

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BLACK RADICALIZATION AND THE FUNDING OF CIVIL RIGHTS: 1957-1970*

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A neglected topic in social movement theory is the effect of factionalism within movements, particularly the role of "radical" activists in shaping responses to "moderates." This paper investigates the effect of black radicalization during the 1960s on the ability of moderate civil rights organizations to attract financial contributions from outside supporters. Trends in donations to seven major black organizations are analyzed. It is concluded that the activities of relatively radical black organizations, along with the urban riots, stimulated increased financial support by white groups of more moderate black organizations, especially during the late 1960s. This finding partially contradicts the widely-held belief that black militants only brought on a white "backlash." On the contrary, the task of fundraising by moderate civil rights organizations was apparently made easier, not more difficult, by the racial turmoil of the 1960s.

Nearly all social movements divide into "moderate" and "radical" factions at some point in their development, although the meaning of these labels is continually changing. Bifurcation has occurred, for example, in the U.S. labor movement (Rayback, 1966), the women's movement (Freeman, 1975), the anti-nuclear movement (Barkan, 1979), and the black revolt in the United States (Allen, 1969; Killian, 1972). Analysts of social movements have largely neglected how radical groups alter the context in which moderate groups operate. In other words, what happens to moderates when radicals appear? Does a backlash ensue? Or do policymakers and other important audiences become more receptive to moderate claims? In the face of militant challenges, do moderates find it easier or more difficult to pursue their goals?

These questions are complex, and they touch upon an issue which is crucial to understanding social movements and social issues: the relationships between factionalism and responses to competing varieties of collective action. Though theoretically important, this issue has received little attention from sociologists and political scientists. This paper addresses these topics by examining changes in the funding of civil rights organizations in the United States during the late 1950s and the 1960s—a period when portions of the black movement were becoming increasingly militant in both their goals and their tactics. The paper begins with a discussion of the sparse literature dealing with the effects of radical factions on moderate groups. Following this brief review, I will describe the escalation of the goals and tactics of organized black activists during the twentieth century. I will then present and discuss data on the funding of civil rights organizations during the period from 1957 through 1970. Although white reactions to black collective action during those turbulent times were diverse, these data will show that radicalization of segments of the black community had the net effect of improving the resource bases of more moderate civil rights organizations by stimulating previously uninvolved parties to contribute ever increasing amounts of financial support.

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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Activists and scholars alike have suggested that the activities of radicals in a social movement can undermine the position of moderates by discrediting movement activities and goals, and by threatening the ability of moderates to take advantage of the resources available from supportive third parties. I refer to this general backlash as the *negative radical flank effect.* The history of social movements in the United States provides several examples of the fear of such negative effects among movement participants. Moderate abolitionists of the early 19th century worried that anti-slavery extremists would discredit their cause and delay the emancipation of black slaves (Nye, 1963). Groups opposed to nuclear power plants have expressed the fear that violent or obstructionist tactics and efforts to expand the movement to embrace nuclear disarmament and anti-corporatism will hurt the immediate goal of stopping nuclear power development (Barkan, 1979). Some scholars have suggested that black radicalization and rioting during the 1960s weakened the position of such mainstream civil rights groups as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Masotti *et al.*, 1969; Muse, 1968; Powledge, 1967). Others have blamed the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment on the statements and actions of militant feminists (Felsenthal, 1982).

Conversely, a *positive radical flank effect* can occur when the bargaining position of moderates is strengthened by the presence of more radical groups. This happens in either (or both) of two ways. The radicals can provide a militant foil against which moderate strategies and demands are redefined and normalized—in other words, treated as "reasonable." Or, the radicals can create crises which are resolved to the moderates' advantage. Freeman (1975) has argued that mainstream reformist women's organizations would have been dismissed as "too far out" during the late 1960s and the early 1970s had it not been for more radical groups: lesbian feminists and socialist feminists appear to have improved the bargaining position of such moderate groups as the National Organization for Women. Ewen (1976) and Ramirez (1978) have suggested that demands by the labor movement for an eight-hour day and collective bargaining became negotiable only after the emergence of serious socialist threats in the early 20th century. Others have argued that the emergence of black militants in the 1960s helped to increase white acceptance of nonviolent tactics and integrationist goals (Elinson, 1966; Killian, 1972).

An understanding of radical flank effects would greatly enhance current social movement theory.[1] The literature on social and political movements abounds with more or less casual references to these effects, and they have been frequently debated by movement activists; but they have received almost no systematic attention. Gamson's (1975) research represents the most direct investigation of the effects of factionalism on protest outcomes. He examined the conditions under which groups came to represent a set of constituents and managed to gain "new advantages" for those constituents. Among the many conditions Gamson examined was the existence of moderate and radical groups championing the same broad issues. He tested—and rejected—the hypothesis that the existence of more militant organizations enhanced the success of less militant organizations. Gamson's test is less than conclusive for several reasons. There were measur-

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1. Radical flank effects are relevant, for example, to the debate between the resource mobilization model of protest and that of Piven and Cloward (1977, 1978). The resource mobilization perspective stresses the dependence of protest groups on the resources available from third parties (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Lipsky, 1968). Implicit in this model is the notion that protest groups must refrain from tactics and statements which would alienate prospective supporters. Piven and Cloward, on the other hand, suggest that reliance on such resources only undermines protest goals and that protest groups can succeed by tactics of mass disruption. Positive radical flank effects in protest movements provide a link between the two; under certain circumstances, moderate groups might well be able to maintain good relations with supporting groups by distancing themselves from the disruptive activities of radicals while at the same time profiting from the crises that they create.

ment and coding problems (Goldstone, 1980). He examined only 30 groups. Labor unions were over-represented in the sample. And, most important, he focused upon only two dimensions of reactions to moderate organizations: (1) the designation of a group as a legitimate representative for a group of constituents; and (2) the group's success in winning significant benefits for its constituents. While these dimensions are important, a number of others remain to be examined. Radical groups might, for example, increase or decrease the level of public *awareness* of moderate groups. They might alter public *definitions* of moderates as more or less "extreme," "reasonable," or "dangerous." Radicals might increase or decrease moderates' *access to decisionmakers*. And, finally, radical flank effects might influence the capacity of moderate groups to *attract resources* from supporters who are not members of the moderate groups themselves. This paper focuses upon the last of these dimensions.

THE BLACK REVOLT IN THE UNITED STATES

The black revolt in the United States after the Second World War is well-suited for studying radical flank effects because it involved a variety of organizations, ideologies, and strategies, and has experienced rapid tactical and rhetorical escalation, especially during the 1960s. This section briefly traces the escalation of black insurgency, highlighting those movement transformations upon which radical flank effects were based.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was the preeminent organizational representative of black interests in the United States from its incorporation in 1910 to the Supreme Court's landmark school desegregation decision in 1954. Other organizations existed, such as the National Urban League, the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (renamed the Southern Regional Council in 1944), and Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association. But none of these matched the NAACP in long-term influence. The NAACP functioned mainly as a legal group; its primary tactic was litigation. Initially, the NAACP did not challenge legalized racial segregation and discrimination. Well into the 1930s it aimed to ensure equality of rights and facilities under the "separate but equal" doctrine established in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), rather than to attack the doctrine outright. During the 1930s, however, this goal changed. The NAACP launched a protracted campaign of litigation, culminating in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (1954), in which the Supreme Court invalidated segregation in public schools. Thereafter, the nature of the black revolt was fundamentally transformed.

Prior to 1954, many groups in the United States periodically defined and attacked the NAACP as a radical organization. This was especially true in the southern states, where many blacks also regarded the NAACP's approach to racial justice as militant. The NAACP's integrationist philosophy and program of aggressive litigation *was* rather "radical" in those times.

When white resistance prevented the kinds of sweeping changes that many blacks expected the Supreme Court's desegration ruling to produce, the movement changed. So did the characteristics of what was called "militancy." Ideologically, the radicals of the late 1950s remained dedicated to racial integration and close to the spirit of U.S. political philosophy—i.e., they sought assimilation and reform, not "revolution." Tactically, however, they were very different. Organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) called for nonviolent direct action—marches, picket lines, boycotts, and the like—to challenge discrimination. Ostensibly, nonviolent direct action worked by appealing to an opponent's latent sense of right and wrong. In practice, however, direct action was usually successful only when it created crises that the white community could not afford to ignore. Direct action was infrequent during the late 1950s but, beginning with the student sit-ins of 1960, it became a popular and widespread tactic in the first half of the 1960s. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) joined the SCLC and CORE as major proponents of nonvio-

lence. Then SNCC quickly drifted into militant voter registration and community organizing activities. These three organizations occupied positions on the radical end of the black political spectrum during the early 1960s. The NAACP and the Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDEF), whose tactics continued to be limited largely to litigation, were by this time better classified as middle-of-the-road or moderate. The National Urban League was the most conservative of the national black organizations.

During the mid 1960s the predominance of nonviolent integrationism broke down, and militancy was transformed once again. As violence erupted in the black ghettos of northern cities and as many black activists began questioning the assimilationist orientation of the civil rights movement, leaders such as Martin Luther King and organizations such as the SCLC were increasingly defined as moderate or, at the very least, as "responsible" militants (Meier, 1965:55). *Real* militancy came to imply a separatist or nationalist outlook and an acceptance of retaliatory violence against an intransigent white power structure. One should not overgeneralize, for there were indeed several different types of black radicalism during the mid 1960s (Allen, 1969). Nevertheless, most black radicals rejected racial integration and strict nonviolence to some degree. Major proponents of the "new" black radicalism after 1966 were the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Black Panther Party, the Revolutionary Action Movement, the Republic of New Africa, and, to a far lesser extent, the Congress of Racial Equality.

While it is clear that black moderation and radicalism evolved during the 1950s and 1960s, students of black collective action are divided over its effects on the civil rights mainstream. Masotti *et al.* (1969:174), Muse (1968), and Powledge (1967), among others, contend that the escalation of black radicalism damaged the position of black moderates by strengthening white resistance to black claims and undermining black-white coalitions. Others have suggested that black radicalization not only failed to weaken moderates but actually enhanced the respectibility of established leaders and organizations, thus increasing their ability to bargain for gradual reform (Elinson, 1966:371; Hough, 1968:224; Meier, 1965; Oberschall, 1973:230).

It is probably impossible to settle this debate in any conclusive manner; it relates to a multidimensional issue, and both positions undoubtedly contain at least a grain of truth. No scholar, however, has yet examined organizational funding patterns in light of radical flank effects.

THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTSIDE RESOURCES

Prior to the 1970s, most scholars tried to explain the emergence of collective action in terms of participants' motives. But as theoretical and empirical problems have emerged in such explanations (Gurney and Tierney, 1982; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; McAdam, 1982), scholars began focusing on the organizational needs of social movements—especially the need to mobilize material and non-material resources (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Lipsky, 1968; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977). Since many aggrieved populations lack the resources necessary to wage large-scale collective challenges, resources obtained from outside supporters are frequently essential. The utility of the resource mobilization perspective is still being debated (McAdam, 1982:23), but it has been rather firmly established that organized conflict cannot operate for long on shared discontent and moral commitment alone. Thus, an understanding of processes which affect a movement organization's ability to mobilize resources would be useful. Unfortunately, resource mobilization theorists have had rather little to say on this subject (McAdam, 1982:21).

Resources may include such material things as money, land, labor (Tilly, 1978:69), or facilities (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1220). But less concrete resources—including "authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills, habits of industry" (Oberschall, 1973:28)—may also be valuable resources for collective action.

While it would be a mistake to equate resources solely with money, I believe money can serve as a convenient index of radical flank effects. I assume that outside supporters contribute money

or other resources only to those movement organizations which they consider acceptable. Supporters need not totally approve of the organization to contribute to it. Rather, they need only have a perceived interest in supporting the cause and they need only define the movement organization as an acceptable beneficiary. I also assume that acceptability is a *relative* thing. A movement organization's acceptability may be largely a function of the relative acceptability/unacceptability of *other* movement organizations. I use the levels of outside financial support obtained by a given social movement organization as rough indicators of the organization's acceptability to financial supporters.

Bearing all of this in mind, one can conceive of several hypothetical effects of radical groups on resource mobilization by moderate groups. Each would be expected to produce a distinct pattern in outside contributions to moderate organizations. We would expect *negative* radical flank effects—backlashes caused by radicals—to produce *declines* in the outside incomes of moderate groups (or a leveling of prior patterns of increasing moderate incomes) following significant ideological or tactical escalations by more radical groups. We would expect *positive* radical flank effects, on the other hand, to produce *increases* in the outside incomes of moderate groups (or a leveling of prior patterns of decreasing moderate incomes) following such escalations. The absence of significant changes in the outside incomes of moderate organizations during periods of radical escalation would indicate an absence of radical flank effects or a balancing of positive and negative effects.[2]

There are two subtypes of positive radical flank effects. One of these occurs when the radicalization of an established organization—such as the Congress of Racial Equality or the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee—causes some of its outside supporters to defect to less extreme organizations. If this were to occur, increases in outside income to moderate groups would match decreases in outside income to radical groups. In other words, a fixed sum of total movement income would be redistributed. The second subtype, and the one which is more significant in theory, involves moderate income gains *in excess* of radical group losses. Here we have not merely a redistribution of a fixed sum of resources but also the infusion of new resources into moderate coffers in response to radicalization. My data indicate that this in fact occurred among civil rights organizations during the 1960s.

DATA

To examine the relationship between radical flank effects and financial support, I set out to gather detailed information on resource mobilization by major black movement organizations during the 1950s and the 1960s. The ideal data would include total income broken down by its sources for each year and each organization. No such data have been compiled by students of the civil rights movement. The authors of organizational histories (Carson, 1981; Meier and Rudwick, 1973; Parris and Brooks, 1971; St. James, 1958) and of more general works on the movement (Brisbane, 1974; Muse, 1968) have provided limited information on the funding of particular organizations. None of these sources, however, contains data that are sufficiently systematic, detailed, and complete for an examination of radical flank effects.

I have used McAdam's (1980, 1982) data on movement income, which he compiled, not to study radical flank effects, but to determine the usefulness of resource mobilization theory as an explanation of the civil rights movement. McAdam was unable to obtain much information from

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2. Obviously, radical flank effects are not the only factor which might affect rates of resource mobilization. Decisions to contribute funds for collective action are complex, and a more complicated multivariate research design would be necessary in order to make truly confident propositions about radical flank effects on resource mobilization. Factors such as the state of the economy and the competition from other movements also need to be considered.

TABLE 1

Total Outside Income of Major Movement Organizations, 1952–1970

Year	NUL	NAACP	LDEF	SRC[a]	SCLC	CORE[k]	SNCC	Total Movement Income
1952	NA	NA	210,624[c]	27,495		4,604		
1953	NA	16,436	224,321[c]	35,735		5,989		
1954	NA	30,944	200,021	59,403		5,600		
1955	NA	40,606	NA	79,308		6,911		
1956	265,000[b]	NA	346,947	31,369		10,115[l]		
1957	265,000[b]	103,907	319,537	109,062	10,000[d]	15,506		823,012
1958	265,000[b]	90,679	315,081	138,274	10,000[d]	22,936		841,970
1959	265,000[b]	93,703	357,988	126,285	25,000[e]	55,324		923,000
1960	265,000[b]	103,838	489,540	139,106	54,756	130,609	5,000[o]	1,187,849
1961	257,000	96,936	560,808	NA[f]	193,168	213,248	14,000[o]	1,475,160
1962	572,000	81,547	669,427	168,247	197,565	244,034	71,927[p]	2,004,747
1963	1,221,000	251,579	1,197,204	161,311	728,172	437,043	302,894	4,299,203
1964	1,539,000	292,738	1,425,321	180,005	578,787	694,588	631,439[q]	5,341,848
1965	1,824,000	388,077	1,661,793	101,105	1,643,000[g]	677,785	637,736[q]	6,933,496
1966	2,201,000	597,425	1,695,718	NA[r]	932,000	400,000[m]	397,237[s]	6,324,485
1967	2,812,000	1,294,909	2,046,356	138,670	932,000[h]	280,000[n]	250,000[o]	7,753,935
1968	3,921,000	1,904,512	2,535,430	269,112	1,000,000[i]	250,000[n]	150,000[o]	10,030,054
1969	8,619,000	2,418,000	2,811,825	204,591	500,000[j]	670,000[n]	50,000[o]	15,273,416
1970	14,542,000	2,665,373	2,980,998	174,321	400,000[j]	210,000[n]	25,000[o]	20,997,692

Notes:

a. Data on the Southern Regional Council relate to the organization's general fund only. Surviving financial reports prior to 1964 do not list information on special projects. I have excluded special projects income from the figures for 1964 through 1970 to permit trend analyses. It should be kept in mind that this seriously deflates SRC income during the mid and late 1960s.

b. I could not find any information for the National Urban League prior to 1961. According to Parris and Brooks (1971:394), NUL income during the mid and late 1950s fluctuated between $209,000 and $315,000. In order to compute movement totals for those years, I have adopted the rather inelegant procedure of estimating yearly income midway between these two figures. The figure of $265,000 is a gross estimate only and should not be taken to mean that there were no changes in NUL income between 1956 and 1960.

c. This represents net income after fundraising expenses were deducted. LDEF financial reports for 1952 and 1953 do not list either fundraising expenses or gross income.

d. This is an impressionistic estimate of the SCLC's outside income derived from various primary and secondary materials.

e. This figure is an estimate based upon receipts for organizational contributions to the SCLC during 1959. The total rests upon my estimate that no more than $4,500 in individual contributions were received. During its early years, the SCLC received hundreds of individual contributions, most of which ranged from $2 to $5.

f. In order to derive a total movement income, I arbitrarily set SRC's outside income for 1961 at $140,000. This is probably somewhat lower than the actual figure, given the trend of preceding years.

g. This figure is an estimate. The SCLC's income data for fiscal year 1964–1965 are available only for the first ten months (83.3 percent) of that year. I reduced the total income for the year as reported in the final audit by 9.8 percent, which was the proportion of the previous year's total income which came from outside sources. This yielded an amended fiscal year 1965 estimated income of $1,409,335.40. This figure, in turn, was increased by 16.6 percent (the estimated income for the two remaining months) to produce the estimated figure shown.

h. This figure is an estimate which was derived from various partial financial reports. It may exclude a limited amount of income from benefit concerts, etc.

i. This figure is an estimate.

j. SCLC income estimates for 1969 and 1970 are adapted from McAdam (1982), by permission of the author.

k. CORE's fiscal year ran from June 1 to May 31. My examination of monthly and quarterly CORE financial reports yielded no reliable manner in which to adjust these figures to a calendar year basis.

l. This figure is an estimate based upon a percentage of total CORE income for 1956 of $12,000 as reported by Meier and Rudwick (1973:78). The percentage, 82 percent, is taken from the internal/external ratio of the previous year.

m. See Meier and Rudwick (1973).

n. CORE income figures for 1967 through 1970 are based upon estimates by McAdam (1982). Each, however, includes foundation grants located in my search through *Foundation News* (Haines, 1983). Consequently, the numbers are somewhat higher than McAdam's estimates, especially for 1969.

o. McAdam (1982:253).

p. The SNCC income for 1962 is taken from Student Nonviolent Coordinating Commitee (N.d.).

q. These figures are estimates. I divided external income for 10 months of each year (which is all that has survived) by 10 to yield an estimated monthly average income. This is interpolated to yield the estimated yearly income.

r. SRC outside income for 1966 is missing. For purposes of producing a movement total, I arbitrarily set it at $101,105, the income of the previous year.

s. This estimate is based upon the same procedure used for 1964 and 1965, except that 1966 financial data are available for only seven months of that year. Actual income for the first seven months is $231,721.32. It is quite possible that the interpolating procedure inflates the total SNCC income for 1966, since the black power slogan was born in the summer of that year.

primary sources such as organizational files and records. Consequently, he relied upon estimation and interpolation from incomplete secondary sources. In an effort to improve upon his data, I obtained financial information on major civil rights organizations during the period from 1952 through 1970, including two that he did not examine: the National Urban League and the Southern Regional Council.[3] I sought data for each of the following major black organizations active during the 1950s and the 1960s: Congress of Racial Equality (CORE); NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDEF); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); National Urban League (NUL); Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Southern Regional Council (SRC); and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

In 1981 I wrote to each of the organizations which still existed—all of them except SNCC, which had disappeared by 1972—requesting the necessary information. Only the National Urban and the Southern Regional Council provided the data. I subsequently examined the financial records of the NAACP and the Legal Defense and Eduational Fund at their respective headquarters in New York City. I obtained partial funding data on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Congress of Racial Equality, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee at the Martin Luther King Library and Archives in Atlanta, Georgia.

My attempt to improve upon McAdam's data yielded mixed results. I was unable to obtain even total outside income from some organizations during certain years—for the National Urban League before 1961, for the NAACP in 1956, for the Legal Defense and Educational Fund in 1955, and for the Southern Regional Council in 1966. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Congress of Racial Equality refused to divulge their financial records, thus forcing me to rely upon sometimes incomplete archival material.[4] In general, I obtained the best data from those organizations most commonly designated as moderate: the NUL, the LDEF, the NAACP, and the SRC. Fortunately, these are the organizations whose incomes comprise the dependent variable for this research.

FINDINGS

Table 1 shows the total outside incomes of the major black organizations from 1952 to 1970.[5] The organizations are arranged from left to right according to their moderation/militancy over

3. For purposes extending beyond the topic of this paper, I also made a concerted effort to obtain figures that were broken down by the following donor categories: (1) government agencies; (2) corporations and other business firms; (3) charitable foundations; (4) labor organizations; (5) churches and religious organizations; (6) other types of organizations; (7) members, chapters, or branches (i.e., internal sources); and (8) nonmember individual contributors (Haines, 1983).

4. The otherwise excellent collections of original SCLC and SNCC materials which are maintained at the Martin Luther King Library and Archives contain only incomplete financial information. Surviving materials of the Congress of Racial Equality are somewhat better, but post-1967 information is missing. Even those existing organizations which have generally maintained the most complete and detailed financial records have lost older material. The National Urban League is unable to locate financial reports for years prior to 1961. The SRC, the NAACP, and the LDEF have also lost financial records for a few years of the 1950–1970 period.

5. I used different approaches to determining outside income for each organization. The *National Urban League* provided yearly income totals derived from several categories of donors, including "affiliates dues," "special events," and "other." I eliminated these three categories, leaving only income derived from strictly external sources. Income for the *Southern Regional Council* was taken directly from financial reports supplied by the SRC and the Atlanta University Archives. SRC figures appearing in Table 1 include "contributions from SRC members and friends" but do not include "members dues," fees, sales, subscriptions, and the like. Miscellaneous outside income, such as honoraria and overhead from grants, is included. In calculating the *NAACP's* outside income, McAdam (1980:52) merely subtracted regular branch memberships from total organizational income. I used a more conservative approach, excluding all receipts from branches and miscellaneous income such as interest and dividends. For the *Legal Defense and Educational Fund*, I subtracted interest and dividends as well as the proceeds from the sale of securities. The *Southern Christian Leadership Conference* is not a membership organization, and from what little I could find out about the group's

the years; e.g., the National Urban League has long been the most moderate of the groups, while SNCC was the most militant. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and SNCC were founded in 1957 and 1960, respectively. Data for the National Urban League (1952 through 1955) and the NAACP (1956) were not available. Therefore, I restrict my discussion and analysis to the years 1957 through 1970.

Two characteristics of the data in Table 1 deserve attention. First, the older, more established, and generally more moderate organizations—the National Urban League, the NAACP, and the Legal Defense and Educational Fund—received more outside income than other groups which were younger and more militant. Secondly, the incomes of the NUL, the NAACP, and the LDEF grew steadily during the 1960s. The incomes of the SCLC, CORE, and SNCC, on the other hand, grew rapidly during the early 1960s and then rapidly declined during the second half of the decade. Total movement income, however, increased steadily after 1957. (Combined totals for 1952 through 1956 are unavailable due to the lack of National Urban League figures for those years). With the exception of 1966, total movement income never failed to increase. During the 1950s, total income remained relatively constant.[6] During the early 1960s, and especially in 1963, it began to grow rapidly. Spectacular leaps occurred in 1963, 1969, and 1970.

Table 2 shows the relative magnitude of income growth for each of the seven organizations and for the movement as a whole. The greatest increase, 114.5 percent, occurred in 1963. Aside from that year, the greatest proportionate increases occurred at the end of the 1960s.

Table 3 shows the distribution of the total movement's outside income among the seven organizations. The National Urban League and the Legal Defense and Educational Fund received the largest shares of outside income during the late 1950s and the early 1960s. The LDEF received the most outside funding in 1957. By 1970, its share had declined considerably, but its raw income had not (Table 1). The NAACP's share of outside income declined during the late 1950s and early 1960s but recovered somewhat during the middle part of the 1960s. Most astonishing of all, however, is the National Urban League's staggering increase, especially during the late 1960s, when it became the financial giant of black collective action. All of the more militant organizations—the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Congress of Racial Equality, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee—increased their shares of total movement income during the early 1960s, then entered a period of decline.

These changes in organizational shares of total movement income may be understood largely in terms of shifts in major sources of funding which took place during the 1960s. Unpublished analyses I have made of the data on which this paper is based (Haines, 1983, 1984) suggest that *elite* contributors became vastly more important money sources for moderate black organizations during the second half of the decade. Among these elite contributors were corporations, foundations, and the federal government.

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methods of fundraising, I think I can safely assume that little error results from treating all of its income as exogenous. I have done so for the most part, although funds of a clearly internal nature have been eliminated from the data when identified. The *Congress of Racial Equality*'s financial records make it difficult to distinguish accurately between income from internal and external sources. In most cases, for example, local CORE chapters were not set apart from other, non-CORE organizations, and their meager contributions to national CORE's coffers were simply lumped into the "organizations" category. Nevertheless, CORE chapters were notorious for their reluctance to contribute to the national office, so little is lost, I believe, in subtracting convention income, sales, and the like from outside income. *Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee* records are even less specific than those of CORE, and I used a nearly identical procedure to determine SNCC's outside income.

6. The characterization of the 1950s trend as relatively constant suffers, of course, from my lack of an absolute baseline. While I lack estimates of the incomes of the National Urban League and the NAACP for 1952, I believe it is reasonable to estimate total movement outside income for that year is not more than $450,000 (Table 1). Assuming that this were true, the proportionate increase between 1952 and 1957 would have been nearly 83 percent. Such a growth rate over six years is not inconsiderable, yet the total amounts are so small in comparison to later years that the increases seem unspectacular.

TABLE 2

Annual Rate of Growth in Outside Income, As A Percentage of Preceding Year[a]

Year	NUL	NAACP	LDEF	SRC[b]	SCLC	CORE	SNCC	Total Movement
1952								NA
1953	NA	NA	6.5	30.0		30.1		NA
1954	NA	88.2	NA	66.2		−6.5		NA
1955	NA	31.2	NA	33.5		23.4		NA
1956	NA	NA	NA	−60.5		46.4		NA
1957	NA	NA	−7.9	247.7	NA	53.3		NA
1958	NA	−12.7	−1.4	26.8	0.0	47.9		2.3
1959	NA	3.3	13.6	−8.7	150.0	141.2		9.7
1960	NA	10.8	36.7	10.2	119.0	136.1		28.7
1961	−3.0	−6.6	14.6	NA	252.8	63.3	180.0	24.2
1962	122.6	−15.9	19.4	NA	2.3	14.4	414.6	35.9
1963	113.5	208.5	78.8	−4.1	268.6	79.1	321.1	114.5
1964	26.0	16.4	19.1	11.6	−20.5	58.9	108.5	24.3
1965	18.5	32.6	16.6	−43.8	183.9	−2.4	1.0	29.8
1966	20.7	53.9	2.0	NA	−43.3	−41.0	−37.7	−8.8
1967	27.8	116.7	20.8	NA	0.0	−30.0	−37.1	22.6
1968	39.4	47.0	23.9	94.1	7.3	−10.7	−40.0	29.4
1969	119.8	27.0	10.9	−24.0	−50.0	168.0	−66.7	52.3
1970	68.7	10.2	6.0	−14.8	−20.0	−68.7	−50.0	37.5

Notes:
a. Based on data in Table 1.
b. General fund only.

TABLE 3

Distribution of Outside Income As A Percentage of Total Movement Income[a]

Year	NUL	NAACP	LDEF	SRC	SCLC	CORE	SNCC	Total
1957	32.2	12.6	38.8	13.3	1.2	1.9		100
1958	31.5	10.8	37.4	16.4	1.2	2.7		100
1959	28.7	10.1	38.8	13.7	2.7	6.0		100
1960	22.3	8.7	41.2	11.7	4.6	11.0	0.4	100
1961	17.4	6.6	38.0	9.5[b]	13.1	14.5	0.9	100
1962	28.5	4.1	33.4	8.4	9.9	12.2	3.6	100
1963	28.4	5.9	27.8	3.8	16.9	10.2	7.0	100
1964	28.8	5.5	26.7	3.4	10.8	13.0	11.8	100
1965	26.3	5.6	24.0	1.5	23.7	9.8	9.2	100
1966	34.8	9.4	26.8	1.6[b]	14.7	6.3	6.3	100
1967	36.3	16.7	26.4	1.8	12.0	3.6	3.2	100
1968	39.1	19.0	25.3	2.7	10.0	2.5	1.5	100
1969	56.4	15.8	18.4	1.3	3.3	4.4	0.3	100
1970	69.2	12.7	14.2	0.8	1.9	1.0	0.1	100

Notes:
a. Derived from the data in Table 1.
b. Based on estimated outside income.

Corporations were rather slow in becoming supporters of black collective action, but their involvement grew as the movement entered its nonviolent collective action phase around 1960. But business contributions became truly large only after successive summers of urban rioting

(Cohn, 1970). While several black organizations benefitted from corporate donations after 1967 (Cohn, 1970:73), the National Urban League provides perhaps the best illustration. In 1962, such contributions amounted to only $153,000. By 1970, they had risen to $1,973,000 (Haines, 1984:18). Similarly, Cohn (1970) reports that the NAACP received considerable amounts from corporate sources after 1967, but I can provide no independent verification of this due to the lack of such information in its Annual Reports.

Foundations also played an increased role in funding black organizations during the 1960s. As the black struggles of the 1960s progressed and as the militancy of the black population grew, foundation contributions became major sources of income for the National Urban League, the Southern Regional Council, and the Legal Defense and Educational Fund—all moderate organizations. In 1970, these three received an estimated total of $7,143,534 in foundation gifts, up from $1,461,264 in 1964 (Haines, 1984:23). Not only was more money directed by foundations to moderate black groups as the decade wore on, but more foundations became involved and a much higher number of individual grants were made. On all of these dimensions, the increases in foundation involvement in funding black collective action and related activities far outpaced the *overall* expansion of foundation activity which occurred during the same time span (Haines, 1984:30–32).

One of the moderate organizations, the National Urban League, became the recipient of large amounts of federal government money during the late 1960s. While these funds were for NUL-run programs for the disadvantaged, not "contributions" in the conventional sense of the word, they were nevertheless unique among the seven major organizations and deserve to be mentioned. No federal money was channeled through the NUL until 1965. During that year, the League received $294,000 from the U.S. government. By 1970, the total had risen to $6,913,000, and it topped $13,000,000 in 1970.

DISCUSSION

The most significant finding of the study is the dramatic increase in the level of outside funding for the civil rights movement as a whole during the 1960s (Table 1). Little increase in outside funding took place during the 1950s, when black radicalism was largely equated with litigation aimed at integration and when nonviolent protest was rare. But as nonviolent action became more frequent and intense during the early 1960s, outside funding accelerated. The year during which nonviolent direct action seems to have reached its dramatic zenith, 1963 (Burstein, 1979:169; Carson, 1981:90), was also the year of the steepest climb in outside income (Table 2). Outside supporters, it seems, were "discovering" civil rights. Income continued to climb until 1966, when it dropped for the first time. This was the year during which Stokely Carmichael of SNCC popularized the black power slogan. Ghetto rioting continued during the summer, drawing media attention. The income slump of 1966 probably reflected a decline in white support due to controversy surrounding the movement. It was, however, only a temporary setback for the movement as a whole. Total outside income resumed its upward spiral during the late 1960s. In fact, yearly proportionate increases for 1969 and 1970 surpassed all other years except 1963 (Table 2). In dollar amounts, these increases were unprecedented. Thus, it was clear that urban violence and black power did not have a negative radical flank effect, at least when measured by outside funding. On the contrary, the data suggest that there was a positive radical flank effect.

During the 1960s, and especially after 1966, three moderate organizations—the National Urban League, the Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the NAACP—received increasingly greater shares of the movement's total outside funding. Not only did these three organizations suffer no financial backlash in the turbulent years of rioting and black nationalism, but their outside incomes rose more rapidly than ever before. The most moderate of the groups, the National Urban League, received a late-1960s windfall that was nothing less than astounding. Together, the

NUL, the LDEF, and the NAACP accounted for all of the aggregate increases in combined movement income by the end of the 1960s. The radical organizations, on the other hand, received rapid increases in outside income during the early 1960s followed by equally rapid declines during the era of the new militancy.

McAdam (1982:208) argues that the level of outside funding for the civil rights movement depended heavily upon the relative acceptability of the organizations involved in the struggle. This, of course, is what I have suggested and is quite consistent with the notion of positive radical flank effects. McAdam suggests that, as movement goals and tactics became more radical around 1965 and 1966, outside support groups came to see the NAACP as virtually the only acceptable recipient of funding. Consequently, the NAACP's outside income rose rapidly. While my procedures for distinguishing between the NAACP's outside and internal income differ from those employed by McAdam, my data bear out his conclusions about the NAACP's enhanced respectability. My data do suggest, however, that McAdam is wrong to conclude that the NAACP emerged from the fray of the mid 1960s as the *only* acceptable recipient of funding. To McAdam, the National Urban League did not qualify as "civil rights organization" and consequently he did not examine its income trends. Regardless of how sociologists classify the NUL, it clearly fit the bill as well as or better than the NAACP did in the eyes of many outside donors.

The shift in outside funding from 1965 to 1970 was more than a zero-sum shift within the community of movement organizations, as McAdam's discussion (1982:208) might be taken to imply. That is, it was not merely a case of a fixed amount of outside money being reallocated among a fixed number of recipients. On the contrary, there was a vast increase in total outside funding as well as a greater concentration of resources in the coffers of two moderate organizations. This is vitally important. Had such moderate organizations as the National Urban League, the NAACP, and the LDEF done no more than pick up the funds that CORE and SNCC (and, to a lesser degree, the SCLC) had forfeited by virtue of their militancy, we would not have a true positive radical flank effect as I have conceived it. Rather, we would simply have a case of an intra-movement shuffling of resources, consistent with the fixed-total subtype. My data suggests that the radicalization of some factions of the civil rights movement increased the total amount of outside financial contributions in a variable-total manner. This is precisely what we would expect a positive radical flank effect to do to the financial support structure of a movement.

CONCLUSION

I have analyzed trends in resource mobilization by major civil rights organizations in order to test the hypothesis of radical flank effects. Admittedly, the approach which I have used lacks many of the essential characteristics of a controlled investigation. But rather than formally testing an hypothesis, I have sought to examine how the data fit the models of positive and negative radical flank effects. This analysis yields three findings:

1. The total amounts of money contributed to the seven organizations by outsiders increased dramatically during the late 1950s and the 1960s. It peaked during the turbulent late 1960s.
2. The increases in total movement income, especially during the late 1960s, primarily reflected vast increases in the incomes of moderate groups.
3. The increased income of the moderate groups did not result from a mere reallocation of a fixed sum of resources within the movement. Rather, it involved the injection of large amounts of new money into the moderate groups. Most of this new money came from elite white groups, which became increasingly important sponsors of moderate civil rights activity.

These findings suggest that positive radical flank effects contributed significantly to increases in the outside funding of moderate civil rights organizations in the 1960s. The increasing importance of corporations, foundations, and the federal government, moreover, suggests that a

portion of the nation's corporate elite recognized that it had a crucial interest in pacifying the black population, particularly in the volatile cities, and in accommodating certain manageable black demands. It also suggests that many previously uninvolved groups were "enlightened" by the glow of burning cities, after years of indifference to nonviolent cajoling by the National Urban League and the NAACP. Some whites came to realize that the integration of blacks into the U.S. mainstream was not such a bad idea after all, that it was in their own best interests given the more radical alternatives, and that it was something they ought to be encouraging with their resources. The prime beneficiaries of such changes of heart were the big moderate groups, the very organizations that had become most concerned with an impending white backlash. Certainly, a white backlash did occur. But the data presented in this paper suggest that, beneath it all, there was occurring an important acceptance and facilitation of "reasonable" black activism and that the effort would not have been made without the progressive radicalization of large numbers of blacks in the United States.

This conclusion suggests a new question: are radical flank effects unique features of the black revolt, or might they be overlooked but critical factors in numerous social movements? I strongly suspect that they affected the course of the U.S. labor movement, and they may have been involved in the ill-fated campaign for the Equal Rights Amendment. The difficulties in identifying positive and negative radical flank effects with confidence are considerable. Financial data, which serves as a measure of only one limited dimension, may be difficult to find for other movements. But these difficulties are not insurmountable, and if we are to understand collective action more completely, we need to carry on the search for evidence of radical flank effects.

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