Ethnicity and Electoral PoliticsThis book asks what distinguishes peaceful plural democracies from violent ones and what distinguishes violent ethnic groups from peaceful ones within the same democracy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it suggests that ethnic groups and their political demands are not inherently intransigent and that violence is not a necessary corollary of ethnic politics. The book posits that ethnic identity serves as a stable but flexible information shortcut for political choices, influencing party formation and development in new and maturing democracies. It furthermore argues that political intransigence and violence expressed by some ethnic groups stem from circumstances exogenous to ethnic affiliations. In particular, absolute restrictions on ethnic access to the executive produce conditions under which ethnic group incentive to participate in peaceful electoral politics is eliminated. A number of case studies and statistical analysis of all electoral democracies since 1945 are used to test and support the formal argument. |
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Términos y frases comunes
access to government analysis argue associated Basque Batasuna benefit Birnir Bulgaria cabinet Catalan constituency countries defined definition democracies democratic dependent variable difficult economic Economist Intelligence Unit effect of ethnicity election period electoral institutions electoral politics electoral system electoral volatility electorally active Ethnic Attractors ethnic cleavage ethnic conflict ethnic diversity ethnic fractionalization ethnic group members ethnic groups ethnic identity ethnic issue ethnic party ethnic violence ethnic vote field figure finding first election flexible Furthermore government coalitions Horowitz implications increasing influence information shortcuts instance intransigence legislative legislature linguistic fractionalization machine politics mobilized nationalists nonethnic party number of parties parliamentary parliamentary systems participation party system party’s percent plurality plurality electoral systems policy preferences political parties presidential systems regional relationship representation represented Romania Saideman salient seats significant significantly social Spain specifically Tamils tion UDMR vote instability vote stability voters voting behavior
Pasajes populares
Página 61 - We are thus led to formulate an accounting rule number two based on the "power of intimidation" or the "blackmail potential" of the opposition oriented parties. Such a subsidiary accounting rule can be formulated as follows: that a party is "big enough" to qualify for relevance whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition, and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition...
Página 71 - The primary characteristic of consociational democracy is that the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country.
Página 76 - In general, institutionalization refers to a process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted.
Página 76 - the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability'.
Página 42 - Undoubtedly, many factors played a role, but it seemed to me that culture had to be a large part of the explanation. South Koreans valued thrift, investment, hard work, education, organization, and discipline. Ghanaians had different values.
Página 52 - the differential benefit, in utiles. that an individual voter receives from the success of his more preferred candidate over his less preferred one...
Página 61 - A party qualifies for relevance whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition — by determining a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition either leftward, rightward, or in both directions — of the governing-oriented parties.
Página 45 - It seems reasonable to conclude that the S, even if not normatively influenced, may be influenced by the others in the sense that the judgments of others are taken to be a more or less trustworthy source of information about the objective reality with which he and the others are confronted.
Página 129 - if it walks like a duck, sounds like a duck, and swims like a duck, it probably is a duck.