Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts

Monday, 28 November 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The following list attempts to keep track of foreign military equipment delivered to Russia by Belarus and Iran during the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War. The entries below are sorted by armament category (with a flag denoting the country of delivery), and due to the confidential nature of some arms deliveries they can serve only as a lower bound to the total volume of weaponry shipped to Russia. Private purchases and commercially available military gear purchased for mobilised troops are not included in this list. This list will be updated as further military support is uncovered.

Sunday, 27 November 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Iran's drone success sets the stage for an expansion of its sphere of influence as the number of countries where Iranian UAVs operate is growing. This not only includes a vast number of non-state actors such as Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, but also countries like Ethiopia (which began to operate its Mohajer-6 UCAVs in late 2021 after some initial teething issues), Russia and Tajikistan. It seems like the number of state actors operating Iranian UAVs is only set to increase in the future, while non-state actors like the Houthis will continue to receive new Iranian drone designs as the country's UAV designs are rapidly evolving despite the implementation of foreign sanctions specifically targeting Iran's drone industry and its exports abroad.

Saturday, 26 November 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Few Russian weapons systems have managed to impress international audiences during the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War. Though this is partially the result of decades of hyping up Russian weapons systems to standards they could never live up to by Western think tanks, Russia also failed to timely invest in certain technologies and thus is a latecomer to systems such as unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and loitering munitions. Despite having designed a host of guided weapons systems, few were ever acquired by the Russian Air Force in any meaningful numbers, which mostly continues to make use of 1980s-era Kh-25s and Kh-29s and even unguided bombs. Even Russia's most modern precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have been observed to be lacking in accuracy, especially compared to Western PGMs.

Friday, 25 November 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The use of Iranian-designed loitering munitions by Russia has received a large share of international media attention. Though they are a menace to Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, Russia has so far largely refrained from using them against Ukrainian military targets. A more serious development to Ukraine's Armed Forces comes in the form of the indigenously-designed Kub and Lancet-3(M) loitering munitions that Russia has increasingly been deploying to strike Ukrainian artillery, radars and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems out of reach from Russia's ground-based assets.

Wednesday, 23 November 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Chechen forces are an integral part of Russia's Armed Forces. Its military formations have generally been described as 'Feuerwehr Der Front' during the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War, leading assaults and plugging holes in Russia's defensive lines. The tendency of some Chechen fighters to film and upload their exploits in combat on TikTok has also resulted in the less glamorous title of TikTok Brigade. In reality, Chechen forces appear to be faring better than most analogous units in the Russian military. Though Chechen units are part of the National Guard, and thus trained and equipped to combat internal threats, they have been mostly deployed to fight a conventional conflict in Ukraine.

Tuesday, 22 November 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The conclusion of the two-year-long First Chechen War in 1997 gave rise to internal chaos as the government of President Aslan Maskhadov proved unable to rebuild Chechnya and reign in the increasing number of Islamist factions in the Republic. Despite Maskhadov's decision to abolish the Chechen parliament and introduce aspects of Sharia law to appease Islamist factions, figures such as Shamil Basayev and Saudi-born Ibn al-Khattab effectively continued to undermine Maskhadov's rule. In April 1998, the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, led by Basyev and al-Khattab, publicly declared its goal of creating an Islamic Emirate on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan and the expulsion of Russians from the entire Caucasus: The seeds for the Second Chechen War (1999-2009) had been sowed.

Monday, 21 November 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
For a list of Russian equipment losses during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War click here.
 
The First Chechen War was fought between Russia and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria from December 1994 to August 1996, ultimately leading to a peace treaty and de-facto independence for Chechnya in 1997. Russia's invasion and the two-year long conflict that ensued was preceded by a covert intervention carried out in support of a coup attempt by pro-Russian Chechen factions and Russian intelligence agencies in November 1994, which unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the regime of President Dzhokhar Dudayev. After successfully repelling a Russian armoured assault on the capital Grozny, Dudayev threatened the execution of dozens of Russian Army prisoners to force Russia to admit its involvement in the coup. By now more than fed up with the lawlessness that marked Chechnya during that period, and realising that its covert attempts at regime change in Chechnya had failed, Russia began to draw plans for an invasion of Chechnya, ultimately invading the unrecognised post-Soviet state on the 11th of December.

Saturday, 29 October 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
  
The 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War has laid bare the issues affecting the Russian Armed Forces and the farce that was Russia's military build-up of the 2010s after a lengthy period of decay throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Having lost the initiative across the whole frontline and so far unable to change the tide, Russia's only remaining hope at stabilising the front are the country's mobilisation and the potential mass use of (Iranian) loitering munitions and ballistic missiles to force Ukraine to the negotiation table at terms favourable to Russia. Whatever their eventual effects on the course of the war, there can be no doubt the Russian leadership completely overestimated its own capabilities while at the same time severely underestimating the Ukrainians' resolve in defending their country.

Friday, 28 October 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Few countries have weaponised disinformation to the extent Russia has over the past decade. Yet for all its attempts at influencing foreign opinion through fabrications and false narratives, Russia generally puts surprisingly little effort into crafting most of its propaganda claims. Whether it's denying the use of cluster bombs over Syria while at the same time publishing a video showing Syrian-based RuAF aircraft carrying cluster bombs or using footage from a video game as evidence of the United States supporting ISIS in Syria, most false narratives serve to convince Russias's domestic audience or a foreign audience that is already inclined to believe Moscow's narrative in the first place. [1] [2]

Thursday, 13 October 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Russia is notably lagging behind in the development and production of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Its attempts to catch up have included weaponising the Forpost UAV, which is a licensed copy of the Israeli IAI Searcher, and designing an indigenous UCAV known as the Kronshtadt Orion. Several more advanced UCAV designs are also in the pipeline, including Sukhoi's Okhotnik-B, and Kronshtadt's Sirius and Grom projects. The future of these systems, already in some doubt due to a lack of access to certain key technologies, will be even more so now that Russia finds itself buckling under the weight of international sanctions. Regardless of the continued course of their development, it is certain that Russia has all but missed the boat when it comes to cashing in on the worldwide drone revolution. To add further insult to injury, Russia has recently found itself forced to turn to Iran for the acquisition of Mohajer-6 UCAVs and Shahed-131/6 loitering munitions to satisfy its operational needs during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Tuesday, 4 October 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
In August 2008, the militaries of Russia and the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia fought Georgia in a brief five-day war. On August 1, South Ossetian forces began shelling Georgia in spite of a 1992 ceasefire agreement. In response, the Georgian Army was sent into territory controlled by South Ossetia on the 7th of August, taking control over most of the city of Tskhinvali. Russia accused Georgia of committing genocide as an excuse to enter the war on behalf of South Ossetia, launching a full-scale land, air and sea invasion of Georgia on the 8th of August.

Tuesday, 16 August 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Mali has been in a near constant state of conflict since 2012, when the Tuareg rebellion prompted an Islamist insurgent advance that soon threatened to put the whole country under Al-Qaeda control. The French military intervened in early 2013 in order to halt their advance towards the capital Bamako and to bring back northern Mali back under government control. The French Army, with the support of Malian forces, quickly reversed the enemy's gains and secured much of the country with the exception of the Kidal region, to which Al-Qaeda (and later Islamic State) retreated. In recent years, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State have attempted to further expand their areas of operation by carrying out numerous attacks on Malian and U.N. forces, which remain deployed to Mali. The primary objective of U.N. forces is to combat the extremist groups, cut off their supply routes and prevent them from creating safe havens to which they can retreat training security forces in the region to handle these threats in the future.

Tuesday, 7 June 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Russia's anti-aircraft artillery forces are perhaps best known for operating large numbers of vicious-looking 2K22 Tunguska and Pantsir-S1 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAGs). Limited numbers of ZSU-23 Shilkas continue to see service as well, with at least four of them lost during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. [1] Newer fighting vehicles in this category and modernisation packages for them continue to be developed to this day, including newer variants of both the Pantsir and Tunguska. Perhaps it's all the more ironic therefore that the latest addition to Russia's anti-aircraft arsenal is in fact a DIY SPAAG currently deployed with the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) in the breakaway state of Transnistria.

Saturday, 16 April 2022

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By Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer

There's little denying at this point that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been an unmitigated military and economical disaster. What was meant to be a quick operation with the aim of surrounding and seize Kyiv and Eastern Ukraine, forcing Western powers to the negotiation table over the future status of the country, has now turned into a bloody war of attrition in the East that Russia is not in a position to sustain. Russia's offensive has laid bare a host of problems with Russian military leadership, tactics and equipment, together culminating in a catastrophe that will surely be analysed for years to come.

Wednesday, 13 April 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
  
Six weeks into Russia's invasion of Ukraine it can be argued that the full array of issues affecting the Russian military and its operational planning have been laid bare. Setting out to first seize Kyiv within days in order to have a strong position in negotiations with the West about the future status of Ukraine in exchange for a reduction of sanctions, it suddenly finds itself a month past that deadline with meagre territorial gains, an army in tatters and severe reputational damage, not to mention an economy buckling under some of the heaviest sanctions ever instated on a nation. [1]

Thursday, 7 April 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
With modern U.S., Chinese and Turkish UCAVs already operationally deployed in a multitude of nations and conflicts worldwide, Russia has been notably lagging behind in the development and production of such drones. Favouring instead attack helicopters like the Ka-52 and Mi-28 to perform strike missions while loitering over the battlefield, they adhere to a doctrine that disregards the UCAV's carefully executed reconnaissance and strike operations for more aggressive search and assault missions. Each new conflict of the modern age seems to showcase the merit of the UCAV to greater detail however, and Russia has thus increasingly opted to invest in the concept as well.

Thursday, 24 March 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer in collaboration with Joost Oliemans, Kemal, Dan and Jakub Janovsky
  
A detailed list of destroyed, damaged and captured ships of both sides can be seen below. This list will be updated as additional footage becomes available.

Sunday, 20 March 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer in collaboration with Joost Oliemans, LotA, Kemal, Dan and Jakub Janovsky
  
A detailed list of destroyed, damaged and captured aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of both sides can be seen below. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Tuesday, 8 March 2022

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By Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer
 
The still early but shockingly brutal invasion of Ukraine by Putin's Russia has thrown the historically tragedy-ridden country back into some of its darkest days. Besieged from three directions whilst a vastly larger military force rains down fire on any target with little to no regard for civilian life, it is struggling for its very right to exist – with Vladimir Putin repeatedly making allusions to his intention of essentially dissolving the country into Russia. Under these circumstances, and with this grim prospective, the Ukrainian people would be forgiven for feeling hopeless and abandoned.

Sunday, 27 February 2022

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By Stijn Mitzer in collaboration with Kemal, Dan and Jakub Janovsky
 
A list of Russian targets confirmed to have been destroyed or neutralised by Bayraktar TB2s over Ukraine can be viewed below. This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. In some cases this solely consists of footage that was recorded on the ground. In these cases, the use of an armed drone was reported by witnesses on the ground. In an effort to attract as little attention to its operations as possible, very little footage of TB2 strikes over Ukraine has been released. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed by TB2s is likely significantly higher than recorded here. Hits on strategic targets of which no footage is available (such as fuel depots struck in Russia) are not included in this list. The list will be updated as additional footage becomes available.