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2018, European Journal of Philosophy
Because of the privileged place of beliefs in explaining behaviour, mismatch cases – in which agents sincerely claim to believe that p, but act in a way that is inconsistent with that belief – have attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, I argue that some of these cases, at least, are at least partially explained by agents believing that they believe that p, while failing to believe that p. Agents in these cases do not believe that ~p; rather, they have an indistinct first-order, beliefy, representation that p. The indistinctness of this first-order representation provides the leeway for the inconsistency seen in their behavior.
2009 •
Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.
Cognitively -oriented literary studies, if they are to appeal to a broad array of literary scholars, will need to link together cognition and culture. This essay brings together cognitive-psychological studies of the metarepresentational mind and of religious belief in order to offer an explanation of the nature and historical emergence of novelistic realism. It shows how novelistic realism, unlike other kinds of story, directly exercises what psychologist Alan Leslie calls the “decoupling mechanism” of the metarepresentational mind. And it argues that this kind of story takes on its specific power in the history of story because of specific cultural change.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks2014 •
Several studies (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007) demonstrated that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others’ actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called “Developmental Paradox”. De Bruin and Kästner (2012) recently suggested that the Developmental Paradox is best addressed in terms of the relation between coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes and argued that if enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. to provide us with a convincing account of how low-level sensorimotor practices transform into higher-order representational skills. This paper defends, against De Bruin and Kästner, an enactive response to the Developmental Paradox. I argue that 3-year olds’ failure to verbally report their false-belief understanding does not arise from stronger decoupling demands. Rather, they fail because the elicited response false-belief trials involve representational decoupling tout court and what is more, under pressure.
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