NOT SO CALM AN ADMINISTRATION: THE ANGLO-FRENCH OCCUPATION OF CANTON, 1858-1861

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One of the more persistent myths of early Sino-European relations is the calm which is said to have prevailed during the three year long Anglo-French occupation of Canton, 1858-1861. As described by one of the best recent histories of modern China:

A few years, later when Canton was occupied by the British in 1857, the Cantonese showed no sign of unruliness and foreigners could walk about unmolested, 'without the slightest sign of resistance or animosity.'

The reality, though, was far different. The Cantonese, long resistant to British demands that they allow foreigners within the walls of their city, continued for quite some time to make life very difficult for the occupying forces. In fact, very considerable resistance was carried out against the foreign military establishment and the mixed units of Sino-European police which worked with them.

The purpose of this essay is to illustrate elements of the allied occupation, the administrative structure established for the city's governance and the various issues, among them the occupation itself, and the coolie trade, which at times made Allied control of Canton considerably more precarious than we have been led to believe.

The initial occupation

The origins of the Second Opium War, or Arrow War as it is often called, are well known and need no more than adumbration here. Certainly, the allied sense that the Opium War treaties, signed more than a decade before, needed revision, as well as long running difficulties between the British and the Cantonese over the right of the former to

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enter the city walls added to the general tension. More specifically Governor-General Yeh Ming-chen, perceived by local Europeans as an obstacle to peace, as they understood it, was quite unwilling to meet the British demands. As for the French, certainly their desire to establish an influence for themselves equal to that of the British by championing the rights of missionaries added impetus to French interest in a confrontation. As is well known, pretexts once desired are usually found. For the British, the Chinese boarding of the *Arrow* near Canton was said to be an act of lèse-majesté against the British flag (regardless of the reality of the ship's status). And for the French the convenient death of a French missionary played its role in bringing the combined flotilla before the walls of Canton in late December 1857. There several thousand British and French soldiers soon gathered to make their assault.

For those not immediately responsible for the military assault the enormity of the undertaking they were involved in must have caused considerable reflection. They were about to attack and presumably occupy an enormous city of more than a million inhabitants. There was no telling, assuming a successful assault, how long they would be required to hold it. But Canton's future administration would be a quieter challenge and one less immediate than the more pressing matter of first taking the city. The actual assault has been often discussed. It suffices here to note that the city's capture, apparently due to the Governor-General's poor planning, was a reasonably simple affair.²

Within days of occupying the city it was clear that the allies would be quite unable to govern it directly. The principal issue was that they were faced with the administration of a city of more than a million people when no more than three among the allied forces could even communicate in Chinese. Of the British only Harry Parkes, the future allied commissioner of the city, and Thomas Wade, later ambassador to Peking, knew Chinese.³

The French, for their part, were without a senior officer able to communicate at all. Their only contribution in this regard was the presenced of a certain Marques who was then serving the French mission as a Chinese secretary. For the French, more than for the British, the lack of Chinese linguists was to be a major impediment to their activities throughout China and for years to come. Almost ten months later Paris

was informed that while the British had twelve Chinese language linguists available, including a number of former officials and students, the French still had only three officials and several students with appropriate language skills. It was obvious that the city's administration would be a far greater challenge than merely capturing it.

Establishing a functioning government was an absolute necessity because looting, first begun by the victorious Allied troops, had been taken up by the local Chinese. The situation was becoming quite out of hand. Organized bands of looters were active throughout the city. A decision had to be made. The only obvious choice was recognition that the local Chinese bureaucrats, individuals only just defeated and imprisoned days before, would now have to be released and recruited to administer the city through an arrangement whereby the allies would supervise them even as they supervised the Cantonese. There was little time to loose, even the local Chinese had begun to insist that the new "authorities" do something. On the Third of January Gros received three petitions insisting that the looting be suppressed.

Since using the imprisoned Governor-General Yeh, who had enraged the foreigners for so long, was quite out of the question, they decided to recruit one of Yeh's former associates, the Governor of Kwangtung, Po-Kuei. The Governor, himself a prisoner of the allies, was understood by Baron Gros to be a rival of Yeh's and apparently willing to resume his former duties. It was understood as well that Po-Kuei's involvement would facilitate the return of the many minor officials whose co-operation would be required as well. Gros himself was skeptical about ruling through the local Chinese, but it was clearly the only feasible plan. It was assumed that with appropriate supervisory mechanisms a satisfactory arrangement could be worked out.

As for Po-Kuei himself, one of his principal concerns was whether the city, having once fallen to the allies, might soon become a rebel stronghold of the Taipings. The allied assurance that they intended to hold the city against any assaults until a settlement could be reached with the Emperor, must surely have reassured the Chinese Governor. Having the city in the hands of the Taipings would probably have been an even greater crisis than the European presence.¹⁰

Agreement reached, Po-Kuci was formally installed on the ninth of January 1858. Unfortunately he arrived a bit late for the ceremony having been somewhat tardily released from the allied stockade. For the allied commanders the real goal now was to ensure that the new allied commission they had planned would be able to supervise Po-Kuci's administration of the city.

The Allied Commission

Having decided, despite reservations, to rely on the local mandarins to administer Canton, the military commanders. Sir Charles van Straubenzee and M. D'Abouville, the French commander, decided to appoint a mixed commission of military and consular officials to supervise the city's Chinese administration. The proposed commission was to have three members, two of whom would be military. They were to be assisted by an English language secretary and another proficient in Chinese. Additionally, the French commissioner was expected to be aided as well by at least one, perhaps two, French language secretaries. Provisions were made to hire a treasurer as well as various coolies, cooks and jailers. They also hoped to hire three Chinese translators though it would actually be some months before competent lingusits, men like Robert Hart, later known for his leadership of the Chinese Customs, arrived to help. 12 Salaries were set by the occupation council made up of the military commanders as well as the expedition's political leadership, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros. 13 Moving to implement their plans, the three went on to name three individuals to serve as commissioners. For the British, Harry Parkes, of the consular service, and Colonel Holloway were selected, while Captain Martineau de Chesnez was selected by the French, 14 Parkes, although ostensibly equal in official duties, was the only one of the commissioners who actually spoke Chinese and thus had a clear advantage over his colleagues. The French, concerned as well that Captain de Chesnez's relatively low rank vis à vis his colleagues could be a problem soon moved to have him promoted. 15 The commission, as the next months would reveal, was to serve primarily as an intermediary between the local Chinese leadership and the allied military commanders who held the real power over the occupied city. 16

It should not be assumed however, as some writers have, ¹⁷ that the Chinese served as mere puppets under the foreigners. It is obvious from

the available administrative records that both Governor Po-Kuei's cooperation and that of his staff were vitally important to the smooth running of the occupation. This was understood quite early when initially there had been considerable concern that the Governor would not be able to gain the support of his staff and then again later, when tensions arose, the Governor's efforts to abandon his post were blocked since without his co-operation nothing could be done. A year later when Po-Kuei died, there was considerable concern lest his successor be less co-operative.¹⁸

Aware both of their need to work through the Chinese and the complications of the situation, the allies put considerable thought into planning an appropriate division of responsibilities for the new city government. Po-Kuei was duly sequestered in the inner sections of the official yamen while allied sentries watched everyone who communicated with him. The Allied commissioners, Holloway, Chesnez and Parkes, occupied quarters in the outer sections of the same compound. 19 Po-Kuci himself was informed that he could continue to administer justice and keep order as long as he accepted the supervision of the commissioners. 20 Meanwhile, the commissioners, themselves under the authority of the military commanders, prepared to approve all of Po-Kuei's proclamations, as well as dealing with those legal cases which involved foreigners.21 Over time they involved themselves as well in the organization and administration of the mixed units of police which were soon set up to patrol the town.²² It was agreed that the commissioners would meet each day in council at eight in the morning; then one or more of them would confer with Po-Kuei to discuss those matters requiring his attention. From ten to one the commissioners planned to listen to public complaints.²³

As for the expenses of the occupation, which eventually lasted more than three years, that is until the autumn of 1861, they were initially paid for by the allies but within a few months the Chinese government assumed financial responsibility for the city's administration.²⁴

Occupation: the early months

As already mentioned, among the principal early concerns were arrangements to police the city to stop looting, by both allied soldiers and Chinese troops, which had begun early in the first days after the

assault. As far as their own soldiers were involved, a dramatic and severe flogging by the allies of the offenders is said to have aroused Chinese admiration. ²⁵ But most importantly, beyond the immediate necessity of restoring order, a regular system of patrolling the streets had to be devised. Unfortunately, the initial efforts proved counterproductive.

At first, the Allies had sent out groups of soldiers on an hoc basis to patrol the streets. But the regular European troops proved to be much less effective than they had been in the city's capture only a few days before. In fact, their mere presence marching through the city's winding streets caused such a stir among the local population that bands of Chinese thieves, following close behind, found their passing to be an excellent opportunity to shop-lift from the market stalls. It was obvious that a less conspicuous method of patrolling was needed. Thus the decision was made to establish mixed units of Western and Chinese troops. 26 By late January, several hundred such units had been organized to patrol both the city and the suburbs. They were told not to dress in uniform and included British, French, Chinese and Manchu troops. About a half a dozen police stations were established around the city and from them, both night and day, the new units emerged to carry out their duties.²⁷ Happily the units co-operated well and were apparently less disruptive than the formal military units had been. According to some observers, the sight of the double files of Europeans and Chinese each led respectively by a sargeant and a petty mandarin were not as well worth contemplating.28 When criminals were apprehended the procedure of having the Europeans dealt with by the allied tribunal while Po-Kuei took responsibility for the Chinese seemed to work quite well.

By the early spring the occupation seemed to be settling into a routine. Many of the shops were opening again despite the considerable damage caused by the bombardment, and commerce was active. ²⁹ Nevertheless, if open hostilities had ended, the Cantonese, who had so long resisted the foreign demands, were hardly co-operative. In fact, so unco-operative was the general population that there was, in early January, talk of lobbing a few more shells into the city just to make sure the inhabitants were sufficiently cowed. However, both Gros and Elgin, the chief diplomats of the mission, were against the idea and nothing came of it.³⁰

Months later the situation had only slightly improved. By March the

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city was calming and civilian foreigners were cautiously venturing within the city walls. But confidence had hardly returned. As for their "partner" in the co-operation, the Governor Po-Kuei, the allies certainly did not trust him. In fact the French suspected that Po-Kuei, despite his apparent willingness to co-operate, was secretly working to undermine their authority.³¹

The long summer of 1858

As mentioned above, despite the relative peace of the first weeks of the occupation, a calm which has often been assumed to have continued throughout the city's occupation, the allied forces soon found themselves caught up in a full-fledged resistance movement which lasted throughout the summer of 1858.

Especially common during the spring of 1858 were attacks on isolated individuals in the environs of the city. The assaults were serious and frequent enough for the French to carry out reprisals against those natives living in the vicinity of the attack. ³² At first it was thought that such a show of force would be effective, but within weeks Cantonese anger had become so obvious that consideration was seriously given to reestablishing the blockade. Harry Parkes, despite his language skills, was, for example, reported to be no longer safe walking the streets without an armed guard. Assassination attempts against alled sentries and others had become commonplace. ³³

Growing alarmed, the allied commissioners met with Po-Kuei and demanded any information he had on potential Chinese attacks against the city. They also protested against anti-foreign proclamations which had appeared advertising rewards for the heads of foreigners or Chinese collaborators. To their frustration Po-Kuei's attitude seemed to be one of indifference. The commissioners insisted that the searches for arms, already begun by the military commanders, be endorsed by Po-Kuei.³⁴

As for the regular commercial life of the city, by May it was winding to a stop as tensions continued to increase.³⁶ By June it was obvious that the provincial authorities were encouraging the Cantonese in their resistance. The new governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Huang Tsung-han, issued a long manifesto reminding the locals of their

past patriotism and encouraging them in their resistance to the occupation. 6

The developing resistance clearly required a military response. Thus, in early June General van Straubenzee led an expedition beyond Canton's walls to disperse 1500 to 2000 braves gathered to the northwest of the city. Little was accomplished. Most of the braves had already dispersed when the Europeans arrived and unfortunately several of the soldiers died during the expedition, some of wounds and others from the heat.³⁷

Within the occupation government the situation was beginning to appear more and more dangerous. The initial decision to rely on the mandarins to run the city now appeared to have been a tactical error. Some of the foreign officers claimed it had given a false impression of allied weakness. 38 The Cantonese themselves, reasonably passive during the initial assault, were now increasingly attacking the foreigners. In mid-June a Dr. Turnbull, chief surgeon of the expeditionary force, was decapitated having been captured as he attempted to aid two soldiers wounded in an earlier assault. The surgeon's death further highlighted the increasing precariousness of the occupation. Each night, under cover of darkness, the situation become much worse. The walls of the city were assaulted by unknown assailants. 49 The foreigners sat through each night as various bombs and fuses were thrown at their positions by the locals.40 Such attacks were answered by daylight Allied reprisals against the various settlements beyond the walls located in the directions from which the shots had been fired.41

By late June the acting British consul Winchester put out a circular warning British merchants to be wary of the warlike tones of the imperial commissioner's proclamations and warning them to "secure themselves against the treacherous and stealthy attacks so consistent to the ideas of the Chinese . . .". They were also told to expect a reduction of ship traffic in front of the city walls as the allied commanders moved to deal with the growing military threat. Eventually all river traffic by Chinese junks was forbidden in the area near the city.⁴²

Throughout the summer the situation continued to escalate. After the Chinese tried to burn a ship which housed the French vice-consul the French retaliated by torching homes to the west of the city walls. ⁴³ The

life of the city was clearly grinding to a halt. Moreover the British, French and American consuls had withdrawn from the city. The French, seeking to demonstrate strength, had gone on the offensive, burning nearby suburbs. Undeterred, the Chinese forces continued to lob bombs at allied positions during the hours of darkness.⁴⁴

As the summer proceeded the attacks became ever more commonplace. Real antagonism had developed between the allied forces and the local population. Attacks on foreigners by armed braves were occuring daily, often in broad daylight, so brazen had the population become. Especially at risk were the British sepoys whom the Chinese had taken to carrying off at the rate of one or two a day. 45

It was becoming an open state of siege. Many of the local Chinese, no doubt seeking to save themselves, had begun to abandon the city. 46 In early July word came to Baron Gros that the Governor-General had put out a circular calling for the complete annihilation of the foreigners. 47 It now seemed likely that a full-scale attack against the allied positions might soon take place. 48 The allied leaders had certainly come to regret their decision to have the Chinese administer the city for them. Elgin was convinced that the arrangement had given a false impression of allied weakness and furthermore discouraged those who might have been willing to co-operate. It was clear in the opinion of Elgin and Gros that martial law needed to be proclaimed and the Chinese administrators removed from power. However, for reasons that are not clear, it does not seem that such martial law was ever proclaimed even temporarily. Again, language problems may have made such a decision impossible. 49

By late July a full scale Chinese attack was launched against the city walls. Encouraged by provincial Chinese officials, the Kwangtung Militia even attempted unsuccessfully to retake the city from its captors. A large body of Chinese braves attacked the Eastern Gate, the very area the allies had successfully assaulted the previous winter. Unfortunately for the Chinese they were less successful. They took several hundred casualties and inflicted no allied wounds. In the immediate aftermath of the efforts to retake the city, the assaults diminished and it appears that the Chinese abandoned their effort to challenge the occupation seriously. ⁵⁰ Nevertheless, harrassment of individual foreigners continued to be quite

common as were allied reprisals. The city itself was at a standstill. Large numbers of Chinese had evacuated and the British traders had long since departed. $^{\rm NI}$

Considering the size of the allied force it is amazing they felt they were able to hold the city at all. In mid August the British had only four to five thousand troops in Canton and the French somewhere between 400 and a thousand. The French numbers were especially limited due to preparations, then under way, for an expedition to Indochina. Moreover, the thirty to forty ships of the British overshadowed the mere three ships available to the French members of the occupying force. 53

Baron Gros, responsible for the city's occupation, warned Paris that the situation was especially grave and that he had word that the authorities, although aware that a peace treaty had been signed, were nevertheless pressuring the Chinese to continue their opposition to the occupation. To Gros' additional frustration the attacks continued throughout early August and the heat, which was apparently unbearable, made sorties against the braves impossible. Some sections of the city had simply been abandoned. Things were so tense that Po-Kuei, the Chinese Governor, who had been willing the previous winter to cooperate with the allies, tried several times that summer to abandon his post. Apparently the French had to literally force him to return and co-operate. The strength of the city force him to return and co-operate.

Happily, though, as news of the treaties signed to the north spread more widely, the resistance subsided. By early September the population had begun to return to the city and the allies, feeling more at ease, again allowed junk traffic near the city walls. Although it would be quite some time before things returned to a reasonable semblance of calm,⁵⁷ they had, it now seemed, survived the long hot summer of 1858.

The Occupation and the Coolie Trade

Although tensions in the immediate environs of Canton did not again reach the levels of the first summer of the occupation, there nevertheless remained issues which threatened to provoke even worse resistance to allied control. Chief among these concerns were those aroused by the kidnapping of locals by coolie merchants.

The kidnappers were daring in their raids. By early 1859 Chinese from all walks of life were increasingly being carried off by Chinese gangs working for foreign coolie agents. The Chinese community was so alarmed that it simultaneously petitioned the allied authorities to stop the kidnappings as well as taking matters into its own hands. In April local merchants petitioned the British to take action. That same month local Chinese, having captured several kidnappers, murdered them.⁵⁸ Consul Alcock described the situation:

The acts of violence and fraud connected with the coolie trade at this port . . . have already reached such a pitch of atrocity that a general feeling of alarm spread through the population accompanied by a degree of excitement and popular indignation which rendered it no longer possible or safe for any authority interested in the peace of the place to remain inactive. 59

Alcock's last sentence provides the principal clue to the allied commissioners' dilemma. Somewhere around 60,000 to 70,000 people had been carried off in recent years, but until recently that had principally been a Chinese concern. But since January of the previous year, Canton had been under allied administration and now any agitation caused by the kidnappers would necessarily impact negatively on the European ability to continue the occupation. In short, it was now their problem. And if simple insecurity was not enough to get them to move against the kidnappers, class concerns added an additional incentive, for it was understood that the randomly selected victims were often from the Chinese upper classes, which the British found more "civilized" than many other groups. 60

If it was imperative that the illegal kidnapping stop, nevertheless, it was true as well that, with the ever-increasing demand for labour in the New World, the Europeans were committed to finding a more acceptable means of recruiting Chinese contract labour. The next months would thus see a two-part effort; on the one hand to suppress the kidnapping while on the other hand to regularize coolie emigration in a fashion that was acceptable to the local Chinese yet which did not compromise the outflow of Chinese labourers.

The first weeks of April were especially busy. Chinese officials, both those under Allied control as well as those elsewhere in the province. and the allied commissioners worked to outlaw illegal coolie traffic even as they moved to put into place a more regular system of contract labour.

Both Huang Tsung-han, the Governor-General, and Po-Kuei issued proclamations condemning the kidnapping while suggesting that a more regular method of recruitment, devoid of coercion, might be allowed. Po-Kuci even offered a reward for the capture of any kidnappers. 61 As for the allied commanders, their own proclamation was issued on 7th April. Again they made it clear that while regular recruitment would be allowed, they would suppress the illegal trade with all the power at their command. 62

That summer and autumn plans were made to reorganise the system of recruitment. The new procedures included an elaborate system of recruitment, an interviewing process designed to ensure that everyone involved completely understood the terms of the bilingual contracts and was entirely willing. Altruism aside, the allied occupation forces had to deal with the kidnapping immediately or face a crisis which would have made the summer of 1858 look mild in comparison. It was one thing for the city residents to accept European occupation in place of the rather distant and at times unpopular Manchu control and quite another to have submitted to the authority of a government unwilling to suppress the kidnapping of their children and family members.

Nevertheless, the world labour situation did require cheap labour, and hence the necessity of searching for a means of satisfying both the local Chinese as well as the foreign coolie markets. It would be many months, however, before a full system was in place which met both obligations.

Regularising the coolie trade

If it was obvious that the occupation simply could not continue while the locals were continuously outraged by the kidnappings of their relatives, it was no less clear that honest recruitment of labourers for work overseas was to be an important responsibility of the allied government. Therefore, by the autumn of 1859 the allied administration formally took steps to organize and control the trade. Henceforth it was to be a government-sponsored operation supervised by the commission itself.

In October a prospectus was distributed advertising the new policy. It made specific efforts to differentiate the new programme from the previous illegal trade. According to the prospectus, the trade was to provide labour for the West Indies and work for the poor of China. It was not to be considered slavery. The rights of those recruited would be guaranteed by the British government and families were welcome to come along. In fact, in addition to promising education for dependents, the flyer outlined contracts of five years with pay set at four dollars a month. The contract could be broken after a year though four-fifths of the price of passage had to be repaid. As an additional incentive a twenty dollar advance was offered. Happily for those interested in recruiting coolies, Lao Ch'ung-kuang, the acting Governor-General who had replaced Po-Kuei, agreed to endorse the plan and to supply a mandarin to work with John Austin, the British recruitment official. By the late autumn the French had made similar arrangements.

Every effort was made to disassociate the now official coolie recruitment from the previous illegal trade. Because the coolie ships had often sat off the coast near Whampoa full of men usually presumed to be prisoners, the new system established land-based recruitment houses in Canton. Parkes, the dominant commissioner, also worked with the local gentry and elders to gain their co-operation. And, as mentioned above, with the co-operation of the provincial officials, each emigration office, French and British, had had Chinese officials assigned to work with it.

The allied commissioners were taking no chances with a potential uprising stemming from ''misunderstandings'' associated with the trade. Coolie inspectors were assigned to interview the recruited labourers. The inspectors had the right to interview the men at any time and, if necessary to close down the offending establishment. No corporal punishment was to be allowed. The inspectors were to be present whenever contracts were signed and inspection officers were required to visit the emigration houses daily. ⁶⁷

Much of 1860 was spent working with the Chinese authorities searching for ways to shut down the continuing private trade in the outskirts of the city. That was not as easy as regularizing the trade within the city. The occupation administration was convinced that the illegal coolie trade with its accompanying brutality would make their continuing administration difficult if not impossible. Thus the commissioners and allied commanders remained committed to outlawing the illegal trade.⁶⁹

Conclusion

If the illegal trade remained a difficult problem, nevertheless, the Cantonese resistance to the occupation seems to have considerably lessened by 1860, and the next year and half, that is until the allied withdrawal, was relatively uneventful. Allowing to one observer:

Today, French, English, Americans, Russians and Portuguese, every foreign nationality can come without experiencing the least obstacle. When we walk in the streets of Canton the Chinese regard us with a curious air, even as we ourselves look at them, but without any demonstration of anger or vengefulness. Everyone knows that we came among them neither to dominate nor to enslave them. They are beginning to understand that our diplomatic and commercial relations should one day make them rich and free. I think they are not far from actually liking us. In effect, the Chinese cannot detest these strangers who have brought them the benefits of civilization. 70

Whatever the likelihood that the average Cantonese would have described the situation as our commentator did, it is nevertheless true that by 1860 the occupation had finally settled down to the routine so many have assumed it to have shown from the beginning. And a year later, by 1861, it was finally time to turn control of the city back to the Chinese.

The official ceremony of departure, in the wake of the settlement of the Arrow War, took place on October 19, 1861, just short of the fourth anniversary of the city's occupation and after most of the allied troops

had already departed. Of the original allied commissioners, only Harry Parkes was still there for the final ceremony which included a tri-national group of Chinese, French, and British dignitaries.⁷¹

If the allied occupation of Canton was not as uneventful as some historical accounts record, it nevertheless had very successful elements to it and may have had an influential impact on future Sino-European relations. At least two employees of the Allied Commission, Robert Hart and Prosper Giquel, both young men at the time, went on to play major roles in future Sino-European co-operative ventures later in the century, Robert Hart as the famous director of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service and Prosper Giquel as the future European Director of the Foochow Dockyard and eventually head of several Sino-European Educational Missions of the 1870s and 1880s. That their earlier experiences had been in the somewhat more co-operative world of the Sino-European police forces and the Sino-European coolie emigration inspection teams is certainly likely to have proved significant in the careers of these two men who were later so much more able than most of their countrymen to work with the Chinese on an equal basis.

NOTES

Abbreviations

ΑE	Archives de la Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
CCC	Correspondence consulaire et commerciale
CP	Correspondence politique, Chine
Armee	Les Archives de l'Armee de Terre, Vincennes
FO	British Foreign Office
PRO	British Public Record Office

SHM Service Historique de la Marine, Vincennes

AN Archives Nationales

¹ Ranbir Vohra, China's Path To Modernization: A Historical Review from 1800 to the Present (New Jersey, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1987) citing Christopher Hibbert, The Dragon Awakes: China and the West 1793-1911 (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 229.

² Douglas Hurd, *The Arrow War, Anglo-Chinese Confusion 1856-1860* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 121-125 and Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 121-125.

³ Elgin to Clarendon, 9 Jan. 1858, Accounts and Papers, XXXIII 2571 p. 140 and Bowring to Malmesbury, 15 April, 1859 Confidential Print, FO 405: 6, fol. 2, no. 1. It is often said that Martineau des Chesnez (see for example Hurd, The Arrow War, p. 125) spoke Chinese as well. This seems a confusion based on the fact that Chesnez spoke English and thus was helpful as a French-English linguist. See for example, Gros to Walewski, 13 January 1858, p.s. of the 14th, CP 23, fol. 41, AE.

⁴ Wade to Elgin, 10 March, 1858, Accounts and Papers, XXXIII 2571, (1859), p. 226.

⁵ See Steven A. Leibo, Transferring Technology to China: Prosper Giquel and the Self-strengthening Movement, (Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985), ch. 5.

⁶ Bourboulon to Walewski, 5 October, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 177-178, AE plus Leibo *Transferring Technology To China*, ch. 1.

⁷ Laurence Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, '58, '59 (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1859), vol. 1, 151.

⁸ Gros to Walewski, 3 January, 1858, CP, vol. 23, fol. 8, AE.

⁹ Gros to Walewski, 3 January, 1858, CP vol. 23, fol. 8, AE.

¹⁰ Gros to Walewski, 8 January, 1858, CP vol. 23, AE.

¹¹ Hurd, The Arrow War, p. 125.

¹² Bowring to Labouchers, 16 April 1858, FO 17 296, des. 49, fol. 117-118, PRO, and Stanley F. Wright, *Hart and the Chinese Customs* (Belfast: Wm. Mullan and Sons, 1950), p. 176.

¹³ Gros to Walewski, 8 February 1858, vol. 25, fol. 210, AE.

¹⁴ Laurence Olipham, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan, p. 155.

¹⁵ Genouilly to Min. de la Marine, July 1, 1858, Dossier Individual Martineau des Chesnez, CC 7 2503, SHM.

¹⁶ Elgin to Mahnesbury, 5 November, 1858, Accounts and Papers, XXXIII 2571, (1859), p. 413.

¹⁷ Hsu, The Rise of Modern China 3 ed. p. 207.

¹⁸ Trenqualye to Waleswski, 28 April 1859, CCC Canton, vol. 2, fol. 112 and D'Abouville to Min. de la Marine, 2 May 1859, BB 4 763, fol. 106-7, AN.

¹⁹ Laurence Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan, p. 155.

²⁰ Gros to Walewski, 8 January 1858, CP vol. 23, fol. 23, AE,

²¹ Hurd, The Arrow War, p. 125.

²² D'Abouville to Min. de la Marine, 12 December 1858, BB 4 763, fol. 20, AN.

²³ 11 January 1858, Accounts and Papers, XXXIII 2571 (1859), incl. 2 in no. 83 fol. 149. PRO.

²⁴ Coupvent to Min, de la Marine, 20 June 1860, BB 4 787, fol. 11, AN.

²⁵ Hurd, The Arrow War, pp. 124-126.

²⁶ Laurence Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan, p. 169.

- ²⁷ Parkes to Elgin, Accounts and Papers, XXXIII 2571 (1859) incl. 1 in no. 93 fol. 161. PRO and George Wingrove Cooke, China: Being "The Times" Special Correspondent from China in the Years 1857-1858, (London, 1858), p. 356.
- ²⁸ Laurence Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan, p. 169.
- ²⁹ Gros to Walewski, 13 January 1858, p.s. of the 14th, CP, vol. 23, fol. 41, AE.
- ³⁰ Gros to Walewski, January 3, 1858, CP, vol. 23, fol. 8, AE.
- ³¹ Trenqualye to Walewski, 24 March, 1858, CCC, Canton, vol. 2, fol. 62-65, AE.
- 32 Bourboulon to Walewski, 5 April, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 102-3, AE.
- ³³ Hong Kong Daily Press, 19 April, 1858, CP, vol. 2, fol. 44, AE.
- ³⁴ Parkes Memorandum, April 21, 1858, incl. 2 in Bowring Depatch no. 116 FO 17 296, 1858 PRO.
- 35 Bourboulon to Walewski, 26 October, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 194, AE.
- ³⁶ Proclamation of Huang Tsung-han, trans. by Parkes, CP, vol. 22, fol. 90, AE.
- ³⁷ Bourboulon to Walewski, 18 June, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 69-70, AE and D'Abouville to Min. de la Marine, 5 June, 1858, BB 4 763, SHM.
- 38 Malmesbury to Cowley, 17 June, 1858, CP, vol. 24, fol. 340, AE.
- ³⁹ Bourboulon to Walewski, 18 June, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 69-70, AE.
- ⁴⁰ Bourboulon to Walewski, 1 July, 1858, ps. of 2 July, CP, vol. 22, fol. 86, AE.
- ⁴¹ Bourboulon to Walewski, 21 June, CP, vol. 22, fol. 103-104, AE.
- ⁴² Circular, 22 June, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 94-95, AE.
- 43 Bourboulon to Walewski, 1 July, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 86, AE,
- ⁴⁴ Bourboulon to Walewski, 1 July, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 84, AE.
- ⁴⁵ Bourboulon to Walewski, 1 July, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 84, AE.
- 46 Ibid., fol. 86.
- ⁴⁷ Gros to Imperial Commissioner, 5 July, 1858, CP, vol. 23, fol. 62-63, AE.
- ⁴⁸ Elgin to Foreign Office, no date, CP, vol. 25, fol. 154, AE.
- ⁴⁹ Elgin to Foreign Office, July, CP, vol. 25, fol. 155-157, AE,
- ⁵⁰ Bourboulon to Walewski, 21 July, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 103-104, AE, and D'Abouville to Min. de la Marine, 8 August, 1858, BB 4 763, AN.
- ⁵¹ Alcock to Acting French Consul Trenqualye, I August, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 125 and Bourboulon to Walewski, 5 August, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 101, AE.
- ⁵² Gros to Walewski, 10 August. 1858, CP, vol. 25, fol. 217-220. The second letter which lists 400 troops rather than the earlier 1000 is probably a correction of the total number of French soldiers.
- 53 Gros to Bourboulon, 14 August, 1858, CP, vol. 25, fol. 250, AE.
- ⁵⁴ Gros to Walewski, 14 August, 1858, CP, vol. 25, fol. 216, AE.
- 35 Bourboulon to Walewski, 20 August, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 132, AE.
- ⁵⁶ Bourboulon to Walewski, 2 September, 1858, CP, vol. 25, fol. 256, AE.

⁵⁷ Bourboulon to Walewski, 6 September, 1858, CP, vol. 22, fol. 147, AE, and D'Abouville to Min. de la Marine, 27 November, 1858, BB 4 763, fol. 12, AN.

⁵⁸ Alcock to Bowring, 12 April, 1859, *Accounts and Papers*, LXIX 2714 (1850) and Alcock to Bowring, 6 April, FO 881 894, p. 4, incl. 2 number 1, PRO.

⁵⁹ Alcock to Bowring, 12 April, 1859, FO 881 894, Confidential Print, p. 1 in no incl. 1 in no. 1 no folio # PRO.

⁶⁰ Alcock to Bowring, 12 April, 1859, Accounts and Papers, LXIX 2761 (1860) PRO.

⁶¹ Huang Proclamation, trans. by Parkes, 6 April, 1859, BB 4763, fol. 93-100, Armee.

⁶² Proclamation of April 7, Accounts and Papers, LXIX 2714 (1860) p. 4, no. 1, PRO.

⁶³ Prospectus stating the conditions on which the British Government is willing to engage "Emmigrants for her West Indian Possessions," 13 October, 1859, CCC, Canton, vol. 2, fol. 148, AE.

⁶⁴ Lao to Allied Commission, 27 October, 1859, Accounts and Papers, LXIX 2714 (1860) fol. 16, PRO.

⁶⁵ D'Abouville to Min. de la Marine, 27 October, 1859, BB 4 763, fol. 288-91, AN.

⁶⁶ Bruce to Russell, 5 December, 1859, Confidential Prints, FO 405: 6, fol. 31 in no. 7 PRO.

⁶⁷ Allied Commission Memorandum, 24 January, 1860, Accounts and Papers, LXIX 2714, (1860) fol. 30 and "Rules under which houses for the Reception of Chinese Emmigrants. . . ." no date, [prob. November 1859] Accounts and Papers, LXIX 2714 (1860), encl. 12 on no. 6, vol. 18, PRO.

⁶⁸ Straubenzee & Hope to D'Abouville, 12 January, 1860, CCC, Canton, vol. 2, fol. 158-160, AE.

⁶⁹ Straubenzee to Sidney Herbert, 14 January, 1860, Accounts and Papers, LXIX 2714 (1860), PRO and D'Abouville, to Com. de Chef de Mers, 13 January, 1860, BB 4 763, fol. 344-45, AN.

⁷⁰ Charles de Mutreey, *Journal de la Campaigne de Chine 1859-60*, vol. 1, (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1861) vol. 1, p. 225.

²¹ Charner to Min. de la Marine, 13 November, 1861, CP, vol. 37, fol. 10, AE, and "Account of Evacuation of Canton on 21 October 1861" *Accounts and Papers*, LXII 2919, (1862), p. 3-4, PRO.

⁷² Steven A. Leibo, "The Sino-European Educational Missions, 1875 to 1886," Asian Profiles [TBA].