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REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND-BASED AND CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMPLISH THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

- References:
- a. J.C.S. 1036
 - b. J.C.S. 521/12, 521/15 and 521/16
 - c. J.C.S. 1368
 - d. J.C.S. 1331/3
 - e. C.C.S. 691/5

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosed report by the Army and Army Air Forces Planners in connection with paragraph 4 a, page 2 of J.C.S. 1036 is submitted for consideration.

2. The Navy Planners do not concur in this report and will submit a separate report later.

A. J. MCFARLAND,
C. J. MOORE,
Joint Secretariat.

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REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND-BASED AND CARRIER-BASED
AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMPLISH THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

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~~TOP SECRET~~ENCLOSUREREQUIREMENTS FOR LAND-BASED AND CARRIER-BASED
AIRCRAFT IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPANReport by the Army and Army Air Forces PlannersTHE PROBLEM

1. To estimate U.S. requirements for land-based and carrier-based aircraft in the war against Japan, giving consideration to the participation of other than U.S. forces.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The latest strategic deployment of U.S. air forces following the defeat of Germany is contained in J.C.S. 521/12 (29 March 1945). In approving this deployment for planning purposes the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (J.C.S. 521/15 and J.C.S. 521/16) both stated that in the light of current progress of events and planning, the deployment of air forces appeared unrealistic and unnecessary.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under consideration J.C.S. 1388 in which the principle is expressed that "the forces of all arms which are required and which should be employed for the operations we contemplate are all those which can be supported in the theater within the means which will be available to us and which can be effectively employed. We feel that the unremitting application of this maximum force is essential to defeating Japan at the least possible cost in lives and resources." C

4. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC) has indicated contemplated deployment of aircraft in Okinawa and Ie, which are the only base areas in the Ryukyus planned for occupation.

5. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC) has provided his preliminary estimated land-based air requirements for OLYMPIC and CORONET.

6. The Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, has reported his air force requirements for support of his approved operations. Requirement figures shown in Annex "A" to Appendix "A" include Army Air Force units which may be based in the Burma-India Theater.

7. The Joint Target Group has completed an estimate for a program of air bombardment of Japan proper to achieve the minimum results necessary to establish acceptable conditions for and to support OLYMPIC and CORONET within four broad categories of targets: production; central stores of materiel; communications; local materiel.

8. CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC recommended a target date of 1 November 1945 for OLYMPIC. In J.C.S. 1331/3, Directive for Operation OLYMPIC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the execution of this operation with that target date.

9. The planned sequence and timing of main operations against Japan on which estimates contained herein have been based are:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Target Date</u>
Ryukyus	In progress
OLYMPIC	1 November 1945
CORONET	1 March 1946

10. British participation to the extent of at least 10 squadrons (220 aircraft) in the land-based air effort against Japan has been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 691/5).

DISCUSSION

11. a. The Royal New Zealand Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force and Dutch Air Forces in the South and Southwest Pacific areas are considered adequate and necessary to meet requirements for air operations against by-passed enemy installations in the South Pacific, Northern Solomons, the Bismarcks, New Guinea and Halmahera, to provide air defense of northwest Australia and to conduct air operations against Borneo, the southeast coast of Asia, and the Banda Sea area.

b. Presently planned deployment of Royal Air Force units to the India-Burma Theater is assumed to meet requirements of Southeast Asia Command operations.

12. The scope of ICEBERG having been decided, OLYMPIC directed and CARBONADO approved, the responsible commanders have submitted their estimated land-based aircraft requirements for the period through CORONET. In this paper, these estimates have been adjusted to accord with the prospective availability of certain types of Marine land-based aircraft. No reduction in deployment of U.S. aircraft has been made as a result of agreement for British participation with an air force on the order of 10 squadrons. The aircraft required in addition to those now in the Pacific are shown redeployed thereto by quarters in accordance with the best estimates of availability of airfields in the Pacific and of shipping. However, a reexamination of the shipping requirements as well as the other logistic support for the air units recommended for deployment herein will be required. Confirmation by the responsible commanders that redeployed units are desired in the area by the dates shown is necessary. It is considered that the present Army Air Force garrison of one heavy bomber squadron, one medium bomber squadron, four fighter squadrons, and one troop carrier squadron should be continued in Alaska and the Aleutians. The

total air units recommended for deployment (shown in the Appendices) are considered adequate to accomplish the air bombardment program recommended as a minimum by the Joint Target Group to establish acceptable conditions for OLYMPIC and CORONET and to support both these operations.

13. J.C.S. 521/12 allocated five B-17 groups for deployment to the Pacific. Contemplated revisions of this paper planned to increase this deployment to seven B-17 groups, four to become operational in the theater February 1946 and three in March 1946. After reexamination of their program the Army Air Forces concluded that a greater weight of bombs could be placed on targets with less effort by a slight augmentation of the B-29 unit equipment aircraft in the Ryukyus. J.C.S. 521/12 also planned a deployment of 48 very heavy bomber (VHB) groups with an ultimate build-up to a unit equipment level of 2,304 aircraft. The Army Air Forces consider that only very heavy bomber groups that can be operational prior to the launching of CORONET should be activated.

The Army Air Forces therefore propose to alter J.C.S. 521/12 to change five B-17 groups from deployment to the Pacific to demobilization, and to modify their VHB program to a total of 40 B-29 groups with a unit equipment of 1,360 aircraft. All B-29 units are scheduled to be operational before CORONET.

14. Assuming continuance of the current campaign of air bombardment and blockade and attrition of Japanese forces and shipping, and the execution of OLYMPIC and CORONET as planned, intelligence estimates of Japanese dispositions and capabilities after CORONET indicate that:

- a. Japanese ground forces in some strength may continue to resist, notably on the mainland of Asia and on Formosa. They will be short of many items needed for sustaining active or large scale warfare.

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b. Japanese air forces will have been almost completely annihilated and reduced to guerrilla type operations.

At most they would have left a few hundred combat aircraft in tactical units, widely dispersed and thoroughly disorganized.

c. Japanese naval forces will have been almost entirely eliminated except possibly for a few cruisers and destroyers and a limited number of submarines, small surface and suicide craft. Hence, naval opposition may be disregarded as a strategic factor.

15. It is not possible to make firm estimates of aircraft employability for the period subsequent to CORONET. However, below are listed some of the tasks which might remain in that period:

a. Continuing land campaigns in Japan.

b. Additional amphibious operations in Japan.

c. Amphibious operations against objectives on the coast of Asia.

d. Mop-up amphibious operations in by-passed areas.

e. Operations in the post-defeat period incident to disarmament, demobilization and evacuation of Japanese forces.

Based on the above intelligence estimate, the scale of Japanese opposition to post-CORONET operations should be materially less than that which will have been encountered up to that time.

16. It is unlikely that circumstances will require postponement of the initiation of CORONET beyond April 1946, but should this occur it could not then be initiated until late fall, because of weather conditions. Should it be postponed, Japanese opposition should be less because of the cumulative effect of air bombardment and blockade, and because of attrition resulting from interim operations.

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17. Examination of all factors, including the estimated critical Japanese situation in relation to the possible tasks that might be required after CORONET indicates that there are no foreseeable operations on a larger scale than that now planned for CORONET, and that additional aircraft over and above those employed through CORONET could not be effectively employed. To meet unforeseen contingencies, however, it is proposed in a separate study to establish in the United States a strategic reserve of land-based air units. It is further expected that reexaminations in the light of developments in the campaign against Japan and plans for post-CORONET operations may indicate a downward revision of the aircraft estimated in this study to be effectively employable post-CORONET.

18. a. Requirements for land-based aircraft are computed on the number of units that can be moved to the theater and effectively employed prior to 31 March 1946. Any postponement of the CORONET target date would give more time for the large air forces then available to conduct preparations for CORONET--i.e., this delay would actually have the effect of an increased air force. Therefore, in computing requirements for land-based aircraft the number of aircraft required on 31 March 1946 has been selected as the maximum that can be effectively employed in the campaign against Japan. Based on the foregoing, Appendix "A", Annex "A", page 8, shows the required deployment of land-based aircraft as calculated by the Army Air Forces.

b. Requirements for carrier-based aircraft are computed on the number of carriers calculated to be operational on any given date. It can be assumed that the United States will suffer some attrition in carriers prior to and through the assault phase of CORONET which will result in a consequent reduction in actual requirements for air groups. On the same principle which has been used for land-based aircraft, that the assault phase of CORONET will require the maximum air effort necessary to be mounted against Japan,

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the number of aircraft embarked as of 31 March 1946 has been selected as the maximum which can be effectively employed in the campaign against Japan. Based on the foregoing, Annex "A", page 11, and Annex "B", page 12, to Appendix "B", are the calculations of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. Annex "A" shows the prospective availability of U.S. carriers in the Pacific with no allowances for losses or damage. Annex "B", page 12, shows the composition of carrier air groups. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations has computed, considering probable carriers lost or rendered inoperational, that the number of aircraft embarked on operational carriers on 31 March 1946 will be _____.

RECOMMENDATION

19. It is recommended that:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the foregoing principles which were used as a basis for the establishment of land-based and carrier-based aircraft requirements to accomplish the defeat of Japan.

b. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the required deployment as calculated by the Army Air Forces in Annex "A" to Appendix "A" and by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations in Appendix "B".

c. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations to conduct continuing examinations of their calculations with a view toward reducing their aircraft requirements in the light of further developments.

~~TOP SECRET~~APPENDIX "A"ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMY, NAVY AND
MARINE LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
(Two photostats)

Annex "A" - Chart showing estimated requirements by quarters
for Army land-based air units and aircraft in the
war against Japan.

Annex "B" - Chart showing estimated requirements by quarters
for Navy and Marine land-based air units and air-
craft in the war against Japan.

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ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "A"

PROCESSED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE FOR THE U.S. AIR FORCE

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	WHB	HB	MB	Ftr	Ftr	Probn	Tactical	Weather	T/C	Air/Sea	Combat	Air	TOTAL
	Op	Op	Op	Op	Op	Sq	Sq	Sq	Op	Sq	Op	Op	
PACIFIC													
June, 1945	20 (480)	9-1 (444)	8-1 (528)	16-1 (1250)	0-8 (96)	2/12 (192)	1/3 (48)	0/1 (12)	6-1 (400)	0-4 (128)	1 (100)	1 (66)	3744
Sept., 1945	26 (688)	10-2 (864)	10-2 (864)	21-1 (1625)	0-10 (120)	2/16 (208)	2/6 (96)	0/1 (12)	8-3 (560)	0-5 (160)	1 (100)	1 (66)	4603
Dec., 1945	32 (1024)	10-2 (864)	12-1 (928)	24-1 (1856)	0-10 (120)	2/14 (224)	2/6 (96)	0/4 (48)	12-3 (816)	0-7 (224)	1 (100)	1 (66)	5856
Mar., 1946	40 (1360)	10-3 (916)	15-1 (1152)	32-1 (2450)	0-10 (120)	2/15 (240)	4/12 (480)	0/8 (96)	14-3 (944)	0-7 (224)	1 (100)	1 (66)	7284
M. PACIFIC													
June, 1945		0-1 (12)	0-1 (16)	1 (100)					0-1 (16)				144
Sept., 1945		0-1 (12)	0-1 (16)	1 (100)					0-1 (16)				144
Dec., 1945		0-1 (12)	0-1 (16)	1 (100)					0-1 (16)				144
Mar., 1946		0-1 (12)	0-1 (16)	1 (100)					0-1 (16)				144
CHINA													
June, 1945		2 (96)	2 (128)	8 (600)	0-2 (24)	1/4 (64)	0/2 (32)	0/1 (12)	3-3 (112)	0-1 (32)	3 (300)		1400
Sept., 1945		1-3 (84)	2 (128)	8 (600)	0-2 (24)	1/4 (64)	0/2 (32)	0/1 (12)	1-3 (112)	0-1 (32)	3 (300)		1388
Dec., 1945		1-3 (84)	2 (128)	8 (600)	0-2 (24)	1/4 (64)	0/2 (32)	0/1 (12)	1-3 (112)	0-1 (32)	3 (300)		1388
Mar., 1946		1-3 (84)	2 (128)	8 (600)	0-2 (24)	1/4 (64)	0/2 (32)	0/1 (12)	1-3 (112)	0-1 (32)	3 (300)		1388
TOTAL													
June, 1945	20 (480)	11-2 (532)	10-2 (672)	25-1 (1950)	0-10 (120)	3/16 (256)	1/5 (80)	0/2 (24)	7-5 (528)	0-5 (160)	4 (400)	1 (66)	5288
Sept., 1945	26 (688)	12-2 (608)	9-2 (608)	30-1 (2325)	0-12 (144)	3/17 (272)	2/8 (128)	0/2 (24)	9-7 (688)	0-6 (192)	4 (400)	1 (66)	6135
Dec., 1945	32 (1024)	12-2 (608)	14-2 (928)	33-1 (2550)	0-12 (144)	3/18 (288)	2/8 (128)	0/5 (60)	13-7 (944)	0-8 (256)	4 (400)	1 (66)	7388
Mar., 1946	40 (1360)	12-3 (612)	17-2 (1320)	41-1 (3150)	0-12 (144)	3/19 (304)	4/14 (224)	0/9 (108)	15-7 (1072)	0-8 (256)	4 (400)	1 (66)	8816
Reduction in a/c compared with 521/12	-944	-168		-100	-36	4160			4 288				-800
M. Pacific													
China													
Total	-944	-180		-125	-36	4 140 (e)			4 32				-257
													-1097

(a) One IAB squadron transferred to Pacific.
 (b) M/LA column includes one IAB Op (Special Pathfinder unit) for USMSTAF.
 (c) One IAB Op converted to HB Op (B-32) in September.
 (d) One IAB Op in readiness 1 April for deployment to Pacific if necessary.
 Note: Increase from B-3 Fighter Grps in China Theater is accomplished by deactivation of 2 Air Commando Groups and reduction of 2 Fighter Groups now in the theater from 4 Squadron Groups to standard 1 Squadron Gr-ups and organization of 2 Gr-ups from 5 Squadrons thus made available.

(e) All Recon units are shown under one heading in JCS 521/12.
 (f) Three squadrons in readiness 1 April for deployment to Pacific if necessary.
 (g) Air/Sea Rescue units not shown in previous deployment, although personnel for these units were carried in AAF totals.
 (h) Combat Cargo and Air Commando shown in footnote to Appendix to Enclosure 'B', JCS 521/12.

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INDEX "P" TO APPENDIX "A"

ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW AND VARIOUS AIR CATEGORIES IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

4 July 1945

	FBHL	FBMC	FBMS	FBLL	VD	VH	VIC	VFB	VWB	VWP	VWP	VWP	TOTAL
GENERAL SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	Jun '45	18/5 (216)	17/4 (204)	22/5 (264)	5/7 (49)	4 (36)	7 (175)	4 (32)	7 (56)	12 (288)	29 (468)	6/1 (72)	127/88 (1466)
	Sep '45	18 (216)	12/2 (144)	10 (120)	6/2 (48)	4 (36)	7 (175)	4 (32)	8 (64)	7 (168)	17 (408)	6/1 (72)	116/5 (1477)
	Dec '45	18/2 (216)	12 (144)	20/2 (240)	6/2 (48)	6 (48)	8 (120)	4 (32)	8 (64)	6 (48)	12 (288)	16 (384)	6 (72)
NORTH PACIFIC	Jun '45	4/4 (48)	4/2 (48)	3/4 (36)	1 (12)	4 (36)	8 (120)	4 (32)	8 (64)	12 (288)	12 (288)	6 (72)	108/2 (1324)
	Sep '45	4/2 (48)	4/2 (48)	3/1 (36)	1 (12)	4 (36)	8 (120)	4 (32)	8 (64)	12 (288)	12 (288)	6 (72)	12/7 (144)
	Dec '45	4/2 (48)	4/2 (48)	2 (24)	2 (24)	4 (36)	8 (120)	4 (32)	8 (64)	12 (288)	12 (288)	6 (72)	12/5 (144)
TOTAL	Jun '45	36/9 (432)	31/6 (378)	42/7 (504)	6/7 (84)	8 (72)	15 (175)	8 (64)	15 (120)	24 (288)	41 (468)	12 (72)	201/2 (2410)
	Sep '45	36/9 (432)	24/6 (288)	30/6 (360)	6/6 (72)	8 (72)	15 (175)	8 (64)	16 (128)	24 (288)	41 (468)	12 (72)	182/1 (2181)
	Dec '45	36/9 (432)	24/6 (288)	22/6 (264)	6/6 (72)	8 (72)	15 (175)	8 (64)	16 (128)	24 (288)	41 (468)	12 (72)	169/2 (2064)

1. March - December, 1946 - No change.

2. Wherever assigned squadrons are non-operational the total assigned is shown. For example: 15/3 indicates a total of 15 squadrons, 3 of which are non-operational, and though under control of the theater commander are assumed to be reforming in the U.S. and unready for combat. Total aircraft (A/C) shown in parenthesis.

- 3. FBHL - (Patrol Bomber Heavy Landplane - PBL)
- FBMC - (Patrol Bomber Medium Landplane - PM)
- FBMS - (Patrol Bomber Heavy-Medium seaplane - PE27, FBI, PM)
- FBLL - (Patrol Bomber Light Landplane)
- VD - (Photographic - Navy and Marine)
- VH - (Rescue)
- VIC - (Patrol Bomber Heavy Transport)
- VFB - (Patrol Bomber Heavy - FB4)
- VWB - (Patrol Bomber Heavy - FB4)
- VWP - (Patrol Bomber Heavy - FB4)
- VWP - (Patrol Bomber Heavy - FB4)

4. Artillery Spotting - Liaison aircraft not included in above.

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APPENDIX "B"

REQUIREMENTS FOR CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT
(EMBARKED) IN THE PACIFIC THROUGH 1946

1. Annex "A", page 11, shows the prospective availability of U.S. carriers in the Pacific through 1946. The composition of carrier air groups for each type of carrier is shown in Annex "B", page 12. This composition is expressed in aircraft required to be operationally available and carrier assigned. No requirements are expressed for spare aircraft or spare groups, since establishment of attrition and replacement rates, including spare air groups, and movement of required replacements is considered to be an administrative function of the Navy Department. In this connection it should be noted that rotation of carrier air group personnel is accomplished primarily through rotation of air groups rather than by replacement of individuals.

2. Requirements are based on presently planned carrier complements. Combat and operational experience should be promptly reflected in adjustments in attrition and replacement rates, in spare air groups available, and in composition of air groups by type aircraft when modification in existing planning figures for these categories is indicated.

3. Assuming that no loss or damage is sustained by our carriers, and that on 30 June 1946 the available carriers in the Pacific are as shown in Annex "A", page 11, the number of embarked carrier aircraft on that date would be 4,675. On the further assumption that the active phases of CORONET are completed by 30 June 1946, it is proposed for planning purposes to establish this number as the maximum which can be effectively employed (embarked aircraft) in the campaign against Japan, subject to continuing adjustment to accord with the actual availability of carriers, developments in the Pacific war, and operational plans based thereon.

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4. Annex "C", page 13, shows the prospective availability of carriers and carrier aircraft in the British Pacific Fleet.

ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

AVAILABILITY OF U.S. CARRIERS IN THE PACIFIC
(No allowance made for loss or damage)

1. Availability of CVB's:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total</u>
December 1945	1
January 1946	2
October 1946	3

2. Availability of CV's:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Night</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Total</u>
June 1945	14	2	2	18
September 1945	16	2	2	20
December 1945	16	2	2	20
March 1946	19	2	2	23
June 1946	23	2	2	27
September 1946	24	2	2	28
January 1947	25	2	2	29

3. Availability of CVL's:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total</u>
June 1945	8
September 1945	8
December 1945	8
March 1946	9
May 1946	10

4. Availability of CVE's:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Transport</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Total</u>
June 1945	6	21	27	54
September 1945	6	21	40	67
December 1945	6	21	44	71
March 1946	6	21	50	77
June 1946	6	21	54	81
September 1946	6	21	59	86
November 1946	6	21	65	92

Note: Terminal Dates indicated above are "In Service" dates through presently approved shipbuilding program.

~~TOP SECRET~~ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"COMPOSITION OF CARRIER AIR GROUPS
(Embarked Aircraft)

CVB	97 VF, 48 VSB	Total	145
CV	73 VF, 15 VSB, 15 VTB	Total	103
CV(N)	33 VF(N), 27 VTB	Total	60
CVL	24 VF, 9 VTB	Total	33
CVE, Combat, C3 & Kaiser -	16 VF, 12 VTB	Total	28
CVE, Combat, Sangamon & Commencement Bay,	18 VF, 12 VTB	Total	30
CVE, Combat, Commencement Bay (Marine)	18 VF, 12 VTB	Total	30

~~TOP SECRET~~ANNEX "C" TO APPENDIX "B"AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET CARRIERS AND AIRCRAFT

	<u>CARRIERS</u>		
	<u>1 May 1945</u>	<u>1 October 1945</u>	<u>1 June 1946</u>
CV's	5	6	6
CVL's		3	5
CVE's	2	8	8

	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>					
	<u>VF</u>	<u>VB</u>	<u>VF</u>	<u>VB</u>	<u>VF</u>	<u>VB</u>
CV's (36 VF - 21 VB)	180	105	216	126	216	126
CVL's (21 VF - 12 VB)			63	36	105	60
CVE's (24 VF)	48		192		192	
TOTAL	228	105	471	162	513	186