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A French Islam
is possible

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*There is no desire more natural
than the desire for knowledge*

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

An Ecole Normale graduate and with an *agrégation* in geography, Hakim El Karoui taught at the Lyon II University before joining the cabinet of the Prime Minister in 2002 as speech writer. After serving within the Ministry of Finance, in 2006 he integrated the Rothschild bank, where he led the Africa Practice together with Lionel Zinsou. In 2011, he joined the strategy consulting firm Roland Berger, where he was joint head of the Africa and French Government advisory sectors. In 2016, he founded his own strategy consulting firm, Volentia. Hakim El Karoui is also a writer (Flammarion has published three of his books on economics and geopolitics) and social entrepreneur (he created the *Club du XXIème siècle* - The 21st Century Club, the Young Mediterranean Leaders, and, together with Bariza Khiari, penned the *"appel des 41"* column on 31 July 2016 in the *Jounal Du Dimanche* newspaper).

The data gathered for this new study were analysed for this report by **Antoine Jardin**, Doctor of Political Science and Researcher at the CNRS (French National Centre for Scientific Research).

A French Islam is possible

CONTENTS

Foreword by Hakim El Karoui

Why study Islam in 2016? Because the violence which has been wrought in its name in France, against French citizens, must be addressed. The organisation of this religion must undergo a profound change if it is to fight against a religious fundamentalism that provides a breeding ground for terrorism. Why study Islam during this pre-electoral period? Because perpetual quarrels regarding the display of Islamic symbols in public spaces - the burkini being the latest example - cannot be the only policy response to Jihadism and fundamentalism. This situation merely reflects a sense of impotency, leading to rising fears and tensions within French society.

Such anxiety is fuelled by a general lack of understanding of French Muslims: Who are they? How do they interact with their religion? And with religious authorities? The scarce information we could access lacked precision and was only based on estimates. To address this issue, the Montaigne Institute carried out an unprecedented survey, together with the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP), using a rigorous approach in strict compliance with existing legislation. Which lessons can we draw from it? First, the number of Muslims in France is lower than what is claimed by various fabricated figures: they represent 5.6 % of the population over 15 years of age in mainland France. Second, this population is considerably younger than the national average, with lower qualifications, although we do note the emergence of a middle and upper class. This large-scale survey also shows that a majority of Muslims in France adhere to a system of values and a religious practice which can seamlessly co-exist within the corpus of the French Republic and nation. Finally, it tells us that there are many young Muslims - albeit still in the minority - whose sense of identity is first and foremost tied to religion, and who stand firm in their belief that: "the more fundamentalist you are, the more you are Muslim, and therefore the more you are yourself." A complex relationship with France forms a backdrop to this situation, with religious fundamentalism providing an outlet for a rebellion against a society that has disowned them; this, at least, is their widely-shared view. Despite the difficulties in analysing the evolution of this trend through time, due to few available figures and methodological constraints, there is no doubt that it has been on the increase over the past ten years.

Two very different realities therefore emerge: on the one hand, a silent majority, often practising Muslims who face no major conflict with French societal norms; on the other hand, a minority drawn to fundamentalism, using Islam as a form of rebellion. Whether we deplore it, applaud it, seek to fight it or accept it, this social reality is inescapable. It must be addressed in the context which we presently face: that of an unrestrained terrorist violence perpetrated in the name of Islam, which makes the current trend towards a self-assertion based on religious identity, or even based on a theological and political world view, a source of anxiety for a large section of the French populace.

However, the system established in 2003 with the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) has shown its limitations:

- (i) the influence of foreign States to whom France has outsourced a certain control over its society and national security;
- (ii) a lack of understanding in the face of an ever more identity-driven Islam, with young boys and girls - often French by birth - leading the trend and unable to relate to the current institutional leaders who are almost all men, often over 60 and born abroad;
- (iii) finally, an inability to take action in the face of spreading religious radicalisation, while conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism and a sense of victimhood abound among those for whom an authoritarian - and even radical - form of Islam provides a means of self-assertion.

Up until today, attempts to organise Islam in France have faced many obstacles:

- firstly geopolitical, since the organisation of a French Islam has found itself entangled in the complex relations that France weaves with both North African countries and Turkey;
- secondly organisational, because despite worries about Islamic separatist tendencies, the "Muslim community in France" is simply non-existent: no sense of belonging, shared interests, or capacity

for coordinated action have been identified. For the past thirty years, successive Ministers of the Interior have in fact continuously failed to find an adequate spokesperson to represent this population;

- thirdly financial, since despite receiving some funding from "friendly" foreign States (Morocco, Turkey, Algeria, Saudi Arabia), Islam in France is under-funded and also suffers from a lack of transparency, hindering its capacity to collect donations from followers, and harming its own reputation;

- finally institutional, since the French government should place more trust in the Muslims living in France, and notably in the new and emerging elites. In this respect, the nomination of Jean-Pierre Chevènement at the head of the Foundation for Islam in France is not an encouraging sign, and despite the many qualities of this former Minister, it has been met with incomprehension and disappointment. Clearly, nobody would have considered nominating him to such a position had it concerned any of the other major religions present in France.

To overcome these obstacles, we must bear in mind the new reality of Islam in this country: the majority of Muslims are born in France and three-quarters of them are French nationals. There is another key sociological evolution: while labourers, low-ranking employees and the unemployed are over-represented compared to the national average, a new, well-educated and professionally well-integrated elite is emerging.

Building a French Islam is therefore possible, but immensely challenging. We have to accept that various tensions are bound to arise, and orchestrate these evolutions carefully enough so that they may attain their objective. We must be ready to face controversies from all sides, since during the electoral period, this will be a particularly sensitive and complex topic, prone to manipulation. We must be prepared to shake up conservative views and preconceived ideas at every step.

This is why the State will have to show its commitment at the highest level, in order for this new organisation of French Islam to see the light; it still has a role to play to facilitate these changes before removing itself from the picture, in accordance with the principle of secularism. The stakes are high: it is a matter of preserving our sense of national unity, and, for Muslims, a chance to create a modern approach to religion.

1. A portrait of the Muslims living in France

Seeing French citizens - Christians, Muslims, Jews, Atheists - die "in the name of Islam": this has become our reality since the attacks perpetrated by Mohamed Merah in 2012. The events of these past two years, terrible and violent acts, differ in terms of targets and scale but provoking the same reactions, all share a common thread of abject brutality. Fear and hate predominate. The minds of citizens, and notably of our political actors, are in a state of turmoil and confusion. The trap set by Jihadists - to stir up hatred against Muslims in order to encourage them to join their ranks - remains wide open. We face the risk of it one day closing in on all of French society.

A brief study of the front pages of major weekly magazines[1] shows that Islam is regularly represented as a source of violence and hate. And this is exactly what Jihadists seek, namely influencing media coverage through their acts[2]. In the past twelve months, around forty editions of the six best-selling magazines in France have displayed a topic related to Islam on their front page; on average, Islam is front-page news on one magazine each week. The visual style of these editions is in fact often similar: images of men with weapons, turban-clad leaders and large swords scattered across a dark background, with large font in contrasting, bright colours. The choice of vocabulary brings to mind criminal investigations: *"accomplices"*, *"masterminds"* and *"underground networks"* must be uncovered. When it comes to analysing the relationship between the State and Islam, the terminology used reflects a sense of weakness and defeat. The headline stories dealing with self-proclaimed Islamic States (Iran or Saudi Arabia) use a vocabulary of menace and fear. A common tone is relayed in the coverage of these topics, with semantic and visual styles that bring across a sense of threat, alarm and unease. Islam remains to be deciphered. Geopolitical issues and extremist tendencies monopolise media representations of Islam. It should be noted that only one issue out of the forty mentioned looked into the daily lives of French Muslims[3].

This trend began with the Islamic revolution in Iran, which inaugurated a period of religiously-influenced politics. Since the 1980s, the crises arising in Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Syria, Libya and Yemen, have slowly but surely become "Islamic". The "Arab springs" and their consequences, along with the growth of a political Islam, have reaffirmed the idea that any issue concerning countries with a Muslim populace can be perceived through a religious lens.

Since the end of the 1980s, there has been an ongoing debate in France about Islam's relationship with the French Republic and the principle of secularism. The first debate took on the issue of headscarves in 1989, and was followed by others in 1993 and 2003. Later, there were discussions as to whether or not there was a Muslim component in the collective representation of riots taking place in the lower-class suburbs of French cities in 2005. These were followed by disputes about national identity, fuelled by various interpretations of Muslim intellectual discourse, startling comments from representatives of Salafist NGOs during television appearances, the preachings of radical imams, etc. It would appear that Islam only exists within three contexts: geopolitics and international relations, terrorist attacks, and social issues linked to the rise of Salafism or political Islam, along with their relationship to secular values.

Faced with the threat of terrorism, it is the duty of the State to respond with enhanced security measures. While this is legitimate, it cannot be the only response. It is necessary to answer the challenges arising from the tragic events of 2015 and 2016 by using knowledge to illuminate future debates with concrete and objective elements. It is at this stage that we hit upon a general lack of understanding of the Muslim population in France: Who are they? What do they think? Due to the lack of public statistics concerning religion[4], nobody can truly say. And yet, opinion surveys are both legal and feasible. We therefore decided to undertake a large-scale opinion survey on Muslims living in France. Our aims are simple: we must get to

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1 We decided to take into consideration the front pages of the six most popular weekly magazines in France. These are: *L'Express, Le Nouvel Observateur, Marianne, Le Point, M le magazine du Monde,* and *Figaro Magazine.*
2 All of the font pages concerned are reviewed in the annex.
3 *M,* the *Monde* newspaper supplement, "Religion, fashion, work and boys: young girls speak out from behind the headscarf", 21/05/2016.
4 Article 8 of the French Law n°78-17 of 6 January 1978 on information technology, data files and civil liberties, states: *"The collection and processing of personal data that reveals, directly or indirectly, the racial and ethnic origins, the political, philosophical, religious opinions or trade union affiliation of persons, or which concern their health or sexual life, is prohibited."*

know them better if we seek, on the one hand, to promote the peaceful integration of the silent majority, and on the other, to offer solutions in the fight against fundamentalism, while guiding as many Muslims as possible - often younger generations - who are tempted by fundamentalism, back towards a system of beliefs and ideas in line with French values.

The Muslim presence in France: a historical context

The conquest of Algeria in 1830 heralded the beginning of France's colonial presence in Muslim countries. The colonisation of West Africa and Equatorial Africa, the protectorates in Morocco and Tunisia, the enduring French presence in Algeria organised into three departments, and the mandates for the Middle East (Syria and Lebanon), *de facto* placed Muslim countries under French governance and administration for almost a century. During different periods, millions of Muslims from Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean became French, with varying degrees of theoretical or actual citizenship.

The presence of Muslims in mainland France covers a more limited period; it began in the early 20th century, although it only concerned a few thousand individuals at this time. During World War I, France mobilised its "colonial troops": 600,000 men, including Moroccan Goumiers and Senegalese skirmishers, but also almost one third of Algeria's male population between the ages of 20 and 40. This initial Muslim presence in mainland France was not restricted to troops, since many Muslims worked behind the scenes, in factories run by the Colonial Labour Organisation Service, which answered to the army. The residence permit was established in 1917 by the French State, which began supporting this immigration, particularly from North Africa, in the inter-war period. The North African Brigades were also created, reporting to the Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs. A few symbolic buildings commemorate this initial Muslim presence, including the Paris Mosque, inaugurated in 1926 by French President Gaston Doumergue, alongside the sultan of Morocco, Moulay Youssef, and the Franco-Muslim Avicenne hospital in Bobigny, opened in 1935.

The Popular Front (a left-wing alliance elected during the inter-war period) gave North Africans the right to freedom of movement within the French territory, provided that they possessed an identity card and special visa. By the end of the 1930s, France had such a negative rate of natural increase and a labour force shortage, that after the fall of the Popular Front, the rate of naturalisations increased, and the Labour Inspectorate granted exemptions to quotas on foreign workers.

After World War II, pressing reconstruction needs triggered a large influx of people from parts of the Muslim world. The vast majority of French Muslims descends from this wave of immigrants who came to work in French factories and building sites during the post-war boom. This explains their congregation around five major geographic areas with historic links to French industry:

- Greater Paris, with a high density in the suburb of Seine-Saint-Denis in particular, and a population base representing a wide variety of backgrounds;
- Marseille and the Mediterranean coastline, where a large part of the population is of Maghreb origin;
- Lyon and the Rhone Valley;
- Lille, Roubaix and the mining area of the North, dominated by the Moroccan community, Riffian in particular;
- Alsace, Moselle and the mining area of the East, which has an important Turkish community.

- Since the 1970s and the first oil crisis, work-related immigration has greatly decreased, and Muslims who settle in France mainly do so through family reunification. A significant proportion has acquired French citizenship, and today a majority has been living in mainland France for two or three generations.

Most French Muslims originate from North Africa: 38 % are of Algerian origin, 25 % Moroccan, 8 % Turkish and 9 % from Sub-Saharan countries. The survey carried out with IFOP shows that the vast majority of Muslims who are foreign nationals are also from Northern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa or Turkey. These regions represent 23 % of the total population surveyed, and account for over 88 % of individuals without French citizenship.

1.1. Survey methodology

This document presents the main results of a survey[5] on the social practices and opinions of individuals in France who identify as Muslim, or come from a Muslim background. The survey is experimental and the first of its kind in France; a cautious and measured approach should be applied when interpreting its results. It is unique, considering that its aim is to examine the Muslim population as a whole, rather than solely Muslims immigrants.

The question of religion cannot be addressed in the general census done by INSEE (the French national institute of statistics), nor through traditional survey methods which, when it comes to interrogating Muslims in France, generally target high-immigrant areas. A methodology was therefore used to extract, from an initial large-scale sample reflecting the population of mainland France (15,459 people aged 15 and over were surveyed), a specific sample of individuals of Muslim faith or culture. This smaller sample included 1,029 people, with 874 self-identifying as "Muslim". This study was undertaken in accordance with the scientific methods and ethical codes of sample surveys. It faces the same limitations: the average margin of error for a survey done with a sample of 1,000 people is approximately 3 %, and when looking at a sub-group of this same sample, this margin significantly increases to 6-8 %. The information it provides is a reflection of views held at the time of the survey and does not serve predictive purposes[6]. While the calculations are scientifically solid and rigorous, the analyses drawn from them merely offer one manner of looking at the survey data. Other methods and other statistical choices do of course exist, which could offer different results.

Nevertheless, we believe that this methodology offered the best compromise in terms of producing reliable results. To promote full transparency, we are making public all of the technical processes applied at each stage of the study, which should allow anyone using statistical software to check and reproduce our results[7]. The analysis of such an important survey cannot be treated as a "black box"; rather, verifiable technical criteria have been used in accordance with the strictest academic standards to date.

However, a full-scale analysis of such a complex survey requires more time. The results presented here constitute an initial, exploratory analysis, which needs to be clarified and refined at a later date. The ground-breaking nature of this survey also aims to identify the methodological contributions and difficulties of a quantitative study of minority religious groups in French society. Some of these difficulties led us to make technical and practical choices, always with the aim of obtaining precise and exact results.

1.2. The socio-demographics of Muslims in France

The major socio-demographic trend concerning Islam in France is the increasing importance of the country's second religion among younger generations. This trend is explained by two factors: intergenerational transmission on the one hand, and conversions on the other.

- The first demographic contribution comes from the intergenerational transmission of religion among the offspring of immigrants from Muslim countries. This transmission does not always take a linear path; it is sometimes a case of children or grand-children, raised in families where religion held little importance, going on to embrace a more religious lifestyle.

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5 The survey was undertaken from 13 April to 23 May 2016. The interviews were held over the phone.
6 Quota sampling was used to ensure that the overall sample was representative of the population with regard to:
- Socio-demographic criteria (age and gender);
- Socio-professional criteria (profession);
- Geographic criteria (administrative region, size of urban unit, proportion of immigrants in the municipality or neighbourhood);
- Civic criteria (nationality);
  Quotas were set based on INSEE census data for a population aged 15 and over, living in mainland France (RP-INSEE 2012).
7 See annex.

- The second demographic contribution comes from a conversion to Islam among people whose families have had no relationship to Islam in preceding generations.

These two trends combine and complement each other.

While 5.6 % of the overall population aged 15 and over[8] identifies as Muslim in our survey[9], this proportion grows to over 10 % among those under 25.

Conversely, two major trends can be identified among the remainder of the French population:
- the continuing decline of personal identification with Christianity;
- the growing number of people who declare themselves "of no religion".

Among the population aged over 75, almost three out of four respondents identify as Christian, and less than 20 % say that they have no religion, compared to 30 % and almost 50 % respectively among those under 30.

1.2.1. Demographics

According to the results of our survey, individuals who identify as Muslim represent 5.6 % of the population in mainland France.

This figure is an approximation, since the survey method inevitably produces margins of error, rendering it difficult to obtain a precise and reliable estimate. The lack of official data, which would allow adjustments based on socio-demographic information, further contributes to this lack of precision. Nevertheless, this result reflects other existing estimates and therefore seems pertinent.

In the original sample of 15,459 people, over 47 % of those aged 15 and over identify as "Christian", 37 % "of no religion", 6 % declined to answer the question, and a little over 3 % follow a minority religion other than Islam. These figures remind us that while Islam is the second most important religion in mainland France, demographically speaking, it represents a small minority. Looking at socio-professional data, there is an over-representation of the working classes and of those excluded from the job market among the population identifying as Muslim:

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8 In mainland France.
9 Or 874 people among the 15,459 surveyed.

- over 24 % of individuals who identify as Muslim are labourers;[10]
- over 22 % are low-ranking employees;
- 30 % of Muslims are non-active but not retired. These people are not included in national unemployment statistics as calculated in France; while they do not have employment, they are not registered as job-seekers. This category does however include students in secondary school and higher education, as well as young people in search of a first job;
- only 4.5 % are management-level employees. For comparison, management-level employees represent 10 % of people who declare themselves as being "of no religion" and over 8 % of Christians. And in contrast, non-active non-retirees only represent 14 % and 9.9 % of these two groups respectively. Overall, Muslims represent 2.8 % of all management-level employees but over 10 % of labourers, 7 % of low-ranking employees and 13.5 % of non-active non-retirees.

This is in part explained by the age structure of this particular social group, which includes a significantly larger number of young people. Muslims in our sample were on average 35.8 years old, compared to 53 for Christians and 43.5 for people of no religion.

A distinctive feature of this sample is that it includes both individuals identifying as Muslim, and those who do not identify as such, but who have at least one Muslim parent. This latter group accounts for 15 % of the population in this sample. These individuals have immediate Muslim parentage, but subjectively position themselves outside of this religion.

72 % of respondents identify as Muslim and have two Muslim parents; 2.7 % are Muslim while only their father is Muslim; 2.8 % are Muslim while only their mother is Muslim. The large majority of Muslims have this religion directly transmitted to them within a family structure in which both parents are Muslim.

This is not, however, the sole method of transmission: 7.5 % of people identifying as Muslim declare that neither of their parents are Muslim. There are more Muslims without Muslim parents than Muslims with only one Muslim parent. This figure may broadly correspond to what we consider to be conversions to Islam.

Moreover, while the transmission of the Islamic faith is in principle patrilineal, Muslims with only a Muslim father do not outnumber those with only a Muslim mother.

Finally, since non-Muslims represent 15 % of respondents, "exit" trajectories from the Muslim religion - or disaffiliation - appear to be twice as common as entry trajectories. This data overturns the perception of Islam as a religion which attracts huge numbers of individuals who are *a priori* far-removed from this tradition.

The growing Muslim population in France is more a reflection of generational movement in the post-colonial era than that of an ideological trend.

1.2.2. Nationality

Data from the survey reveal that 50 % of respondents are French by birth, 24 % are French by naturalisation, and 26 % have a foreign citizenship. Among the French respondents, many individuals also have another nationality which corresponds to their country of origin or that of their parents.

The vast majority of foreign Muslims have ancestry in North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa or Turkey. Citizens from these countries in fact account for 23 % of all Muslims in France and for over 88 % of individuals without French nationality.

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10 5 % of the individuals surveyed declined to answer this question. An unemployed labourer is counted as a labourer in the INSEE social class nomenclature, as well as in census statistics.

1.2.3. Country of origin

Father's country of birth

The fathers of the individuals surveyed were born outside of France in almost 90 % of cases. This figure seems very high, but it is in fact lower in our data than in the results of the *Trajectories and Origins* (TeO) survey carried out by the INED (National Institute for Demographic Studies) among a population of migrants and their offspring under 50 years of age in 2008. It should once again be stressed that in our methodology we chose to look at the whole population of France, and not only at people of French nationality. Algeria and Morocco are the main countries of origin, with 31 % and 20 % respectively. Tunisia represents 8 % of paternal origin, with other African countries accounting for a little over 15 %, and around 5 % for Turkey.

Mother's country of birth

The mothers of those surveyed reflect a similar profile. There are however some notable differences: in almost one in five cases (17 %), the respondents' mothers were born in France, which is 7 percentage points higher than the fathers.

Comparing both parents' country of birth shows the power of national endogamy:

- 72 % of respondents whose father was born in France also have a mother born in France;
- 88 % of people with a father born in Algeria also have a mother born in that country;
- 91 % of people whose father was born in Morocco also have a mother born in Morocco;
- such high rates of endogamy are also found among people with Turkish, Tunisian, and other African origins.

Respondent's country of birth

More than half of all 1,029 respondents were themselves born in France. Among those born abroad:

- 14 % were born in Algeria;
- close to 13 % in Morocco;
- 11 % mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa;
- and almost 5 % in Tunisia.
-
    ### 1.2.4. Other characteristics

Social origins

Origine sociale des enquêtés et de la population générale

	Agriculteurs (exploitant)	Artisans / commerçant	Cadres supérieurs	Professions intermédiaires	Employés	Ouvriers	Retraités	Autre inactif
Population générale	1,2%	3,8%	9,3%	16,1%	17,6%	12,6%	27,7%	11,7%
Population de religion et de culture musulmane	0,0%	4,3%	5,9%	11,3%	22,4%	22,6%	4,1%	29,5%

This survey also allowed us to consider the respondents' social background, i.e. the socio-professional category (SPC) of the head of their household at the time of the survey. While this information sheds light on the class origins of those surveyed, it tells us nothing about their personal situation.

Moreover, SPC classification does not adequately reflect an individual's genuine social status, in that within the category of non-active persons, it does not distinguish students or military personnel, "other inactive" individuals under 60 (non-retirees) with no professional activity, nor the unemployed who have never been professionally active.

There is however a clear predominance of working-class categories and inactive individuals, and an under-representation of higher professional echelons (managers and other white-collar employees).

Middle-management positions are under-represented among the 874 respondents who identify as Muslim (8 % compared to 14.1 % in the overall population), as are management and other white-collar professions (4 % compared to 9 %). In contrast, there is an over-representation of labourers (24 % compared to 13.1 %) and non-active individuals (38 % compared to 16.1 %).

Qualifications

While respondents generally originate from an underprivileged social background, Muslims living in France are gaining qualifications at a rate which is close to the national average.

Individuals with a qualification representing two years of higher education (BAC +2) account for 12 % of the sample; those with an even higher level of education account for 20 %, of which half hold a Master's degree (BAC +5).

Diplômes détenus par les enquêtés

However, an important proportion of those surveyed have very low levels of qualification:

- almost 15 % have no qualification;
- around 25 % have less than a high-school diploma (BAC).

This is the sign of a social division among the Muslim population, marked, on the one hand, by a significant participation in higher education, and on the other, by the educational marginalisation of a large minority.

Employment status

While an important portion of the 1,029 respondents are non-active, the majority of active individuals are in stable employment. Over 55 % have long-term work contracts, and 10 % work within the civil service. However, because of their social disadvantage, a significant part of the Muslim population lacks job security: over 12 % have short-term work contracts, and over 8 % are in temporary employment.

Age structure

Their age structure highlights the large numbers of young people among Muslims living in France. The average age of respondents is 35, and 75 % are under 45.

These results may well reflect the demographic evolution of France's Muslim population, but they may also result from the inherent difficulty which polling organisations face in reaching the oldest generations, as is notably the case with elderly immigrants living in France.

Nevertheless, a significant number of respondents over 50 were surveyed, adding to our knowledge about a sector of the population which was not represented in the TeO study done by the INSEE and INED.

1.3. A typology of Muslims according to their religiosity

A number of variables were selected to help define respondents' attitude towards religion, in order to create a typology by means of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA).

This typology allows us to determine the underlying aspects which shape the attitudes of our 1,029 respondents towards their religion. In order to gain a clearer picture from these results, a classification system was then imposed to identify a small number of groups among the individuals identifying as Muslim or with Muslim parents. The PCA and typology are detailed in the annex. Once again, this typology is one of many possible options. Moreover, the technical criteria used to distinguish between social categories can vary. As such, it is best not to focus too closely on the definition and size of the different social categories, but rather to look at the general structure of opinions and attitudes.

A description of the social categorisation used

This typology allows us to distinguish between six categories, ordered from the most moderate individuals to the most authoritarian:

- The **first category (18 % of the total) is made up of individuals who are the most far-removed from religion.** They support the idea of a secular State; they do not seek to express their religion in daily life, whether at work or in school; they are against the introduction of halal food in school canteens; and they strongly agree that a secular State allows people to freely practice their religion.
  - The **second category (28 % of the total) shares these same values.** The individuals in this category agree that polygamy should be forbidden and that the laws of the French State are more important than religious law. **They differ in that they are more likely to eat halal food, and that some are also in favour of religious expression in the workplace.**
  - The **third category (13 % of the total) is more ambivalent.** While these individuals are opposed to the niqab and to polygamy, they contest the idea that a secular State allows people to freely practice their religion. Without being extremist, this category is critical of the French system, at a minimum in terms of how it is implemented. **An important minority among them would in fact like to be able to express their religion at the workplace.**
  - The **fourth category (12 % of the total) differs from the third in that it is more accepting of secularism. However, these individuals are highly** critical of the prohibition of polygamy in France, all the while outright condemning the niqab, which 95 % of them reject. This category includes many foreign Muslims residing in France.
  - The **fifth category (13 % of the total) represents individuals with authoritarian traits**: 40 % favour the niqab and polygamy, are against secularism and consider religious law to be more important than the laws of the French State. The vast majority do not think that religion is solely a private matter, and most are in favour of religious expression in the workplace.
  - The **sixth category (15 % of the total) differs from the fifth in that it advocates for a "stricter" view of religious practices.** Nevertheless, these individuals consider faith to be a private and not a public matter. Almost all are in favour of the niqab, while almost 50 % are against secularism and for religious expression in the workplace.

  - **These six categories tell three different stories:**

- *Group 1* (categories 1 and 2 - representing 46 % of Muslims in France): individuals who are either completely secularised or approaching full integration into a system of values of contemporary France, which in turn evolves thanks to specific aspects of their religious practice. They do not however renounce their religion, which is often represented through halal food, and they practice their religion far more often than the national average;
- *Group 2* (categories 3 and 4): representing more mixed positions and individuals that occupy a middle-ground. Proud to be Muslim, the individuals making up this group seek a way to express their religious identity within the public sphere. Very pious (Sharia law is very important to them, but less so than that of the French State), they are often in favour of religious expression in the workplace, and have for the most part accepted halal food as a defining factor of "being Muslim". They clearly condemn the niqab and polygamy, and accept secularism;
- *Group 3* (categories 5 and 6): the most problematic. It is made up of Muslims who have adopted a system of values clearly opposed to those of the French State. They are mostly young, low-skilled and facing high unemployment; they live in the working-class suburbs of large cities. Rather than being defined by conservatism, this group identifies with Islam as a mode of rebellion. While some consider that a secular State offers them freedom of religion[11] or that faith is a private matter[12], their views suggest a tendency for withdrawal and separation from the rest of society, rather than a real understanding of the meaning of secularism. **28 % of Muslims in France** can be placed within this group, which includes both authoritarian attitudes and others which are perhaps best described as "secessionist". **For them, Islam is a means of self-assertion at the margins of French society.**

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11 "A secular State allows Muslims to freely practice their religion" • Tends to agree • Tends to disagree • Declines to answer • Does not know

12 "Would you say that religious faith is mainly a private matter for you?" • Yes, completely • Yes, for the most part • No, not really • No, not at all • Declines to answer • Does not know

On the basis of these elements, it is possible to study the socio-demographics of these three groups according to the established typology of their attitude towards religion[13].

Socio-demographic description of the groups

Age impact

Age produces one of the strongest impacts in analysing attitudes to religion. **Group 1, the one most far-removed from religion, has few members among the younger generations.** While it represents almost half of all individuals over 40, it only concerns one third of the youngest respondents.

This trend is complemented by the growth of the third group, **the most religiously austere and authoritarian, representing around 20 % of the population over 40, but almost 50 % of the youngest individuals.**

In contrast, the middle group (Group 2) is both the smallest and the most stable, regardless of the age-range studied.

At this stage, it is not possible to statistically verify that this impact is linked to age rather than to a generational effect, but this first scenario comes across as the most plausible. **The current evolution is characterised by a strengthening of religious identity among the new cohorts (compared to their elders at the same age).** An alternative hypothesis would lead us to consider that, through the course of their lives, people of Muslim culture living in France tend to distance themselves from the more austere views of religion. While this hypothesis cannot be outright excluded, it appears to be rather unlikely if we take into consideration other studies published on these same issues.

Socio-professional impact

The impact of socio-professional category on an individual's attitude towards religion is also noteworthy.

People belonging to the higher echelons of society (supervisory and middle-management workers) are clearly over-represented within Group 1, and under-represented in Group 3 - the most authoritarian. In contrast, those with identity-forming ties to Islam are over-represented in the working classes, among labourers and low-ranking employees, and even more so among non-active individuals, a group which notably includes young people who have never worked and students.

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13 The annex shows the distribution of opinions about:
- the consumption of halal meat;
- the hierarchy between religious laws and State laws;
- the place of religion in the workplace;
- the wearing of the full-face veil;
- polygamy;
- secularism;
- faith as a private or public matter.

Together, the impacts of age and social class help to identify the probable increase of authoritarian religious attitudes among young people and within working-class Muslim populations in France. **This trend is not unique to young working-class Muslims. It is also seen among young people who identify as Christian or of no religion, but is expressed through opinions and behaviours other than an identification with Islam.**

Impact of employment type

This is confirmed by the anaysis of the impacts of different forms of employment. **The most well-integrated individuals are those most likely to renounce very austere approaches to Islam.** This by no means suggests that religion holds less importance for them, or that they are "less Muslim" than others. The different attitudes towards religion, as identified in this typology, vary in nature rather than degree.

Over 80 % of business leaders, civil servants and employees with long-term contracts belong outside of Group 3. In contrast, **among the active population, those with the most unstable forms of employment (interns, temporary or short-term employees) are most likely to belong to groups with highly obstinate views.**

Gender impact

A comparison between male and female attitudes to religion shows that women appear to be slightly over-represented in Group 3, but these differences are minimal when compared to the social and generational dynamics. In this respect, there is a bigger gulf in terms of attitudes towards Islam between a 20-year-old and a 60-year-old Muslim woman, than there is between a man and woman of the same age.

Impact of the type of relationship with Islam

We wanted to determine whether these dynamics are only present among people who identify as Muslim, or whether they are equally found among individuals with at least one Muslim parent but who do not themselves identify as Muslim.

The results may come as a surprise: **while non-Muslims do indeed have a more distant relationship with religion than Muslims, the gap is relatively narrow.**

This is notably the case with Group 3, the most authoritarian of all: almost 20 % of respondents who identify as non-Muslim support these same ideals.

This situation shows that Islam is more often used as a foundation for rebellious views, rather than as a source of spiritual attachment leading to a strict religious practice.

Impact of the type of relationship with Islam (2)

To analyse this result in more detail, it is necessary to compare groups according to their familial relationship with Islam (one parent, both parents, or neither parent being Muslim). Statistically, the differences are small and fragile, however **it would appear that the converts (Muslims with no Muslim parent) represent the most authoritarian views.**

It is nevertheless important to qualify this by stressing that such individuals are in the minority across all social groups[14].

1.4. How is Islam practised?

1.4.1. Halal and dietary standards

Eating halal meat is a highly significant tradition for Muslims, and something which they increasingly identify with being Muslims: being Muslim means being halal (as opposed to "haram"). As such, **many false representations are common. For example, over 40 % of Muslim respondents agree with the statement that eating halal meat is one of the 5 pillars of Islam,** which is evidently not the case[15].

70 % of respondents say that they "always" buy halal meat, 22 % buy it "sometimes" and only 6 % "never".

As many studies have shown since the publication of *Banlieue de la République*[16], eating halal products has become a sign of belonging to a Muslim social group, including for individuals who are not - or hardly - religious. This points to a form of religion which is experienced mainly through social norms and practices, and less through ritual and religious acts.

This adherence to halal food preparation is strong in both the Muslim population and among individuals of Muslim origin. Consequently, eight out of ten respondents agree with the statement that children should have the possibility to eat halal products in schools. The percentage is lower, although still significant, among respondents of Muslim culture who no longer identify as Muslim (67 %).

This social marker has been freed from its religious significance: eating halal food has become normal - in the full sense of the term. The social norm is therefore less tied to faith and theology than it is to a shared lifestyle.

As is shown in the graph below, age does not have a net effect on the consumption of halal products among the population surveyed. Over 80 % of individuals across all ages say that they "always" or "sometimes" buy halal products. And so it appears logical that 80 % of the Muslims surveyed agree with the following statement: *"children should be able to eat halal in school canteens."*

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14 These comments regarding different religious views should be considered in relative rather than absolute terms.

15 In Sunni tradition, the five pillars are declaration of faith, prayer, zakat (alms-giving), fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime for those who are able.

16 Gilles Kepel, *Banlieue de la République*, 2011.

Influence du niveau d'études des enquêtés
sur leur consommation de halal

Similarly, the level of a person's qualifications does not seem to have a net impact on their consumption of halal products. The distribution is once again quite comparable across all respondents.

Regarding the more specific question of whether halal meals should be offered in school canteens, the results are also relatively similar for all 1,029 individuals surveyed. We can however note that 35 % of respondents with at least five years of higher education do not agree with the statement that *"children should be able to eat halal in school canteens"*, whereas less than one in five people share this view among all other respondents.

Influence du niveau d'études des enquêtés sur leur souhait
de voir les cantines scolaires proposer de la nourriture halal

A majority of Muslims regularly eats halal food. A commitment to this practice neither signals an extremist attitude towards religion, nor a religious fundamentalism.

1.4.2. Why wear a headscarf?

The question of the veil or headscarf has long been an issue in the relationship between Islam and France. It is through the polemic regarding the wearing of headscarves in schools that the Union of Islamic Organisations in France (UOIF) gained the attention of media and the public at large in the 1990s and early 2000s. More recently, there have been many debates surrounding the ban of the full-face veil (2009 law), the possibility of extending the school headscarf ban - which was adopted in 2004 - to universities, and the conditions of the headscarf ban in private companies (notably with the case of Baby Loup).

Around 60 % of the 1,029 respondents consider that girls should be able to wear headscarves in secondary school. However, this view is only shared by 37 % of people of Muslim culture (whose parents are Muslims but who do not identify as Muslim). The issue of the female head covering is therefore far more divisive, including among Muslims, than that of halal meat.

Around 65 % of respondents of Muslim faith or culture claim to be in favour of the headscarf[17], and 24 % are in favour of the full-face veil[18]. In both cases, 10 % of those surveyed remained at a remove by selecting the answer: *"it is her choice, everyone can do as they like".*

Contrary to the popular belief that men are more conservative than women, 26 % of men and only 18 % of women are against all forms of head covering. Men are also more likely to say that *"everyone can do as they like".* **These results attest to an ideological commitment to the headscarf on the part of many Muslim women, with 28 % even being in favour of the full-face veil.**

However, we must remember that the full-face veil is banned in public spaces in France, and that simply being in favour of head coverings does not mean that these women are themselves adhering to such dress codes. Perhaps these high figures can be read as a form of provocation, notably following the numerous public debates regarding the display of Islamic symbols in public spaces.

The most common social practice remains to not cover up the head. **Two thirds of women of Muslim culture say that they do not wear a head covering.** 57 % claim that they have never worn one, and 8 % say that they have, but that they no longer do today[19].

Around 35 % of respondents say that they wear a head covering (all the time or just sometimes).

This figure appears to show an increase compared to studies led in 2003 on these same issues (+11 percentage points), but remains far below the 65 % mentioned earlier:
- 23 % of women say that they *"always"* wear a head covering;
- 7 % say that they always wear one apart from at their school or workplace;
- 5 % say that they *"rarely"* wear one.

These figures suggest that such sporadic practices are relatively rare, and that women who wear or take off the *hijab* according to their environment (school or work) are few compared to the larger population of individuals of Muslim culture.

These results are valuable as they attest to an inverse generational dynamic. Once again, we are dealing with small numbers and the results remain to be validated. Nevertheless, it would appear that women aged between 25 and 50 claim to wear a head covering more often (40 %) than those aged between 15 and 25 (around 10 percentage points less). **It is likely that the headscarf ban in secondary schools has had an influence on the relatively low rate of head covering among younger generations, including outside of school.**

While this generational dynamic impacts practices, it does not have the same effect on opinions. Indeed, the majority of respondents aged between 15 and 25 were against the headscarf ban in schools.

When comparing the answers of Muslim women who wear a head covering to those who don't, we note that their reasons for doing so and their perceptions of this practice are rather different. Muslim women who wear a head covering give as their reasons: religious duty (76 %), issues of safety (35 %), and the desire to display their Muslim faith (23 %), with only 6 % saying that they are coerced or imitating others.

Muslim women who do not wear a head covering have a more critical view of the practice. 66 % of them believe that women who wear a head covering do so out of a sense of religious duty, 44 % out of a desire

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17 "Personally, are you in favour of women wearing a headscarf - the hijab?"
18 "Personally, are you in favour of women wearing a full-face veil - the niqab or burqa?"
19 Question asked: Do you yourself wear a head covering (whether a hijab or niqab)? Possible answers: Yes: yes, apart from at your school or workplace - Yes, but rarely; No: no, but you have worn it before; no, and you have never worn it

to display their Muslim faith (+20 percentage points), 27 % out of imitation (+21 percentage points), and 24 % out of coercion (+18 percentage points). **The only time the two groups are in agreement is that 35 % cite safety as a reason to wear a head covering.**

1.4.3. Which religious authorities?

The results of our study highlight the lack of renown and legitimacy of Islamic organisations in France. Attitudes towards religion are rapidly evolving among the youngest generations. This translates into an increasing distrust of all institutions, including Muslim ones.

Notably, more than two thirds of respondents say that they are unaware of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM). Among the 300 respondents who do know of the institution, only 28 % feel that this structure represents them. **Ultimately, only 9 % of individuals who identify as Muslim in France say that they feel the CFCM represents them[20].**

In addition, we asked the people surveyed about their relationship to other institutions and other Islamic figures in France[21]. The UOIF (Union of Islamic Organisations of France), which is no longer represented through the CFCM after boycotting the 2013 elections, has been diminished. While it organises one of Europe's major Muslim events each year at the Bourget site near Paris, over 30 % of Muslims claim not to know the organisation, and only 12 % say that they have a close relationship with it. It is nevertheless likely that the movements and structures which have ties to the UOIF have greater visibility and renown.

Religious figures like Tareq Oubrou (Rector of the Bordeaux Mosque) or Dalil Boubakeur (Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris) did not garner more support, being unknown to 30 % of Muslims, and with only 16 % feeling "close" to these two figures.

In contrast, Tariq Ramadan has a larger support base. 37 % of the Muslims surveyed claim to feel close to him, while only 15 % say they are unfamiliar with him. This disconnect in the relationship to religious leaders and organisations is a sign that Muslims are more often seeking a form of social representation through public figures, whose actions more closely resemble those of the political sphere (meetings, public gatherings, conferences, TV appearances, etc.).

1.4.4. What rate of mosque attendance?

It is important to look at the rate of attendance at mosques. Today, Muslims are largely represented in society by the CFCM, whose make-up partly relies on the importance of different places of worship. Moreover, mosques are a middle ground, presented in public debate both as spaces where radical ideologies are spread, and as places where religion and Arabic are taught. They therefore occupy an important space with regards to all of the different dynamics under study.

According to our survey, around **30 % of the 1,029 Muslim respondents never go to mosque[22].** In addition, another 30 % only go for Ramadan celebrations, or even less often. **Therefore, almost 60 % of Muslims have a distant or non-existent relationship with places of worship[23].**

Around 15 % of Muslims go to mosque once a week, usually for Friday prayers. The most assiduous attendees represent around 12 % of the Muslim population. They attend places of worship multiple times a week, and 5 % of individuals say that they go every day.

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20 Are you aware of the CFCM (French Council of the Muslim Faith)? Yes - No - Declines to answer
As a Muslim, do you feel represented by the CFCM (French Council of the Muslim Faith)? Yes - No - Declines to answer
21 "As a Muslim, do you feel close to... ? "
"Intellectuals like Tariq Ramadan" • Yes • No • Is unfamiliar • Declines to answer • Does not know
"Religious figures like Tareq Oubrou or Dalil Boubakeur" • Yes • No • Is unfamiliar • Declines to answer • Does not know
"The U.O.I.F. (Union of Islamic Organisations of France)" • Yes • No • Is unfamiliar • Declines to answer • Does not know
22 "How often do you go to a mosque or prayer room?" • At least once a week; • Every day; • Several times a week; • Once a week; • At least once a month; • Only for religious celebrations; • Less often; • Never; • Declines to answer; • Does not know
23 In our survey, visiting a prayer room was considered the same as visiting a mosque.

Habitudes de fréquentation de la mosquée des enquêtés

■ Chaque jour   ■ Plusieurs fois par semaine   ■ Une fois par semaine
■ Au moins une fois par mois   ■ Seulement à l'occasion des fêtes   ■ Moins souvent
■ Jamais

While there appear to be relatively loose ties to these places of worship, this should not be taken as a sign that religion is absent from the lives of a majority of Muslims.

On the contrary, prayer is a widespread practice, including the five daily prayers, even among individuals who rarely or never go to mosque[24].

While more than nine out of ten people who go to mosque every day respect the five daily prayers, this is also the case for 50 % of Muslims who only attend places of worship during Ramadan, and 45 % of those who go even less frequently. Therefore, once again, we note **the evolution of a form of religion which is important, but which remains relatively independent of Muslim institutions, places of worship and other structures, while aspiring to a strong sense of devotion and a recognition of religious practices central to community life.**

1.5. Their attitudes towards France, its institutions and society

1.5.1. Attachment

Let us now look at the attitudes of individuals of Muslim culture towards France and its institutions. We asked the people surveyed whether they considered it *"possible"* for a person of Muslim culture to be elected President of France in the forthcoming years[25]. Opinions were very divided, with 45 % of respondents believing this to be possible, and 45 % believing the opposite. These results suggest that people are a relatively confident in the capacity of French society to evolve. These trends may also be encouraged by the example set in the United States, almost eight years after the victory of Barack Obama in the presidential elections of 2008. We wanted to determine what individuals of Muslim faith or culture consider "important" and "not important" in terms of social evolution.

These results reveal the ambition of a very strong majority of the Muslim population to access a higher social status. More than 90 % of respondents consider it important to have a stable job, over 85 % value "high qualifications" and over 65 % think it is important to become a home-owner.

Traditional ideals, such as placing importance on having a boy rather than a girl, are less prominent (65 % of respondents do not consider this to be important). The desire to live in a Muslim country is more prevalent, signalling more ambivalent attitudes: over 30 % of respondents consider this to be important. This is especially the case when the prospect of improving one's social standing appears less likely due to discrimination and inequality, which is sometimes perceived as the consequence of an anti-Muslim

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24 "And do you practice prayer?" • Yes, 5 times a day • Yes, sometimes • Yes, but only during Ramadan and the Eid festivals • No, never • Declines to answer • Does not know

25 "In the next ten years, do you believe it is possible for a French person of Muslim culture to be elected President?" • Yes • No • Declines to answer • Does not know

"conspiracy"[26]. This 30 % should also be placed in the context of a survey which included 25 % of non-French nationals.

1.5.2. Mistrust and dissatisfaction

Taxes and social inequalities are widely criticised, meaning that social issues are a priority for the Muslims in this survey, taking precedence over issues of religion and identity. However, the idea that *"in France, Muslims are the victims of a conspiracy"* rings true to many individuals, with nearly 37 % agreeing with the statement and 8 % choosing not to answer. Such perceptions fuel a sense of mistrust and dissatisfaction in France on the part of some Muslims, whether or not they are French nationals.

These feelings are less often directed at the country itself, and more at the situation of Muslims in France, denounced as the result of an unjust and historical subordination, coupled with a disdain for Islam. For some individuals - and notably among young people in working-class neighbourhoods - re-asserting one's religious identity is a way of taking a stand against this.

How do such dynamics influence people's relationship with the other and their interactions with other social groups?

1.5.3. Openness and diversity

In order to study the social interactions of the individuals surveyed, we listed different behaviours and asked them whether or not this was something they were happy to engage in[27].

The results indicate that a large majority of Muslim people accept being seen by a doctor of the opposite sex (92.5 %); almost 88 % shake hands with a person of the opposite sex; and 89 % listen to music, which does not mean that the other 10 % are opposed to the freedom of listening to music.

However, there is a higher rate of negative response for certain behaviours: 30 % of respondents would not greet a person of the opposite sex with a kiss on the cheek[28], and 33 % refuse to use mixed swimming pools. Once again, gender relations are an area where a form of dichotomy appears between the practices of a significant minority of Muslims and those of the majority of French people.

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26 "In France, Muslims are the victims of a conspiracy" • Tends to agree • Tends to disagree • Declines to answer • Does not know
27 Do you yourself...?
- Accept to be treated by a [female]/[male] doctor or [female]/[male] nurse • Yes • No • Does not know
- Listen to music • Yes • No • Does not know
- Shake hands with [women]/[men] • Yes • No • Does not know
- Kiss [women]/[men] on the cheek as a form of greeting • Yes • No • Does not know
- Accept to use a mixed swimming pool (attended by both men and women) • Yes • No • Does not know
28 This is the usual way of greeting someone in France.

1.5.4. Political opinions on French society

How are the results discussed above reflected in people's political views? To find out, we asked individuals of both Muslim faith and culture to give their subjective opinion, by placing their views on a scale of 0 to 10 going from left to right - 0 being the most left-wing and 10 being the most right-wing[29].

The response was clear: while the left garnered slightly larger support than the right, notably following a large-scale mobilisation in favour of François Hollande during the presidential elections of 2012, over 50 % of respondents declined to answer or positioned themselves at the "centre", i.e. neither to the right nor to the left, while not in fact supporting specific centrist parties.

Left-wing/right-wing political views according to the type of attitude towards Islam.

What relation is there between political views and attitudes towards Islam? By cross-referencing the 6 groups from the earlier typology with the left-right political scale, we note that **the Muslims who are the most liberal and the least religious identify more strongly with the left. The most authoritarian groups have a greater tendency to place themselves outside of the left-right political spectrum, or to gravitate towards the right.**

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29 "Usually, people's political views are categorised on a scale going from left to right. Personally, where would you place yourself on this scale? 0 signifies that in terms of your political views you are very left-wing, 10 signifies that you are very right-wing, and the numbers in the middle allow you to nuance your position."

1.5.5. Attitudes towards politics

Attitudes towards politics are not merely reflected in individual views. They are also shaped by practices and behaviours. In a democracy, the most common political act remains voting. However, in order to vote in France, one must be a French national and registered on an electoral list. We filtered the replies of the 1,029 respondents in order to only look at those from French citizens over 18 years of age. They make up the "theoretical electoral base" representing all potentially registered voters.

Within this population, almost a quarter of respondents are not registered on any electoral lists[30]. This very high figure impacts the entire chain of political participation and representation. Moreover, a quarter of the Muslim population in France does not have the right to vote, since these individuals are not French nationals, and among the remaining 75 %, another quarter are not registered to vote.

Abstention further weakens turnout rates, increasing the gap between the social and political weight of a population of Muslim faith or culture that is evidently under-represented in elections.

We have attempted to reconstruct the voting behaviour of Muslims during the 2012 presidential elections: 27 % of those surveyed who were registered to vote abstained, and 10 % say that they left a blank or spoiled ballot[31]. As such, due to a composition effect, **only 33 % of people of Muslim faith or culture voted for one of the two presidential candidates during the second round of the 2012 elections**; and this during an election which saw the highest participation rates within working-class areas in recent French history.

1.6. Survey findings

While the analysis of this survey merits a more detailed study, it already offers unprecedented answers - drawn in the most rigorous way - as to the social and political behaviours of people of Muslim faith and culture living in France. Without restricting them to one category, and by looking beyond the criteria of age and nationality, this study aims at closing in on a relatively unknown social reality, which previous quantitative studies, seeking to produce representative results, have failed to grasp. We must of course approach our quantitative results with caution: it is very difficult to measure beliefs, there are many biases at play, and with this survey being the first of its kind, we lack comparative elements which would allow us to compare and correct the answers. The survey allows us to identify certain trends, and it is problematic to further interpret these results.

A highly contrasted reality is depicted in this portrait of Muslims living in France. First of all, contrary to many popular misconceptions, there is no single "Muslim community" nor an organised "Islamic separatism". There are people of Muslim faith and culture in France, whose sense of belonging to a Muslim community is first and foremost experienced at the individual level. Islam does not play a big part in their associative involvement, nor do they vote based on a candidate's real or supposed affiliation with Islam; there is very weak evidence for any sense of collective destiny, and very few religious schools exist.

Some behavioural traits do however stand out from the rest of the national population: they appear to be distinctly more conservative when it comes to gender relations (virginity before marriage, expected obedience of wives towards their husbands). There is very little variation in these traits according to gender.

They are united by three common elements: (i) the halal food standard, which has come to represent an Islamic way of being, (ii) a very frequent religious practice compared to the rest of society, and (iii) support for the headscarf or veil, which a majority adheres to despite the existence of widely different attitudes.

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30 "Are you personally registered on any electoral lists here in France?" : Yes / No / Does not know.
31 Did you vote during the first round of the presidential elections of April 2012? • You voted for one of the represented candidates • You spoiled the ballot or left it blank • You abstained • You were not registered to vote • Declines to answer

This population has a different view of society when it comes to certain topics, and which seeks to affirm some of its own specificities. They could therefore organise to influence public debate. Yet there is no evidence of this: they rarely vote; they claim to hold a political middle-ground (whereas they traditionally vote left-wing); they have never set up community or religious parties and continue to hold out a certain hope of integrating into the national political system; half of them believe that a Muslim president could be elected in the forthcoming years; and the major problems they face are economic and social rather than ones of religion or identity.

But their portrait is not limited to these common features. Rather, it is their diversity and the differences among them that dominate the study. A large group - around 50 % - is on a slow and steady path towards secularisation. This does not however mean that they will stop eating halal food or that they will drastically cut back on their religious practices. Their belief system will allow them to adapt to French society, which will in turn evolve thanks to specific aspects of their religion.

The median 25 %, embodying the traits of religious conservatism, are the focus of the current political and ideological struggle. This struggle is also impacting the last and most problematic group, which represents another 25 % of Muslims in France, and, among them, many low-skilled young people facing high unemployment and living in poorer immigrant areas on the outskirts of large cities. This group is no longer defined by conservatism, but by its appropriation of Islam as a mode of ideological rebellion against the rest of French society. This is evidenced by values and behaviours which go against the norm, resisting the common *habitus*.

Let us make an attempt to understand the reasons behind this reality. At this stage, we find ourselves facing a complex situation, with many influencing factors, a real lack of understanding from both sides, and questions of identity fuelled by elements both intrinsic and extrinsic to French society.

The transitional crisis of the Arab world, which is rapidly abandoning its traditional system of organisation and is faced with the need to invent a new modernity, has clearly had an impact on French Muslims. The same can be said of the political and geopolitical crises affecting this part of the world. The transformations taking place in Arab societies, with the resulting violence - and Western interventionism -, form an integral part of their everyday lives and give rise to internal conflicts. They are aware that they cannot rely on traditional systems to resolve their everyday issues, and that the assurance represented by their ties to stable traditional societies is now gone. They also perceive their homeland, and their culture, as being taken hostage in a game played out by Western powers, identifying with the victims in the Middle East (Palestine, Iraq, Syria, etc.). A victim mentality is slowly forming in opposition to certain enemies: Americans, Israelis, the West - soon transformed by some radical Islamists into "Crusaders" and "Jews". Anti-Semitism has therefore become a characteristic of this group[32], which positions itself both as a victim of hostile powers and the bearer of a solution: Islam. An Islam which offers answers to an identity crisis brought on by the question: "Who am I if I am neither truly French, nor a citizen of my parents' homeland?". An Islam which seeks to break away from their grandparents' religion, and from parents who have kept their heads down throughout their lives, themselves victims of what they condemn (the West, colonisation, even the "Crusaders"). An Islam which is no longer transmitted within the home, but through different political and religious groups (Tariq Ramadan, the Muslim Brotherhood, Tabligh, the Salafists, and even the Islamic State). An Islam that focuses on feelings of victimisation and the need to "hold your head high", even if that means praying on fear, since it also means rising above victimhood.

But external factors cannot in themselves explain this phenomenon: obstacles to integration play a major role. Transitioning from a patriarchal system, based on solidarity between brothers, and in which the position of women (and especially girls) is inferior to that of men (especially boys), to a republican model which promotes female education (girls from immigrant families have far higher rates of success than boys, and also fail far less than boys from immigrant backgrounds), represents a true paradigm shift within families, notably those of Arab origin.

This anthropological shock is taking place while French society is itself facing four transformative crises, which are primarily impacting the children of Muslim immigrants. Firstly, de-industrialisation, which is striking at the heart of the manual workforce. Immigrants from North Africa, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Sub-Saharan Africa, were recruited in order to reconstruct post-war France. They participated in the

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32 Dominique Reynié, *L'antisémitisme dans l'opinion publique française Nouveaux éclairages*, Fondapol, November 2014.

industrial boom of this flourishing era, and provided a solution to the lack of qualified labourers which *"the great migration from rural to urban areas"*, that Alfred Sauvy often spoke of, could not satisfy. When, at the end of the 1970s, first the iron and steel industry, then coal mines and the car industry, and finally the remaining French industries began to cut production staff on a national scale, immigrant families paid a high price in terms of unemployment, as well as economic and social instability.

Secondly and concomitantly, working-class political structures have slowly been disappearing. The Communist Party is on its way out, trade unions never managed to integrate immigrants and their children, and De Gaulle-era politics left them sidelined (with the exception of the Harkis). By definition, the Church was far removed from their everyday and spiritual lives. Schools, victims of ghettoisation, were not able to offer them a means of upward social mobility. And as for the State, it has failed to provide them with the ideological and material framework to allow them to rise above their initial condition. What remains is Islam.

The rise of Islamism and fundamentalism, a third transformation, is therefore a phenomenon which is not extrinsic to French society. Islamist ideologues created an intellectual and ideological system which allowed them to encroach upon a society the very moment they were given room to do so. Their rise in power is, in some sense, **the consequence** of the breakdown of a traditional national identity, and not its cause, as many would have us believe. This latter idea would indeed be reassuring: the culprits would be known - in this case the Islamists - and could easily be swept aside.

Finally, this large-scale movement is taking place in the broader context of a French society suspended in a generational power struggle, in which the integration of young people into the labour market, the housing market, and the ideas market, has become remarkably hard for everyone involved, including university graduates, many of whom are leaving France. Those left behind must suffer the scourge of endless internships and unstable forms of employment. Within this context, the position of young people from immigrant backgrounds is extremely difficult, since they endure added forms of discrimination, the intensity of which has now been concretely measured[33]. The result is what the INED and INSEE call a *"denial of Frenchness"*, felt by 40 % of immigrants' children.

It would be a grave error to ignore these causes intrinsic to French society. The rise of religious fundamentalism represents a failure on all of our part, and is not merely "their problem". To ignore what this says about the fate of the French youth, about the functioning and barriers of our society, would be to turn a blind eye to an obvious and disturbing reality. And finally, to believe that the problem can be resolved simply by denouncing religious symbols is to misunderstand the scope of this rebellion. By condemning it, we reinforce it, since these symbols are markers of identity. Evidently, the more we attack such identity markers, the more we strengthen the expression of this identity.

The solution is two-fold. First of all, it concerns France in its entirety: in order to re-integrate the working classes into a collective national project, we must ask how we can give them back a sense of hope. Improving schools, making certain outlying regions more competitive, adopting social policies to fight against "insider" advantages, measuring the effects of the decrease in public spending on disadvantaged regions and people, etc. The list is long and reflects the failures of many decades of French public policy.

Aside from these economic factors, the challenge is to find a way to include these people in the national narrative once again, as Muslims, but also and especially as French citizens. The worst approach would be to respond to this rebellion on the part of certain young people, founded on the idea that there is a "them" - the "impure" - and an "us" - proud Muslims and victims of Islamophobia - through political discourse which is itself grounded in this dichotomy. Only in this case the "them" are portrayed as "dangerous young Muslims", and the "us", as "good" French people under threat. In the current security-based atmosphere, it will be hard to fight this temptation. But we must not let ourselves be provoked into hatred, especially when such provocations are coming from a significant part of the French youth. While France can declare war on Daesh, it cannot declare war on a section of its youth.

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33 Montaigne Institute, *Discriminations religieuses à l'embauche : une réalité*, October 2015.

To avoid falling into the trap set by extremists, political discourse must rely on exemplary French citizens of Muslim faith or culture, and on the silent, well-integrated majority. Two messages must be conveyed: first, we should keep reminding the public at large that it is possible to be both French and Muslim without this posing any issues; second, we should reach out to young people who are attracted to religious fundamentalism, and show them that there is no insurmountable glass ceiling.

The second part of the solution concerns an Islam which is yet to be created, and which will be French in so far as it will do the following: represent a view of the world that conforms to our national values; fight against the ideological dominance of a political Islam; produce and disseminate religious teachings; be financed by French money; and, finally, rely on the actions of a new group of women and men, emerging from the silent majority of French Muslims, to achieve these goals.

Islam in France is fragmented and diverse. There is not one Islam but multiple Islams, nourished and spread by national institutions and movements, as well as by transnational organisations and foreign States. The variety of players involved in French Islam, along with the tensions and rivalries between them, contribute to the sense of opacity and difficulty in understanding the current situation. With respect to this, it seems pertinent to give an overview of the different actors of Islam in France, both at a national and institutional level, as well as at a local and more popular one. This approach allows us to see that these different levels and actors are not isolated, and that they do in fact interact with one another.

2. French Islam: a top-down organisation

In France, Islam is fragmented, divided and composite. Certain historical actors have been present since the foundations of Islam in France: these are the countries of origin of French Muslims, left to oversee Islam and Muslims in France by the French State, for legal and practical reasons (2.1). Progressively, as the Muslim religion developed in France, other actors emerged who continue to play an important role in the evolution of French Islam today. Firstly, there is the Muslim Brotherhood, acting through the Union of Islamic Organisations of France (UOIF), which promotes a new form of religion and which is present on the political scene (2.2). Secondly, there are the Salafists who, due to a combined effect of dwindling political engagement and neo-Islamisation among young people, have come to be increasingly important players, while lacking any kind of overarching organisation (2.4). Finally, we must also mention the imperfect attempt made by the French State to create organisations to represent French Islam (2.3). The government has brought this issue to the fore over the past weeks, and we hope that this report may provide a useful contribution.

a. Consular Islam

Throughout Europe, the management of Islam has been delegated to foreign States for many years. These countries, often the homelands of European Muslims, have had strong influence over European Islam from the time of the very first major influxes of immigrants in the early 1950s. European countries long benefited from a situation which spared them the need to get involved in the organisation and control of Islam, partly because until the mid-1970s, immigrant workers were thought to be in Europe on a temporary basis. As such, for a number of decades, the interests of the host countries and countries of origin were relatively well-aligned. The presence of Muslim immigrant workers was considered temporary, and as a result, Islam was seen as an external reality. The host countries therefore avoided the sensitive question of Islam's status within European societies. Once it became clear that Muslim immigrants were here to stay, pragmatic policies were adopted: since they could not keep a check on foreign influence, European countries promoted the recruitment of Imams through consular networks, believing that this would help restrain any fundamentalist and Islamist trends. Foreign States also saw the benefits of their long-distance management of Islam in Europe, since it was both a way of maintaining control and ties with this emigrating population, and of avoiding that their visits back home result in the spreading of Islamist ideologies. Until the end of the 1970s, European countries developed integration policies with a view to a future return, corresponding rather well with the religious and cultural aims of the three main countries of

origin - Algeria, Morocco and Turkey - as well as with the desire for religious dominance of the Saudi Arabian leadership.

If from the end of the 1950s until today, the countries of origin have maintained - and even increased - their efforts at monitoring emigrant populations, we can nevertheless distinguish two forms of consular Islam: one from emigration-producing countries, another from ideology-producing countries.

a. **The model of consular Islam developed by countries that produce emigrating populations, with Algeria, Morocco and Turkey leading the way, is part of a broader control of this populace.** The narratives emerging from each of these countries have a double aim: to prevent an ideological and fundamentalist contamination of emigrants who could then spread it within their home countries, and to maintain ties with a diaspora that significantly contributes to the country's economic development through the funds they send home.

b. **The second model of consular Islam is the one created by non-emigrant States, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, looking to spread an Islamic ideology on a global scale.** For them, European Muslims represent an important target base. A large network of Islamic organisations has thus developed in order to reach as many European Muslims as possible. Such a religiously-oriented diplomatic policy forms part of a more widespread use of soft power and influence.

c. **Foreign States producing emigration**

The consular Islam promoted by countries that produce emigration has undergone three main phases:

- the first period, dating from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, corresponds to the creation of Islamic structures for the immigrant workforce, whose presence in France was deemed temporary. **This is the "residence Islam";**

- the second period, from the end of the 1970s to the early 2000s, corresponds to the phase when the Muslim population living in France formed its roots, and is characterised by the creation of the first religious infrastructures financed by the countries of origin. **This is the "neighbourhood Islam";**

- the third period, beginning in the 1990s and still ongoing, is marked by the crisis of consular Islam: the arrival of a new generation of Muslims, born or schooled in France and no longer identifying with this foreign form of Islam, is leading to a certain withdrawal of consular networks, which are nevertheless still the main points of reference for public authorities. **This is the "institutional Islam".**

"Residence Islam"

Between 1955 and 1974, roughly 711,000 Algerians, 260,000 Moroccans and 140,000 Tunisians settled in France[34]. This population, largely made up of male labourers, helped to rebuild France after WWII and participated in its development during the post-war boom[35]. As of the 1970s, with a slowdown of the economy and the development of public policies encouraging immigrant workers to return to their homelands, public authorities supported the creation of prayer rooms and the involvement of these countries of origin in the organisation of worship: *"Religious practice is never considered as an end in itself, but rather as a means. Supporting the religious fervour of migrants is mainly a way of ensuring that their feelings of national belonging remain strong enough to discourage them from staying in France for the long term."*[36] Prayer rooms were installed in workers' residences as well as in workplaces relying on this labour force.

"Neighbourhood Islam"

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34 Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France, de la fin du XIXe siècle à nos jours,* Paris: Armand Colin, 1996, p.205.

35 Philippe Dewitte, "*Deux siècles d'immigration en France*", Paris, La Documentation Française, 2003.

36 Solenne Jouanneau, *Les imams en France. Une autorité religieuse sous contrôle*, Paris, Éditions Agone, coll. "L'ordre des choses", 2013, p. 51.

The first oil crisis in 1973 meant the end of mass immigration and of political discourse that called for the eventual return of immigrant populations: the failure of the *Stoléru* project in 1976, which aimed at helping Muslims go back home, and the implementation of a family reunification policy in 1978, marked the end of a fairly illusory view of migration. The long-term presence of these immigrants, most of whom were Muslim, meant that public authorities needed to have a spokesperson with whom to identify and manage religious issues. But they were confronted with the weakness - or even non-existence - of local Muslim organisations, and with certain legal obstacles, particularly due to the separation of the Churches and the State in France. As a result, the organisation of prayer rooms, imams, ritual sacrifices and the pilgrimage to Mecca was delegated to the countries of origin.

Therefore, during the time that Islam grew its roots in France, places of worship were gaining an ever increasing autonomy from the main structures that supervised immigrant workers within their factories and places of residence. Places of worship opened up close to their housing in working-class neighbourhoods. Beginning in 1981, with the freedom of association for foreigners in France (Law of 9 October 1981), worship became structured around local associations, and these independent spaces have emerged as the standard way of organising the Muslim faith.

Islam was also delegated to the countries of origin because European States feared a spread of Islamism. In 1979, a year that witnessed the Iranian revolution, the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the looming prospect of Islamism finally surfaced. The development of consular Islam within European States thus offered a seeming guarantee of security. In the context of the Cold War, marked by the resurgence of Islamism, Algeria, Morocco and Turkey appeared capable of forming a common front which, while not exactly pro-Western (Algeria was then non-aligned but sympathising with the USSR), was at least anti-terrorist.

The example of "ELCO-imams"

The case of "ELCO-imams" in France is undoubtedly the clearest example of cooperation between the State and consular Islam. Created in 1975 and managed by the National Education Service, ELCO programmes (*Enseignements de Langue et de Culture d'Origine* - linguistic and cultural education) allow children of foreign origin to learn the language of their ancestral homeland. The participating home countries choose and pay the teachers - who are civil servants on secondment - and determine the content of the programme, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs grants short-stay visas. Most of these teachers on secondment for a period of four years are religious leaders, as imams are considered civil servants in both Algeria and Turkey. "ELCO-imams" are a legal fiction that allows the State to outsource the organisation of worship while providing administrative supervision. Between 1984 and 1992, it is estimated that around 64,000 students of Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Turkish origin participated in these programmes.

From the late 1980s, the government reinforced its control over the ELCO programmes after several Islamist tendencies were observed.

1975-1997: managing worship through legal fiction

Officials seconded by the Algerian Government are for the most part imams. Since 1969, they have been considered civil servants and have depended on the Ministry of Habous[37] and Islamic Affairs, which handles both religious affairs and real estate. Since 1981, they must also hold a State diploma. The ELCO programme *"is a way of taking advantage of the State control over the Imamah in Algeria, since in this case, Algerian authorities compensate for the absence of an overarching French Islamic institution that can identify legitimate Muslim clergy and develop a hierarchical relationship with them."*[38]
The management of these imam-officials on secondment in France, which was previously in the hands of Algerian consular authorities, was slowly handed over to the Grand Mosque of Paris. The Ministry of

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37 Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs. The Habous is a legal act by which a moveable asset or real estate is given by individuals or by the State for the benefit of a charity or public use.
38 Solenne Jouanneau, *op.cit.*, p.284-285.

Habous chose the imams and the Grand Mosque was charged with welcoming and dispatching them to the various affiliated mosques.

A different "diplomatic outsourcing device" is used for Turkish imam-officials. The Turkish imams present in France are officially there as social workers paid by the Turkish Government. They have an overarching supervision unlike the Algerian imams. It revolves around two entities: the DITIB (*Diyanet Işleri Türk Islam Birliği*), or the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs, which supports the Turkish community, especially in Europe, with regard to religious issues; and the Diyanet, which presides over religious affairs within the Turkish Government. In every Turkish Consulate, a representative of the DITIB[39] is responsible for inspecting all affiliated Turkish mosques, while each imam on secondment receives a "Diyanet bulletin"[40] which includes the Friday sermons prepared by the Turkish Government. The control of imams and their ties with the homeland are therefore much stronger.

1997-2002: Questioning the "ELCO-imams" system

As Minister of the Interior, Jean Pierre Chevènement initiated a review of the ELCO-imams system, which was continued by his successors. This review became necessary as the system was hindered by some problematic behaviour.

Since these imams, acting as civil servants, retained close ties to the government of their home country, they became political relays for consular authorities and showed too great a reliance on the political context of their homeland.

In addition, the imams were not well-integrated into French society. Their provisional secondment hardly encouraged them to make genuine efforts to integrate: few mastered French since they had to preach in their native language (a dynamic encouraged by the Arabisation of the Algerian State). In addition, since a secondment abroad was seen as a career booster for the younger imams and a crowning achievement for the older ones, they were much more eager to keep their hierarchy content rather than to promote a French Islam.

Finally, another problem was the inability to apply this system to all nationalities, since not all Muslim clerics have a civil servant status in their home country. Such is the case of Morocco, for example. This is therefore an inherent weakness of the system, which "by its very nature, is extremely dependent on the way the Muslim faith is structured in the country of emigration."[41]

As such, Jean Pierre Chevènement maintained the idea of outsourcing the control of foreign imams through consular networks, but revised the method. The aim was to end the legal fiction of the ELCO-imams, limiting the liability of the State and formalising the link between France and foreign imams for the first time. Thus, for Algerian imams who came to France before the reform, a review on a case by case basis was undertaken before a "visitor" residence permit (one-year renewable) was issued. The State does not directly intervene in the case of new imams, since their secondment follows the signing of a formal protocol between the Algerian Government and the Grand Mosque of Paris.

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39 Created in the 1980s, the DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs - in Turkish "Diyanet Işleri Türk Islam Birliği") is responsible for supporting the Turkish community, notably in Europe, with regard to religious issues, sending over Turkish imams and religious teachers, along with aid for the construction of mosques and cultural centres in Europe.
40 Diyanet: Presidency of Religious Affairs within the Turkish Government. Reporting directly to the office of the Prime Minister, the Diyanet is in charge of: organising activities linked to the Islamic faith; informing the public about Islamic religion, worship and moral values; administering places of worship.
41 Solenne Jouanneau, *op.cit,* p.297.

The implementation of consular Islam comes from the merger of a "state of affairs" and a public policy seeking to be pragmatic. Initially, Muslim infrastructures were few and far between and still rudimentary: the faithful rarely had access to suitable places of worship (this was the "Islam of the cellars" period) and the vast majority of Muslim associations could not assume the financial burden of administering imams. Foreign States *de facto* took over the administrative and operational tasks related to the religion. It was only later, starting in the 1990s, that the French State tried to gain more control over consular Islam. Thus, Raoul Weexsteen, Islamic advisor to Pierre Joxe and then Charles Pasqua, called for a pragmatic approach: if foreign influences could not be avoided, he favoured the recruitment of imams through consular networks to avoid the emergence of fundamentalist and Islamist movements. The reasoning was that an imam accredited by his home country, notably Algeria, would display moderation, at a time when the Algerian State was fighting against Armed Islamic Groups (AIG) and when Wahhabism was starting to permeate the fabric of French Islam.

During the 1980s and 1990s, consular Islam brought to light a fragmented management of Islam in France. The diplomatic outsourcing of religious organisation gave a key role to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which negotiates with the countries of origin to grant short-stay visas for imams. The ELCO programme, which is an attempt to supervise a Muslim religion managed by proxy, falls to the Department of Education. The Ministry of the Interior, which houses the Central Bureau of Religious Affairs, is responsible for security issues relating to religion: it guarantees freedom of religion but also supervises religious practices. In addition, it oversees relations between local authorities and practising worshippers, and ensures that foreign imams are practising legally.

"Institutional Islam"

Consular Islam was slowly reaching a crisis point. All the while, public authorities made parallel attempts to shape Islam in France: firstly by reviewing the ELCO programmes; secondly by instituting a Muslim Advisory Council supported by consular networks; and finally when Charles Pasqua tried to organise French Islam through the Grand Mosque in Paris, under Algerian authority. Muslims in mainland France were in fact slowly moving away from the Islam of their homeland. The origins of this crisis can be traced to two factors linked to the sociological and demographic evolution of France's Muslim population.

Moreover, the new generations of Muslims made up of the children of Muslim immigrants, who were born and grew up in French society, no longer identified with their ancestral homelands - places that they barely knew. This second generation, which stepped onto the scene during the "Beurs' March" (the March for Equality and Against Racism) in 1983, was in fact more strongly secularised than the first. In contrast to their parents, their approach to Islam was a means of upholding a faded structure, as well as a manner of reasserting their position in public discourse. These new aspirations were then channelled, not through the network of consular associations based on ethnicity and nationality, but through associative structures that look beyond these criteria, such as the UOIF. The consular networks therefore found themselves facing competition from emerging national and transnational Islamic movements.

With the weakening of the *"fabric of control"*[42] developed by the Consulates, public authorities increasingly began to rely on the structures of consular Islam to organise Muslim worship. The various Ministers of the Interior accorded an important role to the representatives of consular Islam as spokespersons for Muslims in France, and legitimised consular networks, which did not reflect the on-the-ground reality. The first elections of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) in 2003, showed the strength of the UOIF; they also shed light on the weakness of the Algerian consular networks, undoubtedly the clearest evidence of the changes taking place. Nevertheless, consular Islam remains a very important component of French Islam, since local councils are somewhat sceptical of independent associations like the UOIF or the *Collectif des musulmans de France* (Community of the Muslims of France). As a result, representatives of religious associations with links to foreign States are among the privileged spokespeople who local authorities turn to.

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42 Bernard Godard, "Les États musulmans et l'Islam de France", *Politique étrangère*, 2015/3.

Today, public authorities continue to strengthen their ties with the various consular representatives and to delegate religious issues to foreign States. A clear example was François Hollande's announcement in September 2015 regarding an agreement with the Kingdom of Morocco for the instruction of imams. However, the gulf between Muslims and their ancestral homelands continues to grow, and consular Islam has lost most of its control over religious matters. This is notably the case among the youngest generation, influenced by the emergence of a new, more radical Islamic discourse which is propagated online. This loss of religious influence is evident when we look at the number of imams in France who are on secondment from their home countries, compared to the total number of Muslim preachers: there are a mere 301 imams on secondment out of around 2,200 imams working in mainland France, or 13 % of the total. **To sum up, and with the risk of pushing the point, it would appear that today, consular Islam participates in the administrative organisation of the Muslim faith, but has lost its normative and prescriptive power over religious issues.**

1. Algeria: a historical actor

Around half of all Algerians living abroad reside in France. It is estimated that around 1.5 million Muslims in France are Algerian or of Algerian origin, which makes this the largest Muslim community in France[43]. The size of this population, together with the historic ties which bind Algeria and France, form the basis for a shared desire on the part of both countries to see Algeria play a major role in the organisation of Islam in France.

Algerian consular Islam appeared on the stage rather late. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Association of Algerians in Europe mainly served as *"a communication channel between a recently independent power structure and migrants in search of community support",* and acted as an "interface" between migrants and Algerian Consulates or French authorities[44]. It played a marginal role in religious issues, since over the course of this period it only organised the transfer of nine imams, with the aim of providing spiritual support for Algerian emigrants[45]. It was only in 1982, when Algeria took over the administration of the Grand Mosque of Paris, that the Algerian State began funding the Muslim faith in France, creating a network of religious associations and building spaces of worship.

The promotion of Cheikh Abbas to the post of Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris (GMP) marked a double turning point, both in Algeria's role in French Islam, and in that of the GMP. Indeed, as of the 1980s, the Algerian State attempted to position itself as leader of Islam in France. It was encouraged in this respect by the actions of Charles Pasqua during his term as Minister of the Interior. He attempted to centre the organisation of French Islam around the Grand Mosque of Paris and a network of Algerian religious associations, giving the former the "monopoly" on ritual slaughter in France. The civil war, the black decade of AIG terrorism and the Paris attacks of 1995 perpetrated by Algerian Islamists, intensified relations between the French Government and Algerian authorities. The organisation of Islam through Algerian networks therefore seemed to guarantee against the rise of political Islamism in France, which was itself mainly an Algerian import.

Despite the importance bestowed upon consular Islam by French public authorities, successive CFCM elections showed the relative impotence of Algerian networks to influence Muslims in France. The National Federation of the Grand Mosque of Paris, uniting all Algerian religious associations, was the big loser of the first elections in 2003, up against the UOIF and the Federation of Moroccans in France. The appointment of Dalil Boubakeur, Rector of the Grand Mosque, as head of the CFCM resulted from a preceding agreement with Nicolas Sarkozy. This electoral defeat highlighted the gap between the GMP's supposed influence, upheld by French authorities, and the genuine influence it had over Muslims in France. The clearest evidence of this came with the withdrawal of the Algerian Federation from the CFCM in 2008, refusing to play by the rules of democracy and reaffirming its dominance over French Islam with no arguments other

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43 Bernard Godard, Sylvie Taussig, *Les musulmans en France*, Paris, Laffont, 2007.

44 Abdelhafid Hammouche, "Des amicales d'hier aux associations de quartier d'aujourd'hui. Un essai de typologie." in *Hommes et migrations,* n° 1229 - Jan-Feb 2001.

45 Jonathan Laurence, *The emancipation of Europe's Muslims. The State's role in minority integration*, Princeton University Press, 2012.

than those based on population size and historical importance, before returning in 2012 during the CFCM reform.

Today, it is estimated that the GMP controls a network of around 250 associations and places of worship, as well as around 150 imams (or roughly 10% of all imams in France), the majority of whom (120 imams) are funded by the Algerian State[46]. During Ramadan, France also welcomes in 299 additional religious figures to support worship through bilateral agreements with countries such as the Kingdom of Morocco and Algeria. How many of these figures come from each country is not publicly known. They have a short-stay visa which expires on the last day of Ramadan and are paid by the countries that send them over[47]. While maintaining its support for and organisation of French Islam in official discourse, notably through its participation in the instruction of religious officials both at the Al-Ghazali Institute within the Grand Mosque and at the University of Constantine, the Algerian Government remains on the sidelines. It only provides €2 million in funding for Muslim worship in France each year, compared to the €4 million it gave in 2011, and nearly €6 million provided by Morocco[48]. As Bernard Godard notes, despite its symbolic power, the Grand Mosque of Paris plays a marginal role in French Islam: "even its construction, and now its administration, have made it a diplomatic and official space, rather than an intellectual or strictly religious centre, despite the presence of a 'Muslim Institute'"[49].

2. Morocco: the power of the *Rassemblement des Marocains de France* (RMF - "The Gathering of the Moroccans of France")

Roughly one third of Moroccans abroad reside in France. After Algeria and its million and a half immigrants, they make up the second largest community of Muslims in France, with a population of around one million people (both nationals and bi-nationals). Morocco aims to retain ties with its emigrant population, especially since the 1980s and 1990s. This policy is based on two objectives: the first is economic, due to the important funds sent home by emigrants; the second is a security issue, linked to the fight against terrorism and political Islamism.

Beginning in the 1960s, with the first wave of Moroccan workers emigrating to France, the Moroccan State created a relatively flexible monitoring network, notably through the Association of Moroccan Workers and Traders in France (ATCMF). The economic factor was key, since the Moroccan community was structured on a religious basis with no real consular support. The repeated calls of King Hassan II to Moroccans, urging them not to break ties with Morocco and not to renounce their Moroccan nationality, form part of this incentive to maintain links to the diaspora.

It was only later, with the rise of Islamism in Morocco and in Europe, that the Kingdom of Morocco set up a system of religious control. The Moroccan State attempted to bring together various Moroccan Muslim associations under the umbrella of the National Federation of the Moroccans of France (FNMF), later changed to the Gathering of the Moroccans of France (RMF). Since its creation in 1990, the goal of the Hassan II Foundation has been to promote Moroccan culture, with the close support of the Ministry of Moroccans residing abroad, and the Ministry of Religious affairs. With an annual budget of $15-20 million, this organisation sends imams to Europe and finances Moroccan religious associations. In its recent report on Islam in France, the French Senate estimated that Morocco currently finances 30 imams on secondment in France[50]. During the month of Ramadan, the Moroccan State *"also delegates over 220 imams through the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans residing abroad"[51]*, some of whom are sent to France.

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46 Sénat, *De l'Islam en France à un Islam de France, établir la transparence et lever les ambiguïtés*, *Rapport d'Information,* Nathalie Goulet and André Reichardt, n°757 (2015-2016), 5 July 2016.

47 Reply given by the Minister of the Interior, Mr Bernard Cazeneuve, to a topical question posed to the government n° 0747G by Ms Nathalie Goulet, published in the Official Journal of the Senate on 12 February 2016.

48 Sénat, *De l'Islam en France à un Islam de France, établir la transparence et lever les ambiguïtés*, *Rapport d'Information,* Nathalie Goulet and André Reichardt, n°757 (2015-2016), 5 July 2016.

49 Bernard Godard, "Les États musulmans et l'Islam de France", *Politique étrangère*, 2015/3.

50 Sénat, *De l'Islam en France à un Islam de France, op.cit*.

51 S. Exc. Mr Chakib Benmoussa, ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco in France, hearing before the Senate on the occasion of the Information Report on the organisation of Islam in France.

The involvement of the Moroccan State in the religious life of its emigrant population is particularly striking if we take the example of the CFCM. With Moroccan Muslims mainly residing outside the capital, and with a network of mosques which have a larger surface area than those in urban centres, the FNMF won the first CFCM elections in 2003; it benefited the most from a voting system based on the size of mosques. This result made Moroccan authorities aware of the determining role they could play within French Islam. In order to increase its influence within the representative body, the Kingdom of Morocco merged the FNMF into a single structure which was to more widely embrace all Moroccan emigrants in France: the *Rassemblement des marocains de France* (RMF - "Gathering of the Moroccans of France"). Such proactive politics bore fruit, as shown in the following elections in which French citizens of Moroccan origin won by a landslide, pushing back the UOIF. At the end of his term in 2008, Dalil Boubakeur, Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, was to be replaced by the French-Moroccan Mohammed Moussaoui.

The involvement of Moroccan emigrants in the Madrid attacks of 2004, as well as an increasing number of Islamist terrorist acts taking place in Morocco, led the country's government to put up a fierce fight against Islamism and terrorism. Morocco is tentatively developing a veritable strategy of restrained counter-discourse in Europe, and particularly in France. This includes a stricter monitoring of Moroccan imams in France, an increased presence of imams approved by the Moroccan Government - as attested to by the agreement signed in 2008 between the French Ministry of the Interior and the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs, planning for 30 imams to be sent to France -, and newly available training for apprentice imams. These initiatives, aimed at gaining more control over religious practices, are accompanied by a funding policy: Morocco has helped to finance the Grand Mosque of Strasbourg and covers all of the costs of the Saint-Etienne Mosque.

At the European level, in 2010 the Kingdom of Morocco created a European Council of Moroccan Uluma, headquartered in Brussels. According to Bernard Godard, *"Rabat is trying to create a kind of counter-structure in Europe to combat the hyperactive nature of the two main enemies of Sherifian religious doctrine. Made up of theologians who are far from being universally progressive, it must counterbalance a structure created by the Muslim Brotherhood more than a decade earlier - the European Council for Fatwa and Research in Dublin -, but must also fight the worrying rise of Salafism, which is influencing the younger generations both in Europe and Morocco."*[52]

The involvement of Belgian and French citizens, some of whom were of Moroccan origin, in the November 2015 attacks in France and the March 2016 attacks in Brussels, pushed the Moroccan Government to pursue its religious policy in order to shield itself against a Jihadist contamination potentially coming from Europe.

The 2015 inauguration of the Mohamed VI Institute in Rabat is another reflection of this impetus towards religious influence. Welcoming apprentice imams from Morocco, as well as from Africa and Europe, the aim of this structure is to "teach new generations of imams and mourchidates [female preachers] the real values of Islam in order to protect Morocco from extremist tendencies" and to ensure "the spiritual safety of Morocco"[53] *and by extension* that of France.

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52 Bernard Godard, "Les États musulmans et l'Islam de France", *op.cit.*
53 Speech given by the King of Morocco during the inauguration of the Mohammed VI Institute in Rabat, 27 March 2015, quoted by Ruth Grosrichard in *Le Monde*.

3. Turkey: an overarching organisation

According to data provided by the Turkish Consulates in France, there are around 600,000 Turkish nationals and French citizens of Turkish origin in France. Most live in the East of France, near the border with Germany, where most Turkish immigrants reside, as well as in the Rhone Valley. While the Turkish government did not take much notice of its emigrating citizens before the 1980s, it is now continually seeking to strengthen ties with the Turkish diaspora and to increase its religious influence over this population.

With this in mind, the Ministry for Religious Affairs (the Diyanet), together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Turkish Emigration, created the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (the DITIB) which it manages and finances. The DITIB supervises the religious practices of Turkish people living abroad. Anywhere a Turkish immigrant minority is present in Europe, the DITIB takes care of religious and cultural Turkish organisations, both existing and new, organises the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the repatriation of bodies for burial in Turkey. It is estimated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara supervises and manages over 500 places of worship, out of a total of 1,000 Turkish mosques and prayer rooms in Europe. The organisation of Turkish consular Islam is therefore far more centralised than that of Algeria and Morocco. Each Turkish Consulate includes a DITIB representative, who is authorised to inspect all affiliated Turkish mosques and to monitor the imams who preside there. Each imam on secondment abroad regularly receives a "Diyanet bulletin" which includes the Friday sermons prepared by Turkish authorities. Currently, 151 imams seconded by the Turkish State preside full-time. This represents half of the 301 imams on secondment from foreign countries, and means that Turkey is the most invested State when it comes to organising Muslim worship in France[54].

The Millî Görüs movement, "National vision" in Turkish, is DITIB's main competitor in terms of the religious influence it exerts over Turkish emigrants. *"Mixing references close to the Muslim Brotherhood movement and exaltations of the Ottoman Empire's lost grandeur"*[55], Millî Görüs brings together fervent opponents of Turkish secularism and staunch supporters of headscarves for young girls[56]. Present in France since the arrival of the first Turkish immigrants, it was responsible for the construction of the first Turkish mosques. Its local foothold and historic presence mean that it can rely on a highly structured organisation, which notably includes a real estate company that looks after its holdings, and its own pavilion in Saudi Arabia, allowing it to organise pilgrimages.

Since its creation in 1984, the Diyanet has reinforced its presence within the Turkish community. Today, France has three DITIB federations: one in Paris, one in Lyon, and another in Strasbourg, created in 1997, which organises Turkish Islam in the Grand-Est region. In just a few years, this Strasbourg-based federation, which has an average annual budget of €500,000 and controls around 60 mosques, has become a major actor in regional Islam. *"For a long time, the DITIB was relegated to rural areas and medium-sized towns in the Alsace region, while Strasbourg was the playing field of Millî Görüs for Turkish Islam (the Eyyub Sultan Mosque in the Meinau neighbourhood) and of the RMF for the Moroccan community"*[57]. The accession of a member of the Strasbourg DITIB to the presidency of the CRCM, along with the development of ambitious educational projects (the abandoned project for the creation of an Islamic University and the opening of the private Yunus Emre school in Strasbourg in October 2015) are some of the more visible signs of this presence: *"Turkish Islamic movements in Europe have developed a very socially active form of Islam. Focused on creating close community ties, their actions take place on three levels: creating mosques, reaffirming traditional values influenced by Ottomanism through teaching, and encouraging community support for schooling and other social issues."*[58]

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54 Sénat, *De l'Islam en France à un Islam de France, op.cit.*
55 Bernard Godard, "Les États musulmans et l'Islam de France", *Politique étrangère,* 2015/3.
56 Bernard Godard, Sylvie Taussig, *Les musulmans en France*, Paris, Pluriel, 2009, p. 52.
57 Claire Gandanger, "Ditib : la montée en puissance de l'islam officiel turc à Strasbourg", *rue89*, 2 October 2015.
58 Samin Akgönul, "Islam turc, islams de Turquie : acteurs et réseaux en Europe", *Politique étrangère,* 2005/1.

Source: Claire Gandanger, www.rue89strasbourg.com.

Turkish Islam does not aim to have dominion in France, but rather to maintain ties between Muslims of Turkish origin and Turkey. This highly structured organisation, which supports community living and practices, is both a barrier to Turkish integration in France, but also to the spreading of Salafism among the Muslim community of Turkish origin[59].

Tunisia is clearly absent from this depiction of the interactions between Maghreb countries and Islam. And yet, towards the end of the 1980s, the first UOIF leaders were Tunisians, chased out of their country by Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Under Ben Ali, the Tunisian State was more prone to applying security and policing measures to control individuals, rather than influencing Tunisian immigrant populations in France (and Europe) through Islam and mosques. Tunisia therefore does not appear as a major actor of Islam in France.

Foreign funding of Islam in France

In its report on the financing of places of worship, undertaken in 2015 under the direction of Senator Pierre Maurey, the Senate stressed that:

- the overall funding of religion (operational and investment spending) largely comes from the worshippers themselves. The *zâkat*, the Muslim equivalent of the Catholic parish tithes, contributes to what is by and large a self-financing of the religion;
- foreign States and transnational organisations also help to finance the Muslim religion in France, but their contribution is marginal. This outside funding is notably used for the building of places of worship or for their maintenance, and also provides a salary for imams on secondment from certain countries.

Hearings with Algerian and Moroccan ambassadors have highlighted the limited nature of funding from foreign countries.

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59 Mohammed-Ali Adraoui, *Du golfe aux banlieues : le salafisme mondialisé*, Paris, PUF, 2013.

Algeria only indirectly finances the Muslim religion in France. This funding takes the form of a global grant sent to the Grand Mosque of Paris, which then attributes a certain sum to its own operations, and the rest to associations, mosques and prayer rooms that make a request for funding and that belong to the National Federation of the Grand Mosque of Paris. The financial assistance that Algeria sends over for the Muslim community in France has been decreasing. While it totalled roughly €4 million in 2011, by 2013 this had fallen to €1.8 million. The sums granted to associations and mosques which put in a request vary from €20,000 to €49,000 per project.

Meanwhile, the aid sent from Morocco has been on the increase. From €4 million in 2013, it has now risen to €6 million in 2016[60]. This funding is direct and must follow strict guidelines: *"requests for funding from Morocco always come from associations of worshippers and are passed on through the embassy, or are sent directly to the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs"[61]*.

Funding from Morocco in 2013 was distributed as follows:

- one third of the funds was used for the construction and renovation of mosques (Saint-Étienne, Strasbourg, Blois, Évry and Mantes-la-Jolie);
- another third was handed over to religious associations;
- the final third was used to fund the wages of imams and preachers who come to France on a temporary basis during the month of Ramadan, a time when larger numbers of worshippers gather at mosques.

This tells us that religious associations and mosques have a real need to fund their religion through the contributions of foreign States. Nevertheless, this need remains marginal, and it is relatively transparent.

In contrast, as the Senate highlighted in its report on Islam in France, private foreign donations which also help to fund Islam are far more opaque: *"Much like private French donations, the multiple foreign donations from private sources cannot be the object of full statistical reporting. Yet, without a doubt, among public opinion they are the ones that generate the most suspicion as to the ideologies that motivate them."[62]*

The fact that most Muslim associations are of the "1901 Law" type, and not religious associations as defined by the 1905 Law, contributes to this lack of transparency. Indeed, religious associations have more important and more rigid accounting obligations than those that come under the "1901 Law". The former must transmit their accounts each year to the prefecture, and their finances may be audited by the Finance Ministry and the Inspector-General of Finances, as stipulated in Article 21 of the 1905 Law: *"Each year, associations and unions must provide an inventory of their moveable assets and real estate. A financial audit of the associations and unions is undertaken by the Finance Minister and by the Inspector-General of Finances."*

The status of religious associations, as defined by the 1905 Law, therefore guarantees financial transparency, notably for private donations given to associations.

60 Sénat, *De l'Islam en France à un Islam de France, établir la transparence et lever les ambiguïtés*, *Rapport d'information*, Nathalie Goulet and André Reichardt, n°757 (2015-2016), 5 July 2016.
61 Hearing with the Moroccan ambassador, Mr Chakib Benmoussa, quoted in: Sénat, "Les collectivités territoriales et le financement des lieux de culte", Rapport d'information, 2015.
62 Sénat, *De l'Islam en France à un Islam de France, établir la transparence et lever les ambiguïtés*, *Rapport d'information*, Nathalie Goulet and André Reichardt, n°757 (2015-2016), 5 July 2016, p.60.

ii. Foreign States producing austere ideologies

1. *Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism: religion as soft power*

While Saudi Arabia has not exported labour towards Europe, the Saudi State has long sought to extend the religious influence of its Kingdom to European countries. Its oil reserves provide it with a strong financial base, allowing it to play an important role in Muslim religion, and in European politics. The spread of Wahhabi Islam is closely linked to the political aims of this Kingdom. Wahhabism was used as a foreign policy tool in the 1960s and 1970s to fight against the influence of Arab nationalism, notably that emerging from Nasser's Egypt. Since the 1980s, faced with the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia committed itself to a fight for the *"control over the mental representations of Islam in the Muslim world"*[63].

Saudi Arabia expanded its religious activities on an international scale during a key era in the relations between Arab-speaking societies and European countries, which also corresponds to the period when Muslim immigration became firmly rooted in Europe. American support for the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the resulting oil embargo by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), made Saudi Arabia - which held almost 22 % of global oil reserves - a key actor in the relations between the West and the Middle-East. This reversal in the power dynamics between the Arab world and the West allowed Saudi Arabia to become a true *"religious superpower"*[64].

As such, in 1962 in Mecca, the Muslim World League - MWL *(Rabitat al-Alamiyya al-Islamiyya)* - was founded under the incentive of Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz. An influential intermediary for Saudi cultural and religious diplomacy, this organisation has two main missions: it disseminates pan-Islamic ideology in the face of emerging Arab nationalist movements, and it seeks to secure Saudi Arabia's dominion over Islam on a global scale. Structured over a number of departments, the Muslim World League organises the instruction of imams, provides study grants and fights Christianity. Today, it has 120 branches all over the world, and a number of affiliated institutions such as the Islamic Council of Europe in London. Headed by an Egyptian member of the Muslim Brotherhood who found asylum in Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Council of Europe plays an important role in creating ties between Muslim organisations in Europe and the Muslim World League. The League has an office in every European country; the one in Paris was opened in 1977.

This League also plays an important role as patron. The financial power of Saudi Arabia has allowed the Muslim World League to become a major actor in the creation of Muslim religious infrastructures in Europe. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on the construction of mosques across Europe: in France, Spain, Italy, Holland, Belgium, the UK, etc. In France, Saudi Arabia notably helped fund the construction of the Mantes-la-Jolie mosque in 1980, the Évry mosque in 1984, and the Lyon mosque in 1994 - which Prince Fahd inaugurated in person, after donating $4 million to it. The MWL may well have spent around $40 million for the construction of mosques in France and to fund religious associations. *"These different financial contributions were not used to bend French Islam towards Wahhabism, but rather to create a certain financial and material authority for Muslim populations in France by forming allegiances and client networks."*[65] Saudi Arabia also continues to finance social and charitable actions, for which it is impossible to precisely measure foreign financial contributions.

Beyond developing an influential international network through the MWL, Saudi Arabia has managed to create a genuine model of religious leadership. This religious leadership strategy is visible on two fronts.

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63 Zaki Laïdi, *Géopolitique du sens*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1998.
64 Samir Amghar, "Acteurs internationaux et islam de France", *Politique Etrangère*, 2005/1.
65 Samir Amghar, "Acteurs internationaux et islam de France", *Politique étrangère,* 2005/1 (Printemps), p. 30.

Saudi Arabia has considerably improved its capacity to host pilgrims during the *Hajj.* With its two Islamic holy sites, Mecca and Medina, the Saudi Kingdom has become a global pilgrimage centre. Each year, almost six million pilgrims travel to Mecca (nearly two million people perform *Hajj*, when only 150,000 did so in the 1950s), where they are given free Wahhabi Islamic literature. In France, 25,000 people perform *Hajj* each year. Roughly 5 % of French Muslims have travelled to Mecca at least once, while over 75 % of people who identify as Muslim aim to go there at some stage in their lives.

The second axis of this strategy for religious influence consists in creating important Islamic universities in Mecca (Umm Al-Qura University), Medina (University of al-Madinah al-Munawarah) and Riyadh (Ibn Saud Univeristy), as direct competition to the great historic universities like Al-Azhar in Egypt, Ez-Zitouna in Tunisia and Al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco. The Saudi State has created many scholarships in order to host theology students from all over the world wishing to become imams. Once they return to their home countries, they become real ambassadors and play an important role in propagating Wahhabi ideology.

The swift expansion of Saudi influence - through the construction of large mosques, the free distribution of millions of Wahhabi books and brochures, and the instruction of imams - is permitted by the financial fortune of its petrol reserves. According to James Woolsey, this policy of religious influence and leadership has funnelled over $85 billion on a global level between 1975 and 2005[66], and aims for spiritual and political control over Muslim practices[67].

This policy of religious influence largely relies on intermediaries and is characterised by a weak on-the-ground presence. The Saudi Arabian ambassador in France, Khalid bin Mohammed Al Ankary, has indicated that since 2011, the Saudi State had *"helped fund eight mosques in France, with contributions varying from €200,000 to €900,000 per project. In total, we have provided €3,759,400"*[68], or an average of €750,000 per year. He also stressed that Saudi Arabia only pays the salaries of 14 imams out of a total over over 2,200 presiding in France.

List of mosques in France whose construction was partly funded by Saudi Arabia[69]			
Name	Address	Aid amount	Year
Grand Mosque of Mantes-La-Jolie	78200 Mantes-la-Jolie	€981,720	2010
Grand Mosque of Strasbourg	67000 Strasbourg	€910,676	2011
Grand Mosque of Saint-Denis	93200 Saint Denis	€800,000	2012
Grand Mosque of Givors	69700 Givors	€291,600	2012
Al Hidayah Mosque	92600 Asnières	€201,612	2012
Othmane Ibn Affane Mosque	78200 Mantes-la-Jolie	€191,274	2014
Grand Mosque of Cergy	95800 Cergy	€191,274	2014
Okba Ibnou Nafaa Mosque	92000 Nanterre	€191,274	2014

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66 Shehabi, "The role of religious ideology in the expansionist policies of Saudi Arabia", in Madawi Al-Rasheed, *Kingdom without Borders, Saudi Political, religious and Media Frontiers*, New-York, Columbia University Press*,* 2008, p. 183-197.
67 James Woolsey, "The Global Spread of Wahhabi Islam: How Great a Threat?", Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 3 May 2005.
68 French Senate Information Report n°757 concerning the organisation, place and financing of Islam in France and of its places of worship, July 2016.
69 Sénat, "De l'Islam en France à un Islam de France, établir la transparence et lever les ambiguïtés", *Rapport d'information,* Nathalie Goulet and André Reichardt, n°757 (2015-2016), 5 July 2016

2. Qatar: financial and media influence as push strategy

Within French Islam, Qatar operates more through targeted and strategic funding aimed at creating social dependency, rather than through the traditional vectors of consular Islam. And it does this by relying on globally recognisable personalities like Tariq Ramadan[70], or "TV imams" like Sheikh Yusuf. Another example is Al-Qaradawi, a leading media exporter of the Qatari vision of Islam, who in his Al Jazeera TV show "Sharia and Life" *(al-sharî'a wa al-hayât),* speaks directly to French Muslims who understand classical Arabic.

According to Haoues Séniguer[71], Qatari sponsors *"make regular donations to the Union of Islamic Organisations of France (UOIF), the heir and sounding platform in France for the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is shared by a majority of Qatari officials."*

The UOIF: a French style Islam
iii. Origins and organisation

The Union of Islamic Organisations of France (UOIF) is an important player within French Islam. It was founded in 1983 by exiled Tunisian students close to the Movement of Islamic Tendency, ancestor of the Ennahdha Party, who were fleeing the repression of President Bourguiba, and whose original aim was to establish a French branch of the Tunisian Islamist Party. Historically close to the Muslim Brotherhood, for whom it is a major actor in Europe, the UOIF, at the time of its creation, had an Islamist rhetoric. In accordance with the doctrine of Hassan Al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement in 1927, the founders of the UOIF maintained that Islam was an overarching system, encompassing all aspects of life[72]; it was therefore not only religious, but also political and social. The goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is the rise of an Islamic society ruled by Sharia Law.

While such Islamist rhetoric is still present within the UOIF, the organisation's institutionalisation, notably with the creation of the CFCM in 2003, contributed to the evolution of this rhetoric, bringing it in line with Western democratic values. Today, the UOIF is a federation bringing together around *"250 Muslim associations throughout France"[73],* but it is also host to a wide variety of rhetoric reflecting different degrees of Islamism. It includes individuals like Tareq Oubrou, who rejects the headscarf, as well as others like Amar Lasfar, the current President, who defends far more conservative views. The multitudinous discourses, and the contradictions between them, are evidence of the deep transformations taking place within the Muslim community in France, and the expression of tensions felt by this organisation, which is torn between its participation in a transnational network and its leading role in the emergence of a French Islam.

These different approaches are also reflected in the make-up of its operating budget, estimated at over €2 million per annum. Samir Amghar in fact notes that 60 % of its funding seems to come from the organisation's own resources (fees paid by member associations and revenue linked to profits from its commercial branch - the GEDIS association -, which is both a publishing house and the main organiser of the annual UOIF forum at the Bourget site), while 40 % appears to be contributions from Gulf donors and grants from NGOs close to Saudi Arabia[74].

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70 Director of the *Research Centre of Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE),* inaugurated in Doha on 15 January 2012, and professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies at St Anthony's College (Oxford), on a Chair named after the former Emir of Qatar: H.H. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani.

71 Séniguer Haoues, "Le Qatar et l'islam de France : vers une nouvelle idylle ?", Confluences Méditerranée 1/2013 (n° 84), p. 101-115

72 The first principle of Hassan Al-Banna

73 Presentation of the federation on its website, viewed on 18 August 2016 (http://www.uoif-online.com/presentation/)

74 Samir Amghar, "Les mutations de l'islamisme en France. Portrait de l'UOIF, porte-parole de l''islamisme de minorité'", *La Vie des idées*, 1 October 2007.

UOIF operations receive a great deal of international funding because the organisation is part of the transnational network of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. This network allows it to benefit from funding from the Gulf region, and notably from Saudi Arabia, which has served as a refuge for the principal leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood following the movement's ban by Nasser in Egypt in 1954[75].

The UOIF is a member of the Federation of Islamic Organisation in Europe (FIOE), an organisation which was co-founded in 1989 with other national European federations - also affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood - such as the *Islamitische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland* in Germany, the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), the *Ligue Islamique interculturelle de Belgique* (LIIB) in Belgium, the *Ligue des musulmans de Suisse* (LMS 1992) in Switzerland, and the Italian *Unione delle Communita e delle Organizazioni Islamiche in Italia* (UCOII 1990). The UOIF therefore played a major role in the creation of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), founded in 1997. This institution creates jurisprudence adapted to the European context and provides legal opinion.

As such, the UOIF is an organisation torn between the logic of transnational expansion and itschance to contribute tothe definition of a French Islam. It must reconcile a number of development opportunities, from the local to the international.

Indeed, the UOIF has a unique role in French Islam, not only because it takes part in transnational and European networks, but also due to its on-the-ground presence and local actions. As Vincent Geisser noted: *"its success is due less to an overarching organisation (a pre-defined plan for Islamisation created by 'Islamic technocrats') and more to a series of achievements at a local and sectoral level. (...) In sum, the UOIF saga is created out of a series of local narratives"[76]*.

The strength of the UOIF resides in its ability to unite very different local realities through a single rhetoric and ideology. For example, in Bordeaux, the associations affiliated with the UOIF largely stem from an academic and intellectual background, while those in the North of France are working-class organisations motivated by ethno-national issues. This regional networking strategy is inspired by political parties. The UOIF has in fact divided France into eight regions with a federation representative at the head of each region. In addition to the 250 associations which are affiliated with it, the UOIF controls around thirty religious centres and two large mosques: Lille South, headed by Amar Lasfar - currently UOIF's President - and Bordeaux, where Tareq Oubrou is the imam.

While on the one hand federating these Islamic associations, the UOIF also applies a strategy which involves a segmentation of its activities and of France's Muslim population[77]. From the *Jeunes musulmans de France* (Young Muslims of France) to the *Étudiants musulmans de France* (Muslim Students of France), from the *Ligue française de la femme musulmane* (French League of Muslim Women) to the *Association des imams de France* (Association of French Imams), and even a medical association (*Avicenne)*, the French Muslim community is fully compartmentalised. *"Each sector of the 'Muslim community' is seen as a market segment to be won"[78]*. This allows the UOIF to begin to seek legitimacy. By formulating a perfectly calibrated rhetoric for each of these sectors, it can establish itself as a representative body for this part of the population.

This segmentation of Islamic life gives the UOIF a real comparative advantage, perhaps even a quasi-monopoly. The training of imams is a case in point. The 1991 launch of the European Institute of Human Sciences (IESH) near Nevers, followed by the opening of an antenna in Saint-Denis in the early 2000s, gave the UOIF a clear headway in this field. Aside from the incapacity of the French State to create a scholarly institution for Muslim religious leaders, this quasi-monopolistic situation is reinforced by the UOIF's participation in a transnational and European network.

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75 Stéphane Lacroix, *Les islamistes saoudiens. Une insurrection manquée*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2010.
76 Vincent Geisser, "L'UOIF, la tension clientéliste d'une grande fédération islamique", in *Confluences méditerranéennes*, 2006/2, n°57, p. 83 to 101.
77 Samir Amghar, *op. cit.*
78 Samir Amghar*, op. cit.*

For instance, Muslim religious leaders in Switzerland are trained at the IESH following an agreement between Swiss authorities and the private Institute[79].

This double strategy of creating regional networks and segmenting Muslim communities fuels a powerful legitimisation process. The institution's almost self-realising affirmation that it is both Islam's best representative in France, and omnipresent in French Islam (a perimeter which it almost exclusively defines), means that public authorities treat it as one of their main reference points for the organisation of French Islam.

iv. An actor of French Islam

The UOIF displays its determination to play a key role in the organisation of French Islam in two ways: first, by affirming the organisation's autonomy with regard to ethnic and nationalist interests; second, by *"striving to 'nationalise' its official rhetoric"*[80]. The organisation thus regularly reaffirms its independence. It presents itself as arising from the Muslim community in France, with no ties to the countries of origin, and as an indispensable actor in the organisation of French Islam. Its discourse even reflects the evolutions of Islam in France. It is rather remarkable that the UOIF changed its name in 1989, from the Union of Islamic Organisations in France, to the Union of Islamic Organisations of France, marking the transition from a temporary and provisional Islam to one which is definitively rooted in the French landscape. This name change was in fact contemporaneous with the event which led to the UOIF's appearance on the French political scene as a major actor of Islam in France: the Creil headscarf affair (1989). The same period witnessed a changeover in the organisation's leadership: in 1994 the "Tunisian majority", which had headed the UOIF until then, was cast aside and replaced by a "Moroccan majority", whose ties to the Muslim Brotherhood movement were less evident.

The UOIF thus gradually became an indispensable reference point for public authorities. The first major institutional recognition came during President François Mitterrand's second term, when Pierre Joxe created the short-lived Advisory Council on Islam in France (the CORIF). The UOIF was represented among the 15 members of this group, which was then swiftly dissolved by Charles Pasqua, who preferred to give the Paris Mosque, under Algerian authority, a leading role in the organisation of French Islam. This brief experience nevertheless set the UOIF on a *"slow path towards institutionalisation"*[81].

In 1999, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, then Minister of the Interior, launched a *"consultation of the representatives of the main forms of Islam on the organisation of Muslim worship in France"* (known as "Istichâra"), which prefigured the creation of the CFCM and heralded a new phase in the UOIF's process of institutionalisation. At this occasion, the UOIF proved itself to be a determining political actor in the emergence of a French Islam. Throughout the process of creating this representative body which was to become the CFCM, UOIF representatives succeeded in asserting their views concerning its implementation and composition. In accordance with the UOIF's demands, the CFCM was to be decentralised, with its regional bodies fulfilling an essential role, both in the organisation's operations and in the appointment of members who would be its representatives at the national level.

Nevertheless, it was only under Nicolas Sarkozy, during his time as Minister of the Interior, that the UOIF gained full political recognition. Close relations were formed between the UOIF and the Minister, qualified by Vincent Geisser as *"mutual clientelism"*: *"(...) this 'UOIF-Sarkozy' clientelist set-up can be summarised as the story of a 'happy' encounter between a community actor (an Islamic federation) searching for swift institutional recognition, and a pragmatic political actor (a Minister of the Interior) seeking a 'credible' spokesperson for Muslims, with few ties to foreign States"*[82]. This mutual recognition came to a head with Nicolas Sarkozy's presence at the Bourget site in 2003, during the annual UOIF gathering[83].

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79 France Messner, "La formation des cadres religieux musulmans", Rapport, 2013.

80 Vincent Geisser, *op. cit*.

81 Bernard Godard, Sylvie Taussig, *Les musulmans en France*, Paris, Pluriel, 2009, p. 52.

82 V. Geisser, *op.cit*. p. 93 et 94.

83 Thami Breze, then President of the UOIF, declared during this visit to Bourget on 19 April 2003: *"We welcome a friend, whom we have discovered and who has discovered us".*

v. Recognition and institutionalisation: a diminished or neutralised UOIF?

The political recognition of the UOIF nevertheless had certain consequences for the association. It had now become a regular reference point for public authorities and - especially following the first elections of the CFCM and the Regional Muslims Councils (CRCM) - one of the main representatives of Muslims in France. But with 13 out of 41 seats on the CFCM Administrative Council along with a Vice-Presidency, the UOIF had to compromise by scaling down its own demands.

As it knitted closer ties with French institutions, and became progressively more institutionalised itself, the opinions it expressed began to change. This resulted in the UOIF, which had previously led the fight for the right of girls to wear headscarves in school, calling its supporters to stay away from demonstrations against a law which aimed to ban the wearing of overt religious symbols in schools. Seeking legitimacy from public authorities, the UOIF also issued a fatwa calling for an end to violence in the streets during the 2005 riots. The fact that this intervention had no effect on the riots was, for Gilles Kepel, a sign of the UOIF's diminishing influence among Muslims in France; a consequence of the organisation's overt institutionalisation and the rise in "notability" of its leaders, which set them apart form the rest of the community[84].

This loss of influence was increased by the militancy crisis which, during the 2000s, affected every political, associative and trade union organisation. This crisis was even greater within the UOIF as it was accompanied by a double conflict, both generational and social. The organisation faced difficulties in renewing its leadership due to the gulf which exists between the leaders of Maghreb origin and the militants and supporters who, while having an immigrant background, were born and raised in France. Even today, the UOIF's main leaders - most of whom are originally from Maghreb countries - practice an endogamy which means that French Muslims are blocked from accessing positions of responsibility. In addition, the decision made in the early 1990s to train the future Muslim elite of France led the UOIF to favour the development of organisations such as the Young Muslims of France and the Muslim Students of France. This was a way of targetting a sector of the population with a relatively high level of education and embarking on university degrees. But choosing this focus meant sidelining young Muslims from poorer neighbourhoods, who ended up relatively excluded. As the organisation became less radical in its religious and social demands, and as its younger supporters saw that they were unable to rise through its ranks - combined with the abandonment of some of the poorest young Muslims -, part of this youth was drawn to alternative forms of engagement. For some, this meant joining the *Collectif des musulmans de France* (Collective of the Muslims of France) led by Tariq Ramadan; for others, it meant getting involved with the Salafist movement, thereby generating a *"class-based religiosity"*[85].

More broadly, this evolution in the UOIF's rhetoric forms part of the transformations taking place within associative movements which prospered in the suburbs of large cities, but also reflects sociological changes within the French Muslim population. The UOIF in fact partly abandoned the political Islam which had characterised it in the 1990s, after its collapse in the Maghreb region. This ideological shift benefited from the dwindling influence of associations such as *SOS Racisme*, allowing the UOIF to reappropriate the founding principles of these movements, while bestowing them with a religious undertone which was only marginal, if at all present, before then. In its declaration of principles, the UOIF highlights *"the need to create an authentic Islam of France, faithful to its origins, respectful of the republican framework, and far removed from any political, ethnic or otherwise motivated divisions and rivalries. Cooperation and coordination with all those working towards a common good. The importance of nurturing close ties to civil society, public authorities and religious and moral authorities. Fruitful coexistence and the need for dialogue and exchange between cultures for mutual enrichment. The promotion of a peaceful coexistence and a respect for diversity."*[86]

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84 Gilles Kepel, *Quatre-vingt-treize,* Paris, Gallimard, 2012
85 Samir Amghar, *op. cit.*
86 Presentation of aims and guidelines on the UOIF website, viewed on 18 August 2016,
http://www.uoif-online.com/objectifs-et-orientations/

The UOIF's target audience is a "new middle class", born, schooled and raised within French society, adhering to the new rhetoric which "promotes a model of integration and a sense of belonging to a French society which is not opposed to the practice of Islam and in which religious identity is not sidelined to the private sphere. This is why the UOIF is in competition not only with different Islamic trends, but also with other associations such as *SOS Racisme*, the *MRAP* [*Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples* - "Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between Peoples"], and *Ni putes ni soumises* ["Neither Whores nor Submissives"], in order to impose its own vision of Muslim integration."[87] In this respect, the idea that the UOIF is on the decline must be seen in relative terms; this is rather a new ideological transformation, similar to the one it undertook in the 1990s. It also reflects the sociological evolution of part of the Muslim population, which is seeking to reconcile it social and professional integration with a "halal way of life".

Today, the UOIF appears as a major actor within French Islam. When it withdrew from the CFCM in 2011, it paralysed this organisation, which was forced to revise its operating model. Its annual gatherings at the Bourget site are increasingly popular. While the first edition of the Annual Gathering of the Muslims living in France in 1983 drew around 300 people, the one in 2006 gathered a crowd of 100,000, a number which had doubled to 200,000 by 2016. Nevertheless, its success must be contrasted with a number of indicators suggesting that the UOIF is becoming somewhat neutralised. Indeed, while this organisation has succeeded in promoting itself to a pivotal position within French Islam, its representation of the Muslim population has not been confirmed. Looking at our survey results, we note that only 12 % of the Muslims questioned say that they are close to the UOIF, while more than one third claims to be unaware of its existence. It is also facing strong competition from Salafist Islam, which today bears the banner that the UOIF held in the late 1980s and early 1990s: it represents a radical religiosity, a transnational reach, and a mistrust of State institutions.

Denominational Muslim schools in France

An overview of denominational education in France

There are two types of private schools in France: establishments which are State-licensed and those which are not.

State-licensed establishments make up the majority of private schools. After operating for a five-year period, a non-licensed private establishment can request a State license. This is a form of contract with the State that requires the establishment to educate all children, without discriminating on the basis of origin, opinion or belief. In return, the State pays the teachers, who must have the same accreditation as their colleagues in the public sector, and local authorities cover the school's operating expenses to the same extent as they do for public establishments. France has 7,845 State-licensed schools (both primary and secondary), of which 7,300 are Catholic, roughly 100 are Jewish, 34 are Protestant and only 6 are Muslim. Around 16 % of children in France are educated in State-licensed private establishments.

Opening a **non-licensed establishment** can be done simply by declaring this beforehand to the Public Prosecutor, the Prefect and the Rector, as well as to the Mayor in the case of primary schools[88]. Estimates suggest that there are 1,300 such establishments, but only around 300 are denominational: there are 200 Catholic schools, roughly 50 Jewish schools, and around 40 Protestant and 50 Muslim schools. 61,370 children attend these non-licensed establishments according to 2015-2016 statistics, or less than 0.5 % of all children schooled in France[89]. While they may be in the minority, the number of non-licensed schools is nevertheless rising, according the the Department of Education, with an increase of 26 % between 2011 and 2014. Sixteen denominational Muslim schools were thus opened in 2015, mostly primary schools[90].

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87 Samir Amghar, *op. cit.*
88 Starting with the 2017-2018 school year, the procedure for opening private schools will undergo a reform: rather than facing opposition after the fact, they will have to obtain prior administrative authorisation.
89 French Department of Education, *2015 Statistical references and indicators*.
90 AEF, "Privé hors contrat : le nombre d'écoles a augmenté de 26 % en 3 ans selon le ministère de l'Éducation nationale", 1 June 2016.

The state of denominational Muslim education

Denominational Muslim education is a minority phenomenon which has nevertheless been expanding these past years. Created in 2014 with support from the UOIF, the National Federation of Muslim Education (FNEM) brings together 56 establishments and aims at both organising and representing denominational Muslim education.

According to the FNEM's 2015-2016 figures, there are:

- **5,000 children educated in private Muslim schools**, among whom 3,050 are in primary school, 1,280 in middle school (ages 11-14) and 670 in high school (ages 15-18);
- **56 educational establishments**, of which 35 are primary schools, 14 middle schools and 7 high schools; on average, each has around 100 students;
- **Only two State-licensed establishments, and four with a partial State license**[91]. The 50 remaining establishments that are members of the FNEM are non-licensed.

Number of denominational Muslim establishments opened in France

Nombre d'établissements confessionnels musulmans ouverts en France [92]

80 % of students are concentrated in four school districts

80 % des élèves sont concentrés dans quatre académies [93]

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[91] The six State-licensed establishments are: the *Medersa* school (opened in 1947) on Reunion Island, the *Averroès* secondary school in Lille, the *Al Kindi* secondary school in Lyon, the *La Plume* school in Grenoble, the *Éducation & Savoir* middle school in Vitry-sur-Seine, and the *Ibn-Khaldoun* middle school in the North of Marseille.

[92] Sénat, "De l'Islam en France à un Islam de France, établir la transparence et lever les ambiguïtés", *Rapport d'information,* Nathalie Goulet and André Reichardt, n°757 (2015-2016), 5 July 2016

[93] *Ibid.*

b. Salafist Islam: an expanding ideology with no overarching organisation

i. A contemporary fundamentalism

Salafism, a contemporary ideology which advocates for a return to the origins of Islam, is a complex and perpetually evolving phenomenon. Salafists firstly seek to act as the pious representatives of the original and idealised Muslim community, united around the model of Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam. Salafism is an attempt to go back to a "pure" form of Islam, as practised at the time of the Prophet. In this respect, as highlighted by Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, Salafism has to do with *"the myth of the Golden Age, that of a lost past or paradise which is to be found in many societies, notably in times of crisis or major political upheaval. Societies grasp at whatever they can in order to survive through an unbearable or difficult present."* Salafism therefore draws its strength from the fractures within our societies and from the current crisis facing contemporary Islam.

The Salafist phenomenon is particularly complex in that it is three-fold. As Mohamed-Ali Adraoui remarks, it relies on paradigm, methodology and orthopraxy:

- paradigm, since all of its actions, behaviours and Islamic interpretations reference the first generations of believers. As such, Salafism distinguishes itself through a systematic desire to imitate Mohammed;
- methodology, since a norm is only legitimate if compatible with Salafist practices. All *bid'a* (innovations), which characterise other doctrines, are condemned and rejected;
- orthopraxy, since only respecting the highly strict religious guidelines ensures the salvation of the faithful.

Therefore, while Salafism remains a minority movement within French Islam and more broadly within Sunni Islam, it is particularly visible: in order to imitate the original worshippers and the Prophet Mohammed, its followers adopt forms of clothing and behaviour which reflect early Islam. For men, this means wearing the *quamis* (long tunic), and for women, the *niqab* (fully covering veil). By seeking to break away both from French society and from the dominant form of Sunni Islam, Salafists develop inward-looking practices before embarking on the *hijra*, a migration towards an Islamic land.

Proselytism is particularly developed among Salafists. Quietist Salafism is based on preaching; it rejects Jihadist logic and violence, but supports missionary attitudes in view of the advent of an Islamic State and society. *"It is a case of instilling Muslims with an Islamic conscience by harking back to a religious practice shorn of all subsequent additions, to Koranic revelation and to the prophetic apostolate. Such preaching can create a social movement leading to a new world order in which Islam will have pride of place."*[94] Teaching and preaching to the faithful therefore play an essential role, driven by: the development of a moral and orthodox discourse which constantly regulates religious beliefs and practices; the actions of preachers in mosques and online, who are for the most part trained in Saudi Arabia; and the adoption of a community-based way of life.

Paradoxically, while being an ultra-conservative movement that rejects political modernity, Salafism also has a very modern way of expressing itself. The spread of Salafism relies on the internet, which is home to a virtual Salafist community [see 2.6.4] made up of relatively young and connected individuals. It exists within a context of globalisation and influences migration patterns, whether temporary - as is the case with Salafists who travel to study in Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia and Egypt - or definitive, like the *hijra*, an emigration towards a Muslim country.

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94 Samir Amgar, "Le salafisme en Europe" *Politique étrangère*, 2006.

ii. Target audiences

There are about 15,000 to 20,000 Salafists in France; 50-60 % have Maghrebic origins, while 25-30 % are converts. They make up a relatively young group, on average between 30 and 40 years old.

Not all Muslims are equally drawn to Salafism; attitudes vary depending on ethno-national characteristics and cultural heritage, as well as on geography and political culture. As a result, **Maghreb populations** are a target group for Salafism, since it plays on their identity issues and depicts *"a positive image of Arab identity"*[95]. Salafism is therefore perceived as a mean of rediscovering a *"lost"* identity and offers an alternative to a French identity, seen as corrupting. **Turkish individuals**, on the other hand, rarely turn to Salafism due to the stronghold which the DITIB and Millî Görüş have over Turkish communities. These organisations help maintain emotional and sentimental ties to the home country and regularly remind their members that Salafism is essentially an Arab, or more specifically Saudi, movement.

Converts represent a relatively large number of Salafists in France (25-30 %). This reveals both *"the existence of a veritable faith market"* and *"the dissolution of the regulatory power of 'traditional' religious social groups, such as the family, the mosque, and to a lesser degree, the structures of consular Islam"*[96]. Conversions take place through a capillary action, mainly in poorer communities where Muslims and non-Muslims rub shoulders.

Finally, Salafism finds fertile ground in former "red suburbs", where a culture of social protest is combined with neo-Islamist tendencies. *"There are two key temporalities at play: one is inherited from a ghetto socialisation and is based on protest and on being 'against the system'; the other is conservative and therefore more reasonable, resulting from a dominant view of politics today, notably among younger generations, through a lens of distrust of organised militancy and of any form of institutional dialogue."*[97] Salafists are unique in that they lack any desire to transform existing social structures. In this respect, as Mohamed-Ali Adraoui notes, Salafism has the advantage of *"being able to vilify an illegitimate political order without the need to make an effort to transform the world"*[98].

An overview of the actions of Islamist movements			
		Reformist-revolutionary movements (UOIF - political Islamists)	Revolutionary movements (Political Jihadists)
VERTICAL	State Dimension	Consider the State as an object of change Participate in elections Use legal and democratic means Build alliances Organise public meetings Target: State Outcome: Compromise	Consider the State as an object of change Believe in a global Caliphate Avoid participating in elections and holding meetings Encourage or use violence as a first or last resort Target: State Outcome: Confrontation

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95 Mohammed-Ali Adraoui, *Du golfe aux banlieues : le salafisme mondialisé*. Paris, PUF, 2013.
96 *Ibid*, p.161.
97 *Ibid*, p.140.
98 Mohammed-Ali Adraoui, *op.cit*, p.141.

		Social movements (based on everyday life) (Islamic NGOs and identity entrepreneurs)	Introversion and pious movements (Quietist Salafists)
HORIZONTAL	Civil Dimension	Consider the society and the individual as an object of change Promote a potential for societal change through the role played by Uluma, intellectuals, the media and religious groups Target: Individuals, society, media and education Outcome: Integration	Withdrawal from social and political life Consider the individual as an internal space for social change Emphasise individual piety, adoration and spiritual exercises Target: individual religious consciousness Outcome: Withdrawal from community life

iii. Differences between Muslim Brotherhood fundamentalists and Salafists

While Salafism is a type of Islamism, it should be distinguished from the political Islam upheld by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood is a modern ideology, a product of the meeting between Islam and Western modernity, which seeks to introduce Islam into the global political sphere. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood therefore participate in political life by creating political parties, taking part in elections, and campaigning for an Islamisation of the law. Since they seek to integrate Islam into all sectors of society, they are present in politics as well as in universities and other institutions.

Conversely, Salafism seeks to "purify" Islam of Western influences and of any innovation and evolution that it has undergone. It is notably based on a *hadith,* a quote from Mohammed, which states: *"The best of mankind is my generation, then those that follow them and then those that follow them".* As a result, Salafism condemns Shia Islam, Sufism, and other non-Salafist Sunni rites. More broadly, Salafism condemns all that came after Mohammed and everythinghe forbid. It follows that secularism, the nation-State, political parties and everything that characterise the modern world are non-Islamic. Salafists define Islam as all of the practices, behaviours and interpretations approved by Mohammed.

In this respect, while the Muslim Brotherhood movement and Salafism both seek the Islamisation of society and the enforcement of Sharia law, their methods for achieving this goal are very different. Salafists advocate isolation and separation from a society they do not identify with, while they await a departure towards a Muslim country (the *hijra*), where they will be able to fully live out their identity. They create an environment in which they will be able to live in isolation from the rest of society, and which will allow them to reconcile their lives with the demands of their doctrine. In contrast, members of the Muslim Brotherhood seek to integrate rather than secede from society: only by participating in public life can society be transformed and rendered compatible with Islam, with, in time, Sharia law being enforced.

Radicalised Islam and Islamicised radicalism: two converging trends

1) What are the incubators of radicalisation?

The incubators of radicalisation, where extremist rhetoric prospers, are the meeting places that make up the radical under-current of a given community. These **spaces conducive to radicalisation** and to the spread of an ideology may be:

- mosques;
- the internet (forums, social networks, etc.);
- prisons;
- student associations;
- NGOs;
- social meeting places (bars, cafés, etc.);
- Islamic bookshops.

2) What are the factors of radicalisation?

Aside from the **geopolitical situation (in Syria, Palestine, Iraq or elsewhere), the search for identity,** notably among young people born in the West, seems to be a major factor. Many of them feel that while they may be citizens in the eyes of the law, they lack all cultural and social recognition.

Radical preachers develop an apocalyptic and dualistic concept of a "holy war" between their faithful allies and impious enemies. **"Us" against "them".**

This situation has worsened for the second and third generation of immigrants, for two main reasons:

- **the lack of any sense of belonging to their ancestral homeland,** which deepens with additional discrimination felt from both sides (*"I'm neither French nor from my parents' homeland. Who am I? I'm a Muslim"*);
- **the lack of socio-economic opportunities.**

3) What links exist between the internet and radicalisation? A well-oiled propaganda machine

The internet **is the ideal place for collective radicalisation and galvanisation,** since this tool allows people to find information and be in contact with Jihadi movements in a relatively safe and anonymous way. Furthermore, since geographic barriers no longer matter, it is now possible to share ideas with radical actors from all over the world.

During these exchanges:

- an emphasis is placed on **"empowerment" and the egalitarian nature of Jihadi groups**: everyone has a chance, each person can achieve "great things";
- the Jihadi individual will therefore have the possibility to become a hero, and death will be his key to paradise and eternal glory;
- for women, emphasis is placed on the virtues of taking part in a **humanitarian operation** in order to save widows, orphans and a people tormented by their leaders and by impious and apostate allies.

Radical Islam therefore uses the internet to reinforce:

- a certain religious interpretation;
- the cult of sacrifice and martyrdom;
- the need to pick a side ("the West" or the sacred path of Islam).
- *What links exist between the Salafi movement and terrorism?*

Stage 1: indoctrination

Indoctrination, a deepening faith, and the full adherence to a Salafi way of life, help to set the scene for a support of Jihad.

The indoctrination process is led by a **spiritual advisor.** This phase is marked by encounters with individuals who share the same beliefs, and who help strengthening this doctrine and sense of commitment. Peers become essential in reinforcing the process of radicalisation.

The key moment in this process is the acceptance of a political and religious ideology which legitimises the **use of violence** against non-Muslims.

Stage 2: the tipping point

There are two important indications that this tipping point has been reached.

1) **Leaving the mosque.** Radicalised individuals no longer go to their mosque, which they consider to be a risk-prone environment. Arguments with other members of the mosque often accompany these departures. The mosque is seen as a threat, since it is often under surveillance by intelligence services.

2) **Politicising new beliefs.** Radicalised individuals start transferring their beliefs into their everyday lives. International events are interpreted through this new, and often dichotomous lens ("us" against "them", non-Muslims against Muslims).

Stage 3: Jihad

This is the moment when people start to identify with sacred warriors (*"mujahidins"*) and to perceive *Jihad* as a moral duty. This corresponds to a planning phase during which the group strengthens its bonds. The radicalised individual may then take the following steps:

- accepting Jihad and potentially travelling to a training camp;
- undergoing physical and mental training;
- planning an attack;
- taking action.

5) What are the obstacles to radicalisation?

In order to be considered **resistant to violent extremism**, the individuals in question must have been exposed to radical ideologies, or even flirted with a radical mentality, before finally rejecting violence.

There are four key factors at play in resisting radicalisation:

- **moral revulsion,** representing a profound disagreement with the idea of using violence to achieve one's goals or to incite social, political, economic or religious changes;
- **the impression that violence is not effective.** This impression may be due to a sense of apathy, i.e. if these individuals feel no need or desire to provoke change, or because an alternative, non-violent path has been chosen to incite change;
- **the perceived cost**, which may be:
  - logistical costs;
  - financial costs;
  - family obligations;
  - or fear of repression;
- the absence of social ties which encourage or reinforce the process of radicalisation.

Conclusion

Armed conflict comes across as an answer to a search for meaning, identity and recognition, by providing certainties and "just causes". As a result, people with weak self-esteem, or those who feel excluded and who are searching for a sense of belonging, for a connection to a cause which can reaffirm or help construct their identity, may join a terrorist group in order to stabilise this sense of identity.

c. The State's attempt to organise a French Islam

The year 1989 was a pivotal moment in the organisation of Islam in France - it marked a split between two distinct periods and approaches. Indeed, from 1960 until 1989, the organisation of Islam was entirely delegated by the French State to the countries of origin. Outsourcing the management of the Muslim religion meant that the State did not have to get involved in the organisation of Islam, and could abide by the principles of secularism and neutrality with regard to religion. At the same time, France was able to maintain close ties with the main countries of origin, who were important partners.

As of 1989, a change took place in the perception of Islam in France. This was even felt within the Muslim community, as evidenced by the name change of the "Union of Islamic Organisations in France" to the "Union of Islamic Organisations of France". But three specific events led the Minister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe, to become personally involved in the emergence of a French Islam. First the *fatwa* launched by Ayatollah Khomeini against Salman Rushdie and his *Satanic Verses;* then the "headscarf affair" that broke out in Creil; and finally the rise of Islamism in Algeria which posed a threat to France, all thrust Islam onto the political scene. In the first case, fundamentalist trends from a sector of middle-Eastern Islam threatened civil liberties in the West. In the second case, French public opinion awoke to a new form of Islam in France. And in the third case, public authorities realised the danger of delegating the organisation of Islam to foreign countries. In all three instances, French representations and certainties were hit hard by this upsurge of the issue of Islam.

A combination of these events, coupled with a realisation that the Muslims on French soil were here to stay, pushed the new Minister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe, to tackle the issue and lay the foundations for a representative organisation of French Islam. His actions set in motion a dynamic which led to the creation of the CFCM, fifteen years later.

i. Pierre Joxe and the creation of the Advisory Council on Islam in France (the CORIF, 1989-1993)

Pierre Joxe faced the issue of Islam in France head on. He was the first to nominate a specific advisor on Islam to his cabinet, Raoul Weexteen - an innovation which has since become the norm for subsequent cabinets. The choice of the CORIF had a lot to do with the position that Joxe himself held within the Protestant community, and with the decisive influence of the Orientalist, Jacques Berque. Indeed, Joxe was inspired by the organisation of the Protestant community, which, while relying on a decentralised federation that guaranteed local control over religious issues, still produced a recognised spokesperson for public authorities. The issue of representation was in part resolved thanks to Jacques Berque, who advised Joxe to embrace a symbolic representation by uniting different figures who could think and work together.

The death of the Rector of the Paris Mosque, Sheikh Abbas el Hocine, in May 1989, provided an opportunity to end the Algerian dominion over this mosque, and to bring the organisation of French Islam in line with its reality: Algerian Islam no longer represented the majority of Muslims in France. However, neither the Algerian government nor the French Foreign Office saw it in this light, and they instead nominated Tedjini Haddam, formerly Algerian ambassador in Saudi Arabia, to the position of Rector. This event revealed the tensions which existed, then as now, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior with regards to the organisation of French Islam. Their two disparate visions are particularly evident when it comes to the issue of the instruction of imams.

Faced with this affront, Pierre Joxe responded by setting up the CORIF, with the key feature of having a majority of French citizens among its members. As such, in November 1989, six co-opted Muslim figures gathered together to form the CORIF[99], which was later expanded to include 15 members on 17 March 1991[100]. The main purpose of the CORIF was to act as an advisory body to politicians and public authorities. While it provided opinions and recommendations, the Minister of the Interior was by no means required to follow them.

This first attempt to form a religious reference body for public authorities produced a few results. In 1991, the Minister of the Interior sent out a memo to local mayors regarding graves in communal cemeteries, inviting them - as far as was possible and in accordance with the limits of existing regulations - to support the development of denominational burial grounds. The dialogue initiated within the CORIF also resulted in an agreement as to the start date for Ramadan. Thought was also given to the issue of halal food, which led to the creation of halal packages for Muslims serving in the French army. The advancements made by the CORIF were small, but they marked a starting point for the creation of a French Islam. This budding initiative was however stopped in its tracks when the Rector of the Grand Mosque was called back to Algeria in 1992 to help in the fight against Islamic terrorism.

ii. The Pasqua approach or the Algerian choice

When Charles Pasqua took up the position of Minister of the Interior, the organisation of Islam in France underwent a radical change. While Pierre Joxe had embraced a pluralist approach, seeking to surround himself with representatives from the different branches and trends making up French Islam, Charles Pasqua chose to make the Grand Mosque of Paris (GMP) - under Algerian authority - his sole point of reference. He gave Dalil Boubakeur, as representative of the GMP, the task of structuring and organising local associations and mosques. They were assured a source of revenue by being given the monopoly on halal certification in 1994. He also supported the creation, in 1993, of a training institute for religious leaders within the GMP: the Ghazali Institute.

In addition to closer ties being formed with the Algerian branch, this period saw an attempt at a "top-down" organisation and structuring of French Islam. With the backing of the Minister of the Interior , the GMP nominated seven regional Grand Muftis, who were to be the main spokespeople before local authorities. A short-lived Advisory Council for Muslims in France was also established, made up of 80 delegates. In 1995, it became the Representative Council of the Muslims of France (CRMF) following the adoption of the "Charter of the Muslim religion" by the different parties concerned. Nevertheless, the budding adventure of the CRMF was stopped short in its tracks by the departure of the National Federation of the Muslims of France, with close ties to Morocco. Charles Pasqua's decision to rely solely on the GMP's network and, following a historic tradition, to build a French Islam based on Algerian networks, failed as a strategy. The creation of a representative body for Muslims in France would henceforth have to take greater account of the reality and diversity of French Islam.

Pasqua's strategy was motivated by a desire to ensure a diplomatic representation of Muslims in France. In seeking to organise a French Islam, he chose an approach based on ethnicity and nationality rather than religion.

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99 Amar Lasfar from Lille, Hocine Chabaga from Villeurbanne, Khalil Merroun from Evry, Mohand Alili from Marseille, Tedjini Haddam, Rector of the Paris Mosque, and Badreddine Lahneche, head of the Lyon Mosque project.
100 A Comorian, Mohamed Zeina, three Tunisians (Abdallah Ben Mansour, the President of the UOIF; Ahmed Somia, a doctor; and Azzedine Guellouz, an academic), Yacoub Roty, a Frenchman from a family of converts, Ahmed Drame from Senegal, and former Prefect Mohand Ourabah.

iii. Jean-Louis Debré and the laissez-faire approach

As successor to Charles Pasqua, Jean-Louis Debré in turn inherited the need to organise a representative body for Islam. His policies were in every way contrary to those of Charles Pasqua, as he withdrew his support for the Grand Mosque of Paris. This U-turn is explained not only by the political dispute between Debré and Dalil Boubakeur - the latter having openly supported Edouard Balladur during the Presidential campaign -, but also by the transformations that the Muslim community in France was experiencing at this time. For instance, the National Coordination of the Muslims of France was established in the summer of 1995, with Morocco, through the intermediary of its French emigrants, aiming to oppose Algeria's monopoly on the organisation of French Islam. Refusing to be subjected to the authority of the Grand Mosque of Paris, in December 1995 the dissenting members of the Representative Council of the Muslims of France came together to create a High Council of the Muslims of France.

Moreover, Jean-Louis Debré believed impossible to create a French Islam due to the principle of secularism and the strength of consular Islam. Contrary to his two predecessors, he stated that *"neither the organisations, nor their representative nature can be ordained by the State"*[101]. Noting that the GMP was incapable of federating Muslim associations, he granted halal certification permits by decree, equivalent to those held by the Evry and Lyon mosques.

Jean-Louis Debré was less invested than his predecessors in the issue of French Islam. He never reached out to Muslim advisors, and did not even make an effort to support the emergence of an alternative representative body. *"It is up to Muslims to take responsibility for themselves"*[102], he stated. This was a particularly liberal handling of the issue, moving away both from Pierre Joxe's focus on associations and from Charles Pasqua's interventionism.

iv. Jean-Pierre Chevènement: from the Istichâra to the foundations of the CFCM

The dissolution of the National Assembly and the rise to power of the left-wing coalition in 1997 led to a new policy change regarding the organisation of the Muslim religion. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the new Minister of the Interior, named three Islamic advisors: Didier Motchane, a magistrate and technical advisor, Alain Billon, a senior official converted to Islam, and Bernard Godard, an expert on security issues and on the challenges facing the Islamic world. These various experiences, combined with the proactive stance of the new Minister, provided fertile ground for the creation of the future French Council of the Muslim Faith. It first took the form of a consultation (the *Istichâra*), whose mission was to identify the institutions making up the future representative body. This consultation took place over three main phases:

- convening the representatives of French Muslims;
- adopting the legal bases and principles to guide relations between the French Republic and the Muslim faith;
- creating organising structures responsible for preparing the first CFCM elections.

The three phases of the Istichâra

In 1999, as Minister of the Interior and Religious Affairs, Jean-Pierre Chevènement sent a letter to six Muslim federations, six large mosques, and six qualified figures. His decision to embrace a sample of French Islam as wide as possible should be noted. Alongside the main federations, which counted a large number of mosques among their members, Chevènement decided to invite "independent" mosques that did not form part of this fabric of allegiances. Six large mosques - chosen according to their regional influence, diplomatic sensitivity and religious orientation - were present as representatives of independent mosques, which at that time accounted for roughly half of all French mosques. Other qualified figures, including a woman (Bétoule Fakkar Lambiotte, later replaced by Dounia Bouzar), ensured the representation of

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101 Jean-Louis Debré, *En mon for Intérieur*, 1997.
102 Alain Boyer, "La représentation du culte musulman en France", *French Politics, Culture & Society*, vol. 23, n°1, spring 2005.

religious trends not covered by the federations or Grand Mosques, notably Sufism and Mysticism. Never before had such a large representative sample been brought together.

The second phase was marked by the signature of the legal bases and principles guiding the relations between the French Republic and the Muslim faith. The approval of this text by each of the parties present was a prerequisite, marking their official participation in this framework as set out by the French Republic. Only the parties recognising the principles as laid out in this text could participate in the consultation which was to give birth to a representative body for the Muslims of France. This text reflects the spirit of Charles Pasqua's "Charter of the Muslims of France", but also insists upon the 1905 law and its jurisprudence. By signing this text, the different representatives of French Islam officially recognised the law regarding the separation of the Churches and the State on behalf of the Muslims of France. *"With this text, Muslims now had a solid legal base upon which to build a representative body for their religion."*[103]

Finally, the third stage of the *Istichâra* was marked by a project for the organisation of the Muslim faith. Following Jean-Pierre Chevènement's statement in 1997 that *"the State will not impose its own choice. It will accept that which is proposed"*[104], the Minister of the Interior left the members of the consultation to draw up the plans for a future representative body. As such, during the summer of 2001, *"a framework agreement for the future organisation of the Muslim religion in France"* was unanimously presented. Members of the CFCM and CRCM went on to be elected on the basis of this text. The State fully accompanied this process by naming a sub-prefect in each region as "the consultation's regional correspondent". This allowed public authorities to maintain a constant and close collaboration with not only the main representatives of Islam in France, but all of the religious associations that signed the texts produced by the *Istichâra*.

Inherent weaknesses of this approach

At this stage we should take a moment to consider the approach that was adopted. While it was essential in creating the CFCM, it presented elements that contributed to the institution's later operational failings. Two crucial decisions were made during the *Istichâra*.

The first was to give Muslims full autonomy. Jean-Pierre Chevènement's spirit of collaboration and desire to hand over responsibility to Muslims meant that he set no deadlines for the institution, nor did he provide it with constrains as to the form that the future representative body should have. The main consequence of this decision was that, since the members of the consultation only finalised a framework agreement on the eve of the 2002 election, the entire process launched by Chevènement had to withstand a political changeover.

The second key decision regards the electoral base that was chosen. The voting system set out by the consultation is quite unusual. Rather than being based on the Muslim population, it is based on places of worship, with the electoral weight depending on surface area. This decision was a result of the secularist principle which forbids the creation of an electoral register based on religious affiliation. As such, the only way public authorities can create an election exclusively for Muslims is to rely on places of worship, which can be subject to a census since they are already registered with the local prefecture. While this electoral method has the advantage of covering a dense regional network across the whole country, it nonetheless presents a number of disadvantages. It provides a greater visibility to candidates who can rely on networks of mosques, marginalising the representatives of smaller religious trends, less present in these places of worship. Furthermore, it paradoxically helps to strengthen the involvement of countries of origin within places of worship. While this foreign presence was still discreet in 2003, by 2005 it had become evident and represented a major obstacle for the institution.

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103 Alain Billon, "Les fondements idéologiques et les choix de la Consultation", *French Politics, Culture & Society*, vol. 23, n°1, spring 2005, p. 31.
104 *Ibid,* note 4.

The voting system chosen was nevertheless a success: *"out of all the places of worship open to the public and run by an association registered with the local prefecture, over a thousand (1,088) signed the founding texts and signed up to partake in the election, representing 78 % of the total."*[105]

v. Nicolas Sarkozy and the birth of the CFCM

The political changeover that followed the 2002 elections, and the arrival of Nicolas Sarkozy to the post of Minister of the Interior, did not impede the process that had been set in motion. In fact, Sarkozy managed to convince various members who had been threatening to leave the consultation to stay, and injected a new dose of energy by increasing the involvement of the Ministry and State services. The role of the State slowly transformed from that of witness to that of adjudicator. Nicolas Sarkozy increased the number of bilateral discussions, involving the countries of origin in the process of creating the CFCM (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey). This was the the start of a true change of strategy, which even led him to personally recognise the representatives of Islam when he showed up at the UOIF's annual meeting at Bourget, declaring himself to be *"a friend of Muslims".*

This new impetus made a coalition possible between the three main federations (the Paris Mosque, the UOIF and the National Federation of the Muslims of France - FNMF), which came together to define the CFCM statutes and divide up its different roles amongst themselves. Thanks to this alliance, the composition of the leadership was confirmed in the run-up to the elections, during the Nainville-les-Roches conference which marked the birth of the CFCM on 28 May 2003. Nine seats were given to the federations, five to the mosques, and two to the qualified figures. Dalil Boubakeur was to have the role of President, while the two vice-presidencies were given to the FNMF and the UOIF. Once all the actors who had been sidelined from this coalition accepted these arrangements, the elections could take place on the 6th and 13th of April, 2003.

These first elections proved a great success. Over 70 electoral lists were submitted across the country and the turnout was over 80 %. As expected, the UOIF and FNMF came out on top, with the Grand Mosque of Paris undergoing a significant setback.

	FNMF	UOIF	GMP	CCMTF
Elected to the Administrative Board	40%	32%	15%	5%
Elected to the General Assembly	34%	27%	21%	9%

This result was due to a number of factors. First of all, the voting system benefited regional and rural mosques, which have a larger surface area due to lower real estate prices, and which are predominantly under Moroccan influence. Secondly, the UOIF reaped the rewards of its previous work to organise its networks on a local level; the years of activism and militancy within religious associations meant that it benefited from significant representation and support within mosques. Finally, the Grand Mosque of Paris undoubtedly paid the price of its seemingly too-close relations with political authorities and its lack of local representation.

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105 Alain Billon, *op.cit.*, p.32.

While the birth of the CFCM was a success which marked a turning point in the relationship between the State and Islam, its first steps were nevertheless unstable, notably because public authorities had overly high expectations. Whereas the main purpose of this new institution was to be a representative towards which public authorities could turn, it was also expected to act as an instrument of social oversight. The CFCM was not only seen as *"an instrument of recognition"*, but also as *"a domesticating institution"*[106]. *"The strictly religious nature of the CFCM therefore expanded to encompass not only the issue of political recognition, but also those of Muslim culture and the interpretation of Islam."*[107] Being handed this mandate, which was not originally foreseen for the CFCM, was one of the main factors leading to the dissolution of this institution. As it became impossible to formulate a common theology, each member group attempted to impose its own. **The CFCM's political diversity, which had been its strength and major advantage, turned against it and became the main barrier to its functioning.** The debates which sprang up around the issue of the Muslim headscarf in 2003-2004 further destabilised the institution, which still managed to project a relative unity and consensus. The lack of a theological point of reference highlighted the importance of the "diaspora effect" within French Islam, and the difficulty in agreeing on a common theological stance. Since it did not initially make a distinction between worldly matters and spiritual ones, or rather, since a multi-faceted organisation had not been created alongside the CFCM to deal with theological questions - for both legal and practical reasons -, the institution had to stumble over obstacles which were inherent to its make-up and organisation.

Indeed, the coalition between the UOIF, FNMF and GMP was to be short-lived since it was never based on shared interests or converging long-term goals - especially with regard to theological issues. The CFCM became a stage for endless power struggles which paralysed it; rivalries between the different countries of origin were reproduced within this organisation. As such, in 2005, Morocco became actively involved in the electoral campaign to renew the CFCM's governing bodies, significantly reducing the number of UOIF votes, notably in the Aquitaine region. Algeria displayed a growing lack of interest in the CFCM, which was dominated by the Moroccan federation following its success in the elections. The federation affiliated with Algeria even left the CFCM in 2008, once Dalil Boubakeur had stepped down, manifesting its refusal to abide by democratic rules and claiming its legitimacy to lead French Islam on demographic and historical grounds.

vi. The CFCM's current situation and future prospects

When Claude Guéant, then Minister of the Interior, began the work of restructuring the CFCM in 2012, the overall assessment was rather disappointing: out of the five independent mosques represented within the CFCM in 2003, only two were still present - Marseille and Saint-Denis. The qualified figures were also swiftly marginalised and ended up leaving the CFCM, including Dounia Bouzar, who resigned very publicly in 2005. Acknowledging the UOIF's refusal to partake in this institutional reorganisation, Claude Guéant confirmed the *de facto* supremacy of the three main federations (the Gathering of the Moroccans of France (RMF), the Coordinating Committee for Turkish Muslims of France (CCMTF), and the GMP for Algeria), by granting them a two-year rotating presidency. He reduced the number of elected officials and increased the number of appointed members, also extending the mandate to six years.

Nevertheless, these changes proved insufficient. The CFCM was largely discredited, both among public opinion and among Muslims themselves. Only a third of Muslims are aware of the CFCM, and among this third, only 12 % feel that they are well represented by this institution. The new nature of the CFCM, not yet firmly established within the public landscape, may in part explain these results; but the weak adherence of Muslims is perhaps also due to misgivings about an organisation of Islam, and above all to the CFCM's evident inefficiency.

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106 ZEGHAL Malika, "La Constitution du CFCM : la reconnaissance politique d'un islam français?", *Archives de sciences sociales des religions*, n° 129, p.8.
107 *Ibid.*, p.8.

Indeed, when it was launched, the CFCM included eleven commissions, none of which fully succeeded in its designated mission due to the perpetual quarrels within the organisation:

- the organising commission, which had the role of improving and developing the statutes - notably by expanding the CFCM to other sectors of French Islam in order to ensure the most accurate form of representation -, was not able to undertake the necessary reforms. The Minister of the Interior, Claude Guéant, was forced to intervene in 2012 in an attempt to reinvigorate the moribund organisation;
- the communication commission, responsible for setting up a website and making the institution visible to the public, also proved to be inefficient. The CFCM website (www.lecfcm.fr) was ranked as 28,000th [108] in France and is no longer active today, while that of the Paris Mosque (www.mosqueedeparis.net) is ranked 6,800th among the most visited French websites;
- while the *halal* commission created a charter in 2011, this has yet to be signed, and no regulation of this area through any sort of financial centralisation looks likely;
- the imam commission was faced with a barrier following the refusal of the UOIF and GMP - which both have their own training institutes - to create an educational establishment encompassing the different forms of French Islam. The importance of consular Islamic networks within the CFCM is another tall hurdle in the creation of a French educational centre for religious leaders;
- the chaplaincy commission was undoubtedly the most active, creating the post of Chaplain General for the prison system in 2005, as well as those of Chaplain General for the armed forces and National Chaplain for hospitals. The CFCM therefore laid the groundwork for three chaplaincies, which have slowly been established. Nevertheless, without a structure to train and supervise this chaplaincy service, and with the reality of radicalisation, most of the work remains to be done.

When he took over the post of Minister of the Interior, Manuel Valls prudently distanced himself from the association. His successor, Bernard Cazeneuve, wanted to work on this issue following the 2015 attacks. He created a new advisory body, inspired by Jean-Pierre Chevènement's *Istichâra*, which aimed to bring together all of the realities and actors of French Islam, with the exception of Salafists. Along with members of the CFCM, the representatives of major federations, large mosques and other qualified figures were invited to the table. The approach is innovative in that it includes lay associations. By inviting them, the Ministry aimed at reaching beyond the inherent limitations of the CFCM by giving more space to the lay representatives of French Muslims. This body is nevertheless conceived as a "discussion forum" rather than a decision-making entity. Its main purpose is to create a space for the Muslims of France to meet and hold a dialogue; its secondary function is to be an advisory body for the French Government.

In August 2016, Bernard Cazeneuve announced the creation of a Foundation for Islam in France, with Jean-Pierre Chevènement heading the cultural division. An association, of the "1905 Law" type, will complement the Foundation and focus on religious issues. It will be run by Muslim representatives and the State will have no stakes in it. Its main purpose will be to centralise all national fundings for the construction of mosques and the theological training of imams. It will also receive a contribution (which will be voluntary and negotiated) from the halal industry, as well as donations from worshippers.

vii. Relations between Islam and the French Republic: methods and men

The personality of the various men who took on the position of Minister of the Interior proved to be a determining factor in shaping a representative institution for Islam (which was to become the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM)) over the course of fifteen years. Pierre Joxe's Protestantism; the historic relations between Charles Pasqua and the Algerian branch; the discord between Jean-Louis Debré and Dalil Boubakeur; Jean-Pierre Chevènement's interest in Islam; and Nicolas Sarkozy's alliance with UOIF representatives, all played a key role in the construction of a French Islam. Along with public policy regarding religion, the impact of personal passions and personality politics should not be underestimated.

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108 Alexa ranking. Alexa Internet is a company founded in 1996. It is owned by the Amazon group. Its website provides statistics about global internet traffic.

A figure must be chosen to represent the issue of "French Islam", who will be able to embrace the widest possible range of Muslim tendencies in France, while providing a positive energy and long-term vision.

But the method used will be just as crucial as the figure chosen to implement it. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the political divide provides us with a host of different approaches. Left-wing Ministers of the Interior have applied a flexible method, relying on associations and willing to promote close cooperation between civil society and State institutions. As such, they gave Muslims a certain leeway. From Pierre Joxe's Advisory Council to Jean-Pierre Chevènement's promise that *"the State will not impose its choice"*, there was a clear desire to foster a collaboration between the State and Muslim representatives. In addition, the aim was to bestow Muslims with a greater sense of responsibility by giving them decision-making power.

While the left advocated for a collaborative approach, bringing both sides to the table, right-wing governments, and more specifically Charles Pasqua and Nicolas Sarkozy, sought to exercise greater control and formed closer ties with consular Islam. This was exemplified by Pasqua's decision to make the Federation of the Grand Mosque of Paris (under Algerian authority) the sole organiser of French Islam, as well as by Sarkozy's personal involvement in the creation of the CFCM, which culminated in bilateral meetings with Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Turkish ambassadors. The State imposed its own choices and its own pace, even when these didn't suit the other parties involved, and relied heavily on consular Islamic networks. While Jean-Louis Debré broke away from Pasqua's and Sarkozy's stringent methods, he still contributed to this dynamic through his attempt to tackle the issue of the Muslim faith by working principally with the representatives of consular Islam.

The successful institutionalisation of the CFCM was in large part the result of very particular political circumstances. During the cohabitation period, from 1997 to 2002, the two sides of the political divide were able to unite around this topic. Similarly, the re-election of Jacques Chirac played a big role in the continued effort made by Nicolas Sarkozy, the new Minister of the Interior, to institutionalise the CFCM. But this subtle balance between Muslim autonomy and State supervision was eventually broken, or rather impossible to maintain. It was therefore also impossible for a common interest to emerge that would reach beyond long-standing divides; ethnic and nationalist preoccupations surfaced once again. The structural review proposed by Claude Guéant in 2012 took account of this situation and once again focused on the structures of consular networks. Ten years after its creation, the CFCM was hardly able to limit the influences of the diaspora in order to establish more permanent roots in France. In this respect, it has evidently failed. Even after the wave of terrorism had started rising in January 2015, it was incapable of taking any concrete and operational initiatives.

When the left came back to power, it turned back to the methods dear to Pierre Joxe and Jean-Pierre Chevènement by opening up a forum for discussion. The scene was once again set for the emergence of a new representative institution. Two questions remain at this time: the first concerns the longevity of this structure and the institutional foothold that it should be given; the second is that of its relationship with the CFCM.

viii. Relations between the State and Islam in Europe: perfecting institutionalisation

Relations between the State and religions in 15 European countries[109]			
	State religion	Public financing of religion	Religious teaching in schools
France	*None*	*No*	*No*
Austria	None	No	Optional
The Netherlands	None	No	Optional
Ireland	None	No	Mandatory
Belgium	None	Yes	Optional
Sweden	None	Yes	Optional
Luxembourg	None	Yes	Mandatory
Germany	None	Yes	Mandatory
Italy	Concordat (Catholicism)	Yes	Optional
Spain	Concordat (Catholicism)	Yes	Optional
Portugal	Concordat (Catholicism)	Yes	Optional
Denmark	Lutheranism	Yes	Optional
England	Anglicanism	Yes	Mandatory
Finland	Lutheranism and Orthodox Church	Yes	Mandatory
Greece	Orthodox Church	Yes	Mandatory

The way that European States perceive Muslim presence has been altered by their **desire to both institutionalise and co-administer Islam in Europe**, with the aim of restraining its radical fringes, reassuring public opinion and accepting its permanence. But this goal of institutionalisation goes beyond a mere recognition of the Muslim faith and seeks to develop a distinctly European Islam.

A change in the institutional paradigm has accompanied this evolution, influenced by **two important trends** since the 2000s:

- the difficulties European Muslims have faced in their attempt to organise, and the additional lack of legitimacy among Muslims;
- the succession of terrorist attacks perpetrated by European Muslims on European soil.

Three preliminary remarks on institutionalisation:

First and foremost, it is interesting to note that the various European **representative councils claim to represent Islam rather than Muslims**. This is far from being a minor nuance, since the different public authorities could only support the institutionalisation of a religion, and not the constitution of a Muslim "lobby", which would express the demands, wishes and political interests of Muslims as European citizens.

This institutionalisation happens **in very different ways** within the national, as opposed to European, framework.

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109 Ahmet Kuru, "Secularism, State Policies and Muslims in Europe. Analyzing French Exceptionnalism", *Comparative Politics*, vol. 41, n°1 (Oct. 2008).

Three distinct systems embody the relations between Islam and European States:

- concordat systems, as in Italy, Germany and Spain, which are based on a contract between religious and public authorities;
- systems based on established Churches of the State, like in the United Kingdom;
- systems based on strict separation, as exist in France and Belgium.

The institutionalisation **supported by European States** has had **two main goals and two phases.**

Two phases: from the institutional void to neo-institutionalisation

The dual purpose of institutionalising Islam in Europe

The neo-institutionalisation of relations between European States and Islam is motivated by two arguments. The first concerns national sovereignty in the face of "consular Islam", even when this consular Islam promotes a pacific middle-ground, like Moroccan Islam, or is founded on (paternal) family values and nationalism, as is the case of Turkish Islam. The second argument relies on the idea that identifying a "syndicate" to represent Muslims would give European Muslims a sense of being treated in an equal and inclusive manner by the State, and would in turn allow European countries to closely monitor these representative institutions. This restructuring of the relations between the State and Islam aims for an inclusive institutional set-up, giving privileged access to policy-makers and fostering close collaboration between these representatives and public authorities.

Converging trends, contrasting methods

While in France, Spain and Belgium, there is an institutional representation of the Muslim faith before public authorities, this is not the case in Germany or Italy, even though one could be created with existing legal tools. As for the United Kingdom, while it does not officially recognise a specific organisation, it has a pragmatic and relatively flexible approach to its relations with the Muslim community.

In order to create organisations that can serve as intermediaries[110] for the Muslim population, **two parallel processes have emerged in Europe**. Institutionalising the Muslim population has been a three-step process:

- **step 1**: selecting participants;
- **step 2**: seeking an explicit acceptance of national laws and constitutions;
- **step 3:** providing a quasi-monopoly as the representative for affairs concerning the State and religion.

We find the following organisational principles throughout Europe:

- a participation in councils, which takes place on a voluntary basis and not through State coercion, and which is founded on non-exclusivity, although there is a recognition of certain privileged partners;
- participants in advisory councils represent their community's acceptance of national institutions and interact with policy-makers and public officials;
- every European government continues to nurture close relations with the representatives of consular Islam, while allowing qualified and hand-picked individuals to partake in the consultation and institutionalisation process;
- and similar obstacles:
  - o a fight for ideological dominance among Muslim associations in every European country;

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110 Jonathan Laurence, *The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims: The State's Role in Minority Integration*, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics, 2012.

- o infighting due to the financial implications of the control of halal certification, the organisation of the pilgrimages to Mecca, and the collection of *zakat* funds;
- o a multiplication of *Uluma* organisations and councils, issuing fatwas in Europe regarding the obligations of Muslims living in non-Muslim majority countries.

In order to avoid such obstacles, European countries have embarked upon a three-stage process to create consensus on the need to institutionalise Sunni Islam in Europe.

1. Gathering Muslim federations and co-opting qualified figures.
2. Signing charters in which the signatories confirm their respect for the different European constitutions and their fundamental principles.
3. Granting a symbolic monopoly to "official" Muslim representatives.

Multiple objectives

The different representative councils for European Islam have an agenda that can vary a great deal from one country to another.

In the United Kingdom, relations between the State and Islam are driven by the aim of preventing terrorism and coming up with a common response to extremism. This security-based agenda arose from the national context following the attacks in London on 7 July 2005. The Home Office sought help from the four major Muslim organisations, which all became founding members of "Preventing Extremism Together". The Home Office also created a steering committee for the mosques and imams of the British Advisory Council.

In Germany, consultations take place as part of a dialogue on shared social values.

The processes used to select participants to the representative councils of Islam also vary widely. As an example, the close ties that German Muslims maintain, especially with Turkey, justified the decision to reach out to multiple organisations that correspond to the different segments of the German Muslim community, rather than to have a central representative body.

In Italy, the Ministry of the Interior used the original approach of individually nominating qualified figures to the advisory council. They stressed that there was not necessarily a representative balance between the power of the different Muslim federations and the spaces of worship in Italy. The Italian Government's goal is for the *Consulta per l'islam* to also engage with moderate Muslims, those who do not frequent mosques, madrasas or Islamic cultural centres, and who have come to Italy to improve their quality of life.

Finally, **in Spain**, once the Ministry of Justice approved the recognition of Islam in 1992, the government asked Islamic communities to create a single federation and encouraged them to negotiate and sign a cooperation agreement. This recognition led to the creation of the *Comisión islámica de España*.

Islam in Austria

Once the sworn enemy of the Ottoman Empire, today a few thousand votes away from electing a far-right President, **Austria is at the avant-garde of Islamic nationalisation on European soil.** As such, on 25 February 2015, the Austrian National Council approved the new law on Islam in Austria, 103 years after the first such law, which was enacted in 1912 after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Habsburg Empire.

With a total of 575,000 people (400,000 of Turkish origin and 100,000 from ex-Yugoslavia who mainly arrived as refugees of war), the Muslim population **in Austria accounts for almost 7 % of the entire population.**

This rate is not far from the **proportion identified by our own study in France (5.6 %).** We can therefore compare the two situations in order to better understand what is required to build a European Islam, even though Austrian Islam has primarily Turkish roots.

Aside from the Austrian Government's desire to give **greater legal protection** to Muslims practising their religion, the law of 25 February 2015 is an original initiative in two respects: **first, because it explicitly aims at creating an Austrian Islam, funded only by Austria; second, because it promotes a linguistic shift, encouraging the use of German in Muslim worship**, instead of Arab, Turkish or Kurdish.

The "Dialogue Forum on Islam" was created in 2012 with this aim in mind. In the presence of experts, this institutionalised dialogue brought together the Federal Government and the Islamic Religious Authority of Austria. It was made up of seven working groups and invoked the need to create a new law on Islam. As a result, a draft amendment to the century-old law was included in the Federal Government's work programme for 2013-2018. Two Sunni Muslim communities participated in the negotiations: the Islamic Religious Authority of Austria (IGGiÖ, recognised in 1979) and the Alevi Islamic Religious Authority of Austria (ALEVI, recognised in 2013). A **new legislative framework** was established, governing the relationship between the Austrian State and Islam. The Shiite community also participated in the discussions through the Shiite Islamic Religious Authority (SCHIA, recognised in 2013).

Why a new law on Islam?

The main objective of the Austrian law on Islam is to create the conditions that will allow people to feel both Muslim and Austrian. In defining the rights and obligations of Islamic religious groups, Sebastian Kurz, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration, declared that "the aim of the 2015 law on Islam is to give Muslims more rights, but also to avoid the growth of extremist trends. In our opinion, imams should be role models for young Muslims, and they must demonstrate that it is possible to be both a proud Austrian and a faithful Muslim. There will therefore no longer be a need for Turkish imams in the future."

Which new measures?

In its first article, the Austrian law on Islam sets out the legal status of Islamic "religious groups", which are defined as **bodies governed by public law, in order that they may be self-financing.** It also requires Muslim faith groups to display *"a positive attitude towards the society and the State"*. This last measure generated significant controversy, and made for some **tense** preparatory discussions, since it singled out Austrian Muslims and gave the impression **that they held a negative attitude until proved otherwise**..

In terms of religious rights, this law not only consecrates the official recognition of the Muslim religion (1912 law) - by affirming the protection of Muslim celebrations and religious services -, but **also secures the legal status of the two existing Muslim cemeteries, as well as future cemeteries**. Furthermore, the law provides **the right to access the services of a chaplain**, as long as the latter holds a university degree and has been approved by an Islamic faith group recognised by the Austrian State. It also grants **the right to Islamic dietary customs** within the Federal army, in prisons, hospitals, social and medical establishments, and public schools.

In terms of religious authority, the new law confirms that Austrian law has precedence over Sharia law. This reaffirmation of the supremacy of public law is crucial since it guarantees that Islamic legal opinions, jurisprudence and institutions in Austria cannot, under any circumstance, contradict the legislative provisions of the Austrian legal system. Going even further, the 2015 law not only requires all imams to display a perfect knowledge of German and have an adequate level of theological training, but it also requires mosques to terminate the work contract of any imam with a criminal record, or representing *"a threat to public order, health, morality, or to the rights and freedoms of others"*. In this context, the Institute of Islamic Theology was created at the University of Vienna to provide future imams and religious teachers with theoretical training and an understanding of theology in the German language, adapted to the present and future needs of Austria's Muslim population.

Finally, with regard to foreign funding, the 2015 law is the most advanced in Europe. It is in fact the only law which explicitly forbids all forms of foreign financing of the Muslims faith, and specifically of mosques. As a result, it is now illegal for foreign donors to regularly fund Muslim places of worship. This ban on financing from foreign States is particularly aimed at Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

A major motivation for Austria is its goal to promote **an Austrian Islam, liberated from the control** of the Turkish Diyanet, which previously financed 60 imam-officials out of a total of 300 imams in Austria. In sum, **the law of 25 February 2015 gives everything over to Austrian Islam by taking away from foreign Islam.**

Islam in France structured itself on a national level. This was initially done by delegating the management of Islam to foreign States. In time, Muslim populations settled down in France, and this meant that Islam was progressively nationalised. The concept of an Islam in France became an Islam of France. The UOIF played a key role in this evolution by pushing Islam into French political life. With Islam becoming part of the French social and political reality, the State had to consider its organisation, and it did so by supporting the emergence of a representative body. While the emergence of a French Islam must be pursued and perfected, some of its principal features have already been established over the past three decades. Nevertheless, French Islam is not merely an institutional and national reality; it is first and foremost a daily and local practice, centred around mosques and imams. This is the Islam of communities. But over the last few years, a new and virtual aspect has emerged. The development of the internet and social networks has had a profound effect on Islam in France. Since the 2000s, this religion has entered into a globally connected era. Organising a French Islam means being able to grasp both ends of this chain: institutional and national on the one side, popular and local on the other.

3. "Bottom-up" Islam

Any analysis of the French landscape would be incomplete without a consideration of the popular, everyday Islam, taking place at a local or municipal level. The daily involvement of municipalities, associations and imams contributes to the emergence of a local Islam, relying on religious infrastructures and an important associative network. But we must not forget the upheaval that Islam in France has undergone with the digital revolution. Since the 2000s, French Islam has entered a globally connected era[111]; new communities are emerging and individual practices are changing.

a. Everyday Islam

i. Everyday Islam in France: the pyramid and the rhizome

French Islam can be understood as having two structural trends. The first is pyramidal and based on a system of hierarchy. *"In the French tradition, shaped during the 19th century after the revolutionary upheaval, the State chose spokespersons whom it wanted to represent the community. They were given the recognition and resources necessary to create a patronage network and fully engage in their role as intermediary."*[112] The second trend is horizontal and polycentric, reflecting Deleuze's rhizomatic process. The components of French Islam exist outside any hierarchical organisation and form an extremely complex root-like structure, lacking any identifiable direction. The development of each influences the others. As a cluster of diverse and autonomous elements, which nevertheless influence one another, French Islam is founded on *"invisible, underground branches, which, on the surface, produce horizontal structures that spread out in every direction."*[113]

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111 The French expression used, *"l'âge de la multitude"*, is borrowed from the work of Nicolas Colin and Henri Verdier. *L'âge de la multitude: Entreprendre et gouverner après la révolution numérique,* Paris, A. Colin, 2012.
112 Rémy Leveau, "France : changement et continuité de l'islam", in Rémy Leveau, Khadija Mohsen-Finan, Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (dir.), *L'islam en France et en Allemagne*, Paris, La Documentation française, 2001, p. 57.
113 Gilles Deleuze, *Mille Plateaux*, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1980.

A tension therefore exists within French Islam between a polymorphous, polycentric and multidirectional rationale - resulting from the break-up of its organisations and the diversity of Muslim backgrounds - and a unified, hierarchical and ordered rationale - the product of State influence and of the Jacobin-style governance of the Churches and the State.

While a State-centric organisation of the Muslim faith has been surfacing since the 1990s, local approaches to this issue had been developing since the 1970s and especially since the 1980s. As Olivier Roy notes, Islam in Europe spontaneously organised around mosques and not around a political party or national movement[114]. Mosques are therefore the cornerstone of French Islam and the place where the conditions for its emergence develop. The first CFCM consultation revealed that around half of French mosques are independent, in that they are not affiliated with a national organisation with ties to consular Islam or translational ideologies like those of the Muslim Brotherhood. **Rather than the State, local municipalities have a leading role to play in the emergence of a French Islam.**

ii. The importance and role of mosques

According to the French Religious Heritage Observatory, there were 2,450 mosques in France in 2015[115]. The evolution in the number of mosques in France is relatively stable, suggesting that the religion is progressively catching up to its structural needs. The researcher Franck Frégosi estimates that: *"overall, the current state of the religious offering for Muslims (within the areas studied) should adequately respond to the needs of worshippers. In some areas, these needs are still to be fulfilled, notably in some parts of the Ile-de-France region."[116]*

This assessment, expressed in 2006, suggests that Islam has almost caught up with its infrastructure needs. Questions regarding the financing of Muslim faith should therefore be more focused on the maintenance and operating costs of its places of worship rather than on their construction. As concerns the relative lag in the Ile-de-France region, it is mainly the result of high real estate prices, which require more substantial capital investments. This delay is exacerbated by the problems inherent to French Islam.

Number of mosques in France

While the development of Muslim real estate projects is far from stagnant, it nevertheless faces certain obstacles. The first is created by the **fragmentation of Muslim communities**. Resources are not pooled due to persisting ethno-national divides.

The diaspora effect gives rise to politics that hamper mosque construction projects. In her study of the construction of the Créteil mosque, Aude-Claire Fourot notes that local public authorities stipulated that

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114 Olivier Roy, *L'islam mondialisé*, Paris, Seuils "Points", 2004.

115 Sénat, *Les collectivités territoriales et le financement des lieux de culte*, Rapport d'information, 2015.

116 Franck Frégosi, "Les mosquées dans la République. Quelle régulation locale du culte musulman ?" *Confluences Méditerranée* 2006/2 (n°57), p.156.

they would only hold discussions with a single spokesperson. In this manner, they sought to end the rivalries between various Muslim associations, in order to avoid the kinds of conflicts that had stalled the construction of mosques in Evry, Marseille and Lyon in the 1980s. Similarly, the inefficiency of a structure like the Foundation for Islamic Works in France (FOIF) adds to this community division, hindering every attempt to create a national strategy. The interests of each individual community still take precedence over collective and overarching needs.

Further obstacles exist, both structural and political. Muslim associations that begin the process of constructing a place of worship tend not to make use of all the legal resources at their disposal. The taxation system is more advantageous for religious associations than for "1901 law" associations. And since few Muslim groups form religious associations, they lose out on a certain number of advantages. Moreover, some municipalities pre-empt construction land for their own political interests in order to stop a mosque from being built, or show an unwillingness to grant emphyteutic leases. Such political interference on the part of certain mayors is becoming less frequent, as shown by the 2015 TNS Sofres survey. Local citizens are less and less opposed to the construction of mosques and prayer rooms, suggesting that Islam is adapting to local community life. In addition, the legal status of most French municipalities does not allow them to guarantee a loan for Muslim associations seeking to fund the construction of a mosque. Only towns and departments in developing metropolitan areas can grant loan guarantees to Muslim associations. For this reason, the town of Créteil and the Val-de-Marne department were able to guarantee a €1.5 million loan for the construction of the Créteil mosque.

There is a very strong symbolic aspect to the construction of a mosque. It shows that the Muslim population has grown roots within a community, and signals its integration. In this regard, it is relevant to note the discrete nature of mosques in France. Franck Frégosi evokes *"a relative invisibility of Muslim religious spaces"*[117]; there are no minarets, financial constraints limit the size of mosques, and there is a certain desire to "integrate" the structure into existing local architecture. As a result, French mosques are relatively modest, at times even invisible. This assessment was confirmed by the 2015 Senate Report on the financing of religious structures, which estimates that 64 % of mosques have a surface area smaller than 150 m² and that only 8 % have a surface area over 500 m². "Mosque-Cathedrals" (over 2,000 m²) are rare: the Grand Mosques of Strasbourg, Lyon and Evry represent a minority and do not reflect the reality of French Islam.

Mosques also have a social function. Beyond simply being spaces of religious worship, they are places where communities gather to participate in different activities, notably educational ones. They are also meeting places for different generations of Muslim worshippers. Solenne Jouanneau writes that *"it is rare to find socially homogeneous groups in mosques, whether in terms of sex, age, social class or social origin, nationality, level of education, etc. Mostly, we see at least two very distinct groups whose proportions vary: on the one hand, immigrant retirees (or those nearing retirement), who are often unskilled and who came to France in the 1960s and 1970s to work as labourers; on the other hand, (young) adults who were born or schooled in France, and who, whether they are students, employed or unemployed, have a higher level of education (having attained it in France or abroad). It is quite logical that these two categories of people, due to their varying social and generational characteristics, often also differ in their approach to religious practice, which, on a day-to-day level, translates into several distinct uses of the mosque."*[118] As a place of socialisation, the mosque is *"a strategic community space"*[119], where groups of worshippers meet during important religious festivals (Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, Ramadan, etc.), but it is also a place of social solidarity, where the most destitute find help.

Finally, the mosque has a cultural function. On the first floor or in an area adjoining the prayer room, religious and cultural associations offers tutoring sessions and educational support. This is a space where the culture of one's parents or grand-parents is passed on and maintained, where both Arab and the teachings of the Koran are studied. Aside from being sites of preservation and transmission, some of the

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117 Franck Frégosi, *op.cit.*

118 Solenne Jouanneau, *Les imams en France. Une autorité religieuse sous contrôle*, Paris, Éditions Agone, coll. "L'ordre des choses", 2013, p. 175.

119 Bernard Godard, Sylvie Taussig, *Les musulmans en France*, Paris, Pluriel, 2009, p. 101.

most active mosques are at times also "places of support", where volunteer worshippers take over from an ineffective public service by offering additional school tutoring. Our field interviews with associative leaders revealed that this cultural and educational support, which some mosques offer, has three main objectives:

- to avoid early school dropping at 13-14 years old;
- to transmit a culture to children;
- and, in parallel, to stop children from being idle after school by providing help with homework, sports, and other activities.

Along with overseeing and guiding religious practices, mosques also increasingly take on the task of social oversight.

iii. The role and importance of imams

As mosques take on a greater role, not only as religious spaces, but also a cultural and social ones , so the role of imams in French Islam is also evolving.

In Islam, the imam is literally he who *"is before"* the worshippers and leads them in prayer. As clergy, he leads the five daily prayers and administers the Friday sermon. He is chosen for his knowledge of Islam and is part of a community of worshippers. While certain qualities are necessary to become imam (speaking Arabic, having expert knowledge of the Koran and the prophetic tradition, along with a good notion of exegesis and jurisprudence), *"the skills of potential candidates to the Imamah are never considered in absolute terms by the decision makers, but relative to the resources available within the community of worshippers that they represent"[120].* In contrast to the Catholic Church, where only those with seminary training can become priests, no such path exists within Sunni Islam, due to a lack of clergy. While Muslim-majority countries have organised the training of their religious leaders, such scholastic structures have not been established in Europe. As a result, an imam's training, background and influence vary from one mosque to the next. Some are salaried, others volunteer; some are full-time imams, others only occasional. Depending on their training, along with leading prayers and Koranic classes, some teach classical Arabic, while others take on the role of social mediator within the community. As Bernard Godard notes, there is a general *"volatility in the definition of the imam"[121]* since it is not in itself a real profession. There are as many definitions of imam as there are mosques in France; these diverse realities reveal the variety of structures and resources of the Muslim faith in this country.

In 2004, the Ministry of the Interior conducted a survey of Muslim religious leaders. While these results are now somewhat dated, they still offer precious information on the imams of France and their various roles. Indeed, out of a total of 1,026 identified preachers, a little over half (555) regularly held a religious service, less than one third (318) only lead the Friday prayers, and one sixth (153) preached only occasionally. The large majority of imams questioned were of foreign origin: only 20 % had a French nationality, mostly through naturalisation. Only a small minority (5 %) were under 30 years old, while the 30-55 and over 50 age groups were of roughly equal size (512 and 465 respectively). Finally, around one third had a good knowledge of the French language, another third had an approximative grasp, and the last third had real difficulties expressing themselves correctly. **Imams in France therefore do not reflect the rest of the French Muslim population, which is mostly of French nationality (75 %), either by birth or naturalisation, and relatively young (more than half are under 50).** This gap goes some way towards explaining the popularity of "internet preachers", who are younger, more familiar with the language and social codes of young French Muslims, and therefore provide a real competition to imams in mosques. Our own survey also highlights this popularity, since when asked, *"When you search for information on Islam, you turn to... ?"* , 73 % of French Muslims replied *"the internet"* or *"Google"*, and only 47 % said *"an imam"*. Today, the Bureau of Religious Affairs estimates there to be around 2,200 imams, showing that, in the space of a decade, Islam in France has significantly caught up to its structural needs. Half of all imams in mainland France work full-time.

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120 Solenne Jouanneau, *op.cit*, p. 143.
121 Godard et Taussig, *op.cit.*, p. 133

As the main embodiment of religious authority, the Imamah has undergone three major phases, which all reflect the role of imams in France[122]:

1. until the 1970s, when the Muslim presence in France was still considered temporary, the imam's role was to support a community of worshippers whose presence on French soil was deemed to be a passing phase. With a view to the return of migrant workers, public authorities encouraged the creation of prayer rooms and the arrival of foreign imams, in order to help this population maintain ties to their religious tradition and easily re-integrate back home. In this respect, both within residences and workplaces, *"religious practice was never considered as an end in itself, but rather as a means. Supporting the religious fervour of migrants was mainly a way of ensuring that their feelings of national belonging remain strong enough to discourage them from staying in France for the long term."*[123] Imams therefore ensured that a "cultural bond" was maintained with the homeland, and that a social harmony existed among the foreign workforce;

2. as of the 1980s, with the permanent settlement of Muslims in France, the role of the imam evolved. Places of worship began to spring up within immigrant neighbourhoods and worshippers slowly organised through associations, once the freedom of association for foreigners in France (Law of 9 October 1981) was enacted. The imams, who often also presided these associations, became privileged spokespersons to whom local authorities would turn when seeking someone to represent the community. *"While the 1980s was clearly a decade when imams and Muslim associations grew local roots, it was equally a time when the very first interactions between 'Muslims' and 'public actors' took place"*[124];

3. beginning in the 1990s, as the Muslim religion became more organised and mosques were being built, the Imamah became professionalised, with imams progressively becoming employees. This evolution gave the religious association greater control over which imam it would employ and what rhetoric he would preach. *"As imams progressively become employees and gained a clearer status, this had an effect on the daily practice of the Muslim faith. It meant that the embodiment of a religious authority became more visible and more constant on a local level."*[125] As the Imamah became relatively professionalised, its role also evolved: as well as organising religious services, the imam was now responsible for transmitting Muslim culture and knowledge to the new generations, born or raised in France.

With the progressive structuring of the Imamah in France, the role of the imam changed. Imams conserved their essential ritual function. Responsible for religious practice, they lead the five daily prayers, preach the sermon for Friday prayers and preside over major liturgical ceremonies. They are also responsible for transmitting Islamic knowledge through informal lessons (*durus*) or, in the more active mosques, by organising real classes. Aside from this religious function, within a community of worshippers an imam can take on the role of social or family mediator, helping to resolve disputes, dispensing individual advice, etc.

However, the imam's main task is to *"prescribe and produce Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy"*[126]; he must reconcile Islamic priorities, religious norms and rituals with the context of Western societies. Imams therefore have an essential role to play in the emergence of a French Islam. They constantly define, explain and adapt the rules of Islam to correspond to the French society. *"[Imams] are not wholly unfamiliar with the process of negotiation, compromise, reinvention and reinterpretation that necessarily forms part of the struggle of those who seek to live 'as Muslims' in a society which has not historically been defined as such."*[127] In this manner, imams, as diverse as they are, transmit an Islamic discourse which is highly localised, very composite, and more or less influenced by the ideological and theological trends experienced by Islam in France. Therefore, the French Islam being created at the local level is not affiliated

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122 Solenne Jouanneau, *op.cit*.
123 *Ibid*, p. 51.
124 *Ibid*, p. 75.
125 Solenne Jouanneau, *op.cit.*, p. 105.
126 *Ibid*, chapter V.
127 *Ibid*, p. 189.

with consular federations, it remains difficult to measure (although CFCM elections have shown that around half of all mosques are independent), and hard to assess qualitatively.

Islam in the workplace

Religion in the workplace: an issue at the heart of public debate. The Baby Loup case

State of the law

The question of religious freedoms and diversity entered the workplace with the arrival of new populations onto the labour market, along with the evolution of labour legislation under the Auroux laws (1982), the Aubry reform (1992) and a European Directive[128].

The French Employment Code protects and guarantees religious freedom: *"nobody can be excluded from a recruitment procedure, an internship or a period of in-house training, no employee can be punished, be made redundant or be faced with discriminatory measures, whether direct or indirect [as a result of] religious beliefs" (art. L 1132-1).*

With regard to company regulations, these cannot include provisions *"restricting the rights and individual freedoms of a person in a manner which is not justified by the employee's task or not proportionate to the aim pursued"* or *"discriminating against employees during their employment or occupation",* notably because of their religious beliefs (art. 1321-3).

Therefore, unless the professional task at hand requires otherwise, employees can freely express their religious beliefs at work.

The Baby Loup case

The Baby Loup case shook up this well-established legal framework. The 1905 law guarantees private individuals the freedom of religion, but imposes strict religious neutrality upon public authorities. But the Baby Loup case questions the neutrality of individuals under a private-law contract.

The Baby Loup nursery is a structure governed by private law (a "1901 law" association). Its employment contracts are therefore private-law contracts and, in accordance with the law, employees are not subject to neutrality requirements. However, the nursery's internal regulations impose neutrality upon their employees, in the name of secularism.

Ms Afif, an employee of the Baby Loup nursery, began wearing a head covering when she returned to work after her maternity leave. The management objected, and then proceeded to fire her for serious misconduct (refusal to abide by internal regulations and insubordination), on 9 December 2008. Ms Afif took the case to the French High Authority Against Discrimination and for Equality (HALDE), which judged that the termination was discriminatory (1 March 2010). This was the beginning of the Baby Loup case.

It took place over three stages.

First, on 14 December 2010, the *Conseil des Prud'hommes* (labour tribunal) ruled that the nursery's mission constitutes a public service, due to the nature of its activity and the fact that 80 % of its funding is public, and confirmed that the termination was legal. This ruling was then overturned by the Versailles Court of Appeal on 27 October 2011, which confirmed that France does not provide a public service for early childhood, and, as a result, that the Baby Loup nursery is not part of the public service.

On 27 November 2013, the Paris Court of Appeal judged that it was possible to apply the principle of secularism to the private sector, that the Baby Loup nursery could be considered a "values-based organisation" (with their values being religious neutrality) and, using a different legal basis, confirmed that the termination was legal. The Court of Cassation then denied that Baby Loup could be considered a values-based organisation, stating that secularism is not a belief.

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128 Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, notably based on religious affiliation.

The case was concluded on 25 June 2014: the Cour de Cassation (final court of appeal) confirmed that the termination was valid, judging that the company regulations were sufficiently precise with regard to the context and objective. The Court deemed justifiable to restrict the freedom of employees (in this case the expression of religious beliefs) in light of the nature of the work.

This legal altercation fired up public debate and led society to question whether the French Employment Code should evolve to allow companies to impose an ethos of neutrality on their employees, much like the one governing public sector workers.

A resurgence of religion in the corporate setting...

The Baby Loup case also generated such a reaction because of a broader context in which the issue of religion in the private sector was becoming more prominent. The Randstad Institute and the Observatory of Religion in Corporations (OFRE) undertake an annual survey on the topic. Its results, along with interviews with business leaders, have highlighted the emergence of religious issues within companies. This evolution concerns all religions, and not only Islam.

In 2015, 50 % of managers said that they had been confronted, either regularly or occasionally, with religious issues that are manifesting themselves more frequently; 23 % of the people questioned confirmed that they came across such issues regularly (+11 percentage points between 2014 and 2015).

The most frequent cases relate to personal requests and practices: absence requests for religious celebrations (19 %); conspicuous displays of religious symbols (17 % compared to 10 % in 2014); requests for alternative work-time arrangements (12 %); and prayer during work breaks (8 %).

Cases that interfere with tasks, call into question work organisation or result in an infringement of legal policy remain few, but undeniable: prayer during work (6 %); refusal to work with a woman (4 %) or under the orders of a woman (4 %); proselytism (4 %); refusal to work with a colleague on religious grounds (1 %); and practising collective prayer.

The emergence of religion within the corporate setting does not necessarily lead to conflict; in 88 % of cases, these requests and practices do not result in conflict or impediment. Nevertheless, the number of managers who are confronted with problematic cases is rising: 12 % in 2015 compared to 10 % in 2014.

The main reasons that some cases are difficult to deal with are:

- threats of accusations of racism or discrimination;
- questioning the legitimacy of the company or the manager to limit religious practices;
- refusing to discuss the matter;
- and, since 2015, the intervention of third parties from outside the company that may support a request and attempt to influence the manager's decision.

Source: Institut Randstad et Observatoire du Fait religieux en entreprise (OFRE), 2015.

...which concerns all the above-mentioned cases essentially affecting Muslims.

Our study indicates that Muslims are in favour of a relatively liberal handling of religion in the corporate setting. According to our survey, 48 % consider that people should be able to express their religious identity in the workplace. 40 % say that employers should adapt to the religious obligations of their employees.

Should secularism be enforced in the private sector?

For the time being, two different views are being expressed in public debates:

- the first states that the law as it stands is sufficient and makes possible to reconcile the religious freedom of employees with the requirements of companies seeking to restrict this freedom;
- the second says that the law should simply evolve to include the right, for companies that wish to do so, to incorporate as "values-based organisations" or "secular corporations".

The issue of religion in the private sector will probably become increasingly important over the coming years. If these questions are to be resolved, a serene and moderate public debate will need to take place.

b. Islam online: a globally connected Islam

Discourse on Islam appears online through seven different channels:

a. the websites of leading French media actors (e.g. *Le Figaro, Le Monde*);
b. Muslim meet-up websites (e.g. Muslima.com);
c. purchasing and information platforms (e.g. Al-Kanz.org);
d. Muslim-oriented news websites (e.g. *Oumma, Saphir, Journal du musulman,* etc.);
e. theological websites, dominated by Salafists (e.g. sunnite.net);
f. far-right websites, which act as sounding boards for the former;
g. community forums.

Diagnostic: Qui parle d'islam sur le web ?

Analysis: Who is talking about Islam online?
1) Forums and blogs
2) Identity and far-right websites
3) Islamist websites
   Mainstream and alternative media

Islam on YouTube

YouTube forms an essential part of the debate, disseminating an enormous amount of public content relating to Islam. In particular, dozens of channels are run by French-speaking imams, with tens of thousands of subscribers.

In addition, there are countless sensationalist videos (hidden camera segments, emotive shots of Mecca, exorcisms, debate extracts, shocking images, etc.), as well as music videos and Koranic recitations. The latter are the most popular in terms of numbers of views, since they are used as background music and played on a loop.

A video-based Islamic ideological offering

Typology and content

The **major role that online videos play** in the dissemination of Islamist ideologies is evidenced by the sheer number of sermons and appeals accessible to the public at large. The most watched videos across the whole YouTube platform can be classified into **five types** (by decreasing number of views):

- **Koranic recitations:** very long videos (60 minutes or more), by far the most watched (16,000,000). The huge numbers of views can certainly be explained by the fact that they are played as "background noise";
- **buzz videos:** short, linked to current events;
  - o **secularism:** young Muslim girls who are stopped from entering their high-school or stores because of their clothes (headscarf, gloves, floor-length skirts, etc.);
  - o **celebrities:** interviews with well-known figures (Karim Achoui, rappers, etc.);
    - ▪ **identity issues:** echoes of the Israel-Palestine conflict (International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism, Jewish Defense League), rejection of institutions and mainstream media who are seen as racist. These are often the most *political* videos;
- **"emotional" videos:** very short videos in which the religious content is almost sidelined; emotion-filled spirituality and sentimental wonder rather than doctrine; an abundance of "miraculous" or dramatic scenes (children moved by the call to prayer, tears, etc.);

o **"spiritual" animations:** animations or videos of landscapes with a narrator covering spiritual topics, most often **eschatological** (warning signs of the apocalypse, etc.), very long (5-6 hours)[129]; **preachings and "conferences"** by "YouTube Imams" (15 mins - 1 hour)[130]. **These are the most popular types of discourse.**

The content shared on YouTube is **not homogeneous enough** to be easily characterised. What they do share however is **a tendency to assert identity through Islam***(s)*. The construction of this identity is often explicitly presented as splitting away from certain interweaving modern trends:

- mass consumerism;
- high-speed communication which distances people from each other and from the spiritual realm;
- a lifestyle which is seen as frivolous, or even sinful;
- institutions judged to be unjust or hostile.

The vast majority of these videos offer content which is hard to reconcile with French Republican values.

A search for meaning: constructing a being-in-the-world, daily interactions and religion

What is astounding about **preaching videos** is the **banality of their subject matter**. Their content is not particularly injurious to the public at large. The questions they tackle relate to **commonplace concerns** that are not particularly religious. Their **staging** is very simple, sometimes very **theatrical** (caricatured acting), **emphatic** (preaching from within a tomb), and displays a **limited technical quality** (poor audio, video and editing).

Preachers mainly respond to questions about **love, relationship issues, sexual relations, success, money, relations between fathers and sons, entertainment,** etc. The answers given are similar to those we would expect of any social religion: the imams advocate for moderation, kindness, generosity, understanding the other, dialogue, tenderness and discipline.

What is more surprising is the **verbal and non-verbal liturgy** that accompanies this trivial content. Three levels of rhetoric are identifiable in these preachings, and reflected through certain gestures:

- most of these preachings use the **vocabulary of a marginalised youth**. Being very familiar with the daily lives and worries of their audience, the orators continuously rely on a mechanism of identification to draw viewers into their rhetoric.
- everyday topics are mixed in with a **moralising and theatrical rhetoric, produced in French.** Here, a religious and moral vocabulary is relied upon ("alas", "mercy", "humility") and the tone is sombre;
- the **third kind of rhetoric**, which punctuates and **interrupts the first two, is expressed in the Arabic of the Koran**. It is made up of ritual formulations and **extended recitations of Koranic verses.**

These three types of rhetoric are intertwined. What results is a rhetoric that makes religious issues a daily concern, and daily life a religious theme:

- words from the Koran are peppered through everyday language, rendering it sacred;
- the most trivial signifiers of daily language gain a religious overtone.

The power of this rhetoric is created through this staging of meaning, which grants it absolute authority. Everything is religious; religion is everywhere.

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129 example: *L'au-delà !* (The Hereafter)
130 examples: Imam of Brest, Nader Abu Anas, Sheikh Al-Awadi (Kuwait)

Conveying promises

This elaborate discourse explains the attraction of this type of Salafist preaching. **Historically speaking, the teleological promise of such preaching is not revolutionary.** Like all Millenarian beliefs, it **warns of the approach of the end of days** and the justice that will befall all.

It calls upon people to live according to the will of Allah, in order to ensure one's salvation. This life is presented as difficult due to the **abounding sins** of the modern world. Hell is so close that escaping it is already almost paradise. **The promise made is that of an inevitable judgement.**

But it should be noted that this judgement is two-fold: it exists in the hereafter, in the event of the Last Judgement, but also here on earth.

Many enlightening stories promise that sins will lead to punishment even in the sinner's earthly life. Therefore, daily life and the transcendental are once again intertwined in a being-in-the-world based on this idea: **the trivial is as important as the religious; the religious is trivial, gestural.** The salvation of the soul is a daily issue, since each day it can be jeopardised.

In this respect, there are almost no promises made about the life proposed: it is its own promise. To live like the Prophet and the *salaf as-saalih* is already paradise.

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French Islam is first and foremost a local and everyday reality, before being an institutional one. It is a divided, fragmented and splintered Islam, but it is making initial steps towards becoming integrated and more structured at the local level. Paradoxically, the development and visibility of Salafism are signs of Islam's relatively strong integration within the national landscape. Because it blends into the background, community Islam is difficult to grasp; it offers up few salient features for analysis and is, in consequence, rarely a topic of study. Only radical, minority movements are visible. As Samir Amghar was already saying in 2005, the swift emergence of Salafism also shows that *"France has become a link in the chain of Islamic globalisation, and acts as a turntable for many transnational Islamic trends. In a context such as this, how can we even conceive a State control, whether French or emanating from one of the countries of origin? Transnationality leads to a transformation of the relations between Islam and the State, to new forms of autonomy and competition. The fact that Islamic movements are now transnational and de-territorialised means that precedence is given to religious leaders and charismatic figures, as is the case with Salafist theologians."*[131]

This trend towards transnational and de-territorialised movements was significantly amplified as the internet and social networks became widely accessible. With French Islam evolving in this direction, it is even more difficult - and even more urgent - for both French Muslims and public authorities to work on structuring Islam in France.

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131 Samir Amghar, Acteurs internationaux

4. Initial recommendations

Analysing the landscape of French Islam allows us to shed light on the flaws of its organisation. Partly under foreign influence, it struggles in its attempt to structure and organise itself. Because they form an "indistinguishable community", and because they are ethnically and demographically diverse, French Muslims find themselves unable to build a transparent, structured and regulated French Islam.

Fundamentalists have gained headway in many areas, but above all in the dissemination of their ideology. The fight must therefore take place at an ideological and cultural level. We must do everything we can to support Muslims in their crucial work of interpreting their texts and spreading this knowledge. **Culture and knowledge represent the biggest challenges.**

The second issue concerns financing and organisation. Islam in France is under-funded and poorly organised which leaves room for militant groups with few means to draw attention to themselves, both in mosques and online. French Islam must therefore be financed and organised in a transparent way, and it must come up with the means to break free from foreign influence.

Finally, the State needs to understand that those who can best organise Islam in France are the French Muslims themselves, and not foreign States or a CFCM that Muslims do not feel represents them; they must therefore be given the means to lead this transformation.

a. Proposals

i. Successfully building two major institutions: the Foundation for Islam in France and the Muslim Association for a French Islam

Proposal: to allow funding of the religion (for the building of places of worship, salary of imams and theological training) through the Muslim Association for a French Islam, which would utilise the royalties collected on the sale of halal products. In order for French Islam to embrace a theology which is compatible with French society, and so that it may break away from the austere ideologies of certain States, it is necessary to create institutions - run by a new generation of Muslims - capable of producing and disseminating religious interpretations, ideas and values that reflect the realities of contemporary France.

Islam in France is facing a two-fold challenge: finally breaking away from the authority of foreign States, and centralising its organisation with the collective interest of French Muslims as a guiding principle.

Islam in France must become French. This is not the case today. People organising it and representing French Muslims still have close ties to foreign States. They have brought with them the tensions existing between certain Maghreb countries, are not familiar enough with the French youth who they are supposed to be engaging with, and cannot successfully manipulate the relevant communication tools.

Yet today, three out of four Muslims living in France are French (50 % of them by birth). A new generation of French Muslims has grown up in France and has an advanced level of education. In order for French Islam to embrace a theology which is compatible with French society, and so that it may break away from the discourse spread by the austere ideologies of certain States, it is necessary to create institutions capable of producing and disseminating French ideals and values.

French Islam is currently extremely fragmented and divided between countries of origin, transnational movements and local actors, and it must reinvent itself. Its organisation needs to be centralised in order to make it clearer and more efficient. This coming of age of a French Islam will also require a centralisation of means, as well as increased financial resources, transparency and overall control. All of this with one aim in mind: the collective interest of the Muslims living in France and their adherence to the Republican pact.

In August 2016, the Minister of the Interior announced the creation of a Foundation for Islam in France (FIF), with Jean-Pierre Chevènement heading the cultural division[132]. Its main purpose will be to train imams and to generate Islamic knowledge.

The Foundation will need to be paired with a religious association of the "1905 law" type to finance strictly religious elements (the construction of places of worship, the salaries of imams, and theological training), since the French Council of State disputed the idea that a public benefit foundation could contribute to the funding of a religion. A proposed name for this association is the "Muslim Association for a French Islam" (AMIF). In order to achieve these goals, both organisations must benefit from a new governance and a new generation of leaders.

Three proposals for the governance and organisation of the two institutions.

1. Proposed governance for the two institutions

For their first mandate, most of the French Muslims on the Boards of these organisations will need to be co-opted by the State. Why the State? Because it is a recognised public benefit foundation, and because the State will have granted the association a monopoly on the issuance of halal certification cards, therefore creating a religious exclusivity. But also because it will be the State's responsibility to ensure both a generational and administrative renewal. This new generation will lead the organisation, together with CFCM representatives, who will need to be in the **minority.**

These new members, capable of uniting the Muslim community and raising funds to finance the Muslim religion, will have two main tasks: to centralise financial contributions for the religion, and to ensure an effective and transparent use of these resources. The elected Boards of both organisations will also be tasked with establishing the mechanism for a renewal of their composition at the end of the first mandate, by means of a representative system.

A new team

The reactivation of the FIF and the creation of the AMIF will require a thorough reform of the representatives and actors of French Islam. It is high time for **a new generation of Muslims to come to the fore, individuals who have grown up in French society and who have expressed a desire to participate in it.** It is up to public authorities to support the emergence of this new generation of French Muslims, by electing these individuals to the Board and Management of the Foundation. They will run this organisation alongside members of the CFCM, who must make up less than half of the spaces on the Boards of the FIF and AMIF. This new generation will also need to be present within the Foundation's regional councils, made up of figures who will be nominated to these positions, for the duration of the first mandate, by public authorities and members of the CFCM.

2. A major task: centralising incoming funds

The Foundation for Islam in France (FIF) and the AMIF must become the cornerstone of the new organisation of French Islam. Benefiting from its access to the religion's funds, the AMIF will be able to finance its places of worship, train and pay imams, and fund theological work. The Foundation will limit the scope of its work to the cultural sphere. The income will come from four separate sources:

- **a monopoly on Muslim slaughterer certification.** Currently, three mosques (two of which have direct ties to foreign countries - Algeria for the Paris Mosque and Morocco for the Evry Mosque) have been approved by the Ministry of Agriculture, after a proposal from the Ministry of the Interior, to deliver ritual slaughterer certification. These ritual slaughterers provide a service which

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132 It can only come across as a surprise that a non-Muslim figure is presiding over the Foundation for Islam in France. However, Jean-Pierre Chevènement could merely act as a stepping stone in the creation of the Foundation, working together with the future president of the religious association, before passing on the task as quickly as possible to a Muslim figure.

is covered by the slaughterhouses, with their product then financing local mosques and relevant associations.

The AMIF (the religious association) should become the sole authorising body in order to be able to centralise incoming funds from halal slaughter (even if this means going through an *ad hoc* legal structure). The AMIF will commit to employing the ritual slaughterers who currently work for the authorised mosques, and will offer the mosques a transparent form of compensation, insofar as the current product of the slaughterers' services serves the Muslim community.

As the sole authorising body, and always acting in the interest of the Muslim community, the AMIF (a "1905 law" association) will then be able to control the cost of ritual slaughter, having assessed the financial needs of the Muslim religion in France and its different sources of revenue. Difficulties will undoubtedly arise (why increase the price of these services? why take away the mosques' control when they have done nothing to deserve it? why take more money from people who often have little income?), but, with the certification service, royalties on halal slaughter will represent a major financial resource which must be exploited to its full potential;

- **halal certification all along the value chain.** It is impossible to create a halal tax given the unclear perimeter of the definition of *halal*, the need to respect the freedom of trade and competition, and the constitutional principle of equality of citizens before taxation. It is nevertheless possible to give the AMIF the task of certifying halal produce along the entire value chain, which would create competition for actors already present in this market. In accordance with competition law and the right to free enterprise, the AMIF would not have a monopoly on halal certification. Instead, it would provide a genuine certification service on the basis of its national legitimacy, its cost transparency, and especially the use of the resulting revenue for the benefit of the community as a whole;

- **collection of donations from foreign countries or individuals.** The current situation as concerns donations from foreign states and individuals to Muslim associations is very opaque. More transparency must be created, and certain associations will need to break ties with their countries of origin. For this reason, incoming funds must progressively be redirected in order to systematically pass through the FIF. This will allow for a centralisation - and full transparency - of foreign funding of French Islam;

- **collection of pilgrimage royalties,** through the organising travel agencies;

- **collection of alms (*zakat*) from French worshippers.** Much like foreign funding, the *zakat* represents an important financial resource for French Islam. Yet this funding method is completely opaque, fragmented and incomplete. Transparency must be introduced, and donations from worshippers need to be pooled within the Foundation. Centralising this source of funding will help French Islam to structure itself and gain in professionalism, and hence to become better integrated. Modern means of donating could be considered, such as smartphone apps for example.

Out of the two organisations, the AMIF will be the one to collect the most money, since funding needs are essentially linked to religious practice. The Foundation will be able to receive donations from individuals, with its action being strictly limited to the cultural sphere, in accordance with the 1905 law and the principle of separation of the Churches and the State.

3. Use of the funds

The funds collected and centralised by the FIF will be used in different ways:

- **to finance the building of places of worship**: the construction of every mosque will first have to go through the FIF, with its financing plan approved by the Board;
- **to provide imam salaries**: any imam who has passed the "French Islam Test" (details below) set by the AMIF, will be able to receive a salary from this association. Centralising resources and ensuring a theology compatible with the values and principles of the French Republic will help a French Islam to emerge;
- **to train imams**: as well as approving - or not - current imams, the Foundation will be charged with training a new generation of imams. The centralised nature of the AMIF, the cornerstone of French Islam, will help bring an end to the delegation of imam training to foreign States or private institutions. The goal is to guarantee that every imam in France is French - or has a firm grasp of French - and has been trained within an institution recognised by the French Republic as compatible with its ethos;
- **to provide salaries for the teams running the AMIF and the Foundation, and for ritual slaughterers**: along with paying the employees responsible for the administration of Islam in France, the FIF will have to cover the salaries of its certified halal slaughterers;
- **to embark on an ideological mission**: in time, once the centralisation of incoming funds has been achieved, and once the institutions necessary for a French Islam are firmly established, the task of the FIF will be to embark upon a real cultural mission, both online and on the ground, in order to weaken the stronghold of Islamist, Salafist and Jihadi discourse over Muslims living in France.

Reactivating the FIF, setting up the AMIF, centralising incoming funds, using these funds responsibly and supporting the emergence of a new generation of French Muslims should all lead to the creation of a French Islam. Moreover, this approach should help put an end to the fragmentation and outside organisation of Islam in France, so that it may better meet the challenges it faces today.

ii. A Grand Imam of France to promote a Muslim doctrine compatible with French values

<u>Proposal</u>: elect a Grand Imam of France who can lead an intellectual and theological reflection aimed at laying the groundwork for a French Islam.

In order to designate a legitimate and representative Muslim spokesperson before public authorities, we suggest the election of a Grand Imam of France. This individual should be required to have French nationality, a degree in theology, be the imam of a mosque and approved by the heads of religious associations. He will be elected by the AMIF Board, and possibly also by a larger commission made up of qualified figures. He will be the bearer of a rhetoric and ideology rooted in Islamic spiritual values, while still being compatible with 21st century France. Together with the presidents of the CFCM and the AMIF, he will be the spiritual representative of French Islam. In this role - much like the Grand Rabbi of France - he will be expected to appear before the media and meet with institutions seeking a theological response to certain questions, in order to help spread knowledge about Islam. He will also be required to lead an intellectual and theological reflection aimed at laying the groundwork for a French Islam. In order to do so , he will need to interact with all the imams in France. With the agreement of the AMIF, he will be able to remove an imam from his functions if he espouses a rhetoric or expresses views contrary to the idea of a harmonious co-existence. He will rely on regional Muslim representatives to do so.

While the Grand Imam of France will be the representative of Muslim religious leaders, the leaders of the AMIF will have to be the faces and voices of the silent majority, of people who are well-integrated within the French society and the first victims of Islamism and religious radicalism.

iii. Extending the concordat in the Alsace-Moselle region to Islam

Proposal: to extend the concordat in the Alsace-Moselle region to Islam in order to ensure that Muslim religious leaders are trained in France.

A special system reinforced through legislature, the Council of State and the Constitutional Council

Alsace-Moselle benefits from a different religious system from the rest of France, in the sense that the 1905 law does not apply in this region. This specificity is justified by the history of these localities , which were under German occupation in 1905. In accordance with provisions in force before the enactment of the 1905 law, the four "recognised" religions (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist and Jewish) are financed through public funding, with public authorities instating and removing religious leaders, and ensuring that each religion is taught in State schools (an optional measure today).

These measures, which constitute an exception to common law, were never called into question, and were ratified by the law of 1 June 1924[133] and by an opinion issued by the Council of State in 1925[134]. Since then, this legal status applying to religious organisations in the Alsace-Moselle region has been confirmed on a number of occasions. The ruling of 15 September 1945, enforcing the law of 16 June 1940, reconfirmed that the concordat system applied in Alsace-Moselle. In 2001, in its decision *"Syndicat national des enseignements du second degré"* (National Union of Secondary School Education), the French Council of State also highlighted that the fundamental principles recognised by French Law, including the secularist principle which figures in the preface to the Constitutions of 27 October 1946 and 4 October 1958 *"did not have the effect of implicitly repealing the provisions of that law"*.

Most recently, in 2013, the Constitutional Council confirmed the constitutionality of these special provisions. As such, during the preliminary rulings on constitutionality (the "*question prioritaire de constitutionnalité*" - QPC) concerning the Association for the Promotion and Expansion of the Secularist Principle ("*Association pour la promotion et l'expansion de la laïcité*"), **the constitutional judge in turn confirmed that the concordat system operating in Alsace-Moselle is not unconstitutional**[135].

The position of Islam within the concordat system

Today, **Islam is not included in the concordat** of the Alsace-Moselle region. **It is considered to be an "unrecognised" religion.** As a result, the funding of Islam - and more broadly of any new religion - is not permitted under the agreement, which only benefits the four recognised religions. However, **under local law, associations can receive public funding and local communities can part-finance unrecognised religions** (as long as they follow certain rules). In this way, the City of Strasbourg, the department of the Lower Rhine and the region of Alsace part-financed the construction of the Grand Mosque of Strasbourg to the value of €1.6 million, or a quarter of the total budget. Nevertheless, the concordat system does not allow public authorities to cover the whole cost of the religion, or to nominate and employ imams. Essentially, **while public authorities can part-finance the Muslim religion in Alsace-Moselle, they have no say in how it operates.**

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133 The law of 1 June 1924 enforcing French civil legislation in the departments of the Lower Rhine, the Upper Rhine and the Moselle, art. 7.

134 Council of State, bringing together the Departments of Legislation, Justice, Foreign and Interior Affairs, Public Instruction and Fine Arts, opinion n°188.150 of 24 January 1925

135 CC, Decision n° 2012-297 QPC of 21 February 2013. See notably the sixth recital: "Considering however, that according to the preparatory work for the draft Constitution of 27 October 1946 relative to Article 1, and for the draft Constitution of 4 October 1958, which reasserted the same provision by proclaiming that France is a 'secular ... Republic' , *the Constitution did not call into question any specific legislative or regulatory provisions on the organisation of certain religions, including in particular the remuneration of religious leaders,which were applicable in various parts of the Republic when the Constitution entered into force;"* (the emphasis is ours)

Since the concordat is protected on the one hand by the legislature, and on the other by the Council of State and Constitutional Council, some have suggested integrating Islam into this system, allowing public authorities to participate more in the organisation of the religion. This is not a new idea. Already in 1997, while he was Minister of the Interior, Jean-Pierre Chevènement envisaged using this exceptional system as a laboratory for French Islam by creating a University of Islamic Theology in Strasbourg.

The same idea was echoed in 2006 by the deputy François Grosdidier, when he proposed a law to include the Muslim religion in the Alsace-Moselle concordat in order to move away from a non-egalitarian system. According to him, given that **new religions, the largest being Islam, find themselves in an unfavourable situation compared to recognised religions** in the three departments of Eastern France, he wished to see *"an update of the concordat law"* in favour of Islam. Further echoing the ideas developed by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, he pronounced himself in favour of creating a Chair of Islamic Theology at the University of Strasbourg, whose work could contribute to the emergence of a French Islam.

This text was never examined due to political and legal reasons, notably the risk of the proposed law being unconstitutional. **In 2011, the Constitutional Council dismissed the public debate on this issue for the time being.** Indeed, in its *"Société SOMODIA"* decision, regarding an update of the Alsace-Moselle concordat system, the Constitutional Council pointed out that while the legislator or regulatory powers could maintain, mitigate or even repeal the provisions of a local law, **they could not extend its scope**. While this derogation from common law remains exceptional, it would not be desirable to extend it, since the risk would be deepening the inequality of citizens before the law. **As such, the constitutional judge ruled that newly-arrived religions in France could not benefit from the same legal status in the Alsace-Moselle region as recognised religions**[136]. As a result, in 2011 the Constitutional Council blocked any attempt at making Alsace-Moselle an experimental stage for the emergence of an Islam "made in France".

Imperative and methods for including Islam in the concordat system

Imperative

Today, more than ever, it is imperative to **include Islam in the concordat system**. Rather than facilitating the funding of the Muslim religion, it is a matter of creating **a political and legal ecosystem** which will allow both the representatives of Muslims living in France and public authorities to **work towards the emergence of a French Islam**, with a rhetoric and practice reflecting the evolutions of our society.

An update of the concordat system should allow for the **creation of a Chair of Islamic Theology** at the University of Strasbourg, whose purpose will be to produce Islamic knowledge for French citizens, and to develop a theology compatible with the French society and Republic.

The Alsace-Moselle region could also be host to **a scholarly institute for imams**. By creating a French degree course in Islamic theology, the State would be responding to a long-standing desire on the part of French Muslims. In the long term, it would also be creating the means of disseminating a rhetoric among Muslim worshippers that echoes the values of our society.

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136 Decision n°2011-157 QPC of 5 August 2011. See notably the fourth recital: Considering that thus, national legislation prior to the coming into effect of the Constitution of 1946 has accepted the principle according to which, as long as they have not been replaced by common law provisions or harmonised with them, the legislative and statutory measures specific to the Departments of the Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin and Moselle can remain in force; *that in the absence of their abrogation or their harmonisation with common law, these specific measures can be adapted only insofar as the differences of treatment which result from them are not increased and their field of application is not widened;* that such is the scope of the basic principle recognised by the laws of the Republic as regards specific measures applicable in the three Departments in question; that this principle must also be reconciled with the other constitutional requirements" (the emphasis is ours)

Methods

Amending the Société Somodia ruling

First of all, if Islam is to be included in the concordat system, **the decision made by the Constitutional Council must be amended**. In his decision relating to the QPC *Société Somodia* in 2011, the constitutional judge reinforced local law over religion (a decision which was confirmed in 2013 with the QPC *Association pour la promotion et l'expansion de la laïcité*). However, it also **prevented all possible updates of the concordat law**, deeming that the inclusion of new religions in the concordat system would be too great an expansion of a local law which is, by its very nature, exceptional.

Updating the concordat system would therefore involve **bringing legislation before the Constitutional Council**, rather than attempting to go down a regulatory route, which could be blocked by the Council of State due to its patently unconstitutional nature. **The constitutional judges** would then need to **overturn the jurisprudence,** in light of the new circumstances and draft law provisions. These legislative changes could be based on the need to reduce the inequality between worshippers of recognised and non-recognised religions, which potentially impacts freedom of religion, rather than on a uniform application of the law nation-wide, or on the aim of limiting derogations to the common law, which influenced the *Société Somodia* decision. The new socio-political context resulting from the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks could justify this evolution.

Such a legislative change would be a significant event, since the Constitutional Council has never overturned a decision made in the context of a preliminary ruling on constitutionality (QPC). This act would certainly set a precedent and would pose a high risk of perturbing legal doctrine. Therefore, aside from the political questions raised by the idea of including Islam in the concordat system, **all of the legal obstacles facing this proposal should be addressed**.

How can the Muslim religion be "recognised"?

The term "recognition" is inadequate, as Jean-Pierre Machelon's 2006 report makes clear: *"no law has ever explicitly recognised the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religions. Instead, during the 19th century, they negotiated with the State for varying lengths of time (50 years in the Jewish case), resulting in what may be termed 'statutory arrangements'. Each religion therefore has its own particular status. [...] Statutory religions are therefore not a homogeneous group, and Islam, with its own particular characteristics, can no doubt carve out a space for itself."*[137]

The **report published in 2006, before the *Société Somodia* QPC ruling, suggests that the Muslim religion could be "recognised"** through regulatory provisions (recruitment of Muslim religious leaders, creation of Islamic establishments, etc.) in order to set a "ratchet effect" in motion and facilitate the introduction of other provisions relying on legislation. Considering the current legal environment, integrating the Muslim religion into the concordat system cannot be achieved in a *"pragmatic and progressive"* way. The legislative level must be aimed for if the text is to be considered by the Constitutional Council.

Furthermore, considering the State's insistence on religious neutrality and its corollary (the equal treatment of different religions within legal frameworks that are derogations from the common law on religion[138]), **it is important that the legislative text used to include Islam in the concordat system does not exclude other religions.** Consequently, the concordat in the Alsace-Moselle region should be updated to **include any new religion that wishes to be a part of it**. Considering existing local religious practices, this mainly concerns the Orthodox, Protestant Evangelical and Muslim religions.

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137 Machelon Report, p. 70-71
138 Council of State, 16 March 2005, n° 265560, *ministre de l'Outre-Mer c/ président de la Polynésie française.*

With this in mind, and in accordance with Article 34 of the Constitution, two non-exclusive options seem possible:

a. since local legislation concerning religious education does not refer to "recognised religions", **a draft law or proposal relative to the creation of contractual positions for teachers of the Muslim,** Orthodox and Evangelical religions would allow the Constitutional Council to examine the text and pronounce itself in favour of possibly overturning previous jurisprudence;

b. in collaboration with the CRCM, which is the local Muslim representative body, and **in the context of a finance law, an amendment concerning the remuneration of Muslim, Orthodox and Evangelical religious leaders** should allow the Constitutional Council - during its examination of the constitutionality of this proposed finance law - to overturn previous jurisprudence regarding the religious system in Alsace-Moselle.

It is clear that these two paths are only **a first step in the creation of an official status for the Muslim religion**, and that their ambition goes beyond the simple structuring of Islam. But it is a necessary step if we are to create a genuine political, legal and intellectual ecosystem that can support the emergence of a French Islam. Without going through this **essential legal process**, it will not be possible to establish a degree course in theology for the above-mentioned contract teachers, nor to create a Chair of Islamic Theology within the University of Strasbourg.

Risks

What risks can arise from the broadening of the concordat system to new religions? While such a measure does not appear to engender significant financial risks (see below), and once the risk of unconstitutionality has been dealt with, **the main risks weighing on this proposal are of a political nature.**

a. The measure is sure to incite **opposition from those in favour of abolishing the concordat system, who do not agree that public authorities should be involved in religion.** This opposition cannot be ignored, and it will be particularly virulent when the draft laws are being examined.

b. **The opposition of religions that are already "recognised" within the concordat system should also be taken into account.** They will express two concerns. On the one hand, they will fear to be the victims of a budgetary realignment; on the other, they will make threats regarding the risk of a breakdown of the concordat system. Its expansion could, in that case, result in its repeal. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Council's 2013 decision constitutes an affirmation of this political and legal mechanism at the highest judicial level.

c. Finally, it is very likely that **some Muslims will be opposed to public authorities administering their religion**. In the Alsace-Moselle region, where most Muslims have Moroccan and Turkish origins, consular Islam is relatively well developed. The creation of an official body of French civil servants to administer the Muslim religion, and the resulting emergence of a new French Islam, will lead to a certain amount of local and diplomatic upheaval which should be anticipated so that it may be better addressed. Moreover, the leaders of some local religious associations are reluctant to see the State become involved in religious affairs, since **this implies that public authorities will also have significant power to monitor and control how the religion operates**.

The cost of extending the concordat system to include Islam

The cost of this measure would be in the range of €5.5-6 million, allocated as follows:

- considering the size of the Muslim population and the number of mosques in Alsace-Moselle, **around 60 religious officials will need to be salaried**, their role being to provide religious education and lead religious services. With a monthly salary ranging from €1,800 to €2,000, we estimate that **creating an official body of Muslim civil servants will cost roughly €2.5 million per year**;

- the **creation of a Chair of Islamic Theology within the University of Strasbourg**, which would initially include around ten professors, is **estimated to cost €1-1.5 million per year**;

- finally, **a budget of roughly €2 million per year would be needed for public authorities to cover the cost of constructing and maintaining religious spaces**, including the building of new mosques.

A prerequisite to all of this spending is the fully-fledged inclusion of Islam in the concordat. **A myriad of measures will be required for Islam to eventually become a "recognised religion"**, and it is difficult to assess the cost of each. It is nevertheless likely that **such an evolution will take many years**, considering both the time necessary for the formulation of Muslim religious teaching, and for the creation of a Chair of Theology. As such, the annual cost of this process will be lower during the first few years.

Teaching Islamic theology in France and training imams

Studying the supply and demand of Islamic academic teaching since the 1980s and 1990s shows us that **two supply dynamics exist, corresponding to two types of demand**.

A composite and incomplete public offering

Under the impulse of political and academic actors, and supported by the conclusions of various public reports, a number of recommendations for a public offering have emerged: establishing religious education in primary schools in the Alsace and Moselle regions, based on the recommendations of the Review Commission for the application of the secularist principle in France (Stasi Report, 2003), the Commission on the relations between religions and public authorities (Machelon Report, 2006), and the Commission on the wearing of the full-length veil in France (Gérin Report, 2010).

Academics (Mohamed Arkoun and Etienne Trocmé) have made countless attempts to draw the attention of French political leaders and to formulate a response to the demand for religious teaching in the context of the 1905 law.

A number of different suggestions have been put forward with the idea of providing a public offering for the instruction of religious teachers, and more specifically for the teaching of Islam and Islamic theology at university level. These have included recommendations for the creation of a Faculty of Muslim Theology in Strasbourg, an Islamic Institute (Pierre Joxe and Alain Boyer in 1987), and even a National School for Islamic Studies modelled on the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*.

In 1997, Jean-Pierre Chevènement revived the idea of creating a "University Institute for Islamic Theology" or "Islamic Cultural Studies" within the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO), to train a Muslim elite.

Between **2005 and 2010**, faculties in the universities of Aix-en-Provence, Paris IV - La Sorbonne and Paris 8 - Saint-Denis, as well as a number of other public establishments, tried to organise programmes aimed at future imams. The only initiative that came to fruition was that of the Catholic Institute of Paris, which created a State diploma (known as a *"diplôme universitaire"* or DU) in 2008 titled: "Interculturalism, secularism and religions".

In 2009, a Master in Islamic Studies was launched at the University of Strasbourg. This programme offers a general framework for the training of French imams.

Today there exists a multiple and disparate public offering, which includes 13 different programmes and qualifications. After those of Paris, Lyon, Strasbourg, Montpellier, Aix and Bordeaux, seven further State diplomas (DU) became available in 2015 in Sceaux, Paris 1, Lille, Toulouse, Mayotte, Nantes and on the Reunion Island.

A rather disparate private offering

A private offering also exists, developed through the initiatives of Muslim individuals, associations or communities who wished to respond to the need for a theological training of imams, "Muslim catechisms" and Koranic interpretation.

In this context:

- in 1990, in Saint-Léger de Fougeret, the UOIF created the European Institute of Humanist Sciences (IESH). The tuition fees are €6,000 per year;
- in 1993, with the financial support of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic University of France was created at Mantes-la-Jolie; in 1995, it became the Paris Institute of Islamic Studies;
- in 1994, Dalil Boubakeur and Charles Pasqua were behind the launch of the Ghazali Institute for the instruction of imams;
- in 1999, the International Institute of Islamic Sciences (ISSI) was created, offering instruction based on the Malekite rite;
- in 1999, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), which had opened in the United States in 1981, created a French branch: the International Institute of Islamic Thought in Saint-Ouen, in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis;
- in 2001, the French Institute of Islamic Studies and Sciences (IFESI) was founded in Boissy-Saint-Léger, in the Val-de-Marne region;
- in October 2002, the Grand Mosque of Paris re-launched its training course for imams, in order to provide theological teaching for future imams and female chaplains;
- in 2006, the Avicenne Institute for Humanist Sciences (IASH) was created in Lille, with the aim of training imams. The programme at the Avicenne Institute is only available to candidates who can show that they have acted as imams or associative leaders for at least six months.

The instruction of Muslim religious leaders in Europe

The methods used to train Muslim religious leaders in Europe depend on the status of national religions in each country.

In **Belgium**, the Muslim religion has been recognised by the State since 1974. In 2006, the Muslim Board of Belgium, their equivalent of the French CFCM, proposed creating an official status for Muslim religious leaders and an imam qualification course lasting 4-5 years (providing theological, citizenship and civic training). The project stagnated and was re-launched in 2013.

In 2007, a Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Brussels was created on a private initiative. In 2008, this faculty signed an agreement with the European Islamic University of Rotterdam, which is close to the Turkish Nursi movement and has a department responsible for the instruction of imams. The degrees it provides are not recognised by the State.

In **Germany** in 2010, the Federal Minister for Higher Education agreed to a 5-year funding plan for academic teaching positions in the departments of Islamic Theology and Religious Education. The universities of Tübingen, Munster, Osnabruck, Frankfurt am Main and Giessen also accompanied the creation of Islamic theology institutes on their campuses. German public authorities have always opposed the creation of a private faculty of Muslim theology and have, on the other hand, favoured the inclusion of Islamic theological teaching in public universities.

In the **United Kingdom**, universities teach non-denominational theology. Religious leaders are trained through courses given in "private halls", which are educational establishments linked to a university and granting qualifications on behalf of the university. Most of these "private halls" are funded by religious authorities. They set the curriculum and run student admissions. Nevertheless, with the aim of maintaining and safeguarding the quality and scientific standards of British universities and colleges, public authorities have made the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education responsible for evaluating the quality of teaching within these "private halls".

Founded in London in 1998, the Islamic College offers degrees validated by Middlesex University, in the context of a partnership between the two establishments.

In **Switzerland**, public authorities would like to see imams and religious teachers in schools being trained in Switzerland. Yet they do not have their own Swiss institute of Muslim theology; instead, future religious leaders are trained in France, at the European Institute of Humanist Sciences (IESH) in Château Chinon, founded by members of the UOIF.

In 2009, a continuing vocational training certificate on "Islam, Muslims and Civil Society" was created within the University of Freiburg, and financed by the Federal Office of Migrations. It covered an ambitious curriculum, including seven modules: epistemology of Islamic sciences; associative administration and management; finance and ethics; Islam and the media; Islamic history and civilisation: texts and contexts; secularism, religion and politics; diversity, integration and social work; public health, religious practices and chaplaincies. Nevertheless, the course was cancelled due to low numbers of candidates.

iv.   Promoting the teaching of Arabic

Proposal: to teach classical Arabic in State schools in order to lessen the draw towards Arabic classes in Koranic schools and mosques.

We note the attraction of some French youth to radical, even totalitarian ideologies claiming to represent Islam. These are perceived as legitimate due to their preachers' seeming knowledge of Arabic, which is presented as inseparable from Islam. Radical, even terrorist individuals, claim to be scholars, "true representatives" of Islam and Arab identity, and profit from the lack of knowledge of Arabic culture. The children of immigrants who came to work in France after WWII were forcibly dragged into a form of cultural integration. This shook up traditional family values and undermined the legitimacy of parental authority, further weakened by high unemployment rates, underemployment, financial insecurity and the stalling of any upward social mobility following the de-industrialisation of the last three decades. In this context, Islamist ideologies can come across as bearers of meaning and pride, and vectors of a Muslim identity. This process is nourished by an ignorance of Islamic history and culture, of the different Arabic cultures, and of the language used to transmit these multiple identities across centuries.

Our survey of the Muslims living in France has shown that 67 % of all people of Muslim faith or culture would like their children to study classical Arabic[139]. Their motivations are varied: cultural transmission; pride at having an ancient heritage; religious prestige of a language linked to religious texts; the advantages of knowing another modern language; and professional opportunities. This appeal is reinforced by the fact that classical Arabic is not spoken by these communities, who communicate in various dialects of Northern or Sub-Saharan Africa, more or less distant from the standard Arabic used by the media and in official discourse in Arab countries. Classical Arabic is therefore highly valued as a direct descendent of the Arabic

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139 Would you like your child or grandchild to be able to learn classical Arabic?
• No
• Declines to answer
• Does not know
Yes: Would you rather they were able to learn classical Arabic… ?
• At school
• At the mosque
• Elsewhere
• Does not know / declines

of the Koran, the language of the great Islamic texts, which is read and understood by millions of people across many different countries.

More than half (56 %) would like classical Arabic to be taught in schools. This may be motivated by convenience: if it is taught in school, the time and means invested in this learning are covered by the institution. A significant majority of those who answered positively do not think that it is incoherent for "classical" Arabic to be taught in a lay institution, which suggests that they make a distinction between this language and its religious resonance. The result is similar among the people surveyed who identify as Muslim, since 54 % would like their children to learn classical Arabic in school.

French State schools should be able to fill this gap, to transmit a culture to children whose parents did not pass it down to them, but also to provide a historical context for Islam, and the tools to question and probe their multi-layered identity and sense of belonging. Moreover, this would mean moving away from the idea that Arabic is somehow a special, exceptional language, given a sacred aura both by fundamentalists who treat is as a revelation, and by supporters of a radical form of secularism, for whom it reeks of the incense of religion. Arabic would therefore become just another language taught in schools and spoken by a large and semi-bilingual part of the population. Its transmission would help generations of French citizens to be more open to a globalised world, in which the relationships between France and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa are continuously expanding. We must dispel the idea that classical Arabic is somehow a "language of identity".

Today, there are only 9,000 children learning Arabic in secondary school in France[140], while in 1985 that number was almost double, somewhere in the range of 15,000 to 17,000 children[141]. This drop can be explained by various factors, and notably by integration policies. On the one hand, Arabic was often considered a "lesser" subject, compared to other "more prestigious" languages, and on the other, new educational standards led to staff reductions in minority subjects. This was also tied to a long-standing idea that learning Arabic meant resisting integration. After the family reunification decree of April 1976, the dominant ideology of educational policies was that, if throughout history, regional languages (Basque, Corsican, etc.) were not taught in schools to the populations who spoke them, then nothing justified teaching Arabic to immigrants or their children. Since immigrant populations would, in time, become more and more French, they would start speaking less Arabic, in order to better integrate.

As a result, school principals did away with many Arabic classes starting in the 1980s, and have since been reluctant to launch new classes, as these are thought to attract immigrant populations seen as "problematic". The high-schools that did offer Arabic classes were often the more prestigious city-centre schools. This reduction has turned out to be highly counter-productive, and has in fact contributed to the ghettoisation of immigrant populations in large cities, with "ghetto-schools" fostering separatist tendencies.

Perhaps with integration in mind, the Department of Education did not allow children with a Muslim immigrant background to attend Arabic classes. Yet there is an ever greater demand for them, with solutions often provided at the community level since they are not offered through public institutions or schools. The gap that the State has ignored has been filled by others - ELCO programmes and mosques.

A need channelled by ELCO programmes and religious associations

ELCO programmes

Classes in the language and culture of origin (ELCO) were originally organised to facilitate the return of the children and grand-children of immigrants to their country of origin, by helping them to maintain cultural ties with their ancestral homeland. At the time, the idea that these children would one day return to their parents' home country still prevailed, and it motivated the creation of these courses. ELCO classes are taught to primary school children outside of school hours by teachers who are paid by the countries of

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140 Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam, Question for the Senate n°10571, JO Sénat, 22 February 2014, www.senat.fr
141 Jacques Berque, *L'immigration à l'Ecole de la République*, Department of Education Report, CNDP-Documentation Française, 1985.

origin (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and, to a lesser extent, Croatia and Spain). These parallel structures, working with foreign teachers, are left by the Department of Education to teach foreign languages to French children. The methods used have often been derided as inegalitarian and sometimes too far removed from French values.

A 2003 report on ELCO programmes suggested eliminating them, but politically, this proved to be impossible due to the involvement of foreign States. A reform was then considered, with the aim of placing the Department of Education at the heart of the mechanism. Happy to participate, the foreign partners created a joint programme, based on the Common European Framework for languages. The Department of Education can now monitor classes, inspect teachers, create a list of primary school ELCO educators and guide their work. Training programmes for teachers form the Maghreb region were established by the Department of Education in order to attract the best teachers from these countries.

ELCO courses are no longer only aimed at children with immigrant backgrounds; from a special mechanism designed for an immigrant community, the programme evolved towards an all-inclusive teaching model, open to all children and answering to the same criteria and standards as other classes. In time, it may be worth progressively replacing these foreign teachers by French nationals. Furthermore, children who have been taught these languages in primary school should be encouraged to pursue them throughout their secondary education. There is indeed an important gap between the number of children signed up to ELCO programmes in primary school and the number learning Arabic in secondary school. From almost 40,000[142] students in ELCO Arabic programmes, the number drops to 9,000 in secondary school.

Mosques and religious associations

Mosques are another type of institution that responds to the demand for Arabic classes. According to an already outdated statistic from the Ministry of the Interior, which is not easily verifiable but which is corroborated by qualitative assessments and testimonials, over 80,000 young French citizens are taught Arabic in mosques, religious associations, charitable institutions, or institutes with ties to religious centres. There is nothing wrong with this as such: the vast majority of mosques are not places of radicalisation, and the religious values and ethics which they teach are compatible with French society.

However, their approach to teaching Arabic is different to that of State schools, relying on a rote learning of religious texts. The values imparted are often those of the countries of origin, and they are transmitted by teachers with a foreign background, who are not necessarily sensitive to the daily challenges and realities of French Muslims. Moreover, the religious context merges into the language teaching and often favours proselytism. This is particularly the case with Salafist mosques, whose highly popular Arabic lessons are often the gateway to a religious realm which extends its influence into other areas of life. It reinforces the idea that Arabic is the language of Islam, but also of the version of Islam that each mosque preaches. This therefore contributes to a certain confusion and amalgamation between Arab and Islamic identities, distorting the teaching of the Arabic language and cultures. Religious associations also often rely on the revenue from these Arabic classes.

With this in mind, if we map the offering of Arabic teaching in Muslim religious associations and secondary schools in the Seine-Saint-Denis area, it is easy to conclude that the Department of Education is paradoxically pushing young French people towards mosques, since these offer far more in the way of Arabic lessons than do State schools.

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142 The Inspectorate-General for the Department of Education, *L'enseignement de la langue et de la culture d'origine*, Rapport n°2005-090, March 2006, p.9, cache.media.education.gouv.fr

Recommendations for the teaching of classical Arabic

A clear political will

The national education system must offer Arabic lessons and accompany this initiative with a proactive discourse. There are many Arabic teachers in France (roughly 200), and many are under-employed, working as substitute teachers due to a lack of classes. These individuals could be offered greater job security (through the creation of permanent positions) in order to entrench Arabic teaching.

Integrating Arabic lessons

In order to promote Arabic lessons and make them a more open environment, the ELCO system should progressively be integrated into the international sections offered in primary schools. Parents often sign up their children to these international classes because they value excellence rather than because of any community-based motives. These classes are very popular and are seen as powerful levers of social advancement for students. Hence, Arabic could also become a valued skill. This trend would be encouraged through middle-school and high-school, where students from ELCO classes would systematically be oriented towards bi-lingual Arabic classes. This continuity between primary and secondary education must be ensured through bi-lingual classes as of the first year of secondary school, in order to avoid students leaving this path too early on and turning instead to the teachings of mosques.

v. Training chaplains and giving them a professional status

Proposal: chaplains are hired by the State and serve a "function" which by its very essence covers the religious and spiritual domain; as such, we propose the creation of a French Institute of chaplains to provide cultural training and recruit individuals to these positions.

The first article of the law of 9 December 1905 on the separation of the Churches and the State recognises religious freedoms and **enshrines** the organisation of relations between the State and religions, basing these **on a double independence**: that of the State from religions, but also that of religions from the State. Meanwhile, the second article of the law states that while *"the Republic does not recognise, pay, or subsidise any religion"*, it does foresee that *"high schools, middle schools, primary schools, hospitals, asylums and prisons can benefit from chaplaincy services to ensure the free exercise of religion in public institutions"*. This spiritual assistance (chaplaincy service), which is legally mandated, provides a framework for the expression of religious beliefs and guarantees the religious freedom of anyone who uses public services within "enclosed spaces", where the principle of neutrality must be respected by all public officials.

The chaplain, a public servant like any other?

Both paid and volunteer chaplains are recruited by chaplaincies through **an approval and selection procedure in which both the administrative services and the religious authorities participate.** As a result, chaplains are nominated by Christian, Jewish and Muslim authorities[143] (the CFCM, and more specifically the CRCMs to which the State has delegated the role of selecting Muslim chaplains), the directors of public establishments approve the nominations, and the administration provides the final authorisation. The administration therefore recruits **public officials on the basis of a public-law contract, or occasional public service collaborators in the case of volunteers**. They are under the authority of the director and abide by the internal regulations of the **public establishment, providing a "service"** which is in essence religious and spiritual.

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143 The prison administration has been condemned multiple times by the administrative court for refusing to authorise Jehovah's Witness chaplains even though the Council of State recognised Jehovah's Witnesses as a religious association. In a judgement on 16 October 2013, the Council of State rejected all appeals from the Ministry of Justice and concluded that the refusal of the prison administration to authorise Jehovah's Witness chaplains was not legally founded.

The legal texts, which do not stipulate **the necessary training that chaplains must undergo before they can be recruited**, allow the administration to give full freedom (a monopoly) to religious authorities **to designate and remove** chaplains. The role of the administration in the **instruction of these chaplains - officials providing a public service -** can also be questioned. A memorandum from the Health Ministry[144] from 2006 **is a clear example of the grey area surrounding the training of chaplains:** *"Aside from possessing knowledge of the relevant religious texts, cultures, practices and spiritual guidance offered by the religion which they represent,* **salaried and volunteer chaplains must undergo continuous training** *in the fields essential to the function that they fulfill within hospitasl, social or medico-social establishments; this notably includes an understanding of hospital culture and of the functioning of public services, the basic rules of hospital hygiene, public freedoms in health establishments, the psychological aspects of listening to people in difficulty, and ethical questions."* **Considering the public service provided by chaplains, and the lack of precision with regard to the instruction these individuals should first undergo, it appears necessary for the State to take responsibility for the training - aside from its strictly religious aspect - of these public officials.**

Creating a university course for chaplains

In order to respond to the need to train chaplains and the question of where this instruction could take place, we recommend that **a course be created for student-chaplains**, who would be selected through an external or internal examination process. At the end of the programme, they could be assigned to a public service position (in prisons, schools, hospitals or the army).

These students would follow a general course and language lessons, as well as a specialist course for their religion, which would be run by the AMIF for the Muslim religion. During this three-year programme, they would undertake internships in public establishments and places of worship.

This course could benefit from an academic exchange programme, which would allow Muslim students to enrich their understanding abroad.

The students would follow an academic curriculum co-created by the State and by the different institutions representing the main religions.

vi. Facilitating the daily management of Islam

<u>Proposal</u>: to legally equip local authorities to support an Islam which is well-integrated within local communities.

Facilitate the creation of denominational plots in cemeteries

Muslims on French soil

There is a growing number of requests for Muslim burials in France, reflecting this population's long-term immigration and attachment to the French territory.

There are around 70 Muslim burial grounds in mainland France, mainly in the Île-de-France, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Rhône-Alpes and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur regions. They vary in size, from a dozen to a few hundred tombs, and even thousands in the case of the Thiais cemetery (Val-de-Marne). There is only one Muslim cemetery in France, created in 1934 in Bobigny by presidential decree. On the Reunion Island, there are two Muslim cemeteries and five Muslim burial grounds.

While **67 % of Muslims** choose to be buried or to bury their loved ones in their **country of origin**[145], we are seeing an increase in the number of burials on French soil. This is due to:

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144   Memorandum DHOS/P1 n° 2006-538 of 20 December 2006 relative to chaplains within the establishments mentioned in Article 2 of law n° 86-33 from 9 January 1986 on the statutory requirements of the hospital public service.
145   "Would you rather be buried in...?"
• A cemetery in your country of origin (that of your parents or grandparents)

- an **immigrant population which is firmly rooted in France**, and wishes to remain close to its children and grand-children who have become French citizens and live in France; parents *"substitute their love for their country with their love for their children. By being buried in France, they create a sort of country of attachment for their children, giving them a place with ancestral ties"*[146];
- the **cost of repatriation** for the body (roughly €3,000).

These requests from Muslim individuals to be buried in France demonstrate their **genuine integration** into the French society.

French cemeteries are subject to the principle of neutrality

However, the increasing number of Muslim burials must accommodate the principle of neutrality in cemeteries, which was progressively established and confirmed by the law of separation in 1905.

Before the advent of the French Republic and the creation of the neutrality principle for cemeteries, funerary law witnessed two major trends. First **in 1598, the Edict of Nantes** forced local authorities to create **separate Protestant cemeteries**, financed by all local inhabitants. The measure was abolished with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Subsequently, after the French Revolution, the **decree of 23 Prairial year XII** (12 June 1804) stated that local authorities had to designate land or create a **cemetery specifically dedicated to each religion present within the community.**

The **principle of neutrality for cemeteries** was established under the Third Republic in three main phases:

- the law of 14 November **1881 revoked the decree of 23 Prairial year XII and the ban on all denominational grouping** by means of a physical separation from the rest of the cemetery[147];
- the law of 5 April **1884** stated that mayors **must remain neutral** when exercising their **control over funerals and cemeteries** (confirmed by jurisprudence: Council of State, 1913, *Abbé Deguille*)[148];
- **Article 28** of the **law of 9 December 1905** confirms the **neutrality of public areas within cemeteries**, by banning *"the erection or affixing of any religious sign or emblem on public monuments or in any public place whatsoever, except for buildings used for worship, burial grounds in cemeteries, funerary monuments, and museums or exhibitions"*;
- these provisions also include the **prohibition to create or expand an existing denominational cemetery**[149].

Therefore, while the law expressly prohibits the existence of denominational burial grounds, the principle of neutrality in cemeteries does not forbid the expression of religious beliefs. **Religious signs and emblems** are in fact **allowed on gravestones**: *"all individuals may, without authorisation, place a funerary stone or other funerary symbols upon the grave of a family member or loved one"*[150]. They are however prohibited in public spaces - unless they preceded the 1905 law[151]. Any restrictions to these principles that may be applied by local mayors, can only be founded on considerations of public decency, safety (CE 1909, *Abbé Olivier*), tranquillity and hygiene (CE 2006, *M. Rémy Martinot et al.*).

• A Muslim burial ground in France (a space reserved for Muslims)
• An interdenominational cemetery in France (a cemetery shared by people of all religions)
• Other answer (non-suggested answer)
• Declines to answer
• Does not know

146 Fiche "Carrés musulmans", n° 6, June 2003, edited by *l'Observatoire régional de l'intégration et de la ville*.
147   article L. 2213-7 of the General Local Authorities Code (CGCT).
148   article L. 2213-9 of the CGCT
149 (CE 1938, *Dame veuve Rode*: on the question of expanding a Jewish cemetery; CE 1944, *Sieur Lagarrigue*: on the question of expanding an Protestant cemetery).
150 article L. 2223-12 of the CGCT;
151 The principle of funerary freedom, established by the law of 15 November 1887 and guaranteed by Article L. 2213-11 of the General Local Authorities Code (CGCT), according to which: *"ceremonies will conform to the customs of different religions; it is up to the families to cover the cost according to their means and capacities."*

While current legislation forbids the creation of Muslim burial grounds, changes could be made to the legal framework in the context of the emergence of a French Islam. In fact, although forbidden by law, Muslim burial plots are supported by public authorities, which creates legal uncertainty.

Existing denominational burial grounds are derogations from common law

Muslim cemeteries and burial plots that are currently being developed uphold derogations to common law:

- the concordat system in the Alsace-Moselle region. The provisions guaranteeing **the neutrality of cemeteries are not relevant**: the law of 13 Prairial year XII still applies. Within the current article L. 2542-12 of the General Local Authorities Code (CGCT):
  - *"in communities where various religions are practised, each religion has its own burial space"*;
  - *"if there is only one cemetery, it is divided up by walls, hedges or ditches, into as many sections as there are religions, with a separate entrance for each, and in proportion to the number of inhabitants of each religion."*

    Since 2000, **non-recognised religions** - including Islam - can have **separate cemeteries or burial plots** (ministerial reply n° 38452 of 7 February 2000).

- Historical derogations
  - After theWorld War I , Muslim plots were created in cemeteries to bury **Muslim soldiers** who had fought during the war;
  - A **presidential decree** from 1934 created the **Muslim cemetery of Bobigny** for Muslims who had died in the Franco-Muslim hospital in Bobigny (now the Avicenne hospital), before access to the cemetery was extended to other Muslims in 1937. Since 1996, it has been managed by the Intercommunal Cemetery Syndicate of the towns of Aubervilliers, La Courneuve, Drancy and Bobigny, and is known as the La Courneuve Intercommunal Cemetery.

Public authorities also encourage local authorities to tolerate the development of Muslim burial grounds, creating a situation of legal uncertainty for mayors and cultural uncertainty for Muslims.

1975: memorandum from the Minister of the Interior[152]. Mayors are encouraged to *"set aside special burial spaces within existing cemeteries for French Muslims if it is requested of them, and every time that this is justified by the number of burials".* This measure was mainly aimed at **harkis** who could not at the time be buried in Algeria.

The memorandum issued by Pierre Joxe in 1991, after a consultation with the CORIF[153], broadened this measure to **all Muslims** residing in France, made it **possible to regroup graves in a reserved area** oriented towards Mecca (although this is prohibited by the principle of neutrality), and recommended *"accommodating the special requests of Muslim families with regard to religious or customary rites for funerals and for the burial of their deceased, subject to compliance with regulations".*

These memoranda create **no legal obligation** and **contradict current law**[154]. However, they create a **risk of legal uncertainty** for both mayors and families:

- since **the judge**, in accordance with the law, **does not recognise the existence of denominational burial grounds**[155] - it is not the mayor's role to define whether a person belongs to a particular community or not;

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152 memo n°75-603.
153 memo n°91-30.
154 *"The creation of denominational burial grounds within cemeteries is not sanctioned by law. However, in practice, denominational burial grounds are permitted and even encouraged by public authorities in order to respond to the requests of families, notably those of Muslim faith."* In the Council of State's Annual Report, 2004, p. 327.
155 Administrative Court of Grenoble, 1993, *Epoux Darmon.*

- since the **mayor alone controls the cemeteries**[156] and, by delegation of the municipal council[157], has **the power to designate plots for burial**. But in the case of existing burial grounds, the religious authority must confirm or deny the person's membership the religious community.

Legalising denominational burial grounds

A modification of the legislation in favour of Muslim burial grounds, and in parallel, the adjustment of Muslim religious customs, must form part of the common will of the Muslims of France and of the public authorities to create a French Islam.

It is conceivable to modify current legislation in **favour of the creation of Muslim burial grounds.** This could be done by amending the following CGCT articles[158]:

- art. L.2213-9 CGCT: addition of a paragraph stipulating that **mayors**, in their control of cemeteries, must **take into account _"the will expressed by the deceased persons_** _in relation to their beliefs"_;
- art. L.2223-13 CGCT relating to **the designation of burial plots**: addition of a provision allowing applicants' **religious beliefs to be taken into account.**

These legal changes, however, **require a degree of caution**, since **religious authorities must not** find themselves de facto in control of the cemetery and **managing the denominational burial grounds** in place of the local public authority.

- The mayor must have the final say in managing the cemetery as a public space. There is a **real risk of sectarian pressure**.
- This modification would not only concern the Muslim religion, but all forms of belief. In addition to these amendments, it will probably be necessary to draw up **a charter of good practices in order to avoid the emergence of unwelcome trends**.
- We will also have to **rely on jurisprudence**, on a case-by-case basis, when litigations arise.

The case of funerals and cemeteries

Nevertheless, the adjustment of Muslim religious customs to French law must be a necessary prerequisite to any modification of funeral law. This legislative evolution must be part of a dialogue between the public authorities and the CFCM. This is an opportunity to strengthen the legitimacy of the CFCM and, in turn, that of the nascent Muslim Theological Council. If public authorities subscribe to this "reasonable compromise", they must in turn require **that Muslim rites and dictates conform to French funeral law**.

With regard to interment and funeral rites, Sharia law and the Muslim _fiqh_ specify that:

- **burial takes place in direct contact with the earth** (sura 77, verse 25). This provision is contrary to Article R. 2213-15 of the CGCT, which, for reasons of public hygiene, requires coffins to be used. Thus, a way of reconciling this dictate with French law is to sprinkle a little earth at the bottom of the coffin;
- **the burial must take place as quickly as possible after death.** French law however insists upon a minimum 24-hour delay before burial can take place[159]. The medieval law scholar Ibn Hazm recalled that the Prophet was buried more than 24 hours after his death. It should therefore be possible for the CFCM to find a legal precedent which is compatible with current legislation;
- **the body of the deceased must be oriented towards the Kaaba in Mecca.** This requirement is generally accepted by public authorities, unless they are faced with problems of space management. This is a point which requires compromise on the part of Muslims, and for which it appears difficult to rely on Muslim jurisprudence;

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156 CGCT art. L.2213-9.
157 CGCT art. L-2122-22.
158 Recommendations made by the Machelon Commission in 2006.
159 art. R.2213-33 CGCT.

- **the graves of Muslims must be separated from those of non-Muslims.** The creation of cemeteries exclusively for Muslims is currently prohibited, and if the legal provisions are modified, Muslim jurisprudence should determine whether a Muslim section in a multi-denominational cemetery can be assimilated to a Muslim cemetery. This is a second point on which the CFCM - and its newly created Theological Council - must show its willingness to bring about the emergence of a French Islam by adapting Islamic norms to the French context;
- **the exhumation of bodies is prohibited by Muslim law**, whereas it is possible in French law. The fact that plots in cemeteries remain in the public domain means that public authorities have to exhume bodies and displace bones from ossuaries. This is a third point that must be accepted by Muslims. A compromise could be found by creating ossuaries solely for Muslims (which could be financed entirely or in part by the FIF).

Allowing associations to create unions in order to better share the resources of worshippers

To finance their places of worship, Muslim associations generally group together in the form of associative unions to enhance resource sharing. Sometimes local authorities also insist on having only a single spokesperson for all Muslim associations[160].

While article 20 of the law of 9 December 1905 provides for the creation of associative unions, these can only be formed between religious associations, and not between associations of the "1901 law" and "1905 law" type. However, a significant number of Muslim associations come under the 1901 law, for reasons which are both historic (liberalisation of the right to form associations in 1981) and practical (they often cover a religious and cultural sphere).

With this in mind, and in order to facilitate both the funding of places of worship and the emergence of a local and integrated Islam, it is necessary to modify articles 19 and 20 of the 1905 law to allow:

- the creation of associative unions between religious associations of the "1905 law" type (associations that fulfil a religious purpose and are governed by local law, like in Alsace-Moselle) and associations of the "1901 law" type;
- funding by associations which are members of these unions, in the form of direct contributions or membership fees, and without the need to wait until the end of the financial year to pay in their surplus revenue.

Allowing local authorities to guarantee a contracted loan for the construction of religious edifices

While public authorities, whether at the national or local level, should not be allowed to finance religious organisations in accordance with the 1905 law, a municipality should be able to guarantee a loan contracted by a religious association for the building of a place of worship.

This measure already exists, but it only applies to developing urban conglomerates: *"**A municipality** can guarantee" or "**departments** can guarantee loans contracted by local groups and religious associations to finance the construction of buildings within developing urban conglomerates which respond to collective and religious needs."*[161]

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160 Franck Frégosi*, op.cit*, 2006.
161 Articles L. 2252-4 and L. 3231-5 of the General Local Authorities Code (CGCT)

Guaranteeing a religious association's loan means that the municipality, after deliberating with its representative bodies, commits to substituting itself for the borrower if the latter defaults on its loans. The General Local Authorities Code nevertheless sets limits in terms of loan guarantees for municipalities. *"As such, a municipality or department cannot guarantee a loan for more than 50 % of the total sum of actual operating costs; a single borrower cannot benefit from a guarantee exceeding 10 % of the municipality's total guarantee capacity."[162]* In its 2004 public report on secularism, the Council of State noted that this guarantee on the part of local authorities helped religious associations and groupings of such associations to obtain bank loans. Furthermore, when local authorities guarantee loans, it helps to increase the financial transparency of religious associations and structures.

The possibility of guaranteeing bank loans for local religious associations and groups should therefore be expanded to include all local authorities, and not only those in developing urban conglomerates. Moreover, considering the current tendency for municipalities to group together into larger administrative units, public establishments for cooperation between local authorities ("*établissements publics de coopération intercommunale*" - EPCI) should also be authorised to guarantee loans.

Allow local urban planning programmes to indicate spaces reserved for the construction of places of worship

The construction of a Muslim religious building can generate tensions within a community, as shown in studies by Franck Frégosi[163] and Aude-Claire Fourot[164]. Muslim associations have faced *"decades of mistrust and sometimes outright refusals"* in their attempts to build mosques or purchase property. Many polemics and fears surround such projects, notably *"fearing that property prices in the area will fall, anticipating a lack of parking spaces or increased traffic, [...] fearing religious radicalism and proselytism"[165]*, etc. Responding to such tensions and fears, some municipalities pre-empt construction land in order to stop the building of a religious edifice (even though article L. 2122-22 of the CGCT states that the right to pre-empt can only be justified by the collective interest).

This is why municipalities and public establishments for cooperation between local authorities (EPCI) should be able to include areas for the construction of places of worship in their urban planning programmes. By allowing time for reflection and debate on this topic before construction requests even come in, this measure would help to ease the tensions generated within a community by such projects. It would also protect the interests of both local elected officials and associations wishing to build a religious structure. The former would have a means of controlling the religious influence within the urban environment, and the latter would see their requests being granted due consideration.

For this evolution to occur, article L. 123-1-5 of the Urban Planning Code must be modified to include "places of worship" in urban planning programmes.

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162 CGCT L.2252-1 ; Sénat, *De l'Islam en France à un Islam de France, établir la transparence et lever les ambiguïtés*, *Rapport d'information* by Nathalie Goulet and André Reichardt, n°757 (2015-2016), 5 July 2016, p.83.
163 Franck Frégosi, "Les mosquées dans la République. Quelle régulation locale du culte musulman ?", *Confluences Méditerranée* 2006/2 (n°57).
164 Aude-Claire Fourot, "Instruments d'action publique et régulation municipale de l'islam. Le cas de la mosquée de Créteil", *Gouvernement et action publique,* 2015/3 (n°3).
165 *Ibid*, p.90.

vii. Appointing a Secretary of State in charge of secularism and religious affairs reporting to the Prime Minister

Proposal: to create a Secretary of State for Religious and Secular Affairs, reporting to the Prime Minister and mainly operating through the Central Bureau of Religious Affairs. Breaking away from the authority of the Minister of the Interior, this body would be responsible for implementing the recommendations in this report.

The principal missions of the Secretary of State for Religious and Secular Affairs would be:

- to send a strong, interministerial political signal, by removing the link between religious affairs and security measures, a result of the current system in which the Bureau of Religious Affairs is under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior;
- to provide a response to the fractured administration of the Imamah, to the issuance of visas to foreign Imams, the instruction of chaplains, the creation of a French Institute of Chaplains, and the control over religious associations;
- to decrease the likelihood of religious authorities, and more particularly Muslim ones, being considered subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior;
- to liaise between public authorities, the old-age and health insurance provider for religious groups (CAVIMAC), and religious groups themselves;
- to promote interministerial relations with different religious groups;
- to ensure the application of the 1905 law regarding the neutrality of public services, recognising no religion and treating all faiths equally;
- to enforce administrative control over religious organisations;
- to maintain regular and constructive relations with religious authorities and associations in each department;
- to appoint a delegate to religious and secular affairs in each departmental or regional prefecture.

Beyond the work done through the Bureau of Religious Affairs, the following measures will also be necessary:

- to create an International Department of Religious Affairs, whose mission would be to develop relations between France and the foreign countries that send over religious officials;
- to create an Inspecting Body for religious and secular affairs;
- to place the Bureau of Religious Affairs of the Alsace-Moselle region under the auspices of the Secretary of State for Religious and Secular Affairs;
- to only grant visas to foreign imams who pass a test on French Islam (TIF), created by the CFCM and administered by the Secretary of State. Moreover, an advanced level of French would be required for the visa to be granted.

The creation of this new Secretary of State for Religious and Secular Affairs will not resolve the multiple questions raised by the current state of relations between the State and different faiths, but it will help to gain a better understanding, and will have the advantage of offering something other than the current security measures.

viii.   Developing an understanding of Islam

Expanding religious statistics

Proposal: to better understand and assess the situation through statistics on religion. Today, the French resistance to religious censuses and the estimates of religious affiliation that are exclusively based on surveys or the *Trajectories and Origins* study (by the National institute for demographic studies), do not allow us to closely track the evolution of religious communities within the population.

How many Muslims are there in France?

In order to answer this question, we need to be able to apply statistical analysis. In fact, as highlighted by Édouard Geffray, Secretary-General of the National Commission on Information Technology and Civil Liberties (Cnil), *"information is both a poison and a remedy. Hence the importance of controlling how it is collected and used."*[166]

The French resistance to religious censuses and the estimates of religious affiliation that are exclusively based on surveys or the *Trajectories and Origins* study (which took seven years to be fully published), do not allow us to closely track the evolution of religious communities within the population.

Furthermore, public debate is constantly **dominated by the confusion between ethnicity statistics, based on ethno-racial criteria, and religious statistics, based on a personal identification with a religion, or at least the expression of a proximity to a particular religion**.

Developing religious statistics on the basis of voluntary contributions

In order to escape from such polemics and from the ambiguous nature of ethnicity statistics, the latter must be removed from the discussion and replaced by religious statistics based on voluntary contributions. In order to achieve this, there is no need to modify the legal framework provided by the Information Technology and Civil Liberties Law of 6 January 1978, which limits the collection of personal data regarding religious affiliation.

This recommendation is founded on a triple objective:

- to fight against religious discrimination by measuring and surveying religious groups in France. **This forms part of a scientific objective;**
- to collect information in order to gain a rational understanding and move beyond the resistance to religious statistics. **This forms part of a demystification objective;**
- to gain a wider insight (while protecting individual anonymity) into religious groupings, allowing us to determine the most relevant geographic area for a public survey of religious affiliation, **with efficiency and pragmatism in mind**.

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166 During his audition before the Senate, on 17 May 2016, in the context of an information report for the Senate on the organisation, place and funding of Islam in France.

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Develop a history manual

Proposal: to develop a shared school history textbook in collaboration with Italy, Spain, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, in order to give a historical perspective to the mutual contributions and the religious and cultural convergences across the Mediterranean.

For this project, a historical commission could be formed to develop a shared history manual. This textbook would have a three-fold purpose:

- to create a shared foundation of objective historical knowledge reaching across the Mediterranean;
- to create a sense of participation in a shared historical narrative and to provide a common cultural and geographic perspective for future schoolchildren;
- to do away with delusions of victimisation, on the one part, and of a civilisation superiority complex, on the other.

This approach offers a number of advantages and opportunities:

- such a textbook will act as a strong symbol **of the shared history and destiny of Christians, Muslims and Jews** in the Mediterranean region and, in time, will help to reduce tensions created by issues of religion and identity which result from a lack of understanding of this shared history;
- the process of creating and using this textbook will promote **educational and intellectual exchanges** between these countries;
- finally, this school book can help to **reduce the retro-colonial sentiment**, which sometimes develops among children born in France who have never known the Maghreb region, and more broadly to **provide all French schoolchildren with greater understanding**.

The risks and disadvantages of this measure are minimal:

- collectively developing a textbook between six countries will not remove the **risk of ideological tensions** regarding certain divisive historical events, even though the goal is to minimise them;
- **the main risk of this project is a limited circulation of the textbook** within the schools of participating countries.

ix. A further option (studied but not recommended in this report): updating the 1905 law in order to include new religions

The law of 9 December 1905 was created to control a "stock" rather than a "flow" of religious practices. Indeed, aside from the separation of the Churches and the State and the resulting non-recognition of religions by the State, this law regulates the use of places of worship belonging to public authorities by the religions established in France at that time - with the Catholic Church leading the way.

Under the 1905 law, the State can have no role in the organisation of new religions. The provisions regarding the recognition of a religion by the State impeded the latter from controlling and organising new religions. The State is no longer in charge of any religious organisation, let alone of any new places of worship created after 1905.
While this system guarantees absolute State neutrality in the religious sphere and gives French citizens a full freedom to believe or not to believe, it also presupposes that religions are self-regulating. The 1905 law works perfectly well for religions established in France for many centuries, but is relatively inefficient when it comes to regulating relations with new religion which, for both organic and material reasons, have difficulty structuring themselves.

With this in mind, and without abandoning the philosophy behind the 1905 law, an update could be envisaged. It is neither a question of creating special rules for a particular religion, nor of suspending this law for a set period of time. Rather, the places of worship built since 1905 would be integrated into the public domain, much like what the legislature called for in 1905.

Advantages and opportunities

There are a number of advantages to this approach, with the first being the ratchet effect it would produce. In fact, by integrating all religious buildings constructed after the 1905 law into the public domain, public authorities would give these new religions a similar legal status to that of recognised religions.

This would notably be the case for designated religious representatives. A religious leader would thus be clearly identified. Since he participates in the management of the religious space, he must be given a specific legal status. Yet this kind of officially recognised status is currently missing in French Islam; from a legal perspective, one is "acting" as imam rather than "being" an imam. In consequence, French Islam would be better equipped to structure itself if public authorities could interact with a clearly identified and legally recognised religious representative.

Moreover, this would give public authorities power to monitor the use of these religious spaces, so that, while they could not influence theological leanings, they would have a better idea of what religious rhetoric and orientation was being advocated. It would be a means of contributing to the organisation of the Muslim religion in France without disregarding the rules of secularism.

Risks and difficulties

This measure nevertheless represents a number of difficulties when it comes to its implementation. The first is deciding which religious buildings should be integrated into the public domain. This question concerns both the religions that would be encompassed by this measure and the places of worship concerned.

Since the State must maintain its neutrality towards religions (an inherent part of the principle of non-recognition of religions), all buildings belonging to religious associations, and which are mainly used for religious purposes, must be included in the system of public ownership. Considering the very broad definition of religion used in jurisprudence, this measure would concern a considerable number of spaces and present a real danger to public finances. An alternative solution, certainly less costly but which would not involve all religions - and by extension religious spaces -, would be to offer the religious associations that wished to do so, the possibility of conceding the religious buildings that they own to public authorities. If the latter were to purchase a significant portion of religious patrimony built after the 1905 law, this would certainly facilitate the organisation and management of new religions.

An integration of religious structures into the public domain could be achieved in two ways:

- by encouraging bequests of religious structures;
- by purchasing religious structures that come up for sale at market price. For some religious structures, this second option would mark an early end to their emphyteutic lease. The legal termination of the lease must result in compensation for the lessee.

Furthermore, implementing an update of the 1905 law would involve creating a detailed inventory of religious real estate, in order to distinguish between that which will remain the property of the association, and that which will become State property. This inventory would also present an opportunity for public authorities to launch a large-scale audit of religious associations in order to gain a greater transparency in this area.

Cost of this measure

The potential cost of this measure is difficult to estimate since we do not have access to a detailed list of religious spaces or a precise estimate of the proportion that would be likely to come under public domain.

If we base ourselves on the information gathered by the Senate for its 2015 report on the funding of religious spaces, we see that an update of the 1905 law would concern a little under 10,000 religious structures, with a breakdown as follows:

- Catholic religion: 2,500 structures built since 1905;
- Protestant religion: 3,520 structures which are not the property of the State, out of the 4,000 listed properties;
- Jewish religion: around 600 synagogues, of which 580 are not public property;
- Orthodox religion: around 130 religious spaces self-financed by their worshippers;
- Muslim religion: 2,450 religious spaces across all of France, of which two thirds have a surface area of roughly 150 m².

Aside from the financial issues inherent to this measure in the context of a tight public budget, potential pushback should also be considered. Indeed, an update of the 1905 law risks being blocked by both the defenders of a strict implementation of this law, and religious associations unwilling to lose control of their property. Furthermore, creating such an inventory could provoke public unrest, much like in 1906, with some worshippers refusing to allow officials from the Ministry of the Interior or magistrates from the Court of Auditors to access their religious spaces in order to register existing property.

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Un islam français est possible

Le fondamentalisme se diffuse sur notre territoire alors que s'exacerbent les polémiques autour de l'inscription des signes d'appartenance islamique dans l'espace public, suscitant crispations et angoisses. Ces peurs sont renforcées par une méconnaissance générale des musulmans, de leurs aspirations et de leurs pratiques religieuses.

C'est pour y répondre que l'Institut Montaigne a conduit dans le cadre de ce rapport une vaste enquête qui permet d'en dresser le premier portrait. Il s'agit ainsi de répondre par la connaissance aux défis que les événements de 2015 et de 2016 ont fait naître et d'éclairer les débats à venir d'éléments objectifs.

Ce travail le confirme, construire un islam français est possible. Mais son organisation, son financement, ses liens avec l'État ainsi qu'avec les pays dits « d'origine » doivent se transformer. Huit propositions pour engager ce mouvement.