Foreign Military Training and Coup Propensity

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Abstract

How does aid in the form of training influence foreign militaries' relationship to domestic politics? The United States has trained tens of thousands of officers in foreign militaries with the goals of increasing its security and instilling respect for human rights and democracy. We argue that training increases the military's power relative to the regime in a way that other forms of military assistance do not. While other forms of military assistance are somewhat fungible, allowing the regime to shift resources towards coup-proofing, human capital is a resource vested solely in the military. Training thus alters the balance of power between the military and the regime resulting in greater coup propensity. Using data from 189 countries from 1970-2009 we show the number of military officers trained by the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Countering Terrorism Fellowship (CTFP) programs increases the probability of a military coup.[1]

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1 Introduction

United States training of foreign military officers is fraught with unpleasant alumni. Its School of the Americas became infamous for training a number of prominent human rights abusers and strong men among its graduates. Now the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the leaders of the 2009 Honduran coup received training there through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. More recently, the March 2012 coup in Mali was led by the IMET-trained officer Amadou Sanogo. The Egyptian military, one of the largest recipients of US training, recently deposed that country's democratically elected president. The United States is not the only state to produce such students; Moussau Dadis Camara, the leader of a 2008 coup in Guinea, was German trained

As it winds down its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States increasingly relies on a more indirect approach–variously called "security assistance," "partner capacity-building," and "phase zero operations"–to advance its interests. While it is by far the largest provider of foreign military training (FMT), the United States is not alone in training militaries as a means of increased influence for the donor and increased development and political stability for the recipient. Countries as diverse as France, China, India, Australia, Israel, and Morocco use aid in the form of FMT to advance their interests. Given the increasing attention to the provision of security and armed services reform as essential components of development and democratization (Collier, 2008), FMT also merits consideration in the larger debate over the political consequences of foreign aid.

We argue that FMT's effects differ from other forms of military (and civilian) assistance. While military aid in the form of hardware or financing can allow leaders to transfer their own resources towards coup-proofing, training does not provide such

flexibility. Aid in the form of *training* therefore increases the likelihood of military intervention in domestic politics. This increased propensity stems from augmenting a military's human capital, which civilian leaders have difficulty offsetting by devoting additional resources to coup-proofing. We find that *any* American military training can nearly double the probability of a military-backed coup attempt in the recipient country.

2 External Influences on Coups

We examine military-backed coups, an illegal attempt to replace a state's governmental leadership through its military's use or threat of violence (Huntington, 2006, 218). The literature on coups is massive, and this paper focuses on the international influences on coups. Nonetheless, some important findings emerge essential to understanding the role of foreign military training. First, coups are more likely to happen in states with weak institutions and conflictual civil-military relations (Talmadge, 2015, 2). Second, government leaders have a range of "coup-proofing" options to protect themselves from their military such as exploiting family, ethnic, and religious loyalties for key positions in the military; creating an armed force parallel to the regular military; and developing multiple, overlapping internal security agencies to monitor one another (Quinliven, 1999, 133; see also Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011, 2012) Alternatively, regime leaders may buy the support of the military through the provision of resources and autonomy (Powell, 2012; Svolik, 2012a).

Third, while the odds of a coup in any particular state in any particular year are quite low, coups have historically been the most common form of irregular regime change (Singh, 2014, 3).. While military coups usually involve very few participants and low levels of violence (Luttwak, 1969), they vary widely in other characteristics.

Some are initiated by quite junior officers (Kandeh, 2004) while others are conducted by the most senior generals. Some coups may result from building too strong a military, while others emerge from not giving it enough resources (Svolik, 2012a). Coups may result from the entire military as a corporate body overthrowing the government (Huntington, 2006), but can also emerge from competition by factions within the military (Singh, 2014). Samuel Huntington (2006) distinguishes coups by the political group the military seeks to displace: oligarchies, the middle class, or the broad public. To say something systematic across this host of cases is daunting, but in our attempt to do so, we start with a simple argument: coup probability increases with the military's willingness to overthrow the government, as well as its ability to do so (Powell, 2012).

A smaller body of literature has focused on the international influences of coups. Foreign threats influence coup likelihood, often in counterintuitive ways (Piplani and Talmadge, 2015; MacMahon and Slantchev, 2015). Goemans and Marinov (2013) have shown that the willingness of powerful states to tie foreign aid to democracy in the post-Cold War era has reduced the number of coups and increased the probability that coup leaders will reinstate elections soon afterwards. However, threats from external actors can also encourage coups in the right circumstances. Thyne (2010) suggests that a signal of American hostility toward a government can encourage the military to intervene to preserve its relationship with the United States.

Direct engagement with foreign militaries through arms transfers may be positively associated with coup probability (Maniruzzaman, 1992). On the other hand, undifferentiated (i.e. non-military) foreign aid can also free up resources to allow regimes to stay in charge by expanding government, consolidating powerful groups, or repressing the population (Remmer, 2004; Wright, 2008; Licht, 2010). While the research is not unanimous, one recent review concludes that "a large and sustained volume of aid can have negative effects on the development of good public institutions in low income

countries" (Moss et al., 2006, 18). Most military assistance, like other forms of aid, exhibits a high level of fungibility in the hands of incumbent regimes (Feyzioglu et al., 1998).

2.1 (US) Foreign military training and civil-military relations

Research on military training largely focuses on the United States due to the massive extent (dwarfing that of any other state) and relative transparency of its efforts.[2] According to the State Department, programs like IMET have two explicit goals: increased "understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries" and "ability of foreign national military and civilian personnel to absorb and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights," including "greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military."[3]

Research to date has focused on the second, normative goal and its benign influence on the *willingness* of militaries to coup rather than their ability to do so. Ruby and Gibler (2010) identify a negative relationship between American training of relatively high-ranking officers and coup risk due to their learning norms of civilian control in class and absorbing them more generally by living in the United States. Atkinson (2006; 2010) finds that American FMT, broadly construed, is associated with regime transitions toward democracy, by increasing the probability that a military will refuse to suppress a liberalizing popular movement. One US State Department official tes-

[2]France is probably the country with the most active foreign military training effort after the United States. Yet the entire budget for its *Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense* (DCSD), about 100 million euros (60% of which is personnel costs), is roughly the size of IMET's annual funding level (Gillier, 2014). In contrast the rough American equivalent to the DCSD, the Office of Security Assistance, directs $6 *billion* in military grants (Departments of Defense and State, 2014). The United Kingdom spent roughly $3.6 billion in 2012 on all "Foreign Military Aid" (HM Treasury, 2014). That same year, the United States spent $485.9 billion (USAID).

[3]http://www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm

tified to Congress in 1999 that "We do not fully appreciate how IMET and similar programs impart American values to the recipients in foreign militaries, both directly and indirectly. The stability we saw in military forces around the world during [the] recent radical decrease in defense budgets would have resulted in coups which today never materialized, in part because of the learned respect for civilian control of the military" (Pomper, 2000).

We argue that the norms transmission mechanism relative to other influences is likely to be weak and its effect indeterminate. First, tension is built within the normative goal of promoting both human rights and civilian supremacy. Successful "liberal" norm transmission may actually exacerbate this disconnect between returning students and the government. One internal study by the National Defense University cited a significant *decrease* in foreign students' perception of human rights practices in their home country (Jungdahl and Lambert, 2012). Regime change can occur when the military upholds human rights. In January 2011, Tunisia's authoritarian President Ben Ali called on the Army (normally not his tool for internal repression) to crack down on recent wide-scale social protests. The Army's chief, Rachid Ammar, refused; apparently choosing human rights over civilian control (Svolik, 2012a; Brooks, 2013, 124).[4]

Even in states where these two norms do not conflict, the effect suggested by previous research requires a very strong model of normative transformation whereby a few months of exposure to US instruction is enough to overcome existing and subsequent norms in officers' home countries and institutions. Substantively, the same behavior—a military's decision to side with "the people" over the government—can often be explained equally well from a normative or an organizational interest standpoint. Indeed, before it refused to repress the public itself, the Tunisian military (largely American-

[4]Ben Ali, who had seized power through his own coup in 1987, had himself been a military officer who had trained in both the United States and France.

trained) failed to step in when internal security forces put down protests in the south and west of the country prior to the revolution (Brooks, 2013).

Examples abound of foreign soldiers appreciating their time in the United States without internalizing such norms. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq spent a year at Fort Leavenworth, where he was "adopted" by a mail carrier named Ed and his wife, Dollie. Years later, Ed and Dollie were invited to the Reagan administration's 1982 state dinner for Zia, who installed himself through a coup and held onto power for over a decade through brutal repression (Powell, 1996, 123). At the US Army War College Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, who recently ousted the first democratically elected leader in Egypt's history, attended Super Bowl and Halloween parties while writing a skeptical (if cursory) thesis on democracy, religion, and internal conflict in the Middle East (Stewart, 2013). A small but novel survey of individual US FMT recipients finds little evidence of norms transmission, and amount of US training does not correlate to any particular military response to the popular uprisings of the "Arab Spring" (Taylor, 2014, 13, 173-194).

If any norm is likely to be transmitted, it is one to which military officers are already most likely to be receptive, a professional identity that does not derive from the officers' own government. The US military has a distinct professional culture, largely adopting Huntington's notion of "objective civilian control" (Huntington, 1957). This ideal precludes interference by the military in politics, while generating a strong, separate corporate identity (a "bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon" in Huntington's famous phrase). In states with internal threats or corrupt governments, a "professional" military may be more likely to step into politics, as Huntington himself recognized (Huntington, 2006; Stepan, 1986). Quinlivan (1999) argues that many states recognize the military's corporate identity as a potential threat to the regime and go

to considerable lengths to undermine it.[5]

Perhaps most importantly,the United States does not appear to assign a high priority to norms transmission in its practice of FMT.

3 Description of US Foreign Military Training Programs

According to the US State Department, the many different forms of FMT share the same primary goal: "regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the US and foreign countries."[6] Most government assessments make it clear that for these programs, even the flagship IMET, human rights and norm transmission are secondary to this main task.

IMET is far from the only American FMT program, and at $99 million in 2013, is far from the best funded. These other programs have relatively little to do with the promotion of democratic norms.[7] The Foreign Military Financing program (over $5 billion in 2013) contains a training component to complement the weapons it provides. Indonesia, excluded from IMET from 1992 to 2005 due to its military's rampant human rights abuses, was the largest single beneficiary from the Pentagon's Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), designed to train foreign forces in counterterrorism techniques through courses such as "Intelligence in Combating Terrorism" and "Student Military Police Prep." Indonesia has also benefitted handsomely from the Defense Department's Global Train and Equip program whose allocations from

[5]Quinliven argues that "training" helps break down this identity as well as convinces the military that a successful coup is hard. We address this argument later in the paper.

[6]State Department web site, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/65533.htm

[7]The best overview of these programs is jointly produced by Departments of Defense and State 2014.

2006–2012 totaled nearly $1.8 billion (Serafino, 2013), or 2.5 times the *entire* IMET budget for the same period.

IMET remains a large program, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) refers to it as the "cornerstone of security assistance training." The program trains 4,000–8,000 foreign military personnel annually.[8] In 2013, its funds supported FMT for personnel from over 130 states, giving a sense of how widespread this effort has become.

IMET is distinct for its longevity, visibility, and its specifically targeted trainees. Much of IMET is devoted to Professional Military Education, which DSCA describes as "progressive levels of military education that prepares military officers for leadership." Members of foreign officer corps enroll in courses, often alongside their American counterparts, ranging from Infantry Officer Basic training to War College (the US military's capstone programs for "strategic leadership"). Compared to the other training efforts focused on lower ranks, IMET alumni are the trainees most likely to lead and influence the security policy of a foreign state and the decision to initiate a coup.

Since the Cold War's end, Europe (particularly former Warsaw Pact states) continues to receive the largest amount of annual funding as a region. However, in the decade following 2001, funding levels for the Near East and for South and Central Asia have more than doubled (GAO, 2011). Training has also grown more expensive, rising from $6,100 to $15,000 per student between fiscal years 2000 and 2010 (GAO, 2011).

While human rights has always been part of the IMET mandate, in 1990 Congress shifted its objectives to "focus on fostering greater understanding of and respect for civilian control of the military, contributing to responsible defense resource management, and improving military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights." A certain percentage of a country's IMET

[8]Similar programs, authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, existed prior to this year.

program must now be selected from approved "Expanded IMET" (E-IMET) courses covering these subjects. This percentage varies by country; on average it is around 20%, but El Salvador had to exclusively use E-IMET courses in fiscal years 1993–1995 (GAO, 2011).

Despite this mandate, human rights rarely appears to be IMET's primary goal. A 2011 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report reviewed 29 training plans for countries with poor political and civil freedom records, and found that only 11 of these plans identified human rights as one of the key objectives. 7 of the 12 managers interviewed by the GAO said that human rights was not a priority compared to other IMET objectives (GAO, 2011). Unlike previous work, we therefore construct a theory reflecting this balance of effort.

4 Aid in the Form of Human Capital

Given the indeterminate nature of norms transmission through FMT, as well as the actual emphasis of US training on combat skills and cooperation with United States forces, we argue that FMT primarily affects a military's *ability* to conduct a coup.

US FMT is foreign aid: resources provided to a state by an outside actor. This aid comes in a very specific form: an increase in the military's human capital. We use "human capital" to describe a range of assets–social, instructional, and economic. Capital is anything that enhances an actor's ability to produce something, and thus has value itself. The benefits consist in part of professional knowledge, ranging from small unit tactics to grand strategy, enabling recipients to conduct military operations more effectively. FMT can also impart a more ineffable form of "social capital" (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988), establishing a powerful network of prestige, trust, and reciprocal relations that allow privileged actors to achieve higher status positions.

Relative to other foreign assistance, externally provided military human capital is less fungible. It does not free up indigenous resources that regime leadership can shift towards counterbalancing through coup-proofing. These benefits make undertaking a coup more feasible, increase the motivation to do so, and provide no offsetting benefits to regimes to prevent it. We therefore expect that FMT will result in more military-assisted coups.

4.1 (American) Military Training as Human Capital

While not using the term "human capital," Singh (2014, 9) emphasizes "soft power" in coups, finding that they succeed not because of "differences in hard military power among the parties but the resources available for setting and coordinating expectations and making facts." FMT can shift the balance of human capital, and thus the ability to conduct a coup, for small groups of soldiers relative to the rest of the military, as well as for the larger military relative to the government.

Increasing human capital has three effects. If American FMT successfully imparts the range of practical skills it claims to, it will improve the relative competence of trainees within the military and consequently the larger military within the government. This competence may also reduce the likelihood of punishment for bad behavior by both the regime and (perhaps more importantly) the United States. Finally, FMT imparts the type of "soft power" that aspiring leaders can use to solve the difficult coordination game of a coup.

The United States has an enormous capacity to generate and deliver military human capital. Its operational experience and economies of scale provide the United States with the same advantages in training it enjoys in building and selling weapons (Caverley, 2007). The US military's training infrastructure is vast, experienced, and combat-focused. It spent $1.2 billion in 2013 on "professional development," a sum

greater than the entire military budgets of 73 countries (SIPRI). The United States military has acquired a great deal of experience and interest in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations over the past decade. Finally, the United States has been training foreign militaries in earnest for well over half a century.

Talmadge (2015) finds training that improves military skills can be used against regimes. While (Quinlivan, 1999, 151-152) argues that training has the opposite effect, he provides no empirical backing to this claim. Given the content of the training provided by the United States, we side with Talmadge's argument and evidence. Militaries with a higher number of personnel trained by the United States (even compared to other, well-established military powers) are therefore likely to be more competent and also more of a threat. Alumni at all levels of training, in turn, are expected to train others upon returning home, increasing the competence of the military more broadly (as well as a social network of like-minded trainees). These characteristics make the recipients of FMT more capable of identifying and taking advantage of coup opportunities.

The IMET training received by Mali's Sanogo was basic, tactical, but thorough: English in Texas, intelligence in Arizona, work with the Marines in Virginia, and finally the Army's infantry officer basic training course in Georgia in 2010 (Cavendish, 2012; Nossiter, 2012). While increased combat proficiency will help if a pitched battle results from a coup attempt; many of these skills (often lacking in developing states' militaries)–efficient communications, discipline in weapons handling, the ability to operate in a decentralized command structure, and even espirit-de-corps–are equally helpful in "bloodless operations" (Singh, 2014).

More senior officers at the War Colleges are supposed to be prepared "for positions of strategic leadership and advisement," with a focus on "national security strategy, theater strategy and campaigning, civil-military relations, joint planning processes and

systems, and joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and integration" (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015, A-A-5). In practice this amounts to time spent considering the role of the military instrument in politics, gaining general insight into managing a large defense bureaucracy, and interacting with rising general officers (and many civilian equivalents) both from the United States as well as other foreign militaries. If the stated goals of these institutions are at all effective, trainees come home from the United States possessing higher levels of professional ability and an increased degree of prestige.

FMT makes soldiers harder to punish. Regimes do not want to alienate a valuable and, in the short to medium term, irreplaceable resource. After five weeks' incarceration and an apology ceremony following their failed 1981 coup attempt in Thailand, the 52 members of the "Young Turks" (led by American-trained officers) gained clemency and rejoined the Army (Samutwanit, 1982, 64).

FMT ties trainees into an international network with like-minded American officers making them valuable for the execution of US interests, creating an alternative source of support for rebellious military members. For example, the strong ties of the Egyptian military to the United States were apparently an important factor in American support for the original revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarrak (Nepstad, 2013, 343). Now well-versed in American doctrine and operations, trainees facilitate interoperability for joint missions with US forces. The increased value of the soldiers to the United States in terms of capability and willingness to cooperate, which is after all FMT's primary goal, may limit American willingness to punish militaries that intervene in politics (Thyne, 2010). There are many examples of the United States forgiving bad behavior by coup plotters during the Cold War, as well as in its more recent counterterrorism efforts.

FMT creates a sense of professional identity and new social ties (Brooks, 2013).

The increased prestige associated with training facilitates organization of coups by providing soldiers with greater influence over their peers. When, following social unrest in Burkina Faso in 2014, two officers launched competing coup attempts, the more junior American trained officer, Isaac Zida, was successful after receiving the backing of the rest of the military and other elites (Bonkougou and Coulibaly, 2014).

Coups are generally carried out by small groups (Singh, 2014); and FMT can help create a small network of reliable plotters that can work together without fear of a defector (Nordlinger, 1977, 99). A mere four junior officers instigated the 1994 coup in Gambia, three of whom had all attended officer training in the United States from 1990-1991 (Hughes and Perfect, 2008).

The 2008 seizure in Guinea was known as the "the German coup" because the small number of low-level, *Bundeswehr*-trained officers communicated in this common language (Heidelberger, 2010).

Facing a coup attempt, initially neutral leaders and units (Singh, 2014) consider the likelihood of bloodshed before declaring their support. The increased professionalism of American-trained officers may reassure actors waiting on the sidelines that violence will be limited (Singh, 2014). Perhaps ironically, successful conveyance of US norms may generate more support for coup-instigating trainees.

4.2 Comparison to Other Forms of Aid

We expect to see a stronger relationship between FMT and coups compared to other forms of aid, military and otherwise. First it is hard to say how other types of aid are likely to increase the willingness of military actors to coup. This paper suggests how in some cases training can in fact have this effect. Second, even military aid in the form of weapons, especially the kind that the United States tends to provide, is unlikely to improve the ability to initiate a coup. Aircraft, tanks, armored personnel carriers are

rarely employed in these operations; and even small arms and light weapons are not the limiting factor for a coup. Saddam Hussein for example was willing to accept a great deal of high-end weapons in the war against Iran, but refused to send soldiers abroad to get the necessary training for fear of their being subverted and becoming a threat back home (Cordesman and Wagner, 1990, 44).

Moreover, other types of foreign aid are more fungible relative to training, allowing leaders to divert more of the state's resources towards making coups less likely: buying off elites, creating additional paramilitary groups, or providing additional public goods. The capital provided by training largely resides in the trainee (and, more diffusely, the military). Because of the American training advantages mentioned above, the human capital provided is large relative to the dollar amount assigned by the United States to it, and thus any resources freed up for coup-proofing are likely to be minuscule. The Foreign Military Financing budget request, which is designed to provide weapons to aid recipients, is sixty-three times larger than the IMET budget. Before Mali's coup, FMT amounted to less than half a percent of total US aid (Boswell, 2012). One might argue that the improved labor component of a US-trained military would allow a government to shift money by reducing its military capital investment without sacrificing security against external threats. However, the newly trained leaders of the military are likely to be unhappy by such a reduction in their budget (providing weapons is often considered a useful tactic for governments to ensure their military's loyalty). Indeed, if, as we argue, US FMT increases the ability (and perhaps the willingness) to conduct a coup, governments will have to spend more of their budget on coup-proofing.

4.3 Why Risk Training One's Military?

The previous section's argument raises an obvious question: if governments approve the training of its soldiers by outside actors, and such training endangers regime secu-

rity, why accept a potential Trojan horse? If our mechanism (and that of Talmadge, 2011) is correct, especially coup-prone states should refuse FMT, biasing recipients to countries where coups are *less likely*. However, a trained military provides benefits to the incumbent regime (defense against external threats, a tool for repression, closer ties to the United States, etc.). Perhaps regimes can take some of the gains from training and use them to bribe its newly-empowered military, which suggests that no coup is possible in equilibrium.

We suggest possible information asymmetries to explain regimes selecting into coup risks. MacMahon and Slantchev (2015) show how governments can be overly concerned with but uncertain about threats (due to the military's private information), increasing its militaries' capabilities in response. Alternatively, it is quite possible that the regime knows that FMT increases coup feasibility, but is uncertain by how much (i.e. the revised utility calculation of trainees is private). A regime may consent to the training, increase its bribery of the military accordingly, but also accept some risk that the FMT has made the military extremely coup-prone.

Finally, almost all IMET-eligible countries participate. This suggests that some benefits exist for most regimes. Coupled with the rarity of coups in any given year, accepting the benefits of aid probably outweigh any (increased) risk of losing power.

4.4 Hypotheses

We test the following hypotheses:

H_1 *More training for a given country will increase the probability of a military-backed coup attempt.*

We test a second hypothesis comparing FMT to other sources of aid:

H_2 Due to greater fungibility, other forms of aid will not significantly change the probability of a military-backed coup.

A theory based on adding military human capital makes no predictions about non-military coups. Norms-based arguments would suggest otherwise. Non-military advocates for regime change may recognize that an American-influenced military is unlikely to side with the autocrat if wide-scale violence is required to maintain power. Thus, civilians' gamble to overthrow a regime may become less costly. A norm-based argument about US training would predict increases in *non-military* coup attempts. To differentiate further our theory from norms-based arguments we test:

H_3 More training for a given country will increase the probability of coup attempts without the military's backing.

4.5 Potential Endogeneity

Does the United States simply train states that are more coup-prone to begin with? The United States is not terribly discriminating about which militaries it trains (about 3 of every 4 militaries participate to some degree in IMET), but it spends a lot of resources on training less professional militaries in developing states.[9] However, the US military has historically used ties with FMT alumni to pressure military non-intervention in politics, especially in the post-Cold War era and especially when it comes to democracies. The United States is legally required to cut off IMET when militaries overthrow democratically elected governments; and often suspends programs, as for Guinea in 2008, even where coups replace autocrats.[10] This institutional feature militates against selecting to train coup-prone militaries. If the goal is to foster strategic relationships,

[9]It is, however, not clear that incompetent militaries are more prone to coups. Our theory, among others (Talmadge, 2015; Egorov and Sonin, 2011), suggests the opposite.

[10]And again, if our mechanism is correct, an autocrat who believes that the military poses a severe coup threat is unlikely to accept FMT.

training and then cutting off contact represents wasted resources. Importantly, years since last coup is *negatively* correlated with Military Backed Coups and *positively* correlated with FMT meaning that countries that have not recently experienced a coup event receive more training (see supplemental).

Perhaps FMT selects coup-prone individuals. Students are chosen based on "leadership potential and likelihood of being assigned, subsequent to IMET participation, to a job relevant to their training for a period of time to warrant the training expense" (Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 2013). The cross-national nature of IMET and our analysis mitigates this problem. IMET does not train the best soldiers in the world, but trains a few of the (ostensibly) best soldiers from each country. A military with more talented (and conceivably more coup-prone) officers does not get more IMET spots. The number of positions a state receives (our explanatory variable) is based on what US Defense and State Department officials believe to be American interests. The actual soldiers attending the training are nominated by the recipient country's government, which is unlikely to boost the soldiers it expects pose the greatest coup threat. Talmadge (2015) finds that more governments that fear coups rarely promote their most talented officers or train them adequately.

A more likely possibility is that a third, confounding variable simultaneously affects levels of US military training and coup propensity. For example, as a foreign aid program, IMET is targeted for under-institutionalized states, where political instability is more likely. Huntington (2006, 193-196) found that foreign training had little effect on causing or preventing coups, because a politicized military is simply a reflection of the many "politicized social forces" (clergy, unions, universities, etc.) in a "praetorian" society. By this logic the twin policies of providing FMT to developing states *unless there has been a recent military coup* strengthens a previously quiescent institution over other competing political groups, shaping the type of instability displayed by the

states, i.e. coups. A related confounding variable is the clear US policy of encouraging new democracies with increased aid. However, democratizing regimes are also quite prone to military coups (Svolik, 2012b). Our theory suggests that increased FMT for new democracies might, ironically, exacerbate coup propensity. Democracies therefore represent an important subsection to test competing cases for theories of human capital and of norms.

More practically, we argue that, at least for IMET, the factors that determine the level of assistance are relatively finite, knowable, and transparent. This makes possible steps to avoid spurious correlations. Finally we argue that endogeneity in the data is more likely to result in a *negative* correlation between FMT and coups. Our analysis is therefore a conservative one. We aggressively control for possible confounding factors and employ matching techniques as an additional test of robustness. Our caution begins with our choice of explanatory variable.

5 Description of the Data

While many different American training programs exist, we focus primarily on the IMET program. First, it is the most transparent, and receives the largest amount of scrutiny. Human rights and civil-military relations are explicitly part of the curriculum, unlike other forms of American training. IMET trainees are therefore the population in which we are most likely to see the effect of norms, i.e. the easy case. If we discover more coups in countries with a large number of IMET trainees, this relationship will likely be stronger in less-scrutinized programs with less focus on liberal civil-military relations.

Second, targeted students for IMET tend to be the elite of any given state's military. While other programs reach down into the rank-and-file, the foreign military personnel

going through war colleges and similar IMET-supported institutions are the officers that would have the wherewithal to launch a coup. On the other hand, IMET data covers a broader range of trainees compared to Ruby and Gibler (2010), who focus only on those in the two most senior grades of War College training. Given that many coup leaders come from relatively low in the officer corps, this represents both a quantitative and qualitative improvement on existing data.

Third, IMET is aid; the United States paid for these students' training. The large majority of the officers in the Ruby and Gibler (2010) data set is funded by their home government through the Foreign Military Sales program. Given our theory's focus on foreign aid in human capital form, IMET data best captures this effect.

Our IMET data ranges from 1970-2009 (DSCA, 2012).[11] We used three different transformations of the IMET personnel data to test our argument. We used the logged number of students trained in a year. We used a binary variable measuring if a country's military had received any IMET training at all. Similar to Ruby and Gibler (2010), we used the logged number of a given country's students trained over the previous five years. We also tested IMET spending, similarly transformed, as an alternative measurement of the "lump sum" of human capital transferred.[12]

In additional models we incorporate data from the Regional Defense Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). In 2013, CTFP trained 3,098 student from 131 countries at a cost of $32 million (Department of Defense, 2014). The purposes and administration of the CTFP differ considerably from IMET. As the name suggests, the aid is targeted at enhancing "partners' capacity to combat terrorism." Unlike IMET,

[11]Note that DSCA still provides "IMET" data prior to 1976, the year IMET was formally instituted, to reflect training beforehand through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

[12]There were 59 country-year observations where the country received funding but no students were trained, and 18 where students were trained but no funding was listed. This discrepancy is partly explained by budget drawdowns. Increased per capita IMET spending might describe the level of human capital imparted to each student, and so we test these operationalizations as well. See supplemental material.

the program concentrates on relatively senior officers at "the strategic and operational levels." While the State Department allots IMET positions, CTFP is largely run by the Department of Defense. A state's development is not directly taken into account, and thus many countries ineligible for IMET–West European states, Japan, and Australia–receive CTFP slots. Although CTFP recipients are vetted under the "Leahy law" for human rights violations, training in human rights and civilian control are not central to the program. Countries ineligible for IMET like Indonesia received significant CTFP assistance; even China has received slots. While IMET poses the toughest test for our theory, the roughly 3,000 CTFP students each year is only a third smaller than the IMET program numbers, and not analyzing the combined programs risks biasing our findings.

5.1 Dependent Variable: Military-Backed Coup Attempts and Success

As our primary dependent variable, we adopt coup attempts in which the military was involved. We derive our set of attempted coups from two comprehensive data sets released in recent years: the Global Instances of Coups (GIC, 2011) from 1950–2010 and the Center for System Peace's Coup d'Etat events, 1946–2011 (CSP, 2011). To test our military-centric theory, from these data we constructed a new measure of *Military-Backed Coups*.

For transparency and accuracy of measurement we confined our attention to either successful or attempted coups, excluding those coded as alleged or plotted coup events. If the leader of a coup was described as a military officer in the CSP dataset, coups were coded as a Military-Backed Coup. However, given the complicated coalition politics of authoritarian regimes, the military need not be the leader or instigator to have played a

vital role. For this reason we sought out evidence of military involvement in the coups beyond leadership.[13] From 1970 until 2009, this provided us with 286 country-year observations in which Military-Backed Coups occurred, 82% of coup attempts listed in CSP's dataset.

We focus on coup attempts rather than their success for the same reason bargaining models of war do better at explaining war's outbreak rather than its outcome. The decision to initiate a coup is based in part on whether the plotters believe they are going to succeed. Coup attempts therefore capture "the disposition to intervene" (Powell, 2012), the mechanism linking training to military action against the regime. While IMET increases human capital and capabilities, some of our causal mechanisms predict that militaries receiving FMT might be inclined to launch riskier coups. Nonetheless, in some models (presented in the supplemental section) we test military-backed coup *success*.

5.2 Alternate Explanations and Confounding Variables

Our second hypothesis predicts differences between the effects of FMT and other forms of assistance. We therefore include *Military Aid*, the value of US Military Assistance from the USAID Greenbook, deflated to 2005 dollars, and then divided by total GDP from WDI, to determine if training has a systematically different effect from other security assistance. Including military assistance also allows us to control for the effects of external aid on military capacity and proxy for any alliance between the US and the country (Maniruzzaman, 1992).

Again, given H_2 we also include non-military aid. High levels of aid dependency can make states more vulnerable to external influence and sanction, reducing the payoff

[13]We first looked for evidence of support for the coup from members of the armed forces in the *New York Times* and the *Times of London*. If we failed to find evidence of military involvement in these two sources, we then expanded our search to other secondary sources.

from staging a coup. Finally, assuming that other states' FMT effort correlates to the amount of all aid it provides a certain country, this term can assuage concerns of bias in our results given that we have no measures of other countries' military assistance. We included the variable *Total Aid* which measures foreign aid from any source as a percentage of GDP (Tierney et al., 2011).

We aggressively control for potential confounding variables. The United States may in some cases seek to instigate coups of regimes it disagrees with politically. We therefore include Gartzke's (2006) *Affinity* of Nations index, which measures the shared interests of states using the similarity of votes in the UN general assembly of the United States and another country.[14]

Regimes can take steps to minimize threats from the armed forces. We include a measure of *Coup-proofing*, the degree of fractionalization of the ground compatible armed forces (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011, 2012). We also included *Spending per Soldier*; higher levels may increase military loyalty (Powell, 2012; Besley and Robinson, 2010).We divided total military spending by the total number of armed personnel taken from the Correlates of War (Singer, 1987). We included *Military Personnel* numbers; military size may both dilute the effect of training and affect coup propensity (Powell, 2012).

Political and social development plausibly play roles (Johnson et al., 1984; McGowan and Johnson, 1984) in both coup propensity and American interest, and correlate to the amount of human capital in the state. We include the log of *GDP per capita* (World Bank, 2013). We also included controls for *Economic Growth*. Oil production increases rents available to the regime and the degree of regime stability reducing coups (Wright et al., 2013), as well as influencing military spending, civil-military relations (Ross, 2004), and of course American interest in a country. We therefore include *Oil*

[14]We also tested models using the ATOP measure of alliances, with similar results.

Revenue (Haber and Menaldo, 2011).

Civil war can undermine regime stability and create incentives for the military to intervene politically. Such instability could also increase the need for US training. A dummy variable was included if the country was involved in a *Civil War* during that year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Countries that suffer from terrorist attacks might gain more support from the US, particularly through CTF, we include a dummy controlling for this (START, 2013). The age of a regime can also affect political stability, we therefore include *Regime Age* using Boix, Rosato and Miller's (BMR) data (Boix et al., 2012). Elites from ethnic groups that are politically empowered often have an incentive to launch coups (Roessler, 2011). *Empowered Ethnic Groups* is a count of politically included ethnic groups taken from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al., 2009). We include BMR's measurement of *Democracy* (Boix et al., 2012). Regime type has also been shown to have important effects on the strategies that regime leaders adopt to limit coups and on civil-military relations more generally (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012).[15]

We included *Cold War* and *post-2001* dummies. The United States might be more inclined to punish coup leaders in the post-Cold War era as they are less concerned about alienating allies. It dramatically shifted IMET's emphasis after the terrorist attacks of 2001.

Coups in the same country are unlikely to be independent events (Londregan and Poole, 1990); *Years Since Last Coup* should account for this as well as time dependence (Roessler, 2011; Powell, 2012). Taking time seriously in the broader sense, we followed the recommendation of Carter and Signorino (2010) and included a cubic time trend, based on years since the last coup event. All independent variables were lagged one time period.

[15]The appendix use alternative measures of democracy

5.3 Methods of Analysis

We analyzed our binary dependent variable with logistic regressions, using multiple imputation (Honaker and King, 2010) to deal with missing data.[16] For a second round of analysis, we also employed "nearest neighbor" matching techniques (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Smith and Todd, 2005, 153) in case our early results are dependent on our modeling choices: decisions on confounding variables, functional form, or link function (King and Zeng, 2006, 135). In unbalanced data (where "treated" observations differ systematically in terms of covariates and number relative to untreated observations), the risk of estimates depending on a particular model increase. Matching improves the balance of the dataset and the problems related to extrapolation are less likely to occur (Ho et al., 2007). We do *not* suggest that matching eliminates the problems of omitted variable bias. Our supplemental section describes our multiple imputation and matching procedures.

6 Results

From 1970-2009, 60% of military-backed coups occur in countries that have received training in the previous year (Pearson's χ^2 p<.01) see Figure 1. Put another way, among all the countries that received no training from the United States for a particular year, 2.7% experienced a coup. Among those country-years with some training, the percentage is 5.3%, nearly double. This is a remarkable bivariate correlation given that the United States suspends training to most states after a coup. Figure 2 shows that among attempted coups, militaries that have received training account for almost two

[16]Rather than excluding observations with *any* missing data (King et al., 2001), which results in a loss of efficiency due to discarding information, and potentially biased results if the stringent assumption of missing completely at random is not met. We analyze the unimputed data in the appendix.

thirds of successes (Pearson's χ^2 p<.10). These results suggest a relationship between training and coup attempts and success.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

6.1 Effects of Military Training on Coup Attempts

We start with the most conservative multivariate models. Every version of our independent variables is significantly associated with Military-Backed Coups. Figure 3 depicts the differences in predicted probabilities of a coup for twelve models when holding our explanatory variable at the 25th and the 75th percentiles ("any training" or "no training" for dichotomous operationalizations).[17] An increase in trained soldiers raises the predicted probability of a coup by 1%, roughly a *doubling* of coup probability in the average case. A one standard deviation increase over the mean increases the probability by .06%. The difference between having no training and any training is even larger, about 1.1%. Figure 3 also presents similar results for the pooled IMET and CTFP data.Using matched data the change in predicted probabilities is similar to that found for the unmatched data, about 1%, reducing our concerns regarding model dependence.

[Table 1 and Figure 3 about here]

[Figure 4 about here]

We then divided the IMET data by time period (Cold War and post-Cold War) and present the first differences for both IMET students and spending in Figure 5. The effect of training during the Cold War is consistently larger than the post-Cold War effect. The difference in effect size is difficult to interpret as the samples differ along

[17]Other variables held at their mean or mode. To calculate the predicted probabilities and the confidence intervals, 2000 simulations were run on each imputed dataset, and then combined.

many dimensions, and predicted probabilities depend on the value of all the variables in the model. However, even in the post-Cold War era, IMET training remains positively and significantly associated with military-backed coups.

Figure 6 presents the first differences dividing by regime type as coded by BMR. The results remain positive and significant. The effect of training appears to be twice as large in autocracies (albeit not significantly different from the effect in democracies). When limited to democracies, the coefficients remain positive. The smaller effect could be evidence that IMET has a weaker coup effect in democracies (again one should not over-interpret the differences in effect size between sub-categories). What is obvious, however, is that training has the *opposite* effect on coups in democracies than normative theories predict.

Finally, we ran the models including only low and middle income countries as defined by the World Bank. The simulated effect appears larger in less developed countries (Figure 7), which supports our human capital argument. We also ran the models using only least developed countries, these results are robust and included in the appendix.

[Figures 5, 6, and 7 about here]

6.2 Other Forms of Aid and Non-Military Backed Coups

We briefly explore the effects of other covariates. Table 1 presents results that allow us to better compare coefficients. We reran the regressions with the input variables standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by two standard errors (Gelman, 2008). The main body only depicts the results for unmatched observations of IMET students, but the results are almost identical in our other models (contained in the appendix).

H_2 posited that training works differently compared to other forms of aid. US military aid has an insignificant negative effect on coup probability. This supports our theory that non-training military aid is fungible and can be shifted towards coup-proofing. Foreign aid also has little effect on coup-propensity, although the coefficients are consistently positive. Only training has a statistically significant effect on coup propensity.

[Figure 8 about here]

To begin testing H_3, we analyzed *non-military-backed coups* from the combined CSP and GIC data sets, and report the results in Figure 8. If IMET was having a positive effect on these sorts of coups, then our theoretical argument that these results are driven by the increased human capital invested in the military would have been incorrect. We do not find any relationship.

Strong reason exists to believe that there is an association between IMET training and coup-propensity, and that the effect differs from other types of aid. Finally we find little evidence of liberal norms being transferred; training still correlates to coups in democracies, and has no effect on non-military-backed coups.

7 Conclusion

Given the nature of aid and the American national interests it serves, the effect on domestic politics of American foreign military training (FMT) is unlikely to be limited to a higher respect for human rights and civilian control. Training imparts valuable resources to a potentially dangerous section of a developing state's polity: increasing the trainees' human capital relative to the rest of the military, and increasing the military's capital relative to the government. This training is likely to increase the

military's resource demands from the regime, and improve its ability to remove the regime should its demands not be met.

We find a robust relationship between American training of foreign militaries and military-backed coup attempts, despite limiting our analysis to the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), which explicitly focuses on promoting norms of civilian control. If the number of soldiers trained moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th, the predicted probability of a coup roughly doubles. We also find that FMT correlates to the likelihood of a successful military-backed coup. Given that coups are rare (albeit often disastrous) events, such substantive changes in their likelihood represent an important finding.[18]

That training is positively associated with coups even when analysis is limited to democracies or the post-Cold War era represents an especially profound challenge to the idea that training's only political effect is to fundamentally alter the normative beliefs of militaries. Additionally, there is no evidence of a link between training and non-military-backed coups, which further undermines the notion that the transference of liberal norms into foreign militaries can play a strong role in domestic politics. Finally, training's effect on coup propensity differs significantly from other forms of military aid in both direction and magnitude, lending support to our theoretical argument about the non-fungibility of military human capital.

FMT comes in many different forms. Both senior and junior military officers (who received American training commensurate with their rank) have overthrown governments. Distinguishing between junior- and senior-led coups, as well as the type of instruction received, will help illuminate the causal paths leading from training to regime change. A great deal of US FMT aid is obscurely included as part of its massive Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, which subsidizes arms purchases. Given FMF's

[18]If small absolute values effects are intrinsically uninteresting, then we should not study coups (or war, financial crises, etc.) at all.

size, relative lack of transparency, and its subsidizing of human capital as well as war materiel; further research should seek to untangle its effects. Finally, while they pale in size and scope compared to the American effort, many other countries train foreign militaries, including France, the United Kingdom, and China. While data on these programs are hard to come by, some focused comparisons might identify the effects of these states' different approaches. Finally many countries pay the United States to train their soldiers; comparing this population to recipients of training as aid is another natural step.

Coups are extreme examples of military involvement in domestic politics. Our human capital-based theory suggests more generally that trained military officers will grow more autonomous from the regime. This can increase inclination for coups but more broadly means that the military will be less invested in regime survival more generally (Atkinson, 2006, 2010; Brooks, 2013). Providing the military with resources that are not vulnerable to redistribution may mean they are less inclined to repress to prevent regime change in general. In this case, normative and resource-based mechanisms make similar claims, and it is possible that they may mutually reinforce each other.

Recent work has found evidence that targeted aid, such as that which focuses on building up a number of robust groups within civil society, can lead to increased democratization. This is not so much because liberal norms become more widely adopted within a state, but because countervailing groups and institutions achieve some semblance of independence from authoritarian regimes. Our research suggests that the military should be considered one of these societal groups, and any aid process that does not consider this vital institution may be missing an opportunity.

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

Figure 1: Mosaic plot of military-backed coup attempts and students



Figure 2: Mosaic plot of military-backed coup success and students



Figure 3: Simulated Effects of IMET and IMET-CTFP Students on Military-Backed Coups

First differences of predicted probabilities moving from the 25th to 75th percentile for annual and five year sums. 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 4: Simulated Effects of any IMET and combined IMET-CTFP Students and Spending on Military-Backed Coups (Matched Data)

Dichotomous treatment variable when any students or money is spent. 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 5: Simulated Effects of IMET on Military-Backed Coups (Cold War and Post-Cold War)

First differences of predicted probabilities moving from the 25th to 75th percentile for annual and five year sums. 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 6: Simulated Effects of IMET on Military-Backed Coups (Democracies and Non-democracies)

First differences of predicted probabilities moving from the 25th to 75th percentile for annual and five year sums. 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 7: Simulated Effects of IMET on Military-Backed Coups (Developing Countries)

First differences of predicted probabilities moving from the 25th to 75th percentile for annual and five year sums. 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 8: Simulated Effects of IMET Spending on Non-Military-Backed Coups

First differences of predicted probabilities moving from the 25th to 75th percentile for annual and five year sums. 95% confidence intervals.

Table 1: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Standardized Coefficients)

	(1) Military-Backed Coups	(2) Military-Backed Coup	(3) Military-Backed Coup	(4) Military-Backed Coup	(5) Military-Backed Coup	(6) Military -Backed Coup
Any Students	0.670***					
	(0.141)					
Total Students		0.662***				
(Annual)		(0.135)				
Total Students			0.053***			
(5 year sum)			(0.014)			
Any Spending				0.596***		
				(0.140)		
Total Spending					0.610***	
(Annual)					(0.136)	
Total Spending						0.039***
(5 year sum)						(0.010)
GDP per capita	-1.098***	-1.152***	-1.265***	-1.080***	-1.098***	-1.221***
	(0.243)	(0.245)	(0.282)	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.280)
US Affinity	-0.048	-0.087	0.039	-0.049	-0.080	0.036
	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.190)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.190)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-0.105	-0.141	-0.032	-0.094	-0.109	-0.040
	(0.242)	(0.259)	(0.266)	(0.233)	(0.239)	(0.273)
Military Spending	-0.148	-0.148	-0.372	-0.171	-0.166	-0.384
	(0.348)	(0.350)	(0.457)	(0.350)	(0.351)	(0.458)
Military Personnel	-0.293	-0.335	-0.272	-0.302	-0.337	-0.274
	(0.249)	(0.255)	(0.266)	(0.248)	(0.254)	(0.266)
Oil Revenue	0.088	0.108	0.150	0.077	0.086	0.137
	(0.235)	(0.234)	(0.257)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.259)
Coup Proofing	-0.059	-0.077	-0.058	-0.044	-0.065	-0.052
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.164)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.164)
Civil War	0.498***	0.456***	0.454***	0.501***	0.476***	0.460***
	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.172)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.172)
Growth	-0.242*	-0.252*	-0.203	-0.236*	-0.248*	-0.202
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.138)
Democracy	-0.287	-0.291	-0.209	-0.279	-0.278	-0.192
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.190)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.189)
Regime Age	-0.160	-0.148	-0.145	-0.156	-0.151	-0.146
	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.155)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.155)
Terror Attack	0.237	0.212	0.080	0.241	0.220	0.093
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.161)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.161)
Total Aid	0.545	0.680	0.293	0.575	0.638	0.262
	(0.596)	(0.589)	(0.662)	(0.592)	(0.588)	(0.661)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.048	-0.044	-0.031	-0.046	-0.045	-0.033
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Post Cold War	-0.168	-0.113	-0.222	-0.157	-0.130	-0.234
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.175)
Post 9/11	-0.320	-0.357	-0.329	-0.328	-0.340	-0.305
	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.252)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.252)
Years Since last coup	-0.149***	-0.152***	-0.176***	-0.150***	-0.152***	-0.176***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Constant	-2.372***	-2.377***	-2.430***	-2.356***	-2.359***	-2.470***
	(0.231)	(0.230)	(0.254)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.255)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Foreign Military Training and Coup Propensity: Supplemental Information

September 22, 2015

S1 Descriptive statistics and correlations

Table S1 presents our list of military-backed coups, while Table S2 lists non-military backed coups. Table S3 shows descriptive statistics covering our variables.

Figure S1 shows graphically the correlation between our explanatory and independent variables. We see little evidence that coups predict the amount of training. Years since last coup is, in fact, positively correlated with our explanatory variable, meaning that countries that have not recently experienced a coup event receive more training. Indeed, this is explicit US policy.

Table S1: Military Backed Coups by Year

Country	Year	Country	Year	Country	Year	Country	Year	Country	Year
Argentina	1970	Bangladesh	1976	Bangladesh	1981	Guatemala	1988	Gambia	1995
Bolivia	1970	Burundi	1976	Bolivia	1981	Haiti	1988	Iraq	1995
Cambodia	1970	Cambodia	1976	Central African Rep	1981	Myanmar	1988	Ivory Coast	1995
Congo (Brazzaville)	1970	Chad	1976	Equatorial Guinea	1981	Panama	1988	Qatar	1995
Haiti	1970	Ecuador	1976	Gambia	1981	Somalia	1988	Sierra Leone	1995
Oman	1970	Lebanon	1976	Ghana	1981	Chad	1989	Bangladesh	1996
Syria	1970	Nigeria	1976	Mauritania	1981	Ethiopia	1989	Burundi	1996
Togo	1970	Sudan	1976	Poland	1981	Government of Sudan	1989	Central African Rep	1996
Argentina	1971	Thailand	1976	Spain	1981	Guatemala	1989	Guinea	1996
Bolivia	1971	Uruguay	1976	Thailand	1981	Haiti	1989	Niger	1996
Morocco	1971	Angola	1977	Bangladesh	1982	Panama	1989	Paraguay	1996
Sierra Leone	1971	Bangladesh	1977	Burkina Faso	1982	Paraguay	1989	Sierra Leone	1996
Sudan	1971	Chad	1977	Chad	1982	Phillipines	1989	Cambodia	1997
Thailand	1971	Congo (Brazzaville)	1977	Ghana	1982	Afghanistan	1990	Congo (Brazzaville)	1997
Turkey	1971	Ethiopia	1977	Guatemala	1982	Argentina	1990	Sierra Leone	1997
Uganda	1971	Ghana	1977	Iran	1982	Mauritania	1990	Zambia	1997
Benin	1972	Government of Sudan	1977	Kenya	1982	Nigeria	1990	GuineaBissau	1998
Ecuador	1972	Honduras	1977	Mauritania	1982	Papua New Guinea	1990	Comoros	1999
El Salvador	1972	Pakistan	1977	Burkina Faso	1983	Phillipines	1990	GuineaBissau	1999
Ghana	1972	Thailand	1977	Central African Rep	1983	Sudan	1990	Honduras	1999
Honduras	1972	Afghanistan	1978	Equatorial Guinea	1983	Zambia	1990	Ivory Coast	1999
Morocco	1972	Bolivia	1978	Ghana	1983	Chad	1991	Niger	1999
Afghanistan	1973	Ghana	1978	Guatemala	1983	Haiti	1991	Pakistan	1999
Chile	1973	Honduras	1978	Niger	1983	Lesotho	1991	Comoros	2000
Greece	1973	Mali	1978	Nigeria	1983	Mali	1991	Djibouti	2000
Iraq	1973	Mauritania	1978	Bolivia	1984	Thailand	1991	Ecuador	2000
Laos	1973	Nicaragua	1978	Cameroon	1984	Togo	1991	Fiji	2000
Rwanda	1973	Somalia	1978	Guinea	1984	Benin	1992	GuineaBissau	2000
Bolivia	1974	Afghanistan	1979	Mauritania	1984	Burundi	1992	Haiti	2000
Central African Rep	1974	Bolivia	1979	Pakistan	1984	Chad	1992	Ivory Coast	2000
Cyprus	1974	El Salvador	1979	Government of Sudan	1985	Comoros	1992	Paraguay	2000
Ethiopia	1974	Equatorial Guinea	1979	Guinea	1985	Madagascar	1992	Burundi	2001
Lesotho	1974	Ghana	1979	Liberia	1985	Peru	1992	Central African Rep	2001
Madagascar	1974	Iraq	1979	Nigeria	1985	Sierra Leone	1992	Ivory Coast	2001
Niger	1974	South Korea	1979	Thailand	1985	Tajikistan	1992	Venezuela	2002
Portugal	1974	Spain	1979	Uganda	1985	Venezuela	1992	Central African Rep	2003
Uganda	1974	Bangladesh	1980	Equatorial Guinea	1986	Burundi	1993	GuineaBissau	2003
Bangladesh	1975	Bolivia	1980	Lesotho	1986	Chad	1993	Mauritania	2003
Benin	1975	Burkina Faso	1980	Phillipines	1986	Libya	1993	Congo (Kinshasa	2004
Chad	1975	GuineaBissau	1980	Togo	1986	Nigeria	1993	Mauritania	2005
Ecuador	1975	Iran	1980	Burkina Faso	1987	Azerbaijan	1994	Togo	2005
Honduras	1975	Ivory Coast	1980	Burundi	1987	Burundi	1994	Fiji	2006
Nigeria	1975	Liberia	1980	Comoros	1987	Gambia	1994	Thailand	2006
Peru	1975	Mauritania	1980	Fiji	1987	Lesotho	1994	Bangladesh	2007
Portugal	1975	Tanzania	1980	Phillipines	1987	Liberia	1994	Phillipines	2007
Sudan	1975	Turkey	1980	Tunuisia	1987	Azerbaijan	1995	Guinea	2008
Uganda	1975	Uganda	1980	Benin	1988	Benin	1995	Mauritania	2008
Argentina	1976	Zambia	1980						

Table S2: Non-Military Coups by Year

Country	Country
United Arab Emirates	1972
Lesotho	1974
Argentina	1975
Comoros	1975
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1975
Cambodia	1975
Cambodia	1976
Benin	1977
Comoros	1977
Seychelles	1977
Cambodia	1977
Cambodia	1978
Grenada	1979
Nicaragua	1980
Swaziland	1983
Ghana	1984
Iraq	1984
Bulgaria	1989
Madagascar	1989
Comoros	1989
Trinidad And Tobago	1990
Madagascar	1990
Djibouti	1991
Comoros	1991
Afghanistan	1992
Tajikistan	1992
Rwanda	1994
Armenia	1995
Qatar	1996
Albania	1998
Armenia	1999
Haiti	2000
Cambodia	2000
Afghanistan	2002
Kyrgyzstan	2003
Chad	2008
Equatorial Guinea	2009
Lesotho	2009

Table S3: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Military Backed Coup	7,560	0.031	0.174	0	1
Any Training	7,560	0.449	0.497	0	1
Any Spending	7,560	0.455	0.498	0	1
Training 5 year sum(logged)	6,615	1.355	3.623	−2.303	11.093
Students (logged)	7,560	0.271	3.014	−2.303	10.430
Spending(logged)	7,560	1.377	4.134	−2.303	9.888
GDP per capita	6,216	7.603	1.584	3.998	11.591
Affinity	6,348	−0.299	0.458	−1.000	1.000
Military Assistance (%GDP)	6,001	0.001	0.016	0.000	0.831
Oil Revenue	5,337	744.138	3,961.313	0.000	78,588.800
Military Spending	5,449	18,082.480	45,467.380	0.000	1,722,499.000
Coup Proofing	5,460	1.673	0.648	1.000	5.557
Civil War	7,560	0.137	0.344	0	1
Terror Attack	7,560	0.370	0.483	0	1
Growth	6,227	3.686	6.385	−51.031	106.280
Democracy (BMR)	6,568	0.465	0.499	0	1
Regime Age	6,528	37.446	43.917	1	210
Total Aid	6,180	.076	.127	0.000	2.223
Empowered Ethnic Groups	5,220	1.738	1.878	0.000	14.00
Years Since Last Coup	7,560	14.587	11.441	0	39



Figure S1: Correlation matrix of main explanatory, confounding, and dependent variables

S2 Multiple imputation and matching procedures

We used the Amelia II package (Honaker and King, 2010) to create five multiply imputed datasets.We analyzed our binary dependent variable using logistic regressions via the Zelig package, which combines datasets using the Rubin method. This method calculates appropriate standard errors for multiply imputed datasets by taking into account both the within imputation and the between imputation variance.

Matching searches for observations that have a similar probability of receiving the treatment (FMT in this case) given the covariates in the matching model. We matched on the dichotomous measures of any training and any spending using nearest neighbor matching (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, 153). A logistic regression including all confounding variables described above was used to generate a predicted probability of receiving training or spending: the propensity score. Each treated observation was then matched with its "nearest neighbor" based on propensity scores.

The matching was carried out using replacement. When matching without replacement, and there are large differences in propensity scores between treated and untreated observations, some observations can be matched despite very different propensity scores (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Additionally, estimates using nearest neighbor matching without replacement depend on the order the matching occurs (Smith and Todd, 2005). Matching with replacement avoids these problems, trading some variance for reduced bias.[1] These procedures were carried out on each multiply imputed dataset and then the data were recombined with Zelig as described above. Figures S2 and S3 (for students) and S4 and S5 (for spending) present the distribution of the propensity scores after matching (for the first of the five multiply-imputed datasets).

[1]Estimates using matching without replacement are similar to those conducted using matching with replacement.



Figure S2: Propensity scores for matching (IMET training, dataset 1 of 5)



Figure S3: Propensity scores for matching (IMET training, dataset 1 of 5)



Figure S4: Propensity scores for matching (IMET spending, dataset 1 of 5)



Figure S5: Propensity scores for matching (IMET spending, dataset 1 of 5)

A Results Discussed in the Main Text

Table S4: Combined IMET and CTFP training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup

	(1) Military Backed Coups	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.653***					
	(0.141)					
Total Students		0.108***				
(Annual)		(0.022)				
Total Students			0.084***			
(5 year sum)			(0.023)			
Any Spending				0.653***		
				(0.141)		
Total Spending					0.072***	
(Annual)					(0.017)	
Total Spending						0.064***
(5 year sum)						(0.018)
GDP per capita	-0.342***	-0.359***	-0.383***	-0.342***	-0.342***	-0.370***
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.088)
US Affinity	-0.052	-0.092	0.043	-0.052	-0.086	0.036
	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.210)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.210)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-2.388	-3.111	-0.435	-2.388	-2.460	-0.959
	(5.282)	(5.742)	(5.673)	(5.282)	(5.239)	(5.920)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.045	-0.060	-0.038	-0.045	-0.050	-0.037
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.120)
Civil War	0.499***	0.457***	0.503***	0.499***	0.476***	0.508***
	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.175)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.175)
Growth	-0.019*	-0.020*	-0.017	-0.019*	-0.019*	-0.017
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.287	-0.291	-0.131	-0.287	-0.279	-0.113
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.191)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.190)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.238	0.214	0.042	0.238	0.222	0.052
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.165)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.165)
Total Aid	0.553	0.689	0.397	0.553	0.646	0.368
	(0.596)	(0.589)	(0.663)	(0.596)	(0.588)	(0.666)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.047	-0.044	-0.028	-0.047	-0.045	-0.030
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.045)
Post Cold War	-0.167	-0.113	-0.228	-0.167	-0.129	-0.239
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.175)
Post 9/11	-0.348	-0.390	-0.342	-0.348	-0.374	-0.326
	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.253)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.252)
Years Since last coup	-0.150***	-0.153***	-0.171***	-0.150***	-0.153***	-0.170***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Constant	0.004	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S5: Training and Spending's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (matched data)

	Military Backed Coup	Military Backed Coup	Military Backed Coup	Military Backed Coup
Any Students (IMET)	0.684***			
	(0.143)			
Any Students(Combined)		0.673***		
		(0.143)		
Any Spending (IMET)			0.610***	
			(0.141)	
Any Students (Combined)				0.673***
				(0.143)
GDP per capita	-0.369***	-0.372***	-0.363***	-0.372***
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
US Affinity	-0.010	-0.035	-0.026	-0.035
	(0.188)	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.186)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-1.832	-1.814	-1.789	-1.814
	(5.132)	(5.112)	(5.296)	(5.112)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.015	-0.017	-0.006	-0.017
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.112)
Civil War	0.533***	0.546***	0.542***	0.546***
	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Growth	-0.017	-0.016	-0.017	-0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.194	-0.200	-0.191	-0.200
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.183)	(0.182)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Total Aid	0.202	0.171	0.226	0.171
	(0.652)	(0.643)	(0.654)	(0.643)
Ethnic Power Relations	-0.056	-0.055	-0.055	-0.055
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Cold War	-0.126	-0.128	-0.110	-0.128
	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.173)
Post Cold War	-0.316	-0.354	-0.330	-0.354
	(0.251)	(0.252)	(0.251)	(0.252)
Year Since Last Coup	-0.141***	-0.143***	-0.144***	-0.143***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Constant	0.248	0.277	0.220	0.277
	(0.557)	(0.557)	(0.555)	(0.557)

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
All models employ lagged independent variables,
a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S6: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Cold War)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.633***					
	(0.179)					
Total Students		0.105***				
(Annual)		(0.028)				
Total Students			0.092***			
(5 year sum)			(0.030)			
Any Spending				0.541***		
				(0.178)		
Total Spending					0.070***	
(Annual)					(0.021)	
Total Spending						0.066***
(5 year sum)						(0.023)
GDP per capita	-0.339***	-0.356***	-0.406***	-0.333***	-0.340***	-0.392***
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.125)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.124)
US Affinity	0.135	0.085	0.288	0.140	0.108	0.280
	(0.211)	(0.210)	(0.253)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.253)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-3.316	-4.136	-0.742	-3.075	-3.373	-1.208
	(5.806)	(6.324)	(6.929)	(5.550)	(5.724)	(7.104)
Military Spending	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Oil Revenue	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.190	-0.204	-0.203	-0.173	-0.191	-0.202
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.196)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.198)
Civil War	0.509**	0.457**	0.533**	0.508**	0.482**	0.522**
	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.253)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.252)
Growth	-0.007	-0.008	0.000	-0.007	-0.008	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Democracy	-0.396	-0.378	-0.095	-0.398	-0.383	-0.092
	(0.245)	(0.244)	(0.283)	(0.246)	(0.245)	(0.283)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.417**	0.386*	0.152	0.435**	0.404**	0.187
	(0.200)	(0.202)	(0.240)	(0.201)	(0.202)	(0.238)
Total Aid	1.025	1.174	0.583	1.064	1.132	0.589
	(0.802)	(0.794)	(1.000)	(0.798)	(0.795)	(0.992)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.072	-0.068	-0.055	-0.070	-0.068	-0.057
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.063)
Years since last coup	-0.396***	-0.402***	-0.481***	-0.401***	-0.405***	-0.486***
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.130)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.129)
Constant	0.434	0.801	1.360	0.412	0.621	1.244
	(0.696)	(0.702)	(0.907)	(0.694)	(0.696)	(0.901)
Observations	3591	3591	2835	3591	3591	2835

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
All models employ lagged independent variables,
a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S7: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Post-Cold War)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.739***					
	(0.263)					
Total Students		0.116***				
(Annual)		(0.044)				
Total Students			0.090**			
(5 year sum)			(0.043)			
Any Spending				0.698***		
				(0.263)		
Total Spending					0.081**	
(Annual)					(0.032)	
Total Spending						0.066**
(5 year sum)						(0.033)
GDP per capita	-0.410***	-0.425***	-0.406***	-0.405***	-0.409***	-0.388***
	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.134)
US Affinity	-0.992*	-0.950*	-0.944*	-1.013**	-1.002*	-0.990*
	(0.513)	(0.513)	(0.513)	(0.513)	(0.512)	(0.513)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-23.661	-25.366	-22.199	-23.890	-24.832	-20.879
	(29.190)	(29.328)	(28.208)	(29.492)	(29.434)	(28.034)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	0.106	0.101	0.112	0.108	0.098	0.105
	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.163)
Civil War	0.424*	0.399	0.424*	0.434*	0.412	0.430*
	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)
Growth	-0.033**	-0.033**	-0.030**	-0.032**	-0.032**	-0.030**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Democracy	-0.102	-0.140	-0.120	-0.088	-0.102	-0.080
	(0.268)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.268)	(0.269)	(0.268)
Regime Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Terror Attack	0.073	0.052	0.011	0.067	0.050	0.013
	(0.242)	(0.241)	(0.240)	(0.242)	(0.241)	(0.241)
Total Aid	-0.127	0.038	0.202	-0.104	-0.016	0.228
	(1.039)	(1.021)	(1.010)	(1.035)	(1.024)	(1.001)
Ethnic Power Relations	-0.014	-0.009	-0.001	-0.014	-0.011	-0.000
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Post-9/11	-0.521*	-0.538**	-0.539**	-0.538**	-0.537**	-0.517*
	(0.270)	(0.270)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.269)	(0.268)
Years since last coup	-0.076	-0.083	-0.074	-0.073	-0.079	-0.071
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Constant	-0.622	-0.112	-0.438	-0.658	-0.342	-0.656
	(1.029)	(1.037)	(1.025)	(1.029)	(1.029)	(1.024)
Observations	3780	3780	3780	3780	3780	3780

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
All models employ lagged independent variables,
a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S8: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Democracies only)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.904**					
	(0.371)					
Total Students		0.148***				
Annual		(0.054)				
Total Students			0.138**			
(5 year sum)			(0.059)			
Any Spending				0.897**		
				(0.372)		
Total Spending					0.120***	
(Annual)					(0.044)	
Total Spending						0.146***
(5 year sum)						(0.053)
GDP per capita	-0.545***	-0.577***	-0.531***	-0.545***	-0.559***	-0.513***
	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.182)	(0.171)	(0.172)	(0.182)
US Affinity	-0.156	-0.141	0.033	-0.156	-0.192	-0.063
	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.455)	(0.391)	(0.392)	(0.454)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-2.720	-4.776	-17.979	-2.765	-4.507	-25.166
	(21.437)	(23.091)	(30.957)	(21.451)	(23.182)	(33.971)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	0.115	0.075	0.081	0.117	0.066	0.041
	(0.234)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.234)	(0.239)	(0.240)
Civil War	0.796**	0.773**	0.878**	0.793**	0.763**	0.865**
	(0.345)	(0.344)	(0.352)	(0.345)	(0.344)	(0.352)
Growth	-0.029	-0.031	-0.017	-0.029	-0.032	-0.021
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.033)
Regime Age	-0.016	-0.015	-0.023	-0.016	-0.015	-0.023
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Terror Attack	0.592*	0.559	0.452	0.593*	0.542	0.388
	(0.342)	(0.343)	(0.372)	(0.342)	(0.344)	(0.376)
Total Aid	-0.875	-0.634	-0.284	-0.879	-0.688	-0.042
	(1.501)	(1.465)	(1.447)	(1.500)	(1.471)	(1.393)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.002	0.018	0.048	-0.004	0.006	0.037
	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.097)
post Cold War	-0.531	-0.438	-0.493	-0.527	-0.502	-0.602
	(0.378)	(0.376)	(0.379)	(0.378)	(0.377)	(0.384)
post-9/11	-0.055	-0.103	-0.107	-0.056	-0.086	-0.090
	(0.450)	(0.449)	(0.454)	(0.450)	(0.449)	(0.449)
Years since last coup	0.071	0.073	0.059	0.069	0.072	0.062
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.107)
Constant	0.170	0.723	0.368	0.181	0.528	0.079
	(1.378)	(1.381)	(1.514)	(1.378)	(1.370)	(1.520)
Observations	2779	2779	2612	2779	2779	2612

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
All models employ lagged independent variables,
a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S9: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Non-democracies only)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.558***					
	(0.156)					
Total Students		0.087***				
Annual		(0.026)				
Total Students			0.067**			
(5 year sum)			(0.026)			
Any Spending				0.475***		
				(0.155)		
Total Spending					0.055***	
(Annual)					(0.019)	
Total Spending						0.042**
(5 year sum)						(0.019)
GDP per capita	-0.230***	-0.244***	-0.263**	-0.223**	-0.228***	-0.248**
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.110)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.109)
US Affinity	0.091	0.041	0.184	0.092	0.061	0.178
	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.245)	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.245)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-3.258	-3.833	-0.960	-3.039	-3.222	-1.206
	(5.077)	(5.411)	(5.530)	(4.840)	(4.934)	(5.675)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Oil Revenue	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.144	-0.143	-0.125	-0.133	-0.135	-0.122
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.145)
Civil War	0.419**	0.383**	0.421**	0.421**	0.401**	0.415**
	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.205)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.205)
Growth	-0.017	-0.017	-0.016	-0.017	-0.017	-0.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Regime Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.106	0.091	-0.112	0.111	0.099	-0.091
	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.193)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.193)
Total Aid	1.030	1.138*	0.715	1.066	1.112*	0.729
	(0.658)	(0.654)	(0.805)	(0.652)	(0.650)	(0.802)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.069	-0.068	-0.053	-0.067	-0.066	-0.050
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.055)
post Cold War	0.023	0.063	-0.018	0.032	0.053	-0.038
	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.206)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.206)
post-9/11	-0.479	-0.500	-0.468	-0.487	-0.491	-0.442
	(0.316)	(0.316)	(0.318)	(0.316)	(0.316)	(0.317)
Years since last coup	-0.247***	-0.251***	-0.279***	-0.249***	-0.252***	-0.284***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.067)
Constant	-0.306	0.008	0.295	-0.336	-0.158	0.184
	(0.616)	(0.626)	(0.799)	(0.612)	(0.615)	(0.791)
Observations	4683	4683	4088	4683	4683	4088

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
All models employ lagged independent variables,
a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S10: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Developing Countries Only)

	(1) mi	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.582***					
	(0.146)					
Total Students (Annual)		0.091***				
		(0.023)				
Total Students (5 year sum)			0.075***			
			(0.024)			
Any Spending				0.506***		
				(0.145)		
Total Spending (Annual)					0.060***	
					(0.017)	
Total Spending (5 year sum)						0.055***
						(0.018)
GDP per capita	-0.315***	-0.337***	-0.295***	-0.307***	-0.316***	-0.277***
	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.098)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.096)
US Affinity	-0.034	-0.071	0.111	-0.033	-0.061	0.100
	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.219)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.219)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-2.383	-2.905	-1.653	-2.197	-2.396	-2.057
	(5.229)	(5.562)	(6.060)	(5.026)	(5.154)	(6.157)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.088	-0.095	-0.062	-0.078	-0.087	-0.065
	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.123)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.123)
Civil War	0.468***	0.434***	0.493***	0.470***	0.450***	0.489***
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.176)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.176)
Growth	-0.020*	-0.020*	-0.016	-0.019*	-0.020*	-0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.079	-0.087	-0.037	-0.068	-0.070	-0.015
	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.198)	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.197)
Regime Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.153	0.139	-0.004	0.156	0.145	0.010
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.169)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.168)
Total Aid	0.517	0.623	0.628	0.554	0.606	0.669
	(0.636)	(0.629)	(0.667)	(0.631)	(0.628)	(0.667)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.052	-0.048	-0.028	-0.051	-0.049	-0.029
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Post Cold War	-0.183	-0.139	-0.206	-0.172	-0.150	-0.231
	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.179)
Post 9/11	-0.360	-0.387	-0.368	-0.366	-0.372	-0.339
	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.258)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.257)
Years Since last coup	-0.138***	-0.140***	-0.160***	-0.139***	-0.141***	-0.162***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Constant	0.020	0.393	0.164	-0.016	0.198	0.015
	(0.605)	(0.616)	(0.693)	(0.602)	(0.606)	(0.687)
Observations	5044	5044	4524	5044	5044	4524

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S11: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Developing Countries Only)

	(1) mi	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.655***					
	(0.200)					
Total Students		0.107***				
(Annual)		(0.036)				
Total Students			0.088***			
(5 year sum)			(0.032)			
Any Spending				0.556***		
				(0.199)		
Total Spending					0.070***	
(Annual)					(0.025)	
Total Spending						0.074***
(5 year sum)						(0.024)
GDP per capita	-0.279*	-0.299**	-0.289*	-0.266*	-0.272*	-0.256*
	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.149)
US Affinity	0.148	0.072	0.078	0.136	0.104	0.124
	(0.271)	(0.267)	(0.269)	(0.273)	(0.270)	(0.271)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-0.369	-1.041	0.706	-0.244	-0.468	0.812
	(3.935)	(4.214)	(3.835)	(3.771)	(3.818)	(3.498)
Military Spending	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	0.023	0.021	0.028	0.039	0.032	0.023
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.165)
Civil War	0.491**	0.430*	0.460*	0.498**	0.471**	0.478**
	(0.238)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.238)	(0.237)	(0.237)
Growth	-0.007	-0.007	-0.005	-0.007	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Democracy	-0.328	-0.312	-0.305	-0.311	-0.316	-0.318
	(0.292)	(0.291)	(0.293)	(0.291)	(0.292)	(0.293)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	-0.010	-0.011	-0.047	-0.015	-0.025	-0.046
	(0.235)	(0.234)	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.235)
Total Aid	0.343	0.435	0.606	0.387	0.424	0.600
	(0.665)	(0.660)	(0.634)	(0.658)	(0.655)	(0.640)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.047	-0.050	-0.044	-0.046	-0.047	-0.042
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Post Cold War	-0.035	-0.001	-0.084	-0.015	0.002	-0.100
	(0.235)	(0.234)	(0.237)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.236)
Post 9/11	-0.325	-0.372	-0.326	-0.330	-0.337	-0.287
	(0.310)	(0.311)	(0.311)	(0.310)	(0.310)	(0.311)
Years Since last coup	-0.068	-0.075	-0.068	-0.069	-0.072	-0.063
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Constant	-0.479	-0.063	-0.257	-0.549	-0.327	-0.535
	(0.947)	(0.950)	(0.959)	(0.946)	(0.943)	(0.951)
Observations	1989	1989	1734	1989	1989	1734

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S12: IMET effects on probability of non-military-backed coup

Non-Military Coup	Non-Military Coup	Non-Military Coup	Non-Military Coup	Non-Military Coup	Non-Military Coup	
Any Students	0.066					
	(0.363)					
Total Students		-0.015				
(Annual)		(0.062)				
Total Students			-0.046			
(5 year sum)			(0.073)			
Any Spending				0.039		
				(0.363)		
Total Spending					-0.004	
(Annual)					(0.044)	
Total Spending						-0.028
(5 year sum)						(0.051)
GDP per capita	-0.189	-0.184	-0.330	-0.188	-0.186	-0.335
	(0.210)	(0.209)	(0.227)	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.227)
US Affinity	-0.814	-0.807	-0.779	-0.814	-0.811	-0.770
	(0.540)	(0.541)	(0.613)	(0.540)	(0.541)	(0.612)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	0.412	0.308	-10.345	0.393	0.339	-9.853
	(7.993)	(8.057)	(11.505)	(8.000)	(8.021)	(11.178)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003*	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.061	-0.044	-0.047	-0.058	-0.050	-0.048
	(0.312)	(0.312)	(0.349)	(0.312)	(0.313)	(0.348)
Civil War	0.437	0.440	-0.066	0.437	0.437	-0.066
	(0.450)	(0.451)	(0.513)	(0.450)	(0.450)	(0.513)
Growth	-0.002	-0.002	-0.018	-0.002	-0.002	-0.019
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Democracy	-1.175**	-1.162**	-1.156*	-1.173**	-1.167**	-1.170*
	(0.556)	(0.557)	(0.630)	(0.556)	(0.556)	(0.627)
Regime Age	-0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Terror Attack	0.249	0.260	0.411	0.250	0.255	0.400
	(0.392)	(0.394)	(0.439)	(0.392)	(0.393)	(0.435)
Total Aid	-1.372	-1.286	-2.342	-1.355	-1.310	-2.356
	(2.302)	(2.252)	(2.456)	(2.296)	(2.269)	(2.469)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.120	-0.117	-0.083	-0.120	-0.118	-0.084
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.130)
Post Cold War	0.585	0.598	0.428	0.589	0.597	0.427
	(0.554)	(0.553)	(0.650)	(0.554)	(0.554)	(0.652)
Post 9/11	-0.786	-0.759	-0.577	-0.783	-0.770	-0.592
	(0.848)	(0.849)	(0.830)	(0.848)	(0.849)	(0.831)
Years Since last coup	-0.100	-0.098	-0.181	-0.099	-0.098	-0.181
	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.204)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.204)
Constant	-2.632*	-2.700*	-1.342	-2.638*	-2.659*	-1.268
	(1.497)	(1.512)	(1.996)	(1.495)	(1.503)	(1.965)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

B Coup Success

IMET training also predicts a higher probability of a successful coup demonstrated when we use successful military backed coups as the dependent variable in our logistic regressions. Calculating the first difference of predicted probabilities from the logit regression shows an increase of a successful coup of about 0.8 % (Figure S6). The absolute change is smaller than that for attempts. But successful coups are rarer than attempts. The percent change in the predicted probability is around 150%. Successful coups are strongly associated with IMET training and spending. The coefficients for these tests are presented in Table S13.



Figure S6: Simulated Effects of IMET Spending on Successful Coups

Points represent first differences of predicted probabilities moving from the 25th to 75th percentile for annual and five year sums of Students and Spending. Any Students or Spending represent first difference of receiving any training. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

While a selection process is no doubt present (actors need to attempt a coup to be successful), results from selection models are often fragile, highly dependent on functional form, and require an exogenous variable in the selection equation that is not part of the data generating process of the outcome. We nonetheless include results from a Heckman probit in the supplementary material. Following Powell (2012), we use years since last coup as the exogenous instrument. The results are weaker than those of the previous models. While all the models indicate that IMET is significantly associated with coup attempts, only three indicate a significant relationship with coup success, though the remaining models are close to significant (Tables S14 & S15).

If the weak instrument underpinning the Heckman probit is justified, the weaker relationship with success having accounted for coup attempts may not be surprising. Coup plotters calculate their utility in expectation; improving their capabilities pushes previously marginal cases to launch risky coups. In addition, our variables change the payoffs of coups, creating incentives for the military to launch riskier coups than otherwise. First, we argue the increased value of IMET trainees to the regime reduces the costs of failure, their punishments may be more limited in some cases. Second, coup plotters are motivated by the payoff of holding onto power (Goemans and Marinov, 2013). We argue this will be higher for IMET trainees, their value to external actors reduces the probability they will be punished by the international community if they seize power. As a result, IMET trainees may be motivated to launch riskier coups.

Table S13: IMET effects on probability of a successful military-backed coup

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	1.151***					
	(0.226)					
Total Students		0.179***				
(Annual)		(0.035)				
Total Students			0.166***			
(5 year sum)			(0.040)			
Any Spending				1.110***		
				(0.227)		
Total Spending					0.136***	
(Annual)					(0.026)	
Total Spending						0.125***
(5 year sum)						(0.031)
GDP per capita	-0.461***	-0.499***	-0.640***	-0.455***	-0.469***	-0.608***
	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.146)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.144)
US Affinity	0.453*	0.361	0.568*	0.466*	0.385	0.559*
	(0.268)	(0.266)	(0.315)	(0.269)	(0.267)	(0.315)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-3.048	-4.150	2.451	-2.633	-3.131	1.759
	(7.654)	(8.226)	(7.095)	(7.300)	(7.584)	(7.582)
Military Spending	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.237	-0.258	-0.326	-0.229	-0.261	-0.322
	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.213)	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.213)
Civil War	0.107	0.024	0.259	0.112	0.058	0.267
	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.296)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.296)
Growth	-0.026	-0.027*	-0.019	-0.025	-0.027*	-0.019
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Democracy	-0.196	-0.189	-0.001	-0.191	-0.177	0.033
	(0.274)	(0.275)	(0.306)	(0.275)	(0.274)	(0.306)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Terror Attack	0.477**	0.445*	-0.006	0.479**	0.439*	0.020
	(0.235)	(0.234)	(0.269)	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.269)
Total Aid	0.801	0.997	-0.009	0.822	0.928	-0.060
	(0.868)	(0.837)	(1.099)	(0.865)	(0.849)	(1.113)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.112	-0.107	-0.125	-0.112	-0.108	-0.127
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.083)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.084)
Post Cold War	-0.442	-0.345	-0.517	-0.435	-0.369	-0.542*
	(0.320)	(0.319)	(0.326)	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.327)
Post 9/11	0.402	0.336	0.367	0.375	0.362	0.432
	(0.428)	(0.427)	(0.428)	(0.427)	(0.426)	(0.427)
Years Since last coup	-0.160**	-0.162**	-0.204**	-0.155**	-0.156**	-0.202**
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.083)
Constant	0.209	0.928	2.167**	0.154	0.594	1.829*
	(0.843)	(0.854)	(1.061)	(0.843)	(0.846)	(1.056)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S14: IMET training's effect on probability of a successful military-backed coup (Heckman probit)

	(1) Military Backed Coup Outcome	(2) Military Backed Coup Selection	(3) Military Backed Coup Outcome	(4) Military Backed Coup Selection	(5) Military Backed Coup Outcome	(6) Military Backed Coup Selection
Any Students	0.430*	0.317***				
	(0.241)	(0.067)				
Total Students			0.061	0.052***		
(Annual)			(0.039)	(0.011)		
Total Students					0.059	0.040***
(5 year sum)					(0.037)	(0.011)
GDP per capita	-0.119	-0.155***	-0.120	-0.161***	-0.223	-0.185***
	(0.118)	(0.033)	(0.120)	(0.034)	(0.140)	(0.040)
US Affinity	0.654***	-0.049	0.624***	-0.065	0.580**	-0.015
	(0.241)	(0.085)	(0.238)	(0.085)	(0.275)	(0.096)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-0.553	-0.167	-0.829	-0.205	2.244	-0.107
	(1.305)	(0.275)	(1.337)	(0.302)	(3.222)	(0.309)
Military Spending	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.223	-0.020	-0.225	-0.026	-0.260	-0.018
	(0.158)	(0.056)	(0.157)	(0.056)	(0.159)	(0.060)
Civil War	-0.482**	0.265***	-0.488**	0.249***	-0.297	0.244***
	(0.215)	(0.079)	(0.212)	(0.079)	(0.239)	(0.084)
Growth	-0.009	-0.010*	-0.009	-0.010*	-0.010	-0.009*
	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.005)
Democracy	0.204	-0.144*	0.196	-0.147*	0.135	-0.100
	(0.245)	(0.081)	(0.246)	(0.081)	(0.263)	(0.087)
Regime Age	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Terror Attack	0.227	0.133*	0.206	0.120*	-0.011	0.061
	(0.205)	(0.071)	(0.202)	(0.072)	(0.218)	(0.076)
Total Aid	0.046	0.384	0.134	0.441	-0.280	0.208
	(0.685)	(0.275)	(0.687)	(0.273)	(0.778)	(0.314)
Ethnic Power Relations	-0.128**	-0.026	-0.120**	-0.024	-0.163**	-0.020
	(0.060)	(0.020)	(0.059)	(0.020)	(0.064)	(0.022)
Post-Cold War	-0.228	-0.089	-0.172	-0.062	-0.188	-0.115
	(0.230)	(0.084)	(0.224)	(0.084)	(0.239)	(0.085)
Post 9/11	0.517	-0.143	0.464	-0.163	0.476	-0.152
	(0.320)	(0.116)	(0.322)	(0.117)	(0.339)	(0.117)
Years since last coup		-0.069***		-0.070***		-0.083***
		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.024)
Constant	1.373*	-0.290	1.579**	-0.119	1.891**	0.116
	(0.733)	(0.249)	(0.721)	(0.252)	(0.855)	(0.301)
Rho	-0.195		-0.212		0.036	
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S15: IMET training's effect on probability of a successful military-backed coup (Heckman probit)

	(1) Military Backed Coup Outcome	(2) Military Backed Coup Selection	(3) Military Backed Coup Outcome	(4) Military Backed Coup Selection	(5) Military Backed Coup Outcome	(6) Military Backed Coup Selection
Any Spending	0.470**	0.284***				
	(0.235)	(0.067)				
Total Spending			0.054*	.035***		
(Annual)			(0.028)	(0.008)		
Total Spending					0.039	0.033***
(5 year sum)					(0.027)	(0.007)
GDP per capita	-0.124	-0.153***	-0.127	-0.155***	-0.102	-0.151***
	(0.118)	(0.033)	(0.119)	(0.033)	(0.117)	(0.033)
US Affinity	0.662***	-0.049	0.631***	-0.064	0.620***	-0.068
	(0.242)	(0.085)	(0.240)	(0.085)	(0.237)	(0.085)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-0.165	-0.149	-0.218	-0.164	-0.169	-0.115
	(1.329)	(0.257)	(1.347)	(0.267)	(1.318)	(0.237)
Military Spending	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.229	-0.015	-0.240	-0.023	-0.202	-0.024
	(0.158)	(0.056)	(0.159)	(0.056)	(0.153)	(0.056)
Civil War	-0.484**	0.267***	-0.498**	0.256***	-0.479**	0.258***
	(0.216)	(0.079)	(0.214)	(0.079)	(0.218)	(0.079)
Growth	-0.009	-0.010*	-0.009	-0.010*	-0.008	-0.010*
	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)
Democracy	0.199	-0.139*	0.186	-0.139*	0.162	-0.145*
	(0.245)	(0.081)	(0.245)	(0.081)	(0.253)	(0.081)
Regime Age	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Terror Attack	0.226	0.134*	0.210	0.123*	0.161	0.104
	(0.205)	(0.071)	(0.204)	(0.072)	(0.202)	(0.072)
Total Aid	0.017	0.392	0.045	0.419	0.171	0.495*
	(0.688)	(0.273)	(0.689)	(0.273)	(0.689)	(0.267)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.128**	-0.026	-0.124**	-0.025	-0.118**	-0.023
	(0.060)	(0.020)	(0.060)	(0.020)	(0.060)	(0.020)
post Cold War	-0.234	-0.083	-0.197	-0.070	-0.199	-0.094
	(0.230)	(0.084)	(0.226)	(0.084)	(0.229)	(0.084)
post 9/11	0.515	-0.145	0.496	-0.152	0.524	-0.148
	(0.321)	(0.116)	(0.321)	(0.116)	(0.322)	(0.116)
Years since last coup		-0.070***		-0.071***		-0.068***
		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)
Constant	1.386*	-0.295	1.572**	-0.194	1.271*	-0.269
	(0.736)	(0.249)	(0.726)	(0.250)	(0.749)	(0.249)
Rho	-0.189		-0.199		-0.168	
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

A Additional robustness checks

We also ran region and country fixed effects logistic regressions. The time dimension of the panel is long enough that fixed effects rather than the conditional logit is acceptable (Katz, 2001; Coupé, 2005). Despite the fact that the country fixed effect models only examine units which suffer a failure during the period under observation, the results are robust, demonstrating within unit as well as cross-national effects. The results from these models are presented in Tables S16 and S17.

Table S21 and Table S22 present the "original" non-imputed data. Table S21 shows the results with Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) substituted for Empowered Ethnic Groups. The reason for this was that Empowered Ethnic Groups from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset includes only groups from countries with populations larger than 1,000,000 and territory of greater than 500,000 km^2 and only extends to 2005. These restrictions on population and territory would exclude many countries that have experienced coups. Using ELF in the models with the imputed data does not change the results. Table S22 shows the results using Empowered Ethnic Groups.

To explore the robustness of our principal finding, we used alternative measures of coups as our dependent variables. We substituted Powell and Thyne's measure of coups for our Military Backed Coup variable (see Table S18). We also used the Marshall and Marshall's Center for Systemic Peace coding of attempted and successful coups (see Table S19). Across all of the models using either the measures of students or spending a significant, positive relationship persists.

We used six different operationalizations of our dependent variable in the main body of the paper. Here we include additional transformations. First, we used the number of students and the 5 year sum of students without taking the natural log. We also used the total amount of spending without taking the natural log. The results were mixed. On the full sample, the non-normalized measure of training was insignificant. These results are being driven by outliers occurring before the official establishment of the IMET program, in Cambodia and Laos. Once these seven observations from the early 1970s are dropped the results are again significant. Finally, we looked at IMET spending per student for that year. Again we find a significant association (Table S20).

As mentioned, while the US military provides data on officers trained in similar programs prior to 1976, the IMET program officially began that year. Significantly, the nine country-years that experienced the most training oc-

curred during this period (in Cambodia and Laos). We ran models using only data after 1976. The results, shown in Table S23, remain significant and in the predicted direction.[2]

Table S24 shows the results when cubic splines are substituted for the cubic time trend.

The rareness of coups could cause problems with estimation. When zeros vastly outnumber ones in the data it is possible that probabilities are estimated incorrectly with quantities of interest sometimes too large or too small. To address this we reestimate the results using rare events logit (King and Zeng, 2001b,a). The results, depicted in Table S25 are similar and significant across all our measures of training or funding.

The results in Tables S26, S27 and S28 show that our main finding is robust to using different operationalisations of regime type. We substituted BMR's measure of democracy for Polity, Freedom House and Geddes, Wright and Frantz's.

[2]The IMET program has undergone a series of institutional changes across time. As described above, in each of these there has been a change in how much emphasis has been placed on training or course related to respect for human rights and civilian control. To check the findings sensitivity to these changes, we replaced the cold war dummy with dummies marking these shifts in policy. These dummies were coded to measure the period from 1976 to 1991, which marked the establishment of IMET, and the post-Leahy amendment era change to E-IMET. Along with this alternative specification, we also fitted models with decade dummies and year dummies. The results with these variables included are similar to the base-line model.

Table S16: Effect of IMET spending on the probability of a coup (Region Fixed Effects)

	(1) mi	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.582***					
	(0.141)					
Total Students		0.095***				
(Annual)		(0.023)				
Total Students			0.075***			
(5 year sum)			(0.023)			
Any Spending				0.505***		
				(0.141)		
Total Spending					0.063***	
(Annual)					(0.017)	
Total Spending						0.054***
(5 year sum)						(0.018)
GDP per capita	-0.294***	-0.301***	-0.317***	-0.289***	-0.293***	-0.311***
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.100)
US Affinity	0.064	0.025	0.176	0.062	0.032	0.171
	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.213)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.213)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-2.596	-3.233	-1.196	-2.404	-2.661	-1.541
	(5.287)	(5.666)	(5.955)	(5.078)	(5.257)	(6.124)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personell	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.014	-0.023	-0.002	-0.003	-0.015	0.004
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.126)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.126)
Civil War	0.525***	0.495***	0.534***	0.526***	0.508***	0.538***
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.175)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.175)
Growth	-0.019*	-0.020*	-0.017	-0.019*	-0.020*	-0.018
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.202	-0.197	-0.024	-0.193	-0.192	-0.014
	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.203)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.203)
Regime Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.200	0.185	0.029	0.202	0.186	0.036
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.167)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.167)
Total Aid	0.574	0.673	0.322	0.608	0.651	0.306
	(0.590)	(0.585)	(0.664)	(0.585)	(0.583)	(0.665)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.052	-0.049	-0.035	-0.050	-0.049	-0.036
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Post Cold War	-0.166	-0.127	-0.223	-0.155	-0.135	-0.230
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.177)
Post 9/11	-0.315	-0.347	-0.326	-0.322	-0.332	-0.305
	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.252)	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.251)
Years Since last coup	-0.149***	-0.152***	-0.172***	-0.150***	-0.152***	-0.171***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Constant	-0.182	0.118	0.321	-0.206	-0.020	0.217
	(0.588)	(0.593)	(0.695)	(0.585)	(0.587)	(0.694)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S17: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (country fixed effects)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.512***					
	(0.171)					
Total Students		0.088***				
(Annual)		(0.030)				
Total Students			0.095***			
(5 year sum)			(0.033)			
Any Spending				0.416**		
				(0.170)		
Total Spending					0.055***	
(Annual)					(0.021)	
Total Spending						0.060**
(5 year sum)						(0.024)
GDP per capita	-0.287	-0.287	-0.691**	-0.281	-0.286	-0.680**
	(0.211)	(0.208)	(0.284)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.282)
US Affinity	0.424**	0.399*	0.570**	0.411*	0.398*	0.525**
	(0.210)	(0.209)	(0.252)	(0.211)	(0.209)	(0.249)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-2.539	-2.878	-2.843	-2.565	-2.658	-3.203
	(4.825)	(4.937)	(7.330)	(4.717)	(4.745)	(7.453)
Military Spending	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personell	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Oil Revenue	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	0.014	0.016	0.003	0.019	0.017	0.006
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.174)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.174)
Civil War	0.759***	0.750***	0.912***	0.755***	0.749***	0.901***
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.245)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.245)
Growth	-0.017	-0.017	-0.012	-0.016	-0.017	-0.012
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Democracy	-0.190	-0.193	0.047	-0.178	-0.182	0.052
	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.268)	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.268)
Regime Age	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.007
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Terror Attack	0.121	0.127	0.122	0.121	0.120	0.127
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.195)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.195)
Total Aid	0.491	0.560	-0.296	0.551	0.557	-0.247
	(0.706)	(0.699)	(0.922)	(0.704)	(0.703)	(0.922)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.105	-0.102	-0.087	-0.106	-0.105	-0.089
	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.117)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.117)
Post Cold War	-0.541***	-0.519***	-0.691***	-0.527***	-0.522***	-0.710***
	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.201)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.202)
Post 9/11	-0.891***	-0.918***	-1.038***	-0.902***	-0.911***	-1.008***
	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.287)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.287)
Years Since last coup	-0.064	-0.071	-0.094	-0.066	-0.068	-0.095
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.058)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S18: IMET training's effect on probability of any coup (Powell and Thyne)

	(1) PT Coup	(2) PT Coup	(3) PT Coup	(4) PT Coup	(5) PT Coup	(6) PT Coup
Any Students	0.646***					
	(0.153)					
Total Students		0.113***				
(Annual)		(0.024)				
Total Students			0.094***			
(5 year sum)			(0.026)			
Any Spending				0.586***		
				(0.152)		
Total Spending					0.075***	
(Annual)					(0.018)	
Total Spending						0.076***
(5 year sum)						(0.020)
GDP per capita	-0.323***	-0.342***	-0.421***	-0.318***	-0.325***	-0.408***
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.101)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.100)
US Affinity	-0.104	-0.137	-0.073	-0.104	-0.134	-0.072
	(0.199)	(0.198)	(0.239)	(0.199)	(0.198)	(0.239)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-4.403	-5.041	-2.260	-4.216	-4.473	-2.982
	(6.727)	(7.207)	(6.465)	(6.544)	(6.752)	(6.836)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.109	-0.132	-0.130	-0.100	-0.119	-0.135
	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.137)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.137)
Civil War	0.424**	0.381**	0.440**	0.427**	0.401**	0.441**
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.196)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.195)
Growth	-0.016	-0.017	-0.016	-0.016	-0.017	-0.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Democracy	-0.263	-0.268	-0.049	-0.256	-0.254	-0.032
	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.213)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.212)
Regime Age	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.129	0.101	-0.116	0.133	0.109	-0.111
	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.186)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.185)
Total Aid	0.094	0.240	-0.153	0.125	0.188	-0.202
	(0.703)	(0.698)	(0.808)	(0.699)	(0.697)	(0.816)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.051	-0.048	-0.032	-0.050	-0.049	-0.034
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.046)
Post Cold War	-0.150	-0.101	-0.223	-0.140	-0.115	-0.237
	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.196)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.196)
Post 9/11	-0.351	-0.383	-0.370	-0.361	-0.372	-0.356
	(0.291)	(0.291)	(0.293)	(0.291)	(0.291)	(0.293)
Years Since last coup	-0.238***	-0.239***	-0.280***	-0.238***	-0.240***	-0.281***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.065)
Constant	0.105	0.506	1.084	0.077	0.307	0.928
	(0.613)	(0.625)	(0.762)	(0.612)	(0.616)	(0.757)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S19: IMET training's effect on probability of any coup (Source: Marshall and Marshall)

	(1) MM Coup	(2) MM Coup	(3) MM Coup	(4) MM Coup	(5) MM Coup	(6) MM Coup
Any Students	0.745***					
	(0.142)					
Total Students		0.116***				
(Annual)		(0.023)				
Total Students			0.087***			
(5 year sum)			(0.023)			
Any Spending				0.671***		
				(0.142)		
Total Spending					0.081***	
(Annual)					(0.017)	
Total Spending						0.067***
(5 year sum)						(0.018)
GDP per capita	-0.359***	-0.378***	-0.418***	-0.353***	-0.360***	-0.405***
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.092)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.091)
US Affinity	0.009	-0.038	0.096	0.011	-0.028	0.095
	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.210)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.211)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-0.460	-1.038	-3.412	-0.384	-0.636	-4.134
	(3.248)	(3.376)	(5.970)	(3.186)	(3.214)	(6.329)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.001*	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001**	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.011	-0.020	0.002	0.000	-0.015	0.001
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.125)
Civil War	0.472***	0.426***	0.431**	0.475***	0.448***	0.436**
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.176)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.176)
Growth	-0.018	-0.018*	-0.018*	-0.017	-0.018*	-0.018*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.431**	-0.435**	-0.247	-0.424**	-0.422**	-0.230
	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.196)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.196)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.278*	0.257*	0.171	0.282*	0.261*	0.180
	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.166)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.166)
Total Aid	0.415	0.555	0.236	0.446	0.516	0.205
	(0.581)	(0.572)	(0.674)	(0.577)	(0.574)	(0.680)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.038	-0.033	-0.015	-0.037	-0.034	-0.016
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.044)
Post Cold War	-0.122	-0.065	-0.200	-0.111	-0.083	-0.211
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.177)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.177)
Post 9/11	-0.399	-0.441*	-0.364	-0.405	-0.422*	-0.346
	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.252)
Years Since last coup	-0.156***	-0.159***	-0.178***	-0.157***	-0.160***	-0.177***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Constant	0.029	0.454	0.757	0.003	0.258	0.607
	(0.567)	(0.573)	(0.676)	(0.565)	(0.567)	(0.672)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S20: (Untransformed) IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (less 7 outliers)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup
Total Students	0.000				
	(0.000)				
Total Students		0.001**			
		(0.000)			
Total Spending			0.000**		
			(0.000)		
Students per Soldier				0.024**	
				(0.011)	
Spending per student					0.006*
					(0.003)
GDP per capita	-0.332***	-0.341***	-0.337***	-0.333***	-0.317***
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)
US Affinity	-0.148	-0.180	-0.167	-0.141	-0.151
	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.177)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-3.380	-3.609	-2.767	-1.907	-1.907
	(6.002)	(6.003)	(5.052)	(4.779)	(4.668)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	0.039	0.010	0.014	0.040	0.031
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.113)
Civil War	0.478***	0.435***	0.461***	0.497***	0.493***
	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.162)
Growth	-0.016	-0.017*	-0.017	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Democracy	-0.220	-0.244	-0.231	-0.252	-0.228
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.179)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.297*	0.280*	0.269*	0.290*	0.282*
	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.152)
Total Aid	0.743	0.778	0.783	0.732	0.698
	(0.563)	(0.564)	(0.567)	(0.568)	(0.569)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.033	-0.032	-0.027	-0.029	-0.035
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
post-Cold War	-0.120	-0.087	-0.084	-0.111	-0.132
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.174)
Post 9/11	-0.300	-0.318	-0.313	-0.322	-0.332
	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.252)
Years since last coup	-0.168***	-0.164***	-0.166***	-0.168***	-0.166***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Constant	0.089	0.143	0.104	0.066	-0.020
	(0.541)	(0.543)	(0.540)	(0.540)	(0.538)
Observations	7371	7364	7371	7371	7371

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S21: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (non-imputed data using Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.436**					
	(0.185)					
Total Students		0.069**				
(Annual)		(0.030)				
Total Students			0.074**			
(5 year sum)			(0.030)			
Any Spending				0.373**		
				(0.184)		
Total Spending					0.046**	
(Annual)					(0.022)	
Total Spending						0.048**
(5 year sum)						(0.023)
GDP per capita	−0.209*	−0.225**	−0.270**	−0.207*	−0.213*	−0.252**
	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.114)
US Affinity	0.299	0.297	0.426*	0.303	0.288	0.412*
	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.247)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.246)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	−19.237	−22.471	−35.999	−18.172	−20.666	−33.793
	(16.153)	(17.134)	(24.162)	(15.854)	(16.751)	(23.453)
Military Spending	−0.00004**	−0.00004**	−0.00003**	−0.00004***	−0.00004**	−0.00003**
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Military Personnel	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.001*	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Oil Revenue	0.00003	0.00003	0.00003	0.00003	0.00003	0.00003
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Coup Proofing	−0.028	−0.033	−0.025	−0.020	−0.029	−0.017
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.135)
Civil War	0.646***	0.620***	0.601***	0.646***	0.630***	0.611***
	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.196)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.196)
Growth	−0.013	−0.014	−0.011	−0.013	−0.013	−0.011
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Democracy	−0.054	−0.060	−0.105	−0.043	−0.045	−0.078
	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.218)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.217)
Regime Age	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.132	0.125	0.082	0.129	0.127	0.093
	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.191)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.191)
Total Aid	−0.154	−0.042	−0.145	−0.122	−0.072	−0.180
	(0.836)	(0.825)	(0.858)	(0.832)	(0.828)	(0.857)
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization	0.440	0.464	0.487	0.429	0.437	0.460
	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.388)	(0.376)	(0.376)	(0.387)
Cold War	−0.260	−0.225	−0.277	−0.249	−0.236	−0.286
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.206)
Post Cold War	−0.415	−0.434	−0.420	−0.422	−0.426	−0.403
	(0.289)	(0.288)	(0.289)	(0.288)	(0.288)	(0.289)
Years since lat coup	−0.228***	−0.231***	−0.237***	−0.229***	−0.230***	−0.239***
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Constant	−0.240	0.030	0.284	−0.231	−0.084	0.155
	(0.868)	(0.867)	(0.893)	(0.867)	(0.865)	(0.890)
Observations	4,065	4,065	3,906	4,065	4,065	3,906
Log Likelihood	−603.352	−603.541	−571.725	−604.135	−603.956	−572.607
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,248.704	1,249.081	1,185.451	1,250.270	1,249.912	1,187.214

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.
Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization was substituted for Ethnic Empowerment to keep countries with populations of less than 1000000 in the sample.

Table S22: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (non-imputed data using Empowered Ethnic Groups)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.374**					
	(0.189)					
Total Students		0.062**				
(Annual)		(0.031)				
Total Students			0.065**			
(5 year sum)			(0.031)			
Any Spending				0.303		
				(0.189)		
Total Spending					0.039*	
(Annual)					(0.022)	
Total Spending						0.040*
(5 year sum)						(0.023)
GDP per capita	−0.239**	−0.257**	−0.304**	−0.235**	−0.242**	−0.283**
	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.118)
US Affinity	0.292	0.291	0.417*	0.296	0.284	0.406
	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.250)	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.249)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	−18.678	−21.777	−33.901	−17.522	−19.773	−31.313
	(15.972)	(16.988)	(23.792)	(15.623)	(16.493)	(23.000)
Military Spedning	−0.00004**	−0.00004**	−0.00003**	−0.00004**	−0.00004**	−0.00003**
	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)
Military Personnel	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.001*	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Oil Revenue	0.00004	0.00004	0.00004	0.00004	0.00004	0.00004
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Coup Proofing	−0.021	−0.028	−0.017	−0.010	−0.020	−0.005
	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.138)
Civil War	0.563***	0.541***	0.523***	0.565***	0.551***	0.534***
	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.201)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.201)
Growth	−0.018	−0.019	−0.018	−0.018	−0.019	−0.017
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Democracy	−0.061	−0.067	−0.109	−0.049	−0.052	−0.081
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.225)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.224)
Regime Age	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.090	0.086	0.049	0.086	0.086	0.058
	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.197)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.198)
Total Aid	−0.156	−0.062	−0.224	−0.118	−0.080	−0.243
	(0.864)	(0.854)	(0.890)	(0.860)	(0.856)	(0.888)
Empowered Ethic Groups	−0.012	−0.009	−0.004	−0.011	−0.010	−0.005
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Post Cold War	−0.299	−0.270	−0.321	−0.290	−0.278	−0.328
	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.213)
Post 9/11	−0.340	−0.359	−0.344	−0.348	−0.351	−0.328
	(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.297)	(0.298)
Years since last coup	−0.237***	−0.239***	−0.246***	−0.238***	−0.239***	−0.248***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070)
Constant	0.345	0.606	0.900	0.334	0.469	0.748
	(0.783)	(0.794)	(0.815)	(0.782)	(0.785)	(0.807)
Observations	3,762	3,762	3,609	3,762	3,762	3,609
Log Likelihood	−575.037	−574.975	−543.644	−575.725	−575.470	−544.492
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,192.073	1,191.951	1,129.287	1,193.451	1,192.940	1,130.985

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S23: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (post-1976)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.587***					
	(0.156)					
Total Students (Annual)		0.095***				
		(0.025)				
Total Students (5 year sum)			0.082***			
			(0.023)			
Any Spending				0.535***		
				(0.157)		
Total Spending (Annual)					0.067***	
					(0.019)	
Total Spending (5 year sum)						0.064***
						(0.018)
GDP per capita	-0.376***	-0.388***	-0.383***	-0.371***	-0.375***	-0.371***
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.088)
US Affinity	0.065	0.044	0.030	0.061	0.035	0.030
	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.209)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.210)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-1.297	-1.524	-0.298	-1.343	-1.602	-0.863
	(6.357)	(6.522)	(5.608)	(6.359)	(6.511)	(5.853)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personnel	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.031	-0.040	-0.039	-0.024	-0.037	-0.041
	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)
Civil War	0.523***	0.492***	0.498***	0.526***	0.503***	0.501***
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)
Growth	-0.017	-0.018	-0.016	-0.017	-0.018	-0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.122	-0.133	-0.128	-0.114	-0.117	-0.112
	(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.190)
Regime Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.110	0.087	0.049	0.111	0.096	0.057
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.165)
Total Aid	0.116	0.244	0.424	0.149	0.214	0.392
	(0.685)	(0.676)	(0.660)	(0.680)	(0.676)	(0.664)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.033	-0.029	-0.027	-0.033	-0.032	-0.029
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Post Cold War	-0.220	-0.175	-0.237	-0.210	-0.189	-0.249
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)
Post 9/11	-0.297	-0.326	-0.318	-0.305	-0.315	-0.302
	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.252)
Years Since last coup	-0.171***	-0.176***	-0.172***	-0.171***	-0.174***	-0.171***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Constant	0.469	0.803	0.659	0.440	0.640	0.524
	(0.661)	(0.667)	(0.661)	(0.659)	(0.661)	(0.658)
Observations	6426	6426	6426	6426	6426	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S24: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (cubic splines)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.657***					
	(0.141)					
Total Students		0.109***				
(Annual)		(0.022)				
Total Students			0.091***			
(5 year sum)			(0.023)			
Any Spending				0.580***		
				(0.141)		
Total Spending					0.073***	
(Annual)					(0.017)	
Total Spending						0.073***
(5 year sum)						(0.017)
GDP per capita	-0.358***	-0.375***	-0.407***	-0.352***	-0.358***	-0.358***
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.090)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
US Affinity	0.019	-0.020	0.079	0.017	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.212)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.181)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-2.277	-3.010	-0.871	-2.055	-2.353	-2.353
	(5.314)	(5.799)	(5.910)	(5.074)	(5.271)	(5.271)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personell	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.045	-0.060	-0.042	-0.033	-0.050	-0.050
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Civil War	0.461***	0.420***	0.479***	0.465***	0.439***	0.439***
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.175)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)
Growth	-0.016	-0.017	-0.014	-0.016	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.267	-0.272	-0.117	-0.259	-0.258	-0.258
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.191)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.179)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.232	0.207	0.050	0.236	0.215	0.215
	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.166)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Total Aid	0.490	0.620	0.348	0.523	0.581	0.581
	(0.603)	(0.596)	(0.669)	(0.598)	(0.595)	(0.595)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.050	-0.045	-0.032	-0.048	-0.047	-0.047
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Post Cold War	-0.154	-0.099	-0.187	-0.142	-0.115	-0.115
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.173)
Post 9/11	-0.307	-0.345	-0.338	-0.315	-0.329	-0.329
	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.249)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.247)
Years Since last coup	-0.087***	-0.088***	-0.089***	-0.088***	-0.088***	-0.088***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Constant	0.455	0.839	1.076	0.425	0.649	0.649
	(0.570)	(0.576)	(0.680)	(0.568)	(0.569)	(0.569)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic splines, and multiply imputed data.

Table S25: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (rare-events logit)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.666***					
	(0.141)					
Total Students		0.109***				
(Annual)		(0.022)				
Total Students			0.090***			
(5 year sum)			(0.023)			
Any Spending				0.592***		
				(0.141)		
Total Spending					0.073***	
(Annual)					(0.016)	
Total Spending						0.064***
(5 year sum)						(0.018)
GDP per capita	-0.340***	-0.357***	-0.385***	-0.335***	-0.340***	-0.370***
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.088)
US Affinity	-0.047	-0.088	0.052	-0.048	-0.081	0.033
	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.209)	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.209)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-2.026	-2.789	-1.080	-1.692	-1.986	-1.585
	(4.798)	(5.335)	(5.542)	(4.500)	(4.697)	(5.676)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personell	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.044	-0.058	-0.043	-0.032	-0.048	-0.043
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.120)
Civil War	0.497***	0.456***	0.501***	0.501***	0.476***	0.497***
	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.174)	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.174)
Growth	-0.019*	-0.020*	-0.017	-0.019*	-0.020*	-0.017
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.281	-0.285	-0.129	-0.273	-0.272	-0.106
	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.190)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.190)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.233	0.208	0.036	0.237	0.216	0.054
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.164)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.164)
Total Aid	0.600	0.733	0.442	0.630	0.692	0.467
	(0.596)	(0.589)	(0.665)	(0.592)	(0.588)	(0.663)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.046	-0.042	-0.026	-0.044	-0.043	-0.027
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Post Cold War	-0.164	-0.110	-0.213	-0.153	-0.126	-0.244
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.175)
Post 9/11	-0.302	-0.339	-0.315	-0.310	-0.322	-0.279
	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.252)	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.251)
Years Since last coup	-0.145***	-0.148***	-0.164***	-0.146***	-0.148***	-0.166***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Constant	0.014	0.396	0.650	-0.013	0.210	0.511
	(0.544)	(0.551)	(0.660)	(0.542)	(0.544)	(0.655)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S26: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Polity substituted for BMR)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.663***					
	(0.141)					
Total Students		0.108***				
(Annual)		(0.022)				
Total Students			0.089***			
(5 year sum)			(0.023)			
Any Spending				0.589***		
				(0.140)		
Total Spending					0.073***	
(Annual)					(0.016)	
Total Spending						0.075***
(5 year sum)						(0.018)
GDP per capita	-0.350***	-0.366***	-0.386***	-0.344***	-0.351***	-0.350***
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.089)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.079)
US Affinity	-0.050	-0.091	0.057	-0.051	-0.086	-0.049
	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.211)	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.192)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-2.357	-3.069	-0.568	-2.135	-2.423	-1.410
	(5.302)	(5.757)	(5.760)	(5.076)	(5.264)	(4.877)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personell	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.044	-0.059	-0.041	-0.032	-0.049	-0.051
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.117)
Civil War	0.500***	0.460***	0.504***	0.502***	0.478***	0.482***
	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.175)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.164)
Growth	-0.019*	-0.020*	-0.017	-0.019*	-0.020*	-0.019*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Polity	-0.015	-0.016	-0.010	-0.015	-0.014	-0.015
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Regime Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.240	0.215	0.045	0.244	0.223	0.156
	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.166)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.161)
Total Aid	0.520	0.652	0.363	0.550	0.610	0.658
	(0.595)	(0.588)	(0.664)	(0.591)	(0.587)	(0.613)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.044	-0.040	-0.026	-0.043	-0.041	-0.037
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Post Cold War	-0.145	-0.091	-0.197	-0.135	-0.110	-0.169
	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.182)	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.183)
Post 9/11	-0.295	-0.332	-0.319	-0.304	-0.317	-0.306
	(0.253)	(0.253)	(0.255)	(0.253)	(0.253)	(0.252)
Years Since last coup	-0.152***	-0.156***	-0.170***	-0.153***	-0.156***	-0.154***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Constant	-0.037	0.346	0.597	-0.058	0.174	0.102
	(0.580)	(0.584)	(0.688)	(0.577)	(0.579)	(0.627)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S27: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Geddes, Wright and Frantz substituted for BMR)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.466***					
	(0.149)					
Total Students		0.075***				
(Annual)		(0.024)				
Total Students			0.072***			
(5 year sum)			(0.024)			
Any Spending				0.384***		
				(0.148)		
Total Spending					0.048***	
(Annual)					(0.017)	
Total Spending						0.049***
(5 year sum)						(0.018)
GDP per capita	-0.284***	-0.305***	-0.303***	-0.276***	-0.286***	-0.285***
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.088)
US Affinity	0.035	0.015	0.036	0.037	0.021	0.036
	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.197)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.197)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-1.596	-2.065	-1.031	-1.468	-1.628	-0.833
	(4.740)	(5.065)	(4.582)	(4.568)	(4.689)	(4.323)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personell	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.071	-0.079	-0.076	-0.058	-0.069	-0.068
	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.122)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.122)
Civil War	0.411**	0.383**	0.397**	0.412**	0.398**	0.405**
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.166)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.166)
Growth	-0.018*	-0.019*	-0.018	-0.018	-0.019*	-0.018
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
GWF	-0.022	-0.025	-0.042	-0.011	-0.014	-0.027
	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.192)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.192)
Regime Age	-0.023***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.023***	-0.022***	-0.022***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Terror Attack	0.044	0.038	-0.017	0.044	0.037	-0.009
	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.165)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.165)
Total Aid	0.105	0.190	0.204	0.147	0.179	0.198
	(0.685)	(0.679)	(0.691)	(0.679)	(0.677)	(0.691)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.053	-0.049	-0.043	-0.051	-0.049	-0.044
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.045)
Post Cold War	-0.290	-0.254	-0.291	-0.283	-0.265	-0.300
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.188)
Post 9/11	-0.238	-0.261	-0.262	-0.241	-0.247	-0.242
	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.264)
Years Since last coup	-0.145***	-0.148***	-0.151***	-0.147***	-0.148***	-0.150***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.057)
Constant	0.216	0.526	0.450	0.184	0.358	0.299
	(0.593)	(0.609)	(0.618)	(0.591)	(0.598)	(0.610)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

Table S28: IMET training's effect on probability of a military-backed coup (Freedom House substituted for BMR)

	(1) Military Backed Coup	(2) Military Backed Coup	(3) Military Backed Coup	(4) Military Backed Coup	(5) Military Backed Coup	(6) Military Backed Coup
Any Students	0.650***					
	(0.151)					
Total Students		0.106***				
(Annual)		(0.024)				
Total Students			0.100***			
(5 year sum)			(0.023)			
Any Spending				0.592***		
				(0.150)		
Total Spending					0.072***	
(Annual)					(0.018)	
Total Spending						0.073***
(5 year sum)						(0.018)
GDP per capita	-0.200**	-0.216***	-0.226***	-0.196**	-0.202**	-0.210**
	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.087)
US Affinity	0.181	0.135	0.159	0.184	0.148	0.164
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.191)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.192)
Military Assistance (%GDP)	-2.528	-3.199	-1.801	-2.401	-2.674	-1.483
	(4.939)	(5.319)	(4.853)	(4.784)	(4.945)	(4.500)
Military Spending	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Personell	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil Revenue	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup Proofing	-0.057	-0.066	-0.065	-0.046	-0.059	-0.060
	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.126)
Civil War	0.404**	0.365**	0.385**	0.411**	0.386**	0.398**
	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.171)
Growth	-0.021**	-0.022**	-0.020*	-0.021**	-0.021**	-0.020*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	-0.145***	-0.146***	-0.143***	-0.143***	-0.143***	-0.140***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Regime Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Terror Attack	0.207	0.192	0.131	0.205	0.192	0.139
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.161)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.161)
Total Aid	0.684	0.820	0.832	0.712	0.776	0.802
	(0.612)	(0.603)	(0.642)	(0.606)	(0.601)	(0.640)
Empowered Ethnic Groups	-0.037	-0.034	-0.031	-0.036	-0.035	-0.032
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Post Cold War	-0.031	0.016	-0.054	-0.022	0.001	-0.068
	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.180)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.181)
Post 9/11	-0.221	-0.254	-0.245	-0.233	-0.241	-0.222
	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.252)
Years Since last coup	-0.115**	-0.119**	-0.117**	-0.115**	-0.119**	-0.117**
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Constant	-0.207	0.166	0.123	-0.233	-0.011	-0.058
	(0.564)	(0.573)	(0.603)	(0.562)	(0.565)	(0.603)
Observations	7371	7371	6615	7371	7371	6615

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models employ lagged independent variables, a cubic time trend, and multiply imputed data.

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