

The Kiwi and the Garuda: New Zealand and Sukarno's Indonesia, 1945-1966



Figure 1 George Duncan Henderson, "Mark my words, no Kiwi is the simple country lad he looks," cartoon, *Taranaki Daily News*, 1964 (Alexander Turnbull Library)

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Abstract

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This thesis examines New Zealand's relationship with Indonesia during the Sukarno period, and locates this relationship within the various crucial historical forces, movements, and ideologies of the mid-twentieth century. Indonesia serves as a case study of how New Zealand's traditional Commonwealth linkages to Britain and Australia, the "winds of decolonization" after the Second World War, and the Cold War shaped New Zealand's engagement with the newly-independent countries of Southeast Asia. In addition to such international forces, the New Zealand-Indonesian relationship was also influenced by domestic developments in Indonesia and Sukarno's personal stamp on Indonesian foreign policy. While the focus is on the bilateral political relationship between the two countries, I also examine the New Zealand public debate around two major flash-points in modern Indonesian history: the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch (1945-1949) and the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation (1963-1966)—an aspect of New Zealand-Indonesian relations that has not been well-covered.

How did New Zealand's Commonwealth linkages and its Cold War security policies shape its policies towards Indonesia? How did New Zealand respond to the challenges presented by Indonesian nationalism during the Sukarno period? How did New Zealand's subordinate relationship towards its main Western allies – Britain, Australia, and the United States – influence its relationship with Indonesia? How does the public debate in New Zealand society around the Indonesian Revolution and the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation contribute to our understanding of New Zealand's response to international issues like decolonisation and the Cold War? To answer these questions, this study draws on a wide range of primary and secondary sources including declassified archival records, government publications, memoirs, scholarly books, journals, and oral recordings.

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Chronology of Key Events in New Zealand-Indonesian Relations, 1945-1966

1945

- 15 August: Japan surrenders to the Allied Powers
- 17 August: President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammed Hatta proclaim the Republic of Indonesia
- 29 September: British and Indian forces land in Java and Sumatra
- 30 September: British forces recognize the Indonesian Republic's de-facto authority over Java and Sumatra
- October 1945: Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) organizes leaflet drops and demonstrations to support the Indonesian Republicans
- 14 October: The Waterside Workers Union (WWU) boycotts the Dutch ship SS *Alcinouse*
- 24 October: The United Nations (UN) is formally established
- 10 November: The Battle of Surabaya
- 30 November 1945: the WWU blacklists Dutch ships in New Zealand ports
- December: New Zealand agrees to temporarily accommodate Dutch refugees from Indonesia

1946

- 12 May: The Netherlands accord the Indonesian Republic de-facto recognition
- 11-12 November: British-sponsored Linggadjati talks between the Dutch and Indonesians
- 15 November: The Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic sign the Linggadjati Agreement
- 30 November: Last British forces withdraw from Indonesia

1947

- 25 March: Linggadjati Agreement comes into effect
- 20 July: First Dutch Police Action
- 25 July: Prime Minister Peter Fraser advocates joint US-British mediation in Indonesia
- 30 July: Victoria University College Socialist Club stages a protest in Wellington to condemn the Dutch police action
- 31 July: Australia and India refer the "Indonesian Question" to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
- 1 August: UNSC call on the Dutch and Indonesians to cease hostilities
- 25 November: New Zealand adopts the Statute of Westminster

1948

17 January: Renville Agreement facilitates ceasefire between the Netherlands and Indonesian Republic.

11 June: WWU lifts ban on servicing Dutch ships

18 September: Madiun Communist uprising

Circa 25 October – 26 November: Usman Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian representative in Canberra, visits New Zealand

8 December: Indonesia becomes an associate member of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)

19-20 December: Second Dutch Police Action

22 December: The United States suspends Dutch Marshall Aid funds to protest the Dutch “police action”

27 December: Acting-Prime Minister Walter Nash issues a statement calling for the UNSC to resolve the “Indonesian Question”

1949

20-23 January: New Delhi Inter-Asian Conference on Indonesia

29 January: The UNSC adopts an American resolution calling for the Dutch to end hostilities and resume negotiations with the Indonesians

Late February: New Zealand supports a British initiative calling for the Dutch and Indonesians to find a settlement to the “Indonesian Question”

March: New Zealand sponsors an Australian initiative to include Indonesia on the UN agenda

3 August: Ceasefire between Dutch and Indonesians announced

1 August to 2 November: Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference talks held at The Hague

29-30 November: The National Party led by Sidney Holland wins the 1949 general election

7 December: United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passes a resolution welcoming the Round Table Conference Agreements

22 December: New Zealand formally recognises the Indonesian Republic

27 December: Dutch formally transfer sovereignty to Indonesia

1950

January: First Colombo Plan conference

21-23 January: Frederick Doidge, the new New Zealand Minister of External Affairs, visits Indonesian leaders in Jakarta

24 January: The Indonesian Vice President Mohammed Hatta acknowledges New Zealand's recognition of Indonesia

1 July: Colombo Plan formally launched

17 August: Indonesia becomes a unitary state

28 September: Indonesia admitted to the United Nations

1951

13 February – 15 July: New Zealand waterside strike/lockout

1 September: Australia, New Zealand, and the United States sign the ANZUS security treaty; Sidney Holland National Government wins a second term in the 1951 “snap” election

1952

12 February: Dutch Parliament formally incorporates West New Guinea into the realm of the Netherlands

24 July: NZDEA officer J.S. Reed is appointed as United Nations Resident Representative in Indonesia

Circa 1953

Indonesia joins the Colombo Plan

New Zealand extends Colombo assistance to Indonesia

Indonesian dental mission visits New Zealand

1954

17 August: the Indonesian Government refers the West New Guinea dispute to UNGA

26 August: New Zealand's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Leslie Munro, voices support for the Dutch

8 September: New Zealand signs the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation Treaty in Manila

13 November: Sidney Holland National Government wins a third term

10 December: Joint Afro-Asian resolution calling for UN mediation in the West New Guinea dispute is defeated

1955

- 18 January: Prime Minister Holland enunciates New Zealand's "forward defence" policy
- 9 February: New Zealand contributes troops to the Malayan Emergency
- 18-24 April: Indonesia hosts the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Java
- 29 July: Leslie Munro objects to the West New Guinea dispute's inclusion on the UNGA agenda

1956

- 13 February: Indonesia formally abrogates Netherlands-Indonesian Union
- 9 April: Indonesia formally abrogates the Round Table Conference agreements with the Dutch
- 4 August: Indonesia cancels all wartime debt payments to the Dutch
- 3 October: The New Zealand Minister of External Affairs T.L. Macdonald announces plans to send twelve English teachers to Indonesia under the Colombo Plan
- 1 December 1956: Mohammed Hatta resigns as Indonesian Vice-President

1957

- 28 February: Second Afro-Asian resolution on the West New Guinea dispute is defeated in the UNGA
- 4 April: New Zealand establishes a Colombo Plan Office in Jakarta
- 26 November: Third Afro-Asian resolution on the West New Guinea dispute is defeated in the UNGA
- 30 November: Labour Party led by Walter Nash wins the 1957 general election
- 3 December: Indonesia embarks on anti-Dutch campaign
- 13 December: Indonesian government issues the Juanda Declaration

1958

- 8 January: New Zealand issues a formal complaint to Indonesia against the Juanda Declaration
- 21 January: Prime Minister Walter Nash issues press statement on the Juanda Declaration
- 15 February: Outbreak of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) and the Universal Struggle Charter (Permesta) uprisings in Sumatra and Sulawesi
- 12 March 1958: Prime Minister Nash criticizes covert Western intervention in Indonesian PRRI-Permesta conflict
- 28 April: End of PRRI rebellion in Sumatra
- 26 June: End of the Permesta rebellion in Sulawesi

June: Indonesia accredits their Australian-based Ambassador Dr. A.Y. Helmi to New Zealand

1959

17-19 February: Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio visits Wellington for talks with Prime Minister Nash; The New Zealand and Indonesian governments approve the Volunteer Graduate Scheme

5 July: President Sukarno reverts to the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, beginning the Guided Democracy era

10-15 November: Prime Minister Nash makes a state visit to Indonesia.

16 December: Sukarno imposes martial law on Indonesia

1960

25 February-1 March: Conference of New Zealand Colombo Plan teachers in Indonesia at Bandung, Java.

21 May: Prime Minister Nash promotes the idea of a united New Guinea at The Hague

22 June: Ambassador Helmi queries New Zealand's position on West New Guinea

17 August: Indonesia severs relations with the Netherlands

Mid-October: Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman offers to mediate the West New Guinea dispute

26 November: National Party led by Keith Holyoake wins the 1960 general election

6 December: Tunku Abdul Rahman abandons his West New Guinea mediation plan

1961

7 April: New Zealand upgrades its Colombo Plan office in Jakarta to Consulate-General status

April: New Zealand delegation and a Samoan Minister Malietoa attend the opening of the Dutch-sponsored New Guinea Council

27 May: Tunku Abdul Rahman proposes merging Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo into a new federated state called Malaysia

11 July: Indonesia appoints Brigadier-General Suadi Suromihardjo as Indonesian Ambassador to Australia and New Zealand

26 September: The Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns proposes transferring West New Guinea to a UN interim administration

9 November: Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio rejects the Luns Proposal

20-22 November: Anglo-Malayan negotiations in London discussing the proposed Malaysian federation

23 November: Indian UN Delegation presents a draft resolution calling for the resumption of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations

24 November: Prime Minister Holyoake welcomes the proposed Malaysian federation

24 November: Franco-African resolution on the West New Guinea dispute released

27 November: Franco-African (52-41-9) and Indians (41-40-21) resolutions fail to gain a two-thirds majority

19 December: Sukarno issues the *Trikora* (Triple Command)

1962

1 January: New Zealand grants independence to Western Samoa

19 March: Indonesia and the Netherlands agree to secret American-mediated negotiations

31 July: Indonesians and Dutch reach a peace settlement on the West New Guinea dispute

15 August: Indonesia and the Netherlands formally sign the Ellsworth Bunker Agreement

27 September: United Nations ratifies the Ellsworth Bunker Agreement

1 October: Dutch transfer West New Guinea to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)

8-17 December: Brunei Revolt

1963

28 January: New Zealand Consulate General is upgraded to Legation status

11 February: Subandrio announces Indonesia's opposition to Malaysia

12 April: British and Indonesian forces clash in Borneo

1 May: United Nations formally transfers West New Guinea to Indonesia; New Zealand Defence Minister Dean Eyre promises to assist Malaya's defence

20 May: Sukarno becomes "President for Life"

9 July: The Malaysia Agreement is signed in London

11 July: President Sukarno delivers the *Ganjang Malaysia* (crush Malaysia) speech

16 August: United Nations Ascertainment Mission arrives in Sarawak and Borneo

25 August: Malaysia Day is postponed until 16 September 1963

31 August: Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and British Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys announce that the formation of Malaysia will proceed on 16 September; Prime Minister Holyoake welcomes the Tunku-Sandys statement

- 14 September: UN Secretary General U Thant finds majority support for Malaysia in Sarawak and Sabah
- 15: Prime Minister Holyoake welcomes the findings of the UN Ascertainment Mission on Malaysia
- 16 September: Malaysia comes into existence; Indonesia and the Philippine sever relations with Malaysia; Indonesian mobs sack the British and Malayan Embassies in Jakarta
- 17 September: Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur is attacked
- 18 September: Indonesian mob destroys British Embassy in Jakarta
- 20 September: Australia and New Zealand decline a British request for military reinforcements in Borneo
- 4 December: Sukarno demands another UN ascertainment mission in Borneo
- 10 December: The New Zealand Chargé d'affaires Duncan Rae returns to New Zealand

1964

- 13 January: Paul Edmonds and Peter Gordon appointed as the Chargé d'affaires and Second Secretary of the New Zealand Legation in Jakarta
- 17 January: Prime Minister Holyoake reaffirms New Zealand's assistance to Malaysia
- 29 January: 1st RNZIR Battalion are deployed on the Malaysian-Thai Border
- 4 February: Death of Duncan Rae, New Zealand Chargé d'affaires in Indonesia
- 16 March: Sukarno calls for Indonesian volunteers to "crush" Malaysia
- 10 April: Britain reiterates calls for Australia and New Zealand to send troops to Borneo
- 11 April: Prime Minister Holyoake pledges £570,000 worth of defence aid to Malaysia
- 18 April: Prime Minister Holyoake makes a state visit to Jakarta
- 17 August: Indonesia deploys paratroopers into Peninsular Malaysia
- 4 September: New Zealand government dispatches 1st RNZIR against Indonesian infiltrators in Labis, Johor
- 9 September: Malaysia lodges a complaint against Indonesia at the UNSC
- 18 September: UNSC votes 9-2 to condemn the Indonesian raids but the Soviet Union vetoes the resolution
- 29 October: New Zealand and Australian troops deployed against Indonesian infiltrators near Pontian, Johor
- 16-21 December: Sharp exchanges between New Zealand, Malaysian, and Indonesian delegates at the UNGA

1965

- 1 January: Malaysia is admitted as a non-permanent member of the UNSC
- 7 January: Sukarno withdraws Indonesia from the United Nations
- 20 January: J.G. Carter assigned to Jakarta as Second Secretary of the New Zealand Legation
- 3-5 February: Australia and New Zealand sends combat troops to Sarawak and Sabah
- 6-15 March: Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visits New Zealand to promote Malaysia's case
- 16 April: The Indonesian parliament, the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPRS), calls for the Indonesian Government to take "firmer action" against the NEKOLIM powers including New Zealand
- 17 May: Major-General Ahmad Kosasih is appointed as Indonesian Ambassador to Australia and New Zealand
- 25 May: Anti-Malaysia demonstration outside the New Zealand Legation in Jakarta
- 21 June: New Zealand and Indonesian troops clash in Borneo
- 9 August: Singapore is formally expelled from Malaysia
- 17 August: Holyoake reiterates that New Zealand will not break relations with Indonesia; Indonesia withdraws from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
- 30 September: 30 September "coup attempt"
- 1 October: Major-General Suharto seizes control of the Indonesian Army and crushes the 30 September Movement
- 2 October: The Indonesian Communist Party's (PKI) newspaper *Harian Rakjat* (People's Daily) praises the 30 September Movement
- 4 October: Prime Minister Holyoake states that New Zealanders in Indonesia are safe
- 5 October: Bodies of the six murdered Indonesian generals found at Halim Air Base in Jakarta
- 15 October: President Sukarno appoints Major-General Suharto as the new Army Chief of Staff
- 16 October: The Jakarta Military Command bans the PKI and its affiliated organizations in Jakarta
- 1-2 December: Secret Quadripartite talks in London to discuss Anglo-American policy towards Indonesia
- 21-31 December: The Indonesian Ambassador, Major General A. Kosasih, visits New Zealand for eleven days

1966

10-15 January: The anti-Communist Pancasila Front and KAMI (Indonesian Student Action Front Group) stage protests in Jakarta

21 February: President Sukarno announces a major cabinet reshuffle and sacks pro-Army members

24 February: KAMI disrupt Indonesian cabinet proceedings

11 March: President Sukarno cedes “executive powers” to Major-General Suharto under the *Supersemar* declaration

12 March: Suharto formally bans the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)

15 March: Wellington rebuffs a proposal by New Zealand Minister R.A. Lochore to donate rice to the Indonesian Army

18 March: Suharto arrests fourteen of Sukarno’s cabinet ministers

18 April: The new Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik announces changes to Indonesian foreign policy

29 May-1 June: High-level Bangkok peace talks between Indonesia and Malaysia

1 June: Bangkok Agreement formally ends the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation

2 June: Prime Minister Keith Holyoake welcomes the Bangkok Agreement

8 June: Holyoake promises to withdraw New Zealand forces from Borneo when Malaysia and Indonesia cease hostilities

13 June: Indonesian MPRS endorses the Bangkok Agreement

16 June: Prime Minister Holyoake orders the withdrawal of New Zealand forces from Borneo

20 June: The Indonesian MPRS appoints General Suharto as head of government

5 July: The MPRS strips President Sukarno of his title of “President for Life”

6 July: The MPRS repudiates Sukarno’s policy of Confrontation

25 July: Suharto appoints a new pro-Army cabinet called the Ampera Cabinet

27 July: Prime Minister Holyoake supports the new Ampera cabinet

11 August: Indonesia and Malaysia sign the Bangkok Accords

28 September: Indonesia rejoins the United Nations

10 November: The New Zealand Defence Minister Dean Eyre announces the withdrawal of the New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) detachment in Borneo



Figure 2: Painting of Sukarno by Bazuki Abdulah, "President Sukarno," oil painting, 2011. Credits: Bruce W. Carpenter. "Presidential Art." Indonesia expat. Posted on 7 November 2011. <http://indonesiaexpat.biz/lifestyle/presidential-art/>

Introduction

Arguments and Setting

New Zealand's interaction with Indonesia during the Sukarno period (1945-1966) was influenced by its traditional Commonwealth linkages to the United Kingdom, Australia, and Malaysia. New Zealand's engagement with this large archipelagic Asian country was part of a wide process of adjusting to the new post-war global forces of decolonisation and the Cold War struggle. While New Zealand originated as a British colonial offshoot that was established during the nineteenth century, Indonesia was a young polyglot republic which had emerged from the ashes of the Netherlands East Indies during the aftermath of World War II. Whereas Indonesians have long regarded 17 August 1945 as their national independence day, New Zealand has no unanimously accepted independence day. Nonetheless, the Peter Fraser-led Labour Government's decision to ratify the Statute of Westminster in November 1947 is regarded as an important milestone in New Zealand history since that is when the small South Pacific country gained full control over its foreign and internal affairs.¹ After November 1947 New Zealand would develop an increasingly autonomous foreign policy in a new international environment characterised by British decline, American ascendancy, deepening trans-Tasman ties, and the growing geopolitical importance of the South Pacific and Asia. Indonesian independence was finally recognised by the international community following a four-year independence struggle against the Dutch. During the Sukarno period, these two countries would relate with each other as equal bilateral partners for the first time. New Zealand's growing engagement with Indonesia during this period marked Southeast Asia's growing strategic importance in New Zealand foreign-policy making.

This thesis is a fresh new synthesis of the earlier literature on New Zealand's relations with Indonesia. While it focuses mainly on the political relationship between Wellington and Jakarta during the Sukarno period, it also examines the New Zealand public debate around two major flashpoints in that relationship: the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949) and the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation/*Konfrontasi* (1963-1966). While the political dynamics of New Zealand-Indonesian relations have already been studied by several scholars and diplomats,

¹ While New Zealand had gained various measures of self-rule by becoming a "self-governing colony" in 1856 and "Dominion" in 1907, it still remained a loyal member of the British Empire, which later evolved into the Commonwealth of Nations. For discussion of the debate around New Zealand's "independence days", see Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), 1-13.

the public discourse around that topic has barely been touched upon. While developments in Indonesia were overshadowed in the New Zealand public sphere by more well-known international conflicts and issues like the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency, the Vietnam War, and sporting contacts with South Africa, New Zealand's response to Indonesia helps us understand how its traditional Commonwealth linkages and Western Cold War alignment influenced its engagement with newly-independent Asian countries like Indonesia. The New Zealand-Indonesian relationship was also influenced by domestic political developments in Indonesia and Sukarno's personal stamp on Indonesian foreign policy. This thesis ends at a critical turning point in modern Indonesian history; the 30 September "coup attempt" which closed the final chapter on the Sukarno period.

President Sukarno occupies a venerated place in modern Indonesian history because he was the country's first President and the premier nationalist leader during the anti-colonial Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch. While Sukarno never officially served as a Foreign Minister, he dominated Indonesian foreign policy throughout his twenty-one year presidency. For Sukarno, the Indonesian Revolution did not end with the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949 but persisted until Indonesia's annexation of West New Guinea in 1963. Sukarno continued the revolutionary theme of Indonesian policy when he embarked on an undeclared border war known as the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. Malaysia was a new federated geopolitical entity consisting of several former British Southeast Asian colonies. Disliking Malaysia's pro-Western orientation, Sukarno denounced his new neighbour as a British "neo-colonialist conspiracy" against Indonesia's national aspirations and security. Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia isolated Jakarta internationally and pushed Indonesia into closer alignment with Beijing.² Ultimately, *Konfrontasi* exacted a heavy toll on the Indonesian political economy and accelerated domestic tensions between the Indonesian Army and the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI), factors which undermined the legitimacy of Sukarno's government. Following a failed pre-emptive action by the PKI leadership and sympathetic army elements against the Indonesian Army high command in October 1965, the right-wing General Suharto took control of the Indonesian Army and launched a violent anti-Communist purge which killed half a million Indonesians. Besides subverting Sukarno's political authority, Suharto also initiated a radical reorientation of Indonesia's political and foreign policy. By emphasizing his anti-Communist credentials, Suharto repaired Indonesia's relations with the

² J. Soedjati Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), vii-x.

Western powers and ended its Confrontation against Malaysia. As a result, Indonesia was overnight transformed from a “near-rogue state” into a key American ally in Southeast Asia.³

The first chapter examines the beginnings of New Zealand’s relationship with Indonesia during the Indonesian revolutionary struggle against the Dutch. In the aftermath of the Japanese capitulation in August 1945 the returning Dutch and Allied forces faced a nascent Indonesian Republic, which had taken control of parts of Java, Sumatra, and Madura. Following a four year independence struggle punctuated by failed diplomatic initiatives, international pressure forced the Dutch to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia in December 1949. The Indonesian Revolution was part of the “winds of change” which swept through Asia, Africa, and the South Pacific following World War Two.⁴ While New Zealand largely remained a bystander during the Indonesian independence struggle, it still helped Australia to bring the United Nations (UN) into the conflict as a peacemaker and the Indonesian Republic to secure a place in the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).⁵ The second chapter discusses the public debate around the Indonesian Revolution in New Zealand. The third chapter examines the expansion of New Zealand’s relations with Indonesia between 1950 and 1963. Whereas New Zealand saw itself as a loyal member of the Anglo-American-led Western alliance, Sukarno’s Indonesia rejected the two main superpower blocs in favour of pursuing an independent foreign policy based on anti-colonialism, neutralism, and advancing Indonesia’s perceived national interest.⁶ During the Sukarno period, New Zealand’s relationship with Indonesia was influenced by several factors including decolonisation, the Cold War, traditional Commonwealth ties and linkages to Britain, Australia, and Malaysia, and Asia’s growing economic and strategic clout in international relations. Throughout the Sukarno years, various Labour and National administrations in Wellington sought to keep in line with New Zealand’s closest allies – Australia, Britain, and increasingly the United States – when engaging with Jakarta. In addition, the New Zealand-Indonesian bilateral relationship would also be strained by several issues such

³ Bradley Simpson, *Economists With Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations 1960-1968* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 158, 171-206, 249-259; John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 106, 202-225.

⁴ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), 1-15.

⁵ Michael Green, “Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia,” in *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 146-150; Aaron O’Brien, “New Zealand and Indonesia, 1945-1962: A clear though indirect interest,” MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 1994, 4-57.

⁶ Audrey Kahin and George Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 40-41; Jamie Mackie, *Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity* (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005), 50-51.

as the West New Guinea dispute (1950-1962) and Sukarno's left-ward drift towards the Soviet Union and Communist China, and the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation (1963-1966).⁷ The fourth and fifth chapters look at the impact of the Confrontation on New Zealand-Indonesian relations and the public debate in New Zealand around that conflict.

Literature Review

Unlike New Zealand's other foreign engagements during the Cold War including Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam, little secondary literature exists about New Zealand's relations with Indonesia during the Sukarno period. The first known academic study is a brief chapter by the political scientist J. Stephen Hoadley, published in 1975, which discussed New Zealand's foreign trade with Indonesia and the impact of domestic economic policy on bilateral relations.⁸ A second, more substantial study is a chapter on the influence of Australian policy on New Zealand's approach towards the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation by D. J. McCraw based on published *External Affairs Review (EAR)* and the *Annual Report to the Department of External Affairs (ARDEA)* records.⁹ Aaron O'Brien's 1994 MA thesis "New Zealand and Indonesia, 1945-1962", examined New Zealand-Indonesian relations during the Indonesian Revolution and the West New Guinea dispute.¹⁰ The most recent study is a chapter by the former New Zealand diplomat Michael Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," which explores New Zealand's relationship with Southeast Asia over a longer period than this study, from the Indonesian Revolution in 1945 to the fall of Suharto's New Order in 1998.¹¹ While these four studies shed light on the New Zealand Government's foreign policies and relationship with Indonesia, they all sidestep the public debate and marginalize the influence of domestic actors on the bilateral relationship.

Other specialist academic studies have examined New Zealand-Indonesian relations within the context of New Zealand's engagement with Southeast Asia during the Cold War. The New Zealand diplomat John Subritzky's 2000 study, *Confronting Sukarno*, links the Indonesian

⁷ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 150-163; O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 62, 120-121.

⁸ J. Stephen Hoadley, "Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy: An Interpretation of New Zealand-Indonesian Relations," in *New Zealand Politics: A Reader*, ed. Stephen Levine (Melbourne: Cheshire Publishing, 1975), 438-446.

⁹ D.J. McCraw, "Objectives and Priorities in New Zealand's Foreign Policy in Asia, 1949-1975: A Study of the Issue of the Recognition of the People's Republic of China and of Security Policies in South-East Asia," PhD. Dissertation, University of Otago, New Zealand, 1978, 371-405.

¹⁰ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia, 1945-1962: A clear though indirect interest," MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 1994,

¹¹ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 145-208.

Confrontation to the wider Cold War struggle, focusing on the importance of Malaysia and Indonesia to Western strategic calculations.¹² Military historian Chris Pugsley's 2003 work *From emergency to confrontation* analyses the role of the New Zealand armed forces in the Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation. Pugsley's focus is the military dimensions of those conflicts; he does not treat the political and domestic aspects of *Konfrontasi*.¹³ Meanwhile, diplomatic historian Nicholas Tarling's 2008 study *Britain and the West New Guinea Dispute, 1949-1962* explores British and Commonwealth foreign policies towards the West New Guinea dispute and argues that Indonesian triumph came at the expense of West New Guinean self-determination, a problem that persists to this day.¹⁴ More recently in a discussion of the expansion of New Zealand's diplomatic representation in Southeast Asia during the 1950s and 1960s, the former diplomat James Kember argues that New Zealand's interaction with Indonesia was a slow, gradual process that was only hastened by the Colombo Plan and regional strategic considerations.¹⁵ Finally, Malcolm McKinnon's 1993 book, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935*, provides some helpful glimpses into the domestic debate around the Indonesian Revolution and the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation.¹⁶

This study also benefits from official and group-sponsored histories of New Zealand's foreign relations and assistance programmes. *An Eye, An Ear and A Voice*, a historical study of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), includes informative accounts of the origins of the Department of External Affairs, the predecessor to MFAT, by several former Foreign Affairs officials who had a role in shaping New Zealand's relations with Indonesia including Alister D. McIntosh and Frank Corner.¹⁷ *The Colombo Plan at 50*, a commemorative history of New Zealand's participation in the Colombo Plan programme produced by MFAT, contains several useful articles written by Colombo Plan experts who had worked in Indonesia and Indonesian students, including Soedjati Djihadono, a University of Otago alumni and

¹² John Subritzky, *Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-65* (Hampshire, England: Macmillan Press, 2000).

¹³ Christopher Pugsley, *From emergency to confrontation: the New Zealand armed forces in Malaya and Borneo 1949-1966* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003).

¹⁴ Nicholas Tarling, *Britain and the West New Guinea Dispute, 1949-1962* (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008).

¹⁵ James Kember, "New Zealand Diplomatic Representation in Southeast Asia: the 1950s and 1960s," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 11, 1 (June 2009), 397-401.

¹⁶ McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935*, 154-155, 159, 167.

¹⁷ Malcolm Templeton, ed., *An Eye, An Ear and A Voice: 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993* (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993), 1-7.

prominent Indonesian political scientist.¹⁸ Laurie Wesley's 2013 edited history of the Volunteer Graduate Scheme (VGS) sheds light on a little known aspect of the New Zealand-Indonesian relationship through providing accounts of the Indonesian experiences of several former Volunteer Graduates between 1959 and 1963.¹⁹ In addition to these accounts, I have also drawn on an email interview I conducted with Wesley in June 2014.²⁰

This thesis also consults the works of several Western academics specializing on Indonesia. In his ground-breaking study on the origins of nationalism, *Imagined Communities*, the Irish-American political scientist Benedict Anderson provided a succinct discussion of how Indonesian nationalists (particularly Sukarno) used the former boundaries of the Dutch East Indies to build a new Indonesian national identity.²¹ The pithy account of the Indonesian Revolution in the Introduction to Herbert Feith's 1962 study, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, provides the structural framework for the background discussion of the Indonesian Revolution in the first chapter below. Feith's assumption that Indonesian nation-building should proceed along Western political line and methods (or should follow Western political norms and methods) has since been challenged by other scholars, a topic touched upon in the third chapter. While it does not deal with New Zealand-Indonesian relations, it provides a useful insight into contemporary Western academic views of Indonesia's political institutions during the Sukarno period.²² Feith's analysis of political developments in Indonesia during the Sukarno period was shared by several New Zealand and other Western foreign affairs officials dealing with Indonesian matters.²³ Jamie Mackie's masterly 1974 study, *Konfrontasi: the Indonesian-Malaysian Dispute*, provided a useful historical background to my fifth chapter which examines

¹⁸ The New Zealand Official Development Assistance (NZODA) was the name of New Zealand's overseas aid programme until 2002. See New Zealand Official Development Assistance (NZODA), ed., *The Colombo Plan at 50: A New Zealand Perspective: 50th Anniversary of the Colombo Plan 1951-2001* (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), 4, 8-12, 18-19, 24.

¹⁹ Laurie Wesley, ed., *Celebrating the New Zealand University Students Association's Volunteer Graduate Scheme for Indonesia* (Auckland: Laurie Wesley, 2013).

²⁰ Laurie Wesley, interview by the author, June 2014, email interview.

²¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2006 reprint (1982; London: Verso, 2006), 5-11, 37-46, 115-16, 119-23, 132-33, 145, 165-70, 174-85.

²² Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 1-15; 32-45, 572-608; Harry Benda, "Democracy in Indonesia," Review of *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Herbert Feith, *The Journal of Asian Studies* 23, no. 3 (May 1964), 449-456.

²³ Telegram No. 168, Canadian Ambassador, Djakarta to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, "Mr Hatta writes another article on the present crisis," 22 March 1957, Canadian foreign source document, PM 318/6/1, Part 14, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington; J.S. Reid, New Zealand Legation, Tokyo to the Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, "Crisis in Indonesia," 10 April 1957, PM 318/6/1, Part 14, ANZ, Wellington, 1-3.

New Zealand's response to the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation.²⁴ Two important sources that consider the pivotal 30 September "coup attempt" of 1965 are John Roosa's 2006 study, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, and Bradley R. Simpson's 2008 study, *Economists with Guns*. Roosa treats the "coup attempt" as the final culmination of an ugly rivalry between the Indonesian Communists and the right-wing Indonesian Army which closed the curtain on the Sukarno presidency. While Roosa does not deal with Indonesian's relations with the West, he has helped inform my understanding of a pivotal turning point in Indonesia's history and foreign relations. Finally, Simpson explores Western complicity in the downfall of Sukarno's regime and the Indonesian anti-Communist mass killings of 1965-66. While Simpson does not consider the New Zealand-Indonesian relationship, his study demonstrates how Cold War security considerations influenced New Zealand and its Western allies' response to the 30 September "coup attempt" and its bloody aftermath.²⁵

This thesis also uses Indonesian perspectives of the New Zealand-Indonesian relationship and Indonesian foreign policy under Sukarno. These Indonesian sources provide a useful insight into Indonesian perspectives of their country's foreign relations. In 2009, the Indonesian Embassy in Wellington published an official history, entitled *Indonesia-New Zealand – 50 Years of Diplomatic Relations*, on contemporary Indonesian-New Zealand bilateral relations. Despite its wealth of photos and facts about New Zealand-Indonesian relations during Suharto's New Order (1966-1998), it neglects to mention several key bilateral state visits which occurred during the Sukarno era – namely the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio's February 1959 state visit to Wellington; Prime Minister Walter Nash's September 1959 visit to Indonesia, and Prime Minister Keith Holyoake's April 1964 visit to Jakarta – suggesting that these visits had little effect on bilateral relations during the Sukarno period.²⁶ One helpful Indonesian voice is the former Indonesian diplomat Suryono Darusman's 1992 memoir, *Singapore and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-1950*. Darusman's brief outline of the conflict informs the background discussion in my first chapter. As an Indonesian revolutionary, Darusman's account is strongly flavoured by his sympathies for the Indonesian Republic; nevertheless he gives us a valuable insight into the inner workings of the Republic's early efforts to conduct its own foreign

²⁴ Jamie Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974).

²⁵ Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 106, 202-225; Simpson, *Economists With Guns*, 171-206.

²⁶ Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, *Indonesia-New Zealand: 50 years of diplomatic relations* (Wellington: Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 2009), 9-10

relations.²⁷ Another useful Indonesian perspective is Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung's *Twenty Years* [sic] *Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, one of the first Indonesian studies on Indonesian foreign policy to be made available to an English-language audience. Agung served as Indonesia's Foreign Minister in 1955-1956 and was highly critical of Sukarno's adoption of Guided Democracy in 1959. While his book is replete with criticisms of Sukarno's post-Guided Democracy foreign policies, Agung is overly sympathetic to General Suharto's New Order; as best reflected by his uncritical acceptance of the Indonesian Army's account of the 30 September coup attempt. While Agung gives a brief discussion of Indonesian-Australian relations in a chapter on Indonesia's relations with its neighbours, he does not address the New Zealand-Indonesian relationship, apart from mentioning that New Zealand's pro-Dutch position during the West New Guinea dispute contributed to its exclusion from the 1955 Bandung Conference and New Zealand's military involvement in the Confrontation. This reflects New Zealand's low level of importance in Indonesian foreign policy priorities.²⁸ Another invaluable Indonesian perspective can be found in Soedjati Djwandono's *Konfrontasi Revisited*, a lucid study of the influence of Indonesian-Soviet relations on Indonesia's "Confrontation" policies against Dutch New Guinea and Malaysia. *Konfrontasi Revisited* gives a unique insight into Indonesian motivations behind these two conflicts, which Sukarno viewed as a continuation of Indonesia's anti-colonial struggle.²⁹ While these Indonesian sources provide a useful balance to both official New Zealand literature and Western academic scholarship on Indonesia, they fail to give a fully-rounded picture of the New Zealand-Indonesian relationship, yet again reflecting New Zealand's low position in Indonesian foreign policy priorities during the Sukarno period.

Methodology

This thesis employs an orthodox source-based approach that relies on New Zealand archival records, official government reports and media texts. Archival research is augmented by the use of oral historical accounts, memoirs, and pamphlets, which provide a glimpse into New Zealand public attitudes towards Indonesia. Secondary literature on New Zealand's foreign relations and modern Indonesian history and politics fills in the historical context in which the primary literature was produced. Together, these sources help to reconstruct a coherent history of New Zealand-Indonesian relations during the Sukarno period. Official sources such as the

²⁷ Suryono Darusman, *Singapore and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-50: Recollections of Suryono Darusman* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).

²⁸ Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945-1965* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).

²⁹ Soedjati Djwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996).

New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), the *Annual Reports of the Department of External Affairs* (ARDEA) in the *Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives* (AJHR), and publications such as the New Zealand Department of External Affairs' (NZDEA) in-house journal *External Affairs Review* (EAR), as well as declassified NZDEA diplomatic cables and reports, give an invaluable insight into the perspectives of New Zealand policy-makers and diplomats on the state of New Zealand-Indonesian relations. They also reveal the extent to which traditional Commonwealth linkages and Cold War security concerns influenced New Zealand's policies towards Indonesia.

Besides official sources, this thesis draws on contemporary news media. To gauge New Zealand public opinion, I have surveyed several metropolitan daily newspapers and weekly periodicals such as the moderately conservative *New Zealand Herald*, *The Dominion*, and the *Southland Times*, that are contrasted with the more liberal *New Zealand Listener*, and the populist *New Zealand Truth*. Contemporary editorials offer a glimpse into both mainstream and more peripheral New Zealand public discourses around events and developments in Indonesia. The work of some New Zealand cartoonists such as Sid Scales and George Henderson reveal New Zealand attitudes towards President Sukarno, who was viewed as an ambitious dictator with megalomaniac ambitions. Official publications of non-state actors who took an interest in Indonesian affairs that provide insight into the scope of contemporary opinion and a distinctly New Zealand voice on Indonesian events, include the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ)'s weekly newspaper the *People's Voice*, the University of Otago's student weekly *Critic*, the pro-business monthly *New Zealand Economist & Taxpayer*, and the Presbyterian fortnightly *The Outlook*.

Besides contemporary media, this thesis also utilizes the archival files, publications, memoirs, and oral recordings of some non-state actors who took an interest in Indonesian affairs. Noteworthy groups include the Waterside Workers' Union (WWU), the Communists, the Victoria University College Socialist Club (VUCSC), Dutch migrants, and the Volunteer Graduate Scheme. The Socialist Club's 1947 *Indonesia Calling*, and the 1964 booklet *The Truth about Vietnam, Laos, 'Malaysia,' and Indonesia*, penned by CPNZ member Ray Nunes, provide a forceful, left-wing counter-narrative to official government literature and the mainstream New Zealand media. Nune's polemical pamphlet helps illuminate Communist perspectives of New

Zealand's foreign policies towards Southeast Asia during the Cold War.³⁰ Dutch perspectives on the Indonesian Revolution include the reporter Hank Schouten's 1992 book *Tasman's Legacy: The New Zealand-Dutch Connection* on the Dutch community in New Zealand, and the former Netherlands East Indies resident Gerarda Bossard's 1999 wartime memoir *POW: One girl's experience in a Japanese P.O.W. camp*. These two texts briefly touch upon how Dutch New Zealanders responded to the Indonesian Revolution and relate the trauma of decolonisation through Dutch eyes.³¹ The Volunteer Graduate Scheme's records provide an invaluable insight into its participants' motivations for embarking on the scheme: concern for the well-being of the Indonesian people, a desire to promote friendly relations between the two countries, and the pursuit of trans-Tasman camaraderie.³²

Finally, three published memoirs shed light on some New Zealand recollections and perspectives of the Indonesian Revolution and the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. These memoirs' treatments of these events reflect the authors' own personal prejudices and political leanings. The expatriate journalist Lachie MacDonald's *Bylines: Memoirs of a War Correspondent* contains a brief account of his travels to Indonesia during the Indonesian Revolution. MacDonald is sympathetic towards the Dutch, whom he regarded as "good" colonial masters genuinely concerned with the well-being of their Indonesian subjects, and scathing of the Indonesian nationalists, whom he viewed as troublemakers not yet ready to govern themselves. *Bylines* captures the paternalistic, colonialist attitude of some New Zealanders who resisted decolonization and regarded the Dutch as reliable wartime allies.³³ Another valuable memoir is the Presbyterian missionary nurse Marie Gray's account of her family experiences in Bandung, Java. Gray relates the impact of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation on Western expatriates living in Bandung and provides a unique New Zealand perspective of the 30 September coup attempt. Echoing the anti-Communist threat narrative endemic in New Zealand society during the 1960s, Gray is highly scathing of the Indonesian Communists and rationalises the Indonesian

³⁰ Anonymous, *Indonesia Calling: The Right of All Indonesians: "To Choose The Form of Government Under Which They Will Live (Atlantic Charter)"* (Wellington: Students of Victoria University College, 1947); Ray Nunes, *The Truth about Vietnam, Laos, 'Malaysia,' and Indonesia* (Auckland: Communist Party of New Zealand, 1964), 16-33.

³¹ Various cassette tape interviews, Dutch Oral History Project, 1992-1993, Toitū Otago Settlers' Museum, Dunedin, New Zealand; Hank Schouten, *Tasman's Legacy: The New Zealand-Dutch Connection* (Wellington: New Zealand-Netherlands Foundation, 1992), 47-64; Gerarda Bossard, *POW: One girl's experience in a Japanese P.O.W. camp* (Auckland: Hodder Moa Beckett Publishers, 1999), 200-203.

³² New Zealand Student Christian Movement Papers, MS-Papers-1617-562, Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL), Wellington, New Zealand.

³³ Lachie McDonald, *Bylines: Memoirs of a War Correspondent* (East Roseville, New South Wales: Kangaroo Press, 1998), Backcover, 145-156.

mass killings of 1965-1966 as a general backlash against Communist subterfuge.³⁴ A counterpoint to Gray's account is the memoir of the New Zealand Communist expatriate writer and poet Rewi Alley, in which he laments the destruction of the Indonesian Communists as a setback for "progressive forces" and denounces the Indonesian Army as pro-Western stooges. Alley visited Jakarta in October 1965 to attend the International Conference against Foreign Military Bases (KIAPMO), which coincided with the outbreak of the Indonesian Army's anti-Communist campaign. Alley's account reflects his Maoist leanings and his deep connection with Communist China, where he spent a large part of his adult life. As a Communist, Alley was estranged from mainstream New Zealand society, which still largely adhered to the Western Cold War alliance during the mid-1960s.³⁵ These three distinct accounts provide us a glimpse into the thinking of individuals who had some contact or connection with Indonesia during the Sukarno period.

³⁴ Marie Gray, *Tā mu: New Zealand family in Java* (1988; Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya, 2001), 105-107, 120-132, 159-167.

³⁵ Rewi Alley, *Rewi Alley: An Autobiography* (Beijing: New World Press, 1986), 243-245.

Political Map of Indonesia



Figure 3: Political Map of Indonesia, BizBillia.com. Last accessed 14 April 2015. <http://travel.agency.bizbillia.com/map-by-countries/Indonesia-maps-id.html>

Chapter One: New Zealand and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-1949

This chapter examines New Zealand's response to the Indonesian Revolution (1945-49). The first section briefly explains why the Indonesian Revolution occurred immediately after the Second World War. The second section examines how the New Zealand Government responded to the Indonesian Revolution. Unlike its "big brother" Australia, New Zealand was a minor international actor in the Indonesian Revolution. However, the Peter Fraser Labour Government was compelled to take an interest in Indonesian developments because of the actions of certain interested domestic actors, New Zealand's close relationship with the United Kingdom and Australia, and its participation in the United Nations. This chapter thereby serves as a background to the second chapter, which examines the New Zealand public debate around the Indonesian Revolution.

Outline

The Indonesian Revolution (1945-49) which ended Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia was one of the various anti-colonial struggles which swept through Southeast Asia following World War II. This conflict was characterised by a combination of guerrilla fighting and diplomacy between the Republic of Indonesia, the Netherlands, and other interested third parties including the United Kingdom, Australia, India, and the United States.¹ Among Indonesian circles, Indonesia's independence struggle became known as the "Indonesian Revolution" since it was driven by a strong socialist and anti-capitalist thrust that sought to overthrow the old colonial order.² According to the former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, the Indonesian Revolution marked the Republic's first foray in exercising its own foreign relations predicated on three main objectives: seeking international recognition for Indonesian independence; defending Indonesia's freedom from Dutch colonialism; and using third-party countries and the United Nations to bring a favourable outcome to the Dutch-Indonesian

¹ Suryono Darusman, *Singapore and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-50: Recollections of Suryono Darusman* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992); 1-7; Yong Mun Cheong, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore connection, 1945-1949* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), 13-24

² George McTurnan Kahin, *Southeast Asia: A testament* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 56-57, 113-14.

conflict.³ According to Benedict Anderson, the Indonesian Republic originated as an artificial political construct which had been built on the foundations of the former Netherlands East Indies (NEI), a collection of islands in the Malay Archipelago that had been brought under Dutch colonial rule by the early 20th century.⁴ The Dutch presence in the East Indies dates back to the 16th century when the Dutch East Indies Company established several trading outposts in the Malay Archipelago. Indonesia was the Netherlands' most important colony since its vast size, natural resources, and strategic location gave greater international clout to a small North-Western European country. During the first forty years of the 20th century, several Western-educated Indonesian intellectuals including Sukarno, Mohammed Hatta, and Sutan Sjahrir became the leaders of various Indonesian nationalist groups which advocated self-rule. Prior to World War II, the Dutch colonial authorities had cracked down on the various Indonesian nationalist groups and exiled their leaders to remote parts of the archipelago.⁵

The rapid Japanese conquest of Indonesia during World War II dealt a fatal blow to the myth of Dutch superiority. During their brief wartime occupation (1942-45), the Japanese courted the Indonesian nationalists and appointed several key nationalist figures including Sukarno and Hatta to positions of power. The Japanese also created an armed Indonesian militia, the "Defenders of the Homeland" (*Pembela Tanah Air*; PETA), the forerunner of the modern Indonesian Army (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*; TNI). Following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta unilaterally proclaimed Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945. Sukarno became the first President of the Indonesian Republic and Hatta its first Vice-President, creating a highly important duumvirate in Indonesian politics. For the Indonesian nationalist movement, 17 August became an important date in Indonesian history since it marked the birth of the Republic of Indonesia. The Republic quickly established control over large areas of Java, Sumatra, and Madura. Within three weeks, the fledgling Indonesian Republic had a temporary constitution, an advisory Central National Committee (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*; KNIP), a presidential cabinet, and the support of virtually every group in Indonesian society, including the small anti-Japanese underground groups.⁶

³ Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945-1965* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), 17, 29.

⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 5-7, 174-178.

⁵ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), 1-6; George Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 2nd reprint (1952; Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), 18-100.

⁶ Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 85-95; Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 5-8

The Republic would soon face its first major test. Following the Japanese defeat, British, Indian, and Australian forces were sent to reoccupy the Netherlands East Indies until the return of the Dutch. While Australian forces in East Indonesia encountered few problems, British and Indian forces in Java and Sumatra were forced to contend with a functioning Indonesia Republic. This placed the British in a difficult position because they were forced to balance their wartime alliance with the Dutch with the growing tide of Asian nationalism. Despite British efforts to maintain peace, fighting soon broke out between the Indonesian and Allied forces as Dutch troops began landing in Indonesia under British cover. By October 1945, fighting had engulfed large areas of Java, Sumatra, and Bali.⁷

The fighting in Indonesia did not escape international attention. Several Asian governments and the Soviet Union sided with the Indonesian Republic and condemned British and Dutch actions as imperialistic.⁸ In Australia, the Waterside Workers' Federation spearheaded an international maritime union boycott of Dutch shipping to protest Dutch efforts to retake the East Indies.⁹ Several sympathetic Western expatriates in Indonesia including K'tut Tantri, John Coast, and Molly Bondan aided the Indonesian independence struggle by making English-language propaganda radio broadcasts to promote the Republic's side of the story. Bondan was born in 9 January 1912 in Auckland, New Zealand, but spent most of her life living in Australia and Indonesia. Molly later married Mohammed Bondan, an Indonesian nationalist political prisoner who had been evacuated by the Dutch to Australia during the Japanese wartime invasion.¹⁰ Conflict between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic was inevitable because of the conflicting visions of the two parties. Dutch plans to create a post-war Dutch Union where Indonesia would maintain close ties to the Netherlands clashed with the Republican leadership's demands for a fully independent Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch also regarded the Republic's leadership as Japanese collaborators and refused to treat them as equal

⁷ Alastair M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations* (London: Steven & Sons Ltd, 1960), 5-12; Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 95-99.

⁸ Darusman, *Singapore and the Indonesian Revolution*, 4-5; Ruth T. McVey, *The Soviet view of the Indonesian revolution; a study in the Russian attitude towards Asian nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1969), 3-7

⁹ Rupert Lockwood, *Black Armada: Australia & the struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1942-49* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1982), 3-5, 314-319.

¹⁰ Timothy Lindsey, *The Romance of K'tut Tantri and Indonesia* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2008), 159-61; George McTurnan Kahin, "Molly Bondan: 1912-1990," *Indonesia*, No. 50, 25th Anniversary Edition (Oct., 1990), 158-161.

partners.¹¹ In order to bring the Dutch and the Indonesians to the conference table in an effort to reach a diplomatic solution to the Indonesian Revolution, the British succeeded in persuading the Republic to purge its Cabinet of elements deemed to have collaborated with the Japanese. On 14 November 1945 power shifted from the older nationalists of the Central National Committee (KNIP) to a younger group led by Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, underground leaders who had refused to collaborate with the Japanese occupiers. Under Prime Minister Sjahrir's leadership, Sukarno's presidential system was replaced by a parliamentary one and the KNIP was transformed into a legislative body. The wartime ban on political parties was also rescinded, leading to a revival of several political parties including the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*; PKI). The Sjahrir-Sjarifuddin Cabinet adopted a policy of diplomacy with the Dutch in order to achieve their goal of Indonesian independence. While British-sponsored negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic continued, the Dutch re-established military control over large areas of Java and Sumatra.¹² Besides the Dutch, the Republic also had to contend with other threats including a *Darul Islam* (House of Islam) insurgency in Java. In July 1946, the Republican Government also quelled an uprising by Commander Sudirman and Major General Sudarsono, who were opposed to its policy of diplomacy with the Dutch.¹³

In mid-November 1946 British diplomacy between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republicans produced the Linggadjati Agreement, which was signed by Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir and the Dutch Lieutenant Governor-General H. J. Van Mook on 15 November 1946. Under the terms of the agreement, the Dutch Government recognised the Republic's de-facto authority over Java, Sumatra, and Madura. Both governments also agreed to work together to create a federal state known as the United States of Indonesia (USI) by January 1949, which would exist within a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. However, the Linggadjati Agreement failed to end the fighting in Indonesia and was heavily criticised by both sides. Within the Republic, the fallout from the Linggadjati Agreement led to the downfall of Sjahrir's government on 27 June 1947. On 3 July, Sjahrir was succeeded as Prime Minister by Amir Sjarifuddin, the leader of the left-wing faction of the Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis*) whose right wing was led by Sjahrir. During Sjarifuddin's brief tenure, the PKI and other left-wing groups grew in influence. On 20 July

¹¹ "Statement Issued by the Netherlands Embassies at London and Washington," enclosed with letter by W.E. van Panhuys, Netherlands Consul-General, 13 February 1946, PM 318/6/1, Part 2, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington; Suryono Darusman, *Singapore and the Indonesian Revolution*, 3.

¹² Feith, *Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 8-9; Darusman, *Singapore and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-50*, 4.

¹³ Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 101-103; Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972), 270-291, 332-409.

1947, the Dutch launched their First “Police Action” against the Indonesian Republic after the breakdown of talks on a joint constabulary to enforce law and order in Republican territory. This “Police Action” in reality was a full-scale military invasion of the Republic’s territory. The Dutch succeeded in recapturing half of Java and most of Sumatra’s urban areas including several important estate, mining, and food-producing areas, and inflicting a heavy blow on the Republic. Despite being a military success, the First Police Action further alienated the Republican leadership and hardened Indonesian resistance against the Dutch. In response, India and Australia filed protests against the Netherlands in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which called for a ceasefire and established a three-member Good Offices Committee (GOC) to help the Dutch and Indonesians reach a peaceful solution. Thus, the United Nations became involved in the Indonesian Revolution, which consequently shifted from being a colonial dispute to an international problem. The GOC’s mediation efforts produced the Renville Agreement, signed by both the Dutch and the Republic on 17 January 1948. The Renville Agreement reinforced the weaker military position of the Indonesian Republic since it allowed the Dutch to keep all the territories that they had seized during the First Police Action. In addition, the Republic experienced considerable hardship because of an influx of refugees from Dutch-occupied areas and a crippling Dutch naval blockade.¹⁴

Following the First Police Action, Dutch-Indonesian relations deteriorated because of Dutch efforts to create a series of federal states within Dutch-occupied areas and the Republic’s insistence on conducting its own foreign relations. In January 1948 criticism of the Renville Agreement led to the downfall of Sjarifuddin’s government. A new coalition government led by Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta, who was committed to using diplomacy to achieve Indonesian independence, was formed. In opposition, Amir Sjarifuddin established a pro-Communist coalition called the People’s Democratic Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakjat*; FDR), which repeatedly attacked the Hatta Government for making concessions to the Dutch. In August 1948, the FDR merged with the resurgent Indonesian Communist Party led by Musso, who had recently returned from exile in Moscow. In September 1948 the FDR-PKI staged a failed coup attempt against the Republican Government known as the Madiun Uprising. The failed Madiun Uprising weakened Indonesian Communism and delayed the PKI’s return to Indonesian politics until the 1950s. Following the breakdown of further Dutch-Indonesian talks, the Dutch launched a Second Police Action against the Republic on 18 December 1948. Dutch forces

¹⁴ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 9-10; Yong Mun Cheong, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore connection*, 18-22.

occupied most of the major urban centres in Java and Sumatra, and captured the entire Republican Government including Sukarno and Hatta. Instead of dealing a “knock-out blow” to the Republic, the Dutch military offensive only intensified Indonesian resistance and inflamed world opinion against the Dutch, particularly among Asian and Middle Eastern states. In January 1949, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru convened a special Inter-Asian Conference to lobby the United Nations to end hostilities in Indonesia. Viewing the Indonesian Republic as a potential anti-Communist ally in the light of the failed Madiun Uprising, the United States threatened to withhold Marshall Plan aid to the Dutch unless they adopted a more conciliatory attitude to the Republic. Finally, the United Nations came down hard on the Dutch Government by passing an American-sponsored resolution which ordered the Dutch to withdraw from all their occupied territories and restore the Republican Government to Yogyakarta.¹⁵ Despite Dutch claims that they had smashed the Republic, an Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia*; PDRI) was established in Sumatra. Facing stiff Indonesian resistance and heavy international pressure, the Dutch conceded defeat and accepted Indonesian demands for complete independence.¹⁶

Following the Van Royen-Roem statements on 7 May 1949 the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic agreed to implement a ceasefire and to release the Republican leaders. Between August and November 1949 a series of talks between the Republic, the Netherlands, and the Dutch-sponsored federal states known as the Round Table Conference was held to discuss the transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesians. On 27 December 1949 the Dutch transferred sovereignty to a federal United States of Indonesia, consisting of both the Indonesian Republic and the fifteen federal states. However, the fledgling Indonesian Republic still faced resistance from demobilized former colonial army personnel and Ambonese separatists who were fearful of their place in the new Indonesia. These brief post-independence conflicts accelerated the shift from a federal system to a unitary state in Indonesia. By 19 May 1950 the USI had been dissolved and its component states were amalgamated into a unitary Republic of Indonesia. In September 1950 Indonesia became the fiftieth member of the United Nations, an important rite of passage for the former colony. Indonesian-Dutch relations during the post-independence period would continue to be plagued by two unresolved issues: the continuation of Dutch control over West New Guinea and the inheritance of a heavy colonial debt of \$1.13

¹⁵ Feith, *Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 10-13; Yong Mun Cheong, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore connection*, 22-23

¹⁶ Taufik Abdullah, *Indonesia Towards Democracy* (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2009), 135.

billion.¹⁷ Having completed our historical overview of the Indonesian Revolution, we can now turn our attention to New Zealand's response to that conflict.




Figure 4: This *People's Voice* cartoon criticized Western governments, particularly Britain, for supporting the restoration of Dutch rule in Indonesia. "Status Quo Auntie," *People's Voice*, 14 November 1945.

¹⁷ Feith, *Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 13-16; Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, xxvi-xxvii, 437-446.

New Zealand policy towards the Indonesian Revolution

Unlike Indonesia, New Zealand had emerged relatively unscathed from the Second World War because of its considerable distance from the conflict's war zones. Many New Zealanders took pride in their country's participation in the Allied war effort as a moral duty to aid the 'Mother Country' Britain in the struggle against Nazism and Japanese imperialism. During the war, the New Zealand economy prospered from exporting foodstuffs to war weary Britain and to American and other Allied forces in the South Pacific. New Zealand's close relationship with the United Kingdom was echoed in the wartime Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage's statement that "where she [Britain] goes, we go; where she stands, we stand."¹⁸ In terms of identity and culture, New Zealanders saw their country as a Western liberal democracy that was closely aligned to the 'Mother Country' Great Britain and its Tasman neighbour Australia. According to Malcolm McKinnon, New Zealand first began to pursue an independent foreign policy in 1935 under the First Labour Government when it criticized the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the League of Nations; a stance at odds with Whitehall. However, New Zealand still did not depart from its traditional policy of association with Britain. During World War II, the threat of Japanese expansionism and the limits of British military power forced New Zealand to develop closer relations with Australia and the United States, which would be further expanded in the post-war period.¹⁹

By 1943 New Zealand's desire to have a voice in Allied decision-making and to conduct its own external affairs led the New Zealand Government to establish a foreign ministry, the Department of External Affairs (NZDEA). Hitherto, the Prime Minister's Department (PMD) had been responsible for handling foreign policy issues that were of interest to New Zealand. This administrative change was accompanied by the expansion of diplomatic missions in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the Soviet Union between 1942 and 1944; a substantial change since hitherto New Zealand's sole foreign mission was a High Commissioner in Britain who also represented New Zealand at the League of Nations. Prior to 1943, most of New Zealand's overseas interests were largely represented by the United Kingdom through the auspices of the Governor-General and the Dominions Office in London. The NZDEA was a distinct organization from an older government department called the Department of External

¹⁸ Gary Hawke, "Economic Trends and Economic Policy, 1938-1992," in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, second edition, ed. Geoffrey W. Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 413; Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), 33.

¹⁹ "New Zealand's International Activities," *External Affairs Review* X, no. 1 (January 1960): 1-3; McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 14-15.

Affairs, which was created in 1919 to look after New Zealand's Pacific Island territories including its League of Nations mandate of Samoa. With the creation of the NZDEA in 1943, the older department was renamed the Department of Island Territories. Until 1975, the NZDEA was attached to its parent agency, the Prime Minister's Department. Between 1946 and 1975, Alister D. McIntosh, a senior civil servant, served concurrently as both the Secretary of External Affairs and the Permanent Head of the PMD.²⁰ Like its similarly titled Australian and Canadian counterparts, the NZDEA was named 'External Affairs' rather than 'Foreign Affairs' in deference to the British Government's responsibility for conducting foreign policy on behalf of the British Empire and later the Commonwealth. With the diminution of British influence "East of Suez" in 1969, the NZDEA was renamed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1969.²¹ Under the wartime Peter Fraser led Labour Government New Zealand also became one of the founding members of the United Nations and played an active role in the San Francisco conference in 1945. Aware of the League of Nations' failings, Fraser wanted the new international organization to do more to protect the interests of small states and to take a stronger stand against aggression. He also opposed the great power veto. While New Zealand would gradually lean closer to the United States for security during the Cold War as a result of the decline of British power, it still maintained close political, military, and economic ties with the 'Mother Country.' However, New Zealand, like Australia, was compelled by geopolitical realities to pay more attention to events in Southeast Asia, its new 'Near North'.²²

According to Michael Green, the New Zealand Government took little interest in Indonesia prior to the Indonesian Revolution. During the 1930s New Zealand had some modest trading links with the Netherlands East Indies, which provided 3.5 percent of the country's imports.²³ Following the Japanese conquest in 1942 an NEI government-in-exile, known as the Netherlands East Indies Commission for Australia and New Zealand, was established in

²⁰ "New Zealand's International Activities," *External Affairs Review* X, no. 1 (January 1960): 2-3; Malcolm Templeton, ed., *An Eye, An Ear and A Voice: 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993* (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993), 1-2.

²¹ Alan Watt, "The Department of Foreign Affairs," in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books Limited, 1982), 35; James Eary, "The Department of External Affairs," in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, 96; Malcolm Templeton, *An Eye, An Ear and A Voice*, 1.

²² Templeton, *An Eye, An Ear and A Voice*, 5-7; McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 50-51, 57-58.

²³ Michael Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," in *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 146.

Australia.²⁴ New Zealand maintained contact with the NEI government-in-exile, but showed little interest in the post-war status of the territory. While the New Zealand Government took no part in the British and Australian efforts to reoccupy Indonesia in late 1945, it still took an interest in developments in Indonesia between 1945 and 1950. Since the NZDEA lacked any direct sources of information in the archipelago, New Zealand policy-makers relied on British, Australian, and Dutch foreign source documents, Indonesian nationalist pamphlets and circulars, and international news agencies.²⁵ The Government, however, was forced to respond to the actions of some domestic non-state actors, namely the Waterside Workers' Union (WWU) and the Federation of Labour (FOL). Following fighting between British forces and the Indonesian Republic in October 1945, the WWU had blacklisted Dutch ships carrying supplies to the Netherlands East Indies in support of the Indonesian Republic and the Australian waterside unions.²⁶ The FOL pressured the New Zealand Government to seek an assurance from Whitehall that British forces and recently surrendered Japanese forces were not being used to crush the Indonesian nationalists.²⁷

In November 1945, several NZDEA officials, led by J. V. Wilson, the Deputy Secretary of External Affairs, produced the Department's first formal study of Indonesian developments. This report concluded that it was in New Zealand's interests to find a peaceful settlement to the Indonesian Revolution that produced a "prosperous and friendly" Netherlands East Indies.²⁸ New Zealand policy-makers also questioned the view that the Indonesian-Dutch dispute was merely a colonial dispute and advocated greater UN involvement. Wilson and other NZDEA officials were sympathetic to the Dutch, regarding them as wartime allies who had a "sound" administrative colonial record in the East Indies. By contrast, they regarded the Indonesian Republic as a Japanese-sponsored creation that was obstructing Dutch efforts to restore their "lawful authority" over the East Indies. NZDEA officials did not oppose self-determination for the Indonesians but instead preferred gradual political evolution over "violent" revolution. This

²⁴ Yong Mun Cheong, *H.J. Van Mook and Indonesian Independence: A Study of His Role in Dutch Indonesian Relations, 1945-48* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 26-27; "The NEI Government in Exile," Australian War Memorial Museum, last accessed 1 August 2014, <http://www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/alliesinadversity/australia/columbia.asp>.

²⁵ Aaron O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia 1945-1962: A clear though indirect interest," MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 1994, 4-6; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia", 146-147.

²⁶ News Summary No. 29, 22 October 1945, Omg 63/1/1, PM 318/6/1, Part 1B, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia", 146-147.

²⁷ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 6-7; Copy of Telegram, External Wellington to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (SSDA), 19 October 1945, PM 318/6/1, Part 1B, ANZ, Wellington.

²⁸ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 7-8; Paper, "Notes on Indonesia," by J.V. Wilson, 6 November 1945, PM 318/6/1 Part 1B, ANZ, Wellington.

attitude was reflected in Wilson's conclusion that the Indonesians and other Asian peoples were not yet ready for self-government and required the United Nations' tutelage. Wilson's report shows that NZDEA officials were slow to comprehend the tide of anti-colonial nationalism sweeping through Southeast Asia and that they favoured the restoration of Dutch control over Indonesia.²⁹

According to O'Brien and Green, the New Zealand Government continued to maintain its disengaged, non-interventionist stance towards the Indonesian Revolution until the Dutch launched a punitive "police action" against the Indonesian Republic in July 1947. As a result, the Government began to take a stronger interest in the political situation in Indonesia. The Government's response to the Dutch police action was mild; decrying the Dutch recourse to military force while avoiding any outright condemnation of the Dutch Government.³⁰ These sentiments were reflected in an official press statement issued on 31 July 1947.³¹ Alister McIntosh, the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, thought that the Indonesians were being obstinate and that the Dutch were trying to find a way to cooperate with the Indonesian Republic.³² Despite their use of military force, Prime Minister Peter Fraser still insisted the Dutch were "good neighbours" who had "stood against the Japanese so admirably."³³ The Prime Minister's Department also took notice of a pro-Indonesian protest march organised by the Victoria University College Socialist Club.³⁴ According to O'Brien, the First Police Action created a dilemma for the New Zealand Government since its two closest allies, Australia and Great Britain, disagreed on how to respond. While the Australian Government wanted to submit the Indonesian question to the United Nations Security Council, British and New Zealand policy-makers favoured a joint Anglo-American offer of mediation as a means of resolving the Indonesian dispute.³⁵ Wellington's stance created friction with Canberra, which regarded the Indonesian dispute as a vital security matter in its "neighbourhood."³⁶ After the

²⁹ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 7-9; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 147.

³⁰ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 12-15; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 147.

³¹ Press Release, 31 July 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

³² Note for File, A.D. McIntosh, "Record of a conversation between Mr A.D. McIntosh and Mr Troostenburg", PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

³³ Extract from Cable Summary No. 59, 25 July 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

³⁴ Alister McIntosh, Note for File, 28 July 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

³⁵ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 14-19.

³⁶ Inward Telegram, No. 194, Minister of External Affairs, Canberra to Minister of External Affairs Wellington, 26 July 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington; Outward Telegram, No. 151, Minister of External Affairs, Wellington to Minister of External Affairs, Canberra, 26 July 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

British proposal failed to gain American support, the NZDEA supported the Australian resolution to refer the Indonesian Question to the Security Council. The Australian resolution led the United Nations to play an active role in facilitating the resumption of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations, which led to the Renville Agreement on 17 January 1948.³⁷

While the Fraser Labour Government remained an observer during the UN diplomatic efforts which led to the Renville Agreement, it supported the Indonesian Republic's effort to join two United Nations bodies between 1947 and 1948, namely the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).³⁸ As a founding member of the United Nations, New Zealand took its participation in the United Nations seriously, viewing the international organisation as a stabilizing force in the post-war international system.³⁹ The Indonesian Republic's efforts to conduct its own foreign relations were controversial since most Western governments only accorded it de-facto recognition. The Dutch, in particular, regarded the Republic's diplomatic activities as a violation of the Renville Agreement, which stated that the Netherlands exercised sovereignty over the NEI until independence was handed over to the Indonesians.⁴⁰ In August 1947, the ECOSOC decided to invite the Indonesian Republic to join the proposed International Trading Organisation (ITO). During the proceedings, Wellington favoured admitting the Indonesian Republic as a non-voting member, arguing that the Republic's case should be judged on its own merits despite its contentious legal position. Ultimately, the issue faded as attempts to establish the ITO faltered, and the proposed organisation became the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The question of Indonesian participation in international affairs resurfaced when both the Indonesian Republic and a Dutch-sponsored "whole of Indonesia" applied for associate membership of the ECAFE. During the Fourth ECAFE session in December 1948, the New Zealand Delegation helped resolve the impasse over the Republic's membership by sponsoring a successful compromise resolution which admitted both the Indonesian Republic and the "whole of Indonesia" as associate members. The New Zealand resolution demonstrated Wellington's view that the Republic could play a valuable role in ECAFE.⁴¹ According to O'Brien, the New Zealand Government's policy towards Indonesian participation in the ECOSOC and ECAFE

³⁷ O'Brien, "New Zealand Indonesia," 18-21.

³⁸ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 20-21.

³⁹ Don McKinnon, "Introduction," in *New Zealand as an International Citizen: Fifty Years of United Nations Membership*, ed. Malcolm Templeton (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995), 5-6.

⁴⁰ A.D. McIntosh, "Recognition of Indonesian Independence," 29 July 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington; Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, 33-34, 153-155.

⁴¹ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 147-148; O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 22-33.

was naïve since it failed to address the “wider political considerations” of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.⁴²

Despite the New Zealand Government’s support for the Indonesian Republic’s participation in ECAFE, it was reluctant to expand diplomatic contacts with the Indonesian Republic. As late as November 1948, the Government had still not accorded the Indonesian Republic de-facto recognition on the grounds that it recognised Dutch sovereignty over the East Indies. While New Zealand was not unsympathetic to the Republic, Wellington took great pains to avoid Canberra’s active advocacy on behalf of the Indonesian Republic; which strained Dutch-Australian bilateral relations during the Indonesian Revolution. As a result, New Zealand tried to remain neutral in the Indonesian Revolution while respecting international treaties and agreements. Thus, Wellington’s “balanced and neutral” foreign policy led the Department of External Affairs to deny an offer by Dr Usman Sastroamidjojo, the de-facto representative of the Indonesian Republic in Canberra, for New Zealand to establish diplomatic relations and trading ties with the Republic.⁴³ However, New Zealand would be forced to take a stronger position after the Dutch launched a “Second Police Action” against the Republic in December 1948. On 27 December 1948, the Acting Prime Minister Walter Nash issued a press statement decrying the recent outbreak of violence and urging both parties to settle their differences at the United Nations. While Nash had received a lengthy justification for military action from J. B. D. Pennik, the Dutch Minister in Wellington, he was not swayed by it because an analysis produced by Rex Cunninghame, NZDEA policy-maker, challenged the Dutch justification for military force by pointing out that the Indonesian Republic had actually complied with most of the Dutch demands. While External Affairs officials recommended that the Dutch work with the United Nations to find a peaceful solution to the Indonesian Revolution, they refused to explicitly condemn the second Dutch “police action.” Reflecting the growing international disenchantment with Dutch policies towards Indonesia, J. V. Wilson, the Deputy Secretary of External Affairs, opined that New Zealand should support the unconditional cessation of Dutch rule over Indonesia.⁴⁴ These developments showed that New Zealand policy-makers had finally accepted that Indonesian independence was an inevitable reality in the near future but were still unwilling to take a hard-line stance against the Dutch.

⁴² O’Brien, “New Zealand and Indonesia,” 21-24, 32-33.

⁴³ “New Zealand Policy Towards Indonesia,” Part B, “Post-War Developments in Indonesia,” Confidential Memorandum for Members of the External Affairs Committee, Copy No. 44, 12 November 1948, PM 318/6/1, Part 4, ANZ, Wellington.

⁴⁴ O’ Brien, “New Zealand and Indonesia,” 34-37; Green, “Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia,” 148.

New Zealand was also compelled to take a more direct interest in the Indonesian Revolution in January 1949 when the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, convened an Inter-Asian Conference in New Delhi to help the United Nations Security Council resolve the Indonesian Question.⁴⁵ According to O'Brien, the Inter-Asian Conference marked an important milestone in New Zealand's early engagement with Southeast Asia since it was invited to participate in a conference where most of the participants were Asian nations. While the Australian Government was enthusiastic about participating in the conference, New Zealand policy-makers were unwilling to participate in the Inter-Asian Conference, citing that the Indonesian dispute was a United Nations' matter. Wellington's reluctance was influenced by several factors including the exclusion of its most important allies, the United Kingdom and the United States; a fear that regionalism and sectarianism would weaken the UN and the British Commonwealth; the fact that New Zealand did not see itself as an Asian country; and Wellington's reluctance to compromise its neutrality in the Indonesian dispute by joining the anti-Dutch "Asian Bloc". Following pressure from Canberra, Walter Nash, the Acting-Minister of External Affairs, reluctantly agreed to send an observer, Foss Shanahan, the Deputy Secretary of External Affairs, to attend the conference.⁴⁶ Shanahan was instructed not to take part in any formal discussions or voting, and to convey New Zealand's interest in resolving the Indonesian dispute through the United Nations.⁴⁷ Due to confusion over the date of the conference's opening, Shanahan was unable to reach India in time and J. Inglis, the New Zealand Trade Commissioner in Bombay, was designated as his replacement.⁴⁸ The Inter-Asian Conference took place from 20 to 23 January and adopted three resolutions, urging the United Nations to: end the fighting in Indonesia; restore the Indonesian Republic; and to grant independence to Indonesia before 1 January 1950.⁴⁹ While Inglis did not speak, the interim Indonesian Foreign Minister, A. A. Maramis, thanked his New Zealand counterpart for taking a "keen interest" in

⁴⁵ Minister of External Affairs, Canberra to Minister of External Affairs, Wellington, 3 January 1949, PM 318/6/1, Part 5, ANZ, Wellington; Outward Telegram, No. 102, Minister of External Affairs, Wellington to New Zealand High Commissioner, London, 4 January 1949, PM 318/6/1, Part 5, ANZ, Wellington.

⁴⁶ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 39-43.

⁴⁷ Outward Telegram, No. 2, Minister of External Affairs, Wellington to Austcom, New Delhi, 19 January 1949, PM 59/2/135, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington.

⁴⁸ Telegram, Minister of External Affairs, Wellington to S.R. Pilcher, Hon. New Zealand Government Representative, San Francisco, 19 January 1949, PM 59/2/135, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington; Outward Telegram, No. 1, Minister of External Affairs, Wellington to Austcom, New Delhi, 19 January 1949, PM 59/2/135, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington.

⁴⁹ "The Conference on Indonesia, New Delhi, 1949," reproduced in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy*, 545-547.

the Indonesian independence struggle.⁵⁰ According to O'Brien, New Zealand's reluctant participation at the New Delhi Conference showed that the Government wanted to limit the country's involvement in Asian affairs. New Zealand only became involved in the Indonesian Revolution because it was obliged as a UN member to respond to a colonial problem which had become an international dispute.⁵¹

Following the Inter-Asian Conference, the New Zealand Government reverted to its observer role. Fraser supported British efforts to encourage the Dutch to comply with the Security Council's ceasefire resolution and resume negotiations with the Indonesian Republic. In March 1949, New Zealand supported an Australian initiative to inscribe an agenda item on the Indonesian question for the 1949 UNGA Session. Following the resumption of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations in April, both sides agreed to convene a Round Table Conference at The Hague to discuss the transfer of sovereignty to an independent Indonesian state. After difficult negotiations, the Dutch agreed to transfer full sovereignty to a United States of Indonesia on 27 December 1949. This development closed the curtain on Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia.⁵² In December 1949 New Zealand voted in favour of a General Assembly resolution welcoming the Hague conference outcome.⁵³ Indonesian decolonisation coincided with the electoral victories of conservative governments in Australia and New Zealand: the Robert Menzies Liberal-Country Coalition and the Sidney Holland National Governments respectively. While there was little change in New Zealand foreign policy towards Indonesia, Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia under the Menzies Government changed overnight from being pro-Indonesian to being pro-Dutch. Under Prime Minister Menzies, Australia became the most stubborn international ally of the Netherlands during the West New Guinea dispute.⁵⁴ While not as controversial as New Zealand's sporting contacts with South Africa and involvement in the Vietnam War, the Indonesian Revolution did arouse some debate within certain sections of New Zealand society, the main subject of the next chapter.

⁵⁰ Letter from A.A. Maramis to the New Zealand "Minister for Foreign Affairs," 23 January 1949, PM 318/6/1, Part 10, ANZ, Wellington; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 149

⁵¹ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 49.

⁵² Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 149; O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 49-50, 53-57.

⁵³ Inward Telegram, P.76, New Zealand Permanent Delegation to the United Nations, New York to Minister of External Affairs, Wellington, 14 December 1949, PM 318/6/1, Part 10, ANZ, Wellington.

⁵⁴ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 57; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy*, 198-199.

Conclusion

The Indonesian Revolution ended Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. The Indonesian Revolution quickly developed from a colonial dispute into an international problem which became one of the first major tests of the new United Nations. New Zealand became involved in the Indonesian Revolution due to its Commonwealth linkages to Australia and Britain, and its membership of the United Nations. While New Zealand played a reluctant and limited role in resolving the Indonesian Revolution, this involvement marked the first footstep in its growing engagement with this large 'Near Northern' country during the second half of the twentieth century.



Figure 5: Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand. Credits: Wikimedia Foundation



Figure 6: Alister D. McIntosh, Head of the NZDEA and the Prime Minister's Department. Credits: Alexander Turnbull Library



Figure 7: Walter Nash, senior Government minister and Ambassador to the United States. Credits: Alexander Turnbull Library

Chapter Two: The domestic debate around the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-1949

This second chapter examines the domestic debate in New Zealand which occurred around the Indonesian Revolution between 1945 and 1949, rather than the New Zealand Government's response to that conflict. While New Zealand did not play an active role in the Indonesian Revolution unlike Australia, the New Zealand Government and public were by no means unmoved by the Indonesian Revolution. New Zealand's limited involvement in the Indonesian Revolution through the United Nations marked the first footstep in its growing engagement with this large 'Near Northern' country during the second half of the twentieth century.¹ This chapter seeks to address the main question of how New Zealand society as a whole responded to the Indonesian Revolution. While New Zealand society was largely indifferent to events in Indonesia, there were five identifiable groups - the Waterside Workers' Union (WWU); the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ); the mainstream press; New Zealand youth; and Dutch New Zealanders - which did take an interest in the Indonesian Revolution. The Waterside Workers' Union, a prominent national trade union known for its industrial militancy and political activism, was the first non-state actor to take action in response to the Indonesian Revolution by blacklisting Dutch ships bound for Indonesia. The watersiders' boycott received support from the Federation of Labour and the wider trade union movement but earned the ire of New Zealand business interests and the opposition National Party, which resented the disruption to trade. The Communist Party contextualized its sympathy for the Indonesian independence struggle within the context of Marxist opposition towards imperialism and capitalism; and its alignment with the Soviet Union, the leading Communist state. Meanwhile, the mainstream New Zealand press's attitude towards the Indonesian independence struggle underwent a gradual evolution from supporting the restoration of Dutch rule to finally accepting the inevitability of Indonesian independence. A vocal minority of New Zealand youths also took an interest in the Indonesian Revolution, interpreting it as part of the emerging trend of decolonisation. In line with contemporary Dutch Government and public perspectives on the Indonesian Revolution, most Dutch migrants who settled in New Zealand following the Second World War were opposed to the Indonesian nationalists, viewing them as Japanese puppets, and supporting a return of Dutch control to Indonesia.

¹ Aaron O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia 1945-1962: A clear though indirect interest," MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 1994, 1-2.

The Waterside Workers Union

The New Zealand Waterside Workers' Union played an important role in the domestic debate on the Indonesian Revolution by spearheading opposition towards the return of Dutch rule in Indonesia and rallying support for Indonesian nationalism in New Zealand. The New Zealand waterside boycott of Dutch ships lasted from October 1945 to June 1948.² It was also influenced by the Australian Waterside Workers' Federation's (WWF) efforts to coordinate an international boycott of Dutch shipping to protest Dutch attempts to retake Indonesia.³ The New Zealand watersiders' actions during the Indonesian Revolution reflected the union's history of supporting political and industrial causes, which sometimes brought it into conflict with the Government. New Zealand watersiders had supported the West Coast longshoremen in the United States during the 1934 West Coast waterfront strike. During the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 the watersiders had refused to load scrap iron on ships bound for Japan in protest against Japanese military aggression in China. Besides the Indonesian Revolution, the Union had also taken a stand on several other international issues during the post-war era. In 1946 its members had refused to load wool on ships bound for Barcelona to protest the authoritarian Franco regime. That same year, the Union had refused to load butter being exported to the United States, where there was no rationing, while Britain was still experiencing a food shortage.⁴

The first known casualty of the watersiders' anti-Dutch boycott was the SS *Alcinouse*, which had docked at Wellington harbour on 14 October 1945.⁵ The watersiders' ban on Dutch ships was also supported by the Federation of Labour, which criticized the British Government for opposing the Indonesian nationalists and using Japanese forces in Allied operations against the Indonesian Republic.⁶ The watersiders' blacklisting of the SS *Alcinouse* prompted a complaint by the Dutch Consul, M.F. Vigeveno that the boycott had held up a shipment of medical

² Anna Green, *British Capital, Antipodean Labour: Working the New Zealand Waterfront, 1915-1951* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2001), 76; Editorial, "Sectional Dictation in Foreign Policy," *Evening Post*, 11 June 1948.

³ "International Trade Union Support for Indonesians," *New Zealand Transport Worker* 19, no. II (5 November 1945): 11; Rupert Lockwood, *Black Armada: Australia & the Indonesian Struggle for Independence, 1942-49* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1982), 229.

⁴ Green, *British Capital, Antipodean Labour*, 76; Toby Hill, "It Seems to Me... That Trade Unions Must Be Trade Unions," *New Zealand Transport Worker* 20, no. 7 (10 September 1946), 1.

⁵ "Crew Won't Sail Alcinous," *People's Voice* III, no. 13 (31 October 1945), 1; "Report on the Hold-Up on the Dutch Vessel Alcinouse," Memorandum for Hon. W. Nash, Waterfront Control Commission, 18 October 1945, Nash 3/0862, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington.

⁶ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 6-7.

supplies and hospital equipment to liberated civilian internees in the East Indies.⁷ The Waterfront Control Commission refused to intervene in the *Alcinouse* dispute, claiming that it was the responsibility of the New Zealand Government since it involved diplomatic considerations.⁸ On October 30 1945 the *Alcinouse* finally departed New Zealand after being partially loaded by Dutch consular staff and the local Dutch community.⁹ On 30 November 1945 the Waterside Workers' Union voted to impose a ban on Dutch ships in New Zealand ports during their biennial conference at Wellington. The Union's national secretary Toby Hill defended the Union's actions by stressing its traditional antipathy towards imperialism and sympathy for colonised peoples.¹⁰ The watersiders' ban on Dutch shipping was also supported by the Federation of Labour, the wider New Zealand trade union movement and the Communist Party.¹¹ The shared opposition of the New Zealand watersiders and the Communists towards Dutch colonialism in Indonesia reflected the significant Communist influence within the Australasian waterside unions.¹²

Despite its neutral stance on the Indonesian Revolution, the Fraser Labour Government, reflecting its predominantly labour and left-wing constituency, backed away from publicly confronting the waterside unions over the ban on Dutch shipping. The watersiders' actions during the Indonesian Revolution coincided with a series of waterside disputes in the late 1940s that strained relations between the waterside union, shipping companies, and the Government.¹³ The Labour Government's inability to manage waterfront industrial militancy was exploited by the opposition National Party, which represented agricultural, commercial, and managerial

⁷ Letter from M.F Vigeveno to the Hon. Walter Nash, Consulate of the Netherlands for the Dominion of New Zealand, 18 October 1945, Nash 3/0862, ANZ, Wellington.

⁸ "Even the Ballast is Black: Wharfies Won't Load Dutch Ship," *People's Voice* III, no. 12 (24 October 1945), 1.

⁹ "Alcinous Loaded By Crew: Intention to Sail Today," *The Dominion*, 30 October 1945; "No Repairs to Dutch Ships: Alcinous Leaves Partly Loaded," *People's Voice* III, no. 15 (14 November 1945), 5.

¹⁰ "New Zealand Waterside Workers' Union Report of Biennial Conference Held in Trades Hall, Wellington," 27 November 1945, Herbert Otto Roth Papers, MS-Papers-94-106-10/10, Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL), Wellington, 6, 26.

¹¹ Undated Federation of Labour note, PM 318/6/1, Part 1B, ANZ, Wellington; "Waihi Unionists Support Indonesians," *People's Voice* III, no. 15 (14 November 1945), 3; "From Here & There: Trades Council on Indonesia," *People's Voice* III, no. 17 (28 November 1945), 7; "Wellington Banners Support Indonesians," *People's Voice* III, no.17 (28 November 1945), 8.

¹² For further details, see James Bennett, "The New Zealand Labour Movement and International Communism 1921 to c. 1938," in *Lenin's Legacy Down Under: New Zealand's Cold War*, ed. Alexander Trapeznik and Aaron Fox (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2003), 73-92; Bob Catley and Vinsensio Dugis, *Australian Indonesian Relations Since 1945: The Garuda and The Kangaroo* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1998), 16.

¹³ Robert Chapman, "From Labour to National," in the *Oxford History of New Zealand*, second edition, edited by Geoffrey W. Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 371-372; Anna Green, *British Capital, Antipodean Labour*, 131-149.

interests who resented the damage caused by strikes to New Zealand's economy and trade.¹⁴ These sentiments were best articulated during a parliamentary debate on 24 October 1945 when the National Member of Parliament (MP) Keith Holyoake criticised the watersiders for trying to dictate New Zealand's foreign policy by disrupting the country's overseas trade.¹⁵ In May 1946 the Waterside Workers' Union and the Federation of Labour made arrangements with Australian watersiders to screen *Indonesia Calling* in New Zealand.¹⁶ *Indonesia Calling* was a controversial pro-Indonesian film produced by the Dutch Communist film-maker Joris Ivens which documented the Australian waterside unions' boycott against Dutch ships.¹⁷ The film's distribution was restricted by the Government because of its negative portrayal of the country's wartime Dutch allies.¹⁸ In June 1946, the *People's Voice* reported that an attempt had been made by the British authorities in Southeast Asia to send a Dutch destroyer, *Piet Hein*, to New Zealand for repairs after it had been denied servicing by the Australian watersiders. However, this plan was quickly scuttled when New Zealander waterside workers indicated that they would not "scab" on their Australian comrades.¹⁹

By 1947 the watersiders' ban on Dutch shipping had affected New Zealand's overseas trade with the East Indies, which created friction between the watersiders and exporters. Dairy exporters, in particular, were unhappy that they were unable to sell their products to Indonesia which while still a small market had the potential to grow. In July 1947 the Royal Packet Navigation Company, which traded extensively with the East Indies, had urged the watersiders to lift their ban on unloading cargo from Dutch ships bound for Indonesia. The watersiders declined the company's request and maintained their ban, citing the recent Dutch police action against the Indonesian Republic.²⁰ The Waterside Workers' Union also wanted to maintain solidarity with the Australian Waterside Workers' Federation, which was spearheading the international trade union movement's boycott of Dutch shipping on behalf of the Indonesian

¹⁴ Barry Gustafson, *The First 50 Years: a history of the New Zealand National Party* (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1985), 48-49, 54.

¹⁵ "Cargo for Dutch East Indies," 24 October 1945, *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 227, 19 September to 26 October 1945, 729.

¹⁶ Letter from Secretary, Federation of Labour to Mr. E. Roach, Assistant Secretary, Australian Waterside Workers' Union, 24 May 1946, Correspondence with Trade Unions: Waterside Workers, New Zealand Federation of Labour: Records, MS-Papers-4100-20/107/01, ATL, Wellington.

¹⁷ John Hughes, "The (heterogeneous) voice of *Indonesia Calling*," *Studies in Australasian Cinema* 4, no. 3 (2010), 283-300.

¹⁸ "Film *Indonesia Calling*," *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* 277, 30 July – 2 September 1947, 460-461.

¹⁹ "No Repairs for Dutch Warship: N.Z. Workers Won't Scab on Aussies," *People's Voice* III, no. 45 (26 June 1946), 5.

²⁰ "Dutch Ships in New Zealand – Possible Action by Watersiders – Lifting of Ban Asked For By Company," *The Press*, 25 July 1947.

nationalists.²¹ The Labour Government's continued inaction against the watersiders over their ban on Dutch ships was criticised by the National MPs Ronald M. Algie and Frederick Doidge. The latter also mockingly labelled the Union's national president, Harold Jock Barnes, as New Zealand's "Foreign Minister."²² In response to Doidge's remarks, Toby Hill reiterated the Union's principled opposition to loading scrap iron for Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War. While the watersiders were not opposed to trade between New Zealand and Indonesia, the Union insisted that peace and democracy first had to be restored to Indonesia.²³ By 11 June 1948 the national executive of the Waterside Workers' Union had decided to lift its ban on Dutch shipping following a similar decision by its Australian counterparts. This development was welcomed by the *Evening Post*, which editorialized that the watersiders had hijacked New Zealand's foreign policy and damaged the country's trading relations with the East Indies.²⁴ Unlike their Australian counterparts, however, the New Zealand watersiders did not reinstate their ban on Dutch shipping following the Second Police Action in December 1948.²⁵

While the New Zealand watersiders' boycott was eclipsed in scale by its better-known Australian counterpart, it proved to be one additional nail in the coffin of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. The international maritime boycott against Dutch shipping hampered Dutch efforts to regain power in Indonesia and allowed the Indonesian Republic to consolidate itself.²⁶ The Waterside Workers' Union's actions undoubtedly helped advance the cause of the Indonesian Revolution but also reinforced its reputation for industrial militancy, which often placed it in conflict with the Government, business interests, and the Press. These tensions foreshadowed an upcoming showdown between the watersiders and the Sidney Holland National Government, which culminated in the 1951 Waterside Strike/Lockout.²⁷

²¹ "Ban on Dutch Shipping – N.Z. Trade with Far East – Watersiders Desire Development," *The Press*, 28 July 1947.

²² "Government's Views Sought," *The Press*, 25 July 1947.

²³ "Ban on Dutch Shipping – N.Z. Trade with Far East – Watersiders Desire Development," *The Press*, 28 July 1947.

²⁴ Editorial, "Sectional Dictation in Foreign Policy," *Evening Post*, 11 June 1948.

²⁵ "Boycott of Ships Bound For Indonesia Spreads on Australian Wharves," *The Dominion*, 20 December 1948; "Dutch Ships at Melbourne – Boycott by Seamen's Union," *The Press*, 30 December 1948.

²⁶ Catley and Dugis, *The Garuda and The Kangaroo*, 17.

²⁷ *British Capital, Antipodean Labour*, 141-148



Figure 8: Toby Hill (second figure) and Jock Barnes (third figure), flanked by two other Watersiders during a Federation of Labour meeting in 1950, Evening Post Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library.

The Communist Party

The Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) took a pro-Indonesian and anti-Dutch stance during the Indonesian Revolution. Throughout that period, the Communist Party's position would mirror that of the Soviet Union and other Moscow-aligned Communist parties, which contextualised the Indonesian Revolution as part of the international anti-colonial struggle against imperialism and capitalism. Based on a study of articles from the Communist Party's newspaper, the *People's Voice*, the CPNZ's response to the Indonesian Revolution can be divided into two main stages: enthusiastic support for the Indonesian Republic (1945-47) and ideological hostility towards the Republican government (1948-49). Between 1945 and 1947, the *People's Voice* gave significant coverage to Indonesian developments and the Trans-Tasman trade union boycott of Dutch ships, and expressed strong sympathies for the Indonesian Republic.²⁸ After the Republic's ratification of the Renville Agreement in January 1948, the *People's Voice* reduced its coverage of Indonesian events and criticized the Republican Government for betraying Indonesian independence to American and Dutch capitalist interests.²⁹ This change in stance also coincided with an escalation of Western-Soviet Cold War tensions caused by recent events in 1948 such as the Berlin Airlift and the Czechoslovak coup d'état. Since the CPNZ and *People's Voice* lacked any direct sources of information in Indonesia, it had to rely on news reports sourced by foreign Communist periodicals like the British *Daily Worker* and its contacts in the wider international Communist movement.

On 3 October 1945 the *People's Voice* (PV) urged all "honest" New Zealanders to support the Indonesian struggle for freedom against Dutch imperialism.³⁰ Later, it likened the post-war tide of Asian nationalism to the emergence of European nation-states during the Age of Revolutions.³¹ The newspaper also defended Sukarno and the Indonesian nationalist leadership from Dutch allegations that they were pro-Japanese "quislings."³² The PV also published numerous articles and cartoons criticising British and Dutch policies towards Indonesia.³³ In

²⁸ "Even the Ballast is Black: Wharfies Won't Load Dutch Ships," *People's Voice* III, no. 12 (24 October 1945), 1; "Soekarno Not A Quisling," *People's Voice* III, no. 13 (31 October 1945), 7; "Dutch Imperialism Angers Australian Troops: Eyewitness On Treatment of Indonesia People," *People's Voice* III, no. 13 (31 October 1945), 6; Photograph, "Indonesians Thank N.Z.," *People's Voice* III, no. 13 (31 October 1945), 3.

²⁹ "Indies Rightists Sold Out to U.S.A.," *People's Voice* V, no. 28, (7 April 1948), 4; Rupert Lockwood, "Nazi Troops, Hatta Sell-Out Aided Dutch Coup," *People's Voice* VI, no. 15 (2 February 1949), 3, S. Scott, Editorial, "Asia and World Politics," *People's Voice* VI, no. 15 (2 February 1949), 2.

³⁰ "Poetra2 dan poetri2 Indonesia," *People's Voice* III, no. 9 (3 October 1945), 5.

³¹ Editorial, "Colonial Revolution Is On The March," *People's Voice* III, no. 10 (10 October 1945), 4.

³² "Soekarno Not a Quisling: Imperialist Lie Nailed," *People's Voice* III, no. 10 (10 October 1945), 7.

³³ "KPM Worked Under Japs and Nazis," *People's Voice* III, no. 12 (24 October 1945), 1; Cartoon, "Status Quo Auntie," *People's Voice* III, no. 15 (14 November 1945), 8; "Dutch had courage for guns," *People's*

October 1945, the CPNZ organised public demonstrations and leaflet drops in Wellington to highlight public awareness of the Indonesian Revolution. The Party also circulated a petition urging Prime Minister Fraser to fulfil his promise to stand up for the rights of small nations by supporting the Indonesian independence struggle.³⁴ The *People Voice's* pro-Moscow biases were best reflected in a short article on 17 April 1946 which labelled the Indonesian Communist leader Tan Malaka as a “Trotskyite” and “an enemy of the Indonesian people.”³⁵ In reality, Tan Malaka was a dissident member of the PKI and Communist International (Comintern) who had fallen out with the dominant Republican leadership due to his calls for a “social revolution” to correspond with the “national revolution” against the Dutch.³⁶ The *People's Voice* was still far-sighted enough, however, to recognise that the Indonesians wanted nothing more than complete independence and were not prepared to settle for gradual political evolution.³⁷ During the First Police Action in July 1947 the *People's Voice* denounced the Dutch military action against the Republic as a “treacherous Pearl Harbour attack.”³⁸ Communist Party member Ron Smith helped the Victoria University College Socialist Club to organize a public demonstration condemning the Dutch police action on 30 July.³⁹

The First Police Action marked the climax of the CPNZ's enthusiasm for the Indonesian Revolution. By 1948 the *People's Voice* had become more critical of the Indonesian Republic and this waning enthusiasm corresponded with a sharp reduction in the coverage of Indonesian events. A *People's Voice* article published on 7 April 1948 castigated the Republican government for accepting the “humiliating” Renville Agreement and denounced the new Hatta Government as a “right-wing Indonesian clique.”⁴⁰ In July 1948 the *People's Voice* covered the breakdown of negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic which ultimately led to the Second Police Action in December 1948 and excoriated the British and Americans for selling weapons to the

Voice III, no. 16 (21 November 1945), 6; “Troops Burn Camp and Strike Over Java,” *People's Voice* III, no. 26 (13 February 1946), 7.

³⁴ “Protest To Premier,” *People's Voice* III, no. 13 (31 October 1945), 4.

³⁵ “Arrested Indonesian Not Communist,” *People's Voice* III, no. 35 (17 April 1946), 5.

³⁶ For a longer discussion on Tan Malaka's role in the Indonesian Revolution, see Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: occupation and resistance, 1944-1946* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972), viii-ix, 270-291, 404-405.

³⁷ “My Bevin can't take it: crisis officially provoked: Soviet case unanswered,” *People's Voice* III, no. 26 (13 February 1946), 1.

³⁸ S. Scott, “Indonesia and N.Z.,” Editorial, *People's Voice* IV, no. 48 (6 August 1947), 2; “Dutch Stage Pearl Harbour in Indonesia: Treacherous Attack While Talks Progressed,” *People's Voice* IV, no. 48 (6 August 1947), 4.

³⁹ Ron Smith, *Working Class Son: My Fight Against Capitalism and War* (Wellington: Ron Smith, 1994), 71-75.

⁴⁰ “Indies Rightists Sold Out to U.S.A.,” *People's Voice* V, no. 28 (7 April 1948), 4.

Dutch.⁴¹ The *People's Voice* did not cover the Second Police Action and the Round Table Conferences, which led to Indonesian independence in December 1949. Instead, the newspaper devoted more attention to the emerging the Malayan Emergency, which it cast as a proletarian uprising against British imperialism.⁴² On 2 February 1949 an editorial on Asian political developments by Sidney ("Sid") Scott, distinguished between the "compromising" bourgeois nationalists, who served Western capitalist interests, and the Communists, who were committed to social reforms and genuine independence. Scott accused Indonesian landlords and capitalists of compromising with the Dutch and Americans while marginalizing the "truly revolutionary" Indonesian Communist Party. Sid Scott also sharply criticised the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's New Delhi Conference, which had been organised in January 1949 to pressure the United Nations to resolve the Indonesian Revolution, for not demanding the withdrawal of Dutch troops and immediate independence for Indonesia.⁴³ In February 1950 the *People's Voice* denounced the newly independent Hatta-Sukarno Government as "puppets" that had betrayed Indonesian independence to Western imperialism.⁴⁴

The CPNZ's shifting response to the Indonesian Revolution must be understood within the context of the Soviet Union's policies towards the Indonesian Revolution in the United Nations. Soviet interest in the Indonesian Revolution began when the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic protested the presence of British troops in Indonesia during the first Security Council meeting in January 1946. While it did not accord de-facto recognition to the Indonesian Republic, the Soviet Union maintained a pro-Indonesian stance and advocated collective intervention by the Security Council in the Indonesian dispute. Reflecting the escalating Cold War struggle, Moscow used the Indonesian dispute to burnish its credentials as the "champion" of colonised peoples and to demonise Anglo-American imperialism.⁴⁵ According to Ruth McVey, Soviet policy towards Indonesia was influenced by Andrei Zhdanov's "two camp doctrine" which viewed international relations as a clash between the Western imperialist powers and an "anti-imperialist" camp consisting of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc, the international labour movement, and the international Communist movement. National liberation movements in

⁴¹ "Dutch Militants support Indonesia," *People's Voice* V, no. 43 (21 July 1948), 3.

⁴² The Malayan Emergency was a Communist insurgency in British Malaya that pitted the predominantly ethnic-Chinese Malayan National Liberation Army against the British authorities and the Federation of Malaya (1948-60). See "May Use Black and Tans Against Malays," *People's Voice* V, no. 44 (28 July 1948), 4; "Malays Fight Against Starvation Wages," *People's Voice* V, no. 45 (4 August 1948), 3.

⁴³ S. Scott, "Asia and World Politics," Editorial, *People's Voice* VI, no. 15 (2 February 1949), 2.

⁴⁴ "Indonesian Revolt Against Puppets," *People's Voice* VII, no. 11 (1 February 1950), 3.

⁴⁵ Alastair M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations* (London: Steven & Sons Ltd, 1960), 16-18, 384-86; J. Soedjati Djwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesian's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), 65-68.

Indonesia and Vietnam were viewed as fellow allies against Western imperialism.⁴⁶ J. Djiwandono and McVey have pointed out that the USSR had hoped that Communist and left-wing elements in Indonesia would assume power in Indonesia and steer the Indonesian Revolution toward a Communist direction. However, Soviet-Indonesian relations chilled in 1948 after the Hatta Government discontinued a Soviet proposal to ratify a consular treaty between the two countries and crushed a Communist uprising in Madiun, Java. While Moscow still supported the Indonesian independence struggle, Soviet attitudes to the Indonesian Republic hardened; the Soviet press denounced the Sukarno-Hatta leadership as “bourgeois nationalist traitors” serving American and Dutch interests.⁴⁷ Following the Dutch transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, the Soviet Union voted against resolutions in the General Assembly and Security Council which endorsed the Round Table Agreements (RTC) and the independent United States of Indonesia (USI), alleging that the RTC Agreements had restored the old colonial regime and that the USI was a Dutch “puppet state.” Despite its belligerent attitude towards the RTC Agreements, Moscow still voted to admit Indonesia as the United Nations’ sixtieth member on 28 September 1950.⁴⁸ The CPNZ’s shift from being an enthusiastic supporter of the Indonesian Republic to a bitter critic of “bourgeois nationalist” elements reflected its allegiance to Moscow and sympathy for fellow travellers.

Press Responses

The New Zealand press kept both the public and the Government informed of the events of the Indonesian Revolution. Since most New Zealand media lacked correspondents in Indonesia, they sourced their news reports from foreign newspaper, news agencies, and people who had resided or visited Indonesia. For most New Zealand readers, the Indonesian Revolution was just one among a host of other contemporary international issues including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Chinese Civil War, the First Indochina War, and the Berlin Airlift. While several newspapers did publish editorials in response to important events surrounding the Indonesian Revolution, there were few letters to the editor on Indonesian developments, reflecting the New Zealand public’s indifference towards the Indonesian independence struggle. While most New Zealand newspapers and periodicals took a balanced editorial standpoint on the Indonesian Revolution, some like the Communist Party’s newspaper *People’s Voice* and the conservative *New*

⁴⁶ Ruth T. McVey, *The Soviet view of the Indonesian revolution; a study in the Russian attitude towards Asian nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1969), 31-35.

⁴⁷ Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited*, 77-80; McVey, *The Soviet view of the Indonesian revolution*, 37-39, 47-53.

⁴⁸ Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, 386-389.



Figure 10: John McNamara's Southern Cross cartoon reflected a growing unease in New Zealand at Dutch policies towards Indonesia. Southern Cross Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library.



Figure 9: The Communist Party's sympathies lay with the Indonesian nationalists. "The Old Technique," *People's Voice*, 1 October 1947.

Zealand Herald sided with the belligerents in the conflict, the Indonesians and the Dutch respectively. The *People's Voice's* pro-Indonesian coverage reflected the CPNZ's opposition to colonialism. The *Herald's* pro-Dutch editorial standpoint reflected the conservative leanings of its editor, Leslie Munro, a prominent National Party member.⁴⁹ The largely neutral standpoint on the Indonesian Revolution taken by the other newspapers that I have surveyed for this chapter – *The Dominion* (Wellington), the *Evening Post* (Wellington), *The Press* (Christchurch), the *Otago Daily Times* (Dunedin), and the *Southland Times* (Invercargill) – reflected their independence from the political parties.⁵⁰ As with the New Zealand Government, the press's attitude towards the Indonesian Revolution underwent an evolution from supporting the restoration of Dutch rule, to becoming more critical of Dutch policies in Indonesia, and finally accepting the inevitability of Indonesian independence.

Following the outbreak of fighting between Indonesian and British forces in Java in October 1945, *The Dominion* warned that native populations in their eagerness for national independence might find themselves under the “aegis of Japanese influence.” This editorial overlooked Japan's recent capitulation and occupation by Allied forces and played on paranoid antipodean fears of a resurgent Japan re-establishing a “co-prosperity” sphere in Southeast Asia.⁵¹ Meanwhile, Leslie Munro penned a column in Auckland's *The Weekly News* defending the “progressive” track-record of the Dutch in Indonesia and arguing that independence would not guarantee safety, stability or democracy in Indonesia, citing the problems facing Thailand and the Latin American republics.⁵² Later, Munro published an editorial in the *Herald* defending British efforts to re-establish law and order in Indonesia and rubbishing the Indonesian nationalist movement as a Japanese-sponsored creation. Munro also argued that President Sukarno's demand for complete independence was unrealistic, citing the Indonesian peoples' low stage of

⁴⁹ Leslie Munro was a founding member of the National Party who served as editor of the New Zealand Herald from 1942 to 1951. He later served as New Zealand's Ambassador to the United States, New Zealand's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New Zealand's representative on the Security Council (1954-55) and as the President of the 12th General Assembly (1958-59). Munro was known for his anti-Communism and developed a reputation as a Cold War Warrior. See Derek Round, “Munro, Leslie Knox,” from the *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* 5 (2000), *Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand*, <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5m63/munro-leslie-knox>.

⁵⁰ Guy H. Scholefield, *Newspapers in New Zealand* (Wellington: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1958), 7, 31-33, 38-39, 83, 175, 204-205, 218-219.

⁵¹ Editorial, “The East Indian Crisis,” *The Dominion*, 18 October 1945.

⁵² L.K. Munro, “Java Troubles: Dutch Rule Challenged: Indonesian Independence Movement,” *The Weekly News*, 3 October 1945.

development and lack of unity.⁵³ By contrast, sympathy for the Indonesian nationalists was expressed in a letter to the editor from *The Press* on 3 October 1945. The author L. A. Efford drew comparisons between the nationalist independence struggles in Indochina and Java, and urged the public to pressure Prime Minister Fraser to keep his promise to support the rights of “small nations.”⁵⁴

Following the First Police Action in July 1947 New Zealand newspapers supported calls for the United Nations, the United States, and Britain to play a more active role in resolving the Indonesian Revolution. Most newspapers tried to maintain a balanced approach and refrain from taking sides. *The Press* called for the Security Council and all other interested parties to act immediately to prevent the spread of conflict.⁵⁵ The paper also rebutted Dutch claims that the Republic was not a government by pointing out that the Indonesian Republic had been “specifically recognised” as a party by the Linggadjati Agreement.⁵⁶ *The Dominion* argued that the Indonesian dispute could no longer be deemed as an internal problem due to the economic and strategic importance of the East Indies, and regarded the Indonesian conflict as an important test for the United Nations.⁵⁷ While the *Southland Times* still supported Dutch political tutelage in Indonesia, it labelled the First Police Action as a “tragic blunder” that had alienated liberal opinion.⁵⁸ The newspaper also called for the Dutch to accept United Nations mediation in the Indonesian dispute.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, the *Otago Daily Times* viewed the outbreak of fighting as a clash between two extremes – the “old Dutch conservative colonials”, who were seeking to return to the “old order” and to exploit Indonesia’s wealth, and the “rabid” Indonesian nationalists, who were committed to total independence.⁶⁰ The *New Zealand Herald* blamed the outbreak of violence on the “chicanery and bad faith” of Indonesian extremist elements, but admitted that Dutch intransigence was also to blame.⁶¹ Meanwhile, the *Evening Post* criticised the Waterside Workers Union for hijacking New Zealand foreign policy by imposing a ban on Dutch shipping in New Zealand.⁶²

⁵³ Editorial, “British in Indonesia,” *New Zealand Herald*, 12 November 1945.

⁵⁴ Letter to the Editor, “National Independence,” *The Press*, 3 October 1945.

⁵⁵ Editorial, “Indonesia,” *The Press*, 22 July 1947.

⁵⁶ Editorial, “Hopes for Mediation in Indonesia,” *The Press*, 28 July 1947.

⁵⁷ Editorial, “Indonesia and United Nations,” *The Dominion*, 5 August 1947.

⁵⁸ Editorial, “A Tragic Blunder in Java,” *Southland Times*, 24 July 1947.

⁵⁹ Editorial, “United Nations and Indonesia,” *Southland Times*, 31 July 1947.

⁶⁰ Editorial, “Warfare Again,” *Otago Daily Times*, 22 July 1947.

⁶¹ Editorial, “Britain’s Example in Asia,” *New Zealand Herald*, 22 July 1947.

⁶² Editorial, “Dictation of the Worst Kind,” *Evening Post*, 28 July 1947.

After the Second Police Action in December 1948, press opinion became more critical of the Dutch and sympathetic towards the Indonesian Republic. The *Otago Daily Times* criticized the Dutch for violating the Renville truce and praised the Republic for successfully crushing a Communist coup attempt.⁶³ Similarly, the *Southland Times* warned that the Second Police Action would exacerbate distrust between the Dutch and Indonesians.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, *The Press* criticised Dutch plans to liquidate the Indonesian Republic as folly since the Republic was to be a “keystone” of the proposed Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The newspaper also called for the Security Council to find a permanent settlement to the Indonesian dispute, arguing that the Organisation could not “afford to let the end be shaped by force and the march of military events.”⁶⁵ By contrast, the *New Zealand Herald* presented the Dutch resort to military force as an act of frustration in response to rampant lawlessness in the Indonesian Republic and the Republican Government’s intransigence in complying with the Renville Agreement.⁶⁶

By December 1949 the New Zealand press was supportive of Indonesian independence, but warned of the challenges facing the new country. Press opinion hoped for improved relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia but doubted the ability of the Indonesians to govern their own affairs. While *The Dominion* welcomed the success of the Round Table Conference which led to the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia; it regretted that the Indonesian independence struggle had destroyed much of the goodwill between the Dutch and Indonesians.⁶⁷ The *Otago Daily Times* regarded the establishment of a new sovereign Indonesia as an important geopolitical event and reflecting contemporary Western security thinking, praised the Hatta Government’s rejection of Communism.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, *The Press* hoped that the Netherlands-Indonesian Union would promote cooperation and good-will between the two states.⁶⁹ On a more pessimistic note, the *New Zealand Herald* argued that Indonesian decolonisation could have occurred earlier and more peacefully “had it not been for the well-meant intervention of outsiders which had the effect largely of encouraging Oriental duplicity.” In addition, its editorial argued that the Dutch had “scored a considerable, constitutional and diplomatic triumph by obtaining a settlement in Indonesia largely on their

⁶³ Editorial, “Action in Indonesia,” *The Otago Daily Times*, 21 December 1948.

⁶⁴ Editorial, “Return to Force,” *Southland Times*, 21 January 1948.

⁶⁵ Editorial, “Indonesia,” *The Press*, 22 December 1948.

⁶⁶ Editorial, “Indonesian Truce Ended,” *The New Zealand Herald*, 21 December 1948.

⁶⁷ Editorial, “Indonesia Assumes Independence,” *The Dominion*, 27 December 1949.

⁶⁸ Editorial, “A New Pacific State,” *Otago Daily Times*, 29 December 1949.

⁶⁹ Editorial, “Indonesian State,” *The Press*, 30 December 1949.

original, basic terms.”⁷⁰ Both *The Press* and the *NZ Herald* also took the paternalistic view that the “inexperienced” Indonesians would continue to need Dutch tutelage and administrative expertise.⁷¹ Ultimately, hopes for peaceful relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia proved illusory in the post-independence era due to the West New Guinea dispute, a topic which will be touched upon in the next chapter.⁷²

Given the lack of direct sources in Indonesia, there was little in-depth coverage of the Indonesian Revolution within the New Zealand Press. The first known serious treatment of Indonesia was a three-part series of articles entitled the “Crisis in Indonesia,” written by the Dutch journalist Erik Schwimmer, in the August year issues of the weekly *New Zealand Listener*, the country’s liberal-leaning radio broadcasting magazine. Schwimmer’s articles helped introduce many New Zealanders to Indonesia, a country still rather distant and obscure within the New Zealand public mind-set. The first article, “From Feudalism to Fraternization” addressed the historical background to the Indonesian Revolution, focusing on racial diversity and feudalism in Indonesia. Schwimmer argued that the Japanese Occupation made a return to the pre-war colonial order impossible and that the Dutch would have to work with a modern liberal-democratic Indonesian state.⁷³ The second article, “Each Group Needs The Other” explored two of the key ‘moderate’ personalities involved in the Indonesian Revolution: Lieutenant Governor-General H. J. Van Mook and the Indonesian Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir. Schwimmer explained that moderate elements in both the Netherlands and Indonesia had been swept aside by extremist elements opposed to compromise.⁷⁴ The third article, “Selfishness and Ignorance Wrecked the Peace” outlined the dynamics behind the First Police Action in July 1947 and identified three reasons for the Dutch recourse to military action: Dutch economic desperation; the Dutch desire to attack the Republic before it could formally become a sovereign state in 1949; and the strengthened resistance to Sjahrir’s Government within Indonesia.⁷⁵ Schwimmer’s articles sparked an angry response from A. F. H. Van Troostenburg de Bruyn, the

⁷⁰ Editorial, “Indonesia Attains Independence,” *New Zealand Herald*, 28 December 1949.

⁷¹ Editorial, “Indonesian State,” *The Press*, 30 December 1949; Editorial, “Indonesia Attains Independence,” *New Zealand Herald*, 28 December 1949.

⁷² Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), 79-175; Nicholas Tarling, *Britain and the West New Guinea Dispute* (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), i-iii, 538-40.

⁷³ Erik Schwimmer, “Crisis in Indonesia (1): Feudalism to Fraternization,” *New Zealand Listener*, 8 August 1947, 6-7.

⁷⁴ Erik Schwimmer, “Crisis in Indonesia (2): Each Group Needs the Other,” *New Zealand Listener*, 15 August 1947, 7.

⁷⁵ Erik Schwimmer, “Crisis in Indonesia (3): Selfishness and Ignorance Wrecked The Peace,” *New Zealand Listener*, 22 August 1947, 18-19.

Dutch Minister in Wellington, who denounced Schwimmer as a Communist and accused him of misrepresenting events in Indonesia. Troostenburg's McCarthyist response reflected the growing anti-Communist paranoia among some conservative Dutch elements.⁷⁶ Besides complaining to his host government, the Dutch Minister also penned a lengthy rebuttal article attempting to "set the record straight" for *Listener* readers.⁷⁷

One New Zealand account of the Indonesian Revolution which warrants detailed examination is that of Lachie McDonald. McDonald was a New Zealand journalist working for the British *Daily Mail*, who visited Indonesia twice in July 1947 and late December 1949. McDonald's account of his Indonesian travels was published in 1998 as *Bylines: Memoirs of a War Correspondent*, which chronicled his 32-year journalistic career. McDonald travelled widely throughout Asia following World War II and covered numerous other events and conflicts including the Allied Occupation of Japan, the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, the First Indochina War, and the Malayan Emergency. While McDonald spent much of his life traveling overseas, he settled down in Wellington during his latter years.⁷⁸ He sympathised with the Dutch, whom he thought were genuinely committed to preparing Indonesia for self-rule but preferred political evolution over immediate independence. According to McDonald, the international community had bullied the Dutch into handing independence to Indonesia. Reflecting some contemporary conservative Western views, McDonald believed that many colonized peoples, including the Indonesians, were not ready to govern themselves and that decolonisation was driven by an "emotional and far from objective support" of self-rule for all indigenous peoples.⁷⁹ McDonald viewed the Indonesian nationalists as a small group of troublemakers. He argued that the Indonesian Republic had provoked the First Police Action by instigating attacks on Dutch troops and pro-Dutch Indonesians, and disrupting the delivery of basic commodities into Dutch-held territories. McDonald regarded the First Police Action as a relatively "clean" affair, claiming that Dutch fatalities during the entire campaign were lower than the death toll on a single day of rioting in many Indian cities during the Partition of India. McDonald conveniently

⁷⁶ During the 1940s, the title Minister was also used to denote the most senior-ranking diplomat in a mission. See Letter from A. F. H. van Troostenburg de Bruyn, Netherlands Minister, to Foss Shanahan, Acting Secretary of External Affairs, Netherlands Legation, 25 August 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington. For one example of anti-Communist Dutch government perspectives, see: P.S. Gerbrandy, *Indonesia* (London: Hutchinson & Company, 1951), 182-83.

⁷⁷ A. F. H. van Troostenburg de Bruyn, "The Crisis in Indonesia: Specially written for "Listener" readers by A.F.H. van Troostenburg de Bruyn, Netherlands Minister in Wellington," 22 August 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3.

⁷⁸ Lachie McDonald, *Bylines: Memoirs of a War Correspondent* (East Roseville, New South Wales: Kangaroo Press, 1998), Backcover, v-vi.

⁷⁹ McDonald, *Bylines: Memoirs of a War Correspondent*, 152.

ignored the significantly higher Indonesian military and civilian casualties sustained during that Police Action. He regarded an independent Indonesian state as economically unviable, citing the dearth of skilled Indonesian administrators, engineers, scientists, and doctors. Lachie McDonald's pro-Dutch sympathies reflected the fact that his interaction during his time in Indonesia was limited to members of the local Dutch community and two elite pro-Dutch individuals representing the Dutch-sponsored federal states: Hamid II, the Sultan of Pontianak and the President of West Borneo, and Tjokorde Gde Rak Soekawati, the President of East Indonesia. However, McDonald had virtually no contact with ordinary Indonesians, who could have provided an alternative view of the Indonesian independence struggle.⁸⁰ McDonald's pro-Dutch bias reflected the distorted nature of his interaction with local contacts during his time in Indonesia. Therefore, McDonald's brief account of the Indonesian Revolution can be regarded as a useful mirror into some contemporary Western perspectives of decolonisation rather than as an accurate insight into the events of the Indonesian Revolution. McDonald also captures the unease within some New Zealand quarters at the granting of self-rule to formerly colonized peoples following World War II.

Youth Response

Another group in New Zealand society who took an interest in the Indonesian Revolution was left-wing youth. This section examines the role played by New Zealand youths in the domestic debate around the Indonesian independence struggle. Within New Zealand, the younger generation tended to be more sympathetic to the Indonesian independence struggle than the adult generation, who were inclined either to "sit on the fence" or to defend the Dutch. While interest in the Indonesian Revolution was largely limited to a small minority of left-leaning and Communist students, it still reflected a growing interest in various international issues including decolonization and world peace among the younger generation. The first signs of youthful interest in the Indonesian Revolution manifested following the First Dutch Police Action against the Indonesian Republic in July 1947. On 30 July 1947 *The Press* newspaper published two letters on Indonesia by two pseudonymous students. The first letter likened the Indonesian Revolution to the Allied wartime struggle for freedom while the second drew a moral equivalence between Dutch efforts to suppress the Indonesian nationalists and the German wartime occupation of the Netherlands.⁸¹ Similarly, the left-wing New Zealand Federation of Young People's Clubs penned a letter to the Dutch diplomat, Dr Van Troostenburg de Bruyn,

⁸⁰ McDonald, *Bylines: Memoirs of a War Correspondent*, 145-156.

⁸¹ Student and Lincoln Student, Letters to the Editor, "Indonesia," *The Press*, 30 July 1947.

condemning the Dutch Government for disregarding the International Court of Justice and the United Nations.⁸²

One notable youth group that took an active stand on the Indonesian Revolution was the Victoria University College Socialist Club (VUCSC) in Wellington. The VUC Socialist Club was a political student club that attracted various left wing elements including Fabians, social democrats, pacifists, Christian Socialists, and members of both the Labour and Communist parties. While the Socialist Club claimed that it was not affiliated with any political party, the fact that it described itself as a “united front” reflected its Marxist orientation.⁸³ The Socialist Club’s most notable action during the Indonesian Revolution was to organise a public demonstration outside the Dutch Legation in Wellington on 30 July 1947.⁸⁴ The Wellington protest was preceded by a larger protest staged by Australian university students and waterside workers outside the Dutch Consulate in Sydney on 25 July 1947, which had degenerated into violence after Sydney police tried to forcibly evict the demonstrators from the consulate’s grounds.⁸⁵ The Socialist Club had mounted their “Indonesia Demonstration” protest after the Dutch Minister, van Troostenburg de Bruyn, had refused to meet a deputation of students concerning the First Police Action.⁸⁶ To publicize their planned Wellington protest, the Socialist Club also dispatched a telegram expressing support to the Indonesian Republic and circulated a pamphlet condemning the Dutch action.⁸⁷ The Socialist Club’s “Indonesia Demonstration” attracted between 200 and

⁸² “Young People Attack Dutch Aggression,” *People’s Voice*, 13 August 1947. The New Zealand Federation of Young Peoples’ Clubs (NZFYPC) was a federation of socialist youth clubs that included the Wellington Young Peoples’ Club. The Club’s founder Herbert Otto Roth later became national secretary of the NZFYPC. See Kerry Taylor, “Roth, Herbert Otto,” from the *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* 5 (2000), *Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand*, updated 28 January 2014, <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5r28/roth-herbert-otto>.

⁸³ L.B. Piper, “This is the Socialist Club,” Victoria University College Socialist Club, March 1950, Papers of Ronald and Carmen Smith, MS-Papers-11189-24, ATL, Wellington. The term “united front” was a Marxist terminology coined by the Communist theorist Leon Trotsky to describe a tactic where Communists would cooperate with non-Communists in various common struggles. See Joseph Choonara, “The united front,” *International Socialism*, issue 117, 18 December 2007: <http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=397&issue=117>.

⁸⁴ “Demonstration by Students – Sympathisers with Indonesia – Orderly Procession,” *The Press*, 31 July 1947.

⁸⁵ “Riot in Sydney Over Netherlands Acts In Indonesia,” *The Dominion*, 26 July 1947; “Students Criticise Police Methods,” *Otago Daily Times*, 30 July 1947.

⁸⁶ Letter from R.J. Smith, Socialist Club to A.F.H. van Troostenburg de Bruyn, the Dutch Minister in Wellington, 26 July 1947, PM 318/6/1 Part 3, ANZ, Wellington; Letter from A.F.H. van Troostenburg de Bruyn, the Dutch Minister in Wellington to R.J. Smith, 28 July 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

⁸⁷ “Students’ Views on Indonesia: Victoria College Cable Messages,” *The Press*, 30 July 1947; Anonymous, *Indonesia Calling: The Right of All Indonesians: “To Choose The Form of Government Under Which They Will Live (Atlantic Charter)”* (Wellington: Students of Victoria University College, 1947).

400 marchers, who were predominantly university students and Communist Party members.⁸⁸ One key participant in Wellington demonstration was Ron Smith, a CPNZ member who had become involved in the Socialist Club while studying at Victoria University College. Unlike the Sydney protest, the Socialist Club's Wellington protest was largely peaceful and orderly. However, the Police did attempt to stop the procession and confiscated two banners and several pamphlets from the participants.⁸⁹ The Police later tried to prosecute the organisers for disrupting traffic. This prosecution failed and the VUC Socialist Club's "Indonesia Demonstration" became a precedent for allowing future public demonstrations.

The VUCSC scored a second victory when a motion to disaffiliate the club from the Victoria University's Student Association (VUSA) was defeated by 134 to 110. The VUSA's leadership had wanted to censure the Socialist Club for its perceived insult towards the Dutch, New Zealand's wartime allies. The VUCSC's victory guaranteed the freedom of university students to organize public rallies.⁹⁰ The VUCSC received support from other like-minded left-wing clubs at Auckland University College, Canterbury University College, and the University of Otago, which later jointly established the New Zealand Student Labour Federation in 1948.⁹¹ In addition, the Socialist Club also established contact with Usman Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian Republic's representative in Australia, who became the Club's chief source of information on Indonesian developments. Unlike the Communist Party, the Socialist Club did not disavow support for the Indonesian nationalists after 1948.⁹²

⁸⁸ There are three conflicting accounts on the number of participants involved in the Socialist Club's Indonesia demonstration. A *Dominion* news article published in August 1947 claimed 200 demonstrators while a *Varsity Socialist* newsletter published in 1952 claimed 300 demonstrators. Meanwhile, Ron Smith's memoir *Working Class Son* has claimed there were 400 demonstrators. See "Students Criticised For Demonstration Begun at Memorial," *The Dominion*, 1 August 1947; C.B. "Traditions from the Past, Perspectives for the Future: Indonesia Merdeka was NZLF's Cradle Song," *The Varsity Socialist*, January 1952, 1; Ron Smith, *Working Class Son: My Fight Against Capitalism and War* (Wellington: Ron Smith, 1994), 73.

⁸⁹ "Demonstration by Students – Sympathisers with Indonesia – Orderly Procession," *The Press*, 31 July 1947; Smith, *Working Class Son*, 73-74.

⁹⁰ Smith, *Working Class Son*, 74-75.

⁹¹ C.B. "Traditions from the Past, Perspectives for the Future: Indonesia Merdeka was NZLF's Cradle Song," *The Varsity Socialist*, January 1952, 1.

⁹² C.B., "News from Indonesia: The Way of the People," *VUC Socialist Club Newsletter*, July 1948, Smith Family: Papers of Ronald and Carmen Smith, MS-Papers-11189-24, ATL, Wellington.



Figure 11: Ron Smith (front) leading the Socialist Club's protest against the first Dutch "police action" in July 1947. Photograph from Ron Smith, *Working Class Son*, 1994.

The VUC Socialist Club's "Indonesia Demonstration" sparked some public discussion in the New Zealand press of the Indonesian Revolution.⁹³ According to a *People's Voice* article published on 6 August 1947, Walter Nash, a senior government minister and former ambassador to the United States, had attempted to discourage the students from proceeding with their planned protest. When that failed, Nash instructed several Wellington newspapers, including the *Evening Post*, the *Dominion*, and the *Southern Cross*, to impose a media black-out on the VUCSC's protest preparations.⁹⁴ This reflected the Labour Government's neutral policy towards the Indonesian Revolution. While the Socialist Club's demonstration was lauded by the Communist *People's Voice*, the student demonstration was criticised by the New Zealand Returned Services Association (RSA). The RSA's secretary, S. J. Harrison, claimed the Socialist Club was disrespecting the memory of fallen New Zealand servicemen by choosing the Citizen's War Memorial as an assembly point for a "partisan" demonstration.⁹⁵ The Socialist Club's

⁹³ "Placards Seized - Students Demonstrate - War in Indonesia," *Evening Post*, 30 July 1947; "Demonstration By Students - Sympathizers With Indonesia - Orderly Procession," *The Press*, 31 July 1947; "Victoria College Students Demonstrate Against Dutch," *Otago Daily Times*, 1 August 1947.
⁹⁴ "Press 'Iron Curtain' on Student Demonstration," *People's Voice* IV, no. 48 (6 August 1947), 5.
⁹⁵ "Actions Criticised - Wellington Student Demonstrators," *New Zealand Herald*, 1 August 1947; "Students Criticised For Demonstration Begun At Memorial [sic]" *The Dominion*, 1 August 1947.

demonstration was also debated in the student press as shown in a series of articles published by *Critic*, Otago University's main student newspaper. A *Critic* editorial, "Student Demonstration" (7 August 1947), suggested that the Socialist Club's student demonstration was premature given the lack of balanced information on Indonesian developments.⁹⁶ An accompanying article, "East for the Asiatics" (7 August 1947), dismissed the Asian "wave of independence" as an irrational mob-driven hysteria and contended that Asian peoples were not yet ready for self-rule.⁹⁷ This article attracted a rebuttal editorial, "Economic and Political Independence" (18 August 1947), by another *Critic* editor named K.W.M, which attacked the article's author for ignoring the economic exploitation associated with colonialism. K.W.M. also defended the Socialist Club's student demonstration as a form of moral support to "show the people involved that you support them."⁹⁸

While the role played by New Zealand youth in the domestic debate around the Indonesian Revolution was peripheral, it demonstrated the growing appreciation of the "winds of change" among the emerging post-war generation. It also foreshadowed the active youthful element in various popular left-wing New Zealand causes during the second half of the 20th century and the early 21st century including nuclear disarmament, opposition to the Vietnam War and sporting contacts with South Africa, Mā ori land rights movement, gay rights activism, and more recently the Palestinian Solidarity and Occupy Wall Street movements.

Dutch Responses

Finally, one group whose views of the Indonesian Revolution we must take into account are Dutch New Zealanders. Most Dutch migrants who settled in New Zealand before and after the Indonesian Revolution supported their home country's effort to reassert control over Indonesia out of patriotism. The Netherlands East Indies was the Netherland's most valuable overseas possession since it provided a small Northern European country with greater international clout. While a small number of Dutch had settled in New Zealand during the 19th century, the first sizeable trickle of Dutch migration to New Zealand began in 1938 when the First Labour Government introduced a skilled migrant scheme targeting the Netherlands.⁹⁹ The Second World War further strengthened relations between New Zealand and the Netherlands;

⁹⁶ T.G.H., Editorial, "Student Demonstration," *Critic* XXIII, no. 9 (7 August 1947), 2.

⁹⁷ Anonymous, "East for the Asiatics," *Critic* XXIII, no. 9 (7 August 1947), 2.

⁹⁸ K.W.N., Editorial, "Economic and Political Independence," *Critic* XXIII, no. 10 (18 August 1947), 2.

⁹⁹ Hank Schouten, *Tasman's Legacy: The New Zealand-Dutch Connection* (Wellington: New Zealand-Netherlands Foundation, 1992), 31-45, 48-50.

the use of Dutch ships to transport wounded servicemen from Europe and North Africa, and Dutch resistance against the German occupation created a favourable view of the Dutch among New Zealanders.¹⁰⁰ Following World War II, the New Zealand Government also accommodated 2,000 liberated civilian internees and prisoners of war from the Netherlands East Indies for rest and recuperation at camps in Avondale (Auckland), Miramar (Wellington), Christchurch, and Dunedin.¹⁰¹ While many of these Dutch visitors later returned to the Netherlands and Indonesia, some later settled in New Zealand. Economic hardship, overcrowding, and poor job opportunities in the war-ravaged Netherlands, combined with the strain on resources created by the Indonesian Revolution, encouraged thousands of Dutch people during the late 1940s and 1950s to migrate to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa, countries that needed manpower to fuel their booming economies. Like Australia, New Zealand practised a discriminatory immigration policy which favoured British migrants and excluded Asians. However, with Britain unable to meet New Zealand's needs, the Government was forced to turn to other European sources particularly the Netherlands. Between 1945 and 1950, thousands of Dutch migrants would settle in New Zealand.¹⁰² They would be joined by a number of displaced Dutch residents from the former Netherlands East Indies, many of whom like former civilian internee, Gerarda Bossard, felt unwelcome in the new Indonesian Republic but were unhappy with poor economic prospects in the Netherlands.¹⁰³ Many Dutch migrants who settled in New Zealand regarded the country as a distant and exotic "promised land" where they could make a fresh start. Boyd Klap viewed New Zealand as a favourable destination due to its good climate, friendly people, and promising opportunities.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, Henk Storm described New Zealand as being "friendlier, greener and smaller than Australia."¹⁰⁵ These aforementioned Dutch migrants would eventually take up New Zealand citizenship, thus become Dutch New Zealanders.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ Schouten, *Tasman's Legacy*, 50-52.

¹⁰¹ Letter from Walter Nash, Acting Prime Minister and Acting Minister of External Affairs, to the Dutch Consul-General, 11 January 1946, Netherlands East Indies-Accommodation for Recuperating P.O.W. and Internees, NASH 229/0329, ANZ, Wellington; Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 13 November 1945, Netherlands East Indies-Accommodation for Recuperating P.O.W. and Internees, NASH 229/0329, ANZ, Wellington.

¹⁰² Schouten, *Tasman's Legacy*, 62-64, 47-57.

¹⁰³ Schouten, *Tasman's Legacy*, 52-55; Gerarda Bossard, *POW: One girl's experience in a Japanese P.O.W. camp* (Auckland: Hodder Moa Beckett Publishers, 1999), 201-203.

¹⁰⁴ Boyd Klap, *Between two countries: The time and life of Boudewijn Klap* (Wellington: Boyd Klap, 2007), 57.

¹⁰⁵ Henk and Janni Storm, interview by Tania Conelly, Tape 3, Side 1, DP 4/1-4, Dutch Oral History Project, Christchurch, 29 October-9 November, 1992.

¹⁰⁶ Bossard, *POW: One's girl's experience in a Japanese P.O.W. camp*, 202-203; Henk and Janni Storm, interview by Tania Conelly, 1992; Schouten, *Tasman's Legacy*, 110-112.

In response to criticism levelled at the Netherlands, many Dutch New Zealanders contended that the Netherlands had an exemplary track record as a colonial power in the Netherlands East Indies, citing the relative peace and stability of the Dutch colonial era. They resented the Japanese for invading the East Indies and fanning the flames of Indonesian nationalism. Many Dutch saw the Indonesian Republic as a Japanese-sponsored creation led by pro-Japanese collaborators. They also asserted that the Netherlands was not trying to re-impose colonialism on Indonesia but was instead preparing the Indonesians for self-rule by creating a federal United States of Indonesia.¹⁰⁷ Some like Bossard also criticised the British for encouraging the Indonesian Republic and delaying the return of the Dutch to their colony.¹⁰⁸ Jan Okkerse, a former Dutch prisoner-of-war who had been liberated from a Japanese prison camp, described the Wellington watersiders' ban on Dutch shipping as the "only sour note" during his stay in New Zealand. Okkerse also recalled that ordinary New Zealanders were generally hospitable and sympathetic towards the Dutch because they were aware of the violence and killings occurring in post-war Indonesia.¹⁰⁹ One unidentified Dutch resident living in Dunedin blamed the Socialist Club's demonstration in July 1947 on the news media not giving "both sides of the story." He also alleged that Sukarno was coercing foreign observers into giving favourable reports of the Indonesian case.¹¹⁰ Cor Fluit, Peter Meyer, and Boyd Klap, three former Dutch Army servicemen veterans who saw action during the Indonesian Revolution, attributed the Dutch decision to grant independence to Indonesia to the strong international pressure against the Dutch following the Second Police Action in December 1948.¹¹¹ The New Zealand Government's neutral and non-interventionist foreign policy towards the Indonesian dispute led some Dutch people like Cor Fluit to view New Zealand favourably over Australia, which had advocated on behalf of the Indonesian Republic in the United Nations.¹¹²

Apart from a few dissenters like the aforementioned journalist, Erik Schwimmer, the perspectives of most Dutch New Zealanders on the Indonesian Revolution overwhelmingly echoed the stance taken by the Dutch Government and its diplomatic representatives in New

¹⁰⁷ "The Other Side: Java Resident's Plea for Understanding," *Otago Daily Times*, 1 August 1947.

¹⁰⁸ Bossard, *POW: One's girl's experience in a Japanese P.O.W. camp*, 200-201.

¹⁰⁹ Schouten, *Tasman's Legacy*, 61-62.

¹¹⁰ "The Other Side: Java Resident's Plea for Understanding," *Otago Daily Times*, 1 August 1947.

¹¹¹ Cor Fluit, interview by Sean G. Brosnahan, tape recording, DP 2, Dutch Oral History Project, Dunedin, 1992; Peter Meyer, interview by Sean G. Brosnahan, tape recordings, M/P2 9/1, Side 2, Dutch Oral History Project, Dunedin, June 1993; Klap, *Between two countries*, 56-57.

¹¹² Cor Fluit interview, Dunedin Oral History Project, 1992.

Zealand.¹¹³ Paraphrasing Hank Schouten, the “loss of Indonesia” was a devastating emotional and psychological blow to the Netherlands which gave further impetus for many Dutch people to migrate in search of “greener pastures.”¹¹⁴ Thus, one of the long-term consequences of the Indonesian Revolution was to facilitate an exodus of Dutch people from the former Netherlands East Indies. While most would return to the Netherlands, some would settle in New Zealand, joining other Dutch migrants.

Conclusion

Despite New Zealand’s limited involvement in the Indonesian Revolution, the conflict still aroused some degree of disquiet within some elements of New Zealand society. Actions taken by certain groups, particularly the watersiders, the Federation of Labour, the Communist Party, and the Victoria University College Socialist Club, along with press coverage of Indonesian developments, helped raise the New Zealand public’s awareness of the Indonesian Revolution. By contrast unsurprisingly, Dutch migrants remained the staunchest critics of Indonesian independence. Despite its geographical remoteness, New Zealand was not unaffected by the “winds of change” that would sweep through Western colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific over the next twenty-five years. The end of the Indonesian Revolution also set the stage for New Zealand to begin the process of building diplomatic relations with the Indonesian Republic, a topic that will be addressed in the following chapter.

¹¹³ For further details, see Yong Mun Cheong, *H.J. Van Mook and Indonesian Independence*, 197-199; A.F.H. van Troostenburg de Bruyn, “The Crisis in Indonesia: Specially written for “Listener” readers by A.F.H. van Troostenburg de Bruyn, Netherlands Minister in Wellington,” 22 August 1947, PM 318/6/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

¹¹⁴ Schouten, *Tasman’s Legacy*, 62.

Chapter Three: Growing Interests and Divergences, 1950-1963

This chapter examines New Zealand's early engagement with the Republic of Indonesia between 1950 and 1963; the period between the Indonesian Revolution and the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, topics which are covered in the other four chapters. While the New Zealand Government formally recognised Indonesia after the official transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949, it did not establish a diplomatic mission in Jakarta until 1961. During that period, New Zealand and Indonesia travelled down separate foreign policy paths. While New Zealand valued its participation in Western collective security alliances, President Sukarno embarked on a non-aligned foreign policy which saw Indonesia drift closer towards the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). This chapter also discusses New Zealand's developmental assistance to Indonesia under the Colombo Plan. It also sheds light on a little-known aspect of the New Zealand-Indonesia relationship: the Volunteer Graduate Scheme (VGS), a voluntary technical assistance scheme which sent New Zealand university graduates to contribute to Indonesia's national development. These two projects helped build bridges between New Zealanders and Indonesians during the formative years of the bilateral relationship. While New Zealand's relations with Indonesia during this period were relatively harmonious and smooth, they were punctuated by differences over issues like the West New Guinea dispute and the 1957 Juanda Declaration. During this period, New Zealand experienced three different administrations: the Holland National Government (December 1949-December 1957), the Nash Labour Government (December 1957-December 1960), and the Holyoake/Marshall National Government (December 1960-December 1972). This chapter explores the main aspects and challenges in New Zealand's relationship with Sukarno's Indonesia following the Indonesian Revolution.

Early Diplomatic Contacts

While the New Zealand Government extended diplomatic recognition to Indonesia following Indonesian independence in December 1949, the Sidney Holland National Government was slow to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia. In mid-December 1949 South Africa recommended that all Commonwealth countries recognise newly independent Indonesia before the Colombo Conference in January 1950. On 22 December 1949 the New Zealand Government announced that it would recognise Indonesia following the transfer of

sovereignty on 27 December 1949.¹ New Zealand also received an invitation from Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta to attend the transfer of sovereignty ceremonies in Jakarta on 27 December. However, time constraints prevented New Zealand's attendance and Holland instead sent a good-will message to Hatta welcoming Indonesia into the international community.² New Zealand's absence caused some offence among the Indonesians. The Minister of External Affairs, Frederick W. Doidge, who had been ill, was unaware that Holland had received an invitation to attend the ceremonies and mistakenly told the press that New Zealand had not been invited.³ At the insistence of the Dutch Minister in Wellington, J. D. B. Pennink, the Secretary of External Affairs, A. D. McIntosh suggested that Doidge visit Jakarta during his return journey from the Colombo Conference in January 1950.⁴ Hatta welcomed the idea and Doidge's visit to Jakarta occurred on 21-23 January. During this visit, Doidge met Sukarno, Hatta, and two Indonesian Cabinet Ministers. Doidge's visit succeeded in mollifying the offence caused by New Zealand's absence and establishing direct political contacts with Indonesia's political leadership. On 24 January 1950 Hatta wrote a letter which acknowledged Jakarta's appreciation of New Zealand's recognition of Indonesia and praised New Zealand for securing Indonesia's associate membership of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). Holland's acknowledgement of Hatta's letter on 17 February 1950 completed the formalities of bilateral recognition.⁵

According to Aaron O'Brien, the question of New Zealand diplomatic representation in Indonesia first surfaced in late January 1950 when Hatta proposed that the two governments exchange diplomatic missions at legation level. Reflecting Indonesia's low position in New Zealand's foreign relations priorities, Doidge did not respond to Hatta's proposal until late March. Later, Doidge declined Hatta's proposal, citing the limited manpower and resources of

¹ Outward Telegram, No. 44, Minister of External Affairs, Wellington to Minister of External Affairs, Pretoria, PM 318/6/1, Part 10, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington; Michael Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," in *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 150.

² Message to the Prime Minister of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, from Hon. S. G. Holland, Prime Minister of New Zealand, 23 December 1949, PM 318/6/1, Part 10, ANZ, Wellington; Press Release, 28 December 1949, PM 318/6/1, Part 10, ANZ, Wellington.

³ Memorandum, "Inauguration of Indonesian Republic – Invitation to New Zealand Government," 4 January 1950, Prime Minister's Department, PM 318/6/1, Part 10, ANZ, Wellington; Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, 3 January 1950, New Zealand High Commissioner to Australia, PM 318/6/1, Part 10, ANZ, Wellington.

⁴ Letter from A. D. McIntosh to Mr J. B. D. Pennink, 30 December 1959, PM 318/6/1, Part 10, ANZ, Wellington.

⁵ Aaron O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia 1945-1962: A clear though indirect interest," MA Thesis, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, 1994, 57-58; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 150-151.

the Department of External Affairs (NZDEA).⁶ While the New Zealand Government increasingly took an interest in Southeast Asia during the 1950s, the historian W. David McIntyre has argued that New Zealand's interests were limited to the British presence in Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo Territories (Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo). New Zealand's interests in Southeast Asia dated back to Britain's Singapore naval base strategy during the 1930s and its participation in the Allied defence of Malaya and Singapore during World War II.⁷ According to the diplomat James Kember, Singapore's strategic importance as a listening post and a major British military base led the New Zealand Government to open its first Asian diplomatic mission, the New Zealand High Commission for Southeast Asia, in Singapore in 1955. By contrast, the New Zealand Government did not establish a diplomatic outpost in Jakarta until 1961 due to Indonesia's lesser strategic importance to New Zealand.⁸

Until 1961 New Zealand's diplomatic and consular interests in Indonesia were represented by the British Embassy in Jakarta. While the Government had established a Colombo Plan office in Jakarta in 1957, its activities were limited to supporting New Zealand Colombo Plan experts in Indonesia and recruiting Indonesian students to study in New Zealand. Because of its limited mandate, the Colombo Plan office did not deal with political and economic queries, which were instead referred to the British Embassy in Jakarta. This reinforced the perception among Indonesian officials that New Zealand was a close ally of the United Kingdom. Due to the West New Guinea dispute and Indonesia's growing strategic importance in the Cold War, NZDEA policymakers supported broadening contacts with Jakarta in order to influence Indonesian policy towards a pro-Western direction. Accordingly, New Zealand upgraded the Colombo Plan office to the status of a Consulate-General on 7 April 1961. Duncan Rae, the former National MP for Eden and the head of the Auckland Teacher's Training College, served as New Zealand's first Consul General to Indonesia. Then, in January 1963, the Consulate General was upgraded to the status of Legation with Rae designated as its *Chargé d'affaires*. In return, Jakarta accredited the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra to New Zealand in 1958. The first Minister of Indonesia for New Zealand was Dr. A. Yahya Helmi, who also served

⁶ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 58-59.

⁷ W. David McIntyre, *Britain, New Zealand and the Security of South-East Asia in the 1970s* (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1969), 25-26; W. David McIntyre, "New Zealand and the Singapore Base between the Wars," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 2, No. 1 (March 1971), 2-21.

⁸ James Kember, "New Zealand Diplomatic Representation in Southeast Asia: The 1950s and 1960s," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 11, 1 (June 2009), 387-393; "New Zealand's International Activities," *External Affairs Review* X, no.1 (January 1960): 11.

as the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia.⁹ In addition, Indonesian interests in New Zealand were handled by an Honorary Consul in Auckland.¹⁰



Figure 13: Frederick Doidge, the Minister of External Affairs (1949-1951). Credits: Alexander Turnbull Library




Figure 14: Duncan Rae, the first New Zealand Head of Mission in Indonesia (1961-1964). Credits: Alexander Turnbull Library



Figure 12: Leslie Munro, New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1952-58). Credits: Alexander Turnbull Library

⁹ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 153, 158-159; James Kember, "New Zealand Diplomatic Representation in Southeast Asia," 397-99.

¹⁰ Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, *Indonesia-New Zealand: 50 years of diplomatic relations* (Wellington: Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 2009), 9-10.

Divergent Paths

Between 1950 and 1963 New Zealand and Indonesia embarked on divergent foreign policy paths. While successive National and Labour Governments kept New Zealand firmly within the Western camp, Indonesia under the leadership of President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammed Hatta pursued an “independent and active” foreign policy based on non-alignment and anti-colonialism. However, a domestic political left-ward drift led Indonesia to gravitate towards the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).¹¹ These divergent foreign policy paths reflected the differing colonial experiences of New Zealand and Indonesia, two former colonies which had gained complete self-rule in the aftermath of World War II.¹² While Indonesia was a former “exploitation colony” where a small Dutch colonial elite had lorded over millions of Indonesians, New Zealand was a former British “settlement colony” where the descendants of Anglo-Celtic colonists had subjugated the indigenous Mā ori and built a British offshoot in the South Pacific.¹³ The newly independent Indonesian Republic’s strong anti-colonial fervour contrasted with Wellington’s evolutionary approach to self-government; which reflected New Zealand’s status as a colonial power that administrated several island trust territories in the South Pacific: the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Western Samoa.¹⁴ In 1953 the Minister of External Affairs, Clifton Webb, defined the four key elements of New Zealand’s foreign policy in an article in the NZDEA’s in-house journal, *External Affairs Review*, as support for the United Nations; cooperation with the Commonwealth; maintaining close ties with Europe; and encouraging peaceful political evolution in the “awakening Asian countries.”¹⁵ This statement reflected the New Zealand Government’s close cooperation with Britain, the United States, and other Western democracies, adherence to the United Nations, and growing engagement with Southeast Asia.

¹¹ Bob Catley and Vinsensio Dugis, *Australian Indonesian Relations Since 1945: The Garuda and The Kangaroo* (Aldershot, England, Ashgate, 1998), 22; Audrey Kahin and George Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 40-41.

¹² New Zealand legally gained independence through the Statute of Westminster in November 1947, which gave it complete control of its internal affairs and external affairs. See Keith Sinclair, *Towards Independence: International Relations: New Zealand in the World since 1945* (Auckland: Heinemann Education Books, 1976), 12.

¹³ Robert Consedine and Joanna Consedine, *Healing our History: The Challenge of the Treaty of Waitangi*, updated edition (North Shore, Auckland: Penguin Books, 2005), 78-102, 132-150; Margaret Kohn, “Colonialism,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/colonialism/>.

¹⁴ John Scott, “Getting Off the Colonial Hook,” in *New Zealand in World Affairs Volume II, 1957-1972*, ed. Malcolm McKinnon (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1991), 122-144; Sinclair, *Towards Independence: International Relations*, 12-15.

¹⁵ Clifton Webb, “New Zealand Foreign Policy,” *External Affairs Review* IV, no. 5 (May 1954): 19-22.

Following World War II New Zealand's close alignment with Britain, Australia, and the United States drew it into several Cold War "hot conflicts" and Western security agreements and alliances. Between 1950 and 1963 New Zealand sent troops and resources to the Berlin Airlift, the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency, and later the Vietnam War. New Zealand also joined several Western security agreements including the 1944 Canberra Pact, the 1949 ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaya) agreements, the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) security treaty, SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organisation), and the secretive UK-USA/Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network.¹⁶ Post-war New Zealand foreign policy thinking was shaped by New Zealand's traditional political and economic ties with the United Kingdom and American Cold War security considerations. Like their Western counterparts, New Zealand policy-makers viewed international Communism as a threat to Western democracies and free markets. The "fall" of China to the Communists in 1949 fuelled fears among New Zealand policy-makers of a Communist "domino effect" sweeping through the Far East into Australasia. This fear led Prime Minister Sidney Holland to send New Zealand troops to support British counter-insurgency efforts in Malaya in 1955. Holland's justified this military intervention by presenting Malaya as the last place where New Zealand could help Britain "draw the line" against Communist expansion.¹⁷ New Zealand's close ties to Britain and its Cold War alignment accentuated the divergent foreign policies of Wellington and Jakarta during the immediate post-war period. During the Suez Crisis in 1956, New Zealand was one of the few international defenders of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. By contrast, Indonesia, along with most of the Afro-Asian bloc, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada, sided with Nasser's Egypt and condemned the Anglo-French invasion in the United Nations.¹⁸

In contrast to New Zealand's alignment with the Western powers, Indonesia refused to align itself with the two superpower blocs. While New Zealand and other Western Governments shunned Communist China, Indonesia was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic

¹⁶ David W. McIntyre, "The Future of the New Zealand System of Alliances," *Landfall* 84 (December 1967), 328-339; On this network, see Nicky Hager, *Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network* (Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing, 1996), 57-73.

¹⁷ Sidney Holland, "Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Broadcast by Prime Minister," 18 January 1955, *External Affairs Review* V, nos. 1 and 2 (January and February 1955): 2-4; McIntyre, *Britain, New Zealand and the Security of South-East Asia*, 25-26.

¹⁸ McIntyre, "The Future of the New Zealand System of Alliances," 332; Malcolm Templeton, *Ties of Blood & Empire: New Zealand's Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis 1947-57* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1994), 71, 146, 174.

relations with the PRC on 14 August 1950.¹⁹ Indonesian commitment to non-alignment led it to view the American-sponsored SEATO as a means of corralling newly-independent Asian countries into a Western military alliance.²⁰ Instead, Indonesia played a leading role in hosting the Bandung Asia-African Conference in April 1955; where Sukarno expounded his view that the world was divided into three camps: the two superpower blocs and a third non-aligned Afro-Asian bloc.²¹ Like Wellington, Jakarta took an interest in the United Nations, viewing the international organization as a forum for resolving conflict between the two superpower blocs and advancing its own national interests.²² The American Eisenhower Administration's antipathy towards Sukarno's non-alignment foreign policy and concerns about the electoral success of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*; PKI) led it to covertly sponsor two regional anti-Communist uprisings in Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi: the *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI; Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) and the *Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam* (*Permesta*; Universal Struggle Charter). However, this covert intervention backfired after an American pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, who was flying for the Permesta air force, was captured. In the wake of Indonesian outrage, Washington ended its support for the rebels and adopted a more accommodating policy towards Jakarta. The fallout from the PRRI-Permesta rebellions induced a left-ward shift in both Indonesian foreign policy and domestic politics.²³ In contrast to its fellow allies, New Zealand opposed covert intervention in Indonesian affairs. During the SEATO Council of Ministers meeting on 12 March 1958 Nash stressed that the PRRI-Permesta rebellion was a domestic matter. Even Leslie Munro, the New Zealand Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, who was no friend of Jakarta, thought that the PRRI-Permesta rebels had a poor chance of success. Despite its disagreements with Jakarta over West New Guinea, Wellington was unwilling to follow its closest allies in pursuing what O'Brien has described as a "foolhardy and even dangerous approach to events in Indonesia."²⁴ While External Affairs officials and diplomats did receive correspondence from the PRRI's overseas

¹⁹ Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Trouble Relationship* (London: Routledge, 1999), 20-38; Annie-Marie Brady, "The War That Never Was: New Zealand-China Relations in the Cold War," in *Lenin's Legacy Down Under: New Zealand's Cold War* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2004), 131-151.

²⁰ Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945-1965* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), 187-188.

²¹ Jamie Mackie, *Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity* (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005), 63-69, 115-116.

²² Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy*, 16, 180.

²³ Audrey and George Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 16-19, 50-51, 75-98; 179-84, 217-21; "Indonesia," Extract from N.Z. Brief for 15th Session of ECAFE, 9 March 1959, PM 318/6/1, Part 22, ANZ, Wellington, 1-3.

²⁴ See Brief for the Prime Minister, Visit of Dr Subandrio, 12 February 1959, PM 318/6/1, Part 22, ANZ, Wellington, 1-2; O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 2-3, 132-144.

representatives, the New Zealand did not reply it; showing that it recognised Jakarta's sovereignty over Indonesia.²⁵

Indonesia's left-ward political and foreign policy drift also coincided with a trend towards political centralization in Java vis-à-vis the Outer Islands. By December 1956 clashes between Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta had led the latter to resign as Vice-President. While Sukarno favoured a centralised unitary state, Hatta preferred a decentralized, quasi-federal state.²⁶ In addition, Indonesia underwent a political transition from parliamentary rule to a semi-authoritarian system known as "Guided Democracy". Following a series of unstable parliamentary governments, Sukarno formally abandoned parliamentary democracy in favour of Guided Democracy in 1959. Under Guided Democracy, Indonesia reverted to the 1945 Constitution which gave greater power to President Sukarno. In addition, the various nationalist, Communist, and religious political parties were corralled together under Sukarno's overarching leadership through a new political framework called NASAKOM (*Nationalis-Agama-Komunis*; Nationalism, Religion, Communism). NASAKOM envisaged these forces working together to advance Indonesian nation-building.²⁷ According to the Australian political scientist Herbert Feith, this shift towards semi-authoritarianism was marked by a clash between "pragmatists" like Hatta, who wanted to tackle Indonesia's developmental problems and "solidarity makers" like Sukarno, who promoted "revolutionary struggle" and foreign adventures instead of tackling the aforementioned problems. The triumph of the solidarity makers was regarded as a setback for Indonesian democracy by some Western academics and foreign policy analysts, and pro-Western Indonesians like the former Foreign Minister Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung; who saw Guided Democracy as a pretext for Sukarno's "personal rule."²⁸ Feith's pessimistic analysis on Indonesian domestic politics was challenged by Harry Benda, a Yale University historian and former New Zealand resident. Benda argued that Indonesia's period of parliamentary democracy

²⁵ Letter from Dr S.M. Rasjid, PRRI Ambassador to Mr J. Shepherd, Wellington, 29 October 1959, PM 318/6/1, Part 22, ANZ, Wellington; *PRRI Informations* [sic], issues 1-8, March-November 1959; *The Birth of New Indonesia (Six Months PRRI) – Commemoration Monograph Genesis and Development of the Revolution Government of the Republic of Indonesia*, PRRI Mission in Europe, circa 1959, PM 318/6/1, Part 22, ANZ, Wellington.

²⁶ Audrey and George Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 38-43; 54-74; Mohammad Hatta, "What is Required at Present," article attached to Despatch, no. 168, Canadian Embassy, Djakarta to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 22 March 1957, Canadian foreign source document, PM 318/6/1, Part 14, ANZ, Wellington.

²⁷ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 96-97;

²⁸ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), 32-45, 572-608; "Indonesia: Constitutional and Political Changes," Canadian Embassy foreign source document, New Zealand High Commissioner, Ottawa to the Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 27 February 1959, PM 318/6/1, Part 22, ANZ, Wellington Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy*, 248-81.

during the 1950s was a brief departure from its historical tradition of authoritarian rule, stretching from the Hindu and Islamic monarchies to the Dutch colonial period. Therefore, Guided Democracy marked a return to the dominant authoritarian tradition of Indonesian history.²⁹

New Zealand's traditional political, military, and economic linkages with the United Kingdom also affected its relationship with Indonesia. During the 1950s and 1960s, New Zealand had an export-based agricultural economy and more than 90 percent of its exports consisted of wool, meat, and dairy products. Following the introduction of refrigeration in the 1890s Britain became New Zealand's biggest market for its agricultural exports.³⁰ New Zealand's trading connections with Britain were further strengthened by the 1932 Ottawa Conference which introduced protectionist policies that favoured Commonwealth producers over foreign producers.³¹ During World War II, the New Zealand economy prospered from exporting food commodities at favourable prices to Britain and the South Pacific. By the early 1950s two-thirds of New Zealand's exports went to Britain. The New Zealand economy entered a boom period during the Korean War due to a high demand for wool. New Zealand also belonged to the 'Sterling area', a group of countries that settled most of their overseas debts and transactions through London. Due to declining British demand for New Zealand's milk and cheese exports, New Zealand began diversifying its economy by selling meat to the American and Japanese markets, and expanding its manufacturing base. As Britain sought to join the European Economic Community (EEC) during the early 1960s, New Zealand began developing closer trade relations with neighbouring Australia and Asia.³² Due to its dependence on overseas trade, the New Zealand Government took offense at Indonesia's efforts to restrict international shipping through its maritime waters in 1958. Under the Juanda Declaration of 13 December 1957 the Indonesian Government unilaterally imposed a 12-mile territorial water limit around Indonesia; provoking angry protests from several Western governments and Japan which viewed it as a major encroachment on the freedom of passage in international waters.³³ On 8 January

²⁹ Harry Benda, "Democracy in Indonesia," Review of *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Herbert Feith, *The Journal of Asian Studies* 23, no. 3 (May 1964), 449-456.

³⁰ Gary Hawke, "Economic Trends and Economic Policy, 1938-1992," in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, second edition, ed. W.R. Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 412-413.

³¹ Geoffrey Bertram, "The New Zealand Economy, 1900-2000," in *The New Oxford History of New Zealand*, ed. Giselle Byrnes (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2009), 537-538.

³² Hawke, "Economic Trends and Economic Policy," 413-417.

³³ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 120-121; John G. Butcher, "Becoming an Archipelagic State: The Juanda Declaration of 1957 and the 'Struggle' to Gain International Recognition of the Archipelagic Principle," in *Indonesia beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State*, ed. Robert Cribb and Michelle Ford (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 28-47.

1958 Wellington issued a protest to the Indonesian Government through the British Embassy in Jakarta, which was followed by an official press statement by Prime Minister Walter Nash on 21 January 1958. This minor spat foreshadowed further New Zealand-Indonesian tensions during the 1960s.³⁴

By 1963 President Sukarno and his PKI allies had fallen out with the Soviets and had turned to China as Indonesia's main ally. Jakarta's relations with Moscow had deteriorated due to the Indonesian Government's acceptance of American mediation in the West New Guinea dispute and Jakarta's delays in repaying debt instalments incurred during the campaign to Moscow. The Soviet Communists also took offense at the decision of the PKI leader, Dipa Nusantara Aidit, to side with Beijing in the Sino-Soviet Split. Like the Chinese Communist Party, the PKI rejected the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's policies of de-Stalinization and "peaceful co-existence" with the West.³⁵ Jakarta's growing ties with Communist China during the early half of the 1960s was accompanied by a progressive deterioration in Indonesia's relations with Western governments including Australia and New Zealand. Reflecting Indonesia's growing rapprochement with Beijing, Sukarno revised his worldview to the more radical New Emerging Forces doctrine, which perceived the international system as two rival camps: the New Emerging Forces (NEFO), consisting of radical Afro-Asian countries like Indonesia and China; and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO), consisting of the Western imperialist powers and "reactionaries" like the Soviet Union. Sukarno's New Emerging Forces doctrine later formed the ideological basis for his *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation) against Malaysia.³⁶ The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation complicated relations between Wellington and Jakarta and will be discussed in the next chapter.

³⁴ "Indonesian territorial waters," Statement by the Prime Minister, 20 January 1958, *External Affairs Review* VIII, no. 1 (January 1958): 21-22.

³⁵ Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited*, 135-45; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy*, 419-424; In a similar development, the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) under the leadership of its Secretary-General Victor G. Wilcox and, following much internal debate and purging, switched its allegiance to Beijing in 1963. Pro-Soviet dissidents subsequently established the Socialist Unity Party (SUP). See Ron Smith, *Working Class Son: My Fight Against Capitalism and War* (Wellington: Ron Smith, 1994), 122-138; Victor G. Wilcox, "NZ Communist leader speaks in China, hits world headlines," *People's Voice* XXI, no. 10 (25 March 1964), 8.

³⁶ Jamie Mackie, *Bandung 1955*, 115-117; J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, 2003 reprint (1972; Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2003), 386-388.

The Colombo Plan

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations, one of the most important points of contact between Wellington and Jakarta was the Colombo Plan. According to O'Brien, the Colombo Plan and the United Nations formed the two main "points of contact" between the New Zealand and Indonesian Governments in the period following World War II, as discussed in the sections below.³⁷ The Colombo Plan was an economic development plan which had been established by Commonwealth foreign ministers to promote social and economic development in the South and Southeast Asian regions during a meeting in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in January 1950. Its main aims were to eradicate poverty, disease, and illiteracy within those regions and to promote friendly relations between Western and Third World countries.³⁸ According to Aaron O'Brien and Bryce Harland, the Colombo Plan was also intended to combat the spread of Communism in Asian countries by promoting economic and political stability.³⁹ Besides New Zealand, other key members of the Colombo Plan included India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the United Kingdom and its Southeast Asian territories, Australia, and Canada.⁴⁰ New Zealand aid to Indonesia under the Colombo Plan can be divided into two components: capital and technical assistance. Capital assistance was meant to help develop the infrastructure necessary to aid Indonesia's economy and social development. Meanwhile, technical assistance was intended to facilitate the transfer of skills and knowledge from New Zealand to Indonesia. Under a Technical Cooperation Scheme (TCS) established in mid-1951 New Zealand allowed students from Colombo Plan countries to study at local tertiary institutions, and also sent New Zealand experts to work in development projects within those countries.⁴¹

After Indonesia joined the Colombo Plan in 1953 the Sidney Holland National Government quickly extended its Colombo Plan aid programme to Indonesia. New Zealand also assisted several United Nations development programmes operating in Indonesia including the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAAs), the World Health Organisation

³⁷ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 62.

³⁸ "Colombo Plan," Statement by Minister of External Affairs, 2 July 1951, *External Affairs Review* I, no. 5 (August 1951), 2-3

³⁹ New Zealand Official Development Assistance (NZODA), ed., *The Colombo Plan at 50: A New Zealand Perspective: 50th Anniversary of the Colombo Plan 1951-2001* (Wellington: New Zealand Official Development Assistance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), 8-12; Aaron O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 62.

⁴⁰ "Colombo Plan Progress Report," *External Affairs Review* II, no. 5 (May 1952), 17.

⁴¹ Memorandum, "The Colombo Plan Participation of New Zealand," NASH1 94/0266-0377, ANZ, Wellington, 2; "Colombo Plan," Statement by Minister of External Affairs, 2 July 1951, *External Affairs Review* I, no. 5 (August 1951), 3; "100th Colombo Plan Trainee," Statement by Minister of External Affairs, 28 January 1953, *External Affairs Review* III, no. 1 (January 1953), 6-7.

(WHO), and the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).⁴² During the Holland premiership, the New Zealand Government funded several capital assistance projects including a trade school in Malang, an asbestos cement factory in Jakarta, and the agricultural faculty at the University of North Sumatra in Medan. Under the TCS scheme, New Zealand sent technical experts and teachers to Indonesia and accepted several Indonesian students. In 1953 an Indonesian dental mission visited New Zealand and this precipitated the reorganisation of the Indonesian School Dental Service along New Zealand lines. Following a visit to Indonesia by the New Zealand Director of Dental Health in 1957, short-term courses in New Zealand were established for Indonesian dental nurses and dentists teaching at the Jakarta School for Dental Nurses. These dental study visits between the two countries continued until 1970. Indonesian efforts to expand English-language instruction in Indonesian schools precipitated a demand for qualified English-language teachers. Following a visit by the Secretary-General of the Indonesian Secretary of Education, M. Hutasoit, in March 1956, the New Zealand Government, at the recommendation of Clarence Edward Beeby, the Director of the New Zealand Council of Education Research (NZCER), instituted a programme to send New Zealand teachers, recruited through the Department of Education, to different parts of Indonesia to improve the quality of English-language instruction at local teaching colleges. The first groups arrived in 1957 and there were ten New Zealand teachers in Java and Sumatra by 1960. By April 1956 New Zealand had sent nine technical experts to Indonesia and had also received 41 Indonesian Colombo Plan students in 1957.⁴³ While New Zealand's technical assistance scheme was moderately successful, the capital assistance scheme failed due to a dearth of technical expertise in Indonesia and the Indonesian government's inability to guarantee counterpart funds to ensure its continued operation.⁴⁴

The Holland National Government's Colombo Plan aid programme was continued by the Walter Nash Labour Government, which assumed power in November 1957. Prime Minister Walter Nash, who also served concurrently as the Minister of External Affairs, had a strong interest in the Colombo Plan as well as aid and economic development.⁴⁵ Because of the unfruitful yields of the Colombo Plan's capital assistance programme and a concurrent economic

⁴² Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 151-152; "Indonesia," Briefing paper for Karachi Meeting 1952, PM 318/6/1, Part 12, ANZ, Wellington, 6; "United Nations Technical Assistance Programmes," *External Affairs Review* IV, no. 5, May 1954, 26-27.

⁴³ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 151-152; "Colombo Plan, English Language Teachers for Indonesia," Statement by Minister of External Affairs, 3 October 1956, *External Affairs Review* VI, no. 10 (October 1956), 11-12.

⁴⁴ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 158.

⁴⁵ Keith Sinclair, *Walter Nash* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1976), 326.

crisis in 1958 the Nash Labour Government reoriented its Colombo Plan assistance programme in Indonesia towards education and technical assistance. To accommodate the increased number of foreign tertiary students, the Government expanded the number of special training facilities and residential accommodation in New Zealand. This economic crisis was the result of a sudden drop in the prices of New Zealand's wool, meat, and dairy exports which had been caused by British attempts to join the EEC; a development which would have deprived New Zealand of a valuable market for its products. This economic crisis forced the Nash Government to devalue New Zealand's currency.⁴⁶ The Nash premiership also saw two high-level visits between New Zealand and Indonesia. In February 1959 the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, visited Wellington and met Prime Minister Nash and other New Zealand Government officials. This was the first formal visit by a senior Indonesian government official to New Zealand. While the West New Guinea dispute was the main subject of the Nash-Subandrio talks, a joint communique issued after the talks emphasised the Colombo Plan's role in promoting bilateral cooperation between the two countries.⁴⁷ In November 1959 Prime Minister Nash led the New Zealand delegation to the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee meeting in Yogyakarta, Java. This marked the first formal visit by a New Zealand head of government to Indonesia. The main purpose of this visit was to review the progress of New Zealand's Colombo Plan assistance to Indonesia and to plan future projects. Following the conference, Nash also stayed in Indonesia as a state guest for five days and met President Sukarno and other leading Indonesian Ministers.⁴⁸

During the 1960s the new Keith Holyoake National Government continued its Labour predecessor's emphasis on educational and technical Colombo Plan assistance to Indonesia. According to the political scientist Stephen Hoadley, the new Government abandoned the previous policy of giving foreign aid through multilateral agencies with few strings attached. Under the Holyoake Government's new aid policy, the Colombo Plan, like other aid programmes, was linked to New Zealand's growing military commitments, and strategic and economic interests in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Aid money was also distributed to New Zealand technical experts and foreign students residing in New Zealand. In addition, the Holyoake Government also abandoned the previous Nash Government's short-lived

⁴⁶ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 152-153; J. Stephen Hoadley, "Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy: An Interpretation of New Zealand-Indonesian Relations," in *New Zealand Politics: A Reader*, ed. Stephen Levine (Melbourne: Cheshire Publishing, 1975), 441.

⁴⁷ "Visit of the Foreign Minister of Indonesia," *External Affairs Review* IX, no. 2 (February 1959), 11; O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 153-154.

⁴⁸ "Prime Minister's Overseas Tour," *External Affairs Review* IX, no. 11 (November 1959), 22-25; A.D. McIntosh, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, "Colombo Plan: Indonesia Asbestos Cement Factory Djakarta," 16 February 1960, Colombo Plan – Indonesia, T 61/3/8/2/4, ANZ, Wellington.

industrialisation programme in favour of diversifying New Zealand's overseas markets by expanding trade with Asia. To achieve these goals, the Holyoake administration created a new Cabinet portfolio for Overseas Trade and provided tax concessions and other incentives to New Zealand exporters. It also expanded New Zealand's diplomatic and trade representation abroad, particularly in Asia, and dispatched trade missions and delegations to explore potential markets in East and Southeast Asia. As mentioned above, these efforts culminated in the establishment of a legation in Jakarta by 1963.⁴⁹ Because of the low standard of English fluency among many Colombo Plan students, the Holyoake Government also established an English Language Institute (ELI) at Victoria University of Wellington in 1961. Many Indonesian teaching students would subsequently take up courses at the ELI. This development led to the phasing out of the English-language teaching project in Indonesia in favour of training English-language teachers in New Zealand. In 1962 the Indonesian Ministry of Education discontinued English-language training at teachers' colleges and introduced university level programmes. Since the New Zealand Government was unable to supply enough qualified experts, the Colombo Plan's English-language project in Indonesia was formally terminated on 26 September 1963. While the Holyoake Government continued sending Colombo Plan assistance to Indonesia the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation (1963-1966) saw a decline in New Zealand's foreign aid, as discussed in the next chapter.⁵⁰

Despite these challenges, the Colombo Plan succeeded in building bridges between Indonesians and New Zealanders, particularly among health and education professionals and students. Geraldine and Gordon McDonald, two New Zealand teachers based at Medan in North Sumatra from 1960 to 1963, became proficient in the Indonesian language and made many Indonesian contacts. Gordon worked as a lecturer in an upgrading course for English-language secondary school teachers, which was funded by the British Council and New Zealand Government. He later headed the English language department at the University of North Sumatra in Medan. For many New Zealand expatriates like the Gordon family, their stay in Indonesia marked their first exposure to a foreign culture, language and environment.

⁴⁹ Hoadley, "Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy," 439-442; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 158, 167-168.

⁵⁰ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 152, 157-158; "N.Z. Ends Teaching Scheme in Indonesia," *Otago Daily Times*, 27 September 1963.



Figure 15: A photograph of the New Zealand English teacher Geraldine McDonald in Balinese costume. Credits: *The Colombo Plan at 50*, 2001.



Figure 16: Indonesian secondary school teachers attending a conversation course run by the New Zealand teachers Geraldine and Gordon McDonald in Medan, Sumatra. Credits: *The Colombo Plan at 50*, 2001

One notable Indonesian Colombo Plan graduate was Dr. J. Soedjati Djiwandono, a prominent Indonesian political scientist who helped to establish Indonesia's leading think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta. Djiwandono was one of the first Indonesian students to enrol at the ELI in March 1961 and later pursued a BA in Political Science and Russian at the University of Otago in Dunedin. Djiwandono went on to complete a MSC and PhD in international relations at the London School of Economics. As an academic and political columnist for *The Jakarta Post*, Indonesia's leading English newspaper, Djiwandono was a vocal advocate for democracy and religious freedom in Indonesia until his death on 9 January 2013.⁵¹ One of his most notable works was *Konfrontasi Revisited*, a study of the influence of Indonesian-Soviet relations on Indonesia's "Confrontation" policies against Dutch New Guinea and Malaysia.⁵² During the 1960s the Indonesian language was introduced to two New Zealand universities, including the University of Auckland, and a few secondary schools.⁵³




Figure 17: Colombo Plan student J. Soedjati Djiwandono.
Credits: *The Jakarta Post*, 2013

⁵¹ NZODA, *The Colombo Plan at 50*, 24, 18-19; Imam Mahditama and Ati Nurbaiti, "In Memoriam: 'Pak' Soedjati: A beacon of light on dark truths," *Jakarta Post*, 11 January 2013, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/01/11/in-memoriam-pak-soedjati-a-beacon-light-dark-truths.html>.

⁵² J. Soedjati Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996).

⁵³ Nicholas Tarling, "Indonesian studies in New Zealand," *Asian Studies Review* 14, issue 1 (1990), 94-96; Carl Walrond, "Indonesians – Population," *Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand*, 13 July 2012, <http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/indonesians/page-1>.

The Volunteer Graduate Scheme

While the New Zealand Government's aid development initiatives have been well-documented, little attention has been given to the role of non-government organisations and private individuals in building ties with Indonesia. One little-known aspect of New Zealand's relationship with Indonesia is the Volunteer Graduate Scheme (VGS), a volunteer work scheme which sent New Zealand university graduates to assist Indonesia's national development between 1959 and 1963. According to former Volunteer Graduate Laurie Wesley, the VGS was unique because it "entrusted volunteers into the care of the Indonesian Government." Under the scheme, Volunteer Graduates were employed by the Indonesian Government for a period of two years. They lived and worked under the same conditions of their Indonesian hosts and assisted their host country by transferring their skills and knowledge to the locals.⁵⁴ Volunteer Graduates also befriended their Indonesian hosts and learnt about the Indonesian language, customs, and culture; thus helping to promote better relations and understanding between the two countries. The New Zealand VGS traces its origins to the Volunteer Graduate Association (VGA), an Australian volunteer assistance programme which operated in Indonesia between 1951 and 1963. Following the Indonesian Revolution, the newly independent Indonesian state faced a high rate of illiteracy and a severe shortage of vital skilled professions including doctors, teachers, and engineers. The Australian VGA scheme sent Australian graduates to contribute to Indonesia's national development while exposing them to Indonesia's culture and society. The scheme was relatively successful and by 1963 41 Australians had volunteered in Indonesia.⁵⁵ One notable Australian Volunteer Graduate was Herbert Feith, who later became a political scientist specialising in Indonesia.⁵⁶

By 1953, Maurice O'Brien, the President of the New Zealand University Students Association (NZUSA), and Pat Morrison, the Secretary-Organizer of the Leadership Committee of the Student Christian Movement (SCM), had heard about the Australian scheme and decided to establish a New Zealand version of it. In 1954 both the NZUSA and the SCM passed

⁵⁴ Laurie Wesley, ed., *Celebrating the New Zealand University Students Association's Volunteer Graduate Scheme for Indonesia* (Auckland: Laurie Wesley, 2013), Editor's Note, 9-14; Laurie Wesley, interview by the author, June 2014, email interview.

⁵⁵ "Jobs in Indonesia," *Student*, September 1956, New Zealand Student Christian Movement (NZSCM) Papers, MS-Papers-1617-562, Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL), Wellington; "What is a PEGAWAI?" n.d., Volunteer Graduate Association for Indonesia, Union House, University of Melbourne, Australia, NZSCM Papers, MS-Papers-1617-562, ATL, Wellington.

⁵⁶ Ted Woodfield, "The Creation and History of the NZUSA Volunteer Graduate Scheme," in *Celebrating the New Zealand University Students Association's Volunteer Graduate Scheme for Indonesia*, ed. Laurie Wesley (Auckland: Laurie Wesley, 2013), 4-5.

resolutions at their annual conferences calling for a similar New Zealand scheme. In 1955 the NZUSA Resident Executive in Wellington began negotiations with the New Zealand Government. Despite securing a provisional agreement from the New Zealand Government in 1957, progress on establishing a New Zealand Volunteer Graduate Scheme was slow due to the lack of direct communications between Wellington and Jakarta and because New Zealand Government officials could only devote part-time attention to the scheme.⁵⁷ In February 1959 the Volunteer Graduate Scheme was formally approved by the Indonesian and New Zealand Governments. Wellington agreed to pay travel fares, insurance, equipment, and rehabilitation allowances, and provide each volunteer with a bicycle. In exchange, Jakarta agreed to provide wages, accommodation, and basic commodities like rice.⁵⁸ The VGS was supported by both the National and Labour Parties, the two major New Zealand political parties. The National MP Hugh Templeton served on its selection committee while Prime Minister Walter Nash personally secured government funding for the scheme and helped to minimize bureaucratic red tape.⁵⁹ Between 1959 and 1963, seven New Zealanders – Ron Kilgour, Anne Kilgour, Garth Barfoot, Laurie Wesley, Barbara Wesley, John Foster, and Janice Foster – served as Volunteer Graduates in Indonesia.⁶⁰ Throughout its short history, New Zealand Volunteer Graduates would work in several different fields including teaching, civil engineering, electrical engineering, and dental nursing. To supplement their limited income, several Volunteer Graduates also provided English tuition lessons to local Indonesians.⁶¹ Wesley has also recalled that there were close informal links between New Zealand and Australian Volunteer Graduates, who often saw themselves as constituting one Australasian group in Indonesia.⁶²

According to Keren Clark and Ted Woodfield, the demise of the Volunteer Graduate Scheme was the result of poor communications between New Zealand spokesmen and the Indonesian Government and a general lack of interest in Indonesia among New Zealand graduates. Other factors included the Indonesian Government's decision to freeze employment

⁵⁷ Keren Clark, *The Two-Way Street: A Survey of Volunteer Service Abroad* (Wellington: New Zealand Council for Education Research, 1978), 9-10; Woodfield, "The Creation and History of the NZUSA Volunteer Graduate Scheme," 5-10.

⁵⁸ Letter from Hugh Templeton to G.C. Burton, Department of External Affairs, 2 September 1957, NZSCM Papers, MS-Papers-1617-562, ATL, Wellington; Clark, *The Two-Way Street*, 11.

⁵⁹ Woodfield, "The Creation and History of the NZUSA Volunteer Graduate Scheme," 11-12; Wesley, "Remembering Indonesia and the Volunteer Graduate Scheme," 15.

⁶⁰ Woodfield, "The Creation and History of the NZUSA Volunteer Graduate Scheme," 5-12; Clark, *Two-Way Street*, 9-12.

⁶¹ Janys Foster, "Recalling My Time as a Volunteer Graduate," in *Celebrating the New Zealand University Students Association's Volunteer Graduate Scheme for Indonesia*, ed. Laurie Wesley (Auckland: Laurie Wesley, 2013), 86-87.

⁶² Laurie Wesley, interview by the author, June 2014, email interview.

in the public service in 1961 in response to increased interest from other Western volunteer services programmes including the United States Peace Corps. The VGS was later succeeded in 1962 by the Volunteer Service Abroad (VSA), which had a wide international scope.⁶³ According to Wesley, many former Volunteer Graduates initially welcomed the integration of the VGS into the VSA and hoped that the new organisation would continue to operate the Indonesian scheme under the same name and conditions. However, the new VSA organisation was not interested in Indonesia because they preferred to send New Zealand volunteers to more familiar and accessible countries. Many New Zealanders were reluctant to live and work in Indonesia because of its chaotic bureaucracy and volatile political situation.⁶⁴ Similarly, John Foster, another former Volunteer Graduate, recalled that many New Zealanders were more interested in distant ‘Mother England’ than nearby Southeast Asia.⁶⁵ According to Wesley, the VSA discontinued the Volunteer Graduate Scheme because it wanted to fully integrate its activities into the new organisation. He and other former Volunteer Graduates were unhappy with this decision because they felt that rebranding the organisation would only create confusion at the Indonesian end. Wesley also recalled his dislike for the VSA’s “paternalistic” nature, “top heavy” bureaucracy, and rigorous selection procedures.⁶⁶

Despite its short lifespan, the Volunteer Graduate Scheme did help to facilitate contact between New Zealanders and Indonesians on a personal level. Nearly all of the Volunteer Graduates became accustomed with the Indonesian language, culture, and customs. Most importantly, some Volunteer Graduates also contributed to Indonesia’s development. For example, Laurie Wesley, a trained geotechnical engineer, worked with Russian engineers on the construction of the Senayan stadium, which was built as part of the infrastructure for the Fourth Asian Games, which were held in Jakarta in 1962. Wesley later became an academic expert on Indonesian volcanic soils and authored the first Indonesian-language soil mechanics textbook, *Mekanika Tanah* (Soil Mechanics). Due to their experiences with the VGS, both Laurence and Barbara Wesley developed a fascination for Indonesia and later returned there under the

⁶³ Clark, *The Two-Way Street*, 11-12; Woodfield, “The Creation and History of the NZUSA Volunteer Graduate Scheme,” 13.

⁶⁴ Laurie Wesley, interview by the author, June 2014, email interview; Laurie Wesley, email conversation, 29 September 2014.

⁶⁵ John Foster, “Re-experiencing My Time as a Volunteer Graduate,” in *Celebrating the New Zealand University Students Association’s Volunteer Graduate Scheme for Indonesia*, ed. Laurie Wesley (Auckland: Laurie Wesley, 2013), 79.

⁶⁶ Laurie Wesley, interview by the author, June 2014, email interview; Laurie Wesley, email conversation, 29 September 2014.

Colombo Plan where Laurie continued the work he had begun under the VGS.⁶⁷ Besides the Volunteer Graduate Scheme, other New Zealand expatriates settled in Indonesia during the post-independence period. Marie Gray and her husband, David Gray, worked as medical professionals in Bandung, West Java with the Presbyterian Mission between 1959 and 1971.⁶⁸ For many of the New Zealand volunteers and their Indonesian hosts, this marked their first exposure to foreign peoples and cultures.




Figure 18: (Left to Right): Four Volunteer Graduates- Laurie and Barbara Wesley, with Anne and Ron Kilgour. Credits: Laurie Wesley, *Celebrating the New Zealand University Students Association's Volunteer Graduate Scheme*, 2013.

⁶⁷ Laurie Wesley, "Remembering Indonesia and the Volunteer Graduate Scheme," 39, 43-44; Barbara Wesley, "Volunteer Graduate Memories," in *Celebrating the New Zealand University Students Association's Volunteer Graduate Scheme for Indonesia*, ed. Laurie Wesley (Auckland: Laurie Wesley, 2013), 68.

⁶⁸ Marie Gray, *Tā mu: New Zealand family in Java* (1988; Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya, 2001).

Map of West New Guinea




Figure 19: Map of West New Guinea. Credits: Maps of Netherlands New Guinea, <http://www.vanderheijden.org/ng/maps/>.

The West New Guinea dispute

New Zealand became involved in the West New Guinea dispute because it was a member of the United Nations and had a close relationship with Australia, which opposed Indonesian claims to that territory because of its strategic interests in New Guinea. The Dutch Government had excluded West New Guinea from the new Indonesian state on the grounds that the Melanesian Papuans were ethnically and culturally different from the Indonesians.⁶⁹ By contrast, the Indonesians viewed West New Guinea (which it called West Irian) as an inalienable part of the Indonesian Republic that inherited the territories of the former Netherlands East Indies. According to the political scientist Benedict Anderson, the internment of many Indonesian nationalists on West New Guinea gave it a central place in Indonesian nationalist folklore and made the territory's inclusion an emotive non-negotiable issue.⁷⁰ The West New

⁶⁹ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 56; "The Issue of Netherlands New Guinea," *External Affairs Review* VIII, no. 2 (February 1958), 18-19.

⁷⁰ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism* (1983; London: Verso, 2006), 176-177.

Guinea dispute strained post-independence Dutch-Indonesian relations. Following the failure of Dutch-Indonesian bilateral negotiations, the Dutch Parliament formally incorporated the territory into the realm of the Netherlands in February 1952. The Indonesian Government refused to accept Dutch control over West New Guinea and embarked on a campaign to reclaim the territory.⁷¹ Undaunted by Indonesian opposition, the Dutch embarked on a decolonisation project to prepare the West New Guineans for self-rule by 1970. By 1961 these efforts had culminated in the creation of a legislative New Guinea Council, a national flag (*Bintang Kejora*; the Morning Star Flag), a national anthem, and coat of arms. Dutch nation-building efforts in West New Guinea helped to promote a West New Guinean sense of national identity, which later spawned a vocal Free Papua separatist movement.⁷²

The New Zealand Government first became involved in the West New Guinea dispute when the Indonesian Government referred the dispute to the United Nations in 1954. During the 1950s the Holland National Government supported the maintenance of Dutch rule over West New Guinea; arguing that the West New Guineans were ethnically and culturally different from the Indonesians. New Zealand policy-makers also argued that the Netherlands was in a better position to look after the welfare of the West New Guineans than Indonesia, which was facing immense economic difficulties and political unrest.⁷³ Wellington also wanted to maintain parity with Canberra, which opposed Jakarta's claims to West New Guinea because of its strategic interests in the territory. The Australian-administered Trust Territory of Papua and New Guinea bordered Dutch New Guinea and Canberra did not want a potentially hostile Asian power as its neighbour. Canberra also shared Wellington's view that the Dutch were better equipped to look after the West New Guineans than the Indonesians. The shared wartime experience of fighting against Japan meant that Wellington understood Canberra's security concerns about a hostile power taking over West New Guinea.⁷⁴ Under the Menzies Government, Australia became the most vocal international defender of the Dutch presence in West New Guinea. In November 1957 the Australian and Dutch Governments issued a joint

⁷¹ Audrey and George Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 45; 'The Issue of Netherlands New Guinea,' *External Affairs Review* VIII, no. 2 (February 1958), 20-21.

⁷² Ron Crocombe, 'Indonesia's Eastward Expansion,' in *Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West* (Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 2007), 281-283; Richard Chauvel, 'Papuan Nationalism: Christianity and Ethnicity,' in *The Politics of the Periphery in Indonesia: Social and Geographical Perspectives*, ed. Minako Sakai, Glenn Banks, and J.H. Walker (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 200-218.

⁷³ O'Brien, 'New Zealand and Indonesia,' 61, 64-65; Green, 'Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia,' 153-154.

⁷⁴ Leslie Munro, 'First Committee: Netherlands New Guinea,' *External Affairs Review* IV, no. 11, November 1954, 15-21; O'Brien, 'New Zealand and Indonesia,' 69-70.

declaration which stated the two governments would work closely together to promote self-determination in their New Guinea territories. Canberra's pro-Dutch stance adversely affected Australian-Indonesian relations.⁷⁵

Between 1954 and 1957 the New Zealand Delegations at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) opposed three Afro-Asian resolutions that called for the international organisation to intervene as a mediator in the West New Guinea dispute. In the UN, the West New Guinea dispute pitted the pro-Indonesian Afro-Asian countries against the pro-Dutch Western European bloc, the "White Commonwealth", and several Latin American countries. Meanwhile, the United States adopted a position of strict neutrality and abstained from voting in the United Nations.⁷⁶ Leslie Munro, who served as New Zealand's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the President of the 12th Session of the UNGA, wanted New Zealand to adopt a much stronger stance against Indonesia and opposed any discussion of the dispute in the UNGA; arguing that it was a bilateral dispute between Jakarta and The Hague alone.⁷⁷ On all three occasions, the Indonesians failed to secure the two-thirds majority necessary to pass their resolutions. Jakarta's failed attempts to secure United Nations intervention in the West New Guinea dispute led to a further deterioration of Dutch-Indonesian relations. In 1956 the Indonesian Government unilaterally abrogated the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and repudiated all debts owed to the Netherlands. In December 1957 the Indonesian Government banned all operations in Indonesia by the Dutch airline KLM, nationalised all Dutch-owned businesses and properties, and expelled 10,000 Dutch nationals.⁷⁸ This anti-Dutch campaign triggered a second exodus of Dutch migrants to Australia and New Zealand, joining the substantial number of former Dutch East Indies residents who had settled in Australasia following World War II.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ "The Issue of Netherlands New Guinea," *External Affairs Review* VIII, no. 3 (March 1958): 4-6; Bob Catley and Vinsensio Dugis, *Australian Indonesian Relations Since 1945: The Garuda and The Kangaroo* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1998), 20-25.

⁷⁶ The "White Commonwealth" was a term used to refer to Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the White-dominated members of the Commonwealth. See O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 67-116; "The Issue of Netherlands New Guinea," *External Affairs Review* VIII, no. 3 (March 1958): 1-4.

⁷⁷ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 88-90.

⁷⁸ "The Issue of Netherlands New Guinea," *External Affairs Review* VIII, no. 3 (March 1958): 1-4, 6-8; "Indonesia: Political Situation," Extract from High Commissioner for New Zealand, Singapore, Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), Review of Current Intelligence, 6th December 1957, PM 318/6/1, Part 16, ANZ, Wellington.

⁷⁹ Hoadley, "Domestic Influences of Foreign Policy," 439.

While the Walter Nash Labour Government continued to support the Dutch presence in West New Guinea, it also proposed an initiative to resolve that dispute. Following a state visit by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio to Wellington in February 1959 Prime Minister Nash proposed merging the Dutch and Australian territories in New Guinea into a unified New Guinea state. Nash's initiative was influenced by New Zealand's ongoing decolonisation efforts in Western Samoa. While Wellington was aware of Jakarta's uncompromising position on West New Guinea, New Zealand policy-makers hoped their initiative would dilute support for Indonesia's claim among the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations. However, the New Zealand initiative found little international support. Indonesian diplomats in Canberra and Kuala Lumpur dismissed the idea that the West New Guineans would prefer association with the rest of New Guinea. Washington claimed that the New Zealand proposal failed to satisfy Indonesian national aspirations. The Nash Government failed to raise their proposal when the Australian Minister of Territories, Paul Hasluck, visited Wellington in September 1960. The Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns dismissed the Nash initiative and insisted on the legitimacy of his government's decolonisation programme for West New Guinea. Meanwhile, the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, dismissed the viability of the New Zealand proposal on the grounds that the "primitive" Papuans were not interested in self-determination. Whitehall refused to consider Nash's proposal because it feared that the Indonesians were going to invade West New Guinea. The New Zealand proposal was quickly overshadowed by a Malayan proposal for the Tunku to mediate between Jakarta and The Hague. While New Zealand policy-makers were initially interested in the Malayan proposal, they quickly withdrew their support when they learnt that its objective was to facilitate West New Guinea's incorporation into Indonesia through a trusteeship programme. The Tunku wanted to use his diplomatic initiative to strengthen ethnic kinship ties between newly independent Malaya and Indonesia. Unfortunately for the Tunku, Subandrio rejected his initiative and insisted that the territory be directly integrated into Indonesia.⁸⁰ With the failure of the New Zealand and Malaysian initiatives to gain traction, the Indonesian Government hardened its position towards the Dutch and began making preparations for a military assault to invade West Irian.

⁸⁰ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 153-175; Nicholas Tarling, *Britain and the West New Guinea Dispute, 1949-1962* (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), 186, 247-264, 273-274.



Figure 20: Prime Minister Walter Nash exchanging gifts with the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio and his wife during a state visit in Wellington in February 1959. Credits: *The Dominion*, 17 February 1959.

Between 1960 and 1962, Indonesia embarked on a policy of *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation), which combined diplomatic, political, economic pressure and limited military action, against the Dutch. Jakarta also successfully exploited the Cold War superpower struggle by soliciting Soviet military aid for a planned invasion of West New Guinea. Fearing the loss of Indonesia to Moscow, Washington abandoned its policy of “passive neutrality” and adopted a more conciliatory stance towards Jakarta.⁸¹ This shift in American foreign policy towards Indonesia coincided with the election of John F. Kennedy on November 1960. The new Kennedy Administration wanted to repair the damage caused to United States-Indonesian relations by the previous Eisenhower Administration’s support for the PRRI-Permesta rebellion. Therefore, the United States Government was prepared to sacrifice West New Guinean self-determination as a price for securing better relations with Sukarno and forestalling a Communist takeover in Indonesia.⁸² Thus, Washington exerted pressure on its Australasian allies, Canberra and Wellington, to revise

⁸¹ Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited*, viii-ix, 1-2, 122-137, 173-180; Tarling, *Britain and the West Papua Dispute*, 538-539.

⁸² David Webster, “Regimes in Motion: The Kennedy Administration and Indonesia’s New Frontier, 1960–1962,” *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 1 (January 2009): 95-123; According to the historian Greg Poulgrain, Washington’s new pro-Indonesian policy towards the West New Guinea dispute was also influenced by powerful American oil companies who were unwilling to share their revenue with the Dutch authorities. See Greg Poulgrain, “Oil and politics prove fatal mix for the people of West Papua,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 December 2009, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/oil-and-politics-prove-fatal-mix-for-the-people-of-west-papua-20091230-lju6.html/>.

their policies towards the West New Guinea dispute. Under the Holyoake National Government, Wellington abandoned its previous policy of supporting self-determination in West New Guinea in 1961 in favour of accepting the territory's incorporation into Indonesia with the consent of both Jakarta and The Hague. While Canberra initially resisted Washington's new policy of accommodation with Jakarta, Wellington was more willing to "keep in step" with American foreign policy.⁸³ Following the appointment of Garfield Barwick as the new Australian Minister of External Affairs in December 1961 the Australian Government abandoned its tough stance on West New Guinea and indicated that it would support the territory's "peaceful" integration into Indonesia.⁸⁴ Thus, US policy towards West New Guinea had an important influence in shifting Wellington and Canberra's positions towards the dispute.

In November 1961, the New Zealand Government supported the Dutch through a complicated series of competing draft resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly, which ended with none being adopted.⁸⁵ In response, President Sukarno escalated his policy of *Konfrontasi* against the Dutch by issuing the *Trikora* (Triple Command) on 19 December 1961 that called for a full-scale military invasion of West New Guinea. Amidst rising international tensions, Prime Minister Holyoake cabled Sukarno in an attempt to convince the Indonesian President not to embark on a "course of action fraught with perilous consequences." Sukarno responded that Indonesia could not remain idle while the Dutch still "illegally occupied" West Irian.⁸⁶ At the last minute, the Kennedy Administration brokered a peace settlement between the Dutch and Indonesian Governments known as the Ellsworth Bunker agreement on 15 August 1962. Under this agreement, the Dutch transferred West New Guinea to an interim United Nations Temporary Administration (UNTEA) on 1 October 1962, which then handed over the territory to Indonesia on 1 May 1963. It was also agreed that an "Act of Free Choice" would be held to determine the future aspirations of the West New Guineans.⁸⁷ For the Indonesians, the New York Agreement marked a moral victory since it ended the last vestiges of Dutch colonialism in the Archipelago. Sukarno's successful West Irian campaign led him to embark on a similar policy

⁸³ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 176-185; Tarling, *Britain and the West Papua Dispute*, 296-299, 335-336, 472-473.

⁸⁴ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 210-211; Catley and Dugis, *The Garuda and the Kangaroo*, 25-28.

⁸⁵ "West Papua," in "The Month in the United Nations: Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly," *External Affairs Review* XI, no. II (November 1961): 49-50; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 161.

⁸⁶ "West Papua," *External Affairs Review* XII, no. 1 (January 1962): 42-45; O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 206-207.

⁸⁷ "Dutch/Indonesian Agreements and Statements on West Papua," *External Affairs Review* XII, no. 8 (August 1962): 50-54; Tarling, *Britain and the West Papua Dispute*, 501-517.

of *Konfrontasi* against the British and the newly-formed Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the main topic of the next chapter.⁸⁸ While Wellington publicly welcomed the Ellsworth Bunker agreement, most New Zealand policy-makers were dismayed that their main allies, Britain and the United States, had sacrificed West New Guinean self-determination to appease Indonesian ambitions.⁸⁹

Conclusion

The years between 1950 and 1963 marked the earliest engagement between New Zealand and the Indonesian Republic on equal terms. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries was a gradual process which reflected the limited resources of New Zealand's Department of External Affairs and the divergent foreign policies of Wellington and Jakarta. While the New Zealand Government stressed New Zealand's loyalty to Britain and the Western alliance, Indonesia under Sukarno shifted from non-alignment to the confrontational New Emerging Forces doctrine which brought Jakarta into Beijing's orbit. Despite these differences, New Zealand aid initiatives like the Colombo Plan and the Volunteer Graduate Scheme succeeded in building bridges between New Zealanders and Indonesians. Wellington and Jakarta's conflicting positions during the West New Guinea dispute foreshadowed the turbulent Indonesian Confrontation with Malaysia, which strained Jakarta's relations with the West.

⁸⁸ Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited*, 173-187; Tarling, *Britain and the West Papua Dispute*, 517-519.

⁸⁹ O'Brien, "New Zealand and Indonesia," 214-215; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 162-163.

Chapter Four: New Zealand and the Indonesian Malaysian *Konfrontasi*, 1963-1966

This chapter examines the New Zealand Government's relation with Indonesia during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation/*Konfrontasi* (1963-66) and the 30 September coup attempt in 1965, which facilitated a change in political leadership in Indonesia. During the Indonesian *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia, New Zealand was forced to balance its desire for friendly relations with Indonesia against its long-standing Commonwealth obligations to the United Kingdom and Malaysia. Alongside Australia, New Zealand contributed military forces to the defence of Malaysia against Indonesia incursions. New Zealand's pro-Malaysia policy during the *Konfrontasi* strained relations which Jakarta, which viewed its newly-created neighbour Malaysia as a British "neo-colonialist conspiracy" directed against Indonesia. Despite the strains in New Zealand-Indonesian relations, the two countries did not sever diplomatic relations and New Zealand continued its Colombo Plan aid project to Indonesia. The 1965 Indonesian coup initiated a radical reconfiguration of Indonesia's political landscape and foreign policy. Due to the influence of Cold War logic on New Zealand foreign policy, Wellington welcomed the emergence of General Suharto's New Order regime, which was strongly anti-Communist and committed to improving diplomatic and economic relations with the Western powers. The abandonment of *Konfrontasi* ushered in a warming of New Zealand-Indonesian relations during the early Suharto years. This chapter addresses how the New Zealand Government responded to the Indonesian *Konfrontasi* and the fall of President Sukarno. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first gives a brief historical outline of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation and the rise of General Suharto's New Order. The second examines the New Zealand Government's response to the *Konfrontasi*, focusing on the tension between Commonwealth obligations and friendly relations with a "Near Northern" neighbour. The third examines the New Zealand's response to the 30 September coup attempt and the rise of Suharto's New Order.

Map of Malaysia



Figure 21: Political and administrative map of Malaysia. Credits: Nations Online, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/malaysia_map.htm.

Outline

The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation (1963-66) was a political dispute and low-level military conflict between Indonesia and neighbouring Malaysia. Confrontation or *Konfrontasi* was a foreign policy developed by President Sukarno which used a complex combination of diplomatic, economic, and military pressure to force a foreign adversary to accept a negotiated settlement on Indonesian terms. *Konfrontasi* was first deployed against the Dutch during the West New Guinea campaign.¹ Confrontation was also influenced by Sukarno's New Emerging Forces doctrine, which had become the main pillar of Indonesia's foreign policy and domestic ideology by 1963 as explained above. The target of Sukarno's Confrontation policy was Malaysia, a newly-created federal state that was the product of British decolonisation efforts to amalgamate its former Southeast Asian colonies – Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and North

¹ Jamie Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), 1-11; Soedjati Djihadono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), ix-x, 173, 185-195.

Borneo/Sabah – into a centrally-positioned Commonwealth bastion.² Following a failed revolt by anti-Malaysian elements in Brunei in December 1962, Brunei abandoned plans to join Malaysia. The Brunei Revolt gave Sukarno the pretext to denounce Malaysia as an illegitimate British “neo-colonial” creation and a threat to Indonesia.³ The *Konfrontasi* was also complicated by the revival of the Philippines’ claim to North Borneo in 1963 which was predicated on the former Sultanate of Sulu’s historic claim to that territory.⁴ The political scientist Jamie Mackie has divided Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia into five distinct phases: firstly, a coordinated campaign of cross-border raids, propaganda and “rough-house” diplomacy with the intention of delaying the creation of Malaysia (January – September 1963); secondly, the intensification of diplomatic and military pressure against Malaysia (September 1963 – June 1964); thirdly, the expansion of military operations into Peninsular Malaysia (July-December 1964); fourthly, the acceleration of Indonesia’s leftward foreign policy drift with disastrous domestic repercussions (January-September 1965); and finally, the 30 September coup attempt which ended the *Konfrontasi* and realigned Indonesia’s political landscape and foreign policy (October 1965-August 1966).⁵ These five stages of the Confrontation are further discussed below.

Between January and September 1963 the Indonesians sought to sabotage the creation of Malaysia through a coordinated campaign of cross-border raids into Malaysian Borneo, propaganda, and “rough-house” diplomacy. On 31 July 1963 Filipino diplomatic efforts to end hostilities between Malaysia and Indonesia produced an agreement known as the Manila Accord, which stipulated that Jakarta and Manila would recognise Malaysia provided the United Nations (UN) could ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of Sarawak and Sabah. However, the Manila Accord floundered due to the joint decision of the British Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys and the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to proceed with the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 without waiting for the UN to publish its results. The Indonesian and Philippine Governments saw this as an act of bad faith by the Malaysians and British and refused

² Tan Tai Yong, *Creating “Greater Malaysia”: Decolonization and the Politics of Merger* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1).

³ Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute*, 111-127; J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, 2003 reprint (1972; Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2003), 400-409.

⁴ For a longer discussion of the North Borneo dispute, see Nicholas Tarling, *Sulu and Sabah: A Study of British policy towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the late eighteenth century* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978), 191-197; Erwin S. Fernandez, “Philippine-Malaysia Dispute over Sabah: A Bibliographic Survey,” *Asia-Pacific Social Science Review* 7, no. 1 (December 2007): 53-64.

⁵ Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute*, 3-5.

to recognise Malaysia.⁶ Following the creation of Malaysia, Jakarta heightened diplomatic, economic, and military pressure against Malaysia and Britain. President Sukarno denounced Malaysia as a British “neo-colonialist conspiracy” against Indonesia while Indonesian mobs sacked the Malaysian and British Embassies in Jakarta. In 1964 American and Filipino diplomatic efforts to broker a peace settlement between Indonesia and Malaysia faltered due to the irreconcilable positions of Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. President Sukarno refused to end *Konfrontasi* and extend recognition to Malaysia until Kuala Lumpur held a second referendum to ascertain public opinion in Sarawak and Sabah. Sukarno distrusted the original UN Ascertainment mission since it had been tainted in his view by Anglo-Malayan plans to proceed with the creation of Malaysia regardless of the UN mission’s findings. Meanwhile, the Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku refused to participate in peace negotiations until the Indonesian Government withdrew its troops from Malaysian Borneo. Escalating military hostilities forced Whitehall to send substantial troops and resources to Malaysia and to call on the aid of its Commonwealth “offspring” Australia and New Zealand.⁷

Between July and December 1964, Indonesia extended its military operations into Peninsular Malaysia, which further deepened Indonesia’s estrangement from the international community. During the latter half of 1964 Australian and New Zealand forces stationed in Peninsular Malaysia as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve clashed with Indonesian infiltrators. The new United States President Lyndon B. Johnson abandoned the previous American policy of accommodating Indonesian nationalism in favour of supporting British efforts to isolate Indonesia internationally and contain *Konfrontasi* militarily. The synchronisation of American and British policies towards Indonesia was linked to Washington’s efforts to secure British support for the escalating American involvement in Vietnam. While a Soviet veto narrowly saved Indonesia from condemnation in the United Nations Security Council, Jakarta failed to win over substantial Afro-Asian support for its anti-Malaysia campaign, in stark contrast to Indonesia’s successful West New Guinea campaign.⁸ By 1965 Indonesia’s deepening international isolation had led it to forge closer ties with its sole international ally: Communist China. Sukarno’s accelerated leftward drift was accompanied by growing domestic tensions between the Indonesian Army and the PKI. Following Malaysia taking a non-permanent seat in

⁶ Malaya had already gained independence from Britain on 31 August 1957 and was governed by a multiracial Alliance coalition led by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.

⁷ Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute*, 3-4, 221-234; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy, 1945-1965* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1973), 493-494

⁸ Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy*, 491-92, 500-03; “The Month in the United Nations: September 1964,” *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 9 (September 1964): 40-41.

the UN Security Council, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations on January 1965 and established a rival international organization called the Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO).⁹ In response to heightened Confrontation tensions, Australian and New Zealand military forces were finally deployed to Malaysian Borneo in January 1965. Despite Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia in August 1965 Jakarta was unable to exploit this rift between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore due to Indonesia's deteriorating economy and mounting domestic political tensions between the three main actors in Indonesian politics – Sukarno, the Army, and the PKI. The PKI's agrarian land reform programme triggered clashes between Communists and the two major Muslim political movements: *Masjumi* (*Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*; the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) and *Nahdatu Ulama* (the Islamic Awakening Party). The Indonesian Army also resisted the PKI's calls to create a "fifth armed force", made up of peasants and workers to fight in Borneo, since it did not want its main domestic rival to have its own military force. The Indonesian Army high command's growing hostility to Sukarno's rapprochement with the PKI and China led it to open secret backchannels with the British and Malaysians to explore possibilities for ending *Konfrontasi*. Ultimately, Army-PKI tensions culminated in the 30 September coup attempt, an important turning point in modern Indonesian history.¹⁰

On the night of 30 September 1965 a group of pro-Sukarno junior army officers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung Syamsuri, calling themselves the 30 September Movement, kidnapped and murdered six high-ranking army generals, who were rumoured to be plotting with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow President Sukarno. The following day, the coup participants announced on national radio that they had taken pre-emptive action to safeguard President Sukarno. In the midst of this political chaos, General Suharto, the commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Dara*; KOSTRAD) routed the 30 September Movement and took control of the Indonesian Army.

⁹ George Kahin, *Southeast Asia: A Testament*, 175; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy*, 495.

¹⁰ The Indonesian Armed Forces had four branches: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Police. Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debauch in Indonesia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 222-227; Edward Masters, "The United States and Indonesia: Personal Reflections," in *Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia*, ed. Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2008), 318.




Figure 22: General Suharto on the cover of *TIME Magazine* 88, no. 3 (15 July 1966)

Alleging that the 30 September Movement was a Communist coup attempt, the Army and its right-wing and Muslim allies unleashed a massive pogrom which killed around half a million Communists and left-wing sympathisers over a period of five months, effectively destroying the PKI as a major actor in Indonesian politics and laying the foundations for Suharto's New Order regime.¹¹ According to the American historian Bradley R. Simpson, the Army's official account of the 30 September coup attempt has not been fully accepted by all quarters. Both academics and anti-New Order critics have produced differing accounts on the role of the PKI, Sukarno or Suharto's foreknowledge of the coup, the nature of the anti-Communist mass killings, and Western complicity in the coup. While New Order supporters blamed the PKI for the coup and mass killings, opponents have alleged Western involvement in these two aforementioned events.¹² The most recent study by the Canadian historian John Roosa in 2006 has argued that a small group of PKI leaders (including the Party's Chairman Dipa

¹¹ Besides defence, the Indonesian Army played an important role in Indonesian society and the economy. See Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978), 24-42; Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), 387-392, 413-417.

¹² Bradley Simpson, *Economists With Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations 1960-1968* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 173-174.

Nusantara Aidit and the Special Bureau's Head Kamaruzaman Sjam) engineered the 30 September Movement in order to purge the Army of anti-Communist elements. Because of poor planning and coordination between the PKI plotters and their Army confederates, the PKI leadership's pre-emptive action against the Army leadership went awry; creating a vacuum which allowed General Suharto to turn the tables on the PKI. Rejecting the New Order's argument that all PKI members were complicit in the coup, Roosa rather suggests that the vast majority of the PKI rank and file were unaware of their leader's plans and that the Army was only looking for an excuse to destroy the PKI entirely. According to Roosa, Suharto's successful efforts to undermine President Sukarno's authority following the so-called Communist coup attempt effectively amounted to a coup d'état since it facilitated Suharto's ascendancy to the Indonesian presidency in 1967.¹³

Following the 30 September coup attempt, the United States, British and Australian governments secretly aided the Army's anti-Communist campaign and efforts to undermine Sukarno's rule. The US Government covertly supplied medical supplies, communications equipment, foodstuffs, and firearms to the Army. In addition, the British, American, Australian, and Malaysian governments disseminated un-attributable propaganda through several radio channels and newspapers depicting the PKI, Sukarno, and Communist China in a negative light, which supplemented the Army-controlled media's anti-PKI blitz. The British and Australian Governments also agreed not to launch further border operations while the Army was still engaged in suppressing the PKI.¹⁴ Following the 30 September coup attempt, the Indonesian *Konfrontasi* entered its final phase: the cession of hostilities with Malaysia, regime change in Indonesia, and a rightward realignment of Indonesia's foreign policy. Following a period of mass unrest and economic hardship, the Army leadership coerced President Sukarno into handing all executive powers to General Suharto on 11 March 1966. Over the next two years, Suharto took steps to further undermine Sukarno's authority by ending the Confrontation with Malaysia, repairing Indonesia's relations with the West, and severing Indonesia's relations with China. Besides banning the PKI, General Suharto purged the Indonesian Government bureaucracy and armed forces of Sukarno's supporters and stacked these state institutions with his own supporters. General Suharto also took steps to legitimize his rule through Indonesia's national

¹³ John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'état in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 106, 202-225.

¹⁴ David Easter, "Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling: Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965-March 1966," *Cold War History* 5, no. 1 (February 2005), 62-69; Australian Embassy Djakarta cablegram, 12 October 1965, Australian foreign source document, PM 318/6/1, Part 29, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington.

legislature, the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*; MPRS). To emphasize the New Order's pro-Western tilt, the Suharto regime also rejoined key international institutions like the UN and World Bank, implemented free market policies, and encouraged foreign investment in Indonesia. In March 1967, Sukarno resigned as President of Indonesia and the MPRS appointed General Suharto as Acting-President, formally ending the Sukarno epoch. On 27 March 1968 Suharto formally assumed the office of President of Indonesia, which he would hold for the next thirty years. Thereafter Sukarno was placed under house arrest until his death in 1970.¹⁵



Figure 23: Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. Credits: Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington.

¹⁵ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, 451-458; Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship* (London: Routledge, 1999), 33-34.

New Zealand and *Konfrontasi*, 1963-66

During the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, the New Zealand Government's Commonwealth linkages and security commitments to Malaya and its successor state, Malaysia, led it to adopt a pro-Malaysian policy. In addition, Wellington's disenchantment with Indonesian vociferousness during the West New Guinea dispute led it to oppose Jakarta's *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia.¹⁶ On 24 November 1961, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake welcomed the Malaysia Plan since it allowed the New Zealand Armed Forces to maintain military forces in Malaya and Singapore, thus fulfilling New Zealand's alliance obligations to Britain's Far East Strategic Reserve and the American-led Southeast SEATO alliance.¹⁷ In August 1962 the Prime Minister announced his support for the 1962 London Agreement between the British and Malayan Governments to proceed with the establishment of Malaysia.¹⁸ In September 1963 Holyoake welcomed the results of the United Nations ascertainment mission in the Borneo Territories.¹⁹ Following Indonesia's escalation of *Konfrontasi* in response to the creation of Malaysia, the Prime Minister promised that New Zealand would assist in Malaysia's defence against Indonesian aggression.²⁰

Despite its pro-British and pro-Malaysian sympathies, Wellington was unwilling to provoke conflict with Jakarta by fully committing its military forces to Malaysian Borneo. As discussed in Chapter Three, the New Zealand Government had already invested substantial manpower and resources into its Indonesian Colombo Plan aid programme. By January 1963 240 Indonesian students had come to New Zealand for training and 41 New Zealand experts had been sent to Indonesia. In addition, New Zealand also had a Legation in Jakarta headed by

¹⁶ Jim Rolfe, "New Zealand Defence Policy During the Cold War," in *Lenin's Legacy Down Under: New Zealand's Cold War*, ed. Alexander Trapeznik and Aaron Fox (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2003), 42-45; Michael Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," in *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 170.

¹⁷ "Greater Malaysia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 24 November 1961, *External Affairs Review* XI, no. 11 (November 1961), 20; John Subritzky, *Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-65* (Hampshire, England: Macmillan Press, 2000), 27-30.

¹⁸ "Malaysia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 4 August 1962, *External Affairs Review* XII, no. 8 (August 1962), 42.

¹⁹ "Malaysia: Secretary-General's Statement," Statement by the Prime Minister, 15 September 1963, *External Affairs Review* XIII, no. 9 (September 1963), 18.

²⁰ "Malaysia: Defence Arrangements," Statement by the Prime Minister to the House of Representatives, 20 September 1963, *External Affairs Review* XIII, no. 9 (September 1963), 21; "New Zealand Troops in Malaysia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 19 September 1963, *External Affairs Review* XIII, no. 9 (September 1963), 20.

the former educator and National MP Duncan Rae.²¹ Despite radio statements by the New Zealand Government expressing its support for Malaysia, the New Zealand Legation escaped the mob violence which destroyed the British Embassy in Jakarta during the aftermath of the creation of Malaysia. However, the destruction of the British Embassy created problems for the New Zealand Legation since most of its classified correspondence was stored there.²² According to the New Zealand expatriate Marie Gray, Duncan Rae was completely taken by surprise by the mob violence which accompanied Indonesia's *Ganjang Malaysia* (Crush Malaysia) campaign. When the ailing Rae eventually comprehended the gravity of the situation, he allowed New Zealand expatriates to use the Legation's diplomatic pouch to post mail to New Zealand to protect them from tampering.²³ On 23 September Rae also forwarded a telegram to assure Wellington that all New Zealanders in Indonesia were safe. While the Australian Embassy in Jakarta had decided to evacuate all women and minors, Rae ruled out evacuating New Zealand nationals because of Indonesian police efforts to restore order. Furthermore, most New Zealand experts were stationed in remote areas unaffected by the anti-Malaysia demonstrations. Due to ill health, Rae returned to Auckland to recuperate in December 1963 where he later died in February 1964.²⁴

Following Duncan Rae's incapacitation, Reuel Anson Lochore was appointed as New Zealand's Minister in Indonesia in early 1964. Lochore was an elderly diplomat, scholar and philologist whose interests included the ancient Indonesian Hindu and Buddhist temples and tracing the origins of the Sundanese and Mā ori languages.²⁵ Prior to his diplomatic career, Reuel Lochore had studied Romance Languages and Literature at the University of Bonn in Germany and developed a fascination for the German language and culture. As a Germanophile, Lochore had sought to promote greater trading relations between New Zealand and Germany. On another occasion, he defended the 1938 visit of Count Felix von Luckner to New Zealand, the

²¹ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 151-153, 157-159, 164, 170; "Establishment of New Zealand Legation at Djakarta," Statement by the Prime Minister, 28 January 1963, *External Affairs Review* XIII, no. 1 (January 1963), 20.

²² Note, D.M. Rae, Chargé d' Affairs, Djakarta to Mr Challis, New Zealand Commission, Singapore, 24 September 1963, JKA 84/2/1, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington.

²³ Marie Gray, *Tā mu: A New Zealand Family in Java* (1988; Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya, 2001), 106.

²⁴ William Renwick, "Rae, Duncan McFadyen," *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* 5 (2000), reproduced in *Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand*, <http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/5r1/rae-duncan-mcfadyen>.

²⁵ Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, *Indonesia-New Zealand: 50 years of diplomatic relations* (Wellington: Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 2009), 9-10; Gray, *Tā mu: A New Zealand Family in Java*, 132.

German commercial raider who had targeted Allied shipping in the Pacific during World War I.²⁶ Following his return to New Zealand in 1936 Reuel Lochore worked as an immigration official for the Department of Internal Affairs and the Prime Minister's Department. He was also known for advocating continental European migration to New Zealand rather than Jewish and Asian migration.²⁷ According to the German filmmaker and activist Freya Klier, Lochore secured his job in the NZDEA because of his connections to the former Prime Minister Sidney Holland.²⁸ Other New Zealand External Affairs officials in Jakarta included the Chargé d' Affaires Paul Edmonds and the Second Secretaries Peter Gordon and J. G Carter.²⁹




Figure 24: Reuel Anson Lochore, the Head of the New Zealand mission in Jakarta, 1964-1966. Credits: Freya Klier, *Promised New Zealand*, Otago University Press, 2009.

²⁶ Freya Klier, *Promised New Zealand: Fleeing Nazi Persecution*, translated by Jenny Rawlings (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2009), 13-17, 19-20, 32-33, 40-43, 83-85. For a longer biographical sketch of Reuel Lochore's life, see Michael King, "The Strange Story of Reuel Anson Lochore," in *Tread Softly: For You Tread On My Life – New & Collected Writings* (Auckland: Cape Catley, 2001), 64-86.

²⁷ Hank Schouten, *Tasman's legacy: The New Zealand-Dutch Connection* (Wellington: New Zealand-Netherlands Foundation, 1992), 67-69; King, "The Strange Story of Reuel Anson Lochore," 68.

²⁸ Freya Klier, *Promised New Zealand: Fleeing Nazi Persecution*, 227, 241.

²⁹ "Diplomatic and Consular Movements," *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 1 (January 1964), 35; "Diplomatic and Consular Movements," *External Affairs Review* XV, no. 1 (January 1965), 30.

In addition, R. L. G. Challis, the future New Zealand Commissioner in Hong Kong and Minister to the Philippines, also served as Chargé d'affaires in Jakarta for a few months during a brief leave of absence of Lochore.³⁰ Paul Edmonds was a Foreign Service officer who later served as New Zealand's Ambassador to South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Prior to his assignment in Jakarta, Edmonds had worked as a Counsellor at the New Zealand Embassy in Thailand.³¹ Meanwhile, Peter Gordon was one of the first Mā ori career diplomats to be recruited into the Department of External Affairs. Besides his Jakarta stint, Gordon had also worked at the New Zealand Embassy in Thailand.³² J. G. Carter had been posted to Jakarta in January 1965 to assume the position of Second Secretary. According to Marie Gray, a New Zealand missionary-nurse working in Java, none of these diplomats could speak the Indonesian language which limited their ability to interact with their Indonesian hosts. In one embarrassing incident, Gray had to act as a translator between Lochore and the Indonesian authorities when the latter was detained for taking unauthorized photographs of an Indonesian Air Force base in Tegallega. The Indonesian authorities had assumed that Lochore was a CIA agent. Using her Indonesian language skills, Gray rectified the situation.³³

According to the historian Barry Gustafson, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake was reluctant to involve New Zealand militarily in Borneo since he wanted to maintain good relations with Indonesia. He also thought that Malaysia's political problems were not solely caused by Indonesian aggression.³⁴ In addition, Holyoake was reluctant to take military action against Indonesia without securing an American security guarantee through the ANZUS agreement. However, Washington was initially reluctant to support Britain in Malaysia since it was becoming increasingly preoccupied with Vietnam and felt that Whitehall's hard-line military response was fuelling Sukarno's hostility to the West and thus driving Indonesia towards Communism. Both the Australian and New Zealand Governments also regarded the defence of the Borneo Territories as the primary responsibility of Britain and Malaysia and thought that the situation in

³⁰ "Diplomatic and Consular Movements," *External Affairs Review* XV, no. 4 (April 1965), 50; Rhys Richard, "Warm Without Depth: New Zealand and the Philippines," in *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 287.

³¹ Robert Rabel, *New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2005), 219-221; "Diplomatic and Consular Movements," *External Affairs Review* XV, no. 4 (April 1965), 50.

³² Malcolm Templeton, ed., *An Eye, An Ear and A Voice: 50 years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993* (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993), 203-206.

³³ Gray, *Tamu: A New Zealand Family in Java*, 168-171.

³⁴ Barry Gustafson, *Kivi Keith: A Biography of Keith Holyoake* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2007), 219.

Borneo had not deteriorated enough to warrant the deployment of Australasian troops. These factors led the Holyoake National Government to decline a joint British and Malaysia request for military assistance in Borneo following the establishment of Malaysia in September 1963.³⁵ According to the diplomatic historian Roberto Rabel, New Zealand also had to balance the competing demands of its two main allies, Britain and the United States. New Zealand's obligations to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) led it to support American efforts to prop up the ailing anti-Communist South Vietnamese Government. Lacking the military resources to fulfil both the Vietnam and Borneo commitments simultaneously, Wellington was forced to prioritize its SEATO commitment to Vietnam. This foreshadowed New Zealand's growing involvement in Vietnam, which fractured the country's traditional bipartisan political consensus and gave rise to a vocal anti-war movement.³⁶

Despite the New Zealand Government's unwillingness to send ground forces into Borneo, Wellington still agreed to send elements of the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) and Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) frigates to assist Anglo-Malaysian operations there. In addition, Holyoake dispatched the 1st Battalion Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (1st RNZIR Battalion) to the Malaysian-Thai border in January 1964 to release British and Malaysian forces for combat operations in Borneo.³⁷ In April 1964, the Holyoake Government finally agreed to provide £550,000 worth of military equipment and training to Malaysia. According to the military historian Chris Pugsley, much of the equipment that New Zealand offered was obsolete and some of the training exceeded requirements. Wellington's reluctant military assistance to Malaysia reflected the New Zealand Government's efforts to maintain good relations with Indonesia by minimising its involvement in *Konfrontasi*. New Zealand was seen to lag behind Australia which took pains to stress its support for Malaysia by providing £3 million worth in military equipment and training. In addition, Canberra committed two minesweepers, a field engineer squadron and four Iroquois helicopters to both Borneo and the Malay Peninsula.³⁸

³⁵ Green, "Uneasy Partners," 163-164; Mark G. Rolls, "Growing Apart: New Zealand and Malaysia," in *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 216-217.

³⁶ Rabel, *New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy*, 38-62, 348-365.

³⁷ Following the end of the Malayan Emergency, the Malayan Communist Party had retreated to the Thai-Malaysia Border to regroup. See "New Zealand Battalion and Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaysia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 29 January 1964, *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 1 (January 1964): 21; Chris Pugsley, *From emergency to confrontation: the New Zealand armed forces in Malaya and Borneo 1949-1966* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003), 196-197, 239-240; Cheah Boon Kheng, "The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948-90: Contesting the Nation-State and Social Change," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 11, no.1 (June 2009): 132-152.

³⁸ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, 197-198.

According to the political scientists Bob Catley and Vinsensio Dugis, the Robert Menzies Liberal-National Government's decision to prioritise its Commonwealth linkage with Malaysia over maintaining good neighbourly relations with Jakarta was prompted by its growing discomfort with Sukarno's increasingly anti-Western rhetoric and rapprochement with Communist China. In response to Indonesian incursions into peninsular Malaysia, Australia also sent army forces to Malaysian Borneo in January 1965. Following the 30 September coup attempt, the Australian Government covertly supported Indonesian Army's campaign against the PKI and President Sukarno. Like Wellington and other Western governments, Canberra regarded Suharto's New Order as a staunch anti-Communist ally.³⁹ According to D. J. McGraw, Wellington's decision to commit troops to Borneo in 1965 was influenced by Australia's growing importance in New Zealand's foreign policy vis-à-vis Britain, especially given that Britain was increasingly becoming less interested in Asia-Pacific affairs.⁴⁰

Despite New Zealand's Commonwealth defence obligations to Malaysia, Wellington still sought to maintain friendly relations with Jakarta by preserving its Colombo Plan aid programme to Indonesia. Throughout the duration of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, the New Zealand Government continued to allow Indonesian Colombo Plan students to study in New Zealand to convey its desire to assist Indonesia's national development. Holyoake also took pains to differentiate New Zealand's opposition to Indonesia's policy of *Konfrontasi* from its warm feelings towards the Indonesian people.⁴¹ In addition, a New Zealand-Indonesia Association was also established on 12 November 1965 to promote Indonesian culture and to collect funds for charitable activities in Indonesia.⁴² The New Zealand Government's desire to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia led Prime Minister Holyoake to make a brief state visit to Jakarta on 18 April 1964 while on his way to attend a SEATO Council meeting in Manila. Holyoake wanted to emphasize New Zealand's support for Malaysia and to warn the Indonesians that any escalation of *Konfrontasi* would have adverse repercussions on New Zealand-Indonesian relations. During his visit, Holyoake attempted to convince President Sukarno, the Foreign Minister Subandrio, and the Defence Minister General Nasution to end their Confrontation with Malaysia. Holyoake also stated that New Zealand did not want to

³⁹ Bob Catley and Vinsensio Dugis, *Australian Indonesian Relations Since 1945: The Garuda and The Kangaroo* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1998), 142-149.

⁴⁰ D.J. McGraw, "Objectives and Priorities in New Zealand's Foreign Policy in Asia, 1949-1975: A Study of the Issue of the Recognition of the People's Republic of China and of Security Policies in South-East Asia," PhD. Dissertation, University of Otago, New Zealand, 1978, 405-407.

⁴¹ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 167-168.

⁴² "Indonesia-NZ: New Group Urges Closer Friendship," *The Press*, 13 November 1965.

appease Jakarta or to act as an intermediary between Indonesia and Malaysia. While Wellington desired good relations with Jakarta, Holyoake reiterated that New Zealand would still honour its defence obligations to Malaysia if necessary.⁴³ During the meeting, Sukarno refused to abandon his policy of *Konfrontasi* and ignored Holyoake's criticism of Indonesian policy towards Malaysia. While Subandrio was willing to withdraw Indonesian forces from Borneo, he reiterated that any such withdrawal was predicated on progress in Indonesian-Malaysian peace negotiations. Meanwhile, Nasution dismissed the Confrontation as a political issue outside his competence on the grounds that the Indonesian forces in Borneo were not regular Army personnel but rather volunteers it had trained. Subandrio and Nasution understood New Zealand's defence obligations to Malaysia and concurred that the escalation of *Konfrontasi* would hurt the New Zealand-Indonesian bilateral relationship. However, Sukarno and Subandrio rejected charges of Indonesian aggression and blamed Britain and Malaysia for instigating the conflict. Unable to make further headway with the Indonesians, Holyoake rejected Subandrio's calls for a resumption of Indonesian-Malaysia negotiations on Jakarta's terms. While Holyoake's Jakarta visit succeeded in clarifying New Zealand's position on the Confrontation, he failed to convince his Indonesian hosts to abandon their conflict with Malaysia.⁴⁴ Holyoake's visit only demonstrated the growing gulf between Jakarta and Wellington caused by the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation.

Following the breakdown of the last round of tripartite summit talks in Tokyo between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines in June 1964, the New Zealand Government's stance towards the Indonesian Government hardened. On 22 June 1964 Prime Minister Holyoake denounced Indonesian intransigence for preventing a peaceful solution to the *Konfrontasi* and forcefully argued that Malaysia had the right to withhold negotiations with Indonesia as long as Indonesian forces continue to encroach on Malaysian territory.⁴⁵ New Zealand-Indonesian relations further deteriorated when Jakarta launched several airborne and seaborne incursions into Peninsular Malaysia in late 1964. On 4 September 1964 Holyoake denounced the Indonesian incursion as a "blatant act of aggression" which threatened peace in Southeast Asia.⁴⁶

⁴³ "Prime Minister's Visit to South-East Asia," Statement by the Prime Minister, *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 4 (April 1964): 19-20; "Indonesia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 27 April 1964, *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 4 (April 1964): 23-24.

⁴⁴ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 165-166.

⁴⁵ Inward Telegram No. 107, External, Wellington to Tui, Djakarta, 23 June 1964, JKA 84/2/1, Part 1, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington; "Malaysia: Bangkok Breakdown," Statement delivered by the Malaysian delegation in Bangkok, 4 March 1964, *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 3 (March 1964): 15-16.

⁴⁶ "Indonesian Landings in Malaysia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 4 September 1964, *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 9 (September 1964): 17-18.

That same day, he accepted a Malaysian request to deploy the 1st RNZIR Battalion in mopping-up operations against Indonesian infiltrators near the Labis area in the Malaysian state of Johor. This deployment marked the first time that New Zealand troops saw action against Indonesian military forces.⁴⁷ On 16 September 1964 the RNZAF dispatched six Canberra B12 bombers from No. 14 Squadron to Malaysia. These bombers were to take part in a top secret British operation to bomb Indonesian air and naval bases called Plan Althorpe. Ultimately, however, Plan Althorpe was cancelled in late 1964 because of Australian, New Zealand, and American concerns about further provoking Indonesian hostility.⁴⁸ As New Zealand's military involvement in *Konfrontasi* escalated, relations between Wellington and Jakarta grew decidedly chilly. President Sukarno added New Zealand to his list of “imperialists with white skins”, countries which included the United States, Britain, Australia, and Canada.⁴⁹ In September 1964 Ganis Harsono, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman, denounced Britain and New Zealand for forcing Asians to fight against each other by sending Gurkha and Mā ori soldiers to prop up the “puppet regime” of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Harsono's vituperative rhetoric was symptomatic of Jakarta's deteriorating relations with Western governments including New Zealand. His admonitions prompted Colonel L. F. Booker to reassure the New Zealand public that Mā ori servicemen were not disproportionately represented in New Zealand's military forces serving in Malaysia.⁵⁰



Figure 25: A 1:72 scale model of an English Electric Canberra jet bomber from RNZAF No. 14 Squadron. Had Plan Althorpe gone ahead, this aircraft would have been used to bomb Indonesian airfields. Credits: Author's personal collection

⁴⁷ Mark G. Rolls, “Growing Apart: New Zealand and Malaysia,” 217-218; “Malaysia,” Statement in the House by the Prime Minister, 9 September 1964, *External Affairs Review XIV*, no. 9 (September 1964): 19-20.

⁴⁸ Chris Pugsley, “Your Target – Jakarta,” *New Zealand Defence Quarterly* 14 (Spring 1996), 12-14; John Subritzky, *Confronting Sukarno*, 118-120.

⁴⁹ While Canada did not join Australia and New Zealand in sending military forces to support Britain during the Indonesian *Konfrontasi*, relations between Jakarta and Ottawa had soured due to the Canadian Government's refusal to sell military planes to the Indonesian Air Force on the grounds that they could be used for military aggression against Malaysia. See David Webster, *Fire and the Full Moon: Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 150.

⁵⁰ “Not Surprised If Most Were Mā ori,” *Southland Times*, 7 September 1964; “Indonesian Claims NZ Using Mā oris,” *The Press*, 7 September 1964.

A three-way exchange between the New Zealand, Malaysian, and Indonesian Delegations at the United Nations General Assembly in December 1964 marked the nadir of New Zealand-Indonesian relations. This verbal match provided the first opportunity for New Zealand to express its views on Indonesia's policy of *Konfrontasi* before the General Assembly. On 16 December, the New Zealand Minister of Justice J. R. Hanan fired the first salvo when he denounced Indonesia's policy of Confrontation against Malaysia as a violation of the United Nations Charter. He contended that Jakarta's unwillingness to end hostilities with Malaysia was the only obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. The following day, Malaysia's Ambassador to the United Nations R. Ramani continued the assault on Jakarta when he argued that Indonesia's dislike for Malaysia's political system and defence relations with Britain did not give it an excuse to wage war on its neighbour, actions which violated the UN Charter. On 18 December L. N. Palar, the Head of the Indonesian Delegation, issued a sharp response to Hanan and Ramani's admonitions. Palar asserted that Indonesia could not be condemned for encroaching on Malaysian territory because it did not recognise Malaysia in the first place. He also reiterated the official Indonesian position that the nature of Malaysia's creation violated the Manila Agreements. For Palar, demanding the withdrawal of Indonesian forces in Borneo was tantamount to demanding that Indonesia recognise Malaysia. In response, Frank Corner, New Zealand's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, denounced the Indonesian argument that non-recognition was a sufficient justification for hostile action as a "lawless doctrine" that violated the Second Article of the United Nations Charter.⁵¹ These UN debates demonstrated the New Zealand and Malaysian tactics of depicting Jakarta as a lawless transgressor of the United Nations Charter.

On 21 December Palar retaliated by denouncing the presence of Commonwealth troops and bases in Malaysia and Singapore as an act of hostility towards Indonesia. He unleashed a scathing attack on New Zealand, asserting that New Zealand could not claim to have cordial relations with Indonesia when it was actively supporting British policies in Southeast Asia. For Palar, New Zealand's involvement in the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation made it a supporter of British neo-colonialism. In addition, Palar accused New Zealand of remaining silent

⁵¹ The Second Article of the UN Charter called for all nations to settle their international disputes peacefully and to refrain from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. See "General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly," 16-18 December 1964, *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 12 (December 1964): 38-50; McCraw, "Objectives and Priorities in New Zealand's Foreign Policy in Asia, 1949-1975," 398-399.

during the 1957-58 PRRI-Permesta uprisings.⁵² He omitted any mention that New Zealand was the only SEATO member to oppose foreign intervention in Indonesia during that aforementioned conflict.⁵³ In response to Palar's tirade, Corner defended the track record of New Zealand's military involvement in Malaysia. He stressed that New Zealand as a small Commonwealth nation was aiding Malaysia, a fellow small state and Commonwealth member, against Indonesia, an "extremely large and potentially powerful country...that was acting in a particularly bullying fashion." Citing New Zealand's participation in the two World Wars, Corner reiterated that New Zealand would always "come down decisively on the side of the small nations which is threatened and bullied."⁵⁴ Corner's admonition harked back to Peter Fraser's advocacy for the right of small nations not to be bullied by more powerful nations. These sharp exchanges between the New Zealand and Indonesian UN delegates showed that when "push came to shove" New Zealand would always favour its fraternal Commonwealth linkages over its relationship with Indonesia. From the Indonesian perspective, New Zealand's support for Britain and its "puppet state" Malaysia placed it firmly in the camp of the "Old Established Forces." Following Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965 Prime Minister Holyoake denounced the Indonesian Government's actions as a "retrograde step" and warned that Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations did not relieve it of its responsibilities to the international community.⁵⁵

In response to Jakarta's growing hostility towards Malaysia, the British Government sought further military commitments from Canberra and Wellington. However, the urgency abated after the British and Malaysians received secret peace feelers from the Indonesian Army leadership, which was growing weary of *Konfrontasi* and increasingly at odds with Sukarno because of his rapprochement with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).⁵⁶ Following a Malaysian request for reinforcements, the New Zealand Government agreed to deploy ground forces – the 1st Ranger Squadron New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) and the 1st RNZIR

⁵² "General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly," 16-18 December 1964, *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 12 (December 1964): 50-55.

⁵³ Brief for the Prime Minister, Visit of Dr Subandrio, 12 February 1959, PM 318/6/1, Part 22, ANZ, Wellington, 1-2.

⁵⁴ "General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly," 18-21 December 1964, *External Affairs Review* XIV, no. 12 (December 1964): 50-52; Confidential Department of External Affairs telegram, Wellington to Canberra, 24 December 1964, JKA 84/2/1, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington, 1-2.

⁵⁵ Don McKinnon, "Introduction," in *New Zealand As An International Citizen: Fifty Years of United Nations Membership*, ed. Malcom Templeton (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995); "Indonesia's Withdrawal from the United Nations," Statement by the Prime Minister, 12 January 1964, *External Affairs Review* XV, no. 1 (January 1965): 15.

⁵⁶ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 166; Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 187-188, 205-209.

Battalion – to Malaysian Borneo in February and May 1965 respectively.⁵⁷ By June 1965 the 1st RNZIR was joining British and Australian army units in top-secret cross-border operations known as Operation Claret into Indonesian Kalimantan. These highly secretive operations were intended to deter Indonesian forces from making further incursions into Malaysia Borneo. During its tour of duty in Borneo, the 1st RNZIR carried out eighteen such Claret operations. In addition, the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) sent naval crews to man two minesweepers, the HMNZS *Hickleton* and HMNZS *Santon*, to patrol Malaysian waters for smugglers and Indonesian infiltrators.⁵⁸

New Zealand's escalating military involvement would have significant repercussions on its relationship with Indonesia. On 16 April 1965 the Indonesian Parliament, the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPRS), adopted a vague resolution calling for the Indonesian Government to "take firmer actions against all the interests of the NEKOLIM (neo-colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism) plotters – the British, United States, Australia, and New Zealand – in Indonesia, as a reprisal for their assistance to the NEKOLIM Malaysia."⁵⁹ On 23 April the New Zealand Minister in Indonesia, Reuel Lochore, assured his Wellington superiors that the MPRS resolution did not threaten New Zealand interests in Indonesia since the MPRS was largely a "rubber stamp body" controlled by President Sukarno.⁶⁰ In a second cable, Lochore concluded that the MPRS resolution contained nothing new and that it would not be implemented by any governmental or public body other than the NASAKOM cabinet, which had become stymied by tensions between the Indonesian Army and the PKI. Lochore advised the New Zealand Government not to publicly raise the issue with Jakarta in order to avoid attracting the hostility of the PKI, which he regarded as an implacable enemy of the Western Powers.⁶¹ Concerns about the increasingly volatile Indonesian domestic political situation and escalating Confrontation tensions led Lochore to formally request that the Indonesian Government supply guards to protect the New Zealand Legation and other diplomatic

⁵⁷ Mark G. Rolls, "Growing Apart: New Zealand and Malaysia," 218.

⁵⁸ "Assistance for Malaysia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 5 February 1965, *External Affairs Review* XV, no. 2 (February 1965), 19-20. For more on New Zealand's military involvement in Malaysia during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, see Robert Gurr, *Voices From A Border War: Borneo 1963-1965*, revised edition (1995; Christchurch: Wilson Scott Publishing, 2009); Gerry Wright, *A Kivi on Our Funnel: The Story of HMNZS Hickleton and Santon* (New Plymouth: Gerry Wright, 2006).

⁵⁹ "Declaration on the Mounting Struggle against NEKOLIM (Resolution of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia," JKA 84/2/1, Part 2, ANZ, Wellington, 3;

⁶⁰ Confidential telegram, No. 58, Tui, Djakarta to External, Wellington, 23 April 1965, JKA 84/2/1, Part 2, ANZ, Wellington.

⁶¹ Confidential telegram, No. 60, Tui, Djakarta to External, Wellington, 26 April 1965, JKA 84/2/1, Part 2, ANZ, Wellington.

properties in Jakarta. Lochore took great pains to stress that unlike the other aforementioned “NEKOLIM” powers, New Zealand had absolutely no financial or economic interests in Indonesia. Thus, he feared that the Indonesians would take out their anger on the New Zealand Legation. On 25 May anti-Malaysian demonstrators marched outside the offices of the Legation and other Western missions in Jakarta.⁶² These protests were part of the campaign of harassment which the PKI and its affiliated trade unions were mounting against American and other Western interests in Indonesia. Such protests forced Western governments to downscale their diplomatic activities and assistance projects in Indonesia.⁶³ Lochore’s request was turned down by Mr. Roesman, the Indonesian chef of protocol, who assured him that the Indonesian Government would protect New Zealand’s diplomatic mission.⁶⁴ Deepening *Konfrontasi* tensions between Indonesia, Malaysia, and its Western supporters raised genuine fears among New Zealand policy-makers that a rapid escalation of conflict into open warfare would adversely affect Wellington’s relationship with Jakarta.

Sukarno’s adamant commitment to Indonesia’s *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia made it increasingly difficult for New Zealand to maintain friendly relations with Jakarta while at the same time fulfilling its Commonwealth defence obligations to assist Malaysia and Britain. By 1965 it had become virtually impossible for the New Zealand Government to reconcile these two contradictory goals. Therefore, the *Konfrontasi* had an adverse effect on Indonesian-New Zealand relations, leading to a sharp decline in bilateral trade and the reduction of New Zealand’s Colombo Plan aid programme. New Zealand imports from Indonesia dropped in value from \$5,984,000 in 1963 to a paltry \$776,000 by 1965. By January 1965 no New Zealand technical experts remained in Indonesia and future projects had been put on hold. The number of Indonesian students studying in New Zealand plummeted from 40 in 1963-64 to 23 in 1964-65, with most of these being English-language teachers. Throughout 1965 only 13 Indonesian students departed for New Zealand to study at the English Language Institute at Victoria University of Wellington. That same year, the New Zealand Government did not send any more capital expenditure or technical experts to Indonesia, and only gave a token book donation to the

⁶² Restricted telegram, R.A. Lochore, Djakarta to the Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, “Jakarta: Security of Property,” 6 May 1965, JKA 84/2/1, Part 2, ANZ, Wellington; “Chronology of International Events,” *External Affairs Review* XV, no. 5 (May 1965), 53.

⁶³ Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 191-192; Masters, “The United States and Indonesia: Personal Reflections,” 318-321.

⁶⁴ Restricted telegram, “Security of Legation Property Jakarta,” 27 May 1965, JKA 84/2/1, Part 2, ANZ, Wellington.

University of Medan's agricultural faculty.⁶⁵ Thus, New Zealand's Colombo Plan programme and trade with Indonesia became casualties of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation.

While Wellington regarded Jakarta's policy of *Konfrontasi* as misguided, Holyoake continued to stress that New Zealand still maintained warm feelings to the Indonesian people. Following a query from Alexander Marentek, the First Secretary of the Indonesian Embassy in Australia, Holyoake issued a public statement on 17 August 1965 denying that New Zealand was intending to break diplomatic relations with Indonesia. Despite Holyoake's assurances, Jakarta's growing estrangement from the West led Lochore to suggest scaling down the mission because it had failed to influence the Indonesian Government towards a pro-Western direction.⁶⁶ By October 1965, the New Zealand Legation in Jakarta had only four staff members, including the Minister to Indonesia Reuel Lochore, the Chargé d'affaires Paul Edmond, and the Second Secretary J. G. Carter.⁶⁷ In response to the growing anti-Western atmosphere in Indonesia, other Western embassies also began downscaling their operations and manpower in Indonesia. By October 1965, the US Embassy in Jakarta only had 35 staff, down from a high of several hundred members. However, the US Embassy still maintained its CIA station, which later assisted the Indonesian Army's anti-Communist campaign.⁶⁸ It would take an unforeseen event, the 30 September attempted coup, to arrest the downward spiral of New Zealand-Indonesian relations.

⁶⁵ J. Stephen Hoadley, "Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy: An Interpretation of New Zealand-Indonesian Relations," in *New Zealand Politics: A Reader*, ed. Stephen Levine (Melbourne: Chesire Publishing, 1975), 439-440; Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 167.

⁶⁶ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 168; "Diplomatic Relations with Indonesia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 17 August 1965, *External Affairs Review* XV, no. 8 (August 1965): 17.

⁶⁷ "No Reports from N.Z. Legation," *New Zealand Herald*, 4 October 1965; "Record of meeting on Wednesday, 24 March, 1967, Indonesia: Mr Paul Edmonds, Chargé d'affaires, New Zealand Legation in Djakarta," External Affairs Committee, External Affairs: Indonesia, Kirk1 4, ANZ, Wellington, 1-3.

⁶⁸ Masters, "The United States and Indonesia: Personal Reflections," 319-320; Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 171-194.

New Zealand, the 30 September coup attempt and after, 1965-66

Reflecting the influence of Cold War logic on foreign policy making, the New Zealand Government welcomed the Indonesian Army's anti-Communist "sweep" and the subsequent diminution of President Sukarno's political authority. Along with its Western counterparts, the New Zealand Department of External Affairs (NZDEA) accepted the official Indonesian Army account that the 30 September coup attempt was an unsuccessful Communist attempt to overthrow the Indonesian Government.⁶⁹ In a letter to the Secretary of External Affairs Alister D. McIntosh on 13 October 1965, R. A. Lochore cited a PKI newspaper's *Harian Rakjat* (People's Daily) editorial supporting the 30 September Movement as evidence of the PKI's complicity in the 30 September Movement.⁷⁰ A sympathetic NZDEA report on 31 March 1966 credited the Indonesian Army's unity for the defeat of the attempted Communist coup.⁷¹ According to Michael Green, the New Zealand Government adopted a policy of silence towards the abortive 30 September coup and the subsequent mass killings. Indeed, the only official comment on these events was a statement by Prime Minister Holyoake assuring that all New Zealanders in Indonesia were "safe and well."⁷² New Zealand policy-makers eagerly accepted the Indonesian Army's official version of events since it fitted with the dominant Western anti-Communist threat narrative. In addition, Holyoake consented to the Indonesian Army using a New Zealand Colombo Plan-funded trade training school for the purpose of training Indonesian Army personnel in technical skills; commenting that it was preferable that the Army rather than the PKI occupied the facilities.⁷³

The evidence in declassified archival records supports Green's contention that New Zealand policy-makers saw the Army-PKI power struggle as a means for the Indonesian military to wind down its Confrontation activities. They issued no significant public comments on Indonesia's political developments since they wanted to prevent the Communists from using

⁶⁹ Sir Andrew Gilchrist to Mr Stewart, "Attempted Coup in Indonesia," 19 October 1965, DH 1015/215, British foreign source document, PM 318/6/1, Part 29, ANZ, Wellington; Confidential cable, "The 30 September Affair – And After," 8 October 1965, New Zealand Legation Djakarta, PM 318/6/1, Part 29, ANZ, Wellington.

⁷⁰ Letter from R.A. Lochore, Djakarta to the Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, "Last Issue of *Harian Rakjat*, Jakarta," PM 318/6/1, Part 29, ANZ, Wellington; Enclosure, translation of *Harian Rakjat* editorial 2 October 1965, "The 30 September Movement," and accompanying cartoon, 13 October 1965, PM 318/6/1, Part 29, ANZ, Wellington.

⁷¹ "Indonesia," in the Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs, A.1, 31 March 1966, *Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand* (AJHRNZ) 1966, 31-32.

⁷² Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 168; "Indonesia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 4 October 1965, *External Affairs Review* XV, no. 10 (October 1965), 16.

⁷³ "Indonesian Army Uses Aid School," *The Press*, 17 November 1965.

Konfrontasi as a rallying point against the Army. Following the events of October 1965, Wellington was informed by Whitehall that the Indonesian Army leadership was seeking to end hostilities with Malaysia. While neither the Indonesians nor the Commonwealth powers were willing to withdraw their military forces from Borneo, both sides agreed to wind down operations while the Army was still preoccupied with the PKI. While New Zealand's allies welcomed the Suharto-led Army's desire for peace, Wellington doubted whether a Commonwealth peace initiative in Indonesia could succeed unless President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio were deposed.⁷⁴ According to Bradley Simpson, hyperinflation and economic hardship had created a shortage of the Indonesian staple crop: rice. While the Army leadership requested an emergency supply of "political" rice, Australian and New Zealand External Affairs officials were reluctant to supply the funds to purchase rice since they feared that pro-Communist elements would use any Western assistance to attack the national credentials of the Indonesian military.⁷⁵ Throughout late 1965 the New Zealand Legation in Jakarta monitored the Army-led anti-Communist crackdown and forwarded regular reports to External Affairs in Wellington.⁷⁶ Reuel Lochore's unsympathetic view of the PKI was reinforced by a meeting with an Indonesian Foreign Ministry official named Razif who told him that the PKI was compiling a list of Indonesian anti-Communists and Western nationals to kill.⁷⁷ The New Zealand Government's pro-Army sympathies during the 30 September coup attempt and the subsequent mass killings showed that it shared the same anti-Communist threat perceptions as its Western counterparts.

In addition, New Zealand officials also took part in secret Quadripartite talks in London with their American, British, and Australian counterparts on 1-2 December 1965 to coordinate policy towards Indonesia. During the talks, the four Anglophone governments agreed to support the TNI because it was seen as the only institution in Indonesia that was able to challenge President Sukarno and end the *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia. Since they could not be seen to support the Army directly, the Western governments decided to aid it indirectly through a propaganda campaign against the PKI and Sukarno. While they agreed to avoid "deliberately dismembering"

⁷⁴ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 168-169; Secret cable, London to Wellington, 18 April 1966, JKA 84/2/1, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

⁷⁵ Simpson, *Economists With Guns*, 196.

⁷⁶ Confidential cable, "Annex to: 30 September Affair – And After," 8 October 1965, New Zealand Legation Djakarta, PM 318/6/1, Part 29, ANZ, Wellington; Restricted cable, "Political Parties and the Gestapu," 15 October 1965, New Zealand Legation Djakarta, PM 318/6/1, Part 29, ANZ, Wellington.

⁷⁷ Secret cable, R.A. Lochore, Djakarta to Alister D. McIntosh, Wellington, 15 October 1965, PM 318/6/1, Part 29, ANZ, Wellington; Lochore's antipathy towards the Indonesian Communists and anti-Communist leanings stemmed from an incident during his student days in Germany when he was beaten up by several German Communists. See Freya Klier, *Promised New Zealand: Fleeing Nazi Persecution*, 13-14.

Indonesia, they decided not to resume official economic aid to Indonesia until Sukarno had been removed from power in order to use the economic crisis to discredit Sukarno's government and to pave the way for a pro-Western Indonesian regime.⁷⁸ According to John Subritzky, the four Anglophone governments also agreed to delay a *Konfrontasi* peace settlement until the Indonesian Army established its control over Indonesia. If an attempt to negotiate a settlement to the conflict was made too early, Anglophone policy-makers reasoned that it could be used by Sukarno to discredit the Army as a "Western stooge" and reassert his power. In the words of Reuel Lochore, "any suggestions for a saner [Indonesian] foreign policy will be used by the communists as evidence that the Army is working hand-in-glove with the reactionary forces of NEKOLIM."⁷⁹ Similarly, the New Zealand Joint Intelligence Committee (NZJIC) noted that the Indonesian generals privately wanted to end the Confrontation but were not yet in a sufficiently strong political position to adopt such a policy publicly.⁸⁰ The December 1965 Quadripartite talks showed that Cold War strategic priorities led New Zealand and its Anglophone allies to maintain a common policy towards Indonesia.

External Affairs diplomats and policy-makers in both Jakarta and Wellington welcomed Sukarno's transfer of executive authority to Suharto on 11 March 1966, a date which marked the birth of the New Order regime. Despite this development, the New Zealand Government was still reluctant to join the United States and other allies in providing aid to the new Indonesian Government until there was sufficient evidence that it was interested in ending the *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia. This policy of caution had led A. D. McIntosh, the Secretary of External Affairs, to reject Reuel Lochore's proposal to donate rice to Indonesia despite the deteriorating Indonesian economic situation. While McIntosh accepted Lochore's favourable report of events in Indonesia, he reasoned that New Zealand adopt a "wait and see" approach to the New Order regime.⁸¹ A May 1966 *External Affairs Review* article on the "Recent Moves in Indonesia" gave a glowing report of the New Order regime's efforts to reverse the previous Sukarno government's policies. On the domestic front, the NZDEA staff writer praised the Suharto regime for banning

⁷⁸ Easter, "Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling," 65-66; Simpson, *Economists With Guns*, 195.

⁷⁹ Subritzky, *Confronting Sukarno*, 177; Letter, R.A. Lochore, Djakarta to A.D. McIntosh, Secretary of External Affairs, 12 October 1965, PM 318/6/1, Part 29, ANZ, Wellington.

⁸⁰ "Indonesia: Confrontation," *JIC* (Joint Intelligence Committee) *Intelligence Review*, 16 November 1965, no. 50/65, CAB 235/1/2, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington. The NZJIC was an interdepartmental committee of New Zealand permanent heads that had oversight over the operations of the Joint Intelligence Office, the predecessor to the current National Assessment Bureau, a section of the intelligence and analysis directorate of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC). In 1975, the NZJIC was replaced by the New Zealand Intelligence Committee. See Pat Helm (DPMC), "Further Information in Response to your Questions on JIC/JIO," email to the author, 17 March 2015.

⁸¹ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 169.

the Communist Party, arresting left-wing pro-Sukarno ministers, and for its willingness to address Indonesia's ailing economy. On the foreign policy front, developments such as the breakdown of the Jakarta-Beijing Axis, and the New Order regime's efforts to end conflict with Malaysia and to improve relations with the West were seen as positive signs for post-Sukarno New Zealand-Indonesian relations. The same *External Affairs Review* article encapsulated the bipolar outlook of Cold War-era New Zealand policy-makers who viewed the developing world as a battleground between the Free World and Communism.⁸²

Because of New Zealand's relationship with Britain and Malaysia, the New Zealand Government welcomed an end to hostilities between Indonesia and Malaysia. On 2 June 1966 Prime Minister Holyoake heralded the resumption of Malaysian-Indonesian peace talks in Bangkok in May as a sign that Jakarta was interested in repairing its relations with Kuala Lumpur.⁸³ Holyoake also promised that New Zealand would withdraw its military forces in Borneo if Indonesia ended its Confrontation with Malaysia.⁸⁴ Since the *Konfrontasi* did not formally end until July 1966, New Zealand renewed its military assistance programme to Malaysia in March 1966.⁸⁵ In July 1966 two developments signalled a thaw in the New Zealand-Indonesian relationship. Firstly, New Zealand delegates attended an international conference of Indonesia's non-Communist creditors in Tokyo on 27 July to address Indonesia's economic problems. Secondly, on 27 July 1966, Holyoake welcomed the appointment of Suharto's new cabinet which excluded Sukarno supporters like the former Foreign Minister Subandrio.⁸⁶ Following the ratification of the Bangkok Accord in August 1966, which formally ended hostilities between Malaysia and Indonesia, Prime Minister Holyoake issued a statement welcoming the end of *Konfrontasi*, in the hope that "wiser and more statesmanlike counsels" in Jakarta would prevail. Announcing the withdrawal of New Zealand's forces from Borneo he also added that New Zealand looked forward to a full resumption of friendly relations with

⁸² "Recent Moves in Indonesia," *External Affairs Review* XVI, no. 5 (May 1966), 10-14.

⁸³ "Malaysia/Indonesia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 2 June 1966, *External Affairs Review* XVI, no. 6 (June 1966), 23.

⁸⁴ "New Zealand Forces in Borneo," Statement by the Prime Minister, 8 June 1966, *External Affairs Review* XVI, no. 6 (June 1966), 24.

⁸⁵ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 169; Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs, A.1, *Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand* 1966, 3-4, 31-32, 41.

⁸⁶ "Aid to Indonesia," Statement by the Prime Minister, 20 July 1966, *External Affairs Review* XVI, no. 7 (July 1966), 25; "The New Indonesian Cabinet," Statement by the Prime Minister, 27 July 1966, *External Affairs Review* XVI, no. 7 (July 1966), 30.

Indonesia.⁸⁷ Indonesia's abandonment of Confrontation allowed New Zealand to withdraw its military forces from Malaysian Borneo in August 1966. The closing curtain on the Sukarno era coincided with the reassignment of New Zealand's Minister to Indonesia, R. A. Lochore, to his new posting as New Zealand's first Ambassador to West Germany in 1966.⁸⁸ The warming of New Zealand-Indonesian bilateral relations during the early Suharto years led to the exchange of Ambassadors between Wellington and Jakarta in 1968. During Suharto's New Order, New Zealand's relationship with Indonesia benefitted from the emergence of a pro-Western regime in Jakarta which shared Wellington's interests in opposing Communism and promoting capitalism and free trade.⁸⁹

Conclusion

The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation marked the swan song of the Sukarno presidency and was driven by Sukarno's bipolar New Emerging Forces worldview. The *Konfrontasi* exacerbated internal divisions within Indonesian society which ultimately contributed to the downfall of Sukarno and the Indonesian Communists, and the rise of General Suharto's New Order. The New Zealand Government's Commonwealth ties to the United Kingdom and Malaysia strained relations with Jakarta during the *Konfrontasi*. While reluctant to risk conflict with Indonesia by sending troops to fight in Malaysian Borneo, the Keith Holyoake-led National Government was ultimately forced to prioritise its Commonwealth obligations over its desire to maintain good relations with Indonesia. The New Zealand Government accepted the Indonesian Army's official version of the 30 September coup attempt since it fitted with its anti-Communist Cold War narrative. While New Zealand did not play a major role in Indonesia following the events of October 1965, Wellington's Western alliance ties and Cold War security priorities led it to condone the Army-dominated New Order's efforts to destroy the PKI and to unseat President Sukarno. Having addressed the New Zealand Government's response to the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, we can now move on to the public debate around that conflict.

⁸⁷ "Agreement to End Confrontation," Statement by the Prime Minister, 11 August 1966, *External Affairs Review* XVI, no. 8 (August 1966), 23-24.

⁸⁸ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, 246-250, 227-240; Klier, *Promised New Zealand: Fleeing Nazi Persecution*, 241.

⁸⁹ Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," 169-71; "Visit of Indonesian Foreign Minister," *External Affairs Review* XVIII, no. 4 (April 1968): 10-18.

Chapter Five: The domestic debate around the Indonesian-Malaysian *Konfrontasi*, 1963-1966

This chapter examines the domestic debate in New Zealand surrounding the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation/*Konfrontasi*, which ended President Sukarno's rule. It complements the above discussion of the New Zealand Government's response to the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation by exploring how New Zealand society as a whole responded to the *Konfrontasi*. It examines four different groups: the press, the two dominant political parties, the New Zealand National Party (NZNP) and the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP), the political Left, and New Zealand expatriates and visitors in Indonesia. The mainstream New Zealand press generally agreed with the Government's military support for Malaysia and viewed Indonesia as the aggressor in the *Konfrontasi*. Both the National Government and the opposition Labour Party supported New Zealand's involvement in Malaysia, which generated far less controversy than New Zealand's escalating involvement in Vietnam.¹ By contrast, the political Left, particularly the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) and the editors and contributors to the left-wing magazine *New Zealand Monthly Review*, were critical of New Zealand policies towards Malaysia and were more sympathetic towards the Indonesians.² In the final section, I will examine the perspectives of New Zealand expatriates and visitors who were present in Indonesia during the *Konfrontasi* and the 30 September coup attempt, focusing on the autobiographical recollections of Marie Gray, a New Zealand Presbyterian missionary nurse living in Java, and Rewi Alley, a New Zealand Communist who had lived in China for most of his adult life.³ While these two New Zealanders cannot be said to fully represent the full spectrum of New Zealand public opinion, they provide two unique and conflicting New Zealand perspectives of the Indonesian events of 1965-66.

The Press

As a whole, the mainstream New Zealand press largely supported the Government's military assistance to Malaysia and viewed Indonesia as the main aggressor in the Confrontation.

¹ Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), 155; "Labour, S. Vietnam & Malaysia," *The Southland Times*, 16 April 1964.

² Ray Nunes, *The Truth about Vietnam, Laos, 'Malaysia,' and Indonesia* (Auckland: Communist Party of New Zealand, 1964), 2, 16-33; Mark D. Sadler, "Malaysia – the need for Caution," *New Zealand Monthly Review* V, no. 55 (April 1965): 8-10.

³ Marie Gray, *Tamu: New Zealand family in Java* (1988; Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya, 2001).



Figure 26: Gordon Mihinnick's cartoon attacking Australian and New Zealand leaders for their "soft" stance towards Sukarno. Credits: *New Zealand Herald* on 7 January 1964

For the purposes of this chapter, I have limited my survey to five daily newspapers: *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), *The Dominion* (Wellington), *The Press* (Christchurch), the *Otago Daily Times* (Dunedin), the *Southland Times* (Invercargill), all mainstream and moderately conservative publications. In addition, I have sampled five national periodicals: the liberal *New Zealand Listener*, the populist tabloid *New Zealand Truth*, the pro-business *New Zealand Economist & Taxpayer* (NZE&T), the Presbyterian fortnightly magazine *The Outlook*, and the conservative Catholic weekly *New Zealand Tablet* (NZ Tablet). During the 1960s print media along with radio were the main news media. Television was still a relatively new technology and was only available in black and white for limited hours on one channel.⁴ Most of the daily New Zealand newspapers sourced their Indonesian reports from news agencies like the New Zealand Press Association (NZPA), Associated Press, and Reuters. Several daily newspapers published editorial standpoints advocating New Zealand support for Malaysia and condemning Indonesian aggression.⁵ Two New Zealand cartoonists, Sid Scales and George Henderson, published cartoons mocking

⁴ John Parker, *Frontier of Dreams: Into the 21st Century, 1947-2005* (Auckland: Scholastic New Zealand, 2005), 33; Brian Pauling, "Radio," *Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand*, updated 13 October 2014, <http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/radio/print>.

⁵ Editorial, "Fruits of Appeasement," *New Zealand Herald* (NZH), 20 September 1963; Editorial, "Aiding Malaysia," *Southland Times* (ST), 14 April 1964.

Sukarno's policies including *Konfrontasi*.⁶ However, there was little discussion of New Zealand policy towards the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation within the letters sections of the newspapers and periodicals that I have surveyed. Some critics of the Vietnam War like Keith Sinclair, a prominent University of Auckland historian, were prepared to acquiesce to New Zealand's involvement in the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation on the grounds that New Zealand was assisting a democratic Malaysia against external aggression.⁷ The most hotly contested foreign affairs issues of the 1960s were the escalating Vietnam conflict, sporting contacts with South Africa, and the Rhodesian Crisis.⁸

The New Zealand press viewed the failed Brunei Revolt in December 1962 as an unsuccessful attempt by Indonesia to sabotage Malaysia and to advance its expansionist ambitions towards its smaller neighbour. A *New Zealand Herald* (hereafter *NZH*) editorial published on 17 December concluded that the Brunei revolt lacked popular support and insinuated that Sukarno's anti-colonial rhetoric harboured his expansionistic ambitions.⁹ A *Press* editorial also expounded on the expansionist theme by highlighting Indonesian sabotage.¹⁰ A more balanced *Otago Daily Times* (hereafter *ODT*) editorial examined the Brunei Revolt in the context of mounting domestic opposition towards Malaysia, and Indonesian and Filipino territorial ambitions. The editor urged the British authorities to proceed cautiously with the Malaysian Plan due to the strong anti-Malaysian opposition in Brunei.¹¹ A follow-up *ODT* editorial on 21 December 1962 opined that Sukarno's success during the West Papua campaign had fuelled his territorial ambitions towards British Borneo and Portuguese Timor.¹² While press opinion largely favoured Malaysia, one dissenting reader named Harry Richardson penned a letter in *The Dominion* on 28 December in which he blamed the outbreak of the Brunei Revolt on the Sultan of Brunei's decision to impinge on his subjects' limited democratic rights by suspending the constitution. According to Richardson, the act of sending planes to ferry British

⁶ Sid Scales, "Confrontation – neo-colonialism, and now Scottish Imperialism!," cartoon, *Otago Daily Times* (*ODT*) 18 September 1963; George Henderson, "Mark my words, no Kiwi is the simple country lad he looks," cartoon, *Taranaki Daily News*, 17 April 1964.

⁷ Keith Sinclair, "Debate on Vietnam," letters, *New Zealand Listener* (*NZ Listener*), 9 July 1965, 10.

⁸ Letters, "Crisis in Vietnam," *NZ Listener*, 4 June 1965, 10; Letters, "Rhodesia," *ODT*, 18 November 1965; Richard Thompson, "Race, Kinship and Policy: Africa and New Zealand," in *New Zealand in World Affairs Volume II, 1957-1972*, ed. Malcolm McKinnon (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1991), 95-121.

⁹ Editorial, "Effect of Brunei Uprising," *NZH*, 17 December 1962.

¹⁰ Editorial, "Brunei Aftermath," *The Press*, 20 December 1962.

¹¹ Editorial, "A Broil in Brunei," *ODT*, 11 December 1962.

¹² Editorial, "Blind-eye policy," *ODT*, 21 December 1962.

reinforcements to Brunei amounted to New Zealand fighting against the Bruneians.¹³ Richardson's admonitions were drowned out by the pro-interventionist standpoint of the mainstream press.

In response to Indonesian-sponsored incursions into the Sarawak and Sabah, a *NZH* editorial in early September 1963 stated that New Zealand had an obligation to send troops to Malaysian Borneo, citing the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement that linked New Zealand to the defence of Malaya and its expanded successor, Malaysia.¹⁴ A second *NZH* editorial later that month called on Australia and New Zealand to take a greater interest in Malaysia's security in light of Indonesian subversion and declining British influence.¹⁵ A third *NZH* editorial published on 16 September 1963 praised the Malaysian Government's cooperation with a United Nations Ascertainment Mission, which confirmed majority support for the Federation in Sarawak and Sabah.¹⁶ The *Herald's* calls for New Zealand to make a stronger contribution to Malaysia's defence were echoed by other metropolitan newspapers including the *ODT* and *The Dominion*.¹⁷ Following the inauguration of Indonesia's "Crush Malaysia" campaign which manifested into attacks on British and Malaysian diplomatic and commercial interests, a fourth *NZH* editorial on 20 September called on Western governments to abandon their "policy of appeasement" towards Sukarno, and implied that Sukarno was becoming an "Asian Hitler."¹⁸ *The Press* editorial on 20 September 1963 argued that Sukarno's anti-colonial rhetoric masked his expansionist ambitions. *The Press* praised Prime Minister Holyoake for offering New Zealand's full support to the infant Malaysian state, which it viewed as a stabilizing influence in an unstable region.¹⁹ The *Southland Times* editorialised on 24 September that Sukarno's "foreign adventures" in West Papua and Malaysia were an unnecessary diversion from tackling Indonesia's developmental and economic problems.²⁰ In September 1963, the *ODT* published two of Sid Scales' cartoons depicting Sukarno as a hate-filled demagogue and the "Big Bad Wolf" in the story of Red Riding Hood. The latter cartoon implied that Western attempts to appease Sukarno with economic aid failed to satisfy his expansionistic ambitions.²¹ Throughout September 1963,

¹³ Harry Richardson, letter, "Imperialism," *The Dominion*, 28 December 1962.

¹⁴ Editorial, "Obligation to Aid Malaysia," *NZH*, 2 September 1963.

¹⁵ Editorial, "Future Links with Malaysia," *NZH*, 12 September 1963.

¹⁶ Editorial, "Nationhood Confirmed for Malaysia," *NZH*, 16 September 1963.

¹⁷ Editorial, "Defence for Malaysia," *ODT*, 3 September 1963; Editorial, "Malaysia, a Fledgling Worth Protecting," *The Dominion*, 17 September 1963.

¹⁸ Editorial, "Fruits of Appeasement," *NZH*, 20 September 1963.

¹⁹ Editorial, "Indonesian Threat to Malaysia," *The Press*, 20 September 1963.

²⁰ Editorial, "Keeping Indonesia Within Bounds," *Southland Times*, 24 September 1963.

²¹ Sid Scales, "Confrontation – neo-colonialism, and now Scottish Imperialism!," cartoon, *ODT*, 18 September 1963; Sid Scales, "Oh grandma – what big eyes you have!," *ODT*, 26 September 1963.

the dominant theme within the mainstream press was that New Zealand should aid a beleaguered Malaysia against Indonesian expansionism. There was little appreciation of Sukarno's anti-colonial motivations. Malaysia was widely regarded as a friendly Commonwealth ally and a successful anti-Communist domino.



Figure 27: Sid Scales' cartoon depicting Sukarno as the "big, bad wolf."
Credits: *Otago Daily Times*, 26 September 1963.

The New Zealand press reacted negatively to Prime Minister Holyoake's brief state visit to Indonesia on 18 April 1964. Holyoake had visited Jakarta to reiterate New Zealand's desire to continue peaceful relations with Indonesia despite its military support for Malaysia; two increasingly irreconcilable goals in the light of President Sukarno's uncompromising opposition to Malaysia. A *New Zealand Herald* editorial published on 21 April chided Holyoake for not condemning Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia and urged New Zealand to use its military aid to Malaysia to secure good behaviour concessions from the Indonesians.²² A third *NZH* editorial on 22 April commented on recent reports of North Korean military assistance to Indonesia. In the editorialist's view, Jakarta's receipt of this assistance shattered any illusion that Western diplomacy and aid could dissuade Indonesia from joining Communist alliances.²³ This *NZH* editorial exposed the Cold War outlook underpinning mainstream New Zealand discourses of international events. The *ODT* and *Southland Times* viewed Holyoake's visit as an

²² Editorial, "Policy towards Indonesia," *NZH*, 21 April 1964.

²³ Editorial, "Communist Aid for Soekarno," *NZH*, 22 April 1964.

unnecessary waste of public expenditure in the light of New Zealand's avowed support for Malaysia against Indonesian aggression.²⁴ On a more positive note, *The Dominion* defended the visit as a conciliatory gesture by the New Zealand Prime Minister to convince Sukarno to end the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation.²⁵

Holyoake's 1964 Jakarta visit was also lampooned by several newspaper cartoonists. The *ODT* cartoonist Sid Scales depicted Holyoake as a hopeless snake charmer being ensnared by a serpentine Sukarno in the presence of New Zealand's disapproving allies, Australia and Britain. Scales' cartoon implicitly stated that the Holyoake Government's "independent line" towards Indonesia breached the Commonwealth alliance arrayed against Indonesia.²⁶ However, assertions that New Zealand took an "independent line" must be treated with caution: Wellington's "independent line" simply amounted to visiting Sukarno to clarify New Zealand's pro-Malaysian policy.²⁷ Meanwhile, the *Taranaki Daily News* cartoonist George Henderson depicted Sukarno as a wannabe Hitler with megalomaniacal ambitions.²⁸ These two cartoons captured the underlying anti-Sukarno current within New Zealand press discourse during the *Konfrontasi*. The Holyoake visit also generated some discussion within the letters sections of the *ODT* and the *Press*. 'R.E.K' urged the Prime Minister to abandon his efforts to pursue friendly relations with Indonesia in the light of Sukarno's fraternization with the Communist powers.²⁹ "P.J.A." denounced Malaysia as an artificially-contrived colonial puppet state and urged New Zealand not to be led into another "foreign war". P.J.A.'s letter attracted an immediate rebuke from "Caractacus" who argued that New Zealand was obligated to assist Malaysia against Indonesian aggression.³⁰

In September 1964 the New Zealand press supported the Government's decision to send troops to counter Indonesian incursions into Peninsular Malaysia. On 5 September the *New Zealand Herald* denounced Indonesia's peninsular incursions as a "fragrant act of aggression"

²⁴ Editorial, "Where Do We Stand?," *ODT*, 21 April 1964; Editorial, "Aiding Malaysia," *Southland Times*, 14 April 1964.

²⁵ Editorial, "Mr Holyoake Among the Indonesians," *The Dominion*, 23 April 1964.

²⁶ Sid Scales, "Fancies himself as a bit of a snake charmer," cartoon, *ODT*, 16 April 1964.

²⁷ Barry Gustafson, *Kivi Keith: A Biography of Keith Holyoake* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2007), 220; Michael Green, "Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia," in *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 165-66.

²⁸ George Duncan Henderson, "Mark my words, no Kiwi is the simple country lad he looks," cartoon, *Taranaki Daily News*, 17 April 1964.

²⁹ Letter to the editor, "Indonesia," *ODT*, 18 April 1964.

³⁰ Letter to the editor, "Malaysia and Indonesia," *The Press*, 14 April 1964; Letter to the editor, "Malaysia and Indonesia," *The Press*, 15 April 1964.

designed to provoke Malaysia into launching an attack on Indonesian territory, which would give Sukarno the opportunity to claim that he was the “victim of imperialist aggression.”³¹ A follow-up *NZH* editorial on 7 September warned New Zealanders to be prepared for war with Indonesia.³² A *NZH* editorial on 19 September discussed the outcome of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting condemning Indonesian aggression in Malaysia, in which only a Soviet veto had protected Indonesia from international condemnation. The editorial saw this as a sign that world opinion was turning against Indonesia’s Confrontation.³³ In a similar vein, *The Press* editorial on 19 September viewed the September UNSC meeting as a moral victory for Malaysia. For the editor, Indonesian denunciations of Malaysia as a British “puppet state” exposed the hollowness of the Indonesian argument that Malaysia threatened to Indonesia.³⁴ A *Dominion* editorial on 2 September 1964 argued that Sukarno’s campaign against Malaysia overlooked the fact that a majority of the Malaysian people had endorsed the Federation.³⁵ A follow-up *Dominion* editorial on 17 September examined New Zealand’s role in the defence of Malaysia. It cautioned against the use of Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) bombers stationed in Malaysia for airstrikes against Indonesia on the grounds that they would escalate *Konfrontasi* tensions.³⁶ Throughout the New Zealand press, New Zealand’s military involvement in *Konfrontasi* was presented as a legitimate response to Indonesian aggression towards Malaysia. Sukarno was seen as another dictator like Hitler or Mussolini, whose fraternisation with the Communists only damned him.

The New Zealand press also reported on the 30 September coup attempt and the Indonesian Army’s anti-Communist campaign. Influenced by a sustained propaganda blitz by the Indonesian Army and several Western governments depicting Sukarno and the Indonesian Communists in a negative light, most international news media, including the New Zealand press, accepted the official Indonesian version that the 30 September Movement was a failed Communist coup attempt.³⁷ The *ODT* editorialised that the 30 September Incident was a Communist coup attempt which had been galvanized by President Sukarno’s ill-health and reports of a right-wing plot. The *ODT* also wrongly predicted that right-wing Muslim leaders

³¹ Editorial, “Fragrant Indonesian Aggression,” *NZH*, 5 September 1964.

³² Editorial, “Military Commitment in Malaya,” *NZH*, 7 September 1964.

³³ Editorial, “Russian Veto Cloaks Indonesia,” *NZH*, 19 September 1964.

³⁴ Editorial, “Russia’s Veto,” *The Press*, 19 September 1964.

³⁵ Editorial, “Unhappy Birthday for Malaysia,” *The Dominion*, 2 September 1964.

³⁶ Editorial, “NZ’s Role in Malaysia’s Defence,” *The Dominion*, 17 September 1964.

³⁷ David Easter, “Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling: Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965-March 1966,” *Cold War History* 5, no. 1 (February 2005), 62-69; Bradley Simpson, *Economists With Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations 1960-1968* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 171-206

would be the main victors when the dust settled. In fact, it was the Indonesian Army that emerged as the main victor of the Indonesian coup attempt.³⁸ An *ODT* cartoon by Sid Scales depicted the PKI as a back-stabbing serpent sneaking up on an unsuspecting Sukarno.³⁹




Figure 28: Sid Scales' cartoon blaming the Indonesian Communists for the 30 September "coup attempt." Credits: *Otago Daily Times*, 6 October 1965.

In the following months leading up to General Suharto's acquisition of executive powers on 11 March 1966 there was sporadic coverage of Indonesian developments in the New Zealand press but little discussion of the coup attempt, the anti-Communist mass killings, or the rise of the New Order.⁴⁰ An *ODT* editorial on 15 March 1966 welcomed the Army's takeover as the end of the "troublesome" President Sukarno's political career. While Sukarno remained head of state, all political powers now rested with General Suharto. Despite acknowledging President Sukarno's role in securing Indonesia's independence, the editorial contended that his vociferous nationalism and pro-Communist leanings threatened Australia and New Zealand.⁴¹ Reflecting the influence of Cold War ideology, a subsequent *ODT* editorial on 19 March welcomed Suharto's political ascension as the beginning of a new era in New Zealand-Indonesian relations.⁴²

³⁸ Editorial, "Clash in Indonesia," *ODT*, 5 October 1965; Bradley Simpson, *Economists With Guns*, 252-56.

³⁹ Cartoon, "Commofrontation [sic]," *ODT*, 6 October 1965.

⁴⁰ "More Fighting In Indonesia," *ODT*, 12 October 1965; "Indonesians Rush Shops as Food Prices Soar," *ODT*, 27 November 1965; "Top Communist Reported To Be Dead," *ODT*, 30 November 1965.

⁴¹ Editorial, "New Indonesian Leader," *ODT*, 15 March 1966.

⁴² Editorial, "Hate-in-a-mist," *ODT*, 19 March 1966.

Despite its substantial coverage and discussion of the escalating Vietnam War, sporting contacts with South Africa, and the Rhodesian Crisis, the moderately liberal weekly current affairs/radio review and television guide *New Zealand Listener* paid little attention to the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. On 6 August 1963 a *Listener* editorial discussing opposition to the Vietnam War briefly mentioned that Indonesia had to be “restrained from reckless adventure.”⁴³ On 15 August 1965 the *Listener* published extracts from a radio interview between Harry Benda, a former New Zealand resident and history professor at Yale University, and K. Funnell, the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation’s (NZBC) Senior Public Affairs Officer, in which they discussed Communism in Asia and focused on the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Indonesian Communist parties. In the article, Benda challenged the view that Asian Communism was part of a monolithic Communist world conspiracy and rejected the domino theory, a common assumption which dominated official and public Cold War discourses in New Zealand. Benda, who had lived in Indonesia during the Japanese occupation, had earlier attracted some controversy for questioning orthodox Western assumptions that liberal democracy was the best model of governance for Indonesia.⁴⁴ Despite its sparse coverage of *Konfrontasi*, the *Listener* nevertheless published a sharp exchange of letters discussing the conflict between July and September 1964. On 10 July the Christchurch resident P. J. Alley, a relative of the New Zealand Communist and China-based expatriate Rewi Alley, wrote a letter disparaging the mainstream media’s coverage of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. He argued that Indonesia was fighting against colonialism and that Malaysia was an artificial state created to bolster British interests in the region.⁴⁵ Alley’s letter attracted two critical responses from Robert P. Montfort and an M. TRFW. Montfort argued that Indonesia was pursuing a contradictory policy since its cross-border incursions into Malaysia violated the Bandung principles. In response to Alley’s assertion that the Western powers were pitting Asians against Asians, he observed that the Soviets were doing the same thing by selling arms to the Indonesian military. Meanwhile, an M. TRFW, a fellow Christchurch resident, denounced Alley as a Communist propagandist and rubbished the Indonesian argument that a small country like Malaysia could threaten 100 million Indonesians.⁴⁶ A left-wing reader, Y. T. Hsieh, sprang to Alley’s defence by arguing that Indonesia was not entirely responsible for all of Malaysia’s internal problems, which he blamed

⁴³ Editorial, “A Place for Dissenters,” *NZ Listener*, 6 August 1963, 10.

⁴⁴ Harry Benda and K. Funnell, “Communism in South-East Asia,” *NZ Listener*, 13 August 1965; Anthony J. S. Reid, “Sukarno and the Nature of Indonesian Political Society: a review of the literature,” *New Zealand Journal of History* 11, Part 1 (May 1977), 78-79.

⁴⁵ P.J. Alley, letter, “Indonesia and Malaysia,” *NZ Listener*, 10 July 1964, 9.

⁴⁶ Robert P. Montfort and M. TRFW, letters, “Indonesia and Malaysia,” *NZ Listener*, 31 July 1964, 8.

on an unrepresentative electoral system and the Malaysian Government's anti-Communist policies. Hsieh also lamented that people who questioned the official New Zealand view on *Konfrontasi* were labelled Communists or Sinophiles.⁴⁷ In response to the exchange between government supporters and Indonesian "apologists", another *Listener* reader, N. Y. K. Foo, urged Malaysia, Indonesia, and their international backers to resolve their differences peacefully. He argued that the political feuding between Sukarno and the Tunku were caused by "rotten economic circumstances."⁴⁸ While the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation was a sideshow to other contemporary international issues in the *NZ Listener*, it still did not fail to trigger some public debate within its pages.

There was sparse coverage of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation in the *New Zealand Truth*, a socially conservative, populist weekly tabloid magazine that focused on domestic and sports news. However, *Truth* did carry a sharp cartoon mocking Prime Minister Holyoake's Indonesian state visit in April 1964. The cartoon crudely depicted a malevolent-looking Sukarno rebuffing a proposal by a timid Holyoake to visit New Zealand on the grounds that he was "tied up" with *Konfrontasi* in Borneo. The caption also referred to North Korean assistance to Indonesia. This cartoon decried the futility of the New Zealand Government's efforts to maintain peaceful relations with Indonesia in the face of the latter's unwillingness to seek peace with Malaysia. In addition, Sukarno's fraternisation with the Communist states made him untrustworthy to deal with.⁴⁹ While *NZ Truth* issued no serious commentary on the *Konfrontasi*, it still published articles on New Zealand troops stationed in Malaysia and New Zealand Army advertisements promoting overseas tours in Malaysia.⁵⁰ A *NZ Economist & Taxpayer* editorial, published on 1 February 1964, commented that certain influential people, particularly in defence circles, were dissatisfied with the timidity of the Government's attitude towards President Sukarno. The editor correctly observed that the Americans had the most important influence on Western policy towards Indonesia, concluding that only Washington alone could decide whether Sukarno had "gone far enough."⁵¹ A follow-up article published in May 1965 concluded that

⁴⁷ Y.T. Hsieh, letter, "Indonesia and Malaysia," *NZ Listener*, 14 August 1964.

⁴⁸ N.Y.K. Foo, letter, "Indonesia and Malaysia," *NZ Listener*, 11 September 1964.

⁴⁹ Cartoon, "I don't think I'll be visiting you yet, Keith. I'm a bit tied up in Borneo, and then the Aussies, the British, and the Tunku are giving me trouble," *New Zealand Truth (NZ Truth)*, 28 April 1964.

⁵⁰ "NZ Troops' morale is as high as ever," *NZ Truth*, 29 September 1964; Advertisement, "Here's Your Chance – Malaya, Here's Action! Variety! Adventure!," *NZ Truth*, 21 July 1964.

⁵¹ "Pointers in Politics: Exacting Tasks Ahead," *NZ E & T*, 1 February 1964, 437.

Konfrontasi was a threat not only to New Zealand's economic interests in Malaysia but also to the Indonesian economy.⁵²



Figure 29: The *New Zealand Truth's* cartoonist West mocking Prime Minister Holyoake's state visit to Indonesia in April 1964.

The publisher Dennis McEldowney contributed a contemplative commentary on the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation to the Presbyterian Church's publication *The Outlook* in February 1964. He criticized the *NZ Herald's* "Hitlerian Sukarno" discourse by pointing to the ulterior political motives behind Malaysia's creation. McEldowney also opined that New Zealand should look for better ways of showing its concern for Asia other than sending men to die overseas.⁵³ By contrast, the missionary Margaret Kirk, another *Outlook* contributor, expressed relief at the defeat of the alleged Communist 30 September coup attempt, observing that the Communists would have purged the Indonesian Christian community had they won.⁵⁴ The conservative Catholic *NZ Tablet* adopted a harsh position towards Indonesia in line with its anti-Communist and pro-Western stance. A July 1964 editorial by "Veritas" linked Indonesian and Viet Cong aggression in Borneo and Vietnam to the wider Cold War.⁵⁵ In September 1964 the

⁵² "Vital Economic Interest in Malaysia," *NZ E & T*, 1 May 1965, 47-48.

⁵³ Dennis McEldowney, "This is New Zealand: Indonesia and Malaysia," *The Outlook* 71, no. 2 (22 February 1964), 15.

⁵⁴ Margaret Kirk, "Gerapi: An Indonesia response to Communism," *The Outlook* 73, no. 16 (3 September 1966), 15-16.

⁵⁵ Veritas, "Crisis In the North," *NZ Tablet* XCI, no. 26 (1 July 1964), 11.

conservative *Tablet* contributor Richard Pattee denounced Indonesian aggression against Malaysia as a cover for Indonesia's imperialist ambitions.⁵⁶ Thus, with few exceptions, the mainstream New Zealand press generally reproduced the official Government narrative that New Zealand was aiding a beleaguered Malaysia in the face of Indonesian aggression. Minority voices highlighting Indonesian grievances towards Malaysia or questioning Government policy towards Malaysia were marginalised. The media also welcomed General Suharto's triumph over President Sukarno and his PKI allies as a good start to better relations between Indonesia and the West. Press coverage of the *Konfrontasi* reflected public acceptance of the Government's Cold War narrative that Communism was a threat to democracy and free trade.

National and Labour

During the Cold War, the National and Labour parties were the two dominant political parties in New Zealand's unicameral Parliament under its First-Past-the-Post electoral system which marginalized third parties like Social Credit and the Communist Party. The National Party was the country's main classical liberal and conservative political party and represented farmers, businessmen, many employers and managerial interests. The Labour Party was the main social democratic party and drew its support from trade unionists, some manufacturers, intellectuals, and workers.⁵⁷ The Parties maintained a bipartisan consensus towards the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation: supporting Malaysia against Indonesian belligerence. Throughout the duration of the *Konfrontasi*, National exercised a comfortable majority in New Zealand's Parliament. Prime Minister Keith Holyoake also served as the Minister of External Affairs and thus played an important role in New Zealand foreign policy. In its 1963 General Election policy manifesto, National reiterated its commitment to its Commonwealth military obligations, Malaysia, the United Nations, and the "Free World."⁵⁸ According to Malcolm McKinnon, many National Party supporters were 'gung-ho' about Indonesia, viewing President Sukarno as another Nasser who should be dealt with summarily. An ardent anti-colonialist, Sukarno hoped to replicate Nasser's feat by driving the British out from

⁵⁶ Richard Pattee, "The New Brand of Imperialism," *NZ Tablet* XCI, no. 39 (30 September 1964), 28.

⁵⁷ Raymond Miller, "Changing Party System," in *New Zealand Government & Politics*, fifth edition, ed. Raymond Miller (Melbourne: Oxford University Press Australia and New Zealand, 2010), 463-464; Hoadley, "Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy," 441.

⁵⁸ New Zealand National Party (NZNP), "External Affairs" and "Defence" planks, in *New Zealand National Party: 1963 General Election Policy/announced by Rt. Hon. K.J. Holyoake, Leader of the Party, 4th November 1963* (Wellington: NZNP, 1963), 12, 21.

Southeast Asia.⁵⁹ The Deputy Prime Minister John Marshall regarded Indonesia's Confrontation policies towards Malaysia as an aggressive military campaign to overthrow a neighbouring government, which in his view would promote further regional instability and unrest. Marshall saw both the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation and the Vietnam War as part of campaign of Communist expansionism in Southeast Asia. He likened abandoning New Zealand's military commitments in the region to Western appeasement policies towards Hitler prior to World War II. Marshall made this statement during a "teach-in" held on New Zealand's Southeast Asian policies held at the University of Auckland on 12 September 1965.⁶⁰ His statement reflected many in the National Party's view that Sukarno was merely the latest in the long line of aggressive, expansionistic dictators that the democratic Western powers had to contend with throughout the twentieth century.

While there was little substantive discussion within National Party literature on Indonesia, Malaysia, and the *Konfrontasi*, there was a discernible current of pro-Commonwealth and pro-Western alignment and anti-Communist sentiment. The National Party's policies towards Indonesia during the Confrontation with Malaysia were influenced by its identification with the Commonwealth and the Western security alliance. National placed an important emphasis on New Zealand's close links with Britain and other Commonwealth member states. The party was also committed to strengthening cooperation with Australia and the United States particularly in the Pacific region, which New Zealand regarded as its "backyard."⁶¹ According to the political scientist Barry Gustafson, the Holyoake National Government's foreign policies towards Southeast Asia were guided by the Cold War doctrines of collective security, forward defence, and the domino theory, which were also shared by New Zealand's major allies the United States and Britain. National's preoccupation with security and upholding alliance obligations led successive National Governments to embed New Zealand within a web of

⁵⁹ The Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal had sparked conflict with Britain, France, and Israel during the 1965 Suez Crisis. Whitehall's humiliating diplomatic setback during that crisis spelled the end of British imperial power in the Middle East. New Zealand and Australia were one of the few countries to support Britain. McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 155, 136-137; David Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-66* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 197, 7-9.

⁶⁰ J.R. Marshall, "New Zealand Government Policy in South-East Asia," in *New Zealand and South-East Asia: Lectures Given at a "Teach-In" on South East Asia, University of Auckland, 12 September 1965*, 40-41. Auckland: Committee on Southeast Asia.

⁶¹ NZNP, "External Affairs" plank, in *New Zealand National Party: 1963 General Election Policy*, 12; NZNP, "External Affairs" plank, in *New Zealand National Party: 1966 General Election Policy/ announced by Rt. Hon. K.J. Holyoake, Leader of the Party, 1 November 1966* (Wellington: NZNP: 1966), 12.

security alliances and send New Zealand military forces to aid their British and American allies in several Cold War conflicts in Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam.⁶²

In terms of foreign policy, the New Zealand Labour Party was committed to supporting the British Commonwealth and the United Nations, and resistance to aggression and self-determination for dependent peoples. According to D. J. McCraw, these objectives guided the Labour Party's policies towards Southeast Asia during the Cold War.⁶³ While sympathetic to the aspirations of colonized peoples, Labour also opposed the spread of Communism, a stance shared by its National Party opponents. This ambivalent approach to anti-colonial nationalist movements shaped Labour's foreign policies, both in government and opposition, in the twenty-year period between 1945 and 1965. While the Peter Fraser Labour Government had supported Indonesian self-determination during the Indonesian Revolution (1945-49), it had refused to recognize the Communist-led Viet Minh in Vietnam, favouring the non-Communist Bao Dai administration. Later, Commonwealth loyalty and opposition to Communism led the Labour Opposition to acquiesce in the Holland National Government's decision in 1955 to send New Zealand armed forces to aid Britain against Communist insurgents in Malaya.⁶⁴ As the dominant centre-left political party, Labour took great pains to avoid being tarnished with the same brush as the Communists. Thus, it maintained an adversarial relationship with New Zealand's fringe Communist Party.⁶⁵ These considerations underpinned Labour's decision to support Malaysia during the Indonesian Confrontation. While the Labour Opposition increasingly clashed with the National Party over New Zealand's escalating involvement in the Vietnam War, the two parties could still find a common agreement over the Indonesian-Malaysian *Konfrontasi*. Both parties believed that New Zealand was obligated to help Malaysia, a fellow Commonwealth member, against an aggressive Indonesia.⁶⁶ In 1964, the Labour Party leader Arnold Nordmeyer offered qualified support for Malaysia when it stated that there was a moral obligation to assist a fellow

⁶² Collective security involved New Zealand entering into military alliances with its main Anglophone Western allies. The forward defence doctrine justified New Zealand's overseas military interventions on the grounds of keeping New Zealand's enemies as far away from its shores as possible. The domino theory held that a Communist victory in one country would create a chain reaction of Communist takeovers in other neighbouring countries. The appeasement of aggressors only fuelled their ambitions by minimising the perceived risks of aggression. See Gustafson, *Kivi Keith*, 207-219; Marshall, "New Zealand Government Policy in South-East Asia," 40-41.

⁶³ D.J. McCraw, "Objectives and Priorities in New Zealand's Foreign Policy in Asia, 1949-75: A Study of the Issue of the Recognition of the People's Republic of China and of Security Policies in South-East Asia," PhD. Dissertation, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 1978, 333.

⁶⁴ McCraw, "Objectives and Priorities in New Zealand's Foreign Policy in Asia," 333-334, 369-370.

⁶⁵ "Labour Rejects Communist Support," *New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) Journal* 2, no. 5, November 1966, 21.

⁶⁶ Editorial, "Labour Looks at Southeast Asia," *New Zealand Herald*, 16 April 1964; N.E. Kirk, "Address to the Federation of Labour Conference," *NZLP Journal* 2, no. 3 (July 1966), 48.

Commonwealth member against foreign aggression.⁶⁷ Nordmeyer's statement on Malaysia reflected a need to assure the Party's more left-wing supporters that New Zealand was not aiding British neo-colonialism in Malaysia, an accusation frequently trumpeted by Sukarno and the PKI. However, Labour was also open to the idea of a peaceful, diplomatic solution to Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. During a "teach-in" held at the University of Auckland on 12 September 1965 the Labour MP Allan Martyn Finlay canvassed the idea of sending a negotiating team of three prominent New Zealanders – Walter Nash, Eruera Tirikatene, and Arthur Tyndall – to broker peace between Indonesia and Malaysia. Finlay's remarks reflected Labour's view that New Zealand should pursue a more independent, foreign policy which did not involve subordinating the country to American and British interests.⁶⁸ Ultimately, Finlay's suggestion was ignored by the National Government which continued its military support for Britain and Malaysia.

The Labour Party's quarterly journal, the *New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) Journal*, echoed the Labour leadership's views by carrying several favourable articles on Malaysia between 1964 and 1965. In a three-part series, titled "Questions and Answers on Malaysia", anonymous contributors argued that Malaysia was a stable and viable democracy.⁶⁹ The *NZLP Journal* also emphasized that the Malaysian peoples supported Malaysia and claimed that the Communists opposed the new country because it would wreck their objective to dominate the small and militarily weak territories of Sarawak, North Borneo, and Singapore. The series' author(s) also rejected claims that Malaysia would pose a threat to Indonesia.⁷⁰ They asserted that Malaysia was the best option on the grounds that the other main alternative, a federation consisting of the Borneo Territories, was incapable of defending itself against external threats, namely Filipino claims to Sabah, and Indonesian expansionism. The *NZLP Journal* also denounced the Bruneian rebel leader A.M Azahari's proposed "Unitary State of North Kalimantan" as a militarized police state.⁷¹ The *NZLP Journal's* favourable coverage of Malaysia overlooked the growing racial and political tensions within the Federation. In contrast to its favourable depiction of Malaysia, the *NZLP Journal* decried Indonesian aggression and lamented the failure of democratic socialism to

⁶⁷ "Labour, S. Vietnam & Malaysia," *The Southland Times*, 16 April 1964.

⁶⁸ A.M. Finlay, "Labour Party View on policy in South-East Asia," in *New Zealand and South-East Asia: Lectures Given at a "Teach-In" on South East Asia, University of Auckland, 12 September 1965*, 51. Auckland: Committee on Southeast Asia.

⁶⁹ "Article 1 – Questions and Answers on Malaysia," *NZLP Journal* I, no. 1 (Christmas 1964), 43-47.

⁷⁰ "Article 2 – Questions and Answers on Malaysia," *NZLP Journal* I, no. 2 (March 1965), 37-39.

⁷¹ "Article 3 – Questions and Answers on Malaysia," *NZLP Journal* I, no. 3 (May 1965), 35-36; "Article 2 – Questions and Answers on Malaysia," *NZLP Journal* I, no. 2 (March 1965), 38.

flourish in Indonesia.⁷² Following the rise of President Suharto's New Order, the Labour Party's leader Norman Kirk expressed his desire for better relations and closer cooperation with Indonesia during a state visit by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik on 19 April 1968, a stance that was also echoed by his National counterpart Holyoake. Kirk also praised New Zealand's track record of sending combat forces overseas to assist her Commonwealth partners, a reference to New Zealand's military involvement in the Malayan Emergency and the *Konfrontasi*.⁷³ Throughout the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation and the rise of Suharto's New Order, New Zealand's two major parties, therefore, maintained a bipartisan consensus on supporting Malaysia against Indonesian aggression and fulfilling New Zealand's Commonwealth obligations to Britain and Malaysia.

The Political Left

The main source of opposition to New Zealand's involvement in the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation was from the political Left to the left of the Labour Party. The most vocal of these dissenting voices was the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ), which accepted the view of Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) that Malaysia was a British "neo-colonialist conspiracy" which threatened Indonesian national interests. The CPNZ's pro-Indonesian stance during the *Konfrontasi* stemmed from its warm relationship with the PKI, as both took a pro-Beijing position in the Sino-Soviet Split. Between 1963 and 1966, the two fraternal Communist parties kept in regular contact with each other. In April 1964 a senior PKI official, M.H. Lukman, attended the annual congress of the CPNZ with two Albanian delegates. In June and September 1964 CPNZ representatives attended PKI events in Jakarta.⁷⁴ A more moderate leftist voice was the *New Zealand Monthly Review* (NZMR), an independent socialist monthly magazine that was known for its opposition to the Vietnam War. While the *NZMR* did not openly voice support for the Indonesians, it was sympathetic to their

⁷² "10th Congress of Singapore People's Action Party," *NZLP Journal* I, no. 2 (March 1965), 23; Democracy and Socialism in ASIA," *NZLP Journal* I, no. 4 (September 1965), 31.

⁷³ "Address by the Leader of the Opposition, N.E. Kirk, at the State Luncheon in Honour of the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, 19 April 1968," *External Affairs: Indonesia, 1966-1974*, Kirk 14, C396 809, ANZ, Wellington.

⁷⁴ Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), 350; Ron Smith, *Working Class Son: My Fight Against Capitalism and War* (Wellington: Ron Smith, 1994), 122-38; "Wilcox back from talks in Indonesia," *People's Voice* XXI, no. 23 (17 June 1964), 8.

grievances against the British and Malaysians.⁷⁵ The Political Left contextualised its opposition to New Zealand's support for Britain and Malaysia during the *Konfrontasi* within the global context of the Cold War, anti-imperialism, decolonization, and Third World nationalism. Regarding the Cold War nuclear arms race as a threat to world peace and humanity's existence, it criticized the New Zealand Government for its involvement in Western security alliances and "foreign wars" in Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam. During the Cold War, the New Zealand political Left sympathised with Third World independence movements; advocated world peace, socio-economic and racial equality; criticized capitalism and imperialism; and opposed militarism, the Cold War, and Apartheid in South Africa.⁷⁶ The discussion below focuses on two entities: the Communist Party and the *New Zealand Monthly Review*. Two CPNZ publications – the weekly party organ *People's Voice* and the party activist Ray Nune's 1964 pamphlet *The Truth about Vietnam, Laos, 'Malaysia,' and Indonesia* are indicative of the stance of the political Left.

In general, the CPNZ and the *NZMR* were much more critical of the New Zealand Government's support for Malaysia during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation than any other contemporary New Zealand organizations and media publications. From the beginning, the *People's Voice (PV)* attacked Malaysia as an illegitimate political creation that had been imposed by the British against the wishes of its inhabitants.⁷⁷ The *PV* also argued that Australasian forces in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve were protecting Britain's lucrative economic investments in Malaysia rather than the Malaysian people themselves.⁷⁸ Thus, the *PV* surmised that New Zealand's military involvement in Malaysia was meant to help Britain and America to prop up "tyranny" in Asia.⁷⁹ Whereas the mainstream New Zealand press derided President Sukarno as a "sawdust Mussolini" and an "Asian Hitler", some *People's Voice* contributors like Len Parker, a New Zealand delegate to the International Youth Solidarity Conference in Jakarta in January 1964, depicted him as a principled anti-colonialist leader. Rejecting charges of Indonesian aggression, the *PV* presented the *Konfrontasi* as a national liberation struggle against the British and their Malayan puppets and as part of the wider

⁷⁵ Roberto Rabel, *New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2005), 69-71; Freda Cook, "They have suffered enough," *New Zealand Monthly Review* (NZMR) IV, issue 34 (May 1963), 6-7; Anonymous, "Malaysia," *NZMR* IV, issue 38 (September 1963), 3.

⁷⁶ Elsie Locke, *Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand* (Christchurch: Hazard Press, 1992), 121-98; Keith Sinclair, "Independence and Morality," *Here & Now*, issue 61 (October 1965): 13-15.

⁷⁷ "Rule by Terror and Deceit," *People's Voice* XX, no. 6 (20 February 1963), 7; "Unpopular Malaysian scheme aimed against S.E. Asia independence," *People's Voice* XX, no. 28 (24 July 1963), 2.

⁷⁸ "Heavy Cost to NZ," *People's Voice* XX, no. 6 (20 February 1963), 7.

⁷⁹ "Stop Govt. Propping up Tyranny: South Korea, South Vietnam and now Malaysia," *People's Voice* XX, no. 43 (6 November 1963), 1.

international struggle against monopoly capitalism.⁸⁰ Following Keith Holyoake's state visit to Jakarta in April 1964 the CPNZ activist Ray Nunes denounced Holyoake as an Anglo-American "stooge" who had been sent to dissuade Sukarno from continuing his struggle against Western "monopoly capitalism" in Malaysia.⁸¹ While the *New Zealand Monthly Review* avoided supporting Indonesia during the Confrontation, its contributors were sceptical of the dominant Government and media standpoint that Indonesia was the aggressor. In September 1963 one columnist insinuated that Malaysia had been created to protect British commercial interests.⁸² Later, in April 1964, another *NZMR* columnist suggested that Indonesia had resorted to force against Malaysia since the latter had breached the Manila Accord, which had been ratified by the Filipino, Indonesian, and Malaysian Governments in July 1963.⁸³ Throughout the duration of Confrontation, both the *PV* and *NZMR*, to varying degrees, questioned the legitimacy of Malaysia and disputed charges that Indonesia was acting aggressively towards its neighbour.

As the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation deepened throughout 1964, both the CPNZ and the *NZMR* criticized New Zealand's escalating military involvement in Malaysia. Following Indonesian paratrooper landings in peninsular Malaysia in September 1964 the *PV* dismissed initial news reports as Malaysian propaganda and claimed that New Zealand troops were being used to suppress the Malaysian people; a veiled reference to the Malayan Communist insurgents and the marginalised political left.⁸⁴ Reflecting the CPNZ's warm fraternal relationship with the PKI, the *PV* also published an interview with Mula Naibaho, the editor of the PKI's newspaper *Harian Rakjat* (People's Daily) that same month. This interview was intended to present Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia as a principled struggle against British "neo-colonialism" rather than an expansionist campaign. Naibaho urged New Zealanders not to send their soldiers overseas to die for "foreign monopoly" projects; which implied that New Zealand was fighting on the "wrong side."⁸⁵ While the CPNZ sought to justify Indonesian actions, the more moderate *NZMR*'s contributors argued that it was folly for New Zealand to pursue a solely military approach to the Confrontation by sending troops to aid Malaysia's defence. One contributor, L. F. J. Ross, a peace activist and anti-nuclear campaigner, argued that the United

⁸⁰ "What Sukarno wants," *People's Voice* XXI, no. 10 (25 March 1964), 6-8; "What's [sic] background of setting up of Malaysia?," *People's Voice* XXI, no. 4 (12 February 1964), 4; "What's [sic] background of setting up of Malaysia?, Part 2," *People's Voice* XXI, no. 5 (19 February 1964), 4.

⁸¹ Nunes, *The truth about Vietnam, Laos, 'Malaysia', and Indonesia*, 30.

⁸² "At Home and Abroad: Malaysia," *NZMR* IV, no. 38 (September 1963), 3.

⁸³ "At Home and Abroad: The Malaysia/Indonesia situation," *NZMR* IV, no. 43 (March 1964), 3.

⁸⁴ "News Fraud by Holyoake: War hoax against Indonesian and 'Malaysian' people," *People's Voice* XXI, no. 35 (16 September 1964), 1.

⁸⁵ "Indonesian visitor to N.Z. answers questions about clash with Malaysia," *People's Voice* XXI, no. 35 (16 September 1964), 2.

Nations was the best forum to resolve the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. In his view, the New Zealand Government's refusal to consider using alternative methods like diplomacy and peacekeeping forces amounted to a dereliction of its United Nations' obligations to "exhaust all means of seeking peaceful solutions to disputes."⁸⁶ In a similar vein, another *NZMR* contributor, Mark D. Sadler, a Christchurch resident and active letter-writer, criticized the visiting Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's calls for Malaysia and its Commonwealth allies to launch retaliatory military strikes on Indonesia. For Sadler, such actions would heighten current Confrontation tensions and draw New Zealand into a full-scale war with Indonesia.⁸⁷ While the CPNZ contextualised the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation within the context of revolutionary struggle, the *NZMR*'s anti-military and pacifist leanings led it to criticize the Government's military response to that conflict.

Following Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965 the CPNZ defended the Indonesian Government's action as a principled rejection of a Western-dominated international organization that had become hostile to Third World aspirations.⁸⁸ In addition, the *People's Voice* lauded Sukarno's attempts to create a rival international forum called the Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) that would include Communist China, which had been excluded from the UN. This showed that the CPNZ accepted Sukarno's New Emerging Forces worldview of a bipolar international struggle between the Western Powers (the "Old Established Forces") and the Third World (the "New Emerging Forces").⁸⁹ Reflecting the camaraderie between the two Communist parties, the PKI's Chairman D.N. Aidit sent a cable thanking his New Zealand comrades for supporting Indonesia's "Crush Malaysia" campaign and its exit from the United Nations.⁹⁰ The CPNZ also welcomed Singapore's departure from Malaysia in August 1965 as proof that the federation was an artificially contrived British "political creation."⁹¹ The CPNZ's revolutionary approach to foreign policy by 1965 reflected its camaraderie with Communist China, which, from 1963, had begun to cultivate friendly relations with President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communists, partly a result of its now open rivalry

⁸⁶ L.F.J. Ross, "NZ Foreign Policy and the drift towards War in Asia," *NZMR* V, no. 45 (May 1964), 8-9; Murray Horton, "Obituary: Larry Ross," *Converge: New Zealand's Online Community Network*, last accessed 28 January 2015, <http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/30/17.html>.

⁸⁷ Mark D. Sadler, "Malaysia – the need for Caution," *NZMR* V, no. 55 (April 1965), 8-9; For a record of Lee Kuan Yew's visit to New Zealand, see *Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia – Age of Revolution* (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1965), 1-20.

⁸⁸ "Indonesia and U.N. C.P Statement," *People's Voice* XXII, no. 5 (10 February 1965), 8.

⁸⁹ "Indonesia's formidable charge sheet against United Nations role," *People's Voice* XXII, no. 4 (10 February 1965), 2.

⁹⁰ "Support Appreciated," *People's Voice* XXII, no. 6 (24 February 1965), 1.

⁹¹ "Singapore withdrawal CPNZ statement," *People's Voice* XXII, no. 31 (18 August 1965), 1.

with the Soviet Union. By 1963 the Indonesian and New Zealand Communist parties had also aligned themselves with Beijing in the Sino-Soviet Split (see Chapter Three).⁹² The Beijing Communist camp had rejected their Soviet comrades' policies of de-Stalinization, "peaceful co-existence" with the West, and using the democratic political process to achieve political power. For the CCP and its like-minded comrade parties, armed revolution was the only way to advance Communism.⁹³ Thus both the CPNZ and PKI preferred to overthrow the international system rather than to work with it. By contrast, the *NZMR* devoted more attention to New Zealand's escalating involvement in the Vietnam War, which showed that it did not share the *PV*'s revolutionary approach to international relations.

Both the CPNZ's *PV* and the *NZMR* devoted substantial space to the 30 September "coup attempt" and the subsequent Indonesian anti-Communist mass killings of 1965-1966. Reflecting their left-wing leanings, both publications rejected the official Indonesian Army version that the PKI had staged an unsuccessful coup attempt against the Indonesian Government. While the *PV*'s contributors repeated the PKI's assertion that the 30 September "coup attempt" was merely an "internal army affair", the *NZMR*'s editor argued that the "30 September Movement" was an attempt by loyalist officers to forestall a Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored coup attempt against President Sukarno. Both publications also took the view that the Indonesian Army and its Western allies had exploited the "coup attempt" as an opportunity to move against the PKI and President Sukarno.⁹⁴ The *PV* and the *NZMR* also slammed the New Zealand Government and its Western allies for not condemning the Indonesian Army's anti-Communist mass killings. While the *PV* contrasted Wellington's silence on the Indonesian mass killings with its vociferous condemnation of the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, the *NZMR*'s editor in November 1965 slammed the United States and its allies including New Zealand as "ogres" for implicitly condoning the Army's heavy-handed actions.⁹⁵ The CPNZ leader Victor G. Wilcox also issued a statement in the Indonesian newspaper, the *Djakarta Daily Mail*, expressing support for the PKI and denouncing the Army generals as reactionaries. Wilcox's statements drew a rebuke from J. G. Carter, the New Zealand

⁹² Soedjati Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), 135-145; Victor G. Wilcox, "NZ Communist leader speaks in China, hits world headlines," *People's Voice* XXI, no. 42 (3 November 1965), 4-5.

⁹³ "Soviet and N.Z. Communist Party Talks: Discussions in Indonesia," *People's Voice* XX, no. 36 (18 September 1963), 1; "The Great Debate: Documents of the Sino-Soviet Split," Marxists International Archive, last accessed 4 December 2014,

⁹⁴ "Notes and Comments: Are They Ogres?," *NZMR* VI, no. 62 (November 1965), 1-2; "What's happening in Indonesia?," *People's Voice* XXII, no. 42 (3 November 1965), 4-5.

⁹⁵ "Indonesian blood-bath," *People's Voice* XXIII, no. 1 (26 January 1966), 1; "Notes and Comments: Are They Ogres?," *NZMR* VI, no. 62 (November 1965), 1-2

Legation's Second Secretary, and the editor of the *Djakarta Daily Mail* who urged the New Zealand Government to suppress the miniscule Party lest it stage a *Gestapu*-style coup attempt in New Zealand.⁹⁶



Figure 30: Victor George Wilcox, the Secretary-General of the CPNZ, 1951-1978.
Credits: *Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand*, 2014.

Both the *PV* and the *NZMR* also took a highly negative view of the new pro-Western New Order regime led by Major General Suharto. These two left-wing publications took great pains to paint Suharto's New Order as a reactionary military dictatorship built on mass murder and political opportunism. Reflecting its Communist orientation, the *People's Voice* denounced the New Order for reversing Sukarno's policies particularly his Confrontation against Malaysia and realigning Indonesian with Western "imperial" economic and strategic interests.⁹⁷ While the New Zealand Government and the mainstream press welcomed the demise of Sukarno and the PKI as a prelude to better relations with Indonesia, the *PV* and the *NZMR* mourned Indonesia's new right-ward political and foreign policy reorientation as the demise of the revolutionary idealism of the Sukarno period.

The Communist Party and the *NZMR* disagreed with the New Zealand Government and mainstream press's pro-Malaysian stance during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. Both

⁹⁶ *Gestapu* (*Gerakan Tiga Puluh September*) was the Indonesian name for the 30 September Movement. See Letter, R.A. Lochore, Djakarta to the Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, "N.Z. Communist Party and the PKI," 26 November 1965, PM 318/6/1, part 30, ANZ, Wellington.

⁹⁷ "Notes and Comments: Tension in Indonesia," *NZMR* VI, no. 66 (April 1966), 2-3; "Indonesia's military regime dons parliamentary disguise to legalise massacres," *People's Voice* XXIII, no. 26 (20 July 1966), 2; "Indonesia right-wing regime begging for more U.S. 'aid,'" *People's Voice* XXIII, no. 35 (21 September 1966), 2; "US tightens its grip on Indonesia," *People's Voice* XXIII, no. 30 (17 August 1966), 2.

of these aforementioned groups tended to be more sympathetic to the Indonesian position and questioned the legitimacy of Malaysia's cause. They also decried Indonesia's rightward political shift which accompanied the 30 September "coup attempt" in 1965. However, while the CPNZ's pro-Indonesian standpoint was motivated by solidarity with their Indonesian Communist comrades, the *New Zealand Monthly Review* was concerned that New Zealand had adopted a fully military response to *Konfrontasi* rather than considering alternative methods like diplomacy and peacekeeping. Such views reflected the contemporary Political Left's sympathy for charismatic Third World leaders like Sukarno who challenged the "twin devils" of Western imperialism and capitalism.

New Zealand Expatriates and Visitors

This section critically examines the perspectives of New Zealand expatriates and visitors living in Indonesia during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation and the 30 September coup attempt. The first person discussed is Marie Gray, a Presbyterian missionary nurse from Napier who worked in the Javanese city of Bandung's Immanuel Hospital between 1959 and 1971. Gray wrote about her and her family's time and experiences in Java in a book entitled *Tā mu: A New Zealand Family in Java*, which was first published in 1988.⁹⁸ The second person introduced is Rewi Alley, a New Zealand writer, poet, teacher, and Communist who lived in China for sixty years founded of the New Zealand-China Friendship Society. Alley visited Bandung in 1965 to attend the International Conference Against Foreign Military Bases (KIAPMO), which had been sponsored by the anti-Western Sukarno government that opposed the presence of Western military bases in neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore. Rewi's account of the Indonesian events of October 1965 is recounted in two main sources: a *People's Voice* guest article published on 15 December 1965 and his 1986 memoir, *Rewi Alley: An Autobiography*.⁹⁹ This section explores how people's ideological leanings and personal life experiences coloured their perceptions of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. Marie Gray's account of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation shares the mainstream New Zealand media and political establishment's antipathy towards Sukarno and the PKI and sympathetic view of Suharto's New Order. By contrast, Rewi's accounts of the post-30 September anti-Communist killings reflect the fraternal bond and comradeship between the New Zealand, Chinese, and Indonesian Communist movements.

⁹⁸ Marie Gray, *Tamu: New Zealand family in Java* (1988; Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya, 2001).

⁹⁹ "Rewi Alley eye-witness to Indonesian Army terrorism," *People's Voice* XXII, no. 48 (15 December 1965), 1, 8; Rewi Alley, *Rewi Alley: An Autobiography* (Beijing: New World Press, 1986), 243-245. Rewi's October visit to Indonesia is also briefly mentioned in Geoff Chapple's 1980 biography *Rewi Alley of China* (Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1980), 198.

Following the creation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 Marie Gray recalled that there was a brief upsurge of anti-Western public sentiment in Indonesia. On 18 September 1963 the British Embassy in Jakarta was sacked by an Indonesian mob. Gray thought that the actions of the British Ambassador Andrew Gilchrist during the riot were unnecessarily provocative and only inflamed Indonesian hostility towards Britain and the Commonwealth. While the New Zealand Legation escaped destruction, New Zealanders in Indonesia had to contend with heightened hostility towards Malaysia and its Commonwealth backers. Gray recalled that nationalistic “Crush Malaysia” posters were posted nearby Bandung’s “Kiwi House”, which served as a club for local New Zealand expatriates. She also recalled that her school-aged daughter Kay narrowly escaped assault and that her family residence in Bandung had been pelted with stones. Sustained anti-Western feeling in Bandung forced the temporary closure of the local international school. In response, several Western governments began evacuating minors and dependents, shuttering down their Indonesian aid programmes, and terminating teaching assignments. Due to the politically-charged atmosphere, an ambulance donated by the New Zealand relief agency, the Council of Organisations for Relief Services Overseas (CORSO) had to be repainted to hide the “CORSO, NEW ZEALAND” sign.¹⁰⁰ Fortunately for Marie Gray and other Western expatriates, this anti-Western upsurge eventually subsided. As the Confrontation dragged on, the deteriorating Indonesian economy made living conditions more difficult for Western expatriates. Despite these difficulties, some Western aid programmes like the Australian National Council of Churches’ Goodwill Work Team continued operating throughout the *Konfrontasi*.¹⁰¹



Figure 31: The New Zealand expatriate Marie Gray (far right), her husband David Grey (far left), and their six children in Indonesia in 1967. Credits: Marie Gray, *Tā mu: A New Zealand Family in Java*, 2001.

¹⁰⁰ Gray, *Tamu: New Zealand family in Java*, 105-107.

¹⁰¹ Gray, *Tamu: New Zealand family in Java*, 120-129.

By late 1964 rising anti-Western sentiment in response to the surge of British troops in Malaysian Borneo and the escalating American involvement in Vietnam had prompted the United Nations, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Ford Foundation to terminate their educational and development programmes in Indonesia. As tensions between the Indonesian Army and the Communists deepened, fears of an impending PKI takeover led many New Zealand expatriates including the Gray family to make preparations to leave Indonesia.¹⁰² For Marie Gray, the 30 September Movement's "pre-emptive action" against the Army High Command came as an unexpected but positive reorientation of Indonesia's relations with the West. Gray's recollections of the 30 September coup attempt and the anti-Communist killings were coloured by contemporary Indonesian and Western newspaper and radio reports. Behind the scenes, the Indonesian Army-controlled the press and the British, Malaysian, Australian, and United States governments had embarked on a sustained disinformation campaign to depict the PKI and Sukarno in a negative light in order to facilitate regime change in Indonesia. Given the skewed nature of contemporary news reports, Gray, along with many of her contemporaries, accepted the Army's official account that the General Suharto and the Army had defeated a PKI coup attempt against the Indonesian government. Gray regarded the murder of the six Army generals as a reprehensible atrocity which exposed the diabolical nature of the PKI puppet masters who controlled the 30 September Movement. Gray also believed that President Sukarno had fanned the crisis by courting the PKI instead of banning it. For Gray, Sukarno's unwillingness to condemn the 30 September Movement suggested that he was either sympathetic to or in cahoots with the PKI plotters. Gray's account of the extensive Indonesia media coverage of the murders of the six Army generals showed the extent to which the Army was willing to exploit their deaths as political capital against the PKI and Sukarno.¹⁰³

In her memoirs, Marie Gray represented the Army-inspired anti-Communist mass killings of over half a million Indonesians as one of the bloodiest purges in the twentieth century, and recalled that her ethnic Indonesian Chinese colleagues at Immanuel Hospital were terrified by the anti-Chinese rioting that had erupted in parts of Indonesia: Communist China supported the PKI and thus anti-Communist sentiment also manifested itself in violent Sinophobia. However, Gray viewed the 1965-66 mass killings as the result of pent-up anger and resentment

¹⁰² Gray, *Tamu: New Zealand family in Java*, 131-132.

¹⁰³ Gray, *Tamu: New Zealand family in Java*, 159-164; Easter, "Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling," 61-69.

within the Indonesian population towards the PKI's policies and actions. For her, the PKI's alleged coup attempt on 1 October 1965 was the proverbial final straw that broke the camel's back. Using metaphorical language that would be easily understood by many New Zealanders, Gray described the PKI as a growing flood of water that had been exerting pressure on a kauri dam, which represented the Indonesian public. The mass killings were likened to the bursting of the dam. Gray seemed to view Communism as an antagonistic alien force that disrupted the normal equilibrium of Indonesian society. Her animosity towards the PKI was also influenced by a Communist-inspired campaign of harassment against British and American nationals and interests in Indonesia in 1964-65, and news reports that the PKI had compiled a list of Westerners to kill on the sixth day after the putsch. Gray's account also described the Indonesian Army's role in instigating the mass murders of Communists. On one occasion, she recalled that a senior naval officer had given a one-word signal – *Silat* (sweep) – for Muslim student groups to embark on the mass killings of PKI members and sympathisers. In addition, Gray recalled that many former Communists joined Islamic or Christian groups in order to survive or to secure jobs and places at universities.¹⁰⁴ She thereby corroborated the contention of John Roosa and Bradley Simpson that the anti-Communist mass killings were an orchestrated campaign of violence organised by the Army and its right-wing allies rather than a spontaneous outbreak of mass anger as claimed by the Suharto regime and its supporters.¹⁰⁵ While Marie Gray's *Tā mu* provides a distinctly New Zealand eyewitness account of the *Konfrontasi* and the 30 September coup attempt, her recollections were influenced by the Indonesian Army and Western government's efforts to facilitate regime change in Indonesia at the expense of Sukarno and the PKI. The Army and its Western supporters took great pains to depict the 30 September Movement as a failed Communist coup attempt against the Indonesian Government. This fitted with Western governments and their anti-Communists allies' Cold War narrative that Communism was a hostile, expansionist ideology bent on world domination.

Rewi Alley provides a counter-balance to the anti-Communist tone of Marie Gray's account of the Indonesian events of 1965. Between 13 and 23 October 1965 Alley visited Jakarta to attend the International Conference against Foreign Military Bases (KIAPMO), which coincided with the outbreak of the Indonesian Army's anti-Communist campaign. The KIAPMO conference was attended by delegates from sixteen countries and Rewi served as the chairman of its drafting committee. During his stay in Jakarta, he witnessed the Army

¹⁰⁴ Gray, *Tamu: A New Zealand family in Java*, 163-167.

¹⁰⁵ John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'état in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 182-201; Simpson, *Economists With Guns*, 176-184.

transporting right-wing mobs to burn down the buildings of the PKI and its affiliated organisations. He also witnessed the mass arrest of PKI members and the campaign of mob violence against PRC diplomatic interests and the Indonesian Chinese community. Reflecting his Maoist leanings, Rewi rejected accusations of Chinese involvement in the 30 September movement, asserting that Beijing had pursued a policy of non-interference in Indonesia. Instead, Rewi viewed the Army's coup and anti-Communist campaign as a conspiracy by the Indonesian "extreme right" and its foreign supporters against the political left in Indonesia; citing the well-organised nature of the mass killings. In his December 1965 article on the mass killings, Rewi also lambasted the Soviet "revisionists" for their policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West. For him, the events of October 1965 vindicated the Maoist view that a peaceful Communist transition to power was impossible due to the entrenched resistance of the "old ruling class."¹⁰⁶ In his memoirs, Alley also recalled helping Willy Harianja, the Indonesian member of the Asian and Pacific Peace Liaison Committee, to escape to Cambodia, and meeting Njoto, the second top-ranking leader of the PKI. Njoto rejected Alley's advice to flee to the hills and remained in Djakarta to carry out negotiations with the authorities. This decision ultimately cost him his life in the Army's anti-Communist purge.



Figure 32: Rewi Alley, New Zealand farmer, teacher, poet, and Communist expatriate who visited Indonesia in 1965. Credits: University of Canterbury, 2014.

¹⁰⁶ "Rewi Alley eye-witness to Indonesian Army terrorism," *People's Voice* XXII, no. 48 (15 December 1965), 1, 8; Chapple, *Rewi Alley of China*, 198.

While visiting Jakarta, Alley met several Chinese diplomats at a function organised by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio. These diplomats decried the adverse repercussions of the anti-Communist mass killings on the Indonesian Chinese community and the PRC's interests in Indonesia, and decried Beijing's inability to influence events in Indonesia.¹⁰⁷ After leaving Indonesia, Alley penned an account of the Indonesian mass killings that was published in the 15 December issue of the *People's Voice* in which he excoriated the Indonesian Army as Western lackeys and likened the Indonesian mass killings to the Kuomintang's violent crackdown against the Chinese Communists during the 1920s.¹⁰⁸ While Gray welcomed the defeat of Sukarno and the PKI as a triumph for the Free World in the Cold War struggle, Alley decried these developments as a setback for Communism.

Conclusion

New Zealand public discourses around the *Konfrontasi* were shaped by the wider public debate around New Zealand's involvement in the Cold War. The mainstream New Zealand press echoed the official New Zealand Government standpoint that New Zealand was aiding a beleaguered fellow Commonwealth state and countering Indonesian aggression against Malaysia. Both the ruling National Party and the opposition Labour Party supported New Zealand's participation in the defence of Malaysia. The strongest dissenting voices in the domestic debate around New Zealand's involvement in the *Konfrontasi* came from the Political Left, particularly the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) and the *New Zealand Monthly Review* (NZMR). In its official organ, the *People's Voice*, the CPNZ adopted a pro-Indonesian stance while more moderately, the NZMR advocated searching for peaceful alternatives to conflict resolution. Accounts of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation by New Zealand expatriates and visitors in Indonesia reflected both their personal beliefs and ideological leanings. While the expatriate nurse Marie Gray's account echoed the anti-Communist threat narratives propagated by the Indonesian Army and mainstream press, the China resident Rewi Alley's account reflected his Communist ideological leanings.

¹⁰⁷ Alley, *Rewi Alley – An Autobiography*, 243-245; Chapple, *Rewi Alley of China*, 198.

¹⁰⁸ "Rewi Alley eye-witness to Indonesian Army terrorism," *People's Voice* XXII, no. 48 (15 December 1965), 1, 8; Chapple, *Rewi Alley of China*, 198.

Conclusion

This thesis has dealt with New Zealand's response to Indonesian national aspirations during the Sukarno period (1945-1966) and discusses the New Zealand public debate around Indonesia. New Zealand's relationship with Indonesia during the Sukarno period was influenced by several key factors including the country's membership of the United Nations (UN), decolonisation, the Cold War, and its traditional Commonwealth and Western alliance ties and linkages. The discussion began by examining New Zealand's involvement in Indonesia's independence struggle, the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949). It discussed both the New Zealand Government's response and the wide public debate around that conflict. It also explored the expansion of New Zealand's relationship in the post-independence period, focusing on the period between 1950 and 1963. Finally, it considered New Zealand's involvement in the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation (1963-1966); a conflict which forced Wellington to prioritize its Commonwealth obligations to the United Kingdom and Malaysia over its relationship with Jakarta. Escalating tensions between Wellington and Jakarta during the Confrontation saw a hardening of mainstream attitudes towards Sukarno's Indonesia.

Throughout the history of the New Zealand-Indonesian relationship, New Zealand often had a subordinate relationship with its major Western allies: namely Britain, Australia, and the United States; a theme that resonates throughout the thesis. A desire to help prop up the Mother Country's interests in Malaysia and Singapore precipitated New Zealand's involvement in Southeast Asia. Thus, New Zealand's engagement with Indonesia during the Sukarno period was a by-product of the British connection. Due to the "tyranny of distance", New Zealand has traditionally taken less interest in Indonesia than its larger trans-Tasman neighbour Australia, which shares a maritime border with Indonesia. Reflecting New Zealand's junior relationship to Australia, Wellington has often followed Canberra's lead when engaging with Indonesia. Reflecting its "kith and kin" ties with these two Commonwealth partners, New Zealand actively avoided acting against British and Australian strategic interests in Indonesia during the Sukarno period. Last but not least, New Zealand and its Commonwealth partners were often compelled to re-align their Indonesian policies with American strategic considerations in Indonesia. For Washington, Indonesia, with its vast natural resources and wealth, was an important asset in the Cold War superpower struggle. American influence played an important role in facilitating international acceptance of Indonesian independence, Indonesia's annexation of West New

Guinea, and the anti-Communist Indonesian Army's takeover campaign in 1965-1966. Therefore, New Zealand's relationship with Indonesia during the Sukarno period was characterized by its subordinate relationship to its major allies. New Zealand's subordinate position in international relations is aptly reflected in the historian David McIntyre's remark that New Zealand was not a power but "actually a small state which has in the past sent men to fight along with a [larger] power."¹

The Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch marked New Zealand's first engagement with the fledgling Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian Revolution was one of the many decolonisation conflicts that swept through Asia and Africa following World War Two. During the last five years of the Peter Fraser Labour Government, New Zealand became a minor participant in the Indonesian Revolution due to three main factors: the actions of interested domestic actors like trade unions, especially the Waterside Workers' Union (WWU), and the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) which sympathised with the Indonesian nationalist cause; Commonwealth ties to the United Kingdom and Australia which both had strategic interests in Indonesia and Southeast Asia; and its participation in the United Nations which viewed the Dutch-Indonesian conflict as an international "trouble-spot". In contrast to Australia's active advocacy for the Indonesian Republic in the United Nations, New Zealand tried to play a more neutral role, which entailed recognising Dutch sovereignty over the Netherlands East Indies. Despite its reluctance to even accord recognition to the Indonesian Republic, Wellington was still willing to help the Republic secure a place in the United Nations' Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). Over a period of four and a half years, official New Zealand policy towards Indonesia evolved from supporting the restoration of Dutch rule in Indonesia to a reluctant acceptance of the inevitability of Indonesian independence. New Zealand policy towards Indonesia was influenced by its warm feelings towards its wartime Dutch allies, a desire to maintain parity with British and Australian policies, and a growing appraisal of the strength of Asian nationalism.

Despite New Zealand's limited official engagement with the Indonesian Revolution, the conflict still aroused disquiet within elements of New Zealand society, as discussed in Chapters One and Two above. New Zealand perceptions of the Indonesian independence struggle were

¹ W. David McIntyre, *Britain, New Zealand and the Security of South-East Asia in the 1970s* (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1969), 26.

influenced by international forces and developments like decolonization and the Cold War. Left-wing anti-colonial sympathies and trade union camaraderie led the Waterside Workers' Union (WWU) to join the international maritime union boycott of Dutch shipping, which had been organised by the Australian Waterside Workers' Federation to disrupt Dutch attempts to reoccupy their former colony. Similarly, the CPNZ's adherence to the Soviet Communist Party line led it to support the Indonesian nationalist cause. However, the defeat of Indonesian Communist elements turned the CPNZ against the mainstream Indonesian nationalist leadership. In contrast, the mainstream press's response to the Indonesian Revolution reflected the New Zealand public's growing and greater acceptance of decolonisation and self-rule. As with the Government position, press opinion evolved from an unquestioning acceptance of the restoration of 'legitimate' Dutch rule in Indonesia to a reluctant acceptance of the inevitability of Indonesian independence. The mainstream press was influenced by Wellington's policies towards Indonesia. The Indonesian Revolution also saw one of the earliest stirrings of youthful political activism in post-war New Zealand society, as illustrated by the Victoria University College Socialist Club's (VUCSC) Wellington demonstration against the first Dutch "police action" in July 1947. A discernible counter-point to the pro-Indonesian discourse of the political Left could be found within New Zealand's Dutch emigrant community. Dutch New Zealanders' perceptions of the Indonesian Revolution were coloured by patriotic attachments to the Netherlands and a distrust of Indonesian nationalists, who were regarded as pro-Japanese collaborators. Economic stagnation in the Netherlands and profound anti-Dutch sentiment in Indonesia led many Dutch to migrate to Western countries like Australia and New Zealand in the post-war era.

Between 1950 and 1963 successive National and Labour governments in New Zealand gradually expanded their relationships with Indonesia through the Colombo Plan and the United Nations, as discussed in Chapter Three above. This cautious expansion of New Zealand's diplomatic interests in Indonesia reflected the growing strategic and economic importance of Southeast Asia in New Zealand foreign policy-making. Nevertheless, New Zealand and Indonesian foreign policies during this period progressively diverged as the Cold War escalated. While New Zealand foreign policy sought security in a series of Western security alliances, Indonesian foreign policy under Sukarno progressively shifted from seeking to create a non-aligned Afro-Asian "third bloc" to closer alignment with Communist China. Despite these differences, New Zealand aid initiatives like the Colombo Plan and the Volunteer Graduate Scheme (VGS) succeeded in fostering a sense of goodwill between the two states and building

bridges between ordinary citizens. Besides aiding Indonesian national development, the Colombo Plan also advanced New Zealand's economic interests and the long-term Western objective of containing Asian Communism. Despite its short life-span, the VGS served as the forerunner to the successful Volunteer Service Abroad programme and succeeded in fostering some New Zealand interest in Indonesia. The West New Guinea dispute (1950-1962) and the 1957 Juanda Declaration produced the first visible strains in the New Zealand-Indonesian bilateral relationship. New Zealand opposed Indonesian efforts to annex the Dutch-controlled territory of West New Guinea because of a desire to maintain a common stance with Australia. Ultimately, American strategic interests in courting Sukarno away from the Communists forced Wellington and Canberra to acquiesce in Indonesia's annexation of West New Guinea in 1963. New Zealand objected to Indonesia's Juanda Declaration, which extended Indonesian sovereignty over the maritime waters of the Indonesian Archipelago. Because of its export-based agricultural economy, New Zealand depended on international shipping lanes to sell its produce and thus opposed any restrictions on free maritime passage. The conflicting positions of the New Zealand and Indonesian governments during the West New Guinea dispute foreshadowed the turbulent Indonesian Confrontation with Malaysia, which strained Jakarta's relations with the international community. Despite its policy differences with Jakarta, Wellington did not join with its Western allies in supporting anti-Sukarno elements during the ill-fated 1958 PRRI-Permesta uprisings in Sumatra and Sulawesi.

The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation marked the nadir of New Zealand's relationship with Indonesia during the Sukarno period. President Sukarno's avowed opposition to colonialism led him to embark on a policy of Confrontation (*Konfrontasi*) against the newly-formed neighbouring country of Malaysia, which he denounced as a British "neo-colonialist conspiracy" directed against Indonesia. *Konfrontasi* was a complex combination of diplomatic and military pressure which aimed to secure a peace settlement on Indonesian terms. Internationally, it deeply strained Indonesia's relations with the West while strengthening Jakarta's relations with Communist China. Domestically, *Konfrontasi* heightened tensions between Sukarno, the Indonesian Army, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which culminated in the 30 September coup attempt of 1965. Following a failed PKI attempt to expunge anti-Communist elements from the Army leadership, the Army embarked on a massive anti-Communist purge which killed approximately half-a-million people. The 30 September "coup attempt" provided the Army leadership with the pretext to undermine Sukarno's political authority and to install

General Suharto as the next President of Indonesia; heralding the emergence of a “New Order” that would govern Indonesia for the next 32 years.

During the *Konfrontasi*, New Zealand chose to prioritize its Commonwealth linkages and security commitments to Britain and Malaysia over its relationship with Indonesia; a topic discussed in Chapter Four above. As with the Indonesian Revolution and the West New Guinea dispute, Wellington followed Canberra’s lead during the *Konfrontasi*. While both Canberra and Wellington contributed military forces to the defence of Malaysia, both governments tried in vain to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia by maintaining its Legation in Jakarta and its Colombo Plan aid programme. Despite these efforts, New Zealand’s trade and aid programme to Indonesia declined as a result of *Konfrontasi* and may have collapsed altogether had it not been for the 30 September coup attempt, which ushered in a radical reorientation of Indonesia’s political landscape and foreign policy. The New Zealand Government readily accepted the Indonesian Army’s narrative that the 30 September Movement was a Communist coup attempt since it fitted neatly with the Government’s anti-Communist Cold War outlook. Cold War and Western alliance security considerations therefore led Wellington to support Suharto’s pro-Western New Order regime.

Compared with the Indonesian Revolution, the Indonesian-Malaysia Confrontation prompted little debate within New Zealand society; a topic discussed in Chapter Five above. Editorials in mainstream daily newspapers and weekly magazines echoed the official government narrative that New Zealand was helping to defend Malaysia against Indonesian aggression. Unlike other contemporary international issues such as the escalating American-led involvement in Vietnam and the 1965 Rhodesian Crisis that sparked several heated exchanges within the letters sections of several New Zealand print media, New Zealand’s involvement in *Konfrontasi* was not a contentious public issue. The two major political parties, National and Labour, both supported New Zealand’s involvement in the *Konfrontasi*. Both major parties emphasized Commonwealth linkages and Western alliance obligations to justify their support for Malaysia. Alternatives to the official pro-Malaysian discourse could be found in the Communist Party and the left-wing monthly magazine *New Zealand Monthly Review* (NZMR). The CPNZ’s opposition to the Government’s pro-Malaysian policy was motivated by its warm relationship with the Indonesian Communists and traditional Communist ideology. For its part, the NZMR criticized the government for pursuing a military solution to *Konfrontasi* and ignoring

Indonesian grievances towards Malaysia and Britain. Personal beliefs and ideological inclinations coloured the accounts of New Zealand expatriates and visitors in Indonesia during the time of the Confrontation and the anti-Communist mass killings. While the account of expatriate nurse Marie Gray echoed mainstream New Zealand anti-Communist threat narratives, that of China resident Rewi Alley reflected his Communist ideological leanings. New Zealand public discourses around the *Konfrontasi* were thereby shaped by the wider debate around New Zealand's involvement in the Cold War.

This thesis has examined how the New Zealand Government and public responded to two major problems in New Zealand-Indonesian relations during the Sukarno period: the Indonesian Revolution and the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. Throughout this period, the nature of New Zealand's relationship with Indonesia reflected its secondary position in relation to its major Western Allies in Whitehall, Canberra, and Washington. While the Government has always held a monopoly over New Zealand foreign policy-making, foreign policy issues have also been discussed and debated by the mainstream press. New Zealand press discourse around Indonesia was shaped by traditional Commonwealth linkages, contemporary international issues like decolonisation and the Cold War, and the actions of certain vocal political and social groups. The Indonesian Revolution marked one of the New Zealand Government's earliest experiences of dealing with an Asian independence struggle. It also sowed the seeds for a growing public appreciation of the "winds of change" that would sweep through the developing world over the next twenty-five years. The period between 1950 and 1963 saw the expansion of New Zealand's economic and strategic interests in Indonesia, which were also accompanied by growing strains between Jakarta and the Western Powers. These strains finally erupted in the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation and the 30 September coup attempt in 1965, which culminated in the demise of Sukarno's regime. General Suharto's New Order ushered in a radical reorientation of Indonesia's political landscape and foreign policy which favoured Western strategic and economic interests in Southeast Asia. Like their Western counterparts, the New Zealand Government initially viewed the new Suharto regime as a superior alternative to the strife and economic chaos of the Sukarno period. The New Order regime's repudiation of Sukarno's confrontational and polarising foreign policies led to the expansion of normal bilateral relations between New Zealand and Indonesia. However, New Zealand enthusiasm towards the

Suharto regime later waned as a result of Jakarta's controversial efforts to forcibly incorporate West New Guinea and East Timor; topics which are covered elsewhere.²



Figure 33: (Left to right): An unidentified Indonesian official, Prime Minister Holyoake, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik during a state visit in April 1968. Credits: *External Affairs Review*, 1968

² The “forcible incorporation” of West New Guinea and East Timor refers to the rigged “Act of Free Choice” referendum in 1969 and Indonesia’s controversial invasion of East Timor in 1975. Michael Green, “Uneasy Partners: New Zealand and Indonesia,” in *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 170-185.

Dramatis personae

New Zealand

Government officials and policy-makers

Beeby, Clarence Edward, (1902-1998), prominent New Zealand educationalist, Director General of Education (1940-1960), New Zealand Ambassador to France (1960-1963)

Carter, J.G., (Unknown), diplomat, Second Secretary of the New Zealand Legation in Jakarta (1965)

Challis, R.L.G., (Unknown), diplomat, New Zealand Chargé d'affaires in Jakarta (1964), New Zealand Commissioner in Hong Kong (1967), cross-accredited New Zealand Minister to the Philippines (1967)

Corner, Frank, (1920-2014), New Zealand's First Secretary to Washington (1948-1952), Deputy High Commissioner to the United Kingdom (1952-1958), Deputy Secretary of External Affairs (1958-62), New Zealand's Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1962-1967)

Cunninghame, Rex Rainsford, (Unknown), Asia expert at the New Zealand Department of External Affairs (NZDEA) (1948)

Doidge, Frederick, (1884-1954), National Member of Parliament for Tauranga (1938-1951), New Zealand Minister of External Affairs (1949-1951), High Commissioner to Britain (1951-1954)

Edmonds, Paul, (Unknown), New Zealand Chargé d'affaires in Indonesia (late 1963-early 1964), later served as the New Zealand's Ambassador to South Vietnam

Eyre, Dean J., (1914-2007), Minister of Defence (1960-1966), Member of Parliament for North Shore (1949-1966)

Finlay, Allan Martyn, (1912-1999), Labour Member of Parliament for Waitakere, President of the New Zealand Labour Party (1959-1964)

Fraser, Peter, (1884-1950), Prime Minister of New Zealand and Leader of the New Zealand Labour Party (1940-1949), Minister of External Affairs (1943-1949)

Gordon, Peter, (Unknown), Foreign Service officer, Second Secretary of the New Zealand Legation in Jakarta (1964-unknown), later worked in the Tourist and Publicity Department

Hanan, Josiah Ralph (J.R.), (1909-1969), Minister of Health (1954-1957), Attorney General (1960-1969), Minister of Justice (1960-1969), Member of Parliament for Invercargill (1946-1969), Mayor of Invercargill (1938-1941)

Holland, Sidney, (1893-1961), Prime Minister of New Zealand (1949-1957) and Leader of the New Zealand National Party (1940-1957), Minister of Finance (1949-1954), Member of Parliament for North Christchurch/Fendalton (1938-1957)

Holyoake, Keith J., (1904-1983), Prime Minister of New Zealand and Minister of External Affairs (1957, 1960-1972), Member of Parliament for Pahiatua (1943-1977)

Inglis, J., (unknown), New Zealand Trade Commissioner in India (1949) and New Zealand's observer at the New Delhi conference on the Indonesian question (20-23 January 1949)

Kirk, Norman Eric, (1923-1974), Leader of the Labour Party (1965-1974), Leader of the Opposition (1965-1972), Prime Minister of New Zealand (1972-1974)

Lochore, Reuel Anson, (1903-1991), scholar, philologist, immigration official, First Secretary to the New Zealand High Commissioner in Malaya (1959), New Zealand Minister (Head of Mission) in Indonesia (1964-1966), New Zealand Ambassador to West Germany (1966-1969)

Macdonald, Thomas L., (1898-1980), New Zealand Minister of Defence (1949-1957), Minister of External Affairs (1954-1957), High Commissioner to the United Kingdom and Ambassador to the European Economic Community (EEC) (1961-1967)

McIntosh, Alister D., (1906-1978), public servant, Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department and Secretary of External Affairs (1943-1966)

Marshall, John R. ("Jack"), (1912-1988), Deputy Prime Minister (1957, 1960-1972), Minister of Industries and Commerce

Munro, Leslie K., (1901-1974), Editor of the *New Zealand Herald* (1942-1951), New Zealand Ambassador to the United States and New Zealand's permanent representative to the United Nations (1952-1958)

Nash, Walter, (1882-1968), New Zealand Minister (Ambassador) to Washington (1942-1949), Prime Minister of New Zealand (1957-1960), Member of Parliament for Hutt (1929-1968), Leader of the Opposition (1949-1957)

Nordmeyer, Arnold, (1901-1989), Leader of the Opposition and the Labour Party (1963-1965)

Rae, Duncan McFadyen, (1888-1964), National Member of Parliament for Eden (1946-1960), principal of the Auckland Teacher's Training College (1929-1946), first New Zealand Consul General to Indonesia (1961-1963), New Zealand Chargé d' Affaires in Indonesia (January 1963-December 1963)

Savage, Michael J., (1892-1940), first Labour Prime Minister of New Zealand (1935-1940), Member of Parliament for Auckland West (1919-1940)

Shanahan, Foss, (1910-1965), Deputy Secretary of the NZDEA (1943-1955, 1961-1964), High Commissioner to Singapore and Malaya (1955-1958)

Templeton, Hugh Campbell, (1929-present), National Member of Parliament for Awarua (1969-1972), Karori (1975-1978), Ohariu (1978-1984), historian and diplomat, aided in the establishment of the New Zealand Volunteer Graduate Scheme (VGS)

Webb, Thomas Clifton, (1889-1962), Minister of External Affairs (1951-1954), Minister of Island Territories (1951-1954), New Zealand High Commissioner to the United Kingdom (1954-1958)

Wilson, Joseph Vivian, (1894-1947), New Zealand Deputy Secretary of External Affairs (1944-1948), New Zealand Minister/Ambassador to France (1956-1959)

Interested Citizens

Alley, Rewi, (1897-1987), farmer, teacher, social reformer, peace activist, writer, Communist expatriate who lived in China, witnessed the 1965 Indonesian mass killings

Barnes, Harold (“Jock”), (1907-2000), trade unionist, President of the Waterside Workers’ Union (1944-1952)

Benda, Harry, (1919-1971), Czech Jewish refugee who settled in Indonesia, New Zealand, and the United States, political scientist at Victoria University of Wellington and Yale University

Bossard-Koning, Gerarda, (1928-?), former Dutch East Indies resident and civilian internee who immigrated to New Zealand after the Second World War

Gray, Marie, (unknown), New Zealand Presbyterian missionary nurse who lived in Indonesia (1959-1971), eyewitness of the 1965 30 September coup attempt

Hill, Tobias (“Toby”) McGlinchy, (1915-1977), seaman, trade unionist, watersider, National Secretary of the Waterside Workers’ Union

Klap, Boudewijn (“Boyd”), (1927-present), former Dutch Army lieutenant who migrated to New Zealand in 1951, insurance businessman, Companion of the Order of Merit (2011)

Macdonald, Lachie J.F., (1910s-2002), former war and foreign correspondent, worked for the *New Zealand Herald*, Australian Associated Press, and the *Daily Mail* (1944-1957)

Nunes, Ray, (1917-1999), Member of the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ), leader of the Workers’ Party of New Zealand (1991-1999)

Scott, Sidney Wilfred, (1900-1970), Member of the CPNZ (1935-1957), editor of the *People’s Voice*

Smith, Ronald Joseph., (1921-1955), Leader of the Victoria University College’s Socialist Club (VUCSC), member of the Communist Party (1946-1973) and the pro-Beijing Workers Communist League (WCL), public servant, peace activist

Wesley, Barbara (unknown), Volunteer Graduate (1961-1963), English-language teacher at the Technical Academy of Public Works Department (*Akademi Teknik Perkerjaan Umum dan Tenaga*; ATPUT)

Wesley, Laurie, (unknown), Volunteer Graduate (1960-1963), geotechnical engineer

Wilcox, Victor George, (1912-1989), Farm labourer, General Secretary of the CPNZ (1951-1978)

Indonesia

Aidit, Dipa Nusantara, (1923-1965), Secretary General of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*; PKI), one of the masterminds of the 30 September coup attempt

Agung, Ide Anak Agung Gde, (1921-1999), Prime Minister of the State of East Indonesia (1947-1949), Indonesian Interior Minister (1949-1950), Indonesian Foreign Minister (1955-1956), vocal anti-Sukarno critic

Djiwandono, J. Soedjati, (1933-2013), Colombo Plan student, Indonesian political scientist, human rights advocate

Harsono, Ganis (unknown), Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesperson

Hatta, Mohammed, (1902-1980), Vice President of Indonesia (1954-1956), Prime Minister of Indonesia (1948-1950), Indonesian Defence Minister (1948-1949), Indonesian Foreign Minister (1949-1950)

Helmi, A. Yahya, (unknown), Indonesian Ambassador to Australia (1956-1961), cross-accredited Indonesian Minister to New Zealand (1958-1961)

Kartawidjaja, Juanda, (1911-1963), 11th Prime Minister of Indonesia, promulgated the 1957 Juanda Declaration

Kosasih, Ahmad, (Unknown), Major-General in the Indonesian Army, Indonesian Ambassador to Australia (1964-1968), cross-accredited Indonesian Minister to New Zealand (1964-1968)

Malaka, Tan, (1897-1949), dissident member of the PKI and Comintern, teacher, philosopher, leader of the Struggle Union (*Persatuan Perjuangan*) imprisoned and later killed by the Indonesian Government

Malik, Adam, (1917-1984), journalist, Indonesian Foreign Minister (1966-1978), Vice-President of Indonesia (1978-1983), 26th President of the United Nations (1971-1972)

Maramis, Alexander Andries (A.A.), (1897-1977), member of the Central National Committee (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*; KNIP), interim Indonesian Foreign Minister (1948-1949)

Marentek, Alexander, (unknown), First Secretary of the Indonesian Embassy in Australia (1965)

Musso, (1897-1948), leader of the PKI during the failed Madiun Uprising in September 1948

Naibaho, Mula, (unknown), editor of the PKI's newspaper *Harian Rakjat* (People's Daily)

Nasution, Abdul Harris, (1918-2000), Commander of the Indonesian Army's Siliwangi Division (1946-1948), Deputy Commander of the Indonesian Army (1948), Army Chief of Staff (1950-1959), Indonesian Minister of Defence (1959-1966)

Palar, Lambertus Nicodemus (L.N.), (1900-1981), senior Indonesian diplomat, Head of the Indonesian Delegation to the United Nations (1962-1964), Indonesian Ambassador to the United States (1965-1966)

Sastroamidjojo, Usman, (1905-?), brother of the Indonesian nationalist leader and Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo (1903-1976), Indonesian Ambassador to Australia (1947-1951)

Sjahrir, Sutan, (1909-1966), first Prime Minister of Indonesia (1945-1947), Minister of the Interior (1945-1946), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1945-1947), leader of the right-wing faction of the Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis*)

Sjam, Kamaruzaman, (1924-1986), Head of the Special Bureau of the PKI, co-conspirator in the 30 September coup attempt

Sjarifuddin, Amir, (1907-1948), second Prime Minister of Indonesia (1947-1948), the leader of the left-wing faction of the *Partai Sosialis* and the People's Democratic Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakjat*; FDR), took part in the failed Madiun Uprising

Subandrio, (1915-2004), first Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom (1947-1950), Secretary-General of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (1956-April 1957), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1957-1965), Deputy Prime Minister (1964-1965)

Suharto, (1921-2008), Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Dara*; KOSTRAD) (1961-1965), Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army (1965-1967), second President of Indonesia (1967-1998)

Sukarno, (1901-1970), leader of the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*; PNI) (1929-1931, 1934-1935), first President of Indonesia (1945-1967)

Suromihardjo, Suadi, (Unknown), Brigadier General in the Indonesian Army, Indonesian Ambassador to Australia (1961-1964), cross-accredited Indonesian Minister to New Zealand (1961-1964)

Untung bin Syamsuri, (1926-1967), Lieutenant-Colonel in the Indonesian Army, commanding officer of the *Tjakrabirama* palace guard regiment, co-conspirator in the 30 September Movement

Abbreviations and Glossary

1 RNZIR

1st Battalion Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment

30 September Movement

Movement created by the PKI leadership and Lieutenant Colonel Untung to arrest the six right-wing Indonesian generals

ANZ

Archives New Zealand

ANZAM

Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaya, 1949

ANZUS

Australia, New Zealand, United States – mutual security treaty, 1951

AJHR

Appendices to the House of Representatives

ARDEA

Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs

ATL

Alexander Turnbull Library

Binjang Kejora

Morning Star flag: West Papuan national symbol

CCP

Chinese Communist Party

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CSIS

Centre for Strategic and International Studies: Indonesian think tank in Jakarta

Colombo Plan

Commonwealth-sponsored economic and social developmental plan for South and Southeast Asia

Commonwealth/British Commonwealth

Intergovernmental organization of former British territories and dependencies

CONEFO

Conference of the New Emerging Forces: Sukarno's proposed rival organization to the United Nations

CORSO

Council of Organisations for Relief Services Overseas

CPNZ

Communist Party of New Zealand

Darul Islam

House of Islam: Islamic insurgents in Indonesia (1949-1962)

EAR

External Affairs Review, official in-house journal of the New Zealand Department of External Affairs

ECAFE

United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East

ECOSOC

United Nations Economic and Social Council

EEC

European Economic Community

ELI

English Language Institute, Victoria University of Wellington

FDR

Front Demokrasi Rakjat (People's Democratic Front)

FOL

New Zealand Federation of Labour (FOL)

Ganjang Malaysia

Crush Malaysia campaign

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GOC

Good Offices Committee: United Nations body operating in Indonesia (1947-1949)

Guided Democracy

Semi-authoritarian political system devised by President Sukarno (1959-1966)

Harian Rakjat

“*People's Daily*”: Indonesian Communist newspaper

HMNZS

Her/His Majesty's New Zealand Ship

Indonesian Revolution

Indonesian independence struggle against the Dutch (1945-1949)

KLM

Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij (Royal Dutch Airlines)

KNIP

Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central National Committee)

Konfrontasi

Indonesian policy of Confrontation against West New Guinea (1960-1962) and Malaysia (1963-1965)

KOSTRAD

Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Dara (Army Strategic Reserve Command)

Malayan Emergency

Communist insurrection in Malaya (1948-1960)

Masjumi

Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations)

MP

Member of Parliament

MPRS

Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Peoples' Consultative Assembly)

Nabdatu Ulama

Islamic Awakening Party

NAM

Non-Aligned Movement

NASAKOM

Nationalis-Agama-Komunis (Nationalism, Religion, Communism)

NEFO

New Emerging Forces (radical developing countries)

NEI

Netherlands East Indies

NEKOLIM

Neo-kolonialisme, kolonialisme, dan imperialisme (Neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism)

New Emerging Forces doctrine

Sukarno's foreign policy doctrine behind *Konfrontasi* (1963-1965)

New Order

Suharto's new regime (1966-1998)

NZBC
New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation

NZH
New Zealand Herald

NZCER
New Zealand Council of Education Research

NZDEA
New Zealand Department of External Affairs

NZE&T
New Zealand Economist & Taxpayer

NZJIC
New Zealand Joint Intelligence Committee: cabinet-level intelligence-sharing group

NZLP
New Zealand Labour Party

NZMR
New Zealand Monthly Review

NZNP
New Zealand National Party

NZPA
New Zealand Press Association

NZSAS
New Zealand Special Air Service

NZUSA
New Zealand University Students Association

ODT
Otago Daily Times

OLDEFO
Old Established Forces (Western powers)

Partai Sosialis
Indonesian Socialist Party

PDRI
Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia (Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia)

Pemuda
Indonesian youths

PV

People's Voice: Communist Party of New Zealand's official newspaper

Permesta

Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam (Universal Struggle Charter): rebel group based in Sulawesi (1958-1961)

PETA

Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland)

PKI

Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

Plan Althorpe

Proposed British-Australian-New Zealand plan to bomb Indonesian airfields during the *Konfrontasi*

PRC

People's Republic of China

PRRI

Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia): rebel group based in Sumatra (1958-1961)

Radio Australia

Australian public broadcasting service

RNZAF

Royal New Zealand Air Force

RNZN

Royal New Zealand Navy

RSA

New Zealand Returned Services Association

RTC

Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference, 23 August-2 November 1949

RUSI

Republic of the United States of Indonesia

SCM

New Zealand Student Christian Movement

SEATO

South-East Asia Treaty Organization

TCS

Technical Cooperation Scheme of New Zealand's Colombo Plan

TNI

Tentera Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Army)

Trikora

Sukarno's Triple Command for the invasion of West New Guinea in 1961

UK-USA

UK-USA Security Agreement ("Five Eyes")

UN

United Nations

UNESCO

United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UNTAA

United Nations Technical Assistance Administration

UNTEA

United Nations Temporary Administration in West New Guinea

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

VGA

Australian Volunteer Graduate Association in Indonesia

VGS

New Zealand Volunteer Graduate Scheme in Indonesia

VSA

New Zealand Volunteer Service Abroad

VUCSC

Victoria University College Socialist Club

WHO

World Health Organization

WWU

New Zealand Waterside Workers' Union

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