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Civil-Military Relations in Marcos' Philippines



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Contents

Introduction: Philippines, 1972.....	3
I. Case study: The Philippines.....	4
Context.....	4
Enter Ferdinand Marcos: The "New Society" and the Military.....	4
Philippine Society and Corruption.....	5
II. Coup-proofing: Theory and Reality.....	6
The Exploitation of Special Loyalties.....	7
The creation of parallel militaries.....	7
The establishment of security agencies that watch everyone, including other security agencies..	8
The encouragement of expertness in the regular military.....	8
Quinlivan - Reality?.....	8
Endgame.....	8
III. Integrating Societal Values into the Military: Burk and Huntington.....	9
Burk's theory.....	9
Philippine Social Values.....	10
Corruption and Military Performance.....	10
Huntington and the Philippines.....	12
IV. Conclusion.....	12
Notes.....	13

Civil-Military Relations in Marcos' Philippines

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Introduction: Philippines, 1972

After gaining its independence in 1946, the Philippines stood as a “showcase of democracy” in Southeast Asia.[i] Both Spanish and American colonization had bequeathed to the islands Western values and institutions.[ii] The Americans had provided for the establishment of a democratic constitutional government. The Philippine press was widely considered one of the freest in Asia.[iii] Yet, on September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 1081, declaring a state of martial law throughout the nation.[iv] In the years following, Marcos’ rule would be marked by harsh political repression, human rights violations, and a massive statewide kleptocracy. The Philippines’ fall from grace left scholars scrambling to answer just how did a promising young democracy fall so quickly.

The key to this question lies in exploring the nature of martial law under Marcos. What was the civil-military relationship under the Marcos

regime? Who was in charge and how did they maintain that authority? In the first section, I will provide a brief history of the Marcos regime and how he maintained control of the military. I will argue that, during the martial law period, the Philippine regime constituted one-man civilian control of the military under the authoritarian leadership of Ferdinand Marcos. I further argue that Marcos was able to maintain control of the military through institutionalized corruption.

In the second section, I will then compare this case study to the broader concept of military control through coup-proofing methods. Specifically, I will apply James Quinlivan’s theory of coup-proofing to the Marcos case study and analyze it for its strengths and weaknesses. I then argue that Quinlivan’s theory is strong when it relates to the importance of personal loyalty and corruption and weak when it departs from these essential variables.

In the third section, I will discuss the hazards of introducing societal values to the military. I will

utilize James Burk and Samuel Huntington's arguments on the role and effect these values have on the military and its effectiveness. Ultimately, I argue that Burk's thesis is a compelling response to Huntington, yet inadequate when considering a wider range of values. I posit that societal values can play both positive and negative roles on military effectiveness, and that the debate must shift to, not just whether these values have a place in the military, but which specific values are appropriate for integration. I also argue that Huntington's argument appears incomplete when considering this case study.

I. Case study: The Philippines

Context

The Philippines presents a unique case for two significant reasons. First, in the years following World War II, the Philippines stood as a "showcase of democracy" in Southeast Asia.[v] Blessed with Western democratic institutions and the patronage of the United States, the Philippines was a shining Third World example of political stability and economic prosperity. Indeed, from 1950 to 1965, the Philippines' average economic growth rates exceeded the rates of all of Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and South Korea. [vi]

Second, the Philippines boasted the unique achievement among Third World countries of establishing a relatively professional military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), in the two decades following independence in 1946, generally succeeded in avoiding politicization and engaging in the corruption that characterized the civilian world. In fact, the Military Academy of the Philippines was modeled after America's West Point and heavily indoctrinated cadets with the ideals of professionalism and civil supremacy.[vii] Unlike many of its regional counterparts, from the 1940s to the 1970s the AFP never initiated coups against the civilian government.[viii]

Although the Philippines stood as an example of the successful exportation of Western institutions, the actual state of Philippine society was much more complicated. Underneath the democratic exterior was a society still based upon

centuries of Spanish colonial rule. While the Philippines had mastered the art of political stability and competitive elections, by the late 1960s it still resembled the society of its colonial past: a nation divided along patron-client, kinship, and regional lines.[ix] A noted scholar has described this marriage between Western democracy and colonial society as a cross between "feudal paternalism" and "Chicago-style machine politics." [x]

This combination was fertile ground for institutionalized political corruption. In the years between independence in 1946 and Marcos' declaration of martial law in 1972, Philippine politics settled into a pattern characterized by electoral bribery and institutionalized looting. Politicians campaigned for the support of the masses, promising income redistribution policies for the poor. Once elected, they rewarded their regional base of supporters at the expense of nation, enriching themselves and their coalitions as quickly as possible before the next election. This form of patronage politics would soon erode popular support for the governing coalition, and a new coalition would campaign on the promise to "kick the rascals out" and win, only to engage in the same vicious cycle.[xi]

Enter Ferdinand Marcos: The "New Society" and the Military

Internal instability provided the immediate pretext for the declaration of martial law. In 1972, the regime perceived three threats to its stability: the Maoist guerillas of the New People's Army (NPA), the rebel Muslim fighters in Mindanao,[xii] and civil unrest brought about by student and intellectual mass movements. The Marcos regime believed in the Communist infiltration of the latter.[xiii] While internal instability provided the immediate pretext, Marcos' declaration of martial law also tapped into society's widespread disillusion with democracy. Indeed, Marcos avowed in his Statement on the Declaration of Martial Law, "I use this power implemented by the military authorities to protect the Republic of the Philippines and our democracy." [xiv]

Indeed, the move to martial law coexisted with,

as a noted scholar has described, an “antithetical yearning for a real democratization of society.”[xv] The aforementioned cycle of corruption that had degraded the nation’s democratic institutions provided Marcos with ample support to break the “democratic deadlock.” By then, electoral competition had become associated with violence, plunder, chaos, and an unchanging social order. While Marcos had, in effect, sought to suppress democratic rights, his actions were couched and justified as a restoration of true democracy.

Despite Marcos’ claims to restore that democracy, in reality martial law meant the expansion of military rule. In the period from 1972 to 1975, the percentage of national defense outlays rose from 13.4% to 21.8% of the total. The size of the armed forces, which was about 55,000 in 1972, tripled in the period from 1972 to 1977 and had almost quadrupled to 200,000 by 1986. At the same time, education expenditures saw a drop from 31.1% to 19.6% of the total.[xvi] The per capita of military personnel per 1,000 of the population more than doubled from 1.56 in 1972 to 3.45 in 1977. Comparatively, the number of teachers per 1000 people dropped from 8.8 to 8.6 in the same time period, as did the number of physicians (from 0.33 to 0.31).[xvii] Martial law saw a dramatic expansion in the budgetary size and presence of the military at the expense of nonmilitary domestic spending.

This increase in military size was accompanied by greater and more intrusive powers over civilian life. The Philippine Constabulary, which handled internal security and law enforcement, reported directly through the military chain of command.[xviii] This ensured centralized decision-making on military and internal security matters. The result was the military’s unlimited powers for the search, arrest, and detention of civilians, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the routine torture of political prisoners. It is estimated that 60,000 Philippine civilians were arrested between 1972 and 1982.[xix]

The expansion of military power under Marcos also meant the decline of civilian institutions. Indeed, martial law saw the banning of

political parties and activities, the jailing of opposition leaders, the dismantling of Congress, and the weakening of the courts. Regulation of the media was even placed in the charge of the Secretary of Defense. [xx] It was said that the only two national institutions that remained after martial law were the presidency and the military.[xxi]

The most conspicuous fact of these developments is that, the greater the military’s authority grew relative to society, the stronger Marcos’ control over the military became. In fact, despite the military’s expanded powers, not once during Marcos’ rule did the military significantly threaten his control. To understand civil-military relations in this era, we must explore how Marcos was able to expand military power without increasing the threat it posed to his authority.

Philippine Society and Corruption

Studies of Philippine corruption often center upon the legacy of Spanish colonial rule and the persistence of a “small wealth elite.” A CIA report in 1965 asserts “the primacy of kinship group over all institutions, including the state... [K]inship and personal connections are far more important than merit and legal niceties... this has contributed to the widespread acceptance of nepotism and corruption as the normal road to political and personal advancement.”[xxii] In a sense, Marcos was the latest in a long line of corrupt Philippine leaders.

While it is true that corruption had existed in previous administrations, its existence had neither threatened the regularity of elections nor had it tainted the military’s professionalism or effectiveness. Marcos’ “achievement” had been to mire the military and civilian spheres to unprecedented levels of corruption, thereby establishing a kleptocracy which discarded the democratic institutions. The most impressive aspect of Marcos’ accomplishment is that he was able to transform a generally de-politicized military into a degraded institution subservient to his authority.

In one sense, Marcos recognized the potential of military power. It was said that Marcos “built a political career by currying the military’s fa-

vor.”[xxiii] Marcos often praised the efficiency of military officers in civilian jobs compared to their bureaucratic civilian counterparts.[xxiv] He understood the indispensable role the military played in maintaining his authority and, thus, he cultivated a relationship with the military to ensure its dependence on him. Marcos accomplished this through an astute manipulation of the military's interest, embedding its top leadership within a myriad of corruption and rewarding loyal officials with political and economic power.

Even prior to the declaration of martial law, Marcos was known to have quietly and patiently staffed the armed forces with loyal officers.[xxv] These high officers were appointed to civilian positions as governors or elections officials and on public and private corporations that managed everything from the media to public utilities.[xxvi] Marcos further provided subsidized commissaries, housing, and glamorous perks for his officers. Colonels driving through Manila in Mercedes-Benz automobiles became a common sight.[xxvii] The Philippine military's system of meritocracy was replaced with a system in which loyalty was the sole criterion for promotion. Marcos ensured that his cronies were stacked at the highest military positions. Indeed, Marcos appointed his own personal bodyguard and driver, Fabian Ver, to be the AFP Chief of Staff, the highest military position in the nation. [xxviii]

Marcos' success in subjugating the military can be seen in the extent of his control. In 1976, Marcos was able to retire eight generals and reassign twenty-one top officers on his whim. [xxix] When a Chief of Staff appointment, Victor Osias, a highly respected military officer, proved immune to corruption and resisted an order to intervene into the political sphere, Marcos unceremoniously replaced him on his own birthday with a more malleable disciple.[xxx] Just prior to martial law, rumors circulated that Marcos' chief military intelligence official, General Marcos G. Soliman, had leaked the impending takeover. Marcos then had him assassinated.[xxxi]

The extent of Marcos' power over the military is further illustrated in his creation of an Executive

Committee in 1981 to serve as an advisory board and as a potential vehicle to determine his successor.[xxxii] Its members consisted of the most powerful figures of the regime. What is interesting to note is that, among its ten appointed members, including President Marcos' wife Imelda, no member of the AFP was included. [xxxiii] Although Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile was included, this is a far cry from the early years of martial law.[xxxiv] During the initial declaration of martial law in 1972, Marcos was surrounded by his "Twelve Disciples," of which eleven were military and defense officials.[xxxv] What we can conclude is that Marcos' rule over the military was so completely consolidated, that he could afford to take his control for granted.

Thus, we find that President Marcos had successfully transformed an army that once upheld notions of military professionalism and integrity to one subservient to his authority. It can be said that the Philippine military grew in power but remained an extension of Marcos' authority. In other words, the more power the military yielded to Marcos, the more power it gained relative to society. President Marcos' rule was effectively a one-man civilian control over the military. He accomplished this by enmeshing the military's leadership in the web of corruption, thereby tying its interests to his authority.

II. Coup-proofing: Theory and Reality

I have argued that corruption allowed Marcos to control his increasingly powerful military. I now turn to the theoretical literature on coup-proofing to determine what other factors can account for Marcos' ability to maintain control. The evidence from this case study can also be used to critique the selected literature. I will now focus on James Quinlivan's article, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East."

Although Quinlivan's article focuses exclusively on Middle Eastern states, he raises points that can be applied to this case study. Quinlivan specifies four structural elements of political-military arrangements that help insulate regimes from coups: 1) the exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties; 2) the creation of parallel

militaries that counterbalance the regular military forces; 3) the establishment of security agencies that watch everyone, including other security agencies; and 4) the encouragement of expertise in the regular military.[xxxvi] (I chose to ignore the final element, funding, as it holds negligible predictive value.)

The Exploitation of Special Loyalties

Quinlivan discusses the importance of building communities of trust and suppressing those groups who cannot be trusted. This determines whether the governing entity can maintain the security and military units to control the entire population. Quinlivan then presents a wide range of needed security forces, anywhere from 2 uniformed police officers per 1,000 of the population (as is the case in the United States) to as many as 20 per 1,000 (as is the case in Ulster).[xxxvii] Much of his analysis focuses on the need for the ruling tribes of Middle East states to build coalitions with other tribes to attain a sufficient level of support.

The population of the Philippines consists less of tribal coalitions than of a vast majority of Catholics who are of mixed Spanish-Pacific Islander descent. Thus, tribal and religious coalitions are not particularly necessary. However, we do know that in the five years after the declaration of martial law, the number of those in the armed forces (including the police and security) per 1,000 of the population rose from 1.55 to 3.45, which is a dramatic increase, but not one that matches the high numbers that Quinlivan predicts as necessary. It is difficult to evaluate this variable, as it appears that Quinlivan had tribal-based societies in mind. Quinlivan should perhaps clarify the level and narrow the range of the armed forces per capita necessary to maintain rule. However, he notes that the Saudi royal family's rule is based on personal loyalty, rather than on an "abstract notion of citizenship." [xxxviii] This loyalty-based authority was the hallmark of Marcos' regime. As mentioned previously, loyalty was Marcos' top criterion for promotion, especially when it came to military advancement. Marcos's power was consolidated and maintained by personal loyalty. In this way, Quinlivan's variable of personal loyalty is

astute and his general theory of special loyalties can be strengthened by expanding it to apply to non-tribal based societies.

The creation of parallel militaries

Quinlivan describes the need for parallel militaries that are bound to the regime by special loyalties and social relationships, which can counter any disloyal forces and protect the ruler. He describes this parallel military as less a paramilitary force and more akin to regular army units, perhaps much like ground combat forces. In this way, such a force could potentially engage the regular military and would be considered by potential coup plotters in any balance-of-power calculation. He also discusses that a portion of this parallel military would be dedicated to the physical protection of the ruler in order to protect him from assassination attempts.[xxxix]

Indeed, during General Osias' short tenure as AFP Chief of Staff, the General had already detected a "private army" loyal to Marcos in the AFP.[xl] However, this "private" army was less a separate, parallel entity and more of an indication of Marcos' top-down control of the military. After martial law, Marcos centralized military and police authority through a single chain of command. This chain bypassed the Minister of National Defense (the top civilian appointee) and unified control of all branches of the AFP under Marcos and the AFP Chief of Staff, always a Marcos crony. These branches included the army, navy, air force, and the Constabulary.[xli] Control of both internal security and the fighting forces were monopolized through one vertical chain of command.

Quinlivan's theory of parallel militaries may be evident in the case of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In those situations, it was necessary for parallel militaries to check each other, especially in societies based on cross-cutting tribal divisions. In our case, however, it appears that the lack of tribal divisions freed Marcos to check the power of the military in different ways. By stacking the military with cronies who were individually loyal to him, he was able to create a military institution that, in the aggregate, was self-restraining and completely subser-

vient. This eliminated the necessity of creating a parallel military. Thus, Quinlivan's analysis must be modified to apply to account for alternative means of checking military power in nontribal societies.

The establishment of security agencies that watch everyone, including other security agencies

Quinlivan's contention here is that multiple security services are necessary to "keep tabs" on each other. This will keep the security services active and loyal.[xliii] He seems to argue that competition, or a security services "market" in which the government is the primary consumer, is necessary to keep the security services alert and ready to suppress any indication of disloyalty from the population at-large. Without this competition, a single security agency could grow disillusioned with the government's heavy-handed policies and even become disloyal.

It appears that Marcos' centralization of authority, which included subjugating the Constabulary under the military chain of command, rendered the creation of overlapping security forces unnecessary. Since the Constabulary became a mere extension of the military, Marcos' control over the military also meant he had control over the Constabulary. In this variable, it appears that the same factors that rendered parallel militaries unnecessary also apply to security agencies. A "market" of security agencies was not necessary to motivate the Constabulary. Marcos' own system of carrots provided sufficient incentives for both the military and the security forces to remain loyal.

The encouragement of expertness in the regular military

Quinlivan contends that the increase of "expertness" in military through the creation of military academies will deter coup attempts. This is because increased knowledge will reinforce the difficulties and risks involved in a coup attempt.[xliv] Perhaps what Quinlivan meant is that the inculcation of professional values will imbue the military with a sense of professionalism that will deter it from undertaking the risks of a coup. This argument harkens back

to Huntington's argument for professionalism and the conservative nature of the "military mind."

As noted previously, the Philippine Military Academy was established and patterned after West Point to inculcate values of integrity and professionalism. It is plausible that this created an organizational culture that discouraged coup plotting in the years prior to martial law. However, under Marcos, the more persuasive argument for a subdued military can be found in the high officers' entanglement in the networks of corruption. Any plausible coup attempts would necessarily have involved the high level officers, but their interests were effectively tied to Marcos' personal rule. Thus, Quinlivan's claim of the importance of expertness for coup-proofing is of negligible value here, as it was Marcos' control of the high officers through corruption that proved more critical to his authority.

Quinlivan – Reality?

Quinlivan's analysis underestimates the power of corruption and the incentives it provides military officials to maintain loyalty to the regime. His analysis of the need for special loyalties can be expanded to non-tribal relationships. Marcos' regime provides the example of personal relationships not based on ethnic loyalties. Here Quinlivan's analysis points in the right direction but has not explored all of the possibilities.

When it comes to his analysis of parallel militaries, overlapping security forces, and expertness, Quinlivan fails to take into account the possibility of maintaining loyalty without competing institutions. Perhaps in tribal societies, where individual institutions can be divided along ethnic lines, competing institutions are necessary to serve as mutual restraints to ensure loyalty. In the case of the Philippines, however, the lack of ethnic divisions freed up Marcos to obtain loyalty in alternate ways. By trying the interests of the military and the security forces to his regime through institutionalized corruption, Marcos developed a mechanism that allowed the military to check itself.

Endgame

What can the coup of 1986 that toppled Marcos add to our analysis of coup-proofing? The story of the events that led up to the coup is highly complex and years in the making, but certain themes emerge that complete our picture of civil-military relations under the Marcos regime. First, the government continued to lose increasing credibility with its disastrous responses to the 1981 and 1983 economic crises.[xliv] As the economy declined, Marcos' ability to provide the necessary carrots to maintain loyalty declined with it.

Second, other than in the final days of the coup, the mass movements were primarily driven by civilian elites, particularly the leaders of the Church and business elites.[xlv] Thus, only at the very end of the coup did Marcos' rule over the military lose its grasp. The events leading up to the coup were primarily outside the realm of the military. Third, the military remained one of the two most crucial pillars of Marcos' support (the other being the United States). Although the regime had almost universally lost legitimacy among the academic and business elite as well as the population at-large years before the fall, the military's support prolonged Marcos' years in power. In fact, in the years after the 1981 crises, in which popular uprisings became more prevalent, a sort of "Polish standoff" developed in which a universally discredited government maintained rule for years because of the support it enjoyed from the military, while the opposition proved incapable of overthrowing the government.[xlvi]

In the end, it was the defection of the two highest military officials, General Fidel Ramos (by then, the Acting Chief of Staff of the AFP) and Secretary of Defense Juan Enrile, that doomed the regime.[xlvii] The military's loyalty (as well as withdrawn U.S. support) proved to be the final trump card. We must then ask, how does this affect our analysis per Quinlivan's theory?

Would a parallel military or overlapping security forces have allowed Marcos to overcome these challenges and perpetuate his regime? While historical counterfactuals are difficult to prove, it does not appear, however, that they could have extended the life of the regime indefini-

tely. What mattered most were the special loyalties that Marcos built within the military. By the end of Marcos' reign, a youthful generation of new cadets were disillusioned and less connected to the regime's kleptocratic networks. In the final days of the Marcos regime, not only did the leaders at the highest levels, Ramos and Enrile, defect, but younger officers engaged in widespread mutinies. These officers, en masse, refused Marcos' orders to fire at demonstrators and even joined the mass movements.[xlviii]

Parallel militaries and security services would not have solved the biggest problem that eventually undid the Marcos government: his failure to maintain the special loyalties and relationships with all levels and all generations of the military. This failure, compounded by the regime's growing inability to provide perquisites (due to the economic crises) proved the biggest failure of coup-proofing. Thus, the fall of the regime only confirms our earlier analysis that special loyalties remain the strongest of Quinlivan's arguments.

III. Integrating Societal Values into the Military: Burk and Huntington

What does our case study tell us about the implications of introducing societal values to the military? James Burk provides a compelling theory about the benefits of this integration.

Burk's theory

In his chapter on "The Military's Presence in American Society, 1950-2000," James Burk theorizes that the military's functional and social imperatives need not necessarily be in opposition. Specifically, Burk focuses on reconciling the democratic values of American society with the military ethos. While Huntingtonian tradition has generally held that exposing the military to these values reduces its effectiveness, Burk argues, rather, that they can be mutually enforcing.[xlix]

Burke's claims rest on three social values that have been integrated into the military: the expansion of citizens' rights, the inclusion of previously marginalized social groups, and changing norms about the use of force.[l] According to Burk, the military, through a combination of

internal reform as well as pressure from external societal institutions, has adhered to or adopted each of these values. Although the military may have trailed society in adopting these values, this integration has allowed it to effectively maintain its status as a legitimate institution.

The novel aspect of Burk's hypothesis is his claim that the adherence to these values has actually increased military effectiveness. He posits that social and military values are not necessarily opposing variables, and integration can actually result in increased military effectiveness. Burk's argument extends Janowitz's thesis that the officer corps need not be sheltered from the issues that impact society.^[li] Just like Janowitz, Burk sees the merging of the civil and military spheres as a positive development, but he focuses primarily on its effects on military effectiveness. According to Burk, the inclusion of previously marginalized groups has actually increased morale and cohesion of the armed forces and, thus, boosted military effectiveness.

Using Burk as a starting point, we can begin to analyze our case study and its implications for the theoretical framework. Although the context of his evidence is primarily the Cold War era in the United States, it is a theory worth testing in a broader context. Such an application will help us understand Burk's theory and its potential limitations. There are a number of variables that Burk's theory employs: societal values, military values, and military effectiveness. Although he develops a typology to measure the military's "institutional presence," I focus more narrowly on his framework as it relates to military effectiveness.

Philippine Social Values

Whereas Burk's example of social values are couched in democratic ideals, determining the dominant values in Philippine society is much more complicated. Although there was disillusionment with democratic institutions, there is evidence that a strong impulse for democracy remained throughout the Marcos years. In the years after martial law, Marcos sought to main-

tain the façade of a commitment to democratic ideals. In 1975, Marcos initiated a referendum to approve his decision for martial law.^[lii] In 1978 Marcos declared an election to create a new National Assembly, ostensibly to enhance democratic participation.^[liii] In reality, each of these steps strengthened his authority. Each time, Marcos met courageous opposition in the face of the threat of violence, arrest, and detention. The Catholic clergy boycotted the 1975 elections in a visible show of defiance.^[liv] A coalition of clergymen, students, workers, and slum organizers formed opposition parties against Marcos in the 1978 elections.^[lv] At the same time, rural unrest developed against Marcos' agricultural reform decrees.^[lvi]

Additionally, it is important not to discount the role of the Catholic Church within the fabric of society. In a nation where Catholicism could claim four-fifths of the population, it is not surprising that the Church would exercise major political and cultural influence.^[lvii] As noted above, the Church participated in demonstrations and boycotts against Marcos in the martial law era, boosting the opposition's moral credibility. Indeed, Marcos' ultimate downfall was preceded by outright opposition from leading clerics.^[lviii]

Thus, Philippine values consisted of a curious mix of firmly entrenched Catholicism, old-world patron-client loyalty, and top-down-imposed Western-style democratic ideals. The combination of the latter two was enough to set the conditions for rampant corruption on all levels of government that thrived prior to Marcos' arrival on the political landscape. It is difficult to pronounce a clear and coherent set of values characteristic of Philippine society. The best we can say is that it was a combination of contradictory values, in which strong Catholic piety and nascent democratic ideals existed alongside rampant institutionalized corruption.

Corruption and Military Performance

The military on the other hand, was a professional force inculcated with the values of restraint, civil supremacy, and de-politicization. On

this count, the Philippine military resembles the American military that Burk included in his theory. The question in the case of the Philippines is whether the military's adoption of societal values led to increased military effectiveness. I posit that Marcos' imposition of social values had a degrading effect on military capability. The clearest indication of this is the AFP's dismal performance against communist and Muslim insurgents in Southern Mindanao. As the Philippine military increased its role in society throughout the 1970s, it was also ordered to conduct a major counterinsurgency effort against these rebel elements.

Rampant corruption played a crucial role in the AFP's loss of professionalism. Marcos' long practice of appointing his loyal cronies to high military positions over more qualified officers not only reduced the quality of the officer corps, but also imbued a generation of officers with a sense of resentment toward their lesser-qualified superiors. As a result, the AFP went to war with a growing proportion of unqualified high officers and disillusioned lower officers.

Marcos style of corruption and authoritarianism hampered the military's effectiveness on the battlefield. By 1981, Marcos cronies who were appointed to leadership positions in the local and provincial areas prevented effective planning of military operations, thereby stifling the counterinsurgency efforts. Additionally, Marcos' personal supervision over military operations limited the options of his commanders, provoking resentment up and down the chain of command.[lix] The combination of these factors and the rising proportion of both unqualified and disillusioned young officers decreased military performance against the insurgency.

Despite a cease-fire signed in 1975,[lx] the lack of discipline led to rampant human rights violations.[lxi] Morale dropped among the armed forces, rivalries developed between units, and blatant forms of indiscipline, such as Saturday night shootouts and drunken military and constabulary shooting sprees, became rampant occurrences.[lxii] Civilians in the countryside were often caught in the crossfire, alienating them from the military and security units and driving

up support for the guerrillas.[lxiii]

The effect on the military's performance was devastating. After decades of efforts to suppress the rebels, the insurgency was as strong as ever. By 1985 the strength of the NPA guerillas were estimated at 12,000 regulars, two thirds of whom were armed.[lxiv] In fact, Marxist uprisings were prevalent throughout 53 of the Philippines' 73 provinces, and communists allied to the NPA were said to have established relationships with leaders in 30% of all local governments. By the fall of the Marcos regime, it was said that the NPA had constituted "the best articulated and most effective political organization in the Philippine countryside." [lxv] Marcos would bequeath a quagmire to the incoming Aquino government. Thus, one finds that the corruption and the authoritarianism of the Marcos regime played a crucial role in degrading military professionalism, reducing its morale, and hampering wartime performance.

What are the implications for Burk's theory? Burk lays a compelling case that societal values can enhance military effectiveness. The experience of the AFP under Marcos demonstrates that there are societal values that could potentially promote elements (such as corruption) that adversely affect military effectiveness. Not every aspect of society can have a positive effect. Burk chooses merely to analyze the positive effects of democratic values, such as inclusiveness, and not the values of society that could have negative effects, such as corruption or ethnic strife, that can disrupt military cohesion.

Burk's analysis is a good starting point but it can be expanded to include negative social influences. The question, then, is which aspects of society are we willing to expose to the military? We must be open to exposing the military to values with positive effects, such as inclusion, but highly wary of values that could have negative effects. This question becomes particularly crucial because the military can be an attractive institution to take on civilian tasks, especially in underdeveloped countries. As previously noted, Marcos lauded military officers' abilities to accomplish civilian tasks far more efficiently than their civilian counterparts.[lxvi] Underdeveloped

nations may be more susceptible to utilizing the military to overcome the inefficiencies of democratic institutions. The danger then is that the military, in taking on civilian roles, will adopt negative aspects of society. Such an adoption becomes all the more dangerous, as the military ultimately plays a crucial role in determining who is in charge.

Huntington and the Philippines

Burk's theory, in some senses, is a counter to Huntington's classic argument of military professionalism. While Burk sees societal intrusion as having a positive effect on military effectiveness, Huntington, on the other hand, argued that military effectiveness can only be attained by "leaving the military alone." The core of Huntington's argument is his notion of the "Military Mind" in the era of modern professional armies. As Huntington argues, the development of professionalism means that the statesman and the military leader cannot be the same person.[lxvii] A clear separation is needed between the civilian and military spheres in order for the military to achieve its highest potential of military effectiveness.

Is it possible that the Philippine example provides a Third World example in support of Huntington's claims? While it is likely that the Philippine military would have been better off left alone by a corrupt civilian sector, we must understand the limits to Huntington's argument. Huntington argued for wholesale separation in all aspects, in which virtually no societal value had a place in the military. This includes all values, such as those that promote inclusion and participation, and those that promote negative aspects, like corruption. Our case study certainly points to the negative aspects of integration, but it does not speak to the possibility of positive societal influences.

It is possible that other values of Philippine society can play a positive role when imposed upon the military. Perhaps the greater inclusiveness Burk alluded to could be applied in the case of the Philippines. In fact, the example of Chinese servicemen in the Philippine military during World War II demonstrates the positive effects

of inclusion. Although the Chinese in the Philippines have historically suffered a troubled relationship with the larger Filipino population, both groups earned each others' respect as comrades-in-arms.[lxviii] This example of increased inclusion supports Burk's claim that society can impose certain values upon the military with positive results. Thus, while our case study does appear to support Huntington's thesis to "leave the military alone," it does not preclude the possibility of positive civilian influences.

IV. Conclusion

When observing the Philippines under Marcos, one finds that corruption allowed for one-man civilian control of the military. While in tribal-based societies governments must overcome ethnic divisions to solidify control of the military, in the case of the Philippines we find that corruption was the sufficient variable. It allowed Marcos to tie the military and security forces' interests to his authority. Ultimately, this case study provides a warning for those who, like Burk, believe in the benefits of inculcating social values into the military. While certain social values, such as inclusion, can have a positive effect, other values such as corruption can degrade military authority and enhance the authority of the ruler. Ultimately, we must move the discussion forward, not just to whether the military should adopt civilian values, but, rather, which values are we ready to integrate.

Notes

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