spring of 2020 at the age of 77.



Sergey Yevgenyevich Naryshkin, born in 1954. After studies at the Leningrad Institute of Mechanics, Naryshkin came to the KGB in 1978. In 1978–1982, he attended the KGB's Counter-espionage school in Minsk (the 302nd School). In 1983–1985, he studied at the KGB 101 School in Moscow. Both his bachelor's thesis *Foreign Investment in Russia as a Factor in Economic Development* (2004) and his doctoral thesis *Foreign Investments and the Development of the Russian Economy* (2010) have been accused and found guilty of plagiarism. It is interesting to note which topics Naryshkin, Putin and other associated Chekists chose to write about as it clearly indicates which issues they considered strategically important for Russia.

In 2004, Naryshkin was appointed permanent member of the National Security Council of the Russian Federation. In 2009–2012, he was chairman of the Historical Truth Commission, an initiative launched by former President Medvedev. Since 2012, Naryshkin has been a highly active chairman of The Russian Historical Society, which was founded already in 1866 but lay dormant throughout the Soviet era. It was not resumed until 2012, when Naryshkin took the society under his wings. To this day, he still runs the society. For a large part of the first decade, he was chief of staff at the Ministerial Council and deputy head at the Economic Department of the Russian Presidential Administration.

Moreover, Putin also appointed Naryshkin to various control functions in Rosneft, Sovkomflot, United Shipbuilding Corporation and the Russian television channel Channel One Russia. From 2008, Naryshkin also headed the Presidential Administration, and in 2011 he became Speaker of the State Duma. When he was subsequently appointed head of the SVR, he was not only a senior Chekist but also a man used to keep many balls in the air.

Since his appointment as director for the SVR, Naryshkin has become highly visible and he is often interviewed by Russian media and comments on a vast array of foreign policy issues. His current image and attitude may well indicate that he has higher political aspirations.



Leonid Petrovich Reshetnikov, born in 1947 in Potsdam (East Germany). His father was a professional military officer. After six years of academic studies in Khariv and Sofia (Bulgaria), and at the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, Reshetnikov joined the KGB in 1976.

During his time in the KGB, he primarily worked with the Balkans and he is known to speak both Serbian and Bulgarian as well as some Greek. As far as is known, his time in the KGB consisted mainly of desk work, including analyses of various political topics. Evidently, this is a period of his life that no one wants to talk about.

A bit more is known about Reshetnikov's activities in the SVR. In the early 2000s, he headed the Directorate for Information and Analysis (SVR IAU) and later, until 2009, he was head of the Directorate for External Relations (SVR VS), which is tasked with handling the agency's contacts with other foreign intelligence agencies. For about a decade, Reshetnikov was reportedly a member of the SVR Collegium, to which everyone in the SVR leadership belongs. In 2009, at the age of 62, he formally retired. However, he certainly did not sit around idly for very long but instantly became the head of Putin's and the SVR's think-tank, the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI).

In the past decade, Reshetnikov has allowed for his religious interests to merge with his professional interests. He is president of the non-profit charity organisation Heritage, which among other things is involved in organising camps in Greece. He is also the chairman of the powerful Russian-orthodox and anti-Western tv channel Tsargrad TV, owned by the religious propagandist and businessman **Konstantin Malofeev**. In 2016, Reshetnikov founded the historic-religious organisation The Double-Headed Eagle, described as an 'orthodox-monarchist organisation'. Malofeev is also affiliated with this organisation. Reshetnikov's scientific background, and no doubt his well-documented analysis and assessment capacity, have promoted him to the scientific councils in several government functions: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Security Council. He is evidently someone whose skills are highly valued when it comes to dealing with complex political situations.

In 2019, Reshetnikov and Malofeev were both declared *persona non grata* by Bulgaria and issued 10-year bans on re-entering the country. The reason behind this was mainly that The Double-Headed Eagle, as well as President Putin's and the SVR's RISI, had paid large sums of money to several pro-Russian organisations in Bulgaria with the intent of changing the geopolitical orientation of Bulgaria, to set up a new political party and to launch a new tv channel in the country. When Reshetnikov was made to leave his post as head of RISI in November 2016, this is said to have been due to Putin's disappointment with the amateurish

handling of these operations. The Double-Headed Eagle was established only a few days later, apparently to ensure that the cash flow to the Bulgarian friends was not cut off.



Vyacheslav Ivanovich Trubnikov, born in 1944 in Irkutsk, Siberia, has had a both exciting and very solid career in both the KGB and the SVR. According to available information, he was only 17 years old when he graduated from the Moscow university with degrees in physics and mathematics as well as a gold medal. He then moved on to the MGU, where he studied Urdu and Hindi. He obviously knew what he was meant for.

Trubnikov was only 23 years old when he began his studies at the KGB's Higher Intelligence School in Moscow, also known as the KGB 101 School. In 1971, he was posted as a foreign correspondent with the Novosti Press Agency (APN). In this position, he covered India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, and he also became a member of the Soviet Union of Journalists.

After six years of writing, 'Slava' returned to Moscow where he immediately became head of what was then the KGB's 7th Geographic Department. During the 1970s, this department was responsible for the KGB's intelligence activities in Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.

During his 33-year-long career in the KGB and the SVR, Trubnikov was, among other things, chief of residence in India and resident in Bangladesh (India was one of few countries with several residencies, as was the US). In 1998, he became colonel general and two years later he was appointed director of the SVR, the youngest head of foreign espionage since 1920. In 1998, Trubnikov became army general, the highest rank of the Russian system.

Trubnikov left the SVR in 2000 when he was appointed deputy minister of foreign Affairs and at the same time, most conveniently, also became head of the MID's Department on Global Threats. After just two years, he was appointed first deputy minister of Foreign Affairs. Between 2004 and 2009, he was Russia's ambassador to India before formally retiring at the age of 65.

Trubnikov had prepared his retirement in the same way as many other Chekists and he was involved in setting up one of several dacha associations established by the SVR near its headquarters in Yasenevo. There are at least half a dozen similar associations with hundreds of residents living within walking distance of the headquarters.

Considering Trubnikov's extensive involvement in many important political organisations known to have attracted many Chekists from the SVR and the KGB over the years, such as the IMEMO, the PIR Center, the Trialogue Club International, Pugwash, the Russian Council for International Affairs (RSMD) and the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, it is not impossible that he, since his formal retirement, belongs to the SVR's Special Reserve.

Appendices

Appendix 1

The SVR's headquarters, 68 buildings and areas

In 1972, the KGB's First Main Directorate (PGU) moved to Yasenevo. The main building had originally been built for the International Department of the CPSU, which found it to be too distant from central Moscow. Since then, the area has expanded several times and the number of buildings has multiplied. This increase has been particularly significant since Putin came to power.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has conducted a study based on satellite images and photographs taken from the ground, and compared data for the period 2007–2018, including photographs of the main complex from 2007, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2016 and 2018 (<https://fas.org/irp/eprint/svr-expansion.pdf>).

Some of the SVR's future plans include more than doubling the size of its area in Yasenevo. For more than ten years, various organisations and private individuals using the woodlands around the complex have protested against these plans and the breach of faith in view of previous promises made by the SVR.

Below are all buildings and areas listed on Wikimapia, including their geographical positions:

| | |
|--|-----------------------|
| Pond | 55°35'10"N 37°30'25"E |
| Fenced area in the forest | 55°35'8"N 37°30'28"E |
| Cottage | 55°35'8"N 37°30'27"E |
| Warehouse | 55°35'0"N 37°30'49"E |
| Building | 55°35'12"N 37°30'54"E |
| Base (no building) | 55°35'12"N 37°30'57"E |
| Warehouse, block No 105, 1, building 6 | 55°35'9"N 37°30'57"E |
| Building | 55°35'8"N 37°31'0"E |
| HQ SVR | 55°35'6"N 37°31'6"E |
| Decorative pond | 55°35'8"N 37°31'8"E |
| Monument for intelligence officers | 55°35'4"N 37°31'4"E |
| Sports complex with shooting gallery and pool | 55°35'2"N 37°31'2"E |
| New headquarters building, block No 105, 1, building 1 | 55°35'0"N 37°30'56"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 2 | 55°34'57"N 37°30'53"E |
| 12-story SPK building | 55°34'54"N 37°31'3"E |
| Mini football | 55°35'0"N 37°31'4"E |
| Construction site | 55°35'0"N 37°31'12"E |
| HQ building under construction | 55°34'59"N 37°31'11"E |
| KPP block No 105, 1, building 10 | 55°34'57"N 37°31'14"E |

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| KPP | 55°35'5"N 37°31'20"E |
| North Gate and Checkpoint at the entrance to the territory of SVR (Sign on the Moscow Ring Road reading <i>Drive only for special vehicles + Brick</i>) | 55°35'21"N 37°31'36"E |
| Construction site | 55°35'14"N 37°31'29"E |
| Sewage pumping station, block No 105, 1, building 79 | 55°35'14"N 37°31'29"E |
| Large parking lot for SVR employees | 55°35'4"N 37°31'35"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 18 | 55°35'5"N 37°31'39"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 19 | 55°35'1"N 37°31'37"E |
| Construction site | 55°35'5"N 37°31'30"E |
| Supermarket, block No 105, 1, building 15 | 55°35'4"N 37°31'25"E |
| Data processing center, TsOD | 55°35'1"N 37°31'22"E |
| 5-story clinic, block No 105, 1, building 21 | 55°34'57"N 37°31'22"E |
| Office buildings complex | 55°34'48"N 37°31'31"E |
| Barracks, block No 105, 1, building 23 | 55°34'54"N 37°31'18"E |
| Barracks, block No 105, 1, building 24 | 55°34'52"N 37°31'17"E |
| Construction site | 55°34'53"N 37°31'23"E |
| Car park | 55°34'51"N 37°31'20"E |
| Office building, block No 105, 1, building 30 | 55°34'51"N 37°31'26"E |
| Hostel | 55°34'53"N 37°31'28"E |
| KPP | 55°34'55"N 37°31'32"E |
| Checkpoint, block No 105, 1, building 31 | 55°34'54"N 37°31'34"E |
| Administrative building, block No 105, 1, building 32 | 55°34'53"N 37°31'39"E |
| Administrative building | 55°34'50"N 37°31'34"E |
| Technical building | 55°34'51"N 37°31'37"E |
| Administrative building | 55°34'49"N 37°31'37"E |
| Building | 55°34'46"N 37°31'35"E |
| Warehouse complex | 55°34'48"N 37°31'25"E |
| Technical building | 55°34'48"N 37°31'18"E |
| Inspection point (checkpoint) for cars entering the technical area, block No 105, 1, building 42 | 55°34'50"N 37°31'15"E |
| Gas station, block No 105, 1, building 43 | 55°34'48"N 37°31'14"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 44 | 55°34'46"N 37°31'13"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 45 | 55°34'45"N 37°31'17"E |
| Fire Department | 55°34'45"N 37°31'23"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 51 | 55°34'44"N 37°31'35"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 52 | 55°34'44"N 37°31'36"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 53 | 55°34'42"N 37°31'35"E |

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 54 | 55°34'41"N 37°31'32"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 55 | 55°34'42"N 37°31'27"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 56 | 55°34'43"N 37°31'26"E |
| Storage house | 55°34'43"N 37°31'22"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 59 | 55°34'43"N 37°31'14"E |
| Technical building, block No 105, 1, building 63 | 55°34'39"N 37°31'32"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 61 | 55°34'39"N 37°31'26"E |
| Building, block No 105, 1, building 62 | 55°34'38"N 37°31'21"E |
| Site for the removal and temporary storage of soil, Construction site | 55°34'34"N 37°31'26"E |
| Storage area | 55°34'32"N 37°31'18"E |
| Sports complex, block No 105, 1, building 77 | 55°34'38"N 37°31'0"E |
| Sports complex for employees | 55°34'40"N 37°31'3"E |
| Decommissioned cars, Sedimentation tank etc | 55°34'30"N 37°31'12"E |
| South Gate and Checkpoint | 55°34'31"N 37°31'8"E |

Appendix 2

Organisations and associations focusing on Russian compatriots living abroad

Please note that this list is currently not complete. It is hoped that when my forthcoming book is published, this list will contain a large majority of Russia's most important organisations and associations operating in this area.

Russia

Commission for Compatriots under the Russian Foreign Ministry

Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation – Rossotrudnichestvo

Foundation for the Protection and Support of the Rights of Compatriots

Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad

Government Commission for Compatriots Abroad

Institute for Russians Abroad

Interdepartmental Commission for the Implementation of the National Programme to Assist the Voluntary Resettlement in Russia of Compatriots Currently Living Abroad

International Council of Russian Compatriots

Media Center for Compatriots

MID Department for the Affairs of Compatriots and Human Rights

Moscow House of Compatriots

National Council of Russian Compatriots

Organization of Russian Compatriots

Regional Council of Foreign Compatriots

Republican Conference of Russian compatriots

Russian Century - Portal of Russian Compatriots

Society of Russian Compatriots in Russia

State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots

The Program for Implementation of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in Respect of Compatriots Abroad in 2011–2013

The Two-Headed Eagle

World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad

World Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots

World Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad

World Games of Young Compatriots

Youth Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots

Abkhazia

Armenia

Australia

Russian Australian Representative Council

Belarus

Croatia

Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Croatia

Czech Republic

Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in the Czech Republic

Estonia

Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Estonia

Council of the Association of Russian Compatriots in Estonia

Country Conference of Russian Compatriots in Estonia

Georgia

Greece

Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Greece

Latvia**Lithuania**

Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Lithuania

Norway

Compatriots in Bergen

Tidskrift for Russisktalende i Norge

Switzerland

Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Switzerland

Serbia

Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Serbia

Sweden

Conference of Russian Compatriots in Sweden

Ukraine

All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots' Organizations

USA

Compatriots in America

Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots of the USA

The rest of the world

Regional Conference of Russian Compatriots of the Nordic and Baltic Countries

Sources

The below list of sources represents a selection of sources used for this study. These sources are also recommended reading for anyone interested in finding out more about Russia and its intelligence apparatus. This area has always been something of a mystery to us living in the West, mainly because there has not been a great deal of available high quality information.

The availability of such information started to improve in the 1980s, thanks largely to several brave officers from the KGB and the GRU who provided their knowledge to the West. Their reason for doing so was often to go against the oppressors in the Kremlin. The situation remains the same today. I would particularly recommend reading the authors with a background in the intelligence apparatus in the Soviet Union and Russia who have fled to the West. They deserve to be taken seriously and should be praised for their courage.

Jakob Andersen & Oleg Gordievsky: *De Røde Spioner – KGBs operationer i Danmark – fra Stalin til Jeltsin, fra Stauning til Nyrup*, 2002. [*The Red Spies – KGB's operations in Denmark – from Stalin to Yeltsin, from Stauning to Nyrup*, published only in Danish.]

Christopher Andrew & Oleg Gordievsky: *KGB – The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*, 1990.

Christopher Andrew & Oleg Gordievsky: *Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations 1975-1985*, 1991.

Christopher Andrew & Oleg Gordievsky: *More Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations 1975-1985*, 1992.

Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin: *The Sword and the Shield – the Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, 1999.

Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin: *The World Was Going Our Way – The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*, 2006.

Catherine Belton: *Putin's People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On the West*, 2020.

Gordon Corrae: *Russians Among Us – Sleeper Cells, Ghost Stories, and the Hunt For Putin's Spies*, 2020.

Pete Earley: *Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy*, 2007.

Tore Forsberg: *Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner*, 2003. [*Spies and spies spying on spies*, published only in Swedish.]

Mark Galeotti: *Putin's Hydra Inside Russia's Intelligence Services*, 2016.

Luke Harding: *Shadow State: Murder, Mayhem, and Russia's Remaking of the West*, 2020.

Jonathan Litell: *The Security Organs of the Russian Federation – A Brief History 1991–2005*,

Thomas Rid: *Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare*, 2020.

Online sources

<http://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/> Website in Russian, dedicated to the Cheka in 1917–1991. Focuses mainly on the Cheka's organisational structure and many of its leading figures.

Baltic Center for Investigative Journalism Re:Baltica, <https://en.rebaltica.lv/>

Bellingcat Investigation Team, <https://www.bellingcat.com/>

Free Russia Foundation, <http://www.4freerussia.org/>

InformNapalm, <https://informnapalm.org/>

Meduza, <https://meduza.io/en>

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, <https://www.rferl.org/>

Stop Fake, <http://www.stopfake.org/en/>

The Dossier Center, <https://dossier.center/>

The Insider Russia, <https://theins.ru/>

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Expansion of Foreign Intelligence Service HQ, Federation of American Scientists, 2018-07-27, <https://fas.org/irp/eprint/svr-expansion.pdf>

FSB Team of Chemical Weapon Experts Implicated in Alexey Navalny Novichok Poisoning, 2020-12-14, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2020/12/14/fsb-team-of-chemical-weapon-experts-implicated-in-alexey-navalny-novichok-poisoning/>

Rysk militär förmåga i ett tioårsperspektiv, FOI 2019, <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4752--SE> [*Russian military capability in a ten-year perspective*, published only in Swedish.]

¹ The term 'active measures' (Активные мероприятия) basically refers to all measure a country may take to attempt to influence another country's foreign, security and defence policies. Active measures can thus be seen as part of, or as a substitute for, an armed attack. Active measures are usually long-term in character and are carried out in combination with other measures to maximise their respective effects. These measures can be large or small, long-term or short-term, and of a covert or overt nature. Irrespective of their specific nature, their aim is to mislead the antagonist in the sectors in which they are applied. Sometimes the active measure in its entirety is designed for a precise purpose, at other times already existing activities are used but altered in accordance with their overall strategy.

Active measures may, for instance, make use of a military exercise, which would take place anyway, but make additions that will change its totality. Such additions may include interruptions to civilian communications, exercises interfering with the activities of other countries, or interference of civilian air traffic by using planes that have their transponders switched off. Utterly small measures may have serious consequences.

The target group can be the general public, members of a specific political party, journalists at a particular newspaper, or individuals living in a certain area.

² <https://www.occrp.org>

³ This compendium, published in 2019, is based on open and well-reputed sources and may be cited and disseminated free of charge: https://gallery.mailchimp.com/55be27e943e9d91bb7781ce9e/files/90887ab8-ec7-40e9-82ff-4d48d6514376/Grundkurs_Sovjetisk_Underra_ttelsetja_nst.pdf. However, please note that the text, which is published only in Swedish, is protected by copyright and anyone wanting to use more substantial parts of the compendium is kindly requested to contact me by email: joakim.von_braun@bredband.net.

⁴ Carat is a unit of mass originating from another unit of mass, namely the ounce (oz). Carat is used to measure gemstones and pearls. One carat of gold is the equivalent of 200 mg, hence a diamond of 100 carats weighs 20 grams.

⁵ Earl Browder recruited agents for the NKVD. He had previously worked as a Comintern agent in Shanghai, China. Browder's ex-wife, Kitty Hawk, was also an agent for the NKVD. If the name Browder rings a bell, this may relate to the fact that Earl Browder's nephew, Bill Browder, was Russia's most successful venture capitalist before Putin decided to put a stop to his activities in the country. His auditor Sergey Magnitsky was arrested on false grounds and beaten to death by the prison guards meant to be monitoring him. Several high-ranking police officers stole 212 million dollars from Bill Browder. As a result of Putin's stance on protecting Magnitsky's murderers, the US has adopted new legislation blacklisting all of the involved Russians and also frozen their potential financial assets in the US. Similar legislation has subsequently been adopted in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Several other countries, including Sweden, are seeking to have similar legislation passed by their national parliaments.

⁶ The five identified agents from Cambridge University were Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross. There were several other agents working for the Soviet Union in their immediate surroundings and with whom the Cambridge Five were in contact. The reason why these five individuals have been referred to as a group relates in part to their close relationship with each other, and it also relates to the very prominent posts they all had within the British intelligence and security services. For a more comprehensive picture, individuals such as James Klugmann, Victor Rothschild and Leo Long should also be mentioned in this context.

The agent handlers from the NKVD and the NKGB (Yury Modin, Aleksandr Orlov, Konstantin Kukin, Teodor Maly, Anatoly Gorsky, Boris Krotov and Arnold Deutch) also played a key role in making sure that everything ran smoothly. The link between Moscow and the group was broken for a long period of time, and on several occasions Moscow was also very suspicious of their British agents, partly because they delivered way too much and way too valuable information, and partly because they claimed that the UK had no spies of its own in the Soviet Union. All of this was in sharp contrast to the paranoid Russians' ideas about how things actually were, and the group's agent handlers likely worked hard to ensure that the agents could continue their mission and that the information they delivered was deemed reliable. Soviet documents only describe one or two of the handlers linked to this circle of spies as being Russian. Many commentators have suggested that the agent handlers' non-Slavic backgrounds, in the 1920s and 1930s, were very important for Moscow's successful recruitment operations during that period.

⁷ In the Czardom, and later in both the Soviet Union and in today's Russia, information on people's nationalities was seen as important. It is worth mentioning that Jews were categorised as a nationality in their own right, and the word 'Jew' was printed in their domestic passports. This was of course highly significant information in a country that was at least as antisemitic as Poland and Germany at this time.

⁸ These are some of the members of the group that worked with Putin in St Petersburg under Anatoly Sobchak:

Aleksandr Beshpalov (KGB), Valery Golubev (KGB), Viktor Ivanov (KGB), Vladimir Yakunin (KGB), Vladimir Kozjih (KGB), Aleksey Kudrin, Valentin Makarov (KGB), Dimitri Medvedev, Aleksey Miller, Sergey Naryshkin (KGB), Oleg Safonov (KGB), Igor Sechin, Viktor Zolotov (KGB) and Viktor Zubkov. Evidently, a majority of them have belonged to the KGB. They have also remained close to Putin for at least 30 years and some of them have subsequently been rewarded with some of the most prominent posts in Russian society. They represent the *crème de la crème* of the 'siloviki'.

⁹ Following Stalin's decision in 1943 to dissolve the Comintern, many of its activities were taken over by the newly established International Department of the Communist Party. The most important tasks, such as sending instructions to communist parties around the world via radio, sending cash and forged identity documents via secret courier lines, and training foreign communists in Moscow continued virtually unchanged even if they were disguised by cover names such as Institute No. 301 and Institute No. 99.

¹⁰ It has been described for a long time how Kim Philby was recruited by an agent recruiter from Moscow, who had been sent the UK. However, the truth of the matter is that he was recruited in Austria by two female agents working for the Comintern. Philby later ended up in the NKVD.

One of these women was Edith Tudor-Hart, who was an agent working for the secret Comintern department OMS where she got to know the fellow countryman Arnold Deutsch. The other woman, Litz Friedman, was active in the KPÖ (the Austrian Communist Party) and is known to have smuggled wanted left-wing activists via the sewage system out of Vienna. Kim Philby allegedly assisted her in this work and the two of them married on 24 October 1934, partly to make it easier for her to leave the then increasingly pro-Nazi Austria.

¹¹ In a historical review of Soviet espionage before the Second World War and until the time of the Vietnam War, the non-Russian agent recruiters from the Comintern stand out as having been much more successful than their Russian counterparts when seeking to recruit Westerners to Moscow's agent networks. Also non-Russian Soviet citizens excelled compared to their Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian colleagues. When it came to the Slavic intelligence officers, it was only those who had worked abroad for a longer period of time who seemed to have results similar to those of the men in the NKVD and the KGB who had come from the West or from Caucasia or the Baltics.

¹² The most important changes were that the KGB's 2nd Main Directorate became the FSB, the Main Directorate of the Border Troops became an agency in its own right, and the Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) was created by merging the principal parts of the KGB's 8th Main Directorate (encryption) and its 16th Directorate (signals intelligence). Almost all functions in the separate agencies were incorporated into the FSB following a presidential decree (*ukaz*) issued by President Putin in 2003. Only a handful of international observers seem to have noted these changes.

¹³ http://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/struktur.htm

¹⁴ PNG is an abbreviation of the Latin 'Persona Non Grata' (alt. 'Personae Non Gratae' in the plural) and means 'Person not welcome'. In the world of diplomacy, this concept signifies a foreign diplomat who has been expelled from the country of their posting.

¹⁵ It is likely that the SVR's Operative Departments largely correspond to the KGB's Geographic Departments of which there were approximately fifteen, numbered from 1 to 20. Some of the numbered departments carried out activities that were not linked to any specific geographic area, e.g. the 15th Department which was responsible for registration and archives, and the 19th Department which focused on emigrants from the Soviet Union. The changes that may have taken place are assessed to concern amalgamations of several smaller departments into a few larger departments.

¹⁶ Vneshekonombank was founded already in 1924, partly as a result of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). Its predecessor Roskombank was founded on 18 August 1922 by the notorious Swedish banker Olof Aschberg, known also as the 'Red Banker'. Olof Aschberg was a personal acquaintance of Lenin and had helped the Bolsheviks with, for instance, smuggling gold worth multi-million sums from Russia to Sweden, where the gold was melted and given Swedish stamps thus making it possible to ship the gold to London where it was sold. In April 1924, Roskombank was transformed into Vneshekonombank and after Lenin's death Stalin kicked out good old Olof Aschberg, who incidentally was the grandfather of the two Swedish journalists Robert and Richard Aschberg. Today, the bank is headed by Vladimir Dimitriev, who for several decades belonged to the

SVR and has been posted to Sweden for Line PR on several occasions. During his last stint in Sweden, in 1991-1993, he had advanced to the post of resident for all SVR officers in Sweden.

¹⁷ Olof Aschberg founded several pro-Russian banks in Sweden around 1917. For several years he was also involved in large-scale smuggling of gold, silver and platinum from Russia to Sweden. Thanks to these activities, the Bolsheviks gained access to sums amounting to billions for which they could buy the products they needed to survive during the civil war.

For a detailed account of Aschberg's activities, see Sean McMeekin's highly interesting book *History's Greatest Heist – The Looting of Russia by the Bolsheviks*, Yale University Press, 2009.

¹⁸ <https://www.volkskrant.nl/tech/dutch-agencies-provide-crucial-intel-about-russia-s-interference-in-us-elections~a4561913/> (Retrieved 2018-01-25); <https://nltimes.nl/2018/01/25/dutch-team-infiltrated-russian-hacker-group-witnessing-us-election-meddling-dnc-attack> (Retrieved 2018-01-25).

¹⁹ <http://shieldandword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/OTU.htm>

²⁰ <http://shieldandword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/1GU/R.htm>

²¹ <http://shieldandword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/1GU/service2.htm>

²² Since the establishment of the SVR in 1991, its aggressive activities have resulted in the expulsion of a large number of SVR officers from the countries to which they were posted. According to media reports, at least 419 spies from the SVR and the GRU have been declared *persona non grata*, i.e. they have been expelled. This number also includes many intelligence officers who were forced to return home prematurely, for instance around 180 Russians who were made to leave their embassies in Europe, North America and parts of the British Commonwealth following the attempted assassination of Sergey Skripal in the UK in March 2018, as well as the 35 Russians kicked out by the US in 2016. However, neither of these mass expulsions targeted individual spies for what they had personally done but were political signals with a direct effect on staff belonging to the SVR and the GRU. The expulsion of an identified intelligence officer is a very stern diplomatic protest, to which Moscow is clearly not responsive.

It should be added that the SVR suffered several particularly hard setbacks in the 1990s, when several of their residents were expelled. This was something that had virtually never happened before.

The SVR resident **Igor Nikiforov** was expelled from Sweden in August 1991.

Soon after this, in October 1991, Norwegian authorities expelled the SVR resident **Lev Koshlyakov**.

In 1997, the SVR resident **Vladimir Alganov** was declared *persona non grata* by Poland.

In March 1998, Norwegian authorities expelled another resident from their country, **Evgeny Serebryakov**.

In 2004, Estonia was added to this exclusive list following the expulsion of **Anatoli Klimkin**.

After the expulsion in 2004, it appears that the SVR has changed its instructions for how work at the local residencies abroad should be carried out so as to avoid having their local heads being forced to go back home and likely also having lost every chance of working in any Western country again. Punishments of this kind would seem to be one of the most effective means of countering Russia's intelligence activities abroad, especially if it is consistently their best officers who are expelled. The method is particularly successful in small language areas for which the SVR and the GRU only have a limited number of officers. Between 1981 and 1991, Sweden expelled on average three Soviet intelligence officers per year. During the same period, some 40 intelligence officers were prevented from entering the country to assume their posts. An estimate, based on all known expulsions of KGB and GRU officers in the world, indicates that Sweden during these years carried out around 12.5 per cent of all expulsions worldwide. This was more than any other country. However, since then Sweden has only expelled a few Russians.

²³ <http://shieldandword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/1GU/S.htm>

²⁴ It has been stated many times that the well-known KGB general **Oleg Danilovich Kalugin** was the youngest KGB general ever. Kalugin was 40 years old when he was awarded the title of major general in 1974. Today, this lacks any relevance whatsoever as Kalugin, on 26 June 2002, was sentenced in absentia to 15 years' imprisonment. He was also degraded, lost the 22 awards he had received and had his pension withdrawn, all as a result of having moved to the US and having voluntarily been questioned by the US Congress. Many senior KGB officers regard Kalugin as a traitor.

²⁵ One of the KGB's most well-known generals was **Yevgeny Petrovich Pitovranov**, born on 30 March 1915, dead in December 1999, 84 years old. Pitovranov retired in 1966, and in 1969 he returned as lieutenant general

for an entirely new KGB department handling scientific-technical intelligence (industrial espionage). This department was responsible for the activities of the Soviet Chamber of Trade and Industry.

²⁶ Already in the mid-1960s, one course was removed from the KGB 101 School's 1st Faculty for Military counter-espionage, which after a three-year trial period became the KUOS, Advanced Training Courses for Officers [Курсы Усовершенствования Офицерского Состава]. The training was formally launched on 19 March 1969 and was not discontinued until 1993. With the SVR's establishment of the Spetsnaz unit Zaslou, it may be assumed that some form of training resembling that offered by the KUOS has been resumed.

²⁷ The rather extensive activities carried out by Vypel in Afghanistan were divided into periods of six months under specific operation names such as *Zenit*, *Kaskad* and *Grom*, and the activities were carried out by a number of (often named) combat groups. See also *Ryska elitförband* [*Russian elite units*, published only in Swedish] by Joakim von Braun and Lars Gyllenhal (2016).

²⁸ For a long period of time, the KGB's most prominent school in Moscow, which trained its officers to operate in the West, was known as the KGB 101 School. A lesser known fact is that the Cheka for many decades had a large number of schools, all of which had three-figure names. Over time, there have been some 20–25 such schools, specialising in different areas of activity (not counting the schools belonging to the border troops). The two central schools in Moscow (the KGB 101 School and the KGB 102 School), which were run on behalf of the 1st and 2nd Main Directorates, held courses that ran for several years and catered for the best students who had usually completed their education at the one-year schools around the country. In the late 1980s, a majority of these courses became 18 months long.

The 306 School in Charkov held courses in counter-intelligence, the 402 School in Sverdlovsk provided training in 'radio counter-espionage', and the 505 School in Tashkent appears to have trained KGB officers from the Baltic States. The 311 School in Novosibirsk was specialised in military counter-espionage. The schools were active from just after the Second World War until the latter half of the 1980s. However, their period of greatness was during the 1950s until roughly the mid-1960s. Some of the schools have changed locations but kept their numbers:

KGB 101 School, Moscow

KGB 102 School, Moscow

KGB 103 School, Leningrad

KGB 132 School

KGB 201 School, Gorky

KGB 202 School, Leningrad

KGB 202 School, Kiev

KGB 204 School, Kiev

KGB 205 School

KGB 301 School, Mogilev

KGB 301 School, Vilnius

KGB 302 School, Lvov

KGB 302 School, Mogilev

KGB 302 School, Minsk

KGB 303 School, Vilnius

KGB 304 School, Sverdlovsk

KGB 305 School, Tbilisi

KGB 306 School, Charkov

KGB 307 School, Chabarovsk

KGB 308 School

KGB 309 School

KGB 310 School

KGB 311 School, Novosibirsk

NKGB 366 School, Kuybyshev

KGB 401 School, Kiev

KGB 401 School, Leningrad

KGB 402 School, Sverdlovsk

KGB 403 School

KGB 505 School, Tashkent

²⁹ Hardly any other government agency in the Soviet Union has experienced as many name changes and changes to its activities as has the Cheka. Between 1917 and 1991, its name changed approximately 15 times. However, it was rarely only a name change but changes were often also made to its organisational structures and areas of activity.

³⁰ Several organisations, military units and legal persons received various awards during the Soviet era. The name 'Yuri Andropov Red Banner Institute' indicates that the school received the Order of the Red Banner for its educational achievements, and the naming of the school after the former head of the KGB, Yury Andropov, was a particular sign of appreciation by the Soviet leadership. As the Soviet society had limited possibilities to hand out material awards, individuals and institutions were showered with elegant titles and a large number of badges, medals and orders.

³¹ http://www.compromat.ru/page_30912.htm (Retrieved 2011-06-16.)

³² Searching through important news media has always been a major task for all ambitious intelligence services. The CIA had a huge organisation known as the FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) and the UK set up a similar function from the BBC's Overseas Services. While the Americans sought to translate everything of interest, the British usually published only the most interesting articles and news programmes. The FBIS's Soviet bulletin consisted of 100 to 150 pages, every day! There was also an equally substantial weekly report on the Soviet Union's economic and technical news. Other daily reports covered Eastern Europe, China, the Arab countries and other continents.

³³ https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Премия_Службы_внешней_разведки_Российской_Федерации;
http://www.svr.gov.ru/svr_today/premia.htm

In 1978–1988, the KGB had a similar cultural prize. In 2006, the FSB introduced a corresponding prize, which is divided into half a dozen categories such as film, radio and television, literature and so on. The MVD also has a similar prize. In part, these prizes function as a tool for prompting different types of media to disseminate the overall views of the security agencies, and in part they provide an opportunity to highlight their own activities over those of others. There are also other prizes, for instance within the security industry and the media, which are awarded to present or former Chekists who are often wearing many hats.

³⁴ Since the 1920s, there have been many training facilities, shooting ranges etc. in the Balashikha district, which are used by various spetsnaz units and some other special units. This is where both the KGB and the GRU trained the units that were involved in the initial attack on Afghanistan at Christmas time in 1979. Today, these units belong both to the SVR and the FSB as well as to the GRU and the National Guard, and some more traditional units belonging to the Western Military District.

³⁵ <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3461885> (Retrieved 2017-11-10). Budanov, who began his career in the KGB in 1966, was posted to the UK until he was expelled from the country in 1971. When counting both those who were expelled and those who were banned from returning, a total of 105 intelligence officers from the KGB and the GRU were affected. As a result, the KGB had only one man left at the embassy. After this, Budanov focused entirely on counter-intelligence, e.g. spending five years in East Germany with Vladimir Putin.

³⁶ The Active Reserve (sometimes referred to as the Operative Reserve, or the Special Reserve) is made up of selected Chekists who have retired from the SVR (often at the age of 55) but want to continue to work for the Russian state. They are usually posted as deputy heads or heads of international relations in various government agencies, companies, associations, etc., where they receive instructions from their former employer and report back anything they consider to be of interest. Best of all, they receive full salaries from both employers, both from the Cheka and from their new employer!

The Active Reserve is no recent invention. It has operated for many years, at least since the 1950s, and it is known to have existed throughout the KGB era. At the same time as it provided the KGB with important

information, the reservists could also carry out instructions from the Cheka in the agencies, companies and organisations at which they were posted. In most cases, their affiliation with the KGB remained completely unknown to most of their colleagues at the agency, company or organisation which they were infiltrating.

The FSB also has an identical reserve, which operates in a large number of agencies and companies across Russia, known as the FSB's Department of Seconded Personnel [Аппарат Прикомандированных Сотрудников].

³⁷ NGO is an abbreviation for Non-Governmental Organisation, and GONGO is an abbreviation for Government-Organised Non-Governmental Organisation. The latter is part of Russia's disinformation and should be understood as an attempt to create an image of a civic society resembling a Western society but which, in actual fact, is nothing but a Potemkin village serving the Putin regime and its political agenda.

³⁸ In the early 1920s, they wanted to achieve two partly contradictory political goals at the same time: to support the world revolution via the Comintern, and to boost the support for the young Soviet state from other countries by increasing the number of trade agreements and diplomatic recognitions via the MID. The Cheka and the GRU were to promote both ambitions at the same time.

³⁹ Since the early 1960s, embassies, consulates and their staff have enjoyed international protection. These protective measures are set out both in an international treaty, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations from 1961, and in its companion piece, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations from 1963. The conventions stipulate that representatives covered by diplomatic immunity must not be arrested or prosecuted, their homes and workplaces must not be searched, and so on. The background to these conventions is to prevent that a host country fabricates information about a crime and makes use of this information to penalise a country. However, should the sending country find that information on crimes potentially committed by their own diplomatic staff appears correct, it may decide to voluntarily lift the diplomatic immunity of its own staff.

⁴⁰ At this time, the Cheka was known as the MGB (Ministry of State Security). In 1954, its name changed to the KGB (Committee for State Security). This name remained in use until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

⁴¹ As a result of the closing down of the Information Committee and the transfer of the Department for Disinformation to the KGB, it may appear to the uninitiated that the Cheka was not involved in disinformation until the formation of Department D in January 1959. This new department was headed by Ivan Agayants, who had previously been head of faculty at the KGB 101 School.
(<http://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/1GU/A.htm>)

⁴² My compendiums *Att identifiera en sovjetisk underrättelseofficer* [*How to identify Soviet intelligence officers*] and *Hur KGB värvar agenter* [*How the KGB recruits agents*, published only in Swedish] were both published in 1989 by Research & Inquiries, Stockholm.

⁴³ In the early 1930s, Rodionov was active in the Baltic Fleet. In 1936, he became naval attaché first in Turkey and later in Greece. During these years, he was the resident for Naval GRU, which existed at that time. He participated in San Francisco in the establishment of the United Nations and later became first deputy director of the KI and headed its Department for Disinformation. In 1950–1956, he was posted as the Soviet Union's ambassador to Sweden before he was appointed head of the MID's Scandinavian Department.

⁴⁴ The local KGB residency had of a number of so-called lines (departments) that worked structurally with certain kinds of intelligence activities, such as political intelligence, counter-intelligence, etc.

⁴⁵ Yevgeny Primakov was director for the SVR in 1991–1996. After this, he was appointed Russia's minister for foreign affairs before becoming the country's prime minister.

⁴⁶ The illegals are the elite among Russian spies. They are secretly dispatched to Western countries and usually operate under false identities and invented legends and CVs. They have no official contacts with Moscow or with any Russian embassies or consulates. They usually receive their instructions via short-wave radio or via the internet. The ten illegals who were arrested in the US in 2010 had used several very advanced computer programs, which enabled invisible communication both via the internet (e.g. steganography) and Wi-Fi traffic (wireless data traffic).

⁴⁷ During the time of Putin's posting to Dresden, there was an unusually high number of KGB officers who were also posted there possibly indicating that the KGB station in Dresden may have been more interesting than what many has assumed in the past. As far as is known, the following KGB officers were posted to Dresden, probably for the duration, or part of the duration, of Putin's years in East Germany:

Lazar Matveev, Aleksey Rostovtsev, Oleg Safonov, Vladimir Shirokov, Evgeny Shkolov, Nikolay Tokarev and Vladimir Usoltsev.

⁴⁸ The term *siloviki* refers to all officers in the Cheka (including both present and former officers in the SVR, the FSB and the KGB) and in the Armed Forces, who in the past 20–30 years have gathered around Vladimir ‘Vova’ Putin. These *siloviki*, who amount to hundreds of individuals, are the persons in positions of power for whom Putin has the greatest confidence. Many of them come from Putin’s hometown Leningrad/St Petersburg.

⁴⁹ <https://theins.ru/news/234458> (Retrieved 2020-11-02).

⁵⁰ Lev Filippovich Sotskov was born in Leningrad on 30 March 1932. After his studies at the MGIMO, Sotskov came to the KGB in 1959. Having spent most of the 1960s in Sweden, Sotskov dedicated the rest of his life to disinformation and active measures. In 1978–1987, he was first deputy director for Department A of the KGB’s First Main Directorate. Department A was responsible for the agency’s disinformation efforts. He then spent at least twenty years working with similar matters within the SVR until he was made responsible for selecting thousands of documents deemed suitable for declassification and publication. He also worked on the SVR campaign against Poland and the Baltic States. In 2001–2011, Sotskov published the following books:

Operation Tarantella, 2001

Unknown Separatism – Service of SD and Abwehr, 2003

Code of Operation – ‘Tarantella’, 2007

The Baltics and Geopolitics: 1935–1945, 2009

Secrets of the Polish Policy: Collection of documents (1935–1945), 2009

Secrets of the Polish Policy: 1935–1945, 2010

Aggression: Declassified Documents of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation 1939–1941, 2011

⁵¹ My compendium *Att identifiera en sovjetisk underrättelseofficer - en kort handledning* was published in the late 1980s by Research & Inquiries Sweden AB. At that time, a copy of the compendium cost SEK 200. Today, the text can be downloaded for free at https://mcusercontent.com/55be27e943e9d91bb7781ce9e/files/e3e2d83a-0249-4ab3-aebf-a418a7537d84/Att_identifiera_en_sovjetisk_underr_ttelsofficer_En_kort_handledning.pdf. Please note that the text is protected by copyright and must not be altered without prior consent of the author. However, there are no restrictions as regards republication of the text in part or in full.

The compendium (translated into English) can be downloaded here:

https://mcusercontent.com/55be27e943e9d91bb7781ce9e/files/5c4c9aa7-817b-4ec4-bde7-0af75ea9ad0a/How_to_Identify_Soviet_Intelligence_Officers.pdf

⁵² The Russians held posts at the embassy, at the consulates in Stockholm and Gothenburg, at the trade representation in Lidingö, at the airline Aeroflot (GRU officers only) and at the tourist agency Intourist (KGB officers, Intourist was established by the NKVD in 1938). They were also posted as foreign correspondents for e.g. the APN, Novoye Vremya, Izvestia, TASS, Moscow Radio/TV and, before the Second World War, the news agency Rosta. They were also represented at Matreco Handels AB in Södertälje, as shipping controllers in Gothenburg (mainly GRU), as representatives for the copyright organisation VAAP, the Merchant Marine (Morflot) and the fisheries company Scarus Marin in Helsingborg. All of the 210 Russians were free to travel anywhere in the country.

⁵³ See Appendix 2.

⁵⁴ <https://vault.fbi.gov/ghost-stories-russian-foreign-intelligence-service-illegals/>

⁵⁵ Bellingcat – <https://www.bellingcat.com/>

InformNapalm – <https://informnapalm.org/en/>

Meduza – <https://meduza.io/en/>

The Insider – <https://theins.ru/>

On several occasions, whether on their own or together with others, Bellingcat has proved the involvement by the GRU in the attempted assassinations of Sergey and Yulia Skripal, several hacking attempts (e.g. against the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW) and other attacks. In these instances, Bellingcat has published the actual names, photographs, numbers of military units and many other pieces of evidence that can be used by other investigators, researchers, journalists, writers, etc.

⁵⁶ Image and audio files are not normally saved as raw data but as compressed files. Compression algorithms are easily recognisable by their names, for instance jpeg (jpg) and gif for images and mpeg (mpg) for audio. Thanks to this compression, the files become several times smaller compared to the files used for storing images and audio as raw data. Today, this type of compression is part of the programs usually applied for audio and image processing, and by double-clicking on a compressed file it can be accessed in real time.

Steganography operates according to the same principles as compression. However, instead of making the file much smaller, someone using steganography makes use of the free spaces created to store the information they want to hide – this information is also often encrypted. It is still possible to double-click on the file to access the image or audio recording. If the same steganography programs are being used that were also used for hiding information on the file, this information can also be made visible and read, should the hidden data consist of written text.

⁵⁷ British and American intelligence services also use these methods. A few years ago, an artificial stone was discovered in a Moscow park. On the inside of the stone was a tape recorder, placed alongside a sender and a receiver for wireless communication. Thus, a Russian agent could walk by and send a report to the stone, and much later a British intelligence officer could walk by the same stone and have the report sent to his laptop or to a specially-designed receiver.

⁵⁸ Tore Forsberg: *Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner*, 2003, pp. 349–350. [*Spies and spies spying on spies*, published only in Swedish.]

⁵⁹ A well-known example is Grigory Alekseyevich Rapota, who after his initial posting to the US came to Sweden from which he was expelled on the Cheka Day, 20 December 1983. After a few years, the Soviet Union pressurised Finland into accepting Rapota as first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. After that, his career continued within the KGB until he finally reached the very top of the SVR. In the late 1990s, he ended his career as one of the SVR's deputy directors and is now colonel general in the SVR's Reserve. Rapota's expulsion from Sweden is completely unknown to the Russian general public.

⁶⁰ In the 1960s, Botyan belonged to Directorate V, which was involved in planning sabotage in the West. However, this directorate was closed down when one of its officers defected to the UK and revealed both its activities and many of its employees who were posted to the West. Botyan was involved in building a weapons stash in Czechoslovakia, which was filled with American and European weapons. The stash was later 'revealed' and used to prove that the West was behind the unrest in the country. In 1983, at the age of 63, Botyan retired as general but remained active in several of the Cheka's veterans' associations. When Botyan died on 13 February 2020, he was 103 years old.

⁶¹ Gevork Vartanyan achieved the feat of being awarded both *Hero of the Soviet Union* and *Hero of the Russian Federation*. Only a few others have received both awards and those who have done so are often other illegals, such as the well-known agents Morris and Leona Cohen (both born in the US) who were awarded *Hero of the Soviet Union* in 1969, and *Hero of the Russian Federation* in 1995 and 1996, respectively.

⁶² Ostozjenka ulitsa is the name of the street in which the MID's Diplomatic Academy and the Maurice Thorez Institute of Foreign Languages are located. A number of Chekists have graduated from both schools and, more specifically, several future illegals have graduated from the Maurice Thorez Institute.