Prolegomena to EthicsThis is a new edition of T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics (1883), a classic of modern philosophy, in which Green sets out his perfectionist ethical theory. In addition to the text of the Prolegomena itself, this new edition provides an introductory essay, a bibliographical essay, and an index. Brink's extended editorial introduction examines the context, themes, and significance of Green's work and will be of special interest to readers working on the history of ethics, ethical theory, political philosophy, and nineteenth century philosophy. |
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Contents
| xiii | |
| xix | |
Preface to the First Edition 1883 | cxv |
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEALCONTINUED | cxxxix |
Use and necessity of the distinction between nature and spirit | 54 |
CHAPTER II | 63 |
And it is implicitly admitted that the perceiving consciousness is | 70 |
and thus shows the existence of an eternal consciousness in man | 75 |
But the development of our personality depends on society and | 225 |
It does enjoin however at least all the particular duties in which | 226 |
And though it is true that a man might think of his good | 228 |
It implies the consciousness of self and others as persons | 232 |
If we take its abstract expression in the formula suum cuique | 243 |
This idea of justice and of a duty to man as man is at once a priori | 249 |
determination of the content of the idea of good | 254 |
But can the good which satisfies the self be a sum of pleasures? | 260 |
Nor does the epithet free take away all meaning from the word | 77 |
Illustration of this by the process of reading where a general | 81 |
But does not this imply that man himself is in part a mere product | 89 |
and that the appearance of the distinctively human consciousness | 95 |
Thus the form in which it presents a good to itself is conditioned | 102 |
The existence of action from such motives is far more certain than | 103 |
But the Chief Good according to the theory is the greatest possible | 104 |
To say that the motive is the outcome of circumstances | 110 |
It is true that the act does necessarily proceed from the motive | 116 |
For example the instinctive impulse to obtain food without | 121 |
по Remorse and selfreformation are intelligible on this view which | 122 |
II2 But the question itself implies that the questioner is not this but | 125 |
And 3 the same action of selfconsciousness is farther implied | 127 |
Or is it a real unity arising from the action of a single principle in | 132 |
And in some cases there is a still more complete involution of desire | 135 |
But human individuality is a consciousness of self which supervenes | 139 |
And this is equally the case whether the adopted desire is good | 141 |
then are we to reconcile this with the obvious difference of intellect | 146 |
Not only is selfsatisfaction sought in ways known to involve | 159 |
To refuse to call this identification desire would be arbitrary | 162 |
But it is misleading to say that mere thought is not will or that will | 168 |
The assumptions that it is that it is present to a divine | 173 |
The Moral Ideal and Moral Progress | 174 |
Hence we suppose it to be realised in nations or in the progress | 184 |
On the ground according to Mill that men knowing both do prefer | 185 |
It is only through it that certain desires on the reality of which | 191 |
The circle is inevitable for in the account of an agent whose | 195 |
175 As being such reproduction under limitations man is not merely | 199 |
CHAPTER II | 206 |
Progress of Humanity again can mean only progress of personal | 212 |
And although this realisation would seem to imply a difference | 218 |
Even if it were conceived as a succession of pleasures desire for | 273 |
And this would be seen if the questions were considered | 279 |
It may however be objected 1 that our definition of virtue does | 289 |
The conception thence arising even if we confine our view | 297 |
But it may be said the effect in this case is a new kind of action | 300 |
For the dangers arising from inadequate theories and from | 312 |
For such forms must be theoretically inadequate to spiritual | 318 |
Thus though there cannot really be more than one duty in a given | 324 |
In any case it can hardly be held that the selfdenying man obtains | 327 |
It is an illusion to suppose that the desires of different men | 333 |
Its prevalence may be ascribed apart from theoretical mistakes | 337 |
Ideal virtue then being defined as selfdevoted activity to | 339 |
The Application of Moral Philosophy to the Guidance | 346 |
but as an illustration will show the difficulty of explaining | 350 |
Indeed but for our imperfect knowledge we should see that in | 352 |
Are we to suppose then that the Chief Good contemplated by | 360 |
But if conscientiousness has thus an intrinsic value can we further | 364 |
And this it is the creator of existing moral practice and in | 370 |
The content of the obligation they assert is blended with | 388 |
Such enlightenment however to be of practical value presupposes | 396 |
At the same time the question may be raised whether this definition | 402 |
But in reality while either theory may suffice for the ordinary cases | 409 |
Again if it be maintained that a course of action if generally | 415 |
A duty must be explained to mean ultimately an act pleasing | 421 |
35I And this danger might become real if the Hedonistic criterion | 428 |
Hence though the idea of human perfection cannot enable us | 436 |
On the other hand the conception of the good as human perfection | 445 |
But desirable when it is distinguished from desired seems to | 451 |
appealed to | 458 |
Translations | 473 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
according action activity actual admit agent animal answer appear arise attainment become better called capacities character claims common conceived conception concern consciousness considered consists constitutes depends desire determined direction distinction distinguish doubt duty effect equally essential ethics exercise existence experience explain expression fact feeling freedom further give given Green happiness human idea ideal imagination implies independent individual influence intelligence interest involves Kant kind knowledge less Liberalism living man's matter means merely mind moral motive nature necessary object ourselves pain particular perfection person philosophy pleasure possible practical present principle produce question realisation reality reason recognised reference reflection regard relation requires result satisfaction seeks seems self-consciousness sensation sense social society spirit succession supposed theory thing thought tion true ultimate understanding University utilitarianism virtue whole
References to this book
Bibliographic information
| Title | Prolegomena to Ethics British moral philosophers, ISSN 1754-5781 |
| Authors | Thomas Hill Green, David Owen Brink |
| Editor | David Owen Brink |
| Contributor | David Owen Brink |
| Edition | illustrated, reprint |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press, 2003 |
| ISBN | 0199266433, 9780199266432 |
| Length | 477 pages |
| Subjects | › Philosophy / Ethics & Moral Philosophy |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |