

**THE KUOMINTANG
MOVEMENT IN BRITISH MALAYA**

**THE KUOMINTANG
MOVEMENT
IN
BRITISH MALAYA
1912-1949**

C. F. YONG and R. B. McKENNA



**SINGAPORE UNIVERSITY PRESS
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE**

© 1990 Singapore University Press
Kent Ridge, Singapore 0511

All rights reserved.

ISBN 9971-69-137-X (Paper)

m
959.5004951
YON

542218

12 NOV. 1990

Typeset by: Times Graphics
Printed by: Printmart Lithographers (S) Pte. Ltd.

Perpustakaan Negara
Malaysia

Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	vi
<i>List of Plates</i>	vii
<i>List of Appendices</i>	viii
<i>Abbreviations</i>	ix
<i>Preface</i>	xi
1. Historical Background	1
2. Flexing the Political Muscles: The First Phase of the Malayan <i>Kuomintang</i> Movement, 1912-1925	22
3. From Supervision to Suspension: British Control and Chinese Nationalism, 1911-1925	44
4. The KMT Forging Ahead Under a Ban, 1925-1930	83
5. Grappling with the KMT: The Divided 'Colonial Mind', 1925-1930	106
6. The Clementi Onslaught and the Lampson Diplomacy: The Taming of the 'Double-Head Snake', 1930-1931	134
7. Retardation and Revival: The Agony of the Malayan KMT Movement, 1931-1942	172
8. The High Tide of the Malayan KMT Movement, 1945-1949	199
9. Conclusion	226
<i>Appendices</i>	236
<i>Glossary</i>	256
<i>Bibliography</i>	261
<i>Index</i>	275

List of Tables

Chapter 1

1. Tung Meng Hui Branches and Principal, Leaders, 1906-1911 13
2. Malayan Chinese Financial Contributions to Chinese Revolution, 1906-1912 17

Chapter 2

1. KMT Branches in Malaya, 1912-1925 26
2. Pang, Birthplace and Social Origins of the Singapore KMT Office bearers, July 1913 28
3. Principal Leaders of the CRP Branches and Sub-Bran­ches in British Malaya, 1914-1919 33
4. Fund Raised by the CRP Branches in British Malaya for Sun Yat-sen Against Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1915-1916 36

Chapter 4

1. The KMT Branches and Sub-Bran­ches in British Malaya, 1926 87
2. The KMT Branches and Sub-Bran­ches, Controlled by the 'Moderates', 1927 90
3. BMHB Office-bearers, 1929 92
4. KMT Membership in Malaya and Singapore, January 1929 94
5. BMHB Office-bearers, 1930 95

Chapter 6

1. Conference on Chinese Affairs, Government House, Singapore 155

Chapter 7

1. Members of the Preparatory Committees of the Malayan Direct Branches, 1931 174
2. Executive and Supervisory Committee Members and Reserve Members of the Selangor Direct Branch, 1933 180

Chapter 8

1. Key KMT Leaders in Fives States in Malaya 205
2. Leadership of the Singapore KMT Branch, 1948 206
3. The Selangor KMT Leadership, 1948 207
4. Estimate of Total KMT Membership in Malaya, March 1948 209
5. SMCIYC Membership and Branches in Malaya, 1947 211
6. KMT-controlled or Influenced Newspapers in Malaya, 1948 215

List of Plates

1. Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925)
2. *Bin Chin* House (or Dr Sun Yat-sen Villa), Singapore
3. Sun Yat-sen's visit to Singapore, 1905
4. Sun Yat-sen with Teo Eng-hock and Tan Chor-nam, 1905
5. Huang Hsing and Perak TMH (*T'ung Meng Hui*) members, 1910
6. Dr Lim Boon-keng, President of the Singapore KMT (*Kuomintang*), 1913-14
7. Chan Chan-mooi, TMH 'old guard', Kuala Lumpur
8. Teng Tse-ju, TMH 'old guard', Kuala Pilah
9. Teh Lay-seng, TMH 'old guard', Perak
10. Lee Guan-swee, TMH 'old guard', Perak
11. Goh Say-eng, TMH 'old guard', Penang
12. Lim Nee-soon, TMH 'old guard', Singapore
13. Teo Eng-hock, TMH 'old guard', Singapore
14. Tan Chor-nam, TMH 'old guard', Singapore
15. Lee Chin-tian, KMT leader, Singapore
16. Lim Keng-lian, KMT leader, Singapore
17. Chuang Hui-chuan, KMT leader, Singapore
18. Tan Kok-chor, KMT leader, Singapore
19. Tan Kah-kee, a TMH member, Singapore
20. Tan Kah-kee with Lau Geok-swee, Penang KMT leader and Tjhung Sie-gan, Batavia KMT leader, 1938
21. Lim Ta-tian, KMT leader, Malacca
22. Tan Kee-gak, KMT leader, Malacca
23. Wong Shee-foon, KMT leader, Johore
24. Ho Ju-khoon, KMT leader, Penang
25. Chew Mua-tong, KMT leader, Penang
26. Ong Keng-seng, KMT leader, Penang
27. Lau Pak-khuan, KMT leader, Perak
28. Hong Siong, KMT leader, Perak
29. Lee Hau-shik, KMT leader, Selangor
30. Sir John Anderson, SS (Straits Settlements) Governor, 1903-1910
31. Sir Arthur Young, SS Governor, 1911-1919
32. Sir Laurence Guillemard, SS Governor, 1920-1927
33. Sir Hugh Clifford, SS Governor, 1927-1929
34. Sir Cecil Clementi, SS Governor, 1930-1934
35. Sir Shenton Thomas, SS Governor, 1934-1942
36. Sir Franklin Gimson, Singapore Governor, 1947-1951

List of Appendices

The following appendices are from Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, England. 'Crown copyright material in the Public Record Office is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office'.

- A. Sir L. N. Guillemard, Governor, SS (Straits Settlements), to the Duke of Devonshire, CO (Colonial Office), 6 December 1922, on a proposal to ban the Malayan KMT (Kuomintang) branches. 236
- B. Sir Cecil Clementi, Governor, SS, to Lord Passfield of Passfield Corner, CO, 25 February 1930, with Enclosure No. 1, Office-Bearers of the BMHB (British Malaya Head Branch) of the China KMT, February 1930 and Enclosure No. 2, Minutes of the Government House Meeting between Clementi and 17 Office-Bearers of the BMHB (British Malaya Head Branch) of the China KMT. 243
- C. Sir F. Gimson, Governor, Singapore, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO, 17 February 1949 (telegram), on a proposal to ban the KMT in Singapore. 253

Abbreviations

ABH	Ang Bin Huay
ACCC	Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce
AEBUS	Overseas Chinese Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society
BMA	British Military Administration
BMHB	British Malaya Head Branch of the China KMT
CAB	Chinese Advisory Board
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDL	China Democratic League
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CMGCC	Chinese Merchants' General Chamber of Commerce
CNEVC	Chinese National Emancipation Vanguard Corps
CO	Colonial Office
COD	Central Organization Department of the China KMT
CP	<i>China Press</i>
CRP	Chinese Revolutionary Party
CSJP	<i>Chung Shing Jit Pau</i>
FIR	<i>Fortnightly Intelligence Review</i>
FMS	Federated Malay States
FO	Foreign Office
JMBRAS	<i>Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
JSEAH	<i>Journal of Southeast Asian History</i>
JSEAS	<i>Journal of Southeast Asian Studies</i>
JSSS	<i>Journal of South Seas Society</i>
KMT	Kuomintang
KWYP	<i>Kwong Wah Yik Poh</i>
LP	<i>Lat Pau</i>
MBPI	<i>Malayan Bulletin of Political Intelligence</i>
MCA	Malayan Chinese Association
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MCS	Malayan Civil Service
MIC	Malaysian Indian Congress
MKJP	<i>Min Kuo Jih Pao</i>

MPAC	Malayan Political Advisory Committee
MPAJA	Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
MPIR	<i>Monthly Political Intelligence Report</i>
MRCJA	<i>Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs</i>
NCJP	<i>Nan Chiau Jit Pao</i>
NCP	Nanyang Communist Party
NDYL	New Democratic Youth League
NEI	Netherlands East Indies
NGLU	Nanyang General Labour Union
NYSP	<i>Nanyang Siang Pau</i>
OAG	Officer Administering Government
OCAJA	Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army
OCBC	Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd
PIJ	<i>Political Intelligence Journal</i>
PMFTU	Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions
PMR	<i>Political Monthly Review</i>
RCA	<i>Review of Chinese Affairs</i>
SCBA	Straits Chinese British Association
SCCC	Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce
SCJP	<i>Sin Chew Jit Poh</i>
SCMC	Singapore Chinese Mobilization Council
SCRFC	Singapore China Relief Fund Committee
SCRFU	Southseas China Relief Fund Union
SIS	Special Investigation Services
SKMP	<i>Sin Kuo Min Press</i>
SMCIYC	San Min Chu I Youth Corps
SPR	<i>Singapore Political Report</i>
SS	Straits Settlements
SSGG	<i>Straits Settlements Government Gazette</i>
ST	<i>Straits Times</i>
TMH	T'ung Meng Hui (the Revolutionary League)
UMNO	United Malays National Organization
UMS	Unfederated Malay States
WIR	Weekly Intelligence Review
WO	War Office
YKP	<i>Yik Khuan Poh</i>

Preface

A special interest in Chinese leadership and power in the colonial history of British Malaya, and in British management of political movements in Asia generally and in Malaya in particular has led to this joint effort on the Malayan *Kuomintang* (KMT) Movement, 1912–1949.

The KMT Movement in British Malaya, hitherto an under-explored topic in Malaysian and Singapore history, entailed persistent Chinese enterprise and consumed much British official energy. This 'Chinese problem', as the British saw it during colonial times, strained relationships between the British authorities and the Chinese community at large and heightened international and diplomatic tensions between the British and Chinese Governments, especially during the governorship of Sir Cecil Clementi (1930–1934).

The Malayan KMT Movement is studied against the background of British colonial rule, the changing political circumstances and fortunes in China and the rising and waning of Malayan Chinese nationalism from 1894. This monograph hopes to unfold on the one hand the dynamics of the Movement, with special examination of its leadership, organization and ideology in British Malaya. On the other it analyzes changing British policy towards the KMT from Sir Arthur Young to Sir Franklin Gimson and the ways the British in Malaya and London managed it between 1912 and 1949.

Because it was both a China-oriented and Malaya-oriented political party and movement, the Malayan KMT was confronted with pressures and constraints from a succession of governments in China and from British governors in Malaya. Limits imposed by internal and external pressures caused the Malayan KMT to wax and wane but survive to leave behind many important legacies. These included the promotion of Chinese culture and education, the increase of Chinese political consciousness and participation, and the provision of financial contributions to China and Chinese government efforts against Japanese encroachment prior to World War II. In the post-war years, Malayan KMT activities helped lay the foundations for a Malaya-oriented political party, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and strengthen the MCA's will and resources to fight against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). By doing so, it helped to isolate and weaken the MCP movement. But it also helped to perpetuate a divisiveness among Malayan Chinese in politics and ideology which has endured right up to the present.

The British monitored the Malayan KMT Movement from 1912 with increasing concern. As a result, British governors were forced to exert

tighter political and ideological control over the Malayan Chinese population in general and especially the Malayan KMT. They outlawed the Malayan KMT on three occasions — in 1925, 1930 and 1949.

Despite some strong evidence of China-orientation in politics and ideology, one must not lose sight of the fact that the Malayan KMT Movement was also a Malaya-oriented movement. The contributions KMT members made enriched Malayan Chinese educational, cultural and intellectual life and, as said, left important legacies in both Malaya and Singapore. Because of this, the Malayan KMT Movement is also an integral part of Malaysian and Singaporean history.

This joint project was made possible by generous help and advice from many quarters. We gratefully acknowledge assistance from archival and library institutions and their untiring staff. This includes the Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, England; the Oriental Manuscript and Printed Books (OMPB) section of the British Library, Store Street, London; the Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London; the Rhodes House Library, Oxford, England; the Singapore National Library and the National University of Singapore Library, Singapore; the Flinders University Library, South Australia; the Monash University Library, Victoria, Australia; and the National Library and the Menzies Library of the Australian National University (ANU), both in Canberra, Australia. We would like to thank Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, nephew of the late Sir Shenton Thomas for permission to use the Shenton Thomas papers in the Rhodes House Library, Oxford.

We are indebted to the Editorial Board of the *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Singapore, for permission to use two articles on the Malayan Kuomintang Movement, published in 1981 and 1984 respectively. The Public Record Office, England, has also kindly permitted us to incorporate three official documents as appendices in this book, which is much appreciated.

We would like to register our special thanks to Sng Choon-ye, formerly Chinese Assistant to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs in pre-war years, and to the late A. B. Jordan, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, 1931–1942, for the courtesy of interviews which revealed some important aspects of Chinese and British thinking in their time.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks to Professor Wang Gungwu, former Head of the Far Eastern History Department, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, for his invaluable advice and encouragement; and to both Chui Kwei-chiang and David Chng Khin-yong of Singapore for generously providing us with Chinese documents at their disposal, on the Malayan KMT Movement.

We are grateful to Mrs. Joan Stephenson and Mrs Ros O'Neill of the History Discipline, Flinders University of South Australia, for typing the whole manuscript and correcting errors. Their patience and dedication to their profession have earned our sincere respect and admiration.

Finally, we wish to thank Ms Patricia Tay, Editor, of the Singapore University Press, for her editorial advice.

September 1988

C.F.Y and R.B.M

Historical Background

The political map of Malaya in 1911 as in 1941 contained three identifiable administrative entities comprising the Straits Settlements (SS), the Federated Malay States (FMS) and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS). The SS consisted of Penang, Malacca and Singapore which were Crown Colonies under direct British rule, headed by a governor responsible only to the Colonial Office (CO) in London. The FMS, made up of Pahang, Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan, came into being in 1895. These were the British-protected states, each with a Malay Sultan as ruler. However, the British Residents had wielded considerable political and administrative power in the FMS. The UMS, which consisted of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, came under British *indirect* rule in 1909, with Johore joining in 1914. However in the UMS, the British advisers had less power, as they only served in a consultative capacity for the Malay sultans.

While the Governor of the SS was assisted by the two legislative chambers, the Executive and Legislative Councils, British administration in the FMS was facilitated by the State and Federal Councils. In both the SS and the Malay States, the British established various departments and institutions to deal with Chinese affairs, such as the Chinese Protectorates, later known as the Chinese Affairs Departments or the Chinese Secretariat, and the Chinese Advisory Boards, both of which lasted until the 1940s.

For the Malayan Chinese community, the most important institution it had to deal with was none other than the Chinese Protectorates, which were established at various times in various states. In Singapore, the Chinese Protectorate was founded in 1877, but until the 1910s it had been more concerned with social and economic matters such as prostitution, gambling, immigration, labour and secret society control, than with political and ideological control of the Chinese. In the SS for example, the Chinese Protectorate set up the Chinese Advisory Board in 1888, with Chinese leaders from various *pangs* (dialect groupings) being nominated as members. The suppression of Chinese secret societies came with the passing of the Societies Ordinances of 1891, again at the instigation of the Protectorate. The Chinese Protectors closely liaised with the Chinese *pang* and community leaders for the maintenance of law and order. They were men who were well versed in Chinese customs, habits and dialects.

They were the 'uncrowned kings' of British Malaya in the eyes of the Chinese there, as they wielded enormous influence and prestige. In nineteenth-century Singapore, both W. A. Pickering (1840-1907) and G. T. Hare were popular and successful Protectors whom the Chinese respectfully called '*Tai-jen*', or superior men. They set up a tradition of being capable of keeping themselves abreast of Chinese community matters, thus logically becoming the advisers to the Governor, on Chinese affairs.

As British political, administrative and judicial control over the three different territories varied, each of the three had its own legislation, statutes and regulations. While most statutes concerning labour, immigration, societies ordinances, banishment ordinances and the registration of schools ordinances were similar in content for the region, some statutes such as citizenship were different, since the Chinese in the FMS and UMS were the subjects of the Malay rulers.

With the British firmly in control of Malaya around 1900, law and order was restored, the civil wars of the Malay States of the 1850s and 1860s had long ceased, and economic prosperity was increased with the interplay of British capital and Chinese and Indian labour. Malaya's political and economic stability was assured with the exploitation of the natural resources of tin and rubber. Malaya's multi-racial and plural society was developing rapidly, with a growing population of Chinese, Indians and the indigenous Malays living side by side. Impelled by adverse economic and social conditions in rural China and lured by employment opportunities, an estimated five million Chinese had entered during the nineteenth century and 12 million more were to land in the country between 1900 and 1940.¹ Despite the fact that many of these 17 million immigrants returned to their native land or left for other parts of Southeast Asia, a considerable number chose to settle and to build a vigorous and resilient community in British Malaya.

But in 1912, the Malayan Chinese community was still in flux, evolving, consolidating and expanding through a continuous inflow of immigrants as cheap labour under the liberal immigration policy of the British. The original Chinese community first developed in the SS, which came under direct British rule in 1826 as Crown Colonies. However after 1840, as tin was found and mined in Perak and Selangor, the Chinese in the SS soon spilled over to the Malay States. More Chinese moved into the FMS when the rubber industry became better established, from the 1900s. The Chinese population grew steadily during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and by 1901, it numbered some 583 000, or 48 per cent of the total population of Malaya of 1 227 000. Ten years later, in

1911, the Chinese population had increased to 914 000, representing only 35 per cent of the total Malayan population of 2 644 000.

After emigrating from China, more and more Chinese chose to make Malaya their home as they established a more secure economic base and a safer niche. Some of the earliest Chinese settlers seemed to have established an easier and better rapport with the Malay population than did later arrivals. Earlier settlers in Penang and Malacca sampled Malay food, adopted Malay dress, spoke the Malay language and intermarried with the Malays. Their descendants were the Straits-born Chinese who founded the *Baba* community, which was culturally closer to the Malay but economically still deeply attached to the immigrant Chinese community. The *Baba* community underwent fundamental social change as British rule was consolidated and as China's political and cultural influences strengthened. By 1901, when the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) was founded in Singapore, and subsequently in Malacca and Penang, the *Baba* community had become more attached to the English language and to British culture, values and lifestyle, as well as in political loyalty. By then, they pledged their undivided allegiance to the British Crown and were proud to identify themselves as King's subjects. The formation of these Associations in Malaya helped create a pro-Western, pro-British cultural and political tradition in the Malayan Chinese community.² The Straits-born Chinese were well-educated, socially active and economically successful. They provided many of Malaya's competent professional men in medicine, architecture, engineering and law. By virtue of their education, professional qualifications, language and leadership qualities, several of the ablest sons of this Straits-born community were nominated as members of the Legislative, State and Federal Councils in the SS and FMS, thus becoming the political and community spokesmen of the Chinese population. Despite all their virtues, qualifications and qualities, the Straits-born Chinese in Malaya were outnumbered by the China-born, Chinese-educated immigrants who formed themselves into the so-called *hua-ch'iao* (sojourners) society. The immigrant *hua-ch'iao* continued to outnumber the Straits-born Chinese in each census return until 1947.

While the Straits-born Chinese community was continuously influenced by the British, the *hua-ch'iao* community was more heavily subjected to pressures from China. Although less stable and settled than its Straits-born counterpart, the *hua-ch'iao* community was economically vigorous and organizationally powerful. They had the numbers and did not lack intellectual and economic talents among them. Most of the time, the Straits-born and *hua-ch'iao* communities collaborated and coexisted

in relative harmony throughout their history in Malaya. Occasionally, however, they became competing or contending communities and élites when politics, ideology and education became involved. But the picture of the Chinese community in 1911 showed that on the whole the Straits-born and *hua-ch'iao* cooperated in China politics.

The *hua-ch'iao* community was far more complex than its counterpart in terms of dialect barriers, territorial origins and economic operation base. The *hua-ch'iao* community tended to be both more divisive and more disunited. It consisted of seven major dialect groupings, or *pangs*. These included the Hokkiens, who came mainly from the two prefectures of Chang-chou and Ch'uan-chou in southern Fukien Province; the Teochews from the Swatow (Shantou) area; the Cantonese, from the Canton region; the Hakkas, from the various Hakkalands in Kwangtung and Fukien Provinces; the Hainanese, from the island of Hainan, off Kwangtung Province; the Kwongsais, from Kwangsi Province; and the Sankiangs, immigrants from three central Chinese provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsu and Kiangsi. In terms of numbers, the Hokkiens were the most numerous, both in the SS and in the Malay States, followed by the Cantonese, Teochews, Hakkas and the Hainanese. The Kwongsais and Sankiangs were minor *pangs*.

The *hua-ch'iao* was structured as a *pang* society along *pang* or dialect lines. Before 1911, each large or small *pang* organized and operated its own secret societies, guilds, *hui-kuans* ('surname' societies), educational institutions, religious temples and burial grounds to enhance *pangs* and kinship solidarity and power. Moreover, these organizations were aimed at protecting and supporting new immigrants and settlers arriving in a *pang*-conscious and tension-ridden society. While there is no denying that these organizations did serve individual *pangs* or kinship interests, they often fuelled rivalry and institutionalized community division. Modern Chinese education, a common spoken language (*kuo-yu*), and modern Chinese nationalism had yet to play an important rôle in unifying the Chinese community by providing a common Chinese identity on the one hand and by breaking down *pang* parochialism on the other. Modern Malayan and Singaporean nationalism as a unifying force for the Chinese community was a post-war event.

Apart from the *pang* element, the Chinese community was also a class society. It consisted of two major social classes, the merchant capitalists and manual labourers. While Chinese-educated intellectuals such as school teachers and newspaper editors and journalists were too small a group to be regarded as a class, their English-educated counterparts had emerged strongly as the cream of the Straits-born society. The Chinese merchant capitalists comprised owners of tin mines and rubber estates in

the Malay states and traders and shopkeepers in the SS. Bankers and manufacturers were to emerge in the 1910s and 1920s. All *pangs*, big or small, had their fair share of traders and shopkeepers, although the Hokkiens emerged as the *pang* which provided the most 'capitalists' in the Chinese community even at this early stage in 1911. Class structure in the *hua-ch'iao* community was never rigid. On the contrary, it was fluid. It permitted easy social mobility for frequent changes in social status. Through hardwork and good fortune, some immigrants succeeded in building up a business empire within a generation. The story of Lim Peng-siang (1872-1944) of the Ho Hong group of companies and Tan Kah-kee (1874-1961) of Tan Kah Kee & Company are two cases in point in the Chinese community in pre-war Singapore. In the eyes of the Chinese population and the British authorities, merchant capitalists enjoyed a higher social status than manual labourers and clerical employees. They were recognized by the Chinese Protectorates as *pang* or community leaders and nominated to such consultative committees as the Chinese Advisory Boards.

Generally, the Chinese merchant capitalists were literates who had received some classical Chinese education in China before their emigration. Some well-to-do Chinese merchant capitalists sent their children back to China for education during the nineteenth century, but more did this in the pre-war years of the present century. By contrast, the bulk of the Chinese labouring class had low educational standards and few educational opportunities in Malaya. Many in this class were practically illiterate before their emigration. Some children of these immigrants might be fortunate enough to receive some classical Chinese education in local private schools called *Ssu-shu*, run by private Confucian scholar-teachers. The modern Chinese school system did not begin until the 1900s and it was not until a decade later that Chinese pupils were able to enter Chinese secondary schools in major cities in Malaya.

As the number of Chinese literates grew in Malaya, the need to have a Chinese press became urgent. The beginning of a modern Chinese newspaper industry in Malaya came with the publication of *Lat Pau* in 1881. This was followed later by various other newspapers in the SS, including the *Sing Po* (1890-1899), *Thien Nan Shin Pao* (1898-1905), *Jit Shin Pau* (1899-1901), *Thoe Lam Jit Poh* (1904-1905), *Union Times* (1908-1911), *Chong Shing Yit Pao* (1907-1910), *Sun Pao* (1908-1909), *Nam Kew Poo* (1911-1914), all in Singapore, and by the *Kwong Wah Yit Poh* (1910-) in Penang, as well as a host of others during the subsequent years. From Singapore, the Chinese newspaper industry spread to other cities in Malaya and Southeast Asia. And like the modern Chinese schools, the modern Chinese press was to play a crucial role in

disseminating Chinese cultural and political nationalism for the two following generations.

Until the Communist takeover in China in 1949, the *hua-ch'iao* communities and immigrants had never broken their ties with their families and villages in China, or with China itself. Throughout the nineteenth century, these ties were maintained through remittances to families, donations for the relief of victims of natural disasters and through migration traffic between China and Malaya among the immigrant groups. There was, however, little or no *political* link between the immigrants and the Ch'ing régime until the establishment of the first Chinese Consulate in Singapore in 1877. The first Consul was Hoo Ah-Kay (1816-1880), a prominent local Chinese merchant better known to the English as Whampoa, the name of a village in Kwangtung province where he came from. Although he was not known to have promoted better relationships between the immigrants and the Ch'ing régime, he was the first official representative the immigrants ever had. The task of fostering local Chinese cultural and political loyalties to the Ch'ing was left to Hoo's successors, Tso Ping-lung (1850-1924) and Huang Tsun-hsien (1848-1905), two most capable career diplomats and Confucian scholar-poets. It was during their terms of office that pro-Ch'ing political nationalism and Chinese cultural nationalism were forcefully and consciously activated. Both these men spared no effort in sponsoring and patronizing literary and debating societies and establishing traditional Chinese schools in the SS. By so doing, both hoped to instil in the Malayan Chinese a deeper sense of common cultural and political bonds with the Ch'ing.³ The thrust of the cultural nationalism was Confucian in content, with special reference to various Confucian precepts ranging from loyalty, filial piety and humanity, to peace, harmony, decorum, righteousness and integrity. Thus a Confucian ideology of the monarchical state, the individual virtues of being diligent but morally superior, and a sense of duty to both Emperor and parents were subtly imparted to the Chinese and systematically disseminated in Malaya generally and in Singapore in particular.

Both Tso and Huang contributed greatly to the generation of pro-Ch'ing nationalism through the sale of Ch'ing titles and honours to wealthy *hua-ch'iao* in Malaya. The titles which were bought enhanced wealthy Chinese in social and political status and represented recognition by the Ch'ing Government of their community leadership.⁴ Apart from the efforts of Chinese consuls to promote the sale of titles, pro-Ch'ing political nationalism was further cultivated by the frequent visits of Ch'ing officials to Malaya for political and charity reasons. Before 1896, the Singapore Chinese Protectorate recorded the visits of four Chinese

Commissioners for studying conditions of the Chinese in Malaya, the calls of 26 Ch'ing officials for fund-raising purposes, the arrival of 11 Ch'ing dignitaries for selling official titles and honours, and the tour of some 17 Ch'ing representatives in Malaya for collecting subscriptions for famine relief in China. The frequent visits and activities of these Ch'ing officials prompted G.T. Hare, Assistant Chinese Protector in Singapore, to suggest to the Colonial Office in 1896 — as a means of winning (and commending) the political loyalty to Britain of both the Straits-born and immigrant Chinese in Malaya — recognition of local Chinese services by a graduated system of official rewards and honours.⁵ Although Hare did not attribute the rise of Chinese cultural nationalism to the Chinese officials and consuls, he freely admitted that a strong pro-China spirit had "pervaded the Chinese community in these British Colonies" in the 1880s.⁶ It is thus reasonable to suggest that the pro-Ch'ing Chinese cultural and political nationalism which had emerged in the 1880s preceded by a decade or more the advent of two more radical streams of nationalism — reformist nationalism (1898–1911) and anti-Ch'ing revolutionary nationalism (1900–1911). The efforts of the Ch'ing officials and consuls heightened the political and cultural consciousness of the Chinese in Malaya and made it easier for the reformists and revolutionaries to promote their respective political and ideological causes as China's national and international crises loomed in the 1890s.

A reformist movement had swept across China and grown up in Malaya in the wake of China's defeat at the hands of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. China signed a humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 agreeing to pay a sum of 200 million taels to Japan in indemnities and to cede Taiwan. These terms shocked the Malayan Chinese into disbelief and into action. Among the reformist leaders in the SS during the 1890s were Khoo Seok-wan (1874–1941), son of a wealthy rice merchant, Khoo Cheng-tiong, who had been a prominent Hokkien *pang* leader during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and Lim Boon-keng (1869–1957), one of the first Chinese Queen's Scholars, a medical practitioner and a very prominent Straits-born Chinese leader in Singapore. Appalled by the declining power of China as a nation, both Khoo and Lim mobilized local Chinese to press for reforms in China and overseas. The Malayan Chinese reformists lent their support to the Chinese reformer, K'ang Yu-wei (1858–1927) and his political aspirations. In May 1898, they founded the *Thien Nan Shin Pao* in Singapore to publicize their conviction that China needed a constitutional monarchy and that the Ch'ing government must rid itself of corruption and incompetent officials. Despite the failure of the so-called 'Hundred Days of Reform' in China in September 1898, the Malayan Chinese reformists

persisted with their efforts in support of K'ang Yu-wei's political endeavours — to restore the deposed Kuang-hsu as China's Emperor.

As well as political reforms, the Malayan reformists went a step further and launched the so-called Confucian revival movement in 1899 which aimed at converting the Chinese to Confucianism. Their methods of reviving Confucianism in Malaya included the study of Confucian texts, the establishment of Confucian temples for worship, the annual observance of Confucius' birthday and founding schools to teach the Confucian classics. Again, the *Thien Nan Shin Pao* was extensively utilized to promote the movement. By the time K'ang Yu-wei himself arrived in Singapore in February 1900 as a political exile, the reformist and Confucian revival movements had been further stimulated in Malaya, making them a strong and well-entrenched political force in the region.

With K'ang's advice and encouragement, the Malayan reformists in 1900 founded the first Chinese political party, the *Pao Huang Hui*, with Khoo Seok-wan as its president. Meaning 'the Emperor Protection Society', the *Pao Huang Hui* aimed at restoring to the throne the Emperor Kuang-hsu, deposed in 1898 by the Empress Dowager. Not having registered as a society, and therefore functioning illegally in the eyes of the British, the reformists were forced to use as a 'front' organization the *Hao Hsueh Hui* (or 'Chinese Philomathic Society') to spread their message and to recruit members. The *Hao Hsueh Hui* had been founded in September 1899 by Lim Boon-keng. It had a membership of some 200, most of whom were merchants and journalists with a sprinkling of medical doctors and government civil servants.⁷ It is quite possible that the *Pao Huang Hui* had attracted more members after its foundation. In Singapore, for example, the reformists were among the most influential and economically powerful community leaders of the 1900s, and became dominant in the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC), founded in 1906. These reformists continued to control the SCCC well into the 1910s. Until 1905 they had the *Thien Nan Shin Pao* as their political mouthpiece, and, between 1908 and 1911 the *Union Times* was their political organ. All in all, the reformists belonged to the articulate, powerful, well-organized and well-entrenched upper crust of the Chinese community. But they were soon to be challenged by a rising anti-Manchu political force in Malaya, the *T'ung Meng Hui* (the Revolutionary League), which was founded in Singapore in 1906 and soon had branches throughout Malaya.

During the nineteenth century, the Malayan Chinese community did not have a strong, cohesive and articulate anti-Manchu political and revolutionary tradition. Although anti-Manchu Chinese secret society members had arrived on the shores of Malaya from Amoy in 1853,

following the abortive uprising against the Ch'ing régime, there is little evidence to show that these members had carried out any anti-Manchu activities in Malaya. It was not until 1901, after the unsuccessful armed revolt in Waichow, Kwangtung Province launched by Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) and his party, the *Hsing Chung Hui* (the Society for the Revival of China), that a revolutionary tradition became established in Malaya. A group of the Waichow revolt leaders, including Yu Lieh, took refuge in Singapore and began to mobilize Chinese secret society members and labourers into a political club called the *Chung Ho T'ang* (Central Harmony Club), which had close affiliations with the *Hsing Chung Hui*. With the headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, Yu Lieh soon established branches in the SS and in Ipoh, to recruit anti-Manchu members from among the lower classes of the Chinese community and to heighten anti-Manchu feeling among them. According to Stephen Leong, Yu Lieh was also instrumental in winning support from the merchant class which included Teo Eng-hock (1871-1958), Tan Chor-nam (1884-1971) and Lim Nee-soon (1879-1936) of Singapore.⁸ As the *Chung Ho T'ang* movement was an underground one, it is difficult to assess how successful it was in creating an anti-Manchu revolutionary movement in Malaya. Suffice it to say that it continued to exist until 1903 when it joined forces with Teo, Tan and Lim in Singapore for more open and bold activities.

Teo Eng-hock, Tan Chor-nam and Lim Nee-soon were among the earliest Chinese revolutionaries in Malaya who had been under the influence of the reformists before throwing in their lot with the anti-Manchu movement. They were all Straits-born Chinese from merchant backgrounds who had received both English and Chinese tuition. They often met at a social club called the *Hsiao T'ao Yuan* (the Small Peach Garden Club) to discuss anti-Manchu politics including ways and means of overthrowing the Manchu régime. In 1903, both Teo and Tan gained considerable fame when they intervened in the famous 'Su Pao Case' of Shanghai by sending a cable to the British Consul there, urging the latter to protect two political prisoners, Chang Ping-lin and Tsou Jung, who were under arrest. The cable requested the British authorities in Shanghai to refuse to extradite the detainees to the Ch'ing government for trial. It would be difficult to assess what direct effects the cable had on the British authorities' decision, but the Ch'ing efforts for extradition did not succeed. In 1904, the *Hsiao T'ao Yuan* revolutionaries financed the publication of the *Thoe Lam Jit Poh* to publicize the revolutionary cause in the SS. After reading a copy of the paper in Hawaii, Sun Yat-sen was impressed, and through Yu Lieh he corresponded with both Teo and Tan. In June 1905, Sun met his two correspondents for the first time in

Singapore, on his way from Europe to Japan to found the *T'ung Meng Hui*. While Sun was pleased with the expression of support for his cause by Teo and Tan, he was in fact hoping that a branch of the proposed *T'ung Meng Hui* would be established in Singapore for enlisting the support of local revolutionaries. For both Teo and Tan, this first, memorable meeting was to establish firmly their personal relationship with Sun and to prompt them to dedicate their lives to the well-being and modernization of China. Prior to the due formation of the *T'ung Meng Hui* in Singapore in 1906, the Malayan revolutionaries were in a very small minority. Even so, they had flexed their muscles through their revolutionary networks with Yu Lieh's *Chung Ho T'ang* and by waging bold polemical battles against Manchu rule, local pro-Manchu conservatives and constitutional reformists. Moreover, the revolutionaries in Singapore had penetrated the *Sin Chew* reading room, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia. This reading room was founded in 1903 by a Chinese Christian missionary, Tay Pheng-teng, to provide reading materials for poor, young Chinese in order to convert them to Christianity. Through the efforts of Teo and Tan, the *Sin Chew* reading room soon became a front organization for disseminating revolutionary propaganda and recruiting new revolutionary members. Thus, between 1901 and 1905, these few young Malayan Chinese had laid the foundations of organization, affiliations, propaganda and communication as well as providing the leadership of an anti-Manchu revolutionary movement. The work of this handful of activists was to find even more fertile ground after the formation of the *T'ung Meng Hui* (TMH) in Malaya, with new recruits from all social classes joining the revolutionary rank and file, until it became a contending political élite within the Chinese community in Malaya during the stormy years of 1912 and 1914.

Between 1906, when both the Singapore TMH and the SCCC were founded, and 1911, there existed considerable political tensions between these two rival groups. The SCCC's political loyalty to the Manchu régime was constantly and pronouncedly illustrated in the Chamber's annual celebration of the birthdays of both the Empress Dowager and the dethroned Emperor, Kuang-hsu. On these occasions, the Chamber advertised in the local Chinese press, advising the Chinese to brighten up their shops and display dragon flags as a mark of celebration. While such celebrations between 1906 and 1908 passed off without incident, the deaths of both the Empress Dowager and Emperor Kuang-hsu in November 1908 were to spark off violent scenes between the two rival political groups in Singapore. For the TMH, the deaths of the Manchu rulers were occasions for celebrations, while the SCCC leadership was in mourning. On this solemn occasion, therefore, the SCCC advised the

Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to close their shops for one day and the Chinese vernacular schools for three days, as a gesture of national condolence. Some TMH members and merchants ignored the Chamber's advice by keeping their shops open. More importantly, they began to organize national celebrations which antagonized and enraged the royalist-reformists in Singapore. As a result, the latter smashed up some shops belonging to TMH members.⁹ Riots between them would have begun and spread, had not the local police successfully prevented the TMH members in time from carrying out their celebrations.¹⁰ This 1908 episode foreshadowed the formation of a rival Chamber in Singapore in 1912, by the TMH members.

Admittedly, external influences including the work of Chinese consuls, the visits of Chinese dignitaries, the exile of K'ang Yu-wei, and anti-Japanese boycott movements of 1908 in China had been largely responsible for the rise and development of Chinese cultural and political nationalism in Malaya. But it is undeniable that internal dynamics, such as the existence of a local Chinese intellectual, political and organizational leadership and its responses to China politics, must be credited with the shaping and direction of that nationalist movement. In fact it was the interaction between these internal dynamics and external influences that made Malayan Chinese nationalism what it was. By the same token, the growth of an organized Chinese revolutionary movement in Malaya after the formation of the TMH in Singapore in 1906 was principally the work of Sun Yat-sen, a globe-trotting anti-Manchu revolutionary and frequent visitor to Malaya. (Sun actually visited Malaya on eight occasions between 1900 and 1911.)

Sun Yat-sen's first visit to Singapore from Saigon, in July 1900, was an abject failure. His stay was brief — three days — and his mission was to save the life of two Japanese friends, Miyazaki and Kiyofuji, who had been arrested for allegedly attempting to assassinate K'ang Yu-wei. Fearful of his creating further political trouble in the colonies, the British decided to put a ban on Sun's visits to Singapore for a period of five years. His second visit to Singapore, in July 1905, on the way to Japan to found the TMH was also brief, but at least he met Yu Lieh, Teo Eng-hock and Tan Chor-nam, three of Singapore's revolutionaries. Sun duly arrived in Japan in July and founded the TMH in August, in Tokyo, marking a new era in his revolutionary struggle against Manchu rule. For the first time, he collaborated with other revolutionary groups, both within and outside China, for united action against the Manchu régime. Moreover, it was significant that the TMH adopted clearly defined principles and platforms for revolution. These included Sun's 'Three People's Principles' of nationalism, democracy and 'the people's live-

lihood', meaning the overthrow of the Manchu dictatorship, setting up a Republican Government based on a constitution along Western lines and the people's right to own land. In November 1905, the Tokyo headquarters published a newspaper, the *Min Pao* (the People's Journal) to disseminate revolutionary propaganda and stimulate revolutionary fervour. The *Min Pao* soon became a popular and successful propaganda machine, spreading revolutionary ideology to the Chinese in Southeast Asia.

Having laid a new organizational foundation in Japan, Sun returned to Singapore on 16 February 1906 for a third time, for a two-week sojourn. He was instrumental in the formation of the Singapore branch of the TMH. He gathered together the small group of Singaporean revolutionaries and helped them organize the TMH headquarters in Bin Chin House, on Tai Jin Road. Among the twelve founders were men of growing importance and already established social standing such as Teo Eng-hock, Tan Chor-nam and Yu Lieh, and nine other new recruits including Lim Nee-soon (1879-1936), Li Chu-ch'ih, Huang Yao-t'ing, Lin Ching-ch'iu, Hsu Tzu-lin, Liu Hung-shih, Ho Hsin-t'ien and Hsiao Pai-ch'uan. From this modest beginning, the Singapore *T'ung Meng Hui* gradually recruited members from all *pangs* including quite a number of the Straits-born Chinese, notably Lim Boon-keng, Dr S. C. Yin, and Tan Boo-liat, a grandson of Tan Kim-ching and the head of the Hokkien *pang* in Singapore. This then was also the modest beginning of the *T'ung Meng Hui* movement in Southeast Asia, with Singapore serving as headquarters for the whole region until 1908, and Penang from 1909 to 1911.

Sun's fourth visit to Singapore, in July 1906, was an important one. He brought Hu Han-min (1879-1936) with him and they stayed for two months and helped draft a formal constitution for the Singapore branch of the TMH. This constitution was subsequently to serve as a "model constitution for all the later branches of the organization in Southeast Asia".¹¹ Besides membership drives in Singapore, the most useful achievement of their trip was the founding of TMH branches in Seremban (Negri Sembilan), Kuala Lumpur (Selangor) and Penang, and mobilizing support for the revolutionary cause as they toured the Malay States.

Having made Singapore the centre for his revolutionary activities in Southeast Asia, Sun Yat-sen made four more trips to Malaya, between 1907 and 1912. His fifth visit to Singapore, in March 1907, was far too brief to be of any major significance. His sixth, commencing March 1908 and ending May 1909, was the longest but the most disappointing of all his trips to Malaya. At this time, Sun Yat-sen was faced with low morale among *T'ung Meng Hui* members in Malaya because of the repeated

Table 1: T'ung Meng Hui Branches and Principal Leaders, 1906-1911

Branches	Foundation Year	Principal Leaders
Singapore	1906	Teo Eng-hock, Tan Chor-nam, Lim Nee-soon
Penang	1906	Goh Say-eng, Ng Kim-keng, Ch'en Hsin-cheng, Khoo Beng-chiang
Malacca	1908	Sim Hung-pek, Li Yu-ch'ih
Malay States		
Muar	Before 1910	Liu Ching-shan, T'ang Shou-shan
Seremban	1906	Chu Ch'ih-ni, Huang Hsin-ch'ih, Lee Choon-seng
Kuala Pilah	1907	Teng Tse-ju
Kuala Lumpur	1906	Too Nam, Yuen Ying-fong, Loke Chow-thye, Ch'an Chan-mooi
Klang	Before 1910	Teh Sau-peng
Ampang	Before 1910	
Ipoh	1907	Teh Lay-seng, Lee Guan-swee, Au Sheng-kang, Leong Sin-nam
Taiping	Before 1910	Lu Wen-hui, Tan Ch'ih-ang
Sungei Siput	Before 1910	
Prai	Before 1910	
Lahat	Before 1910	
Kampar	Before 1910	Yang Ts'ao-tung
Menglembu	Before 1910	
Kuantan	1908	Loke Chow-lo
Lembing	Before 1910	Feng Tzu-yun
Sarawak		
Kuching	Before 1910	Lo Chun-chien, Lee Chin-tian

Sources: Huang Chen-wu, *Hua-ch'iao yu Chung-kuo ko-ming* (Taipei: 1963), pp. 32-4. Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution* (Kuala Lumpur: 1976), pp. 55, 88-94, 115-7, 236 ff.

failure of the armed uprisings engineered by him in China. There was also an economic recession in 1908 which severely restricted financial support by Malayan Chinese for his revolutionary cause. During his 14-month stay in Malaya, Sun travelled twice from Singapore through the various Malay States to Penang and once to Siam for fund-raising purposes. In July 1908, he founded the Nanyang Regional Office in Singapore to coordinate all the branch activities in Southeast Asia. However, due both to low morale among the Singapore members and to British intervention in TMH affairs, Sun was forced to move the Nanyang Regional Office in January 1909 from Singapore to Penang, which then became the centre for his Southeast Asian operations. Sun was so poorly off towards the end of his long stay that "he could barely get enough money to leave the Colony and travel again".¹²

Sun returned to Singapore and Penang for his seventh trip in July 1910 to plan support for an armed uprising in Canton in 1911. This became known as the abortive '*Huanghuakang Uprising*' of 27 April 1911. Of the 72 martyrs claimed by this uprising, 13 were from Malaya and Singapore. In Penang, Sun was accused by the local British authorities of inciting rebellion in China and collecting funds for revolutionary purposes. He was made a *persona non grata* and left the island on 6 December 1910 for Europe. Sun's eighth and final trip to Malaya took place after the Wuchang Uprising of 10 October 1911. He was then elected Provisional President of the Republic of China and arrived in Penang on 12 December to collect his family. He arrived in Singapore on 15 December for one day only, on his way to China. He met some of his close and most loyal comrades in both ports, in a relaxed and jubilant mood. He had by then become an international celebrity, as founder of the Chinese Republic.

Although Sun Yat-sen was undoubtedly important in sustaining revolutionary fervour and endeavours in Malaya between 1905 and 1911, it is proper to throw some light on the Malayan revolutionary leadership, organizations and ideology and their contribution to the success of the 1911 Revolution in China. British attitudes and policy toward the local Chinese revolutionaries and their activities should also be analyzed.

The Malayan TMH movement was institutionalized through underground branches and front organizations, including reading rooms and theatrical troupes.¹³ The TMH organizations and leadership had considerable influence on the Malayan Chinese community in later years, and it is imperative to provide some description of them. Although the actual number of TMH branches is still unclear, it is quite possible that major cities and towns in Malaya had at least either a branch or a reading room for anti-Manchu activism. These branches and reading rooms were to provide the backbone of the KMT Movement in Malaya after the 1911 Revolution.

As all branches of the TMH were unregistered with the Registrars of Societies, and thus were illegal organizations, the TMH's front organizations were extensively used to promote the revolutionary cause. The reading room organization, originating in Singapore in 1903, did not flourish in Malaya until 1907. But between 1908 and 1911, there were some 58 such reading rooms established by TMH members in cities and towns in Malaya ranging from Singapore in the south to Kuantan in the east and Sungei Patani in the north.¹⁴ The main function of the reading rooms was to raise the revolutionary consciousness of the Chinese through the provision of reading materials of a 'seditious' nature,

including books, magazines, journals and newspapers published by various TMH groups. Moreover, anti-Manchu ideology was aired in public talks, lectures and public rallies. More importantly, the reading rooms served as screening and recruiting offices for new members for the TMH, and was therefore an important operational apparatus for the TMH itself. The other front organization, the theatrical troupes, was extensively utilized to spread revolutionary messages. They were a more popular and effective medium for appealing to illiterate labourers from the lower classes of Chinese society.

While the reading rooms and theatrical troupes were aimed at young readers and the masses respectively, the most important propaganda machine of the Malayan TMH was the newspapers, which were responsible for sustaining anti-Manchu feelings among the literate sector of the Chinese community. The first anti-Manchu newspaper in Southeast Asia, the *Thoe Lam Jit Poh* (1904–1905), founded by Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock, was short-lived because of a lack of public support and financial problems. However after the formation of the Singapore branch of the TMH, at least seven other revolutionary newspapers were established by its members or sympathizers, including the *Chong Shing Yit Pao* (1907–1910), the official *T'ung Meng Hui* organ for Southeast Asia, the *Sun Pao* (1908–1909), the *Yang Ming Pao* (1908), the *Nam Kew Poo* (1911–1914), the *Chi-lung-po Jih Pao* (1909–1910), the *Ssu Chou Jih Pao* (1911) and the *Kwong Wah Yit Poh* of Penang (1910 –) which still exists today. The main functions of these newspapers were twofold. Destructively, the aim was to counteract the influence of the Chinese reformists in Malaya through political polemics against their papers, such as the *Union Times* and *Lat Pau* in Singapore and the *Penang Hsin Pao* in Penang. Constructively, it was to establish an anti-Manchu ideological hegemony in Malaya among the Chinese. Before the fall of the Manchu régime in 1912, major polemical battles were fought over such issues as 'reform' or 'revolution', constitutional 'monarchy' or 'republicanism', and Manchu 'barbarism' or Han Chinese 'hegemony'. In 1908, for example, *Chong Shing Yit Pao* fought many a polemical battle against its adversary, the *Union Times*, on issues such as these, with revolutionary leaders Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min, T'ien T'ung and Sun Yat-sen, for example, contributing to the rousing ideological and political debates. Through bitter and prolonged polemical battles, the *T'ung Meng Hui* gained the upper hand by 1911 with Sun Yat-sen's ideology of the 'Three People's Principles' extensively aired and propagated. Many literate *hua-ch'iao* developed the conviction that China belonged to the Han Chinese and that China could survive and prosper through adopting Western political and economic modernization programmes. Surprisingly, in all

the polemics of these years, Western politicoeconomic 'imperialism' was very rarely raised as an issue and never attacked as a stumbling-block to progress and modernization in China. By the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution in China, the Malayan Chinese community, especially the literate sector, had been considerably exposed to China politics. This pattern and tradition of politicization was relentlessly maintained until the 1950s.

It is difficult to verify the size of the Malayan TMH membership between 1906 and 1911, partly due to the fact that many supporters "did not allow their names to be published, often for reasons of safety".¹⁵ Figures of membership provided by various writers range from 1230 to 3500 for Malaya, although they do not explain how each figure has been arrived at. A Chinese scholar from Taiwan, Huang Chen-wu, has recorded a long list of *T'ung Meng Hui* members in Singapore and has come up with a figure of over 400.¹⁶ Were the members of all the Malayan TMH branches and reading rooms to be added, it is indeed conceivable that the membership of the revolutionary groups in Malaya could well be in the vicinity of 2000 to 3000, less than one per cent of the Chinese population in Malaya in 1911.

Principal leaders of the TMH came from all *pangs*. Although none of the leaders in Malaya was known to be among the very rich in the Chinese community, they nonetheless belonged to the upper classes in the social hierarchy — merchant capitalists and shopkeepers. No doubt there were labourers among the rank and file, but the majority of the ordinary members came from the literate and well-to-do sector of the Chinese community, that is, from the educational institutions, the newspaper industry and commercial circles. Although some prominent Straits-born Chinese leaders did join the ranks of the TMH, the majority of members belonged to the China-born, Chinese-educated *hua-ch'iao* community. While few among them were truly bilingual at this time, many were capable of reading and writing classical Chinese. One important characteristic among these leaders was that many of them had met and worked with Sun Yat-sen and his comrades, notably Wang Ching-wei (1883-1944), Hu Han-min (1879-1936), Huang Hsing (1874-1916) and Chu Cheng. These Malayan TMH leaders proudly identified themselves as Sun Yat-sen's personal friends; they were later to become the 'old guard' of the *Kuomintang* Movement in the post-1911 era. It is obvious that TMH leaders had considerable social and economic standing in the Chinese community and they were certainly not faceless nonentities by any means.

The contribution of the Malayan TMH to the 1911 Chinese Revolution can best be examined in the following terms. First, the Singapore

branch and its members were instrumental in spreading the influence of the TMH outside Malaya. They helped set up branches in Siam, Burma and Indonesia, thus making Singapore and later Penang the Southeast Asian regional centre of the anti-Manchu activities.¹⁷ Second, the Malayan TMH and its members provided shelter for Chinese revolutionaries from China, enabling them to carry on political endeavours or seek employment in a Malayan haven. A case in point was the sheltering of over 400 Chinese soldiers in Malaya in the wake of the abortive *Chen Nan Kuan* Uprising against the Manchu régime in 1907. Third, Malayan TMH members and sympathizers contributed considerable sums towards Sun Yat-sen's numerous armed uprisings in China between 1906 and 1911. Table 2 shows an incomplete estimate of the financial support provided for such uprisings.

Table 2: Malayan Chinese Financial Contributions to Chinese Revolution, 1906-1912

Year	Uprising or political cause	Amount (in HK\$ or M\$)
May 1907-April 1908	for various uprisings	HK\$ 10 000
1907	<i>Huang Kang</i> Uprising	M\$ 30 000
April 1908	<i>Hok'ou</i> Uprising	M\$ 5 700
27 April 1911	<i>Huanghuakang</i> Uprising	M\$ 47 663
11 October 1911- 12 February 1912	for funding the Fukien and Kwangtung revolutionary governments, etc.	M\$ 870 000
Total		M\$ 963 000

Source: Yen Ching-hwang, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-314.

Finally, the Malayan TMH contributed manpower to the actual armed uprisings in China between 1907 and 1911. The 1907 *Huang Kang* Uprising was not only entirely financed by the Chinese in Malaya, but also had a number of participants from the Malayan Chinese community, from the Teochew *pangs*. However, a better documented example of this manpower contribution is the *Huanghuakang* Uprising in Canton in April 1911, with a few hundred Chinese from Malaya participating.

While there is no denying that both the reformist (*Pao Huang Hui* and the SCCC) and the revolutionary (TMH) movements helped create and institutionalize a Malayan Chinese political and cultural nationalism, the Malayan Chinese anti-American (1905) and anti-Japanese (1908-1909) boycott activities also contributed substantially to their political consciousness as an ethnic group. The anti-American boycott in the SS and FMS was a direct response to the United States' Exclusion Policy against Chinese emigrating to the country and against the harsh treatment of

Chinese settlers already there. Although the boycott measures in Malaya did not last long, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, reported that 'the American firms who deal in oil and cigarettes suffered somewhat'.¹⁸ The 1908 anti-Japanese boycott had its origins in Canton, with the Chinese Government seizing a Japanese ship, the *Tatsu Maru*, in February 1908, for allegedly carrying contraband arms and munitions into China. The Japanese Government responded with hostility by demanding that the Chinese Government apologize, pay indemnity and punish Chinese officials for the seizure. In the wake of the Japanese ultimatum demanding apologies, indemnity and dismissal of Chinese officials, a boycott of Japanese goods was effected first in Canton, and then in Southeast Asia among the Chinese. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs in Singapore kept monitoring the boycott situation but did not think it serious enough to require punitive measures against those involved. When Governor Anderson asked for a report, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs bluntly advised that 'the best policy the Government can adopt in this matter is to do nothing. Left to itself the boycott will . . . never come to a head'.¹⁹ These early boycotts of the 1900s set the pattern of future protest movements of the Malayan Chinese against Japanese goods, during the 1920s and 1930s.

The British watched and monitored the upsurge of Chinese cultural and political nationalism with concern and alarm, but they were grappling with the problem of how best to counter it. Although British authorities had previously been preoccupied with the suppression of Chinese secret society activities in Malaya, during much of the nineteenth century, they began to feel the impact made by the Chinese consuls and visiting Ch'ing officials on the political loyalty of the local Chinese. In 1896, G. T. Hare, a well-informed Assistant Protector of Chinese in Singapore, had been apprehensive about Ch'ing official attempts to direct the loyalty of Chinese immigrants and settlers 'Chinawards', through the sale of titles and honours and through the collection of funds for political and charitable purposes. Moreover, Hare was uneasy about the growth of a 'sentimental *imperium in imperio*' among the Chinese settled in the SS.²⁰ He was far-sighted enough to urge the colonial government to 'cultivate the loyalty and compass the goodwill of the Chinese citizens by devising some methods recognizing such services as they perform'.²¹ Hare's proposal of 1896 was never enthusiastically received by Governor Sir Cecil Clementi-Smith and the Colonial Office in London, which finally prompted Hare in 1903 to submit a second lengthy memorandum on the creation of a 'New Order of Merit' to recognize the services of Chinese of British birth, and of those Chinese permanently settled in British dominions in the Far East.²²

At the turn of the present century, the British authorities were well aware that political upheavals in China had spilled over to the Chinese community in Malaya, with the arrival of such prominent reformists as K'ang Yu-wei and such revolutionaries as Sun Yat-sen and Hu Han-min, as well as other minor political refugees. They gave proper political protection to K'ang Yu-wei in 1900 on the instruction of both the Colonial and Foreign Offices.²³ However, the Governor reserved the right to deport political refugees on broad grounds of security and welfare under the 1888 Banishment Ordinance, Clause 4, Section 3.²⁴ These same principles and guidelines were applied to Sun Yat-sen each time he visited Singapore. On one occasion in 1908, the SS Governor, Sir John Anderson, personally interviewed and warned Sun that he would be expelled 'if I found reason to believe that he was using this place for the purpose of intrigue against the government of China'.²⁵ In 1910, Sir John Anderson actually instructed Sun Yat-sen to leave Penang when Sun was found to have breached the guidelines that he should refrain himself from making 'inflammatory' speeches to incite his hearers to support his revolutionary endeavours to overthrow the Manchu régime.²⁶

Apart from the Banishment Ordinance which was used by the British to weed out political 'undesirables', Sir John Anderson also applied the Societies Ordinance to curb organized political activism. Moreover, he also tightened up press censorship and seditious publications ordinances in 1908. For example, Sir John Anderson warned Sun Yat-sen through the Secretary for Chinese Affairs that he and editors of the *Chong Shing Yit Pao* or any other newspapers would be banished should they contribute articles in which 'intrigue or seditious agitation against China is advocated'.²⁷

While the above mechanisms were used to check and counter the increasing Chinese nationalism in Malaya up to 1911, there was clearly no coherent and calculated move to ban such political organizations as the *T'ung Meng Hui* and the reading clubs, two of the most important revolutionary institutions, which spread revolutionary ideology, collected subscriptions for Sun Yat-sen's armed uprisings and provided respectable leadership to the *hua-ch'iao* community. In other words, there was neither real insight into nor serious attempts made at gaining political and ideological control over growing Chinese nationalism and its promoters. Admittedly the potent political force — aided by both external influences (such as the visits of reformists and revolutionaries and influx of political literature, etc.) and internal growth (for example, the development of a Chinese press, a Chinese school system and Chinese political organizations) — was difficult to control. But it was a lack of political vision on the British side — their neglect of any active cultiva-

tion of the loyalty of the *hua-ch'iao* community by providing the latter with political mobility and educational facilities for their children — which kept Chinese nationalist feelings simmering.

The development of Chinese nationalism, both cultural and political, in the 1890s into an organized cultural and political movement a decade later left two major historical legacies in Malaya. For the British authorities, it meant greater vigour was required in subsequent decades to counter Chinese nationalism generally and the *Kuomintang* Movement in particular. For the Malayan Chinese community, it meant the creation of a pro-China political and cultural tradition which was to wax and wane for two generations to come.

With the Manchu régime finally overthrown in 1912 and the TMH transformed into a legal and potent political party in China — the KMT, the Malayan TMH forces proudly discarded their veil of secrecy. They legally formed themselves into KMT branches and sub-branches, to flex their political muscles under the jurisdiction of the Peking KMT headquarters. It is noteworthy that the KMT was the first legalized political institution in Malayan history and so was the Movement.

Notes

1. Ooi Jin-Bee, *Land, People and Economy in Malaya* (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1964), p. 113.
2. C. F. Yong, 'Patterns and Traditions of Loyalty in the Chinese Community of Singapore, 1900-1941', *The New Zealand Journal of History* 4, 1 (1970), pp. 77-87.
3. Yen Ching-hwang, 'Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya, 1877-1912', *Modern Asian Studies* 16, 3 (1982), pp. 409-16.
4. ———, 'Ch'ing's Sale of Honours and the Chinese Leadership in Singapore and Malaya (1877-1912)', *JSEAS* 1, 2 (1970), pp. 20-32.
5. CO 273/295/40876, *Recognition of Services of Non-Officials*, dated 9 November 1903, which includes G. T. Hare's Memorandum dated 30 September 1896, under Governor's Despatch No. 551, dated 10 October 1903, p. 7.
6. *Ibid.*: consult Hare's Memorandum on the 'creation of a new Order of Merit by His Majesty the King-Emperor Edward VII to recognise the services and devotion of loyal Asiatics (especially Chinese) and other British subjects resident in the British Crown Colonies and Settlements of the Far East and in other parts of the globe', dated 9 August 1903, p. 11.
7. Yen Ching-hwang, *op. cit.*, p. 422.
8. Stephen Leong, 'Chinese in Malaya and China's Politics, 1895-1911', *JMBRAS* L, 2 (1977), p. 15.
9. *Lat Pau*, 27 February 1909. For more details, consult Yen Ching-Hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 166-8.
10. W. D. Barnes, 'Chinese Protectorate', *Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements for 1908* (Singapore: 1909), p. 21.

11. Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution*, op.cit., pp. 37-65.
———, 'Chinese Revolutionary Propaganda Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1906-1911', *Journal of the South Seas Society* 29, 1 & 2 (1974), p. 48.
12. Wang Gungwu, *Community and Nation — Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1981), p. 133.
13. For more information on the reading rooms and theatrical troupes, consult Yen Ching-hwang's two major works, cited in Note 11.
14. Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution*, op. cit., pp. 115-7.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
16. Huang Chen-wu, *Hua-ch'iao yu Chung-kuo ko-ming* (Taipei: The National War College and Chinese Culture Research Institute, 1963), pp. 31-2.
17. Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution*, op. cit., pp. 303-4.
18. CO 275/72, W. D. Barnes, 'Report on the Chinese Protectorate for 1905', *Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements for 1905* (Singapore: 1906), p. 633.
19. CO 273/337/22519, 'Chinese Boycott of Japanese Goods in Singapore (1908)', see the Secretary for Chinese Affairs' Report, dated 22 May 1908.
20. CO 273/295/40876, consult Hare's first Memorandum dated 30 September 1896, p. 1.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
22. *Ibid.*, consult Hare's second Memorandum dated 9 August 1903, pp. 1-18.
23. CO 273/264/3369, the FO (Foreign Office) to the Under Secretary of State, CO 30 January 1900.
24. CO 273/256/7263, Sir F. A. Swettenham, Officer Administering the Government, SS, to J. Chamberlain, CO, 3 February 1900.
25. CO 273/336, Telegram, Governor of the SS, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO, 5 March 1908.
26. CO 273/359/2135, Sir John Anderson, Governor of the SS, to Lewis Harcourt, CO, 29 December 1910.
27. CO 273/337/34504, Sir John Anderson, Governor of the SS, to the Earl of Crewe, CO, 27 August 1908.

Flexing the Political Muscles: The First Phase of the Malayan *Kuomintang* Movement, 1912-1925

When news of the Wuchang Uprising of 10 October 1911 filtered through British Malaya via both Chinese and English newspapers, the pro-Ch'ing reformists suffered initial shock and apprehension. Humiliation and despair followed, when the last Ch'ing Emperor, Pu Yi, officially abdicated in February 1912. By contrast, there was much glee and ecstasy among the *T'ung Meng Hui* forces. As a sign of political victory and celebration, hundreds of queues were severed, symbolically removing the last vestige of Manchu subjugation. Intensive political organization and mobilization erupted within the Chinese community in British Malaya, resulting in months of inevitable political power struggle between the pro-Ch'ing and anti-Manchu forces. In Singapore, political confrontation was tense but peaceful. In Kuala Lumpur, however, the conflict turned to violence and bloodshed.

The impact of the 1911 Revolution on the Malayan Chinese is still being debated in terms of historical significance. The historian Yen Ching-hwang concludes that it had a unifying effect on the Chinese community in both the short and long term.¹ However, the following discussion indicates that the 1911 Revolution split the Chinese community in British Malaya during the following three years; the scars of conflict only became less apparent during the First World War when *Kuomintang* forces in both China and overseas were on the decline.

Whatever the controversy over the impact of the Revolution on the Malayan Chinese, the historical significance was immense. It heralded an era of legitimized political activism among the followers of Sun Yat-sen, namely the *T'ung Meng Hui* (TMH) members and the *Kuomintang* elements, and paved the way for two generations of Malayan Chinese to be drawn directly or indirectly into promoting Chinese culture, education and China-oriented politics.

As a major revolutionary corps in Southeast Asia, the Singapore TMH groups were prompt in their response, with the establishment of two successful fund-raising campaigns along *pang* lines to render financial support to both Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces which had declared independence soon after the October Revolution of 1911. Teo Eng-hock, Tan Chor-nam and Lim Nee-soon were among the most enthusiastic promoters of the Kwangtung Protection Fund in November 1911, which

raised a sum of \$ 200 000 within the various Kwangtung *pangs*. The Fukien Protection Fund, headed by Tan Kah-kee and Tan Boo-liat, collected a sum of \$ 130 000 from the Hokkien *pang* during a nine-month campaign. Judging by the size of the funds collected, there is no doubt that the revolutionary forces in Singapore had considerable moral and financial support from all walks of life in the Chinese community on the island. In the Malay Peninsula, similar fund-raising campaigns were launched, but on a smaller scale.

While the campaigns for funds were one sign of political triumph, TMH forces soon began to flex their growing political muscles in the open, signalling their presence and a coming of age. The first challenge to the power and leadership of the pro-Ch'ing reformists took place on 1 January 1912 within the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore. It concerned the sensitive political issue of community celebration for the installation of Sun Yat-sen as the Provisional President of the Republic of China. Being firmly under the control of the pro-Ch'ing reformists, the Chamber was neither willing nor prepared to convene a meeting to discuss this particular contentious issue, on the grounds that the Manchu régime had not yet fallen. This delaying tactic by the Chamber leadership prompted Teo Eng-hock to convene a meeting of concerned and interested members of the Chinese community in the Chamber, at which 200 Chinese were reported to have attended. However, this public meeting ended in confusion and disarray owing to opposition from the reformists to Teo's proposal for celebrating Sun Yat-sen's provisional presidency. Since the Chamber appeared neither willing nor able to represent the interests of the emergent TMH forces, the latter decided to break away to found a new and rival Chamber, named Chinese Merchants' General Chamber of Commerce (hereafter CMGCC). The new Chamber was founded within eight weeks, with a constitution drafted. On 22 March 1912, the British authorities gave blessings to its birth.² In April 1912, following its successful registration with the Peking Government under President Yuan Shih-k'ai, the new Chamber proceeded to elect a 60-member Council along *pang* lines in May 1912, thus adding another dimension to community rivalry in Singapore. The new Chamber represented the commercial arm of first the TMH forces, and then from December 1912 the KMT interests. The continual rivalry between the two Chambers highlights the political polarization and power struggle existing among the Singapore Chinese during the early years of the history of the Republic of China.³

The transformation of the Malayan TMH branches into KMT branches during 1912 and 1913 was to a large extent the work of two Chinese emissaries, Lu T'ien-min and Ch'iu Chi-hsien, despatched by

both Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing in Shanghai in September 1912.⁴ While Lu was the founder and Editor-in-Chief of the Shanghai *Min Kuo Sin Wen*, a KMT organ, Ch'iu was on the staff of the Shanghai Overseas Chinese Association.⁵ Both arrived in Singapore in October 1912 to embark on the task of transforming the TMH into the KMT. The result was that the British accorded their official recognition on 23 December 1912 to the Singapore Communication Lodge of the *Kuomintang* of Peking, or the KMT, for short. Not to be outdone by their political opponents, the pro-Ch'ing reformists founded their own political party on 10 March 1913, calling it the Singapore Branch Lodge of the *Kung Ho Tang* of the Republic of China, or the Republican Party for short, as a counter to the KMT forces.⁶ As the Republican Party leadership was largely provided by the SCCC, it is not unreasonable to suggest that it was the political arm of the SCCC itself.

Commercial and political rivalry aside, the ideological confrontation between the opposing parties was aided by propaganda published in the rival newspapers, with the KMT organ, the *Nam Kew Poo*, competing against the mouthpiece of the Republican Party, the *Union Times*. The political division of the Chinese community in Singapore was thus nearly complete.

While the SCCC leaders were more entrenched in various vernacular Chinese school boards, as financial patrons in Singapore since the 1900s, in August 1912 the TMH intellectuals and teachers founded their own body, the Nanyang Chinese General Education Association, to promote Chinese education in Singapore. When the Association was registered by the British in 1913, its stated aims included the provision of textbooks, design of syllabuses, recruitment of teachers and the use and promotion of *Kuo-yu*, the national language of China, as the medium of instruction. In 1921, this Association was de-registered by the British authorities, following its protests against the enactment of the Registration of Schools Ordinance in Singapore, a legislative act to empower the Singapore Education Department to weed out teachers or to close down schools on ideological and political grounds.

Such major responses by TMH members and supporters in Singapore in the wake of the 1911 Revolution were as a rule peaceful and mild compared to their Kuala Lumpur counterparts.

The Kuala Lumpur riots between TMH members and pro-Ch'ing reformists during the Chinese New Year celebrations, 18–21 February 1912, seemed to have taken the form of *pang* conflicts. Sir Arthur Young appointed a commission to enquire into the riots, which reported that 'the determination of the Khehs (Hakkas) and Cantonese, whose minds had been inflamed by Chinese revolutionary literature and propaganda,

to force the Hokkiens to remove their queues' was the major cause of the riots.⁷ In other words, the Malayan Chinese sympathizers of the Republican Government in China, who had already removed their queues, initiated political acts by forced queue-cutting among their opponents and the Chinese who had retained their queues retaliated.⁸ In an attempt to bring order to the incidents, the police fired into the rioting crowds causing one death. Nine others died in the subsequent inter-pang fighting.⁹

In the climate of heightened political tension within the Malayan Chinese community over China politics, KMT forces exerted themselves in the political arena by laying an historical, political, intellectual and organizational foundation for the development of a Malayan KMT movement which lasted through to 1949 and beyond. The fortunes and misfortunes of this political movement between 1912 and 1949 were dependent on external impetus from China, internal political control on the part of the British authorities and the quality and organizational ability of the Malayan KMT leadership.

The Malayan KMT Movement during the period up to 1925 can be conveniently divided into the three developmental stages of (a) its Peking affiliation, 1912-1914, (b) the Chinese Revolutionary Party (CRP) era, 1914-1919 and (c) the KMT revival, 1920-1925.

The era of Peking affiliation began with the founding of the Singapore KMT in December 1912. Although the objectives of the Singapore KMT included the preservation of the unification of the Chinese Government, the adoption of a democratic policy in China and the promotion of peaceful diplomatic relations with foreign nations, the British believed that the real objectives were (a) to collect and send funds to China for the China KMT, (b) to champion Sun Yat-sen's cause and (c) to promote advanced democratic ideas.¹⁰ With the formation of the Singapore KMT, the head lodge for British Malaya, a campaign for the institution of Malayan KMT branches was launched during 1913 resulting in the founding of numerous branches registered with the British authorities, with the exception of the Penang and Klang branches.

Table 1 shows the foundation and demise of the KMT branches in Malaya.

The Table indicates that Perak seemed to be the stronghold of the KMT Movement in the FMS. One possible reason for this may be the efforts of such TMH leaders as Tay Lay-seng, Lee Guan-swee, Au Sheng-kang and Leong Sin-nam. However, the Table should not be regarded as exhaustive since information on the KMT in the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) is underdocumented.

A dearth of documentary evidence makes it difficult to assess the social

Table 1: KMT Branches in Malaya, 1912–1925

Branches	Foundation/Registration	Dissolution/Demise
<i>Straits Settlements</i>		
Singapore	23.12.1912	25.8.1914
Malacca	25.7.1913	30.11.1914
Penang	1913	refused registration on 29.9.1913.
<i>Federated Malay States</i>		
<i>Perak</i>		
Batu Gajah	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Tanjong Rambutan	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Teluk-Kruin	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Jelapang	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Pulai	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Kuala Dipang	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Kopisan Tambun	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Gopeng	29.7.1913	5.5.1922
Kampung Kepayang	29.7.1913	5.5.1922
Ipoh	25.5.1913	27.11.1925
Teluk Anson	2.12.1913	5.5.1916
Sitiawan	9.8.1913	8.12.1916
Tapah	29.7.1913	8.12.1916
Chemor	29.7.1913	22.9.1922
Kuala Kangsar	29.7.1913	24.3.1922
Salak North	29.7.1913	24.3.1922
Sungei Siput	29.7.1913	24.3.1922
Bidor	18.8.1913	8.12.1916
Menglembu	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Papan	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Lahat	29.7.1913	26.10.1925
Siputeh (Perak?)	29.7.1913	26.10.1925
Tambun (Perak?)	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
Tronoh	29.7.1913	26.10.1925
Pusing	29.7.1913	26.10.1925
Taiping	15.7.1913	6.12.1918
Ampang Bahru (?)	29.7.1913	21.4.1922
<i>Selangor</i>		
Kuala Lumpur	1.11.1913	26.10.1925
Klang	1913	refused registration in 1913
<i>Negri Sembilan</i>		
Seremban	15.7.1913	26.10.1925
Kuala Pilah	1913	unregistered
<i>Unfederated Malay States</i>		
<i>Johore</i>		
Muar	July 1913	October 1925 (?)

Sources: CO 273/596, *Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (MRCAs)* 45 (1934), pp. 15–20; *Nam Kew Poo*, 1912–1913.

origins of some of the KMT leaders and the size of the membership except in Singapore. Nevertheless, it is possible to generalize by saying that the KMT leaders of Malayan branches were former TMH leaders who had been active during the 1900s in their opposition to Manchu rule in China. These leaders included well-to-do businessmen who provided funds, newspaper editors, journalists and Chinese vernacular school teachers who provided intellectual and organizational skill for the KMT Movement.

A case study of the Singapore KMT between 1912 and 1914 provides a clearer picture of membership and leadership. Soon after its official registration, the Singapore KMT, headed by Teo Eng-hock, launched a concerted and sustained membership drive. Former TMH members and new recruits were registered as new KMT members with a payment of \$ 3 as entrance fee. Of this, \$ 1 would be sent on to the Peking head lodge as part of overseas members' financial contribution to the party's administrative costs, while \$ 2 was to be used for the maintenance of party organization locally. As well as the entrance fee, each member had to contribute an annual membership fee of \$ 2 towards administrative costs of the Singapore party.¹¹ Members were entitled to participate in all party activities, including annual elections of office-bearers. By the time the Singapore KMT ceased to exist in August 1914, it had about 2000 members,¹² a number comparable to that of the SCCC membership during the same year. This number represented less than one per cent of the total Chinese population of 250 000 in Singapore in 1914.

With a sizeable membership of around 2000, the Singapore KMT was able to elect 123 members as office-bearers in 1913, including three Honorary Presidents. Table 2 shows *pang*, birthplace and social origins of Singapore KMT leaders, elected into office in July 1913.

Table 2 shows that the leadership consisted of both the Straits-born English-educated and the China-born Chinese-educated streams. The British were able to identify sixteen of the 123 office-bearers as British subjects, either by birth or by naturalization, including eight of the top leaders.¹³ A second characteristic of the 1913 list is that the majority of the leaders were well-established businessmen with a sprinkling of school teachers, medical doctors and newspaper editors. A third characteristic is that the great majority of the leadership belonged to the TMH 'old guard' who had been personal friends of Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing. A significant fact is that the 1913 power structure of the Singapore KMT included leaders from all *pangs*, although the Hokkiens made the greatest contribution. Moreover, there were also five female members, giving women's liberation in community and political affairs a conspicuous and early start in Singapore. The election of the English-educated into top

Table 2: Pang, Birthplace and Social Origins of the Singapore KMT Office-bearers, July 1913

Position held	<i>Pang</i>	Birthplace	Social Origin	TMH Members
Honorary Presidents:				
Tan Chay-yan	Hokkien	Malacca	rubber planter	TMH member
Teo Eng-hock	Teochew	Singapore	merchant	TMH leader
Wu Chin-sheng	Cantonese	China	merchant	TMH member
Presidents:				
Lim Boon-keng	Hokkien	Singapore	medical doctor	TMH member
Tan Boo-liat	Hokkien	Malacca	rice merchant	TMH member
Lim Nee-soon	Teochew	Singapore	merchant	TMH leader
Counselling Bureau:				
<i>Chairman:</i>				
Tan Chor-nam	Hokkien	Singapore	merchant	TMH leader
<i>Vice-Chairman:</i>				
C. S. Yin	Hokkien	Amoy	medical doctor	TMH member
<i>Members (45)</i>				
Tan Cheng-siong	Hokkien	Amoy	merchant	TMH member
Teng Tse-ju	Cantonese	China	merchant	TMH leader
Ng Sing-phang	Cantonese	China	merchant	TMH member
Huang Chi-ch'en	Hainanese	China	merchant	TMH member
Wu Tse-huan	Cantonese	China	merchant	TMH member
Ho Chung-yin	Hakka	Tap'u	merchant	TMH member
Party Fund Bureau:				
Tan Siang-ching	Hokkien	China	merchant	TMH member
Khoo Kok-wah	Hokkien	China	rice merchant	TMH member
and two other members				
General Affairs Bureau:				
<i>Chairman:</i>				
Tay Pheng-teng	Hokkien	China	Christian church preacher	TMH member
<i>Vice-Chairman:</i>				
Ch'iu Chi-hsien	Hokkien	Singapore	merchant	TMH member
and ten other members				
Examination and Assessment Bureau:				
Liu Hung-shih	Hokkien	China	merchant	TMH member
Tan Khai-kok	Hainanese	China	merchant	TMH member
and four others				
Social Affairs Bureau:				
<i>Chairman:</i>				
Sim Chu-kim	Teochew	China	merchant	TMH member
<i>Vice-Chairman:</i>				
Yap Geok-sng	Hokkien	China	merchant	TMH member
and ten other members				
Political Affairs Bureau:				
<i>Chairman:</i>				
Soon Shih-chieh	Hokkien	China	merchant	TMH member

Table 2: Con't

Position held	Pang	Birthplace	Social Origin	TMH Members
<i>Vice-Chairman:</i>				
Ho Teh-ju	Cantonese	China	merchant	TMH member
<i>Members (10)</i>				
Lan Chin-ching	Hakka	China	pawnbroker	TMH member
Ho Hai-sing	Hakka	China	teacher	TMH member
<i>Secretariat:</i>				
<i>Chairman:</i>				
Yeh Chi-yun	Hokkien	China	<i>Lat Pau</i> editor	TMH member
<i>Vice-Chairman:</i>				
Lin Ting-hua	Hokkien	China	headmaster, Tao Nan School	TMH member
<i>Members: (10)</i>				
<i>Accountant Bureau:</i>				
<i>Chairman:</i>				
Lu Yao-t'ang	Cantonese	China	newspaper proprietor	TMH member
<i>Vice-Chairman:</i>				
P'an Chao-p'en	Teochew	China	merchant	TMH member
<i>Members (10)</i>				
Chua Kah-cheong	Hokkien	China	merchant	TMH member
Ong Kim-lien	Hokkien	China	merchant	TMH member
and eight other members				

Source: *Nam Kew Poo*, 18 July 1913.

leadership positions was to be expected because of their social standing, community respectability and their long-standing association with Sun Yat-sen and the TMH. Lim Boon-keng's election to the presidency of the KMT was largely due to his ability to smooth things out with the British authorities over the KMT activities.

In Singapore, there also existed several sub-branches which were under the jurisdiction of the Singapore KMT but were never registered with the British authorities. The second sub-branch, for example, was founded in 1913 and exclusively controlled by the Hainanese *pang*. This sub-branch grew out of the *Thong Boon* reading room founded in June 1913 with most of the leaders being former TMH members including Wang Han-kuang, Foo Chao-kuang, Tan Khai-kok and Fu Yang-hua. The sub-branch had 18 office-bearers with a membership of over 500 during 1913, a substantial contribution to the KMT movement from the small Hainanese *pang* with a population of only about 10 000 on the island.¹⁴ The fact

that the *Thong Boon* reading room was turned into a KMT sub-branch is interesting in itself; it leads to the logical surmise that the *Tung Teh* reading room of the Teochew *pang* and the *Sin Chew* reading room of the Hokkien *pang* were also sub-branches of the Singapore KMT during the Peking affiliation era.

Judging by the poor quality and sparse amount of reporting on KMT activities in both Singapore and Malaya by the contemporary Chinese press between 1912 and 1914, the KMT in Singapore does not seem to have been a sufficiently aggressive political party to threaten the British authorities. Apart from rivalry with the SCCC and its front organizations, such as the Republican Party, two big events occurred for the Singapore KMT during 1913. In April a memorial service was convened following the death of a prominent KMT leader in China, Sung Chiao-jen, a victim of a political assassination committed by the Yuan Government in Peking. About 2000 people attended the memorial service, including some 450 students.

Between April and July 1913 preparations for the first official election of KMT office-bearers were undertaken. The July election saw democratic participation in party affairs by members and the emergence of KMT leadership in the open as a community and political pressure group. Other activities during 1913 were on smaller scale. They included commemoration of the *Huanghuakang* Uprising (1911) in May; founding of the Anglo-Chinese Girls' School in June by KMT leaders including Teo Eng-hock, Khoo Kok-wah, Sim Chu-kim, Tan Khai-kok and Tan Chor-nam; and Lim Boon-keng's visit to Muar, Johore, in July, to preach Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of the People' and to help found the Muar branch of the KMT. While commemorative services were China oriented in nature and content, the founding of a school for local Chinese girls, the KMT election and the spread of KMT branches in Malaya were largely Malaya oriented. After the dissolution of the KMT in Peking by President Yuan Shih-k'ai on 4 November 1913, the Singapore KMT lay so low that the contemporary Chinese press hardly reported any KMT activities in either Singapore or Malaya.

The causes behind the demise of the Singapore KMT in August 1914 are now better documented. President Yuan Shih-k'ai's proscription of the Peking head lodge in 1913 and Sun Yat-sen's decision in July 1914 to found a new party, the Chinese Revolutionary Party (CRP), to replace the KMT, served as external factors. A major internal factor was British pressure on the Singapore KMT to furnish the Registrar of Societies with the names and addresses of all party members as part of the requirements of the Societies Ordinance amendments of 1913.¹⁵ Presumably, British

pressure was guided by the fact that Britain recognized the Yuan régime as the legitimate government of China; it was diplomatically necessary to be seen to have exerted tighter control over the anti-Yuan forces in Malaya.

Another more significant internal factor was the political split within the Singapore KMT leadership over issues concerning its attitude towards the Yuan régime and its response to Sun's call for dismantling the existing KMT branches. The official history of the KMT indicates that by August 1914, the Singapore KMT had fragmented into three factions, including (a) Teo Eng-hock and Tan Chor-nam; (b) Lim Boon-keng and Lim Nee-soon; and (c) the *Tung Jen Club*, a sub-branch of the Singapore KMT exclusively controlled by the Cantonese *pang*.¹⁶ It seems closer to the truth to say that both Teo and Tan were opposed to the dissolution of the registered KMT, while Lim Boon-keng and Lim Nee-soon dissociated themselves from Sun's call for the overthrow of the Yuan régime by force.¹⁷ The *Tung Jen Club* faction favoured the replacement of the KMT by Sun Yat-sen's new political party, the CRP. The decision to dissolve the Singapore KMT was not at all popular with its rank-and-file members on several grounds, including the requirement for new members to register afresh and to pay an entrance fee of \$ 10, except where they had rendered meritorious service to the revolution.¹⁸

The era of Peking affiliation, although brief, was nevertheless a high point in the Malayan KMT history with bursts of nationalistic fervour supporting Sun Yat-sen and his cause until 1914, when the party branches in Singapore and Malaya seem to have split. The fact that the British registered most of the KMT branches which applied, and legitimized them as legal and open political establishments, provided considerable impetus and prestige to the KMT movement. Adding to the respectability was the active participation of some of the ablest and most enlightened leaders from the Straits-born Chinese community, in Singapore in particular.

The birth of the CRP in July 1914 in Tokyo was the work of Sun Yat-sen himself. Totally disenchanted with the KMT and its members for their lack of party discipline, ideological cohesiveness and political unity, Sun Yat-sen's Chinese Revolutionary Party set rigorous standards for its members. These included taking an oath to sacrifice life and freedom for the revolutionary cause, rigidly obeying party orders and keeping party activities secret.¹⁹ By stressing secrecy when founding the CRP branches and recruiting members without the branches first being officially registered, Sun Yat-sen contravened rules for conduct of societies under colonial conditions in British Malaya. While personally instructing the

dismantling of legalized KMT branches, his Tokyo CRP headquarters nominated leaders in Singapore and Malaya to found new CRP branches or sub-branches.

Sun Yat-sen's scheme of founding secret CRP branches in Malaya met with hostility and disobedience from a considerable number of KMT members who preferred legal and open activism to underground operation. It explains why many of the KMT branches in the FMS listed in Table 1 remained registered and unchanged. Political expediency was the obvious reason because a registered party was entitled to open activity and mobility. So, during the CRP era in British Malaya there existed both the CRP branches and KMT branches founded during the heady days after the 1911 Revolution.

Sun Yat-sen in Tokyo personally kept some of his closest friends in Singapore and Malaya, including Teng Tse-ju, Lee Guan-swee and Ch'en Hsing-cheng informed of his intention to form the new CRP as a secret society and urged them to found similar branches in Malaya.²⁰ More significantly, he communicated with a Singapore Chinese secret society, known as the *Hung-men Yi-hsin kungszu*, urging it to help found new CRP branches to carry on the Chinese revolution.²¹ However, just what role this secret society played in creating Singapore CRP branches in 1914 is difficult to assess. Suffice it to say that through Sun Yat-sen's personal contacts and appeals to his friends and the Singapore secret society, various CRP branches and sub-branches were secretly organized without applying to the Registrars of Societies for registration. Table 3 shows principal leaders of the Malayan and Singapore CRP branches and sub-branches during the years 1914-1919.

Although much of the CRP history in British Malaya concerning membership, party structure and relationships with the existing KMT branches remains unclear, it is possible to examine the social origins of the CRP leadership at branch level and to document its major activities during the era of secrecy.

Among the eleven branches of the CRP, the main leaders again came from the TMH 'old guard'. These leaders had considerable financial resources as well-established and recognized community or *pang* leaders. As the CRP branches and sub-branches were 'illegal' organizations, the Straits-born English-educated either dissociated themselves or faded into the background. This was clearly the case in Singapore with the Straits-born English-educated of 1912-1914 shunning association with the CRP. It was quite possible that Chinese vernacular school teachers participated in CRP activities for some 200 political refugees from China had arrived after 1913, many of whom had settled down in Singapore to become school teachers.²²

Table 3: Principal Leaders of the CRP Branches and Sub-Bran­ches in British Malaya, 1914–1919

Branches	Presidents	Sub-Bran­ches	Presidents
Singapore	Teo Eng-hock Tan Chor-nam Huang Chi-ch'en Hsu T'ung-hsiung	Singapore	Lu Yao-t'ang Ho Teh-ju
		Singapore Hainanese	Fu Yang-hua Chang Kang
Penang	Ch'en Hsin-cheng Lin Shih-an	Penang Hainanese	Hsin Pi-shan Wang Mo-jen
Malacca	Sim Hung-pek Lung Tao-shun	Batu Pahat, Johore	Lei mien-ch'ao
Muar, Johore	Cheng Wen-ping Lin chao-ying	Chemor, Perak	Ou Yu-ch'u
Seremban, Negri Sembilan	Wu hsi-shih Wu Wen-shan	Mambang Di Awan, Perak	Yang Ta-han
Alor Star, Kedah	Fu Yung-hua Li Ch'i-ming	Telok Anson, Perak	Huang Shao-hsing Teng Tze-hsien
Klang, Selangor	Wu jo-chai	Sitiawan, Perak	Lin Ts'u-lai
Kuala Lumpur, Selangor	Ch'an Chan-mooi P'eng Tse-wen	Pusing, Perak	Lei Sheng Lo Ta-t'ing
Taiping, Perak	Liang Sheng-kung T'ang Chao-hua	Kampar, Perak	Huang Hsin-tz'u
Ipoh, Perak	Tay Lay-seng Lee Guan-swee	Port Swettenham, Selangor	Huang Ch'en-chu
Bentong, Pahang	Wu Fa-wen	Kuala Lumpur Hainanese	Ch'en Chia-feng
		Bukit Mertajam, Perak	Chu Pu-yun
		S. Panti, Kedah	Tu Wen-fu

(Cont. Overleaf)

Table 3: Cont.

Branches	Presidents	Sub-Branches	Presidents
		Batu Gajah, Perak	Ho Ta-sheng
		Tronoh, Perak	Ch'en Ping-chiu
		Seremban, Hainanese, Negri Sembilan	Fu Lan-t'ing
		Jasin, Malacca	Lin Tse-chai
		Asahan, Malacca	Kuo Siao-chun
		Tangkak, Malacca	Kuo Shao-tz'u
		Kuala Kubu Bahru, Selangor	Kuan Wen-sheng
		Kuantan, Pahang	Ch'en Yuan-ming
		Kuching, Sarawak	Hsiao Chun-sheng
		(six other sub-branches in Malaya with Chinese names have not been identified in English)	

Source: "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tang-shih shih-liao pien-tsu'an wei-yuan-hui", ed., *Ko-min wen-hsien ti ssu-shih-wu ch'i*, *Chung-hua ko-min-tang shih-liao* (Taipei: 1969), pp. 99-263.

As the Singapore CRP leadership is better-documented, an examination of its social origins is called for. On 12 October 1914, Sun Yat-sen appointed Teo Eng-hock and Tan Chor-nam as President and Vice-President of the Singapore CRP respectively.²³ However, both declined the invitation to head the party in Singapore.²⁴ It was not until 22 July 1915 that Sun Yat-sen appointed Huang Chi-ch'en and Hsu T'ung-hsiung as President and Vice-President of the Singapore CRP, along with two honorary presidents and fourteen other committee members.²⁵ Huang, a Hainanese businessman from Johore Bahru, was one of the founders of the *Nam Kew Poo* (1911-1914) in Singapore and the chairman of its Board of Directors until the newspaper's demise in May 1914.²⁶ Hsu was a Hakka shopkeeper retailing exclusively Chinese goods. He had been an active leader of the Hakka *pang*, a member of the KMT-controlled CMGCC, and a promoter of Chinese education in Singapore.²⁷ Both Huang and Hsu came from lesser *pangs*, hence there were limitations on their influence in a Chinese community structured along *pang* lines.

During the period under investigation, the CRP in British Malaya faced the major problem of factionalism while engaged in such activities as fund raising for Sun Yat-sen and sporadic anti-Yuan propaganda campaigns.

Factionalism occurred in Southeast Asia generally and in Singapore and Malaya particularly, between Sun's CRP branches and a group led by former Chinese provincial governors, now political refugees in Malaya, including Po Wen-wei, a former governor of Anhwei, Ch'en Chiung-ming, a past governor of Kwangtung, and Li Lieh-chun, a former governor of Kiangsi. These political refugees arrived in Malaya after the fiasco of the military uprising against the Yuan régime in July 1913, known as the 'Second Revolution'. They disagreed with Sun's instruction to dismantle all Malayan KMT branches in 1914 on the grounds that Yuan Shih-k'ai had outlawed the KMT only in China while foreign governments had not interfered with existing KMT branches. Moreover, they established an organization in Penang known as the *Shui-li Kung-szu* (Conservancy Company), which favoured retaining the name KMT. It challenged Sun's political leadership and political organization, the CRP, and favoured independent action by various political factions against Yuan.²⁸ Apart from competition for funds between the factions, Sun Yat-sen and his rivals also differed in their political objectives, especially after Japan had presented Yuan Shih-k'ai with the infamous 'Twenty-One Demands' in 1915 which, if accepted, would have made China a protected state of Japan. While Sun Yat-sen and the CRP played down the role of Japan in the 'Twenty-One' Demands' affair and stuck to their guns

against the Yuan régime, the rival organizations clamoured for national unity and for resistance against Japan as a major threat to China's survival.²⁹ Factionalism kept both the Malayan KMT and CRP activities at a low ebb.

Statistics are sketchy on funds raised by the CRP in British Malaya to support Sun Yat-sen's political and military campaigns against Yuan Shih-k'ai during the CRP era. However, some efforts at fund raising by CRP branches in these territories during the anti-Yuan campaigns of 1915-1916 are summarized in Table 4.

It is important to point out that the figure of \$ 237 000 (Straits dollars) collected in Malaya and Singapore during 1915 and 1916 represented some twenty per cent of all funds raised (\$ 1.12 million Straits dollars) throughout the world, while the figure of \$ 76 000 (Japanese yen) represented four per cent of all funds collected (\$ 1.74 million yen).³⁰

One other notable activity during the CRP era was the holding of memorial services for three Chinese revolutionary leaders in 1916 — Ch'en Ch'i-mei, Huang Hsing and Ts'ai Ao. In Singapore, the joint memorial service for Huang Hsing and Ts'ai Ao was organized by the *Tung Teh* reading room, with 41 public bodies participating and several thousand people attending.³¹ This was one of the few public and open activities recorded in the Chinese press.

The British continued to monitor the activities of both the KMT and CRP by exerting rigid political control over them. In a telegram to the Colonial Office dated 12 May 1915, Sir Arthur Young, Governor of the

Table 4: Funds Raised by the CRP Branches in British Malaya for Sun Yat-sen Against Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1915-1916

Territories	Straits Dollars	Japanese Yen
Singapore	93 522.17	33 337.20
Penang	1 000.00	7 940.00
Kuala Lumpur	6 881.81	6 569.70
Seremban	11 238.10	10 241.87
Kedah		400.00
Ipoh	13 000.00	37 720.84
Malacca	4 046.88	2 090.88
Perak	500.00	600.00
Hainanese sub-branches, Malaya		9 266.40
Klang, Selangor	780.00	1 837.34
Funds collected by Teng Tsu-ju, President of Fund-Raising Committee for Southeast Asia	102 360.00	2 471.00

Source: "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tang-shih shih-liao pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui", ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

SS, expressed the view that it was "undesirable that any encouragement should be given to the Chinese here (to) identify themselves with Chinese politics, or to invest in Chinese loans".³² More importantly, three deportations were reported to have been ordered by the British against those involved in the anti-Yuan Shih-k'ai régime activities during 1915.³³

Between 1914 and 1919, the KMT and CRP remained dormant political forces which concentrated on fund raising against Yuan Shih-k'ai. However the development of Chinese nationalism generally and the growth of vernacular Chinese schools and the use of *Kuo-yu*, the Chinese national language in schools in particular kept the China-oriented culture and politics alive. Response to the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919 by the Malayan Chinese schools and students clearly indicates this. In the wake of the May Fourth Movement in China, Sun Yat-sen founded his territorial base in Canton and embarked on the reorganization of the CRP. As a result, the clandestine organization of the CRP was replaced by the *Chung-kuo Kuomintang*, or the KMT for short. With the rebirth of the KMT in China, there began the reorganization of the KMT in British Malaya (between 1920 and 1925).

Sun Yat-sen had been aware of the damaging split created within the revolutionary rank and file since the founding of the CRP in 1914. In 1916, with Sun's approval to restore the KMT and to reorganize the party, a committee was set up to effect the change. Although the committee had completed the task of reorganizing the party, it was not until 10 October 1919 that a new party constitution was announced and the China KMT, or the KMT for short, was instituted.³⁴

The reorganization of the Malayan CRP branches into the new KMT bodies was again initiated by Sun Yat-sen. The Shanghai headquarters of the KMT despatched two emissaries to Southeast Asia to survey party conditions and to help reorganize new branches. These two persons, Lin Chi-shih and Chang Chen-min arrived in Penang at the end of 1919, but their attempts to reorganize the Malayan branches are said to have been frustrated by the British authorities.³⁵ Although the 1919 efforts by Lin and Chang were abortive, reorganization made headway in 1923 when firm guidance for the establishment of overseas head branches and branches was finally provided by the Canton KMT.

The Canton KMT formulated regulations in July 1923 for the establishment of overseas head branches and branches. Overseas head branches were to be constituted as follows:

- (a) a nine-man council was to be in charge of party affairs;
- (b) the nine councillors were to be elected by members;
- (c) the Council was to hold monthly meetings to sort out party problems and affairs; and

- (d) the Overseas Head Branch was obliged to accept an executive appointed by the Canton party headquarters to carry out party duties or resolutions.³⁶

Each ordinary overseas branch would have an executive committee, under which there were sections for General Affairs, Party Affairs, Finance, Propaganda, Social Affairs, a Political Committee, a Legal Committee, Peasants and Workers Committees and a Women's Committee. After a two-year term, office-bearers could be re-elected into the same positions. The overseas KMT head branches were answerable to the party headquarters in Canton, and it is assumed that overseas branches were directly under the jurisdiction of the overseas head branches. This then was the blueprint for making the overseas branches more efficient and better-organized.

However, following the reorganization of the China KMT in 1924 in Canton, the party set up a South Seas head branch under the direction of Peng Tse-min, a returned Chinese from Kuala Lumpur, to embark on the reorganization of overseas party branches. The aims of this head branch were to collect from overseas branches their annual and special subscriptions and to spread Sun Yat-sen's political teaching.³⁷

The result of overseas party reorganization was reported by the KMT source in Canton in 1925. It stated that there was one head branch for British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies (presumably with Singapore as its location), commonly known as the *Nanyang*, and 14 branches, 71 sub-branches and 80 divisional sub-branches with a membership of 4317.³⁸ Unfortunately, the Canton KMT source did not provide details of localities, membership numbers or leadership structure at all levels of the *Nanyang* KMT organizations. Thus, it is impossible to analyze KMT membership and leadership in Malaya and Singapore for the period 1920-1925.

From Colonial Office sources, including the SS Governor's despatches and the *Malayan Bulletin of Political Intelligence (MBPI)* (1922-1929), a monthly political intelligence journal edited by the Malayan Bureau of Political Intelligence in Singapore, a few glimpses of the revitalized KMT are revealed. First, there existed in Singapore, Penang and Malacca active branches during 1922, and a new Kedah branch was established at Alor Star in the same year.³⁹ A year earlier in 1921, the *MBPI* reported that great efforts were being made to extend the membership of the Malayan KMT, thus increasing party funds. A \$ 10 entrance fee was set for new party members.⁴⁰ In 1923, the *MBPI* revealed that the KMT members in Bentong, Pahang, had founded a correspondence centre and that the Klang branch had had its office-bearers appointed by the

General Affairs Department of the Canton KMT.⁴¹ In the same year, the Penang KMT was cited as having control of five sub-branches, including those at Sungei Patani and Pulau Langkawi off Kedah, and Hadjai (Hat Yai), Chimpang and Singgora, all in Siam.⁴² In November 1923, the MBPI confirmed that the KMT *Gazette*, a party organ established in Canton, was distributed in Malaya to the following KMT organizations: Singapore; Penang; Kuala Lumpur and Klang in Selangor; Seremban and Kuala Pilah in Negri Sembilan; Selama in Perak; Kuala Lipis, Bentong and Kuantan in Pahang; Batu Anam and Muar in Johore; the Langkawi islands and Alor Star in Kedah; and the Dindings, part of the SS,⁴³ indicating considerable sympathy for Sun Yat-sen among the Chinese in Malaya.

Apart from the party reorganization of the Malayan KMT during 1920–1925, Malayan KMT branches were involved in four major activities: (a) fund raising for Sun Yat-sen; (b) consolidating KMT influence in Chinese vernacular schools; (c) attendance by Malayan KMT representatives, of the first Party Congress held between 20 January and 30 January 1924 in Canton; and (d) holding a community memorial service in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Malacca and Klang in April 1925 for Sun Yat-sen on the occasion of his death.

There is no doubt that fund raising for Sun Yat-sen's political and military cause in China was one of the most important functions of the overseas KMT branches. As a Chinese in exile until 1920, Sun Yat-sen was constantly dogged by financial troubles. After Sun Yat-sen had firmly established his territorial base in Canton, he needed funds for military campaigns against the warlords in South China, for running party and government affairs, and for founding the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924. A sum of \$ 400 000 is reported to have been collected during 1920 in British Malaya, when Sun Yat-sen needed it urgently to found a more secure political and territorial base in South China for himself and his party.⁴⁴

Although it is difficult to gauge the penetration of KMT influence in Chinese vernacular schools in Malaya and Singapore, it is certain that Chinese teachers with KMT political leanings became more vocal and demonstrative after the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919. Some of these teachers in British Malaya became politically involved in boycotting Japanese goods in 1919. Tan Choon-yeow (Headmaster of the *Ai Tong* School, Singapore), Chng Suat-hean (*Ai Tong* School teacher) and Sung Mu-lin (Headmaster of the Confucian School, Kuala Lumpur) were all deported by the British authorities.⁴⁵ The British were increasingly worried about the 'subversive' nature of these teachers who made use of the Chinese schools for 'political propaganda' and who opposed

the Registration of Schools Ordinances in both the SS and FMS in 1920.⁴⁶ Conflict became inevitable when the British exerted tight political and ideological control over the Chinese schools and their teachers, this being deemed by the KMT forces to be hampering the legitimate development of Chinese culture and education in Malaya. The enactment of the Registration of Schools Ordinances in 1920 signalled the beginning of a more coherent policy on the part of the British to control Chinese nationalism generally and to check the KMT forces in Chinese schools in particular.

It is worth noting that when the first Party Congress of the KMT was held in Canton in January 1924, there were over 40 representatives from overseas branches, ranging from those in the Americas and Southeast Asia to Australasia. However, the Malayan KMT was under-represented with only one member from Negri Sembilan, Siu Chan-tong, who made a report on the Malayan KMT Movement at the Congress. Although Teng Tse-ju also participated in the Congress, he represented the Canton KMT.

By far the most successful activity of the KMT during this period was the memorial service for Sun Yat-sen on 12-13 April 1925 in Singapore, which was brilliantly transformed into a community affair of sympathy for Sun Yat-sen and his political cause. The death of Sun Yat-sen on 12 March 1925 in Peking provided an occasion for the KMT forces in British Malaya to show their sympathy by holding various solemn memorial services. KMT leaders in Singapore, headed by Teo Eng-hock, made a clever and calculated tactical move in having the preparatory committee for the memorial service located in the SCCC. Having done this, the Committee then convened a community meeting attended by representatives from Chinese social, cultural, *pang* and community organizations to elect office-bearers to a proper and formal body, called the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Service Committee. This official Committee, formed on 2 April 1925, consisted of ten members: Teo Eng-hock, Tan Khai-kok, Lee Choon-eng, Li Leung-kie, Ho Teh-ju, Ong Shao-yam, Fu Yang-hua, P'an Chao-p'en, Hsu T'ung-hsiung and Lee Yu-chieh, who were all prominent KMT members and KMT-controlled reading room activists.⁴⁷ There were also six other sub-committees elected at the community meeting on 2 April to help carry out memorial service functions. Again, judging from the list of 31 members elected to these sub-committees, there is no doubt that the majority of the sub-committee were KMT members or sympathizers. It is reasonable to suggest that the Sun Yat-sen memorial service in Singapore was engineered and controlled by the KMT forces as a community function.

It should be noted that the Chinese Affairs Department in Singapore granted permission for the memorial service to be held at the Happy Valley, Tanjong Pagar, on the understanding that no Chinese shops were to be forced to close on the days of the memorial service and that speeches made during the service must be peaceful and moderate in tone and content.⁴⁸

On the first day of the memorial service, the Chinese community in Singapore was reported to have closed shops and lowered their flags to half mast as a sign of respect for Sun Yat-sen. Men wearing black bands and women black flowers were seen moving about in the streets. At the Happy Valley ground, some two thousand commemorative scrolls were hung around the four gates, inscribed with Chinese names, 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Mutual Assistance', as people entered the hall for the memorial service. Inside the hall, a life-size photograph of Sun Yat-sen was hung behind the rostrum and around it wreaths were piled thick and high, with their fragrance permeating the entire hall. Against the backdrop of flowers and commemorative scrolls, Teo Eng-hock opened the service and participants kept a two-minute silence in memory of Sun Yat-sen who had made eight visits to Singapore in his lifetime. This was followed by memorial speeches, the playing of funeral music, reciting Sun Yat-sen's will and, finally, the playing of the Chinese national anthem. When these rites had been performed, the hall was opened to allow the public at large to pay its final tribute to Sun Yat-sen. According to an estimation in the *Nanyang Siang Pau* and by the Memorial Service Committee, over 100 000 people filed through the hall during the two-day service; this figure included over 30 Japanese citizens living in Singapore, and European and American representatives.⁴⁹ It represented an unprecedented success for the Singapore KMT forces, invoking community sympathy for Sun Yat-sen, and thus promoting Chinese nationalism on this occasion. Similar services were recorded in Kuala Lumpur, Malacca and Klang by KMT branches and sympathizers, with varying degrees of success. This extraordinary mass participation in China politics was eclipsed only by the Shantung Relief Fund (1928-1929) and the China Relief Fund (1937-1941) campaigns in Singapore and Malaya. Nevertheless, KMT achievements and the revival of 1925 were shortlived, for the British authorities eventually proscribed the KMT Movement in October 1925.⁵⁰ The process and rationale for banning the Malayan KMT by the British in 1925 will be examined in Chapter 3.

An analysis of the history of the Malayan KMT between 1912 and 1925 seems to make it clear that external forces played an important role

in the waxing and waning of Malayan KMT prestige and influence. The fortunes and misfortunes of Sun Yat-sen and his party over time were amply reflected by the high and low points of Malayan KMT activism. Needless to say, the changing attitude, policy and response of British authorities to the Malayan KMT Movement were equally crucial to the growth or retardation of this Chinese political organization in British Malaya. While the British were able to control the KMT by punitive measures, they found it almost impossible to check the appeal of dynamic Chinese nationalism to the Chinese community generally, and especially the *hua-ch'iao* community. The British ban of 1925 had to contend with a resurgence of Chinese nationalism upon the unification of China by the KMT in 1928, and with the rise of new blood within the Malayan KMT leadership, as well as with left-wing forces within the Malayan KMT Movement. After the unification of China in 1928 and the purging of the left-wing forces within the KMT, the Malayan KMT Movement forged ahead during the years 1929-1930.

Notes

1. Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 287-90.
2. *Straits Settlements Government Gazette (SSGG)* 1 (1912), p. 433.
3. For further information on the SCCC-CMGCC rivalry, consult C. F. Yong, 'Rivalry Between the New and Old Chinese Chambers of Commerce — Contending Elites and Power Struggle Within the Chinese Community of Singapore, 1912-1914', *Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 75th Anniversary Souvenir Issue* (Singapore: The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1982).
4. *Nam Kew Poo*, 9 September 1912.
5. *Ibid.*, 16 October 1912.
6. CO 275/85, *Minutes of the Proceedings of the Executive Council, Straits Settlements*, 10 March 1913, p. 29.
7. CO 273/387/31489, *Chinese Riots at Kuala Lumpur (1912)*, no page number given.
8. CO 273/387/31473, *Riots at Kuala Lumpur (1912)*. Sir Arthur Young, Governor of the SS, to the CO, 9 September 1912, p. 25.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
10. CO 273/516, *The Malayan Bulletin of Political Intelligence (MBPI)* 1 (1922), p. 2.
11. *Nam Kew Poo*, 17 March 1913.
12. CO 273/596, *Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (MRCA)* 45 (1934), p. 16.
13. *Ibid.*
14. 'Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tang-shih shih-liao pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui', ed., *Ko-min wen-hsien ti ssu-shih-wu ch'i, Chung-hua ko-min-tang shih-liao* (Taipei: 1969), p. 612.
15. CO 273/596, *MRCA, op. cit.*, p. 16.
16. 'Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tang-shih shih-liao pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui', ed., *op. cit.*, p. 623.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 613.
18. CO 273/596, *MRCA, op. cit.* 14, p. 16.
19. George T. Yu, *Party Politics in Republican China — The Kuomintang, 1912-1924* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 127.

20. *Kuo-fu ch'uan-shu*, 3rd edn (Taipei: 1966), pp. 520-1, 583.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 583-4.
22. CO 273/596, *MRCAs*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
23. "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tang-shih shih-liao pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui", ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 160-1, 180.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 621.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 180-1.
26. *Nam Kew Poo*, 14 March 1912; 23 July 1912; 9 May 1914.
27. Lin Po-ai, et al., *Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan* (Penang: *Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan pien-chi-ch'u*, 1924), p. 98.
28. George T. Yu, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-6.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
30. 'Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tang-shih shih-liao pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui', ed., *op. cit.*, p. 75.
31. *Kuo Min Yit Poh*, 8 November 1916; 26 December 1916.
32. CO 273/421/21913, Sir Arthur Young, Governor of the SS, to the CO, 12 May 1915, on "Investment in Chinese Internal Loan".
33. *Kuo-fu ch'uan-shu*, *op. cit.*, p. 599. CO 275/96, A. R. Chancellor, 'Report on the Straits Settlements Police Force', *Annual Reports of the SS for 1915* (Singapore: 1916), p. 20.
34. *Chun-kuo Kuo-min-tang ts'ai hai-wai* (Taipei: 1961), Vol. 1, p. 155.
35. Png Poh Seng, 'The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941', *Journal of Southeast Asia* 2, 1 (1961), p. 14.
36. *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ts'ai hai-wai*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 159.
37. FO 371/12456/2770, 'Attitude of Malayan Government towards Kuomintang', 24 March 1927, with an Enclosure, "The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1926", by A. Goodman and P. T. Allen, dated 7 January 1927, p. 1.
38. *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ts'ai hai-wai*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
39. CO 537/908, *MBPI* 11 (1923), no pages given in the *Bulletin*.
40. CO 273/516, *MBPI* 1(1922).
41. CO 537/916, *MBPI* 16 (1923).
42. *Ibid.*
43. CO 537/919, *MBPI* 18(1923).
44. FO 371/8029/717, F. S. James, Governor's Deputy, SS, to the CO, 29 December 1921. This despatch included a Memorandum on the KMT in Malaya by David Beatty, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, dated 13 December 1921. No pages given.
45. CO 275/108, Minutes of Proceedings of the Executive Council, SS, 27 August 1919, p. 432. *Yik Khuan Poh*, 30 August 1919; 9 September 1919; 25 October 1919; 20 November 1919; 7 January 1920.
46. FO 371/9224, Sir L. N. Guillelard, Governor of the SS, to the CO, 6 December 1922, p. 4.
47. *Nanyang Siang Pau*, 4 April 1925.
48. *Ibid.*, 31 March 1925; 9 April 1925.
49. *Ibid.*, 13 April 1925; 14 April 1925. For the attendance of the memorial service in Singapore, the British estimated that there were 60 000 persons present, a large number of whom were school children. Consult CO 537/932, *MBPI* 29 (1925), Item 159.
50. For more information on the British ban on the KMT in Malaya and Singapore in 1925, consult, C. F. Yong and R.B. McKenna, 'The Kuomintang Movement in Malaya and Singapore, 1912-1925', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12, 1 (1981), pp. 118-32.

From Supervision to Suspension: British Control and Chinese Nationalism, 1911-1925

The year 1911 was a watershed in British political control of the Malayan Chinese. The change from socio-economic to overt political control, implicit in the 1889 and 1909 Societies Ordinances, was furthered by various measures taken by Sir Arthur Young as Governor between 1911 and 1919. Young's successor, Sir Laurence Guillemard, extended the wartime initiatives, introducing new legislation to supervise Chinese education and to control Chinese political activity. In the wake of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 in China, the Malayan KMT was pinpointed as one of the targets of political control. In order to understand how the British managed the growing Chinese nationalism and particularly that shown by the Malayan KMT, it is necessary to acquaint oneself with those British officials involved during 1912-1925 and with the mechanisms they employed for achieving political control. An analysis is also given here of the changing British *policy* towards the Malayan KMT.

The power structure in British Malaya was headed by the Governor of the Straits Settlements who was simultaneously the High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States. He was directly responsible to the Colonial Office in London and, when international affairs intruded into domestic Malayan policies, to the Foreign Office as well. With this 'metropolitan' backing, he controlled, among other things, two arms of authority directly influencing Chinese life in Malaya; the Chinese Affairs departments and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) within the colonial police forces.

The two governors of the period 1912-1925 represented two very different attitudes towards the Malayan Chinese population and its leaders, attitudes which were a reflection of their training and careers. As this and their predispositions inevitably influenced the management of the Malayan Chinese a word about their personal attributes is in order. Socially their origins and schooling were similar — upper middle class and public school educated, prerequisites for colonial administrators of the period.

Sir Arthur Young, governing between 1912 and 1919, was a professional soldier, a former Chief Secretary of the FMS until 1912 and without any personal pretensions to intellectual brilliance. He was,

however, experienced in Malaya and was cultivated, with natural good manners and considerable shrewdness. Left to manage British Malaya without any financial and very little military support during the war years, he was far from being 'not up to it' — as Guillemard later cruelly and glibly announced. In fact he was capable of exercising a degree of political judgement and authority rarely recognized, even today.¹

Young not only professed but also practised a courteous understanding and support of Malayan Chinese needs and aspirations, provided that freedom of belief did not conflict with ultimate loyalty to the British crown. When disloyalty, by his definition, was perceived, he imposed restrictions. He remained efficient and realistic about the mechanisms by which the situation should be controlled, as we shall see later.

His successor, the brisk and brilliant Sir Laurence Guillemard had no previous colonial but plenty of fiscal and financial experience, acquired in the Treasury as a former Private Secretary to Sir Lewis Harcourt. Public school and Cambridge educated, he was sent by Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, to Malaya to repair the economic damage caused by the war years. He said of himself, correctly, that 'not all virgins are foolish' — perhaps overlooking the obvious fact that half of them were. Although uneducated about Chinese society culturally, he was respectful of the intellectual and economic brilliance of some of its leaders, such as Lim Boon-keng. However the political aspirations of some other leaders and of the general Chinese community were an affront to his notions of propriety and order. This led him to some gratuitous and embarrassing blunders in dealing with wealthy community leaders² and to a harsh line against the KMT. He was obsessed with the communist threat to the economic life of Malaya and a perceived Chinese takeover of political authority through the instrument of the KMT organization. During a significant period of overseas Chinese nationalism these two disparate characters presided over the powerful structure of British colonial control embodied in the quasi-parliamentary bodies of the Executive, Legislative and Federal Councils.

While the Executive and Legislative Councils constituted the British crown in the SS, in the FMS the Malay sultans remained the nominal rulers, but retained real authority only over customary law (*adat*) and religious affairs. Subjects of the Malay rulers and British citizens resident in the Malay States were 'protected' by the High Commissioner of the FMS. The Governor of the SS and High Commissioner of the FMS presided over Council, assisted in the FMS by the Chief Secretary as his permanent surrogate. The High Commissioner visited the FMS perhaps three or four times a year to preside over sessions of the Federal Council where legislation was presented, debated and passed for the High

Commissioner's assent with the agreement of the rulers, who represented the Malay community there until 1927.

Membership of the Council in the FMS was predominantly European, through the official members from the Law Department, the Health Department, the Chinese Secretaries and the Inspector-General of Police and the representatives of the European rubber planting community. After 1927 the Malay community in the FMS, formerly represented by the sultans, now had four nominated members. The FMS Chinese community had had two nominated members from 1909, but the first Indian member was not nominated until 1928.

The SS had a more long-standing European domination, reflecting the historical processes by which British authority had been achieved and by virtue of the fact that there were two constituted councils there, the Legislative and the more powerful Executive Council. As in the FMS, European representation dominated the Legislative Council of the SS through official membership of government functionaries, the chief Law Officer, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, the chief Finance Officer and the Inspector-General of Police as well as members of the SS European community. The five Asian members of the Council were nominated by their communities and ultimately the Governor, by virtue of their community and economic eminence, their presumed pro-British loyalty, and, in the case of the Chinese, because they were in most cases Straits-born and thus British subjects. Among the eminent Chinese Legislative Councillors were Song Ong-siang, Lim Boon-keng, Tan Jiak-kim and later Tan Cheng-lock. Present in Council in October 1929, for example, were twelve Official members, eight European members, three Chinese nominated members, one Malay and one Indian.

The Legislative and Federal Councils provided the quasi-parliamentary institutions through which the British hoped to be seen to be working in union with European and Asian colonial populations. They served as a forum through which selected members of communities could voice community concerns or opinions on proposed legislation. Division of opinion was not always along racial or community lines as the progress of Young's proposed banishment amendments through the Legislative Council in 1914 shows. The amendments, aimed specifically against Chinese nationalist activists, had earlier passed through the Federal Council without trouble, but raised objections in the Legislative Council from three European and one Chinese member.³

However Chinese opinion in the Legislative Council was unified against the Schools Ordinance in 1920, where Lim Boon-keng condemned it as cover-up political legislation in the guise of education reform.⁴ Chinese community protest against these ordinances was also

tabled in both the Legislative and Federal councils in the form of petitions. The degree of freedom and force exercised on behalf of their communities by nominated members depended to a large extent on their personalities, and on their cultural and ethnic affinities. But Asian members had no real power to alter official decisions affecting their communities. What the Councils did not do, as far as the Chinese were concerned, nor were they intended to do, as far as the British were concerned, was to provide an avenue for political participation in Malayan affairs. As institutions they were designed to secure the passage of necessary legislation, on most occasions without dissent, to ensure the orderly economic and social management of a multi-racial population to the ultimate advantage of any government in London. In fact it was often in the House of Commons in London, rather than in the Federal or Legislative Councils of British Malaya that vociferous and persistent protest occurred against Malayan legislation, concerning the Chinese, as in the case of the Schools Ordinance and the proposal to ban the KMT in 1925.⁵ International and metropolitan considerations were intrinsic on these two occasions, in deciding how much support the CO and FO would give to Malayan initiatives. Most governors first recognized and then considered the international implications of their proposals in despatches to London and abided by CO directives before acting through the Executive Council.

The CO in its turn was constrained by FO seniority and international politics, however much it may have wanted to support its governors' recommendations. This did not necessarily mean a conflict of purpose. In the case of the 1925 ban on the KMT there was prolonged discussion about the Malayan recommendation. It was finally accepted by the FO and ultimately the Cabinet in July 1925, because of the need to protect British interests in China and Hong Kong as well.

In Straits Settlements such drastic steps were managed through the Executive Council, the real manifestation of British colonial power. It was an all-European council, composed of the Governor, the army and navy Supreme Commanders in the colony, the Colonial Secretary as the most senior colonial official, the chief Legal Officer and the Inspector-General of Police, as a general rule. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs sometimes attended council meetings in the early days in an advisory capacity. By the 1930s the Chinese Secretary was a member of the Council. The Governor's view of the Council is well illustrated by Young's insistence that essential political functions such as banishment must remain within the purview of the Council and not the legal system. To facilitate banishment which was increasingly used against political activists as well as criminals, the Governor-in-Council could rescind

British citizenship granted to SS residents of non-British birth. British subjects could not ordinarily be banished but in exceptional circumstances 'undesirables' could and were. The system of rewards, counterbalancing such punishments and exercising powerful political control in a more subtle way also operated through the Executive Council. Here citizenship was granted as well as taken away and British honours and distinctions conferred. By such means, and in the most powerful place, a form of political control was institutionalized.

Legislative and executive decisions about policy towards Malayan Chinese depended primarily upon advice given by two departments, the Chinese Affairs offices and the police. Less obviously powerful than either the councils or the police, the Chinese Affairs officials exerted considerable influence on some governors and all the Chinese. To a great extent the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs controlled the fortunes of the Malayan KMT for thirty years, 'interfering' in Chinese social and political life in a way, according to Heussler, which made them able inheritors of the Pickering tradition.⁶ Socially and educationally homogeneous like their governors, the secretaries brought to the Chinese Affairs offices an intriguing blend of personalities, predispositions and discrimination.

The institution they served had started life in 1877 in Singapore as the Chinese Protectorate, a virtual 'one-man band' under Pickering, an official who set the tone about how to influence governors. By 1911 the Singapore Protectorate had grown into a formidable institution headed by a Chinese-speaking British official, fluent in one or more of the Chinese dialects, known as the Secretary for Chinese Affairs. Chinese-speaking British Protectors were established in all the major areas of Chinese settlement in British Malaya and depending on the density of Chinese population, were assisted by another Protector, as well as Chinese-speaking middle ranking British officials in charge of such matters as 'women and girls', labour, health, censorship and immigration. Such elaboration often called for a permanent Chinese employee as translator-interpreter. By the 1920s these Chinese officials were supervised by a Chinese Assistant Secretary for Chinese Affairs. Protectorate or Secretariat officials frequently relied on cooperation from the police and on numbers of Chinese informers in the community for specific details of such things as political activity, illegal immigration, gaming or opium trading.

Over the years, the Singapore office had come to assume unofficial precedence in policy management of the Chinese, although Kuala Lumpur officials held firmly to their independence, based on the different demographic and political problems of the FMS. These derived

from there being a smaller percentage of Chinese in the total population and the fact that Chinese in the FMS were subjects of the Malay sultans except in individual cases. However there were two examples in which the Kuala Lumpur office assumed prominence in official policy. In 1912 the Chinese New Year riots set in train stricter political control of the Chinese, and in 1925 the Protectorate office was bombed by a Chinese woman, influencing the London decision to ban the KMT.

British officials in Chinese Affairs moved from place to place, gradually increasing in seniority and expertise, and by 1925 had made themselves indispensable, being instrumental in determining official policies of political control. Not all of them were regarded with respect or affection by the Chinese. Pickering, the first Protector of Chinese was followed by some able officials. The first *Secretary* for Chinese Affairs, G. T. Hare was sensitive to Chinese cultural and political aspirations and was generally well liked; and Peacock received a valedictory address from representatives of the Chinese community when going on leave in 1913.⁷ Subsequent officials received a variety of epithets. W. T. Chapman, Secretary for Chinese Affairs in Kuala Lumpur until 1926 was known as 'the iron broom' for his aggressive solutions to Chinese problems, while his then assistant, A. Goodman, later the Secretary for Chinese Affairs in Singapore until 1932, was known as the 'feather duster' for his gentler, if not vacillating approach.⁸ Despite these appellations, all the Secretaries had a serious common purpose — to stamp out organized Chinese nationalism in Malaya. An interesting insight into the role of and perceptions about the Chinese Affairs officials by their colleagues comes from a recommendation by Guillemard made in 1925 that Beatty should become a C.M.G. (Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George) Guillemard wrote, '... A career in the Protectorate is arduous and not very popular with the Malayan Civil Service and the responsibilities are great ...' The underlying impression of 'second choice' that this carries is belied by the personal histories of the Chinese Secretaries after 1912. The history of their policy advice will be discussed later in this chapter. It is sufficient to say here that there is no doubt that the Chinese thought British official attitudes towards nationalism were blinkered and unnecessarily harsh.

C. J. Saunders, Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the FMS until 1915, 'devoted his life in Malaya to the Chinese' according to his obituary in *British Malaya* in 1941. A scholarly private man, he was a lawyer with special expertise in bankruptcy law. He had been the first judge of the District Land Court in Malaya, and Secretary for Chinese Affairs in Kuala Lumpur in 1912 during the New Year riots. In 1915 Young made him Official Assignee and Registrar of Companies in the wake of the

collapse of the important Kwong Yik Bank in Singapore, a reflection of Saunders' accord with all shades of Chinese society. This position meant that he was a nominated official on both the Legislative and Federal Councils. Though this increased Saunders' power and authority publicly, there was a more significant effect on the early KMT organization — his capacity to sequester funds of deregistered societies. Between 1912 and 1919 six of the twenty-seven KMT branches in the SS and FMS were deregistered, so in one sense Saunders became more rather than less of an influence on organized Chinese nationalism as a result of his move from the Chinese Affairs Department. Collecting funds to support Sun Yat-sen was the primary function of the early KMT branches and stopping the flow cut at the early roots of Malayan nationalist support.¹⁰ When he made Saunders Official Assignee, Young dispensed with the position of Secretary for Chinese Affairs in Singapore. Given his concern with proper discipline of the general Malayan Chinese population and maintaining good relations with Chinese community and commercial leaders, this decision seems out of character. It certainly surprised the CO. But changes in the management of Chinese Affairs, such as the creation of a special Monopolies Department, the appointment of a Protector of (mainly Chinese) Labour and the end of the indenture system under the 1912 Labour Code reduced the activities of the Chinese Protectorate outside those spheres which Young saw as '... merely police business'. Two other factors contributed to Young's decision. One was the apparent and practical loyalty of the Malayan Chinese after the outbreak of the First World War, and the fact that China was an ally of Britain. Also the KMT was in the doldrums and was not seen as presenting a threat in Malaya.

When the position of Secretary for Chinese Affairs was restored by Young in 1919 following the riots in response to the May 4th incident in China, the first incumbent was David Beatty. Born in 1876, of the customary public school/Oxbridge cast, he was a lawyer expert in the Cantonese and Hokkien dialects. He followed the usual path through the various levels of colonial administration as magistrate, district judge, Protector of Chinese and Collector of War Tax in Singapore; by 1918 he was Acting Assistant Colonial Secretary and Clerk of Councils. An intriguing facet of Beatty's character and service history is the apparent absence of sobriquets of any sort for him from the Chinese population and an apparent lack of comment about him in the various reminiscences of his colleagues. Unlike the period discussed in Chapter 5, the period 1912 to 1925 did not produce the quantity of Secretaries' reports which revealed nearly as much about the administrators as about the Chinese. The few documents Beatty and his colleague Chapman in the FMS wrote

reveal opposition to any Chinese cultural activity outside those recognized by the British authorities and a pronounced bias against Hainanese Chinese who made up most of the unskilled work force. This bias seems to be a legacy of Beatty's cadet years and early experiences as a young officer, handling the Chinese work force in the first decade after the passage of the Societies Ordinances. In his mature years as a Chinese Affairs officer he deplored Chinese nationalist activity as a direct derivative of first Bolshevik and then communist ideology which, without constant restraining vigilance, would undermine British political authority and economic life in Malaya.¹¹ He pinpointed the KMT as the instrument of this and as Acting Colonial Secretary in 1920 he piloted the Schools Ordinance through the Legislative Council in the SS. The basis of much of his power — until 1926, when he retired — lay in his own thirty years' experience in Malaya and Guillemard's complete inexperience. And he made good use of the opportunity to argue strongly for a ban on the KMT between 1920 and 1924. By February 1925, then on leave in England, he presented the Malayan Government's arguments for the ban at the Colonial Office joint conference in London, in company with his colleague from the FMS, Chapman. The arguments the Chinese Secretaries used in London in 1925 are analyzed shortly, but first we must look at the then Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the FMS, W. T. Chapman.

William Thomas Chapman was born in the same year as Beatty, 1876, and was, like him the product of a public school, a graduate of Cambridge and a lawyer, an MCS (Malayan Civil Service) cadet in 1899 and a Cantonese speaker. Despite career progress similar to Beatty's in the early days, Chapman stayed closer to legal appointments as Acting Deputy Public Prosecutor in Perak in 1916 and of the FMS in 1918, appointments which generated the sobriquet of 'iron broom' from the Chinese community. He also acted as Assistant Official Assignee in 1918. In 1919, relinquishing the opportunity to further his judicial career he was persuaded to remain with Chinese Affairs in the critical period following the 1919 riots and became Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the FMS, where he remained until he, like Beatty, retired in 1926. Like Beatty he was hostile to Chinese nationalism in Malaya because of its divisive and intimidatory effects on all sections of the Chinese community. In complete accord with his governor about the need to ban the KMT, he was in London on leave at the time of the joint CO conference in February 1925 and was able to act in concert with Beatty at that conference. Here Chapman argued the threat of communist subversion of the labour force in Malaya and the economic fragility that this would produce.¹²

One other Chinese Affairs official made a contribution to policy

direction between 1919 and 1925. This was A. M. Goodman who was Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the FMS in 1920. This was a 'class IB appointment' which had taken both Beatty and Chapman nearly twenty years to achieve after cadetship; it took Goodman eleven. Born in 1886 Goodman, like his colleagues was public school and Oxford (rather than Cambridge) educated, a lawyer and a Cantonese and Hokkien speaker. From 1926 to 1932 Goodman was Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the SS. After 1932, he became the Resident of Penang until he retired in August 1941, being eulogized then as one of the best Residents Penang had ever had.¹³ His main period of influence on policy decisions in Malaya was during his term as Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the SS. He was absent on leave during the passage of the Schools Ordinance through the Federal Council in 1920, but he wrote a report on the effects of the schools enactment in 1921 which impressed Guillemard and contributed to recommendations for stringent control of the Malayan KMT. The report, prepared for the CO in response to protests in London from the Chinese diplomatic community, argued that similar legislation in Hong Kong had caused no trouble. Goodman went on to justify the need for the FMS legislation by arguing that the Chinese Government was intruding into internal Malayan affairs through the KMT-oriented vernacular school teachers. These, he said, were a divisive force among the Malayan Chinese because 'respectable members' of the community had no common ground with the KMT activists and did not want them around. Thirdly he wrote that Malayan Chinese should look to Britain, not China, for protection and inspiration, repeating a long-held policy view about the relationship between Britain and the Chinese in Malaya. While admitting that 'respectable members' of the community objected to government interference in Chinese vernacular education, Goodman believed that the Ordinance was all that stood between the coming generation of Chinese and 'half-digested and dangerous political and economic thinking', an interpretation of Chinese nationalism he never modified.¹⁴

Powerful officials such as Beatty, Chapman and later Goodman were assisted by the Singapore and Malayan Police Forces and police informers in the Chinese community. Informers were very important because until the 1930s all senior police officers were British and the ranks predominantly Malay or Sikh. The police force was criticized in the Kuala Lumpur enquiry into the 1912 New Year riots for its lack of sympathy and understanding of the Chinese population, mainly because all the police were either Malay or Sikh.

During the First World War, creation of a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was proposed, but a director, a Mr V. G. Savi was not

appointed until December 1918. As an interim measure the British decided to restructure the Malayan and SS Police Forces. This was achieved by increasing ethnic diversity in recruitment, promotion and language requirements, and the creation of a CID to allow political organizations — primarily those connected with growing nationalist subversive activities — to be monitored. CID duties in the SS were principally political, despite the title Criminal Investigation Department, until 1933. In June that year Clementi recommended to the CO that the CID change its name to 'Special Branch' of the Police Force, to investigate political and subversive operations of communist organizations in Malaya.¹⁵ In the Malay States it operated in both criminal and political spheres and remained known as the CID, however.

Moves to create a 'special' branch, initiated in the wake of the 1915 Singapore Mutiny, arose from a perception at the time that Indian troop involvement was part of Indian nationalist subversion.¹⁶ Indian informers were recruited as early 'special' branch agents. In 1919 control of political intelligence was removed from the armed forces to a new organization, in line with intelligence-gathering policy changes in London.¹⁷ The 'Special Branch' grew slowly in the 1920s, monitoring KMT and communist activities, cooperating with the Dutch in Java, the Siamese Government and British authorities in Hong Kong, tracing such travelling communists as Tan Malaka, Alimin and Ho Chi Minh.

In 1924, the 'Special Branch' of the CID in Singapore had three Asian Inspectors, two translators and two clerks. By 1935, now officially called the Special Branch, it had 25 officers, and other ranks. The complement of Chinese in the later total varied from three to five over the years, and the Asian members still remained predominantly Malay or Sikh. Even Young, recommending new structures after the 1919 Chinese riots, did not suggest recruitment of more Chinese. However the Special Branch was a professional organization of men with specific training and language skills in the multiracial community and jealously guarded its reputation. It apparently resented the use of Chinese community leaders to defuse Chinese problems. One Senior Inspector of Police in the SS, René Onraet stated that such exercises only exacerbated dangerous situations.¹⁸

Special Branch policed the Societies Ordinance jointly with the Chinese Secretariats until 1933 when, following the reimposition of a complete ban on the KMT by Clementi in 1930, it became the responsibility of the Special Branch alone. The Special Branch also policed the banishment legislation, with the Inspector General of Police attending the Executive Council meetings.

Another refinement of intelligence surveillance in Malaya flowed from

Young's suggestions about political supervision in 1919. This was the establishment of the Malayan Bureau of Political Intelligence, which recorded all political activity in British Malaya including visits from foreign 'subversives', and published lists of banned persons and publications in its own monthly journal, the *Malayan Bulletin of Political Intelligence (MBPI)*. This had a circulation limited to Chinese Affairs, the police and the Governor in Malaya, and to the War Office, Navy Office, CO, FO and Special Investigation Services (SIS) in London. It was discontinued in 1929 when the Chinese Secretariats in both Kuala Lumpur and Singapore started producing their own *Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (MRCA)*. It seems that after a few issues the Kuala Lumpur edition of the *MRCA* was dropped and that it was then published from Singapore only, although the secretariats were not combined until 1933. Much of the information in the *MBPI* came from the Chinese Affairs departments and reflected the important liaison between Protectorate officials and the police 'Special Branch' in its early days and thus the tightened political supervision of the Chinese community.

The mechanisms of political control were created through a variety of ordinances enacted in the Legislative and Federal Councils. These ordinances governed labour, societies, immigration, banishment, press and mail censorship and the printing presses themselves. The ones which exerted direct ideological control were the Schools Ordinances.

Those which controlled cultural matters included the Protection of Women and Girls Ordinances which prohibited such domestic enslavement as the *mui-tsai* (little sister) practices. Legislation underwent numerous amendments as the social and demographic character of the Malayan Chinese community altered. Some legislation was a direct response to socio-political changes. The Schools Ordinances fell into this category; immigration or labour amendments covered both the socio-political and the economic changes from 1911 on.

It has already been said that initially the problems of managing the immigrant Chinese labourers had been left to the Chinese community itself through its own organizations during the nineteenth century. When these got out of hand the British authorities started to assume direct control. The Societies Ordinance of 1889, which was derived from earlier attempts in 1869, 1882 and 1885,¹⁹ controlled all associations of ten or more persons, which had to be recorded with the Registrar of Societies. Penal provisions included deregistration for conducting unlawful meetings, for financial mismanagement, and for criminal and/or political conspiracy. It was not necessary in any prosecution for the Registrar to prove that a society consisted of more than ten persons. He only needed

to state that it was illegal. On deregistration the assets and property of the society were seized by the Public Assignee, who wound up the society. After paying outstanding debts and deducting his own official expenses he divided the remaining assets among the former members of the society as he deemed fit, but not among the officials of the society who could incur fines, imprisonment or banishment.

By 1913 the Ordinance was considered inadequate for dealing with the increasing Chinese nationalism and it was then amended to cover the KMT specifically by prohibiting the collection, by any Chinese, of funds from the community for assumed political causes. KMT branches were founded primarily to generate financial support for Sun Yat-sen's drive to create an independent republic in China. The KMT was thus made more vulnerable under this amendment and by the requirement to provide documents showing the membership, officials and constitution of their society. Failure to provide this information meant immediate deregistration. There was also an ambiguous clause in which 'lawful societies', thought to be acting in a manner 'prejudicial to the good order or welfare' of Malaya could be deregistered even if they had conformed to the other legal requirements of the Ordinance, and their premises could be searched without notice.

Another amendment to the Ordinance in 1924 spelled out five hundred dollar fines, or a three year term of imprisonment for officials failing to comply and in 1927 yet another amendment made individual members as well as officials liable to a five hundred dollar fine and/or six months imprisonment if found in possession of the documents of an illegal society in the FMS. There was to be an annual inspection of the books and membership lists of registered societies, which were not allowed to move their premises without the permission of the Registrar.

These later amendments together with the proscription on fund raising made the KMT illegal by definition, without a ban. The 1925 official ban, operated through the Societies Ordinance, put a public seal on the fact. The reimposition of the ban in 1930 created a political *contretemps* which was resolved by a further amendment to the Societies Ordinance allowing *individual* membership, by Malayan Chinese, of the China KMT but prohibited *corporate* membership of a Malayan organization. This became law in October 1930.

The Societies Ordinance was a direct result of *laissez faire* British attitudes to the management of its immigrant Chinese labour force, given that there was enough labour to keep the economic wheel turning as busily as world economic conditions allowed. As a result labour abuses and problems increased. Commissions of enquiry over the years resulted in a series of labour ordinances and amending legislation to correct and

control labour practices and by extension, though not directly, labour numbers. These culminated in the Labour Ordinance of 1912 which abolished indentured labour and guaranteed and policed labour conditions. However it was not until the 1930s that legislation was introduced to control labour unions and associations, though the danger from these to British political control had been recognized in the early 1920s by the Chinese Secretaries.

Until 1930 labour ordinances acted as a makeshift immigration control for the British, once the economic demands had been met. There was no specific legislation to restrict immigration until the relevant bills were passed by Sir Cecil Clementi in the 1930s. But immigration was not completely *unrestricted*, as Purcell implies, either.

Numbers at least were regulated by economic demands. Ethnicity was also a factor in labour immigration. Chinese coolies were regarded as a political threat in the 1920s, but Javanese labour, being Muslim, was more acceptable to the Malay people.²⁰ Because the British relied on the presumption that the migrant coolie labourers would eventually return home, they also relied on the contractual system to control the rise in immigrant populations. Both these suppositions were false in the long term; the sojourners became permanent residents and became Chinese families rather than single males.²¹ Becoming increasingly assertive in cultural and political matters, the Chinese immigrants developed vernacular schools, peopled the KMT branches and produced their own newspapers. Such demographic changes in the Chinese community meant that official perceptions about the Chinese population had to change. The Kuala Lumpur New Year riots hastened changes in socio-political management. Increasingly political 'subversion' by nationalist activists became the reason for banishment, together with membership of 'dangerous' societies. The Malayan KMT fell into this category. The growing Chinese KMT hold on Canton, from 1920, and the 1919 riots both increased the number of activists banned as 'anti-Japanese propagandist', Bolshevik or strike agitator.

The first banishment legislation had preceded the founding of the Chinese Protectorate. The Banishment Act of 1864 was used in 1866 to banish the first Chinese from Singapore, described as a 'notorious Hylam thief'.²² It was amended in 1888 to ensure that no alien would be banished before an inquiry was conducted into the case at the discretion of the Governor. However in 1899 an attempt to amend the act by defining a 'banishee' as 'not a British subject' was strongly opposed by Lim Boon-keng and Messrs Stringer and Murray. They argued that the proposed amendment prevented prospective banishees of British birth from appealing to the Governor on the grounds of their British

nationality. An altered amendment was passed granting right of appeal to the Governor on grounds of British nationality which had to be proved to the Governor's satisfaction. The banishment could then be rescinded. At this time the Malayan Government clearly stated that the 'exceptional' jurisdiction available to the Executive Council guaranteed that the wealthy could not buy their way out of banishment.²³

In 1913 amendments to tighten up banishment laws to eliminate political activists for Chinese nationalism were proposed by Sir Arthur Young, who defended the Executive Council's role as arbiter of banishment cases and who regarded the banishment ordinances as integral to enhanced political control. Linked with the 'reward' of British citizenship and naturalization procedures for eminent and loyal overseas Chinese who were not Straits-born, was the 'punishment' of banishment, which entailed the Governor-in-Council's prerogative to rescind citizenship, as was done in April 1919, thus opening the way for the removal of prominent political 'undesirables', as in the case of Teh Lay-seng of the FMS in 1930.

Most Chinese banished in the pre-1911 period were convicted criminals, but from then on criminality became increasingly and often inaccurately defined in political terms. In 1915, for example, 31 members of a Hokkien 'secret society' and two members of the 'Third Revolutionary Society' in Singapore were banished, for collecting money, or recruiting volunteers to go to China.²⁴ It seems that both these 'societies' were in fact Sun Yat-sen's CRP, briefly replacing the KMT as the nationalist party.

These 33 'banishees' made up some of the total of some 400 people banished between 1912 and 1916 in the FMS and SS, an increase from about 200 in the preceding five years. Figures for the 1930s indicate the extent to which banishment had become an essential arm of political control, rising to about 1500 between 1928 and 1931 reflecting, no doubt, the emergence of an organized Malayan Communist Party. Based as much on economic as on political contingencies at a time of world economic depression, the political role of banishment was not watered down.

Complementary legislation, extant since 1906, was used in conjunction with first the Banishment Ordinances and later with both these and the Immigration Restriction Ordinance. This included the Exclusion Ordinance of 1906 which covered aliens as well as residents of British Malaya and was intended to prevent the entry of previously recognized undesirables. Wartime legislation included the Registration of Aliens Acts. These were primarily directed against persons from countries at war with Great Britain but could conveniently include others perceived

to be dangerous to British Malaya.²⁵ Following the 1919 riots a Passenger Restriction Ordinance operated to prevent people first from boarding ships bound for Malaya from British controlled ports, and ultimately from landing in Malaya. The 1920 intelligence shake-up resulted in the 1920 Passport Ordinance, which was also connected with the status of British subjects in China, but operated as an adjunct to immigration and banishment procedures. While some British officials may have fancied that immigration into British Malaya was 'completely free', some Chinese trying to get in (or back in) doubtless had a rather different view, given the substantial network of control that had been constructed.

However substantial this network may have become by the 1920s it was not until October 1920 in the SS and December 1920 in the FMS that legislation to exert *ideological* control over the Chinese community appeared. These were the respective Schools Ordinances derived directly from British responses to the riots in 1919.²⁶ There were two main requirements in the Acts — the registration of schools (Part II) and the registration of teachers (Part III). The registration of teachers seems to have occasioned most complaints, being, as Goodman pointed out, the essence of the control. Directors of Education were appointed to inspect schools, literature and curricula, acting as censors in this capacity.

Two important clauses — 18(i) and (ii) [or 19(i) and (ii) in the SS] — provided that any school apparently being used to 'disseminate political doctrines detrimental to the interests of the Federated Malay States/Colony or of the public' could be declared illegal if sufficient justification was not provided by the management to explain such a lapse. A straightforward official statement was made in the Federal Council in September 1920 to the effect that the Government did not intend to allow what it described as 'future citizens' to be taught harmful principles in FMS vernacular schools. Directors of Education, in conjunction with the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs, thus provided another strong force to contain growing Chinese nationalism in Malaya.

Censorship of postal, press and printed material had always been an integral part of political supervision in British colonial territories and British Malaya was no exception. When Chinese nationalism made its presence felt, existing seditious publications ordinances and censorship regulations were used. In conjunction with the Societies, Banishment and later the Schools Ordinances this made up a tightly interlocking framework.

In 1908 Sir John Anderson had started to tighten up the seditious publications ordinance, directing his attack specifically against vernacular Chinese newspapers propagating Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary cause against the Manchu régime. Young passed an amendment to this

ordinance in 1913 in the wake of the 1912 Kuala Lumpur riots. By this time, the KMT had established some branches which had been registered under the Societies Ordinance. Literature of a nationalist nature was distributed to branches, to reading rooms and to the Chinese vernacular schools. Some of it came from China but some was printed in Malaya itself. Both the censorship and sedition ordinances were aimed at controlling both sources. Many Malayan Chinese vernacular newspapers of the period had short lives, but this was due to financial troubles rather than the effectiveness of the censorship and sedition ordinances until the 1920s.

Under Martial Law in 1915 wartime censorship and printing prohibitions were more stringent, but were directed primarily at 'imperial enemies' such as the Germans and the Turks and at the rapidly developing Khalifat Movement within Indian nationalism. Bolshevik and/or anarchist propaganda had always been a target of censorship and as communist propaganda after 1917, continued to be so. Chinese nationalist literature was low on the list of priorities during the war years. This is shown by the fact that, in general, mails to Malaya from China, a wartime ally of Britain, were not censored with the exception of those going on to India or Burma.²⁷

But all this changed with the riots in the SS in 1919. Then, contingency legislation was brought forward under reintroduced Martial Law to control vernacular publications which were not covered by the Seditious Publication Ordinance of 1913. This 1919 sedition amendment remained in force for nearly ten years before the need arose for a further amendment in 1928. It encompassed material which Young described as 'too indefinite' to be covered by the 1913 law, meaning that specific political control was necessary to cover Chinese nationalist publications. One of Guillemard's early actions as Governor in 1920 was to create a Printing Press Ordinance to cover the printing of Malayan Chinese nationalist material. The 1920 Printing Press Ordinance contained punitive provisions against the managers of the presses and the printers.²⁸ The plant and stock of the presses were also vulnerable. Infringement of the Ordinance brought fines and/or imprisonment. The Ordinance increased surveillance of Chinese political activity in conjunction with the Sedition Ordinance and the Schools Ordinance. As schools and teachers were registered and inspected, so school texts, curricula guidelines, journals, pamphlets and newspapers were subject to detailed scrutiny in both the FMS and the SS where parallel legislation was passed. Although lists of prohibited publications had appeared in the annual departmental *Reports*, from 1920, lists also appeared in the *MBPI* and its successor the *MRCA*, as well as in the relevant *Gazettes*. For

example the FMS *Gazette* of 13 November 1925 prohibited five publications from China, three of them newspapers or periodicals, and two pamphlets: one a collection of Sun Yat-sen's speeches and the other the programme for the 1926 KMT National Convention in Canton. No reasons for the ban were given. The *MRCI* however offered reasons for 'suspensions' in its lists, and in 1930 these included 'containing undesirable news on the *Tang* in Malaya'. This is interesting because in March 1930 the Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi, had tried to use the Press Ordinance to prevent *all* newspapers from publishing items about the KMT in Malaya. This attempt was perceived by the English-language press, including the *Straits Times*, as unwarranted and offensive press censorship. The outcry resulted in a quasi-apology and explanation from Clementi in the Legislative Council and a general backing down all round.

The main thrust of press and sedition ordinances in the post-1920 period was against communist or communist-inspired infiltration of Chinese immigrant labour groups and the vernacular schools, and the increasingly active politicization of Chinese society. After the 1925 riots and boycotts in Shanghai, Canton and Hong Kong against British goods, control of radical literature became urgent. A further amendment was passed in 1928 when the Malayan KMT was gaining confidence. The flow of radical material continued, though less got through.

British officials constructed in these ways a finely woven net to contain Chinese politicization. What concerns us next is the development of the ideas which sustained such a policy. Despite Hare's 1896 analysis of Malayan Chinese cultural nationalism as a 'sentimental *imperium in imperio*', growing politicization of the Chinese did not mean that the British had any intention of being sentimental about it themselves. British policy from 1911 was to prevent political refugees, political organizations and political riots from becoming institutionalized as forms of Chinese political participation in Malayan life under the aegis of the KMT.

British policy on Chinese participation operated within the framework of 'protecting' the Malay population and economically developing the Malay States and the Straits Settlements. For this Janus-like exercise, the Chinese population was necessary to provide capital, financial and economic expertise and labour, while at the same time being kept politically quiescent. This was achieved by a system of rewards — British honours, distinctions, education, membership of the Councils and the Chinese Advisory Boards (CAB) — and punishments applied through the ordinances. Rewards and punishments also seem to have been balanced by recognizing certain community organizations such as the

SCCC, the registered societies and certain exempted charitable bodies. The Malays, as the indigenous owners of the land, had to be protected and thus isolated from the economic and demographic advances of the Chinese population, and later from their political aspirations too.

Originally Chinese immigrant labourers had been thought to be in need of protection from coolie-brokers and secret societies. By 1912 the idea was emerging that many in Malaya were in need of protection from the explosion of Chinese cultural and political nationalism. Generated by the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1912, Chinese nationalism was intensified by the Japanese 'Twenty-One Demands' on China in 1915. By 1919 a dangerous head of steam had built up following the Versailles decision to allocate the former German concession of Shantung to Japan. Malayan government policy towards the Malayan Chinese was a direct response to the resounding Malayan Chinese nationalist reaction to the events of 1919.

The changing tenor of Malayan government policy on Chinese political refugees denoted both a hardening line and a move from controlling Chinese nationalism in general to controlling the KMT in particular. Then current humanitarian principles interlaced Malayan colonial policy, and originally political refugees were generally given asylum in Malaya and not deported to their country of origin. In return for such "mercy", political refugees were expected to be politically quiescent in their new refuge. By 1912 however, the rule that 'the enjoyment of the hospitality of a British colony carried with it the obligation to abstain from action that might embarrass the Government of that colony' was deemed to have been broken.²⁹ In British eyes the most notorious culprit was Sun Yat-sen himself who had been ordered to leave Penang in 1910.

By 1914 another dimension had been added to the management of political refugees from China. Pressure came from Yuan Shih-k'ai to enforce the return of KMT refugees in Malaya to China. In February 1914 Young addressed both aspects of the problem, writing 'refugees from China would be given shelter without demur if they asked for it openly and lived in accordance with local laws. . . . It is extremely difficult to deal with foreign political propagandists when their presence in the Colony is only dangerous to the peace of a foreign though friendly state'.³⁰ Foreshadowing future *contretemps* in managing Chinese political activism, Young also wrote that since Sino-British relations were involved in Malayan Chinese affairs he was reluctant to act without CO concurrence. The FO and CO response to Young's memorandum was to reiterate the position that political refugees, as such, could not be deported to their country of origin but that the Governor had FO support in amending the banishment law to 'deal with persons who had an

improper use of the refuge afforded by the Colony'.³¹ But in April 1914 the Secretary of State for the Colonies watered this down in his reply to Young, stating that the banishment law provisions seemed wide enough to deal with undesirables and that deportations could not be sanctioned for 'crimes' not specified under the current law. He was no doubt reflecting earlier advice from Malaya that support for Sun Yat-sen was waning. Malayan officials often had to combat London's official hesitancy over policy recommendations from Malaya as an occupational hazard in pursuing effective political control of the Chinese there in the inter-war years.

World War I was both a help and a hindrance to the political refugee problem. It helped in several ways, first by enabling Martial Law to be declared in 1915, increasing political surveillance of everybody. Second, the proscription of the KMT by President Yuan Shih-k'ai and the break-up of the Malayan KMT retarded nationalist political activism. Then China's entry into the war as an ally of Britain, France and the U.S. diverted most community energies to financial support of the war rather than of the new CRP set up by Sun Yat-sen which few apparently supported.

The war hindered the British application of a moderate political containment policy by generating a climate in which violent political action could become institutionalized in a political party. Instead of supervision, reaction and proscription became the British policy of containment. After the war, political refugees were still allowed into the sanctuary of British Malaya, but nationalist Chinese were no longer defined as political refugees. There were two main reasons for this. The first was the perceived Bolshevik or communist ideology of the nationalists and their use of violence as a mode of operation. The second was the political reality of the situation in China. The nationalists, far from being refugees, looked like becoming a government in their own right, at least in the south. Thus the Chinese-as-political-refugees problem was subordinated to the Chinese-as-political-activists-rioters/problem.

Both the 1912 Kuala Lumpur riots and the 1919 riots took the British by surprise. Both occasions show among other things the divisions in Malayan Chinese society and the failure of British officials to gauge accurately Malayan Chinese response to mainland China affairs.³²

The cultural festival of the Chinese New Year in 1912 should have been a symbol of national regeneration, the first New Year of the new Republic. Instead, inter-*pang* rivalries between the Hakka and Cantonese *pangs* who supported the Revolution, on the one hand, and the Hokkien *pang* who advocated reform, on the other changed the violence from

localized brawling and murders to generalized community violence needing armed soldiers as well as police to control it. Order was finally restored at the cost of ten Chinese lives. An official commission of enquiry into the incident produced a report critical of the way the affair had been handled, in particular the limitation on street gambling, the perceived anti-Chinese bias of some witnesses and the ill-preparedness of the police and back-up forces. The report concluded that the political element was not a major cause of the riot, an accurate but not very far-sighted conclusion. The hostile *Report* incensed the Chief Secretary, Edward Brockman, but curiously it took Young nearly seven months to produce his own memorandum to the CO supporting the FMS authorities against the Commission's findings. He described the Chinese as 'generally peaceful and law-abiding people... independent but... industrious and good citizens under a strong and just government', and emphasized the role played by Chinese community leaders in controlling their countrymen. The operative word in the memorandum was 'strong' government. The ordinance under which offenders had been banished was tightened up to prevent the illegal re-entry of deportees, especially Chinese political extremists, capable of disrupting Sino-British relations as well as creating disorder by their presence in Malaya.

When Young wrote in February 1914 that 'It is extremely difficult to deal with foreign political propagandists under existing laws when their presence in the Colony is only dangerous to the peace of a foreign though friendly state', he heralded a radical shift in policy and political control, which now stated that publicly expressed political views, which did not necessarily create a hazard for British Malaya, could nonetheless be grounds for banishment. He rationalized this tough approach by referring to the particular economic vulnerability of British Malaya, more dependent than other British colonies on Chinese labour. Unstated but implied was the fact that an amended banishment ordinance could act as a form of political surveillance on immigration.

Young took too long getting these ordinances to the Councils, impeded in part by the cautious approach of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Lewis Harcourt. Although certain amendments were passed by the Federal Council in July 1914 they failed to get through the Legislative Council, by which time war had broken out.³³ Martial Law, declared in 1915, superseded the need for banishment amendments. Young's push for political surveillance of Chinese political activity marked an important, though interrupted, change in British policy towards the Malayan Chinese. For the remaining war years perceptions that current laws were sufficient were accurate enough. The practical

loyalty of the Chinese during wartime and the KMT being in the doldrums, banned by Yuan Shih-k'ai and disowned by Sun Yat-sen, reinforced such perceptions.

As a consequence the riots in 1919 caught the Malayan Government by surprise. At the time, official attention was distracted from local Chinese political problems by both long-term and immediate causes. The immediate cause was the chronic shortage and increasing cost of rice in British Malaya, a situation threatening serious community unrest. Long-term causes existed despite the wartime loyalty of the Chinese. The fact that Young had kept a weather eye on the community during the war by a vintage rewards and punishments methodology lulled him into a false sense of security.

A long-term cause of false security, which predated Young, was official British disregard of the Chinese vernacular school system in Malaya. This had received neither punishments nor rewards. It had been ignored and therefore was not perceived as a seed-bed of nationalist ideology and discontent. It turned out to be both. There had been unrecognized warning signs of the nexus between the vernacular schools and China-centric loyalties as early as 1910. Then permission was sought by the Chinese government to send an inspection mission from their Ministry of Education to the SS and Burma. Permission was refused on the grounds that '... the Chinese immigrants should settle in the Colony and regard it as their home... it was felt desirable that the Chinese population in the Colony should look only to British officials for assistance and guidance. ...'³⁴ The paradoxical assumption that supposedly transient migrants should settle in Malaya and consider it their home is interesting.

But in 1919 the power of vernacular education, using a national language to mobilize the political and emotional loyalty of the Chinese shocked British officials. Internationally, and for too long British policy had not taken China seriously as a nation, so most British officials had no capacity to assess the affront to China which the Versailles decisions on Shantung would represent.³⁵

The riots of May were prolonged into boycotts in June, and in July boycotts of the official peace celebrations were organized and led by Chinese school teachers with nationalist sympathies. During the first period of violent unrest Young responded with a show of armed force. He declared Martial Law again, mobilized the Manchester Regiment to reinforce police control and kept HMAS Sydney off Singapore and then Penang, until July 3 when she was allowed to sail for Australia. Sensibly he reduced the price of rice. The military controls were reinforced by amendments to the Seditious Publications Ordinance of 1913 to restrict

the flow of literature from China to the vernacular schools, by amendments to the Naturalization Ordinance to allow Young to revoke naturalization certificates already granted and thus allowing banishment orders to be served. He used the provisions of the Riot Damages Act of 1866 to grant compensation to those who suffered property damage. He also deported eleven teachers involved — two from Singapore, three from Kuala Lumpur and six from Kampar as well as twelve other people.³⁶

In the middle of all this patching up Young correctly identified the need to tighten up political control by supervising vernacular schools and teachers who, he wrote, 'formed one of the main channels through which anti-Japanese agitation made itself felt'. Although in his report Young cited the high price of rice and inter-*pang* rivalries as contributing factors he blamed the nationalist teachers as the major cause of the disturbances, writing that 'no educational departures should be tolerated in this British Colony which are not conducted on British lines or under the supervision of British authority'. This was a precise statement about the use of power and went beyond the 1910 suggestion of official assistance and guidance. Young now recommended that a new ordinance should be passed to control Chinese vernacular education, current war measures such as the Alien Missionary Ordinance not being appropriate for long-term supervision.

It was left to his successor Guillemard to put the ordinances through the Councils of the SS and FMS in October and December 1920, in the face of widespread and bitter Chinese community agitation against them. The ordinances continued the old government policy of rewards and punishments — that is, supervision and conformity would be rewarded by grants-in-aid to the Chinese vernacular schools for the first time. The grants were not implemented by Guillemard until 1923. British policy thus interfered for the first time in ideological matters. This inevitably led to an increase in work for the Chinese Secretariat after 1920.

Perhaps more as a direct reaction to immediate pressures, Young re-established the position of Secretary for Chinese Affairs in Singapore in July 1919. His first reappointment was David Beatty. Beatty was an official much concerned with the bolshevik component of Chinese political activism and with a conviction that the Hainanese community was the most troublesome of them all.³⁷ During the debates and passage of the Schools Ordinance in the SS in 1920 Beatty was the Acting Colonial Secretary, then the most senior official member of the Legislative Council. At this time P. Allen was Acting-Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS and A. Goodman was Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, FMS, under W. Chapman. This partnership in varying combinations was

to dominate the critical years of 1920–1930, when this ‘gang of four’ exerted unparalleled influence on government policy towards Chinese political activities.

Young’s policy changes in the wake of the 1919 riots elevated political control of the Chinese to a significant position in overall British Malayan policy and initiated the move from the general (Chinese nationalism) to the particular (the KMT). Young made one intriguing omission — he failed to recommend specific control of the KMT in 1919.

During Young’s term of office some KMT branches had been registered under the Societies Ordinance before his 1915 amendments to it. Between 1912 and 1915 the Singapore Branch, the Malacca Branch and about twenty-seven branches in the FMS were granted registration on the grounds that the KMT was not against the government of Malaya and that the successful Nationalist Revolution in 1911 in China indicated that the Malayan KMT could be regularized. This charitable spirit was not extended to the Penang or Klang Branches in 1913 however. There is no precise statement in the documents about why they were refused registration, beyond the *MRC*A account in 1934 that the Penang Branch would be used to plot against the Government of China, then under Yuan Shih-k’ai. It is fair to assume that the refusal was connected with banishment order refinements and Young’s perception that political refugees or exiles had become an unacceptable risk in Malaya, especially if they organized activities directed against a friendly government. The amendments to the Societies Ordinance to prohibit fund collecting for political purposes by ‘any Chinese’ was part of the same pattern and made 1913 something of a vintage year in political control. In practice the proscription of fund raising, though inhibiting KMT activity, was directed more specically against the CRP. Of those KMT branches registered by 1913, seven collapsed during CRP–KMT factional struggles, seventeen survived until 1922 during Guillemard’s crackdown on political activity and seven soldiered on until the 1925 ban. It indicates that Young’s administration, despite the legislative initiatives, did not regard the KMT organization as a serious threat.

Young apparently preferred to clamp down on Sun Yat-sen and the CRP. CRP branches did not apply for registration under the Societies Ordinance and this, together with their rigid China-centric loyalty oaths and membership requirements tainted them in British eyes. Furthermore earlier British reaction to visits from Sun and his political activities had set a precedent easy for Young to follow. In 1913 the Governor had informed the CO that he was ‘watching’ the revolutionaries’ movements. This was in response to pressure from the British Legate in Peking, Mr

Alston, who had expressed concern to the FO about Sun's activities in Southeast Asia and the repercussions in China. By 1915, however, Young had stopped watching and acted. Under the provisions of the amended Societies Ordinance, thirty-one members of a 'Hokkien secret society' in Singapore were arrested, tried and deported. This stopped the general activities (of the presumed nationalists) according to the Director-General of Police.³⁸ The heat was on now in contrast to the statement in August 1914 that despite the presence of Chinese revolutionaries in the SS, sympathy for Sun Yat-sen was declining.³⁹

In 1915 Young made no bones about the nuisance created by the CRP, stating that it was undesirable to encourage Malayan Chinese identification with China's politics or, significantly, 'to invest in Chinese loans'.⁴⁰ This shrewd statement reflected Young's ability to use Chinese financial matters to exercise political control. It also seems to reflect official recognition that expatriation of Malayan Chinese funds would be harmful to the Malayan economy. Not overtly stated by Young, the same concern was later expressed by Guillemard who unjustly considered Young to be something of a financial idiot.

A more serious defect of British policy towards the Malayan Chinese, pre-dating Young and continuing after him, was the failure to create realistic avenues of political participation for resident and Straits-born Chinese. They could gain only limited, unofficial membership of the Legislative and Federal Councils, and could only act in an advisory capacity as members of the Chinese Advisory Board (CAB). But this is perhaps too easy to say in retrospect. Recognition of this need would have been unusual in the political climate of the early 1900s. Guillemard certainly did nothing to rectify this oversight. In some ways he contributed further to isolating Chinese political aspirations from the mainstream of Malayan political life, as his handling of the FMS Chinese (unofficial) members of the Federal Council during the decentralization debates indicates. On that occasion he argued that Malay matters did not concern the Chinese.

Guillemard's régime generally reflected the desire and need to be 'political kings' ruling the immigrant and resident Chinese community, an urge which came to displace the historical convention, if not the fact, of Britain as the 'honest trustee' of its dependencies. External political developments in China contributed to this change in Malaya. The ramifications induced Guillemard to believe that the KMT was the instrument of an international communist conspiracy to create an *imperium in imperio* in Malaya to destroy British rule and harm the economy. This view was both suggested and sustained by his Secretaries

for Chinese Affairs, and possibly by his own interpretation of CO instructions to subordinate Chinese economic interests to Malay advancement and protection.⁴¹

An examination of Guillemard's general policy of political control is necessary in order to put his punitive policy against the KMT into perspective. It is apparent that Guillemard had no time at all for Chinese political participation of even a moderate kind in Malaya. He followed Young's policy of using rewards for 'loyal' Chinese as a means of political control. However, unlike Young, he did not sweeten the pill by consultation over Chinese matters. He considered himself a good friend of Lim Boon-keng, Straits-born and British educated, an OBE (Officer of the Order of the British Empire); but in Guillemard's time, Lim was living in Amoy as the second Vice-Chancellor of the newly founded Amoy University, was a friend of Sun Yat-sen and a founding member of the Malayan KMT.⁴² Guillemard seems to have been unaware of these early 'inauspicious' connections of Lim Boon-keng, reflecting the former's ignorance of the complexities of Malayan colonial society. He seems also to have ignored Lim Boon-keng's strictures about the politicization of vernacular education at the time of the Schools Ordinance debate.

Guillemard was however quite unequivocal about where the official rewards should go. To maintain and foster good relations with 'respectable' Chinese, he recommended Ho Siak-kuan for appointment as Assistant Secretary for Chinese Affairs because 'it could give the greatest satisfaction to the local Chinese community'.⁴³

He was also aware of the importance of the perceived stature of the European Chinese Affairs officials in controlling the Chinese population, and particularly the KMT. Following his December 1922 despatch advising a complete ban on the KMT, he recommended a reclassification in the Chinese Affairs departments, arguing his case from Young's initiatives in 1915 and 1919, to allow more time to be devoted to 'the general supervision and special problems' of the Chinese. Guillemard wanted the officials in both Singapore and the FMS to be advanced, as Secretary for Chinese Affairs, to Class IA, 'owing to the prominence of Chinese political questions and the desirability of providing an adequate field for promotion' for those men on whom he relied above all.⁴⁴ The CO agreed to this and Beatty and Chapman were promoted to Class IA in 1923.

Guillemard's punitive policy against the KMT was a two-pronged attack, through legislation such as the Schools Ordinances, Printing Press Ordinances of 1920, amendments to the Banishment Ordinance and

supported by a complete overhaul of the intelligence gathering services.⁴⁵ He created the Malayan Bureau of Political Intelligence and its monthly journal in 1922.

For about six months, the 1920 Schools Ordinances antagonized the Malayan Chinese, the Chinese Government and some members of the House of Commons, prompting the CO request for information which resulted in Goodman's 1921 memorandum on the FMS situation. It also resulted in discussions within the CO and FO about responses to Chinese diplomatic representations against the Malayan ordinances. Problems in managing the Malayan KMT were gradually moving into the international relations arena. At this stage, the CO and the FO decided to support the Malayan legislation to circumscribe KMT activity, 'reassuring the Chinese Ministry by promises of sympathetic administration' while being aware that the Chinese were '[an] obstinate people and skilled in passive resistance', according to Sir George Fiddes, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office. Goodman advised that the general Chinese population was being intimidated into supporting the KMT, for 'it must be remembered that it is difficult for a Chinese shopkeeper to avoid putting his chop on a petition' unless he was prepared to face retribution both in Malaya and among his family in China. However no Chinese 'of any standing' would sign such a document, Goodman advised.⁴⁶

As well as such apparently strong advice against the KMT, Guillemard was advised by Beatty, in a memorandum written in December 1921, that 'Sun is in sympathy with advanced communist and socialist information. He is anti-British in sentiment; hence the possible danger from the activities of his society [the KMT] in British possessions in the Far East. . . .' The two strands in this are important. The obvious communist 'bogey' suggested in 1921 was thought to have become a real threat with the 1924 KMT/Communist Concord. The second strand is the repetition of reference to Hong Kong, foreshadowing the increase in Malayan KMT policy problems after 1925. Beatty also stated that the Malayan KMT was actively trying to extend its membership and raise funds for the party, accusations supported by intelligence reports on active KMT branches in Singapore, Penang and Malacca.⁴⁷

Based on the growing strength of the KMT during 1922 and on CO support during the Schools Ordinances controversies, Guillemard decided to recommend more stringent control measures to London. He advocated a complete ban on KMT activities in a memorandum to the CO written in December 1922.⁴⁸ Guillemard sounded a major theme in this despatch which embraced all his other arguments for a ban. It was the creation, by

international communism, of an *imperium in imperio* in British Malaya through the agency of the Malayan KMT branches. He described a 'vast Soviet organization', extending far beyond Malayan China-born nationalist activities and lining up with anti-British movements in India and anti-Dutch subversion in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). Such international political activism made the Malayan Chinese nationalists internationally as well as locally dangerous, and complicated the policies of political control needed by Malayan authorities. Internally, under this general umbrella, Guillemard distinguished four serious areas of concern.

First he argued that, in general, KMT activities in Malaya were divisive and intimidatory, threatening the lives of the China-born by threatening the lives of relatives still resident in China. Unwilling compliance with KMT policy in Malaya was thus ensured. Second and connected with this intimidatory and enforced membership of the Malayan KMT was the expatriation of Malayan Chinese funds to support KMT activities in China, and 'to champion Sun Yat-sen . . . and promote advanced democratic ideals'. This muddled and ambiguous phrase described the nationalist desire for political and cultural independence and an end to autocratic and corrupt rule in China. Guillemard's error was to assume that this necessarily meant a desire for the end of British rule in Malaya as well because of Sun's association with, and reliance on, Russian advice.

The third area was more specific and more dangerous in the official view. The KMT was interfering in the domestic affairs of Malaya by indoctrinating pupils in the vernacular schools. Through the agency of immigrant KMT teachers, communist and/or political propaganda was purveyed in textbooks imported from China and through the curriculum, which directed the loyalty of the young towards China rather than towards British colonial authorities. The basis for an *imperium in imperio* was thus created.

The fourth point which Guillemard pressed home was the uniqueness of the KMT situation in Malaya, notwithstanding its international relevance. He wrote that no constitutional government could tolerate divisive and defiant activities in its territory and that he had consulted the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Richard Stubbs, on the shared problem of KMT activities among the Chinese. Discussion had revealed, however, that there was no similarity between the Hong Kong and Malayan situations. The KMT in Hong Kong was not a registered society, liable to dissolution under a special Societies Ordinance, as in Malaya. Transmitting Stubbs' advice, Guillemard stated that the KMT was regarded as a political party. It could not easily be suppressed as it was the political

party of the Canton Government. The *party* could not be touched at the time in Hong Kong, but recalcitrant individual members could. Mistaking the form for the substance, Guillemard declared that the Malayan KMT, on the other hand, being a collection of registered societies and not a political party, was open to suppression under the Societies Ordinance. His analysis here is intriguing given the litany of anti-British political activity described in the earlier pages of his despatch.

Guillemard's 1922 despatch is a fascinating and significant document on several counts. It is full of ambiguities, strong words accompanied by caveats about policy ramifications, and a personal confusion, undoubtedly reflecting international confusion, about who or what constituted the Government of China in 1922. Guillemard does not have Stubbs' clear vision of a Canton KMT Government in charge, referring in the despatch to the fact that the KMT, in his view, was established to attack the 'recognized' Government of China in Peking and to finance that attack. The KMT Canton Government, which Guillemard apparently did not recognize, was attempting to battle a northern warlord 'free-for-all' and the remnants of a Chinese Republic set up in the aftermath of Yuan Shih-k'ai.

This raises the question of why Guillemard was so ill-informed compared with Sir Richard Stubbs. Was this a function of his own ignorance of colonial affairs coupled with a deep-seated disdain for the less than eminent Chinese, or was it a function of similar predilections among his advisors, and his necessary dependence on their expertise and advice? The answer here is a combination of both.

Guillemard exaggerated because he was ill-informed. Sun's offer of aid to the Indian nationalists and as a consequence, to 'secure Tibet' were clearly only of propaganda value in 1922 when Sun had barely a foothold in China. Guillemard's cited list reveals that Sun's aims were China-oriented, not world-oriented, except in the matter of preserving peace with other nations, hardly a reprehensible aim. Guillemard preferred to accept advice that these were dangerous 'advanced democratic ideals'. Similarly Guillemard took out of its Chinese cultural context Sun's assertion that not the Cantonese but the KMT should govern Canton, expanding eventually to govern the 'Empire'. This surely meant the defunct Manchu Empire rather than the British Empire.

However, to keep the balance sheet straight, it is necessary to say that there was nothing eccentric, within the canons of his time, in Guillemard's hatred and fear of international communism. He exaggerated the communist role in the Malayan KMT to support his call for a ban, at the same time using Malayan Chinese loathing of communism as evidence of only partial support for the KMT. But he also used the threat of

international communism to set up very useful contacts with the NEI and British consuls there, to reinforce his supervision of 'subversives' who flitted like birds of passage through Malaya en route to China, Japan and Russia. Among such notable revolutionaries in Guillemard's time were the Indonesian communists Darsono and Tan Malaka, the Dutch communist Sneevliet, the Indian M. N. Roy, and, unknown to Guillemard the most eminent of them all, Ho Chi Minh. Guillemard's language on the subject is excited. KMT membership of less than one per cent of the Chinese population in Malaya was seen to present 'a most grave menace' to British control through the ceaseless plotting of Sun. But when it suited his purpose Guillemard could be deliberately vague, implying that in offering evidence of an interrelationship between nationalist and revolutionary organizations it was unnecessary to set out detailed examples, something he had been quite prepared to do in listing the international connections.

One of the most intriguing aspects of Guillemard's December 1922 despatch is that, relying heavily on the officials of the Chinese Affairs Department, he chose to put the word 'expert', when referring to them, in inverted commas. What could the CO and FO make of that? Were they being asked to accept that Chinese Affairs Departments were staffed by well-intentioned but inexpert amateurs?

What can be fairly deduced from the examples of official advice offered by Guillemard is that the Malayan officials, having come to some unilateral conclusions about the Chinese response to the KMT, preferred, by their own testament, to stand on their assessment rather than consult Chinese community leaders. The official assessment was that most respectable Chinese, especially the Straits-born, were against KMT activities and would support suppression of the KMT. Had officials consulted the Straits-born they might indeed have found their own arguments against the KMT strengthened. Their stated reason for failure to consult was that all Chinese were constrained by threats of violence to relatives in China, despite the *locus poenitentiae*, not to give an honest and open answer. Both Chapman, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the FMS and William Maxwell, the Chief Secretary of the FMS, used such arguments when advising Guillemard. Such attitudes are significant for two reasons in particular. One is the revelation of how far the heirs of Pickering and Hare had distanced themselves from the society they were meant to 'protect'. They could not or would not consult with even the most eminent. And second, the very fact that they felt free to inform a governor that they were not consulting indicated the increased power which the Chinese Affairs Department officials were attaching to themselves in the policy-making area under the régime of an 'inexpert'

governor. By distancing themselves in such an authoritarian way from the society they were supposed to be serving, something that would not have been tolerated in Young's day, they reinforced Guillemard's own predispositions, thus further cementing their influence.

The vigour of Guillemard's recommendations, together with their ambiguities and the remarks about international complications prompt another question. What else persuaded Guillemard that a ban was necessary when he had such a powerful set of ordinances and intelligence to exert political control? Here, the answer which presents itself, is that he was in something of a cleft stick, for in his opinion the existing armoury was not working adequately. But he could hardly say this to London. He had passed the Printing Press Ordinance in March 1920 to counteract the increase in vernacular political material from China. Guillemard argued that the subtleties of 'the new Chinese language' were not covered by Young's 1919 legislation and in any case were such as to 'unsettle' ordinary Chinese. Whatever the value of such a patronizing and inaccurate assessment, the new publications from China certainly unsettled officials. In 1922 Chapman in the FMS wrote that the political inaccuracies printed in the *Chinese World* (San Francisco) about the Schools Ordinances were part of a plot to keep Malayan Chinese school children as Chinese citizens.⁴⁹ However Guillemard's new intelligence service journal, the *Malayan Bulletin of Political Intelligence* (MBPI), gave a blander view of press and literature censorship than either the *Proceedings* of the Councils or the official reports of the Chinese Affairs Department. In 1922 the MBPI stated that of eleven vernacular newspapers, six were moderate publications with small circulations, either contradicting Guillemard's rationale for the Ordinance or reflecting some success in its application, for it went on to ban the *Nanyang Siang Pau* for three months in 1923. By this time a Chinese translator had been employed by the MBPI to work on material collected by intelligence people.⁵⁰

The CO's response to Guillemard's advice for a ban was cautious. The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that the existing mechanisms for political control seemed adequate for dealing with the current Malayan KMT problem and that a ban was not appropriate *then*, but suggested that Guillemard continue to report on the situation from time to time. It was indeed matters of imperial policy, as Guillemard had noted, which influenced the CO's response to a considerable extent. The CO had sounded out FO opinion on the Malayan proposal, as well as War Office (WO), Hong Kong and Peking Legation advice on possible repercussions from the Nationalist Government or the Chinese people. In 1923 the Peking Legation argued the importance of Sun Yat-sen's perceived

change of attitude, making him seem more tolerant of Great Britain. Sir Richard Stubbs, Governor of Hong Kong, stressed the advantage to Britain of continued friendly relations with Sun, and added that in any case attempting to suppress a political party was an 'act of folly'. The WO got down to brass tacks and advised that British armed forces and police in China would be unable to protect British residents in China if violence erupted as a result of the Malayan ban. Maintaining the *status quo* became the *modus operandi*.⁵¹

Guillemard promptly took up the CO's suggestion that he report 'from time to time', when in February 1923, writing as High Commissioner of the FMS, he reported that the China KMT 'was working secretly [with a] reorganized anti-European Bolshevik body directly under Lenin and [the] Soviet' and that Sun Yat-sen had admitted to there being a large anti-British society working in Singapore, meaning presumably the KMT. In 1923, Guillemard also belatedly introduced the grants-in-aid provisions of the Schools Ordinances, an initiative treated sardonically by Sir John Pringle in the FO as 'presumably the Gov's [*sic*] alternative method of fighting the political tendencies of the . . . *Kuo Min Tang*'.⁵²

However after 1923 FO officials would not retain for long the luxury of wit at the expense of Guillemard's advice. The substance if not the detail of Guillemard's 1922 analysis of KMT-communist association was confirmed by the KMT-Communist Concord of 1924 between Sun Yat-sen and Borodin, which presented a more perceptible threat to British influence in Malaya than hitherto. In his October 1924 despatch to the CO, Guillemard indicated that KMT allegiance in Malaya was split over the China KMT alliance with the communists and he drew on this to suggest that international considerations no longer applied. Sun Yat-sen's 'conversion to communism', as he put it, had given moderate Chinese the opportunity to withdraw from an organization which had intimidated them into membership. These people, he wrote, would welcome a ban on the KMT at such a 'particularly suitable time', when Sun Yat-sen's hostility had eroded goodwill in Peking and London and fomented anti-British intrigue.⁵³

And he was no longer alone in this interpretation. The Peking Legation for example had informed London that a leading communist, Ch'en Tushiu had been made KMT Director of Propaganda in Canton. As a result of such supporting evidence, Guillemard's ideas fell on more fertile ground and a joint conference on the Malayan KMT and associated problems was arranged for February 1925 at the Colonial Office in London.

The joint conference represented a new approach for handling Malayan KMT problems by making the policy dependent on the

complexities of international affairs. It did not, as a conference, bring about a ban on the KMT. The new approach was that this was a face-to-face conference of several delegates from various departments: the FO, the Peking Legation and consular representation, Hong Kong, the War Office, the Admiralty, the Secret Intelligence Services (SIS), the CO and, most importantly, the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs in the SS and FMS themselves, for the first time.⁵⁴ It was no longer a background discussion, mainly on paper between the CO, FO and the Peking Legation and occasionally with the WO and the Admiralty being involved. The unchanged characteristic was however that no definite decisions were made, and it took international violence threatening British interests to bring about CO support for the new policy desired by the Governor.

Beatty, representing SS interests, and Chapman those of the FMS drew two serious implications from the KMT-Communist Concord which was represented as a threat to British colonial interests. Beatty used the Hainanese as an illustration. Formerly, he said, the Hainanese had been hostile to Sun after KMT forces had invaded their island but now, constituting a large proportion of the work force, they were 'ardent supporters' of Sun Yat-sen and would obey him and KMT directives for 'the advancement of the revolution'. In Beatty's view they had always been troublesome and this propensity was increased by association with a communist-dominated Malayan KMT.

Chapman brought out the labour threat more clearly by stating that the communists in the KMT wanted to centralize all the trade unions in Malaya in the 'manner of Canton'. Chapman meant here the guilds, since trade unions were not then universal in Malaya. Precedents for widespread labour unrest in the Chinese community existed when Chinese national pride was involved, as the anti-Japanese boycotts in 1908 and 1919 testified.

Arguments about incipient communist violence received support from the SIS representative, who cited manifestos which had been sent to Canton from Russia advocating violence and terrorism as part of the political process.

Beatty and Chapman also argued that a ban would bring uniformity to KMT control in Malaya making security more efficient. KMT branches were registered in the SS as societies but not all those in the FMS were and this loophole was seen as a danger. There were other aspects apart from communism and economic disruption which the FO particularly had to consider. These were the position and status of the Nationalist Government in Canton, its stability and future, and its relationship with Britain and America regarding concessions and trade. This was closely connected with the position and numbers of the mainly Chinese work

force in the colonies in difficult economic times and their response to affairs in China. Though these matters became much more important a decade later, they were already present in 1925 and the Malayan KMT was already central to the issue.

Also central to the issue was the effect of Malayan policy on British lives and property in China and, as in 1923, the WO and Admiralty declined to guarantee absolute protection, but indicated that ways could be found to act in a serious emergency. The most important rationale for a ban which subsumed all others was the construction of a foreign ideological and political *imperium in imperio* in a British territory. The Malayan KMT was the instrument of this aim whether it chose to recognize it or not. Though presented powerfully, these arguments did not achieve an immediate, positive or desired result. Beatty and Chapman went away empty handed. Minutes of the conference were circulated for discussion to the relevant departments represented, and their views were sought — a time-consuming process. But a chain of events in China and Malaya in the following months finally achieved Guillemard's aim. Cabinet agreed to a ban on the Malayan KMT in July 1925 after violence in China and Malaya forced its hand.

Two events immediately affected CO thinking about a ban. It is necessary to look at these not in historical sequence but in order of their influence on the CO. Sun Yat-sen died on 12 March 1925 and the CO decided that this event removed first one focus of overseas Chinese allegiance and second one obstacle to a ban. The inaccuracy of this assessment was proved in April 1925 when the Malayan KMT organized memorial services for Sun in various centres, the largest and most significant being in Singapore which was attended by thousands. Community attachment to Sun and his cause and KMT organizational ability had in no way been diminished by his death. Chinese Affairs officials in Singapore gave permission for the commemoration provided it was apolitical and peaceful, conditions which were honoured.⁵⁵

It is important to realize that Beatty, the SS Secretary for Chinese Affairs, was in Britain at the time of the decision to allow the Sun Yat-sen memorial services to proceed. In terms of keeping the peace in Malaya this was a wise decision, but what the services represented to the CO was proof of the power and coherence of Malayan Chinese KMT allegiance along the lines suggested by Beatty and Chapman at the February Conference.

The second event to influence the CO immediately had actually occurred while the Conference was on. A Chinese woman, later said to be a well-known anarchist, attempted a suitcase bombing of the Kuala

Lumpur Protectorate premises on 23 February 1925.⁵⁶ The explosion injured the woman and two Protectorate officials, W. L. Blythe and Mr D. Richards whose hand was severely damaged. However Guillemard did not report this incident to the CO until 23 April, despite the fact that an enquiry and prosecution were effected immediately. The inference is plain despite his stated reason that he delayed because no violent incidents followed the bombing. He delayed reporting it because the outcome of the Conference would determine the value of the incident as further pressure for a ban. Departmental minutes by P. A. Clutterbuck reveal that the CO recognized both the ploy and the implications — 'The Chinese in Malaya have been singularly free from anarchist tendencies . . . the KMT is not anarchist but has absorbed a certain no . . . the position in Malaya may perhaps be eased by the suppression of the Malayan branches. . . .' Yet again commitment to a ban was offset by a decision to discuss the position with Guillemard when he arrived in London on leave.

Guillemard's account of the Kuala Lumpur bombing was also accompanied by a short memorandum by Goodman, Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the FMS in Chapman's absence, on 'Anarchism Among Chinese in British Malaya'. This contains some interesting insights into Goodman's approach to Chinese problems which remained a constant foundation for his own policy decisions after 1926, as Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the SS as Beatty's successor. Charting the history of anarchism in Malaya, he wrote that the absence of anarchism until 1923 was because the 'Chinese mind' preferred organization in groups and thus attachment to communism rather than the individualist politicization of anarchism. He continued that in the face of efficient communist organization of labour in China, anarchism had lost ground. Both elements could still be found in the KMT, though anarchists, he wrote, would be ideologically opposed to Chinese nationalist aims, to the Communist State or the principles of Sun Yat-sen.

What Goodman next brought to light is an interesting bit of special pleading for an understanding of the reasons for Chinese disaffection in Malaya and China. He wrote that there was bitter resentment, felt mainly among the teachers, about government attempts to control Malayan Chinese vernacular education, and about imperialistic western intrusions in the Far East generally in the form of extraterritoriality and unequal treaties. Such insight into domestic and international problems had rarely been expressed by Protectorate officials, with the exception of Hare. It is a pointer to the future power of advisors on Chinese Affairs though how well this sort of advice went down with Guillemard is not

revealed. It does not seem to be in line with either the Governor's predisposition or recommendations about management of the Malayan Chinese, let alone what Guillemard's superiors were recommending in London. There is some indication of the CO response in London however. In a postscript to his minutes, Clutterbuck ordered a duplicate of Goodman's 'letter' to be sent to SIS, saying, 'they can keep it if they want it' — in effect the security content was acknowledged and the political implications 'put on reserve'.

Violent events in China and Hong Kong in May and June 1925 blew such temporizing tactics out of the windows in London.⁵⁷ An explosion of riots, boycotts and strikes, originating as specifically anti-Japanese labour unrest and developing into organized anti-British politicized labour protests threatened British economic enterprises in Shanghai and Canton and put British lives and property at risk. In the end, the May 30th movement, at the root of this disturbance, spread to Hong Kong and eventually disrupted the economic life of the colony for sixteen months. Communist and KMT activists ran the marches and protests and the implications for Malaya were regarded as critical.

Official and Parliamentary concern about the violence and financial losses paved the way for Cabinet agreement to a ban on the Malayan KMT on 1 July 1925.⁵⁸ The motive for the ban was the need to safeguard British colonial autonomy in Malaya, to run the country peacefully for the economic and social benefit of colonial subjects, and to prevent further avenues of Chinese politicization from developing. The Malayan Chinese community had a proper place in this overall policy. The Malayan KMT had no place at all. No colonial government of the day could tolerate disaffection, unilateral political action and economic threats to its territories, and the Malayan Government was no exception in resisting pressure from nationalist forces, foreign or not.

The ideological shift in British policy towards the Malayan Chinese, from indirect rule to political supervision had started long ago with the first Societies Ordinances in the nineteenth century. International fears about communism and the colonial perception that the Chinese had done very well out of British Malaya and ought to be loyally thankful and politically quiescent precipitated the drive for a ban. Above all else, officials failed to realize that among moderate KMT members at least, China-oriented nationalism presented no conflict of loyalty to the interests of Malaya. They also failed to appreciate the role moderate nationalists could have played in containing Malayan Chinese nationalist sentiments. These predispositions and failures helped to drive the KMT into more radical channels, a trend which appeared to vindicate the imposition of the ban in July 1925.

In October 1925 the Officer Administering Government (OAG) informed the CO that all branches of the KMT in Malaya had been closed. Never was a man more wrong.


Notes

1. C. F. Yong and R. B. McKenna, 'Sir Arthur Young and Political Control of the Chinese in Malaya and the Straits Settlements', *JMBRAS* 57, 2 (1984), pp. 1-30.
2. Particularly on the decentralization issue. See Yeo Kim Wah, *The Politics of Decentralization — Colonial Controversy in Malaya 1920-1929* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982); and CO 717, various volumes (42-48), on Guillemard's affront to Choo Kia-peng and his apology in the Federal Council.
3. Yong and McKenna, 'Sir Arthur Young . . .' (*op. cit.*). The objectors were Sir Evelyn Ellis, Mr Darbishire, Mr Hewan and Tan Jiak-kim.
4. See the *Proceedings* of the Legislative Council, SS, and the Federal Council, FMS, March to October 1920 for the Schools Ordinances debates; a notable member of the Federal Council was Eu Tong-sen; for biographies of eminent Chinese of the period, see Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years, History of the Chinese in Singapore* (London: John Murray, 1923) and Yong and McKenna, 'Sir Arthur Young . . .', Appendix (*op. cit.*).
5. Great Britain, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, the *Index* to this series and *Hansard*, 1920-1925. The Labour MP for Hull, Lt-Cdr Kenworthy had twenty columns of entries in the *Index*, most of them on Malayan KMT and related matters, but he did not raise any questions about the May 30th riots in China and Hong Kong.
6. R. Heussler, *British Rule in Malaya* (Oxford: Clio Press, 1980).
7. Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years . . . History* (*op. cit.*), p. 495
8. Sng Choon-ye, former Chinese Assistant Secretary for Chinese Affairs, in an interview with C. F. Yong in Singapore on 17 March 1984.
9. See also John G. Butcher, *The British in Malaya 1880-1941* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979) and Heussler, *British Rule . . .* (*op. cit.*) for other views about the lives of Malayan colonial officials.
10. Yong and McKenna, 'Sir Arthur Young . . .' (*op. cit.*).
11. The anti-Hainanese attitude is clear in CO 273/409/10563, 21 March 1914, which is Beatty's Report on banishment proceedings against a Selangor Club domestic servant; the same bias appears in the Enclosures by Beatty in FO 371/8029/47111, December 1922, and in his submission to the February 1925 Joint Conference at the CO, recorded in the Minutes in CO 273/530/11790, 25 February 1925.
12. Guillemard's 1922 despatch reveals that Chapman seems to have lived up to his 'iron broom' label, being authoritarian, not consultative, even with the so-called 'respectable' or 'better class' Chinese community leaders.
13. *Straits Times*, 26 August 1941, p. 11.
14. CO 717/13/31878, Enclosure No. 2. 'Report for the Secretary of State on Federated Malay States Enactment No. 27 of 1920', by A. M. Goodman. Enclosure Governor, SS, to the CO, 21 May 1921.
15. CO 273/485/3060 Director of the CID (1919); CO 273/591/13115, Police Department, SS, 'Special Branch'; Governor, SS, to the CO, 7 June 1933.
16. See Nicholas Tarling, 'The Singapore Mutiny, 1915', *JMBRAS* 53, 2 (1982), pp. 26-59 on the complex causes of this mutiny.
17. Alun Jones, 'Internal Security in British Malaya 1895-1942', Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1970 (Xerox, Ann Arbor, Michigan: 1971) is the source of the staffing

- figures; Nigel West, *MI 6* (London: 1983) discusses intelligence policy changes in London for the period.
18. René Onract, *Singapore — A Police Background* (London: Dorothy Crisp, 1947), p. 116.
 19. The discussion draws on the texts of the ordinances published in *The Laws of Malaya* for the FMS and the *Promulgations of the Governor . . .* for the SS.
 20. J. N. Parmer, *Colonial Labour Policy and Administration* (New York: Asian Studies Association, 1960) includes discussion of Javanese labour in Malaya; see also R. N. Jackson, *Immigrant Labour and the Development of Malaya 1786–1920* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1961), especially Chapter 2; M. Stenson, *Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia* (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1980), pp. 28–30 discusses importation of Javanese labour in 1941 to counteract Indian-controlled strikes and labour subversion.
 21. W. Blythe, 'Historical Sketch of Chinese Labour in Malaya', *JMBRAS* 20, 1 (1947), pp. 64–114; *Censuses of British Malaya* 1911, 1921 and 1931. Comprising 72 per cent of the Singapore population and 35 per cent in Malaya, the Chinese population had a growth rate of 28 per cent compared with the national figure of 25 per cent. In 1911 in Singapore the China-born outnumbered the Straits-born by three to one (155 132 to 38 884). In 1901 in Singapore females made up 10 per cent of the Chinese population, in 1911 24 per cent and in 1921 38 per cent.
 22. Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years' History . . .* (*op. cit.*), p. 263.
 23. Yong and McKenna, 'Sir Arthur Young . . .' (*op. cit.*), p. 8; CO 273/409/10563, 'Administration of Banishment Enactment', Governor, SS, to the CO, 25 February 1914; CO 273/409/22560, High Commissioner, FMS, to the CO, 27 May 1914.
 24. Alun Jones, 'Internal Security . . .', p. 129; CO 576, Report(s) of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, FMS, for the period; CO 275, Report(s) of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, for the period; both to be found in the relevant *Annual Reports* for the two administrations; CO 275/96, 'Report on the Straits Settlements Police Force' by A. R. Chancellor, in *Annual Report of the Straits Settlements 1915* (Singapore: 1916), p. 20.
 25. The wartime measures were Ordinance No. 4 of the 1917 'Registration of Aliens Act' and four ordinances between 1915 and 1917, 'The Enemy Aliens Winding Up Ordinance(s)', which sequestered the land of enemy aliens and also prohibited Chinese residents in British Malaya from buying sequestered land and property.
 26. The texts of the two ordinances form the basis for the discussion, together with the Proceedings of the Legislative Council, SS, and the Federal Council, FMS, from March to December 1920.
 27. CO 273/424/5943, 'Report on Postal Censorship' by the Governor's Deputy, Mr R. Wilkinson, to the CO, 22 November 1915.
 28. Proceedings of the Legislative Council, SS; Shorthand Report B18–19 and text of the Ordinance.
 29. CO 273/337/34504, CO Departmental Minute by R.G.S.O. [*sic*], 9 October 1908.
 30. CO 273/402/31589, Enclosures; Telegram from Mr Alston, Peking to the FO; the FO to the CO enquiring about action, 9 September 1913; the CO to the Governor, SS, reaction, 11 September 1913; CO 273/396/35322, 'Chinese Rebel Leaders in Singapore', Governor, SS, to the CO, pp. 1–2 of Governor's Memorandum, 28 February 1914.
 31. CO 273/406/7600, Enclosure; Memorandum from the FO, 28 February 1914; CO 273/409/10563, 25 February 1914; CO 273/410/22560, 27 May 1914; Yong and McKenna, 'Sir Arthur Young . . .' (*op. cit.*), p. 8.
 32. CO 273/387/31473, and CO 273/387/31489, 'Chinese Riots in Kuala Lumpur,' 5

- October 1912. Both these large files form the basis of the discussion of the 1912 riots. The files on the 1919 riots are cited in Note 37.
33. CO 273/408/3804/14/15, Governor, SS, to the CO, Enclosure; *Proceedings of the Legislative Council 'Penal Code Amendment Bill'*, pp. 556-60 of file, 24 December 1914.
 34. CO 273/365/13564, pp. 99-102 of file, 14 April 1910.
 35. CO 717/4/55663, Report of the Chief Secretary, 1919; Section IV, 'Chinese Affairs', page 5 of the Report on reaction in the FMS; see also *Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP)*, First Series, Vol. XIV (London: 1966), for British Government reaction, some officials such as Lord Curzon being sympathetic to Chinese sensibilities concerning the insult.
 36. The major files on the disturbances and Government reaction are CO 273/483/39986, for rice prices, and CO 273/483/38589 and CO 273/492/44333, for the whole of July 1919, which form the basis for the following discussion.
 37. CO 273/483/45934, Governor, SS, to the CO, pages 372-3 of the file, 7 August 1919; CO 273/409/10563, the Selangor Club banishment case, and see also R. B. McKenna, 'Political Kings in Our Own Country ' Paper delivered at the Malaysia Colloquium, Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), Australian National University, 8-10 June 1985.
 38. CO 275/96, Report on the Straits Settlements Police Force . . . 1915.
 39. CO 273/408/38451, Governor's Deputy, Mr R. Wilkinson, to the CO, 'Presence of Chinese Revolutionaries (1914)', 8 August 1914.
 40. CO 273/421/21913, Governor, SS, to the CO, 12 May 1915.
 41. Yeo Kim Wah, *The Politics of Decentralization (op. cit.)*, p. 64.
 42. C. F. Yong, *Tan Kah-kee, the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987).
 43. Government Despatch no. 27 of 1922, the Governor, SS to the CO, 6 March 1922.
 44. CO 273/521/21658, the Governor, SS to the CO, and Departmental Minutes, 31 March 1923.
 45. CO 273/500/35862, the Governor, SS, to the CO, pages 161-2 of file, 21 July 1920; FO 371/8053/3885, 1923.
 46. CO 717/13/31878, Goodman Memorandum on the Schools Ordinance and also the Departmental Memorandum by Sir George Fiddes, 1921.
 47. FO 371/8029/47111, the Governor, SS, to the CO, Enclosure; Memorandum by D. Beatty, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, dated December 1921; *MBPI*, March 1922.
 48. FO 371/8029/47111, the Governor, SS, to the CO, 6 December 1922, from which the following discussion is drawn.
 49. CO 717/22/55305, 'Article in Chinese Periodical', Memorandum by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, FMS, Mr W. T. Chapman, 10 October 1922.
 50. FO 371/8053/3054/23, 'Report on the Activities and Organization of the Malayan Bureau of Political Intelligence for 1922', p. 11 (1923).
 51. FO 371/9224/274, 'Kuo Min Tang in Malaya', Departmental Minutes, Memoranda and Enclosures, particularly pages 48, 62, 64, 71 and 78 of file, 6 December 1922; see also D. C. Wilson, *Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924-1928: A Study of the Interaction of Official Policies and Perceptions in Britain and China*, Ph.D. Thesis. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, May 1973.
 52. CO 717/27/5953, Paraphrased Telegram, the Governor, SS, to the CO, page 254 of file, 2 February 1923; CO 273/523/53533, Inter-Departmental Minutes, pages 234-5 of file, 5 November 1923.
 53. CO 273/526/54020, the Governor, SS to the CO, *Kuo Min Tang in Malaya*"; this

- appears as an Enclosure in FO 371/10279, October 1924.
54. CO 273/530/11790, Minutes of a Meeting held at the Colonial Office, London on 26 February 1925 on the suppression of the Malayan *Kuomintang*. Delegates were Sir Gilbert Grindle (CO), Permanent Under Secretary, as Chairman; Mr Clauson and Mr Clutterbuck (CO) from the Far Eastern Section; Mr Waterlow (FO), Permanent Under-Secretary in the China Department; Mr Moss from the Peking Legation; Cdr Crocker (Admiralty); Majors C. D. Rawson and D.M. King, from the War Office (WO); and one unnamed representative from the Special Investigation Services (SIS). The document forms the basis for the following discussion, 26 February 1925.
 55. The *Nanyang Siang Pau* (NYSP), 31 March 1925; 9 April 1925.
 56. CO 717/41/22708, 'Bomb Outrage at Kuala Lumpur', the High Commissioner, FMS, to the CO. Goodman's Memorandum on anarchy is Enclosure No 2, 23 April 1925. This document is the source of the following account.
 57. Richard W. Rigby, *The May 30th Movement: Events and Themes* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980), see especially Appendices 1-3. See also Wilson, *Britain and the Kuomintang . . .*, Notes 38 and 39 on page 198, where he writes, 'One can hardly imagine a more combustible series of factors . . .'
 58. CO 717/45/30039, Cabinet 32 (25), Extract from the Conclusions of a Meeting held on Wednesday 1 July 1925 at 11.30 a.m.; see also CAB 24/174, Cabinet Paper 319 of 1925, 'Note of a Conversation with Former United States Minister, Peking', dated 22 June 1925. In the wake of the May 30th movement and after four years in China, this U.S. official advised that there was no general anti-foreign feeling in China, advice which could either have delayed implementation of a ban in Malaya, lessening its urgency, or conversely, speeded up the decision for a ban because of perceptions of a non-adverse reaction in China. See also FO 371/10935/5953, Secret Despatch from the Office Administering Government (OAG), Mr E. S. Hose, to the CO, 3 November 1925. Hose had been Acting Resident of Selangor in 1921, Resident of Negri Sembilan in 1922-24, and Colonial Secretary, SS, in 1924-25; he retired in 1925.



✓ Plate 1. Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925)



Plate 2. *Bin Chin House* (or *Dr. Sun Yat-sen Villa*), Singapore




Plate 3. Sun Yat-sen's visit to Singapore, 1905




Plate 4. Sun Yat-sen with Teo Eng-hock (left) and Tan Chor-nam (right), 1905




Plate 5. Huang Hsing and Perak TMH (*Tung Meng Hui*) members, 1910



Plate 6. Dr. Lim Boon-keng, President of the Singapore KMT (*Kuomintang*), 1913-1914



Plate 7. Chan Chan-mooi,
TMH 'old guard', Kuala Lumpur



Plate 8. Teng Tse-ju,
TMH 'old guard', Kuala Pilah



Plate 9. Teh Lay-seng,
TMH 'old guard', Perak



Plate 10. Lee Guan-swee,
TMH 'old guard', Perak



Plate 11. Goh Say-eng, TMH 'old guard , Penang



Plate 12. Lim Nee-soon, TMH 'old guard', Singapore

The KMT Forging Ahead Under a Ban, 1925–1930

1925 was a year of profound historical significance for the history of the KMT Movement in both China and Malaya. Two important incidents during that year produced epoch-making results. The first was the death of Sun Yat-sen in Peking in March 1925. This paved the way for a power struggle within the various contending factions of the China KMT and between the KMT and the CCP, which resulted in the rise of Chiang Kai-shek as military strongman and the new arbiter of China's destiny. The subsequent purge of the Chinese communists and the eventual unification of China in 1928 under Chiang's leadership had enormous impact on the politics of the Malayan Chinese in general and on the KMT Movement in particular. The second important incident during 1925 in China was the emergence of a new, militant, anti-foreign, Chinese nationalism caused by the shooting of Chinese demonstrators by British-commanded police in Shanghai, an event which came to be known as the May 30th Incident.¹ When the unrest spread to Canton in June 1925, the KMT, at the instigation of its Russian and communist strategists, launched a protracted Hong Kong–Kwangtung strike against British goods and firms, lasting for a period of over sixteen months. While the May 30th movement had far-reaching effects on China, it probably tipped the scale for the banning of the KMT branches in Malaya by the British Cabinet in July 1925.

In Malaya, 1925 thus witnessed the successful conclusion of Governor Guillemard's persistent campaign against the Malayan KMT. A ban was imposed and the KMT branches were ordered to dissolve in August. His and for all. Ironically though, the ban imposed by Guillemard and his successor, Sir Hugh Clifford, was *not* effective in bringing about the demise of the KMT Movement. A combination of factors saw the KMT re-emerge as better organized and more effective political force by 1928 and 1929, having purged itself of the left-wing elements. British policy towards the Malayan KMT will be analyzed in the next chapter. It is the intention in this chapter to examine how and why the KMT in Malaya survived the ban, and surged ahead after purging the radical elements from within its own rank and file.

Following the British Cabinet decision, the Government of the Straits Settlements ordered all existing KMT branches and sub-branches to be

dissolved. In October the Administrator of the Straits Settlements and Acting High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States, in the absence of the Governor, Sir Laurence Guillemard, informed the Colonial Office that all the branches of the KMT in Malaya had been closed.² As it turned out, this was more a pious hope than a statement of fact, for, although the KMT did dutifully dismantle its party branches and sub-branches, the nucleus of its extensive organizational network remained largely intact. When opportunities arose for regrouping and reorganization, KMT members lost no time in reactivating.

Following up on the orders for dissolution, the British authorities 'played it tough' to prove their serious intention in enforcing the ban.³ They prosecuted and imprisoned two KMT branch leaders in Singapore for their involvement in the activities of 'illegal' organizations. While the KMT branches and sub-branches were under a ban, members could nevertheless rely on such front organizations as reading rooms, night schools, and cultural bodies for their activities.⁴ However, a lull of some five months occurred after October 1925 before the dormant branches began to stir again. Four factors were largely responsible for the reactivating of the Malayan KMT during 1926.

First, there was the persistent drive by the Overseas Bureau of the KMT in Canton to reorganize the Malayan KMT Movement, ever since its formation in 1924. The major aim of the Bureau was to promote closer links between overseas branches and their China counterpart in such areas as fund raising, organization and propaganda. As the Overseas Bureau came under the control of the KMT Left, its approach to overseas organization had become more radical. In February 1926, for example, the Bureau was headed by a member of the KMT Left, Peng Tse-min, who was in favour of inducting students, youth and labour into the KMT Movement overseas, a reflection of the KMT's mass organization policy and practice in China itself. Besides being the head of the Overseas Bureau, Peng was also elected into the powerful 36-member Central Executive Committee of the KMT in China during the second Party Congress of the KMT in January 1926. Peng had been the manager of the *Yik Khuan Po* of Kuala Lumpur before he left for Canton in 1924, and was thus a man with intimate political knowledge of conditions in British Malaya. Under the radicalized Overseas Bureau, seven Chinese envoys were despatched to Singapore to form, in February 1926, a Singapore South Seas Public Bodies Union, with students, labour and local KMT members participating. The aims of this Union were to promote anti-foreign boycotts and to commemorate the first anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death.⁵ This 'united front' body so alarmed the British authorities that they regarded it as 'the first Communist Party organization in

Malaya'.⁶ During the fourth session of the meeting of this Union, the British took strong action by raiding it, resulting in 41 arrests, including four of the seven envoys.⁷ Despite the February raid, many small Hainanese labour unions in British Malaya formed themselves into the *Nanyang* General Labour Union (NGLU) in May 1926, the first left-wing trade union organization in Malayan history. The rules of the NGLU included the unity of all labourers in the South Seas and emancipation of the labour classes.⁸

During 1926, the Overseas Bureau also despatched other emissaries including one named Ho Hua-san who visited Singapore, propagated communism to students at night schools, disowned KMT branches controlled by the moderate faction, and helped radical night schools form themselves into radical party branches.⁹ While the Overseas Bureau played a role in radicalizing the Malayan KMT Movement, it hastened the split between the moderate and radical factions within the party.

Second, the radicalization of the Malayan KMT Movement could also be partly attributed to the returned graduates from the Whampoa Military and Political College in Canton, in 1926. These returned graduates happened to be Hainanese by origin and had been influenced by communists in the College. While they helped to organize night schools into KMT branches, they were active in spreading anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideology to students and local party members.¹⁰

Third, there was the nationalist upsurge in China in the wake of the KMT's Northern Expedition, launched in July 1926. This Expedition had the effect of prompting local KMT members to revive their branches for fund-raising purposes. By the end of 1926, a reported sum of \$ 3600 had been collected for the Expedition,¹¹ but by June 1927 a figure of \$ 7000 was officially quoted as having been remitted.¹² Also, Chinese emissaries, notably Tshui Kwong-siu, formerly from Penang, arrived in August 1926 for a six-week tour to regenerate old branches and establish new ones.¹³ Tshui, Head of the *Nanyang* General Branch of the KMT in Canton in 1926, was thus a high-ranking party official in the KMT's overseas affairs and activities. Before his Canton appointment, Tshui had run a printing press in Penang and had been a former member of the Penang branch of the *T'ung Meng Hui*.¹⁴ The KMT emissaries strongly urged the former KMT members to reorganize their branches to support the cause of China's re-unification under the KMT hegemony.

Fourth, there was an intense drive by the KMT Left, commonly known by the British authorities in 1926 as the 'Main School',¹⁵ to organize trade unions and night schools as party branches in the name of the KMT. The 'Main School' surged ahead in Singapore, controlling sixteen out of twenty-one KMT branches then known to be existing.¹⁶ Despite the

constant clamping down on the night schools by the British, the 'Main School' was to prove troublesome in 1927 to both the local authorities and the KMT Right, then known to the British as 'moderates'. These 'moderates' primarily consisted of merchants and community leaders who were of higher social standing.

The rise of the organized KMT Left in British Malaya thus stimulated the KMT Movement and posed a problem to both the moderate KMT faction and the British authorities. It was the forerunner of the *Nanyang Communist Party* founded in 1928 and the *Malayan Communist Party* (1930), descriptions of which run beyond the scope of this chapter.

It is not easy to tabulate the branches and sub-branches for 1926 as the full details have yet to be found. It is sufficient to say here that many of the old branches and sub-branches had already resurfaced and some new ones were established. Among the new ones were those to be found in Muar, Malacca, Kajang, Taiping, Ipoh, Kulim, and Seremban.¹⁷ The impression of both A. Goodman, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, and P. T. Allen, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, FMS, expressed in their 1926 joint report on KMT activities during 1926, was that 'since October 1925 branches which were dissolved have been reorganized secretly and continue to exist; branches or sub-branches were springing up not only in every considerable town but also in most villages'.¹⁸ The KMT survived the 1925 ordeal and regrouped under the ban in 1926. Table 1 shows the Malayan branches of the KMT in 1926, before the divisions and split in 1927, as provided by British official sources.

1927 was a crucial year for the KMT Movement in both Malaya and Singapore. In April, the split between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party in China occurred, with ramifications for the KMT 'moderates' and the 'Main School' overseas. This was a year of vigorous organizational activity on the part of the 'Main School', which alarmed the British who regarded it as having scored great success in both Malaya and Singapore during the first half of 1927. Deepening its 'grass roots' by organizing trade unions, the 'Main School' controlled eight new sub-branches of the KMT in Singapore, bringing its control to twenty-one sub-branches out of a total of twenty-nine.¹⁹ In contrast, some of the existing sub-branches of the 'moderates' were said to be 'moribund',²⁰ lacking the will and desire to combat the activities of their counterparts. The British claimed that the sub-branches of the 'Main School' were controlled in the majority of cases by 'Chinese of little standing and of small interests in the Colony'.²¹ Furthermore, it was widely believed in official circles that the KMT sub-branches in the SS had become 'extremist' and that "practically all the branches that existed were under the control of extremists who were as a rule Hailam [Hainanese]".²²

The 'Main School' was involved in the Kreta Ayer Incident in Singapore on 12 March 1927, which arose from an organized memorial service for Dr Sun Yat-sen. Ironically initiated by KMT 'moderates' in Singapore, the memorial service to commemorate the second anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death was sanctioned by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs. Tragically, it brought about the incident in which six demonstrators were killed by the police. Prior to the gathering, the KMT Left in Singapore took the opportunity to flex their political muscles by making their own secret plans to take charge of the proceedings on the day of the memorial service. Left-wing Hainanese teachers and night school students arrived at the Happy Valley, 'brushed aside and assaulted the original organizers, made inflammatory speeches, shouted out slogans and distributed pamphlets' of an anti-British and anti-Imperialist nature.²³ The original organizers and the police at Happy Valley failed to control the activist teachers and students who marched off down Anson and Maxwell Roads, towards the Kreta Ayer police station. They staged a street procession with bands and banners, causing a serious traffic jam and holding up the trolley-bus service. The rowdy crowd halted in front of the Kreta Ayer police station where a small police force fired at the marchers, causing the death of six of them. This occurrence soon became the so-called Kreta Ayer Incident, with considerable political implications in British Malaya.

The short-term result was an effective boycott of the British-owned Singapore Traction Company by the general Chinese population in Singapore, lasting for many months. Moreover, the Incident hastened the split within the KMT forces in British Malaya, with intensified power struggles occurring between the 'moderates' and the 'Main School'. The aftermath of the power struggle saw the KMT 'moderates' purging the left-wing elements and organizations within the KMT.²⁴ The long-term effect of this split in 1927 prompted the KMT Left members to break away from the KMT altogether, by forming their own political organization in 1928, the *Nanyang Communist Party*. Finally, the Kreta Ayer incident further hardened the attitudes of the British authorities towards the KMT Movement in both Malaya and Singapore. By August 1927, the British were able to report that the 'Main School' in the SS was much weakened, due to Chiang Kai-shek's purge against the communists in China and to the repressive action taken locally against the KMT by both the Chinese Affairs Department and the police.²⁵

The only consolation for the 'moderate' KMT branches during 1927 was their attendance at the first Delegates' Conference of the *Nanyang General Branch of the KMT of China*, held in Canton in August under the auspices of the Central Overseas Department of the Nanking

Government. The Conference was concerned, among other matters, with the reconstruction of the Party in China and the future course of action for the 'moderate' faction overseas. The 'moderates' despatched a contingent of forty-nine delegates from Malaya and Singapore, representing some 13 720 KMT members for the two territories.²⁶ The Malayan delegates returned with the mission of reorganizing their political party by 'cleansing' it of communist influence. 'Main School' activists in Malaya and Singapore however had embarked on the formation of the 'Communist Youth' in December 1927 and the *Nanyang* Provisional Commission of the Communist Party of China in January 1928, both being forerunners of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), founded in April 1930 in Singapore. The weeding out of the communist elements in China made the final confrontation between the 'moderates' and the 'Main School' inevitable. The parting of the ways finally arrived in 1928 when KMT branches were reorganized by the 'moderates' at the instigation of the KMT of China, and when the *Nanyang* Communist Party was formed by the 'Main School' activists. By the end of 1928, the *Nanyang* Communist Party had become an independent political force in its own right.

By the time of the first Delegates' Conference in Canton in August 1927, KMT 'moderates' were able to take stock of their own organizational strengths and power base in British Malaya *vis-à-vis* that of the 'Main School'. Table 2, based on yearly party subscriptions from existing branches and sub-branches received each month during 1927 by the *Nanyang* General Branch in Canton, shows their effective control over the party organizations in Malaya and Singapore in 1927.

A comparison with Table 1 shows that KMT 'moderates' seemed to be holding their position well enough, except in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Klang, where the 'Main School' had made considerable inroads. In Singapore, the 'Main School' was said to be in control of twenty-one out of a total of twenty-nine sub-branches during 1927, largely due to the fact that it was ideologically and organizationally more dynamic through its close association with the night schools (students) and unions (working class). Moreover, 'Main School' activists had less to lose economically given the repressive and trying conditions under which they worked. Despite losses in branches and sub-branches due to 'Main School' activity, and, to a lesser extent, to British 'repression' (e.g. deportation or imprisonment), the 'moderates' were organizationally and structurally well placed when they finally embarked on party reorganization during 1928 and 1929.

By April 1928, the reorganization of the KMT in China resulted in the closure of the *Nanyang* General Branch, which had been established in

Table 2: The KMT Branches and Sub-Branchees, Controlled by the 'Moderates', 1927

	Perak	Selangor	Negri Sembilan	Pahang
F	Ipoh (SB)	K. Lumpur (6th SB)	Seremban (Branch)	Kuala Lipis
	Menglembu (SB)	Klang (Branch)	Seremban	Sungei
	Lahat (SB)	P. Swettenham	(1st-4th SBs)	Lembing
	Tronoh (SB)	(4th-5th SBs)	Seremban	(SB)
	Sitiawan (SB)	Pudu (SB)	(6th-14th SBs)	
M	Tapah (SB)	Kuala Kubu (SB)	Dangi (SB)	
	Kampar (SB)	Kajang (SB)	Rantau (SB)	
	Taiping (SB)	Ampang (SB)	Port Dickson (B)	
	Bidor (SB)			
	Raub (SB)			
S	Tanjong Malim (SB)			
	Sungkai (SB)			
	Fusing (SB)			
	Telok Kruin (SB)?			
	Johore	Kedah	Perlis	Kelantan Trengganu
	Mersing (SB)	Sungei Patani		
U	Chung Lam (Muar, SB)	(Branch)		
	Muar (Branch)	Kulim (SB)		
	Muar (2nd SB)	Kedah (Branch)		
	Kwan Laan (Muar, SB)	Pulau Langkawi		
M	Kota Tinggi (SB)	(SB)		
	Segamat (SB)	Selama (SB)		
	Kluang (SB)			
	Batu Pahat (SB)			
S	Panchor (SB)			
	Serom (SB)			
	Singapore	Malacca	Penang	
	Singapore	Malacca (1st-3rd SBs)	Penang (Branch)	
	(1st-8th SBs)	Malacca (5th SB)	Tongkah (SB)	
		Asahan (SB)		
		Jasin (SB)		

Sources: NL 5949 G.D. 37 No. 397/1927, *Enclosure No. 1 to FMS Despatch of 8 December 1927*, Appendix B, pp. 20-25, 29, 36.
 NL 5936 G.D. 39 No. 254/1928, *Enclosure to the Straits Despatch of 26 July 1928*, pp. 1-20.

1924 for the control and coordination of all overseas party activities. In its stead, the Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Party in Nanking took charge of all overseas branches. The Organization Department was empowered to reorganize all overseas branches by purging them of the communist elements through the mechanism of registering all party members. In Malaya and Singapore, this task was entrusted to a new and Singapore-based party organization, the Committee of Directors of Party Affairs of the British Malaya Head Branch of the China *Kuomintang* (BMHB), which directed local party affairs and centralized party control in the two territories. This vital Committee of the BMHB consisted of nine appointed directors of party leaders, including Teo Eng-hock, Teh Lay-seng, Lee Chin-tian, Teh Sau-peng, Tang Tsz-sat, Siu Chan-tong, Sim Hung-pek, Ho Ju-khoon, and Iu Teng-chan.²⁷ Apparently, Committees of Directors for branches in Singapore, Penang, Malacca, Selangor, Klang, and Seremban had also been proposed or formed by the Organization Department.²⁸ Although the appointments of directors were made in late April, the BMHB was not 'surreptitiously founded' in Singapore until 19 June, after the arrival of Iu Teng-chan from Nanking to undertake the task of reorganization of the Malayan and Singapore branches.²⁹ A day after the founding of the BMHB, Teo Eng-hock, Iu Teng-chen and Teh Sau-peng then openly gave a press conference in Singapore, sketching the revolutionary process in China, explaining KMT principles and appealing to the Chinese press for fair reporting.³⁰ Iu Teng-chan became a key man for the KMT Movement in these two territories during the next six months. Among his contributions were the formation of the BMHB, reorganization of many Malayan and Singapore branches, re-registration of party members, and the inauguration in Singapore of the first All-Malaya Delegates' Convention in January 1929, a sign of consolidation of party organization and unity by the 'moderates'.

The first meeting of the BMHB on 19 June 1928 was attended by seven directors and from among themselves they elected heads of nine different departments, namely Accounts (Lee Chin-tian), Training (Teo Eng-hock), Investigation (Siu Chan-tong), Propaganda (Iu Teng-chan), Organization (Tang Tsz-sat), Overseas Chinese (Sim Hung-pek), Social (Teh Sau-peng), Correspondence and Secretariat.³¹ Teh Lay-seng and Ho Ju-khoon do not appear to have held any specific position, but remained Directors of Party Affairs of the BMHB. The task of these directors was to establish new branches and sub-branches, streamline party structure (that is, the BMHB, branches, sub-branches, divisional sub-branches) and re-register all party members in order to weed out all undesirable and communist elements. These challenging tasks were completed by the end

of 1928 to pave the way for the first All-Malaya Delegates' Convention, scheduled to take place between 13 and 17 January 1929 in Singapore, under the auspices of the BMHB. During the first session of the Convention, Iu Teng-chan reported that the BMHB had founded eleven new branches and twenty direct sub-branches in both Malaya and Singapore.³² Moreover, the BMHB had also examined and approved over 10 000 re-registration forms of party members, and some 8000 membership certificates had already been received from the KMT in Nanking.³³

The Convention was attended by over seventy party delegates from various branches and sub-branches in Malaya who elected new office-bearers into the BMHB's two Committees. The Executive Committee consisted of nine members and five reserves, the Supervisory Committee of five members and two reserves, a total of twenty-one members. Their names and state origins can be found in Table 3.

The successful reorganization of the KMT branches under the direct control of the BMHB was a watershed in KMT history in British Malaya. Local KMT leaders played a more positive role in directing the Malayan KMT Movement after central control was shifted from Nanking to Singapore. The emergence of the BMHB at 15 Bukit Pasoh Road, Singapore gave the KMT Movement a local colouring and authority in the eyes of the Malayan and Singapore Chinese community. Second, the KMT, after the 1929 reorganization, was a more cohesive, more united and tighter establishment in terms of its ability to respond to China's

Table 3: BMHB Office-bearers, 1929

Executive Committee		Supervisory Committee	
Teo Eng-hock	(Singapore)	Huang Chi-ch'en	(Johore Bahru, Johore)
Teh Sau-peng	(Klang)	Ch'an Chan-mooi	(Kuala Lumpur)
Iu Teng-chan	(Singapore)	Chu Chee-chiong	(Singapore)
Tshui Kwong-siu	(Penang)	Sim Hung-pek	(Malacca)
Ho Ju-khoon	(Penang)	Foo Ho-chien	(Singapore)
Tang Tsz-sat	(Seremban)		
Siu Chan-tong	(Selangor)		
Lo Mei-tung	(Muar)		
5 Reserves		2 Reserves	
Liu Chi-kuang	(Singapore)	Li Lien-chi	(Singapore)
Tay Shun-yung	(Selangor)	Lee Chin-tian	(Singapore)
Lim Choo-pui	(Muar)		
Chiu Fatt	(Ipoh)		
Ko Tien-leng	(Penang)		

Sources: *The Manifesto and Resolutions of the First All-Malaya Delegates' Convention of the BMHB, 1929*, p. 9 (text in Chinese).

needs and its determination to combat communist activities locally. Last but not least, the reorganization succeeded in building up a strong nucleus of known and tried supporters while bringing in some young hopefuls who were to play a role in keeping Chinese nationalism simmering during the 1930s.

Apart from the BMHB, during the second half of 1928 the Singapore Branch was founded in the course of reorganization, as a link between the BMHB and nine subordinate sub-branches. Administrative structure of the Singapore Branch was similar to that of the BMHB with the Executive and Supervisory Committees in charge of party affairs, in coordination with the nine sub-branches. These nine sub-branches, likewise, controlled among themselves forty-one divisional sub-branches with a total membership of 1270 for January 1929.³⁴ The principle of 'Democratic Centralism' for party organization was rigidly applied in Singapore as each level of party organization was controlled by and answerable to the higher level of party organization, right through the hierarchy from divisional sub-branches to the highest BMHB. The BMHB, in turn, was to liaise with the Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT in China.

For the first time since the reorganization, the KMT membership in Singapore and Malaya was registered with the BMHB, with final endorsement to be made by the KMT in China. Documents acquired during British raids on branches in 1929 included party registers and showed the membership of eleven branches and twenty direct sub-branches from January 1929 in British Malaya.

Although the BMHB recruited some new members after January 1929, there is no evidence that a dramatic increase in membership had occurred in Malaya and Singapore between 1929 and February 1930, but it should be borne in mind that the Malayan KMT was still legally under a ban.

Regrettably British sources do not furnish any information on the composition and social origins of party membership in Malaya. However, from Goodman's report, an analysis can be made of the membership in the nine sub-branches of the KMT in Singapore in 1929. Of these nine sub-branches, the first and sixth sub-branches consisted of Hainanese members only, while the fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth and the ninth sub-branches were exclusively Cantonese in membership. Only the second and third sub-branches were mixed.³⁵ So it can be said fairly that party organization along the line of dialect grouping was one important characteristic of the KMT in Singapore.

Social origins of party members varied from one sub-branch to another. For example, in the sixth sub-branch of the KMT in Singapore,

Table 4: KMT Membership in Malaya and Singapore, January 1929

Branches	No.	Direct Sub-Branches	No.
Singapore	1,270	Kota Tinggi (Johore)	120
Muar	840	Batu Pahat (Johore)	50
Negri Sembilan	1,080	Johore Bahru (Johore)	50
Kuala Lumpur	860	Johore Bahru 10 miles	
Klang	540	(Johore)	40
Perak	1,480	Kuching (Sarawak)	120
Alor Star	370	Sibu (Sarawak)	120
Penang	820	Kulim (Kedah)	220
Malacca	460	Selama (Kedah)	170
Sungei Patani	200	Mersing (Johore)	90
Tongkah (Siam)	630	Kluang (Johore)	60
		Renggam (Johore)	70
		Segamat (Johore)	20
		Labis (Johore)	20
		Bentong (Pahang)	120
		Telok Sengat (Johore)	20
		Benut (Johore)	60
		Bukit Mertajam (Kedah)	270
		Mentakab (Pahang)	30
		Kelantan	40
		Kuala Lipis (Pahang)	50
<i>Total</i>	8,550	<i>Total</i>	1,740
<i>Grand Total</i>	10,290		

Source: NL 5937 G.D. 40 No. 212/1929, *Enclosure No. 1 to Straits Despatch 4 September 1929* on 'The Malayan General Branch of the Kuo Min Tang of China', pp. 2-3.

all seventy Hainanese members were labourers, while the seventh sub-branch had a mixed membership. Of a total membership of 122 for the seventh sub-branch, thirty-four were merchants, fifty-five labourers, twenty-one clerks, four hawkers, four teachers, and one each for farmer, newspaper editor, doctor, and orator.³⁶ The social origins of the seventh sub-branch seem to follow the general rule of party members coming from all walks of life within the Chinese community.

In Malacca, of a party membership of 810 during 1930 which spread across some ten sub-branches, 70 per cent came from commercial circles, while labourers, students and peasants constituted 10 per cent each.³⁷

Beside membership, some minor changes in status took place in relation to some direct sub-branches of the BMHB during 1929. For instance, the direct sub-branches at Klang and Johore Bahru became direct branches, which absorbed small direct sub-branches in their neighbourhood. Likewise the Bukit Mertajam sub-branch was promoted to the status of direct branch due to the increase in party membership.³⁸

Table 5: BMHB Office-bearers, 1930

Executive Committee	Supervisory Committee
Teh Lay-seng (Perak) Hokkien	Lee Chin-tian (Singapore) Hokkien
Teh Sau-peng (Klang) Hainanese	Ong Kiat-soo (Singapore) Hokkien
Teo Khai-chuan (Muar) Hokkien	Chu Chee-chiong (Singapore)
Teo Eng-hock (Singapore) Teochew	Cantonese
Chiu Fatt (Ipoh) Cantonese	Ch'an Chan-mooi (K. Lumpur)
Lim Yew-tong (K. Lumpur) Hainanese	Ho Tsz-yun
Oh Siow-yam (Malacca) Hokkien	
Png Chi-cheng (Singapore) Teochew	
Ho Ju-khoon (Penang) Cantonese	
5 Reserves	2 Reserves
Tang Tsz-sat (Seremban) Cantonese	Thye Po-chin (Perak) Hakka
Ho Sun-man (Malacca) Cantonese	Huang Chi-ch'en (Singapore)
Chee Bi-joo (Seremban)	Hainanese
Lei Yi-sin (Seremban) Hokkien	
Chia Boon-chin (Penang) Hokkien	

Sources: NL 5938 G.D. 42 No. 59/1930, *Enclosure No. 1 to Straits Settlements Secret Despatch of 25 February 1930*; *Min Kuo Jih Pao*, 13 February 1930.

During 1929, both the BMHB and the Singapore Branch of the KMT were raided on several occasions by the police and the Chinese Affairs Department, resulting in a severe curtailing of their activities. However, the BMHB leadership survived to hold a second All-Malaya Delegates' Convention in Singapore between 4 and 7 February 1930 to elect new office-bearers for the BMHB. Apart from passing various resolutions concerning Chinese politics, such as support for Chiang Kai-shek, the second Convention elected new office-bearers to the two Committees of the BMHB for 1930.

However, the KMT's perseverance and daring efforts at promoting its activities under a ban were halted by the new Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi, on 20 February 1930. On that day, he summoned the office-bearers of the BMHB to Government House, Singapore, for a meeting. He castigated and humiliated them, calling one of the delegates, Teo Eng-hock, a 'double-headed snake', demanding that they dissolve their party organizations and cease activities without delay.³⁹ The delegates put forward some ineffectual defences, but to no avail. This conference marked the end of the second phase of the KMT Movement in Malaya and Singapore, since its foundation in 1912.

It is not possible to analyze the KMT leadership at each level, for lack of both Chinese and English sources. Between October 1925 and January 1928, the so-called 'moderates' were largely well-established and well-known community leaders in towns and cities. Many of them were

merchants and traders, men of financial substance; some were school teachers and newspaper editors or journalists, the intellectuals of the Chinese community. Some of the leaders were former *T'ung Meng Hui* members, thus falling into the category of the 'old guard'. The KMT Left or 'Main School' leaders were night school teachers, union organizers and workers, men who were of lesser position and social standing in the community. Although the Hainanese figured prominently in the leadership of the 'Main School', as the British often claimed, some of the 'Main School' leaders were obviously not Hainanese. For example, the 1928 Singapore shoemakers' strikes were organized by the Cantonese and the Hakka leaders of their trade and industry, not the Hainanese. The convicted assassin of three visiting China KMT leaders in February 1928 in Singapore was a Cantonese, named Chong Yok-kai, who admitted to having been sent by the Chinese Communist Party in China for the mission.⁴⁰

The reorganization of the KMT during 1928 and the election of the office-bearers to the BMHB in 1929 (Table 3) and 1930 (Table 5) enable an analysis to be made of the KMT leadership at the highest level, such as the Standing Committee of the BMHB. This consisted of Teo Eng-hock, Teh Lay-seng and Teh Sau-peng, who made up the nucleus of the highest level of the hierarchy within the party in British Malaya.

Teo Eng-hock (1871-1958), a second-generation Straits-born Teochew and a British subject, was a founder of the *T'ung Meng Hui* branch in Singapore in 1906 and a founder of the KMT branch in Singapore in 1912. A cloth merchant and a manufacturer of rubber goods by profession, he was a man of financial substance. Teo was also a founder in 1910 of the *Tung Teh* reading room and was prominent throughout the history of this organization. The *Tung Teh* reading room was a front organization of the KMT in 1914, before the dissolution of the KMT in Singapore, and in 1924 when the KMT reorganization took place, the *Tung Teh* reading room became the third sub-branch of the Singapore KMT. From 1912, Teo was an important community leader, whose status improved considerably when Dr Sun Yat-sen, his personal friend, revived the KMT Movement in China during the 1920s. In 1926 and 1927, Teo went back to Kwangtung Province and became the Mayor of Swatow, a sea port and the birthplace of his ancestors. His social standing and influence must have been considerable, for he was recognized by the British authorities in 1925 when he was made a Justice of the Peace.⁴¹ His dedication to the KMT Movement both in China and locally and his sacrifice for its cause were unquestionable. It was in these areas that his solid contributions to the tradition and development of a China-oriented nationalism in Malaya and Singapore lay.

Teh Lay-seng (1870–1939) had been made a Justice of the Peace in Perak in 1919 by the British. Although Teh was born in T'ung An district, Fukien Province, he became a naturalized British subject after having amassed considerable wealth in Perak. He was a general merchant in Ipoh, owning branches in Parit, Bruas and Sitiawan. He was a well-established community leader, being a founder of the Perak Branch of the *T'ung Meng Hui*, the Perak Hokkien *Huay Kuan* (an association of Hokkien fellow-provincials), and the *Yu Choy* School in Ipoh.⁴² In 1920, Teh returned to Canton and held an official position under Dr Sun Yat-sen. He came back to Malaya in 1924 because his businesses were expanding in Perak and needed his management. He was regarded by the British as a 'zealous' member of the KMT and 'very influential'.⁴³ Apart from party leadership, Teh was also a founder of the *Min Kuo Jih Pao*, an overt party organ for British Malaya, published in Singapore from January 1930 until its demise in 1934.

Teh Sau-peng (1874–1938), was a China-born Hainanese, who had migrated to Malaya when young. He joined the *T'ung Meng Hui* in Klang in 1911 and became a zealous adherent of Dr Sun Yat-sen. Like many of his contemporaries and followers of Dr Sun Yat-sen, he provided generous financial assistance to the cause of revolution and reunification in China. Moreover, he was a man of action, often going out of his way to persuade his fellow countrymen to donate funds for political causes. Apart from party affairs, Teh was also a patron of Chinese schools in Kuala Lumpur and Klang, Chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Klang and President of the Klang Branch of the KMT. Contrary to the British report that Teh was 'probably a man of some substance without being wealthy or possessed of much landed property',⁴⁴ a contemporary Chinese source states that his shops spread in Klang and Kuala Lumpur, numbering some six to seven branches and that he possessed numerous rubber plantations in Selangor.⁴⁵ He had two sons and a daughter. His eldest son, Teh Sin-kwang, a graduate of Nanking University, later became a businessman in Singapore. His second son, Teh Sin-yoong, also studied in Nanking and returned to Kuala Lumpur in 1923 to become a school teacher. In 1947 Teh Sin-yoong, then Principal of the Confucian School in Kuala Lumpur, became Secretary of the *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps of Selangor, a youth organization of the Malayan KMT.

Iu Teng-chan was important until January 1929, after which he returned to China and subsequently took no part in the Malayan KMT Movement. He was a nephew of Yau Tet-ship, formerly a wealthy Chinese of Ipoh, interested in mining and general business. He was a Perak-born Hakka, then aged 26, and a graduate of the Nanking Political

College. Being a member of the Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT in Nanking, Iu was a party organizer and activist in China but was less well known locally.⁴⁶

Among the office-bearers of the BMHB for 1929 and 1930, all except four were businessmen who had significant financial stakes in the country. Iu Teng-chan was a professional party worker. Png Chi-cheng and Chia Boon-chin were newspaper editors in Singapore and Penang respectively. Png was an editor of the *Min Kuo Jih Pao*, and Chia was associated with the *Kwong Wah Yit Poh*, founded in 1910. Lei Yi-sin, a Negri Sembilan-born Hokkien, was a Chinese school teacher in Seremban.⁴⁷ Lei, aged 28, was an exceptionally talented young man, who had an excellent command of both the Chinese and English languages and could speak all the Chinese dialects then in use in Malaya.⁴⁸

At least ten of the office-bearers for 1929 and 1930 can be identified as former members of the *T'ung Meng Hui* in Malaya and Singapore. These were Teo Eng-hock, Teh Lay-seng, Teh Sau-peng, Ho Ju-khoon, Tang Tsz-sat, Huang Chi-ch'en, Ch'an Chan-mooi, Li Lien-chi, Lee Chin-tian and Ho Sun-man, who formed the nucleus of the BMHB leadership.

The list of the 1930 office-bearers of the BMHB indicates that a younger generation of KMT leaders was emerging to direct the KMT Movement. They consisted of Teo Khai-chuan, Png Chi-cheng, Oh Siow-yam, Ong Kiat-soo, Lei Yi-sin and Chu Chee-chiong. Teo Khai-chuan was born in Muar, Johore, and was an English-educated Yung-ch'un Hokkien, but proficient in the Chinese language.⁴⁹ He was a successful rubber planter, brick manufacturer, timber miller, and trader. Ong Kiat-soo was a son of Ong Kim-lian, from the T'ung An District, Fukien Province. His father was a successful businessman and was also a founder of the Singapore Branch of the *T'ung Meng Hui*. He was Chinese-educated but Singapore-born. He was active in the concerns of both the *Tung Teh* reading room and the Singapore Hokkien *Huay Kuan*, reorganized in 1929 under the leadership of Tan Kah-kee. However he was less successful as a businessman, during the period under study. Oh Siow-yam (1893-1983) migrated from Fukien Province to Batu Pahat, Johore in 1915 after having completed his secondary school education in China. He was persuaded by a local Chinese school master to join the KMT Movement in Batu Pahat. Later he moved on to Malacca, opened a hardware store and became prominently involved in the local KMT activities. He moved to Singapore during the height of the Depression in 1931 and played a crucial leadership role with Ong Kiat-soo, Lim Keng-lian, Chuang Hui-chuan and Lim Boh-seng in the revival of the KMT forces in Singapore during the 1930s. Chu Chee-chiong was a Cantonese businessman in Singapore who had been active in local party affairs and

in the activities of the *Tung Teh* reading room in the 1920s. These youngish men made up the KMT 'new guard', new in terms of their age and their lack of personal friendship with Dr Sun Yat-sen.

The KMT leadership at the highest level was dominated by the 'old guard', with the 'new guard' gradually emerging to share the power. These KMT leaders all belonged to the political 'moderates', and they shared one common objective — anti-communism. Although factionalism had emerged in 1929 and 1930, and was to become a major disruptive factor in 1931 and 1932 within the hierarchy between the so-called anti-Chiang Kai-shek and pro-Chiang Kai-shek cliques, their anti-communism united them and provided some semblance of solidarity.

Between 1925 and 1930 the KMT Movement in Malaya and Singapore had a reasonably cohesive organization in party branches, sub-branches and the various front organizations, as well as a dedicated leadership. However it seems to have fallen down in the area of ideological propaganda, because of a lack of competent party theoreticians among the members, and the effective but 'repressive' measures of mail and press censorship imposed by the British, which made propagating a coherent ideology under the 'Three Principles of the People' doubly difficult. The businessmen-cum-party leaders saw KMT ideology as essentially identical to their loyalty to the Party and Government in China and to China itself. When the China Party and Government took on an anti-foreign hue by clamouring for the abolition of unequal treaties and extra-territoriality, the Malayan and Singapore KMT members often followed suit, uttering the same sentiments.

This aspect of anti-imperialism in KMT ideology remained a nagging discomfort to the British authorities, who feared that it could be turned into something serious and sinister, capable of threatening law and order. Indeed, British authorities were able to use such evidence to their advantage on at least two occasions. The first was during the Chinese boycott of the British-owned Singapore Traction Company in the wake of the Kreta Ayer Incident of March 1927, and the second the prolonged Chinese boycott of Japanese goods, arising from the Tsinan Incident in 1928 between the Japanese Army in Shantung Province and the oncoming Northern Expedition contingents of Chiang Kai-shek. However these sporadic outbursts of xenophobia in Malaya and Singapore were never serious enough to threaten British rule. In fact there is no evidence from official KMT sources during this period to suggest that any of the anti-British utterances of the moderate KMT in Malaya were aimed at overthrowing British colonial rule. Invariably, the anti-British propaganda materials were despatched from China in response to the conditions and the nationalist temper then existing in China. Hence this

aspect of anti-British propaganda in KMT ideology was exclusively concerned with China's deep-rooted desire to achieve international equality among nations; it had nothing or little to do with British rule in Malaya and Singapore. If it had, then this was, at most, indirect. It could not be equated with advocating anti-British rule in Malaya and Singapore as the British authorities often tended to make it out to be.

While anti-British propaganda in the KMT ideology in connection with the situation in China existed, there is no denying that, from 1928, anti-communism became a crucial aspect of KMT ideology overseas. When stressing the importance of promoting the 'Three Principles of the People' for saving China and the world, the Manifesto of the first All-Malaya Delegates' Convention bluntly aimed at wiping out all 'reactionary forces', including communism.⁵⁰ In the second All-Malaya Delegates' Convention, Teh Lay-seng spoke in the same vein.⁵¹ During the Government House meeting between Sir Cecil Clementi and the seventeen KMT leaders on 20 February 1930, Teo Eng-hock, Teh Lay-seng, and Png Chi-cheng all claimed that the existence of the KMT in British Malaya was to help eliminate the 'undesirable', 'extremist' and communist elements within the Chinese community.⁵² They spoke in the name of law and order, hoping to persuade the British to see the KMT Movement in a different light. However their attempts to justify the existence of the KMT were dismissed by Sir Cecil Clementi in caustic terms.

The KMT propaganda work in Malaya and Singapore was done through various forms and methods. Party organs such as the *Yik Khuan Poh* of Kuala Lumpur, the *Kwong Wah Yit Poh* of Penang and the *Min Kuo Jih Pao* of Singapore were utilized to disseminate political ideology such as the 'Three Principles of the People', and to instil in the Chinese readers patriotic feeling for China. However, party organs suffered considerable constraints and limitations in spreading the party ideology. These included chronic financial problems and censorship by the British. Penalties for violating the censorship law were often included suspension of the publication of the paper for weeks or months, depending on the seriousness of the case. The suspension of the *Min Kuo Jih Pao's* printing licence for two months (May and June) in 1930 is a case in point. It was prompted by the paper's attack on the Japanese and its support for a continuing boycott of Japanese goods.⁵³

One effective way of disseminating propaganda was through speech-making on special occasions, such as the Days of Commemoration and the Days of Shame — a long list which included the Double Tenth and the anniversaries of the *Huanghuakang* Uprising of 29 March, the death of Dr Sun Yat-sen on 12 March, the Tsinan Incident of 3 May and the

establishment of Republican China on 1 January. In addition, each level of the party organization often utilized various Commemoration Weeks for party work, such as organization, propaganda, and training.

Finally, party members in Malaya and Singapore were consciously urged to promote the teaching of the 'Three Principles of the People' in local Chinese schools as part of the curriculum,⁵⁴ this seemingly to be the most important and ingenuous way of disseminating party ideology and indoctrinating young students. However its effectiveness was offset by British censorship of imported written materials, and the weeding out of party activist school teachers under the Registration of Schools Ordinances. But since Chinese teachers and school textbooks continued to be imported from China, the colonial Education Departments in the FMS and SS were hard put to it to check the growth and development of Chinese nationalism completely. It was difficult, if not impossible, for the British to contain and defuse the highly charged nationalism of the 1920s and 1930s, unless the Chinese school system were to be uprooted, Chinese presses banned and Chinese immigration discontinued. As the British did not then have the desire or means to tackle these crucial issues, Chinese nationalism, being part and parcel of KMT ideology, soon flared up with the advent of Sino-Japanese conflict (1928-1937) and war (1937-1945). The fact that the British made little efforts to train Malayan-oriented Chinese school teachers and to produce Malayan-oriented textbooks for Chinese schools made it more difficult to contain the process of constantly evolving Chinese nationalism.⁵⁵

What were the tangible results of the existence of the KMT Movement in Malaya and Singapore during this period and beyond?

In the short term, the KMT Movement in Malaya and Singapore did make a considerable impact. The period under study was a confused one, with the competing ideologies and organization of the KMT and the *Nanyang* Communist Party attempting to win the minds and hearts of the Chinese community, while the British were combating both these forces. Admittedly, many Chinese were confused about Chinese politics during this period, and many more harboured a real fear of British reprisals for their involvement in the activities of proscribed organizations. It should be pointed out that over 10 000 card-carrying members of the KMT, though less than one per cent of the Chinese population in British Malaya, managed to organize, propagate and raise funds for the cause of revolution and for China, knowing full well some unpalatable consequences might result. Although their efforts were frustrated by the British, the KMT succeeded in building a hard-core leadership and a reasonably viable party structure, with the BMHB at the top, ready to

answer the call of China in times of crisis and need. Had the British not restricted the KMT Movement, it is probable that the KMT would have grown by recruiting more members, organizing more and better branches, further spreading its influence in the Chinese community and becoming more firmly entrenched.

Despite the repression and the restrictions imposed on them, KMT members, through their organization and party work helped establish a China-oriented political and cultural tradition in British Malaya. This tradition was further enhanced by the constant influx of Chinese school teachers from China during this period, to preach Chinese nationalism — national pride, race survival and cultural superiority. The politicization of the Chinese through party organs and the viable Chinese school system created a generation of China-oriented Chinese, who later brought Chinese nationalism into full bloom, following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Part of the credit for this blossoming of Chinese nationalism is due to the KMT members who, during this period, led the way in maintaining Chinese schools and preaching and enhancing the political awareness that China should enjoy international equality among nations, and that she must not be allowed to wither and dissipate under foreign pressures and encroachments.

By far the most important effect of the KMT Movement in Malaya and Singapore was the contribution made by its members to the development of Chinese education. Chinese school teachers who were recruited from China tended to be KMT or nationalist in outlook. They provided the backbone of the Chinese schools in towns and villages, heralding a tremendous era of growth in Chinese education in the FMS and SS. Second, they provided political and intellectual leadership to the KMT or nationalist movement at the regional or local level. By using imported Chinese textbooks and publications on Chinese literature, history and geography, they were instrumental in promoting Chinese cultural and political nationalism. Moreover they helped raise the literary and cultural standards of the Chinese throughout British Malaya. Without them, the KMT Movement would have been considerably weakened and so would Chinese education.

One indirect but nevertheless important effect of the KMT Movement during this period was that due to the British policy of proscribing both the KMT and the *Nanyang* Communist Party (later the MCP), the political leadership of the Chinese in Singapore after 1928 fell into the hands of a loosely organized group of Chinese community leaders and non-partisan nationalists, headed by Tan Kah-kee. Being a formidable and popular figure, he was to play a substantial and highly influential role in China-oriented politics in Southeast Asia generally, and in particular in British Malaya during the 1930s.⁵⁶

The KMT Movement between 1925 and 1930 had a chequered history. Its survival despite the ban imposed by the British in October 1925, and its revival through the tragic Kreta Ayer Incident of 1927 were both remarkable. Despite the harassment and repression, the KMT managed to remain a viable and formidable political force among the Chinese in Malaya and Singapore. Although the Movement was fundamentally China-oriented, some of the local ramifications were far-reaching and beyond British control. It succeeded in promoting Chinese education, which became a constant source of inspiration for Chinese cultural and intellectual values. It helped influence the political outlook of the generation of Chinese students who were going through the Chinese schools. Its task of institutionalizing China-oriented nationalism was rendered less difficult during the looming Sino-Japanese conflicts of the 1930s, which provided constant fuel for Chinese national feelings. Moreover the political and cultural activities of the KMT members between 1925 and 1930 also helped raise political and cultural standards generally, among the Chinese in British Malaya.

The KMT Movement between 1925 and 1930 should be viewed as a continuation of the history of modern Chinese nationalism, which had begun with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The generation that grew up in China and overseas following those fateful years could not help but be affected by the continuing revolutionary upheavals, fed by internal decay and the fall of the monarchy in 1912, the rise of warlordism and external pressure resulting from Japanese encroachment in China. Although living in a foreign land, politically conscious Chinese did not relinquish their moral responsibility to effect social and political change in their homeland in the way they saw fit. The KMT Movement in British Malaya was an expression of this sense of moral responsibility and national sentiment, which in general aimed at the promotion of Chinese culture, ethnic well-being and national survival, and in particular the continuing interests in the Party and Government in China. This being so, it is interesting to examine how and why such a basically China-oriented movement as the KMT repeatedly came into conflict with the interests of British rule in Malaya and Singapore prior to World War II.

Notes

1. For full details of the May 30th incident in China, see Richard W. Rigby, *The May 30 Movement Events and Themes* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980).
2. FO 371/10935, F 5953, Secret Despatch from the Officer Adminstrating the FMS, E. S. Hose, to L. C. M. S. Amery, Colonial Office, 3 November 1925 (copy).
3. NL 5949 (Singapore) GD 36 No. 41/1927, *The Kuo Min Tang in Malaya, 1926*, p.9. *Nanyang Siang Pau*, 12 September 1925; 7 December 1925. The *Nanyang Siang Pau* identifies Phua Tin-kiap, a Hainanese, as the leader imprisoned for 12 months while

- Chan Sou-yung, a Cantonese doctor and a KMT leader of the fourth sub-branch in Singapore, was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.
4. On reading rooms and social and cultural clubs, consult C. F. Yong and R. B. McKenna, 'The Kuomintang Movement in Malaya and Singapore, 1912-1925', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12 (1981), pp. 121-3.
 5. FO 371/12456, F 2770/290/10, 'The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1926' by A. Goodman and P. T. Allen, 7 January 1927, p. 124.
 6. FO 371/13243, F 4207/154/61, *MBPI* 63 (1926), Supplementary to *MBPI* Singapore, 31 August 1928, p. 3.
 7. *Ibid.*
 8. FO 371/13243, F 2910/154/61, *MBPI* 59 (1928), p. 1.
 9. *Lat Pau*, 24 May 1927.
 10. FO 371/12456, F 2770/290/10, *op. cit.*, p. 125. Ssu Yun-feng, 'Sin-chou ch'ung-ch'iao yu chung-kuo ke-ming (1906-1927)' in *Hsin-hai ko-ming yu nan-yang hua-jen yen-tao hui lun-wen-chi* (Taipei: The Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University, 1986), pp. 324-6.
 11. CO 273/537/28053, Enclosure No. 1 to Straits Despatch of 31 August 1927, p. 1.
 12. NL 5936 (Singapore) GD 38 No. 113/1928, Enclosure to the Straits Despatch of 27 March 1928 p. 1.
 13. NL 5949 GD 36 41 1927, *The Kuo Min Tang in Malaya, 1926*, p. 7; NL 5935 GD 37 No. 397/1927, Enclosure No. 1 to FMS Despatch of 8 December 1927, pp. 9-10; also *The Malayan Bulletin of Political Intelligence* 47 (1927), p. 3. Consult also CO 273/542/52010, 'Statement of Accounts of the Nanyang General Branch of the KMT of China for the Period January 1926 to June 1927', by Tshui Kwong-siu.
 14. *Nan-yang min-jen chi-chuan* (Penang: 1928), Vol.2, No.2, p. 293.
 15. The 'Main School' was a principal executive communist organization in Malaya and Singapore in 1926 and 1927. Its members travelled from place to place, lecturing, teaching, organizing trade unions and night schools. They were said to have utilized night schools as the headquarters for their political activities. In any event, the 'Main School' could be said to be a forerunner of the *Nanyang* Communist Party, founded in January 1928. The British claimed that the 'Main School' was dominated by the Hainanese, an assertion that has yet to be verified.
 16. CO 273/537/28053, Enclosure No. 1... 31 August 1927 (see Note 11), p. 2.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
 18. CO 273/537/28053, Enclosure to Straits Despatch of 16 February 1927, p. 4.
 19. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 23. FO 371/13243/5518, Supplement to the *MBPI*, No. 63, 31 August 1928, p. 4.
 24. *Lat Pau*, 24 May 1927; FO 371/13243/154, *MBPI* 54 (1927), p. 4, Item 370.
 25. CO 273/537/28053, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
 26. NL 5936 GD 38 No. 113/1928, Enclosure... 27 March 1928, (see above), pp. 1-2.
 27. NL 5936 GD 39 No. 254/1928, Enclosure to Straits Despatch of 26 July 1928, p. 3.
 28. *Ibid.*
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 4. *Manifesto and Resolutions of the First All-Malaya Delegates Convention of the BMHB, 1929*, p. 2. Thanks must go to Mr Chui Kuei-chiang of the National University of Singapore, for locating this invaluable document containing the proceedings, resolutions and manifesto of the BMHB Convention (text in Chinese).
 30. *Nanyang Siang Pau*, 23 June 1928.

31. *Manifesto and Resolutions of the First All-Malaya Delegates' Convention of the BMHB*, 1929, pp. 2-4
32. *Ibid.*, p. 3
33. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
34. NL 5937 GD 40 No. 212/1929, Enclosure No. 1 to Straits Despatch of 4 September 1929, on 'The Malayan General Branch of the *Kuo Min Tang* of China', p. 2.
35. NL 5937 GD 40 No. 212/1929, Enclosure No. 1 to Straits Despatch of 4 September 1929, p. 4.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
37. FO 371/16228/2437, *Activities of the Kuomintang in Malaya*, 9 March 1932, with an Enclosure, 'Report on *Tang* Affairs of the Malacca Direct Branch', by Sim Hung-pek, dated 19 November 1931, p. 2.
38. NL 5937 GD 41 No. 313/1929, Enclosure No. 1 to Straits Despatch of 14 December 1929, p. 3.
39. FO 371/14728, F 2082, Enclosure No. 2, 'Conference Held at Government House, Singapore, on 20th February 1930 at 2.30 p.m.', pp. 1-10.
40. *MBPI* 57 (1928), pp. 2-3.
41. *Nanyang Siang Pau*, 6 January 1925.
42. *Nanyang Min-jen chi-chuan* (Penang, 1925), Vol. 3, p. 372. See also Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), for further biographical information on Teh Lay-seng and other 'old guard' KMT/community leaders.
43. CO 273/542/52010, 'Interim Report of the Activities of the *Kwok Man Tong* in the FMS During 1928 with Reference to Similar or Hostile Organizations', by P. T. Allen, dated 6 July 1928, p. 18.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
45. *Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan* (Penang: 1925), Vol. 2, p. 39.
46. CO 273/542/52010, Interim Report, p. 18.
47. *Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan* (Penang: 1928), Vol.2, No.2, p. 359.
48. Chen Pe-ping, 'Clementi and an Episode of the KMT History', *International Times* 94 (1968), p. 21 (text in Chinese).
49. *Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan* (Penang: 1929), Vol. 4, p. 64.
50. *Manifesto and Resolutions of the First All-Malaya Delegates' Convention of the BMHB*, 1929, p. 21.
51. *Min Kuo Jih Pao*, 11 February 1930.
52. NL 5938 GD 42 No. 59/1930, 'Minutes of a Conference held at Government House, Singapore, on 20 February 1930, Between Sir Cecil Clementi and 17 BMHB Leaders', pp. 4, 6 and 8.
53. *Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs* 7 (1930), p. 50.
54. *Manifesto and Resolutions of the First All-Malaya Delegates' Convention of the BMHB*, 1929, p. 7.
55. *150 Years of Education in Singapore* (Singapore: Teachers' Training College Publications Board, 1969), p. 33.
56. C. F. Yong, *Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 128-297.

Grappling with the KMT: The Divided 'Colonial Mind', 1925-1930

In the eventful phase of the Malayan KMT Movement's development between 1925 and 1930 the climate created by Chiang Kai-shek's successes in China and British imperial policy towards the new KMT Government revealed divisions in official policy in Malaya about the management of Malayan Chinese nationalism. The Secretaries for Chinese Affairs in Malaya wrote quarterly reports on the Malayan KMT which disclose their 'colonial minds' more clearly than the sporadic memoranda of their predecessors in the Chinese Protectorates. The colonial mind of such officials was first revealed by Hare in 1896; in the 1920s Beatty, Chapman, Goodman and Allen revealed their 'colonial minds' and their increasing influence on policy decisions. The inexperience of Guillemard and the 'vacillations' of his successor Clifford ensured that the influence of the Chinese Affairs staff on policy planning and decisions reached unprecedented heights, despite the well developed 'colonial minds' of these Governors. The thinking of the Governors had been presented in their memoranda to the CO on a regular basis. The influence of the thinking of the Chinese Affairs officials was a newer phenomenon.

'Colonial mind' implies at least three aspects of colonial rule in Malaya — economic, political and ethical. Colonial economic capability and success depended on unchallenged political authority which helped to create the sort of social and political stability required by colonial rulers. The ethical considerations presupposed the supremacy of European secular or Christian ethics over indigenous socio-religious values. Colonial paternalistic attitudes meant that indigenous populations were deemed inferior. Thus colonial minds were implicitly racist. In the political arena, because British power needed to be supreme, anything which threatened law and order had to be stamped out. This was achieved by either legislation or force. In this context the 'colonial mind' worked naturally against organized party activism, particularly that of the KMT and MCP but not, it might be noted, against the (European) Fascist Party in Malaya, an obscure political party which had existed in the 1920s. Unfortunately there is no new light which can be thrown on its leadership, ideology and organization to this day.

Officials dealing with Malay affairs had very often developed a great respect for and romantic attachment to Malay culture. By contrast a sympathetic understanding of Chinese culture and political aspirations, let alone a romantic attachment to Chinese life, was rare indeed among British officials in Malaya. In this sort of unsympathetic climate Malayan KMT adventurism ran hand-in-hand with Malayan official misadventure.

Because the Malayan KMT Movement became entangled with the fortunes of the China KMT, the former soon became a source of international contention between China and Britain and a source of domestic contention between London and Malaya. The FO's view was that British influence in China must not be impeded by Malayan domestic decisions. Malayan officials thought that the slightest indecision on the part of the Malayan Government in controlling the Malayan KMT would have disastrous results. The Malayan KMT would surface and expand its influence and subversion, a view discounted by the FO.

From the imposition of the ban in October 1925 until April 1927, Sir Laurence Guillemard presided over British Malaya, having had his term of office extended by two years beyond the customary five, an arrangement mutually agreeable to both the CO and Guillemard. It had little, if anything, to do with the management of Malayan Chinese nationalism, though apparently putting the lid on the latter was a point in Guillemard's favour. His extended term seems to have derived partly from his success in manoeuvring the CO's decentralization policy past the extended, determined opposition of the prestigious old Malaya hand, the Chief Secretary of the FMS, William Maxwell.¹ Another factor was that there was no successor acceptable to everyone at the CO who was thought able to manage the new decentralization policy without difficulty. Clifford's name was considered in 1925 but some saw him as too opinionated and wilful for the job at that time.

However when Guillemard's term finally ended in April 1927 it was Clifford, then Governor of Ceylon, who did succeed him.² Clifford, the 'old Malaya hand', a cultivated, but still paternalistic writer and scholar, should have been returning in glory to his beloved Malaya which had held such a special place in his heart. Tragically this glittering prize was to trickle like dross between his fingers in two brief years. Born in March 1866 into a Catholic family of landed gentry with a long history of service to the crown when that was permitted to Catholic nobles, Clifford was drawn into the colonial service by the death of his father, and by family connections with Sir Frederick Weld, then Governor of the SS. In 1883, at 17, Clifford made his first contact with Malaya, a connection that was

to last until 1903 with some interruptions due to illness. It was a glamorous, successful period.³ Despite this auspicious beginning Clifford's later career did not go exactly as he would have liked. He had to wait twenty-four years before he could once again sign himself Hugh Clifford, MCS (Malayan Civil Service). Not too much should be made of CO or FO hostility to his appointment, his policies or his personality. Records show that antagonizing or irritating Whitehall mandarins was an occupational hazard of being a colonial governor at any time. However Whitehall could and did interfere with career prospects, and Clifford was no different from others in this respect.

In relation to Clifford's management of the Malayan Chinese community two things, among others, need to be noted. Evidence now shows that he was a man at the end of his psychological and perhaps physical tether in 1927 and the complexities of Chinese nationalism and the question of divided loyalties were too demanding for him to resolve in the liberal, humane way that was natural to him. The second point is that despite his courtesy and consultation with the Chinese community and his obvious early sympathy with their aspirations — much in the mode of Young — he was, like Young, authoritarian and paternalistic on questions of where loyalty lay. In his view, loyalty was due to the British authorities in Malaya and when that code was infringed punishment would be handed down.

The irony is that the experienced colonial administrator came to depend, through frailty, as much on the officials of the Chinese Affairs Departments as his predecessor had done through inexperience. Chinese Affairs Departments grew both in size and prestige in the years 1925–1930.⁴ While it became the fount of all political control of the Malayan Chinese it continued to monitor socio-economic life as in the past. At times there were attempts to increase or tighten the watch over labour, domestic servants having to register yet again in 1925 for example. But the significant function of the Chinese Affairs Departments in relation to the KMT was the extension of ideological control over the Malayan Chinese community.

The change of guard at Government House was prefigured by a change of guard in Orchard Road in 1926. Beatty and Chapman retired from the Chinese Affairs Departments in 1926, Beatty having been made a C.M.G. in 1925, on Guillemard's recommendation that his record deserved the same honour as that given to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs in Hong Kong.⁵

Goodman succeeded Beatty as Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, and Allen succeeded Chapman in the FMS. Allen was Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, during the passage of the Schools Ordinances in

1920. He brought a pragmatic and analytical mind to bear on Malayan Chinese problems and a more realistic understanding of the political power and influence of moderate KMT leadership than Goodman. He was therefore able to be more flexible in changing his attitudes about political control without appearing inconsistent as Goodman often did. While the power of the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs increased in this period so did their workload, for from 1927 they were required to present quarterly reports on the KMT for the CO.

In time these came to supersede the value of the *MBPI* as a source of political intelligence on the Chinese community. The Malayan Bureau of Political Intelligence and the Special Branch of the Police, together with the Directors General of Education and Labour, continued to function as support institutions in carrying out the policy of political control. However, the governing institutions for ideological control were the Chinese Affairs Departments.

The mechanisms at their disposal were those constructed in earlier years, especially those created by Guillemard's administration such as the Schools Ordinances, the Printing Press Ordinance and, above all, the ban on the KMT policed under the Societies Ordinance as a joint effort by Chinese Affairs and the Special Branch. Amendments were made to the Schools Ordinances in 1925 and 1927⁶ extending government power to close schools perceived to be being used for 'unlawful purposes', irrespective of the number of pupils and/or teachers, thus removing a loophole in the original legislation as far as the authorities were concerned.

An amendment to the FMS Societies Ordinance in 1927 was made, according to the legal adviser, Mr W. S. Gibson, to ensure that benefit societies said to be infiltrated by KMT activists were run for the benefit and not the detriment of their subscribers.⁷ To this end he drew attention to the two new clauses: No. 4 (vi) which said a benefit society *per se* could not be refused registration, and clause No. 9 which required that a society's accounts be rendered on demand for official inspection. Failure to comply or to lodge an appeal against the requirement meant dissolution of the society. Coupled with other extant clauses, which threatened closure where undefined activities perceived to be prejudicial to the good order in any FMS state occurred, the latter clause brought the FMS legislation in line with the SS Ordinance, as a means of closing KMT front organizations in the FMS.

In 1928 an amendment was made to the SS Seditious Publications Bill which was aimed at stopping the flow of educational material and propaganda from China which sought to control Malayan Chinese vernacular education, run mostly by moderate KMT elements or

community leaders.⁸ Interference by the Chinese Government in Malayan education was influential in changing Allen's mind about policy towards the Malayan KMT, and amendments to the Seditious Publications Bill reflect this.

Following up on Guillemard's initiative, an attempt was made by Clifford to control immigration. Legislation was drafted in 1927, but was never signed by Clifford despite early apparent support for it. This legislation sought to control immigration into the FMS and to stop Singapore being used as a filter to weed out undesirables before they got to the FMS.⁹ The reasons for not proceeding with the legislation included (a) Clifford's lack of drive and increasing hesitancy in administrative matters during 1929; (b) moves by the FO to recognize the Nanking Government; and (c) objections to the legislation voiced by the Nanking Government.¹⁰

Within the framework of the old, tried and true, but refurbished mechanisms and institutions, new policy rationales and imperatives appeared. These were more ramified, both domestically and internationally, needing at the same time more subtle but more assertive solutions than was common in past Chinese affairs management.

Malayan officials from 1920 were faced with two serious problems. One they recognized and dealt with. This was the need to give precedence to Malay interests which found expression in the decentralization issue, recruitment of more Malays in the subsidiary arms of government, legislation to protect or redistribute land to Malays and the establishment of nominated commoner Malays to the Federal Council.

The second problem, which some of the British could not, or would not recognize, was the changing demographic profile, changing political and cultural sophistication and the changing needs of the one-time immigrant Chinese population. It was the interaction of these two problems during Guillemard's administration which created difficulties for him. It is not unfair to say that he regarded the 1925 ban on the KMT as a necessary implement to get rid of the Chinese problem, while he settled the more important problems of Malay States administration and the general economic welfare of British Malaya, in which the Chinese commercial community was still an integral part.

It was the communist-dominated nationalist activists who caused concern even after the imposition of the ban, as Guillemard's contacts with the British consular and NEI authorities in Batavia in 1926 indicate.¹¹ Guillemard suggested a joint intelligence network, operating between Malaya and the NEI to control the passage of communist activists crossing from the NEI, where there was a strong anti-Dutch nationalist movement, to Hong Kong and China where the 'subversives'

made contact with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), then the organizational power within the KMT. Guillemard's obsession with communist subversion was not unnatural in the current climate, nor was his need to build up allies against it in Malaya a reflection of his sense of dissatisfaction with the efficacy of the ban. In August 1925 he had drafted but did not promulgate legislation which gave the Governor-in-Council special powers in times when unspecified danger threatened.¹² In his despatch to the CO he argued that recent events in Hong Kong made it essential that governments were *prepared* to deal with times of stress rather than wait till disorder erupted. The provisions of the Bill, with punitive clauses which covered communications, censorship, detentions, deportations and sequestration of property, seem to be a repetition of the Martial Law, proclaimed by Sir Arthur Young during World War I.

Guillemard's policy to annihilate KMT activity in Malaya was set back. From the beginning of 1926 evidence accumulated in reports from his Secretaries for Chinese Affairs that the KMT was defying the ban, reorganizing clandestine branches and that community leaders such as Teo Eng-hock were in China taking up official positions in banking and Overseas Chinese Associations.¹³ Throughout 1926 money continued to be sent from clandestine branches to China, and delegates from Malaya attended the KMT conference in Canton in August 1927. A proposed commemoration of the first anniversary of the death of Sun Yat-sen in March 1926 however did not take place because police raided the night schools where the vernacular school teachers had initiated the proposal for a commemoration. Interwoven with this activism were attempts to continue anti-Japanese boycotts and harassment of Chinese dealing with Japanese goods. In January 1927 when the CO enquired whether it was still desirable to maintain the ban on the KMT, Guillemard stated that it was essential. His grounds were that the British had adopted a policy of checking the spread of 'subversive' propaganda and of preventing "the formation of any political societies the existence of which in Malaya might lead to local disorder".¹⁴ It was at this time that the Fascist Party in Malaya was not deemed to be a threat to disorder.

If 1926 saw a peaceful flouting of the British ban by the KMT, 1927 was to bring more expert defiance and violence on the part of the KMT, just when Guillemard least needed it, at the close of his term of office. A large commemoration of the second anniversary of the death of Sun was arranged to take place in the Happy Valley Stadium by moderate nationalist and KMT leaders, with the consent of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Goodman. He granted permission on the understanding that there would be no political speech-making during the memorial service. The 'Main School', mainly teacher activists disarranged the

agreement by politicizing it and moving the crowd from Happy Valley on to the streets to a final congregation in front of the Kreta Ayer police station. There, an understaffed and ill-prepared police contingent finally fired on the over-excited crowd, killing six Chinese. An inquiry was instituted and Guillemard eventually telegraphed its findings to the CO after twelve sitting days.¹⁵ The verdict was noncommittal, and according to Guillemard unsatisfactory, because while it stated that the six men had met their deaths from gun-shot wounds, it failed to justify the need to fire on the crowd. Guillemard preferred the view of Braddell, Counsel acting for the Consul-General for China and the injured, that the assembly was unlawful and what the police had done was to fire on an unlawful assembly. The jury of three Chinese and two Europeans must have thought that Braddell, by such interpretation, was hardly representing the best interests of his clients.

The Kreta Ayer affair shocked the moderate nationalists as well as the Straits-born, and alienated many sympathies from the KMT. It prompted Guillemard to issue a statement saying that the Chinese community "now being quiet", he would hold no further enquiries because no further evidence would be offered. For the time being, the CO accepted Guillemard's assessment but requested that in future quarterly reports on the KMT from the Chinese Affairs Departments should be forwarded with the Governor's memoranda.¹⁶

In the final months of his tenure Guillemard faced something of a dilemma. As an outgoing Governor he needed to show that he had been successful. Managing the KMT was an integral part of the broader responsibility of managing the Malayan community. He needed the ban on the KMT, and to justify his retention of it, he had to show that Chinese politicization endangered stable government. But he did not need strikes by Malayan Chinese labour ("imitating Hong Kong and Canton") to drive this home; still less, violent demonstrations which indicated that his much vaunted ban was ineffective. He had been driven to play down labour unrest in February 1926. Now he had to try to sweep the Kreta Ayer affair under the carpet, in April, on the pretext that Malayan KMT extremists were not supported by the 'parent' Chinese Government.¹⁷ However the discussions rumbled on in diplomatic protest to London and in the first despatch of the new Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford.

For his Secretaries for Chinese Affairs and for the FO and the CO, Clifford was something of a problem. Clifford, who has been said to have been at home nowhere but in Malaya came to a strange house in 1927.¹⁸ His changes of policy, *volte-face* according to the FO, need to be put in perspective. At the time of his arrival, in the backwash of the Kreta Ayer

affair, his views were the opposite of his advisers on Chinese affairs. The KMT, under a ban for nearly two years, had survived with an increased membership and branches to some extent dominated by a radical element capable of creating violent demonstrations to achieve its ends. This was the advisers' interpretation

Clifford had a different view, initially expressed in his official criticism of the management of the Kreta Ayer outbreak and the way permission had been given for it in the first place, an attack which unnerved Goodman. There is a consistent thread running through Clifford's statements in his two years of office which needs to be distinguished from the changing policy recommendations which caught most attention. Briefly, whenever Clifford made apparent accommodations to either Chinese political aspirations or to FO requirements, later he always qualified his liberality or acquiescence.

Clifford's first memorandum to London in August 1927¹⁹ broke new ground by expressing reservations about the feasibility of using a ban on the KMT as a means of political control, but he did not recommend its removal. Clifford thought it illogical that a ban should be imposed on the KMT with the prospect of a KMT Government being formed in China. Moreover, the ban would drive the party underground, increasing radical domination and enfeebling valuable moderate influence on Chinese nationalism. In a sturdy defence of tolerance, which he was never to repeat, he said it was reasonable for Malayan Chinese to express deeply held national sentiments and to have political passions. But Clifford's tolerance was firmly embedded in classical colonial theories of divide and rule, and proper obedience to constituted British laws. He advocated using moderate nationalist community leaders to off-set radical political influence. He stated that the proper public role of the Chinese in Malaya lay in their economic contribution and conformity to British laws. To achieve this he recommended that unsuitable Chinese immigrants could be barred, not by restricting immigration *per se*, but by the exclusion of the Hainanese who had been the most 'subversive' and more prone to 'abuse the hospitality offered them by the Malayan Governments than ... any other section of the Chinese population'. These remarks indicate that within a few weeks of his arrival Clifford had familiarized himself with Beatty's approach to Chinese affairs as well as with the ideas of eminent Chinese.²⁰

These issues were publicly raised in Clifford's first address to the Legislative Council in Singapore on 10 October 1927, with the same mixture of apparent liberality and authority.²¹ While acknowledging the valuable role the Chinese had played in the economic development of British Malaya and the stake they had acquired in the country, both

historically and currently, he presented a clear warning. 'We are entitled,' he said, 'to insist upon those who seek the hospitality of our shores conforming to our laws and to our conception of what constitutes good and worthy citizenship; and the Government of the Straits Settlements will allow no purely economic considerations to deter it from taking every possible measure to ensure that this hospitality, so generously extended, is not abused.' The mixture of sympathy and discipline is in the line of Sir Arthur Young, very different from Guillemard's dismissive restraints, but still not a recommendation for unlimited tolerance, as his announcement of contingent legislation to restrict immigration, in this speech, warned.²²

He repeated similar ideas about the Chinese more briefly in the Federal Council on 16 November 1927,²³ referring to Chinese capitalists and traders, and somewhat lyrically to 'hosts of sturdy Chinese coolies' being able to go about their lawful business in peace and quiet under British rule. Curiously he referred to the Chinese, inaccurately, as the 'majority of the indigenous inhabitants of British Malaya', an odd echo of an earlier official's remark that (presumably) transient migrant Chinese should make Malaya their 'home'.²⁴

In this same speech Clifford revealed that his colonial paternalism was not limited to the Chinese but applied just as much to the Malays, however much he felt at one with them. He stated baldly that grafting democratic institutions on to Malay society would bring not peace but the sword, would spread disorder like an infection and submerge the indigenous peoples (meaning the Malays this time) in the more numerous 'other races', a clear indication that Chinese nationalism and/or the KMT must be controlled not only for economic reasons and loyalty to British rule, but to ensure the protection of the Malays.

So it is not surprising to find Clifford writing to the CO in the following year that it was the Malay rulers and people who needed protection from Chinese socio-economic and political assertiveness and the agents of the Nanking Government operating in Malaya.²⁵ This advice derived from a combination of Clifford's inherent authoritarianism, already commented on and accumulated advice from his Secretaries for Chinese Affairs describing a resurgent and increasingly aggressive Malayan KMT. This was seen as dividing a Chinese population at the mercy of gratuitous interference from the Nanking Government in Malayan domestic and cultural affairs. The role and analysis of the Chinese advisers is discussed more fully below; here we need to be aware of its growing impact on Clifford's thinking.

Clifford's initial goodwill towards Chinese nationalism, if not the KMT, had seemed very sensibly based. He had tried to extend his

understanding and improve his management of the Chinese in Malaya by making a personal request to Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister in Peking, for copies of the Legation's 'authoritative' reports on Chinese matters.²⁶ He needed first-hand information because he did not trust what 'filtered down' in Malaya as accurate, either as descriptions of events in China or their impact on Malayan Chinese.

In March 1928 he had advised the CO that recognition of the Malayan KMT would be imprudent, antagonizing the wealthy, law-abiding Chinese in Malaya who were nonetheless devoted to the nationalist aims of unifying an independent China. As things stood, these people could legitimately hold themselves aloof from a reprehensible, banned organization while adhering to their nationalist sympathies. Having said that, Clifford proceeded to address matters from a different angle, advising that repressive hostility by Malayan authorities to legitimate nationalist attachments would antagonize 'thoughtful' Chinese who had a stake in British Malaya. He was in fact describing two sets of opinion from eminent Chinese in this complicated advice; one derived from his 'old friend' Lim Boon-keng, then Vice Chancellor of Amoy University, a KMT stalwart of early days; and the other from British-oriented community and commercial leaders such as Song Ong-siang who, while concerned for China's position in the world, would have given a more anti-KMT interpretation of Malayan Chinese sentiments.

Differences of Chinese opinion aside, Clifford stood out from among his contemporaries in recognizing that cultural attachment to China was *not* a question of divided loyalties for most Chinese in Malaya, who had no desire to see British rule overthrown. After March 1928 most Chinese energies and finances in Malaya were directed towards supporting Chiang Kai-shek, giving succour to victims in China of the Tsinan Incident in Shantung Province, and as an off-shoot of that, attacking the Japanese in Malaya through violence, boycotts and harassment of Malayan Chinese who dealt with Japanese goods. Between 1920 and 1930 the Chinese in Malaya were among the most substantial contributors to China's cause.

Despite his approach to Lampson in November 1928, Clifford had come to rely more upon the advice of his Secretaries for Chinese Affairs as the 'kaleidoscopic' developments in Chinese affairs gathered momentum and became increasingly ramified internationally. The same set of events in China which contributed to the rejuvenation of the Malayan KMT and to FO decisions to recognize the Nanking Government had a detrimental effect on Clifford's thinking. The start of the Northern Expedition in July 1926, the expulsion of the communists in 1927, the Tsinan affair in 1928, and the assumption of control of overseas Chinese

affairs by the Nanking Government as a political right, all eroded Clifford's tolerance of nationalism and allowed the authoritarian side of his nature freer rein. But in July 1928 there is no evidence that the advice he offered the CO was erratic.

In his July 1928 despatch²⁷ he argued that it was impossible to recognize the Malayan KMT while it was being used by the Nanking Government to create a virtual *imperium in imperio* in Malaya. The Nanking Government coerced Malayan Chinese into membership, competing with British authorities in the domestic management of the Malayan Chinese and attempting to exert diplomatic pressure from Nanking on the Malayan Government to make it accede to demands for recognition of the Malayan KMT.²⁸

Between July and November 1928, when Clifford had conversations with F. Gwatkin at the FO while on leave in London, two important things happened. Nanking institutionalized its interference in Malayan affairs with the establishment of the Overseas Education Bureau and adoption of the *jus sanguinis* principle as official policy. And second, the Malayan KMT established the first British Malayan Head Branch (BMHB), its nine directors chosen by Nanking, according to Clifford.

Pressure from his Malayan advisers to maintain the ban and from the FO and the CO to lift it, would have tried the skills of an administrator in his prime, let alone one said to be psychologically exhausted.²⁹ This condition was not evident in his July despatch. There Clifford acknowledged that 'the maintenance of the ban . . . will be beset by difficulties' even while the domestic need for it remained, if Nanking became the recognized government of China, a conclusion he put even more clearly to Gwatkin during a visit to the FO in November 1928.³⁰ In that conversation, Gwatkin recorded Clifford as saying that he would then have no alternative but to remove the ban.

While the records used to date show only Gwatkin's minutes of that important meeting, it is difficult to believe that the FO exaggerated Clifford's acquiescence beyond all recognition. Gwatkin records him as saying that if the ban were lifted, he (Clifford) would have to hope "for the best . . . that the *Kuomintang* would behave itself". On the Malayan Government's reasons for needing the ban, Clifford agreed that the communist factor no longer obtained, but that the objections of the Straits-born to recognition of the KMT remained and that objectors were intimidated into remaining quiet. What the minutes show apart from Clifford's reluctance is that he had no long-term plan for dealing with the KMT without a ban and that his management of the complex problem was becoming characterized by reaction rather than initiative.

This is borne out by the fact that after his return to Malaya at the end of

December 1928 he completely reversed his position, recommending harsh measures against Malayan KMT branches to the consternation of the CO and the FO. Responding to moves from the FO to remove the ban, in January 1929, Clifford wrote a long and repetitive memorandum announcing that the time for 'passive toleration' of the KMT had now passed and repressive measures were needed to prevent the Malayan KMT, under control of Nanking, from becoming a threat to the future of British rule in Malaya.³¹ He put the problem squarely in the Malayan domestic context, dismissing pressure from China on behalf of the Malayan branches as irrelevant since the Malayan Chinese themselves, in his estimation, did not want the KMT legalized. The crux of the problem was the attempt by Nanking to create an *imperium in imperio* in Malaya by intimidating the Malayan Chinese into obedience to Nanking's policies, a tactic to which he said the Chinese were particularly susceptible, an unusual piece of coarseness on Clifford's part.

This advice by itself was not aberrant since it contained arguments Clifford had presented before and as recently as November 1928 in London. What was aberrant was the reversal of, first, understandings he gave in London, at such short notice, and then the logic which had informed his first advice to London in 1927. British authority and prestige, as in 1927, were still endangered by failure of governments to act consistently against the Malayan KMT only now it was harshness not tolerance that would remedy the situation. The principle of divide and rule remained, by the radical means of removing the KMT, while 'having no desire to thwart or suppress national sentiment among the Chinese in Malaya' provided it did not conflict with the laws of the land. Thirdly, the fact that Clifford took the problem of the Malayan KMT out of the international context at that particular time was aberrational and justifies the FO's outrage and description of his memorandum as a '*volte-face*'.

Some interesting reasons lie behind the timing of Clifford's 1929 memorandum. One has its basis in the Tsinan Incident and the subsequent creation of a broad-spectrum Shantung Relief Fund, under the leadership of the non-aligned Tan Kah-kee. This activity had the tolerance, if not the blessing, of the Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, Mr R. Ingham, since it was concerned with relief of distress in Shantung Province and not anti-British political activism in Malaya. But in October 1928 Goodman returned from leave, found the Fund flourishing and decided to crack down on it. Clifford in the meantime set sail for London; but on his return he found Goodman back in the saddle and in a stern mood, a frame of mind echoed by his colleague in the FMS, P. T. Allen. Together, the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs composed a memorandum which supported Clifford's new approach to the KMT.

This memorandum was sent as an enclosure to London to reinforce Clifford's advice.³²

So what was the role and influence of the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs in formulating policies for political control of the Chinese between 1925 and 1930 when Clementi arrived as Governor? The broad answer is that they had a profound effect on policy decisions in that period. The evidence for this conclusion can be found in the quarterly reports they wrote for the CO and in the rationales they adduced to support their recommendations for retaining the ban. The broad application of that policy was a divide and rule tactic with selective application of punitive measures, not because their Governor had recommended this in his first communication, but because they themselves saw it as the most practical way of enforcing the ban without causing major economic or racial problems. Clifford was wrong in 1929 to stigmatize this approach as 'passive toleration'; it was neither passive nor tolerant. Nor was it entirely successful or satisfactory to the Secretaries themselves by the end of 1928.

There had been a divergence of views between Allen and Goodman about the management of the Malayan KMT before 1929. In 1929, some of the differences had disappeared and they acted jointly in a conference held in Hong Kong in November 1929 to discuss the problem of the Malayan KMT. When Allen and Goodman became Secretaries for Chinese Affairs in the FMS and the SS in 1926, they were heirs to a mood of unity of purpose about the need to restrict Chinese political activity in Malaya and the method for achieving this — which might be called a 'united colonial mind' between the Governor, Guillemard, and his advisers Beatty and Chapman.

When Goodman succeeded Beatty in the SS he had already produced two memoranda which revealed his 'colonial mind': one on education in 1921 and the other on anarchism in 1925. These showed him to be the legitimate successor of Beatty in many ways, including his inheritance of the bias against the Hainanese who were regarded as the source of all disruption.

Until Beatty and Chapman retired in 1926 it seemed the ban had dampened KMT activity. However a joint report by Goodman and Allen, written in January 1927³³ shows that during 1926 the KMT in both the FMS and the SS had steadily regrouped with an 'accelerated trend' to the left, and that Protectorate officials were monitoring these activities and instigating punitive action against the night schools, reading rooms, and persons in the front organizations, as well as tightening up the censorship of literature. The report recommended retaining the ban in response to CO queries about its continuing necessity. Two main reasons

were given for this advice. First, recognizing the KMT would legalize the creation of an *imperium in imperio* in Malaya. Second, Rule 80 of the KMT Constitution, obliging activists to create front organizations, for example in labour, would endanger the economic future of Malaya and thus make the continued existence of the KMT incompatible with law and order in Malaya.³⁴

Goodman's analysis of the Chinese community in Malaya is revealing. He simply divided the community into 'respectable' Chinese with no connection with the KMT and those radical activists, mainly Hainanese, who were anti-capitalist and proto-communist. Thus his permission to allow the 1927 commemoration of Sun Yat-sen's death to be organized by (unrecognized) moderate KMT leaders seems less illogical. There was also a hidden problem on this occasion beyond Goodman's control. The moderate KMT and other leaders who had gained consent from the Protectorate to run the function provided it was apolitical did not intend to inform the radical elements in the KMT of this proviso, or to cooperate with them in any way. Thus misjudgement on one side and dishonesty on the other created a violent 'collision' in the community and a veiled reprimand from the new Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, in official circles.

Goodman ran a two-tier drive against the Malayan KMT after 1925. At one level he maintained strict punitive supervision of the more radical elements within the KMT organization, such as the reading rooms, Hainanese night schools, labour unions and vernacular Chinese schools. At a second level he adopted a policy of strict supervision without punitive action of some KMT branches which he believed to be controlled by the KMT moderates.

Goodman's concern about the reprehensible elements within the KMT was also based on his fear that these KMT organizations might fall into the hands of the KMT Left, then known as the 'Main School' cadres. These 'Main School' cadres resorted to intimidatory tactics in membership drives and in labour organization; hence the need to maintain the ban on the KMT despite protests from Nanking and concern in London. To him, even a moderate Chiang Kai-shek Government presented a danger, because 'the object of the *Kuo Min Tang* is always to keep the person of Chinese race a Chinese national, to make him look toward China'.³⁵ Goodman's assessment in this case was accurate, as the Nanking Government institutionalized the *jus sanguinis* principle concerning the Chinese nationality in China and overseas, in 1928.

Goodman had to tread carefully in 1927 after the Kreta Ayer affair. His influence was restricted to making his position (for keeping the ban) clear and well supported in the face of Clifford's new approach, at the

same time putting into practice his policy of selective toleration. On the face of it that policy was based on a very thorough investigation of what was going on in the Malayan Chinese community, even if the analysis was faulty. At this stage the divisions in the 'colonial mind' were clearcut and three-way. Goodman was out of step with his colleague in the FMS and out of step with his Governor, a state of affairs which never improved. Clifford was unable to understand the purpose of Goodman's selective toleration which was to contain organized nationalist activity within the constraints provided by the ban, to prevent animosity from the Straits-born and other pro-British Chinese who were nevertheless interested in China's future. In any case no government could contemplate banishing the whole Chinese workforce simply because it held nationalist sympathies. Clifford failed to appreciate this. Even when he himself had changed his mind, he continued to stigmatize Goodman's policy wrongly as 'passive toleration'.

Goodman went on leave in 1928 and R. Ingham became Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS. Ingham followed in Goodman's footsteps by exercising selective toleration. He kept the SS KMT branches under control but allowed a non-partisan leader, Tan Kah-kee, to head the Shantung Relief Fund. Under Ingham's régime a new Chinese nationalism flourished, with fund-raising campaigns and boycott of Japanese goods all over Malaya. However, when Goodman returned in October 1928 the damage had been done. Goodman forced the Shantung Relief Fund to wind up its activities, but allowed the reorganized KMT in Malaya to continue to exist, now controlled by the British Malaya Head Branch of the KMT. Once again Goodman underestimated the determination and leadership of moderate KMT leaders to organize themselves in the wake of the successful unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek. Goodman did not believe the KMT moderates were a threat. He argued that they lacked community status, and therefore had no ability to influence the Chinese community in any substantial way,³⁶ adding that many old members of the TMH and the earlier KMT had not joined the re-vamped KMT because it no longer had the cachet of the original nationalist movement. Despite these views about the new KMT organization and leadership, he maintained that the KMT ban could not be lifted since interference in Malayan affairs came from the Nanking Government and not from a 'foreign' political party like the Malayan KMT.

From the beginning of 1929, his analysis of the Malayan KMT marked critical divisions in the 'colonial mind' between Malaya and London. The divisions within British policy towards the KMT in Malaya had disappeared by January 1929 when the Governor switched his position

to be in line with his advisers. What had also disappeared were the divisions over policy direction between Goodman in the SS and his colleague Allen in the FMS which had been evident at the end of 1927. Before we look at the joint memorandum of February 1929 which illustrates the union between Allen and Goodman, it is necessary to retrace the route by which Allen was led to switch from a moderate to a hard line position against the KMT by 1929.

Allen was a more realistic, analytical, pragmatic man than Goodman, although like Goodman he was concerned about the communist threat, via the KMT, to peace and order in Malaya. Goodman was doubly unfortunate in 1927 in that Allen had a more liberal view on the management of the Malayan KMT in line with Clifford. Allen suggested that the Malayan KMT might eventually become irrelevant if the KMT hold on China diminished. His most important recommendation in 1927 was that 'suppression of the KMT throughout Malaya is in my opinion impossible and should only be seriously attempted if... there is a reasonable prospect of success and if the ultimate aims of the party, supported by the Nanking branch [are such] as to make its suppression... necessary to the continued existence of effective British control'.³⁷ That position was apparently reached by 1929, but in the early days it seems that Allen, like Clifford, failed to recognize the containment value of a blanket ban applied piecemeal. What Allen did recognize, unlike Goodman, was the standing and importance of eminent FMS Chinese such as Tang Tsz-sat and Teh Lay-seng. He respected their community status and authority and their ability to offset the excesses of their radical countrymen. In 1928 the Chinese made up only 37.3 per cent of the FMS population, in contrast to the 74.4 per cent in the SS, so Allen's outlook could be calmer. Following the Kreta Ayer affair he wrote that while it was a period of great anxiety needing punitive action from the authorities against some KMT activists, 'the ascendancy of the moderates changed the aspects [of things]... shown by a spontaneous manifestation of friendly feelings on the part of the Chinese community towards the authorities...'.³⁸ By some of them any way. Allen was evidently pursuing a policy of divide and rule like Goodman but it seems to have been more intelligently based. He went on to say that expulsion of the radicals from the KMT in China, though not necessarily a long-term situation, did not cause disturbances in the FMS where the Chinese seemed contented to take an interest in the administration rather than indulge in subversive activities.

Allen was not complacent but wary about the KMT menace in Malaya. He gradually moved towards an appreciation of the ban. This is shown by the detailed analysis of KMT activities which he presented in his

quarterly reports and the record of punitive action which resulted from his thorough supervision. He considered that the kaleidoscopic changes of fortune in the civil war in China, which were prejudicial to non-Chinese interests both there and in Malaya, could mean the return of the communists to power in China.³⁹

In July 1928 Allen argued that refusing to recognize the Malayan KMT would not necessarily bring about disturbances too large to be dealt with by the police or problems too intractable to be 'successfully surmounted'.⁴⁰ The basis for this conclusion was an interesting survey of the probity and status of the nine directors of the newly emerging BMHB and their role in off-setting any problems arising from increasing Chinese immigration, coupled with a resurgence of nationalist fervour after Tsinan. What Allen reported about the nine directors shows that at this time he retained his appreciation of eminent Chinese, even if they were KMT members, while slowly changing his mind about the value of a ban as an instrument of control. He regarded Teo Eng-hock as a man of wealth, standing and influence; Teh Lay-seng as an influential and zealous member of the KMT; he saw Tay Sau-peng as a man of influence and substance without being very wealthy and felt that Tang Tsz-sat, who was of considerable social standing in Seremban, was always moderate and well disposed towards the Malayan Government.

But after October 1928 when it is possible to pinpoint almost exactly Allen's move to a hard line stance against the KMT, these eminent moderates became not his friends and allies, but his opponents, by virtue of their propensity for influencing Chinese nationalism in Malaya in ways directed by the Nanking Government. His change of attitude was the result of Nanking Government attempts to control Malayan Chinese education, thus maintaining ideological control over Malayan citizens under British rule. In addition, the Chinese Government was pressing for recognition of the Malayan KMT through its Consuls in Malaya and through its Minister in London, activities perceived as reinforcing China's intention to interfere in Malayan affairs. This was described by Clifford in January 1929 as 'a cynical and complete disregard of the laws of Malaya'.

Eventually the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs produced a joint report in February 1929⁴¹ which signified a unified approach, in contrast to their previous joint effort of August 1927. The 1929 joint memorandum started with a very pointed reminder that in September 1928 the CO had approved the continued refusal of the Malayan Government to recognize the Malayan KMT until there was considerable demand from the local Chinese for recognition or really strong pressure from the Nationalist Government th China. Goodman and Allen argued that neither of these

conditions applied in Malaya, dismissing recognition of the Malayan KMT on the grounds that registration had not been requested by Malayan Chinese. They cited the opinion of such diverse, eminent Chinese as Song Ong-siang and Lim Boon-keng that recognition would bring problems for the moderate and non-aligned Chinese. The most impressive piece of evidence to support the Secretaries came from Teo Eng-hock who is cited as having said in 1927 that the KMT should not be registered because in time, control would pass from local leaders such as himself to the Central Executive Committee of the China KMT and its emissaries in Malaya. Legalizing the KMT would result in an increase membership through intimidation. More seriously, recognition would sanction Nanking's *right* to interfere in Malayan Chinese affairs and alienate the loyalties of the Malayan Chinese.

The strongly worded conclusion to this report states that the Malayan Government had always been sympathetic to nationalist aspirations but opposed foreign political control of its population, especially when the Straits-born Chinese would be powerless to prevent Nanking control from being institutionalized if the Malayan KMT was recognized. This 'menace' would only increase as the situation in China settled down and the Nanking Government strengthened its hold on China, undistracted by civil wars. But this was not new. Chinese government initiatives to cultivate the loyalty of Overseas Chinese went back to the establishment of its consulates in 1877.

The Malayan Government was now set on a collision course with the FO. The desire, predominant to date, not to embarrass the 'infant' Nationalist Government in China, or to stimulate a reaction of greater support for the Malayan KMT and to give way on punitive measures was impeded by directives from London not to initiate a new, tough policy. While continuing to monitor and discipline KMT activities, the Secretaries joined in moves to convene a conference on the Malayan KMT in Hong Kong in November 1929.⁴²

The background to this conference was a flurry of diplomatic and inter-departmental activity. What needs to be noted here is that the conference marks the *end* of the Secretaries' influence on the Malayan Government's Chinese policy, partly because it was followed by a change of Governor, but mainly because the Malayan KMT problem was no longer simply domestic but had been internationalized in the months before the conference took place. The conference was not a catalyst for modifying Goodman's ideas about the need and efficacy of the ban or Malayan policy towards the Chinese generally.

The issues discussed in Hong Kong revolved around a comparison of the Hong Kong and Malayan societies legislation, for controlling KMT

activities, in which, although conditions were different, Goodman thought the official purpose was the same.⁴³ This purpose was to prevent the KMT from organizing and recruiting but not to prosecute Chinese nationalist views *per se*. Goodman also drew Moss's attention to the fact that Malayan fear of the KMT was not unusual; officials in the NEI, both British and Dutch, expressed concern about KMT activities, particularly anti-imperialist indoctrination purveyed through the vernacular school system. Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of the People' were to be enforced in the overseas schools, stated a directive from the Overseas Educational Conference; 'foreign', that is, colonial governments, were not to interfere in Chinese vernacular education and extant colonial legislation against vernacular schools had to be repealed. Such gratuitous and inflammatory remark could not be tolerated by colonial officials. Goodman reaffirmed his view that drastic action against the KMT would become inevitable in the face of Nanking's intransigent interference and the menace to 'our colonies'.⁴⁴

The transcript of the conference proceedings shows that the differences between the Hong Kong and Malayan legislation were thoroughly discussed. Malayan officials were told that they had institutionalized their problem by banning the KMT as a society, leading to conflict with the Nanking Government. Hong Kong banned individual political/subversive activities and dealt with consular staff on these matters, never confronting the Foreign Office at all. Halifax, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs in Hong Kong, and North, his deputy, insisted that a KMT *society* did not exist in Hong Kong, which Allen and Goodman found an incredible statement and which led to some acerbic exchanges. Front organizations of the KMT, if they existed, were dealt with by punishing individuals through existing ordinances and possibly banishment. No requests had been made for recognition of the KMT in Hong Kong because the Chinese Government had been told by the British Minister in Peking that personal membership of organizations was allowed in Hong Kong but political parties were not. This was the substance of the advice offered by Halifax to Allen and Goodman — rearrange your control of the Malayan KMT along Hong Kong lines, inform the Nanking Government through diplomatic channels and ask for their cooperation while retaining the right to punitive action if branches organize themselves.

Goodman and Allen came away dissatisfied, as Goodman's letter to Moss shows. The mood of the conference was against Malayan-type proscription and repression while being sympathetic to the need for drastic action against illegal KMT organizations.⁴⁵ If Goodman failed to see the need for change, the man acting in his absence, J. M. Black

seemed more far-sighted. In his November 1929 report Black wrote that while there 'was magic in the name *Kuomintang*', for the Chinese in Malaya there was little practical use.⁴⁶ He criticized the policy aims of the Malayan KMT as pious resolutions and economic futilities because they lacked a practical base. This was an unjust description of the Malayan Chinese nationalist wish for education in Chinese culture and an end to the opium trade, ethical aims running counter to the British politico-economic drives of the time. But Black shrewdly assessed the glamour of communism for the ordinary Chinese worker because it presented concrete programmes and demands for improvement in working conditions and for tax reforms. However Goodman and Allen, in policing the 'amorphous' objectives as well as the communist ones may have been more perceptive in understanding where the mechanisms for retaining their political kingship lay in the short term.

But their autonomy was gradually eroded. Between 1925 and the end of 1929, while the Secretaries effectively controlled policy direction in Malaya, international and diplomatic processes which had contributed to its imposition began to work against the ban. The complicated fluctuations of the Chinese nationalist fortunes and Western moves to retain economic advantages and influence in China moved the management of the Malayan KMT away from domestic control towards FO control in London. Coincident with political changes in China were changes in British political thinking in London. The Victorian conservative imperialism of Winston Churchill gave way to a seemingly more liberal but in fact still authoritarian imperialism of Leo Amery and Lord Passfield (formerly Sidney Webb) at the CO, and to the free-trade liberal conservatism of Sir Austen Chamberlain at the FO for some of the period. In the House of Commons this was reflected by greater numbers of more vocal Labour MPs, for example, who questioned authoritarian legislation such as the Schools Ordinances and the KMT ban in Malaya. This brought pressure to bear on both CO and FO policy aims. But the greatest pressure on Britain's policy as it affected Malaya at the time was commercial, both internationally with regard to trade concessions and extra-territoriality in China, and domestically with regard to rubber and tin trade. In the latter, falling world prices for Malayan commodities and the intrusion of aggressive Japanese marketing in rubber goods (which affected both the manufacturers in Malaya and those in Britain) were creating widespread unemployment.

The primary aims of FO policy were stated clearly by Sir John Pratt in 1931 when they were within an ace of being accomplished, but these aims applied just as well to the earlier period because they already represented the main thrust of policy from about 1925. Sir John wrote that

the policy of . . . government is, in broad outline, to recognize the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the Chinese people and to make such modifications in the Treaty system . . . as shall enable China to achieve the status of an equal independent sovereign state while at the same time securing adequate guarantees for the lives, property and commerce of the British nationals in China. . . .

Delicate negotiations on extra-territoriality and treaties were the outcome of this approach and the much needed success depended on 'the treatment accorded to Chinese nationals . . . particularly in British territories such as Hong Kong and Malaya . . .'.⁴⁷ The CO was the intermediary, making sure that the Malayan Government conformed to FO imperatives.

The FO pursued its long-term aims in 1926 by requesting its new Minister to Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, to report on Chinese reaction to British trade and privileges in China and British treatment of the Chinese in Hong Kong and Malaya. It backed this up by gently nudging the CO about the possibility of removing the Malayan KMT ban in the event of a successful outcome to Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition. The CO, armed with a firm negative from Guillemard returned a diplomatic negative to the FO because, Clutterbuck said, 'I think we can safely count on the continued support of FO and the Services departments in maintaining the present ban on political societies and with their support it should be easy to deal with any opposition in the House'.⁴⁸

This sense of security was short lived because the Kreta Ayer Incident of March 1927 put a different complexion on things from several points of view. The deaths of the Chinese provoked a great number of questions in the House about the Incident in particular, about the KMT, and the position of the Chinese in Malaya in general, from such eminent politicians as George Lansbury and Pethwick Lawrence.⁴⁹ It also provoked a formal protest from the Chinese Government through its Chargé d'Affaires in London, W. C. Chen.⁵⁰ The CO was at this time strongly of the opinion that the Kreta Ayer Incident reinforced the need for a ban. But against this, in March 1927, came a caution expressed by Clutterbuck, a senior official in the CO, that a KMT government in China would make the Malayan ban a paradox. Sir Gilbert Grindle, Permanent Secretary at the CO said in March 1927 that justification for the ban could not be given within the Malayan context alone.⁵¹

With regard to the Kreta Ayer questions in the House, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Leo Amery, replied that it was not the policy of colonial governments to countenance foreign political parties in their territories. Sir Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied to W. C. Chen that after a very full and proper enquiry the

conduct of the crowd was found to have 'necessitated the action by the police' to maintain order.⁵² Chamberlain also indicated to the CO his support for the Straits policy of not holding further enquiries.

At this time CO and FO policy seemed in harmony. For its own part, the CO ran a policy of supporting Malayan decisions, convinced that it had FO support and that arguments coming from Malaya vindicated retaining the ban. But CO policy in Malaya often ran counter to the direction the FO was setting. For example the CO's general direction to Guillemard to concentrate more on Malay issues than on Chinese economic affairs meant some dissatisfaction among Malayan Chinese businessmen. Discussion between the CO and the FO about the KMT never put the question within the context of general CO policy in Malaya, still less within the context of Malay issues although this had been one of Clifford's most potent arguments for restraining the KMT. By November 1929, FO and CO priorities had moved far enough apart for the FO to write that Miles Lampson's advice, though 'eminently sound . . . will not commend itself to the Government of the Straits Settlements. . . .'⁵³

Clifford's term as Governor had moved the Malayan KMT problem further into the FO camp, at first, because of his own initiative of getting in touch with Miles Lampson in December 1927. Lampson, in his reply, invited Clifford to follow Clementi's example and visit Peking for a while. Thus Sir Cecil Clementi, then Governor of Hong Kong, made his first indirect appearance in Malayan KMT affairs, on which he was to have such a profound impact in 1930. Another aspect was the restriction of immigration policy which Clifford inherited from Guillemard. Initially, Clifford informed the CO that this was not a good idea, but he supported it in both his Council addresses later, an attitude perhaps fortified by Miles Lampson who had informed the FO that consular offices in Canton, Swatow, Amoy and Foochow expected some outcry against it, but nothing troublesome.

A third aspect was Clifford's August 1927 despatch which led the FO to conclude that the ban on the KMT would be removed under Clifford. It has already been said that this interpretation resulted from a partial reading, not a complete understanding of what Clifford was saying. Austen Chamberlain was a great deal more enthusiastic about it than the CO officials. FO officials regarded it as a 'very important despatch . . . the only one worth reading' because it seemed to fit in with their long-term strategy of achieving a strong, united China, when 'the question of the Chinese in Malaya will become an imperial problem of great importance'.⁵⁴ Where the FO saw a fresh mind bringing enlightenment to the Malayan problem, the CO was more cautious, and thought it useful to wait for further despatches after the Governor had been longer

in the colony. Furthermore, the CO saw danger in the fact that Clifford's views were not shared by his advisers and it picked up on what the FO had missed — that Clifford had not recommended removing the ban.⁵⁵

Although it had been the practice to send copies of relevant documents between the FO and the CO, there is no record of the FO having received the Clifford despatches of 1928, which indicated that while Clifford appeared to be acknowledging the importance of international factors for removing the ban, he was retaining arguments for maintaining it. The FO was thus doubly ill prepared for his '*volte-face*' in January 1929, since it also relied on partial assurances given by Clifford to Gwatkin during the previous November. In addition, in December 1928, the British Government had formally recognized the KMT Government of China. Sir John Pratt gave full rein to his irritation over this ill-timed conjunction of events. He remarked in his memorandum on Clifford's rationale that 'even Sir C. Clementi has never suggested that the *Kuomintang* in Hong Kong threatened to reduce British rule in the Colony to complete impotence'.⁵⁶ The immediate FO recommendations were that no active suppression should take place in Malaya while the views of Lampson were sought on the effects in China of the Malayan proposals. In September 1928, W. C. Chen, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, had renewed pressure on the FO for recognition of the Malayan KMT.⁵⁷ The FO adopted a delaying tactic saying the matter was being discussed with the SS Government and Sir Miles Lampson. All three FO minute-writers, Pullen, Gwatkin and Pratt brought up the possibility of either repealing or amending the SS Societies Ordinance, seen as the root of the problem, advice which Goodman and Allen were to receive in November 1929 in Hong Kong.

The tone of these minutes indicates that the FO was preparing to take over the management of the Malayan KMT problem — 'we trust no . . . measures will be authorized [that are not] concurred in by the FO' (Pullen), although 'I do not think we can press the CO at present to override [the SS]' (Gwatkin), even though 'the remedy is most emphatically not forcible suppression' (Pratt).

A reply from Lampson was not received until October 1928. In the interval, the FO received copies of the Chinese Secretaries' quarterly reports, the arguments in some of them provoking typical acidic comment from the FO. For example the rationale that a political society supported by only one per cent of a population presented a serious threat to stable rule drew the comment that the Fabian Society would not stand much chance on those grounds, a reference to Lord Passfield's own

political society. In this atmosphere, the *status quo* between the CO and the FO was maintained.

Lampson's reply on 28 September 1928 stated that it was 'quite untenable' to ban the KMT in Malaya, Britain having recognized the Government of China.⁵⁸ But, he added, the activities and practices of the China KMT in Malaya were also untenable. He recommended recognizing the KMT in Malaya to keep it above ground and observable. Having recognized the KMT, Malayan officials would be in a more powerful position to take drastic action against illegal activities by KMT branches or individuals. The alternative was to act repressively in the short term only to have the embarrassment of giving way in the long term, because reaction in China would have become 'acute'.

This advice was more realistic and more in tune with the FO's long-term objectives than that received from the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Cecil Clementi at the time of the Hong Kong conference on the Malayan KMT. Clementi proposed a joint unified scheme in Hong Kong and Malaya to discipline KMT activity, on the Hong Kong model. Clifford had left Malaya without a named successor but Clementi knew that he was to succeed Clifford when he proposed his unitary scheme to the FO.⁵⁹ Clementi was the catalyst who made the solution to the Malayan KMT problem predominantly an FO operation.

So a variety of conflicting demands — an increasingly delicate balance of international power-broking between Britain and her Western partners and between Britain, China and Japan — reduced Hare's policy of deflecting Sino-centric attachments by rewards and tolerance to a war of attrition by 1930. Some British officials were unable to accept that Malayan Chinese could be culturally attached to China without being disloyal to Britain. But they were also asked to put international considerations before domestic ones, to satisfy the FO. This created a conflict made worse by Clifford's new ideas, his change of mind, his growing administrative incapacity and by the force of Chinese nationalist fervour itself in the 1920s.

Within the framework of such difficulties, Malayan officials applied a policy of selective toleration through the mechanism of divide and rule that worked reasonably well until paramount foreign affairs concerns imposed new stresses on Chinese affairs in Malaya.

External pressure exerted influence on the KMT to survive, on the Malayan Government to enforce political control and on the FO and the CO to make concessions for long-term economic and diplomatic gains. Such conflicting aims created policy divisions and disagreements about the consequences of managing Malayan Chinese nationalism. Such

competing interests, which had helped produce a divided 'colonial mind' in policy management and perceptions were scattered to the four winds when the former Governor of Hong Kong became the Governor of the SS and High Commissioner for the FMS in February 1930.

Notes

1. Yeo Kim-wah, *The Politics of Decentralization* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982). 'Decentralization' refers to changes in British administration policy in the FMS after 1920 and attempts to implement further control over the UMS. Some centralized authority, institutionalized in the position of Chief Secretary, FMS and in the Federal Council was devolved to the Malay rulers, the state councils, the Residents and District Officers. Decentralization was based, among other things, on the ideas that indirect rule should be fortified in the FMS and that advancement of Malay interests should accelerate in a publicly observable manner for political reasons. The corollary of the proposed devolution of authority away from Kuala Lumpur was a reduction in the status and authority of the Chief Secretary of the FMS in Malaya and in that of his colleague, the Colonial Secretary in the SS. A decade of piecemeal implementation of the policy, paper, verbal and official warfare was brought to an end in 1934 when Clementi abolished the position of Chief Secretary. Pushed on by the need to implement financial stringency in Malaya during the world depression Clementi's action created uproar among all groups of Malay and colonial society.
2. Stockwell and Gailey present the most sensitive biographies of Clifford as 'proconsul'; Clifford's own writings reveal himself in great detail and P. C. Wicks, 'Images of Malaya in the Stories of Sir Hugh Clifford', *JMBRAS* 52, 1 (1980), pp. 57-72 and 'The Malayan Novels of Sir Hugh Clifford', *Malaya in History* 27 (1984), pp. 5-15 introduce his literary interpretation by saying that Clifford first arrived in Malaya at a time of 'profound, traumatic and even tragic cultural clash'.
3. A curriculum vitae of Clifford's early years is included in CO 273/295/46288, the OAG to the CO, 'Statements of Service of Officers', 1 December 1903.
4. Proceedings of the Legislative Council, SS, 1926. Shorthand Report, page B21. Song Ong-siang raised questions about increase of personnel in the Chinese Protectorate and the appointment of a 'Lady Protector' and was told that the increase in staff had been sanctioned, but no suitable lady had then been found. Subsequently the wife of J. M. Black, Protector of Chinese in Singapore in 1929 was appointed, before her marriage.
5. The Governor, SS to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, L. C. M. S. Amery, April 1925.
6. CO 273/531, Annual Report for the SS, 1925, the Registration of Schools (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 15), 1925; Proceedings of the Federal Council, FMS, Enactment No. 21 of 1927.
7. CO 717/54/29004, Enactments, 1927. Enactment No. 20 of 1927. The text of this is used here; Enclosure No. 2, 'Report for the Secretary of State . . .', by W. S. Gibson, dated 13 August 1927. See also p. 7 of the Joint Memorandum by Secretaries for Chinese Affairs, FMS and SS, 10 August 1927.
8. Proceedings of the Legislative Council, SS, 1928, the Seditious Publications Amendment Bill. Shorthand Report, pages B 129, 134, 166 and 167.
9. NL 5949 GD 36/18 of 27, the OAG to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 May 1927.

10. NL 5949 GD 37/232 of 27, Paraphrased Telegram, Governor, SS, to the CO, 24 June 1927; CO 717/56/29078, 'Chinese Labour in Malaya', May to October 1927.
11. CO 273/533/3017, 6 February 1926; CO 273/539/28132, 'Methods of Counteracting Revolutionary Propaganda', April-May 1927.
12. NL 5948 GD 34/38 of 25 and Enclosures, file dated 6 February 1926.
13. FO 371/11699/368, 26 February 1926; MBPI Nos 34-39 (December 1925-May 1926).
14. CO 273/537/28053, Enclosure No. 1, 'Joint Memorandum', by A. M. Goodman and P. Allen on the *Kuomintang* in Malaya, 1926, 7 February 1927, p. 9. This statement was to be repeated twice; see CO 273/537/28053, the Governor, SS, to the CO, 16 February 1927, p. 1; FO 371/13925/388, 'Registration of *Kuomintang* in Malaya', which includes a despatch of 20 December 1928, from the Officer Administering Government (OAG), p. 2.
15. FO 371/12466/3847, Telegram, the Governor, SS, to the CO, 13 April 1927.
16. FO 371/12456/4149, the CO to the Governor, SS, 27 April 1927.
17. NL 5948 GD 34/65 of 26, the Governor, SS, to the CO, 27 February 1926; CO 273/537/28053, the Governor, SS to the CO and material on parliamentary questions, February 1927; FO 371/12466/3847, the Governor, SS, to the CO, 13 April 1927.
18. A. J. Stockwell, 'Sir Hugh Clifford in Malaya 1927-1929: "'Pinang pulang ka-tampok"'', *JMBRAS* 53, 2 (1980), pp. 21-41.
19. CO 273/537/28053, Confidential Memorandum, the Governor, SS, Sir Hugh Clifford, to the CO, 31 August 1927. The discussion which follows is drawn from the text of Clifford's Memorandum.
20. FO 371/14719/2829, the 'Report on the *Kuomintang*', by the Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, FMS, Mr A. B. Jordan, 28 March 1930, indicates that in October 1927 Clifford had consulted Dr Wu about the necessity for a ban and had received advice that a ban was unnecessary.
21. CO 717/56/29078, May-October 1927, Enclosure, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, SS, 10 October 1927, 'Address by His Excellency the Governor'.
22. NL 5949 GD 36/199 of 27, the OAG, SS, to the CO, 25 May 1927 contains the contingent legislation.
23. CO 576/33, 16 November 1927, Enclosure, Shorthand Report of Proceedings of the Federal Council, FMS, 16 and 17 November 1927, 'His Excellency the High Commissioner's Annual Address', pages B 110-129. The text of this address is used in the following discussion.
24. See Note 35, Chapter 3; page 12 of the Federal Council Speech and NL 5949 GD 37/389 of 27, the Governor, SS, to the CO, where Clifford corrects his mistake saying he meant the SS, and not 'British Malaya', 27 November 1927.
25. CO 273/542/52010, the Governor, SS, to the CO, 3 March 1928 and FO 371/13925/1898, Duplicate of Secret Memorandum, the Governor, SS, to the CO, 20 February 1929.
26. FO 371/13215/213/14, Enclosure, the Governor, SS, to His Majesty's Minister, Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, 6 November 1927.
27. CO 273/542/52010, the Governor, SS to the CO, July 1928.
28. CO 273/542/52010, Enclosure, Chinese Chargé d'Affaires (interim) London, Mr W. C. Chen, to Lord Cushenden, FO, 7 July 1928.
29. See C. M. Turnbull, 'Malayan Chinese Policy in the Early 1930s: The Hong Kong Connection', Paper delivered at the Fifth National Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Adelaide University, 13-19 May 1984; p.7 is an example of this view.

30. FO 371/13215/6346, Minutes of a Conversation Held at the Foreign Office Between the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Hugh Clifford and Mr F. Gwatkin, 15 November 1928.
31. FO 371/13925/1898, Duplicate, the Governor, SS, to the CO, 20 February 1929.
32. FO 371/13925/1898, Enclosure (Duplicate), Joint Memorandum by the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs, the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States, 20 February 1929.
33. CO 273/537/28053, Enclosure No. 1, Joint Report by the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs, the SS and the FMS, 10 August 1927.
34. See CO 273/534/23307, Departmental Minutes referring to Beatty's advice, given on his retirement, 15 December 1926.
35. A. M. Goodman in Joint Report by the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs . . . , 10 August 1927, as Enclosure in CO 273/537/28053, 1927.
36. NL 5937 GD 40/5 of 29, Enclosure, Quarterly Report by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Mr A. M. Goodman, dated 28 December 1928.
37. CO 273/537/28053, Enclosure, 'Interim Report on the *Kwok Man Tong* . . . in the Federated Malay States', by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, the FMS, Mr P. T. Allen, dated 1 February 1928.
38. CO 273/542/52010, Enclosure, 'Interim Report on the *Kwok Man Tong* . . . in the Federated Malay States', by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, the FMS, Mr P. T. Allen, dated 9 November 1927.
39. CO 273/537/28053, Enclosure, 'Interim Report on the *Kwok Man Tong* . . .', by P. T. Allen, dated 1 July 1927.
40. CO 273/542/52010, 'Interim Report on the *Kwok Man Tong* . . .', P. T. Allen, 1 July 1928.
41. FO 371/13925/1898, Joint Memorandum by the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs, the SS and the FMS, 20 February 1929.
42. FO 371/14728/1327, Enclosures, Verbatim Report of the Conference Held at the Chinese Secretariat, Hong Kong on 13 November 1929, on the *Kwok Man Tong*; Letter from the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Mr A. M. Goodman, to His Majesty's Consul, Canton, Mr G. S. Moss, dated 21 November 1929; Letter from Mr G. S. Moss, to His Majesty's Minister, Peiping, Sir Miles Lampson, dated 4 December 1929; FO Departmental Minutes, file dated 10 March 1930. These documents form the basis for the discussion on the conference which follows.
43. FO 371/14728/1327, Goodman to Moss, 21 November 1929.
44. FO 371/15467/1848, Enclosures Nos. 2 and 3, unsigned copies of Memoranda by A. M. Goodman, dated February 1931, repeating the arguments of his letter to Moss, November 1929.
45. FO 371/14728/1327, Moss to Lampson, 4 December 1929.
46. NL 5937 GD 41/313 of 29, Report by the Protector of the Chinese, Singapore, Mr J. M. Black, dated 22 November 1929; file dated 14 December 1929.
47. FO 371/14728/1489, Enclosure, Draft Memorandum from the FO to the CO, by Sir John Pratt, dated 3 April 1930.
48. CO 273/537/28053, CO Departmental Minutes, by P. A. Clutterbuck, dated 18 February and 14 March 1927.
49. CO 273/538/28093, CO Departmental Minutes, 30 May 1927.
50. FO 371/12466/2490, Letter from the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, London, to Sir Austen Chamberlain, dated 17 March 1927.
51. CO 273/537/28053, CO Departmental Minutes, by Sir Gilbert Grindle, dated 16 March 1927

52. FO 371/12466/2490, Letter from Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, London, Mr W. C. Chen, 17 June 1927.
53. FO 371/13926/5982, FO Departmental Minute, by Pullen, dated 25 November 1929.
54. FO 371/12457/8150, FO Departmental Minute, by F. Gwatkin, dated 27 October 1927.
55. CO 273/537/28053 and FO 371/12457/8150, CO and FO Departmental Minutes; see in particular the Minute by W. Ellis, dated October 1927.
56. FO 371/13925/1898, FO Departmental Minutes, 18 April 1929.
57. CO 273/542/52010, Copy, Letter from the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, London, Mr W. C. Chen, to Lord Cushenden, the FO, dated 7 September 1928.
58. FO 371/13926/5982, Enclosure, Letter from His Majesty's Minister, Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Arthur Henderson, dated 28 September 1929.
59. FO 371/14728/2082, Enclosure, Copy of a Letter from the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Cecil Clementi, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 12 December 1929; but see also FO 371/13926/5982, FO Departmental Minute by Pullen, showing that Pullen thought Clementi unaware of his new posting.

The Clementi Onslaught and the Lampson Diplomacy: The Taming of the 'Double-Headed Snake', 1930-1931

Sir Cecil Clementi came to British Malaya at a critical juncture in Sino-British negotiations, following recognition by Britain of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT Government in December 1928. Throughout 1930 while Clementi was determined to discipline the KMT, the FO was struggling to resolve the issues of extra-territoriality, rendition of ports and Britain's status and influence in China, in a way favourable to Britain.¹ The Malayan KMT was the focus of tension between domestic and international priorities. Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister in Peking, was called in by the FO to resolve the tension and place both Clementi and the FO on what Lampson called 'a good wicket'. His role seems to have been a mixture of last man in, umpire and deep fine leg, to use Lampson's own metaphor.

The domestic situation was also complicated when Clementi arrived in Singapore on 5 February 1930. He came into a vacuum of authority created in the autumn of 1929 by the early retirement of Sir Hugh Clifford. The problems arising from Clifford's fluctuating policies towards the KMT remained unresolved and those left in charge between October 1929 and February 1930, the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs and the Officer Administering the Government, maintained the holding operation against KMT activities. They wrote their quarterly reports advising a harder line against the KMT than they were apparently either able or willing to enforce in the absence of a new governor. The practical outcome of this uncertainty was that the BMHB was given permission by Goodman to hold its second annual delegates' meeting in Singapore on the day the new Governor arrived. The KMT therefore assumed, quite wrongly, that the existence of the Malayan KMT was officially sanctioned. It also meant, in practical terms, that the KMT leaders were too occupied with their own KMT affairs to be part of the unofficial welcome for the new Governor.

Into this milieu came Clementi, a very skilled colonial administrator, experienced in dealing with both the Chinese and Chinese nationalism, as a former Governor of Hong Kong. He saw himself as an expert on China and Chinese affairs and had in the past offered what was seen in London as gratuitous advice on the management of China.² Clementi's

arrival in Singapore coincided with the opening of the second All-Malaya Delegates' Convention by the BMHB at Lorong 35, Geylang, Singapore. He was furious, to say the least, regarding it as flouting colonial law. Clementi lost no time in having himself briefed on the matter by senior officials including the Colonial Secretary and the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, A. M. Goodman. As a result, Goodman led a raiding party of over 20 policemen, headed by an Inspector of Police, on 7 February 1930, against the participants of the Convention. Although he made no arrests then, he summoned Teo Eng-hock, one of the nine Executive Members of the BMHB, to his office to be informed that Clementi wished to meet with all the new BMHB office-bearers on 20 February 1930 at Government House.³ This was later known as the Government House Conference, the minutes of which are attached as Appendix B in this monograph. During this historic meeting, Clementi acted decisively, without prior consultation with or sanction from the CO, to ban all Malayan KMT branches and activities. His punitive action thus ushered in a new era of conflict between the Malayan Government and the CO and FO in London over management of the Malayan Chinese and particularly those of the Malayan KMT.

Before analyzing how the Malayan KMT question became an international and diplomatic issue between China and Britain, and how the problem was eventually resolved in 1931, it is important to provide a profile of Clementi and his style in the management of the Malayan KMT. Clementi had travelled throughout China and Central Asia, was a former Boden Sanskrit Scholar at Oxford and was fluent in Mandarin, Hokkien, Cantonese and other dialects.⁴ He had read widely in the Chinese classics and prided himself on his understanding of Chinese culture. But it was a nostalgic, élitist and unrealistic perception of the current China, couched in the classic Confucian patterns of thinking of a hierarchical scholarly tradition. This in Clementi's view was the real China whose values he admired, whose language and literature he assiduously studied and with whose exponents he could confer on equal terms as a scholar and a gentleman. And there is no doubt that he was both of these himself. An intellectual, he was by predilection scholarly. But he was also aloof, shy and not gregarious outside the formal demands of office. Introspective by inclination, he seems to have been acutely aware of the dignity due to the British Empire and to himself as its representative.

He stood upon this dignity quite ferociously when he felt the occasion warranted it, but he did not gratuitously demand deference as his actions between December 1930 and February 1931 indicate. He was then on leave in England while discussions were being held in Malaya on the

management of the Malayan KMT, with the British Minister to Peking, Sir Miles Lampson virtually in charge. At the time Clementi made no unnecessary, self-indulgent fuss about this incredible arrangement which by any terms was an affront to both his personal and public stature. It is a measure of Clementi's inherent dignity and professional standards that he behaved with a restraint, discretion and humility not often granted to Sir Cecil Clementi by writers or by his own colleagues.

But the tragedy of Clementi was that he was hamstrung by his own false vision of China in dealing with the real Chinese under his jurisdiction first in Hong Kong and then in Malaya. He actively disliked the manifestations of modern Chinese nationalism; he regarded with scorn those wealthy and educated Chinese who participated in *Kuomintang* activities in British colonies. He thought them dishonourable men who had abused the cultural norms of reciprocity and loyalty, the basis of Clementi's ethical tradition. He also considered that his prime objective in Malaya was to honour the treaties made with the Malay rulers. For Clementi this meant protecting the Malays against the intrusive and, as he saw it, unjustified claims of the Malayan Chinese for some form of political expression either within the British colonial system, or inevitably outside it.⁵ Thus the mixture of an ebullient 'foreign' political organization, the KMT, and a punitive Governor bringing with him a cargo of experience inimical to tolerance of the KMT combined to explode in February 1930 and to continue to reverberate throughout the four years of Clementi's tenure.

Between 5 February when he took up residence and 18 February when he held an Executive Council meeting on the subject of the Malayan KMT, Clementi held discussions with the Colonial Secretary of the SS, the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs in the SS and FMS, the Legal Officer and the Inspector of Police for the SS. The advice he received from all of these was that the KMT was a grave political danger and should be suppressed, which was self-evident to Clementi in any case. With first-hand information about KMT management policy and the apparent intractability of the KMT in conforming to the 1925 ban, it was decided at the Executive Council on February 18 that Clementi himself would inform the KMT leaders what his policy towards them would be. The Council also agreed that if the KMT did not comply, 'recalcitrant ringleaders' should be banished.⁶ Goodman who had attended the meeting withdrew at this point, possibly more at peace than he had been for months. The KMT leaders were summoned to Government House on 20 February; seventeen of them as officers of the BMHB attended and included prominent business and community leaders such as Teo Eng-hock, Teh Lay-seng, Tang Tsz-sat, Teh Sau-peng and Png Chi-cheng.⁷

At the Government House meeting on 20 February, Clementi, accompanied by Goodman informed them that all KMT activities must cease absolutely and forthwith. Clementi used his skill in Mandarin and knowledge of classical Chinese culture to hammer home his message in metaphors obnoxious and distressing to his listeners. Discourteous it may have been; however no colonial ruler could tolerate what was perceived as 'subversion' in his territory. Offensive but effective, his rhetoric intimidated most, but not all, the KMT leaders present into formal public compliance with his directive. Like his immediate predecessors Guillemard and Clifford, Clementi argued the benefits that had accrued to Chinese residents in British Malaya, both in the material terms of their own commercial success and in the political terms of their accepting British honours, positions on the CAB or British citizenship. 'No man can serve two masters', stated Clementi, unless of course they 'were *Leung t'au sha* — the double-headed snake'.

Clementi told them that if they wished to be members of the KMT and participate in its organization and activities they could go to China for that. There was, however, no intention to interfere with private views. With apparent insight and generosity Clementi said that he did not 'object to [their] putting up the National flag on proper days and I shall be glad to respect China's national days',⁸ but his objection was 'to any Chinese political organizations whatsoever functioning here communist or non-communist'. This was despite the fact that the communist elements had apparently been purged from the KMT. Clementi was not convinced that the purge had been complete or thorough enough. He said it was very difficult for him to know what the political opinions of people were merely by the fact that they were currently members of the KMT and he expressed the hope that 'the *Kuo Min Tang* in China will free itself absolutely from all communist elements because if... [it] becomes Communist it will be exceedingly difficult for the British Government to maintain friendly relations with it'.⁹ Clementi in other words was presenting the same rationale which Malayan officials had used from 1911 on, when Chinese political activism had been labelled 'Bolshevik' or 'anarchist'. Teo Eng-hock and Teh Lay-seng in response said that the KMT in Singapore had been organized to offset communism there and it should be allowed to remain because it helped to maintain law and order in the Chinese community. Clementi sharply replied that this was fatuous since it implied that one had to break the law to maintain it. He then closed the meeting, curtly dismissing Teh Lay-seng's suggestion of consultation with, and response from, other KMT members, with, 'No reply is necessary. My orders are final'. The transcript of the occasion reads simply, 'meeting ends'.

The meeting may have ended but Clementi's policy thrust against the Chinese community had only just begun. Immediately after the February 20 meeting, the Governor imposed press censorship on all news items about the KMT, on pain of closure. Protests were made by journalists and owners of the vernacular press, questions were asked in the Legislative Council as they were in the House of Commons about the implications of the ban,¹⁰ and letters from England were written to the Editor of the *Straits Times* which suggested quite plainly that Clementi was thought to be misguided in his policy. The authors wrote 'It ought to be plain to anyone that if you tickle this organization you have the Chinese Government up against you'.¹¹ More serious for Clementi was the reaction of the Editor and the journalists of the *Straits Times* itself. The paper carried an editorial on March 25 saying that Clementi had compromised the integrity of the newspaper by conveying 'a definite request to refrain from comment at present', on KMT matters. However after assurances by Clementi in the Legislative Council on March 25 that the English press was not being censored, the Council changed its tune on March 26 and proclaimed that Clementi had done 'the right thing'.¹²

Having embarked on a policy of cutting Malayan Chinese political activism down to size through his attack on the KMT, Clementi then set a brisk pace, pursuing tactics designed to restrict the whole Chinese community. In the months between February and July 1930 he set the pattern for his whole term of office, by strengthening punitive measures against all avenues of perceived Chinese nationalism and against the KMT in particular. He followed the path set by his predecessors, from Young on, attacking Chinese vernacular education, immigration, consular representation, reinforcing the intelligence-gathering functions and thus the status and authority of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs.¹³ He made connections, as Guillemard had done, with the British Consul in Batavia to monitor and control passage of subversives between the Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya, including the Unfederated Malay States.¹⁴ Through such tactics he sought to increase the standing and practical position of the Malays and Malay rulers in relation to the position of the Chinese population, Straits-born as well as immigrant. He needed to create a bulwark against Chinese nationalism and Chinese demands for political participation in the SS and FMS which, by implication, led to domination of the Malays. Constraining the Chinese was fundamental to his plan of decentralization, embarked on in late 1930. This policy finally brought him into conflict with all sections of the community, not only the Chinese, but also with the Malayan Civil Service (MCS) and commercial interests. However, being Clementi, he

succeeded in part by abolishing the position of Chief Secretary in the FMS by 1934.¹⁵

He had signalled his intentions very clearly in a 'memoir' in March 1931 when he stated that the prime responsibility of British colonial rule was to further Malay interests and protect them from Chinese encroachments, a follow-up to his recommendations against the appointment of Chinese consuls in the FMS because of the blatant political activity of Chinese consuls which contravened diplomatic protocol.¹⁶ Chinese consuls had been very active from 1920 in exerting pressure on the Malayan Government to legalize the Malayan KMT, in monitoring the flying of the Nationalist flag at half mast on humiliation days, and in overseeing the curricula, staff and management of Chinese vernacular schools, particularly in the FMS.

Initially Clementi's main thrust was against Chinese vernacular education, following evidence of interference from Nanking in the staffing and curricula of the Chinese schools. Because the literature was perceived to be subversive since it was based on the 'Three Principles of the People' of Sun Yat-sen, it was heavily censored and nearly always prohibited. At first the CO supported Clementi's interest in vernacular education, saying that he had taken 'up the question with both hands making good use of his Hong Kong experience'.¹⁷ But Clementi had excluded representatives of the Chinese community from conferences held to discuss Clementi's suggestion that a training college for Malayan-born Chinese teachers in Chinese vernacular schools should be established, presumably to offset the perceived influx of revolutionary teachers from China. Passfield, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, criticized Clementi for ignoring Chinese community leaders, and the FO, who thought Malayan officials had generally ignored Chinese vernacular education, was scornful of the idea as politically naive.¹⁸ In any case there was a government scheme for part-time training of teachers for Chinese vernacular schools in Kuala Lumpur. In 1926 this scheme had 28 students in 3 classes, in 1930 there were 41 students and in 1931 there were over 40.¹⁹

Clementi's plans to halt financial assistance to Chinese vernacular schools in the long term have to be seen in the context of the depression and its aftermath, as well as in the context of his anti-KMT policy. The facts show a complex pattern. In 1930 assistance to Malay schools, which was confined to primary education, amounted to \$ 767 000 while Chinese schools received only \$ 11 000 in the FMS.²⁰ It is the case that between 1930 and 1934 financial assistance to all schools in the SS and FMS declined, after rising to a peak in 1929,²¹ and it was suggested that fees should be paid by pupils in the Malay colleges in receipt of

government support. In fact in Clementi's first year, allocations to Chinese schools rose from \$ 77 533 in 1930 to \$ 88 405 in 1931 and then declined by less than one per cent each year until 1934.²² Clementi attacked the political role of the schools, like Young before him, but not the social and economic role. Demands that teachers in Chinese vernacular schools, which were privately run, be Malayan-born Chinese under British training and supervision is much more indicative of political control than reductions of grants-in-aid.

Clementi's attack on Malayan Chinese nationalism via restrictions on immigration also has to be seen in the climate of economic recession and gross unemployment among large groups of Chinese immigrants in the rubber, tin and allied manufacturing industries, as well as part of his pro-Malay, anti-KMT policy. Adult male immigration quotas were reduced in 1930 and 1931 and were apparently acceptable to the Chinese community leaders as an interim measure to assist the economy.²³ Until the last quarter of 1931, debate on immigration was couched in these terms. Despite the fact that the rationale in official submissions to the Legislative Council and the CO for restriction were always in economic terms in 1931, Clementi's private argument was on political grounds — that of Nanking's 'irredentist' policy and its general anti-British stand.²⁴ Economic circumstances were thus part of Clementi's concerted attack upon the Chinese community in both the SS and FMS, many of whom regarded themselves as 'worthy, staunch and traditionally loyal subjects'.²⁵ Clementi considered the restrictions on immigration so necessary to the 'political and economic welfare of Malaya' that he regarded possible disaffection to British rule among the Straits-born as of little consequence.

The institutionalized restrictions on the Chinese community, such as the KMT ban, the Societies Ordinance and immigration restrictions meant that as in Guillemard's time, the intelligence-gathering services connected with the Chinese had to be refined and concentrated in the hands of the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs. To this end in 1930 the Bureau of Political Intelligence was re-formed into the Malayan Political Advisory Committee, which included the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs, SS and FMS, as well as police and Special Branch chiefs. The *MBPI* ceased publication, and in September 1930, the *Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (MRCA)* replaced it as a monthly record of purely Chinese intelligence reports compiled by the Secretariat of Chinese Affairs. Although the first issue appeared in the SS in September 1930, from January to May 1931 separate issues appeared in both the SS and FMS.²⁶ However from May onwards both FMS and SS information was compiled in the office of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS. This

prefigured the amalgamation of both the FMS and SS Secretariats into one Secretariat for Chinese Affairs in 1932, with A. B. Jordan as the first Secretary for Chinese Affairs for both territories. Goodman compiled the first issues until he became Resident of Penang in 1932. For nearly a decade, until 1939, A. B. Jordan was in charge of the publication, ably aided by his right-hand man, Sng Choon-ye, Chinese Assistant Secretary for Chinese Affairs.

During his first six months Clementi had constructed a finely reticulated punitive system against the Chinese, presumably to catch the small and slippery fish. But at the end of July 1930 he hauled in two big ones, using the banishment recommendation of the Executive Council on 16 February 1930. Teh Lay-seng and Png Chi-cheng had the banishment order served on them in July but Clementi did not inform London until October that he had banished two prominent Chinese: the one, Teh Lay-seng, a British subject, prominent business and community leader in both the FMS and the SS; the other, Png Chi-cheng, a journalist and not a British subject. While Teh was banished for two years, Png was banished for life. Diplomatic protest to Britain from China and questions in the House of Commons forced Clementi to rationalize his action in October by saying that 'their presence in Malaya was undesirable', because they continued to flout his orders, given in February, to desist from KMT organization and propaganda, though they had both been present at the 20 February meeting with him at Government House. Clementi cited seventy notifications which Teh Lay-seng and others were accused of circulating, only three of which could be interpreted as a threat to British rule and then only indirectly.²⁷ The three notifications directed KMT leaders to appoint only KMT members as teachers of vernacular schools and to ensure that vernacular school staff raised funds for the wounded soldiers in China. No mention was made in these KMT notifications of soldiers' families or general civilian war relief as in the case of the Shantung Relief Fund in 1928, so in Clementi's view, the political statement of the notifications was uncomplicated by humanitarian considerations.

Teh Lay-seng, together with Teo Eng-hock though the latter in a different way, was seen by other KMT members to have damaged both the KMT cause and the position of the Chinese in Malaya by their officious, over-active publicity.²⁸ Clementi, the guardian of the 'efficient protection of kindly British government' so desired by some of the moderates, interpreted Teh Lay-seng's continued politicizing as both 'subversive' to good rule and a deliberate insult to his own position. Despite Clementi's statement in February that he would respect China's national days there is no doubt that he was affronted by the sight of KMT

flags flown at half mast in memory of Sun Yat-sen during his official visit to Perak in April. Together with Teh Lay-seng's argumentative attitude at the February Conference, this propaganda activity constituted a subversive threat to British rule in Malaya which could not be tolerated. At this stage Clementi seems to have acted with some political skill, since he waited until Teh Lay-seng had actually left Singapore for China before signing the banishment order, thus avoiding the problem of physically deporting a British subject. Png Chi-cheng however was deported. The deportation of Teh and Png represented a critical shift in the role of the Malayan KMT as a problem in Sino-British relations.

The activity of the Malayan KMT had by 1930, become an international matter of some importance rather than a purely domestic matter. Clementi's arrival in Singapore and the punitive policy which followed cut directly across the current direction and progress of Sino-British negotiations. The FO saw their own, and ultimately British, advantage over China at such risk that it was thought imperative to 'contain' Clementi, by removing Malayan KMT affairs from his jurisdiction. From 1928 on, FO priorities regarding China were quite clear. They were to maintain as far as possible Britain's political influence and economic advantage in China and to retain British judicial authority over British citizens there. There was also the fact that no British colonial government could be allowed to disrupt FO endeavours, which the CO had recognized in 1929. The international priorities and the protocol of Whitehall meant that the CO always had to defer to FO requirements in the end. But the CO also had its own priorities. Among these was supporting the autonomy and authority of their colonial governors to the hilt, in theory, and as far as common sense allowed in practice. This meant that while the CO acknowledged FO priorities, the FO had to acknowledge that colonial domestic issues should be considered, accepted and built into any agreement between the FO and the CO on colonial management issues.

Because of this *modus vivendi* it was always necessary in Malayan Chinese matters to have the advice of the British Minister in Peking. Lampson had thus been drawn into Malayan matters from the beginning of his term in 1926 to keep the Chinese reaction in mind. By the same token it was always useful to have the views of the Governor of Hong Kong. Clementi in this capacity had been consulted, and had expressed the view that the KMT was a subversive organization which should be eradicated from British territories under a comprehensive unified policy on Hong Kong lines.²⁹ This allowed individual, but not corporate, membership of the KMT of China in Hong Kong; that is, no branches could exist legally and KMT individuals considered to be acting illegally

were banished. Since there was no legal KMT organization in Hong Kong, the Societies Ordinance was never invoked. Premises found to be acting as 'fronts' for KMT branches were closed down and their owners, with associates, were banished as individuals. The Hong Kong Government was never faced with the political dilemma of having to categorize the KMT as an illegal organization.

Clementi as Governor of the SS and High Commissioner for Malaya was, however, a different kettle of fish for London. Priorities expressed as Governor of Hong Kong in troubled times, maintaining an aggressive and punitive stand in the face of KMT 'subversive' activity, transferred unchanged to British Malaya in more politically accommodating times, came into conflict with FO priorities. The stated FO policy 'to recognize the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the Chinese people and to make such modifications in the Treaty system . . . to achieve an independent Sovereign State while at the same time securing adequate guarantees for the lives, property and commerce of British nationals in China'³⁰ was not seen by Clementi as being applicable to British Malaya. His prime objective — protecting the Malay rulers according to the treaties — seemed to mean protecting the Straits-born Chinese from themselves and their errant countrymen indulging in disloyal political activities. By not recognizing any nationalist sentiment as legitimate, or any need to inform London of his measures, Clementi created chaos. While consultation necessarily slowed the rate at which the Chinese community could be controlled, a lack of consultation impeded [relations with London] causing Sir John Pratt at the FO to ask sardonically how far a 'Colonial Governor [could] override the considered policy of H.M.'s Government'.³¹

Clementi was thus in trouble in every way concerning policy direction and policy management. Because he acted unilaterally, re-imposing a ban against the KMT without prior consultation with London, the FO and the CO were initially unprepared for the arbitrary reinforcement of the 1925 ban on the KMT and the rapid tightening of supervision of the Chinese. The FO and the CO had thought that the *status quo* of late 1929, that is, a rigorous inspection and supervision with selective punitive action against the KMT, was still in place, while Lampson investigated likely repercussions in China of more, or less, punitive action against the Malayan KMT. The CO responded sharply in March 1930 as a result of pressure from the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London and questions in the House of Commons by Lt-Cdr Kenworthy.³² A 'severe rebuke' was sent to Clementi from Lord Passfield, by personal letter, in which Clementi was told unequivocally 'that matters which affect international relations . . . must be settled by His Majesty's Government and by them

alone'. Passfield, who had appointed Clementi as Governor of the SS, obviously had an astute judgement of Clementi's character, for he went on to warn Clementi that 'it is all the more necessary . . . because your experience and knowledge of the Chinese may at times lead you to conclusions apparently so clear and so unquestionable that it may escape your notice that there is any room for doubt or any need for reference to a higher authority.'³³ Nobody in London would disagree with Passfield's assessment or the language used, but it was water off a duck's back in Clementi's case.

Passfield not only concurred in FO policy requirements and direction, but also relied heavily on FO advice about his own relations with Clementi.³⁴ The Chinese reaction to the banishment of Teh Lay-seng and Png Chi-cheng was the last straw for the FO and brought about the extraordinary shift in which the FO virtually assumed complete command over Clementi. Through Lord Passfield, the FO ordered Clementi 'to communicate by telegram with Sir Miles Lampson or His Majesty's Government whenever action is taken in Malaya — or preferably if possible before such action is taken — which has any bearing on the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government'.³⁵ Although in the circumstances it was sensible and comprehensive, it remains a remarkable instruction to a colonial governor to defer to the authority of a British ambassador in another country. The FO designated Sir Miles Lampson as agent, to resolve a latent problem of direct conflict with the CO about Malayan policy management, moving the problem from the inter-departmental to the diplomatic sphere to save time on consultation over long distances using as few channels as possible. Perhaps too it was an opportunity the FO had long wanted, to cut Clementi out of the China problems. It was the logical outcome of conflict between Clementi's unilateralist style, and the need to ensure the 'status quo' agreed upon between the Chinese Secretaries meeting in Hong Kong in November 1929, while Sino-British negotiations proceeded.

Clementi complied with the formal requirements of the CO/FO directive in his usual style. In reply to a query from Lampson about the possibility of rescinding the banishment orders, Clementi said that he was 'unprepared to reconsider the decision taken to expel Teh Lay-seng and Png Chi-cheng'.³⁶ By this time, the FO had become not only alarmed by Clementi's 'autocratic' and 'arbitrary' methods but fundamentally disenchanted with his rationale for them, and therefore he was pushed away from participation in Malayan KMT and Malayan Chinese problems. Interpretations of why the FO found itself forced to assume ascendancy in this brusque manner have to be based on Clementi's character as the pro-consul and his immediate past experiences as

Governor of Hong Kong, as much as on the situation in Malaya and FO negotiations in China;³⁷ in other words, the legacy Clementi brought with him to Malaya and its impact on the situation he inherited.

In his first year as Governor of Hong Kong in 1926 Clementi experienced serious anti-British rioting, and a prolonged, destructive boycott of British goods and shipping endangered the economic life of the island.³⁸ Communist influence and KMT participation were evident. The impact of this experience on Clementi was long-lived, and he continued to believe that the KMT had changed only from a real wolf into a wolf in sheep's clothing, following the expulsion of communists from the KMT in 1927, since anti-imperialist anti-British propaganda continued to emanate from Nanking. To counteract this subversive influence, Clementi wanted Britain to agree to an overall plan against the KMT in Southeast Asia, the first phase of which was to recognize the non-KMT breakaway Canton Government. That recommendation failed to impress London so Clementi then advised the permanent acquisition of Hong Kong by Britain.³⁹ That failed to impress as well and he advised that a joint Hong Kong-Malaya area should be established under a common, strict, anti-KMT management, by implication directed by himself. In Malaya in March 1930 Clementi went further and wrote 'I respectfully submit that protection of Malaya and Hong Kong against *Kuo Min Tang* intrigue . . . must be one of the principal objects of British diplomacy', and he advocated informing the Chinese Government that 'any embarrassment in relations' between themselves and Britain was their responsibility.⁴⁰

Unrecognized warning signals about Clementi had been available to London in the past. Apart from Clementi's own memoranda, directives and advice which condemned British Government management of its Chinese affairs as a tragically misconceived effort exposing Britain to ridicule as a paper tiger by the new Nationalist Government,⁴¹ Hu Han-min, a leading Chinese Government member and a veteran China KMT official warned the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in 1928 about misconceiving Clementi's feelings towards China. Hu Han-min considered that the British Government was using false criteria for deciding who had expert and intimate knowledge of China. He told Chamberlain that 'it is a mistake on your part to regard the exchange of visits between the Hong Kong Governor and local officials in Kwangtung as a sign of friendship while the Governor has not a thorough understanding of affairs. Moreover Clementi has in practice shown no friendship towards Chinese in Hong Kong',⁴² an accurate assessment only of Clementi's active dislike and disregard of ordinary Chinese nationalist aspirations, which he was to transfer to Malaya in February

1930 and extend in the next four years to include all Chinese who expressed even moderate requests for political recognition. His bias was reflected in his negative response to Straits-born Chinese requests for additional places in the State and Federal Councils and for an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council of the SS, mainly because, he said, he did not recognize the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) as representative of the Chinese community.⁴³ He saw these requests as reflecting wide-ranging political agitation by the Chinese. Although an unofficial 'Asian' place was created on the Legislative Council in 1932 Clementi nominated a Malay for the vacancy.⁴⁴

His understanding of the Chinese cannot just be seen as a resolution of class differences, based on his nostalgic view of Chinese society and the refinement of classical China. It is based on a more comprehensive view of the Chinese place in his imperial vision. Their interests should be subordinate to Malay interests.⁴⁵ Chinese in Malaya should be loyal to British rule and above all quiescent. His understanding of British protective rule in the FMS meant that the Chinese population had no political place in Malaya, and he intended by his decentralization policy to keep it that way.

Clementi brought destabilizing legacies with him to Malaya. He also inherited some problems from his Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the SS, A. M. Goodman, who had allowed the BMHB to hold its second annual delegates' conference on the same day as that on which Clementi was expected to arrive in Singapore. Goodman may once more have been trimming his sails to the winds from Government House, unsure of the new Governor's policy direction. He may have been unaware of Clementi's views on the KMT which had been available just after the Hong Kong Conference in November 1929. At that time Goodman had written that colonial governments in the future would 'be forced to take very drastic action against . . . KMT organizations within their administrations'.⁴⁶ The letter may have been intended as a signal to any new governor of the sort of advice he might receive from the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs in British Malaya.

As in the past, Goodman described the KMT as a danger to Malaya, a judgement condemned by Pratt at the FO as exaggeration and misrepresentation since Goodman failed to produce evidence acceptable to London to sustain his judgement.⁴⁷

However, despite this, London did recognize that the KMT constituted a problem for Malaya, but an internal problem which derived from Malayan KMT activities. Goodman insisted that the threat to Malaya was substantially different. First, it was a threat and not just a problem and second, it emanated from the Nanking KMT exercising illicit control

over the Malayan membership. In Goodman's terms it was an external threat which the KMT presented, not a local domestic one, since he stated that the community was generally indifferent to the KMT and suppression of it was of very little interest to the business section. The threat was not domestic disturbance, but foreign control of nationals residing in British territory.

There had been evidence of anti-British, anti-imperialist propaganda being sent to the BMHB in Singapore from the Nanking KMT High Command, but Goodman found that 'there was no evidence that the BMHB was concerned in the spread of anti-British propaganda'.⁴⁸ The activities of the BMHB were internal and organizational rather than ideological or subversive, but by reducing the BMHB to a postbox Goodman undermined his own argument of a subversive threat to British rule. Worse he also undermined Clementi's arguments for punitive action and set up disaffection at the FO for Malayan advice, perpetuating the divisions within the 'colonial mind'. Goodman made a lengthy analysis of what he saw as the actual extent of the KMT threat in Malaya. He described the Nanking Government's 'paper plan' for Malaya to use the BMHB as a central bureau, and attempted to show how this had been rendered useless by the dispersion of the BMHB after February 1930.⁴⁹ He seems to be saying that the very existence of the Nanking Government was a threat to Malaya. Goodman relied heavily on Nanking interference in the Chinese vernacular education system as evidence of the danger from the KMT. He wrote that the 'political content of Chinese language textbooks imported for use in Chinese vernacular schools 'by itself and independently of many other existing objections forms a cogent argument' against allowing the *Tang* to operate in Malaya, since it was turning a supposedly non-politically minded population into a politically minded one with an anti-British bias capable of 'causing the gravest embarrassment to our administration and the most serious damage to our trade and commerce'.⁵⁰ There was good evidence that Nanking had intervened in Malayan Chinese education from 1929 when the Chinese Government ordered all Chinese vernacular schools and their teachers to register with the Department of Education in Nanking and accept inspectors sent over from China. In September 1930, however, six months after describing the dangers latent in the Chinese vernacular schools, Goodman reported that few schools had complied with the Nanking directive.⁵¹ As a result, Clementi's memorandum to London in October 1930 was described by the FO as an over-exaggerated reaction which the facts did not support, and which the FO need not take too seriously or reply to.⁵² The FO may not have realized it but Goodman did not agree with Clementi's tight supervision of vernacular education,

or so he told Mr Eric Teichman, the British Representative in Nanking, when the latter was in Singapore for discussions with Lampson on the Malayan KMT, during February 1931.⁵³

A. B. Jordan, who stood in for either Goodman in the SS or Allen in the FMS, had spent most of his career in the FMS until he came to Singapore in June 1931. From 1930 until June 1931 he wrote that the FMS would benefit financially from the cessation of KMT fund-raising activities, and advised that the KMT should not be allowed to re-merge because that would ignite power struggles between the KMT and its opponents who were just waiting for that opportunity. He gave details of undercover branch activities, propaganda and interference in education in precise, but not dull language — 'the KMT are now licking their wounds and preparing for the fray'.⁵⁴ But the FO was not impressed, saying 'the Malayan people are making a mountain out of a molehill'.⁵⁵ Malayan officials had irrefutable evidence of Nanking bad faith over the Wang-Lampson agreements following the visit of George Wu, a KMT Inspector, to Malaya which started in January 1931. Wu had advised the Malayan KMT to reconstitute itself into nine separate branches, mainly in the FMS. George Wu had come to reinforce earlier directives from Nanking about the reconstruction of the Malayan KMT after the ban and the banishment of Teh Lay-seng in July 1930. Malayan officials, armed with this strong evidence, now made good use of it in Jordan's capable hands. Malayan authorities demanded that their own precise wording about prohibited KMT activities should be included in the Societies Ordinance Amendment then under discussion,⁵⁶ and declined to allow Teh Lay-seng and Png chi-cheng to return from banishment together. This, Malaya argued, were it permitted, would be interpreted by Nanking as Clementi giving in to KMT pressure.⁵⁷ Under Jordan's influence Malayan officials were able to stick to their point, convince the CO and win its support for their attitude and force the FO to draw its horns in and concede.

Before the remedial effect of Jordan's influence became active, the combined effects of Goodman's ambiguous reports and Clementi's arbitrary and apparently arrogant methods made it easy for the FO to substantiate its dominant role and discount more and more of the advice arriving from Malaya, either in terms of Clementi's vanity or a grandiose plan to stamp out the KMT. Clementi, said the FO, was called upon not to govern China and all stations east, but to govern Malaya in such a way as not to disrupt FO priorities.⁵⁸ It was also FO opinion that 'considerations of high policy [demanded] that the Governor of the Straits Settlements, whether he is in a position to appreciate their force or not, should loyally carry out any decision of His Majesty's Government'. The

FO was sufficiently concerned about the disruptive effects of Clementi's policy in Malaya to impel George Mounsey, a Permanent Secretary at the FO, to write to Sir Samuel Wilson at the CO that if Malayan 'intransigence' persisted 'it is conceivable that HMG [His Majesty's Government] may eventually be driven in defence of their interests to over-ride the Colonial Government in circumstances which would involve a serious blow to their prestige as well as great harm to British prestige in China generally'.⁵⁹ Thus with tragic irony the man whose whole professional ethic was based on loyalty, was considered incapable of being a loyal servant of the Crown in March 1931 and in need of supervision,⁶⁰ from Sir Miles Lampson.

Clementi and Lampson were friends, men of accomplishment and stature, high professional standing and commanding presence, experts on China and Chinese matters who were both widely travelled in China and long-time servants of the British Crown. However their understanding of contemporary Chinese aspirations and organizations was very different, which is why Lampson succeeded in arriving at a *modus vivendi* with the Chinese and why Clementi signally failed to understand the tenor of modern China.

Lampson, the 'victor' was not an intellectual. He was worldly wise, gregarious, pragmatic and shrewd, if not always sensitive, and often patronizing towards the Chinese.⁶¹ He was patient, with a good eye for the main chance in negotiation — 'we should place ourselves on a good wicket' — and for the subtle advantages that wicket could offer in future possible confrontations, to 'justify and give the sanction of international agreement to any direct action the Malayan authorities might have to take against the local *Kuomintang* on account of a breach of the agreement and thus spike the guns of would-be protest makers in Nanking'.⁶² There is no doubt that despite his subtlety and patience in negotiation Lampson used a distinctive Victorian robustness to settle final issues. He was completely confident of his own social and professional position in British culture and of the moral and ethical advantages which British political and cultural experience could confer on a new Chinese nation.⁶³ He therefore saw no need to stand unnecessarily on his own or on British dignity to achieve British policy aims when flexibility could get the same result.

Another intriguing aspect of Lampson's character and his method is revealed by his relationship with the FO. It puts him in the same class, yet apart from, those countless other servants of empire who had disagreements with either the FO or the CO. Lampson had had a feud with Sir John Pratt, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the FO, for many years. It originally concerned the quality of legation personnel, and the propensity

of those, whom Lampson believed less than adequate, to go over his head in matters of disagreement and consult Pratt directly. It revolved round what Lampson perceived as unnecessary FO interference in legation contact with China and Lampson's appraisal of Pratt's China policy as 'defeatist' in its lack of moral (and armed) support and protection for British settlements in China. Lampson thought that the Eastern specialists at the FO lacked understanding of the way China was going towards unification and independence and that Pratt particularly lacked political judgement. He wanted Pratt removed from Far Eastern matters but Wellesley, then Foreign Secretary, did not agree with Lampson about this.⁶⁴ Though Lampson was often thwarted as in the case of Pratt, excessively irritated and sometimes unsupported, he was never worsted, and generally his policy was accepted.⁶⁵ His successful resolution of the Malayan KMT affair highlights characteristics which made him one of the most effective servants of empire in his time. He was uncompromising on matters concerning British integrity as he saw it and flexible on matters which could be mediated, but only in the end to British advantage.

The central episode of Lampson's period 'in charge of' the Malayan KMT, was an exchange of letters between himself and Dr Wang Chengting, then Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Nanking Government, which aimed at a resolution of Malayan Government policy problems with the Malayan KMT. Whatever the long-term limitations of its effectiveness, this exchange of notes marked a significant achievement for Lampson. It occurred at a time when he was engaged in extremely delicate and long, drawn out negotiations with the Nanking Government. The two critical years, 1930 and 1931, charted a change in Lampson's role, from that of consultant on Malayan Chinese affairs, a function he had performed since his arrival in China in 1926, to that of director of Malayan policy towards or against the KMT.

There were several factors at work in this period which affected, one way or another, Lampson's negotiating freedom, but which were all successfully incorporated by him into his larger strategy of attempting to achieve advantageous agreement with China on extra-territoriality issues and the status of British residents under Chinese law. He negotiated at this point only with the most senior of the Nanking officials such as Wang, and drew Chiang Kai-shek in on Malayan KMT matters. A second factor was his ability to negotiate and convince Malayan officials of the need to adapt their hard-line policy sufficiently to conform with foreign affairs requirements, and this in the contrived absence of their Governor, in London. It had to be done without contravening the protocol of

colonial government while maintaining his own authority to manage Malayan KMT affairs.

A third factor was the increasing, consistent and sometimes uncalled for animosity towards Clementi and the Malayan officials, built up in the FO by advice perceived as inaccurate and contradictory, emanating from Malaya. By July 1931 Lampson himself was to express similar irritation with the Malayan Government, ironically at a time when it actually had a good case. But in 1930, FO animosity was instrumental in sustaining Lampson's authority to direct Malayan Government policy on the KMT, and in keeping CO reservations about intrusion into, and erosion of, the Governor's authority to a minimum. The FO had problems of its own with the CO which was expected to accept FO wishes loyally and whose reaction and response to FO advice was deemed to be 'like the mills of God' by MacKillop.⁶⁶ This added to FO peremptoriness when approaching Malayan affairs and increased Lampson's importance to London.

At the start of 1930 extra-territoriality discussions were at a critical stage. Lampson, in his view of his China posting, wrote that, 'extra-territoriality negotiations dominated all other questions',⁶⁷ but he was also involved in complicated manoeuvres with Wang, on the rendition of Wei Hai Wei.⁶⁸ His philosophy under these conditions was 'that it didn't pay to be in a hurry when negotiating with the Chinese. When Britain is in a position to give something away which the Chinese want and cannot otherwise secure a strong line is likely to be successful'.⁶⁹ Personally, Lampson thought Wang shifty and unreliable in debate and practice, but meeting 'firmness with firmness' meant that 'the firmer we are the fairer we can afford to be... if you are prepared to meet Chinese national aspirations as far as reason and equity permit', while maintaining the framework of legitimate British rights, constructive results would follow.⁷⁰ Although Lampson had difficulties with the Chinese and Malayan officials and with the 'old folks at home', those mandarins of Whitehall with whom he was having his 'little wrangles',⁷¹ he had a generally very good relationship with the Foreign Secretaries under whom he served. In 1929 the change of political philosophy in London, from the Liberal Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Labour Mr Arthur Henderson, meant that pressure was put on Lampson to accelerate the pace of negotiation with China, and bring about a quick resolution. Henderson thought the Chinese were getting tired of procrastination and would act unilaterally on extra-territoriality issues unless Britain showed signs of being willing to accommodate to them.

It was in this climate of pressure and manoeuvre that Clementi generated serious reverberations for Sino-British relations. The FO had

been made aware of this danger in 1929 when Sir Hugh Clifford had, in his turn, but with more decorum, delivered his *volte-face*. 1929 marked the point at which Lampson made his initial move into the management of Malayan KMT affairs and all documents concerning them were circulated to Lampson from then on.⁷² However it was policy management not policy initiative that Lampson controlled during 1930 and 1931.

It is important to realize that Lampson was not at all in sympathy with the 'insidious and objectionable' tone and extent of KMT activity in Malaya, and that he supported a policy which prevented it becoming a threat to British rule.⁷³ But in 1929 Lampson thought it was untenable to proscribe the Malayan KMT, because 'we put ourselves in the wrong while incidentally we drive it underground and force it to adopt underhand methods'. The better method was to recognize it, supervise it and take drastic action if branches or individuals were proved to be subversive. In those circumstances there could be no unfavourable reaction in China.⁷⁴ Management of the Malayan KMT according to Lampson in 1930 meant that a way had to be found of insisting that KMT members in 'British territory refrain . . . from subversive and disloyal activities'. The method was to carry the war into the enemy's camp and ask the Nanking Government, directly, whether it had authorized interference in Malayan Chinese affairs. Until Britain received a proper reply from the Nanking Government, nothing would be done to alter the policy in Malaya. Britain should avoid replying to China on the KMT issue if that could be avoided, given the precarious position of the Nanking Government in its struggles with warlords and communists.⁷⁵ If pressed, the 'metropolitan' (London) Government should summon the Chinese Minister in London and dress him down in a 'frank and candid lecture' about the KMT in Malaya and their offence against 'the principles of international comity'.⁷⁶ Pratt thought that Lampson and the FO were evidently not so far apart.⁷⁷

And at first sight it looked as though Clementi and Lampson were not so far apart either; but there was a significant difference between them. Lampson, consistent with his whole philosophy of dealing with the Chinese, chose what he saw as the tactical moment for the hard line, whereas Clementi applied it regardless. Lampson, in July 1930, thought that it was unrealistic to expect that moves to reform the *Kuomintang* in China would accommodate the needs of the Malayan Government and Malayan Chinese. He thought the Nanking Government misguided in its pursuit of foreign treaties at the expense of internal reform.⁷⁸ Lampson had tried without much success to impress on the Nanking Minister of Education the dangers of interference in Malayan Chinese vernacular

schools, and in August 1930 he authorized the British Representative in Nanking to warn the Nationalist Government to retract its interventionist policy before the position in Malaya became intolerable.⁷⁹ From July 1930, and with the expulsion of Png Chi-cheng and Teh Lay-seng, Malayan KMT matters became the dominating subject of direct negotiation between Wang and Lampson, who in line with his diplomatic philosophy had exerted firmness. Lampson put his own and the British attitude very plainly; throughout British territory, individuals could hold what political opinions they liked provided individuals did not become actively subversive or disloyal. If that occurred, Lampson warned that Britain was prepared to take the 'strongest and straightest action against them and explain the reason to the Chinese Government'.⁸⁰ According to Lampson, Wang professed to find this attitude reasonable. However, early in October 1930 Wang telegraphed the British mission in Nanking, requesting that Teh Lay-seng and Png Chi-cheng be allowed to return to Malaya, but omitted any reference to the position of the Malayan KMT.⁸¹

Lampson had also despatched a more balanced view of communist influence and threat to the Nationalist Government than that which Clementi was currently sending to London. However he stated that recognition of KMT activity in Malaya was a serious and complicated matter.⁸² Concerned to maintain Britain's negotiating advantage, Lampson had also to take into account the CO's attitude that 'whatever the merits of action or inaction, the prestige of the Governor is now involved and must be upheld'.⁸³ This would be difficult for Lampson to manage delicately, since the Governor of a British Colony had been told to inform the British Ambassador to another country before he took any action impinging on foreign affairs in his territory; in the current climate of Sino-British negotiation this meant virtually everything in British Malaya. MacKillop at the FO was sufficiently exasperated by Clementi's intractability in October 1930 over Teh Lay-seng's banishment to record in a minute, '*Sic jubes stet pro natione voluntas* [Such is his command. Let it stand for the will of the nation]. We can hardly tell the Chinese Legation that . . .'⁸⁴ Lampson would have agreed.

What the FO did, in the event, was to suggest that Lampson should visit Singapore in February 1931 as part of his extended tour of Southeast Asia, significantly while Clementi was expected to be in London discussing his Malayan policy with the FO and the CO. It was an underhand, but understandable, solution arrived at in a climate where the FO thought that 'wherever Sir C. Clementi is there will be trouble',⁸⁵ and to which the CO agreed in some embarrassment, well aware of the blatant discourtesy.⁸⁶ In January 1931, the CO, still embarrassed, became resigned to subterfuge in its dealings with Clementi after conferences

with him in December 1930 and January 1931, where 'both sides [Clementi and the FO/CO] seem to be in the right from their own point of view' and where there was general pointlessness in further discussions with Clementi.⁸⁷

The international aspect of Malayan problems was growing more critical in any case. In spite of Lampson's earlier assessment that reaction in China was not noteworthy, by December 1930 resentment had increased significantly against Clementi's punitive policy and was causing serious concern. This stemmed from the fact that it was conveyed by Hu Han-min, thought to be the most powerful man in the Nanking Government and who, according to the FO, had at one time 'been our strongest advocate in the councils of the National Government'.⁸⁸ Lampson therefore prepared to pick up the most delicate thread in his management of the Malayan KMT and negotiate with Malayan officials in the absence of their Governor. Fending off Chinese demands for an explanation of Malayan policy,⁸⁹ Lampson exercised evasive tactics by visiting Malaya in February 1931. His main concern was to convince the Colonial Government to restrict its punitive policy against the KMT, on the lines of the Hong Kong method of allowing individual membership of the China KMT only, but no KMT organization in the territory. This, Lampson wrote, made the government position 'impregnable in the event of necessity for drastic measures' and defused accusations of tyranny against Chinese nationals abroad.⁹⁰

En route to Malaya, Lampson took the matter of the Malayan KMT to Chiang Kai-shek at a meeting (for tea), which included Wang. Chiang Kai-shek thought that the Malayan Government had a less liberal attitude towards the Chinese than in the past, while Lampson made it clear that his own forthcoming visit to Malaya was in no way a mission, but a fact-finding visit to enable him to mediate in some substantial difficulties that in fact existed.⁹¹

The ground in Malaya was also being well prepared for Lampson by preliminary discussions between British consular and diplomatic officials in China, the Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs in Hong Kong and Goodman, in an attempt to put the Malayan officials in a receptive frame of mind. But these were not very successful. Goodman maintained his arguments about the inherent danger of the KMT in Malaya, his fear of it and the demerits of the Hong Kong method which he did not see as controlling the propensity of the KMT to organize even when banned. Individuals would still become groups, or in other words, underground branches.⁹² Although sympathetic to Malayan officials' problems with foreign political societies, Lampson, in the official meeting⁹³ on 8 February, 1931 at Government House in Singapore, had to emphasize

Table 1: Conference on Chinese Affairs, Government House, Singapore
Sunday, 8th February 1931, at 10.30 a.m.

Present

- His Excellency the Officer Administering the Government,
(Mr. John Scott, C.M.G.)
The Hon. The Acting Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements,
(Mr. M.B. Shelley)
The Hon. The Chief Secretary to Government, Federated Malay States
(Mr C.W.H. Cochrane)
The Hon. the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Straits Settlements
(Mr. A.M. Goodman)
The Hon. the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Federated Malay States
(Mr. P.T. Allen)
The Hon. Mr H. Fairburn (Inspector-General of Police)
C. Hannigan, Esq., Commissioner of Police, Federated Malay States
A.B. Jordan, Esq., (Acting Protector of Chinese, Perak).
A.F. Wood, Esq., (Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Hongkong).
His Excellency Sir Miles Lampson, K.C. M.G., C.B., M.V.O.,
(British Minister to China)
E. Teichman, Esq., C.M.G., C.I.E., (Chinese Secretary to the Legation at Peking).
C.N. Stirling, Esq., (Third Secretary to the Legation at Peking).
-

Source: FO 371/15466/1824, Encl. Transcript of Conference at Government House, 1 April 1931.

that the *Kuomintang* was the Government in China, and that the Malayan Government would have to learn to live with it, though remaining 'political kings in their own country', as Scott, the Officer Administering the Government, put it at the time. Lampson also emphasized that it was not policy, but application of policy which was the root of the problem. He was prepared to take up any concrete cases of illegal or subversive activities with the Chinese Government, but they had to be concrete and recent, not abstractions of ancient grouses about KMT activity. More germane, he insisted that the Societies Ordinance which controlled the KMT organization, would have to be amended to avoid stigmatizing the KMT as illegal. This, he said, would put him on strong ground when presenting legitimate complaints from the Malayan Government to Nanking.

Confronted with such clear direction, Goodman responded by clinging to arguments supporting the *status quo*, which had sufficed him since 1920 and which he failed to see caused his present difficulty by their frailty. Allen, firmly believing that China was pursuing an irredentist policy in Malaya, was not convinced that putting a halt to this would

create economic disadvantage for Malaya. Both, like Clementi, put the problem in its Malayan context. In response Lampson had to put the international ramifications in plain terms while expressing 'diffidence in bargaining'. He said that Malayan Government policy was not congruent with the British Government's policy towards the Chinese Government, that is with maintaining formal and friendly relations. He said it was difficult to reconcile KMT policy in Malaya with friendly relations with China, 'the policy which I am instructed to carry out in China'.

On the following day, 9 February 1931, further discussions at Government House resulted in tentative agreement. The problem of amending the Societies Ordinance without weakening government control over the KMT, though difficult, was resolved by the addition of an amending ordinance which re-defined an unregistered society as not a society within the meaning of the Act and therefore not illegal. This allowed Lampson to negotiate with a KMT Government in China unhampered by definitions of KMT illegality. Although this seemed the best solution in February, it carried a nasty sting in its tail which was to frustrate Malayan implementation of the Lampson-Wang agreements made in April, until October 1931. The second important recommendation concerned reducing the banishment terms on Png Chi-cheng and Teh Lay-seng and treating them as a problem separate from the matter of KMT organization. It was agreed that this should be regarded as a preliminary matter, which Lampson could add to his negotiating armoury or drop if necessary. Three other recommendations were included in the formal report from the conference. Two of them required that the Chinese Government provide a statement discountenancing the establishment of the KMT in Malaya; and a third, listed by Lampson as his first, was a definition of his own attitude, that he 'was not prepared to run counter to the views of responsible local governments on a question of this nature... involving the good government of our Malayan possessions and the safety of a centre of such strategic importance as Singapore'.⁹⁴ There was every reason why Lampson should include such a clear statement of position and why he should place it as the first of the recommendations. Negotiating with colonial officials in the absence of their Governor, Lampson had to clear himself and yet remain on strong negotiating ground, and this to some extent he was able to do. Lampson had received formal authority from the FO, with Clementi's concurrence, to negotiate on a promise of reduced banishment sentences — the result of the FO, CO and Clementi conferences in late December 1930 and early January 1931.⁹⁵

Armed in this insubstantial way Lampson returned to China late in February 1931 to continue negotiations with Wang. These in one sense

were the easiest part in the whole business of managing the Malayan KMT, because additional problems were accruing in Malaya while he was negotiating with Wang. Initially Wang was not prepared to accept that the Chinese Government should discountenance KMT organization, as the Malayan Government wished, but suggested instead that the Nanking Government provide assurances against unwelcome KMT activities. Lampson subsequently indicated to the FO that he would not negotiate on this issue even if it meant closing down discussions.⁹⁶ But the FO advised Lampson to continue negotiation, even though on 6 March 1931 Wang repeated that an official embargo on KMT organization in Malaya would not be made by the Nanking Government. Wang introduced the banishments into the discussion, and suggested that an exchange of letters indicating the deportees' willingness not to contravene Malayan law would resolve the question, and that they could then return to Malaya. These cumbersome discussion manoeuvres by Lampson and Wang were part of achieving a face-saving solution, while insisting on British requirements that Nanking make a formal and definite statement of discountenance, and a ploy to prevent Nanking using the banishment cases as a *quid pro quo*.⁹⁷

At the beginning of April 1931, Lampson made what he described as a final attempt to bring Wang round to the British viewpoint, according to the principles enunciated in Singapore in February. He told Wang that failing Wang's acceptance of the major issue of China discountenancing a Malayan KMT organization, discussion would be shelved, a display of firmness which provoked Wang into a request for more time to consider. The response from Wang on 2 April virtually conceded most of Lampson's stipulations, stating 'that it has never been the intention of the *Kuomintang* to interfere in domestic affairs of a foreign government and that my Government does not countenance interference. . . .' Wang stated that the National Government did not propose to establish party offices (*Tangpu*) in Malaya, and that the deportees had promised 'solemnly' to observe the laws of Malaya.⁹⁸ This was formalized in the signed letter which Wang exchanged with Lampson on 4 April, and was extended to

and I take note of Your Excellency's assurance that on the above understanding the Malayan Governments will amend their local legislation making it clear that the *Kuomintang* of China is not, as such, an illegal society in Malaya; that they have no objection to any Chinese in Malaya being a member of the *Kuomintang* of China and that they will not interfere with such members of the *Tang* so long as their activities are not illegal or subversive and provided no attempts are made to establish central or branch *tangpu* in Malaya.

Wang also expressed conventional appreciation of the friendly attitude of the Malayan authorities during the discussions, while reminding them of their future intention regarding the deportees.⁹⁹ Lampson's formal, signed letter requested that (if)

Your Excellency will state on behalf of the Chinese Government that they do not countenance any improper interference by the *Kuomintang* in the domestic affairs of Malaya or the establishment of central or branch party offices (*tangpu*) there, I shall have pleasure in assuring Your Excellency in reply that the Malayan Governments will amend their legislation making it clear that the *Kuomintang* of China is not, as such, an illegal society. . . .

Lampson was more precise than Wang about the deportees, stating that he would recommend the cancellation of Teh Lay-seng's banishment given the proper assurances. However, with regard to Png Chi-cheng, he would recommend favourable reconsideration only after a year, during which time Png would have to cease agitation against the British Government. Later there was an agreement with Wang in May that these texts should be made public, which pleased and surprised Lampson,¹⁰⁰ who had not expected that Wang would choose or be able to honour the earlier arrangement. For by that time the rot had set in on both sides, and the sophisticated amity of the formal letters was being dissipated.

Institutionalizing the proposals in the Wang-Lampson letters was impeded by Malayan official reluctance to proceed with the necessary bureaucratic and legislative reforms, because they perceived, with strong evidence, that China was in fact dishonouring the principles enunciated in the exchange of letters. The CO supported the Malayan Government over this, declined to exert pressure on Clementi and virtually forced the FO to pull in its horns in dealing with domestic Malayan issues. The delicacy of the February Singapore negotiations was under strain and had been, in fact, since January 1931 when Clementi, writing from his Oxford home to Sir Gilbert Grindle at the CO, had tried to convey a message to Malaya, insisting that his policy remain unaltered.¹⁰¹ This wish was politely deflected but in March Clementi wrote a forceful minute putting the Malayan KMT issue squarely in the Malayan context of protection of the Malayan population as a primary consideration, and discounting any responsibility for, or recognition of the China situation¹⁰² as a factor in Malayan security. Clementi left London for Malaya on 21 May 1931, having been absent from his colony during a significant period in Malayan Chinese affairs, a notable absence by any standard. The FO does not seem to have recognized that for a man of his character and ethos he had made enormous concessions to them by remaining in London and allowing Lampson to visit Malaya and direct Malayan

policy in his absence, without undue fuss. He had also swallowed a great deal of pride. A man of brilliant intellect, he could not possibly have missed the intended message of such a set of circumstances. Yet he stood on no ceremony and consulted, if fruitlessly, with the FO and the CO.

The FO tried to convince Malayan officials to alter the wording of the proposed Ordinance Amendment to read an innocuous 'maintains no branches',¹⁰³ but Malaya insisted on the precise wording which included proscription of meeting places, registers and fund raising. They were able to carry their point, fortified by the strong evidence they had acquired of Chinese bad faith over the Wang-Lampson agreements and attempts by Nanking to resurrect the Malayan KMT. They were supported by the CO, and the Malayan choice of wording appears in the three clauses of the Amendment as passed on 31 August 1931,¹⁰⁴ but not put into effect until October 1931. Malaya also argued from the same evidence against the simultaneous return from banishment of Teh Lay-seng and Png Chicheng, saying it was possible to interpret this as the Malayan Government giving in to pressure, and as a condoning the resumption of KMT activity and influence in Malaya.¹⁰⁵ The delays enraged the FO and irritated Lampson, and he wrote, 'Singapore are really hopeless [— can we not] get them back on the right lines'. This for Lampson meant adopting an 'elastic' attitude, which he spelled out precisely as turning a blind eye to unobtrusive KMT meetings. 'There will be no peace as long as you have Goodman dealing with Chinese affairs,' he added, in a final blast of exasperation.¹⁰⁶ Lampson was in the invidious position of having given public guarantees of good faith without having enough facts to substantiate reprimands to Wang and explanations of Malayan Government delays. The FO, in accusing Clementi of 'being at the back of'¹⁰⁷ all the delays, missed the point that that was the proper place for the Governor to be if the KMT was again resurgent in Malaya and the Chinese Government had indeed been guilty of bad faith.

Wang, tackled on the issue of bad faith, tried to argue the *contretemps* away in terms of 'nuclei' of interested KMT supporters and the fact that Nanking was not yet aware of the substance of the Wang-Lampson letters, reasons not accepted by Lampson who told London that it was apparent that Wang had been unable to induce the China *Kuomintang* to abide by the terms of settlement.¹⁰⁸ The outcome of the *contretemps*, apart from a strengthened Malayan government position in relation to FO pressure, was another exchange of letters between Lampson and Wang in June 1931. Lampson demanded further assurances that attempts to organize and establish branches of the *Kuomintang* in Malaya would cease immediately in order that the terms of settlement could be fulfilled in Malaya,¹⁰⁹ whose government declined to move further

without such assurance. The letter was handed to Wang personally by the British Representative in Nanking in the company of the British Consul-General, on the instructions of Lampson, to lend assistance in the case of 'argument [about] the meaning of the Chinese terms in question'.¹¹⁰ Wang, however, did not argue with the evidence and responded in writing on 13 August in evasive terms, 'mere prevarications' according to Lampson.¹¹¹ Wang was in any case to be replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs, partly because the agreement he had reached with Lampson was not acceptable to Nanking, and Lampson felt that nothing further could be done to enforce the April agreements on the Chinese side.

The Malayan Government closed its joint venture with Lampson in the management of the Malayan KMT in a surprisingly strong position. It had complied with the understanding arrived at in April under Lampson's guidance and had amended the Societies Ordinance on its own terms. It had given some ground on the banishment issue by cancelling the order against Teh Lay-seng, but had stuck to its position of delaying the return of Png Chi-cheng. It had confronted the FO on a final issue, and gained the support of the CO. It had been proved right enough to cause the FO to discipline the foreign government rather than colonial officials.¹¹² However this success had been achieved while Jordan, not Goodman, was in charge of the evidence, and it was an indication of a slow retrieval of Malayan Government autonomy in Malayan Chinese affairs over the next few years.¹¹³ Jordan's skill may have proved the FO right in its assertion that Goodman was a problematic factor in Malaya-China and Malaya-London relationships.

China's reactions to and protests against Clementi's suppression of the KMT in Malaya in February 1930 and the deportation of the two KMT activists in July 1930 were to be expected. The Central Executive Committee of the KMT in Nanking headed by Hu Han-min, Sun Fo and Wang Chung-hui, responded in March 1930 by appealing to the British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, to lift the ban on the Malayan KMT. They pointed out that Clementi's action could be taken as 'tantamount to an unfriendly act towards the *Kuomintang* in particular and the Chinese nation in general',¹¹⁴ by arguing that the activities of the KMT branch in Singapore were directed towards training the Chinese overseas to become law-abiding citizens, thus posing no threat to the British authorities.

The other source of vocal protest came from Hu Han-min, a TMH 'old guard' and right-wing KMT stalwart, who had built up an excellent relationship with the British Government in London over the years. Hu was so disenchanted with Clementi's onslaught that on several occasions he attacked the British policy in Malaya and called for the strengthening

of Chinese nationalism to get rid of foreign oppression in China itself. In his speech to the Legislative Yuan on 3 November 1930, Hu poured out all his grievances against foreign 'imperialism', including British ill-treatment of Chinese nationals in Malaya and banishment of Chinese party activists and compatriots.¹¹⁵ Whether or not his accusations of British discrimination towards the Chinese in Malaya were factually based is a moot point. His speech was translated and transmitted to both the CO and the FO, keeping them informed that the Malayan KMT issue was becoming an increasingly contentious one between Britain and China. In December 1930, Hu Han-min had a private conversation with Sir Miles Lampson, in many ways a sad little occasion. For Hu Han-min apparently accepted Lampson's 'frank' statements that Chinese Government interference in Malayan domestic affairs was unacceptable, that literal application of the *San Min Chu-i* (the 'Three Principles of the People') was irreconcilable with loyalty to British authorities in Malaya, and that Hu Han-min would be more usefully occupied trying to 'keep his party's activities abroad within bounds'.¹¹⁶ All good bracing Lampson stuff, to which there was very little answer from someone in Hu Han-min's now relegated position.

And what of Chiang Kai-shek, the man struggling to stay at the top? He needed British goodwill but needed there to be freedom from foreign control of his country's economics and finances, an almost impossible equation in the politico-economic climate of the time. He also needed the money and support generated by the existence of the Malayan KMT — first, to sustain his military activities against the Japanese and the warlords — but equally important Chiang Kai-shek needed the politico-factional support of the moderate to right-wing Malayan KMT in his own power struggle to retain his leadership. To be successful in this he needed to centralize control of the *Nanyang* KMT organizations, activities and progress on his behalf. By definition this meant interfering in the domestic affairs of British Malaya. The Wang-Lampson Agreement was a necessary artifact of this long-term strategy; as such, he tolerated it but had no intention of honouring it in strict terms, since he had the KMT foot in the door with individual membership of the China KMT. His ceremonial tea occasion with Lampson allowed him to deplore the fact that Malayan policy towards the KMT had become much harsher than in recent years, a condition that would hold good until 1937 and the formal outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.

The last word on the particular KMT matter of 1931 was that 'the Malayan Governments have implemented understanding of April 1st as [an] amending Ordinance [which] became law on August 31 and they now expect Chinese government to adhere strictly to settlement'. But

without much hope of success, apparently, for 'there is much evidence to show that Chinese Government is acting in bad faith'. The Malayan Government indicated it was determined not 'to modify . . . considered policy with regard to *Kuomintang* in any way'.¹¹⁷ And so Clementi remained unrepentant, determined not to be misunderstood or supplanted and in effect determined also to extend the punitive policy prevailing against the KMT in a more covert way, to constrain and restrict Chinese nationalism throughout the entire Chinese population in British Malaya. This was because he saw his main duty to be that of upholding the treaties made with the Malay rulers and preventing the country and the Malays from being 'flooded' by Chinese.¹¹⁸ His struggle with the KMT was the initial stage of this strategic plan.

Sir Miles Lampson ended his management of the Malayan KMT on a dying note. He put the Malayan situation within the context of avoiding friction with China, but without real hope that the Chinese would adhere to their side of the bargain. The only thing he seemed sure about was that the British should adhere honourably to their side of the agreement, keep themselves on a good wicket and 'thus spike the guns of would-be protesters in Nanking'. 'In the end', he went on, 'this is what happened . . . thanks also to the elimination of Hin Ham [sic] Min [Hu Han-min]¹¹⁹ and a certain waning of the influence and prestige of the *Kuomintang* generally, the question of the *Tang* in Malaya has, as between the *Wai Chiao Pu* and His Majesty's Legation in China, been completely quiescent during the past two years'.¹²⁰

A fair summary if not entirely accurate. Sir Miles lost the war in one sense, even if he won this KMT battle. The extra-territoriality treaty, a major cause of all the diplomatic flurry about the KMT in 1930 and 1931, though formalized by 1932, was never ratified.¹²¹ The FO was left with a useless document because the Chinese had in any case decreed the termination of all extra-territoriality privileges from 1 January, 1930, and would act unilaterally if they wished and were able. The Malayan KMT virtually became a casualty of diplomatic by-play rather than the victim of its own excesses. The KMT, the cause of all the manoeuvrings, survived despite deportations, through individual membership of the China KMT and congregations of underground branches wherever these could be established.

The Wang-Lampson Agreement cast a long shadow over future KMT activity. Sometimes, as in the years 1937-1941, colonial authorities found it convenient to turn a blind eye to infringements of the Agreement. Then Britain was sympathetic, within limits, to Malayan Chinese support for their countrymen fighting Japan. But the Wang-Lampson Agreement had institutionalized discipline of KMT activities

and the Governor could always invoke it as did Sir Shenton Thomas when banning the *San Min Chu-i* Youth Corps (SMCIYC). The Wang-Lampson Agreement may have been on the shelf in later years but it was in a handy place to be taken down, dusted off and re-activated. The Agreement survived the chaos of war but not the exigencies of decolonization, when there was a need to create a positive Malayan/Malaysian consciousness among Malayan Chinese rather than merely inhibit a Sinocentric consciousness. The demise of the KMT Government in China made the Wang-Lampson Agreement an anachronism far more telling that the Societies (Amendment Ordinance of 1948, but using Lampson's metaphor, the Agreement had a long and useful innings.

Notes

1. Rendition of ports meant the transfer of ports formerly under British jurisdiction to Nationalist Chinese authority. Extra-territoriality was, in practice, the modified recognition by Britain of Chinese jurisdiction over British subjects and citizens ordinarily resident in China. Lampson's own detailed account of these matters appears in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* (hereafter *DBFP*), edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert, Second Series, Vol. XI, 'The Far East' (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), 1970); the *Appendix*, 'Sir Miles Lampson's Review of Events in China, 1926-1933', pp. 558-98. See also W. Roger Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1971), Chapter 5, 'Unequal Treaties'; Sir Eric Teichman, *Affairs of China* (London: Methuen, 1932), especially Chapter 6.
2. CO 129/499/30001/20, the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Cecil Clementi, to the Colonial Secretary, Mr Leo Amery, 14 January 1927.
3. *Min Kuo Jih Pao*, 8 March 1930.
4. Sir Cecil Clementi was educated at St Paul's School, London and Magdalen College, Oxford, where he was the Boden Sanskrit Scholar for 1897. He progressed from being an FO cadet in Hong Kong in 1899, through various colonial appointments, to become Colonial Secretary in Ceylon from 1922 to 1925. He became Governor of Hong Kong from 1925 until 1930, when he became Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States, where he remained until 1934. In 1926 he received an LL.D. from London University and in the same year was made a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George (K.C.M.G.) In 1931 he received the Grand Cross of the same Order (G.C.M.G.) He died of diabetes in 1947. *The Dominions and Colonial Office List for 1935* gives more details of his early career.
5. Yeo Kim Wah, 'British Policy Towards the Malays in the Federated Malay States, 1920-1940', Ph.D. Thesis (Canberra: Australian National University, 1972), Chapter 4; FO 371/15467/1848, Enclosure, Minute by Sir Cecil Clementi initialled 'CC 29/3', 2 April 1931.
6. FO 371/14728/1327, Enclosure, Paraphrased Telegram, the Governor, SS, Sir Cecil Clementi to the CO, dated 26 February 1930, 10 March 1930; CO 275/127, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Executive Council, 18 February 1930, p. 3
7. FO 371/14728/2082, Shorthand Report of a Conference at Government House, Singapore, 20 February 1930 from which the following discussion derives.

8. However in March and April in Kuala Lumpur, flag flying occurred on an improper though logical day. Clementi's visit coincided with commemoration days for Sun Yat-sen and 'Humiliation' days. Clementi was incensed and eventually banished those he thought were concerned in staging the insult — Teh Lay-seng and Png Chicheng
9. FO 371/14728/2082, Enclosure, Shorthand Report, 20 February 1930.
10. CO 275/125, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, SS, 24 March 1930, p B 24.
11. *Straits Times*, 27 February 1930, 20 March 1930.
12. *Straits Times* 'Editorial', 25 March, 26 March 1930.
13. From January to May 1931 the *Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (MRCA)* was apparently produced in both the FMS and the SS; after May it was produced solely by the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, SS. For the FMS editions, see CO 717/80/82398, 'Chinese Affairs Monthly Reviews', 1931.
14. See for example NL 5949 GD 36/88/27, the Governor, SS, Sir Laurence Guillemard, to the Colonial Office, 18 March 1927 and NL 5949 GD 36/156/27, the Governor, SS to the CO, 30 April 1927. Clementi's approaches to Batavia, and NEI reactions are found in CO 273/565/72139, 'Visit of the Governor to Batavia', October 1930; CO 273/567/72163 includes a letter from Clementi to the CO, dated 6 July 1930, on his proposed plan for concerted action with the NEI against intrusive Chinese nationalism in the two territories, July 1930.
15. Yeo Kim Wah, 'British Policy . . .', pp. 292-5; FO 371/15467/1848, Enclosure, Minute by Sir Cecil Clementi, initialled CC 29/3, 2 April 1931.
16. CO 717/73/7239, 'Consular Appointments in the FMS'. See particularly Clementi's despatch and Passfield's reply, May 1930. See also CO 273/567/72163 on unilateral action by the Chinese Consul in Kuala Lumpur on 'Humiliation' day flag flying, July 1930; CO 717/79/82362, Malay States, 1931, Minute by Calder, the CO, dated March 1931, referring to the Consul's actions, March-July 1930, FO 371/15466/366, Enclosure, Despatch from the Governor, SS, to the CO, dated 16 October 1930, p. 180 of file, 8 January 1931; C. M. Turnbull, 'Malayan Chinese Policy in the Early 1930s: The Hong Kong Connection', Paper presented at the 5th National Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Adelaide University, May 13-19, 1984, p. 20; Stephen Leong Mun-choon, 'Sources, Agencies and Manifestations . . .' 1976, also discusses the development of the political role of consuls in sustaining overseas Chinese nationalism.
17. CO 717/74/72426, 1930, 'Chinese Vernacular Education in Malaya', CO Minute by J. N. Martin, dated 19 September 1930, FO 371/14730/6373, 'Chinese Vernacular Education in Malaya', Enclosure, Letter from the Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield to the Governor, SS, dated 16 October 1930, 11 November 1930.
18. *Ibid.* Those who attended the conferences were the Acting Colonial Secretary, the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs, FMS and SS, Jordan and Goodman, and the Acting Director of Education — in other words all British Malayan officials and no Chinese of any category at all.
19. *The Federated Malay States Annual Reports* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), 1926-1931). For 1926, see p. 43; for 1927, p. 58; for 1928, p. 56; for 1929, p. 52; for 1930, p. 64; for 1931, p. 48.
20. CO 717/74/72426, 1930, Enclosure, Minute by Caine dated 26 June 1930. See also the *FMS Annual Reports*.
21. *FMS Annual Reports* 1926-34. These show that funds to English education also declined in 1930-31 by 1% (p. 62 of Report); in 1931-32 by 2% (p. 45 of Report); in 1932-33 by 3% (p. 46 of Report) and in 1933-34 by 12% (p. 56 of Report).

22. *FMS Annual Reports, 1930–1934*. The figures are: 1930 \$ 77 533 (p. 62 of Report); 1931 \$ 88 405 (p. 45 of Report); 1932 \$ 81 164 (p. 46 of Report); 1933 \$ 77 521 (p. 46 of Report); 1934 \$ 78 564 (p. 56 of Report).
23. CO 273/572/82051, 1931, Enclosure 1, 'Unemployment in Malaya', Memorandum by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, FMS, Mr P. T. Allen, dated 8 January 1931, p. 3 of Memorandum; Enclosure 2, Memorandum by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, Mr A. M. Goodman, dated 5 January 1931; Enclosure 3, 'Proclamation', *Straits Settlements Gazette*, Saturday 24 January 1931.
24. CO 273/569/82001/14, the Governor, SS, to the CO, 6 October and 11 December 1931.
25. *Ibid.*
26. CO 273/582, the Governor, SS, to the Colonial Secretary, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, on the Malayan Political Advisory Committee (MPAC), 20 February 1932. The intelligence bureaux were not part of the MPAC and operated independently. The MPCA met only twice in Clementi's first two years and then it lapsed.
27. FO 371/14730/6686, Enclosure, Despatch from the Governor, SS, to the CO, dated 10 October 1930, 24 November 1930. The three serious notifications were No. 40 of 26 May and Nos 30 and 34 of 19 and 28 June, respectively. Questions on the KMT in the House of Commons were normally asked by Lt-Cdr Kenworthy (later Lord Strabolgi), the Labour MP for West Hull. He was a trenchant critic of British policy towards the Malayan KMT (see Chapters 3 and 5), and had reacted strongly against Clementi's reimposition of the ban in 1930. See FO 371/14728/1298, Enclosures, 7 March and 12 March 1930.
28. FO 371/14729/2829, 'Report on the *Kuo Min Tang* in Malaya, February and March 1930', by A. B. Jordan, Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, FMS, dated 26 March 1930, 21 May 1930.
29. Clementi advised that his comprehensive plan should operate under one director, presumably meaning himself. See FO 371/14728/1327, Enclosure, Letter from Sir Cecil Clementi, the Governor of Hong Kong, to the CO; Enclosure, 'Verbatim Report of Conference Held at the Chinese Secretariat, Hong Kong, 13 November 1929', 10 March 1930. See also Note 68, Chapter 5 where there is a copy of Clementi's letter under another file number.
30. FO 371/14728/1489, Enclosure, 'Activities of the *Kuomintang* in Malaya', 17 March 1930; FO Memorandum by Sir John Pratt, 3 April 1930.
31. FO 371/14728/1862, 'Résumé of KMT activities in Malaya 1912–1930', by Sir John Pratt, 3 April 1930.
32. FO 371/14728/1197, Enclosures and Minutes, 3 March 1930; and FO 371/14728/1298, Note 26 above.
33. FO 371/14728/1500; Draft and Typescript, Letter from the Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield to Clementi, dated 17 March 1930.
34. FO 371/14929/2829, 21 May 1930 and *ibid.*, file no. 3113, 5 June 1930, contain inter-departmental correspondence, FO and CO. There is evidence that Passfield not only concurred in FO policy requirements and direction but also relied heavily on their advice in his own relations with Clementi.
35. FO 371/14730/6686, Enclosure, Letter from C. W. Orde, Permanent Secretary, FO, to the Secretary of State, CO, 8 December 1930, 24 November 1930.
36. FO 371/14730/5883, Enclosure, Copy of Cable from the Governor, SS, to His Majesty's Minister in Peking, Sir Miles Lampson; sent 20 October 1930, 21 October 1930.
37. See Turnbull, 'Malayan Chinese Policy in the Early 1930s . . .', *op. cit.*

38. This was the direct result of originally anti-Japanese riots in Canton, which became anti-British after two Chinese were shot by British police, during demonstrations. The riots spread to Shanghai and Hong Kong. The repercussions of the anti-British riots were instrumental in persuading the British Cabinet to agree to a ban on the Malayan KMT in July 1925; see Chapter 3.
39. Turnbull, 'Malayan Chinese Policy . . .', p. 5, citing the CO 129/501/30026, 17 September 1927 Minute by Sir Gilbert Grindle; and Peter Wesley-Smith, *Unequal Treaties, 1898-1997* . . . (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1980), pp. 156-7.
40. FO 371/14728/1284, Enclosure, Paraphrased Telegram, the Governor, SS, to the CO, dated 5 March 1930, 6 March 1930. Bramwell considered Clementi 'somewhat disarming', FO 371/14728/1327, Internal Minute by McKillop, dated 11 March 1930, 10 March 1930.
41. Turnbull calls Clementi's secret despatch of February 1927, 'a damning indictment of British policy in China.'
42. *MRCAs* 3(1930), pp. 10-12. Hu Han Min thought the ability to quote Chinese proverbs and to exchange Chinese jokes with Chinese officials a pretty poor basis for good relations with the Chinese. Hu Han-min's strictures about Clementi were to some extent unfair, for the first Chinese unofficial member of the Hong Kong Executive Council was appointed in 1926 only one year after Clementi had become Governor. Clementi could be sympathetic to the 'right' sort of Chinese, but not to Chinese nationalism. See G. B. Endacott, *Government and People of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964), pp. 145-6.
43. CO 273/577/92004/3, Colonial Office Minutes, dated 11 February 1932; CO 717/81 and CO 717/88, Minutes concerning a conference at the Colonial Office between Sir Cecil Clementi and CO officials, 16 March 1931.
44. *Ibid.*
45. FO 371/15467/1848, 'Clementi Minute 29/3', 2 April 1931.
46. FO 371/14728/1327, Enclosure with the Governor's despatch, Letter from A. M. Goodman, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, to G. Moss, His Majesty's Consul-General, Canton, 21 November 1929, 10 March 1930. At this time Clementi had stated, in his advice as the Governor of Hong Kong, that no alien political organization could be tolerated in a British colony. See 'Verbatim Report of a Conference held at the Chinese Secretariat . . . in November 1929, for examples of Goodman's thinking at this time; see also Chapter 5.
47. FO 371/14728/1862, Pratt Memorandum on the KMT, Item 29, 3 April 1930.
48. FO 371/14728/2082, Enclosure, Despatch by the Officer Administering Government, John Scott, to the CO, 'Kuo Min Tang . . .', Report by A. M. Goodman, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, 31 December 1929.
49. FO 371/14730/5902, Enclosure, Report, 'The Kuo Min Tang in Malaya' (cont.), by A. M. Goodman, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS dated 11 September 1930, 22 October 1930.
50. FO 371/14728/2082, Enclosure, 'Interim Report on the Kuo Min Tang . . .', by P. T. Allen, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, FMS, dated 26 February 1930, 14 August 1930. See also CO 717/74/72426, Enclosure in the Governor's despatch, 'Chinese Vernacular Education in Malaya', by A. M. Goodman, dated 14 May 1930.
51. FO 371/14730/5902, Report by A. M. Goodman, dated 11 September 1930, 22 October 1930.
52. FO 371/15466/366, Minute by Sir John Pratt, 6 January 1931.

53. FO 371/15466/1824, Report by Sir Miles Lampson on his visit to Singapore. Enclosure, Memorandum by Mr E. Teichman on discussions with Mr A. M. Goodman, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, February 1931, 1 April 1931.
54. FO 371/14730/5994, Enclosure, Copy of 'The *Kuo Min Tang* and Opposed Societies in Malaya, July-September 1930', by A. B. Jordan, the Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, FMS, dated 23 September 1930, 27 October 1930. Jordan initially continued Goodman's hard-line approach, but with a better, more logical presentation of facts, and later a more realistic and flexible application of policy requirements. He had a shrewd understanding and respect for Chinese ability which he put to good use from 1932 on, when he became the Secretary for Chinese Affairs in British Malaya. See Chapter 7. He was the first Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the FMS to be nominated as an official member of the Federal Council, on 19 July 1931. See the *Proceedings of the Federal Council*, 19 July 1931, p. 86. The Chinese unofficial members welcomed this.
55. FO 371/14730/5994, Minute by Sir John Pratt, dated 8 November 1930, 27 October 1930.
56. CO 273/569/82001/15, Enclosure, Text of the amending Ordinance, 1 October 1931.
57. FO 371/15467/2656, Enclosure, Paraphrased telegram from the Officer Administering Government, SS, Mr John Scott, to the CO, dated 9 May 1931, p. 164, 13 May 1931.
58. FO 371/14730, Enclosure, Letter from Lord Passfield to Sir Cecil Clementi, dated 16 October 1930; Minute from Sir John Pratt on 'Chinese Vernacular Education in Malaya', dated 17 November 1930; Minute by D. McKillop, dated 14 November 1930; 11 November 1930.
59. FO 371/14728/1489, Memorandum by Sir John Pratt, 17 March 1930; FO 371/15466/1568, Enclosure, Draft Letter to Sir Samuel Wilson, CO, initialled 'GM' [George Mounsey, FO], dated 25 March 1931, 20 March 1931.
60. Lampson's own account of this arrangement is diplomatically bland. He wrote that he discussed with the Malayan Government their 'difficulties'. *DBFP*, p. 577. The FO seems to have become obsessed with the lack, or threatened lack of loyalty to their policy by the Malayan Government. See FO 371/15466/1568, 20 March 1931, Minute by Sir John Pratt, dated 24 March, where he denies to his colleagues that the FO is forcing the issue or 'acting *in vacuo*', in its attempts to get freedom of action for Sir Miles Lampson's China negotiations. A cypher telegram to Sir Miles Lampson from the FO on March 20, enclosed in the file, stated clearly that the 'Straits Government should loyally accept and endeavour to carry out policy suggested . . .'
61. H.E. Kane, 'Sir Miles Lampson at the Peking Legation, 1926-1933', Ph.D. Thesis (London: University of London, 1975); FO 371/13930/3797, 7 June 1929; FO 371/13889/1054, 4 January 1929, Lampson made patronizing remark about Chinese officials but equally he was brisk about the capabilities and personalities of FO officials. Lampson had already established lasting friendships with many Chinese nationalist leaders by the time he returned to China as British Minister in 1927. However, he wrote of the Chinese at that time that, '[they are] like children, they will try it on till they get rapped over the knuckles' and 'the oriental mind doesn't understand conciliation unless backed by force; he merely regards it as weakness'. Lampson was never convinced that Eugene Ch'en, the first Nationalist Foreign Minister he had to deal with, had much influence, was ever speaking the truth or could resist extremist pressure within the Nationalist Party. Ch'en's successor, Dr CT. Wang, was regarded by Lampson as able, energetic and indefatigable, meaning

- that Wang was capable of 'rushing a number of smaller powers' into premature extra-territoriality treaties with 'indecent haste' (*DBFP*, p 562). Lampson refused to move the British Legation from Peking to Nanking after 1928. A British Representative (Mr E. Teichman) was stationed in the nationalist capital Nanking and the British Legation remained in Peking — renamed Peiping.
62. *DBFP*, p. 577. Lampson thought that the settlement he reached with Wang concerning the Malayan KMT in April 1931 put the British Government 'on a good wicket . . . to spike the guns . . .', by virtue of the Agreement being an international one, which could sanction punitive action against future recalcitrance from the Malayan KMT.
 63. Lampson was born in 1880; educated at Eton, he joined the FO in 1903. He served in Tokyo (1908–1910) and in Peking (1916–1920). He became head of the FO Central Department in 1923 and went from there to China in 1927. He was of Anglo-Scotts-American descent, connected with the Locker-Lampson family, two of whom were active in British politics during Sir Miles Lampson's time in China.
 64. H. E. Kane, 'Sir Miles Lampson . . .', Chapter 2.
 65. *Ibid.* Lampson thought that FO officials were undermining his work in China because they were politically inept, did not know how to handle negotiations with the Chinese or understand the domestic situation in China. He felt that some legation officials in China were working behind his back by making unilateral approaches to the FO to achieve their own, rather than British policy in China. He said he never knew when receiving instructions, whether it was official British policy or someone's personal approach, at the FO or legation. He had a warm and useful relationship with Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as Foreign Secretaries, and with their successors.
 66. FO 371/15466/713, Minutes by McKillop, 4 February 1931.
 67. *DBFP*, pp. 577–9.
 68. *DBFP*, p. 565; Kane, 'Sir Miles Lampson . . .', Chapters 6 and 7.
 69. *Ibid.*
 70. FO 371/13228/1807, 'Annual Review of Events in China for 1927,' by Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister in Peking; *DBFP*; Kane, 'Sir Miles Lampson . . .', Chapter 6.
 71. *Ibid.*, Note 40, page 47; W. Roger Louis, *British Strategy . . .*, Chapter 5.
 72. Among other things concerning the Malayan Chinese, Lampson was party to FO/CO—Clementi correspondence about Chinese vernacular education policy planning, in May 1930; see CO 717/74/72427.
 73. *DBFP*, p. 577; FO 371/13926/5982, Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Secretary, Mr Arthur Henderson, September 1929, 20 November 1929.
 74. *Ibid.*
 75. FO 371/15456/47, Record of a conversation between Sir Miles Lampson, General Chiang Kai-shek and Dr C. T. Wang, January 1931, 2 January 1931. Lampson asked Chiang Kai-shek how well the Nationalists were coping with communist and warlord forays against the Nationalist hold on Northern China.
 76. FO 371/14729/3639, Enclosure, Paraphrased Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, dated 4 July 1930.
 77. *Ibid.*, Minute by Sir John Pratt, dated 7 July 1930.
 78. *Ibid.*, Lampson Telegram.
 79. *Ibid.*
 80. FO 371/14730/5358, Enclosure, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, dated 24 September 1930, 25 September 1930.

81. FO 371/14730/5790, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, dated 17 October 1930, 17 October 1930; FO 371/14730/6399, Enclosure, Copy of Minute recording interview in Nanking, on 22 September 1930, between Dr C. T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hsu Mo, Sir Miles Lampson and Mr Eric Teichman, British Representative in Nanking, at the *Waichai Pu* (Foreign Affairs Office), 12 November 1930.
82. FO 371/14730/4861, Despatch from Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, dated 1 September 1930, 1 September 1930.
83. CO 273/567/72163, Minute by Gent (CO), dated 13 August 1930, June to September 1930.
84. FO 371/14730/5883, Minute by McKillop, dated 21 October 1930.
85. FO 371/14730/6318, Internal Minute, 8 November 1930.
86. CO 273/568/72204, 'Visit of Sir Miles Lampson to the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong', Minutes by J. N. Martin, dated 18 December 1930; 9 January 1931. December 1930 to January 1931.
87. *Ibid.*
88. FO 371/14730/7009, 'Treatment of Chinese in Malaya', Minute by Sir John Pratt, dated 15 December 1930, 13 December 1930; FO 371/15466/261, Record of a conversation between Sir Miles Lampson and Hu Han-min, Chairman of the Executive Yuan, 2 December 1930, 12 January 1931. Hu Han-min indicated that a danger threatened Sino-British relations resulting from British policy against the Malayan KMT. There are cross-references in this file to subsequent discussions on the same issue.
89. FO 371/14730/6875, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to the FO on the meeting with Hu Han-min, 2 December, 4 December 1930; FO 371/14730/7214, Despatch on Tour from Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, dated 22 November 1930 from Nanking, 29 December 1930.
90. *Ibid.*
91. FO 371/15466/0047, Record of interview between Sir Miles Lampson, General Chiang Kai-shek and Dr C. T. Wang, dated 4 December 1930, 2 January 1931.
92. FO 371/15466/1824, Enclosure, Memorandum by Mr E. Teichman on discussions with A. M. Goodman; Report by Sir Miles Lampson on his visits to Singapore and Malaya and discussions with the government . . . enclosing Minutes of a Conference on Chinese Affairs, Government House, Singapore, Sunday 8 February 1931, 1 April 1931. The discussion which follows is derived from all these documents.
93. See Table 1, FO 371/15466/1824, Enclosure, Transcript of the Conference at Government House, Singapore, 8 February 1931, 1 April 1931.
94. FO 371/15466/1824, Sir Miles Lampson's Report to the FO on the Conference in Singapore, 1 April 1931.
95. FO 371/15466/331, Cypher Telegram, the FO to Sir Miles Lampson, undated [December 1930/January 1931], 15 January 1931.
96. FO 371/15466/1290, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, dated 3 March 1931, 6 March 1931.
97. FO 371/15466/1600, Minute by Sir John Pratt, dated '27/3', 23 March 1931; FO 371/15466/331, Enclosure, Deciphered Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr Ingram, British Mission, Peking, which reads 'Correction to first paragraph . . . Chinese Government would doubtless appreciate the desirability of saving face'. 15 January 1931. At this stage Wang was negotiating unilaterally and not transmitting either the Nanking Government's actual stance to Lampson, or the British demands (to which he had agreed) to Nanking. See Note 107.

98. FO 371/15467/1856, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, dated 2 April 1931, 2 April 1931.
99. FO 371/15467/1860, Sir Miles Lampson to Mr A. Henderson, FO, Tour Series No. 14, Enclosure No. 3, Dr Wang to Sir Miles Lampson, p. 70 of file; Enclosure No. 2, Sir Miles Lampson to Dr Wang, 2 April 1931. See Appendix B. The following discussion is derived from these letters; identical phraseology in each is indicated thus . . . when repeated by Lampson.
100. FO 371/15467/2528, Telegram. Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, 5 May 1931, 7 May 1931.
101. FO 371/15467/1848, Enclosure, Copy of Letter from Sir Cecil Clementi to Sir George Grindle, CO, addressed from Shillingford Wharf, Oxfordshire, dated 27 January 1931, 2 April 1931. It arrived conveniently too late, as far as the CO was concerned, for its instructions to reach Malaya, via the CO, before the Conference opened in Singapore on 8 February.
102. *Ibid.*, Enclosure, Minute by Sir Cecil Clementi initialled 'CC. 29/3'; FO 371/15467/1851, Cypher Telegram from Clementi to the British Legation, Peking and to the FO, 31 March 1931, 4 April 1931. This disowned any agreement with the Nationalist Government not in accord with recommendations made at the Singapore February conference.
103. CO 371/15467/2332, Telegram. Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, 27 April 1931.
104. CO 273/569/82001/15, Text of Ordinance to Amend Ordinance No. 116 (Societies) (No. 14 of 1931), Passed 31 day of August 1931; 1 October 1931. The precise wording required by the Malayan Government appears in Sub-Sections (b) and (c) of Clause 2 of the Amendment.
105. FO 371/15467/2656, Enclosure, Paraphrased Telegram from the Officer Administering Government, SS, Mr John Scott, to the CO, dated 9 May 1931, 13 May 1931.
106. FO 371/15467/2464, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson, to the FO, dated 2 May 1931, from Nanking, 5 May 1931. In a confidential letter to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Victor Wellesley, dated 26 April, from Nanking, Lampson had recommended a 'blind eye' approach to the recent lapses the Nanking Government had 'perpetrated' in Malaya, and expressed exasperation at the 'wretched (and to my mind unnecessary) impasse from which we are now struggling to extricate ourselves'; see FO 371/15467/2834, 26 April 1931.
107. FO 371/15467/2681, 16 May 1931; and subsequent file Nos 2777, 21 May; 2824, 25 May; 2843, 27 May; 3359, 10 June; 3682, 29 June; 3844, 9 July.
108. FO 371/15467/5366, Telegram, Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, dated 3 October 1931. See also *MRC4* 10 (1931), page 18, for Nanking's official position instructing Wang to file a protest to Lampson concerning the proposed change of status of the Malayan KMT members.
109. FO 371/15467/4217, Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Dr C. T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated 20 June 1931, p. 208, 31 July 1931.
110. FO 371/15467/4217, Enclosures, Letter from Sir Miles Lampson, Peking, to Mr A. F. Aveling, Diplomatic Mission, Nanking, dated 20 June 1931, p. 206 of file; letter from Mr A. F. Aveling to Sir Miles Lampson, dated 4 July 1931, reporting on the meeting with Wang, pp. 217-218.
111. FO 371/15467/5366, Sir Miles Lampson to the FO, 3 October 1931.
112. FO 371/15467/3559, Minute by Sir John Pratt, dated 24 June 1931; Cypher Telegram from Sir V. Wellesley, to Sir Miles Lampson, Peking, dated '24/6', 23 June 1931.

113. FO 371/15467/2464, 5 May 1931. The FO regarded Goodman as an impediment to policy. Goodman was not seen as alarmist by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Victor Wellesley in May 1931, but Sir Miles Lampson and FO officials thought his influence on Malayan Government thinking a 'dangerous' element; see also FO 371/15467/3690, Cypher Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Victor Wellesley, 27 June 1931.
114. FO371/14929, F 3558/1129/10, The Central Executive Committee of the *Kuomintang*, Nanking, China, to Ramsay MacDonald, London, 28 March 1930, pp. 1-2.
115. FO 371/14730, F 7214/1129/10, Enclosure No. 1, in Despatch No. 193 Tour Series, to the FO, of 22 November 1930, Address by Hu Han-min before the Legislative Yuan, on 3 November 1930, pp. 1-3.
116. FO 371/14730, F 6875/1129/10, Telegram. Sir M. Lampson to the FO, 3 December 1930, p. 2.
117. FO 371/15467/4822, Enclosure., Paraphrased Telegram from the Governor, SS to the CO, dated 6 September 1931, p. 226 of file, 8 September 1931; but see FO 371/15467/4793, Cypher Telegram from the Governor, SS, to Sir Miles Lampson, Peking, 4 September 1931, reporting the passage of the Amending Ordinance despite the 'total absence' of Chinese compliance with the Wang-Lampson Agreement.
118. FO 371/15467/1848, Minute initialled CC 29/3, 2 April 1931.
119. Hu Han Min retained some influence in the KMT hierarchy after the communist purges of 1928, but gradually ideological differences between him and Chiang Kai-shek widened, until in 1931 he was removed from influence in party affairs. He died in 1936.
120. *DBFP*, p. 577.
121. W. Roger Louis, *British Strategy...* pp. 166-7. Despite the Chinese Government declaration of January 1932, reinforcing earlier declarations terminating extra-territoriality privileges, the Western powers virtually retained them in practice until the 1940s; John I. Meskill, *An Introduction to Chinese Civilization* (Lexington, D.C.; Heath, 1973), pp. 292-3.

Retardation and Revival: The Agony of the Malayan KMT Movement, 1931–1942

The 1930s were a tension-ridden decade for the 10 000 members of the China KMT in British Malaya. Severely mauled by Clementi's anti-KMT policy and management, the Malayan KMT did not stage a fresh revival until the Sino-Japanese War in China was well under way, in 1938.

In order to tell the Malayan KMT story in a manageable and intelligible way, it is necessary to divide the decade into two distinguishable phases, namely the era of 'retarded growth', 1931–1937 and the epoch of 'national salvation', 1938–1942, under which the Malayan KMT Movement gained a new lease of life.

Clementi's banning of the Malayan KMT organization, fund-raising and propaganda in 1930, which became enshrined in the so-called Wang-Lampson Agreement in April 1931, had the effect of taking the wind out of the sails of the Malayan KMT Movement. In fact, his action paralysed the Malayan KMT by deporting some of its most active leaders to China during his term of office, including Teh Lay-seng and Png Chi-cheng in July 1930 and Teh Sau-peng, Lim Yew-tong and four other prominent KMT leaders from Selangor in February 1932. However, Clementi's anti-KMT policy and management were not watertight, since the British allowed individual Chinese in British Malaya to become registered China KMT members under the Wang-lampson Agreement. By so doing, Clementi's efforts brought about some unforeseen consequences.

By allowing individual Chinese to become China KMT members, the Malayan KMT members were driven into the arms of the China KMT in Nanking, thus making the Malayan KMT Movement even more China-oriented, more subservient to the directives and direction of the China KMT Movement. Moreover, it enabled the China KMT and Government to become directly involved in Malayan KMT affairs. As will be seen, Clementi's anti-KMT designs were, at best, only partially successful.

Following Clementi's clamp-down on the Malayan KMT in February 1930, its leaders were in a state of consternation and its movement in suspense. Numerous pleas to the China KMT and Government for help were not heeded, until the expulsion of Teh Lay-seng and Png Chi-eng in July 1930. In December 1930, the Central Organization Department

(COD) of the China KMT eventually despatched George Wu to British Malaya to investigate party affairs. Arriving on 2 January 1931 in Singapore, George Wu consulted the Singapore KMT leaders and investigated party conditions in the Malay States. As a result, he recommended the establishment of nine 'direct' branches in the place of the former BMHB and other party branches.

George Wu's recommendation was approved by the Central Standing Committee of the China KMT on 2 April 1931, with Chiang Kai-shek, Dr C. T. Wang and others being present.¹ Acting on this decision, the COD took the immediate step of officially appointing prominent Malayan KMT members to the Preparatory Committees of eight Malayan 'direct' branches, with the exception of that in North Borneo. These eight 'direct' branches included Singapore, Penang, Malacca, Perak, Selangor (to include Bentong and Kuala Lipis), Negri Sembilan, Johore and Kedah (to include Sungei Patani, Kulim, Alor Star and Kota Bahru). These Preparatory Committee Members were entrusted with founding other direct branches, with local members eventually being elected to man them. This then was the fourth party reorganization in the history of the Malayan KMT Movement since 1912.

Those members appointed to the Preparatory Committees of the eight Direct Branches in British Malaya can be found in Table 1.

An examination of Table 1 suggests the following characteristics. First, the Preparatory Committee consisted of a mixture of the 'old guard', former *T'ung Meng Hui* members, and the 'new guards' who had joined the KMT in the post 1912 era. Most Preparatory Committee Members were well-established businessmen and reputable community leaders with a sprinkling of newspaper editors (such as See Bok-poon) and teachers (Lei Yi-sin and Ma Lip-san). Needless to say, they were all staunch supporters of the *Kuomintang* régime under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership.

The British were naturally not amused with the latest China KMT drive in British Malaya. Chinese Affairs officials interviewed those appointed to the Preparatory Committees in Singapore, Perak, Penang, Johore and Selangor, and reminded them of the British policy towards KMT organizational activities.² On one occasion, they went so far as to search the home of Tang Tsz-sat, a Preparatory Committee Member of the Negri Sembilan Direct Branch and a member of the *T'ung Meng Hui* 'old guard', for Tang's involvement in the Malayan KMT Movement.³ The KMT failed to heed the warnings, and in January 1932 the British raided the *Sung Man Club* in Kuala Lumpur, known to be the headquarters of the Selangor Direct Branch. This resulted in six prominent KMT leaders including Teh Sau-peng, Lim Yew-tong, Phoon

Table 1: Members of the Preparatory Committees of the Malayan Direct Branches, 1931

Location	Names of Preparatory Committee members
Singapore	Lee Chin-tian; Ong Kiat-soo; See Bok-poon; Au Yuan-chao; Wu Tse-huan; Woo Mun-chew; Foo Chao-kuang
Penang	Chu Pu-yun; Khoo Beng-chiang; Chew Mua-tong; Lim Ewe-aik; Ho Ju-khoon; Khor Seng-li; Tham Sui-kung
Malacca	Lim Ta-tian; Liu Han-peng; Huang Shih-yuan; Chou Ching-chang; Dr. Ho Pao-jin
Perak	Lee Guan-swee; Lam Sing-chau; Hu Chin-chen; Wu Si-chieh; Ch'en Liang-chih; Liu Han-chieh Teh beng-wei
Selangor	Teh sau-peng; Soh Huat-yu; Chu Po-yuen; Cheng Chung-wei; Lim Yew-tong; Ang Chin- chong; Hsu Wei-hsiung
Negri Sembilan	Chee Bi-joo; Tang Tsz-sat; Lei Yi-sin; Lo Hsuang; Chua Thean-keong
Johore	Huang Chi-ch'en; Teo Khai-chuan; Lim Chiu-eng; Liu Chung-han; Huang Yi-tien; Lee Kuo-hua; Huang sou-jen
Kedah	Wang Chien-chen; Lin Yun-tse; Ma Lip-san; Lin Han-peng; Chui Lian-ko; Wu Kuan-ying; Chang Ying-chen

Source: *MRC*, 8 (1931), pp. 46-7.

Tse-sau being arrested in February, and imprisoned on banishment warrants. The *Sung Man* Club was closed down and the six leaders were deported to China by March 1932.⁴

British action against the Selangor Direct Branch had a sobering effect on the Malayan KMT Movement. During the next two years there was an exodus of prominent KMT activists to China, including Teo Eng-hock (Singapore), Huang Chi-ch'en (Johore), Lei Yi-sin, Chee Bi-joo and Tang Tsz-sat (all from Negri Sembilan), Chiu Fatt (Ipoh) and Soh Huat-yu (Klang), among others. Many of these were able to secure government or party positions in China, and continued to foster the China KMT's relationships with the Malayan Chinese population from inside China. But the departure of these seasoned activists from British Malaya weakened the morale of KMT members and retarded the growth of the Malayan KMT Movement.

Despite consistent reporting in the *Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs* (*MRC*) by the Singapore Chinese Affairs Department between 1931

and 1937 that the Malayan KMT was either inactive or at a standstill as a result of punitive measures, the Movement continued to exist. KMT activists managed to maintain a party organizational structure, with eight Direct Branches, each in charge of several sub-branches and divisional sub-branches. A divisional sub-branch normally consisted of three to fifteen members while a sub-branch had a membership of more than fifteen. In 1934, the China KMT in Nanking abolished all the divisional sub-branches substituting for them the so-called Overseas Correspondence Offices.⁵

The organizational structure of the Direct Branches was identical to that of the BMHB established in 1928. Each Direct Branch had two Committees, namely the Executive and Supervisory, and their reserves. While the Executive Committee was to make decisions concerning all party matters and carry them out, the Supervisory Committee had the power to examine decisions made by the Executive Committee, to impeach and discipline Executive Committee Members, and to examine and approve of applicants to the party. As a rule, these two committees worked and acted quite independently of each other. The day-to-day affairs of the Direct Branch were entrusted to a Standing Committee of between one and three members, who became the most important leaders of the Malayan KMT Movement. These leaders, together with other Committee Members of the Direct Branches, enjoyed the sole right of communicating with the China KMT. They had the unenviable task of keeping the China KMT informed of their activities, each month. They received directives from Nanking and were answerable to the Party High Command.

Regular reporting on the Malayan KMT activists by the *MRC*A between 1931 and 1937 makes it easier to throw more light on the KMT Direct Branches and their leadership than on their activities during the phase of retarded growth, 1931-1937.

Despite the fact that there were eight sub-branches and one Direct Branch in Singapore in 1935,⁶ the Singapore KMT Movement seems to have suffered from organizational weakness, a lack of quality leadership, inertia and low morale among its members. There is no evidence to show that the Singapore Direct Branch held a secret delegates' meeting to elect office-bearers to the Executive and Supervisory Committees, due largely to the 'repressive' conditions then existing. Four of the seven members appointed by the China KMT in 1931 as Preparatory Committee Members remained dormant for a long time, while the three more active members (Lee Chin-tian, Ong Kiat-soo and Foo Chao-kuang) actually tendered their resignations to the Central Organization Department in Nanking in 1934, on the grounds of business pressures.⁷ Lee Chin-tian

apparently withdrew his after being asked by the COD to reconsider his decision, for he continued to remain the most important KMT leader in Singapore, as spokesman for the Singapore KMT Direct Branch during this phase of its history.

A lack of leadership in Singapore was not the only problem. The Singapore Direct Branch often incurred financial debts which hampered the administration of the Direct Branch. Further, the Singapore KMT suffered a damaging political split in 1931 caused by disagreement about the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Veteran KMT leaders, notably Teo Eng-hock and Lim Nee-soon, led a bitter campaign against Chiang's detention of Hu Han-min, a political rival of Chiang within the KMT in China. Both Teo and Lim openly aired their grievances in a Chinese newspaper. In the *Nanyang Siang Pau*, Teo pleaded with Chiang to resign and Lim condemned Chiang's dictatorial government.⁸ Teo's campaign against Chiang was reported to have been unsuccessful because he had failed to convince the *Tung Teh* reading room, a sub-branch of the Singapore KMT, to condemn Chiang by telegram. In fact, some fifty *Tung Teh* reading room members turned decisively against Teo, for his divisive action.⁹ Moreover, he was forced to resign from the directorship of the *Min Kuo Jih Pao*, the KMT organ, in 1931.¹⁰ The July issue of the *MRCA* stated that the majority of the KMT members in British Malaya had sided with Chiang Kai-shek and his Nanking Government.¹¹ The political split in 1931 wrought untold damage on the Malayan KMT Movement. Lee Chin-tian, the Singapore KMT leader, tried to patch up the differences, pleading with the rival parties in China to cease internal dissension in the face of pressing external threats. Further, Lee urged Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei to cooperate by sharing responsibilities, with Chiang heading the military establishment, Hu the government and Wang the party hierarchy.¹²

Although the history of the KMT sub-branches in Singapore is still largely obscure, documents show that at least three of the eight sub-branches in Singapore during the 1930s used social clubs as their front organizations. For example, the second sub-branch of the Singapore KMT had its headquarters at the *Hua Ch'iao Club* in Victoria Street while the fifth sub-branch was located at the *Chen Hua Club*.¹³ The eighth sub-branch under the leadership of Chu Chee-chiong had its office at the *Lok Hun Club*.¹⁴ In 1938, another KMT organization was founded by members from the Hokkien community, the *Chung Hsing Club* at Cecil Street. It was headed by Ong Kiat-soo and Ong Sean-say, with a membership of over 140 people.¹⁵ Social clubs were ideal sub-branches for the KMT Movement, as they were compact in size, more easily camouflaged and more capable of disseminating ideas and directives

among their converted members than were reading rooms, for example.

Like social clubs, reading rooms in Singapore, such as the *Tung Teh* and the *Tung Jen*, had been front organizations and party sub-branches in the 1910s and 1920s. The *Tung Teh* reading room had remained one of the cultural and political strongholds of the KMT in Singapore. Most of the prominent KMT leaders were reading room members, including Teo Eng-hock, Lee Chin-tian, Ong Kiat-soo, Tan Eng-guan, Lim Pan-gan, P'an Chao-p'en, Chang Jen-nan, and Ho Hsin-tien, among other prominent figures in the Singapore Chinese community. The cream of the Singapore KMT forces had been concentrated in this reading room since 1911. Prominent KMT leaders who had been presidents of this reading room included Teo Eng-hock (1931–1932), Ong Kiat-soo (1936–1937) and Lee Chin-tian (1928–1929; 1929–1930; 1937–1938).

While the *Tung Teh* reading room members had become disunited in 1931 over the anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign, generally the organization provided a sense of cohesion and solidarity among members in a number of ways. These included the celebration on Sun Yat-sen's birthday, the annual commemoration of the death of Sun Yat-sen, of the 72 martyrs of the *Huanghuakang* Uprising against the Manchu régime in 1911 and the national day of China, the double-tenth. Solemn memorial services were held for the funeral of such prominent China KMT leaders as Hu Han-min.¹⁶ Thus it is reasonable to suggest that the power base of the Singapore KMT lay in the various social clubs and reading rooms, which were either sub-branches of the KMT or front organizations for the party. The pattern of the Singapore KMT organization was generally repeated in the rest of British Malaya.

During Clementi's administration, the Malacca KMT movement suffered severe setbacks. Its organizational work fell apart and its propaganda and training work had to be carried out by party members secretly.¹⁷ Three of its most active and able leaders, Sim Hung-pek, Lim Ta-tian and Ho Sun-man, well-established community leaders, formed the Standing Committee of the Malacca Direct Branch. Sim was a TMH old guard member from the Malacca Hokkien community; Lim was young and public-minded, and came from the Hainanese community. Ho, a Cantonese businessman of considerable social standing, was a committed KMT leader in Malacca. Financial problems during the Depression and Clementi's rigid political control largely accounted for the retarded growth of the Malacca KMT.

However, two important front organizations of the Malacca KMT, the *Ming Hsin ch'ih-san-she* and the *Ch'en Chung li-chih-she*, were more active and successful in rallying KMT support for the China KMT and Government. Founded in 1924, the former was a charitable organization

while the latter, founded in 1929, was a cultural association, aiming at improving the moral, physical and scholarly standards of its members. All prominent Malacca KMT leaders, from the *T'ung Meng Hui* 'old guard', such as Sim Hung-pek and Li Yueh-ch'ih (1879-1936), to the 'new guard' such as Dr Ho Pao-jin (1895-1978) and Goh Chee-yan (1904-) were office-bearers of these organizations.¹⁸ As these two organizations were able to promote competitive sports and recreations such as table tennis and basket ball matches, they were successful in attracting young Chinese members into the fold.¹⁹ More importantly, these particular KMT leaders were also patrons and board directors of three Chinese primary schools, *P'ei Feng*, *P'ei Teh* and *Ping Ming*, hence their respectable social status and educational influence within the Malacca Chinese community.

Among leading members of the 'new guard', Dr Ho was the best educated and the most dynamic. Born in Amoy, Fukien Province in 1895, he migrated to Singapore at the age of 10. He studied in Singapore, Nanking and Shanghai and received his B.A. degree from Shanghai's *Fu-tan* University in 1920. A year before his graduation, Ho Pao-jin had become involved in the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai, being one of China's student leaders, agitating against China's diplomatic fiasco as a result of the Versailles Peace Conference. After Shanghai, he obtained an M.A. degree from Washington University and a Ph.D. degree from the University of Illinois in political science. In 1927 and 1928 he was employed as the Headmaster of the Chinese High School in Singapore. In 1928 he left his teaching career for banking, being employed as Manager of the Malacca Branch of the Ho Hong Bank Ltd. In 1932 when the Ho Hong Bank Ltd merged with two other Chinese banks in Singapore to form the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd (OCBC), Dr. Ho remained as the Manager of the Malacca Branch of the new OCBC until the occupation of Malaya by the Japanese in 1941.²⁰ This then was a rising star of the KMT Movement in Malacca, a bi-lingual banker, community leader and promoter of Chinese culture and education, who served the Malacca Chinese community well.

The Penang KMT struggled on under both internal and external pressure. The majority of the Penang KMT leaders came from two rival reading rooms, the Penang Philomathic Society (the Penang reading room), founded in 1908, and the *Ming Shing Sheh* formed after the 1911 Revolution. The Penang Philomathic Society was founded by *T'ung Meng Hui* members, some of whom were still active enough to be nominated by the China KMT as the Preparatory Committee members of the Penang Direct Branch in 1931. These included Khoo Beng-chiang, a rich rice and rubber merchant and owner of extensive rubber estates in Malaya; Chew



Plate 13. Teo Eng-hock,
TMH 'old guard', Singapore



Plate 14. Tan Chor-nam,
TMH 'old guard', Singapore



Plate 15. Lee Chin-tian,
KMT leader, Singapore



Plate 16. Lim Keng-lian,
KMT leader, Singapore



Plate 17. Chuang Hui-chuan,
KMT leader, Singapore



Plate 18. Tan Kok-chor,
KMT leader, Singapore



Plate 19. Tan Kah-kee,
a TMH member, Singapore




Plate 20. Tan Kah-kee with Lau Geok-swee, Penang KMT leader and Tjung Sic-gan, Batavia KMT leader, 1938



Plate 21. Lim Ta-tian,
KMT leader, Malacca



Plate 22. Tan Kee-gak,
KMT leader, Malacca



Plate 23. Wong Shee-foon,
KMT leader, Johore



Plate 24. Ho Ju-khoon,
KMT leader, Penang



Plate 25. Chew Mua-tong,
KMT leader, Penang



Plate 26. Ong Keng-seng,
KMT leader, Penang

Mua-tong (1878-1937), a landed proprietor and rubber planter; and Lau Ee-beng, a well-established businessman. The 'new guards' who came from the *Ming Shing Sheh* were Ho Ju-khoon, the proprietor of an apothecary since the 1920s and a public figure of the Penang Hakka community; and Lim Ewe-aik and Tham Sui-kung, both businessmen of some social standing in Penang. Khor Seng-li, although from the 'old guard', belonged to neither faction in the 1930s.

Apart from the British pressure, the Penang Direct Branch suffered from rivalry and dissension between the old and new guard. In 1934, the animosity came to a head when the Committee Members of the Penang Direct Branch resigned *en bloc*.²¹ The new guard seems to have fared better since Ho Ju-khoon still maintained his leadership until at least 1937, when he was still in charge of the Penang Direct Branch.²²

The Selangor KMT movement suffered its biggest loss in March 1932 when six of its leaders were deported to China by the British. However, its members were able to regroup and recover, and by October 1933, a newly elected leadership of the Direct Branch took up the reins, as shown in Table 2.

The leadership list in Table 2 suggests that the Selangor Direct Branch was controlled by men of lesser social standing in the Chinese community. They were mostly young, with no connection with the old *T'ung Meng Hui*. With the exception of Wong Tong-seng, they did not fall into the category of community leaders. The emergence of this leadership in 1933 points to the fact that the better-established KMT old guard either dissociated themselves from the KMT Movement, or lay low under duress. There may have been leadership changes after 1933 but Chan Ying-choi was still recognized by the China KMT in 1937 as the leader of the Selangor Direct Branch.²³

There were eleven sub-branches in 1932 in Selangor. However a reorganization took place in July 1933, with only six sub-branches then in operation. Three of the six were located in Kuala Lumpur, while Klang, Ampang and Kajang had one sub-branch respectively, signalling the decline in KMT activities.

Following the appointment by the China KMT of seven members to the Preparatory Committee of the Perak Direct Branch, this branch did get off the ground, by the members' allocating positions among themselves. As a result of the first meeting, Lee Guan-swee was elected a Standing Committee Member and head of the General Affairs Section; Wu Si-chieh was head of the Propaganda Section; Hu Chin-chen, head of the Social Affairs Section; Teh Beng-wei, head of the Finance Section and Ch'en Liang-chih, head of the Organization Section. At the time of the election, the Perak Direct Branch was reported to have 13 sub-branches

Table 2: Executive and Supervisory Committee Members and Reserve Members of the Selangor Direct Branch, 1933

Name	<i>pang</i>	General remarks
<i>A. Executive Committee Members and Reserve Members</i>		
Chan Ying-choi	Cantonese	A fitter, aged 39, appointed to the executive committee of the Selangor direct branch in 1932
Ng Lap-fong	Hainanese	A liquor shop employee; appointed to the executive committee of Selangor direct branch in 1932
Lee Hong-seng	Foochew	A teacher by profession; appointed reserve member of executive committee of the Selangor direct branch in 1932
Foo Tak-peng	Hainanese	A miner, aged 39. A committee member of the defunct Sung Man Club; appointed member of the supervisory committee of the Selangor direct branch in 1932
Wong Tong-seng	Hokkien	A rubber dealer from Klang and a community leader; also appointed member of executive committee of Selangor direct branch in 1932
Lai Cheong	Cantonese	A fitter, aged 30; appointed member of the supervisory committee of Selangor direct branch in 1932
Chia Boon-chin	Hokkien	Manager of the Yik Khuan Poh in Kuala Lumpur, a KMT organ
Hoh Kwok-chan	Cantonese	No fixed occupation; a supervisor of the Tung Shin Hospital, Kuala Lumpur
Looi Chung-heng	?	information yet unavailable
<i>B. Supervisory Committee Members and Reserve Members</i>		
Wong Hoh-teng	Hainanese	A clerk in the Chung Wah Kok Yu night school, Kuala Lumpur; appointed reserve member of executive committee of the Selangor direct branch in 1932
Phoon Hon-kuen	Cantonese	A tailor and brother of Phoon Tsz-sau, a banishee in March 1932; appointed member of executive committee of Selangor direct branch in 1932
Yim Kwai-wing	Cantonese	A cleaner by profession and a director of the 5th Selangor sub-branch in 1928
Cheng Kee-kung	Hainanese	A landed proprietor; he dissociated himself from the Selangor direct branch on 30 October 1933

Source: *MRC4* 38(1933), p. 9; *ibid.*, 39(1933), pp. 12-14.

and a total membership of 1500.²⁴ However, subsequent British cautions, financial difficulties and a decline in membership due to the world economic depression of the 1930s made party work almost impossible. In 1933, the British reported that 'the Perak Direct Branch is practically non-existent'.²⁵

In the 1930s, the shining light of the Perak KMT leadership was the veteran Lee Guan-swee, regarded by Teh Lay-seng as 'the only member of long standing in Perak', who 'has a good reputation'.²⁶ A close friend of Sun Yat-sen, Lee had been one of the most important KMT leaders in Perak since 1912, donating funds for Sun's cause, promoting Sun's ideology of the 'Three Principles of the People' and endorsing China's national reconstruction under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. In 1937, Lee was still recognized by the China KMT as the Perak KMT leader in charge of the Perak KMT movement.²⁷

Until the British put pressure on the Kedah Direct Branch in 1932, the KMT movement there was in a healthy state, with eight sub-branches (Kedah, Sungei Patani, Kuala Ketil, Perlis, Lunas, Kelantan, Kulim and Pulau Langkawi) and two divisional sub-branches (Baling) and a membership of 1222.²⁸ The Direct Branch was officially established on 5 September 1931 with seven elected Executive Committee Members (including Chung Yi-min, Ma Lip-san, Lin Chiu-mo) and three Supervisory Committee Members (Hsieh Hsiao-hou, Chui Lian-ko and Wu Kuan-ying). During 1931, the Kedah Direct Branch aimed at extending propaganda work, teaching KMT principles in Chinese vernacular schools, weeding out communist elements, promoting the sale of national goods and recruiting new members to the KMT movement in Kedah.²⁹ The departure of a number of KMT leaders in 1932 such as Ma Lip-san, a school teacher, and in 1934 men such as Lin Yun-tse, a rice merchant for Alor Star, weakened the KMT Movement. In 1937, a shopkeeper from Kulim, Chang Jih-hsing, was the leader of the Kedah Direct Branch.

The history of the KMT Movement in Johore and Negri Sembilan is less well documented. The movement here seems to have been more fragmented and disorganized between 1931 and 1937, and although direct branches and sub-branches had existed, there were few signs of activity. Again, the departure for China after 1931 of seasoned leaders such as Huang Chi-ch'en of Johore; Chee Bi-joo, Tang Tsz-sat and Lei Yi-sin of Negri Sembilan destabilized both the KMT leadership, and the Movement as a whole. Teo Khai-chuan, of Muar, remained the most important leader of the Johore Direct Branch through to the Japanese occupation of Malaya in 1942.

KMT propaganda during the 1930s was mainly through the four channels of the KMT-controlled social clubs, reading rooms, KMT

teachers at vernacular Chinese schools and KMT publications. While the Malayan KMT could disseminate its messages and ideology within the clubs, reading rooms and in schools either secretly or overtly depending on conditions then existing, the various newspapers were less able to function effectively as party organs under Clementi's rigid press censorship.

In the 1930s, six party or party-controlled newspapers existed, including the *Kwong Wah Yit Poh* of Penang, the *Yik Khuan Poh* (1919-1934), the *San Yik Khuan Poh* (1935-1936), the *Malayan Chinese Daily News* (1937-1941) of Kuala Lumpur, and the *Min Kuo Jih Pao* (1930-1934) and *Sin Kuo Min Press* (1919-1941) of Singapore. While the *Kwong Wah Yit Poh*, the *Yik Khuan Poh*, the *San Yik Kuan Poh* and the *Sin Kuo Min Press* were strictly regional papers, promoted by KMT members from their localities, the *Min Kuo Jih Pao* and the *Malayan Chinese Daily News* were launched and financially maintained by KMT members in Malaya as a whole. An examination of 18 directors of the *Min Kuo Jih Pao* for 1931 and 23 founders of the *Malayan Chinese Daily News* for 1937 shows that they were all KMT leaders of both the SS and all the Malay States.³⁰

Despite the China KMT's monthly subsidies of between \$ 500 and \$ 1000 (Chinese currency) to the *Yik Khuan Poh*, the *Min Kuo Jih Pao*, the *Sin Kuo Min Press* and the *San Yik Khuan Poh*, these newspapers, with the exception of the *Sin Kuo Min Press*, incurred financial losses and eventually had to be wound up. Reasons for the collapse of these papers included the severe world economic depression, their inability to attract advertisement, insufficient readership,³¹ and, in the case of the *Min Kuo Jih Pao*, fierce competition from other non-KMT newspapers in Singapore, such as the *Union Times*, the *Sin Chew Jit Poh* and the *Nanyang Siang Pau*.

Overt KMT propaganda by the party organs was impossible. Political control and application of tight press censorship caused the *Min Kuo Jih Pao* to be suspended in 1930 for a period of four months (April to July) for publishing anti-Japanese articles in connection with the 1928 Tsinan Incident, and the *Nanyang Si Pau* of Penang was closed down altogether for publishing similar articles.³² Under such circumstances, it is no wonder that party organs failed to function as propaganda machines, capable of promoting the KMT interests in Malaya, even if there had already been a solid ideological base among the increasingly politicized Chinese population in Malaya.

A classical example of how the British succeeded in preventing the spread of KMT ideology was the New Life Movement, launched in China in February 1934 by Chiang Kai-shek himself. Chiang promoted this

mass movement in China to raise morale and improve moral standards in Chinese life. He called upon the Chinese to observe strictly the four Confucian virtues of *li* (propriety in manners), *i* (righteousness in conduct), *lien* (honesty in all dealings) and *chih* (possession of a sense of self-respect and honour). In June 1934, the Central Organization Department in Nanking despatched a circular urging overseas party branches to organize the so-called New Life Movement Corps to promote the Movement. Party members were called on to set an example by acting and living in accordance with the virtues re-emphasized by Chiang Kai-shek.³³ The British authorities must have suppressed it, for there was no real New Life Movement in British Malay. It was not until February 1937 that the new Chinese Consul-General for Singapore, Kao Ling-pai, boldly convened a public rally at the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce to form the New Life Movement Association. The rally succeeded in electing eleven office-bearers for the Association with four prominent KMT leaders (Lee Chin-tian, Lim Kian-pan, Lim Keng-lian and Chua Hui-seng), and seven non-KMT leaders (Tan Kah-kee, Hau Say-huan, Chin Kee-sun, Aw Cheong-yeow and three others).³⁴ The Association was soon dissolved however, and the Movement in Singapore fizzled out because the Chinese Affairs Department refused to have the Association registered and legalized, on the grounds of its promoting KMT ideology unsuitable in Malayan conditions.

From its inception in 1912, the Malayan KMT Movement had always had close relations with its headquarters, whether in Peking, Canton, Shanghai, Tokyo, Nanking or Chungking. However, the creation of eight Direct Branches in British Malaya in 1931 inevitably made the Malayan KMT Movement more subservient to the interests of the China KMT. Through the Direct Branches, the Malayan KMT leaders were in constant communication with the Central Organization Department, Central Propaganda Committee, and from 1932, the Central Overseas Tang Affairs Committee of the China KMT in Nanking. These committees were often staffed by returned party members from Southeast Asia, some of whom were deportees well versed in overseas party affairs and political conditions. In order to promote the Malayan KMT Movement, the China KMT subsidized Malayan Direct Branches and party organs, making them more dependent on and answerable to their China counterparts. Moreover party inspectors and emissaries were regularly despatched from Nanking to Malaya to investigate party work and conditions, thus further fostering party relations between the two territories. Likewise, Malayan KMT members returned to Nanking to attend party delegates congresses, providing information on the Malayan KMT Movement and raising their morale. Through regular agitation on

the part of party 'banishees' and delegates, the Malayan KMT question continued to be an international and diplomatic issue between China and Britain since the conclusion of the Wang-Lampson Agreement in 1931.

Being the Party High Command, the China KMT was assertive, and at times even aggressive. They often nominated Malayan party leadership, and if they did not, they legitimized it. Party membership had to be approved by the China KMT and membership certificates despatched from Nanking. In order to train party leaders, in 1934 the Central Organization Department set up a correspondence school in Nanking to train overseas party workers. Successful applicants were given free tuition and textbooks for a one-year course.³⁵

The Central Propaganda Committee instituted rules governing the control of overseas party newspapers. These included a monthly submission of a report on propaganda and financial position, together with a list of employees, a profit and loss account, balance sheet and yearly budget. When the China KMT deemed it necessary, the Central Propaganda Committee could 'appoint a managing director, editor, manager, and accountant to overseas newspapers'.³⁶ Occasionally, the Central Propaganda Committee interfered in non-party newspapers overseas. The request in 1934 by the Central Propaganda Committee through the Chinese Consul-General in Singapore, to the management of the *Nanyang Siang Pau* to dismiss its editors for 'slandering' Chiang Kai-shek is a case in point.³⁷

This then is a rough profile of the KMT Movement on Malaya between 1931 and 1937. The British did not see it as a threat or a serious problem according to an assessment in the *MRC* in 1936:

On the whole, therefore, it may be said that the *Kuomintang* in Malaya has become feeble and ineffective. Its new branches are half-hearted and were it not for the fact that it still suggests itself to local Chinese as a possible stepping stone to appointments in China and as a means of securing rewards and grants, it would probably sink into still further insignificance.

... The inactivity of the *Kuomintang* in Malaya may be attributed to the necessity for working secretly owing to the Malayan Governments' ban on the organization of local *Kuomintang* branches, to the loss of prestige suffered by the *Kuomintang* in China, to the return to China of a number of old Malayan *Kuomintang* enthusiasts, no one of any standing having taken their place, to personal rivalries and animosities, and to lack of funds.³⁸

In a speech made at the 12th Annual Dinner of the Association of British Malaya at the Hotel Metropole, Northumberland Avenue, London, on 4 June 1934, Sir Cecil Clementi, then recently retired, congratulated himself on the success of his KMT policy by claiming the prevention of 'danger from the threatened organization of a Chinese *imperium*

in imperio within the peninsula'.³⁹ Then his victory was roundly applauded.

Clementi may well have been pleased with the result of his punitive action against the Malayan KMT, but he certainly had not succeeded in curbing the politicization of the Malayan Chinese, nor had he prevented individual KMT members from supporting the KMT régime when Chiang Kai-shek's personal leadership was at stake and when Japanese encroachments threatened the survival of the Chinese nation. Joining hands with other community leaders and organizations, individual KMT members provided seasoned leadership, organizational skill and financial resources for boycotting Japanese goods, and for fund raising for the Chinese cause in the aftermath of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the attack on Shanghai in 1932. In July–October 1936, Malayan KMT members helped launch a campaign for funds for purchasing aeroplanes for China on the occasion of Chiang Kai-shek's fiftieth birthday. In December 1936, Malayan KMT members came out *en masse* to clamour for the release of Chiang Kai-shek, kidnapped by Chang Hsueh-liang, this later being known as the Sian Incident. Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937, the political and leadership role of the Malayan KMT members had been visible and their influence within a politicized community extensive.

The revival of the Malayan KMT Movement after 1937 was brought about by a set of complex and changing political situations locally and internationally. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 and the subsequent directive to the Malayan Direct Branches of adherence to a united front policy from the China KMT helped encourage an unprecedented national salvation movement among the Malayan Chinese population. By 1936, British authorities had become more concerned with the Malayan Communist Movement and labour unrest. They had moved from seeing the KMT as a potential threat to seeing it as a comparatively innocuous political nuisance. Britain's entry into the European War in 1939 expedited this fundamental change in emphasis, fuelled by the increased Japanese threat to the British interests in Asia. As will be seen, stark reality and pragmatism were to dictate British policy towards the Malayan KMT under these new circumstances. The Wang–Lampson Agreement was waived and then shelved. By 1941, on the eve of the Japanese Invasion of Malaya, the KMT members found a much-needed ally in the British authorities.

The Sino-Japanese War provided a golden opportunity for the Malayan KMT to profit from increasing Chinese nationalism by extending its organizational and political activities and strengthening its influence in a prolonged, mass fund-raising campaign spear-headed by

the self-proclaimed leader, Tan Kah-kee (1874–1961). Moreover, the war helped further politicize the Chinese community throughout Malaya, making it easier for the seasoned KMT leaders to mobilize the masses for political purposes. Finally, the war boosted the hitherto sagging morale of the KMT members and propelled them into action for China's cause. Teo Eng-hock, a member of the Overseas Affairs Committee returned in October 1937 to reassure Malayan Chinese of China's determination to uphold her sovereignty. One of the first overt stirrings of the Singapore KMT was a social gathering of members of the original *T'ung Meng Hui* on 26 December 1937, at the Great World Amusement Park. Speeches were made by such veteran TMH members as Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock, both of whom urged members to maintain the old fighting spirit which had worked for the establishment of the Republic of China. Teo Eng-hock proposed that an advertisement be inserted in the local press to invite former TMH members to register, in order to facilitate the holding of future meetings. On hearing this suggestion, the Singapore Chinese Affairs Department subtly advised him to curb his activities.⁴⁰

In August 1938, the Singapore Direct Branch felt confident enough to submit a petition to the Overseas Department of the Central Executive Committee, requesting the Chinese Foreign Ministry to re-open negotiations with the British Government concerning the legalization of the Malayan KMT. The reply was vague, merely advising that the Foreign Ministry would be asked to open negotiations at such time as it considered expedient. In the meantime, members of the Malayan KMT were advised to carry out their activities in accordance with local circumstances.⁴¹

There were strong signs of organizational revival in Malaya generally, and Singapore particularly. For the first time in Singapore, the Singapore Direct Branch was bold enough to convene a delegates' conference in August 1938 for the election of new office-bearers.⁴² The formation of the *Chung Hsin Club* on 7 July 1938 at Cecil Street as a KMT sub-branch with 140 members was another sign of growth. In 1940 the British discovered the Minutes of the 14th Joint Conference of the Singapore, Johore and Malacca Direct Branches of the KMT and the Singapore Chinese Consulate-General, indicating the role of the Chinese Consul-General in the Malayan KMT Movement and its renewed organizational strength.⁴³ It is certain that all Malayan KMT Direct Branches and sub-branches had become more vigorous during the era of the national salvation movement by comparison with activity before 1938.

There were also signs of a new membership drive on the part of the Malayan KMT. The China KMT sent a directive in 1938 to overseas branches to make a special effort to enrol men of position and influence

in overseas Chinese public organizations. Also, those who had shown capability in the raising of funds for China's war effort against Japan should be recruited as members. In Malaya where KMT activities were not legally allowed, the local branches were advised to draw up suitable plans for the enrolment of new members and submit them to 'Central' for approval.⁴⁴ Moreover, the Overseas Department of the Central Executive Committee promised to send party officers abroad to help promote activity and to assist in the membership drive.⁴⁵ Finally, the China KMT instructed Malayan branches in 1938 to recruit the youth as members and to provide for the organization of a youth corps.⁴⁶ The emphasis on youth in China's national crisis was to result, in 1941, in the formation of the *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps (SMCIYC) in Malaya, a new arm of the Malayan KMT Movement.

The Corps existed on paper in Malaya in 1940, but it did not become operative until the arrival of Wu T'ieh-cheng, Head of the Overseas Department of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT in Chungking, on a goodwill mission to Malaya in November 1940.⁴⁷ Chiang Kai-shek despatched him as his personal envoy to promote KMT interests in Malaya, including negotiations with the British on the legalization of the Malayan KMT, cooperation with the British to counter the activities of anti-KMT forces including the communists, promoting extension of the KMT influence and the establishment of the Corps.⁴⁸

It is not clear what role Wu T'ieh-cheng played in the formation of the Corps in January 1941 with its Malayan headquarters in Ipoh, Perak, and branches in Penang, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.⁴⁹ The involvement of the Chungking Government in the Corps' development was quite substantial. It appointed office-bearers, financed its activities for the first six months after inauguration and despatched trained organizers and instructors from China. In Singapore, for example, four directors, one being the Chinese Consul-General, and nine executives were appointed. In Kuala Lumpur the Corps' leadership included three appointed directors and nine executives.⁵⁰

The British likened the Corps to the Nazi Youth Movement. The objective of the Corps was to effect a strong, one-party régime using such means as intimidation, the spread of propaganda through the press and even 'liquidation' of opponents.⁵¹ In September 1941, the Colonial Office was officially informed of the aims of the Corps, which included the enrolment of all young men of Chinese extraction in Malaya in a secret semi-military organization and the elimination of all opposition among the Malayan Chinese to the régime in China by methods of propaganda, intimidation and even assassination.⁵² According to British

Intelligence, one of the practical functions of the Corps was to train a Special Unit Section to exterminate so-called 'traitors'. Members of the Section were instructed in the handling of arms, methods of destroying corpses, demolition, bribery of officials, etc.⁵³ The Corps however had also been active in fund raising for China's cause and in promoting the anti-Japanese boycott movement during 1941, as well as in the semi-military activities mentioned. The growth of the Corps in Malaya added impetus to the KMT Movement, making the Corps' influence felt in the Malayan Chinese community right up to the eve of the Japanese invasion of Malaya.

At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in China, the Propaganda Department of the China KMT had instructed overseas Direct Branches to cease any activities which might alienate international sympathy for China and to form a united front movement incorporating non-KMT forces within it. While the united front policy was being formulated in China and overseas, the Central Secretariat of the China KMT urged all KMT branches overseas to found 'national salvation' societies under the direction of local Chinese consuls and party leaders. It was stated that these 'national salvation' societies should 'devote more attention to the work of propaganda and to the collection of funds as well as other national salvation activities'.⁵⁴ As a result of these directives from the China KMT, some Singapore KMT members took an active part in the formation of two 'unregistered', thus 'illegal' front organizations — the Chinese National Emancipation Vanguard Corps (CNEVC) and the Chinese Labour Anti-Japanese National Salvation Corps — in 1937 and 1938 respectively.

The CNEVC could be regarded as a united front underground organization with its founders from both the younger group of the KMT in Singapore and the supporters of Tan Kah-kee, the non-partisan leader and Chairman of the Singapore China Relief Fund Committee (SCRFC), formed in August 1937. The KMT members who helped form this united front organization included Lim Keng-lian, Lim Boh-seng, Ong Kiat-soo, Chuang Hui-chuan and Oh Siow-yam, who were prestigious community leaders in their own right. The non-partisan group which helped to form it included Si Hong-peng, Lau Boh-tan, Ng Aik-huan, Hau Say-huan and Chang Ch'u-k'un. The CNEVC aimed at creating a broad, united front to resist the Japanese and to 'exterminate' traitors. Moreover, it advocated a boycott of Japanese goods and worked for an improvement in Anglo-Chinese friendship and cooperation.⁵⁵ In February 1938, the objectives of the CNEVC were reported to have been extended to include other spheres of activity, such as the establishment of various forms of 'national salvation' organization, extension of national salvation pro-

paganda, removal of clan antagonism, and the soliciting of subscriptions to national salvation funds.⁵⁶

True to the united front tactics and objectives, the CNEVC did cooperate and coordinate activities with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)'s front organization, the Overseas Chinese Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society (AEBUS), formed in August 1937. Leaders of both these organizations met occasionally to discuss measures for carrying out propaganda, fund-raising and boycott activities, and the 'elimination of traitors'. The boycott was enforced by tarring the shops of merchants suspected of trading in Japanese goods, or by imposing financial penalties on those found to be doing so. 'Elimination of traitors' meant inflicting physical injury on persons believed to be breaking the boycott or trading in Japanese goods. The most common penalty for this was clipping off an ear.⁵⁷

Despite some tensions and conflicts between these two front organizations, the united front carried on until 1939 when the British clamped down on both, and when the KMT and CCP alliance in China itself was failing. In July and August 1938, the AEBUS, headed by Ng Yeh-lu, Go Thian, Hung T'ao, Tai Eng-long and Ong Yen-chee, and the CNEVC, represented by Ong Kiat-soo, Lim Boh-seng, Oh Siow-yam and Chuang Hui-chuan publicly endorsed the concept and practice of the united front in the national salvation movement. They argued along the lines that all differences and prejudices must be set aside in the interests of national salvation. In addition, there should be a centralized leadership, organization and action in the national salvation movement.⁵⁸ In December 1938, both organizations cooperated in boycotting both German and Italian goods in Singapore with considerable success.⁵⁹ At the height of the united front activities, British authorities estimated that the combined membership in Malaya of the AEBUS and CNEVC was between 30 000 and 35 000 persons,⁶⁰ a threatening political force in British Malaya. The figure of 30 000–35 000 represented about 2 per cent of the adult Chinese in Malaya during 1938–1939.

The Chinese Labour Anti-Japanese National Salvation Corps was led by the younger members of the KMT Movement in Singapore, mentioned in connection with the foundation of the CNEVC. It aimed primarily at promoting patriotic activities among the Chinese workers in British Malaya and was responsible for the walkout of Chinese labourers who worked in the Japanese mines in Dungun, Trengganu, in February 1938. These KMT activists also successfully arranged for some 2000 miners from Dungun to go to Singapore as a relief measure.⁶¹

While younger KMT leaders were more involved with the anti-Japanese boycott following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, most

of the KMT 'old guard' emerged successfully as leaders of the 'legitimized' and 'regulated' fund-raising committees in Malaya. KMT involvement in the Singapore China Relief Fund Committee (SCRFC) is a case in point. In August 1937 when the SCRFC was publicly founded and led by Tan Kah-kee, a non-partisan nationalist, KMT leaders were prominent. Lee Chin-tian was elected Chairman of the Treasury, Li Leung-kie Chairman of the General Affairs Department, Chew Hean-swee Chairman of the Auditing Department, Lim Keng-lian Chairman of the Public Relations Department and many others were elected into the Fund-Raising Department of the SCRFC. In October 1938 when the Southseas China Relief Fund Union (SCRFU) was formed in Singapore for the whole Southeast Asian region, KMT leaders in Southeast Asia were even more prominent as elected office-bearers. Tan Kah-kee again was elected unanimously as Chairman, but two elected Vice-Chairmen, Lee Cheng-chuan of Manila and Tjhung Sie-gan of Batavia were staunch KMT leaders. Of the sixteen Standing Committee Members of the SCRFU, thirteen were well-established KMT leaders in the region. These included Tan Chin-hian, Lee Chin-tian, Tan Ean-khiam, Chew Hean-swee of Singapore; Ho Pao-jin of Malacca; Lau Geok-swee of Penang; Leong Sin-nam of Perak; Ng Tiong-kiat, Lee Hau-shik and Ch'an Chan-mooi of Kuala Lumpur; Wong Yik-tong of Seremban, Tan Teow-kee (known as Tan Kok-chor in post-war Singapore) of Saigon; and Ong Chuan-seng of the Philippines. The above KMT leaders held important positions in similar fund-raising organizations of the various territories outside Singapore, a further evidence that individual KMT members had exerted considerable control over the national salvation movement since 1937.

Thus the Sino-Japanese War had the effect of reversing the fortunes of the Malayan KMT Movement. It enabled the Malayan KMT to extend their organizational networks, deepen their influence among the increasingly politicized Chinese under duress, broaden their power base to include the 'legitimized' relief fund organizations in the region and lift their political morale as a 'patriotic' and visible organization within the Malayan Chinese community. This political and organizational revival was to stand the Malayan KMT Movement in good stead after the Japanese Occupation ended in 1945.

What was the British attitude and policy towards the Malayan KMT after 1937? Did they mismanage the Malayan KMT problem? Or was it beyond British control that the Sino-Japanese War had brought forth a new set of political circumstances which favoured the revival of the Malayan KMT?

From the outset, it should be made clear that the British had not cancelled the Wang-Lampson Agreement, which allowed individual

Chinese to become registered members of the *China* KMT, but disallowed organization, propaganda and fund-raising activities among the Malayan KMT. Once enshrined in the 1931 Societies Ordinances, the Wang-Lampson Agreement became the established policy of the British during the 1930s. They carried on monitoring KMT activities until 1938, when the majority of their intelligence service energies were required to monitor labour unrest and the Malayan Communist Party and its front organization, the AEBUS. The gradual change in direction of the activities of the intelligence services had begun in 1936 when the British had perceived that the main threat within Malaya was likely to come from the MCP.

The Sino-Japanese War in 1937 was to impose further constraints on the British in terms of their political control over the MCP *vis-à-vis* the strengthening political mass movement led by a 'legitimized', non-partisan nationalist, in Tan Kah-kee. The outbreak of the War witnessed an unprecedented resurgence of Chinese nationalism in Malaya, with the MCP, KMT and non-partisan community leaders competing for the leadership of the national salvation movement. In order to prevent both the MCP and KMT from controlling the national salvation movement, Tan Kah-kee was overtly given blessing by the British to lead the 'legitimized' and 'regulated' SCRFC.⁶² The establishment of the SCRFC in August 1937 was to be followed by similar organizations in the rest of the Malay Peninsula. As respectable and well-established community leaders themselves, the KMT members moved in to share their leadership. As these KMT office-bearers were popularly elected by the various Chinese communities in Malaya, the British could do little to prevent them from raising funds for China's cause and from influencing the Chinese population via the various relief fund organizations for Chinese nationalism.

Despite the improved position of the Malayan KMT during the Sino-Japanese War era, it did suffer a considerable setback in 1941 when it waged a political struggle against the Tan Kah-kee forces but failed to dislodge the non-partisan leadership of Tan Kah-kee in the national salvation movement. The 1941 power struggle between these two formidable political forces arose from Tan Kah-kee's 'comfort mission' to China in 1940 when he found a glaring contrast between the KMT régime in Chungking and CCP rule in Yenan. While his persistent criticisms of the Chungking Government generally and the provincial Fukien Government under Ch'en Yi in particular irked the China KMT high command, his unconcealed admiration for the practice and spirit of Yenan communism practically made him a *persona non grata* in KMT circles in China.

Tan Kah-kee's 1940 China comfort mission left both short-term and long-term legacies, all damaging to KMT causes in China and in British Malaya. One short-term consequence was the despatch of Wu T'ieh-cheng by Chiang Kai-shek to Southeast Asia in the latter part of 1940 to counter the Tan Kah-kee forces, among other things. With Wu's encouragement, the Malayan KMT's attempts to challenge Tan Kah-kee in the national salvation movement split the Chinese community in British Malaya into contending forces, thus weakening the Movement itself. The long-term implications for the Malayan KMT were that Tan Kah-kee led the anti-KMT forces in the post-war years to side with Mao Tse-tung in the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949). As a result, the Malayan Chinese community was fragmented politically and ideologically into three factions, the MCP, KMT and Tan Kah-kee forces.⁶³

British political control in Malaya since 1936 had concentrated more on the MCP. In 1937, for example, twenty important Malayan communist personalities were arrested and banished to China.⁶⁴ In October 1938, four of AEBUS' top leaders in Singapore, including Ong Yen-chee, Lain Wen-hua, Soo Tong-ing and Koo Chung-eng were deported, thus lowering AEBUS morale in Singapore.⁶⁵ In 1940, over 1000 Chinese communist suspects arrested or interned by the Malayan Governments were deported to China through Hong Kong and Amoy.⁶⁶ In contrast, none of the KMT members within the CNEVC were either arrested or deported for carrying out anti-Japanese boycott campaigns. Although the British exiled Hau Say-huan in December 1939, it should be noted that Hau was then a supporter of Tan Kah-kee, in sympathy with the KMT régime in China. He did not become a registered KMT member until his arrival in Chungking in 1940. Thus the changing British perception of the Malayan KMT being the lesser menace encouraged KMT leaders to expand their range of activities and extend their social and political influence within the Chinese community in Malaya.

As in 1930 and 1931, the British authorities in Malaya were subject to an important constraint — Britain's diplomatic relations with both China and Japan. In 1937 and 1938, Britain took a neutral stance towards the Sino-Japanese War and so did the colonial authorities in Malaya. Although Sir Shenton Thomas uttered his sympathy publicly for the suffering of the Chinese people in China under war conditions in 1938, he was intolerant towards law-breakers involved in the anti-Japanese boycott in Malaya.⁶⁷ Like all his predecessors, he was just as paternalistic, as is indicated when he said that the Chinese 'are indebted to the Malayan Governments for practically all they possess, for their livelihood, their homes, their freedom. . . .',⁶⁸ and hence his demand for Malayan Chinese loyalty to British rule and his appeal for

law and order. Sir Shenton Thomas' handling of the Malayan Chinese political crisis during the Sino-Japanese War era marked him out as a firm, steady and understanding Governor, whom the Chinese people came to respect.

By the time Britain entered the European War in 1939, Britain's foreign policy had decisively altered in favour of China. Such changing diplomatic relations between Britain and China prompted the colonial authorities to deal with the Malayan KMT question with more tact, understanding and tolerance. The visit of Wu T'ieh-cheng in November 1940 to Malaya is a case in point. The Governor of the SS, Sir Shenton Thomas, thought Wu's visit 'undesirable under any circumstances',⁶⁹ but his decision was overruled by the Foreign Office. The grounds given by Ashley Clarke, the Under Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, were that Britain was anxious 'not to have to rebuff the Chinese Government more than is absolutely necessary' and that Britain would like 'to be more accommodating in small matters when we can'.⁷⁰ Ashley Clarke added that Wu T'ieh-cheng was known personally to the FO as an official who had been friendly towards the British authorities in Shanghai as a former Mayor of Shanghai. To reinforce his argument, Ashley Clarke asked the CO to advise Sir Shenton Thomas to find a way of requesting the Acting Governor to receive Wu T'ieh-cheng, and give him 'such reasonable facilities as may be possible'.⁷¹ Wu T'ieh-cheng was duly and courteously received by the British authorities in Singapore as a friendly guest, a gesture which greatly delighted the Malayan KMT and boosted its morale. During Wu's visit, he tried to negotiate with the British authorities on legalization of the Malayan KMT and to encourage the development of the *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps. These two issues were to dog Sir Shenton Thomas right up to the eve of the Japanese Invasion of Malaya in 1941.

Changing circumstances had mellowed British attitudes. S. W. Jones, Officer Administering the Government (OAG) in the absence of Sir Shenton Thomas wrote a despatch on 23 October 1940 to the CO stating that the British had found Minutes of the 14th Joint Conference of the Singapore, Johore and Malacca Direct Branches of the KMT, implicating the Chinese Government in breaking the Wang-Lampson Agreement. Clementi would have summoned the KMT leaders involved and intimidated them. Jones however acknowledged that 'in the difficult circumstances of today, it is not my intention that any action, either by court proceedings or otherwise, should be taken against the organizers of these Direct Branches or against other *Kuomintang* activities in Malaya or to ask that a protest should be made to the Government of China by His Majesty's Ambassador'.⁷²

Jones' despatch went to the FO where it prompted some revealing comments in the minutes. Sir John Brennan, the Permanent Under Secretary of the FO, thought for example that the Singapore Government maintained a somewhat outdated attitude in matters relating to the Chinese Government and the *Kuomintang*, while another FO officer said that the attitude of the OAG in matters Chinese seemed to be quite misplaced in these days. On 5 February 1941 an FO Minute reinterpreted the Wang-Lampson Agreement. In the Minute, Dr C. T. Wang was said to have undertaken that KMT branches should not be established in Malaya, but Wang qualified this by saying that party members would wish on occasion to meet informally to discuss their affairs; members, however, would avoid anything which might be construed as inimical to the interests of the local government or as interference in the domestic affairs of Malaya, so 'we are expected to adopt a 'really liberal attitude' in the matter'.⁷³ The contents of the FO Minute were conveyed by Ashley Clarke, FO, to G.E.J. Gent, CO, on 18 February 1941,⁷⁴ which for the last time sealed the issue of the Malayan KMT establishing its Direct Branches and holding meetings.

The most sensitive matters which the British authorities in Malaya, the CO and the FO had to handle during 1941 were Wu T'ieh-cheng's proposal to legalize the Malayan KMT, and the growth of the KMT-directed SMCIYC. The Malayan Government argued strongly against the recognition and legalization of the Malayan KMT which the FO eventually accepted in September 1941.⁷⁵ The question of banning the SMCIYC had a rougher passage and a less fruitful result.

Sir Shenton Thomas had monitored the activities and growth of the Corps in 1941 for six months before he submitted a despatch to the CO on 26 June 1941, requesting approval to ban the Corps at the earliest possible date.⁷⁶ Sir Shenton Thomas wished to deal with the Corps with tact by sending a long despatch to the British Ambassador to China, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, on the same day as his CO despatch. In this long despatch, Sir Shenton Thomas documented the activities of the Corps and asked the Ambassador's opinion on the proposed ban.⁷⁷ In September 1941, the CO and the FO had endorsed the Governor's decision to proscribe the Corps and had advised Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to convey Britain's decision to Chiang Kai-shek in a sympathetic but emphatic manner. The British Ambassador in Chungking was apparently unable to convince Chiang Kai-shek and Wu T'ieh-cheng of the soundness of British motives for refusing to recognize the Malayan KMT and banning the Corps. As the Malayan KMT question seemed to threaten sound Sino-British relationships, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr made an urgent visit to Singapore in October 1941 to discuss the KMT



Plate 27. Lau Pak-khuan, KMT leader, Perak Plate 28. Hong Siong, KMT leader, Perak



Plate 29. Lee Hau-shik,
KMT leader, Selangor

Plate 30. Sir John Anderson,
SS (Straits Settlements)
Governor, 1903–1910

Plate 31. Sir Arthur Young,
SS Governor, 1911–1919
(bottom left)

Plate 32. Sir Laurence Guille-
mard, SS Governor, 1920–1927
(bottom right)





Plate 35. Sir Shenton Thomas,
SS Governor, 1934-1942



Plate 36. Sir Franklin Gimson,
Singapore Governor,
1947-1951



Plate 33. Sir Hugh Clifford,
SS Governor, 1927-1929



Plate 34. Sir Cecil Clementi,
SS Governor, 1930-1934

question with the Governor. Either as a compromise or a delaying tactic, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr suggested that a Malayan goodwill mission should go to Chungking to make personal contact with the Chinese to dispel any suspicion and mistrust.⁷⁸ His suggestion was taken up by A. B. Jordan,⁷⁹ who headed the Malayan goodwill mission in November 1941. However, after Jordan's return, the Wang-Lampson Agreement was temporarily reaffirmed with the Corps banned and the Malayan KMT remaining unrecognized.

Ironically, the outbreak of the Pacific War and the eventual invasion of Malaya by the Japanese in December 1941 undid what the British had achieved in KMT management since 1931. The British needed Chinese cooperation to help defend Singapore, so they had no choice but to abandon their rigid political control by recognizing and accepting all political parties and groups, including the MCP and the KMT, without repealing the established Wang-Lampson Agreement. Against the advice of some of the senior Special Branch personnel and Chinese Affairs Department staff, both the MCP and the KMT received the stamp of official recognition from the Government in its last hours in Singapore and from the Allied High Command.⁸⁰ In addition, all the major political factions within the Singapore Chinese community were blessed by official sanction in their forming the Singapore Chinese Mobilization Council (SCMC) on 30 December 1941 to help the British resist the Japanese. The formation of the SCMC marked the end of the Wang-Lampson Agreement's usefulness and gave the last hurrah to the British adversaries. But the last hurrah was ephemeral, agonizing and tragic, for many KMT and MCP members were soon rounded up by the victorious Japanese for political sins committed by the Malayan Chinese since the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

Notes

1. NL 5939 GD c/167a/31, John Scott, the Officer Administering the Government, SS, to His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, 29 May 1931, p. 2. *Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (MRCA)* 8 (1931), p. 45; 9 (1931), pp. 12-13.
2. *MRCA* 9 (1931), p. 13; 10 (1931), p. 6; 17 (1932), p. 10; 18 (1932), p. 20.
3. *Ibid.*, 18 (1932), p. 44.
4. *Ibid.*, 17 (1932), p. 6; 18 (1932), p. 20; 35 (1933), p. 6.
5. *Ibid.*, 47 (1934), pp. 13-14.
6. *Ibid.*, 57 (1935), p. 4.
7. *Ibid.*, 51 (1934), p. 5. Lee Chin-tian had intended to resign from his party position in Singapore in 1936; see *MRCA* 69 (1936), p. 8.
8. *Nanyang Siang Pau (NYSP)*, 29 May 1931; 30 May 1931.
9. *Min Kuo Jih Pao (MKJP)*, 15 June 1931; 16 June 1931 and 22 June 1931.
10. *MRCA* 10 (1931), pp. 17-18.

11. *Ibid.*, 11 (1931), p. 25.
12. *MKJP* 30 September 1931.
13. *MRCJA* 67 (1936), p. 7; 39 (1933), p. 8; 49 (1934), p. 5.
14. *Ibid.*, 57 (1935), p. 4.
15. *Nanyang Year Book 1951* (Singapore: *Nanyang Siang Pau* Press, 1951), p. Z 299.
16. *NYSP* 14 July 1936.
17. FO 371/16228/2437, 'Activities of the *Kuomintang* in Malaya', see Enclosure No. 1, 'Report on *Tang* Affairs of the Malacca Direct Branch', 19 November 1931, p. 3.
18. *NYSP* 10 October 1934; 31 December 1934.
19. *Ibid.*, 12 April 1936; 21 April 1936.
20. C. F. Yong, *Chinese Community Structure and Leadership in Pre-War Singapore* (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1977), pp. 117-27.
21. *MRCJA* 48 (1934), p. 48.
22. *Ibid.*, 86 (1937), p. 5.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, 29 (1933), pp. 5-6.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
26. *Ibid.*, 49 (1934), p. 12.
27. *Ibid.*, 86 (1937), p. 5.
28. FO 371/16228/2437, 'Activities of the *Kuomintang* in Malaya', 9 March 1932, see Enclosure No. 1, 'Report on *Tang* Affairs of the Kedah State Direct Branch,' by Chang Pu-fei, 1931, p. 1.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
30. *MRCJA* 7 (1931), p. 51; 78 (1937), pp. 48-9.
31. *Ibid.*, 7 (1931), p. 51. The circulation of the *Min Kuo Jih Pao* daily during 1931 was reported to be about 2500 copies.
32. *MRCJA* 3 (1930), pp. 4-5.
33. *Ibid.*, 49 (1934), pp. 15-16.
34. *Ibid.*, 78 (1937), pp. 50-2.
35. *Ibid.*, 51 (1934), pp. 12-13.
36. *Ibid.*, 40 (1933), p. 12.
37. *Ibid.*, 44 (1934), p. 11.
38. *Ibid.*, 69 (1936), p. 10.
39. *British Malaya* 9, 2 (1934), p. 34.
40. *MRCJA* 89 (1938), p. 8.
41. *Ibid.*, 97 (1938), p. 4.
42. *Ibid.*
43. FO 371/24712/5749, Chinese Activities in Malaya, 23 December 1940, see S. W. Jones, the OAG, Singapore, to the CO, 23 October 1940, p. 1.
44. *MRCJA*, 99 (1938), p. 11.
45. *Ibid.*, 96 (1938), p. 6.
46. *Ibid.*, 94 (1938), p. 8; 96 (1938), p. 6.
47. FO 371/27734/7183, Membership of the *Kuomintang*, 30 July 1941; see the Copy of the Letter of Sir Shenton Thomas, SS, to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, His Majesty's Ambassador, Chungking, 26 June 1941, p. 1.
48. *Ibid.*, see also Enclosure No. 'A', Copy of Wu T'ieh-cheng's Confidential Memorandum, 31 December 1940, pp. 1-2.
49. Chui Kwei-chiang, 'Chan-hou ch'u-ch'i hsin-ma ti Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang', *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, 22 February 1982.
50. FO 371/27734/7183, see the Copy of the Letter of Sir Shenton Thomas, SS, to Sir

Archibald Clark Kerr, His Majesty's Ambassador, Chungking, 26 June 1941, p. 2. No names of the leadership of the Corps are given in Sir Shenton's letter.

51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*, see the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO, to the Under Secretary of State, FO, 11 September 1941, p. 2.
53. *Ibid.*, see the Copy of the Letter of Sir Shenton Thomas, SS, to Sir Archibald Clerk Kerr, His Majesty's Ambassador, Chungking, 26 June 1941, p. 2.
54. *MRCR* 85 (1937), pp. 11-12.
55. *Ibid.*, 87 (1937), p. 16.
56. *Ibid.*, 90 (1938), pp. 19-20.
57. Stephen Leong, 'The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya During the National Salvation Period, 1937-1941', *JSEAS* 8, 1 (1977), p. 35.
58. *NYSP*, 30 July 1938; 1 August 1938.
59. *MRCR* 100 (1938), p. 14.
60. CO 273/662/50336, Sir Shenton Thomas, SS, to Malcolm MacDonald, CO, 29 December 1939, p. 6.
61. Stephen Leong, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-6.
62. Pang Wing Seng, 'The "Double-Seventh" Incident, 1937: Singapore Chinese Response to the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War', *JSEAS* 4, 2 (1973), pp. 269-99. See also C. F. Yong, *Tan Kah-kee, the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 204.
63. For more detail, see C. F. Yong, *Tan Kah-kee, the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend*, pp. 229-97.
64. CO 275/149, R. Onraet, 'Annual Report on the Organization and Administration of the SS Police and on the state of crime for the Year 1937', *Annual Department Report for the SS for 1937* (Singapore: 1939), Vol 2, pp. 836-7.
65. CO 273/642/50072, Deportation — monthly returns, giving the names and some details of these four AEBUS leaders to be deported. No pages given.
66. FO 371/24712/4834, Deportation of Chinese Communists from Malaya, 1940. No pages given.
67. CO 275/145, *SS Legislative Council Proceedings, 1938*, p. B 98.
68. *Ibid.*
69. CO 273/665/50693, Visit of Wu T'ieh-cheng, see the Copy of the Telegram from the Deputy Governor, SS, to the CO, 5 October 1940.
70. *Ibid.*, see Ashley Clarke, FO, to G. E. J. Gent, CO, on Wu T'ieh-cheng's visit. No pages given.
71. *Ibid.*
72. FO 371/24712/5749, Chinese Activities in Malaya, see S. W. Jones' Letter to Lord Lloyd, CO, 23 October 1940, p. 2.
73. *Ibid.*, see Cover Minutes to this file of the three FO officers mentioned.
74. FO 371/27815/565, Relations between China and Malaya, 1941, see a Letter from Ashley Clarke, FO, to G. E. J. Gent, CO, 18 February 1941.
75. FO 371/27734/9211, A Telegram from the FO to Singapore, FMS, Chungking and the Governor of Hong Kong, 22 September 1941, concerning the FO's decision not to recognize the KMT in Malaya.
76. FO 371/27734/7183, Sir Shenton Thomas, SS, to Lord Moyne, PC, Colonial Office, 26 June 1941.
77. *Ibid.*, see Sir Shenton Thomas, SS, to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, His Majesty's Ambassador, Chungking, 26 June 1941, on his rationale and intention to ban the Corps within 14 days.

78. FO 371/27734/10354, A Telegram from Sir A. Clark Kerr, Singapore, to the FO, 5 October 1941, on his suggestion to the SS Governor to send a goodwill mission to Chungking.
79. A. B. Jordan (1890-1982), B.A., Oxford University, was born in Nottingham, England. He served as a cadet in 1913 in the FMS and rose through the ranks to become Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Malaya, in 1934. He could communicate in Cantonese and was blessed with the dedicated assistance provided by Sng Choon-yee within the Chinese Affairs Department. He was known to be unsympathetic to Chinese nationalism and intolerant of the KMT and MCP in Malaya. He served the British administration well during the difficult period of the 1930s. In the post-war years, he returned to Nottingham where he became a vicar of a Church of England parish.
80. J. B. Perry Robinson, *Transformation in Malaya* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1956), p. 22.

The High Tide of the Malayan KMT Movement, 1945-1949

The Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1942-5) was an unprecedented catastrophe for British rule and the Chinese population. It was a tragedy for the KMT with many of its leaders fleeing the country for refuge or being forced to collaborate with the Japanese. Some of its prominent leaders, including Lim Ta-tian of Malacca and Teo Khai-chuan of Muar, to name a few, became victims of the new masters. With the exception of some KMT participation in the anti-Japanese resistance movement, including the British-controlled Force 136 and the KMT-directed Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army (OCAJA) active in Perak and Kelantan,¹ the Malayan KMT Movement was practically dormant and virtually defunct. A generation of Malayan KMT endeavours was, it seemed, irretrievably lost. The future looked grim, and at best uncertain by the end of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya in 1945.

As for the British, they suffered great humiliation for the loss of British Malaya to the Japanese. With a handful of former Malayan Civil Service personnel, the CO set up a Malayan Planning Unit in 1943 for post-war political and constitutional reconstruction. The Unit proposed a significant but controversial constitutional change, by incorporating all former Malayan territories, except Singapore, into a Malayan Union, ultimately to be proclaimed in January 1946. The first post-war constitution for Malaya allowed the British to centralize political control under a Governor-General in Kuala Lumpur, weakened the power of the traditional Malay ruling élite, the sultans, and provided stringent conditions for permitting immigrant Chinese to become citizens of the Malayan Union. Although these changes aroused Malay opposition and prompted the rise of organized Malay nationalism, they had less impact on the Malayan KMT Movement in the post-war years. What was more closely related to KMT fortunes was the changing British policy of political control over the burgeoning MCP and the revived KMT, formulated by the Malayan Planning Unit. The fact that both the MCP and the KMT had been recognized by the Governor of the SS on the eve of the fall of Singapore and that the MCP had been an ally of the British during resistance action against the Japanese between 1942 and 1945 allowed the Unit and the CO to adopt a liberal policy towards Chinese political activities. Thus when the British did return to power in Malaya

in September 1945, establishing the British Military Administration (BMA) until April 1946, the CO instructed Lord Louis Mountbatten, then Supreme Allied Commander for Southeast Asia, that the pre-war Societies legislation should not be enforced.² And during the Malayan Union era commencing in April 1946, the CO again despatched an important policy directive to the Malayan Union and Singapore Governments that 'the legislation in the Malayan Union governing the registration of societies should be amended so as to remove the requirements that a society must apply for and be accepted for registration before it can be a lawful society, and the responsibility instead should be placed on the Governor in Council for declaring any existing society to be an unlawful one'.³ These two directives paved the way for both the MCP and the KMT to participate openly and legally in Malayan politics.

However, by September 1946, both the Singapore and the Malayan Union Governments were having second thoughts and were contemplating amendments to the pre-war Societies Ordinances aimed at tightening up political control over 'subversive' political parties.⁴ It was not until May 1947 that the Singapore Government finally amended the pre-war Societies Ordinance of 1931 by making the registration or exemption of all societies compulsory.⁵ The MCP and its front organizations such as trade unions protested and threatened to ignore the legislation. In the midst of popular protests, the Singapore Governor eventually declared in June 1947 that the MCP, the KMT and six other political parties in Singapore were exempted from registration.⁶ In Malaya on the other hand, the registration of societies under the Malayan Union was to remain on a voluntary basis, with a proviso that the Governor-General was empowered to declare illegal those societies deemed incompatible with the peace and good order or welfare of the country.⁷ By then, the KMT had expanded its power and influence within the Malayan Chinese community, a trend which began to alarm and worry the ever wary British authorities.

No sooner had the War ended than surviving KMT members began to regroup and to take stock. While still licking their wounds, many memorial ceremonies were organized for their fellow members killed during the Japanese occupation.⁸ In Singapore, existing KMT branches made a combined effort with 450 other Chinese organizations including the MCP to celebrate China's national day on 10 October 1945.⁹ Chua Hui-seng, a veteran KMT member who had suffered at the hands of the Japanese, was elected Chairman by popular acclaim, for the celebration. It was a joyous occasion and 80 000 Chinese turned up for a celebration procession reported to be five miles long.¹⁰ Cooperation between the

Malayan KMT and MCP did not last, as the Civil War in China between the Nationalists and Communists broke out in June 1946.

The pre-war *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps (SMCIYC) revived and expanded. It had headquarters in the capital of each state and territory and numerous branches and sub-branch Corps dotted among Malayan towns and villages. This KMT youth movement was to reach its peak in 1947 and to merge with the Malayan KMT in 1948. The story of this organization — its leadership, functions and influence in post-war Malaya will be unfolded later.

The rapid revival of the Malayan KMT Movement was largely due to the work of two China KMT inspection missions and one 'goodwill and comfort mission' during 1946. The first party inspection mission was led by Tan Chin-yah and Tan Seng-ngo in January 1946. They both promoted the KMT Movement by giving guidance and encouragement to its revival, and both stayed on to become full-time high-ranking KMT officials in Malaya.¹¹ The second party inspection mission comprising Yeh Jen, Yee Ch'ao-ying and Miss Wang Sin-yueh arrived in late May. Soon after their arrival, they established a Party Reorganization Committee, embarking on an extensive tour of Malaya to help reorganize party branches.¹² Wherever they went, they propagated Sun Yat-sen's ideology as guidance for China's post-war reconstruction and their visit to Malaya was warmly welcomed by local party members.¹³ In October, Thye Kwai-sheng led a 'comfort and goodwill mission' to Malaya. Thye was then Vice-President of the Central Overseas Department of the Chinese Government, with ministerial rank, and was thus a senior government official. He was accompanied by three Secretaries: Lin Chisen, who specialized in commercial affairs in this trip; Yeh Jen, who joined Thye in Malaya as Secretary for Political Affairs; and Thye Yiu-chi, Secretary for Cultural, Social and Party Affairs.¹⁴ Thye's two-month tour of Malaya strengthened party organization and broadened party activities, and judging from the warm reception his group received from the Malayan Chinese community generally and particularly KMT members, Thye's mission was a roaring success. One of the major results of the mission was the establishment of an Overseas Department office in Singapore to direct the Malayan KMT Movement, among other functions.

Despatching party or government missions and the formation of the Overseas Department in Singapore were conditioned by the need to win over the hearts and minds of the Malayan Chinese in support of China's post-war reconstruction programs and Chiang Kai-shek's grim struggle against the CCP. It was a shrewd, perceptive and calculated move on the

competent party organizers to help operate Malayan branches. One example is Fang Huan-yau (1918–), a Cantonese from a wealthy family, who was appointed in 1947 as Secretary of the Selangor Branch of the KMT on a salary of US \$ 300 per month. He had a varied career, ranging from the Central Overseas Department of the Chinese Government to membership of an American-trained Commando Unit of the KMT Army. He arrived in Selangor in June 1947 and was responsible for establishing six new KMT branches and for increasing KMT activities in Selangor.¹⁹

At the state level, the Malayan KMT was blessed with the emergence of an array of bright and forceful members. Some of these had emerged during the 1930s; others arose only in post-war years. With the TMH 'old guard' on the retreat, these 'new guard' members identified themselves politically with Chiang Kai-shek only. Table 1 below provides a brief biographical profile of key KMT leaders in five states in Malaya, leaving the Singapore and Selangor KMT leadership for closer examination.

An examination of these eleven leaders reveals that three of them were Malayan-born, including Wong Shee-foon, Tan Kee-gak and Ong Keng-seng, signifying that Malayan-born Chinese had become embroiled in China politics. Secondly, these three Malayan-born leaders were bilingual, continuing the tradition that the Malayan KMT Movement was not entirely monopolized by China-born and Chinese-educated immigrants. Third, many of the leaders were successful rubber tycoons or tin mining magnates. Fourth, they were all prominent community leaders, playing an active leadership role in their respective State Chinese Chambers of Commerce, professional associations and *hui-kuans*. They were patrons or promoters of Chinese vernacular schools and charitable organizations, the traditional function of all community leaders in the twentieth century. Some, like Wong Shee-foon and Ong Keng-seng, were patrons of Chinese athletic sports on a pan-Malayan basis. These new KMT leaders in the post-war years presented a more positive and impressive image. They were articulate, had boundless energy, ambition, aggression and undoubted ability and were more confident in their actions and with fresher minds. They were different from many of the pre-war KMT leaders in at least three ways. They were more open with their KMT activity and seemed to have impressed the Chinese community with their charisma. They were effective campaigners against communism, particularly the Malayan Communist Movement. In addition, they were all staunch supporters of Chiang Kai-shek who nurtured his relationships with them through consultation and communication. These KMT leaders in post-war Malaya commanded community respect for their leadership role, sound financial base, charitable temperament and unflinching social responsibility to their fellow countrymen. Finally it

Table 1: Key KMT Leaders in Five States in Malaya

Name	Pang	Profession	Institutional networks
<i>Johore</i>			
Wong Shee-foon (1898-)	Cantonese	importer/exporter	numerous <i>hui-kuan</i> positions in Johore Bahru
<i>Negri Sembilan</i>			
Chua Thean-keong (1901-)	Hokkien	businessman	president, Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Hokkien Hui Kuan, NS
<i>Malacca</i>			
Tan Kee-gak (1920-)	Hokkien	rubber trader	Rubber Traders Association; and Rice Guild, Malacca
Goh Chee-yan (1904-)	Hokkien	businessman	president, Malacca Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1947-8
<i>Perak</i>			
Lau Pak-khuan (1895-)	Cantonese	tin mining magnate	Miners Association, Ipoh; Kwangtung Association, Ipoh; Chairman, KMT, Perak
Pek Seng-goan (1895-)	Hokkien	rubber trader	vice-president, Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce; president, Perak Hokkien Association
Hong Siong	Cantonese	tin mining magnate	Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce; vice-president, Miners Association
Ong Chin-seong	Hokkien	rubber trader	Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce; Hokkien Association
<i>Penang</i>			
Khor Seng-li	Hokkien	merchant	Penang Hokkien Association; Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce
Ong Keng-seng (1898-1963)	Hokkien	rubber trader	president, Penang SCCC; Rubber Traders Association
Saw Seng-kew (1904-1970)	Hokkien	rubber magnate & financier	Penang SCCC; Penang Rubber Traders Association

Sources: CO537/3751/55400/5, Pt.1, Who's Who, 1 April 1948, serial Nos. 54, 55 and 57. CO537/3751/55400/5, Pt.1, Who's Who 1 February 1948, serial No. 38. *Straits Times*, 2 July 1970.

is significant that many of the leaders listed in Table 1 were either founders of the MCA in February 1949 or its staunch supporters after 1949.

The KMT's 1948 leadership structure in Singapore is shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Leadership of the Singapore KMT Branch, 1948

Name	Pang	Profession	New/Veteran Leadership
<i>Executive Committee (15)</i>			
Tay Koh-yat	Foochew	businessmen	veteran
Ch'en Lai-yu		businessman	new
Tan Shi-ho	Hokkien	teacher	new
Wang Chung-kwang	Kiangsu	newspaper editor	veteran
Lim Pang-yan	Hokkien	businessman	veteran
Lim Soo-ban	Hakka	businessman	veteran
Tan Chin-yah	Hokkien	newspaper editor	new
Lee Yee-hsieh		teacher	new
Sze Tu Shiu-tak	Cantonese		new
Oh Siow-yam	Hokkien	businessman	veteran
five others have not been located.			
<i>Supervisory Committee (7)</i>			
Leong Hou-chow	Hokkien	businessman	veteran
Tan Chor-nam	Hokkien	businessman	TMH "old guard"
Tan Kok-chor	Hokkien	managing director of <i>Chung Shing Jit Pao</i>	veteran
Lee Chin-tian	Hokkien	businessman	TMH 'old guard'
four other members not accounted for.			

Source: CO 537/3753/5540/5, Pt. 3, *Political Intelligence Journal* 14(1948), p. 559.

The KMT leadership in Singapore reflects that of most of the Malay States with a mixture of the young and the veteran, but dominated by leaders from business circles. Many of these leaders had their own networks in the Chinese community, being patrons of Chinese vernacular schools or leading members of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and *hui-kuans*. Being committed party members, they provided strong, positive leadership to the KMT Movement in Singapore.

The 1948 Selangor KMT leadership in Kuala Lumpur is illustrated in Table 3. Among the leaders, Low sai-yat, Cho Yew-fai, Chan Thye-kai and Leong Chee-cheong were promising post-war community leaders in Selangor. Others like Ng Ho-sin, Ng Tiong-kiat and Ang Keh-tok had been well-established community leaders since the 1930s. Ng Tiong-kiat stood out among the post-war business tycoons in Malaya, controlling one of the biggest, if not the biggest, enterprises which included many branches of various trading companies, rubber factories, oil factories, rubber estates and sawmills throughout Malaya.²⁰

Although not elected to the 1948 KMT leadership in Selangor, Lee Hau-shik (1899–1988), a staunch KMT supporter in Kuala Lumpur, deserves some comment. Lee was a Malayan-born Chinese who was

Table 3: The Selangor KMT Leadership, 1948

Name	Pang	Profession
<i>Executive Committee (15 members)</i>		
Ng Ho-sin	Hokkien	businessman
Chan Ying-choi	Cantonese	fitter
Lim Say-gim	Hakka	businessman
Low Sai-yat (1903-1971)	Hokkien	building contractor
Khong Siu-chee	Cantonese	businessman
Chu Cheong-pok		
Chan Chee-sau	Cantonese	businessman
Ng Tiong-kiat	Hokkien	financier and rubber magnate
Cho Yew-fai	Cantonese	businessman
Liew Hoi-ping	Cantonese	businessman
Chan Thye-kai	Cantonese	businessman
Sha Hai-pan		
Tay Chek-ming	Teochew	wine merchant
Lau Hee-choon	Cantonese	businessman
Leong Chee-cheong	Cantonese	businessman
<i>Executive Committee Reserves (5 members)</i>		
Ho Lan-hiong		
Lee Chiu		
Loo Yew-sin		
Ang Keh-tok	Hokkien	rubber trader
Sin Yoong-fun		
<i>Supervisory Committee (5 members)</i>		
Yim Kwai-wing	Cantonese	businessman
Ng Lap-fong	Hokkien	
Tan Pitt-swee	Hokkien	businessman
Wang Chee-ming		
Lau Ek-kok	Hokkien	businessman

Source: CO 537/3226/25036 Pt 2, Foreign Affairs, China, 1948, see *Review of Chinese Affairs* 24 (1948), pp. 11-12.

educated at St John's College, Cambridge in the early 1920s and obtained Honours degrees in Law and Economics. Described by the British as a man who spoke English with little trace of a foreign accent, Lee had an illustrious career even in pre-war years. During the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, he escaped to India and became a Liaison Officer in negotiations between the Chinese Government and the British, with the rank of Colonel in the Chinese Army. He returned to Malaya after the War and became the President of the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce between 1946 and 1948. He possessed extensive interests in tin mining and rubber estates in Selangor.²¹

One other characteristic of the Malayan KMT leadership which had been absent in pre-war years was its corporate financial effort and strength in economic enterprises in both Malaya and China. In post-war China, the China KMT needed to build up a party reserve fund for China and overseas activities, through government resources and overseas Chinese support. The Chinese Government provided liberal subsidies and facilities to all overseas KMT-controlled industrial projects in China. This then was investment in China through overseas capital. In addition, there was also investment overseas by the Chinese Government in order to boost the party reserve funds.

In response to the call by the China KMT and the Chinese Government for investment in China by overseas KMT members, a conference of all Hokkien delegates throughout Malaya was held in August 1946. Chaired by Aw Boon-haw it resulted in the formation of a limited company to invest in economic construction in Fukien Province. This was known as the Fukien Economic Reconstruction Company Limited, with a capital of \$ 20 million (Straits dollars). The capital was to be collected through the sale of shares in the company, which intended to develop commerce and industry in Fukien in the following areas: banking, communications, mining, irrigation and agriculture, industries, fisheries and salt refining. The KMT promoters of this project succeeded in collecting sufficient funds to convene a first shareholders' meeting in Amoy, Fukien, on 12 July 1947. Aw Boon-haw, a KMT sympathizer in the post-war years, was elected Chairman of the company. The two Vice-Chairmen were Ng Tiong-kiat and Ong Chin-seong, two prominent KMT leaders from Selangor and Perak respectively. There was a board of fifteen Directors which included the following prominent KMT leaders from Malaya: Ho Pao-jin (Singapore), Khor Seng-li (Penang), Lim Soo-gan (Singapore), Tay Koh-yat (Singapore), Peh Seng-goon (Perak), Lim Keng-lian (Singapore) and Ang Keh-tok (Selangor).²² The fortunes of this KMT project in Fukien were, however, first retarded by the Chinese Civil War and then by the final takeover of China by the Communists in 1949.

Another major and, in this case, very successful KMT project in *Malaya*, was the establishment of the *Chung Khiaw Bank* in 1950 with a capital of \$ 2.6 million (Straits dollars). Again, Aw Boon-haw was its initiator, with other KMT leaders supporting it, including Lau Pak-khuan, Lim Soo-ban and Yong Yik-lin.²³ With headquarters in Singapore, this Bank had branches all over Malaya and remains operational and successful today. These two examples of Malayan KMT investment in enterprises for economic and political purposes signified the unity and solidarity of the KMT forces. It also reflected a 'modernization' process in the breakdown of clan, *pang* and language barriers among the Malayan

Chinese, prefiguring the Malayan Chinese identity in the years after 1950.

The drive for KMT membership in Malaya began anew in 1946, accelerated in 1947 and reached its peak in 1948. The formation of the Overseas Department Office was largely responsible for the increase in membership in 1947, when it gave directives to all state branches for a membership drive. In June 1947 a directive to the Selangor KMT Headquarters stated that special attention should be paid to the recruitment of women into the party and to the formation of women's societies.²⁴ The significance of this was obviously that Malayan Chinese women became more involved in China politics.

As a result of the months' membership drive, the Malayan KMT had succeeded, by March 1948, in establishing 219 branches with an impressive figure of 27 690 members. The breakdown for each state or territory is shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Estimate of Total KMT Membership in Malaya, March 1948

State or Territory	No. of Branches	No. of Members
Singapore	23	5,000
Johore	25	2,190
Negri Sembilan	1	400
Malacca	19	1,315
Selangor	21	2,446
Pahang	12	5,161
Trengganu	4	1,000
Kelantan	2	500
Perak	83	5,547
Penang & Province Wellesley	19	3,121
Kedah	10	1,010
Total	219	27,690

Source: CO 537/3752/55400/5 Pt 2, Supplement No. 6 to *Political Intelligence Journal (PIJ)* 6(1948), p. 2.

It should be noted that this figure does not include the membership of the SMCIYC, which constituted the militant arm of the Malayan KMT Movement. Although the SMCIYC enjoyed considerable independence of action and pledged its allegiance only to Chiang Kai-shek, it worked closely with the Malayan KMT. However, when the Malayan SMCIYC finally merged with the KMT after March 1948, the Malayan KMT membership rose to an estimated figure of 45 000 or 1.75 per cent of the Chinese population in 1947. The British authorities became even more

concerned when they considered that 'approximately one in five of Chinese nationals in Malaya are KMT sympathizers',²⁵ a figure not far off the mark judging from the continual politicization of two generations of Malayan Chinese, since the outbreak of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895.

Partly to counter the Malayan communist drive for influence and membership among the youth, the revival of the pre-war SMCIYC throughout Malaya was swift. Initially, the SMCIYC had been a semi-military body in the immediate post-war era, which conducted squad drill and arms drill with dummy rifles and provided guards of honour in white uniforms for leading KMT visitors. The British soon put a stop to these practices. From 1946, the activities of the SMCIYC had been confined to physical training and sports, picnics, scouting, rallies, singing and dramatic performances. Many of its branches also operated night schools and libraries.²⁶

As under the prewar rules, the Malayan youth of both sexes aged between 16 and 30 were eligible to join the SMCIYC. However, working staff and nominated officials were not subject to the age limit. When application for membership was accepted by a sub-branch squad and endorsed by a sub-branch corps, a new member had to go through the ritual of taking an oath, pledging loyalty to the ideology of *San Min Chui*, obeying the command of the Corps leaders, abiding by the rules and regulations of the Corps, and declaring his or her willingness to make personal sacrifice, if necessary, for the cause of the Corps. Some of the Corps' rules included the keeping of Corps secrets, observing the prohibition on joining any political party other than the KMT, and the prohibition on attacking or slandering the party or the Corps. Violation of these rules might mean dismissal or other disciplinary measures such as warning and demotion, according to the offence committed. Largely because the discipline was rigid, morale was high.

In Malaya, the SMCIYC's organizational structure was quite simple. The Headquarters in Singapore controlled the headquarters of the Corps in each state or territory, which in turn, had branches under its jurisdiction. The Singapore High Command of the Corps came under the control of the China SMCIYC in Nanking, the Director being Chiang Kai-shek himself. In September 1947, the Malayan Security Service provided information on the organizational strength of the Malayan SMCIYC, listed in Table 5.

A careful perusal of numerous comprehensive lists of Corps leaders in each state and territory, provided by the Malayan Security Service's *Political Intelligence Journal* (Serial 15, 15 September 1947) reveals that the Corps leadership was largely in the hands of young members

Table 5: SMCIYC Membership and Branches in Malaya, 1947

State or Territory	Branches	Membership
Singapore	12	2,000
Johore	20	2,220
Malacca	7	500
Negri Sembilan	1	300
Selangor	9	1,710
Penang & Province Wellesley	6	511
Pahang	5	560
Perak	49	6,646
Kelantan	2	470
Trengganu	1	103
Kedah	8	684
Total	120	15,704

Source: CO 537/3752/54400/5 Pt 2, Supplement to *Political Intelligence Journal (PIJ)* 15(1947), p. 9

themselves with only a few exceptions. Some prominent and seasoned KMT leaders were also among its leaders, including Leong Hou-chou, Ch'en Lai-yu, Tay Koh-yat and Quek Sin of Singapore; Ng Tiong-kiat and Teh Sin-yoong of Selangor; Tan Kee-gak of Malacca; Ong Chin-seong of Perak; and Ong Keng-seng of Penang.²⁷ The British recorded that the Corps members were mostly China-born youths or the sons of local Chinese who still retained a strong interest in political affairs in China. The Corps was not primarily interested in Malayan politics except in the areas in which it competed with the MCP-led New Democratic Youth League (NDYL).²⁸ The British admitted that 'in its struggle with the Communists it may prove a useful ally to Government — but one which should be used with caution for fear of establishing uneasy obligations'.²⁹ They were also worried that the Corps might have an appeal to the Malayan Chinese youth, similar to that which the Nazi Youth Movement had had for the Germans, and regarded it as a 'potentially dangerous foreign nucleus which must be very carefully watched'.³⁰

What prompted the KMT and the Corps to merge in 1948 is as yet unclear. The need to cooperate and coordinate action and to centralize administrative and political control, as well as cost-cutting considerations were certainly among the reasons for merger. Early attempts by the Malayan KMT to bring about a merger apparently failed. So a conference was convened in September 1947 in Nanking for delegates from the two organizations in Malaya. At this conference, the Malayan SMCIYC was

represented by seven members, headed by Tan Yeang-cheng, Yap Hong-oon and Ong Chin-seong, while the KMT counterparts were Ong Keng-seng, Lau Pak-khuan, Ng Tiong-kiat and Lim Keng-lian.³¹ The decision was taken that the Corps should amalgamate with the Malayan KMT with effect from 1 January 1948 and that the KMT would create a special Youth Section to cater for the needs of the youth.

The decision to have the Corps absorbed by the KMT was obviously not at all popular with Corps members, for the actual amalgamation of the two did not take place until after March 1948. In Selangor, for example, the merger did not take place until May 1948 when all KMT Members and former Corps Members turned up at the Headquarters to take an oath of allegiance to the KMT. Members who had taken the oath would have their membership officially endorsed.³² The merger meant that many of the branch Corps simply changed their names to become new branches of the KMT. For example, in June 1948, the Selangor KMT had 33 branches, instead of the 21 of three months earlier.³³ Due largely to the absorption of the former Corps members, the Singapore KMT membership rose to 8000 in May and June 1948 from the 5000 in March 1948.³⁴ In Penang, the amalgamation was not completed until June 1948, and new office-bearers representing both organizational interests were not elected until 5 July for the Penang KMT.³⁵

Political activities aside, the Malayan KMT had always had considerable influence within the Chinese vernacular schools through the work of KMT teachers. In 1948, for example, five KMT teachers in Malaya were reported to have received subsidies from the Overseas Affairs Committee. Three of these teachers were in Penang. They included David Chen, Headmaster of the *Chung Ling* High school, Executive Committee member of the Penang KMT and President of the Penang Chinese School Teachers' Association; Saw Kean-boon, teacher of *Chung Ling* High School and a prominent KMT leader in Penang; and Siaw Ah-geok, teacher of the Penang *Chung Hwa High School*, an active member of the Penang KMT Headquarters and a former sectional chief of the defunct SMCIYC.³⁶ In 1947 and 1948, the Headmaster of the Confucian High School in Kuala Lumpur, Teh Sin-yoong, was the leader of the Selangor SMCIYC.

In March 1948, the British estimated that 50 per cent of the Chinese schools in Singapore were under KMT influence and that the KMT had succeeded in controlling the majority of the Chinese schools in Kedah, Perak, Penang and Johore.³⁷

Taking stock of the strength and influence of the KMT in Malaya in March 1948, the British also stated that the KMT had had considerable success in infiltrating Chinese social clubs and societies and estimated

that 60 per cent of these organizations in Singapore were KMT-influenced.³⁸

Despite strenuous efforts on the part of the Malayan KMT to establish control over the labouring classes, these endeavours were less successful. Nevertheless, the British admitted that in Singapore, the KMT in 1948 controlled 22 out of 159 registered trade unions, with a membership of 14 000.³⁹ By contrast, the Malayan Communist Party had very substantial control over the Malayan Trade Union Movement, one of its power bases. The MCP-controlled Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), for example, was officially estimated in March 1947 to have 'directly controlled between 80 and 90 per cent of the unions in Malaya'.⁴⁰

The post-war KMT was effective and prominent in its control and influence in the Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Malaya, with the exception of Kedah, Malacca, Klang and Negri Sembilan.⁴¹ Many of the ablest KMT leaders during the 1946–1949 period had been Presidents of this vital commercial and community organization, including Ong Keng-seng of Penang, Lau Pak-khuan of Perak, Lee Hau-shik of Selangor and Chua Thean-keong of Negri Sembilan. KMT influence within the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce was also strong in the post-war years. In both the 1946 and 1948 elections for office-bearers, ten KMT leaders were returned out of a total of 32 office-bearers.⁴² In addition, the KMT could count on the sympathy and support of another ten office-bearers, leaving about one-third of the office-bearers critical of or opposed to the KMT. The Chamber, under KMT influence, organized celebrations for China's national day on 10 October each year after World War II. In 1947 and 1948, for example, the KMT succeeded in prompting the Chamber to send congratulatory telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek personally on China's national day, giving the impression that it was a community wish. By so doing, the Chamber was seen to be siding with the KMT in China politics. This made it unpopular with the forces of the Left in Singapore, including Tan Kah-kee and his supporters. Factionalism over China politics continued for some years after the Communist takeover of China in October 1949.

The KMT's political struggle with the MCP and the left-wing forces in the post-war years gave it an ally in the Triad societies in Malaya, generally known as *Ang Bin Huay* (or *Hung Meng Society*). Several factors accounted for the development of the *Ang Bin Huay* (ABH) in 1945. In part, it was a direct response to the so-called 'ruthless behaviour' of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the military arm of the MCP, in settling old scores with Japanese collaborators and anti-communist elements. A considerable number of Chinese were forced to

join the Triad societies for protection and survival.⁴³ For example, in Penang, the ABH was initially apolitical. However, when it discovered the racketeering activities of the MPAJA which ran counter to its own objectives, it became increasingly anti-communist.⁴⁴ In addition, the Chinese government's avowed policy of allying itself with the Triad societies against communist forces in China and overseas encouraged the Malayan KMT to foster its relations with the ABH.

Thye Kwai-sheng, Vice-President of the Central Overseas Department, reportedly met Triad leaders in Perak, Kedah and Sungei Patani during his 1946 goodwill visit to Malaya.⁴⁵ The Sungei Patani meeting between Thye and the local Triad society resulted in agreement being reached that the Triad members should form an active arm against the communists while the KMT should confine itself to peaceful ways of achieving that aim.⁴⁶ When interviewed in 1977 by Chui Kwei-chiang, Thye denied having had contacts with the Triad leaders personally but admitted that the KMT had enlisted the Triad societies' aid to combat the MCP and the China Democratic League (CDL) in Malaya.⁴⁷ In Singapore, the British reported that the mobilization of Triad aid in 1948 was being carried out under the direction of Tan Kok-chor and Tan Chin-yah, two prominent KMT leaders of the post-war years.⁴⁸

It is difficult to document accurately the clashes and casualties of the Triad societies and the MCP in Malaya in the post-war era. In Penang, the clashes were serious during 1946, as both sides suffered deaths by murder. As a result of these clashes, the Penang MCP founded its own secret society, known as the Black Faces Society, to combat the Penang ABH and other anti-communist organizations. The British reported that the Black Faces Society members were recruited from the MCP and were trained in intelligence, propaganda and the handling of arms. Their duties after the completion of their training included both terrorism and propaganda dissemination.⁴⁹ The British had traditionally been opposed to the Triad societies and their latest activities and development were monitored closely. From time to time, the British prosecuted them, brought them to trial and, on conviction, banished offenders. The British recognized their potential threat to post-war Malaya — the breakdown of law and order. Intimidation and violence by the Triad societies, the possibility of Triads allying themselves with the KMT with consequent anti-communist outbreaks made them increasingly dangerous.⁵⁰ Despite vigilance and prosecution, the British believed in March 1948 that the KMT had made considerable headway in exerting its control over secret societies in Kedah, Penang and Province Wellesley, and Selangor. In Singapore, the KMT claimed to have more control over the secret societies than its left-wing rivals such as the MCP and the CDL in this respect.⁵¹

In the post-war battle for control of Malayan Chinese newspapers for both commercial and propaganda purposes, the Malayan KMT scored some impressive victories over the MCP and the CDL. In terms of numbers of papers, the KMT could safely claim to have controlled or influenced some 80 per cent of Malayan Chinese newspapers in the post-war era. Part of the reason for the KMT success was the inability of the MCP financially to sustain and maintain its publications. Part of it was due to British press censorship and proscription of the MCP's papers. However, two major CDL-controlled newspapers, the *Nan Chiau Jit Pao* in Singapore and the *Modern Daily News* of Penang managed to compete with the KMT papers until September 1950 when both were closed down by the British authorities for political reasons.

Table 6 is a list of major KMT-controlled or influenced newspapers, with daily circulation figures and editorial staff. The aim of the competing Chinese newspapers in post-war years was to influence public opinion in China politics. Basically, the KMT-controlled or influenced newspapers attacked communism in China and Malaya, and favoured the KMT régime and Malayan KMT interests. By so doing, KMT newspapers and those controlled by the CDL occasionally became embroiled in political polemics. In 1949, for example, the *Nan Chiau Jit*

Table 6: KMT-controlled or Influenced Newspapers in Malaya, 1948

Name	Directors	Editors	Daily circulation
<i>Singapore</i>			
<i>Chung Shing Jit Pau</i> (KMT organ)	Tan Kok-chor	Lin Chi-sen; Tan Chin-yah	4,500
<i>Sin Chew Jit Poh</i>	Aw Kow	Aw Long-man	7,500*
<i>Nanyang Siang Pau</i>	Lee Giok-eng	Tseng Hsin-ying; Wang Chung-kwang; Hsieh Seong-shan; Lian Shu-sheng; Ch'en Cheng-hsia	25,000
<i>Kuala Lumpur</i>			
<i>The China Press</i> (KMT organ)	Lee Hau-shik	Sung Yuen-chin	5,500
<i>Ipoh</i>			
<i>Perak Chinese Daily News</i>	?	?	2,000
<i>Penang</i>			
<i>Sin Pin Jit Pao</i>	Aw Boon-haw	Aw Tsang-fang	3,000
<i>Kwong Wah Yit Poh</i>	Khor seng-li; Ong Keng-seng	Chuang Hsin-tsai; Tan Chin-yah	6,500
Total			54,000

Source: CO 537/3752/55400/5 Pt 2, Supplement No. 6 to *PIJ*, 6(1948), pp. 5-6. a: this figure rose to 30,000 in August 1948, see CO 537/3753/55400/5 Pt 3, *PIJ* 15(1948), p. 606.

Pao was engaged in a fierce verbal war, lasting many months, with both the *Nanyang Siang Pau* and the *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, over Chiang Kai-shek and his rule in China.⁵² These political polemics ensured continuing politicization of Malayan Chinese readers, with regard to China politics.

Apart from contributing to the politicization process, the KMT and pro-KMT editors of these newspapers should be credited with providing strong intellectual leadership to the Malayan KMT Movement, either as active participants or as propagandists. As a group of intellectuals, they were seasoned, polished, well-educated and sophisticated, and commanded considerable community respect. They had all come from China in post-war years, with a few exceptions, to keep Chinese patriotism and the KMT Movement in Malaya alive. Together with KMT school teachers, they provided the most important, articulate, intellectual and, to a lesser extent, organizational leadership in the Malayan KMT Movement.

The post-war KMT operation in Malaya had two features — one open and the other underground. The open activities included all the KMT and SMCIYC procedural, organizational and administrative functions of headquarters and branches: regular membership drives, propaganda in the press, in the schools, and in functions associated with the celebration of China's national day, the commemoration of the anniversary of the death of Sun Yat-sen, or the swearing-in ceremonies of KMT office-bearers at state or branch level. Since the British were more tolerant towards KMT propaganda in the post-war years, the Malayan KMT openly propagated its anti-communist ideology with little or no interference from the Malayan Government.

Fund raising for China or the China KMT in the post-war years was not the most important function of the Malayan KMT. However, on one occasion in February 1947, the Malayan KMT was instructed to raise the sum of \$ 200 000 (Straits dollars), equivalent to \$ 331 million in Chinese currency, towards augmenting the China KMT Party Funds. Badges or certificates of honour were awarded by the China KMT to donors. Malayan KMT members raised the full amount of \$ 200 000 (Straits dollars) by June 1947.⁵³

Another open KMT activity in post-war years was to influence or control major Chinese institutional and community organizations, with potential as KMT power bases. The KMT relentlessly worked to infiltrate, influence or control the Chinese press, the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, the vernacular Chinese schools, social clubs, reading rooms, clan associations and *hui-kuans*. The Malayan KMT had enjoyed considerable success in these areas, with the exception of those

hui-kuans controlled by the Hokkiens who were mostly supporters of Tan Kah-kee, a severe critic of the Chiang Kai-shek régime in China.⁵⁴

The underground operation involved the alliance and cooperation with various Chinese secret societies, mentioned already, to counter communist threats and influence within the Chinese community. The use of the *Ang Bin Huay* of Penang in 1946 is a case in point. At times, the KMT-Triad alliance resulted in violence and bloodshed between the KMT/Triad and the MCP.

The British suspected that the Overseas Department Office in Singapore had maintained an underground intelligence organization since November 1947, known as the Special Service Corps, with special agents to collect intelligence information on its opponents including the MCP and CDL. British Security Service personnel also suspected that all Malayan KMT branches carried out intelligence activities for the party,⁵⁵ reporting in June 1947 that:

There is also evidence that the KMT is expanding its intelligence organizations. In the past it has been observed that KMT local headquarters have had reliable and prompt information concerning the moves of Communist personalities and changes of policy; and there can be no doubt that the Party keeps a close watch on the activities of the MCP and its affiliated bodies.⁵⁶

Prior to 1948 the Malayan KMT had generally concentrated on playing China politics and had steered clear of a relationship with the Malayan Government. However, with the Malayan Government and the MCP on collision course in 1948, the Malayan KMT sought closer cooperation with the Malayan Government against the common enemy — communism.⁵⁷ In July 1948, a month after the Malayan Emergency had been proclaimed, Lee Sze-yuen, then Deputy Director of the Overseas Department Office in Singapore, publicly encouraged the Malayan KMT members to enlist in the Special Constabulary to help the Government suppress the Malayan communist insurgency. In addition, Lee also urged KMT members in Singapore to join the Civil District Watch Corps against communist insurgents.⁵⁸ In August 1948, Lee Sze-yuen repeated his appeal to Malayan KMT members to assist in the Government's anti-communist campaign by joining the Auxiliary Police forces in their respective localities.⁵⁹ By October 1948, the Government of China had endorsed Lee Sze-yuen's appeal by instructing the KMT leaders to lend all possible assistance to the British Government's campaign against the MCP.⁶⁰ Overt KMT support for the Malayan Government during the Malayan Emergency brought MCP retaliation. The Malayan communists settled their old scores with the KMT by physical violence and in July

1948, 27 KMT members were officially reported to have died at the hands of the communists.⁶¹ In August 1948, this figure had risen to 40 KMT members who had lost their lives.⁶² In 1951, one of the major KMT losses was the assassination by communists of David Chen, the Headmaster of the Penang *Chung Ling* High School and a prominent KMT leader in North Malaya.

The Malayan Government no doubt welcomed KMT support for its campaign against the MCP at a time when all non-communist Chinese cooperation was needed. Ironically, the KMT's pro-Government strategy could not save its own skin. In May 1949, the KMT in Singapore was proscribed for the third time, much to the chagrin of KMT members. What then prompted first the Singapore Government and then the Malayan Government to change its policy towards the Malayan KMT? What rationale was used for banning the Malayan KMT?

The drastic change of policy by the British from *laissez faire* to outlawing the Malayan KMT can only be explained in the context of rapidly changing constitutional and political development within Malaya. In the first place, there was the instituting of the Federation of Malaya in February 1948 under the Federation of Malaya Agreement signed between the British and Malay rulers. Although the new constitution upheld the Malays' privileged position and favoured their interests, it was, nevertheless, a step towards the new Malayan nationhood, by offering citizenship to all who had made their permanent home in Malaya. The activities, ideals and political objectives of the Malayan KMT ran counter to British attempts to create a Malayan citizenship and national consciousness. Given normal historical circumstances, the creation of a Malayan identity would have been a slow and time-consuming process. However, the communist insurgency of June 1948 prompted the British to expedite this process.

Linked to the encouragement of a Malayan national consciousness was the Government's desire to defeat the MCP. To this end, the Malayan Government needed the support of Malayan Chinese who were prepared to identify themselves with the country and, more importantly, were willing to render support to the anti-communist campaign. It is now well documented that the birth of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in February 1949 was partly the work of the Federal High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, who encouraged its founders to form it and who sanctioned its birth.⁶³ Among its founders was a group of Malayan-born English-educated Chinese, headed by Tan Cheng-lock, Lee Hau-shik, Yong Shook-lin, Khoo Teik-ee and Leong Cheung-ling, and some prominent KMT leaders in the land, including Leong Yew-koh, Lau Pak-khuan, Wong Shee-foon and Ong Keng-seng. One of the objectives of the

MCA was to provide assistance in the maintenance of law and order, to ensure the peaceful and orderly progress of Malaya.⁶⁴ Law and order meant that the MCA gave overt support to the Government's campaign against the insurgents, the MCP and its front organizations.

Before the Government had found an ally in the MCA, the future of the Malayan KMT had received increasing attention from the British. The British had no illusions about the post-war KMT Movement and they disapproved of the KMT's attempts to ally itself with Chinese secret societies. They were concerned about the KMT's ability to raise funds for large-scale investments in Malaya, and were fearful that 'there will eventually be a continuous and considerable leakage of foreign exchange through remittances of KMT-controlled money to China, for the use of the KMT'.⁶⁵ Writing about the SMCIYC in September 1947, the Malayan Security Service Office concluded that the SMCIYC was a 'potentially dangerous foreign nucleus which must be very carefully watched'.⁶⁶

The Malayan KMT's China-oriented activities and objectives, together with the changing political climate during 1948, brought about a change of mood on the part of the Malayan Government towards the existing KMT. By December 1948, the British attitude towards the KMT question had hardened. They wrote that:

The existence of the KMT in Malaya is an obstacle to the political progress of the Chinese in Malaya. It stands for Chinese nationalism and cannot give leadership in the pursuit of political rights for Chinese in this country. The increased activity of the Chinese Consuls also militates against any attempt at the Malayanization of the Chinese.⁶⁷

Like Guillemard in 1922, Sir Franklin Gimson, Governor of Singapore, astutely argued in February 1949 that the time was appropriate for a ban on the KMT in Singapore. Pressing the CO for approval to outlaw the Malayan KMT, he argued that the timing was excellent because Chinese political parties in China were in a state of flux and the China KMT was at a low ebb.⁶⁸ His rationale was that the KMT in Singapore was a foreign political party, which 'militates against the growth of a Malayan civic consciousness'. In his view, as long as such an alien political party was permitted to play a large part in the lives and interests of the Chinese in Malaya, it would remain unreasonable to expect the Malayan Chinese to develop any real sense of loyalty to Malaya, the country of their adoption.⁶⁹ His proposal to ban the KMT was quite simple — remove the KMT from the list of those exempted under Paragraph 2F of the Societies Ordinance of 1947.⁷⁰

Gimson's telegram of 17 February 1949 to the CO proposing the removal of the KMT from the exempted list of political parties was

simultaneously forwarded to: the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald; the High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney; and the Governor of Hong Kong and British Ambassador in Nanking. There was apparently no opposition from these quarters, so the Colonial Secretary in Singapore, P. A. B. McKerron had the Governor's proposal gazetted on 9 May 1949 as follows:

No 1279 — it is hereby notified for general information that an Order deleting the following associations from the list of associations declared to be political associations is published in the Supplement to the *Gazette*:

CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE
KUO MIN TANG.⁷¹

The Singapore action was followed in August 1949 by that of the Malayan Government, when the Federal Legislative Council passed the Societies Ordinance, 1949, to register all organizations of ten or more persons and to refuse to register any organization or group 'of a political nature established outside Malaya', which 'is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for any purpose prejudicial to or incompatible with peace, welfare or good order in the Federation'.⁷² The main aim of this Ordinance was to refuse registration to the Malayan KMT should it apply for it. In response to the new policy of the Federal Government, the KMT held its last meeting of all state branches in Penang on 28 August 1949, deciding that no application for exemption would be submitted to the Registrar of Societies under the said Ordinance. In addition, it passed a resolution that all Malayan branches would officially close on 11 September 1949.⁷³

At the end of this historic meeting, the Malayan KMT issued a final *communiqué* to the Chinese population in Malaya. It gave two reasons for the decision to close down the KMT branches. One, the Societies Ordinance 1949 had put enormous strain on the KMT's survival and, two, 'China's rivers and mountains had changed colours', meaning that the KMT régime had fallen to the communists.⁷⁴ The *communiqué* appealed to the Malayan Chinese spiritually and materially to support China's suppression of communists and to uphold Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of the People'. Moreover, it also urged the Malayan Chinese to obey local law and order and to help the Malayan Government to quell the Malayan communist rebellion.⁷⁵ This then officially closed the last chapter of the Malayan KMT Movement since its inception in 1912.

Protests against the Singapore and Malayan Government ban from various KMT quarters were registered. The Singapore KMT leader, Tan Kok-chor, stated that the British action was poor recompense for the KMT's thirty years of cooperation with the Government and that

England should treasure the friendship of the China KMT.⁷⁶ The Chinese Consul-General in Singapore regretted the British action and hoped the decision to ban the Malayan KMT would be reconsidered and reversed. KMT members were even more disheartened when the KMT régime in China fell, at the hands of the communists, in October 1949.

The closing down of the Malayan KMT branches was not entirely unexpected, given the heated political climate then prevailing in both China and Malaya. Many farsighted KMT leaders had been founders of the MCA in February 1949 because they saw this as an effective way of continuing to combat communism in Malaya. After the KMT branch closures in May in Singapore, and in September 1949 in Malaya, many more KMT members joined MCA branches. In October 1949, the official election of MCA office-bearers at the Penang meeting resulted in four former KMT leaders gaining important 'portfolios' within the MCA hierarchy. These men included Lau Pak-khuan, Lee Hau-shik, and Wong Shee-foon as Vice-Chairman of the Working Committee, and Leong Yew-koh as Chairman of Welfare. Lee Hau-shik was also in charge of Politics, Youth and the Women's Department.⁷⁷ After joining the MCA branches, many more former KMT members played crucial leadership roles within the state MCA hierarchy during the 1950s.⁷⁸

The establishment of an MCA branch in October 1950 in Singapore resulted from a discussion, in June 1950, between the MCA President, Dato' Tan Cheng-lock and a number of former KMT leaders in Singapore and Johore, including Wong Shee-foon, Lim Keng-lian, Chuang Hui-chuan and Teh Sin-kwang. The avowed aim of the Singapore MCA Branch was to 'organize the Chinese masses of the labouring and squatter classes in the fight against the spread of communist terrorism in Singapore'.⁷⁹ Between 1950 and 1953, the MCA Branch in Singapore was dominated by former KMT members including Dr Ho Pao-jin, Ong Kiat-soo, Chuang Hui-chuan, Lim Keng-lian and Wang Chung-kwang.⁸⁰ It was quite possible for former Singapore KMT members to transfer their political allegiance from China-centric to Malaya-centric activities, given opportunity and incentive.

Although the KMT lost its organization after May 1949, it was still a political force within the Chinese community in the 1950s. As before, KMT members had considerable control over Chinese reading rooms, social clubs, clan associations, *hui-kuans* and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce. On occasion, former KMT members still functioned effectively as champions against communism, in their new guise. The response to Britain's recognition of the People's Republic of China in January 1951 by the KMT-dominated Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce (ACCC) is a case in point. On 12 January 1951, the ACCC passed a

resolution appealing to the British Government to withdraw recognition of the Chinese Communist Government in Peking. The grounds for the resolution were: that continuing recognition would do great harm to Malaya, where the Government and people were fighting against communist insurgency; that the Chinese Communist Government in Peking had committed aggression in Korea against the United Nations; that the Chinese Government had threatened the security of Indo-China, with which the security of Malaya was vitally concerned; and that Peking Radio had repeatedly attempted to incite the people of Malaya against law and order.⁸¹ The resolution was conveyed to the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, who forwarded it to the CO in due course. Although the ACCC's resolution fell on deaf ears, it is important to note that the KMT had considerable influence within this organization and was quite capable of making it serve its political interests as a pressure group.

Political independence came to Malaya in 1957 and self-government to Singapore in 1959. The MCP was suppressed in 1960 and communist power in China had become consolidated after 1949. Many staunch KMT members had either dropped by the wayside or mellowed with time and the changing scene. Some KMT die-hards kept up their cultural, spiritual, political, commercial and ideological links through contact with the exiled nationalists in Taiwan, and maintained their personal loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek. When Chiang Kai-shek died in April 1975 in Taipei, Taiwan, 86 former KMT members headed by Dr Ho Pao-jin took out a fullpage advertisement in the *Sin Chew Jit Poh* to commemorate the event with a four-character eulogy in Chinese, signifying Chiang's 'spiritual immortality'.⁸² It may well have been their intention to reaffirm their lasting, defiant conviction that the Malayan KMT was also forever 'spiritually immortal'.

Notes

1. Cheah Boon-kheng, *Red Star Over Malaya* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), pp. 75-9. Ian Trenowden, *Malayan Operations Most Secret — Force 136* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1978).
2. Mss. Ind. Ocn. S. 116, W. L. Blythe Papers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford, including *Chinese Affairs*, 18 February 1946, by Victor Purcell, p. 1.
3. WO 220/566, 'Malayan Long-Term Policy Directives' on eleven subjects, issued by the Colonial Office, 1945, including 'Malaya Long-Term Policy Directives, Chinese Policy', p. 1.
4. CO 437/1533/50823/3, Chinese Affairs in Malaya, 1946, see the CO to Sir E. Gent, Malayan Union, 9 September 1946.
5. CO 537/2140/52241, Pt 1, *H.Q. Malaya Command Fortnightly Intelligence Review 55* (1947), p. 2.
6. The *Kwong Wah Yit Poh (KWYP)*, 7 June 1947.
7. CO 537/2140/52241, Pt 1, *H.Q. Malaya Command Fortnightly Intelligence Review 56* (1947), p. 5.

8. CO 537/3757/55400/11, Chinese Affairs, 1948, see H. T. Pagden's Report on 'Unrest in Malaya', Item 52.
9. Chui Kwei-chiang, 'Chan-hou ch'u-ch'i' hsin-ma ti Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang', *Sin Chew Jit Poh (SCJP)*, 22 February 1982.
10. *Ibid.*
11. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement to *Political Intelligence Journal (PIJ)* 14 (1947), p. 11.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *China Press CP*, 9 July 1946; 13 July 1946; 23 July 1946.
14. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement to *PIJ* 14 (1947), pp. 10-11. See also *CP*, 18 October 1946; 29 October 1946; 6 November 1946; 9 November 1946; 12 November 1946; 16 November 1946; 18 November 1946; 21 November 1946; 27 November 1946.
15. *Ibid.* See also CO 537/3751/55400/5, Pt 1, Malaya Political Developments; and see *Who's Who*, 1 February 1948, Serial No. 39 on Yeh Jen.
16. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement No. 6 to *PIJ* 6 (1948), p. 3.
17. CO 537/3751/55400/5, Pt 1, Supplement No. 1 to *PIJ*, 15 January 1948, Serial No. 4 on Lee Sze-yuen.
18. *Ibid.*, *PIJ*, 1 February 1948; and see *Who's Who*, Serial No. 45 on Lin Chi-sen.
19. *Ibid.*, *PIJ*, 1 April 1948; and see *Who's Who*, Serial No. 51 on Fang Huan-yau.
20. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement to *PIJ* 14 (1947), pp. 16-17.
21. CO 537/3751/55400/5, Pt 1; *Who's Who*, 1 April 1948, Serial No. 60 on Colonel H. S. Lee. See also *CP*, 23 February 1946; 20 March 1946; 10 June 1946.
22. CO 537/3751/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement to *PIJ* 14 (1947), p. 20. See also *CP*, 6 March 1947; *The Chung Shing Jit Pau (CSJP)*, 21 July 1947; 12 September 1949; 27 September 1949.
23. CO 537/3751/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement to *PIJ* 14 (1947), p. 26.
24. CO 537/2140/52241, Pt 1, *Fortnightly Intelligence Review (FIR)* 59 (1947), p. 2.
25. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement No. 6 to *PIJ* 6 (1948), p. 2.
26. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement to *PIJ* 15 (1947), p. 1. And see *Ms. Ind. Ocn. S. 251*, Rhodes House Library, *Malayan Security Service Political Intelligence Journal*, 30 June 1946, pp. 4-5.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 22.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
32. CO 537/3326/25036, Pt 2, *Review of Chinese Affairs (RCA)* 20 (1948), p. 15.
33. *Ibid.*, *RCA* 22(1948), p. 13.
34. CO 537/3753/55400/5, Pt 3, *PIJ* 14 (1948), p. 559.
35. CO 537/3326/25036, Pt 2 *RCA* 23 (1948), p. 13.
36. CO 537/3751/55400/5, Pt 1 *PIJ* 9 (1948), pp. 327-8.
37. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement No. 6 to *PIJ* 6 (1948), p. 4.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. M. R. Stenson, *Industrial Conflict in Malaya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 124.
41. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement No. 6 to *PIJ* 6 (1948), p. 4.
42. KMT Members among the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce's 1946 office-bearers were: Lim Keng-lian, Tay Koh-yat, Chew Hian-swee, Lee Chin-tian, Lien Ying-chow, Chua Hui-seng, Woo Mun-chew, Huang Chin-seng, Lim Soo-ban and Fu

- Chih-feng. In the 1948 election, ten office-bearers were identified as KMT Members, including Tay Koh-yah, Lee Chin-tian, Lien Ying-chow, Huang Chin-seng, Chua Hui-seng, Fu Chih-feng, Lim Soo-ban, Woo Mun-chew, Yeo Chan-boon and Li Leung-kie
43. Cheah Boon-kheng, *op.cit.*, p. 173.
 44. CO 537/2139/52226, 'Chinese Secret Societies, the *Ang Bin Huay*', 1947, p. 1.
 45. W. Blythe, *The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya: A Historical Study* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 357, 371.
 46. CO 537/3751/55400/5, Pt 1, *PIJ* 4 (1948), p. 107.
 47. Chui Kwei-chiang, *The Response of the Malayan Chinese to Political and Military Developments in China, 1945-1949* (Singapore: Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences College of Graduate Studies, Nanyang University, 1977), p. 69.
 48. CO 537/3751/55400/5, Pt 1, *PIJ* 4 (1948), p. 107.
 49. CO 537/2139/52226, *Weekly Intelligence Review (WIR)* 27 (1946), p. 7.
 50. CO 537/2139/52226, 'Chinese Secret Societies, the *Ang Bin Huay*', 1947, p. 6.
 51. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement No. 6 to *PIJ* 6 (1948), p. 4.
 52. Chui Kwei-chiang, 'Malayan Chinese Newspapers and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949', *Journal of the South Seas Society (JSSS)* 38, 1 and 2 (1983), pp. 37-41.
 53. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement to *PIJ* 14 (1947), pp. 6-7. *Nan Chiau Jit Pao (NCJP)*, 1 February 1947.
 54. For more information on the conflict between the KMT and Tan Kah-kee in the post-war years over China politics, see C. F. Yong, *Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 298-348.
 55. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement No. 6 to *PIJ* 6 (1948), p. 2.
 56. CO 537/2140/52241, Pt 1, *H.Q. Malaya Command Fortnightly Intelligence Review* 59 (1947), p. 2.
 57. CO 537/3751/55400/5, Pt 1, *PIJ* 9 (1948), p. 2.
 58. CO 537/3753/55400/5, Pt 3, *PIJ* 14 (1948), p. 560.
 59. CO 537/3326/25036, Pt 2, *RCA* 24 (1948), p. 11.
 60. CO 537/2677/14355/6, Pt 1, *Colonial Political Intelligence Summaries*, 1948, no pages given.
 61. CO 537/4250/52890, Security Position in Malaya, 1948, no pages given.
 62. CO 537/3326/25036, Pt 2, *RCA* 24 (1948), p. 12.
 63. J. M. Gullick, *Malaysia* (London: Ernest Benn, 1969), p. 119. See also CO 537/2679/14355/6, *Monthly Political Intelligence Report (MPIR)*, 15 January 1949, no pages given.
 64. CO 537/4761/52849/48, see *Political Monthly Review (PMR)*, 2 March 1949, no pages given.
 65. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement to *PIJ* 14 (1947), p. 31.
 66. CO 537/3752/55400/5, Pt 2, Supplement to *PIJ*, 15 (1947), p. 3.
 67. CO 825/74/55404/3, *Federation of Malaya Monthly Political Report* 1 (1948), p. 3.
 68. CO 537/4835/54463, see Telegram from Sir F. Gimson to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO, 17 February 1949.
 69. *Ibid.*
 70. *Ibid.*
 71. CO 932/7, *Colony of Singapore Government Gazette Extraordinary* 49, lv (1949), no pages given.
 72. CO 923/2, *Federation of Malaya: Authenticated Acts*, No. 28 of 1949, pp. 2-3. See also *KWJP*, 11 August 1949; 1 September 1949; and *CP*, 1 September 1949.
 73. CO 825/74/55404/4, *Federation of Malaya Political Report* 10 (1949), p. 5. See also *CP*, 8 September 1949; 11 September 1949.

74. CP, 8 September 1949.
75. *Ibid.*
76. CO 825/74/55404/4, *Singapore Political Report (SPR)* 5 (1949), p. 1. *CSJP*, 10 May 1949.
77. CO 537/4761/52849, 'The MCA, 1949', see Extract from *Review of Chinese Affairs* for October 1949 on the MCA; no pages given.
78. Heng Pek-koon, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 88-93.
79. CO 537/5983/52849/48, 'The MCA, 1950', see Extract from *PMR* 6 (1950); no pages given.
80. CO 537/7292/52917, 'The Strength and Activities of the Kuomintang in Singapore, 1951', p. 1. See also *SCJP*, 13 July 1953.
81. CO 537/7301/52928/38, '1951 Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, Malaya', see Sir H. Gurney to the CO, 14 January 1951, p. 1.
82. *SCJP*, 12 April 1975.

Conclusion

The Malayan KMT was the first legalized political party and movement in Malayan history. For over a generation, between 1912 and 1949, it blazed a political trail in the face of adversity and constraints largely imposed by colonial authorities. Consisting of less than one per cent of the Chinese population in Malaya before 1947, the Malayan KMT followed the anti-Manchu revolutionary tradition of the TMH by further promoting Chinese nationalism in the form of cultural, educational, intellectual and political activism within an increasingly polarized and politicized Chinese community. The Malayan KMT Movement represented thirty-seven years of political endeavour by its members and sympathizers, and consumed a large part of the energy and resources of both the Malayan Colonial Governments and their London offices in managing it during that time.

One of the reasons for the rise and development of the Malayan KMT Movement was the continuing stimulus provided by the China KMT, as a party and later as the Government, and by years of political instability arising from warlord, communist and Japanese threats. Such external stimulation evoked political responses and hastened the politicization of the Malayan Chinese in general and Malayan KMT members in particular. In the end, continuing external stimulation and the politicization of the Malayan Chinese made it easier for the Malayan KMT to recruit new sympathizers and members.

External moral support given personally by Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and many high-ranking China KMT leaders as well as numerous party and Government emissaries boosted the morale of Malayan KMT members and helped sustain the Movement itself. Noting the role of party or government emissaries is crucial to an understanding of why the Malayan KMT Movement struggled on, despite Government prosecutions under a ban. Party or Government emissaries including Lu T'ien-min and Ch'iu Chi-hsien in 1912, Iu Teng-chan in 1928, George Wu in 1930-1931, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng in 1940-1941, and Tan Chin-yah, Yeh Jen, Lin Chi-sen and Thye Kwai-sheng in 1946 all contributed substantially to the revival of the Malayan KMT Movement. As professional organizers, the emissaries were despatched by KMT Headquarters to help organize branches or sub-branches. Their difficult missions were invariably successful. Once party organizations were established, local leaders were

left to carry on promoting the Malayan KMT Movement. In post-war years, however, some of the emissaries including Tan Chin-yah, Yeh Jen and Lin Chi-sen stayed on in Malaya to provide vital leadership to the Malayan KMT cause, as party organizers, propagandists or newspaper editors.

Being part and parcel of an ever-nurtured Chinese nationalism, the Malayan KMT strove to help modernize China and determined to fight for the survival and well-being of the China KMT and Government, under duress. In the post-war era, the Malayan KMT added a local emphasis, colouring and orientation to their Chinese nationalism, adopting a pro-British political leaning and maintaining an anti-communist ideology in Malaya. At this time, the Malayan KMT was fighting a war on two fronts — against the Chinese communists in the Chinese Civil War and against the Malayan communists in the wake of the Emergency proclaimed by the British in June 1948.

The manifestations of the Malayan KMT Movement included a host of overt and covert activities, ranging from party organization, propaganda dissemination and fund raising, to promoting Chinese educational, cultural and intellectual growth and the publication of various party organs. Because the Malayan KMT Movement was led predominantly by competent and committed Chinese community leaders, captains of industry and promoters of Chinese education, Malayan KMT influence within the Chinese community was well-entrenched, deep-rooted and widespread, and its legacies numerous and tangible.

The fortunes of the Malayan KMT fluctuated throughout the period under examination. In pre-war years, it survived two bans (1925 and 1930) by the colonial authorities and reached its zenith in influence, prestige and power in the post-war period. The KMT's post-war success was partly due to its legality as an open organization and partly due to the ability of its leaders to broaden the membership base to include the youth, women, workers and secret society members from lower social classes within the Malayan Chinese community. By 1948 when the SMCIYC merged with the KMT, membership of the Malayan KMT was estimated to have risen to 50 000, or just under 2 per cent of the total Malayan Chinese population. In addition, the Malayan KMT was able to claim control of 80 per cent of the Chinese press in Malaya, numerous Chinese schools and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce. Malayan KMT forces in 1948 looked strong and formidable and the Movement vigorous and secure. However, it was not to last. The Malayan KMT was proscribed for the third time by the Malayan Governments in 1949. It was to be utterly dissipated after the communist takeover of China in October 1949. This twin tragedy had such a severe impact that the

Malayan KMT Movement never recovered. Many of its members joined the Malayan Chinese Association to fight their common enemies — the Malayan Communist Party and communism in China. It provided some consolation for former members of the defunct KMT that the combined forces of the Malayan Government and the general Chinese population in Malaya, led by the MCA, eventually defeated the MCP in 1960. Ironically, it was this new set of political circumstances in the post-war years which helped transform the China-oriented KMT members into Malayan-oriented MCA activists, but at the cost of the final demise of the Malayan KMT Movement in 1949.

Despite continuing external stimulus from China and the Malayan KMT's competent and committed leadership, which were responsible for the development of the Movement, a key factor in the fortunes of the Malayan KMT remained the changing perceptions, policies and management techniques of the British authorities in both Malaya and London.

Changes in British policy towards the Malayan KMT Movement between 1912 and 1949 were largely conditioned by the changing perceptions of the Malayan Governments and, from the 1920s, FO and CO constraints and pressure.

Initially, the British under Sir Arthur Young had adopted a liberal policy towards the Malayan KMT by registering and legalizing its branches, with the exception of those in Klang and Penang. A major change of policy occurred in 1919. Riots in Penang and Singapore in the wake of the May Fourth Movement in China involved KMT teachers and KMT-influenced students. As a consequence of these 1919 incidents, the Registration of Schools Ordinances were enacted in both the SS and the FMS in 1920, as a measure to control Malayan Chinese education and to reduce the political influence of KMT teachers.

In 1922, Sir Laurence Guillemard made a positive move against the Malayan KMT and proposed to the CO that the KMT should be banned. Between 1922 and 1925 when the ban was imposed, Guillemard and the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs argued that the Malayan KMT was a political threat, stating that the China KMT under Sun Yat-sen had exhibited 'Bolshevik leanings'. In this way they implicated both the China and the Malayan KMT as part of a potential international communist conspiracy. Moreover, they reasoned that the continuing existence of the Malayan KMT would allow the China KMT or Government to interfere in the social, political and economic life of the Malayan Chinese population. A third rationale provided by Guillemard and his advisers was that if the Malayan KMT were not outlawed it would develop an *imperium in imperio*, flouting British law and undermining British political power and prestige. A combination of

consistent pressure from Guillemard and the May 30th riots in China prompted the British Cabinet finally to approve the proposed ban on the Malayan KMT in July 1925, making way for an apparent disbanding of the KMT by October that year.

Between 1925 and the signing of the Wang-Lampson Agreement in April 1931, the Malayan Government adopted selective punitive measures towards the KMT which were designed to prevent the formation of political societies in Malaya which could cause local disorder, and to check the spread of 'subversive' propaganda. Although the British anti-KMT policy was repeatedly and emphatically stated, there were practical problems in its enforcement and policing. As a result, the selective punitive measures had to be used. Some KMT branches were raided and offenders imprisoned or deported for life, other branches were raided and warned, but allowed to continue operating. Such KMT control measures would have worked more effectively had there been a united 'colonial mind' among the colonial officials, and between colonial officials and the FO and the CO in London. The divided 'colonial mind' first appeared after A. M. Goodman became Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS, in 1926. He was aware of the split within the Malayan KMT Movement between the 'moderate' and 'radical' factions and adopted a divide-and-rule policy directed against the left-wing KMT branches and activists. He tolerated the formation of the 'moderate' KMT-controlled BMHB in 1928 and allowed two delegates' conferences to take place in 1929 and 1930. Goodman's colleague in the FMS, P. T. Allen, did not initially have the same ideas as Goodman about the management of the Malayan KMT, although their views grew closer together by 1929. The cornerstone of Goodman's divide-and-rule policy was loosened by a second, divided 'colonial mind'. Sir Hugh Clifford had an apparently vacillating approach to Malayan KMT problems. He took a bold view in 1927 saying that the Malayan Chinese were entitled to their political aspirations and feelings. He added that he had reservations about the feasibility of using a ban on the KMT as a measure of political control at a time when the China KMT was succeeding in establishing a government in China. However, Clifford had changed his liberal view and approach by 1928, and in 1929 recommended harsh measures against the Malayan KMT. This was regarded by the FO as a *volte face*. No doubt, Clifford's initial view of the Malayan KMT had unnerved his advisers and added an element of destabilization to Malayan KMT control.

A third factor in the creation of a divided 'colonial mind' was the FO itself. The FO needed time to review the whole Malayan KMT question, now that the China KMT had established a legitimate government which had been recognized by Britain in December 1928. This China factor

dominated FO thinking, and the Malayan KMT became a contentious international issue between Britain and China. The emergence of the divided 'colonial mind' during 1925–1930 was largely responsible for the revival of the Malayan KMT Movement.

The arrival of Sir Cecil Clementi in February 1930 and his unilateral, hard-line policy against the Malayan KMT turned the nagging domestic issue into a serious international issue. It involved the FO, the CO, Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister to Peking, and Clementi. As the FO, through its Minister to Peking, was negotiating with China over such issues as extra-territoriality, the FO eventually assumed the leadership in directing the management of the Malayan KMT issue for a brief period.

Clementi, as Governor of the SS and High Commissioner for the Malay States, tackled the Malayan KMT problem in the Malayan context, stipulating that the Malayan KMT, banned in 1925, was flouting British law by still organizing and propagating its views. Moreover, Clementi expected the Malayan Chinese, including the China-born KMT members, to be loyal to Britain, as colonial subjects, rather than behaving as 'a double-headed snake' loyal to China. Thirdly, Clementi regarded British protection of Malay interests as of such paramount importance that Chinese nationalism in general and the KMT Movement in particular had to be suppressed. Finally, he saw himself as the Governor who had prevented the creation of an *imperium in imperio* by the Malayan KMT. While his intention and rationale within the Malayan context might have been sound, what troubled the FO most was his unilateral action against the Malayan KMT, without prior consultation with the FO, and apparently without visualizing the implications for the wider British interests in China. A clash in perception of British interests saw a growing crisis of confidence between the FO and Clementi which resulted in the FO assuming the leadership in managing Malayan KMT affairs.

Clementi's 'intransigent' attitude to the Malayan KMT resulted in Lampson's 1931 mission to Malaya, to seek a compromise solution to the problem. After his Malayan mission, Lampson exchanged notes with Wang Cheng-t'ing, then China's Foreign Minister, on the Malayan KMT question in April 1931, which eventually became known as the Wang-Lampson Agreement. This stipulated that Malayan Chinese could become individual members of the China KMT but were not allowed to organize branches, propagate KMT ideology or raise funds for KMT causes. The substance of the Wang-Lampson Agreement was enshrined in an Amendment to the old 'tried and true' Societies Ordinances, in 1931, making it the established official policy for KMT management for

the rest of the 1930s. Although the Wang-Lampson Agreement was not watertight, it succeeded in preventing the Malayan KMT Movement from developing into a real threat to the British rule.

For a time in post-war Malaya, the Wang-Lampson Agreement was tacitly shelved. Political parties of all colours and shades were tolerated if they presented no subversive threat to the Malayan Governments. This *laissez faire* policy by the British enabled the Malayan KMT Movement to rise to a 'high tide', never before enjoyed by the KMT. But just as the Malayan KMT seemed set to remain strong, secure and formidable as a political force, changing political developments in Malaya and China upset the KMT apperception. The Chinese Civil War had weakened the China KMT and Government, encouraging the Malayan Government to tackle the Malayan KMT question in a more decisive manner. More important was the British intention to speed up the process of granting independence to Malaya. To this end, the British authorities needed to create a Malayan civic consciousness, and political loyalty towards Malaya among the Chinese. As the Malayan KMT was regarded as a 'foreign' political party which militated 'against the growth of a Malayan civic consciousness', a ban on it was thus reimposed in May 1949 in Singapore and September 1949 in Malaya.

Despite the collapse of the Malayan KMT Movement in 1949, it had made an impact in three countries and left a number of legacies in the course of its history.

The impact of the Malayan KMT Movement in China was considerable. Its contribution to the China KMT's well-being was mainly financial before 1928. After 1927, the Malayan KMT joined forces with the general Chinese population by making generous donations to China against invading Japan. The Malayan Chinese remittances and donations to China had the effect of preventing the Chinese Treasury from bankruptcy. Second, the Malayan KMT provided some able leaders to the China KMT, notably Teng Tse-ju of Negri Sembilan, a close associate of Sun Yat-sen from TMH days; Peng Tse-min, a KMT Leftist from Kuala Lumpur, who was one of the 36 Central Executive Members in 1926 and headed the Overseas Department of the China KMT, directing overseas party affairs; and Tan Kok-chor, another Central Executive Member of the 1940s, who was among the most forceful KMT leaders in post-war Malaya. There were also numerous KMT deportees from Malaya such as Teh Lay-seng and Teh Sau-peng, who participated in the China KMT Movement during the period of history under investigation. Third, the fact that the Malayan KMT was China-oriented and closely linked to the China KMT meant that the Malayan KMT became an

international issue and complicated Sino-British relations during the bans of 1925 and 1930. However, the China KMT's intervention on behalf of its Malayan organization had only limited success during the 1930s.

Although Sun Yat-sen regarded the overseas Chinese as the 'mother of the Chinese Revolution' against the Manchu régime before 1912, it is reasonable to state that the overseas Chinese, after 1912, carried on this revolutionary tradition of assisting China in the ways elaborated upon earlier. The Malayan KMT was the vanguard of overseas Chinese nationalism in this regard.

The Malayan KMT Movement made a considerable impact on the CO and the FO in Britain, especially during the 1920s and 1930s. It forced both the CO and the FO to take stock of the Malayan KMT question and its solution, bearing in mind that Britain's interests in China and Malaya must be upheld and protected. Because the FO had to solve the Malayan KMT question in its East Asian context, it gradually assumed the leadership in KMT control in 1930 and 1931, leaving Clementi, the Governor of the SS, in limbo. Because the Malayan KMT Movement had become an international and diplomatic issue by the 1920s, a dramatic increase in the workloads at the CO and the FO produced a series of valuable documents. These throw a fascinating light on the 'colonial mind' at work, on changing colonial policy towards colonial affairs management generally, towards the Malayan KMT specifically and on some of the British management techniques employed in controlling the Malayan KMT. In other words, the Malayan historical sources would have been the poorer had not the Malayan KMT been perceived as an economic, social and political threat to British Malaya.

However, the Malayan KMT Movement made the most impact in British Malaya itself. From 1912, the Malayan KMT question influenced British policy towards the Malayan Chinese population. In the pre-war years, the British totally ignored the right of Chinese immigrants in political participation, but they were to provide citizenship clauses for immigrant Chinese and to encourage them to participate in Malayan political affairs in the post-war years.

Moreover, the Malayan KMT Movement forced the British to tighten up the mechanisms of political control, including those provided by societies, registration of schools, arms and explosives, printing presses, publications, labour, trade unions, immigration and banishment ordinances. In order to gather information on the Malayan KMT, the British increased both police and Chinese Affairs Department personnel, set up a Special Branch for tackling 'subversive' activities, and founded the Malayan Political Intelligence Bureau in 1922 to monitor political activities in Asia which might have had a bearing on Malayan security. This intelligence organization network was to be vastly expanded in the

post-war years to monitor all organized political activities, including those of the KMT and MCP in Malaya.

The Malayan KMT Movement had the effect of increasing the power and authority of the Secretaries for Chinese Affairs. They advised the Governors and the CO on Chinese matters, and until 1931 assumed a rare degree of control over KMT policy management and their Governor's advice on this to London, especially between 1921 and 1930, and between 1934 and 1941.

In the management of the Malayan KMT issue, each Governor revealed his own style of leadership, personality and management techniques. Despite differences of personality and management techniques, what all the Governors of the period had in common was a belief in the necessity of fundamental loyalty to the British authorities in Malaya and the punishment of defaulters from that code, mostly but not exclusively KMT activists. Within this framework Young and Shenton Thomas were more tolerant and liberal towards Chinese nationalism and sometimes the KMT. Like Young and Shenton Thomas, Guillemard pursued a policy of rewards for 'loyal' Chinese and punishments for 'subversives', almost by definition members of the KMT in general and the KMT Left in particular. Guillemard was the first Governor to single out the KMT as the major threat to British rule in Malaya. A brilliant administrator, he was nonetheless totally unsympathetic to Chinese cultural aims and sensitivities. Clifford, his successor, was initially sympathetic but circumstances and illness eroded his liberal-humane ideals, producing an erratic management style which frustrated both London and Colonial Government initiatives. Clementi, in following Clifford, had to deal with a 'recalcitrant' KMT, choosing to do so in an authoritarian and unilateral way which equally confounded imperial and international aims, but in the long term reimposed colonial management rather than FO management on the now attenuated KMT. Shenton Thomas was Governor at a time when the Sino-Japanese War enabled him to show tolerance for KMT humanitarian activities in support of China's needs. Hostile to attempts to subvert British authority he nonetheless showed great acumen in his choice of Tan Kah-kee as leader of Malayan Chinese endeavours both during the Sino-Japanese War from 1937, and on the eve of the Japanese Invasion of Singapore in 1941. Gimson must have felt this was a hard act to follow, though he was himself a man of good judgement, popularity and achievement. Gimson was in a sense fortunate in that the times and affairs in China, made his management of the Malayan KMT an easier task than it had been for his predecessors.

By far the most important effect of the Malayan KMT was on the Chinese population itself. The Malayan KMT made a major contribution to the social, intellectual, cultural and political life of the Chinese in

Malaya. By promoting Chinese education — financing, maintaining and staffing vernacular Chinese schools — loyalty to China was inculcated in the pupils. It was not until 1957 that loyalty to Malaya gradually replaced it. With improved literacy and educational standards, students from these vernacular schools were able to help modernize the Chinese community, thus ensuring its continuing survival and progress in a multi-racial Malayan society.

The KMT activists promoted social clubs and reading rooms and published some important Chinese newspapers, thus enriching the social life of Malayan Chinese and improving their intellectual standards. The Malayan KMT leaders also provided sound leadership in some of the key community institutions, such as the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, charitable organizations, industrial and commercial bodies, sport associations and *hui-kuans*.

While the Malayan KMT leaders enriched their fellow countrymen's socio-political life, their leadership and roles within these organizations made the Malayan Chinese community more able to adjust itself to a changing world and changing political climate.

While the Malayan KMT Movement strengthened the political consciousness and participation of the Malayan Chinese, it was also largely responsible for hastening the birth of a Malayan-oriented political party and movement, the MCA, in February 1949. Even before the demise of the Malayan KMT in British Malaya in 1949, Malayan KMT leaders and members had moved over to the MCA *en masse*. More importantly, they captured many important MCA positions, both at Federal and State level. By so doing, they were able to strengthen the MCA's ideology and its will to fight the MCP. When the time was opportune, the KMT-backed and controlled MCA forces joined with the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) for a concerted drive for Malaya's independence in 1957.

The Malayan KMT Movement left some important and enduring legacies in Malaya. Its anti-communist ideology is still alive today. It provided leadership at all levels to the MCA during the 1950s and 1960s. Some of the original KMT organs such as the *China Press* of Kuala Lumpur and the *Kwong Wah Yit Pao* of Penang survived through these decades. The Headquarters of the Malayan and Singapore KMT Movement during the post-war era, *Bin Chin House*, in Singapore, has now been converted into a library and museum, in memory of Sun Yat-sen and his association with Singapore. A score of KMT social and cultural clubs and reading rooms, such as the *Tung Teh* reading room in Singapore, can be found in towns and cities of Singapore and Malaysia, serving as KMT legacies.

As a partisan movement, the Malayan KMT inevitably became a divisive political force within the Malayan Chinese community, including the Straits-born. Because of its anti-communist ideology and action, it split the Malayan Chinese community into the Left and the Right, a phenomenon which remains largely unresolved to this day. Being fundamentally a China-oriented political party, the Malayan KMT Movement has to take some blame for retarding the creation and development of a distinctive Malayan identity and loyalty among the Chinese before the war. By heavily committing itself to China politics in the post-war years, it played into the hands of Sir Franklin Gimson, Governor of Singapore, who argued that the Malayan KMT, as a foreign political party, had forfeited its right to exist as a recognized institution. It therefore cast itself in the role of a contributing political force in modern Malayan Chinese politics rather than the leading role its history might have indicated.

Despite its China-orientation in politics and ideology as elaborated, it should be stressed that the Malayan KMT was also a Malayan-oriented movement, because of the location from which it operated, the sources and composition of its leadership and membership, the cultural and intellectual contributions it made to the Malayan Chinese community and the numerous other legacies it left behind. Such being the case, the Malayan KMT Movement should legitimately be viewed in the Malayan context not only as part and parcel of the Malayan Chinese cultural and political heritage, but also as a formidable political movement in its own right in the modern history of Malaysia and Singapore.

Appendix A

Sir L. N. Guillemard, Governor, SS, to the Duke of Devonshire, CO, 6 December 1922, on a proposal to ban the Malayan KMT branches.

STRAITS SETTLEMENTS.
SECRET.

Government House,
Singapore.
6th December, 1922.

His Grace
The Duke of Devonshire,
K.G., P.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
etc., etc. etc.,
Colonial Office.

My Lord Duke,

It is necessary for me to address Your Grace on an exceedingly difficult and complicated matter, that of the K U O M I N T A N G.

2. In the Colony registration of branches of this Society is not permitted, but certain other less important registered Societies exist whose policy and aims are much the same as those of Kuo Min Tang.

In the Federated Malay States registration is hitherto allowed.

3. The question as to whether the Federated Malay States lodges should be suppressed has had my most careful attention. Suppression has been, is being, and, I doubt not, will continue to be urged by all my 'expert' advisers, the officers of the Chinese Secretariats.

4. Kuo Min Tang, however, is a world wide organisation. Were local suppression merely a local matter, the decision for or against such action would lie with myself; but local suppression might have repercussions elsewhere, and might raise issues which could affect other Colonial Governments, or dominions for instance South Africa and Australia; it might possibly affect even graver issues, such as the general attitude of South China, or even larger areas, towards His Majesty's Government.

5. I feel therefore that I ought to refer the matter to Your Grace.

6. To do so, in any brief compass, is not possible, but it is my endeavour to limit this despatch to a minimum length consistent with clarity.

7. I propose to approach the matter in the following sequence:—

A. The briefest historical precis of Kuo Min Tang — its local history in Malaya — its interconnection with all South Seas political organisations.

B. The practical identity of Sun Yat Sen and the Kuo Min Tang, and Sun Yat Sen's gradual conversion to Communism.

C. The present menace to British power in the Far East:— the combined Communist (= Soviet Third International) attack from Berlin on the British in the Far East and on the Dutch — and the undoubted connection between

The Soviet

Sun Yat Sen
(Kuo Min Tang)
(Chinese Communists)

Indian
Communists

Dutch &
Javanese
Communists

D. Kuo Min Tang viewed as a local danger to Malaya:- from being a mere 'National' Movement for and in China it aims at creating an Imperium in Imperio: its control of education — its terrorism: its monetary drain.

E. Arguments *against* local suppression of Kuo Min Tang Malayan lodges.

F. General Remarks.

8. A. *KUO MIN TANG*. Historical Outlines.

Kuo Min Tang, historically viewed as a 'Chinese Nationalist League'. A continuation, but with wider objects, of the Triad Societies existing under the Manchu Dynasty, it was essentially revolutionary. Founded in 1910, in Tokyo, by Sun Yat Sen, under the name THUNG MANG WUY, its aim was achieved with the Overthrow of the Manchus in 1911. Kuo Min Tang, however, then remained on 'to free China from all foreign domination', first of Japan, and then of all other Powers.'

In November 1913 President YUAN SHIH KAI by decree, dissolved the Peking Head Lodge. The Society's centre thereupon was moved to Shanghai.

Branches and affiliations now exist literally all over the world. At the beginning of 1922 the head branch office was in Canton, with Sun Yat Sen. At that date Canton was the real headquarters.

Defeated by CHEN CHIUNG MIN, Sun Yat Sen has now fled from Canton and is in Shanghai, where he is ceaselessly plotting.

The past history of Kuo Min Tang in the Straits Settlements and the Malay States is briefly this:-

In the Straits Settlements:-

The Singapore communication lodge was registered on December 18th 1912. This nominally ceased to exist on August 21st., 1914.

The Malacca branch, opened on July 25th 1913, ceased to exist on December 4th 1914.

Application to open a Penang branch was made in 1913 but the Government refused registration.

The *registered* objects of the Singapore branch were

- (a) To preserve the Chinese Government's Unification.
- (b) To extend Chinese local self Government.
- (c) To encourage free mixture of China's five races.
- (d) To adopt a democratic policy.
- (e) To preserve peace with other nations.

The main *real* objects, I am advised, were

- (a) To collect and send funds to China for Kuo Min Tang.
- (b) To champion Sun Yat Sen.
- (c) To promote advanced democratic Ideas.

In the Federated Malay States:-

Kuo Min Tang kept a hidden existence until about 1920 when Sun Yat Sen urgently required funds for his attack, under Chen Chiung Min's generalship, on Canton.

Large sums were collected and sent from all over the Peninsula.

The Chinese Vernacular Schools, started by Kuo Min Tang members, were placed in charge of political refugees belonging to the Society. Thus the schools were connected with the Society, and it was their teachers — for the schools were used for political propaganda — who objected to the new Registration of Schools Legislation (1921), on which correspondence passed between Your Grace's predecessor and myself.

In 1919 the notorious SHAP YAN THUN, 'Ten Men Corps', linked up Kuo Min Tang with the anarchist organisations, through CHUNG LOK SHAN the F.M.S. Schools' delegate to England, against the registration of Schools Legislation.

Before this, many SHU PO SHE, or 'Reading Rooms' had been registered both in the Straits Settlements and in the Federated Malay States, these being definite organisations of branches in the Southern Seas under the Kuo Min Tang and KUNG TO WONG headquarters in China. Their aims were political and definite proof was available in some cases to show them to be the local fund-supplying agencies of Sun Yat Sen.

The possibility of using the old TRIAD organisation for binding together local political Societies was not forgotten. In one political Society — a Triad Society — the object was 'to make persons all over the world into one body and to protect Chinese overseas from oppression at the hands of foreign Governments'.

Throughout its career Sun Yat Sen's party seems to have aimed at a Republic on a Socialistic basis.

Locally, the KUNG TONG supported Sun Yat Sen, and this 'labour party' had some 200,000 members in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States. This party ceased to exist, as such, in the peninsula owing to action being taken against it. It has merged into the main Kuo Min Tang organisation. A similar result has just been reported from Sourabaya (in Java).

Finally, it may be stated that a very close inter-relation exists between the various political organisations operating in the South Seas. It is unnecessary to set out detailed examples.

9. B. Identity of Sun Yat Sen and the Kuo Min Tang, and Sun Yat Sen's progress towards Communism.

In 1917 a Tokyo Report showed Sun Yat Sen in close touch with Indian Revolutionaries. He looked on Britain as a great despotic Power tyrannising over Asia; and for world-democracy England's destruction is essential.

Chu S. Gunn, in 1918, avowed Kuo Min Tang's policy as 'Asia for the Asiatics'. Mr. Gunn is an American Kuo Min Tang leader.

Sun Yat Sen has openly expressed anti-British feelings, and his willingness and that of his followers to do their best to help India to freedom. A revolt in India would make it easier to regain Thibet, 'either during the present war or in the inevitable war that is to follow for the freedom of Asia' (1918).

On March 6th, 1921, Sun Yat Sen delivered his famous speech on the aims of Kuo Min Tang: he spoke at Canton. His aim was 'to establish the Chinese democratic Republic: to weld the five races of China into a new 'Chinese' nationality'.

A Hong Kong paper objected: 'Canton is governed, not by Cantonese but by the Kuo Min Tang'.

'I recognise it,' said Sun Yat Sen, 'my aim is to use the society to govern not only Canton but the Empire'.

This speech was printed and circulated as propaganda in Malaya.

In May 1921, Dr. Mouw, adviser to the Netherlands East Indies government on Chinese affairs, called on Sun Yat Sen in Canton. Sun seemed to him a great destructive genius, purely a revolutionary; who expressed a crazy hatred of the British; who intended to exert his influence widely, boasting 'that time will come when my photograph will be found throughout India'.

Since then, on Sun Yat Sen's flight from Canton, definite documentary proof was discovered, that Sun Yat Sen has Bolshevik leanings. It proved his actual dealings with the Communist party in Berlin. His secret agent in Berlin spoke of an alliance between Russia, Germany, and China, and the establishment of a bureau with the object of bringing about this alliance. The appointment was mooted, as director of his bureau, of Admiral von Hintze, German Minister at Moscow, ex-minister at Peking.

10. C. The present menace.

It is necessary to press closer this leaning towards Communism. For this I select certain points of recent discovery.

The notorious Dutch Communist Sneevliet, who had been expelled from the Netherlands East Indies was in close touch at Shanghai with the Communist Organisation.

Towards the late autumn of 1921, when Sun Yat Sen was in Canton, Sneevliet moved South and established himself in Canton.

Semaocan (Sneevliet's foremost pupil among the Javanese Communists), escaping police supervision, slipped out of Java. He, and Raden Darsono and Malaka, all leading Javanese extremists, travelled via China to Moscow. Darsono attended Communist meetings in Holland. Malaka, on arrival in Berlin, came into contact with 'M.N. Roy', the notorious agent and organiser of Anti-British Intrigue in India and the Far East. It is Roy who, paid by the Soviet, edits the 'Vanguard', and conducts the Berlin training school, endowed by the Soviet, for training and sending out Communist Indian agents.

The Dutch Netherlands East Indies authorities now state that they have very strong reason to believe that Sneevliet, Darsono, and Malaka have arrived in China from Berlin and Moscow. Sneevliet will resume his headquarters at Shanghai (now that Sun Yat Sen is no longer in Canton), while Darsono and Malaka will endeavour to re-enter Java.

It is obvious, I consider, that Sneevliet desires to resume close touch with Sun Yat Sen. Sneevliet's aim in life is to drive the European out of Asia.

'M.N. Roy' was in Java at one time during the war: and the chain of connection between his work, Sneevliet's work, and Sun Yat Sen's work is continued.

Returning to the Berlin bureau — a young Batavia-born Chinese, 'foreign representative' as he styles himself of the Batavia Chinese-owned newspaper 'Sin-po', who from youth up has been openly anti-European, left Batavia and after travelling in Morocco, established himself in Berlin.

This Chinese recently wrote a long article on 'The White Danger'. Dated, in Berlin, September 1922, it was published as the whole leading page of an issue of the 'Sin-po', at the beginning of November.

The article preaches, in vitriolic terms, a Holy War: Chinese versus Europeans, the main attack being entirely against the British. Though it will certainly cost much Chinese blood, they must first be expelled from Hongkong. Once the English go, all other European powers must go.

In November 1922 a parcel of 'Manifesto' was intercepted in the post at Singapore for distribution 'to other school friends'. This manifesto of the 'Pioneer' is directed, on behalf of 'the first Convention of the Communist and racial Revolutionary organisations of the various Countries in the Far East' against 'the English, American, and Japanese buccaneers'.

Its tone is most violent and extreme, and it is, I am advised, undoubtedly the product of the same Head Organisation in Europe which operates the 'International Press Correspondence' whose 'Manifesto of the Congress of the Labouring Masses of the Far East' against 'the English, American and Japanese robbers' had already reached India and Java in the first half of the present year.

I would add that, in the opinion of the British Consul General in Batavia, the 'Sin-po' article is believed to be the product ultimately of the organisation responsible for the English-printed and Chinese-printed Manifesto noted above.

It is the considered opinion of the Chief Adviser on Chinese Affairs in Java, Dr. Mouw, that the present shows a position of vital danger first to the British but also to the Dutch and other European Powers in the Far East and that danger is coming from the Chinese.

Lastly I would mention the sinister fact that, in the intensive Communist campaign now in actual operation in the Far East, the 'S.I.S.' (from whom Your Grace can obtain

further details, if you so desire), has proof of the Third International (the Soviet) having made arrangements for a new dual Control (in Canton and in England) to carry out an extremist line. I do not consider it advisable to note these details in the present despatch.

Taking all these points together, I cannot deny the force of the argument which tends to show that behind all this concentrated attack on the British position in Asia lies a vast Soviet organisation with a distributing centre in Berlin: that this organisation is in the closest touch with 'M.N. Roy', with Javanese Communists, the Sneevliet, with Chinese in Java, with Shanghai and Sun Yat Sen (that is, with Kuo Min Tang).

11. D. Kuo Min Tang as a local danger to Malaya.

So long as Kuo Min Tang — so far as British Colonies and Protectorates outside China were concerned — peacefully aimed at inculcating the spirit of Chinese Nationalism, no adequate ground existed for local suppression.

When Kuo Min Tang began to influence Malayan Schools, placing its political refugees in charge, opposition in the Federated Malay states was thus effected to the Registration of Schools Enactment.

Further, the Federated Malay States Schools delegate formed a link between Kuo Min Tang and the Anarchist Shap Yan Thun, or 'Ten Men Corps'.

Then came the use of the old Triad organisation for binding together local political Societies.

The rules for the local Kuo Min Tang members are most significant; e.g. the rule forbidding members to join another Society or to resign; the locus poenitentiae to persons who have in the past refused to join; the oath including obedience to orders, maintenance of strict secrecy, and sharing of life and death (presumably with Sun Yat Sen).

Again, the Society is established to attack the recognised Government of China, and sends money, and, it seems, men from time to time to China for this purpose.

This is surely unlawful, and places the Colony wrong vis-a-vis the Chinese Government.

Exhaustive enquiries in Hongkong definitely proved that Sun Yat Sen associated himself with the urging on the labour troubles which culminated in the great Hongkong Strike of 1922; He so associated himself through Kuo Min Tang. The Joint Naval and Military Intelligence Bureau gave it as their considered conviction that this activity was part of a definite Anti Foreign Policy which includes the destruction of European commerce and influence in the Far East, more especially those of the British.

There is no definite proof, but the view is held that Kuo Min Tang had some connection with the Tanjong Pagar Strike in Singapore.

Mr. W.T. Chapman, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Federated Malay States, wrote the following significant minute in April 1922: 'I have not consulted the Chinese Advisory Board — because I do not think the matter' (action against Kuo Min Tang) 'is one on which any Chinese in the present state of affairs dares openly express his opinion by opposing the Society. In Penang some Chinese have done so, and now go about in fear of their lives. I do, however, know that many of the better class Chinese will hail the closing down of the Society with a sigh of relief, although as in the case of the banishment of the ringleaders of the movement responsible for the intimidation of the Chinese Community of Selangor from taking part in the Peace Celebrations, the pressure brought to bear on them may be so strong that they may be compelled to present a formal petition against the action taken'.

This view is again put forward in a minute dated October 27th 1922 and signed both by Mr. Chapman and Mr. W.G. Maxwell, the Chief Secretary of the Federated Malay States.

'We are of opinion that a considerable number of the better class Chinese, and certainly a large majority of Straits born Chinese (to whom the Government especially owes its protection) would be in favour' (of suppression). 'We think, that many of them are afraid of in-

curing the enmity of the Kuo Min Tang organisation and we are of opinion that it would not be fair to ask any of them individually for a public or even confidential expression of opinion, or even to ask the Chinese Advisory Board for a collective opinion. It must be remembered that any China born Chinese who expressed any opinion adverse to the Society would run the risk of having his family in China molested by the Kuo Min Tang'.

Finally, very large sums of money have left Malaya for the support of Sun Yat Sen and Kuo Min Tang. Apart from the voluntary contributions it is not unreasonable to believe, bearing in mind the vigorous nature of the Kuo Min Tang organisation, that many other donations are the result of secret force, the using of which by a Society recognised by Government cannot but be a matter most undesirable from whatever point of view it be considered.

My comments on the above points are as follows.

The interference with the Schools, the categorical 'tyranny' of the Oath, the terrorism either actively exercised or secretly feared, are factors which appear to prove that Kuo Min Tang in Malaya is training up a Nation inside another Government's territory, and is not only aiming at, but to some extent is exercising an Imperium in Imperio, a position which the Government of no British Colony can tolerate.

When the local trend of Kuo Min Tang action is such, it is necessary to call into calculation data regarding its methods and aims outside Malaya.

These data are dealt with in paragraphs (9) and (10) of this despatch, and they evidence, to my mind, a most grave menace to the continued control of Government in the Colony and in the Federated Malay States, a menace which can be best met by suppressing the local branches of Kuo Min Tang throughout the Peninsula.

Kuo Min Tang has grown away from its original aim, the formation of a Chinese Nationalist Party to overthrow the effete Manchu Dynasty. Corrupted by Communism, Kuo Min Tang now desires to expel the European from Asia, and to effect this object the Society, by terrorism and external threats seems well on the road towards exercising a tyranny over a community of Chinese who reside in and are governed by a British Colonial Administration, geographically some 1500 miles distant from Southern China.

12. E. Against this view are ranged those who argue that Kuo Min Tang is a party: that in Hongkong no suppressive action has been or indeed could be taken: that suppression before or until overt acts of flagrant disobedience to the local government have been committed will alienate all Chinese opinion and cause to grow up throughout Malaya numberless secret Societies, this rendering the last state worse than the first.

I would mention particularly Sir Reginald Stubbs, the Governor of Hongkong, whose opinion has twice been sought. In reply to a telegram addressed to him in June by Mr. F.S. James, then administering the Government in my absence, His Excellency replied 'We have taken no action against the Kuo Min Tang which is a political party at present controlling the Canton Government. I cannot see how it is possible to take action, but am having a careful watch kept to see that individuals temporarily residing in the Colony do not abuse their position.'

I took the opportunity of talking the matter over with Sir Reginald a few weeks ago, on the occasion of his passing through Singapore on return to Hong Kong and his view was the same as that set out in his telegram.

I feel doubts however as to the soundness of that view as affecting Malaya. I quite agree that, *vis-a-vis* Hong Kong, Kuo Min Tang is a political party, and *qua* a political party cannot be suppressed. In Hong Kong the system of registration of Societies does not exist.

Vis-a-vis Malaya, Kuo Min Tang is not a political party. It is a number of registered Societies in the Federated Malay States, and of smaller kindred societies in the Colony. These registered Societies of the Federated Malay States are entirely different to the Kuo

Min Tang political party of Hong Kong; they are on an entirely other footing; and they can and should be suppressed.

13. F. General Remarks.

After long and anxious consideration and hesitation, I have come to the conclusion that this view is the correct one, although I fully recognise and respect the strength of the arguments put forward on the other side.

But, as I pointed out at the commencement of this despatch, Kuo Min Tang is a world-wide organisation.

My position there is this:

A. I am of opinion that were Kuo Min Tang merely a local matter, its Societies in the Federated Malay States should forthwith be dissolved.

They are aiming at so definite an interference with the liberties of the Chinese subjects of the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Governments as to lead to the fear that, if unchecked by being dissolved, these local Societies will become a tolerated Imperium in Imperio.

No constitutional Government can willingly countenance such a position, once it has become clear that it exists or probably will exist.

B. There is no analogy with the conditions in Hongkong. Were the Hongkong Government to join issue with Kuo Min Tang, its task would be to attack a political party existing in a foreign Country to which Hongkong is most closely situated. Were the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Governments to join issue with Kuo Min Tang, their task would be to dissolve, with constitutional powers already in existence, and with powers already exercised in numbers of similar cases, certain illegal Societies.

C. The present time is admitted by nearly all, if not by all, critics to be a good moment for taking action, if action is decided upon. In this, 'expert' opinion must carry very great weight, and none of the Chinese Secretariat's officials consider that any real trouble would result in the Peninsula.

D. If therefore Kuo Min Tang were merely a local matter, I should, being satisfied of the local menace of its continued existence as a congeries of Registered Societies in the Federated Malay States, proceed to the dissolution of the local lodges.

E. It may be, however, that such local action — in view of the world-wide organisation of Kuo Min Tang — might have, or might be deemed by His Majesty's Foreign Office to be likely to have such repercussions as to render it, in the present world condition of affairs, undesirable from the point of view of Imperial Policy.

F. For this reason I postpone taking any local action pending consideration by Your Grace of the points submitted by me in this Despatch. I would venture to suggest that the opinion of the Foreign Office be asked, and that I may be informed by telegram, so soon as is convenient, whether Your Grace approved my taking steps to dissolve the Federated Malay States lodges and any such lodges in the Colony — such as the Philomathic Union of Penang — as appear, under other names than that of Kuo Min Tang, to carry on the policy and propaganda of this Society.

I have, etc.,
(signed) L. N. Guillemand.

Source: FO 371/9224, Sir L. N. Guillemand, Governor, SS, to the Duke of Devonshire, CO., 6 December 1922.

Appendix B

Sir Cecil Clementi, Governor, SS, to the Lord Passfield of Passfield Corner, CO., 25 February 1930, with Enclosure No. 1, Office-bearers of the BMHB of the KMT, February 1930 and Enclosure No. 2, Minutes of the Government House meeting between Clementi and 17 office-bearers of the BMHB of the KMT

STRAITS SETTLEMENTS
SECRET.

Government House,
Singapore.
25 February, 1930.

The Right Honourable
The Lord Passfield of
Passfield Corner, P.C.,
Etc., Etc., Etc.,
Colonial Office.

Copy to:-
Hong Kong.
Peking.

My Lord,

With reference to the 10th paragraph of my Secret Despatch dated 12th December, 1929, written as Governor of Hong Kong, on the subject of the Kuo-min-tang, and with reference also to previous correspondence from this Government on the same subject, I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that on the 5th instant, the very day of my arrival at Singapore to assume duty as Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Malay States, there was held a conference of the Nanyang Malayan General Branch of the Kuo-min-tang in its premises at Lorong 16, Gaylang. The proceedings of this conference continued on the 6th and 7th February, and unlike those of the previous conference, which was held at Singapore with some secrecy in January, 1928, they were conducted on this occasion more or less openly, and the Kuo-min-tang flag was displayed outside the premises during the conference. Some forty delegates attended as representatives of the Kuo-min-tang throughout Malaya. I attach a list of the Chinese elected to the Executive and supervisory committees, and I am informed by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Singapore that control remains in the hands of the old standing committee of Teh Lay Seng, Teo Eng Hock and Teh Siu Peng.

2. The conference was given considerable prominence in a local Chinese newspaper called the Min Kuo Jit Po, which is the present party organ in Singapore. A 'tea-party' was given by that paper to the delegates and a photograph of the retiring members of the committee was published. At the 'tea-party' speeches were made urging the paper to continue to spread the propaganda of the Kuo-min-tang without faltering, and the atmosphere at the meeting is reported to have been 'intensely revolutionary.'

3. The whole of these proceedings were in public and flagrant violation of the laws of the Straits Settlements, and upon the fact being brought to my notice, I determined at once to consult my Executive Council as to the steps which it was desirable to take. First of all, I had a

Enclosure
No. (1)

conference on the 14th February, with Mr. J. Scott, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. C.W.H. Cochrane, the acting Chief Secretary to Government, Federated Malay States, Mr. A.M. Goodman, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Straits Settlements and Mr. P.T. Allen, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Federated Malay States. I was advised that in the opinion of all present, the Kuo-min-tang was a grave political danger both to the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, and that no branch ought to be allowed to be established in British Malaya.

4. The Executive Council met on the 18th February, after all papers on the subject had been circulated for the consideration of the members. A full discussion took place and the following minute was recorded:-

'His Excellency the Governor explained to the Council his views regarding toleration by this Government of local Kuo-min-tang organization and asked whether the Council agreed that he should in person inform the members of the local Executive Committee of the Kuo-min-tang that such organizations cannot be allowed and order that the Committee and all connected or subordinate organizations should be immediately dissolved. The Council unanimously approved the course of action proposed and agreed that, if His Majesty's orders were not obeyed, recalcitrant ringleaders should be banished.'

5. My next step was to summon the members of the executive and supervisory committees of the Nanyang General Branch of the Kuo-min-tang to meet me at Government House. Arrangements for this meeting were successfully made by Mr. Goodman, and the interview took place on the 20th February at 2.30 p.m., when there was a representative attendance, including the three members of the executive committee referred to in paragraph one above as having real control of the organization. I enclose a shorthand report of the proceedings at this interview, and Your Lordship will note that in quite unequivocal terms I directed the local organization to dissolve. I told those present that, while I had no intention of interfering with the political opinions of individual Chinese resident in Malaya and would not object to their flying the Kuo-min-tang flag on proper occasions I would not allow any Kuo-min-tang meetings to be held here, that I would not allow Kuo-min-tang propaganda to be published here, that I would not allow subscriptions to be collected for the Kuo-min-tang in this Colony or in the Malay States, and that I would not allow members of the Kuo-min-tang to be enrolled here. I took the opportunity of pointing out to Mr. Teo Eng Hock that, being a British subject, he ought not at the same time to be a member of a Chinese political organization; and I drew the attention of Mr. Teh Lay Seng to the fact that, having been a Justice of the Peace under British Rule he ought to know better than to defy the laws of the Colony.

6. It is too early yet to say what effect has been produced by this meeting; but I am watching the situation closely and I am convinced that, for the maintenance of law and order in British Malaya, the directions which I had given must be enforced as strictly here as they have been in Hong Kong. I will keep Your Lordship informed of any future developments.

*Enclosure
No: (2)*

7. I may add that relations between the Nanyang Malayan General Branch of the Kuo-min-tang and the Chinese Consulate General at Singapore are strained. Recently Mr. Teh Lay Seng has reported Mr. T'ong Lau, the Consul General, to the Central Department of the Kuo-min-tang for assisting the widow of Liu Chung-hoi in her attempt to establish, while at Singapore, rival branches of the Kuo-min-tang with 'reorganizationist' sympathies. The late Mr. Liu Chung-hoi was a noted member of the Kuo-min-tang at Canton. He was definitely communist in his political opinions and he was assassinated some years ago in China. The Central Department has asked the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to reprimand Mr. T'ong Lau: but I do not know what reply the Foreign Minister has made to this request. Mr. T'ong Lau is the son of an old friend of mine, Mr. T'ong Shiu-yi (T'ang Shao-yi), who in 1912 was first Premier of the Chinese Republic, and whom I met several times while I was Governor of Hong Kong. A few days ago Mr. T'ong Lau and his wife came to dinner with me at Government House, Singapore; and he then told me that his father had instructed him to regard me as "an elder member of the family" and to seek my advice in all difficult matters. I have not yet had any discussion with him on Kuo-min-tang affairs: but I draw Your Lordship's attention to this incident as illustrating the dangerously fluctuating nature of the political opinions of Kuo-min-tang. There can be no certainty that such an organization, even if apparently law-abiding at the moment, may not quite suddenly change into a subversive and revolutionary secret society with strong anti-British propensities.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

(signed) C. Clementi

GOVERNOR.

**ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO STRAITS
SETTLEMENTS SECRET DESPATCH OF
25 FEBRUARY 1930.**

Executive Committee:

Teh Lay Seng	[Teh Lay-seng]	(郑螺生)	Hokkien	c/- Goh Loo Club, 70-1 Club Street, Singapore
Teh Siu Peng	[Teh Sau-peng]	(郑少炳)	Hylan	Klang
Teo Khai Cheong	[Teo Khai-chuan]	(张开川)	Hokkien	Maur.
Teo Eng Hock	[Teo Eng-hock]	(张永福)	Teochiu	119 North Bridge Road, Singapore
Chiu Fatt		(赵发)	Cantonese	Ipoh.
Png Chi Cheng	[Png Chi Cheng]	(方之楨)	Teochiu	70 Robinson Road, S'pore
Lim Yew Tong	[Lim Yew-tong]	(林友桐)	Hylan	Kuala Lumpur
Oh Siew Yam	[Oh Siow-yam]	(胡少炎)	Hokkien	Malacca

Reserve Executive Committee:

Tang Chi Sat	[Tang Tsz-sat]	(邓子实)		Seremban.
Ho Sun Man	[Ho Sun-man]	(何逸民)	Cantonese	Malacca.
Chee Bi Joo	[Chee Bi-joo]	(徐未如)		Seremban.
Lei Yi Sin	[Lai Yi-sin]	(李怡星)		Seremban.

Supervisory Committee:

Lee Chin Tin	[Lee Chin-tian]	(李振殿)	Hokkien	3 or 4 South Canal Road, Singapore
Ong Kiat Soo	[Ong Kiat-soo]	(王吉士)	Hokkien	18 Boat Quay, Singapore
Chu Chee Chiong	[Chu Chee-chiong]	(朱慈祥)	Cantonese	21 Patani Street, S'pore.

Reserve Supervisory Committee:

Thye Po Chin	[Thye Po-in]	(戴保珍)		Perak.
Wong Kat San	[Huang Chi-ch'en]	(黄吉宸)		Singapore.

N.B. - Teo Eng Hock's father was born in Singapore about 1833.

Teh Lay Seng claims to be born in China and to have come to Malaya when he was about 17 years old

**ENCLOSURE NO. 2 TO STRAITS
SETTLEMENTS SECRET DESPATCH OF
25 FEBRUARY 1930**

**CONFERENCE HELD AT
GOVERNMENT HOUSE SINGAPORE
ON 20TH FEBRUARY 1930 AT 2.30 P.M.**

PRESENT:

His Excellency The Governor
(Sir Cecil Clementi, K.C. M.G.)
The Secretary for Chinese Affairs, SS
(The Hon'ble Mr. A.M. Goodman.)
Mr. Teh Lay Seng. [Teh Lay-seng].
Mr. Teh Siu Peng. [Teh Sau-peng].
Mr. Teo Khai Cheong. [Teo Khai-chuan]
Mr. Teo Eng Hock. [Teo Eng-hock].
Mr. Chiu Fatt.
Mr. Png Chi Cheng. [Png Chi-cheng].
Mr. Lim Yew Tong. [Lim Yew-tong].
Mr. Oh Siew Yam. [Oh Siow-yam]
Mr. Tang Chi Sat. [Tang tsz-sat]
Mr. Ho Sun Man. [Ho Sun-man].
Mr. Chee Bi Joo. [Chee Bi-joo].
Mr. Lei Yi Sin. [Lei Yi-sin]
Mr. Lee Chin Tin. [Lee Chin-tian].
Mr. Ong Kiat Soo. [Ong Kiat-soo].
Mr. Chu Chee Chiong. [Chu Chee-chiong]
Mr. Thye Po Chin. [Thye Po-chin]
Mr. Wong Kat San. [Huang Chi-ch'en]

His Excellency:-

Gentlemen,

I have asked you to come here this afternoon because I wish to explain to you very clearly what is the Government's policy towards the Kuo-Min-Tang, of which you are the executive and supervisory committee in Malaya.

First let me say, by way of preface, that I have spent very many years in China and am very fond of the Chinese. I have travelled much in the 18 Provinces, and have never received anything but kindness from those among whom I travelled. Let me also say that the policy of the British Government is very friendly indeed towards the Chinese people, and that it is anxious to see law and order restored in China. His Majesty's Government has recognised the Nanking Government as being the lawful Government of China, and it has friendly feelings towards the Kuo-Min-Tang, from which the Nanking Government has been formed.

Nevertheless in Hong Kong, where I have just been Governor, we have never allowed any branch of the Kuo-Min-Tang to be

established. The Government of Canton asked that a branch might be allowed to be established in Hong Kong, but the request was refused. We have no objection whatever in Hong Kong or elsewhere to individual Chinese joining the Kuo-Min-Tang, if they wish to do so. We don't object to their flying the Nationalist Flag — that is a matter for each individual to settle for himself. But we have never allowed any branch of the Kuo-Min-Tang to be established in Hong Kong; we have never allowed its propaganda to be published in the Hong Kong newspapers, nor have we allowed contributions to be collected in Hong Kong on behalf of the Kuo-Min-Tang, or meetings of its members to be held there. Now, if you ask me why such a policy is adopted by the Hong Kong government, I will reply by reading to you some of the documents published by the Kuo-Min-Tang. The document, from which I read, is the first number of 'the Hong Kong Kuo-Min-Tang News' issued on the 12th November, 1927. On the cover of this publication was a picture representing Hong Kong with the Kuo-Min-Tang Flag flying from the Peak and the sun of Chinese Nationalism rising behind it. In this publication there were such passages as these:-

"The object of this magazine is to lead the 800,000 people who constitute the masses of Hong Kong in accordance with the Three People's Principles of our President and to fight to the death with the British Imperialists, in order to take back Hong Kong as early as possible."

This monthly magazine of our branch is as good as three thousand machineguns for attacking the British Imperialists. To attack the enemies headquarters and overthrow British Imperialism is our sole aim. To take back the Territory of Hong Kong is the natural duty of our branch."

Now obviously the Hong Kong Government could not possibly allow a political organization, which uses that kind of language, to establish itself in Hong Kong. There also came into the possession of the Hong Kong Government a form which was issued by the Kuo-Min-Tang, and which has to be filled in by applicants for membership. In it there are asked 38 questions. One of those questions is this:-

"To put down Imperialist oppression must not foreigners be killed?"

Even if the answer expected to that question is "NO", I think it is an improper question to be asked at all. Therefore, the Hong Kong Government is quite determined not to allow any branch of the Kuo-Min-Tang to function in any part of that Colony.

I have just come from Hong Kong to Singapore, and on the very day of my arrival here, I found that a meeting was held by the local branch of the Kuo-Min-Tang. This meeting was held on the 5th, 6th and 7th February. I arrived on the 5th. The meetings were held openly, and some 40 delegates attended, representing all parts of Malaya. Much publicity was given to this matter in one of the local papers called the "Min Kuo Yit Po". There was a tea-party, at

which speeches were made urging the local newspapers to spread the Kuo-Min-Tang propaganda without faltering, and the newspapers said that the atmosphere of the meeting was "intensely revolutionary." Now all these proceedings are directly contrary to the laws of Singapore, and the Singapore Government no more than the Hong Kong Government is willing to allow the Kuo-Min-Tang to function in the Malay States or the Straits Settlements. This country is under British Rule and we will not allow here any political organization of the nature of the Kuo-Min-Tang. Accordingly I have asked you to meet me here today, in order that I may tell you very clearly that I will not allow Kuo-Min-Tang meetings to be held; that I will not allow Kuo-Min-Tang propaganda to be published here; that I will not allow subscriptions to be collected for the Kuo-Min-Tang and that I will not allow members of the Kuo-Min-Tang to be enrolled in Malaya. If anyone among you wishes to register himself as a member of the Kuo-Min-Tang, he must do so in China and not here. I have no wish, nor has the Singapore Government any wish to interfere with your private views. I do not object to your putting up the National Flag on proper occasions, and I shall be glad to respect China's National Days. But no Chinese political organization of any kind will be allowed to function here. Therefore my instructions to you is that you must at once dissolve this branch of the Kuo-Min-Tang which you have unlawfully formed here. When this has been done you can, if you wish, continue as individuals to be members - I do not object to that at all; but you must not hold meetings in Malaya. Is that quite clear? These are not empty words. I mean to be obeyed.

Mr. Teo Eng Hock:

The Kuo-Min-Tang is already recognised by the British Government. What about the Nationalist Party?

His Excellency:

The Government recognises that in China and not in British Territory.

Mr. Teo Eng Hock:

The Communist Party has been in Singapore for several years and that is the reason why the Kuo-Min-Tang has come into existence. The reason for the Kuo-Min-Tang's formation is to deal with the Communist Party. Since the formation of the Kuo-Min-Tang Party in Malaya, about 80% of the Communist Party has disappeared. The Kuo-Min-Tang, although illegal, has done meritorious work. I have been a member for over 30 years.

His Excellency:

My objection is to any Chinese political organisation whatsoever functioning here, communist or non-communist. I am well aware that there have been several divisions in the Kuo-Min-Tang, and that there has been in it a large element of communism from time to time. I know also that the Kuo-Min-Tang was purged of its communism to a great extent. But even to-day there remains a strong communist element in the Party. You know perfectly well that Cheung Fat-fui and Wong Tseng-wai were under Russian influence and belong to the extreme left wing of the Kuo-Min-Tang. If a Chinese comes to me and says he is a member of the Kuo-Min-Tang it is very difficult for me to know from that mere statement what his political opinions are. I should have to hold quite a long conversation with him to know what his political opinions really

were. But no matter whether his opinions inclined towards the Left or Right Wing, I should not allow him to organise a branch of the Kuo-Min-Tang in Malaya. In any law-abiding country only one Government can rule, and in this country it is the British Government that rules. No Chinese political party can have any authority here. My instructions to you are absolutely definite. No political organisations will be allowed. I hope very much that the Kuo-Min-Tang in China will free itself absolutely from all Communist elements, because if the Kuo-Min-Tang becomes Communist, it will be exceedingly difficult for the British Government to maintain friendly relations with it, and my great hope is that there will be real friendship not only between Canton and Hong Kong, but also between His Majesty's Government and Nanking. When I left Hong Kong there was friendly feeling between the Canton Government and the Hong Kong Government, and General Ch'an Ming-shei himself came to say good-bye to me. In all the civil wars that are continually being waged in China, the British Government remains entirely neutral; and in this Colony too, while we wish to maintain friendly relations with whatever may be the Government in China, we are neutral, and we will not allow any party organisation. The Chinese resident here owe a duty and obedience to the Government of this Country, and we shall not permit any division of allegiance.

Mr. Teh Lay Seng:

I have been living here for 46 years, and I ask Your excellency to reconsider the matter about the Kuo-Min-Tang. The reason is that there are a lot of undesirables who come from China to this place and, although the Protector of Chinese and the Police have been doing their best to suppress it, the work is not complete, and the object of the Kuo-Min-Tang is to get rid of the Extremist Nationals, and in getting rid of these people to make use of Kuo-Min-Tang. In order to attain this, a campaign for the registration of the Kuo-Min-Tang members was carried out. It is extremely dangerous to allow the Communist elements to exist as they may stir up the labour classes. The instruction from the Kuo-Min-Tang headquarters in China to the General Branch Department is that the Kuo-Min-Tang should obey the laws of the Government here, and one of the tasks of the Kuo-Min-Tang department is to make investigation of the activities of the undesirable elements and report the matter to the Government. In view of this I ask Your Excellency to reconsider the matter.

His Excellency:

You are a Straits-born, are you not?

Mr. Teh Lay Seng:

I was born in China, but I have been living in Perak for 40 years.

His Excellency:

You are a British subject.

Mr. Teh Lay Seng:

Yes, I am a Justice of the Peace and a Member of the Perak Chinese Advisory Board.

His Excellency:

You are a British subject and yet you join the Kuo-Min-Tang. How can you possibly be a British subject and a member of the Kuo-Min-Tang at the same time? You have been a British Justice of the Peace in Taiping and therefore you owe allegiance to the British Government.

*His Excellency
addressing Mr Teo
Eng Hock:
Teo Eng Hock:*

Are you a British subject?

Yes, I am. I was born in the Straits Settlements and so was my father.

His Excellency:

You have, therefore, been British for two generations, and no doubt if you went to China you would claim British protection, you would register yourself in British Consulates in China as a British subject, and yet here in Singapore, you become a member of a Chinese Political society, the Kuo-Min-Tang. So you endeavour to have a double allegiance. There is a Chinese phrase for this. They call it Leung t'au sha "double-headed snake."

Mr. Teh Lay Seng:

In doing the work of the Kuo-Min-Tang so far as I am concerned is to induce the Chinese resident here to obey the laws of the Colony and to do it with the aid of the Kuo-Min-Tang.

His Excellency:

While it seems to me to be quite proper for a Chinese subject to become a member of the Kuo-Min-Tang, it seems to me to be altogether wrong for a British subject to be a member of the Kuo-Min-Tang. Moreover, you as a Justice of the Peace ought to know that the establishment here of a branch of the Kuo-Min-Tang is contrary to law; and, as a Justice of Peace, you should set a good example by obeying the law. It is quite ridiculous to suggest to me that, in order to get Chinese to obey the laws of the Colony, you must first get them to break the Laws of the Colony by organising a local branch of the Kuo-Min-Tang. Again I say, I will not interfere with the private views of individuals, but political organisation is forbidden.

Mr. Teh Ley Seng:

I have been accustomed to dealing with Hong Kong Chinese, most of whom are Chinese subject, but they obeyed me loyally in this matter, and I expect you also to obey me loyally in this matter.

His Excellency:

I again ask Your Excellency to reconsider this.

Mr. Chee Cheong:

My decision is absolutely final and will not be changed.

The most important thing the Government will have to consider is the peace and good order. Is the existence of the Kuo-Min-Tang interfering with that good order? The existence of the General Branch Department here has enabled members of the Kuo-Min-Tang to find out the undesirable elements and to help and maintain peace and good order in this place. I will therefore ask Your Excellency to see your way to allow the General Branch to exist.

His Excellency:

I cannot allow any General Branch to exist in this Colony at all. There cannot be any Kuo-Min-Tang organisation in this Colony: there cannot be any meeting places. If you want to have meetings you must go to China for that.

As you know civil war has begun again in China, and the Canton Government is being attacked once by Cheung Fat-fui in alliance with the Kuangsi party, while Chiang Kai-shek is being attacked by Yen Hsi Shan and Feng Yu-hsiang. Behind the opponents of the Nanking government stands Wong Tseng-wai, and if the enemies of the present governments at Nanking and Canton prevail, the whole character of the Kuo-Min-Tang will undergo transformation. It will be more extreme in its views, it will be tinged with communism

again, it may even be anti-British. No one can foretell what the future of the Kuo-Min-Tang may be and what political complexion it will have. This is another reason why the Malayan Governments cannot allow branches of the Kuo-Min-Tang to be established in their Territory.

Mr. Png Chi Cheng:

In London, Liverpool, Australia and Canada they have Kuo-Min-Tang Branches, and the object of these branches is to promote good feelings between China and the British; and the General Branch here is also to promote good feelings between the British and the Chinese. What my comrades said about maintaining peace and order in this place is a fact. If permission could be given to Australia, Canada, Liverpool and London, I hope similar treatment could be given here. The words used in the Kuo-Min-Tang document about anti-Imperialists do not mean we oppose British, it means we oppose the people who encroach upon Chinese. That question in the form that Your Excellency referred to was meant to enlighten the Kuo-Min-Tang members that Imperialist does not mean any particular nation but those people who encroach upon Chinese. The Chinese here know that Your Excellency understands the Chinese better and therefore we hope that Your Excellency will see your way to adopt the same measures as in Australia, Canada, Liverpool and London.

His Excellency:

I have always been friends with the Chinese wherever I have been, and I hope that, when we get to know each other better, we shall be friends too. You spoke about branches of the Kuo-Min-Tang in England, Australia, etc., but there is an immense difference between Hong Kong and Singapore on the one hand and Liverpool on the other. In Hong Kong the population is practically all Chinese: here the population is about two-thirds Chinese: in Liverpool there is just a handful of Chinese. There is only one allegiance possible, while you all remain in Singapore, and that is to the British Government. Registration has been refused to the Kuo-Min-Tang under the laws of Malaya. Similarly in Hong Kong the Kuo-Min-Tang was not allowed to be established at all. We cannot allow large Chinese political organisations to form themselves in British Territory. The meetings that you held on the 5th, 6th and 7th February, were definite disobedience to the Laws of the Colony. My duty as Governor is to see that the Laws of the Colony are respected, and I shall carry out my duty. You must not, however, think that I am hostile to the Kuo-Min-Tang; that is not so; but the Laws of the Colony come first and they have to be obeyed, and that is why I have asked you to come here to-day so that there may be no misunderstanding.

Mr. Teh Lay Seng:

I shall go home and consult with my colleagues and then reply.

His Excellency:

No reply is needed. My orders are final.

Meeting ends.

Appendix C

Sir F. Gimson, Governor, Singapore, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO., 17 February 1949 (telegram), on a proposal to ban the KMT in Singapore.

INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Orig. on 52928/20/49

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM SINGAPORE (Sir F. Gimson)
D. 17th February 1949
R. 17th February 1949 12.45 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 152. Secret.

Addressed to the S. of S.

Repeated to the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya
" " Commissioner General
" " Governor of Hong Kong
" " Ambassador Nanking (Commissioner General please pass).

The following for Paskin from Gimson. Begins.

The organisation in Singapore of foreign political parties is clearly a factor which militates against the growth of a Malayan civic consciousness. This was realised in the past and to a large extent was the reason for Sir Cecil Clementi's ban on the K.M.T. Organisation in Malaya. To show historical background and also reactions which might be expected I may quote from supplement to number 4 to P.I.J. number 10/1948:-

'Before the war KMT was not accepted as a lawful registered society under societies legislation in Malaya. It had been banned since the days of Sir Cecil Clementi's governorship in spite of strong pleas . . . favour by Lord Killearn, who as Sir Miles Lampson, was H.M. Ambassador to China at the time.

2. The wisdom of Sir Cecil's ban was never held in question by those Chinese who are essentially Malayan in outlook. But with the war all barriers were broken down and both right wing of KMT and left wing groups were encouraged to mobilize against the Japanese. Even so there would be few Malayan Chinese today who would regret re-imposition of such a ban on Chinese political parties in Malaya. Most influential local leaders here have been driven towards one camp or the other.

3. So long as alien politics are permitted to play such a large part in the lives and interests of the Chinese in Malaya, it is unreasonable ever to expect the Chinese here to develop any real sense of loyalty to Malaya as the country of their adoption. Only when power of these alien political groups is broken or reduced will genuine Malayan Chinese leaders begin to come forward. Without full protection of Malayan

Government authority they know they are certain to be attacked by one side or other, and they know also that methods of attack will be thoroughly unscrupulous and effective. From the top to the bottom 'protection' is the key note of the lives of all Chinese. Their complete cooperation with and loyalty to the Malayan Governments will not be forthcoming unless that protection is provided by Government authority.'

2. At the present time political parties in China are in the melting pot; Chinese communist party have not yet finally won the fight. The Kuomintang are at a low ebb, and other parties such as the China Democratic League have not yet recovered their full strength. It is therefore considered that this would be an opportune moment to restrict the activities of such bodies. But if action is to be taken it must be taken quickly before a Communist victory or formation of a coalition Government in China under Communist dominance.

3. At the present time Kuomintang and China Democratic League are foreign political parties excluded from operation by Societies Ordinance under paragraph 2 F. That amendment was introduced when Societies Ordinance was resuscitated in the face of considerable opposition, and these parties were therefore amongst those excluded because it was not possible in the circumstances obtaining at that time to differentiate between genuine Malayan political parties (to whom it was desired to give greatest possible freedom of association) and foreign or foreign sponsored organisations operating in the Colony. The position with banning of M.C.P is very different now. The proposed action would be on the lines of Lampion-Wang agreement in 1931 whereby organisation of branches of Kuomintang in Malaya was prohibited but individual membership of the party in China was allowed; the Societies Ordinance was amended in 1931 to cover this.

4. It would be sufficient by decision of the Governor in Council followed by Gazette notification to cancel names of foreign political bodies from list of those excluded under paragraph 2F of Ordinance. They would then come under provisions of Societies Ordinance and might be refused registration as prejudicial to enjoyment of peace or welfare or to good order in the Colony. Certain Indonesian political organisations have registered under Ordinance and they could also be dealt with in the same way. Although, in Singapore the emphasis must fall on Chinese parties it is important that ban should be enforced indiscriminately against all foreign political organisations.

5. I propose to sound my Executive Council preliminarily when it next meets on 25th February but in the meantime that in view of great importance and urgency of the matter I must let you know in advance considerations I propose to put before them.

6. If action I propose is to be taken it would be clearly supposed necessary for parallel action to be taken in the Federation although developments would be different there. I am therefore sending a copy of this telegram to High Commissioner with whom I propose to discuss matter when we meet in conference on 22nd February.

7. I am of course also sending a copy to Commissioner General with whom I have not yet had an opportunity of discussing my proposals in detail. I shall not act except in closest consultation with him.

I shall be grateful if you will telegraph your comments as soon as possible so that action required, if all are agreed upon it, can be taken while opportunity lasts and it may not last long.

Copies sent to:

Foreign Office, Mr. Dening,
Foreign Office, Mr. Scarlett,
Foreign Office, Mr. R.H. Scott

Source: CO 537/4835/54463, Control of Foreign Political Parties, 1949.

Glossary

- Ai Tong School 爱同学校
Allen, P.T. 爱伦
Amoy University 厦门大学
Ang Bin Huay (Hung Meng Society) 拱门会
Ang Chin-chong 洪进聪
Ang Keh-tok 洪启读
Associated Chinese Chambers
of Commerce 马来西亚华人商会联合会
Au Sheng-kang 区慎刚
Au Yuan-chao 区远照
Aw Boon-haw 胡文虎
Aw Cheong-yeow 胡昌耀
Aw Kow 胡蛟
Aw Tsang-fang 胡让芳
- Baba* 峇峇
Beatty, David 毕普
Bin Chin House 晚晴园
British Malaya Head Branch of the
China Kuo Min Tang (BMHB)
中国国民党驻南洋英属总支部
- Central Organization Department of
the China KMT 中国国民党中央组织部
Central Overseas Department of the
China KMT 中国国民党中央海外部
Ch'an Chan-mooi 陈占梅
Chan Chee-sau 陈治修
Chan Thye-kai 陈泰阶
Chan Ying-choi 陈英才
Chang Chen-min 张振民
Chang Ch'u-k'un 张楚理
Chang Jen-nan 张仁南
Chang Jih-hsing 张日新
Chang Ping-lin 张炳麟
Chang Ying-chen 张应真
Chapman, W.T. 泽敏
Chee Bi-joo 徐未如
Ch'en Cheng-hsia 陈振夏
Ch'en Ch'i-mei 陈其美
Ch'en Chung Li-chih-she 晨钟勵志社
Chen, David 陈克思
Ch'en Hsin-cheng 陈新政
Chen Hua Club 振华俱乐部
Ch'en Lai-yu 陈勵子
Ch'en Liang-chih 陈良知
Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陈独秀
Ch'en Yi, governor 陈仪
- Cheng Chung-wei 郑仲衡
Cheng Kee-kung 曾纪孔
Cheng Wen-ping 郑文炳
Chew Hean-swee 周献瑞
Chew Mua-tong 周满堂
Chi-lung-po Jih Pao (1909-10) 吉隆坡日报
Chia Boon-chin 谢文进
Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石
chih 耻
Chin Kee-sun 曾纪寰
China Democratic League 中国民主同盟
China Press 中国报
Chinese Advisory Board (CAB) 华人参事局
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 中国共产党
Chinese Labour Anti-Japanese National
Salvation Corps 华侨劳工抗日救国团
Chinese Merchants General Chamber
of Commerce (CMGCC) 南洋华侨总商会
Chinese National Emancipation Vanguard
Corps (CNEVC) 中华民族解放先锋队
Chinese Protectorate 华民护卫司署
Chinese Revolutionary Party (CRP) 中华革命党
Chiu Chi-hsien 邱耀星
Chiu Fatt 赵发
Chng Suat-hean 庄雪轩
Cho Yew-fai 曹尧辉
Chong Shing Yit Pao (1907-9) 中兴日报
Chong Yok-kai 张玉阶
Chou Ching-chang 周群昌
Chu Chee-chiong 朱慈祥
Chu Cheng 居正
Chu Ch'ih-ni 朱赤霓
Chu Po-yuen 朱普元
Chu Pu-yun 朱步云
Chua Hui-seng 蔡辉生
Chua Kah-cheong 蔡嘉种
Chua Thean-keong 蔡添恭
Chuang Hsin-tsai 庄心在
Chuang Hui-chuan 庄惠泉
Chui Lian-ko 崔连科
Chung Ho T'ang 中和堂
Chung Hsing Club 中兴俱乐部
Chung Khiaw Bank 崇侨银行
Chung Ling High School, Penang 毓灵中学
Chung Shing Jit Pau (1947-57) 中兴日报
Chung Wah High School, Penang 中华中学
Chung Yi-min 钟益民
Clementi, Sir Cecil 金文泰总督
Clifford, Sir Hugh 克里福总督

- Confucian School 尊孔学校
 Criminal Investigation Department 罪犯调查部
- Democratic centralism 民主集中制
 Department of Chinese Affairs 华民政务司署
- Fan Huan-yau 方焕尧
 Feng Tzu-yun 冯子云
 First All-Malaya Delegates Convention of the
 BMHB (1929) 中国国民党驻南洋英属总支部
 第一次代表大会
- Foo Chao-kuang 符兆光
 Foo Ho-chien 符和谦
 Foo Tak-peng 符德平
 Fu Chih-feng 符致逢
 Fu-tan University 复旦大学
 Fu Yang-hua 符养华
 Fu Yung-hua 符荣华
- Gimson, Sir Franklin 金森总督
 Go Tian 吴天
 Goh Chee-yan 吴志渊
 Goh Say-eng 吴世荣
 Goodman, A.M. 兀敏
 Guillemard, Sir Laurence Nunns 基里玛总督
 Gurney, Sir Henry 葛尼最高专员
- Happy Valley 欢乐园
 Hau Say-huan 侯西反
 Ho Chi Minh 胡志明
 Ho Chung-yin 何仲英
 Ho Hai-sing 何海星
 Ho Hong Bank Ltd. 和丰银行
 Ho Hsin-t'ien 何心田
 Ho Hua-san 何华三
 Ho Ju-khoon 何如群
 Ho Lan-hiong 何兰香
 Ho Pao-jin 何葆仁
 Ho Sun-man 何选民
 Ho Teh-ju 何德如
 Ho Tsz-yun 何泽云
 Hoh Kwok-chan 何国振
 Hokkien Protection Fund 福建保安捐
 Hok'ou Uprising 河口起义
 Hong Siong 冯相
 Hoo Ah-kay 胡亚基
 Hsiao Pai-ch'uan 萧百川
 Hsiao T'ao Yuan 小桃园
 Hsieh Seong-shan 谢松山
 Hsieh Shu-neng 谢士宁
 Hsing Chung Hui 兴中会
 Hsu T'ung-hsiung 徐统雄
- Hsu Tzu-lin 许子麟
 Hsu Wei-hsiung 许伟雄
 Hu Chin-chen 胡锦涛城
 Hu Han-min 胡汉民
 Hua ch'iao 华侨
 Huang Ch'iao Club 华侨俱乐部
 Huang Chen-wu 黄珍吾
 Huang Chi-ch'en 黄吉宸
 Huang Chin-seng 黄芹生
 Huang Hsi-ch'ih 黄心持
 Huang Hsing 黄兴
 Huang kang Uprising 黄岗起义
 Huang Shih-yuan 黄仕元
 Huang Sou-jen 黄守仁
 Huang Tsun-hsien 黄遵宪
 Huang Yao-t'ing 黄耀庭
 Huang Yi-tien 黄异田
 Huanghukang Uprising 黄花岗起义
 hui kuan 会馆
 Hung T'ao 洪涛
 Hung-men Yi-hsin kungszu
 洪门义兴公司
- i 义
imperium in imperio 主权内的主权
 Ingham, R. 英咸
 Iu Teng-chan 姚定尘
- Jit Shin Pau* (1899-1901) 日新报
 Jordan, A.B. 佐顿
- K'ang Yu-wei 康有为
 Kao Ling-pai 高凌百
 Khong Siu-chee 邝少智
 Khoo Beng-chiang 邱明权
 Khoo Kok-wah 邱国瓦
 Khoo Seok-wan 邱蕊园
 Khoo Teik-ee 邱德懿
 Khor Seng-li 许生理
 Ko Tien-leng 郭天麟
 Koo Chung-eng 辜俊英
 Kreta Ayer Incident 牛车水事件
 kuo-yu 国语
 Kuomintang (KMT) 中国国民党
 Kuang Hsu, emperor 光绪皇帝
 Kwangtung Protection Fund 广东保安捐
Kwang Wah Yit Poh (1910-) 光华日报
- Lai Cheong 黎长
 Lain Wen-hua 粘文华
 Lam Sing-chau 林成就

- Lampson, Sir Miles 蓝逊大使
 Lan Chin-ching 蓝镜清
Lat Pau (1887-1931) 叻报
 Lau Boh-tan 刘牡丹
 Lau Ee-beng 刘惟明
 Lau Ek-kok 刘亦国
 Lau Geok-swee 刘玉水
 Lau Hee-choon 柳希春
 Lau Pak-khuan 刘伯群
 Lee Cheng-chuan 李清泉
 Lee Chin-tian 李振殿
 Lee Chiu 李超
 Lee Choon-eng 李春荣
 Lee Choon-seng 李俊承
 Lee Giok-eng 李玉棠
 Lee Guan-swee 李源水
 Lee Hau-shik 李孝式
 Lee Hong-seng 李汉醒
 Lee Kong-chian 李光前
 Lee Kuo-hua 李国华
 Lee Sze-yuen 李思贻
 Lee Yee-hsieh 李义侠
 Lee Yu-chieh 李玉阶
 Lei Yi-sin 李怡星
 Leong Chee-cheong 梁志翔
 Leong Cheung-ling 梁长龄
 Leong Hou-chow 梁后宙
 Leong Sin-nam 梁舜南
 Leong Yew-koh 梁宇攀
Leung t'au-sha 两头蛇
 Li 礼
 Li Chu-ch'ih 李竹痴
 Li Leung-kie 李亮琪
 Li Lien-chi 李凌溪
 Li Yueh-ch'ih 李月池
 Lian Shu-sheng 连士升
 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁启超
 Liang Sheng-kung 梁省躬
 lien 廉
 Lien Ying-chow 连瀛洲
 Liew Hai-ping 刘海平
 Lim Boh-seng 林谋盛
 Lim Boon-keng 林文庆
 Lim Chiu-eng 林照英
 Lim Choo-pui 林祖培
 Lim Ewe-aik 林有益
 Lim Keng-lian 林庆年
 Lim Kian-pang 林建邦
 Lim Kim-tian 林金殿
 Lim Nee-soon 林义顺
 Lim Pang-yan 林邦彦
 Lim Peng-siang 林秉祥
 Lim Say-gim 林世吟
 Lim Soo-ban 林师万
 Lim Soo-gan 林树彦
 Lim Ta-tian 林大典
 Lim Yew-tong 林友桐
 Lin Chi-sen 林启森
 Lin Chi-shih 林奇士
 Lin Ching-chiu 林镜秋
 Lin Han-peng 林汉鹏
 Lin Ting-hua 林鼎华
 Lin Yun-tse 林润泽
 Liu Chi-kuang 刘旭光
 Liu Ching-shan 刘静山
 Liu Chung-han 刘宗汉
 Liu Han-chieh 刘汉杰
 Liu Han-peng 刘汉屏
 Liu Hung-shih 刘鸿石
 Lo Hsuan 罗煊
 Lo Mei-tung 罗美东
 Lok Hun Club 乐群俱乐部
 Loke Chow-thye 陆秋泰
 Loo Yew-sin 卢耀仙
 Looi Chung-heng 吕仲卿
 Low Sai-yat 刘西耀
 Lu T'ien-min 吕天民
 Lu Yao-t'ing 卢耀堂
 Lung Tao-shun 龙道舜
 Ma Lip-san 马立三
 MacDonald, Malcolm 麦唐纳, 东南亚最高专员
 Main School 主要干部
 Malayan Chinese Association 马华公会
Malayan Chinese Daily News (1937-41) 马华日报
 Malayan Communist Party (MCP) 马来亚共产党
 Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
 马来亚人民抗日军
 Mao Tse-tung 毛泽东
Min Kuo Jih Pao (1930-4) 民国日报
Min Kuo Sin Wen 民国新闻
Min Pao 民报
 Ming Hsin Ch'ih-san-she 明星慈善社
 Ming Shing Sheh 明星社
Modern Daily News (1937-51) 现代日报
Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs
 (MRCA), (1931-9) 华人事务月刊
Nam Kew Poo (1911-14) 南侨日报
Nan Chiau Jit Pao (1946-51) 南侨日报
 Nanyang Communist Party 南洋共产党
 Nanyang General Branch of the KMT
 of China 中国国民党南洋总支部

- Nanyang General Labour Union (NGLU)
南洋各业职工会
Nanyang Siang Pau (NYSP) (1923-81)
南洋商报
- New Democratic Youth League
新民主青年团
- New Life Movement 新生活运动
- Ng Aik-huan 黄奕欢
- Ng Ho-sin 黄和先
- Ng Kim-keng 黄金庆
- Ng Lap-fong 伍立方
- Ng Sing-phang 吴胜勳
- Ng Tiong-kiat 黄重吉
- Ng Yeh-lu 黄耶鲁
- Oh Siow-yam 胡少炎
- Ong Chin-seong 王振相
- Ong Chuan-seng 王泉笙
- Ong Keng-seng 王景成
- Ong Kiat-soo 王吉士
- Ong Kim-lien 王金炼
- Ong Sean-say 王声世
- Ong Shao-yam 王肖岩
- Ong Yen-chee 王炎之
- Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd. 华侨银行
- Overseas Bureau of the China KMT
中国国民党中央海外部
- Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee
侨务委员会
- Overseas Chinese Anti-enemy Backing-up Society (AEBUS) 华侨抗敌后援会
- Overseas Department office, Singapore
中央海外部南洋办事处
- P'an Chao-p'en 潘兆鹏
- Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions
泛马职工总会
- Pang 帮
- Pao Huang Hui 保皇会
- P'ei Feng School 培风学校
- P'ei Teh School 培德学校
- Pek Seng-goon 白成根
- Penang Hsin Pao 檳城新报
- Penang Philomatic Society 檳城阅书报社
- Peng Tse-min 彭泽民
- Phoon Hon-kuen 潘汉权
- Phoon Tsz-ssu 潘子修
- Phua Tin-kiap 黄成业
- Ping Ming School 平民学校
- Png Chi-cheng 方之植
- Quek Sin 郭新
- Registration of Schools Ordinance
学校注册法令
- San Min Chu I Youth Corps (SMCIYC)
三民主义青年团
- San Yik Khuan Po* (1935-6) 新益群报
- Saw Kean-boon 苏建文
- Saw Seng-kew 苏承球
- Second All-Malaya Delegates Convention (1930) of the BMHB
中国国民党驻南洋英属总支部第二次代表大会
- See Bok-poon 薛木本
- Sha Hai-pan 沙海洋
- Shantung Relief Fund 山东筹赈会
- Si Hong-peng 施方平
- Siaw Ah-geok 萧亚玉
- Sim Chu-kim 沈子琴
- Sim Hung-pek 沈鸿柏
- Sin Chew Jit Poh (SCJP)* (1929-81) 星洲日报
- Sin Chew Reading Room 星洲书报社
- Sin Kuo Min Press* (1919-41) 新国民日报
- Sin Pin Jit Pao* 星旗日报
- Sin Yoong-fun 洗榕芳
- Sing Po* (1890-9) 星报
- Singapore Branch Lodge of the Kung Ho Tang of the Republic of China
中华民国共和党驻新加坡支部兼交通事务所
- Singapore China Relief Fund Committee (SCRFC) 星华筹赈会
- Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC) 新加坡中华总商会
- Singapore Chinese Mobilization Council (SCMC) 新加坡华侨动员总会
- Siu Chan-tong 萧振堂
- Sng Choon-yeec 孙崇瑜
- Societies Ordinance 社团注册法令
- Soh Huat-yu 苏法聿
- Song Ong-siang 宋旺相
- Soo Tong-ing 苏棠影
- Soon Shih-chieh 孙士杰
- Southseas China Relief Fund Union (SCRFU) 南侨筹赈总会
- Special Branch 政治部
- Ssu Chou Jih Pao* 四州日报
- Ssu shu* 私塾
- Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA)
海峡华人公会
- Sun Pao* (1909-10) 晨报
- Sung Man Club 崇文俱乐部
- Sung Mu-lin 宋木林
- Sze Tu Shiu-tak 司徒兆德

- Tai Eng-long 戴德郎
 Tan Boo-liat 陈武烈
 Tan Chay-yan 陈齐贤
 Tan Cheng-lock 陈祜禄
 Tan Cheng-siong 陈祜祥
 Tan Chin-hian 陈振贤
 Tan Chin-yah 陈振亚
 Tan Choon-yeow 陈存瑞
 Tan Chor-nam 陈楚楠
 Tan Ean-Khiam 陈延谦
 Tan Eng-guan 陈水远
 Tan Jiak-kim 陈若锦
 Tan Kah-kee 陈嘉庚
 Tan Kee-gak 陈其岳
 Tan Khai-kok 陈开国
 Tan Kok-chor alias Tan Teow-kee 陈国础
 Tan Pitt-swee 陈必水
 Tan Seng-ngo 陈醒吾
 Tan Shi-ho 陈诗豪
 Tan Siang-ching 陈先进
 Tan Teow-kee, alias Tan Kok-chor 陈肇基
 Tan Yeang-cheng 陈仰清
 T'ang Shou-shan 汤寿山
 Tang Tsz-sat 邓子实
 Tao Nan School 道南学校
 Tay Chek-ming 郑则民
 Tay Kok-yat 郑古悦
 Tay Pheng-teng 郑聘廷
 Tay Shun-yung 郑恂容
 Teh Beng-wei 郑民伟
 Teh Lay-seng 郑螺生
 Teh Sau-peng 郑少炳
 Teh Sin-kwang 郑心广
 Ten Sin-yoong 郑心融
 Teng Tse-ju 郑泽如
 Teo Eng-hock 张永福
 Teo Khai-chuan 张开川
 Tham Sui-kung 谭瑞恭
Thien Nan Shin Pao (1898-1905) 天南新报
Thoe Lam Jit Poh (1904-5) 因南日报
 Thomas, Sir Shenton 汤姆逊总督
 Thong Boon Reading Room 同文书报社
 Three Principles of the People 三民主义
 Thye Kwai-sheng 戴愧生
 Thye Po-chin 戴保珍
 Tjhung Sie-gan 庄西言
 Too Nam 杜南
 Treaty of Shimonoseki 马关条约
 Ts'ai Ai 蔡葵
 Tseng Hsin-ying 曾心影
 Tshui Kwong-siu 崔广秀
 Tso Ping-lung 左秉隆
 Tsou Jung 邹容
 T'ung An district 同安县
 Tung Jen Club 同仁俱乐部
 T'ung Meng Hui (TMH) (United League) 同盟会
 Tung Teh Reading Room 同德书报社
 Twenty One Demands 二十一条

Union Times (1909-14) 南洋总汇新报
Union Times (1915-31) 石叻总汇新报

 Wang Chee-ming 王志明
 Wang Cheng-t'ing 王正廷
 Wang Chien-chen 王健臣
 Wang Ching-wei 汪精卫
 Wang Chung-kwang 王仲广
 Wang Sin-yueh 王崧悦
 Wang-Lampson Agreement 王·蓝逊合约
 Wong Hoh-teng 黄可定
 Wong Shee-foon 黄树芬
 Wong Tong-seng 黄东升
 Wong Yik-tong 黄益堂
 Woo Mun-chew 胡文制
 Wu Chin-sheng 吴晋陞
 Wu, George 吴仕超
 Wu Hsi-shih 伍蕙石
 Wu Kuan-ying 吴冠英
 Wu Si-chieh 吴锡爵
 Wu T'ieh-ch'eng 吴铁城
 Wu Tse-huan 吴焯寰
 Wuchang Uprising 武昌起义

 Yap Geok-sng 叶玉桑
 Yee Ch'ao-ying 余超英
 Yeh Chi-yun 叶季允
 Yeh Jen 叶人
 Yeo Chan-boon 杨懋文
Yik Khuan Po (1919-34) 益群报
 Yim Kwai-wing 严桂荣
 Yin, C.S. 殷雪村
 Yong Shook-lin 杨旭龄
 Yong Yik-lin 杨溢靖
 Young, Sir Arthur 杨格总督
 Yu Lieh 尤烈
 Yuan Shih-k'ai 袁世凯
 Yuen Ying-fong 阮英昉

Bibliography

I. ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SOURCES

A. Official Records (Unpublished)

- i. *Archival Manuscript Sources* (Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, England)
 - CO 273 Straits Settlements Correspondence, original, 1900-1946
 - CO 274 Straits Settlements Acts, 1867-1940
 - CO 275 Straits Settlements Sessional Papers — Administrative Reports and Executive and Legislative Council Minutes, 1900-1939
 - CO 276 Straits Settlements Government Gazettes, 1900-1942
 - CO 277 Straits Settlements Miscellanea — Blue Books of Statistics, 1900-1939
 - CO 537 Original Supplementary Correspondence for colonial and non-colonial countries, 1872-1951
 - CO 717 Federated Malay States Correspondence, original, 1919-1950
 - CO 825 Eastern Correspondence, original, 1927-1951
 - CO 865 Far Eastern Reconstruction, original correspondence, 1943-1945
 - CO 925 Singapore Authenticated Ordinances, 1946-1959
 - CO 932 Singapore Government Gazettes, 1945-1965
 - CO 939 Singapore Miscellanea — Blue Books of Statistics, 1946
 - CO 940 Singapore Sessional Papers, 1946-1965
 - CO 953 Singapore, Original Correspondence, 1936-1951
 - CO 1022 Southeast Asian Department, original correspondence, 1950-1956
 - FO 371 Foreign Office Files on China and Malayan matters, 1906-1953
 - W0 106 Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1878-1945
 - W0 196 Director of Royal Artillery, 1892-1946
 - W0 203 War of 1939-1945: Military Headquarters Papers, Far East, Allied Land Forces Southeast Asia 1942-1946
 - W0 208 Directorate of Military Intelligence, 1917-1956
 - W0 220 Directorate of Civil Affairs, 1943-1946
- ii. *Archival Manuscript Sources* (National Library of Singapore)
 - NL 5936-5940; 5948-5949, Straits Settlements Governor Despatches, 1926-1930

B. Published Documents

- Federated Malay States Annual Reports* (1900-1940) (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1901-1941).
- Federated Malay States Enactments* (1900-1940) (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1901-1941).
- Federated Malay States Government Gazettes* (1900-1940) (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1901-1941).
- Federated Malay States Proceeding of the Federal Council* (1910-1940) (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1901-1941).
- Nathan, J.E., *Report of the Census of British Malaya 1921* (London: Dunstable & Watford, 1922).
- Parliamentary Papers Command Papers (London: HMSO, 1910-1940).
- Report by the Right Honourable W.G.A. Ormsby Gore, MP. (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) on His Visit to Malaya, Ceylon and Java during the year 1928* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928).
- Straits Settlements Civil Lists, 1900-1941* (London: HMSO, 1900-1941).

- Straits Settlements Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 1901-1940* (Singapore, Government Printer, 1901-1940).
- Straits Settlements Superintendent of the Census, *Report on the Colony of the Straits Settlements, 1891* (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1892).
- , *Report on the Census of the Colony of the Straits Settlements, 1901* (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1902).
- , *Report on the Census of the Colony of the Straits Settlements, 1911* (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1912).
- Tufo, M.V. del., *Malaya: A Report on the 1947 Census of Population* (London: Malaya House, 1948).
- Vlieland, C.A., *British Malaya: A Report on the 1931 Census and on Certain Problems of Vital Statistics* (London: Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1932).
- Visit to Malaya 1932 by Samuel Wilson* (London: HMSO, 1933) (Command Paper No 4276 of 1933).

C. Unpublished Private Papers

- Personal Papers of A.H. Dickinson (Royal Commonwealth Society Library, British Association of Malaya Papers, London).
- Personal Papers of Sir Shenton Thomas (Royal Commonwealth Society Library, British Association of Malaya Papers, London).
- Personal Papers of W.L. Blythe (Rhodes House Library, Oxford).
- Personal Papers of William Donald Horne (Rhodes House Library).
- Personal Papers of Sir Shenton Thomas (Rhodes House Library).
- Personal Papers of George William Webb (Rhodes House Library).

D. Contemporary Sources: Newspapers and Journals

- British Malaya* (Journal of the Association of British Malaya), 1926-1950
- Journal of Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, 1923-1951
- Journal of the Straits Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, 1900-1922
- Malay Mail*, 1929-1930
- Straits Chinese Magazine*, 1897-1907
- Straits Settlements Directory*, 1901-1941
- Straits Times*, 1911-1912; 1930-1941; 1946-1948
- The Times* (London), 1910-1949

E. Articles, Books, Published Papers and Theses

- Akashi, Yoji, 'The Nanyang Chinese Anti-Japanese and Boycott Movement, 1908-1928, A Study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism', *JSSS* 23, 1 & 2 (1968).
- , *The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941* (Kansas: Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1970).
- Allen, Charles, ed., *Tales From the South China Seas* (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1983).
- Allen, J. de Vere, 'Two Imperialists: A Study of Sir Frank Swettenham and Sir Hugh Clifford', *JMBRAS* 37, 1 (1964).
- , *Malayan Union* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).
- Amery, L.M.S., *My Political Life, 1914-29* (London: Hutchinson, 1953), Vol.2.
- Arasaratnam, S., *Indians in Malaysia and Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970).
- Barrett, David P., 'The Role of Hu Han-min in the 'First United Front': 1922-27', *The China Quarterly* 89 (1982).

- Birch, E.W., 'The Vernacular Press in the Straits', *JMBRAS* 42, 1(1969).
- Bloodworth, Dennis, *The Tiger and the Trojan Horse* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1986).
- Blythe, W.L., *The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, A Historical Study* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
- Boyle, W., *China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford: California, Stanford University Press, 1973).
- Brimmell, J.H., *Communism in South East Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).
- Bunker, Gerald E., *The Peace Conspiracy, Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937-1941* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).
- Butcher, J.G., *The British in Malaya, 1880-1941* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979)
- , 'The Demise of the revenue farm system in the Federated Malay States', *Modern Asian Studies* 17, 3(1983).
- Butler, R., Bury, J.P.T., and Lambert, M.E., eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939* (London: HMSO, 1966), First Series, Vol.XV.
- Cavendish, P., 'Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang 1923-8', in Jerome Ch'en and Nicholas Tarling, eds., *Studies in the Social History of China and Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
- Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grassroots* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1976).
- , *A Sensation of Independence A Political Biography of David Marshall* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984).
- Chapman, F.S., *The Jungle is Neutral* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1953).
- Cheah Boon Kheng, *The Mask Comrades. A Study of the Communist United Front in Malaya, 1945-48* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1979).
- , *Red Star Over Malaya* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983).
- Ch'en, Jerome, *Yuan Shih-k'ai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 2nd edition.
- Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *The Government and Politics of China 1912-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970).
- Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970).
- Chu Tee Seng, 'The Singapore Chinese Protectorate, 1900-1941', *JSSS* 26, 1(1971).
- Chui Kwei Chiang, *The Response of the Malayan Chinese to Political and Military Developments in China, 1945-1949* (Singapore: Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang University, 1977).
- , 'The China Democratic League in Singapore and Malaya', *Review of Southeast Asian Studies (Nanyang Quarterly)* xv(1985).
- Clammer, John R., *Straits Chinese Society* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1980).
- Clifford, Hugh, *In a Corner of Asia* (London: Fisher Unwin, 1926).
- , *The Further Side of Silence* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1927).
- Clutterbuck, R., *Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia 1945-1983* (Singapore: Graham Brash (Pte) Ltd., 1984).
- Drysdale, John, *Singapore Struggle for Success* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1984).
- Eastman, Lloyd E., *The Abortive Revolution, China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974).
- Ee, Joyce, 'Chinese Migration to Singapore, 1896-1941', *JSEAH*, 2 (1961).
- Emerson, R., *Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964).
- Evans, T. E., ed., *The Killearn Diaries, 1934-1936* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972).
- FitzGerald, C.P., *The Third China* (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1965).

- Fitzgerald, S., *China and the Overseas Chinese, A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
- Freedman, M., ed., *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970).
- , *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1979).
- Friedman, Edward, *Backward towards Revolution: The Chinese Revolutionary Party* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974).
- Fung, Edmund K.S., 'The Sino-British Rapprochement 1927-1931', *Modern Asian Studies*, 17, 1(1983).
- Furnivall, J.S., *Colonial Policy and Practice A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (New York: New York University Press, 1956), reprint.
- Gailey, H. A., *Clifford: Imperial Proconsul* (London: Rex Collings, 1982).
- Gamba, C., *The Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya, A Study in Colonial Labour Unrest* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press Ltd., 1962).
- George, T.J.S., *Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1973).
- , *The Singapore Saga* (Singapore: Fernandez Joseph George, 1985).
- Godley, M.R., *The Mandarin-capitalists from Nanyang, Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893-1911* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
- Guillemond, L., *Trivial Fond Records* (London: Methuen, 1937).
- Gullick, J.M., *Malaysia* (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1969).
- Gwee Yee Hean, 'Chinese Education in Singapore', *JSSS* 25, 2(1970).
- Hanrahan, G.Z., *The Communist Struggle in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1971), reprint.
- Heng Pek Koon, 'The Social and Ideological Origins of the Malayan Chinese Association', *JSEAS* 14, 2(1983).
- , *Chinese Politics in Malaysia A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988).
- Heussler, R., *Yesterday's Ruler: the Making of the British Colonial Services* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1963).
- , *British Rule in Malaya, the Malayan Civil Service and Its Predecessors, 1867-1942* (Oxford: England, Clio Press, 1981).
- , *British Rule in Malaya, 1942-1957* (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1985).
- How Mung Meng, 'The Federal Council of the FMS as a Colonial Legislature', *Malaysia in History* 27 (1984).
- Hsu, I.C.Y., *The Rise of Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 3rd edition.
- Hua Wu Yin, *Class and Communalism in Malaysia, Politics in a Dependent Capitalist State* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1983).
- Hyam, Ronald and Martin, Ged, *Reappraisals in British Imperial History* (London: Macmillan, 1975).
- Inglis, Christine, 'Chinese Schools in Malaya during the colonial period', *Kebar Seberang*, 7 (1980).
- Innes, J.R., 'The Malayan Civil Service as a career', *National Review* 77 (1921).
- Itagaki, Yoichi, 'Some aspects of Japanese Policy for Malaya under the occupation with special reference to nationalism', in K.G. Tregonning, ed., *Papers in Malayan History* (Singapore: Malayan Publishing House, 1962).
- Jackson, R.N., *Pickering: Protector of Chinese* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965).
- , 'Grasping the nettle: first successes in the struggle to govern the Chinese in Malaya', *JMBRAS* 40, 1 (1967).

- Jones, Alun, 'Internal Security in British Malaya, 1895-1942' Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1970.
- Jordan, Donald A., *The Northern Expedition China's National Revolution of 1926-1928* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976).
- Josey, A., *Lee Kuan Yew, the Struggle for Singapore* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson Pty. Ltd., 1974).
- , *Singapore: Its Past, Present and Future* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, Sdn. Bhd., 1979).
- Kane, Harold, 'Sir Miles Lampson at the Peking Legation, 1926-1933', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1975.
- Khor Eng Hee, 'The Public Life of Dr. Lim Boon Keng', B.A. Honours thesis, University of Singapore, 1959.
- Kratoska, Paul H., 'Proconsuls, Yeomen and Rice Farmers: Cultural Categories in British Malaya', Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1975.
- , ed., *Honourable Intentions: Talks on the British Empire in Southeast Asia delivered at the Royal Colonial Institute 1874-1928* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983).
- Hung-ting Ku, 'The Emergence of the Kuomintang's Anti-Imperialism', *Journal of Oriental Studies* xvi, 1 & 2 (1978).
- , 'Urban mass movement; The May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai', *Modern Asian Studies* 13, 2 (1979).
- Lee, Bradford A., *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1939* (Stanford: California: Stanford University Press, 1973).
- Lee Lai To, ed., *The 1911 Revolution - the Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1987).
- Leong, Stephen Mun Yoon, 'Sources, Agencies and Manifestations of Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941', Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1976.
- , 'The Chinese in Malaya and China's politics 1895-1911', *JMBRAS* 50, 2 (1977).
- , 'The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya during the National Salvation Period, 1937-1941', *JSEAS* 8, 1 (1977).
- , 'The Malayan Overseas Chinese and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941', *JSEAS* 10, 2 (1979).
- Lim Choo Hoon, 'The Transformation of the Political Orientation of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1945-1955', *Review of Southeast Asian Studies* (*Nanyang Quarterly*) ix (1979).
- Lim Teck Ghee, 'British colonial administration and the ethnic division of labour in Malaya', *Kajian Malaysia* (*Journal of Malaysian Studies*) 2, 2 (1984).
- Loh, Philip Fook Seng, *Seeds of Separatism: Educational Policy in Malaya 1874-1940* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975).
- Louis, William Roger, *British Strategy in the Far East* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971).
- , *Imperialism at Bay 1941-1945: the United States and the decolonisation of the British Empire* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1977).
- Luard, Evan, *Britain and China* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962).
- McLane, Charles B., *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: an exploration of eastern policy under Lenin and Stalin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
- Marshall, David, *Singapore's Struggle for Nationhood, 1945-1959* (Singapore: University Education Press, 1971).
- Medlicott, W.N., Dakin, D., and Lambert, M.E. ed., *Documents on British Foreign Policy* (London; HMSO, 1970), Second Series, Vol. XI.
- Middlebrook, S.M., 'Pioneers of China reform in Malaya', *Straits Times Annual* (1941).
- Montgomery, Brian, *Shenton of Singapore Governor and Prisoner of War* (Singapore: Times

- Books International, 1984).
- Morraha, Patrick, 'The History of the Malayan Police', *JMBRAS* 36, 2 (1963).
- Morrison, I., *Malayan Postscript* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson Ltd., 1943).
- O'Brien, Leslie, 'Education and Colonialism: the Case of Malaya', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Social Science* 16, 2 (1980).
- Onraet, R., 'The Establishment of Internal Security', *Straits Times*, 14 January 1946.
- , 'Communism and Labour Troubles', *Straits Times*, 11 January 1946.
- , *Singapore - A Police Background* (London: Crisp, 1947).
- Ooi Jin-bee and Chiang Hai Ding, eds., *Modern Singapore* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1969).
- Osterhammel, Jargen, 'Imperialism in transition: British business and the Chinese authorities 1931-37', *The China Quarterly* 98 (1984).
- Pang Wing Seng, 'The 'Double-Seventh' Incident 1937: Singapore Chinese Response to the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War', *JSEAS* 4, 2 (1973).
- Parkinson, C., *The Colonial Office From Within 1909-1945* (London: Faber and Faber, 1947).
- Parmer, J.N., 'Labour Organisation by Chinese in Singapore in the 1930s', *JSEAH* 2, 1 (1962).
- Pepper, S., *Civil War in China, the Political Struggle 1945-1949* (Berkeley: California: University of California Press, 1980).
- Percival, A.E., *The War in Malaya* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode (Publishers) Ltd., 1949).
- Pluvier, J.M., *South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977), 2nd edition.
- Png Poh Seng, 'The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1949', *JSEAH* 2, 1 (1961).
- , 'The Straits Chinese in Singapore: A Case of Local Identity and Socio-cultural Accommodation', *JSEAH* 10, 1 (1969).
- Purcell, V., *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951).
- , *The Memoirs of a Malayan Official* (London: Cassell, 1965).
- , *The Chinese in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967).
- Quah, Jon S.T., et al., *Government and Politics of Singapore* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), revised edition.
- Rees-Williams, Tan Cheng Lock, Awbery, S.S., and Dalley, F.W., *Three Reports on the Malayan Problem* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949).
- Rigby, Richard W., *The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980).
- Robinson, J.B.P., *Transformation in Malaya* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1956).
- Roff, M., 'The Malayan Chinese Association, 1948-1965', *JSEAH* 6, 2 (1965).
- Roff, W.R., *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1967).
- Shai, Aron, *Origins of the War in the East* (London: Croom Helm, 1976).
- Sheppard, Mubin Tan Sri Dato, *Taman Budiman: Memoirs of an Unorthodox Civil Servant* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1979).
- Short, A., *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960* (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1975).
- Sim, V., comp., *Biographies of Prominent Chinese in Singapore* (Singapore: Nan Kok & Co., 1950).
- Simoniya, N.A., *Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Russian Study* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1961).

- Sidhu, Jagit Singh, 'Sir Cecil Clementi and the Kuomintang in Malaya', *Malaya in History* ix, 1 & 2 (1965).
- Soh Eng Lim, 'Tan Cheng Lock: His Leadership of the Malayan Chinese', *JSEAH* 1, 1 (1960).
- Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1967), reprint.
- Stenson, M.R., *Repression and Revolt: The Origins of the 1948 Communist Insurrection in Malaya and Singapore* (Athens, Ohio, Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 10, 1969).
- , *Industrial Conflict in Malaya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
- , *Class, Race & Colonialism in West Malaysia* (St. Lucia, Queensland: Queensland University Press, 1980).
- Stockwell, A.J., *British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment 1945-1948* (Kuala Lumpur: JMBRAS, 1979), monograph no. 8.
- , 'Sir Hugh Clifford in Malaya 1927-29: 'Pinang pulang ka Tampok'', *JMBRAS* 53, 2 (1980).
- Tan Cheng Lock, *Malayan Problems from a Chinese Point of View* (Singapore: Tannso, 1947).
- Tan Ee Leong, 'The Chinese banks incorporated in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya', *JMBRAS* 26, 1 (1953).
- Tan, T.H., *The Prince and I* (Singapore: Sam Boyd Enterprise, Mini Media Pte Ltd., 1979).
- Tan Yeok Seong, 'History of the Formation of the Overseas Chinese Association and the extortion by Japanese Military Administration of \$5,000,000 from the Chinese in Malaya', *JSSS* 3, 1 (1946).
- Tarling, Nicholas, 'A Vital British interest: Britain, Japan and the Security of Netherlands India during the inter-war period', *JSEAS* 9, 2 (1978).
- , 'The Singapore Mutiny 1915', *JMBRAS* 55, 2 (1982).
- Tate, D.J.M., *The Making of Modern Southeast Asia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), Vol. 2.
- Teichman, Sir Eric, *Affairs of China: A Survey of recent history and present circumstances of the Republic of China* (London: Methuen, 1938).
- Thio Chan Bee, *Extraordinary Adventures of an Ordinary Man* (London: Grosvenor Books, 1977).
- Thio, E., 'The Extension of British Control to Pahang', *JMBRAS* XXX, 1 (1957).
- , *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1910* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1969), Vol. 1.
- , 'The Singapore Chinese Protectorate: Events and Conditions leading to its Establishment 1923-1877', *JSSS* 16, 1 & 2 (1960).
- Thomas, F., *Memoirs of a Migrant* (Singapore: University Education Press, 1972).
- Thompson, V., and Adloff, R., *The Left Wing in Southeast Asia* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1950).
- , *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955).
- Tilman, R.O., *Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya* (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1964).
- Tregonning, K.G., ed., *Papers on Malayan History* (Singapore: Malayan Publishing House, 1962).
- , *A History of Modern Malaya* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, Ltd., 1964).
- , 'Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist', *JSEAS* 10, 1 (1979).
- Trenowden, Ian, *Malayan Operations Most Secret - Force 136* (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1983), first Southeast Asian edition.

- Turnbull, C.M., 'British Planning in post-war Malaya', *JSEAS* 5, 2 (1974).
- , *A History of Singapore 1819-1975* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), reprinted.
- , *A Short History of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei* (New South Wales: Cassell Australia Limited, 1980).
- , 'Sir Cecil Clementi and Malaya: the Hong Kong Connection', *Journal of Oriental Studies* XXII, 1 (1984).
- , 'The Post-war Decade in Malaya', *JMBRAS* LX, 1 (1987).
- von Albertini, Rudolf, *European Colonial Rule, 1880-1940* (Oxford: England, Clio Press, 1982).
- Wang Gungwu, *A Short History of the Nanyang Chinese* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1959).
- , ed., *Malaysia: A Survey* (London: Pall Mall, 1964).
- , 'Southeast Asian hua-ch'iao in Chinese History-writing', *JSEAS* 12, 1 (1981).
- , *Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1981).
- Wicks, P.C., 'Images of Malaya in the stories of Sir Hugh Clifford', *JMBRAS* 52, 1 (1980).
- Wijeyewardene, Gehan, *Leadership and Authority: A Symposium* (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1968).
- Wilbur, C. Martin, *The Nationalist Revolution in China 1923-1928* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- Williams, L.E., *The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966).
- Wilson, D.C., 'Britain and the Kuomintang 1924-1928: A study of the interaction of official policies and perceptions in Britain and China', Ph.D. thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1973.
- Winstedt, Richard, *Start from Alif, Count from One* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1969).
- Woon Yuen-fong 'The voluntary sojourner among the Overseas Chinese: myth or reality?', *Pacific Affairs* 56, 4 (1983-1984).
- Wright, Mary C., 'From revolution to restoration: the transformation of Kuomintang ideology' *Far Eastern Quarterly* 14, 4 (1955).
- Wu Tieh-ch'eng, 'Contributions from Overseas Chinese during the War', *China Quarterly* 5, 4 (1940).
- Wu Tien-wei, *The Sian incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976).
- Yap Pheng Geck, *Scholar, Banker Gentleman Soldier* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1982).
- Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution* (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1976).
- , 'Chinese Revolutionary Propaganda Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1906-1911', *JSSS* 29, 1 & 2 (1974).
- , 'Overseas Chinese Nationalist in Singapore and Malaya, 1877-1912', *Modern Asian Studies* 16, 3 (1982).
- , *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch'ing Period (1851-1911)* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985).
- , *A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya 1800-1911* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986).

- Yeo Kim Wah, *Political Development in Singapore, 1945-1955* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973).
- , 'The anti-Federation movement in Malaya, 1946-48', *JSEAS* 4, 1 (1973).
- , 'The Communist Challenge in the Malayan Labour Scene, September 1936-March 1937', *JMBRAS* 49, 2 (1976).
- , 'The grooming of an elite: Malay administrators in the Federated Malay States, 1903-1941', *JSEAS* 11, 2 (1980).
- , 'The Guillemard-Maxwell power struggle 1921-1925', *JMBRAS* 54, 1 (1981).
- , *The Politics of Decentralization: Colonial Controversy in Malaya 1920-1929* (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1982).
- Yong, C.F., 'A Preliminary Study of Chinese Leadership in Singapore, 1900-1941', *JSEAH* 9, 2 (1968).
- , 'Patterns and Traditions of Loyalty in the Chinese Community in Singapore, 1900-1941', *The New Zealand Journal of History* 4, 1 (1970).
- , 'Emergence of Chinese Community Leaders in Singapore, 1890-1941', *JSSS* 30, 1 & 2 (1975).
- , 'Leadership and Power in the Chinese community of Singapore during the 1930s', *JSEAS* 8, 2 (1977).
- , ed., 'Special Issue - Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia', *JSEAS* 12, 1 (1981).
- , 'Rivalry Between the New and Old Chinese Chambers of Commerce - Contending Elites and power struggle within the Chinese Community of Singapore, 1912-1914', in *Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry 75th Anniversary Souvenir Issue* (Singapore: Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1982).
- , 'Some Thoughts on the Creation of a Singaporean Identity among the Chinese: The Pre-PAP Phase, 1945-1959', *Review of Southeast Asian Studies (Nanyang Quarterly)* 15 (1985).
- , 'British Attitudes toward the Chinese Community Leaders in Singapore, 1819-1941', *JSSS* 40, 1 & 2 (1985).
- , *A Short Biography of Tan Kah Kee* (Singapore: The Management Committee of Tan Kah Kee Foundation, 1987).
- , *Tan Kah-kee, the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987).
- , and McKenna, R.B., 'The Kuomintang Movement in Malaya and Singapore, 1912-1925', *JSEAS* 12, 1 (1981).
- , 'The Kuomintang Movement in Malaya and Singapore, 1925-1930', *JSEAS* 15, 1 (1984).
- , 'Sir Arthur Young and Political Control of the Chinese in Malaya and Singapore, 1911-1919', *JMBRAS* 57, 2 (1984).
- Yu, George, *Party Politics in Republican China: the Kuomintang 1912-1924* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966).

2. CHINESE-LANGUAGE SOURCES

A. Unpublished Records

- NA 007-009, Minutes of the Committee Meetings of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1906-1970. These three reels of microfilms are available at the National Archives of Singapore.

B. Published Contemporary Sources

- Ch'an Chan-mooi (陈占梅), *A Brief Biography of Mr. Too Nam* (杜南先生事略) (Kuala Lumpur, 1939).
- Chiang Yung-ching (蒋永敬), ed., *Hua-ch'iao k'ai-kuo ko-ming shih-liao* (华侨开国革命史料), (Taipei: Cheng-chung Shu-chu, 1977).
- Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih-nien wen-hsien* (中华民国开国五十年文献) Vol. 1, *Ko-ming yuan-liu yü ko-ming yün-tung* (革命源流与革命运动), No. 11 (Taipei: Chung-yang, tang-shih-hui, 1963).
- Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tang-shih shih-liao pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui* (中国国民党党史史料编纂委员会), ed., *Ko-ming wen-hsien ti ssu-shih-wu ch'i*, *Chung-hua ko-ming-tang shih-liao* (革命文献第四十五辑中华革命党史料), (Taipei, 1969).
- Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tang-yuan hsi-chi* (中国国民党党员须知) (Johore Bahru, Johore: Hur Ping Press, 1946).
- Hou Hsi-fan ai-ssu-lu* (侯西反袁思录), (Singapore: Singapore Nanyang Publishing Co., 1947).
- Hsing-chou shih-nien* (星洲十年), (Singapore: Sin Chew Jit Poh Press, 1940).
- Jindashi Ziliao* (近代史资料), Vol. 61 (Peking: The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1986).
- Kuo-fu ch'uan-shu* (国父全书), (Taipei, 1966), 3rd edition.
- Lin Po-ai (林博爱), et al., *Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan* (南洋名人集传) (Penang: Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan pien-chi-ch'u, 1924).
- , *Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan* (南洋名人集传), (Penang: Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan pien-chi-ch'u, 1924), Vol. 2, No. 1.
- , *Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan* (南洋名人集传), (Penang: Nanyang min-shih tsuan-hsiu-so, 1928), Vol. 2, No. 2.
- , *Nanyang min-jen chi-chuan* (南洋名人集传), (Penang: Nanyang min-shih tsuan-hsiu-so, 1929), Vol. 4.
- Manifesto and Resolutions of the First All-Malaya Delegates Convention of the BMHB, 1929* (中国国民党驻南洋英属总支部第一次代表大会宣言及议决案) (Singapore: Convention Secretariat, 1929).
- Nan-ch'iao cheng-lun-chi* (南侨正论集), (Singapore: Southseas China Relief Fund Union, 1948).
- Nanyang ko-shu Fukien t'ung-hsiang tai-piao ta-hui ch'i-yao* (南洋各属福建同乡代表大会辑要), (Singapore: Nanyang Min-ch'iao tsung-hui, 1941).
- Nanyang Year Book, 1951* (南洋年鉴), (Singapore: Nanyang Siang Pau Press, 1951).
- P'an Hsing-nung (潘醒农), ed., *The Teo-chews in Malaya* (马来亚潮侨通案), (Singapore: Nan-tao ch'u-pan-she, 1950).
- Republican China: Archival Documents series, the First and Second Chinese National Guomindang Congress* (中国国民党第一、二次全国代表大会会议史料), Vols. 1-2 (Yang-chou: Kiangsu ku-chi ch'u-pan-she, 1986).
- Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen* (孙中山选集), (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1981), 2nd edition.
- San Min Chu I* (三民主义), (Taipei: Cheng-chung Shu-ch'u, 1965), 7th printing.
- Shü Yün-t'siao (许云樵) and Chua Ser-koon (蔡史君), eds., *Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan 1937-1945 - Selected Source Materials* (新马华人抗日史料, 1937-1945) (Singapore: Cultural and Historical Publishing House Pte Ltd., 1984).
- Su Hsiao-hsien (苏孝先), ed., *Changchou shih-shu lü-hsing t'ung-hsiang-lu* (漳州十属旅星同乡录), (Singapore: Ch'iao-kuang ch'u-pan-she, 1948).
- Ta-chan yü nan-ch'iao* (大战与南侨), (Singapore: Southseas China Relief Fund Union, 1947).
- Tan Kah-kee (陈嘉庚), *Nan-ch'iao hui-i-lu* (南侨回忆录) (Singapore: Tan Kah-kee, 1946), 2 vols.

- , *Ch'en Chia-keng yen-lun-chi* (陈嘉庚言论集), (Singapore: Southseas China Relief Fund Union, 1949).
- Teo Eng-hock (张永福), *Nanyang yü ch'uang-li min-kuo* (南洋与创立民国), (Shanghai: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1933).
- Who's Who in the Far Eastern Archipelago* (远东人物志), (Penang: Yuan-tung min-shih tsuan-hsiu-so, 1934).

C. Contemporary Sources: Chinese Newspapers

- China Press* (中国报), 1946–1947.
- Chung Shing Jit Pao* (中兴日报) 1947–1950.
- Kwong Wah Yit Poh* (光华日报), 1947–1949.
- Kuo Min Yit Poh* (国民日报), 1914–1919.
- Lat Pau* (叻报), 1887–1932.
- Min Kuo Jih Pao* (民国日报), 1930–1934.
- Nam Kew Poo* (南侨日报), 1911–1914.
- Nan Chiau Jit Pao* (南侨日报), 1946–1951.
- Nanyang Siang Pau* (南洋商报), 1923–1956.
- Sin Chew Jit Poh* (星洲日报), 1929–1941; 1951–1956.
- Sin Kuo Min Press* (新国民日报), 1919–1929.
- Sing Po* (*Chinese Daily News*, 星报), 1890–1899.
- The Union Times* (南洋总汇新报), 1909–1914.
- The Union Times* (石叻总汇新报), 1915–1931.
- Thien Nan Shin Pao* (天南新报), 1898–1905.
- Yik Khuan Poh* (益群报), 1919–1921.

D. Chinese Journals

- Asian Culture* (亚洲文化), (Singapore), Vols. 1–11, 1983–1988.
- Essays on the History of Overseas Chinese* (华侨史论文集) (Canton, China), Vols. 1–4, 1981–1984.
- International Times* (国际时报) (Singapore), Vols. 1–5, 1967–1973.
- Island Society Quarterly* (新社季刊), (Singapore), Vols. 1–4, 1968–1971.
- Journal of South Seas Society* (南洋学报) (Singapore), Vols. 1–41, 1940–1986.
- Journal of Southeast Asian Researches* (东南亚研究) (Singapore), Vols. 1–5, 1965–1969.
- Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (东南亚研究学报) (Singapore), Vols. 1–2, 1970–1971.
- Nanyang tsa-chih* (The Nanyang Miscellany 南洋杂志) (Singapore), Vol. 1, Nos. 1–12, 1946–1947.
- Nanyang wen-che* (南洋文摘) (Hong Kong), Vols. 1–21, 1960–80.
- Republican Archives* (Minguo Dang'an, 民国档案) (Nanking), Vols. 1–4, 1987; Vols. 1–4, 1988.

E. Articles, Books and Published Papers

- Chang Ch'u-k'un (张楚琨), "Ch'en Chia-keng yü *Nan Chiau Jit Pao*" (陈嘉庚与南侨日报), *Wen-shih tzu-liao hsuan-chi* (文史资料选辑), 78 (1982).
- Ch'en Po-p'ing (陈伯萍), "Clementi and an episode of the KMT history" (全文泰与国民党的一段往事), *International Times* (国际时报), 94 (1968).
- Cheng Kuang-yu (程光裕), *The Distinguished Overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia* (星马华侨中之杰出人物) (Yang Ming Shan, Taiwan: Hwa Kang Press Co., 1977).
- Chinese Historical Association (中国史学会), ed., *Chungkuo kuo-min-tang "i ta" lu-shih chou-nien chi-nien lunwen-chi* (中国国民党“一大”六十周年纪念论文集) (Peking: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1984).

- Chng, D.K.Y. (庄钦水), *Collected Essays on Chinese in Nineteenth Century Singapore* (新加坡华人史论丛) (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1986).
- Chuang Hsin-tsai (庄心在), "Wu T'ieh-lao yü kang-chan-ch'i-chung ti Nanyang" (吴铁老与抗战期中的南洋), *International Times* (国际时报), 94 (1968).
- Chui Kwei-chiang (崔贵强), "Hsin-ma hua-jen cheng-chih jen-t'ung ti tsuan-pien" (新马华人政治认同的转变), *JSSS* 32, 1 & 2 (1977).
- , *Hsin-ma-shih lun-ts'ung* (星马史论丛) (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1977).
- , "Chan-hou ch'ü-ch'i hsin-ma ti Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang" (战后初期新马的中国国民党), *Sin Chew Jit Poh* (星洲日报), 22 February 1982; 1 March 1982; 8 March 1982 and 15 March 1982.
- , "Malayan Chinese Newspapers and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949" (新马华文报与国共内战), *JSSS* 38, 1 & 2 (1983).
- Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang wei-yüan-hui t'i-san-tsu (中国国民党中央委员会第三组编), ed., *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tsai hai-wai* (中国国民党在海外) (Taipei, 1961).
- Chung-kuo min-chu t'ung-meng li-shih wen-hsien, 1941-1949* (中国民主同盟历史文献) (Peking: Wen-shih chih-liao ch'u-pan-she, 1983).
- Feng Tzu-yü (冯自由), *Hua-ch'iao ko-ming k'ai-kuo shih* (华侨革命开国史) (Taipei: Taiwan Shang-wu ying-shu-kuan, 1953).
- , *Hua-ch'iao ko-ming tsu-chih shih-hua* (华侨革命组织史话) (Taipei: Taiwan Shang-wu ying-shu-kuan, 1953).
- Fu Tao-hui (傅道慧), *Wu-san yün-tung* (五卅运动) (Shanghai: Fu-tan Ta-hsueh ch'u-pan-she, 1985).
- Han Shan-yuan (韩山元), "The Past Glory - an interview with the youngest son of Lim Nee-soon" (运远去的辉煌·林义顺幼子忠宪访问记), in *Ta Ch'ü-chi* (大出击) (Singapore: SNPL Book Publications Department, 1984).
- Hsin-hai ko-ming yü nan-yang hua-jen yen-tao hui lun-wen-chi* (辛亥革命与南洋华人研讨会论文集) (Taipei: The Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University, 1986).
- Hsü Yün-ts'iao (许云樵), "Nanyang hua-ch'iao yü ta-hsüeh chiao-yü" (南洋华侨与大学教育), *JSSS* 9, 2 (1953).
- , "Ma-lai-ya hua-wen pao-yeh-shih" (马来亚华文报业史), in Kao Hsin (高信) and Chang Hsi-tse (张希哲), eds., *Hua-ch'iao shih-lun-chi* (华侨史论集) (Taipei: The National War College, 1963).
- Hua-ch'iao shih-hua hsüan-p'ien* (华侨史话选编) (Fochow: Fukien Ch'iao-hsiang-pao, 1984), Vol. 1.
- Huang Chen-wu (黄珍吾), *Hua-ch'iao yü Chung-kuo ko-ming* (华侨与中国革命) (Taipei: The National War College and Chinese Culture Institute, 1963).
- Huang Fu-luan (黄福銓), *Hua-ch'iao yü Chung-kuo ko-ming* (华侨与中国革命) (Hong Kong: Ya-chou ch'u-pan-she yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1954), reprinted.
- Huang Yi-hua (黄溢华), ed., *The 90th Anniversary Commemorative Issue of the Ee Ho Hean Club* (怡和轩九十周年纪念特刊) (Singapore: Ta-shui-nui ch'u-pan chi-kou, 1985).
- Huang Yuan-ch'i (黄元起), et al., *Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shih* (中国现代史) (Honan: Honan jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1983), Vol. 2, 2nd printing.
- , *Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shih* (中国现代史) (Honan: Honan jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1983), Vol. 2, 2nd printing.
- Hui-i Ch'en Chia-keng* (回忆陈嘉庚) (Peking: Wen-shih chih-liao ch'u-pan-she, 1984).
- Kua Bak-lim and Ng Ching-keong (柯木林·吴强铿), eds., *Hsin-chia-p'o hua-chu-shih lun-chi* (新加坡华族史论集) (Singapore: Nanyang University Alumni Association, 1972).
- Kua Bak-lim and Lim How-seng (柯木林·林孝胜), *Hsin-hua li-shih yü jen-wu yen-chiu* (新华历史与人物研究) (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1986).
- Khor Seng-li (许生理), *Ping-ch'eng yüeh-shu-pao-she wu-chiu-nien lai kai-shu*

- (檳城閱書報社五九年來概述), *Nanyang Wen-che* (南洋文摘), 8, 8 (1967).
- Ku Hung-ting and Chang Chen-tung (古鴻廷·張震東), 'Lun 'Nanyang hua-jen min-chu chu-i yün-tung chih yen-chiu' (論'南洋華人民族主義運動之研究'), *JSSS* 29, 1 & 2 (1974).
- Li Hsin and Sun Shih-pai (李新·孫思白), eds., *Min-kuo jen-wu-chuan* (民國人物傳), (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1978), Vol. 1.
- , *Min-kuo jen-wu-chuan* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1980), Vol. 2.
- Li Tsung-i (李宗一), *Yuan Shih-k'ai chuan* (袁世凱傳), (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1980).
- Lim Chooi-kwa and Loh Cheng-sun (林木樛·駱靜山), eds., *The History of Chinese in Malaysia* (馬來亞華人史), (Selangor, Malaysia: The Federation of Alumni Association of Taiwan Universities, Malaysia, 1984).
- Lim How-seng, et al., (林孝旌·張夏韓·柯木林·吳華·張清江·李奕志) *Shih-lat k'u-chi* (石叻古迹), (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1975).
- Lin Wan Ch'ing (林万菁), *Chung-kuo cho-chia tsai Hsin-chia-p'o chi ch'i yin-hsiang, 1927-1948* (中國作家在新加坡及其影響, 1927-1948) (Singapore: Wan-li shu-chü, 1980).
- Ngow Wah (吳華), *Hsin-chia-p'o hua-chu hui-kuan-chih* (新加坡華族會館志), (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1975), Vols. 1-2.
- , *Hsin-chia-p'o hua-chu hui-kuan-chih* (新加坡華族會館志), (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1977), Vol. 3.
- Ma-lai-ya hsin-chih* (馬來亞新志) (Kuala Lumpur: China Press Co. Ltd., 1957).
- Shang Ming-hsuan (尚明軒), *Sun Chung-shan chuan* (孫中山傳) (Peking: Peking ch'u-pan-she, 1983), 3rd printing.
- Souvenir Issue of the Opening Ceremony of the Newly Completed Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce Building* (新加坡中華總商會大廈落成紀念刊), (Singapore: Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1964).
- Souvenir Issue for the 75th Anniversary of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1906-1981* (新加坡中華總商會七十五周年紀念特刊), (Singapore: Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1981).
- Sung Chek-mei (宋哲美), ed., *Who's Who in Singapore and Malaysia* (星馬人物志) (Hong Kong: South East Asia Research Institute, 1969), Series No. 1, Vol. 1.
- , *Who's Who in Singapore and Malaysia* (星馬人物志), (Hong Kong: South East Asia Research Institute, 1972), Series No. 2, Vol. 2.
- Symposium on Sino-Malaysian and Sino-Singaporean Relations* (中星中馬文化論集), (Taipei: The National War College, 1968).
- Tan Ee-leong (陳維龍), 'Tung-shang-hui tung-shih chung ti wu-min yin-hsiung' (總商會董事中的無名英雄), *Economic Monthly* (經濟月報), 34 (1970).
- , *Hsin-ma tsu-ts'e ti shang-yeh yin-hand* (新馬註冊的商業銀行), (Singapore: The World Book Co. (Pte.) Ltd., 1975).
- , *Tung-nan-ya hau-i wen-jen chuan lueh* (東南亞華裔閩人傳略), (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1977).
- Tan Yeok-seong (陳育崧), 'Lin Wen-ch'ing lun' (林文慶論), *JSSS* 19, 1 & 2 (1965).
- , 'Ch'en Chia-keng lun' (陳嘉庚論), *International Times*, June/July (1969).
- , *Ch'en Chia-keng* (陳嘉庚) (Singapore: Amoy University Alumni, 1970).
- , *Lin Wen-ch'ing chuan* (林文慶傳) (Singapore: Amoy University Alumni, 1970).
- , *Collected Writings from the Ya-yin Studio* (椰陰館文存) (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1984), Vols. 1-3.
- , and Chen Ching Ho (陳荆和), eds., *A Collection of Chinese Inscriptions in Singapore* (新加坡華文碑銘集錄) (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1970).
- Tay Lian-soo (鄭良樹), *Ma-lai-hsi-ya, hsin-chia-p'o hua-jen wen-hua-shih lun-ts'ung* (馬來西亞新加坡華人文化史論叢) (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1982), Vol. 1.

- , *Ma-lai-hsi-ya, hsin-chia-p'o hua-jen wen-hua-shih lun-ts'ung* (马来西亚·新加坡华人文化史论丛) (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1986), Vol. 2.
- The Chinese High School 60th Anniversary Souvenir Magazine, 1919-1979* (新加坡南洋华侨中学创校六十周年纪念特刊) (Singapore: The Singapore Chinese High School, 1979).
- Ti-i-tz'u kuo-kung ho-tso shih-ch'i ti Huang-pu chun-hsiao* (第一次国共合作时期的黄埔军校) (Peking: Wen-shih tzu-liao ch'u-pan-she, 1984).
- Ti-i-tz'u kuo-nei ko-ming chan-chen shih-ch'i ti kung-jen yün-tung* (第一次国内革命战争时期的工人运动) (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1980), 4th printing.
- Ts'ai Lo and Lu Ch'üan (蔡洛·卢权), *Hsiang-kang ta pa-kung* (省港大罢工) (Canton: Kwangtung jen-min chu-pan-she, 1980).
- Tsung Chih-wen and Chu Hsin-ch'üan (宗志文·朱信泉), eds., *Min-kuo jen-wu chuan* (民国人物传) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1981).
- Wang Gungwu (王赓武), *Tung-nan-ya yü hua-jen* (东南亚与华人) (Peking: China Friendship Publishing Corporation, 1987).
- Wong King Kung and Gwee Yee Hean (黄敬恭·魏维贤), eds., *From Settlement to Nation* (从开埠到建国) (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1969).
- Wu Hsiang-hsiang (吴相湘), 'Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng yü Nanyang' (孙中山先生与南洋), *Nanyang Wen-che* (南洋文萃), 10, 5 (1969).
- Wu Tee-jen (吴体仁), *The Pioneers of Rubber Planting* (植产橡胶拓荒人) (Singapore: The World Book Co. Ltd., 1966).
- Wu Tse (吴泽), ed., *Hua-ch'iao shih yen-chiu lun-chi* (华侨史研究论集) (Shanghai: Huatung-shih-fan-ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1984).
- Yong, C.F. (杨进发), *Chinese Community Structure and Leadership in Pre-war Singapore* (战前星华社会结构与领导层初探) (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1977).
- , 'Hsing-hua she-hui tsui-tsoan chih cheng-tang' (星华社会最早之政党), *Sin Chew Jit Poh* (星洲日报), 19 March 1979.
- , 'Hsing-hua-shih shang hsin-chiu shang-hui chih chen shih-mo' (星华史上新旧商会之争始末), *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, 4 April 1979.
- , 'Ch'en Chia-keng yü Fukien po-an-chien' (陈嘉庚与福建保安捐), *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, 25 June 1980.
- , 'Ch'en Chia-keng yü ch'uang-pan hua-chung erh-san shih' (陈嘉庚与创办华中二三事), *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, 7 July 1980.
- , ed., *Tan Kah Kee in Pre-war Singapore: Selected Documents and Analysis* (战前的陈嘉庚言论史料与合析) (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1980).
- , 'Chan-ch'ien ti Ch'en Chia-keng yü hsing-hua Kuo-min-tang' (战前的陈嘉庚与星华国民党), *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, 20 December 1982.
- , 'Chui-lan-t'ing shih-ch'i ti Ee Ho Hean chi-lo-pu' (翠兰亭时期的怡和轩俱乐部), *Lianhe Zaobao* (联合早报), 28 March 1983.
- , 'Huang I-huan hsien-sheng' (黄奕欢先生), *Lianhe Zaobao* 2 November 1985; 4 November 1985.
- , 'Yu-kuan yen-chiu hsin-ma hua-jen, hua-ch'iao-shih ti chi-chun kuan-fan chi-liao' (有关研究新马华人·华侨史的几种官方资料), *JSSS* 40, 1 & 2 (1985).
- , 'Ch'en Chin-hsien hsien-sheng chuan-lueh (1889-1936)' (陈敬贤先生传略), *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, 20 January 1986.
- , *Collected Papers on the Studies of Chen Jia-geng* (陈嘉庚研究文集) (Peking: China Friendship Publishing Corporation, 1988).
- , 'Pen-shih-chi ch'u hsin-chia-p'o ta-p'u i-jen ti wen-chiao yü cheng-chih shih-yeh' (本世纪初新加坡大埔是人的文教与政治事业), *Nanyang Khek Community Guild Bulletin*, 14 (1987).

Index

- Ai Tong School, 39
Alimin, 53
All-Malaya Delegates' Convention (1929), 92f; (1930), 95, 135
see also Kuomintang movement (Malaya)
Allen, P.T., 65, 106, 108-10, 117-8, 120-3, 125, 136, 148, 155, 229
Amery, Leo, 125-6
Anarchist activism, 59, 76, 77, 137
Anderson, Sir John, 18-9, 58
Ang Bin Huay (Hung Meng Society), 213-4, 217
Ang Chin-chong, 174
Ang Keh-tok, 206-8
Anglo-Chinese Girls School, 30
Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce (ACCC), 221-2
Au Sheng-kang, 13, 25
Au Yuan-chao, 174
Aw Boon-haw, 208
Aw Cheong-yeow, 183
Aw Kow, 215
Aw Long-man, 215
Aw Tsang-fang, 215

Banishment Ordinances, 2, 19, 46-7, 54, 56-8, 63, 68, 232
see also deportation, British rule, Societies Ordinances
Beatty, David, 49-52, 65, 68-9, 75-7, 106, 108, 118
Bin Chin House, 12, 202, 234
Black, J.M., 124-5
Black Faces Society, 214
see also Ang Bin Huay, Malayan Communist Party
Blythe, W.L., 77
Bolshevik activism, 59, 62, 65, 137
see also Anarchist activism, Malayan Communism, Malayan Communist Party
Boycott movements, anti-American (1905), 17-8; anti-Japanese (1908), 11, 17-8, 75; (1919), 39, 56, 75; (1928), 99, 115; (1931), 185, (1937-41), 139, 192
Brenan, Sir John, 194
Britain
interests in China, 125-6
recognition of the KMT government, 115, 229
relations with China, 75, 77, 106-7, 123, 126, 129, 192-3
Sino-British negotiations, 134, 145, 150-1, 163n
British Malaya Head Branch of the China Kuo Min Tang (BMHB)
see Kuomintang movement (Malaya)
British Military Administration (BMA), 200
British rule
administration, 1-2, 44f, 54f
anti-Chinese secret societies, 214
attitude and policy to the Chinese, 60-1, 63, 66, 67, 78, 107, 232
attitude and policy to the KMT government, 119
attitude and policy to the Malays, 60-1, 107, 110, 114, 138-9

- cultivation of Chinese loyalty, 19-20, 48
 decentralization policy, 67, 107, 110, 138-9, 146
 divide-and-rule policy, 117-20, 121, 129, 218-9, 229
 perceived Communist threats, 191
 policy and management of political refugees, 61-3, 66
 relations with the Chinese government, 124
see also "colonial mind",
 Governors, Clementi, Clifford, Gimson, Guillemard, Thomas and Young
 Brockman, Edward, 63
- Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 125-7, 145, 151
- Ch'an Chan-mooi, 13, 33, 92, 95, 98, 190
- Chan Chee-sau, 207
- Chan Thye-kai, 207
- Chan Ying-choi, 179-80, 207
- Chang Chen-min, 37
- Chang Ch'u-k'un, 188
- Chang Hsueh-liang and the Sian Incident, 185
- Chang Jen-nan, 177
- Chang Jih-hsing, 181
- Chang Pin-lin, 9
- Chang Ying-chen, 174
- Chapman, W.T., 49-52, 65, 68, 72, 75-7, 106, 108, 118
- Chee Bi-joo, 95, 174, 181
- Ch'en Cheng-hsia, 215
- Ch'en Ch'i-mei, 36
- Ch'en Chiung-ming, 35
- Ch'en Chung Li-chih-she*, front organization of the Malacca KMT, 177-8
- Chen, David, 218
- Ch'en Hsin-cheng, 13, 33
- Chen Hua Club, front organization of the Singapore KMT, 176
- Ch'en Lai-yu, 206, 211
- Ch'en Liang-chih, 174, 179
- Chen Nan Kuan Uprising (1907), 17
- Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 74
- Chen, W.C., 126, 128
- Ch'en Yi, 191
- Cheng Chung-wei, 174
- Cheng Kee-kung, 180
- Cheng Wen-ping, 33
- Chew Hean-swee, 190, 223n, 224n
- Chew Mua-tong, 174, 178-9
- Chi-lung-po Jih Pao* (1909-10), 15
- Chia Boon-chin, 95, 98, 180
- Chiang Kai-shek, 83, 95, 99, 115, 120, 126, 150, 154, 161, 173, 176, 181-5, 187, 192, 194, 201, 204, 209-10, 213, 216-7, 222, 226
see also Kuomintang (China)
- chih*, 183
- Chin Kee-sun, 183
- China Democratic League (CDL), 214-5, 217
- China Press*, 215, 234
- Chinese Advisory Board (CAB), 1, 5, 60, 67, 137
- Chinese Affairs Departments, 1, 6, 44, 49-50, 54, 65, 68, 73, 108, 141, 183, 186, 232
 role of secretaries, 18-9, 41, 46-8, 50, 53, 56, 58, 72, 77, 88, 106, 109, 111-2, 114-8, 122-4, 128, 134, 138, 140, 144, 146, 173-4, 195, 228, 233
see also Allen, Beatty, Chapman, Goodman, Jordan, Chinese Protectorate
- Chinese community
 and China, 6-7, 20, 62, 67
 Baba (Straits-born) community, 3-4, 12, 18
 Babas and politics, 27f, 31-2, 72
 class structure, 4-5
 hua-ch'iao community, 3-4, 6

- hua-ch'iao and politics, 15-6, 19, 27f, 42, 56
 loyalty to the British, 50, 64, 121
pang (dialect grouping) structure, 1, 4, 62, 65, 208
 population, 27, 121
 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 96, 111, 191, 195, 201, 220-1
 Chinese Consulate, 6, 123
 Consuls and politics, 18, 139, 186
 protests against the British for closing down the Malayan KMT, 221
 role of Consul-General in the formation of SMCIYC, 187
 Chinese education, 5, 101-3
 and British policy, 64-5, 138-9
 financial assistance by the British, 139-40
 role of KMT teachers in schools, 182, 206, 228
 schools influenced by KMT, 212, 227, 234
 subsidies to KMT teachers by Chinese government, 212
 textbooks imported from China, 147
 vernacular schools, 65, 102
 use of *Kuo-yu*, 64
 Chinese High School, Singapore, 178
 Chinese Labour Anti-Japanese National Salvation Corps, front organization of the Singapore KMT, 188-9
 Chinese Merchants General Chambers of Commerce (CMGCC), 23, 35
 Chinese National Emancipation Vanguard Corps (CNEVC), front organization of the Singapore KMT, 188-9
 Chinese newspapers, 5-6, 58-9, 73
 control by the Malayan KMT, 215-6
 editors' contribution to the Malayan KMT movement, 216, 234
 KMT-financed, 182
 on Malayan Chinese politics, 30
 rivalry among the Chinese press, 182
 Chinese Protectorate
 functions, 1
 office bombed in Kuala Lumpur, 49
 qualities of protectors, 1-2
 Chinese Revolution (1911)
 contributions by Malayan Chinese, 16-7
 Malayan Chinese responses, 22f
 Chinese Revolutionary Party (CRP), 25, 30, 36-7, 57, 66-7
 and Tokyo CRP, 31-2
 as a secret society, 32, 57, 62
 branches, 32-4, 36
 factionalism, 35-6, 66
 funds collected, 36
 leadership, 32-4, 35
 participation of school teachers in, 32
 Chinese secret societies, 1, 18, 32, 57, 61, 213-4, 217
 Chiu Chi-hsien, 23, 28, 226
 Chiu Fatt, 92, 95, 174
 Chng Suat-hean, 39
 Cho Yew-fai, 206-7
Chong Shing Yit Pao (1907-10), 5, 15, 19
 Chong Yok-kai, 96
 Chou Ching-chang, 174
 Chu Chee-chiong, 95, 98-9, 176
 Chu Cheng, 16
 Chu Cheong-pok, 207
 Chu Ch'ih-ni, 13
 Chu Po-yuen, 174
 Chu Pu-yun, 174
 Chua Hui-seng, 200, 223n, 224n
 Chua Kah-cheong, 29
 Chua Thean-keong, 174, 205, 213
 Chuang Hui-chuan, 98, 188-9, 221

- Chuang Hsin-tsai, 215
 Chui Kwei-chiang, 214
 Chui Lian-ko, 174, 181
 Chung Ho T'ang (Central Harmony Club), 9-10
 Chung Hsing Club, front organization of Singapore KMT, 176, 186
 Chung Khiaw Bank, 208
 Chung Ling High School, Penang, 212, 218
Chung Shing Jit Pau (1947-57), 203, 215
 Chung Wah High School, Penang, 212
 Chung Yi-min, 181
 Churchill, Winston, 125
 Clarke, Ashley, 193-4
 Clark Kerr, Sir Archibald, 194-5
 Clementi, Sir Cecil, 53, 60, 95, 100, 118, 127-9, 134-5, 138f, 142f, 148, 151-6, 158, 162, 163n, 172, 184-5, 230, 233
 abolition of position of Chief Secretary (FMS), 139
 as Governor of Hong Kong, 132, 134, 142-5
 attack on Malayan Chinese nationalism, 140, 145, 162
 China's reactions against suppression of Malayan KMT, 160
 conflict with CO and FO over KMT management, 134f, 142-3, 144, 148-9, 151, 230, 232
 control of immigration and education, 138-40, 147
 expulsion of Teh Lay-seng and Png Chi-cheng, 141, 142f, 154, 160
 expulsion of Teh Sau-peng and Lim Yew-tong, 172, 179
 Government House Conference (1930), 135-7, 141, 243-52 (Appendix B)
 press censorship, 138, 182
 vision of China, 136, 146, 149
 Clementi-Smith, Sir Cecil, 18
 Clifford, Sir Hugh, 83, 106-8, 110, 112-22, 127-9, 134, 137, 152, 229, 233
 Clutterbuck, P.A., 77-8, 126
 Cochrane, C.W.H., 155
 "colonial mind", 106-7, 118, 120-2, 123f, 130, 136, 192, 229, 230, 232, 233
 Colonial Office (CO, London), 1, 7, 18-9, 38, 44, 47, 50-1, 54, 61, 63, 66, 68-9, 72-9, 106-9, 111-2, 114-8, 125-9, 135, 139-40, 142-4, 148-9, 153-4, 156, 158-60, 187, 193-4, 199-200, 219, 222, 228-33
 Communist Youth, 89
 Confucian revival movement, 8
 Confucian School, 39, 97, 212

 Darsono, 72
 deportation of political "subversives", 39, 57, 65, 141-2, 144, 162, 172-4, 192
see also Banishment Ordinances

 Fairburn, H., 155
 Fang Huan-yau, 204
 Fascist Party (Malaya), 106
 Federated Malay States (FMS), 1
 Federation of Malaya, 218
 Feng Tzu-yun, 13
 Fiddes, Sir George, 69
 Foo Chao-Kuang, 29, 174-5
 Foo Ho-chien, 92
 Force 136, 199
 Foreign Office (FO, London), 19, 44, 47, 54, 61, 67, 69, 72-5, 107-8, 110, 112-3, 115-7, 123-9, 134-5, 139, 142-51, 154, 156-60, 193-4, 228-30, 232-3
 Fu Chih-feng, 223n, 224n
 Fu Yang-hua, 29, 33, 40

- Fu Yung-hua, 33
 Fukien Economic Reconstruction Co. Ltd., 208
- Gent, G.E.J., 194
 Gibson, W.S., 109
 Gimson, Sir Franklin, 233, 235
 and suppression of the Singapore KMT, 219-20, 231, 253-5
 (Appendix C)
 Go Tian, 189
 Goh Chee-yan, 178, 205
 Goh Say-eng, 13
 Goodman, A.M., 49, 52, 58, 65, 69, 77, 106, 108-9, 111, 117-25, 135-7, 141, 146-8, 154-5, 159-60, 229
 Grindle, Sir Gilbert, 126, 158
 Guillemand, Sir Laurence Nunns, 44, 45, 49, 52, 65-6, 68, 77-8, 106-12, 137-8, 229, 233
 attempts to set up a joint intelligence network with the Dutch in Batavia, 110-1
 ban on the Malayan KMT, 68-75, 78, 83-4, 111, 219, 228, 236-42
 (Appendix A)
 control of Chinese education, 44, 65
 legislation for special powers, 111
 obsession with Communist threats, 45, 70-2, 111, 228
 see also Registration of Schools Ordinances
 Gurney, Sir Henry, 218, 220, 222
 Gwatkin, F., 116, 128
- Hainanese
 and Kreta Ayer Incident, 88
 and labour unions, 85
 and Malayan KMT movement, 29, 85-6, 93-4, 96
 and night school movement, 85, 86, 119
 British bias, 51, 79n, 113, 118-9
 graduates of Whampoa Military and Political College, 85
 population, 29
- Hannigan, C., 155
 Hao Hsueh Hui (Chinese Philomathic Society), 8
 Happy Valley, 88, 111-2
 Harcourt, Sir Lewis, 45, 63
 Hare, G.T., 2, 7, 18, 49, 60, 77, 106, 129
 Hau Say-huan, 183, 188, 192
 Henderson, Arthur, 151
 Ho Chi Minh, 53, 72
 Ho Chung-yin, 28
 Ho Hai-sing, 29
 Ho Hong Bank Ltd., 178
 Ho Hsin-t'ien, 12, 177
 Ho Hua-san, 85
 Ho Ju-khoon, 91-2, 95, 98, 174, 179
 Ho Lan-hiong, 207
 Ho Pao-jin, 174, 178, 190, 208, 221-2
 Ho Siak-kuan, 68
 Ho Sun-man, 95, 98
 Ho Teh-ju, 29, 33, 40
 Ho Tsz-yun, 95
 Hoh Kwok-chan, 180
 Hok'ou Uprising, 17
 Hokkien *Huay Kuan* (Perak), 97
 Hokkien *Huay Kuan* (Singapore), 98
 Hokkien Protection Fund, 17, 23
 Hong Siong, 205
 Hoo Ah-kay, 6
 House of Commons (London), 47, 125-6, 141, 143
 Hsiao Pai-ch'uan, 12
 Hsiao T'ao Yuan (Small Peach Garden Club), 9
 Hsieh Hsiao-hou, 181
 Hsieh Seong-shan, 215
 Hsieh Shu-neng, 202, 203
 Hsing Chung Hui, 9
 Hsu T'ung-hsiung, 33, 35, 40
 Hsu Tzu-lin, 12
 Hsu Wei-hsiung, 174

- Hu Chin-chen, 174, 179
- Hu Han-min, 12, 15-6, 19, 145, 154, 160, 162, 177
detention by Chiang Kai-shek, 176
outbursts against the British anti-KMT in Malaya, 160-1
- Hua Ch'iao Club, front organization of Singapore KMT, 176
- Huang Chi-ch'en, 33, 35, 92, 95, 98, 174, 181
- Huang Chin-seng, 223n, 224n
- Huang Hsin-ch'ih, 13
- Huang Hsing, 16, 27, 36
- Huang Kang Uprising (1907), 17
- Huang Shih-yuan, 174
- Huang Sou-jen, 174
- Huang Tsun-hsien, 6
- Huang Yao-t'ing, 12
- Huang Yi-tien, 174
- Huanghuakang Uprising (1911), 14, 17, 30, 100, 177
- hui kuans* (Chinese associations)
and KMT control, 206, 216-7, 221, 234
- Hung T'ao, 189
- Hung-men Yi-hsin kungzu, 32
- i*, 183
- immigration
Chinese, 2-3
Indian, 2
policy (British), 2, 110, 113, 140, 232
- Immigration Restriction Ordinances, 54, 57, 232
- imperium in imperio*, 18, 60, 67, 70, 76, 116-8, 184-5, 228, 230
- Ingham, R., 117, 120
- Iu Teng-chan, 91-2, 97-8, 226
- Japanese Occupation (1942-5), 199
- Jit Shin Pau* (1899-1901), 5
- Jones, S.W., 193, 194
- Jordan, A.B., 141, 148, 155, 160, 195, 198n
- K'ang Yu-wei, 7-8, 11, 19
- Kao Ling-pai, 183
- Khalifat Movement, 59
- Khong Siu-chee, 207
- Khoo Beng-chiang, 13, 174, 178
- Khoo Cheng-tiong, 7
- Khoo Kok-wah, 28, 30
- Khoo Seok-wan, 7
- Khoo Teik-ee, 218
- Khor Seng-li, 174, 179, 205, 208, 215
- Ko Tien-leng, 92
- Koo Chung-eng, 192
- Kreta Ayer Incident, 88, 99, 112-3, 119, 121, 126
- Kuo Min Jit Pao* (Rangoon), 203
- Kuang Hsu, emperor, 8, 10
- Kuo-yu*, 4, 24, 37
- Kuomintang (China)
anti-imperialism, 99-100
Central Executive Committee (CEC), 84, 123, 160, 173
Central Overseas Department (Nanking), 88, 202-4
Central Overseas Tang Affairs Committee, 183, 212
Central Propaganda Committee, 183-4, 188
Central Secretariat of the China KMT, 188
control of Party press overseas, 184
Overseas Bureau (Canton), 84
Overseas Department of the Central Executive Committee (Chungking), 186-7
Organization Department of the CEC (Nanking), 91, 93, 98, 122-3, 175, 183, 184
Nanyang General Branch (Canton), 85, 88-9
KMT-CCP concord (1924-7), 69, 74-5; (1937-8), 188-9

- KMT-CCP discord, 83, 86, 88
 relations with Malayan KMT,
 37-9, 91, 107, 116-7, 123, 146-7,
 172f, 175, 183-4
 role of returned KMT leaders,
 174, 184, 231
- Kuomintang Movement (Malaya),
 20, 22, 23f, 37, 40f, 56f, 69f, 83f,
 91f, 100f, 106f, 172f (1930-41),
 199f (1945-9)
 attitudes of the British, 52, 60, 61,
 88, 95, 185
 branches, 26, 29f, 38-9, 50, 66,
 79, 84, 86-7, 90-1, 93, 173-6,
 179, 209, 212
 British Malaya Head Branch of
 the China KMT (BMHB), 91-5,
 96, 101-2, 116, 122, 135, 146-7,
 175, 229
 closing of the Malayan KMT
 branches, 220-1
 closing of the Singapore KMT
 branches, 220
 Chinese government urged to
 negotiate with the British on
 legalization of Malayan KMT,
 186-7
 control of Malayan Chinese
 newspapers, 205-6, 227
 control of secret societies, 213-4,
 217-8
 control of trade unions, 213
 external stimulus, 226-7
 financial difficulties, 176, 181
 factionalism, 99, 176-7
 fund-raising, 39, 55, 216
 in Hong Kong, 70-1, 123-4,
 142-3
 influences in Chinese community,
 39, 213, 221-2
 ideology, 25, 30, 99-100, 101,
 124, 137, 182-3, 203-4, 216, 221,
 227, 234-5
 intelligence services, 202, 217
 investments subsidized by Chinese
 government, 208
 leadership, 16, 27-9, 92f, 95f,
 102, 175, 178-81, 204-7, 227
 legacies, 231-5
 KMT's contribution to the
 formation of the MCA, 205, 221
 KMT Left, 84-6, 88-9, 111, 113,
 119, 233
 membership, 27, 38, 92-4, 101,
 172, 181, 184, 186-7, 209-11,
 212, 226-7
 memorial services for Sun Yat-sen,
 40-2, 76, 88, 111, 119
 organization, 24, 29f, 37-9, 84,
 162-77, 186
 propaganda, 181-2
 purging of the Communists, 137
 recognized as a legal political
 party, 195, 199, 202
 relations with the British, 31, 39,
 41-2
 relations with the China KMT,
 37-9, 88-9, 91, 107, 172f, 176f,
 183-4, 231-2
 reorganization (1919-25), 37-8,
 39; (1926-7), 84-5; (1928-9),
 91-2; (1931), 148, 173; (1946),
 201, 226-7
 riots in Kuala Lumpur (1912), 22,
 52, 56, 59, 62
 riots in Straits Settlements, 22, 52,
 56, 59, 62
 social clubs as front organizations,
 176-7
 suppression of the Malayan KMT,
 (1920s), 47, 55, 68f, 103, 107,
 110, 112, 115-27, 229; (1930),
 55, 95, 134f, 160f, 184; (1949),
 218-22, 227, 231
 united front policy and action
 (1937-9), 185, 188-9, 191
 Kwangtung Protection Fund, 22-3
 Kwong Wah Yit Poh (1910-), 5,
 15, 98, 100, 182, 215, 234

- Kwong Yik Bank, 50
- Labour Ordinances, 54, 56, 232
- Lai Cheong, 180
- Lain Wen-hua, 192
- Lam Sing-chau, 174
- Lampson, Sir Miles, British Minister to Peking, 115, 126-9, 134-5, 142, 144, 148-54, 157, 159-63, 168n, 230
role at the Conference on Chinese Affairs, Government House, Singapore (1931), 154-8
- Lan Chin-ching, 29
- Lansbury, George, 126
- Lat Pau*, 5, 15
- Lau Boh-tan, 188
- Lau Ee-beng, 179
- Lau Ek-kok, 207
- Lau Geok-swee, 190
- Lau Hee-choon, 207
- Lau Pak-khuan, 205, 208, 212-3, 218, 221
- Lawrence, Pethwick, 126
- Lee Cheng-chuan, 190
- Lee Chin-tian, 91-3, 95, 98, 174-5, 177, 183, 190, 206, 223n
- Lee Chiu, 207
- Lee Choon-eng, 40
- Lee Choon-seng, 13
- Lee Giok-eng, 215
- Lee Guan-swee, 13, 25, 33, 174, 179, 181
- Lee Hau-shik, 190, 206-7, 213, 215, 218, 221
- Lee Hong-seng, 180
- Lee Kuo-hua, 174
- Lee Sze-yuen, 202, 203, 217
- Lee Yee-hsieh, 206
- Lee Yu-chieh, 40
- legislatures
Executive Council (SS), 1, 45-6, 53, 57, 136, 141
Legislative Council (SS), 1, 45-6, 47, 50, 54, 60, 65, 73, 113, 136
Federal Council (FMS), 1, 45-6, 47, 50, 54, 60, 63, 65, 67, 73, 110, 114, 146
Federal Legislative Council (Federation of Malaya), 220
State Council (FMS), 1, 146
- Lei Yi-sin, 95, 98, 173-4, 181
- Leong Chee-cheong, 207
- Leong Cheung-ling, 218
- Leong Hou-chow, 206, 211
- Leong Sin-nam, 13, 25, 190
- Leong Yew-koh, 218, 221
- Leung t'au sha*, the double-headed snake, 137, 230
- li*, 183
- Li chu-ch'ih, 12
- Li Leung-kie, 40, 190, 224n
- Li Lieh-chun, 35
- Li Lien-chi, 92, 98
- Li Yueh-ch'ih, 13, 178
- Lian Shu-sheng, 215
- Liang Sheng-kung, 33
- lien*, 183
- Lien Ying-chow, 223n, 224n
- Liew Hoi-ping, 207
- Lim Boh-seng, 98, 188-9
- Lim Boon-keng, 7-8, 12, 28-9, 30-1, 45-6, 56, 68, 115, 123
- Lim Chiu-eng, 174
- Lim Choo-pui, 92
- Lim Ewe-aik, 174, 179
- Lim Keng-lian, 98, 183, 188, 190, 208, 212, 221, 223n
- Lim Kian-pang, 183
- Lim Nee-soon, 9, 12-3, 22, 28, 30, 31, 176
- Lim Pang-yan, 177, 206
- Lim Peng-siang, 5
- Lim Say-gim, 207
- Lim Soo-ban, 206, 208, 223n, 224n
- Lim Soo-gan, 208
- Lim Ta-tian, 174, 199
- Lim Yew-tong, 172-4, 179
- Lin Chi-sen, 201-3, 215, 226-7
- Lin Chi-shih, 37

- Lin Ching ch'iu, 12
 Lin Chiu-mo, 181
 Lin Han-peng, 174
 Lin Ting-hua, 29
 Lin Yun-tse, 174, 181
 Liu Chi-kuang, 92
 Liu Ching-shan, 13
 Liu Chung-han, 174
 Liu Han-chieh, 174
 Liu Han-peng, 174
 Liu Hung-shih, 12, 28
 Lo Hsuan, 174
 Lo Mei-tung, 92
 Lok Hun Club, front organization of
 Singapore KMT, 176
 Loke Chow-thye, 13
 Loo Yew-sin, 207
 Looi Chung-heng, 180
 Low Sai-yat, 206-7
 Lu Yao-t'ang, 29, 33
 Lung Tao-shun, 33
 Lu T'ien-min, 23, 226
- Ma Lip-san, 173-4, 181
 MacDonald, Malcolm,
 Commissioner-General for
 Southeast Asia, 220
 MacDonald, Ramsay, 160
 McKerron, P.A.B., 220
 "Main School" movement, 85-6, 89,
 96, 104n, 111, 119
 and Kreta Ayer Incident, 88
 and formation of the Nanyang
 Communist Party, 88
 Malay schools
 and government assistance, 139
 Malay sultans, 45, 49, 114, 136,
 138, 143, 162, 230
 see also decentralization policy
 under British rule
*Malayan Bulletin of Political
 Intelligence (MBPI)* (1922-9),
 38-9, 54, 59, 73, 109, 140
 Malayan Bureau of Political
 Intelligence (1922-9), 38, 54, 69,
 109, 140, 232
 Malayan Chinese Association
 (MCA), 203
 drive for independence, 234
 Sir Henry Gurney and the birth of
 MCA, 218
 objectives, 218-9
 with KMT support and
 participation in, 205, 221, 228,
 234
Malayan Chinese Daily News
 (1937-41), 182
 Malayan Civil Service (MCS), 51,
 108, 138
 Malayan Communism
 and international communism, 70,
 72
 and vernacular Chinese schools,
 60, 70
 and labour, 60, 85, 125
 British concern, 45, 70-2, 111,
 185
 ideology, 62
 organizations, 84-5
 see also Malayan Communist
 Party, Nanyang Communist
 Party
 Malayan Communist Party (MCP),
 57, 89, 189, 191, 199, 211,
 217-9, 227
 as a legalized political party,
 199-200
 co-operation with the Malayan
 KMT, 201
 control over trade unions, 213
 MCP-KMT rivalry, 202, 204,
 210-1, 213-5, 217-8, 228
 organization of the Black Faces
 Society, 214
 suppressed, 222, 228
 Malayan Emergency (1948-60), 217
 Malayan Indian Congress (MIC),
 234
 Malayan People's Anti-Japanese

- Army (MPAJA), 213-4
 Malayan Planning Unit (1943), 199
 Malayan police forces, 46, 52-3, 140
 Criminal Investigation Department (CID), 44, 52-3
 informers, 52
 Special Branch, 53-4, 109, 140, 195, 232
 Malayan Political Advisory Committee (MPAC), 140
 Malayan Union Scheme, 199-200
 Malays, 60-1, 67, 138, 146, 162, 230
 see also decentralization
 policy under British rule,
 Malay sultans
 Mao Tse-tung, 192
 Martial Law (1915), 59, 62-3, 111
 Maxwell, William, 72, 107
 May Fourth Movement, 37, 39, 44
 and effects, 228
 May Thirtieth Incident (1925), 60
 and impact, 78, 83
Min Kuo Jih Pao (1930-4), 97, 98,
 100, 176, 182
Min Kuo Sin Wen (Shanghai), 24
Min Pao (Tokyo), 12
Min Hsin Ch'ih-san-she, front
 organization of the Malacca KMT,
 177-8
Ming Shing Sheh, front organization
 of the Penang KMT, 178-9
Modern Daily News (Penang), 215
 Mounsey, George, 149
 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, Supreme
 Allied Commander for Southeast
 Asia, 200
Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs
 (MRCA) (1931-9), 54, 59, 60, 66,
 140, 174-5, 176, 184
mui-tsai (little sister), 54
Nam Kew Poo (1911-4), 5, 15
Nan Chiau Jit Pao (1946-51), 215-6
 Nanyang Chinese General Education
 Association, 24
 Nanyang Communist Party (NCP),
 88-9, 101-2
 see also Malayan
 Communism, Malayan
 Communist Party
 Nanyang General Labour Union
 (NGLU), 85
Nanyang Si Pau (Penang), 182
Nanyang Siang Pau (1923-81), 41,
 176, 182, 184, 215-6
 Nationalism
 Chinese, 6-9, 10-11, 15, 17-8,
 19-20, 37, 60-1, 93, 96, 101-3,
 108, 114, 116, 122, 129, 134,
 136, 138, 140, 161, 185, 191,
 201, 226-7
 British attitude towards Chinese
 nationalism, 40, 42, 49-52, 78
 Malay nationalism, 199
 Malayan nationalism, 4, 235
 Singaporean nationalism, 4
 naturalization, 48, 57
 Naturalization Ordinance, 65
 New Democratic Youth League
 (NDYL), front organization of
 MCP, 211
 New Life Movement, 182-3
 Ng Aik-huan, 188
 Ng Ho-sin, 206-7
 Ng Kim-keng, 13
 Ng Lap-fong, 180, 207
 Ng Sing-phang, 28
 Ng Tiong-kiat, 190, 206-8, 211-2
 Ng Yeh-lu, 189
 Northern Expedition, 115, 126

 Oh Siow-yam, 95, 98, 188-9, 206
 Ong Chin-seong, 205, 208, 211
 Ong Chuan-seng, 190
 Ong Keng-seng, 204-5, 211-3, 215,
 218
 Ong Kiat-soo, 95, 98, 174, 175, 177,
 188-9, 221

- Ong Kim-lien, 29, 98
 Ong Shao-yam, 40
 Ong Yen-chee, 189, 192
 Onraet, René, 53
 Overseas Affairs Committee (OAC), 186, 203
 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd., 178
 Overseas Chinese Anti-Enemy Backing-up Society (AEBUS), front organization of the MCP, 189-91
see also Malayan Communist Party
 Overseas Department Office, Singapore, 201
 as the nerve centre of the Malayan KMT (1946-9), 202, 217
 membership drive, 209
 responsible to the Central Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee of China KMT, 202
 P'an Chao-p'en, 29, 40, 177
Pao Huang Hui, the Emperor Protection Society, 8, 17
 Passenger Restriction Ordinance (1919), 58
 Passport Ordinance (1920), 58
 Peacock, W., 49
 P'ei Feng School, Malacca, 178
 P'ei Teh School, Malacca, 178
 Pek Seng-oon, 208
 Peking Legation (British), 73-4, 115, 153, 162
see also Sir Miles Lampson
Penang Hsin Pao, 15
 Penang Philomathic Society (Penang reading room), front organization of the Penang KMT, 178-9
 Peng Tse-min, 38, 84, 231
 P'eng Tse-wen, 33
Perak Chinese Daily News, 215
 Phoon Hon-kuen, 180
 Phoon Tsz-sau, 173-4, 180
 Pickering, W.A., 2, 48-9
 Ping Ming School, Malacca, 178
 Png Chi-cheng, 95, 98, 100, 136, 141-2, 144, 148, 153, 156-60, 172
 Po Wen-wei, 35
 Pratt, Sir John, 125-6, 128, 143, 146, 149-50
 Press Ordinance, 60
 Pringle, Sir John, 74
 Printing Press Ordinance, 59, 68, 109, 232
 Protection of Women and Girls Ordinance, 54
 Pu Yi, emperor, 22
 Quek Sin, 211
 Registration of Aliens Acts (1916), 57
 Registration of Schools Ordinances, 24, 40, 47, 52, 54, 58-9, 65, 73-4, 101, 108-9, 125, 232
 and Chinese reactions, 46, 68-9, 77
 Director General of Education, 109
 Richards, D., 77
 Riots Damages Act, 65
 Roy, M.N., 72
 San Min Chu I Youth Corps (SMCIYC), 97, 163, 209, 216
 aims, 187-8
 and British views, 187, 211, 219
 ban on the Corps, 194-5
 branches, 211
 loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek, 209
 membership, 211
 merger with the Malayan KMT, 211-2
 organization, 210
 revival of the Corps, 201, 210
 role of Wu T'ieh-cheng in its formation, 187, 193

- San Yik Khuan Po* (1935-6), 182
 Saunders, C.J., 49
 Savi, V.G., 52
 Saw Kean-boon, 212
 Saw Seng-kew, 205
 Scott, John, 155
 Seditious Publications Ordinances, 58-60, 64, 109-10
 See Bok-poon, 173-4
 Sha Hai-pan, 207
 Shanghai Overseas Chinese Association, 24
 Shantung Relief Fund, 41, 117, 120, 141
 Shelley, M.B., 155
 Si Hong-peng, 188
 Siaw Ah-geok, 212
 Sim Chu-kim, 28, 30
 Sim Hung-pek, 33, 91, 178
Sin Chew Jit Poh (1929-81), 182, 215-6, 222
Sin Chew reading room, 10, 30
Sin Kuo Min Press (1919-41), 182
Sin Pin Jit Pao, 215
 Sin Yoong-fun, 207
Sing Po (1890-9), 5
 Singapore Branch Lodge of the Kung Ho Tang of the Republic of China, 24, 30
 Singapore China Relief Fund Committee (SCRFC), 41, 188, 190-1
 Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC), 8, 10, 17, 23-4, 27, 30, 40, 61, 183, 206, 213, 227, 234
 and KMT leaders, 233n, 234n
 Singapore Chinese Mobilization Council (SCMC), 195
 Singapore Mutiny (1915), 53
 Singapore South Seas Public Bodies Union (1926), 84-5
 Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), 103, 210; (1937-45), 112, 185, 195, 233
 effects on the Malayan KMT Movement, 186
 Siu Chan-tong, 40, 91-2
 Sneevliet, Hendrik, 72
 Sng Choon-yeo, 141
 Societies Ordinances, 1-2, 19, 30-1, 51, 53, 54-5, 58-9, 62, 66, 70-1, 123-4, 140, 143, 200, 220, 232
 amendments (1920s), 55, 109; (1930), 148; (1931), 155-6, 159-61, 191, 230; (1947), 200; (1948), 163
 Soh Huat-yu, 174
 Song Ong-siang, 46, 115, 123
 Soo Tong-ing, 192
 Soon Shih-chieh, 28
 Southseas China Relief Fund Union (SCRFU), 190
 Special Investigation Services (SIS) (London), 54, 75-6
 Special Service Corps of the Malayan KMT, 202, 217
Ssu Chou Jih Pao (Kuala Lumpur), 15
 Stirling, C.N., 155
 Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA), 3, 146
Straits Times, 138
 Stubbs, Sir Richard, 70-1, 74-5
 Sun Fo, 160
Sun Pao (1908-9), 5, 15
 Sun Yat-sen, 9f, 23f, 31-2, 35, 37, 39, 40-2, 50, 57-8, 60-2, 66-77, 83f, 97, 99-100, 119, 124, 142, 177, 181, 202, 216, 228, 231-2
 and Siam, 13
 and Straits Settlements, 12-4, 19
 and Malaya, 11, 14
 ideology, 11-2, 15
 relations with the British, 14, 19
 see also Nationalism, Three Principles of the People
 Sung Chiao-jen, 30
 Sung Man Club, front organization of the Kuala Lumpur KMT, 173

- Sung Mu-lin, 39
 Sung Yuen-chin, 215
 Sze Tu Shiu-tak, 206
- Tai Eng-long, 189
 Tan Boo-liat, 12, 28
 Tan Chay-yan, 28
 Tan Cheng-lock, 46, 218, 221
 Tan Cheng-siong, 28
 Tan Chin-hian, 190
 Tan Chin-yah, 201, 206, 214-5, 226-7
 Tan Choon-yeow, 39
 Tan Chor-nam, 9-13, 15, 22, 28, 30-1, 33, 35, 186, 206
 Tan Ean-khiam, 190
 Tan Eng-guan, 177
 Tan Jiak-kim, 46
 Tan Kah-kee, 5, 98, 102, 117, 120, 183, 186, 188, 190-1, 217
 anti-Chiang Kai-shek activism, 213
 criticism of the Chungking government, 191
 his community influences, 192
 Sir Shenton Thomas' choice as leader of the Malayan Chinese community, 233
 Tan Kee-gak, 205, 211
 Tan Khai-kok, 28-9, 30
 Tan Kok-chor, alias Tan Teow-kee, 202-3, 206, 214-5, 220, 231
 Tan Malaka, 53, 72
 Tan Pitt-swee, 207
 Tan Seng-ngo, 201
 Tan Shi-ho, 206
 Tan Siang-ching, 28
 Tan Teow-kee, alias Tan Kok-chor, 190
 Tan Yeang-cheng, 212
 Tang Shou-shan, 13
 Tang Tsz-sat, 91-2, 95, 98, 121-2, 136, 173-4, 181
 Tay Chek-ming, 207
 Tay Koh-yat, 206, 208, 211, 223n, 224n
 Tay Pheng-teng, 10, 28
 Tay Shun-yung, 92
 Teh Beng-wei, 174, 179
 Teh Lay-seng, 13, 25, 33, 57, 91, 93, 95-8, 100, 121-2, 137, 141-2, 144, 148, 153, 156-60, 172, 181, 231
 Teh Sau-peng, 13, 91-2, 95-7, 122, 136, 172-4, 179, 231
 Teh Sin-kwang, 97, 221
 Teh Sin-yoong, 97, 211-2
 Teichman, Eric, 148, 155
 Teng Tse-ju, 13, 28, 40, 231
 Teo Eng-hock, 9-10, 11-3, 15, 22, 27-8, 30-1, 33, 35, 40, 91-2, 95-6, 98, 100, 111, 122, 123, 135-7, 141, 174, 177, 186
 Teo Khai-chuan, 95, 98, 174, 181
 Tham Sui-kung, 174, 179
Thien Nan Shin Pao (1898-1905), 8
Thoe Lam Jit Poh (1904-5), 5, 9, 15
 Thomas, Sir Shenton, 192, 193-4, 233
Thong Boon reading room, 29-30
 Three Principles of the People, 11-2, 30, 99-101, 124, 139, 161, 181, 220
 Thye Kwai-sheng
 as director of the Overseas Department Office, Singapore, 202
 as vice-president of the Central Overseas Department of the Chinese government, 201
 career, 203
 mission to Malaya, 202, 226
 relations with the Malayan Chinese secret societies, 214
 Thye Po-chin, 95
 Thye Yiu-chi, 201
 T'ien T'ung, 15
 Tjhung Sie-gan, 190
 Too Nam, 13

- Treaty of Shimonoseki, 7
 T'sai Ao, 36
 Tseng Hsin-ying, 215
 Tsinan Incident (1928), 99-100, 115, 117
 Tso Ping-lung, 6
 Tsou Jung, 9
 Tshui Kwong-siu, 85, 92
 Tung Jen Club, front organization of the Singapore KMT, 31, 177
T'ung Meng Hui (the Revolutionary League), 8, 10-1, 12f, 17, 22f, 32, 85, 96-8, 120, 173, 178, 186, 202, 204, 226
 financial contribution by Malayan Chinese, 17
 ideology, 15-6, 19
 leadership, 12-3, 16, 19, 27
 membership, 15-6
 organization, 12-3, 14, 16-7, 19
see also Lim Nee-soon, Sun Yat-sen, Tan Chor-nam, Teo Eng-hock
Tung Teh reading room, front organization of the Singapore KMT, 30, 36, 96, 98-9, 176-7, 234
 Twenty One Demands (1915), 35, 61
 Unfederated Malay States (UMS), 1, 25
Union Times (1909-14), 5, 8, 15
Union Times (1915-31), 182
 United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 234
 Wang Chee-ming, 207
 Wang Cheng-t'ing, 150, 151, 153-4, 156-60, 173, 194
 Wang Chien-chen, 174
 Wang Ching-wei, 15-6, 24, 176
 Wang Chung-hui, 160
 Wang Chung-kwang, 215, 221
 Wang Han-kuang, 29
 Wang Sin-yueh, 201, 203
 Wang-Lampson Agreement (1931), 148, 156-9, 162-3, 172, 184, 190-1, 194-5, 229, 230-1
 Agreement waved (1941), 185, 193, 195; (1946-8), 231
 China KMT not abiding by the terms, 159-62
 War Office (WO), 54, 73, 75
 Webb, Sir Sydney (Lord Passfield), 125, 128-9, 139, 143-4
 Weld, Sir Frederick, 107
 Whampoa Military Academy, 39, 85
 Wilson, Sir Samuel, 149
 Wong Hoh-teng, 180
 Wong Shee-foon, 204-5, 218, 221
 Wong Tong-seng, 179-80
 Wong Yik-tong, 190
 Woo Mung-chew, 174, 224n
 Wood, A.F., 155
 Wu Chin-sheng, 28
 Wu, George, 148, 173, 226
 Wu Hsi-shih, 33
 Wu Kuan-ying, 174, 181
 Wu Si-chieh, 174, 179
 Wu T'ieh-cheng, 187, 192, 193, 226
 proposed to the British to legalize the Malayan KMT, 194
 Wu Tse-huan, 28, 174
 Wuchang Uprising (1911), 14
 and historical impact, 22
Yang Ming Pao (1908), 15
 Yap Geok-sng, 28
 Yap Hong-oon, 212
 Yau Tet-ship, 97
 Yee Ch'ao-ying, 201
 Yeh Chi-yun, 28
 Yeh Jen, 201-2, 226-7
 Yen Ching-hwang, 22
 Yeo Chan-boon, 224n
Yik Khuan Po (1919-34), 84, 100, 180, 182
 Yim Kwai-weng, 180, 207

- Yin, C.S., 12, 28
Yong Shook-lin, 218
Yong Yik-lin, 208
Young, Sir Arthur, 24, 36-7, 44-6,
50, 53-4, 58, 61-8, 73, 108, 111,
114, 138, 228, 233
Yu Lieh, 9-10, 11-2
Yuan Shih-k'ai, 23, 30-1, 35, 37,
61, 71
Yuen Ying-fong, 13

12 NOV. 1960