JOURNAL of the HELLENIC DIASPORA

VOL. 17.1 (1991) GENERAL ISSUE

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JOURNAL of the HELLENIC DIASPORA

a semiannual scholarly review keyed to the Greek experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

Published by PELLA PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.
337 West 36th Street, New York, NY 10018-6401

Editorial Offices:
Main 544
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West Chester, PA 19383
Tel.: 215 - 436-2901 • Fax: 215 - 436-3150

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The JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA maintains a vision of the Greek world as a paradigm for new conceptualizations of Western identity, standing as it does on the margins of eastern and western Europe and at the boundary between Western and oriental constructs. The JHD separates Greece from traditional isolationist and marginalizing taxonomies to view it both in a global context in terms of its unique setting as part of the Balkans, the Mediterranean, western Europe, and the Middle East, and in relation to the Greeks of the diaspora. JHD takes a transdisciplinary perspective that examines both the nature and the interstices of Greek anthropology, history, literature, philosophy, and social sciences.

The JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA welcomes widely ranging approaches that embrace a variety of methodologies and perspectives. It accepts critical, theoretical, and historical studies, review articles, and translations keyed to the Greek experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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Articles in JHD are abstracted and/or indexed in *Historical Abstracts, America: History and Life, Sociological Abstracts, Psychological Abstracts, Modern Language Association Abstracts, Language Bibliography, International Political Science Abstracts,* and *American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies.*

SUBSCRIPTIONS AND ADVERTISING

JHD is published semiannually in March and September. Annual subscription rates: Individual: $20 (domestic); $25 (foreign). Institutional: $30 (domestic); $35 (foreign). Back issues, $10 each. Advertising rates can be had on request by writing to Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 337 West 36th Street, New York, NY 10018-6401. Telephone: 212 - 279-9586.

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Printed by ATHENS PRINTING COMPANY, New York, NY 10018-6401

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Editorial Note

The present issue of the JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA (17.1) marks a new period in the life of this publication. JHD will now be made up of a team of two editors, Alexander Kitroeff (history and the social sciences) and Kostas Myrsiades (literature and the humanities), together with several Editors-at-Large located abroad, including Andre Gerolymatos in Canada, Marios Evriviades in Cyprus, Ole Smith in Denmark, and Hagen Fleischer in Greece. In the months to come we hope to expand our editorial board with the appointment of a number of associate editors as well as the appointment of more editors-at-large. Our second 1991 issue (17.2) will include an expanded national/international advisory board of distinguished scholars working not only in the area of Hellenic studies but in areas related to the understanding of modern Hellenism.

As we begin our new phase, the JHD will maintain a vision of the Greek world as a paradigm for new conceptualizations of Western identity, standing as it does on the margins of eastern and western Europe and at the boundary between Western and oriental constructs. It will view the Greek past as a construction that has in modern Greece represented a useful tool to interpret contemporary values and beliefs. Thus the new JHD separates Greece from its traditional isolationist and marginalizing taxonomies to view it both in a global context in terms of its unique setting as part of the Balkans, the Mediterranean, western Europe, and the Middle East, and in relation to the Greeks of the diaspora. The JHD will take a transdisciplinary perspective that will examine both the nature and the interstices of Greek anthropology, history, literature, philosophy, and social sciences. We will welcome widely ranging approaches that embrace a variety of methodologies and perspectives; we will accept critical, historical, literary, and theoretical studies, review articles, and translations keyed to the Greek experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

We hope that in the months and years to come this new semiannual (March and September), refereed journal, focusing on the Hellenic experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its relation to the Mediterranean world, will provide our readers with usable, readable, and timely material designed to keep them at the cutting edge of the study of modern Hellenism.

IN APPRECIATION

The JHD was launched in 1974 by Nikos Petropulos, professor of sociology at Indiana-Purdue University in Indianapolis, and by the Hellenic-American Society in that city. Subtitled "Critical Thoughts on Greek and World Issues," the establishment of the JHD reflected progressive concerns with the political, social, and intellectual developments in post-1974 Greece and its diaspora.

The second period of the journal began with its fifth volume in 1978, when it was taken up by Leandros Papathanasiou of Pella Publishing Co. in New York. The new editorial board consisted of young graduate students and junior academics—Dan Georgakas, Paschalis Kitromilides, Peter Pappas, and Yiannis Roubatis. They successfully undertook the transition of the JHD into a more scholarly publication, while retaining its critical tone.

Since its second period, the JHD can boast of several successes including its support of the revisionist historiography on Greece of the 1940s and restoration of the study of the Greek resistance in all its forms, the promotion of new social history-oriented trends in modern Greek historiography, encouragement of new directions in the study of the Greek-American experience, and the hosting of articles reflecting a variety of methodological and theoretical approaches ranging from the traditional to the Marxist and poststructuralist. During this period the JHD functioned as a global forum for the study of modern Hellenism by accepting contributions from scholars based in North America, Europe, and Africa. Nor did the JHD hesitate to host intellectually stimulating contributions from independent non-academically affiliated observers of modern Greek culture.

From the four-man editorial board that has guided the

JHD since 1974, Dan Georgakas was replaced by Alexander Kitroeff and Paschalis Kitromilides by Yiorgos Chouliaras, who was in turn replaced by Marios L. Evriviades. The two remaining members of the original foursome, Peter Pappas and Yiannis Roubatis, are now stepping down. Volume 17.1 (1991) inaugurates a third period in which we hope to build on JHD's achievements. While we are not breaking with our past, we are interested in steering the JHD in new directions. Thus ends another chapter in the JHD's history. The present editors extend their gratitude and admiration to their predecessors for their longstanding commitment to the JHD, and to their promotion of innovative approaches in the study of modern Hellenism.

Alexander Kitroeff
Kostas Myrsiades

Can the Vlachs Write Their Own History?

by NICHOLAS S. BALAMACI

A distinction between "traditional" and "modern" societies[1] is extremely useful, though it has certainly been subject to some misuse. Perhaps the worst misuse is when Westerners simply assume that their society is "modern" (or "developed") and better off while others are more or less "traditional" and, implicitly or explicitly, worse off. A common corollary to this argument is that there exists a series of steps, which can be discovered through the application of strict social-scientific method, that all societies must pass through in order to survive in today's world—as if there were one future, or one path to it, for all.[2]

This brand of modernization theory has not fared well in the postwar period, which has seen the self-assertion of non-Western societies (with their own patterns of development) and the emergence of a *mentalité* of pluralism in the West. Some still argue that the West is better because it developed the very notions of pluralism and of objective standards for measuring what is good, while non-Western societies tend to assert that what is their own is best, thereby leaving no room for pluralistic ways of thought.[3] But this argument defeats itself: The development of the idea that no one culture is necessarily superior to any other proves that Western culture is superior to all others. Clearly the West deserves credit for its various innovations, including pluralistic ways of thought, but the point is precisely

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that *other* cultures deserve some credit, too. While the particular excellence of Western society may very well be the system of rational inquiry that has led to, for example, advanced, successful economies and systems of government, the particular excellence of non-Western societies, which often demonstrate a limited ability to harm the natural environment and a healthy respect for things spiritual, is that they have not led to such Western ills as massive environmental pollution and the possibility of nuclear annihilation. Cultures can learn "excellences" from one another; the one thing that we now feel we must avoid—and we are indeed indebted to the West for this particular bit of wisdom—is that any culture think itself so superior as to seek to dominate the others, putting an end to what diversity still remains after a half-millennium of Western hegemony.

Another critique of the traditional/modern distinction sees it as a typical dichotomous division of reality between an idealized past and a less-than-ideal present.[4] Yet the human tendency to idealize the past does not by itself negate the value of distinguishing two different types of society. And criticisms of modernization theory as simplistic and dichotomous can best be answered by noting that the theory does not necessarily postulate that there are only two types of human society, "traditional" and "modern"; rather, it simply seeks to describe a transition from one type to another without excluding the possibility of, say, a third type (such as a pre-Neolithic hunting and gathering society, for example).

Thus while some of the earlier views of modernization are discredited, the concept remains; modernization is seen not as an absolute series of stages through which a given society must pass, nor even as "good" or "bad," but rather as "a *tendency* or set of *tendencies*," as the historian John Gillis puts it. Gillis goes on to explain,

> [T]radition and modernity are not two completely different conditions. Elements of modernity—for example, the recognition of merit over birth—existed to some degree in preindustrial society. By the same token, the traditional factor of advantage from birth is still powerful in most modern societies, despite every

> effort to give all children equal opportunity. Yet few would deny that over the past two hundred years merit has become more important and birth less so in determining the many important functions in a society. It is therefore the tendency toward equal opportunity rather than the realization of total equality that we describe as modernization.[5]

This interpretation, too, is not without its critics; Immanuel Wallerstein, for example, argues that this view of world history ignores the fact that in order for certain areas of the planet to be developed (a loose synonym for "modernized"), certain other areas of the planet must be underdeveloped.[6] Yet by pointing this out, Wallerstein does not refute modernization theory, but amplify it; indeed, he himself retains the distinction between societies that are "developed" and those that are not, simply asserting that the latter are a prerequisite for the former. Eric Wolf warns that the label "traditional" tends to obscure the differences between widely disparate peasant societies.[7] This is an important point to keep in mind when dealing with modernization theory, which, though it seeks to delineate characteristics various societies have in common, should not be construed to imply that all traditional (or even modern) societies are precisely the same.

Not only does the traditional/modern distinction continue to be a useful one, it still provides a basis for the periodization of the last European millennium—we speak of medieval, early modern, and modern European history. Various characteristics have been suggested as criteria for modernization, including urbanization, commercialization, and industrialization; the changing social mobilization of peoples from localistic loyalties to centralized, integrated national societies; the priority of merit over inherited status; the specialization and professionalization of labor, with resulting new social divisions; the separation of politics and economics from religion and family life; the growth of literacy; the rise of mass media; increased social mobility; and, of course, a new *mentalité* whose main characteristics are an acceptance of social change and a concomitant emphasis on progress.[8] It is this new *mentalité* and its new conception of

time with which this essay is most concerned; Mircea Eliade describes the "two distinct orientations" of time in human society as "the one traditional, . . . that of cyclical time, regenerating itself *ad infinitum*; the other modern, that of finite time."[9]

Since these developments first occurred in the West, there is a tendency to call this process "Westernization." That term implies that when a society undergoes modernization it is forsaking local culture in favor of wholesale adoption of Western European and American cultural forms. It is still far from certain, however, that a modernizing non-Western culture must lose itself in the process (one thinks of the Soviet Union and Japan); thus the term "Westernization" will be avoided here. At the same time, there is no doubt that traditional societies throughout the world have not systematically modernized before contact with the West; they did not produce, say, a modern historical ideal—portraying change over time in an objective manner—before their exposure to Western education and academic values. This ideal of objectivity is indeed something new under the sun; in fact, the degree to which even Western societies, long convinced of their own superiority, approach that ideal with consistency is questionable even today.

* * *

The Vlachs are a traditional society of the Balkan peninsula. Once contained entirely within the Ottoman empire, they were divided as that empire was dismembered to form or enlarge the modern Balkan nation-states. By 1918, the Vlachs were effectively split between Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and what was to become Yugoslavia. Mass migrations created additional communities in America between 1900-20 and in Romania between 1920-40.

For reasons that constitute the basis of this essay, much paper and ink have been wasted on the question of the origin of the Vlachs. Perhaps the simplest way to approach an answer is by analogy to the Americans of today; in antiquity, the Roman language (Latin) and culture supplanted most of the other languages and cultures of Europe save those of peoples who had developed their own literature (the Greeks) or were not subdued by the Romans (the Basques) or had a segment of their popula-

tions located outside the Roman Empire (Germans, Gaelic-speaking Celts). Since there is no way of knowing the lineage of the Romanized populations—there were Greeks in what is now Marseilles, Germans in Spain and Italy, Syrians in the Roman army—they are known to us simply by the language they currently speak, whether Catalan, Italian, Provençal, French, Rhaeto-Romance, Spanish, or Romanian. (A short-lived European preoccupation with "racial origins" ended with the cataclysm it helped cause—World War II—and one hardly hears the term used any longer.)

The Vlachs are thus the Balkan populations that were Romanized, along with individuals later assimilated to Vlach language and culture (as Slavs, Greeks, and even some Gypsies have been). In other words, the Vlachs do not date to classical times, but are a "new" people; there simply was no such thing as a Vlach before the Roman conquest. Which populations existed in the Balkans at the time of the conquest? According to the best information we have, the main groups were Illyrians, Thracians, and Greeks, the last group including the Macedonians.[10] North of the Danube were the Dacians. Some members of each group were certainly Romanized. The Albanians may be the descendants of the Illyrians, as they assert. The Thracians, Dacians, and Macedonians disappeared, assimilated by Romans and Greeks (and, of course, after the sixth century A.D., by Slavs). In Byzantium, Greek civilization was fused to that of the Romans, with Christianity being the catalyst; after a brief period during which it gave way to Latin in official circles, the Greek language came to dominate again in the sixth century A.D., except in the more remote areas of the Balkan peninsula, where a new Romance language was spoken. It is surmised, on the basis of linguistic evidence, that these Eastern Romance speakers were in touch with the Italian peninsula until the sixth-century Slavic invasions severed this connection.[11]

Though both Romance-speakers and Greek-speakers were known by the same designation at this time—"Romans"—it seems that the Romance-speakers nevertheless differentiated themselves from the Greek-speaking "Romans"; it remains uncertain whether Greek-speakers considered these Eastern Romance-

speakers as somehow different from themselves.[12] After the Slavic invasions, which severed the Byzantine empire's control over much of this Romance population, the Byzantine Greeks came to perceive these Romance-speakers as outsiders and called them by a new name they had learned from the Slavs, who in turn had learned it from the Goths: "Vlachs." This word came from the same Germanic root that provided the designation "Welsh," and it has an interesting history. The Oxford English Dictionary cites these forms: Serbian and Bulgarian *Vlach*, meaning Romanian or Italian; Czech *Vlach*, Italian; Polish *Wloch*, Italian; Polish *Woloch*, Walachian; Russian *Voloch'*, Walachian or Italian. These forms "are Slavonic adoptions of the Germanic *Walh* (OHG. *Walh, Walah*; MHG. *Walch*; OE. *Wealh*), foreigner, applied especially to Celts and Latins."[13] The Anglo-Saxons, Germanic invaders of England, applied this term to the native British (Celtic) population they found there, calling them "Welsh."[14] The extension of meaning from "Celt" to "Latin" is explained by John A. Armstrong in his *Nations Before Nationalism*; in speaking of the tendency of ethnic groups to define themselves by comparison to "strangers," he notes:

> Thus the extensive Germanic groups defined themselves as the people "between Wend and Walsche," never using either term to refer to any group that spoke a Germanic tongue. Just as the real referent for Wend shifted, probably, from Finnic reindeer nomads located northeast of the Germanic elements to the Slavs who later occupied the eastern limits of the Germanic sphere, the referent for "Walsche" (or "Welsch") changed from Celt alone to Celt, Latinized Celt, and Roman alike, on the southeast confines of the Germanic world.[15]

While there is a gap of several hundred years in the history of the Romance-speakers north of the Danube River, the Vlachs of the southern Balkans seem to have existed there (though not necessarily in the same precise locations within the southern Balkans) since the Roman conquest. Here we enter the turbulent waters of Balkan history, which, more than other branches of

European history, has regularly been subordinated to present national imperatives; in this case, the Romanians and Hungarians both covet Transylvania and have sought to legitimate their claims to it by asserting historical priority in that region. Thus the Hungarians theorize that the Romanians are really Vlachs from the southern Balkans who migrated north of the Danube during the Middle Ages, *i.e.*, after the Hungarians got there. The Romanians respond by asserting that they are the descendants of the autochthonous Dacians who, though conquered and partially assimilated by the Romans, have continued to exist in all current Romanian lands since antiquity; the Romanians see the Vlachs of the southern Balkans alternately as autochthonous Thracians who were Romanized (the Dacians were a Thracian tribe) and as Romanians from north of the Danube who migrated south.[16]

Like all other ethnic groups on the continent, the Vlachs' consciousness and primary loyalty have long been linked to their immediate environment—village, mountain, valley, clan—and not to any national idea; such ideas were born in Western Europe in the early nineteenth century, and only since then have Vlachs and others come to see themselves as part of a "nation." (The religious history of the Vlachs has not even begun to be addressed by serious scholars.) Whereas the Romanians eventually went on to create their own nation-state in the nineteenth century, the Vlachs have, since at least the seventeenth century, come more and more under the influence of Greek culture, especially through the vehicle of Greek Orthodoxy, due to their proximity to Greek populations. In fact, all Balkan groups during the Ottoman occupation were marked by their relatively peaceful coexistence and the fluidity with which they adopted aspects of each other's culture (especially Greek culture, which predominated through the Church). Once nationalism became a force in European political life in the nineteenth century, however, this peaceful Balkan coexistence ended, and as Ottoman strength in Europe faded, the various Balkan national groups fought over the remaining Ottoman lands in the peninsula.

A Vlach national movement began among wealthy Vlach merchants in Vienna and Budapest at the start of the nineteenth century,[17] but the rising Romanian state soon took the lead,

claiming the Vlachs as long-lost kin and investing large sums in Romanian schools and churches for the Vlachs. While genuinely fraternal feelings certainly existed under the benevolent, naive form of early nationalism, the Romanians also hoped to use the Vlachs as a bargaining chip in their territorial claims against Bulgaria.[18] This Romanian nationalist movement gave rise to the new ethnic designation *Macedoromani*, which meant to signify that the Vlachs were simply Romanians who happened to come from Macedonia. The new designation was adopted at the expense of two important facts, however: first, that (assuming the Romanians have been north of the Danube since antiquity, as they assert) the two branches of Eastern Romance population had been virtually separated for some twelve centuries (*i.e.*, since the Slavic invasions) and had evolved rather differently during that time; and second, that while Vlachs are certainly found in Macedonia, they also inhabit the neighboring regions of Epiros, Thessaly, and Thrace.

The recently formed Greek state opposed this Romanian national movement, and the Vlachs soon came to be divided into pro-Greek and pro-Romanian factions. The bitterness between the two was not great until Greece, in conducting a guerrilla war at the turn of this century against various armed groups of Slavic nationalists for possession of Macedonia, made the unfortunate decision to use force against the unarmed Vlach nationalists, too.[19] Conflict erupted on the academic front as well: Greek nationalist scholars, seeking to prove Greek historical priority and continuity in Macedonia from antiquity (*i.e.*, before the Slavs got there), adopted the theory "that the Vlachs were Vlachophone Hellenes, that is to say racially Greeks who had learnt Vlach."[20] Though this thesis has never found support outside of Greece, it has enjoyed a remarkable staying power among both Greeks and Hellenized Vlachs, and it is important for its effects on Vlach identity. If one is "biologically" Greek anyway, and one's Latin idiom merely an anomaly, then indeed why *not* abandon that idiom and return to one's true "race"?

It is upon this skeletal sketch—unencumbered by the Romanians' desire to have been in Transylvania before the Hungarians, untainted by the Greeks' need to claim members of their "race" in Macedonia from time immemorial—that the

other facts of Vlach history may be hung. Just what that history and those facts are has not yet been attempted (much less realized) outside of a handful of rather remarkable works which, not coincidentally, have had no particular axe to grind concerning the Vlachs: the writings of Gustav Weigand, published in Germany in the 1890s; the Englishmen Alan Wace and Maurice Thompson's 1914 classic, *The Nomads of the Balkans*; and the 1987 book by Tom Winnifrith, also an Englishman, entitled *The Vlachs: The History of a Balkan People.*[21] Particularly important is Winnifrith's comprehensive critique of Greek, Romanian, and other local scholars who have purported to study the Vlachs impartially but who in reality have subordinated the Vlachs to their own narrow nationalistic concerns. This critique has cleansed the slate of Vlach history and rid it of the accumulated debris of 200 years of nationalist infighting—almost all of it at the expense of the Vlachs. Winnifrith's historiographical critique is the signal for a fresh start in Vlach history, a start provided by the remainder of his own book.

But Winnifrith's book is short, far from comprehensive, and suffers from a weak theoretical structure. If local scholars have been ruled out due to their nationalist concerns, to whom can we turn for the definitive history of the Vlachs? Winnifrith's critique of Balkan national scholars would seem to leave us with two main alternative sources: impartial Western scholars, motivated by a sense of curiosity and wonder, or the Vlachs themselves, motivated by an interest in and affection for their ethnic background. Western scholars have already shown that they can produce reliable works on the Vlachs—but those works are few and far between, and there is not much interest in the Vlachs, though they are clearly on the verge of extinction. On the other hand, the Vlachs themselves have a natural interest in the subject—but can the Vlachs write their own history?

* * *

Vlach society never modernized—as a society, that is, for many Vlachs assimilated into societies that were modernizing. But in doing so, they had for all intents and purposes to give up their identity as Vlachs: no modern schools, literature, or political entities were created by or for the Vlachs (the ap-

proach of both Romanians and Greeks was generally that theirs was the literary language of the Vlachs, so rather than modernizing Vlach language and literature, Romanian and Greek schools taught the Vlachs Romanian or Greek language and literature). Without schools, Vlach never developed words for the myriad innovations of modernity, from automobiles to presidents; such terms as do exist are borrowed from more developed languages such as English, Turkish, Greek, Albanian, or one of the Slavic languages. No modern Vlach culture has been created.

Herein lies the essence of the problem, for Vlachs who have chosen to remain involved with their culture have by and large continued to work within the conceptual framework of an extremely traditional culture—even when the intellectuals among them impose on that culture the nomenclature and forms of modernity—rather than seek to create a modern pan-Vlach identity complete with literature, criticism, representative institutions, etc. One of the ramifications of this phenomenon (and the thesis of this paper) is that a traditional *mentalité* is imported into such nontraditional activities as the writing of history, with results as damaging to the traditional society as they are to the ideals of the modern historical profession.

What is a "traditional *mentalité*"? Better yet, with the benefit of Wolf's criticism, what is the traditional *mentalité* of the Vlachs? I would like to offer three criteria, one that is characteristic of traditional societies in general, one that is typical of pastoral-nomadic groups such as the Vlachs, and one that is particularly associated with Vlach traditional society and is critical to any attempt to understand that society.

The first of these criteria—and what Claude Lévi-Strauss describes as "[t]he characteristic feature of the savage mind"[22]—is what we might call timelessness. The Vlachs, like many others, were a "people without history," attuned mostly to the rhythms of biology and nature before coming into contact with anthropocentric Western societies. Even after centuries of contact with the West, however, the Vlach traditional *mentalité* survives, and in this the Vlach experience is comparable to that of other traditional societies. In fact, the antipathetic relationship between the traditional *mentalité* and modern historicism is brought out

most clearly by Calvin Martin, a historian whose essays on the historiography of the American Indians stand as a landmark for all scholars interested in the survival of traditional ways of thinking in seemingly modern times and places. Martin asserts that

> despite our profusion of monographs we have in truth largely missed the North American Indians' experience and meaning of it. We have missed their "time" as they construed and sought to live it. Instead... we make them into a "people of history": assign them our terms and conception of living in time and space, our commitment to changing reality and changing humanity over the ages.[23]

In contrast to the anthropological (human-oriented) outlook of a "people of history," American Indians have the biological (nature-oriented) outlook of a "people of myth."[24] According to Eliade, the only "history" mythic people have is sacred history, which

> is a "history" that can be repeated indefinitely, in the sense that the myths serve as models for ceremonies that periodically reactualize the tremendous events that occurred at the beginning of time. The myths preserve and transmit the paradigms, the exemplary models, for all the responsible activities in which men engage.[25]

Moreover, "such an ideology makes it impossible that what we today call 'historical consciousness' should develop."[26] If something exists now, it must always have existed. "The man of archaic cultures tolerates 'history' with difficulty and attempts periodically to abolish it."[27]

The second criterion of the Vlach traditional *mentalité* is a preoccupation with genealogy, the tracing of real or fictitious bloodlines through the branches of biological descent. The historian John A. Armstrong contrasts the territorial sense of identity that arose in Western Europe during the Middle Ages (and led to the development of stable frontiers around the various territories) with the nonterritorial ethnic identity of

pastoral nomads characterizing such areas as the Middle East; for the latter, "[b]y far the most important mechanism is the extraordinary dominance of the genealogical principle."[28] This "concern for finding ancestors has been carried to lengths that appear absurd to an objective observer," such as when "Albanian refugees in the Negev and non-Semitic Somalis alike claim descent from Mohammed himself."[29] Moreover,

> Because such claims are neither provable nor disprovable, the force of their presentation, including skill in enlisting learned authorities, the superficial plausibility of the oral traditions, and the real power of the claimants are decisive.... It is obvious that what is at stake here is a set of myths, among the most potent structures that have ever influenced identity.... [I]t is not real blood relationships but conviction impelled by an intense desire to identify with a more prestigious group that determines the identity myth.[30]

Of pastoral nomadic origin themselves, the Vlachs, too, rely heavily on genealogy as the ordering principle of their identity.

The third and final criterion of the Vlach traditional *mentalité* I will cite for the purposes of this paper is an attraction to the freedom, mobility, and inconspicuousness of a mountain lifestyle; the Vlachs have done much as they pleased for the last two millennia simply by staying out of the notice of other peoples. As Charles Eliot noted in 1908, "Their villages are nearly always placed in the highest and least visible spots... [an] obvious advantage as a means of eluding the Turkish tax-collectors."[31] One way these characteristics show up in the present is in the strong impulse to camouflage Vlach identity within the context of a stronger, more prestigious, or more successful group. Such a phenomenon, of course, would be most marked in the modern period of competing national identities and states; the old empires did not aggressively seek converts and in fact tended to insulate the governing classes from the governed, keeping the two cultures apart.[32] This chameleon-like characteristic of the Vlachs has been cited often in the last century. Wace and Thompson observed that the Vlachs "are essentially a mountain

people and as soon as they begin to settle permanently in the plains ... [they] rapidly become merged with the surrounding races."[33] The two British scholars, who traveled through Vlach villages in Greek regions during the period of Romanian-Greek friction over the Vlachs, noticed peculiar behavior even in Vlach villages:

> Thus on one occasion we overheard the school children being ordered to talk only Greek as long as we were present; in another village we were assured spoke only Greek, Vlach proved to be the common tongue.... Once in the early days when our knowledge of Vlach was small we arrived at a Vlach village which had just reunited after a winter in the plains. All around were talking Vlach; we were welcomed kindly by the schoolmaster who spoke to us in Greek. "We only talk Vlach when we first meet again after the winter" were almost his first words. It was not until a month later that we heard another word of Greek.[34]

So noteworthy did Wace and Thompson find this phenomenon that they chose to end their tome on the Vlachs on this note: "[T]heir numbers have been steadily, but slowly diminishing, and they themselves have helped this by their lack of national feeling, their dispersion and their power of self-effacement."[35]

Barely a decade earlier, in 1905, the British socialist and journalist Henry Noel Brailsford had written,

> There is no race in all the Balkans so mysterious and so individual as the Vlachs. They shelter themselves in the Greek Church, adopt Greek culture as a disguise, and serve the Hellenic idea. It is rare to meet a man among them who does not speak Greek more or less fluently and well, but at home the national Latin idiom persists, and their callings, their habits, their ways of thinking make them a nationality apart.... They live apart, rarely intermarrying with Slavs, upheld by some tradition of an ancient superiority which teaches them to despise the newer races. If they are a timid people

> they are also singularly tenacious. A family may be scattered between Roumania and Thessaly, but they never cease to be Vlachs.[36]

While he acknowledged that with some Vlachs Hellenism was a genuine passion, Brailsford was quick to add,

> With the mass of the Vlachs, however, this loyalty to Greece was a more calculating and interested attachment. This sparse and furtive race is of necessity opportunist. It seeks to merge and conceal itself in some larger organisation from the same timid and unobtrusive instinct which causes it to build its villages on the mountains. So long as Greece held an undisputed primacy among the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula it was obviously the interest of the Vlachs to shelter under the Greek name. . . . But the recent misfortunes of Greece have thrown some doubt on the wisdom of this connection. . . . The stronger force has an attraction for the Vlach mind.[37]

Modern scholars, too, have noticed this characteristic of the Vlachs, which is operative not only in Greek regions but in Albanian and Slavic areas as well. The Croatian-American sociologist Vatro Murvar noted,

> The Vlachs preferred to use the names of people [*sc.* nations] with whom they wished to become assimilated. They were anxious to achieve this assimilation quickly because "they were ashamed of the associations attached to their own names. They therefore preferred to call themselves Greeks or Serbs." They identified themselves with the Serbs, although they had nothing in common with them but the religion.[38]

Murvar in fact devoted his entire doctoral dissertation to attempting to prove the existence of a Vlach elite calling itself Serbian but still operating within the context of Vlach culture

even as it controlled the new Serbian state and today continues to dominate in Yugoslavia.

An ambivalent attitude toward national identity is not unique to the Vlachs; it may even be common among what we might call the world's "smaller" cultures. In his book on nationalism, Gellner notes that

> in many cases, it is far from clear how a given individual is to be assigned to his "cultural background." . . . Life-style, occupation, language, ritual practice, may fail to be congruent. A family's economic and political survival may hinge, precisely, on the adroit manipulation and maintenance of these ambiguities, on keeping options and connections open. Its members may not have the slightest interest in, or taste for, the unambiguous, categorical self-characterization such as is now associated with a putative nation, aspiring to internal homogeneity and external autonomy. In a traditional milieu an ideal of a single overriding and cultural identity makes little sense.[39]

Precisely how the Vlachs have manipulated the various ambiguities inherent in their situation is the subject of an important essay by Muriel Dimen Schein entitled "When Is an Ethnic Group? Ecology and Class Structure in Northern Greece."[40] Concentrating on the region of Epiros, Schein contrasts the Vlachs (whom she calls by their self-designation "Aroumani") with the Sarakatsans (a Greek pastoral nomadic group) in order to demonstrate that "under conditions of competition for strategic resources, ethnic identity can be used as a means of organizing adaptation to natural and social environments; ethnic differences will then be expressed and recognized, and ethnicity becomes a basis for differential success."[41]

Schein begins by recognizing the ubiquitous Vlach custom we have been discussing: "Like the Aroumani who inhabit other Balkan countries, those in Greece have adopted the major customs of their host country, so that today, in a town or city, the Aroumani can be distinguished from the other rural Epirotes only when they speak Roumanian [*sc.* Vlach]."[42] In the course

of their competition for the limited pastures of Epiros, Vlachs and Sarakatsans have "made use of ethnic identification as a way to allocate and secure pasture."[43] Political and ecological factors interacting with ethnicity led to Sarakatsan success, their lower classes becoming specialized as stock-breeders while their upper classes, as well as both upper and lower classes of the Vlachs, were forced to become generalized into numerous professions—an advantage if the ecosystem changes (as it did in this century).[44] Yet Sarakatsan upper classes tend to lose their Sarakatsan identity, becoming for all intents and purposes Greek when they leave their villages; this does not always happen with the Vlachs, giving the Vlach upper and lower classes the potential advantage of a common bond of ethnicity. In past centuries the Vlachs retained their language and identity due to specific economic and legal advantages given them by the Ottoman Turks.

> But Roumanian [Vlach] is still learned today in the villages, not because of any one particular reason, but because identification as Aroumani continues to confer advantages in diverse contexts. Aroumanian ethnic identity condenses multiple experiences and meanings—non-Greekness, ecological and economic marginality, unique control of muleteering, and dominance of the cheese trade—and thus has great but non-specific potential uses. . . . This is not to say that all Aroumani have always maintained their group membership. Emigrants do so when it is to their advantage: thus, politicians clearly find it useful, as do cheese and stock merchants who use it to maintain connections with Aroumani shepherds. At the other end of the hierarchy, villagers in the remote mountains also continue to use their identity as a major means of finding a way into commercial and political networks. On the other hand, those who settle in plains villages, or become businessmen in non-related industries find it less beneficial to identify themselves as Aroumani and consequently cease to speak Roumanian [Vlach].[45]

In short, ethnicity is a more fluid concept than it is commonly held to be, and ethnic identity is often asserted when doing so confers some political or economic advantage. Schein's thesis goes a long way toward explaining the paradox of the Vlachs' assertion of a non-Vlach ethnic identity to outsiders even as they tenaciously retain a Vlach ethnic identity among themselves (save when they settle in lowland areas and are genuinely assimilated).

As stated earlier, in the absence of a modern Vlach culture, Vlachs who have wished to modernize have done so by assimilating into other cultures that were modernizing. Those who have retained a Vlach ethnic identity have often continued to work within the conceptual framework of an extremely traditional culture—to be Vlach, in other words, is necessarily to be "traditional" to that degree—and virtually no one has sought to create a comprehensive modern Vlach identity. At best, Vlach intellectuals have merely imposed the nomenclature and forms of modernity on traditional Vlach culture, and as a result a traditional *mentalité* is imported into such nontraditional activities as the writing of history, which we now anticipate will lead to assertions that the current situation of the Vlachs has always existed (timelessness) and that the Vlachs have a direct biological link to prestigious ancestors (preoccupation with genealogy); furthermore, the choice of which ancestors to assert will be related to the advantages conferred by the resultant ethnicity (usually either Greek, Serbian, or Romanian outwardly, with a Vlach identity held in reserve for possible ingroup use). Let us now conclude this study by examining a few examples of how these organizing principles of the traditional Vlach *mentalité* have acted to shape and circumscribe the Vlachs' writing of their own history.

Considering how consistently scholarship has been subordinated to political imperatives in the Balkans, it is no surprise that the two main schools of thought among the Vlachs concerning their own history should parallel quite closely the Vlachs' political alignments. In other words, there is a Latinist school (essentially a new incarnation of the old Romanian

school), asserting the kinship and non-Hellenic racial origin of the Vlachs and Romanians, and a Hellenist school, maintaining the kinship and Hellenic racial origin of the Vlachs and Greeks. The traditional nature of the debate is evident from the fact that it has never ceased to center on this question of "racial" origins.

The Latinist school is now represented by Vasile Barba of Freiburg, whose *Uniunea tra Limba shi Cultura Aromana* (Union for Arumanian Language and Culture) issues a quarterly periodical, *Zborlu a Nostru* (Our Word) as well as some occasional publications, including a softcover collection entitled *Latin South of the Danube Today.*[46] ULCA has also held two international "congresses" thus far, at the University of Mannheim in 1985 and the University of Freiburg in 1988; the participants have been few and overwhelmingly of the Latinist school themselves. The mantle of the Hellenist school has recently been taken by the linguist Achilleas Lazarou of Athens with his major work *Arumanian and Its Links to Greek.*[47] Lazarou has also written articles concerning the Vlachs for various periodicals, most recently his controversial "History of Vlach Popular Songs."[48]

The radical nature of the last-mentioned article makes it a natural starting point for us, as a very stark example of how a phenomenon sharpens one's ability to pick out more subtle versions. For more than a century now, a single fallacy generated by an over-enthusiastic Greek nationalist researcher has skewed the study of Vlach folklore in Greece. In 1880, Aravandinos wrote that the Vlachs,

> though they do not use the Greek language at home, nevertheless compose [*sic!*] their songs in it. The reader will find many such songs in the present selection, mostly gathered in Metsovo, Grevena, and Malakasi—Vlach districts in part, certainly, but where one almost never hears a Vlach song. In their dances, at weddings, saint's day festivities, or at home when their women sing lullabies to their babies or keen dirges over the dead, they always sing in Greek, even though occasionally some of them, in their ignorance of the Greek

> language, do not precisely understand the meaning of what they sing. Let this therefore stand as yet one more proof of the almost complete assimilation of this race with that of the Hellenes.[49]

We may ignore for a moment the patent impossibility of composing songs in a language which one is either ignorant of or does not precisely understand, the fact that the songs in question were gathered in areas that were partly Greek, and the problems that arise when circumstances cause one to feel compelled to prove "the almost complete assimilation" by one's own group of the group one is examining. One does not require even these arguments to realize that in order to prove that the Vlachs "always" sing their most important songs in Greek, one would have to prove the almost total absence of such songs in Vlach among unassimilated Vlachs. In light of the well-known reticence of the Vlachs, one would have to have secreted sound-recording equipment in Vlach villages over a period of a century or more. Not only would this have been impossible, but the very notion upon which it would have been based—that a certain linguistic group, unlike all other linguistic groups the world over, is defective in that it speaks in its own language but somehow cannot or will not sing in it—is absurd in the first place. Aravandinos has taken his own peculiar experience—that of a Greek nationalist visiting villages anxious to be considered "Greek"—and generalized it as if it were representative of all Vlachs at all times; indeed, here is a striking example of the events of a very particular place and time being forced to fit the mold of "timelessness."

Regardless of this, the notion that "the Vlachs always sing their songs in Greek" has enjoyed a certain staying power among Greek folklorists. The appearance in 1985 of an anthology of folk songs in Vlach, *The Songs of the Vlachs,*[50] flew in the face of this staple of Greek scholarship and created no small degree of consternation; not only did the author, Zoe Papazisi-Papatheodorou, assert that the Vlachs sang songs in their own language, she had the temerity to publish those songs in an alphabet derived from Romanian—thus drawing a connection (consciously or not) between the Vlachs in Greece and the

Romanians for the first time since the end of World War II, when a new Romanian government chose to discontinue support of schools and churches for these Vlachs. To be sure, this was not the first collection of Vlach songs ever published; several editions have appeared in Romania in the last dozen years alone.[51] But Papazisi-Papatheodorou's book was the first Vlach effort to break the Greek postwar consensus not to assert any non-Hellenic ethnic identity in that country, and as such the book achieved a certain notoriety.

Lazarou's article was an effort at a direct scholarly response which, though it spoke in the idiom of the Greek political and academic establishment, would come from a person who was himself Vlach. Piqued by the appearance of a collection of Vlach folk songs, which were not even supposed to exist, Lazarou's tactic was simply to resurrect and reassert the Aravandinos fallacy of a century ago, only with more of a scholarly apparatus this time. But one need not be a scholar to know that Aravandinos requires more than footnotes; indeed—as most Vlachs know whether they've had one year of education or twenty-one—the Vlachs have a sizable body of folk songs in Vlach that have come down over the centuries, and to this day new songs are created in Vlach almost daily by people who speak Vlach as their primary language.

Lazarou's thesis is this: that the Vlachs sing their folk songs in Greek, and that any folk songs they have in Vlach are the (artificial, by implication) creations and residue of the pro-Romanian nationalist movement among the Vlachs (which lasted from roughly 1860 to 1945). The evidence against this radical position is vast and, with the exception of the collection by Marcu cited earlier, eminently reliable. (Marcu apparently reasoned that Greek songs referring to the Vlachs or their villages must once have been sung in Vlach; though there is no clear evidence that such an assumption is warranted, Marcu nevertheless seems to have gone ahead and translated some of these songs "back" into Vlach—*this*, if anything, is the "smoking gun" Lazarou seeks.) The other collections cited above are largely reliable, as is the sampling in Wace and Thompson, who are in fact explicit about certain types of Vlach songs:

> There are two men in the village [of Samarina] who continually compose new ones which they sing at festivals. They do this not for gain, but for amusement; and neither of the two song writers can be said to have had much education. This song writing is not due to the Roumanian propaganda, for every now and again some one else will make up a topical and personal song, and we have heard muleteers singing them.[52]

Numerous recordings exist of Vlach folk songs; though many were made in Romania, most of the recent issues have come out of Greece (those that have not include collections compiled by the United Nations and by the French National Center for Scientific Research). In the course of my own travels in Thessaly, Macedonia, and Epirus, I have heard dozens of songs and located and purchased several cassettes featuring Vlach songs, most or them from Vlach villages that had little or no contact with the pro-Romanian movement (for instance, Metsovo, Gardiki, Migidei); new cassettes, as one might imagine, are being produced constantly.

Even Vlachs transplanted to America have continued to compose and sing songs in their own language, on almost any subject—from factory work to the moral deficiencies of the next town to major events within the community. Of course, these are not limited to songs recorded on paper, disk, or cassette; the great majority of Vlach songs, now as ever, goes unrecorded. As I was growing up in the United States, I heard perhaps hundreds of songs, not one of which was ever recorded.[53] Does this mean that they did not exist? Moreover, because our community here is, like the Vlach villages of Greece, located within the confines of a significantly more advanced culture (*i.e.*, one with a long, established literature, with schools, with a vocabulary that has kept up with the times), at a point when cultural interaction was unavoidable Vlachs in America naturally began to learn and sing American popular songs—even Vlachs who hardly knew any English. The same thing occurred in Greece a generation or more earlier, much to the delight of Aravandinos. The number of these non-Vlach songs has obviously increased over the years, to the point where most members of the current

generation here—again, like most members of the current generation in Greece—know almost no songs in Vlach, but plenty in the second language.

Which brings us to another fallacy propagated by Lazarou in his eagerness to make Vlachs into Hellenes: the relegation of Vlach to a "second language." While it is true that in 1991 very few Vlachs manage to get along without knowing at least one other language besides their own, most Vlachs know of elderly persons who to this day speak no other language but Vlach. There is abundant evidence that fluency in Greek has come to most Vlachs only lately; as recently as 1861, for example, Spiridhon Sokolis, a Greek doctor visiting Metsovo—the most ardently pro-Greek of all Vlach villages—found that

> with only a few exceptions none of the women or the boys up to the age of ten knew Greek at all, so that Mr. Sokolis had to employ an interpreter. The men, however, could speak Greek freely as it was an essential language for commerce.[54]

What has happened here is that Lazarou has taken a very recent state of affairs and removed the time factor from it; "if Vlachs speak Greek now and sing songs in it, they must always have done so." In other words: What exists now must always have existed. Timelessness.

Timelessness and the assertion that the Vlachs are the direct biological descendants of prestigious ancestors are in fact the concepts that animate Lazarou's major work, *Arumanian and Its Links to Greek.* Though it proposes to examine the origin of the language spoken by the Vlachs of Greek regions, this book actually attempts to assert that the Vlachs are biological Greeks whose Greek language became Latinized after the Roman conquest of Greece.[55] This assertion clearly places Lazarou within both the Vlach tradition of tracing a prestigious biological ancestry and the discredited European tradition that views history in terms of racial or biological continuity. It is as impossible to prove purity of ancestry for the Vlachs as it is for the French or the Greeks, a fact readily recognized by Lazarou's colleague M. Hatzopoulos. In a brief but important essay en-

titled "Photice: Colonie Romaine en Thesprotie et les Destinées de la Latinité Epirote,"[56] Hatzopoulos concedes the futility of Lazarou's biological approach to the Vlachs and suggests instead that we attempt to describe and trace what happened to the Latin colonies we do know existed. One need not share Hatzopoulos's faith in linguistic and inscriptionary evidence in order to agree that this approach is more promising by far than what Hatzopoulos terms the "false problem" of "racial" origins.

"Racial" origins also preoccupy the Latinist school led by Barba. In this case, however, the chief concern is to prove the purity of the *non*-Hellenic ancestry of the Vlachs; within that constraint, there is room for some flexibility, as shown in the following statement:

> The Arumanians have been in the areas known today as Macedonia, Thessaly, Epirus, and Albania for many thousands of years. For two thousand years alone the Arumanians have been known by this name and have spoken the Latin language brought by the Romans after Rome was able to conquer these regions. For many thousands of years before that the ancestors of the Arumanians were known by the names of the regions inhabited by the groups to which they belonged: Agrionians, Dorians, Dardanians, Hedonians, Macedonians, Pelasgians, Sitronians, etc. However, they were all the same, for they were part of the most numerous people then known in Europe, the Thracians. All groups of Thracians spoke a single language, Thracian, which has not come down to us in written form, but we know well today that it was a different language from the single written language of that time, the Greek of Greek towns located on the coast in the area of the Peloponnese.[57]

It is no accident, however, that the most prestigious ancestors of this lot, the Romans and Macedonians, are mentioned most often in ULCA publications—both in word and in image, for a Roman coin with Caesar's portrait is the logo on every issue of *Zborlu a Nostru,* while the cover of *Latin South of the Danube*

Today carries both the same coin and a portrait of Alexander the Great. Moreover, it is a sad remark upon the ULCA's desperate flight from any sort of Greek ancestry that it has led directly to several groups that modern Western scholarship agrees were Greek, most notably the Macedonians.[58]

The extent of ULCA's concern with proving the purity of the Vlachs' non-Hellenic ancestry is evident throughout its literature. Great pains are taken to eliminate even a drop of Greek blood:

> In 146 B.C. Greece, too, was conquered by the Romans, who made it a Roman province. But since the Greeks had a language that was written and was respected by the Romans, they kept their language even after the Roman conquest. The Greeks were not Romanized. But all of those in the Balkan Peninsula who did not speak Greek—the Macedonians—took the Latin language.[59]

Not only must Greek blood be avoided, but that of barbarians, too:

> After the division of the Roman Empire into two parts—one with its capital in Rome and the other in Byzantium—Macedonia stayed with the Byzantines ([A.D.] 395). For some 200 years, the ancestors of the Macedo-Romanians protected themselves well from the barbarians who occasionally crossed the Danube to loot. In 447 groups of barbaric Huns reached the Pindus. Nevertheless, all barbarian groups left the Arumanian regions just the way they had come—like a storm. "Water comes and goes, but stones remain." The barbarians came and went, but the Arumanians remained.[60]

Thus closes the circle of Vlach history for both schools, Hellenist and Latinist alike; indeed, the only difference between the two seems to be that one arose within the framework of a society that confers advantages on those asserting Hellenic origins, the

other in one that confers advantages on those with non-Hellenic Latin origins.[61]

This is a carousel in which some of the horses are black, others white, but all have the same overarching concern: to get back to where they began. Can the Vlachs write their own history? "Historical consciousness" commences precisely at the point where such carousel figures tear free of their moorings and take flight into a future they create for themselves. The possibility of a modern Vlach-authored history can begin only when the Vlachs have abandoned the safe, circular track of their traditional ways of thought.

NOTES

[1]As Ferdinand Tönnies's "community" versus "society," described in *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, trans. Charles P. Loomis (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955); Emile Durkheim's "organic" versus "mechanical" solidarity, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1964); Robert Park's "primary" versus "secondary" relations, in his introduction to Max Weber's *The City*, translated and edited by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958).

[2]As W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961). A contemporary version of this Western theology is the recent essay "The End of History" by Francis Fukuyama in *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989).

[3]This argument is used by Allan Bloom in *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

[4]A detailed and useful criticism of modernization theory that cites this argument is Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15 (1973), 199-226. See especially p. 207.

[5]John R. Gillis, *The Development of European Society, 1770-1870* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), p. xv.

[6]Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Inequalities of Core and Periphery," in *The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 1-36. "The development of underdevelopment" is the theory of André Gunder Frank; see the article of the same name in *Monthly Review* 18 (1966), pp. 17-31.

[7]Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 11-13.

[8]Gillis, pp. xi-xii; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change, and Modernity* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 23-25.

[9]Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 112. See also

E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," *Past and Present* 38 (1967), pp. 56-97; Henri Lefebvre, whose work is cited in Thompson's article, uses the terms "cyclical" and "linear" to describe these two time-orientations.

[10]Though there is much controversy over whether the Macedonians were a Greek tribe or not, there is no doubt that their leaders adopted Hellenic culture and language and disseminated it not only to their own people but to much of the known world during the Hellenistic period.

[11]Andre Du Nay, *The Early History of the Rumanian Language* (Lake Bluff, IL: The Jupiter Press), pp. 33-41.

[12]The main evidence for this is the survival of ethnic designations: the Vlachs, who call themselves *Rumani* or *Arumani*, to this day know the Greeks by the unusual word the Romans chose to call them in antiquity, *Graecus* (pl. *Graeci*), which in Vlach is rendered *Grecu* (pl. *Gretsi*). [Note: Since there is still no standardized Arumanian alphabet, for the purposes of this paper I have followed British writers in utilizing a modified English alphabet.] There is no corresponding evidence of the Greeks calling the Vlachs something other than "Romans" before Greeks adopted the new term *Vlachoi*.

[13]*The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary*, July 1987 edition, p. 3648. OHG=Old High German, MHG=Middle High German, OE=Old English (Anglo-Saxon).

[14]*Compact OED*, p. 3740.

[15]John A. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p. 5.

[16]For the Romanian position, see Andrei Otetea, ed., *The History of the Romanian People* (Bucharest: Scientific Publishing House, 1970), pp. 9-159, and Nicolae Stoicescu, *Continuitatea Romanilor: Privire Istoriografica Istoricul Problemei, Dovezile Continuitatii* (Bucuresti: Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1980), *passim*; for the Hungarian side, see Du Nay, *Early History of the Rumanian Language*. Note that both Romanian theories cited tend to make the Vlachs the same as the Romanians, whereas the more widely accepted theory—that the Vlachs are descended from Romans and Romanized Illyrians, Thracians, and Macedonians and other Greeks, with an admixture of Slavs, Gypsies, and others—does not.

[17]Keith Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality: Andreiu Saguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 11-14.

[18]R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians (from Roman Times to the Completion of Unity)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934; rpt. Archon Books, 1963), pp. 382-385.

[19]The best and most impartial source on the Romanian-Greek struggle over the Vlachs is Alan J. B. Wace and M. S. Thompson, *The Nomads of the Balkans: An Account of Life and Customs among the Vlachs of Northern Pindus* (New York: Dutton, 1914), *passim*.

[20]Wace and Thompson, *Nomads of the Balkans*, p. 7.

[21]Of Weigand's many works on the Vlachs, the best-known is *Die Aromunen. Ethnographisch-philologisch-historische Untersuchungen über das Volk der sogenanten Makedo-Romänen oder Zinzaren*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1985). For Wace and Thompson, see n. 19 above; for Winnifrith, see Tom J. Winnifrith, *The Vlachs: The History of a Balkan People* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

[22]Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966 and 1968), pp. 262-263.

[23]Calvin Martin, "An Introduction Aboard the *Fidèle*," in Calvin Martin, ed., *The American Indian and the Problem of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 15-16.

[24]Calvin Martin, "Epilogue: Time and the American Indian," in Martin, *The American Indian and the Problem of History*, p. 195.

[25]Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, p. viii.

[26]Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, p. viii.

[27]Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, p. 36.

[28]Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, p. 42.

[29]Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, p. 43.

[30]Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, pp. 43-44.

[31]Sir Charles Eliot, *Turkey in Europe* (London, 1908), p. 371.

[32]Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 8-18. A notable exception would seem to have been Rome, which eventually opened up its citizenship to all who resided within the empire and generally offered greater social mobility than most traditional empires—after all, the Vlachs arose from Romans and Romanized indigenous populations. There were also notorious instances of forced conversion to Islam under the Ottomans. Nevertheless, most of the assimilation that occurred within the old empires could probably be termed "accidental" and not the result of any forced campaign. Gellner cites the Roman example on pp. 128-129.

[33]Wace and Thompson, *Nomads of the Balkans*, p. 2.

[34]Wace and Thompson, *Nomads of the Balkans*, pp. 9-10.

[35]Wace and Thompson, *Nomads of the Balkans*, p. 273.

[36]H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future* (London: Methuen & Co., 1906; rpt. New York: Arno Press and *The New York Times*, 1971), pp. 175-176.

[37]Brailsford, *Macedonia*, p. 185.

[38]Vatro Murvar, "The Balkan Vlachs: A Typological Study," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1956, pp. 41-42. Murvar here quotes the classic text on Vlach "infiltration" of Serbia, *O Cincarima* (Concerning the Tsintsars) by D. Popovic (Beograd, 1927). "Tsintsar" is one of many derogatory ethnic designation for the Vlachs by their neighbors; as Murvar hints, even the word "Vlach" is derogatory—it carries the connotation of uncouth shepherd, uncivilized hillbilly, or bumpkin.

[39]Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 12-13.

[40]*Ethnology* 14 (1975), pp. 83-97.

[41]Schein, "When Is an Ethnic Group?" p. 83.

[42]Schein, "When Is an Ethnic Group?" p. 84. I would add the qualification "To the untrained observer" to this sentence, for, as implied in an earlier quote from Brailsford, there are other characteristics besides language that set Vlachs apart from Greeks.

[43]Schein, "When Is an Ethnic Group?" p. 90.

[44]Schein, "When Is an Ethnic Group?" p. 87.

[45]Schein, "When Is an Ethnic Group?" p. 93.

[46]Published in a bilingual German-Arumanian text in 1982 by Caterina and Vasile Barba, editors, as *Das Süddonaulatein Heute/Latina Suddunareana Azî*; though no publisher is listed, it seems from both the poor quality of the text and from certain evidence in its contents that this book may have been produced in Romania.

[47]Published in Greek as Ἡ Ἀρωμουνικὴ καὶ αἱ Μετὰ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Σχέσεις αὐτῆς, β' ἔκδοση (Ἀθήνα, 1986), and in French translation (by

Marie-Hélène Blanchaud) as *L'Aroumain et ses rapports avec le Grec* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986).

[48]Published in Greek as "'Ιστορία τοῦ βλάχικου δημοτικοῦ τραγουδιοῦ," Ἠπειρωτικὸ Ἡμερολόγιο ('Ιωάννινα, 'Εταιρεία Ἠπειρωτικῶν Μελετῶν, 1988), pp. 339-392.

[49]P. Aravandinos, *Collection of Folksongs of Epirus* (Athens: Petros Perris, 1880), p. vii, as cited in Michael Herzfeld, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece* (New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1986), pp. 73-74; the bracketed exclamation is Herzfeld's.

[50]Ζωὴ Παπαζήση-Παπαθεοδώρου, Τὰ Τραγούδια τῶν Βλάχων· Δημοτικὴ κι 'Επώνυμη Ποίηση ('Αθήνα, 'Εκδόσεις Gutenberg, 1985).

[51]See, for example, George Marcu, *Folclor Muzical Aroman* (Bucuresti: Editura Muzicala, 1977), and Nicolae Gh. Caraiani and Nicolae Saramandu, *Folclor Aroman Gramostean* (Bucuresti: Editura Minerva, 1982). In addition, most studies of the Vlachs that touch on folklore record at least a handful of songs; this bibliography is large.

[52]Wace and Thompson, *Nomads of the Balkans*, p. 285.

[53]See my article "The Women of Nizhopoli," in *The Newsletter of the Society Farsarotul* 3:2 (August 1989), p. 20. Though the majority of the singing in America has been performed in the polyphonic style of the Vlachs who come from what is now Albania, there were many in the solo and choral styles of the Vlachs from Greek regions.

[54]Wace and Thompson, *Nomads of the Balkans*, p. 184.

[55]"The Arumanians are pure Greeks, as much as Greeks from other regions, and... were bilingual, or even spoke another language because of the vicissitudes which befell their nation." Lazarou, *L'Aroumain*, p. 103; Ἡ 'Αρωμουνική, σ. 158.

[56]*Balkan Studies* 21:1 (1980), pp. 97-105. Lazarou's book was first published in 1976.

[57]Unsigned article "Straausilli" (The Ancestors), in Barba and Barba, *Latina*, p. 46.

[58]Who were at the least rather thoroughly Hellenized by the Roman period, and at most a Greek tribe; for the latter view, see, for example, J. R. Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982), p. 23. There is a vast literature on this subject.

[59]"Straausilli," in Barba and Barba, *Latina*, pp. 50-52.

[60]"Straausilli," in Barba and Barba, *Latina*, p. 54.

[61]Many—if not most—of those active in ULCA were educated in Romania.

Cavafy and the Poetics of Space

by ROBERT SHANNAN PECKHAM*

> We live lives based upon selected fictions.
> Our view of reality is conditioned by our
> position in space and time—
>
> Lawrence Durrell, *The Alexandria Quartet*[1]

In C. P. Cavafy's poems, where concerns with "Greekness" or "Hellenism" are so conspicuous, the reader's identity is crucial. When, for example, in the poem "Στὴν 'Εκκλησία" Cavafy's protagonist asserts the glories of "our" race—"τιμὲς μεγάλες τῆς φυλῆς μας"—does this imply that for a non-Greek, non-Orthodox reader, Cavafy's experience is inaccessible, atrophied, as it were, for the "barbarians" outside? And what, then, of Cavafy's numerous non-Greek protagonists, Egyptians, Libyans, Syrians, and Romans, who attempt to define themselves in some relation to Greekness or to Hellenism? These are questions that Cavafy's verse prompts in an immediate and dramatic way for non-Greek readers, questions such as the one posed by George Seferis in another context: "What is meant by Hellenism?"[2] Or as the protagonist of Cavafy's poem "Φιλέλλην" insists: " 'Ποῦ οἱ Ἕλληνες;' καὶ 'Ποῦ τὰ Ἑλληνικά. . . .' " This question, "What is meant by Hellenism?", might stand as a fitting epigraph to this paper. For as E. M. Forster once remarked, Cavafy "was a loyal Greek, but Greece for him was not territorial . . . racial purity bored him, so did political idealism."[3]

*I should like to thank Professor Roderick Beaton and Dr. Dimitris Gounelas for helpful discussions. I am grateful to the Greek Ministry of Culture and to Kostis Mokoff for inviting me to participate in the *Cavafia 1990*.

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The connection between Hellenism, notions of identity, and position is pertinent. For often in Cavafy's poetry, the tension between Greek and non-Greek is itself a recurrent motif in the text, expressed as a visual, spatial contrast between "insiders" and "outsiders." As the poem "Στὴν Ἐκκλησία" illustrates, architectural juxtapositions between "interior" and "exterior" reflect tensions between "them" and "us," and on the grammatical level between the locatives "here" and "there." A cursory reading of some of Cavafy's best-known poems, such as "Στὴν Ἐκκλησία," "Ἰθάκη," "Τὰ Παράθυρα," "Περιμένοντας τοὺς Βαρβάρους," or "Τείχη," demonstrates the poignancy of spatial relationships in Cavafy's poetry.

In a more obvious, political sense, the "external/internal" dialectic relates to Cavafy's personal circumstances: to his homosexuality, which he felt ostracized him from society, and to the political environment in Egypt, where as a Greek—a European—he felt himself associated with and compromised by British imperialism. Paradoxically, it is precisely Cavafy's wide reading of European literature and history, of writers from Plutarch to Gibbon, that furnished the poet with much of the material from which he constructed his poetry. That is to say, it is those on the "outside," "the barbarians," who often prompt the poems.

It is possible, therefore, to identify and analyze three central themes: first, Cavafy's notions of Hellenism, bearing in mind the position of the reader; second, how Hellenism might relate to the presiding metaphor of "exclusion" and "inclusion"; and finally, how the reader's relationship to a given poem becomes part of a range of capillary-like interconnected and coexistent (lateral and collateral) relationships.

If the title of this paper evidently recalls Gaston Bachelard's innovative analysis of space in *La poétique de l' espace*, the connection is not arbitrary.[4] In his provocative book *Orientalism*, Edward Said provides a concise summary of Bachelard's pivotal themes. Said's preoccupations are with the power structure that determined and shaped the concept of "Orientalism" in Europe and later in America, and in tracing the genesis of the dominant dualistic perception of East and West. More than an account of how imperialism might relate to other discourses like literature,

Said's work explores more general tendencies that are extremely relevant in the context of Cavafy:

> The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard once wrote an analysis of what he called the poetics of space. The inside of a house, he said, acquires a sense of intimacy, secrecy, security, real or imaginary, because of the experiences that come to seem appropriate for it. The objective space of a house—its corners, corridors, cellar rooms—is far less important than what poetically it is endowed with, which is usually a quality with an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel: thus, a house may be haunted or homelike, or prisonlike, or magical. So space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here. The same process occurs when we deal with time. Much of what we associate with or even know about such periods as "long ago" or "the beginning" or "at the end of time" is poetic—made up. For a historian of Middle Kingdom Egypt, "long ago" will have a very clear sort of meaning, but even this meaning does not totally dissipate the emotional quasi-fictional quality one senses lurking in a time very distant and different from our own. *For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away.*[5]

The preceding analysis immediately recalls Cavafy's spatial interests in the interiors of houses, corridors, windows, streets, and furniture. I. M. Panayotopoulos has noted this proclivity in his description of Cavafy as the "poet of the enclosed space."[6] These spaces as in the poems "Ὁ ἥλιος τοῦ ἀπογεύματος" or "Κάτω ἀπ' τὸ Σπίτι," are transformed into emotional spaces:

> Στὴ μέση τὸ τραπέζι ὅπου ἔγραφε·
> κ'ἡ τρεῖς μεγάλες ψάθινες καρέγλες.

Πλάϊ στὸ παράθυρο ἦταν τὸ κρεββάτι
ποὺ ἀγαπηθήκαμε τόσες φορές.

Θὰ βρίσκονται ἀκόμη τὰ καϋμένα πουθενά.
("Ὁ ἥλιος τοῦ ἀπογεύματος")

Topography overlaps and interacts with sentient dimensions. The space is imbued with a double resonance, illuminated with a figurative value, like the bare room in "Πολυέλαιος."

In addition, Said's résumé brings to mind Cavafy's concern with drama and his historically remote settings. But more suggestively, the idea of a fictional space, a tendency to exploit and dramatize the distance between what is close and what is "Μακρυὰ" recalls other poems, such as "Περιμένοντας τοὺς Βαρβάρους," "Ἡ Πόλις," and "Κι ἀκούμπησα καὶ πλάγιασα στὲς κλίνες των." In this last poem, the narrator's admission into the "House of Pleasure" becomes a preliminary to attaining the "hidden rooms"; like the room "hidden above the dubious tavern" in "Μιὰ Νύχτα," these are associated with deviant eroticism and poetic creation:

Στὲς κάμαρες ἐπῆγα τὲς κρυφὲς
ποὺ τὤχουν γιὰ ντροπὴ καὶ νὰ τὲς ὀνομάσουν.
Μὰ ὄχι ντροπὴ γιὰ μένα—γιατὶ τότε
τί ποιητὴς καὶ τί τεχνίτης θἄμουν.

The concealed corners of the house are contrasted to the "commonplace rooms"; thus the building becomes duplicitous, a mediating framework for conformity and aberration.

In "Περιμένοντας τοὺς Βαρβάρους" the pervasive "inside/outside" contrast is deflated when the "outsiders" fail to materialize, when in fact they turn out to be fictional figures inhabiting the imagination of the "insiders." Similarly, "Ἡ Πόλις" explodes a dichotomous notion of "outside" and "inside"; this time the "outside" signifies deliverance and not threat. It transpires that there is no outside after all:

Καινούριους τόπους δὲν θὰ ϐρεῖς, δὲν θἄϐρεις
ἄλλες θάλασσες.
Ἡ Πόλις θὰ σὲ ἀκολουθεῖ.

In the poem "Στὸν ἴδιο χῶρο" a city milieu becomes not only a territory through which the poet walks and observes landmarks, but a locus in which he externalizes his emotional, subjective life. Thus he maps out an internal geography and demonstrates the contingency of imaginative and physical geographies. Although "περιοχή" connotes region or district, Cavafy also employs the word to mean the range of his poetry—that is, its scope, its "extent."[7] The "same space" of the title thus implies a convergence of the objective and subjective, so that the city, unlike T. S. Eliot's "unreal city," becomes (in the words of another Cavafy poem, "Ἐπῆγα") "half real."

Often in Cavafy's verse space is bound up with time. The past is recollected or repossessed by evoking and filling a designated space, be it a room as in "Ὁ ἥλιος τοῦ ἀπογεύματος," a seascape as in "Τοῦ πλοίου," or a taverna as in "Νὰ μείνει." Displaced objects are replaced in "Ὁ ἥλιος τοῦ ἀπογεύματος," and in so doing instigate a process not only of historical but also of emotional and erotic recovery. In "Κατὰ τὲς συνταγὲς ἀρχαίων Ἑλληνοσύρων μάγων," the protagonist seeks a potion to resurrect his dead lover, and asks:

"Ποιὸ ἀπόσταγμα νὰ βρίσκεται κατὰ τὲς
  συνταγὲς
ἀρχαίων Ἑλληνοσύρων μάγων καμωμένο
πού, σύμφωνα μὲ τὴν ἀναδρομήν,
καὶ τὴν μικρή μας κάμαρη νὰ ἐπαναφέρει."

"Νὰ μείνει" demonstrates an extremely complex geometry of positions. As in "Ὁ ἥλιος τοῦ ἀπογεύματος," the physical space is divided up, partitioned, and at the same time "half-open" (like the clothes of the lovers):

Ἡ ὥρα μιὰ τὴν νύχτα θἄτανε,
ἢ μιάμισυ.

  Σὲ μιὰ γωνιὰ τοῦ καπηλειοῦ·
πίσω ἀπ' τὸ ξύλινο τὸ χώρισμα.
Ἐκτὸς ἡμῶν τῶν δυὸ τὸ μαγαζὶ ὅλως διόλου
  ἄδειο.

Μιὰ λάμπα πετρελαίου μόλις τὸ φώτιζε.
Κοιμούντανε, στὴν πόρτα, ὁ ἀγρυπνισμένος
ὑπηρέτης.

Threshold images characterize this poem and are clearly connected both to the ambiguity that "half-open" implies and to the process of recollection. Poetic composition is intimately related to the narrator's recollection of a youthful erotic encounter. Time and space in this instance are "relative," mutually inseparable. The reader feels that it is precisely this hovering of the threshold moment between contending positions of night and day, sordid reality and fantasy, sexual longing and action, that generates the space, or room, of the poem itself. Jacques Lacan has called this space the essential "gap."[8] It is through this "gap," this vital aperture, that the reader gains access to the text—becomes, as it were, an "insider."[9] Thus the poet's retrieval of his past finds its equivalent in the reader's incursion into the "half-open" text. And images of semi-disclosure, like the word "half," pervade Cavafy's verse.

In another poem, "Καισαρίων," Cavafy demonstrates the necessary ambiguity that reading itself implies. Reading a collection of Ptolemaic inscriptions, the protagonist is attracted by the passing reference to Caesarion. The vagueness of this allusion enables him to interpret the historical figure imaginatively, furnishing an entrance into an otherwise inaccessible past. History becomes "quasi-fictional," to use Said's term, just as the poet's room does. For at the end of this poem, the protagonist envisages Caesarion entering the empirical space of his house, a space coterminous with the "περιοχὴ" of his verse.

Applying the theoretical framework of Eliot's "objective correlative," Seferis has defined Cavafy's "unity" as a historical perception, a way to dramatize and contextualize the past in relation to the present.[10] In the same essay Seferis speaks of a "dualism" and "division" in Cavafy's verse. But to describe the juxtaposition of historical perceptions as a "dualism," or indeed to speak of "dualism" at all, tends to reduce the scope ("περιοχὴ") of debate that takes place in Cavafy's poetry. For it is Cavafy's ability to incorporate multitudinous historical attitudes and perceptions in poems describing specific events that

removes him from the world of the grammarian Lysias, buried in the Beirut Library among numerous scholarly texts and tomes on Hellenism.

Although some critics have sought to adumbrate historical and ideological conformity in Cavafy's verse, Cavafy's poetic milieu is marginal in all senses of the word; its locus is the relative and elusive space between morality and amorality, monotheism and polytheism, Greekness and non-Greekness. Oppositions contest for priority in the text, never permitting a single perception to predominate and thus establishing a genre of structural and perceptual pluralism. If Cavafy's poetry has been labeled ironic, with the dualism this term implies, such a description is inadequate in defining his poetics.[11] These are literally threshold poems in that they are frequently set in architecturally ambiguous ("half-open," "half-closed") settings, where the inside is qualified by an outside, the protagonist or narrator countered by an "other."

In "Μύρης· Ἀλεξάνδρεια τοῦ 340 μ.Χ.," the house of a dead Christian youth gives way, like the "House of Pleasure," to a "hidden room." The drama is seen from the viewpoint of Myres's lover as he contemplates the burial rituals from outside:

> Στάθηκα σὲ διάδρομο. Δὲν θέλησα
> νὰ προχωρήσω πιὸ ἐντός, γιατὶ ἀντελήφθην
> ποὺ οἱ συγγενεῖς τοῦ πεθαμένου μ' ἔβλεπαν
> μὲ προφανῆ ἀπορίαν καὶ μὲ δυσαρέσκεια.

The architecture and the disposition of the house are matched by the lover's efforts to orient his experiences in relation to his dead friend. Moreover, it is the narrator's alienated position that provokes a reassessment of his relations with his lover. He acknowledges that Myres may always have been a "stranger," detached from the company, by reason of his Christianity. The poem expresses an inversion as Myres becomes the "insider" integrated by his Christianity, and the narrator becomes the dissident. Thus the date A.D. 340 is significant:

> αἰσθανόμουν ποὺ ἐνῶθω, Χριστιανός,
> μὲ τοὺς δικούς του, καὶ ποὺ γένομουν
> ξένος ἐγώ, ξενὸς πολύ.

Finally, the locative dichotomy is extended as the narrator evades the house so that his recollections of Myres will remain intact "inside" his memory.

The reader of Cavafy's poetry is struck by the recurrent peripheral images, already noted, of windows, walls, mirrors, entrances, stairways, and outskirts. If concerns with positioning and displacing pervade poems such as "Σταῖς Σκάλαις" and "Τὸ Πρῶτο Σκαλί," Cavafy's poetry itself also constitutes what can be called a "displacement." It registers the relativity of all positions. In "Σταῖς Σκάλαις," for example, the text focuses on the fleeting instant when two men converge on a stairway—the moment, that is, when positions of "up" and "down" are exchanged. In a larger sense Cavafy's verse displaces a series of questions—questions such as the one posed at the beginning of this paper, "What is meant by Hellenism?". It examines the premises and positions from which such questions are posed in the first place. The poems are rooted in what Heidegger termed the "architecture" that the poem implies; they depend on "the opening of saying and naming."[12]

The first stanza of "Στὴν Ἐκκλησία," with its dense description of the interior of an Orthodox church, conveys the impressionability of a visitor moving in from the outside. Here are all the symbols of the Orthodox ritual, to which the poet responds visually and sensually:

> Τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀγαπῶ—τὰ ἑξαπτέρυγά της,
> τ' ἀσήμια τῶν σκευῶν, τὰ κηροπήγιά της,
> τὰ φῶτα, τὲς εἰκόνες της, τὸν ἄμβωνά της.
>
> Ἐκεῖ σὰν μπῶ, μὲς σ' ἐκκλησία τῶν Γραικῶν·
> μὲ τῶν θυμιαμάτων της τὲς εὐωδίες,
> μὲ τὲς λειτουργικὲς φωνὲς καὶ συμφωνίες,
> τὲς μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τῶν ἱερέων παρουσίες
> καὶ κάθε των κινήσεως τὸν σοβαρὸ ρυθμὸ—
> λαμπρότατοι μὲς στῶν ἀμφίων τὸν στολισμὸ—

ὁ νοῦς μου πιαίνει σὲ τιμὲς μεγάλες τῆς φυλῆς
  μας,
στὸν ἔνδοξό μας Βυζαντινισμό.

The reader notes that like many of Cavafy's poems, "Στὴν Ἐκκλησία" begins with an architectural distinction. Characteristically, the very title initiates the poem's dialectic of "interior/exterior," a configuration that the second stanza elaborates with its use of the locative "ἐκεῖ" (there), implying by opposition the undescribed "ἐδῶ" (here) from which the narrator remembers and speaks. From the beginning, therefore, the church is balanced against all that is "outside," and the narrator, as he recalls his experience, bestrides both. Thus in one sense the very dualism he designates ("outside/inside") is deflated by his synchronism. And this is a familiar pattern in Cavafy's poetry, where poems such as "Στὴν Ἐκκλησία" and "Περιμένοντας τοὺς Βαρβάρους" hinge upon the relative and shifting perspective of a "here" and a "there," of "inclusion" and "exclusion."

Significantly, however, Cavafy's poem traces a transformation, a movement at once grammatical and theological, from the first person with its egocentric actions ("I love," "I enter") through the third person in the penultimate line, where the poet's intellect ("νοῦς") becomes impersonalized ("ὁ νοῦς μου πιαίνει"), and the final collective "our" ("τιμὲς μεγάλες τῆς φυλῆς μας, στὸν ἔνδοξό μας Βυζαντινισμό"). This progression, the triangle of first person, third person, and collective, is a trinity that the reader comes upon frequently in Cavafy's poetry. Thus "Στὴν Ἐκκλησία" dramatizes a movement toward plurality and collectivity, the protagonist's movement of participation out of his "corner," unlike the experience of the narrator in "Μύρης· Ἀλεξάνδρεια 340 μ.Χ.." At the same time, that plurality is connected explicitly with aesthetic, religious, and historical experience.

The church, more than an architectural structure, represents a repositioning of the individual, single perception into that of a collective body—simultaneously singular and plural—The Church. It represents a negotiating of personal experience in relation to tradition, history, and collective experience; a convergence of the private and public, of the "here" and "there."

The church is therefore an "architecturing" of experience, a focusing and organizing of perspectives—what the historian G. Every called in the context of the Byzantine Church "a field of vision."[13]

The idea of collectivity relates to political ideas in Cavafy's poetry and to a preoccupation with "relativity" and the Orthodox concept of "οἰκονομία" (a word itself rooted in an architectural distinction). Although both Mikhail Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva have touched upon the relationship of these ideas to Orthodoxy, this remains largely uncharted territory too difficult to broach here.[14] But what is interesting in this context is the manner in which a "conversion" takes place in "Στὴν Ἐκκλησία." The reader, like the poem's narrator, finds himself "converted" from bystander to participant.

Seferis once declared that Cavafy was a "dangerous poet," and Nikos Kazantzakis, in a sketch of Cavafy contained in his travel notes to Egypt, asserted, "He should have been born a Cardinal in 15th-century Florence, privy councillor to the Pope, special envoy to the palace of the Doge of Venice . . . negotiating the most satanic, involved and scandalous affairs."[15]

This idea of trickery, of intrigue, relates to the way Cavafy's poems conspire behind the back of their readers, conveying them into a position of complicity and, in so doing, deflating the dualism that being "outside" and "inside" connotes.[16]

In Cavafy's poetry, fixity in all forms is to be resisted. The pressure to evade all types of conformity characterizes his "Hellenic world" and elucidates his affinity with the Sophists. If the Pathan ruler in the poem "Φιλέλληνʺ attempts to define his Greekness by impressing Greek images on his coins, this concept of fixed, closed identity is undermined by the very function of coins, which are constantly exchanged and circulate through many hands. In Cavafy's poetry definitions are usually fallacious and claims to Greekness, like claims to possession, tantamount to assertions of non-Greekness and impoverishment. In the poem "Ἄννα Δαλασσηνή," the Emperor Alexius Commenus's highest praise for his mother is that " 'Οὐ τὸ ἐμὸν ἢ τὸ σόν, τὸ ψυχρὸν τοῦτο ρῆμα, ἐρρήθη.' "

The elaborate spatial notations described earlier are some of the ways in which Cavafy's attitude to the "Hellenic world"

is dramatized. For above all, "Hellenism" stands for inclusiveness or "collectivity." "Hellenism" is important to Cavafy because it represents a way of maintaining "unity"—in Seferis's term—without fixity; of bringing together seemingly disparate and conflicting attitudes. If, in Cavafy's own words, the opening of the window is the ode, the closing of the window is the elegy. And on the "half-open" threshold between ode and elegy, "a Greek gentleman in a straw hat" positions himself, a poet "standing absolutely motionless at a slight angle to the universe."[17]

NOTES

[1]Lawrence Durrell, *The Alexandria Quartet* (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), p. 210. This paper was delivered as a lecture in the *Cavafia 1990* held in Cairo and Alexandria under the auspices of the Greek Embassy in Egypt.

[2]George Seferis, *On the Greek Style: Selected Essays in Poetry and Hellenism*, trans. Rex Warner and Th. D. Frangopoulos (Athens: Denise Harvey, 1982), pp. 75-97.

[3]E. M. Forster, *Two Cheers for Democracy* (London: Edward Arnold, 1972), p. 237. See also Diskin Clay, "The Silence of Hermippos: Greece in the Poetry of Cavafy," *The Journal of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 3 (1977), pp. 95-116.

[4]See Gaston Bachelard, *La poétique de l'espace* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957).

[5]Edward Said, *Orientalism* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1985), pp. 54-55; my emphasis.

[6]I. M. Panayotopoulos, Τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ τὰ κείμενα IV, second edition (Athens: Οἱ Ἐκδόσεις τῶν Φίλων, 1982), pp. 89-102.

[7]See, for example, the poem "Νόησις": "τῆς τέχνης μου ἡ περιοχή."

[8]Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 21-22.

[9]Lacan's use of "gap" relates in this context to Jacques Derrida's idea of "brisure," an untranslatable term that conflates "breaking" and "joining." See *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

[10]George Seferis, "Κ. Π. Καβάφης, Θ. Σ. Ἔλιοτ· Παράλληλοι," Δοκιμὲς Α καὶ Β (Athens: Ἴκαρος, 1984), pp. 324-363.

[11]See Nasos Vayenas, "The Language of Irony (Towards a Definition of the Poetry of Cavafy)," *The Journal of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 5 (1979), pp. 43-56.

[12]See Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), p. 11.

[13]G. Every, *The Byzantine Patriarchate* (London: S.P.C.K., 1962), p. ix.

[14]See Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, trans Caryl Emerson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985); see also R. S. Peckham, "The Perspectives of Space," *Encounter* (June 1990), pp. 44-47, and "Monasteries in the Air," *London Magazine* (August 1990), in press.

[15]Nikos Kazantzakis, *Journeying* (San Francisco: Donald S. Ellis, 1984), p. 74.

[16]See Lacan's description of Holbein's painting, which aims "*to catch in its trap*, the observer, that is to say, us," *Psycho-Analysis*, p. 92.

[17]E. M. Forster, qtd. P. N. Furbank, *E. M. Forster: A Life*, Vol. 2 (London: Secker and Warburg, 1978), p. 32.

Joseph Matsas and the Greek Resistance

by STEVEN BOWMAN*

The contributions of Greek Jews to the resistance against the German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupiers of Greece during the Second World War are little known to scholars of the period. True, there have been recent publications in Greek and Hebrew of *andartes* memoirs,[1] but these have not entered into the Jewish scholarship of the period, let alone been integrated into Greek or general studies of the resistance. The following pages include the translation (prepared by Moses Altsech) of a lecture given by Joseph Matsas, participant in the resistance. The lecture is prefaced by a short biography of the author, who died in Athens in 1986 after a long bout with cancer, and is derived from information supplied by Leon Matsas (a cousin) and Joseph's daughter, Allegra, of Yanina (Ioannina).

Joseph Matsas was born in Yanina in 1920. His relative Leon Matsas (born in Yanina in 1902) approached Joseph in 1932 with the offer to make use of the French education the latter had acquired at Yanina's Alliance Israélite Universelle school by copying some French letters. There was no thought of further education for the young boy; a Jewish school of higher learning was not available in Yanina, and his father needed the son to supplement the family income since his clothing shop had recently failed.[2]

Impressed by the boy's character and intellectual potential,

*The author thanks Dr. Michael Matsas for the Greek text of the following lecture and for the partial summary of its contents.

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Leon Matsas proposed a plan to Dr. Moshe Koffinas, the powerful president of the Jewish community, who was the uncle of Leon's wife. It was clear that Yanina needed a resource with which to produce a cadre of educated Jews to serve the community. A German rabbi was interviewed to replace the local Yanina rabbis, who were ill educated and for the most part artisans and shopkeepers. Neither knew proper Greek, nor were they conversant with the peculiar Judeo-Greek dialect of Yanina, which had produced a rich liturgy through the centuries in both Hebrew and Greek. Moreover, the Alliance school advocated French language and culture, again to the detriment of the local *minhag*.[3]

Leon Matsas's proposal was to train a local rabbi conversant with the language and culture of Yanina and to support Joseph, son of Bohoraki Matsas, as the candidate. The community council seriously discussed the proposal, and negotiations were begun with the chief rabbi of Corfu to open a yeshiva in Yanina.[4] For a number of reasons, however, that institution was never established. Meanwhile, Joseph completed the Zossimes Gymnasium in Yanina and went on to the University of Thessaloniki. There he continued his general studies with an interest in Greek literature, while taking advantage of Thessaloniki's rich Jewish heritage to continue his study of Judaism, both mastering Hebrew and receiving training in synagogue service.

When the Italo-Greek war broke out on October 28, 1940, thousands of Greek Jews served actively in defense of their homeland and were demobilized after the surrender of Greece following the German invasion of April 1941. Joseph returned to the university for further study.[5] In early 1943 he and a number of fellow students (somewhat more than 250) left Thessaloniki clandestinely during the period of the deportations and after numerous adventures suceeded in joining the developing resistance forces under the aegis of EAM/ELAS, the largest and most successful of the Greek guerrilla groups during the war.[6]

After the war he returned to a city without Jews.[7] Out of a prewar community of some 1,850 Jews, no more than 163 constituted Yanina's postwar remnant.[8] Stripped of their wealth by the Germans who deported the community in March 1944 and denied their property by postwar squatters, the community members were

impoverished and in deep shock over the loss of their families. Periodic outpourings of grief at communal services did not alleviate the shock, while lack of financial aid from Athens and the diaspora Jewish organizations further discouraged the community. For a number of reasons, nearly half of the survivors emigrated over successive decades.[9]

It was this broken community that elected Joseph Matsas as its religious leader, tour guide, resident scholar, and archivist until his untimely death in 1986. The community recovered its sacred scrolls, rescued from the rapacious Nazis by the wartime mayor of Yanina. The oral tradition of Yanina songs was preserved by Joseph Matsas, who led many of the postwar services. Leon Matsas is in possession of a cassette of the Yom Kippur service that Joseph led.

Joseph Matsas's small apartment was always open to visitors who arrived in Yanina during the hours when his small shop in the old Jewish quarter was closed. Well respected by his Christian colleagues in the city, he maintained a wide-ranging correspondence with scholars in many countries, freely sharing his research and knowledge. He also donated the manuscripts of his devastated community to both the local museum (still unstudied) and the Ben Zvi Institute of Jerusalem.

The following publications include manuscripts and essays. A number of others still unfinished are currently under his daughter's capable hand.

In 1953 he published "Yianniotika Evraika Tragoudia" (Ioannina Hebrew Songs) in *Epirotiki Estia*, dedicating them to "the 1800 Jews who were born, grew up and lived in Yanina, only to find terrible death in criminal hands." These manuscripts were donated to the Ben Zvi Institute (MSS 3502, 3519, 3533, 3558, and 3587). An expanded Hebrew version of this material was published by Joseph Matsas, with Hebrew translations of the songs, in *Sefunoth* 15 (*The Book of Greek Jewry* V), 1971-1981, pp. 235-366.

In 1955 appeared *Ta Onomata ton Evraion sta Yiannina* (The Jewish Names of Yanina), which he dedicated to the memory of his high school teacher Christo Soulis, who "showed great interest in the history of the Jews of Yanina and tried to safeguard from total oblivion remnants of their civilization."

This dedication alludes to Soulis's unsuccessful attempt to save Joseph's family during the war.

In 1983 the Institute of Literary Studies of Aimou in Thessaloniki published his "Evraioellenikoi Threnoi" (Judeo-Greek Dirges for the 9th of Ab), which he had presented at the Fourth Symposium of Laography of Northern Greece, held in Yanina in October 1979.

To the above major essays are to be added a number of magazine articles:

1) "Homage to Eliya" in *Eleuthero Pneuma* 19 (March 1976). The latter is a literary magazine published by P. Malamos.

2) "He Yiorte to Pourim sta Yiannina" (The Holiday of Purim in Yanina) in *Chronika* 47:3 (the official organ of the Jewish Communities of Greece), 3-4.

3) "Hiera Keimena se Komike Diaskeue yia to Pourim" (comic passages on Purim), in *Chronika* 47:3, 5-7.

4) Review of Robert Attal's bibliography in *Chronika* 75:13.

5) "Jewish Songs of Ioannina" in *Chronika* 16:7.

6) "The Jews in the Resistance" in *Chronika* 86:11.

His unpublished memoir "The Participation of the Jews in the National Resistance (1940-1944)" is in Yad Vashem, B/3-2.

The following lecture was delivered on October 2, 1982, in Thessaloniki and on December 6, 1982, in Athens. Its publication here is a partial and posthumous tribute to the scholarly career of the last of the *hakhme yavan* of the last generation.

NOTES

[1]Memoirs can be found seriatim in *Chronika*, the official journal of K.I.S. (the Jewish Communities of Greece). See also Shmuel Raphael, *Benetive Sheol: Yehude Yavan Bashoah* (Routes of Hell: Greek Jewry in the Holocaust, Testimonies), Tel Aviv, 1988, and *Yahadut Yavan Behorbanah Zikhronoth* (Greek Jewry in Its Destruction, Memoirs), Tel Aviv, 1988. Dr. Michael Matsas summarized the main points in his essay "How the West Helped the Destruction of Greek Jewry," *The Jewish Week*: Washington, DC, April 13-19, 1978. See also Yitzhak Kerem, "Rescue Attempts of Greek Jews, 1941-1944" (in Hebrew), *Peamim* 17 (1986), pp. 77-108.

[2]There is as yet no history of the Yanina community during the interwar period. Rachel Dalven's recent survey (*The Jews of Ioannina*, Athens, 1990) is a useful interdisciplinary memoir. The sources for the community can be found in the archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris. See A.I.P. archive-Grèce I.C. 15, 16, 19, 20, 21.

[3]Grèce IV E. 54 contains the very informative reports of the young French director of the A.I.U. school for the 1930s, M. Pitchon.

[4]Pitchon's letter (*ibid.*) of May 25, 1932, describes the chief rabbi's visit to Yanina in conjunction with a Greek government project to establish a rabbinical school in Corfu or Yanina. The idea was to be free of Thessaloniki's influence, and of the two sites, Yanina was preferred because of Italian influence in Corfu. The government representative in Yanina supported the project and promised his assistance. He accompanied the rabbi to Athens where the government gave 80,000 drachmas to the Jewish community of Yanina. The school would train students from Corfu, Preveza, Arta, Patra, and Yanina for five years, and the graduates would be guaranteed jobs either as rabbis or as government-employed professors of Hebrew.

The rabbi emphasized that religious Hebrew was preferred to spoken Hebrew ("Il n'est pas besoin, dans une ville comme Janina qu'on sache parler l'hebreu, comme à Jerusalem, pour être un bon Juif"). The introduction of Hebrew would be at the expense of French. Here perhaps is one of the reasons for the failure of the project, which clashed with Zionist and francophile tendencies in the community.

[5]Adolf Hitler's May 4, 1941, speech announced that all Greek POWs had been released as a gesture to Greek valor during the fighting.

[6]See entry "Greece" in the Macmillan Encyclopedia of the Holocaust and L. S. Stavrianos, "The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM): A Study in Resistance Organization and Administration," *The Journal of Modern History* 24 (1952), pp. 42-45.

[7]See Rachel Dalven, "The Holocaust in Janina," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* (May 1984), pp. 87-103.

[8]Official figures supplied by K.I.S. in various publications.

[9]See the eloquent but pathetic letter from Yanina to Athens in Joshua Eli Plaut, "Our Dwelling Place in All Generations: Individual and Communal Jewish Life in the Greek Provinces Before and After the Holocaust (1913-1983)," unpublished rabbinic thesis, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, 1986, pp. 266ff.

The Participation of the Greek Jews in the National Resistance, 1940-1944*

by JOSEPH MATSAS

Very little is known about the participation of the Jews of Greece in the resistance against the Italian fascists and German Nazi invaders from 1940 to 1944. What is indeed known only covers the first phase of the struggle, *i.e.*, the war in Albania (October 28, 1940, to April 1941). With respect to the second phase and the Jews' participation in the fight that took place in the towns and mountains against the invaders, an official silence lasting 38 years has been imposed. That silence was due to the Civil War that broke out in Greece after liberation, as well as the Cold War that prevented any references to the events that took place during the German occupation. Therefore, former resistance fighters found themselves in an extremely difficult position; they were often persecuted, and many were forced to emigrate to Israel, the United States, and elsewhere. Now that the national resistance has been officially recognized by the state, every hesitation has been set aside, and it is imperative that those Jews who gave their life for the freedom of our country be honored, and that we express our gratitude to the organizations of national resistance for the efforts they made to save as many Jews as they could.

*This article is the text of a speech delivered at the cultural center of the Jewish Community of Athens on October 2, 1982, and at the Jewish Community of Thessaloniki on December 6, 1982. It has been edited only for style and grammar.

JOSEPH MATSAS was a member of the Greek Jewish community of Yanina who participated in the Greek resistance.

The victories of the Greek army against the Italian fascist invaders in the Albanian mountains, its heroic resistance at the Macedonian fortresses against Hitler's armored hordes, and the smashing defeat of the German paratroopers in the Battle of Crete established the belief that even though the Greek army may have surrendered its arms, it was never defeated. That is what preserved the Greek people's desire to oust the invaders and regain their freedom and dignity as soon as possible. The Greek people realized their strength and prepared themselves for the second phase of the resistance struggle immediately following the conquest of their homeland. In September 1941 the secret patriotic organization EAM was founded, soon followed by EDES and EKKA, all of which filled the mountains with armed groups that liberated many mountain villages. In the cities, many small groups of saboteurs hindered the moves of the enemy and monitored them on behalf of the allies.

The participation of Jewish fighters in the first phase of the resistance struggle—the war against the Italians in the mountains of Albania during a harsh winter, the defense of the Macedonian fortresses against the wily attack of the Germans, as well as the Battle of Crete—was massive.

When the war broke out in 1940, the total Jewish population in Greece was approximately 70,000 souls, and the community gave its share of enlisted men to every regiment, but especially the Macedonian ones. Jewish soldiers had a highly patriotic spirit and fought the invaders fiercely, fighting as Greeks for their country's defense and as Jews for the defeat of fascism and antisemitism. Their fighting spirit and participation in dangerous missions earned them the admiration of their officers and shot down the myth, created by antisemites and fanatical bigots, that Jews were cowards in the face of war. One battalion of the 50th Regiment was called "the Cohen Battalion" because of the numerous Jewish fighters who served in its ranks. It has been estimated that about 4,000 Jews fought in the battles that took place in Albania. Their casualties were significant and a testimony to their bravery. I will mention some data from the casualty records of the Army general staff as a minimal tribute to their memory:

Officers killed: 1) Colonel Mordechai Frizis of the 8th

Division fell on December 5, 1940, near Premeti; 2) Second Lieutenant Yacoel Moys from Thessaloniki fell at Hill 1532; 3) Second Lieutenant Haim Sakis from Larissa fell at Hill 802.

Two hundred and sixty-eight Jewish soldiers either fell on the battlefield or died in hospital as a result of their injuries. One hundred and seventy-four of those were from Thessaloniki, and 94 from other, smaller communities. Thousands of others were wounded. Those mutilated as a result of bombings and, especially, frostbite numbered 138. All of them were taken straight to crematoria by the Nazis. According to the testimony of Israeli professor Myriam Novitch, director of the Museum of Jewish Resistance at Kibbutz Lohame Aguetaoth near Acco, artificial arms and legs of crippled people from Greece are kept in a section of the Auschwitz museum.

The sacrifices of the children of Israel in the struggle against the Axis are in danger of being forgotten because they are overshadowed by the enormous casualties of Greek Jews during the Holocaust.

In this dark period of slavery, the Jews of Thessaloniki paid a very heavy price, suffering the burdens of occupation more than the rest of the Greek people. Unemployment, hunger, humiliation, executions, forced-labor camps, the looting of their property, and, finally, their physical extermination, took on the greatest and most tragic dimensions in Thessaloniki. Seventy percent of the Jewish population of the city consisted of tobacco-factory workers, dockworkers, employees in the private sector, and skilled workers who worked for a daily wage and who found themselves unemployed when the occupation began. Hunger devasted them. Jewish community services had to bear the heavy burden of burying 50 to 60 corpses daily. Nevertheless, the organized resistance was effective in some areas, at least with respect to coping with the help of philanthropic organizations and the volunteer work of altruistic community members. It tried both to fight hunger (by distributing food rations) and to free prisoners from the forced-labor camps, but it couldn't arouse young people and show them the way to escape from the surrounded city. On the eve of the great persecutions, the old fighting Jewish organizations of the left that could arouse the young no longer existed in Thessaloniki. Their members had all been driven

away by Metaxas's dictatorship and the Germans, who showed particular cruelty in preferring to execute Jewish fighters in reprisals.

The organization of EAM in Thessaloniki moved, as much as its forces allowed, toward helping the Jews who were threatened with annihilation. An EAM member had visited Chief Rabbi Koretz to declare that EAM was ready and willing to help save the Jews. But Koretz and his advisors had been reduced to obedient instruments of the Germans and could not even contemplate resisting them.

Through flyers and illegal newspapers, EAM called upon the Jews not to follow the Germans' orders, but to try to flee instead, warning that those who turned Jews in would be severely punished. The EAM section at the University of Thessaloniki undertook the work of helping Jewish students escape to resistance hideouts. EAM organized escape routes that helped many families go south to territories still controlled by the Italians, who did not enforce anti-Jewish persecutions. Two hundred and fifty-two young Thessaloniki Jews enlisted in the ranks of partisan groups that were having great difficulty at that time—early 1943—in the mountains of Pieria, Vermion, and Pindos. I myself experienced the first tragic and adventurous days when, in order to get to the partisan bases, we had to cross the valley of Thessaloniki across mountains and enemy-controlled bridges without arousing suspicion in the German troops guarding those areas. We walked in the night through fields and hid in the daytime in incredible hideouts, ditches or stables, because our escape took place while German troops were engaged in liquidating operations, sweeping through every access-way to the mountains.

When we finally met the armed partisan groups, we equipped ourselves with guns hidden by peasants after the Greek army's retreat, and we were assigned duties depending on our individual abilities.

Most of us had fought in Albania and immediately joined the combat units. Those who were untrained went through intensive training. The group I enlisted in consisted of forty partisans, ten of whom were Jewish. The terrible shortages and hardships were soon forgotten, thanks to the sense of freedom

we had gained. Hungry, tired from the continuous marching, and wet from the constant rain, we found comfort in singing. We sang the songs of liberty and dreamed of tomorrow's new world that would be free of slavery, persecution, and racial discrimination. That's how we withstood the test, got strong as steel, and, after adventurous all-night marches, reached—at the end of May—"Free Greece" in western Macedonia. There we were given equipment parachuted in by the allies, and we formed into complete military units, ready to join the attack against the invaders.

In September 1943, when the rest of Greece was being occupied by the Germans coming to replace the Italians (who had capitulated), the persecutions started in towns and cities of central and southern Greece. During that time, ELAS had driven the invaders away from the greatest part of the countryside, creating a free area including two-fifths of the country and controlling all villages—but not the cities. On the other hand, the EDES groups under the command of General Napoleon Zervas had liberated a large part of Epiros and Aetoloakarnania in western Greece, and the EKKA group of Colonel Psarros had freed part of Roumeli.

In Athens the political branch of EAM had spread its influence over all strata of the population. About a thousand Jews had been organized in a close association,[1] ready to fight for salvation. They fought on the side of the Greek people and took part in all mobilizations that took place in Athens to prevent the political draft and the descent of the Bulgarians into central Macedonia. The Jewish section of EAM mostly handled the special problems of the Jewish refugees from Thessaloniki, housing, food, medical attention, and forged identity cards. A weekly news bulletin was also circulated, and its dominant slogan was: "No one should appear at the German-controlled [Jewish] Community Offices." On the other hand, the Athens EAM encouraged the Greek people through flyers to help persecuted Jews and hide them from the Hitlerite fury. Those flyers declared that the Jews were part of our people and that their protection was a national duty, warning that any potential traitors would be punished severely. With EAM's subtle encouragement, committees of scientists, professionals, and work-

ers were formed, and they went to the occupation authorities and foreign embassies and put pressure on them to act toward ending the persecutions. The memorable Archbishop Damaskinos had EAM's support in his daring appeals for the rescue of the Jews of Athens. With EAM's help, hundreds of homes were found in working-class neighborhoods and elsewhere to hide the Athens Jews who had abandoned their residences because they were known to the police.

A special team of members of the secret organizations who included the memorable journalist Barouch Shibi, journalist Kostas Vidalis—who was later assassinated in Thessalia—Thessaloniki attorney Elias Kefalides, and other brave young Jews, undertook the task of helping the chief rabbi of Athens, Elias Bartzilai, to escape. On a Saturday—September 25, 1943—the rabbi and his family sneaked out of Athens in disguise and found shelter in a village in Thessalia, near the partisans' general headquarters. There the rabbi had contacts with the leaders of the resistance and members of the British military mission and was honored accordingly as a religious leader. In June 1944 he sent to allied countries a report describing the extent of the destruction of the Jewish communities and praised the resistance for its aid in saving thousands of Jews. In that same month he made an appeal to the Jews of the free world for help to benefit the suffering refugees.

The news of the rabbi's escape gave the Jews of Athens the signal to seek safe shelter in working-class neighborhoods or escape by sea to the Turkish coast and from there to the land of Israel. Without the support of the patriotic organizations of the resistance, it would have been impossible for the persecuted Jews to hide or escape. The resistance exercised effective control in many neighborhoods in Athens, where at times it even fought battles against the invaders and their collaborators, while the escape routes through Evia, as well as the small boats crossing the Aegean at night, were under the control of ELAS and ELAN [the naval branch of ELAS]. The escape route was of vital importance to the resistance because it assured communication with the Middle East, which is why it was kept open even during periods of [German] "cleansing" operations.[2]

At the time when Jews were fleeing, the resistance sent two

of its members to Smyrna and Tel Aviv to coordinate the safe transportation of the fugitives, cooperating in this plan with the Jewish labor organization Histadrut. Recognizing the work of the Greek resistance, the workers of Histadrut sent to ELAS and ELAN in Evia the symbolic aid of 250 pairs of boots and a monetary sum, in spite of their own deprivation during the war period. Thus a great number of Jews escaped to the Middle East. From those, many young people joined the Greek army in the Middle East, fighting the enemy in Africa and Italy with many Egyptian-Greek Jews, and suffering their share of casualties.

The daring attempt to help the chief rabbi of Athens escape was duplicated almost simultaneously in Volos. The memorable chief rabbi, Moshe Pessach, assisted by the metropolitan and mayor of Volos, escaped to the villages of Pelion, escorted by two armed Jewish partisans. Once there, he immediately sent a letter to his flock pleading with them to leave the town and disperse in the villages. The resistance organization gave directions for the welcome and disposition of Jewish families in free villages, where they were given shelter and food rations. That way, 752 Jews of Volos were saved, while the Germans took away only 130, who either had disregarded the advice of the [resistance] organization or had their hiding-places discovered due to betrayal.

In Larissa, Rabbi Kassuto avoided turning over to the Germans the list of the community's Jews and went into hiding in time, together with most of the Jews, who dispersed through the territories controlled by the partisans. There, 950 Jews were saved, while the Nazis managed to deport 225.

In Trikala, nine-tenths of the population was saved in the free areas, 470 were saved in the mountains, and 50 were caught by the Nazis. In Karditsa, which had been liberated by partisans earlier, all Jews were saved, namely 150.

In Patras and Agrinio, the Jews left early for the mountains of Achaia and Roumeli. One particular document, an enemy testimonial found in the German archives, gives us an idea of this. The German consul in Patras wrote to his supervisors, "I have the honor to respectfully report that after the announcement in the local press about the compulsory registration of the Jews, they [the Jews] disappeared."[3] In Epiros, by a tragic mis-

take on the part of the resistance groups of EAM and EDES—which were very powerful but too occupied with fighting each other, thus not comprehending the seriousness of the Jews' position and not acting to drive them out of the city—very few Jews were saved from the old, historical communities. Only 21 young people from Yanina, and fewer than that from Arta and Preveza, joined ELAS, while four joined EDES.

Those Jews who did not find shelter in villages did not remain inactive in the face of the earth-shattering events around them, but rather actively participated with all of their ability in helping the revitalizing activity of the resistance and the fight for liberation. Those who did not bear arms worked side by side with the peasants as contacts, as well as in secondary army services. Those who were literate resumed office duties in the areas of supply, solidarity [*i.e.*, propaganda], and education. Skilled workers worked in crews making clothes, boots, and hats. Women knitted fancy shirts with parachute textiles, socks, and hoods, while younger girls participated in cultural events and theatrical presentations and acted as teaching assistants. Many girls were nurses in combat units, partisan hospitals, and village medical stations. Even little children acted as contacts together with the "little eagles" of the villages. The Jewish partisans, whose number surpassed 650, fought hard and often left behind many dead on the battlefield. They were spread through every combat unit of the partisan army in Macedonia, Epiros, the Peloponnese, and especially Thessalia and Sterea Ellas. They did not constitute separate Jewish units, as in France, but rather served at every level as privates, officers, and saboteurs, as well as in the administration, supply units, and medical teams. They were all distinguished for their fighting spirit created by the thirst for revenge against the Nazis, hangmen of their people. The turbulent period that followed the liberation of Greece with the persecution of resistance fighters, and the agonizing efforts of those who survived to reconstitute their destroyed families, were the reasons why the testimonies were not preserved in order to make known the activity of Jews in the resistance. I will only mention some facts that I've collected from personal memories, random publications, and a few documents, in order

merely to sketch the contribution of Jewish partisans to that heroic struggle.

I will tell of the actions of only those who fell in combat, with the exception of a heroic nurse who emigrated to the United States. I will say a few words about the partisan Fani Florentin, whose actions surpassed the usual limits of female strength. She climbed Mount Paiko, together with her husband Leon, in one of the first missions by young people who escaped the arrests in Thessaloniki in March 1943. She had acquired valuable experience as a nurse with the Greek Red Cross during the war of 1940-41, and she immediately resumed duty alongside a young Jewish doctor who was later killed in the Civil War. Fani, though thin and fragile, showed an indomitable endurance of the hardship of a savage life in the forests, and a wonderful courage. She did not bend under the difficult and exhausting nightly marches on steep mountain trails; on the contrary, it was she who encouraged those who fell behind or were weak, giving them courage and offering them water from a large flask that she carried together with a medical kit. She followed the column at the very end, together with the captain, in order to help out those who, exhausted, lagged behind. Then she would run to catch up with her unit, because the danger of getting lost in the dense forest was great. When we reached the areas of Free Greece in western Macedonia, chased by the German troops that had inundated the roads, Fani took over the partisan hospital and trained the village girls in treating the wounded. She fought to cure the injured and the sick with the meager means available to the resistance. In the fall of 1944, during a large-scale liquidating operation launched by the Germans to assure a comfortable retreat from Greece, Fani was captured together with the seriously injured whom she refused to abandon. She managed to escape along the way, however, since she knew the paths very well, and rejoined her unit, continuing her activity until the liberation. Those who were saved thanks to Fani's care, and especially the Jewish partisans, will always remember her kindly style, her comforting words, and her humane behavior.

An unknown chapter of the Jewish resistance consists of the action of Jews who were executed by the invaders. Their names must be collected and remembered, because each one of them

fell after committing a known or unknown act of resistance and sabotage. I will only mention a few such acts, in chronological order.

After the Battle of Crete, medical corps major Salvator Sarfatis from Thessaloniki died after being tortured. In December 1941, labor activists David Samuel, David Tiano, and Alberto Carasso were executed in Thessaloniki. The latter's brother, Moys Carasso, was executed on May 6, 1944, together with another 200 at the shooting ring of Kesariani, while his son Marcos was killed fighting the Nazis during the destruction of a train in Macedonia.

In Drama, the Bulgarian invaders executed Alberto Cohen and David Mizan, together with other Greek patriots, because they refused to give up their Greek citizenship. Isaac Cohen from Volos was accused of sabotage and executed in Athens. David Cohen, a 39-year-old worker from Preveza, was executed.

At the trial of Thessaloniki's abominable hangman Merten,[4] among his many crimes it was mentioned that he had been responsible for the execution of six young Jews from the city, who were getting ready to leave for the mountains. At the Haidari camp in Athens, reserve lieutenant Haim Leon Levi from Yanina was executed for his resistance activity.

At the German court martial that tried the Jewish partisan Ben-Levi, the defendant cried out courageously: "I am a Jewess, I fought like a Jewess and I am ready to die like a Jewess."[5]

Mordoch, a high-ranking member of EAM, was executed in Eretria, Evia, and the heroic teacher [Mrs.] Moskowitz was executed at the village of Stropones, Evia, by the treacherous stormtroopers.[6]

The following pages are dedicated to the Jewish partisans who fell on the battlefield. We were not able to collect the names of all those who fell, or the places where they fought and were buried.

Reserve second lieutenant Marcos Carasso of the 10th Division was promoted to the rank of lieutenant after he was killed while heroically fighting the enemy. That is mentioned in a decree of October 4, 1944, of the provisional mountain government.[7] By the same decree, the fallen partisans Dino Ovadia and Vital Beracha were also promoted. By another decree, partisan Leon Sakis of the 54th Infantry Regiment was promoted. Then in-

fantry reserve second lieutenant Yohannas Hadjis was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Hadjis was originally from Arta and borrowed the name of Greek War of Independence hero Skoufas when he became a partisan. (It was commonplace for partisan leaders to use names borrowed from heroes of the Greek War of Independence of 1821.) Hadjis had fought in Albania as a sergeant and was then promoted to the rank of second lieutenant. Because of his combat experience he was appointed company leader, and he was loved so much by his fellow fighters that they sang in his honor a variation of a *kleftiko* song: "Skoufas is going to war along with brave *andartes*." Hadjis's company was given the most dangerous missions. In one of the fiercest battles against the Germans, in Amfissa on July 2, 1944, Hadjis was wounded in the leg, but did not stop encouraging his men. During a new attack, he caught a bullet in the chest. He didn't get the chance to see the town of Amfissa liberated by his brave men.

With emotion, I mention the heroic action of my dear and memorable fellow fighter Marcos Carasso. He was a young student in Thessaloniki when he swore to avenge the execution of his father, Alberto, and he went to the mountains with very high morale, which made him withstand and quickly adjust to the incredibly rough living conditions of the first partisan groups. He distinguished himself in the battle fought by the 16th Regiment of Vermion against the *komitatzides*[8] in the Kastoria area, then was sent to an ELAS officer school where he obtained the rank of second lieutenant and assumed the command of a platoon. He fought several battles, the most important of which was at Karyes, on southern Olympus, on May 6, 1944. Together with other units, Marcos's unit set an ambush and destroyed an entire SS battalion which had advanced deep in the ravine and arrested 12 families of Larissa Jews who were hiding at a place called "Kalyvia tou Handjiara." The SS burned the shacks and arrested the Jews. On the way back to Larissa, however, they were caught by surprise and attacked by partisans from both sides of the ravine. The outcome of the battle: 230 Germans dead, 14 captured, including their commander and interpreter, and, most important, the liberation of the poor Jews, who didn't know how to express their gratitude to the partisans.

Those Germans who were spared dropped their weapons and fled back to Larissa. Later Marcos fought in the Vergina area, near Verria, to protect the wheat crops from the predatory looting of the invaders. On July 23, 1944, during an ambush that Marcos's unit had set up against a German train near Edessa, Marcos was killed while climbing aboard the train, shooting at Germans hidden inside it.

Reserve second lieutenant Samuel Eskenazi from Larissa heroically fought in Albania and received a medal. He joined ELAS early and became a company leader in the 54th Regiment. He fought several battles in Thessalia and Pelion and fell fighting bravely at the Kalas Straits.

Medical student Robertos Mitrani was originally arrested during the roundup of July 11, 1942, in Thessaloniki and sent to a forced-labor camp near Thebes. There he made contact with the resistance and escaped with other young people, going to the partisans of Parnassos. He organized a medical team with primitive means, but soon afterward asked to join a combat unit. He carried with him both his rifle and a medical kit, and fought many battles. On January 5, 1944, his company was ambushed by the Germans at Aghia Triada Kaloskopis. The Germans suddenly inundated the area, which was covered with snow. Robertos was wounded, but kept on helping the injured lying around him. His commander, the legendary Kalias, was also injured. Robertos, who had borrowed the honored name "Hippocrates," ran over to help him, but they both fell under machine-gun fire. That handsome, brave Robertos rests in a common grave somewhere between Giona and Parnassos, together with two other Jewish boys, the two Davids—David Russo from Athens and David Michael Cohen from Preveza—both 19 years old, as well as 27 other heroic fellow fighters.

The defender of the Macedonian fortresses at Rupel who had fought against the armored Nazi hordes, Elias Nissim from Thessaloniki, could not tolerate the humiliation of the occupation and went to the mountains of Olympus. He took part in many battles and especially distinguished himself in repelling German attacks against Free Greece. During an operation in the area of Grevena, he fought heroically, in spite of being ill.

He was wounded and taken to the Pentalofos hospital, where he died as a result of his injuries.

Stella Cohen, a student from Thessaloniki, fought in the 50th Regiment of Pieria. She was killed on April 18, 1943, at the battle of Thanitsa.

I shall mention a few more names of Jewish partisans who fell in combat that I collected from their fellow fighters' personal recollections:

- Elias Alalouf fell near Athens.
- Israel Sadikario from Volos.
- Avraam Yosef Bourla fell near Halkida.
- Tselembi Bourla from Serres fell in Epiros.
- Savvas Pardo and his son Moys, tobacco workers from Kavala, fell in battles in Vermion.
- Varon, tobacco worker from Kavala.
- Nico Bourla, of the 16th Regiment, was ambushed at Stavros Verrias on October 20, 1944.
- Charles Carasso fell at Skalohori Kastorias.
- [Woman] partisan "Sheror" fell at a battle in Vermion.
- Partisan Molho was killed in Chalkidiki.
- Partizan Frizis was killed in Vermion.

Two partisans, Solon Avraam Levi from Trikala and Sam Leon Gavrilides from Athens, after having fought the Germans, left upon the liberation of Greece for the land of Israel. They fell fighting in the Israeli War of Independence.

Within the context of the resistance of Greek Jews must be included the isolated or organized acts of sabotage committed by the slaves at the death camps. The relevant testimonies were given by the few survivors, especially Isaac Arouch, and are filed in the book of the memorable authors Joseph Nehama and Michael Molho, *In Memoriam.*[9]

We do not have confirmed data about the activity of Jewish resistance fighters in the small illegal groups that collected information and committed sabotage on behalf of the allies. Mentioned among them are Eliyahu Veissi, journalist for the Thessaloniki newspaper *Messagero*, and journalist Jacques Ventoura. In Athens, Jacques Costi acted as a saboteur and informant in the small group Apollo, which succeeded in destroying a German freighter in the port of Piraeus on June 21, 1943.

I shall finish with a remark from the report of the central committee of EAM: "The Jewish partisans carried on the tradition of the Greco-Italian war during which so many Jews fell, including the heroic Colonel Frizis. More than 600 young Jews joined ELAS as partisans, among whom were many doctors, engineers, and officers. The number of Jews who fell heroically in the struggle for the liberation and independence of Greece is quite significant." And the report ends as follows: "The Greek Christians who never saw the Greek Jews as separate from the rest of the Greek people, feel gratitude towards those Jews who fell in the fight for liberation."

Those of us who survived, and the New Generation that follows, have not done our duty in properly honoring the dead of the struggle because of the great calamity that followed the resistance. Most of them are buried in the inhospitable and inaccessible mountains of Albania. Many lie on Greek soil in unknown graves—graves on which monuments must be erected, according to our religious laws. Let us not even mention the graves of the partisans dispersed on every mountain of our country and places unknown.

May today's moving gathering contribute to making us all, individuals and organizations, act to correct the omissions of 38 long years.

NOTES

[1]The phrase which follows, "ston tomea ton ethnikotopikon omadon" (which may mean that they were organized in local units [groups] belonging to broader national organizations or local groups with a national purpose), is unclear, and is omitted from the text. [Tr.]

[2]The Germans called these operations *Saeberungssunternehmen*. [Ed.]

[3]The German consul's report is mentioned by Professor Pol. Enepekides in his book *The Persecution of the Greek Jews* (1969), p. 126 (in Greek). He perceptively adds: "It is characteristic that the *armatoliki* of Morea also carried away the young of Israel."

[4]Dr. Max Merten in 1959. He was convicted but shortly thereafter released by the Karamanlis government. [Ed.]

[5]Myriam Novitch, *Le passage des barbares* (Nice: Presses du Temps Present, 1961), p. 131.

[6]*The Jews and the Greek Liberation Struggle*, a report of the central committee of EAM (Athens, 1945).

[7]From the collection "Acts and Decrees of the PEEA" (Provisional Committee of National Liberation).

[8]*Komitatzides*: Slavic-speaking guerrillas in Macedonia who fought Greek influence and collaborated with the invaders.

[9]See bibliography in note 1 to introduction. [Ed.]

Greek Immigration to Quebec: The Process and the Settlement

by EFIE GAVAKI

Migration is not to be seen as the simple geographical movement of individuals. Whether voluntary or forced, one should look at it as the relatively permanent movement of groups carrying and holding on to cultural, social, psychological, and collective experiences and memories of the place of origin and its history. Furthermore, immigrants bring with them their dreams, fears, hopes, and expectations of the new world. Immigration is a movement of systems—social group systems, social organizational systems, cultural systems, and personality systems—all products of one society, to be transplanted into a new one with parallel systems of its own, and quite often very different ones. During the process of migration, settlement, and adjustment, the immigrant systems will interact and respond to the dynamics and forces of the new society, while the immigrants themselves will invariably attempt to retain, modify and adapt, or radically change their own systems.

J. J. Mangalam and H. Schwrtzeller view migration as "a relatively permanent moving away of collectivity, called migrants, from one geographical location to another, preceded by decision-making on the part of the migrants on the basis of a hierarchically ordered set of values or valued ends and resulting in changes in the interactional system of the migrants" (p. 8). Greek immigration to Canada can be viewed in this light.

Before World War I Greek migration to Canada was

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sporadic, limited, almost accidental. During this period, it could be looked upon as a series of individual and random events. After World War I, however, and especially after World War II, the outmovement from Greece to Canada resembled that of a collectivity, closely associated by common sociocultural, historical, and family structures. And it is mainly on those characteristics, structures, and experiences that this paper will concentrate, with emphasis on those of the Greeks in Quebec.

Whereas early random immigrants hoped for financial success and dreamed of an early return to Greece, the decision to migrate after the world wars carried with it the reality of permanent settlement. Furthermore, this migration process was relatively voluntary, and the decision rested mainly on the relative deprivation created by the politico-historical and socioeconomic factors in Greece at the time—which "pushed" immigrants out—rather than on the abject poverty and destruction of the mother country, the direct threat to immigrants' lives because of political activities, or the perceived realities "pulling" immigrants to Canada.

This paper will concentrate on who the Greek immigrants to Canada were, why they migrated, where they settled, and the consequences of immigrant experience. And although emphasis is given to Quebec, Greek migration will nonetheless be looked at from the larger migration picture in North America in general, and in Canada in particular.

The "Push-Pull" Factors

The documented presence of Greeks on the North American continent dates back to 1768, when a Scottish physician, Dr. Andrew Turnbull, founded the "Greek colony" of New Smyrna in Florida. Most of its settlers, however, did not survive more than ten years, either because of malaria or because of clashes with the Indians (Vlachos 1975). Both E. Vlachos and P. Chimbos take notice of Demetrius Sicilianos's claim that Christopher Columbus was not an Italian but a Byzantine nobleman by the name of Dispatos. Juan de Fuca, a navigator with the Spanish navy in its exploration of the sea coast of British Columbia in

1592, is thought to have been a Greek by the name of Yannis Phokas, who was born on the island of Cephalonia in the Ionian Sea (Vlassis). The strait which divides Vancouver Island from Washington State was named after this explorer. His visit to the west coast of Canada was mentioned by Michael Lok, an Englishman, who met de Fuca in Venice in 1594 (Chimbos).

It was not until the turn of the nineteenth century, however, when sociopolitical events involving Greece—combined with the attractive "promises" of the new world—brought Greek immigrants in any significant number to the United States and Canada. Before that time, the countries of destination for Greek immigrants were Russia, Romania, Turkey, and Egypt. In the latter two countries, Greeks enjoyed special rights, giving them opportunities for living conditions better than those of the average member of the host population (Agapitidis).

Following the war of independence from the Turks in 1821, and by the end of the century (1821-1900), 19,670 Greeks had left for overseas, all but five for the United States. It was not, however, until the following twenty years (1900-20) that the mass exodus from Greece would take place. During those two decades, 369,632 Greeks, mostly young and male, left Greece, with 351,720 entering the United States. Such a massive outflow threatened to deplete the country of its most dynamic population. At the same time, the influx of immigrants to the United States (and not only from Greece) created concerns for the American authorities of how to deal with these waves of untrained, unskilled, uneducated, rural laborers, and how to control the arrival of more. As a result, the United States imposed quotas on the number of immigrants from each source country.

What prompted such massive immigration from Greece during that period? Among other major factors, three can be identified to explain most of the movement: the political-economic one, the demographic one, and family ties.

Such "push-pull" forces have, of course, explained most of the world's migration movements over the last century, either as direct or indirect functions. In Greece the deplorable conditions of a country just coming out of four centuries of Turkish occupation and the deficient exploitation of the resources of the

country, compounded by crop failures (currant crop failures in the Peloponnesus between 1882-86) and government incompetence and conflicts, all resulted in a variety of "push" factors out of Greece. In addition, the unequal distribution of land at home, political and social instability, the heavy economic burden of the dowry system, and the centuries-old love of the seafaring Greeks for adventure have all been mentioned as causes of Greek migration. In a 1976 survey of the Greeks in Montreal, 74 percent (n = 242) respondents indicated economic reasons as the primary push for migration, whereas another 18 percent indicated "opportunities for a better life," with the remainder indicating direct political threats or personal reasons (Gavaki). At the same time, literature, advertisements, and reports of fact and fiction on work opportunities, easy successes, and favorable immigration policies pulled the immigrants toward that destination.

It is also important to note that during this period of heavy overseas migration, the demographic factors operating in Greece gave a major "push" to immigrants out of the country.

In the early years after achieving independence from the Ottoman empire (1821-30), the total population of Greece grew slowly. However, its growth was considerably accelerated as a result of territorial expansion and the large refugee influx after the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey in 1922: from approximately 938,000 in 1821 to 6,204,684 in 1928. High natural increase also added to this population explosion; hence the need for an exodus (Vlachos 1975). Table 1 presents a summary picture of overseas emigration from Greece between 1921 and 1976.

Wars, political unrest, and economic reasons have remained until now the primary "push" factors for Greek migration. However, marriage and family ties were also to become strong factors, especially in the post-World War II outmovement from Greece. And whereas early immigrants were mostly young, single males—hoping to make their fortune and return to Greece—immigration from the 1950s through the 1970s would involve the movement of entire families and the "importation" of brides, and more often of bridegrooms, to the New World. Of the total number of immigrants leaving Greece between

TABLE 1
TRANSOCEANIC EMIGRATION FROM GREECE
1821 - 1976

Year	Number of Emigrants		
	Total	To U.S.A.	To Other Countries*
	#	#	#
1821-1830	20	20	—
1831-1840	49	49	—
1841-1850	16	16	—
1851-1860	31	31	—
1861-1870	72	72	—
1871-1880	213	210	3
1881-1890	2,310	2,308	2
1891-1900	16,979	16,979	—
1901-1910	173,513	167,519	5,994
1911-1920	196,119	184,201	11,918
1921-1930	91,369	69,675	21,694
1931-1940	30,500	21,903	8,597
1941-1950	20,176	9,317	10,859
1951-1960	152,470	43,536	108,934
1961-1970	256,001	76,177	179,824
1971-1976	72,976	36,010	36,966
1977-Jan./Sept.	5,842	3,027	2,815

*Until 1924, Canada, Cuba, Brazil, Australia, Union of South Africa; since 1925, all other countries, except those in Europe and on the Mediterranean.

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Greece, Athens, 1971 and 1977.

1955 and 1960, 36 percent were women, whereas the percentage increased to 42 percent in the years between 1961 and 1970 and to 44 percent between 1971 and 1976 (*Statistical Yearbook of Greece* 1977). During the period from 1950 to 1970, 10,771 Greek women entered Canada as domestic servants (Chimbos). Most of these women were single, and, in time, offered the sponsorship of a husband-to-be in lieu of a dowry.

Immigration to Canada began late in the nineteenth century as an offshoot of the larger migration to the United States. Canadian immigration was from among the waves of Greek immigrants to the U.S. who, for quota and other reasons, were not able to settle there and sought refuge in different parts of Canada.

The first known Greek who came to settle in Canada was the son of a sea captain and sailor of the British navy by the name of George Kapiotis, who arrived in 1851. He was quite an adventurer, G. Vlassis reports, and he finally settled in Victoria, British Columbia, marrying the sixteen-year-old daughter of the chief of the Songhees Indian tribe. In Ontario, a Greek doctor, Petros Constantinidis, the son of a professor at the University of Athens with a medical degree from the Royal College of Physicians in Edinburgh, Scotland, arrived in Toronto in 1864 and became that city's first surgeon (*Ontario Ethnocultural Profiles: Greeks*).

The first immigrants were sailors from the Greek islands, and they settled in British Columbia and Nova Scotia. Statistics Canada reports that in 1870-80, there were about 39 Greeks in Canada. In 1901 an estimated 300 Greeks had settled in Quebec (66), Ontario (65), Nova Scotia (15), Manitoba (27), British Columbia (96), and in other places. In 1911 the Greek population of Canada rose to 3,650, mainly concentrating in the larger cities of Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax. As they became settled, the Greeks sponsored (first-degree relatives) and nominated (other relatives) the immigration of relatives and friends from their native towns and villages. Thus the pattern of chain migration was set in motion.

By 1921 the population of Greeks in Canada had almost doubled over the previous decade (5,740), whereas the following two decades of 1931 and 1941 experienced a 65 percent and 24 percent increase, respectively, over the previous decade (9,444 and 11,692). It was after the devastation of Greece by World War II and the Civil War, which brought political instability and economic destruction in their wake, that large waves of Greek immigrants arrived in Canada. By 1951 there were 13,866 Greeks. That number was to quadruple by 1961 (56,475) and to be increased tenfold by 1971 (124,475). In 1986, Statistics Canada reported 177,310 individuals claiming Greek ethnic origin

in Canada, most of whom had settled in Ontario and Quebec.

After World War II, the Canadian government adopted a more liberal immigration policy, responding to the country's increasing population needs and to pressures by ethnic groups and individuals to allow them to bring relatives out of the post-war destruction and economic devastation of Europe. Immigration regulations of the early 1950s emphasized the admission of agriculturalists, domestics, nurse's aides, and other workers specifically nominated by Canadian employers. In 1962 the Conservative Canadian government introduced a significance change in the immigration policy which was carried out by the Liberals in 1967 (Parai). That change affected the right of admission to Canada of relatives other than first degree by invitation of a permanent resident, and not only of a citizen as had been the case before. Extended Greek families, and almost entire villages, were thus transplanted to Canada. Such changes placed Greece among the most important sources of Canadian immigration, surpassed only by the United States, Britain, Italy, and Portugal in the 1960s (Chimbos).

Table 2 shows recent Greek immigration to Canada by category of admission and compares the proportion of sponsored (first degree) and nominated (other relatives) with that for all immigrants to Canada for the same period. The family ties and obligations had become very strong "pull" factors.

In Quebec, oral accounts of immigrants suggest that some Greeks arrived around 1880-85. Others, however, suggest that a few Greeks had settled in the port of Old Montreal as early as 1864 (Petritis). Vlassis claims that Greek immigrants resided in Montreal as early as 1839. Finally, T. Ioannou makes reference to the presence of a Greek interpreter who served Samuel de Champlain in his expeditions to New France as early as 1628.

Greeks coming to Quebec at the end of the nineteenth century settled in Montreal, a trend that still continues today. Before 1885 there were about ten Greeks in the city. Between 1895 and 1900, their number rose to 300. Among them, one by the name of Psarianos (coming from the island of Psara) established the first Greek bar in Montreal. George Gerasimos (from Kranidi, Lakonia) established a patisserie, as did Pana-

TABLE 2
GREEK IMMIGRATION TO CANADA BY CATEGORY OF ADMISSION

Year	Total	Category of Admission Sponsored	Nominated	Independent	Sponsored & Nominated Immigrants as % of Total: Greeks	All Immigrants to Canada
		#	#	#	%	%
1967	10,650	7,616	—	3,034	72	33
1968	7,739	2,460	3,841	1,438	81	40
1969	6,937	2,041	3,637	1,259	82	45
1970	6,327	1,956	3,024	1,347	79	46
1971	4,769	1,759	2,211	799	83	52
1972	4,016	1,492	1,898	626	84	53
1973	5,833	1,750	2,449	1,634	72	47

Sources: Department of Manpower and Immigration, Population Statistics; L. Parai, "Canada's Immigration Policy," *IMR* 9, 1975.

giotis Panoulias and Michael Nikolakakos (*Greek-Canadian Telephone Directory of Montreal*).

These early arrivals constituted random and individual migration. They settled in scattered locations and married local women (mostly French-Canadian), and their offspring were rapidly absorbed into the mainstream of Quebec society. By 1900, however, the migration pattern seemed to have changed. More than 1,000 Greeks lived in Montreal, and the beginnings of community organizations were taking place. Table 3 shows the influx of Greek immigrants to Quebec, Ontario, and Canada until 1982, whereas Table 4 shows the number of people in Quebec and Canada indicating Greek as their ethnic origin for the last 110 years.

Immigrants to Canada came primarily from the rural areas of Lakonia, Arkadia, and Macedonia, the mainland regions

TABLE 3

IMMIGRANTS TO CANADA, ONTARIO, AND QUEBEC HAVING GREECE AS THE COUNTRY OF LAST PERMANENT RESIDENCE 1951 - 1982

	Canada	Ontario		Quebec	
Year	Total	Number	% of Total	Number	% of Total
	#	#	%	#	%
1901-1910	3,995	Data Not Available			
1911-1920	5,301				
1921-1930	3,835				
1931-1940	642				
1941-1950	3,043				
1951-1960	39,832	18,829	47	16,195	41
1961-1970	62,183	32,051	52	23,415	38
1971	4,769	2,565	54	1,685	35
1972	6,297	2,494	40	516	8
1973	—	—	—	—	—
1974	5,632	2,984	53	1,997	35
1975	4,062	2,312	57	1,142	28
1976	2,487	1,350	54	846	34
1977	1,960	1,016	52	559	29
1978	1,474	768	52	435	30
1979	1,247	606	49	407	33
1980	1,093	502	46	336	31
1981	958	448	47	287	30
1982	885	430	49	293	33

Source: Statistics Canada, Immigration Statistics, 1901-1982.

of Greece that provided Canada with the bulk of its Greek immigrants. They could be found working in the cities of Montreal and Toronto, mostly in factories, the fur trade, small businesses, restaurants, hospital services, and as taxi drivers.

An institution that played an important role in the movement of Greek immigrants to Canada was the travel agency.

TABLE 4
GREEKS IN QUEBEC AND CANADA
(Ethnic Origin*)
1871 to 1986

Year	Canada	Quebec
	#	#
1871	39	7
1881	—	—
1901	291	66
1911	3,614	772
1921	5,740	1,780
1931	9,444	2,466
1941	11,692	2,728
1951	13,866	3,388
1961	56,475	19,390
1971	124,475	42,870
1981	154,365	49,420
1986	177,310	52,940

*Figures up to 1971 include single ethnicity. Figures for 1981 and 1986 include multiple ethnicity (those who claimed Greek as one of their multiple ethnic origins).

Source: Statistics Canada, Immigration Statistics, 1871-1986.

During the peak of the immigration to Quebec from 1950-60, travel agencies were instrumental in their mediation between the sponsors in Montreal and the immigration and transportation agencies. They helped the sponsors every step of the way: filling out the application forms, going with them to the immigration offices, translating and guaranteeing the loans for the immigrants' fares. Their head offices in Greece assisted the candidates through the screening process, passport acquisition, and embarkation. And upon their arrival in Canada, the agencies were the only entities that could help the immigrants make sense of their new world, translate papers for them, and give them

advice for action. They also helped many immigrants find a job. These agencies became the immigration brokers.

There are about twenty-two Greek travel agencies in the greater Montreal area today. Some were established thirty years ago. They were first established in Greece and then branched off into Montreal. By facilitating and encouraging travel to Greece, they keep immigrants in constant touch with their homeland and help them reestablish ties and reaffirm their ethnic identity. The travel agencies still mediate today in the issuance of visas, passports, and travel and citizenship documents; they translate government documents, provide the immigrants with all sorts of information, and prepare income tax returns. Thus, through necessity and practice, the agencies have become the unofficial mediators between the immigrants and their new society.

The Settlement—The Immigrants

The accurate number of Greeks in Canada, and especially in Montreal, today is a much-debated issue among the leadership of the Greek community. Figures quoted will depend upon the source used.

However, Statistics Canada reported that 124,480 individuals of Greek origin were living in Canada in 1971. Of those, 42,865 were living in Quebec, whereas 67,030 were living in Ontario. These figures indicate the number of individuals who in the 1971 census reported that they, or their ancestors, were Greek (enumeration by ethnic origin). Reporting on mother tongue for the same census year, however, there were 104,455 with Greek as their mother tongue in Canada in 1971. Of these, 38,970 were living in Quebec and 55,440 in Ontario. The difference for Canada of 20,024 (or 19 percent) can be attributed to those who did not report Greek as their first language, or simply preferred reporting English/French as their mother tongue (an action usually attributed to children filling out the census forms instead of their parents), but who still had Greek lineage. The 1986 census lists 177,315 individuals of Greek origin, 33,570 of whom indicate multiple ethnicity (Greek being one of those). Of that number, 52,935 were living in Quebec and 98,505 in Ontario. Table 5 and Table 6 show a comparative picture of

Table 5
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF GREEKS IN CANADA BY SEX
(Ethnic Origin)
1971 - 1981

	Population					
	1971			1981		
Geographical Area	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
Canada	124,480	65,480	59,000	154,360	80,360	74,000
Quebec	42,865	22,350	20,515	49,415	25,740	23,675
Ontario	67,030	35,115	31,915	85,955	44,280	41,675
Newfoundland	105	50	55	30	15	15
Prince Edward Island	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nova Scotia	1,220	635	585	1,695	835	860
New Brunswick	335	180	155	360	235	125
Manitoba	2,095	1,160	935	2,385	1,335	1,050
Saskatchewan	900	535	365	1,225	640	585
Alberta	3,245	1,780	1,465	4,820	2,720	2,100
British Columbia	6,615	3,630	2,985	8,390	4,510	3,880
Yukon	25	20	5	30	20	10
N.W.T.	35	25	10	65	35	30

Source: Statistics Canada, 1971, 1981 #92-723.

TABLE 6
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION HAVING GREEK AS MOTHER TONGUE
1971 - 1981

	Population					
	1971			1981		
Geographical Area	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
Canada	104,455	55,000	49,455	123,230	63,800	59,430
Quebec	38,970	20,235	18,735	44,080	22,765	21,315
Ontario	55,440	29,190	26,250	65,305	33,460	31,845
Newfoundland	50	30	20	—	—	—
Prince Edward Island	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nova Scotia	865	465	400	1,185	595	590
New Brunswick	155	100	55	—	—	—
Manitoba	1,775	1,010	765	1,945	1,020	925
Saskatchewan	740	410	330	880	490	390
Alberta	1,890	1,035	855	3,555	2,040	1,515
British Columbia	4,500	2,475	2,025	5,930	3,225	2,705
Yukon	20	15	5	—	—	—
N.W.T.	30	20	10	—	—	—

Source: Statistics Canada, 1971 #92,723 and 1981 #92,911, Vol. 1.
Note: Mother Tongue: First language learned and still speaking.

TABLE 7

PERMANENT EMIGRATION FROM GREECE TO CANADA BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION 1970-1976

Geographic Region	Percent of Total Emigration 1970	1974	1976
	%	%	%
Greater Athens	31	33	37
Rest of Central Greece & Euboea	7	6	7
Peloponnesos	22	23	19
Ionian Islands	2	3	3
Epirus	1	1	1
Thessaly	6	5	4
Macedonia	16	14	14
Thrace	1	—	—
Aegean Islands	6	5	5
Crete	3	4	3
Undeclared	5	6	7
Grand Total	3,851	2,542	923

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1971, Table II:26; 1975, Table II:38; 1977, Table II:39.

— 1977 was the last year that emigration statistics were published by Greece for region.

Greeks in Canada in 1971 and 1981 by mother tongue and by sex, with their settlement pattern across Canada.

The regional composition of the immigrants includes Greeks from all parts of Greece, with a predominance from Lakonia and Arkadia in the south, Florina and Kastoria in the north, and the islands. There are also some Greeks from Egypt, Turkey, and Cyprus. The majority of immigrants come from rural and semiurban villages and towns, unskilled and illiterate. In Greece, they were part of a closely knit community where their social life centered around the church, their extended families, and immediate friends and neighbors. Table 7 shows immigrants to

Canada from the different regions of Greece and for selected years since 1970.

There are no Greek statistical figures for immigrants leaving for Canada for the years prior to 1970. However, Vlachos (1975) reports that for the years from 1955 to 1969, Macedonia, greater Athens, the Peloponnesos, and Thrace accounted for the bulk of permanent overseas emigration from Greece, approximately 67 percent to 74 percent.

Although one can easily see the rural characteristics of Greek immigrants from these data, one should also keep in mind that the concept of urbanism (urban lifestyles, value systems, personalities, and patterns of relationship and organizations) does not necessarily equate with the statistical definition of the urban region (population size and economic activity). Lifestyles, values, sociocultural and personality systems in most regions in Greece resemble those of the Greek rural areas more than those of North American urban centers. Thus the socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of the Greeks coming to Canada were relatively homogeneous and rural in nature, regardless of the region of origin. The general picture of Greeks in Quebec during this period of heavy migration, and well into the 1970s, was that of the "urban villager," a term first used by H. J. Gans to refer to individuals living in urban slums, usually "European immigrants... who try to adapt their non-urban institutions and cultures to the urban milieu" (p. 4). In describing the Greeks, the term could be used to emphasize their rural socioeconomic and cultural characteristics. They arrived with few or no skills, with low education, and without financial resources. However, in time, they succeeded in developing urban structures and organizations to help them maintain a rural culture and a high level of Greek ethnic identity. To survive, they were forced to acquire urban skills and respond to urban demands. Today they have established a multitude of urban institutions to help them maintain their culture and ethnic structures.

Since the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, however, a new type of immigrant has come to Canada and Quebec. Returning migrant laborers from Western Europe to Greece found conditions in their homeland not suited to their expectations

and aspirations, especially when it is estimated that over 250,000 returned during that period. The 1967 seizure of power by a military dictatorship led Greece to economic stagnation and political uncertainty and fear. Furthermore, the economic decline of the migrant-worker importing nations of Western Europe pushed them out of their industrial centers. As a result, many of these migrant laborers immigrated to Canada and other countries. These new arrivals, although not numerous enough to effect a significant change in the collective picture of the Greeks in Canada, had different characteristics from those arriving in earlier periods. They were more educated, more skilled—being trained in the industrial centers of Europe—and had been exposed to an urban environment comparable to that of North America.

Although predominantly rural in origin, Greeks tend to settle in urban areas. Of the 154,360 Greeks in Canada in 1981, 151,150 were living in urban areas, with 130,210 (86 percent) in cities with populations of 500,000 or more. The total size of the Greek population in greater Montreal in 1981 was 48,255, or 98 percent of the Greeks in Quebec. Of these, 25,005 were males and 23,250 were females. Thus when one talks of the Greeks in Quebec, one essentially talks of the Greeks in Montreal.

The Greek group in Canada is a relatively young group. In 1971, 74 percent were aged less than 45 years and the aging index (65 years and over/14 years and less) for the group was only 0.11 compared to 0.24 for the Canadian population as a whole and 0.45 for the Greek population in Greece at the time. The aging indices for the ethnic group in 1981 were 0.16 for both Canada and Montreal, whereas the corresponding indices for Greece and Canada were 0.54 and 0.43, respectively. Table 8 and Table 9 show the age distribution by sex of Greeks in Canada, Quebec, and Montreal for 1981.

Residentially, the majority of Greeks in Montreal today are concentrated in the low-rent, low-income area that lies between St. Lawrence Boulevard, Mount Royal Park, Park Avenue, Lacadie, and Metropolitan Boulevard.

When the first waves of immigrants arrived in the 1950s, they settled in the Great Divide of the Two Solitudes (English and French) and the mainly immigrant corridor of St. Lawrence Boulevard, which has served as the receiving area for most of

Table 8
DISTRIBUTION OF GREEKS IN CANADA BY AGE AND SEX
(Ethnic Origin)
1971-1981

	1971			1981		
Age Category (Years)	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
TOTAL	124,287	65,477	58,810	154,770	80,370	74,400
Less than 15	39,450	20,480	18,970	43,040	22,025	21,015
15-19	7,745	3,710	4,035	13,930	7,080	6,850
20-24	10,880	4,940	5,940	11,170	5,505	5,665
25-29	12,965	7,045	5,920	11,365	5,445	5,920
30-44	35,485	20,220	15,265	39,335	21,165	18,170
45-54	8,620	4,680	3,940	20,615	11,855	8,760
55-64	5,105	2,475	2,630	8,575	4,375	4,200
65 and over	4,037	1,927	2,110	6,740	2,920	3,820

Source: Statistics Canada, 1971 #92-731, 1981 #92-911, Vol. 2.

TABLE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF GREEKS IN QUEBEC AND MONTREAL BY AGE AND SEX

(Ethnic Origin)

1981

	Montreal			Quebec		
Age Category (Years)	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
TOTAL	48,245	24,995	23,250	49,410	25,735	23,675
Less than 15	13,255	6,875	6,380	13,560	7,050	6,510
15-19	4,785	2,485	2,300	4,860	2,525	2,335
20-24	3,395	1,640	1,755	3,485	1,690	1,795
25-29	2,935	1,365	1,570	3,055	1,460	1,595
30-44	11,895	6,340	5,555	12,205	6,555	5,650
45-54	7,310	4,030	3,280	7,440	4,125	3,315
55-64	2,530	1,400	1,130	2,625	1,450	1,175
65 and over	2,140	860	1,280	2,180	880	1,300

Source: Statistics Canada, 1981 #92-911, Vol. 1.

the immigrants arriving in Montreal. As time passed, they gradually moved to the Saint Louis du Park area in the late 1950s and "invaded" Park Avenue, "succeeding" the Jews who for years were the dominant ethnic group in that district. In recent years, as they have gained some economic flexibility and security, they have started moving to Laval, South Shore, Montreal North, South West, and to the West Island. They are leaving the Park Avenue-Park Extension area to other ethnic groups, such as Pakistanis and West Indians, which are slowly moving in. It is interesting to note here the pattern of internal migration of Greeks in greater Montreal. They basically follow the chain migration pattern, as a "family" or "village" affair. When one member of a family moves to another district, other members, friends, and fellow villagers soon follow. Thus when they move, their basic community structures move as well, so that they soon form new community centers in the new districts.

In summary, then, Greek immigration to Canada and Quebec becomes dominant in the years between 1950 and 1970. The Greeks came as individuals at the beginning, and as entire families later on. They came mainly for economic reasons and better opportunities for themselves and their children, pushed out of Greece by the devastation of war, poverty, political instability, and governmental incompetence. They brought with them their rural values and structures, which they selectively maintain in the urban centers of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. They established organizations and structures to help them maintain their culture and ethnic identity. In Montreal alone, there are more than 120 ethnic organizations.

It is important to note, however, that in 1981 there were only 287 new immigrants arriving in Montreal. Emigration from Greece has dried up, and, in fact, a lot of immigrants are returning to Greece. And unless some unforeseen disaster occurs in Greece to force the population out, one should consider new immigration virtually closed. Such an event will have tremendous cultural and social impact on the Greek communities in Quebec and Canada as a whole. As the bulk of Greek immigration to Canada took place in the Fifties and Sixties, the Greek community in Montreal will be entering a new era during the Nineties: the era in which, for the first time, the majority of

Greeks in Canada will be Canadian-born, with significantly higher levels of education, occupation, and income than those of their immigrant parents. Until the present, research (Chimbos, Gavaki, O'Bryan *et al.*, Reitz, Thomas) shows that Greeks in Canada have maintained very high levels of ethnic identity.

The rise of French nationalism and the separatist movement in Quebec have placed the ethnic communities in Quebec in a different relationship with the larger society than that experienced by immigrants elsewhere in North America. Until the early 1970s, immigrants in Quebec were directed into the English-speaking labor market, school system, and cultural milieu. Since the middle of the 1970s, however, and the rise to power of the Parti Québecois, there have been systematic efforts and policies to change the flow of immigrant absorption into French society. And as new immigration from Greece has come to an end, and as the socioeconomic profile of the community is significantly changing at the present, one wonders whether Greeks will continue to maintain their community organizations, ethnic identity, and strong ethnic and cultural ties. What impact will Quebec's independence (if and when it comes) have on the Greek Montreal? The role that Greece will choose to play in its relationship to the Greeks in the Diaspora must be seriously considered as a major force of reinforcement (or lack thereof) of Greek culture and Hellenism abroad.

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A Preliminary Report about Greek Students Abroad

by JIM KOUTRELAKOS

Although education in Greece is both highly regarded and extensively debated, the use of research methodology to assess it is a recent development. S. Sakka-Paraskeva states that lack of research funds and trained personnel has impeded the scientific examination of education in Greece.[1]

The few studies that have been conducted attempt to provide data for educational reform and to obtain information on how students felt about the education they received. Also, they attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of new methodologies in the classroom. None of these studies was concerned with the substantial number of Greek students who go abroad for advanced training. Although their number and talent would indicate that they make substantial contributions to Greek industry and society, there is a striking lack of information on them.

This study was conducted to begin building a profile of Greek students who study abroad. A number of variables were examined: age, sex, years of schooling in Greece, age upon leaving Greece, basic skills (measured by tests constructed in English), grades, and career choices. The study sought to compare Greek students with other foreign-born and native-born students attending the same university.

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METHOD

A large, public college with low tuition, offering a diverse curriculum stressing the liberal arts, was chosen as an appropriate institution at which to begin gathering data for the student profile. The college attracts a student body of which over one-third is foreign-born and more than one-half is ethnic (black, Hispanic, or Asian). All new students are given placement tests in reading, writing, problem solving (Math 1), and computation (Math 2) before registering for classes. More than 60 percent consistently score low on one or more skill areas and are assigned to remedial courses.

Research Participants

A questionnaire was given to all students who came for placement tests before registering for the fall 1985 term. Participation was anonymous and voluntary; 95 percent of the students completed the questionnaire.

The sample contained a little over 2,500 students who registered, 36 percent of these foreign-born. The foreign-born group contained 24 students born in Greece. This sample was expanded by 32 Greek students who had entered the college prior to fall 1985 and agreed to complete the questionnaire. Since the two subgroups of Greek students were sampled by a different procedure, they were first examined to see if they differed from one another. On the variables chosen (age, sex, and placement-test scores), the two subgroups did not differ, and they were therefore combined into a total sample of 56. In the analyses of students' career choices, an additional 14 Greek students were added to this sample, making a total of 70.

Since Greek students are required to take more classes in mathematics prior to college than are native-born students, it was predicted that they would score higher on the math tests. Based on observations, it was also predicted that Greek students' career choices would show a narrower range of choices and be more focused in investigative careers.

Data Analysis

The total number of research participants was divided into three subgroups: Greek students, other foreign students, and native-born students. This permitted comparing the Greek group with other foreign groups, which face the same problems encountered by students who receive university-level training in a country foreign to them. It also allows comparing them to native-born students. The statistics used tested the significance of the differences between means. Multivariate statistical procedures will be used in a later phase of analysis.

RESULTS

Demographic Description

This is limited to the present Greek research participants since it is doubtful that it is representative of Greek students who study abroad. The demographic variables, however, can be used to compare the three groups. These variables are also of interest since they have often been found to be related to academic success.

Age. The Greek sample is younger than both the foreign and native samples ($p < .001$ and $p < .03$). The differences are very small and may result from the small size of the Greek sample (see Table 1).

The mean age of Greek students when they came to the USA differs significantly from the mean age of the other foreign students (14½ years vs. 14 years). Obviously, both samples consist of some students with immigrant status and some with foreign-student status.

Sex. The Greek sample has an almost equal proportion of males and females (52 percent vs. 48 percent), and this is in contrast to the other groups, which have a lower proportion of males (27 percent and 25 percent). In prior student surveys, a higher proportion of females (70 percent to 80 percent) was consistently found in the total student body (Koutrelakos, 1979). The disproportionate number of females has been thought to

TABLE 1
Description of Research Participants

Variables		Groups 1 Greek-Born	2 Native-Born	3 Other Foreign-Born	t tests 1 vs 2	1 vs 3	2 vs 3
Number		55	1572	928			
Age	X	20.25	21.07	21.69	.030	.001	.03
	SD	2.4	6.3	6.5			
Sex—% Male		52	27	25			
Family Income—							
a) Under $15,000		54	35	58			
b) $15,000-$24,999		22	27	241			
c) $25,000-$34,999		18	19	09			
d) $35,000-$44,999		2	09	05			
e) $45,000 plus		4	10	04			
	X	2.70	3.23	2.53	.01	N.S.	.001
	SD	1.8	1.44	1.26			
Father's Education							
1 8 years or less		52	12	18			
2 9 through 12 years		24	48	45			
3 13 through 16 years		17	28	26			
4 17 years plus		7	12	11			
	X	9.46	12.85	12.11	.001	.001	.001
	SD	5.04	3.84	4.51			
Mother's Education							
1 8 years or less		55	10	19			
2 9 through 12 years		36	53	47			
3 13 through 16 years		5	28	20			
4 17 years plus		4	9	14			
	X	7.81	12.59	11.45	.001	.001	.001
	SD	3.61	2.76	4.03			

result from the college's curriculum, which emphasizes the liberal arts and provides preparatory training in a number of social-service careers, such as teaching and nursing. The higher proportion of males in the Greek sample may result from the sampling procedure used or from a different pattern of career choices among these students.

TABLE 2
Academic Preparation and Grade-Point Average

Variables		Groups 1 Greeks	2 Natives	3 Other Foreigners	t tests 1 vs 2	1 vs 3	2 vs 3
Math 1	X	32.78	34.29	36.69	N.S.	N.S.	.001
	SD	7.95	7.97	9.03			
% Remedial		35	37	54			
Math 2	X	28.71	27.65	26.40	N.S.	.05	.001
	SD	6.78	7.54	8.50			
% Remedial		29	32	40			
Reading	X	26.07	31.69	25.49	.001	N.S.	.001
	SD	7.07	6.51	8.11			
% Remedial		50	20	52			
Writing	X	6.27	7.37	6.06	.001	N.S.	.001
	SD	1.53	1.76	1.86			
% Remedial		67	40	70			
Grade-Point Average	X	2.78	2.76	2.75	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
	SD	0.75	0.85	0.81			

Family Income. The two foreign samples, Greek and non-Greek, do not differ in their family's income (see Table 2). Both groups have a lower family income than the native-born group ($p < .003$ and $p < .001$). Since the native-born students attending the college are primarily of lower or lower-middle economic class, this finding indicates that, for the most part, the foreign students come from an even lower economic level.

Father's Education. The fathers of Greek students have less education than the fathers in the other two groups: 9.5 years vs. 12.6 and 12.3 years, respectively ($p < .001$, in both instances).

Mother's Education. Greek students also report their mothers as having had less education than the other two groups: 7.8 years vs. 12.6 and 11.5 years ($p < .001$, in both instances).

Academic Preparation

Problem Solving. On the Math 1 test, Greek students score lower than the native-born group, but the difference is insignificant. The proportion in each group assigned to remedial courses is also very similar (35 percent vs. 37 percent). The higher scoring of the native-born group is significant when compared to the other foreign students ($p < .001$). Although the higher score of the Greek group is not significant when compared to the other foreign group, the proportions in the two groups assigned to remedial work is better for the Greek group (35 percent vs. 53 percent).

Computational Skills. Greek students gained the highest score on the Math 2 test. Although their mean is not significantly higher than the mean of the native-born group, it is significantly higher than that of the other foreign group ($p < .05$). The Greek sample also has the smallest proportion assigned to remedial work (29 percent vs. 32 percent and 40 percent).

Verbal Skills. As expected, Greek students, like the other foreign students, score lower than the native students on both the reading and writing tests ($p < .001$, in both tests). The proportions assigned to remedial work in both foreign groups is very similar: about 50 percent in reading and over two-thirds in writing.

Academic Performance

Student grade-point averages were used as indexes of their academic performance. To compute this average, the grades of A, B, C, D, and F are assigned the values of 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0, respectively. The three groups did not differ in grade-point averages.

Career Choice

Decision. As shown in Table 3, a larger percentage of students from the Greek sample had decided about their career

TABLE 3
Careers: Popular Choices and Categories

	Groups: 1 Greeks		Groups: 2 Natives		Groups: 3 Other Foreigners
A Decided	81		65		66
B Popular Choices					
Computer Science	17	Nursing	19	Nursing	15
Medicine	14	Computer Science	7	Computer Science	9
Teaching	12	Physical Therapy	5	Accounting	6
Communications	9	Psychology	5	Medicine	6
Medical/Laboratory-		Medicine	5	Psychology	4
Technology	7	Computer Science	4	Teaching	4
Economics	4	Accounting	4	Physical Therapy	3
Dentistry	3				
Percentage of Total	66		49		47
C Categories					
Artistic	3		13		7
Enterprising	7		12		16
Investigative	57		25		34
Social Service	30		44		38
Other	3		6		5

Note: Numbers are in percentages.

plans as opposed to native and other foreign samples (83 percent vs. 65 percent and 66 percent).

Range of Careers. Student career choices were examined for breadth and focus. From a list of 55 possible career choices, Greek students' choices ranged across 20 careers. In contrast, the native students' choices ranged across 36 careers and the other foreign students' choices ranged across 29 careers. Also, as shown in section B of Table 3, the seven most popular choices made by Greek students make up a larger proportion of the sample than the seven most popular choices in the other two samples (70 percent vs. 41 percent and 47 percent).

Career Categories. Students' career choices were grouped

according to Holland's Career Classification System: 1) Artistic—originality and creativity; 2) Enterprising—initiative and leadership; 3) Investigative—analyzing and problem solving, and 4) Social Services—helping others.[2] As shown in section C of Table 3, Greek students have a different pattern of career choices than native and other foreign students. Greek students have a higher concentration in investigative careers, while a relatively small proportion plan to enter careers from the social service category.

DISCUSSION

Family income and parental educational level are indexes of the quality of family life experienced by students. These variables are important, for they have been found to have a positive association with students' academic success.[3] As expected, foreign-born students have parents with a lower income and educational level. The lower educational level of Greek parents was not anticipated. Most likely this finding reflects the disruption of education in Greece caused by World War II and the civil war that followed.

The extremely low educational level of Greek parents indicates that Greek college students experience an even greater generation gap than is usually found among upwardly mobile groups. This gap is probably fostered further for students who study abroad, since they become bicultural and have many experiences that their parents do not share. In these circumstances parents' functionality becomes reduced: their base of experience is not sufficiently relevant to the educational problems students often experience. It would be worthwhile to study the sources of information and advice that are used by students and to assess the need for more adequate secondary and higher education advisory systems.

Foreign students' lower performance on tests of verbal skills was also expected. The expectation that Greek students would score higher than other students on math tests was only partially substantiated. Their mean scores on both math tests did not differ significantly from those of the native students. They did, however, gain the highest score on the computational

test, and the difference between their score and that of the other foreign students was significant.

As previously noted, the three groups differ significantly in terms of family characteristics: Greek students come from families with lower income than do native students, and their parents' educational level is lower than the level observed in the other two groups. The present comparison does not take into account this Greek disadvantage, and there is need for further examination of this issue using multivariate statistical techniques and possibly an expanded Greek sample. Most likely studies that control for family characteristics and test students in their native language would show that Greek students do better in math than students in many other countries. International differences have been observed by L. C. Combes and J. P. Keeves, but unfortunately this study did not include a sample of Greek students.[4]

The academic performance of Greek students, as measured by their grade-point averages, does not differ from that of other students. This also needs further examination. Greek students show a high concentration in investigative careers requiring advanced courses in the natural sciences and mathematics. These courses are often among the most difficult courses in the curriculum. Also, test scores and grades need to be evaluated in terms of Greek students' lower standing on background variables such as family income and parents' education. The present analysis does show that in spite of their disadvantages, Greek students do as well as other students with regard to grade-point averages. This observation is in keeping with B. C. Rosen's conclusion. After examining the child-rearing practices of a number of ethnic groups, he decided that the highest level of need achievement was fostered by Greek and Jewish mothers.[5]

Academic preparation for university training is inadequate for both the Greeks and the other foreign students. The high incident of assignment to remedial courses has been found consistently among foreign-born students.[6] The need to take these courses slows students' progress through the core curriculum, which all students must take, and consequently extends the time and expense involved in completing the requirements for a degree. The most obvious need is to improve verbal skills. Most likely this weakness plays a role in Greek students' differential per-

formance on the two math tests: the problem-solving test requires a higher level of language skills than does the test of computational skills. One immediate application of this finding would be to have the vocabulary and syntax of mathematics included in foreign-language courses for students planning to study abroad.

Greek students' career choices, as expected, appear to be oriented toward investigative careers. It is possible that their choices are guided by a realistic assessment of job opportunities. This possible interpretation needs confirmation, and other influences need to be studied. Limitations in verbal skills seem significantly to influence students to avoid highly verbal professions such as law. Most likely students are also influenced by what has been accepted as traditional (medicine and teaching) and what is highly advertised (computer science). Since modernization typically brings a rapid expansion of personnel in social-service careers, the present pattern of career choices may not meet all the employment needs of the rapidly changing economy in Greece.

The present findings, although of interest in themselves, are possibly more significant because of the various issues they raise and the lines of inquiry they suggest.

NOTES

[1]S. Sakka-Paraskeva, "Educational Psychology Research in Greece," *Contemporary Educational Psychology* 9 (1984), pp. 214-228.

[2]Holland's other categories were not used.

[3]T. Husen, *International Study of Achievement in Mathematics* (New York: John Wiley, 1967), pp. 302-303.

[4]L. C. Combes and J. P. Keeves, *Science Education in Nineteen Countries* (New York: John Wiley, 1973), pp. 154-185.

[5]B. C. Rosen, "Race, Ethnicity and Achievement Syndrome," *American Sociological Review* 24 (1959), pp. 47-60.

[6]James Koutrelakos, "Student Profile Survey: Foreign-born Students" (unpublished manuscript, Hunter College, CUNY-Student Services, 1981), p. 29.

APPENDIX I
PLACEMENT TESTS

Math 1 — Mathematical Concepts and Application. This test consists of 45 word problems involving arithmetic and some algebra. The problems are solved in two steps and require reasoning. More language comprehension is involved on this test than in Math 2.

Math 2 — This test consists of 40 routine computational tasks: half are arithmetic problems and half require algebra. Minimal language skills are required.

Reading — A measure of students' ability to understand what they read. Students read paragraphs and answer questions testing one of the following: understanding main ideas, understanding direct statements, and drawing inferences.

Writing — Students are required to write an essay on an assigned topic. Students are told to express their thoughts clearly, to organize their ideas, and that correct grammar and sentence structure are important. Their essays are corrected by two instructors in the English department. If they disagree on the grade to be given, a third instructor reads the essay.

APPENDIX II

Career Choices: Greek, Native, and Other Foreign

Choice[1]	Greek-Born (N = 81)	Groups Native-Born (N = 65)	Other Foreign-Born (N = 66)
Accounting	1.7	5.8	8.9
Archeology	1.7	0.0	0.0
Biology	8.6	1.5	1.3
Business Administration	0.0	1.6	1.8
Computer Science	17.2	6.0	14.1
Communication Science	0.0	.4	0.0
Communications	8.6	4.4	1.5
Community Health	0.0	.5	.3
Community Service	0.0	.1	0.0
Dance	0.0	.5	.5
Dentistry	3.4	.4	1.1
Dietetics	0.0	1.2	.7
Engineer	0.0	1.4	1.5
Environmental Health	0.0	.1	0.0
Finance and Economics	3.4	.5	1.6
Fine Arts	1.7	.6	.2
Graphic Arts	0.0	.7	.3
Journalism	0.0	3.7	1.8
Languages and Interpreter	1.7	.8	2.3
Law	0.0	3.5	2.6
Librarian	0.0	.1	.3
Marketing and Sales	1.7	.2	.3
Math and Statistics	1.7	.2	.2
Medical Computer Science	0.0	.2	0.0
Medical Laboratory Science	6.9	1.5	2.3
Medical Record Adm.	0.0	.3	.2
Medicine	13.8	7.0	8.5
Music	0.0	1.4	.3
Nursing	1.7	16.3	22.6
Physical Therapy	0.0	7.5	4.3
Psychology	1.7	7.1	5.9
Public Administration	5.2	.3	.2
Research	1.7	.1	.2
Social Work	0.0	2.2	1.8
Teaching	12.1	10.5	5.4
Theater and Film	3.4	4.7	1.6
Veterinarian	0.0	.8	.3
Other	2.1	5.9	5.1
Choice Range	20	37	33

[1]Results are for those students who had decided on a career.
Note: Numbers are in percentages.

The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949

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Before an attempt to examine the nature of civil-military relations in Greece between 1940-49 is made, a rephrasing of this essay's title is necessary. "The military as a sociopolitical force," we feel, reverses the appropriate order of approaching our subject. The impact of political and social change on institutions should have priority over the effect of transformed institutions on society and politics.

The officer corps began to deviate systematically from its expected function only after certain important social changes began to occur in Greece. Whereas throughout the nineteenth century the military never acted as an autonomous corporate body, the period between the world wars was marked by military interventions.[1] Although the scope of most interwar coups was limited to redressing grievances, promoting professional interests, or replacing one civilian order with another, officers became for a while the ever-present arbiters of the struggles between the Conservative and Liberal parties, while at the same time being controlled by them to a large degree.

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The "subjective" control[2] of civilians over the military speeded up the politicization of the officer corps, a phenomenon greatly enhanced by the crisis between crown and parliament in 1915-17. Officers betrayed unprecedented availability to political enticements because their social structure was altered by the political and social changes that transpired between 1912 and 1923. An increase in the military academy's admissions and the introduction of free tuition in 1917 opened up the military career to the less advantaged classes while discouraging more prominent members of society. The officer corps, which had been widened to meet war demands, contracted, thus threatening the least secure (in professional terms) with early retirement.

At the same time, the social transformation caused by the aggrandizement of Greek territory, inflow of diaspora capital, and the impact of refugees, broadened and pluralized political participation in Greece. The massive entrance of new participants in the political game posed an extraordinary challenge to parliamentary democratic institutions. The process of incorporating the newcomers into what had been a rather closed and fairly homogeneous system did not fail to affect the military.

N. Mouzelis's observations on the "demise of oligarchic rule in the parliamentary semi-periphery"[3] include the professionalization of the Greek officer corps in accordance with Western prototypes:

> One of the results of the army's modernization in the parliamentary semi-periphery, combined as it was with quantitative growth and the officers being recruited increasingly from non-oligarchic strata, was that it weakened the nineteenth-century fusion of civilian and military elites that had been based on a shared aristocratic background and/or orientation. This in turn meant that officers in the nineteenth century had tended to intervene in politics as individuals (that is, without strong feelings of corporate identity); during the first few decades of the twentieth century they did so as a relatively cohesive interest group with specific professional demands and with a predominantly middle-class anti-oligarchic outlook.[4]

The Greek military was therefore permeated by the cleavages among politicians. Whether Venizelists or anti-Venizelists, politicians held sway over their own officer clients and consolidated their rise to power with dismissals of their adversary's military supporters. "Subjective" control by parliamentarians was associated with strife among the two contending political camps. King George, the force behind the Metaxas dictatorship, exerted his personal control over an ideologically homogeneous and compliant officer corps purged of prominent Venizelists in 1935.

With the occupation of Greece, members of the Greek government fled to London and Cairo, while traditional political leaders exhibited a singular inability to come to terms with new realities.[5] Preoccupied with the constitutional question after liberation, they abandoned the business of armed resistance against the Germans to EAM, to the British, and to smaller guerrilla bands and organizations. Of the old politicians, only a few chose to collaborate with the occupation forces, while some participated in and led the government-in-exile; the great majority did very little else than preserve themselves for a brighter parliamentary future as they ignored their unsavory present. George Kafandaris, the most respectable of interwar liberals, discouraged his followers from becoming involved with the resistance because he genuinely believed that Greece had given more than its share to the war effort and should desist from further activities that would obliterate it as a nation.[6]

Curiously enough, the one action that united politicians of the liberal and populist camps was an antiroyalist manifesto demanding a postwar plebiscite to decide the fate of the monarchy. This document was signed by leading figures of the liberal camp —Th. Sophoulis, G. Kafandaris, G. Papandreou, and A. Mylonas —as well as by leaders of the populist camp: P. Rallis, S. Stephanopoulos, and G. Chloros.[7] In effect, this exhibition of antimonarchical sentiments by politicians of both camps was partly meant to compensate for their relative passivity during the Metaxas dictatorship.

The breakdown of political authority in Greece had a profound effect on the military. Whether retired since 1935 or heroes of the Albanian front made idle by the demobilization of the Greek armed forces at home, officers who had been accustomed

to political control and direction were suddenly faced with a vacuum of legitimate authority. A significant reorientation of officers' attitudes was dictated by the spirit of defiance bred by resistance and the war effort. Some chose to join the forces in the Middle East and North Africa, but the majority remained in Greece and became part of the resistance or the security battalions, or did nothing.

The anomalies in the Greek armed forces, which were reconstituted in the Middle East under British supervision, had a profound effect on subsequent political developments in Greece. The uprisings of 1943 and 1944 signified the end of the Greek army as a force that could take an active part in the liberation of the country. Left-wing participants and historians still claim that the uprisings were provoked by the British in order to prevent the progressive forces in the army from liberating Greece.[8] Conservatives[9] (and liberals), on the contrary, believed that the coups were planned by the communists to prevent basically loyalist forces from reaching a Greece dominated by a left-wing resistance. Both positions are based on the premise that the true loyalty of the armed forces lay with their side and that it was to the advantage of their opponents to incapacitate them. This clear-cut appraisal of loyalties, however, fails to render the subtleties of the actual picture.[10]

The interwar cleavage between royalists and Venizelists was forcefully resolved in the aftermath of the 1935 coup with a wholesale purge of active Venizelist officers. The royalist monopoly of the army became the guarantee of the dictatorship backed by King George. It follows, therefore, that the position of the royalists in the Middle East forces was no more legitimate than that of their opponents who had been cashiered for seeking to overthrow a popularly elected government in 1935. The latter were forced into idleness during Greece's finest hour while their rivals in the officer corps reaped the glory of the Albanian campaign. The readmission of the purged officers by the Tsouderos government in 1942 was, consequently, charged with feelings of mutual bitterness.

In October 1941, the First Greek Brigade included 6000 men, 400 of whom were officers. This ratio was upset by the continuous arrival of officers from occupied Greece and

surpassed the ten-percent limit set by the government-in-exile. Rivalries in the officer corps were exacerbated by the ever-growing scarcity of commissions. Since royalists had reached the Middle East first, they held the most important commissions. A significant exception to this rule was the commander of the army, General Emmanuel Tsakanakis, a Venizelist of 1935 who had been readmitted and given his office by Prime Minister Tsouderos (also a Venizelist) as a gesture of reconciliation of old political feuds.

Soon royalists and liberals congregated in separate clubs, and members of the forces' secret society, "Nemesis," threatened the authorities with mass resignations if their opponents were not dismissed from active duty. In October 1941, liberals and republicans formed their own society, the "Antifascist Military Organization" (ASO), with chapters in the army and air force. Their goal was to rid the armed forces of royalists who refused to support the war effort; ultimately, they hoped to bring about a republican regime in a liberated Greece.

Supporters of ASO, in and out of the forces, exhibited (or rather harbored) a variety of political positions ranging from traditional liberal Venizelism to republicanism. In this extremely variant camp, Yannis Salas, a young communist who had escaped from the notorious Greek prison of Akronafplia in 1941 and joined the Royal Greek Army of the Middle East (VESMA) as a corporal, became the organization's moving force.[11] Although the British War Office and the Foreign Office expressed their concern over the developments in VESMA, on March 2, 1942, Foreign Secretary Eden and Tsouderos signed the final accord concerning the organization and use of the Greek forces. P. Kanellopoulos, a young liberal politician who had just arrived from Greece, became deputy prime minister in May 1942 and assumed the defense ministry. A political innocent with honorable intentions, he made some headway in improving the performance of the armed forces. He appointed a Venizelist, P. Katsotas, as commander of the First Brigade and gave command of the newly formed Second Brigade to another Venizelist, A. Bourdaras. He court-martialed some of the "Nemesis" officers who had handed in their resignations, and he took credit for the First Brigade's extraordinary contribution to the Battle of El Alamein.[12] These actions made Kanellopoulos a universal target. King George

considered his liberal inclinations dangerous to the crown, while royalist officers viewed him as their enemy, and even the republicans began to turn against him when he placed the two brigades under the general command of a conservative hero of the Albanian war, General Zygouris.

When Kanellopoulos decided to clamp down on the turbulent liberals, ASO members took swift action against him. Katsotas presented Kanellopoulos with ASO's demands that he purge the army of "reactionary elements" and restructure the cabinet to include the old Venizelist politician G. Roussos and B. Karapanayotes, a republican. Caught between liberal-left criticism and royalist displeasure, Kanellopoulos resigned in March 1943 and became the first serious casualty of those who strove to preserve the armed forces for the liberation of Greece.[13] The changes in the cabinet precipitated by the action of ASO gave it a decidedly liberal coloring. Roussos became deputy prime minister and Karapanayotes minister of defense.

ASO left-wingers criticized these changes as being mere window-dressing, but Salas preferred to bide his time, saying, "I am aware that a government with only centrist elements after the revolutionary action of the anti-fascist forces is a rightist deviation. . . . A leftist deviation [however] would only be the equivalent of a leap into chaos."[14] Less flexible and obsessed with his own grievances against Tsouderos, Karapanayotes (shortly before assuming office) prodded Salas to force the prime minister's resignation but was rebuffed. Salas reminded him that Karapanayotes's differences with Tsouderos were certainly less substantial than those between Salas and Karapanayotes, and he pointed out that he was not prepared to provoke British reaction at that juncture.[15] It appears that Salas considered Tsouderos's presence in the government a divisive influence among liberals and therefore useful to his own designs.

In July 1943, Karapanayotes was faced with renewed trouble in the Second Brigade and an escalation of ASO demands. His countermeasures effectively incapacitated the brigade as a fighting force but failed to put down ASO.[16] In August, EAM representatives P. Roussos, A. Tzimas, and K. Despotopoulos, along with E. Tsirimokos, came to Cairo bearing a message from Greece with wider political appeal. They asked that the king's return

after liberation be deferred until the issue of the monarchy was decided by a plebiscite. The representatives also instructed ASO to abstain from activities that would provoke British intervention and the dissolution of the army.[17] News of the formation of PEEA in the Greek mountains, however, made ASO more defiant. In the spring of 1944, the final act of the military troubles in the Middle East was played out. A delegation of officers representing a society called EASDO (National Military Liberation Organization) demanded of Tsouderos the formation of a government according to PEEA principles; its members were promptly arrested. ASO mobilized its forces against Tsouderos and caused his replacement by S. Venizelos. April proved to be the cruelest month for the Greek army.

Renewed demands by EASDO and the spread of rebellion into the navy brought the British into the picture. On April 7, the commander of the British forces, General B. Paget, informed the Greek minister of defense that he had assumed command of the Greek army and would quell the rebellion. Salas responded by sending two soldiers, Andriotes and Tsamatoulides, to spread the uprising to the hitherto peaceful First Brigade.[18] The brigade was preparing to embark for the allied offensive in Italy, but never reached its destination. Representatives of ASO demanded of its commander, Brigadier Pappas, to declare the unit in favor of PEEA; faced with his refusal, they raised the flag of rebellion. British action put an end to the uprising, however; it also undermined the Greek army as a credible force both for liberating Greece and for playing a role in subsequent political developments.

In the Lebanon conference of May 1944, the representatives of PEEA, EAM, and the KKE unanimously condemned the uprisings incapacitating the armed forces. Later, Zahariades intimated that the entire affair had been planned by the British. Andriotes, and more significantly Salas, however, dismissed the theory of British involvement.[19] The latter wrote in his March 1946 report to the KKE's political bureau: "Comrade Zahariades claimed . . . that the coup was the work of the British. Again I must tell you this is not correct. The uprising was the choice of the 'Kathodigisi' and first of all my own choice."[20]

Salas and his group's extraordinary influence on ASO was indicative of a new development in Greek civil-military relations.

Whereas the initial skirmishes between royalist and Venizelist officers in VESMA were inspired by the old royalist-liberal schism and directed toward settling professional scores, the new clash between right and left was based on entirely different premises. Privates and NCOs of ASO were often members of EAM or sympathetic to its cause, and they viewed their conflict with the Greek government-in-exile as part of an international class struggle. Their hold on ASO, although secret, exceeded the scope of "subjective" control exerted on the Greek military by the traditional parties. It is probable that most ASO officers had no clear picture of the real power structure of the organization, yet they accepted the supremacy of ASO's political leadership; after a while, however, it became clear that this was in the hands of privates and NCOs. Be that as it may, antiroyalist sentiments among Venizelist officers facilitated their transition from the old to the new cleavage.

At the beginning of the Axis occupation of Greece in April 1941, there were 4,390 Greek officers on active duty who were forced to retire by the German and Italian authorities.[21] Old feuds within their ranks or between certain groups of officers and political figures of the past determined their future allegiances. Some officers with an axe to grind against Metaxas and the king indirectly supported the position of the occupation government by criticizing the dictatorship's administration of the Albanian campaign. A well-respected Venizelist general, Dimitrios Katheniotis, who had failed to gain admission to active service in 1940, was one of several officers who were asked by the government of General Tsolakoglou to draft a report on the conduct of the war. In the summer of 1941, they were given access to reports from commanders on the front. Katheniotis gathered his material and belatedly published his own scathing conclusions under the titles *A History of the Military Operations, 1940-1941* (Athens, 1945) and *The Most Important Strategic Phases of the War, 1940-1941* (Athens, 1946).[22] Tsolakoglou's motive for commissioning such works was to prove the ineptitude of the Royal General Staff and to exonerate himself for having signed the armistice without orders from his superiors.

Dismissed republicans who joined the security battalions (founded by Prime Minister I. Rallis in the spring of 1943) were

among the least respectable of the Venizelist adherents. Their past in the army had been marked by political intrigue, and their view of professional security was somewhat more mercenary than average. In spite of their declared republicanism, they were clearly interested in making a new career in the army, which would have been impossible under a royalist government.[23] These individuals included Colonel Haralambos Papathanassopoulos, an old royalist conveniently turned fanatical Venizelist and a client of Plastiras in the twenties; Vassilios Dertilis of the notorious republican battalions which had brought Pangalos to power in 1925 and toppled him in 1926; and the ex-dictator himself, who, although he did not join the security battalions, urged some of his followers to do so. These individuals were all of weak character, or, in Pangalos's case, disoriented after several years in jail and political ostracism. Instead of placing too much emphasis on their dubious republicanism, we should perhaps emphasize their availability to practically any form of recruitment. As it turned out, their declared anticommunism served them better in the long run than their antiroyalism.

The end of the appeal of traditional parliamentary ideology in wartime Greek society was the outcome of various factors. The Metaxas dictatorship had prepared the way by disrupting, for a prolonged period, the channels of communication between political parties and their constituencies and, more significantly, depriving the parties of their power to dispense patronage. The hardships of occupation and the collapse of the economy had an unprecedented radicalizing effect on a nation of small property-owners who in the past had always resisted joining corporate movements.[24] Such developments could only increase the prestige and power of EAM-ELAS. As Nicos Svoronos points out:

> EAM's resistance activities, both political and military, as well as its social welfare efforts during the years of famine that decimated the urban population, attracted an ever-widening social spectrum. Its program and activities responded to the demands of a large segment of the popular and petit-bourgeois groups that were becoming more and more socially aware and radicalized. Moreover, in the countryside the political and cultural

activities of EAM contributed to the politicization of the peasants.[25]

The dynamics of the resistance movement, consequently, had wreaked havoc with the Venizelist faction of Greek officers. Initially the resistance offered these men an opportunity to prove their worth as soldiers—since many had been excluded by the Metaxas regime from active participation in the Albanian campaign—and the possibility of reinstatement in a postwar Greek army. By the autumn of 1943, EDES included approximately 900 officers, most of whom had been cashiered as a result of their participation in the coups of the 1930s. This, however, was not a constant figure, and both the number and the political affiliation of the officers in EDES reflected the fortunes of this organization during the occupation.[26] During these fluctuations, many Venizelists found refuge or a means of revenge by joining the security battalions, while others were attracted to the antimonarchist *raison d'être* of those forces.[27] They were replaced in EDES by royalists whose admission to EDES was facilitated by Zervas's reconciliation with the monarchy.[28] By 1944, the fading of EDES's republican complexion as well as the growing power and influence of EAM/ELAS had substantially increased the number of republican officers in the security battalions.[29]

The majority of officers who joined ELAS had also been cashiered by the Populist Party in 1935 and kept out of the Albanian war by Metaxas.[30] Most of them hated the dictator for that, while others despised him because his regime was sponsored by the king—the traditional opponent of their political camp—and not out of any strong commitment to parliamentary democracy. Several belonged to clandestine organizations that had attempted to topple the dictatorship and were therefore prepared for underground activities. Even before the outbreak of the Greek-Italian war, the British SOE had established contact with disgruntled, retired, or cashiered officers to prepare for resistance against a potential occupation of Greece by Axis forces. Colonel Bakirdzis, a leading Venizelist officer who had been implicated in several interwar coups, was an early link between the SOE and officers organizing resistance groups.[31] For such officers, occupation amounted to a change of authoritarian guard and presented

the opportunity for a wide patriotic front against the occupying forces.[32]

The royalist faction had, for the most part, maintained its ideological cohesiveness and identity as a group loyal to the monarchy and the social *status quo*. During the course of the occupation, this group, just as in the case of the Venizelists, had to deal with the phenomenon of resistance. The government of King George II had made no plans for the organization of a resistance movement to carry on the conflict after the government went into exile. At the beginning of the occupation, royalist officers who wished to fight were encouraged by the government-in-exile to join the Greek armed forces in the Middle East. Many of those who remained in Greece, however, followed the lead of Papagos and other senior royalist officers and abstained from any resistance activity.[33]

As a result, both EDES and ELAS acquired a considerable number of royalist officers. In the case of ELAS, the number remained at approximately 600, while it is very difficult to calculate the percentage of royalist officers in EDES.[34] One constant factor, however, was that as EDES units were dispersed and re-formed between 1943-44, new replacements came from the ranks of the royalist faction.[35] In addition, the smaller conservative groups forcibly dissolved by ELAS also included royalists who in 1944 turned to the security battalions as a means of containing and opposing the left-wing EAM/ELAS.[36]

Another important consideration is that the security battalions did not represent a uniform organization. The units established in Athens were organized by the Rallis government, while those assembled in the Peloponnese came into being as a direct result of the efforts of D. Papadogonas and others and reflected the political and ideological conflicts in this region.[37] Initially, the units in the Peloponnese and those of the Rallis government were separate; the former were simply called security battalions while those of the Rallis government were labeled Evzone Battalions.[38] Unlike the units raised in Attica and staffed by republicans, those of the Peloponnese were commanded by officers who opposed EAM/ELAS and were loyal to the monarchy.[39] Part of the catalyst leading to the armed clash of December 1944 included evidence that some former security battalion officers were to be rein-

stated in the army, as well as the knowledge that the Third Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion were to form the nucleus of the new national army.

In December 1944, these units were committed in the battle against ELAS along with British forces, but to ensure victory it was deemed necessary to employ former security battalion personnel.[40] According to Spais, 12,000 of the least noticeable and least known members of the battalions were deployed in national guard units.[41] By March 1945 the last officers and men of the security battalions had been released from detention and were serving with the national guard. During this time great care was taken to keep out of the national guard anyone involved with EAM/ELAS; those suspected of such affiliation were rejected on medical grounds. Officers, in particular, were carefully screened to weed out not only those who had served with ELAS but any who were known to subscribe to liberal sentiments.[42] The same process was also applied, at first indirectly and later quite openly, to the recruitment of officers and men for the new national army. According to Article V of the Varkiza agreement, the appointments of officers were to be made by a special military board. This did not apply, however, to the officers of the Third Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion.[43]

On the surface, the military boards set up by the Plastiras government seemed impartial. Between 1945-46, 221 officers who had served with ELAS were given appointments in the army, along with 228 officers who had been employed by the security battalions. In fact, the veteran ELAS officers were eventually placed on the inactive list, which allowed them to draw their salaries until they were officially retired. Plastiras attempted to use the boards to establish a greater representation of Venizelists in the senior levels of the officer corps, but he was out of touch with the new political sentiments of the republican military faction. According to W. H. McNeill, he appointed his personal friends and former republican allies to the top commands in the army; nevertheless, the officer corps was already becoming increasingly royalist. The republican officers who had remained outside the ranks of EAM/ELAS adopted a position of fervent anticommunism and looked upon the monarchy as the bulwark against the KKE.[44] Some, such as General K. Ventiris, the deputy chief of

staff, had become extremely right-wing and royalist in their political outlook. Ventiris, in particular, used his position to secure the recruitment of like-minded officers to the general staff and in this manner was able to influence appointments throughout the army.[45]

During this period, the officer corps was honeycombed with secret leagues and associations. The structure of many of these organizations was shadowy, and some only represented a loose collection of officers with common interests.

Ventiris led the Officers League, which was inclined to be monarchist in sentiment but opposed the Royalist League led by General Papagos. In 1945 the Officers League dominated the general staff and through Ventiris was able to control all army appointments.[46] The Papagos group had advanced during the Metaxas regime and commanded the Greek army during the Italian and German wars. In the postwar period, however, all its members were on the inactive list, and they believed that the return of the king would enable them to regain their positions in the army.[47] Another group closely associated with the Officers League but led by Colonel Tsakalotos was formed primarily from the veterans of the Rimini Brigade (Third Mountain Brigade), with career advancement as the main objective.[48]

The republicans also had their own group, drawing its membership from officers expelled during the abortive coups of the 1930s. Their leader was General Plastiras, and many republicans holding positions in the army owed their reinstatement to his tenure as prime minister in the winter of 1945. The majority of republican members were elderly officers closely affiliated with the Liberal Party who feared that a return to monarchy would mean the end of their employment.[49] Ultimately the most influential group was the Sacred Association of Nationalist Officers, known by its acronym as IDEA. IDEA was formed in late 1944 from the merger of two earlier organizations, ENA and TRIAINA.[50] ENA was created in the Middle East by royalist officers as a reaction to the democratization of the Greek armed forces, which had removed many right-wing officers from their positions to make room for republicans.[51] TRIAINA, on the other hand, was based in occupied Greece and functioned as an intelligence

organization against the Axis forces, but there is little information regarding its origin or composition.

The fact that the military hierarchy did not represent a unified body once again created opportunities for ambitious politicians to use the military groups affiliated with their parties as a means of securing the army's allegiance for their own political ends. The factions within the officer corps, in turn, maintained close ties with political parties in order to protect themselves from displacement by rival groups also patronized by politicians. This condition had plagued the officer corps since the national schism of 1915-17 and had been the main cause of the military division into royalist and Venizelist camps.

As mentioned earlier, these divisions had faded considerably during the occupation and were no longer a pivotal factor for the officer corps in the postwar period. The emergence of the left as a competing force in society was one factor, but the direct intervention of the British redefined the dynamics of the political and military relationship. The process began in June 1945 and was initiated by Admiral Voulgaris, the head of the "service government." Voulgaris was concerned that the army was falling under the control of right-wing officers led by Ventiris and that the only solution was to give the British Military Mission (BMM) executive authority over the organization of the armed forces. Reginald Leeper, the British ambassador, enthusiastically supported Voulgaris's proposal and urged the Foreign Office to comply with the request of the Greek prime minister.

The Foreign Office was reluctant to allow the BMM to assume executive power, but its objections were dispelled by the arguments of Leeper and Scobie as well as by the British chiefs of staff. The consensus of British officials was that unless the Greek armed forces became politically impartial, the British military commitment in Greece would be prolonged indefinitely. The Foreign Office, furthermore, provided the formula for the BMM's participation by suggesting that Voulgaris create a supreme military council responsible for the organization of the army and invite the chief of the BMM to serve as a nonvoting member. The other members of the council, however, would be given to understand that the advice of the chief of the BMM would prevail in military affairs, while in cases of disagreement, the Greek

prime minister and Leeper would mediate.[52] From the British perspective, the supreme military council would be responsible for the organization and appointment of senior Greek officers; the presence of the chief of the BMM would ensure that the military hierarchy would be placed beyond the control of Greek politicians.[53]

In September 1945 the new minister of defense, General Merenditis, began to implement the proposals of the Foreign Office by establishing a supreme military council and taking away the power of the general staff to make appointments. At the same time he attempted to purge the army of extreme right-wing officers and ordered an investigation of all former security battalion personnel. In the ensuing clash between the minister of defense and the general staff, the BMM supported the army while the government failed to stand by Merenditis, who subsequently resigned on September 28.[54] His successor, General Manetas, also attempted a purge of the officer corps and ordered the removal of officers associated with collaboration. The government of Sophoulis, in addition, passed an edict threatening to discipline severely any officer or other rank who was involved in political activity.[55] The BMM, however, regarded the actions of Manetas as politically motivated and objected to the removal of officers unless warranted by court-martial. Sophoulis, consequently, under pressure from Leeper and Rawlins, the head of the BMM, backed down and only insisted on the removal of Ventiris.[56] The disagreements between Manetas and the BMM continued until April 1946, but, despite some minor adjustments, the policy of the BMM prevailed and no major changes concerning the military were effected by the government. Manetas's successor, P. Mavromichalis, fared little better. Like the previous ministers of defense, Mavromichalis was ready to carry out extensive purges of the armed forces—only, in this case, he was eager to replace republican officers with those of solid monarchist backgrounds.[57]

The British Embassy and the BMM once again expressed their objections and disapproval of political interference with the military hierarchy. Mavromichalis, however, did not attempt to oppose British wishes and was anxious to cooperate. General Rawlins, consequently, used this opportunity to carry out a purge of his own. In conjunction with General Dromazos, the chief of

staff, a list was drawn up of officers slated for retirement or promotion. On Rawlins's recommendations, fifty colonels were retired and several major-generals were promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general. In addition, the government passed a law requiring all officers who kept the same rank for over ten years to retire. At the end of this process, twenty-eight generals, including Dromazos, were retired. G. M. Alexander suggests that this had the effect of removing from the higher ranks of the officer corps many of the elderly and no longer competent republicans appointed by Plastiras.[58]

It is not certain that the political parties' efforts to increase the number of officers in the military hierarchy sympathetic to their respective factions would have given them any greater control over the armed forces. The concerns of Greek officers did not revolve around the republican-royalist schism but were based on professional advancement and fear of the left.[59] The critical path toward the evolution of the officer corps as an autonomous organization proceeded regardless of any sentimental attachments to earlier political factions.[60] The BMM used its leverage to ensure that the officer corps did achieve independence from political interference, but at the same time the BMM guaranteed that the officer corps would evolve beyond the control of civilian authority and look first to the British and later to the Americans for guidance.

By the spring of 1947, the Greek army included seven divisions plus three brigades and three independent battalions, with a total complement of 90,000 men. These forces were not fully armed, however, and lacked adequate support units. In addition, the new military hierarchy carried out a thorough purge of the army, removing any known communists or those with left-wing sympathies. According to Tsakalotos, the recruits from the classes of 1937, 1938, and 1940 were drafted without examination of their political affiliations, while the first four divisions were organized from national guard units whose personnel was equally suspect. Accordingly, the new divisions included many untrustworthy and dangerous elements. First, states Tsakalotos, the communists were removed, followed by those belonging to EAM, cowards, and other unwanted individuals.[61] Many of these were released from line units and formed into labor battalions, while the com-

munists were interned in prison islands such as Makronisos.[62]

The wide-ranging purge of the new Greek divisions was one result of the growing power and independence of the new military hierarchy in 1946. Another factor was the paving of the way for IDEA to increase its activities and act as a pressure group within the officer corps. By the spring of 1946, IDEA was well established within the officer corps, and two of its leaders, G. Karagiannis and I. Karabotsos, were posted to the general directorate of the ministry of defense, using their positions to further the aims of their organization.[63] These aims included the establishment of an army leadership of pure "patriotic" and "nationalist" sentiments and the exclusion of officers sympathetic to the left.[64] Underlying these considerations, IDEA reflected the insecurities of many in the officer corps who subscribed to extreme right-wing views and feared that any reconciliation with the left would result in the loss of their positions. Their suspicions were vindicated, first by the demands of the left for a purge of the armed forces, later by the attempts of Plastiras to include republicans in the officer corps, and ultimately by the efforts of the BMM to include republicans as well as royalists in the reorganization of 1946. In order to style itself as an organization rising above politics, IDEA accepted into its ranks officers who first and foremost espoused the cause of anticommunism. As a result, IDEA came to represent the interests not only of royalists but of right-wing republican officers who now accepted the monarchy and whose ideology was compatible with the monarchist ideals. To achieve these goals, the leaders of IDEA infiltrated key positions in the army, using their influence to secure the promotion of their adherents and to recruit the services of other like-minded officers.[65]

To this end, in the summer of 1946, Karagiannis and Karabotsos persuaded the minister of defense to reinstate former officers who had served in the security battalions. The rationale for this action offered by Karagiannis was that these individuals were devoted anticommunists whose experience in counterinsurgency warfare was needed by the national army. The readmission of these officers into the regular army, we can speculate, also swelled the ranks of IDEA and reinforced anticommunist sentiment within the officer corps. The intervention of IDEA, furthermore, mani-

fested itself in support for rural right-wing groups, which were ultimately used as auxiliary units of the Greek army and gendarmerie.[66] Arming irregular units was opposed by the BMM, but this was viewed by IDEA as interference by the British.[67] The creation of these irregular formations in villages as well as in the countryside, made up of individuals sympathetic to the anticommunist fervor advocated by IDEA, often exacerbated local divisions but proved to be of insignificant strategic value. In addition, the Democratic Army often obtained arms by easily disarming these units.[68]

The effect of these developments, as well as the reorganization of the military hierarchy, had a negative impact on the organization and deployment of the Greek army during the Civil War. The strategy implemented by Markos Vaphiades, the commander of the Democratic Army, required the use of hit-and-run tactics by small mobile units while avoiding costly positional firefights with government forces. The Greek army, primarily made up of infantry and lacking adequate transport, was thus not able to respond quickly to insurgent penetrations. Indeed, even major operations designed to clear the insurgents from the northern mountain ranges, although inflicting serious casualties on the Democratic Army, were not decisive; after government forces were pulled back to their bases, the communists would return and occupy the same territory.

The strategy developed by the Greek general staff to defeat the Democratic Army was based in part on political considerations and on tactics designed for conventional warfare. From the beginning of its deployment, the national army was maintained in defensive positions in order to protect areas of particular concern to powerful politicians. Political considerations as well had made the general staff rigid and over-centralized.[69] Divisional commanders could not move their units and exploit local conditions to their best advantage without permission from the general staff.[70] The insurgents, however, were led by commanders experienced in guerrilla warfare who had acquired their training fighting the Axis forces during the occupation. Their morale was very high, and under the able leadership of Markos Vaphiades, the communist bands were able to strike effectively at points of least resistance. Furthermore, they had the added advantage of withdrawing

to the safe havens provided by the communist Balkan states.[71]

By the middle of November 1946, the Greek army was incapable of containing the forces of the Democratic Army and had lost control of the region north of Mount Olympus. During the winter of 1946-47, the Democratic Army intensified its campaign and regained territory it had abandoned when faced with stronger government forces. To defeat the communist forces, the high command believed, the Greek army required large amounts of materiel and firepower, as well as mobility. The British were not in a position to provide additional military supplies or even maintain the level of their current commitment. The Americans consequently took over the economic and military support of Greece. The United States, through the implementation of the Truman Doctrine, poured millions of dollars worth of military equipment and economic aid into Greece, but these actions failed to hinder the success of the Democratic Army. Both the U.S. aid mission, AMAG (American Mission for Aid to Greece), and the military mission, USAGG (United States Army Group in Greece), realized that neither additional expansion of the Greek army nor military hardware would have any impact on the war. The conclusion reached by the head of the U.S. mission in Greece, Griswold, and the State Department was that the direction of the conflict should be placed under American supervision.[72]

In January 1948, an American general, James Van Fleet, was dispatched to Greece as director of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) as well as commander of the United States Army Group in Greece. By September 1948, the number of American military personnel had reached 450, and they were not only involved in the administration of the flow of equipment and supplies but were participating in the overall strategic and tactical planning of operations. In addition, U.S. officers were attached to senior Greek commanders and provided operational advice down to the divisional level.[73]

The American participation in the organization of the Greek army did not alter the situation established by the BMM: a foreign body not only intervening in the overall affairs of the Greek government but maintaining a direct relationship with the military hierarchy. On the contrary, the Americans opted for greater

control of the Greek military and attempted to distance it as far as possible from Greek politicians.[74] The relationship established between American advisors and the Greek military hierarchy gave the latter the opportunity and encouragement to function almost independently of the Greek government. At the same time, it permitted the Americans to organize the Greek forces to suit the interests of the United States in the Near East and southeastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, the Greek army was trained primarily as an internal security force. The American joint chiefs of staff did not believe that Greece was in a position to defend itself from attack by the U.S.S.R. or from aggression by any of the communist Balkan states.[75] The Greeks, consequently, would have to depend on the United States for military support to counter any external threat. The function of the national army in providing internal security, however, implied the use of the armed forces in a political capacity. The Greek military was not only to prevent communists from gaining control of the state but had a role to play in supporting anticommunist forces even after the end of the Civil War. American policy toward Greece, consequently, echoed the attitude of the officer corps and IDEA, which had already defined the role of the military as the guardian of the state from internal as well as external forces.[76]

In 1948 American officials in Greece and IDEA were advocating the appointment of General Alexandros Papagos as commander-in-chief in the hope that this would bring about complete victory over the communists by centralizing Greek military authority under the control of one man.[77] Papagos accepted on the condition that he have complete power to direct operations, appoint or dismiss officers, impose martial law, and bypass the government on matters of national security.[78] The latter consideration was reinforced by the abolition of the Supreme Council of National Defense and its replacement by a War Council whose powers, comments Nicos Alivizatos, "were an illusion."[79] From the point of view of IDEA, the appointment of Papagos guaranteed the proper direction of the armed forces. The field marshal had the authority to implement the goals and aspirations of *ethnikophrone* officers as well as to protect the armed forces from political interference.[80]

The strange assortment of officers who came in out of the

cauldron of war, resistance, and collaboration found common purpose in the new army by their often belated commitment to the royalist and anticommunist cause. In spite of their apparent dedication to the state they served, there were those who mistrusted and even despised politicians. Some replaced native political patronage with that dispensed by the power across the Atlantic. Twenty-two years after the founding of IDEA, its political heirs in the army found their chance to emancipate themselves from the tutelage of politicians. The offspring of an anomalous period were finally unleashed against their masters.

NOTES

[1]Thanos Veremis, "Some Observations on the Greek Military in the Inter-war Period, 1918-1935," *Armed Forces and Society* (May 1978), pp. 527-538.

[2]S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA, 1957), pp. 80-84.

[3]N. Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery* (London, 1986), p. 98.

[4]Mouzelis, *ibid.*, p. 98.

[5]J. Petropulos, "Traditional Political Parties of Greece During the Axis Occupation, in J. O. Iatrides, ed. *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis* (London and Hanover, 1981), pp. 27-28.

[6]Interview with Nicos Tsitsopoulos, 1975.

[7]Petropulos, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[8]Petros Roussos, *I Megali Pentaetia*, Vol. II (Athens, 1978), pp. 77-78.

[9]George Kousoulas, *Revolution and Defeat* (London, 1965), pp. 182-187.

[10]Hagen Fleischer, "The 'Anomalies' in the Greek Middle East Forces, 1941-44," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 3 (1978). This essay is the most comprehensive and thought-provoking roundup of a complicated subject.

[11]For information on Salas, see: Y. Chiotakis, *Politikes Thieles* (Athens, 1981), pp. 68-69; G. Athanasiades, *I Proti Praxi tes Ellinikis Tragodias* (Athens, 1975), p. 56; V. Nefeloudis, *I Ethniki Antistasi sti Mesi Anatoli*, Vol. 1 (Athens, 1981), pp. 339-348.

[12]P. Kanellopoulos, *Imerologio* (Athens, 1977), p. 121.

[13]Kanellopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-398.

[14]Athanasiades, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[15]*Ibid.*, p. 118.

[16]Alexander Kitroeff, "Anglo-Greek Relations and the Greek Situation in Egypt, 1940-1944," M.A. thesis, University of Keele, 1979, p. 88.

[17]Fleischer, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[18]Procopis Papastratis, *British Policy Towards Greece During the Second World War, 1941-1944* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 165-166.

[19]Nefeloudis, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-312 and p. 318.

[20]Nefeloudis, *ibid.*, p. 348.

[21]For statistics on the various categories of officers, see Andre Gerolymatos, "The Role of the Greek Officer Corps in the Resistance," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 11:3 (Fall 1984), pp. 69-79.

[22]Yannis Koliopoulos, *Palinorthosi, Diktatoria, Polemos, 1936-1941* (Athens, 1984), pp. 196-198.

[23]Andre Gerolymatos, "The Security Battalions and the Civil War," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 12:1, Spring 1985, p. 17.

[24]Concerning the transformation of prewar liberalism, see: Constantine Tsoucalas, "The Ideological Impact of the Civil War," in Iatrides, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-322.

[25]Nicos Svoronos, "Greek History, 1940-1950: The Main Problems," *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[26]By the late autumn and early winter of 1943, EDES was down to 150 men as a result of its conflict with ELAS, yet by 1944 it had increased to 5,000. See Gerolymatos, "The Role of the Greek Officer Corps," *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[27]According to Pyromaglou ("Ta Tagmata Asfalias," *Istoriki Epitheorisis*, p. 543), although the security battalions were envisioned as a means of controlling the immediate postwar period in Greece, they were not intended to be used as an anticommunist force. Their use against EAM/ELAS not only betrayed the republican leaders who had supported the establishment of these units but served to divide the republican world in a manner that was unreconcilable.

[28]Gerolymatos, "The Role of the Greek Officer Corps," *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[29]Gerolymatos, "The Security Battalions and the Civil War," *op. cit.*, p. 19. Pyromaglou states (*op. cit.*, pp. 349-350) that the security battalions were conceived by Pangalos and supported by Gonatas, Dertilis, and Grigoriadis. Pangalos had intended to use these forces to prevent the return of the king. Ironically, the association of officers such as Pangalos, Gonatas, Dertilis, and Grigoriadis with the security battalions gave these forces the credibility that attracted many other republican officers.

[30]Grigoriadis claims that 1,500 retired officers were kept out of the war because they were considered dangerous to the regime. S. Grigoriadis, *Short History of National Resistance, 1941-1945* (in Greek, Athens, 1981), p. 116.

[31]Gerolymatos, "The Role of the Greek Officer Corps," *op. cit.*, p. 71.

[32]By the end of 1943, ELAS included 600 permanent officers; 1,250 former officers, purged earlier for their role in the coups of the 1930s; and 2,000 lower-ranking reserve officers (Gerolymatos, "The Role of the Greek Officer Corps," *op. cit.*, p. 74). An important determining factor for many of these individuals was the adherence to ELAS of well-known republican officers such as Sarafis, Bakirdzis, Mandakas, and Othonaios (*ibid.*, p. 77, note 19).

[33]Pyromaglou suggests (*op. cit.*, p. 539) that most senior officers were overawed by the technical superiority of the German army and did not believe that resistance was possible. They advised younger officers, writes Pyromaglou, to abstain from "such insanity" (*ibid.*, p. 539). Tsakalotos (*40 Chronia Stratiotis tes Ellados*, p. 369) explains that the king's reluctance to encourage officers to fight the occupation forces stemmed from the negative reports he received from individuals who fled to the Middle East and had considerable influence with the monarch. Also see: A. Gerolymatos, "The Role of the Greek Officer Corps," *op. cit.*, p. 72.

[34]See note 32.

[35]Gerolymatos, "The Role of the Greek Officer Corps," *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[36]Gerolymatos, "The Security Battalions," *op. cit.*

[37]In some areas of the Peloponnese, relations between EAM/ELAS and the local population were such that the security battalions served as the only means of acquiring protection and arms to oppose the left-wing resistance. On this point, see Hagen Fleischer, "Nea Stoichia gia te Schesi Germanikon Archon Katoches kai Tagmaton Asfalias," *Mnemon* (1980), p. 192.

[38]B. Stavrogiannopoulos, *H Zoe Katoches kai ta Tagmata Asfalias* (Athens, 1966), p. 23.

[39]By the end of the occupation, the security battalions included approximately 1,000 professional officers, many of these Venizelists, but by the autumn of 1944 they had been followed in the battalions by a considerable number of royalists, including officers from the Peloponnesian units. After liberation, these officers—as well as the rank and file of the security battalions—were confined to Goudhi and other camps. The officers had to face a review by a military board, which decided their eligibility for further service or ordered them to stand trial for collaboration (Gerolymatos, "The Security Battalions," *op. cit.*, pp. 23-25 and note 33).

[40]The forces of the Third Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion comprised 4,500 men. At the beginning of hostilities, General Scobie had at his disposal 13,000 troops, most of whom were stationed in or near Athens. In addition, the government could depend for support upon the 3,000 members of the X organization. Efforts were made to recruit men into the national guard, but many could not report for duty since they lived in areas under ELAS control (Gerolymatos, "The Security Battalions," *ibid.*, p. 25).

[41]Gerolymatos, "The Security Battalions," *ibid.*, pp. 4-25. Two interesting aspects of this story require clarification. First, Spais states that the officers did not have any charges against them, and, as undersecretary of defense, he was compelled to restore their pay privileges. Under these circumstances, the government could and did employ these men in the December hostilities. In February 1945, at the trials of the collaborators, the court decided that those who served in the security battalions were not guilty of treason but were employed as a security force to maintain order (*Akropolis*, June 1, 1945). This judgment, in effect, paved the way for officers of the security battalions to be reinstated in the army.

[42]NARS RG 226 L57536.

[43]*EAM White Book* (May 1944-March 1945), "Varkiza Agreement," Article V, No. 117.

[44]W. H. McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath* (New York, 1947), p. 207.

[45]McNeill, *ibid.*, pp. 207ff.

[46]"Dispatches of Lincoln MacVeagh," ed. Y. Chouliaras and D. Georgakas, *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 12:1 (1985), p. 47.

[47]"Dispatches of Lincoln MacVeagh," *ibid.*, p. 47.

[48]"Dispatches of Lincoln MacVeagh," *ibid.*, p. 47.

[49]"Dispatches of Lincoln MacVeagh," *ibid.*, p. 48.

[50]According to Karagiannis, *1940-1952, To Drama tes Ellados: Epe kai Athliotites* (Athens, 1963), pp. 206-207, IDEA was formed on October 25, 1944, in Athens, but the documentation he provides has January 15, 1945, as the date by which the organization was set up. Six of the original members came from TRIAINA, which is described by Karagiannis as a resistance group made up of officers collecting intelligence for allied headquarters in the Middle East (p. 214).

[51]ENA (Enosis Neon Axiomatikon) was organized in August 1943 in Palestine. Its goals were to protect the state and king from communists and "democratic opportunists" who were infiltrating the armed forces. Membership consisted of lower-ranking officers and mainly of those who had lost their positions in the army as a result of their extreme right-wing views (Karagiannis, *ibid.*, pp. 135-136).

[52]George Alexander, *Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-1947* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 120-121.

[53]According to Nicos Alivizatos, "The Greek Army in the Late Forties: Toward an Institutional Autonomy," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 5:3 (1978), p. 41, the organization that was ultimately set up was defined by a series of "necessity laws" issued by the Sophoulis government on December 5, 1945, and reflected the prewar Supreme Council of National Defense. The new establishment was designed to function as a permanent central institution responsible for national defense, the appointment of higher military commanders, and defense spending. The composition of the council included the three war ministers; the chiefs of the army, navy, and air force; the chief of BMM; and the prime minister.

[54]Characteristically, Merenditis was a member of the republican group in the officer corps. See "Dispatches of Lincoln MacVeagh," *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[55]H. Richter, *British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War* (London, 1986), p. 324.

[56]Ventiris was appointed commander of the Third Corps in Macedonia (Alexander, *ibid.*, p. 162). Richter's conjecture (Richter, *op. cit.*, p. 324) that IDEA was working behind the scenes and exercised considerable influence over the general staff is not substantiated by solid documentation. According to Alexander (*op. cit.*, pp. 118-119), who bases his information on interviews with Karagiannis, a founder of IDEA, the conspirators restricted membership to army officers holding a rank no higher than major. He further adds that there is no evidence to suggest that IDEA received instructions from the general staff.

[57]Unlike his predecessors, Mavromichalis initiated his purges of the armed forces with the Greek air force. According to Alexander (*ibid.*, p. 195), the Hellenic Air Force was known for its republican sentiments and Mavromichalis, without consulting the BMM, dismissed its commanding officers and replaced them with officers who had remained in Greece during the occupation.

[58]Alexander, *ibid.*, p. 196. The new military hierarchy included General Steriopoulos as deputy chief of staff, General Giantzis in command of the First Army Corps, General Georgoulis at the head of the Second Army Corps, and Ventiris at the Third (Th. Tsakalotos, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2 [Athens, 1960], p. 46).

[59]S. Grigoriadis, *Dekemvris-Emphilios 1944-1949* (Athens, 1984), p. 189, states that the fear of the left and anticommunism surpassed the prewar political schism and that the opposition to EAM-ELAS/KKE was extended to include all the left. Those who subscribed to these views styled themselves *ethnikophrones* (nationalist-minded), a term which during the occupation defined not only those who supported the monarchy but included conservative republicans. The political ideology of the *ethnikophrones*, according to Grigoriadis, was characterized by fear and opposition to the left and received greater impetus after the December crisis and the Varkiza Agreement, along with the reappearance of the prewar political parties. According to Tsakalotos (*op. cit.*, p. 399), opposition to communism transcended any other political sentiments among the officer corps.

[60]For a discussion of the independence of the Greek army from the civilian leadership, see Alivizatos, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-45.

[61]Tsakalotos, *ibid.*, p. 47.

[62]Tsakalotos, *ibid.*, p. 47.

[63]N. A. Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Intervention* (Athens, 1970), p. 116.

[64]The aims of IDEA were set down as seven guiding principles known as the Eptaloque and are included in the account of Karagiannis (*op. cit.*, p. 207). Also see N. A. Stavrou, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-115. Tsakalotos (*op. cit.*, p. 399) states that even those suspected of the slightest sympathy to the left were targeted for removal by IDEA.

[65]According to the American ambassador, L. MacVeagh ("Dispatches of Lincoln MacVeagh," *op. cit.*, p. 50), both Ventiris and Tsakalotos were attempting to gain control of IDEA by giving its members choice positions in the army. Tsakalotos, in his memoirs (Tsakalotos, *op. cit.*, p. 399), however, states that when he was approached by representatives of IDEA to become its leader, he promptly threw them out of his office. D. Paralika, *Synomosies: IDEA kai ASPIDA* (Athens, 1982), pp. 29-30, also adds that in 1947 conservative politicians had established contacts with IDEA and that this further legitimated its role as the representative of the officer corps; Tsakalotos, *Bema*, 4/4/1975.

[66]John O. Iatrides, "Civil War, 1945-1949," *op. cit.*, p. 198.

[67]Karagiannis, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-239; E. E. O'Ballance, *The Greek Civil War, 1944-1949* (New York, 1966), p. 129.

[68]The irregular units proposed by IDEA were organized as Battalions of National Defense (T.E.A.), and some were commanded by former collaborators and officers who were employed by the occupation regimes. Later, these units were reorganized and called Community-Supported Security Units (M.A.D.), along with Rural Security Units (M.A.Y.). The M.A.D. formations continued to be made up of extreme nationalists and ex-soldiers and numbered approximately 10,000. In addition to their defensive role, they acted as local informants. The M.A.Y. units consisted essentially of armed villagers. Many of these, according to D. Vladas, *Emphilios Polemos, 1945-49*, Vol. 3 (Athens, 1979), pp. 147-148, had belonged to EAM/ELAS and readily gave up their weapons to the communists. Also see J. O. Iatrides, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

[69]At the outbreak of hostilities, the British had objected to using regular army units against the insurgents, but by October 1946 it had become apparent that the national guard was incapable of handling the situation, and the British agreed to the deployment of the army against the communist bands.

[70]O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

[71]In addition, the communists could rely on the assistance of a fifth column of supporters in Greece who supplied them with intelligence, logistical support, and recruits. On this aspect of the civil war from the point of view of an individual who helped organize fifth-column activities, see: S. Argyropoulos, *Prosfigia, Andartiko, Exoria, 1924-1949* (Athens, 1980), p. 204ff.

[72]L. S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York, 1982), p. 234; Y. P. Roubatis, *Tangled Webs: The U.S. in Greece, 1947-1967*, pp. 57-61.

[73]Wittner, *ibid.*, p. 242.

[74]Roubatis, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[75]*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. V, "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense," p. 191.

[76]According to Karagiannis (*op. cit.*, p. 254), IDEA had made contact with the American military attaché in August 1947, as well as with the leaders of the political parties. During their discussions, Karagiannis writes (*ibid.*, p. 254), they all agreed not only that the communist threat be curtailed but also on the methods to be employed. The Americans initially favored governments consisting of broad coalitions. Once they were committed in Greece, however, they quickly abandoned such ideas and supported the implementation of an authoritarian system (J. O. Iatrides, "American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece," *Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review*, ed. Th. A. Couloumbis and J. O. Iatrides [New York, 1980], pp. 63-68).

[77]Wittner, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-248; Karagiannis (*op. cit.*, p. 256), claims that it was IDEA that convinced Prime Minister Sophoulis to accept the creation of a commander-in-chief and the appointment of Papagos.

[78]Wittner, *ibid.*, p. 248.

[79]Alivizatos, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[80]Karagiannis, *op. cit.*, p. 256. Papagos also received strong endorsement from General Van Fleet. On American policy regarding liberal democracy in Greece, see J. O. Iatrides, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

Book Reviews

ALEXANDER KITROEFF, *The Greeks in Egypt, 1919-1937: Ethnicity and Class*. Oxford: The Middle East Centre, 1989, pp. 1-181; appendices and bibliography, pp. 183-209; £24, clothbound.

One of a number of outstanding Oxford dissertations brought to print by Roger Owen and his colleagues, this work by Alexander Kitroeff is an interesting contribution to a side of modern Egyptian history not well known by the general reader.

Kitroeff had extensive access to the materials of the Greek community in Egypt. He used them to write a book addressed to the wider Egyptian field and not simply Greek studies. One part of his study traces the relationship of the community to Sa'd Zaghlul and the Wafdists who followed him through the Montreux Convention, while another part of the study picks up on the country's social history, focusing on the role of the Greek community in the cotton economy.

A natural concern for a book treating the first third of the present century is the decline of the Greek community in Egypt. The author suggests that the decline was not simply a function of the rise of Egyptian nationalism, as some degree of coexistence with Egyptian nationalism existed. Rather, he puts more emphasis on the splits in the community itself between its local loyalties to the patriarchate of Alexandria and to the homeland. These splits, and the divisions between the various other minority communities, account for the lack of a resistance to the breakdown of the system of capitulations.

Underlying the divisions within the Greek community itself, the author finds class interest: the notables were cosmopolitans, the industrial bourgeoisie was integrationist, the petty bourgeois was ethnicist, while the unionized working class was internationalist or integrationist. The patriarchate, the newspapers, and some educators stayed neutral in this conflict. However, as the author concludes, even had the Greek community been less divided, if and when the Egyptian majority population gained its true independence, it would have spelled the end of the Greek position.

The author's findings are well supported in terms of how Egyptian studies have developed. I would suggest that in the larger sense Egyptian history is still a labyrinth composed of many unintegrated pieces; Greek history could serve as an example of one such unintegrated piece. One remedy is to keep broadening the notion of ethnicity.

The author ties together community and class. I would like to add another dimension of ethnicity, which often takes a back seat in scholarship but which seems important for the historical study of commercial minorities, notably their capacity to assimilate into the milieu in which they are living. I have in mind the debates over what happened to the Jews in Turkey and Spain, of a generation that saw them fleeing to another country and of a subsequent generation that began to study the Donme Jews in Turkey and the Ladinos in Spain.

Egypt lends itself to multiculturalism. People know languages and cultures. They adjust in their daily interactions; one does not see great walls.

For reasons that are clear enough, at a certain moment the center of gravity in several minority communities was the cotton-export economy. Cotton tied the Greek elite to Europe and to the Egyptian landowning class. This is not the whole story—not simply because there were different classes in the Greek community, but because there were other factors at work in a historical sense that cannot be explained in terms of class interest, the situation of the cotton economy, or even the tempo of Egyptian nationalism.

By the 1940s, some disillusionment or despair about the future led many members of the minority communities to leave Egypt. It is difficult to be precise about how many left and where they actually went, but clearly the communities shrank. Kitroeff notes that Egypt was industrializing, and that subsequently, in the 1950s, land and commercial establishments were nationalized. But his discussion is nuanced. Greeks participated in industrialization, and in any case, industrial countries still have commercial bourgeoisies. Many Muslims and Christians, if one were to anticipate the future, also lost their land in the Nasserite era, but they held on. So there is some degree of doubt about all these departures.

The historical significance of the departure of prominent individuals from these communities is clear. Their departure had an influence both on the later history of Egyptian nationalism and on Egyptian socialism. Both nationalists and socialists branded the departers as exploiters and those who befriended them as fifth columnists. As is well known, this reduced the presence of minority-group nationalists and leftists to token numbers, leading finally to splits in the parties.

If one were to place these political trends in a wider framework, a social analysis would show that Egyptian nationalism and Egyptian socialism were movements of the regional self-assertion of Cairo and the Delta that arose and participated in the exploitation of Upper Egypt. The Greek and other minority communities functioned in this framework, too, suffering from the problems that these movements themselves suffered from. This is a tangent, but an important one.

But to return here to my intuition about the historical study of ethnicities and its overreliance on assumptions of community migra-

tion, various historians of Egypt postulate migrations to Egypt of such proportions that one might reasonably have doubts. An example could be the rapid growth of the Greek community in Alexandria in the nineteenth century. It is simply too rapid.

The other side of this is assimilation. I lived in Egypt in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Among people I knew were some who used to be Jewish or who had Greek relatives. They had adopted all-purpose names, such as Mona or Fouad. I wonder if it is not partly the case that the Greek and Jewish communities can be formed and unformed through mutations in the lives of local people and not simply through migrations?

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TONY JUDT, editor, *Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe, 1939-1948*. New York: Routledge, 1989, pp. 221.

The historical importance of the resistance movements in Europe during the Second World War is to be found not in their contribution to the defeat of the Axis occupiers, which was marginal at best, but in the powerful political forces they unleashed upon their national arenas. Because communist parties played a key role in the promotion of large-scale wartime underground and guerrilla activity, national resistance legitimized the entire extreme left and emboldened it to challenge the prewar order. But if resistance brought communist parties out of relative obscurity and banishment into the political inner circle, the tasks faced by their leaders were dangerous and daunting: fighting the foreign enemy was the least complicated of their undertakings. To establish their credibility, they had to offer the promise of radical change basically consistent with their revolutionary vision—thus attracting a mass following—without, however, setting off an anticommunist reaction which could play into the hands of their domestic adversaries. Operating in Britain's wartime sphere of influence, they had to assuage London's traditional suspicion of them as Soviet agents and avoid giving the Churchill government an excuse to bolster their right-wing opponents even more than it was already doing. Finally, as communists, they had to balance their nationalist ambitions and urge to exploit opportunities at home against the wishes of Moscow, whose ideological authority they could never openly challenge, but whose infrequent signals were unhelpful and confusing. In the end, during the course of the war and in the early post-liberation period, communist leaders had to decide for themselves whether revolution was to be pursued as

the immediate goal or merely as a distant aspiration. Choosing to follow totally different courses, Yugoslavia's Tito and Italy's Togliatti were remarkably successful, whereas the French and Greek communists fumbled and vacillated, with disastrous results for their movements. Whatever the outcome, and in dramatically different ways, the communists helped change the political landscape in their respective states and in the process added fuel to the emerging Cold War.

Resistance movements and their political ramifications have, of course, been the subject of exhaustive scholarly study, and the resulting literature is by now enormous. With very few exceptions (an outstanding example is Henri Michel's 1972 *The Shadow War: European Resistance, 1939-1945*), these studies deal with specific cases examined in isolation and make no attempt to compare the dynamics, leadership, tactics, and effectiveness of national resistance activity in different states. However valuable their findings, such narrow approaches result in a misleading perception of resistance as a unique and exceptional phenomenon. Therefore, *Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe, 1939-1945* is a particularly welcome addition to the literature. Although the communist-led resistance activity in France, Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia is reviewed and evaluated in four separate chapters, a penetrating introduction and an informative section on the Comintern and Southern Europe are rich in comparative analysis. Moreover, the specialists dealing with the four case studies have adhered to a basically similar scheme, allowing the reader to draw conclusions of a comparative nature with relative ease. Thus credit for this well-written and useful volume belongs first of all to its editor, a professor of history at New York University.

In his introduction, which offers the volume's principal comparative findings, Judt shows that in sharp contrast to their marginality in prewar politics, Southern Europe's communist parties came to command a powerful political force through the highly popular resistance organizations they created. As the day of liberation approached, they grappled with the question of what kind of revolution they would seek to usher in. Although their ideological character and ultimate objectives were not in doubt, these could not be translated into a blueprint for action, making it necessary for the leadership of each communist party to chart its own course and decide the strategy and tactics to be pursued. One of the more valuable points made in this volume, therefore, concerns the critical role played by party leaders in confronting the dangers and opportunities of the post-liberation power struggle. Thus the Italian communists receive high marks for their flexibility and moderation and the Yugoslavs for their boldness and unswerving determination to seize power immediately. The French and Greek party leaders, however, are depicted as confused and uncertain, contributing to the failure of the movements they spearheaded. All in all, nevertheless, "In the conditions of compromise and cooperation obtaining for most of the period

1935-48, the Communists had not much better idea of where they were going than did their opponents." As for Stalin, what he demanded in the liberated countries was not a genuine revolution from below but Moscow-imposed regimes that were "servile and politically docile."

Geoffrey Swain's chapter on the Comintern deals mostly with efforts to guide and control the Yugoslavs, with whom the headquarters of international communism had regular and direct contact; it has little specific to offer on similar efforts concerning the French and Italian parties. It contains virtually nothing of substance on the Greek party, presumably because in Moscow's view it was the least important and most expendable of the four considered here, especially as it was operating within Britain's sphere of responsibility. The author, who teaches history at Bristol Polytechnic, shows that throughout the period under review the Comintern was cautious in the extreme, seeking to dampen any enthusiasm for revolution and violent confrontation with the ideological opposition. Communists were instructed to cooperate with the bourgeois parties in promoting national resistance against the occupiers and to avoid all talk of revolution. In fact, the Comintern's formal dissolution in May 1943, which came as an unpleasant surprise to Europe's communists, was very probably Stalin's signal of opposition—intended not only for his wartime Western allies but for his ideological underlings as well—to concerted communist revolutionary activity.

The French communists' wartime record, analyzed here by Lynne Taylor, a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan, is described as one of division, confusion, and lack of enthusiasm for the rigors of resistance activity. In the end, under Thorez, the party abandoned any lingering thought of revolution and supported De Gaulle so as not to be left out of his government. As a result, it lost its ideological legitimacy, together with whatever popular support it had earned during the war. The chapter on the Italian communists, by David Travis of the University of Washington, focuses on the remarkable role of Togliatti, whose progressive-democratic tactics and acumen turned the party into a major political force in the period immediately following the war. While enjoying Moscow's approval from afar, before 1948 and the mounting tensions of the Cold War, the Italian communists were not under Soviet control but followed essentially their own political instincts. Despite a very promising start, however, their fate was not different from that of their French comrades. Haunted by their past, when they had failed to resist fascism, and compromised by their eagerness to be part of an ineffective coalition government (Togliatti served as minister of justice) and by their soft stand on the Catholic Church (support of the Lateran Pacts), the party leaders alienated their followers, brought on the electoral defeat of 1948, and ensured internal crisis.

The chapter on the Greek Communist Party (KKE), which this journal's readers will find especially interesting, is contributed by Haris Vlavianos and is based on his doctoral dissertation at Oxford. It

briefly traces the party's turbulent history through the 1920s and 1930s and shows that the KKE failed to generate popular support in large measure because of the Comintern's high-handed control and disregard for Greek national aspirations. The cunningly brutal methods of the Metaxas dictatorship created fear and suspicion and threatened the party's very existence. Yet with remarkable resilience, the KKE plunged into the wartime resistance and—through its political front, EAM—came to be regarded by many Greeks as a legitimate alternative to the defunct bourgeois parties. In the second half of 1944, unprepared to seize power by force as the Germans withdrew, the KKE in a series of compromises gave in to British pressure (and possibly Soviet advice) and entered George Papandreou's government as a minor partner. Outmaneuvered by Papandreou, the communists stumbled into armed confrontation in Athens (December 1944) and were defeated by superior British troops. The failure of the Athens government and its British sponsors to honor the Varkiza agreement, which ended the fighting, and the widespread persecution of the entire republican left set the stage for renewed violence and civil war. The KKE's chief, Zahariadis, who had spent the war years in a Nazi concentration camp, now opted for revolution. Vlavianos's account essentially ends with the escalating violence of 1946, which marked the beginning of the four-year civil war. It treats the crisis as largely a domestic affair and attributes the communists' defeat in 1949 primarily to the Stalin-Tito split, which deprived the insurgents of foreign assistance, while also blaming the East-West confrontation for aggravating Greece's suffering.

Like the other ones in this volume, Vlavianos's essay is well-researched, comprehensive, and sensibly argued. Of course, one can always find facts and interpretations to quibble about. For example, the Soviet military mission to Greece, which arrived in July 1944, did not parachute but landed unannounced at the Neraida airstrip, built and commanded by British officers who were clearly surprised and upset by the visit. More important, the "message" it brought to the KKE was hardly as clear and categorical as is suggested here (pp. 184-185). Ioannidis, on whose account Vlavianos relies, recorded that when he told one of the Soviet officers (Lt. Col. Chernichev) that if necessary the KKE was prepared to fight the British, the response was a "very characteristic grimace," presumably expressing disdain and disapproval. As Ioannidis points out, beyond vague discouragement, such a delphic pronouncement left it to the KKE leadership to decide on how to deal with the British. Nor had the king agreed "by the end of September [1944] . . . to remain abroad, pending the conduct of a plebiscite" (p. 186). Had the king agreed to such an arrangement prior to liberation, developments in Greece might well have taken an entirely different course. Finally, Vlavianos appears ambivalent on the principal cause of the insurrection in 1946. If, as he argues (pp. 196, 210), by February of that year Zahariadis had already opted for the revolutionary

path, the party's decision to boycott the elections in late March was a minor matter and a step consistent with a course already chosen, rather than a critical point, as the author would have it. More broadly, it is not clear whether Vlavianos attributes the civil war to Zahariadis's reckless, ill-timed, and unrealistic ideological zeal or to the wholesale persecution of the left (especially the veterans of the antimonarchy resistance), which he also stresses. But these are relatively minor points of fact or interpretation in a generally solid piece of scholarly writing.

The essay on the Yugoslav communist party, Tito's KPJ, clearly the volume's richest in both factual detail and interpretation, is by Mark Wheeler of the University of London. Stressing that Yugoslavia's revolution was not inevitable, the author analyzes the KPJ's differences from the other three parties covered here, the reasons why it alone among the four achieved victory, and the flexible and opportunistic tactics through which it succeeded in restructuring a multinational state under rigid communist control. Wheeler also traces the tug-of-war between the Comintern, which mistrusted and rebuffed the KPJ leaders' revolutionary vision, and Tito's endless and remarkably effective gyrations to placate Moscow, undermine Mihailovic and other domestic ideological foes, court the British, deflect the opposition of the Yugoslav government in London, and prepare to seize power at the moment of liberation, all the time fighting and evading the Axis occupation forces. In one of his many well-phrased conclusions, Wheeler sums up the crux of the controversy between the Yugoslav communists and Moscow, whose faithful disciples they wished to be: "Their problem—and Stalin's—was that they also believed in themselves, their power, and their own revolution. Time was to show that communists desirous of keeping in communion with Moscow were permitted to believe in only one revolutionary incarnation" (p. 150).

This is one of those rare collections of essays written for both the generalist and the specialist. Its chapters, which stand nicely separately, blend effectively into a coherent whole and combine factual description with useful comparisons, sophisticated analysis, and original interpretation. This volume makes a serious contribution to the understanding of twentieth-century European communism; resistance, revolutionary strategy, and tactics during the Second World War; Moscow's efforts to guide and control communist parties; and some of the more obscure but important elements of the Cold War.

—*John O. Iatrides*
Southern Connecticut State University

LILA LEONTIDOU, *The Mediterranean City in Transition: Social Change and Urban Development.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. xviii+296.

This book is deceptively titled, for it deals with the peculiar development of Athens between the years 1945 and 1981, with only a few side glances at other Mediterranean (and Latin American) cities. Leontidou is a geographer by training and has new and detailed data to offer about patterns of land use in Athens in the years 1950-67. Her maps and tables are derived from unpublished materials collected by the National Center for Social Research before that organization fell afoul of the government and was effectively disbanded. She tells us that she participated in "the early stages" of this research (p. 128), and the solid virtues of her book rest upon new and (presumably) accurate information about the locational changes of industry and housing that took place with dizzying rapidity in Athens across the past four decades.

Leontidou, however, aspires to create a grand geographical theory to the effect that the peculiar patterns of recent Athenian geography are representative of a distinctly Mediterranean sort of city. "We do not encounter different phases in a process of convergence between Northern and Southern cities, but a different model of urban development," she writes. "The elements of the ecological complex have evidenced different articulations, class structuration followed a different course and urban development trajectories diverged.... The unity among Southern cities, despite their professed diversity, can become the basis for an argument for structural differences between Northern and Southern, core and semiperipheral, cities" (p. 235).

The key factor, as far as Leontidou is concerned, differentiating Mediterranean cities from those of northern Europe is what she calls "spontaneous urban development." This phrase dignifies what others call squatting, *i.e.*, the illegal construction by poor wage earners of housing for their own use on bits of land located on the periphery of Athens and other cities. Since this phenomenon is central to her argument, she devotes a first chapter to "Spontaneous urban development: in search of a theory for the Mediterranean city." Antonio Gramsci in her most important theoretical guide, but I was merely confused by passages such as the following, which purport to define one of three "objective axes for the structuring of our explanatory model": "The city as a material context, consisting of the physical or built environment, or 'nature' transformed by labour, but also destroyed or polluted by the expansion of capitalism (Duncan and Shnore's Environment, Parks' Resources of the Habitat). Capitalism in the production of space has its technological aspects (Park's Artefact, Duncan and Schnore's Technology, Ogburn's Technology, Castell's Exchange, Mumford's Transport); it also has its organizational aspects (Park's Customs and Beliefs,

Quinn's Cultural Factors, Castell's Management)" (p. 26). If this is an axis, I must be an ass, for I can make no sense of it.

Fortunately, when she gets down to earth and sets out to embody her theory with information about what happened in Athens, Leontidou's prose becomes more straightforward, and her maps and tables carry much exact and new information. She begins with a sketch of Athens and Piraeus in the early twentieth century, and then devotes a chapter to "The Greek 'economic miracle' and the hidden proletariat" before turning to the heart of her book in Chapter 4, "The 'golden period' of spontaneous urban development, 1950-1967." The next two chapters describe industrial restructuring of urban development by the military dictatorship. The book then concludes with a chapter that purports to show how the peculiarities of Athens's recent history actually typify the urban development of Mediterranean Europe.

I am not convinced by her argument for a unique Mediterranean, semiperipheral style of urbanism. Indeed, if I read her data aright, in the most recent decade she finds signs in Athens of the emergence of a slum area, located near the center of the city, where working-class persons rent deteriorating housing that has been abandoned by the more fortunate classes. Moreover, this development, which looks very like the pattern of urban decay familiar in American and some northern European cities, is matched by migration on the part of middle-class Athenians to peripheral locations. This also looks like an approximation of American suburbia, even if most Athenian migrants from the city center live in multistory apartment buildings instead of in the ranch houses favored by Americans.

Yet, as my first quotation shows, Leontidou expressly denies that Athens is simply catching up with other cities of northern Europe or North America after surviving a tumultuous and extraordinary series of crisis situations, beginning with the almost simultaneous arrival of refugees from Asia Minor in 1922 and the closure of emigration to the United States in the next year. These events impinged upon a poor country where the heritage from Ottoman times made land titles unclear and insecure. (See William McGrew's interesting book on this theme.) Migrants to the city were therefore ready and able to build houses for their own use on the periphery of the city, despite laws that prohibited unauthorized building on agricultural land. Such self-help revived in the post-World War II period when a massive new wave of immigrants from the Greek countryside swarmed into the city. Accordingly, Athens's layout of the 1950s and 1960s was largely created by this sort of "spontaneity," as Leontidou makes abundantly clear.

Approximations of the Athenian pattern of self-built, extra-legal working-class suburbs can be found in other Mediterranean cities of the twentieth century, but not on so massive a scale; and nothing Leontidou has to say about such parallels makes her thesis of a unique Mediterranean style of urbanization seem convincing. Resemblances to the

slums that surround most third world cities seem a good deal closer than she is willing to admit; and insofar as Athens and other cities of the European Mediterranean lands have escaped the squalor of African and Latin American suburbs, it is surely because the capitalism she so deplores has in fact raised standards of living for Greek and Mediterranean populations very substantially since 1945.

Her attachment to Marxist terminology is such as to require her to discover class struggle and a proletariat where others see peasant migrants to the city who were remarkably successful in acquiring property and qualifying their children for entry into the ranks of the white-collar classes. But when evidence is lacking, she is not deterred, as the following passage illustrates:

"It would be futile to search for the Greek working class in the GSEE [Greek Labor Union Organization] which in fact became a mere appendage to the Greek oppressive State after the cancellation of the only genuine elections in 1946. Proletarianization is also not apparent in the electoral behavior of popular settlements, or the social composition of strike activity. It is evident in scattered information on spontaneous popular mobilizations, which is lost, unrecorded by historians. The investigation which follows begins with a 'quantitative' approach to the social structure of postwar urban Greece—a 'nominalist' sociology—based on statistical indicators as a necessary prerequisite for the reconstitution of the hidden proletariat" (p. 109). Thus information that is "lost" (how, then, does she know about it?) can, presumably, be re-created by statistical manipulation—as long as one knows ahead of time what to look for.

She can, perhaps, be complimented on the openness of her manipulation of recalcitrant data to make them conform to her preconceptions, but it would be simpler if she were willing to believe that Greek peasants, when they arrived in Athens, carried with them habits and attitudes that had been shaped by generations of village life. Among those habits was the practice of building one's own house wherever one could, and an aptitude for shrewd buying and selling that made it unnecessary for them to remain mere wage earners for very long. That, rather than some inexplicable loss of information about spontaneous popular mobilization, is what makes the Athenian proletariat she yearns for so hard for Leontidou to find. Or so it seems to me.

— *William H. McNeill*
University of Chicago

EDITORS' NOTE

Because a printer's error caused the deletion of part of the text of the following review on its original publication in *JHD* 13:1-2 (1986), we are pleased to reprint the review in its entirety.

BRIGADIER E. C. W. MYERS, CBA, DSO, *Greek Entanglement*, second edition, revised. Gloucester: Alan Sutton Publishing, Ltd., 1985.

When the first edition of this book, published by Rupert Hart-Davis, appeared in 1955, it was extensively reviewed. But the second edition is worth examining also, since it contains much new material that the author, who was still a serving officer in 1955, felt unable to include in the original version.

E. C. W. Myers's record of his wartime Greek experience as first head of the British Military Mission is known to all students and historians of recent Greek history: it has been published in Greek under the title Ἑλληνικὴ Περιπλοκή. But the revised edition, vital to an assessment of British policy and of the author's role in Greece, seems to have gone unnoticed: book notices of it are nowhere to be found. Yet it is interesting to note that 1985 saw the reissue of the two most important books by British protagonists: Myers's *Greek Entanglement* and C. M. Woodhouse's *Apple of Discord*.[1]

The new material is contained in an appendix that describes the author's vain attempts to persuade Winston Churchill and the Foreign Office to convince the Greek people that Britain would not enforce the return of the unpopular monarch. After the failure of the Cairo Delegation in August 1943 and Churchill's Quebec declaration that he favored the king's return, Myers made his final effort to dissuade his superiors. Subsequently, Myers was not allowed to return to Greece to assume his post, and he found his entire military career blocked. Early in 1944 GHMQE wanted to bring an end to the armed conflict between ELAS and EDES, and SOE advocated the return of Myers. But Churchill and the Foreign Office vetoed the proposal.[2] Myers's fate provides a striking illustration of the conflict between Churchill's and the Foreign Office's long-range interests in Britain's postwar strategy on the one hand, and the GHQ's more immediate concern to defeat the Axis powers on the other.

Myers was free to speak out only in the 1970s, after British official documents became publicly accessible under the Thirty Year Rule. In July 1973 he spoke at a conference on British policy toward the wartime resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece.[3] He voiced his views a second time, and with considerable passion, in an October 1984 BBC film on the SOE in Greece. I have been told that his remarks infuriated no few retired Foreign Office bureaucrats.

Let there be no mistake: in no way was Brigadier Myers pro-EAM. As a professional British officer, he could hardly be so. But historical circumstances in Greece had created a body of professional officers who were committed republicans with liberal, and at times even radical,

views. After such individuals were purged from the armed forces in 1935, ELAS offered them a home of sorts. But no professional British officer—and certainly no BLO—with the conservatism inherent in the British military and class system could fully accept this allegiance. The texts of reports by such men show only too clearly the subterfuges in which they engaged to explain the problem to themselves.[4]

In light of all this, Myers's firm stance on the constitutional issue and his readiness to resist authority and even jeopardize his career are all the more admirable. Indeed, the case can be made that if his advice had been heeded, the subsequent disasters could have been avoided. And Myers was not alone in suffering for giving good advice: Sir Sidney Waterlow, when he eventually saw the light, was made to take early retirement; and the Consul-General of Athens, E. G. Sebastian, was "moved on" when he pressed his own suggestions.

With the new information contained in the 1985 edition, it is clear that this volume must supplant the 1955 original as Myers's definitive study of the period. The new edition also makes it clear that we must reassess its author's impact on the Greek Left, since his contribution differed significantly from that of most other BLO's.

Greek public opinion has long been misled by the irresponsible forgery of the so-called "Eddie Document," to which some early Greek historians of the wartime resistance lent a certain amount of credence. From them, the document found its way into foreign publications, including a 1964 (East) German edition of Sarafis's *ELAS*. Sarafis himself asserted in the 1950s, "Though others might have written thus, it was not in character for Brigadier Eddie." Myers was afforded the opportunity to refute the forgery in the appendix to Sarafis's *Greece: From Resistance to Civil War*,[5] and the record now stands corrected. It is high time to recognize that Myers's courageous support of the constitutional issue stands as one of the strongest arguments for the case of the Left. In the words of one soldier to another: "In our opinion, Eddie had been replaced because he showed himself sincere and objective and was thought to be friendly to EAM (though in fact he was not). As a regular army officer, he saw and reported the true situation, and he wanted it to be seen that he was acting impartially between the organizations."[6]

— *Marion Sarafis*

[1]Rpt. Reston, VA: W. B. O'Neill, 1985.

[2]David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive, with Documents* (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 163.

[3]Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, eds., *British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece* (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 147-166.

[4]Lars Baerentzen, "British Reports on Greece 1943-1944," in *Documents on Modern Greek History* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1982).

[5]M. Sarafis, ed., *Greece: From Resistance to Civil War* (Nottingham 1980), pp. 134-136.

[6]Stefanos Sarafis, *ELAS: Greek Resistance Army* (Merlin 1980), p. 187.

Symposium of Plato. Translated with an Introduction by Tom Griffith. Engraved by Peter Foster. Preface by John Patrick Lynch. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989, pp. 144 (unnumbered) [Stephanus Pages 172-223]; $25.00, clothbound.

The volume under review is a collector's delight. It is a photolithographic reproduction in slightly reduced format of the Libanus 355-copy limited edition, which was printed on Vélin d'Arches rag paper with the Greek text hand set and the English translation set in monotype. Tom Griffith, one of three classicist sons of a classicist father, Guy Thompson Griffith (to whom the book is dedicated), taught Greek and Latin for more than a decade in a public school in England and was head of the classics department at Marlborough College. Moved to produce a lively translation that would at the same time capture the spirit as well as the letter of Plato's *Symposium*, he coopted Peter Forster, a former civil servant for the department of the environment and now a freelance engraver, to do the beautiful wood engravings dispersed throughout the text. Kenneth Dover's Greek text appears on the facing pages.

Designed for bibliophiles, Griffith's translation of Plato's *Symposium* is described by John Lynch of the University of California at Santa Cruz as "By far the liveliest, most readable translation ever published of the *Symposium*—perhaps the liveliest, most readable translation of a Plato dialogue ever printed," whose "lucidity shines through the English in passages where the Greek is tortuous, highly abstract, or ambiguous. Because of Griffith's excellent command of English prose style, all the speakers in the dialogue sound crisp and articulate." That is not to say that Griffith's translation does not have difficulties, but it is eminently readable, even when he recasts entire Platonic sentences and paragraphs and diminishes stylistic and character differentiation for the sake of clarity.

Plato's *Symposium* is one of his most important dialogues, written between 384 and 369 B.C. It is a dialogue presumed to have taken place at a banquet (*symposion*) at the house of the poet Agathon and narrated by Aristodemos, an admirer of Socrates, who was present. Each guest takes a position in honor of love: Phaedrus from a mythical point of view; Pausanias from the perspective of a sophist; and Agathon from the vantage point of a poet. Aristophanes the comic poet acts in accordance with his professional reputation but with seriousness, while Socrates elevates his discussion to a higher plane. The notorious and intoxicated Alcibiades appears at the end of the dialogue, revealing his fascination with Socrates and Socrates' wisdom and unflappability.

Alcibiades acutely notes that Socrates has much to tell us:[1] "He always seems to be repeating himself, and people who haven't heard him before, and aren't too quick on the uptake, laugh at what he says. But look beneath the surface, and get inside them, and you'll find two things. In the first place, they're the only arguments which really make

any sense; on top of that they are supremely inspiring, because they contain countless models of excellence and pointers towards it. In fact, they deal with what you should be concerned about, if you want to lead a good and noble life" (222a).

Socrates, drawing on the wisdom of Diotima, the priestess of Mantinea, demonstrates that love, which "is the desire for permanent possession of the good" (206a), presents us with "the inevitable conclusion ... that we desire immortality as well as goodness" (207a). Those who are mentally creative search for the physically beautiful (the creative urge) and study the different kinds of beauty in the right order so that they may come to the ultimate goal of this educational process. Ultimate beauty is that ultimate goal: "Such is the experience of the man who approaches, or is guided towards, love in the right way, beginning with the particular examples of beauty, but always returning from them to the search for that one beauty. He uses them like a ladder, climbing from the love of one person to love two; from two to love of all physical beauty; from physical beauty to beauty in human behaviour; thence to beauty in subjects of study; from them he arrives finally at that branch of knowledge which studies nothing but ultimate beauty. Then at last he understands what true beauty is" (211b-c). This is the real reason for pursuing Eros—knowledge of "the divine beauty itself in its unique essence" (211e).

Griffith's fine translation of Plato's *Symposium* provides the Greekless student or the student with little Greek with a magnificent means for studying this dialogue, while offering the specialist the opportunity to test the translation itself against the original Greek text. There are no notes or commentary or other aids, so the instructor is free to teach and interpret as is appropriate for the particular occasion. Lovers of books will simply appreciate the beauty of the edition itself, whose subject is beauty—physical and eternal.

—*John E. Rexine*
Colgate University

[1]All the translations that follow are Tom Griffith's.

JOHN J. WINKLER, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece.* New York and London: Routledge, 1990, pp. x + 269; $14.95, paperbound.

John J. Winkler, professor of classics at Stanford University, unfortunately died prematurely this past spring (1990). He was well on his way to becoming one of an increasing number of leading scholars reinterpreting the evidence of classical antiquity in terms of contem-

porary approaches to sex and gender. His work displays intimate knowledge of contemporary anthropological theory and of its application to the study of the ancient world, but with the full understanding that such use is limited because we cannot personally interview ancient Greeks or Romans, as modern anthropologists can do as participant observers. Winkler notes that "the techniques of social and cultural anthropology . . . can elicit from those texts and pictures a richer and more complex understanding of sex and gender" (p. 13). Culture-bound assumptions are quickly and rigorously questioned.

Winkler has also benefited from visits to Greece and from the study of modern Greek practices, though he does not necessarily believe there is any real continuity between the ancient and modern Greeks (something those of Greek heritage will not easily take to). He does, however, admit that this experience has made him see new possibilities in the interpretation of ancient literature and life. Winkler has mastered the jargon of the anthropologists as well as having assumed the position that the contemporary methods of anthropologically informed reading will help in discrediting the ethnocentric interpretations that have dominated the English and German classical traditions for the past two hundred years.

The essays focus on what Winkler refers to as "the three protocols of androcentrism, phallocentrism, and invasion." (The dream analyst Artemidoros provides him with literary evidence for this.) The seven essays in this volume, which are the principal chapters of the book, were done over the last eight years and deal with both men and women. Some have appeared or will appear elsewhere as well. The "*Andres*" essays include (1) "Unnatural Acts: Erotic Protocols in Artemidoros' *Dream Analysis*"; (2) "Laying Down the Law: The Oversight of Men's Sexual Behavior in Classical Athens"; and (3) "The Constraints of Desire: Erotic Magical Spells." The "*Gynaikes*" essays comprise (5) "Penelope's Cunning and Homer's"; (6) "Double Consciousness in Sappho's Lyrics"; and (7) "The Laughter of the Oppressed: Demeter and the Gardens of Adonis." Intervening between these two groups is (4) "The Education of Chloe: Hidden Injuries of Sex." Needless to say, these essays can be read separately or together. There is an illuminating introduction that seeks to provide the rationale and unifying focus for the book, an appendix on "Artemidoros of Daldis: *Dream Analysis*—Book One, chapters 79/80" and another on "*Phusis* and *Natura* Meaning 'Genitals,' " notes, a superb bibliography, an index of the discussed passages, and a general index, as well as a preface and list of abbreviations. Despite the untraditional approach and even content of the book, traditional scholarly paraphernalia are utilized and scholarly procedures strictly observed. The general thesis of the book is that "the constraints of desire are socially constructed norms originating in a public, patriarchally organized order. Though women are a central topic in the articulation of these norms, the point of such

behavioral standards has more to do with the social relations between men than with the control of actual women. Behind the facade of public docility women had lives of their own and, arguably, a more comprehensive understanding of men than men had of women" (p. 209). Winkler's own concluding statement is undoubtedly the best summary of his own book. The individual essays constitute detailed examples of this thesis.

Artemidoros provides Winkler with the starting point in making the distinction between the conventional (*kata nomon*) and the unconventional (*para nomon*), and Artemidoros also shows that the word "nature" (*physis*) means "culture" and is not a value judgment but a category "used to organize fundamental social values and disvalues in the public domain" (p. 43). Winkler tries to show that the enforcement procedures against social deviants were a public fiction that was operational as a political strategy against a very small number within the social body. The assumption was that good men exercised control over all their various impulses to acquisitiveness for the sake of social solidarity ("men will be men"). The *eros* experience is seen as victimization by unwanted invasive forces—an experience that demands strong therapy. The torment of the lover is projected onto the loved one. The Daphnis and Chloe story offers the reader a study of the ambiguities of sexual ideology. Social, not biological forces, are considered to create the distinctions between the sexes.

The essays on women are in some ways more interesting and provocative than the essays on men. The *Odyssey* and Odysseus have long been seen as embodying the strategy of deception and covert communication. Penelope is studied in detail and is shown to be an extraordinary woman—unlike other wives, even as marriage (a certain kind of ideal, that is) is exalted. The *Odyssey* shrewdly demonstrates that *metis* is not gender-specific, since "the focus of the poet's demonstration is that the excellence of being a husband and being a wife are in some sense the same" (p. 161). In the case of the Sappho essay, we are made aware that woman's consciousness can involve much more than appears to a man. In Sappho's case, her reading of Homer involves a double consciousness. She can understand what Homer is saying (smaller circles) but by bringing her own total experience to bear, she can see and reveal the limitations and incompleteness of Homer's world and the strength of her own larger circle. Winkler's study of Sappho's sexual imagery, though the latter can and should be outside critical examination, is intended to illustrate "a personal and subjective commitment to the holy, physical contemplation of the body of woman, as metaphor and reality, in all parts of life" (p. 187). Finally, in his study of women's laughter and the festivals and rituals that embraced it, Winkler elucidates the clear possibility that there was an alternative consciousness, namely, a woman's perspective on sex and gender, that has not hitherto been understood or taken seriously by scholars of Greece.

The Constraints of Desire has already been hailed as a path-breaking book exemplifying the very best in the "new" classical scholarship which is reexamining the ancient texts with the latest tools of the social sciences, especially anthropology. Winkler's investigation seeks to go far beyond the public images conveyed by intellectuals and the competition for ideological domination, and to get as close as possible to recapturing the actual beliefs and practices of both men and women in the general ancient population. In this sense, *The Constraints of Desire* ultimately seeks to reconstruct antiquity on a more accurate and objective historical basis, but proceeding as it does from the perspective of contemporary methodologies colored by modern values, it runs the risk of being as skewed as the traditional "idealistic" classical constructs that it so severely criticizes.

—*John E. Rexine*
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Notes and Comments

KEVIN ANDREWS
1924-1989

by KERIN HOPE

Kevin Andrews arrived in Greece as a 24-year-old graduate student from Harvard, armed with a year's traveling fellowship and a thesis topic he cheerfully admitted knowing nothing about, and stayed on. Much later, on the day in 1975 that he became a Greek citizen, he wrote in a letter to a new compatriot: "When I first set foot on your country's soil twenty-seven and a half years ago something got me by the scruff of the neck. A voice inside me said, 'May I never leave this place.' "

He was born in Peking in 1924, the natural son of an English father and an American mother, and he had a classical education of a mixed Anglo-American kind at Stowe in England and St. Paul's in Concord, New Hampshire. Studies at Harvard were interrupted in his junior year, when he joined the U.S. army and served as a reconnaissance scout in the Po Valley campaign in Italy in the final stages of World War II.

After graduating summa cum laude in classics and American literature in 1947, he set out from the American School of Classical Archaeology in Athens in solitary pursuit of Crusader fortifications in the Peloponnese at a time when the Civil War was still in full swing. The scholarly result was *Castles of the Morea* (1953), an exacting but readable historical and architectural study that is long overdue for reprinting. But his dangerous treks through mountain country where the army was hunting left-wing guerrillas—and some villagers took advantage of the

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climate of lawlessness to settle their personal feuds—also provided the inspiration for *The Flight of Icarus* (1959), which has become a classic of travel writing. In fact, it is much more: rural Greek life is revealed in all its unremitting harshness, along with the disquieting political implications of the struggle between nationalists and communists, in a way that no other foreign writer on Greece has emulated. But the streak of romanticism underlying Andrews's rich, convoluted style is clear, as is his receptiveness and affection for many of the people he encountered.

In 1983, he revised *The Flight of Icarus* for publication by Penguin Books, and found himself, unwillingly at first, overhauling large sections of the text. It was an effort less to polish the writing, though he was inclined to be a perfectionist when it came to style, than to illuminate with the help of hindsight the political and social consequences of that bitter period. But his younger, more innocent self still emerges, coming to grips with the landscape and its personalities.

Meeting him on a mountainside, dressed in a shepherd's goathair cape, with his knapsack and cane flute, he could easily have been mistaken for a reincarnation of Pan. He had, too, the unsettling quality associated with mythological presences in Greek literature, often making those around him sharply—sometimes uncomfortably—aware of large moral issues that are conveniently blurred in day-to-day life. Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that he suffered from epilepsy, the "divine sickness" of the ancient Greeks. He had seizures, lasting only a minute or so, but enough to add an undercurrent of anxiety to a gentle, transparently straightforward character. But he also challenged the disease, climbing mountains in fierce summer heat and swimming long distances alone. It was a seizure while swimming that caused his death.

Marriage to Mrs. Nancy Roosevelt, a daughter of e. e. cummings, turned out unhappily, and his three children were sometimes a source of disappointment. He led a seemingly solitary life behind the shutters of a small house in the Metz district of Athens, disappearing sometimes to Cyprus, often to the Megarid to visit friends who still kept goats and sheep on the mountainsides overlooking the heavily industrialized coastline.

Visiting him in Athens, you never knew quite what to expect. The house was a cherished relic of a different kind of Greece: uncompromisingly bare floorboards; plain furniture—shiny with age, not polished; bookshelves filled with tattered yellow paperbacks, pamphlets, and manuscripts; musical instruments and weavings, for use rather than decoration. If he was writing or revising a text, you might be asked to read it in the study, draped in a woven blanket if it was winter. If he wasn't writing, or had been infuriated by a rejection slip, he would be hammering strips of brass and copper into a heavy bracelet or necklace at a bench in the kitchen hung with old-fashioned pots and crockery. In summer there was the courtyard at the back of the house and, for dinner, a bowl of potato salad, interspersed with sliced onions and hardboiled eggs. Austerity—the kind that keeps shepherds lean on stale bread and a handful of olives—was the rule, but he could be persuaded out to eat a steak, with an air of enjoying an extraordinarily exotic dish.

He hated what became of Athens as dull cement apartment blocks swallowed up the traditional pink-and-ocher neoclassical houses he had lived in, and the city filled up with strangers, noise, and pollution. Yet he wrote what is undoubtedly the best description of the modern city of Athens in Dent's Cities of the World series (1967), a lively, highly original antidote to hagiographies about the birthplace of democracy, which pulls no punches about the shortcomings of modern Greece.

The years of the colonels' dictatorship were perhaps the most intense of his Athenian life: like Greek intellectuals, he often spoke of the junta period with a kind of nostalgia for the companionship of opposition it induced. He followed events closely, combining a reporter's eye for detail with a sharp, poetic sense of history. His account of Seferis's funeral in 1971, reprinted in Greece in *The Dark* (1979), a collection of essays from the colonels' days (some published anonymously), both captures the mood of a day when thousands of Greeks turned out in a spirit of subdued defiance and puts it firmly in context. It ends:

> Thousands of others went their way also, no longer confused, out through the cemetery gate, in an evening light so clear you would have thought there was no end

to it, into the streets where the traffic was moving again, and the southeast corner of the Parthenon showed light-struck under a few clouds over the apartment blocks, high over the noise and the indifference and fear, and the stacks of police still bunched at every corner, with their auxiliary bands of toughs scratching their groins and waiting for trouble.

Both then and later, he apportioned much of the blame for the dictatorship to the Americans, developing a theme of foreign interference in Greece dating as far back as the Romans. In a long poem, "First Will and Testament" (1974), he savaged Western leaders who meddled in Greece with the vehemence of an eighteenth-century satirist. Once the dictatorship was over, however, it proved an unpopular topic, and he found it increasingly difficult to publish his articles in the United States. But he was also dismayed by what followed: democracy under Constantine Karamanlis seemed to him too thoroughly guided, with many former junta supporters allowed to flourish in the police and judiciary, while the New Democracy Party glossed over its right-wing antecedents and pursued a liberal image intended to help Greece's application to join the European Community. He may have been too extreme: his concern for justice and moral responsibility certainly outweighed his sense of politics. But another satirical poem, "Byzantine Blues" (1980), exactly caught the atmosphere of well-heeled conservative hypocrisy in the late 1970s that helped speed Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement to power in 1981.

However, it was the conservative government that altered the law to permit him to become a Greek citizen—something previously reserved for foreigners of Greek descent and women who married Greeks. With his disjointed background, it was a solution to the problem of belonging, while also indicating his determination not to avoid the obligations of living in Greece—which foreigners are generally only too glad to escape. He certainly belonged, giving an occasional lecture or writing in left-wing newspapers and magazines in a stylish, direct, demotic Greek.

He grew apart from politics as it receded into the populist sloganeering of the eighties, and went back to the mountains.

In his last two years, he walked all over the Pindus, exploring the last Civil War battlegrounds of 1949, with a new enthusiasm. He also returned to the Megarid. In a piece published after his death, he described Athens as he first saw it, from a ship about to dock in Piraeus. But it could just as well have been from the height of the Gerania range:

> Six miles inland through pellucid air the Acropolis was a lone, delicate incision above two separate towns of red-tiled roofs, separated by farmland and remnants of the immense olive grove of western Attica. The light was deceptive only in the invitation to enumerate the leaves and tiles as effortlessly as the pebbles on the surrounding mountains.

Just before he died, he fell in love with a fellow writer and poet, and resumed work on a novel set aside years before. They went together to the island of Kythera. On September 1, in high spirits, he played the flute in the supermarket in Chora as they shopped for a picnic on the rocky southern coast opposite the islet of Avgo, a haunt of monk seals and birds. It was the kind of long swim—ten kilometers there and back—that he could not resist. But a sudden wind got up and he disappeared from sight on the outward journey. After night fell, the search was abandoned. His body was found by a fisherman: he had drowned after an epileptic seizure, exactly 42 years from the day that he first arrived in Greece.

Letter to the Editors

Dear Editor:

It is only recently that I read David Ricks' review of my book *Homage to Byzantium: The Life and Work of Nikos Gabriel Pentzikis* in the *Journal*'s 13:1-2 (1986) issue. After thanking Mr. Ricks for writing the review and you for publishing it, I would like to make a few comments.

It is quite natural that a reviewer will want to show his own erudition regarding the subject of the book he is reviewing, but this should be done through correcting the writer of the book, not at his expense. The description of my book is not merely limited, spotty, but also misleading. The first third of the review deals with the humorous Pentzikis. The implication is that I do not deal in my book with this side of Pentzikis or that I do not deal enough. This is not true. Throughout the study, this side of Pentzikis the man and the writer receives attention, and in the chapter "Inspiration and Craft" I focus on Pentzikis' style as "labor" and as "play," his game with numbers (psipharithmisi), etc. On the other hand, I refrained from calling Pentzikis a "humorist," for, in Greece at least, such a term takes us to writers like Psathas and Tsiforos. Skarimbas, whom Ricks likens to Pentzikis, is also a very different case. Further down in his review, Ricks implies that I propose Pentzikis as a stylist and sets about giving the correct definition of Pentzikis as a writer, which definition is, in fact, another way of saying what I say in my book. I never praise Pentzikis for his style, I only try to understand it. In the next paragraph, Ricks refers to the fact that Seferis wrote an essay (kept a diary, is the more accurate term) on Pentzikis' *The Novel of Mrs. Ersi* and conceals the fact that the relationship of Seferis and Pentzikis (as reflected not only in Seferis' diary on Pentzikis but also in Pentzikis' older *spoudogeloion* essay on Seferis, in the volume *Ya ton Seferi*) is given extensive treatment in my book. Of course, the shadowy image of my work (the only prismatic, full-length study of Pentzikis in any language) that emerges from Ricks' review may be due to the fact that he did not read but merely leafed through the book. But I do not think so. There is deliberation, behind which I detect the not unfamiliar arrogance and condescension with which certain non-Greek neo-Hellenists treat the work of their Greek colleagues.

— *G. Thaniel*
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