

The Rebel Governance of the SPLM/A and UNITA
A comparative study on parallel states in Angola and South Sudan

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of rebel political orders and the degree of governance rebels can install in their liberated areas. It studies the ways in which force came to be transformed into authority under the rule of two military organisations fighting asymmetrical wars in highly divided societies. Wartime rebel states are by nature an exercise in control and power, in projecting authority and symbolism, in managing contradictions and shortcomings, but are also deeply revealing of the characteristics of rebel movements, their motivations, survival strategies and organisational capacity. This thesis on the rebel governance of União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) is a study on how two very different reform rebel movements, fighting two of Africa's deadliest and recurrent civil wars, devised and designed institutions to govern civilian populations in the stable liberated areas of Jamba in Angola and Yambio in South Sudan. Existing governing strategies were reformed after both faced critical junctures that exposed the fragilities of their organisations, the insufficient coordination of structures and leadership, and the need to reformulate an ideology to rally widespread support across constituencies.

Their parallel states emerged as a key pillar to survive and win their second liberations. The Free Lands of Angola embodied UNITA's centralised and totalitarian state project. The New Sudan embodied the SPLM/A's decentralized approach to governance and its pragmatism of local alliances. This comparison is structured around four internal agentic elements of these two movements: their leadership, ideology/political program, organisation and approach to civilians. This allows for mutually reinforcing explanations of what informed their parallel states and contextualizes strategies and motivations by

exposing a 'rebel-system' as a theory of operation accounting for change and highlighting elements that powered the movements and their liberation struggles.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

On the 22nd of February 2002, Angola awoke to the news that would end the civil war. União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)'s leader Jonas Malheiro Savimbi had been killed. Reactions were varied in Luanda. Many celebrated, others remained calm but several from different political organisations and opposition parties understood that the main source of resistance to the governing Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) had been extinguished. Reactions in the countryside were very different as over 4 million people were affected by years of scorched earth policies with a deepening and underreported humanitarian crisis. The leader once admired for his resilience and vision for Angola died a brutal warlord that had killed, maimed and purged his own in the last decade of the war. At the same time across the continent, on the 20th July 2002, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)'s leader John Garang de Mabior was preparing to sign the Machakos Protocol with the government of Sudan as war continued to rage but principles for peace were slowly building confidence in a new political reality.

On 20th July 2005, Sudan too received the news that First Vice President John Garang had been killed in a helicopter crash. He had survived decades of war only to perish after 3 weeks of taking office. Protests erupted all over the country upon hearing of his death, threatening to destabilize the government in Khartoum and reignite the war. Savimbi died in retreat, outgunned and outmanoeuvred, Garang died in office but neither witnessed what their experience of wartime state building could do in reconstructing the state during peacetime. Perhaps they never would as transposing lessons and structures

would be unrealistic, contested by elites and existing civil servants, or perhaps would not produce the semblance of functionality they had in smaller more controllable scales. Both leaders and their liberation movements did however, in very different ways and living very distinct experiences, learn to govern civilian populations with authority and not just coercion. Structures that mimicked a state project were erected, other structures emerged that were suited to overcome specific challenges, and others were built to contrast with the structures of “oppression” represented by the enemy state. As a result of these parallel states the governments of Angola and Sudan were denied the ability to exercise the prerogatives of statehood in several parts of their countries. Each was an exercise in political and symbolic expediency, transactional politics, and military strategy but also a project of an envisaged future aiming to alter state-society and society-society relations. Nothing about these rebel parallel states was simple or straightforward and to attempt to explain their contours requires a deeper understanding of the liberation movements themselves.

This thesis studies the manner in which force came to be transformed into authority under the rule of two military organisations fighting asymmetrical wars in highly divided societies. Wartime rebel states are by nature an exercise in control and power, in projecting authority and symbolism, in managing contradictions and shortcomings, but are also deeply revealing of the characteristics of rebel movements, their motivations, survival strategies and organisational capacity. This thesis is a study on how two very different liberation movements, fighting two of Africa’s deadliest and recurring civil wars, devised and designed institutions to govern civilian populations in the stable liberated areas of Jamba in Angola and Yambio in South Sudan. It examines portions of Angola and UNITA’s, and Southern Sudan and the SPLM/A’s history integrating change, survival and

adaptation strategies through the analysis of critical junctures. It is an analysis of parallel states that operate and develop outside of the formal state. In this thesis, the study of rebel governance moves beyond the description of rebel structures and institutions to define the characteristics of these rebel movements that enabled their willingness and ability to govern civilian populations in parallel states. To do this, I focus on four internal, and agentic, characteristics of leadership, ideology, organisation, and approach to civilians. Observing change in these four internal characteristics provides for the 'rebel – system' that highlights 1) how reform rebellions react to critical junctures, 2) the survival of the insurgency and 3) the kind of parallel state they end up with.

This is a study of rebel political orders and the degree of governance rebels can install in their liberated areas. Huntington made the critical point that “the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government”. His concern was to show that whichever the political system, its politics must embody “consensus, community, legitimacy, organisation, effectiveness, and stability”.¹ Understanding how the desire for power is institutionalized into an organisation, with an ideology and a leadership structure, supported by a strategy to contain dissent and factionalism and sustain a civilian support base, lies at the heart of this study on UNITA and the SPLM/A. These rebel movements implemented strategies to deliver public goods and services, using military, political, and administrative instruments with two objectives: to help sustain their war efforts and to build a “nation” of supporters to legitimize their parallel political project. Securing such a support base

1 Huntington, Samuel, 1968, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, p. 1.

was a key element of the parallel state, as defined by nationalist political programmes that aimed to reform the state through the emancipation of the “people” they claimed to represent. The clash of societies and wars of visions, that defined the ways UNITA and the SPLM/A perceived their duty and their right to seek a new order of things, reinforced the protractability of these conflicts. The political orders produced in the Free Lands of Angola and the New Sudan, were sustained by diverse and opposing forces of centralized and decentralized control; of instrumentalising existing systems of authority; on contractarian and relational dynamics, but ultimately, they were exercises in survival, resilience, and adaptation.

This thesis is concerned with three main questions:

- 1) Under what conditions do reform rebels begin to develop their governing projects to create a parallel state?
- 2) What do critical junctures, that led to more complex leadership structures, ideological reformulations, organizational readjustments, and more responsive approaches to civilians reveal about survival strategies and recalibrated priorities?
- 3) What does an understanding of their rebel-system reveal about the underlying practices and strategies that led UNITA and the SPLM/A to adopt different structures and institutions in the context of numerous and multifaceted constraints?

The objective is twofold. Firstly, the thesis seeks an explanation on the development and form taken of the parallel states of UNITA and the SPLM/A. Secondly, it links the dynamics

and changes of the four internal characteristics of the two movements to a rebel-system that integrates survival strategies with alternative political orders. The aim is to develop and illustrate a way of analysing state-building rebel movements as a part of a larger explanatory system of how movements function, why they survive and fail.

I. The Argument and Analytical Framework

I argue that *reform rebels* need to be studied in a dynamic and integrated way, through an analytical framework, that identifies how they progress and regress in four strategic internal aspects. The establishment of the parallel states and the forms they take are a direct result of how leadership, ideology, organisation and approach to civilians are aligned into a broader survival strategy to defeat the enemy on multiple fronts. This is an approach of total war aimed at delegitimising the state territorially, politically, socially, economically and symbolically. These four agentic elements are key to revealing decisions taken and pathways followed towards governing civilian populations. They help produce a rebel-system that links the agentic characteristics of rebels with their state project to develop a theory of operation. It reveals what powered each of the pieces from the perspective of the mechanics of survival, expansion and transformation.

In the analysis on progression and regression two types of moments impact the paths taken by state-building rebel movements: 1) the launching of the rebellion (and extant conditions at the time) and 2) the subsequent critical junctures they faced. Critical junctures are understood as moments in political life that lead transitions to “establish certain directions of change and foreclose others in a way that shapes politics for years

to come”.² The national and structural conditions UNITA and the SPLM/A encountered while organising their rebellions led them to form very different organisations. The critical junctures analysed reveal the deficiencies and the strengths in the four internal areas. These critical moments, where both UNITA (1976) and the SPLM/A (1991) were at their weakest points facing near defeat, led to existing governing strategies being redefined towards greater inclusion and instrumentalisation of civilians and to the creation of new systems of order and institutions to manage them. Ultimately what allowed UNITA and the SPLM/A to survive the immediate aftermaths of the critical junctures was their leadership and the flexibility of their political message that allowed the movements to redirect or create popular anger to advance towards another era of war.

These two cases reveal that the parallel state is built once several alignments take place: 1) a strong leader commanding and overseeing the creation of the parallel state understands the balancing required between political, military and social imperatives so that different contradictory interests can coexist. Such leaders retain the political control of the liberation and manage to persuade commanders and followers to commit to organisational rather than personal imperatives. Understanding which are the reproductive mechanisms at the command levels and civilian levels are a key aspect of this analysis. 2) The rebel movement transitions from having an ideology and political program able to mobilize fighters to one that projects a future vision of the state appealing to civilians of different constituencies. The aim is to build a cohesive political

² Collier, Ruth, and Collier, David, 1991, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the labour movements, and regime dynamics in Latin America*, Princeton University Press, p. 27-31.

identity to reinforce the new nationalist cause. The nationalist message is crafted on real or perceived clashes of societies or wars of visions uniting different constituencies but is flexible enough to accommodate the contradictory interests of elites, followers and external patrons. 3) Organizationally, there is a separation of political, military and administrative branches. The political organs begin to develop and take on greater prominence in preparing the parallel state, engaging civilians and embedding them in an alternative political reality. Delivery of services becomes a key aspect of organisation and logistics as military imperatives are pursued in tandem with political and social imperatives, even if the political wing is underdeveloped and inadequate. 4) The approach to civilians is a result of the previous shifts, and transitions from a lens of recruitment, containment and food source to a lens of self-defined citizenship and participation in the liberation. The strategies to achieve this may differ but the inclusion of other sources of authority (chiefs, church etc.) and civilians in the war effort with reciprocal benefits and devolution of power is key.

To contextualise this comparison in a controlled manner, given the numerous ways to compare rebel movements, I create an analytical framework through which the tools available to these movements are better understood and more easily examined. The use of the 4 internal elements help clarify the factors that led to survival and contextualise the purpose and functioning of the parallel state. This framework reveals *which* similarities actually explain survival, in contrast to approaches which just assume some set of factors of rebel characteristics in advance. They are deemed as “internal” elements, as a way of distinguishing the characteristics that were entirely under the strategic control of the organisations. They are agentic and traceable in how they progress by decisions made within the command of the movements and shifts resulting from new

challenges. They contrast with “external” elements like accessibility of resources, external support, government responses, type and duration of war, social cleavages and ethnic relations, that arguably fall outside the direct ability of movements to control and direct in order to redefine their organisations and liberation struggles. The understanding being that “external” factors would impact only as far as the movement was able to manage and strategically align the “internal” factors. As the internal elements shift in form and structure throughout the war so do the governing strategies in the liberated areas. I defend that an analysis of the internal elements of state-building/reform rebels facilitates a better understanding of these movements by analysing their choices and policies regarding areas where they had the power to make strategic adjustments. External elements do not always allow rebels that level of power and control.

Purpose and Contribution

The thesis does not propose to challenge previous theories of rebel governance in general, neither does it attempt to define the reasons why different state-building movements built different types of parallel states. It does aim to provide a way to understand and assess how parallel states transform the ability of rebel “governors” to *survive* critical junctures and create multipronged responses to war. This reveals the interlinkage of how institutions of governance create and constrain opportunities for rebel success, survival and/or demise, and how governing strategies reflect the characteristics of the internal elements. The analytical framework allows for deeper insights that will explain the ‘rebel–system’. This approach offers a fresh perspective that links the characteristics of rebel movements with their parallel state projects. They are

mutually reinforcing analytical aims. While using such an analytical framework to assist in comparisons is not a novel approach³, it has not been fully used to study⁴ how limitations and choices faced by reform rebels staging a “second liberation” inform strategies and the design of their parallel rebel states. In this way, it is “necessary to construct models of political interactions (...) and show the connections between elements in it”.⁵ Such a model does not “overcome the basic problems of political comparison. Its usefulness is to be judged by its success in drawing the varied elements of politics in the cases it examines into a coherent and convincing relationship”.⁶ I adopt the same approach.

I aim to make two contributions. The first relates to the use of this analytical framework to help define a ‘rebel-system’ that explains the motivations, design, and approaches taken in governing during wartime. The ‘rebel-system’ is an operational paradigm premised on understanding the rebel movements and their parallel states as an integrated system rather than incorporating these into a larger ‘conflict-system’ that analyses the complexities of war, the actors involved, and the societies in which they take place. As an operational paradigm, the rebel-system, places the sequence of events, decisions, strategies, processes and interactions into a framework to organise the data collected. I aim to build a theory of operation for each of the cases by identifying what

³ O’Neill, Bard; Heaton, William; Alberts, Donald, (eds), 1980, *Insurgency in the Modern World*, Westview Press, p.5; Mampilly, Zachariah, 2011, *Rebel Rulers, Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*, Cornell University Press, p.17; Chabal, Patrick, 2002 (1983), *Amilcar Cabral Revolutionary Leadership and People’s War*, Hurst & Company, p. 188.

⁴ The assessment of the existing literature on rebel governance, analysed in Chapter 2, combines external and internal elements to analyse rebel governance.

⁵ Clapham, Christopher, 1976, *Liberia and Sierra Leone: An essay in Comparative Politics*, Cambridge University Press, p. 125.

⁶ *ibid*, p. 127.

are the main factors affecting change and propelling the state-building project. The rebel-system approach helps identify how internal characteristics and the combination of key internal aspects led to different institutional choices and strategies. It also helps identify how responses are conditioned by these characteristics and were crafted to survive critical junctures. The rebel-system is not a comparative tool in this regard but assists the comparison by distilling the key drivers of change.

The second contribution relates to the level of detail afforded to these two cases which goes beyond that available in most work. A full account of the SPLM/A and UNITA's parallel states has, to the best of my knowledge, never been written. The amount of literature on UNITA covering its development in 1970s and 1980s is extensive⁷, but in the 1990s it shifts from academic and policy analysis to a greater focus on NGO reports, accounts of peace violations and UNITA's war economy. The depth of understanding about UNITA's organisation and motivations was much weaker in the 1990s and certainly after the end of the war in 2002 with the focus shifting towards the characteristics of Angola's post-conflict state. A comprehensive history of the movement has yet to emerge and a detailed account of its parallel state is a large part of this under-studied area of UNITA's history. Several of the movement's former commanders and political cadres wrote biographies that highlight important aspects of the movement providing insights

⁷ Bridgland, Fred, 1987, *Jonas Savimbi A Key to Africa*, Paragon House Publishers; Heywood, Linda, 2000, *Contested Power in Angola: 1840s to the Present*, University of Rochester Press; Hodges, Tony, 2001, *Angola – From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway; James, WM, 1992, *A Political History of Civil War in Angola 1974-1990*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick; Marcum, James, 1978, *The Angolan Revolution, Vol II 1962-1976*, MIT Press; Minter, William, 1994, *Apartheid's Contras*, Witwatersrand University Press; Weigert, Stephen, 2011, *Angola A Modern Military History, 1961-2002*, Palgrave Macmillan; Stockwell, John, 1978, *In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story*, Norton & Company, among others.

into specific areas rather than a general portrayal of the organisation and how its capital Jamba operated.

The SPLM/A inspired an array of work⁸ produced by academics and policymakers in the 1980s and 1990s with a focus on its military successes, the 1991 crisis, interactions with UN agencies and humanitarian organisations, and the 2005 peace agreement. Reports and assessments conducted by NGOs in the liberated areas emerged in the 1990s but many were never published. Several commanders and political cadres also published their recollections of the war, retelling parts of the movement's history but not fully accounting for how the parallel state of the New Sudan operated and how governing strategies transitioned in stable areas like Yambio. As a result, a full account of their state-building project in the areas of Yambio and Jamba and analysis of the roles of the leadership, organisation, ideology and relations to civilians has yet to be produced. This study therefore aims to provide a new understanding of the wars in Angola and Sudan and the rebel movements waging a "second liberation" against Luanda and Khartoum, through the analysis of their parallel states.

Reform Rebels and their Parallel States

⁸ Daly, MW; Sikanga, Ahmad Alawad, (ed) 1993, *Civil War in the Sudan*, British Academic Press; Johnson, Douglas, 2003, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, African Issues, James Currey; Rolandsen, Oystein, 2005, *Guerrilla government, Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Tvedt, and Harir (eds), 1994, *Short-Cut to Decay: the case of the Sudan*, Uppsala, Nordiska Afikaninstitutet; Leonardi, Cherry, 2015, *Dealing With Government in South Sudan*, James Currey; Deng, Francis, 1995, *War of Visions. Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, Brookings Institution; Alier, Abel, 1991, *Southern Sudan, Too many Disagreements Dishonored*, Ithaca Press, among others.

This thesis will use two key terms, that need to be defined. Both UNITA and the SPLM/A are treated here as ‘reform rebels’ that built parallel states. *Reform rebels* were defined in the 1990s as insurgencies that sought radical reform of the national government with the goal of creating an entirely different kind of state⁹; they believed that a ‘second liberation’¹⁰ could be achieved that would redeem the failures of the first¹¹ liberation that culminated in independence. They have been described as adapting the “anti-colonial rhetoric of national emancipations and a new societal order”.¹² The definition I use follows these but adds a different nuance that focuses on the disenfranchised groups they represented. Given the analytical framework and what it revealed, I define *reform rebels* as groups seeking a new liberation to correct failed nation and state-building projects by proposing a new socio-political order based on the emancipation of groups who previously suffered political and economic discrimination. They propose alternative visions of the state through a national political program based on different sub-national concerns and motivations as a new nationalist call to arms. *Reform rebels* build parallel states as state-like entities in their liberated areas to organise civilian life, advance war strategies, build capacity and seek internal and external legitimacy. It is an exercise in establishing territorial, nationalistic and symbolic hegemony.

The thesis also defines a *parallel state* as what Spears and others have termed as “states within states”, indicating that governance is a wider project for reform rebels than mere control or a narrow definition of logistical survival. This is quite distinct from Reno’s

⁹ Clapham, Christopher (ed), 1998, *African Guerrillas*, James Currey, p.7.

¹⁰ Diamond, Larry, “The Second Liberation”, *Africa Report* 37:6, 1992, p.38-41.

¹¹ Clapham, Christopher, “African Guerrillas Revisited”, in Boas, Morten and Dunn, Kevin (eds), 2007, *African Guerrillas Raging Against the Machine*, Lynne Rienner, p.233.

¹² Reno, William, 2011, *Warfare in Independent Africa*, Cambridge University Press, p. 119.

shadow states whose elites seek to create instability and reduce state bureaucracy.¹³ The difference being both motivation and their substantive content regarding what they achieve. Reform rebels “seek to create a viable political structure that actually benefits the citizenry within”.¹⁴ These states, Spears continues, have a set of attributes: 1) a defined territory that is effectively controlled, 2) the ability to project power and exercise a monopoly of force in the territory, 3) the presence of a defined national identity and internal legitimacy, 4) revenue generation, 5) infrastructure and administration, including roads and airstrips, farms and even telecommunications, and finally 6) diverse political objectives (a survival strategy, an area for organisation, even if only as a showpiece).¹⁵ Governance of a *parallel state* therefore is a multifaceted approach to war, redefining politics and creating new social orders to sustain the war effort and the reform project.

II. Case Selection

African liberation movements have inspired great division in the worlds of policy and scholarship. UNITA has been depicted as an efficient but ruthless organisation led by a terrorist-like leader who preyed on civilians while funding a conventional war through the sale of diamonds.¹⁶ The SPLM/A on the other hand has been depicted as an inefficient movement, lacking political structures but successfully lobbying international aid

¹³ Reno, William, “Shadow states and the political economy of civil wars”, in Berdal, Mats and Malone, David (eds), 2000, *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Lynne Rienner.

¹⁴ Spears, Ian, “States Within States: An Introduction to Empirical Attributes”, in Kingston, Paul, and Spears, Ian (eds), 2004, *States Within States Incipient political entities in the Post-Cold War era*, Palgrave Macmillan, p 17.

¹⁵ *ibid*, p. 19-29.

¹⁶ Victoria Brittain, 1998, *Death and Dignity*, Pluto Press; Assis Malaquias in Boas and Dunn, 2007, among others.

agencies to assist its war strategies, while carrying the banner of a just cause against “Arab” oppression but failing to deliver tangible benefits to civilians.¹⁷ Both these depictions are reductionist, obfuscating nuanced study of these movements’ state-building projects. They also negate the reality that rebel movements are not static entities; in order to sustain decades of war they need to be both flexible in their approach to war and governance and develop structures to develop resilience by incorporating important lessons learned. The way UNITA and the SPLM/A would transition and alter in all four internal areas during the decades of war provides a clearer understanding of what defined them and the wars they fought at different times. Not enough is known about their parallel states and how they combined the parallel state exercise as an integrated part of their war strategy. Existing research on both movements and their parallel states seem to be missing the depth and detail necessary to understand important nuances and choices by these movements to rule civilian populations. In this thesis, the governance trajectories of UNITA and the SPLM/A are assessed over a period of 12 years each, starting from the critical juncture moment that catalysed the parallel state-building process. For UNITA this covers the period from 1979 to 1991 and for the SPLM/A the period covered is from 1990 to 2002.

These two cases were selected for their two main conditions of being reform rebels and having built parallel states. They are also examples of protracted struggles that led to the parallel state emerging within wider dynamics of long and asymmetrical wars. UNITA and the SPLM/A staged “second liberations” and developed complex responses to

¹⁷ John Young in Kingston and Spears 2004; Alex De Waal and Africa Rights that worked on Sudan in the 1990s among others.

different threats, opportunities and critical junctures. They both ran stable parallel states for over a decade, which in turn contributed to their political and military survival, increased their support base and led to peace negotiations. Variance is found within the dependant variable (the parallel state) and the independent variables (the four elements). The parallel state of UNITA was a centrally controlled and authoritarian exercise of “stateness” based on a utopian projection of a new society and reconfigured state-society relations. It was built from the top down. All three branches – administration, party and military – worked within defined and regulated objectives that were self-reinforcing and complementary. All aspects of civilian and military life were embedded within a deeply intrusive political and propaganda setting. The parallel state of the SPLM/A was on the other hand decentralised and minimalist. It was a political and administrative project that followed loose regulations and was built on the foundations of institutions that fell outside the direct control of the rebels: through the structures of traditional authorities and the development programs of NGOs. It was built from the bottom up. Broad principles of emancipation defined the political program and were locally implemented without coordinated central control. Weak party structures that could not regulate behaviour allowed for the social space to emerge where civilians defined their own citizenship and state-society relations.

With regards to the internal characteristics these movements were more dissimilar than similar. Both movements had very different starting points: UNITA emerged during the anticolonial war in the 1960s and transitioned into a movement fighting a second liberation in the late 1970s while the SPLM/A emerged almost 30 years after independence and following a period of democratic turnover in the 1970s. UNITA and SPLM/A are more dissimilar than similar in their internal characteristics and in the

design of their parallel states, as the following chapters will make clear. At the leadership level Garang sought more consensus by balancing different needs and interests but strategically kept other leaders in a position that would not challenge his hegemony. Savimbi chose to train and empower his commanders to become future political leaders yet did not attempt consensus rather imposing his view as law. Ideologically UNITA largely followed Maoist principles while the SPLM/A was influenced by Marxism; UNITA defined its political program and its war strategies internally and only sought external support after framing its liberation while the SPLM/A, by virtue of being created in Ethiopia allowed the Derg to impose certain principles and political direction (unity rather than secession) from the onset. However, both movements did use sub-national grievances to build a new nationalist cause to unite diverse constituencies.

Organisationally UNITA understood the need to first develop political organs and only later build military capacity. For the SPLM/A the political organs were non-existent until the 1991 critical juncture and after that they remained subservient to the military, which was the main organisational pillar. Their approaches to civilians were also different although they both balanced elements of persuasion and coercion. While UNITA began providing services to civilians from the onset and the SPLM/A began using relief aid from the UN and NGOs as service provisions, the internally driven model was a part of UNITA's dominance and control. By virtue of lacking the means to provide services and in the absence of a strong political party the SPLM/A decentralised control to chiefs and civilians. These cases are in this way representative of several and divergent characteristics of state-building rebels.

In order to conduct the necessary in-depth research to establish a better understanding of characteristics and processes two other factors influenced their selection: previous in-depth knowledge of both and access to their leadership. Because the purpose was to establish greater explanatory richness¹⁸, having in-depth knowledge of both cases in terms of context, histories and political development due to prior work was an important requisite. Access to the leadership also allowed for deeper engagement of several topics with frank and open discussions. It aided logistical and physical access to key locations - the current Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces and the former Minister of National Security of South Sudan facilitated my movement and access to militarily sensitive areas. Access to the party leadership also allowed for lower level leaders and cadres to feel sufficiently comfortable in discussing what they perceived was delicate information.

II.1 Areas of Study

To understand the progression of governance, two areas were selected that were militarily unchallenged, allowing for assured territorial control, and that had a large resident population. The areas chosen for the study of SPLM/A's governance was a town called Yambio. For UNITA's governance it was the rebel capital Jamba. While the choice for UNITA was clear given the creation of Jamba as the movement's capital and rear base, the SPLM/A had its rear base in Ethiopia during the first decade of the war and never developed an administrative and political capital inside the liberated areas. In 1991, when the SPLM/A lost its Ethiopian rear base, different areas in the south took on

¹⁸ George, Alexander, and Bennett, Andrew, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, MIT Press, p. 31.

different strategic purposes, making it difficult to determine which one was the “real” capital and the main governing centre.

The closest example of a rebel-created town in South Sudan, similar to what UNITA had created in Jamba, was the two areas the SPLM/A called ‘New Site’ and New Kush’. These rebel villages emerged after the movement splintered in 1991 and, much like Jamba, were part of a survival strategy to relocate population and the families of leaders into safer areas far from the frontlines. They were created due to defeat and despair. Yet unlike Jamba, New Site never really developed into a fully-fledged rear base. New Site and New Kush would become villages for strategic thinking, military training and leadership meetings making them more elite exercises than examples of ruling civilian populations. They did not have the mass civilian component necessary to understand how the wartime governance developed. Yambio on the other hand did have this component and also had the movement’s longest experience with ruling a liberated area that was never recaptured.

Both areas studied had to be stable enough to allow for institutions to progress and develop over different stages of the war. Both Yambio and Jamba were never captured while they operated as parallel states and were far from the most violent frontlines and contested areas. They were therefore ideally placed liberated areas to understand how these movements developed their governing strategies over a period of 12 years. Both Yambio and Jamba, in differing degrees, meet Spears’ criteria for ‘states-within-a state. Their positioning on the margins of the state, and far from the national capitals, meant

that they were also “zones of regulatory ambiguity”¹⁹ which provided the necessary territorialisation to attempt to transform society and install new political orders. Their proximity of international borders provided important logistical and economic lifelines of trade, international relief aid, and external assistance.

Jamba - Angola

In the southwestern most point of Angola, where the rivers Cuando and Cubango run along the borders of Namibia and Zambia, lay Jamba, a previously uninhabited sandy land that became UNITA’s bastion of the revolution. Positioned at the ‘Bico’, the tip of Angola, Jamba comprised an area of approximately 12,000 sq. km. It was the capital of the movement but was surrounded by satellite military bases that provided support structures for logistics, the leadership’s families, and the surrounding populations. Pushed to the limits of its ability to resist and fight government forces supplied by the Soviet Union and bolstered by Cuban troops, UNITA set up Jamba as the rear base and the capital of its parallel state. Over 12 years (1979-1991) the movement would develop state-like organs for service delivery, and a new society, maximising control over its people, territory and the imagined future. Traditional authorities and social systems were moulded to reflect UNITA’s world order. This was an intrusive and complex project that structured people, beliefs, norms, resources and strategies into a well-defined and centrally-controlled rebel state. The mass propaganda drives and visits conducted for foreigners created a myth-like idea of Jamba but it had very real and long-lasting effects


¹⁹ Zeller, Wolfgang, “Get it while you can: Governance between wars in the Uganda- South Sudan Borderland”, In Korf, Benedikt, and Raeymaekers, Timothy (eds), 2013, *Violence on the Margins*, Palgrave, p.211.

for those that experienced it. The purpose of Jamba was to rehearse governance and prepare cadres and leaders to govern a future state; it was an exercise in expediency and survival but also a projected political and social order for Angola. It was captured in late 1999 by government forces that proceeded overtime to systematically destroy most of the infrastructure and vestiges of the parallel state. Today over 23,000 civilians still live in the area and coexist with a deployed battalion of the Angolan Armed Forces.



Yambio – Sudan

On the margins of the state and the southern tip of the Sudanese territory lay Yambio, an area characterized by long-standing political neglect and underdevelopment, yet endowed with rich agricultural land and trade routes to neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic. A land of the Zande, it would become the 'garden of the liberated areas', where traditional custom prevailed and the SPLM/A learnt that ruling a land with existing systems of authority required strategies of governance and inroads of participation. The SPLM/A's wartime governance in Yambio over twelve years (1990-2002) developed from a militarized and contested rule to the constitution of a "state" imbued with a degree of legitimacy and characterized by loose regulatory and political practices. This New Sudan state project attempted to respond to the needs of the civilian population and prepare the movement to rule in a time of peace. After years of misrule and governing mishaps the SPLM/A, through the Civil Authority for a New Sudan (CANS), managed to transform force into authority in Yambio. A perceived "occupation army" became "our government". The liberation movement did this against the backdrop of a highly divided and fragmented South Sudan. The utility of the parallel state of the New Sudan was to ensure the military, political and logistical survival of the SPLM/A. Seeking legitimacy and harnessing mass support were also key factors that led to the creation of a parallel state. Yambio remained one of the most politically independent areas during the transition of 2005-2011 electing in the 2010 elections the only independent governor, and non-SPLM candidate, of the 10 states of the South. Today Yambio is a bastion of resistance to the government in Juba, with numerous armed groups that have local and national ambitions fighting for representation, economic development and security.



III. Historical Context

*“Any struggle must be anchored in History”
John Garang 2002²⁰*

SUDAN PEOPLES LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY (SPLM/A)

The SPLM/A emerged in 1983, decades after independence was achieved in 1956 and immediately following a period of democratic rule and southern autonomy under the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement. The movement developed as a response to the failings of the peace agreement and the internal political wrangling of the southern elites;

²⁰ Garang’s speech quoted in Johnson, Douglas, 2003, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*, African Issues, James Currey, p. xiv.

as a reaction to the policies of forced assimilation by Khartoum and the rise of militant Islam. It was also a response to the shortcomings of the Anyanya I movement in military, political and ideological terms, and to the growing tide of dissatisfaction that was creating pockets of insurrection throughout the country. In many respects, the SPLM/A fought a war that sought to define a national identity. The structural fault lines of the war were multifaceted and complex, and fall outside the remit of this thesis. Yet, it is important to outline political developments that influenced the creation of the SPLM/A.

Decades of joint British and Egyptian rule under the Condominium (1899-1955) left the country divided institutionally, culturally and also in terms of political and economic development. By administrating the North and South separately under the Closed District Ordinance, Arabism and Islam was reinforced in the North, while it “encouraged southern development along indigenous African lines and introduced Christian missionary education”.²¹ After independence, the political debate centred on whether the south should have a special political status in a federation, to dilute the domination of the North in national affairs.²² Instead the colonial power was substituted for Northern hegemony. Resentment of the Islamic-Arab cultural - imperialist project, driven by the North’s political and economic domination, would lead the South to rise against Khartoum. The marginalisation and inequality experienced by the southerners led to “cultural and experiential identities”²³ that were explained through ancestral, racial, religious and

²¹ Deng, Francis, 1995, *War of Visions Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, Brookings Institution, p.11.

²² Wakoson, E.N, “The Politics of Southern Self Government 1972-83”, in Daly, M.W; Sikainga, A.A, (ed), 1993, *Civil War in the Sudan*, British Academic Press, p. 28.

²³ Jok, Jok Madut, 2007, *Sudan Religion, Race and Violence*, One World Publications, p. 2-3.

other differences. Yet many other socio-economic and political factors stood as key drivers of the wars to follow.

In 1955 the mutiny in Torit began the process of resistance, hastening independence, but a coordinated political and military opposition to Khartoum would only emerge years later. The war for self-determination in the 1960s was led by the Anyanya I movement that would develop into a coalition of guerrilla groups initially organised along tribal lines.²⁴ The war came to an end when Joseph Lagu, commander of the Anyanya and leader of the then renamed Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), and President Jaafar Nimeri signed the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. The agreement was comprised of three parts: a ceasefire agreement, the creation of a southern regional government to guarantee autonomous rule, and numerous protocols on interim arrangements, dealing with administration, resettlement, judicial matters, and military affairs. The regional government suffered from a lack of funds and resources. The south was underdeveloped, with poor infrastructure, transport and communications, weak food production, and inadequate rural and industrial development. While the army was supposed to integrate the Anyanya soldiers, only 6000 were absorbed. This meant the disbanding of the Anyanya and gave Khartoum control over security arrangements.²⁵ Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s small groups, many from disaffected Anyanya soldiers, took up arms against the Addis agreement. Some of these groups became known as Anyanya II, which would later resist being integrated under the command of the SPLM/A.

²⁴ Johnson D., Prunier, G. "The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People's Liberation Army", in Daly and Sikainga, 1993, p.118.

²⁵ Elijah Malok, *The Southern Sudan Struggle for Liberty*, 2009, Kenway Publications.

In 1982, the country was heading back to war after eleven years of peace. Other factors also contributed. When oil was discovered in 1978 in Bentiu the government redrew the boundaries to ensure that the fields fell in the north. Khartoum created a new province – Unity province – and placed it under the presidency with the refinery in Kosti in central Sudan. The decision to build the Jonglei canal, diverting the Nile waters, inflamed the situation. While the regional government in Juba rejected the redrawing of the boundaries and the “theft” of the resources, Khartoum strategically reorganised the south into three smaller sub-regions and dissolved the regional government. The division of the South into three regions split the social and political fabric of the south that reverberated into the liberation years, and into the post war years after 2005. The Equatorians were the biggest proponents of the redivision, resentful of the leaders from Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal, and of Dinka domination. The Dinka were disappointed with the Equatorians (who had led the Anyanya movement) for colluding with the Northerners to abrogate the peace agreement.²⁶ Two other factors led to the unravelling of the Addis agreement: the decree imposing Islamic law in the South and the order to transfer the military battalions of Bor, Ayod, Kapoeta and Aweil, comprised of former Anyanya soldiers, to the North. All these factors would influence the strategy and military programs of the SPLM/A.

The second civil war ‘officially’ began on the 16th of May 1983 with the mutiny of the 105th battalion in Bor of former Anyanya. This led to desertions in Malakal, Nasir, Bentiu, Aweil, Wau, Rumbek and Nzara. The SPLM/A emerged in July 1983 in Ethiopia from many

²⁶ Wondu, Steven, 2011, *From Bush to Bush: Journey to Liberty in South Sudan*, Kenway Publications.

of these guerrilla and mutineer groups under the auspices of President Mengistu. This *rassemblement* led to leadership struggles that were only resolved by force and emphasized military discipline, centralized decision-making, and control over information and intelligence.²⁷ The development of political structures was inhibited by these struggles and by a reaction to the conduct of the political elites of the south during the first war and the peace of the 1970s.

During the Second²⁸ Civil War (1983-2005) the South fought against successive regimes in Khartoum (Nimeiri, Sadiq Al-Mahdi, and Omar Al-Bashir), creating a national movement that would redefine Sudan's politics. This was a complex war characterized by the deployment of ethnic militias against the SPLM/A; internal factionalism within the SPLM/A; the divisionary politics of oil by Khartoum; multiple humanitarian crises; and the astute manipulation of aid and negotiations with international partners. The war extended to the peripheries of the North, with fighting in Darfur, the East, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, with multiple grievances and shifting alliances producing "a pattern of interlocking civil wars".²⁹ The numerous difficulties faced by the SPLM/A and its leadership would culminate in the 1991 split which would propel the movement to change direction.

²⁷ Kok, Peter, "Sudan: Between Radical Restructuring and Deconstruction of State Systems", *Review of African Political Economy* 23:70, December 1996.

²⁸ The first civil war took place from 1963 until 1972.

²⁹ Johnson, 2003: 127.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005 between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and the SPLM/A formally ended the 22-year civil war. It provided a six-year road map for political transformation, addressing economic marginalisation through power-sharing and wealth-sharing provisions. In July 2011, the South achieved independence. Two years later in December 2013 the country would erupt again in a brutal war, now emanating from within the SPLM/A, and still unravelling despite attempts to secure peace with the Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS), of August 2015.

UNIÃO PARA A INDEPENDÊNCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA (UNITA)

UNITA emerged in 1966 as the third liberation movement fighting the Portuguese, five years after the struggle for independence in Angola had begun. UNITA fought as an anti-colonial movement until 1975 and continued its resistance in the post-independence civil war (1975-2002) in which Angola witnessed intermittent years of tense peace. While UNITA fought different enemies in each liberation era, it ultimately sought to give representation to a particular portion of Angola's disenfranchised majority. The war in Angola had many beginnings.³⁰ In early 1961 a series of unplanned and uncoordinated revolts launched the liberation war. From the onset, the rebellion lacked a nationally broad focus³¹ which would be carried into the divisions of the liberation movements that failed to create a united front. Colonial economic policy and the contours of colonial society were at the root of this. The revolt of the cotton rich area Baixa do Kassange is thought to have sparked a rebellion over discontentment at land expropriation,

³⁰ Cramer, Christopher, 2006, *War is not a Stupid Thing*, Hurst and Company, p. 139.

³¹ Marcum, John, 1978, *The Angolan Revolution Vol II 1962-1976*, MIT Press, p. 2.

monoculture agriculture, and harsh labour conditions. In the north, the Portuguese administration adopted a policy of conciliation towards the local elite by allowing them a limited return to independent coffee growing. In exchange, they hoped to secure allies committed to market principles.³² In the south, however, the growth of white settler farming and ranching by the Portuguese was protected with repression. Birmingham writes that the Ovimbundu farming communities suffered most from the prison-style villages, where villagers were herded at night to stop them from giving food and intelligence to the liberation movements, which resulted in the fragmentation of the peasant population.³³ Divisions among the southern and northern communities is also attributed to the perception among the Bakongo that the Ovimbundu trade with the Portuguese was an indication of collaboration and profiting from colonialism.³⁴

This dualist structure reinforced divisions within Angolan society that had begun to take root decades earlier. After the wars of occupation (1845-1917) a new social model was introduced with a Secretariat for Indigenous Affairs aimed at institutionalising racial and ethnic differences and stratifying Angolan society into *indigenae* (indigenous) and *assimilados* (assimilated). The *assimilated* elites (estimated to have numbered 38,000 black and 45,000 mestiço families) were given privileges based on their literacy, values and customs, that were denied to the indigenous population.³⁵ While Luanda and the coastal areas had experienced 500 years of Portuguese rule, the central highlands had

³² Birmingham, David, "Angola", in Chabal, Patrick (ed), 2002 *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*, Hurst and Company, p. 141

³³ Birmingham, 2002: 141

³⁴ Andersen Guimaraes, Fernando, 2001, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, Palgrave, p. 21.

³⁵ Messiant, Christine, "Angola: the Challenge of Statehood", in Birmingham, David; Martin, Phyllis, (ed), 1998, *History of Central Africa*, Longman.

experienced less than 80 years. The Portuguese would only begin conquering the Ovimbundu kingdoms and incorporating them into the colony between 1890 and 1904. These different modes of development were based on the colonial government's failure to extend its administration into the interior, creating avenues for mobilising sub-national grievances.

In the 1960s Angola had three liberation movements. The class distinctions formulated in the colonial period were mirrored in the differences of the nationalist parties. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), founded in 1956, grew out of the urban centres by left-wing elites in Luanda (the *petite bourgeoisie* ³⁶) and was comprised of mulattos, *assimilados*, and whites, even though its ethnic basis was Mbundu. The Mbundu representing 23% of the population, had already integrated Portuguese language and culture into their way of life as a result of sustained interaction with the colonial power.³⁷ The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), founded in 1961 was comprised mainly by the Bakongo (the third largest ethnic group occupying the north-western provinces) and was led by Holden Roberto. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was founded in 1966 to give political expression to the Ovimbundu (37% of the population, the largest ethnic group) of the central highlands and other groups in Eastern Angola. It emerged as a response to the shortcomings of the two other movements. None of the three movements were able to

³⁶ Cleary, Sean, 2001, "Understanding Angola's Conflict and the Way Forward for Future Stability", Angola Development Forum.

³⁷ Hodges, Tony, 2001, *Angola From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway.

stage protracted military campaigns that eroded the colonial powers grip on the country before 1975.

In 1974, following Portugal's revolution that hastened independence in the colonies, all three movements began to position themselves to take over the government. Although an agreement was reached between the three movements to prepare the transition to independence, neither the FNLA nor the MPLA were prepared to share state power, preferring instead to secure a military victory over the other movements. UNITA lacked the military and diplomatic strength of the other two movements, making it more inclined to seek a compromise and wait for elections.³⁸ Although a coalition government was formed in early 1975, under the Alvor Agreement, it only lasted a few months as the FNLA pushed for a military takeover of the capital. Having pushed the FNLA from Luanda, the MPLA declared independence in Luanda on the 11th of November 1975. On the same day UNITA declared independence in Huambo. Following its victory, the MPLA sought to expel the other two movements from the cities and entrench its power with Cuban and Soviet assistance. The FNLA would become a residual force while UNITA had to withdraw from Huambo in the face of a politically stronger and militarily superior enemy, and to develop a new strategy in order to survive. After independence, UNITA began to see the MPLA as a neo-colonialist government extending the divisions perpetuated under the Portuguese. The liberation wars (1961 -75) created divisions amongst Angolans but the wars that followed (1975-2002), between UNITA and the MPLA created deeper political antagonisms and social disaggregation.³⁹

³⁸ Messiant, 1998:148.

³⁹ Messiant, in Birmingham, 1998.

The post-independence war provided a fertile basis for the involvement of international forces bent on advancing their geopolitical and strategic interests. At the height of the Cold War's impact on the region, Angola saw the presence of Cuban and South African troops, while military advice, intelligence and transfer of technology and arms was supplied by Russia to the MPLA and, after the repeal of the Clark amendment in 1985, by the US to UNITA. Regional networks of logistical support also played a key role during this stage of the war interlinking the political and security dynamics of other Southern African countries.

In 1991 some hope for a political settlement came with the Bicesse Accords signed in Portugal. Despite the professed will to implement the agreement, both sides failed to fully commit to peace. The war restarted after failed elections in 1992. In 1994, the Lusaka Protocol was signed, which foresaw the formation of a government of unity and national reconciliation, and another disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. In April 1997, a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was inaugurated, but the country was physically and politically divided, and UNITA's access to diamonds, and that of the MPLA government to oil revenues enabled both sides to continue fighting. The war that ravaged the country from 1998 until 2002 was fought with far more sophisticated arms and brutality. Peace came in February 2002 when what was left of UNITA's top leadership, including Jonas Savimbi, was ambushed and killed. The Memorandum of Understanding signed in April by UNITA and MPLA provided a framework for peace, including an amnesty law, the integration of 5,000 UNITA troops into the Armed Forces, and a timetable for the demobilisation of UNITA's remaining

troops. The first post-war elections were held in August 2008, allowing the MPLA to consolidate political legitimacy through multiparty elections by employing its stranglehold on the economy and the security apparatus. After 38 years in power, President Dos Santos would step down in August 2017 paving the way for the country to either reform or unravel under the weight of its unreconciled past and divided society.

IV. Research Design and Methodology

This thesis takes a historical and comparative approach to the study of wartime politics and state-building. As Chabal reminds us “In reality no adequate history can avoid a large measure of interpretation and no serious political science can dispense with sustained historical work”.⁴⁰ This study was conducted using the comparative method, grounded in historical institutionalism, and the concept of path dependency and its “chain of causation”.⁴¹ As a *small-n* comparison, dealing with complex phenomena that has multiple contributing factors rather than a single cause, this thesis refrains from determining a causal model to explain state-building rebellions, preferring to take an interpretative approach.

IV.1 Comparative Analysis

The point of comparison is the parallel state project created in stable liberated areas, tracing how institutions progressed over time, and how key critical junctures made them take on more complex forms. The aim is to compare “the cases as wholes and to compare

⁴⁰ Chabal, 1983: 12.

⁴¹ George and Bennet, 2005:169.

whole cases with each other".⁴² The virtue of comparing is to provide insights that are not obvious, that when pulling them together reveal that each of the case studies is more than the sum of the parts. For example, had I not compared I would have maintained as per the case of UNITA that strong political structures are key requisites for civilian governance, which was not supported by the SPLM/A case. Had I not enquired into the SPLM/A's trajectory I might have dismissed the claim that civilian support may not be intrinsically linked to the political and ideological foundations of the movement, but rather to their function as a projected government devolving power to disenfranchised groups, which was not entirely the experience of UNITA.

Rebel governance is not a natural phenomenon of war which, under the guide of reform rebels fighting a second liberation and using sub-national grievances, will lead to similar outcomes. It is difficult to prove deterministic causality with regards to the relationship between either set of internal or external elements and the outcome of rebel governance. Rather there is an explanation of processes and progression of the different key internal characteristics of movements that facilitates an observation of the development of a rebel parallel state. One of the main problems faced by the comparative method is having too few cases and too many variables.⁴³ Increasing the number of cases would compromise on the intended detail, which would invalidate the approach of seeking the mutually reinforcing explanation of assessing internal characteristics with the development of the parallel state. Even when studying big processes and large structures, the use of small cases yields greater insights "as the student of a structure or process has little choice but

⁴² Lim, Timothy, 2016, *Doing Comparative Politics*, Lynne Rienner, p. 20.

⁴³ Lijphart, Arend, *Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method*, *American Political Science Review* 65:3, September 1971, p. 685.

to pay attention to the historical circumstances and particular characteristics (...) With large numbers, critical defences and familiarity with context decline”.⁴⁴

I use the case-study approach rather than Mill’s most-different systems design (MDS), given the need for a “system for questioning, not for answering”⁴⁵, although they are not mutually exclusive approaches. The case-study approach, defined as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”⁴⁶, is more useful for forming descriptive inferences and is better suited to the examination of correlative relationships.⁴⁷ To use the case study approach for multiple cases, one has to compare time, context, space and object.⁴⁸ The approach must meet the requirements of 1) a well-defined universe (the parallel states of UNITA and the SPLM/A), 2) a research objective to guide the selection of cases (understand which agentic shifts allowed the movements to survive crippling critical junctures and what factors led to the emergence of the parallel state) and 3) the employment of theoretical variables for purposes of explanation and application to policy⁴⁹ (the focus on internal characteristics to determine the rebel-system). One of the strengths of the case study method is that it “requires a detailed consideration of contextual factors”.⁵⁰ Its aim is not to establish “generalized

⁴⁴ Tilly, Charles, 1984, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*, Russel Sage Foundation p.77.

⁴⁵ Stretton, 1969: 247, referenced in Della Porta and Keating, 2005: 210.

⁴⁶ Gerring, John, “What is a case study and what is it good for?”, *American Political Science Review* 98:2, May 2004, p. 341.

⁴⁷ *ibid*, p. 347.

⁴⁸ Mahoney, James, and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, (eds), 2003, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁹ George and Bennet, 2005: 69.

⁵⁰ *ibid*, p. 19.

relationships between variables” but instead to “seek to understand complex units”⁵¹ and by extension diversity.

IV.II Historical Institutionalism

The Historical Institutional (HI) approach is used for its ability to consider the role played by institutions in political processes and outcomes, as it seeks contextual explanations, bound by particular ‘times’⁵² and sequences of events. HI has been described as having three main features: “Tackling big, real-world questions; tracing processes through time; and analysing institutional configurations and contexts”.⁵³ Institutions are in this sense studied as organizations “that 1) have broad but discernible purposes, 2) establish norms and rules, 3) assign roles to participants, and 4) have boundaries marking those inside and outside the institutions” .⁵⁴ This approach is useful in understanding how institutions emerge to structure behaviour, while also reflecting actors’ choices and behaviour. It is both about agency and contingency, with the focus being on decisions of actors to select particular paths that were available from a variety of plausible options. In this way, “political actors, therefore typically have substantial leeway to choose which pressures to yield to, and which instead to resist in deciding their best course of action”.⁵⁵ The nature of institutions is in many regards determined by the

⁵¹ Della Porta, Donatella, and Keating, Michael, 2008, *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: a pluralist perspective*, Cambridge University Press, p. 198.

⁵² Pierson, Paul, 2004, *Politics in Time. History, Institutions and Social Analysis*, Princeton University Press.

⁵³ Pierson, Paul, and Skocpol, Theda, “Historical Institutionalism in contemporary Political Science”, in Katznelson I, and Milner HV, 2002, *Political Science: State of the Discipline*. New York, p. 693-721.

⁵⁴ King, Desmond, and Smith, Rogers, “Racial Orders in American Political Development”, Vol 99:1, *American Political Science Review*, February 2005, citing the work of Orren, Karen and Skowronek, Stephen, 2004, *The Search for American Political Development*, Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁵ Capoccia, Giovanni, “Critical Junctures and Institutional Change”, in Mahoney, James, and Thelen, Kathleen, (eds), 2015, *Advances in Comparative Historical Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, p.159.

interaction of different actors with multiple interests rather than “cohesive actors pursuing clear objectives”.⁵⁶ Rebel governance institutions are best understood as products of such interactions.

The use of historical institutionalism therefore allows for a clearer understanding of how and why certain choices were made by political actors and the subsequent outcomes. The focus on understanding ‘critical junctures and developmental pathways⁵⁷’ as moments that illustrate changes and ‘shocks’ to institutions that make them change or alter paths is key. Certain processes and changes only became evident when analysing the effect of the critical juncture. These moments can lead to the creation of new institutions or create opportunities for old institutions that were resistant to change to follow different paths. The governing approach of the SPLM/A and UNITA shifted significantly after the critical junctures of 1991 and 1976 respectively, and the motivations behind such shifts are just as important as the tangible effect these institutions had on the civilian population they governed, and on allowing the rebels to survive and push for negotiations. As Thelen pointed out, different institutions rest on different foundations and the processes that will disrupt them will also differ.⁵⁸ This will be confirmed in the critical junctures that UNITA (1992) and the SPLM/A (2005) experienced during the transitional periods following the signing of peace agreements that led to the dismantling of their parallel states.

⁵⁶ Schickler, Eric, 2001, *Disjointed pluralism: institutional innovation and the development of the US congress*, Princeton University Press, referenced in DeVore, Marc, “Organising International Armaments Cooperation: Institutional Design and path dependencies in Europe”, *European Security*, 21:3, May 2012.

⁵⁷ Ikenberry, John, “History’s Heavy Hand: Institutions and the Politics of the State”, paper prepared for the Conference on ‘New Perspectives on Institutions’, University of Maryland, October 1994.

⁵⁸ Thelen, Kathleen, 1999, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, *Annual Review Political Science*: 2, p. 397.

There is disagreement on the centrality of path dependency and the role of big events rather than a series of smaller changes.⁵⁹ Assessing what counts as a ‘critical juncture’ is critical in particular if the potential subjective character of the path dependency approach is to be avoided. In the cases of UNITA and the SPLM/A the critical junctures were not subjectively chosen, but well-documented critical shifts involving a re-alignment of internal, international, ideological, and structural circumstances. These critical junctures (for UNITA in 1976 and for the SPLM/A in 1991) were “unpredictable by theory and perhaps truly random”⁶⁰ yet allowed for a unique alignment of crippling shifts on multiple fronts. The clear test for why these specific critical junctures are used is the emergence of the parallel state as a result of internal realignments. They were critical junctures in the development of the parallel state as the institutional status quo that existed in the liberated areas was challenged with previous governing strategies transitioning and becoming more complex.

V. Data Collection

Research was conducted over a period of 10 months (2012-13) in South Sudan (6 months) and Angola (4 months). For the SPLM/A case study 104 interviews were conducted in Yambio (Western Equatoria State), Juba and Yei (Central Equatoria state), and in Torit, New Site, Chukudum and Kapoeta (Eastern Equatoria state). For the UNITA case-study 80 interviews were conducted in Jamba (province of Kuando Kubango),

⁵⁹ Pierson, 2004: 18-53.

⁶⁰ Mahoney 2000, referenced in Mahoney, James, and Villegas, Celso, “Historical Enquiry and Comparative Politics”, in Boix, Carles, and Stokes, Susan (eds), 2007, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford University Press, p.80.

Luanda, in the cities of Huambo, Bailundu and Katchiungu (Huambo province), Kuito and Andulo (Bie Province). At the time of research Jamba and Yambio no longer played any specific role in the political power of both movements-turned-parties, so it was crucially important to track down leaders and cadres who could explain the operations of the parallel state in these two areas. Each leading cadre, administrator and commander was sometimes privy only to details of his own area of operation. Understanding each area of administration and institution required a piecing together of different facts, testimonies, and information.

There were several challenges in timing the research, due to different political realities, with independence for South Sudan in 2011, and a decade of peace in Angola after UNITA's military defeat and political marginalisation. These settings conditioned narratives and the memories of those interviewed. This was compounded by difficulties in the rural areas. In South Sudan, there was increasing unrest and conflict between communities and the SPLA army. In Angola, the rural areas were being subjected to intimidation and control ahead of the 2012 elections. Recounting UNITA's history was difficult as mistrust persisted and a defeated movement hoping to shed its legacy of brutality was still shrouded in secrecy. Additionally, many of the top leaders were killed and large parts of the stationary populations (the UNITA "people") were dispersed throughout the country.

The SPLM/A was in a much better position to provide evidence based on verbal testimonies and recollections from lived experiences of the civilian population and its politico-military cadres. Although many of its top leaders had been killed, while others

were now fighting a different war against Khartoum in the North⁶¹, it was still relatively easy to access leaders that had played key roles during the war. Having achieved independence a few months before the research began there was a sense of euphoria and nationalism that facilitated discussion of the movement's history. However, the experience of rebel governance was dissipating as the 2005 CPA peace agreement had instituted entirely new forms of government.

V.I Archives

Desk research involved gaining access to key party documents, personal correspondence, reports by national and international observers and multiple written testimonies (by nationals and foreigners) during the war and afterwards. UNITA's written documents, produced and printed in Angola and abroad, provided key information on the ideology, political programs, propaganda and communication strategies but were insufficient in depicting how rebel bases were run and constructed. They were also unable to explain leadership dynamics and coordination of structures. Documentary evidence was found in the Leon Dash archives at the University of Illinois (a journalist who lived with and followed UNITA during the 1970s and 80s), the US Library of Congress, the Hoover Institution archives at Stanford University, documents privately held by different leaders and old UNITA booklets found in private collections worldwide. However, the key administrative documents from Jamba, that could have shed light on the strategies and difficulties encountered in bureaucratisation and institutionalisation during the war, and

⁶¹ Key SPLM/A commanders had formed with 2 SPLA brigades the SPLM-North movement operating in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile and continued waging war in the North.

on day to day operations, were either destroyed or confiscated by the government's military intelligence service after Jamba was taken in 1999.

Unlike UNITA, the SPLM/A did not have a tradition of printing and producing documents extensively and then archiving them. The SPLM/A produced some newsletters abroad but adopting and printing key regulations would mostly occur after 1994. Documents were sought from sources like the Sudan Open Archive of the Rift Valley Institute, the SPLM/A archive in Nairobi, and personal memoirs of current and former SPLA commanders. The lack of policy documents and the tendency of centralising decisions within the movement's high command made it harder to find information on specific decisions and organisational structures as well as leadership dynamics. Many documents only revealed intended programs rather than reflecting on implementation and administrative experience; they were rather evidence of intended reforms and institutional changes rather than experienced governance shifts.

V.II Elite Interviews

Different research tools were used including semi-structured and in-depth interviews. Interviews were conducted with the top leadership of the movements which, because of their experience and first-hand knowledge, were ideally placed to explain their governing projects. They also had a level of autonomy that allowed them to speak freely. Through such interviews 1) different corroborations of what had been established by other sources was possible; 2) they provided a way to establish the beliefs, values, activities and attitudes of the elites; 3) inferences were possible about wider and more general characteristics and processes; and 4) made possible the reconstruction of an event or set

of events.⁶² The issue of trust and building relationships that allowed for greater access was very important. For UNITA, cadres resisted talking about what was once strategic information, perhaps a residual effect of their war experiences and how unintegrated they remained in the post-conflict political order. For the SPLM/A, the majority of the leaders were in government, as either Ministers or Generals heading sections of the security apparatus. Their availability was more a matter of time than of trust although information regarding military formations, elite interactions, and other information was still regarded as strategic and confidential as the country remained on alert over perceived Sudanese aggression. Despite this, they were able to “shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are not clear from an analysis of political outcomes or other primary sources”.⁶³ George and Bennett point out that lower ranking officials are better placed to provide important information given their recollection of everyday operations, though lower-level officials “often do not have a complete or fully reliable picture of how and why a decision was made”.⁶⁴ Both lower and higher-ranking officials were therefore sought to explain the operations and design of the institutions. In both Yambio and Jamba, civilians and chiefs that had experienced the parallel state were also interviewed. The objective was to understand through oral history how the parallel state was built and experienced by different stakeholders. Comparing their recollections also allowed for individual calculations and the broader socio-political conditions that shaped their decisions and interactions to factor into the analysis.

⁶² Tansey, Oisin, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A case for Non-Probability Sampling”, *Political Science and Politics* 40:4, October 2007, p. 767.

⁶³ Oisin, 2007: 766.

⁶⁴ George, and Bennett, 2005: 103.

Using oral history to seek explanations and descriptions of wartime practices carries several difficulties. Notwithstanding the issue of selective memory, ideologically driven narratives or the echoes of propaganda, the self-promotion of elites, and the distortion of the past to reflect the current political agenda of elites and cadres, the limitation of having to understand motivations, prejudices and interpretative lenses had to be taken into account. Recollections of war by elites have other limitations that relate to 1) the construction or invention of objectives and strategies, fitting in with narratives of justification; 2) the lack of representativity of the narrator and his/her experiential knowledge; and 3) the difficulty of fact-checking such memoirs. Understanding the motivations of the elites was key to overcoming these limitations. Each had a message he wanted to convey but they also had several accompanying biases that were taken into account. Many in UNITA wanted the party's history to be written and highlighted the exceptionally well-functioning elements. Almost like a moment of historical closure they needed to relive the stories and remember a time when they were actively exercising power. Many in the SPLM/A understood the difficulties they faced in the independent state and understood the ideological diversion the party suffered with the death of John Garang. They wanted to position themselves as key catalysts of change and governance in the movement's wartime experience. Many of the senior leaders interviewed in both movements saw themselves as historical actors, uniquely positioned to provide explanations on the liberation; having gained their right to be heard.⁶⁵ Cross-checking their accounts in interviews with lower-level officials, civilians and defectors was also key. It was therefore important to know whom I was talking to and what was their

⁶⁵ Tokin, 1992, *Narrating the Past: The Social Construction of Oral History*, Cambridge University Press, p. 134, referenced in Field, Sean, 2008, "Turning up the volume: Dialogues about Memory create Oral Histories", *South African Historical Journal*, 60:2, p. 185.

background; what were the major points of contention and areas of success that I needed to incorporate into the subjective averments. This was to understand the spectrum of the “politics of interpretation” to which I was being exposed.⁶⁶

First-hand accounts are conditioned in many ways by the message they want to convey. It was important to understand this conditionality and rather focus on the way that elites narrated and interpreted the history of their liberation movements, institutions and interactions. Where accounts and explanations could not be corroborated or where there was no evidence linking what elites had stated to the experiences of civilians and cadres, these accounts were not included. In cases of needed clarification or apparent contradictions, I pursued follow-up interviews with key leaders. To check credibility, I triangulated findings with testimony by members that had defected and could explain aspects of rebel governance with a critical view. Triangulation was also achieved with information provided in written documents published during the years of study by NGOs, aid agencies, and journalists. Where possible I tried to reinforce interpretations and explanations given in interviews with information collected in such documents. Despite this, the utility of elite interviews was clear, given that more was learnt through this method “about the inner workings of political process, the machinations between influential actors and how a sequence of events was viewed and responded to within the political machine”.⁶⁷ This was also key in understanding the defining changes of the critical junctures examined.

⁶⁶ White, Hayden, “The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and De-Sublimation”, *Critical Inquiry* 9:1, September 1982, p113-137.

⁶⁷ Lilleker, Darren, “Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield”, *Politics* 23:3, 2003, p. 208.

It was also important to understand the interplay of memory and the political lens that present circumstances have on oral histories of the war. Recollections of the past fit into the “messiness” of different interpretative frames and in many instances, accounts of the past are a product of the present; in which different “‘presents’ inspire different versions of the past”.⁶⁸ For both case studies, it was important to interview those that held power and retained political relevance within the context of the movement and those that provided important voices of dissent; whose own narratives shed light on aspects that other political leaders would have wanted to have erased from their “official” liberation history. For the UNITA elites, the power of the political party and propaganda machine was evident on how they reflected about the war and the reason for their second liberation; yet it did not sufficiently explain how the different parts of the system worked together. Interviews with cadres that ran different operations were key to understanding the mechanics of Jamba and the parallel state; most interviews were long descriptions of structures and processes that provided first hand detail. Many interviewees started off by intertwining their life histories with that of the movement. Their explanations of lived practices were crucial in understanding the inner functioning and fragilities of the parallel state. For the SPLM/A elites, they felt empowered to determine their own history, facing little resistance from any other political forces on how they could reconceptualise their own versions of events and liberation trajectories. This was also a function of the fact that apart from specific episodes (i.e. the 1991 splintering of the movement, and the 1994 National convention) that there was no nationalist and “official” account of the war.

⁶⁸ Honig, Emily, “Striking lives: Oral History and the Politics of Memory”, *Journal of Women’s History* Vol. 9:1, Spring 1997, p. 140.

UNITA on the other hand is facing strong MPLA historic revisionism where the ruling party has tried to “officialise” their version of key events like the 1987-8 Cuito Cuanavale war, the 1992 election debacle, or Savimbi’s last battle of 2002. This difference between UNITA and the SPLM/A’s treatment of history was also determined by how one movement lost the war and the other won, exposing different vulnerabilities and positions of power. In this way, “the nature of the post-war outcome (...) can influence how individuals describe their motivations for participation and evaluate the choices their leaders faced”.⁶⁹ It can also provide self-justifications and self-imaginings that allow for a nuanced understanding of their war experiences.

I chose to keep my interviews anonymous in the research as some asked not to be named directly, feeling comfortable in knowing they helped me with the research and wanted their names included but would not have anything attributed to them directly. A few asked for confidentiality and stated that they were giving me ‘background’ information. Given the current sensitivities with the war in South Sudan and the levels of political intolerance in Angola I have chosen to keep the elite, lower level officials and civilians’ names confidential. In the case of UNITA this confidentiality was key to helping break the ‘silences’ brought about by defeat and the political stigmatism UNITA carried. The current factional war in South Sudan has become so divisive that new master narratives are emerging to silence and marginalise critical voices and descriptions of events of leaders that have become opposition figures. The past and the liberation history has become in this way politically appropriated to serve the narrow interests of elites

⁶⁹ Weinstein, 2007:355

attempting to 'nation-build' from the ashes of an internal party war. Interviews conducted several years earlier - in Angola from 2004 and in South Sudan from 2008 - were also used as the information was corroborated with the current interviews which provided an important sense of continuity in narrative and in memory.

Many of the references to the roles and titles of those interviewed reflect the positions they held during their wars and where relevant the positions held during the time of research. In the case of UNITA there were many roles that each commander and political commissar played over the course of several decades; they may have started in clandestine operations, moved through logistics and ended up in running health care structures. These UNITA interviews, more so than the SPLM/A interviews whose elite mostly retained defined roles within the military, diplomatic mission or other areas and rarely moved between them, allowed for explanations of divergent structures which the reference of the interviewed elite may at times not fully reflect. When titles refer to 'Ministers', 'Secretaries' or 'Generals' these refer to portfolios held under the organisation during the war and the parallel state for UNITA and the SPLM/A. For the SPLM/A some Minister and Deputy Minister positions refer to positions held during the CPA transition and post-independence government but this is made clear in the list of interviews in Appendix 2. Today the SPLM/A and UNITA elites have different roles in the country. UNITA continues to be the main opposition party and many of the elites interviewed are either members of Parliament, party cadres or have integrated into the Angolan Armed Forces as part of the 2002 peace agreement. They have lived and integrated with the MPLA elites of Luanda for almost two decades yet still feel that they inhabit two different Angolan realities. The SPLM/A elites fit into many different categories since the war of 2013 and in particular after the collapse of the peace agreement in July 2016. Many are

in opposition but part of the government of national unity; others that remained in government until 2016 are now staging armed rebellions, and others that stood against the government faction in 2013 have never returned back to the party. I contacted many of those in opposition in 2017 and their testimonies (given during the field research before the 2013 war when they were still in government) did not change despite the current political difficulties. Despite the subsequent losses, destruction and experience of collapse both movements in different ways kept the recollections of the parallel state separate from other war experiences; perhaps as an attempt to crystallise moments of “success” and “legitimacy”.

A note on language is also necessary. This study makes use of two historically charged terms: ‘tribe’ and ‘traditional authorities’. Tribe in particular is a difficult term to use given that in many instances it has been used in very derogatory ways to represent communities as governed by primeval affiliations. Whether understood as an effect of colonialism, a form of colonial rule or even a form of anticolonial revolt⁷⁰, the use of the term ‘tribalism’ varied during the interviews where elites used the term to describe different types of relationships and the power of particular loyalties. In Southern Africa in particular the term is problematic, more so than in East Africa where it is more widely used without the derogative connotation. Tribalism is used in East Africa as a “indigenous term for something that can be of immense importance”, and is a term used among many others including ethnicity, regional/linguistic classifications and other categorizations that have to be locally understood.⁷¹ Throughout the research and while conducting

⁷⁰ Mamdani, 1996:185

⁷¹ Allen, Tim, “Ethnicity and Tribalism on the Sudan-Uganda Border”, p. 114-6, in Fukui, Katsuyoshi, and Markakis, John (eds), 1994, *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, James Currey.

interviews for the SPLM/A case study leaders and communities used this term themselves. It was so widely used throughout South Sudan that I decided to keep the term in the research as part of the discourse of those interviewed. In contrast, the use of 'tribe' in the Angolan case study is not only inappropriate and offensive but would have been used to mean something entirely different. The MPLA's portrayal of UNITA as a "tribalistic" movement was meant to degrade its image and focus on the backwardness of its leaders and the people it represented; it carried its own historical weight because of the war. The term 'tribe' in Angola, as in other Southern African countries could never have been used to mean the same thing as in South Sudan.

The use of 'traditional authority' is less problematic but needs to be clarified, arguably because the roles chiefs took or were attributed to them during the wars in Angola and Sudan fell outside the "traditional" domains of their authority. In the same way as Vail highlights that 'tribalism' was a recent creation and a product of modernization rather than from an ancient past, traditional leaders' influence and roles were also impacted by the colonial use and official sanctioning of chiefs.⁷² Some were state-appointed administrative chiefs, others were kin-based while others were hereditary traditional chiefs but the roles they played in Angola and Sudan's history differed greatly. During colonialism, many became "decentralised despots", where "custom came to be the language of force, masking the uncustomary power of Native Authorities".⁷³ In both case-studies chiefs and traditional leaders played important roles but they had a different impact on the parallel state. The powers and social standing that traditional leaders had

⁷² Vail, Leroy (ed), 1989, *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*, James Currey.

⁷³ Mamdani, Mahmood, 1996, *Citizen and Subject*, James Currey, p. 22.

during the war and still have in South Sudan are commensurably greater than in Angola. This is partly due to the social fabric of these two countries, the socio-political organisation of different groups, and the isolation of communities with regards to a central authority but was also a result of how these chiefs were reconceived during colonialism. In Angola, they were weakened by the Portuguese policy of direct rule while in Sudan they were relatively empowered to take on distinct authority over certain affairs under the British system of indirect rule. Yet in both countries, chiefs and traditional leaders occupied different spaces of simultaneously being victims of the conflict, as coercive actors for the rebel movements or governments, as gatekeepers of their communities, and being on the frontlines of encounters that made the rebel movements adapt.⁷⁴ Traditional authorities are in South Sudan today an experienced form of government where the chief has judicial, administrative and executive powers. In Angola they have today only some form of residual power and are in many cases political instruments of the ruling party. In both countries the term 'traditional authority' or *poder tradicional* (traditional power) has become enshrined in the constitutions of Angola 2010 and South Sudan 2011 as a recognised form of local government. The term is used here to reflect the uses given by the actors themselves but also to reflect the social relationships, particular ancestral links and the territorial and communal belonging that is represented by chiefship and the roles played in the parallel state.

V.III Bias and Limitations

⁷⁴ Leonardi analyses the histories of chiefship, community and the state in several areas of South Sudan, in a way that highlights all these interactions in the production of authority and state power. Leonardi, Cherry, 2015, *Dealing with Government in South Sudan*, James Currey.

This comparison has two key limitations and biases regarding the choices of liberated areas and the choice of timeframe for the study of UNITA and the SPLM/A.

Liberated Areas

The areas in which each movement was able to establish a parallel state were very different in South Sudan and Angola. Each had distinct prior experience with state institutions. Yambio, which had existed in the colonial period, was an established county under Khartoum's rule but like other areas in the South, it had limited experience outside the basic administrative, extractive and security priorities of Khartoum. Jamba was an artificial construct to which a population was relocated to inhabit an area of savannah and bush with no pre-existing state institutions or bureaucratic structures of administration.

Comparing an artificially created rebel village with a pre-existing administrative locality that was captured by a rebel movement posed challenges. The exercise of 'stateness' in Yambio was pre-disposed to using existing state structures while in Jamba UNITA had a blank slate. In Yambio populations existed that were inclined to defiance and rejection of the rebel state by virtue of pre-existing ethnic politics; in Jamba they were either compliant through deep embeddedness with the rebel movement or were forcibly incorporated due to kidnapping. Either way these differences seemed problematic. What allowed this limitation to be potentially overcome was that both Jamba and Yambio provided the setting for two of the longest ruled liberated areas where the progression of governing strategies could be assessed despite the manner in which they were established.

This study is not a comprehensive account of UNITA and the SPLM/A's entire governing project and cannot claim to be representative of all aspects of governance of these two movements. This study does not focus on other liberated areas that also experienced levels of stability and consolidated rule, or other liberated areas that were contested or exposed to battles to retake them. In this way, the study does not depict how these two movements ruled areas where they didn't exercise direct administrative control and the monopoly of violence. What this study can holistically claim to represent are key aspects of the internal characteristics of the movements that were analysed with regards to the specificities of Yambio and Jamba. In this way, the analysis is not impacted or distorted by the choice of liberated area as the focus is on progression of governance over a decade both of which Yambio and Jamba facilitated.

Critical Junctures and Timeframe

The critical junctures experienced by the movements had very different characteristics although they both resulted in the similar outcome: the parallel state. The difficulty remains that progression of governance in Yambio occurred before and after the critical juncture while the institutions that were observed in Jamba were an immediate result of the critical juncture despite UNITA having governed its liberated areas before 1976. This may not change the progression of how change was enacted at the operational, ideological and strategic level, but does reveal different starting points for governance in both areas. This is a geographic limitation that does not severely impact the study of the four analytical framework elements of the UNITA study. Governance in other UNITA areas before the 1976 critical juncture is described in Chapter 4 to highlight how

institutions and administrative practices shifted after Jamba was established. An understanding of how institutions progressed was therefore achievable in this regard, also because unlike the SPLM/A that struggled to standardise their governance approach across liberated areas, UNITA defined and regulated all aspects of its areas even during the first war in the 1960s. An understanding of how governance progressed was achieved for both cases in spite of the different starting points of analysis for Yambio and Jamba.

The timeframe can produce specific biases given that the endpoint chosen may coincide with a period in “which the variable to be explained has attained some high or low point”.⁷⁵ This translates into periods in which the SPLM/A and UNITA were at their highest peak of administrative capacity. This bias is recognized as being part of the phenomena experienced. The specific time periods were chosen as they reflected sufficient time to assess the development of institutions: for UNITA this meant from 1979 until 1991 and for the SPLM/A from 1990 until 2002. The start date refers to the moment the movements began controlling and operating in these two liberated areas. The “cut off” period is when the peace processes commenced as these altered the functioning of these areas and the priorities of the movements. The peace processes also led to other critical junctures emerging. If the timeline were to have been extended, a new era of war and peace would have needed to be assessed. After 1991 UNITA ruled the “urban” areas of the central highlands, focusing its rebel capital in those areas instead of Jamba. After the signing of the first protocols of the CPA and in the run-up to the transitional period, the SPLM/A would position its main base and rebel capital in Rumbek (Lakes state) and

⁷⁵ Geddes, Barbara, “How the cases you choose affect the answers you get: Selection bias in comparative politics”, *Political Analysis* 2:13, 1990, p. 146.

the take over from the Sudanese government in Juba (after 2005). This will be examined in the conclusion.

It is also important to note that the analytical framework used also has a limitation that relates to the level of gradation and measurement of each of the 4 internal elements. While the framework allows for an assessment of progression and notes important shifts it does not clearly facilitate and understanding “on how much gradations of a particular variable affect the outcome in a particular case”⁷⁶ although it does allow for an understanding of how all 4 elements impact the outcome.

VI. Structure of Thesis

This thesis is organised into six chapters. *Chapter 2* provides the theoretical framework that situates this study in the literature of the state in Africa, the study of rebel movements and rebel governance. The purpose is to highlight the contributions that the study proposes to make to this literature by presenting a more detailed lens for the analysis of rebel movements. This is defined by the analytical framework which outlines the four internal characteristics of rebel movements - leadership, internal organisation, ideology, and approach to civilians. It provides an account of how these four characteristics have been addressed in the literature and how each aspect is comprised of multiple component parts. It also identifies which aspects of each characteristic is

⁷⁶ George and Bennet, 2005: 25.

relevant to this study. This will lay the theoretical grounds for the comparison of UNITA and the SPLM/A in Chapter 5.

The next two chapters form the empirical backbone of the thesis where the rebel governance of UNITA and the SPLM/A are examined in terms of their evolution and institutional design. These chapters explain the initial rudimentary structures created by each movement in the liberated areas of Yambio and other areas in the Jamba case, and how these were then developed to create more complex institutions that allowed force to be transformed into authority. The two chapters describe the progression of governance and the organisational pillars they stood upon, as well as the economic and service delivery strategies used. They differ in some sections, highlighting the variation encountered in the governance strategies with a particular focus on the role of NGOs and civil society for the SPLM/A case and the politically controlled environment for the UNITA case. *Chapter 3* traces the progression of SPLM/A's governance in Yambio over 12 years. It describes how a militarized project inserted civilians and traditional authorities into a hierarchical chain of command that also depended on their collaboration and employed pre-existing structures (courts and social networks) to govern. It highlights important changes in the movement, in particular the 1991 critical juncture, and the reorganisation that followed. The tools used by the SPLM/A to govern reflected the characteristics of the movement: a lack of strong political structures with weak party organs led it to outsource and decentralize governance. Governance thus took on more participatory character with attempts to apply the vision of a New Sudan.

Chapter 4 on Jamba begins by tracing UNITA's governance structures and systems during the first war in the run-up to the establishment of the rear base Jamba, which was a direct result of the critical juncture moment of 1976. UNITA already had a strong political party structure and systems that separated the military from the political organs and had designed governing strategies in other liberated areas. As Jamba was being built in 1979, the administrative side was developed to provide blueprints for every aspect of UNITA's governing project. All aspects of the liberation were subjected to the overarching political strategy and party organs even as UNITA was building its military capacity and arsenal to mirror a conventional army. The chapter describes the design of the institutions, revealing a parallel state project that was as efficient as it was coercive. It describes the structured effort to create a class of cadres and skilled workers, embedded in a social order and UNITA society, that would provide a response to the inequalities and disenfranchisement experienced by the southern populations in the MPLA state and society project.

Chapter 5 frames the comparison between the two cases descriptively and analytically to highlight the similarities and differences between the movements and their parallel projects. It employs elements identified in the second chapter and highlights how differences in ideology, organisation, leadership, and approach to civilians influenced the strategies and institutions used to project power. This establishes the rebel-system for both UNITA and the SPLM/A. It begins with a comparison of the critical junctures experienced by each movement to highlight the shift in strategy. It then proceeds to unpack and compare the structures of leadership, ideology, organisation, and approach to civilians sustained by UNITA and the SPLM/A which further contextualises the functioning and form of the parallel states.

The *concluding chapter 6* highlights the main contributions of this study to the understanding of rebel parallel states. The chapter begins by distilling the main pillars of order in Jamba and Yambio and the difficulties they faced using the rebel-system explanation. It draws on key comparative insights. A section on subsequent critical junctures faced by UNITA (1992 and 2002) and the SPLM/A (2005 and 2013) is introduced as a continuation to this study on internal political processes, highlighting which areas of the analytical framework experienced significant shifts. It ends by identifying the way in which this thesis contributes to the academic debates around the state, war and authority.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical and Analytical Framework

This chapter provides the theoretical framework in which this study is situated and the analytical framework that guides the comparison. It provides a brief review on how the state in Africa, rebel movements and their governing projects have been studied. The purpose is to show that any study on rebel governance needs to be inserted into wider debates on the state, war and the emergence of different forms of rebellion. This reinforces the assertion made that the initial conditions for rebellion provide specific leadership, ideology, and organisational directions that influence at a later stage how reform rebels build their parallel states in particular as they morph into more complex forms following critical junctures. The chapter then unpacks the different aspects and internal characteristics of rebel movements into the analytical framework. It discusses how scholars have dealt with these elements in order to provide the background for the dialogue between theory and the empirical evidence of the following chapters. It focuses on how understandings have emerged in the literature on 1) leadership, 2) ideology/political program, 3) internal organisation, and 4) approach to civilians. It describes the key elements in each of these components that could impact governance and war strategies and frames the leading aspects in each of these four elements that help organise and direct the comparison.

I. Theoretical Framework

1.1 The State in Africa

The state in Africa is a crucial element to consider in any study of rebel movements and parallel states. *Reform rebels* are partly a response to the political order, the composition of the state, its policies, rhetoric, elite behaviour, and social engineering projects. An overview of how the state was constructed or adapted by ruling elites, as explored in the literature, sheds light on how state-building can also be done by organised groups outside of the formal institutions of the state. Understanding the state and how authority was projected and reproduced by both the state and reform rebels makes them part of the same war-system. The nature of the state also helps determine the nature of the parallel state; it helps determine some of the characteristics of the rebel movements and the type of incentives deployed to motivate followers to fight wars.⁷⁷ The evolution of the state, and the parallel state, is a function of institutions created by elites to consolidate their power and protect the interests of “their” groups. As a result, the state is a crucial arena in which to ask questions about rebels. In particular as a large number of governments in Africa are the direct result of insurgencies, if one considers the liberation movements seeking independence, and add the number of rebel organisations that have succeeded in capturing state power after independence, in the cases of Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, DRC, among others.

The nature of the State in Africa has been extensively studied and theorised, highlighting key characteristics of the post-colonial setting, by scholars such as Jackson and Rosberg⁷⁸,

⁷⁷ Herbst, Jeffrey, 2000, “Economic incentives, natural resources, and conflict in Africa”, *Journal of African Economies*, Vol.9:3, p.270-294.

⁷⁸ Jackson, Robert and Rosberg, Carl, “Why Africa’s weak states persist: the empirical and the juridical in statehood,” *World Politics* 35, 1982, p. 1-24.

Fatton⁷⁹ Herbst⁸⁰, Rotberg⁸¹ Bayart⁸² and others. Their work has sought to identify lenses through which to understand the State, its failings and the differences in its characterisations; they also sought to understand why these states were not functioning according to conventional Weberian expectations. Different degrees of dysfunctionality were put forward to explain the decline of legitimacy, institutional efficiency and administrative capacity. This approach – understanding the state in terms of what it is *not* – has been increasingly criticized as failing to account for the nuances of politics in conflict zones and the performance of governmental functions by non-state actors.⁸³

The bi-polarity of failure or success, of weakness or resilience, of formal and informal and so forth had led portions of this debate to focus on the different poles rather than combining contradictory elements that coexist. Hydén concludes that scholars on African politics can generally agree on ten assumptions: society takes precedence over the state; that rule is over people and not land; that private and public realms are difficult to distinguish; that governance is driven by patronage not policy; that economics does not inform politics; that informal rather than formal institutions shape relations; that the tendency is to concentrate not decentralise power; that leaders will prefer to control not facilitate; that societies comply rather than deliberate; and that external dependency remains for the benefit of a few.⁸⁴ Many of these listed dynamics also inform the rule of reform rebels and the parallel states but coexist with contradictory and reaffirming

⁷⁹ Fatton, Robert, 1992, *Predatory Rule: State and civil society in Africa*, Lynne Rienner.

⁸⁰ Herbst, Jeffrey, 2000, *States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton University Press.

⁸¹ Rotberg, Robert (ed), 2004, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton University Press.

⁸² Bayart, Jean-Francois, 1989, (2010), *The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly*, Polity Press.

⁸³ Mampilly, Zachariah, 2011, *Rebel Rulers*, Cornell University Press, p. 7.

⁸⁴ Hydén, Goran, 2006, *African Politics in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, p.234-37.

dynamics. As “laws” of African politics, Hyden’s assumptions fit the dynamics of rebel governance in many aspects. While society does take precedence over the state, the rule of rebels is over land and people more so than inherited institutions; economics and logistics in war does to a certain degree inform politics and with reform rebels sustaining a parallel state sometimes plays an active rather than passive role. Understanding the state through the “practice of its multiple parts”, characterized by contradictions and paradoxes is a more useful way to break the rigidity of understanding the state as a “coherent, controlling organisation in a territory”.⁸⁵ The same approach needs to be applied to the study of rebel states.

Increasing the understanding of the linkages and continuation between formal and informal structures, relationships and institutions produces valuable insights into how politics is conducted during conflict and state failure. This is important because the key to resilience of the state in many countries, and their counterparts of parallel states, is found outside formal rules and procedures. The state itself, just like society is a key component of wars and why they emerge but it also changes over time with conflict. When the state fails the processes of remaking political systems by non-state actors emerges. Rotberg explains the nuances of state failure, weakness and collapse by using the criteria of 1) when states are unable to deliver political (public) goods, 2) cannot organise and channel the interests of their people, 3) fail to champion local and national concerns.⁸⁶ While he looks at the disharmony between communities, intensity of violence, flawed institutions, vacuum of authority and other characteristics of failure and

⁸⁵ Migdal, Joel, 2001, *State in Society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another*, Cambridge University Press, p14-6, referenced in Kingston and Spears, 2004:4.

⁸⁶ Rotberg, 2004.

collapse, in rebel governance these aspects coexist with governance in the parallel state. Challenging the notion of anarchy, scholars like Kingston et al begin “from the premise that the crumbling political order can reveal or give rise to the emergence of new or incipient kinds of political orders”.⁸⁷ The state, as the authoritative political institution, has three functions: as a sovereign authority, as an institution (an intangible symbol of identity), and as security guarantor.⁸⁸ These are also the same functions of the parallel states that can coexist with differing formal and informal dynamics, all of which become evident when institutions and political orders fail or emerge.

The literature on ‘governance without government’ began exploring areas where governance emerges in the absence of a formal state structure. Menkhaus explores this topic in the case of Somalia, arguing that although a formal central government has not existed since 1991 forms of social order and governance are present. These have taken the form of traditional clan governance; have included the role played by the private sector and the diaspora in maintaining health and education sectors, the functioning of Islamic structures of justice and finance among others. More evidence of this type of informal governance is found in the work of Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot that discuss the strategies taken by populations in attempting to manage periods of protracted conflict and state failure. They refer to these strategies as existing particularly in zones of ‘limited’ statehood.⁸⁹ In their work, *non-state governance* is defined as the configuration of interests and actors around new definitions of power in conflictual

⁸⁷ Kingston et al, 2004:1.

⁸⁸ Zartman, William, (ed), (1995), *Collapsed States, The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Lynne Rienner.

⁸⁹ Timothy Raeymaekers, Ken Menkhaus, Koen Vlassenroot, “State and non-state regulation in African protracted crises: governance without government?”, *Afrika Focus*, Volume 21:2, 2008.

contexts. They also reflect 'pre-state' traditional governance structures and systems that are absorbed or used by rebel movements to further their own ability to govern. Different forms of governance that emerge in such contexts institutionalise "modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provoke collective goods".⁹⁰ The use of state practices and norms by rebel groups is also linked to the "idea of the state (...) because it still resonates with the social imaginings of public order".⁹¹ The strategies used by rebel governors in parallel states combine these existing systems of authority (traditional and others), existing symbols of power and regulated order with attempts to secure a social contract (although the levels of coercion experienced by civilians makes the possibility of a social contract almost impossible even when they are able to establish their own administrative hierarchies). A form of social contract emerges when rebels carry out their obligations of "1) defence of the people from external enemies; 2) maintenance of internal peace and order; 3) contributions to material security of the populations by increasing peasant incomes and by providing health services, literary training and sometimes land and rural cultivations".⁹² Yet, the ability of civilians to negotiate such a contract on an equal footing has to be termed differently as it cannot be viewed as a social contract but rather a form of 'coercive, productive or permissive contract'.

"A coercive social contract is one in which the right to govern is predicated on the capacity of the rulers to render intolerable the lives of their subjects. (...) like a version of a protection racket. (...) A productive contract is one in which the sovereign authority and the subjects/citizens enter into some form of negotiation over how the rule of the former can contribute to the well-being of the latter. (...) Finally, a permissive contract represents a kind of half-way house. While the governing authority claims its sovereign

⁹⁰ Risse, Thomas (ed), 2011, *Governance Without a State? Policies and politics in areas of Limited Statehood*, Columbia University Press, p.9-11.

⁹¹ Hoffman, Kasper and Vlassenroot, Koen, "Armed groups and the exercise of public authority: the case of the Mayi-Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in Kalehe, South Kivu", *Peacebuilding* 2:20, 2014, p.202

⁹² Wickham-Crowley, Timothy, "The Rise (and sometimes fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America", *Sociological Forum* 2:3, 1987, p. 473

rights, it chooses not to exercise them (or all of them), in return for securing a measure of *de facto* compliance".⁹³

Just as violations of this contract by governments catapults different shifts in state-society and society-society relations the same occurs for rebel states. And just as failures of governments to fulfil this contract may lead populations to accept the governance of non-state actors, the failure of reform rebels to fulfil such contracts will lead to other processes of decline in legitimacy, authority and local level alliances during war.

Moving beyond the macro-state approaches of the central state and its hegemonic role vis-a-vis sub-national dynamics, more micro-level studies began to develop an understanding of how political struggles in the rural areas informed ruling options for the central government. These studies brought out issues of locality, of community and social forces impacting the state. Boone highlights the difficulties of studying the state in rural Africa given the uneven way localities and provinces have been incorporated into the modern state.⁹⁴ She looks at how local government is linked to the central state institutions along the spatial (the placement of state agencies) and processual dimensions (distribution of authority between central and local actors). Her central argument is that governments in Africa "pursued institution-building strategies designed in response to situations they confronted on the ground" resulting in variation from different spatial and processual elements.⁹⁵ This analysis of state-reach to the peripheries is crucial in understanding the measures adopted by rebel governments to either exploit

⁹³ Nugent, Paul, "States and Social Contracts in Africa", *New Left Review*, Vol. 63, 2010, p. 43-4

⁹⁴ Boone, 2003: 2.

⁹⁵ *ibid*, p. 33-4.

weaknesses or mobilize local authorities whose power derives from sources outside of the state.

The disconnect between the peripheries and the centre produced challenging dynamics for the state and more so during the second liberation wars. Herbst identifies the challenge faced by post-independence state-builders, who conducted politics by sustaining an urban bias further marginalising peasant populations.⁹⁶ As a result, the peripheries remained unincorporated into the political systems and were areas that rebels or local militias exploited to mobilize different constituencies, impose order and institute authority. This introduces the issue of how local/rural dynamics were brought into the strategies of insurgencies. Many state-building rebel movements built their parallel states in peripheral and rural areas tapping into sub-national dynamics and as matters of expediency relied on existing forms of local authority. They did this while trying to avoid the trappings of “localisms” in order to project a national agenda, yet invariably remained representations of sub-national interests, concerns and values.

The literature on how the local level feeds politics at the national level provides a crucial lens to view rebel governance and difficulties faced in different localities. Before rebels came in to “organise” different liberated areas there were existing systems of local authority that they had to engage, negotiate with, or instrumentalise. One gap in this literature relates to the reverse effect: the effect of the rebel state on the state itself, in particular the lessons provided for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction phases.

⁹⁶ Herbst, 2000: 18.

Because there is no generic rebel state, given the specific contexts in which they emerge and the different characteristics of the rebel groups building them, they can provide important local perspectives to state-building. During the Angolan peace process, and the subsequent negotiations between the MPLA government and UNITA, there were discussions about merging the two health care systems and other social service delivery areas.⁹⁷ The SPLM/A's leader John Garang used the lessons learned from governing portions of South Sudan during the war, to alter the programmes of governance when the movement became a government in 2005. He instituted three changes: reform of the civil service, the creation of caretaker governor positions, and a "villagisation" strategy. These policies were abandoned after he was killed three weeks into his tenure.⁹⁸ This aspect of the local level should be incorporated into debates on the state in Africa, in particular looking at governing approaches of rebels-turned-governments and cases of institutional hybridity⁹⁹ like the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda that used its wartime resistance committees as local government structures in peacetime yet faced many challenges. Local power dynamics and structures, like local grievances and cleavages, that do not always align with national cleavages¹⁰⁰, provide important lenses to view rebel governance.

1.11 Rebel Movements and Guerrilla governance

⁹⁷ Interviews conducted with members of UNITA's 1992 team for implementation of the agreement and Central Committee members, Lisbon and Luanda 2004-5.

⁹⁸ Interviews with Ministers in the South Sudanese government, and members of the SPLM National Liberation Council (NLC) tasked in 2005 by John Garang to implement these strategies, April 2012, Juba.

⁹⁹ Goodfellow, Tom, and Lindemann, Stefan, "The Clash of Institutions: Traditional authority, conflict and the failure of hybridity in Buganda", *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 51:1, 2013.

¹⁰⁰ Kalyvas, Stasis, "The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars", *American Political Science Review* 1-3, 2003; Autesserre, Severine, "Local Violence, National Peace? Post-war "settlement" in the Eastern DR Congo (2003-2006)", *African Studies Review* Vol49:3, December 2006.

Scholars working on rebel and insurgent movements have tended to produce typologies in an effort to highlight defining characteristics that transcend other sets of structural, ideational or organisational imperatives. They provide important starting points to understand differences and similarities among rebel groups but each category/type needs to be explored further to help explain why certain aspects will impact different rebel groups in different contexts. In his ground-breaking work, Clapham developed four categories of insurgencies: liberation, separatist, reform and, warlord insurgencies.¹⁰¹ Such approaches do not always take into account integrated and dynamic strategies of rebel organisations, in particular those that don't fall neatly into any type even if they are covered by the typology as a mixed case, a rebel movement may fulfil several types overtime. The work of Boas and Dunn provide a response to this and makes valuable comparative inroads into understanding the ethnology of guerrilla movements and conflict.¹⁰² They argue that "African insurgencies are best understood as rational responses to the composition of African states and their polities", while also recognising that changes in the international and local arenas have allowed for the creation of different types of rebel movements and insurgencies. They look at the characteristics of such groups through the lens of ideological motivation, geopolitical context, crisis in the post-colonial state, crisis of modernity, marginalisation, recycled elites, land issues and regionalization of conflicts. While these aspects explain why rebellions begin they may be limited in explaining why they take particular pathways and if or how they survive critical junctures.

¹⁰¹ Clapham, 1998.

¹⁰² Boas and Dunn, 2007.

The continued focus on the impact of external aspects highlights the need to refocus on internal characteristics of the movements as a way to identify different dynamics relating to alliances formed, decisions by the leadership, strategy at the political and military levels, and approaches to civilians. MacKinlay begins taking into account the internal aspects but still combines them with external aspects; he defines four categories that consider motivations, strength of the opposition, leadership, organisation, recruitment, environment, tactics and international reach.¹⁰³ He uses this to differentiate movements into Lumpen, Clan, Popular, and Global insurgent forces. Staniland on the other hand focuses on social bases as having explanatory significance in determining where movements come from and which shape their organisation took. He places groups in four different categories – integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented – with varying degrees of vertical and horizontal ties between rebels and local communities.¹⁰⁴ This introduces the structural elements and conditions that define the emergence of rebellion yet does not focus on understanding progression, and different pathways that internal characteristics provide; failing to account for variation overtime and during critical junctures.

The most useful framework of analysis of rebel movements which seeks an understanding of agentic shifts and political strategy is the work of Bard O'Neill. He identifies seven different types of insurgencies: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, separatist, reformist and preservationist.¹⁰⁵ The value of his work for the

¹⁰³ MacKinlay, John, 2005, *Globalisation and Insurgency*, The Adelphi Papers Series, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 41-3.

¹⁰⁴ Staniland, 2014:25.

¹⁰⁵ O'Neill, Bard, 1990, *Insurgency and Terrorism. Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, Brassey's.

purpose of this study is not the typology but the military and strategic approach – distinct from the pervasive political and economic lens - used to identify key elements defining rebel organisations. These are: strategic approaches, the environment, popular support, external support and government response. It explains survival strategies, internal calculations, organisation and tactical learning in an integrated manner. Yet his analysis hinges mostly on “external” elements, rather than internal elements. O’Neill also discusses the problems of identifying rebel movements within this typology, identifying areas that blur the lines between the categories. These include 1) goal transformation, how movements change goals because of new leaders or shifting calculations; 2) goal conflicts, when different factions have diverging and mutually exclusive goals; 3) misleading rhetoric, where reference to democratic values masks the real goals; and 4) goal ambiguity, when a movement’s goals are difficult to determine.¹⁰⁶ This approach fits well with the analysis of the internal characteristics as they face and adapt to critical junctures. Assessing rebels within the framework of continuity and change is key.

Understanding why rebel groups use violence against civilian populations in some cases and not in others has formed an important part of the literature. The level of violence is attributable to the availability of resources, ethnic identification, external patrons, and ideology although the economic agenda still dominates this literature. Keen sees war in the post-Cold War period as “the continuation of economics by other means”.¹⁰⁷ Some studies have attributed the motivations of groups to ‘greed’ and economic agendas¹⁰⁸, or

¹⁰⁶ O’Neill, 1990: 21-22.

¹⁰⁷ Keen, David, 1998, *The Economic Foundations of Violence in Civil Wars*, Adelphi Papers N320, Oxford University Press, p.11, referenced in Herbst, 200:272.

¹⁰⁸ Collier, P, and Hoeffler, A, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, 2004.

argued that where wealth is absent the movements must cultivate “social endowments” and distinct identities to mobilize collective support.¹⁰⁹ Olson argues that “stationary bandits” will stop roving when they can exercise the monopoly of the use of force in a given territory and will adopt their strategies to pay for the rebellion. While theft by “roving bandits” is uncoordinated and competitive, the stationary bandit rationalises and monopolises theft through taxation; the incentive being to achieve a degree of economic success.¹¹⁰ Weinstein argues that rebel groups that emerge in resource-rich environments or with the sponsorship of external patrons, commit higher levels of indiscriminate violence, while those in resource-poor contexts “employ violence selectively and strategically”.¹¹¹ This starting point is not the most helpful one when analysing rebel governance as it funnels motivations and organisational understanding through the transactional lens. Transactional politics is clearly present during war, as much as it is during peace, but it is a single element of how different interests and needs are aligned to reach outcomes to suit those with political and military power.

Other work has begun to focus on the phenomenon of rebel governance and insurgent behaviour, through comparative studies on governance approaches, in particular those by Wickham-Crowley¹¹², Weinstein¹¹³, Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly¹¹⁴, Mampilly¹¹⁵ and

¹⁰⁹ Weinstein, Jeremy, 2007, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Cambridge University Press.

¹¹⁰ Olson, Mancur, “Dictatorship, Democracy and Development”, *American Political Science Review* 87:6, September 1993.

¹¹¹ Weinstein, 2007:7.

¹¹² Wickham-Crowley, 1987.

¹¹³ Weinstein, 2007.

¹¹⁴ Arjona, Ana; Kasfir, Nelson; Mampilly, Zachariah, (eds), 2015, *Rebel Governance in Civil War*, Cambridge University Press.

¹¹⁵ Mampilly, 2011.

Metelis.¹¹⁶ They provide important lenses through which to study rebel governance and add new details on the parallel states of movements around the world, but focus chiefly on external elements including resources, society and population characteristics, government responses and pre-war governance, among others, rather than integrating these with the internal characteristics of the movements. A gap that has been identified in the study of guerrilla governance is that detailed historical accounts of the trajectories of the groups fail to provide a theoretical framework for understanding their governance structures across cases.¹¹⁷ More importantly is the devising of different angles which researchers of rebel movements can use to allow for deeper understandings of rebel organisation, strategy and governance. While this thesis does not propose to provide final answers to these issues, it does attempt to provide one possible lens for studying rebel movements.

Identifying the forces that influence the mechanics of governance is also key. Mampilly focuses on two conditions that determine the effectiveness of guerrilla civil administration design: state-society relations before the conflict, and the ethnic composition and ideological motivation of the group.¹¹⁸ He argues that pre-conflict state-society relations influence the scope for institutional innovation by rebel groups, and that the stronger the relations, the less innovative the design of the groups, and vice versa. In a later study Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly explore the influence of natural resources on rebel governance, the attributes of rebel government, the impact of ideologies on ruling

¹¹⁶ Metelis, Claire, 2010, *Inside Insurgency*, New York University Press.

¹¹⁷ Kalyvas, Stathis, 2003, "The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars", *Perspectives on Politics* 1:3, PP 475-494.

¹¹⁸ Mampilly, Zachariah, 2007, *Stationary Bandits: Understanding Rebel Governance*, PhD thesis, University of California.

strategies, civilian responses to rebel governments, and the role of different segments of society.¹¹⁹ Understanding rebel organisations as dynamic entities with shifting ideologies, leadership calculations, strategies and programmes to enhance popular support requires further investigations so that these elements become integrated into a wider understanding of their influence on institutions. The fluidity of war, rebel strategies and governance further requires an analysis that factors in change and more specifically moments of multipronged shocks that lead to significant agentic shifts. Greater insight is gained by considering the pathways taken by such groups, their evolution and change over time, reflecting institutional learning at the governance level and strategic learning at the organisational and political levels.

II. Analytical Framework

The purpose of this analytical framework is to guide the analysis of each case study as well as the comparison on which it is based. The following section summarises what has been established theoretically about each of the characteristics studied but requires further empirical investigation. The framework helps distil the dynamics, procedures and interactions of the four agentic characteristics. The concepts and the terms employed in analysing each of the four internal elements require clarification since, “competing interpretations of all the variables (...) exist, and different operationalisations might lead to different results”.¹²⁰ None of these elements fit into neat categorical ascriptions, but rather entertain divergent, contradictory and at times complementary characteristics.

¹¹⁹ Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, 2015:4.

¹²⁰ Geddes, 1990: 145

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In assessing leadership there are three critical, inter-related areas, all adaptive and reinforcing one another. These include 1) the role of a centralising leader that controls both the political and military organs but also has the capacity to build a unified command; 2) the ability to persuade followers and other leaders to pursue organizational objectives and stay the course of a long asymmetrical war, 3) the ability to tailor responses and strategies to survive multiple threats while understanding which balances are needed to address power imbalances and contradictory interests; 4) the ability to motivate, mobilise and secure loyalty of different constituencies through nationalistic appeals, while maintaining the ability to craft a flexible political message.

On ideology and the political program four areas are identified to reflect different analytical dimensions. These include 1) the ability to provide ideational tools to rally collective action and sustain mobilisation; 2) the creation of a new nationalism justifying a second liberation aligned to a new concept of the state and society; 3) the pragmatic understanding of tailoring messages for internal and external audiences at different junctures of the war; and 4) the coherent alignment of political and military efforts that reflect local realities and national contexts using sub-national cleavages and concerns to frame the justification for war.

In analysing organisation four aspects need to be highlighted 1) the capacity to build stable structures and to provide continuation in leadership consultation; 2) the proximity or distance between political and military organs, their separate functioning and the development of administrative organs; 3) the ability to socialise members and determine citizenship into the movement; and 4) the ability to build cohesion and efficient command and control structures and procedures to provide political direction, discipline and manage incentives to secure allegiance in all three organs.

On analysing approaches to civilians 5 areas interact that are dependent on the dynamics between the first three characteristics. These include 1) the ability to understand constraints by conditions on the ground relating to communities, tradition, historical grievances and existing sources of authority; 2) the willingness and ability to establish a social contract through service provision; 3) the use of existing systems of authority (chiefs and the churches) to enhance capacity, improve communication, and negotiate with civilians; 4) the ability to politicise and “educate” civilians about the liberation struggle; 5) the willingness to allow civilians the space to define relations with the movements and the parallel state.

II.I Leadership

Understanding a liberation movement requires insight into its leadership, specifically the experiences and vision of its founder, and the perspectives of its senior commanders and political ideologues; how these were translated into operational frames to mobilize the population, fight a stronger enemy, and manage different types of resources. The characteristics of leaders also influence the willingness to govern civilian populations. Leaders bear the ultimate responsibility for the actions, failures and successes of these

movements; they make the vital strategic and tactical decisions that result in complex relationships and institutions. Scholars of leadership have tended to study the psychological makeup of leaders, the contexts they emerged in, their personal attributes and behaviours, and the responses of their followers. However, the impact of leadership styles on organisations, and their governing strategies, ideologies and approach to civilians within the context of rebel governance has yet to be fully explored as part of the literature on war and rebellion.

Unpacking the many forms and styles of leadership is crucial to understanding parallel state formation. Leaders either centralize or decentralize power and allocate authority to different commanders and political commissars to manage sections of the liberated areas. The structures built, also dealt with at the organisational section further in this chapter, reflect choices, shortcomings, fears and convictions of leaders. Strong *reform rebel* leaders enact changes at the local level to provide an encompassing experience of resistance, linking ideology and political programme to structures and institutions. Some are symbolic while others imply changing how civilians run their daily lives. Such reform rebel leaders “have to find and develop the political fields of leverage - (the) political spaces that they could manage and control - to channel resources, so that their organisations did not become the focus of intragroup competition or ignore the interests of the local population”.¹²¹ The strength of the leaders’ political vision also transpires through the functioning of the parallel state, through training and propaganda strategies; by communicating this vision to mobilize support and motivate combatants; by creating

¹²¹ Reno, 2011:160.

systems of control and sanctions for second tier commanders; as well as changing direction and minimizing disruption of an evolving system of governance as challenges are encountered during the war.

A study on leadership needs to begin with the context and the influential dynamics that led to the emergence of certain leaders. In his comprehensive work on Amilcar Cabral, Chabal argues that any discussion of leadership requires an understanding of historical events rather than analysis based on a functional or behavioural approach.¹²² The study of UNITA and the SPLM/A's leadership cannot be separated from the history of Angola and Sudan, and notably earlier wars and forms of resistance. Roberts and Bradley argue that a period of crisis or turbulence is generally more open to leadership and in particular to leaders that propose radical change.¹²³ In critical situations where there is widespread dissatisfaction "such leaders arise because they provide people with an interpretation that brings order into their confused psychological worlds. The clever leader will sense the causes of dissatisfaction, will realize which old loyalties remain unshaken, and which are being seriously challenged".¹²⁴ While these are important in understanding the leadership of reform rebels, the contours of the first liberation and failed peace processes are likewise pertinent. They determine the benchmarks for failure and success and help determine the perspectives of leaders.

¹²² Chabal, 1983:13.

¹²³ Roberts, N, and Bradley, R, 1988, "Limits of Charisma", referenced in Conger, J. and Kanungo, R. (eds), 2012, *Charismatic Leadership: the elusive factor in organisational effectiveness*, Jossey Bass.

¹²⁴ Cantril, Hadley, 1941, *The Psychology of Social Movements*, Wiley, p 66, referenced in Gurr, 1970:291.

While “leadership requires power”, it requires different types of power and authority that move beyond command and control, creating organisational values that will allow the influence and persuasion of leaders to extend their ability to manage entire organisations.¹²⁵ Authority was divided by Weber into ‘charismatic’, ‘traditional’, and rational-legal¹²⁶ with the charismatic leader legitimated as a uniquely gifted individual; the rational-legal authority via rules set out in constitutions and other legal instruments; and traditional leadership via kinship. Weber observed that the charismatic leader’s allure came from perceived magical abilities, intellect or acts of heroism.¹²⁷ While discussions on the charismatic leader type have tended to highlight the perceived qualities of such leaders rather than concrete attributes¹²⁸, authority is a matter of legitimisation that has to be perceived at various levels of the organisations. Leadership as a result needs to be linked with the different tiers of command and authority as well as the ability to retain the political control of the liberation through critical junctures.

Burns looked into why charismatic leaders had such a hold on followers, suggesting two tendencies: transformational and transactional leadership styles. Transformational leaders appealed to followers through a transcendental mission and “mutual elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral agents”, while the transactional leader approached followers with the “an eye for exchanging one thing

¹²⁵ Nye, Joseph, “Leadership”, in Schechter, Stephen (ed), 2016, *American Governance*, Macmillan, p.1 (online version).

¹²⁶ Weber, Max, 1947, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations*, Free press, referenced in Conger, Jay, “Charismatic Leadership”, in Rumsey, Michael (ed), 2012, *Oxford Handbook on Leadership*, Oxford University Press.

¹²⁷ Conger, 2012: 2.

¹²⁸ Willner, A, 1984, *The Spellbinders: Charismatic political leadership*, Yale University Press, referenced in Conger, 2012.

for another: jobs for votes, or subsidies for campaign contributions”.¹²⁹ Leaders of reform rebel movements will more likely pursue a combination of transformational and transactional leadership. As transformational leaders, they will provide an inspiring vision aimed at reducing narrow self-interest and factionalism; as transactional leaders they will regulate behaviour in “which ambition countered ambitions, and factions countered factions” so that emphasis was “on laws more than individuals”¹³⁰, and the creation of new political orders.

Conger argues that charismatic leaders recognize the deficiencies of the status quo and “effectively articulate for followers (...) a) the nature of the shortcomings, b) a future vision, c) how the future vision will remove deficiencies and fulfil the hopes of followers, and d) the leaders’ plans of action for realising the vision”.¹³¹ Directing the message is a key aspect of understanding reform rebel leadership in particular as new forms of nationalism and political identity are created to mobilise support. The message has to give direction to particular grievances, that in the case of reform rebels use sub-national concerns to build their national cause. The capacity of rebel leaders to articulate a “just” cause, instil belief that the vision can be achieved, and provide a sense of security is essential in seeking to build parallel states. Organisational deficiencies and difficulties in establishing parallel states can arguably be overcome by strong leadership and a rallying message for local support. Yet this is short-term and needs to be supplemented with

¹²⁹ Burns, J, 1978, *Leadership*, Harper, p.4, referenced in Conger, 2012.

¹³⁰ Nye, 2016:4.

¹³¹ Conger, 2012: 9.

organisational strategies and integrated systems of authority (chiefs, local leaders, local commanders and cadres).

Rebel movements that engage in protracted warfare need disciplined command and control structures at the political but also the military level given the need to coordinate complex operations and manage several bases. The nature and type of leadership can be a source of cohesion or division within a movement as can the strategy to structure the leadership at the second and third tier commands. Any attempts to decentralize command and control at an organisational and military level are built on the confidence of ultimate loyalty and control. Yet it can be a risky decision if structures are not in place to contain dissent and factionalism. "The role of leaders is to create common knowledge and expectations, a set of cooperative work norms, and as a foundation, a system of monitoring and control that makes threats to punish defectors credible".¹³² For the purpose of understanding rebel state-building leaders, the ability to create disciplined command and control structures while also decentralising governing mandates is key. To do so operating procedures, rules and regulations need to be formulated to provide standards and define areas of operation, when these are based on ill-defined regulations and loosely applied, governance takes on irregular forms, for example, more personalised ones defined by others rather than the main leader.

The issue of integrated second tier commanders fits into the leadership debate but also into the organisation debate. Commanders are expected to represent the movement in

¹³² Weinstein, 2007: 133.

their localities and areas of combat; they are the only leadership of a movement civilians in particular areas will know and are seen to reflect the character of the movement. Thus, these commanders must be incorporated into structures with measures of compliance and aligned interests. The construction of leadership structures in ethnically heterogeneous countries is crucial in particular when movements are seen to be dominated by one ethnic group whilst governing other communities. Kasfir highlights the concerns of the Baganda civilians with regard to Museveni's NRM where the perception was that "control of the movement remained in the hands of the Banyankole officers, despite the growing recruitment of Baganda soldiers (...) the population was Baganda yet the High Command was not".¹³³ This issue also affected the SPLM/A and UNITA due to perceptions of domination by one ethnic group while the movements were attempting to appeal to other communities to build a nationalist warfront. Yet the need to negotiate with different local level leaders to narrow the space for dissent and advancement of short-term goals by opportunists had to be taken into account.

This brief summary highlights the roles and attributes of a leader required to plan and command military, political, and administrative operations over an extended territory. The very nature of reform rebels requires a different approach to the understanding of leadership. They aim to attain a higher level of political representation and want to correct the failings of the past while attempting to avoid the trappings of existing social and political divisions. To achieve their reform, they need to bring together a critical mass of supporters and leaders of different constituencies, by aggregating similar needs and

¹³³ Kasfir, 2002: 22.

interests while reconciling divergent ones to create a normative system that is broadly accepted.

II.II Ideology and Political Programme

Understanding ideology, political programmes and war strategies of reform rebels allows for a clearer perspective of what these groups want to liberate, how they propose to do it, which internal (social and organisational) fault lines they need to address, and who they want to mobilise. All three are distinct. While ideology is a system of ideals and the ideas spawned by those ideals, a political programme is a summary of aims and principles of a political party or movement as well as a statement of proposed action. War strategies have a military focus on how armed forces are employed to secure political and economic objectives by applying force. For this study, all three are useful and reinforcing elements. Ideology in this regard is essential in understanding and explaining “observed variation in armed group behaviour”.¹³⁴ Ideologies will provide a set of goals on how society and the liberation struggle should be organised and the methods chosen to achieve this objective. The political ideas held may or may not find expression in the institutions and governing systems of the liberated areas. Movements may or may not be able to apply such ideals in their governing strategies of the liberated areas, but in assessing whether they do or do not important shortcomings and contradictions are revealed: mainly around capacity, the strength of convictions, how they resonate with different

¹³⁴ Wood, Elizabeth Jean, and Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez, “Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental adoption and beyond”, *Journal of Peace Research* 51:2, 2014, p. 213.

constituencies, their mobilising strategies, and whether the mythology they generate is sufficiently strong. The study of ideology is key in analysing the internal functioning and motivations of reform rebels. The very *reform* they propose helps situate how and in what way the political ideals and messages shaped the war strategies, relationship among comrades and leaders, and defined the governing order.

Ideology, for the purposes of this study, is taken as the ideational and intellectual source of the political program, either described in a liberation movement's manifesto, or their gradual definition of an alternative vision to reform the state they are fighting, or creating their parallel state. It is "a set of ideas, beliefs and opinions and values that 1) exhibit a recurring pattern, 2) are held by significant groups, 3) compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy, 4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community".¹³⁵ The value of understanding how a movement's ideology impacted its formation and evolution is not disputed but few studies combine the analysis of ideology with the structures of rebel governance and internal organisation. Mampilly recognizes that what differentiates state-building rebels from bandits is "the influence of these modern political ideologies, particularly the Leninist and Maoist tradition of guerrilla warfare and their constitution" .¹³⁶ Kalyvas, Suykens and Hoffman investigate how different "rebel doctrines and cultural values" affect governance.¹³⁷ In the same vein, Kasfir argues that "cultural beliefs and social values instilled in insurgents before they

¹³⁵ Freedman, Michael, 2003, *Ideology A very short introduction*, Oxford University Press, p. 32.

¹³⁶ Mampilly, 2008:21.

¹³⁷ Different chapters in Arjona, Ana; Kasfir, Nelson; Mampilly, Zachariah (eds), 2015, *Rebel Governance in Civil War*, Cambridge University Press.

rebel influence their governance of civilians (...) (while) civilians are more likely to accept governance that embodies values they understand and uphold".¹³⁸ In Kasfir's perspective, rebel goals rather than doctrines are more consequential for how rebels govern. All these perspectives highlight important dynamics that influence and ground the political message of reform rebels. However, it is important to evaluate the ideologies and political programmes vis-à-vis the aspirations of different communities and contextualise them with the manner in which sub-national grievances are placed in wider political programmes and nationalist rhetoric. In so doing, the contradictions and flexibility of the message becomes more relevant.

The principles of guerrilla and revolutionary warfare, as described by Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara, Muammar Ghaddafi, Ho Chi Minh, Amilcar Cabral and Regis Debray also played an important role in the formulation of political programmes and war strategies of reform rebels. These ideas form the basis of the movement's strategy in battle, its propaganda machine, the manner it mobilizes civilians, the different stages of war, the instruments used, among others. Movements that followed Mao adopted a strategy of protracted popular war. Maoism was centred on the belief that agrarian rural society had a role to play in creating a socialist society; that military and political campaigns were 'people's campaigns' which could not be imposed from above; that revolution was

¹³⁸ Kasfir, Nelson, "Rebel Governance – Constructing a Field of Inquiry: Definitions, Scope, Patterns, Order, Causes", p. 40, in Arjona, Ana; Kasfir, Nelson; Mampilly, Zachariah (eds), 2015, *Rebel Governance in Civil War*, Cambridge University Press.

continuous and that self-criticism and rectification was necessary throughout the struggle.¹³⁹ For Mao, the essence of guerrilla warfare was political.¹⁴⁰

In the strategic debate of the Cuban experience under Che Guevara and Regis Debray the military became the most important tool. The fighter in Guevara's perspective was a social reformer with impetus given to combat and efficiency in war but also to the administrative side of civil functions. Debray claimed that the Cuban case proved that prioritising the military above politics led to success with the 'guerila foco' (guerrilla band) being the nucleus of the popular army taking the lead.¹⁴¹ These differences will have in many instances a direct impact on organisation. For movements that followed Mao's tenets on guerrilla war the military establishment was subservient to the political organisation and leadership. For those that followed Che Guevara's theory of guerrilla war the importance of the military was evident above that of the political agenda, which in turn made the development of party structures and civilian-led structures less salient. This political/military angle is not new but has only recently started to be used to explain why some movements survive while others face defeat although issues of defeat are complex as seen with these two cases where UNITA was more organised to win yet lost the war and the SPLM/A was facing greater challenges but won and achieved independence.

¹³⁹ Mao Tse-Tung, 1961, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, University of Illinois Press; Hart, Liddell, 1961, *Mao Tse-Tung and Che Guevara Guerrilla Warfare*, Cassell

¹⁴⁰ Taber, Robert, 2002, *War of the Flea*, Potomac Books.

¹⁴¹ O'Neill, 1990:44.

Kalyvas and Balcells have sought to understand how ideology influences the conduct and outcome of rebellions. They argue that in civil wars where rebels were Marxist, these conflicts were longer, more lethal and more likely to end with a negotiated compromise.¹⁴² This is explained on the basis that Marxist rebels were “robust insurgents” that focused on developing political party structures, on centralisation and discipline, mass indoctrination and the development of state-like structures.¹⁴³ Other work claims that civil wars where rebels recruit from or represent excluded ethnic groups will last longer due to issues of collective solidarity and legitimacy. In this way, “organisations associated with ethnic groups in power are less inclined to endure very long periods of fighting, as are rebellions organised around classes or ideologies that do not benefit from categorical boundaries”.¹⁴⁴ This type of work is important for the study of rebel movements. This thesis seeks to add to this literature by comparing a movement that was driven mainly by Marxists principles with one driven by Maoist principles yet both used sub-national grievances to mobilise their constituencies and fused them with other political ideas.

Beyond the guerrilla and revolutionary war theorists are the political ideas developed by African nationalists. African ideology and political ideas were meant to encompass all: “to the political leader, they are a vision and an instrument. To the political supporter, they are a reason for existence. To the technocrat, they are a basis for action. To the ordinary

¹⁴² Kalyvas, Stathis; Balcells, Laia, 2010, “Did Marxism Make a Difference? Marxist Rebellions and National Liberation Movements”, paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Washington.

¹⁴³ *ibid*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁴ Wucherpfennig, Julian; Metternich, Nils; Cederman, Lars-Erik; Gleditsch, Skrede, “Ethnicity, the state and the duration of civil war”, *World Politics* 64:1, January 2017, p.91.

African, they may be means of obtaining resources, a source of social identity, a point of contact with the political system".¹⁴⁵ The symbolism of liberation movements throughout Africa has been framed within the paradigm of 'representing the oppressed, those wanting freedom and independence', and in this sense these movements embodied the nation. In this way, national liberation movements have a "common theology" which states that regardless of its sins the liberation movement is righteous and not only represents the masses but sees itself as the masses and can therefore never be wrong.¹⁴⁶ This framing was employed mostly during the anti-colonial struggle, more than by post-independence rebel movements and highlights the difficulty faced by second liberation movements in devising alternative strategies and political programmes to justify the continuation of war. This requires a deeper unpacking of the nationalism forged by second liberations.

To seek support and mobilize combatants and non-combatants, rebels must be rooted in several social conditions and produce a unifying idea that overrides the divisions characterising societies at war. "Ideologies are imaginative maps drawing together facts that themselves may be disputed. They are collectively produced and collectively consumed (...) and that collective nature makes them public property".¹⁴⁷ To achieve such a collectivity, identities and grievances have to be mobilised and inserted into the political messages to confer a degree of legitimacy but also to justify the use of collective

¹⁴⁵ Minogue, Martin; Molloy, Judith (eds), 1974, *African Aims and Attitudes*, Cambridge University Press, p. 12.

¹⁴⁶ Johnson, 2002, "The final struggle is to stay in power", Focus, No25, Helen Suzman Foundation, in Melber, Henning, *The Legacy of Anti-Colonial Struggles in Southern Africa: Liberation Movements as Governments*, Conference paper, April 2010, Maputo.

¹⁴⁷ Freedon, 2006:20.

violence. By mobilising sub-national grievances, reform rebels attempt to carve out a “people” that they represent and take the responsibility of liberating yet they also need to appeal to the national level while neutralising the contradictions their view of the “oppressed” may have with other communities they want to represent.

The justification for war will arise differently for different groups. Reform rebels will need to determine in greater detail why their cause is just by mobilising, enhancing or creating grievances. This would form the basis of their new nationalism. The political message will mediate between the parallel state authority and society. In essence, it is the ideological and political traditions of control and consent, which are not socially fixed, that define the nature of citizenship.¹⁴⁸ Through the operationalization of their nationalist and ideological positioning, via their political programs, rebels redefine relations with civilians and the nature of citizenship of the parallel state by projecting the idea of a ‘nation’ to bridge the political and social divisions that existed. The manner in which “citizenship” of the parallel state emerges is also a consequence of how civilians are approached (dealt with later in this chapter).

Understanding the “imaginative maps” of political ideology, the nationalist rhetoric and the different ways these constructs are managed to reflect local realities is key to detailing the alternative nationalist identity built by reform rebels and what, if anything, differentiated their governing approach. This is also key to exploring the nature and form

¹⁴⁸ Munro, William A, (1998), *The Moral Economy of the State: Conservation, Community, and State Making in Zimbabwe*, Ohio University Press.

of the parallel state and the role played in overcoming organisational shortcomings and stronger enemies. This section has focused on the dynamics of the political message relating to the portrayal of the new state and society as a new form of nationalism; the flexibilities of the message to provide answers to different stakeholders; and the coherent alignment of war efforts with local and national realities. A strong mobilising political message and program can sustain rebellions through difficult junctures but these have to be aligned with some form of organisational cohesion.

II.III Internal Organisation

The unpredictability of war, the disruption it effects on social structures, and the difficulty of mobilising fighters and civilians to sustain a cause in the face of hardship and bloodshed, demands exceptional motivational and organisational skills and effective operating procedures. Political and military structures facilitate the absorption of shockwaves that unpredictability brings, they also allow for social systems to find new expressions, while creating the incentives and survival strategies for those engaged in the conflict to stay the course. However, the internal organisation of rebel movements differs widely. War and insurgent warfare exposes the levels of efficiency, durability and fragility of organisations. To challenge a government, rebel movements use their military power, but to attempt to win over society they require political and organizational tools. In the absence of tested political tools – party and administrative structures - they used chiefs and decentralised power to civilians.

Some movements prioritize the military structures over the political while others believe that the struggle is first and foremost a political struggle that employs military means. Several liberation movements in Africa struggled with this duality of the party and the army. The African National Congress (ANC) was very clear in its rejection of militarism “which separated armed people’s struggle from its political context (...) The primacy of the political leadership is unchallenged and supreme and all revolutionary formations and levels (armed or not) are subordinate to this leadership”.¹⁴⁹ The Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) was also very clear in this

¹⁴⁹ ANC document “Strategy and Tactics of the ANC”, April 1969, in Braganca, Aquino; Wallerstein, Immanuel (eds), 1982, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 3*, Zed Books, p171-2.

distinction and organised the party with a strong Political Bureau that would lead the War Council and subordinate the civilian, administrative, technical and military spheres of the struggle to the political. Other movements like the National Resistance Army initially focused on the military aspect and only later formed the political wing (NRM); but once formed the political arm contributed greatly with its governing capacity. Tilly recognized that “to the extent that war-making went on with relatively little extraction, protection, and state-making, military forces ended up playing a larger and more autonomous part in national politics”.¹⁵⁰ State making by military branches would provide different strategies than those by the political branches of reform rebels. This perspective is key in analysing the state-building strategies of reform rebels – which branch, the training and expertise of those commanding the different areas of the branch – as it will reveal the level of embeddedness achieved with civilians and traditional authorities. It will also contextualise the organisational tools available to each movement.

Organizations of reform rebels must account for the many dilemmas faced and the choices made to overcome them. These dilemmas have been summarized in different ways. Frisch identifies five dilemmas: 1) actions versus secrecy affecting communication and technology, 2) growth versus control which influences the level of centralized control, 3) recruitment versus retention which relates to ‘contract enforcement’ with members, 4) resources versus constituencies which involves the level of commitment of recruits and strategies towards civilians, and finally 5) success versus longevity relating to decision-making and policies adopted¹⁵¹. The evolution of rebel movements is

¹⁵⁰ Tilly, 1985:184.

¹⁵¹ Frisch, Ethan, “Insurgencies are Organisations too: Organisational structure and the effectiveness of insurgent strategy”, *Peace & Conflict Review*, Vol6:1, 2011.

influenced by their responses to these dilemmas and the choices they make in dealing with contextual factors. Yet throughout critical junctures responses to such dilemmas shift. Tracing these shifts at the organizational level during and after critical junctures identifies the mechanisms of what drives these movements in particular directions and the alignment of the different parts (4 internal elements) with organisational strengths and weaknesses.

Local systems of authority and control can influence the level of centralising capacity of reform rebels as can the level of preparedness to manage different civilian populations that already have functioning systems of justice, trade, and order. Areas with strong social systems and hierarchies of authority through traditional chiefs provide opportunities and risks. The co-optation or “assimilation” of traditional authorities and local leaders allows rebels to outsource authority, bolster legitimacy and credibility and provide more services. The use and incorporation of traditional authorities in the case of other reform rebels like the NRM and EPLF, was also used to secure rural peace and organise community defence units.¹⁵² Boone, in her study of two regions in Senegal, shows how rural institutional hierarchy influenced political authority with the configurations of rural society impacting state-building.¹⁵³ Although she is not writing about conflict cases, Boone makes the point that greater decentralisation does not necessarily lead to greater community empowerment but can rather mean the entrenchment of local leaders and their networks. The strength of local systems of authority will also test the different political, administrative and military branches capacity. This will help determine some of

¹⁵² Reno, 2011: 128-143.

¹⁵³ Boone, 2003: 44.

the organisational dynamics that lead rebellions to take the form of networks (maximising integration with civilians and using existing hierarchies) or armies (maximising separation from civilians and creating new hierarchies).¹⁵⁴ Survival for the army organisation implies internal cohesion; for the network organisation, it depends on the ability to broaden the social base.

Integrating ideologies with locally relevant political issues and social understanding can be an approach taken to mobilize different constituencies and social groups. In many instances adopting Marxism or capitalist principles during the liberation era was little more than a way to align with the principals in the Cold War to gain their support. Combining ideologies and fusing them with traditional values was another approach used to achieve different levels of identification with and embeddedness in national societies. Weigert's work reveals important contradictions faced by different movements by combining an analysis on the local and national dimensions, and the role played by traditional authorities.¹⁵⁵ The hybrid and dynamic nature of ideology and its corresponding political programs provides an important lens to analyse reform rebellions in particular as war progresses and critical junctures impact how the liberation struggle is politically defined. Structures will have to be devised to reflect options to integrate or balance different social and ethnic interests at the central command levels but more importantly at the local levels where governance is occurring, exposing contradictory forms. Centralising for military purposes might be key yet for governing liberated areas a form of decentralisation will be needed. To decentralise and increase

¹⁵⁴ Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez, and Giustozzi, Antonio, "Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, 2010, p. 837.

¹⁵⁵ Weigert, Stephen, 1996, *Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in Modern Africa*, St Martins Press

administrative capacity the use of local leaders and chiefs becomes imperative; and with the devolution of power comes difficult organizational balances.

Organisations will also be impacted by “governance costs, information flows, and opportunism types”¹⁵⁶ into what Johnston termed U-form (unitary organisation) and M-form (multidimensional) structures. In U-form groups the leadership centralizes and administers violence while the M-form groups are more decentralized with authority being delegated to sub-commanders. The LURD and Kamojor U-form militias in Sierra Leone were militarily more effective, while the M-form groups RUF and NPFL were better at generating wealth. This dilemma of how much control to decentralize poses difficulties for the organisation and the leadership. Structures to monitor actions, control resources and provide feedback (intelligence) are built to counter the possibility of defection, factionalism and information leaks. Strategies to govern different areas and contain indiscipline will differ across liberated areas as each will face different challenges (proximity to frontlines, heterogeneity of population, resistance etc). Evidence is growing regarding how local issues force restructuring and how organisational forms are impacted by political relationships between commanders and local communities. Speight discusses a tax revolt in Bouna in northern Cote d’Ivoire that led the Forces Nouvelle leader Guillaume Soro to restructure the local administration in order to control the military wing and bolster legitimacy¹⁵⁷ with the population. Staniland¹⁵⁸ argues that pre-war social bases are driving elements of the organisation of insurgent movements, as

¹⁵⁶ Johnston, 2008:113.

¹⁵⁷ Speight, Jeremy, “Rebel Organisation and Local Politics: Evidence from Bouna (Northern Cote d’Ivoire, 2002-10), *Civil Wars*, 15:2, 2013, p.219-241.

¹⁵⁸ Staniland, 2014:228.

their leaders “socially appropriate existing structures of collective action for new functions”, with social networks being the most important given the linkages that facilitate “secrecy, discipline and obedience”.¹⁵⁹ This area is important as it factors in how local dynamics impact the organisation of governance in the different liberated areas and how willing the movements are to correct their actions and institute new procedures.

The availability of resources, externally provided (from patrons and relief agencies) or internally secured (revenue raising within the liberated areas), can influence the cohesion and design of institutions and strategies but should not be analysed in isolation to other equally more important aspects of organisation. Resources may have a uniquely military component, via external patrons’ support, leaving the political and administrative sides of the organisation to find alternative sources of income to assist in their development. Lidow suggests that different economic resources lead to three “types” of organisations: one that is dependent on ‘bottom-up’ natural resources that the movement controls directly; another that depends exclusively on civilian resources via taxation or looting; and finally, ‘top-down’ resources where revenue accrues directly to the rebel leaders.¹⁶⁰ While this thesis does not analyse the resource base of either UNITA or the SPLM/A, it does assess how resources were used, distributed and directed. The findings reveal that resources mobilised for the functioning of the parallel state in both resource poor (SPLM/A) and resource rich (UNITA) rebellions, as well as the main organisational tenets are not defined by where the resources come from or who controls

¹⁵⁹ibid, p. 23.

¹⁶⁰ Lidow, Nicholai, “A Model of Resources and Rebel Organisation”, paper prepared for WGAPE, University of Berkeley, December 2008.

them but rather how they were managed and instrumentalised. This was a function and consequence of organisational shifts and human capacity.

Organisational shifts and the composition of political, military and administrative organs of reform rebels must be examined from a multifaceted perspective. Reform rebels will have an array of organisational options that will be constrained and impacted by 1) the leadership structures formed to balance interests, build cohesion and counter dissident, 2) the priorities given to political party and cadre development and the power of the military branch, and 3) the development of administrative capacity and how to manage demands of civilians in the liberated areas. In areas where they face shortcomings they will devise new strategies to operate liberated areas even when organisational tools are missing.

II.IV Approach to Civilians

To understand the approaches of state-building rebels to civilian populations, three aspects will be highlighted: how civilians were brought into the movement, the institutions that allowed for their participation and the strategies that allowed force to be transformed into authority. This includes understanding the values and norms employed by rebels to entice civilians to accept parallel governance; the strategies of the rebel leadership in its relations with civilians; the design of institutions to allow for civilian participation and reciprocity; and the different levels of empowerment. The approach to civilians is defined and constrained by the three previous elements. Leaders will direct their commanders, political commissars and troops to respect, protect or disregard civilians needs and properties. The political program will define how civilians

fit into the liberation struggle and the roles attributed. At the organisational level the development or weakness of political organs will lead to other strategies to buffer the direct contact between the military branch and civilian populations.

The obstacles to securing civilian support are many and can define the success or failure of a rebel movement. Civilian populations that resist rebel rule will give information to government troops, and resist providing food, material support, and recruits. Arjona discusses why some civilians resist while others provide support, and distinguishes between full and partial resistance. She contends that full resistance occurs when rebels attempt to intervene in local affairs by attempting to replace institutions, especially when these institutions are effective and are highly regarded by local residents.¹⁶¹ Shaping popular support to ensure collaboration and deter collusion with enemy forces provides an important link between adherence and control of civilian populations.¹⁶² In many ways, local dynamics will determine the strategies used to govern civilians in liberated areas. Kasfir takes a more nuanced approach in analysing the structures rebels use to enable voluntary compliance and the dilemmas of managing existing structures and dynamics. He points out that “villages are not neutral sites waiting for guerrillas to organise them (...) civilians who are chosen to collect food, elected to manage villagers, or selected to teach (...) often take advantage of their new positions to settle scores with other villagers”.¹⁶³ State-building rebels will in many cases have to devise strategies to ensure internal peace within the liberated areas and manage local disputes. Establishing

¹⁶¹ Arjona, Ana, “Civilian Resistance to Rebel Governance”, in Arjona, et al, 2015.

¹⁶² Kalyvas, Stasis, 2006, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge University Press, p.12.

¹⁶³ Kasfir, Nelson, “Dilemmas of Popular Support in Guerrilla War: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981-86, Paper presented at Laboratory in Comparative Ethnic Processes, UCLA, November 2002, p.9.

order in the setting of war provides an element of predictability and allows for the containment of violence and disputes within the civilian population. The SPLM/A and UNITA, before embarking on more detailed and responsive governance strategies post critical juncture, had already understood the need to ensure peace within their liberated areas.

The mismanagement of relations with civilians can be costly to a movement; reform rebels will need to determine responses that do not create multiple internal fronts. Cleavages along the lines of ethnicity, race, class and religion are both at the root of uprisings, and a condition for the way they develop but can also undo efforts of reform rebels. Zahar argues that when rebels identify with a population that they will treat them well, while if they don't, they will attempt to control them.¹⁶⁴ It may not be as linear as this given that control and treating civilians well are compatible strategies. Empowering civilians may suit specific but controllable purposes but will certainly not give them the means to weaken the parallel state project. Movements that set up governing structures will need to achieve different levels of embeddedness, consent and structural control of the population. Controls are set up to facilitate operations and logistics regardless of identification. As pointed out by Ajona, Kasfir and Mampilly, "rebels cannot fight wars effectively while holding a gun to the head of every civilian, nor have financial rewards alone proven sufficient for enduring civilian compliance".¹⁶⁵ Such compliance is achieved through three main areas: 1) the establishment of an implicit agreement with civilians and traditional leaders to reorganise society, 2) the ability to politicise and educate

¹⁶⁴ Zahar, Marie-Joelle, "Proteges, Clientes, Canon Fodder: Civil-Militia Relations in Internal Conflicts", in Chesterman, Simon, (ed), 2001, *Civilians in War*, Lynne Rienner, p.45.

¹⁶⁵ Ajona, Kasfir and Mampilly, 2015:3.

civilians into the nationalist cause, and 3) the roles crafted or created for civilian participation and empowerment.

The issue of civilian political awareness must also be highlighted. Almond and Verba placed civilians into three categories: parochials, subjects and participants. 'Parochials' are generally illiterate and have little if no awareness of the political system or their role in changing it; 'subjects' are part of the system but have no role in shaping policy and no inclination to join an insurgency; 'participants' are the educated elites that are aware of national institutions and policies and are willing to engage actively.¹⁶⁶ O'Neill rather classifies participation into 1) passive, referring to sympathizers, 2) active supporters, those willing to make sacrifices and 3) the intellectual masses. State-building rebels face challenges of integrating different participants and raising political awareness. To do this they need to achieve social control. Migdal argues that the most prominent factor in a state's ability to survive is its ability to mobilize society and define the operative rules by which its population organises itself.¹⁶⁷ The ability of societies to help mould states is a crucial determinant of which institutions work and which fail to respond to civilian needs and organise their actions in rebel territories. This can be taken further into determining how the rebel group managed to insert its institutions, rules and regulations into existing civilian survival strategies. Arjona examined the social order produced in liberated areas seeking to determine if there was an underlying contract and whether the rebels' intervention in civilian affairs was broad or narrow¹⁶⁸, by looking at the institutions, rules

¹⁶⁶ Almond, Gabriel; Verba, Sidney, 1963, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton University Press, referenced in O'Neill, 1990: 63-4.

¹⁶⁷ Migdal, Joel, 1988, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, Princeton University Press.

¹⁶⁸ Arjona, Ana, "Armed Groups' Governance in Civil War: A Synthesis", Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, 2009.

and regulations used to engage with civilians, and explore how intrusive they were. Yet different levels of intrusion and totalitarian control can also result in the creation of a social order that civilians may not entirely reject. These will result in contractarian or relational dynamics between rebels and their civilian constituencies.

Several movements created participation forums as well as structures to direct civilian activity towards greater coherence with the objectives of the governing project. These forums could take the form of feedback mechanisms or electing different councils in the liberated areas. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the NRM in Uganda developed village democratisation processes in their liberated areas. The village committees in EPLF areas involved sectoral representation of women, workers, youth and peasant organisations, in an attempt to empower disenfranchised communities.¹⁶⁹ The NRM leadership converted its clandestine committees into elected resistance committees to expand civilian compliance, introducing a "measure of democracy, but also to eliminate the imputation of their responsibility for decisions by committee chairs that were poorly received by villagers".¹⁷⁰ Committees or assemblies were used to sensitize civilians to their role in the war effort through material support and recruitment, but were also forums used to propagate the message of the leadership and the ideals of the movement. Such forums are an essential part of the parallel state as they serve to direct policy and create the space for participation; they embody different forms of political devolution and decentralisation of power.

¹⁶⁹ Connell, Dan, "Inside the EPLF: The Origins of the 'People Party' and the Liberation of Eritrea", *Review of African Political Economy*, N89, 2001, p-345-364.

¹⁷⁰ Kasfir, 2002:34.

Relations between civilians and reform rebels are complex. While rebel movements claim to represent the disenfranchised people, they don't always succeed in gaining the 'hearts and minds' of the population. The legitimacy and credibility of the social orders produced hinge on many factors which will differ according to the three internal characteristics analysed earlier and the symbolism and function assigned to the parallel state. Civilian organisation and demands to be citizens rather than subjects will require defined responses in particular as liberated areas progress into more sustained stages of stability and begin playing a support role for other fronts and operations. Understanding how civilians defined their roles in parallel states is key, partly because as Clapham argues, rebel organisations are created on the ground and "must be constructed in large part from the social materials they [rebels] find there".¹⁷¹ This framework therefore focuses on the strategies used by reform rebels to maximise legitimacy by integrating civilians into different organisational, leadership and symbolic aspects of the liberation struggle. The approach reform rebels take towards civilians needs to be analysed from the perspective of how they navigate constraints on the ground and existing systems of authority; their willingness to establish an implicit agreement of reciprocity by providing services; and their willingness to allow civilians the space to define their roles in the parallel state.

¹⁷¹ Clapham, 1998:11.

CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the link between the state and rebel movements as part of the same war system. It showed that understanding locality is a key element in the study of rebellion and more specifically reform rebels, bringing into perspective national and sub-national dimensions. It explored earlier academic analysis of rebel movements and rebel governance, that have investigated how and why some movements build relatively complex bureaucracies and systems of governance. Answers were sought in the structure of society, pre-war state institutions, sources of revenue and government responses. It revealed how this body of work has framed the analysis through a combination of internal and external elements (resources, external support, social and ethnic fractures, type of war etc) placing the approach taken in this thesis as a partial answer to this literature. Internal dynamics and characteristics of rebel movements need to be analysed in greater depth when assessing the parallel political orders and wartime governance of reform rebels or other state-building insurgencies. The internal characteristics reveal linkages and explain strategies that provide important nuances in understanding the parallel state but also in determining the crucial or superfluous elements within a specific context of each rebel-system.

While the theoretical framework looked at the war-system, the analytical framework defined the analytical universe for the rebel-system. The framework provided a review of the concepts that are deployed in this study, providing an explanatory basis for the comparison in Chapter 5. Leadership, ideology, organisation and approach to civilians, tells us a lot about reform rebel movements but more importantly for this thesis, they reveal areas that introduce new perspectives with which to analyse their governance

strategies. They provide a lens to understand limitations, constraints, internal fault lines and areas of resilience. They also allow for a deeper engagement with the internal agentic elements – helping to understand change - while establishing reciprocal relationships between all four areas towards an enhanced understanding of motivations and strategies. This allows the study of the parallel state to be built on the elements that will contextualise variance and institutional design options as facets incorporating structural strengths and weaknesses, strategic and tactical options, and evolving dynamics between national ambitions and local power relations. The analytical framework therefore breaks down the complexity of analysing the conditions within which parallel states emerge and the forms they take by breaking down elements that help contextualise this complexity, separating their analysis from the complexities of the war, resources, social and ethnic stratification and external support.

CHAPTER 3

Yambio

The New Sudan: From Militarisation to Legitimacy

1990- 2002

“They get food, they get shelter, they get clean drinking water, they get healthcare services, they get social amenities, they get economic infrastructure such as roads, they get jobs and so forth. Unless we provide these essential services to our people (...) then the people will prefer the government of the NIF (...) This is simple arithmetic: if the SPLM cannot deliver anything and we just shout Revolution! Revolution! and yet the cattle of the people are not vaccinated; their children are not sent to school (...) when the barest minimum essential things of life are not available, then the people will drive us into the sea, even though there is no sea they will find one”. (John Garang, 2002)¹⁷²

The preceding chapter defined the parameters for the analysis of the rebel-systems of these two case studies. This SPLM/A case-study reveals a rebel-system powered by a strong military ethos and organization, a nationalism fuelled by anger and discrimination, weak political structures, dysfunctional collective leadership structures at the central level that led to decentralized governance and autonomous commands, and a strong society that defined the contours of the parallel state at the local level.¹⁷³ This chapter traces the progression and stages of governance that occurred in Yambio, as it became the first county of the liberated South in 1990 until the signing of the first CPA protocol in 2002. This is done by describing and analysing the progression of institutions - from the Civil-Military Administrator (CMA) to the Civil Authority for a New Sudan (CANS) - that allowed for the SPLM/A to gain the acceptance of the population and ‘its

¹⁷² “The Call for Good Governance in the Republic of South Sudan” delivered to SPLA military officers, Wel, PaanLuel (ed), *The Genius of Dr John Garang, The Essential Writings and Speeches Volume I*, printed by Amazon.co.uk.

¹⁷³ These different elements will be situated within the analytical framework in Chapter 5.

right to rule'. The chapter is divided into four sections beginning with a first section dedicated to setting the scene for the liberation of Yambio and the initial contact between the SPLM/A and the civilian population. The second section describes what was effectively the first governing strategy of the movement. A highly militarized system (the CMA system) was combined with the old traditional order of chiefs, a rehabilitation of indirect rule, to secure the liberated area without the need to create legitimacy or rule through persuasion. The next section explains how the movement redefined the liberation struggle and what caused it to transform its approach to governance. This is followed by a detailed description of the New Sudan state and the CANS institutions which took on a more bureaucratic/regulated form and was driven by the parallel development of the Party as the state of the liberated south. Explaining the cause and creating the political spaces the movement could manage and control¹⁷⁴, was a vitally important step the SPLM/A had to take to transition into an organisation driven by political rather than uniquely military priorities.

What this progression of governance points to is the imperatives of 1) the reformulation of military calculations and strategies as political programs and objectives; 2) internal and external perceptions and calculus of strength, 3) the "popularisation" of the liberation struggle and legitimacy of the cause, 4) the creation of internal bases for resource management and production of symbolic capital 5) and finally the coordinated use of existing systems of authority. These factors help explain what drove and influenced the design of the governance strategy and the New Sudan state-building exercise. The

¹⁷⁴ Reno, 2011:160.

“moral calculus of power”¹⁷⁵ would now factor into the SPLM/A’s strategy through the creation of an ideological message that compelled widespread support, acceptance, and mediation of state authority by social forces of the South. The movement understood that it is the ideological and political traditions of control and consent that define the nature of citizenship¹⁷⁶ and by extension the nature of the state it was building as a parallel to Khartoum. The anger-fuelled nationalism, resulting from the failures of the 1972 peace agreement, allowed the movement to initially use this as a mobilisation tool rather than developing the political structures to ensure that it was creating its *nation* as an “artefact of men’s convictions, loyalties and solidarities”.¹⁷⁷ It took the SPLM/A 11 years before it understood that the tangibles of legitimacy had to be accompanied by a state-like entity that would challenge Khartoum but also other political threats from southern nationalist movements (in particular the SPLM/A- Nasir splinter group). The nation it was defending had to be built on the idea of freedom of all the southerners and not just mere ethnic coalitions; it also had to aspire to a different political order. Programmatically this was what they aspired to produce however the SPLM/A encountered difficulties due to weak central political structures capable of uniting diverse communities.

A war veteran of the Anyanya I liberation and a leading member of the SPLM/A who never defected explains that “The liberation was to emancipate the South (...) the administrative ideology had to change. This was the objective of the war and the revolution (...) the idea was to trace a new path to take people to a new promised land”.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Munro, William A, (1996), “Power, Peasants and Political Development: Reconsidering State Reconstruction in Africa”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* No38 (1)

¹⁷⁶ Munro, 1998.

¹⁷⁷ Gellner, Ernest, 1983, *Nations and Nationalism*, Blackwell, p.7.

¹⁷⁸ Interview former head of the humanitarian wing SRRA, October 2012, Juba.

A 'state' needed to be imagined and experienced for this second liberation to truly take root and allow for a new political order to emerge. Building their project on the ashes of a failed state was not the way to secure the power bases it needed to create in order to win the war and secure the peace. Ruling through the structures left behind by Khartoum or attempting to mirror their administration was not an option for the SPLM/A as these were part of the structural causes of the conflict. A leading commander and former secretary general of the party explains that "Sudan was controlled by two authorities that did not recognize each other (...) when the duality of power and sovereign authorities appeared the SPLM/A administration became more established".¹⁷⁹ This case study also points to the interaction between authority and power and how the SPLM/A understood that administrative structures had to reflect existing systems of power. In this way, the state had to be built on the basis of existing social systems and informal patron-client networks firstly through the use of chiefs (during the CMA era) and then by mobilising and corporatizing society (during the CANS era). It took a few years for the movement to understand that it had to mobilize and secure social control so that the state became a real and symbolic aspect of civilian's daily survival strategies.

This analysis follows Migdal's argument that the nature of the state cannot be separated from the nature of society and that the ability of the state to win the battle (between societies and states) for social control determines if it becomes weak or strong.¹⁸⁰ Azarya distinguishes between incorporation and disengagement when referring to state-society relations, providing an important understanding of societal responses to state actions,

¹⁷⁹ Interview with former SPLM secretary general, May 2012, Juba.

¹⁸⁰ Migdal, Joel, 1988, *Strong Societies and Weak States. State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton University Press.

and how organised or spontaneous actions are a response to government and not to general economic, social, or metaphysical forces.¹⁸¹ The CMA system experienced different levels of disengagement while the CANS system achieved degrees of incorporation. If institutions, once rooted, mould behaviour¹⁸² and by extension political culture, informal/endogenous governance structures by rebel movements will impact sub-national identities and their relation to the central authority. Understanding how at the sub-national level the differences were managed or exacerbated and the 'localisms' attempted replacement with a unifying nationalist cause, reveal the impact of society on the parallel state. The nature and characteristics of the rebel organisation, and its ability to create legitimacy, also influences how resilient the parallel state they were creating became. In the absence of strong political structures, the SPLM/A strategically opted to decentralize power to local authorities, while embedding them in a broad political framework and militarising society to ensure order. The result was a shift in state-society relations and unexpectedly in society-society relations. The movement also outsourced the delivery of key services to relief agencies and international NGOs. It instrumentalised legitimacy in this manner. This is an example of a locally-experienced parallel state that never expanded centrally beyond the imagined conceptions of its leadership; a fact that would haunt the SPLM/A during the 2005 transition and after independence.

¹⁸¹ Azarya, Victor, "Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement", in Rothchild, Donald, Chazan, Naomi (ed), (1988), *The Precarious Balance, State and Society in Africa*, Westview press.

¹⁸² Kohli, Atul (2002), "State, Society and Development", in Katznelson, Ira, Milner, Helen (ed), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, WW Norton.


II. Yambio: Force and Persuasion

Yambio is the capital of the Western Equatoria State (WES)¹⁸³, bordering the states of Western Bahr El-Ghazal and Lakes to the north, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the south, Central African Republic (CAR) to the west, and Central Equatoria state to the east. Home to the Zande, Balanda, Mundu, Fertit, Moru, Beli and Avokaya ethnic groups it is the only state in South Sudan that in 2010 elected an independent candidate as Governor, Joseph Bakosoro, rather than an SPLM candidate. The Zande, the dominant group in WES, claim that a great level of persuasion is necessary for them to provide obedience to authority. The Zande Paramount Chief explains that “We fought everyone that tried to dominate us: the Arabs, the British and the French”.¹⁸⁴ Ruled by the Avungara royal clan, the Zande kingdom operated under central and hierarchically organised systems of authority. A threat to colonial rule, the British attempted to reduce the power of King Budwe, but never managed to circumvent the power of such a centrally controlled system. After independence, in 1955, riots broke out in WES when steps were taken to install greater Northern presence. This became a catalyst for the Torit mutiny often seen as the start of the first civil war.¹⁸⁵ Given this innate characteristic of the Zande to resist any authority that did not persuade them made Western Equatoria a challenging area for the SPLM/A to try and rule over during the war.

¹⁸³ WES no longer exists as part of the 10-state division in South Sudan yet will still be used in this thesis to reflect the territorial divisions at the time of research. In late 2015 President Salva Kirr divided the 10 states into 28 and in 2017 into 32 states.

¹⁸⁴ Interview, June 2012, Yambio; He is considered the most senior Zande traditional authority.

¹⁸⁵ Johnson, 2003.



Yambio was chosen as the area to study the SPLM/A's governance efforts because of its unique standing as the first county of the New Sudan, a fact that made it the most stable liberated area that was never retaken after 1990. This allowed the movement to experiment with systems of governance, forcing it to engage with the population and provide some continuity of services and authority. A former commissioner of Maridi and a senior army officer in Yambio estimates that Yambio had over 250,000 people in the 1990s living permanently in the county while also having groups moving in during different stages of the war between the front and the rear.¹⁸⁶ Originally hostile to the SPLM/A, the local population considered the movement an occupation force for many years. As the SPLM/A moved closer into the area in 1990 the population abandoned

¹⁸⁶ Interview with former Commissioner of Maridi, April 2012, Yambio

Yambio in the wake of the movement's arrival. The re-division of the South into three provinces by Khartoum, explained in Chapter 1, left the south divided not only territorially and ethnically but also psychologically. Equatoria was the main bastion of pro Kokora sentiment and had, in the 1970s, pushed for the re-division of the South.¹⁸⁷ When the SPLM/A arrived in Equatoria it was perceived as an occupying force of Dinka fighters bent on revenge against the Equatorians for having betrayed the cause of a nationalist south. A former CANS Secretary from Equatoria, and post-independence Minister explains that "Khartoum had waged a vigorous campaign portraying the SPLM/A as an ethnic organisation, this is why people feared the movement when it arrived".¹⁸⁸

However, Yambio is not entirely representative of the SPLM/A's wartime governance experience given the diversity of the south, the accompanying demography, ecology, and security challenges, although it did provide a blueprint for other areas. Nevertheless, the elements that drove the movement to govern civilian populations in a more participatory manner were based on several contextual and organisational aspects that were general to the war and the SPLM/A. Many governance initiatives described in this chapter and implemented in other areas had their origins in the administrative experiment of Yambio. In fact, when the CANS were devised and began to take root in 1994 only Yambio was stable enough to allow for the movement to implement its state project. Other areas would only experience the CANS administration after 1997. Unless specifically stated, the

¹⁸⁷ The word 'Kokora' is a Bari word for 'divide equally'; it has been equated with deep divisions across the country.

¹⁸⁸ Interview CANS Humanitarian Affairs Secretary that had trained and worked in Khartoum, April 2012, Juba

description of processes, institutions and initiatives deal with what was achieved in Yambio.

The SPLM/A captured Yambio on the 25th of December 1990 without having to engage in a single battle. The evacuation of government forces and administration allowed the movement to enter the town peacefully, although the majority of civilians had evacuated to neighboring villages or across the border to the DRC and CAR, fearful of the destruction the rebels would bring. The initial hostility of the Equatorians to the SPLM/A soon dissipated by the experience of living under the movement's rule and the strategy used by Garang to empower a local leader as a conduit for the population and the movement. After liberating Yambio, Garang persuaded the Zande Brigadier Samuel AbuJohn, previously a Minister in Abel Alier's Regional Government, to take part in the SPLM/A liberation struggle. AbuJohn was given the important role of Governor of Equatoria. This gave the Zande some comfort in returning to Yambio and living under the SPLM/A's rule. Leadership was important in having the movement become relatively accepted however ethnic tensions were not eased sufficiently to allow for complete acceptance of the SPLM/A during the first 4 years of wartime governance. The Zande make an interesting distinction that the SPLM/A was not the problem but indeed the Dinkas.¹⁸⁹

Ethnic tensions were a problem the movement would have to contend with, especially as troops were deployed into areas that took them outside their original areas. The

¹⁸⁹ Testimonies collected from April to October 2012 from interviews conducted with civil society and traditional authorities in Yambio and some Equatorian intellectuals in Juba all pointed to this distinction.

movement portrayed itself as a nationalist organisation but urgently needed to forge a sense of unity given the common perception within certain communities of the South that it was a Dinka dominated organisation. The experience of governing a region that had fragile forms of cultural intersections and bonds of solidarity between different communities, was easily instrumentalized to cause division by warring factions within the South. Communities lived within the confines of their traditional system and ethnic areas, and little had been done administratively and politically under Khartoum's rule to integrate communities and form a 'nation' in the broader sense. This would have an impact on the SPLM/A's governance experiment in the 1990s, after independence and would reach a breaking point when the war started within the SPLM/A in 2013.

III. MILITARISATION AND THE OLD TRADITIONAL ORDER: THE CIVIL MILITARY ADMINISTRATION (CMA)

The SPLM/A began its liberation trajectory on a highly militarized basis with the focus being on gaining territory and bringing down the central government rather than on politically uniting different elites and communities as part of a larger social transformation process. Its establishment in Ethiopia and the influence of the Derg defined several important decisions and pathways. As a result of mass recruitment campaigns and the graduation of successive military units in Ethiopia the SPLM/A rapidly transformed its army into a conventional force. The first recruits were coming mainly from Dinka areas of Jonglei and Lakes, and the Nuer areas of Nasir and Bentiu but as the war progressed the movement drew in new areas with mobile units sent to further

recruit among their kin and age-groups.¹⁹⁰ The movement was credited with creating military units that had a national character with soldiers from different areas and ethnic groups which allowed it to do three things: 1) to undercut the tendency of factionalize the army, 2) to advance into new areas and recruit locally, and 3) to provide coherence of operations across regions by building local alliances. During the 1980s it had managed to transform itself into a formidable force, making it one of Africa's more successful guerrilla movements capable of securing considerable territory, dealing with international relief agencies, and suffering no major defeat until 1991.¹⁹¹ In 1988-9 it was sending battalions to the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile, effectively taking the war out of the south.¹⁹² From 1988-91 the SPLM/A had conquered over 70% of the South's territory.

Uniting southerners behind any single cause was difficult to achieve in the 1980s, in particular the cause for unity that could politically and symbolically unite diverse and unconnected populations. This was a result of an ill-defined ideology and political program; weak political organs and militarized leadership structures. A secessionist cause would have been easier to sell to the southerners but the SPLM/A was adamant about not replicating the mistakes of the Anyanya liberation. One important tool the movement used until 1991 was Radio SPLA. The radio first aired on October 12th 1984 and for 8 years proved to be of invaluable assistance to the war effort and to making known the SPLM/A's mission. Policies and changes within the movement were announced on the radio with programs aired in English, Arabic, Zande, Dinka, Nuer,

¹⁹⁰ Johnson, in Clapham 1998: 58.

¹⁹¹ Johnson and Prunier p.117, in Daly and Sikainga, 1993.

¹⁹² Johnson, in Clapham 1998: 59.

Shilluk, Nuba, Bari and Juba-Arabic; they would discuss issues of inequality, Arab domination, strategies of peace and war. The radio was shut down in 1991 leading the SPLM/A to devise other more localized strategies of political mobilization. While several political schools operated in Ethiopia for political commissars, the SPLM/A failed to develop the necessary political organs within the movement to later direct and control the parallel state. Each of its governance stages reflected this handicap with traditional authorities and local communities influencing the approach once the political space was created in the mid-1990s. Until then the approach developed in the liberated areas was of a militarized system of rule.

Millions of southerners lived under the SPLM/A in the 1980s¹⁹³ and faced the difficulties of having to engage with a hierarchical chain of command they had no immediate access to and with a movement that was aimed at meeting the needs of the organisation rather than the needs of the population. Consent and participation of the citizenry in the revolution would not factor into the military strategy of the movement at this stage. As the movement became stronger and major rural areas captured the Civil Military Administrator system (1988-94) was devised as the first stage of organised administration in the liberated areas.

The CMA system had two main objectives: to stabilize and secure newly liberated areas and incorporate the population into the war effort through the chief's system. This

¹⁹³ Luk, John, "Return to Normalcy: Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in the SPLM/A Administered areas", In Doornbos, Martin; Cliffe, Lionel; Ahmed, Abdel; Markakis, John (ed), 1992, *Beyond Conflict in the Horn*, James Currey.

militarized system was devised in a way that commanders took the reins of administration, security, and procurement of resources. Provision of services and the rehabilitation of economic activities were not the CMA's main functions. This fell mainly under the auspices of the movements' relief wing, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) created in 1986 to act as a liaison between international NGOs and the SPLM/A. At this stage, the movement was merely trying to replace the old political and administrative structures that had collapsed with the evacuation of government civil servants, and did not aim to build a political base. Using the only organisational tools it had available, the movement structured the CMA system through the structures of the military. The SPLM/A's theatre of military operations was divided into Axis, Zonal and Front commands, which were subsequently divided into independent area commands.¹⁹⁴ Zonal and area commands had the responsibility of appointing CMA's at the different levels of local administration while chiefs operated at the village levels.

The CMA administrative authority was therefore established using native and provincial structures in the Zonal areas of particular military commands. The movement used the same local government divisions of Sudan but changed their names in order to create a sense of a new administration. [SEE TABLE I](#). Using a skeletal governance structure, the CMA encapsulated many roles. He was the civil administrator, the main adjudicator of legal cases, the head of the military in the area, and the chief of resource organisation. Each CMA had the power to arbitrate and coordinate judicial matters by supervising chiefs' courts and having this system interact with SPLM/A appointed magistrates. The

¹⁹⁴ These military divisions are explained further in Chapter 5.

CMA's were also responsible for coordinating chiefs to provide the movement with recruits, food, porters and information. As the head of the county, the CMA would be under the authority of the regional commander, but would be the ultimate authority of the district (payam) and rural councils (boma) that fell under his jurisdiction. The CMA system did however follow a specific structure with assistant CMA's at the payam level and village administrators at the boma levels. [SEE TABLE 2](#)


Table 1: Old Administrative System and SPLM/A system

Table 1 Two Administrative Systems

SUDAN GOVERNMENT	SPLAM/A GOVERNMENT
Province / Area Council	County
District / Rural Council	Payam
Court Centre	Boma
Villages	Villages

Table 2: CMA System

Table 2 CMA System



After capturing Yambio, the SPLM/A had to ensure that it could keep the area from falling back to government forces, given that the neighbouring counties of Maridi and Mundri were still frontlines. The evacuation of the civil servants and entire government administration before the arrival of the SPLM/A, created a vacuum that needed to be filled. Citizens that had remained behind in villages surrounding Yambio explain that on the same day that the SPLM/A arrived the movement established a military administration. A local leader, that later took on important functions during the transition and after independence in WES as Speaker of the State Legislature, explains that

“they (the SPLM/A) appointed military administrators and created 5 payams¹⁹⁵ in Yambio county – Gangura, Bangasu, Yambio town, Rangu, and Nadianguere, but we did not understand the titles of this new local government (...) they said that at the boma¹⁹⁶ there was a sub-chief and for the payam a chief. That’s when they summoned all the chiefs and said that the army needed food”.¹⁹⁷

To ensure that the area was safe, groups of soldiers were posted all around Yambio and Nzara with outposts of between 35 and 70 soldiers on roads to detect movements of the enemy. The military barracks were posted on the outskirts in order to minimize direct contact between civilian and the military. The objective at this stage was not to transform force into authority but in fact to define force and reorder it as not to damage relations with civilians so that they could contribute to the war effort. It was about expansion and not consolidation of rule. Although the movement aimed at restoring some sense of

¹⁹⁵ Payam is a sub-division of counties that brings together several bomas, a category created by the SPLM/A, it is also an old name of the Kushite Kingdoms.

¹⁹⁶ Boma refers to a livestock enclosure or a collection of villages and was the smallest administrative unit of the SPLM/A. Boma was also the name of the first area the SPLM liberated in Jonglei 1984.

¹⁹⁷ Interview former Speaker of Parliament of Yambio, June 2012, Yambio.

normalcy by empowering chiefs and restoring native administration functions, the mentality at the time was still turned towards the superiority of the military over the political/administrative leader. A local government officer from Jonglei, that became critical of the militarised nature of the movement, explains “For those that grew up within the military the army was everything to them – knowledge, authority, future”.¹⁹⁸ This militaristic drive created the impression that the army was above politics, ideology, culture and tradition.

A local government official from Yambio, empowered by the movement to lead the population towards their own development, explains that the local population was given direct responsibilities for assisting the movement and providing services.¹⁹⁹ “I was elected the first chairlady of the county and had to encourage people to return to Yambio and begin forming associations to help the administration (...) we organised ways to help the communities”, was the testimony of the first female county commissioner.²⁰⁰ Schools were re-established during the first years of the CMA system under the auspices of women’s groups and the churches. Government figures in 1989 indicated that out of the 1417 schools that existed in the South before the war only 300 were operational.²⁰¹ The rehabilitation of the education system would be one of the greatest difficulties the movement would face. Testimonies from the SPLM/A leadership point to how the CMA system in Yambio was more organised than in other parts of the South, that while committees for the delivery of services were not a priority they were already emerging.

¹⁹⁸ Interview former MP, March 2012, Juba.

¹⁹⁹ Interview former member of CANS Economic Commission, March 2012, Juba.

²⁰⁰ Interview former commissioner Yambio, April 2012, Yambio.

²⁰¹ Figures given at the National Dialogue Conference on Peace held in Khartoum in 1989, in Luk, 1992:45.

III.I Militarisation of Society

From 1990 to 1994 traditional authorities, civilians, civil servants, teachers and any member of the community had to undergo military training. This was so communities could defend themselves from enemy incursions or militia forces that ventured into the liberated areas. This strategy served the purpose of civil defence but also allowed the movement to 'incorporate' civilians. Chiefs were given military training and commissioned as officers and incorporated into the military structure. "The first thing the SPLA²⁰² did in 1990 was to take chiefs for 45 days of military training and this was difficult for the older chiefs (...) one chief from Nzara died during the training", explained the Paramount Chief.²⁰³ A local party representative from Yambio describes how "Over 3000 people from Yambio went for training in Moroto (an area in Eastern Equatoria near Nimule) and chiefs were taken to a separate training facility in Kidepo (...) chiefs would learn the same skills as recruits: military, political and intelligence".²⁰⁴ The militarisation of social life would cause disruption at levels the SPLM/A didn't expect and in the opinion of key leaders the militarisation of chiefs destroyed the structures of traditional authority. The paramount chief was given the rank of captain while all executive chiefs became lieutenants. An intellectual and key SPLM/A representative in the US explains that "A chief who had the rank of lieutenant could not say anything to a SPLA Major. The new dispensation was upside down because chiefs were always revered" and the most

²⁰² When referring only to the army interviewees would refer to the SPLA rather than the SPLM/A movement as two separate entities; a reflection of the separation encountered during the 2002-5 transition.

²⁰³ Interview Paramount Chief of Yambio, June 2012, Yambio.

²⁰⁴ Interview SPLM state secretary for WES, October 2012, Yambio.

respected form of government at the local level.²⁰⁵ The objective of giving ranks to the chiefs was so that soldiers would respect them²⁰⁶, which pointed to the need to empower existing sources of authority but also the movement's inability to function outside a militarized structure that could accommodate different opinions and regulate social life through political structures.

III.II Traditional Authorities

Traditional authorities were expected to continue providing a system of local governance to their communities while functioning within the military structure. As chiefs they had many roles: 1) they were the "Gatekeepers" or the go-between with the SPLM/A government, reporting problems and needs of the community to the movement and communicating SPLM/A orders to the community. 2) they organised food and tax collection, recruiting of soldiers, and organising for self-help projects; 3) they had judicial and arbitration roles; 4) and were guardians of culture, traditions and customary laws.²⁰⁷

While the SPLM/A interfered and militarized the traditional authorities it also depended on them to create pillars of social order. "The social consciousness of the traditional society expressed in customary law, is so deeply ingrained that any developmental scheme, which disregards it cannot find its way into the hearts of the people".²⁰⁸ The movement knew that it could not rule the liberated areas without the chiefs, given the lack of structured support by segments of the population, a missing political wing to serve

²⁰⁵ Interview former SPLM Ambassador, March 2012, Juba.

²⁰⁶ Interview leading SPLM intellectual and former MP, March 2012, Juba.

²⁰⁷ Deng et al. 2011:12.

²⁰⁸ A quote by Francis Mading Deng, in a paper written by Justice Aleu Akechak Jok, Robert A Leitch, and Carrie Vandewint for World Vision International and the New Sudan Secretariat of Legal and Constitutional Affairs, *A Study of Customary Law in Contemporary Southern Sudan*, March 2004, p. 25.

as a civil service, the lack of resources available to provide services, and any other ordering force that could replace the chiefs. Because of this the SPLM/A needed to govern through intermediaries. It tied people that had prior legitimacy like chiefs to their rule by inserting them into a larger organisational structure, a clear form of indirect rule as developed by the British in Uganda and Nigeria.

However, unlike the organised British Lugardian scheme of indirect rule that rested on 3 pillars of the Native Court, the Native Administration, and the Native Treasury²⁰⁹ the SPLM/A's rudimentary version rested on securing the immediate needs of ensuring order and obtaining food, rather than being instrument to a system with a larger politico-administrative objective. What the SPLM/A was trying to do was restore the system of indirect rule that had existed in the Sudan under the British so that it could be at the service of the SPLM/A. During British rule the system of 'Indigenous Local Authority' was adopted in 1920, which effectively gave traditional authorities executive and judicial powers. The system was based on ethnic or sectional boundaries and thrived in a context of homogeneity²¹⁰ where communities were ruled within their traditional ethnic boundaries. This was a practice that had already re-emerged after independence when the Sudanese Government revived the system of native administration in 1985 to serve "as a practical vehicle of local administration".²¹¹

²⁰⁹ Mamdani, Mahmoud, 1996, *Citizens and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, James Currey.

²¹⁰ Dak, Samuek Ater, 1996, "Experiences and Problems in the Organization of Local Authorities", paper presented at the Conference on Civil Society and the Organization of Civil Authority in New Sudan, SPLM/A.

²¹¹ ElHussein, Ahmed Mustafa, 1989, "The revival of 'native administration' in Sudan: a pragmatic view", *Public Administration and Development*, Vol 9, p437-449.

Working within ethnic lines and within the confines of traditional rule gave the movement some relative peace with regards to any potential resistance emerging from its perception of being a Dinka movement. Traditional authorities were considered the backbone of the justice system in the liberated areas and generally in South Sudan. The first SPLM/A Chief Justice for Greater Equatoria described how “The use of traditional authorities goes back to the beginning of the war, as in 1983-4 it was a time to organise and when the Penal and Disciplinary Code came out room was already given to the traditional authority in liberated areas”.²¹² The provision of justice and conflict resolution mechanisms was divided between the two types of laws: the SPLM disciplinary law of 1984 for the military and customary law for disputes amongst civilians. Because of the nature of the war justice was a vital sector that needed to be secured if order was to be maintained in the liberated areas. “Trauma was in the head of the people and if civilians and the military committed crimes they were brought to justice using A courts and B courts²¹³ and people settled”, explained a former civilian commissioner of Yambio.²¹⁴ The military commander would in certain instances act like the court of appeal²¹⁵ if these courts were unable to make decisions that both parties accepted. Without tapping into this existing system of justice and using it to maintain order, the SPLM/A would have struggled to secure rural peace.

The SPLM/A was aware that if it interfered too deeply with the chiefs system that it could face resistance, in particular with a group like the Zande. “When you divide a people they

²¹² Interview Legal authority that prepared laws of the New Sudan, March 2012, Juba

²¹³ ‘A’ courts referred to a chiefs court (later Boma court) while ‘B’ courts were higher courts made up of several chiefs and a president (later Payam court).

²¹⁴ Interview former commissioner Yambio, June 2012 Yambio

²¹⁵ Interview civilian SPLM leader from Jonglei, former MP, March 2012, Juba

can divide you”, warned a former civilian commissioner from Yambio.²¹⁶ “Because we are a kingdom the chiefs are respected and if you want to succeed here you have to go through the chiefs”.²¹⁷ The chiefs’ system in Zande areas was described as abiding by concrete rules of succession. “Chiefs must come from the Avungara clans that are descendants of King Budwe and their rule is given to them by God (...) not just anyone can be nominated chief”, explained a Zande local government official in Yambio.²¹⁸ However, one case in Tombura could have explained some of the allegations that the SPLM/A interfered and appointed chiefs. The movement decided to appoint a chief in 1990 for the Baranda people who, according to the Zande Paramount Chief, did not have a chief but used instead community leaders as they lived in Zande territory.²¹⁹ Not having a chief was an anomaly the movement had to address, similar to what the British did in eastern Nigeria where the absence of an identifiable executive authority led them to discover or invent chiefs.²²⁰ The movement sought to place a chief in the area so that some level of authority could be controlled by the SPLM/A to collect food. As the main interlocutors with the civilian population chiefs were created where they were needed. In this way, the paramount chief would answer to the highest SPLM/A authority; below him the executive chief at a lower level and the headmen below him at the village level, coordinating respectively with their CMA counterparts.

III.III Economic Activities and Relief

²¹⁶ Interview former commissioner of Yambio, April 2012 Yambio

²¹⁷ Interview former Commissioner of Yambio, April 2012, Yambio.

²¹⁸ Interview Local government officer, April 2012, Yambio.

²¹⁹ Interview Paramount Chief of Yambio, June 2012, Yambio.

²²⁰ Crowder, 1964:199.

As the SPLM/A began to liberate and define its theatre of operations it also began to distinguish between different areas of the South according to levels of insecurity. Conflict areas were termed 'front line emergency' while liberated areas were considered transitional and post conflict areas. Each was followed with a classification of needs. Conflict areas were recipients of relief assistance, while transitional areas combined the use of self-reliance strategies and relief assistance, and post conflict areas focused only on self-development. Yambio fell under the post conflict category. Its economic potential, in terms of agriculture, manufacturing, and mineral resources was never truly explored to the fullest despite the fact that the government of Sudan managed to maintain the Nzara Agro-industrial complex after independence in 1956. As with other regions of the South, the economy of the area was veered to benefit the North, through the exploitation of labor and resources. This factor of marginalisation sustained the rhetoric of a just war during the liberation struggle and was used by the SPLM/A as a mobilisation call for support and self-sufficiency so that empowerment could happen on many fronts. The first few years of the SPLM/A's rule in Yambio were difficult with the population in dire need of assistance. The challenges faced by communities ranged from food insecurity, lack of basic services, education and housing, lack of clothing and tools for farming and basic sustenance. With the 1988 famine in Bahr El -Ghazal capturing the attention of relief organisations, and 250, 000²²¹ southerners having died from starvation, the region of Western Equatoria fell outside the classification of emergency relief. This left the SPLM/A and the chiefs to their own devices in terms of food security and service provision.

²²¹ "The Famine in Sudan", Human Rights Watch Report, 1999.

Although the movement had tried to rehabilitate services, with the creation of its relief wing the SRRA, it depended entirely on international assistance. Until 1993 Yambio was completely isolated from much needed relief assistance. This insulation also led local communities to seek self-sufficient and creative ways of surviving the first few years of war, allowing for a degree of administrative experimentation in the face of great adversity. Efforts were made to initiate economic activities and coordinate resources beyond the immediate need of just sustaining the military effort and collecting food. An Economic Commission was created by the movement that aimed at securing investment in key areas of natural resources (namely gold in Kapoeta), livestock, and fisheries.²²² Trade networks between liberated areas were also beginning to operate again as the SPLM/A secured more territory. Goods were moved from government-controlled Abyei through Yambio and onto Uganda in an intricate manner.²²³ However, the CMA system faced serious challenges when in 1993 influxes of internally displaced (IDPs) flowed into neighbouring areas of Mundri and Maridi after the Bor massacre²²⁴ bringing more pressure on scarce resources. The waves of IDPs led international relief agencies to begin operating in Yambio in 1993, bringing with them the services required to assist the IDPs but also address the severe shortages faced by the local population. The entry on international NGOs and the complete dependence of service delivery on external actors severely constrained the SPLM/A's ability and willingness to develop the organisational capacity and a more meaningful agreement based on a form of reciprocity with its civilians.

²²² Deng, 2013: 125.

²²³ Johnson, in Harir and Tvedt, p. 136-41.

²²⁴ D'Silva, Brian, and Sakinas, Anne, "Evolution of a Transition Strategy and Lessons learnt", September 1999, USAID report; the Bor massacre occurred in 1991 after the movement splintered when Riek Machar's faction targeted and killed Dinka Bor (Garang's community) in Jonglei.

III.IV Assessing the CMA system: Ruling by Force

The difficulty with assessing this system is the lack of coherent explanations of the role of the CMA in the testimonies of several leading officers that became part of this administration. The system was experienced differently by different segments of the population with the leadership pointing to micromanagement and centralisation on one hand but on the other hand to the inconsistency of an unwritten and unregulated system. The CMA's "word was therefore law, whether he was right or wrong, drunk or sane, corrupt or honest, patriotic or traitor".²²⁵ There was a clear militarisation of society at this stage of the SPLM/A's rule that led to numerous human rights abuses and a sense that the SPLA was an occupying force of Dinka soldiers in Yambio. The movement clearly lacked the structure to govern the liberated areas and had not devised a clear objective of winning the hearts and minds of the people they were liberating. It was also during the CMA years that corruption began emerging within the movement and certain areas "had developed into a state of warlordism".²²⁶ "Commissioners became powerful warlords that taxed the population (...) instead of building institutions [they] were looking after themselves" explains a lower level cadre that had worked for decades with different SPLM/A leaders.²²⁷

Although the CMA system had many shortcomings it did create a structure upon which the CANS were built. The CMA system was the reason for the survival of the SPLM/A

²²⁵ Malok, 2009: 182.

²²⁶ Mai et al, 2009: 109.

²²⁷ Interview SPLM cadre, February 2012, Juba.

during its most challenged phase of 1991-94²²⁸; it allowed the movement to gain some legitimacy with the population. However, testimonies show that relationships with the masses and the movement were strained. “We asked ourselves – why are people fleeing our areas? We are their liberators. So we had debates about the difference of capturing a garrison town and liberating an area (...) Liberation occurs afterwards because that happens in the minds of the people”.²²⁹ The traditional fabric of society had been disrupted in many ways. “Original chiefs were laid off as they needed young people to sing the slogans of the movement. The administration in the bush helped to create ethnic conflict”, explained a local government officer from Jonglei tasked with conducting a review of the SPLM/A’s rule over the liberated areas.²³⁰ This mistake was inadvertently corrected during the CANS by allowing communities space to experience the ‘state’ through its multiple forms by empowering them rather than imposing the authority of military commanders from other ethnic groups. Despite this, the movement never overcame the “communitization” of the nation to build a strong sense of a unified South.

IV. REDEFINING THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE: The Impetus to Transform

The SPLM/A’s parallel state of a New Sudan emerged in a context of national contestation when the movement was being challenged militarily, politically and symbolically. Facing the prospects of a likely demise John Garang’s movement began to rethink its approach to governance and the politics of legitimacy. Understanding the shortcomings of a militarized system of governance the New Sudan system began to adopt the attributes of

²²⁸ Johnson, 1998.

²²⁹ Interview SPLM cadre, February 2012, Juba.

²³⁰ Interview former CANS officer, March 2012, Juba.

a state: stable territory, monopoly of violence, national identity, revenue generation, infrastructure and administration²³¹, and greater strategies for civilian empowerment and participation. What propelled this shift was a multi-pronged shock that broke its military capacity, challenged its political legitimacy and reactivated ethnic fault lines dividing communities.

From May to August 1991 the SPLM/A would experience two sets of internal implosion: 1) the loss of its main patron, rear base and supplier of military and non-military support and 2) the splintering of the movement with the emergence of the SPLM-Nasir faction. “The collapse of Mengistu was a serious setback. We were not prepared to relocate to any other country and we also believed we would liberate the south before the Derg would fall as we had sent 10,000 men to reinforce their side. We lost everything and our refugees had to leave”, explained a leading Commander from Upper Nile and former SPLA Chief of Staff.²³² In May 1991 Mengistu Haile Mariam’s government collapsed, leading to mass refugee flows with over 200,000 leaving Ethiopia into Upper Nile. The SPLM/A had all of its training facilities, communications systems, weapons arsenal, political schools, and refugee camps in Ethiopia and the fall of the Derg would destroy all of the infrastructure that had been a fundamental lifeline for the liberation struggle. The movement then ordered all its bases and refugee camps to be relocated across the border. Some would move into Upper Nile, others to Kapoeta in Eastern Equatoria creating a build-up of civilians in these areas that would then become divided by the factional split of the movement.

²³¹ Spears, 2004.

²³² interview former SPLA Chief of Staff, October 2012, Juba.

The year 1991 was meant to see the SPLM/A begin a process of reform, as evidenced by testimonies and decisions made by Garang to begin working towards better administration and strengthening the political party in preparation for the possible defeat of the Derg. He realized that the movement would need to embark on internal restructuring and ideological recalibration to begin appealing to a wider audience, in particular to western governments and donors. It needed a more liberal façade to engage with the international community in order to maximize diplomatic support and the continuation of vital supplies from relief aid. A political school in Isoke, in Eastern Equatoria, was created in early 1991 to prepare the leadership and the senior cadres for this ideational and ideological shift. The idea was “to prepare cadres for social change and to install an ideology given that we had people of different backgrounds (students, army, former government officials) which all had different orientations” explained a former SPLA Director for Colleges and a leading commander from Jonglei.²³³ The school only operated for a few months. The SPLM/A’s shift in strategy was for the first time veered at creating a support base for the liberation struggle inside the South.

The meeting of the Political Military High Command (PMHC), the movement’s highest decision-making organ, in September of 1991 discussed new ways to reorganise the movement. The splintering of the movement with the SPLM-Nasir coup’s timing was allegedly aimed at pre-empting this meeting.²³⁴ The Torit resolutions were passed after 2 weeks of deliberations: one was aimed at reorganising a new administrative set-up for

²³³ Interview senior SPLA commander from Jonglei, November 2012, London.

²³⁴ Malok, 2009: 172.

the liberated areas of the New Sudan, and the other was to adopt the policy of self-determination.²³⁵ At the leadership level, Garang dissolved the PMHC and established the General Field Staff Command Council (GFSCC) as its substitute that was a larger forum composed of all SPLA commanders (70 at the time) with several specialised sub-committees entrusted with devising a plan to restructure the movement, devise organs for socio-economic development, civil administration and foreign policy.²³⁶

On August the 28th 1991, the second implosion occurred. Riek Machar Teny and Lam Akol, two members of the movements High Command, Gordon Koang Chol and other key military commanders, declared they were staging a coup against Garang and unseating him as chairman. Garang was not overthrown and the movement split with the Nasir faction emerging and operating from Upper Nile. The commanders took this decision by alleging lack of democracy in the movement, human rights abuses, despotic leadership, and the need to liberate the south in a separatist armed struggle. They would issue the Nasir Declaration signalling a break with the movements policy of unity with Sudan.²³⁷ Their appeal to key constituencies in the south made them a larger threat to the “united” front against Khartoum, despite the SPLM/A having had to contend with counterinsurgent ethnic militias before the split. As a result of the 1991 split and the creation of two fronts, the government and the Nasir faction, the SPLM/A lost most of the territory it had liberated since 1983. Most of Upper Nile, most of Bahr El-Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria had fallen.

²³⁵ *ibid*, p. 173.

²³⁶ *ibid*, p. 173.

²³⁷ Akol, Lam, 2003, *The Nasir Declaration*, IUniverse.

The splintering of the movement invariably took ethnic dimensions creating deeper schisms in the social fabric of the South, in particular between the Dinka and the Nuer. In 1992 the Nasir faction was joined by several other armed groups and formed the SPLM-United (later renamed South Sudan Independence movement/army in 1994, a result of its own internal fragmentation). Other senior commanders like William Nyoun and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol (SPLA Chief of Staff) would also defect.²³⁸ Desertions were to continue in the ranks of the SPLM/A, and movements like those organised by Equatorians (Alfred Lado Gore and David Mulla) took shape as the Patriotic Resistance Movement (PRM) and the Southern Sudan Freedom Fight (SSFF). The resulting factionalism of multiple militia groups would severely weaken the fight against Khartoum.

This catapulted Garang's movement into a greater sense of urgency to begin to create a 'state' and internal bases for support. Fighting an easily distinguishable enemy like Khartoum made the movement delay the political aspect of generating popular support through a structured process of institution building, political education, indoctrination and the production of social outcomes. Fighting an enemy within the South, the SPLM-Nasir, that had that same capacity to generate legitimacy and capture the imagination of the population with a more democratic and secessionist rhetoric was an entirely different threat. The SPLM/A became more inclined to create legitimacy through accommodation and the empowerment of civilians rather than an escalation in violence.

²³⁸ Mai, 2009:39.

The SPLM/A held its first political and mass consultative meeting three years after the critical juncture moment. It aimed at producing the symbolic and political capital needed to bring on board different constituencies and tailor responses to the needs of existing liberated areas. The First National Convention in Chukudum took place between 28th March and 11th April 1994. It convened community leaders, SPLM delegates, civil society leaders and traditional authorities from all over the country. In many cases it took as long as 5 months of continuous march for delegates from Southern Kordofan, northern Upper Nile, and northern Bahr el-Ghazal to reach Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria. Many delegates were killed by government offensives and aerial bombardments along the way. Chukudum became a reflective conference that allowed the movement to analyse, criticize, and question the leadership on the path taken by the movement since 1983.

V. A NEW ORDER: CIVIL AUTHORITY FOR NEW SUDAN (CANS) and the PARTY-STATE

Following the 1992 Torit Resolutions a roadmap was created for the emergence of the Civil Authority for a New Sudan (CANS). However, the structure and the process of transformation were only formally initiated at the 1994 First National Convention. It had the principal objectives of: creating structures for political, public and economic institutions; acquiring the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the people of the South and other areas participating in the liberation struggle; and the separation of the three tiers of government (legislative, executive and judiciary).²³⁹ The New Sudan state would emerge as the movement attempted to govern several areas of its 5 regions of Bahr El

²³⁹ Mai, James Hoth, 2008, "Political Reconciliation between SPLM, SPLA and Anyanya: a Negotiation tool for national reconciliation and peace in Post-war Sudan," thesis, University Fort Hare.

Ghazal, Equatoria, Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Upper Nile. As a decentralized system of governance, based on a party-state structure that allowed the SPLM to control all areas of socio-economic and political life, this state project would encounter problems. It would find it difficult to institute 'the necessary balance between peripheral pull and central control'.²⁴⁰

The SPLM/A state would be structured with the three branches of government. The New Sudan Executive would take the form of the National Executive Council (NEC) headed by chairman Garang and comprised of 20 Secretariats (Ministries) dealing with different areas of governance. Ministers were appointed by the chairman and the NEC was meant to sit every six months. The New Sudan Legislative would be formed on the basis of Liberation Councils that were also a central political organ of the party. The Judiciary was based on the principles of both statutory and customary law with the highest courts prioritising the New Sudan laws and the lowest courts deferring to the chiefs. Hierarchically the chairman sat at the apex of this structure, followed by his deputy and a core group of military commanders, which included the 5 governors of the New Sudan regions. Below the governors came the county commissioners, the payam and boma administrators. The 1998 SPLM Constitution further developed the role of the CANS as the authority regulating the relationship between the population of a sovereign country and its government, and not only the party/movement organs.²⁴¹ Created as a party document and also as a guideline for the establishment of civil authority, the Constitution

²⁴⁰ Nyang'oro, Julius, "The State of Politics in Africa. The Corporatist factor", in *Comparative International Development*, Spring 1989, Vol24:1, p. 5-19.

²⁴¹ Herzog, Herbert, 1998, "Report on Mission on Governance to Western Equatoria, Southern Sudan", Liebefeld Switzerland, Herzog Consult, p.15.

established the National Political and Executive Committee (NAPEC) that merged the roles of the executive and the SPLM political secretariat, bringing the Ministries under NAPEC.²⁴² It was an attempt to define political organs and have the party delineate all other aspects of the liberation including the military.

In Yambio this centralising body didn't seem to operate or have a strong influence on how the CANS were being implemented. What the movement needed to begin doing was to expand the administrative roles and educate the civilians on how to collaborate and participate in this new system. The movement also needed to build the physical infrastructure to support this new administrative expansion. Former government offices in Yambio were insufficient and the army was tasked with constructing new building for the CANS administration. A senior general explains how his forces built the structure for the Housing Department (that had 200 employees) and that today is the governor's office.²⁴³ Several other buildings were renovated and expanded upon so that Yambio could serve as the movements "capital" of the CANS.

Table 3: New Sudan Government Structure

²⁴² *ibid*, p. 15.

²⁴³ Interview former SPLA Chief of staff, October 2012, Juba.

Table 3 Civil Administration for a New Sudan - Branches of Government

	LEGISLATIVE	EXECUTIVE	JUDICIARY
SPLM System & Congresses	National Liberation Council	National Liberation Council Secretariats (Ministries)	(National) Court of Appeal
	Regional Liberation Councils	Regional Executive Councils	(Regional) Court High Courts
County Congress Elects →	County Liberation Councils	County Executive Councils	County Courts
Payam Congress Elects →	Payam Liberation Councils	Payam Executive Councils	Payam Courts
Boma Congress Elects →	Boma Liberation Councils	Boma Executive Councils	Chief's Courts

As part of this process of creating a “government” while simultaneously building the structures of the party, the movement had ambitious plans to introduce controlled elections. This meant that elections would be held at all levels of government, starting from the grassroots boma level upwards via the payam, county, regional and then national. The objective was to create a state that would be regulated by its New Sudan laws and the 1998 Constitution. However, in the absence of a functioning civil service and institutions outside of the military, the SPLM - as the political party - took over and dominated all tiers of government and civilian activities. Elections were held by some structures in Yambio but only at the local government level, leaving intact the composition of structures at the highest levels of power within the SPLM/A at the regional and national levels which remained defined by military hierarchy. SPLM Congresses at the county, payam and boma level were intended to be the supreme political body at the local level with powers to elect and review the work of the liberation

and executive councils.²⁴⁴ Governance expanded as the party was expanding, but without the necessary level of cohesion and party structures. The SPLM/A understood that it would have to install a decentralized system of governance, given the same constraints that had led it to adopt indirect rule during the CMA years, but was trying to establish a form of centralized control through the creation of party structures to guide this process of state formation at the local level. In this sense, the dominant party could be counted on “to hold disintegrative tendencies in check”²⁴⁵ in a system that was administratively decentralized.

The aim of the CANS was multidimensional: 1) It was designed to translate an ideological concept into nationalist support, becoming a tool to secure the hearts and minds of the people so that they too imagined the “state” with the SPLM at its helm; 2) it was aimed at ensuring a constant flow of recruits from civilian areas, and a continuous source of food; 3) it meant to acquire the mandate from Southerners to negotiate for peace on their behalf as a response against having the Nasir faction negotiate with Khartoum and therefore become the main representative of the South; 4) it was to guarantee that the population politically supported the SPLM/A and that the party would develop as a structure; 5) that civilians were provided with services and NGOs programmes coordinated for the advancement of the New Sudan; 6) that it would give the SPLM/A government civil servants the experience to govern and prepare the necessary human

²⁴⁴ Rolandsen, 2005:160.

²⁴⁵ M. Fainsod, 1962, *How Russia is Ruled*, Harvard University Press, as referenced in Hutchcroft, Paul, “Centralisation and Decentralisation in Administration and Politics: Assessing Territorial Dimensions of Authority and Power”, *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, Vol 14:1, January 2001.

capital to take over any administration during peacetime; 7) and finally a strategy to survive the war given that the conflict was going to be a long war.

The SPLM/A attempted to transform itself and build its political base when it was at its weakest point; it was shaken by the ease with which the Nasir faction gathered support and this exposed it to the fact that it was not the natural liberator of the South. The element of “explaining” why the movement was fighting and phrasing it in terms of protecting the rights of the people, “popularised” the liberation struggle. The civilian population understood that the SPLM/A was fighting to liberate the country from Northern dominance but hadn’t understood the extent of the reform programme the movement proposed because the party itself never developed and built the capacity to translate this message politically. This was to only happen 11 years after the movement was formed. There was a need to begin delivering to the southern Sudanese a sense of what the liberation would achieve for them: a new political dispensation, a new governing culture, an opportunity to help shape the future, and a sense of participating rather than being instrumentalised by the war and the movement.

In contrast to the unchecked authority of the CMA, the authorities of the new CANS system were given guidelines and mandates, as defined by the resolutions of the Convention in 1994. However, these proved to be too vague and lacking implementation modalities that could assist with the actual development of the different institutions. During the first 2 years of the CANS, civilian structures faced many difficulties namely lack of capacity, lack of funds and the absence of job descriptions that resulted in

duplication of roles and conflict between organs. Administrators managed institutions in a personalized way, which led to corruption and inconsistency in governance.

In addition to these difficulties, the military that had become accustomed to being the ultimate source of authority and having unrestricted power now had to contend with cohabitating with other forms of authority. Several officers and commanders in the army found it difficult to relinquish the power and privilege they had been accustomed to for over a decade and resisted the transition from CMA rule to a separate civil administration. Another internal organ that resisted the CANS was the relief wing that for years was the civilian face of the movement. The CANS impacted the way the SRRA functioned and clearly withdrew some of its power and responsibilities as several CANS secretariats took the lead in key areas of service delivery.

The civilian and military structures had to be separated so that the political party became the main driver of the liberation struggle. The aim was to demilitarize society. SPLA officers were relieved of their military functions in order to serve as CANS officials and this created the feeling that they were 'being rejected and abandoned' by the movement, that being part of the CANS was a demotion and punishment. The SPLM/A learnt through its experience with the CMA system that there had to be less interference from the military in the everyday life of the liberated areas. The message now was that the liberation was for the people and that the movement was fighting a just cause supported by the civilian population. "People began to feel that we were fighting for *them* and not that *they* were at the service of the army", explained a member of the SPLM/A National

Executive Council and a former aide to Garang.²⁴⁶ Testimonies by the civilian population, community leaders and local administrators also supported this idea that there was now “unity of mind”²⁴⁷, and that “when the CANS came people perceived it as things coming to normality”.²⁴⁸ The effort to bring the movement to the grassroots through party structures, explained further in this chapter, changed the dynamics between the population and the SPLM/A and created an implicit agreement defining the limits, rights and duties of the governors and the governed.

VI. Branches of Government

The SPLM/A’s ambition to create an entirely new state led it to begin developing the three branches of government in the liberated areas. The executive ran the civilian administration; the legislative became the basis for the building of party structures, and the judiciary incorporated the chiefs into a formal structure of justice. The institutional arrangement of the New Sudan was based on five levels of governance: the national, the regional, the county, payam and boma levels. In each of these five levels of authority the three branches of the government were represented. It was a decentralized system that allowed the three lowest tiers of local government a degree of autonomy while the regional and national level ran in more centralized and hierarchical ways. The Chairman made appointments for the Legislative and the Executive at the national and regional levels but at the local levels consulted with community leaders to determine who from the community had the necessary popular acceptance, liberation credentials and record

²⁴⁶ Interview NEC member and one of Garang’s aides, March 2012, Juba.

²⁴⁷ Interview key SPLM political commissar, February 2012, Juba.

²⁴⁸ Interview SPLM civilian leader, March 2012, Juba.

of efficiency. Before the war civil servants had been appointed to serve anywhere in the South but after the movement began to develop its administration it opted for the appointment of the 'sons and daughters' of the area to serve in the CANS civil service.²⁴⁹ This meant that in addition to the use of chiefs and other authorities, civilians and retired military officers from a certain area were selected to govern their areas of origin.

EXECUTIVE: Executive Council and Secretariats

The National Executive Council (NEC), as the central executive authority, was responsible for executing the policies and programmes of the movement, and the administration of the liberated areas. Comprised of several Secretariats (Ministries) and a decentralized arm of councils, the system was rendered ineffective by the leadership five years after its implementation. One of the many difficulties in its operations was the fact that the executive had no permanent place of operation to conduct state affairs and bureaucratic work. Affairs were coordinated from a decentralized level without a central system of authority and coordination. The leadership would only get involved when problems emerged at the local level, as it believed that the creation of the party structures would be sufficient to mitigate any eventual problems of administration. From 1991 the central command became a mobile organ travelling with Garang. This meant that continuity and supervision of the system was not constant. In the first two years of the CANS the NEC met only four or five times²⁵⁰, when as the seat of the SPLM government it should have

²⁴⁹ Interview CANS official from Upper Nile, March 2012, Juba.

²⁵⁰ Chol, Timothy Tot, 1996, "*Civil Authority in the new Sudan: Organisation, Functions and Problems*", presentation at the Conference on Civil Society and the Organisation of Civil Authority in New Sudan, SPLM/A.

been coordinating efforts and establishing protocols of governance in a more coherent and effective manner.

The NEC was represented at each level of governance through county executive councils (CEC), payam executive councils (PEC) or boma executive councils (BEC). Councils were elected and were constituency based with women electing 25% of the council. These bodies were meant to meet once a year and had the power to dissolve the legislative (the liberation councils).²⁵¹ During CEC meetings input was contributed from the different payams and interest groups in the county. When they functioned they facilitated an open dialogue with the civilian population and among different segments of society, the administration and the movement. They became grievance forums that allowed the movement to assess their performance. One constant problem mentioned in these meetings was the abuse by soldiers, the lack of resources for the administrators, and the emergence of corruption; topics that in their nature could have easily been silenced and rules established to curb potential criticism.

Elections were also held at the local level with the participation of civilians, chiefs and the party. One report describes how in 1998 a congress of Karika boma (Mundri county neighbouring Yambio) conducted a census of the population, deployed registration teams and informed the traditional authorities of the upcoming boma elections. Of a population of 8794 roughly 4500 participated and elected the chairman, the secretaries and

²⁵¹ Deng, 2013:144.

members of the liberation council.²⁵² The same report describes how a Yambio county congress was held over a period of four days and discussions were led by the different payam representatives, syndicated organisation members; reports were delivered by the five congress committees (political, security, finance, administration and legal).²⁵³ There was a considerable effort to jointly find solutions to real problems and ways to improve administration. Discussions were frank and open with resolutions being proposed and passed to address issues as diverse as inefficiency of the county administration, inefficient tax collection, and the misappropriation of funds.

Although there was an effort to separate the soldiers from the civilians abuses and incidents still occurred after 1994. As a result, resolutions were adopted in the County Congress of Yambio that confined soldiers to areas under tight military control or barracks.²⁵⁴ Local authorities and civilians confirmed that soldiers found to have broken the criminal codes were “fire squadded”. The county SPLA commander is reported in having stated during the July 1998 congress that civil society had to report to the civil authorities’ incidents of abuse so that action could be taken. This was an example of the civil administration acting to bring the military under its direct authority.

LEGISLATIVE: Liberation Councils

The National Liberation Council (NLC) was the legislative branch of government but also became the central committee of the party. This body was composed of 183 members at

²⁵² Herzog, 1998:17.

²⁵³ *ibid*, p. 18.

²⁵⁴ *ibid*, p. 7.

the national level from all areas of the South with representation of different interest groups including paramilitary groups, nominated members and popular organisations affiliated to the movement. The NLC was organised into 11 specialized committees in order to facilitate its mandate of legislating the laws of the New Sudan, approving NEC programmes and other executive decisions.²⁵⁵ The NLC failed to meet for several years after its establishment due to the difficulty of reuniting all members in one place given the vastness of the territory, the lack of transport and infrastructure facilities, and the pockets of insecurity. Liberation councils were replicated at all levels of governance, including at the county, payam and boma levels, and became forums where a decentralized and localized level of government would be instituted. At the local level the liberation councils would also take on a political party function and would play “the vital role of recruiting people of different constituencies using the chiefs and the CANS to join the SPLA and the SPLM” explained a former Chairman of the NLC.²⁵⁶ This was partly why they were elected by SPLM/A congresses (the executive branch). [See Table 3](#). A testimony by a leading chief in Yambio explains how chiefs were incorporated into the liberation councils so that the grassroots could be taught the mission and vision of the movement²⁵⁷. If any of the council members, be them civilians or chiefs, failed to comply with the Liberation Council Act they were replaced by other members of the community.

²⁵⁵ These committees were divided as follows: peace and internal solidarity, members affairs, Legal affairs, Military and security, Foreign affairs, Finance and economic affairs, information and publicity, public administration and local governance, relief, rehabilitation and humanitarian affairs, social affairs and services, refugees and displaced, human rights, women’s affairs and social welfare.

²⁵⁶ Interview former NLC Chairperson, February 2012, Juba.

²⁵⁷ Interview Executive Chief of Yambio town payam, June 2012, Yambio.

Like the executive councils, their legislative counterparts also held elections. The councils were elected at the county, payam and boma levels from members of the community in all five regions of the New Sudan, except the area of Upper Nile that was under Khartoum's rule. The boma liberation council (BLC) had 11 members, the payam liberation council (PLC) was comprised of 31 members, and the county liberation council (CLC) had 51 members. These were constituency-based organs that were elected geographically in two distinct ways through group/stakeholder-based representation and appointment-based representation. Civil society organisations (CSOs) were also given a certain percentage of seats to appoint members. This meant that the councils at the different levels of government would have elected officials by popular vote, officials elected by CSOs, and members appointed by the leading authority – be it the Chairman, the governor, the commissioner, the administrator or the head of organised forces (like the police).

Ideally the SPLM/A wanted to have every segment of the population represented so that diverging interests and needs would be taken into account when policy was being discussed. Members of the executive councils would also become delegates to the liberation councils by virtue of office, making the debate less effective but also curtailing any potential checks and balances.²⁵⁸ This was an attempt at a corporatist strategy to direct/integrate different groups of society into the SPLM/A state. Nyang'oro identifies this move to eliminate spontaneous interest articulation by the establishment of a limited number of functional groups under the tutelage of the state as central to the gradual

²⁵⁸ Deng, 2013: 147.

process of authoritarianism.²⁵⁹ This corporatist strategy would become more entrenched as the SPLM/A further blurred the party and state divide. It followed “many regime’s inclinations to look for arrangements that ensure their longevity”.²⁶⁰ This became clearer with the movement’s responses to local NGOs and civil society groups, explained later in this chapter.

One main shortfall of the liberation councils experiment was that the movement didn’t focus on creating the necessary cadres to direct the new era of the liberation struggle. As a result, “political enlightenment stayed only at the top and it didn’t trickle down to the boma and payam levels (...) The SPLM never came down to remobilize people and change the mentality”, explained a civil society leader from Yambio.²⁶¹ However, these structures and their political commissars played a vitally important role in convincing the population of the need for a consolidated front and attempting to secure the legitimacy necessary to represent them. While political commissars of the party had existed since the movement’s inception, keeping with its Marxist origins, they were meant to transition into a larger and more important role during the CANS. It seems like this never happened. Chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen were also used to take the mission and vision of the movement to the grassroots and were incorporated into the Liberation councils. Unlike the executive councils that stopped operating in the late 1990s, the liberation councils continued throughout the war and the peace negotiations.

²⁵⁹ Nyang’oro, 1989:15.

²⁶⁰ Nyang’oro and Shaw, in Villalon and Huxtable, 1998:40.

²⁶¹ Interview CSO leader from Yambio, March 2012, Juba.

JUDICIARY: Courts, Chiefs and New Sudan Laws

Following the Torit Resolutions in 1992 that called for the establishment of the judiciary, a new penal code, a code of criminal procedure and a code of civil procedure were promulgated at the 1994 Convention, and the 1984 laws repealed. The judiciary, based also on the 1998 constitution, was given the responsibility of administering justice, overseeing the police, and was given the role of custodian of the CANS. SPLM laws guided all the traditional laws although in the different courts system (chiefs and New Sudan courts) both customary and statutory laws were enforced.²⁶² The objectives of having a new type of administration that would be built on the 'ashes of the Old Sudan' system could have potentially left the traditional authorities in a precarious situation. However, the movement made a concerted effort to bring the traditional chiefs structures and customary law into the formal system of the 'New Sudan'. After the First Convention, the position of the chiefs was formalized within the SPLM/A's administrative structure. The idea was to establish a legal system that would embrace the cultural identity enshrined in customary law while creating the conditions required to foster the rule of law and reduce ethnic tensions.²⁶³ However, the issue of building a governing system that sustained legal pluralism created problems.

The harmonisation of legal proceedings was difficult in the liberated areas in particular since different communities and ethnic groups had different ruling principles and systems of justice. In areas where there were IDPs of different ethnic groups cohabitating

²⁶² Interview former Bangasu payam administrator, June 2012, Yambio.

²⁶³ Mennen, Tiernan, 2010, "Lessons from Yambio: Legal Pluralism and Customary Justice Reform in Southern Sudan", *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 2:218-252.

with populations of the locality there were difficulties in administering justice and mediating inter-communal conflict due to jurisdictional issues. It was in these gaps of customary jurisdiction that statutory courts would have to take the lead, although not always effectively. In most areas of the south there was a problem of having parallel and unconnected systems of statutory and customary law. Attempts were made at making subject-matter jurisdiction but this didn't succeed and instead individual chiefs would adjudicate customary law as they saw fit.²⁶⁴ Testimonies from Yambio point to a functional coordination of the CANS courts and their liaison with traditional courts, although some confusion arises when trying to explain how each operated differently. Again the movement seemed to replicate a system that resembled a form of colonial legal pluralism whereby customary law was recognized as long as it abided by the fundamentals of the state legal system.²⁶⁵

The court structure in the liberated areas was comprised of different judicial institutions: at the apex stood the court of appeal (headed by a Chief Justice), followed by High Courts at the regional level.²⁶⁶ County courts (statutory and customary), joined magistrates and also chiefs, while payam courts were comprised of senior chiefs and boma courts were composed of three chiefs. The system of joining both sources of law and the two types of courts was meant to expedite justice and avoid backlog and bureaucratisation. This was why the county courts became the backbone of the legal system as they joined both statutory and customary law and shared jurisdictions on civilian matters. Five years after

²⁶⁴ *ibid*, p. 225.

²⁶⁵ Tuori, Kaius, 2011, "The Disputed Roots of Legal Pluralism", *Law, Culture, and the Humanities*, 9:2, p. 330-351.

²⁶⁶ A Chief Justice was appointed only in 1995, but was unable to serve given that the court of appeal couldn't function with merely one judge.

the creation of the New Sudan legal system, a conference was organised to evaluate the progress and the difficulties of establishing the rule of law in the liberated areas. The result was a revision of 25 New Sudan laws and other reforms.

The 1999 workshop on the Rehabilitation and Restructuring of Legal Institutions and Law Enforcement Agencies aimed at reviewing several laws, creating an anti-corruption unit, addressing the problems faced by the judiciary, and the reorganisation of the courts system. One of the problems identified was the lack of clarity of who presides over courts at a local level. This issue was raised by the High Court Judge for the Equatoria Region, Deng Biong Mijak, who stated that while judges and magistrates sit at the Court of Appeal, the High Courts and the county courts, it remains unclear what level of chiefs (the paramount chief, chiefs, sub-chiefs or headman) should preside over the payam and boma courts. This highlights the difficulty the system faced in operationalising a modern judiciary with a pre-existing and well-established customary system. Both had to work together to establish law in the liberated areas and find lasting solutions to challenges of cohabitation. If issues were not resolved at the chief's court's level then cases could be referred to the High Court, in particular cases involving murder, rape, and stealing of government property. "The High Court was military but there were also chiefs there that served as judges. I was a judge in Yambio for seven years and at the High Court we treated soldiers and civilians equally as citizens according to the law"²⁶⁷. This testimony by an executive chief shows how the two systems interacted. According to other testimonies in Yambio four chiefs, one from Maridi, one from Tombura and two from Yambio, were

²⁶⁷ Interview Executive Chief of Yambio town payam, June 2012, Yambio.

given legal training by justice Deng Biong for a year in an effort to standardize the use of New Sudan laws.

There was an additional element that challenged the courts even further. Because of the IDP situation in Western Equatoria and the subsequent arrival of international NGOs to assist in relief and recovery efforts, cases in the early 1990s involved several aid workers that had committed social and moral crimes against the community. Kuol (2008) describes how in 1995 an agent from Care International was accused of committing adultery with a Zande lady and was sentenced to pay the 'Kasirbet'²⁶⁸ compensation and also a fine. Several cases during this period involving expatriates, who were subjected to the laws of the liberated areas, highlight how the delivery of justice was so important to maintain a sense of order. Although NGOs were the lifeline of entire sectors of the liberated areas the movement did not want to disturb systems of justice and morality of the community by allowing impunity for foreigners. As each case was heard and fines paid to the victims, fines were also paid to the courts. A structure of revenue sharing from the courts was set up that would be channelled to the war effort where the SPLM county authority would receive 30%; the army would receive 40% and the courts kept the remaining 30%.²⁶⁹

The Legal Secretariat was also to take charge of the police and other organised forces (wildlife and prisons). The Police Act of 1994 established the New Sudan Police force. An

²⁶⁸ Kasirbet means house trespassing; to explain how women in the family are considered part of the household and no breaches are allowed before formal proceedings of marriage or other arrangements are met.

²⁶⁹ Kuol, 2008.

SPLM/A police force could have been created as early as 1989 when the movement established the wildlife, prisons and police services with literate non-commissioned officers being sent to Isoke for training in the early 1990s but was never active or deployed.²⁷⁰ Any semblance of a functioning law enforcement agency operating in the liberated areas was to only emerge after 1994. The police remained badly equipped and under resourced for the duration of the war, and mostly existed in principle although military police units were functioning to deal with deserters. In the late 1990s a county the size of Yambio only had 43-armed police officers from a force of 143.²⁷¹ Security was still maintained by the military although, according to the Zande paramount chief, other ethnic groups and not Zande SPLA officers filled the roles of the “police” and security, which over the years built resentment and feed into the 2013 civil war.²⁷²

Additionally to the courts structure other bodies were created to provide greater guidance on recurring problems. In 1997 a Land Committee was established in Yambio where disputes over land and illegal seizure of property could be settled peacefully through mediation. Headed by a land officer the committee attempted to mediate situations between soldiers seizing land from local civilian communities, although “during sessions people brought guns to discuss the dispute”.²⁷³ On average five cases were heard a week and in order for families or communities to apply for mediation they had to communicate their problems to the county authorities. This body only functioned at the county level while land disputes at the boma and payam levels remained the

²⁷⁰ Paper by New Sudan Inspector General, Commander Makuei Deng Majuc, “Police Paper”, presented at the 1999 SPLM/A Workshop on Legal Institutions.

²⁷¹ Herzog, 1998:31.

²⁷² Interview Paramount Chief, June 2012, Yambio.

²⁷³ Interview former Chairman of Land committee, June 2012, Yambio.

jurisdiction of the chief's courts. The focus of land disputes was particularly relevant in the Equatorian region as agricultural communities interacted with pastoral groups that also needed to use their land. The issue of livelihoods and the clash between agriculturalist and pastoralist groups was one of the drivers of the Dinka and Zande antagonism. The SPLM/A managed to create a working solution by having the Dinka communities keep their cattle away from towns. This fragile equation was broken in 2005 when Dinka and Zande communities clashed violently over land causing the SPLM/A leadership at the highest level in Juba to intervene to avoid a serious inter-communal conflict.

Contradictions with the Levels of Government

The national, regional and local levels of government faced several contradictions. In many instances, the local level worked better than the regional and national levels. The county administration was the most effective level of governance as it exercised some degree of centralized execution while also understanding the different structures of the payam and boma below it. The county commissioner's office had its own departments of finance, information, agriculture, cooperatives and rural development, land, commerce, social welfare, youth, health, public works and police. Yambio had three commissioners during the CANS phase of governance showing a disposition for political rotation. Mary Biba was the third commissioner of Yambio and stayed for 6 years (1999-2005), she was also one of the first women to hold such a prominent role in the administration of the liberated areas. As commissioner of the county she ran hospitals and health care centres, organised schools, dealt with NGOs and ensured that civil society groups were self-

sufficient and able to produce goods to trade with Rumbek (another liberated area) and Uganda.²⁷⁴

The movement was making an effort to appoint civilians to the roles of county commissioners although once appointed they were given military ranks. If the military was to be brought under the control of the civilian administration, the highest civil servants had to be given a rank, pointing to the still weak hold political structures had on the movement and their capacity to bring the armed wing under their control. Working directly under the commissioner was the executive director that in Yambio had a very well-established relationship with the chiefs. The relationship between the CANS officials and the traditional authorities in this county and in its payams and bomas is deemed as one of the reasons why the SPLM/A's 'state' worked in Yambio, according to one of the first county commissioners.²⁷⁵

Yet, the system encountered difficulties from the start. At the conference on Civil Society and Organisation of Civil Authority in April 1996, implementation difficulties were discussed. A paper delivered by Timothy Tot Chol to the plenary pointed to several of the structural and operational problems the CANS faced.²⁷⁶ The regional level of the New Sudan was conceptualized in a way that contradicted the objectives of the CANS to separate the military from the civilian aspect of the liberation struggle. Each of the five regions of the New Sudan was headed not by civilian but by military Governors that

²⁷⁴ interviews, June 2012, Yambio.

²⁷⁵ Interview former Yambio Commissioner, June 2012, Yambio

²⁷⁶ Chol, 1996.

would prioritize military affairs over all other aspects of governance. They were placed over the central level of the Secretaries that were the “Ministers” of the New Sudan instead of below them. The movement clearly fused the different structures that were operated or supervised by the same members. This merger was a necessary process and the SPLM/A only expected the three branches to separate fully after the war.²⁷⁷ The governors, commissioners, payam and boma administrators would at the same time represent the executive, the legislative, and the party, which only further consolidated the creation of the SPLM party-state replicating inefficiencies and extending structural deficiencies.

One of the weaknesses of this approach was that it was unregulated and non-standardized which made the link from the local levels to the central commands weak. As a result, local authorities were not structured by rules that were defined by a larger SPLM/A political system but by local dynamics operating within the constraints of the SPLM/A institutions. Decentralised control was not an end in itself for the movement but rather a means to ensure sufficient control of large areas using minimal central leadership structures. Garang and his High Command faced too many strategic obstacles to also be able to focus on day-to-day affairs of the civilian administration. Orders were given at the central command level but how they were implemented depended on the capacity, understanding and resources of the local administration. In the absence of a stable seat of government most of the Secretariats operated during the first few years from Yambio while the chairman moved with the military in the frontlines. When asked

²⁷⁷ Herzog, 1998:15.

about the system of receiving directives from the central government level (from the office of the Chairman) the answers were not consistent. Directives would be communicated from headquarters and then passed to the different commissioners and written in a message book, as explained by a local SPLA officer that received directives from the central command.²⁷⁸ The absence of a clearly defined communications system for the CANS points to orders being received by the military commanders in the field and then passing these to the administrators.

VII. Service Delivery and Economic Development

As the New Sudan government structures emerged the SPLM/A needed to create alternative strategies for the delivery of services and economic development to accompany its 'state' project, despite the movement being under-manned and under-resourced to do so. Chiefs and relief agencies were used as service providers, a situation that already existed. The difference this time was that the community was encouraged to become the pillar of these efforts by becoming self-reliant and taking the reins of development initiatives. The community was expected to provide the basis of their own education and health care, as well as provide for their own food. Local NGOs were established for this purpose with the assistance of international NGOs. This "outsourcing" of service provision and the minimal involvement of the movement was a lost opportunity for the SPLM/A to consolidate an agreement with the population that would have created stronger bonds of loyalty, obedience and reciprocity. Had the movement been able to play a more active role in providing services, the process of embedding a

²⁷⁸ interview SPLA colonel, June 2012, Yambio.

state within the civil population would have allowed it to consolidate its New Sudan project more easily. As a key institutional aspect of legitimacy, the direct provision of services by the SPLM/A would have created a feedback loop allowing for stronger bonds with society while also developing administrative competence to deliver these services. However, the large presence of external organisations made the SPLM/A complacent. By not directly providing welfare, the New Sudan state had instead to define what it was offering (freedom and empowerment) and the mechanisms to shape the different encounters (councils, self-sufficiency groups, civil society).

Principles of Self-reliance and Self-Sacrifice

Given the many resource and manpower constraints faced by the movement, there was a need to mobilize civilians to organise themselves as community leaders and “civil servants”. The element of mobilisation was a very prominent factor mentioned in the interviews with chiefs, civilians and local civil servants showing how the CANS brought groups together with a common purpose. “We focused on self-reliance and the only thing affecting us was human resources (...) our expectation was to change the shape of the country even without resources”, explained the SPLM Representative in Western Equatoria State.²⁷⁹ There was a community development approach “where people would be convinced to help build and clear roads, to build schools, all to our benefit”.²⁸⁰ One of the greatest difficulties and also achievements, as per the testimonies of CANS officials, was the fact that the movement managed to persuade people to work on a voluntary basis without any salary and few privileges. “Life was difficult – we had no clothes, no food, no

²⁷⁹ Interview SPLM Secretary WES, October 2012, Yambio.

²⁸⁰ Interview Executive Director of Yei payam, March 2012, Yei.

cars, not even when I was Chairman of the NLC”.²⁸¹ There was also a sense of purpose in working for the CANS without pay, as “people knew it was a preparation for governance”, explained a lower level officer from the CANS Legal Secretariat.²⁸² The argument made in support of this was that if soldiers at the front, that were also unpaid, heard that civil servants were receiving salaries they could defect. A Director General of a Secretariat, the second in command, would receive two bags of sorghum a month. This also shows a major weakness of the SPLM/A’s administration, which was unable to mobilize enough resources to run the administrations and compensate the civil servants. Any resources at this stage were purely going towards the war front and the procurement of arms, fuel and other necessary materials. This also showed a lack of structured organisation given the amount of natural resources the movement had at its disposal, including teak, gold and other minerals, but was unable to capitalize on.

Self-Reliance was a policy that the SPLM/A formally adopted in 2000. “The SPLM brought the system of enlightenment not to depend on others but depend on ourselves” explained the leaders of a women’s group working a cooperative.²⁸³ Empowerment was a key principle as it facilitated a decentralized system where people could operate community projects and run entire sectors of service delivery without dependency on the movement. This gave people a sense of the break with the syndrome of dependency they had under the Arabs.²⁸⁴ “We challenged the population to think on their own as local communities were now regarded as citizens, as social capital and participated”, explained the head of

²⁸¹ Interview former NLC Chairman, February 2012, Juba.

²⁸² Interview former member CANS Legal Secretariat, February 2012, Juba.

²⁸³ Interview women’s group member, June 2012, Yambio.

²⁸⁴ Interview local administrator, October 2012, Yambio.

the Humanitarian Wing SRRA.²⁸⁵ This was also a convenient approach for the movement given its inability to provide all the necessary services to its population and also organise their labour and markets as to assist with livelihoods and food security. Professing a system of self-reliance meant that the expectations placed on the SPLM/A were managed and reduced. This system was the beginning of what Garang would later propose as his model for rural participatory development, of “Taking the Towns to the Villages”, similar to what Julius Nyerere had tried to do in Tanzania with the *Ujaama* villagisation policy.

Popular Participation: Civil Society Organisations

A driving concept of the New Sudan was the establishment of “minimal government” which meant that the civil authorities would create an enabling environment in which civil society could develop.²⁸⁶ While “minimal” the presence of the movement would be replicated at all levels and the population was expected to participate in popular and syndicated organisations. The movement promoted the emergence of youth, women, farmers, workers and other groups but these were SPLM/A affiliated organisations that were given quotas of representation in the liberation councils. All the syndicated organisations came under the supervision of the Director for Popular Support in the SPLM’s Political Secretariat. These organisations were party organs, encouraging people to work within the system rather than against it. “With the CANS space was created for the participation of non-military personnel. It broadened the scope of the struggle and the liberation struggle became bigger than the SPLM”, explained a senior SPLM/A

²⁸⁵ Interview former head of SRRA, October 2012, Juba.

²⁸⁶ Herzog, 1998:9.

Equatorian civilian leader that openly detailed the hierarchy of power.²⁸⁷ Testimonies of civil society members point to a belief that there was a space to operate in society regardless of the partisan constraints and incursion of the movement.

Civil society was encouraged to develop their own organisations and to take a leading role in the delivery of services. They were either syndicated organisations or initiatives supported by NGOs as independent organisations. These included the New Sudan's Women's Associations, the Mundri Relief and Development Association (MRDA), the New Sudan Youth Association, the New Sudan Law Society, Sudan Medical Care (SMC) among others. Organisations also existed for traders and farmers especially in areas like Yambio, Maridi, Mundri, Yei, Tombura, Rumbek and Tonj. One of the most effective farmers organisations was the Yambio Farmers Association (YAFA). Established in 2000, YAFA had 52 groups of farmers that organised individual and family farms to produce enough surplus to allow for markets to develop and trade between areas to increase. The chairperson of YAFA explained "it was an order that the SPLM/A government gave to people to produce food (...) they called World Vision in 1995 to assist farmers to create a system so we could start using the Ugandan shilling to buy products we needed".²⁸⁸ The SPLM/A later created their own currency, the New Sudan pound in Rumbek, but the experiment failed because of the lack of capacity to run a financial policy. The Ugandan shilling was used in Yambio, due to the proximity with the border, while the Sudanese pound was used in other liberated areas.

²⁸⁷ Interview former SPLM Ambassador, March 2012, Juba.

²⁸⁸ Interview YAFA Chairperson, June 2012, Yambio.

The Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society (IPCS) was another initiative that was coordinated by key SPLM/A leaders and civil society.²⁸⁹ It began operating in Yei and in Yambio in 1999. IPCS and other initiatives like it, a hybrid between local community initiatives with support by leading members of the movement, had as their main aim: to strengthen traditional authorities and the church (that they perceived were the main force behind development); give civic education to the military so that there were better links with the population; and teach the grassroots about the roles of the liberation councils and elections in their areas. IPCS managed to facilitate and strengthen the structures of different services sectors; in the area of health they prepared people to elect their own village development committees. However, their success was not always supported. “The SPLA accused us of creating a parallel structure but one was political (the liberation councils) and the other was for development. When you empower the community, you have accountability”.²⁹⁰

Women’s groups also became very active from 1996 when programmes coordinated by World Vision and other organisations began skills training in Yambio. “This idea of waiting for planes to drop food was not a system” explained the leader of a woman’s farming group.²⁹¹ The SPLM/A made it a point to reverse the exclusion of women from the public sphere that had been perpetuated under Khartoum’s rule. There were as many as 16 women’s associations in Yambio.²⁹² These groups managed to break out of the

²⁸⁹ The IPCS was created with the support of General James Wannu Igga, one of the PMHC members.

²⁹⁰ Interview founder of IPCS, March 2012, Juba.

²⁹¹ Interview CSO founder in Central Equatoria, March 2012, Juba.

²⁹² Interview member of women’s association, June 2012, Yambio.

traditional roles assigned to women in the Old Sudan, by spearheading income generating activities like soap-making and tailoring, and seeking skills training. Later women started attending adult training. A member of the Women's Association in Yambio explains that "with the Arabs they did not allow us to get skills (...) with the SPLM/A came changes and we had women's groups educating other women in home economics".²⁹³

Civil society organisations had such an impact that international organisations highlighted their potential for the development of grassroots organisations and democracy in the region.²⁹⁴ Groups were created all over the Equatoria region, with many becoming important enterprises of change like the South Sudan Women Concerned Association that had 5000 women working on agricultural development projects in Kajokeji.²⁹⁵ Testimonies point to the multiplying effect that some of these initiatives had and their impact in stabilising civil society behind the frontlines. The more cautious view of the genuine liberalisation of public space in the liberated areas would point to the role of international NGOs being directly responsible for the emergence of local civil society groups rather than them being part of an embryonic process. Had international organisations not taken the lead in supporting local NGO's the public space of civil society in liberated areas would have most probably remained insignificant. In this view, INGOs needed to strengthen their local counterparts that led to the introduction of new institutions on the ground like the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) and Sudanese Indigenous NGOs (SINGOs).²⁹⁶

²⁹³ Interview women's empowerment group, October 2012, Nzara.

²⁹⁴ D'Silva, 1999: 5.

²⁹⁵ Interview founder of this organisation, March 2012, Juba.

²⁹⁶ Rolandsen, 2005:80.

SINGOs became an important element in the spectre of popular participation. Although they were financed by international NGOs they largely operated on an independent level.²⁹⁷ In the early 1990s hundreds of SINGOs were created with interventions in various fields like adult education, wildlife conservation and traditional medicine. As many as 50 SINGOS could have been operating in Western Equatoria.²⁹⁸ One of the difficulties mentioned with these civil society groups was the constant threat of “*kasha*” (forced recruitment into the SPLA) that would take away key members of the organisations and disrupt the process and expansion of these initiatives. The founder of a civil society group mentions how an identity cards system was created to protect against *kasha* so that “those that weren’t able to participate in combat, like teachers and farm workers, could do other jobs. The army needed justification of why men could not go to war” .²⁹⁹

NGOs and Service Delivery

While this thesis will not attempt to portray the entire picture of international assistance in South Sudan during the war, or for that matter in Western Equatoria, it will briefly describe some of the activities that brought the NGOs into the New Sudan project. There is no doubt that the NGO presence and that of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was a major driver in the delivery of basic services to the population during the war.³⁰⁰ Many areas

²⁹⁷ Riehl, Volker, 2001, “Who is Ruling South Sudan? The Role of NGOs in Rebuilding Socio-political Order”, Report No 9, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

²⁹⁸ *ibid*, p. 6.

²⁹⁹ Interview CSO founder in Central Equatoria, March 2012, Juba.

³⁰⁰ This was a UN led coalition of relief agencies that began operating in Sudan in the 1980s.

had health care facilities, schools, boreholes, and farming projects entirely funded and managed by international relief agencies and NGOs, with the supervision of the SRRA. Some argue that OLS and NGO engagement with the movement had a direct impact on the formulation of political reforms by encouraging the creation of SINGOs to act as implementers, thereby forcing the SPLM/A to initiate local democratic and administrative reforms.³⁰¹ Others however accuse the UN and the international community of assisting the movement in sustaining its war efforts while also allowing it to take credit for service delivery that was entirely outsourced. Africa Rights argues that international aid operations in South Sudan extended the war through the constant flow of material resources that supported the SPLA's military activities, and were also used for diplomatic and propaganda purposes.³⁰²

INGO operations during the war have been described as effectively providing local administration and operating like a state within a state³⁰³, in what has been termed as the "internationalisation of public welfare".³⁰⁴ However, this relationship was tested and strained as the SPLM/A and SRRA attempted to officialise their role in governing South Sudan and bring international organisations officially under their control. In 2000, the movement issued an ultimatum to NGOS to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or be forced to withdraw operations. The MoU established that, among other things, international organisations had to pay country fees to the SRRA for issuing work permits,

³⁰¹ Rolandsen, 2005:51.

³⁰² Africa Rights, 1997.

³⁰³ Tvedt, and Harir (eds), 1994, *Short-Cut to Decay: the case of the Sudan*, Uppsala, Nordiska Afikaninstitutet, p. 91.

³⁰⁴ See Mark Duffield, "Famine, Conflict and Internationalisation of Public Welfare", in Doornbos, Martin; Cliffe, Lionel; Ahmed, Abdel Ghaffar (eds), 1992, *Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan*, The Hague Institute of Social Studies.

had to ask for permission before interacting with local communities, and demanded control over the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Several organisations like World Vision refused to sign the MoU and evacuated. Their withdrawal from Western Equatoria resulted in the almost collapse of the Primary Health Care program.³⁰⁵

Although the SPLM/A was a rebel movement it was acting as a government in its areas and this created a predicament for international organisations. The engagement was very new on both sides with the international relief community not having “yet considered what ‘normal’ development activities could take place in a rebel held area and in an area called a war zone”.³⁰⁶ But efforts to harmonize their work with the SPLM became important. Coordination meetings between members of these NGOs, local commissioners, area commanders and SRRA members would occur regularly to coordinate activities and implement security procedures. This was short of giving full international recognition of the SPLM as the governing authority of the South.

Organisations like Catholic Relief Service (CRS), World Vision and UNICEF implemented a wide range of projects in Yambio from income generating activities (like the Tombura bicycle repairs cooperative), to food security projects (like the Fishpond rehabilitation project and enterprise development). USAID activities from 1993 to 1999 took innovative forms of development assistance that began with the rehabilitation of infrastructure and introduction of barter systems whereby basic items like soap and blankets were airlifted

³⁰⁵ Riehl, 2001: 9.

³⁰⁶ Quote by a former USAID field officer, in July 1999, in D'Silva, 1999: 7.

into Tombura or Yambio and exchanged for surplus grains produced locally by the community.³⁰⁷ The grains were sold by CARE (the implementing partner) to other NGOs to use for relief operations. While this Local Grain Purchase (LGP) programme was initially done by international organisations, the SRRA and the CANS, via cooperatives, began instituting the same system. At the boma level primary cooperative societies were created that had a minimum of 25 farmers while at the county level the cooperatives association was the entity managing all the lower levels. By late 1994 cooperatives and community development projects were underway, initiating the slow transformation of subsistence farming into market-orientated agriculture of agronomic crops, fruit trees, and cash crops. The SPLM/A sought an agreement with neighboring countries to allow for their respective currencies to serve as legal tender in the south for programmes of regional food monetisation. This allowed the international agencies to also reduce the costs of humanitarian assistance because of these LPG initiatives.

As a result, the Secretariat for Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery, and Animal Resources (SAFFAR) began the process of coordinating with international NGOs the growth of relief food inside the liberated areas. Rather than buying internationally, aid organisations were able to buy locally from the cooperatives. Using seeds and tools supplied by NGOs this innovative idea led to other levels of organisation like the maintenance of feeder roads that could support trucks of seven tones, as well as the creation of rural stores to keep the produce (maize, sorghum, ground nuts, cassava, sweet potato), among other things. “Market teams would go and buy in the rural areas for Care and World Vision and

³⁰⁷ D’Silva, 1999: 10.

then the lorries would move to other areas in the South where there was food deficit (...) we were maximising the humanitarian market”, described the CANS Secretary for Agriculture.³⁰⁸ As many as 20 trucks per day could leave Tombura, and six Hercules C130 flights could take off from the Nzara and Yambio airstrips during the large harvesting seasons (August and September) for areas that needed relief. This system of supplying food to WFP and FAO worked for 10 years (1995-2005) and allowed for the creation of a revolving fund, the County Development Revolving Fund (CDRF). “Donors would provide the first funds of capital and operation costs and then we would use the money from the proceeds of the projects for other purposes”.³⁰⁹ The revolving fund also functioned as a microcredit facility to local communities so they could initiate businesses and small trade. Bigger businesses also developed in areas like timber exploration and transport, but these were primarily controlled by SPLM/A commanders.

In areas where there were cattle SAFFAR devised ways to provide the necessary care for the 16 million heads of cattle. Tackling livestock diseases like anthrax and east coast fever included the coordination of veterinary services and vaccination campaigns from the boma to county levels but also in IDP camps. Contrary to the agricultural inputs that were free, the veterinary supplies were on a cost-sharing basis. Money would be collected by the county livestock officer and then reimbursed to the NGO that assisted with the provision of these services.³¹⁰ Because of these initiatives the livestock population

³⁰⁸ Interview former CANS Secretary of SAFFAR, October 2012, Juba.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Interview former CANS Secretary of SAFFAR, October 2012, Juba.

increased for the first time during the war, with the fronts being supplied more regularly with cattle.

Attempts were also made to address the capacity issue and lack of qualified personnel to administer projects. The Institute of Development Environment and Agricultural Studies (IDEAS) was established in Yambio in 2000 with the aim of providing vocational training and education to civilians living in the liberated areas. It had as its motto “The pursuit of knowledge Through Liberty and Freedom” with projects being led at a community level and allowing for work-based distance learning. IDEAS attempted to pioneer new ways of engaging the population with skills training in as diverse areas as farm management and local governance so that capacity was built internally. Other intensive courses that IDEAS led at its campus in Yambio was the Civil Administration Training (CAT) where skills from former Sudanese civil servants would be put to use. Once IDEAS’s funding from UNICEF ended the institute was no longer able to operate. Aware of the weakness of the CANS institutions, the SPLM/A leadership requested in 1997 that USAID design a programme to enhance capacities for democratic governance and support economic rehabilitation.³¹¹ As a response, the Sudan Transitional Assistance Rehabilitation (STAR) programme was created to train civil administrators. Yet once external funding ended the SPLM/A was unable to mobilize resources to continue such initiatives.

New Sudan Education system

³¹¹ Deng, 2013:157.

Education was mainly provided by the churches, NGOs and the OLS. INGOs and the movement focused on creating the necessary conditions for the provision of basic education by involving the community and building local capacity. The curriculum was diametrically opposed to the one in Khartoum that attempted to Islamize education; it became an important resistance tool but also allowed the SPLM/A to define the kind of government it was building. However, just like with other services it faced many challenges.

The SPLM/A highlighted in its Education Policy (2002) the need to counteract the “assaults on the cultures and traditions of the indigenous peoples” that had marked the education system under colonial rule and under Khartoum.³¹² Education was meant to foster nation building, self-reliance, patriotism, and the respect for other cultures and traditions, and was one of the founding tools the movement had set for the emergence of a new society. The rhetoric of prioritising education seems to have been genuine but the movement did not allocate resources to support international initiatives. As a result, communities carried the entire costs of maintaining the schools by contributing 100% of the fees (90% retained for the teachers and 5% for the school office) with the remaining 5% being paid to the assistant commissioner of the payams for his support staff.³¹³ In the late 1990s Yambio had seven primary schools and two secondary schools with an estimated 12,000 students of which 40% were girls. During this period only 20% of teachers had received any form of training.³¹⁴ With 97 operational facilities in the WES

³¹² *Education Policy of the New Sudan and Implementation Guidelines*, SPLM Secretariat of Education, January 2002.

³¹³ Herzog, 1998:35.

³¹⁴ *ibid*, p. 56.

area the schools had only approximately 928 teachers.³¹⁵ A social welfare CANS official explains how UNICEF and other organisations only developed schools in towns and payams but not in bomas due to the isolation and distances between them.³¹⁶

New Sudan Health system

The New Sudan Health Policy was written in 1997. It was conceptualized to incorporate elements of the old health care system and the SPLM/A system, while harmonising traditional and modern medicine. The system was premised on the concept of primary health care (PHC). It focused on prevention, and control of health problems, provision of adequate sanitation and water, family planning, immunisation, provision of essential drugs, and the treatment of common ailments. The PHC programme was run by community health workers that operated the health care units in the villages. It was however relief agencies and NGOs that were the lifeline of the health care system despite the fact that the movement wanted the community to run this service. The SPLM policy stated, “that people owned their health care system as active participants and not just recipients (...) as owners of the system”.³¹⁷

Health facilities were overstretched with attendance averaging 17,000 civilians (including children) a month in Yambio.³¹⁸ Health services were managed at the different local levels through committees that fell under the County Health Authority (CHA) and

³¹⁵ Johnson 1994 report.

³¹⁶ Interview Deputy-Chairperson Social Welfare Committee, October 2012, Yambio

³¹⁷ Interview SPLM Health policy advisor, October 2012, Juba.

³¹⁸ Akbar, September- October 1995 Report, Progress Report Western Equatoria.

National Health Authority (NHA) of the New Sudan. At the boma level the chief would call the community and elect 12 members into the health committee so that the health centre, made with mud and grass, could be built. Each primary health care centre would have a consultation room, a treatment room and a pharmacy. This process was supervised by the Payam and the County Health Authorities, and directly assisted by NGOs that provided them with medication. The committees also identified who could become health workers and maternity health care providers. Having identified a man and a woman, these would then proceed to training for a year in areas like Maridi, Rumbek or Kapoeta that had training centres.³¹⁹ While doctors were trained abroad, health care workers remained inside the liberated areas with the Maridi Clinical Institute (2001) being the most advanced training institute.

The SPLM/A lacked capacity and expertise to both compete and attempt to design NGO's interventions in the health sector. In fact, the Catholic Church in Yambio threatened in 2000 to withhold funds if the SRRA-run hospital was not taken over by the Catholic Diocese of the county.³²⁰ As many as 100 NGOS worked with the CANS Health Department and ensured that there was appropriate medical care. "Regional hospitals, like the one in Yei and Yambio, had surgery rooms – one male and one female – had over 200 beds, paediatric wards, dentistry and ophthalmology³²¹" and were run by international NGOs, explained the CANS Health official. Yet the system remained underdeveloped and unable to fully address all the health issues of the community.

³¹⁹ Interview SPLM Health policy advisor, October 2012, Juba

³²⁰ Riehl, 2001:11.

³²¹ Interview SPLM Health policy advisor, October 2012, Juba.

Resources and Taxes

Taxation, as a core function of governance, was an area the SPLM/A also failed to invest in and shape state-society relations in a way that further built the state. The movement didn't manage to go beyond being a gatekeeper of the state. Gatekeeper states "had trouble collecting taxes, except on import and export (...) had trouble making the nation-state into a symbol that inspired loyalty (...) what they could do was to sit astride the interface between a territory and the rest of the world collecting revenue and foreign aid, entry and exit visas".³²² The issue of taxation points to the elements of consent and cooperation. Not only did the movement have to develop the ability to tax, the population needed to willingly pay, which in turn would create a mutually reinforcing contract between them. The movement had difficulty in creating this dynamic.

At the county levels the only sources of revenue came from taxing exports and imports, market fees, court fees, brewing fees, and health fees at the payam and boma levels.³²³ Once the Customs Department began functioning, taxes were being collected on import (the Gibana tax³²⁴) and on export (of cash crops). Goods subjected to Gibana included agricultural products (like maize and cassava), cattle, fish and honey.³²⁵ Imported goods were taxed between 4% and 15%, depending on the item, with an additional tax for the

³²² Cooper, Frederick, "The recurrent Crisis of the Gatekeeper State", in *Africa Since 1940. The Past of the Present*, 2002, Cambridge University Press.

³²³ Rohn, Helge; Nyaba, Peter Adwok; Benjamin, George, 1997, "Report of the study on Local Administrative Structures in Maridi, Mundri, and Yei counties, West Bank Equatoria, South Sudan", Aktion Afrika Hilfe.

³²⁴ Gibana is a tax on goods transiting through the county.

³²⁵ Rohn, 1997:59.

county commissioner.³²⁶ Initially the county authorities in Yambio tried to tax NGOs but had to exempt them after an appeal by international organisations was made to the SRRA office in Nairobi. However, NGO cars and motorbikes had to be registered with the police that would for a fee allow them to function using New Sudan license plates.³²⁷ The Yambio county congresses decided that soldiers participating in trading activities were also to be taxed although enforcement of this policy would have been almost impossible given that soldiers continued to collect taxes themselves against instructions of the movement. A personnel tax (the Country Income Development tax) was also instituted by the Finance Secretariat where locals working for NGOs would have between 3% and 10% of their pay directly sent to the civil authorities. Other revenues collected included road fees and travel permits (exit and entry visas) that were stamped by the SRRA but paid to the county authority.

Although local authorities were requested to remit 70% of their revenue to the central level, revenues from exploration of natural resources or taxes from the civilian population were so low that they hardly managed to cover the running costs of the civil authorities. A study in 1997 on 3 counties in the Equatoria region showed that the gross annual income in cash was between 1.5 and 4.5 million Sudanese pounds (equivalent of US\$4,000-9,000), with only a fraction of this available for the county administration.³²⁸ As the Secretariats that dealt with resources were being established in 1994, a

³²⁶ Herzog 1998:34.

³²⁷ Herzog 1998: 28.

³²⁸ Rohn, 1997.

Commission of Production Ministries was created and mandated to find ways of generating income.

Following an economic conference in Yambio in 1999, a Natural Resources Technical Committee was created. The committee became operational in 2000 and teams were organised to begin the geological survey of the country, while other teams worked on surveying wildlife and forestry, trade and taxes operations. Working under this commission were the Secretariats for Finance, Transport, and Mining that attempted to create a coordinated system where exploration of natural resources (like teak and gold) could be efficiently managed in order to sell them in neighbouring countries. The commission prospected for gold in Eastern Equatoria and found that there were many deposits of the mineral but also “found that in Kapoeta the local community only had one small mining equipment so we had to cooperate with them (...) by 1996 we had enough money to answer the immediate needs of the frontline, even medicine”, explained a former local government official from Jonglei.³²⁹ “We took forestry resources of Yambio to buy anti-aircraft guns” described the head of the Natural Resources Technical Committee.³³⁰ The forestry sector managed to make over US\$1 million in total during the last years of the war, hardly enough to fund the requirements of the front for a few months. In the run-up to the capture of Yei and then the subsequent attempt to take Juba in 1997, several initiatives were organised to render this natural resource profitable. The exploration of timber was becoming bureaucratized at the later stages of the war with the creation of the Timber Resources Evaluation Committee (TREC), which produced a

³²⁹ Interview Former Governor of Jonglei, October 2012, Juba.

³³⁰ Interview, October 2012, Juba.

standard application form that allowed for selective harvesting. This was to regulate the supply of teak and avoid deforestation.

VIII Recentralisation of Administrative Decision-making

In 1999 a reversal of policy within the New Sudan project occurred that set back the decentralisation of decision-making. The movement termed this reform of existing structures as a 'major shake-up' to ensure better mobilisation of internal resources. At the highest level of power of the SPLM/A the chairman decided to suspend the NLC sessions and reintroduce the SPLA High Command in the form of a Leadership Council consisting of 14 senior commanders. The NEC was after only a few years in existence rendered dysfunctional and fragmented into seven commissions that clustered several secretariats/Ministries.³³¹ The new structure and institutional framework was justified by the leadership because the administration of the liberated areas needed centralized and collective decision-making, and timely implementation of the resolutions of the movement.³³² The executive branch of the New Sudan was renamed and reorganised the governors as SPLM/A Regional Secretaries and the Secretaries (ministers) as SPLM/A Commissioners. All the 5 SPLM/A Regional Secretaries became members of the Leadership Council, clearly an amalgamation of the powers of the executive falling under the control of the military. In Yambio these central changes were felt as a return to militarisation "In July 1999 there was a return of the military and civilians could not give orders to the military", explained a former civilian commissioner of Yambio county.³³³

³³¹ These commissions were divided into: Military, Political, External Relations, Judiciary and Law Enforcement, Economy, Social Services, and Civil Society.

³³² Malok, 2013:156.

³³³ Interview former commissioner Yambio, June 2012, Yambio.

The fall-back position for the SPLM/A when difficulties arose and systems of administration stalled was to revert to the military centralized structure rather than devising new mechanisms to alter the systems and empower institutions.

This seems to have been temporary as from 2000 onwards, with peace negotiations gaining momentum, the SPLM/A realized it needed to secure structures to sustain the South during a transition period. Once a peace agreement was signed the movement needed to have in place a strategy and build its capacity to define government institutions and a governance plan. As expressed by many leaders within the movement, the CANS were the most important factor that allowed the SPLM/A to take the reins of power from 2005 after the CPA agreement and in 2011 after independence. Although the CANS system had many shortcomings it gave the movement some governing experience that prepared it for the transitional period and the creation of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and the Government of National Unity (GNU).

CONCLUSION

“Demography in the South is against the process of nation-building, where the government is a structure in name only but lower down there are communities and tribes. We cannot have a loose party or a loose state because we will fall apart.”³³⁴

This chapter on Yambio highlighted several fundamental drivers of the SPLM/A's governing strategy. The movement relied on strong social structures of customary organisation to build the basis of its state, by empowering local leaders, incorporating

³³⁴ Interview SPLM youth leader, February 2012, Juba.

chiefs, and decentralising administration, the movement – that lacked strong political structures – managed to achieve a partnership with its civilians. The SPLM/A's governance progression in Yambio shows that the movement understood that without incorporating the civilian population into the struggle and creating an implicit agreement with civilians and their leaders to reorganise society they would have probably lost the war. From the stability in Yambio the movement experimented and improved the CANS to later apply in other liberated areas. There was a sense, as expressed in interviews, that the CANS gave the people of the south a government that was their own. Even if it was a “bad government of our people it is always better than a good administration of foreigners” defends a senior civilian leader from Jonglei who had been critical of the movements militarised tendencies.³³⁵

When confronted with strong social organisation, the SPLM/A incorporated them and their functions into their parallel state during the CMA years. The movement attempted to reorder society and these social organisations in the CANS but these were unable to fully take root. Instead the politics of survival led the SPLM/A to “pre-empt the development of large concentrations of social control outside the state organisation”³³⁶ which led it to accommodate and balance different interests which weakened its grip on power. The most significant shift that occurred in the New Sudan was away from militarism and militocracy³³⁷ in allowing power and authority to be defined at the local levels by civilian leaders, communities and chiefs.

³³⁵ Interview SPLM civilian leader from Jonglei, March 2012, Juba.

³³⁶ Migdal, 1988:236.

³³⁷ Militarism is defined as the “extensive control by the military over social life, coupled with the subservience of the whole society to the needs of the army” and Militocracy is the “phenomenon of

One of the SPLM/A's more strategic decisions was to outsource service delivery in the absence of sufficient human, logistical and financial capital to attempt to provide such services. In the same way that it used and instrumentalized traditional authorities by reactivating native administration during the CMA years it also began to instrumentalize relief agencies. The movement had for over a decade of war understood that the international community was going to operate in the South to assist with relief aid despite the diplomatic, logistical and security challenges it faced. Externally the movement had to take into consideration of what would be accepted internationally as sufficiently state-like so that attributes of the SPLM/A project would count as recognizably state-building. If it was to negotiate on equal terms with Khartoum in any potential internationally sponsored talks it needed to project this kind of legitimising force. Internally the calculation of the movement essentially factored in what would be the symbolic, material, political and logistical arrangement that would assist them with the war and the liberation. A uniquely militarized project in the first decade was insufficient to win a war that required the hearts and minds and the support of several constituencies. The result was a parallel state that attempted to corporatize society while maintaining the parameters of its gatekeeping presence in terms of development and service provision.

Despite the shortcoming of the CANS and the fact that many of the civil servants in the SPLM/A administration lacked qualifications and education, some leaders and cadres

preponderance of the military over civil personnel", Andreski, Stanislav, 1971 (1954), *Military Organization and Society*, University of California Press, p.185.

referred to the benefits of starting an entirely new system that wasn't one of servitude as it had been in the past during Khartoum's rule. By building a parallel state, the SPLM/A also provided some measure of social and institutional predictability that allowed citizens of the New Sudan to begin to plan their futures and a sense of normalcy established during the war. Although services and economic development were financed and driven by external actors, the provision of a form of security, justice, and a political path that created symbolic capital, gave the SPLM/A enough legitimacy and support to move its New Sudan project forward. This case study reveals a minimalist and decentralised approach to building a parallel state riddled with conflicting power dynamics of: a) NGOs and CANS welfare, b) Civilian (former military) commanders and chiefs, and ultimately c) the parallel state and society. It also reveals how leadership and ideology/political program became key factors redirecting the governance paths after the 1991 critical juncture. At the organizational level the SPLM/A was ambitious but unable to fully operationalise different structures. The next case study, in contrast, reveals a near-totalitarian parallel state project that managed to operationalise complex administrative and bureaucratic systems aimed at creating a utopian world order.

CHAPTER 4

Jamba

Governing the Free Lands Republic of Angola

1979-1991

“War is a matter of Consciousness. It is not made to be destructive but to create a better world in a free land”, (Jonas Savimbi)³³⁸

This chapter will trace UNITA’s trajectory in devising a centralized governing strategy that allowed it to not only survive the war during the years under scrutiny here, fight a stronger and better-resourced enemy, but also build its popular support base and prepare an “army” of cadres and civil servants to govern a UNITA dominated Angola. From 1979 to 1991 Jamba was the embodiment of UNITA’s capacity to govern a state within a state. Built as a rear base and a training ground for its growing army of soldiers, commanders, cadres and civilians, Jamba allowed the movement to define a UNITA world order based on the redefinition of society and what it meant to be “Angolan”. What made this possible was an alignment of leadership, the organisation and structure of the rebel movement, the iron-like discipline surrounding the tripartite structure (party, military, administration) and the embedded sense of a “nationalist” purpose to liberate Angola resulting from a structured strategy of indoctrination and acculturation. It was UNITA’s strong political organisation and party structures that allowed the movement to develop complex and far-reaching governance institutions and programs.

³³⁸ Roque, Fatima; Vaz da Silva, Helena, Manoel de Vilhena, Luiza; Avilez, Maria João; Nogueira Pinto, Maria José, 1988, *Seis Portuguesas em Terras da UNITA*, Bertrand Editora, Lisboa, p 49 (authors’ translation).

UNITA's wartime governance in Jamba, in the south-eastern most province of Kuando Kubango, is briefly contextualized in the previous structures of governance created during the 1966-74 war against the Portuguese as the foundation for the expanded military regions and their civil-military bases. UNITA fought the Portuguese through guerrilla tactics and neutralising their counterinsurgency strategies of population resettlements; later on, UNITA fought the MPLA and the Soviet-Cuban alliance by producing a state alternative and staging a propaganda and acculturation war aimed at delegitimising the MPLA post-independence state. Fighting the MPLA was as much a military matter as it was a question of political legitimacy and an opposing vision for the nation and state. To introduce this change in strategy and organisational capacity, the event that marked a turning point, "The Long March" of 1976, is explained. The creation of the rear base in Jamba was a direct response to UNITA's near military defeat by the MPLA in 1976. The chapter then describes the layout and operations of the capital of the "free lands" of Angola, as Jamba became known to its supporters, and how it was linked to other military regions in the different warfronts across Angola.

The creation of Jamba had several objectives: 1) to support the movement in what was going to be a long war, and provide an area large enough to begin building a conventional army and train new recruits; 2) to allow UNITA to develop its health and education programmes to populate the free lands with politically aware civilians and to prepare a class of skilled workers to govern in peacetime, 3) to be the nerve centre for propaganda, political training and indoctrination, 4) to provide the leadership and the population living there moments of reflection and projection of a normal life so that there could be a break with the tension of war, 5) to play the important role of providing a rehearsal for staff, cadres and structures for future governance.

“We needed to have a practice of governance and a way of managing people and inserting them into our structures so that we could get the pilot experience for the entire country”, explained a former Governor of Jamba.³³⁹ And finally, 6) it allowed UNITA the ability to project internally and externally the idea that it was running a parallel state as the ultimate expression of its “sovereignty”. UNITA was attempting two things with this “far-reaching project of engineering ‘a normal existence’³⁴⁰”: it wanted to a) regulate and condition the behaviour of its combatants and followers by inserting them into an organisation that designed and controlled their entire existence, and b) create a civilising project by preparing southern elites and intellectuals and that would ‘elevate’ the southern populations and those from the ‘bush’ to the educational and class level of the those in the cities. To this effect civilian and political life in UNITA’s military bases and its capital Jamba was staged “as to counter the threatening wilderness of the surrounding *mata*³⁴¹” and all that it represented. For the movement, the experience of Jamba revealed a deeper level of “preparedness” that had begun in the 1960s with the idea of creating a rural southern equalising force³⁴² to empower the marginalised southern communities.

UNITA’s experience in governing Jamba was characterized by a highly controlled society, that had at its root a social engineering project, coupled with a well-structured political mobilisation strategy and large military enterprise. This governance project was also

³³⁹ Interview former Governor of Jamba, January 2013, Luanda. After 1992, when UNITA’s shadow government moved to the cities, Jamba was run by a Governor.

³⁴⁰ Beck, 2009:349.

³⁴¹ Beck, 2009:349.

³⁴² while this was not a direct expression it was implied by UNITA cadres.

characterized by a “survivalist” instinct of creating a UNITA world order that would teach its citizens to obey and to engage fully in the new nationalist struggle for a second liberation. Physically located in an uninhabited and deserted area, UNITA populated Jamba with civilians from all over Angola. This “deterritorialisation” allowed the movement the opportunity to embed the population and its fighters alike into a new socio-political reality. Jamba was never built to become a second Luanda, it was always a provisional capital that would provide UNITA with the necessary conditions and stability to stage its revolution and win the war. “Jamba was created to allow UNITA to combat the enemy in every way – with every task so that it wasn’t just military but was about ideas, a confrontation of two state projects, of two societies”, explained a Colonel that grew up in Jamba.³⁴³ UNITA’s state-society project was built on the creation of a new nationalist sentiment. Forging this new Angolan nationalism, based on opposition to foreign (Soviet Union and Cuban) occupation and perceived exclusionary MPLA practices, required the redefining of “belonging”. Ignatieff demonstrates how belonging and nationalism are mutually reinforcing. “When nationalists claim that national belonging is the overridingly important form of all belonging, they mean that there is no other form of belonging – to your family, work or friends – which is secure if you do not have a nation to protect you”.³⁴⁴ UNITA was that “nation” in the liberated areas.

This case study speaks directly to how the state is imagined and how it is constructed, staged and experienced by its citizens as an extension of the liberation struggle. It links the state and the imagined nation. Abrams suggests that the state is first and foremost an

³⁴³ Interview UNITA Colonel, January 2013, Luanda.

³⁴⁴ Ignatieff, Michael, 1994, *Blood and Belonging, Journeys into the New Nationalism*, Vintage, London, p.6.

exercise in legitimation and is therefore more of an idea than a system.³⁴⁵ Hansen and Stepputat argue that the state is in a continuous process of construction, while Mitchell suggests that two objects of analysis should be distinguished – the state-system and the state idea.³⁴⁶ For UNITA the state system and the state idea were indivisible as one was an operational form of the other. To believe in UNITA's parallel state idea, the population, soldiers and cadres had to experience it as a projection of a future political order. There was a need to have the state be “constructed” in the minds of those leading the state formation process, so that they could visualize, and conceptualize the structures they intended to form as vehicles for public goods. In this sense, it is not the state itself that matters, but rather its future and therefore its potential value as a social institution.³⁴⁷ This state needed to exist “in the hearts and minds of its people (...) if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life”.³⁴⁸ However, in Jamba the “state” was also a matter of institutions, political culture and a UNITA moulded society. The analysis of everyday practices shows how the boundaries between state and society are constructed and deconstructed through these practices³⁴⁹. Hansen suggests that the qualities of the state are accessible from the local level where people transform them into practices.³⁵⁰ A study of the state needs to take into account how the “state tried to make

³⁴⁵ Abrams, Philip, 1988, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State”, *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1(1): 58-89.

³⁴⁶ Mitchell, Timothy, 1999, “Society, Economy and the State Effect” in Steinmetz, George *State/culture: state-formation after the cultural turn*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

³⁴⁷ Meierhenrich, Jens, “Forming States after failure”, in Rotberg, 2004: 155.

³⁴⁸ Strayer, Joseph, 1970, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, Princeton, p.5, as quoted in Meierhenrich, 2004:155.

³⁴⁹ Sharma, Aradhana; Gupta, Akhil (eds), 2006, *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, Blackwell, Oxford.

³⁵⁰ Hansen, Thomas Blom, (2001), “Governance and Myths of State in Mumbai, in Fuller, Chris; Benei, Veronique (eds), *The Everyday State and Society in Modern India*, Hurst & Company.

itself real and tangible through symbols, texts and iconography (...) and study how the state appears in everyday and localized forms”.³⁵¹



source: Angola Today

II. First Bases and Administrative units in Military Regions

During the first war of the 1960s and 70s against the Portuguese, UNITA had already begun to develop structured guerrilla bases. From the onset UNITA proposed to establish counter-administrations to allow it to propagate its political discourse and its version of Angolan nationalism. During its first party Congress (March 1966) UNITA defined its strategy: 1) to depend only on local capacity and not wait for external assistance; 2) to mobilize the peasants and guide them into a revolutionary party, 3) to stage war as the only solution against Portuguese domination; 4) to apply an ideology that was valid in different circumstances; 5) to form a democratic front; 6) to join the people in the interior of the country; and 7) to prioritize the guerrilla fighter.³⁵² This meant that UNITA had to operate deep within the Angolan territory and establish bases that would allow it to

³⁵¹ Hansen, Thomas Blom; Stepputat, Finn, (eds), 2001, *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Post-Colonial State*, Duke University Press, p.5.

³⁵² Chiwale, 2008: 97-99.

mobilize the population and expand operations. In following with its Maoist training, the principles of self-reliance, organisation and popular support were vital.

The administration established in UNITA areas was premised on three important pillars: the respect for ethnic custom, a developed agricultural system and the organisation of community institutions. UNITA villages were populated either on the voluntary basis of local chiefs choosing to bring their villagers behind UNITA lines, through forceful means, or as a result of the service delivery and societal assistance that the movement provided. In a move to reverse the gains of Portugal's counterinsurgency strategy of inserting populations into *aldeamentos* in order to isolate them, UNITA recruited villagers to resettle into their areas, and their "liberated villages". In a similar manner, the Portuguese had hoped to win the war in Angola by denying the three liberation movements access to the non-combatant populations. In 1967 the colonial government's strategy began "regrouping Africans into strategic hamlets".³⁵³ These population resettlements took three different forms: the *aldeamentos* (strategic resettlements organised by the military in fighting areas), the *reordenamentos rural* (rural resettlement outside immediate fighting areas), and the *colonatos do soldados* (soldier's settlement where former servicemen are settled into areas considered strategic).³⁵⁴ What these settlement strategies achieved was to extend the rule of the colonial power. "While pre-war settlement attempts affected only several thousand Africans in Angola, the schemes affected more than one million Africans (20% of the populations)" in the 1970s.³⁵⁵

³⁵³ Bender, Gerald, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency. An African Case", *Comparative Politics*, April 1972, Vol4: 3, p. 334.

³⁵⁴ Bender, 1972:335.

³⁵⁵ *ibid*, p. 337.

Understanding its military limitations, comparatively to its larger and better-organised FNLA and MPLA counterparts, UNITA relied primarily on political means to extend control over the population. “The focus was on political mobilisation and gaining support from the population, as we had very few arms and military capabilities”, explained a senior commander that experienced the first war 1966-75 and the subsequent wars until 2002.³⁵⁶ Political commissars played key roles from the onset with the responsibility of mobilising support and ensuring that the war effort was supported with food, information, and popular backing. UNITA instituted the policy that a soldier had to also act as a political mobilizer and establish contacts with chiefs. Each one of these policies would find expression in larger and more complex institutions as the post-independence war progressed and UNITA gained more terrain.

Bases were established within defined military regions to allow for the movement to increase its contacts with different communities and also organise its guerrilla strategy. UNITA divided its operations into six military regions (*Regioes Militares RM*)³⁵⁷ or guerrilla zones with a commander being referred to as the politico-military coordinator. Later in the war, the ultimate authority of the RM became the military commander who was the governor of the area and the superior representative of the party. Each region had its guerrilla force. As support grew with enhanced political mobilisation bases were

³⁵⁶ Interview commander of the first war 1966-75, September 2012, Luanda.

³⁵⁷ As the war progressed in the 1980s these Military Regions (RMS) would grow exponentially in number and organization. While the MPLA divided Angola into 10 military regions, UNITA divided the country into over 22 politico-military regions that overlapped with the number of strategic fronts.

being organised within the RMs. In May 1970 the *Black Panther*, *Black Star* and the *Black Fury* military columns were created as part of a more defensive strategy and with them greater detail on how administrative structures were to support the bases.

Given that the movement depended on the population for its food, information, and guidance in areas the guerrilla force had little knowledge about, UNITA subdivided its structures into: the smallest being the cell, followed by the local committees, zones, sections, regions, and then the people's assemblies.³⁵⁸ The 'People's Assemblies' were comprised of 16 villages each as a way of handing over political power to the different communities. The movement would supply the military personnel for their security and health facilities "but all other services (schools, cooperatives, local political committees) were in the people's own hands".³⁵⁹ However, this strategy changed as the movement developed and UNITA became aware of the need to define, run and finance each of the services in order to ensure effective delivery and propagate a UNITA society project. This decentralized model would be replaced over time with greater organisation capacity into a hierarchically controlled central governing structure.

Initially, bases followed a specific layout and areas were divided along a main avenue; structures were built like a *kimbo* (village) with a central *jazigo* – information post. The main military camp also had schools, political indoctrination centres and served as a "seat for a local parliament consisting of representatives (...) of all the villages".³⁶⁰ The

³⁵⁸ Chiwale, 2008: 135.

³⁵⁹ UNITA Bulletin 1/74, Published by the Chief Representative of UNITA in the USA.

³⁶⁰ Alberts in O'Neil et al, 1980: 252.

administrative areas were clearly separated from the military structures: there were areas for the troops, logistics, administration, and services areas. Surrounding the bases were ambush areas. The population that was not directly connected to the movement would remain in their villages with the People's Sentinels (the Republican force) whose mission was to protect the people and contain information, explained a political commissar and mobiliser.³⁶¹ The sentinels were trained for 45 days and were envisaged as part of a public security force. "In imminent zones (frontline) they'd stay with the population or outside the base so there wouldn't be casualties of war".³⁶² Deemed to have a patriotic conscience they were there to protect the people, their belongings, provide information, assist with logistics, and when necessary integrate fully into the guerrilla forces.³⁶³ In return, the population was expected to provide loyalty, food and intelligence to the movement. They were also there to control civilians.

II.1 Traditional authorities

UNITA's dependence on traditional authorities stemmed from their need to have direct interlocutors with diverse communities and outsource rule in villages to traditional chiefs. By incorporating the *sobas*, *sekulus*, and *ocimbandas*³⁶⁴ into their structures UNITA was attempting to win the necessary legitimacy to govern the villages. This policy directly contrasted with the MPLA's strategy of re-educating local leaders.³⁶⁵ Savimbi is said to

³⁶¹ Interview political mobiliser, January 2013, Andulo.

³⁶² Interview commander first war, September 2012, Luanda.

³⁶³ Savimbi, Jonas, 1986, *Por um Futuro Melhor*, Nova Nordica, Lisboa, p. 40.

³⁶⁴ *Ocibandas* were the local witch figures; the *sobas* and *sekulus* were authority figures (below that of the King – a figure that remained important after the fall of the Ovimbundu and Bakongo kingdoms) that managed disputes, distributed land presided over traditional courts.

³⁶⁵ Stuvoy, 2002:59.

have prioritized relations with the *sobas* as part of the movement's underlying belief that African traditions had to be respected and inserted into the new governing system that would replace the 'second colonial system' of the MPLA. Unlike the British, the Portuguese followed a "systematic direct-rule policy where the paramount chiefs were not recognized, except for the Kongo king, and the *sobas* were reduced to village level executors of colonial policy".³⁶⁶ According to Messiant, this meant that indigenous Angolans, in the absence of traditional leaders able to present local claims or oppose colonialism, were dependent on Western institutions and on the elites formed by them.

UNITA tried to revive the powers of the *sobas* but inadvertently ruled the traditional authorities in a similar direct way by placing them within a framework defined by the movement and the party, and limiting their ability to contest the movement's rule. However traditional authorities did help shape the policies that governed these populations. They became the mouthpiece for the movement with regards to their populations and the political coordinators of the civilian population.³⁶⁷ *Sobas* were used to resolve problems at the village level. "Every time something came up or changed during the struggle we called upon the *sobas* to explain the situation to their people so that they could be enlightened", explained a retired Logistics captain that never left Jamba.³⁶⁸ The *sobas* operated the local village councils and coordinated all local administration matters under a UNITA framework.

³⁶⁶ Messiant, in Birmingham 1998: 133.

³⁶⁷ Heywood, Linda, "Towards an understanding of Modern Political Ideology in Africa: The case of the Ovimbundu of Angola", *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36:1, 1998, p.165.

³⁶⁸ interview former Logistics Captain, September, Jamba

UNITA later developed feedback mechanisms. *Sobas* would regularly meet with the leadership in Jamba and other bases where they would also receive some material help for their families. A Council was set up for this purpose during the party's 6th Congress (August 1986), called the Parliamentarians. This forum of elders and traditional authorities were advisors and would meet annually in Jamba with Savimbi who would take account of the problems in the liberated areas. If one commander was causing problems and this was exposed during these meetings he would be demoted. This was confirmed in several interviews with senior and junior military officers.³⁶⁹ Another testimony by a leading General mentions the establishment of a Consultative Council in the Kwame Nkrumah base where elders were consulted and asked to provide ideas about the struggle, the people, health and other service areas that could be having problems. "They would bring proposals to Savimbi in meetings that happened every 6 months. (...) These elders came from all RMs to meet in Jamba (...) and ideas had to be brought from each of the different regions and those representing different ethnic groups. They were asked 'how is the relationship between the troops and the people? And if there was a problem an inquiry would be made" and action taken, defended a UNITA founder and leading commander.³⁷⁰

II.II Evolving service delivery strategy within the Guerrilla Republic

UNITA's dependence on the population, its political programme of mass mobilisation, coupled with the insertion of traditional authorities into "liberated villages" required a strategy for service delivery. Early on the movement understood the need to provide

³⁶⁹ interviews with Commanders of the first war, retired Generals and UNITA MPs January 2013, Luanda

³⁷⁰ interview UNITA founder, January 2013, Luanda

public goods and create the idea of a “guerrilla republic” in spatial and political terms. While the movement had no rear base or “capital” at this stage of the war the idea of an alternate “state” or Maoist parallel hierarchies of governance were already present. Six years after its emergence, in 1971, UNITA was operating from bases in 5 of Angola’s then 12 provinces (Moxico, Bie, Malange, Lunda, and Kuando Kubango). The movement had already managed to extend to these areas both military and civilian sectors.³⁷¹ The “liberated villages” brought together educational, health, agricultural and social service networks. Initially built by UNITA in the central highlands, these were successfully replicated in other parts of the country as the war progressed.³⁷² Heywood has argued that these bases and those formed in the 1970s were premised on the organisational principles of protestant villages of the Central Highlands giving the movement an aura of legitimacy.³⁷³

Early accounts of service delivery structures and villages reveal an emerging philosophy of guerrilla warfare but also of coordinated action to ensure civilian support. Journalist Franz Sitte reported on the existence of boarding schools in UNITA base camps and of kibbutz-like farms to develop agricultural activities; Leon Dash reports on how UNITA had four hospitals and 10 elementary schools in 1973.³⁷⁴ “In the forests children are learning to write and do arithmetic, writing on wooden slates with charcoal or bits of manioc instead of chalk (...) Even at an early age they get some political

³⁷¹ Sitte, Franz, “Angola’s Guerrilla Republic”, *Observer*, London, 9th April 1972.

³⁷² Heywood, Linda, 2000, *Contested Power in Angola 19840s to the Present*, University of Rochester Press, p.173.

³⁷³ *ibid*, p. 172.

³⁷⁴ Described in Brigland, Fred, 1987, *Jonas Savimbi A Key to Africa*, Paragon House Publishers, p. 120-6.

indoctrination”.³⁷⁵ During one of Sitte’s first visits in 1972, he describes how he had to produce his UNITA pass and papers to the guard for stamping before entering the ‘guerrilla republic’.³⁷⁶ Sitte further describes how the economy was carefully planned in each of the bases visited with civilians working cooperatives to feed the army.

The report celebrating the sixth year of UNITA’s struggle mentioned progress in the liberated areas and the commitment to service delivery stating that a total of 12,000 children were in UNITA schools and that over 25,000 civilians had received medical care in the movement’s health facilities.³⁷⁷ These numbers are a clear exaggeration given the limitations UNITA faced at the time but point clearly to the strategy of contrasting with the “enemy’s” lack of development in the areas of education and health service. This issue spoke directly to the colonial distinctions that divided the Angolan population into the “*assimilado*” and “*indigena*” citizenship categories (as explained in Chapter 1) with accompanying levels of political and economic rights. Education and other services were used as distinctive measures that deepened the class distinction. UNITA would use the same strategy during the second war as it depicted the MPLA as an elitist urban movement dominated by *assimilados* and *mestiços*.

III. The 1975-6 War and The Long March

³⁷⁵ Sitte, 1972.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ “UNITA Six Years of Struggle”, March 1972, *Freeland of Angola, Central Base of Region Number 2*, Hoover Institution Archives, Collection: Angolan SC, Box 4, Folder 1971-1979, Stanford University.

On November 11th 1975 UNITA and the FNLA declared Angola's independence from Huambo while the MPLA officially declared independence in Luanda as the post-independent government. The transitional arrangements of the Alvor Agreement that sought to establish a quadripartite government (three liberation movements and the Portuguese) to govern until elections could be held in October had failed and the political process collapsed. War was looming as the FNLA and MPLA had clashed continuously throughout 1975 but the movement did not expect to be forced into a massive retreat by Cuban forces. "On the 8th of February 1976, the Soviet and Cuban invasion chased UNITA out of the cities and each commander had to return to their areas in retreat", testified a commander that experienced this retreat in Huambo.³⁷⁸ Testimonies point to the numerous bombardments of the Soviet supplied MiGs and as many as 6000 Cuban troops involved in the fall of Huambo, that was faced with little resistance. On the 10th of February Savimbi and several other leaders ordered the movements followers to abandon the city and take to the bush.³⁷⁹ The leadership understood strategically that the presence of foreign troops in Angola only a few months after the Portuguese army had withdrawn was a mobilisation tool. The military incursion produced such an effect, targeting and killing "anyone that was deemed as not being MPLA", that those that retreated from Luanda and then Huambo joined the war not on ideological basis or any particular sympathy for UNITA.³⁸⁰ A UNITA dissident that later joined the MPLA in the early 1990s explained that "The MPLA made the mistake of killing people in the bush, it eliminated people to cause fear and they joined the guerrilla".³⁸¹ UNITA was the target of

³⁷⁸ interview Retired Brigadier, January 2013, Huambo.

³⁷⁹ Bridgland, 1987:174.

³⁸⁰ interview General first war, January 2013, Luanda.

³⁸¹ interview senior UNITA leader that defected in 1991, January 2013, Luanda.

five major military offensives from June 1976 to January 1977³⁸² which pushed it and key supporters deeper into the bush as they staged their Long March.

Following UNITA's near defeat, the movement's leadership and supporters began a retreat to the bush for 15 years. Many would only return to the cities and the capital Luanda in 1991 with the Bicesse peace accords and the 1992 elections. For the entirety of the second war UNITA would operate outside the cities and dominate whole portions of the countryside. The retreat from Huambo was a symbolically difficult one, as UNITA had lost its "capital", and the movement needed to rethink how it would resurface and survive another long war. "The only way to resist the Cuban invasion was to take this fight by stages: we advanced until reaching the stage of equilibrium and the stage of pressure", described a former Governor of Jamba.³⁸³ This meant that the movement would have to seek a more isolated and safer area to build its rear base.

UNITA fell back on its Maoist teachings of the 1960s and understood that it needed to retreat to the bush. On the 22nd of March 1976 Savimbi began the Long March, trekking for seven months across the interior of the country with a group of supporters through the provinces of Huambo, Moxico and Kuando Kubango to the border with Namibia. "The objective was to seek support and for the population to know of our existence so that we could spread our message. We talked to the people and organised them" described a former FALA Chief of Staff that survived the march.³⁸⁴ "We had the concept of a Long war

³⁸² James III, 1992:111.

³⁸³ interview former Governor of Jamba, January 2014, Luanda.

³⁸⁴ interview former FALA Chief of Staff, September 2012, Luanda.

and needed to become hardened. Our time with the people was a time to educate, understand them and be useful so that they would hand over their children to the cause (...) we needed to sensitize them to produce and collect information”, explained another commander that participated in the march.³⁸⁵ The march is described as one of the most important historical moments of the movement. It was the “realisation that people had to be empowered to save themselves”.³⁸⁶

The Long March became a moment of reflection for the leadership that allowed it to restructure the movement and reorganise itself. Savimbi is quoted as stating that the strategy had changed and that “from now onwards we will abandon conventional warfare for guerrilla warfare (...) now we will see who are the true patriots, because in the cities all are patriots but from today we will start walking (...) only the true revolutionaries will walk with us until the end”.³⁸⁷ An estimated 1000 followers (over 800 guerrilla fighters, and some 200 women and children) took part but only 79 survived the hardship of malnutrition, exhaustion, and attacks from the MPLA.³⁸⁸ UNITA was pushed back into using the bases that had operated during the first war as they retreated. From base to base the columns of leaders, supporters and all those taking part in the Long March were under constant pursuit from FAPLA (MPLA’s army) and Cuban troops and airstrikes. During the march, the movement organised a party meeting in May 1976 near the Cuanza River.³⁸⁹ During this meeting, the political bureau and central committee decided to “reorganise the command of the FALA (UNITA’s army) in order to clearly redefine the

³⁸⁵ interview former FALA Chief of staff and leading commander, January 2013, Luanda.

³⁸⁶ Interview FALA Colonel and former military Instructor, January 2013, Luanda.

³⁸⁷ Chiwale, Samuel, 2008, *Cruzei-me com a Historia*, Sextante Editora, Lisboa, p221-2.

³⁸⁸ Brigland, 1986: 278.

³⁸⁹ Chiwale, 2011: 225.

politico-military aims of our army of workers and peasants”.³⁹⁰ It was during this meeting that Savimbi mentioned the need to produce a guiding manual for the guerrilla (*a Cartilha do Guerilheiro*) that would provide rules of conduct for the guerrillas and their interactions with the civilian populations.³⁹¹

UNITA understood that the MPLA-Cuban-Soviet force was unable to win the war due to compounding factors it would later exploit. These included the vast territories that for over 500 years the Portuguese never managed to completely control; rural populations and several ethnic groups that had no affiliation to the MPLA; an extended system of roads and railways where sabotage operations and ambushes were easily conducted; an economy destroyed by the liberation war; a civil service that was understaffed and inefficient; unemployment and lack of services in towns and villages. Most of all, UNITA’s manifesto emphasized the “bourgeois character of the Luanda clique unable to unite the exploited and oppressed masses; and the existence of UNITA as the vanguard of the poor and all the patriots opposed to the presence of foreign troops”.³⁹²

When the survivors of the long march arrived in Cuelei in August 1976, after walking for over 3000km, this experience had proved to be an enormous boost for morale for the leadership. “The march was the most profound experience of my life (...) All of us who were on the march believed by the end of it that the war really could be won”, was the

³⁹⁰ UNITA, River Cuanza Manifesto, 17th June 1976.

³⁹¹ The team tasked to produce this manual included Savimbi for the political and strategic section, Nzau Puna for the economy, and Samuel Chiwale for the military side. The *Cartilha* (The Warriors Manual) would be published in 1977. Chiwale, 2011: 226.

³⁹² River Cuanza Manifesto.

testimony given by Tito Chingunji.³⁹³ However, the Cuelei base, situated 150km from Huambo, proved to be inadequate given its location in the central highlands that was under constant threat of attacks. From there onwards UNITA would move from military region to military region, moving from base to base, and would only settle permanently two years later in Jamba. In order to operationalize what the leadership had reflected during the march, the 4th Congress was convened in 1977.

The 4th party Congress is considered the turning point for the restructuring of the party and the defining moment in the strategies adopted to combat the MPLA. Over 1600 delegates participated in the congress, held at a catholic mission in Benda. The struggle previously defined as one against Portuguese colonialism, was transformed into a 'struggle against Russian-Cuban' imperialism.³⁹⁴ It was here that the 'Theory of Large Numbers' was developed. This theory became a fundamental organising tool that sought to mobilize the majority of Angolans. UNITA would rally the largest ethnic group – the Ovimbundu– and other smaller groups to form the governing majority in any future state. "Many thought it was a tribalistic tendency to create Ovimbundu supremacy but realistically only the Central Highlands could give us the men we needed to create a regular army capable of disarticulating the regime so we could move beyond the guerrilla strategy", explained a UNITA general that trained in China in the 1960s and later defected.³⁹⁵ But in order to achieve this UNITA needed to secure a safe rear base that the MPLA and their foreign allies would never manage to attack. The movement would also

³⁹³ Brigland, 1986: 278.

³⁹⁴ Beck, 2009: 347.

³⁹⁵ Interview UNITA General, January 2013, Luanda.

need to operationalize the three branches of the movement - the party, the military and administration - and create a feedback loop between them. It was also at the 4th Congress that the political party structures evolved with the creation the youth league *Juventude Revolucionária de Angola* (JURA), the women's league *Liga da Mulher Angolana* (LIMA), and trade unions (SINDACO).³⁹⁶ As with the SPLM/A the development of party structures would deepen as a result of the critical junctures with the contrasting element being that the SPLM/A had to develop political structures while UNITA added organs to existing political structures.

IV. Second Liberation War: System of expanding bases and links to Rear Base

UNITA's second liberation depended on building a conventional army and a political apparatus that would mirror the state in all its forms and institutions. Early on Savimbi understood that he had to perpetuate another sense of Angolan nationalism. "The history of nationalism everywhere seems to show that a conflict is much more intense when it expresses itself in terms of symbolic resources than in competition over mere material rewards".³⁹⁷ As a result, political mobilisation and indoctrination took on a larger and more strategic role during this war. The movement made a huge effort to insert the civilians into its political organisation and "indoctrinate" them to follow the political program.

³⁹⁶ interview Savimbi's former chef de cabinet, January 2013, Luanda.

³⁹⁷ Adam, Heribert, "Rational Choice in Ethnic Nationalism: a critique", *International Migration Review*, N18, 1983: 379-80, quoted in Banton, Michael, 1998, *Racial Theories*, Cambridge University Press, p. 207.

When areas were liberated or being contested, commissars and party members would be sent to the villages and leave the message that UNITA was there to liberate and protect them. The idea was to transform the people into UNITA supporters and not to punish them. Pearce points to another very important element which was the need to instil fear of the MPLA and to promote the perception of threat so that communities were convinced they needed UNITA as a defender.³⁹⁸ Once an area was liberated chiefs would then be used as the main interlocutors with the communities and UNITA leaders. If a general was from Moxico and the newly liberated area was in Moxico he would be sent there to lead the party and the political strategy. While inserting UNITA elements amongst “their” people was a strategy to bring immediate proximity, the ultimate ideological objective of the political education was to ‘nationalize’ the people and remove their “ethnic elements”. In an interview to journalist Leon Dash in 1977, Savimbi explained the process of “trying to get a man to switch from thinking of himself as a Cuanhama to thinking of himself first as an Angolan. It’s very complicated”.³⁹⁹ “The task of converting colonial subjects into national subjects –capable of responsible public conduct, loyal to the state and prepared to accept their responsibilities as the backbone of society”⁴⁰⁰ was a process UNITA took very seriously as it strove to produce a “national people”.

Areas were defined so that there could be a control system: there were the government held areas, the contested areas and the UNITA areas. “The MPLA only controlled the provincial capitals but the municipalities remained with us (...) we were in all the

³⁹⁸ Pearce, Justin, 2015, *Political Identity and conflict in Central Angola 1975-2002*, Cambridge University Press, p. 103.

³⁹⁹ Quoted in Pearce, 2015: 104.

⁴⁰⁰ Hansen, Thomas Blom; Stepputat, Finn (eds), 2005, *Sovereign Bodies*, Princeton University Press, p. 26.

provinces although Huila didn't work well and Cunene and Namibe didn't have a large guerrilla presence. In 1985, we had reached the Lundas, Uige and Cabinda provinces", explained a former commander of the Northern Front.⁴⁰¹ As the movement was growing and the military's importance threatening to outweigh that of the political party, UNITA created the role of the commander-cadre (*comandante quadro*) so that the hierarchical figure in the bases combined both the political and the military. Beck points to how the military commanders' hierarchical inferiority to the political commissar had become dysfunctional in battle conditions.⁴⁰² At a later stage UNITA would train commanders to understand the basis of administration, political mobilisation and economic development so that this duality would never threaten operations.

At its peak UNITA's spatial organisation in the 1980s had four levels: 1) the republic – which was comprised of the liberated areas of Angola –and functioned like a state with its capital in Jamba; 2) the Compact Guerrilla zones that interlocked with the central state structures (in Jamba) and were part of the first line of resettlement until people were allowed into the liberated areas, 3) the expansion zones where military operations were taking place, and 4) the line of clandestine cells that functioned behind government lines with infiltration and sabotage operations. Each RM replicated the political and administrative structures that existed in Jamba, with representatives of the party and the different Ministries. In these RMs the military commander was expected to perform many duties and because of this had to undergo administrative training and political orientation classes. "The objective was that when the war ended the military chiefs of

⁴⁰¹ interview UNITA General, September 2012, Bie.

⁴⁰² Beck, Teresa Koloma, 2012, *The Normality of Civil War. Armed Groups and Everyday Life in Angola*, Campus, p. 100.

yesterday would become the administrative chiefs of today (...) we needed to manage a unit of 1500 troops and also understand how to manage a municipality. The rest was a matter of amplification”, clarified a former commander of the Northern front.⁴⁰³

When expanding the bases in each of the military regions, the administrators would begin by conducting a census in order to understand how many civilians lived in that area and also coordinate with the military how to defend the areas. Each region had agricultural technicians that would work to teach the population to farm more effectively and yield more harvests. For such purposes, the bases created teaching areas and also cooperatives. Everything that was captured was sent to the administrative centre to be divided amongst the civilians, the military and the administration. Health services were provided by mobile clinics at the village level. “Later when MSF arrived in our areas they saw that we were already implementing important public health procedures like using dry pits as bathrooms (...) our focus had been on preventive health care”, explained the former Health Minister.⁴⁰⁴ Committees were created at different levels to coordinate the population from the region to the village. Each committee had a president that was elected by the population. The movement made sure that civilians chose their own leaders in order to maintain the necessary direct link with different communities. But in order to make sure that these leaders were properly inserted into the revolution they, and their communities, would be taught the principles of the revolution, literacy and agriculture.

⁴⁰³ interview UNITA General, September 2012, Bie.

⁴⁰⁴ Interview former Health Minister, September 2012, Luanda.

UNITA's administration in other liberated areas was managed through local autonomous entities that were self-sufficient and ran independently from the rear base Jamba. In fact, Jamba was only the main supplier of assistance in military, political and logistical terms to the areas that were closest to the Kuando Kubango province. While food imports and other logistical supplies from South Africa were important lifelines for Jamba, other areas that did not have a direct supply link to Jamba had to depend on themselves for food and other supplies. A former front commander described how "There was a decree for self-sufficiency so that people would not depend on Jamba for food in the interior. Support came mostly in terms of medication from the rear base but each military base had their own structure – hospitals, nurses, schools, food production".⁴⁰⁵ The idea behind this level of autonomy was tactical but also strategic. If one RM fell or one base within it then this was a self-contained incident that would not have bigger implications of the organisation. The capturing of one area would not compromise the structures, information systems, and functioning of the others. Each base ran as a structured entity that had an operational management defined in Jamba and within tight political confines. The bases were all structured in similar ways. The bases "could be run by a sergeant that was almost illiterate because he would know where things had to be and operate (...) everything followed a defined plan, layout and program", explained UNITA's current President. There was no room for error or interpretation.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁵ interview UNITA General, September 2012, Bie.

⁴⁰⁶ interview Isaias Samakuva, January 2013, Luanda.

IV.1 Tripartite Structure: Party, Administration and Military

Although UNITA had emerged with separate political and military branches in the 1960s it began to organisationally distinguish between the Administrative, Political/Party and Military roles of its leaders and members in the 1970s. These three areas were conceived as the three pillars of the movement's survival and expansion. Those that joined or were forced into UNITA had to be inserted into a socio-political framework that defined behaviour and redirected activities to suit the needs of the organisation. The military had as its leading motto for combatants 'weapon, hoe and pen' which broadly translated into the three branches of organisation and the three areas that each UNITA member was being socialized into: rural development, fighting efficiency, and education.

At the leadership level the three areas had different commanding members: The Chief of General Staff for the Army, the Head of Administration (acting like a Prime Minister) for civilian affairs, and the Secretary General for the Party for the political issues. Savimbi, as the High Commander stood above all of these structures and controlled this tripartite project by centralising their dependence on his vision and instructions, but also allowing a level of decentralized control to emerge by having trusted leaders, who had shown loyalty and ability to replicate his vision, into these leading positions. The three structures were subordinate to the Political Bureau (the High command) and the Central Committee.⁴⁰⁷ The administrative branch was comprised of several Secretariats (Ministries) that ran different areas and services for the civilian government in the Free

⁴⁰⁷ Toussie, 1989: 16.

Lands. Each branch and secretariat was organised vertically from the central authority in Jamba with regional, zonal and smaller bases called 'positions'.⁴⁰⁸

Military Training

Before Jamba was created, military training was occurring in the Delta base where the first unit of companies was organised. Although UNITA was already training forces in its existing bases in the interior of the country it was only when they began establishing their bases in Kuando Kubango that semi-regular and "regular" forces began to receive training. FALA's first battalion 'Samanjolo' was formed south of Bie and trained by Savimbi himself. While the rear base was being organised, training was being conducted in the Bico area by South African Defence Forces (SADF) trainers together with Angolan instructors. FALA developed into 3 types of military forces: regular, semi-regular and guerrilla columns (aka compact forces). The guerrilla forces were columns of 30 men, deployed rapidly and trained locally with instructors from Jamba. Semi-regular and "regular" forces received more complete and intensive training. Training could range from a quick course of 90 days or 9 months; troops were trained to resist hunger, thirst and survive long marches.

For this purpose, UNITA created the Military Instruction Directorate that coordinated all the instruction given to the FALA troops at every level. The directorate had to introduce instructors in combat forces in order to guarantee constant training. Their mission was to observe these men in combat and then correct them in areas they had failed or propose

⁴⁰⁸ *ibid*, p. 17.

them to form part of semi-regular battalions. Compact force units were used to destabilize the enemy and also attack their supply and logistics lines. Semi-regular forces were used to engage directly with the enemy and also secure territory. Until 1991 semi-regular forces were treated like regular forces, armed with some arsenal, combat vehicles, vehicles mounted with anti-aerial and anti-tank mortars. UNITA also had between 15 and 20 commando's platoons of Special Forces, each with 45 men. A former military instructor that trained with the SANDF explained that "The specialized commandos were trained to destroy the enemy wherever he was and secure terrain. These forces trained for 6 to 9 months and one men trained from these commandos had the training of 4 or 5 specialisations – infantry, working with mines, operating armaments like RPG-7, 60 and 82 Mortars (...) they could do everything alone".⁴⁰⁹

South African military instructors were training FALA semi-regular forces as early as 1979 in the Namibian border as the Jamba structures were being built. As the area was being secured and training expanding to the entire RM66 (that included Jamba) several camps for military training were developed. Dotchi was where regular forces were trained. Compact forces were trained in the *Batalhão de Instrução* neighbourhood of Jamba once the rear base was complete. The idea was never to concentrate many troops in one area. "Dispersion was the maximum idea in Jamba so that we were not all together as aviation could strike and we needed time to manoeuvre into other areas" described a former military instructor from Jamba.⁴¹⁰ The SADF's role became a vital one as UNITA

⁴⁰⁹ interview Military instructor, January 2013, Huambo.

⁴¹⁰ interview Colonel, January 2013, Huambo.

expanded its military capacity and transformed its guerrilla force into units of conventional forces.

The movement never allowed military instruction to occur in a political void. Everything that the movement did was deeply seeped into politics and indoctrination. After training was concluded by the South Africans “our soldiers would go to another area and for a month we would take away the mentality that the South Africans had given them (that it was a fight against communism) and we changed it to a purely nationalistic mentality (...) it was a political and philosophical change”, explained a former chef de cabinet for Savimbi.⁴¹¹ Despite this, the SADF had a very strong influence on the design of the units. A former commander of a RM explained that “They had a say in who would command the troops trained by them”.⁴¹² He continues describing how “The MPLA started using very complicated aviation- the MIGs that had a severe psychological effect on us as they destroyed everything (...) That’s when we got the Stingers (from the US) and when the first MIGs begin dropping from the sky we knew the war could end soon as their infantry would be defeated and we already controlled two-thirds of the territory”.⁴¹³ As the Americans began to take on a larger role in supporting UNITA, the movement appointed one of its officers to act as a ‘handler’ for the CIA representative stationed at their diplomatic mission within Jamba. “Every day at 16:00 I would take a report to the Americans to indicate where the FAPLA were, all their movements, and they would in return give us satellite imagery. During the 1987-88 offensive, we had to report to them

⁴¹¹ interview Savimbi’s former chef de cabinet, January 2013, Luanda.

⁴¹² interview UNITA Brigadier, January 2013, Katchiungo.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

every time we used a Stinger missile, by recording the serial number of the weapon and the result achieved".⁴¹⁴

The confidence of the level of training and the ability to defeat a conventional army was echoed in the interviews. A former military instructor that trained several of UNITA's commanders described how "UNITA was very creative in the military front – after training these forces it was very easy to send these men to train in Morocco, South Africa, Zaire and later the US with General Charlie from the Pentagon training superior commanders and officers."⁴¹⁵ Commanders were trained in Jamba, as there were better conditions of force maintenance in such a vast area. Once an officer was called in for training he was then sent back to teach his fellow officers, in a type of constant cascade training in the fronts. In order to ensure more efficiency, UNITA placed instructors and commanders together in the same training courses so that instructors could then be the ones training future commanders. The motto was *'Treinar fortemente para combater facilmente'* – Train vigorously to fight easily.

V. Jamba – a State of Force Aiming at Structural Efficiency













*Political and spatial divisions of Jamba*⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁴ interview former Military Instructor, January 2013, Huambo.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ This drawing is the first of its kind. The author requested this drawing from a UNITA Colonel that was Savimbi's military map expert drawer to layout, from memory, what Jamba looked like in its heyday.

LEGENDA

-  Estrada
 -  Caminho de pé posto
 -  Limite ou Contorno de Bairros
 -  Contorno de Lagoa e Terrenos Agrícolas
 -  Lagoa
 -  Edifício em Madeira e Cimento
 -  Casa Rudimentar (Com Barro)
 -  Jango em Madeira
 -  Tribuna de Honra
 -  Praça da Liberdade
 -  Praça 5017
 -  Arame Farpado
1. - Casa do Presidente, Aguias de Concórdia
 2. - Gabinete do AC
 3. - GEC
 4. - Casa do Vice Presidente
 5. - Casa do CEMG Demóstenes Chilingutilla
 6. - Gabinete Militar
 7. - DIVITAC
 8. - Gabinete do Chefe do Estado Maior General
 9. - Gabinete das Operações do Comando Operacional Estratégico
 10. - Comando de Comunicações
 11. - BRINDE
 12. - Comando Militar da Jamba
 13. - Gabinete do Comissariado Político Nacional das FALA
 14. - Comando da Direcção de Artilharia Antiaérea
 15. - Hospital Geral do Comité Kazombuela
 16. - Hospital do Batalhão Mocho
 17. - Pavilhão 3 de Agosto
 18. - Casa do Governo
 19. - Gráfica Nacional
 20. - Gabinete do MIRNA
 21. - Gabinete da UREAL
 22. - Gabinete do SINTRAL
 23. - Residência de Padres e Professores do Liceu
 24. - Bairro de Agrupamentos Musicais
 25. - Pousada do Estado Maior General
 26. - Igreja Adventista
 27. - Posto Médico das Comunicações
 28. - Campo de Futebol das Comunicações
 29. - Ginásio Gino Desportivo
 30. - Armazéns do PAM
 31. - Central Eléctrica
 32. - Gabinete dos Transportes
 33. - Posto Policial
 34. - Escola de Condução
 35. - Casa Mortuária

Jamba, meaning *elephant* in Umbundu, was the area chosen to build the capital of the Free Lands of Angola and UNITA's rear base. Its actual location remained a mystery for decades and visitors would be brought in under strict UNITA control. Local populations that lived in Jamba and became part of the civilian and military contingent of the rear base would only circulate in and out with special permits and documents; an example of how tightly controlled the capital became and the strategy used to avoid infiltration and escapes. The area was chosen given its remoteness and distance from Luanda and any airfield that could be used by the government to destroy the movement's organisational capacity and military arsenal. The closest airport was Mavinga but UNITA made sure that

the FAPLA and their foreign allies never captured the town. The area was also chosen because of its proximity to friendly neighbours Zambia and Namibia (then under Apartheid South Africa's control) that could assist with constant supplies and where the movement could build logistics bases.

A reconnaissance group led by General Kanjimo, came to explore this remote sandy area in mid -1978 where, the story is told, they apparently found the carcass of a dead elephant and decided they would set up the movement's main rear base. The area needed to be large enough to support economic infrastructure, military training facilities and administrative structures. The rear base started being built in 1978 with the first military training facilities. Administrative structures were only organised a year later after the 12th Conference of the party.⁴¹⁷ After this conference, the three Secretaries of political affairs, administration and portfolio of the masses would become the pillars of UNITA's governance strategy. The policy adopted as the structures were being built was to populate these areas that were previously uninhabited. This meant sending word to family members in the central highlands of Huambo, Bie and Benguela to begin the long descent to the province of Kuando Kubango. Jamba was first inhabited by a group of 600 supporters, elements of the leadership and their families.

Although Jamba operated in a centralised way and managed to deliver services, there was an element of 'mimicking the state' that went beyond this functional aspect. Although

⁴¹⁷ At the annual meeting, held at the Delta base between May and June 1979, several issues were discussed in order to recalibrate the struggle and reorder it to suit changing circumstances. Chiwale, 2011:254.

these seem anecdotal, they were the details that many foreign visitors would mention when visiting Jamba. One was the traffic policeman that stood at a crossroads in Jamba (where the General Headquarters, and the road to the airport met) dressed in white gloves coordinating traffic (that was almost non-existent). Other such examples were of the Driving School, the Military Museum, the Music Conservatory, and the Public libraries. The element of imagining the 'state' and inserting an element of urbanism in a rural rebel base was clearly in play here. This was part of UNITA's social engineering project that aimed at bridging the gap between the urban and 'civilized' elites and the rural and 'backward' populations that it governed. UNITA's symbols of "civilisation and normality" in Jamba feed directly into Hansen and Stepputat's idea that a mythology of the ideal state "empowers otherwise widely discrepant practices" when the "myth is carefully cultivated inside the bureaucracy and any political figures as the state's own myth of itself and is constantly enacted through grand state spectacles, stamps, architectures, systems of etiquette".⁴¹⁸ This also resonates with the understanding of the "boundary-making effect of state practices" that require a constant imagining of the state through an "invocation of the wilderness, lawlessness and savagery that not only lies outside its jurisdiction but also threatens it from within".⁴¹⁹

V.I Layout and Neighbourhoods

The first structure built in August 1978 was the *Quartel General* (QG) (General Headquarter). This area would over time develop into a large neighbourhood, cordoned

⁴¹⁸ Hansen and Stepputat, 2001:17.

⁴¹⁹ Das, Veena; Poole, Deborah (eds), 2004, *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*, School of American Research Press, p. 7.

off by tight security that would house the intelligence services, the Party Secretariat, the Government Ministries, Strategic Logistics operations, the houses of the leadership and Presidential security services '*Mocho*'. QG would also have civilian neighbourhoods that were serviced by primary schools, clinics, a high school, and was where the central electricity grid was based. Years later QG would have a main square that would honor Savimbi's father, Loth Malheiro Savimbi, with a small train carriage positioned on an elevated cement platform carrying the number 5017 that was Loth's ID number as a worker in the Benguela railway. Next to the square was the main library and also the *Casa do Movimento* (the Movement's House), which would become the seat of government where all the Ministries operated. Near the 5017 Freedom Square were the trade unions, the Union of the Free Angolan Worker SINDACO and SINTRAL, and the catholic and protestant churches. Adjacent to QG was the *Coordenação* area where the main structures of the party were located, as well as the Politico-Military Commissariat.

The second area to be developed was the *Batalhão de Instrução (BI)* (Instruction Zone) neighbourhood, created in 1981, where recruits would receive training and where the captured or voluntary adult men were formed into battalions and units and then sent to two different military training fields near the Zambian border. Several other training fields were later developed, as many as seven that were supported by mostly South African Instructors. American instructors allegedly ran the Bumbu training field and the camp in Missa was French run.⁴²⁰ For every company of 150 men there were three Angolan instructors and one South African. This level of organisation was what allowed

⁴²⁰ interview former military instructor, September 2012, Jamba

UNITA to rapidly transform its guerrilla units into semi-regular and regular forces. As the war intensified, so did the conscription campaigns, as testified by several captured civilians living in Jamba and military instructors tasked with training new recruits.⁴²¹ BI would become a large neighbourhood that not only housed military structures and training facilities, but also had civilian neighbourhoods, the military band, instructor's living quarters, and schools. This area housed the Foreign Ministry (the Secretariat for International Cooperation) and external relations' offices of UNITA's diplomats and their foreign advisors. The secretariat was created in 1985/6 and was the body responsible for liaising with external partners, journalists, and relief agencies. It held a crucial portfolio as it expanded to have representation offices all over Africa, in Europe and the US. UNITA representatives from all the missions abroad would stay in the BI neighbourhood when they returned to their base in Jamba. In many occasions UNITA representatives would return with diplomatic guests and foreign journalists to showcase the rebel capital.

Near BI was the *Parada Militar* (Military Parade) where large military processions would take place in demonstration of UNITA's military might. It was also the area that would be bombarded by the Cubans in 1989, the first time ever in Jamba's history, and have the main stage destroyed. Savimbi would discuss policy and strategy with his troops and hold several rallies in UNITA's constant effort to inspire its fighters and followers through carefully studied esoteric appeals.⁴²² All military equipment that was captured from government and Cuban forces would be paraded in this area and every year on the 13th

⁴²¹ interview military instructors and captured civilians, September 2012, Jamba.

⁴²² Esoteric appeals are one of Bard O'Neill's six identified methods to gain popular support. They "seek to clarify the situation by placing it in an ideological or theoretical context that orders and integrates political complexities", (1980:7).

of May the day of UNITA's founding, large celebrations would be organised by the youth league JURA, the women's league LIMA and the children's league Alvorada.

The next structure to be built was the Central Hospital that developed into a large health facility where the most severely wounded from the different fronts, military regions, and their commanders would be treated. It serviced all the liberated areas. Close to the hospital was a neighbourhood of wounded soldiers and those maimed by mines that would receive rehabilitation therapy in the hospital facilities. The main hospital in Jamba was built years before the Health Secretariat was created. It was one of the pillars of Jamba's existence and an important lifeline to the struggle. It had nine infirmaries, each with between 20 and 32 beds, and six surgery rooms, three for men and three for women. The hospital also had a trauma unit and an intensive care unit, maternity and paediatrics wards, a dentistry area, and a physiotherapy ward for amputees and the wounded.⁴²³ This facility had "equipment for performing bacterial cultures, more advanced blood chemistries, serology (...) and a unit for the determination of chemical weapons exposure".⁴²⁴ Throughout all the neighbourhoods in Jamba there were clinics that assisted with smaller concerns like malaria and typhoid. Other more severe problems would be dealt with at the hospital.

Near the hospital was a lagoon which was where the first anti-aerial tower was located. The anti-aerial regimental command would later be stationed here and would be

⁴²³ Interview former nurse, September 2012, Jamba.

⁴²⁴ Toussie, 1989: 30.

responsible for protecting Jamba from aerial bombardments. Over time the rear base managed to erect 18 anti-aerial towers that stood tens of meters above the tree line and had artillery pieces positioned above them as deterrents for the fighter jets. Although it is difficult to confirm, it seems that not a single plane was every shot down by these artillery pieces. This was more a tactic of psychological warfare.

By the mid 1980s all the structures were established and built in Jamba. *Irmão Cordeiro* (IC) neighbourhood, named after a Catholic priest that assisted Savimbi with his studies and hugely influenced him as a teenager, was where the US Embassy was positioned. “The first US Embassy on Angolan soil was in Jamba not Luanda, the same happened with the French and the South Africans” positioned in the 25th of December neighbourhood, explained a former general who was part of UNITA’s external mission.⁴²⁵ It was also the area next to where many of the cadre training activities occurred. UNITA maintained their allies in separate neighbourhoods as a control mechanism and to ensure that they never crossed paths unless this was planned. The same occurred with the South Africans that had their embassy near the Radio station VORGAN.

A system of bunkers (made up of buried fortified containers) in all neighbourhoods was created to help the population and the leadership take cover from aerial attacks. More sophisticated bunkers were used in the QG by Savimbi and his commanders that served as war rooms to coordinate troops, weapons and supply movements. The leadership was instructed to have ‘*copos*’ (cups) dug out for their individual use near their houses. Each

⁴²⁵ Interview former General, September 2012, Luanda.

copo would have the depth of 1 meter and was large enough to sustain one person, explained a former member of COPE and 4-star General.⁴²⁶ This was a system that all other bases in the liberated areas also used. When government planes would take off from Menongue (capital of Kuando Kubango), it would be detected by the radar system in Jamba and sirens would go off to alert the population to take cover in their bunkers or the *copos*.

Once Jamba was built, administrative divisions of local government were created to replace the village *soba* administration and were focused on the municipality and neighbourhood approach. Jamba's neighbourhoods were divided as municipalities and followed prescribed party structures of different political committees. All the neighbourhoods would be equipped with primary and secondary schools, clinics to assist with minor health problems, areas for political mobilisation and feedback mechanisms that allowed the population to express grievances or inform on others that were causing problems.

The first UNITA parallel government only became fully operational in 1981 although it functioned with very rudimentary structures and without qualified staff to administer the functions in all the liberated areas. Different Secretariats (Ministries) were set up to develop the different governance areas. Each Minister was responsible for their administrative units in Jamba and the military regions. They were held personally accountable to Savimbi for any failings. These ministries delivered services to the

⁴²⁶ Interview former General, February 2013, Luanda.

populations under their rule, estimated to have been over 1 million in the late 1980s in all areas under UNITA control.⁴²⁷ Jamba's population ranged from 25,000 to 100,000 in surrounding areas. Overseeing these secretariats was a Prime Minister, a position occupied by Jeremias Chitunda until his death in Luanda in 1992.

At its operational peak, Jamba not only had functioning electricity and plumbing networks that allowed for neighbourhoods to have running water and flushing toilets, but was divided into functional areas that allowed industry, political activities, military training, and cultural events to occur. By 1985 there was a specific department created to coordinate the building of infrastructure for service provision – *Repartição de Obras Publicas* (REOP)– a department located in the presidency. The water and electricity company - *Serviço de Agua e Electricidade* (SAELT) was responsible for extending electric lines and the plumbing system from the boreholes to the population. SAELT had generator technicians that could not allow electricity to fail in Jamba, or they would face severe punishment. SAELT was of such strategic importance that it was located in the QG neighbourhood. Jamba had a *Departamento de Direcção Geral de Pessoal*, which was the central registry and equivalent of a Home Affairs office that dealt with issuing birth and marriage certificates. This department issued Identity documents and drivers licenses, which were later given recognition by the government in Luanda. “In 1991 during the peace process I exchanged my documents obtained in Jamba for the ones in Luanda and they were all recognized” explained a former FALA Chief of Staff and COPE member.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁷ Toussie, 1989; Minter, 1994:189.

⁴²⁸ interview former FALA chief of staff, January 2013, Luanda.

Jamba's postal service, CITAL, had a system of postmen that ensured that mail was delivered and sent from the rear base to other UNITA military regions.

V.II Relocation and Population Movements

Jamba needed population to inhabit it. This led UNITA to begin a coordinated campaign of bringing people under its control and into the liberated areas. Many came voluntarily from traditional UNITA areas of the Central Highlands, when word was sent that they could find safety and services at the bases of Kuando Kubango. UNITA leaders called for their families to start the weeks-long descent to Jamba and many mobilized their extended families and communities. This type of mobilisation was similar to the recruitment strategy of calling on pre-existing social ties of the Ovimbundu during the first war. Men and women volunteered to join the movement, following other family or community members, making kinship and ethno-linguistic ties to the organisation a relevant mobilisation tool. However, attacks and Cuban offensives in the Central Highlands between 1976 and 1979 also contributed to an exodus of people that fled south to safer areas. But as the civil war developed and the need to secure more followers and fighters emerged, the strategy of 'kidnapping' populations took form. The waves of "capturing" populations brought them under armed guard to the rear base and other liberated areas. Many of those kidnapped were children who would be educated into UNITA's social order by attending the boarding schools in Jamba and then trained to join the armed forces. In these population sweeps many MPLA supporters and also FAPLA soldiers were captured which meant that they would then find themselves in re-education centres and spending months in prisons. "When people were captured they'd first stay in the guerrilla support bases while they were being politically assimilated. Re-

education was done at the military bases with the help of the party secretariat”, explained a party ideologue.⁴²⁹

The other form of repopulation and building a large civilian base in UNITA areas was the use of *sobas* and village leaders that chose to bring their people under the movement. The attraction of having access to services and other benefits outweighed in many instances the level of control and repression they were subject to. Having villages under UNITA protection also minimized the level of attacks they would be subjected to had they remained in contested areas. *Sobas* were used to mobilize recruits for the army with UNITA officials collecting the young men and women from the villages and taking them to the rear base for training. This forced recruitment of adolescents would become an important strategy for securing long-term combatants.⁴³⁰

V.III Logistics

Around Jamba many logistics centres were operating, mostly because of their proximity to the border with Namibia. The movement had over 30 smaller logistics centres in the liberated areas⁴³¹ where trucks, ferries and porters would take supplies for civilians and the military throughout UNITA territory.⁴³² The General Logistics Directorate was the organ responsible for collecting and distributing material. UNITA's most important logistical operations area was in Mucusse (Kakuxi) and it operated from 1978 until 1990.

⁴²⁹ interview Ideologue of the party, January 2013, Luanda.

⁴³⁰ Beck, 2009: 350.

⁴³¹ James, 2011: 99.

⁴³² Skari, Tala, “Inside the Camps of UNITA's Stubborn Rebels”, *US News & World Report*, 1st October 1984.

The Directorate ensured that the movement had all the supplies it required at the military and civilian level. At the logistics centres, items were organised into different centres (for the collections of clothes, for military support, among others). Everything had to be accounted for so that the percentages determined by the leadership were followed: 40% was Tactical, 30% was Strategic and the remaining 30% was divided into 10% for reserve and 20 % for commerce and trade with different communities. The strategic portion was meant for the fronts and people in the rear; the tactical portion was considered working capital and was also divided between the military and the populations at the rear.⁴³³ The reserve would not be distributed unless Savimbi gave an order.

Trade was regulated by the 'Kwacha' stores that were run by the party. Although commerce was infrequent, UNITA maintained a mobile trading system where farmers could exchange surplus food for clothes, shoes, batteries, radios and other materials.⁴³⁴ Although these materials came as external assistance from South Africa and as a result of trade and purchases made by the movement, the largest source of supply was still the materials captured from the enemy. UNITA would use the guerrilla forces to target supply routes of the FAPLA and achieve two things simultaneously: depriving troops of their materials and therefore weakening their position and also supply FALA with new material.

⁴³³ Interviews with logistics personnel, September 2012, Huambo.

⁴³⁴ Toussie, 1989:53.

Given the extension of territory UNITA had to devise ways of supporting the fronts without any initial or frequent aerial support. Transportation of goods to the other liberated areas from Jamba and its logistical bases on the Namibian border implied having to establish complex distribution systems. Bridgland writes about the 'Savimbi Trail' that went from Mavinga 130km north towards the Moxico province and functioned as the logistical supply lifeline to the armed forces and the administration.⁴³⁵ The objective was to reach the Benguela railway, 800km inside Angola, so that troops could be supported into consolidating positions. However, given the difficulty of the terrain and lack of infrastructure, most distribution had to occur through the use of heavy trucks. Depending on the proximity and security of the fronts, columns of Samy and other cars would be organised to transport goods to different bases. UNITA's fleet of cars from South Africa, and the hundreds of captured vehicles of Polish, Soviet and Czech origin were vitally important to the movement's capacity to keep the logistics flowing.

"Savimbi taught us that we should never send one car full of only one thing – so each Samy vehicle would take cans, maize, uniforms, weapons – so that if there was an attack all the other cargos could be integrated fully and we wouldn't lose our entire supply of uniforms all at once", explained a logistics officer that worked for the General Directorate for Administration.⁴³⁶ Cars would reach the limit of the Kuando Kubango perimeter on the border with Bie province and the eastern belt of the Alto Zambesi (Cazombo) and from there the walking columns would takeover. For units that operated near Mavinga, Lumbala N'guimbo, and Menongue the cars would still reach those warfronts, but after

⁴³⁵ Bridgland, 1986: 420.

⁴³⁶ interview logistics officer, January 2013, Huambo.

those areas it was the population that would take the materials by foot to the different bases. Columns would take their corresponding part to their designated area and then pass on the materials to the receiving column that would continue along the trail. These were large columns of mostly villagers that would spend weeks at a time walking for hundreds of kilometres. If they were walking to consolidated and liberated areas then they would proceed in groups of 100 if they were walking into imminent zones where attacks were happening columns were much smaller in size, explained a LIMA (Women's League) member that was part of this trail in her role as a civilian mobiliser.⁴³⁷

VI. Economic Program: The Angolan Road to National Recovery

The experience of Jamba helped define the economic programme and development tenets that UNITA later used to campaign during the 1992 elections. In 1983 UNITA came out with a publication called 'The Angolan Road to National Recovery', published in Jamba, where the principles of its reconstruction and economic programme were explained. The development of human resources was a pre-requisite for the second 'liberation' and this meant that UNITA had taken on the task of elevating the "technical, professional, political and cultural level of the Angolan worker (...) transforming workers through education, training and organisation".⁴³⁸ "Education is key in raising the level of productivity and the standard of living; in unifying the country and bridging social, cultural and class differences; in raising the national consciousness (...) Democratized education refers to the equality of opportunity for all school age children to attend

⁴³⁷ Interview LIMA member, September 2012, Luanda.

⁴³⁸ *The Angolan Road to National Recovery: Defining the Principles and the Objectives*, UNITA, December 1983, Jamba, p.22.

schools at all levels, including university”.⁴³⁹ In order to achieve this nationally UNITA needed to achieve this in the liberated areas and more specifically design its model and programme of services in Jamba.

The focus on rural development and “the experiment of creating Jamba in an uninhabited area – that had sandy soil and little arable land, was characterized by extreme temperatures of desert like fluctuations, and was a bush area where wild animals roamed – proved that any area in Angola could be developed” defended the former Minister for Agriculture.⁴⁴⁰ UNITA advocated that in peacetime the state would need to embark on a rural development programme given that “most Angolans (up to 80%) were rural, illiterate, engaged largely in subsistence farming, with no services (no decent housing, no water supply, no electricity, no libraries, no recreational facilities, no hospitals, inadequate schools, no roads, no postal services, no telephone)”.⁴⁴¹ The movement wanted to reverse the trend of rural-urban migration and allow for the return of urbanized populations to rural areas, to what would be called “socio-cultural gravitational centres”. This meant redefining the infrastructural and social landscape of the country to factor in the characteristics of the rural majority. The plan was ambitious but it was left unimplemented to a large extent given the return to war in 1992. However, what the movement managed to achieve in the 1980s in the socio-economic area showed an adherence to this programme in the Free Lands.

⁴³⁹ *ibid*, p. 30-1.

⁴⁴⁰ Interview UNITA Minister for Agriculture, September 2012, Luanda.

⁴⁴¹ *The Angolan Road to National Recovery*, p.35.

VI.1 Education System and Leadership Schools

The educational system was premised on giving basic education to all sectors of society –traditional authorities, soldiers, civilians and children of the liberated areas. This led UNITA to devise a system of education that saw the establishment of schools in all the RMs, Jamba, the satellite bases, and the establishment of specialized schools for leadership and cadre training. From the onset of the second war literacy became mandatory in UNITA areas. The idea was to allow people to develop themselves “Man is the measure of everything that can be achieved on earth and we have to enrich and cultivate him”, echoed a party ideologue and leading commissar.⁴⁴²

The National Secretariat for Education, had 3 different Directorates: for primary education, for the *Primeiro ciclo* (ages 6 to 9) and the *Segundo and Terceiro ciclos* (until the age of 14). “We didn’t want to make reforms to the Portuguese schooling system because we thought it wasn’t necessary to nationalize the schooling – it was preferable to know Portuguese as spoken by Camões and Gil Vicente⁴⁴³ – and also the manuals were conceived by people that had a lot of experience with the Portuguese schooling system. What we did was complement it with Universal History”, explained a former minister for education that later defected.⁴⁴⁴ Throughout the 1980s the system developed into an arrangement of institutes and secondary schools that were run by priests, pastors, former Portuguese colonial teachers, and Angolan teachers. In 1988, there were reportedly 975 primary schools in the UNITA areas and 22 secondary schools⁴⁴⁵, an

⁴⁴² interview party ideologue, January 2013, Luanda.

⁴⁴³ Luis de Camões and Gil Vicente are a leading part of the Portuguese literary canon.

⁴⁴⁴ interview Education Minister, January 2013, Luanda.

⁴⁴⁵ Minter, 1994.

estimated 7130 teachers, and 225000 students.⁴⁴⁶ Although the schools followed the Portuguese curriculum, classes were also taught in several national languages. “If people wanted to learn in Chokwe, Nganguela, Kimbundu and Kikongo, not only in Umbundu, they could (...) UNITA was not tribalistic because it brought everyone together from all over the country”, explained a captured teacher forced to work in Jamba.⁴⁴⁷

One of the first schools in the vicinity of Jamba was the Polyvalent Institute founded in 1979 and created by teachers and pastors from the Dondi mission of Huambo.⁴⁴⁸ Although some teachers and pastors came voluntarily the majority were brought by force to teach in UNITA schools. Initially located in Bico, the institute was relocated to Catapi, Luengue and then Chibujango, as more free territory was being secured. It taught hundreds of UNITA members and civilians along the way. The Institute gave classes in Portuguese and local languages, and from the 5th year onwards taught in English and French.

The first source of recruitment of teachers came from the old missions and former public servants of the colonial days. They were the first teachers of the schools until UNITA was able to begin training civilians and the wives of the military personnel. A captured priest described how

“The pastors identified the curriculum that had to be taught in the schools – Portuguese, French, English, Latin, biology, universal history etc. (...) When I got to Jamba in 1982 I

⁴⁴⁶ James, WM, 1992, *A Political History of Civil War in Angola 1974-1990*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, p. 149.

⁴⁴⁷ interview captured teacher, September 2012, Jamba.

⁴⁴⁸ The Dondi mission was a leading institution that taught many of the anti-colonial liberation leaders and also formed the backbone of UNITA's leadership schooling.

found many priests that had been captured except 2 that voluntarily went to Jamba—these were father Baptista Catombela (from Andulo) and father Damião (from Katchiungo). Father Baptista knew Savimbi and was part of the transitional government helping with the education directorate on UNITA’s side in the 1970s”.⁴⁴⁹

School materials would mostly come from South Africa and Portugal but at the Jamba Printing Press books and brochures on different subjects were produced for local consumption. Jamba had connections with the Portuguese high school in Kinshasa where it would receive the schools’ programmes and curriculum to assist with the design of their own schooling system.⁴⁵⁰ In Jamba and other liberated areas, schools only taught until the 9th year (14 years old). The best students would be selected to study in the high schools in the Mavinga area and Boa Esperança in Licua, and then proceed to study at the Portuguese school in Kinshasa, proceeding with a full scholarship to schools in Portugal, Senegal, France, Ivory Coast or the US, explained a CENFIM student that studied abroad in this scholarship program.⁴⁵¹ “If the student performed well they’d give him a certificate from Kinshasa as students couldn’t continue studying abroad with documents issued by UNITA”, explained a Catholic priest that taught in Jamba.⁴⁵² From 1988 the school in Kinshasa was no longer used as the vehicle to send students out and these would go directly to Portugal, the US and France. This was assisted by the diplomatic effort of UNITA’s diplomatic representations abroad.

⁴⁴⁹ interview catholic priest, January 2013, Katchiungo.

⁴⁵⁰ Interview pastor that taught in Jamba, January 2013, Huambo.

⁴⁵¹ Interview UNITA official, September 2012, Huambo.

⁴⁵² interview Catholic priest, January 2013, Katchiungo.

The *Centro de Formação Integral da Juventude* (Centre for the Formation of the youth) CENFIM, created in May 1981, was a key institute in Jamba. “CENFIM became a source of teachers and students – it was a nucleus to ensure continuity of UNITA’s vision”, explained a former front commander who began in 2010 teaching UNITA’s history in Bie at the party headquarters.⁴⁵³ It was a military academy, which was divided into six companies (from A to F) with each having between 300 and 400 students. It was initially constituted as a response to the influx of children and orphans that came from the interior. Thousands of students were brought to study at this male boarding school sent by their parents or brought by troops. Orphaned children that were captured in ‘*recolhas*’ (civilian capturing rounds) would study at CENFIM and receive the principles of military training. A CENFIM student described that “to eat we had to march to the kitchen”.⁴⁵⁴ They were trained in a multiple of subjects that ranged from politics and the military to arts and culture, mechanics, tailoring and agriculture. “Each company had a political and a paramilitary instructor (...) and a mother figure (normally a LIMA lady) to give moral and social support”, explained the director of CENFIM.⁴⁵⁵ The LIMA ‘mothers’ would look after 5 children in each of the boarding houses until they turned 14. At the age of 15 the children would begin receiving basic paramilitary training and learn about guerrilla warfare and basic notions of defence.

Leadership and cadre training was an area UNITA prioritized during the second war. As early as 1975, Savimbi was already preparing staff to play a bigger role in the future of

⁴⁵³ interview UNITA General, September 2012, Bie.

⁴⁵⁴ interview CENFIM student, current Colonel, January 2013, Luanda.

⁴⁵⁵ interview CENFIM Director, January 2013, Luanda.

Angola by training them in Masside in Moxico province. However, it was only in 1983 that these leadership schools were extended to cadre training programs. The main leadership school – the *Centro de Formação Comandante Kapese Kafundanga* (CEKK) – that operated in 1981-91 was where military commanders and local administrators and commissars were trained. CEKK also prepared them to become future administrators in a time of peace. Savimbi taught most courses at CEKK although several members of the leadership that held doctorates and university degrees would also lecture. Over time the curriculum developed into dealing with complex issues of political negotiation, party organisation and political mobilisation, social theory, public administration, law, and philosophy, described a UNITA General that studied at CEKK.⁴⁵⁶

Training and Industry

Part of UNITA's plan to change Angola and rebuild it after the war entailed having to prepare a generation of Angolans that were equipped with the technical know-how for reconstruction and economic development. Investment in human capital was one area the movement went to great lengths to develop. Civilians were selected to receive training at the industrial school of Nova Aurora, created in 1986 and located 40km outside of Jamba. Angolan colonial teachers and technical experts would give training in as diverse areas as mechanics, electrician training, carpentry, and plumbing, among others. Nova Aurora was conceived to lead the self-sufficiency drive of the liberated

⁴⁵⁶ Interview UNITA General, September 2012, Luanda.

areas. There it had a sawmill that employed over 300 workers that prepared hardwood for export in Namibia.⁴⁵⁷

Other areas of expertise were taught at the Technical School for Agriculture and Livestock (ETAPE), created in 1985 and located in the *3rd of August* area near Jamba. At ETAPE, trainees would learn about different farming techniques, irrigation mechanisms and mechanical farming, with courses lasting 2 years. The school managed to train over 2250 medium and basic agricultural experts (*técnicos*) that were later deployed to all the liberated areas to guarantee food self-sufficiency. The *Antonio Capalala* School near Rivungu was created in 1983 to train nurses and health professionals. A nursing certificate would be awarded after 18 months of training and 6 months of practical work; taught by Angolans but also South Africans.⁴⁵⁸ Capalala later developed a laboratory-training programme and followed the curriculum of the World Health Organisation for “public health laboratories in the Developing World”.⁴⁵⁹ Over time UNITA created eight health worker training schools in the liberated areas that provided 2-year courses for medics and other health technicians; “The medics would receive instruction in elements of anatomy, pathology, pharmacology, first aid, and public health”.⁴⁶⁰ Other professional training institutes were developed to prepare a UNITA “civil service”. A Secretariat school trained UNITA’s women for 12 months to work as personal assistants and secretaries in the administration; they would learn Portuguese, maths, French, stenography, and

⁴⁵⁷ In the 1980s UNITA is reported to have made between \$3 million and \$12 million a year with the export of hardwoods. Minter, William, “Accounts from Angola. UNITA as described by ex-participants and foreign visitors”, 15 June 1990, Leon Dash Archives, p.9.

⁴⁵⁸ Interview nurse, September 2012, Jamba.

⁴⁵⁹ Toussie, 1989: 33.

⁴⁶⁰ Toussie, 1989: 33.

dactylography. Run by Ana Junjuvili, several teachers carried diplomas from schools in Paris and Abidjan.⁴⁶¹

The Central Workshop of War Material (OFICENGUE) in Jamba was the industrial complex where weapons would be restored and recuperated after they were captured from the enemy. The workshop began operating in 1978 although it only had 2 vises and 164 men to assist with making the necessary transformations of the armament to repair weapons. "Before I went to the bush I had been a metalworker in the CFB railway and that's why I was sent to work in this workshop. We made adaptations of vehicles so we could mount weapons. We repaired all sorts of weapons - carabines, AK-47s, and even T-32 and T-55 tanks", explained the director of OFICENGUE.⁴⁶² It developed into a war material workshop where artillery cannons F76mm, BM21 and BM14, and other weapons could be repaired. "A chief mechanic at one workshop devised a new kind of a rocket launcher from parts taken from helicopter firing pods".⁴⁶³ Between 1984 and 1989, the workshop had over 600 people working there from 7am to midnight. During military offences, the workshop would operate during 24hrs.

OFICENGUE was divided into 1) the section for weapons, 2) the workshop that made handles for weapons out of wood; prosthesis were also made here and sent to the hospital, 3) the electric section in charge of the large generators, which also repaired weapons that had electric components, 4) the metal/ironworks section, 5) carpentry

⁴⁶¹ Muekalia, Anabela Chipeio, 2015, *Angola: Quando o impossivel se torna Possivel*, Porto Editora, Lisboa, p. 80.

⁴⁶² interview Director of OFICENGUE, January 2013, Huambo.

⁴⁶³ Burke, 1984:21.

section that made furniture, and 6) crafts section that made presents for international visitors or when Savimbi would go on “state visits”. “We sent several wood carved gifts to the White House when Savimbi visited President Reagan”, explained Savimbi’s former map-maker that also worked as a craftsman.⁴⁶⁴ The transformations done to many of these war materials allowed Jamba to have functioning tools and materials from the industrial complex to serve as household items. Next to the OFICENGUE was the General Factory of Fatigues where 500 machines, with two tailors each over 12hr shifts, would produce military uniforms 24/7 to send to the fronts. A vital part of UNITA’s order was that its soldiers always be presented in professional gear and proper uniforms. “All regular troops (wore) leather boots and locally made uniforms consisting of khaki olive-greens, or dark blue depending on the unit”.⁴⁶⁵

VI.II Agriculture

As referred earlier, UNITA’s economic programme focused on rural development and community farming. In 1975 the movement was already locating the technical staff at a national level in the liberated areas that could start developing demonstration camps to assist communities in enhancing their crop production. “Because we hardly had any staff and had one technician per 100 farmers, we decided to organise seminars to talk about cultivating, combating plagues, and also home economics so that people understood they could support the family and sell the surplus”, explained a former agricultural expert that later took on a key political role.⁴⁶⁶ The system around Jamba was organised in a more

⁴⁶⁴ Interview former craftsman and current Colonel, September 2012, Luanda.

⁴⁶⁵ Burke, Robert, “UNITA – A Case study in Modern Insurgency”, April 1984, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, p. 21.

⁴⁶⁶ interview former Secretary General, January 2013, Andulo.

centralized manner with UNITA farms and other 'joint-ventures' with local villages⁴⁶⁷; it was supervised from Jamba by the Agricultural Secretariat. The secretariat further provided maintenance of the large farms, selected the agricultural sites for resettlement of displaced populations, and allocated land.⁴⁶⁸ The movement would supply these relocated people with a plot of land, seeds, tools and food until the first harvest, in order for them to farm the land and later contribute to the food stalls.⁴⁶⁹ UNITA introduced several crops to areas that hadn't grown them before. This occurred throughout the liberated areas but especially in Kuando Kubango.

The Agricultural Secretariat had regional units throughout the liberated areas that would follow different programs. In areas close to the frontlines, the population was expected to contribute food. Bridgland describes how 'Resistance' collectives, one of the joint-venture initiatives between UNITA and the population, operated in 1981 by bringing chiefs under UNITA areas and having villagers work a day a week in these collectives in exchange for their ability to work their private plots using the collective's tractors. The movement claims to have had nine of these collective farms at the time yielding quite significant harvests. One of these resistance collectives is reported to have harvested 150 tons of maize in 1981 from 54 hectares of land⁴⁷⁰, with the projected harvest for 1982 to exceed 350 tones from an expanded area of 100 hectares. Large grain storage facilities

⁴⁶⁷ Stuvoy, 2002:58.

⁴⁶⁸ Toussie, 1989: 17-18.

⁴⁶⁹ Toussie, 1989: 48.

⁴⁷⁰ Bridgland, 1986: 402.

were kept away from the warfronts, and were located in Mavinga, Lomba and Kueyo having a total capacity of storing 5,000 tones.⁴⁷¹

Production centres were opened in different locations around Jamba, in Benda, Capacala, Xilemba, Xicosi and Lomba, and were supported by tractors and irrigation systems that allowed for the farming of beans, corn, soya, sweet potato and horticulture, explained a captain from logistics.⁴⁷² It is unclear if these production centres were initially just catering for the food security of the armed forces or if they were also tending to civilians' needs. It seems however that Jamba was mostly supplied with food items from Namibia and South Africa, and some testimonies point to agricultural activities only beginning in the outskirts of Jamba in 1988 as the withdrawal of support from Pretoria was approaching.⁴⁷³ Agricultural centres were reported to have existed around Kuando Kubango in 1984 but operated more like demonstration areas than large farming enterprises. Food distribution in Jamba was done every two weeks through neighbourhood committees that were responsible for the equitable distribution of food to each household. Each committee was comprised of 150 people and they would calculate the amounts necessary for distribution. Each individual would receive one kilo of Maize flour and rice, which corresponded to 4 days' worth of food.

⁴⁷¹ Toussie, 1989: 51.

⁴⁷² interview Captain, September 2012, Jamba.

⁴⁷³ This was a result of the New York agreement of 1989 that led to the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the independence of Namibia in 1990.

In 1983, the Ministry of Agriculture under Engineer Salupeto Pena began investing in training experts and in diversifying production areas. “He instilled a more scientific method of work in the existing staff and also ensured that they understood the nature of the soil in UNITA territory by personally surveying all the liberated areas”, described an agricultural technician that worked closely with Salupeto Pena.⁴⁷⁴ The Ministry did this reconnaissance of the land, soil and the climates dividing them into categories: 1) clay like soil near rivers and lagoons which was used for vegetables and cereals, 2) high ground where corn, massango and massambala (more resistant forms of maize) was grown, and 3) other types of soils. As a result, the liberated areas were divided into 30 different agricultural zones where different crops, techniques and systems of agriculture were introduced. In the 1990s UNITA was operating 53 collective farms, totalling 25,000 hectares, and producing maize, vegetables and other foodstuffs.⁴⁷⁵

The Ministry sent the agricultural experts trained at the ETAPE technical school outside Jamba to all the liberated areas. The experts had different levels – and ranged from the medium expert (equivalent to the former regents with 15 years of experience), the base expert, individual promoters of agriculture and rural mobilizers. Once trained they would be distributed in the Politico-Administrative Coordination centres that existed in the south, centre, north, east and west of the country– with expansion into Cabinda. They created demonstration sites in each village and experimentation camps in each sector. “They’d teach the techniques of cultivation and agriculture and introduced scientific knowledge regarding the choice of land, the type of plants that each land could support,

⁴⁷⁴ Interview agricultural technician, January 2013, Huambo.

⁴⁷⁵ James, 1992.

the harvests etc.”⁴⁷⁶ These agricultural experts would recruit the community leaders and empower them to become the mobilizers and promoters of these initiatives in order to secure the acceptance of the population to the new ideas and methods.⁴⁷⁷ “The *sobas* were the opinion leaders of the communities and were also trained at ETAPE so that there was effective coordination of agricultural activities. (...) The key to our success was political mobilisation – the idea that we could count only on our own people, and people mobilized everything for the troops. We operated under an iron-like discipline”, explained a former Secretary General of the party.⁴⁷⁸

One of the movement’s biggest failings in the second war was its inability or unwillingness to use money. While trade was conducted in other liberated areas this was not the case in Jamba and the UNITA leaders spent almost two decades not knowing what monetary policy was. “I didn’t know what money was and what it meant – this was what we lacked in our state”, explained Savimbi’s former chef de cabinet that later worked in the external missions in Europe.⁴⁷⁹ This was the foundation of a utopian system where there was no commerce (although there was barter), no currency, salaries were not paid and citizens would “contribute according to their capacities and receive according to their needs”.⁴⁸⁰ Only a few members of UNITA’s leadership dealt with money, in particular those that were in the diplomatic sphere and those dealing with logistics.⁴⁸¹ Internal sources of revenue were strictly controlled.

⁴⁷⁶ interview Agricultural technician, January 2013, Huambo.

⁴⁷⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁷⁸ interview Secretary General, January 2013, Andulo.

⁴⁷⁹ interview Savimbi’s chef de cabinet, January 2013, Luanda.

⁴⁸⁰ Roque et al, 1988: 43 (authors translation).

⁴⁸¹ Interview former member of External mission in Portugal, January 2008, Lisbon.

VI. III Resource Extraction

Resource extraction and UNITA's war economy was dominated by the Ministry of Natural Resources (MIRNA). This ministry developed and expanded into the 3rd war (1992-2002) as UNITA faced the withdrawal of major sources of external support. Even when UNITA was receiving significant external support it still devised an alternative economic system, which was the basis upon which the movement's war economy in the 1990s emerged.⁴⁸² By 1979 the movement was using multiple supply routes to export internally generated sources of revenue: ivory, gold, rhino horn and animal skins.⁴⁸³ From the beginning MIRNA operated with a hierarchical structure that was not dissimilar to other ministries. The Minister was the one responsible for coordination and reporting to COPE⁴⁸⁴, while the Vice Minister coordinated activities at the field level in different areas of resource exploration. Below him, the Director General gave tactical instructions to the MIRNA delegates and articulated the work of all the delegates in the different fields of resource extraction. Delegates were based at the RM level and specialized in prospecting for gold, diamonds, ivory, animal skins, timber etc. These men were trained in France, South Africa, and the Ivory Coast. Given the amount of resources available throughout the liberated areas, every front and its respective commander had to respect the areas determined for resource exploration and ensure that enough troops were deployed to protect them.

⁴⁸² Stuvoy, 2002:73.

⁴⁸³ Stuvoy, 2002:73.

⁴⁸⁴ COPE was the ultimate operating command headed by Savimbi, as explained in Chapter 5.

At the 5th Congress in 1982 the first diamonds were identified in Kuando Kubango near the Chimbunjango River close to Mavinga. The quality was poor so their trade wasn't able to sustain the war but it was sufficient to sustain diplomatic efforts, explained a former UNITA diplomat.⁴⁸⁵ By 1983 UNITA is reported to have had foreign diamond merchants flying into Jamba⁴⁸⁶, although it is unclear how the movement began to first export diamonds. UNITA is thought to have used its access to South Africa to reach international diamond markets but could have also initially relied on its Zairean supply routes.⁴⁸⁷ Despite being at the initial stages of its diamond empire that would develop exponentially during the 1990s.⁴⁸⁸ UNITA claims that by 1986 it had exported \$386 million in diamonds from mines they attacked and from within the liberated areas.⁴⁸⁹ The movement's increase in diamond revenues in the 1990s was concurrent with the capturing of mines from government areas and the expansion of MIRNA into the Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, Kwanza Sul and Bie provinces. It was only in 1992 that UNITA began to trade in diamonds on a mass scale and the diamond trade took on an industrial capacity.⁴⁹⁰

VI.III Health Care System

Delivery of health care services was functional in UNITA areas despite the fact that the movement spent many years without any external help in this sector. An assessment by

⁴⁸⁵ Interview former member of external missions, January 2013, Luanda.

⁴⁸⁶ Bridgland, 1986:453.

⁴⁸⁷ Dietrich, 2002:276; Bridgland, 1986: 509.

⁴⁸⁸ The extent of UNITA's revenue from its diamond trade is difficult to ascertain however there are estimates that it was managing an annual output of \$300 million in 1993, reaching its production peak in 1996 with \$600 million annually, and reducing to \$100-300 million between 1998-2000. Sources quoted in Stuvoy, 2002:77.

⁴⁸⁹ Reported by *Expresso* Journalist Paulo Camacho, quoted in Minter, 1990:9.

⁴⁹⁰ Dietrich, Christian, "UNITA's diamond mining and exporting capacity", in Cilliers, Jakkie; Dietrich, Christian (eds), 2000, *Angola's War Economy*, Institute for Security Studies, p. 277.

the US State Department in 1989 noted that the health care system was “the most complex and widespread civilian administration”.⁴⁹¹ Civilian health units existed in the liberated areas but were also run in the “contested” areas. UNITA began its health care programme in the early 1970s before independence with Eduardo Sakuanda, a trained nurse from the missions, conducting rudimentary surgeries and amputations. “By 1976 we included the delivery of health in our political campaigns” explained the former Health Minister.⁴⁹² The movement began to first structure the health services for the military, coordinated by ex-Portuguese military that helped train people. Once UNITA was faced with having to provide for large numbers of civilians they began to devise strategies to deliver civilian health services. The system separated the military and civilian health areas and the staff differed although the infrastructure was shared.

Medecins San Frontiers (MSF) began to help the movement in 1983 with a doctor and a team of nurses and supplied the health staff with some medication in the Capacala Hospital. “Luanda called them the white coated mercenaries”.⁴⁹³ MSF assisted the battle wounded, trained medical staff and assisted in all health development areas. Anabela Muekalia assigned to serve as a translator to the MSF team in 1984 describes how a permanent support group led by Captain Amos Chissende accompanied the medical team of one doctor, a lab technician, a nurse and a midwife. As part of this support group were 10 soldiers, a cook with three helpers, and a radio team. In later years the Red Cross, International Medical Corps and *Medecins du Monde* would assist UNITA but the needs of

⁴⁹¹ Toussie, 1989: 29.

⁴⁹² interview former Health Minister, January 2013, Luanda.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

the liberated areas far exceeded the assistance given. There were not enough doctors. UNITA only had a few trained doctors and most of the health care services, including lifesaving surgeries, were done by either nurses or by an intermediary position called *clínicos* (medical assistants). It was these assistant doctors that led the hospitals and the clinics throughout UNITA areas.⁴⁹⁴

The Health Secretariat was only set up in Jamba and was run by Dr Ruben Sikato, one of UNITA's only doctors. Dr Carlos Morgado was the medic in charge of military health care and was Savimbi's personal physician. All doctors had received their medical degrees from Portugal but the equipment and medication that they used was bought in South Africa. "Timber was sold and exported to Namibia as one of the ways we devised to start buying medication", explained a nurse that worked in the central Hospital in Jamba.⁴⁹⁵ The Secretariat became the main depository for medication and was responsible for distributing supplies and managing personnel at the national level even though the different RMs had semi-autonomous health care systems. The ministry estimates that it provided health services to over 500,000 people in the liberated areas. All medical treatment and medication was free of charge, given that money was not used in the free territory of Angola. Neo-natal and pregnancy assistance was compulsory for all women. UNITA aimed to provide inpatient delivery services to all pregnant women who would "stay in hospital from 7 to 30 days before delivery and up to 7 days following delivery for uncomplicated pregnancies".⁴⁹⁶ A training centre was set up in 1988 around

⁴⁹⁴ interview former Health Minister, January 2013, Luanda.

⁴⁹⁵ Interview nurse, September 2012, Jamba.

⁴⁹⁶ Toussie, 1989:35.

Mavinga while an ontological Health code was also being devised. All health professionals of the fronts and zones were called to Kuando Kubango province to become familiarized with the methodology being used and hierarchy installed under the national Health Secretariat. Training was then expanded at each military region. "Physicians, nurses, clinicians, midwives and supervisory technicians received formal training in UNITA's (8 training) schools and abroad".⁴⁹⁷

While Jamba had a central hospital, other hospitals and clinics existed throughout the liberated areas. The number of medical staff is difficult to ascertain fully. Minter reports that military health services had 3000 nurses and that civilian health services had 3800 nurses.⁴⁹⁸ UNITA reported in 1989 to have 8608 health workers, of which 55% were within civilian jurisdiction.⁴⁹⁹ It operated with three different types of medical units throughout their liberated territories: central hospitals with capacity of 200 beds each and equipped to conduct surgeries; regional hospitals each with a capacity for 150 patients focusing on small procedures; and over 500 clinics that assisted in neo-natal care and basic health services.⁵⁰⁰ In 1983 UNITA claims to have run 5 central hospitals, 22 regional hospitals, and treating over 67,000 people every six months.⁵⁰¹ By 1989 the movement ran eight central hospitals, 28 regional hospitals, and 35 local hospitals.⁵⁰² Because of the large presence of anti-personnel mines the issue of amputees was widespread. UNITA ran a prosthesis factory in Jamba where locally sourced materials

⁴⁹⁷ *ibid*, p. 33.

⁴⁹⁸ Minter, 1994: 220.

⁴⁹⁹ Toussie, 1989:32.

⁵⁰⁰ Roque et al, 1988:23.

⁵⁰¹ Barata-Feyo, 1985: 73.

⁵⁰² Toussie, 1989:30-32.

(wood and rubber) were used by the amputees to make their prosthesis. The factory in Biongue, several kilometers from Jamba, was assisted by a Belgium NGO, and became the main site where prosthesis were made.⁵⁰³ The Biongue base had over 3500 civilians and catered for 1800 amputees that were rehabilitated physically but also trained to contribute to other work areas in the rear base.⁵⁰⁴

VII. A Politically Structured and Controlled Environment

A key element of UNITA's social order was its ability to control the discourse, the history and the worldview of its followers.⁵⁰⁵ The movement achieved this through extensive programmes of "acculturation and education", through the control of information, and through the "normalisation" of daily life. UNITA valued recreational moments where soldiers and civilians would enact moments of normalcy to envisage a life that could exist during peacetime. This was part of winning the hearts and minds' strategy. UNITA's national radio VORGAN played a fundamental role in this area while other mechanisms provided necessary stopgaps for any creeping doubts or potential dissent among the population. The intelligence services and communications systems were one of the movement's strongest organisational aspects.

Information Secretariat and VORGAN Radio

⁵⁰³ interview former military instructor, September 2012, Jamba.

⁵⁰⁴ Roque et al, 1988:30.

⁵⁰⁵ Propaganda was a priority given by UNITA as early as the late 1960s when it began producing written briefings and publications explaining its vision and cause, and its battlefield successes.

UNITA's Information Secretariat was responsible for managing information within and outside Angola. The *Voz da Resistência do Galo Negro* (Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockrel) VORGAN was the movement's radio, a powerful propaganda tool that allowed UNITA to communicate to all the provinces of Angola. It began operating from Namibia and first aired on the 4th of January 1979. Its programs were meant to break the spirit of the enemy by reporting on battlefield losses but were also used to explain UNITA's cause. In 1988 VORGAN began operating with the assistance of the CIA's technology and equipment that would completely revolutionize the movement's ability to communicate with Angolans outside of the liberated areas. It had 2 large transmitters each with 3 antenna towers and was powered by 2 generators.⁵⁰⁶ VORGAN functioned in all the liberated areas with 280 radio stations located throughout the country and cared for by over 1400 radio technicians. The technology was so strategically sensitive that security in the VORGAN compound in Jamba was very tight and access was restricted to only a few technicians "no one else, not even those that worked directly in Savimbi's office could access the transmitters area".⁵⁰⁷ A former VORGAN technician, that had privileged access to the transmitters described how "In 1999, when UNITA began to abandon Jamba ahead of the military offensive that would retake it, one of the structures that were destroyed with explosives were the VORGAN transmitters".⁵⁰⁸

The radio station was thought to have operated using 3 frequencies assigned by the Voice of America: from 06:00 to noon (9.700kHz frequency), from noon to 19:00 (11.830kHz)

⁵⁰⁶ Interview former VORGAN technician, September 2012, Jamba.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Interview former VORGAN technician, September 2012, Jamba.

and from 19:00 onwards (7.100kHz).⁵⁰⁹ It was inaugurated on the 8th of May 1988 in its newly refurbished cement installations in Jamba and aired 24hrs a day with different news, cultural and political programs. One of the programs that explained the revolution was the *Galo Negro* – the awakening of a New Dawn for Angola - program. All programs passed through the Information Secretariat to check for content and other issues, and were presented in Portuguese and all the national languages. In order to transmit international news there was a center within the VORGAN compound that would receive news from all major news agencies in Europe, the US and Africa. At the VORGAN installations was the Kwatcha UNITA Press (KUPA) that would launch a monthly international bulletin in three foreign languages.⁵¹⁰ On a daily basis KUPA would send dispatches all over the world to UNITA diplomatic missions. Kwatcha (meaning “wake up” in Umbundu) news then began producing official newsletters of the Free Angola Information Service (that operated from Washington) in the form of bi-monthly editions.

Communication System and intelligence

Initially UNITA’s communication system was very rudimentary. In 1976/7 the movement used couriers to carry messages between the commands. After a few years the first radios were captured yet UNITA was still unable to function without the courier messenger system. In 1978, “UNITA forces, equipped with hand held Racal radios, used coded messages to remain in daily contact with all their units and bases over a 900 set two-way radio network”.⁵¹¹ UNITA was able to build a stable base of communications run by

⁵⁰⁹ Albuquerque, Carlos, 2002, *Angola: A Cultura do Medo*, Livros do Brasil.

⁵¹⁰ Roque et al, 1988:26.

⁵¹¹ Burke, 1984:21.

General Andrade who worked to 1) streamline communications for Savimbi and his commanders, and 2) to intercept the enemy's communications. In 1979/80 the Directorate for Administration of Transmissions was already functioning and had a Centre for Transmissions that was sub-divided into: 1) cryptography – this department was known as the “Kitchen” where messages were coded and decoded, and 2) explorations and radio area that did reception and transmission of message. The transmissions centre had an Office of Studies and Analysis that dealt with the production of coding systems.

The communication structure was divided into different regions and organised through networks that covered different liberated areas. “Each network covered 4 RMs and each of these regions also had their own sectors. Each sector controlled an area and different codes were devised for each of the regions – so we could maintain security in information and if this was captured the rest of the country would not be exposed and fragile” explained an officer from the Presidential communications team.⁵¹² The main idea behind the system was to centralize information in the office of the President and the Party so that he was aware of everything that occurred in the liberated areas. Daily messages were sent using different levels of urgency. “Information had to come in two or three times a day. Reports were laid out by priorities and Savimbi read absolutely everything and would respond by recording orders and giving orientations to the country and abroad. These recordings would then go to communications and be transcribed into a written document”.⁵¹³ By 1990 UNITA had over 1000 operators working in the five different

⁵¹² interview officer from Presidential communications, January 2013, Huambo

⁵¹³ *ibid.*

sectors of communications, in what had become a complex system of communications and interception for different areas and intelligence fields.

The communications structure and system for UNITA was divided into five large areas: the Directorate General (DG) located in Jamba, the High Commanders communications, the Office of Interceptions GITOP, the intelligence service BRINDE, and Special Operations. Initially the DG structure of communications was developed in two areas in Jamba and later in four different military regions in the centre of the country (RM 50/35/19/71) to support the military units. The motto of communications was “Speed/Efficiency and Secrecy” - Efficiency in coding and secrecy in who had access to the information.

Working in interception was the Office of Operational and Technical Interception (*Gabinete de Intercepção Técnico e Operacional*) GITOP. “With GITOP we managed to intercept communications in Russian, French, Spanish and English to know the strategy of the enemy”, explained a FALA Colonel that remained beside Savimbi until the final battle in 2002.⁵¹⁴ GITOP had three large areas of 1) Wiretap/Listening where radio workshops would disable the broadcast system so that radios only had receivers and the enemy could not hear messages; 2) Decoding where messages at the Wiretap section would be decoded and clarified, 3) Area of study and analysis of the systems of communication of the enemy. At the communications centre in Jamba there was also a training facility for DG and GITOP operators, that would then proceed to specialize in

⁵¹⁴ interview UNITA colonel, January 2013, Luanda.

either wiretaps, decoding, finding patterns, or analysis. Operators were also sent with the different military units.

The 3rd area of communication was BRINDE (explained in the following section), that dealt with communication for the intelligence and security services and it had its own structure and staff. This large structure controlled thousands of people as each liberated area had their own BRINDE representation in the military regions. The 4th area was Special Operations that operated in Rundu from 1984-89. The Cuito Cuanavale offensives of 1987/88 had special communications centres that worked with the South Africans to support the troops on the ground and to collect information. This information was then passed to the SADF and airplanes were sent to destroy certain targets.

The 5th area for communications was that of the High Commander. Savimbi's office had a separate centre for transmissions that dealt only with messages for his office. It had been operational for several years but took on a more structured form in 1989/90 when it became the Division for the Transmissions of the High Commanders (*Divisão de Transmissões do Alto Commandante* (DIVITAC)). DIVITAC had 2 areas of internal communication: 1) when the president spoke to the politico-administrative structures and as commander for the military and 2) for external communication - whose operations were turned towards the issues of diplomacy and the UNITA representatives worldwide. After 1992, during the 3rd war, the communication system operated in a more limited way. While GITOP was moved to Bailundo in 1993/4, DIVITAC was taken out of Angola and operated from the Ivory Coast.

Control Mechanisms, Re-education and Justice

UNITA didn't develop a complex justice system with courts and trials like the SPLM/A that used and empowered chief's courts to ensure rural peace. It rather depended on commissions to intervene and deal with problems as they emerged. Society in Jamba and the surrounding areas was so 'controlled' that there wasn't much room for intercommunal conflict or any other social disorder to occur and threaten the stability of the liberated areas. When such episodes did occur, they were dealt with very harshly to ensure that people would remember the effects of working against the system. One such event was the Burning of the Witches episode, described later in the chapter. "If there were disputes the leadership would be consulted and they would be resolved via political dialogue and consensus. The party was the organ to resolve problems", explained a former leading commander.⁵¹⁵ The Ministry of Justice was only created in 1991 at the 7th Congress, ahead of the peace agreement, with the formal separation of civilian and military justice systems. The Legal codes were different for civilian justice and military justice. Civilian justice worked through commissions and a justice delegate that would intervene "when there were problems (...) He would invite the *sobas* and their counsellors to discuss the problem and the sentence (...) but the last word was held by the military commander of the RM for both civilians and military matters".⁵¹⁶ "People knew the laws as the party explained them to everyone and norms could not be transgressed", explained a former political commissar in the propaganda Directorate.

⁵¹⁵ interview former chief of staff, January 2013, Luanda.

⁵¹⁶ interview political commissar, February 2013, Luanda.

⁵¹⁷The police would become involved in criminal cases that fell outside the reach of these mediation mechanisms.

If people were found to have committed a crime or broken the rules that governed Jamba they would be sent to re-education camps in the Nova Aurora area. Punishment in Jamba also included jail time, or summary execution, but in other liberated areas it focused on forced labour with prisoners working on agriculture and transportation of materials. *Esquadra Piloto* was the area in Jamba where the police stations and the criminal investigation divisions were located. Some prisoners were the responsibility of the Interior Secretariat while others were of the security service. It was also in this area that the underground prison cells were located to accommodate for the political prisoners and MPLA troops that were captured.

The Brigade for National Defence, *Brigada Nacional de Defesa do Estado*, (BRINDE) was created in 1980 as UNITA's internal police and intelligence service. Until 1974 the movement had already operated with such services under the *Serviço de Segurança Geral (SSG)* that operated at the guerrilla level and controlled infiltration areas. BRINDE eventually came to coordinate hundreds of operatives under several branches of security, as per the testimony of the Director of this intelligence branch.⁵¹⁸ The department was subdivided into information areas dealing with: 1) Foreigners, 2) Prisoners of War, 3) the President and Leadership Security, 4) and Infiltration and Counter-intelligence. All these

⁵¹⁷ interview political commissar, February 2013, Luanda.

⁵¹⁸ interview BRINDE Director, February 2013, Luanda.

department areas had branches throughout the country in all RMs. “In Jamba many wanted to escape with Nzau Puna in 1991⁵¹⁹ and we needed to know who wanted to escape to prevent leaks, and denunciations. We had an independent network of security to inform on others (...) whoever revealed having doubts while abroad in the diplomatic mission would be sent here into the interior”, defended the Director of BRINDE who was tasked with averting defections.⁵²⁰

All activities were directed to ensuring that there was cohesion and loyalty and that there was no infiltration from the enemy. At the more local level, neighbourhood committees were used as control and information collection mechanisms. They had a chief, a sub-chief and a secretary for each neighbourhood and used the *Control Book* to register any anomalies that could arise within the daily activities of the community. Whatever was registered was sent to the security and intelligence services BRINDE.

In order to effectively manage information and intelligence gathering in the liberated areas, the head of BRINDE coordinated his activities with the head of Military Intelligence and the office of the Chief of Staff of the army. The Military Intelligence service (SIM) was created in 1978 and initially ran out of the Muandonga base before being transferred to Jamba. The head of SIM, General Peregrino Chindondo Wambu, was trained in South Africa, Morocco, and Western Germany. At its operational peak SIM had over 2500 staff

⁵¹⁹ Nzau Puna’s defection in 1991, following the death of UNITA Representative to the US Tito Chingunji, cost Savimbi his international image, many supporters and US support. This episode of who ordered and killed Tito is debated secretly amongst UNITA leading members and none explicitly state or deny that the order came from Savimbi.

⁵²⁰ interview BRINDE Director, February 2013, Luanda.

that detected enemy operations, produced intelligence reports and gave vital information to operational commanders. The organisation operated from 1978 until 1992 but took on a different form after the 3rd war began.

One legacy that severely damaged UNITA's external image during the 1990s was the 'Burning of the Witches' episode in Jamba. The episode occurred in 1983 where over 20 women and their children were burnt alive accused of being witches. In the run-up to their summary trial there had been episodes of wounded soldiers in the hospitals being smeared with faeces and having their medication stopped. In an environment where infiltration was avoided at all costs and where fear and doubt had no place in the imagination of the population, a trial was organised to punish those that were instigating this fear in the population and disrupting the system of harmony and safety felt in Jamba. The hearing was verbal and in the presence of the civilian population several women were called out from the crowd and thrown into the flames, together with their children. This incident was clearly one about installing fear in the population and reasserting control. It was about giving a sense of curbing the presence of any kind of enemy at the rear base.

UNITA was also known for its internal purges, in particular of high level cadres and commanders, that were killed on Savimbi's orders. Famous generals were sentenced to death and accused of treason, and these killings occurred in Jamba. If commanders or UNITA diplomats were thought to be misdirecting the cause or diverging from their mandates they would be summoned to the rear base and the party would deal with them accordingly – this could mean a military rank demotion, prison time or death. Waldemar

Chindondo, former Chief of Staff was one such commander as was Vakulukuta, who were both killed in 1984. Their bodies were buried in unmarked graves outside of Jamba's official cemetery in order to detract from any future inspiration for dissent. The assassinations of Tito Chingunji and Wilson dos Santos, and their families, in 1991 was one of the episodes that most hurt the movement's external image and caused a wave of defections from high ranking officers including the former Secretary General of the party Nzau Puna (at the time Interior Minister) and co-founder Tony da Costa Fernandes. Episodes of the death of several leaders would continue throughout the 3rd war (1992-2002) with levels of extreme paranoia and ritualistic killings.⁵²¹

"Guerrilla Democracy": Feedback Mechanisms

Forums for community engagement and feedback were held regularly throughout the liberated areas. The main forum used was the Warrior's flame meeting (*Chama do Guerilheiro*) whereby civilians, UNITA leaders and the military would meet once or twice a week to discuss community issues. These meetings were presided by the leader of the community and the objective was to allow for tensions and frustrations to be voiced. These meetings were a regular occurrence in Jamba and in all the RMs. They would begin with a recreational activity and "we'd have a dance of some sort, they could be traditional dances like Kassumbe" describes a party ideologue.⁵²² After that the political and military issues would be brought to the floor and people could express them freely. These sessions

⁵²¹ interview colonel that stayed with Savimbi until 2002, January 2012, Andulo.

⁵²² interview party ideologue, January 2013, Luanda.

had the objective of correcting wrongs and re-adjusting the pace and progress of the liberation.

The military also had a feedback mechanism where the lowest ranks were allowed to voice an opinion. The Soldiers Committee (*Comité do Soldado*) was a meeting that occurred in groups of 50 soldiers from regular forces, of 20 soldiers from semi-regular forces, and in groups of 7 from guerrilla forces. They were opportunities used to identify problems so that military discipline could prevail. It was used as a participation instrument that would allow a meeting of minds between the soldiers. “If soldiers agreed they didn’t want a certain commander Savimbi would have him removed after receiving feedback from these meetings”, explained a party ideologue.⁵²³ The President’s office would be informed of any misconduct or dissatisfaction reported during these meetings. The main policy of the leadership was that the commander had to set the example so that soldiers could follow and be held accountable. There were strict rules defined by the Disciplinary code and the punishment would suit the severity of the issue. “If one soldier was found to have taken the wife of another he would be subject to 50 whips (...) if it was an officer who had done this he would be demoted”.⁵²⁴ These committees were described as the movement’s experience with democracy in the bush where debate was encouraged. “A 4-star general could face questions from his soldiers at these sessions (...) they were political structures that had the effect of being a counter-power” explained a leading commander and former secretary general of the party.⁵²⁵

⁵²³ Ibid.

⁵²⁴ interview General from first war, January 2013, Luanda.

⁵²⁵ interview former Secretary General, January 2013, Luanda.

Cultural Events and the Performance Element

The *Pavilhão VI Congresso* (VI Congress pavilion) in Jamba was built in 1986 and was one of the areas where people would come and enjoy cultural evenings. The social activities in Jamba were aimed at creating a sense of normalcy that occurs during peace, where football matches are attended and traditional dances organised, in order to remove the constant pressure of a community living in a war environment. The *3rd of August* Stadium, named after Savimbi's date of birth, was another area where cultural and sporting activities were organised to allow for decompression of the combatants during their rest and recuperation period. The stadium had a football field and basketball courts where tournaments were organised. It also had a playground for children. "When we left the frontlines, we would come and rest, we would read, play ping pong, and football tournaments with the two teams – the Red Stars and the Black Stars", described a front commander.⁵²⁶ One of the main objectives of having these recreational activities and emulating 'normal activities' in the bases was to allow for a projection of normal life. "It allowed us to diminish the shadow of war and to believe that we would live beyond this".⁵²⁷ Other sports activities like the martial arts centre were part of this strategy.

Creating "normality"⁵²⁸ was part of a larger strategy of consolidating UNITA's world order. For normality to be effective it had to be part of a set of new symbols and devices; part of a process of "inventing tradition"; a "process of formalisation and ritualisation" in

⁵²⁶ interview UNITA General, September 2012, Bie.

⁵²⁷ interview party ideologue, January 2013, Luanda.

⁵²⁸ This phenomenon is explored by Beck, 2012.

particular when “a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which the “old” traditions had been designed”.⁵²⁹ The populating of Jamba with “deteritorialised” and uprooted communities facilitated this. The spatial and political definitions of Jamba confirm the idea that “the identity of a place emerges by the intersections of its specific involvement in a system of hierarchically organised spaces with its cultural construction as a community or locality”.⁵³⁰

Cultural events also played an important performance role for foreigners that would visit Jamba. It was during these occasions and with the reporting of such visits by journalists and foreign diplomats that helped solidify the idea of Jamba being a “theatre” of governance and formulated to project a particular image abroad. An account of a 1983 visit by Portuguese and French journalists describes how the main stadium was decorated with giant hand painted murals of the faces of UNITA’s leaders and posters with the party slogans. These giant posters also decorated the stadium with depictions of how UNITA saw the war. “Soviet-made jets bombing villages, bearded Cuban soldiers bayoneting terrified women and children, and triumphant guerrillas overrunning government positions”.⁵³¹ “At the centre of the stadium were 3 FALA platoons with their AKs (...) around the stadium are 3 thousand civilians and when Savimbi arrives they erupt into dances and singing⁵³²” Savimbi would then give a long speech and at the end there is a display of all the activities that UNITA coordinated: a truck exhibiting what was

⁵²⁹ Hobsbawm, Eric: Ranger, Terence, 1983, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, p.4-5.

⁵³⁰ Gupta, Akhil; Ferguson, James, 1997, *Culture, Power, Place. Explorations in Cultural Anthropology*, Duke University Press, p.36.

⁵³¹ Girardet, Edward, “Angola’s UNITA: guerillas...or shadow government?”, *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 June 1983.

⁵³² Barata-Feyo, Jose Manuel, 1985, “Angola: A Terra dos Robinsons”, *Grandes Reportagens*, Amigos do Livros Editores, (authors translation), p. 23.

done in agriculture with farmers “working” on a pyramid of earth; tailors using their sewing machines, mechanics repairing items, fisherman displaying their catch on fishing boats placed on top of the trucks, teachers and their students, and nurses taking the blood pressure of soldiers.

CONCLUSION

This chapter on Jamba highlights the totalitarian and utopian nature of UNITA’s parallel state. Unlike the SPLM/A that relied on strong social structures to build the basis of its state, UNITA integrated and acculturated every social force in the liberated areas. The parallel state was the motor behind society’s transformation, it was the power behind economic development, and the political direction the county was envisaged to take. UNITA’s governance in the first war was focused in more autonomous commands and smaller scale villagisation strategies coupled with the use of traditional authorities and structured political work. It progressed into centrally managed structures that focused on regulating behaviour, instilling operating procedures, and embedding the principles of disciplined work, education, and combat. Jamba was meant to demonstrate its capacity to govern. The institutional features that the Republic of the Free Lands took were similar to those of totalitarian regimes with a monistic centre of power, an official and enforceable ideology, and the mass mobilisation of the citizenry by the single party⁵³³. All this was done with the aim of legitimising UNITA as the only political alternative to govern Angola.

⁵³³ Linz, Juan, 2000, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian regimes*, Lynne Rienner, p.70.

UNITA's organisational capacity was premised on its political program. Organisation was aimed at securing logistics, 'educating' followers and fighters, and maintaining services but also coordinating the entire Republic of the Free Lands. Each Secretariat and security organ had a defined structure that followed a hierarchical chain of command and would answer to COPE. Every aspect of civilians lives and the military was controlled and regulated so that political "legitimacy" was indoctrinated into them at every juncture – at the fronts, in the rear base, within the community, and at social events. Without the political and party organisation, and the training programmes that came with this social engineering project, UNITA would not have been able to govern the free lands in the same structured way. The military presence alone would not have achieved what the movement managed in the areas of health, agriculture and education. Savimbi and his commander-leaders saw the two first wars (against the Portuguese and then the MPLA-foreign alliance) as first and foremost theatres for political combat, supported by military operations, and as a result developed the party and administrative structures required to defeat the enemy on all fronts.

After the Bicesse peace agreement was signed in 1991, Savimbi gave orders for all his 'Ministers' and thousands of cadres to begin their move to the cities and start the political campaign for the September 1992 elections. In the run-up to the peace agreement Savimbi had already begun implementing his strategy of educating his most trusted commanders in politics, economics and other disciplines that would assist them in preparing for their transformation into civilian leaders. Ministries were created to fully shadow the exiting government in Luanda and senior cadres were listed to become members of Parliament. Lower level technocrats and civilians trained in key areas needed for the reconstruction of the country were also sent to the cities. Thousands of

civilians left the bases of Kuando Kubango, returning to their original areas of the Central Highlands after almost two decades away. UNITA's leadership was convinced that they would become the ultimate rulers of Angola, elected in free and democratic polls, with the legitimising presence of the UN and the Troika (US, Portugal and Russia). This meant that after 1991 no other structures were built in Jamba and most of the leaders had left the capital of the free lands never bent on returning. Their destination was now the cities and had to begin the work of preparing themselves for an urban life, with communities that had not received the level of "political education" that allowed them to unwaveringly support UNITA, while having to begin setting up structures for future governance and the running of the political party throughout the country. When the 1992 war began, UNITA relocated all of the most strategic assets, like the VORGAN radio and the intelligence services, to the key bases of Bailundu and Andulo in the Central Highlands. The movement would adopt very different operating procedures, struggling to enact the same level of political control in diverse, urban and politically hostile populations. It focused instead on military success and by August 1993 UNITA controlled 70% of Angola.

Although the last 10 years of the war (1992-2002) were focused on military operations and less on building a parallel Angolan reality in UNITA areas, the political project that Savimbi and his commanders had led in the second war had a far-reaching impact on Angola's social fabric. UNITA's project was so intrusive on the people that had experienced it that the integration of many individuals and communities into the Angolan 2002 post-war reality was difficult. In the immediate post-war years interviews with internally displaced communities, returning refugees and ex-combatants revealed two expressions that resonated in their discourse: "we are visitors" and "this land no longer

is ours".⁵³⁴ For many, they felt estranged by the society they were now part of and did not feel represented by the state they lived under. They were stuck between the UNITA society that no longer existed and the life they were living under a political party and state that they believed reject(ed) them.⁵³⁵ "The men and women that had spent their lives with UNITA appeared like aliens in today's Angolan society".⁵³⁶ If Angolans began the second liberation war with some differences among them in regional racial and class terms they certainly had them deeply ingrained in their political and historical memory after the war. This was a direct result on the political propaganda and indoctrination programmes that both UNITA and the MPLA used for the "soul" of the nation.

⁵³⁴ These expressions came from interviews with civilians, UNITA demobilized soldiers and commanders in Moxico and Huambo provinces, April-May 2004, conducted while doing research on the return and Resettlement process for a US-based human rights organisation.

⁵³⁵ Beck, 2009:352.

⁵³⁶ Beck, 2012:118.

CHAPTER 5

The Rebel-System

UNITA and the SPLM/A in Comparative Perspective

The two previous chapters described the general features of the parallel states of the SPLM/A in Yambio and UNITA in Jamba. Structured according to differing principles, institutions, relationships and priorities, they were both aimed at military and logistical survival, political renewal and social embeddedness. Born out of moments of multipronged shocks these parallel states reveal that governance is possible during war and that it can emerge even when reform rebel movements are at their weakest points. Their very nature was a result of the ideological, leadership and organisational priorities reflected before the critical juncture but more so after the critical juncture (1991 for the SPLM/A and 1976 for UNITA) as a key feature in their survivalist strategy. The parallel state was greatly influenced by the form of the critical juncture and the threats faced which was not replicated in subsequent critical junctures that resulted in the dismantling of the parallel state as new threats and opportunities arose. These parallel states were the entry points identified to govern diverse civilian populations and institute new socio-political orders; they revealed the deepest organisational fragilities and strengths of the movements and the strategies used to transform force into authority. They also highlighted the vision of the leaders and how the political programmes were developed and applied. They were as much exercises in the expediency of power and control as they were about the symbolism of a total war front of the marginalised masses as defined and envisaged by the two movements to be governed in distinct ways. The parallel state broadened the areas for intervention to align with changing political, military, social and

economic conditions. It tilted the balance of legitimacy and perceptions of powers that went beyond the battlefields into the political and social realms. The parallel state also became the ingredient of protracted resilience that led to peace negotiations and the search for political solutions.

The SPLM/A's parallel state reflected its militarized focus, even after the critical juncture, where weak political structures allowed for civilians and local leaders to operationalize the parallel state with minimal interference from the central leadership. Its strategy focused on outsourcing service delivery and enhancing order through chief's courts while also allowing for civil society to engage in entrepreneurial activities to aid the war effort. The New Sudan challenged the power relations between civilians and the state as it devolved power to the local levels. It was a strategy that aimed to incorporate existing systems of authority into a broadly defined governing approach aimed to politically unify a diverse nation. The SPLM/A's rebel-system denotes a decentralised and minimalist parallel state that was built from the bottom up. UNITA's parallel state reflected its politicised focus of formulating a new order that indoctrinated, educated and conditioned cadres and civilians to believe they could take the reins of power. UNITA's state relied on self-sufficiency drives to manage service delivery and was an exercise in the division of labour, power and coordination at all levels. UNITA's rebel-system denotes a centralising and totalitarian parallel state that was built from the top down. It was an expansionist strategy that aimed to ensure a legacy of UNITA rule, power and influence beyond the war years. The comparison of these two cases had two common driving elements: the political control and strategies of their leaders and the ideologies/political programs that were defined as existentialist fights under the banner of a new nationalist war. While ideology and leadership were determinants of organisation and approaches to civilians

they resulted in two different approaches. The rebel-system highlights what accounts for these differences and similarities in procedural and substantive ways by linking the fundamental features that defined all the components of the parallel states.

These rebel-systems place the heterogeneity and complexity of the two movements into a structured analysis that allows for their essence to be distilled in a clearer and more coherent way. They are systems that highlight continuity and change over time; each element is not defined merely by its essence but by its relationship with other elements and the changing nature of those very inter-dependent relationships over time and in context.

This chapter compares the leadership, internal organisation, ideology and approach to civilians of UNITA and the SPLM/A. Frameworks serve the purpose to place “facts in some ordered relationship, and thus makes it possible to compare political processes between polities, without wrenching them from the context which gives them meaning”.⁵³⁷ Building on the analytical framework established in Chapter 2 where different interpretations of the characteristics of rebel movements were unpacked within the existing literature, this chapter inserts the study of UNITA and the SPLM/A within this framework to operationalise the rebel-system linkages. It begins with an analysis of the biggest multipronged “shock” that these movements experienced and how they chose to adapt and reinvent themselves. It then compares UNITA and the SPLM/A at the leadership level, their ideology and political programme, and how internal organisation

⁵³⁷ Clapham, 1976: 2.

balanced military and political interests. It ends with a brief analysis of the key features of how both approached civilians, highlighting similarities between strategies described in the Yambio and Jamba chapters.

I. Critical Junctures and Reorganisation

Understanding change, crucial choices, the transitions they catapult and the legacies they leave behind are key to identifying the resilience and composition of reform rebel structures of leadership, organisation and ideology. Both UNITA and the SPLM/A experienced crippling setbacks in multiple areas during the critical junctures identified in the preceding chapters on Yambio and Jamba. The critical juncture faced by both movements embraced the three components of 1) “a period in which elites find themselves obliged to make significant choices and take action in response to the crisis”, 2) “the choices and strategies embarked upon, which (shaped) the new arrangements, (were) understood as themselves constrained by past choices”, and 3) the “choices made and actions taken in this period (shaped) the nature of the state and state-society relations for some relatively significant time to come”.⁵³⁸ These shocks led to structural shifts that allowed for a different approach to civilians and governance. The impact of the critical junctures led these reform rebels (that had pre-existing governing strategies) to insert the idea and function of the state as an integral pillar of their survival strategy.

⁵³⁸ Villalon, Leonardo, and Huxtable, Phillip (eds), 1998, *The African State at a Critical Juncture, Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, Lynne Rienner, p. 7.

Post-critical juncture, leadership and ideology were crucially important elements that defined how the movements developed in organisational terms but also how they related to civilians. The type of setback faced and the vulnerabilities exposed during the critical junctures led these two movements to devise direct responses to strengthen their weakest organizational areas. For UNITA building military capacity was a result of the crushing military defeat in 1976 by a stronger more sophisticated army. It also led UNITA to focus on building a southern equalising force to ensure representation of its “people” by projecting a new nationalism and extensive literacy programs. For the SPLM/A the defections of 1991 and loss of rear bases for support and training led the movement to invest in building the socio-political foundations to rebuild internal support structures. It also led the movement to seek greater proximity with different communities and mobilize them on a political basis by building party structures. Both movements turned to what they described as consultative processes to recalibrate their war effort, organisation and political direction (the Long March for UNITA and Chukudum Convention for the SPLM/A).⁵³⁹ While UNITA maintained structures for recurring consultations and coordination of the three branches (party, military, administration), the SPLM/A would sustain structures for sporadic consultation, rather preferring to engage in large meetings to address specific problems. UNITAs approach revealed its centrally controlled structures while the SPLM/A revealed the locally autonomous structures but were not attached to the central command.

⁵³⁹ UNITA describes the Long March as a process that brought it closer to the people to understand their needs; it was a moment of reflection for the leadership. The SPLM/A describes Chukudum as the consultative process that brought leaders, chiefs and representatives from all regions to redefine the struggle. The first was a Maoist consultation, the second was a representative elite consultation.

In the post-critical juncture phase the SPLM/A was able to rally key constituencies under a loosely framed ideological and political project – the reconceived New Sudan vision – that allowed for greater buy-in from local communities, yet the effects of building political party structures and maintaining the assimilating military strategy would later prove centrally ineffective. In the post-critical juncture phase, UNITA almost entirely adopted a new political program, it reformulated its reformist objectives and moved to capitalize on the presence of foreign troops to launch a nationalist war (although it too had the support of foreign troops). It began to devise a total strategy that, because of its socio-cultural, political and economic nature, created deeper divisions within society. The post-critical juncture strategies defined by both movements would factor the parallel state as a key pillar of military, logistical, political and symbolic survival.

Both UNITA and the SPLM/A had the ability to resist the shocks by embracing change rather than developing similar strategies, behaviours, and operations. “Through institutional layering, actors chose not to remake existing institutional configurations, but instead add new components that bring the institution in alignment with their needs”.⁵⁴⁰ Thelen and Streeck identify 5 types of change: 1) *displacement* when one institution supersedes another, 2) *layering* when an institution takes on additional functions, 3) *drift* when the environment changes but the institution does not adapt to this change, 4) *conversion* when institutions take on new purposes, and 5) *exhaustion* when institutions fail.⁵⁴¹ In each of these 4 internal elements (leadership, ideology,

⁵⁴⁰ Mahoney, James, and Villegas, Celso, “Historical Enquiry and Comparative Politics”, in Boix, Carles, and Stokes, Susan (eds), 2007, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford University Press, p. 80.

⁵⁴¹ Thelen, Kathleen, and Streeck, Wolfgang, (eds), 2005, *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, Oxford University Press.

organisation and relations with civilians) there were traces of these types of change. Displacement occurred at the SPLM/A leadership level in 1994 when new structures were created but the military also faced an element of drift that it was unable to recover from. UNITA experienced rather different forms of layering and conversion for existing structures as it developed a complex administration structure and training programmes in Jamba. Both managed to adapt and grapple with difficult choices. What accounts for this flexibility and adaptability was the political control of the leaders and the reformulated unifying political ideology that defined the boundaries and identity of the liberation.

Leadership

Both leaders reformed their leadership and second tier command structures to ensure that they could secure hegemonic control over the liberation, they decentralised control over specific areas by striking different balances. Garang devolved power at the local level while allowing his commanders to have operational autonomy. Savimbi decentralised decision-making to the military and political leaders of the different branches, bases, and fronts. Both positioned themselves at the helm of these different levels of decentralisation with a central command structure while securing new alliances – internal and external – that allowed them to increase their political and social bases.

At a leadership level Garang had to show strength to avoid the movement's collapse; he had to motivate troops to keep fighting after huge losses; he had to decentralize areas of control to enhance the role of civilian and political leaders. He understood that the centralising and authoritarian tendencies had to be corrected if the movement was not

to fracture further and began creating forums for greater consultation leading to the first national convention of the party in 1994. While there was a level of displacement in leadership structures to allow for more collective decision-making many structural factors impeded their functioning: the lack of a central command base, the deconcentration of governance across unlinked liberated areas, and the lack of sufficient commissars and cadres to support political structures. At UNITA's leadership level, the critical juncture forced Savimbi and his officers to retreat and build the movements military capacity while formulating different political and administrative strategies. The key to this was the creation of the rear base in Jamba where leadership could train, meet and direct the war effort. Leaders from different ethnic groups were nominated to lead the three branches of the movement but this was based on political and military expediency, allegiance and skill rather than the need to balance ethnic interests. The layering experienced was aimed at ensuring efficiency and control that would sustain national rather than local and sub-national objectives. The leadership schools and training programs allowed UNITA to create a "class" of cadres and commissars that became key to operating the governing systems in the liberated areas.

Ideology

Ideological and political recalibration was aimed at securing alliances with different communities in Angola and Sudan, but was also partially aimed at external allies. Both movements aimed at correcting structural imbalances that they perceived as disenfranchising and alienating their constituencies, resulting in new nationalist rhetoric that would inform their political programs. Ideologically for the SPLM/A, the shift towards incorporating broader possibilities for self-determination had to be framed in a

way that would not expose deep contradictions within the vision of the New Sudan (that had called for a united country) and still carry a message that would rally people all over the country. As the political structures of the movement were developing, the need to simplify the message and teach it in the liberated areas emerged. While the movement had fought in a relatively ideological vacuum in the first decade it would, after the critical juncture, explain its ambitions in ways that were translatable to different constituencies and provided solutions to real concerns. Garang understood that new alliances were necessary and that ideological inclinations had to be revised. The SPLM/A shed its Marxist mantle and began adopting more liberal principles, that like UNITA developed into a form of ideological hybridity.⁵⁴² The SPLM/A strategically fashioned itself to become a partner that international donors could work with, adopting a more instrumental approach to NGOs and the UN.

At an ideological level UNITA, had to justify the continuation of the war after the country was independent. The movement developed a political programme that sought change beyond the current foreign alliances of the MPLA and repackaged the idea of the Angolan nation in need of a “real” independence. Savimbi became more pragmatic with his alliances, more so than his collaboration years earlier with the Portuguese against the MPLA, and sought an alliance with apartheid South Africa.⁵⁴³ This alliance would be very politically costly for UNITA. Savimbi also understood the role UNITA could play as a pawn of Cold War politics, portraying the movement as an ally in containing the spread of

⁵⁴² Ideological hybridity is used here as a way of explaining how both movements put together self-styled ideologies using multiple ideas and sources.

⁵⁴³ UNITA had collaborated with the Portuguese since 1972; identifying the MPLA as the biggest obstacle to peace and revealing the locations of its bases. “An Explosive document Angola: The long-standing treachery of UNITA”, published in *Afrique-Asie* 61, July 1974

communism in the region. However, both movements understood the polarity of ideology of having to please several audiences and compromising on the purity of political action. They chose to pillar their political programs on ideational, historical and aspirational elements of the communities they deemed to represent and integrated these with ideological hybridity. Ideologically and programmatically, the principles of liberation and the “people” both movements deemed to represent did not change in the post-critical juncture.

Organisation

Organisational structures had to be flexible enough to sustain the impact of loss of fighting capacity and weapons, resources and external assistance, but strong enough to retain command and control of troops and commanders. Both movements defined a three-pronged approach to the liberation that combined the party with administration and the military. Organisational development had to “accompany the escalation of violence”⁵⁴⁴ but also had to provide responses to the defeats experienced. The SPLM/A organised around military structures until the complexity of the war enhanced political and social fragmentation within the southern resistance that required stronger and more inclusive strategies to incorporate civilians and chiefs into the political structures. The military had to recalibrate its conduct and war ethos. This would be counter-intuitive for many mid-level commanders and the rank and file that had grown accustomed to governing by coercion and self-reward. Fighters were to become administrators working parallel to civilian leaders and traditional authorities without any political training. Yet,

⁵⁴⁴ O’Neill, 1990:94

the separation of civilian/political and military authority was never fully achieved for the SPLM/A. The level of drift experienced was a result of weak political tools to alter the behavioural DNA of the military. This implied having to confront many contradictions; it meant building political structures that the leadership had initially rejected, and taking the liberation to the local and sub-national level to rally communities and govern them using untested and ungrounded political tools. This led the movement to outsource governance to existing local structures and to instrumentalize aid agencies as service providers.

At the organisational level, UNITA formulated a complex multi-tiered organisation that coordinated all the facets of war and governance, while socially engineering an army of fighters, cadres and a social base of civilian support. It continued organising around political structures but focused on building the necessary military capacity to move beyond the guerrilla warfare stage. All structures were seeped into politics and the justification for the war; the party became the nation for the citizens of the Free lands of Angola. UNITA built a rear base that allowed for military training and the development of stable logistics and information systems; skills training and education programmes. Propaganda and political indoctrination tools would become very important. The three branches of the movement – military, party and administration- became coordinated and structured in ways that allowed for the reproduction of institutions in all the liberated areas. The conversion experienced was a function of the ambition of UNITA to govern Angola but also the expansionist strategy to conquer territory, establishing governance and securing support in order to keep conquering areas and transforming society along the way.

Both movements developed the initial tools and structures they had prioritised at inception. They added structures but didn't alter the fundamental driving forces and ethos of the organisations: the SPLM/A remained militarised and UNITA was guided by the political wing. They both understood that in order to compensate for material and other shortcomings they had to build a triad of self-reinforcing organs that would widen the scope of participants and entrench their vision/strategies at the local levels. UNITA developed the triad of administration, party and military. The SPLM/A developed the triad of military, party and 3-branch government. Militarily both movements developed their forces only as much as they needed in order to contain government forces and attempt to create a balance of forces.

As a result of these recalibrated responses the creation of a parallel state emerged, and by extension relations with civilians, became one of the centre pieces of the war strategy for both movements. Fundamentally though neither movement radically altered the guiding principles and driving forces at the leadership, ideological and organisational levels. They retained the core characteristics throughout but developed programs and objectives further to address their weakest aspects. This facilitated deeper social and political engagement with different constituencies, secured recruitment and rebuilt military capacity. At each juncture of these recalibrated relationships and institutions, greater insight was provided to the way UNITA and the SPLM/A governed their parallel state. The following sections will operationalise the analytical framework placing the history of both movements, the testimonies collected, and the features of the parallel state into different sub-sections (as per the analytical framework table in chapter 2). Each

section highlights the dynamics and features that drove the internal elements, which in turn found expression in the conception and operation of the parallel state.

II. Leadership

The leadership of reform rebels is key to understanding their parallel states. The decision to establish different types of governing strategies and institutions are defined by the leaders of the movements and reflect their biases, prejudices and personal experiences. The following section contextualises the emergence of John Garang de Mabior and Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, what influenced their decisions and defined initial strategies. Both understood that in order to wage a successful rebellion they needed a unified command where rival groups or communities would agree to subordinate their interests to align with the overall interests of the movement. For the SPLM/A this meant adopting a military structure; for UNITA it meant a political party structure.

Savimbi and Garang led two complex rebellions and survived several internal and external threats. Factionalism, dissent, asymmetrical warfare, loss of external patrons, diplomatic pressure, among others, were challenges that led to tailored responses and strategies to survive at an organisational and capacity level. Given the centralising nature of their leadership the decisions of military importance, political strategy, the day to day administration of war, governing the liberated areas, and managing resources fell on them. They were the commanders in chief of their armies and the political leaders of their movements. It was their ability to maintain political control of the struggle that assisted the movements in mobilising support and develop the structures for war (military, training, communications, diplomacy, management of resources, logistics, and

administration). Their capacity to determine the political vision of the movement and alter it when necessary to gather international support while projecting a war of visions and societies was also key. Both Garang and Savimbi wanted to be recognised as ‘sovereign presidents’⁵⁴⁵ that unlike warlords or other rebel leaders that aimed at seizing power, they wanted to be seen as the legitimate representatives of their people who they defended. They both sustained the necessary exoteric appeals⁵⁴⁶ by interpreting existing grievances, enhancing them and popularising them in ways that their constituents would embrace as their own and seek remedy. Both Garang and Savimbi had to be flexible enough to reformulate a political message that retained the reformist contours but differentiated itself from the other liberation movements during the second liberation. The SPLM-Nasir and the MPLA had the capacity to upstage them through their own political messages and nationalist appeals.

These two leaders stand out for their unmeasured ambition to achieve something visible of “revolutionary and reformist” proportions; for their drive and tenacity to find solutions at all junctures; for their self-confidence to carry important unpopular decisions; and for their realist perspectives of what was required and possible so that responses were aligned with shifting opportunities. These were key to allowing UNITA and the SPLM/A to wage decades of war and create their parallel states. The study of leadership highlights the important formative lessons that allowed these movements to take their shape and

⁵⁴⁵ Johnson, Patrick, “The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil Wars: Evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone”, *Security Studies* 17:1, 2008, p. 120.

⁵⁴⁶ O’Neill, 1990:77.

organisational structures. It also reveals how ideology and political programmes were reflected in history and the interpretation of society and politics by Savimbi and Garang.

1.1 Characteristics of the Founding Leader

While Garang and Savimbi fit the 'charismatic leader' conception that motivated followers to commit to the cause and organisation and sacrifice their own interests for the interests of the movement. their complexity was enhanced and impacted by the wars they fought, the social cleavages they experienced, and the difficulties felt within their own movements. Garang was described as a highly intelligent and charismatic man, a natural leader that was humble yet unrelenting in his determination to dismantle the regime in Khartoum.⁵⁴⁷ Garang is said to have been "a man who had always known how to juggle a stone and an egg without losing sight on either".⁵⁴⁸ He was one of the few Sudanese politicians who was able to rally significant support for a unified country.⁵⁴⁹ His strategic alliances with Northern opposition parties, and his understanding of power dynamics in Khartoum, made him a national threat to the Sudanese government. However, his critics described him as indecisive, authoritarian and incapable of dealing away effectively with his enemies preferring to incarcerate them due to concerns of international condemnation.⁵⁵⁰ Garang's leadership was key in leading several military and diplomatic victories. His death in 2005 and subsequent developments in the SPLM/A show that he had a unique way of balancing difficult decisions and power struggles.

⁵⁴⁷ These testimonies were gathered in Sudan, South Africa, and Kenya by diplomats and SPLM/A leaders, from 2008 to 2012 in the context of prior work and during the research.

⁵⁴⁸ Waihenya, Waitaka, 2006, *The Mediator*, Kenway Publications p. 69.

⁵⁴⁹ LeRiche, Matthew, and Arnold, Matthew, 2012, *South Sudan From Revolution to Independence*, Hurst, p 41.

⁵⁵⁰ US House Committee on Foreign Affairs report, 1993.

Under a new leader the SPLM/A would, by default of the peace agreement, succeed in achieving independence but would collapse internally leading to a war of genocidal proportions in 2016.⁵⁵¹

Savimbi was described as being a man of exceptional intelligence, whose public speaking ability led many to follow him unconditionally.⁵⁵² “It did not matter what (Savimbi) said just as long as he spoke – telling them what to do, how to do it and how long it would take. They would follow”.⁵⁵³ His commanders admired his self-discipline, organisational capacity, and relentlessness. He was described as “that rare coincidence of history, a throwback to the great tribal leaders of Africa – Tchaka Zulu, Msiri, and Jomo Kenyatta”.⁵⁵⁴ He prided himself in his African roots and traditional culture speaking several Angolan languages. Those that accompanied his many stages of political and nationalistic development point to how he truly did believe in transforming Angola. This image rapidly changed in the 1990s partly due to testimonies of UNITA leaders that defected and enhanced MPLA propaganda with descriptions of Savimbi’s violence, but largely due to his own mismanagement of dissent and the war crimes he committed. “Savimbi did not die in 2002, he died in 1992 when the electoral process failed. From then onwards he stopped believing and no longer had a political program”, explained a former general that stayed with him until 2002.⁵⁵⁵ The war Savimbi staged from 1992-2002 was

⁵⁵¹ The term ‘genocide’ was used to describe the war of July 2016 by the UN Human Rights Commission.

⁵⁵² Interviews with numerous Portuguese and Angolan intellectuals and politicians who were core supporters of UNITA, Lisbon and Luanda, 2004-2008.

⁵⁵³ US Journalist, Leon Dash quoted in Burke, Robert, “UNITA: A Case study in Modern Insurgency”, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, April 1984.

⁵⁵⁴ quote by John Stockwell former top CIA agent in Angola, in Bridgland, 1987:15.

⁵⁵⁵ interview, former UNITA General, January 2013, Luanda.

purely destructive, revealing his intense paranoia and psychosis.⁵⁵⁶ Under a new leader since 2002, UNITA would work hard to sanitise its war image and have to slowly rebuild confidence with key constituencies, but would fail to provide the necessary accountability to MPLA misrule in the post-war period.

Savimbi and Garang's leadership traits were essentially different but for the purpose of reform rebellions they shared several common characteristics. They 1) formulated the vision and manipulated grievances while enhancing sub-national cleavages for political mobilisation and managed to create a new nationalist platform; 2) were capable of persuading, and tailoring language and messages accordingly, to rally civilians, local leaders, the diaspora, and intellectuals from diverse communities 3) sustained contradictory alliances and incorporated political principles to reflect the plurality of internal and external audiences; 4) tailored organisational responses to address key shortcomings during the war through military and political skill and strategy; 5) never lost the political control of the liberation despite dissent and fragmentation.

III Experience from Previous movements and Peace Agreements

The historical context within which these two leaders emerged is crucial. Their personal histories are naturally intertwined with the history of their country, perpetuating a sense of grievance and injustice requiring a collective response. Both Garang and Savimbi established their liberation movements in a context of existing movements that were in principle fighting a version of the same cause. Upon graduating from the US in 1971

⁵⁵⁶ interview US diplomat stationed in Angola in the 1990s, April 2015, Washington.

Garang returned to Sudan and joined the Anyanya I movement for a short period as the peace agreement was signed a year later. For Garang Anyanya I had played an important role in the resistance to Arab domination but failed to impose change on how Khartoum dealt with the south. The political wrangling and bickering of the political elites and how they lost control of leading the South due to negotiating weakness and lack of strategic thinking, led the SPLM/A to disregard any initial internal calls of democratisation, collective decision-making and political discussions in favour of a disciplined and structured military command. In the 1983 Manifesto, the shortcomings of Anyanya I were highlighted, accusing it of implementing 'fake governments, complete with its Western-type cabinet' comprised of a bourgeoisified southern bureaucratic elite. The perceived leadership inefficiency sustained by the dual command of the political party and the Anyanya military arm that were headed by different people, led Garang to amalgamate power to avoid contradictions. He became the commander in Chief and Chairman of the movement.

Disillusionment with how the anti-colonial struggle was being waged by existing movements also impacted Savimbi who criticized the MPLA and FNLA for having their leadership based in either Congo Brazzaville or Kinshasa. He believed the leadership of any liberation struggle had to be on the front lines and this led UNITA to lead its liberation from inside the country. Although his initial sympathies had turned towards the 'progressive' MPLA, Savimbi nevertheless joined Holden Roberto's União das Populações de Angola (UPA) (later renamed FNLA) in 1961 and became the Secretary General of the movement and later its Foreign Minister in the GRAE (government in exile). Savimbi became disillusioned with UPA's approach to the liberation struggle despite its claiming very similar ideological stances that UNITA would adopt. Its capitalist pro-Western

stance would contrast with the MPLA's Marxist orientation, even though the latter would only become explicit after independence in the mid-1970s. However, Savimbi openly disagreed with Roberto's "tribalistic leadership" at an OAU meeting in 1964 where he accused Roberto of incompetence and corruption. He would also criticize the MPLA for failing to be more inclusive. In particular, the Ovimbundu, Savimbi's own ethnic group and the largest in Angola, did not have a political force to represent their aspirations.⁵⁵⁷ He would build alliances that would bring the Ovimbundu, Chokwe and other smaller ethnic groups under one movement. Both Garang and Savimbi took the negative example of the previous movements to craft new "improved" strategies but also defined the universe of their liberations differently to the previous movements: Garang's constituents would include all the Sudanese not just southerners; Savimbi's constituents would include the "totality" of Angolans not just the southerners of the central highlands.

The experience of failed peace agreements would also impact these leaders. The failure of the Addis Ababa agreement and Khartoum's continuous violations would impact Garang and the SPLM/A. In January 1972 Garang wrote to Anyanya I leader Joseph Lagu suggesting the necessary conditions and strategy for the talks with Khartoum including the condition of having two armies and two administrations, and alerting to the failure of constitutional guarantees against the "barbarities of Arab nationalism and chauvinism". Blame for the failure of the peace agreement was assigned to President Nimeiri's abrogation of key provisions, the imposition of Sharia law, the mismanaged integration of forces, and the dividing of the south into three regions. But blame was also assigned to

⁵⁵⁷ James III, 1992:89.

the politicians of South whose divisionary and factionalist manoeuvres became self-defeating.

Unlike Garang, who didn't play a formal role in negotiating the Addis Ababa agreement, Savimbi was very committed to securing the political outcome of the 1975 Alvor Agreement. He believed in the possibility of the Agreement securing UNITA's political role in independent Angola. Although all three movements began implementation in early 1975, the accords did not prevent the FNLA and later the MPLA from making military moves to take power. Fighting would continue and the MPLA's request for additional support led to mass inflows of Soviet aid and hardware, as well as Cuban troop reinforcements that, by 1976, reached between 10-14,000.⁵⁵⁸ In a publication issued by UNITA's observer mission to the UN in February 1976⁵⁵⁹, the movement identifies the difficulties faced by the 1975 Transitional government: 1) the lack of a national army and police to maintain public order, 2) the administrative inexperience of the members of government and the impact of partisan politics, 3) Portugal was clearly favoring one side.

Both Garang and Savimbi would use these lessons from previously failed processes to inform their negotiating positions in future peace agreements. That was why the 2005 CPA saw two standing armies and two separate administrations during the transition in Sudan. For UNITA the lack of an integrated security apparatus in 1975 was corrected by the creation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) as a result of the 1991 Bicesse peace

⁵⁵⁸ Marcum, 1978:273.

⁵⁵⁹ "UNITA The People's Struggle Until Victory", published by Norman Bethune Institute.

agreement. UNITA also worked to counter the unpreparedness of the cadres to partake in administrative positions in government. The previous wars, the movements fighting them, and the resulting peace agreements would inform in very direct ways the manner and form of UNITA and the SPLM/A.

I.III Founding the movement and Structuring the Leadership

The way these two leaders came to head these movements was very different. UNITA was founded in the Chokwe village of Muangai in Angola in March 1966, through a consultative process that began in Zambia and among different Angolan elites. At inception UNITA elected a Central Committee and adopted a constitution. The SPLM/A was founded in mid-1983 in the Gambella region of Ethiopia operating with provisional structures later to be replaced by a military high command. While Savimbi was behind the idea of UNITA and rallied support inside and outside Angola with key constituencies and leaders, Garang secured his position following a leadership dispute moderated by the Ethiopians. As early as 1975 the Derg began to politically organise refugees in Gambella and Addis Ababa in what became known as “project 07” of the Defense Ministry, that assisted in the formation of the SPLM/A.⁵⁶⁰ Mengistu’s regime was fundamental to the SPLM/A’s initial formation and survival by arming the movement directly, by providing it with the rear bases and training camps, and curbing dissent. While Garang had sustained contact with the different groups opposing the Addis agreement in the 1970s, there were other more senior contenders from the Anyanya I movement that were positioning themselves for the chairman role. Garang’s task was to organise and structure

⁵⁶⁰ Yihun, Belete Belachew, “Ethiopia’s role in South Sudan’s March to Independence 1955-1991”, *African Studies Quarterly* 14:1, November 2013, p. 41.

a movement that would join several existing groups mobilising for war.⁵⁶¹ It took over five months of leadership negotiations in Ethiopia before the SPLM/A was formed.

While UNITA began as a small group that did not dispute Savimbi's leadership, Garang had to contend with a divided leadership that would throughout the war challenge his authority and cause deep rifts in the attempt to create a united front. He fought several movements and militias throughout the war, leading to continuous negotiation and incorporation of existing rebel groups. Garang more so than Savimbi would have to contend with the fact that the "organisation was not built from a clean slate; instead, it reflected the terrain of collective action available to leaders"⁵⁶², many of which had previous experience in the wars of the 1960s, in government and parliament, and as founders of Anyanya I and II. Savimbi would face different constraints as the two other liberation movements were already spearheading the anti-colonial struggle. He had to balance different interests while also developing a political agenda that would differ from that of the FNLA and the MPLA. It was a difficult proposition given that his predecessors in the MPLA and FNLA already had backing from several African countries, had the military experience that he would have to contest, and had contrasting political messages inside which he would have to reposition his new movement.

⁵⁶¹ These included the National Action Movement (NAM) led by Akwot Atem de Mayen, Joseph Oduho and Samuel Gai Tut, the Anyanya Absorbed Forces Undergorund Movement, the Juwama African People's Organisation, the Council for the Unity of Southern Sudan, and the Movement for the Total Liberation of South Sudan led by Equatorian dissidents.

⁵⁶² Staniland, 2014:78.

Structuring the command of the movement was difficult and both leaders had to compromise with key commanders, many of whom would later be side-lined and purged. In August 1983 Garang was elected Chairman and commander in Chief of the SPLM/A at Itang camp, where he structured a Provisional Executive Committee (PEC). The PEC had been comprised of several committees dealing separately with the military, administration, justice, finance, political and foreign affairs. It was meant to lead the revolutionary movement in mobilising the population and determining the politico-military strategy of the war. However, the PEC ran into several difficulties with internal power struggles in 1985, effectively ending the role played by the organ that contained a more multifaceted function and could have taken the lead in developing the party and administrative structures during the 1980s. Instead the leadership became structured around military seniority.

The Political-Military High Command (PMHC), that replaced the PEC, was comprised of the five SPLM/A founding members Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, appointed Deputy Chairman and Deputy Commander in Chief, William Nyoun Bany as the Chief of General Staff (CoS), Salva Kiir Mayardit as Deputy CoS for security and military operations, Arok Thon Arok as deputy CoS for Administration and logistics.⁵⁶³ The only two politicians of the PEC, Joseph Oduho and Martin Majier, were no longer part of the leadership when the PMHC was formed, making it a command structure comprised only of soldiers that ran all non-military affairs with the same ethos and hierarchy.⁵⁶⁴ The difficulty of managing the

⁵⁶³ Arop Madut Arop, 2008.

⁵⁶⁴ Oduhu, who had been the President of SANU in the 1960s had become the Chairman of the Political and Foreign Affairs Committee of the PEC. Majier, had been in charge of Legal and Administrative affairs. Both were imprisoned from 1985 to 1992.

different issues of seniority, political ambitions, and contrasting interests would lead the movement to align continuously on military hierarchy and seniority of the founding members even after independence in 2011. This was reflected in the way the first governing strategy of the CMA was conceived and managed. As seen in the Yambio chapter even the chiefs were given military ranks and incorporated in to the command structures. Only after 1991 when the need emerged did more collective decision-making processes secured by political imperatives begin to structure relationships in the liberated areas.

Savimbi's quest to begin a third front of the liberation in Angola would bring him to unite a group of several organisations represented in Zambia in the early 1960s. The new nationalist unit would draw upon three constituencies: the defectors from the FNLA whose group was led by José Kalundungo and became part of the 'Amangolans'⁵⁶⁵ an Ovimbundu Congo-based association; a student union Uniao Nacional de Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA) group led by Jorge Valentim; and several leaders based in Zambia from Chokwe, Lwena and Luchazu groups that were organised as self-help organisations.⁵⁶⁶ As the group of activists entered Angola in 1966, UNITA became the only liberation movement to have its leadership operating within Angola. UNITA claimed its distinctiveness also on the basis that it sought to represent ethnic groups that did not find direct expression in the FNLA (whose leaders and followers came from northern Bakongo provinces) or the MPLA (that was composed of urban elites, *mestiços*,

⁵⁶⁵ The Amigos do Manifesto Angolano (Amangola) called upon Angolans to return to the country and mobilize for guerrilla warfare.

⁵⁶⁶ Martin James III, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974-1990*, 2011, Transaction Publishers, p. 89.

assimilados, and Kimbundu-speaking constituencies). UNITA claimed to represent the ‘Total’ union of Angolans and in particular the Ovimbundu masses of the central highlands, the Chokwe, Ovambo, Ganguela and other groups of eastern Angola. Savimbi’s difficulty was in mobilising diverse groups and placing them in a coherent organisation, it was not a leadership dispute that led him to structure the commands the way Garang was forced to. In this way Savimbi faced a constituency issue and Garang a command issue, which are both tied to the difficulty of overcoming problems due to disparate causes and interests.

Both movements developed the hierarchical structures necessary to allow for effective control, mobilisation of resources, military operations, integrated strategies, flow of information and logistical support. The aim was to “reduce the resources that must be expended on managerial monitoring and supervision”.⁵⁶⁷ This dual strategy to centralize and decentralize authority was employed at different levels. Both UNITA and the SPLM/A divided their leaders to cover different military areas and manage other additional portfolios. Priority was given to placing trusted senior commanders in the different fronts and military regions and only then distributing other roles and responsibilities which would develop the initial structures of command. UNITA’s co-founders⁵⁶⁸ were selected to run these areas following the hierarchy of 1) the military FALA that would have a Supreme commander, a chief of staff, regional chiefs of staff, district commands, military

⁵⁶⁷ Weinstein, 2007:134.

⁵⁶⁸ These included Joao Jose Liahuka, Tony da Costa Fernandes, David Jonatao Chingunji, Miguel Nzau Puna, Ernesto Joaquim Mulato, Alexandre Magno Chinguto, Pedro Paulino Moises, Jose Kalundungu, Jacob Hossi Inacio, Nicolau Biago Tchiuka, Isaias Mussumba, Mateus Bandua, Samuel Chivava Muanangola, Tiago Sachilombo, and Jeremis Kussia Nundu, the commanders of region 5 Smanuel Chiwale and region 6 Kolungu. Chiwale, 2008:99-101.

councils and the village forces; 2) at the party level it had a congress, 12-member political bureau, 25-member central committee with councils all the way to the village level as of 1969; 3) and the administrative structures defined at a national, provincial, district, council and village levels.⁵⁶⁹

After Jamba was fully functional in the early 1980s the three areas were united in a more coherent structure. In 1987, the leadership was restructured at 3 levels: into a) strategic organ that dealt with the politics of the revolution the *Commando Operacional Estrategico* (COPE), into b) the political commission that approved strategies and c) a commission that implemented decisions and deliberations. COPE was the main strategic and operational command structure that brought together the military, the party and administration. Members of COPE included all the senior leaders of these branches, including intelligence agencies, who were there “to help complete and advise Jonas Savimbi”.⁵⁷⁰ There were also two separate COPE structures in the north and in the south of Angola that the office of the Chief of Staff followed closely.

Garang would also build on the initial founders and enlarge the High Command structures, both as a necessity because the war was expanding to different areas but also to develop further the representation of different communities. In early 1986, 10 additional senior officers were appointed to the PMHC as alternate members (that had no veto power).⁵⁷¹ They were vitally important at the operational level but were not

⁵⁶⁹ Chiwale, 2008:99.

⁵⁷⁰ interview key commander and COPE member, September 2012, Luanda.

⁵⁷¹ These included Nyachugak Nyachiluk, Riek Machar Teny, James Wannu Igga, Yusif Kuwa Mekki, Kuol Manyang, Martin Manyiel Ayeul, Lual Ding Wuol, Daniel Awet, Gordon Koang Chol, and Gelario Modi.

decisive for strategic decision-making. The enlargement of the PMHC was meant to have it function as a council and parliament that would draft the movement's laws, would decide on deployments of military commanders, operations and dealing with humanitarian organisations.⁵⁷² Each of its members would lead operations and administer the liberated areas under their areas of operation. Yet the enlarged PMHC did not have the same coordinating capacity that COPE had for UNITA. It continued to embody the same structural challenges given that the PMHC was the political party, the administration command, the military and the judiciary with a little understanding of separation of powers.

The SPLM/A's command structures were described as blending "autocratic control with an anarchic reactionary system premised on continual negotiation between Garang and the movement's upper echelons".⁵⁷³ The central command structures did not operate as forums to meet and discuss operations, to monitor success and redirect strategies where they had failed. Garang as a result retained the centralising authority, despite the challenges of controlling a vast territory, lacking proper communication systems, even when the "importance of local cultures and tribal units conspire(d) against his ability to micro-manage".⁵⁷⁴ Garang also needed to retain control, allegiance and direction of the commanders on the ground. Mechanisms for coordination and collective decision-making were as a result operating on different levels: at the local level it was achieved through the cohesion of units under different commanders, and was achieved at the

⁵⁷² Mach Guarak, 2011:206.

⁵⁷³ LeRiche and Arnold, 2012:41.

⁵⁷⁴ Young, 2003:426.

national level through Garang and not the PMHC. The ad hoc nature of the PMHC, that seldom met and was aimed at military rather than political decisions meant that these were hardly a blueprint for governance structures in the liberated areas. The structures in Yambio took specific forms through interactions of governance with chiefs, civilian engagement, and the creations of political local structures (the liberation councils) rather than being applied as defined and reproducible institutions in all the SPLM/A liberated areas. In contrast, the structures in Jamba were created with the aim of being replicated at all levels of the liberated areas as they were based on standards of operation, with defined hierarchies and reporting systems. The centrality of leadership structures and their ability to command all other areas of operation were reflected in the administrative capacity and design of the institutions of the parallel state. In Yambio the central command had a tenuous influence on administration; in Jamba and other liberated areas it was the ultimate authority.

Ethnicity and Balancing interests

In stratified countries like Angola and Sudan where communities lived relatively isolated existences and had few intersections to build an inclusive nationalist sentiment, the management of ethnicity and regionalism would be crucial for the development of both movements. Both UNITA and the SPLM/A managed these cleavages enough to ensure military cohesion and success but they did not manage them sufficiently to create strong political platforms to contain ethnic and community shocks by rival commanders; or in building consensus across regions during peacetime politics. Both movements had to contend with several delicate balances. Criticism emerged that these movements, despite their nationalist appeal, were predominantly dominated by the ethnic group of their

leaders. The SPLM/A was accused of being a Dinka dominated organisation; UNITA was seen as a predominately Ovimbundu organisation. Both Garang and Savimbi understood that they needed to empower commanders and political leaders from different regions and ethnic groups to secure the support of their constituencies and fighters. They also knew that retaining control of civilian populations in liberated areas required the inclusion and empowerment of local leaders. Yet, they would continue to be criticized for their overdependence of recruits and commanders from their respective ethnic and regional strongholds.

Although the leadership disputes faced by Garang in Ethiopia were not based on ethnic divisions among the Nuer and the Dinka but on the ideological issue of unity or secession⁵⁷⁵, the first year of the movement was spent trying to neutralize the threat posed by two leadership contenders Akuot Atem and Samuel Gait Tut of Anyanya II.⁵⁷⁶ When Atem and Gai Tut were killed in 1984 their rebellion was taken over by William Abdallah Cuol who led an entirely Nuer force.⁵⁷⁷ The Dinka-Nuer fault line would worsen after the 1991 split where the 2 factions encouraged Nuer and Dinka civilians to attack each other.⁵⁷⁸ "Initially, the [Dinka] refugees from Upper Nile and Bhar El Ghazal considered themselves to be the proud owners of the SPLM/A. The few of us from Equatoria who identified with the movement were considered mere 'supporters' or 'sympathizers'".⁵⁷⁹ Many Equatorians were initially sceptical about the objectives of the movement, seeing it rather as a tribal organisation aimed at restoring Nilotic domination.

⁵⁷⁵ Johnson, 2003:65.

⁵⁷⁶ Johnson and Prunier 1993:126.

⁵⁷⁷ Johnson, 2003:66.

⁵⁷⁸ *ibid*, p. 114.

⁵⁷⁹ Wondu, 2011:144.

Several communities and groups took up arms against it over land and boundaries, while others were armed and instrumentalized as tribal militias by successive regimes in Khartoum that armed the Murle of Pibor and the Mundari of Terekeka as anti-Dinka militias.⁵⁸⁰ While Sudan enhanced ethnic fault lines, the Angolan government chose to weaken UNITA with other political and military tools rather than ethnically fragmenting its constituent base. The war strategies of the enemy would therefore also impact how different interests were balanced at the leadership level and within the organisations. Both Savimbi and Garang had to provide responses to the counter-insurgency strategies of the enemy forces.

The accentuation of these localized and ethnic counter responses to the SPLM/A would pose a multitude of challenges during the 22 years of war. Initially, Garang was able to strategically bring in several other groups. Elements of Anyanya II like the Upper Nile units, commanded by Captain Oyay Deng Ajak and Captain John Kulang Pot joined the SPLM/A in October 1983. Anyanya II groups operating in Bahr El-Ghazal and other young recruits from Eastern Equatoria also joined at that time.⁵⁸¹ The SPLM/A continuously absorbed forces from different militia groups and armed movements, which contributed to the difficulties of maintaining a unified command and structured movement. One of the most strategic decisions was to incorporate the different local zonal commanders, from the Nuba Mountains (Yusuf Kuwa), the Blue Nile (Malik Agar), Darfur (Daud Bollad) and Western Bahr El Ghazal (Daniel Aweit), to expand its operations and give the

⁵⁸⁰ Johnson and Prunier, 1993:130.

⁵⁸¹ Malok 2009: 146-147.

movement a truly national character.⁵⁸² By the late 1980s, the SPLM/A had secured a base in Eastern Equatoria, which meant that it “could move beyond the Nilotic heartland (...) it also demonstrated that they could move, albeit tentatively, beyond the North-South border, and expand the war”.⁵⁸³ In fact, it was the fighters from the Nuba mountains and Abyei that were instrumental in liberating Yambio.⁵⁸⁴ To counter the perceptions of a Dinka army, Garang placed Brigadier Samuel Abu John, a Zande, in the leading position of governor of the greater Equatorian region that brought assurances to the people in Yambio. Despite this and efforts at the local administrative and military level to empower local commanders, the movement would still carry the Dinka label. The Leadership Council of the SPLM/A had in the post-1991 split seven Dinka members and six members from other communities. The issue was not the overrepresentation of one group but the fact that the SPLM/A did little to fully embrace other groups.⁵⁸⁵ Yet at the local level the SPLM/A instinctively allowed the ‘sons and daughters’ of their areas to take the political and administrative control of the liberated areas, which allowed it to accumulate significant nationalist political capital.

Savimbi also understood the constraints faced of uniting disparate groups and initially opted to allow representation of different communities in the leadership. When this proved to be ineffective he centred his commanders, political and administrative leaders around him in a tightly controlled and defined structure that coordinated all their operations, kept them in check but also managed to motivate them. He used these

⁵⁸² Johnson, 1998, p. 61.

⁵⁸³ Johnson and Prunier, 1993:135.

⁵⁸⁴ interviews with commanders that liberated Yambio, February 2012, Juba.

⁵⁸⁵ Young, John, “Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias and Peace”, *Review of African Political Economy* 97, 2003, p. 425.

structures to extend control to the local levels by empowering local leaders and placing military commanders from the area to ensure effective coordination. Savimbi was concerned with erasing the localisms of communities to forge a nation, much like Garang was, but unlike Garang, who failed due to weak political structures, Savimbi managed to subvert local interests to advance his political objectives. This was a strategy of layering command structures where all were absorbed into a defined political 'world order'.

Although the support base of UNITA had an ethno-linguistic regional nature (southern and eastern Angola), it projected itself as a nationalist movement. Yet it would struggle to get mass support from the constituencies the FNLA and the MPLA rallied. As a direct response to the perceived Bakongo "tribalism" of the FNLA, UNITA initially decided to appoint 3 vice-presidents (VP) of different ethnic groups. The idea at the time was to achieve ethnic balance and have the Chokwe, who were the majority of the supporters in 1966, play a key role. "The 1st VP was Smart Chata who was a Chokwe, the 2nd was Salomon Njolomba a Chivale from Bazombo, the 3rd was Moises Muliata a Banda from the Lundas; these leaders were given these roles also because they had already formed "proto-political organisations".⁵⁸⁶ "In 1968 at the 2nd party congress the party ends this VP situation because only Chata wanted to fight in the interior (...) we couldn't have figureheads that did nothing", explained a UNITA founder and commander of the first war.⁵⁸⁷ However, other testimonies from UNITA leaders show that the party had begun to divide itself into ethnic factions during these two years, in particular while Savimbi was in Cairo under arrest for 9 months. Upon his return in mid-1968, Savimbi found the

⁵⁸⁶ interview UNITA General from first war, January 2013, Luanda.

⁵⁸⁷ interview UNITA founder, January 2013, Luanda.

movement divided into groups of combatants led by Samuel Chiwale, Paulino Moises and Samuel Kafundanga Chingunji.⁵⁸⁸ He would face the difficulty of having to reorganise his movement and assert his authority after having his leadership challenged.

At the second congress in 1969 Savimbi placed a Cabindan, Miguel N'zau Puna, as the Secretary General and as the main political commissar of the forces a move meant to demonstrate the national rather than regional character of UNITA.⁵⁸⁹ Throughout the movement's history it would have at its helm non-Ovimbundu leaders such as Antonio Vukulukuta (Quanhama) a leading commander, Ernesto Mulato (Bakongo) who served as Secretary for Administrative Coordination, Antonio Dembo (Mbundu) who served as VP from 1992-2002 among others. The Ovimbundu nationalism that emerged during the anti-colonial struggle was, as argued by Heywood, different from those of the Mbundu populations (MPLA) and the Bakongo (FNLA), because of the sense of cohesive identity and group solidarity that was aided by the historic role of the Protestant missionaries in the country.⁵⁹⁰ In the 1980s this nationalism was laced with Ovimbundu political ideology that skilfully incorporated traditional beliefs and witchcraft.⁵⁹¹ During the anticolonial war UNITA recruited from communities from the East and the South but as it moved into new areas in the 1980s it was recruiting from northern regions. Yet the Theory of Large numbers developed in 1977 to rally the Ovimbundu for war, like the SPLM/A had rallied the Dinka populations initially to secure large numbers, would later be used by critics to present UNITA as an ethno-regionalist and tribalist movement.

⁵⁸⁸ Weigert, 2011: 37.

⁵⁸⁹ Marcum, 1978:194.

⁵⁹⁰ Heywood, 2000.

⁵⁹¹ Heywood, 1998: 165.

Throughout their wars both movements would recruit and mobilize all over their countries, transforming their armies into multi-ethnic forces, although they would never truly shed their sub-national character.

Comparing these two leaders provides a clearer understanding of lessons they applied from previous movements and peace processes and how these factored into changes in organisation, leadership structures and negotiating positions. Garang understood that diversity of political objectives (some groups wanted secession while others sought autonomy and reform in the Sudanese context) and ethnicity would create greater difficulties for creating a unified front. He opted for military efficiency and placed all the potentially fractious commanders, intellectuals and politicians within a hierarchical chain of command. This became the ultimate equalising strategy. Unable to command civilians and chiefs in a fully incorporated military hierarchy, he chose to devolve power to the 'sons and daughters' of each liberated area. Savimbi understood that despite the Ovimbundu constituency not having its own political force that he would need to unite them and bring in other groups to build his third avenue for liberation. Although the political objectives that UNITA defended ultimately being the same as those of the MPLA and FNLA until 1975 (to achieve independence) Savimbi understood that he needed to build his cause around political not military achievements. Having placed leaders of different ethnic groups as VPs led to fragmentation rather than unity. This led Savimbi to embrace cohesion around structures and political coordinating principles so that the strength of the nationalist cause became the unifying factor; he would create an executive stranglehold to eliminate contestation. The structures built to support Savimbi's leadership enhanced his autocratic control, more so than those of Garang which gave him

only a portion of the same hegemonic power despite him being accused of running the SPLM/A “out of his briefcase”.⁵⁹²

III. Ideology and Political Program

An analysis of the ideology and political programs of UNITA and the SPLM/A contextualises the strategies used to put into action their utopian social and political projects. As “each war is as different as the society that produced it”⁵⁹³ so are the responses that reformist movements structure in order to fit with the particularities of their own conflict setting. In this manner ideology and the political programme had to serve many purposes but above all they needed to provide the political tools to rally collective action and sustain mobilisation. Their hybrid and plural nature had to also include an array of ideational tools that were aimed at proposing national alternatives that would resonate with different internal and external audiences. While the SPLM/A loosely followed Marxist principles as per the Derg’s influence, UNITA followed Maoism as its organisational source (explained in the following section). The ideological and political programme of these two movements would have a deep impact on their war strategies and their prioritisation of political or military development, as well as on their formulation of institutions to govern the liberated areas. As self-justification drives they had to persuade diverse constituencies into the righteousness of their cause and the feasibility of radical change.

⁵⁹² This expression was used by several defecting commanders in 1991 and repeated in interviews with numerous SPLM/A leaders, 2011-12, Juba.

⁵⁹³ Sambanis, Nicolas, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45: 3, June 2001, pp. 259-282.

The message and political program is key in the first stages of mobilisation. It has to appeal to particular sentiments but also to wider audiences; “founders cannot chose just any ideology but must take into account normative commitments: Which ideology will identify, resonate with and therefore motivate a concrete constituency?”.⁵⁹⁴ Founding leaders also have to understand the social fabric they are mobilising. The SPLM/A was able to redirect existing mass anger and frustration in the 1980s but it was not able to reorder such anger so that it would not turn against it in the form of different militia groups, as well as not being able to redirect it into a unifying element to build a political project across localisms and sub-national identities. UNITA had to enhance anger and frustration and define this as a sub-national issue with national implications to define a constituency to mobilize but failed to project an integrative form of nationalism. The choices during these initial stages found organisational expression in different forms in order to address the challenges of cohesion, integration, mobilisation and survival.

As reformist rebels, a new nationalism had to be created for the justification of the second liberation, but also a new concept of the state had to emerge. It would emerge through the projection of a deep clash of societies, state projects and visions. The cause and framing of the liberation struggle therefore had to “impute particular structures to political action; it defined who or what the main initiators of action were (...) and attribut(ed) specific roles to these actors”.⁵⁹⁵ Ideology also helped identify friend and

⁵⁹⁴ Sanin and Wood, 2014:214.

⁵⁹⁵ Almond, Gabriel, 1954, *The appeals of Communism*, Princeton University Press, in O'Neill et al, 1980:7.

foe⁵⁹⁶ and helped discern that “discontented people act aggressively only when they become aware of the supposed source of frustration, or something or someone with whom they associate frustration”.⁵⁹⁷

In order to unify diverse interests and perspectives, the ideological framing of the two movements took a hybrid form. UNITA’s ideology has been described as balancing several contradictions and inconsistencies. A general close to Savimbi, explained the reason for this by pointing to the internal realities of Angola that could only be economically and socially addressed with left wing policies while externally right-wing policies was what secured UNITA much needed support. “This led Savimbi to defend two policies and have two faces”.⁵⁹⁸ Savimbi explains that “from Mao and the Communists I learned how to fight and win a guerrilla war. I also learned how not to run an economy or a nation”.⁵⁹⁹ This hybrid approach was explained coherently in several elite interviews. “UNITA wanted to come up with its own revolution and not just be seen as a leftist revolutionary movement. That’s why we studied the French and American revolutions, the Vietnam War and the political ideas of great strategists”, explained a leading commander that studied at CEKK.⁶⁰⁰ UNITA wanted to define its ideology as fundamentally Angolan. “In Africanism we defended the capacity to keep our values (...)

⁵⁹⁶ O’Neill et al, 1980:8.

⁵⁹⁷ Gurr, Ted, 1970, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton University Press, p. 205 quoted in O’Neill et al, 1980:8.

⁵⁹⁸ interview UNITA General, January 2013, Luanda.

⁵⁹⁹ Jonas Savimbi, “The War against Soviet Colonialism: The strategy and tactics of anti-communist resistance”, *Policy Review* 35, 1986.

⁶⁰⁰ interview UNITA General, January 2013, Luanda.

the MPLA had the politics of acculturation and destruction (...) they wanted to destroy everything that was Angolan as it was the only way to perpetuate their regime”.⁶⁰¹

The objectives during the second war were 1) the withdrawal of the Cubans, 2) to change the philosophic and ideological principles of the MPLA that was communist and according to UNITA acted contrary to Angolan society, and 3) to reverse the practices of marginalisation and exclusion.⁶⁰² UNITA’s programme for Angola was explained by the four words in its coat of arms: socialism, negritude, democracy and non-alignment. Under socialism UNITA would establish a collective production system and the planned development of the country. In the concept of negritude UNITA held the “cultural African identity of all the peoples of Angola as a pillar to the concept of national unity”.⁶⁰³ Under democracy UNITA used the principle of free elections as a way to give Angolans the “opportunity to give their views on those political economic and social problems that affect their lives” and the formation of government led by the majority.⁶⁰⁴ In its non-alignment approach UNITA based its foreign policy to ensure its independence of action so that cooperation with countries was based “on reciprocal interest, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs”. In this way, the movement reflected the ideology of external alliances, the national character of society that they envisioned, but also the piecemeal approach of combining different ideological tools to structure the liberation and justify it.

⁶⁰¹ interview ideologue of the movement, January 2013, Luanda.

⁶⁰² interviews UNITA leaders, 2012, Luanda.

⁶⁰³ UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola, 1985, Jamba Press, p. 25.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid, p.26.

The SPLM/A referred to itself as a Socialist Revolutionary Movement in 1983 but as the years passed it proved to have a loose adherence to its ideological roots. The movement did not develop the vertical party hierarchy that linked mass popular horizontal organisations and a strong political party that are normally associated with Marxist liberation movements. The “imposition” of socialism by the Ethiopians would also bring into question the commitment of the top leadership. Arop writes that none of the 5 initial founders were known for their communist credentials.⁶⁰⁵ Intellectuals in the movement point to the fact that these top commanders had little understanding of communism or the socialist doctrine and applied the principles in a repressive manner.

As a result, it was described as lacking ideological or political consistency. A leading commander, that defected in the 1990s and returned to the SPLM/A to later serve as a Minister during the CPA years and after independence explained that

“The brand of our socialism – which was a mixture of what was happening in Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana and Zambia - would reveal its nature as the pace of the struggle progressed. We did not want to commit dogmatically so everyone was fighting. We had so much anger that we were fighting without an ideology”.⁶⁰⁶

This idea that the SPLM/A essentially operated with its main unifying force the opposition to the North, has been linked to the over militarisation of the movement.⁶⁰⁷

The 1983 manifesto has been criticized for lacking the political direction that most

⁶⁰⁵ Arop, 2006: 88.

⁶⁰⁶ Interview, October 2012, Juba.

⁶⁰⁷ Young, 2003:427.

liberation movement founding documents developed. Its greatest weakness was in this regard “the gap between establishing the validity of its cause and the realistic political strategy for realising its goals”.⁶⁰⁸ Yet the lack of dogmatic rigidity or defined revolutionary principles brought together pastoralists, workers, peasants, students and intellectuals, allowing it to become a “melting pot for all these ethnic differences (...) giving them a political and national context and form for the first time”.⁶⁰⁹ After the fall of the Derg, the SPLM/A shed its Marxist-socialist mantle, a pragmatic shift aimed to secure western support.

The lack of ideological unity within the SPLM/A leadership also contributed to this hybridity that unlike UNITA was not only a matter of alliances expediency but rather a consequence of weak ideological and political structures. In 1985 the PMHC is said to have divided into groups of socialists, communists and capitalists, that “instead of looking at themselves as revolutionaries, Bonga and Bilpham politicians looked at themselves through the lens of former political affiliations”.⁶¹⁰ After the critical juncture and the emergence of the 1998 SPLM Constitution, the New Sudan took on a different form. The reform program could be applied in five national settings to accommodate different forms of self-sufficiency: 1) as a unified country under a secular and democratic government; 2) as a confederation 3) as a united secular African state 4) as a united Islamic Arab Sudan, and 5) as two separate countries. These 5 models were meant to keep Northern opposition parties, southerners and external allies engaged. In both cases the critical junctures led UNITA and the SPLM/A to provide greater clarity on the reforms

⁶⁰⁸ Justice Africa, 1997: 65.

⁶⁰⁹ Nyaba, 1997:27.

⁶¹⁰ Mach Guarak, 2011:308.

they proposed and the political contours of the country they wanted. Despite the different degrees of definition and consistency, both movements established their political programmes on reformist ambitions that defined the enemy and their constituent bases as opposing forces. Their hybrid nature was a consequence of having to accommodate different interests and needs while representing a vision that tried to unite such diversity.

II.II Nationalist Ambitions

The nationalist cause was for UNITA and the SPLM/A a matter of projecting a political project to correct the failings of the first liberation and empower the disenfranchised people they claimed to represent; it also aimed at projecting a new national identity. The issue of nationalist, ethnic, and sub-nationalist mobilisation would find expressions in different moments of the movement's strategies. It was nationalism based on existentialist differences of instrumentalised sub-national grievances yet calling for unity of the nation. The difficulty with this kind of nationalism is the "epistemological illusion that you can be understood, only among people like yourself".⁶¹¹ Both failed to build a nationalist platform uniting different communities that would have an enduring legacy. Both struggled to build "a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries (...) should not separate the power-holders from the rest".⁶¹² The nationalism that UNITA and the SPLM/A intended to create would not escape the paradox of "the universality of nationalism as a socio-cultural concept vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete

⁶¹¹ Ignatieff, Michael, 1998, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, quoted in Waihenya, 2006:68.

⁶¹² Gellner, Ernest, 1983, *Nations and Nationalism*, Blackwells, p.1.

manifestations (or) the political power of nationalisms vs their philosophical poverty and even incoherence”.⁶¹³ The appeals made by both movements to their nations were nationalistic but in reality, did not reflect with mobilisation and recruitment processes rallying rather sub-national sentiments.

The manner in which both movements were to conduct their political programmes ultimately led them to build an artificial construct of the society they were trying to represent. They had to craft a relatively unexperienced “commonness” of oppression and project a future of aligned and reconciled interests, needs and values. They were trying to do two things in this way: to construct their alternative vision of the state and the nation by trying to provide a platform that could unite disparate and diverse groups and were trying to forge the necessary nationalist unity that would help contain factionalism and dissent. It was a delicate balance that in many ways implied an invention of tradition in so far as UNITA and the SPLM/A were attempting to create new forms of social organisation. The strategies used to advance this included a combination of those establishing “a) social cohesion or artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimising institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those whose main purpose was socialisation, the inculcation of beliefs and value systems and conventions of behaviour”.⁶¹⁴ All of these three strategies were necessary for the functioning of the parallel state in particular when different communities were brought to live together. The deterritorialized character of civilians in Jamba that mixed individuals from many communities, some of which rejected UNITA (many were captured) increased the need

⁶¹³ Anderson, 1991:5.

⁶¹⁴ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983:9.

to build a new social order. Yambio would also experience the entry of different communities into Zandeland (as IDPs) and resulted in deep clashes, in particular with the cattle-keeping Dinka groups. Even in the small scale of these two liberated areas both movements had to create social harmony.

The SPLM/A's main challenge was creating a united front from a political setting that was characterized by tribes.⁶¹⁵ It was because of this level of fragmentation that Garang was also against defining the war as a 'southern problem' rather than a problem of the Sudan. It needed to go beyond the localisms.

"The oppressor has divided the Sudanese people into northerners and southerners; westerners and easterners, Halfawin and the so-called Awlad El Balad who have hitherto wielded power in Khartoum; while in the South people have been politicized along tribal lines resulting in such ridiculous slogans as 'Dinka unity', 'Great Equatoria'. 'Bari Speakers, 'Luo unity' and so forth. The oppressor has also divided us into Muslims and Christians, and into Arabs and Africans".⁶¹⁶

Garang proposed that a new nationalism emerge, which he termed as *Sudanism*, which stood in opposition to all the sub-nationalisms and political groupings. It was meant to unite all religions, ethnic groups, regions and cultures of the country in order to recreate a Sudanese national identity. Yet Garang's insistence on fighting for a unified Sudan did not reflect the goals and aspirations of the many southerners that wanted secession.⁶¹⁷

The only institution that had a national character were the armed forces of the SPLM/A

⁶¹⁵ John Young, quoted in LeRiche and Arnold, 2012:65.

⁶¹⁶ Speech by Garang, 3rd March 1984, in Khalid, Mansour (ed), 1987, *John Garang Speaks*, KPI Limited, p. 19.

⁶¹⁷ Akol, 2003:70.

as the administrative and political structures were developed mostly at a local level and empowered local leaders rather than being guided by national leaders driven by nationally defined political objectives.

The centrality of structures in UNITA and the ethnic diversity of the leadership gave a national character to the different branches of the movement, although the majority were still Ovimbundu. UNITA's Constitution stated that "without identity, cultural pride and proper civilisation (...) the country runs the risk of disappearing".⁶¹⁸ During the second war, UNITA would rally nationalist sentiment on the basis that the MPLA was a minority government, kept in power by non-African nations (Cuba and the Soviet Union), and was not a black Angolan political party instead dominated by *assimilados* and *mestiços* who were complicit in the subjugation of the black Angolans.⁶¹⁹ From the perspective of "UNITA's black nationalism, the Soviets and Cubans represent(ed) an extension of white rule. (...) UNITA's platform (was) for complete independence and not neo-colonialism from the East or the West".⁶²⁰ Ironically, the MPLA also used the presence of foreign advisors and South African troops in UNITA areas to disqualify them. This informed the way legitimacy was contested on both sides. The nationalism propagated by the MPLA was deemed as stressing urban orientated rights and obligations while the UNITA rural nationalism was portrayed as stressing "blood and soil".⁶²¹ Despite UNITA's efforts to

⁶¹⁸ quoted in James III, 1992:133.

⁶¹⁹ *Free Angola* UNITA publication 1986, in James III, 1992:102.

⁶²⁰ Marcum, James, "The Politics of Survival: UNITA in Angola", *Africa Notes* 8, February 1983, CSIS.

⁶²¹ Pereira, Anthony, "The neglected tragedy: The return to war in Angola 1992-94", *Journal of Modern African History* 32:1, 1994, p. 1-28.

redefine the Angolan identity there was a “powerful stream of Ovimbundu nationalism” underlying its Angolan nationalism.⁶²²

The nationalist ideals defined by UNITA and the SPLM/A were deeply linked to the confrontation of societies and clashes of visions that essentially were built along sub-national concerns and needs. The most essential component “of successful political mobilisation in the African context must surely be the creation of over-arching ties of supra-ethnic loyalties and a sense of national identity. The paradox is that successful mobilisation requires, not the abolition of ethnic sentiments (...) but rather the politicisation of ethnicity for nationalist purposes”.⁶²³ The ultimate test for both would be their “winning over” of supporters and leaders from the “enemy camp”. Both failed at this as UNITA’s political identity was not accommodating of other perspectives and never managed to make significant inroads into the MPLA’s support base. It wasn’t just a matter of ethnicity, it also entailed class distinctions, national identities, and different approaches to culture and tradition. The SPLM/A also failed in convincing the northern Sudanese (despite some support from the North and its strategic alliance with Northern political and military groups– under the National Democratic Alliance) of their ability to represent all the facets (including Arabism and Islam) of Sudan’s identity.

III.I Confrontation of Societies and Visions

⁶²² Heywood, 1998:148.

⁶²³ Chabal, 1983:200-1.

Both UNITA and the SPLM built their liberation rhetoric and programme around the belief that the enemy they were fighting held a vision and a state project that not only contradicted the very fabric of society (as they saw it) but was also a direct threat to the values that the 'people' these movements claimed to represent held. It was a 'war of visions' in Sudan and a 'clash of societies' in Angola. To achieve the legitimacy of representing these groups the SPLM/A and UNITA had to project divisions, frame their fights as existential but also create the governing structures in the liberated areas to demonstrate their own version of "stateness". The motivation for creating parallel states in this regard partly emanated from this political positioning. The contours of that state project in Yambio and Jamba need to be understood within this context and the commitment to the vision assessed through the symbolic and institutional forms of their political orders.

Conceptions of the state and their alternative visions for reform mattered. They mattered because they provided a blueprint to structure governance and arguably the design of institutions. They were the experienced element of the reform programme for their supporters and constituencies. For UNITA, the creation of a critical mass of civil servants, political leaders, engineers, doctors, administrators etc. was meant to advance the social order proposed by the movement. It was meant to provide the opportunity for an entire segment of the population to seek to become a force capable of countering the assimilated elites of the MPLA and the imperialist project it sustained through its collaboration with the Soviets and Cubans. For the SPLM/A it mattered because building alternative state structures in direct opposition to Khartoum's state was part of the resistance. This led the movement to change names of administrative units, to organise consultative forums, to allow women to partake in economic and political life. It was about devolving power

to the grassroots. To retain enough symbolic and political capital and help overcome the many governance shortcomings, both movements enhanced their previous positioning to also build a society that was “loyal” to their state.

For UNITA, this meant projecting

“a confrontation of two societies (...) where Luanda had 500 years of contact with civilisation and Huambo only completed 100 years (of its founding as a city by the Portuguese). Here we have two different classes and two different societies (...) When the Portuguese came and went to the coast they used blacks – chiefs, *chipaios* (slave traders) and assimilated to fight the indigenous people of the interior. A conflict was created between the native in defence of the interests of the colonialists and those of defence of their own areas. People started seeing the black man that came with the white man as their enemy. This was the perception that was being created that in the north and coast that they are “superior” to the south and the interior – those that came from the bush. Only with the passing of time did this battle unravel and the interior produced people to go and study in Portugal. There was no care to talk about equality and culture. This affected the thought of the people and resulted in permanent cliques. We feel used and despised. Today we feel that the Bailundo⁶²⁴ will never reach power – that they should only sweep the streets”.⁶²⁵

This explanation is framed around the experience of the Ovimbundu as an example of the disenfranchisement experienced by other people and framed as a matter of correcting historical injustices.

The war of visions in Sudan was over competing versions of the state and the nation. The SPLM and the Khartoum government were on clear opposing poles when it came to the secularisation of the state and the political characteristics of the system that supported it. “The crisis of national identity in the Sudan emanates from the fact that the politically

⁶²⁴ This is a derogative term referring to the Ovimbundu people.

⁶²⁵ interview President of UNITA, January 2013, Luanda.

dominant and economically privileged northern Sudanese Arabs (...) deny the African element in them”.⁶²⁶ For Garang “the central problem of the Sudan is that the post 1956 Sudanese state is essentially an artificial state, based on a political system and institutional framework of ethnic and religious chauvinism, and after 1989 on Islamic Fundamentalism. It is a state that excludes the vast majority of its citizens”. The system that Khartoum operated could not be reformed, it had to be brought down so that “in the ruins of the old we build a new Sudan”, explained a former secretary general that believed in the idea of a unified Sudan.⁶²⁷ In this way, Sudan was “still looking for its soul, for its true identity”.⁶²⁸ Khartoum was imposing a syndrome of dependency in the South, as expressed by a Colonel in Yambio, who explained that even to make bricks you had to get permission from Khartoum, which was another way of dominating people. The SPLM/A would counter this with programmes to allow people to become more self-sufficient and self-reliant. Yet like UNITA it also failed to accommodate the values of communities that did not experience and feel the particulars of this marginalisation. Other groups and movements fighting against the NCP government in Khartoum, like in Darfur and elsewhere, were not ready to deny their own Arab and Islamic identities. This highlights the difficulties that reform movements face in attempting to represent many constituencies and aligning different interests into a political program yet not managing to fully overcome the unintentional narrowing of their proposed identities. Many in Sudan and Angola who were against the NCP and MPLA nevertheless felt unrepresented by the identities built by the SPLM/A and UNITA.

⁶²⁶ Deng, Francis, 1995, *War of Visions*, Bookings Institution, p. 484.

⁶²⁷ Interview former secretary general, May 2012, Juba.

⁶²⁸ Khalid, Mansour (ed), 1989, *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, KPI Limited, p. 127.

As a result, the difference in societies perceived by UNITA and the SPLM/A's perspectives did not result in creating a platform for inclusive empowerment as they had hoped. Rather they created divisions in the social fabric of their countries because of the mutually exclusive formulations of the state and society they used. They were unifying for the purposes of war but were destructive for the purposes of peace. The SPLM/A would fail to create a unifying platform for the Southern Sudanese where they could rally around political rather than ethnic and community values. While UNITA did develop political values to better build a national platform, it still failed to provide a sufficiently broad political platform to attract support from followers of the MPLA and appeal to the intellectuals and middle classes of the cities.

IV. Internal Organisation

As organisations, rebel movements can only operate with the tools they develop and the structures they create to compensate for the superiority of their opponents. The form their organisations take are conditioned by several factors: the ability to recruit and maintain support; the critical mass of leaders and commanders available to help structure and run different organs; the structures to allow for efficient delegation of duties; the resources available and weapons training; the fit between the strategic objectives and the tactics on the ground; the social links to key constituencies and how this support base was used. UNITA and the SPLM/A provided responses to these issues but they did so using different tools and under distinct operating procedures. The first purpose of organisation for rebel movements is their cohesion and ability to provide a centralising structure of command and control that provides political direction,

discipline, and manages incentives to secure allegiance. The organizational format can take three “general possibilities: control by politicians, control by the military, and independent political and military commands (...) the idea of a unified command is more effective, since it is more conducive to giving the insurgents an overall strategy and for dealing with the ideological, tactical, and personal differences that divide the movement”.⁶²⁹ For UNITA this meant developing simultaneously the three branches (party, administration, military) that culminated in a centralising command headed by Savimbi. For the SPLM/A it was a command structure that absorbed all different areas under Garang with mid-level decentralisation at the military level and lower level decentralisation for administration despite the SPLM/A also having three defined branches (party, military, government).

Understanding how rebel movements structure their organisations and by extension parallel state helps explain how individuals and communities are socialized into it as members; it also allows for an understanding of how the movement determines its hierarchy of power and privilege in the parallel state. In the Yambio chapter the CMA system revealed how the SPLM/A militarized society as a governing strategy; it used the tools available to create “membership” and socialisation into its military hierarchy. But it also revealed how the military was the most important (multi-ethnic) institution in society as the main vehicle in promoting nationalism. It was through the military that civilians and their chiefs were given ranks and were able to take part on the SPLM/A liberated areas. During the CANS era, the SPLM/A allowed local power dynamics to

⁶²⁹ O’Neill et al, 1980:14.

determine citizenship of the New Sudan even as the political organs were trying to build a national platform of unifying symbols. Despite this, the military would throughout the war define the leadership, identity and vision of the movement.

UNITA on the other hand had a political view of organisation, and citizenship was achieved through training and political education so that communities understood and experienced UNITA's version of statehood, and internalized its narrative of what it meant to be Angolan. This was a far more complex, intrusive and structured approach that also implied militarisation but was premised above all on socio-political engineering and control. UNITA's identity extended to the combatant that was embedded in a civilian life of *arma, inchada e lapis* (fighting, agriculture, education).⁶³⁰ "UNITA leadership set out to design and control the entire life world"⁶³¹ of their supporters, fighters and populations. The SPLM/A did not have this objective, partly because South Sudanese "world order" was so vehemently opposed to northern hegemony that the rallying call was already set out for mobilisation. The fragmentation of the south also made it difficult for the SPLM/A to socially engineer an identity; it had to defer to the localisms and traditional authorities.

For UNITA, it was the link between all the different parts that allowed the organisation to operate more efficiency and coherently so that the political aspect informed the military and administration. For the SPLM/A the organisational form of administration was closely tied to the social environment and the structures of authority at the local

⁶³⁰ Beck, Teresa Koloma, "Staging Society: Sources of Loyalty in the Angolan UNITA", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol 30:2, August 2009.

⁶³¹ *ibid*, p. 349.

level. Both movements had to define 1) structural differentiation based on hierarchy of power, 2) functional differentiation based on division of labour,⁶³² and 3) had to devise ways to coordinate these and other structures within a framework of rules and regulations. In this way UNITA can be seen more as a rational systems organisation that as a collective was “designed to pursue selected goals (and) founded structures in order to improve the efficiency of goal attainment”.⁶³³ The SPLM/A followed rather a natural systems organisation “driven by the need to survive, (whose) ... strategies invariably hinge(d) on various kinds of networks of actors (...) that (sought) to promote compatible interests”.⁶³⁴ This is relevant to civilian governance in so far as the tools used to sustain structures together, secure recruits and leaders allegiance are the same tools used to build parallel states, reflecting the level of centralized and decentralized control, and the levels of persuasion and coercion.

As a result, “because political and military leaders had different preferences, policy outcomes were shaped by the institutional framework within which these groups interact(ed)”.⁶³⁵ These frameworks were determined by core organising principles. For UNITA it was democratic centralism. For the SPLM/A it was a form of military-focus strategy with a corporatist component that relied on the conditions of believing that popular support was sufficient and therefore did not require extensive political organising efforts.⁶³⁶ Yet regardless of the directions taken, both movements had to

⁶³² O’Neill, 1990; Staniland, 2014; O’Neill et al, 1980 deal with similar matters regarding organisation.

⁶³³ Farrell, Theo, “Figuring out fighting organisations: the new organisational analysis in strategic studies”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 19:1, 1996, p.124.

⁶³⁴ Farrell, 1996:124.

⁶³⁵ DeVore, Marc, “Armed forces, states and threats: Institutions and the British and French responses to the 1991 Gulf war”, *Comparative Strategy* 31:1, February 2012, p. 60.

⁶³⁶ O’Neill, 1990:41.

define mechanisms for decision-making, sanctions for those that deviated, and provide coordination mechanisms among different branches to allow for integrated strategies.

The SPLM/A “was not organised as a liberation movement, merging with the people and carrying out social reform. It was organised as a hierarchical army, broadly on the model of its opponent”.⁶³⁷ This emphasis on militarisation “meant a neglect of other social, economic and political functions. (...) the rapid expansion of the SPLA outpaced the growth and the political and ideological development of the SPLM”.⁶³⁸ The SPLM/A’s decentralized approach was less a strategy and more a function of the need to outsource governance to chiefs, civilian leaders and aid organisations. It was a decentralized approach experienced also at the level of military operations and autonomy of commands during the CMA and CANS eras. Johnson argues that the SPLM/A was “able to harness local grievances by offering to liberate and preserve local custom and livelihood against the very real threat of religious, political and economic reorganisation from Khartoum, not by imposing a uniform ‘revolutionary’ administration based on principles drawn from other liberation movements”.⁶³⁹ While this may have been the case, the SPLM/A’s lack of uniform administration and effective political organs was also its weakest element as a parallel government.

UNITA placed the political party as the coordinating structure of the movement. It also had a very clear distinction between what was the party and what was the movement.

⁶³⁷ Justice Africa, 1997:84.

⁶³⁸ Nyaba, 1997: 53-59.

⁶³⁹ Johnson p.72, in Clapham 1998.

“The movement represented everyone – from thieves to religious leaders – but the party was more selective and operated in circumstances that went far beyond the armed conflict” explained a political commissar from the propaganda directorate.⁶⁴⁰ The revolution was to benefit all but only those truly committed to UNITA’s vision were members of the party. UNITA’s political party led it to create an administrative arm for civilian rule that centralized control over all aspects of civilian life. UNITA adopted a position of political dominance where its fighters, leaders and civilians had to be embedded into its ideological conception. The local population had to alter their perceptions in order to truly join the liberation struggle; civilians that were not persuaded by UNITA’s vision had to nevertheless operate in politically controlled spaces.

Organisational capacity was also dependent on the stability of structures and their ability to provide continuation in leadership consultation and issuance of directives. A key difference between the two movements was the transient nature of the SPLM/A’s headquarters, their mobility, lack of definition and lack of rooting in one area to allow for development of structures, training, consultation, leadership coordination and the maturation of standards and procedures. Having had its rear base in Ethiopia would deeply impact the SPLM/A in this regard. The movement failed to develop a central capital for political and administrative control. Different SPLM/A commanders explained that the headquarters were in different areas and playing different roles. For some New Site was the political capital while Rumbek was the administrative capital and Yei was where the military command was based; this changed at different times of the war.

⁶⁴⁰ Interview political commissar, February 2013, Luanda.

Officers within the SPLA explained that the movement had several HQs for operation purposes “the tactical HQ was in Kidepo between Torit and Kapoeta, Yei was the administrative HQ after Yambio, while John Garang and his main officers (chief of military intelligence, communications, operations etc) were the mobile HQ”.⁶⁴¹ While the flexibility of a mobile HQ seemed innovative and a potentially effective way of overcoming centre-periphery dynamics, it failed. It failed not because of its conception, which reflected the decentralised military and administrative structures of the SPLM/A’s parallel state, but because it lacked a unifying political arm that could level out inconsistencies and contradictions that weakened the war effort, and link the local level to the central command.

A senior SPLA commander explained that the mobility of the capitals and HQs were intentional because where Garang was stationed was where the HQ was for that day. He continues to explain that each commander had his HQ, with about five in all of the military regions, revealing a level of autonomy that would have created differences in the way the liberated areas were governed.⁶⁴² UNITA took the opposite approach and structured all institutions, decisions and procedures from the capital Jamba. This was partially due to its Maoist training but also the understanding that it needed to sustain logistical supply routes from the border areas and have training facilities outside the military reach of the government. Only Jamba could have allowed for this. A UNITA ideologue explains this dilemma very well by stating that “we couldn’t operate a transformation in a transitory situation”, referring to the difficulties of the post 1992 war when the movement moved

⁶⁴¹ interview SPLA colonel in communications, May 2012, Yambio.

⁶⁴² interview former chief Military intelligence, May 2012, Juba.

from different bases in the central highlands despite having had Bailundu and Andulo as their HQs.⁶⁴³ For UNITA having Jamba as the main rear base and capital became one of its key factors for success at the organisational level. This also allowed UNITA to effectively coordinate violent and nonviolent activity and create the basis for the new society they aimed to build. The inability to reproduce this system after the 1992 war revealed how it was inflexible and arguably unable to be applied to larger urban centres.

II.II Political Party Structures

After the critical junctures moment both movements began to better coordinate the dual structure of the party and the military even though the SPLM/A was developing the party structures along the way. Coordinating the dual structures also implies that they work as separate organs. For UNITA this functioned within the defined hierarchical structure that was then replicated at the different levels of the liberated areas, although decisions were ultimately taken by Savimbi who controlled both structures. For the SPLM/A, Garang held the two structures as a single organ in the PMHC that positioned the struggle in military terms; even after the political organs were operating they were run by the same military commanders.

UNITA as explained before was a political organisation that would hold regular congresses and conferences, building a strong political foundation as these policy-making forums were vital in defining and refining strategy over the years. Congresses were held every four years; conferences and central committee meetings were a yearly event; the

⁶⁴³ interview, January 2013, Luanda.

Political Bureau would meet every three months. Savimbi and UNITA's leadership were re-elected during these congresses. The movement adopted as its three methods of work the principles of democratic centralism, collective leadership and criticism and self-criticism which required the separation of political and military structures. Between the 1969 and 1973 congresses the movement was already separating the two with the nomination of a secretary general for the party and a separate Chief of Staff for the army. For UNITA, annual party conferences were big events that aimed at restructuring the movement, reviewed internal regulations, and reformulated strategies. The XII conference of June 1979 was attended by 1062 delegates from all the party structures including the people's assemblies, local committees, mass organisations and the missions abroad.⁶⁴⁴ Comparatively to the SPLM/A these elective conferences were as logistically challenging as the 1994 Chukudum convention which for the SPLM/A was only able to replicate a decade later.

At the top of UNITA's hierarchy was the Cabinet of the President and the Commander in Chief which was a military but also politico-administrative cabinet; this was followed by 2) the chief of General Staff's office; 3) the strategic organ COPE; 4) The Party Secretariat; and 5) General Administration. By 1985 UNITA brought the leadership of the party and the armed forces under the Executive Committee that had 12 permanent members (ranging from front commanders to the SG of the party) and five additional members. It was followed by a National Committee (NC) that included Savimbi and the members of the Executive Committee and additional 33 members. The NC was elected at every party

⁶⁴⁴ Final Communique XII Annual Conference UNITA.

congress and was charged with executing the movement's policy which was then implemented by the party's Secretariat. Although the party took a prominent role, Savimbi like Garang still centralized decisions in a smaller group and more restrictive organ. The main difference being that the party would elect and re-elect key leaders holding different portfolios and the compositions of different organs every few years under UNITA's party system.

The SPLM/A would only develop the dual structure of separating the political (SPLM) from the military (SPLA) after the 1994 convention. The structural and organisational results of the Chukudum convention would in principle alter the movement significantly. In practice, the separation functioned better at the lower levels than at the senior leadership levels. The SPLM/A did not have distinct command structures for administration and the political structures like UNITA, although it did have the SRRA humanitarian wing that was arguably considered an initial administrative structure in the 1980s. What the SPLM/A did was to fuse the party with local government and administrative structures as both were developing simultaneously. The General Field and Staff Command Council (GFSCC), composed of a group of 61 military leaders, and formed in February 1992 was the interim government structure until the convention was held. This meant more collective decision-making, an element that was missing during the PMHC era. Some SPLM leaders point to the fact that while Chukudum established a government-like organisation, it failed to change the way the movement was run and decisions were taken. Others point to the fact that Chukudum created a culture of conferencing that allowed for a process of sharing ideas, brainstorming and collective responsibility for the liberation process, it also allowed those that didn't carry guns to

become freedom fighters.⁶⁴⁵ In principle, the congresses and other large policy conferences held by the SPLM/A in the 1990s were not dissimilar to how UNITA conducted its leadership consultations. However, the SPLM/A only held three conventions (1994, 2008 and 2016) while UNITA held 12 congresses, three extraordinary congresses, and numerous central/national committee meetings over the course of 30 years. Like UNITA, the SPLM/A congresses held were meant to provide solutions to particular problems and endorse the course of actions and strategy defined by the leadership. Had the congresses been supported by regular meetings of the party organs, the implementation of the SPLM/A resolutions would have been easier and facilitate the development of party structures.

Meetings of the different political party organs were sporadic for the SPLM/A, partly explaining why they failed in fulfilling their objectives. Upon its formation in 1994, the National Liberation Council (NLC) was unable to meet regularly and as the central committee it remained ineffective. The inefficiency of the SPLM/A's structures led to a partial reversal of collective decision-making in 1999-2000 that saw the creation of the Leadership Council (LC) which reinstated a similar structure to the PMHCs. The LC was an amalgamation of the executive and the party and effectively took over the functions of the NLC and the NEC.⁶⁴⁶ It was transformed into the Political Bureau (PB) following the 2004 SPLM Strategic Framework for War to Peace Transition but would only be formally created in May 2008, three years after the SPLM had begun functioning as a government. Essentially the SPLM/A would only develop the political party structures 20 years after

⁶⁴⁵ Wonda, 2011: 183.

⁶⁴⁶ Deng, 2002.

its founding, with links between the political and military areas of the SPLM/A remaining tenuous even after the 1994 reforms.

The ultimate test for the political structures of both movements would come after the death of the founding leaders. When Savimbi died in 2002, UNITA managed to transition into peacetime politics and fully disarm (due to its military defeat but also the belief that the party could rebuild itself and compete in the democratic process). Savimbi held one last party meeting in late 2001 in the bush to prepare his leaders and cadres for the transformation into a political party. He gave them a set of steps and policies they needed to implement, knowing that he was not going to survive the last assault on UNITA.⁶⁴⁷ When Garang died the SPLM/A morphed into a more personalized and less institutionalized structure; any traces of collective leadership disappeared and political consistency with the vision of a New Sudan discarded for political expediency ahead of the 2011 independence referendum. Despite having attained the ultimate goal of reaching power, the SPLM/A would splinter into several factions in 2013.

II.V Military Organisation

Writing on civil-military relations, Huntington highlighted that “the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from threats to the society’s security and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within society”.⁶⁴⁸ In this manner, the military is a factor of

⁶⁴⁷ Interviews with Savimbi’s close aids and his son, January 2013, Luanda.

⁶⁴⁸ Huntington, Samuel, 1957 (1995), *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and politics of Civil Military Relations*, Harvard University Press, p. 2.

politics, of society and the different institutions that bring people together. Both UNITA and the SPLM/A developed conventional armies that fought against government forces in open battles with the same intensities as two standing armies. Militarily both movements produced very effective command structures that allowed for operational autonomy and the effective exercise of centralising control. The scale of military operations of these movements required them to coordinate multiple operations, effective communications systems and complex logistical lines, as well as maintain a supply of weapons and adequate distribution of resources.

What contributed to the level of military success for both was the structured and systematic training by elements of two large armies- Ethiopia for the SPLM/A and South Africa for UNITA - in the safety of a rear base that was not threatened by enemy forces, coupled with mass recruitment campaigns which rapidly built the capacity for the movements to move beyond guerrilla attacks. Yet this development occurred for UNITA after the critical juncture while for the SPLM/A it occurred before the critical juncture. This meant that the way the armies were built either incorporated the parallel state as a pillar of military survival (UNITA) or did not factor in civilian support as intrinsically connected to military survival (SPLM/A). While UNITA shifted its military strategy after the critical juncture to enhance its capacity to combat government forces, the SPLM/A maintained its strategy of an amassed army after the critical juncture to replicate previous successes. This reveals that entrenched interests and operating procedures of the leadership are harder to reform when cemented in organisational structures after critical junctures even if they adopt new strategies. The inability to correct this would cause great difficulties for the SPLM/A even as the liberated areas were being locally managed with problems emerging between civilians and abuses by the army. The

military therefore did not accompany the political and administrative changes. Rather a form of amalgamation of forces would further introduce a level of structural and political indefiniteness given the expedience of militia alliances that remained largely outside the SPLA.

The level of reform the SPLM/A army was open to after the 1991 juncture was limited by the previous military victories and the need to regain military control after defections and mass losses. The formula before 1991 had worked; this conditioned the level of civilian and political control military commanders and officers were willing to give up. This reform-resistance was cemented at the leadership level; these leaders/ commanders were placed above the executive Ministers positions as explained in the Yambio chapter, weakening the political command of the army. For UNITA the level of political training and development before the critical juncture allowed the movement to build a mass army in a politically controlled way which reversed the balance of power as reflected in the SPLM/A case. For UNITA the army was at the service of the wider political project; it was a key instrument but operationalised in a coordinated three-pronged socio-political and economic strategy. This allowed the administrative branches to be empowered and coexist with authority next to the military branches. The party stood above both as political commissars were at the fronts engaging the FALA and continuously embedding them with UNITA's political ideology and morale.

The function of having a parallel state and shadow government required the projection of military power as a form of state power. Power had to be projected throughout different areas of the country as a way of undermining their enemies' authority and

intimidating their troops, but also projecting sufficient power to attract support by virtue of military victories. The rebel army was also the first structure to make significant inroads into different areas of Angola and Sudan where the movements were not considered as dominant (in areas that were not naturally aligned to their liberation like Equatoria for the SPLM/A and northern provinces for UNITA). In this way, the rebel army became “one of the instruments with which political power is originally created and made permanent”.⁶⁴⁹ For the importance of analysing the parallel state, the military needs to be assessed as a tool for mobilisation, for representation of different constituencies, and cementing the advances of the liberation struggle on the ground. The strategies used to continue fighting in a sustained way, even as the accessibility and levels of resources differed, was for UNITA and the SPLM/A a matter of aligning military fronts and divisions outside and alongside administrative units and logistics channels. When these didn’t always align, governance strategies shifted and adapted to less centralised and more local forms as was the case of Yambio but not of Jamba.

Militarily the SPLM/A followed a conventional army structure reflecting the mass recruitment and number of fighters it had to organise. At its peak, the movement could have numbered over 400,000 in following with the Soviet tradition of massed armies⁶⁵⁰; although other estimates point to 100,000.⁶⁵¹ The smallest unit of the SPLM/A was the platoon of 12 men all the way to the biggest unit of the division which was comprised of between 10 and 12 thousand men. Each of the five divisions of the SPLA were then sub-

⁶⁴⁹ Paret, Peter, “Military Power”, *The Journal of Military History* 53:3, July 1989, p. 240.

⁶⁵⁰ Africa Rights, 1997: 65.

⁶⁵¹ De Waal, Alex, 2015, *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa*, Polity, p. 94.

divided into three reinforced brigades. The movement re-divided military operations into different 'Axis Command', Zonal commands and Front commands.⁶⁵² The five Axis were commanded by the five permanent members of the PMHC while the four Zonal commands (that were independent military areas) were commanded by alternate members of the PMHC.⁶⁵³

By September 1989, Garang created three fronts: Bright Star Campaign (BSC) headed by Garang, New Funj Campaign (NFC) headed by Willian Nyuon and the Kon Anok Campaign (KAC) headed by Salva Kiir. The pursuit of rapid military successes in the 1980s subverted several important reforms mentioned earlier that the movement should have undergone to be able to counterbalance the fragilities of the terrain given the level of social stratification and presence of different militias. Garang chose to balance interests and incorporate groups into a massive military machine rather than develop the political structures to insert these different groups and turn them into a coherent national force. It would take the SPLM/A almost four years before it could begin staging large military offenses after the 1991 critical juncture. Slowly it managed to rebuild its capacity and began the process of absorbing different factions into its ranks. In 1995 with the Lafon declaration Willian Nyuon's group was reintegrated, this was followed by Kerubinos group in 1998, Peter Gadet's group in 1998, the SSDF Fangak group in 2001 under Taban

⁶⁵² There were 5 Axis commands: Axis 1 was commander by Garang and covered the areas east of the Nile including parts of Eastern, central and western Equatoria; Axis 2 was commanded by Kerubino and covered southern Blue Nile; axis 3 was led by Willian Nyuon covering eastern and western Upper Nile; Axis 4 was commanded by Salva Kiir and covered southern Upper Nile; Axis 5 was led by Arok Thon Arok and covered Akobo, Waat, Ayod and Panjak but also was there to support Axis 3 and 4. Arop, 2006:196.

⁶⁵³ The Bentiu Independent Military Area was under Riek Machar; the Bahr El Ghazal independent military area was under Daniel Awet; the Nuba mountains were under Abdel Azziz, and the Darfur independent military areas was under Duad Balad. Arop, 2006:197-8.

Deng Gai and then the 2002 reunification with Riek's group and the SPLM-United under Lam Akol.⁶⁵⁴ The strategy of integrating different groups with diverging political views never changed after the critical juncture.

This would be reflected as a major difficulty in the CPA and post-independence years. The disintegration of the SPLA along factional lines in 2013 was part of the problem of not having instituted a basis for a disciplined army that would undergo defence transformation and submit to civilian rule. Another issue would haunt the SPLM/A leadership in 2013: the ethnic composition of the army and in particular the senior command. Although the movement had recruited from all five regions of the New Sudan, it's composition remained under the control of the Dinka and some Nuer commanders. "The only standing army was predominantly Dinka; other nationalities were always recruited at the campaign level to liberate certain areas. They were overwhelming during the capture of Yei, Torit etc. But in the end the other ethnicities were sent home and only the Dinka and the Nuer remained", explained an NLC member who is also a leading Equatorial politician.⁶⁵⁵ This testimony was reflecting what occurred during several campaigns in the 1980s and 90s although these divisions were reflected in the composition of many battalions after independence. In heterogeneous settings like Angola and Sudan the ethnic composition of the army's command and fighters became important and the balances struck would either consolidate previous gains or unravel them.

⁶⁵⁴ Detailed in the 'Draft of the SPLM Policy on Dialogue', date not specified.

⁶⁵⁵ interview NLC member and former advisor to Garang, May 2017.

UNITA's armed forces, the FALA, were created and organised around the slogan of revolution and reconstruction. By 1974 UNITA claimed to have 4000 trained guerrillas, although this was an overestimation.⁶⁵⁶ Over the course of a decade (1976-1986) UNITA managed to become a fighting force that directly contested and fought against the better armed FAPLA. In 1981 the first brigades (12th, 21st, 53rd, 34th, and 45th) were formed and operating as independent units. UNITA was present in all of the provinces by 1984, making massive inroads into non-Ovimbundu areas.⁶⁵⁷ By 1990 FALA claimed to have 20,000 regular troops, 18,000 semi-regulars, 20,000 compact guerrillas and 35,000 dispersed guerrillas, although numbers could have ranged anything between 28,000 to 90,000.⁶⁵⁸ The level of expansion and innovation during these years was a result of training and stability of the rear base and the need to engage the MPLA forces on all levels in particular as they were supported by superior armies –Russia and Cuba.

UNITA's areas of military operations were structured around five Strategic Fronts and 22 military regions (RM) with each being subdivided into military sectors and military detachments. Military detachments under each RM worked closer to the cities and operated like clandestine cells. Zones were created according to the geographic terrain. Strategic Fronts established in 1983 were: 1) "Esperança Negra" in the Lundas commanded by General Nunda; 2) "Estamos a Voltar" in the Central Highlands led by General Chendovava, 3) the RM25 Front of Cazombo and the East led by General

⁶⁵⁶ Marcum, 1978:217.

⁶⁵⁷ James III, 1992:120.

⁶⁵⁸ James III, 1992:96-7.

Chilingutla, 4) “A Frustração do Povo” north of Huambo until Malange, and 5) the Southern Front. These were established immediately after Savimbi finalized the first year of CEKK training in strategy for commanders. In each front about five RMS were grouped together. “Savimbi did not manage the autonomy of these sectors. It was the Chief of Staff of the front that was responsible for running the military and politico-administrative affairs”.⁶⁵⁹ UNITA, unlike the SPLM/A, had several rotations of Chiefs of Staff of the Army. From 1966 to 2002 UNITA had 9 chiefs of staff of the FALA. Despite its military focus the SPLM/A only began streamlining and transforming the army in the late 1990s with the creation of the Chief of General Staff’s (COGS) office.

Both movements were able to decentralize their military commands to allow for operational autonomy in each of the different fronts and military regions. This was a major source of military effectiveness and the extension of administration of territory. The differences in terrain, technology and weaponry used by the opposing armies, and the military strategies of the enemy: the use of proxy militias by the Sudanese army sophisticated weaponry aided by Soviet advisors and Cuban troops by the Angolan army impacted their organisation.

Ultimately, both UNITA and the SPLM/A created military organisations that mirrored in many aspects the characteristics of the enemies they were fighting. Strategically they only needed to be as organised and effective as the government forces or at least able to neutralise their advances. Khartoum used militias to support its military campaigns in

⁶⁵⁹ interview former Brigadier, January 2013, Huambo.

the South which led the SPLM/A to broadly operate as a “mob” that didn’t need to organise itself further to achieve military victories. The same principle applied to UNITA that began as a small and largely ineffective guerrilla force and transformed itself into a conventional army to fight a professional and well-resourced Angolan army. Unlike UNITA that began at the guerrilla stage, the SPLM/A began with two battalions of army defectors and several armed groups. Garang reflected in 1996 that “We did not start as a movement in the classical way of Latin American liberation movements (...) we started as a mob. We have been in a series of reforms, reforming a mob”.⁶⁶⁰ The challenges posed at the organisational level of coordinating the mob were different to those of building a rebel army from guerrilla units to brigade size forces as was the case of UNITA.

Organisationally, UNITA and the SPLM/A differed greatly in all aspects. Despite the difference of political and military ethos driving the organizational culture, both movements adapted their organisations to reflect social conditions, the strategies of their enemies but also the organisational shortcomings that resulted in having to be selective on what to prioritise. These choices were conditioned by the leader’s biases, historical understanding of previous movements failings but were also a result of cleavages at inception within the command levels and the social bases. The choices were also reflective of the ideology and political programs as defined by the movements and how they prescribed distinct institutions, war strategies and the training of their fighters, cadres and followers. While elements of leadership and political ideology were determinants in organisational development, they also became their biggest challenges.

⁶⁶⁰ Opening Address to SPLM Conference on Civil Society and Organisation of Civil Authority, New Kush, April-May 1996.

The underdevelopment and weakness of the SPLM/A's political structures contributed to the lack of commitment to the reformist principles and goals. This became evident during the CPA years when the movement failed to implement its reformist vision. Political power remained for the majority of SPLM/A leaders a matter of military strength rather than constituency mobilisation and structural party development. Garang, his PMHC and the loose conception of the New Sudan were partly to blame for this. For UNITA, the development of party structures was unable to accommodate different perceptions and views. While there was autonomy in each of the three branches the personalised and tightly controlled hierarchy under Savimbi made them unable to transition and adapt to the subsequent stages of war in the 1990s. The political program no longer reflected the conditions of the country when the war restarted in 1992 because of how it narrowed the grievances of key constituencies.⁶⁶¹ In the SPLM/A it was a case of weak political definition and for UNITA it was a matter of inflexible political definition that weakened their ability to provide continuity in organisational terms after they had established the parallel states and were operating in new political realities.

V. Approach to Civilians

War occurs within society. It blurs the divide between fighters and non-combatants. Civilians become instruments of combat in the logistical but also social and political sense as they become simultaneously targets of violence and 'hearts and minds' strategies, as

⁶⁶¹ All the mobilising elements UNITA previously used to rally support and discredit the MPLA were no longer there: Cuban troops had withdrawn; the MPLA had transitioned to working under principles of multi-party politics and market economy.

well as accomplices and drivers of change. War is fought from the civilians' perspective in their territorial space within the social networks of communities, families and traditional systems of authority. War also blurs the line between society and state projects as reform rebels intrude and invariably impact the social fabric of relations between respected sources of authority (chiefs) and between communities. Yet social connections also provide a degree of risk and vulnerabilities when conflict emerges and divisions among communities are enhanced.⁶⁶² The constraints that rebels face because of the social setting will require tailored responses. Skocpol argues that "once a political movement is in contact with the countryside, there may be only some possible policies that will work to mobilize the peasantry, given on one side, the constraints faced by revolutionaries and, on the other side, the specific features of local class, community, and political arrangements of the peasantry".⁶⁶³ Yet, "insurgent organisations must nonetheless be created on the ground, to an appreciably greater extent than any other form of African political organisations, and (...) must be constructed in large part from the social materials they find there".⁶⁶⁴ The importance of host societies is great, in particular because in both the UNITA and SPLM/A liberated areas respect for traditional authorities and local social systems were the driving force of how the local levels of organisations were constructed. The main difference was that the SPLM/A resurrected the native administration approach of the British by empowering traditional authorities. UNITA also used chiefs as an extension of administration but brought them under a tightly controlled system not dissimilar to the Portuguese strategy of direct rule.

⁶⁶² Staniland, 2014:36.

⁶⁶³ Skocpol, Theda, "What makes Peasants Revolutionary?", *Comparative Politics* 14:3, 1982, p.365, in Staniland, 2014:38.

⁶⁶⁴ Clapham, 1998:11.

The parallel states produced by UNITA and the SPLM/A highlight three important aspects of their approach to civilian populations. Firstly, that a version of an agreement to ensure loyalty, obedience and reciprocity established by the provision of services can be internally (UNITA) or externally (aid agencies for the SPLM/A) managed and can still produce the required effect of establishing reciprocal links between civilians and the movements, which led to the establishment of a degrees of legitimacy of the parallel state. This 'agreement' was rather premised on the parallel state's aim, as defined by the two movements, of protecting the identity and rights of civilians while providing services in exchange for loyalty, obedience and resources.

Secondly, both movements understood that using existing systems of authority like that of chiefs and the church will not only enhance the bureaucratic capacity of the parallel states but will also produce simpler systems of communication and negotiation with civilians. Ruling civilians indirectly through these systems builds confidence in the rebel state but also reduces the space for confrontation and mismanagement between the army and the community. Using this indirect system does not necessarily require structured political organs as seen in the case of Yambio. Thirdly, that in order to continue to reproduce the system established in the liberated areas and improve on it, forums for feedback become important.

Both movements had to create an agreement with their populations in order to advance their cause but also get support, fighters and food for the war effort. While the SPLM/A seemed to have a more contractarian approach (of different types of exchanges), UNITA

pushed for a more relational one based on its intrusive social engineering project (that aimed at coercively controlling its population), although it was also contractarian. As seen in the previous sections, focus on the political function of the liberation struggle provided responses to civilians as active and necessary participants. Focusing on military efficiency may not have overridden the ability and willingness to engage constructively with civilians but it did limit the spectrum of structures and organs available to assist in defining relationships. This points to the difficulty of forging an agreement to ensure loyalty and reciprocity at gun point or within a context characterised by any degree of militarisation.

The agreement that emerged was established with the population and premised on 1) their contribution to the cause in exchange for the provision of services, 2) empowering traditional authorities as leaders of the community establishing proximity between civilians and the movements, and 3) seeking to educate and politicize them as a way to “empower” them. The fourth characteristic differed: while the SPLM/A allowed civilians the space to define their own relations with the parallel state, UNITA defined this for civilians. Working within this framework of established relationships gave the movements and their leaders significant social and institutional capital by collectivising their state endeavour through mass participation of civilians. As seen earlier the SPLM/A used the structures of each of the communities to determine their civilian administrations. UNITA placed its organisational effort in coordinating and controlling the grassroots levels despite empowering the chiefs. The incorporation of local leaders into the different structures (at communal and local levels) allowed the SPLM/A to build trust with less effort.

V.I Service Delivery

The provision of social and public goods (in the form of health, education, production capacity etc.) had a mitigating effect on the rebel movements use of violence in advancing their goals. The time and effort required to provide public goods was compensated by the degree of acceptance of rebel hegemony rather than resistance to rebel domination and coercion. When UNITA and the SPLM/A understood the value of inserting the civilian population into their liberation struggle, and succeeded in defining approaches that produced positive feedback, violence and coercion were somewhat reduced. This was also a consequence of shifting the war strategies to include civilians as components of the liberation struggle that played a role in the functioning and operationalisation of the parallel state. The delivery of services in the liberated areas was a measure of efficiency but also a demonstrated willingness to govern civilians. Providing services for civilians meant in different ways a redirection of effort, resources and capacity from military purposes as personnel needed to be placed to manage external aid and NGOs (SPLM/A) or had to establish structures, secure logistical and resources flows, and enhance reproductive capacity (UNITA). Delivering services using wartime bureaucracies was even harder to achieve due to the lack of existing infrastructure, structured budget and reliable revenue flows, civil servants, sectoral development, and functioning local government structures. As a result, the delivery of services not only required the willingness and capacity for rebels to deliver, it also required acceptance from the civilians side, their collaboration and active effort to work within existing constraints and limitations.

The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A was both a diplomatic tool but also a way to ensure the role of the movement in assisting war-torn communities. It coordinated service delivery despite the fact that capacity and funds came from aid agencies and NGOs rather than from within the liberated areas. This was a form of contracting out private public service delivery. This engagement was not an easy one given the internal dynamics within the SPLM/A administration – with the duplication of roles of the SRRA and the CANS; it led to conflict among the different parties, wasted resources and duplication of work.⁶⁶⁵ The opinion of the elites and cadres is divided on this question that the NGOs were fundamental pillars of the CANS success. Some dispute this on the basis that they had different mandates as the NGOs were dealing with specific programmes relating to health and education while the CANS had more extensive programmes which dealt with empowerment and development of political structures. Others contend that the CANS would not have managed to retain an agreement to ensure obedience, loyalty and reciprocity with the population without the delivery of services provided by the NGOs. The difficulty remains that the SPLM/A was not effectively building such an agreement through service provision with its civilians if it was based on relations between civilians and international NGOs.

UNITA, as demonstrated in the Jamba chapter constructed an extensive bureaucracy and service delivery system inside its rear base to support other liberated areas. For UNITA the capacity and the funds came from within the movement although there was support

⁶⁶⁵ D'Silva, 1999: 5.

in these areas from patrons and some NGOs operating in the liberated areas. The support provided by the South Africans and later the Americans in the 1980s was for UNITA crucially important in the development of its war machine but these were focused on strategic political and military areas. UNITA struggled to secure the necessary resources to fund its education and health programs despite this external support and turned to selling ivory and other means to provide services. The exercise of managing limited resources for education and health contributed to the development of UNITA's administrative capacity. The comparison here demonstrates that service delivery was key in securing legitimacy and support but that it could be externally or internally secured just as long as the movements could politically capitalize on its effect. Interviews with civilians revealed how the provision of services by UNITA created greater acceptance of coercion while the lack of sustained coercion by the SPLM/A was not sufficient to make up for the lack of direct service provision. What the SPLM/A did successfully was to reformulate the narrative and expropriate the effect of NGO service provision, a strategy it currently uses as a government.

V.II Traditional Authorities

UNITA and the SPLM/A both attempted to transform society and how civilians related to state-like structures in their liberated areas. Had they imposed rigid structures and norms on the different local communities they would have encountered greater resistance. Instead, they had to begin by constructing links to existing systems of authority and embedding them into structures they could control. They also needed to

organically link “local conflicts with the “master cleavage” of the war”⁶⁶⁶ so that communities would link themselves to the wider goals of the liberation struggle and by extension secure their allegiance and access recruitment pools. UNITA, like the SPLM/A, held the conviction that religious and traditional beliefs were so deeply rooted that no movement could succeed without respecting them. Both respected customary law and used traditional authorities as a vital element in their governing structure. This allowed them to disperse nodes of decision-making with a stated objective and within a defined set of relationships that created management systems to assist in the running of the liberated areas. However, UNITA’s social project meant that although they respected traditional structures, those were attributed defined political and social roles.

Defining the relationships with these traditional authorities became useful in distributing responsibilities, ensuring the flows of resources (food, recruits etc.) and establishing predictability. However, while the SPLM/A came into Yambio and was faced with a very strong legacy of rule by the Zande chiefs, Jamba was not inhabited and therefore all the people living in UNITA’s capital were brought in from outside of their social structure and networks. Even if they had chosen to move to Jamba and into UNITA areas, the process of abandoning their homes implied their uprooting. This applied even more so to the populations that were captured and forced behind UNITA lines. The family and other social structures were shattered as a result of creating “a space for intervention by the authorities in accommodating children or arranging marriages”.⁶⁶⁷ Smith argues that “uprooted and homeless masses are equally eager to proclaim their allegiance to

⁶⁶⁶ Staniland, 2014:43.

⁶⁶⁷ Pearce, 2015:113.

politically effective units to which they can feel they 'belong'; and what better way of suggesting and inducing that sense of belonging than by 'rediscovering' submerged or ethnic roots lost in the mists of immemorial time?".⁶⁶⁸ After the 1991 crisis the flows of IDPs into existing liberated areas like Yambio also brought in uprooted communities. This heterogeneous setting in both Yambio and Jamba had to be managed by traditional authorities so that the rural peace was maintained. They devised strategies to reorder and contain violence and social conflict in the liberated areas.

Both UNITA and the SPLM/A were careful in the way they handled traditional authorities and community leaders. There were many occasions in which they mishandled these relationships, with the SPLM/A being accused of creating chiefs and removing legitimate authorities that did not comply. UNITA would also impose sanctions on traditional authorities and their communities if they did not cooperate. Attempts to control them led both movements to create structures to give chiefs political powers. At the 1994 Chukudum convention, the SPLM/A took steps to correct some of their past mistakes and try to reconcile the party's past with traditional authorities. But it was in 2004 at a meeting in Kapoeta that the Kamutu Declaration was established, paving the way for the role of traditional authority in the future new state.⁶⁶⁹ "Garang called this meeting in order to get the consent of the chiefs before signing the CPA peace agreement. They were the legitimate owners of the peace process (...) over 600 kings, chiefs, notables attended".⁶⁷⁰ While they were important pillars during the CMA and CANS years the

⁶⁶⁸ Smith, Anthony D., 1986, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 14.

⁶⁶⁹ Mai, 2009:97.

⁶⁷⁰ interview former Chief of Military Intelligence, March 2012, Juba.

SPLM/A only brought them into contributing to policy and assisting in governing approaches as political authorities much later than UNITA.

UNITA would, throughout the 1976-1991 war, bring in chiefs to participate in all the party congresses so that they would be informed on changes to the politico-administrative directives. “The *sobas* were sacred to us. In every rally, the first salutation would go to the *sobas*”⁶⁷¹; this was part of UNITA’s use of Afro-populism to justify the nationalist appeal as a counter-measure to how the Marxist MPLA was “destroying Angolan culture”. UNITA created a council for the chiefs; it was headed by a chief elder, assisted by an administrative secretary dealing with health, education, agriculture and social welfare, and an advisory council of between 6 and 20 men.⁶⁷² These councils would also help the movement integrate and resettle displaced populations as they came into the Free Lands. While strategies differed - UNITA directed and “reorganised” the traditional authorities and the SPLM/A instrumentalised their power (in some instances they destroyed the power and in others enhanced it) to serve the interests of the movement - both understood they would struggle to build a parallel state without the chiefs.

V.III Civil Society and Popular Participation

The participation of civilians in the parallel state needs to be assessed by the space and power they had to determine their own governance structures and the manner in which

⁶⁷¹ interview party ideologue, January 2013, Luanda.

⁶⁷² Toussie, 1989:23.

the military could be held accountable through feedback forums and courts. To provide a credible commitment of

“restraint on the part of the (rebel) government and participation on the part of civilians, (...) institutions must have key qualities. They establish a structure of joint governance involving the rebel military and civilians in the process of rulemaking, resource management and the provision of public goods (...) they provide a continued incentive for the rebel government to show restraint in the extraction of resources (...) by making governance structures as inclusive as possible so that civilian preferences play a role in shaping choices”.⁶⁷³

These dynamics are precisely the factors that UNITA and the SPLM/A used to engage their civilians. One aspect that is difficult to fully ascertain is the existing organisations of civilians before these movements came “in to organise” them. For the SPLM/A, civil society was to a certain extent created in the liberated areas with the help of intellectuals and the churches. Such was the case of the Institution of Promotion of Civil Society (IPCS), the SINGOs and other associations as described in the Yambio chapter. For UNITA the creation of civil society would work against its principles of reordering civilians world order. CSOs imply a level of autonomy that UNITA would not have accepted unless it was inserted deeply within the party structures and run by its youth JURA and women LIMA leagues. Instead UNITA inserted civilians into the syndicated and structured organisations that allowed them to be under the political control of the party. The SPLM/A also attempted this corporatist strategy but its syndicated organisations remained weak in comparison to the NGOs and civil society associations.

⁶⁷³ Weinstein, 2007:169-70.

The creation of feedback loops was an important element in the relationship between the rebels and the civilian population. It served at times to blur the lines, with regards to the SPLM/A, between the rulers and the ruled at the local level. Operationally, both movements wanted to reach the bases and empower communities to play different roles in the liberation struggle. For UNITA the “masses were heard through the ‘warrior flame’ and other forums for debate (...) it was truly guerrilla democracy via democratic centralism where the debate is expanded so the grassroots can be heard and then the debate starts going up the pyramid”, explained a former Secretary General.⁶⁷⁴ However, unlike the local level organs of the liberation councils of the SPLM/A, that experienced some form of elections, it is unclear that UNITA instituted these practices of allowing for elections at the local level rather opting for consultation. While UNITA may have been less open to elections their organisational capacity did allow them to create effective feedback loops that would reach Jamba and the highest command. The SPLM/A attempted to institute the same practice as mentioned in the Yambio chapter but the level of efficiency in terms of how far the opinions of the lowest levels reached Garang and the top leadership outside of specific meetings is unclear. What the SPLM/A did achieve was the creation of different forums, the liberation councils and the congresses, where debate was promoted and responses to problems jointly devised. In this regard, the SPLM/A feedback forums allowed for greater degrees of freedom and civilian empowerment.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed and compared the internal elements of UNITA and the SPLM/A that were instrumental in allowing them to govern liberated areas as parallel states. It

⁶⁷⁴ Interview former Secretary General, February 2013, Luanda.

demonstrates that diverse leadership styles and structured commands, as well as the organisational differences deriving from socio-political challenges, historical learning experiences and different strategies will impact the manner in which rebel movements like UNITA and the SPLM/A construct their parallel states. Contrary to what might be expected, the development of strong political structures aided by a class of skilled and politically trained cadres leading indoctrination campaigns within the military and civilian populations, are not necessary conditions for the formation of rebel governance. As long as support by key constituencies was guaranteed through nationalistic appeals and local level empowerment, weak political, ideological and administrative structures could still lead to parallel states as the case of the SPLM/A demonstrates.

The most significant shared features of these two movements relate to the strength and capacity of their leaders to build a rebel movement capable of securing large portions of territory, securing allegiance through coercion and/or persuasion and indoctrination, determining the tools (political and military) that would maintain the leadership's unity, and directing the vision to suit different stages of the war. The second common feature is the formulation of the movement's ideology and political programme as an existential fight aimed at protecting the marginalized and disenfranchised from an exclusivist, elitist, and discriminatory state. For both UNITA and the SPLM/A the clashes and wars of societies and visions had to rally support from different constituencies aimed at mass recruitment of fighters but also of civilian support. Civilians were crucial because they would provide the justification of having a new society and new world order. The two other features analysed – organisation and relations with civilians – were informed by these 2 elements yet they were strikingly different in the way they developed and resulted in the formulation of a parallel state.

The organisational difference for the SPLM/A and UNITA revealed two different approaches to governance in their liberated areas. The SPLM/A's weak political organisation led it to decentralize governance to the grassroots and to the chiefs. Its militarized ethos also allowed the permeation of a culture of militarisation and the mythologizing of virtues of the fighter, distorting to a degree the balance of civilians and military interests and needs, and for whom the liberation was aimed at. Yet, after its critical juncture moment the approach was re-evaluated and political strategies were geared towards devolving power to the grassroots, also by virtue of the SPLM/A lacking the capacity to politically control their liberated areas in the same way as UNITA. UNITA's strong political structures led Jamba to run under a very tight political and administrative structure where all aspects of life were controlled. The necessity of creating an equalising southern force factored deeply into the need to allow politics to dictate all other aspects including the military and society. UNITA defined its governing objectives and then introduced existing structures of civilian and traditional authority into its ideologically defined structures. UNITA had in this regard a more rigid and dogmatic approach that made it more vulnerable to change. The SPLM/A was less effective in replicating structures and providing standardized governance. This did not mean that the SPLM/A lacked organisation, rather the opposite was true. The movement managed to rally almost half a million combatants and organise their operations in a highly diverse social and military terrain; it had to secure territory that faced numerous challenges including lack of infrastructure, isolation and lack of resources. This comparison shows that organisation can take different forms as long as one of the wings – political and military- is robust enough to provide unified leadership structures and the ideational, administrative, territorial and relational capital to rally and sustain collective action.

By virtue of the context of collective anger within which the SPLM/A emerged it had to expend less effort in mobilising and indoctrinating than UNITA. This was also detected at the level of governing strategies in Jamba and Yambio as indoctrination in one setting became a pillar of order while in the other it was not a necessary ordering tool but did become a valuable instrument to achieve greater coordination and purpose during the CANS era. For the SPLM/A, the parallel state structures were emerging and fusing with the political party structures as these developed. This created ownership at the civilian level but also weakened the political definitions of the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A allowed traditional authorities and civilian leaders in the 1990s to take the lead in developing the CANS. It was a default position that combined an already decentralized approach to the military and reconfigured it as a decentralized approach to governance, but was also a matter of expediency given that there was no capacity, internally procured resources, or sufficient political commissars to help define a new political order inside the liberated areas. Yet this required enough organisation that civilian populations and their leaders were able to insert and operate the liberation councils and the executive committees defined by the SPLM/A. UNITA on the other hand had to create and sustain the collective anger to justify its second liberation. While the feeling of disenfranchisement was real with the southern populations, UNITA began its fight (immediately after independence) against the MPLA without having experienced rule under the MPLA. This required a very structured indoctrination approach that also attempted to forge a nationalist platform that Angola never had during the anti-colonial war. This required organizational responses that built in totalitarian control and structured efforts to design all aspects of the liberation. The impetus to centrally control and direct the liberation was a result of the defined political structures that UNITA developed over the years, informed by the

functioning of a stable rear base and capital where the leadership could reflect and redirect efforts.

The legacy of these structures and the experience of civilians in the liberated areas of the SPLM/A and UNITA are clear in the testimonies provided during the months of research. With all their failings and their successes, these parallel states and their corresponding orders managed not only to provide the necessary military, logistical, political but also social lifelines they needed to recover from crippling defeats in 1991 and 1976. The survival of the movements was equated with the survival of their supporters in the testimonies revealing the hegemonic dimension that they took and how they influenced the lives, livelihoods, and personal histories of the civilians in their areas.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

This thesis set out to examine how force was transformed into authority in the parallel states of UNITA in Jamba and the SPLM/A in Yambio. It examines portions of Angola and Sudan's history when, over a period of 12 years (1979-1991 for UNITA and 1990-2002 for the SPLM/A), these countries had two competing "states" with competing conceptions of society, history and national identity. UNITA and the SPLM/A's parallel states and the manner in which they staged their liberations challenged the governments in Luanda and Khartoum on many levels. The conflicts transitioned from being theatres of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare to theatres of political legitimacy and symbolic sovereignty. It was because of the parallel states that both movements managed to introduce a level of protractability to the war requiring political and social responses not just military ones. The parallel states became the main tools to survive the war and reach peace negotiations but were also expressions of political orders reflecting the convictions, fears, strengths and weaknesses of the two movements. The thesis shows how *reform rebels* should be studied in a dynamic and integrated way, through an analytical framework that identifies how they develop in four strategic internal areas. The establishment of the parallel states and the forms they take are a direct result of how leadership, ideology, organisation and approach to civilians are aligned into a broader survival strategy to defeat the enemy on multiple fronts. As an operational paradigm, the rebel-system places the sequence of events, decisions, strategies, processes and interactions into a framework that builds a theory of operation for each of the cases. The rebel-systems of UNITA and the SPLM/A are assessed separately in dedicated chapters as well as comparatively.

The preceding chapters explain how the comparison was done and why it was necessary. Chapter two sets out the parameters to analyse the two movements and their parallel states. The Analytical Framework determines the critical inter-related areas to understand the form and dynamics of the parallel states. Each of the four internal areas have different driving aspects that provide important nuances. The literature reviewed reveals how previous work on rebel movements and their governing projects has combined internal elements (as defined in this thesis) with external elements such as social fault lines and ethnicity, government responses and type of war, resource availability, and external patrons. The value in incorporating both internal and external elements is not disputed. However, in order to understand what drove decisions and capacity the rebel system requires a core understanding of the internal elements that will provide the interpretative lens for the external elements. The aim is to contribute to this literature and move the debate in a different direction.

Chapter two also unpacks the different aspects of the four internal areas of study. Leadership is analysed through the historical context that the founding leader emerges from; the previous forms of resistance and failed peace processes; the way sub-national grievances are perceived and defined. Assessing leadership also requires an understanding of the compromises and balances necessary to keep a command unified which involves second tier leaders and military commanders. Ideology and political programs are assessed from the perspective of their capacity to mobilise and order ideas and grievances in effective ways; the nationalist cause emerges as part of this process. The hybrid nature of ideology is also analysed from the standpoint of strategy and alliance-building. Organisational aspects are defined from the perspective of military and political party organs and how each branch relates to the other; it involves structuring

power and devolving power to different areas and leaders. Approaches to civilians entails looking at the roles attributed to non-combatants and the use for existing systems of authority; it also considers the impact of civilian organisation on the parallel state.

Chapter Three traces the progression and stages of SPLM/A governance that occurred in Yambio, as it became the first county of the liberated South in 1990 until the signing of the first CPA protocol in 2002. It describes the progression of institutions - from the Civil-Military Administrator (CMA) to the Civil Authority for a New Sudan (CANS) - that allowed for the SPLM/A to gain the acceptance of the population and 'its right to rule'. A highly militarized system (the CMA system) was combined with the old traditional order of chiefs and a rehabilitation of indirect rule, to secure the liberated area without the need to create legitimacy or rule through persuasion. After the critical juncture of 1991, a new approach to governance emerged that repackaged the ideological message, defined the political program, decentralised power at the local levels and created the space for civil society and the population to engage in entrepreneurial activities, and determine their relations with New Sudan state. NGOs and relief agencies were instrumentalised to become the service providers for the SPLM/A. Chiefs were empowered to continue providing justice and were crucial in maintaining rural peace and social harmony. However, a militarised movement remained organised and defined at the leadership levels around the strength of the military. The party-state that functioned at the local levels was relatively detached from the central command levels which later led the post-conflict peacebuilding exercise to face severe challenges.

Chapter Four traces UNITA's centralized strategy that produced a state alternative and staged a propaganda and acculturation war aimed at delegitimising the MPLA's post-independence state. The movement altered its strategy to govern civilians after the critical juncture of 1976. What had earlier operated as autonomous bases, run by guerrilla commanders and *sobas*, and relied on self-sufficiency drives to provide services in the liberated areas became a centrally controlled and totalitarian endeavour. The first governing strategy of the 1960s was pillared on three principles: the respect for ethnic custom, a developed agricultural system and the organisation of community institutions. After Jamba was built, UNITA's strategy involved a far-reaching social engineering project of "elevating" the southern masses to become the next leaders of Angola through extensive skills training, political indoctrination and mandatory education. The world order of civilians, fighters, cadres and leaders was defined and controlled by UNITA's political machine. From 1979 to 1991 Jamba became the embodiment of UNITA's capacity to govern a state within a state. Built as a rear base and a training ground for its growing army, UNITA used Jamba to test its redefinition of society and what it meant to be "Angolan". The iron-like discipline surrounding the tripartite structure (party, military, administration) resulted in a political order that was both totalitarian and utopian. It was also this inflexible and tightly controlled program that led UNITA to fail to adapt to changing circumstances of war in the 1990s.

The Yambio and Jamba chapters reveal that the parallel state, as experienced in these two areas, was ordered on very different pillars. They faced distinct challenges, were premised on different organising principles, had different levels of devolution of power and civilian participation, and were sustained by different political, administrative and executive structures. It was important to compare them because of these differences.

Despite these differences, the pillars that allowed governance to develop in Yambio and Jamba rested on several similar dynamics: 1) strategic leadership either at central or local levels, 2) nationalist messages aimed at producing adherence, political control, and social cohesion, 3) respect for traditional authorities, 4) separation of military, administrative and political organs, 5) civilian participation and 6) coordination of service delivery to secure a form an implicit agreement to ensure obedience, loyalty and reciprocity. Both movements generated different types of capital: a) *ideational* capital referring to identity, values and symbols, b) *administrative* capital which is material and includes positions and power⁶⁷⁵, c) the *relational* capital that bonds together members of different constituencies and ethnic groups, and d) *physical* capital that links territoriality with legitimacy and existing systems of authority.

Both parallel states were meant to create the physical conditions necessary to operate a rebellion, but they were also meant to deliver several tangibles (services, order, justice) and intangibles (reimagined normality, participating in developing a new future, new definitions of citizenship and representation). All the intangibles were there to counter the nefarious effects of war and chaos that had changed the social fabric of these communities in many reinforcing ways. They were also there to allow for the movements to entrench their influence in defining the political communities and social orders, by acting as a government, and becoming the source of empowerment and representation of different communities.

⁶⁷⁵ Ishiyama, John, and Batta, Anna, "Rebel organisations and Conflict Management in Post-Conflict Societies 1990-2009", *Civil Wars*, 13:4, p 437-457.

Chapter Five compares the differences and similarities in the four internal areas that define their respective rebel-systems and contextualises the characteristics of the two parallel states. The Republic of the Free Lands of Angola was a centrally controlled and totalitarian project, built from the top down, that embodied Savimbi's personalised rule and was aimed at securing UNITA's righteousness in representing a constituency in need of "liberation". The New Sudan was decentralised and minimalist, built from the bottom up, and embodied pragmatism and devolution of local power while it was attached to the central leadership through the nationalist vision of a reformed state. Each of these were powered by distinct rebel-systems.

The comparison reveals that two very dissimilar movements, operating under distinct military, social, resource and organisational constraints both survived crippling multipronged shocks through the strength and strategies of 1) their leadership, 2) their ideology/ political programs, and 3) the resilience of one operational structure (military or political party). At the leadership level the ability of the founding leader to unify the command and never lose the political control of the liberation struggle through moments of extreme fragility were key. It meant persuading followers and other leaders to pursue organisational goals and continue mobilising and motivating them through nationalistic appeals. Both leaders believed they were fighting a just war and that their political project would provide answers to the structural deficiencies of the state. Both leaders and the second-tier commanders were key in maintaining cohesion, mobilization and growth. Strategic alliances were established at all levels (local, ethnic, military) to ensure expansion and the permanence of their political message. Both movements respected but

also attempted to instrumentalize traditional authorities by seeking to build different types of alliances to allow local interests to be accommodated into broader goals of the organisation in managing the liberated areas. This allowed the nationalist rhetoric to become part of the social transformation of the war by linking the operation of legitimate systems of authority with the function of the parallel state.

Their ideologies and political programs were framed around the representation of marginalized groups that required empowerment through reformed national power structures. They projected a war of visions and clash of societies. A new form of nationalism was built this way, aimed at uniting diverse communities but really only appealing to sub-national sentiments. Through the operationalization of their nationalist and ideological positioning, via their political programs, both UNITA and the SPLM/A redefined relations with civilians and defined the nature of citizenship of the parallel state. The movements had to define their message in ways that justified a second liberation to align along a new concept of nation, state and society. Messages were pragmatically tailored for internal and external audiences aimed at sustaining support, gaining legitimacy and the “right” to represent their constituencies.

The organisational aspects were deeply influenced by the two previous elements although it was vitally important that one branch – either the military or political wing – be resilient enough to sustain the impact and losses resulting from the critical junctures. This branch had to be robust enough to ensure a unified leadership and sustain collective action. Structures had to sustain cohesion and sufficient command and control to provide a direction and war strategy. Each of the branches – military, party and administration-

would have to follow, even if broadly, a coherent strategy to reflect local realities, the national context but also the transformative goals proposed. Strategies determined how the three branches would relate to each other and at which levels; assigning roles to civilians, cadres, fighters and commanders. Although in different ways - as UNITA was more intrusive than the SPLM/A - they both developed a party-state, linking the empowerment of their “people” to the condition of supporting their political objectives.

With regards to approach to civilians the two movements had to adapt to the constraints on the ground and respect existing systems of authority. They had to determine the strategy to secure an implicit reciprocal agreement with the population. They had to politicise, socialise and “educate” their “citizens”, and had to allow for feedback mechanisms to allow for civilians to respond to the parallel state. Both UNITA and the SPLM/A were concerned with reordering society to operate the intended transformation of the state. This reordering aimed at creating political orders that would allow for 1) the expression of the needs and interests of their “people”, 2) to aggregate similar interests and reconcile divergent interests, 3) to establish, maintain and progressively adapt a normative system accepted as legitimate and as a model to reconfigure power in peacetime. Social harmony was a requisite for political order and the development of institutions to run different operations. Both movements understood the fundamental need to monopolize violence and monopolize the levers of mediating order and mitigating conflict. Stability and order had to be maintained to allow for a degree of predictability and ‘normality’ to emerge. In the absence of strong administrative structures, the SPLM/A did this through the structures of the chief’s courts that were key in securing rural peace and mediating between communities. UNITA did this by instituting rules and regulations enforced by different organs like BRINDE, military police

and the People's Sentinels. Its hegemonic power meant that it dominated all discourses, subjugating state-society relations to "a shared state-authorized language of cognition, control and contestation".⁶⁷⁶

The comparison also allowed for the operationalisation of the rebel-system as similarities and differences in both cases revealed different and reinforcing dynamics. Two reform rebellions, sustaining parallel states over a decade were fundamentally driven by different imperatives despite sharing several common elements.

I. The Rebel-Systems

Every rebellion, reformist or otherwise, will have a leadership structure, an ideology and political program, a form of organisation, and some defined approach to civilians. Understanding how these elements shift and adapt over time reveals the main drivers of strategy at distinct junctures. The parallel state was established as a strategy to survive in the critical junctures analysed (1976 and 1991); it was deconstructed in the subsequent junctures as other strategies were necessary to survive sequential multipronged shocks for which the parallel state no longer provided a solution. These were determined by the form of the critical juncture but also the shifting political, military and social conditions faced by each movement. The rebel-system places these changes and how they impact the internal elements of rebel movements in a theory of operation. This understanding helps explain the fragilities of the SPLM/A and UNITA and how they responded to the subsequent critical junctures; why the SPLM/A survived and

⁶⁷⁶ Hansen and Stepputtat, 2001:26.

achieved independence but subsequently disintegrated and why UNITA was militarily defeated, lost its political definition and support of key constituencies but was able to reinvent itself in peacetime (though not effectively).

New Sudan and the SPLM/A Rebel-System

The SPLM/A rebel-system highlights several dynamics that affected the way governance was managed and defined in the parallel state. The rebel-system of the 1990s would also be very indicative of the challenges the SPLM/A would face during the 2005 transition and after independence.

- 1) Leadership structures of the SPLM/A reflected the contradictory interests at the central command levels that required hegemonic control, negotiation and power-sharing formulas to dissuade fragmentation. None of these dynamics affected local administration but rather allowed for power to be devolved to the local levels because of the absence of fully cohesive leadership structures within the party. Had the SPLM/A at the time been able to provide for collective decision-making structures, linking the central leadership to lower levels through effective mid-level commands, administration may have been different. Instead, Garang chose to unify these commanders and leaders through the military hierarchy, placing political leaders below military commanders. This was a result of the Anyanya I failings, his distrust in politicians but also the schisms he inherited by having so many fractured and unaligned militia groups joining his liberation struggle. It was also a consequence of instituting a system that would level out ethnic considerations and the issue of representation, which was dealt with at lower leadership levels. The strategy of autonomous commands within the military

leadership kept the movement relatively united but at the administrative level did not result in the cohesion of different leaders across liberated areas. Placing the 'sons and daughters' of each liberated area in command positions allowed the movement to gain legitimacy but did not overcome the problem of Dinka hegemony at the central commands and army.

- 2) Ideologically, the establishment of the movement in Ethiopia and the imposition of socialism did not result in the movement adopting a vertical party hierarchy that linked mass popular horizontal organisations and a strong political party. Personal decisions and leadership contestations led Garang to side-line ideologues and intellectuals and delay the development of the party. The proposal of a unified Sudan, rather than a secessionist stance, meant that many groups would not follow the SPLM/A on an ideological level. The levels of mass anger allowed mobilisation to happen by opposition to northern domination. When the New Sudan program took on more adaptive applications, as a reform program for a unified or independent South, the movement lacked sufficient political commissars to begin explaining the vision in all the liberated areas. This was delegated to the local level leaders that became the only link they had to the central command. There was a broad definition of the New Sudan, unimplementable resolutions and vague directives, which allowed for degrees of interpretation to occur at the local levels of governance. This also allowed for greater buy-in. While Garang believed in redefining the "soul" and identity of Sudan, the SPLM/A really only mobilised at sub-national levels (despite having support in the North) within the regions of the south and Nuba mountains.
- 3) Defining power in military terms could have produced centralised structures to run the liberated areas as long as there was division of labour and sufficient

cadres. Yet the SPLM/A lacked the supporting administrative and political branches to fully control governance of the liberated areas. The movement was also unable to institute regulations and practices that placed military commanders under the control of political and civilian leaders. By default, the movement devolved power in greater degrees than during the CMA years to traditional authorities, community leaders and civilians. This same handicap led the movement to outsource service provision to relief agencies and NGOs which allowed civilians and civil society the space to define their roles in the parallel state. This entrenched several of the “localisms” Garang was attempting to avoid and did not fully bring the local areas into the main political frame of the revolution where a Dinka from Bahr El Ghazal for example would feel connected through nationalistic appeals to a Kakwa in Yei. This was a consequence of the political program but also of the organisation of the movement that didn’t have a rear base and rarely consulted its leaders.

- 4) At the civilian level, there was greater acceptance of SPLM/A governance when it became demilitarised. This also translated into devolving power to local leaders and keeping the army out of Yambio. Harmony was achieved through the chiefs’ courts and by aligning statutory and customary legal structures. The self-sufficiency drives meant that the SPLM/A interfered less with development and agricultural projects but also meant that unless NGOs supported the education and health sectors that these would remain underdeveloped and under-resourced. The SPLM/A as result lost an opportunity to secure a strong agreement to ensure obedience, loyalty and reciprocity with the population.

The dynamics revealed by the rebel-system described above created contradictory effects. Despite not being built on a strong political party capable of overriding the “localisms” as identified by Garang, the New Sudan was probably the greatest unifying symbol the South Sudanese would experience until 2013. What the CANS in fact achieved for many was a means of communication and proximity between the movement and the civilians; it “brought the people closer to the SPLM”.⁶⁷⁷ This symbolic capital gave the movement significant credit of governance with the population, even when they failed to deliver. “People were behind the SPLM as a revolutionary war and assisted in pushing the enemy out. This was the success of the CANS”.⁶⁷⁸ One commissioner explains, “there was a new political dispensation being created that allowed for the old, the paradigm of Arabism that denied us our rights, to be destroyed”.⁶⁷⁹ It had delivered a government southerners could identify with, despite its shortcomings. Others highlight the issue of consent by the population for the CANS to take root: “after the vision was conceptualized it could only exist in an atmosphere conducive to its survival”.⁶⁸⁰ There was space in conceptual and real terms to allow for the interpretation of this new SPLM/A “state” to factor in civilian organisation and their needs which allowed them degrees of freedom to structure their participation. This would inform how civilians would interact with the state during the CPA years, in the run-up to the referendum, and the disappointment felt when it failed.

⁶⁷⁷ Interview Payam Administrator, March 2012, Yei.

⁶⁷⁸ Interview commissioner in Central Equatoria State, March 2012, Yei.

⁶⁷⁹ Interview former commissioner of Maridi, April 2012, Yambio.

⁶⁸⁰ *ibid.*

Free Lands of Angola and the UNITA Rebel-System

UNITA's rebel-system reveals its greatest failings and its most resilient aspects. It also highlights several dynamics that led to its defeat in 2002 although the changes in the 1990s were a result of several other factors explained in the following section on subsequent critical junctures.

- 1) At the leadership level, Savimbi understood from inception the need to take full political control of the movement and the liberation struggle. The first attempt to institute a power-sharing formula sustaining a coalition of associations in the first few years, giving VP positions to different leaders of other ethnic groups, failed. The cohesion UNITA sought, in the context of two more experienced and better-resourced movements MPLA and FNLA, and the tendencies to factionalize led Savimbi to structure the movement under his command. He divided the branches, in line with his Maoist training, and developed each by preparing and training leaders at all levels to manage the structures. This translated into centralized institutions in the liberated areas that standardized a division of labor, separate command structures and were all accountable to COPE and Savimbi. The administrative, military and party branches would as a result have rotation of leaders at all levels, never allowing them to entrench their influence or challenge Savimbi's stranglehold on the movement.
- 2) Ideologically, UNITA balanced several contradictory elements that joined Maoism with capitalism and Afro-populist principles to tailor a political program that suited Angola's socio-economic conditions, as perceived by the movement, and satisfy external allies that were key to building its military capacity and

international political support. The movement was concerned with mobilizing and uniting different communities behind an alternative idea of what it meant to be “Angolan” and to experience a “real” independence. Yet it also mobilized sub-national grievances that were not fully experienced by all the constituencies it was trying to unite. The use of traditional authorities and respect for African culture contrasted with the city elite’s and the MPLA’s perspectives of modernity. This led to UNITA being portrayed as a tribalistic and rural movement which would make it even harder to propagate its nationalism to wider, and especially urban, constituencies. The controlled indoctrination programs in the liberated areas were a response to this. They were meant to create legitimacy and a sense of political permanence for UNITA’s world order.

- 3) The central commands and the three branches functioned under a tightly controlled structure. Organizationally, the ambition to create a new political and social order where marginalized groups would govern, led UNITA to institute widespread and standardized education, skills training and leadership programs. All the cadres, fighters and followers were led by political commissars and the party structures that stood at the helm of the movement. Engagements with civilians were determined by these objectives. Savimbi believed that he and UNITA would only reach power by applying the theory of large numbers, which led him to mobilize and kidnap men and women for this state project and army. This implied having enough organization to train them and indoctrinate them to follow UNITA’s party line and war strategy. It also meant that the movement had the necessary logistics to place fighters and cadres into structured commands throughout the liberated areas. All areas of operation had strict guidelines and operating procedures, communicated and delegated effectively through the

different communication systems; and supervised by the different intelligence and party structures. There was no room for interpretation or doubt, true to its totalitarian form.

- 4) At the civilian level, the ambition of creating a new order implied having to alter the experience of the state and politics that civilians held. While traditional authorities were respected they were inserted into the structures of the movement and conditioned to operate within established confines. Service provision and the development of health care and education sectors in all the liberated areas allowed UNITA to secure an agreement to ensure obedience, loyalty and reciprocity. This was in fact the main link that it had to several captured communities that did not feel represented by its political program. The performance element of trying to project 'normality' was a phenomenon experienced in Jamba. The "guerilla democracy" forums were applied in all the liberated areas and were meant to allow civilians and fighters moments of controlled "freedom". In these sessions people could speak freely and criticize, though it's unclear how free they truly were given the levels of control. UNITA was concerned that doubt and criticism would create an environment that could be exploited by the enemy through infiltrations. Social order was therefore key in Jamba but was tightly regulated by the party and the intelligence services. The movement intruded in this way in all areas of civilians lives.

The Free Lands of Angola, were for the UNITA "people" and cadres a symbol of strength, resistance, discipline, organisation, political indoctrination and a utopian society. It was also a controlled and regulated reality that would impact those that experienced it in very

profound ways. In Jamba two effects were explained by those that experienced the parallel state. For some it was the closest they would come to taking part in building a future for Angola. For others, it was a prison that inserted them into a social order they were estranged from. Jamba today continues to exist in the memories of the UNITA “people”, in the imagination of younger generations that seek to understand a part of the wars’ history and is a small military outpost. When government forces overran Jamba in late 1999 they destroyed most of the structures and confiscated all the intelligence and administrative files. “The memory of what was achieved in Jamba and UNITA areas is still dangerous for the MPLA. My files are no longer strategically relevant but the intelligence chiefs will not hand them back to me (...) UNITA’s history has to be erased”, explained a UNITA General that integrated into the FAA in 1992.⁶⁸¹ Today over 23,000 civilians remain in Jamba, having returned from their refugee camps in Zambia after 2002. Many speak of a past with some nostalgia, even the captured populations that resented Savimbi’s authoritarian rule. “He was a bandit but he knew how to run a state and everything worked here”.⁶⁸² “We were never hungry and had running water to drink and grow our crops. Today there is desertification and we have nothing.”⁶⁸³ What was achieved in Jamba – the training and literacy programs – are still credited with preparing the current UNITA leadership and many others that defected and joined the MPLA with the necessary skills and work ethic. “What was achieved in Jamba resonates deeply in society today. We prepared our leaders”, explained a CENFIM trained Colonel that remained with Savimbi until 2002.⁶⁸⁴ For many the post-war reality continues to enhance

⁶⁸¹ Interview former UNITA General, September 2008, Luanda.

⁶⁸² interview former radio technician, September 2012, Jamba.

⁶⁸³ interview captured teacher, September 2012, Jamba.

⁶⁸⁴ interview FAA Colonel, August 2012, Luanda.

the historical and social cleavages they were indoctrinated into: of a clash of two states and two societies.

II. Subsequent Critical Junctures

Just as UNITA and the SPLM/A chose to take different paths in 1991 and 1976 out of a set of different choices, the subsequent critical junctures revealed choices that would reverse many developments and result in different rebel-systems. The parallel states were a product of the alignment of several conditions and characteristics after the 1976 and 1991 crises. Their dismantling was also a result of significant shifts. Two sets of critical junctures, resulting from an evolutionary process of several key events, would impact UNITA and the SPLM/A altering the ways they had functioned earlier. (SEE timeline in Table below) In many ways the first critical junctures of 1992 for UNITA and 2005 for the SPLM/A provided the “antecedent conditions” and the legacies establishing the “mechanisms of production and reproduction”⁶⁸⁵ for the second set of critical junctures. For the SPLM/A it was 1) the death of John Garang in 2005, and 2) the outbreak of civil war in 2013 that resulted in fundamental and perhaps irreversible shifts. For UNITA it was 1) the collapse of the Bicesse peace agreement and the resumption of war in 1992, and 2) the death of Jonas Savimbi and the Luena accords in 2002 that altered the way it had previously operated. In all four internal elements, these movements would suffer tremendous shifts.

⁶⁸⁵ Collier and Collier, 1991:30.

In the 1990s UNITA altered its governing strategy into a much more militarized project, governing new areas and several cities, facing international isolation and building a huge diamond extractive enterprise to fund the war. UNITA began fighting a war to punish the government and the political transformative agenda was abandoned. In the Central Highlands, its symbolic “capital”, UNITA would face contestation. It would struggle to define a “people” to liberate. Organisationally, structures were built and developed for the war machine and diamond extraction sector and the power of the political consultative organs reduced. The Free Lands Republic was dismantled in many ways during the post-1992 war. Political education and skills training were not structured, and coordination of the administrative units ineffective in the landscape of governing several cities and under constant threat of losing territory to government forces. The equalizing southern force would never reach power and the marginalization felt would become more experienced in the post war years as reconstruction efforts were designed to exclude key segments of the population and empower the Luanda elites. The evolution of the leadership, political ideology, and organisational changes of the 1990s would lead to the military defeat of the movement and the death of Savimbi, rendering UNITA unable to challenge for 15 years the MPLA’s hegemony.

The SPLM/A on the other hand was operating under a successful peace agreement, supported by international guarantors when Garang was killed in 2005. Reforms initiated by Garang that reflected the governing lessons of the CANS were discarded under the leadership of Salva Kiir yet the country would not derail given the specific roadmap of reforms and the large UN peacekeeping mission ahead of the 2011

independence referendum. The parallel state had been dismantled as a result of the CPA agreement and the intrusive state and nation-building agendas of international partners; the elements that had made it operate at the local level stagnated and were not built upon. The dysfunction of the SPLM/A as a party directing government policy became visible and it lost the ability to diffuse leadership disputes. It also lost the ability to project a vision for the independent state. Militarisation of power at the leadership levels in Juba and the local levels, coupled with corruption and nepotism, would lead to the ethnicization of politics and the fragmentation of the party, military and society. This evolution that began in 2005 culminated in the December 2013 crisis when the SPLM/A splintered into three factions and a new era of war started.

TIMELINE FOR SUBSEQUENT CRITICAL JUNCTURES



UNITA

1992 ● 1ST CRITICAL JUNCTURE : ELECTIONS & RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

The 1992 elections were the culmination of a process of political and security arrangements under the 1991 Bicesse agreement, monitored by the UN mission UNAVEM II. The results of the presidential polls revealed that a second round was necessary while the parliamentary polls revealed an MPLA win. Eight of the 12 opposition parties, including UNITA, contested the results and deemed the process fraudulent. Savimbi sent a team to negotiate the situation while he prepared for war. On the 31st of October the MPLA, armed supporters, paramilitary police and the army staged the Halloween massacre. Over 10,000 UNITA supporters and some of its leaders are estimated to have been killed.

UNITA was already suffering from an internal crisis and political isolation before the 1992 elections. The killing of UNITA's representative in the US Tito Chingunji in 1991 created the deepest fissure among the founding leaders of the movement. In the run-up to the 1992 elections N'zau Puna and Tony Fernandes left the party, initiating a period of fragmentation within UNITA that continued until the end of the war. In the aftermath of the 1992 elections, UNITA was left with severe internal fragilities. It had lost key leaders (the VP, SG and other commanders in the massacre in Luanda), and had also lost several key commanders and military units to the national army in accordance with the Bicesse agreements' DDR process.

In a series of military victories UNITA gains control of several provincial capitals including Huambo, M'Banza Congo, Ndalatando and Caxito, and several areas in the Lundas provinces that gave it access to diamonds

1993 ● In January war breaks out in 10 of the 18 provincial capitals. UNITA had conquered by August over 70% of the territory though these were short term gains as government forces began to retake many areas, leading to new negotiations. In mid-1993 the US declares UNITA a threat to its interests in Angola, permanently damaging the alliance. Over 18 months, following the 1992 elections, over 120,000 died (half the casualty rate of the previous 16 years) revealing the ferocity of the fighting on both sides. UNITA's governance of several cities in the Central Highlands is deemed as an occupation by many, rejecting the movement. The first set of UN sanctions are applied in September against UNITA.

1994 ● Lusaka Agreement is signed providing for a power-sharing formula and a new DDR process. Weak implementation and mistrust on both sides continues.

1997 ● Taking of office of the Government of National Unity as per the Lusaka protocol. UNITA does not allow the government to take residence of several cities. The second set of UN sanctions are applied against UNITA.

1998 ● In December 1998 the MPLA's Fourth Congress, Dos Santos rejects the Lusaka agreement, asks the UN to leave, and declares that peace will be achieved through war.

1999 ● Loss of HQs and return to guerrilla warfare after successive military defeats. Following the loss of Bailundu in December 1998, the second of UNITA's HQs Andulo is captured in February 1999. By December the government estimates that they had destroyed over 80% of UNITA's military capability. In late 2000, UNITA loses its access to the diamond areas. UNITA suffers a series of high level military defections. The military wing is divided into 5 guerrilla zones.

2002 ● 2ND CRITICAL JUNCTURE : DEATH OF SAVIMBI & LUENA PEACE ACCORDS

Following successive military defeats, increased isolation, logistical collapse, years of government scorched earth policy, and even famine, UNITA divided its leaders into different columns. Government forces begin advancing on Moxico towards Savimbi where they ambush and kill him. Despite the loss of territory, civilian support and internal purges, at the time of the ceasefire UNITA still had 90,000 troops that remained loyal as well as over 450,000 family members – the majority of whom went either into IDP camps or quartering areas for demobilisation.

2003 ● Party congress and election of Samakuva. UNITA holds its IX party congress with over 1500 delegates and Isaias Samakuva is elected overwhelmingly.

2008 ● Elections UNITA becomes a residual political force. It loses 54 seats in Parliament, managing to only get 10% of the national vote.

2012 ● Splinters before the elections with the creation of CASA-CE but manages to increase its seats in Parliament

2017 ● Elections UNITA and opposition challenge MPLA hegemony

Angola experienced its third post-war elections on the 23rd of August 2017. All the opposition parties rejected the official results that attributed 61% of the vote to the MPLA claiming that their parallel tabulation process revealed that the ruling party lost its majority, and the real result was closer to 54%. For the first time the opposition, in particular UNITA, are believed to have won the vote in several provinces.

TIMELINE FOR SUBSEQUENT CRITICAL JUNCTURES



SPLM/A

2005 1ST CRITICAL JUNCTURE : DEATH OF GARANG & CPA TRANSITIONS

Three weeks into his tenure as First Vice President, Garang is killed in a helicopter crash. Months before his death, several fault lines were emerging at the leadership level- the most notable one being the Rumbek crisis in 2004 before the signing of the CPA which saw Salva Kiir threaten to oppose Garang in a similar manner as Riek Machar had in 1991. Although there was no obvious successor, Salva Kiir takes the leadership of the party. He abandons all of Garang's policies to direct the development of the South. Kiir stops working for unity and begins moving towards secession, creating a deep division with the "Garangist" leaders of the party, including the Secretary General Pagan Amum. Developments during the 6-year transitional period revealed a rudderless SPLM/A that reacted to crises and was torn by internal divisions. The SPLM continued to expect international donors and NGOs to continue providing and funding key sectors – in particular service provision.

2006 'Big tent' strategy and Lafon Declaration that integrates Paulino Matiep's militias and begins a process of absorbing several government-allied militias.

2008 SPLM/A Second convention and leadership crisis develops as several commanders position themselves to take the chairmanship, including Riek Machar. A solution was found to bring Machar in as Kiir's deputy followed by James Wani Igga and Malik Agar below him. This was meant to ensure balance of the different regions.

2010 Elections and subsequent insurrections. The SPLM/A and the NCP become entrenched as the ruling parties in the South and North respectively. The SPLM mismanages its candidate nominations leading to several running as independents. Several who were side-lined by the SPLM's nomination process took up arms against it including George Athore, David Yau Yau and Gatluak Gai that led local uprisings – mainly in Greater Upper Nile. The party suffers a splintering before the elections as Lam Akol forms his own party – the SPLM/Democratic Change.

2011 Referendum and independence in July. Southerners vote overwhelmingly to separate from Sudan with 97% in favour of secession.

2012 Oil shutdown following a dispute with Khartoum. In the midst of difficult negotiations in Addis between Sudan and South Sudan over several issues resulting from secession, tensions reach a breaking point with the South accusing Sudan of stealing its oil. It proceeds to shut down all oil operations. Over 90% of Juba's revenues came from oil.

2013 2ND CRITICAL JUNCTURE : SPLM/A LEADERSHIP DISPUTE & CIVIL WAR

The divisions within the leadership of the SPLM/A, made more pronounced after Garang's death, had led to the party becoming increasingly divided. In Kiir's big tent approach the composition of the government and key positions in the army reflected the integration of groups outside of the SPLM, further marginalising key leaders and their constituencies. Mid 2013 the cabinet, Riek Machar and the SG of the party are dismissed. Machar, Garang's widow Rebecca Nyandeng and SG Pagan Amum openly criticise Kiir and emerge as challengers to the chairmanship. Overnight Kiir dismantles his big tent approach and divides the political and military elites, placing many against the SPLM. Following a press conference where these leaders and several other senior commanders and cadres criticise Kiir and call for an NLC meeting, fighting erupts in Juba in December. House to house searches target Nuer civilians and Machar barely escapes Juba. The army splits along the Nuer-Dinka fault lines. Machar begins his rebellion and the Nuer seek revenge against the killing of their kinsmen and massacre Dinka in Bor. The party splits into three factions: one led by Kiir, one led by Machar and the non-armed group led by Pagan Amum.

2015 SPLM Reunification agreement and ARCISS peace agreement.

2016 Collapse of ARCISS and more fractured and ethnicised war.

Leadership and Ideology

Just like leadership and ideology/political programs had been the main drivers of the movements' ability to survive the critical junctures of 1976 and 1991, they remained the key contributing factors to the way the movements responded to the subsequent critical junctures leading to defeat (UNITA) and internal war (SPLM/A). When the vision of the founding leaders died the SPLM/A and UNITA changed even further. In post-independence politics, the SPLM/A lost its political direction, lacked a nationalist vision and all of the "Garangists" turned against Kiir. Political structures were further destroyed and policy was conducted on a personalized basis with military power (several SPLM/A elites developed private militias) determining political positions in government. Neither Isaias Samakuva (who has been the President of UNITA since 2002 nor Salva Kiir Mayardit (who took over the SPLM/A in 2005 as Chairman) were as capable of steering the party's political vision in the same way to avoid factionalism and determine effective mobilizing strategies for peacetime politics.

After 1992, Savimbi lost internal and external support; his paranoia and party purges, as well as escalation in military operations, would lead to greater atrocities being committed against the civilian population. UNITA would face international isolation, crippling international sanctions and constant defections of military leaders. Savimbi lost the political control of the liberation in 1992 and failed to repackage the political message in a way that justified another decade of war. Samakuva was left with the difficult task of shedding the movement's brutal and militarized image, which he managed to achieve. Yet under Samakuva, the party split (in 2012 with the creation of CASA-CE under the leadership of UNITA leader Abel Chivukuvuku) and has only in the last few years

managed to rally and reorganize its support base. UNITA today claims to have 3.1 million card carrying members. This was a result of the political strength and party structures that UNITA had built during the 1980s. However, as the main opposition party in Angola today, it continues to be outmaneuvered by the MPLA and has failed to capitalize on its governing failures. It has also failed to define a unifying political message to integrate different constituencies.

Once Kiir took over the SPLM/A he abandoned the policies that Garang had defined for peacetime state-building: 1) to launch the 'towns to villages' strategy in all 1000 payams in the country as a program for rural development; 2) to link the local level to the central command by creating non-ethnic caretaker governments with key commanders being deployed to govern areas other than their own; 3) to develop a nationwide civil service integrating CANS and government structures; 4) to professionalize, downsize and streamline the SPLA into a national army; and 6) to institute party reforms to allow the SPLM to become a policy vehicle driven by collective leadership principles. Kiir instead sought to manage governance challenges through the "big tent" approach of integrating militias and disaffected politicians which further diluted the SPLM/A's political definition. Garang had done this during the war and Kiir failed to understand that such a strategy in peacetime would militarise politics. During the first 6 years of Kiir's tenure the country was implementing the CPA peace agreement and there was a clear governance agenda defined by the international community. After independence in 2011, the country was lacking a vision for a post-independent nation. The party structures remained underdeveloped and the SPLM/A was unable to direct government. After independence politics reverted to a level of militarisation which would lead to the party's implosion in December 2013.

Ideologically, both UNITA and the SPLM/A in the subsequent critical junctures failed to realign the political identities that they had devised during the war with new political programs in peacetime. Even during the war, merely having an anti-identity (rejecting the identity imposed by the state) was not enough for these two movements. They had proposed alternatives as direct responses to a sense of exclusion of Angolans in the interior and south and southerners in the Sudan. In perpetuating a sense of continued imperialism and revisited colonialism from Khartoum and Luanda both UNITA and the SPLM/A became the vehicles to emancipate the populations they deemed as experiencing this marginalisation. Neither movement managed to reinvent this wartime rhetoric to continue mobilising constituent support with peacetime programs that would politically separate them from other political actors and reinforce the legitimacy they had sought. The SPLM/A as a government failed to essentially achieve what the ANC has astutely managed to do, even while failing as a government to address socio-economic issues. The ANC managed to retain the exclusivity of representing the excluded and the masses, which has sustained its liberation credentials despite facing its strongest challenges and leadership crisis under President Jacob Zuma. UNITA on the other hand began depicting itself as the opposing force to the MPLA by default of the governments' failings. It failed for almost 15 years to produce and manipulate a political identity of exclusion for its supporters (uniting other communities that remained represented by other parties PRS and FNLA) when all the ingredients were present: the MPLA's nepotism, corruption, elite enrichment, partisan state institutions etc. UNITA instead tried to make inroads into MPLA strongholds like Luanda which it managed to by virtue of the MPLA's governing failures rather than its own political program for reform.

Organisation and Approach to Civilians

At the organizational level, there were obvious alterations during peacetime. The very weaknesses and strengths revealed during the war at the organizational level were replicated in peacetime despite the need to alter their form and their objectives. As an opposition party UNITA abandoned the majority of its structures that functioned as a shadow state despite maintaining its shadow cabinet. Although it disbanded, many wartime institutions after 2002 as it fully demobilized and disarmed, UNITA came to reactivate a few after a decade of peacetime politics. The BRINDE was said to have been redeployed to provide intelligence to keep the leadership safe from constant security threats by the government; and cadre training schools began functioning in Huambo province to continue building political structures and cadres. In the 1990s UNITA's priority was in securing territory and military victories, it abandoned many of the strategies to politically govern the populations leaving many "UNITA" communities to feel abandoned.⁶⁸⁶ It built an extensive diamond extraction enterprise and distribution network that maintained services in the liberated areas but these were ultimately turned towards military operations and the leadership's survival. As the ministry governing resources, MIRNA would become the most strategic of the administrative branches. The organization had become even more coercive but without the political justification to attempt to secure support and mobilization. The fact that UNITA was losing territory

⁶⁸⁶ interviews conducted between 2004 and 2012, in several areas of Luanda, and the provinces of Huambo and Moxico with ex-combatants and cadres that felt that the UNITA leadership after 2003 had focused on building their credibility in Luanda and forgot "their people" in the rural areas.

easily in the mid-1990s meant it was unable to continue running leadership schools, skills training and health care programs in the same way.

The SPLM/A on the other hand remained a highly militarized organization where party seniority reflected military hierarchy of the wartime Politico Military High Command. Internal leadership disputes emerged and took ethnic dimensions as the party failed to accommodate divergent interests and build the political structures necessary to curb the tendency for power grabs from particular elites. The SPLM/A would retain its amassed army and integrate several militias rather than streamlining the SPLA in preparation for northern aggression ahead of the 2011 referendum. Party organs would become redundant as policy was being directed from government by Kiir and a group of non-SPLM leaders, creating divisions within the party. Decentralization efforts during the transitional years and after independence failed to link local leaders to the central government and further isolated the local level, allowing ethnic fiefdoms to emerge and under the domains of key commanders. The SPLM/A would continue to expect international agencies to provide services to its population, running and funding almost exclusively the education and health ministries⁶⁸⁷, and would struggle to manage its oil revenues. As a result of these organizational shifts, catapulted by changes at the levels of leadership and ideology/political program, both movements reduced their support bases and narrowed their socio-political areas of operation.

⁶⁸⁷ interview former Education Minister, February 2016, Juba.

In their approaches to civilians, UNITA and the SPLM/A also faced several challenges. Civilians, chiefs and community leaders compare the experiences of war with the experiences of peacetime state-building and judge the mistakes committed in much harsher ways. Throughout the research, this comparison was constantly made at the civilian and cadre level despite the atrocities committed and the recurring mistakes made by both movements throughout the war. Here the level of memory and nostalgia play an important role but it also alerts to the level of impact sustained by societies and communities when experiencing orders that create certain expectations that never materialize. In South Sudan, the SPLM/A is judged with the same level of intensity as that experienced in Angola despite the movement being the same organization running the wartime and peacetime reform programs. In Angola, the people emerging from UNITA areas were in many cases estranged by the functioning of the MPLA government. For the South Sudanese the CANS, despite their shortcomings and inefficiencies, created an expectation of greater proximity between the governed and the governors that never materialized given the power plays between Juba and the peripheries. Because of their experience under UNITA's social order certain groups of cadres became more critical of the lack of services post-war and the inability to apply the skills training and education they had received under UNITA. They were denied a role in peacetime reconstruction as all sectors were dominated by Specialist Committees of the MPLA that determined who was eligible for employment.

The closest the peacetime SPLM came to achieving the level of unity and mass support as during the 1990s came during the 2011 referendum and the 6 months that followed until independence was formalized. Since the 2013 war the ethnicization of the party and political groups has increased. President Kiir is openly accused of promoting Dinka

hegemony and instigating ethnic massacres against the Nuer, the Equatorian groups, the Fertit, Murle, Shilluk and other communities. UNITA's relations with civilians was badly affected by the 1992-2002 war. Mass human rights violations had been occurring against civilian populations during this decade. Rebuilding trust and support in peacetime would become a huge challenge. UNITA would only begin regaining any political strength after the 2012 elections by mobilizing in key strongholds, venturing into other areas and placing young leaders in key positions to appeal to the youth.

Analysing these subsequent critical junctures in this summarized way is difficult yet it serves to place the trajectory highlighted by the rebel-system into a context that allows for these junctures to be understood as a continuum of politics and previous strategies. Ideology and leadership would continue as drivers of the subsequent changes. For both movements, this means that a future reconstitution of any political and social legitimacy will have to be grounded on the strength of leadership and political ideology, if both have any hope of surviving future challenges. UNITA will have to do this as an opposition party in peacetime politics where the MPLA looms large, and the SPLM/A as a government contested and fought on all sides by several ethnic groups.

Reflections on the State and Nation

This study of UNITA and the SPLM/A was ambitious in both its scope and its objective. Although it was a study about reform rebels and wartime governance, the analysis of the rebel-system provided for a much needed nuanced understanding of protracted wars, nationalism and state-making. The following are some reflections of these themes,

offering not final answers to their complexities, but merely a few angles of analysis to consider.

This thesis considered the many binaries of reformist wars: two opposing states, clashing conceptions of the nation, two opposing societal formulations, parallel economic structures and programmes, and two forms of sovereignty. In each side of these equations the political order was organised around the prospect of violence and existentialist destruction but also rebirth and restoration. This type of war and the rebels fighting it highlighted the crisis of the nation-state in Angola and Sudan where the conceptions of a stable territory, containable population, conformity and homogeneity, and identifiable sovereignty were challenged on many fronts. During specific periods of both wars, social order, legitimacy, authority, and a form of responsive governance coexisted with the many forms of destruction. As a result this study allows us to ask questions about the *state* as a fluid, temporal and shifting entity, and about the different dimensions of state-making. The parallel state, like the state it aimed to destroy, became a crucial part of the functioning set of boundaries, hierarchies, codes of conduct, socio-economic and political motivations that sustained heterogeneous communities within the nation-state. This study presented the many formulations of the *nation* and therefore also allows us to ask questions about nationalism and the type of nation envisaged by these reform rebels and the populations they represented.

The study of the SPLM/A and UNITA highlights how the parallel state was a fundamental resistance tool to the contested central state. Its symbols and structures embedded the “state” in the minds and lived experience of its constituents; it mediated the idea of a

liberated, normalised and reformed “state” that could function during wartime; and enhanced the power of the local/ peripheral levels as catalysts for state-making , not on the margins or borderlands of war but at the very heart of the conflict. Tilly’s historical understanding that “war makes states”⁶⁸⁸, and that war is not synonymous with chaos where no order prevails when “clearly, order is necessary for managing violence as much as the threat of violence is crucial in cementing order”⁶⁸⁹ is an experience that cuts across divergent contexts and conflicts. Although today, externally driven models of state-building, global changes in warfare, and the privatisation of coercion and capital, and other features of current wars may bring into question if these continue to make states⁶⁹⁰, the experience of parallel states throughout Africa, the Middle East and Latin America shows that the interactions between violence, ideology and the organizational survival of second liberations can produce a “state”. However, the making of the state in the case of UNITA and the SPLM/A, moved beyond Tilly’s fiscal-military paradigm of coercion, extraction, distribution and production, and included the development of organisations and interactions that were aimed at socialization, regulation and normalization.⁶⁹¹ They sought to introduce certainty, predictability and procedure into what was otherwise an environment characterised by mass violence, destruction and disintegration.

⁶⁸⁸ Tilly, Charles, “War Making and State Making as organised Crime”, p. 183, in Evans, Peter; Rueschemeyer, Dietrich; Skocpol, Theda (eds), 1985, *Bringing Back the State*, Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁸⁹ Kalyvas, Stasis; Shapiro, Ian; Masoud, Tarek (eds), 2008, *Order, Conflict and Violence*, Cambridge University Press, p.1.

⁶⁹⁰ Leander, Anna, “War and the Un-Making of States: Taking Tilly Seriously in the Contemporary World”, in Guzzini, Stefano, and Jung, Dietrich (eds), 2004, *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, Routledge.

⁶⁹¹ Pincus, Steve; and Robinson, James, “Wars and State-Making Reconsidered: The Rise of the Interventionist State”, 2013, URL: www.law.nyu. (online version).

The parallel state also shed light on the temporal utility of the state, serving different purposes at different times, under the guise of different political principles and social objectives. It considered the mobility and fluidity of institutions and interests bringing the analysis of the *state* into a lens of transition and constant transformation. The state adapted in this way, not only to times of peace or war, but to fulfil particular objectives of the governors and the governed. It refracted the dynamics of what Appadurai termed as the “anxiety of incompleteness” as the idea and construction of a majority brought into question the primary identity of the nation and by extension of who was entitled to become full citizens of that state.⁶⁹² The parallel state and its “imagined community”⁶⁹³ attempted to define Angola and Sudan through the representations of UNITA and the SPLM/A. It was in this “incompleteness” that the state and nation were reconceived and created. Both movements did this by layering state-making on several tangibles and intangibles through which the state was constructed, experienced and imagined. The parallel state challenged in this way the assumption of the fixed boundaries and a unified set of rules of states, considering rather the shifting, procedural and spatial nature of state-making so that it was in the images and practices of the state where power and authority were generated in dynamic, integrated and contradictory ways. In this way, both state actors and rebels managed to ‘see’ and ‘do’ the state.⁶⁹⁴ The parallel states of UNITA and the SPLM/A provided in this way two examples of the transient, paradoxical and contingent nature of state-making. It was in the very search for the state and the power of reconfigured sovereignty of different national communities that different

⁶⁹² Appadurai, Arjun, 2006, *Fear of Small Numbers. An Essay on the Geography of Anger*, Duke University Press, p. 8.

⁶⁹³ Anderson, 1983

⁶⁹⁴ Migdal, Joel, and Schlichte, Klaus, “Rethinking the State” p. 14, in Schlichte, Klaus (ed), 2005, *The Dynamics of States, The Formation and Crises of State Domination*, Routledge.

political orders were formed during wartime. These states were simultaneously local in their character and examples of the dynamics and master cleavages of their wars, societies and governing organisations (rebel movements). The state in these two cases was born from the interests, strategies, values and interactions of the governors and the governed; continuously reconfiguring authority, legitimacy and contestation. The design, processes and structures of the parallel states were profoundly influenced by the internal characteristics of the movements, in particular the leadership dynamics, the organisational strengths, the level of resources (human, material, logistical) and the function and symbolism attributed to certain structures and institutions. They took particular forms because of the very character and strategies of these movements. This sheds light on the influence of ruling parties, leadership and elite dynamics on the state itself; after all, institutions are people and the individuals that create and operate them that will influence their political culture.

This thesis also reveals important aspects of the particular nationalisms produced by reformist rebel governments. The parallel state was a sub-nation state that “extrude(d) blood” (by engaging) in acts of exclusion, cleansing and purification.⁶⁹⁵ In order to understand the condition upon which the “nation” and the “state” was redefined under UNITA and the SPLM/A it was necessary to delve deeply into the ideology of nationalism that both provided. Their nationalism was “produced – or better it (was) induced – by *political* [and cultural and economic] *fields* of particular kinds. Its dynamics (were) governed by the properties of political fields, not by the properties of collectivities”.⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹⁵ Appadurai, 2006, referenced in Korf and Raeymaekers, 2013: 254

⁶⁹⁶ Brubaker, Rogers, 1996, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationalism and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge University Press, p.17.

The “nations” produced by UNITA and the SPLM/A were rather a contingent event instead of a result of enduring and substantial collectivities.⁶⁹⁷ Yet the form and nature of the resulting state and sovereignty were intrinsically linked to the process of sub-nationalism and the symbols and beliefs that bound and divided communities that were redefining their collectivity at different stages of the war and socially reengineering a nation.

The nationalism of these two reform rebellions was derived at the sub-national level of divided societies, incorporating local grievances with national objectives; it was aimed not at seeking political independence but rather seeking reform and asserting a new national identity that would integrate the “excluded”. This nationalism was very different from those experienced during the anti-colonial wars or during secessionist wars. It was aimed at creating a cohesive identity from fractured landscapes using these very cleavages to define their right and duty to rebel. Yet to justify war and mobilise constituents, a new concept of the state and society had to be proposed becoming in essence a struggle for the “soul” of the nation. Those defined by the rebel movements as their constituents – the excluded and marginalised – had in this way experienced a form of “segmented sovereignty” where they had only partial rights, entitlements and access to services, making them the ideal group in need of another form of sovereignty.⁶⁹⁸ State-making therefore became the process of creating the bases upon which this new national community could be enacted and sustained through a myriad of structures, processes and practices. The evolving nature of war and political contest, transnationally and locally

⁶⁹⁷ Brubaker, 1996: 21.

⁶⁹⁸ Migdal, Joel, “State Building and the Non-Nation-State”, *Journal of International Affairs* 58:1, 2004.

defined, will increasingly see the emergence of a different type of nationalism based on sub-national identities that attempt to mask their very local nature and the paradoxical objective of un-making the nation by the reforms proposed. What differentiates it from past nationalisms is the degree of inversion. Whereas nationalism inverted reality by “claim(ing) to defend folk culture while in fact (it was) forging a high culture; it (was) claim(ing) to protect an old folk society while in fact helping to build up an anonymous mass society”⁶⁹⁹, sub-nationalism used the national platform to empower local society and attempted to bond the micro and the macro by fundamentally rejecting the macro-nationalist identity of the past. It used sub-nationalist identities, needs and values to form the micro-level solidarity necessary to connect it to the larger nationalist narratives of war. The nationalism of UNITA and the SPLM/A placed a set of grievances and multiple inequalities, superimposed on each other to emerge as political fault-lines, in terms of how they could be corrected and empowered to form the backbone of the “real” nation. Both aimed to impose their versions of the nation and its corresponding state-idea, in a heterogeneous setting that they could not unite. Given that “nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a universal necessity”⁷⁰⁰ the shifts they experienced during wartime affected the identities of communities and the collective interpretations of history, war and injustice. The legacy of this type of sub-nation nationalism is still felt in both countries and has in Angola become an impediment to reintegration and reconciliation and in South Sudan it has morphed and scaled down to the sub-community level.

⁶⁹⁹ Gellner, 1983:124.

⁷⁰⁰ Gellner, 1983: 6.

The importance of understanding the micro-dynamics of civil war⁷⁰¹, the micro-foundations of nationalism and state-making, and the logic of mobilisation and strategy of political actors bent on implementing deep structural reforms is key to understanding the many forms of the state and by extension the contours of multi-nation states. The study of parallel statehood and nationhood cannot afford to ignore these interlinkages so that a greater dialogue between concrete and detailed empirical evidence of wartime rebel state-making can enhance an understanding of nationalism, state-building, and protracted civil war.

Final Remarks

Understanding the parallel state and aspects of the war in both countries is key to understanding what they are facing today. Just like the SPLM/A and UNITA emerged as a response to and partly from the past struggles for liberation and peace, the future of South Sudan and Angola will carry elements of its past. UNITA's military defeat and the SPLM/A's taking of office did not erase the effects that the experiences of wartime governance had on the population, on state-society relations, how perceptions of justice and freedom were formed, how expectations were (mis)managed and different identities reconciled. The residual effects of the experiences of living under UNITA and the SPLM are evident in the interviews of many leaders, civilians and lower level cadres who reflect about the time they were stakeholders in the future of the country. Even if these recollections are merely symbolic and sustained by a distorted recollection of history, they reveal how the political orders of Angola and South Sudan are still divided along

⁷⁰¹ Kalyvas, 2008:397

several of the same fault lines with differing degrees of state disengagement, real or perceived marginalisation, social division, and lack of national unifying symbols. They also reveal the difficulty of building a state out of the ashes of war and after wartime governance that sustained competing ideas of the state, nation and society.

This thesis examines an important part of Angola and South Sudan's history, through the testimonies of several UNITA and the SPLM/A's leaders, their supporters and their defectors. Although at opposing poles of victors' revisionism (SPLM/A) and a fight of the defeated against historical denial (UNITA), history has become a political tool that too often ignores the lessons provided of unreconciled societies, disputed political legitimacy and imperfect state and nation-building exercises. Both countries are facing a mismanaged transition from war to peace despite one having resulted in a military victory and the other in a negotiated settlement.

Angola and South Sudan are once again experiencing forms of contestation. South Sudan is engulfed in a conflict system that is taking genocidal proportions where the response on all sides is the collective punishment of communities. The history of the liberation and the SPLM/A has for now ceased to be important. It no longer holds a unifying capacity as the leadership in Juba remains unable and unwilling to reactivate the structures of the party to decentralize power and decision-making and reverse the usurpation of power by Dinka elites. As a failed state, South Sudan has few if any institutions that can rebuild confidence in the state and begin repairing the damage caused to the country's social and political fabric. While Angola is still at peace, the exclusionary politics pursued by MPLA elites have continued unabated since 2002. Entire segments of the population survive

outside formal structures and do not recognize the legitimacy of the government. In Angola, a popular expression has cemented these dynamics with the peace divided enriching the elites, where oil “wealth had generated poverty” and where the “poor are combated and not poverty”.⁷⁰² The marginalisation of several constituencies and sense of discrimination used by UNITA to advance its own political agenda during the war are still realities in Angola. The contestation of societies and war of visions remain symbolic and relational realities, though in different forms, and today UNITA and the SPLM/A carry the responsibility of bringing their constituencies towards consensus to help lay the foundations for new post-conflict socio-economic and political relations.

⁷⁰² Popular expressions used by the urban youth and intellectuals in Luanda, interviews conducted at the Catholic University, November 2015.

APPENDIX 1: Acronyms Used

ANC - African National Congress

BRINDE - *Brigada Nacional de Defesa do Estado* (Brigade for the State's National Defence)

CANS - Civil Authority for a New Sudan

CDRF - County Development Revolving Fund

CEKK- *Centro de Formação Comandante Kapese Kafundanga* (Commander Kapese Kafundanga Leadership School)

CENFIM – *Centro de Formação Integral da Juventude* (Centre for the Formation of the Youth)

CHA - County Health Authority

CMA- Civil-Military Administrator

CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement

COPE - *Commando Operacional Estrategico* (Strategic Operational Command)

DIVITAC - *Divisão de Transmissões do Alto Comandante* (Transmissions Division of the Commander in Chief)

EPLF – Eritrean People's Liberation Front

ETAPE - Technical School for Agriculture and Livestock

FALA – *Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola* (Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola)

FAPLA – *Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola* (Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola)

FNLA – Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola

GFSCC - General Field Staff Command Council of the SPLM/A

GITOP - *Gabinete de Intercepção Técnico e Operacional* (Office of Operational and Technical Interception)

GNU - Government of National Unity

GOSS - Government of South Sudan

IDEAS - Institute of Development Environment and Agricultural Studies

INGOS – International Non-Governmental Organisations

IPCS – Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society

JURA – Juventude Revolucionaria de Angola (UNITA's Youth League)

KUPA - Kwatcha UNITA Press

LIMA – Liga da Mulher Angolana (UNITA’s Women’s League)

MIRNA – Ministerio dos Recursos Naturais (Ministry of Natural Resources)

MPLA – Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola

MRDA - Mundri Relief and Development Association

MSF - *Medecins San Frontiers*

NCP – National Congress Party

NHA - National Health Authority

NAPEC – National Political and Executive Committee of the SPLM/A

NEC – National Executive Council of the SPLM/A

NLC – National Liberation Council of the SPLM/A

NRM- National Resistance Movement

NSCC - New Sudan Council of Churches

NSYA - New Sudan Youth Association

OFICENGUE – *Oficina de Guerra* (Central Workshop of War Material)

OLS – Operation Lifeline Sudan

PAIGC – Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde

PMHC – Politico-Military High Command of the SPLM/A

REOP - *Repartição de Obras Publicas* (Public Works Department)

RM – UNITA Military Regions

SADF – South African Defence Force

SAELT - *Serviço de Agua e Electricidade* (Water and Electricity Service)

SINGOS – Indigenous NGOS in South Sudan

SMC - Sudan Medical Care

SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

SPLM-Nasir – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement - Nasir

SRRA- Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association

SSG - *Serviço de Segurança Geral* (General Security Service)

STAR - Sudan Transitional Assistance Rehabilitation

TREC - Timber Resources Evaluation Committee

UNITA – União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola

VORGAN - The *Voz da Resistência do Galo Negro* (Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockrel)

YAFA- Yambio Farmers Association

APPENDIX 2: List of Interviews

Interviews conducted for the SPLM/A case-study SOUTH SUDAN (February – October 2012)

Juba, Central Equatoria State and National Capital

Name	Position
Mr BW	SPLM cadre, worked at the Council of States, critic of current government
Justice Deng Biong	Key legislator for the movement and customary law expert
Prof Alfred Lukoji (3 interviews)	civil society member and intellectual; Professor at Juba University; critic of the government and SPLM
Mrs MKK	Former head of Women's organization and current MP, critic of the government
General Daniel Awet Akot	Member of PMHC; third in command after John Garang; former Minister of Interior; current Presidential advisor
General Edward Lino (2 interviews)	key commander and former Head of Military Intelligence; in opposition and a critic of the government
Gabriel Alaak Garang	Finance Director SPLM, remains with the government
Timothy Tut Choul	Former local government officer in Greater Upper Nile, former MP
Dr Luka Biong Deng	Former Minister in Presidency, Professor at Juba University; intellectual and currently living outside of the country
Mr AN	Leading SPLM Political commissar, currently with the government
Akol Paul	SPLM Youth Leader, current Deputy Minister for Information

Elijah Malok (2 interviews)	Former head of SRRA humanitarian wing, former Governor of Central Bank
Dr Aleu Garang Aleu (2 interviews)	Former State Prosecutor Ministry of Justice, worked as a CANS official in Rumbek
Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth (2 interviews)	Current Minister of Petroleum, NLC member, formerly allied to Riek Machar in opposition
Gabriel Mathiang Rok	Former speaker of the NLC, retired from politics
Canon Clement Janda (3 interviews)	member of South Sudan Council of Churches, former member of Council of States, in Exile in Uganda, Equatorial leader/Elder
Gabriel Gabriel Deng (2 interviews)	Former Director General Ministry Parliamentary Affairs, intellectual, in opposition
Atem Garang Atem (2 interviews)	Former Chief Whip of SPLM during CPA, intellectual, supports the government
James Wani Igga (2 interviews)	Current Vice President, member of PMHC in succession line for Chairmanship
Dr Lual Deng	Former Head of development strategy for CANS, Phd Economics, formerly with the World Bank, current head of Think Tank
Atem Yaak Atem (2 interviews)	Journalist, former founding member of SPLA radio, former Deputy Minister of Information
Dr Steven Abraham Yar	Formerly with Coordination Council-Khartoum civil Service; joined Ministry of Cabinet Affairs
Dr James Okuk	Lecturer at Juba University, Opposition member
Dr Peter Adwok Nyaba	leader and intellectual, defected in 1991 and returned to movement; former Minister for Higher Education and currently in exile

Mr RT	Former head of Local NGO, agronomist and development expert Equatoria
Dr Steven Wonda	Former Auditor General, former Ambassador
Dr William Kon Bior	Former CANS legal Expert; practicing lawyer
Martin Okeruk	Former MP, Former minister of Housing, Close aid to John Garang
Colonel LL	SPLA officer, close to former Minister of National Security
Mr DM	Former SPLA officer, working with international NGOs
Peter Longole	Former commander in Eastern Equatoria, former MP
David Deng Athorbei	Current Minister of Finance, former CANS Secretary; close to Garang
Kosti Manibe	Former Minister of Finance; former CANS Humanitarian Affairs Secretary and previously with the Sudan Council of Churches; in opposition
Michael Makwei	Current Minister of Information, former Minister of parliamentary affairs, former CANS legislator
Pagan Amum (3 interviews)	Former SPLA commander; Former SPLM Secretary General, key opposition leader for the SPLM faction known as SPLM-FDs (Former Detainees)
General Majak D'Agoot	Former SPLA commander; former Deputy Defence Minister; in opposition as part of SPLM-FDs
Philip Thon Leek	Former MP; former Head of FACE schools and former Governor of Jonglei
Dr Valerio Awoy	Leading member of CANS Health Ministry
Pascal Bandidi (2 interviews)	Former MP; former CANS Agriculture Secretary

Dr Anne Itto	Current Presidential Advisor; Former Civil society leader; former Deputy SPLM Secretary general
General James Hoth Mai	Former SPLA Chief of Staff; former commander; aligned to government
Lt Coronel AM	Former aid to SPLA Chief of staff; current Governor of one of the 32 states
Gier Chuang	former commander and Head of Communications for the SPLM/A; former Minister; in opposition
John Luk	Former Minister of Legal Affairs; key SPLM/A legislator, defector in 1991 and returned to movement; in opposition
General Oyay Deng Ajak	Former commander and former Chief of Staff for Garang; former Minister of National Security; in opposition
General Malual Ayom Dor	Current SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration; former commander and director of SPLA production

Interviews in Yei, Central Equatoria State

Mr RLG	Local SPLM political officer
Ms RC	Women's association and civil society
Mr LC	Community development organizer
Mr EJG	Founder of local NGO – CANS affiliated
Mr PM	Leader of local NGO – CANS affiliated
Mr Hj	Former CANS Bureaucrat
Rev Hilary Luate Adeba	Bishop of Yei
Mr AI	Former Yei payam Administrator; former coordination council member
Mr AS	Former SRRA County Secretary

Mr AD	Former Otogo payam Deputy Director
Mr VL	Civilian from Ombasi Boma
Mr CL	Former local CANS administrator

Interviews in Yambio, Western Equatoria State

Mary Biba (2 interviews)	first female commissioner in Yambio, retired from politics
Edward Bukulu (2 interviews)	Former Commissioner of CANS in Maridi; former Speaker for Yambio state legislator
Mr EA (3 interviews)	Former CANS bureaucrat; former Arrow Boys leader
Chief EE	Zande Chief
Mr PK	Former Yambio local Government official
Mr GOL	Former local SPLA officer
Chief EAP	Zande Chief
Richard Noti	Former speaker of WES State legislator
Mr AE	Former Secretary general of YAFA
Mr LM	Former Chairperson of YAFA
Mr SJ	Former Treasurer of YAFA
Mr BD	Former land officer
Chief Wilson Hassen Peni	Zande Paramount Chief
Mr RZ	civilian and former community leader Yambio
Colonel SB (2 interviews)	Former SPLA officer, former radio expert
Mrs MS	Former head of local Women's association
Executive Chief M	Zande Chief
Mr X	Elder, civilian 95 years old
Mr FF	Former Local official with SRRC

Mr DW	Former local government official
Mrs NE	Member of women's association
Mr MDA	Former Yambio SPLM State Secretary
Mr SJ	Headman
Mrs LC	Leader of Women's empowerment Group
Mr ST	Former local SPLM Secretary for youth
Mr DO	Former Deputy SPLM Secretary General for WES
Mr PK	Former Nzara SPLM Secretary
Mrs L	Former teacher and county inspector during CANS
Mr PJ	Former Director for documentation WES State government

Interviews conducted in New Site, Chukudum, Nathinga and Torit, Eastern Equatoria State

Captain GA	Former head of War veterans
Captain JB	Former bodyguard for John Garang
Chief KM	Dinka Chief
Mr MKG	EES state local government officer
Chief JA	Toposa Chief
Chief RL	Didinga Chief present at 1 st national convention
Colonel F	Former SPLA officer

**Interviews Conducted for UNITA Case study
ANGOLA (August 2012- February 2013)**

Luanda , Province of Luanda and National Capital

Brigadier Horacio Junjuvili (2 interviews)	Former chef de cabinet Savimbi; UNITA representative in Electoral commission since 2008
General Peregrino Chindondo Wambu (2 interviews)	Former head of Military Intelligence; COPE Member; integrated into FAA in 1990s; current legal advisor to Chief of Staff of FAA
General N	Former Front commander; defected in 1990s and integrated into FAA
Lt Colonel A (2 interviews)	Grew up in Jamba, stayed alongside Savimbi until the end, integrated into FAA in 2002
Lt Colonel AS	Grew up in Jamba, integrated into FAA in 2002
Brigadier Marcial Dachala	Former Spokesperson Presidency (Savimbi); Former Communication and Information Minister; UN sanctioned 1998
General Samuel Chiwale	UNITA founder and only surviving member of the 12 of China; former Chief of Staff of FALA; COPE member
General Camalata Numa (2 interviews)	former Secretary General and key commander; UNITA Chief of staff integrating the FAA alongside MPLA counterpart in 1991; UN sanctioned 1998; current MP
Alcides Sakala	Former UNITA representative in Germany and Belgium; Former Foreign Minister 1995; UNITA Spokesperson; current MP
Eng Ernesto Mulato	Formerly with UPA/ FNLA; Former Prime Minister in Jamba mid 1980s; Former Vice President of UNITA; current MP
General Paulo Lukamba "Gato" (2 interviews)	Former director of Savimbi's Office; former Secretary General; Former UNITA representative in Europe; Negotiated 2002 peace agreement, current MP
Adalberto da Costa Junior	Former UNITA representative in Italy, Spain and Portugal; Current MP - positioned as favourite to take over Presidency of UNITA in 2019

Chipindo Bonga (2 interviews)	Former Director of CENFIM (Orphans school in Jamba); also considered ideologue of the party
Isaias Samakuva (2 interviews)	Former UNITA representative to UK and later France; UNITA President since 2003
Abel Chivukuvuku	Former UNITA representative in Africa; Head UNITA parliamentary group in 1998 (under the GURN); Splintered in 2008 and formed CASA-CE; Current second largest opposition party leader
General Carlos Kandanda	FALA commander; UN Sanctioned in 1998; left UNITA and joined CASA-CE party in 2012
General Jacinto Bandua	Founding UNITA family, key commander that defected in 1999 after Savimbi ordered him to be killed; Current head of Psychological Warfare for FAA
Isaias Chitombi	former Governor of Jamba after 1992 ; current representative in Electoral Commission
Dr Ruben Sikato	former Health Minister; former Health Minister under Unity Government 1997; current MP
Miguel Nzau Puna	Former Interior Minister and COPE member; defected in 1991 and damaged UNITA's reputation; joined MPLA
General Antonino Chyiolo	Commander of First war; UN sanctioned in 1998; former Front commander; current secretary of UNITA veterans
General A	Commander in the first war 1966 and remained a military commander until 1990s.
General Vicente Vihemba	Commander first war 1966; former MP in 1997 under unity Government; current secretary for Social Affairs
Rafael Massango Sakaita Savimbi	Savimbi's son; current Deputy Secretary General of UNITA

Gen Demostenes Chilingutla	Key commander and former Chief of Staff of FALA 1978-85 and then again 1986
Clarice Caputo	Women's Association and current MP
Ms EC	LIMA member
Mrs GM	Daughter of UNITA hero; joined her father in the bush in 1979; LIMA member
Ms NC	Joined FALA aged 15; Former member of Battalion 89
Colonel JK	Savimbi's key map-maker; integrated into FAA in 2002
Jose Pedro Katchiungo	Former Chef de cabinet for Savimbi 1994/5; Member of External missions in Portugal; current MP
General Samuel Epalanga	Former Chief of Intelligence BRINDE; UN Sanctioned 1998; captured in 2002 by government forces
Jaka Jamba	Former Education Minister and historian of the movement
Eugenio Manuvakola	former head of JURA 1977; former Education Minister; leader of breakaway group UNITA- Renovada 1997; re-joins UNITA 2002
Brigadier FC	Former leading political commissar, Propaganda Department
Armino Kassesse	Former head of propaganda for eastern and Southern front 1978; former secretary for Information; Director of CEKK Leadership school

Interviews in Jamba, Province of Kuando Kubango

Those interviewed in Jamba lived in the base before in was captured in 1999 and returned to Jamba after 2003 from refugee camps in Zambia

Mr D	Captured civilian; Former military instructor worked with SANDF, current teacher in Jamba
Mr PP	Captured civilian 1984; Former teacher in Jamba High school

Mr EN	Recruited from Huambo 1989; Former nurse in Central Hospital
Mr DA	Captured civilian 1983; Former Vorgan radio operator
Captain C	Former military instructor, logistics unit and active UNITA supporter
Mrs M	LIMA member
Mrs K	LIMA Member, came to Jamba in 1985
Mrs A	LIMA member, worked in Agriculture organisation Agrupec
Mrs CC	Captured MPLA member; held prisoner in Jamba; current municipal administrator

Interviews in Huambo Province (Cities of Bailundo, Huambo, Dondo, Katchiungu)

Liberty Chiaka (2 interviews)	Former youth leader, grew up in Jamba; Provincial UNITA Representative; current MP
Mr E	Civilian that joined UNITA in 1960s; Elder from Jamba
Colonel AJC	Former Military Instructor in Jamba
Brigadier Menezes Sahepo	Former Director of MIRNA – Ministry of Resources
Mr JM	Former logistics unit; key communications operator in Bailundo and Andulo in 1990s and later in Ivory Coast
Mr CMI	Key agronomist worked in Ministry of agriculture in Jamba
Mr AH	Clandestine operations, later worked at Housing Ministry in Bailundu
Colonel VV	Former principal operator of military and leadership Communications
Valeriana Bandua	Founding member of UNITA
Mr AS	Civilian lived in Jamba
Father A	Priest that was forced to teach in Jamba, became a sympathiser

Brigadier Alvaro Mussili	key commander; trained in China; UN sanctioned 1998
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Interviews in Bie Province (cities of Angulo, Kuito)

General Eliote Ekolelo	Former FALA commander; former provincial Representative UNITA in Bie; current Secretary for social reintegration of Ex-combatants
General Severino Sawenda	Commander of the first war; Former Chief of Staff of FALA; retired in 2002
Mr ANL	Former National Secretary for youth in military (FALA)
Manuel Savihemba	Former Clandestine operations; became MP for UNITA in 1997 Unity Government; arrested in 1999 by MPLA government; Current MP
Vitorino Nhany	Former clandestine operations; worked in Agricultural secretariat in 1995; former Secretary general
Mr M	Former Director General of Central Logistics in Jamba
Mr C	Civilian lived in Jamba; considered an "elder"
Mr C	Former political commissar 1980-90s
Mr ES	Former civilian mobiliser
Mrs T	Former member of Battalion 89
Father J	Priest captured and forced to teach in Jamba High School in 1982
Colonel VC	Former Director of OFICENGUE from 1986; transferred to MIRNA in 1996 worked in diamond sector
Mr JC	Former communications officer in Jamba under DIVITAC

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