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Latin Americans of Japanese Origin (*Nikkeijin*) Working in Japan – A Survey

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Abstract

Since the revision of the Japanese immigration law in 1990, there has been a dramatic influx of Latin Americans, mostly Brazilians, of Japanese origin (*Nikkeijin*) working in Japan. This is mainly because the revision has basically allowed *Nikkeijin* to enter Japan legally even as unskilled workers, while the Japanese law, in principle, prohibits foreigners from taking unskilled jobs in the country. In response, the number of these Latin American migrants has increased from practically zero to more than 250,000. The migration of *Nikkeijin* is likely to have a significant impact on both the Brazilian and the Japanese economies, given the substantial amount of remittances they send to Brazil. The impact is likely to be felt especially in the *Nikkeijin* community in Brazil.

In spite of their importance, the detailed characteristics of *Nikkei* migrants and the prospect for future migration and remittances are under-researched. The major purpose of this paper is therefore to provide a more comprehensive account of the migration of *Nikkeijin* workers to Japan. The paper contains a brief review of the history of Japanese emigration to Latin America (mostly Brazil), a study of the characteristics of *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan and their current living conditions, and a discussion on trends and issues regarding immigration in Japan and migration policy. The final part of the paper briefly notes the limitation of existing studies and describes the *Brazil Nikkei Household Survey*, which is being conducted by the World Bank Research Group at the time of writing this paper. The availability of the survey data will certainly contribute to a better understanding of the Japan-Brazil migration and remittance corridor.

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I. Introduction

Since the revision of the Japanese immigration law in 1990, there has been a dramatic influx of Latin Americans, mostly Brazilians, of Japanese origin (*Nikkeijin*) working in Japan. This is mainly because the revision has basically allowed *Nikkeijin* to enter Japan legally even as unskilled workers, while the Japanese law, in principle, prohibits foreigners from taking unskilled jobs in the country. In response, the number of these Latin American migrants has increased from practically zero to more than a quarter of million. According to the statistics provided by the Japanese Ministry of Justice, the number of Brazilians staying in Japan increased from about 4,000 in 1988 to 268,332 in 2002. In 2005 the number further increased to 302,080. The migration of *Nikkeijin* is likely to have a significant impact on both the Brazilian and Japanese economies, given the substantial amount of remittances they send to Brazil. The impact is likely to be felt especially in the *Nikkeijin* community in Brazil. While the number of *Nikkeijin* in Brazil is estimated to be a little less than two million, about a quarter of million *Nikkeijin* migrant workers from Brazil are currently in Japan. In other words, about one in every eight *Nikkeijin*s in Brazil is living in Japan. Given the high rate of return/circular migration, practically every *Nikkeijin* household has one member of the household with some working experience in Japan.

In spite of their importance, the detailed characteristics of *Nikkei* migrants and the prospect for future migration and remittances are under-researched. The major purpose of the present paper is therefore to examine the migration and remittance issues as well as their policy implications pertaining to *Nikkeijin* working in Japan. Although the main focus of the paper is placed on *Nikkeijin* workers, some discussions of migrant workers in general and the government policies towards foreign workers are also included since these issues are not widely known to non-Japanese.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the history of Japanese emigration to Latin America (mostly Brazil). This section is indispensable for understanding the characteristics of return migration of *Nikkeijin* to Japan. Section III discusses general trends and issues regarding immigration in Japan. Section IV, the core section of this paper, describes the major characteristics of *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan including the place of their residence, the types of their work, the duration of their stay, and the difficulties these *Nikkeijin* migrants face. The section also draws attention to the present situation and future prospect of remittances to their home countries. In addition, the section reviews policies of the central and local governments towards *Nikkeijin* workers. Given that the number of *Nikkeijin* workers has dramatically increased and they tend to be clustered in several cities (e.g. Hamamatsu, Toyota, Toyohashi, and Oizumi), the social and economic impacts of *Nikkeijin* workers on these cities are likely to be substantial. In response, governments as well as NGOs are making various efforts to create harmonious living of *Nikkeijin* workers within Japanese communities. Finally, Section V briefly notes the limitation of existing studies and describes the *Brazil Nikkei Household Survey*, which is being conducted by the World Bank Research Group at the time of writing this paper. The availability of the survey data will certainly contribute to

a better understanding of the Japan-Brazil migration and remittance corridor. Section VI summarizes the findings of the study, and discusses agendas for future studies.

II. History of Japanese Emigration to Brazil

(1) Overview

Before discussing *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan, let us examine the history of Japanese emigration to Latin America. In view of the fact that 85 percent of *Nikkeijin* workers from Latin America to Japan are Brazilians (see Section IV for more details), this section focuses primarily on Japanese emigration to Brazil. As the chronology of the Japanese emigration in the Appendix I shows, this migration began in 1908, when the ship named Kasado-Maru, carrying 791 Japanese bonded workers (*colonos*), arrived in the port of Santos. They were initially employed as bonded workers in coffee plantations. They gradually began to be engaged in various activities in Brazil including cultivation of various crops (other than coffee), commerce, and education. The current number of *Nikkeijin* in Brazil is estimated to be close to two million as indicated in Table 1.

The 100 years of Japanese emigration to Brazil may be divided into five periods as follows:

Period 1 (1908-1924): Immigration by private initiatives
Period 2 (1925-1936): Government sponsored immigration
Period 3 (1937-1951): Immigration stricken by the War and its aftermath
Period 4 (1952-1987): Post-war immigration
Period 5 (1988- to present): Return migration to Japan (*Dekasegi*)

This section will briefly discuss Periods 1 to 4, and the detailed discussion of Period 5 will be made in Section IV below.

(2) Prologue (before 1908)

The government of Japan in Tokugawa era (i.e., Samurai era) had closed the country in 1639 fearing the spread of Christianity. Since then Japan had very limited contact with the outside world for more than 200 years until American Commodore Perry came to Uraga City and forced Japan to open the country in 1853. Japanese emigration began in 1868 (the first year of Meiji era), when about 500 Japanese immigrants arrived in Hawaii (and 40 in Guam). In 1869 about 40 Japanese immigrants arrived in California. Because of the maltreatment of the Japanese migrants in the destination countries, the Japanese government became reluctant to encourage emigration. However, in the 1880s the attitude of the Government changed due to the country's stagnant economy. In order to mitigate unemployment problems, the Japanese government finalized official migration agreement with the Government of Hawaii in 1885. In that year, the first official Japanese immigrants – 943 of them – arrived in Hawaii. Between 1885 and

1894, many "official" Japanese immigrants were sent to different destinations including Hawaii, the mainland of the United States, Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji.

In 1894, "Migration Protection Regulation (Imin Hogo Kisoku)" was issued by the Japanese government, which assigned private migration companies to recruit and arrange Japanese emigration. Since then several migration companies took an initiative to send Japanese immigrants to all over the world. While major destinations of these immigrants were Hawaii and the United States, they were also sent to other parts of the world. For example, 790 Japanese bonded workers arrived in Peru in 1899, and about 3,000 Japanese bonded workers were sent to the Philippines in 1903. The United States and Canada, however, began to restrict Japanese immigration. In 1907 the Japan-U.S. Gentlemen's Agreement was signed, which severely restricted Japanese immigration to the United States including Hawaii that was annexed to the United States in 1898. In 1908 a similar gentlemen's agreement was concluded between Japan and Canada. As a result, the immigration to North America became extremely restricted, and the migration companies had to look for new destinations, mainly in Latin America. Table 2 shows the number of Japanese immigrants to Latin America between 1899 and 1941 (the year when Japan-U.S. Pacific War broke out). More than a quarter of million Japanese migrated to Latin America and Brazil was by far the main destination with more than 200,000 (78.43%) Japanese immigrants (De Carvalho, 2003). Peru followed Brazil and received about 33,000 Japanese migrants. Brazil was also the single most important destination after World War II. More than 60 percent of Japanese emigrants to Latin America headed for Brazil.

The desire of Japanese migration companies to shift Japanese emigration from North America to South America coincided with an increase in the demand for labor in Brazil. The major sources of labor for coffee plantations in Brazil used to be slaves brought from Africa. However, the slavery was abolished in Brazil in 1888. Due to the labor shortage caused by the emancipation, the owners of coffee plantations began to accept immigrants from Europe, mainly from Italy and Spain at first. Nevertheless, the shortage of labor was not overcome by the European immigration alone. Therefore, the owners of coffee plantations started to explore other sources of labor supply. This development coincided with the need of Japanese migration companies to look for destinations other than North America for Japanese migrants. Consequently, the agreement between a Japanese migration company and the government of São Paulo was signed in 1907.

(3) Period 1 (1908-1924): Immigration by Private Initiatives

On April 28, 1908, the Kasado-Maru left the port of Kobe for Brazil. The ship carried 781 Japanese emigrants who all expected to become wealthy in a few years in Brazil and to return to Japan in triumph. In order to enhance the recruitment of Japanese emigrants to Brazil, Kokoku Shokumin Kaisha (Imperial Migration Company), a private migration company, issued a deceiving advertisement. According to the advertisement, coffee was "a tree of gold", and each family of Japanese migrants in

Brazil could save 40 yen a month (at that time a monthly salary of a young teacher in the elementary school was 10-13 yen). This advertisement was sanctioned by the Japanese Police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

While the Japanese migrants dreamed of the tree of gold, the owners of coffee plantations simply wanted cheap labor. The Japanese migrants thus faced disappointment: their actual income was far less than advertised (just a subsistence level) and their working conditions were harsh. Although the Japanese immigrants dreamed of returning home after making a fortune in a few years, it remained just a dream. Of the 200,000 Japanese migrants who had migrated to Brazil before World War II, only seven percent actually returned to Japan (Takahashi, 1993). The majority of them thus remained in Brazil without knowing when (or if) they would make enough money to return home.

Despite the hardship of the Japanese immigrants in Brazil, the migration wave to Brazil continued, partly because the Government of São Paulo and the owners of coffee plantation gave travel subsidies to Japanese migrants. Table 3 shows the number of Japanese emigrants to Brazil since 1908. As the table indicates, the number of Japanese immigrants to Brazil surged in the 1910s. In most years, the number reached several thousands per year. In 1914 the total (accumulated) number of Japanese immigrants to Brazil exceeded ten thousands.

Almost all of the Japanese immigrants to Brazil in early years were bonded workers called "colonos." These colonos were obliged to stay at their original plantations for a few years under the contract. Nevertheless, due to the low wages and harsh working conditions, most of them left the plantation before their contracted term was over. Some of them just ran away under the cloak of night, while others made an agreement with the plantation owners to move away to other plantations. After leaving their original plantations, these migrants had to find other jobs for living, which can be classified into three broad categories: (i) working in coffee and cotton plantations owned by relatively well-off Japanese; (ii) engaging in rice cultivation in the Rio Grande delta area; and (iii) moving to cities like São Paulo and working as domestic help etc. As early as 1909 (just one year after Kasado-Maru arrived in São Paulo) five Japanese families owned land in Brazil and had started the cultivation of cotton. In 1915 several Japanese plantations called "colonies" were opened, the most famous of which was Hirano Colony Plantation. Table 4 shows the crop share of *Nikkeijin* farmers in Brazil since 1912. As this table reveals, in 1912 more than 90 percent of Japanese farmers were engaged in coffee production. However, 10 years later (in 1922), the share of farmers engaged in coffee production dropped to half, whereas the shares of rice, cotton, and suburb farming (e.g. vegetables, eggs, and chicken) increased substantially.

The Japanese migrants realized that it was extremely difficult for them to become rich and to return home quickly. Hence they began to form infrastructure in the *Nikkeijin* communities. As they never gave up the idea of returning home some day, they put a particular emphasis on the Japanese language education for their children. In 1915 the

first Japanese language school opened in São Paulo (Taisho School). Since then the number of Japanese language schools increased rapidly. In 1932 the number of Japanese schools in São Paulo alone was close to 200, with more than 10,000 *Nikkeijin* children being enrolled. In 1916 the first Japanese-language newspaper was published. In those years, *Nikkeijin* lived within *Nikkeijin* communities without assimilating into Brazilian communities. In many cases they did not speak Portuguese, and inter-marriages were rare.

(4) Period 2 (1925-1936): Government-sponsored Immigration

As mentioned above, in early years the São Paulo Government and the owners of plantations gave Japanese immigrants travel subsidies hoping that those Japanese immigrants would provide cheap labor for coffee plantations. However, since the Japanese immigrants did not stay in the original coffee plantations, the government of São Paulo announced the termination of travel subsidies to Japanese immigrants in 1921. In response, the Japanese government decided in 1925 to provide travel subsidies to Japanese emigrants who wanted to go to Brazil. This was the beginning of the era of government-sponsored migration to Latin America. In addition to travel subsidies, in 1926 the Japanese government loaned a large amount of money (80,000 yen), with very low interest rates, to Japanese coffee farmers in Brazil, who were suffering from the plunge of world coffee price. In 1927, "Overseas Immigration Union Law (Kaigai Iju Kumiai Ho)" was enacted in Japan. The purpose of the law was to promote Japanese colony plantations all over the world, except in the United States and Canada. The United States and Canada adopted very strict policies against Japanese immigration. For example, in 1924, the United States enacted the law, which completely prohibited new immigration from Japan. In 1928, Canada took a similar measure to severely restrict Japanese immigration to the country. In 1928, the Ministry of Immigration (Takumu Sho) was created in the Japanese government with the mission to promote and direct Japanese emigration overseas (except for the United States and Canada destinations).

Due to the emigration promotion policies by the Japanese government and the shift from the United States and Canada, the flow of Japanese immigration to Brazil greatly increased in those years. As Table 3 shows, the number of Japanese annual emigration to Brazil more than doubled in 1925. The high rate of immigration continued until the mid-1930s. During the period, the average number of Japanese emigration to Brazil exceeded 10,000 per year.

In the 1930s, the Japanese imperialism, backed by the military force, became prevalent, and the Japanese invasion to China was intensified. In 1931 the Manchurian Incident, i.e., the war between Japan and China, broke out. In 1932 Manchuria became an "independent state", which was a puppet regime of the Japanese military force. Since then the flood of Japanese immigration to Manchuria continued until the end of World War II (in 1945). In the same year, the Japanese government greatly increased travel subsidies given to the Japanese migrants traveling to Brazil in order to boost the immigration to Brazil. As a result, more than 20,000 Japanese arrived in Brazil in 1933

(and also in 1934).

The military advance of Japan put *Nikkeijin* in Brazil into a difficult situation. Since Brazil was a close ally of the United States, the country discouraged the inflow of immigrants from Japan, Germany, and Italy. In 1934 the famous "two percent clause" was added to the Brazilian Constitution, which limited the number of annual inflow of immigrants from each country to two percent of the total immigration from that country in the previous 50 years. Since Japanese immigration had a short history (started in 1908), the two percent clause meant a drastic decline of Japanese immigration to Brazil.

In 1936 the Japanese militarism further intensified due to the "2.26 incident." On February 26, about 1,400 military personnel attempted a coup d'etat in Japan. Many politicians, including the Minister of Finance, were assassinated. Although the coup attempt failed, the military authorities practically took over the Japanese government since then.

(5) Period 3 (1937-1951): Immigration Stricken by the War and Its Aftermath

Faced with the military advance of Japan and the imminent breakout of the warfare between Japan and the United States, Brazil, a close ally of the United States, began to take oppressive measures against *Nikkeijin* in Brazil. The Brazilian government tried to force *Nikkeijin* to assimilate to Brazilian society and to become Brazilian rather than Japanese. In an attempt to force assimilation, the Brazilian government prohibited Japanese language education for students under the age of fourteen in 1937. In 1938 the Brazilian new immigration law was enacted, which severely restricted *Nikkeijin*'s rights. In that year, Japanese (also German and Italian) language schools were forced to be completely closed in Brazil. In 1939 World War II broke out, and many Japanese immigrants returned to Japan to fight for their country. In 1941 the Japanese language and Japanese newspapers were prohibited in Brazil. The Pacific War (Japan-U.S. War) also broke out in the same year, turning *Nikkeijin* into people from an enemy country. In 1942 Brazil cut any diplomatic relation with Japan, Germany, and Italy, and further oppressive measures were imposed on *Nikkeijin* in Brazil. As a result, the number of Japanese immigration to Brazil decreased to zero in that year. Some of the *Nikkeijin* properties were frozen, and *Nikkeijin* were expelled from certain districts of large cities for "national security" reasons.

In June 1945, Brazil declared a war against Japan. On August 6 and 9, the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied Nations. In spite of the defeat of Japan in 1945, most *Nikkeijin* did not believe it, because they did not have any access to information from Japan and they had been told, by pre-war education, that Japan was the nation of the Sacred God, which would never lose. *Nikkeijin* who did not believe in the Japanese defeat were called "Kachi Gumi (the group of winners)", whereas those who did were called "Make Gumi (the group of losers). In the following few years after the end of the war, extremist groups of Kachi Gumi carried out terrorist attacks against Make Gum people. Many assassinations

of leaders of Make Gumi were made by radical Kachi Gumi members. This conflict between Kachi Gumi and Make Gumi was a tragic event in the history of *Nikkeijin* in Brazil.

Another tragic incident was the "return home scam." Since many *Nikkeijin* in Brazil believed that Japan won the war, they were waiting for the triumphant Japanese ships to arrive in Brazil to save them from their hardship in Brazil. Some scam artists, who were also *Nikkeijin*, took the advantage of this situation and provided other *Nikkeijin* false information that a Japanese ship would arrive in, say, the port of Santos the following month. In order to reserve the seat on the ship, people were asked to make an advance payment for the return ticket. Despite such a simple hoax, many *Nikkeijin* actually became the victims of this scam. In 1950, about 50 members of the right-wing fraud syndicate "Kokumin Zenen Tai (National Vangurd)" were arrested in São Paulo for the return home scam.

In spite of the hardship, Japanese immigrants worked hard, and put an emphasis on education of their descendents. As time went by, successful *Nikkeijin* emerged in Brazil. For example, in 1951 Mr. Tamaru became the first *Nikkeijin* parliament member of the State of São Paulo.

(6) Period 4 (1952-1987): Post-war Immigration

In 1952 the Brazilian government approved a resumption of Japanese immigration to Brazil, and the first Japanese immigration ship after World War II arrived in Santos in 1953. After the end of World War II, the Japanese government promoted emigration to mitigate poverty and unemployment in Japan. During World War II, most major cities in Japan, including Tokyo, Osaka, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Kobe to name a few, were almost completely destroyed by carpet bombing of the U.S. forces. About eighty percent of the production capacity of the Japanese economy was lost. The situation facing Japan at the time was probably worse than that of many developing countries today. In an attempt to ease unemployment, in 1955 the Emigration Bureau (Iju Kyoku) was created in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The mission of the department was to promote Japanese emigration overseas, mainly to the Americas, e.g. the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Dominican Republic. As Table 3 shows, the average number of Japanese emigration to Brazil in 1955-1961 was more than 5,000 per year.

However, the wave of the post-war immigration was short-lived because of the economic success of Japan following the war. Although the Japanese economy was severely damaged by the war, Japan showed a swift recovery and a miraculous economic development thanks to effective industrial and trade policies (see Figure 1 for *real* GDP of Japan). In 1961 the Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda announced the "income doubling plan", which initiated miraculous economic growth in Japan. As a result of the effective economic policy, the Japanese economy began to show a sign of strong recovery, and the double-digit growth rate continued until the Nixon Shock in 1971. Table 5 reports GDP and per capita GDP of selected OECD countries since 1950. In

1950 the GDP per capita of Japan was less than seven percent of that of the United States. The speed of the country's catch-up was remarkable, and the Japanese per capita income has exceeded that of the Unites States since 1990.[1]

Thanks to the prosperity in Japan after the mid-1960s, the movement of people from Japan to Brazil decreased, and foreign direct investment to Brazil rose instead. In the late 1970s, more than 500 Japanese firms went to Brazil. Although the Japanese immigrants before and during the war were Japanese who wanted to return to Japan sooner or later, the Japanese migrants in the post-war period, especially the descendents of the earlier migrants, were *Nikkeijin* who expected to live permanently in Brazil. Because of the emphasis on education, *Nikkeijin* are still playing important roles in Brazil today, e.g. many of them have become politicians, doctors, lawyers, and professors.

Since the late 1980s, a great number of *Nikkeijin* in Brazil have been returning to Japan to make money, which is the migration in the opposite direction to Japanese emigration in the past. The detailed discussion of the return migration of *Nikkeijin* is given in Section IV below.

III. Government Policy toward Migrant Workers in Japan

1. Recent Trend in Number of Migrant Workers in Japan

While the previous section has examined emigration from Japan, this section will discuss immigration into Japan. Although Japan has a restrictive policy toward foreign workers, their number has been increasing rapidly. Table 6 lists the share of foreign population in the total population in selected countries in 1990. As indicated in the table, only 1.2 percent of the total population was foreign born in East/Southeast Asia, which is substantially less than the share in North America (8.6%) or Europe (5.0%). The foreign born population had a relatively larger share in some internationalized countries (areas) such as Hong Kong (40.0%) and Singapore (15.5%). In total the share of foreigners in Japan was only 0.9 percent, which was among the lowest in the world.

Nevertheless, the share has been increasing rapidly since the 1990s. Table 7 shows the changes in the aggregate number of registered foreigners in Japan since 1978. The number of registered foreigners almost doubled from 1.1 million in 1990 to 2 million in 2005. The share of foreign population in 2004 was 1.6 percent. Even if the share is still smaller than that of most countries in the world, the rate of increase has been dramatic. Table 8 presents the number of registered foreigners by regions. Three quarters are from Asian countries, while the share of people from South America was 18.2 percent in 2004, most of them being *Nikkeijin* from Brazil, as will be discussed further in the next

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[1] Needless to say, it is difficult to compare the GDP of one country with that of another country, because the international comparison depends on the foreign exchange rates between their currencies.

section.

2. Basic Principles of the Japanese Immigration Policy

Let us examine the basic principles of the Japanese immigration policy. The policy of the Japanese government toward migrant workers is very clear. The Ninth Basic Plan of Employment Measures, approved by the Cabinet in August 1999, presents three principles for the Japanese immigration policy as follows (translation by the author):

(i) As for foreign workers with professional skills, their immigration to Japan should be promoted in order to vitalize economy and society of Japan, and to promote further internationalization of Japan;

(ii) As for the so-called unskilled foreign workers, their immigration should be carefully monitored given that their admission is likely to have a serious impact on the economy and society of Japan and the lives of Japanese citizens;

(iii) It is improper to consider immigration as a way to cope with the expected labor shortage due to the aging population and declined fertility in Japan. In order to deal with the labor shortage, it is important to create a society where elderly and women can actively participate in the labor market.

From the above, it is clear that the Japanese government welcomes professional and skilled foreign workers, but prohibits admission of unskilled foreign workers with some exceptions, e.g., *Nikkeijin* as discussed below. However, it has been argued in recent years that Japan should accept more foreign workers, both skilled and unskilled. Since the Japanese population is rapidly aging, the country will not be able to cope with possible labor shortage without accepting immigration at a large scale. Furthermore, it is argued that migration to Japan benefits sending countries by increasing their GDP through remittances sent back by migrants. For this reason Japan, one of the richest countries in the world, has a responsibility to admit migrant workers from poor developing countries.

3. Three Categories of Migrant Workers in Japan

(1) *Legal Skilled Workers*

Table 9 summarizes the number of migrant workers in Japan by visa categories in 2002. As shown in the table, the number of legal and skilled workers is very small, only about 0.3 percent (179,643) of the total Japanese labor force. Even when unskilled workers, mostly from Latin America, are included, the number of legal migrant workers makes up 0.62 percent (413,536) of the labor force. This is partly due to the strict Japanese immigration law, which severely restricts the number of jobs that foreign workers are allowed to take in the country. Therefore, most legal foreign workers, except for Latin Americans of Japanese origin, *Nikkeijin*, are professional workers, such as professors, researchers, lawyers, and accountants. In comparison with the European countries, the share of legal foreign workers in the labor force is extremely small. For instance, the

share of migrant workers, including illegal migrants, in the total labor force in Japan is less than one percent. In contrast, the same figure for France and Germany is around seven percent and it is as high as seventeen percent in Switzerland.

Despite the limited number of skilled and professional migrant workers in Japan, there are two groups of migrant workers that have dramatically increased in recent years: (i) illegal unskilled workers from neighboring Asian countries, and (ii) legal Latin American workers of Japanese origin. These two groups will be discussed in the following sections.

(2) *Illegal Unskilled Workers*

Although the number of migrant workers (both legal and illegal) in Japan is still less than a million, it increased substantially since the mid-1980s until the severe economic recession curbed the inflow in the 1990s. As Figure 2 shows, the number of illegal foreign workers apprehended by the authorities sharply increased from 2,339 in 1983 to 64,341 in 1993. Although the number declined slightly since then due to the severe recession of the Japanese economy, the number of illegal migrant workers is far greater than the level before the mid 1980s. Needless to say, these numbers represent only a small part of the total illegal foreign workers in Japan. According to the Ministry of Justice, the total number of illegal foreign workers in Japan is currently estimated to be about 200,000 to 300,000.

Just as most illegal aliens in the United States come from Mexico and other neighboring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, most illegal foreign workers in Japan come from neighboring Asian countries (see Table 10). Since the wage rate in their home countries is extremely low, even compared with a discriminatory low wage rate by Japanese standard, potential income gains are one of the main determinants of this migration.

The recent influx of Asian workers is markedly different from earlier migrations. Until the mid 1980s most illegal foreign workers were women who worked as bar hostesses (the so-called "*Japayuki San* (Miss Japan-going)"). In 1983-84, for example, more than 90 percent of illegal foreign workers were female. However, the number of male workers dramatically increased to about 50-80 percent of the total number of illegal immigrants (see Figure 2). As shown in Table 11, in 2004, about a quarter of the illegal male workers were construction workers, and 36 percent of female workers were bar hostesses. As in many other parts of the world, most illegal aliens are taking work that few Japanese want to do because of unfavorable working conditions. It should be noted that about two-thirds of the illegal migrants are working in the non-tradable sectors, such as construction and service industries.

(3) *Legal Unskilled Workers – Migrant Workers of Japanese Origin (Nikkeijin)*

In addition to the illegal foreign workers discussed above, there has been a remarkable

increase in the number of *Nikkeijin* workers. They come from Latin American countries with a history of Japanese immigration such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. The arrival of these workers is mainly due to the revised immigration law in Japan, which was enacted in 1989 and was put into effect in June 1990. Since the wage rate in Japan is much higher (and Japanese society is much safer) than that in Latin America, a great number of Latin Americans of Japanese origin were attracted to Japan. According to the media, some of these immigrants fell into huge debt to pay for their travel cost, and other people without Japanese origin were arrested for forgery of their birth certificate or for using some other person's identification. Figure 3 shows the increase in the number of *Nikkeijin* workers since 1988. While the number of *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan was only eight thousand at the end of 1988 (the year before the revised immigration law was enacted), it doubled every year to reach around 8,000 in June 1991. In 2004, the number of *Nikkeijin* staying in Japan was 250,734.

4. *Reasons for the Sharp Increase – Push and Pull*

Why did many unskilled foreign workers suddenly come to Japan after the middle of the 1980s? It is clear that the most important reason for the increase in the *Nikkeijin* workers from Latin America is the change in the Japanese immigration policy in 1990. In contrast, the reasons for the influx of illegal foreign workers from neighboring Asian countries are not so obvious.

One of the most important factors is that a push-force in neighboring Asian countries coincided with a pull-force in the Japanese economy in the 1980s. As far as the supply side is concerned, one of the most important reasons for the sharp increase was probably the decline in the demand for Asian migrant workers in the Middle East. In the 1970s, an increasing number of Asians had been recruited to work at construction sites in the oil producing Middle Eastern countries. When the price of crude oil quadrupled after the First Oil Crisis in 1973, a construction boom occurred in the oil-rich countries. Given the relatively small population size of these countries in the Middle East, they started to recruit a large number of temporary immigrants mostly from southern Europe and Asia. As a result, the number of migrant workers from eight Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea) to the Middle East grew from a little more than 0.1 million in 1976 to more than 1.2 million in 1982. Nevertheless, as the price of crude oil went down in the 1980s, the construction boom in the Middle East subsided, and some 400,000 Asian migrant workers lost their jobs and had to return to their home countries.

The return of these workers was a serious blow to the Asian sending countries, since remittances from the migrant workers had become an important source of foreign exchange. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example, remittances from migrant workers were almost as large as the total value of their exports. The slowdown in the Middle East created a large pool of Asian worker who were eager to find new jobs in some other countries. To these unemployed workers, Japan, one of their rich neighbors, appeared as the new land of opportunity.

The increase in the supply pressure coincided with the increased demand of Japanese businesses for migrant labor. Due to the strong performance of the Japanese economy, the labor market in Japan became very tight in the mid-1980s. The performance of the Japanese economy after the middle of the 1980s was impressive: the annual growth rates of the real GNP in 1988, 1989, and 1990 were 6.2 percent, 4.7 percent, and 5.6 percent respectively; those of industrial production in 1988, 1989, and 1990 were 9.5 percent, 6.1 percent, and 4.6 percent respectively. Consequently, the labor market became tight, and the job-opening/job-seeker ratio (one of the most commonly used indicators of the labor market condition in Japan) sharply increased. While the ratio nose-dived in 1975 (the First Oil Recession) and stayed at around 0.6 (i.e., only six jobs were available for every 10 job seekers), it began to increase after 1987. In 1988 the ratio exceeded one for the first time since 1974, and it went as high as 1.40 in 1990. The labor shortages were especially felt in the construction and service industries. Moreover, due to the decline in the number of domestic marginal workers (i.e., seasonal workers called "*dekasegi*"), the demand for migrant workers to fill the gap in this marginal labor market also increased.

A typical practice of Japanese firms in boom years has been to increase the number of marginal workers, such as seasonal and temporary workers, because firms have at least a moral obligation to keep their *regular* employees on the payroll even in a recession. However, the construction industry was losing an important supply source of domestic non-regular workers. Until the 1980s, the labor shortage in the construction industry in boom years had been largely filled by seasonal workers, *dekasegi*. They were mostly farmers in the northern part of Japan who came to metropolitan areas like Tokyo and Osaka to take temporary jobs in an attempt to supplement their farm incomes in the farmers' slack season. In the early 1970s, the number of *dekasegi* amounted to about 600,000 (Goto, 1990). However, because of increased job opportunities in their home towns the number began to diminish steadily. According to the Japanese Ministry of Labor, only 142,200 *dekasegi* were reported in 1993. The decline in the supply of *dekasegi*, along with the construction boom, created a serious labor shortage in the construction industry. The strong demand for marginal workers in the Japanese construction industry attracted an increasing number of foreign workers who were facing the decreasing demand for their labor in the Middle East.

Given the strong push- and pull-forces, illegal mediators between Japanese employers and Asian migrants (like the "coyote" figure for Mexican illegal aliens in the United States) have become prevalent. Although the details of their illegal activities are unknown, involvement of gangsters has often been reported. According to an estimate by the Japanese Ministry of Justice, in 1990 about 70 percent of illegal migrant workers entered Japan with the help of such illegal mediators.

IV. *Nikkeijin* Workers in Japan and the Japanese Government Policy towards them

1. Dramatic Increase since the Beginning of the 1990s

The influx of *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan is due to the revision of the Japanese immigration law in 1990. As mentioned above, foreigners are prohibited from taking unskilled jobs in Japan, in principle. However, the revision of the immigration law added a visa category of "long term resident (*teijusha*)". The law allowed anyone whose parent or grandparent was Japanese (second and third generations) to apply for the "long term resident visa". Long term residents can stay in Japan for three years, and they can take any activities in Japan including the unskilled work. As a result, a great number of *Nikkeijin* began to come to Japan to make quick money. Table 12 shows the number of "long term residents" by sending countries. As indicated in the table, in 2004, more than half (57.6%) of the long term residents were Brazilians.

The increase in the number of Brazilians coming to Japan has been dramatic. Figure 4 presents the number of Brazilians staying in Japan since 1988. While there were only 4,159 Brazilians in Japan in 1988, the number jumped to 56,429 in 1990. Since then, the number of Brazilian immigrants has increased almost every year to 286,557 in 2004, which is seventy times as high as that in 1988. Moreover, many Brazilians are repeat migrants, who come back to Japan in a few years after they return to their home country. Table 13 shows the number of entry of Brazilians to Japan since 1999. As indicated, about half of Brazilians are repeat migrants.

In the early 1990s, most of *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan were single males, who intended to stay for a few years and to return home with big money earned in Japan. They therefore remitted a large portion of their income to their home country. However, the *Nikkeijin* workers have begun to stay for a longer period and to live in Japan with their families. Some of them obtained permanent residency in Japan. The more they take root in Japan, the less remittance they may send to their home country. In the following section, I will first briefly discuss the situation of *Nikkeijin* workers in the early 1990s. Then I will examine what kind of changes emerged in the characteristics of *Nikkeijin* workers in more recent years, and discuss how these changes affect the amount of future remittances to their home country.

2. *Nikkeijin* Workers in the Early 1990s --Single Males in Car Parts Factory[2]

The Japanese Ministry of Labour published results of a survey on *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan in 1991, and the following discussion is mainly based on the outcome of this survey. According to the survey, about two thirds of the *Nikkeijin* were male, and the majority of them were under thirty years old. About two-thirds were coming to Japan without family, and only 13 percent were accompanied by their entire family. Almost all (more than 90 percent) of these males were working as production workers in the manufacturing sector. Of these, approximately one-third were employed in the transport equipment production sector (most of them in car parts factories). This constituted a striking contrast with illegal unskilled workers from Asia, who were employed mainly

[2] The discussion in this subsection is largely based on Goto (1993).

in the non-tradable sectors, such as construction and services.

In terms of working conditions in the early years, there was no substantial difference between the hourly wage of the *Nikkeijin* workers and that of their Japanese counterparts. Since *Nikkeijin* were legally employed, employers tended to pay them at regular hourly wage rates. However, the annual income of these *Nikkeijin* workers was much smaller than that of Japanese workers, because most of the *Nikkeijin* workers were employed on a daily basis and paid by the hour. Note that, in terms of wage structure, blue-collar production workers in Japan are similar to white-collar workers in the United States. Most of the blue-collar production workers in Japan receive a monthly salary (instead of hourly wages). Further, these salaried workers receive bonus payments twice a year and enjoy various fringe benefits. The bonus payment in Japan constitutes a substantial part of their annual income – the amount of average bonus is equal to five month salary. Therefore, even though the hourly wage rate of *Nikkeijin* workers was similar to that of the Japanese counterpart, their annual income was much smaller than Japanese workers because most of *Nikkeijin* workers did not receive bonus payment and fringe benefits.

Moreover, the *Nikkeijin* workers were often exploited by brokers or mediators. According to the survey result, less than half of *Nikkeijin* workers were directly employed by the firm where they actually worked. More than half of *Nikkeijin* workers were employed by mediator agencies and were sent by them to the factories.[3] Hence the actual income of *Nikkeijin* workers was usually smaller than what the factories were paying for their work. In some cases, exploitation by gangsters was also reported. In addition, the above survey reveals that most of the *Nikkeijin* workers were working without medical insurance and unemployment insurance.[4] In Japan almost 100 percent of workers (and their family) are covered by a very generous government-sponsored medical insurance program. Workers contribute to the medical insurance program according to their income and the deductibles are nominal. No matter how high the actual medical cost is, the payment out of the patient's pocket does not exceed about 500 dollars a month and the balance is paid by the insurance program. Very poor people can enjoy the same benefit as the others without contributing anything. Nevertheless, according to the survey, only 23 percent of the *Nikkeijin* workers were covered by the medical insurance program, probably because neither the employers nor the *Nikkeijin* workers themselves wanted to pay their contributions to the program. But this implies that in case of illness or accident these *Nikkeijin* workers had to pay 100 percent of their

[3] As shown in Table 17, this wais still the case in 2003. In 2003 more than 64 percent of *Nikkeijins* are employed through mediators and contractors.

[4] Thanks to the efforts by central and local governments, most *Nikkeijins* are now covered by the unemployment insurance system. However, many *Nikkeijins* are still outside of the coverage of medical insurance. The reason for the low coverage of medical insurance is believed that medical insurance and pension are presented as a package (i.e., if someone wishes to participate in the public medical insurance, he or she has to be enrolled in the national pension system as well). Since *Nikkeijin* does not think he or she would stay in Japan for more than twenty years, when he or she becomes eligible to receive pension), he or she tends to decline the public medical insurance in order to avoid contribution to the pension system.

medical expenses out of pocket.

3. *Nikkeijin* Workers in Recent Years: Settlers with Family

(1) From Temporary Guest Workers to Settlers

When an increasing number of Brazilian *Nikkeijin* began to come to Japan in the early 1990s, most of them were "*dekasegi*" workers (i.e., temporary guest workers), who stayed in Japan just for a few years and went back to their home country with a fortune made in Japan. However, in recent years, the Brazilians have begun to settle in Japan, just as the Japanese emigrants did in Brazil about 100 years earlier. Figure 5 shows the result of a survey on *Nikkeijin*'s length of stay in Japan, which was conducted by Sangyo Koyo Antei Sentah (Industry Employment Security Center) in 2002. As the table indicates, almost 80 percent of *Nikkeijin* workers stayed in Japan for more than three years. Twenty-eight percent of them stayed in Japan for more than 10 years. This is probably due to the fact that it was very difficult for *Nikkeijin dekasegi* workers to quickly make a great amount of money under the stagnant Japanese economy. In addition, it was hard for them to find good jobs in Brazil after returning home due to the Brazilian stagnant economy. Although the long-term resident visa is valid only for three years initially, the Japanese government is generous to allow those Brazilians to apply for renewals. Unless they commit a crime, the renewal is almost automatic.

After two or three renewals, they can apply even for a permanent resident visa, which is extremely difficult to obtain for foreigners other than *Nikkeijin.* As a result, the number of permanent residents from Brazil has been rapidly increasing in recent years. Table 14 presents the change in the number of permanent residents by nationality since 2000. As indicated in the table, the overall number of permanent residents increased only by 18 percent from 657,605 in 2000 to 778,583 in 2004. However, the increase for Brazilians is remarkable. While there were only 9,062 permanent residents from Brazil in 2000, the number in 2004 (52,581) was almost six times larger. As a result, while the Brazilian *dekasegi* workers used to predominantly be on a long-term resident visa in the early 1990s, the share of long term residents decreased to about half (52%) of the total Brazilians staying in Japan in 2002 (see Figure 6). Thirty-four percent of Brazilians entered Japan with a visa for spouse etc. of Japanese citizens, and 12 percent were staying in Japan with a permanent resident visa in that year.

As *Nikkeijin* from Brazil stay longer in Japan, they bring their family to Japan. The male *dekasegi* workers started to bring their wives and children from Brazil. Table 15 shows such a tendency. The table compares the number of Brazilians by age and gender in 2002 with those in 1992. The share of working-age Brazilians (15 to 64 years old) in 1992 was 91.5 percent, but it dropped to 84.4 percent by 2002. On the other hand, the share of children (0-14 years old) increased by seven percentage points from 8.3 percent in 1992 to 15.2 percent in 2002.

As discussed in detail below, the increase in spouses and children has generated various

problems including those related to the education of their children in Japan and daily life in the Japanese community.

(2) Clustered Cities

Nikkeijin migrants from Brazil tend to be clustered in certain cities and towns, where employment in the manufacturing industry is available. About 60 percent of foreign residents are clustered in 15 towns and cities as shown in Table 16. The table indicates the share of foreign residents (and Brazilians) in total population in each municipality. While the share of Brazilians in the total population of Japan is 0.21 percent, the Brazilian shares in the population of these fifteen cities are much higher than the national average. For example, in Oizumi Town in Gunma Prefecture, where the number of total population is 41,284, more than 4,000 inhabitants are Brazilian. The share of Brazilians in Oizumi Town thus exceeds 10 percent (11.4%). In certain living districts in these cities, the concentration is even greater. For instance, in Homi Housing District in Toyota City in Aichi Prefecture where about 10,000 people are living, the number of Brazilians is as high as 4,000, or 40 percent. Since very few Brazilians speak Japanese, and since social custom in Japan is very different from that in Brazil, the Brazilians often encounter various problems: e.g. while a party with Samba music at midnight might be common in Brazil, such behavior often results in a serious conflict with Japanese neighbors.

Due to the clustering, the municipal governments of the cities with a large number of foreign residents, mostly Brazilians, face many challenges. In May 2001, mayors from 13 municipal governments of such cities formed "Gaikokujin Shuju Toshi Kaigi (Congress of Major Cities where Foreign Residents Concentrate to Live)". This was an attempt to achieve harmonious living by foreign residents in these Japanese communities.

As for employment of the *Nikkeijin* workers, Table 17 shows that almost all of them (86.0%) are employed in the manufacturing industry. That is different from other (illegal) foreign unskilled workers, most of who are employed in the service sectors. It should be noted that two-thirds (64.3%) of *Nikkeijin* workers obtain employment through private mediators and contractors as mentioned above.

The municipalities with the concentration of foreign residents provide public housing to foreigners. Table 18 shows the current rate of foreign households' occupancy of public housing in selected municipalities. In these cities, more than 10% (13.7%) of public housing is occupied by foreign residents. This is particularly true in Iwata City in Shizuoka Prefecture where more than a quarter of public housing is occupied by foreign residents.

(3) Problems with Education and Crime

The increased number of children of *Nikkeijin* workers has caused various problems, of

which the education of *Nikkeijin* children and their high crime rates are two primary concerns. As Table 15 shows, the number of school-age children (5-14 years) tripled in 10 years. While the number of school-age children was 7,244 in 1992, it increased to 23,610 in 2002. It is surprising to observe a high non-attendance ratio among *Nikkeijin* children. One of the main reasons for the poor attendance is their lack of Japanese language skills, which poses difficulties in following the class. Another possible explanation is the high tuition fees of Brazilian-language schools in Japan. Table 19 shows the number of school-age foreign residents and the number of the school enrolment in cities where foreign residents are concentrated. As indicated in the table, absenteeism of foreign children, mostly *Nikkeijin* children, is appalling. More than a quarter of *Nikkeijin* children do not attend school, which is a striking difference compared to the enrollment rate of Japanese children that is 99.9 percent.

Absenteeism often results in juvenile delinquency. Table 20 summarizes the change in the number of criminal offences by Brazilians and Peruvians since 1992. Between 1992 and 2002, for instance, the number of foreign residents from Brazil increased by 80 percent from 147,803 to 268,332. The number of criminal offences committed by Brazilians also increased dramatically. In 2002 the number of crimes committed by Brazilian reached 4,967, which is 22 times larger than that in 1992 (222). That constitutes a sharp contrast with Peruvians in Japan. While there is no clear increase in criminal offences by Peruvians, those committed by Brazilians have increased sharply in recent years. Moreover, the number of criminal offences per Brazilian resident is much higher than that of Peruvians. Criminal offences are particularly serious among Brazilian juveniles. Brazil tops the rank in terms of the number of juvenile crimes committed by foreign residents in Japan.

(4) Policies of the Japanese Governments towards *Nikkeijin* in Japan

Faced with the increasing number of *Nikkeijin* workers and their families in the country, the Japanese governments, both central and local, are taking various policy measures to assist the living of *Nikkeijin*, and to achieve harmonious coexistence of Japanese and *Nikkeijin*. The following is a partial listing of such policy measures.

(i) Measures taken by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
* Interpreters of Portuguese and Spanish at 62 public employment security offices
* Job counseling specially designed for *Nikkeijin* Workers at the employment service centers for *Nikkeijin* (at Tokyo and Aichi Prefecture)
* Job counseling for prospective *dekasegi* workers in São Paulo
* Leaflets on job openings in Portuguese and Spanish
* Assistance to *Nikkeijin* juveniles to find jobs in Japan

(ii) Measures taken by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
* Special teachers who give necessary assistance to non Japanese-speaking students
* School counselors who assist students and parents coming from abroad

* Special curriculum for non Japanese-speaking students

(iii) Measures taken by the local governments (especially of clustered cities)
* Leaflets and newsletters in foreign language (Portuguese, Spanish, English etc.) on the life in Japan
* Counseling centers in various foreign languages
* Free medical examinations for foreign residents
* Special personnel to assist students from foreign countries
* Japanese language education

(5) Remittances

In many developing countries, e.g. the Philippines, remittances are a very important source of income. This is also the case in Brazil. According to Beltrão and Sonoe (2006), remittances by *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan are estimated to be US$2 billion annually, almost equal to the annual exports from Brazil to Japan.

There are a few studies on the amount of remittances to Brazil from each *Nikkeijin* worker. Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Kikou (Japan Institute of Labour) conducted interviews in 1993 and 1998 among *Nikkeijin* in Brazil who had working experience in Japan.[5] According to the survey, average monthly remittances from each *dekasegi* worker were US$1,664 and US$1848 in 1993 and 1998 respectively. In 1993 the average amount of monthly remittance (US$1,664) was almost three times higher than the average monthly income in Brazil (US$623). Also in 1998, the amount of monthly remittances (US$1,848) was a little higher than monthly income in Brazil (US$1,806).

Commissioned by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Microfinance International Corporation (2005) did a similar study on remittances of Latin Americans working in Japan.[6] This study reports that seventy percent of Latin Americans working in Japan remit regularly. According to the study, these migrants remit 14.5 times a year, and the average amount of remittance each time is US$600. This implies that they remit US$8,700 annually, and that the average amount of monthly remittance is US$725, which is far less than the amount based on the study by the Japan Institute of Labor.

While the amount of total remittances by *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan is enormous at present, the current level of remittance flows from Japan to Brazil may not last in the future. As discussed above, an increasing number of *Nikkeijin* workers are changing status from temporary *dekasegi* workers to settlers in Japan. In 2004 the number of permanent residents from Brazil exceeded 50,000, and the number has been increasing rapidly in recent years. The longer they stay, the less they might remit. The history of Turkish guest workers in Germany has shown the decline in the amount of remittances sent back to Turkey as the guest workers settled in the host country.

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[5] See Appendix II for the methodology used for these surveys.
[6] See Appendix II for the methodology used for this survey.

V. Limitation of the Existing Literature and the *Brazil Nikkei Household Survey*

This paper has presented a descriptive account of the migration of *Nikkeijin* to Japan based on the available data and existing studies. While some data on the *Nikkei* migrants and remittances sent to Brazil are available, most of the data are available only at the aggregate level, not at the household level, and there seems to be some discrepancy even among the existing data as noted earlier. A more serious problem is, however, the absence of microeconomic data at the household-level for the Japan-Brazil corridor, which would allow us to empirically analyze the migration and remittance behavior of *Nikkeijin* and examine their welfare implications. In order to fill this gap, the World Bank Research Group is conducting the *Brazil Nikkei Household Survey* among the Japanese community in Brazil at the time of writing the present paper.

The primary objective of this survey is to ascertain key determinants and constraints of migration by *Nikkeijin* to, settlement in, and return from Japan. The survey also aims to examine the socioeconomic and welfare impacts of migration and remittances on *Nikkei* households. The survey contains usual questions included in household surveys such as those on demographic composition of households, education level and economic activities of household members, information on housing conditions and ownership of durable goods. In addition, it incorporates migration-related questions specific to each group of respondents, namely households with returned migrants, those with current migrants, and those which do not have any household member who ever migrated to Japan. The survey, for instance, asks the main reasons for migrating to Japan (or for not migrating to Japan), the economic activity in Brazil before migrating (and after returning to Brazil for returned migrants) as well as in Japan, the duration of stay in Japan, the types of visa obtained upon arrival (and upon departure), whether the migrants had any network (i.e., friends, families or other acquaintances) in Japan, and the frequency and method of contact with the other household members left in Brazil.

The survey also contains questions regarding remittances. For instance, it asks households whether they receive any remittances from Japan, and if they do so, how they receive and how they spend them. It also asks about each household's general accessibility to and use of financial services. If the household has any returned or current migrant, the survey asks which method he/she uses/used for remitting money to Brazil, and what factors affected the choice of the method used.

Another non-trivial contribution of this survey will be the assessment of different survey sampling methodologies to collect representative data through household survey questionnaires for applied microeconomic analysis of migration and remittance corridors.[7] The survey will firstly implement a "random stratified sampling frame" based on the available census data. It will then implement two alternative

[7] See McKenzie and Mistiaen (2007) for more detailed discussion on the experiment of different sampling methodologies.

methodologies, namely "snowball sampling" and "intercept sampling" techniques. The former is a technique where a sampling frame will be built up from a certain number of "seed" *Nikkei* households, i.e., these seed households are asked to provide referrals to other households with the *Nikkeijin* community. In contrast, the latter involves interviews taking place during set time periods at a number of pre-specified well-defined locations that are frequented by *Nikkeijin*. These two alternatives are a non-probability sampling technique. It is obviously more ideal to obtain data based on a probability sampling. However, it is generally a difficult task to construct a sampling frame for sub-groups of population who migrate, send or receive remittances. The fact that these sub-groups are typically "rare elements" in the population makes this task hard. The findings of the survey will therefore help us assess how representative data the alternative sampling approaches can generate in case the probability-sampling technique is not feasible or too costly.

In sum, given the relatively extensive and detailed questions of the survey, this dataset will certainly advance our understanding of not only the Japan-Brazil migration and remittance corridor, but also of migration and remittance behavior in general. The data will also allow us to investigate the robustness of some of the existing findings on the Japan-Brazil corridor presented in this paper. Finally, the outcome of the survey will have some methodological contributions to migration-related studies.

VI. Concluding Remarks

This paper has examined the background and major characteristics of *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan. Section II examined the history of Japanese emigration to Latin America (mostly Brazil). Section III discussed immigration in Japan in general. In response to the revision of the immigration law and the relatively straightforward procedure for renewing visas and also for obtaining permanent residency for *Nikkeijin*, the share of *Nikkeijin* workers in the total migrant workers in Japan dramatically increased in the 1990s. Section IV discussed the main characteristics of *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan. *Nikkeijin* workers in the early 1990s were mostly temporary guest workers, who intended to return home in a few years with a fortune made in Japan. However, they have gradually begun to settle in Japan with their families. Since *Nikkeijin* are clustered in certain cities (e.g. Hamamatsu, Toyota, Toyoshashi, and Oizumi), the social and economic impacts of *Nikkeijin* workers on these cities are enormous. Governments, as well as NGOs, are therefore making various efforts to create harmonious living of *Nikkeijin* workers in Japanese communities. Section IV pointed out that, while the current amount of remittances by *Nikkeijin* is non-trivial, this may not last in the future, because the amount of remittances tends to decline as migrant workers start settling in the destination country.

Although I have presented various data on *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan, more studies on *Nikkeijin* and remittances are clearly needed. First, while there are various studies on the characteristics of *Nikkeijin* workers and remittances, most of them are based on ad hoc interviews, and therefore the results vary widely from study to study. For example,

according to the study by the Japan Institute of Labor, the average amount of monthly remittances was about $1,664 -- $1,848, while the study commissioned by the IDB reported a far smaller amount of $725. Thus, accumulation of ad hoc survey results do not seem very useful for understanding *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan and future prospect of remittances from those workers. Secondly, an econometric study is clearly needed in addition to descriptive analyses. In order to forecast the future remittances, for instance, it would be useful to estimate elasticity of the amount of remittances with respect to, say, the length of stay, and the number of family members in each *Nikkeijin* household. For these ends, the availability of the *Brazil Nikkei Household Survey* data described in Section V will certainly help us deepen our understanding of the migration and remittance behavior of *Nikkei* migrants and their future prospects.

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Table 1: Number of *Nikkeijin* in Brazil (1923-2006, estimates)

Year	Number
1923	39,249
1932	133,358
1940	205,850
1958	430,151
1976	800,000
1986	1,075,133
1996	1,444,889
2006	1,941,810

Source: Carvalho (2003).

Table 2: Japanese emigrants to Latin American countries

	1899-1941		Post-1945		Total	
	number	share (%)	number	share (%)	number	share (%)
Total	257,575	100.00	86,427	100.00	344,002	100.00
Argentina	5,398	2.10	12,066	13.96	17,464	5.08
Bolivia	202	0.08	6,357	7.36	6,559	1.91
Brazil	202,025	78.43	53,555	61.97	255,58	74.30
Chile	519	0.20		0.00	519	0.15
Colombia	229	0.09		0.00	229	0.07
Cuba	686	0.27		0.00	686	0.20
Dominica		0.00	1,39	1.61	1,39	0.40
Mexico	14,476	5.62	671	0.78	15,147	4.40
Panama	415	0.16		0.00	415	0.12
Paraguay	521	0.20	9,612	11.12	10,133	2.95
Peru	33,07	12.84	2,615	3.03	35,685	10.37
Uruguay	18	0.01		0.00	18	0.01
Venezuela	12	0.00		0.00	12	0.00
Others	4	0.00	161	0.19	165	0.05

Source: Compiled from the data in Carvalho (2003).

Table 3

Number of Japanese emigrants to Brazil, 1908-1986

Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number
1908	830	1924	2 673	1940	1 268	1956	4 912	1972	352
1909	31	1925	6 333	1941	1 548	1957	6 147	1973	492
1910	948	1926	8 407	1942	0	1958	6 586	1974	239
1911	28	1927	9 084	1943	0	1959	7 123	1975	254
1912	2 909	1928	11 169	1944	0	1960	7 746	1976	1 126
1913	7 122	1929	16 648	1945	0	1961	6 824	1977	682
1914	3 675	1930	14 074	1946	6	1962		1978	584
1915	65	1931	5 632	1947	1	1963	2 124	1979	500
1916	165	1932	11 678	1948	1	1964	1 138	1980	562
1917	3 899	1933	24 494	1949	4	1965	903	1981	417
1918	5 599	1934	21 930	1950	33	1966	937	1982	329
1919	3 022	1935	9 611	1951	106	1967	1 070	1983	289
1920	1 013	1936	3 306	1952	261	1968	597	1984	261
1921	840	1937	4 557	1953	1 928	1969	496	1985	258
1922		1938	2 524	1954	3 119	1970	435	1986	363
1923	895	1939	1 414	1955	4 051	1971	452	Total	######

Source: Carvalho (2003)

Table 4: Crop Share of *Nikkeijin* Farmers in Brazil

	1912	1922	1932	1942	1958
Coffee	92.6	52.2	59	24.3	27.5
Rice	2.5	17.6	8.3	4.5	3
Cotton	1.2	12.1	14	39.2	20.5
Kinko	0.6	10.2	13	19.9	34.1
Other	3.1	7.9	5.7	12.1	14.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Kikumura-Yano, A. (2002).

Table 5: National Income of Selected OECD Countries

	GDP				GDP per capita			
	(Value, in $billions)				(Value, in $)			
	Japan	USA	UK	Germany	Japan	USA	UK	Germany
1950	109	2883	377	234	131	1897	744	468
1960	440	5153	727	722	468	2852	1390	1302
1970	2033	10155	1249	1846	1949	4952	2254	3041
1980	10632	27319	5353	8185	9103	11996	9567	13296
1990	30522	58033	9946	15470	24718	23209	17377	24458
2000	47661	98247	14409	18752	37574	34796	24571	22844
	(Index, USA=100.0)				(Index, USA=100.0)			
	Japan	USA	UK	Germany	Japan	USA	UK	Germany
1950	3.8	100.0	13.1	8.1	6.9	100.0	39.2	24.7
1960	8.5	100.0	14.1	14.0	16.4	100.0	48.7	45.7
1970	20.0	100.0	12.3	18.2	39.4	100.0	45.5	61.4
1980	38.9	100.0	19.6	30.0	75.9	100.0	79.8	110.8
1990	52.6	100.0	17.1	26.7	106.5	100.0	74.9	105.4
2000	48.5	100.0	14.7	19.1	108.0	100.0	70.6	65.7

(Source) IMF

Table 6: Foreign Population in Selected Countries

	Total population (thousand)	Foreign population (thousand)	[1990] Foreigner ratio (%)
East/Southeast Asia	652,927	7,594	1.2
Japan	123,267	1,075	0.9
Korea	42,663	900	2.1
Malaysia	17,670	745	4.2
Singapore	2,690	418	15.5
Taiwan	19,080	1,508	7.9
Hong Kong	5,680	2,271	40.0
Thailand	55,138	314	0.6
North America	276,384	23,868	8.6
Canada	27,606	4,266	15.5
United States	248,778	19,603	7.9
Europe	498,740	24,908	5.0
France	56,563	5,897	10.4
Germany	79,195	5,037	6.4
Switzerland	6,804	1,092	16.0
United Kingdom	57,332	3,718	6.5
Latin America	402,285	6,550	1.6
Argentina	32,325	1,675	5.2
Brazil	147,134	1,138	0.8
World	5,926,830	120,000	2.0

Source: United Nations, Japanese Ministry of Labor, U.S. Census Bureau

Table 7
The changes in aggregate number of registered foreigners (as of end of each year)

Year	Total number	Year-on-year rate (%)	Index	The share in total population of Japan (%)
1978	766,894		39	0.67
1979	774,505	1.0	39	0.67
1980	782,910	1.1	40	0.67
1981	792,946	1.3	40	0.67
1982	802,477	1.2	41	0.68
1983	817,129	1.8	41	0.68
1984	840,885	2.9	43	0.70
1985	850,612	1.2	43	0.70
1986	867,237	2	44	0.71
1987	884,025	1.9	45	0.72
1988	941,005	6.4	48	0.77
1989	984,455	4.6	50	0.80
1990	1,075,317	9.2	54	0.87
1991	1,218,891	13.4	62	0.98
1992	1,281,644	5.1	65	1.03
1993	1,320,748	3.1	67	1.06
1994	1,354,011	2.5	69	1.08
1995	1,362,371	0.6	69	1.08
1996	1,415,136	3.9	72	1.12
1997	1,482,707	4.8	75	1.18
1998	1,512,116	2.0	77	1.20
1999	1,556,113	2.9	79	1.23
2000	1,686,444	8.4	85	1.33
2001	1,778,462	5.5	90	1.40
2002	1,851,758	4.1	94	1.45
2003	1,915,030	3.4	97	1.50
2004	1,973,747	3.1	100	1.55

Sources: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Table 8: Number of registered foreigners by sending region **(as of the end of the year)**

Region	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004		
						Share (%)	Percentage change from the end of the previous year (%)
Total	1,686,444	1,778,462	1,851,758	1,915,030	1,973,747	100.0	3.1
Asia	1,244,629	1,311,449	1,371,171	1,422,979	1,464,360	74.2	2.9
South America	312,921	329,510	334,602	343,635	358,211	18.2	4.2
North America	58,100	60,492	63,201	63,271	64,471	3.3	1.9
Europe	47,730	51,497	55,288	57,163	58,429	3.0	2.2
Oceania	12,839	14,697	15,898	16,076	16,131	0.8	0.3
Africa	8,214	8,876	9,694	10,060	10,319	0.5	2.6
Stateless	2,011	1,941	1,904	1,846	1,826	0.1	-1.1

Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Table 9: FOREIGN WORKERS IN JAPAN (2002)	
Legal foreign workers	413,536
Skilled workers	(179,639)
Migrant workers of Japanese origin	(233,897)
Illegal foreign workers	220,552
Total	634,088
Total Labor Force In Japan	**66,490,000**

Source: Japanese Ministry of Labor.

Table 10: Illegal Foreign Workers Apprehended, by Country of Origin (2004)

	Number			Share (%)		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Total	55,351	31,100	24,251	100.0	56.2	43.8
China	15,702	9,536	6,166	100.0	60.7	39.3
Taiwan (China)	503	156	347	100.0	31.0	69.0
Hong Kong	66	37	29	100.0	56.1	43.9
Philippines	8,558	2,975	5,583	100.0	34.8	65.2
Korea	7,782	2,781	5,001	100.0	35.7	64.3
Thailand	3,572	1,384	2,188	100.0	38.7	61.3
Indonesia	2,103	1,463	640	100.0	69.6	30.4
Malaysia	1,575	1,141	434	100.0	72.4	27.6
Myanmar	1,466	1,179	287	100.0	80.4	19.6
Brazil	1,338	833	505	100.0	62.3	37.7
Bangladesh	1,312	1,215	97	100.0	92.6	7.4
Peru	1,292	775	517	100.0	60.0	40.0
Other	10,082	7,625	2,457	100.0	75.6	24.4

Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice

Table 11: Illegal Foreign Workers Apprehended, by Activities (2004)

		Number	Share (%)
Male	Total	25,348	100.0
	Factory worker	7,401	29.2
	Construction worker*	6,185	24.4
	Cook*	2,591	10.2
	Unskilled help*	2,185	8.6
	Bartender *	1,401	5.5
	Dish washer*	1,112	4.4
	Other	4,473	17.6
	(Nontraded)	13,474	53.2
Female	Total	17,710	100.0
	Bar hostess*	6,368	36.0
	Factory worker	3,038	17.2
	Waitress*	2,070	11.7
	Other service*	1,670	9.4
	Cook*	1,001	5.7
	Dishwasher*	973	5.5
	Other	2,590	14.6
	(Nontraded)	12,082	68.2

Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice

Note: "Nontraded" is the summation of activities with an asterisk (*).

Table 12: Number of foreign resident with "long term resident" visa (as of the end of the year)

Nationality (place of birth)	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004		
						Composition ratio (%)	Percentage change from the end of the previous year (%)
Total	237,607	244,460	243,451	245,147	250,734	100.0	2.3
Brazil	137,649	142,082	139,826	140,552	144,407	57.6	2.7
China	37,337	36,580	35,020	33,292	32,130	12.8	-3.5
Philippines	13,285	15,530	18,246	21,117	23,756	9.5	12.5
Peru	21,369	22,047	21,538	21,045	20,779	8.3	-1.3
South Korea / Korea	9,509	9,243	9,091	8,941	8,751	3.5	-2.1
Others	18,458	18,978	19,730	20,200	20,911	8.3	3.5

Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Table 13: Entry of Brazilians to Japan

Year	Total	First comer	Repeater
Number			
1999	70,794	38,275	32,519
2000	101,513	58,577	42,936
2001	81,800	39,533	42,267
2002	71,763	33,296	38,467
2003	79,692	41,101	38,591
Share (%)			
1999	100.0	54.1	45.9
2000	100.0	57.7	42.3
2001	100.0	48.3	51.7
2002	100.0	46.4	53.6
2003	100.0	51.6	48.4

Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Table 14: Number of the permanent residents by nationality (as of the end of the year)

Nationality (place of birth)	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Composition ratio (%)	Percentage change from the end of the previous year (%)
Permanent resident	657,605	684,853	713,775	742,963	778,583	100.0	4.8
General permanent resident	145,336	184,071	223,875	267,011	312,964	40.2	17.2
China	48,809	58,778	70,599	83,321	96,647	12.4	16.0
Brazil	9,062	20,277	31,203	41,771	52,581	6.8	25.9
Philippines	20,933	26,967	32,796	39,733	47,407	6.1	19.3
South Korea / Korea	31,955	34,624	37,121	39,807	42,960	5.5	7.9
Peru	7,496	11,059	13,975	17,213	20,401	2.6	18.5
Others	27,081	32,366	38,181	45,166	52,968	6.8	17.3
Special permanent resident	512,269	500,782	489,900	475,952	465,619	59.8	-2.2
South Korea / Korea	507,429	495,986	485,180	471,756	461,460	59.3	-2.2
China	4,151	4,060	3,924	3,406	3,306	0.4	-2.9
Others	689	736	796	790	853	0.1	8.0

Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Table 15: The number of foreign residents by age and gender (Brazilian)

(A) End of 1992

Age	Brazil	Composition ratio	Male	Composition ratio	Female	Composition ratio
Total	147,803	100.0%	87,679	59.3%	60,124	40.7%
0-4 year	5,082	3.4%	2,541	2.9%	2,541	4.2%
5-14 year	7,244	4.9%	3,682	4.2%	3,562	5.9%
15-19 year	12,997	8.8%	7,550	8.6%	5,447	9.1%
20-64 year	122,269	82.7%	73,760	84.1%	48,509	80.7%
over 65 years of age	211	0.1%	146	0.2%	65	0.1%

(B) End of 2002

Age	Brazil	Composition ratio	Male	Composition ratio	Female	Composition ratio
Total	268,332	100.0%	147,322	54.9%	121,010	45.1%
0-4 year	17,264	6.4%	8,852	6.0%	8,412	7.0%
5-14 year	23,610	8.8%	12,035	8.2%	11,575	9.6%
15-19 year	16,106	6.0%	8,397	5.7%	7,709	6.4%
20-64 year	209,702	78.2%	117,214	79.6%	92,488	76.4%
over 65 years of age	1,650	0.60%	824	0.6%	826	0.7%

Source: "Foreign residents statistics" from Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Table 16: Number of foreign residents in municipalities where foreign residents concentrate to live

	Total population	The number of foreign resident	The number of Brazilian resident	The proportion of Brazilian in total population
Ota City,Gunma	149,599	7,203	3,390	2.3%
Oizumi Town, Gunma	41,284	6,166	4,704	11.4%
Iida City, Nagano	109,434	2,873	1,380	1.3%
Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka	596,988	21,434	12,712	2.1%
Iwata City, Shizuoka	90,128	4,392	3,301	3.7%
Kosai City, Shizuoka	44,601	2,549	1,818	4.1%
Fuji City, Shizuoka	242,392	4,494	1,850	0.8%
Toyohashi City, Aichi	372,986	15,417	9,655	2.6%
Toyota City, Aichi	344,549	11,381	6,251	1.8%
Ogaki City, Gifu	154,048	5,397	3,432	2.2%
Kani City, Gifu	96,203	3,854	3,015	3.1%
Minokamo City, Gifu	50,820	3,373	2,438	4.8%
Yokkaichi City, Mie	289,797	7,234	3,127	1.1%
Suzuka City, Mie	187,425	7,046	3,851	2.1%
Ueno City, Mie	59,626	3,041	1,999	3.4%
Total	2,829,880	105,854	62,923	2.2%
（National Data, whole Japan）	126,688,364	1,851,758	268,332	0.2%

Source: The data from each municipality.

Table 17: The employment situation of non-Japanese and *Nikkeijin* from Latin America (as of June 1, 2003)

	non-Japanese who come from Latin America	Composition ratio	(Of those) *Nikkeijin* from Latin America	Composition ratio
The total number of direct labor	61,172	100.0%	55,193	100.0%
(by industry)				
Manufacturing industry	51,980	85.0%	47,444	86.0%
Service sector	4,524	7.4%	3,708	6.7%
Wholesale and retail trade	669	1.1%	571	1.0%
Restaurant, lodging industry	271	0.4%	205	0.4%
Instruction, learning assistance service	189	0.3%	80	0.1%
Others	3,539	5.8%	3,185	5.8%
The labor who takes up employment with a business establishment which primarily performing labor dispatch or contracting business	38,542	63.0%	35,469	64.3%

Source: Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare.

Table 18: The foreign household's occupancy status of the public housing in municipalities where foreign residents concentrate to live (the end of March, 2002)

	The total number of households	The number of foreign households	The proportion of foreign households
Ota City,Gunma	3,505	355	10.1%
Oizumi Town, Gunma	698	96	13.8%
Iida City, Nagano	1,103	145	13.1%
Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka	7,413	951	12.8%
Iwata City, Shizuoka	623	116	18.6%
Kosai City, Shizuoka	516	146	28.3%
Fuji City, Shizuoka	2,765	183	6.6%
Toyohashi City, Aichi	6,694	1,159	17.3%
Toyota City, Aichi	7,176	1,450	20.2%
Ogaki City, Gifu	1,197	27	2.3%
Kani City, Gifu	227	4	1.8%
Minokamo City, Gifu	266	26	9.8%
Yokkaichi City, Mie	5,639	670	11.9%
Suzuka City, Mie	2,084	129	6.2%
Total	39,906	5,457	13.7%

Source: Gaikokujin Shuju Toshi Kaigi (Congress of Major Cities where Foreign Residents Concentrated to Live).

Tabel 19

The current state of school attendance in the cities where foreign residents concentrate to live

＊The current state of school attendance of foreign residents ready for school (2002)

	School age foreign resident	The number of school attendance	The enrollment in foreign school	The number of school non-attendance	Rate of school non-attendance
Ota City, Gunma	502	233	91	178	35.5%
Oizumi Town, Gunma	646	313	109	224	34.7%
Iida City, Nagano	195	149	0	46	23.6%
Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka	1,556	873	358	325	20.9%
Iwata City, Shizuoka	270	118	91	61	22.6%
Kosai City, Shizuoka	169	116	unknow	58	34.3%
Fuji City, Shizuoka	274	191	0	83	30.3%
Toyohashi City, Aichi	1,100	644	250	206	18.7%
Toyota City, Aichi	819	431	236	75	9.1%
Ogaki City, Gifu	364	212	unknow	152	41.8%
Kani City, Gifu	258	91	74	93	36.0%
Minokamo City, Gifu	238	110	74	54	22.7%
Yokkaichi City, Mie	461	274	109	78	16.9%
Suzuka City, Mie	497	167	50	280	56.3%
Total	7,349	3,922	1,442	1,913	26.0%

Sources:Gaikokujin Shuju Toshi Kaigi (Congress of Major Cities where Foreign Residents Concentrate to Live)

Table 20: Criminal Offences by Brazilians and Peruvians

	1992	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	
							increasing rate
The number of foreign resident	1,281,644	1,512,116	1,556,113	1,686,444	1,778,462	1,851,758	4.1%
Brazilian	147,803	222,217	224,299	254,394	265,962	268,332	0.9%
Peruvian	31,051	41,317	42,773	46,171	50,052	51,772	3.4%
Number of Offence	12,153	31,779	34,398	30,971	27,763	34,746	25.2%
Number of Criminal Offence	7,457	21,689	25,135	22,947	18,199	24,258	33.3%
Brazilian	222	3,278	5,110	3,273	3,457	4,967	43.7%
Peruvian	331	1,023	1,250	482	425	436	2.6%

Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Figure 1: Real GDP of Japan



Source: Japanese Prime Minister’s Office.

Figure 2: Illegal Foreign Workers Apprehended



Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Figure 3: Migrant Workers of Japanese Origin



Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Figure 4: The Number of Brazilians Staying in Japan



Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

Figure 5: Nikkeijin's Length of Stay in Japan



Note: The data for 2002.

Source: Sangyo Koyo Antei Sentah (Industry Employment Security Center).

Figure 6: Brazilian by Visa Categories



Note: The data for 2002.
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.

APPENDIX I: Chronology of the Japanese Emigration

1868	Meiji Restoration About 500 Japanese immigrants arrived in Hawaii. About 40 Japanese immigrants arrived in Guam.
1869	About 40 Japanese immigrants arrived in California.
1885	Official migration agreement was concluded between the governments of Japan and Hawaii. First “official” immigrants from Japan arrived in Hawaii (943 people)
1888	Emancipation of slaves in Brazil
1894	“Migrants Protection Regulation (Imin Hogo Kisoku)” was issued by the Japanese government charging private migration companies with recruiting and sending emigrants.
1895	Diplomatic relations were opened between Japan and Brazil
1899	Japanese bonded workers arrived in Peru (790 people)
1903	Japanese bonded workers arrived in the Philippines (about 3,000 people)
1907	A Japan-U.S. Gentlemen’s Agreement was signed, which severely restricted Japanese immigration to the United States
1908	“Kasado-maru”, which carried 791 Japanese immigrants, arrived in the port of Santos, Brazil. Almost all of these immigrants were bonded workers on coffee plantations.
1909	Five Japanese families owned the land in Brazil. They started the cultivation of cotton.
1910	Japan annexed Korea. The rush of Japanese migration to Korea started.
1914	The number of Japanese immigrants to Brazil exceeded ten thousands. The state government of São Paulo announced termination of immigration contract with Japanese migration companies. The World War I broke out. The direct immigration from Japan to Argentina began.
1915	Japanese colony plantations were opened, the most famous being “Hirano Colony Plantation.” The first Japanese school was opened in São Paulo (Taisho School)
1916	The first Japanese language newspaper was issued in Brazil.
1921	The state government of São Paulo announced termination of travel subsidies to Japanese immigrants.
1924	The United States enacted the law which prohibited the new immigration from Japan. As a result, the immigration to Latin America was boosted.
1925	The Japanese government began travel subsidies to Japanese immigrants to Brazil. It was the start of the government sponsored immigration to Brazil.
1926	The Japanese governments loaned 850,000 yen, with very low interest rate, to Japanese coffee farmers in Brazil.
1927	“Overseas Immigration Union Law (Kaigai Iju Kumiai Ho)” was enacted. The purpose of the law was to promote Japanese colony plantations.
1928	Japanese immigration to Canada was severely restricted by the Canadian government.

1929 “The Ministry of Immigration (Takumu sho)” was created, with the mission to promote and direct Japanese emigration.
The Great Depression. The price of coffee plunged.
1931 The Manchurian Incident broke out.
1932 Manchuria became an “independent state.” The flood of Japanese immigration to Manchuria started (until the end of the World War II in 1945)
The Japanese government greatly increased travel subsidies to Japanese immigrants to Brazil.
1934 “Two percent clause” was added to the Brazilian Constitution. The clause limited the number of annual inflow of immigrants from each country to two percent of total immigration from each country in the last 50 years. This resulted in a severe reduction of Japanese immigration to Brazil.
1936 “The 2.26 Incident” occurred in Japan. (About 1400 military personnel attempted coup d’etat on February 26. Many politicians, including the Minister of Finance, were assassinated. Although the coup attempt failed, the military authorities took control of the Japanese government since then.
Cotton plantations managed by Japanese immigrants increased substantially.
1937 Japanese language education for students under 14 years old was prohibited in Brazil.
1938 The Brazilian new immigration law was enacted, which severely restricted Japanese immigrants’ rights.
Japanese (also German and Italian) language schools were forced to close in Brazil.
Japanese short-wave radio broadcast to overseas began.
1939 Many Japanese immigrants returned to Japan.
The World War II broke out.
1941 Japanese language newspapers were prohibited in Brazil.
The Pacific War (Japan-U.S. War) broke out.
1942 Brazil cut diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy and Japan.
Various oppression measures were imposed on Japanese immigrants in Brazil.
1945 Brazil declared war to Japan (in June)
Atomic bombs were dropped to Hiroshima and Nagasaki (in August)
Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces (in August)
1946 Terrorist attacks by “Kachi-Gumi (non-believer of Japanese defeat)” on “Make-Gumi (believer of Japanese defeat) increased.
1947 “Return home scam” victims increased among Japanese immigrants in Brazil.
1950 About 50 members of the right-wing fraud syndicate “Kokumin Zenei Tai (National Vangurd)” were arrested in São Paulo.
1951 The first Japanese ship (Kobe-Maru) after the W.W.II arrived in the port of Santos.
1951 Mr. Tamaru became the first *Nikkeijin* parliament member of the State of São Paulo.
1952 The Brazilian government approved resumption of Japanese immigration.
1953 The first Japanese immigrants after the WWII arrived in Santos.
1955 The Emigration Department was established in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The mission of the department was to promote Japanese emigration to the Americas.
1956 The first group of Japanese immigrants arrived in Dominican Republic.

1957 The foreign direct investment of the Japanese firms to Brazil increased.
1959 Japanese Prime Minister Kishi visited Brazil and Argentina.
1961 Prime Minister Ikeda in Japan announced the “income doubling plan”, which initiated miraculous economic growth in Japan.
1961 Pan-American Airlines began scheduled service between Japan and Brazil, which connected the two countries in 40 hours.
About 600 Japanese immigrants to Dominican Republic returned home, and reported their terrible immigration experiences.
1960s Emigration boom subsided in Japan due to the Japanese economic success.
1988 Return migration of *Nikkeijin* workers increased.
1990 The Japanese immigration law was revised, allowing the second and third generations of the Japanese emigrants to come and work in Japan.
1990s The number of *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan dramatically increased.

APPENDIX II: Methodology of the Surveys Cited in the Paper

In section IV of the paper, I quoted three surveys on remittances by *Nikkeijin*. Brief summary of methodology of the three surveys are as follows:

1. 1993 survey by Japan Institute of Labor

(1) Sample: *Nikkeijin* living in Brazil

(2) Number of questionnaires distributed: 500

(3) Number of interviews: 376 (of which 202 (53.7%) had an experience of working in Japan)

(4) Date of interviews: September 1993

2. 1998 Survey by Japan Institute of Labor

(1) Sample: *Nikkeijin* living in Brazil

(2) Number of questionnaires distributed: 300

(3) Number of interviews: 205 (of which 106 (51.7%) had an experience of working in Japan)

(4) Date of interviews: September 1998

3. 2005 Survey commissioned by the Inter-American Bank

(1) Sample: Latin American immigrant adults living in Japan

(2) Number of Interview: 1,070 interviews

(3) Language of Interviews: Portuguese, Spanish and Japanese

(4) Date of interviews: February 2005