

THE ORIGINS OF THE 1897 OTTOMAN-GREEK WAR:
A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

A Master's Thesis

by

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THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

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A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis, pertaining to the underlying factors and developments of the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, focuses primarily on the political and diplomatic proceedings that took place between the Greek occupation of Crete on 13 February and the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire on 17 April. This war broke out, against the will of the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, as an outgrowth of the irredentist policies of Greece. The Ottoman Empire expected that the Great Powers would prevent war, but since the Powers could not take a unanimous decision for undertaking coercive measures on Greece, they left the two states alone. The Ottomans were willing to preserve peace, yet they finally declared war on Greece after the bands of Greek irregulars crossed the border. This monograph, based on a multi-sided bibliography including Ottoman and British official documents, intends to shed some light on the international politics of the time.

Keywords: 1897, Ottoman Empire, Greece, Concert of Europe, Abdülhamid II, Deligiannis, Ethnike Hetairia, Crete, Thessaly.

ÖZET

1897 OSMANLI-YUNAN SAVAŞI'NIN KÖKENLERİ: BİR DİPLOMATİK TARİHÇE

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1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Savaşı'nı hazırlayan faktör ve gelişmeleri konu edinen bu çalışmada esas olarak Yunanistan'ın Girit'i işgal ettiği 13 Şubat ile Osmanlı Devleti'nin savaş ilânına karar verdiği 17 Nisan tarihleri arasında meydana gelen siyasî ve diplomatik gelişmeler üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu savaş, Osmanlı Devleti ve Büyük Devletler'in irâdesine aykırı olarak Yunanistan'ın yayılmacı politikalarının bir neticesi olarak meydana gelmiştir. Osmanlı Devleti Büyük Devletler'den savaşı engellemelerini beklemiş; fakat bu devletler Yunanistan'a uygulanacak zorlayıcı tedbirler üzerinde uzlaşamadıklarından iki devleti yalnız başlarına bırakmışlardır. Osmanlı Devleti barışın devamından yana olmasına rağmen Yunan çetelerinin sınırı tecavüz etmesi üzerine Yunanistan'a savaş ilân etmiştir. Başta Osmanlı ve İngiliz belgeleri olmak üzere çok yönlü bir kaynakça kullanılarak hazırlanmış olan bu monograf ile dönemin uluslararası politikalarına ışık tutulması amaçlanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: 1897, Osmanlı Devleti, Yunanistan, Avrupa İttihâdı, II. Abdülhamid, Deligiannis, Etniki Eteryâ, Girit, Tesalya.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In February 1897, shortly after the Christians in the Ottoman island of Crete had initiated an insurrection, the Greek government sent a fleet and military units to this island. Facing the occupation of Crete, the Ottoman Empire did not declare war on Greece and expected a peaceful settlement of the problem. Both states concentrated troops on their side of the border against the possibility of war. The crisis on the border escalated for about two months. After a couple of raids by Greek irregulars into their territory, the Ottomans finally declared war on 17 April. The war continued for one month. Although the Ottoman troops had occupied almost the entire Thessaly at the cessation of hostilities, the frontiers before the war were restored with minor changes in the peace treaty, according to the will of the Great Powers.

Although this ephemeral war was an unequal contest of two neighboring states in Southeastern Europe, it still occupied a noteworthy place within world power politics of the time. While the six Great Powers, namely Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, had control over almost every single international development in the world, the progress of events between the Cretan crisis and the outbreak of the war did not suit with their interests at all. None of the Powers desired to see an Ottoman-Greek war. Though for a short period, the

cabinets in Europe spent considerable effort to prevent it. But when they realized that the measures they could take would not be able to appease the Greeks, the Powers let the war happen, with the precondition that it would not change the balances in the region.

The Ottoman Empire did not have any intention to go to war with Greece, either. Especially Sultan Abdülhamid II had always been extremely careful to maintain peaceful relations with other states, as he feared that the empire did not have enough resources to cope with a serious military threat.¹ The severe defeat against Russia in 1878 and its injurious consequences had led him to keep away from all forms of international adventurism and polarization and to follow an absolutely peaceful foreign policy.² This is why he often resorted to concessions whenever it became obvious that diplomatic initiatives would not yield any result. The sultan consented to the *de facto* losses of Tunisia to France (1881), Thessaly to Greece (1881), Egypt to Britain (1882) and Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria (1885) with little opposition in order to decrease the tension in the empire's foreign affairs.³ When Crete was occupied by Greek troops, the sultan preserved his caution and instead of resorting to force, he left the settlement of this problem to the Great Powers. Although he ordered the dispatch of a massive armed force to the Greek border, the sultan never had any intention for an offensive. The war was declared only after the raids from the Greek side of the border began to menace the security and reputation of the empire.

The main responsibility for the war lay on the shoulders of Greece, particularly the Greek public, who had kept a burning desire for the materialization of the *Megale Idea*, and the *Ethnike Hetairia*, which endeavored to accomplish this goal. The Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, though arising out of the Cretan crisis, was

¹ F. A. K. Yasamee, "Ottoman Diplomacy in the Era of Abdülhamid II (1878-1908)," in *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, edited by İsmail Soysal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 227.

² Selim Deringil, "Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet İnönü," in *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 4: 1 (Summer 1987), 39.

³ Süleyman Kocabaş, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid: Şahsiyeti ve Politikası* (İstanbul: Vatan, 1995), 205.

in fact one of the recurring attempts of Greece in the nineteenth century for territorial enlargement. The Greeks had made three, almost identical, attempts in the years 1854, 1878 and 1886. None of these attempts had resulted in war with the Ottomans, thanks to the intervention of the Great Powers, and the Greeks had even acquired a sizeable territory in 1881. As the Great Powers were in competition over Africa and East Asia, and the Ottoman Empire was coping with numerous internal problems, the Greeks hoped that they could acquire Epirus, or even Macedonia through a threat to general peace. However, neither their occupation of Crete, nor their military preparations produced a compromise from any of these states. Diplomatic efforts by the Powers and the Ottoman Empire were not able to persuade the Greeks to retreat on their policy. The crisis escalated constantly, and the activities of the relentless *Ethnike Hetairia* kindled the flames of war in the end.

The number of studies that especially pertain to the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 is not very high. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be many ambiguities on this war in the historical literature, due to its limited nature in terms of time, area and impact. In addition, sources that provide partial information on the war are abundant. Apart from the official documents in the Ottoman, Greek and European archives, there are numerous secondary sources that deal with various aspects of this incident. Nevertheless, most of the studies on this war have been written by putting one state, or a few of states, at the center of events and evaluating the proceedings from that standpoint. For example, Greek scholars have usually understated the role of Greek government in the origins of the war, and charged the responsibility for the disaster almost entirely on the *Ethnike Hetairia*. On the other hand, most of the Turkish sources, both contemporary and later, portray the belief that the Great Powers were always in pursuit of a pro-Greek and anti-Ottoman policy. In addition, studies based on British official documents are written with observable suspicion towards Russia and Germany; while those based on Western European archives accommodate considerable disdain towards the Ottomans.

Because of such prejudices one often encounters contradictory statements in different sources.

Although the Ottoman Empire was one of the two sides of the conflict, Ottoman sources were usually neglected by Greek or European scholars that studied Ottoman-Greek War of 1897. Even Theodoros G. Tatsios, the author of one of the most comprehensive works on this war, rightly acknowledges the deficiency of his book resulting from the omission of Ottoman documents.⁴ On the other hand, studies that have been conducted by Turkish scholars are generally prejudiced by the Ottoman perspective, since they are based, almost exclusively, on sources in Turkish. A recent book by M. Metin Hülagü⁵ is a typical example for the latter. This work is a fairly detailed account of the origins, course and aftermath of the war based on an extensive collection of primary and secondary sources in Turkish. But since this study lacks investigation of European sources, it remains somewhat one-sided and incomplete. Ideally, the better account of the war, as well as its origins and aftermath, would integrate the information yielded by Ottoman sources to the historical literature based on European ones, and evaluate the developments in a critical and comparative outlook.

The aim of this thesis is to present the origins of the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 from a multi-sided perspective. Since the war was caused by the aggressive policy of Greece, the second chapter of the thesis is devoted to the political culture and foreign policy of this state, with special emphasis on the underlying factors of Greek irredentism, which paved the way to war. In the third chapter the Cretan crisis, which was the antecedent of the Ottoman-Greek War, will be discussed. The main part of the thesis is the fourth chapter, which focuses on the diplomatic and political developments between the Greek occupation of Crete (13 February 1897)

⁴ Theodore George Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), viii.

⁵ M. Metin Hülagü, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Çerçevesinde 1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Savaşı* (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2001).

and the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire (17 May 1897) in detail. The final chapter includes some concluding remarks along with brief information on the course of war and its aftermath.

The attitudes and actions of the Ottoman Empire on the road to war are investigated mainly in the Ottoman archival documents and the two contemporary accounts written by Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî⁶ and Vecîhî et al.⁷ The information on the proceedings among the Great Powers is based on published British documents, a selective collection of German documents and the world-renowned book by William L. Langer.⁸ The excellent multi-volume work written conjointly by Driault and Lhéritier,⁹ the diligent study of Papadopoulos based on unpublished British documents¹⁰ and the monograph of Tatsios are utilized extensively to trace the policies of not only the Great Powers, but also Greece. In addition, a large collection of other sources are utilized in order to verify and support the information yielded by the abovementioned documents and works and, hence, to reach more reliable conclusions. It is a regret for the author that Russian sources pertaining to the war, which could give a more complete picture of the diplomatic developments, are not consulted.

All of the dates in this thesis are given in the Gregorian calendar, even though different calendars were being used in both Greece and the Ottoman Empire at that time. The names of people and places are usually based on the spelling in their original language. Alternative usages of place names, if any, are given in parentheses.

⁶ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, *Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye ve Yunan Muhârebesi* (İstanbul: Mihran, 1315).

⁷ Vecîhî ve Rüfekâsı [Vecîhî, et al.], *Musavver Tarih-i Harb* (İstanbul: İkdâm, 1315).

⁸ William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism: 1890-1902* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968).

⁹ Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours* (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926).

¹⁰ G. S. Papadopoulos, *England and the Near East: 1896-1898* (Thessaloniki: Hetaireia Makedonikon Spoudon, 1969).

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL CULTURE IN GREECE AND GREEK FOREIGN POLICY

The Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 is an outgrowth of the nineteenth-century Greek foreign policy. Neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Great Powers desired to see this war happen, but their efforts to prevent it proved insufficient against the determination of the Greeks to fight. Even though the king and government in Greece showed a mixed attitude towards war during the escalation of crisis, their irredentist and nationalist policy, which had continued for decades, rendered a major military conflict with the Ottoman Empire inevitable. At first sight, it might be difficult to understand why such a small state having limited economic and military capabilities adopted such a daring foreign policy with little hesitation. In order to understand this, tracing the development of Greek political culture after the foundation of modern Greece is essential.

2. 1. The Evolution of Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy

Greece was a peculiar state both in its foundation and development. This is because, it was not established after a successful revolution supported by a sound

enterprise;¹ but rather as a result of the mutual endeavor shown by the Great Powers to keep the existing balance of power within European politics. Indeed, no matter how much the Greek rebellion was the first step for the separation of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, the understanding between Russia, Britain and France played the key role on the foundation of the modern Greek state. In accordance with the interests of these three Powers, Greece was formed as a monarchy under a dynasty of Western European origin instead of a republic under the political will of the Greek population. After creating this state, these Powers also spent considerable effort to offset its poor economic and political conditions; since Greece neither had enough economic power, nor political stability, even to survive.

Regardless of these problems, Greek politicians and public stuck to the dream of territorial enlargement for the sake of liberating their compatriots abroad. The “*Megale Idea*,” namely the idea of uniting the whole Greek community under one flag, was pursued by the modern Greek state right after its establishment, and this national dream proved to be the leading element within the domestic and foreign policy of Greece for decades. The artificial nature of the modern Greek state, the opportunism of the Greek politicians and the existence of an extreme degree of rapport within the Greek community were the principal reasons for the development of this expansionist and irredentist policy.

When founded in 1830 as a nation-state, Greece was far from what the Greek revolutionaries had dreamed of and worked for since the beginning of their insurrection. Their goal was the independence of the whole Greek community; yet what they achieved in the end was a rump state comprising only one-fourth of the Greek population in the world. Around 2,000,000 Greeks still remained in both

¹ The Greek rebellion, which broke out in 1821, was in fact a leaderless and generally unorganized movement with no vital sources or national exchequer which could enable a protracted struggle: John Alexander Levandis, *The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), 1. Hence the Greek onslaught was checked by Ottoman forces within a few months and conflicts in the Greek mainland went on as a stalemate until the intervention of the European Powers in October 1827.

Ottoman territories and the British-held Ionian Islands.² As a result, the Greeks who had been able to obtain independence set themselves to “redeem their enslaved brethren abroad.” This ambition shortly became the central element of Greek political culture. With the belief that the adventurous prospect of the *Megale Idea* made “their otherwise mundane existence” meaningful,³ the common people in Greece aimed towards a shared objective as a coherent society.

Despite all foreign oppositions and the precarious financial and military status of Greece, Greek politicians uniformly kept enunciating irredentist and pan-Hellenist claims. In a state which was established after a nationalist struggle, adopting such a policy was obviously an easy way of obtaining popular support. Since the Greek society had no aristocracy or plutocracy to stabilize public opinion, “the passionate and unreliable mob of Athens” enjoyed an enormous political influence.⁴ Thanks to the strong cultural and commercial relationships between Greeks who lived in and outside Greece, the political party which most eagerly defended the *Megale Idea* received the greatest support from the Greek public.

The conception of the *Megale Idea* accommodated a certain degree of variation. While it generally referred to incorporation of the Aegean Islands and the provinces north of Greece to the motherland, in some circles it was extended into an imperialistic program for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire by subjugating the other Balkan peoples to Hellenism.⁵ After the 1850s, the Greeks tried to legitimize their irredentist policies by emphasizing the role of Greece between the East and the West and the country’s mission to civilize the “Oriental East.”⁶ Their first attempt to gain territory from the Ottoman Empire through hostility came

² Douglas Dakin, “The Formation of the Greek State, 1821-33,” in *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, edited by Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1973), 177.

³ Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics* (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 41.

⁴ Sir Ellis Ashmead Bartlett, *The Battlefields of Thessaly* (London: John Murray, 1897), 23.

⁵ Leften Stavros Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 468.

⁶ Kostas A. Lavdas, “Reconceptualizing Politics: Concepts of Politics in Modern Greek Political Culture,” paper for *ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop on ‘The History of Political Concepts: A New Perspective on European Political Cultures’* (Copenhagen, 14-19 April 2000), 20.

about during the Crimean War. Greek volunteers in Epirus and Thessaly revolted in January with support of the Greek government in terms of money and men. It was the prompt intervention by France and Britain, through the blockade of the Piraeus, which urged King Otho I of Greece to yield and thus prevented a probable Ottoman-Greek war.⁷

The “national” character of Greek politics was underlined in a new internal crisis which continued between 1862 and 1864. At the end of this crisis, Otho was overthrown by a military coup, largely because of his failure to pursue the *Megale Idea*, and was replaced by a Danish prince, George I. Despite the fact that the Greek state did not have the economic base for an adventurous foreign policy, the reign of the new king was also dominated by the theme of expansionism. In addition to the island of Crete, where the Christian population revolted several times throughout the nineteenth century, Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia were the primary loci of Greek interest.

As happened during the Crimean War, the Greeks did not want to miss the opportunity of the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1877. The breakdown of Ottoman resistance in Plevne and the Russian occupation of Edirne (Adrianople) in the winter of 1877-1878 encouraged the Greeks to march on Epirus.⁸ Especially Theodoros Pangaiou Deligiannis, who was the minister of the foreign affairs at that time, believed that the occupation of Thessaly and Epirus without declaration of war would bring a considerable bargaining power to Greece in the forthcoming peace negotiations. Consequently, the Greek army was ordered to cross the Ottoman frontier on 2 February 1878; but the conclusion of armistice between the belligerents on the same day foiled the attempt.⁹ Nevertheless, the desire of Britain to counterbalance Russian expansion worked for the Greek aims. In accordance with the “balance-of power doctrine,” the increase in the influence of

⁷ Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War 1853-1856* (London: Arnold, 1999), 51-52.

⁸ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1962), 8: 112.

⁹ Tatsios, 51.

the Slavic elements in the Balkans had to be offset by making concession to Greece.¹⁰ Thus, in the Protocol 13 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire was required to undertake certain border rectifications in favor of Greece. Although the sultan resisted ceding territory to Greece for a considerable time, he was finally persuaded by the Powers to give up Thessaly, excluding the town of Alasonya (Elassona), and a small portion of Epirus in July 1881. However, the rectification of frontier did not satisfy the Greeks, who regarded Thessaly only as a partial gain.

Throughout the 1880s, a dichotomy with regard to foreign policy persisted within the domestic politics of Greece. While Kharilaos Trikoupis, the prime minister, tried to calm down the supporters of adventurism and implemented a cautious policy which placed primary importance on domestic reform and reconstruction, his political rival, Deligiannis, advocated irredentism in the most ardent way.¹¹ The escalation of tension in the Balkans increased the popular support to the latter and, accordingly, the National Party of Deligiannis won the elections in 1885. The territorial enlargement of Bulgaria through the annexation of Eastern Rumelia the same year induced the new government to take immediate action. The Greek army was mobilized with the aim of invading Epirus and Southern Macedonia.¹² Greek irregulars attempted to cross the frontier in February 1886, but they were shortly driven away by Ottoman troops. Having settled the recent Eastern Rumelian Crisis, the Great Powers were not willing to face new trouble in the Balkans. Thus, once more they undertook the task of preventing an Ottoman-Greek war. Fleets of the Powers, excluding France, blockaded Greek

¹⁰ René Albrecht-Carrié, *The Concert of Europe 1815-1914* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), 290.

¹¹ S. Victor Papacosma, *The Military in Greek Politics* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1977), 10-11.

¹² The Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia had convinced the Greeks that obtaining the connivance and encouragement of at least one of the Powers would yield a similar result for them: E. J. Dillon, "The Fate of Greece," in *Contemporary Review* 72 (July-December 1897), 4.

ports in May 1886 and the Greek government was forced to resign. Trikoupis, forming the new cabinet, accepted demobilization.¹³

Yet this setback did not give an end to nationalist overtones in Greece, and the political rivalry between Trikoupis and Deligiannis continued. The latter became the premier again in 1890, owing to the tense political atmosphere created by uprisings in Crete; but his ineffective policy resulted in the return of the former to the premiership with the elections in 1892.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Deligiannis still maintained his popularity and political influence thanks to his artful and populist demagoguery advocating a “Greater Greece.”¹⁵ The strong opposition led by him finally forced Trikoupis to resign in January 1895, and Deligiannis came to power once again through a decisive electoral victory that year.

2. 2. The *Ethnike Hetairia* and the Revitalization of Irredentism

The change in Greek government in 1895 signified an increase in nationalist tendencies among the public. This increase coincided with the abrupt growth of a nationalist organization, which would have an extreme influence over Greek politics in a couple of years. This organization, which called itself the *Ethnike Hetairia* (National Society), was established in 1894 by a number of young officers for the purpose of “raising the morale of the country and to provide support to the subjugated population.”¹⁶ The high level of discontent in the Greek army towards the Trikoupis government, caused by the decrease in military funds and the prevention of officer involvement in politics, increased the popularity of this

¹³ Fahir Armaoğlu, *19. Yüzyıl Siyasî Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 556-557; Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993), 29; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 31-46; Karal, 8: 114-115.

¹⁴ Tatsios, 60.

¹⁵ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67; Papacosma, 11.

¹⁶ Alexander Mazarakis-Ainianos, *Istorike Melete 1821-1897 Kai O Polemos Tou 1897* (Athens: [s.n.], 1950), 291, quoted in Tatsios, 86.

organization among officers.¹⁷ These officers, affected negatively by the slump in Greek finances, believed that the territorial enlargement of Greece would be the only way of acquiring prosperity.¹⁸ This idea led the *Ethnike Hetairia* to work for the unification of Epirus, Macedonia and, to a lesser extent, Crete to Greece.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, there was an intensive and multi-sided rivalry over the future of the Balkans in which Greece did not seem to have a favorable position. Bulgaria had become adjacent to Macedonia after its annexation of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgarian committees were operating eagerly to lay the groundwork for a future penetration of Bulgaria in that region. The Serbians were also uttering their claims over the Slav population of Macedonia. In addition, Russia and Austria-Hungary were implicitly competing over the Balkans, and none of them was sympathetic to Greek expansion in the region. The agitations carried out by consulates of Greece throughout Macedonia¹⁹ were no longer sufficient to keep the Greeks in the race.

Under these circumstances, Greek nationalists were extremely concerned that the *Megale Idea* was in danger. Numerous proclamations were published in newspapers to arouse the interest of the Greek public and government towards the rivalry over Macedonia.²⁰ Seeing that the future of Ottoman control over the region was quite uncertain, the *Ethnike Hetairia* decided to take action without delay. Obtaining the sympathy of phil-Hellenes throughout the world, the organization collected a considerable amount of money for its cause. The first Olympic Games, organized in Athens in April 1896, created a suitable environment for the organization to meet numerous Greeks from different parts of the world, particularly from the Ottoman Empire, and arrange their plans concerning

¹⁷ George Gavrilis, "Understanding Greek-Ottoman Conflict: Statist Irredentism, Belligerent Democratization or a Synthesis?" in *New Approaches to Balkan Studies*, edited by Dimitris Keridis, Ellen Elias-Bursac and Nicholas Yatromanolakis (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2003), 59.

¹⁸ T.C. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (henceforth abbreviated as BOA), Y.A.HUS., 363/134.

¹⁹ Luigi Villari, "Races, Religions, and Propagandas," in *The Balkan Question*, edited by Luigi Villari (London: John Murray, 1905), 141.

²⁰ See Appendix B for an example of these proclamations.

Macedonia. When the insurrections in Crete, which broke out shortly after the Olympic Games, amplified the Greek antagonism against the sultan, the *Ethnike Hetairia* found a suitable atmosphere to commence propaganda for a revolt in Southern Macedonia.²¹ Throughout the summer of 1896, small troops of volunteers in the pay of the *Ethnike Hetairia* crossed into this region and commenced agitations.²²

Despite the predominance of irredentist ambitions among the Greek public and politicians, Greece was considered by Abdülhamid as a potential ally against the Slav element in the Balkans. This is why he had a permanent concern to maintain good relations with this state, by tolerating to a certain extent the growth of Greek nationalism in the region.²³ After the outbreak of the Cretan insurrection in 1896, the sultan even had a tendency to bargain sovereignty over Crete with the Greeks.²⁴ Yet the raids of Greek irregular bands into Ottoman territory were signaling that diplomatic efforts would not be enough to maintain peaceful relations between the two states. There was an observable boost of nationalist feelings in Greece and it was certain that they would go out of control if the attempt of the *Ethnike Hetairia* in Macedonia yielded the slightest success. The sultan reasoned that the raids had to be tackled in the most drastic way so that the Greeks would be dissuaded from engaging in further adventures that could threaten the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. So, he ordered the troops at the Greek frontier to “crush the bands and save the honor of the Ottoman army.”²⁵ Military reservists from Selânik (Salonika), Kosova (Kosovo) and Manastır (Bitola) were also conscripted as reinforcements.²⁶

²¹ Pierre Mille, *De Thessalie en Crète* (Nancy: Berger-Levrault et C^{ie}, 1898), 165-166.

²² John S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 215; BOA, İ.HUS., 48/1314S-34.

²³ Sabri Sürgevil, “1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Savaşı ve İzmir,” in *Tarih Boyunca Türk-Yunan İlişkileri* (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı, 1986), 297; Yasamee, 229.

²⁴ [Sultan] Abdülhamit, *Siyasî Hatıratım* (İstanbul: Dergâh, 1999), 65.

²⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 46/116.

²⁶ Alan Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (London: John Murray, 1992), 180.

The caution of the Ottomans did not permit the bands of Greek irregulars any concrete achievement, but the incursions were narrated in the Athenian press with a high level of excitement and exaggeration. The Greek public, thrilled by the heroic stories in the newspapers, started to believe that the *Megale Idea* would come true through the endeavors of the *Ethnike Hetairia*.²⁷ Receiving the support of numerous merchants, shopkeepers and other well-to-do civilians,²⁸ the organization shortly obtained enormous popularity and influence in Greece.

The increase of warlike overtones among the Greek society urged the Deligiannis government to improve the military power of Greece. Foreign loans were spent on armament and a training camp for 12,000 men was opened at Thebes in July 1896.²⁹ Under pressure of the *Ethnike Hetairia*, the opposition and public, the government prepared a project of reorganization of the army, which was eventually approved by the king. Reservists were called to military service and a massive spending on armaments was launched. Due to the lack of financial resources, these preparations were carried out through foreign loans, internal credits and voluntary subscriptions.³⁰ Nevertheless, the premier still kept his hesitance to intervene in the crisis due to the poor condition of the Greek army and navy.

The attitude of Deligiannis was harshly criticized by both the opposition and the *Ethnike Hetairia*, which desired a pro-active policy for the sake of the *Megale Idea*. Especially the latter, assuming the leadership in pursuit of this cause, started to act more audaciously than before. Through long manifestos published in newspapers, the *Ethnike Hetairia* called the Greek nation to force their king and government to “undertake their responsibilities.”³¹ In December 1896, the Ottoman consul in Iasi (Yaş) reported that the organization had purchased 20,000 Gras rifles

²⁷ Tatsios, 88.

²⁸ Henry W. Nevinston, *Scenes in the Thirty Days War between Greece and Turkey* (London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1898), 77.

²⁹ Bartlett, 14-16.

³⁰ BOA, HR.SYS., 193/3.

³¹ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 363/134.

from Belgium to arm the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire. He also conveyed rumors that the committee was planning to incite a revolt in Ottoman lands in the following spring through contribution of armed bands as well as Ottoman Greeks.³² The Ottoman consuls in the Greek towns of Trikkala (Tırhala), Larissa (Yenişehir) and Volo (Golos) warned the Ottoman minister in Athens that Greek secret committees were collecting money to purchase arms and outfits for brigands, while a massive number of Greek regular forces were being transferred to the Ottoman frontier.³³ When Asım Bey, the Ottoman minister in Athens, asked Deligiannis about these reports, the premier replied that he had no information on such developments.³⁴

The increase of irredentist and warlike sentiments in Greece in the 1890s and the strengthening of the *Ethnike Hetairia* were simultaneous developments that fostered each other. The preparations by the *Ethnike Hetairia*, which were encouraged by the nationalistic impulse existing within the populace, amplified the public excitement even further. This vicious circle created an irreversible popular trend directed towards war. The government's power and ability to control the proceedings were reduced severely by the prevailing ambitions among the Greek society. Only a small spark would be enough to transform this emotional accumulation into a daring movement. This spark arose from Crete before too long.

³² BOA, Y.A.HUS., 365/12.

³³ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 365/44.

³⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/49.

CHAPTER 3

THE CRETAN CRISIS

The Cretan Crisis was not the direct cause of the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, as the war was a consequence of the abiding and ever-growing irredentist aspirations in Greece. But by creating the momentum for military and national mobilization in Greece, the crisis in Crete was the main catalyst of the war.

3. 1. Cretan Insurrections throughout the Nineteenth Century

Throughout the nineteenth century, Muslim and Christian inhabitants of Crete lived in a state of perpetual quarrel, which had turned out to be a sort of vendetta rather than a conflict due to religious fanaticism.¹ These quarrels owed much to the never-ending aspiration among the Cretan Christians for the union of the island with Greece.² Two major insurrections, in 1841 and 1866, were initiated by them with this aim, causing large casualties on both sides and increasing the awareness of Europe in the matters of Crete. Fearing that the Great Powers could intervene in the Cretan question on the side of the Christian Cretans, the Sublime Porte undertook certain reforms on the island in 1868. Ten years later, the supporters of union attempted to take advantage of the war between Russia and the

¹ Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe* (London: Edward Arnold, 1900), 338.

² Tatsios, 30.

Ottoman Empire by instigating another insurrection. The Greek government also requested the Great Powers to authorize union, by pointing out the high level of discontent among the Christian inhabitants of the island. Refusing the detachment of Crete from Ottoman sovereignty, the Powers advised the Sublime Porte, articulated in Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, to execute the reforms of 1868 with appropriate modifications in favor of the Christians.³ Upon this provision, the Ottoman government concluded a convention with the Christian rebels in Halepa on 23 October 1878.

The Halepa Convention was able to pacify the island for some time, yet, in fact, the embers in Crete kept smoldering. The annexation of Eastern Rumelia by Bulgaria encouraged the Christian Cretans to rise up again. The insurrection started in 1888. In order to restore order, the sultan reversed certain provisions of the Halepa Convention and sent a Muslim military commander to the island. This action was protested by the Christian Cretans as well as the Great Powers.⁴ The extremist elements among the Christians founded a committee called *Epitropi* in September 1894. This committee shortly became a powerful revolutionary organization devoted to liberating the island from Ottoman “yoke.” The replacement of Alexander Karateodori Paşa, the Christian governor of Crete, by a Muslim, Turhan Paşa, on 8 March 1896 totally infuriated the Christians in the island. A large-scale insurgence broke out shortly after the new governor’s declaration that he would not allow the Cretan Assembly to convene unless the *Epitropi* was disbanded. The Ottoman fort at Vamos was besieged by the Christian insurgents in May.⁵ Volunteers from Greece began to flow to the island.

Even though the Greek government seemed to be against armed insurrection of the Christian Cretans, the public in Greece was extremely sensitive towards the matters of Crete. This was mainly because of the nationalistic

³ Cemal Tukin, “Girit,” in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1996), 14: 90.

⁴ Selim Sun, *1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Harbi*. (Ankara: Genelkurmay, 1965), 17.

⁵ Tatsios, 75.

propaganda carried out by the *Ethnike Hetairia*.⁶ The excitement among the Greek populace was weakening the control of the king and government over the proceedings. When King George was requested by the Great Powers to stop Greek support to the Cretan insurgence, he replied that he was unable to retain the volunteers from departing for Crete, as Greece in its entirety would rise up then in the name of the *Megale Idea*.⁷

Realizing that the efforts of Great Powers would not be able to pacify the island, the Ottoman sultan and government resorted to self-help and dispatched 16 battalions of troops to Crete to restore order.⁸ The Great Powers were against any kind of disturbance in the Near East that would upset the general peace and stability in the region. Thus, when the Cretan insurrection turned out to be a Greek separatist movement, they began to send naval forces to the Cretan waters in order to prevent a direct confrontation between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Greek and Ottoman governments were respectively advised by the Powers to stop the ongoing support to the Cretan insurgence and to undertake certain administrative reforms in the island.⁹ In order to expedite the reforms, the ambassadors of the Great Powers in İstanbul prepared a program, which was quite in harmony with the demands of Christian deputies in the Cretan Assembly.¹⁰ The sultan, under pressure of the Powers, formally promised on 27 August 1896 to execute this program. An arrangement for the administration of the island was promulgated on 10 September and a Christian, Georgi Paşa Berovich, was appointed as the governor of Crete for

⁶ Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908).” (Ph.D. diss., Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İzmir, 1994), 153.

⁷ Édouard Driault, *La Grande idée: La renaissance de l’Hellénisme* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1920), 163.

⁸ Erdoğan Yeğen, “XIX. Yüzyılın Son Çeyreğinde Girit Olayları ve Osmanlı-Yunan ve Büyük Devletlerin İlişkileri,” in *Tarih Boyunca Türk-Yunan İlişkileri* (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı, 1986), 285.

⁹ Adıyeke, 155-156.

¹⁰ Beside a number of structural reforms, this program stipulated that the governor of Crete should be a Christian and two-thirds of civil-service posts should be held by Christians: Tatsios, 79-80.

a period of five years with extensive authority.¹¹ The Powers undertook the task of establishing a new judicial system and gendarmerie in Crete.

3. 2. The Cretan Insurrection of 1897

No matter how decisively the reform process was put into effect by the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, it was soon realized that it would not easily bring the troubles in the island to an end. The *Epitropi*, encouraged and supported by the *Ethnike Hetairia*, could not be satisfied with any other solution than the unification of Crete with Greece. Many Christian deputies in the Cretan Assembly also possessed such an ulterior desire.¹² According to the supporters of union, execution of reforms under the auspices of the Great Powers was reinforcing the Ottoman sovereignty over the island and could thwart their goals for a long time to come.¹³ On the other hand, the Muslim inhabitants of the island started to worry that they would eventually be deprived of certain rights that they actually possessed.¹⁴ Therefore, both parties attempted to disrupt the reform process. Ottoman authorities also delayed the enforcement of reforms in order not to offend the Muslim Cretans.¹⁵ But these procrastinations reduced the level of distrust among the Christian Cretans towards the existing administration. Gennadis, the Greek consul-general in Crete, was encouraging the extremist elements among Christians with the active support of the opposition leaders in Greece.¹⁶ Transportation of arms, munitions and volunteers from Greece to the island continued. Finally, in late-January 1897, armed conflicts broke out again.

¹¹ Great Britain, *Turkey No. 8 (1897) Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1897), No. 23.

¹² Édouard Driault, *Şark Mes'alesi: Bidâyet-i Zuhûrundan Zamanımıza Kadar*, translated by Nafiz (İstanbul: Muhtar Hâlid, 1328), 345.

¹³ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 94.

¹⁴ Adıyeke, 162.

¹⁵ Süleyman Kâni İrtem, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Makedonya Meselesi* (İstanbul: Temel, 1999), 44.

¹⁶ Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, 36.

At the outbreak of disturbances, the king and government in Greece portrayed a somewhat neutral attitude and expressed their willingness that tranquility should be preserved in Crete.¹⁷ On 5 February, Deligiannis declared in the Greek parliament that “at a moment when the Powers are working for the re-establishment of the operation of the institutions which have been granted to Crete, Greece has no interest, nor was she in duty bound to interfere, and to present herself as wanting the union of Crete with Greece.”¹⁸ Whether the premier was sincere in this statement is difficult to know, but an ominous telegram received from Hanya (Canea) on the very same day led him to make a decision which contradicted his speech. This telegram, sent by Gennadis, announced with exaggeration that the Christian Cretans were on the verge of annihilation: “The Turkish soldiers have given the signal for massacre by shooting from the ramparts into the town. I have asked the consuls to debark marines to save what is possible; the consuls have refused. No hope. The Christians of the town will all be massacred.”¹⁹

The Greek government could not remain inactive upon these news, which caused great uneasiness in Athens. Two warships of the Greek navy were dispatched to the island immediately.²⁰ Alexandros Skouzes, the Greek minister of foreign affairs, informed the Great Powers that sending of these vessels was for the sole purpose of “succoring the suffering,”²¹ but this action was most likely intended to test the standpoint of the Great Powers in the crisis. Although it was generally

¹⁷ Papadopoulos, 116.

¹⁸ Great Britain, *Turkey No. 11 (1897) Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete and the War between Turkey and Greece* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1897) (henceforth abbreviated as *Turkey No. 11*), No. 36.

¹⁹ Langer, 357; İrtem, 45; Tatsios, 91. Colonel Herbert Chermiside reported to the British government on 5 February that the responsibility of the Cretan Christians for the disorders was at least equal to that of the Muslims and the conduct of the Ottoman troops had been well. After receiving these reports, the Marquess of Salisbury, the prime minister and foreign secretary of Britain, concluded that the intelligence furnished to the Greek government was exaggerated: *Turkey No. 11*, No. 13.

²⁰ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 54, 55. The captain of *Hydra*, one of these two warships, refused to salute the Ottoman flag at the port of Hanya until the British consul urged him to do so on the following day: Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 102.

²¹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 54; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/42.

known that they desired to maintain the general peace and would not easily tolerate an audacious attempt by Greece, the Powers had a general idea that the misgovernment of the sultan was the primary cause of the troubles in Crete. Furthermore, any support by the Greeks to their Christian “brethren” in Crete would doubtlessly be praised and supported by the European public opinion. Under these circumstances, how the Powers would react to the involvement of Greece in the Cretan crisis was somewhat uncertain.

The dispatch of Greek warships to the Cretan waters was protested by the Great Powers as, on the one hand, increasing the excitement among the Greek public, and, on the other hand, inducing the Ottoman government to take counter-measures.²² But the opposition of the Powers did not go further and neither their representatives in Athens, nor their consuls in Crete made an effective effort for the withdrawal of the dispatched vessels. The apparent indifference of the Great Powers encouraged the Greek government to send further naval units, carrying volunteers, weapons and munitions, to the island.²³ Protestations by the Ottoman government were evaded with the allegation that the vessels were being sent only for humanitarian purposes.²⁴

Yet neither the public in Greece nor the Cretan Christians were satisfied with the steps taken by the Greek government. The public, already agitated by the telegram of Gennadis, became totally infuriated by fabricated reports and stories published in newspapers.²⁵ Hostile demonstrations against the Ottoman Empire were organized in Athens and the provinces.²⁶ Encouraged by the warlike atmosphere in Greece, the *Ethnike Hetairia* published a long and excessively fervent proclamation, calling their “Cretan brethren” to fight for the union of Crete with their “Hellenic motherland.”²⁷ Cretan insurgents responded to this invitation

²² *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 30, 47.

²³ Adyeke, 166; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/56.

²⁴ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 28.

²⁵ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 35.

²⁶ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/56; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/58.

²⁷ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 64; Langer, 357.

positively by hoisting the Greek flag, declaring union with Greece and appealing to King George to take possession of the island.²⁸

The proceedings were developing quite rapidly and neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Great Powers was able to respond on time. Although the Ottomans were alarmed at the intelligence coming from Greece and Crete, they did not want to take unilateral action while the reforms in the island were still being carried out. Instead, the Sublime Porte requested on 8 February from the Great Powers to “either urge the Greek government to withdraw their navy from Crete, or let the Imperial government undertake the measures necessitated by the incidents.”²⁹ What the Powers did in response was to repeat their advice of peace to the Greek government and authorize their admirals in the Cretan waters to prevent an aggressive action by Greek vessels.³⁰ Although none of them was willing to take the initiative, the Powers were anxious to avert a Greek attempt to annex Crete, as it was almost certain that such an annexation would pave the way for dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and generate the danger of a general war in Europe.³¹

3. 3. The Greek Decision of Intervention

Facing on the one hand the warnings by Europe to respect peace, and the internal pressure for aggression on the other, the Greek government found itself in a difficult position. Since the government was not completely decided on the policy it should follow, its declarations and actions oscillated between these two alternatives for some time. On 10 February, when a number of Greek vessels, including armed torpedo boats, were still in the Cretan waters, Deligiannis was still

²⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/13; Langer, 358.

²⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/13.

³⁰ *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 43, 44, 57.

³¹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 90.

trying to calm down the supporters of war with a long speech he gave in the Greek parliament:

... The entire Greek population throughout the world also desires that Crete should be united to Greece. But, in fact, this desire contradicts with the international law; since none of the treaties of 1830, 1856 and 1878 has placed the island under the sovereignty of the king of Greece... Thus, we have to be careful about not being pushed by our dreams, which have deviated from reality, and prefer a moderate policy towards Crete... We are aware that the Muslims of the island have been working to annihilate the Christian population there... But the Cretan question is persisting and it will surely have different dimensions in the future. I can assure you that in any case the government will not hesitate to undertake its responsibilities; and, if required, it will act in the boldest way possible... Therefore, I advise you to be patient and criticize our government if our policy proves wrong in the end.³²

No matter how these words were intended as a response to criticisms by the opposition towards the apparent lethargy of the Greek government, the speech of Deligiannis in fact gave the signals of a prospective enterprise for the annexation of Crete. After some time of testing the resoluteness of the Great Powers for peace, and the Greek public, the *Ethnike Hetairia* and the opposition for aggression, the premier had finally realized that it was almost impossible for him to resist the overwhelming pressure coming from the latter. The opposition, led by Dimitrios Rallis, had long been blaming the government and the king for missing the opportunity to occupy Crete during the conflicts in 1896.³³ The mob, stimulated by the warlike propagandas of the *Ethnike Hetairia*, had become the actual ruling power at Athens.³⁴ The positions of the king and the government would be in danger if the crisis in Crete was concluded without any material gain for Greece. Alternatively, while opposing demands of the public was extremely difficult, the Great Powers could possibly be brought to terms, as their dread of a general war might induce them to concede the Greek claims.³⁵ In this respect, defying the

³² BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/107; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 122.

³³ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 364/10.

³⁴ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 90.

³⁵ Bartlett, 15.

Powers and the Ottoman Empire instead of its public seemed to be the most preferable strategy to the Greek government.

Under these circumstances, the rumors that the Sublime Porte was preparing reinforcements to be used in Crete impelled the Greek government to act hastily. The Ottoman government had withdrawn a substantial portion of its forces from the island when the reforms began to be carried out,³⁶ and the circumstances at that moment were optimal for an audacious move on Crete. Arrival of new Ottoman troops could make such a move totally unfeasible. Thus, on 10 February, the same day that Deligiannis gave his speech in the parliament, a fleet under the command of Prince George was sent to Crete.³⁷ On the following day, Skouzes formally declared to the Great Powers that Greece could no longer remain passive to the proceedings and Crete should be liberated from Ottoman sovereignty.³⁸ He also did not hesitate to tell Count Szechenyi, the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires in Athens, that "Greece would sooner raise a general conflagration by means of her large communities at Constantinople and all over the East than yield in the matter of Crete."³⁹ On 13 February, the Greek iron-clad *Miaoulis* opened fire on an Ottoman steam-yacht *Fuad* and increased the tension in the Cretan waters even further.⁴⁰

The final and most striking move of the Greek government came about on the same day. A military force of approximately 1,400 soldiers,⁴¹ under the command of Colonel Timoleon Vassos, was sent to Crete with the following instructions:

... Landing with the troops under your command on Crete and in a proper locality, you will, in the name of the King of the Hellenes, George I, occupy the island, driving away the Turks from the forts, and taking

³⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/13.

³⁷ Driault, *Şark Mes'alesi*, 349; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 39. The fleet arrived to the Cretan waters on 13 February.

³⁸ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 59.

³⁹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 68.

⁴⁰ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 112-113.

⁴¹ H. A. Lawrence, *The Greco-Turkish War 1897*, quoted in Papadopoulos, 258; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 71.

possession of them. Every action that you will take you will base upon the established Hellenic laws in the name of the King and under the responsibility of the Hellenic Government. As soon as you land you will issue a Proclamation concerning the occupation.⁴²

The dispatch of Greek troops in Crete internationalized the Cretan crisis, which had initially been a local problem within the Ottoman Empire. By attempting to occupy a foreign territory without declaration of war, Greece was not only breaching international law, but also threatening stability in the Near East and Balkans. Therefore, the representatives of the Great Powers in Athens immediately presented to the Greek government a memorandum, declaring that “in the event of its being true that the regular troops are under orders to effect an armed landing on a point of the Ottoman Empire, we consider it our duty...to dwell upon the disapprobation which such a proceeding will meet with from all our Governments...”⁴³ The memorandum was answered on the same day by the Greek foreign minister that the Greek government, which could no longer endure the lamentable condition of the Cretans, as it was bound to them by “sacred ties and religion,” decided to occupy the island and restore peace and order there.⁴⁴ Prince George tried to justify the decision of the Greek government by claiming that the Cretan insurgents would not surrender their arms to the Great Powers or to Turkey, but to Greece alone.⁴⁵ Deligiannis explained this incident to Asım Bey by alleging that his government was forced to send troops to Crete by the pressure of public opinion and the dispatched ships were only charged to sail round the island.⁴⁶ However, in the Greek parliament, he did not hesitate to declare that since Crete was henceforth a part of Greece, a draft of law for the island would shortly be prepared.⁴⁷

⁴² Tatsios, 200; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 139.

⁴³ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 69.

⁴⁴ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 70.

⁴⁵ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 82.

⁴⁶ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 78.

⁴⁷ Vecîhî, et al., 70.

While dispatching naval and military forces to Crete, the Greek government also set about to summon classes of reservists to the colors to be sent into Thessaly.⁴⁸ This might be a defensive measure commenced with the anticipation that the Ottomans could declare war on Greece after the occupation of Crete. But the Greek nationalists believed that it was the right time to take the offensive against the Ottoman Empire. A secret society in Athens, which called itself “the Bloody Committee,” was inciting the Greeks, living both inside and outside Greece, to unite for war by delivering the following proclamation:

The time for salvaging the honor of the Greeks, who have been overwhelmed with wickedness, has come. The nation must shake off the innumerable disgraces, to which they have been subjected for a long time, and rise up. Let us rise up altogether. Let us get ready to fulfill every kind of sacrifice. Let us decide on freeing our nation from the stains of evil and disgrace with the blood-floods of an honorable war...The king, the prime minister, the leader of opposition, ministers, members of the parliament and owners of wealth: Unite for this movement as it will direct you to fame and honor...War, war again, and war forever!⁴⁹

Through its agencies across Europe, the *Ethnike Hetairia* had already been carrying on propaganda and collecting money for its cause. Some European press was subsidized for writing fabricated stories about atrocities suffered by the Christians in Crete.⁵⁰ The members of the *Ethnike Hetairia* expected that in case of war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, a large mass of volunteers would come from Europe and fight alongside the Greek army.⁵¹ They also hoped to inflame a large-scale conflagration within the Ottoman lands, by provoking the Christians living in Epirus, Macedonia, Albania, and even in İstanbul, and thus to turn the European public opinion against the Ottoman Empire once more.⁵²

⁴⁸ Driault, *Şark Mes'alesi*, 349; H. A. Lawrence, quoted in Papadopoulos, 258.

⁴⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.TKM., 37/59.

⁵⁰ Hans Barth, *Türk Savun Kendini*, translated by Selçuk Ünlü (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1988), 50-51.

⁵¹ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 231.

⁵² BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/43; Driault, *Şark Mes'alesi*, 349.

CHAPTER 4

THE ROAD TO WAR

4. 1. The First Reactions to the Greek Occupation of Crete

4. 1. 1. The Ottoman Empire

The latest incidents were certainly enough to be declared *casus belli* by the Ottoman Empire. But, fearing the possible repercussions of a direct military confrontation, particularly in Balkan affairs, the Ottomans decided not to sever diplomatic relations with Greece at once, but to expect a solution through the channel of Europe.¹ Accordingly, the Sublime Porte immediately requested the Great Powers to “intervene in the most energetic manner, and, if necessary, by coercive measures,” or at least allow the Ottomans apply appropriate measures for the resolution of the incidents.² On 14 February, Tevfik Paşa, the Ottoman minister of foreign affairs, met Alexander Nelidov and Sir Philip Currie, the Russian and British ambassadors in İstanbul, and discussed rumors that the Greek government was planning to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. The ambassadors eased the minister’s concerns by indicating that Prince George and his troops had not landed on the island yet, and the Great Powers would never allow a massive Greek

¹ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 361-362.

² BOA, Y.A.RES., 85/20; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 78.

military force to land in Crete. Yet the Russian ambassador still advised him to be cautious about an attempt by Greek irregulars to infiltrate the Thessalian border.³

Nevertheless, the situation was too grave for the Ottomans to be completely entrusted to the good offices of the Great Powers. Especially the possibility of a Greek uprising in Epirus and Macedonia induced the Ottoman government to take military measures. To what extent the advice of Nelidov was influential is difficult to determine; but on the very same day with the abovementioned meeting, the sultan issued an imperial decree which formed an army of 140 battalions, 27 squadrons and 36 artillery batteries, and attached to this force the fortification and pontooning companies at Üsküb (Skopje) as well as the telegram company and the transportation battalion at Manastir. The regular troops (*nizamiyye*) of this army would depart immediately to Yanya (Janina) and Alasonya, which were respectively on the Epirote and Thessalian side of the Greek frontier, while the reservists (*redif*) would be sent to these locations following conscription.⁴

The mobilized forces constituted roughly one-fourth of the whole Ottoman army. In spite of the precarious political and financial situation of the empire, caused by the recent Armenian uprisings, the Ottoman government did not hesitate to undertake such an onerous activity. In his book, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz did not conceal his surprise about the success of the campaign by indicating that the mobilization of the Ottoman army was fulfilled by an amount of money which was equal to the daily expenses of the German army in expedition.⁵

The Sublime Porte tried to justify the mobilization of the Ottoman army by declaring that “the presence of raw levies and bands of brigands in Thessaly necessitated precautionary measures of a defensive character.”⁶ Although the Great Powers kept requesting insistently from the Porte not to dispatch additional troops

³ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 55/57.

⁴ BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/821; Sun, 280.

⁵ Goltz Paşa [Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz], *Osmanlı-Yunan Seferi (1313-1897)*, translated by Yakub Şevkî (İstanbul: Mekteb-i Fünûn-i Harbiyye-i Osmânî Matbaası, 1326), 9-11.

⁶ Clive Bigham, *With the Turkish Army in Thessaly* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1897), 2.

to Crete,⁷ the military preparations on the Greek border did not cause any resistance in Europe. Foreign ministers of the Powers later responded that these preparations were a rightful activity of self-defense and would not be objected unless the Ottomans executed a preemptive attack.⁸

4. 1. 2. The Great Powers

News that the Greek government was sending land forces to Crete alarmed the European cabinets. In spite of the sympathy of the Christian public opinion, as well as Queen Victoria of Britain and Czar Nicholas II of Russia, who had kinship with the dynasty in Greece, to the Greek cause, the governments in Europe were exceedingly careful to avert a new international crisis.⁹

In Britain, although the queen, the opposition and the public had phil-Hellenic tendencies, the British cabinet did not regard supporting Greece in its attempt as a prudent policy. This is because, some of the Great Powers clearly condemned the Greek enterprise over Crete and it was clear that they could not be easily convinced to intervene in the crisis in favor of Greece. Under these circumstances, an isolated support by Britain to the insurgence in Crete would be to quarrel with the other Great Powers, which would disturb the European Concert.¹⁰ Moreover, if the hostility of the Greeks were rewarded by Europe, that would surely encourage the other Christian elements in the Balkans to obtain similar concessions through aggression. Such a situation, creating new disputes between the Powers, could lead to serious complications in Europe, possibly to a general war. With these calculations, Salisbury declared the Greek expedition to Crete as “a most ill-advised act” and preserved the intention to resolve the crisis in agreement with the other Powers.¹¹ The first reactions of Gabriel Hanotaux and

⁷ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/78; BOA, Y.A.RES., 85/20.

⁸ BOA, Y.A.RES., 85/20.

⁹ Langer, 360-361.

¹⁰ Papadopoulos, 117.

¹¹ Langer, 361-362; Papadopoulos, 120.

Emilio Visconti-Venosta, the foreign ministers of France and Italy respectively, to the incident also advocated collective action by the Powers to prevent an Ottoman-Greek war.¹²

A military conflict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was not desirable for Austria-Hungary and Russia as they feared that the war could provoke the other states in the Balkans and create serious complications there. Although both of these Powers had long regarded the Balkans as a potential area of enlargement, neither was disposed to actively engage in the affairs of the region at that time due to several reasons. Austria-Hungary was suffering acute internal difficulties which hardly allowed any international adventurism.¹³ Especially the recent refusal of the British government to renew the Mediterranean Agreements, which had somewhat worked as a guarantee for the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary since 1887, made the Austrians anxious to preserve the balances in the Near East and Balkans. The Russians, on the other hand, were concerned primarily with the problems of East Asia, so they were as eager as the Austrians to maintain stability in the Near East and Balkans, at least for a certain period of time.¹⁴

The strongest opposition to the dispatch of Greek troops to Crete came from Germany. In Berlin, Emperor Wilhelm II reacted to the news by expressing that “the reply to this should be the dispatch of cannons to the Piraeus.” He believed that the foolhardiness of Greece, which could precipitate fresh troubles in Greece, Macedonia, Eastern Anatolia as well as Istanbul, had to be punished by the Powers. Europe should not, according to him, allow the landing of Greek forces on the island while persistently impeding the dispatch of reinforcements by the Ottoman government.¹⁵ The emperor addressed to Frank C. Lascelles, the British

¹² *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 83, 87.

¹³ Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), 261.

¹⁴ Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 210; Norman R. Rich, *Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 335; Langer, 362.

¹⁵ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 354.

ambassador in Berlin, a proposal to blockade the Piraeus as early as 14 February.¹⁶ Although the attitude of the German government did not match the outburst of the emperor at the beginning,¹⁷ the idea of an international blockade of the Piraeus soon became the central element of German policy concerning the crisis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire.

Friedrich von Holstein, an influential statesman in the German Foreign Office, had long believed that Britain would prefer to see a continental war in Europe, which would secure its presence in Africa and Asia. Therefore he strongly endeavored to promote the desires of Russia and Austria-Hungary for preserving the *status-quo* by gaining the support of Italy and, if possible, France. Although the existing crisis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire seemed to be a local one, it had to be contained before growing into a war which could stimulate rivalries among the Great Powers. With these considerations, the German government assured the Russian government that any Russian proposal designed to maintain peace would be supported by Germany and recommended to Austrian and Italian cabinets, for their approval, as well.¹⁸ In response to this offer, the Russians prepared a project of landing detachments from various European ships in Crete and holding the island *en dépôt* (i.e. in trust) until the Powers would agree on a permanent solution of the Cretan question.¹⁹ This project, agreed upon by the other Great Powers, was conveyed to the Sublime Porte and the admirals of the Powers in the Cretan waters. In İstanbul, a special commission of ministers (*Encümen-i Mahsus-i Vükelâ*) immediately issued the permission that a certain number of soldiers that belonged to the naval forces of the Great Powers could be disembarked on Crete.²⁰ On 15 February, 450 marines (100 each from the British,

¹⁶ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 82; *German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914*, selected and translated by Edgar Trevelyan S. Dugdale (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969), 2: XII. 327.

¹⁷ Norman R. Rich, *Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 2: 480.

¹⁸ Rich, *Friedrich von Holstein*, 2: 478.

¹⁹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 76; Papadopoulos, 118.

²⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/21.

French, Russian and Italian ships and 50 from Austria-Hungary) were landed in Hania.²¹ Assuming the temporary protection of the town, the admirals declared to the local government and leaders of the rebels that:

After summoning in the SS Sicily, under the presidency of Vice Admiral Canevaro, the admirals and captains of the European naval forces decided to put Crete under the control of the Great Powers by landing marines on every city in the island. This decision will be communicated to the command of the Greek fleet and the commander will be invited to abstain from any military action on the island. The marines will defend the island in case of attack or harassment. Greek troops will be arrested immediately if they are found in the island. The Great Powers announce that appropriate measures will be taken for the benefit of the both communities living in the island and declare that it is necessary for everyone to leave the arms in order to gain the goodwill of Europe.²²

On the same day, another declaration was made in Crete; but this one was addressed to the whole Cretan community. Upon landing with his troops near Hania, Colonel Vassos issued the following proclamation, which had been delivered to him by the Greek government:

...This lamentable condition of a people of the same race and religion, who have the same destiny and history as ourselves, could no longer be tolerated. His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, my august Master, decided to put an end to this state of things by the military occupation of the island...Without distinction of religion or nationality, I promise, in the name of His Majesty, that I will protect the honor, life and property of the inhabitants, respect their religious convictions, and bring them peace and equal justice.²³

4. 2. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 1

The Greek government having landed in Crete an operating force, and the admirals having put the island under their control, a double duty was imposed on Europe on avoiding mutual aggression between the Christian and Muslim Cretans, and preventing a conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Greece.²⁴ Germany still

²¹ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 348; Tatsios, 95. German detachments were landed only after the arrival of *S.M.S. Kaiserin Augusta* to Crete on 21 February: *German Diplomatic Documents*, 2: XII. 319.

²² BOA, Y.A.HUS., 366/91.

²³ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 168; Tatsios, 201.

²⁴ *L'Italie*, Italian daily, 21 February 1897, quoted in *Turkey No. 11*, No. 173.

insisted that Wilhelm's project of blockading Greek ports would be the best remedy for both complications. Contrary to the general supposition, neither love of the Ottomans, nor despise towards the Greeks was a motivation for the Germans. The project of blockade was actually designed to prevent an action by not only the Greek but also the Ottoman side. On 17 February, Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, the German chancellor, articulated the rationale of the project to the Powers as follows:

For the purpose of depriving the Greek Government of the conviction - which is the foundation of its actions- that, in case of need, it can rely on the support of certain of the Powers, and, on the other hand, of removing the alternative -either that the Turkish Government accepts the challenge to fight, or that Mussulman fanaticism seizes the opportunity for a rising with incalculable results- the individual measures...are insufficient. If the Powers seriously desire to avoid an outbreak, they will be forced in their joint action to strike harder and closer to the center of the Greek movement...²⁵

The German proposal was supported by the Russian government, which strongly denounced the presence of an armed Greek force in Crete. Mikhail Nikolayevich Muravyov, the foreign minister of Russia, regarded the action by the Greek government almost as a declaration of war to the Great Powers.²⁶ Thus, he informed the German government that Russia was ready to participate in an energetic measure to be carried out collectively by the fleets of the Powers against Greece.²⁷ Austria-Hungary was also sympathetic to the blockade of the Piraeus.

But the opinions of these three governments were not enough for a collective action by the Powers, especially when the British government was not willing to make such a commitment. First of all, when the British cabinet had prevented him, in 1885, from implementing a pro-active policy upon the Sublime Porte concerning the Armenian matters, Salisbury had decided to place secondary importance to the 'Eastern Question.'²⁸ But, thanks to the Cretan crisis, Britain had

²⁵ *German Diplomatic Documents*, 2: XII. 329.

²⁶ BOA, Y.A.RES., 85/20.

²⁷ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 135.

²⁸ J. A. S. Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century* (London: The Athlone Press, 1970), 94; Rich, *Great Power Diplomacy*, 334.

been dragged once more into a dispute between the sultan and his Christian subjects. The *mise en dépôt* of Crete was not an insignificant commitment, and the British government wanted to see some result from that before proceeding to a new one. Besides, participation of Britain in a coercive measure against Greece would be perceived as an open support to the sultan, who was constantly being blamed by the opposition and the public in Britain as the responsible party for the sufferings of the Christian Cretans. Thus, no matter that he did not approve the daring attempt of Greece, Salisbury endeavored to appease the Greeks without offending them, as well as the British public opinion. The best way to achieve this would be accelerating the process of establishing autonomy in Crete. While the blockade of their ports could exasperate the Greeks and drive them to advance into Macedonia,²⁹ decreasing Ottoman authority over Crete would, according to him, pleasantly induce them to end their campaign in the island.³⁰ Therefore, on 17 February, Salisbury responded to the German proposal of blockade with another proposal of restructuring the administration of Crete: "It is not possible usefully to consider [the proposal] until the Powers have resolved upon a course of action as regards the island of Crete, which is now occupied by them...A strong feeling is entertained by Her Majesty's Government that... [Crete] must be converted into a privileged province of the Empire."³¹ According to him, the governor-general of Crete should be appointed by the Great Powers and he should enjoy considerable liberty in his decisions. Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador in London, wrote to his government that Salisbury imagined "a future position for Crete, similar to that of Bulgaria."³²

While King George and the Greek Government were repeatedly assuring the representatives of the Powers that Greece would act strictly on the defensive on

²⁹ *German Diplomatic Documents*, 2: XII. 331.

³⁰ Driault, *Şark Mes'eleleri*, 350.

³¹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 125; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/90.

³² *German Diplomatic Documents*, 2: XII. 331.

the Thessalian border,³³ the Greeks kept taking further steps towards annexation of Crete. Vassos had already ordered his troops, augmented by a massive number of Cretan insurgents, to occupy the interior of the island, by ignoring all the efforts by the admirals on the ground that he could not take orders from anybody except his government.³⁴ On 19 February, Gennadis hoisted a Greek flag at the Greek consulate in Hania. The commander of the foreign detachments immediately protested this action and requested him to haul down the flag.³⁵ On the following day, a bill was introduced by Skouzes to the Greek parliament for the abolition of the Greek consulates at Hania, Kandiya (Candia) and Resmo (Rethymos), which was incompatible with the new state of affairs that occurred by the Greek occupation of Crete.³⁶ On the grounds that Crete had ceased to be Ottoman territory, Gennadis would thence be the royal commissioner of Greece in the island.³⁷ This defiance produced a strong reaction from the Powers, inducing them to undertake more effective measures.³⁸ The German government, in particular, exasperated by the effrontery of the Greeks decided to follow a two-sided strategy. While pushing for the blockade of the Piraeus in European diplomatic circles, Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, the German foreign minister, advised the Ottomans to hasten military preparations that would enable their forces to cross the Thessalian border if and when necessary. Even if an armed conflict never took place, he continued, these military preparations and the presence of a large Ottoman army nearby the border could be advantageous for the Ottomans in negotiations on Crete.³⁹

Despite the admirals' unanimous resolution to defeat the insurgents, their forces were only able to protect the large coastal towns. According to them, the

³³ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 144.

³⁴ Tatsios, 96; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 131-132.

³⁵ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 172.

³⁶ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 196; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 174.

³⁷ Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, 37.

³⁸ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 350.

³⁹ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/53.

crisis could not be resolved unless Greece was persuaded to withdraw its forces from Crete.⁴⁰ Yet the lack of consensus among the Powers concerning the measure to be applied on Greece hindered a collective European action. The Germans, supported by the Austrians and the Russians, insisted on the blockade of Greek ports while the British were completely against that. France and Italy were somewhat reserved, owing much to the phil-Hellene tendencies within their public. The French government, while being disinclined to support the German idea of blockade, was still disposed to contribute a collective effort to end the crisis. This is because, if prolonged, the crisis could cause more serious complications and France was not ready yet to engage in a major conflict.⁴¹ The Italians, on the other hand, were acting on the principle that they would participate in a measure only if it was agreed unanimously by the other five Powers.⁴²

When it became clear that neither Germany nor Britain would relinquish their stiff postures concerning the Cretan affairs, the Russian government assumed mediation among them. With a telegram, dated 23 February, Muravyov proposed to the Great Powers two basic principles on which the European policy concerning Crete to be based henceforth:

1. Crete shall in no case be annexed to Greece under present circumstances.
2. As Turkey has delayed the application of the reforms agreed upon, they no longer meet the requirements of the present situation. The Powers have resolved, while maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to bestow on Crete an autonomous administration.

According to the proposal, these two points would be communicated to the Ottoman and Greek governments, and the latter would also be demanded to withdraw its troops and ships from Crete within three or four days. If this demand

⁴⁰ Driault and Lh eritier, 4: 351.

⁴¹ George F. Abbott, *Turkey, Greece and the Great Powers* (London: Robert Scott, 1916), 52; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 176; S uleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Z uhdi, 180-184.

⁴² *Turkey No. 11*, No. 142; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 368/85.

was not complied with, the Powers would “proceed immediately to measures of extreme rigor.”⁴³

The two articles and the later provisions in the Russian proposal were evidently designed to satisfy the demands of Britain and Germany, respectively. The Germans did not raise an objection to the project, possibly owing to the advice of Count Agenor Goluchowski, the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary, to accept a compromise.⁴⁴ But, on the following day, the British government responded to the Russian initiative with an alternative project based on four points. The first three, i.e. autonomy, Ottoman sovereignty, and communication of the resolution to the two parties, overlapped with the Russian proposal. The last point was, however, different as it required the withdrawal of not only Greek, but also Ottoman forces from Crete: “If either Turkey or Greece persistently refuse, when required, to withdraw their naval and military forces from the island, the Powers should impose their decision by force upon the State so refusing.”⁴⁵ The British government still kept its caution not to portray an explicit reaction to the Greek expedition to Crete. According to Salisbury, sending an ultimatum only to Greece, as proposed by Russia, would create an impression that Britain was willing to restore Ottoman forces as the masters of Crete.⁴⁶ But, the Liberal Unionists in the British cabinet, led by Joseph Chamberlain, a fervent phil-Hellene,⁴⁷ would never accept any solution less than the complete autonomy of Crete.⁴⁸

The British counter-proposal was evaluated and responded to by the other Powers in a short period of time. All of them raised objections to Point 4 except Italy, which totally agreed with Britain.⁴⁹ Hanotaux was also not completely against the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Crete; but, pointing out the

⁴³ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 174; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 192.

⁴⁴ Papadopoulos, 122.

⁴⁵ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 178.

⁴⁶ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 180.

⁴⁷ Papadopoulos, 120.

⁴⁸ Langer, 363.

⁴⁹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 186.

vulnerability of Muslim Cretans, he stated that this should be done after the local gendarmerie in the island was organized by the Powers.⁵⁰ The German and Austrian foreign ministers were of the opinion that if the island was to remain under suzerainty of the sultan, Ottoman forces had the right to be in the island while the Greek ones did not.⁵¹ Muravyov did not express any opinion on whether the Ottoman forces should stay in Crete or not; but indicated that such a proposal would cause delay in the negotiations.⁵²

4. 3. Reflections of the Crisis in the Balkan Politics

The negotiations between the Powers went on approximately for a week. In the meantime, Deligiannis, fearing a unanimous decision of blockade, brazenly declared that unity existed between the interests of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, so the problem should be resolved directly between the two states. While making absolutely no impact on the negotiations held in Europe, this statement raised hopes in Istanbul for a pacific settlement of the Cretan question. The Ottoman minister in Athens was instructed immediately to meet Deligiannis and to communicate to him that the Sublime Porte was ready to halt the military preparations as long as the Greek government recalled its forces from Crete. But the minister was not able to obtain a clear answer from the Greek government.⁵³ His reports back to the Porte rather pointed out that big demonstrations about the Cretan question were being organized in Athens and the level of excitement in the city was extremely high.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, Ottoman consuls in Trikkala, Larissa and Volo were reporting that Muslims who lived in Thessaly were subjected to offenses and a mass emigration to the Ottoman Empire from the region was to be expected.

⁵⁰ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 183.

⁵¹ *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 184, 185.

⁵² *Turkey No. 11*, No. 188.

⁵³ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/60. See Appendix C.

⁵⁴ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 367/68.

In consequence, Tevfik Paşa sent for the Greek ambassador and asked the termination of hostile practices in Greece.⁵⁵

Actually, the real anxiety of the Ottomans was not a military confrontation with the Greeks, as their armed forces were incomparably superior, in terms of both quality and quantity, to the Greek army, but a possible inclusion of the other Balkan states in the conflict. At that time, it was generally believed that the Macedonian question would soon break out in an acute form, and there was already an air of preparedness about activity in the Balkans.⁵⁶ A joint attack by Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia would obviously be disastrous for the Ottoman presence in Europe, while a minor defeat of the Ottoman army might cause serious complications within the internal affairs of the empire, including a revolution. These considerations were the underlying factor in the decision of the Ottoman government to mobilize a massive military force, which was more than enough to overcome the Greek army.⁵⁷

The apprehension of the Ottomans about the Balkans was not unfounded. The escalation of crisis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire excited both the Bulgarian and Serbian governments greatly with the calculation that any advantage to be obtained by Greece would mean a change in the regional balances at their expense.⁵⁸ At the beginning, the Bulgarians had the idea of benefiting from the crisis. With an implicit threat of mobilization, they demanded from the Ottoman Empire establishment of a synod, with five Bulgarian priests, in İstanbul⁵⁹ as well as appointment of Bulgarian metropolitans and commercial agents to certain towns in Macedonia.⁶⁰ Yet the sultan constantly evaded putting these demands into the

⁵⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/49.

⁵⁶ Papadopoulos, 113.

⁵⁷ Goltz Paşa, 21-22.

⁵⁸ Fikret Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu*, translated by İhsan Catay (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Y., 1996), 133.

⁵⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/48.

⁶⁰ Realizing that the autonomy of Macedonia was a remote accomplishment, the Bulgarian government had begun to make inroads to acquire *berats* from the sultan for the establishment of Bulgarian sees in Melnik, Kilkış (Kukush), Ustrumca (Strumica), Debre (Debar) and Manastır, as well as appointment of Bulgarian commercial agents to Selânik, Üsküb, Manastır, Dedeğaç and

agenda by pointing out the financial and political difficulties he had to handle first.⁶¹

In order to double the effectiveness of its efforts, the Bulgarian government also initiated rapprochement with Greece. In January 1897, a Bulgarian legation was opened in Athens, and Konstantin Stoilov, the Bulgarian premier, suggested the Greek government to exert pressure on the Sublime Porte jointly with the demand of reforms in Macedonia. The Greek government, envisaging the partition of the region, did not accept this idea.⁶² Nevertheless, the Greeks would love to see Bulgaria, and also Serbia, fighting on their side against the Ottoman army. If they assured the help of these two states, the Greeks contemplated, with the support of irregulars trained by the *Ethnike Hetairia*, they could overcome the Ottomans and obtain not only Crete; but also Epirus and a part of Macedonia.⁶³ The Ottomans were also aware that a coalition of these three states could set the entire Macedonia in flames. Bulgarian revolutionary committees had already begun to operate in the region⁶⁴ and, after its annexation of Eastern Rumelia, a further move by Bulgaria on Macedonia was predictable. Since the military transportation was carried out by land, an armed attack from Bulgaria could put the Ottoman army in a difficult position.⁶⁵ As a measure against an aggression from the Bulgarian side, Hâfız Mehmed Bey, the governor of Kosova, advised the Porte that military forces in towns that were close to the Bulgarian border and mostly inhabited by Bulgarians, such as Palanka, İştib, Osmaniyye, Koçana and Kratova should not be removed, but reinforced even further.⁶⁶ The Ottoman government frequently sent orders to

Edirne: Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria, 1878-1918: A History* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1983), 234-235.

⁶¹ Veska Nikolova, "La Bulgarie et les pays voisins pendant la Guerre gréco-turque (1897)," in *Bulgarian Historical Review* 9: 4 (1981): 28.

⁶² Crampton, 234-235; Nikolova, 31; Tatsios, 108-109.

⁶³ Tatsios, 107; Bartlett, 23; Bigham, 1.

⁶⁴ *1313 Yunan Harbi Harekât-ı Askeriyyesi ve Muhâberâtı* (İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, Türkçe Yazmalar, No: 9919), 44.

⁶⁵ Tahsin Paşa, *Sultan Abdülhamid: Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi, 1990), 68.

⁶⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.UM., 36/107.

the army commands at Edirne and Selânik that every measure should be taken against a Bulgarian assault, especially when the transfer of military forces was still in progress.⁶⁷

As regards Serbia, a report sent from the legation in Belgrade on 23 February increased fears in İstanbul. Ahmed Tevfik, the Ottoman minister, wrote that although King Aleksandar Obrenović pledged that Serbia, in case of war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, would remain strictly neutral, Serbian people, along with a number of politicians, were harshly criticizing the friendly policy of the king towards the sultan. They were extremely disturbed to see that this policy had never yielded any positive result for Serbia while Bulgaria and Greece had acquired certain concessions through hostility. The preceding expectation of the Serbians was the reopening of Serbian schools in Macedonia and appointment of a Serbian metropolitan there. The minister strongly advised his government to resolve these questions as soon as possible to avert hostilities by Serbia, and added that “faced with the threat of Bulgarian committees, driving the Serbians towards at least neutrality is vital for our security in the Balkans.”⁶⁸ The sultan, reluctant to accept the Serbian demands, intended to sign a military convention with this state.⁶⁹ But this intention was not materialized.

While the Ottoman suspicions towards Bulgaria and Serbia remained alive, these two states came to an understanding on a common policy towards the Ottoman-Greek crisis and the Macedonian affairs. When its attempt to cooperate with Greece fell through, the Bulgarian government turned its face to Serbia. The Serbian government, as well as the king, was already willing to reconcile differences with Bulgaria, as Serbia was not ready to engage in a conflict at that time. At the end of February, Aleksandar visited Sofia and concluded a secret agreement with Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria. According to Article 2 of this

⁶⁷ *1313 Yunan Harbi Harekât-ı Askeriyyesi ve Muhâberâtı*, 57.

⁶⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA., 26/15.

⁶⁹ Langer, 367.

agreement, neither of the parties should engage in a unilateral action which could upset the status quo in the Balkans. Article 3 stipulated cooperation in religious and educational issues concerning Macedonia.⁷⁰

4. 4. The Verbal Note of 2 March: The First Diplomatic Effort by the Powers

Towards the end of February, the Great Powers were also at the brink of an agreement, concerning the measure to be applied in Crete. As it was clear that the aforementioned proposal of Britain, stipulating synchronized removal of Greek and Ottoman troops from the island, would not be supported by the other governments, the British did not stick to this idea as strictly as before. Actually, there were certain signals that Continental Powers could initiate drastic measures without waiting the consent of Britain.⁷¹ Thus, Britain turned to the Russian proposal, which had already been declared as acceptable by the other Powers. With the desire to reduce the pressure on the Greek government, Salisbury suggested the Russians to submit an “official summons” to Greece rather than an “ultimatum,” to remove the phrases “immediately” and “extreme rigor,” both depicting the future measures to be applied if Greece rejected the summons, from the proposal, and to extend the allowed delay of the Greek reply to six days.⁷² All of the suggestions were accepted by Russia and the British were finally convinced. The two points in the Russian proposal was communicated to the cabinets of İstanbul and Athens on 2 March as a verbal note. In addition, the latter was summoned to recall its naval and military forces from Crete within a period of six days, and notified that the Powers would resort to coercive measures if the summons was not complied with.⁷³

On the other hand, a diluted version of the British proposal, stipulating the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Crete, was prepared by the ambassadors in

⁷⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 26/45; Adamır, 133; Crampton, 234; Langer, 367-368; Tatsios, 108-109.

⁷¹ Papadopoulos, 122-123.

⁷² *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 192, 212.

⁷³ Driault and Lh eritier, 4: 361.

İstanbul on 1 March, as a memorandum to be appended to the verbal note. According to this document, as soon as the island was evacuated by the Greek troops, Ottoman troops in Crete would be concentrated in the fortified places which were occupied by European detachments at that time. After receiving approval from their governments, the ambassadors submitted this additional memorandum to the Sublime Porte on 5 March.⁷⁴

4. 4. 1. The Ottoman Response to the Verbal Note

While submitting these communications, the ambassadors repeatedly requested the Ottomans to restrain the Muslim Cretans from committing hostilities against the Christians, to act with extreme caution on the Greek border and especially not to utilize local paramilitary troops (*başıbozuk*) in Macedonia against the Christians. The Ottomans were already committed not to engage in any adventurism and to follow the advices by the Powers with maximum care. This is because, at a time when the Great Powers were, at least in appearance, intervening in the crisis on the side of the Ottomans, any single act of hostility by Muslims against Christians, either in Crete or in the border, would infuriate the Europeans and might result in a volte-face on their policy. The fragility of the situation imposed the ironically bothersome task of containing its subjects against a mass of merciless insurgents in Crete, while endeavoring to defend its border against infiltrations and attacks of irregulars with an extreme control on its own troops. Both the sultan and the government did their best to perform this task. Numerous categorical orders were sent to the army commands at Yanya and Alasonya that no action that could breach the peace should be occasioned.⁷⁵ With an imperial decree dated 23 February, employment of paramilitary troops was also banned. On 2 March, the Council of Ministers decided to apply serious and vigorous measures to

⁷⁴ *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 224, 282.

⁷⁵ BOA, Y.MTV., 151/191; BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/79; *1313 Yunan Harbi Harekât-ı Askeriyyesi ve Muhâberâtı*, 73.

influence the Muslim Cretans not to engage in any activity that could “threaten the security on the island and expand the difficulties in foreign policy.”⁷⁶

The reply of the Ottomans to the verbal note of the Great Powers was totally in accordance with this pacific policy. With a verbal note, dated 6 March, the Sublime Porte declared its desire of insuring the maintenance of peace and accepted the autonomy of Crete in principle, assuming the right of discussion with the ambassadors on the form and details of the administration to be established in the island.⁷⁷ Yet the Ottomans did not respond the additional memorandum of 5 March immediately, since a positive response to this document entailed a serious commitment. Before making such a commitment they rather preferred to see the course of events, especially to determine the attitude of the Greek government as well as the resolution of Europe. On March 14, when it was realized that the collective effort by the Great Powers was still far away from yielding a concrete result, the Sublime Porte replied to the memorandum by stating that the concentration of Ottoman troops was a matter to be discussed after the withdrawal of Greek forces from the island.⁷⁸

4. 4. 2. The Greek Response to the Verbal Note

In Europe, it was generally believed that the resolution of the Powers, which was observable in the verbal note of 2 March, would induce the Greeks to act in a reasonable way,⁷⁹ but this belief shortly proved wrong. The Greek government responded to the verbal note of the Powers on 8 March, which was the last day of the allowed period, with a long reply. Although, the reply stated, the Greek government totally shared the desire of the Great Powers to preserve general

⁷⁶ BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/825.

⁷⁷ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 246; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 213; Vecihî, et al., 99.

⁷⁸ Great Britain, *Turkey No. 6 (1897) Reply of the Turkish Government to the Note Presented on March 5, 1897 by the Representatives of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, in regard to Crete* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1897).

⁷⁹ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 212.

peace and had the willingness to help this cause, it could not be indifferent to the perpetual sufferings of the Cretans, who shared the same race, religion and sect with the Greek people. With the alleged justification that those troops were working for the same goal with the forces of the Great Powers in Crete, the Greek government requested the Powers to “reconsider their persistence” concerning the withdrawal of Greek troops from the island:

Even if the operation of the naval forces of the Great Powers in the Cretan waters and their determination to prevent landing of Ottoman troops may render the presence of the Greek vessels needless; the Greek army should remain in the island for securing the peace and tranquility... In fact, if the duty of reinstalling peace and security is entrusted to our troops in the island, which deserve the full trust and confidence of the Great Powers, the desires of the Powers will be satisfied promptly and fully.

In its reply, the Greek government also rejected the autonomy to be granted to Crete:

We have no doubt that the new type of administration, planned by the Great Powers...shall never be able to restore peace and tranquility in the island; nor can it terminate the current hostilities... Thus, we would be under a big culpability if we did not request the Great Powers to relinquish their insistence for the establishment of autonomy in Crete; but to return the island, which was actually a part of Greece during the presidency of Kapodistrias –at the time when the other Greek provinces obtained their independence-, to Greece.

In accordance with these views, it was proposed, at the end of the note, that after the restoration of order in Crete, the future of the island should be determined by the free will of the inhabitants.⁸⁰

It is obvious in the reply of Greece that the Greeks were truly optimistic that they could influence the Powers by carrying out a stiff and aggressive policy. The Greeks did not want the establishment of autonomy in Crete as they feared that if the Cretans once tasted the delights of self-government, their pan-Hellenic tendencies would vanish.⁸¹ With the presuppositions that the Ottoman Empire was

⁸⁰ BOA, Y.MTV., 152/15; BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA., 26/54; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 252; Driault and Lh eritier, 4: 366; Tatsios, 97; S ileyman Tevfik and Abdullah Z hd , 214-218.

⁸¹ Bartlett, 15.

a powerless state on the verge of disintegration, that the Powers would not allow the breach of the Concert because of an Ottoman-Greek conflict, and that public opinion throughout Europe mostly supported the Greek cause -it was at least against the sultan-, the Greeks believed that Greece could annex Crete through an ostensible challenge against both the Ottoman Empire and Europe.⁸² In February, excitement of the masses had spread to the government. Deligiannis and Colonel Metaxas, the minister of war, appeared quite sympathetic towards war against the Ottoman Empire.⁸³ Especially the former was openly “pandering” to the nationalistic and warlike sentiments of the Greek populace.⁸⁴ Even the king, who had been known as a pacific figure, was signaling that he would not be a mediator between his public and the Powers anymore. He openly declared that he was resolute to accomplish the annexation Crete, and the Powers should regard this as a natural right of Greece, similar to the occupation of Cyprus by Britain, Schleswig-Holstein by Germany and Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary.⁸⁵

Although his subjects were delighted with the attitude of King George; whether he really believed that Europe would allow Greece to annex Crete was rather questionable. The king’s pan-Hellenist expressions can well be attributed to his concerns with domestic politics. Since the actual intervention of the Powers, the Greek public had been advocating the idea of fighting the Ottomans in the north if they were not allowed to do that in Crete.⁸⁶ On 13 March, the French minister in Athens wrote to his government that “it is impossible to ignore the intensity of the national feeling which directs everyone towards the border. Such a feeling has not been observed in Greece since the War of Independence.”⁸⁷ In addition, the *Ethnike Hetairia*, which had become powerful enough to be called an *imperium in imperio*,

⁸² Tahsin Paşa, 65; Rich, *Great Power Diplomacy*, 336.

⁸³ M. Henri Turot, *L'insurrection Crétoise et la Guerre Gréco-Turque* (Paris: Librairie Hachette et C^{ie}, 1898), 94-96.

⁸⁴ W. Kinnaird Rose, *With the Greeks in Thessaly* (London: Methuen & Co, 1897), 158.

⁸⁵ Bartlett, 314; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 363-364; Tatsios, 103.

⁸⁶ Driault, *Şark Mes'eleleri*, 352.

⁸⁷ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 379.

began to intimidate the king by asking either to follow the motion of Hellenism or leave the throne at once.⁸⁸ The king was convinced that his choice lay between going for war and internal revolution.⁸⁹ Any attempt by the king to stop the expedition would probably result in an internal chaos in Greece. In this respect, it is even possible to assume that he supported the warlike overtones in his country with the expectation that the Powers would eventually intervene and give an end to the Greek venture in Crete.⁹⁰

Furthermore, both the government and the king were aware that their insistent defiance could result in a blockade of their ports by the Powers. Such an outcome would definitely exasperate the Greek public and voices of the war supporters would thus increase to a higher pitch. But since the blockade would render the maritime transportation impossible, transfer of the Greek army to the Ottoman border would be a difficult and slow process. Expecting a prompt and decisive move by their government, the Greeks would respond the protraction with a revolt, which would ensue in the fall of government, and even the deposition of the king. In order to avert this, the army had to be mobilized as quickly as possible. In short, both for King George and Deligiannis, pushing the country recklessly towards an external conflict seemed to be the only way to avoid an internal crisis.⁹¹ Since neither had enough courage to counter the stream and tell their people that Greece was not ready for war,⁹² they preferred to intimidate the Ottomans and the Europeans through military preparations and urge them to yield. If their bluff worked they could obtain Crete, but if it fell through, nobody in Greece could blame them for being apathetic to the *Megale Idea*.

Driven on the one hand by irredentist aspirations, and concerns on domestic politics on the other, the Greek government decided to hasten military preparations

⁸⁸ Turot, 96-97; Bartlett, 125.

⁸⁹ Papadopoulos, 126.

⁹⁰ Joan Haslip, *İngiliz Merkezli Şark Politikası ve II. Abdülhamid*, translated by Zeki Doğan (İstanbul: Fener, 1998), 243; Langer, 366.

⁹¹ Mille, 171.

⁹² Abbott, 308.

on the Ottoman border. Owing to the fear of a prompt blockade, this decision had been put into action before the Greek reply to the verbal note of the Powers was submitted. Thus, military reservists were called out and armed forces began to be dispatched to Thessaly and Epirus.⁹³ These preparations produced rumors that in the face of the pressure from the Great Powers to withdraw their troops from Crete, the Greeks would attack the Ottoman border without an official declaration of war.⁹⁴ When the representatives of the Powers in Athens requested an explanation from the Greek government, Skouzes assured them that Greece would remain strictly on the defensive, and would not be an element of discord in Europe.⁹⁵ But the activities of the *Ethnike Hetairia* were increasing the tension on the border and causing a considerable level of apprehension on the Ottoman side.

4. 5. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 2

The Greek reply to their verbal note was regarded by the European cabinets as a blatant defiance. Apart from the furious reactions by the German, Russian and Austrian foreign ministers, Hanotaux believed that the reply included certain unacceptable terms, and its ulterior object was to separate the Powers.⁹⁶ But Salisbury was still trying to find a way to resolve the crisis by satisfying the Greeks rather than offending them. His concerns on domestic politics still preceded those on foreign affairs. As Lord Curzon, the British undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, later confessed, the government “had had to reckon with the phil-Hellenic tendencies in the country, which had permitted action by England against Greece, but not action in favor of Turkey.”⁹⁷ On 9 March, Salisbury told Count Deym, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, that it seemed to him “worthy of consideration

⁹³ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK., 119/11; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 368/35; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 369/4.

⁹⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/98; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 368/51; *1313 Yunan Harbi Harekât-ı Askeriyyesi ve Muhâberâtı*, 66-67.

⁹⁵ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 239.

⁹⁶ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 258.

⁹⁷ *German Diplomatic Documents*, 2: XII. 408.

whether the Greek force might not be divided and placed under officers of the Powers, serving, of course, under the flag of the Power to whom they were assigned. This arrangement could furnish the material for a gendarmerie, probably better fitted than any other to keep order in a Greek district.”⁹⁸ Unsurprisingly, this suggestion of Salisbury, which obviously intended to legitimize the *fait accompli* by the Greek government, did not receive any support from the other cabinets. Muravyov openly criticized this idea on the grounds that such a concession would not only encourage the Greeks, but also prove a dangerous example for the other parts of the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁹

In the meantime, the admirals in Crete were authorized by their governments to apply required measures to assure the security of the island. Their first target was the Greek Consulate in Hania, which was generally recognized as a hotbed of intrigue and conspiracy in the island.¹⁰⁰ On 8 March, the admirals forced Baraklis, the Greek vice-consul, to board a ship and leave the town along with a number of Greek journalists. Their expulsion was carried out strictly despite furious protests both from the consul and the Greek government.¹⁰¹ On 13 March, Goluchowski stated to the Greek chargé d'affaires that: “The naval commanders would naturally remove from Crete any person whose presence there they considered dangerous.”¹⁰²

In anticipation of the Greek reply to the verbal note of the Powers, the admirals had unanimously proposed, on 5 March, to their respective governments a project for the re-stabilization of affairs in Crete. The project included the following clauses:

1. Blockade of the Piraeus and the principal Greek ports.
2. Blockade of Crete.
3. Governments to make Proclamation of blockade.

⁹⁸ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 259.

⁹⁹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 267.

¹⁰⁰ Ardern G. Hulme-Beaman, *Twenty Years in the Near East* (London: Methuen & Co., 1898), 265.

¹⁰¹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 263; İrtəm, 49; Hulme-Beaman, 266; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 157.

¹⁰² *Turkey No. 11*, No. 300.

4. All Greek ships met at sea to be escorted to Milo, where they will be placed in blockade.
5. Every hostile act committed by Greek ships against a ship of the Six Powers will be considered as a declaration of war with the Six Powers.
6. Every Greek torpedo-boat will be repelled by gun fire if she comes within range of the ships of the Powers.¹⁰³

Although the project was agreed to by the admirals, its implementation required approval by every Great Power as such a forceful plan of action would upset the European Concert if put into force without unanimity. As expected, the British proved to be the most averse party to undertake the project. Especially the idea of blockading the Greek ports did not convince Salisbury at all. He believed that the blockade of Crete, which he regarded “more efficacious and less exasperating” than that of the Piraeus, would suffice.¹⁰⁴ Yet, after receiving the Greek reply to the collective verbal note of the Powers, the German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian governments had begun to insist on the blockade of the Piraeus even more fervently. Especially the Germans used the threat that they would withdraw their forces from Crete if the Powers relented to Greece after such an overt defiance.¹⁰⁵ According to Marschall, the state of anarchy which existed in Crete owed much to the presence of the Greek troops, and the security on the island could not be restored as long as a single Greek soldier remained there. Furthermore, he believed that the king of Greece would never risk his throne by yielding to “half-measures” by Europe; but only to a resolute and united attitude by the Powers would persuade him, as well as the Greek public.¹⁰⁶ Muravyov thought in the same way as his German colleague. He told Nicholas O’Conor, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, that as soon as the ports of the Piraeus, Patras and Volo were blockaded, the Greeks, affected economically from that, would assume a more reasonable attitude.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 245; Papadopoulos, 126.

¹⁰⁴ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 256.

¹⁰⁵ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 370.

¹⁰⁶ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 280.

¹⁰⁷ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 334.

Realizing the determination of these two states, Salisbury soon softened his attitude. In fact, he was personally disposed towards the blockade of Crete and the port of Volo, but this project was firmly opposed by certain members of the government. After a few sessions in the cabinet, he formally declared to the various ambassadors that Britain agreed only to the blockade of Crete;¹⁰⁸ by adding that the blockade of the Piraeus might be considered as necessary if the other measures failed.¹⁰⁹ The Italian government simply followed British policy, and would not take part in any action without participation of Britain.¹¹⁰ The reluctance of Britain and Italy put the French government into a difficult position, as its government was eager to keep following Russia's lead, but the tide of phil-Hellenism was constantly rising among the French public.¹¹¹ The most illustrious orators in France, such as Jaurès, Clemenceau, Denys-Cochin and Millerand had already begun to protest against government policy,¹¹² and hundreds of French students were offering their services to the Greek ambassador in Paris.¹¹³ The government feared that if the public pressure rose to a certain level to change French foreign policy, the agreement of the Powers on a certain common policy would be even more difficult, and the European Concert could be disrupted as a result.

4. 6. The Escalation of Tension at the Ottoman-Greek Border

The lack of a monolithic attitude among the Powers towards Greece was making the question even more complicated. The insistence of Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary for a blockade on Greek ports caused a fear among the Greeks that they could not send enough forces to the Ottoman border in case of

¹⁰⁸ Papadopoulos, 128-129; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 368/72.

¹⁰⁹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 281.

¹¹⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/86.

¹¹¹ Papadopoulos, 128.

¹¹² Édouard Driault, *La Grande Idée: La Renaissance de l'Hellénisme* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1920), 164.

¹¹³ Charles W. Dilke and Demetrius N. Botassi, "The Uprising of Greece," in *North American Review* 164: 4 (April 1897), 461.

military conflict. On the other hand, the moderate policy of Britain induced the Greeks to believe that their challenge could yield a result without waging war, just as the way in which Thessaly had been ceded to Greece in 1881.¹¹⁴ These circumstances assured the Greeks that the most rational response to these two potential outcomes seemed to be assembling armed forces on the Ottoman frontier as soon and much as possible. This is because, such an action would not only render the blockade useless; but also be perceived in Europe as a threat to general peace, urging the Powers to settle the question in a peaceful way. European cabinets, influenced by their public opinion, could put pressure on the Ottoman government to cede territory to Greece.¹¹⁵ Even if military preparations of Greece were regarded by the Ottomans as provocation and precipitated a war with them, the Powers would probably intervene in favor of the Greeks on the grounds that the peace had been breached by the Ottoman side. As articulated by E. Ashmead Bartlett, “it was simply the performance of a shrewd but hard-pressed gambler, who, being in a desperate case, stakes heavily upon a single throw, knowing that, even if he loses, his position will not be much worse.”¹¹⁶

With these calculations, full mobilization was declared in Greece on 15 March,¹¹⁷ and a massive maritime transportation of arms and munitions from the Piraeus to Volo started immediately. The *Ethnike Hetairia*, by declaring that it was too late for the Greek people to step back from fighting, was simultaneously sending its armed bands to Thessaly and laying the groundwork for a general insurrection in Macedonia.¹¹⁸ The number of provocations on the Ottoman border increased accordingly.¹¹⁹ A law was passed in the Greek parliament to make it possible for Greeks from abroad to enlist as volunteers in the army with the same

¹¹⁴ Goltz Paşa, 32; İrtem, 54.

¹¹⁵ Rose, 159.

¹¹⁶ Bartlett, 23.

¹¹⁷ Langer, 367.

¹¹⁸ İrtem, 52-53; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 226.

¹¹⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/79.

status as Greek nationals.¹²⁰ As a result, with the encouragement and assistance of Greek consuls, volunteers from Samos, İzmir, Cyprus and other parts of the Ottoman Empire began flowed to Greece.¹²¹ When these activities were evidently pushing Greece into war, Smolenski, the Greek minister of war, resigned from his position on the grounds that Greece was not prepared enough for such a big campaign.¹²²

The permanent increase in the hostile attitude of Greece and the uncertainty of the European intervention caused a considerable degree of apprehension among the Ottomans. A Greek offensive on the frontier was imminent and reports from Bulgaria indicated that the Bulgarians were about an attack in Macedonia if they became convinced that Greece would acquire a piece of land from the Ottoman Empire.¹²³ In order to avoid a large-scale conflict, the Sublime Porte immediately resorted to military and diplomatic measures. Commanders in the region were instructed that the army should keep vigilance against any kind of border violation, while the peace should be fully respected and the order of troops should be preserved with maximum care.¹²⁴ The existing troops on the border were reinforced by forming reservist units from the Albanians.¹²⁵ A fleet under the command of Hasan Râmi Paşa was sent to the Dardanelles to avert a Greek naval operation on İstanbul.¹²⁶ In addition, concerns about the inclusion of Serbia and Bulgaria to the conflict were immediately presented to Nelidov. The Russian ambassador assured the sultan that the Bulgarian and Serbian governments would not take any action against the Ottoman Empire, as they had promised upon categorical warnings by the czar, adding that the Ottoman government should refrain from sending troops to

¹²⁰ Koliopoulos, 219.

¹²¹ Beria Remzi Özoran, "Tesalya Savaşı," in *Türk Kültürü* 110 (December 1971), 109; BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/68; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 369/4.

¹²² Tatsios, 105-106.

¹²³ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK., 119/56.

¹²⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/63; BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/70.

¹²⁵ Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1966), 3: 217.

¹²⁶ İrem, 55.

its borders with these two countries, in order not to stimulate nationalist sentiments there.¹²⁷

Despite having concentrated a strong army on the Greek frontier, the Ottomans were regarding the use of force as the last resort. The potential complications of military confrontation with Greece were well known in İstanbul, and the sultan was of the opinion that even a war concluded by victory would be at the expense of the state.¹²⁸ He was still hopeful that the conflict could be settled diplomatically with Greece, but he was reluctant to initiate direct negotiations with the Greeks due to the fear of a reaction by the Great Powers.¹²⁹ Therefore, notwithstanding the prolongation of the negotiations in Europe, the Ottomans still expected the solution from the Great Powers, and kept requesting them to implement coercive measures on Greece at once.¹³⁰

4. 7. The Blockade of Crete

In the middle of March, the Powers finally came to a collective decision on the measures to be applied in Crete. These measures basically included the blockade of Crete against all vessels carrying the Greek flag, and the establishment of *de facto* autonomy in the island. On 15 March, Hanotau declared in the French parliament that the land forces of each Great Power in Crete would be reinforced by an additional 500-600 soldiers.¹³¹ Two days later, the transportation of troops to Crete began and the admirals were instructed by their governments to blockade the island.¹³² The Greek and Ottoman governments were notified of the decision of the Great Powers on March 18 and 19, respectively. The blockade was officially put

¹²⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/77.

¹²⁸ Hasırcızade, *Abdülhamid Han ve Osmanlı-Yunan Muharebesi* (İstanbul: Ferişt, 1989), 16.

¹²⁹ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 385. The Russians were in favor of such a bilateral agreement; as Nelidov later expressed his regret that, even if some of the Powers had objected it, the sultan would still have performed his attempt informally and confidentially: BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 50/77.

¹³⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/91.

¹³¹ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 23/83.

¹³² Süleyman Tefvik and Abdullah Zühdi, 221; Tatsios, 101.

into effect on 21 March, at 8 o'clock in the morning.¹³³ In addition, the admirals announced to the Cretans that the island would be henceforth completely independent in its internal affairs from the supervision and inspection of the Ottoman government, and invited them to put down their arms immediately.¹³⁴ However, this proclamation did not make a big impact among the insurgents and, due to their demand of union with Greece, they kept their obedience to Colonel Vassos.¹³⁵ In addition, the extreme length and irregularity of the Cretan shores also rendered the blockade ineffective.¹³⁶ Under these circumstances, it was soon realized that the latest effort by the Powers was still insufficient to pacify the island. Alfred Biliotti, the British consul-general in Hania, wrote to his government that the latest effort by the Great Powers was not sufficient to prevent war.¹³⁷ The admirals requested further steps from their governments: i.e. appointment of a governor-general to Crete, reinforcement of the troops under their command, organization of the new regime in the island, application of pressure to the Greek and Ottoman governments for withdrawing their forces, and blockade of Piraeus.¹³⁸

4. 8. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 3

4. 8. 1. Further Negotiations

Actually, it was well known in Europe that the blockade of Crete and establishment of autonomy there were only half-measures to end the crisis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The bellicose actions of Greece, followed by the military preparations on the two sides of the frontier had transformed the Cretan

¹³³ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 374-375; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 340.

¹³⁴ BOA, Y.A.RES., 369/56.

¹³⁵ Tatsios, 102.

¹³⁶ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 223.

¹³⁷ Yeğen, 290.

¹³⁸ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 376-378.

question into a large-scale Ottoman-Greek conflict, shifting the locus of the crisis from Crete to Thessaly and Epirus. This is why the negotiations on a collective action to stop Greek aggression continued among the Powers even as the measures to be applied in Crete were agreed on. The three continental empires were still underlining the necessity of blockading ports on the Greek mainland in order to prevent the imminent war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. On 17 March, Marschall told the British ambassador that unless immediate pressure was put upon Greece, war would be inevitable; because if the Greeks attacked, the Powers could not prevent the Ottoman Empire from defending itself.¹³⁹ But, on the same day, Salisbury informed the Germans that, due to the prominence of phil-Hellenism in his country, the British would continue to be “lookers-on” in case of war.¹⁴⁰

The indifference of Britain was developing into a threat to the European Concert. At that time Russia was pushing, at least in appearance, for rapid action to keep the Greeks away from an armed conflict with the Ottomans. Muravyov, urging the Powers to blockade the port of Volo without any delay, declared that if Britain abstained at that juncture, the responsibility of a war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece and a general conflagration in Macedonia would fall on the British government.¹⁴¹ Goluchowski, realizing that the blockade could be carried out more effectively without participation of Britain, tried to find a middle way between Britain and the continental Powers by suggesting the British government that the Greek ports could be blockaded by the other Powers while Britain joined only in the blockade of Crete.¹⁴²

Yet the British government was hesitant to approve such an action due to the firm opposition from the Liberal Party. Instead, on March 20, Salisbury proposed the other Powers to urge the Greek and Ottoman governments to withdraw their forces up to 50 miles from their side of the frontier. If Greece

¹³⁹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 311.

¹⁴⁰ *German Diplomatic Documents*, 2: XII. 371.

¹⁴¹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 335.

¹⁴² *Turkey No. 11*, No. 338.

refused to comply with the summons, Britain would approve the blockade of Volo. In case of a refusal from the Ottoman side, Britain would “be ready to partake in the measures of coercion that the Powers would regard essential to be adopted.”¹⁴³

This proposal did not receive any support from the other Powers, except Italy.¹⁴⁴ Hanotaux and Muravyov expressed their fears of an incursion by Greek irregulars into Ottoman territory, and stated that 50 miles is too great a distance for the Ottoman troops to defend their frontier.¹⁴⁵ Goluchowski’s reply was that war was imminent and addressing the summons to the two governments would be nothing but loss of time.¹⁴⁶ The German government was already unwilling to address a further communication to Greece before the Greek troops were withdrawn from Crete. Above all, the blockade of Volo was still regarded urgent and indispensable by these four Powers because the Greeks were shipping all their troops and supplies from the Piraeus to this port.

Under these circumstances, on March 23, Salisbury made a final declaration that although Britain was prepared to join the blockade of the Greek littoral if and when the other Powers agreed on it unanimously; London would not participate in the blockade of Volo and the Piraeus.¹⁴⁷ At the same time, the two governments would be urged to withdraw their forces to a convenient distance from the frontier, and the Sublime Porte would be informed that if the Ottoman forces crossed into Greek territory, that would be regarded as a hostile act against Britain.¹⁴⁸

4. 8. 2. Deadlock

The declaration of Salisbury demonstrated once again the high level of influence of the public opinion and opposition on the British foreign policy. With

¹⁴³ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 341.

¹⁴⁴ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 370/51.

¹⁴⁵ *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 345, 359.

¹⁴⁶ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 362.

¹⁴⁷ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 381.

¹⁴⁸ *German Diplomatic Documents*, 2: XII. 383; Papadopoulos, 132.

its dilatory attitude, the British government was virtually forsaking the European Concert. Hanotaux reacted to the proposal of Britain by telling Count Wolkenstein, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Paris, “this is the end of the European Concert,” while Wilhelm regretted that if Germany had possessed a strong navy, the German viewpoint would have been received by the other Powers with much esteem.¹⁴⁹ In response to the latest declaration of Salisbury, the Russian government decided to abandon its efforts for coercive measures as it was “jaded by waiting and seeing its paralyzed initiative.” Thus the attempts for a collective measure over Greece were suspended for some time.¹⁵⁰

However, the anarchy in Crete was still going on and the Greeks were taking further steps towards war. On March 26, with a royal decree, Prince Constantine was named commander-in-chief of the Greek army in Thessaly and was sent to Volo the following night.¹⁵¹ Small-scale provocations on the Ottoman border were still being perpetrated by the Greek irregulars.¹⁵² The imminence of war led the admirals in Crete to warn their governments once again. According to them, the time for half-measures was past, and in order to persuade the Greek government to comply with the resolution of the Powers, the Gulf of Athens should be blockaded immediately and Greek vessels should be “moved away, encircled and detained.”¹⁵³ This firm warning of the admirals surprisingly changed the attitude of the British government. Finally winning the assent of his colleagues to a compromise, Salisbury declared at the end of March that Britain was ready for the blockade of the Gulf of Athens whenever asked by the admirals, and approved collectively by the other Great Powers.¹⁵⁴

This was the most critical moment of the negotiations; as Salisbury’s declaration left it open to the Powers to take action. But, in fact, cabinets in Europe

¹⁴⁹ *German Diplomatic Documents*, 2: XII. 386.

¹⁵⁰ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 382.

¹⁵¹ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 382; Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, 39.

¹⁵² BOA, Y.A.HUS., 370/51.

¹⁵³ BOA, Y.A.HUS., 370/103; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 382; Papadopoulos, 133.

¹⁵⁴ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 385.

were not totally decisive to do that. Since the admirals opposed sending their vessels, which were still being used in the blockade of Crete, to the Gulf of Athens, dispatch of massive reinforcements was required to commence the blockade.¹⁵⁵ Except Germany and Austria-Hungary, which still insisted on blockade, the Powers were disinclined to send additional forces to the Near East. Thus, they tried to evade this commitment with certain pretexts. Italy declared its reluctance to use coercive measures against Greece, by pointing out that the Greeks would be infuriated, while France posed equal contribution by the Great Powers as a prerequisite for its participation. The Russians, believing that the Greek troops had already been transported to Thessaly and the blockade could drive the Greeks towards hostilities, did not show any willingness to support this measure anymore.¹⁵⁶ In short, the negotiations that had continued among the Powers *ad nauseam* came to a halt with no practical result.

The disappearance of Russian disposition towards the blockade owes much to the clarification of the Balkan states' attitudes. The primary concern of the Russians was to preserve the *status-quo* in the Balkans, and what they feared most was the possibility of a general conflagration in the region. This is why the Russians had taken the lead in urging Bulgaria and Serbia to keep neutral in case of war, while proposing the other Powers implementation of forceful measures on Greece to stop its aggression. Yet in mid-March, discovering the understanding between these two states, the Russians became convinced that neither was willing to upset the *status-quo* in the Balkans at that time. Since the possibility of a multi-sided conflict had decreased, it was no longer a prudent strategy for them to insist on a blockade. First of all, the utility of the blockade was doubtful. Certain Powers were still reluctant to participate in the blockade and further negotiations on that would be disruptive upon the existing harmony within the European Concert. Furthermore, if the blockade was commenced with Russian initiative, the

¹⁵⁵ BOA, I.MTZ.GR., 31/1205.

¹⁵⁶ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 383; Grenville, 92; Langer, 368; Papadopoulos, 132-134.

reputation of Russia among the Greeks would be damaged seriously and that would be detrimental for the Russian influence over the competition in Macedonia. On condition that Bulgaria and Serbia would remain strictly unmoved, it would even be to the advantage of the Russians to stay out of the conflict and watch Greece and the Ottoman Empire, the two non-Slav states in the region, wear each other out.¹⁵⁷

4. 9. Further Developments in the Ottoman Empire and Greece

At the end of March, a massive number of troops had been concentrated on both sides of the Ottoman-Greek frontier. But the overtones rising from each side were completely opposite. The Ottomans were extremely anxious about the developments and were willing to keep acting with utmost caution. Although they were confident that the Greek army would be defeated without much effort, the Ottomans were concerned with the possible repercussions of war and, thus, reluctant to have recourse to violent measures.¹⁵⁸ According to them, peace had to be maintained, but, at the same time, the danger of invasion by the Greeks had to be averted. Especially the concentration of Greek irregular bands near the frontier caused great apprehension that these bands could cross the border and instigate a revolt in Macedonia. There were even some attempts at crossing the border and the Ottoman army promptly repulsed the intruders back to Greek territory. But they could not be pursued further, since the Ottomans were almost sure that any violation of the Greek border, even conducted with totally defensive concerns, would be severely opposed by the Great Powers, and, therefore, would serve the interests of Greece. On the other hand, occupation of even a very small portion of Ottoman territory by the Greeks, which would signify a change in the regional balances, would also create grave results for the future of the empire.¹⁵⁹ Under these circumstances, the Ottoman army, while staying strictly on its side of the

¹⁵⁷ Bartlett, 29.

¹⁵⁸ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 382.

¹⁵⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/7.

border, had to be extremely careful not to allow any crossing by the Greek forces. This was a not an easy task, especially bearing in mind the fact that the frontier was considerably long and mountainous.

Furthermore, even though Bulgaria and Serbia pledged neutrality, it was almost certain that neither would keep indifferent if the war spread to Macedonia. On 22 March, the Serbian king told the British minister in Belgrade that Serbia would keep its neutrality in case of war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire unless a massacre, directed towards Christians, took place in Kosova and Macedonia.¹⁶⁰ This statement evidently meant that the Serbians were cautiously watching the developments and would take action if necessary. The attitude of Bulgaria was more or less the same. Under these circumstances, the Russians and Austrians, not to mention the Ottomans, were extremely anxious to keep the conflict limited. The latter especially grew apprehensive about the possibility of a general rising by not only the Christians in the Balkans, but also those inhabiting the other parts of the empire, particularly the Armenians. Accordingly, the Sublime Porte issued the following circular:

While the state is engaged with the Cretan and Greek problems, even a small-scale strife between Muslims and non-Muslims could create grave results such as foreign intervention. Officials should always stay vigilant, keeping in mind the delicateness of the time. *Millet* leaders should be appropriately requested to duly execute the civil law of their communities. If an incident happens somewhere, local authorities who are responsible for public administration and security will be held responsible and penalized severely.¹⁶¹

As for the Greek side of the frontier, what was observed there in general was a high level of excitement and resolution for war. The Greeks felt totally frustrated because their occupation of Crete, as well as their huge campaign of military preparation had not borne any fruit yet. According to them, by blockading Crete and discussing the blockade of Greek ports, the Great Powers were taking the

¹⁶⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA., 26/83.

¹⁶¹ BOA, A.MKT.MHM., 612/10.

side of the Ottomans.¹⁶² If the Greek government gave in at that moment, all the preparations would go to waste and Greece, let alone obtaining a gain, could eventually be blamed by Europe for attempting to intimidate the Concert with false displays. Thus, in the eyes of the Greeks, the only way to end this deadlock seemed to be another outrageous move, a military challenge against the Ottoman Empire. Although they were aware of the imbalance between the two armies, in favor of the Ottomans, the Greeks still believed that the war could produce more favorable results than the actual situation. Above all, the Ottoman Empire was known to be worn out by perpetual financial crises and Armenian uprisings. If the Greeks were able to induce Bulgaria and Serbia to a joint action, that would be disastrous for the Ottomans and could yield territory to Greece in the Balkans. Alternatively, the Great Powers, intimidated by the hard attitude of Greece, might intervene before a serious confrontation between the Greek and Ottoman troops, and offer mediation which would be favorable for both sides. In any case, the Greeks calculated, taking the risk of war would grant some result, while succumbing to the opposition of the Powers would bring nothing.

Although the majority of the Greeks had this point of view, both the king and the government still kept to their mixed attitude towards war. While being encouraged by the motivation of the public, the intimidations and encouragements by the *Ethnike Hetairia*, as well as the potential benefits a war could bring, they were also aware that Greece took an adventurous risk. If the calculations would not come true and the Great Powers, or the other Balkan states, would not involve in the conflict, there would be the danger of a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Ottomans. Such a defeat would be completely disastrous for the finances of Greece, which was actually in deep crisis, while injuring the reputation of the king and the government both at home and abroad. In addition, after a defeat, Greece

¹⁶² *The War Dispatches of Stephen Crane*, edited by R. W. Stallman and E. R. Hagemann (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 19-21; *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 401, 421.

could lose its power to carry on the rivalry with the other Balkan states over Macedonia and that would be a big setback in the pursuit of the *Megale Idea*.

These concerns led the Greek leaders to come to terms directly with the Ottomans. The request was made personally by Deligiannis through the Ottoman legation in Athens. The sultan immediately replied that his only desire was maintaining peace, and, if the Greek government agreed to withdraw its forces from the border and Crete, the Ottoman Empire would be ready to sign a convention, as before, against the destructive activities of banditry on both sides of the frontier.¹⁶³ The leaders on both sides seemed to have similar tendencies, while a direct settlement between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was also desired by the Powers, at least by Russia and France.¹⁶⁴ Alexandros Mavrokordatos, the Greek ambassador in İstanbul, was also highly discomfited with the current trends in his country, and willing to reinstate the peaceful relations between the two states.¹⁶⁵ However, after few deliberations, no result was obtained, simply because the Greeks did not cease dispatching troops to the frontier, making the Ottomans suspicious about their genuine intentions. After being requested by Mavrokordatos to act as a mediator before the sultan for a peaceful settlement, Hasan Hüsnî Paşa, the Ottoman minister of navy, wrote to Abdülhamid that:

The Greeks, overwhelmed by the mobilization of a huge army, as well as the preparation of naval forces, by the Ottoman Empire in a quite short period of time, are in search of a tool for reversing their wrong policy. The attempt may even be a political plot to create the impression among the European Powers that Greece is acting in a peaceful manner.¹⁶⁶

It is hard to determine what the real intentions of the Greek leaders were at that time. But whatever they may be, their influence on the course of events was trivial. The die had been cast, and the war was resolved. People on the streets and in cafes were vehemently claiming that the time to realize the great cause of

¹⁶³ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/11.

¹⁶⁴ Papadopoulos, 140.

¹⁶⁵ [Serasker] Rızâ Paşa, *Hülâsâ-i Hâtrât* (İstanbul: [s.n.], 1325), 47.

¹⁶⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK., 120/36.

Hellenism had finally come. Their nationalist and irredentist sentiments were bolstered by newspapers, which simply followed the domestic trends.¹⁶⁷ An extreme level of excitement and overconfidence was observed in the Greek army.¹⁶⁸ Bands of the *Ethnike Hetairia*, consisting of 1,200 to 1,500 men,¹⁶⁹ were inspired by the arrival of Prince Constantine in Thessaly and were growing impatient to commence raids into Ottoman territory. Under these circumstances, leaders were no longer able to control the developments, let alone to reverse them. After his arrival in Thessaly, the crown prince had been advised by Deligiannis to hold the irregulars from crossing the border. A number of brigands that had trespassed Ottoman territory were accordingly arrested by Greek forces.¹⁷⁰ But, only a few days later, the prime minister, under pressure of the public and the *Ethnike Hetairia*, retracted his advice. As long as the domestic pressures rendered war inevitable, he believed, it was better the war commenced sooner than later, because the Greek finances lacked the resources to keep the army mobilized for a long time.¹⁷¹ Therefore, without giving a direct order to the irregulars to fight, he asked the crown prince to let the irregulars act in their own way.¹⁷²

4. 10. The Verbal Note of 6 April: The Last Diplomatic Effort by the Powers

Since the war was obviously imminent, the next question in minds was when it would break out. In European circles it was estimated that the Greeks would commence hostilities on 6 April, the independence day of Greece,¹⁷³ when their excitement would reach its zenith. As a last attempt of deterrence, Muravyov

¹⁶⁷ Mille, 169-170.

¹⁶⁸ Rose, 32-34.

¹⁶⁹ Koliopoulos, 217.

¹⁷⁰ BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/840.

¹⁷¹ *Devlet-i Aliyye ve Yunan Muhârebesi Hakkında Müdâvele-i Efkâr*, translated by Abdî Tevfik (İstanbul: İkdâm, 1315), 73.

¹⁷² *Austro-Hungarian Documents Relating to the Macedonian Struggle: 1896-1912*, edited by F. R. Bridge (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), No. 21.

¹⁷³ On 6 April 1821 (25 March of the Julian calendar) Archbishop Germanos, the Metropolitan of Patras, raised the Greek national banner and gave the first signal of the Greek revolutionary movement against the Ottoman Empire.

proposed the other five Powers to address a further communication to the Greek and Ottoman governments.¹⁷⁴ Unlike the project of blockading Greek ports, this proposal was immediately approved unanimously by the Powers. On 6 April, the following text was submitted to both governments as a verbal note:

In face of the danger due to the concentration of massive forces on the Ottoman-Greek frontier by both states, the Great Powers, who desire the preservation of peace and tranquility, have instructed their ambassadors in İstanbul and Athens to declare that;
In case of a war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, the aggressor will be held entirely responsible for the conflict,
Whatever the result of the war may be, the Great Powers will in no case allow the aggressor to derive the least advantage from that.¹⁷⁵

If the Greeks had decided to set out to act on 6 April, this attempt of the Powers, which was actualized on the very same day, would have been too late. But the events did not turn out the way it was feared in Europe. The *Ethnike Hetairia* had not yet completed preparations for starting the raids and it was known that the Ottoman army was on the alert for countering a Greek attack.¹⁷⁶ Besides, 6 April was a Tuesday, an ill-omened day with all Greeks.¹⁷⁷ Hence, except a few nationalistic demonstrations, nothing happened in Greece on that day.

The verbal note of 6 April was responded to by the Sublime Porte on 8 April with a long reply. After indicating that the pacific intentions of the Great Powers were totally shared by the Ottomans, the Porte reminded the Powers that the only aim of the concentration of Ottoman troops at the frontier was to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the empire. If the Greek government agreed to recall its forces from Crete and the Ottoman frontier, the note continued, the Ottoman troops at the frontier would also be withdrawn immediately, since the reasons which had necessitated their mobilization would have disappeared. In conclusion, it was stated that the Ottoman government was truly eager to witness

¹⁷⁴ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 395.

¹⁷⁵ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/13; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 414; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 383-384; Vecîhî, et al., 114.

¹⁷⁶ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 266.

¹⁷⁷ Nevinson, 55; Hasircızade, 14.

the reciprocal withdrawal of troops, and the Powers should encourage the cabinet of Athens to obtain such a result.¹⁷⁸

4. 11. The First Raid of Greek Irregulars

Ironically, the first spark of the impending war was set on the same day on which the Ottoman government issued this peaceable statement. On the evening of 8 April, around 10 o'clock, bands of Greek irregulars crossed the Ottoman border. They occupied the Kranya (Krania) hill, surrounded a number of Ottoman guardhouses, blew up a blockhouse and cut the telegram lines. After invading the village of Baltinos (Baltimon) the insurgents proceeded towards the town of Grebene (Grevena).¹⁷⁹ Although the number of the irregulars employed in the attacks was obviously not enough to overcome the Ottoman forces, the *Ethnike Hetairia* had estimated that they would be supported by Christians living in the Ottoman territory. After crossing the border, the irregulars attempted to instigate the local Christian population to join their attack. But these attempts proved fruitless. After gaining a few minor successes, the bands were dispersed and driven back to Greece in a short time.¹⁸⁰

These incidents were immediately protested by the Ottoman government. These protestations were ignored by Skouzes as he claimed that no troops from Greece had participated in the attack. Instead, according to him, the perpetrators had been Macedonian insurgents, thus subjects of the sultan. Refusing any responsibility concerning the incidents, Skouzes protested the Ottoman government on the grounds that Greek outposts had been fired by Ottoman troops “without any reason.”¹⁸¹ On the other hand, Deligiannis informed the British and Ottoman ministers that the bands who had crossed were volunteers, “clad in *fustanellas* with

¹⁷⁸ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/13; Y.PRK.HR., 24/6; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 431. See Appendix D.

¹⁷⁹ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/20; BOA, Y.EE., 49/22; Goltz Paşa, 91.

¹⁸⁰ Rose, 52-55.

¹⁸¹ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 390.

a distinguishing cap and a description of uniform with the letters ‘E.E.’ [i.e. *Ethnike Hetairia*] on them.” But the premier firmly rejected the allegations that regular troops had been employed in the attack and stated that the crown prince had strict orders to give no encouragement to the bands, and to remain on the defensive against an Ottoman offensive.¹⁸²

Yet the Ottomans strongly believed that the bands had been supported by the Greek army. Telegrams from the frontier indicated that the bands had utilized artillery, which was not a weapon owned by volunteer groups, and they had been directed by bugle-calls.¹⁸³ A Greek captive confessed to Clive Biggam, the special correspondent of *Times* with the Ottoman army, that he was a reservist and he had been armed by the Greek army and dispatched to the frontier.¹⁸⁴ On 9 April, the Council of Ministers evaluated the situation in an extraordinary sitting. Since these data were not based on official reports, the Ottomans did not have a strong *casus belli*. Hence, the council decided to communicate the latest incidents, including the information suggesting that regular troops had been involved in the crossing, to the Great Powers and to sound out them about whether they would still hold the Ottomans responsible if a major conflict arose with Greece.¹⁸⁵

The communication by the Ottoman government, dated 10 April, was responded by the Powers with sympathy, as the responsibility of Greece for the escalation of the crisis was obvious. Marschall replied that the latest incidents showed how right he had been when advising the Ottomans, as early as February, to get ready on the Greek frontier.¹⁸⁶ The incidents also created great anxiety in the French government. Hanotaux, while instructing his minister in Athens to search the means of a concerted action before the Greek government,¹⁸⁷ gave quite a frank

¹⁸² *Turkey No. 11*, No. 444; BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/33.

¹⁸³ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/15; BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/20; Rızâ Paşa, 45.

¹⁸⁴ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 275.

¹⁸⁵ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/15; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 418.

¹⁸⁶ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/20.

¹⁸⁷ With the initiative of the French foreign minister, the representatives of the Powers in Athens discussed about submitting a collective note to the Greek government and requesting removal of Greek forces some distance away from the frontier. But the German minister abstained from

answer to Sâlih Münir Bey, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris, who delivered him the abovementioned note. Hanotaux admitted that the Ottoman government had always adopted a reasonable and deliberate policy, but the Powers had not found heretofore an adequately effective means of expressing themselves to Greece. He advised the ambassador that if the Greeks had really taken the offensive the Ottoman army should respond promptly, and added that: "I do not believe that the other Balkan states will involve in the conflict unless a rebellion and bloodshed occurs in Macedonia. But since there is always some possibility for such an incident, the Ottoman government should act with utmost equanimity, serenity and caution."¹⁸⁸

4. 12. Going to War or Not: The Dilemma at İstanbul

The Ottomans were indeed acting with utmost caution, and the sultan was unquestionably the most cautious of them. Since the dispatch of troops to the Greek border, he had issued constant orders underlining that if Greek irregulars crossed the Ottoman frontier without involvement of Greek regular army, and if the Ottoman army took the offensive in response, full responsibility of the conflict would be charged on the Ottomans and the positive attitude of the Great Powers towards the empire would vanish accordingly. But the latest incidents exhausted the patience of the majority of ministers in the Ottoman cabinet. Their primary fear was that the Greek irregulars could succeed in causing a general uprising in Macedonia. According to them, the Greeks had once again attacked with mixed irregular and regular forces, as they did in 1854, 1878 and 1886, and, under these circumstances, no responsibility could be placed on the Ottoman government for further hostilities. The views of German and French foreign ministers had also

participating, by declaring that he was no longer authorized by his government to participate in a collective communication to the Greek government; as the Greeks had not given enough consideration to the warnings by Europe. As a result, no communication was made: Driault and Lh ritier, 4: 390; *Turkey No. 11*, No. 435.

¹⁸⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/8.

confirmed, though implicitly, that the Ottomans had right to respond to the attacks. During the sitting on 11 April, the Council of Ministers assessed the situation and finally decided to recommend the declaration of war to the sultan with the following considerations:

After crossing the border, they are going to arm and instigate the local Christians in order to create disturbances to the Ottoman army from inside and thus to prevent an Ottoman counter-offensive. Since Yanya is more suitable for attack, the Greeks may move the bulk of their forces to that front by leaving only a few battalions at Alasonya. If their assault on Yanya yields a positive result for them, God forbid, that can not only change the international balances; but also stimulate the Christian population all over Rumelia to rise up... In order to prevent such grave results, the Ottoman army, after checking the aggression, should initiate a swift counter-offensive without losing any time.¹⁸⁹

But it was not easy to induce the sultan to relinquish his extreme reluctance towards war. This is because he still believed that the Greeks would not dare to declare war on the Ottoman Empire, and that the latest incidents were one of their intrigues to provoke the Ottomans and attribute the responsibility of a future conflict to them. On 11 April, the very same day of the council's recommendation for war, the sultan sent the following order directly to the headquarters in Alasonya:

If the Greek regular forces attack without declaring war, fulfill your military responsibilities without deviating from the previous directions; and always provide information to the palace. In case of a bandit attack, as frequently underlined before, expel these bandits as promptly as possible; but you shall by no means cross the Greek border.¹⁹⁰

On the following day, the sultan issued a long reply to the recommendation of the cabinet. At the beginning of his *irâde*, the sultan underlined that the decision of the ministers was based upon reports claiming that Greek regular forces had participated in the latest incidents. But since these reports lacked substantial proof, declaration of war would not be a prudent action. European Powers had repeatedly warned the Ottoman Empire not to declare war until Greece engaged in an act of

¹⁸⁹ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/20.

¹⁹⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/29.

hostility and aggression. The latest statement of Hanotaux had also portrayed an offensive by the Greek army as the precondition for an Ottoman response. But the Greek government firmly and repeatedly declared that regular troops had not been involved in the latest incidents and every measure was being taken to prevent such activities. This attitude of Greece, the sultan believed, was intended to obtain the compassion of Europe, and might even be encouraged by a Great Power behind closed doors. Hence, he continued, the proceedings could not be regarded as a simple confrontation and the friendship of the Great Powers, albeit ostensible, had to be preserved as much as possible. Otherwise, the empire would face the danger “to be subjected to a harsher reaction from Europe than what had happened in Navarino during the Greek revolution.” In conclusion, the sultan ordered that the state of peace should be maintained and the shortages of the army should be completed before deciding to wage war. Furthermore, with a verbal note, the Great Powers should be informed that the only desire of the Ottoman Empire was to defend its territories and if Greece was induced to withdraw its forces from Crete and the border, the Ottoman Empire would negotiate the autonomy of Crete with the Great Powers. Besides, an ultimatum should be given to Greece.¹⁹¹

In accordance with the decree of the sultan, the Powers were informed by the Sublime Porte that the instance of provocation by the Greeks would not be considered a *casus belli* if such an incident did not happen again.¹⁹² Additionally, a verbal note to the Greek government demanded to stop the activities of the bands and warned that further violations of the border would be regarded by the Ottomans as committed by the Greek regular army.¹⁹³

However, the divergence between the views of the cabinet and the sultan was becoming more obvious than ever. While the former was advocating an energetic policy to end Greek aggression, the latter was still describing violations

¹⁹¹ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/33; Türkgeldi, 3: 74-75.

¹⁹² George Herbert Ferris, *The Eastern Crisis of 1897 and British Policy in the Near East* (London: Chapman and Hall Limited, 1897), 234.

¹⁹³ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 286.

of the border as “bandit attacks” and advising pacifism and caution. This attitude of Abdülhamid became a source of irritation for certain ministers. Particularly Rızâ Paşa, the minister of war, had no patience left for the Greek provocations. If these provocations were countenanced, according to him, other Balkan states as well as Austria-Hungary would also adopt aggressive policies for their causes over the region.¹⁹⁴ Mehmed Said Paşa, the chief of the Council of State (*Şûrâ-i Devlet*), was of the opinion that peaceful measures, such as giving an additional ultimatum to Greece, would result in an international conference, which would not settle the question in favor of the Ottomans.¹⁹⁵ Without blaming the sultan directly, the supporters of war attributed his extreme reluctance to the counsels of Arab İzzet Paşa, the second secretary of the palace (*mâbeyn kâtib-i sânisi*), who was known to have high influence on Abdülhamid’s decisions.¹⁹⁶

Although the sultan’s attitude was regarded by certain ministers as pusillanimity, his concerns were not totally unfounded. With the experience of the disastrous war against Russia in 1877-1878, he feared another large-scale campaign resulting in partition of the empire through international conference. It was almost certain that the Great Powers would disapprove the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire if there was not enough proof on the involvement of Greek regular troops in the latest incidents. Even if the Powers would not react immediately and the war broke out, that would entail the danger of a general rising in Macedonia, which would again be followed by foreign intervention. It was true that the Great Powers were disposed to preserve the existing boundaries in the Balkans at that time, but a large-scale conflict in the region could change the balances and, thus, reverse the policy of the Powers.¹⁹⁷ A slight success of the

¹⁹⁴ Rızâ Paşa, 59.

¹⁹⁵ [Sadrazam] Sait Paşa, *Anılar* (İstanbul: Hürriyet, 1977), 183.

¹⁹⁶ Ziya Şakir, *Sultan Abdülhamid’in Yunan Zaferi ve Gizli Siyaseti* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi, 1994), 25; Rızâ Paşa, 45; Tatsios, 111.

¹⁹⁷ This is exactly what happened later in the First Balkan War (1912). No matter how the Great Powers issued a collective declaration affirming the status-quo of the Ottoman boundaries just before the outbreak of the war, they finally recognized all territorial acquisitions of the Balkan states. This radical change of stance was explained by Serge Sazonov, the Russian minister of

Greeks would raise this risk to the maximum. This is why the sultan regarded the war as the last resort and wanted to be totally confident with the strength of his army before deciding to launch the campaign. On 13 April, the headquarters in Alasonya still reported that the army needed four divisions of soldiers, munitions, vehicles and other military supplies for attack.¹⁹⁸ Under these circumstances, Abdülhamid was still anxious to see the pacific settlement of the conflict, which would probably be fulfilled by a collective action by the Powers. In accordance with the will of the sultan, Tefvik Paşa requested Baron von Saurma, the German ambassador, once more to apply the required coercive measures on Greece without delay. In reply, the ambassador stated his belief that the blockade on certain ports of Greece, including the Piraeus would commence in a few days.¹⁹⁹

Despite the optimism of the German ambassador, it was clear that there was a lack of unity among the Powers towards a drastic measure against Greece. Muravyov, describing the existing situation in Europe as a “crisis,” advised the Ottomans to maintain their prudence and caution.²⁰⁰ But the apparent lethargy of the Ottoman Empire in face of provocations coming from a smaller, and a Christian, state began to create a deep concern within the Ottoman public and army. It was commonly believed that the hesitation of the empire was damaging to its international reputation and, furthermore, encouraging the Serbs and Bulgarians to resort to self-help in Macedonia.²⁰¹ If the sultan persisted in his refusal to order his troops to advance, his position could be similar to that of King George in the eyes of his subjects.²⁰²

foreign affairs, that the real purpose of the declaration had been to preclude any kind of Ottoman territorial gain: Mustafa Aksakal, “Defending the Nation: The German-Ottoman Alliance of 1914 and the Ottoman Decision for War.” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, Princeton, 2003), 74.

¹⁹⁸ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/21.

¹⁹⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/16.

²⁰⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/12.

²⁰¹ Karal, 8: 116; BOA, Y.PRK.ŞD., 2/34; BOA, Y.EE. (Defter), 1121, p. 29-30.

²⁰² Papadopoulos, 140.

4. 13. The Declaration of War

On the night between 16 and 17 April, another incident took place at the Ottoman-Greek border. Greek irregulars, assisted by regular forces, attempted another raid in Ottoman territory and they were met by Ottoman troops with a counter-offensive. As soon as the first reports arrived from the frontier, the Council of Ministers convened in the Yıldız Palace. Most of the ministers were in favor of war, but since they also acknowledged the concerns of the sultan, the cabinet was not able to reach a decision easily. The sitting continued for hours. Rızâ Paşa, persistently stressing that the empire had to demonstrate its ability to resist external threats and assuring the ministers that the state had adequate resources to cover the expenses of an armed campaign, finally convinced the cabinet to decide on war. Then he was called by the sultan for a face-to-face discussion. Abdülhamid, thinking that a defeat would be completely disastrous for the empire, requested the minister to reevaluate the situation. In response, Rızâ Paşa indicated that the empire would face no lesser difficulties if there was no war. Eventually, in the evening of 17 April, the sultan, albeit unwillingly, gave his consent and approved the minute of the cabinet which declared war on Greece.²⁰³ Diplomatic relations with Greece were ruptured. The headquarters in Alasonya was ordered to carry out “whatever was required militarily.”²⁰⁴

This order denoted implementation of the war plan against Greece, which had been designed in 1886 by Muzaffer, Ali Saib and Veli Rızâ Paşas, under the supervision of Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz.²⁰⁵ This plan basically stipulated remaining on the defensive in Epirus and moving forward swiftly in Thessaly. This is because while an offensive in the former would not yield a substantial result, a number of large Greek towns and, more importantly, the major route in north-south direction could be put under threat by an offensive in the latter. With such a threat,

²⁰³ Rızâ Paşa, 48-52; Türkgeldi, 3: 76.

²⁰⁴ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/32; BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/850. See Appendix E.

²⁰⁵ Goltz Paşa, 25, 62.

the Ottomans would keep the battle on Greek territory and, thus, prevent a conflict between Muslims and Christians throughout Rumelia.²⁰⁶ In addition, a lightning attack with massive forces on Larissa and Trikkala would cut the Greek army's route of retreat and force them to surrender.²⁰⁷ This was the best preferred strategy for the sultan, as it could enable the Ottomans to win the war in the shortest time possible. Prolongation of the war would not only create a significant financial burden, but also increase the possibility of complications within the empire, particularly in its Balkan territories.²⁰⁸

Upon the authorization of the Sublime Porte, Turkish newspapers announced in the morning of 18 April that the war broke out and Greek nationals and vessels should leave the country in fifteen days.²⁰⁹ The Porte communicated the declaration of war to the Great Powers on the same day through its ambassadors in Europe. The text of the communication was prepared with extreme finesse in order not to give an impression that the Ottomans had an invasive purpose. After the policies and attitudes of the Greek and Ottoman governments were reminded with reference to earlier incidents, the communication was concluded as follows:

The Imperial Government, as they have frequently stated, entertain no idea of conquest against Greece, and if they are now forced to accept war, for their legitimate defense in consequence of open hostilities on the part of Greece, it is simply for the protection of their most sacred rights and their integrity. If within a short time the Greek government withdraw their troops from Crete and their frontiers, the Imperial Government, in order to afford fresh proof of their pacific intentions, will not fail, on their side, to stop their military movements. Such is the sincere intention of the Imperial Government, who rely on the sentiments of equity and justice of the Great Powers.²¹⁰

The sultan had long believed that the audacity of Greece must have been based on encouragements by a Great Power, and the first Power that came to his

²⁰⁶ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/32.

²⁰⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK., 51/36.

²⁰⁸ Goltz Paşa, 53-62; Kocabaş, 281.

²⁰⁹ Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdi, 288-290.

²¹⁰ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 437; BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/32; BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/850; Türkgeldi, 3: 221-222.

mind was usually Russia.²¹¹ He had assumed that an armed conflict in the Balkans would have been used as a pretext by the Russians, as happened in 1877, to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. Hence, after the outbreak of war with Greece, Abdülhamid felt obliged to address a direct communication to the Russian government, in addition to the abovementioned communication submitted identically to the six Powers. After explaining that the declaration of war was unavoidable under present circumstances, the sultan invited the Russians to “distinguish the aggressor and the oppressed with utmost equity despite the Greeks are Orthodox and strong family bonds exist between the Greek and Russian dynasties.”²¹²

While the Ottomans accused the Greeks of being responsible for the latest developments, the Greeks did the same for the Ottomans. With a royal declaration, which was read in the Greek parliament on 18 April, it was claimed that the hostilities had been initiated by Ottoman troops, as they had attacked the neutral zone without any reason. Greece, the declaration continued, had always pursued its “noble goal, which was imposed upon her by its duties towards civilization and by a sentiment that is possessed by every people towards their coreligionists and congeners,” by pacific means, but when the Ottomans declared war, the Greeks had no choice but to accept that.²¹³

4. 14. The Attitudes of the Great Powers towards the War

The verbal note which the Powers had submitted to the Greek and Ottoman governments on 6 April had a remarkable influence over the attempts of the two sides to justify war. Both belligerents tried to convince the Great Powers that the entire responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities belonged to the other side. The reason for this effort was the fair belief that, regardless of who the eventual victor

²¹¹ Türkgeldi, 3: 76.

²¹² BOA, Y.EE. (Defter), 1121, p. 29-30.

²¹³ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 451; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 391-393.

was, any territorial, financial and political change the war would entail depended on the will and consent of the Great Powers. Bearing in mind numerous experiences the empire had suffered before, the sultan and the Porte feared that they would face the Powers once again, either in the battlefield or in a conference, if the responsibility of hostilities was charged on the Ottomans. On the other hand, the Greeks primarily wished to draw sympathy of the European public opinion by creating the impression that they were blameless and, furthermore, the oppressed side.

As discussed earlier, all the Great Powers were disposed to preserve the *status-quo* in the Balkans, thus an Ottoman-Greek war was not desirable for any of them. But their common disposition did not produce a collective action to prevent the war. The efforts by the three “conservative” states, namely Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, to implement an effectively forceful measure to contain Greece had not come about as the three “democracies,” namely France, Italy and, above all, Britain, were somewhat influenced by their public against such an action. When the latter group tended to come to an accord with the former, it was too late to reverse the Greek mobilization through blockade. In addition, the assurance of neutrality given by Bulgaria and Serbia signified that even if war broke out it would be only a minor and local conflict. European correspondents in Macedonia were also reporting that a Christian insurrection in the region was exceedingly remote, and that even if it took place it would be promptly put down by the Ottoman forces.²¹⁴ These circumstances left little motivation to the Powers for undertaking the costly and bothersome task of naval blockade. The fervent negotiations among the European cabinets for drastic measures were accordingly replaced by diplomatic efforts to prevent the war.

The outbreak of war did not create any change in the attitudes of the Powers. This is not because their willingness for the preservation of the *status-quo*

²¹⁴ Bigham, 15

had faded away, but simply because none of them regarded the war as a major threat for the balances in the Southeastern Europe. Above all, it was almost certain that the Ottomans would easily defeat the Greeks. This would be an agreeable result for the Powers, as an Ottoman victory over Greece would not only keep the Slavic states unmoved, but also deter the Greeks against further attempts that would threaten security of the Balkans.²¹⁵ In this respect, permitting the war to take place was actually a more expedient strategy, at least for the “democracies,” than applying coercive measures directly on Greece. In addition, the Ottoman claims for territory after their victory could be easily refused with reference to the statement of the Porte that the only aim of the Ottoman Empire while waging war was defending its territory. On the other hand, in case of a surprise success of Greece, the Powers could still keep the *status-quo*, as they had already declared that the aggressor would not gain any benefit from the war. With these considerations, the Great Powers maintained their neutrality and set themselves to wait for a suitable time for intervention.²¹⁶

²¹⁵ In the eyes of the Powers, the war would be check on the Greek irredentism, which posed a considerable threat to the stability of the Balkans. After the declaration of the war, the ambassadors of the Great Powers told Tevfik Paşa that they backed this decision of the Sublime Porte as they were annoyed by the hostile attitude of Greece: BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/15.

²¹⁶ Driault, *Şark Mes'elesi*, 354.

CHAPTER 5

EPILOGUE

The Greek public and statesmen shared a common goal of “liberating their brethren abroad” since the establishment of modern Greece. In order to actualize the *Megale Idea*, the Greeks remained in search of a slightest opportunity for decades, and even took steps for this cause with a few attempts. By arousing nationalist and irredentist feelings in Greece, the Cretan crisis of 1896-1897 created an atmosphere which was suitable for another attempt. The public, opposition and the *Ethnike Hetairia* started to pressurize the king and government to lead the banner of phil-Hellenism once more. Both the king and the premier were cognizant of the financial and military shortages of Greece. But they were also aware that if they acted against the screams for war, they could be accused by the public of being apathetic to the *Megale Idea* and even be deposed through a civil war. In order to avoid such a catastrophe, they decided to take the audacious steps of dispatching a fleet to the Cretan waters, occupying Crete, mobilizing the Greek army and sending it to the Ottoman frontier. Through these actions, they expected, on the one hand, to receive the sympathy and support of their public and, on the other hand, to induce the Great Powers to offer some concessions to Greece for the sake of overall peace in Europe.

The Great Powers indeed did not want to see the crisis turn into a war. Yet they did not have any intention to make a diplomatic effort which would favor Greece. If the aggressive policy of Greece returned concrete results, other nations could follow this example. Initiating fresh competition over the Ottoman territories would entail rivalry and polarization in Europe. As long as none of them was willing to enter into competition in the Near East and Balkans that time, the Great Powers tried to convince the Greeks to retreat on their aggressive policy. But they did this only by diplomatic means, since the Powers could not agree upon a collective measure of coercion to be applied on Greece. The lack of a common will among the Powers persuaded the Greeks not to retreat, and encouraged them even further on keeping their defiance.

The Ottomans were anxious to maintain peace. However, after the Greek occupation of Crete, they foresaw further aggressions by Greece and accordingly decided to amass a massive military force on the Greek border. In spite of the concentration of Greek troops on the other side of the border, as well as the ongoing provocative activities of the Greek irregulars, the Ottoman army retained its defensive position due to categorical orders by the sultan. But the crossings of border by the army-supported bands of the *Ethnike Hetairia* obliged the Ottomans to declare war on Greece.

The Ottoman-Greek War broke out, no matter that the six Powers and the Ottoman Empire had been against it. In other words, the conservatism of seven states was not able to thwart the revolutionary overtones in Greece from prompting the war. Yet, although it had been believed earlier that a war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece could create serious complications in the Balkans, it was almost obvious at the outbreak of hostilities that the war would remain a minor and local conflict. First and foremost, the evident inequality between the strength of the Greek and Ottoman armies was a sign that the war would shortly be concluded with the victory of the latter. Indeed, against the massive force of the Ottomans,

which numbered around 120,000, the Greeks had to fight with an army of 75,000 soldiers in total.¹ Furthermore, it was known that the majority of the Greek officers, let alone the privates, lacked sufficient training and experience on warfare.² Falkner von Sonnenburg, a German army major, observed that the Ottoman preparations were carried out with vigilance, reason and order unlike the “theater-like actions” on the Greek side.³ The Greek army also had a shortage of horses, weapons and munitions while the system of military transportation in Greece was somewhat primitive.⁴ A success by the Greek army seemed almost impossible unless an uprising broke out in Ottoman territories or the other Balkan states involved in the conflict on the side of Greece. Since none of these two developments seemed likely, the Great Powers did not have any motivation to intervene actively with the aim of preventing hostilities.

The neutral attitude the Powers portrayed before and during the war did not please the Greeks at all. In face of the successive defeats of their army by the Ottoman forces, Greek statesmen tended to avert public and international pressure by declaring the Great Powers the scapegoat of the disaster. According to King George, the Powers, by uniting on the side of the Ottomans, “politically counterworked and actively opposed every action taken by Greece.”⁵ His former ambassador in İstanbul, Mavrokordatos, also believed that it was the attitude of the Powers which had escalated the Cretan Question towards an Ottoman-Greek war.⁶ These declarations evidently support the argument that the warlike posture of Greece had been designed as a bluff rather than an actual defiance of the Ottoman

¹ For a general survey on the numbers and positions of Ottoman and Greek troops at the beginning of the war, see Bigham, 18, 25-26; Bartlett, 139-140, 153-154; Sun, 77-79, 80-84; Goltz Paşa, 65-68.

² Nevinson, 280.

³ Goltz Paşa, 24.

⁴ Tatsios, 112.

⁵ Bartlett, 310-311.

⁶ During the war, he told the correspondent of *Neue Freie Presse*, the Viennese newspaper, that: “We had to enter Crete...If the restoration of security in the island was entrusted to Vassos, there would be no need for this bloodshed. But the European Powers did not want an easy resolution for the problem.” BOA, Y.EE., 145/43.

Empire as well as the Great Powers. Greek leaders expected that the Great Powers would eventually save them through some form of intervention.⁷ Yet since the Powers, owing much to the existing international conjuncture, remained unmoved, the bluff did not bear fruit and, moreover, left Greece alone and helpless against the militarily superior Ottoman Empire.

Clive Bigham observed that in the eyes of the Ottomans the war was “purely a punitive enforcement of diplomacy” rather than being a religious or national campaign.⁸ Presumably, this is why the Yıldız Palace played the key role in the direction and supervision of the Ottoman army. Bearing in mind that the results of the war could be extremely influential on the empire’s foreign policy, Abdülhamid wanted to exercise full control over the proceedings in the battlefield. Following the declaration of war, a special military commission, which was to be headed by the sultan himself, was formed in the palace.⁹ The instructions on war plans and army formations were telegraphed to the headquarters from Yıldız and every single tactic to be used in the battlefield had to be firstly explained to and authorized from the commission, in other words, by the sultan. Edhem Paşa, the commander-in chief in Thessaly, had extremely little liberty in his decisions and practically worked as an intermediary between the army and the palace.¹⁰

Although Bulgaria and Serbia had pledged their neutrality earlier, a threat of mobilization came from the former only a few days after the commencement of hostilities. The Bulgarian representatives in İstanbul repeated their demands for appointment of Bulgarian metropolitans and commercial agents to Macedonia and declared that the Bulgarian army would be mobilized if the Ottomans did not

⁷ A few months after the war, Deligiannis declared before the Greek chamber that an intervention from Europe had been hoped until the last minute: Levandis, 89. Nevertheless, this statement may also be an attempt to attribute the full responsibility of the disaster to the *Ethnike Hetairia* and the Great Powers.

⁸ Bigham, 111-112.

⁹ Tahsin Paşa, 25.

¹⁰ Goltz writes in his account that the mere reason for the appointment of Edhem Paşa to the commandership of the Ottoman army was his obedient character: Goltz Paşa, 82, 122. Also see Bigham, 29; Mille, 98.

accept the terms.¹¹ This attempt of the Bulgarians was possibly a bluff to acquire certain rewards in return for their neutrality. The Serbians were also pushing, though less ardently, for the reopening of Serbian schools in Macedonia and appointment of a Serbian metropolitan to Üsküb. In order to prevent a Balkan coalition hostile to the Ottoman Empire, the sultan felt obliged to promise that the required *berats* would be granted to both Bulgaria and Serbia as soon as the conflict with Greece ended.¹² This pledge, satisfying both states to a certain degree, decreased the apprehension in the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Europe, that they could involve in the war. Nevertheless, until the end of the war, the Great Powers, particularly Russia and Austria-Hungary, kept advising the Bulgarians and Serbians to respect the *status-quo* and preserve their neutrality.¹³

The war was fought in two fronts, Epirus and Thessaly. Only a few major skirmishes occurred in the former,¹⁴ while the latter was the scene of the main course of the war. On 18 April, Ottoman forces seized the control of the Meluna Pass, an important passage in the north-south direction. On 23 April, the Greek army was defeated near Mati and, consequently, the town of Tyrnavos (Tirnova) was captured by the Ottoman army on the following day without any fighting. The Greek army, along with a considerable number of Greek people, retreated southwards, to the towns of Trikkala, Pharsalos (Çatalca) and Volo. The Ottoman army pursued the Greek forces and captured Larissa on 25 April. Three days later, Trikkala also fell into the hands of the Ottomans. The Greek public blamed the king and the government for the defeat and the hasty retreat of the army. Furious demonstrations were organized in the squares of Athens. In order to prevent

¹¹ Papadopoulos, 144; Tatsios, 110.

¹² Adanır, 134; Driault, *Şark Mes'alesi*, 354; Türk geldi, 3: 89.

¹³ Nikolova, 38; BOA, Y.A.RES., 87/55.

¹⁴ The Greek forces on this front occupied the town of Loros at the very beginning of the war; but following the Battle of Beşpınar (Pentepigadia) on 23 April, they were shortly expelled from the Ottoman territories. The Ottoman troops kept defending the borderline and did not engage in any offensive until the end of the war.

internal chaos, the king forced the Deligiannis government to resign on 28 April. A new cabinet was formed immediately by Rallis, the leader of the opposition.¹⁵

After the capture of Larissa, the bulk of the Ottoman army proceeded towards the Aegean coast with the aim of blocking the transfer of reinforcements to the Greek army.¹⁶ In the last days of April, this force was checked by Greek troops under the command of Colonel Smolenskis on the hills of Valestinos (Velestin). But the Ottoman forces renewed the attack on 5 May, and forced the Greeks to retreat on the following day. While the Greek forces were retiring to Almyros (Ermiye) and Domokos (Dömeke), the Ottoman army captured Pharsalos and Volo on 6 and 8 May, respectively. After the capture of Volo, the Ottoman troops remained inactive for about one week, probably due to an order by the sultan with the expectation that the Powers would make an effort for peace.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the efforts of the Ottomans in the battlefield could hardly produce a substantial result without the consent of the Great Powers. At the time of the conflict, their engagements in other parts of the world, internal difficulties, as well as the level of distrust among them dictated the Powers, *nolens volens*, to act in concert to maintain the *status-quo* in Southeastern Europe. Even if assisting one of the belligerents could be to the advantage of certain Powers, none of them dared to injure the existing, albeit shaky, harmony in Europe by engaging in unilateral action.

As early as 21 April, Marschall had called Ali Gâlib Bey, the Ottoman ambassador in Berlin, and presented the “friendly counsels” of the emperor to him. Marschall told the ambassador that the Ottoman army would eventually defeat the Greeks and in order to forestall an intervention by the Great Powers at the end of the war and to generate a positive impression on them, the Ottoman Empire should prepare its terms of peace upon these principles:

¹⁵ Langer, 375-376; Rose, 163-165.

¹⁶ Driault, *Şark Mes'alesi*, 356.

¹⁷ Bartlett, 231.

- 1- The Greek government shall immediately withdraw its forces from Crete.
- 2- The Sublime Porte shall categorically declare to the Greek government that it will accept the autonomous administration of the island, which will be established by the collective decision of the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire.
- 3- The Ottoman Empire shall not demand any pecuniary indemnity from the Greek government.¹⁸

If these were the “friendly counsels” of the German emperor, who was supposed to be the European ruler which had the most intimate relations with the sultan, it is difficult to imagine a worse result for the Ottomans in case of an intervention by the Powers after their victory. Immediately after the capture of Larissa by the Ottoman army, Marschall reiterated these counsels of his emperor and advised the Ottomans to bring the campaign to an end soon.¹⁹

The attitude of Germany is enough to indicate that the Great Powers were resolute to restore the *status-quo-ante-bellum* after the defiance of the Greeks would have been punished by the Ottoman army. During the visit of Emperor Franz Joseph and Goluchowski to St. Petersburg at the end of April, Russia and Austria-Hungary underlined the necessity of maintaining balances in the Balkans. This agreement entailed the localization of the Ottoman-Greek War and mediation in favor of Greece.²⁰ Britain, France and Italy were obviously against any Ottoman territorial gain. Thus, the earlier declaration by the Powers that the aggressor would not gain the slightest benefit from the war was practically modified as “none of the two belligerents would gain anything.” But what would their attitude be if the Greek army proved superior and captured Ottoman territories is not an easy question to answer.

Volo was a strategic location for the Greeks with the highest importance, since almost all supplies and reinforcements for the Greek army had been transported to the port of that town by sea and dispatched to the battlefield via

¹⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA., 26/128. These suggestions were also presented to Tevfik Paşa by the German ambassador on the same day: BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/16.

¹⁹ BOA, Y.EE., 145/19.

²⁰ Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 400; Jelavich, 212; Langer, 374.

railroad then.²¹ The capture of Volo by the Ottomans thus signified that defeat was inevitable for the Greeks. On 8 May, Stephanos Skouloudis, the new Greek foreign minister, informed the representatives of the Great Powers that Colonel Vassos had already been recalled and all Greek troops in Crete would be withdrawn gradually.²² Two days later, he formally announced that the autonomy of Crete was recognized by Greece. Upon this declaration, the representatives of the Powers in Athens unanimously offered a proposal of mediation to the Greek government. The Greeks immediately accepted the proposal, stipulating that “Greece would not respond the amicable initiative and the utmost solicitude of the Powers better than leaving to them the protection of her interests and adhering unreservedly to their advices and recommendations.”²³

Undertaking the diplomatic patronage of Greece, the Powers made an appeal to the Sublime Porte for peace. In response, the Ottomans, in contradiction to their earlier declaration that the war was not waged for the purpose of occupation, tried to take advantage of their military victory. On 14 May, the Sublime Porte announced its demands for the suspension of hostilities. These demands included the retrocession of Thessaly, a pecuniary indemnity of 10,000,000 Ottoman liras and renewal of the treaties between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, which meant the abolition of the capitulations that had been granted to the Greek nationals.²⁴ On the same day, the sultan ordered Edhem Paşa to march on Domokos (Dömeke). This offensive was explained to the Great Powers as a response to the Greek attacks in Arta on 12 May and Gribovo on 13 and 14 May,²⁵ but it might also be a tactical move to strengthen the position of the Ottomans in the forthcoming peace negotiations. After a short but furious battle,

²¹ Bartlett, 230.

²² *Turkey No. 11*, No. 565; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 402; Yeğen, 290.

²³ *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 574, 600; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 403-404; Langer, 376; Rose, 217-218.

²⁴ BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 20/908; BOA, Y.A.HUS., 372/41; *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 620, 656.

²⁵ Ahmed Refik, *Abdülhamid-i Sâni ve Devr-i Saltanatı: Hayât-ı Husûsiyye ve Siyâsiyyesi* (İstanbul: Kitabhâne-i İslâm ve Askerî - İbrahim Hilmi, 1327), 3: 925.

Ottoman forces were able to capture Domokos on 18 May and proceeded westwards, pushing the Greek army back.

The night before the capture of Domokos by the Ottomans, the Russian czar, assuming the task of mediation for peace, sent a telegram to the sultan.²⁶ With this telegram, after remarking the friendly relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and congratulating the successes of the Ottoman army, he requested the sultan to cease hostilities immediately and accept the mediation of the Great Powers on behalf of Greece. This notice was quite similar to what the Austria-Hungarian Emperor had addressed to the Bulgarians when they defeated the Serbians in 1885, as it was intended to leave the victor frustrated due to the resolution of the Powers for preserving international balances.²⁷ Nevertheless, the remarkably gentle phraseology used by the czar in his telegram convinced the sultan to give an end to hostilities, possibly with an expectation that the czar would countenance the Ottoman demands for peace.²⁸ Although some Ottoman statesmen were against ceasefire unless a direct appeal was made from Greece,²⁹ the sultan issued an *irade* complying with the request of the czar. Instructions were sent to the commanders in Epirus and Thessaly to communicate with their Greek counterparts for the suspension of fighting.³⁰ Hostilities were terminated on 19 May and the ceasefire was signed the following day.

The demands that had been raised by the Sublime Porte on 14 May were regarded unanimously by the Great Powers as unacceptable. The ambassadors in İstanbul submitted their counter-proposals to Tevfik Paşa on 25 May. With this memorandum, they declared that the Powers would only consent to a rectification

²⁶ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/83. See Appendix F for the full text of this telegram.

²⁷ Nicolae Iorga, *Histoire des Etats balcaniques jusqu'à 1924* (Paris: Librairie Universitaire J. Gamber, 1925), 437.

²⁸ The intention of Nicholas while writing this telegram was to persuade the sultan to cease hostilities without offending him: Bartlett, 42. Yet the Ottomans expressed themselves proud to receive such a bombastic and complimentary telegram from the czar. After translating the telegram into Turkish, Aleksandr Karateodori Paşa, an experienced diplomat, told the ministers around him that the czars had not written such a telegram to the Ottomans for two centuries: Tahsin Paşa, 66.

²⁹ BOA, Y.EE. (Defter), 1121, p. 36.

³⁰ BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/83.

of the frontier based on strategic considerations and an indemnity which should not exceed the limits of the financial resources of Greece. The Ottoman demand for the renewal of earlier treaties with Greece was also declined on the grounds that “certain privileges and immunities have been conceded to the Hellenic subjects in virtue of arrangements concluded with the Great Powers could not be affected by the rupture of relations between Turkey and Greece.”³¹

The peace negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, representing Greece, commenced on 4 June and continued throughout the summer as the Ottomans were unwilling to give up their demands. The sultan regarded especially the retrocession of Thessaly and the renewal of agreements with Greece as indispensable terms to be included in the peace treaty.³² He even wrote personal notes to the German emperor and the Russian czar, indicating that the Ottoman Empire was ready to undertake a portion of the Greek foreign debt in return for the town of Larissa.³³

Yet, since the Powers were completely against any change in the regional balances, they firmly opposed an acquisition of territory by the Ottoman Empire except minor rectifications on the Greek frontier to prevent future incursions by Greek bandits. The Ottoman demand for abrogation of the capitulations enjoyed by Greek nationals was also opposed, presumably due to the idea that such a practice could later be used by the Ottomans as an example for reducing the privileges of other nationals.³⁴ Instead, the Powers suggested regulating the practice of the capitulations to eliminate abuses. In addition to these, the Powers, holding bonds in Greece, endeavored to reduce the Ottoman demands of war indemnity by pointing out that the economy and finances of Greece would not allow the payment of an extensive sum of money. Upon prolongation of the negotiations, the King George’s threats of abdication were received in Europe with anxiety and the Powers

³¹ *Turkey No. 11*, No. 690.

³² BOA, Y.PRK.HR., 24/37.

³³ BOA, Y.EE. (Defter), 1121, p. 38-39; Türkgeldi, 3: 80.

³⁴ *Turkey No. 11*, Nos. 607, 619; Tatsios, 129.

increased pressure on the sultan accordingly.³⁵ The diplomatic attempts by both the sultan and Tevfik Paşa were refused by the Great Powers. As Holstein stated, the sultan could “only offer resistance in questions on which Europe is divided and the Powers impede[d] each other by taking opposite views.”³⁶ But during the peace negotiations, the Great Powers never relinquished their collective attitude against the Ottoman demands.

On 12 June, the Sublime Porte acquiesced to strategic rectifications on the Greek frontier and reduced its demand of pecuniary indemnity to 5,000,000 liras on 28 June. But the Powers insisted on their offer of 4,000,000. This offer was accepted by Tevfik Paşa in one month’s time.³⁷ Finally, the preliminaries of peace were concluded by Tevfik Paşa and the ambassadors of the six Powers in İstanbul on 18 September. The peace treaty, which was basically an official confirmation of these preliminaries, was signed between Greece and the Ottoman Empire on 4 December, in İstanbul.³⁸

The phrase that any territory that had ever been Christian would not be allowed to become Muslim was used as a motto by the European statesmen while opposing the retrocession of Thessaly. Rather than being based on merely religious concerns, this principle was more likely a policy for the maintenance of the European Concert. This is because, one of the basic problems of the Eastern Question was the elimination of the problems faced by the Christian populations under Muslim rule. The lack of tranquility which had been persisting in various parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Eastern Anatolia, Macedonia and Crete, was already a big threat for the fragile balances within European politics. In this respect, retrocession of Thessaly to Ottoman rule would certainly create a new scene of quarrel and trouble which could spur the conflict of interests in Europe.

³⁵ Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, 42; Tatsios, 120.

³⁶ *German Diplomatic Documents*, 2: XII. 427.

³⁷ Ahmed Refik, 3: 937-938.

³⁸ See Appendix G for the official texts of the Preliminaries of Peace and the Peace Treaty.

Even though the actual belligerents were Greece and the Ottoman Empire, it is difficult to regard these states as the real actors of the crisis. This is because, neither the aggressive policy of Greece which prompted the war, nor the decisive victory of the Ottoman Empire in the battlefield could determine the result. Given the neutrality of the other Balkan states, the war was nothing more than a circumscribed test of strength. After the outbreak of hostilities the Great Powers repeatedly declared that neither of the belligerents would be able to make any change on the existing map of Southeastern Europe.³⁹ As articulated by a contemporary observer, the Powers “behaved like the managers of a prize-fight. They held the stakes... and laid down the rules of the game.”⁴⁰ The only dangerous situation the war could bring forth would be the total defeat and collapse of one side. Such a possibility was prevented through a reasonably punctual mediation. The Powers did not allow the Ottomans to convert their decisive victory in the battlefield to material gains more than a mediocre war indemnity. The military and economic losses of Greece that had been caused by the war were offset by the *de facto* termination of Ottoman sovereignty over Crete one year later. This later move by the Powers also forestalled probable demands for revenge in Greece. The result was completely in accordance with the desire of Europe: Nothing changed in the balances and stability was preserved.

³⁹ Rose, 271.

⁴⁰ Odysseus, 342-343.

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APPENDIX D: Verbal Note by the Ottoman Empire to the Great Powers

BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/13.

بدر کمالی
باش کاتب داره سی

دول مملکت عثمانیه جو ابا خارجه نظر رفته یازدهم بقدرت عثمانیه مودعه سی صورتیه

باب علم دولت علیه و یونانہ اردولرینہ حد و دراز رفته تحت لری نہ قولدایہ ہ جہت محافظہ بہ من صلح و مسالمت محاطہ سے ارزوستہ یونانہ دول مملکت
عمانہ ظہوری حالت سولتیک متعصبہ اولہ صو طرفہ عائد اولہ جہت نتیجہ عمانہ ہ اولہ وقت جنی استفادہ یہ قاضیہ موافقتہ ایچہ کلرین نفعہ اولہ
یونانہ حکومتہ نہ تبلیغ اولہ نفعہ بیدریختہ بیانات متفقہ لری ایچہ در سعادت سفیرین مانور ایدہ کبریہ دار ۶ سالہ ۱۸۹۷ تاریخ تقریرتھاں واقعہ
ایکتہ دولت علیه دول ممالک افکار و نمایندہ صلح و از لری تمامہ استراک در عایتک انارین علم خصوصی کہ پراشتہ بدایتہ نہ بر
ابراز و تائیدہ نہ برانہ حالتی قاطعہ بربر حد و دراز رفته فوجہ العادہ اردو تکید یونانہ علیہ کذولک نہ بر نفعہ مقصدہ کل مجر یونانہ کلکتہ
حقوقہ ملل قواعدینہ مغایر اولرہ کریم عاکر فطرت سولید حد و دراز دھا اول عکرتحیدہ معامدہ خصما کوسٹمڈہ و حد و ممالک دولتہ
عیدی تمامہ محافظہ مقصدہ نہ لولای مجر اولہ و احوال صافہ نہک بدایتہ ظہور نہ نہ برو متخہ اولہ صلح مسالمتوانہ نہ تفصیلات و رجعت
و حد و دراز کی اردولرینہ حال سفیری بہ وضعن ایجاب آیدہ برہ اسباب مجرہ نہک کذ و سوا اولہ تا تیراخہ دول ممالک نزدنہ مقیم سفیرینہ
کونہ روکیہ مقلد افکارہ تمہید بیارہ ایدہ بربر حقوقہ کلکتہ مسالمت و ممالکت ایستہ نقل یونانہ یونانہ حکایتہ بر تالیقہ قطعہ عاقدہ ویرد لری دول ممالک
قابیلرینہ معامدہ ایستہ در برینہ توریج ایستہ اولدیندہ نہ ذکر اولنا ہ مقتضایا و نا بر صورتین دول مجموعہ نہ تالیقہ و توتیقہ مطہب و ملتین اولہ
افکار و بیانات خاصانہ نہ برہا اولہ اوزرہ ایچہ تقریرتھاں یہ مبولی سفاکہ ممالک ممالک نظہ اطلہا عربیہ وضع ایدہ و یونانہ کلکتہ کریم
عکرتحیدہ مقصدہ ممالک دولت علیه نہ بر قطعہ نہ نقصانہ اولیدہ بویہ برہاں مقصدت سکوتینہ و نفعہ استفادہ نہ دول مملکت نہ عیدم خالری
متخہ یونانہ تقریرتھاں قید صریحہ بویا نہ سدا اتحاد اوزرہ ایچہ دولتی حد صلح عثمانیت محاطہ سے حقہ کی ارزوی خاصانہ نہ دھا اول
اظہار ایستہ و برار زوستہ تالیقہ ایچہ مسالمت برہکتہ سبب و برامدک ایچہ فوجانہ انریہ نقیبات اکیہ ویرمس اولدیندہ نہ سدی کہ و سدا دول مملکت
امید و انتظار حال و ممالک اقتداری موجبہ محاذ بر اولہ سوجع عکرتحیدہ میدانہ کتورہ یونانہ خطبات و تکتہ آتہ بر طرف ایستہ مقصدہ بکارتہ
عبارتہ نہ بناؤ علیہ کریمہ جنیرہ سی یونانہ عکرتہ نہ تخلیہ اولدین و حد و دراز یونانہ یونانہ کتورہ یونانہ خطبات و تکتہ آتہ بر طرف ایستہ مقصدہ بکارتہ
قوتیلا اردولرینہ رواج تکتہ ایچہ سبب قاطعہ اولدیندہ بوی کورمکن حد امتن بولندیندہ و یونانہ اردوس طبعی لریینہ ایستہ دولتی حد صلح حال سفیرینہ
مسالمت کسارتہ نہ انتظار اولدیندہ دولتی مملکت بیدریختہ سفیری ممالک ممالک ایستہ ایچہ اولدیندہ بیدریختہ بیانات نتیجہ

محمود
تظیف
ممدوح
توفیقہ
محمد
عبدالرحمن
رفعت
مقابلہ ایدہ
قولرک
قولرک
محمد صواد
محمد صواد
محمد صواد

Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı

APPENDIX F: The Telegram of Czar Nicholas II to Sultan Abdülhamid II

BOA, Y.A.RES., 86/83.

Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı

نومره ١

Le 17/5 1897
وصول نومروسى
N° d'arrivé
دقیقه ساعت
h. m. du

TELEGRAMME

Le 17/5 1897
واسطه سله
Transmis par Pera
دقیقه ساعت
h. m. du
بدأ بخاره

ارسال
Réexpédié 3 35
Commencé à
Fini à 3 35

L'Etat n'accepte aucune responsabilité
مأمورك امضاسى
Signature de l'employé à raison du service de la télégraphie.
De Zarskoé Selo Palais
مأمورك امضاسى
Signature de l'employé

محل نومروسى	عدد كلمات	غروب	محل تاريخى	ساعت	دقیقه	روز و شب	طریق	اشارات مخصوصه
N° du dépôt	Nombre de mots	Group	Date du dépôt	Heures	Minutes	Matin ou soir	Voies	Indications non taxés
58	157		17	1	50			

S. N. - T. - le Sultan Abdul Hamid

Constple

Votre Majesté T. ne sera pas surprise si les relations de sincère amitié et de bon voisinage qui existent entre nous me portent à faire un appel à ses sentiments les plus élevés et m'inspirent le ferme espoir qu'elle ne tardera pas à couronner les succès remportés par ses vaillantes armées dans une lutte héroïque par une parfaite fidélité aux intentions modérées et pacifiques qu'elle a proclamées au début de la guerre en faisant éviter immédiatement le

mouvement de ses troupes en Grèce
et en accueillant favorablement la
médiation des grandes puissances pour
le rétablissement de la paix. Votre
M. J. acquerrait un nouveau
titre à la haute estime que l'entoure
et accomplirait un acte de profonde
sagesse dont personnellement je sau-
rais garder à jamais le souvenir.
Je prie Votre M. J. de croire à
mon invariable amitié.

Nicolas

APPENDIX G: Full Texts of the Preliminaries of Peace and the Peace Treaty

BOA, Y.EE., 73/11.

OSMANLI ARSIVI DAİRE BASKANI

دول معظمه سفر اسلیه طرفخانه قصرهایوننده امضا اولنان

میت صلحیه

الله

دولت علیه و یونان حکومتی بیننده عقد و امضا قناتان

میت صلحیه

PRÉLIMINAIRES DE PAIX

Signés à Top-Hané, le 6/18 Septembre 1897

entre

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE TURQUIE

et

LES AMBASSADEURS DES GRANDES PUISSANCES

et

TRAITÉ DÉFINITIF DE PAIX

conclu le 22 Novembre/4 Décembre 1897

entre

LA TURQUIE ET LA GRÈCE.

CONSTANTINOPLE

IMPRIMERIE OSMANLI

1898

troduites à l'avantage de l'Empire Ottoman par un accord entre les délégués de la Sublime Porte et des Puissances lors de l'application du tracé sur les lieux.

Les détails de cette délimitation seront fixés sur les lieux par une commission composée de délégués des deux parties intéressées et de délégués militaires des Ambassades des Puissances médiatrices.

La Commission de délimitation devra se réunir dans un délai de quinze jours, ou plus tôt si faire se peut, à partir de la date du présent acte et prendra ses résolutions à la majorité des voix des trois parties intervenantes.

Art. 2.

La Grèce paiera à la Turquie une indemnité de quatre millions de Livres Turques.

L'arrangement nécessaire pour faciliter le paiement rapide de l'indemnité sera fait avec l'assentiment des Puissances de manière à ne pas porter atteinte aux droits acquis des anciens créanciers détenteurs de titres de la dette publique de la Grèce.

A cet effet il sera institué à Athènes une commission internationale des représentants des Puissances médiatrices à raison d'un membre nommé par chaque Puissance. Le Gouvernement hellénique fera adopter une loi agréée préalablement par les Puissances réglant le fonctionnement de la Commission et d'après laquelle la perception et l'emploi de revenus suffisants au service de l'emprunt pour l'indemnité de guerre et des autres dettes nationales seront placés sous le contrôle absolu de la dite Commission.

Art. 5.

Sans toucher au principe des immunités et privilèges dont les sujets hellènes jouissaient avant la guerre sur le même pied que les na-

عائد بعض تعديلات جزئية باب عالي ايله دول معظمه دلکھری بیننده بالانفاق اجرا اولنه بيله جکدر اشبو تحديد حدودك تفرعاتی علاقه دار اولان طرفین دلکھریه دول متوسطه سفاراتی عسکری دلکھریدن مرکب بر قومیسون طرفندن محلنده تعیین قلمه جقدر .

تحديد حدود قومیسونی اشبو سند تاریخندن اعتباراً اون بش کون مدت ظرفنده ویا ممکن ایسه ده اول اجتماع ایده جک ومقرراتی ایسه داخل اولان اوج طرفک اکثریت آرامی ايله اتخاذ ایله جکدر .

اینگنی ماده

حکومت یونانیه دولت عایسه یه درت ملیون لیرای عثمانی تضمینات حربیه تأدییه ایده جکدر .

اشبو تضمیناتک سرعت تأدییه سی تهیل ایچسون اقتضایدن صورت تسویه یونانستانک دیون عمومی سی تحویلاتی حامل اولان اسکی داینلرک حقوق مکتسبه سنه ایراک خلل ایتمه جک صورتده دول معظمه تک انضمام معاوتیله یا بيله جقدر .

بونک ایچسون دول متوسطه وکیللرندن مرکب اولوق ودول مشار الیهمدن هریری بر اعضا بولندیرمق اوزره اتنده مختلط بر قومیسون تشکیل ایدله جکدر حکومت یونانیه قومیسونک معاملاتتی تنظیم ایدر و اول باول دولتلر طرفندن تصویب اولغش برقانونی قبول ایستدیره جکدرکه اشبو قانون موجبنه تضمینات حربیه ایچسون عقد اولنه جق استقراض ايله دیون ملیه سائرته تک تسویه تقاسیطه کافی وارداتک صورت استیفا واستعمالی مذکور قومیسونک مراقبه مطلقه سی نحتنه وضع اولنه جقدر .

اوینجی ماده

تبعه یونانیه تک قبل المحاربه دول سائره تبعه سی مملو مستفید اولدقلمقرری معایفات و امتیازاتک قاعده سنه طوقنلمقسزین

aux des autres Etats. des arrangements
ciaux seront conclus en vue de prévenir
us des immunités consulaires, d'empêcher
entraves au cours régulier de la justice,
assurer l'exécution des sentences rendues et
sauvegarder les intérêts des sujets ottomans
étrangers dans leurs différends avec les su-
s hellènes, y compris les cas de faillite.

Art. 4.

Quinze jours après la ratification des pré-
nts préliminaires de paix, ou plus tôt si faire
peut, des négociateurs hellènes, munis des
pouvoirs nécessaires, arriveront à Constantinople
pour procéder avec les Plénipotentiaires Otto-
mans à l'élaboration et à la signature du traité
de paix définitif. Ce traité sera conclu sur la
base des stipulations du présent acte et con-
endra, en outre, des clauses pour l'échange
des prisonniers de guerre, pour l'amnistie, pour
la libre émigration des habitants des territoires
étrangérés, ainsi que pour le mode d'indemnisa-
tion des particuliers en raison des pertes cau-
sées par les forces grecques. Il stipulera aussi
le rétablissement des relations postales et télé-
graphiques conformément aux accords généraux
qui règlent la matière.

Art. 5.

Des négociations seront en même temps en-
treprises à Constantinople pour la conclusion
dans un délai de trois mois des arrangements
suivants :

- a) Une Convention réglant les questions de
nationalité contestées sur les bases du projet
négocié en 1876 entre la Turquie et la Grèce ;
- b) une Convention Consulaire dans les con-
ditions prévues par l'Article 3 ;
- c) une Convention d'extradition pour la re-
mise réciproque des criminels de droit com-
mun, et
- d) une Convention pour la répression du
brigandage sur les frontières communes.

قونسلوسلق معاياتجه سوء استعمالات وقوعنه محل بر اقامق
ولازمه عدالتك حسن جريانه حائل اولان احوالى منع ايتك
واعضا اولان اعلاماتك اجراسى تايمين وافلاس ايشلىرى داخل
اولوق اوزره يونانيلرله اولان اختلافاتده تبعه عتاييه واجنيهك
منافعى محافظه ايلمك مقصديه صور آسويه مخصوصه عقداولنه جقدر .

در دنجى ماده

اشبو مقدمات صالحهك تصديقندن اون بش كون صكره
ويامكن ايسه دها اول اقتدار وماذونيت لازمه ي حائز يونان دلگه لرى
معااهده صالحه قطعنهك امن تنظيم وامضاسنه دولت عليه
مخلصلرله برلكده مباشرت ايتك اوزره در سعادت كله جكلر در .
معااهده مذكوره اشبو سند احكامك اساسى اوزرينه
عقد ايديلهك وبوندن ماعدا اسراى حريسهك مبادلهسى
وعفو عمومى واعاده ايديلان اراضيه متمكن اهالينك سربستى
مهاجرى وبرده قواى يونانيه طرفندن ايرت ايديلان خساراتدن
طولاني افراد اهالى به اعطا اوله جق اضميناتك صورت تاديهسى
حقتنده برطاق موادى محتوى اوله جنى كى پوسته وتلغراف
مناسباتك بو مناسباتى تنظيم ايدن مقاولات عموميه به توفيقاً اعادهسى
دخى مشروط بولنه جقدر .

بشجى ماده

اتى الذكر مقاولاتك اوج اى مهلت طرفنده عقدى ايچون
دخى عىنى وقت وزمانده در سعادتده اجراى مذاكراته مباشرت
اولنه جقدر .

اولا معترض فيها اولان تابعيت مسائلى بيك سكرت يوز
يتش اتى تاريخنده دولت عليه ايله يونانستان بيننده تذكر اولنان
لايحهك اساسلى اوزرينه تنظيم ايدر بر مقاوله نامه
تايبا اوچنجى مادهده مصرح شرائط داخلنده اوله رق
برقونسلوسلق مقاوله نامهسى
تالنا حقوق عموميه بحريهك متقابلاً تسليمى ايچون براعاده
بحر مين مقاوله نامهسى
رايبا طرفين حدودى اوزرنده حرركات شقاوتكارانهك
منع وشكيبلى حقتنده بر مقاوله نامه

Art. 6.

L'état de guerre entre la Turquie et la Grèce cessera aussitôt que le présent acte aura été signé.

L'évacuation de la Thessalie s'effectuera dans le délai d'un mois à partir du moment où les Puissances auront reconnu comme remplies les conditions prévues aux deux derniers alinéas de l'Article 2 et où l'époque de la publication de l'emprunt pour l'indemnité de guerre aura été établie par la Commission internationale en conformité avec les dispositions de l'arrangement financier mentionné dans le dit article.

Le mode d'évacuation et de remise aux Autorités helléniques des localités évacuées sera déterminé par les délégués des deux Parties intéressées avec le concours de délégués des Grandes Puissances.

Art. 7.

Dès que le présent acte aura été signé et ratifié, des relations normales entre la Turquie et la Grèce seront reprises: les sujets de chacun des deux Etats dont la situation est régulière devant la loi pourront séjourner et circuler librement, comme par le passé, sur les territoires de l'autre et la liberté de commerce et de navigation sera rétablie d'une manière réciproque.

Les deux Parties se réservent de conclure ultérieurement un traité de commerce et de navigation.

Art. 8.

Dès la ratification du présent acte, les Consulats pourront être rétablis et fonctionner dans les deux pays avec le concours des représentants des Puissances chargés pendant la guerre des intérêts de leurs nationaux. Jusqu'à la conclusion et la mise en vigueur de la Convention prévue par l'Article 5 A) les

التبجي ماده

اشبو مقدمات صالحه امضا اولنور اولنيز دولت عليه ايله يونانستان بيننده حال حرب ختامذير اوله جقدر .

تساليانك امر تخليه سي ايكنجي ماده نك صوك ايكي فقره سنده مصرح شرائطك ايشا اولنديني دوللرجه تصديق وتضمينات حرييه ايجون عقد ايديلهك استقراضك زمان نشري ماده مذكوره ده مصرح صورت تسوية ماليه احكامي موجبه محتاط قوميسيون طرفدن تعيين ايدلهكي كوندن اعتباراً برآي مدت ظرفنده اجرا قلنه جقدر .

تخليه اوله جق مللك صورت تخليه سيله مأمورين يونانيه صورت تسايي دول معظمه دللكلرينك انضمام معاوتيله علاقه دار اولان طرفين دللكلري جانندن تعيين قلنه جقدر .

تبعجي ماده

اشبو مقاروله نامه امضا وتصديق ايديلنجه دولت عليه ايله يونانستان بيننده مناسبات منظمه به تكرر مباشرت اوله جق وايكي حكومتدن هر برينك نظر قانونده حال وموقعي منظم اولان تبعه سي ديكرينك اراضيسي اوزرنده كما في السابق سربسته اقامت ودور وسياحت ايديلهك وسربسته تجارت وسير سفان صورت متقابه ده اعاده قلنه جقدر .

طرفين ايلروده برتجارت وسير سفان معاهده نامه سنك عقدي صلاحيتي محافظه ايدرلر .

سكنجي ماده

مقاروله حاضره تصديق اولنور اولنيز فونسلوساقلر تكرر تاسيس اوله بيلهك ويونلر هر ايكي مملكتنده اناسي محاربه ده كندى تبعه لرينك منافعي محافظه به مأمور اولمش اولان دولتلر سفيرلرينك انضمام معاوتيله ايشاى وظيفه ايدله بيله جكلر در سنجي ماده نك «تاسا» اشارتاً فقره سنده معاهده مقاروله نامه نك

qu'ils exerceront leurs fonctions administratives sur les mêmes bases qu'avant la guerre. Les affaires judiciaires entre sujets ottomans et sujets hellènes, celles qui ont été portées par devant les tribunaux à une date antérieure à la déclaration de guerre continueront à être traitées en Turquie conformément au régime en vigueur avant la guerre; les affaires qui auront surgi postérieurement à la déclaration de guerre seront traitées conformément aux principes du droit européen sur le cas de la Convention Turco-Serbe du 26 Mars/9 Mars 1896.

Art. 9.

En cas de divergence dans le cours des négociations entre la Turquie et la Grèce, les différends contestés pourront être soumis par l'une ou l'autre des Parties intéressées à l'arbitrage des Représentants des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople dont les décisions seront obligatoires pour les deux Gouvernements. Cet arbitrage pourra s'exercer collectivement ou par l'intermédiaire d'une Commission spéciale des intéressés et soit directement, soit par l'entremise de délégués choisis par les Parties.

En cas de partage égal des voix, les arbitres choisiront un surarbitre.

Art. 10.

Les stipulations de la Convention conclue le 17 Mai 1881 pour la cession de la Thessalie à la Grèce sont maintenues, sauf celles qui sont modifiées par le présent acte.

Le Sublime-Porte se réserve de saisir de ses résolutions pour le règlement des questions soulevées par la dite Convention les Puissances qui en sont signataires et dont les décisions doivent être acceptées par la Grèce.

عقدینه و موقع اجرایه وضعه دکن فونسلوسلر اداره به متعلق وظیفه لرینی محاربه دن اولکی عینی اساسلر اوزرینه ایقاییه جکدر در . تبعه عثمانیه ایله تبعه یونانیه بیننده کی مصالح عدلیه به کلنجه اعلان حربدن مقدم محاکمه حواله ایدنش بولنان مصالح عدلیه حقدنه ممالک شاهانه ده محاربه دن اول مرعی الاجرا اولان اصوله توفیقاً معامله ده دوام اولنه جق و اعلان حربدن صکره ظهور ایدن مصالح حقدنه ایسه دولت علیه ایله صرب حکومتی بیننده منعقد ^{۲۶} _۹ ^{شباط} _{مارس} سنه ۱۸۹۶ تاریخلو مقاله نامه اساسه مستنداً و اورویا حقوق دولیه سی قواعدینه توفیقاً معامله ایدیه جکدر .

طغورنجی ماده

انهای مذاکرانده دولت علیه ایله یونانستان بیننده اختلاف وقوعی تقدیرده علاقه دار اولان طرفیندن بری ویا دیگری نقاط معترض فیهای در سعادتده مقیم دول معظمه سقراسنک « آریتراز » یته حواله ایده بیله جک و بونلرک مقرراتی دولتین ایچون مجبوری الاجرا اوله جقدر اشبو « آریتراز » صورت مشترکه ده ویا علاقه دارانک مخصوصاً ارانه ایده جکلری وجهله و کرک طوغریدن طوغری به و کرک مخصوص دلکله لر معرفتیه اجرا اولنه بیله جکدر تساوی آرا وقوعنده حکملر بر حکم ناک ایتمک ایدیه جکدر .

اوتومی ماده

تسالیانک یونانستانه ترکی حقدنه کی ۲۴ مایس سنه ۱۸۸۱ تاریخلو مقاله نامه تک احکام و شرائطی اشبو سند ایله تعدیل ایدنش بولنان احکام و شرائط مستنا اولق اوزره ایقایدنشدر باب عالی مذکور مقاله نامه احکامندن منبعت مساتلک تسویه سی حقدنه کی تکلیفاتی مقاله نامه مذکورده امضا ایدن دولتله تبلیغ و حواله ایلمک حقی محافظه بیورر دول مشار الیه مک مقرراتی حکومت یونانیه طرفندن قبول ایدنک لازمکلور .

Art. II.

vue d'assurer le maintien des rapports de bon voisinage entre les deux Etats, les Gouvernements de la Turquie et de la Grèce s'engageront à ne pas tolérer sur leurs territoires des agissements de nature à troubler la sécurité et l'ordre dans l'Etat voisin.

Article final.

Aussitôt que le présent acte aura reçu l'approbation de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, elle sera donnée dans un délai de huit jours, les clauses qu'il contient seront portées aux Représentants des Grandes Puissances et la connaissance du Cabinet d'Athènes et de Londres en sera donnée.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le six/dix-sept Septembre mil huit cent quatre-vingt-dix-sept.

Signé): TEYFIK (Signé): CALICE
 » NELIDOW
 » P. CAMBON
 » PHILIP CURRIE
 » SAERMA
 » PANSA

DÉCLARATION

annexe à l'acte préliminaire de paix
 du 6/18 Septembre 1897.

En procédant à la signature des Préliminaires de paix en date de ce jour, Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan déclare que dans la pensée du Gouvernement Ottoman la médiation qui vient d'être exercée par les six Grandes Puissances pour le rétablissement de la paix et pour la fixation de

اره برنجی ماده

دولتین بیننده مناسبات حسن همجوارینک تأمین متصدیه دولت علیه ایله حکومت یونانیه کندی الکلارنده حکومت متجاورنک حضور و امنیتنی اخلال ایده بیله جک تحریکات و تسویلات وقوعی تجویز ایتمکی تمهید ایله جک کردر .

مذامنه

اشبو مقدمات صالحیه سکر کون مهلت طرفنده طرف اشرف حضرت پادشاهیدن تصدیق بیوریلور بیورلمز احکام و شرائط مندرجه سی دول معظمه سفراسی طرفدن اتنه قابنه توسته تبلیغ قلمه جق و مجبوری الاجرا عد اولنه جقدر .

فی ۱۸ ایلول سنه ۱۸۹۷ تاریخنده ایکی نسخه اوله رق در سعادتده تنظیم اولمشدر .

امضا	امضا
توفیق	قالیس
	نلیدوف
	پ. قانبون
	فلیپ کورری
	زاتورما
	پانسا

۶ ایلول سنه ۱۸۹۷ تاریخله امضا اولنابن

مقدمات صالحیه به مربوط بیاننامه

خارجیه ناظری دولتو پانسا حضرت تری بو کونکی تاریخلو مقدمات صالحیه امضا ابتدکی صروده شوراسی بیان ایلرکه حکومت سینه نیک اعتقادنجه مصالحه نیک عقدی و دولت علیه ایله یونانستان بیننده مستقبلاً جریان ایده جک مناسباتک تعیین اساسی ضمتنده بوکره دول سته معظمه طرفدن اجرا اولنابن توسطک دول مشار الیههم سفراسنک لادی الحاجه اشبو مقدمات صالحیه نیک

la base des relations futures entre la Turquie et la Grèce, ne doit en rien influencer sur le mandat d'arbitre que les Représentants des dites Puissances peuvent être appelés éventuellement à remplir en vertu de l'article 9 de ces Préliminaire de paix et qu'en conséquence les arbitres auront, comme de règle, la plus parfaite plénitude d'appréciation des points ou des questions qui leur auront été soumis par les Parties.

Leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs prennent acte de cette observation et reconnaissent qu'elle est conforme aux sens de l'article 9.

(Signé):

TEVFIK

(Signé):

CALICE

NÉLIDOW

P. CAMBON

PHILIP CURRIE

SAURMA

PANSA

DÉCLARATION

annexe à l'acte préliminaire de paix

du 6/18 Septembre 1897.

Aussitôt après la signature des préliminaires de paix, les Autorités Ottomanes en Thessalie seront invitées à s'entendre avec des délégués hellènes pour assurer la réintégration dans leurs foyers des émigrés Thessaliens.

En cas de difficultés, on aura recours à des délégués des Puissances médiatrices.

(Signé):

TEVFIK

(Signé):

CALICE

NÉLIDOW

P. CAMBON

PHILIP CURRIE

SAURMA

PANSA

طوقونجی ماده سی موجباً ایضاً دعوت اولنه بیه جگری « حکم » وظیفه سی اوزرنده بر کونه حکم و تأثیری اوله می جق و بناه علیه حکمر طرفیندن کندولرینه تودیع اوله جق نقاط و یا مسائلی تدقیق و تقدیرده اصول و قاعده و جهله سر بسیت کامله بی حائر اوله جقدر .

دول معظمه سفراسی اشبو ملاحظاتی سند انجاز و بونک

طوقونجی ماده نك مضمونه موافق اولدیغنی تصدیق ایدر لر .

امضا

توفیق

امضا

قالیس

نلیدوف

پ . قانبون

فلیپ کورری

زاتورما

پانسا

7 ايلول سنه 1897 تاريخيله امضا اولنان

مقدمات صلحیه مریوط بیاننامه

مقدمات صلحیه امضا اولنور اولمز تسالیاده کی مأمورین عثمانیه تسالیامهاجرینک مملکتلرینه اعاده سی تأمین ایچون یونان دلکدر لریله حصول اشتلافه دعوت اولنه جقدر لر .

مشکلات ظهورنده دول متوسطه دلکدر لرینه مراجعت

ایدیه جگری .

امضا

توفیق

امضا

قالیس

نلیدوف

پ . قانبون

فلیپ کورری

زاتورما

پانسا

فَعَاهِدَةٌ قَطْعٌ صِلَا حَسْبِيَّةٌ

TRAITÉ DE PAIX DÉFINITIF

SA MAJESTÉ IMP. LE SULTAN, EMPEREUR DES OTTOMANS,

ET

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DES HELLÈNES

étant mis d'accord pour compléter et convertir en traité de paix définitif les préliminaires de paix du 6/18 Septembre 1897 signés par Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, d'une part, et par Leurs Excellences les Représentants de l'Allemagne, de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Italie et de la Russie, agissant au nom de la Grèce, d'autre part, ont nommé à cet effet pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires savoir :

SA MAJESTÉ IMPÉRIALE LE SULTAN :

Son Excellence Tefik Pacha, Son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, décoré des Ordres Impériaux de l'*Osmanié* et du *Médjidié* en brillants et des médailles d'or et d'argent de l'*Imtiaz* etc. etc. et Son Excellence Hassan Fehmi Pacha, Président de la Cour des Comptes, décoré des Ordres Impériaux de l'*Iftihar*, de l'*Osmanié* et

ذات شوکتسمات حضرت بادشاهی ایله حشمتلو یونان قرالی
حضرتلری بر طرفدن خارجیہ ناظری دولتو پاشا حضرتلری
ودیکر طرفدن حکومت یونانیہ نامنه حرکت ایدن المانیہ اوستریا
فرانسہ انکلتراہ ایٹالیہ و روسیہ دول فخیہ سی سفراسی جانبندن
۱۸۹۷ سنہ ۱۸ ایلول سنہ تاریخندہ امضا اولنان مقدمات صاحبی
آکمال و معاهدہ صلحہ قطعہ شکنہ تحویل و افراخ ایچون بینارندہ
موافقت افکار حاصل ایتمش اولدقلرندن طرف اشرف حضرت
شہریاریدن مرصع عثمانی و مجیدی نشان ذیشانلریہ التون و کوش
امتیاز مدالیہ لرینی و سائر نشانلری حائز و حامل اولان خارجیہ ناظری
دولتو توفیق پاشا حضرتلریہ مرصع افتخار و مرصع عثمانی
و مجیدی نشان ذیشانلری التون و کوش امتیاز مدالیہ لرینی
و سائر نشانلری حائز و حامل اولان دیوان محاسبات رئیس
دولتو حسن فہمی پاشا حضرتلری

و حشمتلو یونان قرالی حضرتلری جانبندن فوق العادہ
و مرخص اورتہ ایلیجی عنوانی حائز و «سوور» نشانک
ایکینجی رتبہ سیلہ سائر نشانلری حامل اولان موسیو نیقولا
ماور و قورداتو ایله فوق العادہ و مرخص اورتہ ایلیجی عنوانی

Médjidié en brillants ainsi que des médailles et d'argent de l'Imtiaz etc. etc.

ET SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DES HELLÈNES :

Excellence Monsieur Nicolas Maurocor-Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire, Grand Officier de l'Ordre du Sauveur etc. etc.

Son Excellence Monsieur Denis M. Stéphanos, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire, Commandeur de l'Ordre du Sauveur etc. etc.

Les sceaux, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont été revêtus de la formule qui suit :

Article 1^{er}

La frontière turco-hellénique est rectifiée, conformément au tracé indiqué sur la carte, accompagnée d'une description détaillée, annexée aux préliminaires de paix, ainsi qu'il suit : la nouvelle frontière part du golfe de Samsoun à l'embouchure du fleuve Potamouli; elle suit ce fleuve jusqu'à Pappapouli, ensuite elle se dirige vers le nord-ouest sur l'ancienne frontière qu'elle rejoint au sommet de Karakia (cote 1063 p.) en laissant Kalyvia et Amotika à la Grèce. Elle se dirige ensuite vers Krania et Rapsani en laissant ces deux villages à la Grèce. Elle contourne par le Sud les sommets d'Analipsis-Rapsaniotikos (cote 3 p.) et de Sopoto (4072 p.); à partir du sommet de Sopoto elle se dirige sur Nézéros suivant à peu près le bas des pentes à l'Est du lac de Nézéros et rejoint l'ancienne frontière au couvent d'Athanasios au Nord du village de Nézéros.

À partir du couvent d'Athanasios, elle redescend dans la direction du Sud en suivant le bas des pentes à l'Ouest du lac de Nézéros, jusqu'à l'endroit qu'elle rencontre le cours d'eau Kodrisios; à partir de là, elle se dirige sur la hauteur de Kokkinopetra au Sud-Est de Goda. De Kokkinopetra elle prend la direction à l'Ouest, traverse la vallée d'Argyropoli et rejoint le contrefort à l'Est de Veletsiko (3671 p.).

حائز و « سوور » نشانک او چنجی رتبه سیله سائر نشاناری حامل اولان موسیو « دنیس م . استفانوس » مرخص تعیین اولدق فریدن مرخصان مشار ومومی الهم یولنده ومنتظام کورینان رخصتنامه لرینی بعد التعاطی مواد آتیله بی قرارلش دیر مشلردر :

برنجی ماده

دولت علیه ایله یونانستان بیننده کی حدود مقدمات صالحیه لایحه سنه مربوط مفصل تعریفنامه وخریطه اوزرنده کوستریلان کذرکاهه تطبیقاً بوجه اتی تصحیح اولنشدر .

یکی خط حدود سلانیک کورفرینک « بوتامول » نهری منبندن بدأ و بو نهری « پایاپولی » یه قدر تعقیب ایدرک شمال غربی استقامتیه اسکی حدوده توجه ایدر و « قالیویا » ایله « اینغاموتیقا » بی یونانه براقوق « قاراغاجیا » (ارتفاع ۱۰۶۳ قدم) ذروه سنده اسکی حدوده ملاقی اولور بعده « قرانیا » و « رایسانی » یه طوغری کیدرک بوایی قره بی یونانه براقور و « انالیسیس - رایسانبوتیقوس » (ارتفاع ۳۲۶۳ قدم) و « سوپوتو » (ارتفاع ۴۰۷۲ قدم) تپه لرینی جنوب جهندن طولاشور و « سوپوتو » تپه سنندن اعتباراً « نزرورس » کولنک جهت شرقیه سنده کائن صرتلرک اتکنی تقریباً تعقیب ایدرک « نزرورس » طوغری کیدر و « نزرورس » قره سنک شمالنده واقع « اطناسیوس » مناسترنده اسکی کذرکاهه ملاقی اولور « اطناسیوس » مناسترندن « قودریزیوتیقو » صونک مجراسنه تصادف ایدنجیه قدر « نزرورس » کولنک جهت غربیه سنده کی صرتلرک اتکنی تعقیب ایدرک تکرار جنوب استقامتیه طوغری اینر واورادن « غودامان » ک جنوب شرقیه سنده واقع « فوکینو پترا » تپه سنه طوغری کیدر و « فوکینو پترا » دن غرب استقامتی الهرق و « ارکیرو بولی » وادیندن کچهرک « ولتسیکو » (۳۶۷۱ قدم) تپه سنک جهت

à une distance d'environ deux kilomètres de ce sommet.

De ce point elle suit une ligne à peu près parallèle à l'ancienne frontière et distante d'environ deux kilomètres en longeant le sommet de Menexé et le col de Melouna jusqu'au Nord du village de Ligaria.

A un kilomètre environ à l'Ouest de Ligaria, elle se dirige vers le Sud sur une longueur d'environ trois kilomètres, puis reprend la direction de l'Ouest et rejoint l'ancienne frontière au Nord de Kourtsiovali (cote 1900 p.). De là elle contourne le village de Kourtsiovali à l'Ouest et reprend au Sud de ce village la direction de l'Est en passant au Nord du sommet A-Georgios (2066 p.); elle contourne ensuite le massif de Losfaki en suivant le bas des pentes de ce massif à l'Est et, laissant à la Grèce la route de Tirnavo à Melouna, elle rejoint l'ancienne frontière au sommet 1200 p. à trois kilomètres environ au Nord-Ouest de Tyrnavo.

Elle se sépare de nouveau de l'ancienne frontière à Bey-Deyirméni au bord de la rivière Xérias, contourne à l'Est le massif de Sidéropalouki (1694 p.) et atteint le fleuve Salamvrias à un kilomètre à l'Ouest de Gunitza; de là elle se dirige vers le Sud et change de direction vers l'Ouest au Nord-Est de Koutzo-Khéro en passant à un kilomètre environ au Nord de ce village. Elle traverse de nouveau le Salamvrias et suit le bas des pentes de la rive gauche du fleuve en se dirigeant vers l'Ouest jusqu'au sommet de Babou (2147 p.) qu'elle contourne par le Sud; elle remonte ensuite vers le Nord en suivant la ligne des hauteurs à pic, laisse à l'Est le sommet de Babou et continue dans la direction du Nord jusqu'à un kilomètre au Sud-Ouest du sommet (1600 p.); elle prend ensuite la direction de l'Ouest en suivant une ligne distante d'environ deux kilomètres de l'ancienne frontière qu'elle rejoint à l'angle formé par celle-ci au Nord de Gritzanon.

La nouvelle ligne coupe à l'Ouest d'Elevthérokhorion l'angle dont le sommet est sur la hauteur 1742 p.

La frontière suit l'ancien tracé jusqu'au

شرقیہ سسندہ و بوتہ دن تخمیناً ایک کیلومٹر مسافہ واقع تہ جکا ایریشور و بوتہ دن اسکی حدودہ ہان موازی و تخمیناً ایک کیلومٹر بعد مسافہ بر خط تعقیب ایدرک « لیغاریا » قریہ سنک شمالہ قدر « منکشہ » تہ سبلہ « ملونا » کیدینک بوچیہ کیدر و « لیغاریا » نک تخمیناً بر کیلومٹر غربندہ بولنان نقطہ دن تقریباً اوج کیلومٹر طولنجہ جنوبہ طوغری کیدرک بعدہ تکرار غرب استقامتی الور و « قورچیوالی » (ارتفاع ۱۹۰۰ قدم) نک شمالندہ اسکی حدودہ ملاقی اولور اورادن غرباً « قورچیوالی » قریہ سنی طولاشرق و « ۰۱ یورکیوس » (ارتفاع ۲۰۶۶ قدم) تہ سنک شمالندہ کچہرک اشبو قریہ نک جنوب جہتدن تکرار شرق استقامتی طونار و بعدہ « لوسفاکی » نک شرق جہتندہ کی صرترنیک اتکرری تعقیب ایدرک و طرنوہ دن ملونایہ کیدن بولی یونانہ براقرق « لوسفاکی » سلسلہ جبالی طولاشور و طرنوہ نک شمال غرب سسندہ تخمیناً اوج کیلومٹر مسافہ واقع ۱۲۰۰ قدم ارتفاعندہ کی تہدہ اسکی حدودہ بر لشور خط حدود جدید « قسہ ریاس » چاینک کنارندہ واقع « نک دکرمن » دہ تکرار اسکی حدوددن ایریلہرق « سبدہرو یالوکی » (ارتفاع ۱۶۹۴ قدم) سلسلہ جبالی شرق جہتدن طولاشور و « غویجہ » نک بر کیلومٹر غربندہ « سالامبریا » نہرینہ واصل اولور و اورادن جنوبہ دونہرک « قوچوخرو » قریہ سنک شمال شرق سسندہ غربہ طوغری تبدیل استقامتہ تخمیناً بر کیلومٹر مسافہ بو قریہ نک شمالندہ کچر و یکیدن « سالامبریا » نہرینی کچہرک نہر مذکورک ساحل یسارندہ کی صرتارک اتکنی تعقیب ایدر و « ۲۱۴۷ قدم » ارتفاعندہ کی « بابو » تہ سسندہ قدر غربہ طوغری کیدر و بوتہ بینی جنوب طرفندن طولاشد قدنصرکہ دیک تہلر سلسلہ سنی بالتعقیب شمالہ طوغری جبقار و « بابو » تہ سنی شرقدہ براقوب « ۱۶۰۰ قدم » ارتفاعندہ کی تہ سہ نک جنوب غرب سسندہ بر کیلومٹر وہ قدر شمالہ طوغری کیدر و بعدہ غرب استقامتی الوب اسکی حدوددن تخمیناً ایک کیلومٹر مسافہ بر خطی تعقیب ایہ اسکی حدودک « غریجانون » نک شمالندہ تشکیل ایلیکی زاویہدہ بو حدود ایہ ملاقی اولور .

یکی خط حدود « الفته روخوریون » ک غربندہ واقع اولوب ذروہ سی ۱۷۴۲ قدم ارتفاعندہ بولنان زاویہ بینی قطع ایدر و « غورچا » (ارتفاع ۳۱۹۶ قدم) ذروہ سسندہ قدر اسکی کذرکاهی بالتعقیب اورادن شمالہ طوغری « بارہری » نقطہ ثانی اوزرینہ کیدرک اورادہ اسکی حدودہ بر لشور و اسکی حدودی « یقنادا » بہ قدر تعقیب ایلیکن صکرہ « میتریجا » (ارتفاع

et de Gorza (3196 p.) de là elle se dirige vers le Nord sur le point trigonométrique de Barbéri où elle rejoint l'ancienne route. Elle la suit jusqu'à Pikhada; elle dirige ensuite sur le sommet de Mitri-418 p.)

Mitriza elle suit l'ancien tracé jusqu'au sommet de Nasadiko, situé au Nord-Ouest du village de Kérassia-Sinou; de Nasadiko elle dirige vers l'Ouest sur le sommet de Kut- (1916 p.) où elle rejoint l'ancien tracé passant à égale distance du village de Botadès et du sommet 2555 p. qu'elle a la Turquie.

du sommet de Kutzuru, elle suit l'ancien tracé jusqu'au sommet d'Agios-Elias; à partir de ce point elle se dirige directement sur le sommet de Djuma-Psiti en passant au Nord du village de Kérassia.

De Djuma-Psiti, elle suit l'ancien tracé jusqu'au sommet de Bulgari; de là elle se dirige à peu près en ligne droite sur le sommet de Djumanalta (3091 p.) au Nord-Ouest du village de Mostrovo où elle rejoint l'ancien tracé. Elle suit jusqu'à l'angle qu'il forme à 1 kilomètre au Sud-Ouest du village de Pikhada.

À partir de cet angle, la nouvelle frontière dirige vers le Sud-Ouest sur le sommet de Mostrovo (4786 p.) qu'elle contourne par le Nord; elle prend ensuite la direction de l'Ouest, à 500 mètres au Nord du village de Malakassi à un kilomètre au Nord du sommet de Mostrovo; longe le plateau à l'extrémité duquel elle trouve ce sommet, passe à un kilomètre au Nord du sommet 4200 p., descend ensuite directement vers le Sud en passant à 500 mètres de l'Ouest du village de Malakassi, traverse le village de Lamvrias à un kilomètre à l'Ouest du village de Mostrovo, voisin de la cote 2180 p. passe à un kilomètre à l'Est du sommet 3700 et vient rejoindre la rivière descendant du sommet de Mostrovo à l'Ouest du sommet de Kizil-Tépé. Elle suit le cours de cette rivière jusqu'au village de Dokimi (6244 p.), où elle rejoint l'ancien tracé et où s'arrête la rectification de la frontière.

La délimitation sera fixée sur les lieux par une Commission composée de délégués des deux parties intéressées et de délégués

4418 قدم) ذروسی اوزرینه کیدر «میتریچا» دن «کراسیاسینو» قریه سنک شمال غریبسنده کائن «نازادیقو» ذروسنه قدر اسکی خط حدودی تعقیب ایدرک «نازادیقو» دن «فوجورو» (ارتفاع 1916 قدم) ذروسنه قدر غریبه طوغری کیدر «قریچونادس» قریه سیله 2555 قدم ارتفاعنده کی تیه نک تام اورتسندن کیکرک اوراده اسکی کذرکاهه ملاق اولور ومدکور تیه بی دوات علیه برافور «فوجورو» تیه سندن «آیوس الیاس» ذروسنه قدر اسکی کذرکاهی بالتعقیب بونقطه دن اعتباراً «کراسیا» قریه سنک شمالسندن کیکرک طوغریچیه «جمه پستی» ذروسنه کیدر «جمه پستی» دن «بلغاری» تیه سنه قدر اسکی کذرکاهی بالتعقیب اورادن «نوسترووو» نک شمال غریبسنده «جومانالتا» (ارتفاع 3091 قدم) ذروسنه همان خط مستقیم اوزره ایریشور و «نوسترووو» ده اسکی کذرکاهه بالتلاق بونی «ساغیادا» قریه سنک جنوب غریبسنده برکیلومترو مسافده تشکیل ایلدیکی زاویه قدر تعقیب ایلر اشبو زاویه دن اعتباراً یکی خط حدود جنوب غریبه طوغری «غریبوو» (ارتفاع 4786 قدم) ذروسنه کیدرک جنوباً بو ذرو بی طولاشور بعده غرب استقامتی الهرق 4000 قدم ارتفاعنده کی تیه نک شمالاً برکیلومترو بعدنده کائن «زهرالیس» قریه سنک بشیوز مترو شمالسندن کیکرک ومنتهاسنده اشبو تیه بولنان ذرو مسطحه بویجه کیدرک 4200 قدم ارتفاعنده کی تیه نک جنوباً برکیلومترو مسافسندن کیکرکدن صکره «مالاقاسی» قریه سنک بش یوز مترو غربسندن بالمرور خط مستقیم اوزره جنوبه طوغری اینر و 2180 قدم ارتفاعنده کی تیه قریبسنده کی کورینک غرباً برکیلومترو مسافسندن «سالامبریا» نهرینی قطع ایدرک 3700 قدم ارتفاعنده کی تیه نک شرقاً برکیلومترو مسافسندن کیکرک و «دوکیمی» تیه سندن «قزل تیه» تیه سنک غرب جهته آقان چایه ملاق اولور واشبوچایک مجراسنی 6244 قدم ارتفاعنده بولنان «دوکیمی» تیه سنه قدر بالتعقیب اوراده اسکی کذرکاهه تلاق ایدرک و تصحیح حدود دخی اوراده بیتر

اشبو حدود علاقهدار اولان طرفین دلکهلریله دول معظمه متوسطه سفاراتی عسکری دلکهلرندن مرکب برقومیسسیون معرفتیله محنده تعیین اولنه جقدر.

تحدید حدود قومیسسیونک همان عقد اجتماع و محانه عزیمتله بلا تأخیر معاملاتنه ابتدار اتمسی لازم کلور قومیسسیون کندو مقرراتی ایشسه داخل اولان اوج طرفک اکثریت اراسیله اتخاذ ایلنه جکدر.

militaires des Ambassades des Puissances médiatrices.

La Commission de délimitation devra se réunir incessamment, se rendre sur le terrain et commencer ses travaux sans retard. Elle prendra ses résolutions à la majorité des voix des trois parties intervenantes.

Lors de l'application du tracé sur les lieux de légères modifications au point de vue stratégique peuvent y être introduites à l'avantage de l'Empire Ottoman, par un accord entre les délégués de la Sublime Porte et des Puissances.

L'acte définitif de délimitation avec la carte y annexée, qui seront dressés et signés par la Commission de délimitation, feront partie intégrante du présent traité.

Art. 2.

La Grèce paiera à la Turquie une indemnité de Guerre de quatre millions de Livres Turques, conformément aux conditions prévues à l'article 2 des préliminaires de paix.

Art. 3.

L'évacuation de la Thessalie s'effectuera suivant les conditions posées dans l'article 6 des préliminaires de paix; elle aura lieu dans le délai d'un mois à partir du moment où les Puissances auront reconnu comme remplies les conditions prévues aux deux derniers alinéas de l'article 2 des préliminaires de paix et où l'époque de la publication de l'emprunt pour l'indemnité de guerre aura été établie par la Commission internationale, en conformité avec les dispositions de l'arrangement financier mentionné dans cet article.

Le mode d'évacuation et de remise aux Autorités helléniques des localités évacuées sera déterminé par les délégués des deux parties intéressées avec le concours de délégués des Grandes Puissances.

حدود کدر کاھنک ارض اوزرنده حين تطبيقه سوق الخيش
نقطة نظر نجه منافع دولت عليه به موافق تعديلات جزئيه باب عالي ايله
دول معظمه دلککری بيننده بالاتفاق اجرا اولنه بيه جقدر .
تحدید حدود قوميسوني جانبندن تنظيم وامضا ايديله جک
اولان تحدید نامه قطعی ايله اکامر بوط خربطه اشبو معاهده نامه نك
جزؤ متمعی عد اولنه جقدر .

ایکنجی ماده

حکومت یونانیه مقدمات صلحیه نك ایکنجی ماده سنده
مندرج شرائطه توفیقاً دولت عاییه به درت ملون لیرای عثمانی
تضمینات حربیه تأدییه ایده جقدر .

اومینجی ماده

تسالیانک امر تخلیه سنه مقدمات صلحیه نك التنجی ماده سنده
موضوع شرائط وجهله ابتدار اولنه جقدر .
امر تخلیه مقدمات صلحیه نك ایکنجی ماده سنک سوک
ایکی فقره سنده مصرح شرائطک ایفا اولندی بی دولت لرحه تصدیق
وتضمینات حربیه ایچون عقد ایدیله جک استقراضک زمان نشری
ماده مذکورده مصرح صورت تسویه مالیه احکامی موجبنجه
مخاطب قومیسون طرفندن تمین ایلدیکی کوندن اعتباراً برآی
مدت طرفنده اجرا قلنه جقدر .
تخلیه اولنه جق محال لرحه صورت تخلیه سیله مأمورین یونانییه
تسلیمی دول معظمه دلککری نك انضمام معاوتیلله علاقه دار اولان
طرفین دلککری جانبندن تمین قلنه جقدر .

Art. 4.

Les prisonniers de guerre seront rendus de part et d'autre immédiatement après la ratification du présent traité.

در دنیجی ماده

اسرای حربیه اشبو معاهده نامه نك تصدیقی متعاقب هر ایکی طرفدن اعاده اوله جقدر .

Art. 5.

Une amnistie pleine et entière est accordée de part et d'autre à toutes les personnes qui ont été compromises dans les événements qui ont précédé ou suivi la déclaration de guerre.

بشقی ماده

اعلان حربدن اول و صکره ظهور ایدن وقوعانده ذی مدخل اولان کافه اشخاص حقنده هر ایکی طرفدن کاملاً و تماماً بر عفو عمومی اعلان اولمشدر .

Art. 6.

Les sujets de chacun des deux Etats, dont la situation est régulière devant la loi, pourvu qu'ils n'aient pas séjourné et circulé librement, comme au passé, sur le territoire de l'autre, chaque des deux hautes parties contractantes se réservant la faculté de refuser l'accès de son territoire à ceux des sujets de l'autre partie qui auraient subi des condamnations judiciaires d'ordre pénal ou qui auraient été l'objet d'un arrêté d'expulsion à raison de leurs antécédents et méfaits de droit commun. Avis préalable en sera donné aux Légations respectives.

التبجی ماده

ایکی حکومتدن هر برینک نظر قانونده حال و موقعی منتظم اولان تبعه سی دیگر برینک اراضیسی اوزرنده کما فی السابق سربسته اقامت و دور و سیاحت ایده بیله جقدر طرفین عاقدیندن هر بری دیگر طرف تبعه سندن مواد جزائیهده قانوناً دوچار حکومیت اولمش و یا خود سوابق احوال لرندن و حقوق عمومییه متعلق ارتکاب ایلدک لری جرایمدن طولانی حقنرنده طرد و تبعید قراری لاحق اولمش بولسا نلری کندو ممالکنه قبول ایتمک صلاحیتنی محافظه ایدر کیفیت اولجه طرفین سفارتلرینه اخبار ایدیه جقدر .

Art. 7.

Les musulmans habitants ou originaires de Grèce qui, en vertu de l'article 13 de la Convention du 24 Mai 1881, avaient acquis la nationalité hellénique, seront libres d'émigrer ou de fixer leur domicile en Turquie. Ceux qui ont acquis la nationalité hellénique tout, en vertu d'une déclaration préalable faite à l'Autorité compétente dans un délai de trois ans à partir de l'échange des ratifications du présent acte, la faculté d'opter pour la nationalité ottomane. Tous ces émigrés

بشقی ماده

تسالیک سکنه سیله اهالی اصلیه سندن اولوب ۲۴ مایس سنه ۱۸۸۱ تاریخلو مقاوله نامه نك اون اوچنجی ماده سی موجبجه تابعیت یونانییه ای اکتساب ایتمش و یا ایتماش اولان مسلمانلر ممالک شاهانه یه مهاجر تده و آوراده اقامتگاه لرینی تعیینده سربسته اوله جقدر در تابعیت یونانییه ای اکتساب ایتمش اولنر معاهده حاضره تصدیق نامه لرینک مبادله سی تاریخندن اعتباراً اوچ سنه مدت طرفنده اولجه . مومرین عانده یه اعطا اولنسه حق بریانتنامه موجبجه تابعیت عثمانیه یی قبول و اختیار ایتمک صلاحیتنی حاضر اوله جقدر در

auront à jouir pleinement et sans aucune restriction, conformément à la dite convention, des propriétés immobilières sises en Grèce et de les administrer.

Les mêmes avantages sont accordés par la dite convention à la population des territoires rétrocedés à la Turquie par suite de la nouvelle rectification de la frontière ou bien actuellement domiciliés dans ces localités.

Les mêmes habitants ou bien originaires des territoires rétrocedés à la Turquie ainsi que les représentants des institutions ou commissions sises dans ces localités qui auraient des propriétés immobilières en Thessalie seront autorisés à passer la frontière pour les cultiver, les administrer et les affermer, comme par le passé, sans qu'aucune entrave puisse leur être opposée de ce chef.

Les mêmes avantages identiques sont accordés tant aux habitants ou originaires de Thessalie qu'aux représentants des institutions ou commissions s'y trouvant qui posséderaient des propriétés immobilières dans les territoires rétrocedés à l'Empire Ottoman.

Art. 8.

En exécution de l'article 4 des préliminaires de la paix, la Grèce paiera à la Turquie, en indemnisation des particuliers en raison des dommages causés par les forces grecques, la somme de cent mille Livres Turques.

Le paiement de cette somme sera effectué dans le plus court délai possible et au plus tard au moment que l'indemnité de guerre.

Art. 9.

On ne doit pas toucher au principe des immunités personnelles dont les Hellènes jouissaient avant la guerre et sur le même pied que les nationaux des autres Etats, des arrangements spéciaux conclus entre la Turquie et la Grèce ont été faits pour prévenir l'abus des immunités con-

مهاجرین مرقومہ نیک جلسہ سی مار الذکر مقالہ نامہ بہ توفیقاً یونانستاندہ کائن املاک نندن تمامیہ وبلا مانع استفادہ وبونلری اداره دہ دوام ایلیہ جکلردر .

حدودک یکیدن تصحیحی مناسبتیہ دولت علیہ اعادہ قلنان محللرک سکنہ سندن و اہالی اصلہ سندن اولنلرہ ویا خود ایوم محال مذکورہ دہ مقیم بولنانلرہ متقابلاً عینی فوائد بخش اولمشدر .

دولت علیہ اعادہ قلنان محللرک اشبوسکنہ ویا اہالی اصلہ سندن و محال مذکورہ دہ کائن مؤسسات ویا نواحی وکیللرندن تسالیادہ املاکی بولنانلر بونلری کافی السابق زرع وادارہ ایتمک والتزامہ ویرمک اوزرہ حدودی حکمکدہ سرہست اولہ جقلر و بوند لٹولایی کندولرینہ برکونہ مانع ایقاع ایدیلمیہ جکلدر .

کریک تسالیانک سکنہ ویا اہالی اصلہ سندن و کریک محال مذکورہ دہ کی مؤسسات ویا نواحی وکیللرندن دولت علیہ بہ اعادہ اولتان اراضیدہ املاکی بولنانلرہ عینی فوائد بخش ایدلشددر .

سکونجی مادہ

مقدمات صلحیہ نیک دردنجی مادہ سی احکامی اجراء حکومت یونانیہ قوای یونانیہ طرفندن ایقاع اولنان خساراتدنظولایی افراد اہالی بہ تضمینات اولوق اوزرہ دولت علیہ بہ یوز بیگ عثمانلی لیراسی تادیہ ایڈہ جکلدر مبلغ مزبور تضمینات حربیہ ایلہ عینی زماندہ تادیہ قانہ جکلدر .

ظفونجی مادہ

تبعہ یونانیہ نیک قبل الحارہ دول سائرہ تبعہ سی مثلومستفید اولدق لری معافیات و امتیازاتک قاعدہ سنہ طوقلمقسوزن قونسلوسلق معافیاتجہ سوء استعمال وقوعنہ محل بر اقامتق و لازمہ عدالتک حسن جریانہ حائل اولان احوالی منع ایتمک واعطا اولنسان اعلاماتک اجراسنی تأمین وافلاس ایشلری داخل اولوق اوزرہ

ولایوں، د'ہمپہچر لہس انٹراوے اؤ کورس رےگولیر دہ لا جوسٹس، د'اسسور ل'ہخکوشن دہس سینٹنس رینڈوے اؤ دہ سائوگاردہ لہس انٹیرٹس دہس سؤجٹس اؤٹومانس اؤ اٹرانجہرس دانس لہرس دہفرینڈس اوی لہس سؤجٹس ہللینہس، ۛ کومپریس لہس کاس دہ فائلیٹہ.

Jusqu'à la conclusion et à la mise en vigueur de la Convention prévue par l'article 5 des préliminaires de paix, les Consuls ottomans en Grèce et les Consuls hellènes en Turquie exerceront leurs fonctions administratives sur les mêmes bases qu'avant la guerre.

Quant aux affaires judiciaires entre sujets ottomans et sujets hellènes, celles qui ont été portées par devant les tribunaux à une date antérieure à la déclaration de guerre continueront à être traitées en Turquie conformément au régime en vigueur avant la guerre; les affaires qui auront surgi postérieurement à la déclaration de guerre seront traitées, conformément aux principes du droit Européen, sur la base de la Convention Turco-Serbe du 26 février/9 Mars 1896.

Art. 10.

Les stipulations de la Convention du 24 Mai 1881 pour la cession de la Thessalie à la Grèce sont maintenues sauf celles qui sont modifiées par le présent acte.

La Sublime-Porte se réserve de saisir de ses propositions pour le règlement des questions découlant de la dite Convention les Puissances qui en sont signataires et dont les décisions doivent être acceptées par la Grèce.

Art. 11.

Les deux Hautes Parties contractantes conviennent de conclure dans un délai de trois mois à partir de la ratification du présent traité, les arrangements suivants:

یونانیلرہ اولان اخیلافانندہ تبعہ عثمانیہ واجنبیہ نیک منافعی محافظہ ایلک مقصدیہ دولت علیہ ایہ یونان حکومتی بینندہ صورتویہ مخصوصہ عقد اولہ جقدر مقدمات صالحیہ نیک بشنجی مادہ سنک « نایا » اشارتلی فقرہ سنندہ مصرح مقالہ نامہ نیک عقدیہ موقع اجراہ وضعنہ دکن یونانستاندہ کی دولت علیہ شہنڈرلری و ممالک شاہانہ دہ کی یونان قونلوسلری ادارہ بہ متعلق وظیفہ لری بحار بہ دن اولکی عینی اساسلر اوزرینہ ایفا ایلیہ جکلر در .

تبعہ عثمانیہ ایہ یونان تبعہ سی بینندہ کی مصالح عدلیہ بہ کلنجہ اعلان حرب دن مقدم محاکمہ حوالہ ایڈلش بولٹان مصالح عدلیہ حقندہ ممالک شاہانہ دہ بحار بہ دن اول مرعی الاجرا اولان اصولہ توفیقاً معاملہ دہ دوام اولہ جق و اعلان حرب دن سکرہ ظہور ایڈن مصالح حقندہ ایہ دولت علیہ ایہ صرب حکومتی بینندہ منعقد ۲۶ شباط ۱۸۹۶ سنہ تاریخلو مقالہ نامہ اسانہ مستنداً اورویا حقوق دولیسی قواعدینہ توفیقاً معاملہ ایڈیہ جکلر .

اوتھی مادہ

فی ۲۴ مایس سنہ ۱۸۸۱ تاریخلو مقالہ نامہ نیک احکام و شرائطی اشبو معاہدہ نامہ ایہ تعدیل ایڈلش بولٹان احکام و شرائط مستنا اولوق اوزرہ ایسا ایڈلشدر باب عالی مذکور مقالہ نامہ احکامدن منبع مسائلک تسویسی حقندہ کی تکلیفاتی مقالہ نامہ مذکور ی امضا ایڈن دولترہ تبلیغ وحوالہ ایتمک حقنی محافظہ بیورر دول مشارالہیمک مقرراتی حکومت یونانیہ طرفدن قبول ایڈلک لازمکلور .

اوبہ برنجی مادہ

طرفین عاقدین اشبو معاہدہ نامہ نیک تاریخ تصدیقندن اعتباراً اوج ای مدت طرفندہ صور تسویہ آتیہ نیک عقدینہ قرار ویرمٹلر در .

اولا معترض علیہا اولان تابعیت مسائلہ سنک سکا ہون

validité contestées sur les bases du projet
signé en 1876 entre la Turquie et la Grèce;

une Convention Consulaire dans les con-
ditions prévues au premier paragraphe de
l'article 9 (art. 3 des préliminaires de paix);

un traité d'extradition pour la remise
des criminels de droit commun, et

une Convention pour la répression du
banditisme sur les frontières communes.

Les deux parties se réservent de conclure
éventuellement un traité de commerce et de
navigation.

En attendant la conclusion de ce dernier
traité, la liberté de commerce et de navigation
sera établie d'une manière réciproque.

Art. 12.

Les relations postales entre l'Empire Otto-
man et la Grèce, qui avaient été interrom-
pues depuis quelques années, seront rétablies
conformément aux accords généraux qui règlent
les relations postales aussitôt que les Administrations pos-
tales des deux pays auront conclu une conven-
tion spéciale à ce sujet.

En attendant les deux Administrations pos-
tales pourront échanger directement, dans les
conditions qu'elles désigneront comme sièges d'é-
change, leurs valises et colis dûment scellés
et adressés par voie de terre ou de mer à
l'exception des deux pays ou pour le transit.

Art. 13.

Les Administrations des télégraphes des deux
pays devront prendre les mesures nécessaires
pour établir les communications entre leurs
stations respectives et pour entretenir convena-
blement leurs lignes télégraphiques de manière
à assurer un cours ininterrompu et rapide aux
affaires des dépêches.

بشمع التي تاريخيخنده دولت عليه اياه يونانستان بيننده تذکر
اولان لایحه نك اساسی اوزرینه تنظیم ایدر بر مقاوله نامه .

ثانیاً طقوزنجی ماده نك برنجی فقره سنده (مقدمات صلحیه نك
اوجنجی ماده سی) مصرح شرائط دائره سنده اوله رق برقونسلوسلق
مقاوله نامه سی .

ثالثاً حقوق عمومیہ بحرینك متقابلاً تسلیمی ایچون
براعاده بحرین معاهده نامه سی .

رابعاً طرفین حدودی اوزرنده حرکات شقاوتکارانه نك
منع ورفی ایچون بر مقاوله نامه .

طرفین ایروده بر تجارت و سیر سفان معاهده نامه سی
عقدی صلاحیتی محافظه ایدر لر اشبو صوك معاهده نامه عقد
اولتجهیه دکن سربستی تجارت و سیر سفان خصوصی صورت
مقابله اعاده قلمشدر .

اوه ایلنجی ماده

برقاج سنه دنیرو دوچار انقطاع اولمش اولان دولت علیه اياه
یونان حکومتی بیننده کی بوسته مناسباتی طرفین بوسته اداره لری
بیننده بو بایده بر مقاوله نامه مخصوص عقد اولنور اولنر بوسته
مناسباتی تنظیم ایدن مقاولات عمومیہ به توفیقاً اعاده اولنه جقدر
بوکا انتظاراً طرفین بوسته اداره لری اصولی وجهله تمهیر اولنوب
یکدیگری ممالکنه برأ ویا بحراً ویا خود ترانسیت صورتیسه
کوندر یلان بوسته چانطه ویا کتلیجی محل مبادله اتخاذ ایدیه جکلری
برلرده طوغریدن طوغری به مبادله ایدیه بیله جکلر در .

اوه ارینجی ماده

طرفین تلفراف اداره لری هر ایکی مملکتده یونان خطوط
تلفرافیه بیننده مخابراتی اعاده ایتمک و مخابرات تلفرافیه نك بلافاصله
سرعت تمامینی تأمین ایدیه جک صورتده خطوط مذکوریه
حسن حالده محافظه ایلمک ایچون اقتضایدن تدابیری اتخاذ
بجور اوله جقلر در .

Art. 14.

En vue d'assurer le maintien des rapports de bon voisinage entre les deux Etats, les Gouvernements de la Turquie et de la Grèce s'engagent à ne pas tolérer sur leur territoire des agissements de nature à troubler la sécurité et l'ordre dans l'Etat voisin.

Art. 15.

En cas de divergences dans le cours des négociations entre la Turquie et la Grèce, les points contestés pourront être soumis, par l'une ou l'autre des parties intéressées, à l'arbitrage des Représentants des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople, dont les décisions seront obligatoires pour les deux Gouvernements.

Cet arbitrage pourra s'exercer collectivement ou par désignation spéciale des intéressés et soit directement, soit par l'entremise de délégués spéciaux.

En cas de partage égal des voix, les arbitres choisiront un surarbitre.

Art. 16.

Les ratifications du présent traité définitif de paix par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et par Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes seront échangées à Constantinople dans le délai de quinze jours à partir d'aujourd'hui ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.

Fait en double à Consople, le $\frac{22 \text{ Novembre}}{4 \text{ Décembre}}$ 1897.

(Signé):	(Signé):
TEVFIK	MAUROCORDATO
HASSAN FEHMI	STÉPHANOS

اوره دردی ماده

دولتین بیننده مناسبات حسن همجواریتک محافظه سنی تأمین مقصدیاه دولت علیه ایاه یونان حکومتی کندی الکارنده حکومت متجاورونک حضور وامینتی اخلال ایده بیله جک تحریکات و تسویلات وقوعنی تجویز ایتامکی تعهد ایدر لر .

اوره بشمی ماده

اشنای مذاکرانده دولت علیه ایله یونانستان بیننده اختلاف افکار ظهوری تقدیرنده علاقه دار اولان طرفیندن بری و یا دیگرى نقاط معترض علیهای در سعادتده مقیم دول معظمه سفرا سنک «ار برترانه» بنه حواله ایده بیله جک و بونلرک مقرراتی طرفین حقنده مجبوری الاجرا اوله جقدر اشبو و ار برترانه صورت مشترکده و باعلاقه دارانک مخصوصاً ارانه ایده جکری وجهله کرک طوغریدن طوغری به و کرک مخصوص دلکلمر معرقتیله اجرا اوله بیله جکدر . تساوی ار او قوعنده حکملر بر حکم ثالث انتخاب ایده جکدر .

اوره التیمی ماده

اشبو معاهده صلحیه قطعیه نك طرف اشرف حضرت پادشاهیدن وحشمتلویونان قرالی حضر تلری جانبدن تصدیق قلمش نسخته لری بوکوندن اعتباراً اون بش کون مدت ظرفنده و یا تمکن ایسه دها اول در سعادتده مبادله اوله جقدر .

تصدیقاً للمقال طرفین مرخصاری اشبو معاهده صلحیه قطعیه امضا وار مالی مهر نریله تمهیر ایلمشدر .

۲۲ تفرین تایی سنه ۱۸۹۷ تاریخنده ایکی نسخه اوله ورق ۲ کانون اول در سعادتده تنظیم اولمشدر .

امضا	امضا
توفیق	ماوروقورداتو
حسن فهمی	استفانوس

Protocole A.

par la demande de Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires Hellènes de connaître les bases principales qui formeront les propositions du Gouvernement Impérial en ce qui concerne les arrangements prévus par l'article 3 des préliminaires de paix, Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans acceptent de leur communiquer dès à présent, à titre de renseignement et sans qu'aucune discussion puisse être entamée à ce sujet avant la ratification du traité de paix définitif, les bases principales desdits arrangements telles qu'elles ont été arrêtées dans la pensée du Gouvernement Impérial et qui consisteront dans les points suivants :

fixer les limites de la franchise douanière des Consuls; assurer l'exécution des jugements rendus par les Tribunaux Ottomans envers les Consuls Hellènes en matière civile et commerciale; définir le domicile du sujet hellène et préciser les conditions à observer lors des acquisitions domiciliaires, surtout pour les cas où le drogman ne se rendrait pas à l'invitation des Autorités ottomanes; préciser également les conditions à observer pour les cas où les délégués consulaires ne se rendraient pas aux tribunaux compétents en matière mixte; connaître la compétence de la Cour de Cassation ottomane d'après les lois en vigueur; préciser également la compétence des tribunaux ottomans pour les cas de faillite des sujets hellènes ainsi qu'en matière pénale soit par eux, soit avec les sujets des autres puissances; régulariser la signification des décisions judiciaires destinées aux sujets hellènes; assurer l'exécution par les Autorités ottomanes des jugements rendus par les tribunaux ottomans dans les procès mixtes.

Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires hellènes, prenant acte de cette communication, déclarent faire leurs réserves les plus formelles sur son contenu au sujet duquel des discussions et négociations ultérieures devront avoir lieu immédiatement après la ratification du traité de paix définitif, soit sur le refus, en cas de divergence, à l'arbitrage des

A. اشارتی برتقول

حکومت سنیہ نیک مقدمات صلحہ نیک اوچنچی مادہ سندیہ مصرح صور تسویہ بہ متعلق تکلیفاتی تشکیل ایدہ جک اولان باشلوچہ اساسلرک نهدن عبارت اولدیفنک کندولرینہ بیلدیرلمسی حقدنہ یونان مرخصلری جانبندن وقوعبولان طلب اوزرینہ دولت علیہ مرخصلری مارالذکر صور تسویہ ایچون حکومت سنیہ نیک فکرنده تقرر ایدوب تقساط اتیہده مندج بولسان باشلوچہ اساسلری معلومات قیلندن اولق و معاهدہ صلحیہ قطعیہ نیک تصدیقندن اول اولبایدہ برکونہ مباحثانہ کیریشلمامک اوزرہ شمیدین مرخصان موئی الیہمایہ تبلیغہ موافقت ایتمیشلردر نقاط مذکورہ شونلردر :

قونسولسارک حازر اولدقلری کمرک معافیتنک تعیین حدودی مواد حقوقیہ و تجاریہ ده محاکم عثمانیہ جانبندن یونان قونسولساری حقدنہ اصدار اولتان اعلاماتک تنفیذ احکامی تبعہ یونانیہ نیک تعیین اقامتکاهی و علی الخصوص ترجمانک مأمورین عثمانیہ نیک دعوت واقعہ سنہ اجابت ایتمدیکی تصدیقده اقامتکاهک حین تحریرسندہ رعایت اولنہ حق شرائطک تصریحی دعاوی مختلطہده قونسولسوخانہ مأمورلری محاکم عائدہ بہ عزیمت ایتمدیکی صورتده کذلک رعایت اولنسی لازمکلاں شرائطک توضیحی قوانین مرعیہ موجبجہ حکمہ تمیزک قبول و تصدیق صلاحیتی تبعہ یونانیہ نیک افلاس ایشرلیہ کرک کندی یینلرنده و کرک دول سائرہ تبعہ سیلہ اولان مواد جزائیہده کذلک محاکم عثمانیہ نیک قبول صلاحیتی تبعہ یونانیہ بہ مخصوص اوراق عدلیہ نیک امر تبلیغتنک تحت انتظامہ وضعی دعاوی مختلطہده محاکم عثمانیہ طرفندن اصدار اولسان اعلامات احکاماتک مأمورین عثمانیہ جانبندن تأمین اجراسی .

یونان مرخصلری اشبو تبلیغاتی سند اتخاذایہ برابر کرک معاهدہ صلحیہ قطعیہ نیک تصدیقی متعاقب موقع بحث و مذاکرہ بہ وضع اولنہ حق اولان اشبو تبلیغاتک مندرجاتی و کرک اختلاف افکار وقوعنده مقدمات صلحیہ نیک طقوزنجی مادہ سندیہ مصرح اولدینی اوزرہ در سعادتنده کی دول معظمہ سفرا سنک اربیتراژینہ

Représentants des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople. prévu par l'Article 9 des préliminaires de paix.

Constantinople, le 7/19 Novembre 1897.

(Signé):	(Signé):
TEVEIK	MAUROCORDATO
HASSAN FEHMI	STÉPHANOS

Protocole B.

Le traité de commerce et de navigation prévu par l'article 11 du traité définitif de paix (article 7 des Préliminaires) devra être conclu dans le délai de deux ans à partir de l'échange des ratifications dudit traité de paix.

Pendant ce délai, le régime en vigueur avant la guerre relatif aux tarifs douaniers, au cabotage et à la pêche des éponges est maintenu sur la base de la réciprocité.

Si, toutefois, jusqu'à l'expiration du délai susvisé de deux ans, le traité de commerce et de navigation n'est pas conclu et ratifié, les deux parties reviendront au régime établi par l'article 11 du traité de paix (article 7 des Préliminaires.)

Il est entendu que dans le cas où le nouveau traité de commerce et de navigation étant conclu et ratifié dans ledit délai, ne pourrait pas, par suite de motifs indépendants de la volonté des deux Hautes Parties contractantes, être mis en application, le régime susindiqué en vigueur avant la guerre sera maintenu, toujours sur la base de la réciprocité, jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du nouveau traité.

Constantinople, le $\frac{22 \text{ Novembre}}{4 \text{ Décembre}}$ 1897

(Signé):	(Signé):
TEVEIK	MAUROCORDATO
HASSAN FEHMI	STÉPHANOS

مراجعت خصوصی حقننده الك قطعی قیود احترازیه در میان ایندکله نینی بیان ایدر لر .

در سعادت فی $\frac{۷}{۱۹}$ تشرین ثانی سنه ۱۸۹۷

امضا	امضا
توفیق	ماورو قورداتو
حسن فهمی	استفانوس

B. ائمانتی برتقول

معاهده صاحبه قطعيه نك اون برنجی ماده سنده (مقدمات صاحبه نك يدنجی ماده سی) مصرح تجارت و سیر سفان معاهده نامه سی اشبو معاهده صاحبه تصدیق نامه لر نك تاریخ مبادله سندن اعتباراً ایکی سنه مدت ظرفنده عقد اولته جقدر اشبو مدت ظرفنده كرك تعرفه لر به قابوتاز و سونكر صیدی حقننده محاربه دن اول مرعی الاجرا اولان اصول مقابله بالمثل اساسی اوزرینه ابقا ایدلشدر اكر اشبو ایکی سنه مدت انقضاسنه دكین تجارت و سیر سفان معاهده نامه سی عقد و تصدیق ایدلماش بولنور ایسه طرفین معاهده صاحبه قطعيه نك اون برنجی ماده سنده (مقدمات صاحبه نك يدنجی ماده سی) مصرح اصوله رجوع ایده جكلردر .

تجارت و سیر سفان معاهده نامه جدیدی مدت مذكوره ظرفنده عقد و تصدیق اولتوبده طرفین عاقدينك رضا و اختیار لر ی خارجنده بولسان بعض اسباب دن طولانی موقع تطبیق و اجراه وضع ایدله مدیكی حالده محاربه دن اول مرعی الاجرا اولان اصول مذكورك معاهده نامه جدیدك موقع اجراه وضعه دكین دائماً مقابله بالمثل اساسی اوزرینه ابقاسی مقرردر .

در سعادت $\frac{۲۲ \text{ تشرین ثانی}}{۴ \text{ كانون اول}}$ سنه ۱۸۹۷

امضا	امضا
توفیق	ماورو قورداتو
حسن فهمی	استفانوس

Procès-Verbal.

Les soussignés s'étant réunis aujourd'hui à la Sublime Porte pour l'échange des ratifications du traité définitif de paix conclu entre la Turquie et la Grèce et signé à Constantinople le ^{29 Novembre}/_{4 Décembre} 1897 et le texte français collationné, ayant été trouvé conforme au texte du traité signé par les Plénipotentiaires des deux Hautes Parties contractantes, l'échange des instruments de ratification a eu lieu suivant l'usage.

Il est reconnu que le protocole **A** daté du 7/19 Novembre 1897 et le protocole **B** daté du ^{22 Novembre}/_{4 Décembre} 1897, signés par les Plénipotentiaires des deux Hautes Parties contractantes, ayant été aussi sanctionnés par l'Empereur Impérial, font partie intégrante dudit traité définitif de paix.

En foi de quoi le présent procès-verbal a été dressé en double et signé.

Constantinople, le 6/18 Décembre 1897.

(Signé):	(Signé):
TEVFIK	MAUROCORDATO
HASSAN FEHMI	STÉPHANOS
MÉHÉMED NOURY	
YOUSSEUF	NAOUM

ضبطنامه

محررين امضا دولت عليه ايله حكومت يونانيه بيننده عقد و ۲۲ تشرين ثاني سنه ۱۸۹۷ تاريخيه در سعادته امضا اولنان معاهده قطعيه صلحيه نك تصديقنامه لرني لاجل التعاطي بوكون باب عاليه عقد اجتماع اتمش وفرانسجه متن على الاصول مقابله اولتدق طرفين عاقدين مرخصلري جانيندن امضا ايديلان معاهده نامه متنه موافق كورنمش اولديغندن تصديقنامه لر اصولي وجهه تعاطي قلمشدر .

شوراسي مقرر در كه طرفين عاقدين مرخصلري جانيندن امضا اولنان ۱۹/۷ تشرين ثاني سنه ۱۸۹۷ تاريخلو و « A » اشارتلي پروتوقول ايله ۲۲/۲ كانون اول ۱۸۹۷ تاريخلو و « B » اشارتلي پروتوقول دخي اراده سنيه سي شرفصا در اولمش اولديغندن بوتلر مارالذ كر معاهده قطعيه صلحيه نك اجزاي متممه سندندر . تصديقاً للمقال اشبو ضبطنامه ايكي نسخه اوله رق تنظيم و امضا قاندي .

في ۱۸ كانون اول سنه ۱۸۹۷

امضا	امضا
توفيق	ماورو فوردا تو
حسن فهمي	استقائوس
محمد نوري	
يوسف	نعوم