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Terrorists or national heroes? Politics and perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine[☆]



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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes controversies and public attitudes concerning the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine. The research question is: Which factors affect attitudes toward the OUN-B, the UPA and Bandera in contemporary Ukraine? This article employs comparative and regression analyses of surveys commissioned by the author and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2009 and 2013 to determine the effects of regional and other factors on attitudes toward these organizations and the OUN-B leader. The study shows that regional factors and perceptions of these organizations' involvement in mass murder were the strongest predictors of the views concerning the OUN-B, the UPA and Bandera. Their public support is strongest in Galicia and weakest in the East and the South, in particular, in Donbas and Crimea, two major conflict areas since the "Euromaidan."

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1. Research question and hypotheses

The policies, attitudes, definitions, and commemorations of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and their leaders and members have exposed significant political divisions in Ukraine since its independence in 1991. They have become the ones among other central issues in Ukrainian politics since the "Orange Revolution" and the "Euromaidan." (Katchanovski, 2014; Marples, 2007, 2010, 2015; Narvselius, 2012; Shevel, 2011). This is one of the first academic studies of the determinants of public attitudes toward the OUN, the UPA, and Stepan Bandera.

After he became the president of Ukraine as a result of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004, Viktor Yushchenko and various nationalist parties in the Orange coalition governments pursued policies of political rehabilitation and heroization of the OUN and the UPA. Yushchenko posthumously awarded the "Hero of Ukraine" title to Bandera, the leader of the main faction of the OUN (OUN-B), and to Roman Shukhevych, the supreme commander of the UPA. In contrast, Viktor Yanukovich, his Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and many other pro-Russian and pro-Communist parties and politicians opposed such policies.

The Yanukovich government after he was elected as the president of Ukraine in 2010 abandoned his predecessor's policies concerning the OUN and the UPA at the national level. The Donetsk Administrative Court in Eastern Ukraine annulled Yushchenko's decrees that awarded the "Hero of Ukraine" title to Bandera and Shukhevych on the grounds that they were not citizens of Ukraine. However, the policies regarding the commemoration of leaders and members of these organizations as

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national heroes continued to be pursued at regional levels in Western Ukraine, especially in Galicia, after the radical nationalist party Svoboda won local elections there, and in Volhynia. Regional and local governments there sponsored monuments to OUN and UPA leaders and renamed streets after them. Many national newspapers, such as *Den*, *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, *Ukrainska Pravda*, and *Ukraina Moloda* along with television (TV) channels, such as TVi and the 5th Channel, as well as regional mass media in Western Ukraine actively promoted historical revisionism and the political rehabilitation and heroization of the OUN and the UPA. Mass media, owned by the government or pro-Yanukovych oligarchs, such as the First National Channel, Inter, and Ukraina TV channels, also frequently disseminated such narratives.

Although the minister of education in the Yanukovych government expressed strong anti-OUN and -UPA views, the history education concerning these organizations and their leaders differed significantly from region to region during the Yanukovych presidency. An interview-based study conducted at that time showed that history teachers in Western Ukraine generally promoted a nationalist perspective concerning the OUN, the UPA, and their leaders, while teachers in Crimea tended to present these organizations and their leaders as Nazi collaborators and mass murders (Korostelina, 2013). There were similar patterns of regional differences in education, mass media coverage, and local government policies on these issues since Ukraine's independence in 1991 during the Kravchuk, Kuchma, and Yushchenko presidencies. In contrast, the "Euromaidan" governments attempted to radically change this pattern and to promote the nationalist narrative in all regions under their control via history education, historical memory, and mass media policies. These policies included specific guidelines disseminated by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory and the Ministry of Education and a 2015 law, which declared the OUN and the UPA as fighters for Ukrainian independence and stipulated that public disrespect toward them and public denial of the legitimacy of their fight for independence of Ukraine would be illegal.

Svoboda, the Right Sector, and several less influential far-right organizations presented themselves as ideological successors of the OUN and the UPA. While these far-right organizations were in a minority among the "Euromaidan" leadership and participants, they played a key role in the violent overthrow of the Yanukovych government in February 2014 (Katchanovski, 2015). The Right Sector, the Social National Assembly, Svoboda, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists formed battalions and other paramilitary formations under their own command or under the formal command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and these units played a significant role in the civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine.

Leaders of the "Euromaidan" and the subsequent Maidan governments brought the "Glory to Ukraine. Glory to Heroes" slogan of the OUN-B and UPA into mainstream use. President Petro Poroshenko declared October 14 as day to honor the defenders of Ukraine; this day has been marked by the OUN-B, UPA, and contemporary far right organizations as the date of the UPA's founding. A law, which declared the OUN and UPA to be fighters for Ukrainian independence and made it illegal for Ukrainian citizens or foreigners to express public disrespect to members of these organizations was proposed by Yuri Shukhevych, son of a UPA supreme commander, and it was adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in April 2015 (Marples, 2015).

The issue of the politics of the OUN and the UPA is relevant not only to Ukraine but also to other countries. The Simon Wiesenthal Center, a leading United States (US)-based Jewish organization, expressed its "deepest revulsion at the recent honor awarded to Stepan Bandera, who collaborated with the Nazis in the early stages of World War II, and whose followers were linked to the murders of thousands of Jews and others" (Wiesenthal, 2010). The European Parliament in its resolution of February 25, 2010, concerning the situation in Ukraine stated that it "deeply deplores the decision by the outgoing President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, posthumously to award Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) which collaborated with Nazi Germany, the title of 'National Hero of Ukraine'; hopes, in this regard, that the new Ukrainian leadership will reconsider such decisions and will maintain its commitment to European values" (European, 2010).

In spite of their differences on many other issues, the leaders of Poland and Russia and many other politicians, especially before the "Euromaidan," expressed similar stance concerning the OUN and the UPA and opposed the political and historical revisionism concerning these organizations and Yushchenko's awarding of the title of "Hero of Ukraine" to Bandera. They pointed out the OUN's collaboration with Nazi Germany and the OUN's involvement in mass murder. For example, the Polish Senate declared the anti-Polish actions of the UPA and the OUN during World War II to be ethnic cleansing with "elements of genocide" (Sejm, 2010).

Leading Russian politicians and the Russian media exaggerated the involvement of the OUN and UPA's ideological successors among the far right organizations during the "Euromaidan" and the conflict in Donbas, claiming that a "fascist coup" took place in Ukraine. The Russian government and separatist leaders used such claims to justify the secession and the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 with the help of Russian military intervention there. Leaders of Russian-supported separatists in Donbas made similar claims and adopted the Saint George's Ribbon, a Russian World War II symbol, to argue that they fought the "fascist" regime. In contrast, the Western governments and the media generally minimized or ignored OUN- and UPA-related issues during the "Euromaidan" and the conflict in Donbas.

This study analyzes attitudes concerning the OUN-B, the UPA, and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine. The research question is: Which factors determine attitudes concerning the OUN, the UPA, and Bandera in Ukraine? This first section of the article reviews previous studies and examines contemporary controversies regarding these organizations. It provides a framework for the analysis of public attitudes toward the OUN-B and the UPA. The study focuses on the OUN-B because it was historically more influential than was the Andrii Melnyk faction (OUN-M), in particular, by organizing the UPA, and because the policies of the heroization of the OUN in Ukraine primarily concerned the Bandera faction.

The main research hypothesis is that regional factors are major determinants of views concerning these organizations. Because the OUN and the UPA were regional organizations that were based primarily in Galicia in the 1930s and the 1940s, public support for these organizations is likely to be strongest in this region. Support for the OUN and the UPA is also likely to

be much higher in other regions of Western Ukraine than in the regions of historically Eastern Ukraine. Previous studies show that a pro-nationalist political culture became dominant in Western Ukrainian regions, which experienced Polish, Czechoslovak, and Romanian rule between World War I and World War II. Western Ukraine came under Soviet rule as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and World War II; this is in contrast with historically Eastern Ukraine, which experienced much longer periods of Russian and Soviet rule. Western regions, with the exception of Volhynia, were under Austro-Hungarian Empire rule before World War I. Due to differences in historical experience in the 19th and the first half of 20th century, nationalist values are stronger in Galicia compared with in the historical Western Ukrainian regions of Bukovyna, Transcarpathia, and Volhynia. Galicia, which includes Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil Regions, was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy until World War I and then a part of Poland until incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1939. Bukovyna (Chernivtsi Region) and Transcarpathia (Transcarpathian Region) also were under Austro-Hungarian rule till World War I, but Bukovyna then became a part of Romania until World War II, while Transcarpathia became a part of Czechoslovakia. Like Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine, Volhynia, which includes Rivne and Volyn Regions, belonged to the Russian Empire before World War I. While Central, Eastern, and Southern Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union as a result of the communist victory in the civil war after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Volhynia belonged to Poland until incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1939.¹ There are also historical and cultural differences among Central, Eastern, and Southern Ukraine as well as within these regions, such as Crimea and Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk Regions). For example, Crimea, which included until its secession and annexation by Russia in 2014 the Crimean Autonomous Republic and Sevastopol City, was transferred from Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 (Birch, 2000; Katchanovski, 2006).

The article also tests the research hypotheses that ethnicity, language, and age have significant effects on the public views of the OUN-B and the UPA in contemporary Ukraine. Ethnic Ukrainians, Ukrainian-speakers, and younger respondents, who were socialized in Ukraine since its independence in 1991, are likely to be more supportive of these organizations compared with the ethnic Russians and other ethnic minorities, Russian-speakers, and older respondents who were socialized in Soviet Ukraine, respectively.

This study uses data from two national surveys that were designed and commissioned by the author and conducted in Ukraine by the KIIS in June 2009 and September 2013. The first survey conducted in “Orange” Ukraine includes questions concerning general attitudes toward the OUN-B, the UPA, and the involvement of the OUN and UPA in the mass murder of the Polish, Jewish, and Ukrainian populations. The survey question focused on perceptions of the involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA in the mass murder of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, because these groups were predominant among victims among the civilian population. The UPA and the Security Service of the OUN-B and the UPA were also involved in direct killings or Nazi-led mass murder of significant populations of other groups, primarily Russians. However, ethnic Russians were not a significant and compactly settled minority in the areas of Western Ukraine, and the victims among Russians included, primarily, military and NKVD personnel and Soviet and Communist Party activists.

The 2013 KIIS survey, which was conducted during the Yanukovich government shortly before the “Euromaidan,” queries attitudes towards Bandera. The study employs comparative and multiple regression analysis of these surveys to determine the effects of region, ethnicity, language, and age on public attitudes toward the OUN-B, the UPA, and Bandera.

2. The OUN and the UPA: previous studies and controversies

Previous studies of the OUN and the UPA often embrace differing views of these organizations. However, a rapidly growing body of academic research exists in the West on the OUN and the UPA and their involvement in the mass murder of Jews, Poles, and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainians and Russians (Berkhoff and Carynyk, 1999; Himka, 2011a, 2011b, 2009; Katchanovski, 2013; Kudelia, 2013; Marples, 2010, 2007, 2006; Rudling, 2011, 2006; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2011, 2014; Shevel, 2011). However, these studies mostly focus on historical issues or historical memory issues concerning these organizations, and they do not specifically examine public attitudes toward the OUN and the UPA.

Research on the OUN and the UPA in the Soviet Union was restricted, censored, and often driven by the communist ideology, which depicted these organizations as “bourgeois nationalists” and as close allies of Nazi Germany. For similar reasons, the issue of the OUN-UPA’s involvement in the genocide of Jews and the ethnic cleansing of Poles was largely ignored in the Soviet Union. Pro-Communist and pro-Russian politicians and historians in independent Ukraine largely abandoned the Soviet descriptions of the OUN and the UPA as “bourgeois,” but they continue to emphasize the collaboration of the OUN and the UPA with Nazi Germany (Voitsekhevsky et al., 2006). Many of them adopted views that the UPA’s mass murder of Poles constituted a genocide (Nakonechny, 2006).

A nationalist narrative or perspective concerning the OUN and the UPA became dominant in the Ukrainian diaspora after many leaders and members of these organizations received refuge in Western countries following the end of World War II. Nationalist politicians, such as President Yushchenko, adopted and promoted such uncritical historical approaches in their policy of the political rehabilitation and heroization of the OUN and the UPA. For example, Ihor Yukhnovsky, the first director of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, which was created by Yushchenko with the status of a central government agency, stated that “a return of Stepan Bandera’s good name on the whole territory of Ukraine” was the main task of this

¹ A small part of Volhynia was included into the Ternopil Region after their incorporation into the Soviet Union.

government institute (Stepan Bandera, 2009, 10). Many Ukrainian historians, such as Volodymyr Viatrovych, employed a similar narrative, which they primarily disseminated in mass media or non-refereed publications. Viatrovych was especially influential in promoting such views in the Ukrainian government and the media as the head of the Center for the Studies of the Liberation Movement in Lviv in Western Ukraine, the director of the State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine during the Yushchenko's presidency, and the director of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory since the "Euromaidan."

The nationalist politicians and historians in Ukraine presented the OUN and the UPA as part of a Ukrainian national liberation movement, which started in Western Ukraine with broad popular support and extended to many other regions of Ukraine. They argued that the OUN-B was forced to collaborate with Nazi Germany, not for ideological reasons but because it was in the interest of the pro-independence struggle, and they argued that this collaboration effectively ended after the Nazi leadership refused to accept OUN-B's leaders' declaration of the Ukrainian state in Lviv on June 30, 1941. These politicians and historians emphasized that many OUN-B leaders and ordinary members, including Bandera, were arrested, imprisoned in concentration camps, or executed at the hands of the Nazis. They presented the UPA as a large guerrilla force that included not only ethnic Ukrainians but also a significant number of minorities, such as Jews, Georgians, and Tatars, and who successfully fought against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (Ukrainska, 2008).

For instance, Yushchenko claimed that half a million Ukrainians fought in the UPA in 1943 (Serwetnyk, 2010). However, the analysis of UPA documents indicates that the maximal membership of the UPA reached about 20–23 thousands in 1944 and most of them were Ukrainians from Galicia (Katchanovski, 2014). Although some of its smaller units and commanders fought until the mid-1950s, the UPA was largely decimated by 1948 by the Soviet security forces, which also arrested and exiled large numbers of Western Ukrainians because they were wrongly accused of being members of the OUN and the UPA or because their family members were in these organizations.

Similarly, a report from Ivan Klymiv, who headed the OUN-B in Western Ukraine, to Bandera puts the membership of this organization in Ukraine at about 20,000 during the period of its maximum influence in July 1941. The absolute majority of the OUN-B members were in Galicia (up to 14,700), and the remainder were based mostly in Volhynia (up to 5000) and Bukovyna (up to 500). In contrast, the OUN-B membership in other regions of Ukraine was small. It consisted, to a large extent, of members from its marching groups, which Galicians dominated. The marching groups were mobile groups of OUN members sent by the OUN from the occupied Poland to establish national and local administration and the police in Ukraine and assist the German advance into the Soviet Union in summer of 1941. Although the OUN-B initially established the UPA in Volhynia, most of the UPA's leaders and members were from Galicia. An analysis of 119 biographies of leaders of the OUN-B and the UPA in Ukraine shows that 71% of them were from Galicia, 20% were from Volhynia, 1% was from Bukovyna, and 6% were from other regions of Ukraine (calculated from Sodal, 1994).²

The nationalist narrative depicts the UPA as a guerrilla army that fought primarily against Soviet and German police and military forces as well as Soviet and Polish partisans. Mass killings of Polish civilians were either ignored or were justified as retaliatory actions of the UPA for the pacification policy of the Polish government before World War II and for the murders of Ukrainian nationalists in the Chelm region. Similarly, killings of Ukrainian civilians were either dismissed as Soviet propaganda or were attributed to the "false flag" operations of the Soviet security forces that misrepresented themselves as UPA units. Similarly, the involvement of the OUN-B militia and police that later joined the UPA in the genocide of Jews is also ignored or justified in various ways (Ukrainska, 2008).

The analysis of the ideology and policy of the OUN, which split into the Bandera faction and the Melnyk faction in 1940—primarily due to tactical and leadership differences—shows that it was a semi-totalitarian organization that combined elements of extreme nationalism and fascism. For example, a greeting and a hand-salute that the OUN adopted and that the OUN-B endorsed with some modifications resembled those that other fascist parties used, such as Hitler's National-Socialist German Workers Party, Mussolini's National Fascist Party, and Pavelic's Ustasha. The same concerns Stepan Bandera's title of *providnyk*. (HDA SBU, Fond 13, Sprava 376, Vol. 4, 40; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2011, 2014).

Stepan Bandera was the leader of the main faction of the OUN after its split. German, Soviet, OUN-B, and U.S. sources provided evidence of collaboration between Bandera and Nazi Germany, primarily during the first two years of World War II. Such evidence includes his statements during a meeting with German representatives (OUN, 2006, 274–281). Bandera was arrested by the German security forces in July of 1941, but he was confined in relatively privileged conditions. He was released in 1944, along with some other OUN-B leaders, as the result of a deal between the OUN-B and German security agencies (Ukrainskie, 2012).

At the beginning of the Nazi-Soviet war in 1941, the OUN-B envisioned the creation of a quasi-independent Ukrainian state that was allied with Nazi Germany and run as a dictatorship under OUN leadership. This monoethnic state, which was similar in many ways to *Ustashi* Croatia, was supposed to include parts of modern day Russia, Poland, and Belarus. The OUN regarded as hostile such minorities in Ukraine, as Jews, Poles, and Russians (Berkhoff and Carynyk, 1999; Rudling, 2006, 2011; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2011, 2014). Although its official ideology abandoned many of its extreme elements since 1943, the OUN-B's actual policies did not change to the same extent. For example, the UPA in 1943 undertook an ethnic cleansing campaign against Poles in Volhynia.

² Non-OUN and non-UPA members of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, which was created in the middle of 1944 and played a ceremonial role, are excluded.

The UPA included some units that comprised non-Ukrainians, such as Georgians, Azeris, and Uzbeks. However, these units consisted mainly of former Soviet prisoners of war (POWs), whom Germans recruited in various police formations before they joined the UPA mostly for instrumental reasons. A very small number of Jews served in the UPA, primarily in such secondary capacities as doctors. Their presence was also motivated primarily by instrumental reasons, as they tried to escape the Nazi genocide while the UPA used them because it needed medical and other such services that the Ukrainians could not provide. Most of these minorities in the UPA were killed by the UPA or fled to the Soviet side. (Diukov, 2008; Himka, 2009).

Both the OUN and the UPA were terrorist organizations because their actions corresponded to academic definitions of terrorism as the use or a threat of the use of violence against civilians by organizations and other non-state actors in order to intimidate and to achieve political goals. The OUN relied on a campaign of the assassinations of Polish and Soviet officials as well as pro-Polish Ukrainians in the 1930s in order to advance its political goals. For example, Bandera and other leading members of the OUN, such as Mykola Lebed and Shukhevych, organized in 1934 an assassination of Bronislaw Pieracki, the Polish minister of internal affairs. Evidence of the involvement of the OUN in international terrorism also exists—for example, a reported Nazi-led plot to assassinate U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1940–1941 as well as OUN assistance in the assassination of the king of Yugoslavia and of the French foreign minister in 1934 (Case 800.20211/Matzejko, 1940–1944; Henry, 1940–1964; Sudoplatov, 1998/2003, 26).

The UPA also fits a definition of a terrorist organization because it relied on violence against civilians to induce terror and to achieve its political goals. The UPA, immediately after its creation in spring 1943, conducted a campaign of mass terror against the Polish minority in Volhynia with an aim of ethnic cleansing, and in 1944, it extended this campaign to Galicia. Many Polish historians estimate Polish civilian casualties in Volhynia to be 35,000–60,000 and classify the UPA's mass murder of Poles as genocide (Hrytsiuk, 2001, 262; Siemaszko and Siemaszko, 2000). However, the higher-end estimates are inflated. They are based on the extrapolation of the casualties from the known locations of the killings of Poles to locations where information about the murders of Poles is lacking; the inclusion of victims of formations that were under German services, such as the Ukrainian police, the 31 SiPo Battalion, and even unidentified "Ukrainians" or pro-Soviet militia; or an assumption that the Polish population in the region was several times less likely to perish as a result of Nazi genocidal policies compared with the Ukrainian population of Volhynia.

The analysis of documented Polish casualties includes those from unspecified locations but excludes casualties that are not linked to the actions of the UPA, and it adjusts the demographic changes of the Polish population for excessive deaths and other losses that are linked to German genocidal policies and to the number of Poles drafted into the Polish Army in 1944–45. This type of analysis produces a more reliable estimate of approximately 35,000 Polish casualties of the UPA, including the Security Service of the OUN-B, in Volhynia (estimated from Hrytsiuk, 2001; Siemaszko and Siemaszko, 2000). This estimate is close to data that concerns Polish casualties of the UPA from UPA and Soviet sources. For example, the Siemaszko's estimate of 20,000 documented Polish casualties of the UPA and the Ukrainian police in the Volyn Region in Volhynia in 1943, after making similar adjustments, is close to the number of 15,000 Poles whom the UPA murdered in the Volyn Region according to the testimony of Yuri Stelmashchuk, who commanded the UPA in this region (Delo, 1945, 89; Siemaszko and Siemaszko, 2000, 1045).

The UPA's mass murder of Poles in Volhynia did not constitute a genocide but rather constituted an ethnic cleansing. No evidence of the UPA's intent to eliminate the entire Polish nation or a significant part of it exists. A UPA order in 1943 to conduct the mass murder of Poles in Volhynia did exist, but this action was mostly limited to Polish settlements in rural parts of this relatively small region of Ukraine, and it led to the exodus of a greater number of Poles to Poland as well as to towns and self-defended Polish settlements in Volhynia (Delo, 1945, 95; Protokol, 1945). Although the UPA killed a significant proportion (at least 10%) of ethnic Poles in Volhynia, the Polish casualties comprised about 1% of the pre-war population of Poles in territories where the UPA was active, and it comprised 0.2% of the entire ethnically Polish population in Ukraine and Poland.

The UPA mounted an anti-Soviet terror campaign in Western Ukraine. KGB data put the Soviet casualties of the OUN-UPA in 1944–1953 at 22,000 civilians, compared with about 8000 members of military, security, police, and paramilitary forces. Most of the civilian casualties were pro-Soviet local Ukrainians, Soviet and Communist Party officials, and intelligentsia, many of whom came from historically Eastern Ukraine (Politychnyi, 2002, 771).

Historical studies show that many representatives of the OUN and a significant proportion of the UPA members were involved in the Nazi genocide. The Nazi genocidal policy was responsible for the deaths of about 7 million people, including 1.5 million Jews, who perished in Ukraine during World War II (Brandon and Lower, 2008; Katchanovski, 2010, 2014; Vallin et al., 2002). In Volhynia, Jews accounted for more than 200,000 out of the estimated 400,000–500,000 victims among the local population and Soviet POWs (Hrytsiuk, 2001). The OUN-B and the OUN-M established a local police and administration in many regions of Ukraine, particularly in the West, following the German occupation of Ukraine in 1941. Although the German authorities reorganized the police into auxiliary police in the fall of 1941, the OUN continued to maintain a substantial presence and informal control over many units of the auxiliary police, especially in Volhynia and Galicia.

The majority of policemen in Volhynia abandoned their positions on the orders of the OUN-B, and they provided a foundation for the UPA creation in the spring of 1943. The former policemen, who joined the UPA, along with former members of auxiliary police units whom the OUN-M and Taras Borovets controlled and who were incorporated into the UPA, constituted the majority of the UPA members until at least the beginning of 1944. At least half of the top commanders of the UPA were former police commanders in Nazi-occupied Ukraine (Katchanovski, 2013).

The local police helped to implement the Nazi genocides of Jews, Ukrainians, Russians, Belarusians, and Poles by assisting in mass executions and in other policies that aimed to physically eliminate the entire Jewish population and significant parts

of the Ukrainian, Russian, Belarusian, and Polish populations. Local Ukrainian police commanders and members assisted Nazi executioners in implementing the Nazi genocidal policy by rounding Jews and guarding them during mass executions, catching escapees, and guarding Jewish ghettos. Similarly, the local police was used in guarding and capturing Soviet POWs, most of whom were ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, and in mass killings of Ukrainians and other civilians—for example, about 3000 residents of the village of Kortelisy in September 1942 (Berkhoff, 2004; Brandon and Lower, 2008; Katchanovski, 2013).

The OUN-B also helped to organize anti-Jewish pogroms in a significant number of Western Ukrainian towns and cities in the summer of 1941, specifically in Lviv (see Himka, 2011a). However, mass executions of Jews—which the OUN-led militia carried out on German orders, which often coincided with or followed these pogroms, and which are often described as pogroms, for instance, in Lviv, Kremianets, Ternopil, Zolochiv, and Zboriv—were parts of German genocidal policy. In addition, the UPA itself killed at least a thousand Jews who survived the Nazi genocide (Himka, 2009).

The nationalist narrative often commemorates October 14, 1942, as the date of creation of the UPA in order to emphasize its anti-Nazi activity. However, historical studies and archival documents show that the OUN-B created the UPA in Volhynia in the spring of 1943 after the turn of the war, which was brought about by a defeat of the German army and its allies in the battle of Stalingrad, and which happened after Soviet partisan units moved to Volhynia from Eastern Ukraine. Even though Galicia was the main stronghold of the OUN-B, the UPA was fully organized there by the spring and summer of 1944, shortly before this region fell under Soviet control.

The nationalist narrative often inflates the German losses from the UPA. Casualty numbers, which are reported in the OUN and the UPA documents for individual battles and skirmishes against German forces and which many historians uncritically repeat, are generally not corroborated by other sources or significantly inflated because the corresponding casualties of the UPA are given as being several dozen times lower (Litopys, 1995–2012). The UPA carried a certain number of military actions against German police and military forces, their allies, and Polish and other collaborators. The analysis of German, Polish, OUN-UPA and Soviet sources concerning specific UPA clashes indicates that the overall losses that the UPA inflicted on the Axis forces totaled several hundred men killed, primarily members of various police formations, including formations created from Poles and Soviet POWs. Similarly, reports concerning a UPA unit's killing of General Viktor Lutze in Volhynia in 1943 are falsified because German sources list a car accident in Germany as the cause of his death (Motyka, 2006, 202–203).

The OUN-B collaborated with the intelligence and security agencies of Nazi Germany and Wehrmacht in intelligence-gathering and sabotage activities against the Soviet Union and in the creation of local militia and administrations in occupied Ukraine until the German side suspended this collaboration at the end of summer and in the early fall of 1941. A large number of OUN leaders were arrested, but the German authorities released most of them. Since the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, the OUN-B and the UPA leaders resumed a secret collaboration with Nazi Germany that was directed against the Red Army and the Soviet partisans (Litopys, 1997, 180–236; OUN, 2006; Sbornik, 1962; Ukrainskie, 2012). The biographic analysis indicates that at least 63% of the top OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine, including at least 74% of the top UPA commanders, collaborated, primarily in 1939–1941, with Nazi Germany and its allies (Calculated from Sodol, 1994, and other sources).

The nationalist perspective typically equates the OUN and the UPA with Ukrainians. For instance, the UPA's ethnic cleansing of the Poles is often presented as a conflict between local Ukrainian and Polish populations that stemmed from Polish “pacification” and discrimination policies against Ukrainians before the war. Similarly, Western Ukrainians are often regarded as pro-OUN and UPA because these organizations in the 1940s were mainly based in Western Ukrainian regions and because these regions became strongholds of nationalist parties and politicians in post-Soviet Ukraine—in particular, since the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan.”

Conversely, many previous studies explicitly or implicitly attribute the mass murder of Poles, Jewish pogroms, and involvement in the Nazi genocide of Jews to Ukrainians or the local Ukrainian population. Ukrainians are regarded as perpetrators of the mass murder or as supporters of the OUN, the UPA, and the Ukrainian auxiliary police (Siemaszko and Siemaszko, 2000; Spector, 1990). For instance, the Public Opinion Research Center poll found in 2008 that just 5% of Poles attribute “crimes” that were committed in Volhynia in 1943 to the UPA and Ukrainian nationalists, while 14% blame Ukrainians, and 19% erroneously single out Russians, the Soviet Union, Stalin, and NKVD as the perpetrators (Public, 2009).

The nationalist perspective viewing the leaders and members of the OUN-B and UPA as national heroes became the most prominent in “Orange” Ukraine and since the “Euromaidan.” In contrast, Western scholarship concerning these organizations and their activists is generally focused on issues of their involvement in the Nazi-led genocide of Jews, the ethnic cleansing of the Polish minority, and collaboration with Nazi Germany. For instance, a letter signed by 70 historians and political scientists, primarily from Western countries, cited these issues to voice their public opposition to the 2015 law (Marples, 2015). Various perspectives fall in between. For example, such approaches were expressed, primarily by a number of Ukrainian scholars, during public debates concerning Bandera and the 2015 law (Amar et al., 2011). However, either-or perspectives concerning the OUN-B and the UPA have been more prevalent in Ukraine (Shevel, 2011). The same concerns the West.

Academic studies of attitudes toward the OUN and the UPA are lacking. Polling companies in Ukraine conducted most previous surveys that included questions concerning the OUN and the UPA, but only selected results were published. Previous surveys often dealt with specific aspects, such as the recognition of UPA veterans.

The 2002 Institute of Politics Survey showed that a minority, 13% of the respondents in Ukraine, had very positive views of the UPA, while 20% had mostly positive views of the UPA. Conversely, 27% had very negative attitudes, and 16% had mostly negative attitudes. Similarly, 29% of the respondents in the 2002 Institute of Politics Survey, 20% in the 2004 Razumkov Center

Poll, and 24% in the 2006 Institute of Politics Survey expressed positive attitudes toward Bandera, while, respectively, 48%, 35%, and 44% had negative views of the OUN-B leader (Institute of Politics, 2009).

Yushchenko and other nationalist politicians cited results of a 2008 audience-voting for a popular TV show entitled *Greatest Ukrainians* as evidence of the rapidly growing popularity of the OUN-B and its leader after “the Orange Revolution.” However, these results were non-representative of the population of Ukraine because the TV voters were self-selected, and they had the ability to vote an unlimited number of times. In contrast, a 2007 KIIS poll showed that only 1% of Ukrainians regarded Bandera as the “greatest Ukrainian” (Kyiv, 2008).

The analysis of available polling reports indicates that, since the “Euromaidan,” public attitudes in Ukraine have become relatively more supportive toward the OUN, the UPA, and Bandera. The polls by the Lviv-based Rating show that 31% of the respondents expressed positive views of Bandera in April 2014, compared to 22% in 2012. The negative views of the OUN-B leader decreased from 58% to 48%. However, the 2014 survey did not include Crimea. (Rating, 2014). The Democratic Initiatives Foundation survey of December 2014 and January 2015 showed that 13% of the respondents perceived Bandera as one of the most positive historical leaders, but a higher percentage (20%) named him as one of the most negative leaders in the history of Ukraine. In the same poll, 37% of the respondents viewed the 1929 founding of the OUN favorably, and 31% viewed it unfavorably. Similarly, the UPA’s formation, incorrectly dated in the survey question to 1942, was perceived as positive by 40% and as negative by 31%. However, these results does not necessarily indicate that the views of the OUN and the UPA have become more positive overall, because in addition to a statistical margin of error, this survey was not conducted in Crimea and in part of separatist-held Donbas, which had some of the most negative views towards these organizations and the OUN-B leader; the way the questions were formulated may also have had an impact. (Democratic, 2015).

Polls indicate that the UPA as well as the OUN-B and its leaders are much more popular in historically Western Ukraine than they are in the other regions of Ukraine. For example, Western Ukrainian regions expressed much more positive views, compared with other regions, toward Bandera and granted former UPA members the status of war veterans. In the 2010 Research & Branding Group Survey, 48% of the respondents in the West, compared with 20% in the Center and 8% in the South and the East, agreed that Bandera deserved the “Hero of Ukraine” title. Conversely, 27% in the West, 59% in the Center, and 82% in the South and in the East believed that he did not deserve this title. (Research, 2010).

The 2014 Rating and the 2014/2015 Democratic Initiatives Foundation polls showed that significant regional divisions have remained after the “Euromaidan.” For example, in the 2014 Rating poll, the absolute majority of the respondents in Western Ukraine viewed Bandera positively, while absolute majorities in the South and the East held negative attitudes (Rating, 2014). However, these poll reports did not provide data concerning specific historic regions and Crimea and Donbas.

3. The Determinants of Public Attitudes toward the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine

A nationally representative survey, which was designed by the author and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2009, shows that 5% of the respondents expressed very positive attitudes and 8% expressed mostly positive attitudes toward the UPA. Conversely, 29% of residents of Ukraine had very negative attitudes, and 16% expressed mostly negative views of this organization. A quarter of the respondents (24%) held a neutral opinion of the UPA. Attitudes toward the Bandera faction of the OUN were similar (Table 1).

The 2009 KIIS Survey indicates that attitudes toward the UPA and the OUN did not become more positive after the “Orange Revolution” in spite of Yushchenko’s policy of the political rehabilitation and heroization of these organizations and their leaders. This conclusion is derived from estimates that are based on the distribution of “neutral” responses toward the UPA in the 2009 poll and various polls concerning attitudes toward Bandera. The direct comparison with the 2002 Institute of Politics Survey is not possible because the 2009 KIIS Survey included a “neutral” response category, while respondents of the 2002 survey had only a choice between positive and negative attitudes toward the UPA.

The 2013 KIIS Survey shows that 19% of the respondents view Bandera positively; 36% regard him negatively; and 30% neutrally. The overall pattern is similar to the perceptions of the OUN-B and the UPA in the 2009 KIIS survey. These and other polls cited in this study indicate that public attitudes concerning these organizations and Bandera did not change radically during the Yanukovich presidency and immediately after the “Euromaidan.” In the 2014 Rating Survey, the percentages of positive and negative views of the OUN-B leader were both 12% higher than on the 2013 KIIS Survey, but the 2014 survey did not include a neutral response option and did not poll in Crimea.

Table 1
Attitudes towards the OUN-B, the UPA, and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine, %.

	OUN-B*	UPA*	Bandera**
Very positive	6	5	9
Mostly positive	8	8	10
Neutral	23	24	30
Mostly negative	15	16	12
Very negative	30	29	24
Don't know/not sure	18	18	16
Total, %	100	100	100
N	1023	1024	1019

Source: * 2009 KIIS Survey, ** 2013 KIIS Survey.

The 2009 KIIS Survey shows that 35% of the residents of Ukraine believed that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the mass murder of Ukrainians, Poles, or Jews in the 1940s; 3% believed that they were involved in the murder of only Ukrainians; 2% believed that the murders involved only Jews; and 1% believed that the murders involved only Poles. Fourteen percent denied any involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA in the mass murders. Close to half (45%) said that they did not know or were not sure.

A regional divide exists concerning attitudes toward these historical nationalist organizations in Ukraine. A majority of the respondents in Galicia have positive perceptions of the Bandera faction of the OUN and the UPA (63% and 59%, respectively). A minority of Ukrainians not only in the East, the South, and the Center but also in the historic Western Ukrainian regions of Volhynia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia have positive attitudes toward the OUN-B and the UPA. One-third (36%) of the respondents in Transcarpathia, 25% in Volhynia, 16% in Bukovyna, 19% in Kyiv City, and 12% in other Central regions (Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytsky, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr Regions) express favorable opinions of the OUN-B. Such views were shared by 0% of the residents of Crimea, 2% in Donbas, and 3% in other regions in the South (Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa Regions) and 3% in the East (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia Regions). Views of the UPA are similar (Table 2).

However, the percentages of the respondents who have negative attitudes toward the OUN-B in all Western Ukrainian historic regions are similar, and they are much lower than they are in regions of historic Eastern Ukraine. The minority of the respondents in Galicia and Volhynia (both 11%), Bukovyna (10%), and Transcarpathia (7%), compared with a much higher proportion in Kyiv City (31%), the other Center (40%), Donbas (73%), the other East (46%), Crimea (93%) and the other South (71%), express negative attitudes toward the OUN-B. A similar regional pattern characterizes attitudes toward the UPA. Very negative views of the OUN-B and the UPA (61 and 62%, respectively) were dominant in Donbas. (Table 2).

Galicia has the highest rate of positive views of Bandera (77%); just 1% of respondents from that region have negative attitudes toward him. This is the only region in Ukraine where the majority of residents express a very positive view of the OUN-B leader (53%). Favorable attitudes toward Bandera are expressed by a minority, ranging from 35% in Volhynia, 22% in Bukovyna, and 21% in Kyiv City to 3% in Donbas, 4% in Transcarpathia, 6% in the other Southern regions, 9% in Crimea, and the 10% in the other Eastern regions. Conversely, negative views of the OUN-B leader are much stronger in the East and the South, in particular in Donbas, and Crimea, where, respectively, 57% and 32% expressed a very negative stance (see Table 2).

The question concerning the involvement of the UPA and the Bandera wing of the OUN in mass murder also produces significant regional differences. Much smaller proportions of the respondents in the regions of Western Ukraine (11–18%) than in the other regions, in particular, Crimea (51%), the other South (60%), Donbas (63%), and the other East (47%), say that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the mass murder of Ukrainians, Poles, or Jews in the 1940s. The percentages of the respondents, who regard these organizations as being linked to the mass murder of all three groups, is much larger in all regions than are the percentages of respondents who believe that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the murder of one

Table 2
Attitudes towards the OUN-B, the UPA, and Stepan Bandera in regions of Ukraine, %.

	Galicia	Volhynia	Bukovyna	Transcarpathia	Kyiv City	Other Center	Crimea	Other South	Donbas	Other East
<i>OUN-B*</i>										
Very positive	37	4	3	4	8	2	0	2	1	2
Mostly positive	26	21	13	32	11	10	0	1	1	1
Neutral	21	56	21	48	30	23	3	18	13	25
Mostly negative	6	7	4	0	13	18	44	24	12	13
Very negative	5	4	3	8	18	22	49	47	61	33
Don't know/not sure	5	8	55	8	20	26	4	8	12	26
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	109	44	18	29	49	283	48	103	159	183
<i>UPA*</i>										
Very positive	35	5	7	0	6	2	0	2	0	2
Mostly positive	24	12	8	36	7	10	0	3	0	3
Neutral	24	67	19	48	31	24	6	16	12	28
Mostly negative	5	4	4	0	14	18	51	21	15	15
Very negative	4	4	3	8	24	20	41	51	62	27
Don't know/not sure	8	8	59	8	19	27	2	6	10	25
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	109	44	20	29	50	284	46	103	158	183
<i>Stepan Bandera**</i>										
Very positive	53	4	13	0	9	5	6	0	1	3
Mostly positive	24	31	9	5	13	9	3	6	2	7
Neutral	20	43	37	22	37	44	24	32	11	26
Mostly negative	0	5	0	4	8	13	10	21	16	17
Very negative	1	1	26	0	21	12	32	26	57	32
Don't know/not sure	2	16	15	68	12	16	26	15	13	16
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	109	48	19	24	57	268	54	105	159	175

Source: * 2009 KIIS Survey, ** 2013 KIIS Survey.

Table 3

Perceptions of the involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA in mass murder by regions in Ukraine, %.

	Galicia	Volhynia	Bukovyna	Transcarpathia	Kyiv City	Other Center	Crimea	Other South	Donbas	Other East
Ukrainians, Poles and Jews	15	14	11	9	27	28	45	57	49	44
Only Ukrainians	1	0	0	0	0	4	6	0	7	1
Only Poles	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1
Only Jews	0	2	0	5	2	1	0	3	7	1
Not involved at all	52	28	7	31	19	11	10	3	2	10
Don't know/not sure	30	54	81	54	53	55	39	37	36	43
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	104	44	20	29	50	276	46	100	153	181

Source: 2009 KIIS Survey.

of these groups. Half (52%) of the respondents in Galicia, compared with 31% in Transcarpathia, 28% in Volhynia, 7% in Bukovyna, 2% in Donbas, 3% in the other South, and 10% in both Crimea and the other East, deny that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in mass murder in the 1940s. Very large proportions of people in all parts of Ukraine did not give definite answers. The percentages of such responses range from 30% in Galicia and 36% in Donbas to 53–55% in Volhynia, Transcarpathia, Kyiv City and the other Center as well as 81% in Bukovyna (Table 3).

Significant differences exist in attitudes toward the OUN, the UPA and Bandera by ethnicity and language. For example, 20% of ethnic Ukrainians and 4% of ethnic Russians express very positive or mostly positive views of the UPA. Conversely, half (48%) of ethnic Ukrainians and 81% of ethnic Russians have very negative or mostly negative attitudes toward the UPA. Similarly, 21% of ethnic Ukrainians, compared with 2% of ethnic Russians, hold favorable opinions of the Bandera wing of the OUN, while, respectively, 48% and 84% express negative attitudes. A greater percentage of ethnic Ukrainians (21%), compared to ethnic Russians (3%) and other minorities (6%), hold positive views of Bandera. (Table 4). There is similar pattern of differences concerning these organizations and the OUN-B leader among Ukrainian and Russian speakers.

The attitudes toward the OUN-B and the UPA differ by age, but these age differences are much smaller than are the regional differences. For instance, the younger generation (18–29 years old) in Ukraine display slightly more positive but not radically different attitudes concerning the OUN-B, the UPA, and Bandera, compared with the older generations. For example, the youngest respondents are somewhat more positive towards the OUN and the UPA (17%), compared with the oldest group of the respondents of 70 years old and above (12%). Much higher proportions of the 18–29-year-olds hold negative views of the OUN-B and the UPA (33% and 31%, respectively) than embrace positive opinions concerning these nationalist organizations. Views of Bandera in the 2013 KIIS Survey have a similar generational pattern. The youngest respondents express somewhat more positive attitudes toward the OUN-B leader (22%) than do those in the oldest group (16%). However, supporters of Bandera were in the minority among all age groups, including those born from 1984 through 1995. The 2014 Rating Survey, conducted after the “Euromaidan,” produced a similar generational pattern of attitudes towards Bandera (Rating, 2014). The youngest group of respondents is significantly more likely than many of the older-age groups to express neutral attitudes or say that they do not know or are not sure about their views of the OUN-B, the UPA, and Bandera (see Table 5).

Multiple regression analysis—which allows to determine the effects of each factor, keeping other factors and socio-demographic variables, such as education level, gender, place of residence, the size of settlement, and the perception of the involvement in mass murder, constant—shows that regional variables, ethnicity, language, and age are significant predictors of the attitudes toward the OUN-B and the UPA in Ukraine. The residents of not only Crimea, Donbas, Kyiv City, and other Central, Eastern, and Southern regions, but also of the Western Ukrainian regions of Volhynia and Transcarpathia held more negative opinions of both the OUN-B and the UPA than did the residents of Galicia when the other factors were held constant. The regional variables, with exceptions of Bukovyna, were statistically significant. However, the size of the unstandardized regression coefficients (B) shows that the differences between Galicia and other Western Ukrainian regions were much smaller compared with the differences between Galicia and the other regions, with the exception of Kyiv City. Galicia is the omitted variable in the regressions because it serves as a yardstick for a comparison with other regions (see Table 6).

Table 4

Attitudes towards the OUN-B, the UPA, and Stepan Bandera by ethnicity, %.

	OUN-B*			UPA*			Bandera**		
	Ukrainians	Russians	Other	Ukrainians	Russians	Other	Ukrainians	Russians	Other
Very positive	7	1	4	7	0	0	10	0	4
Mostly positive	10	1	0	10	3	0	11	3	2
Neutral	25	13	6	26	16	14	32	19	14
Mostly negative	14	18	42	14	20	44	11	19	15
Very negative	26	51	25	26	46	19	21	41	24
Don't know/not sure	18	16	24	18	15	24	14	18	41
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	821	180	24	821	180	24	834	134	47

Source: * 2009 KIIS Survey, ** 2013 KIIS Survey.

Table 5
Attitudes towards the OUN-B, the UPA, and Stepan Bandera by age in Ukraine, %.

	18–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	60–69	70 and Older
<i>OUN-B*</i>						
Very positive	7	6	4	6	5	6
Mostly positive	10	10	9	5	10	6
Neutral	28	27	23	20	21	11
Mostly negative	15	13	15	17	17	15
Very negative	18	27	30	38	34	41
Don't know/not sure	23	16	19	14	12	20
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	229	176	199	142	148	131
<i>UPA*</i>						
Very positive	6	6	4	5	6	7
Mostly positive	9	11	9	6	7	5
Neutral	32	28	23	22	22	13
Mostly negative	14	13	17	17	18	17
Very negative	17	27	28	37	35	38
Don't know/not sure	22	16	20	13	12	20
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	229	177	197	142	148	131
<i>Stepan Bandera**</i>						
Very positive	10	6	9	7	12	7
Mostly positive	12	8	6	10	13	9
Neutral	33	39	35	27	23	15
Mostly negative	6	9	15	21	12	15
Very negative	20	20	20	24	25	39
Don't know/not sure	20	17	14	11	14	15
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	227	178	196	141	147	129

Source: * 2009 KIIS Survey, ** 2013 KIIS Survey.

The regression analysis shows that the regional factors and perceptions of the involvement of the Bandera faction of the OUN and the UPA in mass murder were the strongest predictors of views concerning these nationalist organizations when all other factors are held constant. Hence, in Donbas, Crimea, other Eastern and Southern regions and in the Center the negative perceptions of the OUN's and UPA's involvement in mass murder were the strongest. These variables have the biggest standardized regression coefficients (Betas). Views of Bandera were much more negative than those in Galicia in all other regions, including Volhynia, Bukovyna, Transcarpathia, and Kyiv City. All these regional variables are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. (Table 6).

Table 6
Determinants of attitudes towards the OUN-B, the UPA, and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine, OLS regressions.

	OUN-B [~]		UPA [^]		Bandera [^]	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
Volhynia	-0.549***	-0.093	-0.583***	-0.101	-0.994***	-0.164
Bukovyna	-0.430	-0.034	-0.299	-0.024	-1.445***	-0.155
Transcarpathia	-0.539**	-0.076	-0.583**	-0.083	-1.215***	-0.090
Kyiv City	-0.459*	-0.077	-0.679***	-0.119	-1.453***	-0.260
Other Center	-0.965***	-0.329	-0.908***	-0.315	-1.459***	-0.496
Crimea	-1.403***	-0.249	-1.231***	-0.223	-1.697***	-0.278
Other South	-1.134***	-0.283	-1.060***	-0.271	-1.848***	-0.440
Donbas	-1.233***	-0.360	-1.237***	-0.371	-2.442***	-0.693
Other East	-0.905***	-0.264	-0.681***	-0.205	-1.815***	-0.524
Perception of mass murder involvement	-0.660***	-0.390	-0.672***	-0.406		
Ethnic Russian	-0.280**	-0.084	-0.161	-0.049	-0.201	-0.052
Other ethnic minority	0.157	0.018	0.173	0.020	-0.060	-0.008
Russian-speaker	-0.314**	-0.122	-0.421***	-0.167	-0.294**	-0.113
Age	-0.005**	-0.067	-0.006***	-0.083	-0.006**	-0.085
Education	0.004	0.006	0.001	0.002	0.022	0.032
Rural	0.129	0.048	0.134	0.051	-0.039	-0.014
Male	-0.067	-0.027	-0.069	-0.028	0.089	0.034
Size of settlement	-0.021	-0.033	-0.011	-0.018	-0.020	-0.037
Constant	4.541***		4.581***		4.515***	
R squared	0.517		0.532		0.409	
N	814		819		850	

Source: [~]2009 KIIS Survey, [^]2013 KIIS Survey. *** Statistically significant at the 0.001 level, ** statistically significant at 0.01 level, statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

The regression analysis demonstrates that Russian-speakers and younger respondents held relatively more favorable views of these nationalist organizations and Bandera compared, respectively, with Ukrainian-speakers and older respondents. Ethnic Russians variable is statistically significant in the case of the OUN-B attitudes. Ukrainian-speakers and ethnic Ukrainians are omitted dummy variables in the regressions because they serve as yardsticks for comparisons with Russian-speakers, ethnic Russians, and other ethnic minorities. However, the standardized regression coefficients (Beta) show that magnitudes of the effects of the ethnicity, language, and age variables are much smaller compared with the effects of the regional variables and the perception of the mass murder variable. Other ethnic minorities, the level of education, rural residence, settlement size, and gender do not have statistically significant effects on attitudes toward these historical far right organizations and Bandera in the regression analysis. (see [Table 6](#)).

4. Conclusion

The issue of the political rehabilitation and heroization of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army have become one of the central political issues in Ukraine since the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan.” This issue has provoked major political controversies and debates in Ukraine. The Yushchenko and Poroshenko governments, nationalist parties, and many Ukrainian historians attempted to recast the OUN and the UPA as a popular national liberation movement, which fought against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and to present OUN and UPA leaders as national heroes. They either denied the involvement of the OUN and the UPA in terrorism, the Nazi genocide, and the ethnic cleansing, or justified these by the organizations’ pro-independence struggle. While this policy was abandoned during the Yanukovich presidency at the national level, regions had a significant autonomy in shaping historical memory policy concerning these nationalist organizations similarly to the status quo during the Kravchuk and Kuchma presidencies.

Historical studies and archival documents show that the OUN relied on terrorism and collaborated with Nazi Germany in the beginning and at the end of World War II. The Bandera faction of the OUN-B by means of its control over the UPA masterminded a campaign of ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia in 1943 and, to a lesser extent, in Galicia in 1944 and mounted a terror campaign in Soviet-controlled Western Ukraine at the end of the war and after the war. The OUN-controlled militia and police, which produced the majority of the top UPA commanders and, at least until the beginning of 1944, of the UPA members, were also involved in the Nazi-led mass murder of Jews during World War II, in particular, in Volhynia and Galicia. The UPA and the OUN-B were also involved in mass killings of Ukrainians and Russians.

The 2009 and 2013 KIIS Surveys show that minorities of the residents of Ukraine have favorable views toward the OUN-B, the UPA, and Stepan Bandera and deny involvement of these organizations in the mass murders of Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews in the 1940s. Other surveys indicate that perceptions of these organizations and the OUN-B leader have become more favorable since the “Euromaidan” but did not change fundamentally. The Soviet experience suggests that while radical changes in the historical memory policy after the “Euromaidan” are likely to increase the public support of these historical far-right organizations and their leaders, a radical transformation of the public opinion in the near future is unlikely.

The youngest generation of respondents, who were socialized in independent Ukraine, express somewhat more favorable views than the older generations, who were socialized in the Soviet Union, but such positive views remain a minority opinion among all major age groups.

The 2009 KIIS Survey demonstrates that most respondents, excluding those who did not have definite opinions, believe that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the mass murders of not only Ukrainians but also Poles and Jews. The denial or uncertainty concerning the involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA in mass killings and views about the majority of the residents of Galicia, Volhynia, and Bukovyna and the relatively small percentages of people in these regions expressing negative views of these organizations do not mean that such mass killings did not take place.

The analysis of the 2009 and 2013 KIIS Surveys demonstrates that regional factors are the strongest determinants of attitudes toward the OUN-B, the UPA, and Bandera in Ukraine. Positive perceptions of the OUN-B, the UPA, and Bandera are much stronger in Galicia and Volhynia than in the South and the East. Crimea and Donbas have the most negative attitudes towards these organizations and the OUN-B leader. This study also shows that the OUN-B, the UPA, and Bandera himself were much less popular in Volhynia, where the UPA was formed, compared to Galicia.

The historical issues contributed to radicalization of the Ukrainian society since the “Euromaidan.” While their role was exaggerated by Russian and separatist politicians, these divisive historical issues, the resort to violence by contemporary ideological successors to the OUN and the UPA, such as the Right Sector, and their embrace by Maidan leaders and Maidan-led governments contributed to the de facto breakup of Ukraine manifested by the secession and the Russian annexation of Crimea and the civil war in Donbas. This study implies that the regional differences in attitudes toward the OUN, the UPA, and their leaders are not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future, and that the increased political salience of these issues after the “Euromaidan” is likely to exacerbate regional cleavages and conflicts in Ukraine.

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