The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies Per A. Rudling Center for Russian & East European Studies University Center for International Studies Number 2107 University of Pittsburgh 4400 W. W. Posvar Hall 230 South Boquet Street The OUN, the UPA Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260 and the Holocaust: (412) 648-8716 www.ucis.pitt.edu/crees/cbpaper.html. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths Ronald Linden, Bob Donnorummo, William Chase, Andrew Konitzer, Co-Editors Eileen O’Malley, Managing Editor Julie Tvaruzek, Editorial Assistant The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies Number 2107 Per A. Rudling The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths Per A. Rudling is a postdoctoral fellow at the Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald, Germany. His research interests include memory, identity, and nationalism in the Polish-Belarusian-Ukrainian borderlands. No. 2107, November 2011 © 2011 by The Center for Russian and East European Studies, a program of the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh ISSN 0889-275X Image from cover: Ukrainian postage stamp of Stepan Bandera, released for the centen- nial of Bandera’s birth. Image is within the public domain. The Carl Beck Papers Editors: William Chase, Bob Donnorummo, Ronald H. Linden, Andrew Konitzer Managing Editor: Eileen O’Malley Editorial Assistant: Julie N. Tvaruzek Submissions to The Carl Beck Papers are welcome. Manuscripts must be in English, double-spaced throughout, and between 40 and 90 pages in length, including notes. Acceptance is based on anonymous review. Mail submissions to: Editor, The Carl Beck Papers, Center for Russian and East European Studies, 4400 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, 230 South Bouquet Street, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.  Abstract During the past decade, particularly under the presidency of the third Ukrai- nian president Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010) there have been repeated attempts to turn the leading figures of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its armed wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) into national heroes. As these fascist organizations collaborated with the Nazi Germany, carried out ethnic cleansing and mass murder on a massive scale, they are problematic symbols for an aspiring democracy with the stated ambition to join the European Union. Under Yushchenko, several institutes of memory management and myth making were organized, a key function of which was to deny or downplay OUN-UPA atrocities. Unlike many other former Soviet republics, the Ukrainian government did not need to develop new national myths from scratch, but imported ready concepts developed in the Ukrainian diaspora. Yushchenko’s legitimizing historians presented the OUN and UPA as pluralistic and inclusive organizations, which not only rescued Jews during the Holocaust, but invited them into their ranks to fight shoulder to shoul- der against Hitler and Stalin. This mythical narrative relied partly on the OUN’s own post-war forgeries, aimed at cover up the organization’s problematic past. As employees of the Ukrainian security services, working out of the offices of the old KGB, the legitimizing historians ironically dismissed scholarly criticism as Soviet myths. The present study deals with the myth-making around the OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust, tracing their diaspora roots and following their migration back and forth across the Atlantic. 1  Brought to power by the so-called Orange Revolution, the administration of Ukrainian within the fascist tradition.4 As for the OUN, integral nationalism is a problematic term. The president Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010) expressed a clear ambition to orient Ukraine away Ukrainian nationalists themselves did not use it, whereas references to fascism and national from Russia and toward the EU, NATO, and the Western world. One step in this direction socialism abound in nationalist texts from the 1930s and 1940s.5 Belonging to a tradition of was the reassessment of modern Ukrainian history. Old Soviet heroes were reexamined, and European generic fascism, the OUN emerged out of an amalgamation between the Ukrai- the anti-Soviet nationalist resistance to Soviet rule reinterpreted in heroic terms. This is all nian Military Organization and a number of other extreme right-wing organizations, such part of a long and painful process of nation building and national consolidation, as Ukraine as the Ukrainian National Association, the Union of Ukrainian Fascists, and the Union for moves away from Soviet historiography into nation-based history writing.1 Following inde- the Liberation of Ukraine.6 From the moment of its founding, fascists were integral to, and pendence, and particularly after the Orange Revolution, nationalist and diaspora historical played a central role in, the organization. The OUN avoided designating itself as fascist in interpretations were adopted as the basis for new national myths. This essay addresses one order to emphasize the “originality” of Ukrainian nationalism.7 In 1941 the organization split particularly sensitive and delicate part of this mythology, the relation of Ukrainian nation- between a more radical wing, the OUN(b), named after its leader, Stepan Bandera, and a alists—the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the OUN(b), and more conservative wing, the OUN(m), led by Andrii Mel’nyk. Both were totalitarian, anti- its armed forces, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the UPA—to the Jews, a polarizing topic Semitic, and fascist. In terms of tactics, the OUN(m) was more cautious and stayed loyal which has come to have important political connotations. The purpose here is not to restore to Nazi Germany throughout the war, whereas the OUN(b) took a more independent line one single historical “truth.” Rather, it is to study the political use of history, the manipula- vis-à-vis Nazi Germany. The OUN(m) was a smaller and weaker organization and plays a tions of the historical record, by tracing the genealogy of a set of historical myths, circling minor role in the nationalist myth-making today. The main focus of this essay is therefore key mythmakers, their choice of material, and its potential for political mobilization, impact the OUN(b) and its offshoots. and political consequences.2 Roger Griffin offers a broad conceptual model to suggest an eclectic interpretation of The first part of this essay considers the legacy of the OUN and the UPA, their political fascism, seeing it as the main consequence of European society’s yearning for a new be- ideology, goals, and political orientation. The second part is the story of the manufacturing of ginning.8 Fascism was hardly a historic anomaly but a well-integrated part of the European the legends of these organizations and the genealogy of these myths as they have migrated history in the twentieth century. Following academic tradition, I refer to the generic fascist from Ukraine, developed within the diaspora community, and, after the fall of commu- tradition to which the OUN belonged as fascism in lower case, while using upper case to nism, been reimported to Ukraine. The third part examines the apologetic narrative of the refer specifically to Italian Fascism.9 The OUN shared the fascist attributes of antiliberalism, myth-makers, the impact of the myths on Ukrainian society and on its neighbors after they anticonservatism, and anticommunism, an armed party, totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, Füh- were elevated to state ideology and promoted by the state security organs and government rerprinzip, and an adoption of fascist greetings. Its leaders eagerly emphasized to Hitler and propaganda agencies. The essay concludes with an assessment of, and reflection upon, the Ribbentrop that they shared the Nazi Weltanschauung and a commitment to a fascist New consequence of the legitimizing narrative and its role in the rise of the far right in Western Europe. Franziska Bruder, the author of the most detailed study of the organization describes Ukraine following Yushchenko’s defeat in 2010. “[t]he OUN as a classic representative of a nationalist movement with fascist characteristics that appeared in East-Central Europe,” an analysis shared by other non-nationalist scholars The OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust of the OUN.10 The ideology of the organization was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Dmytro Founded in 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists became the dominant Dontsov, Italian Fascism, Nietzsche, and German National Socialism, combining extreme political movement of the Ukrainian far right. It was formed out of a number of radical nationalism with terrorism, corporatism, and the Führerprinzip.11 Dontsov translated the nationalist and fascist groups and was, initially, led by war veterans, frustrated by their fail- works of Mussolini, Hitler, Goebbels, Rosenberg, and Franco and published Ukrainian trans- ure to establish a Ukrainian state in 1917–1920. In the increasingly authoritarian political lations of their works in Visnyk and other OUN-affiliated intellectual journals.12 “Ukrainian environent of interwar Poland, radicalized the Ukrainian nationalists. nationalism uses the term nationalism in the same way German and Italian nationalisms use Fascism the terms ‘National Socialism’ and ‘Fascism’ . . . Nationalisms: Fascism, National Social- ism, Ukrainian nationalism, etc. are different national expressions of the same spirit,” wrote The term integral nationalism was applied to the OUN by the American historian John Iaroslav Orshan, an influential OUN ideologue.13 The OUN slogan “The Nation Above Armstrong.3 The term has stuck, and many pronationalist historians find it preferable to the Everything” was taken quite literally, as was the slogan “Ukraine for the Ukrainians.” The term fascism, which today carries strong negative connotations and is used colloquially as a Decalogue of the OUN explicitly called upon its members not to hesitate to enslave foreigners term of abuse. There is no contradiction between fascism and integralism, which is a variety and “treat enemies of Your Nation with hatred and ruthlessness.”14 In 1936 Stepan Bandera 2 3 indicated the magnitude of the crimes the OUN was prepared to consider in order to achieve Central to the OUN’s racism was the concern that miscegenation would lead to this goal. “The OUN values the life of its members, values it highly; but—our idea in our degeneration of the racial stock. understanding is so grand, that when we talk about its realization, not single individuals, nor hundreds, but millions of victims have to be sacrificed in order to realize it.”15 Racial biology [Natsiia-Nauka] also underwrites these conditions. Professor Dr. St. Rudnyts’kyi, in his book On the Basis of Ukrainian Nationalism, writes that “mixed marriages with our neighboring peoples are disadvantageous,” Racism as they lead to the denationalization of many, and the degeneration of others. . . . The reflex against mixed marriages is natural, as it rises out of the instinct The maintenance of racial purity was an important call to the nationalist faithful. OUN of self-preservation and growth of the Nation. It is typical for all national[ly members were guided by a list of behavioral rules the called “the 44 rules of life of a Ukrainian conscious] societies. Nations in the process of expansion strictly adhere to this nationalist.” Number 40 read: “Cherish motherhood as the source of re-generation of life. law. For instance, in Germany racial laws determine the destiny of the people Make your family the ciborium for the racial purity of your Nation.”16 The OUN embraced and of the individual throughout his entire life (The same is true for Italians, a highly racialized discourse, borrowing heavily from the Nazi racial theoreticians Alfred and others.) Peoples in decline (spiritually as well as physically) ignore this law, which appeals to the instinct of self-protection. They are deaf to the health Rosenberg and Hans Günther.17 “Raciology [rasoznavstvo] is the key to world history; and the growth of life.23 mastering of the race is the path to world politics.”18 The commitment to racial purity and the preservation of the race were taken very seriously by nationalist activists who promoted OUN propaganda material identified the Ukrainians in biological terms, but also with national awareness to police the sexual relations of their imagined community. Mykola Biblical undertones: “Ukrainians are those who are blood of our blood and bone of our bone. Sukhovers’kyi, an OUN(m) activist, reminisced about how they enforced ethnic separation Only Ukrainians have the right to Ukrainian lands and Ukrainian names, and Ukrainian among students in Chernivtsy, which in the interwar era was part of Romania: ideas.”24 In the “Zaporozhe” [student fraternity] we had decided that no member was The OUN embraced the romantic notion of a national revolution, a mixture of Cossack allowed to marry an alien girl—a non-Ukrainian. That decision was made on nostalgia, glorification of violence, and sacrifice in the name of the biologically defined nation. the basis of Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi’s Decalogue,19 which was printed in the In the 1930s the OUN press contained enthusiastic references to the Hajdamaki uprising in Samostiina Ukraina and which stated: “Don’t marry a foreigner, since your which many Poles, Uniates, and Jews were slaughtered. children will become your enemies.” It needs to be recognized that Ukrainians who married Romanian girls of course ceased to be good Ukrainians, and their When this new, great day [of national revolution] arrives, we will have no children directly came to belong to Romanian culture. . . . I came up with two mercy. There will be no cease-fire, the Pereiaslavl or Hadiach peace treaties suggestions: 1) if we want to preserve our order, then no aliens are supposed will not be repeated. A new Zalizniak, a new Gonta will come. There will be to be invited to our parties or dance courses and 2) we should invite Ukrainian no mercy, neither for the big, nor the small, and the bard will sing: ‘And father girls only from peasant homes, from the surrounding areas.20 slaughtered son.’25 The OUN(b) perceived the nation as a biological organism: The 1935 program for the military education of OUN combatants stressed that “a fighter should not hestitate to kill his father, brother, or best friend if he gets such an order.”26 The nation emerged organically. In the world there is a constant struggle for existence, development, and power. There is a struggle between the species: Anti-Semitism . . . dogs, cats, lions, eagles are animal species; peoples, nations, and tribes are human species (Ukrainians, Germans, Muscovites, Gypsies, and Jews); While the influences from Nazi Germany had a significant impact on the anti-Semitic there are differences between humans, animals and plants, just as there are attitudes of the OUN, the organization had its own anti-Semitic tradition, independent of between human species.21 the Nazis.27 Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia had developed a narrative already in the late Family life must be of Ukrainian character. Its content: the parents (father- nineteenth century, complete with an elaborate anti-Jewish discourse.28 mother) and children have to be Ukrainians. Mixed marriages (Ukrainian- The Ukrainian nationalist press of the 1930s carried anti-Semitic articles on a regular Polish, Ukrainian-Muscovite, Ukrainian-Magyar, Ukrainian-Jewish) will be basis.29 Dontsov himself regularly published anti-Semitic articles in the OUN-affiliated banned, forming such unions will be made impossible. We regard their very press, either under his own authorship or as translations from the leading Nazi theoreticians. existence and the making of such unions a crime of national treason.22 In a 1929 article in the journal Rozbudova Natsii, the OUN’s “intellectual laboratory” and leading ideological journal,30 Iurii Mylianych described the Ukrainian Jews as “an alien and 4 5 predominantly hostile body within our national organism” and urged Ukrainians to develop eliminatory, anti-Semitism in the writings of senior OUN ideologues and intellectuals, either guidelines for a Ukrainian policy toward the Jews. during the interwar period or following the outbreak of the war.42 During the Holocaust, the nationalist Ukrainian press in occupied Poland, Ukraine, Germany, and Bohemia published How to deal with the Jews? We have over two million of them in Ukraine. anti-Semitic articles commissioned or endorsed by the German authorities.43 . . . Should we allow them to further abuse the Ukrainian national organism? Assimilate them? Take them in? Amalgamate them? Get rid of them from Nazi Germany and the Establishment of Ukraine? How? Expel them? Where? It is neither that easy to expel 2 million people, nor get rid of them altogether. Nobody wants them; everybody is New national States in Central Europe only happy to get rid of them. In practice, other than the Spaniards, no single The OUN cooperated closely with other fascist states and movements—Italy, Japan, European Christian nation has been able to solve the Jewish problem in a fully satisfactory way. Various methods have been tried, and not a single one Spain, and, in particular, Germany. It established contacts with the Iron Guard in Romania of them has solved this issue.31 and later the Chetnik leader Draža Mihailovi!.44 The OUN’s relations with the Ustaše were close; the organizations trained their terrorists together in Fascist Italy. The OUN assassinated In 1938, Volodymyr Martynets, the editor of Rozbudova Natsii, described Jews as a several leading Polish politicians, among them Tadeusz Ho"owko in 1931 and Bronis"aw “parasitical,” “morally damaging,” “corrupting” and “hostile element,” “racially unsuited for Pieracki in 1934, and provided the Ustaše assistance in the assassination of King Alexander miscegenation and assimilation.” Rather than violent pogroms and mass murder, Martynets’ I of Yugoslavia and the French foreign minister, Louis Barthou, in 1934.45 In the second half argued that “a total and absolute isolation of the Jews from the Ukrainian people”32 would of the 1930s, its relations with Nazi Germany were close. In September 1937, Volodymyr be a more effective solution to the “Jewish problem.” Martynets’ represented the OUN at the Fifth Congress of National Socialists Abroad (fünfte Reichstagung des NSDAP-Verbandes der Auslandsdeutschen) in Stuttgart.46 It is easier to liquidate 44,000 Jews using these methods, than to liquidate 3¼ The OUN also supported German efforts to undermine Czechoslovakia.47 Under million with more radical methods. . . . All of the possibilities, especially if German tutelage, Slovakia declared independence on March 14, 1939. Two days later the combined, will decrease the current strength of Jewry and will not only bring an end to their expansion in our country, but assure a continuous decline in Slovak leader, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, declared that his state would remove its national the number of Jews, not only through emigration, but also through the decline minorities “in a Christian way,” without “cruelty” and “hatred,” starting with the Czechs, of their natural growth rate. As the Jews will not be able to make a living, the and with the Jews to follow.48 The Slovak constitution, which was modeled on Mussolini’s Jews will take care of this themselves.”33 Italy, Salazar’s Portugal, and Schussnig’s Austria, made the clerical fascist Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party-Party of Slovak National Unity (Hlinkova slovenská l’udová strana—Strana Visnyk subscribed to a conspiratorial worldview. It perceived Bolshevism as a tool slovenskej národnej jednoty, HSL’S-SSNJ) “the sole representative of the political will of of Jewish dominance. The United States, as well as the Soviet Union, were controlled by the whole state.” Jews and Gypsies were denied rights, Magyars and Ukrainians had their Jewry, and Jewish interests were setting Britain, France, and the United States against Nazi rights sharply curtailed.49 The emergence of an independent Slovakia indicated that Hitler Germany. Referring to the United States, Visnyk spoke of “120 million Aryans over the was willing to break up multiethnic states and support the establishment of separate fascist ocean, under the yoke of Israel.”34 When Mussolini introduced anti-Semitic legislation in states in Central and Eastern Europe. Other Central European fascists closely monitored 1938, Visnyk approvingly cited the “practical realization” of the “Jewish question” in Fascist the development in Slovakia.50 Yet Nazi Germany sent out mixed signals: it had opened a Italy.35 Nationalist intellectuals like Dontsov and Martynets presented the OUN with a racial consulate in Transcarpathia in October 1938, but when Transcarpathia followed suit and theory. Their repeated rejection of assimilation suggests that the OUN had internalized and proclaimed the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine on March 15, Hitler did not recognize its “wholeheartedly accepted” a full-fledged, racial, anti-Semitic discourse by the late 1930s.36 independence, and its government had to flee within a few hours.51 In a May 2, 1939, letter The OUN described the 1918–1919 pogroms during the civil war in Ukraine as part of a to Joachim von Ribbentrop, the OUN leader Andrei Mel’nyk assured the German Foreign “social liberation struggle.”37 Radicalized over the 1930s, anti-Semitism became particularly Ministry that the OUN Weltanschauung was closely related to that of the Nazis and the prominent between 1939 and 1943, reaching a high point in 1941–1942.38 Leading members Fascists and offered to help in the “reorganization” of Eastern Europe.52 On April 10, 1941, of the Bandera wing wanted Ukrainian Jews killed or removed, and offered to participate in four days after the Wehrmacht entered Yugoslavia, the Ustaše declared the “resurrection” the process.39 In April 1941, the OUN(b) declared that they “combat Jews as supporters of the of the so-called Independent State of Croatia (NDH),53 a fascist state in which all political Muscovite-Bolshevik regime.”40 Its propaganda directives in the following month demanded parties but the Ustaše were banned.54 The OUN(b) leadership in Krakow was electrified by the destruction of the Jews: “Ukraine for the Ukrainians! . . . Death to the Muscovite-Jewish the news from Zagreb and sent Ustaše leader Ante Paveli! a congratulatory telegram, en- commune! Beat the commune, save Ukraine!”41 There is no shortage of radical, even thusiastically greeting the establishment of the NDH.55 In April 1941, Andrii Mel’nyk, now 6 7 the leader of the OUN(m), proposed to Hitler the creation of a Greater Ukraine, stretching vasion, urged the population: “Don’t throw away your weapons yet. Take them up. Destroy from the Danube to the Caspian Sea.56 Dreams of a Ukrainian empire had been nourished the enemy . . . People!—Know this!—Moscow, the Hungarians, the Jews—these are your by both wings of the OUN, and the aspiration for territorial expansion was shared by all enemies. Destroy them.”71 East-Central European fascist movements.57 Like their Slovak and Croatian counterparts, the On June 30, 1941, the OUN(b) issued the “Act of Renewal Ukrainian Statehood” (Akt OUN combined territorial expansion with a quest for ethnic “purity.”58 The OUN ideologue vidnovlennia Ukrains’koi Derzhavy, or Akt ), hoping that Ukraine would obtain a status Mykola Stsibors’kyi envisioned the state as a “natsiokratiia” or a “natiocracy,” an ethnically similar to that of Tiso’s Slovakia or Paveli!’s Croatia.72 The twenty-nine-year-old firebrand defined totalitarianism.59 The OUN perceived a “Ukraine for the Ukrainians” as an ethni- Iaroslav Stets’ko presented himself as its prime minister on behalf of Stepan Bandera.73 His cally cleansed totalitarian state, where all other political parties were to be banned.60 And, proclamation appears modeled on the Ustaše declaration, which it follows closely, but in like Tiso’s Slovakia, Paveli!’s Croatia, and Antonescu’s Romania, the OUN embarked on its explicit references to Hitler it went further than the Slovaks and Croats. Stets’ko speci- an eliminationist project to “purify” their nation of “alien” racial elements.61 fied that the new state would “cooperate closely with National Socialist Greater Germany . . . under the Führer Adolf Hitler.”74 On July 3, 1941, he sent letters to the other European Barbarossa and Pogroms in Western Ukraine, 1941 fascist leaders: Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and Paveli!, emphasizing that his state was a loyal Following the German and Soviet invasion of Poland, many leading OUN members member of the new, fascist Europe, the support of which he now sought. He explained to gathered in the German-occupied part of Poland, the General Governement. They were the Croatian Poglavnik Paveli! that “both revolutionary nations, hardened in battle, will further radicalized by the brutal Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine in 1939–1941 and guarantee the establishment of healthy circumstances in the Europe of the new order.”75 by the ideological and military training of many of their leaders by Nazi Germany from The declaration of Ukrainian statehood was accompanied by violent pogroms. 1938–1939 onwards.62 Referring to itself as a “natural ally” of Nazi Germany and the Axis Stets’ko’s “government” expressed its willingness to annihilate the Jews of Ukraine, and powers, the OUN(b) declared its readiness to go to war against the USSR.63 Stepan Lenkavs’kyi, its main propagandist, advocated the physical destruction of Ukrainian In Berlin on June 17, 1941, Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Reich Security Main Jewry. Stets’ko endorsed “the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing Ger- Office, gathered dozens of SS and police personnel to share with them his instructions man methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation and the like.”76 regarding the encouragement of so-called self-cleansing actions.64 A week later, on June Grzegorz Rossoli#ski-Liebe refers to the OUN(b) plans to evacuate or annihilate the ethnic 25, 1941, in a letter to Bandera, Iaroslav Stets’ko wrote, “We are setting up a militia that minorites and replace them with “ethnic” Ukrainians to be resettled on “ethnic” Ukrainian will help remove the Jews and protect the population.”65 Instructions issued to the OUN(b) lands as a Ukrainian Generalplan Ost.77 Between June 30 and July 3, 1941, massive pogroms militias urged them to cleanse the terrain of hostile elements. claimed the lives of four thousand Jews in Lviv alone.78 The participation of OUN militias in the murder of Jews is well documented, from OUN correspondence with the Nazis, their own In the time of chaos and confusion it is possible to permit the liquidation of fliers and directives, down to movies and photos of Ukrainian militiamen in action. Some can undesirable Polish, Muscovite, and Jewish activists, especially supporters of be identified from the photos.79 OUN(b) documents establish the collaboration between the Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism.66 Ukrainian militia and the Wehrmacht in joint Aktionen against Jews.80 Similar pogroms took Destroy the officer staff, shoot the Muscovites, Jews, NKVD men, the political place across Western Ukraine.81 At least 58 pogroms are documented in Western Ukrainian instructors, and all who want war and our death!67 cities, the estimated number of victims of which range between 13,000 and 35,000.82 The Nachtigall Batallion, consisting almost exclusively of OUN(b) activists serving in German The Jews are to be isolated, removed from positions to avoid sabotage, uniforms under Shukheyvch’s command, carried out mass shootings of Jews near Vinnytsia Muscovites and Poles even more so. If there is an absolute need to retain, for in July 1941.83 Stets’ko described the pogroms in June 1941 as Ukrainian self-defense.84 example, a Jew in the economic administration, one of our militiamen must be placed over him, and should liquidate him for the slightest transgression. The OUN(b) leadership hoped that, faced with a fait accompli, the Nazis would ac- Only Ukrainians, not foreign enemies, can be leaders in the various branches cept a fascist Ukraine as a vassal state. They were encouraged by signals from the circle of life. The assimilation of Jews is excluded.68 around Alfred Rosenberg and within Abwehr, the German military intelligence service, who promoted a geopolitical vision in which the dismantled Soviet Union would be replaced OUN activists participated in the July 1941 pogroms, in which many of them displayed by a reduced Muscovite Russia and a number of buffer states, including a Greater Finland, an above-average brutality.69 Upon their arrival in L’viv the commandos of the Ukrainian Baltica, Ukraine, and the Caucasus.85 Hitler and his closest men opposed Ukrainian state- Nachtigall Battalion could rely on a fanatically anti-Semitic auxiliary contingent with good hood, pursuing instead colonial plans of exploitation which greatly complicated OUN(b)- knowledge of local conditions.70 OUN flyers, distributed in the first days of the German in- Nazi relations. Bandera was arrested on July 5 and brought to Berlin, where he was put 8 9 under house arrest. Bandera and Stets’ko appear to have continued clandestine political The OUN(b) expanded the UPA by means of a forced draft and the political terror activities for some time. Not only the Nazis, but also the OUN(m) rejected the legitimacy created by its dreaded security service Sluzhba Bezpeki OUN (SB OUN). Thus, the UPA of the June 30 declaration. On August 30, 1941, their senior activists Stsibors’kyi and Senyk leadership came to consist of ruthless OUN(b) men, whereas many foot soldiers were forc- were assasinated, in all likelihood by the OUN(b).86 On September 15 Bandera was again ibly drafted from the local population. Soviet and German reports both certify how discipline arrested and kept in a Berlin prison as an honorary prisoner until October 1943. He was was maintained by terror. The Soviets wrote that then transferred to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, north of Berlin, where he and Stets’ko were placed in comparatively comfortable confinement in the Zellenbau, a special forty percent of the regular soldiers of the UPA are volunteers, the rest are forcibly mobilized. In the Rivne oblast’ the men were mobilized by the threat barracks for high profile political prisoners. In October 1944 he was released and resumed of physical extermination. . . . Desertions among the men forcibly mobilized his collaboration.87 Other OUN(b) leaders, among them Roman Shukhevych and many future into the UPA has increased in December 1943 in connection with the Red UPA commanders, continued to serve in German uniform until 1943. Thus, the OUN(b) Army’s successful advance into the territories of Western Ukraine.94 “break” with Nazi Germany was half-hearted, and contacts were retained on several levels until the end, and even after the war. A German report from December 1943 gives the following description of the SB OUN: The nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army has set up a ‘security service.’ 1943: Political Reorientation After the Battle of Stalingrad We were able to arrest the representative of the ‘national-Ukrainian security service’ in the Rivne district. He said that this security service is a subordinate The battles of Stalingrad and Kursk were major turning points in the war, foreshadowing group of UPA and has the following tasks: extermination of Communist the collapse of the Axis powers and forcing the OUN to reassess its strategy and search for new Party members, Poles and Germans, extermination of deserters, supervising strategic allies. In the spring of 1943, armed OUN(b) units under Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi and of nonlocals, drafting young people into the Ukrainian nationalist movement Roman Shukhevych took control of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka and the Insurgent Army.95 Armiia, UPA) from the group of Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’, its original founder.88 While these forces were anti-Semitic and carried out pogroms and murders of the local Jewish popula- Murder tion, they rejected the fanaticism of the OUN(b).89 The original UPA, which had been created The training provided by these collaborating forces was essential to the 1943–1944 under the name Polis’ka Sich (the Polessie Riflemen), was loyal to the Ukrainian People’s UPA campaign of ethnic cleansing of Poles, Jews, and other minorities, the organization Republic in exile and refused to recognize Stets’ko’s June 30 “renewal” of statehood as and execution of which closely resembles the anti-Jewish and anti-Partisan operations in legitimate.90 When the UPA forces refused to subordinate themselves to the OUN(b), the 1941 and 1942.96 Philip Friedman, a pioneer on the history of Jews and the UPA, placed the Banderites took control by force and unleashed a campaign of terror in which many of the UPA’s anti-Jewish murders within the context of its cleansing of Western Ukraine of ethnic leaders of the original UPA were killed.91 minorities: “Sometime in the winter of 1942–1943 the various Ukrainian partisan groups The new leadership consisted of ruthless OUN(b) activists, most of whom were trained began an intense fight against all non-Ukrainians. Jews who escaped from the ghettos were in Nazi Germany, and many were deeply involved in the Holocaust. The Ukrainian gendar- seized on the highways, in villages, or in the forests, and were put to death.”97 The timing of merie, Hilfsfreiwillige (volunteers), and, in particular, the so-called Schutzmannschaften, had the UPA’s assault on the Jews largely coincides with the violent takeover of the organization been central to the implementation of the Holocaust in Ukraine and Belarus. Often they were by the OUN(b), with former auxiliary police men, known as Schutzmänner, particularly from tasked with the dirty work, the Schmutzarbeit, of the Nazis, sealing off areas for the murder the 201 Battalion, assuming command. Bul’ba-Borovets was horrified by the mass murders of Jews, communists, and pro-Soviet partisans.92Among the UPA officers who had been carried out by the new Banderite UPA leaders. Writes Karel Berkhoff: “According to Boro- trained by Nazi Germany or had served in the police, gendarmerie, and military organs, we vets’, the Banderites (he mentions Lebed) imposed a collective death sentence on the Poles find the supreme commander and the chief of the general staff of the UPA, the commanders of “western Ukraine” in March 1943, sent him a list of demands in April that included their or chiefs of staffs of all three areas of UPA activities (the UPA-North, UPA-West, and UPA- ‘cleansing,’ and instructed the UPA in June to complete the ‘cleansing’ operation as soon South), the commanders or chiefs of staff in at least nine out of eleven military districts. as possible.”98 In April 1943 Mykola Lebed’, the acting leader of the OUN(b), advocated a Since biographical data on the occupations of a large proportion of the UPA commanders are policy “to cleanse the entire revolutionary territory of the Polish population.”99 The “mass lacking for the years 1941–1943, the percentage of former policemen is likely to be higher. extermination” was organized by Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi, known under the nom-de-guerre Former policemen constituted at least half of all UPA members from spring 1943 until the Klym Savur.100 The UPA’s ethnic cleansing of the Poles in Volhynia and Galicia continued end of that year, and a very significant proportion thereafter.93 through 1943 and much of 1944, until the arrival of the Soviets. Whereas the UPA also killed 10 11 Jews, Czechs, Magyars, Armenians, and other ethnic minorities, Poles were their main target. On the initiative of the OUN(b), negotiations with the SS and its Security Service “Long live the great, independent Ukraine without Jews, Poles, or Germans. Poles behind the (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) were resumed on March 5, 1944. Father Ivan Hryn’okh, who had San, the Germans to Berlin, and Jews to the gallows,” went one OUN(b) slogan in the late served as army chaplain in the Nachtigall Batallion and Batallion 201119 and represented the fall of 1941.101 UPA soldiers testify that orders to murder Poles often overlapped with those OUN(b) in the negotiations, emphasized that to murder surviving Jews,102 something that was reflected in the military songs of the UPA. An OUN song had the following lyrics: “We will butcher the Jews, strangle the Poles, and those who believe that the Bandera group considers the German Reich as their opponent are mistaken. The political situation in the Great Russian lands could establish a Ukrainian state!”103Another Polish survivor recalled that UPA soldiers passing have played out quite differently if the German Reich in 1941 had recognized through the Polish colony of G"$boczyca in Volodymyr-Volynskyi county singing: “Vyrizaly the Ukrainian right to establish its own state administration. Without any my zhydiv, vyrizhemo i liakhiv, i staroho, i maloho do iednoho; Poliakiv vyrezhem, Ukrainu doubt, Ukraine would have been satisfied with a state administration, such zbuduiem” (We slaughtered the Jews, we’ll slaughter the Poles, old and young, every one; as a protectorate. But as this hope was not fulfilled, the Bandera group was we’ll slaughter the Poles, we’ll build Ukraine.)104 forced to continue its illegal activities, yet strictly maintaining the rules not to attack German interests and aim all its forces toward the preparation for a The murderers used primarily farm tools—scythes, knives and pitchforks.105 Orthodox decisive struggle against the Muscovites.120 priests blessed such weapons in their churches.106 The bodies were often badly mutilated, partly as a byproduct of intimate murder, but were futher tampered with in order to dehuman- By March 1944, the UPA was sharing information with the German authorities on their ize the victim and strike terror. Some had their stomachs cut open, noses cut off, or faces murder of “Poles, bandits, and Jews.” Formal cooperation with the German Security Police, smashed in. The display of dismembered, crucified, or disemboweled bodies was meant to Sicherheitspolizei (SiPo) and the SD was resumed in May 1944.121 The German authorities instill fear and panic and encourage the Volhynian Poles to flee.107 Polish and Jewish survivors’ released Bandera in October 1944.122 accounts emphasize the brutality of the murders. Moshe Maltz, a survivor, wrote in his diary: Jews in the OUN-UPA? When the Bandera gangs seize a Jew, they consider it a prize catch. . . . They literally slash Jews to pieces with their machetes.108 While the OUN and the UPA took part in the mass murder of Jews, there are examples of individual Jews surviving the Holocaust within the ranks of the UPA. The Holocaust Bandera men . . . are not discriminating about who they kill; they are gunning changed not only the ethnic and cultural landscape of Western Ukraine. The murder of the down the populations of entire villages. . . . Since there are hardly any Jews left to kill, the Bandera gangs have turned on the Poles. They are literally Jews removed cobblers, tanners, smiths, and other professions in which the Jews had been hacking Poles to pieces. Every day . . . you can see the bodies of Poles, with prominent. Accounts of the war years show that people had problems with fur coats and wires around their necks, floating down the river Bug.109 boots falling apart, after the Jews were removed. The UPA suffered an acute shortage of nurses and doctors. John-Paul Himka describes the relationship between the UPA and indi- The OUN(b)’s reorientation toward the West in 1943 was accompanied by a change in vidual Jews who survived the war within its ranks as “a marriage of convenience between ideology, following its third, extraordinary congress in August that year. The overt racism was a partisan unit desperately in need of doctors and nurses and Jews desperately in need of a toned down and official OUN-UPA statements were increasingly wrapped in a democratic place that would keep them out of the hands of the Germans.”123 and inclusive rhetoric, but their mass murder of national minorities continued unabated.110 The UPA’s anti-Jewish violence culminated in late 1943 and early 1944.111 In what appears a Ukrainian sources speak of a considerable number of Jewish physicians, deliberate strategy, surviving Jews were lured out of their hiding places and murdered.112 In dentists, and hospital attendants who served in the ranks of the UPA. The 1943, the security service of the OUN(b) in Volhynia issued orders to “physically exterminate question is: Why did only a small number of them remain alive? The Jews who were hiding in the villages.”113 The murders of Poles and Jews continued through Bandera groups also utilized other Jewish skilled workers. According to Lew Shankowsky, practically every UPA group had a Jewish physician or the winter and spring of 1944.114 The estimates vary; Grzegorz Motyka estimates that the pharmacist, as well as Jewish tailors, shoemakers, barbers, and the like. Again UPA killed one or two thousand Jews, mainly in Volhynia;115 John-Paul Himka estimates the question arises: What happened to these hundreds of thousands of Jewish the number as “several thousand, but perhaps the number was much higher.”116 This should professionals and skilled workers? Betty Eisenstein states that in the spring of be put in relation to the documented 88,700 Polish victims of the UPA.117 The murders were 1943 the Bandera groups began to imitate the German tactics of “selection.” carried out along ethnic lines in an area with many mixed Polish-Ukrainian families. Polish Only the skilled workers were left alive, and they were concentrated in special camps, where they worked at their trades or on the farms. One such camp, survivor testimonies contain gruesome accounts of how the UPA forced family members to established in April 1943 near Poryck, Volhynia, contained more than 100 take part in murders of their relatives.118 Jews. A second camp, which had some 400 Jews, was located in Kudrynki, 12 13  nearly 20 miles from Tuczyn, Volhynia. Eisenstein reports that at the approach the Germans made the Judenrat . . . confirm the cooperation of Ukrainian of the Soviet army the Bandera groups liquidated the Jews of the camps.124 police in the actions.136 In late 1943 and early 1944 some of the few remaining Jews of Western Ukraine were The OUN(b) leaders issued explicit instuctions on how to blame pogroms and anti- invited into the ranks of the UPA, but many were executed when the Soviets were approaching Jewish violence on the Germans and Poles, ordering the preparation of and they were no longer useful.125 The UPA had three main targets: Soviet partisans, Poles, c. Lists that would confirm that the Germans carried out anti-Jewish and Jewish refugees, while Germans were generally exempt from UPA attacks.126 While anti- pogroms and liquidations by themselves, without the participation or help of German sentiments were widespread, according to captured activists, at the time of the Third the Ukrainian police, and instead, before carrying out the executions, urged Extraordinary Congress of the OUN(b), held in August 1943, its anti-German declarations the Jewish committee or the rogues themselves to confirm with their signatures the presence of the Ukrainian police and its involvement in the actions. were intended to mobilize support against the Soviets, and stayed mostly on the paper. They did not result in any major, or lasting changes in the OUN’s relations to Nazi Germany.127 d. Material that would clearly confirm that Poles had infiltrated and The OUN(b) leader Mykola Lebed’ opposed military attacks on German interests,128 and taken part in anti-Jewish pogroms and at the same time that they had served Roman Shukhevych strongly opposed the decided anti-German actions, wanting to aim all as the hirelings and agents of the Germans in their struggle with Ukrainians.137 attacks exclusively against the Soviets.129 UPA group North repeatedly requested permission One of these collections, “The Book of Facts” (Do pochatku knyha faktiv), was aimed to take up arms against the Germans, but the leadership always turned them down.130 There at deflecting attention from OUN(b) and UPA participation in the Holocaust. Written in the were, however, clashes. six percent of the UPA and OUN(b) leaders, and 0.3 percent of the form of a chronicle, and made to appear to date from 1941, this was an attempt to create SB OUN leaders in Volhynia were killed by German forces.131 a “convenient” set of documents, after it was clear that Germany was losing the war.138 It claimed that the Germans asked the OUN(b) to take part in a three-day pogrom in early July Inventing a Comfortable Past 1941, but that the OUN(b) regarded it as a German provocation, and refused. “The OUN The outcome of the battle of Stalingrad had changed the geopolitical situation and leading activists informed themselves and informed the leading cadres that this was a German necessitated a reorientation. The OUN(b) now started to do away with its overtly fascist at- provocation to compromise Ukrainians through pogroms in order to give the German police tributes. In February 1943 the Third Congress of the OUN(b) decided that raising the right a pretext to get involved and ‘enforce order,’ and, what is more serious, to divert the energy arm was no longer to be considered an obligatory party salute132 and began to remove any of the Ukrainian community from the political problems of the struggle for independent references to it in their own documents.133 The leadership of the original UPA protested the statehood, to the slippery road of anarchism, crimes, and violence.”139 OUN(b)’s violent takeover of their organization and found their hijacking of the UPA brand On November 1, 1943, the central command of the UPA issued a directive “to em- name cynical. Wheras the original UPA had indeed taken up arms against the Germans, phasize that we tolerate all nationalities—also Jews, who work toward Ukrainian statehood. senior OUN(b) leaders, among them Roman Shukhevych, had repeatedly volunteered their They will remain Ukrainian citizens with full civic rights. Regarding this we need to talk services to Nazi Germany and served in German uniforms until 1943.134 In an open letter to Jewish doctors and other professionals, who are part of our effort.”140 Around the same to the OUN(b) leaders, Bul’ba-Borovets’ reminded them that “when, in July of 1941 the time, the UPA published propaganda leaflets aimed at other ethnic minorities: Georgians, Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the ‘Polis’ka Sich,’ started its armed resistance, you took a nega- Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmans, Poles, Belarusians, Russians, Czechs, and others. 141 Prona- tive position, which you maintained until the last minute.”135 His observation was prophetic: tionalist scholars often emphasize the UPA’s multinational, internationalist nature when its the appropriation of the name UPA would indeed be used in post-1943 OUN(b) propaganda murders of Poles, Jews, and other minorities are brought up. Whereas in 1942, OUN(b) to whitewash its activities in 1941–1942 by predating its 1943 “break” with Nazi Germany. flyers and posters commemorating the first anniversary of the declaration of Ukrainian The manipulation of the OUN legacy forms an unbroken chain from 1943 until today. In “statehood” contained explicit anti-Semitic references, after 1943 the rhetoric changed. In October 1943, the OUN(b) embarked upon a project to revise its history, manufacturing a 1947 and 1948, the OUN-UPA annual commemoration was presented as an oppositional, version more presentable to its new intended allies. In October 1943 the Homeland Leader- anti-German step.142 At this time, the OUN’s denial of its own anti-Semitism was already ship (Kraiovyi Provid) of the OUN in Western Ukraine ordered the preparation of categorical. In 1947, the OUN issued an English-language propaganda leaflet in post-war Poland, which maintained, a special collection of documents which would affirm that the anti-Jewish pogroms and liquidations were carried out by the Germans themselves without We have never edited nor spread nowhere . . . any anti-Jewish leaflets. In all the help of the Ukrainian police, and that, on the contrary, before the shootings, our political literature, underground revolutionary papers and proclamations, 14 15  neither now, nor at the time of the German occupation you would seek in vain The OUN(b) regularly censored any documents that contradicted the image they wanted if only one word [was] directed against the Jews. Like objections are nothing to produce—such as Stets’ko’s 1941 declaration of loyalty to Hitler and Nazi Germany. The other as a sterling invective and lie. As well as we have never taken part in whereabouts of the many UPA leaders, who like Shukhevych served in German uniform any anti-Jewish actions.143 in 1942, were omitted from their biographies, their break with the Nazis predated. By 1946 Even though the OUN from 1943 denied its anti-Semitic legacy, its propaganda Shukhevych, who himself had actively opposed attacks on German interest, presented the material still contained anti-Semitic undertones.144 The foreign section of the OUN(b), OUN’s activities in 1943 as “an armed insurgency, including the wide popular masses, in Zakordonna Chastyna OUN, or ZCh OUN, which could operate freely in the West, did not other words the entire Ukrainian people, in that struggle against the German occupant.”151 seek cooperation with Jewish (and Russian) émigré groups, and its leadership continued to In 1948 the OUN activist Petro Poltava (a pseudonym), claimed that “the OUN under the embrace anti-Semitic stereotypes of Jews as the avant-garde of Bolshevism.145 Jews were leadership of Stepan Bandera conducted a massive struggle of the entire people [masovu not a “truly” national people, since they lacked a definite ethnograhic territory. Jews rarely vsenarodnu borot’bu] against the Hitlerite occupants in 1941–1944.”152 Other nationalist figured in the post-war OUN material, as the organization regarded the Holocaust as having stories of OUN-UPA resistance against the Nazis, such as Kosyk and Stets’ko’s postwar “resolved” the “Jewish question.”146 In March 1950, the OUN-UPA published a pamphlet, claims that the commander of the Nazi Stormtroopers, (the Sturmabteilung, SA) Viktor Lu- Jews—Citizens of Ukraine, declaring, in democratic, inclusive language that it regarded tze was killed by UPA unit in Volhynia in 1943, are entirely fictional.153 Nevertheless, these Jews as citizens in the state for which it was fighting.147 The anonymous authors of this claims, uncritically repeated by pro-UPA historians came to enter the nationalist canon.154 one declaration aimed exclusively at the Ukrainian Jews, even refer to them by the Soviet term evrei, not their customary zhyd. The declaration, issued immediately after the killing Diaspora Nationalist Myth-making: The Fanatics of Shukhevych, at a time when the UPA was essentially defeated, is best understood as an The Bandera group dominated heavily among Ukrainian émigrés—U.S. intelligence attempt to woo the Western world and to seek its support as their insurgency was defeated. reports estimated that 80 percent of the Ukrainian Displaced Persons (DPs) from Galicia Yet, even this leaflet ends with a thinly veiled threat, based upon the same old stereotypes remained loyal to Bandera, who tried to establish a dictatorship in exile that would be trans- of Jewish disloyalty and communist leanings. ferred to a liberated Ukraine. They benefited from their pre-existing clandestine political network. In the immediate postwar period, Bandera was protected by a group of former We, the Ukrainian revolutionaries turn to you: SS men.155 The US Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) described him as “extremely Remember, that You are on Ukrainian land and that it is in Your own interests dangerous,” surrounded by bodyguards ready to “do away with any person who may be to live in agreement with its legitimate rulers—the Ukrainians. Stop being a fifth column in the hands of the Muscovite-Bolshevik imperialists. The moment dangerous to him or his party.156 when the times of Khmel’ntyskyi will be repeated is not too far away. Yet this The OUN(b) maintained discipline by the use of systematic terror and kept kidnap- time we would like it to take place without anti-Jewish pogroms. We do not ping, murdering, and abusing political opponents well into the 1970s. The main center of its want a repetition of what Your poets described in the following words: activity was in Bavaria, in the U.S. zone of occupation, where Evhen Lozyns’kyi was the Bitter tears were pouring local providnyk, or leader, for the OUN(b).157 West German police reports contain estimates Over the souls of good and honest men, Whose bloody was flowing that the Bandera movement carried out about one hundred assassinations in Germany after Like the water of mountain creeks. the war.158 Today, during the times of harsh struggle the Ukrainian people for its freedom, In the immediate postwar years the OUN(b) split over its fascist legacy. Bandera for national independence, we turn to You, Jews—citizens of Ukraine: denounced its democratic façade, which he called a tactical maneuver, and dismissed as Remind those brothers of your nationality, whose hands are helping the Kremlin “Sucking up to the West.”159 This led to a clash between the committed totalitarians Bandera, robbers crucify our people. Tell them to stop their criminal activities.148 Stets’ko, Lenkavs’kyi, and their associates and the group around Mykola Lebed’, Lev and Stepan Lenkavs’kyi was responsible for the propaganda activities of the Zakordonna Daria Rebet, and Ivan Hryn’okh, who wanted to retain the program of the Third Extraordinary Chastyna OUN, a key task of which was clearing the past of the movement itself.149 The Congress of the OUN(b).160 Bandera, who refused to give up the Führerprinzip, terrorism, Banderite narrative represented their own legacy as a “heroic Ukrainian resistance against and the conspiratorial methods,161 expelled members of the growing opposition, resulting in the Nazis and the Communists” which had been “misrepresented and maligned” by “Mos- June 1948 in a full break between the Bandera-Stets’ko (ZCh OUN) and Lebed’-Hryn’okh cow propaganda”; the OUN(b) and the UPA were fighting “not only for Ukraine, but also groups (Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council Ukrains’ka for all of Europe.”150 Holovna Vyzvol’na Rada, UHVR, Zakordonne Predstavnytstvo ZP UHVR).162 The hatred between Bandera and Lebed’ became so personal and intense163 that Lebed’ personally 16 17 fired a gun at Bandera and ordered his followers to kill him.164 In 1948, the Bandera group nationalism and fascism were retooled and employed by Western intelligence services in planned to assassinate the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Vyshinskii during his upcoming the struggle against the USSR.187 One CIA analyst argued that “some form of nationalist visit to the UN General Assembly in Paris.165 Bandera’s group financed its terrorist actvities feeling continues to exist [in Ukraine] and . . . there is an obligation to support it as a cold by producing counterfeit U.S. dollar bills.166 By 1951 they turned vocally anti-American, as war weapon.”188 The CIA and the state department sponsored Lebed’s 1949 immigration into the United States did not support the OUN aim of an independent Ukraine.167 The OUN(b) the United States, and shielded him from the immigration authorities and from prosecution papers spewed anti-American rhetoric, their thugs terrorized political opponents among for war crimes until the 1990s.189 In 1956, the CIA incorporated a set of networks under the émigrés, intimidating Ukrainians who worked for the United States.168 The CIA later Lebed’s leadership as the nonprofit Proloh (Prologue) Research and Publishing Association, lost interest in Bandera as an agent, as did the British MI6.169 By 1954, the CIA described funded by the CIA. Through Father Ivan Hryn’okh, Proloh maintained an office in Munich, Bandera as a “ruthless” “terrorist” and “bandit type,” “politically unacceptable to the US called the “Ukrainische Gesellschaft für Auslandsstudien.”190 Proloh came to preside over Government.”170 The CIA would have liked to get rid of him and advocated the “political a significant anticommunist propaganda network: radio broadcasts, newspapers, book neutralization of Bandera as an individual.”171 At the same time it was concerned about Soviet publishing, and the intellectual journal Suchasnist’. Its orientation was nationalist. Lebed’ plots against Bandera after a covert Soviet team had entered the American zone of Germany and his group remained very useful for the CIA for the entire Cold War.191 Hryn’okh, who in June 1946 to kidnap him.172 “The Soviets are not allowed to kidnap or kill him . . . under after 1945 presented himself as a supporter of parliamentary democracy, was the group’s no circumstances must Bandera be allowed to become a martyr.”173 Instead, the OUN(b) associate in Western Europe.192 oriented itself toward authoritarian right-wing dictatorships, whose support they sought. The collaboration between U.S. and other Western intelligence services and Lebed’s The OUN(b) organized an umbrella organization for fascist and authoritarian east group became mutually beneficial. The CIA received valuable information and insights about European movements, called the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), linking former its Cold War adversaries in return for helping nationalist veterans into positions of influence members of Tiso’s government, former Nazis, Romanian Legionnaires, the successors of and authority, assisting their creation of semiacademic institutions and/or academic postions the Ustaše. It came to cooperate closely with Franco’s Spain, and became an active partici- at established universities. From these formal and informal networks the pronationalist pant of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL).174 The OUN(b) was negotiating with scholars promoted, with some success, self-serving, apologetic accounts of the past of the the Spanish authorities about providing training in Spanish military academies for former OUN-UPA, and, in some cases, of their own wartime activities. The line between scholar- members of the UPA and the Waffen-SS division Galizien, a Ukrainian collaborationist ship and diaspora politics was often blurred, as nationalist scholars combined propaganda formation established in April 1943.175 While Bandera’s July 1954 audience with Franco and activism with scholarly work. Lebed’s circle never condemned the crimes or the mass was cancelled in the last minute,176 Stets’ko met with Franco and Chiang Kai-shek in 1955 murders of the OUN, let alone admitted that they had taken place. On the contrary, it made and 1956.177 The OUN(b) sought to provoke a revolutionary uprising in the Soviet Union denial, obfuscation, and white-washing of the wartime activities of the OUN and the UPA in order to split the Soviet army, get rebel control over Soviet nuclear weapons, seeking a a central aspect of its intellectual activities. nuclear confrontation with Moscow.178 The movement developed an intese cult around the concept of sacrificial death. Following Bandera’s assassination by the KGB in 1959, the Nationalist Predominance in Ukrainian Studies OUN(b) cult of personality around its martyred leaders was further intesified. By 1968, The émigré elites maintained close bonds across the Atlantic. They developed a collec- when the OUN(b) held its Fourth Congress they were elevated to the status of religious tive historical memory, in which the diaspora historians and chroniclers came to play a central icons, included in prayers to “the nationalist Trinity—Konovalets, Shukhevych, Bandera.”179 role. The CIA employed intellectual nationalist émigrés, mainly followers of the Ukrainian Nationalist Myth-Making: the Intellectuals—OUN(z) and Proloh National Rada and the OUN(m), at Radio Liberty or its affiliated Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR.193 Since many of its employees were elderly and had limited knowledge The Western allies generally preferred cooperation with the group around Mykola of western langauges, the Munich Institute never became a serious center for Soviet studies Lebed’.180 The OUN(z) group, which included Volodymyr Martynets’ and Volodymyr and was closed down in the seventies.194 Kubijovy%, now presented themselves as democrats.181 Vasyl’ Kuk, Shukhevych’s suc- Other nationalist activists went into academia and produced sympathetic accounts cessor, described Lebed’ as a nondogmatic, but suspicious politician.182 From his exile in of their organizations. Among these academics were UPA veteran Petro Potichnyj; OUN Rome, Lebed’ established contact with U.S. intelligence in 1945.183 While describing him veterans Evhen Shtendera,195 Wolodymyr Kosyk,196 and Taras Hunczak;197 SS-Galizien as “very radical, possibly more so than Bandera,”184 “a well-known sadist and collaborator veterans Vasyl’ Veryha,198 Oleksa Horbatsch,199 and Petro Savaryn.200 Some nationalist of the Germans,”185 the CIA nevertheless realized the value of his knowledge and contact leaders—Mykola Lebed and Yaroslav Stest’ko, but also Volodymyr Kubijovy%, Roman network and cultivated close relations with his group.186 During the early Cold War, extreme Ilnyts’kyi, Ivan Hryn’okh,201 and Petro Mirchuk202—produced their own accounts of the 18 19 past. The latter three were linked to the Ukrainian Free University (Ukrains’kyi vil’nyi . . . In Ukraine there were no collaborationists seduced by Nazi ideology or by universytet, UVU) in Munich. the seemingly irresistible Griff nach der Weltmacht (grasp for world power). Unlike the French, Belgians, Dutch, and Russians, Ukrainians did not establish Ethnic Studies and Identity Politics fascist organizations and youth movements that promoted collaboration with Germany.214 Ukrainian studies was long an isolated discipline, thoroughly politicized and seen as lacking in objectivity.203 The change came with the ascent of identity politics, multicultural- Bohdan Wytwycky’s entry on ‘anti-Semitism’ in the Encyclopedia of Ukraine, ism, and “ethnic” studies in the 1970s. Following the establishment of academic institutions edited by Volodymyr Kubijovy%215 and published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrai- on an “ethnic” basis, the nationalists’ selective accounts of the past began appearing with nian Studies, CIUS, informs us that “there has never . . . been a Ukrainian anti-Semitic established academic publishers and made inroads into the academic mainstream. From the organization or political party.”216 1970s, a new generation of nationalist academics, sympathetic to the OUN legacy, and mas- Pronationalist historians did not undertake any significant steps to interview surviv- tering the language of political correctness, came to dominate the field of Ukrainian studies. ing Jewish or Polish victims of the 1943–1944 ethnic cleansing. At the same time, even Following the collapse of the USSR, apologetics for the OUN and UPA were increasingly anti-Semitically inclined Ukrainian nationalists, such as senior OUN(b) member Petro articulated in terms of anti-colonialism, as the voice of the subaltern, and, in Canada, under Mirchuk, sought vindication from Ukrainian Jews to aid their cause and to absolve them the aegis of official multiculturalism.204 The pronationalist historians have generally failed of allegations of anti-Semitism. Mirchuk appealed to the Jewish community: to treat their nationalist heroes as objects of inquiry and instead used them as platforms to You should . . . [be] informing Israel of the Ukrainian truth, i.e., the Ukrainian defend the nationalist mythologies into which they were socialized.205 Until recently, there fight for liberation from the Russian tyrants. Write articles to Jewish magazines, were almost no critical studies of the Ukrainian research institutes themsleves.206 give lectures to Israeli students about this. Dispel the malicious accusations Like the Soviets, the émigré nationalists guarded their archives jealously, and their that Ukrainians are “anti-Semites” and that they cooperated with the German Nazis—propaganda conjured up by the Russians and supported by the KGB’s historians mirrored the Soviet toeing of the party line.207 Lebed’s group controlled their ar- falsified “documents.” . . . Praise the heroic fight of the Ukrainian nation, of chives tightly, released documents selectively, retyping, editing, or otherwise manipulating the OUN and UPA, against the German and Soviet Russian Nazis, revealing the documents to produce a selective version of the past, particularly for 1941–1942, when at the same time the crimes of the occupiers of Ukraine.217 the OUN involvement with Nazi Germany was the most intense.208 Only with the opening of the Soviet archives could the original documents be compared with the “sanitized” versions Mirchuk wrote an entire book in an attempt to dispel the perception of Ukrainians as of the diaspora publications.209 Nevertheless, many of the post-Soviet successor states have anti-Semites. A former inmate of Auschwitz, he maintained that the Ukrainians really had continued to release documents selectively, or have established propagandistic or ideological suffered worse than the Jews during the war, since Ukrainians, unlike the Jews would defend watchdogs to police access to documents and create a nationalistic, edifying, patriotic past.210 themselves.218 The effectiveness of the book was limited, as it is saturated with anti-Semitic, anti-Polish, and anti-Russian stereotypes and crude ethnic slurs in the OUN(b) tradition.219 Denial of Anti-Semitism Even when a Jew was choking a Ukrainian villager, sucking his blood as a Given the particular stigma anti-Semitism carried following the Holocaust, pronation- nobleman’s tax collector, or innkeeper, or torturing him in the basements of the alist historians have gone to great lengths to deny its very existence. Denial of the fascist Cheka, GPU, NKVD, KGB, or as a Bolshevik commissar—this was alright, honorable and just, in accordance with the command of your Jehovah. And and anti-Semitic nature of the OUN, its war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and participation in yet when that Ukrainian defended himself, then this was already criminal the Holocaust have become central components of the intellectual history of the Ukrainian “anti-Semitic” and a “pogrom of the innocent, defenseless Jews.” . . . You see, diaspora.211 The UPA veteran and military historian Lev Shankovsky, claimed that anti- the name of the Russian empire became “USSR” [SSSR in Russian] after the Semitism “never existed in Ukraine. But there exists a myth about Ukrainian anti-Semitism revolution. Are you aware of how the “goyem” within the empire read that?: promoted by Moscow.”212 Bohdan Osadczuk asserted that “the Ukrainian ‘integral’ national- “Three Sruls and one Russian.” 220 ists from the OUN, unlike almost all other groupings of this type in all of Europe, did not Senior diaspora historians have categorically denied that the UPA murdered Jews.221 have an anti-Semitic program.”213 “Neither the Ukrainian underground movement nor any When contemporary research established, beyond any reasonable doubt, the mass killing other organizations . . . cultivated anti-Semitic programs or policies,” Taras Hunczak alleges. of Jews by the OUN and the UPA, pronationalist historians deny any anti-Semitic motives They readily accepted Jews into their ranks and sheltered them from Nazi behind the murders. Asked to comment on recent research findings that the UPA indeed persecution, despite the popular perception of Jews as promoters of communism. did kill significant numbers of Jews, Professor Emeritus Petro Potichnyj’s explanation was 20 21 that Jews were killed because they were communists.222 The same argument is repeated in pretation, becomes primarily an issue of whether a movement is successful in achieving its cruder form by anti-Semitic, nationalist diaspora politicians.223 A similar line of reasoning goal of controlling a state. Subsequently, the argument goes, the Slovak and Croat regimes has been invoked to rationalize or legitimize the OUN and UPA’s ethnic cleansing of Poles. were fascist because they controlled states, whereas Stets’ko’s unsuccessful state project did Nationalist historians have defended the murder of Poles on the grounds that they supported not.237 The Nazis’ refusal to recognize the OUN state, Motyl argues, “inadvertently sav[ed] communism and aided the Soviets,224 or they deny that the Polish victims were civilians.225 the nationalists from a collaborationist and possibly fascist fate.”238 Motyl elegantly, and Ukrainian neofascists justify the mass murder of Poles and Jews by referring to these national implicitly, divorces the OUN from its ideological kin—the Ustaše, the Hlinka Guard, Mus- minorities as “occupants” of Ukrainian lands and thus legitimate targets for mass murder.226 solini’s Fascists, and Hitler’s National Socialists. Referring to Ukrainian Nazi collaborators A crude anti-Semitic interpretation charges Mykola Lebed’ with the UPA’s mass murders would be impossible twice over, according to this line of reasoning. Ukrainians, serving in of Poles in the summer of 1943, identifying him as a Jewish agent provocateur and citing German uniform, taking oaths to Adolf Hitler, and fighting for the New Order in Europe his allegedly Ashkenazi-sounding nom de guerre “Ruban” as evidence of his Jewishness.227 could not be called “Nazi collaborators,” according to the pronationalist argument. The rac- Soviet propaganda complicated matters further by producing a one-sided picture of ist ideology of the Nazis precluded the possibility of Ukrainians joining their movement,239 the OUN and the UPA as Nazi collaborators.228 While the Holocaust was a taboo topic in “collaboration” would have required a Ukrainian state, something that did not exist in 1941.240 the Soviet Union, from 1979 on, Soviet propaganda used such allegations of Holocaust col- Motyl’s argument is unconvincing for for several reasons, not least, as Daniel Ursprung has laboration as a tool to discredit diaspora nationalists and to cast a shadow over the Western shown, because only a few fascist groups in Eastern Europe succeeded in gaining control countries that housed them.229 The topic of collaboration and war criminality polarized over a state machinery.241 Motyl argues that “the correct term matters . . . it’s important Ukrainian and Jewish communities. Hypersensitive to such allegations, the Ukrainian to call things by their real names and not engage in unneccessary obfuscation.”242 Yet his diaspora reacted hysterically and aggressively to investigations of war criminality in their definitions and terminology have proved controversial among nonnationalist scholars, who community, denying it categorically.230 Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, have taken Motyl to task for doing exactly that. While Motyl’s stringent criteria for fascism significant sections of the Ukrainian diaspora continue to rally around alleged death camp disqualifies the OUN, he defines contemporary Russia as an “unconsolidated fascist state.”243 guards, whom they regard as martyrs and victims.231 Jewish-Ukrainian relations came to He presents himself as “a long-time critic of the Bandera movement,”244 yet his denial of constitute, in the words of Petro Potichnyj, two solitudes.232 the OUN’s fascism and collaboration has become an important component of the narrative of diaspora nationalists and pro-OUN intellectuals. It is difficult to escape the notion that a Denial of Collaboration and Fascism definition of fascism which includes Medvedev’s Russia, but not Bandera and Stets’ko, is Pro-OUN historians have developed a number of strategies and narratives of denial tailored to fit the self-image and ideological needs of a community which to various degrees regarding the OUN’s fascism. The explicit fascist nature and orientation of the Stets’ko state identifies with the pro-OUN tradition. project has been categorically denied, and Stets’ko’s public declaration—the Akt of June 30, Some pro-UPA chroniclers have tried to separate the UPA from the OUN(b), arguing 1941—was edited to omit his pledge of loyalty to Hitler and Nazi Germany. Pronational- for the rehabilitation of the former but not the latter.245 Petro Potichnyj, in particular, eagerly ist historians, relying on selective accounts, described this as a clean break with the Nazis. emphasizes that the OUN(b) and the UPA were separate organizations and objects to the Lebed’ himself claimed that the proclamation was “completely independent of all foreign commonly used term OUN-UPA to describe the organization.246 Another strategy has been influences and political and ideological orientations.”233 Wolodymyr Kosyk insisted that to divorce Shukhevych, Stets’ko, and Bandera from their ideology, reduce them to symbols “when the Germans refused to recognize the independence of Ukraine, any cooperation of Ukrainian glory and heroism, and to regard the cult of personality as merely an edifying with them became out of the question.”234 Petro Potichnyj describes the Akt as an overtly patriotic celebration.247 This line of reasoning reduces to a mere detail the significance of the anti-German declaration.235 Taras Hunczak argues that the OUN(b) “crossed its Rubicon in OUN leaders’ explicit endorsement of the Holocaust, their declarations of loyalty to Hitler the very first days of the German-Soviet war, placing it in an adversarial position vis-à-vis and the New Europe, and the mass murder of civilians to minor stains on their records, not the Germans.”236 significantly different from similar mistakes committed by Winston Churchill and Neville The perhaps most intelligent denial of the OUN’s fascism and collaborationism is made Chamberlain.248 by a political scientist, Alexander Motyl. Motyl’s argument differs from the crude denial As we have seen, in the predominant diaspora discourse several key characteristics of the OUN-affiliated historians. It is instead based upon the OUN’s failure to establish a of the OUN were denied: its anti-Semitism, its ideological affinity with Nazi Germany, and state. While Motyl admits the OUN’s enthusiasm for a fascist Europe, its fascist intentions, its leadership’s enthusiastic support for a new, fascist Europe. Yet negative definitions are he presents fascism is a model of organizing an existent state. This interpretation shifts the an insufficient basis for myth-making and the mobilization of nationalist passions. In order focus away from ideology to measurable achivement. Fascism, according to Motyl’s inter- to be accepted as idols, heroes the ideologues needed to supply with positive charcteristics, 22 23 acceptable to democrats. Creating such heroes required more imagination from the myth- Ukrainian nationalists remember the Holocaust quite differently from Jewish survivors: makers. Pronationalist intellectuals present the OUN(b)-controlled UPA as the source and “Had the OUN-UPA pursued an anti-Semitic ideology . . . perhaps thousands of Jews would basis for today’s Ukrainian democracy. In order to produce such a picture, the nationalists not have survived,” wrote Taras Hunczak in response to the publication of Stets’ko’s anti- generally curtail their scope of attention to the limited period between 1943 and 1951, relying Semitic biography, or zhyttiepys.256 In Jewish collective memory, on the contrary, Ukrainians heavily on OUN propaganda from the period when it was seeking new allies in the west.249 are often remembered among the worst perpetrators of the Holocaust.257 Jewish survivors in “By studying these primary documents of the UPA one can secure the sources of the genu- Western Ukrane typically emphasize that with 98.5 percent of the Volhynian Jews murdered, inely pluralistic, democratic Ukrainian society,” writes Howard Aster in a 1996 Festschrift there were few places in Europe where the Holocaust was so brutally thorough, and had it to Petro Potichnyj. According to Aster, the documents published in Litopys UPA, of which not been for the Banderites, more Jews would have survived.258 Potichnyj is the main editor, represent the “culmination of the development of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology towards a greater emphasis on economic and social welfare, and upon Omission and Falsification securing individual rights.”250 There is a distinction between the denial and obfuscating of the OUN’s fascism and ethnic cleansing and the outright falsification of history upon the basis of forgeries. While the Re-export of the Nationalist Myths to Ukraine former constitutes the context in which this peculiar narrative developed, the representation The collapse of the Soviet Union created a demand for new history writing. Soviet of the OUN as philo-Semitic rescuers of Jews contains several examples of the latter. The textbooks were discarded and, in many cases, replaced with diaspora accounts of the past. genealogy of the narrative of the UPA as rescuers of Jews dates several decades back. One The re-export of the nationalist narrative to Ukraine went relatively smoothly, finding a early source comes from Mykola Lebed’ himself, and was published in 1946.259 particularly receptive audience in the western parts of the country. A significant number of The majority of physicians in the UPA were Jews, whom the UPA had rescued. Ukrainian historians and intelligenty, used to toeing the Soviet line, swiftly replaced Marxist- . . . The Jewish physicians were treated as citizens of the Ukraine and officers Leninist orthodoxy with nationalist interpretations. While the influence of returning émigré of the Ukrainian army. It should be duly stressed at this point that all of them nationalists on Ukrainian politics has been modest, their influence on Ukrainian history discharged their existing duties faithfully. They rendered service not only to the soldiers but also to the entire population. They traveled throughout the area, writing and myth-making has been significant, particularly after 2004.251 and organized field hospitals and local medical stations. They did not desert the fighting ranks in trying situations, even when they had an opportunity to Philo-Semitic Nationalist Narratives go over to the Reds. Many of them died a hero’s death.260 of the OUN(b) and the UPA In the 1950s and 1960s, a narrative of the OUN was portrayed as an organization of By the turn of the millennium, a new narrative about the OUN and the Jews was crys- righteous rescuers of Jews began to crystallize, eagerly supported by the émigré OUN.261 The tallizing, one that increasingly presented the OUN-UPA as a tolerant, ethnically inclusive OUN(b) took an active role in the myth-making, including the manufacturing of forgeries. force that welcomed Jews, Poles, and other minorities, and fought for a multiethnic and One of the more significant forgeries is the biography of Stella Krentsbakh/Kreutzbach, a democratic Ukraine.252 The historian Volodymyr Serhiichuk calls the OUN-UPA a democratic fictitious Jewess, who prasies “God and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army” for having survived force leading an antitotalitarian struggle against Stalinism and Nazism. Among the people the Holocaust. The forged biography appeared in a volume edited by Petro Mirchuk.262 The who “sacrificed” themselves for the casue, Serhiichuk asserts, were not only Ukrainians, but Krenstbakh/Kreutzbach story received significant attention in the émigré press. Yet jour- also Polish and Jewish volunteers.253 Pronationalist historians often present the OUN-UPA nalists who tried to find her soon learned that such a person did not exist. Philip Friedman, as rescuers and benefactors who exercised an admirable restraint vis-à-vis the Jews, despite himself a survivor of the Holocaust from Western Ukraine, took an immediate interest in Ukrainian suffering at the hands of genocidal Jewish commissars. Some occasionally concede the story, but could soon conclude that “the entire story is a hoax.”263 When the nonexistent that there were anti-Semitic tendencies within the OUN, yet are quick to add that these were Krentsbakh/Kreutzbach could not be found, stories and rumors circulated in émigré circles not embraced by the movement in its entirety, that it made a distinction between communist that she would have been murdered, execution-style, in Israel, with a bullet to the back of and noncommunist Jews, and ultimately adopted an inclusive view of civic nationalism, her neck, for telling the truth about the UPA’s attitude to the Jews.264 We will return to the humanism, and democracy.254 Other nationalist intellectuals deny the fascist legacy entirely. ficitious Stella Krenstbakh/Kreutzbach memoirs later, as they would come to play an im- Some have gone as far as to allege that the “political principles expressed in the programs portant role in pro-OUN propaganda half a century later. of the Third Congress of the OUN(b) have today entered the Ukrainian constitution.”255 24 25  Policing the National Memory: Institutionalized Victimization Yushchenko appointed a former deputy Prime Minister, Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi, a sympathizer of the extreme right Social Nationalist Party of Ukraine.270 Another important propaganda Swept to power by the so-called Orange Revolution in 2004, Viktor Yushchenko’s institution is the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement (Tsentr Doslidzhen’ presidency represented the pinnacle of diaspora influence on history writing in Ukraine. It Vyzvol’noho Rukhu, TsDVR), an OUN(b) “façade structure”271 which has come to serve as an elevated the diaspora’s historical myths to state policy and provided state funding to insti- important institutional link between the young Ukrainian pro-OUN legimitizers and diaspora tutions tasked with the development of legitimizing narratives which the cult of the OUN nationalists of the post-war wave of émigrés, such as Wolodymyr Kosyk and Petro Sodol.272 leaders required. Yushchenko developed a memory politics based heavily upon a vicitimiza- The Center is a partner of the CIUS, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI), as tion narrative, “a meta-narrative that categorized Ukraine as a nation-victim by integrating well as diaspora nationalist organizations, such as the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) all central historical events of the twentieth century, from the civil war and Sovietization to and the OUN(b)-dominated Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA).273 The the Chernobyl disaster.”265 The culmination was the 1932–1933 famine, presented as the mission statement of the Center reads: central and defining event of the Soviet period.266 Yushchenko has a complex relation to the OUN. On the one hand, he rejected its The history of the struggle of liberation is the basis of the national idea of fascism, totalitarianism, terror, Führerprinzip, and ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, the every state, the basis for its values and orientation. The past of the Ukrainian people, in particular its liberation struggle, was for many years silenced and Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the direct descendent of the OUN(b), were members twisted by the totalitarian regimes. Therefore a new non-prejudiced view of of his Nasha Ukraina (Our Ukraine) Bloc.267 A somewhat paradoxical situation appeared the Ukrainian liberation movement is extraordinarily urgently needed. The 20th as a new, aspiring democracy with a stated commitment to democratic values, pluralism, century was the high point of the development of the Ukrainian resistance—the and human rights used state institutions to rehabilitate fascists and elevated them to national best example is the struggle of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and heroes, symbols of the young democracy. the Ukrainian Insurgent Army from the 1920s to the 1950s. Unfortunately, today the activities of those structures remain one of the least studied parts of The Holocaust has come to occupy a central role in contemporary European political the Ukrainian historiography. The study of the various aspects of the struggle culture, to the point that the ability to address this issue has come to be regarded as something of the Ukrainians for their national and social freedom is the main purpose of of a litmus test of the democratic maturity of the new EU members and candidates. Increas- The Center for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement.274 ingly, Europe imagines itself as a community of shared values, in which the Holocaust plays a key role, a “collective European memory.”268 In Ukraine, two cultures of memory, the cult In turn, the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement is linked to the Ukrainian of Nationalist heroes and the Western European memory culture in which the Holocaust Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, most importantly, the Ukrainian Security Forces (Sluzhba plays a central role, are mutually exclusive. As Wilfried Jilge has aptly observed, Bezpeki Ukrainy, SBU), the direct successor of the KGB. This organization was tasked with the most important aspects of Yushchenko’s apparatus of memory management: to The absence of the Holocaust from the Ukrainian culture of memory is directly guard the memory, the institutions, resources, and archives of the Ukrainian security forces. connected to the closeness of the OUN to National Socialism, particularly in Sofia Hrachova emphasizes that “the SBU enjoys a monopoly on information and uses this its relation to anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism. . . . Nationalist intellectuals can legitimize the heroic role of the OUN and UPA only by ignoring the Jewish monopoly to political ends, publishing selections of documents that represent historical Holocaust and its connection to Ukrainian national history.269 events according to the current official perspective, and authorizing the official position on controversial issues.” Unlike analogue archives in other countries in East-Central Europe, Institutionalized Production of Official Memory most of their collections remain inaccessible to scholars.275 Yushchenko’s propaganda institutes disseminated an official interpretation of history to A part of Yushchenko’s “Europeanization” of Ukrainian society included bringing the public, based on two main themes: a victimization narrative centered on the 1932–1933 collective memory more in line with the culture of memory of the European mainstream. In famine, which was described as a genocide against the Ukrainian nation that claimed ten order to bridge the conflicting memories, the Yushchenko government needed to manufacture million victims, combined with a glorification of the OUN(b) and UPA. The institutes were an edifying Ukrainian national past, a patriotic narrative that could partially reconcile the cult interlinked: its directors cross-referenced and legitimized each others’ existence. The pro- of the OUN(b) and the UPA with recognition of the Holocaust. The narratives developed by pagandistic and naïvely heroic representations were presented as reliable and full accounts authoritarian groups in the diaspora required a significant make-over in order to make them of the past. Yukhnovs’kyi’s endorsement of one of V’’iatrovych’s propaganda book, The marketable in the twenty-first century. The task rested heavily on three official institutions. Ukrainian Insurgent Army; the Army of the Undefeated is typical of this rhetoric: The Institute of National Memory, established in 2006, was modeled after the Polish example. Its purpose was to consolidate the “nation” through a patriotic use of history. As director, 26 27  The book in front of you is written by authors who belong to a new generation When I wrote a booklet on the [OUN’s] relation to the Jews, a girl who worked of Ukrainian historians, and offers a full account of the heroic struggle of the on its graphic design aked me: I do not understand—did the nationalists love the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. I am convinced that every Ukrainian citizen who Jews or did they not? For me, this was revealing. As a matter of fact, relations reads it will be convinced that our people is not only good, beautiful and hard between nations cannot be that simple. A boy can love a girl. International working, but also heroic. The reader will be convinced that independence relations are much more complicated. We need to explain to people the came to us as a result of a long, heroic struggle. Read this book. Looking at multivalence of the historical process, so that they do not go along with any the faces of the heroes of the UPA, you possibly also find your own likeness.276 sort of primitive political speculations.286 One of the first steps taken by the Institute of National Memory was to petition Yush- V’’iatrovych highly selective accounts followed the diaspora tradition in their denial chenko to posthumously make the OUN(b) and UPA leader Roman Shukhevych a national and downplaying of the OUN’s anti-Semitism, and have rightly been harshly criticized hero.277 In 2007 and 2010 Shukhevych and Bandera were officially designated “Heroes of as very one-sided, legitimizingm and revisionist, failing to meet even the basic scholarly Ukraine,” and a similar status was given to Yaroslav Stest’ko.278 The concept of official heroes requirements. In the words of John-Paul Himka, and the habit of projecting contemporary, politically convenient values back on the past are deeply rooted Soviet practices.279 With the help of his legitimizing historians, Yushchenko V’’iatrovych manages to exonerate the OUN of charges of antisemitism and complicity in the Holocaust only by employing a series of highly dubious attempted to divorce the OUN leaders from their fascist ideology and place them within a procedures: rejecting sources that compromise the OUN, accepting uncritically new, curious, philo-Semitic narrative, tailored to fit the expectations of their intended West- censored sources from émigré OUN circles, failing to recognize antisemitism ern partners and to partly recognize the centrality of the Holocaust. This narrative denies in OUN texts, limiting the source base to official OUN proclamations and the nationalist leaders’ commitment to mass murder and ethnic cleansing and presents them decisions, excluding Jewish memoirs, refusing to consider contextual and as good Europeans—democrats and pluralists—and the OUN-UPA as inclusive, tolerant comparative factors, failing to consult German document collections, and ignoring the mass of historical monographs on his subject written in the English organizations, champions of a multi-ethnic Ukraine. Monuments to Ukrainian nationalists and German languages.287 were erected at sites of Jewish tragedy, including former ghettoes and Babi Yar.280 Not only are these new national memorials modelled after monuments to the Holocaust of the Euro- Relying primarily on the Litopys UPA, V’’iatrovych attempts to deflect the OUN’s pean Jews, they are deliberately intended to surpass and forget the other “victim nation.”281 anti-Semitic legacy by dwelling on five named Jews who served in the UPA, including the fictitious Stella Krentsbakh/Kreutzbach.288 He indicates that the number could have been The OUN-UPA as Rescuer of Jews greater had the Jews shown more cooperation and cites the commander of UPA North, Ivan Lytvynchuk, who “sought a person, literate in the Yiddish language, to write an anti-German Volodymyr V’’iatrovych letter, addressed to the Jews,” but “unfortunately, he was not able to realize this project.”289 Occupying double positions as director of both the Archives of the SBU and the Center In March 2008, V’’iatrovych’s SBU circulated Do pochatku knyha faktiv in an effort to for the Study of the National Liberation Movement, Volodymyr V’’iatrovych (b. 1977) was defend the reputation of the OUN, Shukhevych, and the Nachtigall Battalion. Distributing perhaps the most prominent of Yushchenko’s legitimizing historians. V’’iatrovych dedicated it through government channels, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ukrainian particular attention to the topic of the OUN and the Jews.282 diplomatic missions abroad, the Ukrainian government presented it as an authentic chronicle V’’iatrovych has made no effort to consult memories of Holocaust survivors who recall from 1941 and willfully deceived the public with it.290 According to the Ukrainian govern- the OUN and UPA with terror and fear and describe the organization as deeply anti-Semitic.283 ment, this OUN forgery demonstrates He avoids the topic of how UPA leaders were trained by Nazi Germany and collaborated in the OUN’s categorical disagreement with the Gestapo proposition to organize the Holocaust and ignores evidence of UPA mass murders of Jews found in Ukrainian and Jewish pogroms. . . . Thus, the documents at the [Central State Archives of the German archives.284 Omitting a significant body of literature, which testifies to the opposite, Ukrainian Intellience Service, Holovnyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Sluzhba Bezpeky V’’iatrovych concludes that “all-in-all, from the publications of the leading ideologues of Ukrainy] HDA SBU confirm that the OUN took precautions to avoid getting the movement, their programmatic statements, [one can only conclude that] the ideology of involved in the actions against the Jewish population in Lviv and that there the Ukrainian nationalists did not take positions that justify accusations that the OUN was were no official orders to take part in their destruction or the execution of the pogroms.291 anti-Semitic.”285 Instead, he paints a picture of OUN neutrality to the Jews. V’’iatrovych dismisses criticism of Shukhevych as a baseless political campaign against the UPA commander’s memory.292 28 29  Soviet propagandists deliberately omitted the parts of the OUN ideology and among them Levko Luk’’ianenko and Iurii Shukhevych, were regular guests at the events program which mentioned the equal rights of all national minorities; avoided at V’’iatrovych’s propaganda institutes.300 giving attention to the Jews who, as members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, fought for an independent Ukraine. Unfortunately, that is the way many Moisei Fishbein contemporary publicists and historians behave, looking in this old manner at Ukrainian history through the glasses of “Agitprop.” One of the most wide- One of the most successful popularizers of the nationalists’ narrative, denying the spread accusations against the Ukrainian nationalists is the allegation of their participation in the anti-Jewish pogroms in L’viv in the beginning of July UPA’s anti-Jewish violence, is the poet Moisei Fishbein. Fishbein dismisses research showing 1941.293 that the UPA killed Jews as a “special operation” orchestrated by the Kremlin and aimed at keeping Ukraine out of NATO. He categorically denies Shukheyvch’s participation in anti-Semitic violence and condones the murder of civilians. Asked if Shukhvevych’s units took part in war crimes It is very important to the disinformers also to discredit General Shukhevych, the UPA, and the entire Ukrainian national liberation movement, as well against the civilian population, V’’iatrovych retorted: “Is it possible to consider Poles or as President Yushchenko of Ukraine. Therefore they used the old Chekist Belarusians a peaceful population, if they during the day work as ordinary villagers, only to provocation and played “the Jewish card”: one was the accusation [that the arm themselves in the evening and attack the village?”294 UPA] murdered Jews, the other the “heroization” of the alleged murderers. In April 2008, the SBU dedicated a “public hearing” to the topic of Jews in the UPA The purpose is clear: to exclude Jews from the Ukrainian national renaissance. in order to establish a new national ideology, a narrative of Ukrainians and Jews fighting To alienate the entire civilized world, from those who want the rebirth of a true, Ukrainian Ukraine—Ukrainian in spirit, in language, in memory about together against a common Bolshevik-Muscovite enemy. The director of the SBU, Valentyn her geniuses and heroes. Ukrainian—for who live there, regardless of their Nalyvaichenko, who presided over much of the myth-making, presented the enterprise as ethnic origin. . . . [The claims of] “UPA Anti-Jewish actions” is a provocation, an attempt to dispell myths. distributed from Moscow. It is a provocation. That the UPA would have killed Jews is a lie. Tell me, how could the UPA have exterminated Jews when there Today, we are making public documents about Ukrainians and Jews who were Jews in the UPA, who served in the UPA? I knew Jews who served in fought together after the great Famine against the totalitarian and communist the UPA. For instance, I knew doctor Abraham Shtertser, who lived in Israel regimes. That historical truth has been brutally suppressed and mythologized. In after the war. There was Samuel Neuman, his pseudonym was Maksimovich; a cynical and evil fashion, the KGB tried to stir up unnatural hostility between there was Shai Varma (pseudonym Skripach); there was Roman Vynnytskyi, the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples. Such a myth, created and sustained over his pseudonym was Sam. There was an outstanding figure in the UPA, a several decades, has no right to exist.295 woman called Stella Krentsbakh; she later used a pseudonym. She was born in Bolekhov in the L’viv area, she was the daughter of a rabbi, Zionist, and was Nalyvaichenko stated his desire to replace the Soviet lie with a Ukrainian “historical friends there, in Bolekhov, with the daugher of a Greek Catholic priest, called truth about the past of the Ukrainian people” and to “liberate Ukrainian history from lies Olya. In 1939 Stella Krentsbakh graduated from the philosophical department and falsifications.”296 The press center of the SBU asserted that “the documentary material of L’viv University. From 1943 she was a nurse and intelligence officer in the UPA. In the spring of 1945 the NKVD captured her during a meeting with a objectively certifies that the history of the Ukrainian liberation movement provides many contact in Rozhniatov. Thereafter she was jailed, sentenced to death, but UPA examples of collaboration between Ukrainians and Jews in their struggle against the totalitar- soldiers liberated Stella Krenstbakh, the Jewess. In the summer of 1945 she ian regimes.”297 V’’iatrovych again returned to the 1950 pamphlet Jews—Citizens of Ukraine, crossed the Carpathians with Ukrainian insurgents and October 1, 1946, she which he claimed represented a correct picture of the OUN’s disposition toward Jews. He managed to reach the English zone of occupation in Austria. She made it to ignored and offered no commentary on its veiled threats.298 The legitimizing historians at Israel. Do you know where she worked in Israel? In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In her memoirs Stella Krentsbakh wrote: “The reason I am alive today, the SBU had an ambivalent attitude to the Jews. Whereas they put significant efforts into and have been able to give all the strength of my 38 years to the free Israel, I presenting the Banderites as friends of Israel and Jewish nationalism, they did not shy away owe, apparently to God and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. I became a member from traditional nationalist stereotypes. In line with its ambition to blame the 1932–1933 of the heroic UPA on November 7, 1943. In our group I counted 12 Jews, of famine on easily definable outsiders, the SBU in July 2008 published a highly selective list which eight were physicians.”301 of nineteen perpetrators of the “famine-genocide.” Of these, eight people, or 40 percent, Repeating this claim in a number of forums, Fishbein reduces the OUN’s anti-Semitism were of Jewish “nationality,” presented in the Soviet fashion of listing the “real” Ashkenazi to a fabrication invented by the enemies of Ukraine. “In playing the ‘Jewish card’ in their names next to their Slavic names.299 High-profile anti-Semites and Holocaust revisionists, special operations against Ukraine, the Russian special services are exploiting the ‘Putin- Juden,’ particularly Moscow-based rabbis,” Fishbein wrote.302 He repeated this argument at 30 31 a conference at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2009.303 His words were Myth-Making with Complications enthusiastically reported in the nationalist press. The English-language Kyiv Post, a popular forum for the diaspora, published his statement as an op-ed.304 Fishbein received remarkable Despite the pretentious claims of the propagandists, it is not fully clear what can be media attention, not only in nationalist diaspora publications such as The Ukrainian Weekly, made of the activities of a handful of Jewish physicians in the UPA. Even if we were to Ukrainian News, Kyiv Post, and others, but also in mainstream news venues, such as the take the most optimistic assessments of the legitimizing historians, include the forgeries and BBC news. Respectable analysts, like Paul Goble uncritically repeated Fishbein’s assertions: accept at face value their assertions regarding the Jewish identity of all the unnamed people V’’iatrovych claims fought in the OUN and UPA, the number of Jews in those organiza- Few people have been as dogged as Fishbein in tracking down this and other tions still constitute a minute fraction of the total UPA membership (between 0.001 and 0.1 Russian falsifications and slanders against Ukraine, but his work in this area percent).312 Certainly it is difficult to interpret a handful of Jewish nurses and doctors who deserves to be better known not only because it . . . explains why so many Ukrainians want to gain the protection of Western institutions like NATO.305 survived the Holocaust within the ranks of the UPA as evidence of the existence of a joint OUN-UPA–Jewish front against common enemies. V’’iatrovych does not comment upon the With state support, Fishbein recirculated Mirchuk’s ficticious Krentsbakh/Kreutz- many documented cases of how the OUN-UPA attacked and murdered rescuers of Jews.313 bach “autobiography,” accompanied by an English translation, I Am Alive Thanks to the He omits the fact that 50 percent of the UPA leaders had a background as collaborators within UPA presenting it as an authentic document which would once and for all disprove the the military, police, or punitive organs of the Nazi German occupants and played key roles OUN-UPA’s anti-Semitism.306 Soon thereafter, V’’iatrovych’s Center for the Study of the in the implementation of the Holocaust in the occupied Soviet Union. Liberation Movement again returned to the Krentsbakh/Kreutsbach story, issuing a press Nevertheless, this enchanted narrative has found a receptive audience beyond the circle release with the title “The Jewess Stella Krentsbakh explained that she survived thanks to of the nationalist true believers and started to take on a life of its own. The legend of the UPA UPA.”307 Marco Levytsky, editor of the pro-OUN Ukrainian News in Edmonton, Alberta, as an inclusive, democratic force where Jews fought side by side with the OUN against Hitler again and again returned to the Stella Krentsbakh/Kreutzbach story, citing the poet as a is already making it into popular culture. In 2010, Oksana Zabuzhko, perhaps Ukraine’s most reputable source and authority in the field, using the story to deny OUN complicity in the popular fiction writer, published a massive book, Muzei pokynutykh sekretiv, (The Museum Holocaust.308 Similarly, Victor Rud, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Human Rights’ of Forgotten Secrets) in which the major heroine is a Jewish nurse in the UPA, apparently Committee of the Ukrainian American Bar Association, in an open letter to the Washington modeled on Krentsbakh/Kreutzbach. For her research, Zabuzhko relied partly on material Post in response to an article critical of Yushchenko’s UPA cult, relies on Fishbein’s lecture provided to her by the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement and its museum in at Urbana-Champaign, referring to it as “a recent study” and citing Fishbein’s statement to the former Lontskyi Prison, where on the request of V’’iatrovych center, the book launch the effect that was held.314 The first edition sold out in three days. Reviewers received the book very well. “Oksana Zabuzhko has written a panorama of the history of the Ukrainian past—the history Russia’s special services are seeking to destabilize the situation in Ukraine, of Ukrainians of the 20th century,” the Lviv daily, Vysokyi Zamok, commented.315 undermine its sovereignty and independence, create a negative image of this country, block its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Nevertheless, government propaganda has failed to gain popularity with ordinary Ukrai- and turn Ukraine into a dependent and manipulated satellite. In their special nians. An nationwide opinion poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology operations against Ukraine they attribute exceptional importance to the ‘Jewish in June 2009 showed that only a small minority of Ukrainians embraced Yushchenko and card.’309 his myths about the OUN and UPA.316 The cult of the OUN and UPA has, however, tainted the image of Ukraine abroad, particularly in Poland, a key EU partner. Polish collective In December 2009, Fishbein again circulated the 1950 UPA pamphlet Jews—Citizens memory of Ukrainians during World War II remains highly critical, according to an August of Ukraine in another attempt at disproving UPA anti-Semitism. Fishbein offered no com- 2009 survey, even more so than the wartime roles of Germans and Russians.317 By turning ment on its ethnonationalist statements that Jews are but guests in the land of Ukrainians, its Bandera, Shukhevych, the OUN(b), and the UPA into official heroes and denying their stereotyping of Jews as Bolsheviks, and was unconcerned even by its thinly veiled threats.310 murders, Yushchenko’s legitimizing historians helped cement a stereotypical identification One can only speculate about Fishbein’s motives for publishing this known forgery. It of Ukrainians with banderivty. Many Poles hold “Ukrainians” collectively responsible for seems unlikely that he, or the legitmizing historians, are unaware of the literature on the the crimes of the UPA.318 Ironically, some of the historical interpretations of his successor topic, including in the Ukrainian language; as late as 2008 the historians Taras Kurylo and Viktor Yanukovych and his electorate in the east and south of the country are more in line John-Paul Himka discussed the Krentsbakh/Kreutzbach forgery in the leading intellectual with the rest of Europe than those Yushchenko, who describes his political orientation as journal Ukraina Moderna.311 oriented toward the West, 319 32 33  Conclusion: Politics, Memory and Raison d’être defending its fascist activities while denying its fascism. Both groups pick and choose the parts of the legacy they find convenient. They gloss over, downplay, deny, or legitmize the Nationalizing states are often involved in the manufacturing of national myths, and OUN-UPA mass murders. Under Yushchenko, this philo-Semitic nationalist narrative was the Ukrainian case is by no means unique. Here, in a new, weak state, divided by language, elevated to official policy and the myth-making given state funding. While the ideology of religion, and historical experience, the leadership has put significant effort into producing these two groups differ, they often work in tandem, the activities of the former paving the historical myths of political utility, a significant part of which stand in direct opposition to way for the latter. Both groups are apologists for a fascist tradition. Neither one has admitted what the sources and current scholarship say. Ernst Renan wrote, “Forgetting, I would even the OUN’s war crimes, let alone condemned them. go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of states.”320 Bruno Bet- Whereas the myths surrounding the OUN-UPA are products of diaspora imagina- telheim famously argued that “children need fairytales.” “We want our children to believe tion, they were disseminated by successors of the Ukrainian KGB. The inspiration for that, inherently, all men are good. . . . The dominant culture wishes to pretend, particularly Yushchenko’s establishment of an Institute of National Memory comes from contemporary where children are concerned, that the dark side of man does not exist, and professes a belief Poland, but his institutes of myth-production and memory management closely resemble in an optimistic meliorism.”321 He argues that fairy tales contribute to the child’s psychologi- old Soviet propaganda organs. The fairy tale scenarios produced by the state agencies come, cal development. paradoxically, with claims to truth and objectivity. Herein lies a paradox of the myth-making: Ambiguities must wait until a relatively firm personality has been established the selective, propagandistic, and edifyingly patriotic myths are presented not as such, but, on the basis of positive indentifications. . . . Futhermore, a child’s choices are on the contrary, as a more “true” and “correct” version of Ukrainian history.326 The dis- based, not so much on right versus wrong, as on who arouses his sympathy and semination of misleading propaganda—even forgeries—in the name of “historical truth” who his anthipathy. The more simple and straightforward a good character, the and “objectivity” reveal Soviet habits and practices, and mirror Stalin’s 1931 commentary easier it is for a child to identify with it and to reject the bad other.322 that what matters in history writing is not the sources, but rather a “correct attitude.”327 The In their famous study, Opa war kein Nazi (Grandpa was no Nazi), Harald Welzer, Soviet nature of these clumsy hagiographies and simplistic myths is reflected not only in their Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschuggnall highlight the difficulties many Germans have in Manichean simplicity, their blind spots, omissions, and taboos,328 but also in Yushchenko’s relating to their family members’ role in the Third Reich. Generations raised and socialized attempts to accompany his myth-making with the legal repression of those who question in the Federal Republic, well aware of the crimes of Nazi Germany, tend to see the Nazis as the official line.329 “the others” and to disavow their own grandparents’ association with National Socialism. The Is the manifacturing of contrafactual nationalist legends and edifying patriotic myths authors demonstrate that there “is no systematic place for the Holocaust in German family necessarily a bad thing? Bettelheim points to some of their benefits of legends and fairy memories”323 and that “the following generations construct a past in which their relatives tales. Some diaspora nationalists reason along similar lines. Commenting on the Krentsbakh/ appear in a role having nothing to do with the crimes.”324 The parallels to the Ukrainian di- Kreutzbach forgery, historian and UCC activist Roman Serbyn argues that “there is nothing aspora memory of the OUN and the Holocaust are striking. The diaspora culture of memory, wrong with the idea of a Jewish woman serving in the UPA; as part of Ukrainian mythology developed primarily in North America and re-exported to Ukraine after 1991, denies not it promotes positive Ukrainian-Jewish relations.” Serbyn’s problem is rather that the reha- only the OUN’s fascism and anti-Semitism, it denies the crimes themselves, presenting bilitation of Ukrainian forces in service of the Nazis was not far-reaching enough: “What perpetrators as rescuers of Jews. Fact-based historical analysis is rejected and replaced by Yushchenko can be reproached with is not having brought into the project the Ukrainian comfortable and politically expedient myths of the past. Weltzer, Moller, and Tschuggnall’s veterans of the Waffen SS Division Halychyna [Galizien, PR] and other units of the armed observation, that the “emotional process of memory reproduction is not the same thing as forces of the Axis forces.” 330 learning from facts and possessing of knowledge,” pertains also to the Ukrainian diaspora Yet, simplistic heroic tales based upon myths, half-truths, and deliberate falsifications ideologues and Yushchenko’s legitimizing historians.325 have not only resulted in a failure to examine the past. What is worse, distorted, evenfictional, There are two interrelated groups of myth-makers. The first group consists of the im- narratives are presented as “truth” and scholarly inquiry is derided as enemy propaganda, mediate heirs to the fascists: authoritarian nationalists and neofascists who share the tenets of critical voices are labeled as communists, “Ukrainophobes,” Putin supporters, or “useful the OUN philosophy—authoritarianism, leader cult, and anti-Semitism. Ironically, the philo- idiots” in the service of Yanukovych and the Kremlin.331 This logic implies that Ukraine Semitic legitimizing narrative originated within this group as a byproduct of its concerted would benefit more from silence, state propaganda, and mythmaking than from critical efforts to cover up the OUN and UPA’s anti-Jewish violence and to obfuscate the organiza- inquiry. Furthermore, the philo-Semitic narrative of the OUN and UPA constitutes a form tion’s fascist activities. The second group consists of politicians, propagandists, and pundits of Holocaust “revisionism”—it denies the OUN-UPA’s involvement in the Holocaust and who describe themselves as democrats yet identify with and celebrate the OUN, typically divorces it from its fascist and anti-Semitic legacy by means of producing an unrepresenta- 34 35 tive and factually incorrect version of the organization’s past. It shares with other forms of Ukrainy! Heroiam Slava!”337 The diaspora OUN(b) regard the popularly elected Yanukovych Holocaust denial the gross exaggeration of relatively insignificant details while it ignores, government as an “occupation regime” with which they have broken off all contact.338 Anti- overlooks, or presents well-documented facts as falsifications. By legitimizing the myths of Semitism is a central component in Lozynskyj’s apologetics. He claims that “an . . . over- the extreme right, this narrative has aided the mobilization of the Ukrainian extreme right. whelming amount of Soviet accomplices during the Soviet’s two years in Western Ukraine These myths failed to constitute a basis for national mobilization outside the diaspora from 1939–1941 were Jews,”339 alleges Jewish control over Canadian media,340 and charges and the Ukrainian west. On the contrary, the cult of the OUN-UPA has polarized Ukraine that scholars who study the anti-Jewish violence of the OUN and UPA are paid to “invent and antagonized its neighbors. The deliberate distortions have complicated the process of demons” by Jewish interests.341 He dismisses scholarly studies of the OUN’s racism with historical and political reconciliation among Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles. It has frustrated references to the alleged Jewish ethnicity of the researchers.342 Poland and the EU and unneccesarily complicated Ukrainian integration into European Paul Grod, president of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress has favored quiet diplo- institutions. Last, but not least, it made it easier for the Kremlin to portray the Ukrainian macy,343 but remains as committed as ever to the cult of the OUN and the UPA, vehemently leadership as irresponsible and politically immature, and to exploit this for political purposes. and categorically denying Ukrainian nationalist involvement in the Holocaust.344 In March, Whereas children—and nationalist politicians—may need fairy tales, the task of the 2010 the UCC organized a “task force” of nationalist activists to prevent “attacks on the historian is to deconstruct and understand the past. Awareness of the Holocaust, attempts at national liberation movement” by silencing, discrediting, or undermining the credentials of understanding the mechanisms behind the OUN and UPA’s racist violence, and respect for critical scholars, and accusing them of “treason” against their imagined communities.345 After their victims does not have to be an obstacle to nation-building. On the contrary, an open he lost his job as director of the SBU archives, in 2010, V’’iatrovych has been engaged by inquiry of the past is an important component of the building of a liberal democratic society his nationalist “partners” in the diaspora. He received a fellowship at the Harvard Ukrainian with rule of law, pluralism, and respect for human rights. Research Institute and was invited as keynote speaker at the twenty-third conference of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress as in Edmonton on November 5–7, 2010.346 The CIUS Postscript, October 2010–May 2011 invited V’’iatrovych to speak at the University of Alberta. In Edmonton, he again denied the Since this article was written in the fall of 2009, Ukraine has seen a change of govern- OUN’s anti-Semtism and obfuscated its involvement in the Holocaust. The Lviv pogrom, ment. As one of his final acts in office, Yushchenko officially designated Stepan Bandera he argued, was the subject of “much academic controversy.” as a Hero of Ukraine, in a polarizing and much-criticized move. The Ukrainian Canadian Individual members of the population did take (part) in the German-initiated Congress, of which both OUN wings and veteran organizations of the UPA and the Waffen- repressions. . . . The participation in the repressions from the general population SS Galizien are members, enthusiastically endorsed Yushchenko’s decree and called “upon included criminal elements who wanted to benefit materially by participating the Government of Canada to make changes to Canada’s War Veterans Allowance Act by in the repressions. Some took part relying on German propaganda, which was expanding eligibility to include designated resistance groups such as OUN-UPA.”332 Under put forward at the time that Jews were responsible for, as the Germans called Yanukovych, a sharp reversal in the field of memory management followed. Yushchenko’s it, Jewish Bolshevism.” But “no Ukrainian political movement advocated the participation in these repressions or anti-Jewish pogroms,” he said. “The fact posthumous designation of Bandera and Shukhevych as national heroes was declared illegal that some members of the police force organized by the Germans ultimately by the courts, and the order was recalled.333 V’’iatrovych and Yukhnovs’kyi were fired, and ended up in various military formations, such as the . . . Ukrainian Insurgent the SBU Archives and the Institute of National Memory got new directors. Valerii Soldatenko, Army (the military wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) does not who succeeded Yukhnovs’kyi as director of the Institute of National Memory, is a member establish proof that these particular formations were involved in perpetrating of the Communist Party. In March 2011, the liquidation of the instiutute was announced.334 the Holocaust.”347 The end of state support for the OUN and UPA cult outraged nationalist believers in Introduced as “the Ukrainian historian Volodymyr V’’iatrovych at Harvard University,” in the diaspora. Representatives of the OUN(b)-controlled Ukrainian Congress Committee of Ukrainian media, he again dismissed OUN’s anti-Semitism involvement in the Holocaust America (UCCA) refused to meet with President Yanukovych and staged noisy protests as “a historical myth.”348 during his visit to the United Nations in New York in September 2010. Askold Lozynskyj, On Rememberance Day, a day which in Canada traditionally emphasizes the role 335 one of the organizers of the protest, told the Ukrainian ambassador to the United States of military men in the fight against fascism, the UCC saluted the OUN, the UPA, and the that the only thing that could prevent the protests would be to “fire Soldatenko, Education Ukrainian veterans of Waffen-SS Galizien.349 Less than a week later it pledged genocide Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk and recognize the Holodomor [Famine] as genocide.”336 Dressed awareness for the 1932–1933 famine, inflating the number of victims by 300 percent, to in a folkloristic outfit and with a bulls’ horn in his hand, Lozynskyj led noisy demonstra- over ten million people.350 tions outside the UN General Assembly, chanting “Russian butchers, go to hell!” “Slava 36 37  Abandoned as state policy following Yushchenko’s disastrous defeat, the narrative of Notes denial and myth making around the OUN-UPA is now again mostly the preserve of the ex- treme right in the diaspora and Ukraine proper.351 Yanukovych has continued Yushchenko’s * A version of this paper was presented at the forty-first national convention of the American legacy of playing the eastern and western parts of Ukraine against each other, further polar- Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Boston, Massachussets, Movember 12–15, izing the pro-nationalist and “anti-Orange” camps. 2009. The right-wing extremist Svoboda party has become the largest party in the local Acknowledgements elections in Western Ukraine and the fifth largest party nationwide. While its political breakthrough came under Yanukovych, the responsibility must be shared by Yushchenko This article has benefited from the comments, insights, ideas and constructive criticism of Marco Carynnyk, Tomislav Duli!, Norman J. W. Goda, John-Paul Himka, Krzysztof Janiga, David Marples, and his legitimizing historians, whose official veneration, state-sponsored myth making and Nina Paulovicova, Grzegorz Rossoli#ski-Liebe, and the extensive and very helpful comments of two denial of the OUN-UPA atrocities provided political legitimacy and paved the way for this anonymous reviewers. He also wishes to acknowledge the generous support from the Interdisciplinary second turn to the right. Research Training Group 1540 “Baltic Borderlands: Shifting Boundaries of Mind and Culture in the In the ultra-nationalist rendering of history has devolved into historical fiction. Dedi- Borderlands of the Baltic Sea Region,” funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). cated fascists and anti-Semites who repeatedly volunteered their services for Hitler’s new 1. See, for instance, David R. Marples, Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Europe are presented as the first to oppose the Nazis, totalitarians are presented as freedom Ukraine (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007); Johan Dietsch, Making Sense of fighters. Accounts in the press, polemics, and popular culture allege that “Bandera was the Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture (Lund: Lund University only warror [lytsar] in Europe, who in 1941 said ‘no’ to Hitler.”352 In Svoboda party leader Press, 2006); Olena Radziwi"", “Viina za viinu: Druha svitova viina ta Velyka vitchyzniana viina u shkil’nykh pidruchnykakh z istorii Ukrainy (1969–2007),” paper presented at “World War II and the Oleh Tiahnybok’s interpretation of history, (Re)Creation of Historical Memory in Contemporary Ukraine, An International Conference,” Kyiv, Ukraine, September 24, 2009. our Heroes were shaped in bloody battle with the occupants when the so-called ‘civilized Europe’ ran away. Therefore, to judge Bandera is to spit in the face 2. On this topic, see Franziska Bruder’s pioneering study, “Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement. Anti-colonial to its nature, it sterben!”: Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN), 1928–1948 (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, was first and foremost anti-communist and anti-Nazi. [To condemn Bandera] 2007), 23. means spitting on the Ukrainians’ right to their own state.353 3. Armstrong writes that “the theory and the teachings of the nationalists were very close to fascism, We have thus come full circle. Over the years, crossing the Atlantic back and forth, and in some respects, such as the insistence on ‘racial purity,’ even went beyond the original fascist doctrines.” John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945 (New York: Columbia University the self-serving nationalist mythology has taken increasingly fantastic forms. Stets’ko’s Press, 1955), 279. “At least as a start, it seems preferable not to call the OUN’s ideology ‘fascism’ but openly pro-fascist, pro-Hitler, pro-German declaration has metamorphosed not only into to designate it ‘integral nationalism,’ in accordance with Carlton Hayes’ classification of the Action an anti-Nazi act, but into the first and and bravest challenge to Hitler in Europe. The OUN Française model.” John A. Armstrong, “Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist leaders’ anti-Semitism and open endorsement of the Holocaust are dismissed with reference Variant in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Modern History, 40, no. 3 (Sep. 1968): 400–401. to a handful of Jewish survivors within the ranks of UPA. As an ultimate irony, this narrative 4. Juan J. Linz, “Political Space and Fascism as Late-Comer: Conditions Conductive to the Success is appropriated by extreme nationalists who do not shy away from anti-Semitic historical or Failure of Fascism as a Mass Movement in Inter-War Europe,” in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt interpretations and open admiration for the Waffen-SS. Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust (eds.), Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980): 169, 187. 5. Grzegorz Rossoli#ski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941: Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 87, n. 12. Heorhii Kas’ianov rejects attempts at establishing an umbrella definition of the far right, arguing that applying terms such as fascism, Nazism, but also integral nationalism to the OUN is not productive, as these movements constitute different phenomena. Teoriia natsii ta natsionalizmu (Kyiv: Lebed’, 1999), 326. 6. Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 32; Oleksandr Panchenko, Mykola Lebed’: Zhyttia. Diyal’nist’. Derzhavno-pravovi pohliady (Lokhvytsia: Kobeliaky, 2001), 15; Anatol’ Kamins’kyi, Krai, emihratsiia i mizhnarodni zakulisy (Manchester: Vydannia Politychnoi Rady OUNz Nakladom Kraevoi PR OUNz u Velykobrytanii, 1982), 39–42. 38 39 7. Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 35. 18. Orshan, Doba Natsionalizmu, 5. 8. Roger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler 19. Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi’s Decalogue was a set of rules to police the political, social, and sexual (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 62. activities of nationalists. Rule 1 stated that a Ukrainian state should reach from the Carpatians to the Caucasus, number 2 that “all people are your brothers, but Muscovites, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians 9. There is a rich literature on the theory, definition, and charcterization of fascism. Here it would and Jews are the enemies of your people [moskali, liakhy, uhry, rumuny ta zhydy—se vorohy nashoho suffice to mention Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Pinter, 1991), 1–19, and Stanley narodu]. Rule 3 states “Ukraine for the Ukrainians!” Rule 10, which so appealed to Sukhovers’kyi and G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914–1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), other nationalist activists, reads: “Do not take a wife of alien stock, since your children will become 3–52, and idem, “The Concept of Fascism,” in Ugelvik Larsen, Hagtvet, and Myklebust, Who Were your enemies; do not find aquaintances among the enemies of our people, as that would give them the Fascists, 17. On the fascism of the OUN, see Rossoli#ski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National strength and courage; do not buy from our oppressors as that will make you a traitor.” This nationalist Revolution’ of 1941,” 85–90. decalogue is still on the Ukrainian Students’Association—University of Winnipeg (UWUSA) Facebook site: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=171502843414 (accessed March 3, 2011). 10. Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 51. The characterization of the OUN as fascist is also shared by Richard Breitman, Norman J. W. Goda, John-Paul Himka, David Marples, Grzegorz Rossoli#ski-Liebe, 20. Mykola Sukhovers’kyi, Moi spohady (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo “Smoloskyp,” 1997), 50. Sukhovers’kyi Timothy Snyder, and other historians. See Richard Breitman and Norman J. W. Goda, Hitler’s Shadow: (1913–2008), a native of Bukovyna, worked in Berlin as a liason between the OUN(m) and Nazi Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The National Archives, Germany during World War II and later settled in Canada. He was the honorary president of the 2010), 74, and, for instance Himka, Marples, Rossoli#ski-Liebe, and Snyder in Tarik Cyril Amar, Ivan Ukrainian War Veterans association in Edmonton and a leading figure in the OUN(m). He worked Balyns’kyi, and Yaroslav Hrytsak (eds.) Strasti za Banderoiu: statti ta essei (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2010). as a librarian at the University of Alberta where the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta still administers the Celestin and Irena Suchowersky Endowment Funds. Bohdan 11. Taras Kuzio, “OUN v Ukraine, Dmytro Dontsov i zakordonna chastyna OUN,” Suchasnist, vol. Klid and Myroslav Yurkevych, CIUS: 30 Years of Excellence/KIUS: 30 Rokiv Uspikhiv, 1976–2006 12 (1992): 34; Armstrong, “Collaborationism in World War II,” 402. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, 2006), 35. 12. Taras Kurylo, “’The Jewish Question’ in the Ukrainian Nationalist Discourse of the Interwar 21. “Orhanizatsiia Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv: Natsiia iak spetsies,” Holovnyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Period,” Polin, no. 26 (forthcoming). Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy (henceforth HDA SBU), f. 13, no. 376, tom 6, l. 1. Undated OUN brochure, no earlier than 1943. 13. Iaroslav Orshan, “Doba natsionalizmu,” V Avanhardi (Al’manakh) (Paris: n.p. 1938), 41. Availble online from the web forum Natsional’na Diia “RID,” http://rid.org.ua. Thanks to Taras Kurylo for 22. “Orhanizatsiia Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv: Rodyna v systemi orhanizavanoho ukrains’koho this reference. natsionalizmu,” HDA SBU, f. 13, tom 6, l. 6. 14. Yury Boshyk, ed., World War II in Ukraine: History and Its Aftermath (Edmonton: CIUS and 23. Ibid., f. 13, no. 376, tom 6, l. 7. University of Alberta, 1986), 172–173; “10 zapovidei Ukraintsia-Natsionalista (Dekal’oh),” Tsentral’nyi 24. “Orhanizatsiia Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv: Atomistychna teoriia pro natsiu,” HDA SBU, Fond derzhavnyi arkhiv hromas’kykh orhanizatsii Ukrainy, henceforth TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 23, d. 13, no. 376, tom 6, l. 4. 931, ark. 68. Thanks to John-Paul Himka for this reference. 25. Rozbudova Natsii, no. 11–12 (Nov.–Dec. 1930): 265–266, cited by Krzysztof &ada, “Teoria i 15. Mykola Posivnych, “Molodist’ Stepana Bandery,” in Mykola Posivnych (ed.), Zhyttia i diial’nist’ ludobójcza praktyka ukrai#skiego integralnego nacjonaliymu wobec Polaków, 'ydów i Rosjan w Stepana Bandery: Dokumenty i materialy (Ternopil’: Aston, 2008), 38. pierwszej po"owie XX wieku,” in Cz. Partacz, B. Polak, and W. Handke, eds., Wo!y" i Ma!opolska Wschodnia 1943–1944 (Koszalin-Leszno: Instytut im. gen. Stefana Gorta, 2004), 48. 16. Z Tvoei rodyny stvory kyvot chystoty Tvoei Rasy i Natsii, from 44 pravyla zhyttia ukrains’koho natsionalista. Sviatoslav Lypovets’kyi, OUN banderivtsi: frahmenty diial’nosti ta borot’by/The 26. “Z programu szkolenia bojówek OUN z 1935 r.,” Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Rivnenskoii Oblasti (DARO), Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Banderites): A Collage of Deeds and Struggles (Kiev: f. 32, op. 36, spr. 2, l. 22ff. Cited by Ewa Siemaszko, “Przemiany relacji polsko-ukrai#skich od po"owy Ukrains’ka Vydavnycha Spilka, 2010), 93–94. lat trzydziestych do II wojny (wiatowej,” Biuletyn instytutu pami#ci narodowej, no. 7–8 (116–117) (July–August 2010): 65, and reprinted in Wiktor Poliszczuk, Nacjonalizm ukrai"ski w dokumentach 17. Nationalist publishers translated Nazi racial theoretician Hans Günther’s 1920 racist tract Ritter, Tod (cz#$% 2): Integralny nacjonalizm ukrai"ski jako odmiana faszyzmu. Tom czwarty. Dokumenty z zakresu und Teufel as Hans F. K. [Ginter] Günter, Lytsar, Smert’ i chort’: Herois’ka mysl’. Vstup ta pereklad dzia!a" struktur nacjonaliymu ukrai"skiego w okresie od 1920 do grudnia 1943 roku (Toronto: Viktor iz IV. nimets’koho vydannia Rostyslava Iendyka [Introduction and translation from the IV German Poliszczuk, 2002), 49. edition by Rostyslav Iendyk] (L’viv: Vydavnytstvo “Prometei,” 1937). Orshan introduced the book, written “in 1920, at the time of all the misery that befell Germany after its loss in the World War, 27. On the OUN’s anti-Semitism, see Marco Carynnyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist democratic-liberal decay, pacifism, and the weakening of the national instinct, and the rise of Jewish Discussions about Jews, 1929–1947,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 39, No. 3, (May 2011): 315-352; supremacy [postupaiuchoi supermatii zhydivstva],” Orshan, Doba Natsionalizmu, 3–4. On Hans Bruder, “Den Ukrainischen Staat’,” 46–48, 99–101, 166–169; Kurylo, “Jewish Question”; Taras Kurylo F. K. Günther, see Alan E. Steinweis, Studying the Jew: Scholarly Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany and John-Paul Himka [Ivan Khymka], “Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv? Rozdumy nad knyzhkoiu (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 25–41, and Leo Kramár, Rasismens ideologer: Volodymyra V’’iatrovycha Stavlennia OUN do ievre&v: formuvannia pozyti& na tli katastrofy,” Ukra&na Från Gobeneau till Hitler (Stockholm: Norstedts Förlag, 2000), 207–227. Moderna 13 (2008): 252–265. 40 41 28. John-Paul Himka. “War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian 42. Iu. Mylianych, “Zhydy, sionizm i Ukra)na,” 271–276; Devius [D. Dontsov], “Voiuiuchyi sionizm,” Diaspora,” Spaces of Identity 5 (2005): 16–17. Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk, no.10 (1929): 915–918; S. Narizhnyi, “Chuzhi narody v svitli ukrain’skykh prykazok,” Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk, no. 10 (1929): 921–926; Martynets’, Zhydivs’ka problema. 29. O. Mytsiuk, “Ahraryzatsiia zhydivstva za dobu bol’shevyzmu,” Rozbudova Natsi&, no. 7–8 (1933): 180–190, and no. 9–10, 226–235; idem., “Pozaahrarna diial’nist’ zhydiv po svitovii viini,”Rozbudova 43. Philip Friedman, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation,” YIVO Annual of Natsi&, no. 11–12 (1933): 277–287, cited in Kurylo, “The Jewish Question.” Jewish Social Science, 12 (1958–1959): 184; John-Paul Himka, “Krakivski visti and the Jews, 1943: A Contribution to the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Second World War,” Journal 30. Ryszard Wysocki, Organizacja Ukrai"skich Nacjonalistów w Polsce w latach 1929–1939: geneza, of Ukrainian Studies 21, (Summer–Winter 1996): 81–95. struktura, program, ideologia (Lublin: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej, 2003), 201. 44. File of Mikhail Dmitrievich Stepaniak, HDA SBU f. 6, d. 1510, tom 1, l. 65. 31. Kurylo, “Jewish Question,” 6, citing Iu. Mylianych, “Zhydy, sionizm i Ukraina,” Rozbudova Natsii, no. 8–9 (1929): 271. 45. Ivan Katchanovski, “Terrorists or National Heroes” Nationalities Papers (forthcoming), citing The Henry Field Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, box 52, folder “1964,” 32. Volodymyr Martynets’, Zhydivs’ka problema v Ukra&ni (London: Williams, Lea & Co., 1938), and Pavel Sudoplatov, Spetsoperatsii: Lubianka i Kreml’ 1930–1950 gody (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 10, 14–15. 1998/2003), 26; Yelena Novoselova, “Stepan Bandera: As Seen by Russian and Ukrainian Researchers,” Den’, April 29, 2010: http://day.kiev.ua/296328/ (accessed April 30, 2010). 33. Ibid., 22. 46. DARO, Delo Stepana Ianishevskogo, microfilm no. 124148, cited by Viktor Polishchuk, “Gora 34. Kurylo, “Jewish Question,” citing R. O., “Obludnyky humanitaryzmu,” Visnyk no. 1 (1939). No rodila mysh’. Banderovskuio,” in Vladimir Vorontsov, ed., “OUN-UPA. S kem i protiv koho oni page number provided. voevali”: istoriko-dokumental’nye ocherki (Sevastopol: Mezhregional’naia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia “Ob’edinenie patriotov Sevastopol’ia,” 2011), 74; and Lucyna Kuli#ska, “Dzia"no(! 35. Kurylo, “Jewish Question,” citing M. O. [M. Ostoverkha], “Antysemityzm v Italii,” Visnyk, no. terrorystyczna ukrai#skich organizacji nacjonalistycznych w Polsce w okresie mi$dzywojennym,” 1 (1938): 712–714. Biuletyn instytut pami#ci narodowej, no. 7–8 (116–117) (July–August 2010): 57, n. 40. 36. Kurylo, “Jewish Question.” 47. File of Mikhail Dmitrievich Stepaniak, HDA SBU, f. 6, d. 1510, tom 1, l. 67. 37. Bruder, “Den ukrainischen,” 147. Several pogroms took place in Ukraine in between 1918 and 48. Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The State That Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 1920, during which some one hundred fifty thousand Jews were killed, an estimated 53.7 percent by Press, 2009), 112. Petluira’s nationalist forces, 17 percent by Denikin’s White Army, and 2.3 percent by the Bolshevik Red Army. Manus I. Midlarsky, The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 49. Yeshayahu Jelinek, The Parish Republic: Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, 1939–1945, East Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45. European Monographs 14 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 48. The anti-Semitic Slovak constitution, “Ústavný zákon zo d*a 21. Júla 1939 o ústave Slovenskej republiky,” is available online, 38. Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its on the website of the Slovak Nation’s Memory Institute: http://www.upn.gov.sk/data/pdf/ustava1939. Attitude towards Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets’ko’s 1941 Zhyttiepys,” Harvard Ukrainian pdf (accessed Dec. 30, 2008). Thanks to Nina Paulovicova for these references. Studies 23, no.3–4 (1999): 149–184; Kurylo and Himka “Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv?” 252–265; John-Paul Himka, “A Central European Diaspora under the Shadow of World War II: The Galician 50. In Croatia, German support for Slovak statehood strengthened the pro-German wing of the Ustaše Ukrainians in North America,” Austrian History Yearbook 37 (2006): 22; Kurylo, “Jewish Question”; movement and significantly increased its production of anti-Semitic propaganda material. On the H. V. Kasianov, “Ideolohiia OUN: istoryko-retrospektyvnyi analiz,” Ukrains’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, racialist ideology of the Ustaše movement, see Tomislav Duli!, Utopias of Nation: Local Mass Killing no. 2 (2004): 38–39. in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941–1942 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsalensis, 2005). 39. Karel Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, 51. Heimann, Czechoslovakia,106–108; Serhii Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Nation (Oxford: Oxford Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 83. University Press, 2007), 131. 40. Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi et al., eds., OUN v 1941 rotsi. Dokumenty. V 2-kh ch. Ch. 1. (Kiev: Instytut 52. Mel’nyk assured von Ribbentrop that the OUN was “ideologically related to similar movements in Istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, 2006), 43, citing OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii Europe, in particular National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy [weltanschaulich verwandt ta inshykh dokumnetiv z borot’bi 1929–1955 r. [Zakordonni chastyny Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh mit den gleichartigen Bewegungen Europas, insbesondere dem Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland Natsionalistiv] (1955), 24–47. und dem Fascismus in Italien].” Auswärtiges Amt Archive, PA AA, R 104430, Po. 26, No. 1m Pol. V. 4784, p. 2. Thanks to Ray Brandon for this reference. 41. Kul’chyts’kyi, OUN v 1941 rotsi (2006), 159, 165, citing “Propahadnyvni vkazivky na peredvoennyi chas, na chas viiny i revoliutsii ta na pochatkovi dni derzhanvoho budivnytstva z Instruktsii 53. The Ustaša “resurrection” of Croat statehood appears to have served as a model for the OUN. The Revolutsiinoho Provodu OUN (S. Bandery) dlia orhanizatsiinoho aktyvu v Ukraini na period viiny proclamation was not delievered by Paveli! himself, but his deputy, (Doglavnik) Slavko Kvaternik. “Borot’ba i diialnist’ OUN pid chas viiny,” Tsentral’nyi Arkhiv Orhaniv Vlady Ukrainy (henceforth “People of Croatia! The providence of God, the will of our allies, the century-old struggle of the Croatian TsDAVO Ukrainy), f. 3833, op. 2, spr. 1, ark. 77–89. 42 43 people, our self-sacrificing Leader [Poglavnik] Ante Paveli! and the Ustaša movement within and Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European outside the country has decided that we today, on the eve of the resurrection of the son of God also Studies 1505 (Pittsburgh: University Center for Russian and East European Studies, 2001), 68. will witness the resurrection of our Croatian state.” Kvaternik referred to “the will of our allies,” but without explicitly mentioning Hitler. Later that day, Kvaternik sent a telegram to Hitler, to thank him 63. Kul’chyts’kyi, OUN v 1941 rotsi (2006), 12 and 61, citing “Borot’ba i diial’nist’ OUN pid chas “in the name of the Croatian people for the protection the German army has given the Croat national viiny: Politychni vkazivky (traven’ 1941 r.),” in OUN v svitlui povstanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii rebellion and [to] request your recognition of the Independent State of Croatia by the Greater German ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot’bi 1929–1955 r. [Zakordonni chastyny Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh Reich. Long live the Führer of the German people!” Zlo'ini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 1941–1945 Natsionalistiv] (1955), 48–57. (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1993), document 3 (the declaration) and 4 (the telegram). Thanks to Tomislav Duli! for this reference. 64. Tomasz Szarota, U progu Zag!ady: Zaj$cia anty(ydowskie i pogromy w okupowanej Europie: Warszawa, Pary(, Antwerpia, Kowno (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo “Sic!” 2000), 210–214, and Peter 54. R. J. B. Bosworth, The Oxford Handbook of Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 431. Longereich with Dieter Pohl, ed., Die Ermordung der europäischen Juden: Eine umfassende Dokumentation des Holocaust 1941–1945 (Munich: Piper, 1989), 118–119. An analogous development 55. “Natsionalistychnyi rukh pid chas Druhoi Svitovoi Viiny: Interv’iu z B. Levyts’kym,” Diialoh: also took part among profascist émigré groups in Germany. On March 19, 1941, they urged the Jews Za demokraiiu i sotsializm v samostiinii Ukraini, Vol. 2 (1979): 15. to leave Lithuania, so that “there would not be any unneccessary victims.” In Berlin on May 10, 1941, the so-called Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF) presented its völkisch ideological program, which 56. Kul’chyts’kyi, OUN v 1941 rotsi (2006), 10. Similar attitudes were found in the OUN(b). In accused the Jews collectively of having destroyed Lithuania and emphasized that “communism is 1942, an OUN activist elaborated further on the size and scope of the Ukrainian state: “It will cover directly rooted in Judaism.” Klaus-Peter Friedrich, “Spontane Volkspogrome oder Auswüchse der NS- the lands from the Volga to the Carpathians, from the mountains of the Caucasus and the Black Sea Vernichtungspolitik?: Zur Kontroverse um die Radikalisierung der antijüdischen Gewalt im Sommer to the sources of the Dnieper, a territory of one million square kilometers. This will be a deciding 1941,” Jewish History Quarterly (Kwartalnik Historii )ydów), no. 4 (2004): 591. factor for the solution of the eastern problems in regards to Russia and the Baltic States, Poland, the Caucasus, the Black Sea states, and also the path to Africa and India through the Bosporus and the 65. TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 12, l. 10, Telegram Iaroslav Stest’ko no. 13, 25.6.1941. Dardanelles . . . Ukraine for the Ukrainians! This will be a Great United National State.” Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Rivenskoi oblasti, inv. nomer 326, cited in Vorontsov,“OUN-UPA,”10. 66. “Instruktsii Revolutsiinoho Provodu OUN(B) dlia orhanizatsiinoho aktyvu v Ukraini na period viiny. “Borot’ba i diial’nist’ OUN pid chas viiny” V. Viis’kovi instruktsii,” TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, 57. In 1938–1939, senior OUN functionary Colonel Roman Sushko toured Canada. According to the op. 2, spr. 1, ark. 25–33. RCMP, Sushko “had adopted many of Hitler’s mannerisms when delivering speeches.” Sushko boasted that “the nationalist movement is so powerful that we will soon see the emergence of a Great Ukrainian 67. Ivan Patryliak, “Viiskovi plany OUN(B) u taemnii instruktsii Revoliutsiinoho provodu (traven’ 1941 State from the Caspian Sea to the Tatra Mountains.” Orest T. Martynowych, “Sympathy for the Devil: r.) “Borot’ba i diial’nist’ OUN pid chas viiny,” Ukrains’kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal’, no. 2 (2000): 136. The Attitude of Ukrainian War Veterans in Canada to Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1933–1939,” in Rhonda L. Hinter and Jim Mochoruk, eds., Re-imagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, 68. “Instruktsii Revoloiutsiinoho Provodu OUN(B) dlia orhanizatsiinoho aktyvu v Ukraini na period and Identity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 186. After the 1940 split, Sushko sided viiny. “Borot’ba i diialnist’ OUN pid chas viiny” H. Vkazivky na pershi dni orhanizatsii derzhavnoho with the OUN(m). He was murdered in 1944, a murder his family attributes to the OUN(b). Myron zhyttia,” TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 2, spr. 1, ark. 33–57. B. Kuropas, “Who shot Col. Sushko?” The Ukrainian Weekly, March 1, 2009, 7. 69. Berndt Boll, “Z"oczów, July 1941: The Wehrmacht and the Beginning of the Holocaust in Galicia: 58. See for instance Aristotle Kallis, Genocide and Fascism: The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist From a Criticism of Photographs to a Revision of the Past,” in Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann, and Europe (New York: Routledge, 2009), and Marius Turda, The Idea of Natonal Superiority in Central Mary Nolan, eds., Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century (New York: The New Europe, 1880–1918 (New York: Edwin Miller, 2005). Press, 2002), 73. 59. Mykola Stsibors’kyi, Natsiokratsiia (n.p.: Ukr. vyd-vo “Proboiem,” 1942). For a discussion of 70. Hannes Heer, “Einübung in den Holocaust: Lemberg Juni/juli 1941” Zeitschrift für natsiokratsiia, see Roman Dubasevych, “Ukraina abo smert’,” in Amar, Balyns’kyi, and Hrytsak, Geschichtswissenschaft Vol. 49, 5 (2001): 409–417; Israel Gutman, “Nachtigall Battalion,” Strasti za Banderoiu, 17–36. Encyclopedia of the Holocaust (New York: Macmillan, 1990). 60. Rossoli#ski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution,’” 87. 71. “Ukrains’kyi narode!” OUN(b) flyer, July 1, 1941, TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 42, l. 35. See also Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944: Organization 61. For Romania, see Vladimir Solonari, Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens, 2d ed. (Munich: Verlag Oldenburg, 1997), 57. Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania (Washington D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). On Slovak minority policies, see Heimann, Czechoslovakia, 112; on Croatia, see Duli!, Utopias of Nation. 72. Kul’chyts’kyi, OUN v 1941 rotsi (2006), 11; Himka, “Central European Diaspora,”19. 62. Roman Shukhevych, leader of both the OUN(b) and the UPA, served in various Nazi German units 73. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 150. from 1938 until 1943. He received training at the German Military Academy in Munich in 1938, in 1939–1940 he was joined by 120 other Ukrainian nationalists at a Gestapo training camp in Zakopane. 74. Volodymyr Serhiichuk, ed., OUN-UPA v roky viiny: novi dokumenty i materialy (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 289, 298; Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 74, 91; Jeffrey Burds, The khudozhnoi literatury “Dnipro,” 1996), 239. 44 45 75. Rossoli#ski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941,” 99, citing TsDAVO Ukrainy, 86. The leader of the original UPA, Taras Bul’ba-Borovets, wrote that “the supporter of pathological f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 22, ll. 1–27. Führerprinzip (vozhdyzm), the banderite Kuzii, killed the two senior officers of the Ukrainian army, Colonel Mykola Stsibors’kyi and Captain Senyk-Hrybivs’kyi, who were leaders of the Provid of 76. Gabriel N. Finder and Alexaner V. Prusin, “Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police the OUN[(m)] and were travelling to Kyiv, by shooting them in the back on an open street.” Taras and the Holocaust,” East European Jewish Affairs, 34, no. 2 (2004): 102; Berkhoff and Carynnyk, Bul’ba-Borovets’, Armiia bez derzhavy: Slava i trahediia ukrains’koho povstans’koho rukhu. Spohady. “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 171. (Kyiv: Knyha Rodu, 2008), 154. The OUN(m) immediately accused the OUN(b) of the murders, which carried all the hallmarks of Banderite assasinations. TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 42, 77. Rossoli#ski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941,” 100. Similar attitudes were l. 33, “Podae do vidoma!” claims the two OUN(m) leaders “fell by the hand of fratricidal murder”; found within the OUN(m). Its organ Selians’ka dolia described the Jews as enemies, who “had to TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 42, l. 42, “Dvi klespsydry,” accused the OUN(b) of the murder, leave the land or die on it. The Muscovite, the Pole, and the Jew were, are, and will always be your claiming that Stsibors’kyi and Senyk were killed by “fratricidal bullets.” German documents show enemies.” Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik that there was no German involvement in these murders. Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 242–243, citing TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 57, op. 4, d. 369, l. 63. 87. Grzegorz Rossoli#ski-Liebe, “Celebrating Fascism and War Criminality in Edmonton: The Political Myth and Cult of Stepan Bandera in Multicultural Canada,” Kakanien Revisited, December 29, 2010, 3: 78. Heer, “Blutige Ouvertüre”; Kai Struve, “Layers of Violence: Mass Executions and Pogroms against http://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/GRossolinski-Liebe2.pdf (accessed January 9, 2011), citing Jews in Eastern Galicia in Summer 1941,” paper presented at the Fifth Annual Danyliw Research Federal’naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, Moscow, N-19092/T. 100 l. 233 (Stepan Bandera’s prison card). Seminar on Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, October 30, 2009. 88. Marples, Heroes and Villains, 129. 79. John-Paul Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941,” paper presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities, the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 16 April 2011. 89. “Olevsk,” entry by Jared McBride and Alexander Kruglov, Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettoes, 1933–1945, vol. 2, German-Run Ghettos, ed. Martin Dean (Bloomington: Indidana University Press 80. Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 146, citing Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung, 60 in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, forthcoming); Jared McBride, ff.; Text des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr vom Juli, 1941, IfZ, Fd 47, Bl. 47, Bl. 41; Ic/AO vom 2.7.1941, “Ukrainian Neighbors: The Holocaust in Olevs’k,” unpublished working paper. BArch-MA, RH 20-17/277, Bl. 91, 126 and 137. 90. Bul’ba-Borovets’, Armiia bez derzhavy, 247. 81. On the pogroms, see Marco Carynnyk, Furious Angels: Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles in the Summer of 1941 (forthcoming); on the pogroms in Dubne, see idem, “The Palace on the Ikva: Dubne, 91. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 74; Marples, Heroes and Villains, 129–130, 309; Bul’ba- September 18th, 1939 and June 24th, 1941,” in Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth A. Cole, Kai Struve, eds., Borovets’, Armiia bez derzhavy, 250–267; Report from Soviet agent “Iaroslav” to the deputy director Shared History—Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939–1941 (Leipzig: of the third department of the GUKR NKO “Smersh,” Nov. 23, 1944, HDA SBU, f. 13, sbornik Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007; Band V of Leipziger Beiträge zur Jüdischen Geschichte und no. 372, tom 5, l. 25, reports that “the local leadership of OUN North has partly begun a struggle Kultur), 263–301; on Zolochiv, see idem, “Zolochiv movchyt,” Krytyka, no. 10 (2005): 14–17, on to totally liquidate the “Bul’ba” party and to cleanse a large part of Volhynia from Red Partisans”; Lviv, see Himka, “Lviv Pogrom”; on Ivano-Frankivs’k, see Abraham Liebesman, During the Russian “Orientovka o deiatel’nosti ukrainsko-nemetskikh nationalistiov v zapadnnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi Administration: With the Jews of Stanis!awow During the Holocaust (Atlanta: n.p. 1990), 2–6; Joachim SSR za period 1941–1944 g.g.: Sostavlena po materialam NKVD USSR,” report from the Ukrainian Nachbar, Endure, Defy, and Remember: Memoirs of a Holocaust Survivior (Southfield, Mich.: J. SSR commissar Riasnoi of State Security, Kyiv, March 1944, HDA SBU f. 13, sbornik 372, tom 5, Nachbar, c2003), 7–9; on Drohobych, see Bernard Mayer, Entombed: My True Story: How Forty- 199. This author uses the commonly used term OUN-UPA to describe the organization following its Five Jews Lived Underground and Survived the Holocaust (Ojus, Fla.: Aleric Press, c1994), 7–16; violent takeover by the banderivtsy, and to distinguish the post-1942 UPA from the organization led on Borys"aw, Sabina Wolanski with Diana Bagnall, Destined to Live: One Woman’s War, Life, Loves by Bul’ba-Borovets’, which had a quite different orientation and ideology. The OUN(b) perceived Remembered (London: Fourth Estate, 2008), 31–35; on Kuty, see Abraham Klein, My Life in Kuty: A the UPA as its armed wing; its leadership was staffed with ranking OUN(b) cadres. From May 1943 shtetl destroyed (Montreal: A. Klein, 2003), 126–128. Thanks to John-Paul Himka for these references. Shukhevych was the leader of both the OUN(b) and the UPA, and even the UPA’s own fliers used the term “OUN-UPA.” While the OUN(b)-led UPA from July 1944 was formally subordinated to the so- 82. Dieter Pohl, “Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Western Ukraine: A Research Agenda,” in Barkan, Cole, called Ukrainian Main Liberation Council, UVHR, this organization was staffed by the leaders of the and Struve, eds. Shared History—Divided Memory, 305–315. OUN(b): Shukhevych was responsible for military matters, Lebed’ for foreign affairs in the General Secretariat. Bruder, “Den Ukrainischen Staat,” 189, 194, 202. Bul’ba-Borovets’ dismissed the idea that 83. Viktor Khar’kiv “Khmara,” a member of both Nachtigall and then Schutzmannschaft battalion the UVHR would be anything but the OUN(b) leadership under a different name as a “falsification”: 201, wrote in his diary that he participated in the shooting of Jews in two villages in the vicinity of “UVHR was the same and only OUN Lebed’-Bandera. Its ‘Council’[Rada] was declared to be a new Vinnytsia. TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 57, ark. 17–18. form of that same group of people, Lebed’, Stets’ko, Father Hryn’okh, Roman Shukhevych, Stakhiv, Lenkavs’kyi, Vretsiun, Okhrymovych, Rebet, and others.” Bul’ba-Borovets’, Armiia bez derzhavy, 84. Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 147. 291. Shukhevych himself emphasized the institutional continuity of the OUN(b) and UPA: “The new revolutionary organizations UVO and OUN were born out of the traditions of insurgent struggle, 85. Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies, 2d ed. which they maintained through the entire, difficult 25-year period of occupation in order to in 1943 (Boulder, Colo.: 1981), passim. again put into action a massive insurgency—now under the name of UPA.” T. Chuprynka [Roman Shukhevych], “Zvernennia Holovnoho komamdyra UPA R. Shukhevycha do voiakiv UPA, July 1946,” 46 47 cited in Volodymyr Serhiichuk et al. eds., Roman Shukhevych u dokumentakh raiians\kykh orhaniv 104. W"adis"aw Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko, eds. Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów derzhavnoi bezpeky, 1940–1950, (Kyiv: PP Serhiichuk M. I., 2007), 2: 52. ukrai"skich na ludno$ci polskiej Wo!ynia 1939–1945, 2 vols., (Warsaw: Wydawn. von Borowiecky 2000),1:872; see also 2:1269. Other UPA songs had a similar content: 92. See, for instance Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–1944 (New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with the United States Holocaust Museum, 2000). See also Timothy Snyder, “To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Zdobywaj, zdobywajmy s!aw#! Let us achive our glory! Once and For All: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947,” Journal of Cold War Wykosimy wszystkich Lachów po We’ll cut down all Poles [Liakhy] all the Studies, no. 2 (1999): 97. Warszaw# . . . way to Warsaw . . . 93. “[An] analysis of 118 biographies of OUN(b) and UPA leaders in Ukraine during World War II Ukrai"ski narodzie. . . . Ukrainian nation. . . . shows that at least 46% of them served in the regional and local police and administration, the Nachtigall Zdobywaj, zdobywajmy si!#! Gather strength! and Roland Battalions, the SS Galicia Division, or studied in German-sponsored military schools, primarily, in the beginning of World War II. At least 23% of the OUN(B) and UPA leaders in Ukraine Zar(niemy wszystkich Lachów do mogi!y . . . We’ll butcher the Poles into their graves . . . were in the auxiliary police, Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, and other police formations, 18% in military and intelligence schools in Germany and Nazi-occupied Poland, 11% in the Nachtigall and Ukrai"ski narodzie. . . . Ukrainian nation. . . . Roland Battalions, 8% in the regional and local administration in Ukraine during the Nazi occupation, Gdzie San, gdzie Karpaty, From the river San, to the Carpatians, and 1% in the SS Galicia Division.” Katchanovski, “Terrorists or National Heroes,” calculated from Petro Sodol, Ukrains’ka povstancha armiia, 1943–1949: Dovidnyk, (New York: Proloh, 1994). gdzie Krym, gdzie Kauka— From the Crimea to the Caucasus— Ukraina—Ukrai"com, Ukraine for the Ukrainians, 94. Report No. 4-8-2034, by Pavel Sudoplatov, the leader of the third department of the fourth UPR of the NKGB of the USSR, to Kobulov, Deputy People’s Commissar of the NKGB of the USSR, a wszystkim przyb!#dom—precz! All aliens must go! March 16, 1944 HDA SBU, f. 13, sbornik no. 372, tom. 5, l. 209. After (the Polish translation) in ibid., 2: 1294. 95. Reichsführer-SS, Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Chef der Bandenkampfverbände Ic.-We./Mu. Tgb. Nr. 67/44 a. H. Qu. 4 Januar 1944 lc.-Bericht über die Bandenlage ost für die Zeit von 16.12–31.12 Grzegorz Motyka, cites the following OUN march: “Death, death, death to the Poles/Death to the 1943, Natsional’nyi Arkhiv Respubliki Belarus’ (NARB), f. 685, vop. 1, sp. 1, t. 1, l. 8. Moscow-Jewish commune/The OUN leads us into bloody battle . . . Each tormentor will face the same fate/ One gallow for Poles [Liakh] and dogs.” Grzegorz Motyka, Ukrai"ska partyzantka 1942- 96. Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 1960: dzia!alno$% Organizacji Ukrai"skich Nacjonalistów i Ukrai"skiej Powsta"czej Armii (Warsaw: (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), 162. Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN; RYTM, 2006), 54. 97. Friedman, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations,” 182. 105. Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 146. 98. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 291. 106. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 292. 99. Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 165. 107. Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 169. 100. Mykhail Dmytrievich Stepeniak file, HDA SBU, f. 6, d. 1510, tom. 1, ll. 29, 39. 108. Moshe Maltz, Years of Horrors—Glimpse of Hope: The Diary of a Family in Hiding (New York: Shengold, 1993), 147, entry for November 1944. 101. Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 166, citing Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 126 of October 27, 1941, Meldung der Kommandeurs der Sipo und des SD in Lemberg, BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 109. Ibid., diary entry for November 1943, 107. 58/218, Bl. 323. 110. Carynnyk, “Foes of our Rebirth”; Per A. Rudling, “Theory and Practice: Historical Representation 102. A UPA “pogrom” could look like this: “Before our military action we were given orders to kill of the Activities of the OUN-UPA,” East European Jewish Affairs, 36, no. 2 (2006): 163–189. and rob all Poles and Jews on the territory of the Dederkal’s’kyi r[aio]n. I personally took part in the pogrom of Poles and Jews in the Dederlal’kyi raion in the village Kotliarovka May 10–15, 1943. 111. John-Paul Himka, “The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust,” paper prepared for the There we burnt 10 Polish farmsteads, killed about 10 people, and the rest escaped.” “Protokol doprosa forty-first national convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Vozniuka Fedora Iradionovicha, 23 maia 1944,” HDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 1020, ark. 221–229. Thanks Boston, November 12–15, 2009, 8. to Jared McBride for this reference. 112. “With the Poles gone and the Soviets approaching, UPA made a decsion to find the remaining 103. Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 100, citing Kommunikat Nr. 7, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Jewish survivors and liquidate them. As the Germans had taught them, they made assurances to Ambasada RP w Berlinie 3677, Bl. 262. Jews that they would not harm them anymore, they put them to useful work in camp-like settings, and then they exterminated them. . . . These murders took place at the same time OUN was trying to make overtures to the Western Allies (as were the East European collaborationist regimes.) . . . What 48 49 is absolutely clear, however, is that a major attempt was launched at this time to eliminate Jewish 126. Spector, Holocaust, 279; Mykhailo V. Koval’, Ukraina v druhii svitovyi i velykyi vitchyznianyi survivors completely.” Ibid., 27. viinakh, 1939–1945 rr., (Kyiv: Dim Al’ternatyvy, 1999), 154. 113. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 264, citing interrogation of Vladimir Solov’ev, TsDAHO Ukrainy, 127. Interrogation of activist Mykhail Dmitrievich Stepaniak, HDA SBU, f. 6, d. 1510, tom 1, l. 54. f. 57, op. 4, d. 351, l. 52. On UPA murder of Jews, see Shmuel Spector, The Holocaust of Volhynian When working with Soviet interrogations, it is critical to keep in mind that the Soviets had special Jews, 1941–1944 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem and the Federation of Volhynian Jews, 1990), 268–273. interests in demonstrating the OUN-UPA’s German connections. Yet, they confirm a picture, borne out of other evidence, that Nazi Germany was but a secondary enemy of the OUN and UPA. 114. Threatened Poles sought help from the Germans, and in some cases, replaced local Ukrainians as police units. The UPA’s own records from spring 1944 show how the murder of Poles continued, 128. Ibid., ll. 71–72. now on the charges that the Poles collaborated with the Gestapo. One UPA document, for the period March 13–April 15, 1944, reports 298 Poles in 19 villages were killed, many farmsteads burnt down, 129. Ibid., l. 61. but a fraction of the OUN-UPA murders at the time. “Zvit s protypol’stkykh aktiv,” Postii, I. V. 44, TsDAVO, f. 4620, op. 3, spr. 378, ll. 43–44. On the OUN(b)-led UPA murder of Jews in Galicia 130. Report from Soviet agent “Iaroslav” to the deputy director of the third department of the USSR during this period, see Himka, “The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust,” 12–17. People’s Commissariat of Defense Chief Counterintelligence Directorate “SMERSH” (Glavnoe upravlenie kontrrazvedki SMERSh GUKR-NKO, “Smersh,”) Nov. 23, 1944, HDA SBU, f. 13, 115. Motyka, Ukrai"ska partyzantka, 295–297. sbornik 372, tom 5, l. 25. 116. Himka, “The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust,” 28. 131. Ivan Katchanovski, “Terrorists or National Heroes?” See also Stepeniak file, HDA SBU, f. 6, d. 1510, tom 1, ll. 42, 54. 117. According to the most extensive study of the OUN-UPA’s anti-Polish campaign, the number of Polish victims reach 130,800 when including the victims whose names could not be established. Ewa 132. Special resolution passed by the Third Congress of the OUN(b) in February 1943, TsDAVO, Siemaszko, “Bilans Zbrodni,” Biuletyn instytutu pami#ci narodowej, no. 7–8 (116–117) (July–August f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 102, ark. 1–4. Thanks to Marco Carynnyk for this reference. See also Motyka, 2010): 93. Ukrai"ska partyzantka, 117, n. 47. 118. Motyka, Ukrai"ska partyzantka, 346–347. Mixed families were quite common in the Polish- 133. The Second Congress of the OUN(b) issued detailed instructions that the fascist salue should Ukrainian borderlands, where the custom was that boys inherited nationality after their father, girls be executed by raising the right arm “slightly to the right, slightly above the peak of the head,” while after their mothers. Kresy literature contains many testimonies of murders within mixed families. Ewa exclaiming “Glory to Ukraine!” (Slava Ukraini!), to which fellow members responded “Glory to the and Wlodys"aw Siemaszko have registred forty-five victims of intrafamily killings in Volhynia alone. Heroes!” (Heroiam Slava!). This section was omitted from the republished resolutions of the Second Most of the victims are known by surname. Siemaszko and Siemaszko, Ludobójstwo, 2: 1059, table 13. Congress. Compare, for instance, OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv (n.p.: Zakordonni Chastyny Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh Nationalistiv, 1955), 44–45, with the original 1941 publication, TsDAHO, 119. Andrii Bolianovs’kyi, “Ivan Hryn’okh—Providnyyi diach ukrains’koho pidpillia,” in Ivan f. 1, op. 23, spr. 926, l. 199 (Postanovy II. Velykoho Zboru Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh Nationalistiv, Hryn’okh, Boh i Ukraina ponad use, ed. and introduction by Oleksandr Panchenko (Hadiach: 37), cited in Rossoli#ski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941,” 90. Vydavnytstvo “Hadiach,” 2007), 64–65. 134. Per A. Rudling, “Szkolenie w mordowaniu: Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 i Hauptmann Roman 120. TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 4628, op. 1, d. 10, ll. 170–179, in Vorontsov, “OUN-UPA,” 229. Szuchewycz na Bia"orusi 1942 roku,” in Bogus"aw Pa+ (ed.), Prawda historyczna a prawda polityczna w badaniach naukowych: Przyk!ad ludobójstwa na kresach po!udiowej-wschodniej Polski w latach 121. Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 376; Frank Golczewski, “Shades of 1939–1946, (Wroc"aw: Wydawnictwo uniwersytetu Wroc"awskiego, 2011), 183–204. Grey: Reflections on Jewish-Ukrainian and German-Ukranian Relations in Galicia,” in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, eds., The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization (Bloomington: 135. Bul’ba-Borovets, Armiia bez derzhavy, 254, citing “Vidkrytyi list da Chleniuv Provodu Indiana University Press, 2008), 143. Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv Stepana Bandery,” Oborona Ukrainy: Chasopys’Ukrains’koi Narodn’oi Revolutsiinoi Armii, Osoblyve vydannia ch. 1, August 10, 1943. 122. Bruder, “Den Ukrainischen Staat,” 57; Friedman, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, ” 195; Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 150; Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s 136. John-Paul Himka, Ukrainians, Jews and the Holocaust: Divergent Memories (Saskatoon: Shadow, 74, 76. Heritage Press, University of Saskatchewan, 2009), 46; Kurylo and Khymka, “Iak OUN stavylosia do ievreiv?” 260. 123. Himka, “The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust,” 28. 137. Carynnyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth,” citing “Nakaz Ch. 2/43, Oblasnym, okruzhnym i povitovym 124. Friedman, “Ukrainian-Jewish relations,”189. providnykam do vykonannia,” TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 43, l. 9. 125. Spector, Holocaust, 271; Weiner, Making Sense of War, 263; Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations 138. Himka, Ukrainians, Jews, and the Holocaust, 46–47. 170; Dmytro Rybakov, “Marko Tsarynnyk: Istorychna napivpravda hirsha za odvertu brekhniu,” Levyi bereh, November 5, 2009. http://lb.com.ua/article/society/2009/11/05/13147_marko_tsarinnik_ 139. Document scan available on the website of the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada, http://www. istorichna.html (accessed November 6, 2009). ukremb.ca/canada/ua/news/detail/11684.htm (accessed January 18, 2011). 50 51 140. Volodymyr V’’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN do ievreiv: formuvannia pozytsii na tli katastrofy Druhii svitovii viini (Lviv: Naukove t-vo imeni T. Shevchenka u L’vovi, 1993), 325. “We Ukrainians (L’viv: Vydavnytstvo “MS”, 2006), 73. are proud of the fact that . . . the Chief of Staff of the German S.A. Lutze, [was] killed in course of military operations by the UPA, under the command of General Taras Chuprynka, the former Ukrainian 141. Kosyk adds Armenians, Lithuanians, Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, and Belgians. commander of the “Nightingale Battalion.” Jaroslaw Stetzko, “The Truth About Events in Lviv, West Kosyk, The Third Reich, 373–374. Some of these non-Ukrainian UPA participants appear to have Ukraine, in June and July, 1941: An Open Letter to the “Rheinische Merkur,” Cologne,” The Ukrainian been former Soviet POWs who had served as Schutzmänner but defected after Stalingrad, and other Review 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1963): 70. collaborators. U.S. intelligence also mentioned former members of the Slovak Hlinka Guard, former soldiers of the Ukrainian Waffen-SS division Galizien, but also “escaped German SS men.” Breitman 154. R. Hryts’kiv, “Protypovstans’ka borot’ba,” in Volodymyr V’’iatrovych et al., UPA: Istoriia and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 79, citing Preliminary Reports I and Informant Report 35520 [undated], neskorennykh (Lviv: TsDVR, 2007), 281. National Archives and Records Administration, (henceforth NARA), RG 319, IRR TS “Banderist Activity Czechoslovakia,” v. 1, D. 190425. 155. Burds, The Early Cold War, 13, citing a secret report from CIC Special Agent Vadja V. Kolombatovic to the Commanding Officer, CIC Region III, May 6, 1947, United States Army 142. “Through resurrection and sabotage we finally broke the strengths of the Muscovite-Jewish Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Dossier ZF010016WJ, 1906–9. [moskovs’ko-zhydovskyi] occupant. When the war finally broke out our partisan activities included his physical extermination and and our rise under the leadership of our leader Stepan BANDERA.” 156. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 77, 79, citing Special Agent Fred A. Stelling, Memorandum Leaflet distributed in June 1942 on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Act of June 30, 1941. for the Officer in Charge, August 1, 1947, TS Organization of Banderist Movement, NARA, RG 319, HDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, ch. 35, l. 200. On 1947, see f. 13, op. 376, tom 4, l. 363. On 1948, see f. IRR Bandera, Stephan, D. 184850. The 1950 so-called Kelley Report, written by Robert F. Kelley for 13, op. 376, tom 65, l. 243. the United States Army, similarly estimated that perhaps 75–80 percent of the Galician DPs sympathized with the OUN(b). Robert F. Kelley, “Survey of Russian Emigration,” 92–93, 106–07, 111, 116, in 143. “To the brotherly Czech and Slovak nations,” in Petro J. Potichnyj, ed., English Langauge Lebed archives, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, box 1, file 12. This document was declassified Publications of the Ukrainian Underground, Litopys UPA, 17 (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1988), 158. on 30 October 1992. Thanks to John-Paul Himka for this reference. 144. For instance, an underground OUN(b) journal from 1946 describes the History of the VKP(b) 157. Evhen Lozyns’kyi (1909–1977), was a local leader of the OUN(b) in the Stanislaviv area. He as the “Bolshevik Talmud.” Ukrains’kyi robitnyk: Vydaie kraiovyi oseredok propahandy OUN, No. stood behind the June 30 Akt, but was soon arrested by the Gestapo, imprisoned in Kraków, L’viv, 1. (January 1946): 2. and Auschwitz, and released only at the end of the war. A committed totalitarian and one of Stets’ko’s closest associates, Lozyns’kyi served as regional providnyk of the OUN(b) in Bavaria after the war using 145. Anna Holian, “Anticommunism in the Streets: Refugee Politics in Cold War Germany,” Journal the nom-de-guerre Iur. Emigrating to the United States, he was detained at the border and spent four of Contemporary History, 45, no. 1 (2010): 144. months in dentention for his alleged involvement in the planning of a terrorist act against Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinskii. In the United States, he served on the OUN(b)’s own “court system” and as leader 146. Ibid., 147–148. of the Ukrainian League of Political Prisoners. “Vypiska iz doneseniia agenta . . . ot 17 avgusta 1944 goda,” HDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, ark. 346; “Protokol doprosa obviniaemogo Okhrimovicha Vasiliia 147. “Evrei—hromadiane Ukrainy,” OUN(b)-UPA leaflet written in March 1950, HDA SBU, f. 13, Ostapovicha ot 10 Marta 1953,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 445, ark. 49; “Protokol doprosa Matvienko, d. 376, tom 65, ll. 283–294. Mirona Vasil’evicha,” HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 56232, ark. 231–237; Mariia Lozyns’ka, “Pam’’iati Ievhena Lozyns’koho (1909–1977),” Svoboda, no. 46, November 16, 2007, 29: http://www.svoboda-news. 148. Ibid., l. 293. com/arxiv/pdf/2007/Svoboda-2007-46.pdf (accessed January 6, 2011). 149. “Protokol doprosa obviniaemo Okhrimovucha Vasilia Ostapovicha ot 5 ianvaria 1953 g.,” HDA 158. As late as 1974, the RCMP investigated the “planning [of] a violent act—possibly the kidnapping SBU, f. 5, spr. 445, t. 4, ark. 297, printed in Volodymyr Serhiichuk et al., eds., Stepan Bandera u of a Soviet diplomat in Canada” by the OUN(b). Inquiry 74WLO-2S-83, “Re: Acts of aggression dokumentakh radians’kykh orhaniv derzhavnoi bezpeky, 1939–1959, (Kyiv: PP Serhiichuk M. I., against the Soviet Union in Canada,” inquiry from the RCMP Liaison Office, Washington D.C. to 2009), 3: 385. CIA, Washington, DC, December 9, 1974, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 2; Staatsarchiv München, Staatsanwaltschaften 34887, vol. 1, l. 59, document on the OUN in 150. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 79, citing NARA, RG 319, IRR TS “Banderist Activity Bavaria written by Inspector Fuchs, September 13, 1960. Thanks to Grzegorz Rossoli#ski-Liebe for Czechoslovakia,” v. 2, D. 190425. these references. 151. “List R. Shukhevycha kerivnyku pidpillia na Volyni ‘Dalekomu,’ July 18, 1946, HDA SBU f. 159. Heorhyi Kas’ianov, Do pytannia pro ideolohiiu Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh Nationalistiv (OUN): 65, spr. S-9079, t. 2 (dodatok), ark. 287 (konvert), in Serhiichuk et al., Roman Shukhevych, 2: 54. analitychnyi ohliad (Kyiv: Instytut Istorii Ukrainy, 2003), 32; Iurii Kyrychuk, Ukrains’kyi natsional’nyi rukh 40-50kh rokiv XX stolittia: ideolohiia ta praktyka (L’viv: Dobra sprava, 2003), 356. 152. Petro Poltava, “Elementy revolutsiinosti ukrains’koho natsionalizmu,” Ideia i chyn, ch. 10 (1948), HDA SBU, f. 13, no. 376, t. 6, l. 223. 160. “Protokol’ doprosa obviniaemogo Okhrimovicha, Valieiia Ostapovicha ot 21 oktabria 1952 g.,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 445, t. 1., ark. 219. 153. In fact, Lutze was not even in Volhynia at the time, but was killed in a car accident in Potsdam. Motyka, Ukrainska partyzantka, 202–203. This falsification appeared with UPA veterans in the 161. Ibid., ark. 241. early 1950s, and is often repeated by the nationalists. Volodymyr Kosyk, Ukraina i Nimechchyna u 52 53 162. Ibid., ark. 44, 48. 177. Slava Stetzko, “A.B.N. Ideas Assert Themselves: The 20th Anniversary of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.), 1943–1963,” The Ukrainian Review 10, no. 3 (Autumn, 1963): 9, Lypovets’kyi, 163. Ibid., ark. 69. OUN banderivtsi, 76. 164. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 16, 55–56. 178. “Do Ponevolenykh Narodiv i ikh Emigratsii: Zvernennia IV velykoho Zboru OUN” Vyzvol’nyi shliakh: Suspil’no-politychnyi i naukovo-literaturnyi misiachnyk, kn. 10 (247), (October, 1968): 1166; 165. “Stenogramma protokol doprosa Matvieiko Mirona Vasil’evicha ot 9 1952 g.,” HDA SBU, f. 6, S. Stetzko, “A.B.N. Ideas Assert Themselves,” 9; Oleksandr Panchenko, “Peredmova,” in Roman spr. 56232, ark. 173–179. Il’nyts’kyi, Dumky pro ukrains’ku vyzvol’nu polityku: Vstupne slovo Oleha Il’nyts’koho (Hadiach: Vydavnytstvo ‘Hadiach,’ 2007), 34. 166. Ibid., ark. 177; Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 83, citing [Redacted] to Director of Security, January 9, 1956, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 1; Chief Base Munich 179. Father N. Bahatyr, “Molytva pid chas vidkryttia IV Velykoho Zboru OUN,” Vyzvol’nyi shliakh: to Chief, SR, EGMA-19914, March 29, 1956, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name suspil’no-politychnyi i naukovo literaturnyi misiachnyk, Vol. 11–12 (248–249), (November–December File, v. 2, and enclosures; Deputy Director, Plans, to Department of State, July 1, 1957, NARA, RG 1968): 1267. 263, E ZZ-18, B 126, Jaroslav Stetsko Name File, v. 1; Joint US-UK Conference, January 20, 1955, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 12, n. 1; Director, CA to [Redacted], 180. “Protokol doprosa obviniaemogo Okhrimovicha Vasilia Ostapovicha 30 oktabria 1952,” HDA DIR 00782, March 2, 1956, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 11, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 13. SBU, f. 5, spr. 445, t. 2, ark. 136. Yet, the Reagan administration maintained friendly relations with the OUN(b). In August 1983, Yaroslav Stest’ko was invited to the White House and received by President 167. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 81, citing SR/W2 to SR-DC, EE/SSS, January 13, 1952, Reagan and Vice President Bush. “Ukraina staie predmetom svitovoi politiky: u 25-littia tyzhnia NARA, RG 663, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 10, f. 1. ponevolenykh narodiv i 40-richcha ABN,” Homin Ukrainy, August 17, 1983: 1, 3; “Politychnyi aspekt vidznachennia richnyts’: TPN i ABN,” Homin Ukrainy, August 24, 1983: 1, 4. 168. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 83, citing “[Redacted] to Director of Security, January 9, 1956, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 1; Chief of Base Munich to 181. Panchenko, “Peredmova,” 32, 41. Chief, SR, EGMA-19914, March 29, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 2 and enclosures; Deputy Director, Plans, to Department of State, July 1, 1957, NARA, RG 263, E 182. Handwritten testimony by Vasyl’ Kuk, “Kharakterystyka osib natsionalistychnykh seredovyshch ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 12, n. 1; Director, CIA to [Redacted], DIR 00782, March za kordonom: Seredovyshche ZCh OUN,” HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 51895, t. 2, ark. 37. 2, 1956, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 11, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 13. 183. “Protokol doprosa obviniaemogo Okhrimovich Vasiliia Ostapovicha ot 11 dekabria 1952 g.,” 169. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 80–81. HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 445, t. 4, ark. 30. 170. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 82, citing “Our Relations with the Ukrainian Nationalists 184. Burds, The Early Cold War, 13, citing a secret report of CIC Special Agent Vadja V. Kolombatovic and the Crisis over Bandera,” attached to EGQA-37253, March 12, 1954, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, to Commanding Officer, CIC Region III, 6 May 1947, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 1906–9. B 10, Aerodynamics: Operations, v. 10, f.2. 185. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 86, Card Ref. D 82270, July 22, 1947, NARA, RG 319, 171. Goda and Breitman, 82, Hitler’s Shadow, citing CIA/State Department—SIS/Foreign Office Talks E 134B, B 757, Mykola Lebed’ IRR Personal File, Box 757. on Operations Against the USSR, April 23, 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamics: Operations, v. 9, f. 2. 186. “Protokol doprosa obviniaemogo Okhrimovicha Vasilia Ostapovicha ot 1 1952 g.,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 445, t. 2, ark. 183. 172. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 80. 187. Holian, “Anticommunism in the Streets,” 138. 173. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 83, citing “Joint US-UK Conference, January 20, 1955, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 12, f. 1. 188. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 88–89. 174. Paveli!’s exiled Ustaše movement, reorganized in 1956 as the Croatian National Liberation 189. The Immigration and Naturalization Services saw in Lebed’ a “clear-cut deportation case” due Movement (Hrvatski Oslobodila'ki Pokret, HOP), joined Stets’ko’s Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, to his wartime record with its “wholesale murders of Ukrainians, Poles and Jewish (sic),” but he was and had its European headquarters in Franco’s Spain. protected by CIA Assistant Director Allen Dulles’s personal intervention. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 86, citing NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, Box 80, Mykola Lebed Name File, v. 1. 175. “Protokol doprosa Matvieiko, Mirona Vasil’evicha ot 14–15 iolia 1951 goda,” HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 56232, ark. 96 190. Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 88. 176. Taras Fedoriv, Batkivshchina Bandery (Staryi Uhryniv, Ukraine: Hromas’ka orhanizatsiia 191. “Report details ties between US and ex-Nazis,” Associated Press, December 10, 2010: http:// “Banderivs’ke zemliatsvo,” 2007), 10. www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hJe2eJeWstJo3-tpdA7nw-vGP6Tg?docId=3faa07 027f724e5da4c1837d8c41b788 (accessed December 15, 2010). 54 55 192. “Protokol doprosa obviniaemo Okhrimovicha Vasiliia Ostapovicha ot 21 oktiabria 1952 g.,” 200. Petro Savaryn (b. 1926) never held an academic position, but was one of the founders of the HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 445, t. 1, ark. 220. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and chancellor of the University of Alberta 1984–87. He also served as president of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians 1983–1987, and the Alberta Progressive 193. Charles T. O’Connell, The Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR: Origin and Social Conservative party. He is also active in the society of the veterans of the Waffen-SS Galizien. Petro Composition, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 808. (Pittsburgh: University Savaryn, Z soboiu vzialy Ukrainu: Vid Tarnopillia do Al’berty (Kyiv:KVITs, 2007), 275. Center for Russian and East European Studies, 1990), 9f, 28–32. The Ukrainian National Rada, led by Andrii Livyts’kyi, at the time consisted primarily of by Petliurites and members of the OUN(m). By 201. Ivan Hryn’okh (1909–1994), veteran and chaplain of the Nachtigall and Schutzmannschaft cooperating with Russian anticommunists, Bandera believed that the Melnykites had “broken the united Battalion 201, worked at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, as assistant professor 1974–1977, front of hostility toward so-called cooperation with . . . Muscovite imperialists and their protectors.” full professor 1978–1990, professor emeritus 1991–1994. Shafoval and Iaremko, Universitas Libera “Pis’mo Glavaria ZCh OUN Bandera Stepana, adresovannoe ‘Provodu’ OUN na Ukrainskikh zamliakh, Ucrainensis, 122. ‘Provodu’ OUN L’vovskogo kraia, druz’iam Chernomu i Usmikhu,” June 1955, HDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 379, t. 2, ark. 191. 202. Petro Mirchuk (1913–1999) was arrested by the Germans in 1941 and spent the war in internment camps, including Auschwitz. Immediately after the war he was responsible for OUN(b) propaganda in 194. Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and occupied Germany. He was one of Stepan Bandera’s close allies and a stern adherent of totalitarianism. Radio Liberty (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 168. Mirchuk’s writings are representative of the sort of pseudo-scholarship the OUN(b) produced after the war. He received a J.D. in 1941 and a Ph.D. in 1969 from the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, 195. Evhen Shtendera (b. 1924) served as commander of political education in the UPA. Serhiichuk, and wrote several widely cited chronicles on the history of the OUN. He combined academic activities Stepan Bandera, 3:8–9. See also HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 445, t. 3, ark. 100–129, published in ibid., 3: with high-ranking positions in the OUN(b). Posivnych, Zhyttia i diial’nist’ Stepana Bandery, 140. 318. After the war he became a librarian at the University of Regina, main editor of the Litopys UPA, Mirchuk was also used as an “expert” for the defense during the OSI hearings on deportation. and from 1992, an instructor at the L’viv Polytechnic Institute. 203. Markus Huss, “Male Historians in Exile: Constantly Relating to Their Background,” Baltic 196. Wolodymyr Kosyk (b. 1924) combined his academic career with clandestine activities in the Worlds 3, no. 1 (2010): 17–18. OUN(b) and its youth section, the Ukrainian Youth Association, (Spilka Ukrains’koi Molodi, SUM). After the war he taught at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. In 1957 he led an ABN mission in 204. Some of the more prominent examples are found in the writings of Mykola Riabchuk, according Taipei, in Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist China. He published his research both with the Ukrainian Free to whom “Ukraine is not just a ‘normal’ nation,” but rather, “a postcolonial country shared near equally University in Munich and in the Banderite intellectual jounral Vyzvol’nyi shliakh. Zirka Vitoshyns’ka, by the ‘aboriginal’ and ‘settler’ communities.” Riabchuk juxtaposes the “aboriginal” Ukrainains to “Volodymyr Kosyk: ‘Politychni podii vidbuvaiut’sia ne v zamknenomu koli iakohos’ narodu, a v the Sioux population with (non-Ukrainian) “settlers” and invokes Hollywood images of Dances with pevnomu vnutrishn’omu i zovnishn’omu politychnomu kontksti,’” Dzerkalo Tyzhdnia, August 19, Wolves. Under these conditions, Riabchuk argues that a part “of Bandera’s legacy remains relevant—that 2006: http://www.dt.ua/newspaper/articles/47531 (accessed January 18, 2011); S. Stetzko, “A.B.N. of patriotism, national solidarity, self-sacrifice, idealistic commitment to common goals and values.” Ideas Assert Themselves,”11. For his research, Kosyk was awarded a gold medal from the Ukrainian Mykola Riabchuk, “Bandera’s Controversy and Ukraine’s Future,” Russkii vopros, no. 1, 2010: http:// Free University in Munich in 2000, and the order For Merit (Za zaslugi) of the third degree from www.russkiivopros.com/?pag=one&id=315&kat=9&csl=46#_edn13 (accessed April 28, 2010); idem, President Yushchenko himself in 2005. He is honorary director of the Center for the Study of the “Ukraine: Revisiting a ‘Success Story’?” Transitions Online, issue 10/17/2006: 4. On Riabchuk’s use Liberation Movement in L’viv. of postcolonial rhetortic in the service of nationalism, see Rudling, “Iushchenkiv fashyst,” in Amar, Balyns’kyi, and Hrytsak, Strasti za Banderoiu, 254, and Roman Dubasevych, “Dity rozpachu,” zakhid. 197. Taras Hunczak (b. 1932), with his brother, sister, and father, were members of the OUN. Taras net, December 20, 2010: http://zaxid.net/article/82258/ (accessed December 20, 2010). Hunczhak, Moi spohady—stezhky zhyttia (Kyiv: Dnipro, 2005), 16, 22, 30. 205. Following president Yushchenko’s designation of Stepan Bandera as Hero of Ukraine in January 198. On Veryha (1922–2009) in Waffen-SS, see Vasyl’ Veryha, Pid krylamy vyzvol’nykh dum (Kyiv: 2010, CIUS director Zenon Kohut defended Bandera and denied the fascist nature of the OUN. Zenon Vydavnytstvo imemi Oleny Telihy, 2007). His works have been published by the Canadian Institute Kohut, “Ukrains’kyi natsionalizm,” 145–146, and Rudling, “Iushchenkiv fashyst.” of Ukrainian Studies. See, for instance, Wasyl Veryha, ed., The Correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow and Lviv with the German authorities, 1939–1944 (Edmonton: Canadian 206. Only in the past few years have scholars started to give these institutions serious attention. See, for Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, University of Alberta, 2000). instance, O’Connor, “The Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR;” Holian, “Anticommunism in the streets”; Julia Delande, “‘Building a Home Abroad’—A Comparative Study of Ukrainain Migration, 199. Oleksa Horbatsch (1915–1997) was assistant professor at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich Immigration Policy and Diaspora Formation in Canada and Germany after the Second World War,” 1965–1967, full professor 1971–1990, professor emeritus 1991–1997. Mykola Shafoval and Roman Ph. D. Dissertation, Hamburg University, 2006; Huss, “Male Historians in Exile”; Rossoli#ski-Liebe, Iremko, eds., Universitas Libera Ucrainensis: 1921–2006 (Munich: Ukrainische Freie Universität, “Celebrating Fascism.” 2006), 122. Horbatsch was proud of his service as a soldier in the Waffen-SS and a regular contributor to the veterans’ journal Visti kombatanta. Bohdan Matsiv, ed., Ukrains’ka dyviziia “Halychyna”: 207. Frank Golczewski, “Besprechung,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte Osteuropas, 44, no. 4 (1996): 592 Istoryia u svitlynakh vid zasnuvannia u 1943 r. do zvil’nennia z polonu 1949 r. (Lviv: ZUKTs, 2009), ff, cited in Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,”12. 218–219, 254; Mykola Mushynka, “Ioho biohrafiia v ioho naukovykh pratsiakh: Do 75-richcha z dnia narodzhennia Prof. Oleksy Horbacha z Nimechchyny,” Druzhno vpered: Shchomisiachnyi kul’turno- 208. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 149; Himka, ”War hromads’kyi iliustrovanyi zhurhnal, vydae Soiuz rusyniv-ukraintsiv Slovachchyny, no. 3 (1993): 13. Criminality,” 11; Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 12–13; Krzysztof &ada, “Creative Forgetting: 56 57 Polish and Ukrainian Historiographies on the Campaign against the Poles in Volhynia during World 217. Petro Mirchuk, My Meetings and Discussions in Israel: Are Ukrainians “traditionally anti- War II,” Glaukopis, no. 2/3 (2005): 346; Himka, “First Escape: Dealing with the Totalitarian Legacy in Semites”? (New York: Ukrainian Survivors of the Holocaust, 1982), 121. the Easrly Postwar Emigration,” paper presented at the Workshop on “National Politics and Population Migrations in Central and Eastern Europe,” Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota, 218. Bruder, “Den Ukrainischen Staat,” 167, n 69, citing Petro Mirchuk, In the German Mills of Minneapolis, 7–8 April, 2006, 7; idem, “Central European Diaspora,” 22; Jeffrey Burds, “Access Death, 1941–1945, 2d ed. (New York, 1985), 17. Restrictions in Central European Archives,” round table discussion at the fortieth national convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Philadelphia, November 23, 2008. 219. Mirchuk habitually refers to Poles as “degenerates,” Jews as blood-suckers, Russians as Mongols and tyrants. Mirchuk, My Meetings and Discussions in Israel, 116, 118, 121, 122. He accused Jews 209. Thus, only in 1996 did a complete version of Stets’ko’s Akt of June 30, 1941, retaining the statement of controlling the U.S. courts. “What is ‘Jewish justice’ doing in American courts? And why ‘Jewish’ that the Ukrainian state would “cooperate closely” with Nazi Germany, appear in print. Volodymyr and not American justice? Are we a colony of theirs? It’s not enough that our government gives Serhiichuk, ed., OUN-UPA v roky viiny: Novi dokumenty i materialy (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 1996), Israel billions of our tax money each year for nothing, and now American courts must yield to Jewish 239–240. Confronted with primary documents that establish the anti-Semitic nature of the OUN, demands? . . . Goebbels himself wouldn’t have been able to turn the Americans against the Jews the pronationalist historians have sometimes dismissed them as Soviet forgeries. See, for instance, Taras way they did it themselves. . . . I repeat again and again, not as an ‘anti-Semite’ but as your friend: the Hunczak, “Problems of Historiograhy: History and Its Sources,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 25 (2001): abuse of your influence in America for the purpose of persecuting innocent Ukrainians by accusing 129–142. For a discussion of this, see Himka and Kurylo, “Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv?” 253. them of cooperation with the Germans—is merely sowing the wind. And everyone is familiar with the proverb: ‘Who sows in the wind, reaps the storm!’ Think over this carefully! . . . I’m not threatening you 210. Burds, “Access Restrictions,” 2008. with pogroms, I’m only warning you. All of those who have come to America from Eastern European counties, occupied by the Bolsheviks, know a great deal about the role of the Jews in the recent history 211. Himka, “War Criminality,” 9–24; idem, “Central European Diaspora,”17–31; Rudling, of these lands—a role which, for your own good, it would be better to cover-up before the American “Iushchenkiv fashyst,” 237–309; Rossoli#ski-Liebe, ”Celebrating Fascism.” public. But with these trials of ‘war criminals’—the so-called murderers of innocent Jews—you’re provoking them to reveal everything incriminating against the Jews. Is this what you want? These 212. Lew Shankowsky, “Pro problemu antysemityzmu v Ukraini,” Svoboda, February 3, 1960, cited East-European émigrés have children and grandchildren, born and raised as American citizens. When in Himka, “War Criminality,” 10. you maliciously and groundlessly accuse their forbearers of imaginary crimes—and even generalize the accusation by claiming for example that all Ukrainians ‘are anti-Semites’—then they, in turn, seeking 213. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 152, citing Bohdan to know the truth, learn from their parents about the role of the Jews in the apparatus of the bloody Osadczuk, “Curesy i cymesy,” Zustriczi 9 (1995): 30. Yet, during the war, Osadczuk (1920–2011) CheKa, GPU, NKVD, KGB; and they pass on this information to all their American acquaintances, published anti-Semitic material in the collaborationist press in occupied Poland. Covering the Ustaše co-workers, professors, journalists, et al. Tell me, do you really want that?” Ibid., 124–127. press for Krakivs’ki Visti, Osadczuk reported: “The mass graves in Vinnytsia, Hrvatski Narod states, is new proof of the politics of destruction that the Jews from the Kremlin have conducted among the 220. Mirchuk, My Meetings and Discussions in Israel, 66. (Srul is a derogarory term for Jews.) Ukrainian people. The murdered Ukrainians again throw guilt on Stalin and his Jewish collaborators and summon the world to an implacable struggle against the Jewish-Bolshevik threat, which would 221. Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 489. This view like to bring upon Europe the same fate that the defenseless vicitms in Vinnytsia met.” B[ohdan] came to have an impact also on Ukraine, as Subtelny’s textbook, in Ukrainian translation, was widely O[sadchuk], “Kryvava propahanda Ukrainy: Vynnytsia v evropeis’kii presi,” Krakivs’ki visti, August used in Ukraine during the first years of independence. Marples, Heroes and Villains, 7, 23, 40–41. 7, 1943., cited in John-Paul Himka, “Ethnicity and the Reporting of Mass Murder: Krakivs’ki visti, the NKVD Murders of 1941, and the Vinnitsa Exhumation,” paper presented at the University of Alberta 222. In a discussion at the Fifth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Holocaust Workshop, January 14, 2005, 13. the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, the University of Ottawa, October 30, 2009, Potichnyj argued that Jews, killed by the UPA, were killed because they were communists. Interviewed by the Washington 214. Taras Hunczak, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations,” in Yuri Post, he elaborated on this idea. “As for the killings of Jews and Poles, Potichnyj argues that no matter Boshyk, ed., Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath (Edmonton: CIUS, 1986), 42, 45. where guerillas fight for liberation, it’s a messy affair. The Poles provoked the Ukrainians, he said. ‘With respect to Jews,’ he said, ‘obviously, in the situation there must have taken place some killing 215. One of the initiators of the Waffen-SS division Galizien, Kubijovy% endorsed ethnic cleansing of the Jews, although in 1943, when the UPA was quite strong, there were hardly no Jews left because of Ukrainian lands and published anti-Semitic material during the Holocaust. Volodymyr Kubijovy%, the Germans had, unfortunately, killed them all off. But there were some remnants, and the remnants “Pered maiestatom nepovynnoi krovy,” Krakivs’ki visti, July 8, 1941, cited in John-Paul Himka, “The were either working with the Ukrainian underground or they were working with the Soviets.’ Those Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Ukraine,” in Joanna Michlic and John-Paul Himka, allied with the Red partisans were obviously enemies of the underground, he said.” John Pancake, eds., Bringing to Light the Dark Past: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommununist Europe “In Ukraine, movement to honor members of WWII underground sets off debate,” Washington (forthcoming); John-Paul Himka, “Ethnicity and the Reporting of Mass Murder,” 19; Per A. Rudling, Post, January 6, 2010: A7; John Paul Himka [Ivan-Pavlo Khymka], “Chy ukrains’ki studii povynni “Organized Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Ukraine: Structure, Influence and Ideology,” Canadian zakhyshzhaty spadshchynu OUN-UPA?,” in Amar, Balyns’kyi, Hrytsak, Strasti za Banderoiu, 163. Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes 48, nos. 1–2 (March-June 2006): 96. 223. “What is also indisputable is that many Jews served in the Soviet secret police during that period 216. Bohdan Wytwycky, “Anti-Semitism,” in Volodymyr Kubijovy%, ed., Encyclopedia of Ukraine of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine. Naturally, Himka fails to mention the Jewish complicity which may (Toronto: CIUS Press 1984), 1: 82. On Wytwycky’s writings on Jews as communists and NKVD men, have pointed to the motive of any number of oppressors. . . . While being Jewish in and of itself, certainly, see Rudling, “Organized Anti-Semitism,” 98–99, n. 81. was not reason to be killed, being Jewish was not immunity from being attacked when you sided and 58 59 fought with the enemy.” Askold S. Lozynskyj, “Rewriting history: An evidentary persepective,” Kyiv 233. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 149, 151, 152, citing Post, February 16, 2010: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/59650/print/ (accessed Mykola Lebed’, “Orhanizatsiia protynimets’koho opouru OUN, 1941–1943 rokiv,” Suchasnist’, no. February 22, 2010). 1–2 (January–February 1983): 154. 224. Volodymyr Serhiichuk, Nasha krov—na svoii zemli (Kyiv: Ukrains’ka vydavnycha spilka, 2000), 234. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 151, citing Wolodymyr 56–57; Volodymyr Serhiichuk, Trahediia Volhyni: Prychynyi perebih pol’s’ko-ukrains’koho konfliktu v Kosyk, “Problems of the History of OUN and UPA,” Ukrainian Review 40 (Spring 1993): 26–27. roky druhoi svitovoi viiny (Kyiv: Ukrains’ka vydavnycha spilka, 2003). For a discussion on Serhiichuk, see Marples, Heroes and Villains, 232–233, 236–237. 235. Petro J. Potichnyj, in Yevhen’ Shtendera and Petro J. Potichnyj, eds., Litopys UPA, vol. 17, English-Language Publications of the Ukranian Underground (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1988), 140. 225. See the interview with Volodymyr V’’iatrovych, to which we will return to later. Masha Mishchenko, “Pratsivnyk SBU: My izdyly v Izrail’ pobachaty dos’e proty Shukhevycha—a ioho 236. Taras Hunczak, “Between Two Leviathans: Ukraine during the Second World War,” in Bohdan prosto ne isnue,” UNIAN, March 25, 2008: http://unian.net/news/print.php?id=242913 (accessed Krawchenko, ed., Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress April 8, 2008). for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 99. 226. For instance, on November 10, 2010 during the trial in Kyiv regarding the legality of Yushchenko’s 237. Alexander Motyl, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian collective designation of the OUN and the UPA as Heroes of Ukraine, Petro Mykytovych Perepust, Nationalism, 1919–1929 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 166. representing the Sumy chapter of the far-right Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self Defense (UNA-UNSO), justified the “murder, dismemberment, and slaughter [i ubyvaty, i pyliaty, i 238. Alexander Motyl, “Ukraine, Europe, and Bandera,” Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper, rizati]—that is done all across the world when one people fight for their independence, they kill other 10/05 (March 2010), 6: http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Alexander_J_Motyl_Ukraine_ people.” Legal argument, case 2a-6732/10, “Za Pozovom Vitrenko Natalii Mykhailivni do Prezydenta Europe_and_Bandera.pdf 6. Ukrainy shchodo vyznannia nezakonnym Ukazu Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 28 sichnia 2010 roku No. 75/2010 ‘Pro vshanuvannia uzhastnykiv borot’by za nezalezhnist’ Ukrainy u XX stolitti,” Okruzhnyi 239. “It makes no sense to refer to Eastern Europeans, who were regarded by the Germans as Administratvnyi sud mista Kyeva, November 10, 2010. Press release, November 12, 2010. The subhumans, as ‘Nazi’ war criminals; they were not allowed to join the Nazi Party.” Myroslav Yurkevich, proceedings are also available online: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=znQjFCNCAXg (accessed in “Discussion,” in Bozhyk, Ukraine in World War II, 158. Yet, National Socialism attracted many November 12, 2010). Thanks to Krzysztof Janiga for this material. Eastern Europeans. In fact, Nazi Germany categorically banned any use of swastikas and other Nazi symbols in the émigré press, as well as prohibited the use of the term “National Socialist” in the names 227. In an interview, the 87-year-old Volhynian UPA veteran Ivan Hnatevych Kisliuk (b. 1923) presses of any Slavic émigré organizations in Germany. Iury Hrybouski, “Belaruski rukh i Niamechchyna the book Armiia bez Derzhavy, by the founder of the original UPA, into my hands, and told me to napiaredadni i u pachatku Druhoi sus’vetnai vainy,” ARCHE No. 5 (80), (May 2009): 152. open to page 253. It reads: “In the end of July 1943 the General Staff of the UNRA issued an appeal to the Ukrainian people, in which it protested against all those measures, which were condemned 240. Hunczak, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations,” 44–45. Similarly Mykola Riabchuk describes the as the disreputable acts of blinded totalitarians, and emphasized that the full responsibility for the OUN’s collaboration and anti-Semitism as “rather disputable” and relies on Motyl’s definition, in crimes falls upon the leader of the OUN Bandera, Mr. Mykola Lebed’-Ruban.” “See, Ruban, Jew! which collaborators are “individuals or groups who abandon their sovereign aspirations and serve [zhyd!],” Mr. Kisliuk said, pointing at Lebed’s Ashkenazi-sounding nom de guerre, which to him another power’s goals.” Mykola Riabchuk, “Bandera’s Controversy and Ukraine’s Future,” citing proved Jewish responsibility for the Volhyn massacres. Bul’ba-Borovets’, Armiia bez derzhavy, 253. Motyl, “Ukraine, Europe, and Bandera,” 6. Personal interview, Kyiv-Troishchina, Ukraine, September 23, 2010. 241. Daniel Ursprung, “Faschismus in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa: Theorien, Ansätze, 228. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 161–172. Fragestellungen,” in Der Einfluss von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus auf Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, ed. Mariana Hausleitner and Harald Roth (Munich: IKGS-Verlag, 229. V. R. Nakhmanovych, “Bukovyns’kyi Kurin’ i masovi rozsteli evreiv Kyiva voseni 1941 r.,” 2006), 22. Ukrains’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 3 (474), (May–June 2007): 90. 242. Alexander Motyl, “Is Putin’s Russia Fascist?” National Interest Online, December 3, 2007: http:// 230. John-Paul Himka, “The Reception of the Holocaust.” nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-is-putins-russia-fascist-1888. 231. Himka, “War Criminality”; idem, “Central European Diaspora”; Glenn Sharfman, “The Quest for 243. Motyl, “Is Putin’s Russia Fascist?” and idem, “Surviving Russia’s Drift to Fascism,” Kyiv Post, Justice: The Reaction of the Ukrainian-American Community to the John Demjanjuk Trials,” Journal January 17, 2008: http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/oped/28182/ (both accessed January 15, 2011). of Genocide Research 2, no. 1 (2000): 65–87. Andreas Umland has taken Motyl to task over his use of this terminology. “If we would apply Motyl’s loose conceptualization of fascism to contemporary world history, we might find so many ‘fascisms’ 232. Petro J. Potichnyj was one of the few exceptions among the pronationalist scholars. He reached out that the term would lose much of its heuristic and communicative value. . . . Motyl’s comment is in to the Jewish community, aiming at a dialogue. Howard Aster and Peter Potichnyj, Jewish-Ukrainian so far unconstructive as he deprives researchers of Russian nationalism of an important analytic tool.” Relations: Two Solitudes (Oakville, ON: Mosaic Press, 1983); idem, eds., Ukrainian-Jewish Relations Andreas Umland, “Is Putin’s Russia Really “Fascist”? A Response to Alexander Motyl”: http://www. in Historical Perspective (Edmonton: CIUS and University of Alberta, 1990). globalpolitician.com/print.asp?id=4341 (accessed January 15, 2011). 60 61 244. Motyl, “Ukraine, Europe, and Bandera,”14. 254. Vasyl’ Derevins’kyi, Stavlennia OUN(b) i UPA do susidnikh narodiv ta natsional’nykh menshyn (Kyiv: Natsional’na Akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 2006), 44. 245. Wilfried Jilge, “Competition Among Victims? The Image of the Other in Post-Soviet Ukrainian Narratives on World War II,” in Heorhii Kas’ianov, ed., Obraz inshoho v susidnikh istoriakh: mifi, 255. Serhii Hrabovs’kyi, “Tak proty koho zh voiuvav Shukhevych u Bilorusi?” Ukrains’ka Pravda: stereotypy, naukovi interpretatsii: Materialy mizhnarodnoi naukovi konferentsii, Kyiv, 15–16 hrudnia http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2007/11/13/66774.htm (accessed November 18, 2007). On 2005 roku (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 2008), 66. Hrabovs’kyi’s celebration of OUN-UPA and Waffen-SS division Galizien, see Marples, Heroes and Villains, 231–232. 246. This interpretation has found a receptive audience among some pro-OUN and UPA diaspora historians. See, for instance, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Director Zenon Kohut’s reply to 256. Hunczak, “Problems of Historiograhy,” 136. John-Paul Himka “Re: Should Ukrainian Studies Defend the Heritage of OUN-UPA?” February 12, 2010. Dominique Arel’s Ukraine List, UKL 441 (Bandera-OUN and Famine Debates), February 16, 257. Morton Weinfeld, Like Everyone Else . . . but Different: The Paradoxical Success of Canadian 2010: http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/UKL441.pdf. Jews (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2001), 213–214; Daniel Mendelsohn, Lost –A Search for Six of Six Million (London: HarperCollins, 2007), 99; Golczewski, “Shades of Grey,” 114–155. 247. For instance, public intellectual Mykola Riabchuk sees no difficulty with the UPA cult, as long as the focus remains on their “ethical rather than ideological values” and as long as their ideology, 258. See, for example, Himka, “The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust,” 15, citing the USC ethnic cleansing or mass murders are not celebrated. “The UPA fighters . . . are praised first of all for Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education, 20586 Jack Glotzer, 12–15; Spector, The their patriotism and commitment to the national-liberation cause, for their idealism and dedication, Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 358; Ahron Weiss, “Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine for spiritual strength and self-secrifice.” Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukraine: Neither Heroes nor Villains: During the Holocaust,” in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Review of Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine, by David Marples Historical Perspective (Edmonton: CIUS and University of Alberta, 1990), 409–420; Weiner, Making (Budapest: Central European Press, 2007),” Transitions Online, 6 February 2007. Sense of War, 270–271. 248. See, for instance, the interview with Volodymyr V’’iatrovych,. Masha Mishchenko, “Pratsivnyk 259. See Mykola Lebed, UPA: Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiia (n.p. 1946), 35–36; for other early SBU.” claims on Jews in UPA, see Petro Mirchuk, Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiia, 1942–1952 (Munich: Cicero, 1953), 69–72. 249. See, for instance Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, eds., Political Thoughts of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943–1951 (Edmonton: CIUS and University of Alberta, 1986); Himka, “War 260. Lebed’, Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiia, 35–36, cited in Friedman, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations,” Criminality,” 11. See Rudling, “Theory and Practice”; &ada, “Creative Forgetting;” Marples, Heroes 204. and Villains, 298–301; Dietsch, Making Sense of Suffering, 147–176; Grzegorz Rossoli#ski-Liebe, “Der polnisch-ukrainische Historikerdiskurs über den polnisch-ukrainischen Konflikt, 1943–1947,” 261. Leo Heiman, “We Fought For Ukraine—the Story of Jews Within the UPA,” Ukrainian Quarterly, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 57, no. 1 (2009): 54–85. vol. 20, no. 2 (Spring 1964): 33–44. 250. Howard Aster, “Reflections on the Work of Peter J. Potichnyj,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 262. Dr. Stella Krentsbakh, “Zhyvu shche zavdiaky UPA,” in Petro Mirchuk and V. Davydenko, eds., 21, no. 1–2 (1996): 226–227. Potichnyj largely limits his focus to the period during which OUN and V riadakh UPA: Zbirka spomyniv buv. Voiakiv Ukrains’koi Povstans’koi Armii (New York: Nakladom UPA took a more liberal and open position to national minorities. See, for instance, Potichnyj and T-va b. Voiakiv UPA v ZDA i Kanadi, 1957), 342–349. Shtendera, Political Thoughts of the Ukrainian Underground, a collection of essays partly based upon Mykola Lebed’s archives. Unsurprisingly, there is next to nothing in the Litopys UPA on the topic of 263. “The questionable source mentioned here is the ‘memoir,’ allegedly by a Jewish woman named the Volhynian massacres in 1943, and total silence on UPA murders of Jews. Stella Kreutzbach, in Nasha Meta, Toronto 27 and December 4, 1954; Ukrainske Slovo (Buenos Aires?), October 10, 1954; Kalendar Almanakh na 1957 Rik (Calendar Almanac for 1957) (Buenos 251. Andreas Umland, “Die andere Anomalie der Ukraine: ein Parlament ohne rechtsradikale Aires): 92–97. Kalendar also features an article by Dmitry Andreyewsky (pp. 88–91), in which he states Fraktionen,” Ukraine-Analysen, no. 41 (2008): 7–10. Émigré nationalists who reestablished contacts that Stella Kreutzbach went to Palestine after the war, where she was later employed as a secretary in in Ukraine, used to clandestine work, were often disappointed the organization and nature of the the foreign ministry, and that several weeks after the publication of her memoirs in the Washington nationalists in the old country. See, for instance, Sukhovers’kyi, Moi Spohady, 237. Post (which the Ukrainian publication credited for first releasing the memoirs) she was mysteriously shot and killed. I checked the Washington Post of that period and did not find the memoirs. At my 252. For examples of this narrative, see Petro Sodol, “Foreigners in the UPA,” Ukrainian Quarterly request, Dr. N. M. Gelber of Jerusalem made inquiry in the foreign ministry there; the reply was that 58, no. 4 (2002): 342–348; Volodymyr Kosyk, “Organizational Conditions and the Initial Struggle of the ministry had never had an employee by that name and that such a case of homicide was entirely the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),” Ukrainian Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2002): 310–325; Volodymyr unknown. Moreover, a careful analysis of the text of the ‘memoirs’ has led me to the conclusion that Viatrovych, [V’’iatrovych] “The Communist Alliance against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),” the entire story is a hoax. Similarly, the Ukrainian writer B. Kordiuk labels the story ‘a mystification’; Ukrainian Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2002): 326–341; Herbert Romerstein, “The KGB Disinformation he states that ‘none of the members of the UPA’ known to him ‘ever met or heard of her.’” Philip Campaign Against Ukrainians and Jews,” Ukrainian Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2002): 349–360. Friedman, Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust, ed. Ada June Friedman, introduction by Salo Wittmeyer Baron (New York: Conference on Jewish Social Studies, Jewish Publication Society 253. Serhiichuk, Nasha krov—na svoii zemli, 3, 42, 77. of America, 1980), 203–204. 62 63 264. The Krentsbakh/Kreutzbach forgery was also discussed in the Ukrainian émigré press, where 272. OUN(b) veteran Volodymyr Kosyk serves as its honorary director, and Petro Sodol (b. 1935), a the writer Bohdan Kordiuk concorded with Friedman’s conclusions: “The careful historian Friedman former president of the OUN(z)-affiliated publishing house Prolog in New York and a senior member of give the story of Dr. Stella Krentsbakh, who ‘Thanks UPA for her Life,’ which has been re-printed so the Ukrainian nationalist youth organization Plast. http://upa.in.ua/book/?page_id=5#zabilyj (accessed many times, his attention, but finds nothing about her. And rightly so, since none of the UPA veterans, December 15, 2010). On Plast and SUM in the diaspora, see Per A. Rudling, “Multiculturalism, known by the author of these lines, either heard or knew of this legendary Stella Krentsbakh. Neither Memory, and Ritualization: Ukrainian Nationalist Monuments in Edmonton, Alberta,” Nationalities have any Jews heard of her. Hardly any one of the tens of thousands of Ukrainians refugees claim to Papers, Vol. 39, no. 5 (September, 2011): 738–739. have met this Stella Krentsbakh. The biography, attributed to her in certain places, does not hold up to critical scrutiny; claims that she would have been working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not 273. For a list of the TsDVR’s intellectual collaborators and partners, see http://cdvr.org.ua/content/ correspond to the truth. And some were nonsensical claims—that she would have been killed on the ,-./01.2 (accessed October 1, 2011) streets of Jerusalem from a shot to the nape of her neck, supposedly due to her favorable memories of the UPA. That nonsense constitutes a jungle of the prejudices which so burden Ukrainian-Jewish 274. News release of the Center for the Research of the Liberation Movement, TsDVR, Informatsiina relations. It seems to us, that as long as there is still no independent evidence, the stories of Dr. dovidka; http://upa.in.ua/book/?page_id=7 (accessed December 15, 2010). Stella Krentsbakh need to be regarded as a mystification.” Bohdan Kordiuk, “Retsenzii: Pro liudei, spovnennykh samoposviaty: Their Brother’s Keepers by Philip Friedman. With a Foreword by Father 275. Sofia Hrachova, “Unknown Victims: Ethnic-Based Violence of the World War II Era in Ukrainian John A. O’Brien. Crown Publishers, Inc. New York, 1957, pp. 224,” Suchasna Ukraina (Munich) 15 Politics of History after 2004,” paper presented at the Fourth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in (194), July 20, (1958): 7. Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, October 23–25, 2008, 9. 265. Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “The Geopolitics of Memory,” Eurozine, May 10, 2007. Available online: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-10-zhurzhenko-en.html (accessed November 9, 2010). 276. Endorsement by “Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi, Academician, head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory,” in Volodymyr V’’iatrovych, ed., Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiia: Istoriia neskorenykh 266. Dietsch, Making Sense of Suffering, 223–226. (Kyiv: Tsentr doslidzhen’ vyzvol’noho rukhu, 2007), back cover. 267. Andreas Umland and Anton Shekhovtsov, “Pravoradikal’naia partiinaia politika v postsovetskoi 277. “Instytut natsional’noi pam’’iati zvernuvsia do Iushchenka, aby vin prysvoiv Romanu Ukraine: zagadka elektoral’noi marginal’nosti ukrainskikh ul’tranatsionalistov v 1994–2009 gg.,” Ab Shukhevychu zvannia Heroia Ukrainy,” Zik: syla informatsii, July 2, 2007: http://zik.com.ua/ua/ Imperio, no. 2 (2010): 219–247. news/2007/07/02/80305 (accessed October 15, 2010). 268. Johan Dietsch, “Imagining the Missing Neighbor: Jews and the Holocaust in Ukrainian History 278. On the state honoring of Stets’ko, see Viktor Yushchenko, “Ukaz prezydenta Ukrainy No. 416/2007 Textbooks,” in Heorhii Kas’ianov, Obraz inshoho v susidnikh istoriakh: mifi, stereotypy, naukovi Pro vshanuvannia pam’iati Iaroslava Stets’ka i Iaroslavy Stets’ko”: http://www.president.gov.ua/ interpretatsii: Materialy mizhnarodnoi naukovi konferentsii, Kyiv, 15–16 hrudnia 2005 roku (Kyiv: documents/6145.html (accessed April 10, 2008). On the cult of Shukhevych, see Per A. Rudling, “The NAN Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 2008), 202, citing David Levy and Nathan Sznaider, “Memory Shukhevych Cult in Ukraine: Myth Making with Complications,” World War II and the (Re)Creation Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory,” European Journal of Social of Historical Memory in Contemporary Ukraine, Kyiv, September 25, 2009. Available online http:// Theory, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2002): 100. ww2-histroricalmemory.org.ua/abstract_e.html (accessed October 11, 2009). On Bandera, see Amar, Balyns’kyi, and Hrytsak, Strasti za Banderoiu. In December 2010, the Kyiv city council declared 269. Wilfried Jilge, “Zmanannia zhertv,” Krytyka, vol. 10, no. 5 (May, 2006): 14–17. that they will rename city streets after Shukhevych, Stest’ko, and Mel’nyk. “Na Oboloni z’’iavyt’sia vulitsia Romana Shukhevycha,” Ukrains’ka pravda: Istorychna pravda, December 16, 2010: http:// 270. Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi (b. 1925) is a physicist, not a trained historian. An enthusiastic admirer www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2010/12/16/9227/ (accessed December 17, 2010). of Bandera and Shukhevych, the OUN and UPA, Yukhnovs’kyi has occasionally voiced anti- Semitic views. Aleksandr Burakovs’kyi, “Key Characteristics and Transformation of Jewish- 279. Swedish historian Göran B. Nilsson describes the Soviet practice of writing history from the Ukrainian Relations during the Period of Ukraine’s Independence, 1991–2008,” Nationalism and perspective of a constantly changing present as “chronological imperialism.” Göran B. Nilsson, Ethnic Politics, 15, no. 1 (2009): 121; Zenon Zawada, “Kyiv conference focuses on World War “Historia som humaniora,” Historisk Tidsskrift no. 1 (1989): 1, 4. II and hisotrical memory,” Ukrainian Weekly, no. 44, November 1, 2009, 18. On Yukhnovs’kyi’s sympathies for the “Social Nationalists,” see Lilia Kuzik, “Ihor Iokhnovs’kyi: Ta derzhava zh mala 280. To commemorate the centennial of the birth of the OUN poet Olena Teliha, President Yushchenko utvorytysia. I ia robiv, shchob vona utvorylas’,” Zaxid.net, August 11, 2011. http://zaxid.net/home/ in 2006 issued a presidential decree to erect a memorial “to her and her associates” in Babin Yar, showSingleNews.do?igor_yuhnovskiyta_derzhava_zh_mala_utvoritisya_i_ya_vse_robiv_shhob_ where her body had been buried in 1942. Aleksandr Burakovs’kyi, “Istoriia memoralizatsii evreiskoi vona_utvorilas&objectId=1233429 (accessed October 2, 2011) The Social-Nationalist Party of tragedii v Bab’em Iaru za god ee 70-letiia: pozor Ukrainy,” My Zdes’, no. 278: http://www.newswe. Ukraine (SNPU) mobilized the neo-fascist right and used an SS symbol as party emblem. In 2004 it com/index.php?go=Pages&in=view&id=2725 (accessed October 3, 2010), citing Yushchenko decree was renamed the All-Ukrainian accociation Svoboda. Anton Shekhovtsov, “The Creeping Resurgence No. 416/2006. In Drohobych, a monument to Bandera has been erected at the site of the former ghetto. of the Ukrainian Radical Right? The Case of the Freedom Party,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. Omer Bartov, Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine (Princeton, Conn.: 2, (March 2011): 213. Princeton University Press, 2007), 52–53. 271. Lypovets’kyi, OUN banderivtsi, 84. 281. Jilge, “Zmanannia zhertv,” 14. 64 65 282. V’’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN do ievreiv. 296. Wilfried Jilge, “Nationalukrainischer Befreiungskampf: Die Umwertung des Zweiten Weltkrieges in der Ukraine,” Osteuropa 58, (2008): 179. 283. There is no shortage of such memoirs. See for example Shimon Redlich, Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews and Ukrainians, 1919–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 297. SBU, “U Sluzhbi bepeki Ukrany vidkrylas’ fotovystavka “Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiia. 103–104; Reuben Ainsztein, Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe: With a Historical Istoria neskorennykh,” May 27, 2008: http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_ Survey of the Jew as Fighter and Soldier in the Diaspora (London: Paul Elek, 1974), 252–256. On id=78839&cat_id=78711 (accessed August 21, 2008). the OUN’s and the UPA’s attitude to Jews during the war, see Weiner, Making Sense of War, 239–297. 298. V’’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN, 96, citing HDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, tom 65, ark. 283–295; SBU, 284. A Wehrmacht intelligence report from April 1944 reports that “the UPA has successfully taken “Evrei v Ukrains’komu vyzvol’nomu rusi.” up pursuit of the Jewish gangsters and up to now shot almost 100.” Staatsanwaltschaft Dortmund 45 Js 24/62, Bd “Reste von Gutachten und Dokumenten aus dem Bestand des Pz. AOK 4,” BA-MA, 299. SBU, “Sluzhba bezpeki Ukrainy vidkryvae dlia shyrokoho zahalu arkhivni materially shchodo RH-21, Pz. AOK 4, Abt. Ic/AO, Tätigkeitsbericht, April 1944, as cited in Golczewski, “Shades of osib, prychetnykh do orhanizatsii ta zdiisnennia politiki Holodomoru-Henotsydu represii”: http:// Grey,” 143. On this topic, see Weiner, Making Sense of War, 263–264. www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=80420&cat_id=395 (accessed August 7, 2008). 285. Pres-tsentr Sluzhba bezpeki Ukrainy, “U Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy vidbulys’ Hromads’ki 300. SBU, “U Sluzhbi bezpeki Ukrainy vidkrylas’ fotovystavka ’Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiia.’”Iurii istorychni slukhannia “Evrei v Ukrains’komu Vyzvol’nomu ruzi,” April 14, 2008, http://www.sbu. Shukhevych (b. 1933) is the son of UPA commander Roman Shukhevych and leader of the far-right gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=77689&cat_id=39574 (accessed April 14, 2008). UNA-UNSO, the Ukrainian sister party of the German neo-Nazi NPD. It is openly antidemocratic—in the 1990s its propaganda posters carried the slogan “Vote for us and you will never have to vote again.” 286. Iryna Ehorova, “Volodymy V’’iatrovych: Holovnym sub’ektom istorychnoho protsesu v Ukra)ni XX stolittia bula ne URSR, a ukra)ns’kyi vyzvol’nyi rukh,” Den’, February 18, 2008: http://www. Along with Levko Luk’’ianenko (b. 1928), Shukhevych was one of the more prominent nationalist ukrnationalism.org.ua/interview/?n=69 (accessed March 16, 2008). dissidents and a cause celebre for the émigré OUN. Following independence, Luk’’ianenko became Ukraine’s leading anti-Semite. Yushchenko designated both Iuryi Shukhevych and Luk’’ianenko 287. John-Paul Himka, “True and False Lessons from the Nachtigall Episode,” Brama, March 19, Heroes of Ukraine. Per A. Rudling, ”Anti-Semitism and the Extreme Right in Contemporary 2008: http://brama.com/news/press/2008/03/080319himka_nachtigall.html (accessed March 19, 2008). Ukraine,” in Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins, eds., Mapping the Extreme See also Kurylo and Himka [Khymka], “Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv?” 252–265. Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational (forthcoming); John-Paul Himka, “The Importance of the Situational Element in East Central European Fascism,” East Central Europe 37 288. V’’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN, 78–81. At the April 2008 conference at the SBU, V’’iatrovych (2010): 357. repeated his argument on the SBU website, adding an additional example of a Jew in the UPA, Leiba- Itsko Dobravs’kyi. “U Sluzhby bezpeki Ukrainy.” 301. “Fishbein: ne dopustit’ Ukrainu v NATO—spetsoperatsiia Kremlia,” DELFI, July 12, 2009: http://www.delfi.ua/news/daily/foreign/fishbejn-ne-dopustit-ukrainu-v-nato---specoperaciya- 289. V’’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN, 74, citing R. Petrenko, “Za Ukrainu, za ii voliu. Spohady,” Litopys kremlya.d?id=467241 (accessed September 7, 2009); Svitlana Makovyts’ka, “Maestro bozhystoi Ukrains’koi Povstans’koi Armii, 27 (Toronto and Lviv: Litopys UPA, 1997), 173. movy: Ukrains’kyi poet Moisei Fishbein—pro politychnyi dal’tonizm, heniiv slova i heroiv Ukrainy,” Ukra&na moloda, November 28, 2007: http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua/number/1051/171/37785/ 290. Himka, Ukrainians, Jews, and the Holocaust, 47. (accessed December 5, 2007). Fishbein repeats, almost verbatim, the same statements in subsequent interviews. Ol’ha Betko, “Poet M. Fishbein: dlia mene UPA—tse sviate,” BBC Ukrainian Service, 291. As of January 2011, the documents were still available on the website of the Ukrainian Embassy October 14, 2008. in Canada, “Novini,” Posol’stvo Ukrainy v Kanadi, February 6, 2008: http://www.ukremb.ca/canada/ ua/news/detail/11684.htm (accessed January 18, 2011). 302. For Fishbein’s complete speech, see Moses Fishbein, “The Jewish Card in Russian Special Operations Against Ukraine: Paper delivered at the 26th Conference on Ukrainian Subjects at the 292. Iaryna Iasynevych, “V’’iatrovych: ‘Kampania proty Shukhevycha ne maie istorychnoi osnovy,’” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 24–27, June 2009: http://www.vaadua.org/VaadENG/ Narodna Pravda, March 4, 2008: http://narodna.pravda.com.ua/history/47cd371e88b05/ (accessed News%20eng-2009/fishbeyn2.htm (accessed November 8, 2009). March 16, 2008). 303. Fishbein, “The Jewish Card”; “Russia uses ‘Jewish card’ to destabilize Ukraine, Fishbein says,” 293. Volodymyr V’’iatrovych, “Iak tvorylasia lehenda pro Nakhtihal’,” Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, no. 6 (685) Ukrainian News, 25 June–July 8, 2009, 6; and Marko Levytsky, “UPA detractors fan the flames of 16–22 February 2008: http://www.dt.ua/3000/3150/62036/ (accessed March 16, 2008) ethnic discord,” Ukrainian News, February 18–March 3, 2010, 6. 294. Mishchenko, “Pratsivnyk SBU.” 304. Moses Fishbein, “The Jewish ard in Russian Operations against Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, June 30, 2009: http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/44324 (accessed September 7, 2009). 295. SBU, “U Sluzhbi bezpeky Ukrainy vidbulys’ Hromads’ki istorychni slukhannia ‘Evrei v Ukrains’komu vyzvol’nomu rusi,’ April 14, 2008: http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/ 305. Paul Goble, “Window on Eurasia: Moscow Special Services Again Play the ‘Jewish Card’ against article?art_id=77689&cat_id=39574 (accessed April 14, 2008). Ukraine, Kyiv writer Says,” Window on Eurasia, July 9, 2009: http://windowoneurasia.blogspot. com/2009/07/window-on-moscow-special.html (accessed September 5, 2009). Goble presents himself 66 67 as “a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia,” and worked, among other things, 314. “Sered heroiv novoho romanu Zabuzhko ‘Muzei pokynutykh sekretiv’ kolysgni v’iazni tiurmy for the U.S. State Department, the CIA, and RFE/RL until 2004, when he made a career as vice dean ‘na Lontskoho’” Press-tsentr TsDVR, December 24, 2009: http://upa.in.ua/book/?p=981#more-981 and director of research at several universities in the former Soviet Union. (accessed December 27, 2010). Zabuzhko writes that V’’iatrovych’s center provided her with “half a bag full of working material—xero copies, DVDs, photographs and memoirs on the history of the 306. Krentsbakh, “Zhivu schche zavdiaky UPA”; “Spohady Stelly Krentsbakh—‘Zhyvu shche Ukrainian Resistance—the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).” “Popil Klaasa,” Ofitsiina storinka zavdlaiky UPA.’ Memoirs of Stella Krenzbach—‘I Am Alive Thanks to the UPA,’” October 25, 2009, Oksany Zabuzhko, http://www.zabuzhko.com/ua/critique/ukrhellebosch.html (accessed December on Moisei Fishbein’s blog: http://mosesfishbein.blogspot.com/2009/10/memoirs-of-stella-krenzbach- 27, 2010). i-am-alive.html (accessed October 25, 2009). 315. “L’vivs’ki novyny: Oksana Zabuzhko: ‘Ia ne pysala istorii UPA—ia pysala lav-stori,’” Vysokyi 307. “Ievreika Stella Krentsbakh rozpovila, shcho vyzhyla zavdiaky UPA,” Press-tsentr TsDVR, zamok, January 26, 2010: http://news.lvivport.com/content/view/20694/26/ (accessed December 27, December 9, 2009: http://upa.in.ua/book/?p=929 (accessed December 15, 2010). 2010). 308. Levytsky, “UPA detractors fan the flames of ethnic discord,” 6: Marco Levytsky, “Open letter 316. Only 6 percent of Ukrainians had a “very positive” attitude toward the OUN(b), and 8 percent villifies freedom fighters, minimizes Holodomor,” Kyiv Post, May 6, 2011 http://www.kyivpost. “basically positive,” whereas 30 percent were “very negative,” and 15 percent “generally negative.” com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/103827/print/ (Accessed May 10, 2011) Riabchuk also repeats the The attitudes to the UPA was similar, with 5 percent very positive, 8 percent generally positive, while V’’iatrovych/Fishbein line that “quite a few Jews were rescued by nationalists, and some of them 29 percent very negative, and 16 percent generally negative. Significantly, the attitudes within the even joined UPA to fight both Nazis and Soviets.” “Bandera’s Controversy and Ukraine’s Future.” younger generation did not differ significantly from the older; neither did the attitude within the group 309. Victor Rud, “RE: John Pancake’s UPA Article of January 6, 2010,” Open letter to the Washington of highly educated differ much from the population in general. The exception was Galicia, where 62 Post on behalf of the Ukrainian American Bar Association, January 22, 2010, citing Fishbein, “The percent of those surveyed had a positive attitude to OUN(b), and 59 to UPA. Even in Volhynia only Jewish Card in Russian Special Operations Against Ukraine.” 5 percent of respondents were very positive, and 11 percent generally positive to UPA. Asked about war criminality, 35 percent of respondents thought OUN(b) and UPA were guilty of mass murder of 310. Moses Fishbein, “Listivka UPA ‘Evrei—hromadiany Ukrainy.’ 1950 rik,” December 7, 2009: Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles; 6 percent of murdering people from one of these groups. Only 14 percent http://mosesfishbein.blogspot.com/2009/12/1950.html (accessed December 7, 2009). of respondents thought them innocent of mass murder. Ivan Kachanovs’kyi, “Ukraintsy ne veriat v mify ob OUN i UPA,” Fraza: http://www.fraza.ua/print/14.10.09/76064.html (accessed January 23, 2010). 311. Kurylo and Himka, “Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv?” 317. Asked, “How would you define your country’s relation to the following groups during World 312. This is based upon V’’iatrovych’s most positive estimate, which includes the four named Jews, War II?” 64 percent of the respondents answered that relations with Ukrainians were bad, a higher the Stella Krentsbakh/Kreutzbach forgery and her claim that she worked with twelve Jews in her number even than Germans (63 percent) and Russians (57 percent). Wojciech Szacki and Marcin sanitary unit: twenty-five Jews divided by the lowest estimate of about 25,000 UPA insurgents in 1943. Wojciechowski. “3li Niemcy. +li Ukrai#cy: To Niemcy byli g"ównymi wrogami Polaków w II wojnie V’’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN, 74–82. In order to provide a perspective here, this handful of Jewish i to oni zadali nam najwi$cej cierpie#. Ale najgorzej wspominamy kontakty z Ukrai#cami,” Gazeta physicians in the UPA should be put in relation to estimates that between 25,000 and 40,000 people Wyborcza, August 24, 2009, 4. served in the UPA in 1943–1944 and that perhaps as many as 300,000 people came through the ranks of the OUN-UPA. Marples, Heroes and Villains, 131–132, 169. The estimates of the number of people 318. The question, “Who was responsible for the crimes committed in Volhynia in 1943?” 14 percent organized in the OUN and UPA varies. Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi estimates that 400,000 people were answered “Ukrainians,” while only 5 percent answered “UPA, Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian military organized by the OUN-UPA between 1929 and the middle of the 1950s, or 10 percent of the Western formations.” A full 19 percent blamed “Russians, the USSR, NKVD. Among them, 1 percent blamed Ukrainian population. Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi, “Polska problematyka w ukrai#skich badaniach historii “Ukrainians and Russians” and “Ukrainians executing Russian orders”; 1 percent blamed “Germans” OUN-UPA,” in Antypolska akcja OUN-UPA, 1943–1944: Fakty i interpretacje (Warsaw, 2003), 137, and “Ukrainians, on German orders”; 2 percent blamed “Poles and Ukrainians,” “Mutual slaughter,” and cited in Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat,” 279. German estimates from the end of 1943 put UPA “both sides”; 1 percent maintained that “Others were responsible,” or that it was “unclear” who was to membership at 40,000. Nationalist sources claim 100,000 members, but well-substantiated estimates blame. By far the largest group, 57 percent, answered “Don’t know, have not heard about it, difficult to provide numbers between 30,000 and 40,000 soldiers. John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3d answer.” Katarzyna Makaruk, “Wo"y# 1943,” Komunikat z bada", Warsaw, July 2008, BS/110/2008, ed. (Englewood, Colo.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990), 115. Centrum Badania Opini Spo"ecznej, CBOS, 4: http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2008/K_110_08. PDF (accessed December 26, 2010). 313. See, for instance the story of Ludwik Wrodarczyk, a Roman Catholic village priest in Okopy in Volhynia, a rescuer of Jews who in 2000 was designated as Righteous of Nations. The UPA kidnapped 319. Andreas Umland, “Die andere Anomalie der Ukraine: ein Parlament ohne rechtsradikale and killed him in December 1943. Maria D$bowska and Leon Popek, Duchowie"stwo diecezji !uckiej: Fraktionen,” Ukraine-Analysen, no. 41 (2008): 7–10. Ofiary wojny i represji okupantów, 1939–1945 (Lublin: Polihymnia Wydawnictwo Muzyczne, 2010). In Hanachevka (Hanaczów) in Galicia, the commander of the Polish self-defense, Kazimierz Wojtowicz, 320. Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?” in Homi K. Bhabha, ed., Nation and Narration (London: assisted dozens of Jews in the village. The Jews of Hanachevka organized a Jewish platoon, fighting Routledge, 1990), 11. the UPA together with the local Poles within the ranks of Armja Krajowa. Wojtowicz survived the war and was, together with his two brothers designated as Righteous of Nations. Marples, Heroes 321. Bruno Bettelheim, The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales (New and Villains, 206; Jerzy W$gierski, W lwowskiej Armii Krajowej (Warsaw: PAX), ch. 2–7; Motyka, York: Vintage, 1989), 7–8. Ukrai"ska partzyantka, 382. 68 69 322. Ibid., 9–10. 333. Pres-sluzhba Prezydenta Viktora Ianukovycha, “Rishenniam sudu prezydents’kyi ukaz ‘Pro prysvoennia S. Banderi zvannia Heroi Ukrainy’ skazovano,” press release, January 12, 2011, 323. Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschuggnall, “Opa war kein Nazi”: Prezydent Ukrainy Viktor Ianukovych: Ofitsiine internet-predstavnytsvo: http://www.president.gov. Nationalsozialismusnund Holocuast im Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch ua/news/19103.html (accessed February 12, 2011). Verlag, 2002), 210. 334. “Babi Yar transferred to Culture Ministry,” Ukrinform: Ukrainian National News Agency, March 324. Ibid., 207. 2, 2011. 325. Ibid., 209. 335. Askol’d Lozyns’kyj (b. 1952), a New York lawyer and OUN(b)-activist, is a former president of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, and the son of Evhen Lozyns’kyj. 326. Peter Niedermüller, “Der Mythos der Gemeinschaft: Geschichte, Gedächtnis und Politik im heutigen Osteuropa,” in Andrea Corbea Hoise, Rudolf Jaworski, and Monika Sommer, eds.,Umbruch 336. Wolodymyr Derzko, “Ukrainian Diaspora must learn how to play hardball with Yanukovych,” im östlichen Europa: Die nationale Wende und das kollektive Gedächtnis (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, Kyiv Post, September 27, 2010: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/84019/ (accessed 2004), 11–26. October 13, 2010); Askold S. Lozynskyj, “Anti-Semitism charges don’t stick against Ukrainian nationalist group,” Kyiv Post, December 20, 2010: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/ 327. Gudrun Persson, “On the Meaning of the Tristesse and the Lie,” Baltic Worlds 3, no. 2 (June detail/93235/ (accessed December 24, 2010). 2010): 16, citing Andrei Zubov, Istoriia Rossii: XX vek, 1894–1939 (Moscow: Astrel, 2009), 933. 337. Olena Tregub, “Ukrainian-Americans reject meeting with Yanukovych,” Kyiv Post, September 328. Dmytrii Rybakov, “Marko Tsarynnyk: Istorychna napivpravda hirsha za odvertu brekhniu”; LB.ua, 23, 2010: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/83599/ (accessed October 15, 2010). November 5, 2009. http://society.lb.ua/life/2009/11/05/13147_Marko_TSarinnik_Istorichna_napivp. html (Accessed Nov. 6, 2009); Himka, “True and False Lessons; Vasyl’ Rasevych, “Zamknute kolo 338. “Paul Grod: ‘My position on Ukraine . . . was agreed with leaders of UCC’s member ‘spetsial’noi’ ukrainskoi istorii,” Zaxid.net, September 13, 2010: http://zaxid.net/article/74357 (accessed organizations,’” interview by Martha Onufriv, EPOSHTA, September 28, 2010: http://www.eposhta. September 16, 2010). com/newsmagazine/ePOSHTA_100928_CanadaUS.html#fo1a (accessed October 15, 2010). 329. In April 2007, President Yushchenko submitted to the Verkhovna Rada a draft law against 339. Lozynskyj, “Anti-Semitism charges don’t stick.” Holodomor denial, which, had the law passed, would criminalize denial of the genocidal character 340. Askold S. Lozynskyj, “How insensitive bigots continue to play Ukrainians and Jews against each of the famine of 1932–1933. The Day Weekly Digest (Kyiv), no. 11, April 3, 2007; Ilya Khineiko, other,” Kyiv Post, November 8, 2010: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/89252/ “Russian Duma’s Discussion of Second World War Revisionism in the Near Abroad States,” Current (accessed November 8, 2010); Peter O’Neil, “My role in a dark conspiracy,” Letter From Paris by Politics in Ukraine, June 23, 2009: http://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com/ [CIUS Stasiuk Program Peter O’Neil, November 10, 2010:http://communities.canada.com/shareit/blogs/letterfromparis/default. Blog] (accessed October 2, 2009). As there is no consensus whether the famine was an act of genocide, aspx?PageIndex=2 (accessed November 13, 2010). this would, technically, have made a number of senior scholars and academics, including Mark B. Tauger, R. W. Davis, Stephen G. Wheatcroft, Michael Ellman, Lynne Viola, Moshe Lewin, even Robert 341. Lozynskyj, “Rewriting history,” reprinted as Askol’d Lozyns’kyi, “Perepysuvannia istorii: Conquest—who remains ambivalent on the—liable for jail time in Ukraine. On the assessment of the z perspektyvy dokaziv,” 204–210; also Rudling, “Iushchenkiv fashyst,” 255, 302, both in Amar, famine as genocide, see Marples, Heroes and Villains, 72, 313, n. 1. Balyn’skyi, and Hrytsak, Strasti za Banderoiu. 330. Roman Serbyn, “Erroneous Methods in J.-P. Himka’s Challenge to “Ukrainian 342. Lozynskyj, “Anti-Semitism charges don’t stick.” Myths,” August 7, 2011, Current Politics in Ukraine Blog: Opinon and analysis on current events in Ukraine, Stasiuk Program, CIUS, University of Alberta, ed. David R. Marples. 343. Onufrir interview, “My position on Ukraine.” http://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com/ (accessed October 1, 2011). 344. Peter O’Neil, “Ukrainian museum toured by Harper shows ‘one-sided’ history of atrocities, 331. The following commentary by Taras Hunczak is fairly typical in this regard: “Despite overwhelming critics say,” Edmonton Journal, November 5, 2010: http://www.edmontonjournal.com/news/Ukrain evidence exonerating the OUN and Roman Shukhevych, there are still individuals, particularly those ian+museum+toured+Harper+show+sided+history+atrocities+critics/3785861/story.html (accessed with communist leanings or followers of the Moscow trend to condemn the Ukrainians’ struggle for November 6, 2010). independence, who continue to slander the leaders of the Ukrainian resistance movement.” Taras Hunczak, “Shukhevych and the Nachtigall Battalion: Moscow’s Fabrications,” Ukrainian Weekly, 345. Rudling, “Iushchenkiv fashyst,” 252–253, 296; Himka, “Interventions” no. 37 (September 13, 2009): 18. 346. “Reminder to Register for the XXIII Congress in Edmonton,” email from UCC to author, October 332. Ukrainian Canadian Congress, “Ukraine’s President Recognized Ukraine’s Freedom Fighters,” 15, 2010. UCC Press release, email of February 1, 2010. On the UCC’s strategy to “defend” their heroes, see Rudling, “Iushchenkiv fashyst,” 252, 295–296 and John-Paul Himka, “Interventions: Challenging 347. Peter O’Neil, “Historian hopes Harper’s visit to Ukraine museum will help shed light on war the Myths of Twentieth-Century Ukrainian History,” in a forthcoming Ab Imperio volume on atrocities,” The Montreal Gazette, November 10, 2010, http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Hist Geschichtspolitik, sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, ed. Alexei Miller. orian+hopes+Harper+visit+Ukraine+museum+will+help+shed+light/3807727/story.html (accessed November 10, 2010). 70 71 348. “Arkhivni dokumenty ruinuiut’ mif pro antysemityzm OUN, - V’’iatrovych,” Zik: syla informatsii, http://zik.com.ua/ua/news/2011/01/09/265640 (accessed January 9, 2011) 349. Paul Grod, “Ukrainian Community Honors Veterans on Rememberence Day,” UCC Press release, November 11, 2010. 350. “Rememberance Candle Focus of Holodomor Commemorations: Canadians prepare to mark the 77th anniversary of the Ukrainian Genocide,” UCC National Press release, November 16, 2010; Peter O’Neil, “Harper’s Ukraine famine exaggerated, scholar says,” Edmonton Journal, October 30, 2010: http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=ea26329d-c6c5-4e76-b8f5- 48ff37f57537 (accessed March 24, 2011). 351. Whereas the change of national government has effectively ended state support for the OUN cult, this sort of heroization continues on the local level. In December 2010 the Kyiv city government announced plans to rename streets after Roman Shukhevych, Iaroslav Stets’ko, Andrii Mel’nyk, and Olena Teliha. “Na Oboloni z’’iavyt’sia vultrsia Romana Shukhevycha,” Ukrains’ka pravda: Istorychna pravda, December 16, 2010: http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2010/12/16/9227/ (accessed December 17, 2010). 352. “Voin UPA: Bandera—iedinyi lytsar u Evropi, khto 1941 roku skazav Hitleru ‘ni’”: http://a- ingwar.blogspot.com/ (accessed September 26, 2010). 353. Oleh Tiahnybok, “Evroparlament he vkazuvatyme Ukraini, koho vyznavaty Heroiami,” February 26, 2010, Ukrains’ka Pravda Blohy: http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/tiahnybok/4b88066cc9c5f/ (accessed April 26, 2010). 72