peace and conflict

2003

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CIDCM
Center for International Development & Conflict Management

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THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) is an inter-disciplinary research center at the University of Maryland. Its team of scholar-practitioners addresses pressing problems of conflict, equity and human rights in countries around the world through basic and applied research, policy analysis and training.

CIDCM is strategically located at the nexus of theory and practice, academics and activism, economic development and civil society, technology and human needs. Since its founding in 1981, CIDCM has developed an unparalleled ability to integrate the study of conflict resolution with economic development and information technology. Its accomplished scholars, its expertise in data collection and analysis, and its direct involvement in regional conflict management make the Center a unique resource for creating enduring solutions to the most intractable conflicts.

CIDCM carries on the pioneering work of the late Edward Azar on "Second Track Diplomacy and Conflict Transformation," and promotes confidence-building, training and international dialogue at all levels of civil society. The Center's research encompasses every aspect of the conflict process — from root causes to its dynamics, termination, and enduring legacies. CIDCM's activities are organized around three initiatives central to social change in the twenty-first century.

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A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy

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*Specters of violence will continue to shadow
even the most enduring peace*

AS THIS REPORT GOES TO PRESS (January 2003) the United States is poised to invade Iraq to check its development of weapons of mass destruction and Asia's regional security is challenged by a North Korean regime whose nuclear weapons program is out of the closet. The US and its allies also are trying to root out the remnants of an international terrorist network that has metastasized throughout the Islamic world. Despite years of progress toward settlement, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is at its most deadly level in decades, the peace process in Northern Ireland is at an impasse, and the long-simmering rivalry between the South Asian giants India and Pakistan has only recently edged back from the brink of a potentially nuclear war.

Current crises appear to challenge the evidence in the previous edition of this report, *Peace and Conflict 2001*, which suggested the world is becoming a more peaceful and democratic place. The process by which these gains have been achieved has prompted resistance by countries and movements that do not accept Western notions of world order. Countries like Iraq, North Korea, India, and Pakistan seek weapons of mass destruction as a counter to regional rivals and a rebuff to U.S. hegemony. Islamist movements reject Western principles of secular democracy, gender equality, and religious tolerance. Economic and cultural globalization are opposed by an international coalition of protestors.

Progress and resistance have always been part and parcel of world politics. Whether the global trends toward greater peace and democracy continue or reverse depends on decisions by international policy makers that determine whether and how specific challenges are met. A number of very positive trends have continued during the last two years, as this report documents.

- The decline in the global magnitude of armed conflict, which began in the early 1990s, has continued and few of the many societal wars that were contained since 1995 have resumed.

- Most democratic regimes established during the 1980s and 1990s have endured and a number of others continue to experiment with and expand democratic reforms, though the wave of democratization has leveled off.

- Ethnonational wars for independence, which were the main threat to civil peace and regional security in the first post-Cold War decade, have declined to their lowest level since 1960. More armed conflicts over this issue were contained in 2001-02 than in any previous two-year period, often when rebels agreed to begin or resume negotiations.

- Paralleling the shift toward democracy, there has been long-term improvement in respect for human rights (a new element in this report).

- International crises declined in number and intensity throughout the 1990's, many of them contained by diplomatic means (a new feature of this report).

Are the international crises and challenges of early 2003 anomalies, or do they signal a general shift toward a more conflictual world? Specters of violence will continue to shadow even the most enduring peace. The globalization of the economy, of communications, and of governance by their very nature creates new threats and challenges, as well as opportunities. Among the causes for concern are these:

- Conflict has declined in eastern and central Africa in the last several years but may be intensifying once again in West Africa. Dysfunctional societies and humanitarian crises remain pervasive throughout the continent. The HIV pandemic is a huge obstacle to human development in most of the continent.

- The quality of Israeli-Palestinian relations has long been a gauge of regional tensions. A new war in Iraq, with its spillover effects, will further complicate and exacerbate a delicate situation and have unpredictable repercussions throughout the Middle East and beyond.

- Armed conflict and lack of development both are inimical to the survival of new democracies. By comparison with their historical predecessors, many "third wave democracies" of the last few decades should have died in infancy. Their survival depends on international support and if that support is diverted, the risks are high that a number of new democracies will falter in the next few years.

- Democratic governance does not guarantee full respect for civil and political rights nor does it necessarily prevent regimes from using coercion against restive citizens or to "influence" the electoral process. The third wave of democratization has been accompanied by an increase in the number of democratic regimes with mixed human rights records.

- Though many civil wars have recently been settled or contained, enduring peace depends on implementation of agreements and, often, on international support and security guarantees. Where these fail, wars may resume. In many African, Asian, and Middle Eastern instances militants in "settled" civil wars have taken refuge in neighboring countries and may return to fight again.

- Resistance to globalization and US hegemony are emerging threats to peace. The escalating international campaign of protests against multinational economic institutions is the subject of a special feature of this *Report*. Al Qaeda exemplifies opposition to American hegemony in its most violent and uncompromising form. As such, new forms of global protest and rebellion will be featured in future editions of the *Report*.

Another challenge to world peace is the perception, increasingly influential in the U.S., that some security threats are impervious to peaceful or multilateral solutions. When problems are framed in this way, policy makers are disposed to rely on unilateral force and to shift attention and resources away from long-term, constructive efforts at conflict management. This shift threatens one of the great accomplishments of the first Cold War decade, namely the containment of societal conflicts promoted by the UN and regional organizations, and reinforced by constructive engagement by the US and other powers. Military intervention may be necessary, as it was in a number of post-

Cold War civil conflicts, but to be effective needs to be used in conjunction with diplomatic and political strategies.

The use of military force in Afghanistan, and prospectively Iraq or North Korea poses specific risks. One serious consequence of military confrontation is that it displaces armed conflict and resistance to countries and regions now enjoying a tenuous peace. The dispersal of the al Qaeda forces from Afghanistan to countries in Southeast Asia and parts of Africa already contributes to political disorder there. Military action in Iraq is likely to disrupt the Iraqi Kurds' hard-won regional autonomy and prompt new armed conflicts within Iraq and its neighboring states. These malign effects may reinforce and strengthen the anti-American sentiment that is already pervasive in the Islamic world; it may also fracture the post-Cold War peace alliance that has been instrumental in managing global conflict. The "lessons learned" from the successful use of multilateral force to quell violence in Bosnia and Kosovo, situated as they are in the European "good neighborhood," may not apply to situations in the more troubled regions of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa (see figure 2.1: The Global Distribution of Peace-Building Capacities, in the next section).

The shift toward reliance on military force to achieve international security in the Middle East, and potentially in the Korean peninsula, carries another ominous risk to the trend toward democracy and improved civil rights performance. It signals to regimes elsewhere that repression can be justified and ratcheted up in the guise of anti-terrorism. The governments of Russia, Uzbekistan, China, and India have appropriated this rationale to justify increased repression against Chechens, Islamists, Uighers, and Kashmiri Muslims respectively.

Most of the progress toward a more peaceful world… was the result of patient and determined political and diplomatic efforts…

Military means… were rarely sufficient in and of themselves.

Most of the progress toward a more peaceful world during the first post-Cold War decade was a result of patient and determined political and diplomatic efforts to encourage new democracies, to promote respect for human rights, to induce regimes of all stripes to reach accommodation with separatists and revolutionaries, and to negotiate settlements to international crises. Military means were often used to help achieve settlement goals and protect these achievements but were rarely sufficient in and of themselves.

This Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) program report updates and expands our earlier (2001) survey of global and regional trends in conflict and peacemaking. It complements, rather than replaces, the previous edition. It uses data and summarizes research developed at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, on organized violence among and within states, the settlement of self-determination conflicts, and democratization. This edition of the *Peace and Conflict* series includes new contributions that examine trends in human rights, globalization protests, and international crises. Of course, the analysis of general trends must begin with the examination of the conditions characterizing the many individual states that comprise these trends. This information is summarized in the (following) Peace and Conflict Ledger that evaluates the countries of the world according to their capacities for building and sustaining peace. Information regarding individual wars and self-determination conflicts is listed in the three appendix tables at the end of this report.

by Monty G. Marshall

The Peace and Conflict Ledger rates 158 countries according to their scores on seven indicators of capacity for peace-building. As explained in the Ledger's notes, we judge a country's capacity for peace-building to be high insofar as it has avoided recent armed conflicts, managed movements for self-determination, maintained stable and equitable democratic institutions, has substantial material resources, and is free of serious threats from its external environment. Countries are evaluated and placed into three ordered categories of peace-building capacity: red, yellow, and green. Red-flagged countries are considered to be at the greatest immediate risk of new outbreaks of violent societal conflicts and government instability; green-flagged countries enjoy the strongest prospects. Figure 2.1 shows the global distribution of the three general state capacities for peace-building in 2003.

Figure 2.1: Peace-Building Capacities of States

The Ledger lists countries by region. Each region's list is headed by those countries which were either experiencing major armed societal conflicts at the end of 2002 or had ended major armed conflicts since late 1999. Following the war-torn countries, the remaining countries are listed alphabetically within each of three categories of peace-building capacity: red, yellow, and green, with the most challenged countries (red) at the top of each regional list. The 34 red-flagged countries, those with a red icon in the "peace-building capacity" column, are at serious risk of armed conflict and political instability for the foreseeable future. Examples are Afghanistan, Egypt, and Kenya. The 50 yellow-flagged countries have a mix of positive and negative factors. India, for example, has stable democratic political institutions but, on the negative side, poor human

security and limited resources. Russia, another yellow-flagged state, is positive on democracy, resources, and neighborhood (its external environment) but its democratic institutions are only recently established, it has poor human security, and a mixed record for managing self-determination movements. Just under half of all countries are green-flagged including all the well-established Western democracies, most of Latin America and the Caribbean (except for yellow-flagged Haiti and Peru), and most of the former-Socialist countries of Europe (with the notable exceptions of yellow-flagged Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Russia, and Yugoslavia).

The African Crisis Zone: African countries face the greatest challenges to peace and stability but there are important differences within the region. There are twenty-six (26) red-flagged countries on the African continent and fourteen (14) yellow-flagged countries. These troubled countries are contrasted with only five green-flagged countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Botswana, Mali, Namibia, and South Africa) and one in North Africa (Libya).[1] Almost every country across the broad middle belt of Africa—from Somalia in the east to Sierra Leone in the west, and from Sudan in the north to Angola in the south—has a volatile mix of poor human security, unstable and inequitable political institutions, limited resources, and, inevitably, a "bad neighborhood" of similar crisis-ridden states. In southern Africa, a small cluster of green-flagged states headed by South Africa manages to maintain good prospects for avoiding serious conflicts and political instability, despite deteriorating conditions in neighboring Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and, especially, Zimbabwe. Most African states to the west of Nigeria have experienced deterioration in their prospects for peace as Guinea, Liberia, and Ivory Coast have succumbed to new outbreaks of armed societal conflicts, despite the stabilization of the situation in Sierra Leone. Mali and Benin are the few exemplars in this region. The outcome of Nigeria's shaky transition to democracy is crucial for the region, as is the outcome of international efforts to stabilize the brutal anarchy that has engulfed the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa). If democratic governance can be achieved and societal war headed off, Nigeria may help stabilize all of West Africa, a role the Republic of South Africa has played in the southern continent. Of course, continued turmoil in the pivotal state of Congo-Kinshasa will seriously challenge not only Nigeria's potential for contributing to stabilization in the west but, also, the prospects for peace and recovery in Angola and the several countries of the Rift Valley in eastern Africa. Further complicating prospects for stabilization in the African crisis zone are some of the more pervasive consequences of long-term poverty and warfare: deteriorating sanitation and health and, especially, the related AIDS pandemic; widespread and recurring famine; and large numbers of refugee, displaced, and otherwise marginalized populations.

The Asian Crisis Zone: The Asian heartland is a second serious crisis zone. Though not quite as poor or vulnerable as the countries in the African region, the Asian crisis region similarly encompasses most of the continent. Since the end of the Cold War, the majority of the world's major armed societal conflicts have been concentrated in the Asian and African continents. Asia is also home to about half of the world's population, making this crisis zone of particular concern. The Asian crisis zone is characterized by three distinct security complexes: a south-central complex centered on the three red-

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1 The island states of Comoros (red-flagged), Mauritius (green-flagged), and Madagascar (yellow-flagged) are included in the African listings.

flagged countries of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; a Middle East complex highlighted by the red-flagged countries in the Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan; and a southeastern complex where green-flagged Thailand finds itself sandwiched between red-flagged countries Myanmar (Burma) and Cambodia.[2] Green-flagged countries are scarce in greater Asia and situated mainly around the periphery, including Saudi Arabia and the smaller oil-emirates of the Arabian Peninsula to the west, Thailand and Singapore in the southeast, and the several Pacific island countries of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand in the east. The continuing vulnerability of the Asian crisis zone is of even greater concern due to the increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies across the continent. Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel are all known to possess nuclear arsenals and delivery systems and several states are suspected to have programs aimed at developing such capabilities. In 2002, rapidly escalating tensions between long-time rivals India and Pakistan led to the first overt nuclear confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Surprising Successes and Failures: Among the most stunning successes have been the persistence and improvement of democratic institutions in many of the former-Socialist states and former-Soviet republics and the continuing political and economic integration of the European continent. Only one of the new democracies in East Europe (Belarus) has faltered since the end of the Cold War. Several of these democratic transitions remain shaky, however, especially those in the war-ravaged countries of the former-Yugoslavia and the Caucasus region.

In more general terms, the persistence of the "third wave" of democratization that accompanied the end of the Cold War is a surprising success. As we will discuss later in this report, many of the newly democratizing states of the world are those states which, historically, have been the least likely to attempt and maintain democratic institutions; these are some of the world's poorest countries. The requirements for the establishment of fully-institutionalized democracy are largely absent from these countries, yet many of the experiments by Third World countries with open societies and multiparty politics have managed to traverse the five-year "danger zone" for new polities despite limited resources and bad neighborhoods. Most new democracies in poor countries shift back toward autocracy within five years. Most poor countries in high-conflict regions also are challenged by armed conflicts. These countries' recent stability may be due to some combination of good institutional design, far-sighted policies, and appropriate external support—or it may prove to be ephemeral. Their governments deserve redoubled international encouragement and support. Equally important, they should be studied for lessons that can be applied elsewhere. The persistence of large numbers of democratizing states is both a surprising success and an ongoing concern. The emerging global system remains highly vulnerable to sudden shocks; a seemingly small or isolated crisis in one part of the world could have devastating repercussions that spread quickly and reverberate throughout the system.

The persistence of large numbers of democratizing states is both a surprising success and an ongoing concern.

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2 The Caucasus region has not been viewed, in the conventional policy literature, as being part of the Middle East. This convention is in large part due to that area being part of the Soviet Union. The Caucasus lie at the juncture between Muslim and Eastern Orthodox cultures, at the periphery of the Middle East region and are strongly influenced by the conflict dynamics of the Middle East region.

As civil wars recede, the attendant problems of organized crime and trafficking in "black market" commodities gains greater prominence.

Among the surprising failures have been the recent escalations of the societal wars in Colombia and the Philippines, despite the fact that both of these countries are green-flagged for peace-building capacity. The deteriorating situations in both countries are, at least partially, a result of the changing priorities of the global powers in the post-Cold War era. Two trends are notable. As the protracted armed societal conflicts of the Cold War era reach settlement, situations characterized by organized and sustained combat between (or among) relatively disciplined forces give way to decentralized, sporadic, and criminal applications of organized violence. As civil wars recede, the attendant problems of organized crime and trafficking in "black market" commodities gains greater prominence. Colombia has managed to maintain its democratic institutions despite the extreme seductions and contentions of the lucrative global trade in illicit drugs. Afghanistan and Myanmar, among other countries with histories of major drug trafficking, have not fared nearly as well. Even ostensibly legal commodities, and human beings themselves, gain black and "gray" market value in weakened and war-torn societies; many African countries face enormous challenges in bringing their trade in mineral resources (particularly diamonds) back into the regulated, legitimate market. There have also been notable increases in the use of mercenary forces and in the trafficking of human beings for forced sex and labor, and as child soldiers.

The situation in the Philippines illustrates a second important trend: the dimensions and dynamics of the still unfolding confrontation between the "global terrorism" of the al Qaeda network and the US-led "global war on terrorism." Al Qaeda has become a focal point for stirring discontent and mobilizing militancy in both the Arab and, broader, Muslim communities. The US, as the world's preeminent power and most prominent promoter of globalization, and as the defender of the status quo, has become a favorite target for the militants. This high profile confrontation has contributed strongly to the polarization of forces and the development of a "siege mentality" in both "camps" as many believe their most personal, core, values to be under assault by the "other." In many locations around the globe there is evidence of strong and persistent tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim populations, whether in Sudan, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Bosnia, the Caucasus, South Asia, Indonesia, or the Philippines.

Security or Development, or Both? As of this writing (early January 2003), the United Nations' millennium initiative for global poverty reduction is finding its humanitarian goals increasingly challenged by the "more immediate" demands of the "global war on terrorism" and the threat of "preemptive" war with Iraq. The projected costs of the latter two policies far outweigh the relatively modest costs and investments requested for the poverty reduction plan; they also far surpass the annual donations by governments for development assistance. In our previous report, we presented evidence that the vast majority of societal wars were being fought in the world's poorest countries (see figures 5a and 5b, pages 12-13). Understanding the connections between poverty, development, governance, and security is crucial to effective, global conflict management. In a world of limited resources and political will, where should our priorities lay? Does one of these elements hold the key to managing the others or must they be addressed simultaneously as part of a coordinated strategy?

Our observations and conclusions concerning general policy implications from our earlier 2001 report still ring true and are worth repeating here. Some red-flagged countries are highly resistant to efforts either to contain conflict or to promote better governance. Afghanistan, Congo-Kinshasa, Iraq, and North Korea are examples of countries with a syndrome of conflict-generating traits that could justify international decisions to disengage and impose sanctions and quarantines. Such triage is a bad idea for two reasons. For one, it violates post-Cold War international norms to ignore large-scale repression and suffering. Second, protracted armed conflicts have major spillover effects. The idea and evidence for our indicator of "bad neighborhoods" is that a conflict-ridden country exports refugees, armed conflict, and insecurity to surrounding countries.

The implication for international policy makers is that countries in crisis need low key diplomatic and humanitarian engagement, not triage, and usually not military intervention either. They are not hospitable places for peace-making or nation-building. The short-term aim should be to contain the spillover effects of conflict wherever possible. This means cutting off support for war-making, for example by embargoing trade in small arms and munitions. It also may mean providing packages of political, economic, and military assistance for countries on the margins of conflict zones, to contain the risks that they might be destabilized by warring neighbors.

In the longer run, international actors who have been engaged in crisis situations in these limited ways are positioned to take advantage of openings in which a cease fire may be brokered or political settlements attempted. Societal and regional conflicts in Central America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia that once were thought to be intractable eventually moved toward settlement because international policy makers and members of civil society did not give up on efforts at peace-building.

We find ourselves at a crossroads of sorts in the early years of the "next millennium." As we will show in the following section, global warfare has been reduced by over sixty percent since 1991. What remains are, in many cases, the most intractable conflicts. Equal to the danger of disengaging from the most difficult conflict scenarios is the danger of "resting on our laurels," of convincing ourselves that partial successes, while impressive, are the best we can do or all that needs to be done. Just as protracted societal conflicts tend to spread ill effects when they are "in bloom," the insidious qualities of past and future conflicts tend to contract and withdraw into the most "intractable" conflicts. These are the linchpins of regional and global security. Peace is a social process, not simply a goal or an accomplishment.

We find ourselves at a crossroads of sorts in the early years of the "next millennium."

Notes for the Indicators in the Peace and Conflict Ledger

The Peace and Conflict Ledger lists the 158 larger countries in the world – all those with populations greater than 500,000 in 2002 – on eight indicators of capacity for building peace and avoiding destabilizing political crises. We rate a country's peace-building capacity high insofar as it has avoided recent armed conflicts, provided reasonable levels of human security, shows no active political or economic discrimination against minorities, successfully managed movements for self-determination, maintained stable democratic institutions, attained substantial human and material resources, and is free of serious threats from its neighboring countries. Countries are listed by world region, and within each region from lowest (red) to highest (green) peace-building capacity.

Column 1: Peace-Building Capacity
The summary indicator of peace-building capacity is located on the far left side of the ledger. It summarizes the seven component indicators listed on the right side of the ledger and described below. The ranking is used to classify the countries in each geographical region according to a single global standard. The armed conflict indicator, also located on the left side of the ledger, is not used in the calculations but is used to highlight countries with major armed conflicts in late 2002. Red and yellow icons on the seven component indicators are evidence of problems whereas green icons signal a capacity for managing conflict. Weighted values are assigned to each of the seven indicators (2 for red, 1 for yellow, -1.5 for green) and averaged for the number of icons listed (a blank indicator value is not used in the calculation). Countries with an average greater than 1 have red icons on the summary indicator of capacity; countries with an average less than 0 are given green icons. Yellow icons signal an average score between 0 and 1.

Column 2: Armed Conflict
The icons in this column are used to highlight countries with major armed conflicts being fought in late-2002, as summarized in figure 3.1 and described in Appendix table 1; these icons are not used in calculating the indicators of peace-building capacity. A red icon highlights countries with an ongoing (low, medium, or high intensity) major armed conflict in late 2002; a yellow icon identifies countries with either a sporadic intensity armed conflict in late 2002 or an armed conflict that was suspended or repressed between late 1999 and mid 2002.

Column 3: Human Security
The icons in this column indicate the general quality of human security in the country over the past ten-year period, 1991-2000. The Human Security indicator incorporates information on armed conflicts and rebellions, inter-communal fighting, refugee and internally displaced populations, state repression, terrorism, and, in a few cases, genocides. Red icons

Table 2.1 The Peace and Conflict Ledger 2003

Peace-building Capacity	Armed Conflict		Human Security	Self-Determination	Discrimination	Regime Type	Durability	Societal Capacity	Neighborhood
North Atlantic									
■	■Y	United States	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Austria	●			●	●	●	●
■		Belgium	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Canada	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Denmark	●			●	●	●	●
■		Finland	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		France	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Germany	●			●	●	●	●
■		Greece	●			●	●	●	●
■		Ireland	●			●	●	●	●
■		Italy	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Netherlands	●			●	●	●	●
■		Norway	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Portugal	●			●	●	●	●
■		Spain	●Y	●Y		●	●	●	●
■		Sweden	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Switzerland	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		United Kingdom	●Y	●		●	●	●	●
Former Socialist Bloc									
■Y	■R	Russia	●R	●Y		●	●R	●	●
■Y	■Y	Yugoslavia	●R	●Y	●Y	●	●R	●Y	●
■R		Armenia	●Y			●R	●R	●Y	●Y
■R		Azerbaijan	●Y	●Y		●	●Y	●R	●Y
■R		Tajikistan	●Y			●R	●R	●R	●Y
■Y		Albania	●			●R	●R	●	●
■Y		Belarus	●			●Y	●Y	●	●
■Y		Bosnia	●Y	●Y		●Y	●R	●R	●
■Y		Croatia	●Y	●Y		●	●R	●Y	●
■Y		Georgia	●Y	●Y		●	●	●R	●
■Y		Kazakhstan	●	●	●Y	●R	●	●	●
■Y		Kyrgyzstan	●	●		●	●	●R	●
■Y		Turkmenistan	●			●Y	●	●Y	●
■Y		Uzbekistan	●Y	●		●Y	●	●Y	●
■		Bulgaria	●		●Y	●	●	●	●
■		Czech Republic	●	●		●	●Y	●	●
■		Estonia	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Hungary	●			●	●	●	●
■		Latvia	●Y		●Y	●	●	●	●
■		Lithuania	●			●	●	●	●
■		Macedonia	●	●Y	●Y	●	●	●Y	●
■		Moldova	●	●		●	●	●Y	●
■		Poland	●			●	●	●	●
■		Romania	●	●	●	●	●	●Y	●
■		Slovak Republic	●	●	●	●	●	●Y	●
■		Slovenia	●			●	●	●	●
■		Ukraine	●	●		●	●	●Y	●

Peace-building Capacity	Armed Conflict		Human Security	Self-Determination	Discrimination	Regime Type	Durability	Societal Capacity	Neighborhood
Latin America and the Caribbean									
■	■	Colombia	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Haiti	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Peru	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Argentina	●			●	●	●	●
■		Bolivia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Brazil	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Chile	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Costa Rica	●			●	●	●	●
■		Cuba	●			●	●	●	●
■		Dominican Republic	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Ecuador	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		El Salvador	●			●	●	●	●
■		Guatemala	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Guyana	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Honduras	●			●	●	●	●
■		Jamaica	●			●	●	●	●
■		Mexico	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Nicaragua	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Panama	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Paraguay	●			●	●	●	●
■		Trinidad & Tobago	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Uruguay	●			●	●	●	●
■		Venezuela	●		●	●	●	●	●
Asia and the Pacific									
■	■	India	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Nepal	●			●	●	●	●
■	■	Philippines	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Afghanistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Myanmar (Burma)	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Pakistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Indonesia	●	●		●	●	●	●
■	■	Sri Lanka	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Cambodia	●			●	●	●	●
■		Bangladesh	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Bhutan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		China	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Fiji	●		●	●	●	●	
■		Korea North	●			●	●	●	●
■		Laos	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Malaysia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Mongolia	●			●	●	●	
■		Vietnam	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Australia	●	●		●	●	●	
■		Japan	●			●	●	●	●
■		Korea South	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		New Zealand	●		●	●	●	●	
■		Papua New Guinea	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Singapore	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Taiwan	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Thailand	●	●		●	●	●	●

indicate countries that have had a generally high level of human security problems in several of the categories over a substantial period of time. A yellow icon indicates a country that has had problems of somewhat lower magnitude over a more limited span of time. Green icons indicate countries that have experienced little or no human security problems during the previous ten-year period.

Column 4: Self-Determination

The icons in this column take into account the success or failure of governments in settling self-determination conflicts from 1980 through 2002, based on information summarized in Appendix tables 2 and 3. Red icons signify countries challenged by violent conflicts over self-determination in 2002. Yellow icons flag countries with one of these two patterns: either (a) non-violent self-determination movements in 2002 but no track record of accommodating such movements in the past 20 years; or (b) violent self-determination movements in 2002 and a track record of accommodating other such movements in the past 20 years. Green icons signify countries that have successfully managed one or more self-determination conflicts since 1980, including countries with current non-violent self-determination movements. Countries with no self-determination movements since 1980 are blank in this column.

Column 5: Discrimination

Active government policies or social practices of political or economic discrimination against minority identity groups are strongly associated with divided societies, contentious politics, and self-determination grievances. They are also indicative of strategies of exclusion by dominant groups. This indicator looks at general levels of both political and economic discrimination against minorities at the end of 2001. Red icons denote countries with active government policies of political and/or economic discrimination against minorities comprising at least ten percent of the population in 2001. Yellow icons identify countries where there are active social practices of discrimination by dominant groups against minority groups that comprise at least ten percent of the population but no official sanctions. Green icons are assigned to countries with little or no active discrimination and government policies designed to help remedy or alleviate the effects of past discriminatory policies and practices for groups constituting at least five percent of the population. Countries with little or no active discrimination against minorities are blank in this column.

Column 6: Regime Type

The icons in this column show the nature of a country's political institutions in 2002. Red icons are anocracies (see section 4, following), that is, countries with governments in the mixed or transitional zone between autocracy and democracy. Yellow icons represent full autocratic regimes. Green icons are full democracies.

Column 7: Durability

The icons in this column take into account the maturity of a country's system of government and, as such, its conflict management capabilities. New political systems have not yet consolidated central authority nor established effective institutions and, so, are vulnerable to challenges and further change, especially during their first five years. So are the governments of newly-independent countries. Red icons highlight countries whose political institutions in 2002 were less than five years old, that is, they were established between 1997 and 2001. Yellow icons register countries whose polities were less than ten years old; established between 1992 and 1996. Green icons are used for countries whose polities were established before 1992.

Column 8: Societal Capacity

The governments of rich societies are better able to maintain peace and security than are governments of poor societies. We use an indicator that combines information on both GDP per capita (income) and societal energy consumption per capita (capitalization) over the past ten-year period to rate countries on this indicator. Red icons signify countries in the lowest quintile (the bottom 20%) of societal capacity. Yellow icons flag countries in the second and third quintiles. Green icons identify countries in the top two quintiles (the upper 40%) in societal capacity.

Column 9: Neighborhood

We define ten politically relevant "neighborhoods": West Africa, North Africa, East Africa, South Africa, Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, South America, Central America, and Europe/North America. For each region we gauge the extent of armed conflicts in 1999/2000 and the prevailing types of regimes, either democratic, anocratic, or autocratic. Countries with green icons are in regions with relatively low armed conflict and mostly democratic governments. Countries with red icons are in "neighborhoods" with high armed conflict and many anocratic, or transitional, regimes. Countries with yellow icons are in regions with middling levels of armed conflict and mostly autocratic regimes. For countries that straddle regions, or are situated in regions with mixed traits, a final determination was made by reference to armed conflicts in bordering countries. For example, countries with two or more bordering countries engaged in armed conflicts are coded red on this indicator. Island states without close, "politically-relevant" neighboring states are blank on this indicator.

Peace-building Capacity	Armed Conflict		Human Security	Self-Determination	Discrimination	Regime Type	Durability	Societal Capacity	Neighborhood
North Africa and the Middle East									
■	■	Algeria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Israel	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Iraq	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Turkey	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Egypt	●			●	●	●	●
■		Iran	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Jordan	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Kuwait	●			●	●	●	●
■		Lebanon	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Morocco	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Syria	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Tunisia	●			●	●	●	●
■		Yemen	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Bahrain	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Cyprus	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Libya	●			●	●	●	●
■		Oman	●			●	●	●	●
■		Qatar	●			●	●	●	●
■		Saudi Arabia	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		United Arab Emirates	●			●	●	●	●
Africa South of the Sahara									
■	■	Burundi	●		●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Congo-Kinshasa	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Ivory Coast	●			●	●	●	●
■	■	Liberia	●			●	●	●	●
■	■	Sudan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Angola	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Chad	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Comoros	●	●		●	●	●	●
■	■	Congo-Brazzaville	●		●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Ethiopia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Nigeria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Rwanda	●		●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Sierra Leone	●			●	●	●	●
■	■	Somalia	●	●		●	●	●	●
■	■	Uganda	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Eritrea	●		●	●	●	●	●
■	■	Senegal	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Burkina Faso	●			●	●	●	●
■		Cameroon	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Gambia	●			●	●	●	●
■		Ghana	●			●	●	●	●
■		Guinea Bissau	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Kenya	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Lesotho	●			●	●	●	●
■		Malawi	●			●	●	●	●
■		Tanzania	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Togo	●			●	●	●	●
■		Central African Republic	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Djibouti	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Gabon	●			●	●	●	●
■		Guinea	●			●	●	●	●
■		Madagascar	●			●	●	●	
■		Mauritania	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		Mozambique	●			●	●	●	●
■		Niger	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Swaziland	●			●	●	●	●
■		Zambia	●	●		●	●	●	●
■		Zimbabwe	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Benin	●			●	●	●	●
■		Botswana	●			●	●	●	●
■		Mali	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
■		Mauritius	●			●	●	●	
■		Namibia	●		●	●	●	●	●
■		South Africa	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

by Monty G. Marshall

The global trend in major armed conflict has continued to decrease markedly in the post-Cold War era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in general magnitude. According to our calculations, the general magnitude of global warfare has decreased by over fifty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2002 to its lowest level since the early 1960s, as shown in Figure 3.1.[1]

Figure 3.1: Global Trends in Violent Conflict, 1946-2002

Total Magnitude of Armed Conflict

Warfare Totals
(Societal + All Interstate)

Societal Warfare

All Interstate Wars
(inc. colonial wars)

Interstate Warfare

Summary. At the end of 2002 there were twelve (12) ongoing major societal wars: one ethnic war in the North Atlantic region (Russia-Chechens); one political war in Latin America (Colombia); one political war (Algeria) and one ethnic war (Israel-Palestinians) in the North Africa and Middle East region; one political war (Nepal) and two ethnic wars (India-Kashmiri Muslims and Philippines-Moro Muslims) in the Asia and Pacific region; and two ethnic wars (Burundi-Hutus and Sudan-Southerners) and three mixed ethnic/political wars (Congo-Kinshasa, Ivory Coast, and Liberia) in Sub-

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1 Only countries with at least 500,000 populations in 2002 are included in this study (158 total in 2002); interstate and societal wars must have reached a magnitude of over 500 directly-related deaths to be listed. The magnitude of each major armed conflict is evaluated according to its comprehensive effects on the state or states directly affected by the warfare, including numbers of combatants and casualties, size of the affected area and dislocated populations, and extent of infrastructure damage. It is then assigned a single score on a ten-point scale measuring the magnitude of its adverse effects on the affected society; this value is recorded for each year the war remains active. See Table 1 in the Appendix for examples of how current war have been scored. See Monty G. Marshall, "Measuring the Societal Effects of War," chapter 4 in Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002) for a detailed explanation of the methodology used and a complete list of wars, and their scores, during the period 1946-2001.

Saharan Africa. There was also one ongoing episode of international violence as US and British warplanes patrolling the "no-fly zones" over Iraq continued to strike air defense targets on the ground, accompanied by the imminent threat of a ground invasion of Iraq. In addition, eleven (11) societal wars were experiencing sporadic outbursts of violence at the end of 2002. These include seven (7) in the Asia and Pacific region (Afghanistan; Philippines; two each in India and Indonesia) and four (4) in Sub-Saharan Africa (Congo-Brazzaville; Nigeria; Somalia; and Uganda).

On the plus side, seven (7) major societal wars appear to have been suspended or repressed during the past two years, 2001-2002; these include wars in Angola, Chad, Comoros, Indonesia (Kalimantan), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka. Additionally, important progress was reported in late 2002 in reaching effective peace settlements to end wars in the Congo-Kinshasa, Indonesia (Aceh), and Sudan. Seven of these successful conflict settlement efforts have focused on ending protracted conflicts in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, all of which have benefitted by intense international engagement. Of the twenty-four societal wars listed in our previous report, Peace and Conflict 2001, as having been suspended or repressed during the period 1995-2000, only one has broken down in serious violence: Congo-Brazzaville in 2002. See Appendix table 1 for a full listing of the world's recent armed societal conflicts and a brief description of each conflict's status at the end of 2002.

Overview. Interstate wars were uncommon after the United Nations collective security system was established following World War II. In the 1990s, there were very few interstate wars and their magnitude and duration were mostly limited. The 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent 1991 US-led Gulf War to expel the invaders is the only unambiguous interstate war during the post-Cold War era. High casualties occurred in two interstate wars in this period: in the Gulf War, during which only the Iraqi forces suffered high casualties, and in the border war that broke out in 1999 between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The latter conflict, which was suspended in June 2000, was an indirect consequence of the protracted secessionist war that led to Eritrea's separation from Ethiopia in 1993. Other inter-state wars in the 1990s occurred in the guise of armed interventions in civil conflicts, including US-led interventions in Bosnia in 1995, against Iraq since 1998 (enforcing "protection zones" over Kurd and Shia Arab regions), Yugoslavia in 1999 (ending repression of the Kosovar Albanians), and in Afghanistan in 2001 (siding with the Northern Alliance to oust the Taliban regime and destroy al Qaeda terrorist bases). Other instances include Armenian support for the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists in Azerbaijan and several military clashes between Pakistan and India connected with the ongoing rebellion in Kashmir. The first two years of the 21st century were largely free from inter-state conflict but witnessed rising tensions between the US and Iraq and, in 2002, the first, overt confrontation between emerging nuclear powers of India and Pakistan.

Armed civil, or societal, conflicts were numerous and widely distributed through the global system in the 1980s and 1990s but in the early years of the 21st century have become concentrated mainly in Africa and south-central Asia. While the frequency of new outbreaks of all types of wars remained fairly constant during the last half-century, with a small spike in ethnic wars immediately following the end of the Cold War, societal wars were enormously resistant to resolution and, thus, accumulated over time to reach a peak in 1991. Over one-third of the world's countries (54 of 158) were directly

Over one-third of the world's countries were directly affected by serious societal warfare at some time during the 1990s…

affected by serious societal warfare at some time during the 1990s and, of these states, nearly two-thirds (34) experienced armed conflicts for seven or more years during the decade. On the more positive side, only six of these protracted societal wars remained "hot" at the end of 2002 and continued to defy international pressures for reconciliation (Algeria, Burundi, Colombia, the Congo-Kinshasa, India, and Israel). In addition, two more recent societal wars (in Russia and Nepal) have become protracted, bringing the current world total to eight. Four other protracted wars (in Myanmar, Philippines, Somalia, and Sudan) continue at low levels while negotiated solutions are actively being sought. In four others fighting had ended while resolutions are being negotiated or implemented (Afghanistan, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka). Sporadic outbursts of violent communal conflicts continued to plague Indonesia (e.g., in Aceh, Kalimantan, the Moluccas, and West Papua) and Nigeria (religious tensions in the north and ethnic tensions in the Delta region). The seemingly intractable terrorist campaign of Basque (ETA) separatists in Spain remained mostly unchanged.

Societal warfare has become concentrated in three geographical regions in the early 21st century. Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest number of armed conflicts in late 2002 clustered mainly in a band that straddles the equator and crosses the continent. The combination of pervasive poverty, poor infrastructure, low technology, lack of industrialization, and weak administration make armed conflicts in these countries particularly difficult to manage and render these societies highly vulnerable to humanitarian crises. (See *Peace and Conflict 2001*, pp. 11-13, for an examination of the link between society capacity and societal war.) Wars in middle Africa are characterized by the preeminence of small arms and light weaponry, making them at once more decentralized and less disciplined, and in many ways more brutal.

A second serious concentration of armed conflict affects the South Asia region. Real progress has been made in ameliorating protracted armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, but these gains have been offset by a serious deterioration in the relations between regional giants India and Pakistan, centered on their long-running dispute over Kashmir. Peasant (Maoist) insurgencies are increasing in intensity in Nepal and neighboring regions in India while ethnic violence continues to plague India's northeast provinces and neighboring Myanmar. A third concentration affects the island states of the Asian Pacific, especially Indonesia and the Philippines, which continue to experience periodic surges in communal violence.

Two other world regions are largely free of deadly conflict at the end of 2002: the Western Hemisphere, where only the drug-related war in Colombia disturbs the peace, and the European north, where Russia remains trapped in its intense war in tiny Chechnya. On the surface, the Middle East appears similarly calm with only one instance of open, societal warfare: the Israeli-Palestinian violence. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict defies classification; it is simultaneously a historical, societal, interstate, regional, and global conflict. It is the focal point for broad tensions in the Middle East, a region that has long been, and remains, the center of deep-seated tensions of global proportions. The emergence and consolidation of the al Qaeda global terrorist network during the 1990s and its hijacking of the global security agenda with the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, and the consequent US-led "war on terrorism" are symptomatic of a new, post-Cold War, global security problematique.

The emergence and consolidation of the al Qaeda global terrorist network… and the consequent US-led "war on terrorism" are symptomatic of a new, post-Cold War, global security problematique.

Failing, Failed, and Recovering States. Large parts of eastern Asia experienced devastating warfare and political turmoil during and in the immediate aftermath of World War II. These east, southeast, and south Asian wars signaled the beginning of the global decolonization period that soon spread to North Africa and, eventually, throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. These wars of independence often led to long periods of contention and instability as rival ethnic and political factions vied for control of state power that had been seized from or abandoned by the European colonial authorities. Fueled by the superpower rivalry that characterized the Cold War period, large portions of the developing world became engulfed in, and consumed by, protracted social conflict and societal warfare. As these societies emerge from years of intense societal conflict in the 1990s and early 2000s, they are finding their prospects for recovery challenged by their weakened state capacity, deeply divided societies, devastated economies, squandered resources, and traumatized populations. At the same time, civil societies crippled by societal wars must compete for loyalties and revenues with internationalized organized crime and black market networks. They also must contend with the spillover effects of similar problems in neighboring states. In turn, limited capacities at the local and regional levels present enormous challenges for the international donor community that seeks to rebuild these societies in the face of rapidly spreading humanitarian crises: dislocations, disasters, predation, famine, and disease.

Some of the the most troublesome features of societal conflicts in the modern, globalizing world are their systemic effects. We can no longer afford to think of societal conflicts as localized and isolated problems requiring negotiated settlements by the leaders of the warring parties; we must see them as "nested" problems that substantially effect and, in turn, are significantly affected by their surrounding environment. Social and factor mobility in a globalizing world have created a situation where not only can assets flee from problem areas (e.g., "brain drain" and "capital flight") but, also, conflict liabilities can move rather easily from strengthening societies to weaker locations to seek refuge and take advantage of new and future opportunities. Local conflicts and failed states take on regional and, even, global proportions, as witnessed currently by the complex "vortex" conflict dynamics characterizing the west and central African regions, the south-central Asia region, and the global al Qaeda terrorist network. Economic interdependence and the transnational qualities of social ills require regional and global, multilateral engagement in and commitment to the peace-building process. Broad reconciliation, recovery, integration, and development strategies must accompany the implementation of conflict settlements for the process of peace-building to be successful over the medium to long term.

Systemic Repercussions and the Changing Nature of Warfare. The era of interdependence is giving way to an era of globalization and the downward global trend in major armed conflicts is an important barometer of the globalization trend. We proposed in our previous report, *Peace and Conflict 2001*, that "if [the three positive trends of lessened armed conflicts, more frequent resolutions of self-determination conflicts, and increased numbers of democratic governments] continue in the first decade of the new century, [they] will establish a world more peaceful than at any time in the past century." The three trends are continuing through 2002 and we stand by our claim (see the following sections for reports on trends in governance and self-determination movements). But the positive trends coexist with counter-trends that present major challenges to the emerging global community.

Broad reconciliation, recovery, integration, and development strategies must accompany the implementation of conflict settlements…

One such challenge, already mentioned, is the legacy of wounded societies and failing states as they emerge from years of destructive conflict. A second is the unleashed surplus of war personnel and materiel that is flooding the global market, fueling organized crime, and feeding the emerging global security problematique. This challenges not only the limited capacity of states and international organizations to manage conflicts but, also, the ability to monitor and analyze conflict trends. Highly centralized societal wars are breaking up into highly decentralized applications of violence and other anti-societal activities that operate "below" our conventional radar screens and "outside" our traditional conflict management strategies. A third challenge stems from the ghettoization of large areas of the world where deepening poverty and deteriorating social conditions marginalize entire populations and severely limit their access to the benefits of the global economy.

A final challenge stems from the increased levels of external engagement that follow deceased levels of armed societal conflict. International actors are widely expected to assume responsibility for post-civil war reconstruction. Warriors are transformed to peace-makers and peace-builders and expected to simultaneously police and administer many war-torn societies. But the care of affected populations, the rebuilding of war-torn states, and the need to forestall regression to open warfare overwhelms current levels of international assistance and undercuts expectations of progress in development at a time when the more fortunate countries are themselves growing weary of providing charity. The challenge is that the need for diligence and vigilance are even greater during the societal recovery phase, a phase that can last a very long time indeed. The gains we are witnessing in making peace must be simultaneously augmented by concerted efforts at repairing the peace, maintaining the peace, and increasing the capacity of societies to reproduce the peace. What we are witnessing at the beginning of the 21st century is not the "end of history" but the beginning of a unique opportunity, and challenge, to set it on the right track.

One challenge is the legacy of wounded societies and failing states as they emerge from years of destructive conflicts. A second is the unleashed surplus of war personnel and materiel that is flooding the global market… A third challenge stems from the ghettoization of large areas of the world… A final challenge stems from the increased levels of external engagement that follow decreased levels of armed societal conflict.

by Monty G. Marshall

A dramatic global shift away from rigidly autocratic regimes and toward democracy began in the mid-1980s, before the end of the Cold War, and continued into the mid-1990s. This was the widely-heralded "third wave of democratization." According to our data on the qualities of institutional authority, graphed in Figure 4.1, the remaining numbers of autocracies continue to decrease gradually while the numbers of democracies continue to increase in the first years of the 21st century. There were eighty-three (83) countries classified as democracies in early 2002, nearly double the number of democracies counted in early 1985 (42). The eighty (80) autocracies in 1985 fell by nearly two-thirds to twenty-eight (28) in 2002. At the same time, the nearly three-fold jump in the number of states that fall in our middling category of regimes, the transitional polities or "anocracies," (from 16 in 1985 to 47 in 2002) appears to have leveled off.

Figure 4.1: Global Regimes by Type, 1946-2001

Number of Countries

- Democracies
- Anocracies
- Autocracies

While we view the major global shift toward greater democracy as a very important and generally positive trend, the sharp increase in the number of anocracies is cause for serious concern. Research suggests that anocracies are highly transitory regimes, with over fifty percent experiencing a major regime change within five years and over seventy percent within ten years. Anocracies also are much more vulnerable to new outbreaks of armed societal conflict. They are about six times more likely than democracies and two and one-half times as likely as autocracies to experience new outbreaks of societal wars (see figure 4.2 and discussion, below). Anocracies also are about three times more likely to experience major reversions to autocracy than democracies.

…the sharp increase in the number of anocracies is cause for serious concern

Defining Democracy. Democracy, autocracy, and anocracy are ambiguous terms and different countries have different mixes and qualities of governing institutions. However, even though some countries may have mixed features of openness, competitiveness, and regulation, the core qualities of democracy and autocracy can be viewed as defining opposite ends of a governance scale. We have rated the levels of both democracy and autocracy for each country and year using coded information on the general qualities of political institutions and processes: competitiveness of executive recruitment, extent of executive constraints, and openness of political competition. These ratings have been combined into a single measure of governance: the Polity score, ranging from -10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to +10 (fully institutionalized democracy).[1] A perfect +10 democracy, like Australia, Greece, and Sweden, has institutionalized procedures for open and competitive political participation; chooses chief executives in competitive elections; and imposes substantial checks and balances on the powers of the chief executive. Countries with Polity scores from 6 to 10 are counted as democracies in figure 4.1. Elected governments that fall short of a perfect 10, like Panama, Ukraine, and Venezuela, usually have weaker checks on executive power, some restrictions on political participation, or shortcomings in the application of the rule of law to opposition groups.

In a perfect -10 autocracy, by contrast, citizens' participation is sharply restricted or suppressed; chief executives are selected according to clearly defined (often hereditary) rules of succession from within the established political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with few or no checks from legislative or judicial institutions. Only Saudi Arabia and Qatar are rated as fully institutionalized autocracies in 2002; other monarchies, such as those in Bhutan, Kuwait, and Swaziland, share some powers with elected officials. In general, except for a strong presence in the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula, hereditary monarchy has nearly disappeared as a form of governance in the early 21st century. Autocratic governance at the turn of the century is far more likely to be characterized by the authoritarian rule of personalistic leaders, military bureaucracies, or single party structures; Libya, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam are examples of these non-monarchical autocracies. Besides having slightly more open, or less-clearly defined, rules of succession, autocracies may allow some space for political participation or impose some effective limits on executive authority; examples include Belarus, China, and Zimbabwe. Countries with Polity scores of -10 to -6 are counted as autocracies in figure 4.1.

…hereditary monarchy has nearly disappeared… autocracies now are more likely to be characterized by the authoritarian rule of personalistic leaders, military bureaucracies, or single party structures

1 The Polity IV data set has annually coded information on the qualities of political institutions for all independent countries from 1800 through 2001 and is regularly updated by the lead author of this report. Only those countries with populations greater than 500,000 in 2002 are included in these analyses (158 total in 2002). The data set is available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity. The indicators are described and analyzed by Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr in "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 31 No. 4 (1995), pp. 469-482. Civil and political rights are not built into the indicators, but, for years when they have been reported, are consistently correlated with them.

Whereas democracy and autocracy are very different forms of governance, they are very similar in their capacity to maintain authority, control the agenda, and manage political dynamics.

Many governments have a mix of democratic and autocratic features, for example holding competitive elections for a legislature that exercises no effective control on the executive branch or allowing open political competition among some social groups while seriously restricting participation of other groups. There are many reasons why countries may come to be characterized by such inconsistencies, or incoherence, in governance. Some countries may be implementing a staged transition from autocracy to greater democracy; others may institute piecemeal reforms due to increasing demands from emerging political groups. Societal conflict often stalemates democratic experiments: some regimes may be unable to fully institutionalize reforms due to serious disagreements among social groups; some may harden their institutions in response to increasing challenges or due to the personal ambitions of opportunistic leaders; and others may simply lose control of the political dynamics that enable, or disable, effective governance. Whereas democracy and autocracy are very different forms of governance, they are very similar in their capacity to maintain central authority, control the policy agenda, and manage political dynamics. Anocracies, by contrast, are characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing these fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity. Figure 4.2 charts the relationship between the nature of the governing regime (measured on the Polity scale) and the likelihood of experiencing one of two general types of state failure: a new outbreak of armed societal conflict or an adverse regime change.[2]

Anocracies are a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance. They are countries whose governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic; their Polity scores range from -5 to +5.[3] Some such countries have succeeded in establishing full democracy following a staged transition from autocracy through anocracy, as in Mexico, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Taiwan. A number of African and a few Middle Eastern countries have recently begun a phased transition to greater openness, among them Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea, Iran, Jordan, Tanzania, and Tunisia. The Ivory Coast appeared to be headed on a similar course before stumbling (in 2002) into civil war. Others have been able to manage conflict between deeply-divided social groups for substantial periods of time through the use of categorical restrictions on political participation by an out group as in Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa (under Apartheid). This also appears to be the new strategy adopted in Fiji. Other anocracies are the result of failed transitions to greater democracy, as currently in Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, and Haiti.

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2 The calculations use historical data from the Polity IV dataset and State Failure Task Force's roster of state failure events (Problem Set), including major armed societal conflicts: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, and genocides or politicides and adverse regime changes. The period covered by the analysis is 1955-2001. Major episodes are defined as organized and sustained events that include direct participation by the state and meet two minimum thresholds: first, there must be 100 battle deaths in a single year and, second, 1000 battle deaths over the course of the conflict. Adverse regime changes are defined by a six-point or greater negative change (i.e., toward greater autocracy) in a country's Polity score occurring over a period of three years or less or a complete collapse of central authority. Likelihoods are calculated by three-score running averages dividing the number of problem events that occurred during a particular regime score by the total number of country-years recorded at that Polity score. A description of the State Failure Problem Set and a full list of state failure events can be found on the Web at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail.

3 Also included in the Anocracy category are countries that are undergoing transitional governments (coded "-88" in the Polity IV dataset) and countries where central authority has collapsed or become anarchic (these "non-"regimes are neither democratic nor autocratic; they are coded "-77" in the dataset).

Likelihood of State Failure

Combined Likelihood of
State Failure Event

Likelihood of Armed Conflict
Outbreak

Likelihood of
Adverse Regime Change

As mentioned, few countries have stayed in the middling category for long. Most can be expected to continue to shift either to full democracy or back toward full autocracy. Unfortunately, some countries may languish in or cycle in and out of this middling category over a long period of time simply because they can not manage to chart their way out. Countries like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Lebanon, Myanmar, and Nigeria must learn how to incorporate highly contentious and widely disparate ethnic and confessional groups before they will be able to fully institutionalize democratic governance. Others, like Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, and several Latin American countries, have oscillated back and forth between more autocratic military regimes and more democratic civilian regimes in response to recurring political and economic crises and may continue to do so in the foreseeable future. While the long-term trend in global governance shows strong signs that the number of countries that establish democratic forms of governance will continue to increase, this long-term trend does not preclude the possibility of short-term, and possibly wild, regional fluctuations in these numbers. New forms of governance, whether they are democratic, autocratic, or fall somewhere in between, are inherently unstable and transitory. New regimes are highly susceptible to failure or conversion in their first five years and it is only over time that this vulnerability decreases. The immediate post-Cold War period is unique not only because of the dramatic global shift in forms of governance, but also in the relative durability of such a large number of new regimes.

Democracy, Wealth, and War. There are two fundamental truisms regarding democracy as a form of governance. One is captured in the Kantian notion of a democratic peace, that democracies do not make war with other democracies. The second is that wealthy societies are much more capable of building and sustaining democratic governance. To better understand both the dramatic global shift toward democratic governance and the prospects for sustaining this trend, we examined the relationship between wealth (measured by GDP per capita) and form of governance (measured by our Polity typologies: Democracy, Anocracy, and Autocracy). We compare the general relationship between wealth and governance in both the leading (1980s) and trailing (1990s) decades of the third wave of global democratization, as seen in figure 4.3 .[4]

Figure 4.3: Regime Type by Income (Quartiles), 1980s and 1990s

Figure 4.3 shows a very clear, nearly linear relationship between wealth and governance in the 1980s (left side of the graph), the decade leading into democracy's third wave. Democracy was very strongly associated with high income per capita and autocracy was even more strongly associated with poor countries. Equally interesting is the fact that

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4 For the analysis of wealth, we relied primarily on the World Bank's World Development Indicators measure of GDP per capita in constant 1995 $US; missing data was imputed using other data sources. The country-year data were parceled into income quartiles: the lowest quartile ranged from $0 to $470; second, from $471 to $1490; third, from $1491 to $4700; and the highest quartile, over $4700. Each country was assigned to a single quartile for each decade. Borderline countries (i.e., those where income per capita fell in different quartiles in different years) were placed in the quartile where they spent the most years of the target decade; where years were more evenly split, the country's average income was used to determine in which quartile to place it. Data on polity regime types for each year of the decade were then tabulated for the decade and converted to a percentage, an adjustment needed to overcome distortions caused by slight variations in the numbers of country-years in each quartile (mainly due to the breakup of the Soviet Union).

governance in the lowest and highest quartiles was more stable than in the middle quartiles, where the percentage of anocracies is far greater. Comparison of the 1980s with the 1990s helps us to identify how wealth is associated with the shift toward democracy in the third wave. Looking at the data for the 1990s, Autocracies showed a very high rate of failure, or incomplete reform, and all quartiles show an increase in the percentage of democracies. However, it is clear that countries in the third quartile were far more likely to institute new democracies than the other quartiles. The wealthiest quartile remains highly stable (with the lowest percentage of anocracies) but the lowest quartile becomes, by far, the least stable (with the highest percentage of anocracies). Poor autocracies were highly responsive to democratization influences in the 1990s but most lacked the capacity to accomplish democratic transitions and, thus, shifted only to the middle or anocratic range. The relationship between capabilities for democratization and past experiences with societal wars is more muddled. What is clear in this regard is countries coded as fully institutionalized democracies (Polity code "10") experienced very little societal war over the entire post-World War period (since 1946). Only four of the thirty-four (34) "perfect" democracies counted in early 2002 had any experience with major societal wars: Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Greece's civil war occurred in the late 1940s. Cyprus, Israel, and the United Kingdom have managed ad hoc condominiums that separate and contain violent challenges from threatening their political cores, although Israel is struggling to maintain its "separation and containment policy" in 2002. Of the fifty-six (56) countries counted as democracies in early 2002 that had made a transition to democracy during the "third wave," only fourteen (14) had experienced major societal wars in the ten year period before the transition.

Regional Trends in Governance. A closer look at regional variations in the global trend toward democratization can also improve our understanding of its dynamics and future prospects. Figures 4.4 a-f show six regions' trends in democratization. (See *Peace and Conflict 2002*, pp. 10-11, for regional trends in violent societal conflicts.)

Perhaps nothing better symbolizes the end of the Cold War than the healing of the East-West rift in Europe. The reintegration of the European continent has proceeded under the complementary auspices of the expanding European Union and NATO international organizations. Therefore we have reconfigured our regions for analysis from the scheme used in our previous (2001) edition. With eastern and western countries combined, we can clearly see (figure 4.4a) the Cold War division of Europe between the democratic states of the West and the one-party autocracies of the East. The intense pressures of ideological confrontation during post-1945 reconstruction maintained regime stability in Europe through the mid-1980s. The first evidence of the coming thaw came at the end of the 1980s when nearly all European autocratic states, including the new states of the former socialist federations, embracing democratic governance by 2000. Only Belarus has bucked the trend by re-instituting an authoritarian regime under the personalistic leadership of President Lukashenka. The last remaining communist regime in Europe ended in 1999 with the fall of Milosevic in Yugoslavia following the war with NATO over Kosovo.

Countries in the Western Hemisphere have been divided into two regions: North America (including Central America and the Caribbean, figure 4.4b) and South America (figure 4.4c). The two regions show similar trends in recent decades: both have shown a consistent trend toward democracy beginning in the late 1970s and have become almost exclusively democratic in 2002, except for Cuba (autocracy) and Haiti (anocracy). However, the two trends reflect quite different regional dynamics in the earlier Cold War decades. North America had a fairly constant mixture of regime types until the late 1970s. South America, on the other hand, began the period with anocratic governance in almost all its countries and experienced considerable difficulty instituting democratic governance. About half the countries in the region transitioned to democracy in the late 1950s and early 1960s and another half instituted autocratic regimes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nearly all of these autocratic regimes had transitioned directly to democracy by the early 1990s, with the exception of Peru, which resisted the trend until the fall of the Fujimori government in 2000 and the election of President Toledo in 2001.

The governance trends in Asia (figure 4.4d) show a fairly equal mix of regimes in the 1990s, with some indication that democracy has made important gains in this region since the late 1980s. There were nine autocracies in early 2002. One-party autocratic states persist in North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and China although there are signs that these countries are becoming more receptive to market-oriented reforms, particularly China. Myanmar remains under military rule despite a strong democratic movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Former Communist Party leaders have remained in power as personalistic rulers in the former Soviet republics of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In 1999 Pakistan's democracy succumbed to a military takeover led by General Musharraf, and Bhutan stands as the region's only monarchy. Asian anocracies are split between countries struggling to manage ethnic divisions, in Fiji, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Singapore, and those struggling with the legacies of societal wars, in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Tajikistan; while Kyrgyzstan has been held back mainly by poverty and its remoteness. Democracies in Asia are also split between well established democracies, in Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea; emerging democracies, in Indonesia, Mongolia, Taiwan, and Thailand; and

Figure 4: Regional Trends in Governance, 1946-2001

a. Europe

b. North America

c. South America

Democracies Anocracies Autocracies

d. Asia and the Pacific

e. North Africa and the Middle East

f. Africa South of the Sahara

Democracies   Anocracies   Autocracies

challenged democracies, in Bangladesh, Philippines, South Korea, and Sri Lanka. Nepal appeared to be establishing democracy in the 1990s but may have suffered a setback in late 2002 when King Gyanendra seized power and dissolved parliament in response to a deteriorating internal security situation.

Whereas the Asian region is the last bastion for communist one-party autocracies, the region that encompasses North Africa and the Middle East is the remaining stronghold of hereditary monarchies (figure 4.4e). There are eight such monarchies in the region, seven of which retain strong autocratic powers: Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (the eighth, Jordan, has moved closer to a constitutional monarchy and is counted as an anocracy). All the strong monarchies, except Morocco, rely heavily upon substantial revenues from oil exports to maintain their hold on power and most of the oil monarchies (except Saudi Arabia) are small states with small populations (less than 3 million). The other six autocracies in 2002 are ruled by personalistic leaders backed by a strong military and one-party or corporate bureaucracies: Azerbaijan, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Sudan, and Syria. The four democracies counted in early 2002 in this region lie on the periphery: Cyprus, Israel, Mali, and Turkey. Of the region's ten anocracies, two deserve special mention. Iran is a unique case of a large, major oil-exporting country with a dual, theocratic and elected, government. Algeria, as already mentioned, experienced a failed transition to a more democratic system in 1992 and has fallen into protracted societal war. Lebanon is also a special case as it emerges from an intense, complex, and protracted societal war under the tutelage of Syrian forces and the watchful eye of Israel to the south.[5]

The Sub-Saharan Africa region (figure 4.4f) provides a vivid and heart-rending example of the crucial links between governance, conflict, violence, and societal development. It is an understatement to say that this region faces numerous and enormous challenges at the beginning of the 21st century, complex challenges its governments are categorically ill-prepared to confront. Governance trends in this region reflect not only the intensity of these challenges but, also, the importance of

5 Lebanon is not counted in the tally of regime types because it is coded in the Polity IV dataset as being under Syrian control in 2002. Similarly, Afghanistan and Bosnia are not counted in their respective regions because they were under international administration in 2002.

global influence in fostering open governance. Most of the region remained under European colonial control through the late 1950s; only Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa were independent countries. The de-colonization process in this region began when Guinea gained independence in 1958; sixteen countries gained their independence in 1960. On average, two more countries became independent each year through 1968 and six more joined the ranks in the 1970s. Namibia was the last country to gain independence in 1990 (from an African country, South Africa).[6] The trends show that the region had no more than five democracies in any year until 1991. Although many of the newly independent states experimented with various forms of open governance, most quickly succumbed to autocratic seizures of power. The region was almost entirely under autocratic rule by the mid-1980s. The end of the Cold War brought with it a transformation in African political institutions. The numbers of autocracies in the region fell from thirty-three (33) in 1988 to three in 2002 (Eritrea, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe). However, the number of democracies increased to only ten (10) in 2002 and three of these countries faced serious challenges in 2002 (Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, and Madagascar). Two-thirds of the states in Africa (26) are counted as anocracies in 2002.

Democracy, Peace, and Peace-Building. Building and maintaining social peace and security depends fundamentally on the characteristics of polities. Autocratic governments manage societal conflicts mainly by coercion, with accommodation and reform playing secondary roles. Democratic governments manage societal conflicts mainly by channeling them into conventional protest and electoral politics. When divisive ethnic and political issues do surface in democracies, they usually are expressed in strikes and demonstrations rather than open rebellion and often culminate in reformist policies. Anocracies are far more likely than autocracies or democracies to be challenged by armed conflict, and are less likely to be able either to repress or settle it.

The gains of the third wave of democratization will be difficult to sustain without concerted, proactive, international policies by a consortium of the world's fully institutionalized democracies.

While democracy is strongly associated with peace and peace-building, what is not clear is democracy's role in establishing peace and prosperity. It is not clear how much democracy actually fosters peace and facilitates peace-building and how much democracy is the culmination of economic performance and peace-building efforts. What seems clear from the evidence presented here is that it is only the fully and deeply institutionalized forms of democracy that are truly stable, resilient, and peaceful. These "perfect" democracies are clearly superior over the other forms of governance on nearly all measures of effectiveness and performance. Yet open forms of governance in general have shown themselves to be extremely fragile political systems that are highly vulnerable to internal challenges. They are particularly ill-equipped to manage or repress violent challenges, whether revolutionary, separatist, or predatory, and they are ill-suited to withstand the twin pressures of grievance and contention in war-torn societies. This is the nature of the governance-development conundrum that beguiles analysts, practitioners, and policy-makers alike at the beginning of the 21st century. The gains of the third wave of global democratization will be difficult to sustain without concerted, proactive, international policies by a consortium of the world's fully institutionalized democracies.

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6 Eritrea gained its independence in 1993 as the result of its protracted separatist war against Ethiopia.

*by David Quinn and
Ted Robert Gurr*

*Twenty-two armed
self-determination
conflicts are ongoing
as of the beginning
of 2003.*

The quest of national and indigenous peoples for self-governance has reshaped the political landscape in many countries and the international system as a whole during recent decades. Some states and many autonomous regions within states have been formed as a result of such movements. Seventy territorially concentrated ethnic groups have waged armed conflicts for autonomy or independence at some time since the 1950s, not counting the peoples of former European colonies. Two of these conflicts erupted since 2000 and were carried out by Albanians in Yugoslavia and Macedonia; both were spillovers from the separatist war fought by their ethnic kin in Kosovo a few years earlier. One other conflict that were previously contained saw renewed hostilities since 2000: Igorots in the Philippines. Twenty-two armed self-determination conflicts are ongoing as of the beginning of 2003, including some Oromos and Somalis in Ethiopia; Chechens in Russia; and Tripuras, Assamese, Kashmiri Muslims, and Scheduled Tribes in India. Hostilities intensified in several of them in the past two years, most notably the breakdown in negotiations and resumption of fighting in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Despite instances of continued warfare, the last two years have generally seen an acceleration of a trend beginning in the early 1990s that we documented previously — a sustained decline in armed self-determination conflicts and a countervailing shift toward containment and settlement. In fact, more such conflicts have been contained in the past two years than in any other post-World War II time period (see table 5.1 and figure 5.1). Nine major violent self-determination conflicts were held in check in 2001 or 2002, including high-profile cases with international involvement involving the Acehnese in Indonesia, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Tajiks and Uzbeks in Afghanistan, and Southerners and Nuba in Sudan. Two of the three conflicts involving new or renewed hostilities since 2000— Albanians in Macedonia and Albanians in Yugoslavia — were also contained during the same time period. In addition, a year-long flare up in tensions involving Abkhazians in Georgia was contained in late 2000. Ceasefires and negotiated settlements continue to provide some combination of political recognition, greater rights, and regional autonomy to the populations represented by these movements; though not all segments of those fighting for self-determination accept the conditions of these peace accords (see Appendix table 2). In addition, East Timor (formerly a province of Indonesia) became the world's newest fully independent state in May 2002. Though the process was messy, the East Timor case is one of the rare examples of full implementation of peace accords in armed self-determination conflicts, and even more rare since the result was complete independence.

We also have documented another seventy-six (76) territorially concentrated groups that currently support significant movements seeking greater self-determination by political means. This tally includes nineteen (19) movements — new and old — added to the list reported in the 2001 edition of *Peace and Conflict* (see Appendix table 3). Leaders of these groups rely mainly on building mass support, representing group interests, and carrying out electoral and/or protest campaigns. Their tactics may include isolated acts of violence but thus far they have stopped short of serious armed conflict. Some of them, like the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, the Catalans in

Spain, and the Jurassians in Switzerland, act through autonomous political institutions that were created to satisfy group demands for autonomy. The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, Cornish in the UK, the Inuit indigenous people in Canada, and Hungarians in Yugoslavia all gained some degree of increased or re-instated (as in the case of the latter group) political, economic, or cultural autonomy between late 2000 and early 2003.

Phases of Self-determination Conflicts: Self-determination conflicts move through phases from conventional politics to war, settlement, and sometimes independent statehood. We developed a diagnostic scheme with ten phases to make it easier to track and compare these conflicts. Appendix table 2 categorizes the current status of seventy (70) conflicts — all those with an armed conflict phase sometime during the last 47 years — using the ten phases defined here.

1. Conventional politics (3 groups): Self-determination currently is sought by conventional political strategies including advocacy, representation of group interests to officials, and electoral politics. Groups with self-administered regions and power-sharing arrangements in existing states are also categorized here. Protagonists who once fought armed conflicts but now rely on conventional politics include Serbs in Croatia, Kurds in Iran, and Baluchis in Pakistan. Another forty-eight (48) groups that have not rebelled openly in the past also use these tactics now (see Appendix table 3).

2. Militant politics (3 groups): Self-determination is sought by organizing and inciting group members to use disruptive strategies (mass protest, boycotts, resistance to authorities). These strategies may be accompanied by a few symbolic acts of violence. Former rebel groups using these strategies at present include Tibetans in China and Ibos in Nigeria. An additional twenty-six (26) groups listed in Appendix table 3 that have not engaged in large-scale violence in the last half-century currently use militant politics.

3. Low-level hostilities (11 groups): Self-determination is sought by localized use of violent strategies such as riots, local rebellions, bombings, and armed attacks against authorities, for example by Kurds in Turkey, Uighers in China, and Ijaw in Nigeria. We characterize the Basques in Spain as using these strategies since 1999 (they were categorized in the previous report as using militant politics) because of ETA's persistent and increased bombing campaign.

4. High-level hostilities (10 groups): Self-determination is sought by widespread and organized armed violence against authorities. Wars of this kind are being fought by the Chechens, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Kashmiris and Assamese in India.

5. Talk-fight (4 groups): Group representatives negotiate with authorities about settlement and implementation while substantial armed violence continues. Fighting may be done by the principals or by factions that reject efforts at settlement. Karenni in Myanmar, Moros in the Philippines, and Cabindans in Angola all re-opened previously dormant negotiations with authorities during 2001 and 2002, while fighting persisted.

6. Cessation of open hostilities (12 groups): Most fighting is over but one or more principals are ready to resume armed violence if efforts at settlement fail. Conflicts where hostilities are checked by international peace-keeping forces, in the absence of agreements, also are classified here. This kind of tenuous peace held at the beginning of 2003 for the Kosovar Albanians, Kurds in Iraq, and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Ceasefires were reached in the following conflicts between late 2000 and early 2003: the Nuba in Sudan, Nagas in India, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Abkhaz in Georgia (the latter checked a resumption of fighting in October 2001).

7. Contested agreement (14 groups): An interim or final agreement for group autonomy within an existing state has been negotiated between the principals but some parties, within the group or the government or both, reject and attempt to subvert it. This is the current situation of the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, the Chittagong Hill peoples of Bangladesh, and the Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea. Southern Sudanese, Casamançais in Senegal, and Acehnese in Indonesia all reached significant peace accords in the last two years whose durability remains to be determined. In addition, representatives of the Miskito nation of Nicaragua declared that they were re-seeking an independent nation in July 2002, thus contesting a 1988 accord granting them more autonomy.

8. Uncontested agreement (5 groups): A final agreement for group autonomy is in place, is accepted in principal by all parties, and is being implemented. The conflict involving Kachins in Myanmar is at this stage, as are the conflicts between Tuaregs and the governments of Mali and Niger.

9. Implemented agreement (2 groups): A final settlement or agreement for group autonomy has been largely or fully implemented, for example among the Mizos in India and the Gaguaz in Moldova.

10. Independence (5 groups): The group has its own internationally recognized state. As noted above, the former Indonesian province of East Timor is the newest addition to this list.

...we cannot be confident that a conflict has ended until agreements have been fully implemented.

Self-determination conflicts do not move inevitably through all phases, and due to their complex dynamics, there often is movement back and forth between phases. Groups that have used conventional politics for a long period of time are very likely to continue to do so. But if a group signals its objectives through militant politics or low-level hostilities, the risks of further escalation are high. Six such groups that were in these two phases as of late 2000, including the Corsicans in France and the Shan in Myanmar, escalated their conflicts in the following two years. At the settlement end of the spectrum, we cannot be confident that a conflict has ended until agreements have been fully implemented. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict progressed from agreements to partial implementation during the 1990s and the Palestinian Authority was close to independence when, in September 2000, the conflict shifted back to "talk-fight" as the Second Intifadeh was launched. Negotiations broke down completely in 2001, moving the conflict to a phase of high-level hostilities. In Bosnia, it is possible that if peacekeeping forces withdraw, the Serbs and perhaps the Croats will resume fighting to secure border adjustments. The scarcity of fully implemented agreements signals a potential for renewed resistance by former rebels in most formerly violent self-determination conflicts. The Miskito conflict in Nicaragua is a prime example of this.

Trends in the Onset and Settlement of Self-Determination Conflicts: Many observers fear that contemporary self-determination movements will continue the process of state breakdown signaled by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation at the beginning of the 1990s. In fact only five internationally recognized states were born in armed separatist conflicts during the last forty years. They are Bangladesh (1971), Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), Eritrea (1993), and East Timor (2002). One can expand this list by citing several de facto states established by separatist movements, political entities which are not recognized as such by the international community. Somaliland, which is dominated by the Isaaq clan, has an effective central government and few of the crippling economic and security problems of the failed Somali state. Others are the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, the Trans-Dniester Republic that nominally is part of Moldova, Abkhazia in Georgia, and Kosovo. The final international status of these entities remains to be determined.

These exceptions aside, the most common outcome of self-determination conflicts is a settlement between governments and group representatives that acknowledges collective rights and gives them institutional means for pursuing collective interests within states. Sometimes a group gains better access to decision-making in the central government, often it gains regional autonomy, and of course some settlements include both kinds of reforms. Thus the outcome of self-determination movements seldom is a redrawing of international boundaries, but rather devolution of central power and redrawing of boundaries within existing states. Agreements recently signed by the Acehnese in Indonesia and southern Sudanese purport to provide more regional autonomy to these groups, but it remains to be seen if these accords will be implemented. The Acehnese accords, signed in December 2002, soon showed indications of preliminary fissures.

Concerns sometimes are voiced that autonomy agreements are a prelude to all-out war for independence. This is an unlikely though not wholly unprecedented scenario. The more common scenario is that most people accept and work within the framework for autonomy while a few spoilers continue to fight in hopes of greater concessions. The greatest risk in autonomy agreements is not the eventual breakup of the state, rather it is that spoilers may block full implementation, thereby dragging out the conflict and wasting resources that might otherwise be used to strengthen autonomous institutions. The pendulum can swing the other way as well — when a state drags its feet during the implementation phase, more militant factions of the communal group may continue or resume violence, arguing that the state has not made good on its promises. For example, splinter groups of Albanians in Macedonia and Yugoslavia, Chittagong Hill peoples in Bangladesh, and Casamançais in Senegal were responsible for acts of violence in winter 2002-03.

Armed conflicts over self-determination spiked sharply upward at the end of the Cold War, but they had been building in frequency since the late 1950s, doubling between 1970 and the early 1980s. Table 5.1 and figure 5.1 summarize the evidence. From five ongoing wars in the 1950s their numbers swelled to a maximum of forty-eight (48) in 1991. But then they declined even more precipitously, to a current low of twenty-two (22), a smaller number than at any time in the last quarter-century. Moreover, fighting in most of these conflicts is low-level and de-escalating.

The immediate reason for the decline has been a marked increase in local, regional, and international efforts to contain and settle wars of self-determination. During the Cold War a half-dozen were contained, usually when the rebels were defeated militarily, and nine were settled or, in the case of Bangladesh, led to independence. Three of the negotiated settlements were in India, two of which — with Nagas (1963) and Tripuras (1972) — led to second-generation wars. During the 1990s another fourteen (14) wars were contained, often as a result of internationally backed negotiations and peacekeeping, and another seventeen (17) were settled by negotiated agreements or — in Slovenia, Croatia, and Eritrea — internationally recognized independence for rebel nationalists. As mentioned earlier, the pace in containment continued in the last two years with nine (9) new conflicts contained in 2001-02. However, no new conflicts were conclusively settled in this time period, perhaps due to the freshness of many of the recent agreements. It is likely that as both sides pull back their troops and reach definitive agreements, a number of these recently contained conflicts will move to the settlement phase. All told, over 70% of all terminations of separatist wars (by containment and settlement) during the last half-century have occurred since 1990.

Self-determination wars are easiest to settle in their early years. Between 1988 and 1994 eleven began in the USSR, Yugoslavia, and their successor states. By 2002 all had been contained or settled except in Chechnya, after an average of three years' fighting. The three newest uprisings in the region — those carried out by Abkhazians in Georgia, Albanians in Macedonia, and Albanians in Yugoslavia — were contained in an average of twelve months. During the same seven years, from 1988 to 1994, another fifteen (15) self-determination wars began in Africa and Asia. By 2000, four of the six new African wars were over and six of nine Asian wars were concluded, after an average of about nine years' fighting. The self-determination wars fought by Afars in Djibouti and Uzbeks in Afghanistan are the most recent to be terminated, the latter due to assistance

Table 5.1: Armed Conflicts for Self-Determination and their Outcomes, 1956-2002				
Period	**New Armed Conflicts**	**Ongoing at End of Period**	**Conflicts Contained**	**Conflicts Settled or Won**
before 1956		4		
1956-60	4	8	0	0
1961-65	5	12	0	1
1966-70	5	15	2	0
1971-75	11	23	0	3
1976-80	10	31	2	0
1981-85	5	35	0	1
1986-90	10	41	2	2
1991-95	16	39	7	11
1996-2000	2	28	7	6
2001-2002*	3	22	9	0
TOTALS	72		29	24

Note: Based on conflicts listed in Appendix table 2. "Settled" conflicts include five that ended with the establishment of a new, internationally recognized state. In cases where a settlement/containment of a earlier conflict lasted for five or more years before the outbreak of new fighting, the new outbreak of fighting is counted as a new armed conflict and a subsequent settlement/containment may then be counted as a new event. Examples are Nagas in India, Tripuras in India, Hmong in Laos, Igorots in Philippines, and Sudan Southerners.

(*) The asterisks in table 5.1 and figure 5.1 indicate that the information for the most recent period in the graph, 2001-2002, covers only two years, unlike the other five-year periods. As such, the most recent period is not strictly comparable with the other periods and the last increment in the chart is not a true depiction of the most recent trend.

Figure 5.1: Trends in Armed Conflicts for Self-Determination, 1956-2002

Number of Ongoing Wars

Changes to the Number of Wars

Legend:
- Number of Wars Ongoing at End of Period
- Change in the Number of Wars: New Armed Conflicts
- Change in the Number of Wars: Conflicts Contained
- Change in the Number of Wars: Conflicts Settled or Won

X-axis categories: before 1956, 1956-60, 1961-65, 1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000, 2001-2002*

International engagement helped end most of the separatist wars in the post-communist states

from the United States in pursuit of its anti-Taliban goals. International engagement helped end most of the separatist wars in the post-communist states, which helps account for their short durations. Asian and African separatist wars usually were contained or settled without international mediation or peacekeeping, which helps explain the fact that they persisted more than twice as long as those in post-communist states.

The longer self-determination wars drag on, the more resistant they are to either containment or settlement. The average duration of the twenty-two (22) armed self-determination conflicts still being fought at end of 2002 was twenty-nine (29) years and their median duration twenty-five (25) years. Nearly sixty percent are being fought in Asia, most of the others in Africa. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been intermittently violent since 1968 despite extraordinary efforts to negotiate and implement an enduring settlement. A handful of new separatist wars began after 1995 and nearly all have been contained. The exception is the ongoing Ijaw rebellion in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta, which escalated in 1995 from protest against lack of development and political participation to rebellion, but is susceptible to settlement in a democratic Nigeria.

...[during the 1990s] most regions showed a marked shift from full-scale separatist wars toward reliance on conventional politics [and] protest

The general trends in the uses of violence to pursue self-determination that we find in our analysis of groups in the Minorities at Risk survey complement these regional findings. Between 1998 and 2000 alone, about forty percent of groups using full-scale or episodic violence to pursue self-determination demands were found in Asia, a continuation of a pattern we observed in the early- and mid-1990s. However, Africa was home to the highest percentage of separatist groups engaging in full-scale rebellion (45%) rather than conventional politics, protest campaigns, or episodic acts of violence during the 1998-2000 period. When comparing changes in tactics from the early 1990s to the late 1990s, we found that most regions showed a marked shift from full-scale separatist wars toward reliance on conventional politics, protest campaigns, and occasional acts of violence. The exceptions are Latin America and the Western democracies, where the percentage of self-determination movements using nonviolent tactics was high throughout. Asia also saw the largest increase in those groups shifting away from full-scale rebellion between the early and the late 1990s, a full twenty-two percent (22%). Thus, while Asian countries have the largest proportion of armed self-determination conflicts, the prospects for containment and settlement also seem the most promising there.

The most critical phases in self-determination conflicts are "talk-fight" and "cessation of open hostilities." Previously dormant negotiations were re-opened in three self-determination conflicts in the last two years — in conflicts involving the Karenni in Myanmar, Moros in Philippines, and Cabindans in Angola — though binding cease-fires or agreements have not yet been reached. In the absence of final agreements, any of the fifteen (15) conflicts in these two phases may revert to open warfare — and have done so recently in the Palestinian-Israeli and Abkhazia-Georgia conflicts. Preventive action and efforts at mediation should be redoubled in these situations to keep them moving toward agreement. Mediators can assist parties in identifying areas of agreement when their hardline bargaining stances prevent them from realizing the needs and interests of the other party, or from recognizing that compromise is possible and necessary to end fighting.

Contested agreements also are worrisome because significant elements on one or both sides of a conflict reject them. Some rebel factions may continue fighting either to cut a better deal, like the Abu Sayyaf faction of Philippine Moros, or because they reject any compromise, like Chechen Islamicists who mounted a jihad against Russian influence in the Caucasus after the first Chechen war ended in a Russian withdrawal. On the other side, political opponents of a government may try to subvert an agreement between authorities and an autonomy movement. They may use legislative means to block implementation or stage provocative actions, like Likud leader Ariel Sharon's visit in the company of armed police to Jerusalem's Temple Mount in September 2000. Though a peace agreement was implemented in East Timor, pro-Indonesian militant groups instigated retaliatory violence against the former insurgents. Militia and paramilitary activity against those involved in autonomy movements may also occur in certain conflicts. However challenging it is to reach an initial agreement, it may be still more difficult, and require greater international engagement, to get from "yes, but" to "yes, let's implement the agreement."

Table 5.2: Which Minorities were Most Likely to Seek Self-Determination in 1998-2000?[1]

Most Important Factors

	Group's Likelihood of Seeking Self-Determination (other factors held constant)[2]	Number of Groups Seeking Self-Determination (of total number of groups with this trait; other factors not held constant)[3]
Group-level factors		
Group organization and cohesion		
No cohesive organization	2%	10 of 53
Cohesive organization	85%	147 of 215
Historical loss of autonomy		
No historical loss	21%	19 of 85
Loss limited or distant in time	80%	65 of 103
Recent and complete loss	100%	3 of 3
Country-level factors		
Change in communication technology† **1995-2000**		† (measured in terms of telephone mainlines per 1000 people)
Decrease of 127 mainlines	<1%	
No increase or decrease in mainlines	38%	
Increase of 34 mainlines (median change)	70%	
Increase of 56 mainlines (mean change)	85%	
Increase of 146 mainlines	100%	

Other Important Factors[4]

	Effect on Likelihood of Group Seeking Self-Determination
Group-level factors	
Recent increase in demographic stress*	Increases
High levels of political discrimination*	Lowers
High degree of territorial concentration in a regional base*	Increases
Past persistent protest or rebellion	Increases
Targets of severe repression	Increases
Recent increase in cultural restrictions	Lowers
High degree of economic differentials in comparison to dominant group	Increases
Country-level factors	
Highly democratic	Increases
Greater recent increase in human development	Increases
Large number of minority groups	Increases
International factors	
Existence of separatist kin across international borders*	Increases
State participates in major episodes of international violence	Increases
Group currently receives some type of transnational support	Increases
Recent increase in transnational support for the group	Lowers
Large number of conflicts in bordering countries	Increases
High total magnitude of all conflicts in bordering countries	Lowers

1 Results of bivariate and multivariate analysis of factors that distinguished communal groups seeking self-determination from those that did not, using coded data on 285 politically active groups from the Minorities at Risk project. The analysis examined traits of groups, the societies and countries in which they are situated, and their international environment. Multivariate analyses were run individually at each of these levels of analysis and the most important factors at each level were combined in a final, full multivariate analysis.

2 These values were derived by holding other factors in the final, full multivariate analysis constant at their average levels, then calculating the percentage contribution of each factor to the probability that a group will seek self-determination.

3 The numbers should be read as follows: 53 groups in the Minorities at Risk dataset lack cohesive organization, of which 10 seek self-determination, whereas of the 215 groups that have cohesive organizations, 147 seek self-determination. Numbers are not shown for communication technology because this is a continuous variable; values are chosen to illustrate the general relationship between change in communication technology and self-determination demands.

4 The lower section of the table lists factors that were significantly related to self-determination demands at each level of analysis, i.e. traits of groups, traits of the countries in which they are situated, and traits of their international environment. **Asterisks (*)** flag factors that also were significant in the full multivariate analysis, though with lesser significance than those listed in the first section of the table.

Our survey has identified fifty-one (51) groups using conventional political means to pursue self-determination and another twenty-nine (29) using militant strategies short of armed violence (see Appendix Tables 2 and 3). Most are in democratic or quasi-democratic states and have little risk of escalating to armed conflict. The most worrisome of these conflicts involve the people of Western Cameroon; Tibetans and Mongols in China; Sindhis and Sarakis in Pakistan; Ibo, Yoruba, Ndigbo, Oron, and Ogoni in Nigeria; Lhotshampas in Bhutan; Reang (Bru) in India; East Caprivians in Namibia; and Lozi in Zambia. None is a hot war at this writing (January 2003) but the protagonists are using or advocating provocative tactics against governments with a track record of repression. The Tibetans get lots of international attention, the others very little. International attention usually encourages autonomy-minded people to work for constructive solutions and discourages governments from cracking down on them. In the absence of international attention, the peoples flagged here are the most likely protagonists and victims of new separatist wars in the early years of the 21st century.

Origins of Self-Determination Demands: Nearly sixty percent of groups in the Minorities at Risk survey (161 of 285) sought greater autonomy or full self-determination in 1998-2000, the others did not. What kinds of groups, in which kinds of political environments are most likely to seek political autonomy or independence? In search of general answers to this question, we did detailed statistical analyses using coded information on traits of groups, the states in which they reside, and their international environment. The factors include many of those identified by the authors of previous theoretical and comparative studies. Our aim is to test them across the full range of politically active communal groups. Some of the results are summarized in Table 5.2.

Most self-determination demands are justified by reference to a group's historical loss of political autonomy. Not surprisingly, our coded information on lost autonomy is one of the strongest determinants of contemporary self-determination demands. We assessed the effects of whether each group lost autonomy in the distant past or more recently, and whether the loss was limited (such as the dissolution of a regional government) or total (such as military conquest of a previously independent state). Nonetheless, groups whose loss was limited or distant in time — such Quebecois in Canada, indigenous peoples in Nicaragua, and Sandzak Muslims in Yugoslavia, for example — are fifty-nine percent (59%) more likely to have self-determination grievances today than groups that suffered no such losses, holding other factors constant. And all groups in the Minorities at Risk survey that experienced high and recent loss of autonomy have self-determination grievances. Examples of separatist-minded groups which experienced major losses of political autonomy since World War II include the Ibo in Nigeria, Karens in Myanmar, Tibetans in China, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Kashmiri Muslims in India, and South Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia. Resentment about the loss of control over a group's own affairs, even if held only briefly – as in the case of the Ibo and the Georgian groups – makes it virtually certain that the group will pursue self-determination in the present.

Groups that are highly organized and cohesive are very likely to pursue self-determination. A group that is highly organized and cohesive is eighty-three percent (83%) more likely to have separatist grievances than groups that lack any cohesive organization, holding other factors constant. Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, Scots and Northern Irish

Catholics in the UK, Oromos in Ethiopia, most politically active communal groups in India, and some indigenous peoples in Latin America have highly cohesive group organizations that articulate their demands for self-determination. They contrast sharply with ethno-classes like Afro-Caribbeans and Asians in the UK, Russians in most of the post-Soviet republics, and communal contenders like those of Kenya that lack cohesive political movements. A high degree of group organization is not likely to be a root cause of self-determination demands, but it is a close-to-necessary condition for the articulation of such demands and the formation of movements that can pursue such ambitious aims.

Another factor that facilitates self-determination demands is a societal or country-level factor — a recent increase in communication technology, as indicated by an increase in telephone mainlines. The larger the increase, the more likely it is that the group will express self-determination grievances. Despite recent arguments that the increase in cellular and internet technology gives aggrieved groups better means to communicate, we have no conclusive evidence that this is linked to articulation of self-determination demands. As is the case with group organization, increases in telephone mainlines facilitate activists' connectedness to each other and allows them to more easily and extensively articulate their demands. Kurds in Turkey, Dayaks in Malaysia, and Basques and Corsicans in France are examples of autonomy-seeking groups in countries that had an increase of at least 60 telephone lines per 1000 people since 1995.

Other factors also contribute to the pursuit of self-determination, though not with the same strength of association. A comprehensive list is given in the lower half of Table 5.2. For example groups that are highly concentrated in one region, such as Papuans and Acehnese in Indonesia, Kurds in Iraq, and Albanians in Macedonia, frequently seek greater autonomy or independence, though this factor alone is not as strong as some researchers have suggested — a number of more widely dispersed groups also want self-determination. Ten groups with less than fifty percent of their members living in their regional base express self-determination grievances, while eighty-one (81) groups with more than seventy-five percent of their members living in their regional base have such grievances. Groups with separatist kin across international borders, such as Croats in Yugoslavia and Bosnia, Basques in Spain and France, and Lezgins in Russia and Azerbaijan also are likely to pursue self-determination themselves — not necessarily union with their kin, but greater autonomy within their country of residence. This is the most significant international factor associated with self-determination demands.

...self-determination demands are more often voiced by groups in democratic states

Several indicators of group status within their societies also are linked to self-determination grievances. Groups with a recent increase in demographic stress due, for example, to an influx of migrants or high and rising birthrates, are more likely to pursue self-determination than others. And, somewhat surprisingly, groups that experience relatively low levels of political discrimination — the pattern we code as "disadvantages due to historical neglect" — also are likely to seek self-determination. We also find that self-determination demands are more often voiced by groups in democratic states — probably because the opportunities for seeking self-determination are greater in a more open political environment.

Taken together, these factors are part of a larger syndrome that characterizes many autonomy-seeking groups. They lost political autonomy when they were absorbed or conquered by the state and are concentrated in peripheral regions of the country; they remain relatively disadvantaged in material terms (high stress) and experience some political disadvantages (low to middling political discrimination). Democracies provide opportunities to articulate such demands, broad and cohesive political movements provide the means for pursuing them. Expression and pursuit of self-determination demands is facilitated by developments in communications technology.

Of the 161 groups that had self-determination goals only one-quarter (41) were engaged in armed conflicts in 1998-2000

Protest or Rebellion? Strategic Choices in the Pursuit of Self-Determination: Of the 161 groups that had self-determination goals in 1998-2000, only one-quarter (41) were engaged in armed conflicts in 1998-2000, usually in the form of guerrilla wars like those being fought by Chechens in Russia, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and southerners in Sudan. Another six punctuated predominantly non-violent campaigns with episodes of bombing and militant clashes with authorities — examples are the Uighers in China, Basques in Spain, and Corsicans in France. The remaining two-thirds of groups (108) used strategies of conventional politics and non-violent protest (six others could not be classified).

Note that our analyses of self-determination grievances and choice of strategies to pursue these grievances include groups with any self-determination interests, from limited autonomy to full independence. To highlight the factors related to grievances and the choice of rebellion or conventional/protest politics in general, we cast the net as widely as possible. It is likely that groups desiring independence rather than autonomy within existing states are more likely to rebel than to protest — a proposition to be tested in future analyses.

The research question here is to identify the characteristics of groups seeking self-determination and their political environments — domestic and international — that shape their choices of strategies. We ran two different sets of analyses, one of which looked at the factors that promoted full-scale rebellion and another that examined the conditions that prompted groups to use any kind of violence. The same factors proved to be significant in both analyses and are summarized below and in Table 5.3.

The factor most closely related to a group's strategic choices is persistent participation in past rebellion. Specifically, groups seeking self-determination that were involved in high-level rebellion with authorities for five or more years after 1985 were sixty percent (60%) more likely than other groups with self-determination grievances to resort to full-fledged rebellion in 1998-2000, holding all other factors constant. Overall, groups that have persistently rebelled in the past have a seventy-seven percent (77%) greater likelihood of using that strategy now. Thus, past choices strongly shape current choices, but this is not quite the same as saying that rebellion (or protest) necessarily persists over time. Some episodes of past rebellion and many protest campaigns for self-determination were and are episodic. What our evidence shows is that when groups resume active pursuit of self-determination grievances, they are very likely to make the same strategic choices that they did in the past. Examples of groups that engaged in sustained armed clashes with authorities for five or more years between 1985 and 1997 and that continued to do so in 1998-2000 include Nagas, Bodos, Tripuras, Kashmiri Muslims, and Assamese in India; Afars and Oromos in Ethiopia; Chechens in Russia; and Tamils in Sri Lanka. In contrast, groups that used protest or conventional political tactics for

five or more years since 1985 and continued to do so in 1998-2000 include Aborigines in Australia, Croats in Bosnia, indigenous peoples in Brazil, Pashtuns and Sindhis in Pakistan, and Zulus in South Africa.

Table 5.3: Which Minorities Seeking Self-Determination were Most Likely to Rebel in 1998-2000?[1]

Most Important Factors

	Group's Likelihood of Using Sustained, Intense Rebellion (other factors held constant)[2]	Number of Groups Using Sustained, Intense Rebellion (of total number of groups with this trait; other factors not held constant)[3]
Group-level factors		
Persistent past high-level rebellion		
No persistent past high-level rebellion	17%	9 of 104
Persistent past high-level rebellion	77%	31 of 48
Severity of repression facing the group		
No repression	<1%	3 of 51
High-level threats to life	17%	38 of 63
International factors		
Military support from foreign governments		
No military support from foreign governments	17%	16 of 115
Military support from foreign governments	65%	25 of 37

Other Important Factors [4]

	Effect on Likelihood of Group Seeking Self-Determination
Group-level factors	
Greater net increase in support for conventional organizations, 1997-2000	Lowers
Group's claimed homeland is different than its current region of residence	Lowers
Greater recent increase in political restrictions	Increases
High current level of restrictions on both freedom of expression and access to higher office[5]	Increases
Country-level factors	
High current degree of human development	Lowers
Greater recent increase in human development	Increases
International factors	
State receives military support from any external source	Increases
Group receives any type of transnational support from NGOs	Increases
High total magnitude of all conflicts in bordering countries	Lowers

1 Results of bivariate and multivariate analysis of factors that distinguished between the 41 groups that pursued self-determination using sustained, intense rebellion from 114 groups using conventional politics, protest, and sporadic violence (six could not be classified). The analysis examined traits of groups, the societies and countries in which they are situated, and their international environment. Multivariate analyses were run individually at each of these levels of analysis and the most important factors at each level were combined in a final, full multivariate analysis.

2 These values were derived by holding the repression variable constant at its highest level and other factors in the final, full multivariate analysis constant at their average levels, then calculating the percentage contribution of each factor to the probability that a group will use sustained, intense rebellious tactics to pursue their self-determination demands. The severity of repression factor was held constant at its highest as opposed to its mean level because of the unique distribution of cases at the different levels of repression. Nearly all (93%) of the groups using high-level rebellious tactics were also facing the most severe form of repression, while the remaining 6% were facing no repression. To account for this fact, repression was held constant at its highest level.

3 The numbers should be read as follows: 104 groups in the Minorities at Risk dataset lack persistent past high-level rebellion, of which 9 are using high-level rebellion currently, whereas of the 48 groups that have used high-level rebellion persistently in the past, 31 are using such tactics currently as well.

4 The lower section of the table lists factors that were significantly related to the use of high-level rebellion to pursue self-determination demands at each level of analysis, i.e. traits of groups, traits of the countries in which they are situated, and traits of their international environment.

5 This factor indicates the interaction effect between restrictions on a group's freedom of expression and access to higher office. These two political restrictions individually are not significantly related to choice of strategies, but the combined effect of the two is significant.

International support for separatist groups is a second major factor. Groups receiving military support from any foreign government have a sixty-five percent (65%) overall chance of engaging in sustained armed rebellion. Such groups are forty-eight percent (48%) more likely to be engaged in high-level rebellion than groups receiving no military support from any foreign government. Rebellious separatist groups that received such support in 1998-2000 include the Casamançais in Senegal, Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia, Tajiks and Uzbeks in Afghanistan, and Acehnese in Indonesia. The direction of causality is ambiguous because in many instances foreign military support is given to groups already in rebellion. But there is little doubt that such support is important in sustaining such conflicts.

A third, somewhat weaker factor is the severity of repression used against a group with self-determination objectives. Groups targeted for high-level, life-threatening forms of state repression are seventeen percent (17%) more likely to use high-level violent strategies than groups that have not been subjected to any repression. The direction of causality is ambiguous because almost all groups in rebellion are targeted for severe repression. Our evidence illustrates the point that separatist rebellions are very likely to persist despite severe repression, for example among Karens and Shans in Myanmar, Chechens in Russia, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and Cabindans in Angola.

A number of other factors also shape group decisions about whether to rebel or use more conventional political means, though with weaker effects. They are listed in the lower half of Table 5.3. Regional concentration increases the likelihood of rebellion, so do recent increases in political restrictions — though these may be responses rather than preconditions of rebellion. Groups seeking self-determination in countries with high levels of human development are less likely to rebel; those in countries with rapid increases in human development, on the other hand, are more likely to rebel - perhaps because countries in the middle stages of development provide more opportunities and incentives for rebellion than highly-developed countries. Rebellion also is associated with significant external support for states and groups — again, probably responses to rather than precursors of rebellion.

...once a conflict crosses the threshold into rebellion, it is likely to persist.

The results summarized here are the first step in our analyses. They do not offer much help in identifying the circumstances under which groups that have pursued self-determination by peaceful means are likely to shift to rebellion. But they clearly delineate the reinforcing cycle of violence and counter-violence that characterizes many protracted separatist wars: once a conflict crosses the threshold into rebellion, it is likely to persist.

At the same time we have summarized ample evidence that the cycle has been broken in a number of violent self-determination conflicts. In 2001-02 alone, nine such conflicts were contained, as we observed above. The evidence of our case studies suggest that two kinds of factors have been decisive in most such instances — international engagement, often including forceful intervention, and the warring parties' reluctant acceptance, often under external pressure, that more is to be gained by cease-fires, negotiations, and agreements that lead to greater group autonomy within existing states.

By Mark Irving Lichbach

Once upon a time, in a bygone era called the Cold War, citizens' resistance against authority aimed to capture or at least tame state power.[1] Protest occurred in one country at a time, was led by a vanguard grievance group (e.g., workers, blacks, women), and though more-or-less hierarchically organized drew upon community support.

Let's call the old paradigm cold-war or state-centric protest. While it still exists, one of the superpowers is gone and the other is busy reorganizing the world under a new flag called globalization. This latest stage of modernity means that today's markets, cultures, and politics operate not only within countries but also among them. A common and complementary set of global interests (e.g., neoliberal markets), identities (e.g., Western values), and institutions (e.g., political democracy) are congealing under American hegemony.

Some, like Fukuyama, applaud these developments and see them as the end of history. Others believe globalization comes at a price and that they are the losers. Thus diverse groups in civil society seek protection against certain cross-border flows and the institutions encouraging them.

A new kind of dissent – let's call it global-centric or even anti-globalization protest – has emerged.

A new kind of dissent – let's call it global-centric or even anti-globalization protest – has thus emerged. In comparison to dissent during the Cold War, this protest is globalized, diverse, and networked.

Characteristics	Cold War	New World Order
Claims, Targets, Actions	One country	Global
Participants	Vanguard group	Rainbow coalition
Organization	Hierarchy or community	Network

While the exemplar of this new kind of protest is the Battle of Seattle, which occurred between November 30 and December 3, 1999, during the World Trade Organization meetings, the events in Seattle are not the only case. The Battle of Seattle was merely the most visible episode – the tip of the iceberg – in a series of protests that pits proponents of "top-down-globalization," that is, sponsors of multilateral economic institutions associated with efforts to create a neoliberal world order, against advocates of "bottom-up-globalization," that is, activists in a global social movement who contest neoliberalism. As figure 6.1 shows, this movement has used the political opportunities created by international meetings of such multinational economic institutions as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank (WB) to protest neoliberal globalization. The Battle of Seattle was thus preceded by many other protests, for example, against a G-8 meeting in Cologne, and it was followed by many more protests, for example against meetings of the IMF/WB in Washington D.C., the IMF in Prague, the EU in Nice, and the April 2001 Free Trade Area of the Americas meeting in Quebec City.

Figure 6.1: Reported Numbers of Protest Campaigns Outside of Multilateral Economic Institution Meetings and Numbers of Protest Participants, 1994-2001

Number of Protest Participants

Number of Protest Campaigns

Number of Protest Participants

Number of Protest Campaigns

The Battles of Seattles were distributed over space as well as time. In late 1999, some two dozen cities in the U.S., approximately four dozen cities in sixteen countries in the North, and over a dozen cities in seven countries in the South experienced Battles of Seattles or protest events explicitly designed to coincide with the November 30-December 3, 1999 events in Seattle. Anti-globalization protest, in short, was globalized.

Rather than a one-shot and local affair in Seattle anti-globalization protests thus consist of continuing protests against global institutions which involve simultaneously organized activities in cities in the North and the South. A series of master frames for global protest – claims directed against neoliberalism, globalization, corporate power, U.S. hegemony, and capitalism itself – have joined with a series of master global protest targets – international governing institutions – to generate Battles of Seattles sustained over time and space. While the Cold War was characterized by the localization of global conflicts in which national struggles became proxy wars fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, the New World Order is characterized by the globalization of local conflicts in which resistance movements increasingly frame, interpret, and attribute their grievances to neoliberal globalization and its governing institutions.

…the New World Order is characterized by the globalization of local conflicts in which resistance movements increasingly frame their grievances to neo-liberal globalization…

Rainbow Protest Coalition

The Battle in Seattle was able to disrupt the WTO's meeting because of the ability of multiple groups harboring anti-WTO grievances to combine their resources and networks, recruit protest participants, and join together in a rainbow protest coalition. Instead of one or a few groups challenging neoliberal globalization, multiple and simultaneous protests in Seattle mobilized a sense of widespread dissatisfaction. There were three central paths to the protests.

Material Interests. Since the neoliberal world is driven by economics, some suspect that people with economic grievances would be well represented. We define protests based on such material interests as involving groups that primarily resist perceived national-level threats to their existing or future economic well-being. These are the constituencies who want state jobs, subsidies, and rents. Organized labor, public and social service sector employees, rural peasants, and the urban poor think of themselves as materially threatened by economic globalization.

Social Identities. Others suggest that strong identification with old and new collectivities is increasing under globalization. Dissent based on social identities results from personal identification with an ethnic, gendered, or communal group. Strong feelings of attachment to the collectivity bring about a sense of common fate. In response to perceptions of unjust treatment, members are pushed towards group claim-making.

Global Ideals. Still others argue that today's resistance movements pursue Kantian global ideals. Environmentalists seeking to limit state-induced economic growth, peace activists seeking to control state use of military force, human rights advocates seeking to broaden and deepen democracy, economic justice advocates seeking to reduce inequality between the global North and the South, and anarchists seeking to dismantle all forms of hierarchical order perceive neoliberal globalization as a threat.

Table 6.1: Types of Protesters in the Battle of Seattle

Material Interests				Global Ideals		
Organized labor	66.0%	30,000		Environment	11%	5,000
Rural peasantry	0.1%	50		Peace	0.2%	100
Urban poor	0.1%	50		Human Rights	1.0%	500
Social Identities				Economic justice	7.0%	3,000
Nationalist/indigenous/ethnic	1%	500		Anarchists	4.0%	2,000
Religious/spirituality	2%	1,000		**Mixed**		
Gender	0.4%	200		Students	7.0%	3,000

While the protest coalition in Seattle was diverse, table 6.1 shows that teamsters (labor) provided many more foot-soldiers than turtles (environmentalists), who, in turn, greatly outnumbered the identity-oriented groups that have captured the academy's and the media's attention. Protest has evidently changed. In the identity politics of the 1970s and 1980s, labor fought for workers, feminists fought for women, environmentalists fought for whales, human rights advocates fought for prisoners, consumer activists fought for consumers, and global justice advocates fought for the poor. Unlike this one cause-one group approach to dissent, anti-globalization protests today involve groups that cooperate despite different goals and agendas, histories and traditions, and strategies and tactics. As claim-making has become multifaceted and interrelated, coalition has replaced community. The Seattle coalition – a term that has become synonymous with the rainbow protest coalition – thus combined the self-defined losers of globalization.

…the rainbow protest coalition combined the self-defined losers of globalization

Networked

If protest today has been decentered, how have the multiplicity of social groups and the fragmentation of social classes produced rainbow protest coalitions? How do activists coalesce the potpourri of single-issue grievances and groups into a sustained movement?

While protests still draw on hierarchical parties and local communities, the WWW has facilitated the formation of a transnational civil society. Cyberactivism – activist listserves and protest web sites – have carved a global public space that is newsworthy to CNN and other globalized media.

Some data offers intriguing evidence that the WWW has helped create a global network of dissident groups: Outside of Seattle, activist online sources reported many more of the organizations and specific groups involved in the transnational protests than traditional news sources. Web-based activist sources identified 77 social movement organizations protesting outside of Seattle in the USA or international cities, over five times more than the fourteen protest organizations identified by Lexis Nexis. Outside of Seattle, The New York Times reported five SMOs, Global Newsbank two, while the Seattle Times mentioned none. Lexis Nexus, surprisingly, identified the greatest number of SMOs participating in Seattle followed by the Seattle Times. The Seattle Times reported 74 anti-WTO SMOs in Seattle, while the New York Times reported 43, and the Global Newsbank 25. In sum, web-based activist sources contained higher reporting frequencies for SMOs protesting nationally and internationally, while both Lexis Nexis and the Seattle Times reported the greatest number of SMOs protesting locally in Seattle.

To the internet, from the internet. As protesters move online to mobilize diverse groups around the world, conflict researchers will increasingly find that extracting information from activist online sources offers new research opportunities.

…protesters [have moved] online to mobilize diverse groups around the world

Conclusion

Protest nowadays is globalized, diversified, and networked into endless Battles of Seattle. While interesting questions can be asked about the extent of globalization, diversity, and networking in past protests, the politically important questions relate to the future: Will anti-globalization protests continue to join together cities in the North and in the South? Will the rainbow protest coalition's strange bedfellows remain together? And will networks replace hierarchical organizations and local communities as the basis of protest? In short, can a globalized and diverse protest coalition be sustained by networking?

The answers will have major implications for the contemporary world. Just as those of us interested in peace and conflict must track democratization movements, ethnic conflicts, and global crises, we also need to follow anti-globalization protests because they too reflect cracks in the New World Order.

By Jonathan Wilkenfeld

The prominence of the Iraq-US crisis in 2002-03 obscures evidence that the frequency of international crises declined by nearly half in the first decade after the end of the Cold War. International crises, such as Berlin, Cuban Missiles, Angola, India Pakistan Nuclear Tests, are dangerous episodes that can be destabilizing not only to the actors directly involved but also to the entire international system. Crises can present overwhelming challenges to established institutions and belief systems and can change forever the distribution of power within the international system or in a regional subsystem, for example, Munich 1938, Palestine Partition 1947, Dien Bien Phu 1954, UNSCOM Inspections 1997-98. The destabilizing effects of crises, as of internal and international wars, are dangerous to global security. Understanding the causes, evolution, actor behavior, outcomes, and consequences of crises is possible by systematic investigation. This knowledge, in turn, can facilitate efforts by scholars and policy makers to develop better mechanisms for crisis prevention, management, and resolution.

Crises can present overwhelming challenges to established institutions…

An international crisis is identified when it meets two criteria: (1) A change has occurred in the type, and/or an increase in the intensity, of disruptive (hostile verbal or physical) interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities. These changes, in turn, (2) destabilize their relationship and challenge the structure of an international system. When an ***international crisis*** is triggered at the system level, at least one state is experiencing a ***foreign policy crisis***. A state is considered a crisis actor if three conditions are present: Decision makers perceive a threat to basic national values; leaders believe that they must make a decision within a finite period of time; and leaders consider the chances of involvement in military hostilities to be heightened.[1]

The International Crisis Behavior Project, some of whose results are summarized here, aims to shed light on this pervasive phenomenon. To do so we have systematically analyzed the sources, processes, and outcomes of all military-security crises since the end of World War I, within and outside protracted conflicts, and across all continents, cultures, and political and economic systems in the contemporary era. Our methods are both qualitative and quantitative: in-depth studies of perceptions and decisions by a single state; and studies in breadth of the 432 crises that plagued the international system from the end of World War I to 2001, involving the participation of 950 individual states as crisis actors.

The numbers of crises per year increased steadily from 1918 to the late 1980s, as can be seen from the four-year aggregates in figure 7.1. There was a 54% increase in crises per year during the interwar era, characterized by multipolarity (1918-1939), a further 20% increase from bipolarity (1945-1962) to polycentrism (1963-1989), followed by a dramatic 47% *decline* from polycentrism to post-Cold War unipolarity. This recent sharp reduction in the number of international crises per year can be explained in part by the decline in power of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, culminating in its disintegration into 15 independent states, coupled with the emergence of the United States as the dominant military power in the system. These events profoundly affected the nature

1 Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.

While the global system remains dangerous, crises are less often present in [post-Cold War] conflict situations.

and frequency of international crises. While the global system remains dangerous, the defining characteristics of international crises – increased disruptive interactions between two or more adversaries, heightened probability of military hostilities, and a challenge to the structure of the international system, either global, dominant, or sub-system – are less often present in the conflict situations that typify the post-Cold War unipolar era. Instead there is a proliferation of conflicts based on ethnicity, nationality, and religion, most of which – Al Qaeda aside – do not threaten the structure of the international system.

Number of Crises

It is helpful to take a closer look at the crises that began in the immediate post-Cold War international system. Figure 7.2 shows a significant shift in the locus of crises across the century, with Africa and Asia in particular evidencing sharp increases, while there was a sharp decline for Europe. Africa saw its largest increase from 1963 to 1989, when the continent accounted for 45% of all international crises for that era. After the Cold War ended Africa accounted for only 24%. Asian crises went from 34% of the total in the 1945-62 bipolar period, dropped to 16% in the 1963-89 era, and jumped again to 32% in the post-Cold War era. Meanwhile, Europe dropped from 53% of all international crises from 1918-1945, to just 7% in polycentrism and 13% in the post-Cold War era. The Middle East holds steady at about 20% during the entire post-World War II period.

Figure 7.3 amplifies the above trends with data on the eleven states responsible for triggering the largest number of international crises since the end of World War II – together they account for 32% of all crises. The "stars" of the unipolar system since 1990 were Iraq, which triggered five crises in this era (the Gulf War 1990-91, Bubiyan 1991, Iraq Deployment in Kuwait 1994, UNSCOM I 1997-98, and UNSCOM II 1998) – and Pakistan (Kargil 1999, and the India Parliament Attack 2001). In the immediately previous polycentric era, from 1963-1989, the leading triggering states were South Africa, Libya, Israel, Pakistan, and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

Figure 7.2: Location of International Crises in Time and Space

Percentage of Crises

Legend:
- Middle East
- Europe
- Asia
- Americas
- Africa

Time period: 1918 - 1939, 1939 - 1945, 1945 - 1962, 1963 - 1989, 1990 - 2001

International crises are markedly different in the post-Cold War era than those of the previous four decades.

International crises are markedly different in the post-Cold War era than those of the previous four decades. Protracted conflicts, that is, hostile relations between states that extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare, characterized 61% of all crises in the earlier era, but only 50% of post-Cold War international crises, primarily India-Pakistan, Arab-Israel, Taiwan Strait and Korea. Threat as perceived by the crisis actors increased in gravity from high threat levels of 17% for the earlier eras to 32% for the post-Cold War era. Violent crisis management techniques were more prevalent among post-Cold War crises than those that preceded them, 63% versus 55%. Decisive outcomes are less common – perceptions of victory and/or defeat on the part of the actors characterized 47% of the earlier crises, but only 34% of the post-cold War crises. Interestingly, the role of ethnicity has held steady for the entire period from 1945-2001 – it has been a significant factor in about 30% of all crises in each successive era.

One of the more intriguing observations is that mediation characterized only 30% of earlier crises, but was used by the international community in attempting to resolve crises in 60% of post-Cold War crises. This parallels other evidence we report on the general move in recent years toward mediated management of social conflicts.[2] Mediation appears to be particularly prevalent when territorial issues are in contention, when crises are characterized by multiple issues, when ethnicity is involved, when crisis actors are geographically contiguous, when crises occur at the sub-system rather than the dominant system level, and when extreme violence, usually at the level of full-scale war, has occurred.

2 Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen Young, Victor Asal, and David Quinn, "Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, forthcoming.

To summarize, from the perspective of international politics, the system has become less dangerous in the sense that there is a decline in the potential for conflicts to spill over into the international system as hostile interactions among nation states. The crises that do arise are less likely to be embedded in ongoing protracted conflicts. And post-Cold War crises have been far more amenable to mediation on the part of the international community and its various organs. Nevertheless, there are still a number of actors whose propensity to become involved in crises has continued unabated, and the seriousness of many of these crises in terms of levels of threat, the employment of violence in crisis management, and the tendency of some of these crises to involve large numbers of actors – Gulf War, Kosovo, Democratic Republic of Congo – continue to be a concern to the international community well into the first decade of the 21st century.

As we go to press (January 2003), the Iraq/US crisis over weapons of mass destruction and the Iraqi regime appears to be heading toward full-scale war. With the notable exception of the Gulf War, this type of extremely violent conflict appears as an aberration to the trends we have noted in international crises of the post-Cold War era. This may be the inevitable outgrowth of the active US pursuit of hegemony in the international system. As with all trends, we will have to wait for more data points before we will be able to posit the existence of a new pattern of behavior for the international system.

Figure 7.3: Leading Triggering Entities, 1946-2001

Percentage of Total Crises per Period

Legend:
- 1945 - 1962
- 1963 - 1989
- 1990 - 2001

X-axis: South Africa, USSR, Libya, Israel, Iraq, Pakistan, US, China, Nicaragua, Egypt, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

We have documented two very general but competing trends.

The general trends plotted in this report help us to look beyond singular successes and failures of peace-making and democratization to gain perspective. We have documented two very general but competing trends. The first characterized the Cold War. International crises were frequent and often led to military clashes. New societal wars began at a steady pace but seldom were settled and, thus, became protracted and pervasive. Poor countries were very likely to have autocratic governance and experiments with democratization were usually short-lived.

The end of the Cold War signaled the beginning of counter-trends. International crises became less common and more likely to be settled by diplomacy. Many of the protracted wars of the Cold War era ended in negotiated agreements, for example in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. While new societal wars continued to break out in the 1990s, they were more likely to be contained by enduring settlements. Poor countries moved to the forefront in experimenting with open, multi-party electoral systems. Unprecedented numbers of transitional democracies have persisted long past the average life-span of similar regimes during the Cold War decades. The contrasts, and the risks, are striking. The global peace emerging in early 2003 is carrying forty-eight (48) anocratic regimes, thirty-three (33) societies recovering from recently ended wars, and twenty-five (25) societies still locked in violent struggles, with many of these located in poor countries and concentrated in underdeveloped regions. In a more conflictual global setting, countries experiencing these kinds of circumstances have been prone to instability and state failure.

Can the Positive Trends be Sustained?

The downward trend in the total magnitude of global warfare can not continue indefinitely, though barring major shocks, it is likely to continue downward over the short-term. The first years of the new millennium have produced a virtual cascade of peace talks and settlements in civil wars and negotiations in international conflicts. The methodology used to measure the global trend in warfare charted in figure 3.1 requires both an explicit suspension of fighting and an entire year of calm before a specific war ceases to be counted in the trend.[1] This means that the recently negotiated ends of protracted, high-magnitude wars in Angola, Sri Lanka, and Sudan, if they hold through 2003, will almost certainly push the trend downward in the coming year. There is also reason to think that current talks will mark the end of the violent anarchy that has consumed most of Somalia; other long-running armed conflicts also are in various stages of negotiating settlements. Nonetheless, the best that can be expected is for the trend in global warfare to continue to decrease and then level off at some lower level. The threat of violence and war has been a major instrument in both international and domestic politics for a very long time and it would be naïve to think that the option of force would suddenly cease to be used. As the threat of force remains an option, some wars are likely to continue to break out, but they need not escalate nor become protracted.

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1 A breakdown in the peace between former warring parties within four years leads to a reclassification of the event as continuous across the period of reduced fighting.

The interests of global security gain little when problems in one area are simply dispersed or pushed into neighboring areas.

Our previous report recommended perseverance in dealing with armed conflicts that seem most resistant to settlement. These wars are unlikely to end on their own volition but their settlement is crucial to regional security. This perseverance becomes even more important as many of the armed conflicts that comprise "bad neighborhoods" reach settlements. As "neighborhoods" are tamed, militants and spoilers either leave or are pushed into untamed areas, areas that can become the incubators of future conflicts should regional circumstances take a turn for the worse. Countries such as Colombia, Haiti, the former-Yugoslavia, Liberia, Congo-Kinshasa, Somalia, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and North Korea should be seen as the linchpins of regional security, rather than the ghettos of a global community. They should be the focus of what we characterized, in our previous report, as a "three-step mix of *containment* to check war-making capacity, low-key diplomatic and humanitarian *engagement*, and *assistance to neighboring states* to help protect them from spillover effects." The interests of global security gain little when problems in one area are simply dispersed or pushed into neighboring areas. Proactive engagement helps strengthen the moderate agenda in deeply-divided societies and reminds protagonists that the extremist agenda is likely to lead to devastating failure. The contrasting trends of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras provide strong evidence that governing elites and their opponents are susceptible to international influences, whether the message is to engage in uncompromising armed struggle or to accommodate their differences within democratic structures.

Again, barring major shocks, the recent trend in democratization is likely to continue for several years. We can expect an incremental, net increase in the number of democracies. Although some younger democracies may fail, those losses probably will be more than offset by transitions of anocracies and autocracies to greater democracy. The longer a society experiences democracy, the harder it is for an autocratic clique to seize and hold power over it. Only in extraordinary circumstances will empowered citizens shift their preferences away from greater personal liberty to greater public order. An economic collapse or sustained increase in violent conflict can lead to such a shift in preferences. On the other hand, anocratic regimes – those with an unstable mix of autocratic and democratic traits – are numerous and some may shift to more stable, autocratic governance. What we do not expect is a dramatic "fourth wave" of democratization in the foreseeable future. A fourth wave would necessarily involve either the consolidation of full democracies in the poverty-stricken states of Africa or the fall of autocracies in the Middle East or Asia. Waves of positive political change happen when incremental changes are thwarted over a long period of time and, then, released, as they were by the end of the Cold War. Waves of negative change begin when tensions are allowed to build over a long period and, then, are suddenly galvanized by a triggering event. A major downturn in the global economy or an outbreak of major regional war in key venues could trigger the failure of democratization in marginal states with limited peace-building capacity. There is no reason to believe that these scenarios would foster the consolidation of democracy in weak states.

This report also has identified some counter-trends that are cause for concern. One of the most important is the general deterioration of local and regional societal systems as a result of the high magnitude of warfare, both "hot" and "cold," during most of the twentieth century. Weakened and divided societies are both more vulnerable and more volatile; they are crisis-prone and negative change can occur quite quickly. One facet of this general trend has been the extraordinary concentration of health, wealth, and

power in the "zones of peace" and the concentration of quality of life deficits in the "zones of disorder." Another very troubling trend has been the rapid development and proliferation of weapons and military technologies. Our capabilities for mass destruction seriously challenge our capacities for building peace.

Globalization and Tactics of Mass Disruption

The continuing processes of economic and technological globalization are creating an enormously complex, and largely ad hoc, open societal system that seriously challenges the traditional state-system in world politics. Transactions and interactions are expanding far beyond the capacities of governments to monitor, let alone control them. As such, we have seen an explosion in the numbers and types of both inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs), as well as transnational corporations (TNCs).[2] While IGOs are chartered by states to help them administer the increasing breadth and volume of interactions, international NGOs (which have grown in numbers from less than 500 in 1946 to over 15,000 in 2002) are private interest organizations that coordinate actions largely independent of government regulation. NGOs are especially active and intrusive in situations of armed conflict and humanitarian crisis, situations in which states are unlikely to get directly involved and in which IGOs, if they are present, rarely have sufficient mandate or resources. Taken together, IGOs, TNCs, and NGOs have created a complex web of actions, relations, and effects that are poorly understood and only partly coordinated. However inchoate, the trend toward ever greater globalization will not be reversed, except by the worst cataclysm. The self-sufficient "fortress state" is an illusion in the modern world.

Globalization will have major implications for conflict in the new millennium. This is obvious. What is not so obvious is the nature of globalization's effects. One emerging effect has been discussed in this report: new forms of anti-globalization protest. These protests stem from perceptions of inequities and injustices associated with globalization and its agents. Another aspect, mentioned in passing, is the emergence of new forms of anti-globalization rebellion. The anti-colonialization movement of the immediate post-World War II period that, over the course of thirty years (1946-1975), resulted in the independence of a large number of mainly Asia and African countries may be considered the first anti-globalization rebellion.[3] That movement was a rebellion against a particular form of direct foreign domination and it ended with decolonization, although its repercussions are still felt in many parts of the world.

We may be witnessing the beginning of a second anti-globalization rebellion. The professed vision of the al Qaeda terrorist network is essentially anti-globalization. And the US-led "war on terrorism" closely resembles a global anti-insurgency campaign. Regardless of the interpretation, this unfolding "global war" has serious implications for world politics. Globalization has created a vast, amorphous, and intricate web of new linkages that are increasingly vulnerable to tactics of mass disruption. Thomas

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2 It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss the myriad effects that TNCs have on societies, states, and international relations. Suffice to say that there are TNCs that control volumes of economic activity that surpass the gross domestic products of most non-Western states.

3 Some may consider the rise of Communism or Fascism as earlier forms of "anti-globalization protest and rebellion." We consider these to be revisionist movements in that they involved regimes that accepted globalization but sought to replace established powers and establish themselves as its leader(s).

Friedman has coined the term "super-empowered individual" to refer to the increased technical capabilities of individuals to move about and to disrupt the new and emerging global systems.

Terrorism has always been a tactic of mass disruption. It requires little investment, modest expertise, and no mass organization but its capacity to disrupt is enormous, especially with the relatively unfettered access to new technologies that corresponds with trends in democratization and globalization. Terrorism is often used as a tactic by a relatively weak rebel group that wants to inflict harm on their opponent without risking a direct military confrontation with the opponent's much stronger force. Terrorism is most successful when it manages to capture the collective imagination and is most effective when unexpected. It uses the media to broadcast an image of threat that can stimulate preoccupation with personal security and, consequently, a serious distortion in immediate priorities, an effect far out of proportion to the actual threat of physical harm.

Terrorism is an essentially personal act and, as such, it is highly localized and xenophobic. A study of terrorism covering the ten years prior to the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda attacks in the US found that "distant-international" terrorism (i.e., attacks by terrorists in countries that do not share a border with the terrorists' home country) accounted for only about a half of one percent of all terrorism-related deaths.[4] Curiously, the general trend in international terrorism shows a substantial decline in both the number of incidents and number of deaths from the 1980s to the 1990s (up to the September 11, 2001 attacks).[5] Terrorism, as a form of rebellion, lives and breeds from the attention it receives. The real danger posed by terrorism is its potential for instigating the polarization, radicalization, and escalation of conflict. The transformation of the "global war on terrorism" to a "clash of civilizations," a transformation which has already gained prominence in war rhetoric, would most certainly lead to a major reversal of established trends in warfare, democratization, and prosperity.

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The Future in the Balance

This report has charted strongly positive trends. Civil wars that grew increasingly commonplace during the long Cold War period seem out of place in the new millennium. Respect for human rights has been elevated to a standard obligation of states in world politics. Rigid autocracies, narrow self-interests, restricted participation, and controlled information have given way to open, multiparty electoral systems, cosmopolitan agendas, empowered populations, and information superhighways. But these positive developments have not reached everyone nor benefited all equally. Globalization also has its downside. Resistance to the West's ascendancy, the rise of global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and decisions to counter these threats by unilateral and military means threaten to reverse many of the gains of the 1990s. How we choose to respond to these emerging threats now will have major implications for the future trends in peace and conflict.

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4 More details are given in Monty G. Marshall, "Global Terrorism: An Overview and Analysis," study commissioned by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, contract #7577 UN/DESA/DSPD/SIB; available in electronic format from the INSCR Web site at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/papers.

5 This analysis uses the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) data series, 1968-2001, Todd Sandler and Peter A. Fleming, principal investigators (TSPFI project). Average annual numbers of deaths in international terrorist incidents decline by over forty percent beginning in the early 1990s; average annual numbers of incidents decline by over fifty percent beginning in the mid-1990s.

This table identifies all active instances of societal armed conflicts as of mid-December 2002 and changes in the status of these conflicts since our previous report, published in 2001. It has been compiled from ongoing work in tracking global armed conflicts being done by the Armed Conflict and Intervention (ACI) project, a joint project of CIDCM and the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP). The ACI research provides general magnitude scores for all major armed conflicts since 1946 (the same magnitude scores used to construct global trends graphs in text figure 1). The full list can be found at the CSP Web page: http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm; see *Peace and Conflict 2001*, table 3, for brief descriptions of all major armed societal conflicts over the period 1995-2000.

Conflict Type and Magnitude Scores: Each of the major armed societal conflicts listed below are categorized by "conflict type" as Communal, Ethnic, Political, and/or International. Communal armed conflicts involve fighting between militants from local, often ethnic, communities without direct involvement by the central state; the state is a central conflict actor in the other three conflict types. The challenging group(s) in the "ethnic" conflict category is/are identified in parentheses following the conflict type. General magnitude scores are provided for each episode listed. The magnitude numbers listed represent a scaled, categorical indicator of the destructive impact of the violent episode on the directly-affected society, similar to that used to gauge the destructive power of storms and earthquakes. The scale ranges from 1 (low damage and limited scope) to 10 (total destruction). Magnitude scores reflect the widest range of warfare's consequences to both short-term and long-term societal well-being, including direct and indirect deaths and injuries; sexual and economic predation; population dislocations; damage to cooperative social enterprises and networks; diminished environmental quality, general health, and quality of life; destruction of capital infrastructure; diversion of scarce resources; and loss of capacity, confidence, and future potential. The magnitude scores are considered to be consistently assigned across episodes and types of warfare and for all societies directly affected by the violence, thereby facilitating comparisons of war episodes and charting trends. A detailed explanation of the categorical magnitude scores is provided in the source noted in section 3 (note 1) and on the CSP Web page: http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warcode.htm. If a societal conflict is linked to an armed interstate conflict, that conflict and its magnitude are identified in italics at the end of the listing.

Current Status of the armed conflicts was assessed as of mid-January, 2003. Only those armed conflicts that were considered ongoing or sporadic at press time and those whose categorical status had changed since our previous assessments were published in *Peace and Conflict 2001* are described below. General status categories used are as follows: **Ongoing** armed conflicts involve active, coordinated military operations and are further assessed as high, medium, or low intensity (in parentheses).[1] **Sporadic** indicates that occasional militant clashes or terrorist incidents occur but there is no evidence of sustained challenges. **Repressed** indicates

that sufficient armed force has been deployed to contain serious challenges by the opposition despite the fact that the underlying source of the conflict remains serious and unresolved. **Suspended** indicates that serious armed conflict has been suspended for a substantial period due to stalemate, ceasefire, or peace settlement; all suspended conflicts are considered tentative until the suspension of armed conflict has persisted for four or more years, as it often takes that long to fully implement the terms of the settlement. Suspended status may be qualified as tenuous (in parentheses) if substantial numbers of armed fighters on either side have rejected or ignored the terms of the suspension but are not now openly challenging the peace with serious attacks. Repressed conflicts, as they rely on enforcement without a negotiated settlement, are considered tenuous by definition.

Suspended and Repressed Conflicts

Nineteen (19) armed societal conflicts were listed in our 2001 report as having been suspended since 1995. We are pleased to report that open hostilities in all but one of these conflicts remained suspended at the end of 2002. These suspended conflicts include the following cases (the year the conflict was suspended is noted in parentheses). **Political wars (5):** Albania (1997); Cambodia (1998); Guinea-Bissau (1999); Lesotho (1998); and Tajikistan (1997). **Ethnic wars (10):** Azerbaijan, Armenians (1997); Bangladesh, Chittagong Hill Tribes (1997); Bosnia, Croats, Muslims, Serbs (1996); Croatia, Serbs (1995); Georgia, Abkhazians (1998); Iraq, Kurds (1996); Moldova, Trans-Dneister Slavs (1997); Niger, Tuaregs (1997); Papua New Guinea, Bougainvilleans (1998); and Yugoslavia, Albanians (1999). The suspension of the ethnic conflict in East Timor (Indonesia) resulted in that region's independence in May 2002. One of the suspended conflicts had both **political and ethnic war (1)** qualities: Guatemala, Mayans (1996) and one had **interstate and ethnic war (1)** qualities: Eritrea-Ethiopia, Oromo (2000). The issues defining these societal conflicts remain salient to varying degrees; their future salience is tied to improvements in the quality of group relations and/or the full implementation of peace agreements. One previously suspended political war in Congo-Brazzaville increased to sporadic violence in 2002 (see below).

Five (5) armed societal conflicts were listed as having been repressed in our earlier report. These conflicts remain repressed in late 2002, except the **political and ethnic war (1)** in Peru (indigenous peoples, 1997) which should now be considered "suspended" since that country's return to electoral democracy in early 2002. The conflicts that continue to be repressed are the **political war (1)**

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1 *The "intensity" designation of armed societal conflicts differs from the more general "magnitude" measures, both of which are listed in Appendix table 1 , and from the level of "hostilities" noted in Appendix table 2 that follows. Intensity refers to the tenor of actual armed conflicts in late 2002; magnitude refers to the general societal effects of an armed conflict episode over its entire course; hostilities refer to the general, operational strategies of conflict interaction (see pp. 27-28).*

in Egypt (Islamicists; 1999) and the ethnic wars (3) in China, Uighers (1997); Iraq, Shi'as (1998); and Pakistan, Sindhis and Muhajirs (1998). Repressed conflicts usually rely on a continuation of strong repressive measures, at least until the salience and incentive structures driving the underlying dispute can be transformed.

Fighting suspended or repressed since *Peace and Conflict 2001*

The following nine (9) armed societal conflicts appear to have been suspended or repressed since the publication of our previous report. The suspension of open warfare and the transformation of group relations to non-violent, conventional politics is a long and difficult process that is highly vulnerable to reversals and the return to armed force. Crucial to the outcome of both armed conflicts and their settlement are the global political climate and the willingness of influential international actors to encourage, support, and facilitate the peace process. Suspension often begins with a negotiated ceasefire and depends on the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive peace settlement. Many ceasefires fail to bring agreements and many agreements are not fully implemented. As such, all parties to suspensions of open warfare, particularly warfare of long duration and high magnitude, must demonstrate their commitment to the peace process and the viability of the conflict resolution over the medium- to long-term. Repressed warfare, on the other hand, may require the state to maintain a strong military and police presence in the disturbed areas for a long period of time. Of the following conflicts, three seem especially ripe for long-term settlement: Angola, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Three suspensions were arrived at too recently to demonstrate any real commitment to changing the nature of conflict behavior and policy: Congo-Kinshasa (various factions), Indonesia (Aceh), and Sudan (southern Africans); these conflicts are listed in the "sporadic" or "ongoing" conflict sections. Some of the more protracted conflicts, such as that in Congo-Kinshasa, may be too broad, too deep, and too complex for practical solutions based on comprehensive agreements and, thus, continue to defy the concerted efforts and best intentions of parties interested in settling them. If current, positive, global trends continue, and the level of international commitment to conflict resolution and recovery remains strongly proactive, the majority of the new conflict settlements identified below may be successfully managed.

Angola   Political / *Magnitude: 6*

(suspended, March 2002) The death of the leader of the rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Jonas Savimbi, in February 2002 marked a critical juncture in the devastating civil war that has wracked Angola since its independence in 1975. Fighting largely ended in March 2002 and the signing of a peace agreement in August, which recommitted the rebels and the government to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, signaled a strong commitment to end the protracted societal war. Perhaps more important than any commitments on paper (which have been broken many times in the past), the weakening of UNITA's tactical capabilities and the government's overwhelming military advantage will most likely keep the rebels in check and prevent the recurrence of the civil war. Risks remain, however, as the government is faced with demobilizing and reintegrating 85,000 UNITA fighters into society and establishing law and order over areas that remain violent and lawless, includ-

ing the diamond areas in the northeast. Also of concern is Cabinda, an oil-rich enclave separated from the Angola mainland, where the government has been faced with a low-intensity rebellion by the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC).

Chad   Political/Ethnic (Toubou) / *Magnitude: 4*

(suspended, January 2002) The Chadian government and the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT), with Libyan mediation, signed a peace accord in January 2002. Although there were reports of some minor clashes in late 2002 following the death of the MDJT leader in a landmine accident, the peace process appeared to remain on track in late 2002.

Comoros   Political / *Magnitude: 1*

(suspended/tenuous, December 2001) The suspension of open hostilities in the Union of Comoros following the adoption of a new constitution in December 2001 remains tentative as power struggles continue to plague the islands of Grand Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli. Anjouan had declared its independence in August 1997, followed by Moheli. After an earlier agreement failed to end the dispute, the Fomboni agreement was forged in August 2000 under the auspices of the OAU; this agreement led to the December 2001 constitutional referendum that created a loose federation of the three islands. The April 2002 runoff elections for Union president were boycotted by the opposition candidates handing the victory to Col. Azali Assoumani, who had originally seized power in a 1999 coup. Following the elections, there was a confrontation between the Union president and the president of Grand Comore, an opponent of Assoumani, regarding overlapping power over the Union's main island.

Indonesia   Communal (Dayaks-Madurese) / *Magnitude: 1*

(suspended, March 2001) Fighting first broke out between Madurese and Dayaks in West Kalimantan in 1996-1997 when 500 people, mostly Dayaks, were killed. Since then there have been three major massacres by the indigenous Dayaks against the Madurese, who originally emigrated from the island of Madura in the 1960s as part of a government-ordered relocation program. The communal conflict escalated in February and March 2001 as Dayak militants, with the avowed aim of driving them off the island, attacked Madurese communities, killing over 1000 persons. As a result, more than 75,000 Madurese were evacuated by government authorities to other islands before the violence ended.

Rwanda   Ethnic (Hutu) / *Magnitude: 3*

(repressed, July 2001) Tutsi rebels who seized control of the government in 1994 following a massive genocide orchestrated by extremists in the Hutu-dominated government also succeeded in driving large numbers of the Hutu Interahamwe militants into neighboring regions of Zaire (now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC; listed here as Congo-Kinshasa). In May 2001, a faction of the Interahamwe militia, known as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (Alir), launched major incursions into northwestern Rwanda. This was the first attack by the Hutu rebels into Rwanda in over one-and-a-half years. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) decisively quelled the incursions by July 2001, killing as many as 2,500 rebels and capturing the same number, including the Alir chief of staff. Alir plans for a second attack in late 2001 from bases in Burundi were effectively preempted by RPA forces. Armed Hutu militants maintain a strong presence in the Kivu region of the DRC and continue to

pose a serious threat for the Rwandan government.

Senegal
Ethnic (Casamance) / Magnitude: 1

(suspended, December 1999) The southern Casamance region remains mostly calm following a negotiated ceasefire in December 1999 and subsequent peace agreement signed in March 2001 between the rebel group, Movement of Casamance Democratic Forces (MFDC), and the newly-elected government of President Wade. The MFDC had waged a low intensity separatist conflict against the hegemonic control of the Senegalese Socialist Party (PS) since the early 1980s. Multi-party elections in 2000 unseated the PS leadership in Senegal and created an opportunity to pursue a settlement to the conflict.

Sierra Leone
Political/Ethnic (Mandingo) / Magnitude: 3

(suspended, May 2001) No new fighting was reported in 2002. In May 2001, a UN-brokered peace agreement was signed with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group in the hope of ending ten years of societal warfare. In January 2002, the government announced completion of the mandated disarmament of the RUF forces and in March the state of emergency was lifted. May 2002 general elections, generally free of violence and considered fair by international observers, strongly endorsed the government of President Kabbah and his Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) that was first elected in 1996 and credited with ending the war. However, future stability remains challenged by central government weakness, fighting in regional neighbors Liberia and Ivory Coast, repatriation of large numbers of refugees, and tensions over the control of the diamond-producing region.

Sri Lanka
Ethnic (Tamils) / Magnitude: 5

(suspended/tenuous, February 2002) December 2001 elections, reported to be one of the island state's most violent, resulted in the formation of a new ruling coalition led by the United National Party (UNP). The new government quickly implemented its conciliatory agenda, including a willingness to negotiate with the separatist rebels, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The two sides agreed to an internationally monitored ceasefire in February 2002 that has held despite some scattered clashes. Negotiations, held in Norway, continued through 2002 and resulted in the first formal agreement (December 2002) between the warring parties to commit to ending the war and institute a federal system in Sri Lanka. While the expressed willingness of the LTTE to accept regional autonomy was a major contribution to the peace process, deep divisions remain between the LTTE, UNP, and the former ruling coalition, the People's Alliance and, so, progress toward a final peace settlement remains tenuous.

Turkey
Ethnic (Kurds) / Magnitude: 3

(suspended, September 1999) The capture of the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, in February 1999 and the requirement of human rights reform as a precondition for consideration of Turkey's (1987) application for membership in the European Union has led to a transformation of the PKK and its strategy of armed rebellion to one emphasizing popular protest and conventional politics. As a further development, the PKK re-formed, in April 2002, as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (Kadek). However, little improvement has been made in the treatment of the Kurdish population; its leaders are still subjected to mass arrest; and progress toward the legal recognition of the Kurdish language and cultural rights has remained stalled. Increasing US interest in neighboring Iraq and support for Iraqi Kurds in 2002 has also increased pressure on Turkey to moderate its policies toward the Kurdish minority.

Sporadic Societal Armed Conflicts

Eleven (11) armed conflicts were reported as experiencing sporadic armed clashes in our previous report. Of these eleven conflicts, three are considered to have been suspended or repressed (Chad, Rwanda, and Senegal; see above) since 2000 and two are considered to have intensified to open warfare (Algeria and Liberia; see below). Six of the armed conflicts continue to experience sporadic outbursts of fighting (India, Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Somalia, and Uganda); descriptions of recent activity in these conflicts follow.

India
Ethnic/Communal (NE Provinces) / Magnitude: 2

Conflicts in India's northeast provinces have involved many of the region's ethnic groups and several of these conflicts have flared into open violence at various times through the post-independence period. Pressure over control of land and resources and encroachments by central authorities into traditional cultures have resulted in a complex dynamic of communal competition and rebellion. Several of the main tribal areas have been at least partly accommodated by autonomy and regional administration agreements. Large influxes of Bengali immigrants have triggered the rise of militant organizations that use violence in an attempt to limit immigration and maintain local control. The most active groups in 2002 have been the ethnic-Bodo militants and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) terrorist group. In the past year, there has been an increase in activity among peasant, insurgent groups (commonly referred to as Naxalites) in the area along the western border with Bangladesh (Bihar and West Bengal) coincident with the increase in fighting in 2002 in neighboring Nepal.

Indonesia
Ethnic (Aceh) / Magnitude: 1

Following the failed implementation of a January 2001 regional autonomy agreement, Free Aceh Movement (GAM) militants and Indonesian armed forces engaged in renewed violence. Although President Megawati Sukarnoputri had pledged, as recently as August 2002, to crush the GAM rebellion, the Indonesian government responded to intense international pressure and signed a new regional peace and autonomy measure with the GAM leadership in Geneva in December 2002. Several difficult issues, such as the disarmament of the rebels, were left to future negotiations and the commitment to peace remains untested.

Iraq
International (US and UK) / Magnitude: 1

United States and British warplanes continue to patrol the skies over large sections of Iraqi territory, the proclaimed "no fly zones" designed to protect the Kurd minority in the north and the larger Shia population in the south following Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War. Iraqi air defenses continue to track and fire upon patrol flights, prompting aerial attacks on ground targets. Attacks escalated in 1998 and have increased in 2002, along with increases in general tensions regarding the quality of Iraq's compliance with UN Security Council resolutions.

Philippines
Political / Magnitude: 3

Hostilities continue to increase between the government and the New People's Army (NPA), especially as the US once again increases its military presence in the Philippines. The government

has tried to dampen the conflict by assurances that US assistance, directed at Muslim militants, would not be used against the NPA. Both the NPA and the Muslim militants have been operating mainly in Mindanao.

Somalia · Political / *Magnitude: 5*

Sporadic armed clashes continued to plague Somalia in 2002; many of the more serious factional clashes occurred in the capital city, Mogadishu, which has been carved up among rival warlords and forces loyal to the Transitional National Government (TNG) which was formed in September 2000. Various regions of Somalia have emerged with fairly stable regional administrations from the intense violence that tore the country apart in 1991, including Somaliland (1991), Puntland (1998), and Southwestern Somalia (2002). The TNG and several factions signed a joint ceasefire agreement in December 2002 with hopes of ending armed clashes in Mogadishu. Peace talks in Eldoret, Kenya were ongoing and progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement was reported in late 2002.

Uganda · Political/Ethnic (Langi and Acholi) / *Magnitude: 1*

The ongoing conflict in north Uganda defies conventional analysis as the main rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), has established a fairly secure base of operations in the troubled area across the border in the Sudan. The LRA has been preying mainly on the very large refugee and internally displaced populations in the region. A December 1999 agreement between Sudan and Uganda to cooperate in lessening the strength of armed rebel factions in the border regions led to a March 2002 agreement allowing Uganda armed forces to attack LRA bases in south Sudan. One immediate result of the Ugandan offensive in Sudan was an increase in LRA attacks in north Uganda. The March 2002 agreement was extended in December 2002 to allow Ugandan forces access to Sudan territory until the end of January 2003.

Changed to Sporadic since *Peace and Conflict 2001*

The intensity of seven (7) societal conflicts changed to Sporadic since our previous report. In four of the conflicts listed below, the intensity of the fighting appeared to be diminishing in late 2002: Afghanistan, Indonesia (Christian-Muslim), Myanmar, and Nigeria. In three other conflicts, violence appeared to be increasing: Congo-Brazzaville (previously suspended, 1999) India (Hindu-Muslim; new outbreak), and the United States (international violence, al Qaeda attacks; new outbreak).[2]

Afghanistan · Political/Ethnic (non-Pushtuns) / *Magnitude: 1*

(from Ongoing-High) Fighting in Afghanistan has decreased substantially since the forces of the Northern Alliance, with the considerable support, including intense aerial bombardments, of the US and its coalition forces, succeeded in ousting the Pashtun-dominated Taliban regime in late 2001. An interim government was established in December 2001. A June 2002 meeting of a Loya Jirga (the traditional assembly) established the Transitional

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2 *We also considered listing the armed conflict in the Central African Republic that began in October 2002 with an attack by rebel forces led by Gen. Bozize against the government of President Patasse in the aftermath of the failed coup of May 2001. At the time of this writing, the fighting in the C.A.R. did not appear to have reached the level of magnitude for inclusion in the list of major armed conflicts.*

Authority (TA) and elected Hamid Karzai as president. The TA is expected to rule for 18 months before a general election is held. Security for the TA is provided by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), composed of troops from more than 18 countries, but the authority and capabilities of the central government remain limited. Most of the country has come under the direct control of regional warlords. Ethnic rivalries remain strong and the situation remains tense despite the strong international presence.
International (United States)/Magnitude: 4 (2001)

Congo-Brazzaville · Political / *Magnitude: 3*

(from Suspended) Hostilities erupted in Congo at the end of March 2002, when several government military positions in the Pool region were attacked by Ninja militias. The renewed fighting followed March 2002 presidential elections; both Ninja and Cocoye militias had backed leaders opposing President Sassou-Nguesso's 1997 seizure of power. Ninja spokespersons claimed the clashes were provoked when they discovered government plans to arrest their leader, the Rev. Frederic Bitsangou (alias Ntoumi). There had been no fighting in Congo since a peace agreement was signed in November 1999 ending two years of warfare. The current fighting has been concentrated in the Pool region of the country, just northwest of Brazzaville.

India · Communal (Hindus-Muslims) / *Magnitude: 1*

(new outbreak) Widespread communal violence erupted in the western state of Gujarat in late February 2002 between Muslims and Hindus. It was the most intense communal rioting involving India's two main confessional communities since country-wide communal riots that were connected with the Ayodyha Movement during the period 1989-93. The violence was sparked when a Muslim mob attacked a train carrying Hindu activists, killing 58 people. Following that incident over 1000 people, mostly Muslims, were killed in communal rioting across Gujarat. The BJP-dominated (Hindu-nationalist party) state administration and police did little to quell the violence. In September 2002 an attack on the Swaminarayan Hindu temple in Gandhinagar by suspected Islamic militants left at least 30 people dead. Unlike the February events, the Indian central government quickly stepped in, deploying approximately 3,000 army personnel to stave off another round of retaliatory violence. December 2002 state elections in Gujarat were won by the BJP and communal tensions remain high.

Indonesia · Communal (Muslims-Christians) / *Magnitude: 1*

(from Ongoing-Low) Muslim-Christian communal rioting first erupted in Ambon in January 1999 and quickly escalated as (Muslim) Laskar Jihad militias converged on the islands on the Moluccas and Sulawesi. Despite the signing of peace agreements by Christian and Muslim communal leaders in Sulawesi, December 2001, and the Moluccas, February 2002, serious communal clashes continued to occur through 2002.

Myanmar · Ethnic (Non-Burmans) / *Magnitude: 4*

(from Ongoing-Low) The ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, formerly the State Law and Order Restoration Council) maintains its repressive hold on power, however, the SPDC has moved haltingly toward political pluralism by opening dialogue with the main opposition movement, the National League for Democracy (NLD) under pressure from international donors. The opening has not extended to relations with the vari-

ous non-Burman ethnic groups residing in the border regions, which remain outside the conventional political process. Sporadic clashes with ethnic militias continue, particularly with the Shan, Karen, and Karenni groups, which have established de facto autonomy over traditional lands.

Nigeria — Communal / *Magnitude: 1*

(from Ongoing-Low) Nigeria is one of the most ethnically-diverse countries in Africa and it has been plagued by communal conflicts since independence. Most recently these communal clashes have been concentrated in the oil-producing Delta region and, more importantly, along the north-south divide between Muslim and Christian confessional groups. Since the movement to impose Shari'a law in the northern Muslim states gained momentum in 1999, many thousands have died in communal clashes in the central plains region of Nigeria. The clashes, mainly involving ethnic-Hausa (Muslim) and ethnic-Yorubas (Christian), generally diminished in 2002 but broke out once again in Kaduna in November 2002 and quickly spread in reaction to the scheduled holding of the Miss World beauty pageant in Abuja.

United States — International (al Qaeda) / *Magnitude: 1*

On September 11, 2001, two hijacked commercial airliners were intentionally crashed, one into each of the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York; the skyscrapers consequently collapsed. One other airliner was crashed into Defense Department headquarters (the Pentagon) in the nation's capital and another crashed into a Pennsylvania field when passengers succeeded in thwarting the hijackers plans. Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against US targets, mainly in foreign locations, continue.

Ongoing Societal Armed Conflicts

The 2001 list of major armed societal conflicts reported seventeen (17) such wars were ongoing in late 2001 at one of three general levels of intensity: Low (8), Medium (4), or High (5). Of these conflicts, nine (9) are considered to be ongoing at the end of 2002, with two (Philippines and Israel) designated as Low intensity and seven as Medium intensity (Burundi, Colombia, Congo-Kinshasa, India, Nepal, Russia, and Sudan); there were no conflicts listed as High intensity in late 2002. There are two conflicts that increased in intensity from sporadic since the previous report: Algeria and Liberia; and there was one new outbreak of major armed societal conflict in Ivory Coast.

Algeria — Political / *Magnitude: 4*

(Low; from Sporadic) The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (a splinter group of the GIA that objected to its strategy of targeting civilians; GSPC) continue their violent campaigns to undermine the secular government. In 1999 voters approved President Bouteflika's plan to negotiate a peace settlement with the armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and accepted his decision to offer a general amnesty to all Islamic guerrillas who would lay down their guns. The GIA and GSPC refused the offer and continue to wage war against the central government.

Burundi — Ethnic (Hutu) / *Magnitude: 4*

(Medium) Peace remains elusive as efforts to reach a general cease-fire failed to gain approval by the country's two main rebel groups, Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) and National Liberation Forces (FNL). Continued fighting undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the transitional government that was instituted in November 2001. Settlement of the conflict has been further complicated by splits in the rebel movements and factional fighting.

Colombia — Political / *Magnitude: 4*

(Medium) Peace talks initiated by President Pastrana collapsed in February 2002 after more than four years of on-and-off negotiations. The army recaptured the demilitarized zone that had been granted to the rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in the southern part of the country. Violence had been fairly constant throughout the negotiations, which appeared unable to bring a definitive resolution to the more than 30 years of civil war. In response to the government offensive, FARC initiated a counter-offensive and, further, attempted to disrupt April 2002 elections. One of newly-elected President Uribe's first acts was to declare a "state of emergency" and, with considerable backing by the US, abandon negotiations in favor of counter-insurgency policies. The new strategy appears to focus on diminishing the strength of FARC by the use of military force against rebel strongholds and undermining its financial base by destroying coca crops. The smaller rebel faction, the National Liberation Army (ELN), has kept a low profile in 2002, while the main right-wing paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces (AUC), disbanded and re-formed under pressure in July 2002 due to its reputation for serious human rights violations.

Congo-Kinshasa — Political/Ethnic/International / *Magnitude: 5*

(Medium; from Ongoing-High) The Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) has fractured into four distinct regions since armed rebellion first flared in September 1996 forcing the fall of the long-standing and corrupt Mobutu central regime in May 1997. The coalition of rebel forces that brought Laurent Kabila to power in 1997 quickly disintegrated and violence resumed. Kabila himself was assassinated in January 2001 and was replaced by his son Joseph Kabila. The presence of large numbers of fighters and refugees from armed conflicts in neighboring states and the active involvement of troops from several regional states has further complicated the situation. Strong international pressure on the warring parties has led to a string of ceasefire and peace agreements including the Lusaka peace accord in August 1999, negotiated withdrawals of foreign troops, and, most recently, the December 2002 power-sharing agreement signed in Pretoria but an end to the fighting remains elusive. At the end of 2002, the northern quadrant, controlled by the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), and the eastern quadrant, controlled by the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), were the main centers of opposition to the central government. The southeast quadrant is characterized by an uneasy alliance between the central regime and rebels from Rwanda and Burundi. The central government controls the west. Fighting continues to plague the eastern region near the borders with Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. Fighting has also erupted around Kisangani, which lies sandwiched between the MLC- and RCD-controlled regions, and in Kantanga province in response to moves by the central government to expand its authority and disarm rebel militias.

India — Ethnic (Kashmiris) / *Magnitude: 3*

(Medium) India's strategy of creating peace and stability in the disputed Kashmir territory from within (i.e., attempting to legitimize its administration over the territory by holding democratic

elections and engaging in dialogue with the local authorities over self-rule and governance issues) continued to be undermined by Muslim militant groups that seek to either establish an independent Kashmiri state or bring it under rule by Pakistan. Attacks by Islamist militants on the Kashmiri legislative assembly in late September 2001 and on India's parliament building in December 2001 drastically raised tensions between India and Pakistan. Persistent infiltration from Pakistan and attacks by Kashmiri separatists brought the two countries to the brink of interstate war in May-June 2002.

Israel/Palestine — Ethnic (Palestinians) / *Magnitude: 1*

(Low) Violent confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis continued with only short spells of relative calm since the latest outbreak of the Palestinian "Intifada" (uprising) in September 2000. By late December 2002 the renewed violence had claimed over 2000 lives, the majority of them Palestinians. Both sides have escalated their tactics, with Palestinians using suicide-bombings of mainly civilian targets and Israelis enforcing containment, mounting military invasions of Palestinian enclaves, and launching preemptive attacks on Palestinian militants. Further complicating the situation has been a standoff regarding the status of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, his administration of the Palestinian territories, and the Israeli government's refusal to negotiate with him.

Ivory Coast — Political / *Magnitude: 1*

(Low; new outbreak) The current situation in Ivory Coast first began to unravel in December 1999 with a military coup that ousted corrupt President Bedie. When coup leader General Guei attempted to thwart October 2000 presidential elections by first disqualifying the most popular candidates and then nullifying the results, massive demonstrations ensued and a little known politician, Laurent Gbagbo, was sworn in as president. A second, violent confrontation occurred in December 2000 when legislative elections were marred by political maneuvering. After a failed coup attempt in January 2001, all parties pledged to work toward reconciliation. The reconciliation ended with an apparent coup attempt in September 2002, which was quickly followed by the killing of General Guei; these events triggered an eruption of open warfare. A rebel group, calling themselves the Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI), seized control of several areas in the north. In November 2002, two new groups emerged and took control of territory in the west: Movement for Peace and Justice (MPJ) and the Popular Ivorian Movement for the Great West (MPIGO). Peace talks among the warring factions have so far been unable to quell the fighting.

Liberia — Political / *Magnitude: 1*

(Low; from Sporadic) The loose coalition of rebel forces, known as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), continued to challenge Charles Taylor's control of the state. LURD first emerged as a rebel group after entering northwestern Liberia in July 2000 from bases in Guinea. Since then, LURD has made several attempts to drive deeper into Liberian territory with the aim of taking the capital, Monrovia, and overthrowing Taylor. In February 2002, a rebel offensive approached the capital, Monrovia, and the government declared a "state of emergency." Complicating the situation is the presence in Liberia of remnants of the RUF guerrilla group from neighboring Sierra Leone who are allied with the Taylor regime.

Nepal — Political / *Magnitude: 2*

(Medium, from Ongoing-Low) The six-year low-level insurgency, or "People's War," led by the United People's Front (UPF) and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) intensified in November 2001 and continued at this higher level through 2002. Several events precipitated the increased fighting. The government headed by Prime Minister Deuba had pursued a conciliatory approach with the rebel group since 1996 but, after the June 2001 murders of popular King Birendra and his immediate family under suspicious circumstances and the ascension of his brother Gyanendra to the throne, peace talks broke down and the rebels launched an offensive in November 2001. A "state of emergency" was imposed. During 2002, King Gyanendra consolidated power by first dissolving parliament in May 2002 and then dismissing the entire government in October 2002 and replacing it with an interim government comprising his supporters. The Maoists have vowed to oust the monarchy.

Philippines — Ethnic (Moro) / *Magnitude: 3*

(Low) The transition of power from President Estrada to his vice-president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo prompted a significant change in the government's policy toward the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which broke from the main Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) following its signing of an earlier peace agreement and continued to seek an independent Muslim state in Mindanao. In 2000 Estrada had adopted a hardline policy against the MILF and launched a military offensive against them. Arroyo, however, initiated a more conciliatory path. Peace talks between the government and MILF began in May 2001 and a ceasefire was signed in August 2001. The peace process stalled, however, in early 2002 as a splinter, extremist group, Abu Sayyaf, staged high profile attacks on civilian targets and the United States extended its global war on terrorism to the Philippines.

Russia — Ethnic (Chechens) / *Magnitude: 4*

(Medium; from Ongoing-Low) The armed conflict between the Russian government and separatist rebels in the republic of Chechnya resumed in autumn 1999 and fighting continued through 2002, despite intense efforts by Russia to crush the rebel forces and force an end to the war. The continuing war has led to increased friction with neighboring Georgia which has been accused of harboring rebel forces. Chechen militants, once again, have expanded the range of their attacks to targets outside Russian forces' attempts to establish a security perimeter and enforce a containment policy. Chechen militants have been blamed for several deadly attacks on Russian helicopters in late 2002 as well as the seizure of 800 hostages in a Moscow theater in October 2002 (that ended with Russian troops storming the theater and resulted in over 150 dead, including all the militants).

Sudan — Ethnic (southern Africans) / *Magnitude: 6*

(Medium, from Ongoing-High) Fighting increased between the government of Sudan and the main rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), during the first half of 2002. The war continued through the summer, despite peace talks and the signing of the Machakos Protocol in July 2002 stating agreement on a self-determination referendum for southern Sudan after a six-year interim period. The warring parties focused efforts on controlling, or disrupting, the oilfields region, while the SPLA and its allies in the National Democratic Alliance opened a third-front in

Appendix Table 2: Armed Self-Determination Conflicts and their Outcomes, 1955-2002

Country and Group *Periods of Armed Conflict* Current Phase	Status in Winter 2002-03
North Atlantic	
France: Corsicans *1976-present* Low-level hostilities since 2001	**Ongoing:** French parliament adopts bill giving Corsica limited autonomy in areas of law-making and language instruction in December 2001. French high court declares law-making aspects of bill unconstitutional in January 2002, but center-right government adopts main tenets of bill in October 2002. Negotiations on further autonomy to continue; some nationalists continue violent opposition to limited autonomy.
Spain: Basques *1959-present* Low-level hostilities since 1999	**Ongoing:** Moderate Basque nationalist parties control regional government, but refuse to enforce August 2002 central government ban on political wing of rebel ETA. ETA resumed terrorist attacks and continues to push for more autonomy as tens of thousands demonstrate either in support of or against violent nationalists during 2002.
United Kingdom: Catholics (Northern Ireland) *1969-94* Contested agreement 1998	**Settled:** Britain suspends Northern Ireland assembly in October 2002 and institutes direct rule for fourth time in three years. Sectarian violence increasing since May 2002. Protestant loyalists and Catholic republicans both allege that the other has breached 1998 ceasefire, while IRA claims that it is disarming. Sinn Fein has expressed doubts regarding extent of promised reforms to police forces.
Former Socialist Bloc	
Azerbaijan: Armenians *1988-97* Cessation of open hostilities since 1997	**Contained:** OSCE-led negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan continue. De facto autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh region. Pro-autonomy leader wins landslide re-election in August 2002. Large crowds demonstrate in Azerbaijan in favor of the use of force to resolve conflict; Armenia promises retaliation.
Bosnia: Croats *1992-95* Contested agreement 1995	**Settled:** Creation of confederal Bosnian state and collective presidency in 1995. UN mandate designed to ensure equality of government is implemented, Croats recognized as constituent peoples. Hard-line nationalists representing each ethnic group win October 2002 elections throughout Bosnia. Croats demand more rights and autonomy. Main Croat nationalist party failed in attempt to form autonomous Croat republic in March 2001. Muslim and Croat parties formed coalition in 2002. Problems of resettling displaced ethnic populations persist.
Bosnia: Serbs *1992-95* Contested agreement 1995	**Settled:** See Bosnia: Croats, above. Serbs recognized as constituent peoples, but continue to demand more representation, greater autonomy, and amnesty for some war criminals. Problems of resettling displaced ethnic populations persist.
Croatia: Serbs *1991-95* Conventional politics since 1996	**Contained:** Many Serbs who fled fighting in the early 1990s remain refugees, and issues regarding their return, property restitution, and the resettlement of Croats in Serb areas remain. Resident Serbs participate in conventional politics and voice concerns over rights and representation; gaining constitutionally-proscribed autonomy remains high priority.
Georgia: Abkhazians *1992-93, 1998, 2001-2002* Cessation of open hostilities since 2002	**Contained:** Abkhazians and Georgia government agree in principle to ceasefire in November 2002 as a result of negotiations that resumed in January 2002, following renewed fighting between Georgian troops and a coalition of Abkhazian troops and Chechen rebels in October 2001. Georgian troops remain in Kodori gorge region despite provisions of April 2002 accord. Russia removes military bases. Return of ethnic-Georgian residents who fled remains unsolved.
Georgia: South Ossetians *1991-93* Cessation of open hostilities since 1993	**Contained:** Some agreements reached on economic development and refugee return. Russian peacekeepers remain and region's political status still subject to OSCE-mediated negotiations, but no real progress made since 2000. South Ossetians claim increased tensions and military presence in region since March 2002 and a willingness to renew fighting, if necessary. Georgia views November 2001 South Ossetian presidential elections as illegal.
Macedonia: Albanians *2001-present* Contested agreement 2001	**Contained:** Separatist ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) launches offensive against Macedonian security forces in January 2001. Government and rebels sign NATO-overseen ceasefire and peace accord in August 2001; rebels agree to disband and surrender weapons to NATO forces in exchange for constitutional amendments (November 2001) giving ethnic-Albanians more rights and recognition. Most refugees return, law passed granting general amnesty to rebels, and multi-ethnic police force recreated in 2002. Negotiations continue. NLA splinter groups trigger clashes in late 2001; episodic violence and sectarian clashes continue.
Moldova: Gaguaz *1991-92* Implemented agreement 1994	**Settled:** Autonomous region created in 1995. Regional elections held and rebels join Moldovan armed forces. In fall 2002, countrywide talks were begun regarding the federalization of Moldova.

Country and Group *Periods of Armed Conflict* Current Phase	Status in Winter 2002-03
Moldova: Trans-Dniester Slavs *1991-97* Contested agreement 1997	**Contained:** Settlement talks on status of region suspended in September 2002. Dniester and Moldovan authorities introduce economic and trade restrictions on each other. Removal of Russian armaments ongoing, with talks on this issue to continue. OSCE mediation team drafts document calling for division of Moldova into autonomous territories with own constitutions and legislation, but many Dniestrians claim proposal is insufficient.
Russia: Chechens *1991-present* High-level hostilities since 1999	**Ongoing:** First direct peace talks between separatists and government in November 2001, but peace process dissolves after continued violence. Rebels offer to renew talks in summer and fall 2002, but government refuses, demanding unconditional surrender as precondition for negotiations. High profile attacks by Chechen militants against civilian, security, and administrative targets further challenge the possibility for negotiated solution. Referendum on constitution for Chechnya scheduled for March 2003.
Yugoslavia: Albanians *2000-2001* Contested agreement 2001	**Contained:** Ethnic-Albanian rebels begin offensive against Yugoslav security forces in 2000 in Presevo region bordering Kosovo. NATO brokers peace deal in May 2001 that calls for rebel groups to dissolve and Yugoslav armed forces to leave the Presevo area. Ethnic-Albanians continue to press for autonomy of Presevo region and complete withdrawal of Serb security forces from area. September 2002 elections accepted by some Albanian parties and multiethnic Presevo municipal council takes office. Sporadic violence by some rebel factions continues.
Yugoslavia: Croats *1991* Independence	**Settled:** Croatia independent since 1991. Nearly all remaining Yugoslav Croats reside in Vojvodina, a region which has an ethnic-Hungarian majority. Yugoslav parliament adopts law granting limited autonomy to Vojvodina region in February 2002 (pending adoption of new Yugoslav constitution).
Yugoslavia: Kosovar Albanians *1998-99* Cessation of open hostilities since 1999	**Contained:** Kosovo administered jointly by UN, NATO, and 2001-elected Kosovar legislature; security provided by NATO peacekeeping force. Legislature elects new president and prime minister in March 2002 and demands that international community address question of Kosovo independence and prevent re-annexation of Kosovo by Serbia and Montenegro. Sporadic acts of violence continue; issue of displaced populations remain unsolved. Mass protests by ethnic-Albanians over arrests of former rebels.
Yugoslavia: Slovenes *1991* Independence	**Settled:** Slovenia independent since 1991.
Latin America and the Caribbean	
Nicaragua: Indigenous Peoples and Creoles *1981-88* Contested agreement 1988	**Settled:** Despite 1988 granting of autonomy to two Atlantic Coast regions, Miskito Indian Council of Elders announces in July 2002 its intention to create an independent nation, citing lack of development in region, government and foreign corporations' infringement on indigenous lands and resources, and group's lack of political power over own affairs as impetus for declaration. International support and mediation requested by Miskitos.
Asia and the Pacific	
Afghanistan: Tajiks *1979-92, 1996-2001* Low-level hostilities since 2002	**Contained:** Civil war ends after United States (intent on eliminating international terrorist training camps) launches massive air strikes and assists the opposition Northern Alliance (led by Tajiks) in ousting the ethnic-Pashtun Taliban regime in late 2001. Ethnic militias take control of regional enclaves. Coalition-based interim government continues to rule in winter 2002-03; although it remains weak and fragmented and dependent on a strong international military presence. Three Tajiks appointed to Cabinet positions. Episodic fighting between Uzbeks and Tajiks for control over certain northern towns began in August 2002.
Afghanistan: Uzbeks *1996-2001* Low-level hostilities since 2002	**Contained:** Civil war ended in late 2001 (see "Tajiks in Afghanistan" above). Four Uzbeks appointed to Cabinet positions. Episodic fighting between Uzbeks and Tajiks for control over certain northern towns began in August 2002.
Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Peoples *1975-96* Contested agreement 1997	**Settled:** Regional council created in tribal areas. Former rebels join political process. Development plans, government repression, and residence and voting rights of those living in region are key issues. Moderates sharply oppose continued use of violence by a militant faction.

Country and Group *Periods of Armed Conflict* Current Phase	Status in Winter 2002-03
China: Tibetans *1959-67* Militant politics since 1996	**Contained:** Under increased international pressure, Chinese officials hold autonomy talks with Dalai Lama envoy in September 2002 (first time since 1980s). Chinese repression has escalated in Tibet since the mid-1990s, especially targeting Tibetan culture and religion; ethnic-Han Chinese emigration to urban areas also substantial. Amnesty for some Tibetan political prisoners and increased development programs in Tibet since 2000.
China: Uighers *1990-present* Low-level hostilities since 1990	**Ongoing:** Muslim Uighers want separate East Turkestan state. Widespread repression and cultural discrimination since the mid-1990s escalates in the wake of September 11, 2001 as UN Security Council supports China's claim that Uigher separatists are an international terrorist organization.
India: Assamese *1990-present* High-level hostilities since 1990	**Ongoing:** Violence continues as government and rebels both call for negotiations in 2002; rebels considering truce to encourage peace talks but demand preconditions of UN mediation in neutral location and state sovereignty as part of the agenda; government unwilling to hold talks until rebels abandon violence
India: Bodos *1989-present* Talk-fight in 2002	**Contained:** 1993 accord created autonomous Bodo region within Assam. Government agrees to constitutional recognition of autonomous Bodo region in July 2002. Ongoing talks over number of villages to be included in final boundary. Ceasefire with one major rebel group continues; other militants continue sporadic attacks.
India: Kashmiri Muslims *1989-present* High-level hostilities since 1989	**Ongoing:** Increased violence in late 2001 and 2002; contributed to increased tensions between India and Pakistan and military confrontation in June 2002. Kashmiri moderates retain power in regional government but subject to increased attacks by militants. Proposals for talks put forth by rebels and government, but negotiations not yet initiated. Major differences exist within Kashmiri community over degree of independence desired.
India: Mizos *1966-84* Implemented agreement 1986	**Settled:** Separate federal state of Mizoram created in 1986; former-rebel group joins political process and wins state elections the following year.
India: Nagas *1952-64, 1972-2001* Cessation of open hostilities since 2001	**Contained:** State of Nagaland created in 1963, fighting resumed in 1972. Ceasefires with Isak-Muivah rebels since 1997 and Khaplang faction since 2001. Autonomy talks underway since 1997. Ban on Isak-Muivah faction was lifted and direct negotiations with the central government were proposed in November 2002. Sporadic clashes continued between Naga factions and with authorities throughout 2001-02.
India: Scheduled Tribes *1960-present* Low-level hostilities since 1960	**Ongoing:** Some tribals waging Marxist insurgency, and despite offers of negotiations and several unilateral ceasefires from rebels, government refuses to hold talks with Marxists until attacks and raids cease. Other tribals utilize conventional means to press for autonomy and integration into political system.
India: Sikhs *1978-93* Contested agreement 1992	**Settled:** Insurgency contained by 1993; Punjabi moderates win state elections in 1992 and 1997. Some militants still carry out sporadic bombings. Continued demands for separate Sikh homeland promoted by conventional parties.
India: Tripuras *1967-72, 1979-present* High-level hostilities since 1980	**Ongoing:** Separate federal state of Tripura created in 1972. Tribal parties defeat ruling party in 2000 elections and continue agitating for autonomous homeland. Militants increase amount of kidnappings, village raids, immigrant killings, and clashes with army in last few years.
Indonesia: Acehnese *1977-2002* Cessation of open hostilities since 2002	**Contained:** Rebellion resumed in 1999. An earlier autonomy agreement scheduled for implementation in January 2001 failed. Conceding to international pressure, a peace accord was signed in December 2002 that provides for an official ceasefire, the initiation of a weapons surrender process by GAM rebels within two months, partial demilitarization of Aceh province, free and fair provincial elections by 2004, and regional control over much of Aceh's timber and natural gas revenue. International observers arrived immediately to monitor the ceasefire and oversee the handing in of weapons. Rebels have not dropped independence demand but articulate willingness to participate in political process. Negotiations continue in winter 2002-03 despite reported violations of the agreement.
Indonesia: East Timorese *1974-99* Independence	**Settled:** East Timor independent since May 2002. Presidential and parliamentary elections held. UN agrees to help repatriation of refugees until end of 2002. Pro-Indonesian militias still active.
Indonesia: Papuans *1964-96, 2000-present* Low-level hostilities since 2000	**Ongoing:** Level of violence increases in Irian Jaya province since 2000 as Papuans continue to demand East Timor-like independence referendum. Government bill giving province larger degree of cultural and economic autonomy is rejected by most Papuans as insufficient. Talks occurred in 2001 but no indication of resumption in 2002.

Country and Group *Periods of Armed Conflict* Current Phase	Status in Winter 2002-03
Laos: Hmong *1945-79, 1985-96, 2000-present* High-level hostilities since 2002	**Ongoing:** Long-running anti-communist insurgency that was re-ignited in mid-2000 continues and causes large refugee problem. Hmong claim they are subject to ethnic cleansing policies, as well as biological and chemical weapons attacks from Laotian and Vietnamese governments throughout 2002. Hmong request international intervention.
Myanmar: Chin/Zomis *1985-present* Low-level hostilities since 1985	**Ongoing:** Violent clashes with military and pro-government militias reported in Chin areas. One of the few groups yet to reach a ceasefire with the junta. Several reports of groups of Chin soldiers exchanging "arms for peace" in 2001 and 2002. Chin complain to UN and EU of lack of political freedom in 2001.
Myanmar: Kachins *1961-94* Uncontested agreement 1994	**Settled:** 1994 ceasefire agreement allows Kachins to retain weapons and control some areas. Developmental assistance was promised; unclear if it was delivered. Kachin hold large conference in October 2002 with intent of finding common platform to represent their interests, but some factions balk due to government sponsorship.
Myanmar: Karenni *1945-present* Talk-fight in 2002	**Ongoing:** Ceasefire agreement in 1995 crumbled quickly as the military resumed offensive against the Karenni. Rebel groups hold preliminary talks with government in November 2002 but vow to continue armed resistance. Reports of repeated rebel surrenders in 2002.
Myanmar: Karens *1945-present* High-level hostilities since 1949	**Ongoing:** Violent clashes continue between Karen and both the Burmese military junta and a pro-junta Karen splinter group. Rebels and junta offer peace talks to each other in mid-2002, but negotiations have yet to be initiated. Reports of rebel surrenders and junta human rights abuses continue.
Myanmar: Mons *1975-97* Contested agreement 1995	**Settled:** 1995 ceasefire agreement allowed Mons to retain weapons and control some areas. Developmental assistance was promised under this agreement; unclear if it was provided. Last major rebel faction surrendered in 1997, but several smaller separatist factions continue sporadic violence. Mons complain to UN of lack of political freedom in 2001, and widespread human rights abuses reported in Mon areas.
Myanmar: Rohingyas *1991-94* Contested agreement 1994	**Contained:** 1994 ceasefire agreement reached with major rebel faction. Tens of thousands of Arakan refugees remain outside Burma. Rohingyas complain to UN of lack of political freedom in 2001.
Myanmar: Shan *1962-present* High-level hostilities since 2000	**Ongoing:** Some Shan agreed to a 1996 ceasefire. Despite offers, military junta refuses to hold talks with remaining rebel faction. Major six-year suppression campaign in Shan areas continues, and violent clashes increase since 2000. Several reported incidents of groups of Shan soldiers surrendering since 2001. Shan complain to UN about lack of political freedom, and widespread human rights abuses reported in Shan areas.
Myanmar: Wa *1989* Contested agreement 1989	**Settled:** Largest Wa group continues to abide by 1989 ceasefire agreement and forms coalition with Burmese armed forces; minor Wa factions engage in sporadic anti-state violence. Wa involved in border clashes with Thai troops trying to stem the drug trade in Wa-dominated areas.
Pakistan: Baluchis *1973-77* Conventional politics during periods of democratic rule	**Contained:** Separatist insurgency defeated. Baluchis continue to press for economic development, equal rights, and autonomy. Rebels use mostly conventional tactics to pursue demands, but organized massive strike in October 2002 to protest election fraud.
Pakistan: Bengalis *1971* Independence	**Settled:** Bangladesh independent since 1971.
Papua New Guinea: Bougainvilleans *1989-98* Contested agreement 2000	**Settled:** Legislation based on 2001 peace agreement is passed in March 2002 giving Bougainvilleans broad autonomy powers; full implementation depends upon completion of UN-sponsored weapons disposal program. Referendum on independence to be held in 10 to 15 years. Decline in public services in region and country-wide financial problems hamper peace process. Minor rebel faction remains opposed to accord.
Philippines: Igorots *1976-86, 2002-present* Low-level hostilities since 2002	**Ongoing:** Rebels integrated into army in September 2001, but 1986 peace and autonomy agreement has yet to be fully implemented. Land rights and more autonomy remain central issues. Major factions of Igorot rebels align with communist NPA guerrillas in 2002 and conduct attacks on government punctuated by intermittent ceasefires. Government resumption of negotiations with Igorot-communist alliance contingent on rebels' cessation of attacks on civilian targets.
Philippines: Moros *1972-present* Talk-fight in 2002	**Ongoing:** Former insurgent groups (MNLF and MILF) govern autonomous southern Muslim region. Ceasefire signed in August 2001 following mid-2000 government offensive remains in place, despite continued fighting and accusations from both government and rebel groups that truce has been violated. Agreement signed in May 2002 to develop southern region. Talks continue in November 2002. Abu Sayyaf, the most militant Moro faction, rejects negotiations and continues attacks.

Country and Group *Periods of Armed Conflict* Current Phase	Status in Winter 2002-03
Sri Lanka: Tamils *1975-2001* Cessation of open hostilities since 2001	**Contained:** Rebels regained substantial northern areas lost to the government in 1995 as of 2000, leading to stalemate. Internationally-mediated peace talks continue in late 2002 following December 2001 ceasefire and February 2002 truce agreement. Rebels drop their demand for total independence in late 2002. Ongoing negotiations focus on autonomy, human rights, and power sharing issues. Government and rebels allege several violations of truce by the other side.
Thailand: Malay-Muslims *1995-98* Militant politics since 2000	**Contained:** Thai military crackdown, along with minor concessions to reduce marginalization of southern Malay-Muslims, deflates movement by 1998. Unclear if series of bombings and police killings in 2002 is linked to renewed and reconstituted Muslim separatist movement or rival drug lords in southern Thailand; remaining separatists deny responsibility.
North Africa and the Middle East	
Iran: Kurds *1979-94* Conventional politics since 1996	**Contained:** Armed rebellion mainly suppressed in the mid-1990s; scattered acts of violence involving Kurdish separatists reported in 2002. In September 2002, two major rebel groups promise not to resume violence. Some Iranian Kurdish rebels are based in northern Iraq, fueling fears that increased instability in the region may re-ignite Kurdish separatism.
Iraq: Kurds *1980-92* Cessation of open hostilities since 1997	**Contained:** Autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq protected by US and British air superiority since 1991. Main Kurdish factions reconvene Kurdish assembly in 2002 for first time in six years to discuss plans for self-rule in the event that the Iraqi regime topples due to rising confrontation with the US. Turkey vows to use military force to prevent formation of Iraqi Kurdish state; Kurds give assurances that they are not seeking a separate Kurdistan.
Israel: Palestinians **(West Bank and Gaza, disputed)** *1968-93, 2000-present* High-level hostilities since 2001	**Ongoing:** Partial transfer of West Bank and Gaza to Palestinian control, following contested 1994 agreement. Failure by Israel to fully abide by agreements leads to resumption of militancy, "Second Intifadeh," in September 2000. Hostilities increase as September 2001 ceasefire and U.S. and Saudi Arabian mediation efforts fail. Israeli government refuses to negotiate with Arafat-led Palestinian leadership. Israeli forces and Palestinian rebels engage in mainly urban warfare tactics. US, EU, UN, and Russia devise new plan for creation of Palestinian state; discussion tabled until after January 2003 Israeli elections.
Morocco: Saharawis **(Western Sahara, disputed)** *1973-91* Cessation of open hostilities since 1991	**Contained:** UN proposal to create autonomous Western Sahara region under Moroccan rule is accepted by Morocco but rejected by Polisario rebels in June 2001. Polisario continues to request self-determination and UN-promised referendum on independence that has been repeatedly postponed by Morocco with no new date set. UN currently drafting alternative proposals. Polisario continues to release POWs.
Turkey: Kurds *1984-present* Low-level hostilities since 1999	**Ongoing:** Armed clashes and violent demonstrations continue since 2001 in spite of 1999 ceasefire between government and major rebel group, PKK. Negotiations regarding peace process ongoing, as government lifts state of emergency and some restrictions on instruction in Kurdish language in 2002. PKK disbands and reforms to pursue conventional strategies, seeking support from the EU due to Turkey's strong desire to gain EU membership. Turkey vows to respond militarily to prevent formation of independent Kurdish state in neighboring Iraq.
Africa South of the Sahara	
Angola: Cabindans *1991-present* Talk-fight in 2002	**Ongoing:** Rebellion that began with Angolan independence in 1975 continues in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda. Negotiations with regional government taking place but not much progress reported. Rebels call for internationally mediated talks with central government but authorities refuse to meet until rebels recognize a single leadership that can negotiate for the group. Rebel movement is highly factionalized. Situation complicated by influx of refugees from neighboring countries.
Chad: Southerners *1979-86, 1992-98* Uncontested agreement 1994-97	**Settled:** 1997 agreements allow most factions to become political parties; some rebels integrated in army. Umbrella group of exiled armed movements and political parties, including former southern Chadian separatists, re-open dialogue with government in 2002. Separatist commander killed in landmine accident in mid-2002; some scattered attacks reported in late 2002.
Djibouti: Afars *1991-2001* Uncontested agreement 2001	**Settled:** The major Afar faction, FRUD, which is now part of the ruling government, negotiated a settlement in 1995. Talks that began with remaining rebel faction in April 2000 ends with peace agreement in May 2001, which promises decentralization of government, institution of an unrestricted multi-party system, and rehabilitation for war-torn areas. Most armed rebels demobilized by June 2001; program to demobilize government troops to be completed by the end of 2003.

Country and Group *Periods of Armed Conflict* Current Phase	Status in Winter 2002-03
Ethiopia: Afars *1975-1998* Cessation of open hostilities since 1998	**Contained:** Relations between government and rebels continue to improve since 1998 ceasefire, despite reports of minor clashes between rebels and Ethiopian army in October 2002. Main Afar groups unite with Eritrean opposition groups with goal of toppling Eritrean regime to "unite Ethiopia," while several Afar factions vow to continue armed struggle against Ethiopian regime.
Ethiopia: Eritreans *1961-91* Independence	**Settled:** Eritrea independent since 1993.
Ethiopia: Oromos *1973-present* High-level hostilities since 2001	**Ongoing:** 1994 regional autonomy agreement rejected by some Oromo factions seeking an independent Oromia state. Rebellion intensifies during Ethiopia-Eritrea border war of 1999-2000 and again in 2001; repression in rebel areas increased in 2002. Reported coalition talks between Oromo and Somali rebels in 2001.
Ethiopia: Somalis *1963-present* High-level hostilities since 2001	**Ongoing:** Some factions reject 1994 regional autonomy agreement and continue to seek independent Ogaden. Hostilities increase since 2001 as government commits more troops to fighting Ogaden insurgency once Ethiopia/Eritrea border conflict is diffused. Reported coalition talks between Oromos and Somalis in 2001.
Mali: Tuaregs *1990-95* Uncontested agreement 1995	**Settled:** Substantial implementation of peace agreement. Rebels disarmed and integrated into army; most refugees have returned. Last splinter group lays down arms in September 2001 and asks for more development in region. Reports of sporadic banditry continue.
Niger: Tuaregs *1988-97* Uncontested agreement 1995	**Settled:** Disarmament of Tuareg completed in September 2001 and reintegration of former rebels underway. Niger army kills last rebel commander of Tuareg splinter insurgent group in September 2001.
Nigeria: Ibos *1967-70* Militant politics since 1999	**Contained:** Armed secessionists defeated in 1970 and reintegrated into Nigerian polity. One large faction still seeking separate Biafran state and utilizing protest and civil disobedience; negotiations with this faction occurred in mid-2001 but broke down. Apparent split between Ibos using conventional politics and Ibo militants seeking separate state.
Nigeria: Ijaw *1995-present* Low-level hostilities since 1995	**Ongoing:** Niger Delta peoples continue to press for autonomy, sharing of oil revenues, greater participation and integration into political life, and withdrawal of Nigerian armed forces from their communities. Disruptive protests, interruption of oil activities, kidnappings, and assassinations continue.
Senegal: Casamançais *1991-present* Contested agreement 2001	**Contained:** Ceasefire reached in December 1999 but not entirely respected. Peace deal signed in March 2001 provides for amnesty and reintegration of rebels into society. The more militant rebel faction rejects peace agreement and continues low-level hostilities. Talks geared toward final settlement stalled in November 2002.
Somalia: Isaaqs *1986-90* Cessation of open hostilities since 1991	**Contained:** De facto regional independence of Somaliland since 1991. Somaliland government praises but refuses to attend 2002 talks on peace in Somalia as a whole, claiming that the problems do not affect Somaliland since it is an "independent state." Overwhelming support for independence of Somaliland demonstrated by June 2001 referendum; rallies in favor of independent Somaliland continue in 2002.
Sudan: Nuba *1985-present* Cessation of open hostilities since 2002	**Contained:** Nuba and southern Sudanese rebels sign ceasefire in mid-2002 to bring peace to Nuba Mountains region. Southern Sudanese rebels and government sign landmark autonomy agreement in July 2002. Nuba organizations request separate administration in Nuba region during transitional period. Negotiations continue despite repeated violations of ceasefire.
Sudan: Southerners *1956-72, 1983-2002* Contested agreement 2002	**Contained:** Rebels and government agree to ceasefire and sign landmark agreement in July 2002 that will give administrative autonomy to southern Sudan for six years and exclude it from Islamic law which governs northern Sudan. A referendum on independence is to be held at the end of the six-year period. Negotiations continuing on power and wealth sharing. Government and rebels accuse each other of violating truce as sporadic violence continues.

Appendix Table 3: Other Self-Determination Conflicts

Group and Country	Politically Active Since (post-WWII)	Current Phase (Winter 2002-2003)
North Atlantic		
Belgium: Flemings	Late 1950s	Conventional politics
Belgium: Walloons	Late 1950s	Conventional politics
Canada: Indigenous Peoples	Early 1960s	Conventional politics
Canada: Quebecois	Early 1960s	Conventional politics
Finland: Saami	Early 1950s	Conventional politics
France: Basques	Late 1950s	Militant politics
France: Bretons	Late 1940s	Militant politics
Italy: Sardinians	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Italy: South Tyrolans	Mid-1940s	Conventional politics
Norway: Saami	Early 1950s	Conventional politics
Spain: Catalans	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Sweden: Saami	Early 1950s	Conventional politics
Switzerland: Jurassians	Early 1950s	Conventional politics
United Kingdom: Cornish	Late 1990s	Conventional politics
United Kingdom: Scots	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
United States: Indigenous Peoples	Mid-1960s	Conventional politics
United States: Native Hawaiians	Early 1970s	Conventional politics
United States: Puerto Ricans	Early 1950s	Militant politics
Former-Socialist Bloc		
Azerbaijan: Lezgins	Early 1990s	Militant politics
Georgia: Adzhars	Late 1980s	Conventional politics
Kazakhstan: Russians	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Kyrgyzstan: Uzbeks	Late 1980s	Conventional politics
Romania: Magyars (Hungarians)	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Russia: Avars	Late 1980s	Conventional politics
Russia: Buryat	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Russia: Kumyks	Late 1980s	Conventional politics
Russia: Lezgins	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Russia: Tatars	Early 1960s	Conventional politics
Russia: Yakut	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Slovakia: Hungarians	Late 1960s	Conventional politics
Ukraine: Crimean Russians	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Ukraine: Crimean Tatars	Late 1960s	Militant politics
Uzbekistan: Tajiks	Late 1980s	Conventional politics
Yugoslavia: Hungarians	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Yugoslavia: Montenegrins	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Yugoslavia: Sandzak Muslims	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
Latin America and the Caribbean		
Brazil: Indigenous Peoples	Early 1970s	Militant politics
Chile: Indigenous Peoples	Early 1970s	Conventional politics
Colombia: Indigenous Peoples	Late 1940s	Militant politics
Ecuador: Lowland Indigenous Peoples	Early 1970s	Militant politics
Mexico: Indigenous Peoples	Early 1970s	Militant politics
Peru: Lowland Indigenous Peoples	Early 1980s	Militant politics
St. Kitts-Nevis: Nevisians	Early 1960s	Conventional politics
Trinidad & Tobago: Tobagonians	Early 1970s	Conventional politics

Group and Country	Politically Active Since (post-WWII)	Current Phase (Winter 2002-2003)
Asia and the Pacific		
Australia: Aborigines	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Bhutan: Lhotshampas	Early 1950s	Militant politics
China: Mongols	Late 1980s	Militant politics
India: Kashmiri Buddhist Ladakhis	Late 1980s	Conventional politics
India: Kashmiri Hindus	Early 1990s	Conventional politics
India: Reang (Bru)	Late 1990s	Militant politics
Indonesia: Dayaks	Mid-1990s	Militant politics
Pakistan: Pashtuns (Pathans)	Early 1950s	Conventional politics
Pakistan: Sarakis	Mid-1990s	Conventional politics
Pakistan: Sindhis	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Sri Lanka: Muslims	Mid-1980s	Conventional politics
Taiwan: Aboriginal Taiwanese	Mid-1980s	Conventional politics
Vietnam: Montagnards	Late 1940s	Militant politics
North Africa and the Middle East		
Algeria: Berbers	Early 1960s	Militant politics
Cyprus: Turkish Cypriots	Early 1960s	Conventional politics
Lebanon: Palestinians	Early 1960s	Militant politics
Africa South of the Sahara		
Cameroon: Westerners	Late 1950s	Militant politics
Comoros: Anjouanese	Late 1990s	Contested agreement
Congo-Kinshasa: Bakongo	Early 2000s	Militant politics
Congo-Kinshasa: Lunda and Yeke	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Equatorial Guinea: Bubis	Early 1990s	Militant politics
Namibia: East Caprivians	Late 1990s	Militant politics
Nigeria: Ndigbo	Late 1990s	Militant politics
Nigeria: Oron	Late 1990s	Militant politics
Nigeria: Ogoni	Early 1990s	Militant politics
Nigeria: Yoruba	Early 1990s	Militant politics
Somalia: Puntland Darods	Late 1990s	Conventional politics
South Africa: Afrikaners	Mid-1990s	Conventional politics
South Africa: Khoisan	Mid-1990s	Conventional politics
South Africa: Zulus	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Tanzania: Zanzibaris	Early 1960s	Contested agreement
Uganda: Baganda	Late 1940s	Conventional politics
Zambia: Lozi	Late 1940s	Militant politics
Zimbabwe: Ndebele	Early 1950s	Conventional politics

Acknowledgements

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